Full text of "Mind"
MIND
A QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF
PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.
THE ABERDEEN UNIVERSITY PRESS LIMITED
MIND
it t
A QUARTERLY REVIEW
OK
PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.
EDITED BY
DR. G. F. STOUT,
WITH THE CO-OPERATION OF DR. E. CAIRD, PROFESSOR WARD, PROFESSOR
PRINGLE-PATTERSON, PROFESSOR E. B. TITCHENER, AND OTHER
MEMBERS OF AN ADVISORY COMMITTEE.
NEW SERIES.
VOL. XI.-I902
WILLIAMS AND NORGATE,
14 HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON,
AND 20 SOUTH FREDERICK STREET, EDINBURGH.
1902.
CONTENTS OF VOLUME XL
(NEW SERIES.)
ARTICLES.
ADLER, F. A Critique of Kant's Ethics
BENN, A. W. The Later Ontology of Plato .....
BRADLEY, F. H. On Active Attention
On Mental Conflict and Imputation
The Definition of Will
GOLDSTEIN, J. The Keynote of the Work of Nietzsche
MACKENZIE, J. S. The Hegelian Point of View
MAcCoLL, H. Symbolic Reasoning (IV.)
McDouGALL, W. The Physiological Factors of the Attention-Process
(I.) 316
MCTAGGART, J. E. Hegel's Treatment of the Categories of Quality . 503
MARSHALL, H. R. The Unity of Process in Consciousness . . . 470
RASHDALL, H. The Commensurability of all Values .... 145
SCHILLER, F. C. S. ' Useless ' Knowledge 196
SINGER, E. A., Jun. Choice and Nature 72
DISCUSSIONS.
DIXON, E. T. On the Notion of Order 527
STEWART, J. A. The Attitude of Speculative Idealism to Natural
Science 369
TOULOUSE, VASCHIDE, and PIERON. Classification of Psychical Phen-
omena for Experimental Research 535
CRITICAL NOTICES.
BLUNT, H. W. J. Bergmann, Hauptpunkte der Philosophic . . 98
DIXON, E. T. M. Meyer, Contributions to a Psychological Theory of
Music 567
JONES, E. E. C. A. Sidgwick, The Use of Words in Reasoning . . 377
LORENZ, T. A. C. Fraser, Tlw Works of George Berkeley . . . 249
MARETT, R. R. J. E. McTaggart, Studies in the Hegelian Cosmology 389
MclNTYRE, J. L. K. Groos, Tlie Play of Man . ' . . . . 398
MCTAGGART, J. E. G. H. Howison, The Limits of Evolution, etc . 383
,, J. Royce, The World and five Individual (Second
Series) 557
MYERS, C. S. C. Stumpf , Beitriige zur A kiistik und Musikivissenschaft 393
POLLOCK, F. H. H. Joachim, TJie Ethics of Spinoza .... 246
RITCHIE, D. G. A. T. Ormond, Foundations of Knmoledge ... 92
J. M. Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psy-
clwlogy 547
RUSSELL, B. P. Boutroux, L' Imagination et les mathematiques selon
Descartes ..... 108
VI CONTENTS OF VOLUME XI.
t'AGB
SMITH, W. G. P. B. Kidd, Principles of Western Civilisation . . 563
TAYLOR, A. E. Miinsterberg, Grundziige der Psyclwlogw, Band I.,
Die Prinzipicn der Psychologic 227
UNWIN, G. G. Simmel, Die Philosophic den Geldes .... 103
NEW BOOKS.
ALLING-ABER, M. R. An Experiment in Education, etc. . . . 119
BERKELEY, G. The Principles of Human Knowledge (ed. McCormack) 118
Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philono-ns (Re-
print) 119
BOER DE, T. J. Geschichte der Philosophic im Islam .... 415
BOURDEAU, L. Le ProbUme de la Vie, Essai de Sociologie Gtntrale . 119
GOHN, P. J. Allgemeine Aesthetik 413
DURAND (DE GROS), J. P. Nouvelles RecJierches sur VEstlMique et de
Morale 124
EBBINGHAUS, H. Grundziige der Psychologic (Zweiterhalbband) . 578
FLOURNOY, TH. Nouvelles Observations sur tin cas de Somnambulisine
avec glossolalie 262
FORMAN, L. L. Selections from Plato, etc. 407
GIDDINGS, F. H. Indiictive Sociology, etc 256
GRASSERIE, DE LA, R. Des Principes Sociologiqncs de In Criminolotjie . 408
HATZFELD, A. Pascal 264
HEINZE, M. (See Ueberweg)
HERBART, J. F. Outlines of Educational Doctriiu' (trans. A. F. Lange) 117
HINSDALE, B. A. The Art of Study, etc 118
HODDER, A.. The Adversaries of tlw Sceptic, or tJu 1 Specious Pivm'nt,
etc. ......' 112
HOLLANDER, B. The Revival of Phrenology, etc. .... 404
JACKSON, H. Texts to Illustrate a Course of Eleinentai'i/ Lectun's on
the History of Greek Philosophy from Thales to Aristotle . . 258
JASTROW, J. Fact and Fable in Psyclwlogy 402
M..The Study of Religion ....... 572
JUVALTA, V. E. Prolegomena a una Morale Distinta Dalla Metafisica 416
KASTIL, A. Zur Lehre der Willensfreiheit in der NicJujmachischen
Ethik 125
KELLY, E. Government or Human Evolution : vol. ii., Individualism
and Collectivism ...... .... 116
KUHTMANN, A. Maine de Biran, etc 123
LANGE, A. F. (See Herbart)
LECLERE, A. Essai Critique sur le Droit d'Affirmer . . . . 121
LEOPOLD, J. H. Ad Spinoza-s Opera Posthuma ..... 579
LINDSAY, J. Momenta of Life : Essays Ethical, Historical, and
Religious 575
LOEB, J. Comparative Physiology of tlie Brain, etc. .... 573
LOORIE, O. La Philosophic russe Contemporaine .... 575
MARTIN, J. Saint Augustin . 122
MASCI, F. II Materialismo Pxicofisico c La dottrina del ParalMiswo
in Psicologia . 127
McCABE, J. Peter Abelard 113
MCCORMACK, T. J. (See Berkeley)
MEZES, S. E. Ethics : Descriptive and Explanatory .... 110
MUIRHEAD, J. H. Chapters from Aristotle's Ethics . . . . 115
PRAT, L. Le Myster&de Platen 124
PROAL, L. Le Crime et le Suicidf Pa&sionnels ..... 409
PUTNAM, D. A Text-Book of Psychology for Secondary Schools . . 118
RITCHIE, D. G. Studies in Socui I and Political Ethics . . . 405
ROGERS, A. K. A Student's History of Philosophy .... 257
SABLO, F. DE Studisulla Filosofia Contemporanca. I. Prolegomeni
La " Filosofia Scientifica " 268
R. Wille und Er)><>uninis, etc 416
CONTENTS OF VOLUME XI. Vll
PAGE
SCHWABZ, A. Der HermenetitiscJic Syllogismus in der Talmudischen
Litteratur 576
SIDGWICK, H. Lectures on the Ethics of T. H. Green, Mr. Herbert
Spencer and J. Martineau (Advance Notice) 407
SIGHELE, S. La Foule Criminelle, 410
TABDE, G. IS Opinion et la Foule 263
THOKNDIKE, E. L. The Mental Life of the Monkeys .... 117
,, Notes on Child Study 117
,, The Human Nature Club, etc 406
UEBEBWEG, F. Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophic des neunzehn-
ten Jahrhunderts (herausgegeben von M. Heinze) .... 579
YIDABI, G. Problemi Generali di Etica 125
VOBGES, DE, le COMTE DOMET. Saint Anselme 259
WABTENBUBG, M. Kant's Theorie der Kausilitdt, etc. . . . 265
Das Problem des Wirkens, und die Monastische
Weltanschauung, etc . .. 265
WASHBDBN. (See Wundt)
WOODSIDE, D. Life of Henry Calderwood 115
WOBMS, RENE (Publics sous la Direction de). Annales de Vinstitut
International de Sociologie ........ 410
WUNDT, W. The Principles of Morality and tlie Departments of the
Moral Life (trans. M. Washburn) 254
WUNDT, W. Gustav Theodor Fechner 266
,, Einleitung in die Philosophic 411
PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.
Philosophical Review (vol. x., No. 2 vol. xi., No. 2) . 130, 271, 418, 581
Psycliological Revieiv (vol. viii., No. 2 vol. ix., No. 2) . 132, 273, 419, 582
American Journal of Psychology (vol. xii., No. 2 vol.
xii. No. 4) 133, 276, 583
American Journal of Sociology (vol. vi.) .... 407
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (New Series, vol. i.) 277
International Journal of Ethics (vol. xi., No. 4 vol.
xii., No. 3) 134, 278, 420, 585
Revue Philosophise (July, 1901 June, 1902) . . 420, 585
U Annee Psychologique (Septieme Annee, 1901) . . 279
Revue de Metaphijsique et de Morale (9e Annee, No. 2
9e Annee, No. 5) 135, 280, 422
Revue Neo-Scolastiqm (No. 2729) .... 136, 282, 423
Kantstudien (Bd. vi., Heft 2 Bd. vi., Heft 3) . . 426
Zeitschrift filr Psych, und Physio, der Sinnesorgane (Bd.
xxvi'., Heft 5 Bd. xxviii., Heft 1) . . . . 137, 282, 424, 585
Philosophischc Studien (Bd. xvii., Heft 2 Bd. xviii.,
Heftl) 138,283,586
Archiv f. Systematische Philosopliie (Bd. vii., Heft 3) . 138
Vierteljahrsschrift filr wissenschaftliche Philosophic
(Bd. xxv., Heft 3 ; Bd. xxvi., Heft 2) ... 139, 429
Zeitschrift filr Philosophic und Philosophisclws Kritik
(Bd. cxviii., Heft 1 Bd. cxx., Heft 1) ... 284, 428
PhilosophiscJies Jahrbuch (Bd. xiv., Heft 2 Bd. xv.,
Heft. 1) . . 139, 286, 429
Rivista Filosojica (Anno ii., Vol. iii., Fasc. iii. Anno
iv., Vol. v., Fasc. ii.) 140, 287, 430
NOTES.
ADAMSON, R., Prof., Death of 287
,, ,, Obituary Notice of (by H. Jones) . . . 431
MIND Association (Annual General Meeting and Full List of
Officers and Members) 141
MIND Association (notices) 288, 588
NEW SERIES. No. 41.] [JANUARY, 1902.
MIND
A QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF
PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.
-3SS-
I. ON ACTIVE ATTENTION.
BY F. H. BRADLEY.
MY object in this paper is naturally not to attempt a com-
plete treatment of its topic. I was led to write it because,
in endeavouring to make clear the essence of volition, I
found myself embarrassed constantly by the claims of atten-
tion. And rightly or wrongly I resolved to remove before-
hand this recurring obstacle. I am therefore going to try,
so far as I can, first to fix the meaning of active attention;
in accordance with the ordinary usage of language, and next
to deal with a certain number of questions concerning it.
That the usage of language to some extent varies I readily
admit, but this variation is on the whole, I think, consistent
with one central meaning. And in psychology to employ
words in a sense opposed to their everyday signification is
surely most ill-advised. It is difficult to suppose that the
established use has no reason behind it. It is hard to
imagine that the reader and the writer could ever wholly
free their minds from the influence of association even if
that were irrational. And in short, if we cannot employ
terms in something like their ordinary sense, it is better to
make new ones than to abuse and pervert the old. In the
case of attention the abuse has even been carried to such a
point that attention has been used to include and cover what
every one does and must call a state of inattention. Such
an attempt must naturally be short-lived, and we need not
trouble ourselves to discuss it. It will repay us better to
ask what is the ordinary meaning of our term and what
1
'2 F. H. BRADLEY :
that meaning implies. In this article I shall take attention
always (unless the reader is warned) in the sense of active
attending. 1 And I do not mean by this merely a state in
which in some sense we may be said both to be active and
to attend. I mean by it a state in which the attention
itself is involved in and follows from an agency on our
part.
I will at once proceed to consider the facts in the light of
ordinary language. If I am sitting at ease with my mind
not dwelling, as we say, on any subject, but wandering aim-
lessly as I regard some well-known scene, I am what every
one would call inattentive generally. If we keep to ordinary
language I am not attending here to anything at all. I am
occupied by no one object, and even that mode of sensation
and feeling which may be said to predominate, is both
diffused and feeble. Let us suppose now that a sudden
and acute pain shoots through me, or that without warning
a gun is fired close by, my state at once is altered. These
things at once occupy me there is no doubt of that but
am I to be said at once therefore to attend to them? If
we use attention strictly for active attention we are unable
to say this unconditionally. My state becomes attention if
I go about consciously to get rid of my pain, or again if I
begin to wonder what it is ; and the same thing holds, of
course with a difference, in the case of my hearing the shot.
And I naturally and probably under the conditions do so
go on to attend. But suppose that at once, recognising the
sound as the report of a gun, I throw myself flat on the
ground, have we, with merely so much as that, got active
attention ? I should deny this, and I should deny it again
even if my act has proceeded from the idea of escaping
danger and has thus been a real volition. 2 For attention in
the first place, if we follow the usage of language, must have
an object, and in the second place it must involve some
dwelling on and maintenance of that object, and so by con-
sequence some delay. If an animal hearing a sound pricks
1 In this and in some other points I am departing to some extent (it
seems not worth while to ask in detail how much) from an article in
MIND, No. 43, 1886. I must beg the reader also not |to forget that
throughout the present article I am assuming that volition consists in
the self-realisation of an idea. There is obviously no space in which to
discuss this question here. I may refer the reader provisionally to MIND,
No. 49, and again to MIND, N.S., No. 40. But I propose to deal with the
question in future articles.
2 For the justification of this see the references given above. The
arbitrary limitation of volition to acts of choice is in my view quite
indefensible.
ON ACTIVE ATTENTION. 3
its ears and springs at once, and, as we say, by one action,
we should not call that attending. But if it pricks its ears
and then pauses, we at least perhaps have got attention.
There must in brief be an object and its maintenance, and
hence we must proceed to inquire about the meaning of
these terms.
The mere having of an object or objects is by itself not
attention. If I am sitting listlessly, as described above, it
cannot be said that I perceive no object. For I certainly
have objects before me though I attend to none of them.
There may even be some prominent object in my visual field,
or there may be some predominant object of hearing, such as
the sound of a machine, and yet I need attend actively to
neither. And I may be assailed by ideas which are certainly
objects, and which maintain themselves as we say even
actively, and yet I need not attend to them. I may succeed
in not attending to them if and so far as, whenever they
recur, I do nothing to maintain them but turn instinctively
to something different. Thus to treat attention as the state
generally where I have an object would be at least to come
into collision with language. I do not attend by the mere
perception or thought of an object. I begin to attend when
in a further sense I go on to make this my object.
To attend iu the proper sense I must by my action support
and maintain an object in myself, but we have attention only
so far as I maintain it theoretically or at least perceptively.
Attention alters something, that is clear, and it is so far
practical, but in the sense of altering the existence of the
object it is not practical at all. If I turn a handle and so
keep up a sound, that by itself is not attention and it need
not even in any way imply it. If I turn the screw of a
microscope, my act is not in itself attending, and it need not
involve attention to the object, though in most cases in fact
it does so. If again I move my eyes or my hands and so
gain knowledge about an object, that action in the first place
need not involve attention. And in any case, so far as I
alter the actual thing, that alteration will fall outside of the
attention itself. So far as in general my act can be said to
create the existence of the object, we have so far not got
attention at all. My act is attention only so far as it sup-
ports and maintains the ideal presence of the object in my
perception. Thus attention is practical but it is not practical
except as altering myself, and as so causing the object, un-
altered by me, to maintain and to develop itself before me
and in me.
In more familiar language we may say that my end in
4 F. H. BRADLEY :
attention l is to maintain an object before me with a view to
gain knowledge about it. My aim is thus to develop the
object ideally for me as it is in itself, and so to know it. But
in saying this we must be on our guard against a possible
error, and we must not confine knowledge to a purely in-
tellectual cognition. For clearly I may attend to a beautiful
object while I may not be seeking theoretically to understand
and comprehend it. I may desire merely in a wide sense to
apprehend the object, as when for instance I listen attentively
to an air, or with attention observe the development of some
pleasure or pain in myself. 2 The process in both cases is in
a wide sense theoretical or ideal, because there is an object
in it to which the whole process is referred as an adjective.
The object preserves for me its identity and unity and de-
velops itself in the process before me as an individual whole,
a whole in which the beginning is qualified by the end, and
where on the other hand my act does not make the object
to be other than it is. Any such process must deserve the
title of ideal or theoretical knowledge, if that is taken in a
wide sense, and we need not go on to inquire here how it
is related to understanding and truth and to a more strictly
intellectual mode of cognition.
It may be objected here that in attention more is really
done than to develop the object ideally. The object (it may
be said) is always made more prominent and is strengthened
by the process, and attention therefore alters the object as
well as maintains it. To this I reply that I will ask later
whether in attention the object is actually strengthened, and
1 More accurately ' my end so far as attention is concerned '. My main
end may be practical and may seek to alter the thing itself, and the ideal
development of the thing in me may be a mere means involved in and
consequent on this. See more below.
2 So far as the pleasure or pain coming from an object qualifies as an
adjective this object for me or again is taken as an adjective qualifying
my self I can of course attend to it. Otherwise and if the object
merely gives pleasure, I can of course attend to the object but so far not
to the pleasure or pain, since that is so far not ' objective '. Even if (to
pass to another point) an object remains unaltered and does not change
when maintained by attention, we may still properly call this permanence
the ideal development of the object. The object preserves its ideal
identity through the process of time and the change of context, and
qualifies itself by that process. When Dr. Stout (Manual, p. 65 ; ed. 2,
p. 71) makes attention aim at " the fuller presentation of an object," I
quite agree with him, if, that is, I may interpret "presentation" in the
sense of my text. I am not sure however that lower down in the same
paragraph Dr. Stout does not teach a divergent doctrine. On the subject
of attention I am indeed forced in some respects to dissent very strongly
from some doctrines that have been urged by Dr. Stout, but I need not
enter on that here.
ON ACTIVE ATTENTION. 5
if so in what sense. But any such strengthening, even if it
exists always in fact, is none the less, I would urge, acci-
dental. It is an alteration of the object's psychical existence
which falls outside the character of attention itself, and is as
external to it as are again its physical effects. The only
change in psychical existence which really belongs to the
essence of attention is the maintenance in and for perception
of the object itself. And the object itself though developed
by the process cannot be taken as changed by it. And, if it
is altered otherwise, its alteration must be regarded as
accidental.
Attention is thus negative of any mere psychical inter-
ference with the object and its knowledge in me. And it
might be said that attention therefore is directed not at all
upon the object but simply on myself. The essence of the
process (it may be urged) is not to maintain the ideal devel-
opment of the object, but merely to keep open my self to
its appearance in me. Attention will thus consist in the
suppression of any psychical fact which would interfere with
the object, and its essence therefore is not positive at all,
but merely negative. But any such view, though it perhaps
might not take us wrong in practice, is really one-sided and
in the end inconsistent with itself. And a true doctrine
about the general nature of negation would assure us that
any such view is false in principle. You cannot, in short,
anywhere or in any way negate except from a positive basis.
And you cannot suppress in particular whatever is to inter-
fere with a special positive development, unless you have
some idea as to what that development is and keep its
requirements in mind. But, if so, the process can be seen
at once to be more than barely negative. If, in making at-
tention to consist essentially in a mere alteration of yourself,
you do not include in that alteration the end and object for
which it is made, you clearly have not defined attention
nor have you said what you must really have meant. But
otherwise you have qualified the process essentially by the
positive development of the object. The real development
in an ideal form of the real object itself is in fact the posi-
tive end 1 which against hindrance is pursued in attention.
Our scruples or our prejudices may not allow us to accept
what I will call this evident doctrine. But if so we have
preferred to make the general fact of knowledge and truth,
I do not say inexplicable, but impossible. The merely
1 Where not itself the direct end it is included in the end as means and
is so the indirect end.
6 F. H. BRADLEY :
negative character of attention would rest in short upon a
superficial error.
Attention implies (we have seen) the ideal presence of an
object, but it is not confined, we must remember, to thought
in the narrower sense of that term. In what we call pure
thought the object is not merely in some way developed
without loss of identity, but it must itself seem to develop
itself by a movement which, if not intrinsic, is at least ideal.
On the other hand attention and knowledge are obviously
not limited to this. For their result may come from obser-
vation and it may be given by sense-experience, and it may
depend upon matter of fact without us or within us. At the
same time we saw that an ideal synthesis is involved in atten-
tion, and the process may therefore be certainly said in a
sense to involve thought. When I attend to a sequence of
mere fact external or internal, there must be for me in the
process a unity which is not merely given but is ideal. There
is a single object which is qualified as a whole and at once
by the series, and such a qualification cannot be merely given
as a succession of facts. If we use in a wide sense the terms
thought and idea, attention always, we must say, in this
sense involves thinking, and it involves a knowledge the
essential nature of which is to be held together by an idea.
But attention in the sense of active attention means more
than any kind of mere knowledge. It implies (as we have
seen) also a volition on my part, and we may with advantage
once more here consider the actual facts. Suppose that I am
sitting either listless or absorbed, 1 and that I see perhaps a
rabbit move or a bird fly across the scene, do I necessarily
give them my attention ? If again I passively, as we say,
accept the current and course of my own thoughts, must I
be said also in every case to be actively attending to them ?
If we follow the usages of language I think we must deny
this. 2 We cannot hold that in every such case my active
1 These states are very far of course from being the same, and it would
be a serious mistake for some purposes to confuse them. I think that
they have been so confused with a bad result in connexion with the
words distrait and distraction.
2 My attitude towards the perceived activity of my own thoughts may
in fact be often felt as disagreeably passive and as anything but active.
There are statements made on this point which I read with astonishment.
And to urge here that a feeling of my passivity must to some extent
imply a feeling of my activity would in my opinion be indefensible, at
least apart from an inquiry into the meaning of these terms. We want
on this whole subject, I will venture to add, less prejudice and dogma
and more inquiry, and I believe that in time we shall get it. The appear-
ance of Mr. Loveday's interesting article, since these words were written,
has tended to confirm this belief. See MIND, N.S., No. 40.
ON ACTIVE ATTENTION. 7
attention must have been present, when nothing (as we
should say) has excited and arrested it. Something neces-
sary to make attention has been wanting, and that something
is certainly not here the ideal identity of the object. For
this may have been present, and may have been present even
in a purely logical form, and yet attention itself may have
been absent. And thus the reason why I have not actively
attended cannot be that I have not thought. The reason is
that I have not done anything myself to support and to
maintain the object. There have been from time to time
objects each with an identity and an ideal development how-
ever short, but I on my part have done nothing at all towards
actively developing them. The idea of the object was in
short really not ' my idea '. It did not go before and itself,
directly or by implication, prescribe and bring about its own
existence in me. There was in other words no will, and
without my willing I do not actively attend. Even where, as
in pure thought, an idea develops itself theoretically, we have
not got will unless the foregoing idea of that development
has itself been thus the cause of its own existence. 1 And
where this feature is absent we assuredly have no active
attention. In every observation and in all experiencing, if it
is indeed actively attentive, we have, in however vague a
form, the idea of my perceiving that which is to happen to-
the object, or we have at least an end which involves as.
means the ideal development of the object, an end which
1 Cf. here MIND, No. 49, pp. 25-26. It may indeed be contended that all
thinking does in the end imply will in this sense. Without pausing to
discuss this view I will state in passing that I certainly cannot accept it.
Of course, to pass to another point, I should agree that at first in the
main the moving ideas in will are practical. The idea of myself, for
instance, catching a beast causes me under certain conditions to keep
still and to watch the movements of the object. And it can be argued
that in the end every theoretical interest is thus ultimately practical. I
cannot discuss such a large matter in passing, but I do not think that
such a contention in its crude form is defensible. It is one thing to hold
that no theoretical or aesthetic interest is in the end barely theoretical
or aesthetic. It is quite another thing to propose to subordinate such
interests to what is barely practical, without even asking whether a
mere practical interest is not itself also in the end incomplete.
Since writing the above I have had the advantage of reading Prof.
Royce's interesting book, The World and the Individual. 1 hope that at
some future time I may be able to discuss the doctrine there advocated
with regard to the internal meaning and purpose contained in all ideas.
As I understand this view, I however find myself unable to accept it.
I cannot see how in the end and ultimately it is an idea which makes the
selection which takes place in knowledge, and I have not succeeded in
apprehending clearly the relation of thought to will as it is conceived by
Prof. Royce. I hope however to profit by further study of this volume.
8 F. H. BRADLEY :
is felt in that development to be carrying itself out. And
this idea of end operates in determining the process in
which itself ceases to be a mere idea and becomes actual
fact. Active attention in short everywhere implies volition. 1
But in what sense (this is now the question) does active
attention imply will ? We must here on each side be on our
guard against error. In the first place attention is not the
same thing as will. We have noticed already that in its
absence volition may be present, and I shall hereafter return
to this point. I shall therefore dismiss it here and ask how
attention, itself not being will, implies will in its essence. I
will begin by dealing with a mistake of a different kind.
Attention certainly does not imply volition in the sense that
.all attention is willed directly. The attention itself is not
always the aim of my will. It may or it may not be itself
my end, according to the circumstances of the case, and the
facts, as soon as we look at them, seem to put this beyond
doubt. I may often of course have an idea of attending to
this or that, and so go on to attend to it, but no one could
say that apart from this there is no active attention. For, in
carrying out some purpose without me or within me, I may
be undoubtedly attending, and yet, having felt no tendency
to wander mentally from my aim, I may as undoubtedly
never have directly willed to attend. In short attention is
a state which may itself be willed directly, but which cer-
tainly need not be so, and which far more usually is not so
willed. Its essence is not to be itself an end and object of
volition, and it is enough that it should be implied in an end
and object which as a state of mind it subserves.
Wherever an end, external or internal, practical or theo-
retical, 2 involves in and for its realisation the maintenance
and support of an ideal object before me and in me, that is
active attention. If I will to capture an animal, this purpose
may imply the keeping of its movements, and perhaps also
my own, steadily before me. If I mean to solve a problem,
the idea of its solution entails my dwelling theoretically on
the means. If I see and desire to go on seeing some show,
that idea in carrying itself out involves my abstinence from
distracting movements and thoughts, and it involves positively
the keeping my eyes and mind open to the continuous per-
ception of the object. In all these cases the attention comes
1 The doctrine of an attention contrary to will, which is advocated by,
for instance, Mr. Shand, in MIND, N.S., 16, p. 452, seems to me quite
indefensible, if at least attention is to mean active attention.
2 These distinctions, the reader should remember, are not the same.
ON ACTIVE ATTENTION. 9
from my will l and it is active attention, but you cannot say
that the attending itself is itself that end which I willed.
But it becomes this end, and it is this end, where the delay
and the hindrance to the realisation of my idea is apprehended
as in some way consisting in my failing and distraction.
The attention itself then goes on to be included explicitly in
my idea of the end, and the state of attending is now itself
directly willed, and not as before implied incidentally and
even conditionally.
Active attention, we may say roughly, is the dwelling ideally
on an object so as to do something practical or theoretical to
that object or with regard to it. But this dwelling is cer-
tainly not always itself included in the idea of my end, it is
certainly not always itself the direct aim of my will. If you
take a state such as observation and active expectancy, 2 that
state will without doubt always include attention, but it will
not include in every case the will so to attend. My im-
mediate end here is to get to know more about the object, to
realise it ideally, with or without a further end theoretical or
practical. In this direct end is implied the adoption of the
necessary means, in other words here my keeping the object
before my mind and my assisting it to develop itself in me.
But this assistance of mine is not in every case itself spe-
cifically willed. It is not itself directly willed except where
1 The reader will not forget that for me there is no will at all without
an idea, and that volition is essentially the self-realisation of an idea.
Dr. Stout (Manual, pp. 248-251 ; ed. 2, p. 258) holds that we may have
attention and even search without an idea of the object. I cannot agree
that in any such case we have a right to speak of active attention, and if
I agreed to this I can see then no reason why I should not descend even
lower, and speak of attention being present even there where there is
perhaps not even so much as perception. The pathological case, as Dr.
Stout reports it, does not seem to me to show that the subject had in
each case no idea (in fact I think it shows the contrary), but merely that
his ideas were exceedingly vague and exceedingly restricted. But, if the
opposite could in some way be shown, I should without the least hesitation
refuse to admit the presence of either mental search or active attention
in such a case.
2 The assertion that all expectation implies will is in my opinion in-
defensible. What we call active expectancy and a sustained attitude
towards the future does certainly imply will, but expectation is used also,
I should have said, with a wider meaning in which no will is implied.
Expectation certainly need not always involve what we call observation.
A mere suggestion as to the future or an anticipation of it on which I do
not dwell, and again even a judgment about the future need, I should
say, none of them imply attention or will, and they clearly need not
involve desire. Expectation, as containing essentially attention and a
will to know, is used, in short, in a sense which is artificially narrowed
(of. MIND, No. 49, p. 16). I have already mentioned that I cannot ac-
cept the doctrine that all interest is practical.
10 F. H. BRADLEY :
its absence, actual or possible, has been brought before inc..
The delay or the failure in the realisation of rny object is one
thing, and my failure in respect of this is another thing, and
it is only the second of these which calls forth a direct will
to attend.
Active attention may therefore be defined as such a theoretic
or perceptive occupancy of myself by an object as is due to
and involved in a volition of some sort directed on that object.
The ideal development of the object in me is thus, directly
or indirectly, the realisation of my will. And whatever
psychical support, positive or negative, is required to maintain
this development, issues therefore from my will and must be
regarded as my work. Wherever on the other hand an ideal
content is so interesting in itself as of itself to produce, apart
from my will, whatever is required for its own psychical main-
tenance, that maintenance is not active attention and cannot
be taken as the work of myself.
The meaning so far given to active attention will, I think,,
be found in the main to agree with the ordinary employment
of that term. The various divergent senses, in which we
commonly make use of attention, will be seen by us to waver
naturally and pass one into the other. And that sense, which
in the above account I have tried to fix and define, hits, I
venture to think, the point amid these variations which may
be called their centre. In our ordinary use the chief diver-
gence is between active and passive attention. The latter
seems equivalent to what may be called the mere occupancy
of myself. 1 A sensation or a feeling or an idea, if these are
1 It would be a reasonable proposal to limit this wide use of passive
attention, and to apply the term only in cases where I am occupied by
an object before me. The fact that my organs and my mind are given
a certain ' direction ' towards an object, may perhaps be taken as implied
in the ordinary use of attention. To such a limitation I should not be
averse, so long as two points were kept clear, (i.) In the first place the
aspect of exclusive domination is (we must remember) quite essential, and
this aspect is not contained in the mere fact that my mind possesses an
object. We have seen that, where I have a variety of objects before me,
I may be inattentive to some of them or even to all. (ii.) In the second
place, even where an object occupies me and so I passively attend to it,
if its control over my mind comes from the activity of the object itself,
this control is not my work and there is no active attending. Now these
two essential features, first of domination and next of maintenance by
my activity, will tend, I fear, to be obscured by the proposed limitation
of passive attention. For always in having an object before me my mind
naturally may be said in a sense to be ' active,' and, if so, this mental
state naturally will tend to be called active attention. And it will be
called so where my mental state could not be fairly taken as my own
work, and it will be called so even where we have not the domination.
ON ACTIVE ATTENTION. 11
sufficiently strong or sufficiently influential, may be said to-
dominate me or engross me, or also perhaps again to move
me, in an eminent sense. Attention here, it will be seen,
may be intelligent but is not so essentially, and if, following
this line, we make active attention to be the willed procure-
ment of such an occupancy or domination, the element of
intelligence, of ideal dwelling on the object, if present is once
more not essential. The article which some years ago I
published (MiND, No. 43) did in fact follow this line, and in
the sense which it gave to active attention it to some extent
conflicts with the account I now offer. And this is a point
which perhaps we must be content to decide arbitrarily, in
whichever way we decide it. But with regard to attention
which is not active on the part of myself but consists in my
domination or passive occupancy, the account which I have
given above does not exclude such a meaning. Whether in
psychology we are to use attention in this sense I do not
attempt to decide, but I am sure that it is a sense the exis-
tence of which we cannot afford to forget. Where an idea
extrudes others and dominates me simply and so produces
volition, my attention to the idea evidently will so far be but
passive. Where after the advent of a sensation or a per-
ception I act at once and without delay, my attention, so far
as it exists, once more is passive. The action itself certainly
is not an attending, and the action may even be not psychical
and only physical. And we must decide in the same way
where a sensation is, as we say, ' apperceived,' and is modified
by the activity of what we call a ' disposition '. This will
not be my active attending unless I can be said as a result
of my will to maintain and to dwell ideally on the object.
Activity is present, if you like, and this activity again may
be said, if you please, to cause in a certain sense attention
to the object. But the attention once again, so far as it
exists, will itself be but passive, and the activity, to whatever
subject I refer it, will most certainly not be active attention
employed by my self. 1 For we do not have that until, as we
have seen, we have an idea and a volition.
I will now go on to show briefly how the main senses of
attention pass naturally one into the other. If we begin
which is involved in passive attention. Hence, in the presence of this,
misleading tendency with all the confusion which it entails, I think it
safer to take the line which is followed in the text. But the limitation,
I agree, would keep us nearer to everyday usage.
I 1 shall touch on this subject again lower down, and in the meantime
may remind the reader that the activity here and the subject of it is
taken by some psychologists to be simply physical.
12 F. H. BRADLEY :
with attention in the low and perhaps improper sense of
psychical domination or occupancy, such a psychical fact
must normally tend to become the object of a perception.
And a prominent object of perception, even apart from its
practical side, must tend naturally to become a thing to
which I actively attend. It will probably, if it lasts, be
dealt with in some volition theoretically or practically, and
this will tend to imply a dwelling on it more or less directly,
and an ideal maintenance and support thus proceeding from
myself. For the suppression of conditions in myself hostile
to the undisturbed presence of the idea seems involved in
its continuance and development before me. And this sup-
pression, we have supposed, will arise, not directly from the
object itself, but at least in part from that object as a means
to and as included in my end. 1 And with this we clearly
have arrived at an active attending. And such attention
tends to pass further into the attention which is itself the
end and object of will. For so far as there is mental
wandering the original purpose will tend to be frustrated,
and hence the remedy of that frustration, if the purpose
holds, will normally be suggested as a fresh idea. And this
idea realising itself is itself in general my will to be attentive
actively. I do not think that any account of attention, which
differs materially from the above, will be able in the same
way fairly to do justice to the facts alike of language and of
experience.
Active attention is not the same as thought or will, but in
its essence it implies each, and it therefore possesses the
characteristics of both while identical with neither. I will
proceed at the cost of some repetition to enlarge on this
thesis, using thought as before in a wide sense so as to
cover the entire theoretical attitude.
(i.) In the first place attention is not wholly identical with
thought, and thought can certainly exist without active
attention. Even if thoHght implied attention, the attention
itself would be but one aspect of the thought, for the atten-
tion itself does not qualify the object. But it is not even
J It may be asked whether that ideal development of the object which
is a means to my end may not in it^lf become so interesting as of itself
to engross me, and whether in this case we any longer have active
attention. Any difficulty in answering this question arises, I think, from
the difficulty of making in fact the abstraction required. So long as and
so far as we take the end to remain dominant and controlling, we must
speak, I should say, of an active attention. For, so long and so far, the
repression of competing psychical factors is taken as coming, not from
the mere idea itself, but from the end willed by me.
ON ACTIVE ATTENTION. 13
true that all thought implies active attention, and it cannot
be said that in all thought I actively maintain and support
an ideal object. There must certainly in thought be on the
positive side an ideal continuity, and on the negative side an
absence of psychical interference. But no one would say
naturally that in all cases I actively procure this result.
We might perhaps as naturally say that in all thought I
am passive, while the object itself actively produces the result
in me. But neither of these extremes would really be tenable,
(a) Let us consider first what happens when, as we say, my
thought is concentrated and I am fully absorbed in it. Let
us take the case of an intense intellectual or sesthetic activity,
where the object seems to develop itself before us without
help or hindrance. If you insist that here in all cases and
throughout I myself am actively attending, I would ask you
what it is that I myself am doing with or to the object or
myself. And for myself I cannot find that I at least am
always actively attending. For so far as the ideal develop-
ment of the object is interesting in itself, the psychical control
over my mind is naturally taken to proceed not from myself
but direct from the object, (b) Let us examine next my state
where, as we should say, I am inattentive altogether. . Can
we assert that in such a case there actually is no thought at
all ? My mind is wandering doubtless, and there is no one
single object which emerges from the general background
and develops itself ideally throughout. But are there no
passing objects here that develop themselves ideally before
me even for a moment and to the very slightest extent ? I
cannot myself see how in the face of facts such a view could
be sustained, (c) Where I am not (as we say) generally
inattentive, but am occupied by, and am perhaps also actively
attending to, one continuous central train of thought, is there
outside of this central train not any recognition and judg-
ment? It would be, I think, difficult to deny wholly the
existence of such thoughts, however passing and sporadic,
and yet, if we cannot, then apart from or outside of our
active attending we shall once more probably have found
thought, and shall certainly have found at least the fact of
' objective reference '. We may in any case rest our con-
clusion on the two previous instances, if about the third we
are inclined to doubt. Thought may certainly exist apart
from active attention, and attention itself is not wholly
identical with thought.
(ii.) Active attention (to pass to another point) is not the
same as will, though it involves will in its essence. Will can
undoubtedly exist in the absence of active attention, and, even
14 F. H. BRADLEY :
where that is present, will must still in a sense be superior to
it and prior, (a) Let us first take the case where, without
pausing to think about my suggested action, I act at once.
We are to suppose that there is present here an idea of what
I am about to do, for without such an idea we should cer-
tainly not have volition. But in the case supposed the idea
realises itself forthwith without any further ideal develop-
ment, and in such a case we have in the proper sense no
attention. I certainly perceive an object, and that object
may, as we say, violently strike me, and I may also be
dominated and overpowered by the idea of my action on the
object, but with all this, if I go on to act at once, I do not
actively attend. My attention will under certain conditions,
it is true, follow as a consequence, but it has so far had no
time in which to develop itself, and so far in fact it is not
there, (b) We may do well in this connexion to consider
also the case where my attention is willed actually and as
such. There is here a special will, a will, that is, to produce
the state of attending. We have therefore present here the
idea of myself attending, and this idea carrying itself out into
existence is the special will to attend. But if any one main-
tained that this idea also itself must be actively attended to,
he would be surely opposing himself to the evidence of fact.
And, if we keep to the facts, we must admit here the presence
of a will which is itself certainly not attention but which on
the contrary conditions it. The idea of myself attending
dominates me, and the idea so produces the existence of my
attention, but clearly I do not at the same time actively
attend to my idea. That would require a further idea and a
further volition, and we should thus be driven to enter on
a fruitless regress. We assuredly never should arrive at an
idea at once the ultimate condition of my attention and itself
ultimately attended to. But probably no one could hold with
us that will is implied in active attention and that an idea is
essential to will, and at the same time maintain that this idea
itself must be an object of attention. 1 If then our premises
are right we may conclude that attention and will differ, and
that attention implies, while on the other hand it is not im-
plied in volition. We must insist that without attention
there may be will, and that where both are present both
are not the same or even co-ordinate. Attention is an ap-
1 If we believe that there is will and active attention without the pre-
sence of an idea, of course in that case the argument of the text does not
apply ; but I have already dismissed this doctrine. What in such a case
the fact of, a will to will, really would mean I do not know, and it would
be unprofitable for me to consider.
ON ACTIVE ATTENTION. .15
plied will, and it is therefore in this sense something clearly
subordinate and lower.
(iii.) We have seen that attention l is not the same as either
thought or volition. But on the other hand, since it implies
these, it will possess the characteristics of both, and I will go
on to enlarge for a space on this head. I shall not attempt to
exhaust the subject or in discussing it to follow a strict order,
but I will offer some remarks which perhaps may be useful.
(a) Attention, we have seen, involves thought, if thought is
taken in the general sense of the perceptive or theoretical atti-
tude. Attention has always in other words an object quali-
fied in me by ideal adjectives. And this attitude implies on
my part a certain passivity. In attention I must be passive
first in the sense that I do not go about to alter the object
but receive and accept it. And there is again beside this a
further sense in which in attending I am passive. My self
must more or less be occupied and affected by the object,
and I (we may say) must suffer this object as mine and in
me. And more or less clearly I must also feel and be aware
of this sufferance. In fact a feeling of this sort, which is
present always in active attention, may go some way towards
obscuring there my sense of being active. I shall very soon
return to this and shall point out something which this felt
passivity implies, but for the moment I will pass on to notice
another mark of attention.
(b) Attention, being will, must of course give us, beside the
-sense of passivity, a sense also of being active, though this
sense again can under certain conditions be weakened. And,
as will, attention involves naturally the more or less clear
awareness of my active relation to the object of my attention.
The practical attitude implies always within what is ex-
perienced the opposition of my self to the not-self, and I
must also be aware of these terms and of their relation. The
same thing holds with a difference in the theoretical attitude,
for there the relation and its terms must again be experienced
though not quite in the same sense. 2 I cannot properly
attend without an experience of my self as passively affected
and again as actively affecting. This awareness may be
present of course in very various degrees of distinctness. It
may be vague feeling or again it may be clear self-conscious-
ness, 3 but it never fails to be present.
1 The reader, I hope, remembers that apart from a special warning he
is to take attention as active attention.
a I cannot enter on this matter here.
3 1 think that Mr. Shand is more or less exaggerating when (in MIND,
N.S., 12, p. 459) he speaks of "a clear awareness" in all attention. The
16 F. H. BRADLEY :
I will before proceeding lay stress on a point which I have
mentioned already. We have, I presume, undoubtedly a
sense and an experience of being active and passive, and I
mean by this that we have an actual awareness of our selves
in both these characters. But unless both self and not-self
and their relation are actually experienced and I mean by
this are present within the experienced as parts or aspects or
features of its content I cannot see how a sense of activity
or passivity, in attention or in anything else, is to be either
explicable or possible. To be aware of activity and passivity
without being aware of that which is active or passive, and
without this also entering itself into the content of the ex-
perienced, is to my mind in the end a thing quite without
meaning. 1 Others perhaps may understand how this is
possible or at least may know that it happens, but in this
understanding or knowledge they fail to carry me with them.
And in their dealing, so far as they can be said to deal, with
this fact of experienced activity, too many psychologists excite
in me an astonishment which does not end in admiration.
There is doubtless here, as we are told, a familiar distinction.
There is the activity of a thing which is aware that it is
active, and there is again the activity of a thing which has
no such feeling and experience. We all in this latter sense
should speak of the activity of a volcano or of a pill, and in
this latter sense we may also in psychology make use of the
term ' active '. And I might claim, even myself, without any
very prolonged struggle to have possessed myself of this dis-
tinction. But having perhaps risen so far there remains a
point at which I am still left behind. I fail to perceive how
this distinction, even when we have attained to it, can either
rid us of the fact of experienced activity or can entitle us to
treat such a fact with neglect. I still do not comprehend
how the knowledge on our part of this distinction I do not
even see how even the ignorance of it on the part of others
can excuse us when we make apparently no attempt to find
out what experienced activity contains. Such neglect still
appears to me to be in short inexcusable, even though ap-
parently its consequences with a little good will may conduct
us to Theism.
In attention then I am practically related to an object, but
this practical relation (I would once more repeat) is of a
limited kind. Attention, being will, must involve the altera-
awareness certainly always is present, but in what sense and to what
degree can it be always called " clear " ?
1 Compare here the remarks in MIND, N.S., No. 40.
ON ACTIVE ATTENTION. 17
tion of existence, but on the other side, as attention, it must
not alter its object. The object, we have seen, is not changed
by me but develops and reveals itself within me. What
then is that existence of the object which really is changed
by attention? It is, we answer, the psychical existence
which belongs to the ideal development of the object. In
all perceptive knowledge there are these two sides which are
indissolubly united. And in active attention we have on one
side the willed self -revelation of the reality in and for me, and
on the other side the psychical existence and the alteration
of that existence without which the object cannot appear. 1
In attention you cannot, as we have seen, leave out either
of these factors. Attention does not merely consist in the
alteration of my psychical existence, and again it cannot even
by an abstraction be regarded merely as the ideal movement
of the object.
It is for this latter reason that we are not said to attend
to anything except what is 'presented'. Mr. Shand (MiND,
N.S., 12, p. 467) has noticed this usage, which appears to be
well marked, but he has not, I think, pointed out the prin-
ciple and the reason which underlies it. But the reason is
that, being will, attention, like all will, 2 must be directed on
immediate existence. "We cannot, as Mr. Shand remarks,
properly attend to another man's thoughts or to what is
happening at ; the antipodes. And yet obviously I can attend
to an idea, say the idea of attention. I can attend to it so
far as it is taken as an idea existing now in and for me,
and is therefore in this sense ' presented '. But if on the
other hand you abstract from this side of the idea, I can
attend to it no longer. And in speaking of another man's
thoughts or of an event at the antipodes, you are naturally
1 1 may perhaps once more be permitted to remind the reader of a vital
point. That alteration of my psychical existence which is involved in
the maintenance of the ideal development, must not, where we have
active attention, come direct from the object itself. For, wherever this
happens, it is the'object which is taken to be active and not I myself, and
naturally with this we can speak no longer of my actively attending. In
active attention the ideal development issues from and is implied in my
will, and its maintenance also is thus taken to be willed and to proceed
from myself.
2 ^Jr. Shand would, I understand, not admit this. He adduces (MiXD,
N.S., No. 16, p. 463) the fact of intention and resolve as a proof that will is
not always an action on immediate existence. But except so far as inten-
tion and resolve are or imply such an action, I cannot agree that they are
volition, and I think that when they are denned so as to exclude this
aspect no one would call them will, or would call them anything beyond
mere intention and mere resolve. I have touched on this subject in my
Appearance, etc., p. 463, and I shall have to recur to it in a future article.
2
18 F. H. BRADLEY :
taken for the purpose in hand to abstract from the existence
of these things in my knowledge. Hence you cannot attend
to them, since it is of the essence of attention to imply this
aspect of psychical existence and its alteration. Whether we
can will an event outside of and quite apart from our psychical
existence, as we certainly can desire it (MiND, 49, p. 21),
I need not here discuss. But my willed attention to such
an event is, as we have just explained, self-contradictory.
(c) I will now briefly indicate another feature which belongs
to attention in its character of will. Attention may itself
vary in strength, while its object either does not vary at all
or becomes indifferently more or less. 1 In the first place I
may be occupied and dominated more or less by an object,
while that object, taken in itself, remains the same. The
object may in a certain character and on a certain scale
remain of the same degree, while the range and extent to
which my self is involved and disturbed may change inde-
finitely. But that occupation and disturbance is of course
not the same thing as my active attending. My attention
will in the proper sense be strong or weak, exactly in the
way in which we speak of volition possessing these characters.
The strength of a volition is a topic to which in another
article I hope to return, but it consists, we may say briefly,
in the strength of the idea with which the self is identified
and the amount of tension and struggle set up between this
idea and existence. The extent up to which the whole self
is involved in this idea and is excited by this conflict and is
identified with one side of it, gives, I should say, the degree of
volition. With this of course is connected the felt amount
of pleasure and pain. On the other hand the experienced
strain on an organ, unless so far as it is included in the
above, does not count towards fixing the degree of the tension.
And my passive occupancy by the object once again is not a
factor, except so far as it subserves and increases the struggle.
I do not think that I can with advantage here enlarge on
this subject.
We have perceived the essential nature of active atten-
tion, and have surveyed its main features from the side alike
of volition and of thought. I have now to deal with some
other problems, and in particular will discuss the mean-
ing of the phrase " object of attention ". But first I will
glance at a question about attention's effects. Are we to
1 On the excessive ambiguity of a psychical ' more and less ' see MIND,
N.S., No. 13.
ON ACTIVE ATTENTION. 19
say that it does or that it does not intensify its object ? I
could not here enter at length into this controversy, even
if I were qualified to do so, but I will venture in passing to
offer some remarks. Very serious ambiguity attaches not
only to "psychical intensity," but also, as we shall presently
see, to attention's " object "- 1 And without a previous inquiry
into the meaning of these terms any discussion of the question,
it seems to me, must in part lead to nothing. I should be
inclined, if I might venture an opinion, to agree that attention
does not essentially raise the strength of the object to which
I attend, if and so long as this object is considered with
reference to its own scale. If, that is, I am comparing one
visual object with others, or even generally one psychical
object with others, it is not of the essence of attention to
raise in the scale one of these objects against another, so long
as the scale enters into the whole object to which I really
am attending. In other words so far as you attend to a
whole field of comparison, your attention does not essentially
strengthen one part of this connected whole as against other
parts. And, if this conclusion seems trivial, I can only reply
by asking that it may at least not be forgotten. On the
other hand I should agree that in general the effect of at-
tention is to strengthen and to make clear, 2 and hence it
may in fact incidentally falsify for the purpose of comparison
some part of the object. I will not attempt further to enter
on this matter, but before proceeding will offer a necessary
remark. Attention is not something abstract and general,
but is always individual and special. It is, we have seen,
in effect a will to develop perceptively an object in me. And
with regard to the nature of objects and their ways of develop-
ment the greatest diversity prevails. And hence the strength
1 When Mr. Shand (MlND, N.S., No. 16, p. 464) says that, though at-
tention does not arrest a disappearing sensation, will on its side may
do so, I find the statement extremely ambiguous. If the will is simply
to observe what happens within a certain field, the attention does not
alter, or at least it ought not to alter, any one element in that complex.
But on the other hand if the will is directed to an end which in itself
involves a continued attention to some idea that naturally wavers surely
here the attention both can and often does arrest. From my point of
view there would of course be no meaning in saying here that will can
do that which attention cannot do. And so far as Mr. Shand understands
by will an action that takes place without any idea of it, I radically dis-
sent from any view of this kind. Mr. Shand's very interesting article is
pervaded throughout by that ambiguity as to the nature of the " object "
which I am shortly to discuss. With regard to attention strengthening
and not strengthening, the reader will find some instructive hesitation in
Wundt, Phys. Psych., chap. xv.
2 1 cannot discuss here the meaning of ' clearness '.
20 F. H. BRADLEY:
and clearness which are essential to attention are not always
one thing. They are in each case prescribed in amount and
character by the particular matter and purpose. Whatever
is enough to meet this particular demand will be sufficient,
however little there may be of it, and only so much as this
is really essential to attention. And a further end and pur-
pose for which the attention exists, we must remember, is
not the attention itself.
I will now proceed to an inquiry into the meaning of
attention's 'object'. We f:an attend, as will presently be
shown, to but one thing at a time. Except under certain
abnormal conditions we may say that attention never really
is divided, and before explaining this I will very briefly state
why the fact must be so. There would be much more to say
here if I had space at command, and I must content myself
with giving what seems the main reason while ignoring other
aspects of the matter. Attention is single, we may say in
a word, because will is single. And will is single not in the
least because it is a faculty there is too much of this kind
of ' explanation ' still on hand but, we may say, because, if
it were not single, it would have perished with its owners.
Without the habit, and so in the end the principle, of doing
and attending to one thing at a time, no creature could have
maintained its existence and its race. This, I would repeat, is
not offered as being by itself the whole reason, but it seems
enough to show why attention must normally be single. And
with this I will pass on to inquire further about the ' object '
of attention.
The object of attention, it will be said, is in fact very far
from being single. And, it will be added, the object is so far
from being one and not many, that authorities have differed
and have even experimented about the extent of its plurality.
And if the object really has all the time been one, this seems
not possible. But it is more than possible, I reply, if the
term ' object ' is highly ambiguous, and if some psychologists
have taken no account of its ambiguity. And I will forth-
with state the main conclusions to which we shall be led.
(1) There is in attention never more than one object, the
several ' objects ' being diverse aspects of or features within
this. (2) Within the one object the unity is of very different
kinds. (3) The nominal object and the real object may be
very far from being the same, and the latter may contain
within itself the former as a feature which is subordinated
and even negated.
(1) The first of these heads I may pass over rapidly, since
I can refer the reader here to the works of Prof. James and
ON ACTIVE ATTENTION. 21
Dr. Stout. 1 Apart from, oscillation, and again apart from
abnormal states, to attend to a plurality is always to attend
to it as one object, and it is not possible to have really
several objects of attention at once. The idea that we can
do this comes from a want of insight into certain truths
about the object, and I will at once, under (2) and (3),
proceed to set these out. I would add that these truths
have a wide and important bearing, and that any neglect
of them can hardly fail to result in error.
(2 and 3) Attention, we all know, may in various degrees
be diffused or be concentrated, but we may fail to perceive
that this concentration and diffusion itself falls within the
object and qualifies that. The extreme of diffused attention
would be, I presume, to observe impartially the whole detail
of a complex scene. Its aim would be to observe at large
everything which happens in and to this general object, to
notice in other words any and every kind of change which
takes place before my mind. But even in this supposed
extreme we should have the unity of my world, as perceived
here and now, and we should have the idea of my noticing
whatever may happen in this field ; and thus every diversity
would be comprehended in and would be subordinate to the
unity of this general object. The plurality even here would
be the adjective of one thing, but the various features of this
object would be of precisely the same rank. They are thus
taken as simply co-ordinate, and they are coupled, we may
say, by a mere ' and '. We are to attend to an object the
several contents of which are A and B and C, where A, B,
and C are equal and all stand on exactly the same footing.
A case so extreme, I at once hasten to add, cannot actually
exist. If one is to observe really and in fact, one cannot
observe really at large, but in order to act one must act, as
we say, in a certain interest. But this means that our
attention is never equally diffused, and that more or less we
are compelled to select and to limit. An animal, that searches
when hungry, will search not for anything and everything,
but always for something more or less special while neglect-
ing the rest ; and the animal must thus always select more
or less from the totality of what in general it perceives,
1 Prof. James, Psych., i., 405, ii., 569, teaches the right doctrine that
there can be but one object. I do not know if it is quite consistent with
this when, p. 409, he speaks of a plurality of "entirely disconnected"
systems of conceptions. Prof. James's use of the word "object" is
however (L, 275 foil.) to the very last degree loose. As to oneness of
attention Dr. Stout teaches the right view throughout, Anal. Psych., i.,
194, 211-212, 260.
22 F. H. BRADLEY:
and even from the limited totality of that which it sees
or smells. The extreme of diffusion will therefore not be
present actually and in fact, since with regard to the whole
object some neglect and some selection is necessary.
There will in the first place be features of our scene, or
in other words of the total object before us, to which we
give really and in fact no attention at all. Our object is
thus so far divided into two fields, one of inattention, \ve
may say, and the other of attention. And passing by the
first let us look at the second, the field and object of
attention. Will all the details of that object be without
exception attended to equally ? Is none relatively neglected
while another is in comparison more prominent ? Is every-
thing within attention's object still simply co-ordinate and
coupled still by a mere ' and,' the one feature being no more
important and attended to no more than is the other ? If
this is ever so, it assuredly is not so always, and, where it
is not so, we have even within the chosen field at least some
subordination. We find in short no longer a mere ' and '.
It is not a case of attending simply to A and to B, but of
attending to A while not omitting to notice B. And B has
with this become lowered to the rank of a condition or
circumstance. It is a mere adjective, a more or less subor-
dinate detail in the object, and subordination once begun
can be carried to a great length. We may find in short
that in the end what we call attention's ' object ' may be
very different from the true object and aim of our attention.
That true aim, that real object, may be even the exclusion
or the destruction of the nominal object of attention.
We have in attention (a) that part of the whole object to
which we do not at all attend. This must be distinguished
on one side from all of the moment's feeling which is not
even an object, and on the other side from that part of our
whole object to which we attend. We have next (b) this
real object of attention with all its internal detail. And we
have last (c) the nominal object. The nominal object is that
part of the detail, or that aspect of the whole process, which
for some cause we select and call the object of attention.
And there is a tendency here to confuse, and to put this
nominal object, this mere fragment preferred mainly for
the sake of convenience, in the place of attention's real and
entire object. And from this origin rises a whole train of
more or less disastrous mistakes. 1 I will proceed to explain
and to enlarge on this statement.
l The metaphor of the visual field and focus which in Wundt and his
followers appears as a doctrine, has, I venture to think, in its results
ON ACTIVE ATTENTION. 23
The 'object of attention,' far removed from being a term
clear and precise, is, as we have seen, a phrase full of
ambiguity. But in too much psychology, as in common life,
this phrase is used with no regard for its uncertain meaning.
The ' object ' of attention is in this respect like the ' subject '
of a judgment. In a judgment the nominal subject may be
something very different from that about which the asser-
tion really is made, and the logician who fails to see this and
to remember it will not avoid error. I will point out at
some length this ambiguous character of attention's object.
If we take such an instance as the pursuit of a prey by a
man or a beast, the real object of attention is not the mere
animal pursued but the whole pursuit of that animal. And
hence every detail in the scene which in any way bears on this
pursuit, whether as contributing to it or as hindering it, is or
may be included within the real object attended to. Or let
us take the instance where a woman's object in going to
some party is in fact to promote the success of her daughter.
We might say here naturally that, apart from oscillation and
failure, her daughter was throughout the time the real object
of her attention. But this way of speaking, if convenient, is
not correct. Her true ' real object ' is the observing, the
doing and the preventing this and that thing with regard
to her daughter, and, we must add, in a certain interest.
And hence it is hard to say what detail in the scene may as
a condition or circumstance fail to be included in the object
which she pursues to be attended to and to be contained in
her attention's real object. And it is from this point of view
that we must understand also the diversion of attention, for
diversion once more is an ambiguous phrase. When we say
that something occurs to attract the mother's attention to
something other than her daughter, our meaning is doubtful.
We may mean first that, for a longer or shorter period or
periods of time, she does not think at all about her daughter
or in any way notice her. And, if so, during those periods
her attention to her daughter has ceased, except in an
improper sense to be noticed below. But on the other
hand our meaning when we speak of diversion may be widely
different. For the new pursuit and the old one may be co-
ordinated in various ways into one whole object. And in
this case the diversion of my attention from A will not imply
that I cease to attend to A because I now attend to B. For
been decidedly mischievous. The metiphor appears in Lotze's Med.
Psych., p. 505, and I should presume that Wundt owes the doctrine to
Forblage's Psychologie, but he himself is, I suppose, responsible for its
prevalence so far as it has prevailed.
24 F. H. BRADLEY :
I may attend at once to both B and A as co-existing adjectives
in one pursuit or scene, or I may subordinate B to A in various
ways as a more or less accidental detail, circumstance or
condition. The question is here not of ' Yes or No ' and of
' Either one or the other ' ; the question is really about both,
and it concerns the degree in which each is present, and again
the relative position in which the one stands to the other.
The diversion of attention in short takes place here within
the attention itself. And hence the division and the diversion
of attention are phrases the meaning of which can never any-
where be assumed as known. The meaning will vary in
different cases and it will vary perhaps vitally, and it must
be investigated for each purpose in hand before conclusions
are drawn. And I doubt whether even with the regenerate
man of the psychological laboratory this necessary investiga-
tion has always taken place. The object of attention, even
where our attention is concentrated, is not that aspect of it
which for convenience we may abstract and may entitle the
object. The real object is on the contrary always a process
with this ' object '. It is a more or less systematic whole of
action and scene in which the nominal object may be more
or less reduced to a detail or condition. That which, for
example, Mr. Shand has called the "set of the interest"
(MiND, N. S., 12, 454) is really an integral part of the atten-
tion's object, and this may be true again of the whole present
scene with its background and environment. When I attend
to the decay and to the disappearance of a sensation, this
mere sensation is not the real object to which I attend. And
the fact that I observe the cessation surely proves that any
such view is erroneous. The object which I really observe
is the sensation in its relation perhaps to a certain special
system or scale, and at least in its more general connexion
with a wider order and scene. And if we forget this then,
as we saw above with regard to the question of intensity,
our inquiry may be ambiguous and our conclusions may
be vitiated beforehand. In short between the real and the
nominal object of attention the divergence may be vital.
Our real object (as we saw) may even consist in the negation
of what we call our object. I may thus be said to attend to
a thought which persecutes me, while I really attend to the
extruding of this thought from my mind. My object here
is the process of extrusion together with, all that this process,
implies. But I, taking into view the thing on which I am
to act, for convenience call this my object, and I thus am led
into error both in theory and practice. My real object, the
process of extruding A, is a negation, which like all negation,
ON ACTIVE ATTENTION. 25
involves a positive basis, and A itself is a detail which has
no right to appear except as a condition thus positively
negated. And if this essential subordination is for a moment
wanting, and if A for one moment is set free, my object and
my attention have at once been changed surreptitiously and
radically. There are probably few of us who in practice
have no acquaintance with this error. We have resolved to
attend to the not thinking of something which tempts us.
Our resolve here, if genuine, and our true object is to drive
out this idea when it occurs, and to do this by keeping our
minds fixed on that which will extrude it. And the Devil,
when he knows his business, induces us by some pretext to
keep the temptation before us. He suggests that it is even
our duty always to bear this temptation in mind, of course
always qualified by the idea that it is a thing which we reject.
And thus the idea naturally, by being held before us, tends
to free itself at least in part from its mere subordinate phase,
and so in the end acts positively and independently. And
our object and our attention have in this way been essentially
transformed. We may note again the same natural trans-
formation in the case of repentance. The repentance, w r e
may say, that allows itself ever to think of the past deserves
to be suspected. And repentance, we might even add, is a
luxury permitted only to those who are morally rich.
The bearing of this whole question is so wide and its
importance is so great l that I will ask the reader to delay
and to consider carefully a further instance. And I will take
this instance from Mr. Shand's article in MIND, N.S., 12,
p. 457. We can, of course, attend to a pleasure or a pain
and make it our ' object '. But the effect of our attention
upon this object may vary indefinitely and may go to
strengthen it or again to expel or to weaken it. And hence,
if in each case we assume that our object is the same, we
seem landed in a difficulty. But the real object, as we have
seen, is in each case not the same but different, and to
attend actively to a mere sensation or to a mere pain is in no
case possible. The sensation or the pain or the pleasure
never is and never could be the entire and real object. It
is but one feature in that larger object to which I really
1 In the end it takes us back to the question of the true essence of
negation, and I think that wrong views as to this have in certain points
injured psychology. The possibility of a negative will and the real
nature of aversion are points to be discussed in a future article. For
the second of these see MIND, No. 49, p. 21. The doctrine of our text
will be shown in another article to have vital importance also with
regard to the question of mental conflict and of imputation.
26 F. H. BRADLEY :
attend and which in each several case may differ widely.
Thus with pain my true object may be the means which I
use to remove it, or I might possibly attend to the dwelling
on my self as a sufferer from this pain, indignant or unre-
sisting or calmly resigned. My object and my attention in
each of these cases is something different, and, if the effects
vary, that result is surely natural. Again I may attend to a
present pain not as to a thing by which I now am perturbed,
but as to a fact in which I take theoretical interest. I may
wish to observe this pain as a given psychical phenomenon,
or I may wish to view it in its wider bearings either as this
pain or more generally, and in either case as an element in
the moral world or in the Universe at large. The object
even of such theoretical attention will not be the same in
each case. And even here the effects may be more or less
diverse, but the general tendency is here, we may say, to
subordinate the pain as now felt and so to weaken it. From
this I may go on to attend in a different way. I may fix
my mind on the pain as a thing which should not be attended
to except with contempt. Here nay real object is the practi-
cal degradation or extrusion of the pain, and this negative
process involves a positive object and a positive volition.
My aim is to carry out that idea of my self which satisfies
me and of which I approve, and such an object implies the
negation of the pain. But there is, I think, no occasion to
enlarge and to dwell further on this instance. . Enough has
been said to make clear the essential ambiguity of the
' object '. There is in brief never any presumption that
what we are disposed to call attention's object is the real
object of attention ; and that real object may even on the
contrary consist in the positive suppression of the nominal
object. Hence every inquiry must begin with this prelimin-
ary question, What in the case before us really is contained
in the true object of attention ?
I will now briefly touch on a point which I have noticed
already, the meaning which should be given to a ' permanent
attention '. We should all say naturally that perhaps for
weeks we have been attending to something, and it is of
course obvious that through all this time we cannot actually
have attended. And in the same way we ' keep watch '
where through all the time we have not been actually
watching. 1 We mean, I presume, that we have had
1 See here Prof. James, Psychology, L, 420. There is no doubt that
sustained active attention generally means a succession of willed acts,
but it is not clear what are the limits of such an act. There must be an
ON ACTIVE ATTENTION. 27
throughout a constant will to observe, and the sense to
be given to a constant or permanent will can be best dis-
cussed further in a later article. But here as elsewhere,
whenever we speak of attending, we mean a special attention
with regard to a certain particular purpose. And if through
any period our amount of actual attention has been sufficient
for that purpose, we naturally express this by asserting
that through all the time our attention has been there. It
has not really been there, but what has happened has been
this. The idea of carrying out the proposed end has been
associated with my inner and outer worlds in such a manner
that, given the occurrence of any change sufficiently con-
nected with this idea, my actual attention to the means will
at once be aroused. And thus by a licence our attention is
said to have been present throughout, since it has been
present conditionally. And it has been actually present so
far as our end and purpose requires, and everywhere the
necessary amount of attention is and must be measured by
the purpose and the end.
From this I will go on. to offer a few remarks about the
fixation of attention. If we remember that active attention
involves will, and that will is the self-realisation of an idea,
we can at once reply generally to the question how attention
is fixed. Active attention is fixed always by the idea of an
end. The idea, we have seen, may be the idea of an activity
which is no more than theoretical, but in some form the idea
of an end is essential. Wherever it is absent, there at least
for the time we are without active attention. We may be in
a sense occupied and engrossed, we may be in such a state
that whenever we deviate we are brought back, and hence, as
we have just explained, attention is present in such a state
conditionally. But, apart from an idea which realises itself,
we are not actively and in the proper sense attending. We
may say then that always and in principle attention, in the
sense of active attention, is fixed by an idea. And if we
endeavour to pass behind this idea to a more fundamental
attention, we are led either to a fresh and more remote idea or
to something which certainly is not active attention and will.
We may doubtless ask a further question as to how ideas
themselves become fixed, and this question is doubtless as
important as it is wide and difficult. But I do not think that
idea which realises itself, and, when that is over, the act is over, until
again we have an idea, either the same or another. But suppose, e.g., I
have willed to occupy myself with a subject and the occupation goes on,
at what point does that occupation cease to be the realisation of ray
idea and so to be my act '?
28 F. H. BRADLEY:
such a problem falls within the limited scope of this article,
and at any rate it is impossible to deal with it here. A
question which involves difficulties such as would be raised,
for instance, by any discussion of what are called "fixed
ideas," deserves to be treated with some respect.
How and under what laws the idea acts in attention is
again a question which I cannot attempt here to answer.
Without, entering on this I will briefly notice our employ-
ment of outward objects. As a help to concentration on an
abstract problem we are used to gaze on something prominent
in our field of vision and so to anchor our thoughts. This
familiar process has two sides. It is in part negative and
serves to inhibit distracting sensations and movements, but
in the main and in principle it is positive. The outward
object has itself now become part of the content of an idea,
the idea of myself pursuing a certain end. And hence the
object itself now on occasion resuggests the pursuit and so
resists deviation. 1
I will conclude with some observations on a point which
bears on the foregoing, the connexion between attention and
what is called ' conation '. We have here again a term
which is dangerously ambiguous.- Conation may be used
for something which is either not experienced at all, or at
least is not at all experienced as conation. But, passing by
these senses, I should deny that conation is involved in at-
tention, unless conation is used merely as a general head
which includes volition. If it were used more narrowly and
taken to imply an experienced effort or striving, we could not
truly say that all volition and attention contain it. Attention,
being will, must involve an opposition between existence and
idea, but I cannot agree that this opposition must entail an
effort and struggle. The resistance of the fact may be no
more than what comes from inertia, and to remove it actually
may cost little more than to anticipate its removal ideally.
And if the alteration of existence implies always a struggle,
I at least can often neither perceive this nor feel it. And
hence I could not admit that, used in this emphatic sense,
conation belongs to all active attention.
1 On the unmeaning movements made in attention see Prof. James,
Psychology, L, p. 458. He however omits to notice that, beside " drafting
off," these movements, if monotonous, may fix positively. A movement
with one character may serve as a fixed object. How far, if at all, with-
out a fixed external world any attention and any self-control would in the
end be possible, is an interesting question on which here I of course do
not touch.
' J With regard to conation I may refer the reader to MIND, N.S., No. 40.
ON ACTIVE ATTENTION. 29
It is true (to pass from this point which is of little im-
portance) that our attention corresponds on the whole to our
permanent interests. Our attention may be said to answer
in the main to the felt wants and the unfelt needs of our
nature and to conduce to their satisfaction. But to turn
this broad correspondence into an essential unity, or even
into a necessary connexion, is indefensible. It is an attempt
to force a construction on the facts against which the facts,
unless we close our eyes, most evidently rebel. Thus to
identify every ' disposition ' with an actual conation is plainly
unjustifiable, so long as we use conation for that which is
experienced and of which we are aware. And if on the other
hand we take it as something either not experienced at all
as conation, or at all events not so experienced by that con-
sciousness of which we speak, we should at least make clear
what it is that we do and that we do not assert. But, if
apart from such hypotheses we go by the facts, one conclusion
becomes plain. We may will and may attend actively because
we have first been compelled to ' attend ' passively, because,
that is, we have been somehow impressed and laid hold of
by an idea. 1 And if attention is used in this improper sense,
we often will because we have attended, and do not attend in
the least because we will. If one follows the known facts
one must admit the existence of volition, where the idea
realises itself quite apart from any antecedent desire or cona-
tion, and where these have not even contributed to the origin
and suggestion of the idea. We may end in such cases, and
we probably do end, by attending actively to the idea, but we
may do this because and only because the idea has laid hold
of us passively. Thus our will to realise this idea in external
action and in inward knowledge is but the self-realisation of
the idea which so has possessed us. And you cannot, if you
keep to facts, maintain even that the suggestion holds us in
all cases because it arouses desire or even pleasure. For in
some cases these both are absent, at least from the known
facts, while in other cases we may find even the presence
of their opposite. In short the attempt to get rid of ideo-
motor action, or to deny that at least some ideo-motor actions
are volitions, is founded on error and leads to a conflict with
fact. 2 The suggested idea which moves us does not, to repeat
this, always move us because in any sense it corresponds to
an actual conation, if, that is, conation means something
1 ' Idea ' here includes any suggestion even when coming straight from
a perception.
2 1 hope to show this at length in a future article.
30 F. H. BRADLEY : ON ACTIVE ATTENTION.
which we know and experience. This idea may come from
an association, or it may arise from some kind of external or
at least sensational emphasis, or we may be unable in any
way to assign to it a psychical origin. There are cases
where all that we are aware of is that the idea somehow is
there, and that in itself it does not please us nor do we desire
its fulfilment. But the idea remaining there, and because it
remains there, becomes insistent and goes on to realise itself,
and in this way unfeelingly forces, we may say, our will and
our active attention.
If it is urged that we have a general disposition to realise
all our ideas, I have no wish to gainsay this. I am not, how-
ever, prepared to agree that such a disposition is ultimate,
and in any case the assertion that it essentially depends
upon pleasure or pain or essentially answers to a conation, I
must once more repeat, seems really contrary to plain fact.
You may add again, if you please, that, without some special
disposition in each case, no idea could hold and possess us.
And once more, if you will not in every case assert the neces-
sary presence of pleasure or pain or of conation or desire, I
am ready to accept and even to endorse this doctrine. But
in some cases I must insist that this disposition is but
physical, physical I do not say entirely but for the most
part and in the main. 1 If you are true to facts, and if you
keep to that individual soul with which alone you are here
concerned, you cannot in all cases take the disposition as
psychical. But to suppose that, with a physical or with even
a psychical disposition, a step has been made towards refuting
the doctrine which we have advanced, would in my opinion
be most mistaken. It is a subject which however cannot
be further pursued in the present article.
1 What I mean is this, that, however right you may be in saying that
for psychology a certain disposition is merely physical, you will never
be right in asserting that its psychical result conies merely from it, and
that psychical conditions have contributed nothing to that result.
II. THE LATER ONTOLOGY OF PLATO.
BY A. W. BENN.
IT is only within recent years that a complete and satis-
factory view of Plato's philosophy has been made possible.
Such a view may not yet exist ; but at any rate we have
what our predecessors had not, something like adequate mate-
rials for its construction. By a rare good fortune, indeed,
the world has always possessed all that Plato ever wTote
about philosophy ; but his writings have come down to us
without any authoritative interpretation, with imperfect
external evidence of their authenticity, and with no external
evidence whatever, beyond the fact that the Laius was the
last published, of the order in which they were composed.
There are thinkers like Plato's own disciple, Aristotle,
who can be thoroughly understood in the complete absence
of such chronological information, for their systems are
perfected before they begin to teach, and each successive
treatise does but add fresh illustrations of the same unal-
terable principles. That formal systematisation was ever
present as an ideal to Plato, but was never actually realised.
His artistic instincts were always leading him away from the
rigid symmetry which as a dialectician he professed to
admire ; as an Athenian noble he despised those habits of
plodding industry without which strict self-consistency
cannot be achieved ; and above all he had a mind that was
always growing, that readily responded to altered circum-
stances, and that was constantly assimilating new material.
The older interpreters could not see this, they mistook him
for a pedant like themselves ; and there are some who cannot
see it now. Hence one attempt after another has been
made to get rid of the contradictions that abound in his
writings by a perverted exegesis, or by a wholesale rejection
as spurious of some of the most important Platonic docu-
ments ; or, if of a more genial turn, they contended that this
great inaugurator of reasoned truth threw out with supreme
irony a handful of irreconcilable theses to be fought over by
his credulous disciples. It has been reserved for our own
32 A. W. BENN :
time to introduce into this study also the fertile method of
evolution already applied with such success to the Pentateuch
- and to Homer; and, what was indispensable to a right
understanding of Plato, it has given us, to begin with, an
account of the order in which his Dialogues were composed,
based not on any doubtful a priori theory of their logical
development, but on unimpeachably disinterested philological
evidence. 1
For this important achievement, the indispensable con-
dition of all further progress, we are chiefly indebted to Eng-
lish scholarship ; and that such should be the case seems a
fitting reward for the devotion to Platonic studies which has
honourably distinguished our country ever since the Tudor
period, a devotion common to our thinkers and our poets, to
the children of the Renaissance and the children of Puritan-
ism, to the pupils of James Mill, and the pupils of Jowett.
There is, indeed, as Wordsworth observed, a large infusion of
Platonism in the English genius ; and the claim will only be
rejected by those who have failed to discern how much of
practicality there is in the one and how much of idealism in
the other. But the kinship of the English mind to the mind
of Plato, if such there be, is a privilege that has its dangers.
Our interpreters are apt to put more into him than he con-
tains, to read him in the light of their own favourite specula-
tions, to credit him with a maturity, or at least a modernity
of which, with all his anticipatory reach, the Athenian
prophet was quite incapable. Charles Kingsley tells us of
a Cambridge tutor who put a too inquisitive undergraduate
in his right place by observing that their business was to
translate Plato, not to understand his philosophy. If that
stern teacher still lives he might profitably warn a later
generation that their present business is to understand Plato's
philosophy, not to translate it into terms of modern thought.
The author of the Parmenides and the Timceus was neither a
Hegelian nor a Kantian, neither a Leibnizian nor a Berke-
leyan ; he was not even a Platonist, except in so far as
Platonism means a life-long passion for truth, an unweari-
able capacity for rising to new points of view. But we
must learn to admit that among those points of view the
subjectivity of modern philosophy had no place. The notion
of matter as a mental function, still more the ideality of
space and time first glimpsed by Spinoza never dawned
on his horizon.
1 For a f nil, clear and interesting account of the methods and results of
this investigation, see Lutoslawski's (>,-i</i/i (aid droirth <\f Plain's Logic,
London, 1897.
THE LATER ONTOLOGY OF PLATO. 33
In this respect the Germans, with their wider and more
careful reading, have a great advantage over us. A critic
like Zeller acquires from his familiarity with the whole range
of ancient and modern speculation a certain tact that makes
such misconceptions impossible to him ; and when they are
seriously put forward by others his familiarity with the
Platonic texts brings to his memory the decisive passages by
which they are dispelled. That Zeller should refuse to admit
what is good and sound in English criticism when he finds
it associated with the chimerical interpretations alluded to
is natural, though regrettable. But there is reason to hope
that younger German scholars will keep a more open mind
on the subject.
So far it may be claimed that one important result of the
new Platonic criticism has been placed beyond all reasonable
doubt, and that another result, although far from certain,
has been made at least extremely probable. Of these the
first relates to the order of the Dialogues, and the second to
the Theory of Ideas. It is now generally admitted that the
so-called dialectic dialogues were written after the Republic,
and represent a more advanced stage of reflexion ; while
among the dialectic dialogues themselves the Parmenides pre-
cedes the Sophist. The Timceus keeps its old place as a late
composition coming not long before the Laws ; and a strong
case has been made out for assigning the Phcedrus, once con-
sidered a very early work, to a date falling shortly after the
completion of the Republic.
With regard to the true meaning of the ideal theory there
is less unanimity, and it is a question on which opinions will
perhaps always differ. Until a comparatively recent period
the accepted interpretation was that Plato credited the Ideas
with an independent and separate existence apart from the
sensible appearances in which they are manifested to us.
Many passages in his own writings, backed as they are by
the clear and emphatic testimony of Aristotle, might be
quoted in support of such a view. But an increasing number
of scholars seem to agree in thinking that it is irreconcilable
at least with the positions maintained in what are now
ascertained to be the later dialogues. This at any rate is
my own view, and the present article is offered as a contribu-
tion to its support.
It is admitted that Plato, under the name of Parmenides,
has anticipated all the objections subsequently urged against
the transcendence of the Ideas, and that he has stated them
with a vigour that leaves little or nothing to be desired.
3
34 A. W. BENN :
Whether he is attacking his own former theory, or the theory
of his disciples, or the theory of the Megarians a school
which by the way seems to owe its existence largely to the
historians of philosophy is a question of little importance
in this connexion. The difficulty is that he seems to give
away his own criticism by concluding with the declaration
that to disallow the existence of eternal and immutable
Ideas is to destroy the possibility of dialectics (Parmenides, 135
B-C). But such an assertion makes at most for an attitude
of provisional scepticism, and leaves the objections to the
transcendental theory unimpaired. Perhaps w r e shall find
in the sequel that Plato afterwards hit on a method, more
or less satisfactory, for making his way out of the dilemma.
The second part of the Parmenides professes to furnish a
new mode of testing hypotheses by alternately assuming
their truth and falsity, deducing the consequences that
result from each position, and comparing them with one
another. The cases chosen are the existence and the non-
existence of the One. We are invited, that is, to consider
what follows from either alternative, first with reference to
the One itself, and then with reference to all other things ;
the reason given for limiting the discussion to these particu-
lar theses being that the counter thesis, ' If the Many are/
had already been discussed by Zeno, the disciple of Par-
menides, with a view to defending his master's philosophy
against superficial objectors. For Parmenides, according to
Plato, asserted that the One alone truly is ; and when people
made merry over the absurdities that follow from such a
doctrine Zeno retaliated by exposing the still greater ab-
surdities that would follow from the reality of the Many.
It is important to note that the terms One and Many, as
used by Plato, have by no means the same force as the same
terms as used by the Eleatics. What with them had been a
purely geometrical distinction has become with him a meta-
physical distinction. The All, said Parmenides, is one con-
tinuum without separation or distinction of parts. For,
added Zeno, if space were conceived as divided into parts
sundry impossibilities would follow. Plato, on the other
hand, means by the One the idea of unity conceived in
its very highest degree of generality, and by the Many he
means everything besides, everything that is not unity. It
is therefore clear that in developing the logical consequences
of assuming the existence or non-existence of the One he is
not speaking about the universe as a concrete whole ; nor do
his difficulties find their solution in that view which looks on
the Absolute as the reconciling synthesis of contradictory
THE LATER ONTOLOGY OF PLATO. 35
attributes. Indeed he has been at some pains to exclude
such an interpretation. In the Parmenides itself he warns us
that the discussion is not concerned with visible objects,
which are just what the historical Zeno was concerned with
{129 sqq.) ; the warning is repeated in the Philebus, where,
in evident reference to the present argument, the common
and obvious paradoxes about the One and Many are only
mentioned to be dismissed as childish in comparison with the
puzzles arising from the consideration of purely ideal unities
{14 D) ; and once more in the Sophist Plato shows himself
perfectly aware that the Absolute of Parmenides was not an
abstract unity, but an individual extended whole (244 E). It
is then merely by a dramatic equivocation that the Eleatic
couple are introduced as talking about the One and the
Many in the Parmenides ; and we have to ask ourselves why
Plato should single out that particular pair of terms for the
application of the dialectic method by which the validity of
the ideal theory is to be finally tested.
The answer is, in my opinion, that Plato has chosen this
particular pair to operate on because the opposition of the
One to the Many is the most general expression for the ideal
theory itself. He has told us repeatedly in the Republic (476
A, 507 B), in the Phcedrus (265 D), and now once more in the
Parmenides itself (128 E sqq.) that every Idea is the reduction
to unity of what our senses showed us as scattered among a
multiplicity of phenomena ; while in the Republic he had
pointed to an ultimate Idea, the Good, to which the particu-
lar Ideas are in turn related as many to one (509 A, 511 B). *
If then the assumption of this highest abstraction leads to a
series of inextricable contradictions the very acropolis has
been betrayed, the old theory must be abandoned as hopeless,
and a new interpretation of nature substituted for it. The
logical value of the reasonings that fill the latter part of
the Parmenides is not now in question. They may form a
chain of rigorous demonstration, or they may be a tissue of
sophistry. In either case the net result is the same. The
theory of separate Ideas when reduced to its simplest ex-
pression lands us in a quagmire of hopeless contradictions.
A word has been said about the fallacy of interpreting
Plato by identifying his doctrines with the results of modern
thought. Nevertheless where there is no danger of such
confusion, examples drawn from modern philosophy may
advantageously be used in illustration or development of his
1 1 think this may fairly be taken as Plato's meaning, although he does
not state it in so many words.
36 A. W. BENN :
principles and methods. In the present instance Locke's
criticism of the theory of innate ideas, furnishes, I think, an
appropriate parallel. It will be remembered that the great
English thinker in contravening the doctrine that there are
certain primary notions not acquired by experience which
the mind brings with it into the world and possesses in per-
fection from the first moment of its existence, opens his
attack by disputing the a priori origin of the two axioms,
'What is, is,' and, 'It is impossible for the same thing to
be and not to be ' ; ' for these,' he thinks, ' have of all
others the most allowed title to innate '. But I do not
understand Locke to assert that any one had ever in so many
words declared these two propositions to be innate ; nor am
I aware that they were classed as such either by the Stoics
or by Lord Herbert of Cherbury, or by Descartes, the oppo-
nents whom throughout he has in view. Any how he argues
that if principles so general and so certain are not innate, no
others are ; and although he discusses on their own merits
some alleged cases of innateness, the question has, in his
opinion, been virtually decided by showing that the supreme
laws of logic are not present to every human mind from the
moment of birth.
Now what I would suggest is that Plato uses the One and
the Many as Locke uses the laws of Identity and Contradic-
tion, namely, in order to cut out the transcendental theory by
the roots. For the result of his inquiry is to demonstrate,
at least to his own satisfaction, that whether we assume the
ideal One to be or not to be, it will both be and not be, and
will involve everything else in the same disagreeable pre-
dicament. In other words it is a thoroughly nonsensical
conception. And we are left to infer that what is true of
the supreme Idea must be true of all particular Ideas ; they
cannot without contradiction be isolated from the multitu-
dinous phenomena which they unite.
But the interest of the Parmenides is not exhausted by this-
result, revolutionary as it seems. It not only gives evidence
of Plato's dissatisfaction with the transcendent realism of his
middle life, but it also throws a light forward on the inquiry
that was next to occupy his thoughts. This is a point on
which his silence becomes more significant than his speech.
The dialogue is left unfinished, l at least to the extent of
having no formal conclusion. The interlocutors do not take
leave of one another, nor do they agree to meet for a further
1 1 say this deliberately, after reading Maguire's argument to the con-
trary.
THE LATER ONTOLOGY OF PLATO. 37
discussion of their difficulties. May we not suspect that
Plato was surprised in the middle of his search by an un-
expected discovery which so to speak cut across his path at
a right angle and set him on a new line of reflexion ? To
hazard a guess, the discovery was that in losing his first
principle of existence he had lost, what to him was no less
valuable, his first principle of classification as well.
For knowledge as well as for being the first principle took
the form of a contrasted couple. Without such an anti-
thetical arrangement indeed Greek thought could no more
live and move than one of the higher animals could live and
move without bilateral symmetry of structure. Even when
the opposing terms were identified, as by Heracleitus, or one
side suppressed, as by Parmenides, it was only their simul-
taneous presence to the thinker's mind that made thought
possible. Now Plato, as we have seen, had chosen the
antithesis of the One and the Many as the most general
expression of his ideal theory. But on profounder reflexion
it had melted away under his touch. Each of the Many
reproduced the One : the One resolved itself into an infinite
multitude of parts. Fatal to his own system, he seems to
have believed that the result was fatal also to the Monism of
the Eleatics. Nevertheless it was apparently to Parmenides
that he turned in search of a new expression for the ultimate
antithesis. At any rate in his next important dialogue, the
Sophist, three such fundamental distinctions are enumerated,
and all three may be traced to the great poem of the Italiote
sage ; these are, Being and not-Being, Kest and Motion, the
Same and the Other (Identity and Difference). Parmenides
had declared Being to be eternally unmoved and absolutely
homogeneous with itself. According to him Motion and
Variety have no positive meaning ; they are mere negations,
forms of not-Being, and therefore not only non-existent, but
even inconceivable, for what is not has most emphatically no
being even for thought, since to be thought of and to be are
the same. But Plato demurs to the summary logic of his
revered master, and at once puts his finger on a fatal flaw in
the chain of reasoning. Being and not-Being, he observes,
so far from excluding one another in the rigid manner
assumed, are found exerywhere co-existing. To say that a
thing is itself is to say that it is not anything else. To
remain within the limits of the categories above enumerated,
Kest is not Motion, and the Same is not the Other. More-
over since both Rest and Sameness are they coincide to a
certain extent with Being, but do not exhaust it. Thus in
reference to pure Being they both are and are not ; while
38 A. W. BENN :
again Being as such is neither Best nor Sameness, although
it rests and is the same with itself. In short not-Being
turns out to be just Otherness, and as an independent
category must be altogether struck out of our list, which is.
thus reduced from six to five members, Bein^, Sameness and
Otherness, Rest and Motion, each participating in the nature
of the remainder, with the possible exception of Best and
Motion, the relation between which is left unsettled (250 A-
259 B).
These somewhat scholastic refinements which, however,
are filled with interest and vitality in the original exposition
must be carefully borne in mind if we would understand
the further development of Plato's ontology in the Timceus.
It will be noticed that our old friends the One and the Many
are not included in the list of ultimate Forms. There is an
occasional reference to them in the Sophist ; but on the whole
Plato seems to have convinced himself that they were un-
serviceable as points of reference in the reorganisation of
thought. Or it may be permitted to conjecture that he had
now come to identify the Many, like not-Being, with Other-
ness. In the latter part of the Parmenides he had substituted
a different expression ra\\a (the others) for ra 7ro\\d (the
many) ; this would easily pass into ffarepa, and then into
Oarepov the Otherness of the Sophist, and this would at once
evoke its opposite ravrov the Same as a substitute for the One.
As another important result important, that is, from the
Greek point of view we note that Being has been left
without an antithesis, not-Being having been identified with
Difference. Now according to a fundamental law of Greek
thought that which has no opposite must mediate between
opposites. Plato's last analysis then has for its logical con-
sequence the necessity of finding a pair of terms between
which Being can be placed ; and his table of Forms furnishes
two such couples to choose between. It will be remembered
that these are Same and Other (or in our language Identity
and Difference) on the one hand and Best and Motion on the
other. When he wrote the Timceus his choice was made.
Stated generally the object of the Timceus seems to be to-
show how the universe is constructed, how a knowledge of
its structure has been made possible for man, and how that
knowledge becomes available for the reorganisation of human
life. More particularly it is an attempt to provide a satisfac-
tory substitute for that ideal theory which the Parmenides had
shown by two distinct methods to be untenable, and to effect
this by concluding the process of simplification first begun
and partly carried out in the Sophist.
THE LATEK ONTOLOGY OF PLATO. 39
Plato entered on his literary and philosophic career as a
religious agnostic of the Socratic school. Believing like
his great master that the gods had reserved the secrets of
the external world for their own exclusive cognizance, he
devoted himself during the greater part of his efficient life
to the study of ethical and logical problems, without any
absolute confidence in the power of the human mind to
solve even these. But increasing familiarity with the work
actually done by contemporary science, especially perhaps in
Western Hellas, convinced him that the ' meteorologists,' at
whom he had been taught to sneer in his youth, had reached
results both in mathematics and astronomy of undeniable
certainty, of great immediate utility, and of still greater
promise for the future. Personally his opinion of their
abilities might not be much altered : he ' had never met a
mathematician who could reason ' ; but he saw that their
demonstrations offered a model to which the true reasoner
was bound to conform. Again his ethics led him to infer
that so mean a passion as envy could have no place in the
divine counsels ; while his devotional feelings culminated
in the identification of the human with the divine spirit.
Finally his political studies taught him that the problem of
social reorganisation could not be isolated from the problem
of cosmology as a whole.
The study of cosmology threw Plato back on the systems
of early Greek philosophy. All of these are more or less
represented in the Timceus, and much of its obscurity is due
to his not always very successful attempts at a reconciliation
between their opposing or intersecting methods. Our busi-
ness is only with those parts which seem peculiar to himself
and which enter into the general plan of his philosophy con-
ceived as a self-developing logic.
Taking up the thread of that development where it was
dropped, we recall the significant circumstance that the form
or category of Being was left without its original antithesis
not-Being, and that accordingly by the laws of Greek thought
it had to be placed as a middle term between two extremes.
Well, the principal speaker in the Timceus tells us in the
mythical phraseology employed throughout that dialogue
that the supreme God mingled together the Same and the
Other and produced from them the form of Being, situated
between the two (35 A). It must indeed be admitted that
the word which I have translated 'Being' is not identical
with the word habitually used in the Sophist to express that
category. In the earlier dialogue Plato says TO ov, in the
present instance he says r) ovaia. But in the Sophist also
40 A. W. BENN :
77 ovcria is used at least once as absolutely synonymous with
TO ov (250 B) ; and the latter term has probably been avoided
in the passage where the composition of Being is described
.simply because Plato has incidentally to speak of all three
categories, the Same, the Other and their joint product as
Tpia ovra, ' being three things,' and there would have been
a certain absurdity in implying that two out of the three
were in being before Being itself had begun. If, however, it
seems desirable to use the word Being only where the
original has TO ov there can be no objection to translating
7 ovcria by Existence. l
To place Existence between Identity and Difference and to
represent it as resulting from their union is more than an
advance in logic, it is an advance in metaphysics. For what
Plato really means is that the supreme Ideas are not hypos-
tasised essences, but simple abstractions derived from the
analysis of concrete existence and having no actuality apart
. from it. Even in the Republic he had already hinted at such
a conclusion by declaring that the highest of all Ideas, the
Idea of the Good, far exceeded existence in dignity and
power (509 B). We may suppose that this superiority con-
sists in the fact that the Good, or as we should say the Ideal,
is perpetually moulding reality into conformity with itself. 2
But this refusal to acknowledge an independent and
isolated existence of the Ideas is not to be confounded with
a mere reversion to the common-sense or Cynical point of
view. It is the natural outcome of Plato's practical genius,
the metaphysical expression of his reforming enthusiasm.
What he calls the Same is in truth the assimilative principle,
the tendency towards order, harmony, and reconciliation. He
has already told us in the Sophist that being means nothing
but power, the capacity for acting or for being acted on ('247
D-E). Therefore that the Same may be it must assimilate
1 This is also the word used by Dr. Jackson in his summary of
the TimsRUS (Journal of Philology, vol. xiii., p. 6). Mr. Archer-Hind
renders 17 oixria by 'essence' in his translation of the Tintxus. I had
already proposed ' Existence ' in my Greek Philosophers (vol. i., p. 266) ;
.but I cannot tell whether or not the intei-pretation was original.
2 Plato would evidently not have agreed with Descartes in holding that
the idea of perfection involves that of existence. A remarkable parallel
to his position may be found in that last dying speech and confession of
French Eclecticism, Vacherct's La Metaphysique et la Science (Paris,
1858), where it is argued in direct opposition to the school to which
the author originally belonged that all reality is necessarily imperfect
(vol. ii., p. 68) ; and the parallelism is the more significant as Vacherot
himself was not aware of it, being imbued with the old belief that Plato
realised his Ideas.
THE LATER ONTOLOGY OF PLATO. 41
the Different to itself, must carry law and order into what
else were chaotic. And that the Different also may be it
must undergo this action, must submit to this assimilation.
Nor is their union a type of practical endeavour alone ; it
is also the mainspring of scientific classification, which for
Plato meant science itself, that which makes possible the
dialectical ascent and descent through successive groups of
things, with a preponderance of identity at the upper end, of
difference at the lower end of the scale.
It is perhaps for this reason, with a view to the exigencies
of classification, that the Same and the Other, although
without reality apart from their union, are represented as
not merged in it, but as continuing to preserve a certain
separateness as objects of thought. Such at least seems to
be the meaning of a rather mysterious passage in which the <
Platonic Timaeus tells us that God mixed together the Same,
the Other and Existence to form the soul. It implies that
there are various types of existence distinguished by the
relative homogeneity or heterogeneity of their contents, and
realised in the first instance as more or less uniform or
irregular modes of motion.
Here we enter on the most critical part of the whole
discussion, and I must ask the reader to give his best atten-
tion to what follows. It relates to the vexed question of
what Plato understood by soul (tyv'xyi).
The introduction of a creative God in the Timaus is, of
course, purely allegorical. Nothing existed before Existence
itself ; and no external power was needed to combine the
abstract elements into which it is decomposed by thought,
as in reality they had never been separated. So much is
now generally admitted. But the notion of a cosmic soul
seems to be more seriously intended ; and it is just what has
given rise to the theories alluded to at the beginning of this
paper as involving, in my opinion, a complete misinterpreta-
tion of Plato and a gross anachronism in the history of
philosophy. It has not been sufficiently considered that by
soul the Greek thinker means an invisible and intangible,
but not what is for us the decisive note of spiritualism
an inextended substance. In the present instance the soul
described is, as may easily be gathered from the detailed
account of its structure, a limited area of space divided into
several concentric zones and engaged in perpetual movement.
That space or any part of it should move is for us an incon-
ceivable supposition ; but Plato seems to find no difficulty
about it. The difficulty for him would rather have been to
conceive space as not moving. And these rotatory figures
42 A. W. BENN :
into which the soul-substance is divided are no allegory ;
they are the orbits of the heavenly bodies, the sphere of the
fixed stars with the enclosed spheres (or wheels) in which
-the sun and planets are carried round the centre of the
universe, i.e., the centre of the earth ; l and in speaking about
them as divisions of one great soul he means to emphasise
their pure and incorruptible nature, the unchanging con-
stancy of their movements, the mathematical harmony of
the intervals by which they are separated, and the spon-
taneous energy with which their revolutions are performed.
Whether seriously or, not, these revolutions are represented as
being indispensable to the free play of the cosmic intelligence,
which through them is kept in touch with every part of the
universe and made aware of what goes on through its whole
extent. As Grote puts it in his business-like style, ' informa-
tion is thus circulated about the existing relations between all
the separate parts and specialties '. -
The conception of soul as inseparable from extension was
inherited by Plato from Parmenides, with whom it was a
survival of the primitive animism common to all mankind.
After refining down corporeal existence to pure space the
Eleatic master proceeded naively to identify this attenuated
residuum with pure reason, a confusion in which he was
followed by Anaxagoras, and which Aristotle was the first to
overcome. No thinker indeed has ever made more of the
distinction between soul and body than Plato ; yet the
distinction as we find it in him is always somewhat waver-
ing and relative. From the ideal scheme of the Timceus we
may perhaps gather that by soul is to be understood that
form of existence in which the element of Identity prevails,
by body that in which Difference prevails. According to this
view, pure space stands for the utmost conceivable amount
of Difference, a dim something just at or a little beyond the
bounds of legitimate thought. For to Plato as to Kant to
think was to condition ; only what to the modern is a merely
subjective process was to the Greek an objective process also,
the process which alone makes existence possible, the process,
of limitation.
In a somewhat earlier dialogue, the Pliilebus, which like
the Sophist supplies a connecting link between the Parmenides.
and the Timaus, Plato had described this process as a
1 1 am inclined to think that Plato thought of the sun and planets aa
being carried round the centre of the universe by flat bands or hoops
according to the theory of early Greek astronomy, not by spheres as in
Aristotle's cosmology.
I'latoand the Other Compa/nions ofSokrates, vol. iv., p. 227 (ed. of 1885).
THE LATER ONTOLOGY OF PLATO. .43
mingling of the Limit (TO Trepa?) with the Unlimited or
Infinite (TO aireipov, 23 C, 26 D). With a reminiscence of
his first antithetical construction he there speaks of the
Limit as one and of the Unlimited as many, though without
identifying them directly with the One and the Many as
such ; while again their synthesis, the Limited, is not
treated as coextensive with existence, although a phrase
occurs about generation into existence, pointing significantly
in that direction (26 D). l But as the primary object of the
Philebus is ethical rather than metaphysical being in fact to
show that pleasure only becomes a good through limita-
tion the ontological problem remains outstanding and first
receives its solution in the Timosus, where the Limit and the
Unlimited reappear as the Same and the Other, and this
Other takes the shape if shape it can be called that shape
has none of infinite space, an abstract of the content
enclosed by all quantitative and qualitative limitations, and
ever striving to break loose from all.
Space as defined and limited by the courses of the stars
and planets presented no difficulties to Plato, for there form
and content were inseparably united, and constituted the
very type of eternal reality. But on descending to the lower
region between sky and earth he found it filled with bodies
that come into being and pass out of it again, resolving
themselves into the form and matter by whose union they
had been temporarily constituted. The forms, whether
numbers or geometrical figures, or qualities, or groups of
qualities, had long occupied his attention ; he had accounted
for them as terrestrial copies of eternal self-existent Ideas ;
and now that he had come to represent the Ideas as
modifications of the Same by successive combinations with
the Other placed visibly before our eyes in the heavenly
spheres, it was as copies, however imperfect and distorted, of
those spheres that he conceived the inhabitants of earth, as
effluxes of their glory and revelations of their power, passing
down by a series of degradations from perfect definiteness to
something almost indistinguishable from the formless inane.
Being mere images and created, or rather, if the expression
be permitted, become things, they do not, like the heavenly
bodies, possess a certain portion of space in perpetuity, but
are always drifting about from place to place. 2 And as they
1 The opposition here is between yiveais and ova-ia ; in the Timxus it is
between yevtvis and Sv (52 D), a clear proof that Plato uses.ovtrta and ov
as equivalent and convertible terms.
2 So I understand the difficult words (Tim., 52 C), fireiirep oiS' ain-6
TOVTO ((()' a> ytyoixv favrrjs f&Ttv, (Ttpov df rti/oy, aei (f)tpfrai <fodvTacrp.a, which
44 A. W. BENN :
are dissociated from space, so space must be conceived or
rather dimly imagined as dissociated from them, but as
ready to assume the form of each in turn. By a curious
illusion of the inward sense it is indeed represented as a
partaker in their restlessness, as swaying about from one to
another (52 D-E). l
It is this ascription of motion to what Parmenides had
more justly described as absolutely immovable that makes
the account of space in the Timceus so difficult to realise. In
truth space was to Plato without reflexion what long reflex-
ion has made it to the modern psychologist, not so much
an infinite aggregate of coexistences as an infinite possibility
of movement ; while again this conception lapses into the
conception of matter as at once the subject of movement and
the object of sensation. For it is by the imposition of
various geometrical figures on pure unformed space that he
imagines the primary molecules of matter to have arisen ;
and he explains the elementary properties of matter as
modes of motion due to the violent oscillations of space
acting on particles of different sizes and shapes, aided as
would seem b c y the pressure resulting from the rotation of
the celestial sphere ; and it is by the impact of these particles
on our bodily organs that sensations are produced (52 E, 58
A, 61 C sqq.*).
We are now in a better position to consider what has
become of the outstanding antithetical couple, Kest and
Motion, in the readjusted economy of our philosopher's
ultimate ideas. As an antithesis it would seem to have
been merged in the Same and the Other. We may, if we
choose, very appropriately think of Kest as the eternally
self -identical, of Motion as the eternally self -differentiating
principle in things. 2 But it would be truer to say that in
this instance the antithetical relation has passed out of sight.
Where there is an antithesis there is, at least for Greek
Mr. Archer-Hind seems to me to have entirely misapprehended. I can
make nothing of Jowett's translation, ' an image not possessing that of
which the image is, and existing ever as the changing shadow of some
other,' except that the peculiar force of fapfTai seems to have been
missed. The intriate, not to say contorted phraseology of the whole
passage gives one the impression that Plato wished to disguise from
others and even from himself the extent to which he had abandoned his
old transcendentalism for a theory more in consonance with ordinary
experience.
1 In the above interpretation I have tried to combine what is true in
Teichmuller's view (Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe, p. 328) with the
generally accepted view that \rnpn means empty space.
2 Indeed as much is intimated in Tim., 57 E.
THE LATER ONTOLOGY OF PLATO. 45
notions, an opposite valuation ; and it would be against all
Platonic usage not to class Kest as a supreme good. Yet in
the Timceus Motion seems to occupy a very honourable posi-
tion as an essential attribute of the cosmic bodies and even
of the human soul, which is represented as imitating their
revolutions and as being enabled to reason only by per-
petually returning on itself. Nor can this view be put aside
as part of the mythological machinery by which purely
spiritual relations are illustrated ; for in the Phcedrus and
again in the Laws the soul is described as ever-moving and
self -moved, while the Eleatic Stranger of the Sophist declares
motion to be inseparable from being (245 C, 896 A, 248 E).
In all these instances, however, if I am not mistaken, we
are to think of Motion not as absolute, but as combined with
Rest. The possibility of a direct union between the two had
been suggested in the Sophist and provisionally rejected, but
with a hint that the question might be reopened on a more
suitable occasion. l And now in the Timceus the solution
seems to have been found. May we not say that Best and
Motion are combined in the perfectly uniform revolutions of
the starry sphere (or rather of the whole world) on its axis,
of the lesser spheres on their axes, and to a less extent, that
is with a preponderance of the inferior element, in all the
other periodic cycles of nature? If so another abstract
opposition has been reconciled in the actuality of concrete
existence.
Reference has just been made to the intimate association
between psychic activity and movement. The notion is
peculiar to Plato's later dialogues assuming the Ph<zdrus to
have been written after the Republic' 2 and reaches its.
extreme development in Laws (book x.), where an evil soul is
postulated as the cause of irregular movements. The
analogy with Zoroastrianism at once suggests itself, but is
probably accidental. Where Plato is writing for a popular
audience, as in the Laws, the introduction of moral values in
connexion with physical speculations must not be taken too
seriously. The significant thing is the thoroughgoing
identification of soul with the cause of physical motion, with
what modern science until recently called Force, or even
with motion itself, considered as the result of impact and
1 256 B, with Prof. Lewis Campbell's note.
2 Lutoslawski, op. cit., p. 348. The absolute dates assigned by M.
Lutoslawski to the Republic and the Phiedrus are in my opinion much
too early ; and as regards the latter I do not see what support he gets
from Thompson ; but the important thing is the determination of their
relative date, and there I agree with him.
46 A. W. BENN :
pressure, and the merely secondary reference to feeling and
thought. We can hardly suppose that Plato attributed the
disturbance of one stone by another which is an instance
of what he calls irregular motion to the direct action of
Satan, or whatever else the ' evil soul ' is to be called. The
question is rather how far he really attributed conscious
intelligence to the animating principles of the celestial
bodies. We seem to be dealing with a stage of reflexion
where spiritualism and materialism, monism and dualism
are still very imperfectly differentiated.
Physic from metaphysic takes defence
And metaphysic calls for aid on sense.
Space, matter, motion, force, life, soul and reason form a
continuous series, our interpretation of which largely de-
pends on the term that we choose to take as the keynote
of the whole system. And there is at least one indication
going to prove that the idealist view will not bear being
too strictly pressed. But here the question, already a suffi-
ciently intricate one, becomes still more complicated by its
connexion with the doctrine of final causes.
Plato distinguishes between teleological and mechanical
causation, an opposition which has survived into modern
philosophy. With him as with us the distinction lies
between intelligent action for a pre-determined purpose
and blind obedience to physical necessity. But at the very
outset a difference presents itself between his point of view
and ours, which incidentally illustrates the extreme caution
needed in the comparative study of ancient and modern
thought. For when we follow the parallel into detail what
seemed a resemblance becomes a contrast. The spiritualism
of Athens is the materialism of to-day. The immutable
uniformity, the eternal self-repetition which we associate
with blind mechanical causation and which has found its
most general expression in the doctrine of the Conservation
of Energy, is with Plato the end itself, and its presence the
very sign of a purpose fulfilled. He sees in the revolutions
of the starry heavens, in what he calls the circle of the
Same, the most complete success of designing intelligence,
the supreme victory of the assimilative over the differen-
tiating power. And it is by the wayward incalculable
movements of the molecules from which the four elements,
fire, air, earth and water, are built up, of these elements
themselves and of the organisms w r hich they nourish that
the reign of necessity is best represented. But in the
interest of the present argument what concerns us most to
THE LATEE ONTOLOGY OF PLATO. 47
notice is that in direct opposition to this theory of matter he
elsewhere describes two of the four elements, fire and earth,
as existing for the sole purpose of being perceived by sight
and touch ; while the other two, air and water, are there
merely to connect those extremes by harmonious mathe-
matical proportions (31 B sqq.). In other words matter does
not, as with Berkeley, exist through perception, but in order
that it may be perceived by our senses, and therefore it takes
the form of fire and earth, an antithetical couple with the
usual mediating links. And now comes the very significant
detail to which attention is invited. Plato tells us that the
heavenly bodies were composed chiefly of fire, and the sun
(as would seem) entirely of that element in order that he
might illuminate the whole heaven, and that by studying his
revolutions the living beings to whom such knowledge is
appropriate might learn arithmetic, and through arithmetic
attain to the ideas of Identity and Difference. By the way
it is rather remarkable that Plato in his increasing fanaticism
for logic and mathematics should completely ignore the sun's
life-giving power on which he had particularly dwelt in the
Republic. But to return : besides their bodies of fire, the
sun and the other celestial orbs have souls constituted by
the twofold movement that animates them, a movement of
axial rotation representing the form of Identity, and a retro-
grade movement of revolution round the centre of the whole
cosmic sphere in a circle inclined to the celestial equator,
representing the form of Difference. The fiery body is
apparently devoid of sensibility, and exists only that it
may illustrate an object-lesson in natural law for intelligent
beings, i.e., ourselves. Is it likely then that the movements
which it makes manifest should be constituted or accom-
panied by consciousness ? especially if, as there seems every
reason to believe, the movements are such as could be
performed without the intervention of intelligence and will. x
To unravel this tangled skein of thought, two points must
1 The same ambiguity is exhibited, but with much greater clearness in
Aristotle's cosmology, where two independent explanations are offered of
the celestial motions, either of which would render the other superfluous.
The one, which may be called physical, represents the quintessential
matter of which the heavens are composed as naturally moving in a
circle without ever stopping, whereas fire rises and earth falls until they
come to rest on reaching their respective places at the circumference
and centre of the sublunary sphere. The other or metaphysical ex-
planation (adopted by Dante) is that the heavenly orbs are animated by
conscious spirits which move them round in love and emulation of the
eternal self-thinking thought, itself unmoved, on which all nature hangs
(De Coelo, i., 2 ; Phys., viii., 10 ; Metaph. xii., 7 and 8).
48 A. W. BENN :
be borne in mind. The first is that, as has been already
observed, Plato's object in writing the Timceus was not
merely to explain what the world is, but also to explain how
it can be known. The second is that according to the
unanimous tradition of Greek philosophy like can only be
known by like. Plato accepted this leading, and it probably
had a good deal to do with his preference for the category of
identity in the construction of an intelligible universe. He
had explained the heavens as a series of repetitions and
imitations ; he had now to bring human life under the same
law, and accordingly he bends every effort towards establish-
ing an equation between nature and man.
There does not at first sight seem to be a very striking
resemblance or even analogy between the body of man and
the world that he inhabits or between his mind and the
principles by which that world is moved ; but our logician
gets over the difficulty in the following ingenious manner.
The essential part of a human being is his head, the abode of
reason ; the trunk and limbs are mere subsidiary appendages
designed to meet the necessity for nutrition and locomotion
entailed by his residence in a region of perpetual flux where
the loss of old material must be continually made good by
the accession of new supplies. Like him the cosmic sphere
and the smaller spheres that it encloses are rational animals
indeed they have furnished the pattern on which he is
constructed but being limited to rotatory movements and
not subject to waste they can dispense with a locomotory,
prehensile, and digestive apparatus. In short they are all
head, and our heads are the heavenliest thing about us : but
where are their axial and orbital revolutions ?
Plato knew that our heads do not turn ; and he must
have known that when they seem to go round it is the worst
possible sign for the orderly functioning of the brain ; but he
finds a parallel for the circles of the Same and the Other,
that is for the diurnal and periodical revolutions of the celes-
tial spheres in the working of a rightly ordered human
reason ; and he looks to the study of astronomy as a primary
means of intellectual and moral discipline in the reformed
society of the future. Of course it is all a fantastic way of
saying that there is a unity of composition through the
whole of nature, and that the steadiness of physical law is a
guide to steadiness of reasoning and conduct. Yet no one
would have attacked another philosopher with more merci-
less ridicule had he chosen a phenomenon so suggestive of
dizziness as the outward and visible sign of rational reflex-
ion, and the deliberate adoption of such an absurdity can be
THE LATER ONTOLOGY OF PLATO. 49
explained only by the desire to force an analogy through at
all hazards. But we may well ask whether the ascription of
consciousness to the world without is to be understood more
literally than the ascription of rotatory movement to the
world within. With respect, however, to the deification of
the heavenly bodies, a practical motive comes into play,
which, as Plato grew older, gained increasing ascendency
over his teaching. This was the desire to reconcile his
philosophy with the popular faith ; partly no doubt in order
to escape persecution, but also, and to a greater extent,
because he had come to look on a purified theology as the
surest sanction of social order.
What remains after allowing the largest possible discount
for dialectical accommodation, for myth, for allegory, for
religious edification gained at the expense of the old Ionian
plain speaking, or of extreme deference to popular fanaticism,
is the great thought of identity in difference, the conquering
assimilation of the Same in the cosmic order with the Same
in the human self, the mystical communion, already affirmed
by Heracleitus and Parmenides, to be reaffirmed long after-
wards by Kant and Wordsworth, between the starry heavens
without and the moral law within. And on a lower or at
any rate a different plane, the plane of pure science, the
Timceus foreshadows one of the most fertile methods of
modern inquiry, never used with more searching effect than
in our own day, what may be called the method of assimila-
tion, based on the tendency of evolution to make things not
more unlike but more like one another.
In tracing the outlines of this philosophy of identity one
cannot but be reminded of another Identitats-philosophie, of
the fragmentary system which remains as Schelling's only
real contribution to the development of modern thought.
For the German as for the Greek ontologist the object was
to reconcile nature with man ; only what the one had just
glimpsed as an antithesis between knowledge and being
transforms itself for the other into the profounder antithesis
between subject and object. But the method by which both
attempt to establish an equation between disparate quan-
tities is substantially the same. It consists in carrying over
portions of each to the other side and arranging them in
parallel series until a complete analogy of structure has been
effected, when the two are boldly declared to be the same, or
to reflect one another. For example (' that's Schelling's
way ! ') we may argue that in self -consciousness the subject
is its own object, hence there is an identity between the two
and these three are one. And with a little ingenuity and
4
50 A. W. BENN :
more good-will certain physical concepts may be so manipu-
lated as to play the part of percipient subjects to others
standing for perceived objects, while a third set represents
the synthesis or ' identity ' of the two. Thus the evolution
of consciousness does but reflect on a higher plane what
was prefigured in the evolution of inorganic matter and of
unconscious life.
The substantial identity of mind with its object occupies a
much less prominent place in the Timcsus than in the Natur-
philosophie. But we can hardly doubt that when Plato set
up the Idea of the Same as the ruling principle of cosmic
being and of human reason alike he wished the two to be
regarded as essentially one. The Same must everywhere be
the same with itself. And this method would have the
additional recommendation of giving a new meaning and
sanction to his habit of conveying philosophical lessons
through the vehicle of myth and allegory. For according to
his latest interpretation Nature herself is the great allegorist
and myth-maker. The consummate and eternal reality of the
starry sphere repeats itself on a smaller scale through all the
lower spheres, of which our earth is one ; on a still smaller
scale, with less definite forms and with endless self-reproduc-
tion as a substitute for their eternal duration, in the creatures
of the lower world. In the Republic he had drawn a dis-
paraging contrast between imitation and reality, shadow and
substance. He had now learned to think of imitation as the
primal reality, the constraint exercised by the Same on the
Other, the obedience of the Other to the Same. And perhaps
he would have recognised a truer echo of his doctrine in
the repetition universelle of M. Tarde than in all the hollow
declamation of Victor Cousin.
I have already drawn attention to the fact that the Idea of
the Good in the Eepublic is, like the Same in the Timaus,
beyond existence. And the resemblance does not end there.
We are told that the Idea of the Good is, like the sun, a
source of life no less than of illumination, the author of
being no less than of knowledge. Now this, as we have
seen, is precisely the part played by the Idea of the Same,
the assimilative power of the Timaus. It brings order out of
chaos in space, it brings knowledge out of confused sensation
in consciousness. And we are told that the Good can only
be approached through the study of geometry a method
not less indispensable to the apprehension of the Same as
Plato conceived it, that is primarily under the form of
mathematical equality.
Nevertheless the Good is not the Same. For as the
THE LATEE ONTOLOGY OF PLATO. 51
analysis of the Philebus shows, Plato had come to think of
the former after a much more concrete and human fashion
approaching very closely to the standpoint of Aristotle's
Ethics 1 than that under which it appears in the Republic.
Like Existence it has passed from the position of an ex-
treme to that of a mean. It is neither pleasure alone nor
knowledge alone, but the reconciling synthesis of both, the
delighted realisation of ourselves. Accordingly its metal
physical functions are now taken over by the more genera-
conception of Identity, which by combining with Difference
actualises and reveals itself as an assimilative power. It is
this which at once creates the cosmos and enables us to
understand it through the consciousness of its essential
sameness with ourselves. But neither is the ethical aspect
of the absolute Idea forgotten ; for Plato significantly
reminds us that God, being good, wished everything to
resemble Himself (Tim. 29 E).
Plato can hardly have been blind to the irreconcilable dis-
crepancies between the Timcetis and the Republic , and there
is even reason to believe that he contemplated the prepara-
tion of a new and revised edition of the earlier dialogue with
the omission of the sections embodying the metaphysical
theories which riper reflexion had induced him to abandon
as mistaken or incomplete. For without such an assump-
tion the references to the Republic in the introductory portion
of the Timceus can hardly be explained. Nearly the whole of
the Republic as we now read it takes the form of a con-
versation originally held between Socrates and two young
friends of his, Glaucon and Adeimantus, Plato's brothers,
and repeated on the following day by Socrates himself to
some person or persons unknown. But in the Timceus no
mention is made of these young men, and the conversation
about the structure of the ideal state is represented as having
passed between Socrates and certain other persons not
named in the -Republic, Critias, Timseus, Hermocrates, and
a fourth who is not now present. They have met again
to continue the discussion ; and to refresh their memories
Socrates recapitulates the conclusions reached in common on
the preceding day, but with the significant omission of all
reference to the long philosophical argument extending
1 Aristotle's sneers at the unpractical nature of Plato's ideal Good show
how little the pupil can be trusted as an authority on the final teaching
of the master. I have therefore been at no pains to reconcile his version
of Platonism with that adopted in the present paper.
52 A. W. BENN :
from book v., 471 C, to the end of book vii. 1 Partly on
account of this omission and partly for other reasons it has
been supposed by some that the summary of the Timceus
refers to an earlier version of the EepuUic than that now
extant, written when Plato was comparatively young, and
that the philosophical digression was inserted long afterwards
as the fruit of his riper years. Such an explanation, however,
has become completely untenable in the face of modern
researches, showing that no portion of the Republic can be
dated much earlier than Plato's fiftieth year; while the
evolution of his thought, if it followed the order traced out
in the present paper, subsequently reached a much higher
stage than that represented by the conversation with Glaucon
and Adeimantus. I submit then as a not unwarrantable
alternative that the later Socrates makes no reference to this
conversation because its author had in view an amended
version of his great work, possibly on a new plan, and at any
rate with a different set of interlocutors, who were to have
reserved the subject of ontology for a separate discussion.
The results here arrived at are not perhaps of any great
speculative interest. World-thinkers count in the history of
philosophy less for what they have actually thought than for
what they have been thought to think. Now at the three
epochs of his most momentous influence on the human
mind, that is during the years that immediately followed his
death, during the early Middle Ages, and during the Kenais-
sance Plato passed without question for a Realist in the
scholastic sense, for one who attributes a separate existence
to Ideas independent of the human mind and independent of
the sensible particulars that they inform. In the England
of our own time he has come once more to count as a literary
and philosophical force of the first order ; but he counts as
inspiration rather than as authority, and he counts by his
earlier rather than by his later works. We have learned
from him how the highest culture may be combined with
the most strenuous efforts for the amelioration of life, how
' the spectator of all time and all existence ' must descend
to be an actor in the one time and the one existence that are
allotted him to work in while he has the light. And the
lesson is happily independent of what his particular opinions
1 As Mr. Archer-Hind observes, ' its metaphysical teaching is superseded
by the more advanced ontology of the Tim&us' (The Timzeus of Plato,
p. 56 note). I do not, however, understand Mr. Archer-Hind to suggest
that a new edition of the Republic was in contemplation ; and his
interpretation of this ' advanced ontology ' differs widely from mine.
THE LATER ONTOLOGY OF PLATO. 53
were and whether we agree with them or not. Yet apart
from the value rightly attached by all scholars to truth as
such, and from the interest always attached to the correct
interpretation of so great a mind as Plato's, it may be urged
that the evolution of thought becomes more intelligible when
we consent to treat the cosmology of Aristotle the key to
his whole philosophy as having been moulded far more
than he would have liked to admit by the method of a
master to whom he was less than just, but from whom he
learned the secret of a great achievement, the reconciliation
of Parmenides with Heracleitus, the principle of eternal
self-identity in the absolute whole with the principle of
variety, relativity, antagonism, and mutual dependence in
its component parts.
III. THE HEGELIAN POINT OF VIEW. 1
BY J. S. MACKENZIE.
AT the opening of such a society as this, it seems most
fitting to attempt a somewhat general survey of the philo-
sophical situation, rather than to discuss one of those more
specific problems with which the society may be expected to
be engaged throughout the course of the long life of energetic
thought to which, I trust, it may look forward. It is im-
portant that we should take our bearings from time to time,
lest we lose ourselves in a multitude of details ; and especially
at the outset it is highly desirable that we should have some
general conception of the point of view from which philo-
sophical problems are to be discussed. For though a society
of this kind is not to be regarded as existing for the propaga-
tion of any particular philosophical creed ; yet I think it
would be equally fatal to its usefulness to suppose that it
has been called into being merely for the idle play of dialectic,
merely to tear theories to rags and tatters, according to
Plato's image, after the manner of puppy-dogs. It is, I
think, a general condition for the profitable discussion of
specific questions that those who take part in it should be to
some considerable extent in agreement on the larger questions
of principle and method. No doubt it is possible to carry on
a society for the express purpose of discussing the point of
view that is to be adopted ; and indeed I should hope that
this would form part, and even a considerable part, of our
work here. But I am afraid the society would soon be felt
to be unprofitable if we only came together to make known
to one another the hopeless divergences in our ways of re-
garding things. We should in that case be too nearly in the
position of those poor islanders, recently alluded to by the
late Dr. Sidgwick, who earned a precarious livelihood by
washing each other's clothes. We may sometimes be wash-
ing one another's clothes ; and we may even, from time to
1 The Opening Address to the Philosophical Society at University
College, Cardiff: Delivered in March, 1901.
THE HEGELIAN POINT OF VIEW. , 55
time, have a sort of spring cleaning ; but our regular employ-
ment must, I think, be something different. We must have
some sort of garments, more or less clean, to go on with.
Now the point of view from which we approach philo-
sophical questions will no doubt be determined for us very
largely by the present position of human thought in general.
We may find that we have a Socrates or a Descartes among
us, some one who will be able to give a new turn to the
whole course of our speculations ; but even Socrates and
Descartes were very largely guided by the ideas that their
predecessors had been slowly building up. If we were living
in ancient Athens, we should have to discuss the ideas with
which Plato and Aristotle were struggling : it would be vain
to attempt to introduce those of Spinoza and Leibniz, though
in many respects the latter were very similar to the former.
So, if we were living in the seventeenth century in Europe,
our best hope of progress would lie in throwing ourselves
into the problems that exercised the minds of the Cartesians.
At any time we shall find that there is a point of view from
which a survey can be taken, and from which advance is
possible. It is of some importance, therefore, to ask our-
selves where we stand at the present time, and what are
likely to be the most fruitful methods of procedure. It is
my object in this paper to urge that the point of view from
w T hich we must set out may, in a certain broad sense, be
described as the Hegelian ; and to bring out what appear to
me to be the most essential elements in that position.
In doing this, I must try to distinguish between a philo-
sophical system and a philosophical point of view. A system
is the construction of an individual. It generally bears
considerable traces of the idiosyncrasies of its maker his
special knowledge, his peculiar interests, the virtues that he
chiefly prizes, his prejudices, his limitations. A point of view
is something much wider. It is the world within which
systems are made. It belongs rather to the age than to the
individual. The systems of Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus,
Parmenides, are vastly different from one another ; but the
point of view from which they are built up is very largely
the same. So it is with the systems of Plato and Aristotle,
with those of the Stoics and Epicureans, with those of
Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, with those of Hobbes,
Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, with those of Kant, Fichte,
Hegel, and Schopenhauer. In all such cases we have to
deal partly with the constructive efforts of individuals, but
partly also with a general phase in the development of the
human mind. Now, it will generally be found in such cases
56 J. S. MACKENZIE :
that some one or two writers bring the special phase in
question to a focus, and enable us to see its precise signifi-
cance. Heraclitus and Parmenides bring out between them
the essential ideas and the fundamental difficulties of early
Greek thought. Descartes shows us the beginning of one
line of thought, and Spinoza its end. Hobbes represents the
positive foundations of the most characteristically English
philosophy, while Hume exhibits its sceptical results. So
Kant gives the critical roots for German idealism, while
Hegel presents to us its largest and ripest fruits. In speak-
ing, then, of the Hegelian point of view, I do not mean
to direct attention so much to the peculiar features of his
own philosophical construction as to the general significance
of the line of thought of which he is the most complete and
conspicuous representative.
There are several grounds on which it seems to me
specially desirable to draw this distinction. One is the
rather obvious one, that the Hegelian system is exceedingly
comprehensive and complicated. If I were to attempt to
deal with its more specific features, we should soon be lost
in the midst of details as bewildering as those of the Aris-
totelian system. We could not possibly do justice to such
details, even if we could venture to hope that we had rightly
understood them. Further, I am of opinion that the Hegelian
system, like most other constructive systems perhaps more
decidedly than most is an amalgam of gold and other less
valuable materials. What he said about the tides is prob-
ably worth as little as what Aristotle said about the brain ;
and similar remarks might possibly apply even to some of
the more important parts of his system. Hence I wish, as
far as possible, to direct attention rather to the underlying
spirit and meaning than to the more or less insignificant
details. This attitude can, I believe, be justified on historical
grounds. In Germany, as was natural, the Hegelian system
took root as a whole, aud controversies raged over its appli-
cations in particular directions, with the result that the
school split up into parties, which were mutually destructive,
and in the heat of whose debates the general significance of
the point of view seemed almost to evaporate. In our own
country the development of the Hegelian point of view
seems to me to have been in some respects more fortunate.
Its first and most enthusiastic exponent in this country, Dr.
Hutchison Stirling, did indeed follow in the lines of its
German adherents. He might fairly be described as a
propagandist of the system as a system. But hardly any
others of the leading representatives of the Hegelian ten-
THE HEGELIAN POINT OF VIEW. 57
dency in this country have adopted this attitude. The late
Prof. Wallace, who did more than any one to make some
of the chief works of Hegel accessible to English readers,
dealt with Hegel in general, as he dealt with some other
leading philosophers, not as the maker of a system, but as
one who suggested certain large ideas and methods of treat-
ment. T. H. Green, who in his later years was generally
regarded as the leader of the Hegelian tendency, was very
far indeed from being an adherent of the Hegelian system.
According to one account, he was in the habit of saying
that it would all have to be done over again. According
to another, he even described the most fundamental part
of the Hegelian construction as a Wirrwarr or Chaos. Cer-
tainly his own constructive attempts are widely different
from those of Hegel, both in method and in results. Dr.
Edward' Caird is no doubt more fully in sympathy with the
Hegelian system ; but even he has been mainly occupied in
making a bridge from Kant to Hegel a bridge of which it
may perhaps be said, that it is much more certain that it
leads us away from Kant than that it leads us on "to Hegel.
The work of Dr. F. H. Bradley, again, though closer to that
of Hegel than Green's, is still in many important respects
both of method and of content far removed from it. Dr.
Bosanquet is no doubt still closer to Hegel ; but, though he
has followed him very definitely on some detailed points, his
general attitude is rather that of one who has absorbed some
of the leading ideas of the Hegelian point of view, and who
uses them freely in his own way. I need not refer to the
younger members of the school, whose final position remains
more in doubt ; but I think it may be said of them in general
that, though they are sometimes more minutely loyal in
the following out of the details of Hegelianism than their
predecessors were, yet their criticisms notably those of
Mr. McTaggart point to even more emphatic divergences
from tbe stricter tenets of the sect. Yet the result of all
this has been, I think, that the general spirit of the Hegelian
philosophy has gained an even firmer hold on the speculative
thought of this country than it gained in Germany. Hence
there seems to be some historic ground for believing that, in
this as in many other cases, the letter kills and the spirit
gives life. But, after all, it may be safer to rest my case on
a more subjective ground. What Hegel has meant for me
is the point on which I am most entitled to speak ; and
what I can say is that I have derived the greatest help
from his general point of view, but have not as yet seen my
way to follow him much with regard to details. This is
58 J. S. MACKENZIE :
very probably my fault and not his ; but, at any rate, it
leads me to take a greater interest in trying to give some
account of what I take to be the essential elements in his
position than I should in attempting to expound the more
special features of his system. I must beg, then, that you
will regard what I have to say simply as a statement of
what the Hegelian philosophy means for me, not what it
meant for Hegel, nor what it means or may come to mean
for any of you. Hegel's philosophy is a very large thing, one
of the most remarkable products of the human mind ; and it
probably has a somewhat different significance for almost
every one who approaches it. Hegel himself is said to have
complained that only one man ever understood him and
he did not understand him. Perhaps all of us who try to
study his work may claim in some degree to be that man.
We all understand him, and do not understand him. We
understand what he means for us, not what he meant for
himself.
In trying to explain, in general terms, what the Hegelian
point of view has meant for me, I may avail myself of a state-
ment of the general significance of German Idealism, made
some time ago by Dr. Bosanquet in a paper that is no doubt
familiar to many of you his essay on the philosophical im-
portance of a true theory of Identity. That paper seems to
me to be characterised by a more than ordinary degree of the
writer's happy faculty for hitting upon the most essential
points, without appearing to be saying anything very particu-
lar. He is not concerned in it, any more than I am here, with
the details of the Hegelian or any other philosophical system ;
but he aims at a general characterisation of that movement
of German thought of which the Hegelian system was the
culmination. In doing this, he remarks, in the first place,
that it is a mistake to suppose that the distinction between
the main line of German speculation and that which is
specially associated with our own country is to be found in
the fact that the latter appeals to experience, or that it in-
volves the recognition of the relativity of knowledge. No
philosophy could well contain a more emphatic appeal to
experience than those of Kant and Hegel ; nor would it be
easy to have a more ample recognition of the relativity of
all things than we find in their works. It is urged, in the
paper to which I have referred, that the real point of differ-
ence lies rather in the emphasis that is laid throughout the
course of the German line of thought on the reality of the
universal as an element of identity in difference, as against
the disintegrating atomism which shows its constructive
THE HEGELIAN POINT OF VIEW. 59
results in Hobbes and its sceptical issue in Hume ; and it is
pointed out that this recognition of the universal leads to a
remodelling of the treatment of some of the most fundamental
questions in Logic, in Psychology, in Ethics, and in Political
Philosophy.
Now, in a general way, I think we may almost regard such
a remodelling as an accomplished fact in British philosophy.
In Logic, Dr. Bosanquet himself, following the lead of
Bradley, has done yeoman's service in this direction. We
are probably not in much danger of returning either to the
nominalistic Logic with its computations and equations of
identities, or to the concept ualist Logic with its combination
of distinct notions. The unity in difference contained in the
judgment is now pretty universally recognised. In Psychol-
ogy, the atomism of the Associationist school has been largely
broken down by Dr. Ward's continuum ; and, more recently,
in the work of Dr. Stout, the place of the universal in con-
sciousness has been still more completely brought to light.
In Ethics and Political Philosophy we cannot perhaps as yet
point to work of quite the same definite and detailed character ;
but Green, Caird, Bradley, Bosanquet, and others, have at
least made a very good beginning in the direction that is
required. If Hedonism still lingers, 1 it has certainly lost its
old confident tone ; and even seeks to shelter itself, as in the
case of the late Prof. Sidgwick, under the wing of the uni-
versal. These various applications, however, of the idea of
identity in difference, or of the reality of the universal, are
almost commonplaces of the German method of philoso-
phising. They belong to Kant, or at least to Lotze, almost
as much as to Hegel. What we have now to attempt' to
bring out is the point of view that is more distinctively
Hegelian.
Now, many would, I suppose, say at once that the most
distinctive feature of the Hegelian philosophy is its Dialectic
Method, which appears at every point in its course, and at
every point pursues the same inevitable march. The No-
tion fulfilling itself through negation is thought to be " the
Secret of Hegel"; and it can only be grasped by following
the windings of the dialectic process from Pure Being up-
wards. And, in a sense, I have no doubt that this is true.
The student who wishes to have a thorough grasp of the
Hegelian point of view must master the idea of the Dialectic,
1 The curious reviral of it in Mr. McTaggart's Studies in Hegelian
Cosmology is noteworthy, especially when taken in conjunction with his
denial of the organic unity of society.
60 J. S. MACKENZIE :
wrestling with the expositions of Hegel himself, and perhaps
helping them out by such comments as those of McTaggart,
McGilvary, Noel, and others. 1 But it is possible to make
too much of this. There is a danger of exaggerating the
importance of a philosopher's special method of procedure,
which is often an accident, and sometimes even a separable
accident, of his mode of thought. I suppose few would
maintain that the geometrical method has much to do with
the most essential points in Spinoza, though it is of supreme
importance to remember that he was working througohut
with mathematical conceptions. A still better illustration
is perhaps provided by Kant. If Kant had been asked what
he valued most in the contributions that he made to philo-
sophic thought, I fancy he might have been inclined to point
to his discovery of the categories. We find him returning
to these again and again throughout his writings, one might
almost say with affection, and seeking to apply them in all
possible departments of thought. They are his bunch of
keys, just as the Dialectic is with Hegel. But would any
recent Kantian regard them in a similar light? I suppose
it would now be almost universally admitted, even by those
who value Kant's work the most, that his categories are in
reality derived from a view of the logical judgment that is
inconsistent with his own maturer conception of its meaning,
and that, as a complete statement of the essential modes of
thought-determination, they must utterly fall to the ground.
What is it, then, that we at the present time most value
in the Kantian system ? To this there might be different
answers ; but I believe most of them would come in the end
to this, that Kant's most real contribution to philosophy
was not his system of categories but his view of knowledge
as involving universals which are necessary to the constitu-
tion of any real experience. What was essential to his
system, in short, was his emphasis on the necessity of a
Theory of Knowledge, and his substitution of this for dog-
matic Ontology on the one hand and sceptical Psychology on
the other. But there are few who would accept Kant's
Epistemology as final, and still fewer who would accept his
method of discovering the categories as an integral part of it.
This is, I think, one of the most striking illustrations of the
great difference that may often be found between the under-
lying spirit and permanent essence of a philosopher's work
and certain evanescent devices of method which he himself
may sometimes value even more highly than the other. I
- 1 Especially now those of Mr. J. B. Baillie.
THE HEGELIAN POINT OF VIEW. 61
think something of the same sort might be brought out,
even more strikingly, in the case of Aristotle, whose tricks of
method are completely dead, though the spirit of his thought
was perhaps never more alive than now ; and other instances
might no doubt easily be given. Now I am disposed to
believe though I am well aware that the stricter adherents
of the doctrine will regard it as a heresy that this is largely
the case with the dialectic method of Hegel. It may be a
weakness of the flesh, a shrinking from ' the labour of the
Notion '. The Hegelian way of getting at the categories
certainly seems to me very much superior to that of Kant ;
but if we turn it into a mechanical process, a sort of intel-
lectual switchback, I doubt whether it has very much value.
What, then, is the really important element in the Hegelian
construction? To this I should be disposed to answer,
following the line that has been indicated by Dr. Bosanquet,
that, as the German line of thought in general brings out
the significance of the true universal, so Hegel in particular
has his chief significance in the emphasis that he lays on the
concreteness of the true universal, on its living relation to
the whole, or, in other words, on the solidarity of experience.
Let me try to bring out what I mean by this, by considering
it, first of all, in its relation to Kant's general theory of
knowledge.
Kant, as I have said, brought out the importance of the
universal or thought element in experience. In so doing,
however, he left pure sensation, on the one hand, and the
thing in itself, on the other, quite out of the range of
thought. The intellectual element in experience was thus
made largely formal, dealing with a material to which it
had no real relation. It was regarded, as Caird has put it,
as if it were in the position of an episcopus in partibus, trying
to persuade the recalcitrant particulars of sense that they
ought to come into the unity of thought to have peace and
atonement. It is this mere ' Sollen ' that Hegel everywhere
disapproves. He does not recognise the absolute opposition
between sensation and thought : he does not believe that
there is any such thing as a mere manifold of sensation, and
consequently does not think it necessary to assign to thought
the formal task of bringing it to unity. On this point, at
least, modern psychology seems to be more in accord with
him than with Kant. Experience thus comes to be regarded
as a whole ; and the work of thought is not to make it one,
but rather to make it intelligible to bring out the essential
unity and systematic connexion which are already in it.
Now, if we take this view of the nature of experience, a
62 J. S. MACKENZIE :
doubt is almost inevitably thrown on any abstract and
formal methods of dealing with it perhaps, in the end, on
that of Hegel, as well as on that of Kant. The universals
that have real value for us, from this point of view, are not
abstract, principles that are brought formally to bear upon
an alien material, but principles, so to speak, that emerge
out of the material itself. It is such principles, I believe,
that Hegel seeks to arrive at ; but the significance of this
is apt to be concealed from us if we attach a too exclusive
importance to the dialectic method. The essence of the
Hegelian method seems to me to lie much more in its
genetic than in its dialectic character. I cannot quite agree
with the view that seems to be taken by Mr. Hobhouse,
that the dialectic is only a kind of disease, and that the
healthy mind can get to the concrete universal by a leap.
But I think we miss the true significance of the Hegelian
conception, if we suppose that the aim of the dialectic is to
provide us with abstractions, instead of helping us to annul
them. And I think also that, if any one can succeed in
annulling vicious abstractions, and having a clear insight
into the solidarity of the real universe, by any other method
than that of the dialectic process, he would be very welcome,
from the Hegelian" point of view, to do so. I am, indeed,
not quite convinced in my own mind but perhaps, as I
have said, this is a weakness of the flesh that the dialectic
method is even the best way of doing it. But I am con-
vinced, at least, that it must be done genetically, and not by
a sudden leap.
I conceive, then, that the significance of the Hegelian way
of thinking for the modern world is very much the same as
that of the Aristotelian way of thinking for the ancient
world. There is, indeed, a curious parallelism between the
two lines of development. The English associationists
ground down the contents of experience into very much the
same fine powder as that to which it was reduced by Hera-
clitus and his school ; and Kant, just like Plato, endeavoured
to give it unity again by introducing a system of universals
from without (differing from those of Plato chiefly by their
subjectivity). It was the great aim of Hegel, just as it was
the great aim of Aristotle, to grasp the concrete, to see the
world of individual facts as holding in solution the universal
principles by which they are to be interpreted. A view of
this sort may easily be misconceived in two opposite ways.
It may be represented as merely formal or as merely empir-
ical. Aristotle's method is easily made to appear much more
formal than that of Plato, and this is, perhaps, the more
THE HEGELIAN POINT OF VIEW. 63
common misconception. On the other hand, Aristotle may
be contrasted with Plato as a mere empiricist, and this also
is a common mistake. Similarly, the Hegelian method is
often thought of as a formal dialectic ; and, if an attempt is
made to correct this, it is apt to seem as if it were merely
empirical. But in the case of both these philosophers, and
in that of Hegel more definitely than in that of Aristotle,
we are saved from the empirical position by the conviction
that we have not truly reached what is actual unless we
have been able to see it in the light of thought that only
the intelligible is ultimately real and concrete.
Now, if we accept this general statement as to the sig-
nificance of the Hegelian point of view for modern thought,
it is not difficult to realise why his way of thinking has
meant so much for many of us even for many who by no
means accept the details of his system. With the view,
however, of bringing this out more definitely, I will now
make a further attempt to illustrate the value of such a
point of view with reference to several distinct aspects of
philosophic thought. In the first place, I wish to refer
again, somewhat more explicitly, to its value from the point
of view of epistemology, then to its value in dealing with
the particular sciences, then to its practical value for human
life, and finally to its more purely speculative significance as
an attempt to solve the riddle of the universe.
From the epistemological point of view, its value seems to
me to lie, as I have already indicated, in bringing out more
clearly what Kant was in reality aiming at. Some, indeed,
seem to think that the Hegelian point of view is merely a
revolt against the Kantian epistemology a fresh plunge of
the sow that had been washed into the mire of ontology.
But it seems clear that the point of view of Hegel follows
directly from that of Kant. Kant's doctrine of the structure
of knowledge, when baldly stated, amounts simply to this,
that we start with a disconnected manifold of sense material,
which it is the work of thought to synthesise ; and that this
synthesis takes place by means of the categories, which can
be discovered by a formal analysis of the logical judgment.
Now such a view presents difficulties that seem in the end
insuperable. The two elements of which experience is thus
made up are too disparate to form any real combination ;
and Kant is only able to evade the difficulty by the somewhat
mechanical device of inserting the imagination as a mediating
faculty between sense and thought. When we inquire more
closely what this means, it soon becomes apparent that what
is really involved in it is that the independent existence of
64 J. S. MACKENZIE :
the ' manifold of sense ' is mythical, that pure sense, without
any admixture of thought, is ' for us as thinking beings as
good as nothing'. This is a point that has been further
emphasised in recent times from the point of view of psy-
chology. Here also it is urged that we have no real ex-
perience of any such thing as an atomic sensation, and that
the perplexities of Hume with regard to this are a self-
created torment. But if we do not recognise an independent
'manifold of sense,' it seems clear that we must also deny
the synthesising activity of thought as at first conceived by
Kant. If the unity of thought is implicit in our sense-
experience from the outset and this is what the doctrine of
Kant seems in the end to amount to then the work of
thought in relation to the material supplied by thought is
not that of putting unity in, but rather that of bringing it
out not construction, but interpretation. Now, I cannot
but think that it was in this direction that the thought of
Kant itself was pointing ; but, if he had definitely taken the
step that is here indicated, it would have involved a complete
transformation of his philosophical position. It is essentially
this transformation that lies at the basis of the system of
Hegel. For Hegel sense and thought are no longer opposed,
except as the implicit and the explicit ; and so the work of
thought becomes, in a sense, analytic rather than synthetic
or, rather, both at once.
Of course, this must not be understood as meaning that
the sense element in experience disappears, or loses its
significance. It is sometimes supposed that this is involved
in the Hegelian point of view that everything has to be
reduced to pure thought. But if this was what Hegel meant
for himself, as it is for many of his critics, it is at any rate
not what he means for me. To take up such an attitude
would be, in a manner, to return to the position of Leibniz,
according to whom our sense experience is simply a confused
way of thinking. If such a view were to be put forward, it
would be necessary to reiterate the arguments of Kant about
screws that turn in opposite directions, and the difficulty of
putting a left-hand glove on the right hand. Or, again, we
might refute it by pointing to the simple distinction between
the colour red and the colour blue a difference which can
only be sensuously experienced, never expressed in any form
of thought. The Hegelian point of view does not, I think,
imply any annulling of the element contributed by sense,
but only the recognition that within this element, as in all
others, there are involved universal determinations which
cannot be interpreted except in the light of thought.
THE HEGELIAN POINT OF VIEW. 65"
Now, this fundamental distinction between the point of
view of Hegel and that of Kant reappears again, at the other
ends of their systems. The opposition between sense and
thought is the real ground for the opposition between the
phenomenal world and the world of things in themselves.
There must be a source beyond thought for the element that is
foreign to it. Hence knowledge must be conceived, not only
as limited, but even as definitely bounded. At a certain
point we come up, as it were, against a blank stone wall.
But if once we recognise that the universal principles which
thought discovers are principles that are contained in the
material itself, there is nothing left outside of thought's
domain, though there may be many things beyond its
immediate grasp at any given time. Thought, in fact, is
conceived simply as the real world rising to consciousness
of itself, not as a more or less foreign power imposing its
laws on a partially subjected territory.
This leads me to notice the significance of the Hegelian
point of view in relation to the various particular sciences.
A complaint has recently been made by Mr. Hobhouse, that
much of our modern philosophic thought tends to be rather
scornful of the sciences, and that a certain scepticism about
science may almost be said to be taking the place of the
older scepticism about theology. No doubt this attitude
of mind shows itself more particularly in the ' philosophic
doubt ' of such writers as Mr. Balfour, who seek to defend a
conservative reaction in thought by the argument that the
progress of science does not lead to truth. But Mr. Hob-
house urges that such doubt is to a large extent countenanced
even by many who believe in philosophic progress. Mr.
Bradley refers somewhat scornfully to the principles of the
particular sciences as only ' useful nonsense,' and contrasts
them, almost after the manner of Parmenides, with that
completely self-consistent view of the Absolute, which alone
is true. No doubt the man who is trying to view things as
a whole will always be a little impatient of the specialist
' who cannot see the wood for the trees ' especially when
the latter begins to deny that there is any wood at all. I
believe, however, that the attitude of contempt towards the
special sciences is not one that can be justified from the
Hegelian point of view. Such an attitude connects itself
much more naturally with the Kantian opposition which,
I suppose, is the real foundation of ' philosophic doubt '-
between the phenomenal world and the world as it is in itself.
The more fully we recognise that the intelligible world of
philosophy is nothing but the world of experience completely
5
66 J. S. MACKENZIE :
interpreted, the more shall we be led to acknowledge that it
is only on the basis of the preliminary interpretation of the
world by the special sciences that any real philosophic advance
can be made. If, indeed, the dialectic method were a me-
chanical process an intellectual switchback, as I have already
suggested, on which one had simply to set oneself, and be
carried along it might well be regarded as independent of
the work of the particular sciences. But I think it is only
by experience and science is an enlarged and purified ex-
perience that we can discover the principles that are involved
in the constitution of our world ; and it is only by testing
these principles in the interpretation of various aspects of
experience that we can learn their significance and their limits.
No doubt, as Hegel himself said, philosophy is apt to show
itself a little ungrateful to that which supports it : it devours
that on which it lives. But to devour is at least not to set
aside. If the significance of the Hegelian point of view with
respect to epistemology is such as I have described, there is
no point of view that might be expected to encourage a more
sympathetic interest in the ideas, principles, and methods of
the physical sciences, though that interest would no doubt
be partly a critical one. Philosophic criticism of the special
sciences is apt to be too purely negative. This is perhaps a
fair ground of complaint even against such a careful work as
that of Stallo ; and" even Prof. Ward may be charged with a
similar defect. It is comparatively easy to bring out the
limitations of scientific ideas and methods. What 'is philo-
sophically important is to combine this with an appreciation
of their truth and value within their own limits. This ought
to be easier to the Hegelian than to others. Others are apt
to be scandalised by any principles in which there is an
appearance of logical inconsistency ; whereas a Hegelian is
accustomed to contradictions, and knows that they merely
point to limitations in the use of the ideas in connexion with
which they occur.
So far I have been referring mainly to the physical sciences.
The bearing of philosophical ideas on psychology is naturally
more direct. It has not yet been found possible in general
to separate the study of psychology from that of philosophy ;
and I doubt whether it would really be wise to attempt it.
Psychophysical experiments and observations on children and
chickens may no doubt be carried on with very little reference
to philosophical principles ; but, in all the more speculative
parts of the study, the relation to philosophy is very close.
I do not say that it is different in kind from the relation of
other sciences to philosophy ; but it is certainly much more
THE HEGELIAN POINT OF VIEW. 67
intimate in degree. Now, it is commonly thought that our
modern psychology connects more closely with the Herbar-
tian point of view than with the Hegelian ; but I believe that
this is at bottom a mistake. The most significant work in
psychology that has recently been done in this country is,
I suppose, that by Prof. Ward and Dr. Stout. Now it is cer-
tainly true that their line of thought sets out, on the whole,
from Herbart; but the latest results of their studies seem to
me to be far more Hegelian than Herbartian. The real signi-
ficance of Herbart lay mainly in his effecting a transition
from the English associationist school to the more German
mode of thought. Starting with psychical atoms he sought to
combine them in mechanical methods. This was no
doubt interesting and led to considerable advance in the
study of pure psychology, and still more in its applications
to education. But it seems to me that in both directions it
has been already outgrown. In particular, the recent studies
of Dr. Stout have brought psychology into direct relation
to the view of the universal expounded by Bradley and
Bosanquet, which is essentially the Hegelian view. I notice
also that some recent educational writers are beginning to
recognise that the Hegelian doctrine of development is
more truly enlightening than the artificial Herbartian
1 circles '.
This leads me to make a few remarks on the general bearing
of the Hegelian point of view on practical life. This aspect
of the Hegelian teaching requires perhaps even more em-
phasis than any other ; since it has, I think, been a good deal
misrepresented. Hegel himself has been represented as a
mere defender of the status quo one who maintained that
4 whatever is actual is rational,' and who thus, like Carlyle,
turned Might into Eight. His contemporary Fries, with
true German thoroughness in vituperation, said that Hegel's
political ideas were grown, ' not in the garden of science, but
on the dunghill of servility '. There may be a grain of truth
in such accusations. The two intellectual kings of Germany
at the beginning of the century Goethe and Hegel were
both characterised to some extent by a lack of sympathy
with what has been known in this country as philosophical
radicalism. They were, I suppose, partly influenced, like
our own Burke, Wordsworth, and others, by the reaction
against the revolutionary ideas that had made such a stir
in France. How far this was wise in the case of any of
these leaders of thought, we can hardly at this point pause
to consider. All that I wish to urge is, that there is nothing
in the Hegelian point of view that is opposed to any genuine
68 J. S. MACKENZIE :
progress. If we think of man's life, as Hegel does, as a
process in which the universal element in the world comes
to consciousness of itself, we at once regard it as involving
an ideal aim, which must progressively realise itself in history.
Such a conception naturally leads to a sympathetic treatment
of the past, a full recognition of the significance of what has
already been achieved, and does not readily connect itself
with reforms of a revolutionary character ; but it is certainly
as far removed from any approval of stagnation. Here, as
elsewhere, the great value of the Hegelian point of view
seems to me to lie in its insistence on the concreteness of
the universal. Its general lesson is perhaps best expressed
by saying that it teaches us to aim at wholeness and reality
in life.
The most characteristically English of Ethical Systems,
Utilitarianism, does not sufficiently distinguish between the
real and the unreal. All forms of enjoyment are regarded
by it as being in themselves equally valid. And the same
is largely true of that other characteristically English theory,
Intuitionism, for which we may say that every deliverance
of the individual conscience has in itself equal weight. Both
of these appeal to the particular, to the consciousness of the
individual agent, though they do so in very different ways.
The categorical imperative of Kant, on the other hand,
represents the abstract universal the mere form of law,,
separated from all particular contents of experience. As
against all these, Hegel seeks to show the universal law in
contrast with reality and as the inner meaning of reality ;
so as to make it appear that ' morality is the nature of
things '. The modern theory of evolution does! this also to-
some extent ; but Hegel's doctrine seeks to show the ground
and meaning of the process of development ; and does not
leave it at the sport of accident, as some modern theories
tend to do.
From the political point of view, the value of this attitude
shows itself perhaps most of all in its power of freeing us
from such opposite dangers as those that are expressed by
the terms Individualism and Socialism, Liberalism and
Imperialism. I do not know that any of these terms has
a very precise meaning ; but they express certain tendencies
with which we are all more or less familiar, and which are
due, to some extent, to an imperfect way of thinking about
life. There is a tendency, whether we call it individualism
or liberalism or by what name we please, which seeks to
leave every individual and every group to work out its own
salvation in its own peculiar way. There is a great deal to.
THE HEGELIAN POINT OF VIEW. 69
be said for it ; but it often fails in practice, because so large
a proportion of mankind have no real way of working out the
problems of their lives, but, when left to themselves, simply
drift to destruction. There is another tendency, which is
known by such names as socialism and imperialism, which
seeks to organise life on a large scale, fencing it round with
regulations ; and the rock on which this splits is that men
and nations that have any force of character refuse to be run
like machines. Now I know of no point of view, unless it
be the Aristotelian, which raises us more completely above
such opposing abstractions than that of Hegel. With him
human life is thoroughly personal ; but personality is the
expression of a universal meaning. It is necessary for each
that he develop a free personality, but this he can only do in
relation to a common weal. Properly to balance these oppo-
site aspects of life is of course a matter for the statesman
and social reformer rather than for the philosopher ; but it is
something to have a philosophic point of view from which
each side can receive its due.
But, after all, the value of a great philosophic system lies
no doubt mainly in its power of supplying us with some sort
of insight into the meaning of the universe as a whole. How
far the point of view of Hegel furnishes us with this in a
finally satisfactory form, it is hardly possible here to consider ;
but I may notice one point in connexion with the ultimate
metaphysical significance of his system, which is closely
related to that on which I have been chiefly laying emphasis,
and which is often made the ground of objection to the
Hegelian point of view in general. You will often find it
said that in the end Hegel reduces everything to thought ;
that his point of view is merely logical throughout ; that he
practically ignores altogether the aspects of feeling and will.
In this respect he is sometimes contrasted unfavourably with
Schopenhauer, with Lotze, or even with Fichte and Schleier-
macher. Now I do not deny that Hegel, like Herbart, may
have laid a somewhat undue emphasis on the more purely
intellectual or apprehensive side of conscious life, and it may
well be that this has given rise to some defects in his treat-
ment of morality and politics, and possibly also of art and
religion. Perhaps philosophers, whose work consists in think-
ing, are rather apt in general to fall into this mistake. If
Plato erred in supposing that you could make a king by
dialectic, 1 it would no doubt be just as erroneous to suppose
that you could make a saint or a poet by any such process, or
1 Which, however, it is not quite fair to say that he did.
70 J. S. MACKENZIE :
that, by taking thought, you could add a cubit to your stature,
or a star to the heavens, or even a molecule to the meanest
piece of matter. But I doubt whether Hegel is justly charge-
able with any such mistake. At any rate, if anything of this
sort is involved in what he meant for himself, it does not seem
to me to be contained in what he means for me. On the
whole, the criticism to which I refer appears to rest on a mis-
conception. If the essence of the Hegelian doctrine lies, as I
have sought to maintain, in its insistence on the reality of
the concrete universal, it is certain that this can be found
in feeling and in action quite as truly as on the more purely
intellectual side of our nature. Human happiness is dis-
tinguished from animal pleasure by the presence of the
universal element in it, quite as truly as human science is
distinguished in this way from the vague sensitiveness of a
jelly-fish. Equally does the universal element in man's life
present itself in the action of a hero. We can feel and act
from the point of view of the whole, just as we can think
from that point of view. The ' thought ' which is emphasised
by Hegel is not thought as opposed to feeling and will, but
thought as the conscious grasp of the universal, in whatever
form it may appear ; and it is only in this sense that he seeks
to interpret art and religion and morality, and the world as a
whole, in the light of thought.
I have now explained to you, as well as I am able, what I
believe to be the real significance of the teaching of Hegel,
in its bearings on some of the leading aspects of philosophic
study. Its value seems to me to lie, like that of the philo-
sophy of Aristotle, much more in the point of view than in
the system. I suppose there is no one at the present time
who accepts the Aristotelian system ; but Aristotle's ethics
retain almost as much vitality for us as they ever had ; and
the same is to a considerable extent true of a large part of
his work in other departments. The point of view from
which he approached things was one that enabled him to deal
with them in a comprehensive spirit, and to gain a real in-
sight into their most essential features ; and for this reason
his work is in the main a possession for all time, though the
more specific features of his doctrine have largely lost their
interest. I think it very probable that the same may in the
end be true of Hegel. It seems possible already to detect
elements in his system that are merely of an accidental
character, due to the special tendencies of his time or to his
own more individual interests. But I believe that when all
these are cleared away, it will remain true that he, more
than any other in modern times, has provided us with a.
THE HEGELIAN POINT OF VIEW. 71
comprehensive point of view, within which we may go on
working at the special problems of philosophic study, with
a reasonable hope that what we thus do will not be alto-
gether in vain. It is at least one of the great merits of his
position, that there is plenty of room in it for growth.
IV CHOICE AND NATURE.
BY EDGAR A. SINGER, JR.
1. Method. In so experienced an age one can hardly
beguile oneself into a sense of the newness of one's reflexions.
It is with something of regret for a bygone freshness that
Lucretius's eager lines come back to us :
"iuvat integros accedere fontis
atque haurire, iuvatque novos decerpere flores ".
Nor has the pleasant weariness of completed labours taken
the place of the beginner's zest. We can count scarcely one
question settled, one finished task : our philosophic inheri-
tance is a tangle of opinion, to unravel which is a labour greater
than all the rest. Yet if the past is to repay in enlightenment
what it has cost in disillusionment we must make it teach us.
This is our modern problem, and the nature of the task has,
to some extent, dictated the method of its accomplishment.
The history of philosophy is itself a philosophy, and to
develop its method has been the first interest of our century.
Finding conflicting opinion, this philosophy has sought under-
lying motives, and giving play to motives, it has enticed
conflict into contrast. Dwelling on antitheses, it has forced
history to take on a dialectic form, and in expressing the
truth grasped, has pointed neither to extremes of doctrine
nor to " happy means," but to the continuous unfolding of
the story. Thus it has made use of the very discord of
opinion to teach the lesson of experience, and as part of the
lesson learned has ceased to be anxious for the fate of its
" last word ". It is in the spirit of such a method that I
would approach the old problem of the relation of Choice to
Nature : it is because the problem is so old that I venture
to attack it.
2. Progress, Determinism and, Tolerance,, To begin as far
back as we may : the more primitive the intelligence we
examine, the more do we find it impressed with the caprice
of detail in Nature, and the more ready does it show itself to
see in this lawlessness the play of imagined choices. To
CHOICE AND NATURE. 73
the savage, yes, to the cultivated Greek (and perhaps to
the larger portion of the civilised world of to-day) it is not
only fellow-man and fellow-animal that behaves in an un-
predictable way, but the tossed divining stick, the trickling
blood of the sacrifice, the tea-leaf floating in the cup. These
seeming chances are interpreted as choices : they are given
an oracular meaning, and are not one with that routine
in which the stone always falls to the ground, the arrow
always flies toward the mark. On the other hand, the farther
back we go in any civilisation, the less room do we find set
apart for the play of opinion. A statement is either true or
false, an action good or bad ; there is a vanishingly small
region within which different interpretations of the same
facts are allowed to abide together in peace. In a word,
primitive thought is at once fanciful and intolerant.
Progress is understood gradually to invert this state of
affairs. With expanding science the region of indeterminate-
ness shrinks, with growing experience reflexion is forced to
admit many interpretations of the same range of phenomena :
choice vanishes from the midst of the Nature described and
reappears in the function of description. Science and toler-
ance go hand in hand.
But our first satisfaction in this amicable relation between
accurate knowledge and free interpretation gives way to a
sense of confusion when we try to establish the line that
divides the two domains. Science appears to be tolerant
only of such beliefs as are incapable of being confirmed or
refuted by its methods. (For the unwillingness of science to
pronounce in favour of conflicting theories in the absence of
a crucial test is not tolerance toward different beliefs, but
an abstention from belief. Nor does science merely permit
or advise such suspension of judgment, but commands it,
frequently in terms that do not smack of tolerance.) Re-
ligious faith, moral conscience, aesthetic appreciation have
claimed freedom from compulsion, and science has frequently
admitted that its methods conduct to no conclusions respect-
ing the spiritual, the good, the beautiful. But where these
claims have won the day they have taken their stand on the
ground of common ignorance. Science has indeed been their
useful ally in forcing ignorance to recognise itself ; but beyond
the confession of insufficient evidence science cannot go and its
so-called tolerance does not extend. Within the region which
this confession affects, science, once more, can only abstain
from belief : it is not freedom to believe but freedom to doubt
that it champions, and in the face of doubt there is no more
room for choice than in the presence of the most brutal fact.
74 EDGAR A. SINGER, JR. :
Before those who really claim the right to believe in unsup-
ported possibilities, science can only plead its inability to
grasp their meaning. "Either," it says, "your so-called
beliefs are conceivably capable of confirmation or they are
not. If they are, they await the event to be confirmed or
refuted, as my doubts await it to be resolved. If they are
not, but pose as faith in bare possibilities, they escape all
chance of destruction by abandoning every vestige of content."
So the tolerance of science toward parts of experience
that lie beyond its ken is an empty concession. For the
only regions to which it could apply turn out to be void, or
else, after all, to be remotely within its own sphere. Choice
of interpretation respecting Nature vanishes as completely as
caprice within Nature, unless indeed the choice resides with-
in the bosom of science itself.
3. Tolerance and Subjective Choices. If the tolerant con-
sciousness were willing to accept the dictum of science
respecting it, the history of philosophy would end in a frank
empiricism. Tolerance would call itself scientific reserve,
and the only choice remaining to us would be that of acting
at a risk or abstaining from acting (equally at a risk), in the
face of conditions whose outcome was veiled by our ignorance.
(Such reactions have no interest for us here, for the decision
made in unavoidable ignorance and forced upon us by the
course of events can neither be wise nor foolish, and lacks
the attribute of " oughtness " that we are investigating.)
But to such empiricism the claimant to the right of free
opinion has an objection that recurs again and again in the
history of reflexion. "If," he retorts to science, "if every
judgment were a bare statement of fact, then the weighing
of its truth must, as you say, await the event respecting
which the assertion is made. But there is an extensive
class of judgments which do not pretend to be statements of
fact, and whose truth rests on quite different grounds. It
lies with the individual both to make these judgments and
to make them true. Foremost among them are just these
religious, moral and aesthetic appreciations of the world.
Here the individual must be the final arbiter, and tolerance
is more than a confession of ignorance, it is a declaration of
independence."
Such is the doctrine sometimes called " indifferentism "
and we must estimate its historical significance. But be-
cause religious conviction expresses itself but vaguely (when
it does not, as in the historic creeds, actually make state-
ments of fact) and because the cry for moral liberty may not
seem quite sincere (for does it not also call for social laws?),
CHOICE AND NATURE. 75
we shall confine our attention to the case of aesthetic ap-
preciation. Here the following questions arise : Does the
individual mind enjoy a freedom in ascribing beauty to the
facts of Nature which is denied it in judging these facts
themselves ? Can the adjectives true and false be attached
to the judgment of beauty at all? If so, what lies in the
meaning of beauty that makes the truth of aesthetic apprecia-
tions so different in kind from that of plain statements of
fact?
The first historic motives for a tolerant attitude towards
appreciations of beauty are simple enough, being of the kind
that express themselves in the old saw " De giistibus ". You
pronounce Mona Lisa beautiful : I call her plain what is
to be done about it ? If it were a question of proportions
we could appeal to the foot-rule ; but that would leave the
matter of the harmony of those proportions untouched. You
cite Pater ; I retort, " He is only a third individual ". " But,"
you urge, "he is a judge." To which I may make one of
two historic replies. The first defiant : "Who made him to
be a judge over us ? The individual man is the measure of
beauty." The second humble: "I do not pretend to be a
judge of beauty, I can only tell what I like ".
According as one or the other of these replies is made,
beauty is given one or the other of two meanings between
which the concept has always oscillated. In the first case
it is frankly identified with a subjective liking which the
judgment "this is beautiful" confesses. In the second case
it is admitted that one individual may be wrong, another
right in his estimate of beauty : there is such a thing as
"correct taste" and "experienced judgment," and in so far
the appreciation of beauty stands on a footing with the
estimate of size or the description of colour. We are less in-
terested in determining which of these meanings corresponds
to the place that the judgment of beauty occupies in a given
culture than in asking what effect either would have upon
our notion of the truth and error of aesthetic appreciations.
And I think it will be seen that from neither point of view
does the judgment of beauty possess peculiarities unshared
by the strictest statement of fact of which science is capable.
For if, in the first place, only subjective liking is in question,
there is no sense in which the avowal of such liking can be
true or false unless it be the sense in which it agrees or
disagrees with the facts of the case. If stress be laid on the
subjectivity of these facts and their inaccessibility to any but
the individual's own observation, it may equally well be
pointed out that the whole structure of science is built of
76 EDGAR A. SINGER, JR. :
just such individual observations. My micrometer reading
is neither more nor less accessible to you than my liking for
port wine or Beethoven sonatas. And, in fact, the historic
outcome of the motives that lead one to say " Man is the
measure of beauty " is the doctrine that " Man is the measure
of all things ". If this is not wrong, it yet does not in the
leasf interfere with the construction of a confessedly objec-
tive science ; neither, then, ought it to be urged against the
objectivity of beauty.
It is not, however, for a theory of beauty that we are
looking, but for an example of a judgment whose truth is
constituted by the individual that pronounces it : if not the
ascription of beauty to an object, then the avowal of liking
for it, and if not that, then any judgment in which the
subject seems to be sole arbiter of the truth of his own
statement. So that we may at once take the highest pos-
sible ground and ask whether any expression of opinion can
refer to a "last seeming" so completely subjective that the
" subject " has the right to say what he will about it without
risk of error.
The historic pursuit of such a type of judgment conducted
the Sophists to " immediate certainty " as furnishing the
final illustration. Only, it may seem odd that we should
here present such certainty as a type of judgment which,
all in being absolutely true, is still absolutely free. Is it not
the proper historic function of this judgment to stand for
that which is absolutely forced upon the subject as a bare
fact of experience? I answer, the paradox goes with the
paradigm, for those philosophers who with a very temerity
of caution confined their estimate of truth to immediate
certainty, also furnished to their successors the " horrible
example " of completely wayward thinking. Nor is this an
historic accident; it belongs to the nature of the "immedi-
ate " to present itself in the guise of just this contradiction :
in fact it is the disorder from which it always suffers and to
which it at last succumbs. For exactly that inaccessibility
to more than one point of view which is supposed to shield
" immediate certainty " from the danger of contradiction
also robs it of the chance of confirmation. The assumption
that the case can never occur again does make it quite
indifferent what judgment is passed on it. But a little
reflexion will show that the only instance in which + a =
- a is that in which a = : the only absolutely free judg-
ment is the meaningless one. Upon Heraclitus follows
Cratylus, wagging his finger in mute irony, and upon Pro-
tagoras follows Gorgias, pitifully complaining that nothing
CHOICE AND NATURE. 77
is, but that if anything were we could not know it, and if
we knew it, could not tell.
Meanwhile the " subjective " and " immediate " must be
given some place in experience, and they do seem to carry
with them certain exemptions from outside criticism. The
humility that makes no pretension to " knowledge " of beauty,
but contents itself with an avowal of "liking" must yet stop
somewhere. It would take it to be a poor return for its
yielding disposition did the masterful critic venture to doubt
the genuineness of the liking. " What impertinence," it
would say, "to tell me that I do not know my own mind."
And yet it may be that the critic's attitude is impertinent
rather than meaningless. When one is young one feels
more secure in the secret possession of a unique personal
experience than when, after longer contact with life, one has
formed the habit of "seeing through" others and has had
the shock of being " seen through ". And I am not so sure
that the experience of philosophy has been different from
that of each individual. Gorgias found that the subjective
did not thrive on an incommunicado regime, and it is not un-
natural that Hegel should insist on the part played by other
individuals in forming the nature of the self's most intimate
possessions.
However that may be, I think the dialectic of history has
sufficiently emphasised the relativity of the distinction be-
tween the subjective and the objective. In so far as a
judgment lays claim to truth, in so far does it pretend to
have grasped an objective reality, and in so far must it be
capable of confirmation or refutation from an indefinite series
of other points of view. The average of these observations
(though never quite static) is the only result to which either
the connoisseur of beauty or the scientific investigator can
point as to the fact he is in search of. In the comparison
with such an average the truth of the " subjective apprecia-
tion " appears its freedom disappears. That which has
led history to separate the truth of a judgment of beauty
from that of a judgment (say) of size is the relatively large
" variable error " of the former which masks the nature of
the average. We have not yet found a type of judgment
that does not involve a question of fact, and statements of
fact are capable of a continuous treatment throughout the
whole range of experience.
What then is the outcome : do we relapse into the em-
piricism against which the protest of tolerance is directed ?
That depends upon the way in which the conclusion of
empiricism is stated. If, as against the tolerance we have
78 EDGAR A. SINGER, JR. :
been examining, it urges that the answer to every meaningful
question must be wrung from experience and hence must
involve a question of fact, I think history forces us to accept
the dictum. So that if any class of judgments involves the
exercise of a choice, it is because the statement of fact
itself depends on choice. But if in insisting on the necessity
and sufficiency of the " scientific method " empiricism views
this method as excluding all choice on the part of the de-
scriber of Nature, it goes farther than we are yet justified
in following it, and its conclusion must be tested by an
examination of the momenta that contribute to the growth
of science itself.
4. Science and Objective Choices. The form that our present
question must take is determined by our past admissions.
We have accepted the ideal of science : the image of Nature
with which our description presents us must be that of a
completely determinate process, and we have agreed to
admit no choice or caprice within the phenomena of Nature
which would set a limit to the pursuit of this ideal. We
have asked whether in some of its aspects a determinate
Nature might not admit of more than one description. And
we have concluded from the continuity of the concept of
truth that any choice which may belong to the function of
describing must be traceable in all the ways in which this
function could be exercised in the scientific formula as well
as in the ethical or aesthetic appreciation. So that our final
question is this : taking scientific description as typical of all
description, is there only one, or are there more than one
way in which the scientist may present Nature as a uniquely
determinate process? If more than one, and the scientific
describer is constantly called upon to choose from among
several, is his selection capricious or can we discover a
principle by which it must be guided if his description is to
be true, the Nature it portrays real ?
Our first impression of the scientist is of one thrust into
the midst of Nature to observe and to record. Nature flows
by him as a stream of facts and it is for him to map the
currents : the laws thus formulated are no less facts. " Die
Natur ist nur einmal da " and he whose sole function is to
tell what is " there " can arrive at but one result : it in no
wise rests with him what this result shall be.
In this mood we think of the scientist as coming in
possession of a given fact by a single observation, and as
recording his observation in a categorical judgment. He
measures a rod and then announces, " This rod is 1 cm.
long ". The laboratory observer himself, however, does not
CHOICE AND NATURE. 79
view the matter in this way. What he calls a fact is never
the result of a single observation, and his record does not
take on a categorical but a disjunctive form. "This rod,"
he will say, "is (1X) cm. long": i.e., its length is either
{1 + X) cm. or (1 - X) cm. or lies between the two. It is not
merely that the scientist is cautious and repeats his observa-
tion " to make sure " ; but that he is actually without means
of denning the "real fact" he is in search of save in terms
of an average of observations with a zero "probable error"
attached. I need not point out that a zero probable error is
from the very nature of its formula unattainable in a finite
experience. Hence the probable error and the indefinite
series of points of view whose variation it summarises is
part of the scientist's meaning when he speaks of a " fact ".
The disjunction of ignorance which the probable error ex-
presses in a quasi-categorical form is essential to any image
of Nature that science can evolve.
I should like to dwell on the wealth of this concept of
" probable error ". If I am not mistaken all the disjunctions
of ignorance at which the stages of scientific progress pause
could be put into this form. Were we suspended in doubt
between a corpuscular and an undulatory theory of light ?
Then it was because the probable errors of our estimates of
the velocity of light in media of different density overlapped.
So, too, the probable error is the means of defining the
region within which certain " neglects " that science practises
are permissible. If we analyse the meaning carefully, the
sense in which the "law of inertia " which seems to refer to
a body " left to itself " may none the less be applied within
a world in which no body could be "left to itself" will be
seen to depend upon the permissible neglect of errors of
detail which fall within a "probable error" of result an
error whose magnitude is independently fixed.
I mention these matters for two reasons. First, because
since science must always present us with disjunctions, it
seems always to be leaving us an alternative which makes
a choice not only permissible but imperative. And some
recent philosophers have held that the psychological factors
that determine the choice of the individual scientist at such
junctures may have a permanent influence on " the result ", l
Second, because other philosophers have contended that since
such axioms as Newton's " law of inertia " cannot be literally
illustrated in Nature, therefore science "abstracts" from
Nature and gives us, instead of a true image, an "ideal con-
1 James, Will to Believe.
80 EDGAR A. SINGER, JR. :
struction " on which it would be unsafe to form our Weltan-
schauung l . But when we see that all the disjunctions with
which science presents us are really of the nature of that
"probable error" which must attach to any statement of
fact, does it not seem that we have already taken account of
these " psychological factors " ? Are they not among the very
causes which lead to variation between observers and of which
the "probable error" gives a summary statement? They
no doubt play their part in the drama of science, but they
belong in the chorus. For the rest, I am here only stating
in another form the view already accepted that the disjunc-
tion of ignorance is no ground for a play of choice, but only
for a wavering of doubt. And as to the " abstractions " of
science, I can only find suggestion of them in the careless
abbreviations of the scientist and in the unfair interpreta-
tions of the critic. Science may be an "ideal construction "
but its ideals do not involve the neglect of facts.
I must leave this subject of the "probable error" which
has helped us to pass beyond the impression that a statement
of fact is the categorical utterance of an individual observa-
tion and enabled us first to detect its disjunctive character,
then to trace in the result the contributions of a society of
observers. Even now we have not exhausted the meaning
which a simple statement of fact has for the scientific
observer. If the "probable error" is of the nature of a
disjunction, so the concept of the "constant error" points
to a condition involved in a statement of fact. " This rod
is indeed (1X,) cm. long, but only if the temperature be
t degrees, the stress / dynes, etc." Omit these conditions
and the statement is meaningless, misrepresent them and,
however faithfully it may record observations actually made,
it is false : it is affected by a " constant error ".
From this it would follow that the very simplest statement
which science can make about Nature that from which all
its generalisations start, the record of an individual fact
must take on a hypothetical form. Yet it would seem that
this much of the na'ive attitude towards science from which
we started must remain true to the end : namely, that the
account of Nature which interests us must finally be expressed
in categorical (or quasi-categorical) judgments. We want to
know what has happened and most of all what will happen,
and cannot remain eternally satisfied with the knowledge
that if a should come about then we must look out for b.
And since science undertakes to satisfy us on this score, since
1 Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism.
CHOICE AND NATUEE. 81
it does make categorical predictions, the question naturally
arises : What has become of the conditional clauses ?
The answer is not far to seek. Neglect such conditions as
cling to every statement of fact science cannot without loss
of meaning : absorb them in the categorical judgment itself
it can and does. And that by a very simple device : the
setting up by convention of so-called "standard conditions".
Now as regards these conventions there are several things
to be noticed. First, they are said to be " arbitrary," which
does not mean that they are unmotived and capricious, but
only that they result from a choice. Second, this choice is
social, not individual, and constitutes the " universe of dis-
course " within which the individual judgment is meaningful
and true. Third, this choice selects from among several
alternative accounts of Nature each of which presents Nature
as a thoroughly determinate process. Finally, no categorical
account of Nature, i.e., no image of Nature " in the concrete,"
can be given which does not embody a series of such choices.
But in spite of the fact that the Nature we point to .with
hope or with fear is always a Nature described, it is gener-
ally felt that there is a difference between Nature-in-itself
and the description we give of it. However completely the
choices we have mentioned may be embodied in the " uni-
verse of discourse" yet this can never be identified with the
Universe : the conventions are purely " nominal ". " II y a le
nom et la chose," says Montaigne, "le nom ce n'est pas une
partie de la chose, ni de la substance : c'est une piece etran-
gere jointe a la chose, et hors d'elle". l
Now it is quite true that the choices and conventions of
which we have spoken are in the nature of definitions. In
the example of length we were merely watching the growth
of the definition of length to meet the needs of a more refined
description. So that we may pass at once to the general
question of the definition or, let us say, of classification.
Then it will be seen that the motives which inspire the
preceding paragraph are those which lead Kant to treat
definitions as analytic judgments and, being such, as es-
sentially different from any other a priori factors of knowledge
which may really help to "constitute" experience as we
know it.
There is no doubt that this insistence upon the triviality
of definition and classification in our system of knowledge
strikes a sympathetic chord in the common understanding,
one which responds in terms of such saws as "Soft words
1 Montaigne's Essai " de la Gloire ".
6
82 EDGAB A. SINGER, JR. :
butter no parsnips " or the poet's line " A rose by any other
name would smell as sweet". At the same time we must
not forget that the very opposite point of view has received
historic expression : e.g., in the mot " La science est une
langue bien faite ". Now, as has been said in the intro-
ductory paragraph, the whole history of philosophy is a
dialectic growing out of just such antitheses as the one
before us. And generally we have learned that the contrast
arises from a breach of continuity to re-establish which is to
grasp the truth of the situation. Just so here : it is no
doubt always possible to distinguish between the facts of
Nature and a classification to which they are subjected. If
it were not for the indifference of such facts to the various
ways in which they could be classified, the problem of
arrangement would not present that element of choice which
we have insisted upon. But to be indifferent toward certain
alternative classifications is not to be independent of all
classification, and it must always be equally possible to
show that these facts presented in Nature are themselves
the resultants of finished classification : if they were not
they could not be "presented". Those whose attention is
attracted by the factual aspect of Nature fly to one limit :
"we do not really know Nature until we get at the ' solid '
facts, untainted by arbitrary arrangement and eternally in-
different to the way in which we classify them". Those
who recognise the important part that classification plays in
the final image of Nature rush to the other extreme : " know-
ledge is nothing but the game of arrangement ". But if
there is one thing that the dialectic of history seems to have
established more firmly than another it is that, not at the
"limits," but in the continuous series which defines them,
lies the truth. Whatever is required to account for the way
in which one of its stages follows on another is essential to
the nature of experience. And since at any stage of our
growing knowledge at which we try to tell what Nature is,
the describer is presented with a choice, and since no stage
can be found which does not embody past choices, I take it
that this series of choices is involved in anything we do or
can mean by Nature.
5. The Choices of Science and Their Truth. It is not well
that a philosopher should be let off with a generality. If he
has really caught a fragment of the truth, let him show
where it fits into the scheme of experience. I shall try to
do this with respect to the choices of science by showing
where in the history of science such choices have been exer-
cised, and how they have gradually moulded the meaning
CHOICE AND NATUBB. 83
that we now attach to the term Nature. But to illustrate
systematically would be to write a history of science, for we
have said that such choices must be exercised continually
and work gradual transformations. The best that can be
done in brief space is to look for the most striking instances,
and to lay them before the reader with little comment. In
each case, too, we may answer a question raised at the
beginning of our search into scientific method by pointing
out that these choices have not been exercised capriciously,
but according to a given principle. Science has regarded
one alternative as preferable to another and has treated the
ground of preference as a ground of truth. And when we
have finished I think we shall see that the exercise of such
choices is the only factor in experience that has any claim to
be called a priori: whether or not we retain for them the
term analytic, we shall at least have grasped all the motives
that have led to the doctrine of a priori synthetic judgments.
Since we have stated the function of choice to be exercised
in the business of classification, we naturally turn for our
first illustration to the science in which the problem of clas-
sification has received the greatest recognition. The day is
not long past when the main question of biology was that of
" true orders ". The biologist of this time felt that it had a
meaning to ask whether a given scheme of classification were
true or false. " I will not give my reasons," writes Linnaeus,
" for the distribution of the natural orders which I have
published. You or some other person after twenty or fifty
years will discover them and see that I was right." l It is the
language of the " realist " that looks for classes in re a
language that we still speak when we distinguish between
"artificial" and "natural" systems of classification. And
yet it is clear that there are many consistent classifications
to which the facts presented to Linnaeus were susceptible.
The period that witnessed this struggle after " true orders "
culminated in the genetic classification of evolutionist biology.
Is this a truer arrangement than any other consistent group-
ing that could be devised ? I only point out here that the
way in which a classification is made determines the next
question that the scientist asks. The question may be " put
to Nature " and receive an empirical solution ; but it cannot
be answered until it is asked. Now the peculiarity of the
genetic classification was that it led to a form of question
which did not apply to biology alone. Other principles of
division would have been as consistent with the facts given
1 Romanes, Darwin and after Darwin, i., 26.
84 EDGAR A. SINGER, JR. :
to them, but respecting the facts resulting from them we could
not have asked: "Are they the results of development?"
The search for the " mechanical factors " of evolution
would never have troubled us, nor engaged us with its broad
promise of unified sciences. And yet it is the insight into
just these analogies which, as the patient Kepler said, leads
us into the arcana of Nature. When we ask what Nature
is, it is in terms of such insights we are answered. It is in
this sense that a classification can be " true to Nature," it is
in this sense that classes can be said to exist in Nature. One
is all the more a realist for being idealist enough to see in
Nature the embodiment of choices.
Let us turn to another instance and another science.
We shall see the " analytic " aspect of choice gradually
slipping away ; for in the case we now take up historic
science did not even notice that its problem had an analytic
side, but supposed itself to be facing a bare question of
fact. I suppose most will remember to have been taught that
modern astronomy dates from Copernicus's "discovery"
that the earth revolves around the sun and not vice versa.
Huxley speaks of the old "geocentric system of astronomy
with its eccentrics and epicycles " as "an hypothesis utterly
at variance with fact". 1 And it is common enough to hear
the Church of the period upbraided for flying in the face of
facts.
Yet when one's attention is called to it, I fancy no one
will fail to justify Mach's contention that the Copernican
change of standpoint was only a change of standpoint and
raised no question of fact. 2 The paths of the planets are
necessarily describable with respect either to the sun or to
the earth as origin. The question of the origin of co-
ordinates is a question of interpretation, and it is decided in
favour of relative simplicity. The " truth " which this
advantage seemed to impart to the Copernican point of
view appeared to Huxley to have the same cogency to force
acceptance as has a fact to compel belief. Hence he regarded
the question of origin, not only as one capable of a right and
wrong answer, but actually as a question of fact.
I might recount the sequel to this historic incident, how
the change of origin effected by Copernicus made Kepler's
questions possible ; how the resulting laws made it possible
for Newton to ask the same question of the moon that
Galileo asked of falling bodies and Huygens of a ball swung
1 Progress of Science.
2 Mechanics in Its Development, 232.
CHOICE AND NATURE. 85
on a string ; how these general views of motion suggested
the question : is the whole system of visible motions a self-
repeating cycle? and how, on the assumption (afterwards
empirically verified) that it is not, the concept of motion is
included by Kant and Laplace under that of growth : until
at last our image of Nature includes an evolution of me-
chanical processes, as well as the mechanical processes of
evolution. Each stage would be seen to depend upon
certain choices of arrangement, and a history of science
written with these in view would be the realisation of
Hankel's ideal : " Die Geschichte einer Wissenschaft kann
selbst Wissenschaft werden". 1
But it is better to have exhausted the significance of a few
illustrations than to have squandered many. I have been
laying emphasis on the a priori part of our thinking, and the
reader may have felt that justice has not been done to the a
posteriori. Let us put the feeling into a question. The results
of Kepler and Newton led to the discovery of a new planet
whose behaviour was in accordance with their predictions.
But suppose accident were to lead to the discovery of another
which did not conform (say) to Kepler's laws, should we not
reject those laws ? Are we not then dealing with descrip-
tions of Nature whose truth reduces to an agreement with
the facts ?
That every judgment capable of truth or error involves a
question of fact I not only admit but have been at some
pains to defend : that it reduces to a question of fact I
cannot see. No doubt we should reject a scientific law in
the face of an exception ; but the form in which we should
express our new knowledge is not uniquely determined.
Our first step is to replace a universal affirmative proposition
with an exceptive ; but it is not our last. And why ? The
determinateness of our image of Nature is not interfered
with by stating a law and its exception. "All planets
except X obey a certain law and X obeys another": the
space distribution of planets at a given instant of time is
determinate enough. What we have lost is the simplicity
1 1 should like to have included among these illustrations the much
disputed problem of geometrical axioms. For I think the question as
to what experiment proves respecting the truth and the error of these
axioms depends upon what we will let it prove. If they are a priori
they are so by command, and it is for this reason and not because of a
happy chance, that the true axioms are the simplest. The matter, how-
ever, proved too subtle to be condensed into a paragraph. If the reader
is interested in this point of view I may refer him, as to the treatment
most closely in sympathy with it, to Poincard (Rev. cle Met. et de Mor.
1895, 631 ; 1899, 251 ; Monist, 1898, 1.).
86 EDGAR A. SINGER, JR. :
of our formula, and it is because we choose that our descrip-
tion of Nature shall be simple, that we reject a formula
which permits of exception as not representing a law of
Nature. We assume that the description of this determinate
flow of facts we call the course of Nature is capable of
complete expression in universal judgments. What right
have we to proceed on such an assumption ? Is it that we
detect on the part of facts an eagerness to oblige? They
are not noted for such complaisance : philosophers have even
been known to call them " brutal ". Is it not rather because
we have the remaking of the facts within our power ? And
this by reconsidering an old choice of classification : in the
resistance that facts offer to our desires is always to be de-
tected the opposition of our old choices to our present needs.
It is for this reason that the search for a universal formula
for Nature is always bound to succeed.
For example, Newton's law of universal gravitation is
actually subject to many exceptions. Not every body of
matter attracts every other with a force proportionate
directly to the product of the masses and inversely to the
square of the distance between their centres of gravity.
This is only true in case the bodies are without electric
charges, do not possess magnetic poles and have other
negative properties. So far science has been content to state
our physical laws in terms of exceptions, and instead of a
single formula for Nature we have several. The image of
Nature resulting is determinate enough save for "probable
errors ". But modern analytical mechanics is not satisfied
with mere determinateness : it demands simplicity. Con-
sequently we find it throwing the mass of phenomena into
a single formula the generalised Hamiltonian principle or
the generalised Lagrangian equations. 1 It is not pretended
that this is more than a "formal " transformation of all the
formulae of physics, for it does not really reduce the number
of " dimensions " (since the same term in the formula has
different though analogous meanings within different classes
of phenomena) and it introduces no new determinateness.
For that reason such transformations must always be possible.
But what is the next step ? By treating the system of bodies
as though it included concealed motions we manage (perhaps
after the manner of Hertz) to express the different deter-
mining properties of the bodies in terms of the velocities of
these motions. Now we have really reduced the number
1 The most satisfactory account of this process appears to me to be
that given by Helmholtz, Vorlesungen iiber die Theoretische Physik, L, 2.
CHOICE AND NATURE. 87
of dimensions to mass, space and time, but we have not
reduced the indeterminateness due to "probable errors":
we have introduced no new observation of facts. And what
does this hypothetical " as though " mean? For a system to
have a certain constitution, and for a system to behave as
though it had a certain constitution, mean the same thing :
the moon behaves as though it had another side. All that
we have done is to introduce a new classification which has
the conditional flavour of all classifications, a flavour that
only fades away as the classification ceases to be new. We
no longer state our law in terms of " all bodies " in Newton's
sense, adding exceptions that apply to different kinds of
bodies ; we state our formula in terms of mass, space and
time. The kinds of bodies and motions are characterised
by the different degrees in which these dimensions belong
to them, and Newton's view of the situation appears as a
special case, along with its exceptions, the other special
cases. Can the facts obstruct such progress ? I think not :
a classification that possesses maximum simplicity must
always be possible, and if at any stage new observations
lead to exceptions, these do not force a rejection of old
choices, but they invite it. "The order and regularity of
the phenomena we call Nature, we ourselves introduce
into them, and we should never be able to find it there had
we not first put it there." Thus did Kant from a some-
what different point of view express much the same
thought.
6. Nature, Choice and Will. It would seem, then, that when
we wonder at the order and simplicity of Nature, we wonder
at our own handiwork as Nature builders " The heavens
proclaim the glory of Kepler and Newton". And if, with
Omar, we find the scheme of things "sorry," can we not
" shatter it to bits and then remould it nearer to the heart's
desire"? We not only can do so, but constantly are doing
so it is the function of science. Only, the " heart's desire "
must not be unprincipled. In the historical illustrations we
have seen that the choice exercised by the describer is regarded
as true only in so far as it abides by a certain principle,
which we might variously call the principle of maximum
simplicity, economy or unity. It remains to be shown why
this choice should be regarded as true.
In the first place it will be recognised that the demand for
maximum unity expresses a strong intellectual need. But it
is not the only need of our nature, it is not shared by every
one, as witnesses the attitude of the Church toward Coper-
nicus. And even supposing it the predominant need, why
88 EDGAR A. SINGEE, JR. :
should it not determine the utility rather than the truth of
our description of Nature ?
We have seen that the choices which play a part in the
constitution of Nature are exercised in the function of
classification. Now there is only one sense in which we
commonly apply the term error to a classification, it is that
which we illustrated in the case of " constant error," that
which permits us to speak of a wrong definition. Error in
this sense must always involve the contrast between an
individual and a social choice. If then we have a right to
gratify any need of our being in exercising the choices we
have been considering, it must be because the need is uni-
versal, it is a principle that expresses a universal will. But
there are many needs whose wide distribution throughout
society we can discover by observation. If the criterion of
universality is to be empirical, there is no reason for satisfying
the intellectual rather than the aesthetic or " spiritual " needs,
and this is the position taken by some modern writers. 1 ,
But all through our study we have seen that the will which
is reflected in a true image of Nature is not expressed in
a mere consensus gentium. We justify Copernicus although
he was a minority of one : we condemn the Church that
stood for the voice of the people and the voice of God. The
will to which Copernicus appealed was broader than his age,
and the will we are now in search of must be sought sub
specie ceternitatis.
The search for the absolutely universal will is one that
has been attempted before, at least the method of search
has been defined. For if we are not to stop at an empirical
generality but to find the principle of choice that would be
exercised by all describers in the face of all possible experi-
ence, it is evident that we seek the principle without which
no description, no experience and, consequently, no Nature
is possible. We are faced with the old problem of deduction
as it appeared to Kant. Our demand for a universal will is
not a little like his motive for seeking " categories," and we
may rest satisfied with expanding Kant's method to fit our
needs.
The conclusion of Kant's deduction is that the trait of
experience without which there could be no experience, and
yet which does not belong to an aggregate of bare facts, is
unity ; and in this unity is reflected the activity of a describ-
ing consciousness. We have arrived at the same conclusion
in our own way. But Kant's attitude toward experience
1 James, op cit.
CHOICE AND NATURE. 89
leaves it, in several respects, static. Its movement is a flow
of facts : the " forms " into which these facts fit are ready-
made categories. As a result the forms of thought " consti-
tute " experience in giving to it its unity ; but the evolution
of unity, the struggle after maximum unity, falls under merely
" regulative principles ". Thus a permanent separation be-
tween the truth and the value of description is allowed.
It may be said, I think, that the outcome of post-Kantian
thought is a transition from a static to a dynamic attitude
toward experience. Its " flow "is no longer a mere flow of
facts, but an evolution of interpretations. It is such evolu-
tion that Hegel is constantly dwelling upon (die Bewegung).
From this point of view, it is not the unity of our thought
but our thought's struggle after maximum unity that con-
stitutes experience what it is. It is this desire for maximum
unity that we struggle to satisfy and the gratification of
which constitutes the truth of an interpretation. The desire
is, of course, a fact of our experience, but it is to be dis-
tinguished from other empirical needs in that the right to
gratify it is to be deduced from the meaning of experience
itself, within which it is the absolutely universal principle of
choice. It is this that makes maximum unity a true not
merely a useful, a constitutive not merely a regulative prin-
ciple. I need not point out that all our illustrations have
been so many scenes from the drama of human thought
struggling after maximum unity in the building of the world
of Nature.
But now if the choices that are not determined by fact are
determined by the principle of maximum unity whose claim
to truth depends upon its necessity to the very meaning of
experience, has not individual liberty to satisfy individual
need completely disappeared ? And if so, what has become
of the illustrations cited in this very paper in which the indi-
vidual, yes,the larger part of society, rejected this universal
principle? The Church opposed the astronomical scheme
of Copernicus, and yet the Church not only meant something
by its attitude but still continues to live and to function.
It would be interesting to show the difference between the
sense in which the " unity of apperception " was felt by Kant
to be a universal and necessary condition of experience, and
that in which maximum unity represents to us the will of a
universal society. But I must confine myself to an example
which will tend to show the kind of liberty an individual
may possess to resist a law without which the society of
which he is a part and to which he owes his own nature
could not exist. I take the specialised type of experience
90 EDGAR A. SINGER, JR. :
we call " life". Life is what it is because the living being-
is essentially a struggling being. From this it does not
follow that every living being enters consciously into the
struggle. There are the fortunate ones who toil not neither
do they spin, and yet continue to live. To them struggle
may seem a mere accident of life and not its essence.
But we must see that they could not thus live were they
not part of a society which is a struggling society and heirs
to the ages that were ages of conflict. They are made in
the image of the surviving fittest, and lazy as they may
wish to be they cannot give up all the functions made neces-
sary by the struggle and continue to live. So far as they do-
give up the struggle, they do give up, i.e., the very definition
of their apathy is couched in terms of the strife they shun r
and in shunning, recognise.
So with experience as a whole : the individual has a certain
liberty to decide untruly. Whether from indifference (the
apathy of surrender), or from pride (the self-will of a romantic
genius that a Nietzsche expresses), or from prejudice (the
bigotry of the Church in the preceding example), history is
full of instances of the denial of the will to experience. But
this denial carried to the limit means extinction, and carried
part way means partial stagnation : experience may die by
inches. In all cases its essential characteristic is denial or
revolt, and that recognises the nature of the law against
which it revolts. It need scarcely be remarked that this
individual may be a very large group. The human race
may for ages be lethargic. But the dark ages contain the
germ of an Aufklarung and moreover are not themselves com-
pletely without light.
From all this the relation of Nature to the individual desire
follows of itself. We have represented the individual as
faced with a group of facts ; but not of bare facts, for in so
far as these have even enough meaning to be pointed out as
facts they bear the traces of description with all that this
implies of past choices. So that at no stage is he presented
with a situation so purely factual that it cannot be altered by
re-interpretation. Observation has, of course, an important
place in his life ; but his experience is not increased by bare
additions. The real importance of observation is to serve as
the stimulus to new interpretations. These interpretations
we have seen were indeterminate save for a principle of
choice not yielded by the facts themselves. Yet this choice
is not the individual's own ; but that of the society to which
he belongs. Nor is this society that of his day and genera-
tion, for that is only a larger individual, but the universal
CHOICE AND NATURE. 91
society to contradict whose will is to destroy the meaning of
experience. Such a will dictates a principle of choice that
gratifies a desire which an individual may well possess. In
so far, then, as the individual desires what all must desire if
they would have experience, Nature as embodying our inter-
pretations must yield him satisfaction. But in so far as the
desire is purely individual, Nature offers no guarantee that it
shall be gratified.
As the type of universal desire we have taken maximum
unity a rather cold, intellectual one, it may seem. It would
be interesting, did space permit, to consider the question
"Are not the demands for the goodness and beauty of our
world involved in this?" It maybe that the concepts of
unity, goodness and beauty are more closely allied than their
frequently contradictory expressions would lead us to sus-
pect : history is full of attempts to identify them. The old
scholastic formula " Quodlibet ens est unum, et verum et
bonum " may be profoundly true. For the present, however,
I must leave this question untouched.
V. CEITICAL NOTICES.
Foundations of Knowledge. In Three Parts. By ALEXANDER
THOMAS OBMOND, McCosh Professor of Philosophy in Prince-
ton University. London : Macmillan & Co. ; New York :
The Macmillan Company, 1900. Pp. xxvii., 528.
THE author of this lengthy treatise has hardly taken sufficient
care about the form in which he has put before the public what is
clearly the result of much thinking and of a serious and laborious
effort towards a constructive philosophy. Misprints are numerous,
and only six have been noted in the list of " Errata " : others quite
as glaring have been overlooked. Thus, of three words in Greek
type which occur in the volume (without any special necessity),
one is wrongly accented (0>s on p. 10), and two are without accents
(" Aoyos from Xcyw " on p. 260, and also in the index). Some other
Greek words are given in Italic characters. Among these we find
" pon sto" (p. 105). To St. Augustine is ascribed a treatise
" Contra Academicas " (not italicised, p. 333). There are mis-
prints in the titles of the works of M. Fouillee and M. Tarde
which are referred to on pages 81 and 291. (M. Fouillee's name is
put right in the " Errata ".) Other examples are " Loyd Morgan"
(p. 69), " Tyler " (for Tylor, on p. 427), " Schien or illusion "
(p. 381), " post-Schenpenhaurian philosophy" (p. 227). In "the
relative and infinite world" (p. 413), "finite" is probably the
correct reading. There are many strange, and one might think
unnecessary, innovations in language, e.g., "posit" (as a noun),
"devoidance," "mergence," "finitation," "judgmental," " media-
tional," "unmediable," " freed omist," "volistic" (a word which
seems to suggest a philosophy among the field-rnice). Some novel-
ties are introduced with an apology, e.g., "relatived," "pulsion".
Others are indeed sanctioned by the liberal canons of the Century
Dictionary, e.g., "trialism," "outer" (as a verb), "revelatory".
On page 105 we find : " The child brings the spoils of its excursus
back to the home treasury," which is at least an odd expression.
" The knowing subject begins to have an awTiing (query =
Ahnung ?) that," etc. (p. 116). "The perception of time is more
erudite than that of space" (p. 129). "The element of each is
some minimum visible or appreciable " (it is printed thus, on p.
136 ; one is uncertain whether it is meant for English or Latin).
" This would not only defecate mathematics, but would also leave
ALEXANDER THOMAS ORMOND, Foundations of Knowledge,. 93
physics in a bad way " (p. 321). This would seem to suggest that
" defecation " does harm.
The punctuation is of a kind that does not always help the
reader. Single commas are interpolated between nouns and their
verbs, between prepositions and the nouns they govern. Thus on
page 466 : " Now, mechanism as thus far conceived, is a relative
conception ". This method of punctuation seems to be applied on
system. In the footnote to page 521 there is a reference given as
follows : " Chap, viii., Grounding of Eelative Conceptions Theme,
Mechanism, and Teleology ". Ambiguity is also caused by care-
lessness in style. Thus on page 490 we have " direct stimulation
of the transcendent other," there the "of" must apparently be
taken in the sense of " by ". " It " and " its " are several times
used in a way that gives trouble to the interpreter. Thus : " We
have seen that at various points in experience the transcendent is
involved, and we have pointed out in certain connections how the
transcendent leads to the formation of intra-experiential concepts
and principles which are necessary for its reduction to unity and
stability " (p. 356). " Its " here must be referred to " experience ".
Metaphors abound and are not always kept from mixing.
" Through the interpretation of Sterling (sic) the pulsating heart of
the Hegelian dialectic was projected into the field of English
thinking " (p. 11). " The concept of time as the incessant flow of
discrete pulses " (p. 142. The " bull " here seems intended to lift
us over a difficulty). "The vitals of Kant's doctrine are to be
found at the point of Hume's greatest blindness " (p. 184). " The
notion that changes are not without anchorage, but that somewhere
in our world there is something that will shed light on their
origin, and thus clothe them with a degree of rationality " (p. 209).
But more startling than such kaleidoscopic imagery, is the etymo-
logy suggested on page 480. " The seeing eye [of feeling] is
more or less suffused with a mist of emotion which impairs its
power of clear conceptual definition. The apprehension that is
effected in such an organ may well be called mystical, and we find
here perhaps an important linguistic motive for the selection of
the term by which this type of experience is designated." It is a
pity that some would-be " mystics " do not know, and learn from,
the true etymology of the name.
The words " will " and " would " are constantly used, instead of
" shall " and " should," in a way that makes even a Scotsman
shudder : and yet it cannot be said, in excuse, that the word
" shall " is simply boycotted, for it is used some six times correctly
in 500 pages, it is once used incorrectly instead of "will," and
twice where either word might have been employed. However
important the message a philosopher has to deliver, he might take
some thought for the convenience of his readers and show some
respect for the language in which he professes to write.
To pass from the form to the substance of the work Prof.
Ormond's aim, as stated by himself (p. 518), is to prove (1) "that
94 CRITICAL NOTICES :
the world is through and through, experience" [the punctuation
is his own], and (2) " that the world is through and through,
rational" a conclusion which looks very like what Prof. Ormond
would call "Hegelism," but which is reached by a method which
he clearly considers to have more affinity with what he calls
" Kantism " and which is made to fit in with what on the same
principle should be called " McCoshism ". A passage from the
" Preface " may be quoted as indicating the writer's method of
treatment : " While the work aims to be broadly experiential in
the sense that the notion of experience is to be regarded as all-
comprehensive, yet the application to it of the term empirical in
any narrow or partisan sense may fairly be resented. For as
regards the ordinary issues between empiricism and rationalism
or intuitionism, they are simply transcended by the inclusion of
reason and intuition among the functions of experience ; for it is
clear that experience cannot dispense with intuition, and it is no
less obvious that the supreme intra-experiential test is that of
rationality." Prof. Ormond's attitude to Hegel is expressed in
& somewhat oracular passage : " What we have maintained is that
no concept of the absolute is adequate to a first-hand deduction of
the nature and content of the finite. In this we split with the
thought of Hegel, but we are perhaps anticipating the truer Hegel
in our contention here that though the organ of finite experience
must be our guide in the first stages in the discovery of content,
yet in order to reach a final construction, Virgilius must give way
to Beatrice" (p. 470). [The word "anticipating" is puzzling,
unless there is a Hegel yet to come : and why Lat. " Virgilius "
.(and if Latin, why not " Vergilius ") along with Engl. or Hal.
"Beatrice "?] Towards Kant Prof. Ormond adopts a patronising
tone. " In the transcendental notion of unity," we are told, " Kant
has in fact stumbled upon our category of unity as developed in
the aesthetic consciousness. . . . We are in a position to reach
& more satisfactory result " (pp. 245, 246). Yet on page 125 we
find the statement " that everything arises in experience " made
as if it was something that Kant had not held. It seems doubtful
whether Prof. Ormond has ever realised what Kant's problem
really was. He complains that " Kant rarely, if ever, takes
psychological ground " (p. 125) ; but though (on p. 19) he speaks
of epistemology as distinct from " psychology or any directly
historical science," he seems to regard a genetic account of how
experience grows as supplying a sufficient epistemology. After
a short discussion in " part i. " of " the ground concepts of know-
ledge," he proceeds in "part ii. " to treat of "the Evolution of
the Categories of Knowledge " ; and it is there that he criticises
Kant's Transcendental ^Esthetic and Analytic. Now it is of course
a tenable position at least it is a position that has been held
that we can have no epistemology over and above what genetic
psychology can furnish ; but, if Kant's distinction between a
criticism of experience and a psychological description of it is to
ALEXANDER THOMAS ORMOND, Foundations of Knowledge. 95
be put aside, some explicit justification for such procedure should
be given. Kant should certainly not be criticised as if he had
made no such distinction. Prof. Ormond makes, indeed, a valid
criticism on Kant in saying that he failed to distinguish with
sufficient clearness between presentative and conceptual space
(and time). But he goes on to treat the fact that the mathe-
matician is dealing with conceptual space, as if that fact of itself
solved the problem with which Kant was concerned. Now (1) if
we are giving a genetic account of the evolution of mathematical
conceptions, it will not do to begin with the conceptual points,
lines, etc. , of Euclid. A psychological account of our way of thinking
of space should surely take note of the fact that, before Euclid, the
Pythagoreans (like children of to-day and empiricist philosophers)
believed that geometry dealt with points which had magnitude
(minima visibilia), etc. It was only the criticisms of Zeno the
Eleatic and the philosophy of Plato which led later mathematicians
to the purely abstract and conceptual view. (2) Prof. Ormond
says "it is found that the space yielded by mathematical concep-
tion is a space capable of empirical determination " (p. 141). But
this is just where Kant's problem begins. Kant sees a difficulty
where Prof. Ormond is content to say "it is found". What en-
titles us to determine experience a priori (i.e., independently of
experience) in the mathematical sciences ? Prof. Ormond says :
" The mathematical point has nothing in common with the unit
of presentation, nor have the lines and surfaces of mathematics
anything in common with the presentative lines and surfaces
except what they acquire through motion. It is through motion
that the mathematical intuition gradually achieves an empirical
result." How the motion of a purely conceptual point, which
must be a conceptual motion, can make the transition to a
perceptible point or line, Prof. Ormond nowhere explains : and
if this miracle were explicable, the necessity of mathematical judg-
ments as applied to perceptual experience would still not be
accounted for. The conception of the line as a point in motion,
of a surface as a line in motion, etc., is a purely modern way, and
a highly instructive way, of conceiving abstract spatial relations ;
but long before any one had thought of it r the Greek geometers
were able to determine experience a priori. Kant's problem arises
on any theory which allows the necessity of mathematical judg-
ments. What gives objectivity (i.e., validity for all minds like
ours) to the results of our mathematical thinking ? Throughout the
whole of Prof. Ormond 's volume there is no analysis of the con-
ception of objectivity. The term " objective " is constantly used
as if it were sufficiently explained by the most elementary distinc-
tion between subject and object in any cognitive act.
Just as our knowledge of space and time is treated in a purely
psychological manner, and with a rather inadequate psychology,
so are the categories of substance and cause treated as if the
"animism" of primitive and unphilosophical thinking explained
96 CRITICAL NOTICES:
everything that had to be explained in a theory of knowledge.
Cause is called a "volitional category," Substance is traced back
to the notion of self : and Kant is again criticised from this in-
adequate psychological point of view. " What Kant was really
denning to our later vision was the close analogy of the notion
of substance with that of self. Kant did not see this, at least
with any clearness, but in his hands substance begins to assume
the lineaments of a subject-activity " (p. 185). What a strange
inversion of history ! Berkeley had already seen and used the
analogy ; and Kant expressly argued against the applicability
of the conception of substance to the self. So again we are told,
as if Kant's arguments did not at least deserve refutation, that
"Soul is a perfectly concrete and intro-experiential term" (p.
266). "Experience," it should be noted, is taken by Prof.
Ormond to include not merely actual but possible experience : yet
there is no analysis anywhere of the term " possibility ". Some
terms are denned ; but the definitions are not always helpful.
Thus on page 67 we read : " Knowledge is, of course, a conscious
function. Taking it objectively it is a product of what we call
the cognitive consciousness." On page 92 " the real is to be
regarded as the realised content of experience ". Either there is
a circulus in definiendo or there is an awkward ambiguity in the
use of the word "realised ".
A great deal is made of personality, but the analysis of the
conception is very inadequate. After referring to the use of the
term Xdyos for " the self- manifesting reason of the world," Prof.
Ormond proceeds : " When the Latin tongue succeeded the Greek
in our western life as the language of religious thought, the term
persona and its derivatives became the vehicles of this profounder
significance which still constitutes the inner sense of our modern
notions of person and personality" (p. 260). Now it is not true
in any historical sense that the term persona took the place of the
term Xdyos. In its theological sense persona was used for WTOO-TCIO-IS :
in its legal sense persona has helped to give us the modern ethical
concept of personality. Some attention to the legal source of the
modern term might have suggested the consideration that " indi-
vidual " and "person" have not always been regarded as co-ex-
tensive terms as applied to human beings. Prof. Ormond would
have followed the guidance of history better, if he had treated
personality among the categories which are influenced by the
consciousness of community. But he assumes the conception of
personality before he touches on the social factor in knowledge.
"Personality," he says, influenced by the original meaning of
persona, " will be the expression of the self as a whole, not of
any part or aspect abstracted from the whole, and it will be a
fundamental expression of nature, not a mere flash in the pan
which signifies nothing " (p. 262).
In spite of the unfavourable impression produced by the manner
of the book and especially by the criticisms of Kant, we must
ALEXANDER THOMAS OEMOND, Foundations of Knowledge. 97
recognise several features of real interest in the psychological
account of cognition which is put forward as an epistemology ;
especially (1) the stress laid, with perhaps some exaggeration, on
the ceslhetic element in the demand for unity that influences all
our cognitive processes (part ii., ch. ix.) ; (2) the recognition, though
rather inadequate, of the social factor in mind and the tracing
back of both egoism and altruism to their social basis (part ii.,
ch. xiii.). There are also some suggestive things in the chapter
on " Knowledge and Belief" (part iii., ch. i.). The third part is
in many ways the most important : and it would be a pity, if the
unfortunate style of the writer deterred any one from reaching
this more interesting portion. It is entitled " The Transcendent
Factor in Knowledge," and deals with the subjects treated in
Kant's "Dialectic". Chapter vi. on "The Transcendent Sub-
ject" has a subtitle "Psycho-Theology," which seems to mean
"The Psychology of the Divine Mind ". Prof. Ormond insists on
the recognition of the element of Feeling, as well of Thought and
Will, in the Absolute Consciousness (p. 441). The treatment of
mysticism, is on the whole, philosophical. The philosophy is,
indeed, more after the manner of Plotinus or Augustine than after
that of Kant or of Plato, who was always more careful than his
professed followers to separate myths and symbols from strict
philosophical thinking. On page 417 pluralism is implicitly criti-
cised in the warning against " the mistake of supposing that
individuality, in order to be real, must be absolute ". Yet this
leaves us more astonished that the author should make such an
unphilosophical appeal to prejudice as this, on page 479: "The
soul's shrinking from the thought of its own annihilation is not
wholly the re-action of the instinct of self-preservation ; there is in
it also the recoil from a kind of blasphemy". Now apart from
any legal definition blasphemy is a matter of sentiment : and
there are some who might think there was more blasphemy in
speaking as if the endless perdurability of every individual human
being, as an individual and a self-identical person, were an inalien-
able right to be demanded of the Absolute. There is surely no
blasphemy, but a truer reverence, in the caution of Lotze, who is
content to say : " That will last for ever which on account of its
excellence and its spirit must be an abiding part of the order of
the universe ; what lacks that preserving worth will perish "
(Microcosmus, Eng. tr., i., p. 389). Towards the very end of
Prof. Ormond's book there is an excellent -passage, in the spirit of
Leibnitz, which marks a very great philosophical advance in
" Intuitionism," if the McCosh Professor may be taken as the
exponent of the doctrine of his school. " The mechanical aspect
of the world is absolutely universal and co-extensive with reality,
and we may look in vain for gaps in its armour. If the spiritual
must depend for its right to be, on the existence of crevices and
gaps in mechanism then the spiritual is doomed, for it can safely
be predicted that no such gaps will be found. The spiritual
98 CRITICAL NOTICES :
mode of conceiving the real asserts itself in its own right, and is
as universal an aspect of the world as mechanism itself " (p. 521).
D. G. EITCHIE.
Untersuchungen iiber Hauptpunkte der Philosophic. Von JUL.
BEBGMANN. Marburg : N. G. Elwert'sche Verlagsbuchhand-
lung, 1900. Pp. viii., 483.
PROF. BERGMANN'S volume is in form a collection of essays of
which only one is wholly new, only one wholly rewritten. Widely
scattered in their first publication and under titles which give but
partial promise of inner connexion, they cover topics so far apart
to all appearance as the criterion of truth and the psychology
of desire, or as Wolff's doctrine of the complementum possibilitatis
and the determination how far, given the self-subsistent reality of
the material world, a soul-inhabited body can be made intelligible.
Actually, however, the several studies now reprinted do exhibit
an inward unity, do subserve a single metaphysical construction,
which, despite of a certain element of bookishness in its inception,
has some claims to originality.
The metaphysic which the Marburg professor has to expound
is frankly Cartesian in its inspiration. If the conclusions are not
those of Descartes, Spinoza, or even Leibniz, the shaping of the
problems, the lines of solution, the conception of method, bear the
hall-mark of the school. On the other hand, if the ultimate issue
is an objective idealism according to which an all-inclusive spirit,
of which the individual consciousness is a limitation, has for its
everlasting phenomenon the spa tio- material world, it is not in the
following of the post-Kantian development that this result is
achieved. In Prof. Bergmann's view Kant leads to an agnostic
cul de sac, from which we must retrace our steps, if we would
reach the goal which the Cartesians divined but did not attain to.
It is as critics of Kant, or as throwing light upon the fundamental
positions of Cartesianism, that appeal is made to Schopenhauer
and to Fichte, to Herbart and to Lotze. The keynote of Dr.
Bergmann's teaching is a Neocartesianism.
It is in the essays on " Existence and the I-consciousness," on
" The Objects of Perception and Things in Themselves," and on
" Soul and Body," and in a less degree in that devoted to "The Law
of Sufficient Eeason " that the collective title is seen fully to justify
itself. The rest, though of solid structure and not devoid of
interest both in themselves and for Prof. Bergmann's system, may
be briefly dismissed. The fjrst, on " Belief and Certainty," chops
some doubtful logic contrasting the icht (as opposed to nicht) pre-
dication of glauben with the bare predication of meinen, defines
belief as the holding for true, and discusses some rather academic
difficulties as to negative and problematic judgments. It then
characterises certainty as belief with the added recognition of its
warranty. The sceptical objection that for the certainty of your
J. BERGMANN, Hauptpunkte der Philosophic. 99
mark of certainty you require a fresh mark, and so without end, is
met by the distinction of recognition and full comprehension. Like
the hero of the fairy story, we know when we are in the last room,
and seek to penetrate no farther ; nor does subsequent reflexion
add anything to conviction. In the case of non-derivative cer-
tianties we recognise either analytical correspondence of predicate
with subject under a law of identity or else accord with experience,
whatever that may mean. The second essay seeks simply to set
the required law of identity side by side with the law of contradic-
tion as formulated by Kant, to expound them and to determine
their limits. The chief interest so far is the polemic against the
certainty of synthetic judgments a priori and the non-logical
certainty which Kant maintains in the moral sphere. There are
' anticipations of knowledge,' and analytical but ' heterological '
(not tautologous) judgments are possible analytische Erweiter-
un /surtheile. The unconditionality of moral obligation is in one
sense not certain, in any other if certain it is so according to the
laws of logical certainty.
The fifth essay is devoted to a criticism of Wolff's teaching as
to the relation of possibility and actuality, with special reference
to Baumgarten and Kant's treatment of the same subject. Prof.
Bergmann must clear his argument of any suspicion of complicity
with ' the ontological proof ' of rational theology, whilst yet, as we
shall see, his own metaphysic cannot avail itself of Kant's formula
of disproof. Hence an acute discussion of the ens realissimum.
The eighth and last essay, which now appears for the first time,
takes up the criticism of Kant's ethics adumbrated in the first, and
out of this constructs a theory of morals of a high degree of sug-
gestiveness. Can a practical reason or will be independent of the
content of desire? What is the content of desire in general?
Can the results of a treatment of volition as directed upon an
end ostensibly external to it be reconciled with those of its treat-
ment from the standpoint of its intrinsic character ? What would
intrinsic character mean ? Is there and must there be something
corresponding to what the Moral Sense School put in the fore-
front of their ethics ? What formal criterion is there of higher
and lower with reference to ends ? and the like. The essay is
instructive, but it has little bearing upon Prof. Bergmann's neo-
cartesian theory of appearance and reality, by which the permanent
value of his book must stand or fall. Indeed it is not brought
into definite relation with it. There is nothing of the relation of
will to self-consciousness, and the Kantian position most conspic-
uous by its absence from the ethical discussion is the antithesis of
the intelligible and empirical character. Further, it is held to be
a reductio ad absurdum of one-sided rigorism that a tugendhaftes
Wollen would need to have itself for its end and aim ad infinitum.
This would need careful shaping to be compatible with Prof.
Bergmann's metaphysic.
To this we gain our definite introduction in -the third essay, that
100 CRITICAL NOTICES:
on the Law of Sufficient Reason. Primarily exegetical, this study
aims at bringing the principle of the ground into the closest of
relations to the well-known text : prcedicatum inest subjecto. For
a perfect intelligence all matters of fact must be capable of being
contents of analytical judgments. This pronouncement, however,
needs the establishment of non-tautologous analytical judgments,
and requires further to be harmonised with the possibility of
change, whether of things or, on an idealist hypothesis, of psychical
contents or conscious subjects. As to the first point : that may
be objectively der Sache nach identical, which subjectively der
Auffa&swng nach exhibits diversity, e.g., judgments about tri-
lateral figures are identical and yet not identical with correspond-
ing judgments concerning triangles. This carried a little farther
leads us to the reality of time. As does the discussion of the
second point : if for a perfect intelligence all the determinations of
a subject can be expressed analytically, any subject A remains one
under all its changes. But this can only be so if A as it was, A as
it is, A as it will be, not in points of time but in minimal tracts of
time, are the same in re, different conceptu. Identity in difference
is operated by time, which is therefore no mere phenomenon. It
is, on the other hand, true that the time-determinations of a ' thing '
would follow from its individuelle Wesenheit, and not conversely.
We conclude apparently to the everlastingness of the world in
time, and in a sense to that of the things in it, though there is of
course a sense in which they are generated and destroyed. As it
was without beginning is now and ever shall be without end.
So far we have reached a conclusion upon the Leibnizian
hypothesis. The next essay in part modifies, in part develops the
conclusion reached. It deals with the fundamental problem of
Cartesianism, existence in its relation to consciousness. " The
Concept of Existence and the I-consciousness " embodies Dr.
Bergmann's central thought, or it may be said to ' key ' his
system. By the existence (Daseiri) of any subject we mean its
independence of the need to be an object of perception or thought
to some subject beyond itself. Whilst agreeing with Kant that
existence or reality cannot serve as a predicate to a subject, he
maintains against him (a) that every judgment posits the existence
of its subject ; (b) that existence is a determination belonging to a
subject ; (c) related to all other determinations as general to par-
ticular. In view of the fact that many propositions fail to affirm
the existence of their grammatical subjects and since we reject
' the ontological proof ' of the existence of God, we need obviously
to determine what the subject of the judgment really is in various
types of judgment. Its existence is posited, but what is it ? In
the case of separate things, if such there be, other than conscious
selves, their existence would be co-existence with all similarly
existing things in an existent world. This world is the subject.
The fact that it involves the thing in question is the predicate.
But what again is it that we mean by the reality or existence of
J. BEBGMANN, Hauptpiuikte der Philosophie. 101
the all-inclusive whole or world ? Not self-inclusion or corre-
spondence with itself. That were a tautology or would mean
everlastingness in a real time without beginning and without end.
The latter cannot be a factual datum for consciousness since
futurity is involved. If we are to get forward then, we must be
sure of the reality of some one being, without the assumption of
that of something beyond it without end. Existence as applied
to ' things ' is only intelligible as implicated in that of a world.
This again, to be realised, must have the reality of somewhat
established to which it is related. We can establish Dasein for
individual consciousness. Cogito, ergo sum. Consciousness to ap-
pear to itself, or to envisage itself as appearing to itself, must be
real. Thought if not independent of thought is independent of
the need to be thought by aught beyond itself. That 1 am is a
primitive analytical a priori judgment, but withal it is not
tautologous but ampliative, and it is an experience or there is no
experience. The reality of the world is posited in relation to this
real I-consciousness, as including it and all else that is real. The
world in question is still hypothetical, and we must be on our
guard against identifying it overhastily with the spatial world,
and there is trouble yet before us as the nature of the individual
self-consciousness, but we have established our Cartesian sum and
the hypothetical est as they come under the notice of Kant in his
' refutation of idealism '.
The I of self-consciousness is both subject and object. As sub-
ject it is again object in relation to a subject, and so on without
end. As object it is again subject in relation to an object, and
so without end. Prof. Bergmann's fundamental paradox is the
acceptance of this twofold infinite process. If time be real it is
possible to have an infinite series of ' self-positions '. What we
find in memory, the present of self in a minimal but finite stretch
of time, conscious of its unity with the past of self, and passing
over to a future of self similarly conscious of unity with its past, is
the fact. We have something like Prof. William James's doctrine
of Self operated through a doctrine of Time suggestive of Dr.
Shadworth Hodgson's, in either case less psychologically and more
metaphysically conceived.
The sixth essay on the objects of .perception and their relation
to things in themselves is intended to orientate Prof. Bergmann's
ontology more exactly with regard to Kant's main positions. The
pure philosophical construction is avowedly Prof. Bergmann's
chief interest, but incidentally it is possible to serve, and receive
service from, history of philosophy, and Kant's Critique, as it shows
to a thorough-going criticism of Kant, is a focus, so to speak, for
the calculation of Prof. Bergmann's positions. What are to be
our views of space, time, matter, the thing in itself as unknown
residuum defying analysis when we consider our perceptions, and
the equally unknown and residual thinker in itself ?
It is here, if at all, that Prof. Bergman is to escape from the
102 CRITICAL NOTICES
suspicion of subjective idealism with which we were left in respect
of a world whose reality was possibly only hypothetical or prob-
lematic, only ostensible or imputed in the relation of container to
the real consciousness for which it was. If it is independent, how
are we to construe and how prove its independence ? We are
certain of the distinction between objects of outer perception and
objects of imagination, but none of the things of outer perception
are given as real and not phenomenal. Certain of the Dasein of
our consciousness and of the attribution to this existent of the
possession of external perceptions, yes. Of the Dasein of the
contents of such external perceptions, no. Even the primary
qualities of matter are dependent on their percipi in the sense
that we could not say that they would not be obliterated with the
envisaging consciousness. The thing-in-itself on the side removed
from the thinker is meaningless. Kant is in the right in affirming
the phenomenal character of space, and therewith clearly of all
spatio-material content, but this involves the abdication of the
unknown unconscious assumed to underlie it. There is no Mrs.
Harris. On the other hand there is a way of getting forward on
the side of consciousness. In the first place, from the disparate-
ness of the way in which we actually perceive space and the way
in which it seems that we have to think it, i.e., as infinite and
infinitely divisible, the suggestion emerges that mathematicians'
space, if not a mere fiction, is phenomenon to an all-inclusive
consciousness, while physical space is what space is as phenomenon
to the individual's limited perception. So, too, for the primary
qualities of matter and ail the prcemissa of scientific physics. They
are phenomena for the infinite consciousness, and in construing
them the individual is under the necessity to employ sensuous
experience, because they are not merely his phenomena, but those
of the unbounded and all-inclusive spirit. If science really achieves
anything, then we cannot rest in subjective idealism. If we pass
beyond subjective idealism the monadology does not help us. If
we take the step to objective idealism, inorganic ' things,' our
bodies, other selves present no real difficulties. This is the train
of argument by which the problematic or assumptive nature of
Dr. Bergmann's idealism is auftjehoben. In the second place, if
the 'I think,' that for Kant accompanies all my perceptions, is a
fact for consciousness, it takes place in time. A consciousness of
the persistence of anything in time itself persists through that
time, but grant this, and the distinction of the timeless I from the
empirical I of inner sense is destroyed. The former is not, for
there is no timeless consciousness. The latter is not, for there
is no I-phenomenon. Instead is the everlasting self-position, not
only as to existence, but as to nature, of a real self in real time,
and so of its world, of the infinite self -consciousness and of its
phenomenal 'other,' the everlasting spatio-temporal world.
Throughout this ' rectification ' of Kant, and especially with re-
gard to certain phenomena implicating both sensation and feeling,
GEORG SIMMEL, Die Philosophic des Geldes. 103
e.g., toothache, we have constantly been confronted with bodily
our-bodily facts. Our bodies too are objective phenomena,
for the infinite consciousness and so for the finite. Nevertheless
in the essay on " Soul and Body " a brave attempt is made to
vindicate once more the plain man's conception of bodily organ-
isms, i.e., bodies where the conditions of a true unity are present,
endowed with soul or consciousness. It is, of course, intended
that this should fail, but it is intended also to show it so nearly
successful as to reduce the artificially widened gap between
empirical and metaphysical world-formulas. This essay is in
its detail the cleverest in the book, though in these days of
electro-magnetic and ether theories some of its mechanics may
be thought belated. Dr. Bergmann has cognisance of multi-
dimensional space-theories, but Euclidean space is involved for
him in a heterological analytical judgment a priori. The ' ad-
verse occupancy ' of space by matter rests for him on a to us
unknown, because not extensional, character of matter. The
conditions of a real, i.e., self-subsistent organic unity might be
fulfilled if we have other similarly imputed unknown characters, but
still the fusion with consciousness, or the co-ordination of organised
extension and consciousness as not self-subsistent attributes of an
unknown third, contradict our doctrine of consciousness, just as
the presumed independence of the spatial world contravenes our
doctrine of perception. So we conclude in terms of our metaphysic
as developed.
The renewal of interest in Leibniz and the growing tendency of
certain schools to couple their logic and dynamics in the manner
of that master, might perhaps act somewhat unexpectedly in favour
of a writer who has kicked against modes in philosophy and
followed his own train of thinking despite of the dominant sub-
jective interests of his day. But even if no disciples accept Prof.
Bergmann's construction as the truth, at any rate any student who
will work through Dr. Bergmann's wealth of detail must learn
what is new to him, true to him, of value to him. Prof. Bergmann
has studied philosophy in a great school, namely, in the history
of philosophy itself, notably that of the eighteenth century. He
has felt the fascinations specially of two great masters, Leibniz
and Berkeley. And he is
Nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri.
HERBERT W. BLUNT.
Die Philosophie des Geldes. Von GEORG SIMMEL. Leipzig :
Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1900. Pp. 554.
MONEY is at once symbolical of and instrumental to that connexion
which subsists between the most external phenomena of existence
and its most ideal potencies. A Philosophy of money should deal
therefore on the one hand with those preconditions in the constitu-
tion of the soul, in the relations of society, etc., from which money
104 CRITICAL NOTICES :
derives its significance ; whilst on the other hand it should follow
out the part played by money in the development of the inner life
of the individual and of society. " Keine Zeile," says the preface,
" dieser Untersuchungen ist nationalokonomisch gemeint." Yet
the facts of economic science and of economic history necessarily
play a large part in the discussion, as also do the facts of anthro-
pology. There are many interesting contributions to descriptive
ethics ; the main points of ethical theory are brought under con-
sideration and there is a digression on the theory of knowledge.
But the central theme lies in an amplification of the ideas expressed
in Prof. Simmers essay, Uber Sociale Differ enzurung, which was
published in 1890. The two aspects of the subject above referred
to are dealt with in the Analytischer Tell and the Synthetischer
Te.il respectively, each being divided into three chapters.
The lirst chapter discusses value in general and the distinction
between its subjective and its objective forms. Over against the
world of mere conceptions (Beyriffe) stand the two independent
all-embracing categories of Being and of Value. Each rests on
fundamental feeling and neither is reducible to the other. In the
same way the distinction between subjective and objective values
appears to be taken for granted. Objective values need not refer
to the object ; ' there may subsist relations between subject and
object by virtue of which certain feelings present themselves to
the former as equally obligatory and inevitable as sense impres-
sions. In realising their living force we appear only to acknow-
ledge a claim of the conceptual order of things, religious, aesthetic
and moral.' The conception of objective value is in fact meta-
physical, and is referred ' to the fundamental disposition of the
human spirit, so to experience a content as if it were not itself
the subject of the experience, but the medium ( Vermittler) through
which an impersonal Power realised its existence '. To this
explanation which seems to smack a little of the 'vis dormitiva,'
it is but a corollary to say that the practical significance of objective
value lies in providing norms for subjective value. This starting-
point, however, being granted there is little to object to in the
account given of the gradual determination of values through the
conflict of desires among themselves and the opposition they
encounter in the nature of things ; though now and then the
author seems to confuse, perhaps inevitably, the historical with
the logical order. In the last section of this chapter Prof. Simmel
geeks to fit his conception of economic value into " ein prinzipiell
bestimmtes Weltbild ". Our ideas are dominated, he tells us, by
the physiological necessity we are under of alternating between
rest and movement. Hence arises the antithesis between sub-
stance and attribute and in course of time that between absolute
and relative. With the growing sense of the relativity of knowledge,
the absolute has lost its content and seems about to disappear.
Yet the mere relations imply criteria, and these again an ultimate
criterion. In our search for such criteria we may never attain
GEORG SIMMEL, Die Philosophic des Geldes. 105
finality, but we must continually approximate to it ; and persist-
ence in this distinguishes the relativist from the sceptic. These
criteria however are not superimposed but immanent, not con-
stitutive but regulative. Truth is in fact relative to practice ; it
emerges in a mutual self-adjustment of ideas, it is a 'functionelles
Z iisammenyehoren '. The truth in the sense of sight of a man, an
eagle or a fly, lies in its adaptation to its respective environments.
The origin and nature of value are closely analogous to the origin
and nature of truth. ' Relativity is not a weakening, a qualification
of an otherwise independent idea of truth it is the essence of
truth itself it is the mode in which ideas (Vorstellungen) become
truths justas it is the mode in which objects of desire become values.'
The philosophical background thus sketched in shows a be-
wildering transition of standpoint between physics and psychology,
the theory of knowledge and metaphysics, which reminds one of
a Platonic dialogue. Indeed it is in a short digression on the
Platonic ideas at a later stage in the book (pp. 479-481) that the
reader will find what is perhaps the author's most successful
attempt to state his own philosophical position. It may be added
that the value of Prof. Simmel's speculations is largely independent
of this metaphysical basis ; or rather that the implicit rnetaphysic
which is essential to his psychological investigations has an
adequacy which seems to fail it when drawn out into abstraction.
The second chapter treats of the distinctions between the
substantial character of money and its functional character ; and
describes the historical evolution by which the former character
tends to lose itself in the latter, a process, however, which can
never be perfectly completed. To most English readers there
will probably appear to be an excess of subtlety in the treament of
this part of the subject. The functional character of money as a
pure means being considered as approximately realised, the third
chapter on ' Das Geld in den Zweckrechen ' follows out the psycho-
logical and economic consequences involved in the possibility of
separating means from ends. In this connexion will be found a
discussion of most of the conceptions introduced of late by
economists in expounding the theory of value, marginal utility,
consumer's rent, future values, etc., and a specially careful analysis
is given of that cumulative power of capital by virtue of which
quantity passes over in quality. On the psychological side there
is an interesting analytical study of the various abnormal phases
of character to which a money economy naturally gives birth, i.e.,
the passion for money making, avarice, extravagance, voluntary
poverty, modern cynicism and the blase character. In such
psychological characterisation lies one of Prof. Simmel's strongest
points, but to summarise the result is impossible.
The second or ' Synthetic ' half of Prof. Simmel's book will
probably be of greater interest to most readers, and it is perhaps
on the whole the more successful half. Its three chapters are
entitled ' Individual Freedom,' ' The Money Equivalent of Personal
106 CRITICAL NOTICES :
Values,' and the ' Style of Life '. Though they cover a great deal
of ground and are marked by the author's usual wealth of illustra-
tion and tendency to digression, the main theme is throughout the
development of the ideas expressed in the essay on Social
Differentiation. The progress of civilisation is to be measured by
the constant widening of the circle of persons with whom a given
individual is brought into relations of interdependence, and at
the same time by a decrease in the degree of dependence of the
individual on any particular person or group of persons. The
psychological differentiation of function of which this development
is the outward expression finds its main instrument in the money
economy. From a tribal status under which the whole concrete
personality is bound by a single undiscriminating obligation at
once religious, political, social and economic, man passes by degrees
to a condition in which he is bound by separate ties to his country,
his church, his family, his trade, his party, his social circle, etc.,
and for the most bound only in a form of limited liability which
lends itself increasingly to experiment and variation and therefore
to positive freedom. Along side this development there proceeds
an auxiliary and complementary evolution of property from its
most immobile forms to the perfect fluidity of an all-pervading
currency, a process which renders possible the formation of those
professional classes which are perhaps the most characteristic
feature of a high civilisation. In the earlier stages what a man
has and inherits largely determines what he is ; whilst in the
later his personality acquires an increasing power to imprint its
character on his possessions. We cannot cease to be the heirs
of the past but it makes all the difference to our liberty whether
the inheritance is one that claims us, or one that we ourselves
choose. The money economy thus opens the way to a progressive
individualisation of the individual ; whilst at the same time by
an ever subtler and more complex interweaving of the separated
fibres of impersonal relationship it promotes the socialisation of
society.
The fifth chapter begins with a discussion of ' blood money ' and
of marriage by purchase. It seems at first a curious paradox that
the period most remote from the money economy should have
been the one in which the value of a person was most readily
balanced by a money equivalent. Apart from much ingenious
interpretation of anthropological details which are themselves
perhaps still somewhat involved in a speculative atmosphere,
Prof. Simmel would account for this class of social phenomena
generally by the fact that neither the intrinsic value of man nor
the extrinsic value of money had yet emerged into clear conscious-
ness. Now that the antithesis between humanity as an end and
money as a means has been realised, the moral degradation
involved in bartering the former for the latter is typified in the
word prostitution. Prof. Simmel subjects to a careful analysis
these perversions of freedom and also those cases 'of negative
GEORG SIMMEL, Die Philosophic des Geldes. 107
freedom in which the transition to a money economy has lowered
instead of heightening the personal status; and he devotes the
final section of this chapter to the discussion of labour values.
His treatment of the Marxian theory shows a great advance in
sympathetic appreciation on the usual academic criticism, which,
starting from a purely economic standpoint, have no difficulty in
proving Das Kapital to be a mass of absurdities. This is as if
one were to subject " Le Contrat Social" to the severest tests of
anthropology and comparative jurisprudence. What demand
serious philosophic attention are the passionate idealistic beliefs
that appealed through these books to the multitude, not the
devious and illogical form of the speculations through which they
found expression. Prof. Simmel at any rate carries us to a
higher standpoint from which the essential features of this phase
of idealism begin to emerge upon our view. He holds the labour
theory to be philosophically the most interesting of all theories of
value. The attempt to reduce all labour to physical labour is not
due to ignorant contempt for mental work, but points rather to
the fact that a considerable portion of the mental factor in pro-
duction is actually gratis. What determines the form of the theory
is, however, an ideal of social equality which is only conceivable on
an economic basis. It is, moreover, as an ideal and not as a
statement of fact that the constant correspondence of the use-
value of a commodity with the labour-time spent upon it, can
alone be fruitfully criticised.
The sixth chapter on the ' Style of Life ' is apparently intended
to balance the third. The psychological predispositions attendant
upon a money economy which were there traced in the formation
of individual character are here shown to give a colour and a tone
to the life of civilised society as a whole. Foremost of these
characteristics is the increasing predominance of the intellectual
element over the element of feeling in social psychology. The
analogy between the parts played by intellect and by money is
once more insisted upon. The intellectual development of human
society and the rise of the money economy each assist at the
formation of a certain impersonal almost communistic atmosphere.
The interests of life are objectified so that we view them coolly
and disinterestedly, and a spirit of toleration is fostered which
was impossible amid the conflict of immediate unreflecting im-
pulses. But, in course of this same process, as desire loses its
directness, as means multiply and ends are obscured, as the
rationalistic temper prevails over sentiment, a new sphere of
activity is created apt for the aggrandisement of the individual
and for the exploitation of the many. Moreover, in the culture
of the spirit our subjectivity is overborne by the ever-growing
predominance of the ' Objective Mind ' of humanity. " Things are
in the saddle ; " ' The individual withers and the world is more
and more '. The last section of this concluding chapter gives a
series of ingenious illustrations of the effects of the money economy
108 CRITICAL NOTICES :
on the formal aspects of life expressed in terms of perspective,
rhythm, measure and symmetry, all of which serve to accentuate
tlie function of money as symbolising the relativity of existence.
The saying of Joubert about himself, ' Je suis propre a semer
mais non pas a batir et a fonder,' might be applied without
injustice to Prof. Simmel. His book is a storehouse full to
overflowing of tine psychological observation, of valuable philo-
sophical suggestion, and its weakest points are where it makes
the nearest approach to systematic treatment. It must be added
that it is probably more useful and stimulating than a more
systematic attempt would have been, since the time is scarcely
ripe for successful construction. In this connexion it is most
significant that the author should have chosen to formulate his
views as a philosophy of money rather than as a philosophy of
value. It is quite consistent with this that the Weltbild into
which he would fit his speculations, is a theory not of reality but
of knowledge, a theory, moreover, which, however it may seek to
outgrow its origin, has its roots in scepticism. If the combination
of subtle psychology with naive metaphysics seems to carry us back
to the pre-critical epoch this is because philosophy having widened
its orbit must repeat its phases. Philosophy, however, cannot
unlearn its past, and from time to time it is borne in upon the
reader of this book that if the hands are the hands of Hume the
voice is the voice of Hegel.
In shifting its centre, as it is tending to do, to the notion of value,
philosophy is following by a true instinct the direction of the
concrete human spirit. The social idealists have already sought
the Absolute in work and in wages. The labouring man has
vaguely felt that each pay-day should have the finality of the
Last Judgment. To whatever abode the human ideal shifts its
quarters, philosophy must follow with its transcendental dialectic.
In this migration Prof. Simmel is a brilliant pioneer. He has
cleared the ground and shown how the land lies. The imperfect
juncture of the two parts of his book reveals the nature of the
problem, which is to bring into vital connexion the phenomena of
value and the phenomena of social differentiation. Of the reality
of such a connexion, the money economy is the outward and
visible sign. On those deeper aspects of the subject to which any
philosophy of money must be inadequate Prof. Simmel has not
failed to touch. He is never so happy, for example, as when he
is drawing illustrations and analogies from the world of art ; and
this is the region where all the higher elements of the problem of
value converge. GBOBGE UN WIN.
L' Imagination et les mathematiques selon Descartes. Par P. Bou-
TBOUX, licencie es lettres. Bibliotheque de la Faculte des
Lettres de I'Universite de Paris, No. x. Paris : Alcan, 1900.
Pp. 45.
THIS volume contains a careful exposition of Descartes' doctrine
P. BOUTEOUX, L' Imagination et les mathdmatiques. 109
on the subject dealt with, but abstains from all criticisms ; the
many objections to the doctrine are not mentioned, and some, at
least, seem not to be perceived. The difficult questions as to the
Cartesian meaning of imagination are left untouched. The work
has as motto a quotation from the Regulce to the effect that the
intellect alone can perceive truth, but that it is well to assist it by
means of imagination, senses and memory. This thesis is ampli-
fied in the text. Descartes aimed at restricting the use of imag-
ination in mathematics, but regarded, it, nevertheless, as in some
degree an indispensable auxiliary. M. Boutroux divides his dis-
cussion into two parts, the first on the principles of mathematical
knowledge, the second on mathematical demonstration. In the
first part, it is pointed out that, though knowledge requires ideas,
not images, yet imagination is useful, not only in Geometry but also
in Algebra, from which Descartes excluded every notion not capable
of representation by an image. In the second part, it is pointed
out, to begin with, that Descartes asserts not only that the triangle
can be conceived, but also that its properties can be proved, with-
out the help of imagination or the senses (p. 13). But demon-
stration, being regarded as a practical method of arriving at new
truths, may be pursued by whatever method is most convenient,,
and practically it is easier to employ the imagination to some
extent. M. Boutroux proceeds to remark (p. 15) that imagination
always intervenes in deduction, since this operation takes time.
This view seems irreconcilable with the previous view as to the
demonstrability by the pure understanding of the properties of the
triangle. It seems also scarcely possible to hold, as he does, that
imagination is essentially to be distinguished from the under-
standing by the fact that the former, but not the latter, acts in
time. For the imagination is a part of the body, situated in the
brain (ReyiUce, xii.), which is surely part of its essential difference
from the understanding. M. Boutroux points out that Algebra,
for Descartes, has to borrow its definitions and axioms from
Geometry, and in this way makes use of imagination ; and that
the practical utility of symbols depends upon their being imaginable.
Descartes' universal mathematics is regarded as a youthful dream,
which he afterwards abandoned. Demonstration, we are told, is
not properly an affair of the understanding, for, from the point of
view of the understanding, one proposition does not precede
another or give its reason. This view, by the way, though
probably Cartesian, is certainly false. The volume ends with two
appendices, one on Victa, pointing out that he was more dependent
on imagination than Descartes, the other on the differences be-
tween the Regulce and later works.
Though many of Descartes' remarks on mathematics are ex-
cellent, his theory of the imagination appears thoroughly erroneous
so much so as to possess nothing but a historical interest. But
such as it is, the theory has been clearly, and, I think, correctly,.
set forth by M. Boutroux.
B. EUSSELL.
VI. NEW BOOKS.
Ethics : Descriptive and Explanatory. By S. E. MEZES, Ph.D., Professor
of Philosophy, University of Texas. New York and London :
Messrs. Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1901. Pp. xxi., 435. Price 10s. 6d.
net.
IN this book, Prof. Mezes claims to give a scientific account of morality,
without prejudice to the metaphysic of ethics. His aim is to investigate
ethical phenomena purely on the basis of experience, refraining even
from giving an estimate of their value. Yet, experience is to be widely
interpreted, embracing the past as well as the present, and paying due
regard to uncivilised as to civilised races. The methods also are various ;
introspection alone not being sufficient. Help is to be sought from every
available source, and more especially from the study of origins.
After two chapters of an introductory character, the work is divided
into two parts the first devoted to consideration of subjective morality
(extending from chapter iii. to chapter viii.), and the second to consider-
ation of objective morality (chapters ix. to xv.). By subjective morality
is understood what Tightness means to the agent himself ; and so part
i. is occupied with a discussion (a) of voluntary action, and (b) of the
individual conscience (its nature, its cause, its origin, and its develop-
ment). By objective morality, on the other hand, is designated " the
body of actions vouched for as moral by the standard or wise con-
science " ; and the topics treated under part ii. are the cardinal virtues
(here set down as five) and welfare.
The concluding chapter (xvi.) of the treatise sums up the subject, and
makes a few remarks on the value of morality. A tolerably full Index
completes the volume.
As will be seen from this brief outline, the writer's object is a decidedly
limited one. By restricting it so, he not only gets rid of the meta-
physical issues, but also feels justified in ignoring many of the puzzling
questions in psychology. His role is simply that of a describer, explain-
ing as he goes along by giving an account of how the various ethical
principles and conceptions have come to be. And, in unfolding his
subject, he has the merit of adhering consistently to the plan laid down.
He is also, for the most part, thorough in his handling ; the topics as
they appear being expanded with elaboration, and sometimes with an
exhaustiveness that borders on prolixity. The work cannot be said to
be in any remarkable degree original ; but it is executed with care and
patience, and written in a style that is clear, though not always free
from faults in grammar, or from an un-English use of words and phrases.
It is characterised, further, by good psychological analyses, and by
sound common sense, which frequently takes a practical turn. This List
characteristic is most prominent in the handling of the virtues.
As good an example as any of Prof. Mezes's powers are the chapters on
NEW BOOKS. Ill
Conscience, under subjective morality, treating of the adult conscience,
the psychic cause of conscience, the birth and growth of conscience in
the child and in the race. Although reproducing in part, as needs must
be, the investigations of others, they are marked by real insight, and
show at its best the virtue of the genetic method in the handling of
ethics.
Less satisfactory is his handling of voluntary action. Too many ques-
tions are passed by, being referred to the text-books on psychology ; and
also the analysis of Will is inadequate. Had Prof. Mezeg gone back to
Aristotle, he would have been guided to a completer presentation of
volition. At any rate, he would have been impressed with the necessity
of taking Will in connexion with Desire and of giving some explicit
exposition of the latter.
So, too, his position that only voluntary actions are moral phenomena
is a very obvious one ; but it is not so obvious that " neither emotional
states, intellectual states, nor fixed habits are moral phenomena ". True
enough, emotional states in themselves are not moral phenomena, but
they become so when they are brought within the range of self-control ;
for, then we contract a responsibility regarding them, inasmuch as their
intensity is, in part at least, regulated by the degree of attention we
accord them. In like manner, intellectual states are regulated by atten-
tion, and thvis come under the will and may have a moral aspect ; and,
as to fixed habits, these, in so far as fixed, are removed from the ordinary
control of the will, but, as a habit is formed voluntarily, it may seriously
be questioned whether any habit is ever so absolutely fixed as to be
excluded, under every conceivable set of circumstances, from the will's
influence.
In his section on objective morality, the author is concerned with the
question of the ultimate end, which he makes out to be sentient welfare
or "the common good of all co-operating sentient beings " ; and the
greater part of the exposition consists in a detailed handling of the cardinal
virtues. These are maintained to be five in number, viz., courage and
temperance (involving the will), benevolence (attaching to feeling), justice
and wisdom (which are specifically intellectual). This list, the author
holds, " is at once adequate and compact, covering the whole field of
morality, but covering no portion of the field twice". It can hardly be
said that his own treatment bears out this estimate. That there is
overlapping among the five virtues becomes very apparent as the exposi-
tion proceeds ; and it is difficult to persuade oneself that there are not
also grave omissions. Take Humility, for instance : where is its place
in the classification ? Doubtless, by a Procrustean process it might be
possible to fit it to one or other of the five forms, but not satisfactorily.
Humility is neither courage nor temperance, although, under certain
circumstances, it may assimilate itself to either. It is not benevolence,
although in certain aspects it faces that way ; nor can you, except
in a special context, designate it justice or wisdom. It is a quality of
character quite distinct, and, in civilised communities, prompts to actions
that minister to social welfare. That, according to Prof. Mezes's own
test, gives it a right to a separate place in the treatment of objective
morality.
So, too, with Truthfulness which is here unmentioned. Not only is
this one of the most important social virtues with a quality of its own,
but it also presents peculiar difficulties needing to be carefully elucidated,
and it lends itself in a very special manner to the historical mode of
treatment that Mr. Mezes delights in.
The characterisation of the five virtues selected for consideration
112 NEW BOOKS.
becomes very much, in the hands of the author, distinct character-
sketches of the virtuous man in his five-fold aspect the courageous
man, the temperate man, the benevolent man, the just man, the wise
man. These are, in the main, successful ; but the sketch of the wise
man is slight and not sufficiently vital to be effective.
WILLIAM L. DAVIDSON.
Tlie Adversaries of tin* .sVv^/r, or the Specious Present : a New Inquiry into
Human Knowledge. By ALFRED HODDEE, Ph.D. London: Swan
Sonnenschein & Co., Limited ; New York : The Macinillan Co., UH)l.
Pp. ili., 320. Price 6s.
The sceptic is Dr. Hodder. His adversaries are Mr. Bradley and Prof.
Eoyce. He poses as " the defender of the Specious Present as the
starting-point of thought against the defenders of mere postulates,"
professing a " scepticism " that is a " solipsism of the Specious Present ".
His position, however, is neither sceptical nor solipsistic in a ' construc-
tive ' sense. He does not ' positively deny '. He does not assert ' I am
really All '. In fact, he talks black and thinks drab perhaps a not
unpardonable device on the part of one whose literary object is evidently
to shock. Yet Dr. Hodder would not shock us out of our senses so much
as back to them. " Naive realism," in regard to metaphysics and ethics
alike, is the moral of this eminently readable, though shockingly mis-
printed, book the ' doubtful ' moral, let us hasten to add, lest we fail to
do full justice to the principles of its author.
Dr. Hodder's " logic " is a " psychologic," and claims to be based on
indubitable " fact ". So much we are told ; but otherwise little tixmble
is taken to keep foundation and superstructure distinct in the interest of
the reader. The latter is left to divine as best he can what that ultimate
" fact " is which the sceptic is prepared to swallow, or rather which willy-
nilly swallows him. The indications, however, point to its being the
following that there is a " real " basis of vivid " presentative " elements
intuitively given in any experience, however momentary, which basis of
itself distinguishes itself from any " representations " it may seem to
support, such as those of a past or future. We are informed that we are
standing in one of those circular panoramas which have their foreground
built up of solid things and the background painted in. " Introspection,"
it is asserted, will always enable us to detect where three dimensions give
place to two, where presentness -the here and now as it is in itself
shades off into the " make-believe " of presentness. The " mode of
existence," the "essential stuff" of present reality and present make-
believe of its own accord proclaims itself different.
What follows ? As against ' absolutism ' in metaphysics it is supposed
to follow that there can be no ' necessary ' postulates, presuppositions,
implications, of thought in virtue of any activity it may seem to display.
' I judge, therefore a standard of judgment is,' cannot but be inconclusive,
since I do not know myself as judging " of " and " about " in any sense
and to any purpose with that perfect presentative sense of assurance
wherewith I know, that is, am " acquainted with," the here and now in
the intuition coi/itatur <'i-</<> <.-;/ (as Leibnitz would have put it). Nor is the
' voluntarist ' view of postulates held to be much, if at all, sounder than
the absolutism it seeks to displace. The constructions of representative
thought at their least invalid are no outcome of a ' will to believe '.
Within the problematic region of the representative those collocations
of symbolised experience which present themselves " unforced " dis-
tinguish themselves by a sort of realitj- of make-believe from those
which ' we ' call into being by the aid of " imagination ".
NEW BOOKS. 113
It will be noticed that the foregoing argument against absolutism bases
itself on quite a different kind and order of " fact " to that contemplated
in the argument against voluntarism. To the " logic " of the former the
scepticism of its upholder or rather vehicle offers no objection. And
yet here there was surely something for him to cavil at. Since his
" reality " is not one with the bare givenness of experience as a whole,
but falls within that givenness as a special kind of givenness, namely,
presentativeness, it has surely at best but the relative character (what-
ever be the degree of vividness attaching to it in what we distinguish as
feeling) of a substratum, ground, or what not, of representative conscious-
ness. But no. Intuition and vivid feeling and reality are something
absolute and apart, and yet there are representations purporting to be
of something about which we are not allowed to say that it absolutely is
not. For our Solipsist of the Specious Present is half-hearted. We read
that the limits of the here and now are " as walls pierced with windows,"
and that " what is dimly seen is seen ". The precise ontological status
attributed to the dim view commanded by these windows is that it is the
possible or at any rate the not-impossible. In which world of precarious
being "fact" of a kind, as we have seen, is nevertheless able to dis-
tinguish itself from " fiction ". Man knows himself most distinctively as
the father of lies. The test of " fact " at this stage is imforcedness,
spontaneity (as contrasted with the will !) pertinacity, predominance and
permanence. Perhaps it is just as well for us that certain ' useful lies '
are uncommonly pertinacious in their way !
The corollary of all this is naturally hedonism. Pleasantness in the
sense of a felt " welcorneness " occurs as fact par excellence (fact of the
inferior second kind, of course) in our forecasts of the future. Motive,
meanwhile, is simply forecasted fact and nothing ' we ' make, volition
being but the selection of means whereto we are driven by the precarious,
yet inexorable, " logic " which posits the end. Desire and Will, however,
it is admitted, are, qua facts, amongst the grounds of inferential forecast.
Room thus would seem to be left for a paradoxical hedonism which should
assert that the desire and will to do right without regard to consequences
in the way of unideal and vivid pleasure are of all the facts relating to
morals precisely the most " pertinacious " and most instinct with " wel-
coineness ". Dr. Hodder, however, does not seem so strong on the side
of history as on that of introspection to judge, at least, by his Thrasy-
machean harangue on the subject of the ' Morality that Is ".
So much, then, for this " new inquiry " which urges most of the old
things that have been said on behalf of ' objective ' versus ' subjective '
absolutism in a fresh and spirited, if somewhat mazy, way. Dr. Hodder's
" adversaries," however, are likely to remain unconvinced. They will
ask him to turn his scepticism against that " specious present " of his
which bears so suspicious a resemblance to the phenomenon of that
name which certain psychologists declare themselves to have timed by
the aid of a stop-watch. Once " we " are got well into " time " by the
aid of a psychological catch-word, it is comparatively easy to prove us
superfluous or worse, our affirmations of the pre-existently firm being
echo, when valid, and, when invalid, presumably the devil.
E. E. MARETT.
Peter Abelard. By JOSEPH McCABE. London : Duckworth & Co., 1901.
This is a very unsatisfactory book. The 'monastic, scholastic and
ecclesiastical experience,' on the strength of which Mr. McCabe con-
siders that he ' may approach the task ' of giving a ' complete study ' of
114 NEW BOOKS.
Abelard ' with a certain confidence ' has perhaps enabled him to sympa-
thise to some extent with the great teacher's bitterness of spirit, but that
is all. It is unnecessary to dwell on the evidences of a lack of good
taste in style and temper which the book exhibits, or to enumerate the
many inaccurate and loose statements which may be found in it. From
the point of view of the readers of MIND, as an account of Abelard's
philosophy, it is utterly worthless. It is no doubt true that the exact
logical doctrine of Abelard (why, by the way, does Mr. McCabe prefer
the indefensible hybrid form Peter Abelard ?) is difficult to discover, but
Mr. McCabe does not touch upon it at all, beyond some cheap scoffs at
the discussions on the nature of universals carried on in the twelfth
century, scoffs which are not made at all more impressive by the
information that the author has ' sat on the chair of scholastic philosophy
and held grave discourse on genera and species '. He succeeds better in
stating the importance of Abelard as a theologian ; but his contempt for
speculations connected with the doctrine of the Trinity (speculations
full of significance for Abelard) is too great to allow him to give the
reader any intelligible account of what Abelard held or did not hold on
this matter ; and the fact that in his version of Abelard's description of
the council of Soissons he omits one sentence, the omission of which
entirely deprives of its point the otherwise amusing story of the papal
legate who was drawn into a direct conflict with the Athanasian creed,
sufficiently indicates the uncertainty of his touch when dealing with this
part of his subject. Even with the external side of the history of
philosophy in Abelard's day, Mr. McCabe can have but a superficial
acquaintance. Otherwise he would have hesitated to think it possible
that Abelard knew Aristotle's Prior Analytics and Topics (a view which
he attributes, without apparent ground, to Cousin, who knew better),
or that he might have 'approached the easy Greek text of the New
Testament ' ; he would not have spoken of the currency of a translation
of the Timaeus in twelfth-century France as a fact which might be
questioned : he would perhaps have asserted less boldly that Erigena
was ' well remembered ' in Abelard's time. Abelard was a great thinker
and a great sufferer ; a martyr for intellectual freedom and a teacher who
did much to determine the subsequent course of intellectual progress in
Europe. In Mr. McCabe's book he appears as the hero of a shallow and
arrogant secularism. No doubt he was a man of a haughty and revolu-
tionary spirit ; pride and mockery came easily to him ; but this negative
or destructive side of his intellectual character, which alone appeals to
his present biographer, was not the only side which it presents. He
cannot be rightly understood if we ignore the positive and constructive
aspect of his nature, on which he was as deeply interested in the problems
of his age and resolved to understand them, as he was impatient of the
acquiescence in mere traditional formula} as affording a solution of them.
One may share Mr. McCabe's regret that we have not received a com-
plete study of Abelard from Mr. Poole ; it is impossible to think that Mr.
McCabe has done anything even temporarily to fill the gap. We may
conclude by hoping that no one will be misled by Mr. McCabe into
supposing that the Confessions of St. Augustine and the Historia Calami-
tatum of Abelard are at all alike, except in that both are autobiographies ;
and by recommending to Mr. McCabe's attention as a student of mediaeval
thought the masterly contrast and comparison between St. Bernard and
Abelard's successor as the object of Bernard's persecuting zeal, Gilbert
de la Porree, drawn by the hand of John of Salisbury, the friend of both
and the pupil of Abelard himself, in his Historia Pontififalis.
C. C. J. WEBB.
NEW BOOKS. ll-'V
The Life of Henri/ Caldurwood. By his Son and the Rev. DAVID WOODSIOK.
London : Hodder and Stoughton, 1900. Pp. viii., 447.
The authors of this volume are to be congratulated on an excellent
piece of work. The biography is shorter than one would have expected
the record of such an extraordinarily full and active life to be. Yet
within the limits to which the authors have chosen to restrict them-
selves they have given a most successful and interesting account of Prof.
Calderwood's life and work. While making a rapid survey of his public
career and work their main object, they have not failed to present with
sufficient clearness the principles and views which determined his action
on all the more important and often difficult and disputed questions with
which he had to deal in his various capacities as educationist, citizen,
and churchman. Their narrative has, besides, the merit, of leaving the
reader with a strong impression of those qualities of mind and character
which made Calderwood's work what it was his clear-headedness, his
resoluteness of will joined with a most conciliatory temper and great
kindness of heart, but above all the strenuous moral purpose which was
manifest in every action of his life, and gained him the profound respect
and confidence of all those who knew him or came under his influence.
This influence of his personality is rightly emphasised by those who
have contributed recollections of him as a teacher.
A short but admirable sketch of Calderwood's philosophical writings
by Prof. Pringle-Pattison concludes the volume. It is unfortunate for
Calderwood's philosophical 1'eputation that his most important work be-
longs to an almost forgotten controversy, and is consequently little read.
Written within a few years after he had passed through Sir William
Hamilton's classes, his book on The Philosophy of the Infinite showed
not merely great courage and independence of thought, but also a re-
markable insight into the real weaknesses of Hamilton's position. Thus,
to take only one of the passages here quoted, when he argues that " whi
it is true that the finite mind cannot have infinite thoughts ... [it is]
equally true that the finite mind can have finite thoughts concerning
an infinite object," he unquestionably fastens iipon a most fundamental
distinction, and one which renders much of Hamilton's argument un-
tenable. It is interesting to read (p. 197) that he had at one time formed
the project of writing a popular exposition of moral philosophy, in which,
it may be conjectured, the more practical parts of the subject, which are
very briefly treated in his published text-book, would have held a prom-
inent place. And it is certainly a matter for regret that this project
of a work, for which he was peculiarly fitted by his practical wisdom
and experience, was never carried out.
Chapters from Aristotle's Ethics. By J. H. MUIRHEAD, M.A., Professor of
Mental and Moral Philosophy, Mason University College, Birming-
ham. London : John Murray, 1900. Pp. xiv., 319.
This modest production possesses the characteristic merit of Prof. Muir-
head's work, via., that of fulfilling the purpose for which it is intended.
No attempt is made to step outside the definite limits laid down, but
within those limits all is clear, well-arranged and complete. The special
object of these ' chapters ' is " to bring some of the leading conceptions
of the Ethics into connexion with modern ideas for the sake of the
general reader ". Their original form was that of a course of lectures to
teachers, and the special reference throughout is to persons engaged in
educational work who know no Greek.
The first, and larger, portion of the book consists of thirteen lectures
116 NEW BOOKS.
upon Aristotle's conceptions of Virtue, Happiness, Friendship, etc. ; the
remainder of an English version of the ' Selected Passages ' upon which
the lectures are based. The version succeeds, without sacrifice of
accuracy, in reproducing Aristotle's doctrine in a manner more readable
than is usual, or indeed possible, in a translation intended for the use of
students. The only serious fault is the use of the word ' soul ' (both in
the version and throughout the lectures) as the rendering of ^u^. This
conventional equivalent has its dangers even for scholars, and nothing,
surely, could be more misleading to the ' English ' reader. The lectures
combine the advantage of a historical, with that of a scientific, introduc-
tion to the study of Ethical questions. The idea was a happy one and
has been excellently worked out, while upon some points ?.</., the
relation of Habit to Choice, the educational value of Friendship, the
psychological nature of Pleasure Prof. Muirhead's treatment wiU give
food for thought to readers who are beyond the introductory stage.
W. H. FAIRBROTHER.
Government or Human Evolution ; vol. ii., Individualism and Collectivism^
By EDWARD KELLY. London : Longmans, Green & Co., 1901. Pp.
xv., 608. Price 10s. 6d.
The second volume of Mr. Kelly's Government or Human Evolution is-
devoted to a criticism of Individualism and a vindication of Collectivism.
The initial difficulty of Mr. Kelly's argument is that it starts from the
conception of these rival abstractions as if they were final and real (e.g~
" the fact that pauperism, prostitution and crime are the necessary (sic}
attendants and products of individualism is a sufficient reason for
questioning its claims ") ; and his whole historical review of Individual-
ism may be said to proceed upon an abstraction, the result being that
his logic of social and economic causation wiU appear to many minds as
" unequal to the subtlety of Nature ". It is doubtful at any rate whether
it will carry conviction to any one who is not already in favour of the
thesis to be maintained. There is, we think, a substantial truth in Mr.
Kelly's position ; but certainly he is very free with generalisations of a
kind which suggest that he has not been too carefiil to verify his refer-
ences. They are generalisations which would certainly be very interest-
ing if they were true ; but we are a little afraid that they may indispose
the exact reader for the more constructive part which follows ; and this
is really an eminently reasonable and " presentable " statement of the
case for collectivism. Mr. Kelly is careful to emphasise the distinction
essential to any profitable estimate of its claims between collectivism
as a method or programme of social reform and collectivism as an ideal
condition of society. He has not altogether succeeded in avoiding the
" Utopian " aspect of collectivism ; but, taken as a whole, Mr. Kelly's
statement of the collectivist case is commendably tentative and elastic ;
his earnestness and enthusiasm are tempered with judgment and dis-
cretion. The statement, however, would have been better if it had
been shorter. This is not the place for any examination of Mr. Kelly's
argument ; his definitions may not always be exact enough for the
philosopher, and he occasionally uses terms like " social mind " in a
somewhat disconcerting sense ; but there is nothing in his philosophy
that should offend any but an " individualist " pure and simple, and there
is much in it that invites favourable comparison with the " social philo-
sophy " of professed philosophers. It may be pertinent, however, to
remark that Mr. Kelly's comment on Aristotle's definition of virtue was.
perhaps unnecessary ; it is certainly wrong-
SIDNEY BALL.
NEW BOOKS. 117
Outlines of Educational Doctrine. By J. F. HERBART. Translated by
A. F. LANGE. Annotated by C. DE GARMO. New York : The Mac-
millan Company, 1901. Pp. xi., 334.
This work, as the Preface does not inform us, is an annotated translation
of the second or 1841 edition of Herbart's Umriss paedagogischer Vorles-
ungen. It may also be added, for the benefit of the uninformed reader,
that the paragraphs headed Note are by Herbart himself, and not by his
present commentator. Some confusion on the point might, indeed, arise,
even in the minds of those who had read Herbart : for in certain cases
the commentator has, without sign or warning, interpolated remarks of
his own in Herbart's text.
''The reasons for translating and annotating Herbart's Outlines are,
first, to present to the English-speaking public Herbart's latest, and also
his most complete, work on education ; and, second, to note . . . the
advances made in educational thought since Herbart laid down his pen."
Both aims are praiseworthy. It may be feared that the immediate effect
of the book will be to increase the present lamentable Herbart -worship ;
but, after all, the better Herbart is known at first hand, the more truly
will he, in the long run, be appreciated. As for execution : the first
part of the translation is decidedly good, the latter part slovenly. The
notes by Prof, de Garrno are of the practical or ' common-sense '
kind ; they have nothing of theoretical import, and show no sense of
historical perspective. They vary greatly in value : some, by the sharp
contrast of old and new, are really illuminating ; many are platitudinous.
"Combats of any kind between teacher and pupil are to be deplored,"
certainly, but it is hardly necessary to print the remark ; and similar
statements are all too common. The book is well indexed.
The Mental Life of the Monkeys. By E. L. THORNDIKE. Psych. Review
Mon. Suppl, No. 15. May, 1901. Pp. iv., 57. Price 50 c.
This paper describes a series of interesting, if somewhat fragmentary,
observations upon three Cebus monkeys. The experiments were in part
similar to those previously performed by the author upon dogs and cats.
The monkeys show progress towards human mentality (1) in sensory
equipment (focalised vision) ; (2) in motor equipment (co-ordination of
hand and eye) ; (3) in instincts or inherited nervous connexions (general
physical and mental activity) ; (4) in their method of learning or associa-
tive processes (qiaicker formation, greater number, delicacy, complexity
and permanence of associations). In method of learning, however, the
monkeys do not advance far beyond the generalised mammalian type ;
there is at any rate no large stock of ' free ideas ' in the author's sense of
definite and discriminated presentations.
The author, apologising for the lack of clearness and completeness of
the monograph, finds his excuse in the inconstant and variable conduct
of the monkeys themselves. We are grateful for what he has given us,
and shall be glad to receive further instalments.
Notes on Child Study. By E. L. THORNDIKE. Columbia Univ. Contrib.
to Phil., Psych. 'and Education, viii., 3-4, June, 1901. New York:
The Macmillan Company. Price $1.00.
" These notes are printed primarily for the use of my classes . . . and
are subject to revision. It is my intention to issue a new edition yearly.
They are incomplete and ill-proportioned, and probably somewhat biassed
118 NEW BOOKS.
by the author's personal views." So runs the introductory statement,
by which the critic is at first disarmed. A reading of the Notes, how-
ever, does much to cancel his favourable impression of the writer's
modesty. It is to be regretted that he did not rest content with ' private
circulation,' and wait a little before publishing. As it stands the work is
not such as we have a right to expect from Dr. Thorndike.
A Text-book of Psychology for Secondary Schools. By D. PUTNAM,
New York: Amer. Book Company, 1901. Pp. 300. Price 90 c.
This book represents the conscientious and painstaking work of a
practical teacher. Nevertheless, it is precisely the type of book which
the modern psychologist must regard as unfitted for secondary school
use. It consists, almost entirely, in an analysis of concepts, and seeks
to include within its 300 12mo pages a sketch of the nervous system,
-an analytic psychology, a logic and an ethics. Mind is defined, on the
fifth page of the text, as " the Ego, the I myself ; that which knows,
feels and wills. We assume at the outset that there is a soul, that it is
immaterial, that though intimately associated with matter it is distinct
from matter." And where the pupil should be engaged in simple
introspective exercises, he is given a surfeit of quotation : Ladd and
James, Lindner and Scripture, Hall and Le Conte, Davis and Compayre,
all figure in the first six pages ! This is not the way to arouse interest
in psychological problems.
The Principles of Human Knowledge. By GEORGE BERKELEY. Edited by
T. J. McCoRMACK. Chicago : Open Court Publishing Company,
1901. Pp. xv., 128. Price 25 c. ; Is. 6d.
This volume of the Religion of Science Library contains a reprint of the
Principles from the edition of 1734, together with the dedication and
preface of the edition of 1710. There are, further, a facsimile of the
title-page of the first edition, and a portrait of Berkeley by Smibert.
The Editor's preface reproduces, with some additional remarks, the
sketch of Berkeley's life and aims given in Lewes' Biographical History
of Philosophy (1845). The publishers are doing good service with these
cheap philosophical reprints : the books are light in hand, and the text
clear. But the cover of the present volume is hideous.
The Art of Study : a Manual for Teachers and Students of the Science and the
Art of Teaching. By B. A. HINSDALE. New York : American Book
Co., 1900. Pp. 266. Price $1.00.
" The ultimate object of this book is to place the Art of Study as a
tool or instrument in the hands of pupils and students in schools." In
other words, it is an essay on the psychology of acquisition, written from
the teacher's standpoint, and made as practical and as little technical as
possible. Five of the twenty-two chapters are devoted to Attention, and
one to the relations of Feeling to study and learning : the rest are rather
pedagogical than psychological in character. The author follows James
in his psychology, and the modern Herbartians in his educational doc-
trine. His theories do not always harmonise, as, indeed, is the rule in
works upon applied psychology : but the discussions, on the whole, are
clear and sensible, and the work should have a distinct sphere of useful-
ness.
NEW BOOKS. 119
An Experiment in Education : also the Ideas which Inspired It and Were
Inspired by It. By. M. R. ALLING-ABER. New York : Harper Bros.,
1899. Pp. ix., 245. Price $1.25.
The aim of the author's 'experiment,' begun in 1881, was "to see if
the child may not be introduced at once to the foundations of all learning
the natural and physical sciences, mathematics, literature, including
language, and history and at the same time be given a mastery of such
elements of reading, writing, and number as usually constitute primary
education ". The chapters detailing the experiment itself are reprinted
from the Popular Science Monthly for 1892, and are followed by discussions
of the underlying ideas, of the teaching of special subjects, and of the
' atmosphere ' of schoolrooms. The author remarks, with justifiable
pride, that " all which her experiment was meant to demonstrate as
feasible now bids fair to become the common usage in education ". The
book is of interest to students of applied psychology.
Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. By GEORGE BERKELEY.
Chicago : Open Court Publ. Co., 1901. Pp. vii., 136. Price 25c. ;
Is. 6d.
This is the latest number of the very useful series of Philosophical Re-
prints now in course of publication by the Open Court Company. It con-
tains a portrait of Berkeley from the engraving by T. Cooke (the reprint
of The Principles of Human Knowledge reproduced the picture by Smibert,
now in Yale University) ; a brief editorial preface by T. J. McCormack,
illustrating Berkeley's home in Rhode Island ; a facsimile of the title-
page of the original edition of 1713 ; the dedication and preface (omitted
in the 1734 edition) ; and the text of the dialogues.
Le Problenie de la Vie, Essai de Sociologie Generale. Par Louis
BOURDEAU. Paris : Felix Alcan, 1901.
The Problem of Life is a posthumous work of the well-known posi-
tivist teacher, Bourdeau, written when he was almost seventy years of
age, but showing no falling-off either in intellectual vigour or in imagina-
tive power. Its scope is of the widest the nature of life, its cause,
raison d'etre, its end in the order of the world : the method is the well-
worn one, so often the prelude to the wildest metaphysics, viz., " the in-
ductive extension of the sum total of best established knowledge" to
the unknown beyond, the realm of probability : the hope is to^found at
once " a positive metaphysics," and " a scientific religion ".
The first book (i Analysis of Individual Life " is on familiar lines ;
it treats of the individual organism from the two standpoints of Somatism
and Psychism, although psychical and physical are merely different attri-
butes of being. On the Somatic side the general life of the organism
is the sum of the particular lives of its constituent organs and parts, but
at the same time " directs " the forces contained in these lives. There
is, as the structure of the human body shows, an autoplastic, self-
directing influence in each organism, a design pursued, a task realised.
A series of fortuitous accidents would not account for any living body,
but, underlying the growth of each there must be " a profound thought,
-which may be unconscious of itself, but is none the less real " an
internal and spontaneous finality. No conception seems to have been
present as to the utter contradictions involved in these statements.
So on the psychic side, one soul is the collective expression of a
120 NEW BOOKS.
number of partial souls, those of the subordinate centres, which possess
only a restricted consciousness. " The unconscious is the dark or night
side of psychic life, giving only vague glimmers of light, and is none the
less real, though more obscure, than the side brought into light by the
full day of inward sense " (pp. 53, 54;. Thus, with virtuous consistency,
Bourdeau traces the psychic life of the individual to that- of its con-
stituent cells, then its plastides, its protoplasm, and finally to that of
matter itself. The attraction and repulsion, action and reaction, every-
where manifest in " dead " matter, represent the beginnings, the elements
of the animation (external and internal; that living nature reveals. In
the simplest movement is expressed an active force, a tendency, a need
felt, the germ of intelligence and will. Here is a bold principle, "As
everything which lives feels itself live, so everything which is must feel
itself being, under penalty of non-existence ". This is a positivist
induction !
In the second book the " Synthesis of Collective Life " Bourdeau's
naive metaphysics gives us a system to which one can hardly deny a
tribute of admiration, however widely it seem to contrast with the
method laid down at the beginning. Societies, the family, the crowd,
the state, humanity all these are new organisms whose members
function in a common life, and constitute together a real being, a dis-
tinctive personality, with life, soul, passions, ideals, will, energy of
action. With Izoulet, these beings are classed after protozoa and
metazoa, as "hyperzoa" their souls " hyperspirits " ! The soul is not,
however, any more than the soul of man, a substance that bete noire of
Positivism but a " unified sum of psychic phenomena" (p. 110). Just
as in us the conscious self is both the resultant and the synthesis of all
the cellular consciousnesses, so the rational soul is the resultant and
synthesis of all individual consciousnesses, dominating, co-ordinating,
generalising their activities. Reason, by the way, is the soul of humanity :
it is "an ensemble of psychic functions, co-ordinated," and so differs in
some unexplained way from the concrete reality of " metaphysics " (p.
122). Humanity then is conscious of itself, has its ideal, its will-to-live,
at which we can but guess : hence the gradually unfolding plan we
observe in the life of the race, the spirit of the whole directs particular
activities, " ranging them towards ends of which they are ignorant,
causing the finalities d 1 ensemble to prevail over individual caprice ".
Beyond humanity are still higher, more comprehensive organisms, or
hyperzoa : the animal kingdom, then the world of all living things,
animal and plant alike, then the earth as a whole. As life is a natural
growth out of inorganic matter, the latter must possess in a virtual
state all the phenomena of life, a latent life ; and along with it a virtual
principle of animation, a latent psychism. It is one and the same fund
of spirituality, which, "imperceptible in the elements, indistinct in the
mineral, dormant in the plant, awake in the animal, reflective in man,
animates in diverse degrees all beings and excites them to action ". So
the terrestrial globe has a living soul, a powerful individuality, directing
the actions of all living beings within it to a given end (p. 196) : not,
however, an extrinsic, pre-ordained end, a design formed a priori,
executed a posteriori, but an intrinsic finality, concomitant with the
effects it governs, exercised in every (higher) being through the organising
power of its own elements (p. 78).
Next in order are of course the Solar System, the Interstellar System,
the Nebular System, and highest of all Universal Nature, or the Ether,
out of which all things have developed in an order which implies a
guiding spirit, a fund, in the Ether, of psychic virtuality. The Ether
NEW BOOKS. 121
Alone, in effect, possesses the attributes hitherto given to imaginary
deities, of being "by itself," of determining and of directing all things
(p. 243).
The Ethics suggested by the system is not of a more inspiring type
than ordinary positivist schemes. Evil arises from the necessary con-
flict between the individual and the whole of which he forms a part, on
the one hand, the parts of which he constitutes the whole, on the other.
In man the conflict is between the spiritual ideal and the bodily needs,
between the claims of different organs, of different mental faculties
" we pass from illusion to disgust, from enthusiasm to disenchantment,
without meeting, among the innumerable aspects of beauty, any delights
which endure, ever by the new seduced, pleased, deceived " (p. 290).
The same conflict exists among the higher groups, only in the whole is
there perfect harmony : what to the individual is evil, is to the whole
an element of progress. Death, for example, is the renovator of nature,
only the primordial substance and the One-all are eternal and infinite.
Immortality of the individual, an elysium without evil, are alike illusions.
Yet even for the individual, good is prepotent, a statement for which
the only ground given is the curious one that individuals desire to live !
Bizarre, romantic as the system is, the work is not without its value,
if only for the consistency (in inconsistency) and the boldness of the
speculation it contains.
J. L. MclNTYRE.
Essai Critique sur le Droit d' Affirmer. Par ALBERT LECLERE. Paris :
Felix Alcan, 1901.
M. Leclere is of the school of Idealism which seems to flourish at
present in France. His work is avowedly an attempt to revive Eleatism,
as he understands it, the view, namely, that " non-being " i.e., the
world of phenomena, including all the facts of psychology is absolutely
non-existent, that " what is " is the object of, and is one with, thought-
in-itself, that the principle of identity is the only criterion of truth.
The greater part (chapters iii. and iv.) deals with the contradictions
which analysis of phenomena, as individuals, and as a whole, reveals.
The idea of consciousness, of the empirical or individual consciousness,
and along with it all ideas of phenomena, and hence (?) phenomena
themselves, as spatial, temporal, numerical facts, are shown, in familiar
Hegelian fashion, to imply either in themselves, or in their connexion
with one another, insuperable difficulties. Thus science, as commonly
known, is an illusion ; if it existed, its object would not be the real. All
mental activities alike, intuition as well as induction and deduction, are
contradictory, self-negating processes, while their data are illusory.
In the constructive part of the work (chapters i. and v. chapter ii.
contains an exposition of Eleatism) there is more novel matter, although
not easy to reconcile with the destructive part. Truth is what is posited
as true, what is affirmed : affirmation is an act of the subject of which
the immediate result is the idea that he, the subject, is in possession of
truth. The certainty it gives is immediate and absolute, there can arise
no question as to the right of affirmation. Truth always seems imposed
on us from without it is impersonal. Its subjective guarantee is the
force with which the proposition is affirmed in us. Certitude is thus,
literally, incommunicable, it is the result always of effort and of search,
and cannot anticipate them. As in morals the secret of perfection is
self-forgetfulness, so in speculation " the condition of certitude is the
practice of thought without preoccupation about certitude " (p. 30).
122 NEW BOOKS.
So much being granted, the rest is easy ; the only idea which M.
Leclfere finds to survive critical destruction is the idea of th^mjht-in-itsdf.
Every affirmation appears as affirmation of a real truth, external to the
thought which thinks it, not internal, subjective, floating : it springs
from our will not the free, reflective will, but that profound will which
appears to belong rather to our nature, than to ourselves, as the source
of decrees proclaimed in us (p. 181). This 'real truth' is thought-in-
itself, at first a pure form, but one which brings forth its own matter, if
allowed free play. The sum of this matter, or content, is that Being is,
that it is " in itself," i.e., is activity ; that it is " for itself," i.e., is thought ;
that it is freedom and love. But thought, love, freedom constitute
personality Being then is personal. On the question whether there is
one or many Beings, the author's dogmatism fails him : there is nothing
contradictory in a plurality of beings, since there may be diversity of
degree in thought, love, freedom, and in the heart of Being is an
"indefinite spontaneity". His hypothesis is that there is one wholly
independent, self -positing Being God and at the same time many
Beings, receiving from God the power of positing themselves, and so of
consenting to be voluntarily what the plan of God would have them to
be : and so a comfortable opening is allowed for morality and Religion
into the world of ' Reality '. But even Science is not wholly excluded,
for by a curious twist, a ' partial ' truth is found even in the facts of
Science. There is no absolute error, every thought is truly true,
although more or less. Contradiction is only in ideas, not in facts, which
are independent : every activity of mind is legitimate, so long as it ia
possible : to be true, it has only to satisfy thought. All knowledges,,
apart from the one system, are to be considered not as so many
variations upon the same theme, but as different airs having no real
connexion among themselves (p. 209). How far this conception of
knowledge is either satisfactory in itself or consistent with the author's
own assertion that all science is pure illusion, pure nothing, it is hardly
necessary to question.
J. L. MclNTYEK.
Saint Augustin. Par 1'Abbe JULES MARTIN. Paris: Alcan, 1901.
8vo, pp. xvi., 403. Price 5 fr.
This work falls into three parts, of which the first is devoted to Know-
ledge ; the second, to God ; the third, to Nature. The author confines
himself in the mam to exposition, and travels but seldom, even for
illustration, outside the writings of his subject. This method is not
without its advantages, and has resulted in a very useful and interesting
volume. At the same time, the student of philosophy will be most in-
terested in the first book, which deals with Knowledge, and will be
tempted to leave the remaining two books to professed theologians.
M. Martin is almost exclusively occupied with the attitude of mind
which Augustine assumed upon his adoption of the Catholic faith, and
to which he adhered, with little variation, until the end. But it would
be profitable to consider at somewhat greater length than M. Martin ha
done, the history of Augustine's mind, and especially the sceptical
temper with which he began. I think it might be said that he passed
from one side to the other of the controversy which occupies the
Academica of Cicero : a treatise very familiar to Augustine. The New
Academy first claimed him with its balance of probabilities before he
adopted the Stoic doctrine of the criterion of truth that 'irresistible
impression ' which was accepted by him as fairly describing the way in
NEW BOOKS. 123
which truth announces itself. Again, he shook himself free of another
tenet which comes more directly from Plato. At first he uses ' remin-
iscence ' in order to explain the disclosure of ideal truth. Later he
reduces 'reminiscence' to a metaphor. 'When we learn, we discover
in ourselves, and so to say we bring to light buried doctrines ' (p. 56).
Instead of 'reminiscence,' Augustine speaks of an eternal reason through
which truths are disclosed. ' The ignorant have present, so far as they
can perceive it, the light of the eternal reason, and in this light they see
these immovable truths' (ib., cf. Conf., x., 10). And, in passing, we may
note that Siebeck, in his History of Psychology, attaches undue import-
ance to ' reminiscence ' in his account of Augustine (i., ii., 390).
M. Martin does not seem to me successful when he attempts to find
the unity of the soul clearly affirmed by Augustine (pp. 69 ff.). On the
contrary, the unity of the soul is not attained except as it is concentrated
upon an eternal object a concentration which is imperfect in all experi-
ence as we have it (cf. p. 74). And here we may note Augustine's
curious use of 'memoria' almost as a synonym for consciousness ' tan-
quam ipsa (sc. anima) sit sibi memoria sui ' (p. 62).
I have dwelt rather upon topics which invite criticism, than upon the
undoubted merits of M. Martin's volume. Let me say, in conclusion,
that he furnishes himself the materials by which he may be criticised,
and that, so far as I have been able to test the references, his transla-
tions are throughout felicitous, and his exposition, in the main, relevant
and correct.
FRANK GRANGER.
Maine de Biran : Ein Beitray zar Geschichte der Metaphysik und der Psy-
choloyie des IVillens. Von ALFRED KUHTMANN. Bremen : Max Ndssler,
1901. Pp. viii., 195.
Both in this country and in Germany the study of the French philoso-
phers who wrote during the latter part of the eighteenth century and
the opening decades of the nineteenth seems for some time past to
have been entirely out of fashion, and this interesting little essay is very
welcome. Maine de Biran, if not the most important or influential of
the writers indicated, was yet in some ways the most remarkable of
them. Although irresolute in temperament and devoid of all the literary
graces which usually distinguish his countrymen, he has asserted for him-
self a permanent position in the history of philosophy by the originality
of his revolt against Condillac's doctrines and by his extraordinary fore-
shadowing of modern voluntarism. His great achievement was his
theory of V effort voulu, substituting will or mental activity in place of
sensation as the fundamental concept in psychology, and therefore also,
according to his view, in metaphysics. Dr. Kiihtniann in a very interest-
ing chapter compares De Biran first with Schopenhauer and then with
Wundt. The resemblance is more close in the latter case, and it is
especially striking since Wundt does not appear to be philosophically
descended from the French writer. At the most, they are collaterally
related, inasmuch as both can trace their pedigree back to Leibnitz.
Dr. Kiihtmann's essay is clearly and easily written. The first and
second chapters ot it are introductory ; the third gives an outline of Con-
dillac's philosophy ; the fourth and fifth and sixth deal with De Biran's
own theories, and with his relationship to previous writers. These are
followed by a biographical chapter, part of which would have been
better placed at the beginning of the book. The author next deals with
French criticisms on De Biran, then with related or similar views in
124 NEW BOOKS.
England (a rather thin chapter), and lastly with Schopenhauer and
Wundt. The concluding chapters are critical and give an outline of the
author's own view. The treatment of these various subjects is in no case
exhaustive, but it is concise and to the point, and does not, except in one
place, degenerate into mere sketchiness. That exception is the later
part of the biographical chapter, which deals with his relations to con-
temporary thinkers like Cousin, Royer-Collard and Ampere. Misprints
are unfortunately very frequent.
T. LOVEDAY.
Nouvelles Recherches stir V Esthetique et la Morale. Par J. P. DURAND (DM
GROS). Paris : Felix Alcan, 1900. Pp. 275.
Most of the essays composing this volume were written, the author
explains, some thirty years ago, and were intended to meet the urgent
need for a scientific and constructive treatment of questions of morals.
This need he believes to be no less urgent now, for in France the
guidance of opinion on these questions is still divided between an un-
progressive Catholicism on the one hand, and a merely negative and
destructive positivism on the other, and the only result of the conflict
is a weakening of moral convictions, since it is impossible to find satis-
faction on either side. The leading ideas of the book can be stated very
briefly. Regarding the treatment of aesthetic and moral sentiments as
belonging to a wider theory of feeling in general, the author starts with
an analysis of sensation. The actual sensation is the effect of three
causes, viz., the faculty or psychological cause, the organ or physiological
cause, and the agent or physical cause. Of these three an objective
aesthetic or theory of feeling is concerned primarily with the last, i.e.,
with the normal objective causes of the differences of different feelings.
Again, every sensation is accompanied (1) by a state of pleasure or pain,
(2) by a more or less useful motor reaction, impelled by the pleasure
or pain, and guided by the objective knowledge which the sensation
affords. To the normal objective cause of pleasure in general the author
.gives the name of " the Beautiful," using this term in a very wide sense.
And he then seeks to connect the directly pleasurable effect of the
Beautiful with its utility, so that the Beautiful is that which, being
directly pleasurable, is also either useful in itself or impels us to useful
actions. A few essays are devoted to the illustration of this thesis.
Then a similar application of the original analysis is made in the case
of the moral sentiments, and it is affirmed that the feeling of duty has
for its true objective cause the code of action of a normal society, i.e.,
one which exists to secure the good of all its members. The mis-
cellaneous essays which make up the last half of the volume deal,
it is true, with points of morals, but have little or no bearing upon
the thesis just mentioned. This outline may suffice to indicate the char-
acter and value of the book.
Le Mystlre de Platon. Aglaophamos. By Louis PRAT. Paris : Felix Alcan,
1901. Pp. xxii., 215.
M. Prat has apparently set himself to discuss the philosophic problem*
of the day in the form of Platonic dialogues supposed to have occurred
in Plato's old age. In the present instalment, which is prefaced by M.
Renouvier, Aglaophamos is the representative of Catholicism, the in-
trinsic contradictions of which are skilfully made to reveal themselves,
Eudoxos (of Knidos) of scientific ' positivism,' Plato himself of ' Nao-
NEW BOOKS. 125
criticism ' ; while Kallikles (of the Goryias) has been mellowed by age into
an exponent of Kenan's philosophic attitude. Whether M. Prat will suc-
ceed in overcoming the immense difficulties of the literary form he has
adopted and in reaching results commensurate with the pains he has
evidently taken, is a question on which it will perhaps be better to reserve
judgment until he has completed the whole series of dialogues which he
seems to contemplate. It may, however, not be impertinent to call his
attention to the fact that the best kind of Platonic dialogue involves also
a delineation of the character of the participants and does not disdain
the aid of humour and fancy to enliven its high seriousness of purpose.
F. C. S. SCHILLEK.
Zur Lehrt con der Willensfreiheit in der Nichomachischen Ethik. Von Dr.
ALFRED KASTIL. Prag, 1901. Pp. 44. ,/
After a careful discussion and translation of the relevant passages in
the Ethics the author comes to the well-known conclusion that Aristotle
btops short of the point at which the problem of indeterminism arises.
So does he. Indeed he abstains even from indicating the obscurities in
Aristotelian doctrine which render it so interesting an example of a
philosophy trembling on the verge of the 'free-will' problem.
Problemi Generali di Etica. Da Giovanni Vidari. Milan o, 1901. Pp.
xvi., 271.
The ethical problems dealt with in this thoughtful essay are problems of
method. According to the author all genuine systems of morality as
sume that life has a positive value, or, as he prefers to put it, that it is
a duty to live ; and they assume also the existence of self-conscious
individuals. Now these two assumptions demand for their justification
a theory of the universe, either materialistic, pantheistic, or theistic ;
and in point of fact the older ethical systems were built on one or other
of these foundations, and admit of a corresponding classification. But,
just as in other branches of knowledge, we may provisionally ignore the
necessity of a metaphysical basis and construct our ethical system in-
ductively from the facts of experience. In this way we shall have a
science as distinguished from a metaphysic of ethics. An examination
of the facts of consciousness discloses the existence of an ideal of con-
duct, present to the thoughts and feelings of all men in all ages whence
particular rules of conduct are derived. And here again the relative
phenomena admit of being studied according to different methods. The
older moralists, represented in a comparatively recent period by Mill and
Bain, looked no further than the growth and structure of the individual
mind for the genesis of morals. In contemporary philosophy this pro-
cedure has been completely superseded by the sociological method the
study of the ideal as it presents itself to the collective consciousness of
the community, and as it is gradually transformed by the processes of
historical evolution. Once more the sociological method subdivides
itself into three distinct types, the biological represented by Herbert
Spencer and Leslie Stephen, the economical by Marx, and the psychico-
historical by Wundt and Baldwin. Finally the author gives his almost
unqualified adhesion to the principles of Prof. Baldwin as, so far, the
most illuminating of modern guides.
After studying the process by which the ethical ideal comes to be
formed and recognised as such, we have to consider how ethics are
organised into a system of positive teaching. Should the ideal take
126 NEW BOOKS.
shape as a theory of virtues, of duties, or of goods ? Our author holds
that all three points of view find their appropriate place in a complete
moral philosophy. Virtue stands for the individual, duty for the social
side of the ideal, while the final good is to be found in the synthesis and
interpenetration of both. And the question whether morality should be
looked on rather as a personal or as a social interest receives a similar
solution. Morality is essentially social in so far as it springs from the
relations between members of a community ; while at the same time it
is only realised in the self-consciousness of the individual soul. And the
individual only realises himself as a moral agent in certain morally
organised communities. In two of these, the Family and the State, the
moral constitution is already complete ; in two others, Society and
Humanity, it is still in process of formation.
Since writing his prize-essay on Rosniini (reviewed in MIND for January,
1900), Prof. Vidari has made considerable progress. The mischievous
paradox that the study of moral science should be entirely divorced from
the practical teaching of morality has been completely though silently
withdrawn and replaced by an opposite point of view. And if the
theological implications of his former volume have not been abandoned
at least they have receded into a remote and shadowy background. But
his exposition is still hampered by the detestable Italian custom of
dragging in references to the literature of the subject at every available
opportunity occasionally with the result of exhibiting the author's
ignorance rather than his knowledge. For example the " inadmissibility
of universal determinism as a philosophical foundation for morality " is
by no means so generally conceded as he asserts (p. 43) ; and when in
close connexion with this statement he proceeds to quote " Huxley and
Kidd" by the way our author should, to use a phrase of Nietzsche's,
be more careful about his conjunctions as having demonstrated that
the "-mechanical and biological conception of life is incapable of justifying
duty," he seems to suggest, what is not true, that Huxley rejected the
doctrine of determinism. Neither the Stoics nor Spinoza taught Uni-
versalistic Hedonism (p. 105). The author may be right when he tells
us that individual conduct and action, taken in their totality, give no
evidence of moral progress (p. 155) ; but he has no right to quote Buckle
as an aiithority for this cheerless view of human nature. What Buckle
denied was that there is any advance in the knowledge of moral truth
in other words he would have refused to admit that ' evolution of the
ideal ' to which Prof. Vidari would limit moral progress. Incidentally I
may observe that to trace the transformations of organised hypocrisy
through all history for that after all is what this theory of ethical
evolution amounts to seems a singularly unattractive way of spending
one's time. But to continue, Auguste Comte is strangely enough accused
of holding that ideas, as distinguished from sentiments, move the world
(p. 160) ; whereas he held, just as the author does, that the function of
ideas is to guide, of sentiments to impel. Finally when our author
attempts a little ethical history on his own account he blunders most
conspicuously. It has been already mentioned that he distributes the
subject-matter of ethics under the three heads of virtue, duty and good.
Well, a propos of this classification, he informs us that the moralists of
antiquity occupied themselves wholly with elaborating the conception of
virtue ; that the conception of duty first arose in the middle ages, and
indeed could only arise at a time when morality was regarded as some-
thing supernaturally revealed and imposed ; while the complete investiga-
tion of the good, suggested as' it is by the conflict and comparison of
different ideals, has been reserved for modern times. Is it possible that
NEW BOOKS. 127
Prof. Vidari has never been told the stories whether true or false
matters nothing of Brutus and Begulus, that he has never read the
De Officiis, or that he has never observed how the tiecunda Secundw of
Aquinas and the vision of Dante, both countrymen of his own, are con-
structed on a scheme not of duties but of virtues and vices ? The truth
is that virtue, duty and good are all Greek conceptions and have only
been further elaborated by building on foundations laid in Greece.
A. W. B.
11 Materialismo Psicofisico e La dottrina dd Parallelismo in Psicoloyia. Da
FILIPPO MASCI. Napoli, 1901. Pp. 283.
By ' psycho -physical materialism ' the author of this essay means the
theory which ' attributes causality (solely) to the physical process, and
considers the psychic process as an " epi-phenomenon " ' (p. 219), that is as
a collateral incident of nervous action on which it does not react. That is
one kind of parallelism. Another kind is Spinoza's theory, according to
which the two processes flow on side by side, neither interfering with the
other. Both views are subjected to a minute criticism, and are finally
rejected as irreconcilable with experience. A similar condemnation is
passed on dualism, the theory which regards mind and matter as two
distinct substances acting and reacting on one another. Signer Masci
himself comes forward in support of what is known among English
philosophers as the ' double-aspect ' theory. Every manifestation of
consciousness is accompanied by some form of nervous action involv-
ing an expenditure of energy, the two being related to one another
neither as cause and effect, nor as independent concomitants, nor even
as conjoint manifestations of a single substance, but as correlative and
inseparable sides of one and the same event, manifest to itself as
consciousness, manifest to a spectator as cerebration. Moreover, the
mental side of the process is not limited to consciousness. There is
such a thing as unconscious ideation and volition, proved to exist by
our own experience, proved to be no mere cerebration by the fact that
it can only be understood as such, that is as operating according to
the laws of mind which are quite distinct from the laws of matter. We
must assume that this subjective side is present in every act of animal
vitality ; probably it accompanies plant life also ; and possibly it is even
present to the specific energies of inorganic matter, but this last is a
problem on which experience throws no light whatever.
Signer Masci has little claim to originality ; nor does his advocacy of
it tend to make the double-aspect theory more intelligible. If cerebra-
tion and ideation are the same thing why have they such contrasted
laws ? If spirit and matter, considered as distinct entities, are mere
abstractions (p. 207) how can the inorganic world be conceived as possibly
inanimate ? Again, we are told that ' the physiological phenomenon is
that aspect of the total phenomenon which is or might be the object
of an outward observer ' (p. 206). But this ' outward observer ' is by
hypothesis himself a phenomenon, so that we have to ask how one
phenomenon can be the object of another ; what is the difference between
phenomena, aspects, and objects ;. under which heading ' externality ' is
to be placed ; and finally how the two ' aspects,' internal and external,
are to be conceived as united except in a tertium quid, which the hypo-
thesis excludes, or by one of the things to be united, which is absurd.
' Psychic objects,' the author tells us, considered ' as fixed substrata of
events do not exist ' (p. 210). And he also holds that ' human personal-
ity is the psychic form of the existence of the human organism ' ; while
128 NEW BOOKS.
' spirit must be considered as the last product of organic evolution ' (p,
263). From such Aristotelian doctrines no other conclusion can logically
be drawn than Aristotle's own conclusion that the soul perishes with the
organism. Nevertheless Signer Masci winds up his book with a highly
rhetorical plea for a future life based entirely on sentimental grounds.
One who so far forgets the duty of a philosopher should erase from his
title-page the proud words of Spinoza, non flere, non indignari, W
intelligere.
A. W. B.
RECEIVED also :
Annual Report of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution, for
1899.
J. M. Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, vol. i., New York,
Macmillan, 1901, pp. xxiv., 644.
M. W. Calkins, An Introduction to Psychology, New York, Macmillan, 1901 t
pp. xv., 509. c
Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, part 41, vol. 16.
B. Hollander, The Mental Functions of the Brain, London, Grant Richards,
1901, pp. xviii., 512.
H. G. Hutchinson, Dreams and Their Meanings, London, Longmans, 1901,
pp. 320.
E. C. Richardson, Classification, Theoretical and Practical, New York,
Scribner's Sons, 1901, pp. xiv., 248.
K. Groos, The Play of Man, London, Heinemann, 1901, pp. ix., 412.
J. E. M. McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, Cambridge, University
Press, 1901, pp. xx., 292.
J. B. Baillie, The Origin and Significance of Hegel's Logic, London, Mac-
millan, 1901, pp. xviii., 375.
A. K. Rogers, A Students 1 History of Philosophy, New York, Macmillan,
1901, pp. xi., 519.
J. W. Thomas, Intuitive Suggestion, London, Longmans, 1901, pp. viii.,
160.
C. A. Mercier, Psychology Normal and Morbid, London, Sonnenschein, 1901,
pp. xvi., 518.
C. A. Reid, Alcoholism, London, T. F. Unwin, 1901, pp. xvi., 293.
J. Lindsay, Momenta of Life, London, E. Stock, 1901, pp. 146.
H. Jackson, Texts to Illustrate a Course of Elementary Lectures on the
History of Greek Philosophy, London, Macmillan, 1901, pp. xi.. 111.
H. C. Bastian, Studies in Heterogenesis, part i., London, Williams & Nor-
gate, 1901, pp. iv., 61.
Annie Besant, Thought Power, London, Theosophical Publishing Society,
1901, pp. 145.^
Lux Aurea : Light from the Summerland, London, Gay & Bird, 1901, pp.
208.
F. H. Giddings, Inductive Sociology, New York, Macmillan, 1901, pp.
xviii., 302.
F. H. Collins, Epitome of the Synthetic Philosophy, fifth edition, London,
Willianis & Norgate, 1901, pp. xix., 692.
J. Halleux, L'fivolutionnisme en Morale, Paris, Alcaii, 1901, pp. 228.
Ossip Lourie, La Philosophic russe contemporaine, Paris, Alcan, 1902, pp.
278.
NEW BOOKS. 129
L. Couturat, La Loyique de Leibniz, Paris, Alcan, 1901, pp. xiv., 608.
R. Schellwien, Wilk und Erkenntnis, Hamburg, A. Janssen, 1899, pp. 122.
O. Schlapp, Kants Lehre vom Genie, Gottingen, Vandenhoek & Ruprecht,
1901, pp. xii., 463.
W. Wundt, Einleitung in die Philosophic, Leipzig, Engelmann, 1901, pp,
xviii., 466.
H. Leser, Das Wahrheitsproblem, Leipzig, Diirr, 1901, pp. 90.
N. H. Marshall, Die yegenwdrtigen Richtungen der Religionsphilosophie in
England, Berlin, Reuther & Reichard, 1902, pp. vii., 136.
G. Oehmichen, Grundriss der reinen Loyik, Berlin, Reuther & Reichard,
1901, pp. viii., 55.
F. de Sarlo, Studi sulla filosofia contemporanea, vol. i., Roma, E. Loescher,
1901, pp. viii., 241.
V. Grimaldi, La Mente di G. Galilei, Napoli, Detken & Rocholl, 1901,
pp. 122.
VII. PHILOSOPHICAL PEKIODICALS.
PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. Vol. x., No. 2. CK S. Fullerton. 'The
Doctrine of Space and time. I. The Kantian Doctrine of Space.' [When
Kant says that space is a necessary form of thought, and therefore that
we cannot conceive the possibility of the non-existence of space, although
we can easily conceive the non-existence of objects in space, he is leading
us into a philosopher's fallacy: we are asked "to annihilate space, and
yet keep in mind, so to speak, the place where it was". The argument
that we cannot conceive of space as finite means, that we cannot con-
ceive it as a whole in the space beyond which there is no further space,
i.e., is another philosophical quibble. With it falls the demonstration
that the sensible world is unlimited in extent. Finally, as to infinite
divisibility, Kant reasons "(1) that what is given in intuition must be
composite, for, by the law of our sensibility, nothing can be given in
intuition that is not composite ; . . . and (2) he argues that it is subver-
sive of mathematics to deny the infinite divisibility of what is given in
intuition ". Both arguments can be met.] F. Thilly. ' The Theory of
Interaction.' [" Parallelists deny interaction, because they believe it
contradicts the law of the conservation of energy, the causal law, and
the law that no physical occurrence can have anything but a physical
occurrence as its cause. But interaction does not contradict the first
two laws, properly understood, and the last law is not true."] A. K.
Rogers. 'The Neo-Hegelian "Self" and Subjective Idealism.' [The
thought which is real for Hegelianism is the thought of an Absolute
Self. Yet, by their language, the Hegelians are constantly slipping buck
into subjective idealism. They are seeking to prove two conclusions,
which are not identical : that reality is rational, and that reality is a
single all-inclusive consciousness. The valid element in their argument
is the "reduction of objects to factors within a rational conscious whole ".
They show that " in opposition to sensationalism, human experience is
no compound of unrelated feelings, but is objective from the start, i.e.. is
constituted by thought-relations". But we must go on and ask further
whether this apparent knowledge of ours tells us truth of a reality
abiding beyond its transitory existence as an experience. The Hegelian
resolutely refuses to catch sight of the problem : and the presumption is
that the "consciousness or knowledge, of which he is continually speak-
ing, is just the consciousness of the individual man ". " In his desire to
bring man and the world into harmony, Hegel has strained an argument,
legitimate in its place, to an application which is not legitimate, unless
he means to confine himself to the private experience of the individual ;
. . . his unqualified rejection of the independent existence of the world,
and of the problem of epistemology, is mistaken."] ' Proceedings of the
First Annual Meeting of the Western Philosophical Association, 1901.'
Reviews of Books. Summaries of Articles. Notices of New Books. NotcN.
Vol. x., No. 8. CK S. Fullerton. ' The Doctrine of Space and Tune. n.
Difficulties connected with Kant's Doctrine of Space.' [Zeno's pu/xle
PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. 131
cannot be resolved, if we grant its foundation : c.f. Clifford's reasoning in
' Seeing and Thinking '. We may prove, in .the same way, that a point
on the periphery of a revolving disc is " all around the disc at once," when
the disc revolves with infinite rapidity. We can prove, too, that the
mind is in the pineal gland and, at the same time, in all parts of the
body. The nonsense rests upon the nonsensical assumption that "an
endless series can be completed by a progress which results in the
attainment of a final term ". We may avoid the fallacy by turning our
minds from the whole subject : or we may quibble, saying that space is
infinitely divisible, but not infinitely divided. Neither ' way out ' is
philosophical.] Q. N. Dolson. 'The influence of Schopenhauer upon
Friedrich Nietzsche.' [There is no great similarity in the theories of the
two philosophers, and their interests were even more widely separated.
What " attracted Nietzsche to Schopenhauer was a radical independence
of tradition and public opinion ". Schopenhauer " gloried in disagreeing
with established authority . . . ; his manner of expressing his criticisms
was often personal in its tone ". Nietzsche controverted many of his
views with great bitterness, but his strictures were never contemptuous.
" The chief bond between the two men was that of a similar intellec-
tual personality."] E. Albee. ' An Examination of Professor Sidgwick's
Proof of Utilitarianism.' [Sidgwick's proof "equally involves the
validity of his treatment of the three fundamental ' intuitions ' and his
hasty determination of the nature of the Good, which he holds that all
of these intuitions imply ". Justice is merely the postulate of objectivity
or impartiality, epistemologically akin to the fundamental methodological
postulates of the various sciences. As regards rational prudence and
benevolence, (1) "the assumption of an original separateness between
the interest of each individual and that of all others" cannot be conceded,
and (2) " only the principle of rational prudence is really treated as a
separate intuition, that of benevolence having been arrived at indirectly ".
Nor do these principles all imply a Good, still undetermined, of which
they are to be regarded as ' distributive ' principles.] A. H. Lloyd. ' A
Study in the Logic of the Early Greek Philosophy. Pluralism: Eiu-
pedocles and Democritus.' [In a finite pluralism that of Empedocles
"(1) force as apart from mere substantial existence in the form of
passive elements is a necessary supplementary or compensating concep-
tion ; (2) this external arbitrary force is double, there being in reality
two forces which counteract each other and give to the process of
the universe a rhythmical character ; and (.3) the two forces have to
figure as other elements, but other both quantitatively and qualitatively ".
There follows the infinite pluralism of Democritus. But infinity is a
quantitative abstraction ; as number or extension it is only formal. Hence
the " elements cannot be real elements, nor the vacua or gaps real vacua,
nor the external forces real external forces, nor even the rhythm a real
alternation". In every case, the unreality or formal character shows
itself in a paradox. The paradoxes are, however, "necessarily pro-
phetic" ; the mechanicalism which Democritus substituted for Em-
pedocles' dynamism "was only a subtle disguise for something else," i.e.,
for " relationism or organicism, the philosophy of evolution ".] D. Irons.
' Natural Selection in Ethics '. [" The moral law does not enjoin survival,
but performance of function regardless of all else. It is not evolved in
the struggle for existence, for it is the supreme principle of the universe
as manifested in the world of persons. It is an expression of the supreme
principle which makes the universe a universe, and cannot be evolved
by any process which goes on within the 'universe. . . . There is ethical
as well as organic evolution. . . . The whole history of civilisation shows,
132 PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.
on the plane of objective fact, the working of this principle of moral
selection. ... A vanquished nation may conquer its conquerors if its
civilisation is higher. . . . From the essential nature of evolution, moral
evolution must be different from any form of organic evolution, since it
holds, not in the region of mere life, but in the world of personality."]
Reviews of Books. Summaries of Articles. Notices of New Books. Notes.
PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW. Vol. viii. No. 2. O. T. W. Patrick.
' The Psychology of Profanity.' [" Profanity is only to be understood
by the genetic method, the point of departure being the growl of anger
in the lower animal, which is ... a serviceable form of reaction in cases
of combat. It belongs, therefore, to a primitive form of vocalisation, . . .
being one of several forms of speech preceding articulate language. . . .
By a process of selection it chooses at all times those forms of phonation
or those articulate words which are best adapted to terrify or shock the
opponent. . . . The occasion of profanity at the present time may be any
situation in which our well-being is threatened, as in helpless distress or
disappointment. There is always, however, some object . . . against
which the oath is directed."] W. Fite. ' Art, Industry and Science : a
Suggestion towards a Psychological Definition of Art.' [The paper con-
ceives of art and industry as successive phases in the development of
impulse, and of art and science as similar phases in the development
of cognition. (1) " The aesthetic or practical character of a want, the
beautiful or useful character of an object, the artistic or industrial
character of a form of activity, depends upon the extent to which it
constitutes a fundamental feature in one's organised system of habits. . . .
We have ... a graded continuum, with the distinctively practical at one
end, . . . and the purely aesthetic at the other." Again, (2) " whether an
object be apprehended as a work of art or as a fact of science depends
wholly upon the extent to which it is apprehended in analytic detail," ?>.,
is also a matter merely of degree. This conception of beauty covers
and brings into mutual relation the various proposed definitions of the
beautiful.] R. Dodge and T. S. Cline. ' The Angle Velocity of Eye
Movements.' [Critique of Volkmann, Lamansky, Delabarre-Huey.
Description of new (photographic) apparatus. Movements to the left
(arcs of 12 to 14) occupied a mean time of 40 - 9<r ; movements to the
right (arcs of '2 to 7), a mean time of 22'9<r.] Proceedings of the
Ninth Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association, 1900.
Psychological Literature. New Books. Notes. Vol. viii., No. 3. J. R.
Angell and W. Fite. ' The Monaural Localisation of Sound : from the
Psychological Laboratory of the University of Chicago.' [Observations
upon the capacity of localisation in a person entirely deaf in one ear.
(1) The differences between binaural and monaural localising capacity are
" interpretable as chiefly differences in the magnitude of the difference
limen for locality, rather than as absolute differences in the kind of
localising process involved". Only in the region directly opposite the
deaf ear are the localisations markedly uncertain. (2) " Qualitative dif-
ferences in the sounds coming from different directions " are the basis of
localisation. (8) The presence of eye-reflexes was often noticed. (4)
There is no evidence for the concernment of cutaneous sensations in the
localising process.] E. L. Thorndike and R. S. Woodworth. ' The
Influence of Improvement in One Mental Function upon the Efficiency of
Other Functions.' i. [" 0\\r chief method was to test the efficiency of
some function or functions, then to give training in some other function
or functions until a certain amount of improvement was reached, and
then to test the first function or set of functions," care being taken
that no extrinsic factors were allowed to affect the tests. A sample
PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. 133
experiment is given, the results of which are summarised as follows.
" The improvement in the estimation of rectangles of a certain shape is
not equalled in the case of similar estimations of areas of different
shapes. . . . Even after mental standards of certain limited areas have
been acquired, the function of estimating with these standards con-
stantly kept alive by noticing the real area after each judgment is a
function largely independent of the function of estimating them with
the standards fully acquired, . . . but not constantly renewed by so
noticing the real areas." Still further " the ability to judge one magni-
tude is sometimes demonstrably better than the ability to judge the
next magnitude ; one function is better developed than its neighboiir.
The functions of judging nearly equal magnitudes are, sometimes at
least, largely separate and independent."] W. M. Urban. ' The Prob-
lem of a " Logic of the Emotions " and " Affective Memory." ' i. [An
attempt to trace the genesis of the ' emotional abstract,' and to find the
constant element in generic affective states. " Those affective states
which bear the marks of abstraction concept feelings, sentiments and
moods are characterised in general by lower hedonic intensity and by
qualitative indefiniteness, and yet their unitary quality stands out
strongly. . . . The process of abstraction consists of the bringing into
prominence by selective attention of a fundamental quality (the ' dynamic
constant ') other than the varying elements. . . . The first stage of this
generalising process is then the generic emotion itself . . . made up of
a number of motor tendencies manifesting themselves in consciousness
in varioiis organic sensations, qualitatively different, but each group
having the common dynamic constant. . . . Still more generic phases
of emotionalism . . . may be looked upon as complexes of a higher
order, as assimilations of varying emotional tendencies on the basis of
their dynamic constanc3 T ." The 'dynamic constant' itself is "a rela-
tively permanent system of intensities and of temporal and rhythmic
relationships among the organic sensations of an emotional reaction,"
i.e., is Sifnndierter inhalt. It affords a basis in psychology for a doctrine of
values.] J.M.Gillette. ' Multiple After-images.' E. F. Buchner et (d.
' Disclaimer No. 2.' Psychological Literature. New Books. Notes.
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. Vol. xii., No. 2. H. H. Foster.
' The Necessity for a New Standpoint in Sleep Theories.' [Historical
review of the circulation theories, the chemical theories (combustion and
auto-intoxication), and the histological theories of sleep. Approach to
the problem from the evolutionary standpoint. (1) "Sleep results from
the limited capacity of the organism to receive and respond to stimuli,
either through fatigue or through lack of development. Both factors
are internal. The relation of each to function can be traced along
chemical, histological and vasomotor lines." (2) A second question
concerns the operation of selection upon sleep, and the rise of secondary
determining factors. To note are the primary rhythm of the nervous
system ; blood supply ; conscious adaptation to the conditions most
favourable to sleep ; attention. (8) Sleep falls under the general head-
ing of nervous rhythms as the period of rest, not (as Manaceine says)
of consciousness, but of the support or vehicle of consciousness. The
cessation of consciousness is an integral feature of the sleeping state.
Bibliography.] M. F. McClure. 'A "Colour Illusion".' [Repetition
and extension of Ladd's experiments with coloured strips upon variously
coloured backgrounds. Rejection of explanation in terms of fatigue, and
substitution for this of contrast and local adaptation (Hering). There
is really no 'illusion' involved.] L. Hempstead. ' The Perception of
Visual Form.' [In looking at forms liminally different from their back-
134 PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.
ground, we continue lines and complete figures under the principles of -
symmetry and similarity; we also round angles and ignore certain lines
altogether. Our subjective idea of the number, form and position of the
component lines is indefinite, and is again guided by the principles of
symmetry and similarity. Each observer has certain habits of illusion,
or typical modes of associative completion.] W. C. Bagley. ' On the
Correlation of Mental and Motor Ability in School Children.' [A general
inverse relation was found between motor and mental ability : clever
children, with quick reaction times, are not the best developed physically,
not the strongest, and not endowed with the greatest power of motor
control. There is little relation between class standing and reaction
time, except that excellence in either goes with deficiency of motor
ability. Motor ability increases with age more markedly than mental
ability. There is a tendency to inverse relation of mental ability and
head girth.] W. S. Small. ' Experimental Study of the Mental Pro-
cesses of the Rat.' u. [Tests of white rats in mazes on the Hampton
Court pattern: cj. the home-burrow of the kangaroo rat. The white
rat is less vigorous and hardy than the wild rat ; he has sloughed off
some of his native furtiveness and timidity ; but his senses (except sight;
are as keen, his characteristic rat-traits as persistent, and his mental
adaptation as considerable. " Animal intelligence works almost exclu-
sively by the trial and error method " ; cf. young children. The question
of animal reasoning is still treated by the author as a question of the
' perception of relations '. First among the sensations, in order of im-
portance, stand the tactual-motor ; then come hearing and smell (the
" effect of smell sensations is general and emotional ") ; sight is least of
all relied upon (control experiments were made with a blind rat).] A. J.
Kinnaman. ' A Comparison of Judgments for Weights Lifted with the
Hand and Foot.' [" The difference in sensibility of the hand and foot
beyond 1,200 gr. is very small. The larger difference with the lighter
standards may be due to finer dermal discrimination in the hand than
in the foot." As regards method, " standard sensations play an important
role in a series of like judgments"; and "the second test of the series
is j udged better than any others ". Attempt to estimate the relative
value of focal and marginal factors in judgment : " the influx of marginal
sensations, and transposition of focal sensations, . . . seems to have
been most marked at from HOO to 1,200 gr.". Interferences of sensation
may arise either from distraction or from fusion : the latter is evidenced
by tkjp insinuation of arm-weight into the weight of the standard as
the latter increases. Bibliography.] Psychological Literature. Books
received.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. Vol. xi., No. 4. H. Rutgers
Marshall. ' Our relations with the Lower Races.' [The commonwealth
of nations is similar to a civic commonwealth, in that the lower units
must have as much free development as possible. The lowest races
must not be crushed out of existence ; tor they may develop into some-
thing higher than the races which at present are highest. This refutes
imperialism.] R. A. Bray. 'Unity of Spirit as the Basis of a National
Church.' [Religious teachers ought to combine to combat Commercialism.
Their combination must not be based on unity of purpose, nor of belief,
but of spirit. This spirit must be an enthusiasm of humanity.] C. M.
Bakcwell. ' A Democratic Philosopher and His Work.' [An appreciation
of the late Thomas Davidson.] J. R. MacDonald. ' The Propaganda of
Civilisation.' [Civilisation is propagated among barbarians by improving
the rudiments of it which they already possess ; not by imposing on them
a Western civilisation which does not suit them and has its own failings.
PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. 135
We can do most for civilisation by raising our own lower classes.] W.
P. Ker. ' Imagination and Judgment.' [They are usually contrasted ;
but, as a fact, imagination supplies what is best in morality, politics,
science and history. It does not annul common experience, but perfects
it.] E. Gr. Dexter. ' Ethics and the Weather.' [An estimate of the
effect of meteorological conditions on moral behaviour based on American
criminal statistics. The conditions act indirectly by raising or lowering
vital energies.] Discussions. ' The Moral Problems of War,' in reply
to Mr. J. M. Robertson, by D. G. Ritchie. ' A Reply to the Foregoing,'
by J. M. Robertson. Book Reviews.
REVUE DE METAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. 9 e annee, No. 2. Mars,
1901. Cr. Tarde. 4 L'action des faits futurs.' [Written more than
twenty-three years ago, and containing conclusions which the author
would not now accept. Points out very clearly that scientific laws
would all apply equally well to cases different from any which actually
occur ; and that therefore, to account for what does occur, we must
also always have recourse to other actual occurrences facts. But,
since future occurrences are connected with the present by exactly the
same necessary laws as are past occurrences, why do we always regard
the past alone as explaining the present ? and are we right ? M. Tarde
argues that it is a mere prejudice, proceeding from the fact that we
never realise so clearly that nothing can hinder the future from being
what it is to be as that the past is unalterable ; we do not realise that
future contingents are as impossible &spast, because the past is what we
know best, and from which we have to make our inferences. He simply
assumes that because the future is equally necessarily related to the
present, it therefore has the same relation to it as the past, namely, that
which we call ' action on ' : consequently he immediately contradicts
himself when he argues that it is contradictory to suppose the relation of
a thing to what it will do, i.e., to what follows it, reversed. He goes on
to argue that it is a mistake to regard what is called normal development
as if it alone exhibited finality (to which he now gives also an eulogistic
sense) ; that it is precisely in the highest forms of life, where the
influence of the past is most marked (habit, heredity), that the influence
of the future (correlation of organs to a common end) is so too, etc., etc. ;
and, finally, that the root of the prejudice against explanations by the
future lies in the error of ' sacrificing the importance ... of the complex,
the different, the individual, ... to the importance of the simple, the
identical.'] 25. Le Roy. ' Un positivisine nouveau.' [There has lately
arisen a new ' Criticism/ which maintains the ' primacy of activity ' as
against the ' positivism ' of the middle of the nineteenth century, which
maintained the ' primacy of reason ' = ' Intellectualism ' : the author's
object is (1) to justify this criticism ; (2) to show that it is not sceptical
but leads to a new positivism. ( 1 ) No one scientific theory is truer than
another; it is only that some suit better than others those habits of
thought which constitute ' common sense '. Scientific laws are mere
definitions : the mind can ' decree scientific results ' capriciously ; for it
may choose any of the infinite conclusions which are not self-contra-
dictory ; only some of them would not accord with common sense.
Scientific facts are ' made by the scientist ivho recognises them ' ; and one
is more valuable than another, only if it helps us to reason or act more
easily. (2) The ' intellectualist ' objection that this theory is sceptical,
fails to recognise that it does not make scientific truth consist in a ' mere
verbal decree,' but makes its value, as knowledge, consist in the ' power
of inner life it contains '. There follow nine ' theses ' of the new criticism,
which show it to be a positivism ; whence we learn : That necessary
136 PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.
laws are arbitrary only from a purely logical point of view, but yet are
not quite necessary from any point of view : and that ' We know
nowadays ' that ' the greater apparent value of Euclidian Geometry . . .
is at bottom only our practical preference for solids, the mark
and effect of our corporeal structure'. Perhaps the view that our
'corporeal structure makes us prefer solids' is itself an effect of our
corporeal structure, and therefore false ? Or does it contain too much
power of inner life ?] J. Wilbois. ' L'esprit positif.' [Surpasses
M. Le Koy's article in the confidence and fervour with which it preaches
the vague absurdities of ' the new philosophy '. The Introduction
informs us that ' In our time it has been minutely proved ' that ' the
mind manufactures scientific facts, by long processes of artifice ' ; that
' Nobody questions any longer,' but that ' the spirit of positivism is a
spirit of relativism ' ; but that the fundamental fact that it is ' a spirit of
life ' is less generally recognised : what ' life ' means the author can't
define, but ' the intuition ' of its meaning may be conveyed by what
follows, to those who have undergone, or judge it worth while to undergo,
the necessary ' disciplines '. What follows is a first chapter on ' The posi-
tive spirit in the formation and use of the principles of physics '. This is
divided into four parts: (1) Those who 'don't possess the intuition of
principles' are described. (2) Principles may be analysed into two
elements, which are ' indissolubly united ' ; (a) the ' relative element,'
' a form under which ' a principle is a convenient ' tool ' ; (6) the ' in-
dependent element,' ' an exterior truth '. These are illustrated by
examples, and an excellent literary description of the psychology of
discovery follows, which we are told might be transformed into a logic,
which, unlike Mill's, would consist in ' moral rules '. Two laws are
given : Scientific progress is made by proceeding in the direction (a) of
the artificial, (b) of the contradictory. (3) Principles are (a) alive, (6)
each dependent, in its life, on all the rest, (c) immortal. They com-
bine the contrary characters that they are (a) 'our own decrees,' (b)
'variable with experience,' (c) 'directed by action'. (4) 'The intuition
of principles ' cannot be attained either by the ' intellectual ' or by the
' sesthetic ' method. The true method must, like them, be 'regressive.'
in order to remove the influence of corporeal, industrial and rational
action ; but, unlike them, it must be itself an activity which transcends
these three forms of action : it is a self-sacrificing inner life, which is
objective, in the truest sense ('what can become common to all'),
because it alone is ' truly contagious '.] Etudes Critiques. Questions
Pratiques. New Books, etc.
REVUE NEO-SCOLASTIQUE. No. 27.^ J. Halleux. ' L'lvypothese ovolu-
tionniste en Morale.' [The evolution hypothesis has not confined itself
to the purely scientific domain. It has given birth to a new conception
of the Moral Order. M. Halleux in the present article commences an
examination of the evolution theory as applied to Morals. Taking Mr.
Herbert Spencer as his guide, he sets forth the views of the Evolution
school on the nature and definition of conduct, the evolution of conduct,
the basis of the distinction between good and evil, or, in other words,
the criterium of morality, together with the criticisms of Mr. Spencer
on the theological, legist, intuitionist and utilitarian theories of Morals,
all of which theories, in Mr. Spencer's opinion, seek for the basis of
morality elsewhere than in the nature of things. M. Halleux will discuss
these views and criticisms in later articles. But, meanwhile, he states
in passing that Mr. Spencer has misapprehended the principles of
theological morality.] A. Thiery (' Le Tonal de la parole ') explains the
various experiments that have been made with the view to ascertaining
PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. 137
the pitch and establishing the melody of the human voice, considered
as an organ not of song but of speech, and exhibits various species of
notation that have been invented for the recording of this pitch and
melody. His treatment of the subject is highly technical and likely to
be appreciated only by skilled musicians. But musicians will probably
follow his researches with interest. D. Mercier (' Le bilan philosophique
du xix e siecle : suite et fin ') maintains that philosophy is the most
complete explanation possible of the universal order. The sciences, each
of them working in some particular field of knowledge, lay the foundation
of this work of explanation. Philosophy, following after the sciences,
profits by their acquisitions, and undertakes the task of establishing
amongst the various branches of human knowledge a logical subordina-
tion which shall be the certain and accurate expression of the sum of
the contents of consciousness. Philosophy is thus the natural develop-
ment of science. Hence by reason of the progress of science in recent
years, no time has been so well fitted as the present for the elaboration
of philosophy.
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESOEGANB.
Bd. xxvi., Heft 5 und 6. Gr. Heymans. ' Untersuchungen iiber psy-
chische Hemmung.' IL [Continuation of the study published in number
xxi., page 321. Experiments (pressure and sight) with affection of different
areas of the sensory surface by ' active ' and ' passive ' stimuli of the
same quality. The same general result follows as from the mixed action
of stimuli of different quality upon the same sensory area : weaker sensa-
tions are inhibited by stronger, in a degree proportionate to the intensity
of the stronger. Theoretical conclusions : (1) the relation between stimulus
and sensation. The facts of inhibition are of a psychological, not of a
physiological character. The question whether sensations increase pro-
portionally to the stimuli or to the logarithms of the stimuli thus seem
to call for answer in terms of the former alternative. (2) The inhibition
of difference-sensations by sensations (Weber's Law}. Weber's Law must
be distinguished from the logarithmic law, which is Fechner's interpreta-
tion of it. Many objections have been raised against the latter (objections
of Hering, of Merkel and Ament, facts of inhibition ; validity of Weber's
law outside the sphere of sensation intensities ; Fechner's assumption
of the difference limen, and recourse to auxiliary hypotheses for the
explanation of upper and lower deviations). " I regard the difference
limen as a phenomenon of inhibition, and Weber's Law as a special (or
limiting) case of the first law of inhibition, i.e., the law of proportionality
between inhibiting and inhibited stimulus magnitudes." Discussion of
the difference limen, the general contents of Weber's law, the limits of
its validity, and the upper and lower deviations from it. (3) The weaken-
ing of difference-sensations by sensations (MerkeVs and Ament's experiments),
Elaborate analysis of the experimental results of Merkel, Ament and
Angell (method of mean gradations) ; their explanation in terms of the
law of inhibition.] F. Kiesow und R. Hahn. ' Beobachtungen tiber
die Ernpfindlichkeit der hinteren Theile des Mundraumes fur Tast-.
Schrnerz-, Temperatur- und Geschrnacksreize.' [Exploration of the
surfaces of the uvula, tonsils and palatal arches with stimuli for pressure,
pain, temperature, space perception, tickling and taste. Only a few
results can be mentioned here. (1) The buccal cavity contains, besides
areas which are sensitive to pressure but not to pain, structures which
possess sensitivity to pain but none to pressure (cf. Von Frey's results
on conjunctiva and cornea). (2) Von Frey's statement that pain sensa-
tion is to be measured in units of pressure (gr./mm. 2 ) and not of tension
(gr./mm.) is confirmed. (3) The tonsils are sensitive to cold, warmth
138 PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.
and pain ; the uvula shows a great reduction of pain and warmth sensi-
tivity. (4) The sensation of heat appears in areas which are lacking
i n cold spots ; it may also arise by radiation, from thermally stimulated
pain spots (against Alrutz). (5) The uvula is not sensitive to taste. The
same thing holds, at least in general, of the tonsils and the palatal arches.]
Literaturbericht. Erwiederung. [Reply to criticism, by H. liaeck.]
PHILOSOPHISCHE STUDIEN. Bd. xvii., Heft 2. F. Krueger. ' Zur
Theorie der Combinationstone.' [(1) Two simultaneously sounding tones
give rise for perception, as a general rule, to a summation tone and four
or five difference tones. These combination tones and their consequences
(beats, intermediate tones, etc.) are all alike independent of the existence of
overtones in the primary clang. (2) All beats are referable to the exist-
ence of at least two neighbouring tones, i.e., tones not more than a major
third apart ; Koenig's multiple beats do not exist. (3) Koenig's beat tones
are not the only combination tones. Certain difference tones lie between
the primaries. (4) There are only two kinds of combination tones : dif-
ference tones and summation tones. The distinction between beat tones
and difference tones is not borne out by the facts. It is to be explained
historically as due to a neglect of the dissonances, and a consequent
erroneous generalisation of certain differences of intensity among differ-
ence tones. (5) Hermann's middle tones, and Riernann's undertones and
subjective overtones, do not exist. (6) All attempts so far made to
replace by other hypotheses the Ohm theory of analysis, and the Helm-
holtz-Hensen resonance theory based upon it, meet with great intrinsic
difficulties and (or) contradict acoustical experience. (7) The objections
urged against the Helmholtz theory of audition, including that of the
interruption tones, are not binding. (8) Helmholtz' explanation of the
subjunctive combination tones is unsatisfactory. (9) The physiological
theory of these tones need not pass beyond the bounds of the resonance
hypothesis. The attempt should be made, first of all, to apply Helm-
holtz' theory of the objective combination tones to the processes occurring
in the internal ear during the perception of subjective combination
tones.]
ARCHIV FUR SYSTEMATISCHE PHILOSOPHIE. Bd. vii., Heft 3. P.
Staudinger. ' Empirische und rationale Methode in der Philosophic.'
[A criticism of the System der Werttheorie of Ehrenfels. Ehrenfels
confuses the genetic and analytic points. Hence his untenable doctrine
that the value of anything consists in its being desired. The value of
anything really consists in its being a means to an end which is part of
a unified system of ends. The same fallacy affects Ehrenfels' view of
ethical appreciation as directed merely to feelings and feeling dispositions.
A good article.] B. Erdmann. ' Die psychologischen Grnndlagen der
Beziehungen zwischen Sprechen und Denken.' [Diagrammatic repre-
sentation of the series of apperceptive fusions which take place in
understanding speech, in repetition of what others say. in speaking oneself,
in the internal speech of silent thought, in reading and in writing. Three
stages of the development of language are carefully distinguished, and
the difference between auditive, motor and visual types is throughout
kept in view. A very elaborate, conscientious and valuable piece of work.]
Paul Natorp. ' Zu den logischen Grundlagen der Neueren Mathematik.
[A criticism of Russell's I<'iiinl<ititniK of H'lninti-ij. Russell's work is ren-
dered incoherent by its concession to the empirical or " definitional "
point of view. The Euclidean constitution of space follows from its
homogeneousness and continuity when these principles are applied to
" direction " as well as to quantity.] P. Jodl. ' Jahresbericht lib.
Erscheinungen d. Ethik a. d. Jahren 1897 und 1898.' R, Stammler.
PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. 139
' Bericht liber Deutsche Schriften zur Kechtsphilosophie 1894-98.' Bd.
vii., Heft 4. B. Erdmann. 'Die psychologischen Grundlagen der
Beziehungen zwischen Sprechen und Denken' (conclusion). [Gives
symbolic representation of the physiological correlates of the processes
analysed in previous article. Should be especially useful to student of
aphasia.] R. Stammler. ' Bericht iiber deutsche Schriften zur Kechts-
philosophie, 1894-98.' Bibliographic der gesamten philosophischen
Literatur (1900).
VlERTELJAHKSSCHRIFT FUR WlSSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE. Bd.
xxv., Heft 3. J. W. A. Hickson. ' Der Kausalbegritf in der Neueren
Philosophie und in den Naturwissenschaften von Hume bis Robert
Mayer,' Art. iv. [Mayer's own logical justification of the conservation
of energy is satisfactory, and it is the only one that is satisfactory. This
law alone gives to the causal principle a form which is scientifically
valuable and defensible.] J. Petzoldt. ' Solipsismus auf praktischem
Gebiet.' [Criticism of Doring's Gitterlehre. According to Doring action
can be reasonable and therefore right only if it is based on an estimate
of its value to the agent himself. Thus for Doring the fundamental
principle of ethics is egoistic eudaernonism. Petzoldt criticises on
well-known lines. He insists on the logical parallelism of Doring's
doctrine with theoretical solipsism.] Heft 5. Hans Kleinpeter. ' J. B.
Stallo als Erkenntniss Kritiken.' [A good exposition and appreciation.
Stallo is shown to anticipate Mach and similar writers in essential points.]
J. W. A. Hickson. ' Der Kausalbegriff,' etc. (concluded). [Cause and
ground. Causality and agency. The concept of action in its relation to
time. Occasion. The reciprocity of cause and effect. Physical causality
and the teleological interpretation of biological phenomena. The article
contains among other interesting matter some good criticism of Bradley.
The whole series of articles deserves attention.] Paul Barth. ' Zum
Gedachtniss des Nicolaus Cusanus.'
PHILOSOPHISCHES JAHEBUCH. Bd. xiv., Heft 2. F. X. Pfeifer. ' Gibt
es in menschen unbewusste psychische Vorgange ? ' [In this article the
writer maintains the existence of unconscious mental facts or processes.
' Unconscious ' comprises whatever cannot possibly be noticed, and it has
a wider scope than ' not attended to '. The twof oldness of things seen is
a mental fact, but it cannot be noticed. So is the compound nature of
vowels, etc. These are not directly perceived but known by means of
other perceptions.] H. Schell. 'Das erkenntnisstheorische Problem.'
[This paper, answering the question how we get from Seeming to
Being, affirms the active character of presentation, and the causative
nature of its contents ; the first proves the reality of the Ego, the second
the reality of what the Ego perceives.] J. Donat. ' Zur Frage iiber
den Begriff' des Schonen.' [The author concludes by denying that beauty
is ' perfection taken as the object of an intellectual tendency '. Its
elements are intellectual, but they are the object of love and desire,
therefore of the will.] E. Rolf. ' Neue Untersuchung iiber die platon-
ischen Ideen.' [The controversy is continued between the writer and
Zeller, the former attempting to explain certain passages in the TimfBUB
and the Republic, and to prove by others that Plato did not attribute to
his Ideas a separate self -existence, but only meant in general to assert
the reality of an ideal world.] Bd. xiv., Heft 3. M. Maiser. ' Die
neuen Strahlungen und die physikalische Constitution der Ponderablen
Materie.' [This paper, following step by step the latest theories and
discoveries as concerns molecule and atoms, concludes that the tendency
is towards infinite divisibility of matter, since we find molecules made of
atoms, and atoms of electrons. He notes the similarity between Lord
140 PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.
Kelvin's vortex-atom theory and that of matter and form.] H. Strater.
' Ein modernes Moralsystem. ' [This article is an attack upon Wundt's
system of ethics, and firstly in the present number the writer refutes his
idea of the Will and of consciousness, of motive and of freedom. Motives
do not account for the whole causality of a human act. Character,
whether individual or given by the family or by society cannot explain
the feeling of freedom. Wundt's determinism destroys all responsi-
bility.] Ch. Willems. ' Die obersten Seins- und Dnkgesetze,' etc.
[This is the first of a series of articles expounding the principles of
contradiction, of excluded middle, of sufficient reason, and of causality,
according to Aristotle and Aquinas. Here the writer begins by the law
of causality, and points out at length how Aquinas understood it, quoting
chiefly from his proofs of God's existence.] G-. Gretmann. ' Nachmals
iiber den Begriff des Schonen.' [The writer answers several objections
of Father Jungmann to a preceding article of his in the Jahrbuch, and
refers at length to Aquinas and Suarez in support of his theory.] N. von
Seeland. ' tlber das Wo der Seele.' [It is a mistake to think that the
soul, being immaterial, is nowhere in space. Its functions being, among
others, to act on the body, to feel, etc., it is where it acts, i.e., where the
body is.]
EIVISTA FILOSOFICA. Anno ii., Vol. iii., Fasc. iii. May- June, 1900.
R. Mariano. ' Religione e Religioni.' G. Romano. ' Gli studi storici in
Italia allo stato presente in rapporto alia natura e all' ufficio della
Storiografia.' D. Jaja. ' I/enigma della coscienza.' R. Bobba. 'Appunti
bibliografici intorno ad alcune opere contemporanee relative alia Filosofia
di Aristotele.' Rassegna Bibliografica. Notizie. Sommari delle Riviste
Straniere. Libri ricevuti. Fasc. iv., September-October, 1900. P.
Bonatelli. ' La Psycologie di D. Mercier.' R. Mariano. ' Religione e
Religione ' (Parte II a , ed ultima). F. De Sarlo. ' La metafisica dell'
esperienza dell' Hodgson ' (I a parte). F. Cosentini. ' La nozione di
progresso nella filosofia sociale contemporanea.' Rassegna Bibliografica,
etc. Anno iii., vol. iv., Fasc. i. January-February, 1901. A. Faggi.
' Attraverso la Geometria.' E. Sacchi. ' Giacomo Leopardi come uoino,
poeta e pensatore.' A. Franzoni. ' La morale utilitaria di Stuart Mill
esposta dal Prof. G. Zuccante.' A. G-nesotto. 'Interesse e disinteresse
nei sentimenti ed in particolare nei sentimenti morali.' Rassegna Biblio-
grafica. Rassegna di Psicologia. Rassegna di Riviste Straniere. La
morte di Giuseppe Verdi. Pro Philosophia. Notizie e Publicazioni.
Sommari delle Riviste Straniere. Libri ricevuti. Per le onoranze a
Gioberti. Fasc. ii. March-April. F. Bonatelli. 'II Movimento Pnim-
matistico.' A. Franzoni. ' Vincenzo Gioberti nella Storia della Pedagoia.'
F. Enriques. ' Sulla spiegazione psicologica dei postulati della Geometria.'
N. Fornelli. ' II Fondamento dell' Esperienza nella Pedagogia Her-
bartiana.' G. Buonamici. 'L'Antico e il Moderno nella Filosofia del
secolo xx.' Lettera inedita di Vincenzo Gioberti. Rassegna Bibliografica.
II Centenario di Vincenzo Gioberti a Torino. Sguardo generate alle
Riviste Italiane. Notizie e Pubblicazioni. Sommari delle Riviste
Straniere. Libri ricevuti. Fasc. iv. September-October, 1901. G.
Allievo. ' La Psicologia filosofica di fronte alia Psicologia fenomen-
istica.' De Sarlo. ' Scienza e Coscienza.' Rassegna Bibliografica, etc.
VIII NOTES.
MIND ASSOCIATION.
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142 NOTES.
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NOTES. 143
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144 NOTES.
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NEW SERIES. No. 42.] [APRIL, 1902.
MIND
A QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF
PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.
I. THE COMMENSURABILITY OF ALL VALUES.
BY REV. H. RASHDALL.
IN a previous article I have endeavoured to defend the
possibility of a hedonistic calculus. I maintained that it
was psychologically possible to compare different lots of
pleasures and to say which, on the whole, duration and
intensity being both taken into account, was the greatest.
If that be admitted, the fashioning of life in such a way as
to attain either for oneself or for society a greatest quantum
of pleasure becomes a possible and intelligible aim of life.
It is possible to aim consistently at doing what will promote
the greatest pleasure on the whole. At the same time I
hold that such a conception of the ethical end would be
a false one. I do not propose in the present essay to argue
against Hedonism. Suffice it to say that while I do regard
pleasure as a good, I do not regard it as the good. It seems
to me perfectly clear that the moral consciousness does
pronounce some good to be higher, or intrinsically more
valuable than others ; and that at the head of these goods
comes virtue, while many other things intellectual cultiva-
tion of various kinds, aesthetic cultivation, emotion of various
kinds are also good and of more intrinsic value than mere
pleasure. It is true that pleasure is an element in every
state of consciousness to which we assign ultimate value.
I can attach no meaning whatever to the proposition, " I
find this picture supremely beautiful, and yet it gives me no
pleasure to look at it : as far as pleasure is concerned, I
would just as soon contemplate a blank wall for half an
10
14G REV. H. RASHDALL :
hour together." Even with regard to virtue, it is difficult
to answer the question whether I should judge virtue to
possess value, if it gave me no sort of pleasure or satisfaction.
The belief in a priori judgments of value must not be
interpreted to mean that we can see what in detail is good
for human nature apart from the actual psychical and
emotional constitution of human nature. If a being could
exist (the very supposition doubtless involves an absurd
abstraction) capable of appreciating the idea of duty, and
yet not merely actually indifferent to the doing of duty,
but for ever by the very constitution of his nature incapable
of deriving the smallest amount of pleasure or satisfaction
from the performance of duty by himself or another, I do
not know that I would attach any meaning to the assertion
" Virtue is to such a being a good ". Pleasure is an element
in everything to which we attach value : and yet we do not
attach value to consciousness in proportion to its pleasantness :
pleasure differs in kind or quality ; and pleasure is not the only
element in consciousness which is good. As I endeavoured
to show in my last article, this amounts to the assertion
that something else in consciousness possesses value besides
its pleasantness : there are other goods besides pleasure.
On what principle then are we to choose between these
different kinds of good ? It is to my mind a perfectly clear
deliverance of the moral consciousness, that nothing can be
right or wrong except in so far as it tends to produce a good,
and that when we have to. choose between goods, it is always
right to choose the greater good. Such a doctrine implies
that goods of all kinds can be compared, that we can place
goods of all kinds on a single scale, and assign to each its
value relatively to the rest. The defence of this assumption
is the object of the present paper.
In the first place I must begin by distinguishing between
two different senses in which it may be asserted that goods
of different kinds are commensurable. It may mean that
a certain amount of one good can be regarded as a sufficient
and satisfactory substitute for the other, so that however
superior virtue may be to culture, a sufficient amount of
culture could be regarded as an entirely satisfactory com-
pensation for the absence of all virtue : that given enough
sensual pleasure, the absence of either virtue or culture
would cease to be an object of regret. If this were the only
possible meaning of the commensurability of heteroge-
neous goods, I should fully sympathise with the assertion
that the value of the higher goods (particularly of virtue) is
incommensurable with that of anything else. But that is
THE COMMENSURABILITY OF ALL VALUES. 147
not the only possible meaning of our assertion. It may
mean only that when we have to choose between a higher
and a lower good, token we, cannot have both, we can compare
them, and pronounce that one possesses more value than the
other.
And this is the only possible interpretation of the formula
which is open to those who hold that no one of the compet-
ing goods, not even virtue, is by itself the good. The true
good of a human life does not consist either in virtue only,
or in knowledge only, or in pleasure only. I altogether
decline to pronounce evSaifAwv, a man who has enjoyed
twenty years of unbroken virtue in a loathsome dungeon,
cut off from books or human society, and afflicted by per-
petual toothache or a succession of other tortures. Such a
man has not attained the true end of his being. He may be
much more evSaipcov than the successful sinner, but his lot
cannot be pronounced a wholly desirable one ; he is " blessed "
for his goodness, but he is not altogether " blessed ". Equally
little would any abundance and variety of sensual pleasures
make me attach high value to the life of a stupid sensualist ;
nor will any amount of refinement or intellectual enjoyment
induce me to regard as supremely desirable the life of a
Borgia or even a Goethe. No amount of one kind of good
can compensate for the absence of the other. But when
circumstances make it impossible for me to secure for myself
or for others all these kinds of good, then I can and must
decide which of them I regard as best worth having ; and
that implies that for the purpose of choosing between them they
are commensurable.
It is quite true, as will be indignantly protested in some
quarters, that each of these " goods " taken by itself is an
abstraction. No one of them can exist wholly without the
other, or at least without the opposite of the other. Pleasure
cannot exist at least for a human being without some
kind or measure of knowledge or intellectual activity. Know-
ledge can hardly be supposed ever to be accompanied by no
kind or sort of pleasure, though the pleasure may in some
cases be greatly outweighed by attendant pains.
And, if you stripped off from a human being all activity of
thought (even that implied in the most mechanical occupa-
tion, or the most humdrum routine of duty), and all feeling
of satisfaction at one thing rather than another, it would
be difficult to see wherein the virtue of such a being could
consist. It is not upon each one of these things taken by
itself that we pronounce our judgments of value, but upon
each of them taken as an element in a whole. Our ideal of
148 EEV. H. BASHDALL :
human life is not a certain amount of the higher goods
mechanically added on to a certain amount of lower goods,
but a connected whole in which each is made different by
its connexion with the others. It is not virtue + pleasure,
or knowledge + pleasure that we desire for man, but that he
may be virtuous and find pleasure in his virtuous activities,
that he may study and enjoy his studies, that he may enjoy
the pleasures of eating and drinking, but enjoy them in
such a way and degree as may be conducive to the develop-
ment of his higher nature, and consistent with the highest
good of his fellows. But, when through unfavourable cir-
cumstances this ideal is not realisable, we can distinguish
between the various elements in a human life and form a
judgment as to which of them seems to be most important
a large amount of this, or a small amount of that ? If we
were not thus capable of distinguishing between various
elements in human life, 1 all thinking or talking about the
moral ideal, or indeed about practical aims or objects of
any kind, would be estopped. And if, when we have dis-
tinguished them, we are not to say which of them is best
and to act upon our answer, there is an end to the possi-
bility of any ethical system that admits that the morality
of an act depends upon its consequences. The latter ad-
mission is now generally made by the most anti-hedonistic
writers. There is a general consensus to use an expression
which Prof. Paulsen 2 has introduced in this connexion that
Ethics must be ' teleological,' though not hedonistic. And
this admission seems absolutely to carry with it the further
concession that all values must be, in the sense defined,
commensurable. If the morality of an act depends upon the
value of all its consequences taken together, we must be able
to say which of two sets of consequences possesses the most
value ; and, if different kinds of consequences are to have
any weight assigned to them, we must be able to attribute
more or less weight to each of them. To deny this seems
to amount to the denial that there is any one fixed and
consistent meaning in the word value or worth, or good, and
1 It is true, of course, as has been admitted above, that we never get
one element wholly apart from the other. The greediest bon-vivant, with
his attention wholly concentrated on his food, is thinking of something,
and the student absorbed in his books may be enjoying the carnal
pleasure of sitting in a comfortable chair, but we may make abstraction
of these things sufficiently to ask " Which is best eating or study ? "
2 In A System of Ethics (English Translation by Tilly) a work which
forms the best, though avowedly a somewhat popular, exposition of the
general view of Ethics which is presupposed in this article.
THE COMMENSUEABILITY OF ALL VALUES. 149
to make impossible any system of Ethics which is based
upon this conception.
The only way of escaping the admission that different
kinds of good are commensurable would be to assert that
it is always right to choose the highest. Now (if we assume
that virtue is the highest of goods) this contention involves
all the difficulties of the formalistic Ethics (to use the term
which Prof. Paulsen has used as the opposite of "teleo-
logical") of Kant. If nothing in the world possesses value
except the good will, we cut ourselves off from the possibility
of assigning a rational ground for regarding one volition as
better than another. To use the stock criticism, a will that
wills nothing but itself has no content. The term ' right ' is
meaningless except in reference to the good. The good will
may possess infinitely more value than any consequence that
it wills, but unless that consequence be good, the will cannot
be good either. Charity is no doubt better than the feeding
of the hungry, but unless the feeding of the hungry be good,
there is no reason for applying the word good to the charit-
able act. To deny that anything possesses value but a good
will (which Kant after all did not do), is to deny that such
a thing as a good will is possible. The attempt may, indeed,
be made to escape the force of this criticism by pleading
that it is only where some lower good is incompatible with
some higher good that it must be treated as possessing no
value at all. Now, in the first place, it seems difficult to
understand the admission that when we assign some value
to the lower and a value to the higher which always over-
weighs any conceivable amount of the former, we are not in
a sense treating them as commensurable : we do in a sense
measure the value of the one against the other, even when
we pronounce that their values are related as finite quantities
are related to infinity. But the main question is whether we
do always pronounce that the smallest quantity of the higher
is worth more than the largest quantity of the lower. And
here it is obvious that the appeal can only be to the actual
moral judgments of mankind.
So long as I confine myself to my own virtue, it seems clear
that it can never be right for me to prefer any quantity of a
lower good to the doing of my own duty. And if goodness,
morality, a rightly directed will, be the thing of highest value
in the world (as in my view the moral consciousness un-
hesitatingly affirms) I shall always be choosing the greatest
good for myself by doing my duty. If in any case it is
right or reasonable for me to choose a lower good rather
than a higher one, then eo ipso I shall not be violating my
150 REV. H. BASHDALL :
duty by pursuing it, and therefore I shall not be postponing
morality to anything which is not morality. The principle
that all values are commensurable can never in practicv
bring the morality of any individual into competition with
any other good, so long as his own voluntary acts alone are
concerned. It can never compel us to say " For an adequate
quantity of some other good it is reasonable for me to com-
mit a sin". So much results from a mere analysis of the
idea of duty.
But can we say that there are no cases in which we have in
judging of the effect of our conduct upon others to institute
comparisons between the intrinsic worth of goodness and
the intrinsic worth of other and lower goods knowledge,
culture, bodily pleasure, immunity from pain ? Can we say
that it is always right to regard the very smallest amount
of moral good in that sense of moral good in which one
man's moral goodness may be increased and diminished by
the act of another as preferable to the utmost conceivable
quantity of any lower good ? It seems to me that to main-
tain that such is always our duty would involve an austerity
or rigorism by which few would even pretend to guide their
ethical judgments outside the pages of an ethical treatise.
Take the case contemplated by Cardinal Newman. Cardinal
Newman in defending himself against the charge of de-
preciating veracity because lying is only, according to Roman
Catholic Moral Theology, a venial sin, has laid it down that
it would be better for millions of the human race to expire
in extremest agony than for a single human soul to be
guilty of the slightest venial sin. Mr. Lecky has declined
to endorse this tremendous judgment. 1 And, I believe, few
who in the least realise the meaning of the words which
they are using would do so either. And what does this mean
but that we judge that a little morality (so far as morality
may be the result of another's conduct) possesses less value
than an immense quantity of freedom from pleasure or the
absence of a vast quantity of pleasure that it is from the
point of view of Reason more important that so many thou-
sand people should not suffer torments than that one man
should not commit a small sin.
It will perhaps be objected that such a case could not occur ;
but such a contention would, it seems to me, betray an ex-
traordinary blindness to some of the most difficult practical
problems with which we are confronted every day of our
lives. I have a limited sum of money to spend on charity.
1 Hist, of Europe, " Morals " (1899), i., p. 111.
THE COMMENSURABILITY OF ALL VALUES. 151
I believe that spiritual good can be promoted by efficient
curates, and that intellectual good can be promoted by edu-
cation, and that pain can be saved by hospitals. Shall I give
it to an Additional Curates' Society, or to education, or
to a hospital ? I have a son who wishes to get into the
Indian Civil Service. Shall I send him to a "crammer's,"
which (in his particular case) may give him the best chance
of getting in, or to a public school and university, which
will be best for his moral and intellectual well-being ? A
problem more exactly resembling the hypothetical case pro-
pounded by Newman arises when some great material benefit
can only be obtained by the bribery of an official. Few
people would hesitate to bribe a Chinese Mandarin to be
unfaithful to his superiors, a traitor to his country, disloyal
very possibly to his own highest ideal (which may enjoin
relentless hostility to foreigners) in order to set free a score
or so of Europeans who would otherwise be exposed to torture
and death. By such an act I should distinctly be causing a
small amount of moral evil in order to produce a large amount
of hedonistic good.
Such an admission could only be escaped if we were to
adopt the extravagant position sometimes taken up by ex-
treme libertarians the position that moral evil in one can
never be made better or worse by the action of another. The
admission that in some cases it is right to prefer a larger
amount of lower good to a smaller amount of a higher in no
way involves, be it observed, the principle " to do a great right
do a little wrong ". The individual must himself always
do right : the moral evil that he causes is not even a little
wrong in him, if (as the view I am defending maintains) it is
right for him to cause in another this little moral evil rather
than be the cause of an immense amount of undeserved physi-
cal suffering. And I fail to see*how moral judgments which
could in practice be assented to and acted upon by the holiest
of mankind can be explained or justified upon any other view.
There are, I must freely admit, very many more cases in
which I am certain that the accepted morality of our time
and country implies some such preference of much lower to
a little higher good than there are cases in which I am certain
that such a preference is really justifiable. We compel large
masses of young men to remain unmarried, well knowing the
moral consequences which are likely to ensue from such a
state of things, because we hold that the country must be
defended and that it would be too expensive to allow all
soldiers to marry. We allow the children of the working
classes to be withdrawn from school at the age of twelve or
152 REV. H. RASHDALL :
thirteen, though no one doubts that they would benefit morally
and intellectually by staying till sixteen, because we think it
would be too great a strain upon the resources of the country
and of the individual parents (here, now, for the moment,
under existing social and economic conditions) to compel
them to keep the children at school so long. In other words,
we think that the enjoyment of luxuries by rich taxpayers,
of culture by the educated, of comforts by poor taxpayers, of
the necessaries of life by poor parents is of more intrinsic
importance than the higher moral and intellectual advance-
ment of the children. I need not pursue such illustrations
further. There is, in fact, no single expenditure of money
public or private upon material enjoyment which goes
beyond the bare necessaries of life when we might spend it
upon some higher object which can justify itself upon the
theory that it is never right to promote lower good when we
could promote ever so little of some higher good.
It is quite true, and it is important to remember, that
the opposition between higher and lower good is seldom so
absolute as has been here assumed. It is seldom, in such
practical problems, that all the higher good is on one side
and all the lower good on the other. When we insist that,
given certain circumstances, the claims of national defence
must take precedence of education, and even of certain
branches of personal morality, in so far as morality can be
promoted or hindered by external influences, we may plead
that we attach importance to national defence, not only in
the interests of commerce and material well-being, but in
the interests of national independence, national character,
and international morality. When we refuse to burden poor
parents beyond a certain point for the education of their
children, it may be suggested that further pressure would
involve the semi-starvation of the children, which would not
be ultimately in the interests of their moral and intellectual
well-being. And, more generally, we may contend that a
certain indulgence of the lower appetites and desires of human
nature an indulgence going considerably beyond the para-
mount requirements of health is in average men more con-
ducive to moral well-being than a semi-compulsory asceticism
with the inevitable reaction which such asceticism ultimately
provokes. All this is very true ; but still we cannot, as it
seems to me, avoid the admission that in some cases the
balance of moral good is on one side, and of the lower on
the other. Give that bribe and the moral character of your
Mandarin will have taken a downward turn : withhold it
and twenty European men, women and children will die in
THE COMMENSURABILITY OF ALL VALUES. 153
torture and dishonour. It is only a fanatic to whom, the
small deterioration of our Mandarin, ex hypothesi not a
character of the highest order, will seem a more valuable
end than the saving of twenty European lives with all their
possibilities of happiness. It may be said that there are
possibilities of goodness also. Then let us suppose that
death is unavoidable, and that it is only a question of tor-
ture. No doubt the prevention of injustice may have good
moral effects. But these are vague possibilities as contrasted
with the certain moral evil of our corrupting the Mandarin
with all the incidental moral evil which that corruption
carries with it. Our moral judgment is not really deter-
mined by these vague possibilities. We really think it more
important to spare so much suffering than to avoid the slight
deterioration of one Mandarin's character.
For the agent himself it can never, we have admitted, be
right to prefer his own lower to his higher good, for the simple
reason that to do right is always his own highest good.
And yet, even in considering one's own moral good, there
may be cases in which it may be right, just in order to do
our duty, to adopt a course of action which may be likely on
the whole to have an injurious effect on one's own character,
in that sense of character in which a man is made better or
worse by influences not under the immediate control of his
own will. It may sometimes be right for a man to adopt
a profession which in the long run may have a lowering
effect upon his ideals and upon his conduct, in preference to
one which would be likely to have a more elevating influence :
or in innumerable other ways to face temptations which he
does not know that he will always be able to resist rather
than to purchase his own moral purity at the cost of other
people's well-being. Our own future well-being, in so far
as it lies beyond our own immediate control, is in the same
position as other people's moral well-being to be weighed
against the other kinds of good, and assigned a value which,
though enormously transcending that of lower goods, can-
not be held to be absolutely incommensurable with them.
But still, this admission does not involve any abandonment of
our previous contention that it can never be right for a man
to do an immediately wrong act for the sake of any other
advantage to himself or others. By choosing the greater
good, he has done his duty (even in choosing a course which
may in the long run react in some ways unfavourably upon
his own character), and by doing his duty he has chosen the
greatest good for himself. He would have become a worse
man by taking the opposite course.
154 REV. H. RASHDALL :
So far, we have been comparing the value of morality or
character with that of all other goods. When we come to
the weighing of higher goods other than the highest of
intellectual and aesthetic goods for instance against the
lower, there will be perhaps less objection to admit that
a small amount of the higher may sometimes have to give
way to a large amount of the lower. At all events the task
of showing that that is the principle upon which ordinary
good men act is here an easy one. Some of the instances
already given will serve to illustrate this case also the
sacrifice of education to health and comfort, the spending of
national money upon armies and guns instead of universities,
libraries, and scientific expeditions, the cutting down of the
British Museum grant in the interest of the South African
War. However much w r e may regret and condemn the
indifference which Parliaments and Governments in thi^
country (more than in any other in the world) show to such
intellectual objects, few of us would be prepared to push the
expenditure of public moneys upon them to a point which
would on the material side lower the standard of comfort to
the level of bare health and subsistence. And here few of
us will scruple to admit that it is not only in conduct affect-
ing others, but in conduct affecting primarily only ourselves
that we act, and feel that we do right in acting, upon the
principle that the quantity as well as the quality of various
heterogeneous goods must be taken into account in choosing
between them. We feel that art is higher than comfort
and good eating, but we do not feel bound to lower our
standard of comfort below a certain point in order to buy
books and pictures. We recognise that study is intrinsically
more valuable than ordinary conversation, but we feel justified
in spending on the enjoyment of society a considerable
amount of time which might be spent upon study. AN
acknowledge the claim of culture, but we do not feel bound
to pursue culture when it would interfere beyond a certain
point with health and comfort and the ordinary enjoyment
of life an enjoyment consisting in the following out of
natural tastes, and inclinations which, however harmless,
we cannot upon reflexion pronounce to have a high intrinsic-
value. We may admit on reflexion that we do not care for
and pursue our own intellectual improvement as much as
we ought to do, but in our most serious moments of self-
examination we hold that it is sometimes lawful to spend
half an hour upon some lower amusement without proving
that the giving up of that amusement would injuriously
affect our health or cause some other evil than the mere loss.
THE COMMENSUBABILITY OF ALL VALUES. 155
of that amusement. In such cases there is indeed no great
disproportion between the amount of the higher and lower
goods. If we think of cases where the disproportion would
be very great, the verdict of the practical reason will be still
more unhesitating. If we had to weigh the sufferings of
some thousand tortured rabbits against the purely intel-
lectual gain of some theoretically unimportant and prac-
tically unfruitful piece of scientific knowledge, or a woman's
heart broken and her life wrecked against the scientific or
aesthetic advantage to a philosopher or a novelist in being
enabled the better to analyse the passion of love in cases
like these there will be little doubt what the verdict will be
on the part of any person of common humanity not sophisti-
cated by the gospel of self-realisation. 1
All these judgments then imply that we do actually weigh
very heterogeneous goods against one another, and decide
which possesses most value, and in making that estimate we
do take into consideration the amount of the two kinds of
good as well as the quality. We do hold that a little of some
higher good is too dearly bought by the sacrifice of a lower
one, and, on the other hand, that a very small quantity of one
good is worth a great deal of another. If a facetious opponent
forthwith challenges us to produce a graduated table of goods,
a tariff by reference to which we may at once say how much
toothache ought to outweigh the culture implied in the read-
ing of a play of Shakespeare, the answer is the one which the
opponent will probably urge against the whole scheme that
there are no means of measuring with exactitude such things
as culture or charity, and, again, that the value of a ' good '
is relative to many circumstances. The reading of a play of
Shakespeare may be an intellectual revolution the beginning
of a new intellectual (and it may be) moral life to one man,
while to another it will be of no more value than the same
number of pages of Marie Corelli. But, as I have so often
had occasion to point out, the impossibility of reducing to
numerical precision judgments of this kind does not imply
that the judgments are not made or that they are not
quantitative. It is only in quite recent times that mechanical
methods were invented for instituting exact comparisons
between lights of different strength : yet, long before such
methods were invented, men judged that one light was
stronger much stronger, moderately stronger or a little
stronger than another light, and acted on their judgments.
1 1 have nothing to say about vivisection, duly regulated, in the inter-
ests of Humanity.
156 REV. H. RASHDALL :
A little ingenuity might perhaps find cases in which we
could with some meaning say that one higher good pos-
sessed twice the intrinsic value possessed by another. But I
admitted that even in comparing pleasures, and pleasures of
the same order, such exact measurements were rarely possible
and never of use. It is a characteristic of these higher goods
that their value, or rather the value of their objective source
or cause, varies with circumstances more even than is the
case with simple physical pleasures and pains. And there-
fore here the attempt to find cases in which such a mensura-
tion might have a meaning is too far removed from anything
which actually takes place in our practical life to be worth
attempting, even by way of playfully illustrating the quanti-
tative character of these judgments.
There is one really formidable objection to the position
taken up in this and my former article which I must attempt
briefly to meet. Some of those who strongly hold that all
goods can be compared, that ' value ' must always have the
same meaning, and that the moral way of deciding between
two alternative courses of action is to ask " By doing which
shall I produce good of most value?" will object to the
distinction which has here been drawn between pleasure-
value and value of a higher kind. It has been assumed
that we sometimes say " This course will produce the most
pleasure, but the pleasure is not sufficient to outweigh the
evil of another kind which is involved in it : the course
which produces least pleasure will produce most good ". But
it may be urged that if we are really to be faithful to our
doctrine that all values are comparable, we must refuse to
recognise any but one kind of value : and that if we reject
the doctrine that pleasure is the only thing that has value,
we cannot really compare states of consciousness as pleasures,
and then override that judgment by a second valuation as
goods. " The ideal or rational standard of comparison," it may
be said, " is the only one. Whether it is pleasure or culture
or morality that we are comparing, all that we can do is to
say which appears to us to be worth most." I have some
sympathy with the spirit in which this objection is made.
For I freely confess that I find it impossible to get hold
either of a satisfactory definition of pleasure or to distinguish
in any sharp or scientific way between pleasure and that
higher kind of value which, though doubtless normally ac-
companied by more or less of pleasure, is not (for the developed
moral consciousness) measured in terms of pleasure. It is
easy to show how wildly wide of the mark are most of the
definitions of pleasure which ha\ > been put forth by eminent
THE COMMENSUBABILITY OF ALL VALUES. 157
authorities. After each of them one exclaims, " Well, what-
ever I mean by pleasure, it is certainly not that". And yet
I cannot easily bring myself to believe that pleasure is simply
a vox nihili, for nothing less than that would be the logical
consequence of saying " Pleasure does not = value : we
can compare values but we cannot compare pleasures ". It
has been fully and frankly admitted that pleasure is an
abstraction, that it is one particular aspect of consciousness,
but it is not the only one. Now I do not think that it is-
possible to define what this aspect is sufficiently to mark
it off with absolute precision from those other aspects which
we have in view in pronouncing upon the absolute or ultimate
value of some state of a conscious being. And yet it is-
certain that it does represent one of the aspects under which
we are practically in the habit of considering and valuing
such states.
I tremble at the thought of putting forth a new defini-
tion of pleasure and protest that what follows is not intended
as a definition : but I venture to suggest that, when we try
to estimate the value of a state of a consciousness as pleasure,
we are thinking of its value simply as immediate feeling,
abstracting as much as possible from all reference to the
higher parts of our nature. Our appreciation of the value
of duty depends not merely upon the immediate feeling that
accompanies the doing of duty: that is the "moral sense"
view of the matter which (as Hume has shown once for all),
when fully thought out, ends in Hedonism. It depends
upon our appreciation of the relation between this present
consciousness of ours and our own past and our own future,
upon our consciousness of our relation as persons with other
persons, upon the presence of all sorts of desires and aspira-
tions which go beyond the moment beyond even our own
consciousness at all. The same may be applied in a modified
degree to our estimate of the value of intellectual or ses-
thetic cultivation. All these things are put aside when we
estimate our consciousness simply as present feeling.^ This
is most clearly seen in the case of those conscious states
which have no value except what they have simply as
so much pleasant feeling. If we found that the drinking
of a certain liquid not required for purposes of health
was not satisfactory simply in and for itself, we should
pronounce it to have no value at all. It would be easy
and tempting to essay a definition of pleasure by making it
consist in the satisfaction of our lower as distinct from the
satisfaction of our higher desires. But this will not express
what we really mean by pleasure. It is something which
158 REV. H. RASHDALL :
the lower sources of satisfaction have in common with the
higher. When we compare the glow of self-satisfaction which
sometimes attends a conquest over temptation, we feel at once
that the resulting feeling has something in common with the
state of mind into which we are put on other occasions by a
glass of port wine. It is this something which we seek to
indicate by the term pleasure. And yet I do not feel that
the value of that good will of ours is dependent upon the
satisfactoriness of the present feeling, or of any future
succession of such feelings. Apart from that we judge that
it has value, and indeed it is this recognition of its value
which is the cause, or at least one condition of the pleasure
quite otherwise than in the case of the port ; there we could
not say what value it has till we taste it, and if we do not
like the taste, it has no value at all. To the man who
desires goodness, or cares about doing his duty, the doing of
it must bring some pleasure, for there is pleasure in the
satisfaction of all desire ; and it would be (as I have ad-
mitted), meaningless to ask whether we should attach value
to morality for a being who was for ever incapable of feel-
ing, or being brought to feel, any such satisfaction in good
conduct. But we can equally little assert that the value of
the good act depends upon the amount of the resulting pleas-
ure. For while a good act must bring pleasure to him who
has any sense of its value, the amount of the pleasure is
dependent upon very many other things than the amount of
the good will upon health, temperament, spirits, surround-
ing circumstances of all kinds. But these variations in the
actual pleasantness of the good exercises no influence upon
our judgment of the higher value which goodness possesses,
as compared with the drinking of good wine. We judge
that goodness has a pleasure- value which may be compared
with the pleasure-value of champagne, which may some-
times exceed, and sometimes fall short of that value, but
that it possesses beside a value of its own which it does not
share with the champagne. We are brought back at last to
the simple fact of consciousness. The only way of defending
the possibility of a judgment, or the existence of a category.
is .to show that we do actually think in that way ; and it is
clear to me that either (1) the attempt to analyse all value
into pleasure-value, or (2) to analyse pleasure-value into
value in general, or (3) to deny that sometimes we are driven
to compare pleasure-value with some higher kind of value
fails to represent the actual deliverance of our moral con-
sciousness.
If the view which we have taken of the relation of the
THE COMMENSURABILITY OF ALL VALUES. 159
idea of pleasure to the idea of value be well founded, it will
be obvious why, from the nature of the case, no sharp dis-
tinction can be drawn between them. Among the things to
which we attach no value some appeal so entirely to the
higher or rational part of our nature that, except for the bare
fact that they do satisfy desire, they seem to have nothing in
common with the lower. When a man does his duty at the
cost of toil and suffering, it is so exclusively the higher part
of his nature that impels him to the sacrifice that we should
feel it unnatural to say that it is merely the pleasure to which
he attaches value. This higher nature of his is, indeed, so
closely connected with his lower that it is impossible that
the satisfaction of that higher impulse can fail to excite some
pleasant feeling, but it is not valued simply as feeling. On
the other hand, the mere ' prick of sense ' ceases to have
value when it ceases to give pleasure. The vast majority of
those states of consciousness to which we attach value are
intermediate between the two cases. They appeal to our
higher and to our lower nature at the same time. The per-
formance of duty, even at the sacrifice of much that under
other circumstances would be valued, the activity of our
intellect in an interesting profession or an interesting study,
social intercourse with those whom we really care for all
these under favourable circumstances are accompanied by
feeling of a kind which has much in common with the feeling
that one gets from bathing or basking in the sunshine.
They appeal to the higher and to the lower part of our
nature at one and the same time. It would be ridiculous to
talk as if we valued them simply as pleasures ; for we feel
that, when through unfavourable circumstances, or interfer-
ing unpleasantness, they practically cease to appeal to the
lower nature at all, we value them still. It would be equally
impossible to pronounce that our judgment of their value
is wholly independent of that which they have in common
with the merely animal satisfactions. In these cases it is
practically impossible to say how much of the value is
due to one source and how much to the other. If we
supposed the lower side of this satisfactoriness progressively
diminished, it would be virtually impossible to say exactly
when we have reached the point at which we have ceased
to prefer them as pleasant states of mind, and now prefer
them only as states of mind which we value apart from their
pleasurableness. It is only when we attempt by a violent
effort of analysis to compare the higher and the lower simply
from the same point of view that we do actually distinguish
between the value of our mental condition on the whole
160 REV. H. RASHDALL :
and its value as pleasure. And such efforts, being seldom
useful, are seldom made. It is only when the higher and
the lower elements of interest get violently separated
when the value which some object of desire has for us as
rational and reflecting beings gets very far removed from the
value which it has for us as merely sensitive beings, 1 that it
becomes natural to say " We prefer this to that, but we do
not prefer it simply as pleasure ". And it is probable that
in practice different people use this term ' pleasure ' with
considerable differences of meaning. Some people, even
among philosophers, seem to be unable to dissociate the
term pleasure from bodily indulgences : the existence of
high-minded Hedonists seems to show that some people
really use it almost or entirely in the sense of ' intrinsically
valuable consciousness '. On the whole, then, it is clear to
me that we cannot do without this distinction between value
and pleasure. To merge the idea of value in that of pleasure
practically involves all the fallacies of Hedonism ; to merge
the idea of pleasure in that of value involves the refusal to
distinguish different elements in the supremely valuable kind
of conscious life which the moral consciousness undoubtedly
does distinguish. Practically we cannot get on without
both the ideas of value and that of pleasure. Yet it may be
admitted that the idea of value belongs to the language of
strict philosophical thought : the idea of pleasure rather to
the region of the popular conceptions, which the philosopher
must take account of, which he is bound to use but which
are from their very nature incapable of exact definition, and
which, therefore, must necessarily be used without exact
scientific precision. We want a term to express that in
value which is common to the higher and the lower states
of consciousness, in which we recognise value : but, just
because higher and lower shade off into one another, pleasure
must needs shade off into something that is not pleasure.
We may speak of pleasure as the value which feeling pos-
sesses simply as feeling ; but just because feeling does not
exist apart from the other elements in consciousness, but is
one aspect of an indivisible reality the thinking, feeling,
willing self it is impossible sharply to distinguish the value
which we attach to consciousness simply as feeling from the
value which we attach to it because it satisfies our rational
nature : for the lover kind of satisfaction often depends upon
and arises from our consciousness of the highest kind of
value. Enthusiasm for an idea religious or other may
1 Of course we are never in reality merely sensitive.
THE COMMENSURABILITY OF ALL VALUES. 161
produce some of the emotional and some of the physical
effects of the keenest sensual enjoyment. It will no doubt
be urged that Philosophy has nothing to do with such a
vague and indefinable conception ; but a Philosophy which
fails to take account of the vague and inadequate language
in which alone it is possible to express our moral experience
must be a Philosophy which deliberately refuses to deal with
one side and that the most important and fundamental side
of that spiritual experience in which Reality consists. It
is all very well to protest against abstractions, but without
abstractions there is no thought. A Philosophy that would
avoid abstractions must be speechless : and the moral Phil-
osophy of some of my friends would seem to be practically
speechless except in so far as it indulges in occasional
outbursts of abuse or contempt for those who humbly en-
deavour to put their moral convictions into intelligible words.
It is right no doubt to protest against " one-sided abstrac-
tions " ; but every abstraction must be one-sided while it
is actually being made. The only way to neutralise the
abstraction involved in looking at one side of a thing apart
from the other side is to look at the other side also at another
time. I trust that in insisting on the indispensability of the
distinction between the pleasure-aspect and other aspects of
consciousness, and in contending that both have value, though
one has a higher value than the other, I have not violated
this doubtless important principle.
To develop further, and to defend, the view of Ethics which
finds the moral criterion of our action in its tendency to
promote for society at large an ideal which includes an
ascending scale of goods 1 ranging from mere sensual grati-
fication up to the good-will itself, would lead us beyond the
scope of the present article. My object has been merely
to defend it from one particular line of preliminary objection.
l l take this expression from the theologian Kitsch! whose view of
Ethics also includes all these goods, as well as the effort to promote them,
in his conception of the Kingdom of God : " The task of the Kingdom of
God includes likewise all labour in which our lordship over nature is
exercised for the maintenance, ordering, and furtherance even of the
bodily side of human life. For unless activities such as these are ulti-
mately to end in antisocial egoism, or in materialistic overestimate of
their immediate results, they must be judged in the light of those ends
which, in ascending series, represent the social, spiritual and moral ideal
of man" (The, Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation^
Eng. Trans., 1900, p. 612).
11
II. A CRITIQUE OF KANT'S ETHICS. 1
BY FELIX ABLER.
IN the preface to the second edition of the Kritik of Pure
Reason Kant says: "It behooved me to destroy knowledge
(that is, the presumed knowledge of transcendental truths)
in order to make way for belief". His moral belief was
founded on his ethical theory. This theory it is the purpose
of my paper to subject to criticism.
The task of honest criticism is difficult. The popular
adage tells us that it is hard to see ourselves as others see
| us. It is no less hard to see another in the manner in
which he sees himself, to enter into his mental world, to
put one's self mentally in his place, to see the objects of his
thought in the same illumination in which they present
themselves to his inner eye. Yet, without thus stripping
off one's own personality, as it were, without some such
preliminary act of self-renunciation, without a willingness
to learn from another, nay, almost, for the time being, to
become that other, the business of the critic is hopeless from
the first. Nor ought these remarks to appear superfluous to
any one who remembers the fate encountered by the Kantian
philosophy at the hands of many of his interpreters. The
greatness of this extraordinary thinker has indeed been
acknowledged by all. But, after some preliminary tributes
to his genius, the attempt has often been made to overthrow
his credit by triumphantly refuting opinions which he never
held, and to expound his system, not in the light of doctrines
which he himself taught, and for which he was willing to
stand sponsor, but according to what, in the opinion of his
expositors, he ought to have taught, or would have if he had
as clearly known his own mind as they professed to know it,
or if he had foreseen the implications of his thought which
they, his successors, had succeeded in explicating. In this
way it has come about that some of the most authoritative
1 A Paper read before the Philosophical Club, New York, 28rd October,
1900.
A CRITIQUE OF KANT*S ETHICS. 163
accounts of the Kantian philosophy in the English language
are so infiltrated with the elements of those later systems,
which Kant himself did not know and which in their first
beginnings he repudiated, that his actual teachings in the
minds of many have become obscured, and a kind of bastard
Kantianism has come into vogue, reminding one of the
spurious Aristotelianism that was current in the schools of
the middle ages.
I mention these facts at the outset as a warning intended
not so much for my readers as for myself. I, too, am about
to undertake the hazardous task of criticism. It is well to
remind oneself of the pitfalls that beset such an undertaking.
To criticise, one must understand. To understand, one \
must sympathise, nay, one ought, in the first instance, to
forget criticism and be willing to take the humble attitude
of a learner. The entire ethical system of Kant depends
on the idea of freedom not on freedom itself, but on the
idea of freedom. What meaning does he attach to this
idea? How does it originate? How does he seek to
legitimate it ? How does he endeavour to reconcile it with
the idea of necessity ? These questions we shall now take up.
The passages which it concerns us to study and to keep
before us in their ensemble, as each in some degree supple-
ments the others, are : the chapter on Freedom in the Kritik
of the Pure Reason, the corresponding chapter in the Kritik of
the Practical Reason, a chapter on this subject in the Prole-
gomena, and, in addition, the observations contained in
Kant's Philosophical Diary, edited by Erdmann, and published
in 1884 : " Observations on Freedom," numbers 1511 to 1552
inclusive. I shall make the attempt to state the main points
of Kant's argument in a series of propositions.
First, a distinction is to be drawn between the fact of
experience, the inference from this fact, and the argument
designed to furnish a metaphysical basis for this inference.
The fact of experience is the occurrence in us of judgments
implying absolute obligation. I ought to act in such and
such a way, irrespective of my inclinations, and even con-
trary to them, without regard to the force of obstructive
habits, heredity, education, environment, etc. ; something it
is absolutely right for me to do. A merely hypothetical fi
judgment affirms that certain means ought to be adopted in
case I desire the end. A categorical judgment affirms the
existence of an end which I am not at liberty to choose or
reject at my good pleasure, but am under obligation to
choose. In every other case the word "ought" refers to
the means. In the case of moral obligation the word
164 FELIX ADLER :
"ought" refers to the end itself as well as to the means.
This fact of experience constitutes the starting-point of the
Kantian ethics. If we dispute this fact, we part company
from him ab initio. Let us, however, hold in abeyance any
objections that may arise in our minds and pursue the
argument further.
jf The starting-point, then, is the fact, real or assumed, of
^unconditional obligation. The inference from the fact is
what Kant calls practical freedom. Because " thou oughtest,"
therefore " thou canst ". It is of the utmost moment to
remember that the freedom of the will, according to Kant,
is not a matter of experience. Moral freedom is not for an
instant to be confounded with psychological freedom, the
faculty of deliberation or suspended judgment, or the con-
sciousness of self-determination. Freedom, according to
Kant, cannot be proved to occur in consciousness at all. It-
is not itself a fact of experience, but an inference from such
a fact. The fact itself is the judgment "thou oughtest".
The inference is " thou canst," " thou art free ".
In the next place, practical freedom requires for its specu-
lative basis transcendental freedom. If we are, on moral
grounds and for purely moral purposes, to regard ourselves
as free agents we must be able to justify the idea of freedom
in its own right ; we must be able to show, at least, that no
self-contradiction is involved in assuming it, and especially
that it may be held without infringing upon the law of uni-
versal causality, which is the foundation of science. Moral
liberty may imply affirmations which transcend the domain
of science. It must not, however, come into conflict with
science in its own field. If we are to accept the doctrine of
I freedom at all it must be possible to define freedom and
I necessity in such a way that both may be held conjointly.
It will be of assistance to us, at this point, to recall the
decisive contrast in method which marks off from one another
Kant and his idealistic successors. The latter started from
the metaphysical side in order to construe the world of ex-
perience. Kant always sets out from the empirical side and
his metaphysics consists of a series of fundamental principles
intended to establish the laws of experience on a secure
foundation. The whole of the K. P. B. is orientated toward
the exact sciences. The phrase " the possibility of experi-
ence," of constant recurrence throughout the Kritik, means
nothing but the possibility of exact scientific knowledge.
What seem to the superficial reader mere metaphysical enti-
ties, leading an independent existence in the thin upper air
of speculation I mean the chorus of a prioris, with the
A CRITIQUE OF KANT'S ETHICS. 165
unity of self-consciousness as their Apollo at their head, turn
out on closer acquaintance to be the very Lares and Penates
of the scientific household, the familiar genii to which every
serious investigator pays homage on entering his study or
his laboratory. It would doubtless tend to facilitate the
understanding of Kant's thought and to strip it of the air of
foreignness which is produced by a somewhat pedantic termin-
ology, if the student would always bear in mind the concrete
scientific problems, with reference to which the discussions
in the Kritik are carried on, but which the author, as a rule,
does not distinctly mention, in order that the purely abstract
character of his argument may be preserved. Thus, for
instance, the transcendental aesthetics deals with the T and
S of mechanical physics, not with the psychological notions
of time and space, nor with their genesis. The chapter on
the Axioms of Intuition is concerned with the application of
pure mathematics in its complete precision to the objects of
experience. The Anticipation of Perception is concerned
with the fundamental principle that underlies the conception
and the measurement offeree. In the discussion of Causality
and of Reciprocity or Community it is Newton's laws of
motion which the argument keeps in view. 1 In the chapter
on the Postulates of Empirical Thinking we are invited to
clarify our thought with respect to the scope and limitations
of scientific hypotheses. Even when we pass beyond the
borders of the Analytic and discuss the ideas of the reason,
we have not escaped from the territory of the exact sciences.
The idea of God, for instance, in the K. P. E. is justified on
the ground of its scientific Usefulness. It is intended, though
capable of being charged later on with a richer meaning, to
promote the process of induction so that it may confidently
be pushed to its farthest possible limits. The ideas of the
homogeneity, the specification and the affinity of nature are
gathered together, as it were, in a kind of mental symbol,
with the ens realissimum, or God, as their substratum. We
are asked to look upon nature as if it were the work of a
rational being, not because we have the right to affirm the
existence of such a being, but that we may the better
succeed in discovering such rational connexions in nature
as actually subsist. We are asked to regard it as a coherent
whole in order that we may make our interpretation of it as
coherent as possible.
The T and S of mechanical physics, Newton's laws of
motion, the scope of scientific hypotheses, the assumptions
1 See Hermann Cohen's Katits Theorie der Er/ahrung.
166 FELIX ADLER :
that underlie the process of induction, these and such as
these, and the problems which they involve are the subjects
with which the K. P. R. is concerned. If Kant had entitled
his book "A Philosophical Inquiry into the Fundamental
Principles of the Exact Sciences," such a title would have
covered the positive side of the Kritik, and possibly might
have served to prevent much subsequent misinterpretation.
Kant let us hold fast to this one thought intends by
his entire system to account for the element of certainty in
experience. He distinguishes between knowledge, loosely
so called, and knowledge in the strict sense, between per-
ceptive judgments and judgments of experience or scientific
judgments. He asks, Whence the difference? Or, to put it
in another way, it is the distinction between the expectation
of future happenings, founded on previous association, and
the prediction of future happenings, founded on scientific
certainty, that constitutes the pivot on which the Kritik of
Pure Reason hinges. Does scientific prediction merely differ
in degree from that expectation which is encouraged by
habitual sequence? Is the difference one merely of degree?
Kant asserts that it is a difference in kind. There are n
prioris in a certain part of our knowledge, and this part he
calls experience. And what are these a prioris ? They are
the factors of certainty. The substitution of the term
' factors of certainty ' for the term a priori might be ;i
gain. The term a priori suggests independent existence
which Kant, far from asserting, constantly and strenuously
denies. It suggests a pretended insight into the aboriginal
constitution of the mind, into the germinal principles out
of which intelligence has developed. And this claim of
pretended insight, I take it, was equally foreign to Kant's
conception. At any rate, the validity of his theory of know-
ledge does not depend on the admittance of any such claim.
The term a priori suggests chronological antecedence and,
in this respect, it is particularly misleading. The Kantian
a priori is discovered not in its origin, but in its operation.
The a priori in the Kantian sense may be synchronous with
its product, may be born at the very moment when it yields
its first effect. If a new science were to arise, containing
some new element of certainty heretofore unmanifested, we
should be compelled to formulate a new variety of the
called a priori, and we should be justified by the spirit, if not
by the letter, of Kant's teachings in so. doing. The doctrine
of the a priori, often confused as it is with the doctrine of
innate ideas and of intuition, is reaUy as unlike these doctrin- 1 -
as it is possible to be. The thinker of the Kantian type does
A CRITIQUE OF KANT'S ETHICS. 167
not attempt to discover a mental content which is common
to the Fiji Islander and to Lord Kelvin, does not attempt to
acquaint us with an a priori which consoled the cave man in
his moments of meditation. Nor does he speak of truths
which are apprehended in a flash of intuition, apart from
experience. The thinker who follows along the Kantian
lines lies in wait, watching how the human mind behaves
when it exercises its powers. He observes how the mind
reveals itself in the exercise of its powers, and these moments
of self-revelation he fixes on his philosophic camera. He
watches to see what harvest of assured knowledge the soil of
the human mind produces under the rarest and most favour-
able conditions, and from this crop he makes his inference
as to the seed. But as to the origin of the seed itself, as to
how it came to be planted in the human mind, into such
questions as these he forbears to inquire, and the whole
question of genetic development he leaves to the psychologist
to deal with it as he may see fit.
I have said that Kant traverses the field of experience and
that wherever he finds an element of certainty he raises the
question as to the factor which produces it. And this brings
us back, after a somewhat lengthy but, I trust, not irrelevant
digression, to the subject in hand. In the realm of ethics,
too, he lights upon an element of certainty, namely, that
which is implied in the Categorical Imperative, in the idea
that there are lines of conduct which ought to be followed at
all times and by all persons. There is, indeed, a capital
difference between the certainties of science and those of
ethics. The former are verified in experience while the
latter are not capable of such verification. It cannot be
proved, Kant tells us, that a single human being has ever
obeyed the Categorical Imperative, that a single human being
has ever pursued the line of conduct which yet he must
admit to be universally binding. There is a gap between
assent and performance of which it cannot be shown that it
has been filled, even in a single instance. In ethics, there-
fore, we do not deal with any demonstrable lawfulness or
certainty of conduct, but with the idea of such certainty, of
such lawfulness, and it is the task of ethical philosophy, ac-
cording to Kant, to account for this idea.
To repeat what was said above " thou oughtest, therefore
thou canst," is the starting-point. To say 'thou canst' is
to assert practical freedom ; but practical freedom pre-
supposes transcendental freedom. To an examination of
the latter we shall now pass on. Transcendental freedom
is, putting the gist of Kant's thought into a single sentence,
168 FELIX ADLER:
the timeless origination of effects that appear in time. In
Observation 1543 (Kant's Reflexionen) we read : " Transcen-
dental freedom (of any substance whatsoever) is absolute
spontaneity in action. Practical freedom is the faculty of
\acting on the sole impetus of reason." Observation 1541 :
'.' Freedom is the independence of causality from the condi-
tions of space and time ". The causality of a thing regarded
as a thing per se. Observation 1533 : " Freedom is the
faculty of a cause to determine itself to action, untrammelled
by sense conditions ". Observation 1545 : " We cannot
demonstrate freedom a posteriori. . . . We cannot cognise the
possibility of freedom a priori, for the possibility of an original
ground of action, which is not determined by some other, is
wholly inconceivable. Hence, we cannot theoretically prove
k freedom at all, but only demonstrate it as a necessary practical
hypothesis." The gist of these quotations may be put as
follows : Transcendental freedom is the pure self-activity of
reason, or the application to one substance of a general notion
which, in the case of transcendental freedom, embraces all
substances. Freedom is inexplicable and inconceivable. We
cannot prove its actuality nor even its possibility. For, what
is meant by an act of spontaneous volition or by a substance
which, without any determining influence from beyond its
sphere, produces the motives upon which it acts we are incap-
able of understanding. The idea of freedom takes us outside
the phenomenal world into the region of things per se, or of
noumena. Freedom, be it distinctly noted, is vested in the
noumena. What is called psychological freedom is a trans-
parent piece of self-deception. Self-determinism, which has
sometimes been presented as a substitute for freedom,
namely, the fact that, after our character has been formed
by heredity, education, environment, in short, by the conflu-
ence of innumerable extraneous influences, we then act along
the lines of this, our character such self-determinism Kant
dismisses with a single word of infinite contempt. " The
freedom of a mechanical turn-spit " he calls it. No; genuine
freedom, he demands, self-activity of the reason a very
different thing from self-determinism the rational substance
in us, acting on its own motion, causing to emerge of its
own accord the commanding motives that ought to sway
our will. But this freedom, he tells us, occurs behind the
scenes. We have no consciousness of it, at least, not any
that we can build on. There is an actor in us who never
takes off his mask, who never appears on the stage, and of
whom, nevertheless, we are to assume that he exists because
of certain effects which he produces, from behind, or from
A CRITIQUE OF KANT'S ETHICS. 169
within ; in short, from the region of the unseen. This actor
is our noumenon. Freedom is vested in the noumenon ; our
freedom is in our noumenon.
But, in this connexion, it becomes indispensable to pause
and to consider to what we should be committing ourselves
if we were to go along with Kant in assuming noumena in
general and the noumenon of man in particular, more es-
pecially as the degree of reality which belongs to freedom
depends on the reality ascribed to the noumenon of which
freedom is a function. Now does Kant say that things per
se exist? Not at all. He says they must be assumed to
exist. The distinction is sharp. At first blush, it looks as
if, in contrast to phenomena, which convey merely the ap-
pearance of reality, the things per se were designed to satisfy
our craving for the ultimately real. The world of phenomena
is the world of seeming ; that of noumena the world of truth.
But, in a certain sense, the direct opposite is unquestionably
Kant's meaning. The world of phenomena is for us and,
of course, only for us the world of objective reality. By no
other means, according to Kant, can we attain to the know-
ledge of reality except by subjecting the data of sensation to
the synthetic processes of the understanding. Sense data,
thus synthesised, he calls objects. They exist. The solar
system exists. The fall of a stone is an actual occurrence.
The things per se do not exist. They are only assumed to
exist. According to Kant, the separate rings in the chain of
experience and the interconnexion of link with link, are real.
But the whole chain is not a reality. The notion that the
chain can be carried back endlessly, or that it is suspended
somewhere, from an aboriginal pier or support, does not corre-
spond to reality. Such a thing as a universe does not exist,
except only in idea.
If this be the case, if noumena do not exist, but are only
assumed to exist, what profit is there in assuming them ?
They have such value as belongs to concepts of limit.
Negatively, they serve to warn us that our interpretation of
things is not the only possible one, not the final one. We,
indeed, can know no other ; but we can know that there may
be, must be, others. With the sort of material to which we
are restricted, namely, the data of sensation, with the sort
of mental tools with which we must work, namely, the
synthetic processes of the understanding, Kant tells us we
may never hope to complete the chain of knowledge. Not
only have we not succeeded thus far, but, in the nature
of the case, the prospect of complete success is excluded.
But in addition, the noumena have certain positive values.
170 FELIX ADLEB :
They are " dukes of the marches," stationed on the frontier
of the kingdom of science to defend it against the incursions
of supernaturalism and to extend it without assignable limit,
under the stimulus of the idea of totality which, though
incapable of realisation, is indispensable as a provocative of
effort. And, in addition, there are two noumena, the
noumenon of God and the noumenon of man which, in the
field of morality and religion, acquire the highest kind of
positive, practical value, this value consisting in their being
the assumed centres of self-activity, the assumed fountain-
heads of that freedom which, in virtue of the Categorical
Imperative, according to Kant, we are compelled to postulate.
Does this ethical value make them any the more real ? If
we keep within the bounds of Kant's thought, I think we
must answer in the negative. We must assume that the
noumenon of man, for instance, the centre of his self-activity,
exists. We are bound to act as if it existed, but w r e do not
know that it exists, and we cannot say that it does exist, as
we say that light exists ; we cannot say that self-activity
operates, as we say that the forces of nature operate. >
So far off, so impalpable, so, in a certain sense, unreal is
this rational noumenon, so little does it enter into competition
with the things whereof we know. A high, subtle, abstract,
inconceivable, though not therefore unthinkable, somewhat !
We are bound to act as if it existed. This is the whole out-
come. Whatever certainty belongs to it is in the nature of
moral certainty. Whatever life-blood of reality it possesses
it borrows from its uses. It is not the ultimate reality. It
is an X that stands for the ultimately real. Yet, even to go
as far as this, even to admit the noumenon into our schema
of thought at all, as an indispensable auxiliary of moral effort,
we are obliged to show, unless our mental household is to
be hopelessly divided against itself, that self-activity and
mechanical causality can subsist together, that they do not
clash, that the order of nature and the order of freedom ma y
obtain in the self-same act.
Let us review, for a moment, the steps we have taken.
(Unconditional obligation, the one sure fact and the starting-
point. Practical freedom the inference. Transcendental
freedom, the presupposition of the latter. Freedom, wholly
ruled out as a matter of experience, lodged in the noumenon.
This noumenon, this, our transcendental substance, the
timeless originator of effects in time, incapable of being
proved to exist, but only assumed to do so. Yet the freedom
which is thus assumed, inconceivable and inexplicable as it
may be, must, at least, be shown to be not incompatible
A CRITIQUE OF KANT'S ETHICS. 171
with natural causality. To the task of showing this Kant
addresses himself in the famous chapter of the K. R. V.,
which, as has been said, should be taken in conjunction
with his statements in the Prolegomena, in the K. P. R.
and in the Reflexions. He is aware of the difficulties of his
task and wrestles painfully both with his thought and with
the expression of it. I myself do not believe that he has
succeeded in solving his problem ; but I have been chiefly
concerned, thus far, in my interpretation, to make clear the
auxiliary nature of his metaphysical concepts, and I trust I
have shown that they are quite devoid of that transcendent
or mystical meaning with which some believe them to be
fraught. In commenting on the subject which we now take
up, my principal concern, before I attempt to criticise at all,
will still be the same, to arrive at Kant's exact meaning as
far as possible, and to demonstrate that it is far less charged
with positive metaphysical affirmation than a cursory reading
might suggest.
Others have said : determinism or freedom. Kant says : t
determinism and freedom. The line of his argument is a I
straight and narrow way, as narrow as a razor's edge. It is
easy to miss his drift, as the example of famous expounders
sufficiently attests. And yet, we have here reached the
critical point of Kant's ethics, and should we fail to obtain
light here, we shall have to grope in darkness through all the
remainder of our journey. The key-thoughts which express
the terms on which the reconciliation between freedom and
necessity is attempted to be effected are the following :
(a) If the objects of nature were things per se there could
only be a single law applicable to them. Since they are
appearances there is room for a 'double law, the law of
natural causality applying to the appearances, and the law of
causality through freedom applying to the things to which
these appearances correspond.
(b) Freedom is the timeless origination of effects in time.
The cause is noumenal ; the effect phenomenal. This relation
is possible because causality is a dynamic relation, and the
cause may therefore differ in kind from the effect.
(c) The law of freedom is compatible with the law of
mechanical causality because freedom is a " cosmological
idea," that is to say, because the notion underlying it is the
same as that which underlies mechanical causality, only in
the former case expanded, magnified, raised to the power of
the infinite. The common notion is that of constancy and
necessity. In the case of phenomena, that which happens
constantly and necessarily namely, the invariable occurrence
172 FELIX ADLER :
of certain consequents after certain antecedents is condi-
tioned upon similar dependable relations existing between a
series of preceding antecedents and consequents. The mind,
however, unable to pursue this chase to the finish, fashions
for itself the idea of an unconditioned necessity and constancy,
that is, of something which happens always and necessarily,
just as it does happen, without respect to what precedes or
follows. And this is the notion of freedom as Kant entertains
it. The point of his argument on behalf of reconciliation is
that the idea of constancy and universality in general does
not contradict that of constancy and universality in a par-
ticular instance. Farther than this he does not attempt to
go. He warns us repeatedly that he does not undertake to
show how freedom and natural causation may be harmonised,
that he does not attempt to show that freedom is actual nor
yet to show how it is possible, but only that it is possible,
namely, in the sense that the notion of freedom, as of uncondi-
tioned necessity and constancy, does not contradict the notion
of conditioned necessity and constancy, but rather is an exten-
sion of the latter, the latter raised in idea to the power of
the infinite. To put the thought in different language, the
idea of freedom, while leaving the empirical nexus untouched,
superadds the missing logical link between antecedent and
consequent. The empirical nexus is a foot-bridge that spans
a river. Causality, through freedom, is the steel cable that
connects the banks and supports the frail structure that hangs
suspended from it. The idea of freedom is that of the complete
conditioning of what, in experience, is always incompletely
conditioned, and this idea is reached, not by a perfect regressus
from which we are precluded, but by our going outside of the
time series, being warranted in so doing by the dissimilarity
in kind that may subsist between a cause and its effect. (I
ought here to say, by way of caution, that Kant does not
attempt to efface the distinction between the order of nature
and the order of freedom, when he urges upon our attention
what is common to both, namely, the notion of constancy
and necessity in happenings. Unconditioned self-activity
and activity determined by antecedent conditions remain as
widely apart as ever. The two have not really been recon-
ciled. Still, if we admit the argument, they are shown to be
not irreconcilable. The same act which we know to be
determined, when w r e regard it as lying in the empirical
series, we may regard as free, when we consider it as the
effect of a deeper, under-working cause. And at this point,
it may be well to observe the closeness of connexion between
the Kritik of Practical Reason and the Kritik of Pure Reason.
A CRITIQUE OF KAN.T*S ETHICS. 173
The formula of the Categorical Imperative is but the appli-,
cation to conduct of the idea of necessity and universality,.!
that is, of freedom regarded as a cosmological idea.)
Let us now proceed to consider how these key-thoughts
are applied to the problem of the freedom of the human will.
First, a distinction is drawn between the empirical character
and the noumenal character. The former is wholly subject
to the law of natural necessity ; the latter is free. Every act
of ours, Kant tells us, is to be referred back for explanation
to antecedent conditions. All that part of any human act
which is explicable is thus to be explained. If we could
completely know the empirical character of a man at any
given moment, we should be able to predict all his future
actions with as much certainty as we predict an eclipse.
Language could not be more explicit than this. The law of
natural causality tolerates no exception, and our empirical
self, the only self we know, lies wholly within the province
of that law. Wherein, then, does freedom consist? In the
fact that our empirical self is but the phenomenon of the
noumenal self, in the fact that the whole series of our acts is
but the manifestation in time of a timeless choice. The
noumenon does not enter as an interloper between any ante-
cedent and its consequent. It is the profounder reality of
which the whole string of antecedents and consequents are
the external apparition.
Further amplification and elucidation, however, are needed.
What, we may ask, does Kant mean when he says that a
man's empirical character is the phenomenon of his particular
noumenon ? Empirically, the influences that contribute to
form us stretch back far beyond the limits of our individu-
ality. Sixteen grandparents, if we go back only a few
generations, and hosts of ancestors back of these, have
helped to mould us. Our origins are so ramified as speedily
to be lost to view in the general mass of humanity ; and
humanity itself, in its beginnings, extends backward into
the animal world. What, then, does Kant mean when he
says that my empirical character is the appearance of my
noumenon? The word ' character,' it seems to me, is to be
taken strictly. Only the character is the phenomenon of the
noumenon. And what is the character ? Briefly, the degree
of intensity with which the reason in me resists all those
influences upon me that are uncongenial with itself, the
degree of effort which the reason puts forth in affirming
itself. When Kant, therefore, declares that, if we knew a
man's empirical character at any moment, we could predict
all his future acts, he includes in the term ' character ' this
174 FELIX ABLER :
aboriginal set of the will. But, if this be so, why does he
assert that, nevertheless, every act of ours can be explained
in terms of its antecedents, seeing that the set of our will,
the degree of intensity with which the reason resists counter
influences and affirms itself is the operation in us of freedom
'and cannot be explained in terms of antecedent conditions.
The answer to this question is that the set of our will, the
degree to which we are estranged from or conform to reason,
is a wholly unknown quantity, is hidden even from ourselves.
Yes, indeed, we should be able to predict a man's future acts
if we knew his empirical character. But we never can know
his empirical character, at least, not that element in it which
stamps it as a character, which is the imprint on it of the
rational cause. What we know about other people and even
about ourselves is only the objective, outward side of morality,
the act, but never, with any degree of certainty, the motive.
Self-interest, concern for our reputation, the desire for in-
ternal peace may account even for those acts which seem the
most virtuous ; such as charity to the poor, self-sacrifice,
truthfulness, etc. Briefly, the morality of an act does not
lie within the range of experience. We may give ourselves
and others the benefit of the doubt and assume that they or
we have acted from a purely rational motive ; but we can
never be sure of the fact that they have or that we have.
Still less can we be sure of the degree of merit to which we
are entitled to lay claim. Our worth is proportional to the
degree of effort which the rational nature in us puts forth in
the attempt to affirm itself. But it is obvious that if the
counter influences, as in the case of the offspring of a dipso-
maniac, are great, even a sturdy effort of the rational nature
may produce but meagre objective results ; while, on the
other hand, if the influences from without are propitious,
as in the case of the gently born, even a feeble effort may
produce outwardly fair results. The degree of merit, how-
ever, is proportioned, not to the result, but to the effort, and
this, even in our own case, we cannot estimate.
Of the Imperative alone "thou oughtest " are we sure,
and of the idea of freedom involved in it. Actual freedom
is an inference, a postulate. But if the freely operating
cause be thus inaccessible and if, at the same time, unlike
the noumena of phenomena in general, it is represented as
a cause which has intercourse with the phenomenal world,
and which injects its influence into the latter, how are we
to represent to ourselves this connexion between tw r o orders
of existence so entirely disparate? I think we shall best
comprehend Kant's language if we assume that what he
A CRITIQUE OF KANT'S ETHICS. 175
says on this subject is to be understood symbolically. A
symbol, in the sense in which Kant employs the term, is a
noumenon represented for the nonce as if it were clothed
with phenomenal attributes. We know that the garments
do not fit. We do not assert that any such being as we have
dressed up actually exists. But we require the help of such
a figment because it stands for or symbolises an ultimate
truth, which we need to keep before the mind, and of which
we cannot in any other way lay hold. Thus, for instance, i
the conception of God. as Kant employs it, is symbolic. '
He does not say that God exists. On the contrary, he has
taken the utmost pains to destroy the proofs of his existence.
Nor is his re-introduction of the idea of God a glaring self-
contradiction, as it is often represented to be. He does not
say that God exists. He tells us that we are to think andj
to act as if such a being existed, for practical purposes.
He has draped the noumenon in phenomenal attributes.
And in the same way, I believe, in the chief passages that
relate to the subject which we are now considering, he
has invested the noumenon of freedom with phenomenal
attributes, with garments that do not fit, with attributes
that really contradict its nature. He asks us to pass over
the contradiction, to look upon the thing as if it were what
he describes it to be, to treat it as the symbol of what we
cannot, in its own essence, grasp, in order that we may be
able to keep before our minds the fact that there is such a
noumenon. Thus, for instance, he represents a rational,
timeless cause as acting. But how can we speak of action
at all which does not occur in time ? What sense can we
connect with the words " timeless action " ? Never mind,
says Kant, we are dealing with a symbol. A noumenon is
treated ad hoc as if it were a phenomenon. Again, a rational
cause, one which is determined solely from within, never-
theless elects in a timeless choice to assert its rational nature
imperfectly. The lapses of our empirical character are
represented as due to a noumenal flaw. But how can there
be such a flaw? Since reason, ex hypothesi is not determined
by anything outside itself but solely by itself, how can it
give effect to its nature otherwise than in a perfectly adequate
manner? Once more, " Never mind ". We are investing a
noumenon with phenomenal attributes. We speak of it with
a proviso " as if ". It is only on the assumption of the symbolic
significance of those statements of Kant which relate to the
commerce of the noumenon of freedom with the phenomenon
that his theory can be properly articulated, and the various
parts of it so disposed as to avoid clashing with each other.
176 FELIX ABLER:
I have devoted so much of my time to exposition as to
leave little room for criticism. But as, in that part of this
paper which is devoted to the theory of freedom, my main
object has been exposition, I shall not regret this circum-
stance and shall state my points of criticism very briefly.
They are of two kinds : practical and metaphysical. The
attempt to formulate at all or to represent, even in symbolic
fashion, the relation of the supersensible to the sensible
world is ever fraught with grave moral perils. There are two
alternative positions between which those who undertake
such attempts are sure to oscillate, two horns of a dilemma
on either one or the other of which they are certain to be
impaled. Either the phenomenal is noumenalised, or the
nournenal is phenomenalised ; either the relative, the human,
is invested with an absolute character and thus acquires a
degree of rigidity which deprives it of life, or the absolute is
degraded to the level of the relative and thus loses its abso-
lute character. A result of this nature has attended Kant's
undertaking. He tells us that the empirical character is
but the unfolding in time of a noumenal choice, taken outside
the realm of time. If this be so, then it follows that the
hope of moral regeneration is cut off and on the most obvious
grounds of practical morality we must protest. To say that
the empirical character is merely the apparition of the nou-
menal is tantamount to saying that w r e cannot really become
different than we have been, that we can only, as circum-
stances favour or inhibit, bring to light that moral self in us
which has been and is and will ever be the same. But this
is to deny our dearest moral hope. From the standpoint
of practical morality, we are bound, on the contrary, to say
that we can always transcend our former selves, that we can
; really become different beings, that our choice is not beyond
! recall, that a new choice is open to us every day and every
hour. The following alternative, it seems to me, so far as
Kant is concerned, is not to be evaded. Either he must
make the character a rigid thing and introduce noumenal
inflexibility into the empirical will ; or, if he were to admit
the possibility of genuine moral change, he would be con-
strained to introduce change into the noumenon itself and
thus abolish its noumenal character.
The other class of objections are metaphysical.
In the first place, let us state the objections that lie against
the Kantian deduction of the possibility of freedom. Admitting
that natural causality applies only to phenomena, it follows
that another kind of causality, operating over and above or
outside of the time series, is thinkable. Thus far we must, I
A CRITIQUE OF KANT'S ETHICS. 177
think, assent to Kant's argument. We are bound to remember
that the temporal series of antecedents and consequents is
a fragment incapable of being extended so as to touch a
starting-point or to merge into a final end. Natural and
libertarian causality are contradictory only on the assumption
that a past eternity has actually elapsed, that the whole
series of natural causes exists objectively, independently of
our subjective ability to siirvey it, that it lies like some silent
world which has never been visited, like the Pole which has
not been reached, but of which we know, all the same, that
it is objectively existent. If the whole series of antecedents
be supposed to exist in this fashion, ready to appear to an
intelligence capable of winging its flight so far, then, indeed,
natural causality precludes any other kind of causality, then
determinism swallows up liberty, and the problem of freedom
cannot even be raised. But if we distinguish between the
infinite expansion of possible experience and the possibility of
an infinite experience, as Kant does, then the law of natural
causality is merely a provisional device for the arrangement
of phenomena with a view to our subjective mastery of
them, a device which does not yield final truth and does not
exclude recourse to other modes of interpretation, if, for valid
reasons, we find ourselves called upon to resort to them.
To this extent, then, I should agree with Kant. But he
takes a further step, and here my agreement with him ceases.
We may think of the noumenon, he says, as that unknown
X which lies behind the screen of phenomena, a mere ideal
point to which attaches our logical demand for totality. We
may also think of it, he goes on to say, as a cause which
produces effects in the time series, and which has relations
to and commerce with a certain particular class of pheno-
mena. The noumenon in the first sense is the noumenon
of the world in general. The noumenon in the second sense
is our human noumenon, that which corresponds to and
serves as a point of attachment for the idea of a unified or
moral personality. It is this notion of intercourse between
two wholly disparate orders of existence that creates all the
difficulties, the insuperable difficulties, with which his doctrine
of freedom is embarrassed.
The metaphysical objections are these. There are two
factors to the combined use of which the human mind is
unalterably committed by its very constitution. The one a
manifold of some kind, as a datum ; the other the synthetic
process in some one of its various modes. Within the field
of experience Kant realises that these two factors are in-
separable, that unity is meaningless unless it be the unity of
12
178 FELIX ABLER :
a manifold of some sort. Outside of the field of experience
he seeks to cut the cord which connects these Siamese twins,
to break the contract by which these two mutually dependent
correlatives, these everlasting partners are associated, and to
establish a synthesis in vacuo, to treat the rational factor
which contributes the element of unity to experience as if it
were capable not only of existing by itself, but of becoming
the cause of effects. This attempt to set off by itself one of
a brace of correlatives, to cut with one of a pair of shears,
seems to me the capital metaphysical error.
A second error seems to lie in the assumption, which
is fundamental to Kant's argument, that effect and cause
need not be the same in kind, causality merely implying
dependence, and not involving an intrinsic connexion. Now
it is true that the effect is never wholly identical with the
cause but, in some respects, differs from it, else it would be
impossible, even in thought, to hold the two apart. And
yet, not only is there, despite the difference, a fundamental
identity, a common substance necessarily presumed to under-
lie all changes, but the changes themselves must be reducible
to a common denominator, as when the physicist attempts to
explain all the manifestations of energy in Nature as modes
of motion. Nor can we establish a firm connexion between
effects and causes until we have satisfied both requirements ;
until we have found or assumed an unchanging somewhat
that underlies the change, and have discovered a common
process of which all the changes may be explained as
variations. Now, it is evident that, while Kant may be
admitted to have proved the possible identity of substance,
as between noumenon and phenomenon, he has not shown the
common process of which the phenomenal and noumenal
happenings are the modes, and, in default of such a demon-
stration, it is not legitimate to refer phenomenal effects to
noumenal causes. Such differences as may properly be
allowed to exist between effect and cause are differences
within the same order, not differences between one order
and a wholly different order. Moreover, the statement of
Kant that causality implies merely dependence and not
intrinsic connexion, shows that he transfers what is only
true of phenomena to noumena. In the case of the former,
precisely because they are only phenomena, we must rest
content with a merely extrinsic nexus. But a noumenal
cause is one the very assumption of which implies an attempt
to satisfy our logical demand for a complete account of the
relation between cause and effect, and a complete account
must show the intrinsic bond between the two.
A CRITIQUE OF KANT'S ETHICS. 179
At this point, and before passing to other parts of my
subject, I may perhaps attempt to indicate succinctly my
own attitude toward the question of freedom, as I have been
requested to do. The problem of moral spontaneity or free
will seems to me to be only a special case of the problem of
mental spontaneity. Is it true that the mind can act
spontaneously? Is it true that it can react in an original
way on the data of sensation presented to it ? When the
key of sensation is thrust into our mental lock is there a bolt
shot that holds fast experience and prevents the treasures we
gather from being scattered to the winds ? Does there occur
an act of unification ? If so, then this act of unification is
an act of mental spontaneity strictly speaking, itself not
explicable in terms of that manifold, of the coherence of
which it is the prior condition. Thus, in a certain sense, we
are justified, instead of narrowing the territory of freedom,
rather to extend it, instead of wondering and doubting
whether we can vindicate the existence of freedom in one
aspect of our mental life, rather to wonder at the suggestion
that there should not be freedom in the mental life as seen
from one particular point of view, since freedom, spontaneity,
is the characteristic of our mental life from every point of
view. I do not say, of course, that we can explain this
fundamental act of unity in any of its manifestations. I
only claim that it is not more inexplicable in that aspect of
the mental life which we call volition than in any other.
The fundamental question is : how the one and the many
can embrace, how it comes to pass that all that is highest
in us, our science, our art, our ethics, should be the offspring
of this marriage of two such alien opposites as the one and
the manifold. And to this question there is no answer. We
are so constituted. As a matter of fact, truth, beauty, and
goodness are the children of this pair who are for ever fleeing
and for ever seeking each other, for ever clamoring to be
divorced on the ground of radical incompatibility, and for ever
unable to endure the absence of each other's society. How
there can be mental spontaneity is the insoluble problem,
soluble only in a practical way, namely, by the assurance that
there is. Every time a mathematician conceives the notion
of uniform space, or a physicist the notion of uniform time, he
performs an act of mental freedom. Every time we mark
off a set of relatively constant processes and regard them
collectively, i.e. from the point of view of unity, as an object
or a thing, we are performing an act of mental freedom.
The chain of causes and effects, of antecedents and con-
sequents, a chain which hangs loose in air at both ends,
180 FELIX ABLER:
nevertheless, so far as link is interlocked with link, is a
product of our mental freedom. Natural causation itself,
which seems to fetter us as if we were slaves, is a fetter
which we ourselves have forged in the workshop of mental
freedom. The world, so far as we can speak of a world
and we can only speak of it by a species of poetic licence ;
Nature, or this fragment of Nature of which we have know-
ledge, which we have made in our own mental image, or, at
least, stamped with our mental image, which, in this sense,
we have not merely reproduced but created, Nature, I say,
with all the causality that obtains in it, is the evidence and
the witness of our mental freedom.
And yet, of course, there is a distinction between moral
and mental freedom. Though the fetter be forged by our own
hands, it binds us none the less securely. And the problem,
as it seems to me, is really this : not how freedom is possible,
for the answer to that question simply is, it is possible in-
asmuch as it is actual, but how is one kind of freedom
consistent with another kind, the kind of spontaneity which
we mean when we think of volition, with that kind of freedom
which operates in constructive science? And what is the
distinction between these two? Briefly, to my mind, the
distinction is this. The act of unification, which is involved
in science, is a synthesis of causes. The act of unification,
involved in ethics, is a synthesis of ends. The face of
science is turned backward. It seeks to explain the present
in terms of the past. The face of ethics is turned forward.
It seeks to determine the present with reference to results
to be attained in the future. Or, to go a step farther,
the ultimate distinction between science and ethics is it
not this ? The manifold with which science deals, which it
is its business to unify, is given in sensation, in experience.
The manifold with which ethics deals is not given, not sup-
plied at all from without, but is a purely ideal manifold.
Granted that, being so made as we are, the union of the one
and the many is the burden of every song we sing, is the theme
of that intellectual music in obedience to the strains of which
our world, the little world we inhabit, is built up, granted
that this is so, we find that in the field of science our liberty
is restricted by the circumstance that the manifold, which it
is of the essence of our intelligence to seek to unify, is forced
upon us, as an unalterable datum, to which we must ac-
commodate ourselves in order to master it, and which yet
we can never wholly master because of the irrational residuum
which remains in it, despite our utmost efforts to rationalise
it, because it is, in the ultimate analysis, intractable and
A CRITIQUE OF KANT'S ETHICS. 181
uncongenial to our intelligences. And therefore, aiming at a
highest manifestation of our constructive liberty, seeking an
utterly free field for the achievement of rational synthesis,
we figure to ourselves the idea of a manifold which shall be
wholly tractable, of such differentia in which shall wholly be
expressed the underlying unity, of such unity as shall wholly
embrace and absorb in itself the opposing plurality. And
it is by this means, by freeing the notion of the manifold
from the restricting conditions to which as a datum ab extra
it is subjected, by transcending the bounds of experience
and taking the notion of the manifold in an unlimited
sense, as 'manifold in general,' by conceiving the two an-
tipodal poles between which our intellectual life plays, as
ideally harmonised, it is by such means that we arrive at
the organic ideal, or the ethical ideal. For the two are
identical. The organic ideal is that of an infinite system of
correlated parts, each of which is necessary to express the
meaning of the whole, and in each of which the whole is
present as an abiding and controlling force. The ethical
ideal is produced by applying this purely spiritual conception
of an infinite organism to human society. To act as if my
fellow-beings and as if I myself were members of such an
infinite system in which the manifold and the one are wholly
reconciled is to act morally. So act, not as if the rule of thy
action were to become a universal law for all rational beings
(for I shall presently endeavour to show that this is impos-
sible) but so act that through thine action the ideal of an
infinite spiritual organism may become more and more potent
and real, in thine own life and in that of all thy fellow-beings.
And how is this ethical kind of freedom compatible with
the other kind which expresses itself in forging the chain of
natural causality? The two are compatible only, because
they refer to totally different sides of the same act. Natural
causality deals with the manifold that is given. It seeks to
piece together the parts of it as they appear in the time series,
to relate each successor to its predecessor. Moral causality
deals with a manifold that is not given. It signifies the
force in us of an idea, namely, of the idea of a final recon-
ciliation of Unity and Plurality, whereof experience presents
no example, and which, nevertheless, in consequence of the
inborn desire to harmonise the two conflicting tendencies
of our nature, we are compelled to propose to ourselves
as our highest end. Moral causality leaves natural caus-
ality intact in its own sphere and uses it. Natural causality
may be compared to the shuttle that runs backward and
forward weaving, according to unalterable mechanical laws,
182 FELIX ABLER :
the web and woof of existence. Moral causality, our ' best
card' in more senses than one, may be compared to the
pattern in accord with which the web is to be woven.
(Technically speaking, the fatal error that vitiates Kant's
transcendental dialectic is to be found in the proposition
that the idea of the unconditioned arises solely a tergo.
Any existing thing whatsoever being conditioned, he says,
necessarily presupposes the idea of a preceding sum of
conditions adequate to account for its existence, or the idea
of an unconditioned. But we are not equally constrained,
he maintains, to look beyond the present and to think of
the multitudinous consequences of that which now is as
converging toward a future unconditioned. So far as we
are mere spectators of the show, inquisitive of causes, this
is true. But, inasmuch as we are also actors, and since
each end of action that we propose to ourselves has only
relative significance, w r e are forced, would we satisfy the
demand for unity in the choice of ends, to push forward in
anticipation toward some ultimate end to which all our
minor ends may be related as means. The unconditioned
of the future, therefore, necessarily arises for us in the field
of conduct or of ethics, and the idea of the complete merging
into one another of the manifold and the one appears to
me, if not the absolute end, the highest and clearest repre-
sentative symbol of it to which we are capable of attaining.)
Having thus, in bare outline, indicated my acceptance of
the doctrine of freedom on other than Kantian grounds and
with a meaning assigned to it different from his, let me now
pass on to other points of criticism. The connexion between
the Kritik of Pure Reason and that of the Practical Reason is
. close and must ever be borne in mind. Kant is the philo-
isophical exponent and champion of the universal reign of
law. Throughout the Kritik it is his aim to fortify our
confidence in the validity of natural laws. To this end, he
demonstrates the existence in the mind itself of the types of
which these laws are the replicas. He discovers in the mind
itself the philosopher's stone which transmutes associations
into laws. By what right do we speak of physical laws at
all ? he asks. What is the law-creating element which gives
to these so-called laws their lawful character? These are
the questions which in the Kritik he puts. And the various
forms of the synthetic process furnish the answers to them.
Kant is the philosopher of physical law. His metaphysical
concepts are intended to buttress and support the throne of
physical law. And as to his fundamental ethical principle,
this again turns out to be nothing more than the disem-
A CRITIQUE OF KANl's ETHICS. 183
bodied ghost of physical law, just the sheer idea of absolute
lawfulness applied to conduct, just the bare notion of necessity
and universality in action, without regard to the content of
the act. There is no sunlight in Kant's moral world. All
moral acts in themselves considered are as dead and cold
as the satellite that revolves around our earth, and the
light of universality and necessity, with which they shine, is
reflected and comes to them from an unseen luminary lying
beyond our horizon. Now, in replying to this view, let it be
remembered that the notion of necessity and universality, in
the Kritik of Pure Reason, is always presented as the con-
comitant of the synthetic processes. Something occurs in
consciousness, namely, the synthetic process in one of its
various forms, and, in virtue of the constitution of our minds,
we realise that this process, this act of unification, is neces-
sary and universally valid for ourselves and for all rational
beings like ourselves. Something happens which we recog-
nise as necessary. But in the Kritik of the Practical Reason
necessity and universality, these concomitants of something
else, are represented as if an independent authority belonged
to them, as if they were cogent in their own right. This
is not and cannot be the case. And here we light upon
the flaw in Kant's ethical principle. Here we see why his
ethics is so unconvincing. It is, I repeat, because that
which is cogent only as the concomitant of something else
is represented by him as if it were cogent on its own ac-
count. I do not admit, as is often asserted, that it is the
formal character of Kant's ethical principle that makes it ^
unsatisfying. The principle of causality, too, is a purely
formal one, and yet it is fruitful and convincing enough.
Kather is it the failure of Kant to point out, as underlying
ethics, some specific, synthetic process capable of being ap-
prehended by us as necessary and universal that makes his
ethics sterile. It is a ghost, the ghost of natural law, which
we are asked to accept as the oracle of conduct. Kant's
Categorical Imperative comes to us with the impact of a blow
on the head. "Thou shalt." Why? We are forbidden
even to ask that question. One is sometimes tempted to
think that the spirit of the Prussian Army, as it was handled
in the days of Frederick the Great, Kant's contemporary, has
entered, in the shape of the Categorical Imperative, into the do-
main of philosophy, that the Imperative of the metaphysician
is a kind of echo of the commands of the corporal. But, if
we take heart, nevertheless, and reflect upon the way we are
thus bidden to act, if we imagine a state of human society
in which every man would be a perfect moral agent, accord-
184 FELIX ABLER :
ing to Kant's formula, i.e., a state of society in which every act
of every human being would have the character of necessity
and universality, and then ask ourselves whether such a state
of society would really represent to us the perfect moral
order; whether we should be able to dwell upon it with
satisfaction, I think the answer would be in the negative.
Suppose the goal, as Kant conceives of it, to have been
reached ; but what has been gained ? Suppose that every
word spoken and every deed done is determined by this ab-
stract idea of universality and necessity. Suppose that men
act with the precision of conscious automata. But in what
respect would the moral order thus painfully established if
ever it could be be superior to the physical order? The
inhalation and exhalation of breath, the discharge of the
basest animal functions, the fall of a stone, are marked by
the same universality and necessity. Consciousness, indeed,
would be superadded. The machine would be aware of the
turning of its wheels. But this, considered as the net out-
come of "the travailing and the groaning," is hardly an
inspiring outlook. And moreover, even this result, the per-
fect automatism plus consciousness, could only be attained in
the last days, at the end of evolution, in the far distant future.
While, in the long interval, the consciousness which is
superadded would be distinctly a disturbing factor inhibiting
instincts which might have been surer guides, confusing and
often baffling our decisions. Kant's ethics is a species of
physics. His moral law is natural law dipped in the bath
of consciousness. The fundamental flaw is that he repre-
sents the joint notion of necessity and of universality, which
is cogent only as the accompaniment of the synthetic process,
as if cogent on its own account.
The next point of criticism is that Kant's conception of
morality is projected so far into the empyrean that there
seems to be no bridge by which it can be connected with the
actual sublunary world. According to Kant, a moral act is
one which is performed exclusively out of respect for the
idea of necessity and universality. Now, as he admits, it
cannot be proved that tmch an act has ever been performed,
and hence it follows that the existence anywhere of moral
beings becomes doubtful. For what is a moral being ? Shall
we say a being capable of moral acts, capable only, without
our having adequate reason to think that this capacity has
ever expressed itself? Kant doubtless would say that a
moral being is one who acknowledges the obligation to act
morally, whether he does so or not, one who recognises in
himself the sort of constraint whicL .is due to the working.
A CEITIQUE OF KANT's ETHICS. 185
as he would explain, of the idea of universality and necessity.
But have we any ground for supposing that the preponderant
majority of men are even faintly moved by this idea of uni-
versality and necessity, that they stand inwardly in awe and
reverence before it, or that they feel the obligation of purging
the springs of their conduct of every other motive except
that of respect for necessity and universality ? And if we
have no ground for supposing this, then, also, have we no
ground for regarding the preponderant majority of mankind
as moral beings. We cannot even be sure that we ourselves,
who walk on the upper levels of abstract thinking, are moral
beings ! And hence the moral law falls to the ground because
there is no one of whom we can be sure that he applies it,
and no one to whom with certainty it can be applied.
Plainly, we are bound to act morally only toward other
moral beings. If, nevertheless, it is urged once more that
though freedom be absent the idea of freedom is present in
every human being, even in the most humble and the most
debased, I must again reply that the idea of freedom, as Kant
interprets it, is surely not present in the minds of the ignorant
or of the vicious. And, if we are to continue to regard every
one who wears the human form as a moral being, and as
one toward whom we are bound to behave morally, it must
be on other grounds than those with which Kant supplies us.
The next objection is that the practical moral commands
are incapable of being derived from the Kantian formula.
It is a matter of surprise that this difficulty has not more
clearly forced itself on the attention of the many thinkers
who have trodden in Kant's footsteps. The duties which all
recognise as moral cannot be derived from the bare idea of
lawfulness. There is a fallacy involved in Kant's reasoning,
there is a false assumption underlying it. To show what
this is, let us take up his own examples of the moral commands
or duties and observe the method by which he endeavours
to deduce them from his formula. All that is requisite, he
tells us, in order to decide in a given case whether a contem-
plated act is moral or not, is in thought to universalise it,
that is, to suppose that all men should act in the same way.
If, on this hypothesis, it is still consistent to act in this
manner, then the act is moral. Self-consistency, on the;
basis of universality, is the test. For instance, in the case
of veracity. A man hesitates whether it is morally right or
wrong to tell a lie. Let him assume that all men should
make it their rule in their communications with their fellows
to speak, not the truth, but the opposite of it. Under such
circumstances, would not the entire advantage of lying dis-
186 FELIX ADLER :
appear ? Would it be consistent for a man, that is, consistent
with the object which he hopes to gain, to prevaricate ? A
man lies, says Kant, on the assumption that others, that the
world at large will stick to the truth. If every one else
should lie, what profit would there be for him in doing so ?
The same holds good, he tells us, with regard to theft. A
man may fail to respect the property of others so long as he
expects that they will be good-natured enough to respect his
own. If stealing were to become general what would it profit
any one to steal? The same, again, applies to the duty of
charity. A man may refuse to aid a fellow-being in distress,
but he cannot desire that it shall become the accepted rule to
leave the sick, the starving, the indigent to their fate. He
can easily enough realise that a time may come when he will
be dependent on the good offices of others, and that the rule
which he had sanctioned in the day of his strength would seem
wicked enough to him in the day of his weakness. It is hardly
necessary to observe that it is not the gospel of enlightened
self-interest that Kant teaches. He uses self-interest not as
a motive but as a criterion. That which would be to our
interest, if one and the same rule of action were adopted by
all, whether actually it be adopted by them or not, that is
moral. But what an absurdly short cut is this toward solving
the most intricate and complex of all practical questions,
the question, what is right ? what is obligatory ? what is my
duty ? Contrasted with the sublime flight which he takes
into the region of the noumenal in order to obtain his first
principle, this device to which he resorts for obtaining the
laws of the noumenal as they reflect themselves in the world
of phenomena, I must say, seems to me a veritable anti-
climax. We can explain it perhaps by calling to mind that
Kant devoted the major part of his life to the investigation
of physical laws and of the fundamental principles that
underlie them, and that he gave to ethics, not intentionally
but actually, the crumbs that fell from the table of physics,
the remnant of the strength of his declining years. But let
us see wherein consists the false assumption implied in his
method.
To take up first the case of theft. If stealing were to be-
come general, Kant says, it would be absurd to steal. The
one who despoils another does so in the hope- of keeping as
his property what he seizes. If property rights were not
respected at all, the thief might as well dip his hand into
the sea, with a view of grasping and keeping a part of it, as
into his neighbour's pocket. The fallacy underlying this
reasoning is the assumption tKat, if all men were minded to
A CRITIQUE OF KANT'S ETHICS. 187
take away the possessions of others, they would all be equally
able to do so, the assumption that all men are equal, if not
completely, yet to all practical intents and purposes. And
this assumption he shares with the leading thinkers of the
latter part of the eighteenth century. It was the same un-
demonstrable hypothesis that underlay the doctrines of the
Laissez-faire School in economics ; the same hypothesis, blindly
accepted, that inspired the political reasonings of Kousseau,
that expressed itself in the French declaration of the rights
of man, and in the American Declaration of Independence,
the assumption, namely, that all men are born equal. Strange
as this view appears to us, we can very well understand
how it arose as a reaction against the artificial inequalities
which the feudal system had introduced in European society.
It was natural for those who rebelled against those artificial
inequalities to go to the opposite extreme of supposing that
all inequalities between man and man are artificial in their
origin, and that if the prevalent hierarchical system of caste
could be swept away and men be revealed in their true
nature, as they come from the hands of the Creator, it would
be found that no inequalities existed between them, at least,
none that might not be regarded as negligible. It is this
doctrinaire assumption of eighteenth century speculation
that we find involved in Kant's attempted deduction of the
practical moral commands from the idea of abstract lawful-
ness. If all men were really equal, then their intent to rob
each other of their possessions would mean their ability to
do so. But, supposing merely the intent without the ability,
then the general acceptance of the rule of stealing would not
make it inconsistent for the strong and unscrupulous to defy
the weak, and to rest securely in their unhallowed gains, in
the midst of universal lawlessness.
The derivation of the rule of charity is open to precisely
the same criticism. Kant, in this connexion, goes into some
details. The duty of assisting the needy is not based on the
egotistic expectation of a possible quid pro quo. It is not a
rule of do ut des. We are not advised to throw our bread
upon the waters in the hope that it may return to us after
many days. " For a man. conceivably," says Kant, " may
be so misanthropic and sour in temper as to be quite willing
to enter into a contract that no one shall ever help him if he
can but have the satisfaction of withholding assistance from
those who importune him for it." "But," he continues,
" even such a misanthropist, pleased as he might be for his
own part to escape from the claims of benevolence, could not
as an impartial observer contemplate with approbation a state
188 FELIX ADLEE :
of society in which the rule were general, that no one shall act
benevolently toward another." It would be against reason
to approve of such a rule. The argument of Kant derives its
force from the supposition that all men are equally dependent
on one another, but it quite misses fire if, as is actually
the case, this dependence obtains in highly unequal degrees.
It would not be inconsistent, e.g., for the miser who has
purchased a large annuity, or has invested in safe securities,
to refuse to give alms, trusting to the extreme improbability
that he himself shall ever be in want.
The next example is that of truthfulness and falsehood.
And here, again, I can see no reason why the rule of pre-
varication should be self-defeating, in case falsehood were to
become general. Let us consider for a moment how such a
plan would work. In the first place, there would be one
element of certainty upon which we could always rely.
Everything that a man said to us would be sure not to be
true. There is a sphere in which this state of things is said
to a considerable extent to have prevailed, until recent times,
the sphere of diplomacy. Was it, then, inconsistent for
a diplomatist to follow Talleyrand's maxim that language
is given us for the purpose of concealing our thoughts,
because he knew that his fellow-diplomatists would treat
him in like fashion ? By no means, for the obvious reason
that not all men are equally skilled in concealing their
thoughts. And even if this were not so, the difference in
psychological penetration and in ability to interpret the
signs, apart from language, by which facts may be ascer-
tained would still make it possible for the crafty liar to attain
his end at the expense of his more bungling competitor.
I do not, of course, imply that the spectacle afforded by
human society, if lying, theft, etc., were to become the
general practice, would be a pleasant one to contemplate.
Nor do I gainsay that even the partial acceptance of the
moral rules greatly enhances the commodity of human exis-
tence. What I deny is that it would not be consistent for
the stronger and the more crafty to pursue their selfish ends
without scruple if all others iried to do the same.
Finally, a word in this connexion in regard to the grounds
on which Kant bases the prohibition of suicide. Self-love,
or the desire for happiness, he says, is a means to an end,
namely, the preservation and enhancement of life. It would
be inconsistent, he thinks, if the same principle which is
designed for the enhancement of life should lead to the
destruction of it. This argument is so far-fetched and so
unreal that one is at first at a loss to decide in what sense
A CRITIQUE OF KANT'S ETHICS. 189
Kant wishes it to be understood. Does he mean that Nature
has implanted in man self-love, or the desire for pleasure,
for the ulterior purpose of preserving and enhancing life,
pleasure being the bait, and life the end, and that the act of
suicide would therefore exhibit Nature to the extent that she
is manifested in man, as at variance with herself, the desire
for pleasure producing the very opposite effect of that which
it was intended to subserve? If this be Kant's meaning,
then we must say that the inconsistency, if any such there
be, is Nature's and not man's ; that, like a bungling workman,
she has failed properly to adjust her means to her ends ;
that, as a matter of fact, the bait is not seductive enough to
produce the desired result. And why should man be held
responsible for Nature's failure? But if Kant means that it
is inconsistent for man, from motives of self-love, to end his
life, since self-love is the force which prompts him to support
life, then the answer is that this may be true of self-love in
the instinctive stage, but that it is not true when self-love
has reached the stage of reflexion. The latter (reflective
self-love) does not seek pleasure in order that there may be
life, but desires life in order that there may be the experience
of pleasure. Life is the means, and pleasure the end, and
not conversely. And, when the means cease to be adequate
to the end, when life, instead of yielding a harvest of joy,
produces only an evil crop of pain, -it is not inconsistent, but
highly consistent, on grounds of mere self-love to terminate
life.
Let us now briefly summarise the outcome of the preceding
discussion. Kant's position is this. Would you know what
is a moral act? Take any action whatsoever. Ideally
universalise it. That is to say, imagine that all men acted >
in such a manner. Then if, under this hypothesis, the act is '
self-consistent, i.e., if it does not defeat its own purpose, it is
a moral act. The reason why this deduction breaks down
is because it is based on the error that the same rule of
action, adopted by all men, would lead in each case to the
same result. In consequence of the innumerable gradations
of strength and intelligence that subsist among men, this is
not the case. And hence the test of self-consistency fails.
There are two functions which remain to be performed by
the critic if he would grasp the root from which the Kantian
ethics springs, and comprehend the fruit it bears. One of these
is an examination of the Kantian teleology, of the meaning!
he attaches to the notion of an ' end,' and of the illegitimate
use, as I think, which he makes of this notion. This inquiry
is of the utmost importance because Kant, while vigorously
190 FELIX ADLEE :
excluding the pursuit of our own personal happiness as a
moral end, enjoins it upon us as a moral duty to promote
the happiness of others. It is evident that he is compelled to
take this step if his moral system is to be relieved of its aspect
of frowning austerity, and is to acquire warmth of colour and
richness of content. We must, according to him, repress
the desire for happiness in ourselves. We must take our
cue from the voice that echoes through empty infinities.
Not even the Decalogue, as a set of specific commands, but,
as it were, the tone of thunder in which it was promulgated
is to be the incentive of our personal morality, and yet we
must be permitted to take an interest in the happiness of
others, if our philanthropic impulses are not to be wholly
thwarted. A merely negative morality, one which respects
and forbears to infringe upon the precincts of the personality
of others, is not enough. We must be enabled to positively
further their development, and to assist them in the at-
tainment of their ends. Philanthropy demands as much.
And Kant was a thorough-going philanthropist. Strangely
enough, his extreme rationalism seems to have been but
the obverse side of a profound susceptibility to feeling, so
profound, indeed, that perhaps he felt all the more the
need of curbing it, a susceptibility which helps to explain
the sympathy he felt for a sentimentalist like Rousseau,
despite the metaphysical differences that separated them.
Kant felt the necessity of introducing the happiness of
others as an aim in order to people the moral edifice which
otherwise might have remained bare and almost untenanted.
But was he justified in so doing? Was it allowable for
him, on the basis of his system, to do so? For my own
part, I submit that it was not, and for the following reasons.
There are, as Kant maintains in the Kritik of Pure Eeason
and elsewhere, strictly speaking, no such things as natural
ends. The notion of telos or end is applied to natural
objects only per viam analogies. The telos is a provisional
concept intended to cover the gap in knowledge due to our
ignorance of causes. It is an index finger pointing to the
existence of unknown causes, a prod intended to stimulate
our search for such causes. A true telos does not exist in
nature. We are only advised, or, if you will, enjoined, so to ,
regard nature as if it were the product of a purposeful intelli-
gence, as if it represented a concatenation of ends, in order
that we may the better succeed in unravelling the chain of
causes. A telos, strictly speaking, exists only in the moral
realm. There is only a single example of it of which we have
any knowledge the act which expresses absolute univer-
A CRITIQUE OP KANT'S ETHICS. 191
sality and necessity. Now, so far as our fellow-men are
moral beings they must work out their salvation without our
assistance. A moral act is an act of pure spontaneity which
no one can suggest to or elicit in another. A man's morality
is wholly his own creation. We cannot enter into another's
soul. We cannot either infect or purify his motives. The
degree of effort which he makes to lift the rational motive
into consciousness and keep it there constitutes his moral
desert. And that effort, in the nature of the case, must be
his own. On the other hand, when we regard man as part
and parcel of the order of nature, we find that the notion of
end applied to him from this point of view is altogether
illusory. Our desires, our volitions, are to be regarded as
the effects of causes, quite as much as the melting of wax
under the effect of heat. The fact that, in ordinary parlance,
we use the term ' end ' whenever the representation of the
outcome of an act precedes the act does not really justify
the use of that term. The process of volition is not really
teleological if the representation that precedes the act is itself
the inevitable consequence of a string of previous representa-
tions. From the standpoint of the Kantian Kritik, therefore,
it seems to me forbidden to speak of the natural ends of
man. As a natural being, he has no ends. The notion of
end applies to natural objects only by way of analogy. It is
intended to be used as a kind of wishing-rod to help us in
locating the spot where we must dig for the gold of causes.
It is only a device designed to facilitate investigation. There
are no ends in nature. We merely conduct our investigations
"as if " there were ends. Now my criticism of Kant is that
the proviso "as if," which he couples with the notion of end
in the Kritik of the Pure Season, is omitted by him when he
speaks of man as a natural object in the Kritik of the Practical
Reason. And thus, without justification, abruptly, he confronts
us with the notion of the natural ends of our fellow-beings as
the basis for a scheme of positive altruistic duties.
I must content myself with barely mentioning, in passing,
that the illicit notion of end, as applied to man in his natural
character, is also the unstable foundation whereon rests
Kant's moral theology. A God is needed in order to harmon-
ise the moral end and the so-called natural ends, to distribute
happiness in exact proportions to moral desert. But if the
basis of natural ends goes to pieces, the superstructure of moral
belief, which has been erected upon it, likewise crumbles, and
new foundations will have to be supplied if it, or anything
like it, is to be maintained.
. The nobility, the force and the fire of the Kantian ethics
192 FELIX ADLEE :
is contained in the proposition that no human being may be
treated merely as the tool of another, merely as a means to
another's end, but shall ever be regarded as an end in himself.
This statement, to my mind, is the Alpha if not, as orthodox
Kantians have claimed, also the Omega of morality. Un-
fortunately, I am compelled to think that in putting forth
this statement Kant's ethical perception far outran his ethical
theory, that the theoretic underpinning which he offers does
not really support this great practical pronouncement. We
hear much nowadays of the necessity of a return to Kant.
And I, too, believe that a return to Kant is necessary, at
least for those who maintain that there is an absolute element
in morality, despite the admitted relativity and changeable-
ness of the specific moral commands. Yes, a return to
Kant, but in the sense of taking up anew the problem which
he attempted, but failed to solve, in the sense of trying by
a new path to reach the goal which he had in view, and
which, it has become evident, cannot be reached by the path
which he pursued. He has not justified the conception of
an end in itself, as applied to man. He could not do so be-
cause he missed the organic idea from which alone the con-
ception of end or purpose can be derived. 1
1 We hear the crash of a tree as it falls in the primeval forest. We
see the snow disengage itself from the brink of a precipice and tumble
in powdery cascades into the abyss below. The notion of purpose does
not arise in connexion with such occurrences. We say ' this thing has
happened ' ; that is all. If we wish to go further, we ask ' Why has this
thing happened ? ' What are the causes that have produced this effect?
We see an erratic boulder in the midst of a green field. We do not ask,
' What end does it serve by being here ? ' but ' What are the forces that
have brought it hither ? ' Its being there is the effect of a cause or
causes. An effect is that which happens because something else has
previously happened. Shall we now define, per contrast, that a means
to an end is something which happens in order that something else may
happen thereafter ? Kant takes this view of the relation of means to
ends, and hence infers that the notion of an end is essentially an anthro-
pomorphic conception founded on the analogy of the purposeful action
of human beings. And this view is shared by the majority of those
who have written on the subject. Watch-making and house-building are
the typical examples of the adjustment of means to ends. The objects
of nature, to which the teleological view applies, says Kant, are to be
regarded as if they were the products of an intelligence like that of man,
Ian intelligence in which the idea of the resulting whole, present in a
mind operating from the outside, precedes and controls the arrange-
ment and the specification of the parts. But a more thorough-going
inquiry will make it manifest that this explanation is, in reality, a case
of putting the cart before the horse, that, instead of the organic idea
being an anthropomorphic analogy based on the purposeful action of
man, the reverse is true, namely, that the purposeful action of man is
dependent on, springs from and derives its meaning from the fact that
A CRITIQUE OF KANT'S ETHICS. 193
And, lastly, the ethical system of Kant is individualistic
because intellectualistic and rationalistic. What he calls
the rational nature is the element of unity separated from
its correlative, and man, so far as he is a rational being, is
considered as an embodiment of this unity, a unit or atom,
while the rational commonwealth is an aggregate of such
atoms. Individualism was the keynote of eighteenth century
speculation, and the individualistic tendency of the age found
its most authoritative expression in the Kantian philosophy.
If additional proof, after what has been said, were required,
it would only be necessary to cast a glance at the Tugend
Lehre, or " The Doctrine of Virtue," in which Kant outlines
the scheme of practical morality which springs from his
theory. In this practical exposition of the chief duties of
life, we find that the self-regarding duties receive minute
attention, that the general, altruistic duties are also carefully
he is an organic being, or at least that he is controlled in his conduct by
the organic idea. The organic idea takes precedence. Our separate
purposes are secondary to it, subservient to it, corollaries from it. Our
simplest plaiiful acts, the eating of food to satisfy hunger, the quench-
ing of thirst, the kindling of fuel to sustain the warmth of the body, the
erection of dwellings for the sake of shelter, all have reference to the
functions of our body, i.e., of a system of parts which are, at least to some
extent, organically related. These volitional acts of ours are purposeful
because the functions which they subserve are purposeful, that is, because
the functions subserved are members of a system of correlated functions.
And of the highest examples of human purpose in the realm of science,
of art and social condiact the same is still more palpably true. The
reciprocal dependence of intellect, feeling and will in the individual, the
organic connexion between each individual and all others in the social
union is the background from which all these purposes stand out, the
underlying reference which they imply. Thus the Kantian definition
jjhat the idea of the outcome of an act precedes the act is not adequate
to characterise purpose. If it were, then such idle doings as the deliber-
ate pouring of water through a sieve, or the heaping of sand on the beach
in a vacant moment would be properly termed purposeful conduct, which
they are not. The notion of purpose involves not only that the idea
of the outcome of what happens shall precede the happening, but that
that outcome, whatever it be, shall fit into a scheme of interdependent
happenings.
Thus the organic idea, and it alone, enables us to substantiate Kant's
fundamental ethical thought that man shall be regarded not only as a
means but also as an end. In an organic system every means is at the
same time an end. Every part subserves the others, and is served by
them. The whole not only presides over the arrangement of the parts,
but is present in each part. For the organic idea is nothing else than
that complete fusion of the idea of the one and the many, the source of
which in the very constitution of the human mind we have indicated
above. The one is in each member of the manifold because the plurality
is but the explication of the unity, and each of the separate members is
indissolubly related to every other because every other is as necessary to
that complete explication as itself.
13
194 FELIX ADLEB :
considered, while the specific duties of the family, of the
professions, of the various social classes toward each other,
etc., in brief, those duties which most obviously imply an
organic relation, a correlation of dissimilars rather than a co-
ordination of similars, are either scantily treated or wholly
"omitted. The conjugal duties, for instance, do not appear
at all in this scheme of practical morality. The personal
duties are accentuated. The social duties, in the strictest
sense, are left out. And therefore the Kantian system and
this is perhaps the weightest objection that can be urged
against it at the present day cannot adequately help us in
developing the social conscience, cannot satisfy that need
t which to-day is felt more keenly than any other, the need
I of a social ethics, the need of a clearer statement of the prin-
ciples which shall determine social morality. In bis private
life, too, Kant displayed his individualism. He not only
never married, but he did not recognise, in a finer sense, the
ties of consanguinity. He discharged punctually his external
obligations toward his kinsmen, but even his nearest, his
brother and his sister, he kept at a distance, as his bio-
grapher tells us, in the belief that association should be a
matter of free choice, and not subject to the constraint of
natural bonds. Friendship, however, he celebrated in terms
almost as eulogistic as those of Aristotle, friendship, the one
social tie which is most congenial to the spirit of individu-
alists, because it can be knit at pleasure and dissolved at
pleasure.
These, then, are the objections or the points of criticism
which I have desired to submit.
In defining freedom, Kant tries to set off by itself one of a
brace of inseparable correlatives, to cut with one of a pair pf
shears.
In positing mere empty necessity and universality as the
essential characteristics of moral action, he offers us the
ghost or echo of natural law as the motive of conduct and
represents the cogency which accompanies the synthetic pro-
cess as if it could exist with the synthetic process left out.
His scheme of morality, founded on pure rationality, is in
the air and has no footing upon earth. There is no one to
whom we can be certain that we owe moral duty because
there is no one of whom we are certain that he is a rational
being, in the Kantian sense.
The moral rules cannot be deduced from the Categorical
Imperative, and the deduction which Kant undertakes is based
on the false assumption of an equality between human beings,
which does not exist.
A CBITIQUE OF KANl's ETHICS. 195
The conception of man as an end in himself, which is the
most inspiring of his pronouncements, is at variance with
the Kritik of the Pure Reason, and is not established by the
Kritik of the Practical Eeason. It cannot be justified in his
system.
Finally, his ethics is individualistic and cannot serve us in
our most pressing need at the present day. And yet, despite
these shortcomings, Kant's ethics has sounded through the
world with a clear, clarion note, has had a mighty awakening
influence, and something like the flashes of the lightning that
played on Sinai have played about it. It has had this in-
fluence because it emphasises the fundamental fact that the
moral law is imperative, not subject to the peradventure of
inclination, of temperament, or circumstance, an emphasis to
which every moral being, at least in his higher moments, re-
sponds. It has had this influence because of the sublimity of
the origin which he assigns to the moral law, because he
translates it from the sphere of ephemeral utilities, whether
individualistic or racial, into the region of eternal being, com-
parable with nothing in the physical universe except only
the starry firmament. And last, and not least, because his
own lofty personality shines through his written words. A
man may be bigger than his creed, and, in the same way,
he may tower above his philosophy. I think it is true to
say that Kant's personality produces this effect upon his
readers, that when we study his ethical writings we obtain
the impression of one who was fallible, indeed, and shared
in many ways the limitations of his time, but who, at the
same time, was a man morally high-bred, a man in whom
a certain chastity of the intellect communicated itself to
every faculty, producing a purity of the entire nature, incom-
parable of its kind, a man to whom may be applied the words
which Aristotle used of Plato, ov ovS* alvelv rola-t, Kateola-t,
("whom the bad have not even the right to praise").
III. 'USELESS' KNOWLEDGE:
A DISCOURSE CONCERNING PRAGMATISM.
BY F. C. S. SCHILLER.
IT will readily be understood that once the idealistic art of
waking oneself up out of our world of appearances and
thereby passing into one of higher reality is fully mastered,
the temptation to exercise it becomes practically irresistible.
Nevertheless, it was not until nearly two years (as men
reckon time) after the first memorable occasion when he
discoursed to me concerning the adaptation of the Ideal
State to our present circumstances 1 that I succeeded in
sufficiently arousing my soul to raise it once again to that
supernal Academe where the divine Plato meditates in holy
groves beside a fuller and more limpid stream than the
Attic Ilissus.
When I was breathlessly projected into his world, Plato
was reclining gracefully beside a moss-grown boulder and
listening attentively to a lively little man who was dis-
coursing with an abundance of animation and gesticulation.
When he observed me, he stopped his companion, who
immediately came hurrying towards me, and after politely
greeting me, amiably declared that the Master would be
delighted to converse with me. I noticed that he was a
dapper little man, apparently in the prime of life, though
beginning to grow rather bald about the temples. He was
carefully robed and his beard and his hair, such as it was,
were scented. One could not help being struck by his re-
fined intelligent countenance, and his quick, observant eyes.
As soon as Plato had welcomed me, his companion went
off to get, he said, a garden chair from a gleaming marble
temple (it turned out to be a shrine of the Muses) at a little
distance, and I naturally inquired of Plato who the obliging
little man was.
1 The contents of this interview have not yet been divulged, for reasons
which will appear from the course of the present narrative.
' USELESS ' KNOWLEDGE. 197
' Why, don't you know? ' he replied, ' Don't you recognise
my famous pupil, Aristotle ? '
' Aristotle ! No, I should never have supposed he was
like that.'
' What then would you have expected ? '
' Well I should have expected a bigger man for one thing,
and one far less agreeable. To tell the truth, I should have
expected Aristotle to be very bumptious and conceited.'
' You are not quite wrong,' said Plato with an indulgent
smile, ' he was all you say, when he first came hither. But
this is Aristotle with the conceit taken out of him, so that you
now behold him reduced to his true proportions and can see
his real worth.'
' Ah, that explains much. I now see why you are even
greater and more impressive than I expected, and why he
appears to be on such good terms with you once more.'
' Oh, yes, we have made up our differences long ago, and
he has now again the same keen, unassuming spirit with
which he first charmed me, as a boy. Not that I was ever
very angry with him even formerly. Of course his criticisms
were unfair, and, as you say, his great abilities rendered him
conceited, but you must remember that he had to make a
place for himself in the philosophic world, and that he could
do this only by attacking the greatest reputation in that
world, viz., mine. But you see he is returning, and I want
to ask you how you fared after our last meeting. Did you
find it difficult to get back to your world ? '
' I hardly know, Plato, how I managed it. And, oh, the
difference when I awoke in the morning ! How sordid all
things seemed ! '
' And did you tell your pupils what my answers were to
your questions ? '
' I did, and they were much interested, and, I am afraid I
must add, amused.'
' And after that what did you do ? Did you persuade your
political men to enact laws in the Ecclesia such as those we
showed to be best ? '
' I fear I have not yet quite succeeded in doing this.'
' Why, what objections have you failed to overcome ? '
' I have not yet even overcome the first and greatest
objection of all. I have not published the account of our
conversation.'
' Why not ? '
' To tell you the truth, I was afraid ; I feared that your
arguments might fare ill among the British Philistines.'
'Why should they fare ill, seeing that, both for other
198 F. C. S. SCHILLER :
reasons and to please you, I was conservative, wonderfully
how, amid all my reforms, and proposed nothing revolu-
tionary, but essayed only gently to turn to the light the
eyes of the Cave-dwellers whom you mention ? '
' You don't know how they abhor the light.'
' Yet I was only preaching to them the necessity of self-
realisation.'
' I know that ; but your language would have sounded
unfamiliar.'
' Then you should repeat it, until it sounds familiar.'
' How splendidly you must have lectured, Plato ! I hardly
dare however to follow your advice. However mildly I
might put them, your proposals would shock the British
public.'
' And yet you told me that the infinitely more revolutionary
and unsparing proposals of my Eepublic command universal
admiration, and are held to be salutary in the education of
youth.'
' Ah, but then they are protected by the decent obscurity
of a learned language ! '
' Surely your language is learned enough, and by the time
they have passed through your mind my ideas will be obscure
enough to make them decent and safe.'
1 You are victorious as ever, Plato, in argument. But you
do not persuade me, because there is another obstacle, even
greater than that which I have mentioned.'
' Will you not tell me what it is ? '
' I hardly know how to put it. But though it now seems
almost too absurd even to suggest such a thing, you know
everybody to whom I spoke disbelieved that I had really
conversed with you, and thought that I had dreamt it all, or
even invented the whole matter. '
' That, as you say, is too absurd.'
' Nevertheless, so long as people believed this, you see it
was vain for me to try to persuade them of the excellence
of your proposals. For I do not happen to have been born
the son of a king myself, and am of no account for such
purposes.'
' Still they could not have supposed that you could have
invented all you said yourself.'
' I am afraid they did.'
' That was very unreasonable of them.'
' I am not so sure of that. For after all they had only
my word for it that I had really met you.'
' But did they not recognise what I said, and my manner of
saying it ? '
' USELESS ' KNOWLEDGE. 199
' Not so as to feel sure.'
' And did they not think your whole account intrinsically
probable and consistent ? '
' I hope I made it appear so. '
' Surely they did not think that you could invent a world
like mine '? '
' I suppose they thought I might have dreamt it.'
' What, a world so much better, more beautiful, coherent
and rational, and, in two words, more real, than that in which
they lived ? '
' There is nothing in all this to make it seem less of a
dream rather than more.'
' Do you think they will believe you after this second
visit ? '
' I doubt it. Why should they ? '
' It would seem, then, that we have no means of convincing
these wretches of the truth/'
' I fear not ; so long as they can reasonably maintain that
it is no truth at all.'
' You do not surely propose to defend their conduct ? '
' No, but I think it is by no means as unreasonable as you
suppose.'
' I see that you are preparing to assert a greater paradox
than ever I listened to from Zeno.'
' I am afraid that it may appear such.'
' Will you not quickly utter it ? You see how keenly
Aristotle is watching you, like a noble dog straining at the
leash.'
' Let me say this, then, that though I can no more doubt
your existence and that of the lovely world wherein you
abide than I can my own, yet I cannot blame my fellow-
men for refusing to credit all this on my sole assertion.
They have not seen you, nor can they, seeing that you will
neither descend to them nor can they rise to you. Your
world and theirs have nothing in common, and so do not
exist for each other.'
' You forget yourself, my friend.'
' True, I am a link between them. But what I have ex-
perienced is not directly part of their experience. It is far
more probable, therefore, that I am lying or deluded than
that I should establish a connexion between two worlds.
Before they need, or indeed can, admit that what I say is
true, I must show them how, in consequence of my visits
to your higher world, I am enabled to act more successfully
in theirs. You see, Plato, I am exactly in the position of
your liberated Cave-dweller when he returns to his fellow-
200 F. C. S. SCHILLER :
prisoners. They need not, can not, and will not, believe that
I speak the truth concerning what I have seen above, unless I
am also able to discern better the shadows in their cave below.'
' And this surely must be the case.'
' I notice that you assumed this, but you did not explain
how it was that the higher knowledge of the Ideas, for
example the ability to understand the motions of the
heavenly bodies, was useful for enabling men to live better.'
' But surely knowledge is one and the True and the
Beautiful must also be useful.'
' I am not denying that, although your friend Aristotle
would, unless he has greatly changed his opinion ; I am only
saying that you have assumed this too lightly.'
Instead of replying Plato looked at Aristotle, who with a
slight hesitation ventured to suggest that possibly I was
right, and that he had always been of the opinion that his
master had overrated the practical usefulness of scientific
knowledge. Plato meditated for a while before replying.
' It is possible that there are difficulties here which escaped
my notice formerly. But did I not prove that the soul
attuned to the harmonies of the higher sphere of true reality
was also necessarily that most capable of dealing with the
discords of phenomenal existence ? '
' No doubt, Plato, your spectator of all time and all existence
is a very beautiful being, and I too trust that in the end
you may be right in thinking that Truth and Goodness must
be harmonious. But neither in your time, nor in the many
years that have passed since, has it come about that the
pursuit of abstract knowledge has engendered the perfect
man. I greatly doubt whether you convinced even your own
brothers by your argument in the Republic, and you have cer-
tainly failed to convince those who have deemed themselves
the greatest philosophers from the time of Aristotle to the
present day. They would all in private scoff at the notion
that speculative knowledge was by nature conducive to prac-
tical excellence, even though a few of the more prudent might
not think it expedient to state this in public, while as for the
great majority, they are always crying aloud that it is sacri-
lege and profanation to demand practical results from their
meditations, and that only an utterly vulgar and ill-educated
mind is even interested in the practical consequences which
theoretical researches may chance to have. And this temper
we observe not only among the philosophers proper, who are
few and speak a " language of the gods " unintelligible to the
many, but also more patently among those who pursue the
sciences and the arts, and hold that " Truth for the sake of
' USELESS ' KNOWLEDGE. 201
Truth " and " Art for the sake of Art " alone are worthy of
their consideration.'
' Is it true, Aristotle, that you also hold such opinions ? '
' May I be permitted, oh my master, to expound my views
at length, and yet briefly, as compared with the importance
of the subject ? You know that I do not find the method of
question and answer the most convenient to express my
thoughts (Plato nodded). Well then ) let me say first of all
that I do not hold it true that speculative wisdom (a-o<f>ia) is
the same as practical wisdom (fypovtia-is), or that the latter is
naturally developed out of the former. I must, therefore,
with all respect agree with our critic from a lower world
that you have too easily identified the two. They are quite
distinct, and have nothing to do with each other.'
Then observing an involuntary shudder on my part, ' Oh,
I know,' he continued, 'what you are wishing to object.
How can aofyia exist without the help of <j)povr)<ris in beings
that have to act practically in a social life, seeing that it does-
not as such concern itself with the means of human happi-
ness ? l I confess to an overstatement. It is not quite true
that <ro(f>ia and <f>powrja-i<; have nothing to do with each other.
There is a connexion, because practical wisdom has to pro-
vide speculative with the material conditions of its exercise.
In other words, men are too imperfect to live the divine life
of contemplation wholly and always. They must to some
extent busy themselves with the needs of the perishable part
of their nature, and the contingencies and changes of the
sublunary sphere. And the regulation and satisfaction of
such needs, the whole v\rj of things that are capable of being
otherwise (evBe^o^evfov aXA,&><? e%etv), appertains to practical
wisdom.
' Without it, therefore, speculative wisdom could not exist
among men, or at least could not maintain itself. But it
does not follow that it thereby becomes dependent on
practical wisdom, and still less, derivative from it. Practical
wisdom serves speculative like a faithful servant. It is the
trusty steward who has so to order the household that its
master may have leisure for his holy avocations. It would
be truer, therefore, to say that practical wisdom depends on
speculative, without which life would lose its savour. But
best of all is it to say that the two are essentially distinct
and connected only by the bond of an external necessity.
' Having shown thus that practical and theoretical activity
(evepjeta) are different in kind, let me explain next why the
1 Cp. Eth. Nick., vi. 12, 1.
2O2 F. C. S. SCHILLKl; :
latter is the better, and the relation between them which I
have described is a just one.
' They differ in their psychological character, in their object
and in their value. Practical wisdom is the function of
a lower and altogether inferior " part of the soul," of that
" passive reason " (vovs TraOrjriKos) which we put forth only
while we deal with a " matter " whose resistance we cannot
wholly master. Speculative activity on the other hand is
the divine imperishable part of us which, small as it is in
bulk in most men, is yet our true self.
' Again the object of practical wisdom is the good for man
and the transitory flow of appearances in the impermanent
part of the universe. But the good which is the obje*ct of
our practical pursuit is peculiar and restricted to man. It
is different for men and for fishes, 1 and although I do not
deny that man's is the higher and that therefore fishing is
legitimate sport, I feel bound to point out that there are
many things in the world far diviner than man. The object
of speculation on the other hand is the eternal and imniu*
table which is common to all. I mean to include under this
not merely the eternal truths, such as the principles of meta-
physics and mathematics, but the eternal existences of the
heavenly bodies and the unvarying character of the percep-
tions which are the same for all beings, e.g., those of colour,
shape, size, etc.
' Whence it follows, lastly, that the value of speculation is
incomparably superior to that of practice. It is not useful,
and that it should occasionally lead to useful results is
merely a regrettable accident. In itself it is beautiful and the
beautiful is self-sufficient. But it is not useful, because it
is exalted far above the useful, and to demand use for know-
ledge is literally impiety. For to contemplate the immutable
objects of theoretical truth is in the strictest sense to lead
the divine life. For it contemplates the higher and more
perfect, even though it cannot grasp the absolutely perfect
as continuously as God can contemplate His own absolute
perfection. Still to do this, in however passing a fashion,
is to rise above death and impermanence and decay. It is to
immortalise oneself.
' It follows, therefore, logically and in point of fact, that
any attempt to hinder or control the concern with Pure
Truth, is an outrage upon what is highest and best and
holiest in human nature, an outrage which the law should
punish and all good men rebuke, with the utmost severity.
1 Htli. Mel,., vi. 7, 4.
' USELESS ' KNOWLEDGE. 203
Truth demands not merely toleration for herself, from the
State, but also the unsparing suppression of every form of
Error, of every one who from whatever motive, whether from
ignorance or sordidness or a mistaken and degrading moral
enthusiasm, attempts to put any hindrance in the way of
her absolute supremacy.'
Towards the end of this diatribe, to which I had at various
points shown myself unable to listen without writhing,
Aristotle had wrought himself up into a state of fervour of
which I should hardly have deemed him capable. Plato,
however, skilfully provided for the continuation of the dis-
cussion by blandly remarking :
' Bravo, Aristotle, you have spoken most interestingly, and
shown not only the analytic subtlety for which you are
famous, but also that true enthusiasm which proves that
you are not merely a logical perforating machine for wind-
bags and other receptacles of gaseous matter. I will leave
it, however, to our visitor to answer you, partly because the
question has, it would seem, grown somewhat beyond my
ken, and partly because I can see that he has not a little
to say, and foresee that your differences will prove most
entertaining and instructive.'
' You are right, Plato, in thinking that I differ profoundly
with the doctrine to which Aristotle has just given such
eloquent expression. But I feel that I am hardly equal
single-handed to cope with Aristotle, and I wish that lames
were present to support me and to persuade you both of
what I believe to be right and reasonable.'
' And who is lames ? '
' A philosopher, Plato, of the Hyperatlanteans, not one
of the " bald-headed little tinkers " who are philosophers, not
by the grace of God but by the favour of some wretched
" thinking-shop," and a man (or shall I rather call him a
god ?) after your own heart. But, alas, he has been bridled,
like Theages, by his own, and so has not been enabled to
set forth fully the doctrine which he has named 1 Pragmatism,
and which I would fain advance against that of Aristotle.'
' You describe a man whom I should be eager to welcome.
You must bring him with you the next time you come,
having told him what we have discussed/
'I will if I can.'
' As for your present difficulty, you need not be afraid.
You shall argue, with me as judge, and I will see to it that
Aristotle obtains no unfair advantage over you.'
1 Strictly speaking, I am reminded, it was Mr. C. S. Peirce, but one
must not spring too rnairy new philosophers at once on the ancients.
204 F. C. S. SCHILLER :
' You embolden me to try my best.'
' I do not think that courage is what you lack.'
' If I have courage, it is like yours, that which comes
nearest to that of despair.'
' I never quite despaired.'
' Nor will I, though it is hard not to, to one regarding the
present position of philosophy.'
' Aristotle is beginning to think that you are not going to
answer him.'
' Then I will delay no longer. And first of all let me say
that besides the views which have been taken by you and
by Aristotle there seem to me to be two others, and that if
you have no objection, I will state them, first recapitulating
your own.'
' I have never an objection to be instructed.'
' I will begin with your own view then. It seemed to
me to assume that there was no real or ultimate difference
between the use of the reason in matters practical and
matters theoretical. Knowledge was one and all action
depended on knowledge, right action presupposing right
knowledge. Knowledge, therefore, was useful, and there
was no real opposition between the True and the Good,
because the True could not but be good and the Good true.
Nevertheless Goodness was born of Truth rather than Truth
of Goodness. Have I understood you aright ? '
' You have put things more definitely than I did, but not
perhaps amiss.'
' Aristotle on the other hand, whom we have just heard,
clearly thinks that Truth and Goodness have nothing to do
with each other.'
' Pardon me, there is a goodness also of Truth, and in a
sense speculative activity (9ewpia) is also action (Trpaft?).'
' Yes, I know that ; you mean as exercise of function ?
The speculative life also is something we do, it is the
exercise of a characteristic human activity, and so has an
excellence and contributes to our happiness.'
' Precisely.'
' Very well then, what I meant was that you did not
derive practical from theoretic activity.'
' Certainly not.'
' The two are as far opposed as is practically possible.'
'Yes.'
' But speculative wisdom is by far the loftier ? '
' Of course.'
' And far too lofty to be useful ? '
' So I maintain.'
' USELESS ' KNOWLEDGE. 205
' Very well again. Now for a third view. Is it not
possible to maintain with you that the practical and the
speculative reason are different and opposed to each other,
but that the former is the superior, so that in the end we
must believe and practically act on what we do not know
to be true? And is not this the converse of your view,
Aristotle ? '
' I suppose it is, but if that is your view, I tell you frankly
that I never heard anything more absurd.'
' In that case it is lucky, perhaps, that it is not my view.'
' Who then has been confused enough in his mind to
propound it ? '
' It is the view of the great Scythian, Kant, who nearly
criticised the reason out of the world.'
' Ah, I know, a queer little hunchback of a barbarian !
He came here once, not so long ago, but would not stay and
could not say anything intelligible. I could only make out
that he was seeking the Infinite (faugh !), and was impelled
by something he called a Categorical Imperative (unknown
alike to logic and to grammar). Possessed by evil demons
he seemed to us. Nothing Hellenic about him at all
events ! '
' I don't wonder at what you say, nor that Plato agrees
with you. Nevertheless, he was a remarkable man, on his
way, perhaps, to a higher truth, to which we may follow him,
passing through the absurdity of his actual view, which is
far greater than I have had time to indicate.'
' Let us go on, then, at once to something more reasonable.'
' I will go on then to the view of the Pragmatists. May
one not say, fourthly, that there is no opposition between
speculative and practical wisdom because the former arises
out of the latter and remains always derivative and secondary
and subservient and useful ? '
' One may say that or any other nonsense, but if one does,
one must say what one means. And one cannot always
prove what one says.'
' I thought that would excite you, Aristotle. But I thought
it better to reveal to you the whole aim of my argument
before I proceeded to reach it.'
' You are still far from your aim.'
' I am coming to it, in good time. Meanwhile have you
observed that this position which I hope to reach is the
exact converse of the first, of Plato's ? '
' You mean that you also deny the opposition between
Oewpia and 7rpa%is, but derive the former from, the latter ? '
' Exactly so. I entirely deny the independence of the
206 F. C. S. SCHILLER :
speculative reason. And I assert that you were quite wrong
in drawing the distinctions you did between the objects of
0(0pla and of Tr/aa^?.'
' Do you then deny that the good which is the aim of prac-
tical wisdom is merely human ? '
' Not at all ; but I assert that the true, which you imagine
to be in some sense superhuman, is also merely human. It
is the true for us, the true for us as practical beings, just as the
good is the good for us.'
' How so ? '
' Why, quite simply. Are not colour and shape and size
perceived by the senses ? '
' Certainly.'
' And are not the senses human, and relative to us and to our
needs in life, in the same way as our perception of the good
and the sweet ? '
' I don't see why I need suppose them to be merely
human . '
' I don't see how you can show them to be anything more.
How do you know that your fishes see white as you do ?
And even if they did, that would only show that their senses
were constructed like yours, and fitted to see and avoid you
when you dangle a worm before their eyes with evil intent.
And, generally, how do you fancy you can refute Protagoras'
great maxim ' that which appears to each, is ' ? It is literally
true, as soon as we look more exactly. Each being in the
universe from your God (if indeed He be in the universe) down
to the humblest blackbeetle, has his own individual way of
perceiving his experience, and when we say that several
perceive the same things what we really mean is that they act
in a corresponding manner towards them. When you and I
both see "red," that means that we agree in the arranging of
colours, but leaves inscrutable (and indeed unmeaning) the
question whether your experience in seeing " red " is the
same as mine.
' And this agreement is both difficult, partial, and derivative.
It is the fruit of much effort and of a long struggle, and not
an original endowment. It has had to be carried to a certain
pitch in order that it might be possible for men to live
together at all. It has grown because it was useful and
advantageous and those who could manage to perceive things
in practically the same way prospered at the expense of those
who could not. Thus the objectivity of our perceptions is
essentially practical and useful and ideological. How then
can you venture to ascribe to the gods, with whom you do
not live, the perceptions which have come to exist as " the
' USELESS ' KNOWLEDGE. 207
same " for your senses, only in order that you might be able
to live with your fellow creatures ? '
' Even though our senses are different may we not per-
ceive by their means the divine order of the same universe
which higher beings perceive by such modes of cognition
as are worthy of them ? '
' Eeally, Aristotle, it astonishes me that you, living in a
more real world, should still cling to the objective reality
of the world you have now quitted for more than 2,000
years. Do you perceive it now?'
' No, but I did, and it may still be a part of the world
which I no longer perceive.'
' Where then is it with reference to your present world ?
Is it north, south, east or west ? Or is it not in the same
space with it at all ? '
' Still it is in space. And I still perceive a world.'
' So does every one who dreams. Your perceiving it,,
therefore, is no proof chat it is ultimately real. And if you
had entirely forgotten what you experienced formerly, you
would not even be able to assert that it once was real for
you. How can you venture, then, to attribute to all beings
perception of one and the same world ? '
' Perhaps I was mistaken about the world in which I
then lived. But this present world at least is real, and
seems to me fair enough to be worthy of being perceived
even by the gods.'
' It is real no doubt for you, and for me also, while I am
in it. But you may remember that what started the argu-
ment was the difficulty I had in convincing the denizens of
your former world of the superior reality of this in which
we now are. And, besides, how do you know that beings
still higher than you, if you do not resent my mentioning
such, may not enjoy the contemplation of worlds vastly more
perfect even than yours ? '
' Still this process cannot go on to infinity. You must at
last conceive a world of ultimate reality, the contemplation
of which by the supreme being would be absolute truth.'
' No doubt ; you are speaking of what Plato would call
the world of Ideas. But still that does not affect the argu-
ment. The world and the truth and good we were discussing
are those relative to us.'
' I see that I was wrong in basing my argument for
absolute truth on the perceptions of the senses. But of
the eternal truths of mathematics and the like one may
surely affirm that they necessarily exist for all intelligences '? r
' Even this is more than I can grant you.'
208 F. C. S. SCHILLER :
' How so ? '
' They seem to me to be also relative to us ; nay, human
institutions of the plainest kind.'
' Is it not self-evident and absolutely certain that the
straight line is the shortest between two points ? '
' That is the definition of distance. It will do in the sense
in which you use it, if I may add, " for one living in a spatial
world which behaves like ours, and apparently yours, once
he has succeeded in postulating a system of geometry which
suits his world ".'
' I really do not understand you.'
' I fear I have not the space to explain myself, and to
show you the practical aim of our assumptions concerning
<( Space," even if I dared to discuss the foundations of
geometry in the presence of Plato. But it really does not
affect my point. What I desire to maintain is that the
eternal truths are at bottom postulates, demands we make
upon our experience because we need them in order that it
may become a cosmos fit to live in.'
' But I do not find myself postulating them at all. They
are plainly self-evident and axiomatic.'
' That is only because your axioms are postulates so
ancient and so firmly rooted that no one now thinks of
disputing them.'
' Your doctrine seems as monstrous as it is unfamiliar. '
' I can neither help that nor establish it fully at this
juncture. Perhaps, if the gods are willing, I shall find
another occasion 1 to expound to you the proofs of this
doctrine, and even, if the gods are gracious, to convince
you. For it seems to me that in a manner you already
admit the principle of my doctrine.'
' It would greatly surprise me if I did.'
' You contend, do you not, that concerning ethical matters
it is impossible to have the right opinion without, at the same
time or before, having the right habit of action ? '
' And do I not contend rightly? '
' I am not denying that your view is right, though perhaps
you overemphasise the impossibility of separating ethical
theory from ethical practice. What I should like you to see,
however, is that this same doctrine may be extended also to
speculative matters. Why should we not contend that the
true meaning and right understanding of theoretical principles
also appears only to him who is proposing to use them prac-
1 See the essay on " Axioms as Postulates " in the forthcoming volume
of essays edited by Mr. Sturt.
' USELESS ' KNOWLEDGE. 209
tically ? Can we not say that the Scythian was both prudent
and wise who would not grant that 2 and 2 made 4 until he
knew what use was to be made of the admission ? Just as
the wicked man destroys his intellectual insight into ethical
truth by his action, 1 so the mere theorist destroys his insight
and understanding of " theoretical " truth by refusing to use
that truth and to apply it practically, failing to see that, both
in origin and intention, it is a mass of thoroughly practical
devices to enable us to live better.'
' I cannot admit that the two cases are at all parallel. In
practical matters indeed I rightly hold that action and insight
are so conjoined as not to admit of separation, but to extend
this doctrine to the apprehension of theoretic truth would
lead to many absurdities.'
' For instance ? '
' Well, for one thing, you would have to go into training
for the attainment of philosophic insight after the fashion of
an Indian Gymnosophist whom I once met in Asia and who
wished to convert me to the pernicious doctrine that all things
were one.'
' How did he propose to effect this ? '
' Well, in the first place he declared that truths could not
be implanted in the soul by argument, but must grow out of
its essence by its own action. So he refused to give any
rational account of his opinions, but told me that if I submitted
to his discipline, I should infallibly come to see for myself
what he knew to be true. I asked him how, and was amused
to find that he wanted me to sit in the sun all day in a stiff
and upright posture, breathing in a peculiar way, stopping
the right nostril with the thumb, and then slowly drawing in
the breath through the left, and breathing it out through the
right. By doing this and repeating the sacred word " Om "
ten thousand times daily, he assured me I should become a
god, nay, greater than all gods. I asked him how soon this
fate was likely to befal me, if I tried. He thought enlighten-
ment might come to me in one year, or ten, or more. It all
depended on me. I replied that even if I failed to get a
sunstroke I should be more likely to become an idiot than a
god, but that I should already be one if I tried anything so
ridiculous. You, however, seem to me to be committing
yourself to the same absurdity when you try to extend to
contemplation the method which is appropriate only to
action.'
' But that, Aristotle, is just the point to be proved. My
1 Cp. Eth. Nich., vi. 12, 10.
14
F. C. S. SCHILLER :
contention is that Pragmatism extends to the acquisition of
theoretical principles a method as appropriate to them as to
practice. As for Gymnosophistic, I think that your Indian
friend's method was really quite different. For though he
professed to reach truth by training, there was no rational
connexion between the truths he aimed at and the methods
he advocated, which indeed could only produce self-deception.
In moral matters, on the other hand, it is, as you say, necessary
to dispose the mind for the perception of truth by appropriate
action. If we declined to do this we should not start with a
mind free from bias and impartially open to every belief for
that is impossible but with one biased by different action in
a different direction. So that really the training you demand
is only what is needed to clear away the antimoral prejudices
to which our character would otherwise predispose us. Is
this not so ? '
' Certainly ; you speak well so far. '
' Thank you. May I point out next that the method of
Pragmatism is precisely the same in theoretic as in practical
matters? In neither can the truth or falsehood of a con-
ception be decided in the abstract and without experience
of the manner of its working. It gets its real meaning only
in, from, and by, its use. And you can use it only if you
desire to use it. And the desire to use it can only arise if it
makes a difference to you whether or not you conceive it, and,
if so, how. You must, therefore, desire, or, as I should say,
postulate it, if you are to have it at all. If, on the other
hand, your practical experience suggests to you that a certain
conception would be useful, if it were tme, you will reason-
ably give it a trial to see whether it is not " true," and if
thus you discover it and find that you can work with it,
you will certainly believe that it is " true," and the more
confidently and profoundly, the more extensively useful it
appears. Thus it is by hypothetically postulating what we
desire to be true because we expect it to be useful, and
accepting it as true if we can in any way render it useful,
that we seem to me manifestly to come by our principles.
Nor do I see how we could really come by them in any
other way, or that we should be prudent if we admitted their
claims to truth on any other ground.'
' Might they not be self-evident ? '
' Self-evidence only seems an accident of our state of mind
and in no way a complete guarantee of truth. Much that
was false has been accepted as self-evident and no doubt
still is. Its self-evidence only means that we have ceased
to question a principle, or not yet begun to do so.'
' USELESS ' KNOWLEDGE. 211
' And can you not see that there are intrinsically necessary
truths ? '
' Not a bit. Unless by necessary you mean needful, an
intrinsic necessity seems to me a contradiction. Necessity
is always dependence, and so hypothetical.'
' You blaspheme horribly against the highest beings in
the universe, the Deity and the Triangle ! '
' Even though you should threaten to impale me on the
acutest angle of the most acute-angled specimen of the latter
you can find in your world of "necessary matter" (//,??
evSexoftevwv aAA&>? e^eiv), I should not refrain from speaking
thus. For I want you to see the exact point of my doctrine,
and where it diverges from your own.'
' Of course I see that. If you can prove your derivation
of the Axioms and show that the necessary is only the needful,
the speculative reason must say a long farewell to its in-
dependence.'
' Perhaps it will be none the worse for that.'
At this point Plato interposed a question.
' Have I understood you rightly, most astonishing young
man, to affirm that theoretic truth was wholly derivative
and subservient to practical purposes ? '
' You have.'
' In that case would you not have to regard theoretic
falsehood as, in the last resort, practical uselessness ? '
' You are quite right, Plato, and I am glad I have made
my point so clear to you.'
' You are very far then from agreeing with a statement
which I found lately in a book by one of your Oxford sophists l
who seemed to be discussing much the same questions, that
"the false is the same as the theoretically untenable"?
You would rather say that it was ' ' the same as the
practically untenable " ? '
' Of course. Or rather that the theoretically untenable
always turns out to be the practically untenable.'
' The sophist whom, with difficulty, I read seemed to see
no way from the one to the other.'
' I don't suppose he wished to. It would have upset his
whole philosophy, and unfortunately he is getting old.'
' And even you have asserted the existence of such a way
rather than shown it to us.'
' I must confess, Plato, that much as I should have wished
to show you that my way is both practical and practicable
I have not had the time to do this. But if I had, I feel
sure that I could do so.'
1 Bradley, Appearance and Reality, p. 155.
212 P. C. S. SCHILLEB I
' Say on ; there is no limit but life itself to the search for
Truth.'
' That is all very well for you, whose abode has been in
these pleasant places for so long, and to whom, it seems,
there comes neither death nor change. But I have to go
back.'
' To your pupils ? '
' Yes, and already I feel the premonitory heaviness in my
feet. It will slowly creep upwards, and when it reaches the
head I shall go to sleep and wake again in another world
far from you.'
' I am sorry ; though it will interest us to see how you
vanish. But before you pass away, will you not, seeing that
all truth you say is practical, tell us what in this case is the
practical application of the " truths " you have championed ? '
' With the greatest pleasure, Plato, that is what I was
coming back to. They form my excellent excuse for neglect-
ing to tell men about your ideas.'
' I do not quite see how.'
' Why, so long as my knowledge of your world is useless
to them, it is for them, literally and in the cornpletest way,
false ! '
1 But surely both they and you must admit that there is
much useless knowledge ? '
' There is much, of course, which is so called, and actually
is useless for certain purposes, but nothing which can be
so for all. Much that is ' useless ' is so because certain
persons refuse to use it or are unable to do so. Pearls are
useless to swine, and, as Herakleitos said, gold to asses. And
so neither ass nor hog could truly call them precious. Or,
again, often what is called useless is that which is indirectly
useful. It is useful as logically completing a system of know-
ledge which is useful in other parts and as a whole. Or
perhaps in some cases the use has not yet been discovered.
A great deal of mathematics would be in this position.
Or lastly there is a good deal of knowledge which is com-
paratively, or as Aristotle would say, accidentally, useless,
because the time spent in acquiring it might be more usefully
employed otherwise. For instance, you might count the
hairs on Aristotle's head, and the knowledge might enable
you to win a bet that their number was less than a myriad
But ordinarily such knowledge would be deemed useless
seeing that you might have been better employed.'
' But would these explanations cover all the facts ? '
' Not perhaps quite all in our world, in which there is also
seeming " useless knowledge," which is not really knowledge
' USELESS ' KNOWLEDGE. 213
at all, but falsely so called ; being as it were a parasitic growth
upon the real and useful knowledge, or even a perversion
thereof, a sort of harmless tumour or malignant cancer,
which would not arise in a healthy state and should be ex-
tirpated wherever it appears.'
' Still it exists.'
' As evil exists ; indeed it seems to be merely one aspect
of the existence of evil.'
' Are you not now extending your explanations so far that
your paradox is in danger of becoming a truism ? Can you
any longer give me an instance of really useless knowledge ? '
' Of course not, Plato, seeing that my contention is that
there is none and that in proportion as any alleged knowledge
is seen to be useless it is in danger of being declared false !
The only illustration I can give, therefore, is of knowledge
falsely so-called, which is thought" to be useful, but is really
useless, and therefore false.'
' Even of that we should like an example.'
' I see, Plato, that you are willing to embroil me with most
of the philosophers in my world. For if I am to speak what
is in my mind, I must say that knowledge of the Absolute or,
what comes to the same, of the Unknowable, seems to me to
be of the kind you require. Aristotle, no doubt, might speak
similarly of your own Idea of the Good.'
' Oh, but I intended it to be supremely useful both in
knowledge and in action.'
' No doubt you did, but because you were not able to make
this plain, Aristotle would not admit it to be true.'
' We had better let bygones be bygones.'
' Very well ; let me in that case give you another example,
which now concerns us nearly, of knowledge which seems
false, because it seems useless. I mean knowledge about
the world in which we now are, regarded with the eyes of
those whom in a little while I shall no longer dare to call
benighted dwellers in the Cave. Until we can make our
world useful to them, it is false : I am a liar and you are the
unreal figments of my creative imagination.'
' You quite alarm me. Can you not devise a way, then,
whereby we might prove ourselves useful, and so existent,
to your friends ? '
' Certainly. Could you not appear at a meeting of the
Society for Psychical Kesearch and deliver a lecture, in your
beautiful Attic, on the immortality of the soul ? That would
be very useful ; it might induce some few really to concern
themselves with what is to befal them after death, and lead
them perhaps to amend their lives. I know the Secretary of
214 F. C. S. SCHILLEE :
the Society quite well, and I think we could arrange a good
meeting for you ! '
' Evfapei wvQpwire. I could not think of such a thing : it
would be too degrading. Besides, to tell you the truth, I
have long ceased to feel any practical interest in the generality
of men and their world. I would do something for you, but
you already know and do not need persuading. Can I not do
something to benefit you personally, whether it was useful,
and therefore convincing, to others or not ? '
' I suppose, Plato, it is conceivable that you could, if you
liked, but that it is very likely that you would not like.'
' I have already told you that I will do anything short of
mixing myself up with a world like yours. I once tried it,
soon after I came here, but I soon discovered that Herakleitos
was right in thinking that souls retained their power of
smell. Indeed, I suppose my nose must have become absurdly
sensitive, for I was driven back by the stench of blood before
I had got very far into its sphere. I simply could not go on.'
' I do not wonder. Things are as bad as ever in this respect,
except that we have grown more hypocritical about our
murders. But I can tell you how you could not only help
me, but even persuade the others.'
'How?'
' By useful knowledge.'
' Of what ? '
' Could you not by some divination predict to me what
horses were about to win what races, or what stocks were
going to rise or fall how far? Such knowledge would be
most useful and therefore truest by the admission of all
men : it would enable me to amass great riches and if I were
rich enough all would believe whatever I might choose to
say. Money talks, as the saying is, and none dare doubt
but that it speaks the truth. In this manner I might get
men to credit the whole story of my visit to you. For my
credit would then be practically limitless.'
' I suppose you are joking and do not seriously expect of
me anything so atrocious. Besides, why should you attribute
to me, or to any of those who have departed to higher spheres,
any such capacity for knowing what goes on in the world
we are glad to have abandoned ? '
' I am sure I don't know ; only that is what men com-
monly suppose about such matters. They think that there is
far more education in death than ever there was in life,
and that even the greatest fool, as soon as ever he is dead,
may be expected to be wise enough to know all things,
and good enough to place his knowledge at their disposal.'
' USELESS ' KNOWLEDGE. 215
' They seem to me as foolish as they are selfish.'
' No doubt ; still there is that germ of truth about their
action which we saw. Whatever knowledge cannot be
rendered somehow useful cannot be esteemed real.'
' Alas, that it should be so ! '
' I do not on the whole regret it, although I can see it
must annoy you to be considered as part of the non-existent
of which you always thought so meanly. But really I must
be going, and return to my Cave to convince, if possible, my
fellow Troglodytes that you still live and think, and to
impress on them, if I can, the importance of the " two-world
problem," both for its own sake and as an illustration of the
truth of Pragmatism.'
IV. THE KEYNOTE TO THE WORK OF
NIETZSCHE.
BY Dr. JULIUS GOLDSTEIN.
WHEN Nietzsche first became known in Germany, by an
article of the Danish literary historian Georg Brandes, the
general attitude of criticism towards him was that of derision,
and the way in which this criticism worked was by taking
words and sentences out of the logical connexion and putting
them together. The result was that Nietzsche's philosophy
was at first regarded as an ethical and intellectual mon-
strosity, in which light English people often consider it even
now. But in spite of this critical condemnation Nietzsche
secured hold of Modern German Literature. His aphor-
isms re-echoed in literary discussions, he was studied with
enthusiasm wherever in Germany the waves of the Modern
Literary Movement ran high. He became a public event.
Nietzsche exercised, and is still exercising, the same swaj 7
as Schopenhauer did forty years ago and Edward von Hart-
mann thirty years ago.
A second stage of criticism followed. Instead of flippant
and prejudiced derision on the one side and glorifying deifi-
cation on the other side, an appreciative and serious criticism
was inaugurated in which philosophers and theologians took
an active part. A new literature sprang up, analysing the
thoughts of Nietzsche and acknowledging in him the merit
of having propounded real and important new problems.
In England the criticism of Nietzsche has, generally speak-
ing, not yet arrived at the second stage. On the occasion of
his death newspapers and periodicals gave a more or less
comprehensive account of his life and writings, but in reading
all these articles and notes one had not the impression that
the writers had grasped the keynote of Nietzsche's work.
But this is indispensable, if a philosopher who is even para-
doxical for his own countrymen is to be understood in a
foreign country.
In this paper I shall try to point out this keynote of the
work of Nietzsche by showing that the chief problems which
THE KEYNOTE TO THE WOEK OF NIETZSCHE. 217
Nietzsche raised, far from being confined to the province of
esoteric German philosophy, are, on the contrary, of general
European interest. They belong to that universal range of
problems which have arisen out of the conflict between the
the one-sided radical movement of the nineteenth century and
ethico-religious idealism of the past, an idealism which has
had its most powerful historical realisation in Christianity,
to use that word in an undogmatical and broad sense. In
Germany this conflict has been carried on in the keenest
way. I shall therefore follow up the special evolution of
German thought in the second half of the nineteenth century ;
and inquire how it was that the teaching of Nietzsche arose.
This teaching is chiefly characterised by two features, the
" transvaluation of values" (Umwertung oiler Werte) and the
ideal of the " Overman " (Uebermensch) .
Before entering upon my subject I must remark that I do
not propose to exhaust all the sides of Nietzsche's many-
sidedness. My aim is to give in general terms a sort of
perspective view of the characteristic work of Nietzsche
without caring for the succession of his books or the various
stages of his thought. The first third of the nineteenth cen-
tury is the golden age of German philosophy and literature.
Carlyle then called the Germans the people of poets and
thinkers. At that time poetry and philosophy were the chief
interests of the Germans ; what is called in Germany "innere
Bildung " (self-culture) was the central point around which
gathered all the highest aspirations of the prominent person-
alities. This period found its fullest philosophical expression
in the system of Hegel who combines in his speculation all
the tendencies of his age. There was one great presuppo-
sition underlying the whole German idealistic movement :
Whatever is spiritual in man and mankind is the unfolding
of a Divine Spirit. In the history of art, religion, morality
and philosophy we have the gradual evolution of the spiritual
world basis. The process of the Universe is a spiritual one,
and this world of space and time is the appearance of a
spiritual world, the world of reality.
After the death of Hegel, his system broke down and with
it German idealism. The period of Materialism began. The
causes of this intellectual and spiritual revolution are not
only intellectual. The realistic side of life came into the
foreground. Its centre of gravity was removed to the in-
terests arising from our social existence. Natural Science,
after having emancipated itself from the arbitrary treatment
of speculation, brought to light those great discoveries which
have changed the face of the earth and the relations of the
218 DB. JULIUS GOLDSTEIN :
nations. Social and political ideals pushed aside the ideals
of "self-culture". A new philosophy arose out of the new
Zeitgeist, which had the deepest contempt for metaphysics,
hut which was nevertheless as metaphysical as Idealism.
Feuerbach, the first leader of the anti-Hegelian movement,
has expressed in a very neat way both his own conception
and the conception of his time: "God was the thought of
my youth, then came Reason, last of all came Man. He.
Man alone, is and must be our God. Outside of him Salva-
tion cannot be." It was in this subjectivistic theory of
religion that Materialism was first mirrored.
For Feuerbach God is only the projection of Man's wish,
Or, to put the matter antithetically :
Hegel says : Man is the product of God.
Feuerbach says : God is the product of Man.
Hegel maintains that Matter is the product of Spirit.
Feuerbach, like most of the post-Hegelian Materialists, turn-
ing Hegel topsy-turvy, maintains that Spirit is the product
of Matter. The mot of Feuerbach : " der Mensch ist was er
isst " (Man is what he eats), wittily expressed his position.
Marx, the founder of German Socialism, shows a similar
tendency in his materialistic philosophy of history. For
Hegel ideas are the moving forces in history ; for Marx ideas
are only the reflexion of the economical processes which
alone determine the historical evolution of Mankind.
Materialism was reinforced by influences from England.
The Darwinistic theory destroyed by its mechanical explana-
tion of organic forms the last bulwark of a teleological view of
the Universe. Darwin's book was received with enthusiasm
in Germany. What Darwin only very carefully and cautiously
tried to prove was taken up by his ardent devotee Ernst
Hackel in Jena as a new gospel. And with the new dogmas
of this gospel : evolution, struggle for life, selection, adapta-
tion, Hackel and his adherents made havoc with the old
outworn dogmas of the Christian Church. For them the
walls which divide Nature and Man had fallen ; there was
no longer an incomprehensible gulf between man and animal,
both belonged* to the same range of beings, both were like-
wise subject to the same laws of the Universe. Man no
longer occupied an exceptional place outside the infinite
concatenation of natural events.
This theory of evolution in its naturalistic form, which
has filled the aga with its triumphs, meant for its followers
a theoretical change in the province of science and philosophy
and a resignation of long-cherished hopes and beliefs ; among
them the belief in the immortality of the soul. But there
THE KEYNOTE TO THE WORK OP NIETZSCHE. 219
was a rich compensation for the loss of a transcendental
world the faith in the ascending evolution of mankind,
Hegel had ventured the daring saying: "Every form of
intelligence is real and everything real is a form of intelli-
gence". Hegel was right to say so, for he regarded the
world as the realisation of Reason. Naturalism however had
just destroyed the idea of a Universal Reason ; Naturalism
denied the existence and the work of Reason in the world.
Was that not the same as to abandon the Hegelian optimism ?
But feeling is much more conservative than understanding.
And the feelings of these men were still imbued with the
happy optimism of the Hegelian period. Therefore they
both held that the new creed of science was able to prop up
optimism with real facts. Science has proved so ran the
argument that man and this glorious civilisation had arisen
from the lowest stages of animal life, that man by his own
energy had in the long course of ages been able to work
himself up to his present high stage of culture. This truth
gives us reason enough to hope that man's power over
nature will go on increasing, and that so he will be able
finally to root out the evils which still distress mankind.
Men were dazzled by this ideal prospect ; their eyes were
blinded so that they could not see the dependence of their
optimism upon the idealism of Hegel. They were insensible
to the blow which Naturalism had dealt at the root of the
spiritual existence of man
But what if this prospect should turn out to be a phantas-
magoria ? What if Naturalism should prove a Janus head
whose other face looked as grim and gloomy as this face
looked bright? What if the very facts underlying their
theory were by similar inexorable logic shown to support a
dark pessimistic view of the universe and of man ?
That this was the case was proved by the pessimism of
Schopenhauer. Historically Schopenhauer is completely
independent of Darwin, but in the mind of those who
embraced the philosophy of Schopenhauer Darwinism only
reinforced pessimism.
Schopenhauer wrote his chief work, Die Welt als Wille und
Vorstellung, about 1817. Nobody noticed it. But in the
days of political failures it was the reactionary period after
1848 men felt more inclined to pessimistic views. For
Schopenhauer the world is the realisation, the objectification
of unreason, of an objectless, unconscious, unrelenting will.
He tried to prove his thesis empirically by bringing forward
all the seamy sides of life, by illustrating with an unrivalled
power of exposition the utter misery of the world and of man..
220 DR. JULIUS GOLDSTEIN :
Schopenhauer's doctrines laid hold on the mind of Nietzsche
in the strongest way. Nietzsche himself writes : " One day
I picked up the volume and I know not what demon said to
me : ' Take that book home '. I took it home, and throwing
myself with my new treasure into a corner of the sofa I
began to let the energetic gloomy genius work upon me."
In the course of his thinking Nietzsche dropped the meta-
physics of Schopenhauer, but he kept the pessimistic view.
The cheerful picture of a happier mankind which was to
arise in the course of evolution had no power over his mind.
Like his teacher, Schopenhauer, he did not believe in an
evolution leading to an increase of happiness. His pessimism
was reinforced by Darwinism and naturalistic philosophy.
He was deeply influenced by the grim-looking side of
Naturalism, that side which Huxley has depicted so vividly
in Evolution and Ethics.
Nietzsche's personality was full of religious fervour and
feeling ; he was brought up in a pious Protestant faith ; at
the same time he had an almost demoniacal craving after
truth, truth in its absolute and fullest sense. He had learnt
from Schopenhauer to put the questions : "Is life worth
living ? "What are the true values of life ? Has it any
valuable ends ? When such a personality comes face to
face with what was in his time the outcome of scientific
development what will happen ? Such a man will not see
the advantages which natural science has brought to man-
kind, he will not feel the intellectual joy excited by its
discoveries : his thoughts, his feelings, his whole being will
be hypnotised by the one point which naturalistic philosophy
has treated as accidental, as a matter of secondary import-
ance the breaking down of the idea of God or, as Nietzsche
has styled it, " the death of God ".
That Nietzsche made this outcome of the naturalistic
movement of the nineteenth century the starting-point of
all his ideas, of his whole philosophical work, secures him a
place among the original thinkers of mankind. Nietzsche
was the first to realise that mankind, abandoning the idea
of God, had changed its nature, and with God gone not only
mankind but reality itself had lost its old meaning. For
Nietzsche "the death of God" was an experience of more
than mere personal importance, it was the greatest historical
revolution which mankind had undergone. Through all his
books one can hear re-echoing the sound of the strife pro-
duced in his mind by* the " death of God ".
Let us listen to Nietzsche himself on this subject.
Nietzsche was not only a thinker but a great poet too ; he
THE KEYNOTE TO THE WORK OF NIETZSCHE. 221
did not give abstract formulas ; his artistic imagination lent
its gloomy colours to his ideas ; instead of a bare sentence
he gives a picture full of suggestions and passionate im-
pressiveness.
The passage which I am going to quote is an outburst of
despair on account of the death of God. It is to be found
in the Froehliche Wissenschaft, a book not yet translated into
English. Nietzsche introduces a madman who runs about
searching for God in broad daylight with a lantern, and
clamours thus :
" Where is God ? " he cried. " I will tell you. We have
killed him, you and I. We are all his murderers. But how
have we done it ? How have we drunk up the waters of the
sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the whole
horizon ? What have we done when we unchained this
earth from its sun ? Whither goes it now ? Away from all'
suns ? Are we not ever on the brink of a catastrophe, con-
tinually stumbling? Backwards, sidewards, forwards in
every direction ? Is there still an over or under ? Are we
not straying through a never-ending Naught ? Is it not
getting colder? Does not the darkness grow deeper and
deeper? Hear we nothing yet of the noise of the grave-
diggers who bury God ? God is dead ! God remains dead
and we have killed him. How shall we console ourselves ?
The worst of all murderers ! Our Holiest and Mightiest has
bled to death under our own knives ! Is not the greatness of
this deed too great for us ? "
Nietzsche was well aware that the greatness of the event
was not felt by his contemporaries. Therefore he regards it
as his task to follow out its consequences relentlessly and as
he has put it " even if it should lead to crime " (" radical bis
zum Verbrechen "). His books, Horgenroete, Froehliche Wis-
senschaft, Genealogie der Moral, Jenseits von Gut und Bose, are
devoted to this task.
In brief his reflexions on the breakdown of Christian
religion run as follows : Naturalism maintains that the
world with which natural science deals is the only real
world. If this is generally accepted as it was in the second
half of the nineteenth century and sometimes nowadays-
then all the ideas and tendencies which connect the life of
man with a spiritual world are wrong and must therefore be
destroyed. Eeligion and especially Christianity must fall ;
for the very possibility of Eeligion depends on the reality of
an invisible transcendental world, a metaphysical background
of life. This last, having turned out to be only imaginary,
Christianity in its broadest sense has ceased to exist.
222 DR. JULIUS GOLDSTEIN :
This consequence Nietzsche held in common with other
prominent personalities of his age. I may remind the reader
of the then famous book of David Strauss, The Old and the
New Creed. The old Creed is Christianity, the new Creed is
Naturalism. Strauss, the famous theologian, boldly takes the
side of the new creed, going to the root of the matter with
the question : Are we still Christians ? which he answers
in the negative.
But Nietzsche did not stop here. Christianity is not an
isolated fact. It has passed through a history of nearly 2,000
years and it has filled this history with its moral " values ".
The highest and loftiest ideals have sprung from the Chris-
tian belief in a Universal Justice, a moral order of the world.
How are we to preserve these moral values if Christianity
with its metaphysical presuppositions is to fall? Here we
are in the centre of the most stirring problem of the present.
All other serious thinkers who have denied the metaphysical
foundation of Christianity were eager to preserve its moral
values. Mill, e.g., in his most interesting essays on Keligion
is wrestling with this problem and finally conies to the con-
clusion that the Christian values are to be preserved. But
this result is brought about more by his good intention and
utilitarian habit of thought than by logical reasoning on his
part.
Nietzsche takes boldly the side of logical reasoning and
denies the standard of Christian morality, denies the ruling
moral values as being based upon imaginary presupposi-
tions. This is the origin of his famous demand for a ' trans-
valuation of all values ' (Umwertung aller Werte) which means
on the one side an ethical iconoclasm directed against
Christian values and on the other side a creating of new
values compatible with the modern presuppositions of
Naturalism. This dependence of ethics on metaphysics is a
thoroughly German tendency of Philosophy. The idea of
<l transvaluation of values" ceases to be paradoxical if one
keeps in mind the line of thought by which Nietzsche had
been led to it. The reproach of immorality which has been
cast upon his aphorisms is quite illogical, for the moral con-
demnation is based upon those Christian values the validity
of which Nietzsche denies.
I desire to impress upon the reader the necessity by which
Nietzsche was driven to this revolutionary idea. It was not
personal idiosyncrasy, it was not caprice, but it was the
logical outcome of Naturalism. Consider the Universe in
the light of Christianity and in the light of Naturalism.
Christianity fully acknowledges a mechanical system of
THE KEYNOTE TO THE WOBK OF NIETZSCHE. 223
Nature, but it maintains that by the mechanical laws a
reasonable and valuable end is brought about.
Naturalism regards the Universe as a mechanical system
without any meaning or end. Now consider man ! Accord-
ing to Christianity or to any philosophical idealism man
though forming part of the system of nature belongs on his
spiritual side to a Divine Keality. According to Naturalism
man is an animal among other animals. All that appears
spiritual to him must be reduced to the level of physiology
and biology. The real being of man is to be found in these
two sciences.
It is not necessary to go on comparing the two views.
'They are radical contraries and the difficulty naturally arises
as to how the man who is a mere animal though a refined
one can continue to have the same ethical values and ideals
as before. Man and his life had a meaning on the idealistic
view of the world. This view cannot stand its ground before
the claims of science. Man as an animal or, as Nietzsche
has called him, as a "valuing animal" has no values, no
meaning until now, his old " table of values " being broken.
Nietzsche takes up the position of a new priest of a man-
kind bereft of God. He, Nietzsche, will give to mankind
new values, a new goal for the historical evolution the
" Uebermensch ".
We have arrived at Thus Spake Zarathustra.
In .Thus Spake Zarathustra Nietzsche tries to give an
answer to the question which he has raised in the Mor-
yenroete ; " When al], customs and morals are finally de-
stroyed upon which rests the power of gods, priests, and
saviours, when, therefore, morality in its old sense shall have
died then comes what will then come ? " Zarathustra, the
mouthpiece of Nietzsche, has found an answer in his solitude
and he is going to bring his new gospel to men. When
stepping down from his mountains he meets an old hermit.
"And what doth the Saint in the forest?" asked Zara-
thustra.
The saint answered : "I make songs and sing them and
making songs I laugh, cry, and hum. I praised God thus
. . . ' When Zarathustra was alone, however, he spake
thus into his heart :
" Can it actually be possible ! This old saint in his forest
has not yet heard aught of God's being dead ! " And Zara-
thustra goes on preaching the death of God, and the new god
he brings, the " Uebermensch," a god whom man himself
is summoned to create.
A new period in history begins for Nietzsche with this
224 DR. JULIUS GOLDSTEIN :
preaching of Zarathustra. Nietzsche looks at history ;t<
passing through three stages which he characterises hy the
symbols of the camel, the lion and the child.
The spirit of the Christian past is like a camel laden with
the load of " Thou shalt ". This " Thou shalt " contains all
those values which are against the natural instincts of man.
Truth for truth's sake, justice for justice's sake are Christian
values or, as philosophy styles them, " absolute values ".
These values belong to the spiritual side of man. Christi-
anity maintains that by following them man's life is lifted
up in a higher sphere of reality.
But the age of Christianity is past for Nietzsche. There
is no reality beyond the world of space and time. The
spiritual world of idealism is naught and absolute value^
have no meaning.
This knowledge leads to the second age of history, the age
of destruction, the symbol of which is the lion. The spirit
must become a lion to tear asunder the trammels which the
Christian age has laid upon the natural instincts of man.
The aim of this age of transition is to inspire man with the
courage to follow his natural instincts. Therefore Nietzsche
glorifies the criminal not for his being a criminal but because
he acts on principles which are not Christian. Nietzsche
takes the criminal as a testimony that Nature is not com-
pletely extinguished in man, " To create freedom for new
creation for that the lion's power is enough ".
But after this age of necessary destruction the Spirit must
become a child. " The child is innocence and oblivion, a
new starting, a play, a wheel rolling by itself, a prime motor,
a holy asserting." With these poetical terms Nietzsche
introduces the third age, which has done away with all de-
pendencies on the past, with all metaphysical prejudices,
an age, where, as Dr. Alex. Tille has rightly put it, " Physi-
ology is the sole arbiter, on what is great and what is small,
what is good and what is bad, where physiological ascent or
decline is the last judgment of moral action. This moral
standard is beyond good and evil in the sense of our traditional
morality.
This third age is to become the age of the " Uebermensch '"
who is ruled by one great passion " the will for power ". In
the " Uebermensch " Nietzsche gathers together all the posi-
tive features of the new ideal which he has in his mind.
But the attempt to cut off all dependence upon the past
is a vain one. In the picture of the " Uebermensch " many
of the old values glide in unconsciously. Despite of certain
expressions of Nietzsche which seem at first sight to point
THE KEYNOTE TO THE WORK OF NIETZSCHE. 225
in that direction, the common mistake which treats the
Overman as a mere beast of prey was far removed from
Nietzsche's intention ; for the " Uebermensch " has earned
for himself the right to exercise power. He has the great-
ness which exacts submission and he has learnt to govern
himself even by renunciation. There is something of the
spirit of Goethe as he portrays the ideal-man in his poem
"Die Geheimnisse" breathing again in the ideal of this
latest, most unclassical and most romantic figure of German
literature.
Nietzsche has two different views as to how the " Ueber-
mensch " conies into existence. The one view has a Dar-
winistic colouring. Nietzsche believes in the possibility of
breeding a new species of man. As man has followed the
ape in biological evolution, so the " Uebermensch " as a
higher biological being has to follow man, not by a happy
chance of nature, but by the creative will of man, by means
of a hereditary aristocracy. But this ideal is practically
impossible, for the change of one species into another pre-
supposes thousands of years. It is further a very doubtful
question whether acquired qualities are inherited from
generation to generation. Genius is mostly not hereditary.
The other conception of the " Uebermensch " is to be found
in the "Antichrist". Here Nietzsche maintains that man
is a biological end. The "Uebermensch" has only relative
significance a being who is a superior by his qualities,
coming out as a chance product in historical e'volution.
In postulating the " Uebermensch " Nietzsche represents
the reaction against the democratic tendencies of his age.
Thus Spake Zarathustra and most of his other books contain
a spirited criticism of contemporary thought and life. But
Nietzsche has not given positive ideals which can be followed.
That lies in the nature of the subject. Nietzsche is the most
unhistorical thinker of the nineteenth century. A philoso-
pher who thinks that it is possible to begin history anew,
who looks at Christianity as an historical faux pas has not
learnt the lesson of our age of history. He holds the belief
of the " Aufklaerung," that by the arbitrary will and action
of a single man history can take another course.
Nietzsche's importance lies more in his suggesting general
tendencies which present a sound antagonism to stereotyped
prejudices. It is his struggling with the problems of the
present rather than his positive results which makes the sig-
nificance of Nietzsche. He does not belong to those philo-
sophers who have given new truths to mankind, but to those
who have aroused mankind by putting new questions. He
15
226 DR. J. GOLDSTEIN : KEYNOTE TO NIETZSCHE'S WORK.
has thrown back German philosophy upon the ultimate pro-
blems of our spiritual and moral life, and by doing so he has
given a new impetus to the revival of philosophical idealism
whose symptoms can be recognised in the German speculation
of the present.
He has seized hold of men by the impetuous passion and
fierce enthusiasm with which he treats the problems of his
time. His time has to face the problems especially the
religious one which he has formulated in a new and start-
ling way. In this sense we may apply to Nietzsche the
saying of Hegel: "The condemnation which a great man
lays upon the world is to force it to explain him ".
V. CKITICAL NOTICES.
Miinsterberg's Grundzilge der Psychologic. Band i., Allgemeiner
Teil. Die Prinzipien der Psychologic. Leipzig, 1900. Pp.
vii., 565.
PROF. MUNSTERBEBG'S work, which though nominally a "first
part " is really logically complete in itself, is a courageous attempt
to determine on first principles the relation of psychology to
the other sciences, physical and mental, to practical life, and to
philosophy. The importance of the subject as well as the
eminence of the writer should ensure it careful study on the part
both of psychologists and of philosophers. The main object of
the book, as the author observes in the preface, is polemical ; it is
intended as an "idealist" manifesto against "naturalism" in
philosophy. More definitely, it aims at a synthesis of analytical
and empirical psychology with Fichtean philosophy. Empirical
psychology of the most rigidly atomistic type is to have its right
to existence fully conceded, but at the same time the reality of the
individual self and its ethical purposes, which analysis appears to
dissolve, is to be secured by showing on " epistemological " grounds
that atomistic psychology deals from first to last with scientific ab-
stractions bearing no direct relation to actual life. The program
is an attractive one, and with the author's general position most
readers, except those who are themselves phenomenalists of a
crude type, will probably sympathise. For two things at least
are certain ; that the advance of analytic psychology cannot be
arrested by any arbitrary ne plus ultra of the moralist or meta-
physician, and that either analytic psychology does not directly
deal with realities or else the highest human interests are pre-
eminently illusory. If we are not to sit down with this un-
comfortable and unphilosophical conclusion we must somehow
find a way of safeguarding the rights of both analytic psychology
and constructive philosophy. It does not, however, follow that
we can all acquiesce in the details, or even in the general outlines,
of Prof. Miinsterberg's solution of the problem, and precisely
because of the importance of the subject it will perhaps be most
profitable to devote the greater part of the present article to the
indication of points of difficulty and possible divergence from the
author. Some of my difficulties may perhaps be due to a reviewer's
misunderstanding of his author's meaning, for Prof. Miinsterberg's
NOTICES:
book is by uo means easy reading, but others, I trust, will be
found suggestive of serious philosophical questions. And first,
a word as to one or two general features of the book. Prof.
Miinsterberg, it will be seen, is above all things " epistemological "
in his methods ; Erkentnisstheorie and its requirements figure on
many, if not most, pages of his book. I am forced to say that
some of the erkentnisstheoretisch doctrines he enunciates tend to
strengthen a suspicion or prejudice to the effect that Erkentniss-
theorie is another name for irresolute and half-hearted metaphysics.
But of this more in detail directly. A second peculiarity with
which some of us, who are in general sympathy with the writer's
aims, may find it hard to agree is his constant insistence on the
alleged primacy of the volitional element in our nature. Of this
also I shall have more to say below. For the present it may be
observed that the " primacy of will," if it be a truth, can only be
established by metaphysics ; nothing is proved by merely appealing
to the importance of the volitional aspect for practical life, or its
priority in development.
To proceed, however, to a more detailed examination of the
author's argument. In chapter i. we have a preliminary sketch
of the present-day tendencies in psychology, which leads up
gradually to Prof. Miinsterberg's fundamental distinction be-
tween two types of science, the objectifying and the subjectify-
ing. Objectifying sciences deal, in his view, with objects which
merely "are," "are there" or "are given" apart from any
relation to the purposes and interests of the self, in fact with
physical and psychical processes conceived simply as processes,
and apart from their "value" or "meaning" for an acting sub-
ject. The method of such sciences is that of description and
its necessary complement, causal explanation by means of general
laws. " Subjectifying" sciences, on the other hand, deal not with
" what is " or " what is given," but with the meaning and worth
of things for subjects which are essentially active ; thus they are
concerned not with " existence " as such, but with " values," and
their method is not description of processes but " understanding "
and "interpretation" of meanings. (Thus one might say the
distinction amounts to a restatement of the antithesis between
mechanical and teleological science.) Now Prof. Miinsterberg's
main thesis is that while psychology is an " objectifying " science,
the various Geisteswissenschaften, history, aesthetics, etc., are "sub-
jectifying ". Psychology, that is, describes mental processes viewed
simply as processes forming a part of the world of ''given" or
" existing " events, and in entire abstraction from their " meaning "
as conveying the purposes of active selves ; history, for instance,
deals with the same things, but solely in their character as
expressions of intelligent purpose, as Erlebnisse des Subjekts, and
does not describe, but "interprets" and evaluates them. Thus
history remains in the main true to the original practical attitude
of the self to the world ; psychology, on the other hand, cannot
Miinsterberg, Grwndziige <ter Psychologic* 229
exist until the "real" world of purposes and interests has been
replaced, for scientific purposes, by a corresponding but unreal
world of events and processes which " are " but do not " mean ".
The logical motives of this intellectual transformation are subse-
quently discussed in chapter ii.
Now as to psychology, it is not my purpose to dispute what
indeed seems to me in the main an admirable account of the
difference between the world of actual life and the realm of scien-
tific abstraction. But with respect to history and the other
Geistesivissenschaften, I should like to suggest that one and all
depend upon a similar "transformation," only to a different degree,
and that the " subjectifying " attitude spoken of by Prof. Miinster-
berg really belongs to practical life alone as opposed to every kind
of science. Can there, in fact, be any science which deals with
mental events as Erlebnisse des Subjekts ? Or does not siich a cut-
ting of the mental event loose from immediate feeling as all scientific
study of it implies already involve the beginnings of the abstrac-
tion which becomes complete in analytic psychology? E.g., Caesar
is, of course, to the historian something much less abstract than
the " self" which psychology takes to pieces, but Caesar is not to
the historian what he is to Pompey or Crassus a rival personality
towards whom one must first and foremost take up a practical
attitude of co-operation or opposition but, pace Prof. Miinsterberg,
a " something given " and demanding description. To demand
that the historian shall treat, e.g., the crossing of the Eubicon, not
as an event bo be described, but as an Erlebniss of the subject,
seems to amount to demanding that Caesar's historian shall be
himself a Caesar. No doubt there is a sense in which' no one but a
Caesar can "understand" Caesar, but "understanding" in this
sense being really what Prof. Miinsterberg maintains all "under-
derstanding " is, a re-living of the experience understood belongs
to the poet or to the historian just in so far as his work is poetic
and not " scientific ". The true antithesis is not so much between
the sciences which " understand " and those which " describe," as
between science, which can only describe with more or less con-
creteness, and the intuition of the poetic genius who "understands ".
In short, Prof. Miinsterberg does not seem to have shown that the
difference between the Geisteswissenschaften and Psychology on
this point is one of fundamental method. His assumption that
analysis into atoms is the one and only method of " description "
may fairly be called in question. Is anatomy, then, the only
possible " description " of living organisms ? And if so, how shall
we class Natural History ?
To criticise his classification thus is not, be it remarked, to con-
cede that history and society are mere forms of applied psychology,
or that psychology is the " foundation " of all the mental sciences.
Chemistry and mechanics are both, in Prof. Miinsterberg's termin-
ology, " descriptive " in their methods. This is not, however,
enough to prove that chemical processes are really merely mechan-
'230 CRITICAL NOTICES :
ical. Similarly, history and psychology may both " describe "
mental realities and yet the individuals who figure as units in the
historian's description may be incapable of complete analysis into
complexes of mental processes. Prof. Miinsterberg has perhaps
been led astray on this point by a failure in his metaphysics. For
we find him at page 38 incidentally maintaining that the logical
reconstruction of an individual object of perception out of general
concepts, though complicated and difficult, is not in principle im-
possible. He forgets, that is, that the "individuality" of the
perceived object lies precisely in that direct contact with imme-
diate feeling which all conceptual analysis and reconstruction
must begin by abolishing.
In chapter ii. we reach the author's formal exposition of his own
fundamental philosophical view. The problem is to explain the
logical motives which lead to the transformation of the " values "
of actual experience into the " given " and " valueless " objects of
abstract science, and to assign to psychology in particular its special
place among the sciences which depend for their existence upon
this transformation. And here, again, in the midst of much that
is most suggestive and admirable, one is constantly haunted by a
suspicion of Prof. Miinsterberg's metaphysics. What Mr. Bradley 7
has called the commonest of metaphysical blunders, the setting up
of alternatives which are not mutually exclusive, meets us re-
peatedly in the course of the argument. Thus we find it tacitly
assumed at the outset (p. 45) that either we may view mental life as
a teleological unity, or from the standpoint of scientific psychology,
but not both at once. But is it so manifest after all that all descrip-
tive science must be " atomistic " ? Would a physicist, e.g., admit
that only " atomistic " hypotheses are scientific in physics ? And
if he w r ould not, why must the restriction be imposed on psy-
chology ? To pass on to a more important point. The fundamental
antithesis between the actual and the scientific worlds wdth Prof.
Miinsterberg is that in the actual world things do not " exist,"
they have "values" orare "valid"; forthe "objectifying" sciences
they have no "values," they merely "exist". Indeed he even
pushes this antithesis so far as to speak of the objects of direct
experience as " not being, but having validity " (p. 60). Now
it is clear that the starting point for this distinction is a correct
and important reflexion ; it is quite true the objects with which
we make acquaintance in real life are not objects merely pre-
sented," without relation to our practical needs and impulses, and
that reaction rather than description is what they demand of us.
It is also true that in physics and psychology we treat the world
in abstraction from this practical relation to the willing subject.
But it is overstraining an antithesis when we are told that it is
only for abstract science that things are existents. For practical
life, no doubt, things are much more than mere existents, but " not
mere A " and " not A " must be carefully distinguished. Prof.
Miinsterberg, in fact, falls into the error of treating " existence "
Munsterberg, Grwiidzuge der Psychologic. 231
as the predicate of a judgment (p. 56), and lays himself open to
the awkward question whether the imaginary hundred dollars of
Kant have not as much "worth" or "validity" as the real hundred
dollars, only that unfortunately they do not " exist ".
Incidentally this antithesis between the actual and the existent
involves consequences of some importance in psychology. In the
first place, if all that has to do with the teleological unity of con-
sciousness and the position taken up by the subject towards the
giver is to be excluded from psychology, as forming part of the
world of " values," we are committed from the outset to a psycho-
logical doctrine of the most extreme ' presentational ' type, without
any adequate theory of attention, or of the teleological character
of perception. In the second, it is hard to see what psychology,
as defined by Prof. Miinsterberg, is to make of the whole realm
of instinct and impulse. In the third, we may doubt if the feeling
side of consciousness is likely to get much recognition. Prof.
Miinsterberg, as we shall see, exhibits great ingenuity in his
attempts to escape from these restrictions, but his ingenuity can-
not disguise the fact that he has imposed them on himself by his
initial metaphysical assumption that what "exists" is not "valid,"
and what is " valid " is not " existent ".
To the question what is the logical motive for the creation of
the "objectifying" sciences Prof. Miinsterberg gives the answer
that it must be sought in the practical necessity of learning to
anticipate the future. If we are to adjust our behaviour to our
environment in advance at all, we cannot avoid asking ourselves
how things will behave, assuming that we do not interfere with
them, and the attempt to answer this question brings us at once
face to face with the useful, though fictitious, concept of a world
of things independent of the activity of a self, which merely " are
there " or " are to be found " in experience. In principle this
solution of the problem is no doubt correct, but it might be sug-
gested that it scarcely allows enough importance to the instinct
of intellectual curiosity which seems to exist in us. In ordinary
every-day life itself, certain experiences seem to interest us simply
in virtue of their own quality, apart from any further relation to
our practical ends, and so far as this is the case, it might be
contended that " pure experience " as well as science, though
not to the same degree, presents us with at least some objects
which are merely "found" or "existent". More important is the
author's answer to the next question with which he deals. In the
realm of pure abstract sciences what is the true basis for the
distinction between physical and psychical objects ? This basis is
found in the ultimate difference between that which is, at least
potentially, a common object to many consciousnesses (the physical),
and that which from its own nature is directly an object only to
one consciousness (the psychical). The physical and the psychical
objects alike presuppose an ego or subject as their correlate ; the
peculiarity of the psychical object is that it can only be experienced
by one such subject (p. 72).
232 CKITICAL NOTICES:
Two points in connexion with this definition seem to call for
some examination. As to the nature of the "subject" of ex-
perience presupposed by both physical and psychical science
we are told that it cannot be the "actual" self of real life, nor
can it be any hypothetical self conceived of as exercising an
influence upon the course of consciousness ; it must be a mere
passive spectator of the current of psychical events, a merely
logical bond of connexion (pp. 71-72). Now if this be admitted,
it follows of course that scientific psychology and atomistic
associationism are the same thing ; but is there any good reason
for the admission? Granting to the full that the "self" of
psychology is not the concrete " self " of real life, but a creation
of abstraction, why must it be purged in this ruthless way of
all teleological unity ? Because .a self, however abstractly con-
ceived, which has unity of purpose and structure, cannot be an
object of " description " ? By a similar process of reasoning it
might be maintained that physics has no right to the idea of
energy or its conservation. If you analyse a given material into
its constituent parts, you will nowhere come upon its energ3 r as
one constituent, side by side with its component particles ; by
comparing the successive states of the material you discover the
presence throughout the succession of a constant which is not
an element but a form of relation of the elements. Similarly it
may well be that the simplest psychological processes cannot be
adequately described in terms of the elements found by analysis
only ; we may need to introduce into our description some per-
manent form of relation between the elements of which the process
is composed, and this form of relation may be found to "be in
general of a teleological character. Psychology, in that case, may
retain its character as an abstract and " descriptive " science, but
its " descriptions " will not be restricted to being enumerations of
atomic elements ; they will, like the descriptions of every other
science, involve the characteristic forms of relation belonging to
the processes described. Prof. Miinsterberg's determination that
the descriptions of psychology shall include nothing like the
teleological unity of attention as one of their terms seems to lead
him into a serious paradox. He frequently insists that the " con-
sciousness " studied by psychology, unlike the selves of real life,
has neither knowledge nor will. Its states are merely there ; it
has them, and they succeed each other according to certain
mechanical laws, but it knows no object and wills no result by
means of them. What, in real life, we should call the " meaning "
of a thought becomes for the psychologist merely the fact that state
A is mechanically effective in setting up state B by association.
Undoubtedly if the atomistic assumptions already made are correct,
the consequence is inevitable, and Prof. Miinsterberg is highly to
be commended for the courage and candour with which he has
drawn it. But what remains for psychology to do, when once
it has found its elements ? Can we give any intelligible account
Munsterberg, ffrwndziige der Psychologie. '233
of any typical perceptual or volitional process in terms of these
states which mean nothing and exist for a subject with none but a
purely logical unity ? Or to take a single test case ; if psychology
translates " meaning " into a sequence of associated ideas, must
we not say that her translation is not merely inadequate but
radically false and therefore useless ?
Less paradoxical, though still not convincing, is the contention
that the psychical object from its very nature, has no causal con-
nexion with other psychical objects (p. 88). The reasoning by
which this result is reached appears to turn on an unconscious
amphibology. The psychical is denned as that which can only be
experienced by one subject ; causal relation is then rightly declared
to be an identity between the contents of a plurality of experiences,
and it is inferred that the psychical, because only experienced by
one "subject-act," cannot exhibit sucli an identity in diversity. I
trust I do not misrepresent the author's meaning, but I confess
myself unable to follow his argument. It appears, however, that
he is partly influenced by the conception of causality as essentially
something to be expressed in the form of a kinematical equation.
I would suggest, on this point, that it is of the essence of causality
not to be expressible as a relation between quantities. Whenever
the advance of mathematical physics makes it possible to substitute
for a relation between the qualitatively diverse an equation be-
tween quantitative aspects of a continuous process, the distinction
between cause and effect, and with it the category of causality,
seems to lose its applicability.
I have dealt with some of the fundamental questions of principle
raised by Prof. Miinsterberg's first two chapters at such length
that I must pass very hurriedly over the three following chapters
which expound the views as to the relation of psychology to the
historical and the normative sciences and to practical life already
familiar to English readers of the author's Psychology and Life.
These views will in the main be most acceptable to all who are
convinced of the hypothetical and abstract character of psycho-
logical science and the consequent impossibility of its taking the
place of direct experience and concrete knowledge of men. It is
specially gratifying to find a psychologist of Prof. Miinsterberg's
eminence protesting so vigorously against the current delusion
that the psychological text- book and laboratory will give the
teacher the clue to the inmost workings of his pupil's mind.
And how timely is the warning to the teacher who proposes to
treat his pupils as "subjects" for experimentation, that at best
the loss may be greater than the gain ! "To the educator the
scholar is an individual subject, not a bundle of psychical ele-
ments. Tact and sympathy, interest and patience, in which the
immediate relation of will to will reveals itself are more valuable
for education than the cleverest calculations based on psycho-
logical constructions " (p. 197).
I cannot however omit to call attention to the strange paradoxes-
234 CBITICAL NOTICES:
of Prof. Miinsterberg's account of history as affording an illustration
of the lengths to which he is forced to go in consequence of hasty
and inadequate metaphysics. History (p. 125) deals with realities
which are timeless, and (pp. 117, 129) have no causal connexions.
As how? Marry, thus. History deals with intelligent purposes
and their relations to one another ; but acts of will are timeless,
and the relation of the various purposes which compose society
to one another is teleological and therefore not mechanical. Now
with the alleged timelessness of acts of will we shall have to
deal later on ; yet even now it is surely manifest that, whether
timeless or not in their own nature, human purposes only con-
stitute the material of history in so far as they are gradually realised
in the process of events. A divine purpose realised " from the
foundations of the world " would have no history. Or, to take
the author's own illustration and turn it against himself, the
German Empire is a teleological system of purposes, but a History
of the Empire must do much more than analyse the system into
its parts ; it must exhibit the successive stages by which it has
been created. What does not do this is no History. In fact we
have the old metaphysical error over again. What is not mere
temporal succession is taken to be not successive at all. So
with the exclusion of causal explanations from history. If the
relation between wills is not adequately expressed by the category
of causal determination it is taken to be not causal at all. We
are offered our choice, " either causal explanation or teleological,"
and no account is taken of the possibility that the alternatives may
not be exclusive, but that both causality and teleology may be
applications though at different levels of a single principle. So
long as this possibility remains undisposed of, it is a manifest
petitio principii to assume that a given science must be confined
to the employment of either system of categories.
With the sixth chapter we enter on the second main division
of the book, the enumeration and classification of the "psychical
objects". In chapters vi.-ix. Prof. Miinsterberg deals successively
with the relation of the psychical to consciousness, to space and
time, the dimensions of the "psychical manifold," and the "de-
scription of psychical objects ". From the methodological position
previously adopted it follows at once that for him the "self" of
psychology must be purely passive, a mere name for the common
logical character of psychical objects as existing only for " one "
consciousness. All influence of the "subject" upon the order of
its states must be rigidly excluded, and all psychical processes
reduced to changes in the objects or contents of this qualityless
consciousness. The " synthesis of the manifold " is never a func-
tion of the psychological subject (p. 209) ; " consciousness can
have no other function than to become conscious of its contents,
all active forces must, from the standpoint of psychology, rest in
the content and not in the subject ". Hence a scientific psy-
chology must deal with all problems of attention as "changes in
Munaterberff, Grundzuye der Psychologic. 235
the object " (p. 214), in other words, must be atomistic and in
general character associationist. I have already tried to show the
invalidity of the methodological and metaphysical foundations of
this theory, and need only add that the inference from the analogy
of physical science (pp. 204-205) seems to rest upon the questionable
assumption that the " psychical object," like the objects of physics,
is the sum of its parts and nothing more.
From the psychologist's point of view we may fairly ask whether
Prof. Mlinsterberg's program is really capable of execution. Can
we, for instance, find room within the limits prescribed us for so
much as a passable substitute for the selective attention which
characterises all actual mental life? Or, to put the question of
principle in its most general form, can what is " in " the mind be
satisfactorily identified with what is " before " it ? In England, at
any rate, the marked tendency of contemporary psychological
thought seems to give a decided negative to the suggestion. The
same conclusion seems forced upon us by consideration of Prof.
.Minister berg's own thorough-going and consistent statement of the
consequences of his doctrine. The " subject " of psychology, being
a purely logical fiction, has neither unity, permanence, nor multi-
plicity (p. 210 If.). The self of real life has a teleological unity, is
one, because its system of aims and purposes is one. The "con-
tents" of the consciousness studied by the psychologist have a
mechanical unity, being rigidly connected in a single causal system ;
but the " subject " for which they are " contents " has neither the
one nor the other. Incidentally the author seems here to bear
witness against himself ; the unity of aim which he rightly regards
as the foundation of real personal identity is not necessarily or even
normally always present to consciousness ; indeed it may require
the minutest scrutiny of the biographer or historian to make its
reality apparent. My conduct may be most true to my inmost
ideals where I least suspect it. Thus for real life and, therefore,
why not for psychology? what is "before" the mind by no
means exhausts what is "in" it.
Similar reflexions are suggested by the searching criticism of the
concept of " unconscious " states. The unconscious, as the author
well says, must not be used as a " collective explanation of unsolved
biological problems," but may only be introduced into psychology so
far as specially psychological facts appear to warrant. Even here,
however, an unfortunate metaphysical afterthought is not absent
from the immediately following proposition, " the physical must be
explained in physical terms ". For as the context shows, the
author's meaning is " purposive physiological processes must be
explained in terms of mechanism," a proposition by no means of
axiomatic evidence. Among psychological facts Prof. Miinsterberg
finds, after an admirable examination of current confusions on this
head, two main classes which suggest the possible existence of un-
conscious psychical states : (a) the facts of oblivescence and subse-
quent recollection ; (b) the processes of apperception. As to the
2'M CRITICAL NOTICES:
first class it is easily shown that the tendency to treat the " idea "
which has vanished from consciousness as still existing " below the
threshold" is partly at least due to unconscious materialism; we
have no right to transfer the doctrine of the conservation of mass
to psychology, and until the general question of the nature of the
causal connexion between mental states has been answered, it
must be left an open question whether the representative of an
idea no longer in consciousness is an unconscious "psychical dis-
position " or a purely physiological state. Again, in the various
forms of apperception, where subsequent attention and analysis
result in the detection of the previously unobserved, as when the
partial-tones of a musical instrument are detected with the aid of
a resonator, we have no genuine " unconscious " ; in other cases,
we have no right to identify the unconscious factors which de-
termine the course of experience with psychical dispositions rather
than physiological states until we have discussed the whole problem
of psycho-physical connexion. Thus there remains no satisfactory
ground for assuming the existence of unconscious mental states,
and psychology is entirely the theory of "the contents of con-
sciousness " (p. 230). Brilliant as all this is, it leaves the question
unanswered whether the forward-looking selective character of all
perceptual activity does not constitute an " unconscious," if the
" conscious " is to be reduced, as by Prof. Miinsterberg, to a serif-
of atomic "contents ".
Prof. Miinsterberg's treatment of the relation of the psychical
to space and time is one of the most striking pieces of analysis
in the book, and will be, no doubt, found most suggestive even by
those who cannot entirely subscribe to his results. Contrary to
the popular opinion in psychology he holds that the psychical is
non-temporal as well as non-spatial. The activity of the real
subject of concrete life is " out of time," because it is, so to say.
the fixed point with reference to which all that happens is located
as past, present or future ; events are past, present or future,
according to their relation to the direction of the subject's activity :
to ask whether that activity itself is past, present or future, is
unmeaning. Again in the psychologist's world of abstractions, the
" states of consciousness " are themselves non-temporal. Just as,
though A is to the right or left of B, there is no sense in asking
whether my percept of A is right or left of my percept of B, so
there is no sense in asking whether the thought of A is before
or after the thought of B. In the only sense in which thoughts
have position in time they have also position in space, riz., in
so far as they accompany ph\ rnological processes which are both
spatial and temporal. In short, the objects which are in time and
space are exclusively physical. Subtle as this argument for the
" eternal self " is, it appears to rest throughout on questionable
metaphysics. This is incidental!}' revealed by the author's own
language when he is driven to speak of " tendencies " of the self
which are not in time, and of a " Wechsel der Vorstellungen "
.\fnii.ster!>ery, (IrHinhji^e der Psycholcgie. 237
which is not a succession, and even more strikingly when he
tells us of physiological processes (themselves, be it remembered,
admittedly in time), which " accompany " the timeless ideas. For
what can this companionship mean if it does not mean simul-
taneity? The positive arguments for the timelessness of mental
life do not appear very conclusive. Because it is senseless to say
that the thought of A. is to the right or left of the thought of B,
does it follow that I cannot intelligibly say, apart from all reference
to cerebral processes, " I have been thinking about Plato and am
now thinking of Prof. Miinsterberg " ? Bather than pronounce
such a judgment unmeaning I would, if the Professor's dilemma
seemed a sound one, admit that mental states are extended in
space as well as in time. But the dilemma itself is probably
fallacious. Experience will teach us all that there is this marked
difference between the relation of the psychical to space and to
time ; except in the sense of cerebral localisation, no one has
ever dreamed of there being a spatial connexion between two
thoughts about non-spatial objects, while every one knows at once
what we mean by saying that of two thoughts about non-temporal
objects one came before or after the other.
If the psychical object has neither spatial nor temporal exten-
sion, it must be entirely unquantitative and incapable of measure-
ment, and all that is commonly called " psychical measurement "
must be misnamed. This conclusion is draw r n in the following-
chapter (chap, viii.), on " The Psychical Manifold," a chapter which
is a masterpiece of acute and thorough analysis. The psychical and
the physical w r orlds, when once all temporal relations have been
excluded from the former, become respectively a purely qualitative
and a purely quantitative continuum ; quantity being excluded
from the realm of psychology by the same logical necessity which
banishes all differences of quality from the sphere of mathematical
physics. It now becomes manifest that the psychical as such
cannot be measured ; there is no sense in speaking of one quality
or one intensity as a multiple of another, and where such language
is used, we may presume an inaccurate transfer to the psychical
quality of predicates properly belonging to the corresponding-
physical stimulus. This holds good, as the author excellently
observes, of the " extensive " sensations as much as of others.
" The form-sensation of a millimetre is not contained a thousand
times nor any other number of times in the form-sensation excited
by a metre rod. To assert that it is, is to confuse the presented
extensions, directions and forms with the parts of the single
space of our mathematical postulates " (p. 264). The fundamental
character of the psychical, indeed, is incompatible with the condi-
tions on which measurement depends. For measurement is only
possible where you have a system of constant units, and for
psychical objects, states which exist once and then disappear
without recurrence, there can be no such system (p. 269). What
then is really effected in our so-called psychological measurements ?
238 CBITICAL NOTICES :
(p. 271 ff.). Prof. Miinsterberg distinguishes sharply between the
case of measurements by the method of " just-perceptible differ-
ences " and by the method of " overperceptible differences ". The
equality of two just-perceptible differences really denotes the mere
fact that in both cases the further diminution of the stimulus
would abolish all psychical effects ; when " overperceptible dif-
ferences " are declared equal we have a genuine comparison of
psychical states, but not a quantitative one ; the qualitative dif-
ferences between the two pairs of sensations are what we really
pronounce alike.
All this is most admirable, nor does it lose its force if we venture
to differ from the author about the temporal character of mental
states. Mere duration as such, though clearly in some sense
quantitative, will yield by itself no system of constant and trans-
ferable units of measurement ; whether mental states have duration
or not, all that Prof. Miinsterberg says about the impossibility of
devising units of measurement for objects which never recur seems
to retain all its force, and his judgment on the metaphysical errors
of a mathematical psychology remains substantially just. "The
increased acuteness of analysis which emanated from Herbart,
and the adoption of experimental methods which begins with
Fechner, were introduced by an error of principle which we must
surrender" (p. 280).
What then are the dimensions of the qualitative manifold which
forms the object of psychological analysis? Prof. Miinsterberg
rightly holds that the question must be treated as a purely
psychological one, without reference to the various differences in
the physical antecedents of mental states. Hence he rejects some
classifications which are current in contemporary psychology,
notably the favourite arrangement of colour and sound sensations
according to the form, amplitude and complexity of their physical
causes. His own classification is a somewhat elaborate one ; " the
qualitative differences " of mental states of all kinds are subdivided
into differences of quality in their contents, their form (spatial and
temporal) and their value (differences in pleasure-pain worth,
attention worth, liveliness). The content-qualities and form-
qualities each constitute a manifold of three dimensions, every
group of sensations being capable of arrangement according to
degree of likeness in kind, intensity, and "independence". (In-
dependence = the degree to which a given sensation retains its
distinct character when combined with others.) The "value-
qualities " correspond to what in actual life would be called the
varying interests and attitudes of the subject, but for the
" objectifying " science of psychology they must be translated
into functions of the psychical object (pp. 293-294). The subtlety
with which this analysis is worked out is extraordinary, but one
may perhaps question the possibility of such a reduction of varia-
tions in attention and pleasure- pain worth to characteristics of an
object which is simply passively "found there". For the hypo-
Miinsterberg, Gfrundzdge der Psychologie. 289
thetical subject, who merely "has" mental states which mean
nothing, there ought to be no "value-qualities" at all; while, if
once we may give unity of aim and purpose to the consciousness
we are studying in psychology, the grounds for the forced treat-
ment of values as qualities of the object disappear. Prof.
Miinsterberg's psychology on this point seems sounder than his
deductions from Erkentnisstheorie.
With chapter ix. we enter on a detailed theory of the nature and
conditions of psychological description which ends the second part
of the book. Psychological description, from the nature of the
case, must always be indirect. I cannot exhibit the contents of
my mental state for my neighbour's inspection ; I can at best
describe with accuracy the physical conditions under which it
arises, or the physical movements which follow on it. The former
method is naturally adopted for the description of perceptive, the
latter for the description of volitional processes. Only the former,
however, is capable of receiving exact scientific precision. The
one method of scientifically exact description in psychology is that
which we follow in the analysis of perception, the accurate de-
termination of the correspondence between variations in the
physical constitution of the perceived object and variations in the
different qualities of the percept. For it is only in perception
that every variation in the psychical state "stands for" or
" means " a variation in a physical object with which the psychical
state is in a " noetic connexion ". Hence, if we define a " sensa-
tion " as the simplest element in a perception which still retains
noetic relation to the physical world, the ideal of scientific
psychology will be so far as its object is the communication of
its results the analysis of the entire content of consciousness into
complexes of sensations (p. 309). It is not assumed here (a) that
sensations themselves are incapable of further analysis, but only
that their elements if they have any, are no longer in any " noetic
relation " to the physical world, nor yet (b) that feeling and will
are presentations, but that the elements of presentation, feeling
and will are identical (p. 310).
In his treatment of the isolated presentation Prof. Miinster-
berg seems in the main successful. He has little trouble in
showing that, though the presentation is never the sum of its
elements, it is so related to them that for the logical purposes
of psychological analysis they may be substituted for it, and his
refutation of the view that the temporal- spatial character of
a presentation is not itself a quality of the presentation, but a
form of combination of its elements, which would be destroyed
if the presentation were analysed into its elements is a masterpiece
of analysis (pp. 320-330). The real difficulties only begin when
we reach the attempt to show that non-presentations are only
capable of scientific description if they are analysable into sensa-
tions (p. 331). There is, it must be remembered, no ground for
this reduction of all psychical processes to sensation-complexes
240 CRITICAL NOTICES :
except the methodological assumption already discussed, that
mechanical atomism is the one ideal of descriptive science. Even
if we admit this and, with the author, definitely regard physiology
and biology as less "scientific" than mathematical physics, we
should still have to consider how far mechanical atomism in
psychology is compatible with the writer's other fundamental
assumption that psychical objects are purely non-quantitative.
We certainly seem forced upon a dilemma ; either psychology is
a purely mechanical and atomistic science, and in that case its
objects must in the last resort have purely quantitative differences,
or its objects differ in their qualities, and it is therefore not
atomistic. To the present writer at least Prof. Miinsterberg's two
principal premisses appear to involve a radical inconsistency.
The details of the reasoning by which Zustdnde as well as
Vorstellunyen are reduced to complexes of sensation-elements are
full of interest, but contain nothing which helps to remove this
difficulty of principle. Everything really turns on the successful
manipulation of feeling and emotion. The convincing proof
(p. 351 ff.) that voluntary action needs no " feelings of innervation "
for its description in itself brings us no nearer to the author's
desired conclusion. When volitional action has been analysed
into action characterised by anticipation of the result plus n
feeling of our own activity, the question still remains whether
this last-named factor is itself a sensation- complex or not. Now
in order to answer this question as to feeling in his own way.
Prof. Miinsterberg is driven to the position that feeling itself, for
psychology, must be simply a complex of organic, kinaesthetic and
peripheral sensations. The aspect of a feeling which corresponds
to an attitude of the self towards its perceptions, appetition or
aversion, is a factor always present in actual experience, but not
an object for psychological science (p. 345). Similarly, in dealing
with instinctive and impulsive action, psychology as distinguished
from biology or psychophysics is to take no account of the quasi-
teleological character of instinct ; the process is to be reduced to
a complicated system of associations without significance, pur-
posive "for the organism " but not for the subject. Thus we get
a hint of the paradoxical view that biology may use teleological
categories while psychology must do without them (pp. 359-360).
The account of psychological description closes with a remark-
able anticipatory sketch of a possible " psychical atomistic " of the
future, which may conceivably analyse sensations themselves still
further into complexes of atomic elements each absolutely unique
in quality, and comparable with others only in respect of vivacity
and degree of "independence," which two differences are again
conceivably to be reduced to variations in vivacity alone. Thus
Prof. Miinsterberg seems to promise as an achievement of future
psychology a reconstruction of the Herbartian " Mechanik " pre-
viously declared to be founded on a delusion. His attempt to
show that similarity between one " simple " sensation and another
Mdnsterberg, Grimdziige der Psychologic. 241
might be a result of a partial identity of component atoms, while
" blending " may be due to relations of vivacity and consequent
mutual Hemmungen of the atoms, while most ingenious, labours
under the double difficulty of ascribing " parts " to the ex hypothesi
non-quantitative and postulating processes in the non- temporal.
The difficulty is not removed by the comparison with the plus
and minus signs of the root of a quadratic. For it is precisely the
possibility of a geometrical or kinetic interpretation, i.e., an inter-
pretation in terms of space and time, that makes the double sign
intelligible.
With the third division of the book we come to the problems of
explanation. All explanation rests upon the establishment of
connexions ; what is the special nature of the connexion between
psychical objects ? To begin with, it is not causal. There is no
causal connexion between one " state " or " percept " and an-
other, for two reasons ; (1) because causal relation can only
subsist between permanent objects, and (2) because no " causal
equations are possible between non-quantitative states " (p. 385).
For the same reason there can be no causal relation between a
physical and a psychical state. The second of the two alleged
reasons has already been criticised ; the first also appears to rest
on a dubious assumption. That causal and all other relations
are only possible within a system which is itself unchangeable
may be true, but is not to the point. The real question is whether,
e.g., in the physical world causal relation loses all its meaning if
the principle of the conservation of mass is not absolutely true,
a question which ought scarcely to be answered in the affirmative
without examination, seeing how persistently modern theories of
" ether " attempt to get behind the concept of " mass " itself.
Where you can specify the conditions under which B succeeds A,
you have a prima facie case for asserting causal relation, whether
A itself is "persistent" or not. Psychical dispositions would
appear to supply as good a background for psychical as persistent
forms of motion in an ethereal medium for physical causality.
Such a line of thought would clearly lead us to the concept of the
"soul " as an empirical not of course a metaphysical substance
of which presentations are passing states. Prof. Munsterberg has,
of course, to reject this idea (pp. 390-392), as he has already reduced
the universe of psychical objects to a plurality of detached states
and nothing more, and has also denied them all temporal char-
acter. Thus he finally reaches the following result : " the soul,"
the permanent system of aims and purposes, is a concept which
belongs to actual life and the normative sciences ; it corresponds
to an identity which is real but not causal or temporal ; the rela-
tion of a plurality of such personalities again is not temporal or
causal but is one of greater or less sameness of purpose. For
metaphysics it is a further problem to show how such a plurality
of wills is ultimately held together in the single teleological system
of the Absolute (the Absolute being conceived as a universal will
16
242 CRITICAL NOTICES :
which wills the imperatives of ethics). For psychology such tele-
ological unities have no meaning ; we cannot even speak of will
or personality as self-determining, for causal determination and
will belong to realms which have nothing in common, and identity
of character and purpose have nothing to do with the unity of
temporal processes. Identity of purpose is identity of values and
all values "lie in the timeless ". The soul thus disappears from
psychology and we have to examine the problem of causal connex-
ion from the physical side (pp. 395-401). It would be out of place to
criticise the Fichtean idealism of all this in detail, but the difficulty
of principle is surely manifest. Our systems of aims and values
may no doubt rest in the end upon our relation to a timeless
reality, but purposes which have themselves no temporal character
at all seem unimaginable, and it is hard to see how the categories
of teleology can express the final truth about the timeless Absolute.
The problem of the relation of the Absolute to temporal appearance
cannot be solved by the mutilation of the facts. Where " not yet "
has no meaning, can teleology and " value " have any meaning
either ?
Prof. Munsterberg then advocates a doctrine of rigid parallelism.
Psychical states are only connected as concomitants of a system of
mechanical brain-processes. But, as he candidly avows, this theory
is not in the least dictated by empirical facts; the " facts" will
fit a theory of interaction or even of occasionalism equally well.
He is also admirably clear on the important point that the " con-
servation of energy " affords no valid reason for denying interaction.
Parallelism is with him a purely a priori theory resting upon the
assumed necessity of rigid mechanism as the only scientific view
of nature. If there is interaction, we must abandon our rigidly
mechanical conception of the physical world. But, I would ask,
what then ? Precisely in the same spirit Aristotle objected to
methods of approximation in geometry, on the ground that to
admit them would introduce inconsistency into the ideas and
methods of mathematics. So undoubtedly it did, but what pro-
gress could geometry have made without tolerating the incon-
sistency ? If the mechanical view of nature rests throughout on
abstraction, as Prof. Miinsterberg is emphatic in maintaining, why
should it not be the case that its application in psychology leads
to sensible errors, though in some other branches of science only
to insensible ones ? If this were the case, as some of us believe
it is, surely we should be justified in preferring to keep our science
in touch with the real facts of mental life, even at the cost of some
want of rigid method, rather than by rigid adherence to an a priori
theory of the methods and limits of the science to deprive it of all
intelligible relation to the real. Prof. Miinsterberg's programme
for psychology seems to involve the disappearance of all recognis-
able resemblance between the psychic states of psychology and
any mental life of which we know. He tends at times to forget
that the abstract concepts of science lose all their value when cut
Miinsterberg, Grundzuge der Psychologie. 243
entirely loose from their foundation in the actual world. The
fundamental logical crux of the parallelistic theories, the assertion
that two series of states correspond point to point and are yet
mutually independent, he makes no attempt to remove, unless
the mere application of the epithet rein logisch can be regarded
as such an attempt. Interesting as his discussion of parallelistic
views is in many respects, its main interest is the striking
proof it affords that the doctrine of parallelism rests on nothing
more than a dislike to admit the possibility that the categories
of mechanism are not equally applicable for description and ex-
planation everywhere. For my own part, believing with Prof.
Miinsterberg that reality is not mechanical, I should be much
surprised if they were.
It follows, as a logical consequence of the author's principles,
that all forms of " apperceptionist " psychology are to be con-
demned as radically unscientific (pp. 436-457). Apperceptionism
in psychology, like vitalism in biology, means the application of
teleological categories to a causal series, and if causality and
teleology are really reciprocally exclusive, the one belonging only
to the " subjective " and the other to the " objective " sciences, such
an application must lead to absurd results. That teleology and
causality do exclude one another we have already seen to be one
of Prof. Miinsterberg' s favourite metaphysical theories ; it were
to be wished that it had been supported by a more thorough in-
vestigation into the meaning both of " cause " and of " end ".
The question being thus decided a priori on metaphysical grounds,
the author naturally gains an easy victory over his opponents,
who, by the way, are assumed to make their case worse by admit-
ting rigid parallelism for the case of sensations while rejecting it
for the "higher" processes (p. 452). If the "apperceptionist"
takes this ground he certainly deserves to lose his case ; but I
should conjecture that the serious antagonists of parallelism will
probably be inclined to abstain from the initial concession. They
will prefer to maintain, with Prof. Ward, that in sensation we
have a prima facie case of interaction, and will invite Prof. Mun-
sterberg to make his proof of the opposite more cogent precisely
in this simplest case. Meanwhile they might fairly contend that
the elimination of all teleological concepts amounts to much more
than "transformation" of real mental life into a form suitable for
scientific analysis ; it is much more like a new creation of a fanciful
world of non-human automata. The " apperceptionist " view may
no doubt often suffer perversion, but in its essence it simply amounts
to the theory that there are processes the stages of which can-
not be conceived as coherent wholes except with reference to their
ends, and that the processes of mental life are of them. There is
nothing in Prof. Miinsterberg's book which disproves the rationality
of such a theory, or proves the necessity of constructing our psy-
chology without its help.
The author next turns to the biological aspect of the problem.
244 CRITICAL NOTICES :
Can human action in all its complexity be regarded as the working
of a peculiarly complicated physical mechanism, or must biology
avail itself of non-physical terms? His reply is that, granting the
possibility of developing the advantageous and suppressing the
disadvantageous reaction by natural selection, the evolution of the
human organism and the social organisation is explicable on
purely physical lines as a process of increasing complication of the
apparatus for reaction, without the introduction of a psychical
factor. In reaching this result he avails himself very largely of
the latest researches into the development of instinct with happy
effect, but there still remain certain fundamental problems which
his treatment does not appear to touch. E.g. there is the question
how the distribution of variations the existence of which he is
content to assume is itself to be accounted for, and the possibly
even more important question whether increasing complexity of
preformed reactions is really the line which evolution has consist-
ently followed throughout its course. Plasticity of instinct plus
increasing power to form new appropriate responses rather than
complication of " instinctive " preformation would seem to be
what in the main distinguishes the higher animals. The interest-
ing character of the " instinctive " performances of the ant and bee
should not blind us to the possibility that these species represent
a side development rather than the main line of evolutionary
progress. Such investigations as Bethe's, even if we accept their
results unreservedly, contain no answer to the question whether
a psychical factor is involved in the evolution, e.g., of the verte-
brates. Again the author does nothing to remove the inherent
difficulty of understanding how consciousness comes to develop
at all if mere increase in complexity of the physical machinery of
itself answers all purposes. With him, as with all consistent
supporters of parallelism, consciousness really does nothing at
all for its possessor, and its presence in the organism is a sort of
standing biological miracle. The difficulty is not solved when we
are told that what runs parallel to physical processes is not our
real acts, but the unreal psychical states of psychology (p. 461).
The severance between truth and reality in Prof. Miinsterberg's
philosophical scheme has been made so complete that there seems
to be no bridge of connexion left between them. If practically
every predicate of psychical states is absent from real mental life
and vice versa, if psychology in short deals with mere /AT/ ovra. one
no longer sees what it is good for. To have any logical worth it
must treat of objects which, as Plato would say, are at least ovra Try.
With his last two chapters Prof. Miinsterberg comes to the con-
struction of his own special psycho-physical theory. That theory is
bound by his metaphysical presuppositions to be in spirit associa-
tionist, but it must not be off- hand identified with the current form
of the association doctrine. Current associationism is in chapter
xiv. pronounced to be right in its rejection of the purely psychical
and teleological factor of " apperceptionism," but to have failed
Mdnsterberg, Grundzdye der Psychologic. 245
hitherto to account for those facts of intelligent choice and selective
attention upon which " apperceptionism " lays stress (p. 497). On
the physiological side, too, the associationists' favourite principle of
the formation of " paths of least resistance " is far too crude an
explanation of the wealth of inner relations between the various
cerebral tracts (p. 511). It still leaves us without any real answer
to the question why, at a given moment, just this one out of all the
possible associations takes place, while all the others remain in-
effective (p. 519), and none of the current hypotheses as to the
nature of cerebral processes avails to fill the gap. The psycho-phy-
sicist has still to ask, After all the hypotheses as to the machinery of
nerve action have been exhausted, " who decides in the particular
case which path is to be blocked and which open ? " (p. 521). Prof.
Miinsterberg's answer is given by what he calls his " action theory ".
Eetaining the associationist view that the quality of a sensation
depends on the specific energy of the conducting path, and its
intensity on the strength of the centripetal excitation he would
add that its "vivacity" is a function of the strength of the con-
sequent centrifugal excitation. I.e., the sensory excitation in
itself is purely physiological and only acquires a psychical side as
it passes into motor discharge (p. 531). Thus, his theory, though
in a sense a synthesis of the principles of associationism with the
facts of apperception, remains in spirit essentially associational.
The theory is put forward in the first instance on logical grounds,
and not as a result of empirical observation, but finds its empirical
point d'appui in the fact that every motor centre has an an-
tagonistic centre from which its activity can be obstructed
(p. 533 f.). The subcortical motor centres thus form an "ana-
tomically pre-established connexion, which conjoins one small
cell-colony with one and only one other" (p. 536). Upon the
momentary state of this subcortical motor machinery and its
reaction upon the cortical processes depends the "vivacity" (i.e.,
the attention-value) of the various sensory excitations (p. 537),
upon the spatial position of the path of discharge, their feeling-tone
and other worth qualities (pp. 545-549). More important than the
hypothetical physiology here suggested is the attempt (p. 549 ff.)
to explain attention and suggestion in terms of the theory. The
explanation starts from the perhaps questionable metaphysical
doctrine much affected by the author, that all contradictory
opposition is opposition of antagonistic motor processes. An im-
pression is attended to, because its motor process inhibits possible
competitors (p. 550). Similarly with abstraction and judgment; an
" abstract " idea is for psycho-physics one which is connected with
the motor reaction which belongs in common to a whole group of
objects (p. 552), a judgment differs from a concept psycho-
physically in virtue of the new motor adaptation for future action
which accompanies affirmation or denial (ib.). Finally similarity
is explained in the same way. Instead of saying similar presenta-
tions arouse similar reactions, we must maintain that " objects are
246 CRITICAL NOTICES :
similar if the reactions excited are similar" (p. 553). If space
permitted, it would, I think, be legitimate to challenge the general
assumption as to the nature of opposition on which these con-
clusions depend. It is more to the point, perhaps, to ask whether,
when all is said, the theory of action does more than throw light
on the nervous mechanism of the attentive process. That the
author is right in insisting that the process is sensory-motor and
not purely sensorial can hardly be doubted, .but we still have to
ask of his theory, as he asked of associationism, Who decides
which motor innervation shall at a given moment inhibit its
antagonist? How is the selective character of the process, with
its power of originating new adaptations, to be understood without
either introducing a psychical selecting factor or permitting in
biology the teleological concepts which have been excluded from
psychology ?
The present article may perhaps appear to the reader to be too
exclusively polemical. It must be admitted that it is in effect
a sustained polemic against Prof. Miinsterberg's two cardinal
doctrines of the incompatibility of causal and teleological cate-
gories, and of the non-temporal character of the psychical. I have
been compelled, for the purpose of dealing more fully with these
fundamental principles, to pass over much that is of the greatest
psychological interest in his book, and to dwell more upon what
seem to me the defects of his metaphysics than with the main
purpose of his polemic against "naturalism," with which I find
myself in hearty accord. I trust this polemical attitude which has
been in fact necessitated by the polemical character of the book
itself will not be taken for a want of appreciation of its remarkable
merits. There is perhaps no work on psychology of recent years
which raises so many important questions of ultimate principle,
discusses them in a manner so acute and original, or compels the
reader so persistently, if he dissents from the author's results, to
give himself no peace till he knows why he dissents. If the value
of a book is to be measured by the degree to which it stimulates
its reader to think for himself, Prof. Miinsterberg has written
a book that is invaluable. Certainly no one who desires to think
for himself about the relation of psychology to philosophical truth
can afford to neglect it or to hurry through it carelessly.
A. E. TAYLOR.
A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza. By HAROLD H. JOACHIM.
Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1901. 8vo, pp. xiv. and 316.
MR. HAROLD JOACHIM is to be congratulated, in the first place,
on having produced that which is too rare in academic literature
of any kind, a sound and genuine commentary. This book has
nothing to do with the tribe of abridgments and manuals. It
assumes that the reader can turn to the text of Spinoza at any
HAROLD H. JOACHIM, A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza. 247
moment, and that, if not already familiar with it, he is at any rate
studying it concurrently with the comment. It assumes, also,
that the primary object is to understand what the author did say,
not to frame conjectural hypotheses of what he might or ought
to have said. Lawyers are trained in this fundamental rule of
interpretation ; it has been too much neglected among philosophers.
Not that Mr. Joachim fails to have a point of view of his own,
or conceals it. To say that he has one is only to say that he has
produced a coherent commentary and not a series of detached
scholia. The true commentator must bring his own light with him.
At this day my lights, such as they are, seem to me to have
become a good deal more like Mr. Joachim's since I had my own
say twenty years ago. However that may be, the more light can
be thrown on Spinoza from the more quarters the better. I
shall premise, to save tedious repetition, that all statements of
doctrine not qualified by express words or obvious context are
meant to apply to Spinoza's doctrine as I conceive it, and not
necessarily to my own individual opinions.
On the fundamental definitions I find some differences, but I
think in expression more than intention. Mr. Joachim's clear
pronouncements that reality not only can be known, but ' is what
is known or knowable,' and that God is the fulness of reality, not
an abstract ' being as such,' could not be improved upon. I do
not understand, however, why it need be said (p. 37) that God is
defined as one Substance amongst others. The phrase is really
explained by the context, but it might puzzle a novice. It means
only that Spinoza cannot tell us everything at once. The senses
in which ' Substance ' and ' God ' are used are matter of defi-
nition ; and Spinoza was too good a draftsman to imitate the
modern statutes that smuggle whole propositions of law into
interpretation clauses. It is matter of subsequent proof that
there can be no other Substance than God ; in other words, that
both definitions correspond to reality, and to one and the same
reality.
The statement that Thought is coextensive with all the other
Attributes (p. 72) is in my opinion not only correct but fundamental.
It leads to the conclusion, already descried by one acute critic in
Spinoza's own time, that the system is implicitly a form of idealism.
Why Spinoza did not or could not make it explicitly so is a
question one would like to see more fully handled.
At page 89 it might have been more simply put that Substance,
as such, is indivisible. The reader is supposed to be capable of
following philosophical language ; and, where elementary explan-
ation is out of place, the fewest apt words are the best. I am not
sure that it is strictly correct to call an Attribute a whole of
parts : for thus one might seem to say that the Attribute is a sum
of parts and nothing else, and certainly this is not so. For,
though the parts are real, their reality can be duly perceived only
sub specie aternitatis , that is, in connexion with the whole. The
248 CRITICAL NOTICES :
part is a part only because and in so far as it is conceived as in
alio, and therefore we can never make out the whole by summing
up the parts. Neither can we derive or deduce the finite world
from God, which Mr. Joachim seems to assume (p. 118) that
Spinoza professes to do. Only the infinite intellect of God has the
material for that. Not that ' deduce ' or ' derive ' would be the
right word in any case, though Spinoza is driven to speak of
mediation in a logical sense when he is constructing the ' infinite
modes '. God is the necessary and sufficient reason or rational
justification of the finite world, but we cannot find any short cut
that way to detailed scientific explanation. ' Calculation ' or
scientific explanation ' is there where there is another,' that is,
it is versed in finite relations, as Jalalu' ddin Kumi says in one of
his more abstruse couplets : ' there is no calculation in the region
beyond that category '.
Hence, again, the world as perceived in time and space is not
illusory except by our own error, and in relation to our own
erroneous inferences. ' If there seem to be a brim, it is the fault
of the cup.' There is no illusion in our consciousness in the first
instance. As Mr. Joachim himself says, furnishing the correction
to some other expressions which seem unguarded (p. 165) : ' So
far as the ideas of imagination go (in Spinoza's sense of ordinary
impressions under the forms of time and space), they are true.
If we take them as what they really are, if we do not attempt to
find more in their revelations than they really contain, we are
not deceived.' The illusion is not in supposing our perceptions
real, but in supposing them to exhaust reality or to have inde-
pendent reality. To use the venerable Indian example, it makes
no difference to a rope in the path if we take the rope for a snake.
Obviously the natural unreflecting man is often mistaken. But
does he dwell in constant illusion? I doubt it. The reign of
illusion comes with materialism, when the first stage of crude
reflexion seeks to justify itself.
As to the psychology of the Ethics, Mr. Joachim, like all serious
students, has found difficulties in ii., 8 (see p. 223). I would
suggest that these difficulties may be partly removed if we con-
sider the proposition as mainly negative, and intended to lead up
to the positive proposition (ii., 9) that every finite existence has its
place in a series of finite conditions : a proposition absolutely
necessary for the development of the system. It strikes me that
some of Mr. Joachim's points against the dialectic of the Ethics,
as regards the place of finite causality in the universe, are equally
valid against every form of determinism ; but it would not be
appropriate to pursue this. The explanation of conatus, the self-
preserving ' effort ' which also has puzzled many students ap-
pears to me too purely logical. Spinoza, writing more geometrico,
uses the language not only of geometry and pure mathematics, but
of mathematical physics as Descartes had left them. We cannot
free his conatus from misleading associations till we have brought
ALEXANDER c. FEASER, The Works of George Berkeley. 249
it into line with such terms as vis inertice. But I have nothing
new to say on this head. On the still harder puzzle of idea ideas
I do not think Mr. Joachim and I really differ much. He says
(p. 237, a) : ' Spinoza's use of the term idea is ambiguous, not
because it means for him both soul and thought of the body, but
because it means both " reflective thought " and "feeling"'. I
can accept this with no greater variation than reading ' not only
because,' etc.
I will allow myself one more remark in the nature of a personal
explanation. It was never my intention to deny (p. 298) that all
modes, i.e., finite things, are in one sense eternal, ' in so far as
they are conceived in their necessary dependence on God,' which
correctly expresses Spinoza's sub specie ceternitatis. Nor do I
understand how any careful reader of the Ethics could deny it.
But this general property of Modes is consistent with the human
mind being capable of eternity in a more eminent sense, namely,
by its power of reflective consciousness, which may become a clear
and adequate consciousness of union with God ; and I can hardly
think that Mr. Joachim, in turn, means to deny this.
These notes are brief, but those who are already acquainted
with Spinoza will not need anything longer ; and it seems only
fitting to give Mr. Joachim the same honour that he gives to
Spinoza, that of assuming that the reader who is seriously
interested at all will have the book before him, and will not
expect the comment to be clear without the text. Brief as I
have been, I have not thought it necessary to avoid minute points.
Whoever walks with Spinoza must be content to walk inter apices
philosophic ; and in work so thorough as Mr. Joachim's nothing
is too small to count.
F. POLLOCK.
The Works of George Berkeley. With Prefaces, etc., by ALEXANDER
CAMPBELL ERASER, Hon. D.C.L. Oxford, Hon. LL.D. Glas-
gow and Edinburgh, Emeritus Professor of Logic and Meta-
physics in the University of Edinburgh. Oxford : At the
Clarendon Press, 1901. 4 vols. Pp. Ixxxix., 527 ; i., 415 ; vi.,
412 ; viii., 611.
PROF. FRASER, to whom we owe the most complete collection
of Berkeley's Works, has, in his eighty-second year, undertaken
a new edition. Comparing it with the four volumes which he
published in 1871, we notice that one part of the old edition is
not contained in the present, namely the biography which consti-
tuted the former half of the volume entitled " Life and Letters ".
Only the outline of a biography, intended to serve as an introduction
to the Works, is prefixed to the new edition, and the old volume
(which is still in stock) is to remain " as a magazine of facts for
reference ". As things are, this was, no doubt, the best course
to take, although the old biography can no longer pretend to be
'250 CBITICAL NOTICES :
what it was, when it first appeared : a complete collection of the
letters and other biographical materials extant. I hope to have
another opportunity of offering a little contribution towards the
completeness of their list, but must here restrict myself to the
matter common to both editions or added in the new one.
Great improvements have been made. The alterations consist
chiefly in a new order of the Works, a revision of the prefaces and
footnotes, and the incorporation of new discoveries.
The new arrangement of the Works is very- satisfactory. The
first three volumes contain the strictly philosophical works in
chronological order ; the fourth volume consists of the rest of
Berkeley's writings, also in chronological order. Thus, the first
volume contains the so-called " Commonplace Book/' the " New
Theory of Vision," the " Principles of Human Knowledge," the
" Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous," and the Latin treatise
" De Motu," in short, all the works constituting Berkeley's meta-
physics in its early, i.e., its classical form. The second volume
contains " Alciphron " and the " Theory of Vision, Vindicated and
Explained," the third " The Analyst " and " Siris," together with
the writings connected with those two works. This distribution
greatly facilitates the use of the new edition.
Prof. Fraser has, in great part, rewritten the prefaces, embody-
ing, of course, such materials as were first published in his smaller
biography (in Knight's " Philosophical Classics "). Among the
numerous footnotes I think those most valuable which refer the
reader to other passages dealing with the same question, and those
which provide biographical notices about persons mentioned in the
text or explain references to contemporary life. I have to correct
here only one little mistake which I happened to notice. In the
Dedication to the Earl of Pembroke, prefixed to the " Principles
of Human Knowledge," Berkeley mentions the " bounty which you
have been pleased to show towards our Society ". This society was
not, as Fraser states in a footnote, Trinity College (Dublin), but the
Dublin Philosophical Society, with the Earl of Pembroke as its pre-
sident and Berkeley among its members. I will also mention here
that the fact of the date of one of Berkeley's sermons being earlier
than that of his ordination as a deacon (see iv., 86), is to be ex-
plained by a passage in the old college statutes, prescribing that all
Eesident Masters of Arts, whether clerical or lay, had to deliver short
sermons in their turn. This biographical and historical commen-
tary is very helpful, and might perhaps even be augmented a little
here and there. On the other hand, I am rather doubtful whether
it be advisable to introduce, in a standard edition like the present,
notes which are intended to explain or criticise the philosopher's
doctrine, or to compare it with that of other philosophers. It
must be always very difficult, if not impossible, to avoid, in such
notes, a great amount of subjective bias, as to their range as well
as their contents. Besides, Berkeley's style of writing hardly calls
for explanatory comments, except where beginners in philosophy
ALEXANDER c. FRASEE, The Works of George Berkeley. 251
are concerned, and they would probably turn rather to a book
like Fraser's Selections from Berkeley, where such a commentary
is perfectly justifiable and appreciable. But, however one may
think on these points, it must be acknowledged that, in the new
edition, Prof. Fraser has striven to condense such notes and to
lessen their subjectivity, as will be seen, e.g., by referring to those
passages of the first edition which laid stress on Berkeley's sup-
posed " Dualism ".
One mistake in the footnotes is rather surprising, coming as it
does from such a specialist on Berkeley. The " New Theory of
Vision," so very interesting to the psychologist, contains some
curious reflexions on the Minimum Sensibile (Minimum Visibile
and Minimum Tangibile), which cannot fail to remind one of later
speculations on space-perception, such as were carried on for ex-
ample by Lotze. Now, these reflexions are to be found as early as in
the "Commonplace Book," where Berkeley uses the abbreviations
M. S., M. V.,M. T. (seei., 11). His definition of " M. S." as " that
wherein there are not contained distinguishable sensible parts "
does not leave room for the slightest doubt that those abbreviations
stand for the above-mentioned Latin phrases. But Prof Fraser
reads them "matter sensible," "matter visible," "matter tangible"
an explanation which deprives those interesting passages of all
meaning. In reading this I could not help being reminded of
Prof. Fraser's somewhat high-handed remarks on the specula-
tions of " some German savants," such as " Lotze, Helmholtz,
or Wundt," which he thinks of " little philosophical value," at
least " from Berkeley's point of view," and only of " physiological
interest". Do not England and the Continent suffer from two
opposite extremes, psychology being, in some quarters, as much
overvalued here as underrated there ? At any rate, Berkeley him-
self, or, let us rather say, the young Berkeley, was in this respect
more modern than his critic, as was already pointed out on a
former occasion in this same periodical by George Groom Eobertson,
its then editor. And some intimacy with recent psychological
literature would certainly not be useless to an annotator of the
" New Theory ". It is, e.g., a little strange to find in a book pub-
lished in 1901 a list of the more important cases of persons born
blind and healed afterwards, ending with a case of 1858 as " one
of the last and best described " (see ii., 413).
While Prof. Fraser's first edition was in the press he discovered
a third edition of " Alciphron " and the original edition of the
" Querist ". In both cases he gave in an appendix the differences
which he found in these two editions. They were for the first time
printed in full by Mr. George Sampson in his more popular but care-
ful edition of Berkeley's Works (in "Bonn's Library," 1897-8).
Mr. Sampson further discovered, besides another (spurious) third
edition of " Alciphron," a letter addressed by Berkeley as Bishop of
Cloyne to his clergy in 1745. This letter is, of course, now also to be
found in Fraser's new edition. As to the " Querist," the numerous
252 CRITICAL NOTICES :
queries contained in the first edition, and omitted afterwards, are
again given in an appendix. No doubt Prof. Fraser was right in
deeming it unnecessary to print both editions in full like Mr.
Sampson ; but would it not have been much preferable to print
the complete text of the first edition, enclosing in brackets those
queries which were omitted later on? With regard to " Alciphron"
the new edition professes to take notice of the alterations intro-
duced by the philosopher in the second and third editions of these
dialogues. But a comparison with the appendix to the second
volume of the old edition, as well as with that of Mr. Sampson,
would show that this has not been done very carefully.
As the original editions are far out of my reach at this moment,
I do not know to what degree the new edition has otherwise
followed the principle of noting scrupulously all alterations, even
the smallest, introduced by the author in later editions. I think
this principle indispensable for every standard edition of a great
philosopher. For, however trifling such differences may often
appear at first glance, every one who has ever tried to follow the
development of a philosopher's doctrine knows that additional
light may sometimes be thrown on such researches by differences
which, to another reader, would seem quite insignificant. For the
same reason, I should have liked to see the " Commonplace Book "
edited with pedantic accuracy and without any omissions. That
very small and external things sometimes can afford an interesting
insight can be seen in the little booklet in the library of Trinity
College (Dublin) which contains, in Berkeley's own handwriting,
the first sketch of the introduction to the " Principles ". The
dates written on the margin of the MS. show that the young
philosopher wrote his book in small but pretty regular daily
portions, as if he had set himself a daily task. This cannot be
gathered from Fraser's edition, whicb gives only two or three of
those dates, picked out at random. An exact philologer would
further take exception to the method of enclosing extracts from
letters in quotation marks, when the original words are abridged
and otherwise altered, even though the sense be the same.
Prof. Fraser must himself have seen the little booklet just
mentioned, for he says he found it in the library of Trinity College.
Under these circumstances, I cannot understand why he did not
include in his edition a sermon on " Thy will be done on Earth as
it is in Heaven," which is contained in the same little volume.
It is of greater philosophical interest than most of the sermons
and skeletons of sermons which he has published.
While the new edition was in the press, some more \vritings of
the philosopher came to light. Prof. Swift Paine Johnston
of Dublin discovered, also in the library of Trinity College, an
essay " Of Infinites," which he published in Hermathcna (xxvi.,
1900), just in time for Prof. Fraser to affix it as an appendix
to the third volume. I succeeded myself in identifying an anony-
mous political tract (" Advice to the Tories Who Have Taken
ALEXANDER c. FBASEB, The Works of George Berkeley. 253
the Oaths ") as coming from Berkeley's pen. It is directed
against the Jacobites and was published by me in the Archiv filr
Geschichte der Philosophic (xiv., 312), too late, I am sorry to say,
to be embodied in the present edition.
In a former article in the Archiv (xiii., 541 ; see also Proceed-
ings of the Royal Irish Academy, 3rd series, vi., 272) I had
proved that a letter, hitherto ascribed to the philosopher, was in
reality written by a namesake of his, also a clergyman, and I had
mentioned a suspicion that the facsimile of Berkeley's handwriting
under his portrait (in the old edition) had been taken from this
very letter, not written by the philosopher at all. In the new
edition, that facsimile has been replaced by another I do not
know whether for the reason just mentioned. Prof. Fraser does
not say anything about it, nor does he state from what document
the new facsimile was taken ; but he accepts my theory concerning
that letter (see i., p. xlii).
I am afraid the confounding of two persons with the same
or a similar name has played him another trick. The letters
between the philosopher and Lord Egmont can leave but little
doubt that there is another Mr. Clerke among his friends, besides
the famous metaphysician Dr. Samuel Clarke. But in the short
biography prefixed to the new edition these two appear under the
name Clarke as one and the same person (see index).
On the whole, we have to thank Prof. Fraser for having founded
a standard edition of Berkeley's Works. And if we point out
that there is room for further improvements, no one will probably
acknowledge that more readily than he himself, as he says in his
preface: . . . " I offer these volumes which still imperfectly realise
my ideal of a final Oxford edition of the philosopher who spent his
last days in Oxford, and whose mortal remains rest in its Cathedral ".
THEODOE LORENZ.
VI NEW BOOKS.
The Principles of Morality and the Departments of the Moral Life. By
WILHELM WUNDT. Translated by MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN,
Ph.D. London : Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Limited ; New York :
The Macmillan Co., 1901. Pp. xii., BOS.
IT might seem enough to state shortly that we have here an exceedingly
careful and readable translation of the third and last volume of the
second edition of Prof. Wundt's Ethik, seeing that there has already
appeared in a previous volume of MIND (xii., pp. 285-292) a most search-
ing critical analysis of the German first edition. But some years have
passed since Mr. Thomas Whittaker wrote his able review. Hence a
few additional comments of a general nature maj* now be offered as
possibly not inopportune, especially if it be the case, as I venture to
think it is, that philosophers have in the interval displayed an increasing
disposition to view the problems of Ethics in much the same light as
that which the volume before us seeks to cast upon them.
Prof. Wundt is an empiricist for whom experience, in virtue of the
predominance he assigns therein to Apperception, the conative norm-
positing moment, is an actuality which in essence is a perpetual reach-
ing-beyond-itself an actuality into which ideals enter actually and
organically, as constitutive principles of its life, as very blood and
marrow. Thus it were almost as correct to term him an idealist. The
premisses are empirical, the conclusion idealises, and the logical transi-
tion is effected by means of an enemy would say ' under cover of ' the
idea of Will.
Applied to Ethics, this theory requires History to pave the way for
Normative Science, and at the same time insists that Normative Science
must contribute something of its own, ere the verdict of History can
become the norm. Origin is not in itself equivalent to Validity, though
on the other hand Validity uninstructed with regard to Origin is futile
guess-work. An Ethnic Psychology, which presses Anthropology and
the History of Culture into its service, is the indispensable propaedeutic
of legislative Morals. And Prof. Wundt is ready to practise what he
preaches. The other two volumes of his Ethics present us with a
specimen of the kind of historical preparation needed, into the par-
ticular merits of which questionable as these perhaps are as concerns
the treatment of sundry matters of fact, e.g., the connexion of early
religion with -morality, or the characteristics of the English moralists
we are hardly called upon to enter here. Meanwhile, the general
methodological principle according to which his treatise is arranged
will surely be voted admirable by all save those who, fearing to face
experience as it comes to us mixed and wholesale, take refuge in a barren
dualism which disjoins duty and doing once and for all time.
Presupposing, then, a historical survey of the evolution of our ethica
ideals, we proceed from ' is ' to ' ought '. (There is lacking, by the way,
any introductory explanation of the methods by which, historically, the
live ideal is to be distinguished at any given moment from the decaying
NEW BOOKS. 255
survival, more especially in times when there seems to be taking place
what we should call a general set-back a degradation and ' dissolution '
in the moral world.) Ethics, having somehow detected the de facto
Best-under-the-circumstances, converts it by the fiat of the Will it
embodies into a de jure Best. Such a Best (until such time as the
law of the " heterogony of ends " causes a Better-still to appear) has
necessity. That is, it is posited by the ethical Will as necessary, since
unconditionally imperative. Merely a methodological necessity the
critic will urge. To which the reply is that what is necessary for Ethics
is necessary for the self-organising progressive life as a whole ; for the
normative sciences as a class rule the unconsciously normative physical
sciences as a class, whilst Ethics in its turn rules the normative sciences,
even Logic, though second in authority, being inferior, in fact an " ethics
of thought ". Such a reply would seem to save the dialectical situation.
Whether, however, the historical Ethics of which Prof. Wundt previously
treated was always taken in this wide sense, namely, as the architectonic
science of universal valuation, is another matter.
And where, it may be asked, do we come in ? Ethics is said to posit
the ' ought '. Whose Ethics ? Or has Ethics a Will of its own ? It is
to the latter alternative that Prof. Wundt would appear to incline. The
*' objectivity " of moral duty is thus secured ; but, one is tempted to
insist, at some cost. For what is duty to me if my Individual Will be
not as such concerned therewith ? (It is the ineradicable vice of the
English mind, so we are told in the second volume, to harp on this
string.) The Social Will under God who in Prof. Wundt's metaphysic
bears a suspicious resemblance to the Absurd Infinite of the mathe-
maticians is invoked as a sort of higher personality before which we
are bound to bow. But surely not unless we choose ; for otherwise what
becomes of the autonomy of Will ? But, if our choice is involved in the
matter, then clearly we have severally the right to demand an explicit
and intelligible answer to the question Why must I '? It is no answer
to say Because the duty is objectively there ; unless this objectivity is
somehow shown to be likewise subjective and internal for me the
property of a system which I own, even though it owns me sensu
eminentiori. Let Ethics by all means seek to give objectivity to its
norms. If I elect to ' play the game,' it is obvious that I must attend
to the game regardless of whether my partners are also doing their
best or no. It is a fact of experience that a peddling policy of give-
and-take is wont, ethically, to defeat its own ends. But the constructor
of ideals cannot afford to disregard this fact either, that individual per-
sonality is a ' live option ' of actual human nature when at its most
moral. Hence it would seem that Prof. Wundt's supreme norm that
the " larger " end must always be preferred, the social before the
individual, the humanitarian before the social needs to be brought
home to each 'me,' as self-evident, as aesthetically perfect, as a char-
acteristically moral intuition, as satisfying our whole nature, or what
not. Else it is in danger of becoming an unworkable abstraction of
the kind that lumbers up our philosophical museums. The materials,
indeed, are at hand for a solution on the lines suggested. There is the
psychological scale of activities, understanding supervening on percep-
tion, reason on understanding ; there is the position assigned to the
" subjective duty " of self-respect ; and so on. Meanwhile, there is
practical failure to bring moral duty home to the free individual Will
as it seems, at least, to one who has been reared amidst the " egoistic "
traditions of English Ethics.
B. B. MARETT.
256 NEW BOOKS.
Inductive Sociology : a Syllabus of Methods, Analyses and Classi-
fications, and Provisionally Formulated Laws. By F. H. GIDDINGS,
Ph.D., LL.D. Macniillan & Co., 1901. 8vo, pp. xviii., 302.
" THE object of this book is to present a scheme of inductive method,
a somewhat detailed analysis and classification of social facts, and a
tentative formulation of the more obvious laws of social activity all as
a basis for further inductive studies . . . only one-half of the field of
General Sociology is here described. Studies of the historical evolution
of society and of the deeper problems of causation are not included.
Within this limited field these pages contain much material, and many
developments of theoretical detail, not given in my earlier books." The
broad features of Prof. Giddings' conception of Sociology are sufficiently
familiar. Sociology is in the main a psychological science : being, that is,
for the most part a study of mental phenomena as presented by a number
of interacting minds a study, therefore, of " the interaction of minds,
and of the reciprocrocal adjustments of life and its environment through
the evolution of a social medium". The \init of investigation is the
socius, and the social phenomenon par excellence is that of " like-minded-
ness ".
Sociology uses all known methods of scientific research : " its chief
reliance, however, is necessarily upon inductive method ". A vast amount
of inductive work has already been accomplished. A great many
" classes " have been formed, and the further task of inductive sociology
is to " define, subdivide, and co-ordinate these classes, and then to arrive
at such conclusions as are possible within the category of causation".
Prof. Giddings proposes, therefore, to " present a classification of social
facts which seems to be warranted by existing knowledge, and to carry it
out into tabular schemes of further inductive study, which, it is hoped,
may in time lead to the verification of sociological laws already formu-
lated, and to the discovery of others not yet surmised ". A striking
feature of the present work, accordingly, is a series of " Tables " each
of which " contains all the data necessary to enable the investigator or
student to construct in outline or blank form the table which should be
filled out with the results of his inquiries ". Some of these Tables seem,
to an unitiated student, fearfully and wonderfully made, and to be at
best of very unequal and xmcertain value. The following specimen is
taken at random :
TABLE XXI. TYPES OF CHARACTER.
M 1. Forceful. M 8. Austere.
M 2. Convivial. M 4. Rationally conscientious.
(M stands for "majority" or ''minority," and indicates that the column is to
be filled with majority and minority symbols. ) The investigator is referred
in a note to various sources of information " Statistics of the per capita dis-
tribution of saloons and dance-halls are an indication of the distribution of
the convivial type. Restrictive legislation affecting liquor selling, gambling,
prize-fighting, horse-racing, and the use of tobacco indicates the distri-
bution and activity of the austere type. Statistics of the distribution of
independent voting throw some light upon the distribution of the rationally
conscientious type." This is followed by a Table of the " characteristic
pleasures to be looked for in each type of character," and another of the
" traits of character found more or less in each type " : this again by :
TABLE XXIV.- TYPES OP MIND.
M 1. Ideo Motor. M 3. Dogmatic Emotional.
M 2. Ideo Emotional. M 4. Critical Intellectual.
NEW BOOKS. 257
TABLE XXV. SUB-TYPES OF CRITICAL INTELLECT.
M 1 . Deductive and Critical : M 2. Deductive and Critical :
aesthetic. scientific.
M 3. Critical and Inductive.
It goes without saying that " the science of sociology " is prolific of
terminology, if of nothing else, and Prof. Giddings' readiness and con-
fidence in this particular, as in many others, is truly remarkable.
We are not satisfied, however, that " like-mindedness " (with its
species of instinctive, sympathetic, dogmatic or formal, deliberative
like-mindedness) is the open sesame to the interpretation of social
phenomena. It cannot be said that political phenomena, still less
economic phenomena, are merely developments of " like-mindedness,"
or can be resolved into a mere " consciousness of kind ". Though Prof.
Giddings admits at the end of his book that " since the tendencies to-
wards both cohesion and dispersion are persistent, the social system
simultaneously exhibits phenomena of combination and of competition,
of communism and of individualism," all that we have heard about so
far is " cohesion " and " co-operation ". The curious point of view from
which Prof. Giddings considers economic phenomena is not a little
significant of his method. "Incidental to these developments of co-
operation in civilisation are the phenomena of concerted volition in
financial or industrial booms, crazos, panics and strikes," and concerted
volition is consciousness of its kind " in its higher developments ".
Again, " when the advanced industrial system has been created by the
more highly rational modes of like-mindedness, the sympathetic like-
mindedness which survives in all societies, however highly evolved, can
from time to time manifest itself in widespread economic speculations,
industrial ' booms,' financial panics, and contagious strikes ".
This is not, however, the place for any examination of the foundations
on which the Inductive sociology of Prof. Giddings rests ; but one can-
not help feeling a misgiving as to the use to which it may be put " in
the college class-room and in the university seminary " more especially
if it is to be regarded as a substitute for the more familiar, if more
limited, disciplines of ethics, politics, and economics.
SIDNEY BALL.
A Student's History of Philosophy. By ARTHUR KEN YON ROGERS, Ph.D.,
Professor of Philosophy in Butler College.
Prof. Rogers seems to us to have accomplished a very difficult task
with remarkable success. It is no easy matter to give in the brief
compass of some five hundred pages an account of the history of philoso-
phy from Thales to the present day which shall be at once trustworthy
and readable, and shall avoid the appearance of affixing labels to each
thinker in turn. Yet this Prof. Rogers has done : and he has done it to
a great extent in consequence of his admirable method of giving as often
as he can somewhat extensive quotations from the writers of whom he
speaks. He thus contrives to give the just impression that there is more
to be found in them than he has told us ; and to avoid the air of having
given in a conveniently compressed form ah 1 that is important to know
about them. The first few and the last few pages of the book are the
least satisfactory. The first might with advantage be simpler ; the last
might show more clearly the relationship between different lines of
thought at the present time. It is true that Prof. Rogers reasonably
enough declines to aim at completeness in his account of contemporary
17
258 NEW BOOKS.
philosophy ; but the name of Lotze should not have been altogether
omitted ; and one would have expected some recognition of the work of
Mr. Bradley. Among the best things in the book are the accounts of
Bacon, of Kant, and of Hegel : all of them for various reasons especially
difficult subjects. Some criticisms in detail occur to us. In the de-
scription of Aristotle's ethical teaching, the peyaXA^vxos of Eth. Nic., iv.,
is too much put forward as Aristotle's own moral ideal. On page 200
the rejection of the view that matter is intrinsically evil by the Christian
Church is ascribed not unjustly to a ' feeling for the dignity and infinity
of God ' : but some mention should also have been made in this context
of the central Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. On page 202 the
Roman Empire is said to have been able to rouse the enthusiasm of the
provincial ' much less ' than of the Roman mind ; but was not something
like the reverse of this the truth ? The statement (on p. 218) that
Anselrn's doctrines had ' much the same general tendency ' as Erigena's
is misleading. Both no doubt were in a certain wide sense Platonic.
But Anselm's antecedents are to be sought in the recognised doctor of
the Western Church, St. Augustine ; it was mainly through Augustine
that the influence of Plato reached him : while Erigena's predecessors
belong to the Eastern Church, and Platonisni came to him rather from
the school of Proclus through ' Dionysius the Areopagite ' and Maximus
of Tyre. There is no trace of the Areopagite's influence in Anselm ;
though it was felt again at a later time in scholasticism. This influential
writer is nowhere mentioned by Prof. Rogers ; and another oversight is
the absence of the name of Averroes, whose teaching appears to have
had no small share in determining the form of the system of St. Thomas
Aquinas. Prof. Rogers does not seem to know of Anselm's answer to
the criticism of Gaunilo. It is difficult to understand why on page
897 Kant's critical philosophy is said to have been ' the starting point
of one of the two great movements of recent thought ' : it seems to be
recognised on page 499 that both idealism and agnosticism (so to call
them) go back to Kant. There are some small slips to be mentioned :
Berkeley, though he died and was buried at Oxford, was never a
student there ; and ' Dublin ' should therefore be read for ' Oxford ' on
page 359. The editor of Lucretius was Munro, not Monro. The
remark on page 213 that ' it was the peculiar task of the Middle Ages
to carry out by their authority the training of barbarian Europe ' is
surely ill-expressed : the authority was not that of the middle ages
themselves. Among books which might well be added to the useful
little bibliographies which Prof. Rogers appends to his chapters there
occur to us Dr. Bigg's Neo-Platonism, and Dr. Rashdall's Universities
of Europe in the Middle Ages.
( . C. J. WKBB.
Texts to Illustrate a Course of Elementary Lectures on flic Hixtort/ of
Greek Philosophy from Thales to Aristotle. Macmillan, 1901. Pp.
xii., 111.
The primary purpose of Prof. Henry Jackson's volume of select texts is
to meet the needs of certain victims of the Cambridge examination
system, for whom the sources of the history of ancient philosophy are
prescribed as what the elegant diction of the sister university terms a
"semi-prepared" subject. Dr. Jackson has, however, the further end
in view of compelling within the same covers some keynote passages
required for constant reference by more advanced students of Greek
philosophy. He designs to illustrate lectures the aim of which " is not
NEW BOOK. 259
so much to record the details of S3*stems as rather to trace the develop-
ment of philosophical thought". By "elementary" Dr. Jackson does
not mean popular, but in outline.
The labour-saving character of Dr. Jackson's compilation, for the pur-
poses of the lecture-room of Trinity College and for those of Cambridge
generally, will at once be recognised. And granted that it is better to
save the exceptional pupil from the toilsome collation of note-books and
verification of quoted passages, and not worse to dispense the average
pupil, who usually dispenses himself, from the need of looking up
" gobbets " in their context, Dr. Jackson's selection may be useful- even
to a wider circle. It will scarcely displace Bitter and Preller's Historia
in the outer world, but the chapter on Plato must stir outside interest.
The passages which so accomplished a Plato scholar as Dr. Henry
Jackson thinks to be crucial for the interpretation, or typical of the
teaching, of the chief Platonic dialogues must indeed "be generally
acknowledged as important".
Given the legitimacy of Dr. Jackson's purposes, the texts are well
chosen. And they are well printed. It remains only to dispute dc
ijustibus. In the excerpts dealing with the pre-Socratic philosophers we
miss certain passages relevant to the claims of Anaximander as " a
Greek forerunner of Darwin," and a passage of Simplicius which we are
accustomed to consider of essential importance in the matter of the
komwomera of Anaxagoras. Coming lower, we would prefer a quotation
from the doctrine of Prodicus as against that given from the sophists of
Plato's Euthydemus. The paragraph on Euclides stops a line too short.
The section on Aiitisthenes omits the passage from Stobseus on pleasure
after toil. The famous divided line in Plato's Republic is further sub-
divided by Dr. Jackson. The selections from Aristotle, especially from
the Organon and the Ethics are, as Dr. Jackson allows, not representative
but useful. Some passages from the biological writings would have been
valuable in preference to the overlarge quotations from Metaphysics Z
the half here is not only less than the whole but less than a smaller
selection. There is no passage from the moral psychology of De Anima,
iii., and Ethics, vi. There is nothing on practical s'yllogism. Choice,
with an eye to passages to which Dr. Jackson proposes to refer in
lecture, is of course entirely justifiable, but it implies an opportunism
which diminishes his book's usefulness outside. However, Dr. Jackson's
texts are only texts, and it rests with the preacher to fill in the gaps. A
student who had come to realise why Dr. Jackson chose each of his texts
would know a good deal of Greek philosophy.
HERBERT W. BLUNT.
Saint Anselme. Par le COMTE DOMET DE VORGES. Paris : Felix Alcan,
1901. Pp. vi., 334.
This is one of a series of monographs on Les Grands Philosophes written,
if we may judge from the contents of this volume, and from the names
of the contributors of others, from a Roman Catholic point of view. M.
Domet de Verges has evidently read his author thoroughly, but his book
would have been more valuable had he not been less concerned to think
himself into St. Anselm's own position than to compare it with that of
the later scholasticism, and especially with that of St. Thomas, whose
views he practically treats as authoritative. This characteristic has not
unfrequently led to the introduction of irrelevant matter. There is, for
example, a whole chapter on Realism and Nominalism, which would
have been better away ; for Anselm, as he justly observes, did not occupy
260 NEW BOOKS.
himself directly with that controversy. Nor is there again anything
particular about Anselm in the chapter called ' Du Compost' Huniain.'
which is intended to show that ' of all philosophical theories the animism
of Aristotle, which is also that of St. Thomas, is the only one har-
monising fully with the facts' discovered by modern biology. But M.
Domet de Vorges's dogmatic point of view leads to worse faults than
irrelevance. It makes him incapable of genuine criticism. It induces
him to apologise (p. 241) for the absence of the notion of ' creation,' from
the writings of the ancients on the ground that ' they had no instance
of this mode of production before their eyes '. Was M. Domet de
Verges, we may ask in passing, more favoured than the hero of the
Book of Job, in having been present when God laid the foundations of
the earth ? In the same spirit, he takes Anselm to task for confusing
the spheres of nature and of grace (p. 208) without seeing any need to
criticise his own principle of demarcation between them ; he refuses to
trespass on what he considers theological ground in a philosophical work,
and by this refusal deprives of all claim to completeness his discussion
of Anselm, who would surely have been much surprised at his remark
that the doctrine of the Trinity is (as he oddly puts it) ' un hors d'ceuvre
dans un ouvrage de pure philosophic ' (p. 263). No one capable of thus
withdrawing a whole region, and that the most important, of human
speculation, from the survey of philosophy can be expected to under-
stand so genuine a metaphysician as Anselm. Hence one is not surprised
to find him wholly mistaking the intellectual character of his hero. He
wished, he tells us, speaking of the Monologium, less to instruct than
to elevate and improve (p. 264). This judgment is hopelessly at fault.
Anselrn's desire was primarily neither the one nor the other ; it was (as
he tells us himself) to understand : the very title of the Monologiwm
should have prevented his critic from finding it a sermon. Neither with
Spinoza nor with Hegel was the primary impulse more truly that of
disinterested speculation than with Anselm. It is only what is to be
expected after this misunderstanding, when we find that the pro founder
results of Anselm's reflexion, such as his doctrine of the divine light
(p. 106), are unintelligible to M. Domet de Verges. Ancient or modern
analogies do not come to his aid ; for philosophy outside of scholasticism
is to him practically an unexplored region. He supposes (on p. 245),
for instance, that modern thought finds little difficulty in the conception
of a creator who once upon a time made the world and let it go on its own
way without further interference, but can see no reason in the doctrine
of its need of perpetual conservation by the power to which it owes its
origin. He lives, one may say, in a fool's paradise, where he takes the
slender stream of modern scholasticism for the full river of living human
thought which once flowed along that channel but has now deserted it
for ever. Few whispers from the world without penetrate into this
enchanted country. The names of Kant and of Hegel as critic and as
defender of the ' ontological argument ' have reached our author's ears ;
but he is sure that St. Anselm would have been as little moved by the
praises and counsels of Hegel as by the objections of Kant. His mind
was too deeply imbued with the doctrine of the Fathers of the Church
to take account of appreciations founded on principles so far removed
from la .mine philosophic traditionelle (p. 806).
On the ' ontological argument ' itself, to the consideration of which
chap. vii. is devoted, M. Domet de Vorges's criticism is very far from
penetrating. He misconceives the whole inner meaning of Anselm's
reasoning, because he obstinately persists in studying it from the point
of view of ' inference,' ' analogy ' and the like, scholastically conceived,
NEW BOOKS. 261
without ever asking himself what is involved in these processes. From
a philosophical standpoint like his, it is true, which is that of uncritical
agnosticism, this crowning thought of Ansehn's must be necessarily
unintelligible.
Of the problems which beset the notion of causality (p. 808), or of the
need of asking himself what he means by ' outside ' (p. 228) he has no
inkling. It is curious that he seems to be unacquainted even with
writers on Anselm of his own communion beyond a certain circle ; he
shows no sign of having heard of the works of Mr. Rule or Mr. Bigg.
He thinks it necessary to explain that Ansdlm's De Conceptu Virginali
does not deal ' as one would expect ' with the immaculate conception
of the Virgin herself (p. 77). The historical evolution of dogma or
opinion does not exist for him. The traditional truth has always been
the same ; ' St. Augustine, St. Anselm, St. Thomas all knew and taught
the same doctrines ' (p. 110). The connexion of this view, so strangely
at variance with the dominant tendencies of our time, with certain
currents in contemporary French politics peeps out in the exclamation
on p. 68) from which we learn that bishops like St. Martin and St.
Anselm are yet to ' snatch France from the grip of impiety and anarchy '.
M. Domet de Verges' scholarship leaves much to be desired. He
transposes subject and predicate in translating Nihil apertius quatn
nullam rem esse malum (p. 215 n. 1). He suggests that the works of
Diortysius the Areopagite, whom strangely enough he regards as a
philosopher of the first rank, were buried (like Aristotle's) for centuries,
so that though perhaps really written by St. Paul's convert, they were
notwithstanding not available for use in the controversies of the primitive
Church (p. 81). He does not grasp the distinction between Predicables
and Predicaments (p. 145). He does not seem (from the list of Anselm's
works on p. 80) to have studied the preface to Gerberon's edition, which
distinguishes the treatises which are printed in that edition according
to their varying claims to authenticity. He quotes with respect (p. 149)
M. de Wulf, whose untrustworthiness as a guide to the history of
mediaeval philosophy, we were compelled to point out in MIND, N.S. No.
25. He has indeed drawn his information far too exclusively from
Roman Catholic sources. Thus he would have easily found an ' indi-
cation de source ' of the saying quoted from William of Occam on p.
287, had he gone to Erdmann or to Haureau.
M. Domet de Vorges has no suspicion that, in the designation of the best
known thinker of the ninth century, Scotus and Erigena mean the same
thing, and proposes to reconcile them by supposing John to have been
of a Scotch family but born in Ireland (p. 28). He has read Eadmer's
life of St. Anselm very carelessly ; thus the relations of Anselm to his
father immediately before his flight from Aosta are quite wrongly
described on p. 48, and on p. 49 he has confused the refusal of the abbot
at Aosta to receive Anselm as a boy into his monastery with Lanfranc's
later hesitation as to his admission to the fellowship of Bee. Not only
did Lanfranc not require the leave of Anselm's father, but Auselm's
father was already dead when Anselm consulted Lanfranc as to the
best way in which he could live a religious life, and one of the alter-
natives suggested was that he should live upon his own patrimony and
minister of his inherited goods to the poor. The printing, especially of
Greek words, is careless ; we have xplvov for uplvov (p. 91) ; TroAAaKwr for
TToXXd^wy (p. 161) ; Noirmoutiers for Marmoutier (p. 72) ; sint for sunt
(p. 219 n. 1).
C. C. J. WEBB.
262 NEW BOOKS.
Nouvelles Observations sur un cas de Somn&tnbulisme ci-<- <//<m-;/f///' .
Extrait des Archives de Psycholoyif de la Suisse Romande L, ii., p.
101-255. Par TH. FLOURNOY, Geneva, 1902 ; London (Williams \-
Norgate).
Prof. Flournoy's ' observations ' refer to the inediuinship ' of ' Mile.
Helene Smith' which he studied so acutely in his justly famous book,
Des Indes a la planete Mars. 1 They record, however, little of importance
in the way of novel developments, and it appears that Prof. Flournoy's
opportunities of observing the case have been somewhat restricted, and
that there has lately been a final rupture of relations with ' Mile. Smith,'
who has been endowed by a wealthy American lady with a competence,
in order that she may be able to devote herself entirely to the peculiar
form of contemplative life for which she seems to have such aptitude.
As this happy change in her circumstances has been due to the attention
drawn to her by Prof. Flournoy's book, and as the scientific interest of
her case rests almost entirely on his emphatic endorsement of her
honesty, under what would otherwise have seemed to be rather sus-
picious circumstances, this discarding of Prof. Flournoy somewhat savours
of ingratitude. Yet it is after all natural that ' Mile. Smith ' should her-
self prefer the more romantic spiritist interpretation of her phenomena,
which makes her a divinely gifted intermediary between our own and
other worlds (especially as this is also the view of her benefactress),
to one which makes her, at worst, a fraud, and, at best, a curious case
of morbid psychology. One can Tinderstand, therefore, that ' Mile.
Smith ' should be " profoundly irritated against science and scientists
and desires to have nothing more to do with professors" (p. 115). But
the loss to science may be considerable, if this means, as is probable,
that henceforth no accurate and trustworthy record will be kept of
' Mile. Smith's ' performances. This result will no doubt be satisfactory
both to the spiritists, who in their pursuit of edification and titillation
of their sense of the marvellous will be freed from the irksome criticisms
of scientific method, and to the ' orthodox ' scientists who will be able
to cherish the comfortable feeling that no further novelties menace the
symmetry of their preconceived systems from this quarter, and that
academic psychology may return with a good conscience to the more
congenial pursuit of counting ' sensations ' and tabulating ' reaction-
times '. As for Prof. Flournoy himself, he deserves the thanks of the
few who really ' desire to know ' and to explore these obscure facts
with an open mind, and their congratulations on the manner in which
he has acquitted himself of a difficult and invidious task.
The only point which criticism could perhaps raise is a delicate one of
the logic of science, or rather of a possible divergence between the logic
of proof and the logic of discovery. Prof. Flournoy's method is to explain
away the creations of ' Mile. Smith's ' subliminal imagination by reduction
to recognized psychological principles. And he is completely successful
in disposing even of the most startling features in ' Mile. Smith's '
mediumship. It is almost pathetic to watch ' Mile. Smith's ' sub-
consciousness struggling vainly to reverse the verdict passed on her
' Martian ' by the analogous production of ' Ultramartian,' ' Uranian,'
and ' Lunar ' languages, pictures and scripts. The scientific explanation
is the same in all cases and constitutes a crushing exposure of such naive
methods. But the effect on the ' medium ' is either discouragement or
disgust, which either check the production of the phenomena, or (as in
1 C/. MIND, N.S. 36, p. 546.
NEW BOOKS. 263
this case) withdraw them from the purview of science. Hence science
seems in such cases to defeat its own purpose. Its aim is to elicit as
much novelty as possible, to provide for study as much and as good
material as it can. But by prematurely insisting on the connexion of the
new with the old, it checks discovery. Hence a distinction would seem
to be suggested between the methods appropriate to discovery and those
by which, after discovery, the systematic validity of the new truths may
be exhibited. Thus a spiritist interpretation might conceivably have
proved a better working method of bringing out ' Mile. Smith's ' capa-
bilities, without being on that account accepted as the final explanation,
and it seems possible that if Prof. Flournoy had treated it as more of an
alternative to his own and had refrained from so triumphantly showing
it to be totally unnecessary, he might have retained his position as his
mediiim's scientific director. But the personal questions which arise
in such cases are usually extremely difficult, and we owe it no doubt to
Prof. Flournoy's great tact that the co-operation of ' medium ' and
professor endured so long.
F. C. S. SCHILLER.
U Opinion et la Foule. Par G. TARDE, de 1'Institut, Professeur an
College de France. 1 vol. in-Bo de la Bibliotheque de Philosophic
Contemporaine. 5 fr. (Felix Alcan, editeur), 1901. Pp. vii., 226.
This volume includes three studies in " collective " or " social " psy-
chology to use the current phrase psycholoyie inter-spirituelle being
the title by which the author himself would prefer to designate the
psychology of what is really the interaction of minds. They have all
appeared before, but as now put together for the first time they may
be said to form a continuous subject. In the first and main study (" le
public et la foule"'), the special object of investigation is "the public"
as distinguished from " the crowd ". " The public " is une foule dis
persee in which the interaction of minds has become an action at a
distance, and it is essentially a modern product created by modern
means of communication. The author sums up the general conclusion
of his study in the following passage :
" J'incline a croire, malgre tout, que les profondes transformations
sociales que nous devons a la presse se sont faites dans le sens de
1'union et de la pacification finales. En se substituant ou en se super-
posant, comme nous 1'avons vu, aux groupernents plus anciens, les
groupernents nouveaux, toujours plus tendus et plus massifs, que nous
appelons les publics, ne font pas seulement succeder le regne de la
mode a celui de la coutume, 1'innovation a la tradition ; ils remplacent
aussi les divisions nettes et persistantes entre les multiples varietes de
1'association hurnaine avec leurs conflits sans fin, par une segmentation
incomplete et variable, aux limites indistincts, en voie de perpetuel
renouvellement et de mutuelle penetration."
The second study (" Vopinion et la conversation ") treats ' opinion '
as the direct consequence of ' the public,' and ' conversation ' as the
most general and constant source of ' opinion '. In his study of ' con-
versation ' the author is conscious of breaking new ground, and of
working with insufficient data. He suggests that a complete history
of ' Conversation ' would be a highly interesting document of social
science, and even contemplates the possibility of a science of 'com-
parative conversation,' to take its side by a science of comparative
religion, art, or industry. In the meantime Prof. Tarde's observations
on this topic, in spite of their tentative and unmethodical character, are
full of interest and suggestion.
264 NEW BOOKS.
The last study ("la fovlf ct /r.s- secte* <-rhninelles") is on more
i'amiliar ground. The writer distinguishes between different forms of
social groupings, from the ' crowd ' to the ' corporation,' in the widest
sense, of the term ; emphasises the rfile. of the meneuror conducteur, and
the inferiority of the crowd in intelligence and morality to the average of
its individual members ; analyses the comparative psychology or patho-
logy of crowds and criminal associations (such as Anarchists) ; and
accentuates throughout the complicite du milieu in des crimes collectifs.
These studies are characterised throughout by the felicity of style
and handling that distinguishes the writings of their author. The essay
form is peculiarly appropriate to subjects of this kind, and Prof. Tarde
is a master of this form of writing : there is hardly a page which is not
lighted up by delicate observation and apt illustration. On the other
hand, they read perhaps more like a mosaic of interesting remarks
than the development of any single conception ; and the remarks, as
might perhaps be expected, are of very unequal import and value :
some of them are only redeemed from triviality by their atmosphere,
others are very much like glimpses into the obvious, others again
deserve to be further developed. But regarded as essays or sketches
these studies are a model of sociological literature ; and the genial
treatment of ' conversation ' might well inspire quelque jeune travailleur
with le desir de combler cette (/rande lacune.
SIDNEY BALL.
Pascal. Par AD. HATZFELD. Paris : Alcan, 1901. 8vo., pp. xii., 291.
Price 5 fr.
This is a new volume in the series Les Grands Philosophes edited by the
Abbe Piat. The author M. Hatzfeld died soon after finishing his manu-
script, and before he could see his book through the press a task which
has been fulfilled by M. Piat. Lieut. Perrier discusses, in the third
part of the work, the scientific achievements of Pascal.
The divided authorship answers to the two chief phases of Pascal's
career as a scientific investigator, and as a religious enthusiast. But
there is an interesting difference in the attitudes of the two authors.
M. Hatzfeld inclines a little to the hagiologist who conducts his subject
along a predestined path to the haven of orthodoxy. To Lieut.
Perrier Pascal reveals the frailties which are found even in men of science
and philosophers. I will confess that it was a relief to turn from the
somewhat fervid pages which deal with Pascal's religious history, and to
trace the amiable weaknesses which he displayed in his dealings with some
of his contemporaries such as Torricelli and Copernicus (pp. 131, 173,
190). But so far was Pascal from being blameless in the conduct even
of his religious life, that on one occasion he descended to the part of a
common informer, and was the means of bringing a thinker named
Forton, before the court of the Archbishop of Rouen, on a charge of
heterodoxy. I do not presume to say whether Pascal in so doing approved
himself a good Catholic, but the incident is somewhat jarring in the life
of a philosopher. M. Hatzfeld mentions this episode without condem-
nation or even apology (p. 19).
Having said thus much, I can go on to praise unreservedly the Gallic
clearness and brilliance of his style, qualities so rarely found in the
historian of philosophy, yet surely to be required from every one who
writes about Pascal. And let not the objection be raised that style is a
matter of literature, rather than of philosophy. Pascal's masti'ily
fragment De VEsprit (}i'nm?'triqu<' shows how closely, in his mind,
thought and expression ran together.
NEW BOOKS. 265
But in Pascal, as Lieut. Perrier says (p. 188), there is something beyond
style ; there is ' the admirable ordering of the plan '. And it is here that
I find a serious deficiency. It is impossible to separate Pascal's mathe-
matical theory of probabilities from his standpoint as a thinker, and we
do not find given us any systematic account, which may bring together
the varied applications of this theory, notably in the wager about the
Existence of God (p. 264), and, on the other hand, in the realm of human
action. It is surely a paradox that Pascal should have formulated the
theory of probabilities, and, also, have been the champion of those who
refuse to apply the theory to casuistry.
As far as I am able to judge, Lieut. Perrier has performed his task in
an admirable manner. And the book, as a whole, is an excellent intro-
duction to the study of Pascal. It is to be hoped, however, that in the
succeeding volumes of this series the writers may have a freer hand. In
the Pascal, as in the St. Augustin, too much is said about the orthodoxy
in which these great minds found rest, and not enough about the origin
and history of their opinions.
FRANK GRANGER.
Kant's Theorie der Kausalitfit : Eine historisch-kritische Untersuchung
zur Erkenntrisstheorie. Von Dr. M. WARTENBERG. Leipzig, 1899.
Hermann Haacke. (London: Williams & Norgate.)
Das Problem des Wirkens, und die Monistische Weltanschauung : Eine
historisch-kritische Untersuchung zur Metaphy&ik. Von Dr. Mscis-
LAW WARTENBERG. Leipzig, 1900. (Same publishers.)
These two volumes, written with youthful enthusiam and freshness,
represent one of the many attempts now being made, to dethrone the
prevailing monism, and to substitute for it a pluralistic conception of the
universe. In the earlier work, the idea of causality is discussed from the
point of view of the Theory of Knowledge. A clear and readable, if
somewhat diffuse, statement of Kant's theory, especially as it stands in
the Critique of Pure Jleason, is followed by a criticism on the lines
already laid down by Sigwart. It is shown that causality cannot stand
as a constitutive principle in our knowledge of reality, and that as a
merely regulative principle it is an extraneous factor to knowledge itself.
It is not a necessary principle, but a hypothesis, and differs from other
hypotheses, apparently, in the degree of its arbitrariness, which is
extreme, for there is nothing in the facts themselves to suggest it. The
justification for the hypothesis is found in the Will it is a postulate of the
practical reason, not a principle or axiom of the speculative reason at all.
Our desire, striving, willing to knou>, to grasp reality as an interconnected
system, can be satisfied only if necessary, causal, Connections subsist.
The causal principle is valid so far as it is valid not on logical or on
ontological grounds, but for general psychological reasons as Sigwart
had already insisted. There is, however, a certain superficiality in the
distinction between knowledge and the will to know : if the latter cannot
be satisfied unless causal connexion holds between different processes or
stages of reality, it is either because the act of knowing itself implies
such necessary connexion and causality is then a constitutive principle,
as Kant taught or because the will contains an ideal of completeness,
certainty, or the like, towards which it aims. The mere willing cannot
suggest any postulates, and whatever is implied in an ideal of knowledge
is implied in knowledge itself : the principle of causality can never rest
on psychological grounds if it has any validity at all, it is a theoretical,
not, or not merely, a practical principle.
266 NEW BOOKS.
In the second work, in which there is special reference to Lotze, the
problem of Activity succeeds that of Causality, and the venue is changed
from Epistemology to Metaphysics. The criticism of Lotze is an attrac-
tive piece of dialectical work, marred again by a habit of diffuseness.
The barrenness of Lotze's Absolute the M which is really an X the
futility of a " progress " which is merely a perpetual renewal of the status
quo, the inconsistency of a " freedom " of which the resultant activity is
predetermined by the nature of the whole in which it is contained
these and other similar points are made with great skill. The hypothet-
ical pluralism so established is worked out in a review of the principal
spheres of being dead matter, living organisms, and the physical world
and emerges first of all in a dualism of soul and body-substances. The
facts of experience cannot be understood except on the assumption that
transient activity, not merely imminent, is real, although the possibility
of it can never be understood, because it can never be experienced by
us. As in the material world, and in the physical world, substances act
and react upon one another, so between the two kinds of substances the
same interaction takes place. Psychophysical parallelism is a delusion :
the principle of the conservation of energy has no validity beyond the
material facts on which it is based ; but even within the material world
it has a merely subordinate value, because of the influence of other
immaterial substances on the quantity of energy within the world. But
after all, one cannot help a feeling of " parturiunt monies " : for the
dualism gives place finally to a trinism or is it a monism ? There is
in the world a certain harmony, order, hierarchy of ends, which points
to a supreme Substance : it cannot be thought of as an imminent cause,
but is a transcendent being acting upon and from without the world !
and so all the problems solved suggest themselves anew. Is there
action only, or also reaction between the Absolute and the finite sub-
stances ? If reaction, why should not this Absolute be one among
many ; if action merely, where is the freedom and independence of
the individual substance ?
J. L. .M.
Gustav Theodor Fechner. Rede zur Feier seines 100 jahrigen Geburt-
stages. Gehalten von W. WUNDT. Leipzig : \V. Engelmann, 1901.
Among the mass of studies biographical, philosophical, or literary
which bore such eloquent testimony last year to the enduring influence,
of Fechner's work upon the German philosophy and psychology of
to-day, Prof. Wundt's lecture takes an honourable place. We are
glad to meet again the literary grace, the charming lucidity of exposi-
tion, which made the Vorlesungen ilber Memchen-und-Thier-Seele such
good reading. It is no mere single aspect of Fechner's thought and
life which is here touched upon. He himself lives before us for a while,
such as Wundt, after the lapse of all these years, remembers that strange
old man, half-blind, enthusiastic and combative, kept alive by the desire
to make his system triumph, yet scrupulously impartial and objective
in his treatment of criticism, however minute and technical, however
remote from the central intention of his life-work ; a poet who was yet
among the most exact of exact scientists ; an artist who could yet go
about measuring the proportions of a picture with a foot-rule ; a lover
of nature who could enjoy to the full the glories of a sunset, observing
after-images the while ; a humourist who could poke fun at the con-
ceptions he was most in earnest about. No savant was ever more
thoroughly a man ; no sceptic ever dwelt with more ironical enjoyment
NEW BOOKS. 267
upon the two sides of every question than did this fanatical believer
in the truth of his own system. The mere logician is bewildered by
what seems to him a bundle of irreconcilable paradoxes. The amateur
of antithesis finds here an exhaustless mine. But neither can grasp the
fundamental unity of Fechner's life and purpose. Prof. Wundt has
explained this to us admirably. How much of Fechner's later develop-
ment was due to the accident of his strange disease ? To what extent
is his system as a whole the logical outcome of his earlier Anschauung ?
to what extent the expression of a character enriched and broadened by
long struggle against weakness and despair '? These are questions upon
which opinions have always been divided ; Wundt settles them for us in
an admirably lucid way.
Fechner began his academic life as a medical student ; but, totally
unfit as he was for the diplomatic side of a doctor's career, he turned to
physics, to chemistry, to the exact sciences. He lectured, he composed
and translated huge text-books, he made valuable original contributions
to experimental physics. None of this work has any direct connexion
with philosophy. But while he was translating the two volumes 011
Cerebral Pathology, the six volumes of Thenard's Traite' de Ohimie ,-
Biot's four volumes of Physique ; two volumes of the same Biot's
Repertoire de Chimie; three more volumes of a Record of Experimental
Physics, while he was editing the eight volumes of a Hauslexicon (all
this between 1824 and 1838), he found time to write some of the most
whimsical of his parodies of the prevailing Naturphilosophie, and to
discover to the world the first glimpse of his ' Tagesansicht ' (in the
Biichlein vom Leben nach dem Tode). Prof. Wundt, who is not unpro-
ductive, marvels at Fechner's fertility. No starving compiler in a
garret could rival in point of bulk the Leipzig savant's yearly average
of three or four big volumes, and most of it original ! What wonder if,
almost as soon as his elevation to an ordinary professorship removed
the necessity for making money by his pen, Fechner's nervous organisa-
tion broke down completely ? But the point to bear in mind is that
the Tagesansicht first dawned upon him many years before his illness-
It is idle to speculate whether the Psycho-Physik would have been
written, had Fechner never done those experiments on after-images
which were the proximate cause of his three years' seclusion in a
darkened room. All the main ideas of the Zend-Avesta are foreshadowed
in the Biichlein, and almost everything Fechner wrote in later life de-
veloped out of the Zend-Avesta. This is evident to any one who has
read other books of Fechner's besides the first part of Psycho-Physik,
and we are grateful to Prof. Wundt for reminding psychologists of the
fact that the Psycho-Physik, far from being an independent work, is a
mere outpost, designed to render impregnable the central fortress. " In
Wahrheit," says Prof. Wundt, " kehren alle wesentlichen Ideen des
Zend-Avesta in der Psycho-Physik wieder ; es sind aber auch umgekehrt
die Grundgedanken der Psycho-Physik schon im Zend-Avesta zu finden."
Even the psycho-physic law is anticipated in the second volume of this
work. The idea flashed upon him early one morning, 22nd October,
1850. Ten years later, he thought the presumptions of his earlier
analogical reasoning had been entirely confirmed by careful experiment
(Ps. Ph., 1860). The ' Atomenlehre,' the ' Ideen zur Schopfungs-und-
Entwickelungsgeschichte ' are directly, the ' Collectivmasslehre ' in-
directly, developments of the Zend-Avesta. Obviously the critic of
Fechner must begin with this work. Prof. Wundt rightly makes it the
centre of his sympathetic account of Fechner's philosophy. We need
not follow him here in detail. Fechner never intended that his system
268 NEW BOOKS.
should be regarded as scientifically proved. He did not regard it as
the function of philosophy to assert nothing but what could be strictly
demonstrated. On the other hand, he was careful to make no assertions
which had not in his view strong analogical probability. Philosophy
for him held a middle position between Science and Religion. The
whole of experience is its material : Belief no less than Knowledge. It
proceeds from the latter to the former by means of Induction and
Analogy. The result is the opposition of the ' Tagesansicht ' to the
' Nachtansicht ' ; the picture of a living, sentient, coloured, glowing,
loving world, as opposed to the dead dark world senseless atoms in
purposeless motion of popular materialism. To this, little as Fechnor
profited by the lessons of Kant, his books provide even to-day the best
antidote.
This booklet contains also a photograph of the Fechner Memorial at
Leipzig, and several appendices including personal reminiscences and
discussions of special points.
F. N. HALES.
Studi sulla Filosofia Contemporanea. I. Prolegomena La " Filosofia
Scientifica ". By FRANCESCO DE SARLO. Roma : Ermanno Loescher
& Co., 1901. Pp. 241.
In the forthcoming studies, to which the present volume is introductory,
we shall await with interest any- constructive effort Prof, de Sarlo
may make towards a philosophic synthesis which shall take up the
converging lines of the most general concepts in the special sciences and
vindicate his belief that ' una e la scienza come una e la realta '. These
prolegomena are entirely critical. Reconstruction, he holds, is necessary
in virtue of the domination of scientific progress over thought, entailing
a ' disruption ' of speculative scope by its tendency to specialization,
and by its ' adoration of the-thing-done,' fatto. But ' before his dis-
cussions take a properly philosophic line' so the author prefers to
distinguish his forthcoming studies from those before us, which are
nothing if not properly philosophical he wishes to bring out ' such
salient features in modern science as are tending to acquire a philosophic
aspect and content '. For if philosophers will not bestir themselves to
philosophize science, men of science will do it themselves, and that
after an amateurish sort, reducing the principles, which they need to
give value and import to science, to a popular doctrine which is neither
good science nor good philosophy.
And so he takes the ' threefold basis ' of what he terms naturalistic
agnostic scientific philosophy, viz., the mechanical conception of the
universe, the psychoplvvsical value of cognition, and the concept of
evolution and discusses them as they appear, most impressively and
characteristically, in the thought of Du Bois Reymond, Helrnholtz and
Darwin respectively. The book is completed by an essay on contem-
porary Positivism in Italy.
The author is too genuine a metaphysician to conduct his criticism
so sympathetically as ' to get right through to the standpoint of his
sciemia-ti, the logic of which governs their conclusions as surely as his
own logic guides him to differ from them. While he rejects the
agnosticism of Reymond's ignorabinvu*, holding that that which is un-
knowable is unreal, he meets all advance in scientific analysis with the
inexpugnable necessity for postulating, as the creator and interpreter of
all experience, an ' ideal ' subject. Paley's watch in fact, now lies not
on the bosom of the external world, but bedded in conscious experience.
NEW BOOKS. 269
The ' psychological ' ego, as an evolved product of consciousness, does
not at all satisfy him, and he waves evolution aside as practically devoid
of any philosophical value.
It is in precisely its clear statement of the a priori position over
against the advance of genetic methods in science that the book lies.
If ever a way will be found to carry that position which shall satisfy and
convert the metaphysician himself, it cannot conceivably be otherwise
than through those methods being applied far more rigorously than as
yet to the history of the ego. And it is good to have a careful, detailed
discussion to show how unassailable is the postulate of an ' ideal ' ego
as full-grown noumenon.
Such a work should appeal to philosophic students outside Italy, and
it is to be regretted that philosophers of that country, mindful of the
limited ' circulation ' of their language, do not lay themselves out more
strenuously to attract and aid the foreign reader. The style in this
case is not too involved and. there are some short sentences. The ever
recurring double negative non puo non cumbrous to English ears, but
good as eliminative logic, can be got over. But there are absolutely no
sign posts to guide as to what departure in argument is coming, neither
at the head of sections, numbered meaninglessly, nor over the page.
The argument too proceeds discursively, not by definite development.
Hence the reading, for foreign inquiries, is rendered needlessly tough.
For the very numerous typographical errors the author is fain to appeal
to the help of his readers, after filling a page with corrigenda.
C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.
RECEIVED also :
V. Basch, La Poetique de Schiller, Paris, Alcan, 1902, pp. 297.
F. Le Dantec, L' Unite dans Vetre vivant, Paris, Alcan, 1902, pp. viii.^
412.
A. Drews, E. von Hartmann's philosophische System, Heidelberg, C.
Winter, 1902, pp. xxii., 851.
E. T. Campagnac, The Cambridge Platonists, Oxford, Clarendon Press,
1902, pp. xxxvi., 327.
Kantstudien, Band 6.
G. H. Howison, The Limits of Evolution, New York, Macmillan, 1901,
pp. xxxv., 396.
F. Jordan, Moral Nerve, London, Kegan Paul, 1901, pp. xxiii., 141.
J. Royce, The World and the Individual, Second Series, New York.
Macmillan, 1901, pp. xx., 480.
G. Meyer, Die wissenschaftlichen Grmidlagen der Graphologie, Jena, G.
Fischer, 1901, pp. 81.
M. Dessoir, Geschichte der neueren deutschen Psychologie, Zweiter
Halbband, Berlin, C. Duncker, 1902.
J. Loeb, Comparative Physiology of the Brain, London, Murray, 1901 r
pp. x., 309.
E. Richmond, The Mind of a Child, London, Longmans, 1901, pp. 176.
F. H. Hayward, The Ethical Philosophy of Sidgwick, London, Sonnen-
schein, 1901, pp. xxiv., 275.
G. Abiusi, La Pedagogia c' una scienza, Nicastro, V. Nicotera, 1901,
pp. 23.
270 NEW BOOKS.
\\. Wundt, Sprach(jeschi( lit< uml Sprachpsychologie, Leipzig, W. Engel-
mann, 1901, pp. 101.
A. R. Waller, The Civiliziny of the Mftafrinus, London, R. B. Johnson,
1902, pp. 71.
A. R. Whiteway, Recent Object-Lessons in Penal Science., third series,
London, Sonnenschein, 1902, pp. 216.
L. T. Hobhouse, Mind in Evolution, London, Macmillan, 1901, pp. xiv.,
415.
E. Cassirer, Leibniz's System, Marburg, N. G. Elwert, 1902, pp. xiv., 548.
M. Jastrow, The Study of Religion, London, W. Scott, 1901, pp. xiv.,
451.
J. C. Kreibig, Pwchologische Grundlage eines Systems der Wert-Thcori> .
Wien, A. Holder, 1902, pp. vii., 204.
A. Welcker, A Dream of Realms beyond us, San Francisco, 1902, pp. 29.
J. H. Leopold, Ad Spinosae opera posthuma, Hagae comitis, M. Nijhoff.
1902, pp. 92.
O. Kraus, Zur Theorie des Wertes, Halle, M. Nieineyer 1901, pp. vi., 147.
B. Kidd, Principles of Western Civilisation, London, Macmillan, 1902.
pp. vi., 518.
A. H. Pierce, Studies in auditory and visual Space Perception, New
York, Longmans, 1901, pp. 361.
J. A. Leighton, Typical Modern Conceptions of God, New York, Long-
mans, 1901, pp. xii., 190.
C. Read, Logic, second edition, London, G. Richards, 1901, pp. xvi., 386.
Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution for 1900, Washington.
1901, pp. Ixv., 759.
VII. PHILOSOPHICAL PEKIODICALS.
PHILOSOPHICAL EKVIEW. Vol. x., No. 4. J. Seth. ' The Utilitarian
Estimate of Knowledge.' [" Knowledge is only a part of the complete
whole of human possibility." But, within this larger whole, " it is not
merely a means to an end beyond itself, it is also an integral part of the
end. To assign to it a merely instrumental and subjective value is to
negate the essential idea of knowledge, and the logical issue of such a
view is scepticism." The ethical significance thus secured for knowledge
is social as well as individual in its scope.] F. J. E. Woodbridge. ' The
Dominant Conception of the Earliest Greek Philosophy.' [Discussion of
Heraclitus, Parmenides, Empedocles and Anaxagoras, in the light of the
preserved fragments. " The dominant conception of early Greek philos-
ophy seems to be, not a permanent material substance out of which all
things are made, but that nature is a process of physiological generation,
a succession of births and deaths, of coming into existence and passing out
of existence, mediated by some natural principle, as water, or a nameless
inexhaustible substance, or air, or fire."] G. S. Fullerton. ' The Doc-
trine of Space and Time. in. The Berkeleian Doctrine of Space.' [The
only fundamental error of the Kantian doctrine " lies in supposing that in
dealing with any single intuition it is dealing with ' real ' space and ' real '
things ". For the Berkeleian, " the absolute object and its absolute
space are not an object (intuitive), and a space (the ' form ' of an intu-
ition), but rather an indefinite series of substitutions gathered up and
hypostatised into an individual ". The real thing, in any but a relative
sense, is a possibility of substitutions according to a definite principle ;
it is not a single intuitive experience of any sort whatever. " If the
Berkeleian will admit that ' real ' space is infinitely divisible (as it may
be), and the Kantian will admit that ' real ' space is not given in any in-
tuition (as it certainly is not), there need be no quarrel between them."]
E. Adickes. ' The Philosophical Literature of Germany in the Years
1899 and 1900.' [History of philosophy ; metaphysics and epistemology ;
ethics.] Reviews of Books. Summaries of Articles. Notices of New
Books. Notes. Vol. x. No. 5. C. S. Myers. 'Naturalism and
Idealism.' [Criticism of Ward's Naturalism and Agnosticism. (1)
..Specific criticisms : vacillating attitude to mechanism, erroneous con-
ception of protoplasmic activity, misunderstanding of natural selection.
(2) General criticism : the writer keeps a battle raging between teleology
And mechanism, spiritualism and agnosticism, until in the end he gives the
victory to the former. But "neither the idealism of the teleologists, nor
the naturalism of the mechanists, is one whit the more real, the more
adequate, or the more true than the other. . . . Each is a creation of
consciousness or mind, or whatever term is used to denote that ex-
perience which consists merely in a duality of subject and object."
Ward assumes that the results of the one half of experience are to be
exalted at the expense of the other half. The real is "that unity of
states of consciousness which we have called mind or experience."
272 PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.
Monism, "based on unknowable experience, is at once the source and
haven of all philosophy " ; dualism must suffice for ordinary life.] F. C.
French. 'The Doctrine of the Twofold Truth.' [Philosophical truth
(inferable from Aristotelian principles) and theological truth (harmony
with the doctrines of the Church) were at first identified ; later, recognised
as two, but regarded as easily reconcilable by logic ; while, finally, one
after another of the doctrines of faith is declared indemonstrable "the
mysteries of faith and the speculations of philosophy form each a separate
and distinct system, and we have the twofold truth." The inherent
contradiction may be avoided logically (Thomas Aquinas, Locke) ; or
ontologically (Kant) ; or practically (Kant, James). In spite of these
methods of escape, the twofold truth is still with us : witness Miinster-
berg's Philosophy and Life. The sources of Miinsterberg's error are
certain wrong suppositions regarding the nature of science : the belief
that science is necessarily atomistic involves a transformation of reality,
and is the product of a subjective purpose.] G. S. Fullerton. 'The
Doctrine of Space and Time. iv. Of Time.' [The difficulty as stated by
Augustine : " past time is not now, future time is not yet, and present
time has 110 duration ". Augustine's reference to psychology (we measure
not time but memory and expectation) leaves the problem where he
found it. (1) Kant's answer is unsatisfactory: infinite time is not given
in original intuition ; we are not conscious of time as infinitely divisible :
for the Kantian, no division of time whatever can come to an end. We
must emphasise with Berkeley the distinction of appearance and reality.
We then find (2) that there is a crude intuition of duration, which is the
foundation of our notion of ' real ' time ; that we are thus intuitively
conscious of time, as present, past and future ; that this time is not
infinite ; that the time given in a single intuition is not composed of an
infinite number of bits of time ; that no single intuition of duration
constitutes 'real' time. The most serious objection to this position is:
how can even crude time " be given in intuition, when time is composed
of moments no one of which can alone constitute time, and no two of
which can exist simultaneously ? " It is sufficiently met if we show that
"there is nothing inconceivable in the fact of a consciousness of dura-
tion".] Discussion. W. Smith. 'Professor Thilly on Interaction'.
[Both theories, parallelism and interaction, assume that psychology and
physiology represent two departments of knowledge, equally objective
and independent. The problem, as thus stated, is antiquated. We have
at most three series of facts : (1) the series of the percipient's sensations
called the brain of the person observed ; (2) the series of conscious
experiences in the person observed, which cannot be directly intuited ;
(3) the forms of substance and energy, entities like the members of
the second series that are objective and metaphysical. With this
critical re-statement, "the mystery of the interaction of mind and
brain has disappeared. . . . There is no heterogeneity."] Reviews
of Books. Summaries of Articles. Notices of New Books. Notes.
No. 6. G-. S. Fullerton. ' The Doctrine of Space and Time v. The Real
World in Space and Time.' [(1) Are tune and space conceptions or
intuitions ? " What is given in intuition, in the strict sense of the word,
is but a symbol of the real world in space and time. . . . But the world
in space and time, the object of our symbol, is an individual, not an
abstraction. . . . Since space and time are in this sense individual, Kant
applied to them the term ' intuition '." (2) When we contrast ' space
and time ' with ' the world in space and time ' we must not imagine that
the world is one thing, and space and time independent entities of an-
other sort. "The real world in space and time is a vast complex of
PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. 273
tactual things standing to each other in certain relations of distance and
direction, and passing through a series of changes. The plan or system
of its actual and theoretically possible relations and changes is what
we mean by space and time." All three are intuitions, in the sense
that they are individual ; but the last two are abstracted from the first.]
H. W. Wright. ' The Truth in Ascetic Theories of Morality.' [" The
implications of self-consciousness justify us in maintaining that there are
in man two selves struggling for the mastery in the form of two opposing
tendencies, the one that of natural individuality which would turn all to
purposes of individual satisfaction, the other that of self-determining
personality whereby the individual is led to make the good of others
an end of action, and to identify himself with a social order in which all
humanity is united in the realisation of a common good." Plato erred in
making these tendencies mere psychological abstractions, reason and
sensibility ; the naturalists err in neglecting the opposition altogether ;
Kant and Fichte err in overestimating discipline and negation. The
true end of morality is a " synthesis of ideal and real ".] J. D. Stoops.
' The Concept of the Self.' [Consciousness has five stages. We have
(1) instinctive or immediate consciousness, pure sense experience ; con-
sciousness is the sensation itself. Next comes (2) impulsive or ideal
consciousness, or simple perception, the laying hold upon quality ; here
we find consciousness of the sensation. (3) Ideomotor consciousness, or
ideation, " sees this quality in such a system of relationships as to
constitute it an aspect of an object of thought ". (4) " The coming of
the idea ... is the ushering in of a dualism, the dualism of subject and
object. ... It gives us the negative aspect of self-consciousness, the
mere awareness of self " ; " there is consciousness of the object as
revealed through the idea as an ' other ' over against the subject ". This
is the self-consciousness of Buddhism. (5) But " the idea as a universal
belongs to both subjective act and objective or ideal meaning " ; in
positive or Christian self-consciousness, " the subject is conscious of the
object as content of the individuating idea ".] S. P. MacLennan.
' Trans-subjective Realism and " Hegelianism ".' [Reply to Rogers. (1)
Trans-subjective realism " draws a circle about ' fact ' ". But fact is
existence plus content ; and only existence is given. Whatever about
' fact ' is significant is fluent. Moreover, the theory must in consistency
make perception a matter of intuitive knowledge, and conception an
affair of later reflective construction. (2) For the Hegelian, " indetermin-
ate ' existence 'is ... the presupposition and datum of knowledge. . . .
Reality emerges as the determinate existence implicit and immanent
in all indeterminate existence. Knowledge is the function in and
through which this determinateness is revealed."] Reviews of Books.
Summaries of Articles. Notices of New Books. Notes. [Discussion
between Miinsterberg and Stratton.]
PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW. Vol. viii., No. 4. P. H. Giddings. 'A
Provisional Distribution of the Population of the United States into
Psychological Classes.' [If we group mental phenomena under the
three headings of motor, emotional and intellective, we have the six
temperamental possibilities : MEI, EMI, IME, MIE, EIM, IEM. Of these,
MEI and EMI are found only in animals, human infants, and defectives.
The four normal types remain, and may be particularised under the
rubrics promptness of reaction, continuity of activity, kind of move-
ment, degree of emotion, temperament, formation of belief or judgment,
mode of reasoning, disposition, character. MIE may be termed the
ideo-motor ; EIM the ideo-emotional ; IBM the dogmatic emotional ;
and IME the critical intellectual type. Examination by nationalities
18
274 PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.
and religions, checked by preference for classes of books, shows that
"the mental 'mode' of the American people as a whole is ideo-emo-
tional to dogmatic emotional".] R. S. Woodworth. 'On the Volun-
tary Control of the Force of Movement '. [" The regulation of the
force of movement, at least in the case of a blow, is not simply a deriv-
ative function, dependent on regulation of the extent. Nor is it de-
pendent on the duration of the movement. . . . And if the regulation of
force is an independent function, so is also the perception of the force of
movement, since the control of the force of any one blow is based on the
perception of the preceding blow. The muscle sense informs us of the
force of a movement directly," i.e., the various constituent sensations
functionate unitarily.] W. M. Urban. ' The Problem of a " Logic of
the Emotions " and " Affective Memory ".' n. [The question of the affec-
tive memory is not whether the affective elements, pleasantness and un-
pleasantness, can be revived as such, but rather : " Can an affective state
become the presupposition of another affective state, that is, the mood of
recognition ? Is feeling, emotion, capable of becoming a presupposition
of a judgment-feeling of familiarity ? >r This latter question must be
answered affirmatively. Recognition of affective states rests " not upon
the definite quality of the ideal or organic elements, but rather upon the
dynamic relations of the elements of the emotional states ; and this
revivability goes back iiltimately to the dynamic relation to volition ".
Critique of Eibot and Marshall. " When aesthetic theory, in its psycho-
logical analysis, shall have made clear the processes and the reasons for
the processes which underlie the passage of the attention from the object
to the complex of relationships which constitute the organic reaction to
the object, the most difficult question of aesthetics will be solved."] M.
V. O'Shea. 'The Psychology of Number: a Genetic View'. [The
' Symbolic ' versus the ' practical ' teaching of arithmetic. The genesis of
the number idea in the child's mind a sketch based on the work of
McLellan and Dewey. Criticism of these authors' analysis of the
psychology of counting. The appeal to ' correlative differentiation and
identification ' and to the synthesis of units is too logical ; the child's
pleasure in counting is, .</., due in large part to the pleasure of being
able to do something that others can do.] E. L. Thorndike and R. S.
Woodworth. ' The Influence of Improvement in One Mental Function
upon the Efficiency of Other Functions, n. The Estimation of Magni-
tudes '. [Summary of experiments, the general conclusion of which was
given in the first paper.] C. L. Franklin. ' Colour Introspection on
the Part of the Eskimo.' [The four rectilineal colour series, in the light
of Rivers' account of the colour vision of the Eskimo. Helmholtz'
theory, of the physical colour triangle, ignores the psychological colour
square ; Bering's theory, of the psychological colour square, ignores the
physical colour triangle.] Psychological Literature. New Books. Notes.
Vol. viii., No. 5. J. R. Angell and W. Fite. ' Contributions from the
Psychological Laboratory of the University of Chicago. (1) Further
Observations on the Monaural Localisation of Sound.' [Continuation
of study published in Review, viii., 3, bringing out especially "the
variations in monaural localisation which are connected with the
duration of deafness". The experiments serve to reconcile the con-
flicting statements about monaural localisation made by aurists, and
suggest the possibility and desirability of training for persons who have
lost their hearing in one ear. The improvement noted " is attributable
merely to systematic direction of attention to the peculiarities of sounds
coming from different directions". To this should be added visual
knowledge of the position of the stimulus. The discipline suggested is
PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. 275
" comparable with the ocular gymnastics prescribed to persons suffering
from defects of the oculomotor mechanism".] '(2) New Apparatus.'
[Describes a multiple contact key ; a platform for tuning-fork and marker ;
an apparatus for determining the impact liinen ; a standard for adjusting
a common form of the registering tambour to the surface of the drum,
in plethysmographic work; an adjustable form of the Hallion and Comte
plethysmograph ; and a thermal apparatus. All are useful instruments.
C. L. Morgan. ' Further Remarks on the Relation of Stimulus to
Sensation in Visual Impressions.' [Ten notes of detail, suggested by
Meyer's critique in the Amer. Journal, 1900, 135.] J. H. Bair. ' De-
velopment of Voluntary Control.' [A study of the acquisition of
voluntary control over the retrahens of the ear. Description of a
' registration helmet ' whereby a record of ear movements could be
obtained. Graphic representation of results in three stages : (1) before
voluntary control is acquired ; (2) when control is just beginning to
appear ; (3) when the maximum of contraction is attained, without
innervation of the brow or contraction of irrelevant muscles. Con-
clusions : more than the idea of movement is required to secure move-
ment; the muscle must first be controlled in a group, if it is to be
controlled in isolation ; control is favoured by direction of attention
to the desired movement and away from other movements. Interpreta-
tion of results, on the assumptions that the ' original motor discharge '
hypothesis and the hedonic concept are correct, and that the race is
(and for many generations has been) exposed to a constant or but slightly
changing environment.] Psychological Literature. New Books. Notes.
No. 6. E. L. Thorndike and R. S. Woodworth. ' The Influence of
Improvement in One Mental Function upon the Efficiency of Other
Functions. in. Functions Involving Attention, Observation and Dis-
crimination.' [" Improvement in the function of observing and marking
words containing s and e is not equivalent to improvement in the group-
function of observing the make-up of words. Neither the speed nor the
accuracy acquired in the training is a general power equally applicable
to other data." Brief report of similar experiments, giving like results ;
hints for further work.] E. A. Kirkpatrick. ' A Genetic View of Space
Perception.' [Space perception is the results from (and aids towards)
useful reactions upon surroundings. The earliest space reactions are
those that result in increasing favourable (or decreasing unfavourable)
stimuli ; the chief centre of reference is the region of the mouth. Con-
sciousness of space relations is the consequence of space reactions ; ideas
of direction, magnitude, distance, are gradually formed by the manipula-
tion and comparison of objects ; distance, e.g., is not at first distinguished
from other causes of varying clearness of perception. The child is a
space-reacting organism at (and probably before) birth.] W. H. Sheldon.
' A Case of Mental Causation.' [" The thing to be shown is that there
is some one mental state which, if entertained, brings up other mental
states, and brings them up in such a way that a real necessity is seen
for their appearance." The mental state used for illustration is the idea
of more, and the following states are the ideas used in elementary
arithmetic. (1) More involves the ideas of size and of movement. But
to have an idea of something that increases is to tend toward conscious-
ness of a series of increments. And this idea of ' more and more '
suggests a relationship between the increments. It is then natural to
seek to discover the character of the relation. So we are led to the ideas
of (a) sameness, and (6) difference. (2) There are three conditions of
necessary connexion : the character of the second event must, in the last
analysis, be the same as that of the first ; there must be a change, the
276 PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.
second must be a distinct event ; and there must be a movement, a
process of continuous flow, in the antecedent, such that it gradually
becomes the consequent. All these conditions are fulfilled in the case
of the idea of more. (3) Let us then proceed with the ideas of number
and quantity to which more naturally leads. We have (c) position in the
series, " that in which the repeated increments in a more-series differ ".
(d) Magnitude, " that in which the differently placed increments in the
more-series are the same ". (e) Later and earlier, " as describing more
and as comparing it with its own part, that which is less ". (f) Equality ;
" we have a series of equal sizes, which series increases as new members
are added ". (g) " The finite number series becomes an infinite number
series." This movement is a psychical causation.] E. B. Potwin.
' Study of Early Memories.' [Classification of and comment upon
the earliest memories of college students, seventy-five women and
twenty-five men.] Discussion and Reports. J. M. Gillette. ' The
Relation of Emotion to Mathematical Belief.' [Beliefs should be graded
not by age alone, but by their ability to prove their clearness to men by
their emotional colouring. We then have (a) belief in the right to live ;
(6) that in the right to means of subsistence ; (c) genetic beliefs ; (d)
religious, ethical, governmental, legal, scientific beliefs. Mathematics is
aloof and apart from the burning interests of mankind ; its truths seem
to be mere instruments to use in connexion with affairs. They are thus
less capable of producing emotional effects, upon the mass of the people
at least, than are scientific tenets.] R. Hessler. ' Redreaming dreams.'
[Instances of repeated dreams under the influence of salol.] Psycho-
logical Literature. New Books. Indexes.
AMERICAN JOURNAL, OF PSYCHOLOGY. Vol. xii. No. 3. R. M. Ogden.
'A Method of Mapping Retinal Circulation by Projection.' [Projection,
with and without blue glasses, upon a white translucent screen. Satis-
factory maps were obtained from various observers, in the region about
the macula. Criticism of Helmholtz and Boisser : the regular phenomena
are due, not to stoppages, but to chance spaces between corpuscles or
bundles of corpuscles in the normal flux ; stoppages are manifested in
brief, jerky flashes. The bright interspaces are preceded or followed by
shadows of collections of corpuscles.] E. B. Huey. ' On the Psychology
and Physiology of Reading. n.' [(1) " The eye gets its data by a process
of photographing successive sections of each line, the photographs over-
lapping constantly, and being taken at quite irregular distances." With
all line lengths, the eye moves oftener than is necessary to bring the
printed matter within the range of clear vision. The average number of
words per fixation ranges from 1'5 to 3'63, being greater with short lines.
(2) The rate of reading varies with individuals, with subject matter, and
with conditions. Test with silent reading (subject's own method),
auditory reading, motor (lips closed and lips moving), and reading aloud.
The average normal rates (number of words per second) for twenty
subjects are: 5'63, 5'12, 5'29, 4-88 and 3'55. (3) Perception of reading
units and interpretative processes. There are, in reading, " two sets of
processes, somewhat independent and paralleling each other : a reading
in terms of interassociated word and phrase units (themselves composed
of interassociated sub-units), thought in a variously proportioned com-
bination of visual, auditory and motor elements ; and a reading (or
interpretation) in terms of direct representations of the realities with
which the subject matter deals". (4) Practical suggestions: "the
arrangement that is finally found to be the best for ordinary reading will,
I believe, facilitate skimming as well".] Studies from the Psychological
Laboratory of the University of Michigan. I. J. W. Slaughter. 'The
PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. 277
Fluctuations of the Attention in Some of Their Psychological Relations.'
[The fluctuations depend neither upon the apperceptive process nor
upon peripheral changes ; they are closely related to vasoraotor and
respiratory processes. The periods are not constant, but evince a regular
order of variation ; voluntary effort shortens fluctuation and increases
efficiency of attention. The cause is physiological, probably " a re-
inforcement of the acbivity of the nerve cell, nob indirectly through
changes in nourishment, due to variations in blood pressure ".] n. R.
W. Taylor. ' The Effect of Certain Stimuli upon the Attention Wave.'
[The length of the waves and the efficiency of attention are increased by
weak, decreased by strong stimuli. Many changes of attention occur
during (or just after) inspiration. The waves are due to overflow effects
from the vasomotor and respiratory centres upon the cortical centres.]
in. W. B. Pillsbury. ' Does the Sensation of Movement Originate in
the Joint ? ' [The sensitivity of elbow and knee is decreased by the
faradisation of distal joints (wrist and ankle) as well as by currents
through the joints themselves. " This fact, together with the lack of
anatomical evidence that the joints have sensory endings, makes it
probable that the sensation of movement is derived mainly from the
tendon and muscle rather than, as Goldscheider thought, from the joint."]
N. Triplett. 'The Educability of the Perch.' [Modified repetition,
with perch and minnows, of Moebius' experiment. The experiment was
successful : the perch clearly formed " a firm association " with regard to
the glass partition ; Bateson's statements of the slowness with which
fish profit by experience must therefore be modified. Remarks on
hearing v. sense of jar, keenness of vision, imitation, discrimination.]
N. Triplett and E. C. Sanford. ' Studies of Rhythm and Metre.' [(1)
The stanza forms of Nursery Rhymes. Most frequent is the stanza of
four lines of four stresses each ; frequent is also that of two four-stress
(first and third) and two three-stress (second and fourth) lines; after
these comes the stanza of three three-stress lines (first, second, fourth)
and one four-stress line (third). The' pattern dominates the syllables.
(2) Experimental study of rhythms. There is a general uniformity in the
intervals between stresses, though there is also a tendency to quicken in
rate from first to last. The characteristic movement of the commonest
patterns depends on the distribution of pauses and (perhaps) on the
tendency to quicken. Imperfectly worded rhymes are forced by school
children into one or other of the common patterns. (3) College yells :
the same metrical patterns recur, but in strikingly different proportions.
(4) Some common rhythms (bugle calls, train beats) and the words
that have been fitted to them.] Literature. The MIND Association.
Correspondence. Books Received.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY. New Series, vol. i. G-.
F. Stout. ' The Common-sense Conception of a Material Thing.' [A
detailed analysis of the conception of things as static and as subject
to change, with the result incidentally of showing omissions and mis-
takes in the views o? J. S. Mill and Kant.] E. C. Benecke. ' On the
Aspect Theory of the Relation of Mind to Body.' [Every process in
which the neuro-cerebral system is concerned has two aspects, and it
is according to the aspect which it presents to the Conscious Subject
that it forms part of that Subject's physical or psychical series.] S.
H. Hodgson. ' The Conceptions of Cause and Real Condition.' [The
conception of Real Condition is a reformed and restricted form of the
materialistic conception of efficient Cause. Real Conditions are the
Ki'ne qun non of our conscious experience but cannot account for its
quality. This leaves room in the universe for infinite varieties of
278 PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.
conscious quality.] E. H. Donkin. ' On some of the Phenomena of
poetic effectiveness.' [An analysis of the writer's personal feeling of
satisfaction in the concluding lines of one of Tennyson's poems,
tending to show that poetic effects may be roughly classified as (1)
positive in negative ; (2) unity in variety.] H. Sturt. ' Art and Per-
sonality.' [The artistic interest is an interest in personal life. It is
separate in its quality and objects from our other higher interests.
Its value is posited by a personal affirmation.] S. H. Hodgson. ' The
Substance-Attribute Conception in Philosophy.' [The substance-attri-
bute conception is erroneous. The conception of Real Condition should
be substituted for that of Substance.] G. E. Moore. ' Identity.'
[Numerical difference exists as well as conceptual difference. There
is no conceptual difference without numerical difference. Numerical
difference can exist apart from conceptual difference.] J. Lindsay.
' Italian Philosophy in the nineteenth century, with special reference
to the place of Francesco Bonatelli.' [A critical and historical ap-
preciation.] A. Boutwood. 'A Scientific Monism.' [A criticism of
the monistic views of Prof. Ernst Haeckel.] Miss E. E. C. Jones.
' The Meaning of Sameness.' [A criticism of the views of Drs. B.
Bosanquet and G. E. Moore on identity.] A. J. Finberg. ' The
Pseudo- Science of ^Esthetics.' [An attack on Prof. Bain's theory of
beauty, and a plea for the adoption of the comparative method in
the scientific study of art.] H. W. Carr. ' The Theory of Subjective
Activity!' [An adverse criticism of Prof. J. Ward's theory of Subjective
Activity as the basis of a spiritualistic monism. The theory can neither
dispense with matter as the cause of sensation ; nor can it explain the
mode of our activity.] G-. D. Hicks. ' The Belief in External Realities.'
[The source of our apprehension of external realities lies in feeling.
Volitional experience elaborates, but does not, as Dr. Stout holds,
originate this primordial apprehension.] S. H. Hodgson. ' The Con-
scious Being.' [The conscious being is not a datum, but a false con-
struction ; the datum is consciousness. The continuous real condition of
consciousness is not mind or ego, but neuro-cerebral matter.] Abstract
of minutes, etc.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. Vol. xii., No. 1 . J. S. Mackenzie.
' The Use of Moral Ideas in Politics.' [There is serious difficulty in
keeping to a high moral standard in politics. Yet we cannot regard
politics and morality as separate spheres. It will help to reconciliation
if we remember (a) that personal morality is mainly self-realisation ;
(6) that the moral problems of politics cannot be solved quite in the same
way as those of persons.] T. Davidson. ' The Task of the Twentieth
Century.' [It is to combat those reactionary tendencies of the nine-
teenth century which militated against freedom. We need a rejuvenated
philosophy which recognises desire as the primal fact, together witli a
great diffusion of education and of economic welfare. We also need a
band of self-sacrificing apostles.] J. A. Hobson. ' Socialistic Im-
perialism.' [A refutation of certain socialistic arguments in favour of
the South African War, (a) that the Boers neglected to develop their
country ; (ft) that the law of modern industries (and so of empires) is
for the larger to absorb the smaller.] C. S. Devas. ' Monopolies and
Fair Dealing.' [The rapid growth of monopolies has altered the condi-
tions of industry. Political economists must () revise the old theories ;
(6) estimate the power and effects of combination ; (c) advise on meas-
ures to curb the abuses of monopolies.] Eliza Ritchie. ' Women and
the Intellectual Virtues.' [A plea for the better education of women on
the ground that they have invaded the spheres of political and industrial
PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. '279
activity, and that their emotional temperament will work mischief unless
they are trained in the intellectual virtues.] Q-. E. Moore. ' The Value
of Religion.' [An argument to show that religion is valueless. There is
nothing to show that God exists, the ordinary ' proofs ' being fallacious.
Granted that religion is a delusion, there is nothing to show that it is
a serviceable delusion.] A. L. Benedict. ' Has the Indian been mis-
judged ? A study of Indian character.' [A vindication of the North
American Indians from charges of cruelty, immorality, etc.] Discussions.
' A further reply to Mr. J. M. Robertson,' by D. Cr. Ritchie. ' Human
Sentiment with regard to a future life,' by F. C. S. Schiller. Book
Reviews.
L'ANNEE PSYCHOLOGIQUE. Septieme Annee, 1901. The volume con-
tains twenty-four memoires originaux chiefly by MM. Bouvier, Fere,
Binet and Simon. Many of these, however, deal with subjects which
belong rather to general anthropology, or to zoology, than to psychology
proper. E.-L. Bouvier. ' Les habitudes des Bembex.' [A purely
natural-history article on the habits of this group of the genus sphex,
based largely on the well-known works of Fabre and of Dr. and Mrs.
Peckham, but showing considerable use of the researches of other ob-
servers as well as of the author himself. It is not specially interesting
to the psychological student.] Ch. Fere". ' Les variations de 1' excitabilite
dans la fatigue.' [This and the two next memoirs all deal with records
of effect of stimulation on work done by muscular effort. The results
are not startling. They show that all excitation, whether pleasurable or
painful, brings about some additional output of work, but not much.]
A fourth memoir by Ch. Fere*, ' L'excitabilite comparee des hemispheres,'
is an experimental study on the excitability of the right and left sides of
the brain. J. Claviere. ' Le travail intellectuel.' [Experiments show
that intense intellectual work is followed by a considerable diminution
of muscular power, as measured by the dynamometer ; slight intellectual
work is followed by no diminution ; intellectual work is never followed
by increase of muscular power. More important than these results is
the preliminary remark, viz., that it is indispensable to employ only sub-
jects trained to the use of the dynamometer.] A. Binet. ' Un nouvel
esthesiometre.' [Description of a much more elaborate instrument than
Weber's blunted compasses to secure simultaneous application of the
points, equality of pressure and other more or less important conditions.
Followed by a short paper on the technique of this branch of research.]
Ed. Claparede. ' Sensations spe"cifiques de position des membres.' [A
defence of the doctrine that the perceptions of position are complex,
and involve visual or tactual factors, with some reference to the recent
work of M. Bonnier, L 'Orientation.] J. Laureys. 'Comment 1'oeil
et la main nous renseignent differemment sur le volume des corps.'
[The results of a series of experiments undertaken for somewhat the
same purpose as those of Dr. Ley (Journal de Neurologie, 20 aout,
1900), -viz., to settle the question, Which sense gives us the most
accurate information as to the volume of bodies ? Cubes were em-
ployed, and the subjects were required to identify the cube which had
one-eighth of the volume of a given standard cube. The experiments
were not sufficiently numerous to give numerical results of any import-
ance, but they seem to show that sight gives us the more precise measure
of volume, and that the estimate based on touch sensations is far less
accurate. The author does not appear to have noticed that the estimates
were, roughly speaking, good or bad in the same person for both kinds of
perception.] J. Larguier des Bancels. ' De 1'estimation des surfaces
colorees.' [The experiments of Pierce (Psychical Review, 1894), and of
280 PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.
Quantz (American Journal of Psychology, 1895), have shown that
colour has an important influence on our estimation of surfaces. The
present paper records some experiments which illustrate the effect of
colour in connexion with the well-known illusion of Poggendorf's dia-
gram. If the rectangle be coloured the illusion is changed in degree, the
amount of displacement varying according to the colour. The results
have considerable agreement with those of the two American experi-
mentalists, and are of distinct interest. Our estimates of extension are
clearly in some degree dependent on the colour of the extended surface.]
De Moor and Daniel. ' Les enfants anormaux & Bruxelles.' [Some
account of the pupils in the communal schools for abnormal children.]
A. Binet gives us five closely connected papers on the cephalometry of
children, followed by one on the same subject by Dr. Simon. In these
(nearly) 200 pages there is not very much of direct psychological
interest except Dr. Binet's confessions (pp. 824 et seq.) of the effect of
auto-suggestion on his measurements. Simon. ' Experiences de copie :
essai d'application k 1'examen des enfants arrieres.' [Continuation of
the observations of Dr. Binet in the sixth volume of L'Annee Psycho-
logique, the subjects being taken from the schools for backward children
at Vaucluse. The number of digits or words copied on an average in each
act of copying, the number of mistakes made, the time taken. Dr.
Simon was very favourably impressed with the value of the act of
copying a phrase as a method of testing intellectual development.]
A. Binet. ' L'observateur et 1'imaginatif.' [The distinction between
these two types of mind is a very important one and runs through
most of the intellectual processes.] A. Binet. ' Un nouvel appareil
pour la inesure de la suggestibilit/'.' Simon. ' L'interpretation des
sensations tactiles chez les enfants arrieres.' [Results of a series of
experiments (made in 1900) on children of about thirteen years of
age all more or less backward, some being idiots, others only mentally
weak. The object was to detect the capacity for discriminating double-
contacts ; the method employed was that of vising little boards pierced
at right angles with points, the method usually employed by Dr. Binet
and frequently described. As a rule the accuracy of interpretation of
the tactile sensations bore a distinct relation to the intelligence of the
subject.] The original articles occupy about 560 pages ; about 140 pages
more are devoted to bibliographical analyses, or brief resumes of import-
ant books and papers in French, German, English and other languages.
And there is a bibliographical list running to about 130 pages and
including books and articles in all the principal languages, published
in 1899-1900.
KEVUE DE MifTAPHYSiQUE ET DE MORALE. 9e Annee, No. 3. Mai.,
1901. G. Sorel. ' La valeur sociale de 1'art.' [' Questions relative to
^Esthetics' are A. "What is the causal relation between an artist's
work (as effect) and the state of society in which he lives ? B. What
specific emotions do works of art excite ? On these two questions
no certain results have been obtained. M. Sorel will deal with C.
' What effect does art produce on society? ' and he seems to identify this
both with ' What effect ought it to produce ? ' and with ' What is a work
of art ? ' Most people, he says, are agreed that the artist ' has no claim
to our admiration, if he propagates error '(!); and it is equally obvious
that he has none if he 'neglects morality '. After this short preface the
article consists of a loose string of interesting observations and criticisms ;
and the conclusion seems to be that the ' Fine Arts,' which are ' games'
and merely 'amuse the idle,' are losing (and rightly) their importance,
and that, in view of the increasing occupation of modern societies with
PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. 281
' work,' only those arts are surviving and ought to survive which, (a)
most effectually relieve from intellectual strain ; (6) beautify the com-
monest instruments of production in such a plain way as will point out
to the workman who uses them the ' spirituality ' of his work, and so
make him love it.] E. Charticr. ' Sur les perceptions du toucher.'
[Pretends to describe the main steps of the process by which a man, who
had only the sense of touch, would ' acquire the notions ' of ' distance,'
' direction ' and ' resistance ' : he must have acquired the first before he
can acquire the second, and the second before the third. The first
requires not only a knowledge of the relation between the sensations
(whatever they may be) produced by his own bodily motions and the
sensations (chiefly of heat and cold) produced by objects, but also the
idea of moving voluntarily from one such object to another; indeed, 'the
idea of distance is never anything but the representation ' of the movement
necessary to obtain a desired perception. M. Chartier here identifies
the sensations produced by our own bodily motions with the perception
of those motions ; and a mass of mistakes even more childish render his
other speculations even more useless. But he is anxious, we find, to
teach 'philosophers' that 'every question of origin throws us into a
circle ' : ' to know one's own body, one must perceive, while to perceive,
one must already know one's own body '. Thus ' resistance ' is ' de facto
a primitive and immediate perception,' but he has shown that de jure it
is not so ; and, similarly, of all perceptions, it is obvious that a ' purely
qualitative difference ' can be nothing but an ' agreeable or disagreeable
modification,' and that what ' philosophers ' take to be a ' simple and
primitive impression ' is in every case ' an idea, itself composed of ideas ' :
in fact ' every idea ' both is and presupposes ' all ideas '.] E. lie Roy.
' Sur quelques objections adressees k la nouvelle philosophic.' [' Ques-
tions of Method ' : (1) ' The postulate of Intellectualism ' has been gener-
ally admitted hitherto ; the N. P. rejects it. Both agree that there exists
' in the spirit ' not only a luminous centre ' fully lighted by the brightness
of reflection,' but also an immensely larger mass of surrounding shade
called ' action and life ' ; both aim at ' increasing the region of light ' : they
only disagree about the means of effecting this increase ; for Intellec-
tualism refuses to ' subordinate what is clear and conscious to what is
not so,' whereas the N. P. maintains that the shady region ' plays the
essential part ' in ' discovery ' : they agree, therefore, (sic} about the
means of creating more light, and the Intellectualist mistake consists in
ascribing to ' the obscure ' a purely practical role and in denying that it
is itself ' knowledge ' ! (2) The N. P. is ' precisely opposed ' to Intel-
lectualism by maintaining that ' the real ' may be ' lived,' even if it is
inconceivable for ' abstract thought '. The ' brilliant light of discursive
thought ' is always second in value to ' the obscure action which gives
knowledge its only value '. ' No opinion is false ' ; but the author says
that his own thesis would be proved to be false, by the mere fact of his
success (if that were possible) in defining its meaning. The test of truth
is ' durability ' ; everything can acquire durability ; and there are some
things to which we ought to give it. (3) The N. P. is not sceptical,
although it maintains that ' the precision and necessity of science are in
inverse proportion to its truth and objectivity ' : on the contrary the
Intellectualist cannot deny 'the positive results of the new criticism,'
which are that the necessary is ' arbitrary ' and ' conventional,' and
hence, in maintaining science to be both necessary and true, becomes a
'nominalist' and contradicts himself a scepticism which the N. P.
avoids by ' entering the paths of lived contingence '.] fitudes Critiques,
Discussions, Questions Pratiques, etc.
282 PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.
REVUE NEO-SCOLASTIQUE. No. 28. T. Halleux (' L'hypothese evolu-
tionniste en Morale ') continues his expositions of Mr. Spencer's views as
to the relation of evolution and morality, and finally sums up these views
as follows : (1) Conduct is the sum total of the actions of man or brute
which tend to the preservation or development of life. (2) Conduct
follows an evolution parallel to that of structure or function. It appears
more and more complex and efficacious as one rises higher in the hier-
archy of things. (8) Efficacious conduct may be regarded as good only
on the supposition that life is more productive of pleasure than of
suffering. (4) Conduct presents various aspects, physical, psycho-
logical, biological and sociological. Under whichever of these aspects
it may be regarded, it is always seen to be subject to the same law of
evolution. (5) Seeing that it is favourable to the development of life,
the evolution of conditct must eventually bring about the realisation
of a perfect social state characterised by the completest possible ex-
pression of altruistic sentiments and the harmony of all individual
interests. A. Thiery (' Le Tonal de la Parole ') returning to the subject
commenced by him in the previous number, treats of musical aesthetic
and technique as applied to the study of the tonal in the speaking voice.
He compares together the musical technique and aesthetic as under-
stood by ancient and modern writers. He distinguishes between what
is essential to spoken language and what belongs to its perfection. He
maintains that melody belongs to the perfection of spoken language,
and argues that pleasure and displeasure are produced in us by the
same causes whether the voice be used in song or in speech. D.
Mercier (' L'induction Scientifique ') replies to the criticisms of M.
Bersani on his exposition of the inductive process, and contends that
his critic, through his confusion of an actual whole with a universal
law, has failed to distinguish between complete and scientific induction.
Complete induction leads to collective groupings, to actual wholes. Oil
the other hand, induction properly so-called, the fruitful instrument
of the experimental sciences, leads to universal law, that is to say to
laws whose extension is potentially indefinite. M. Bersani has shown
that he confuses the two kinds of induction by describing the con-
clusions of both complete and scientific induction by the same am-
biguous term universal whole. The conclusion of a complete induction
is a whole. The conclusion of scientific induction is a universal. The
description universal whole applied to the two processes is therefore
ambiguous because complex, and necessarily complex because am-
biguous.
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORUANE.
Bd. xxvii., Heft 1 und 2. C. Hess. ' Zur Kenntiiiss des Ablaufes der
Erregung im Sehorgan.' [(1) Description of experiment with interrupted
orange strip; coloured figure of the after-image. "A part of the retina
which lias not been affected by any light stimulus is able, i to 1 second
after excitation of neighbouring parts by moderately bright light, to
mediate a light sensation of considerable brightness and duration : " this
happens, then, at a time when, according to von Kries, the excitatory
process has wholly rung off. (2) Criticism of von Kries, with partial
restatement of the author's views and observations as published in the
Arch. f. OphthalmJ] R. Saxinger. ' Ueber den Einfluss der Gefiihle
auf die Vorstellnngsbewegung.' [(1) Ehrenfels' Law of Relative Further-
ance of Happiness does not hold on the side of unpleasant feelings. The
persistence in consciousness of unpleasant ideas is due not to the vivid-
ness of the ideas themselves or to ' secondary influences,' but to the actual
feelings. (2) Melancholia can be explained as due to the alteration of
PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. 283
affective disposition by feelings : Ehrenfels' Law is unnecessary. ' (3)
Affectively toned ideas not only persist, but frequently 'crop up' in
consciousness. Ehrenfels explains the cropping-up as due simply to
habituation and fatigue. But there can be no doubt that it depends
upon actual feelings, pleasant or unpleasant. (4) How do feelings affect
the movement of ideas ? The persistence and cropping-up of ideas are
two modes of manifestation of one and the same disposition. If, now,
" in cases where certain feelings come into play, the ideas crop up more
frequently without associative instigation and persist in consciousness
for a longer time than in cases where the feelings are absent or too
weak to exert a noticeable influence, the only explanation is that the
ideational dispositions concerned have been strengthened by the opera-
tion of feeling ".] M. Lobsien. ' Experimented Untersuchungen liber
die Gedachtnissentwickelung bei Schulkindern.' [Report of eight series
of experiments upon 238 boys and 224 girls, from nine to fourteen and a
half years of age. The investigation is in many ways analogous to that
of Netschajeff (Zeits., xxiv., 321). The results are shown in a profusion
of curves and tables, and cannot well be summarised. The stimuli were
seen objects, noises, spoken numbers, words arousing visual ideas, words
for auditory, tactual and affective ideas, meaningless sounds. The range
of memory for affective ideas and numbers increases most, that for noises
increases least, with increase of age. The total increase of memory is
somewhat greater for girls than for boys. On the formal side, i.e., as
regards accuracy of serial reproduction, the girls are also ahead. The
memory of seen objects is the most accurate, both for boys and for girls.
Range of memory and accuracy of serial reproduction increase together,
though not in direct proportion.] W. Sternberg. ' Geschmacksemp-
findung eines Anencephalus.' [Tests on a female anencephalic infant. A
sweet stimulus induced sucking movements and the reflex movements of
the ' sweet ' expression ; bitter, sour and salt stimuli evoked movements
of repulsion, and the corresponding facial expressions, j P. Kiesow und
R. Hahn. ' Ueber Geschmacksempfindungen im Kehlkopf.' [Historical
summary ; repetition and extension of Michelson's experiments. The
beakers on the posterior surface of the epiglottis and in the interior of
the larynx are alike sensitive to taste. We have in them instances of
phylogenetic ' survival,' retained possibly on account of their relation to
the reflex mechanism.] Literaturbericht.
PHILOSOPHISCHE STUDIEN. Bd. xvii., Heft 3. W. Wirth. 'Der
Fechner-Helmholtz'sche Satz iiber negative Nachbilder und seine Ana-
logien. n. Die Veranderungen der Farbenerregbarkeit.' [This second
instalment occupies 120 pages, a large part of. which is taken up with
details of experiments, tables, curves, etc. Hence summary is hardly
possible. (1) Introduction: preliminary and theoretical sketch of the
whole inquiry, taking account of the three visual dimensions of bright-
ness, colour tone and saturation. (2) The principal experimental groups,
and the method in general : indication of possible experiments with the
Marbe apparatus. (3) The method of experimentation in detail. (4)
Results : fixation of the colour by the side of a grey (or complementary
colour) of the same brightness. (5) Variation of extent. (6) Course
(Ruckgang) of the colour after-image upon different colour surfaces. (7)-
Combination of brightness after-image and colour after-image. (8) Varia-
tion of the reacting brightness for approximately pure colour after-images.
(9) Variation of the brightness relations of the fixated colours. (10)
Summary. " The Fechner-Helmholtz law may be made to cover the
form which the values of colour after-images assume for any mode of
variation of the reacting colour stimuli, provided that the meaning of
PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.
* change of excitability ' (the fundamental concept of the whole law, as
opposed to the 'positive' after-image effect) be taken broadly enough."
Whether the facts can be explained in terms of fatigue and recovery,
y>//'.s the intermixture of positively complementary effects in Hering's
sense, or whether the notion of change of excitability must be generalised
as " a proportional shift of excitation in a determinate direction for the
whole colour system," the author leaves undecided, inclining towards
the latter alternative. The simplest stimulus variation (increase of
intensity) gave for all colours tested the simplest functional relation in
the sense of the law, cf. the increase of brightness in the brightness
after-image. Variation of the reacting degrees of saturation, with emial
degree of intensity, gave results which can also be subsumed to the law,
-after reduction of the mixtures to their different colour components.
The negative after-image thus documents itself as a relatively peripheral
process. All colour excitations must be conceived of as analogous to
the positive brightness excitation.] Q. Melati. ' Ueber binaurales
Horen.' [The intensity of tones heard binaurally is slightly increased
with the least intervals, if anything weakened with large intervals.
With small intervals, the tones make the impression of more widely
extended localisation. Fusion degree is much reduced by binaural hear-
ing, and quickly decreases with increasing difference of pitch. Beats :
(1) binaural beats are much less clear than uniaural ; they attain their
greatest clearness with a pitch difference of ten to twenty vs. ; (2)
the idea of the beats, on the contrary, is clearer, separate from that of
the tones, and differently localised ; (8) the beats are undulatory, not (as
uniaural beats), sharply demarcated ; (4) binaural beats are weaker, the
maximum of intensity is found with least intervals (1-2-4-8) ; (5) the
limit of their perceptibility is lower (fifty vs. in the once-accented
octave) ; (6) while the tones are continuous, the beats evince two kinds
of oscillation : periods of rise and fall in a complete rhythmical unit, and
oscillations in the elements of the rhythm ; the latter are more notice-
able in slow rhythms. Harshness is less pronounced ; it disappears with
intervals of over thirty vs. Dissonance remains, though weaker, even in
cases where harshness is not remarked. When the two tones are liminal
they are heard alternately, and there is no binaural beating : the feeling
of dissonance persists.] K. Marbe. ' Berichtigung.' [Defence of the
author's Naturphilosophische Untersuchungen zur Wahrscheinlichkeiti'
lelire against the criticism of Lipps (vol. xvii., 116 f.).]
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHIE UNO PHILOSOPHISCHE KRITIK. Bd.
cxviii., Heft 1. J. Volkelt. 'Beitrage zur Analyse des Bewusstsein^.'
[The present paper, which is the second of a series, deals with the
certainty of memory. In recalling our past experiences we feel an
intuitive certainty of their actual occurrence whereby consciousness
transcends itself, comparable to the certainty given in our intuition of an
external world which involves a like self-transcendence. So far Memory
is a simple and ultimate fact of consciousness. But the feeling ex-
perienced when we recognise objects as familiar admits of analysis into
three distinct elements: (1) the feeling of confidence in the general
power of memory ; (2) the feeling of our capacity to realise at pleasure
the whole significance to ourselves of the familiar object ; (3) the feeling
of likeness between the successive perceptions of the object. Closely
connected with the certainty of memory is the unity of consciousness in
time without which our scattered and fragmentary experiences could not
l>c fused into a single whole. And with this again is connected the
feeling of time. Time is no mere appearance, but a reality of which we
become aware through the continuity of consciousness.] H. Siebeck.
PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. 285
' Das Problem cler Freiheit bei Goethe.' [Goethe shows a keen sense of
the reality of moral obligation, and therefore must have believed in free-
will, which however he united in a higher synthesis with determinism.]
H. Clasen. ' Gustav Glogaus System der Philosophic.' [An admiring
exposition of Glogau's philosophy continued in the following number and
not yet completed.] Heinr. G-omperz. ' Die Welt als geordnetes
Ereignis.' [A very interesting exposition of extreme phenomenalism,
conveyed under the form of critical annotations on a short essay by
Richard Wahle. After completing his review, which extends through
this and the next two numbers of the Zeitschrift, Gomperz had the
melancholy satisfaction of finding himself largely anticipated in Mach's
' Analyse der Empfindungen.' His views are, briefly stated, as follows :
Nothing exists but what is immediately given in consciousness. A
noumenal cause of phenomena is inconceivable. So also is the self as a
synthetic unity underlying consciousness. And it is illegitimate to admit
(as Wahle does) that besides the ' total occurrence ' known as our own
consciousness there are other total occurrences in the shape of other
people's consciousnesses. There is one consciousness into which our
own and other bodies enter as parts nothing more. Neither have we
a right to assume the existence of past events as causes of present events.
Franz Brentano has shown that our sense of time cannot be derived
from the experience of a succession of passing moments. It is a massive
feeling composed of parts of which we cannot say originally that they
are either successive or co-existent, but which are distinguished from one
another by 'local signs' or indices known in a more developed stage of
consciousness as past, present, and future. Real existence is timeless,
eternal. It is an occurrence composed of parts connected by orderly
relations. By abstracting and combining these relations we obtain the
world of space and time, a fictitious but most useful object of study.
The method might with advantage be extended, and the qualities of
things be more frankly treated as realities. At the same time certain
problems such as the derivation of consciousness from matter should be
abandoned as insoluble. And physical science should give up its
mechanical view of nature, based as it is on the illogical distinction
between the primary and secondary qualities of matter.] Rich. Ha-
mann. 'Das Problem des Tragischen.' [Continued from a former
paper. The spectacle of unmerited suffering is offensive to the moral but
not to the aesthetic sense. The business of the tragic dramatist, as of all
artists, is to place before us an interesting exhibition wrought up into a
well-rounded whole. And we are much more easily interested in the
sorrows and sufferings of others than in their joys.] Hermann Laser.
' Zur Wiirdigung Nietzsches.' [An estimate of Nietzsche from the
orthodox German Protestant point of view, completed in the following
number. Kant's dissolution of the objective world led to an increased
stress being laid on human personality, illustrated first by the categorical
imperative, then by Carlyle's hero-worship, and finally by the dream of an
Uebermensch. Nietzsche thoroughly misunderstood Christianity and
therefore failed to see that only in it could his dream be realised. But being
after all the child of his age he fully recognised the profound incom-
patibility of its materialistic science and industry with the spirit of
the Gospel. To have done this remains his real and only merit.]
Recensionen, etc. Bd. cxviii., Heft 2. H. Brbmse und E. Grimsehl.
' Untersuchungen zur Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre.' [An endeavour to show
that the distinction drawn by D'Alembert and recently revived by Marbe
between mathematical and physical possibility cannot be maintained.
The question is discussed on the physical side by Bromse, while Grimsehl
286 PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.
points out what he alleges to be serious flaws in Marbe's mathematical
reasoning, and adds a discussion of the ' Petersburg problem'.] Hermann
Leaer. 'Zur Wiirdigung Nietzsches' (Schluss). H. Clasen. ' Gustav
Glogaus System der Philosophic' (Fortsetzung;. Heinr. G-omperz.
'Die WeltalsgeordnetesEreigniss' (Fortsetzung). Recensionen. [Among
these is a very interesting review by H. Brbmse of Prof. Win. James's
Will to Believe, part of which has appeared in a German translation.
High praise is given to the literary skill and general ability of the work,
but with considerable reservations as regards its logic.] Bd. cxix., Heft 1.
A. Doring. ' Epicurs Philosophische Entwicklung.' [Draws attention
to the importance of Nausiphanes as a link connecting Epicurus with
Democritus and Pyrrho.] Georg Simmel. ' Beitrage zur Erkenntniss-
theorie der Religion.' [Religiosity is a fundamental category, co-ordinate
with the categories of Being and Willing, having its appropriate sphere
and objects which it can grasp in complete independence of those other
categories. Faith is at once an emotional and a theoretical state of the
soul. The apparent circle of believing in God because we feel Hun and
feeling Him because we believe in Him is perfectly legitimate from the
religious point of view.] Edm. Konig. ' Waruin ist die Annahnie einer
psychophysischen Causalitat zu verwerfen ? [Continues a controversy
carried on in former numbers of the Zeitschrift. The question of psycho-
physical interaction does not come under the exclusive cognizance of
metaphysics, but may and must be treated according to the methods
of empirical science. Judged by these the arguments adduced to prove
the reality of a reaction between mental and physical states are invalid.
But a general solution of the problem is only possible from the stand-
point of transcendental idealism.] Gustav Storring. ' Zur Frage der
Erinnernsiiberzengung.' [Corrects an alleged rnisstatement of the writer's
views in Volkelt's article on Memory noticed above.] Heinr. Gomperz.
'Die Welt als geordnetes Ereigniss' (Schluss). August Messer. ' Zur
Beurtheilung des Eudamonismus.' [Replies to an article by Adickes in
a former number. By ' eudsBmonism ' the writer seems to understand
what in this country is called egoistic hedonism, and he attacks it with
the usual arguments.] Recensionen, etc.
PHILOSOPHISCHES JAHKBUCH. Bd. xiv., Heft 4. Gutberlet. ' Eine
neue actualistische Seelentheorie.' [The writer criticises Miinsterberg's
theory which denies the existence of a soul. Every activity requires
an active principle, if not material, then an immaterial principle. Caus-
ality is not identity, as Mtinsterberg supposes without proof. We
accept hypothetical ether to explain light, etc. ; we are driven by
psychical facts to infer that the soul exists ; in both cases we know
nothing of either directly and positively.] Schmid. ' Die Lehre Schel-
ling's von der quelle der ewigen Wahrheiten.' [The mediaeval question
de origine essentiarum was answered by Schelling in a personal-pan-
theistic sense. His God is the knower of all things and is everything.
Against this the writer, admitting the first part, points out a distinction
between things in God's knowledge and things in His creative power.]
Pfeifer. ' Gibt es im Menschen unbewusste psychische Vorgange ? '
[In this concluding paper, the writer guards himself against the inference
of an unconscious God and of a non-immortal soul, that might be drawn
from the admission of unconscious mental activity, and points out that
its denial would give us Psychology without a soul.] Von Holtum.
' Thierisches und menschliches Erkennen.' [The writer points out several
essential differences between the intelligence of brutes and that of man ;
to say that brutes can abstract is a gratuitous assertion.] Gietman.
' Nochmals iiber den Begriff des Schonen.' [This is a short and some-
PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. 287
what controversial article, concerning the idea of the Beautiful according
to St. Thomas.]
E.IVISTA FILOSOFICA. Anno iii., Vol. iv., Fasc. v. November-December,
1901. C. Cantoni. ' Studi Kantiani.' [Prof. Cantoni, himself the
author of an elaborate work on Kant, reviews a number of recent con-
tributions to Kantian literature, particular attention being given to
Paulsen's work. Cantoni agrees with those critics who dispute Paulsen's
contention that Kant had after all a metaphysical system of his own.]
L. Credaro. ' I Progressi della Pedagogia di G. F. Herbart.' [Extols
the educational philosophy of Herbart and notices some recent French
and Italian works on the subject.] G. Cesca. ' II Monismo di Ernesto
Haeckel.' [A rather contemptuous criticism of the ' Weltrathsel ' from
an agnostic point of view. Haeckel owes his success to the aggressive
theological reaction which marks the closing years of the nineteenth
century.] Rassegna Bibliogratica, etc.
VIII. NOTE.
DEATH OF PROF. ADAMSON.
IT is with deep regret that we have to announce the death of Prof.
Adamson, of Glasgow University. An obituary notice will appear in
our next.
MIND ASSOCIATION.
THE following have joined the Association since the printing
of last number :
BERKELEY (Commander H.), Sunnymead House, Oxford.
GALLAGHER (Rev. J.), Clwyd Hall, Ruthin, N. Wales.
LOWNDES (Miss M. E.), Via di Fontelucente 20, Fiesole, Florence, Italy.
SHAND (A. F.), 1 Edwardes Place, London, W.
SHARGHA (Prof. I. K.), The College, Bareilly, N.W.P., India.
Those who wish to join the Association should com-
municate with the Hon. Secretary, Mr. HENRY STURT, 5
Park Terrace, Oxford ; or with the Hon. Treasurer, Mr.
F. C. S. SCHILLER, Corpus Christi College, Oxford, to whom
subscriptions should be paid.
Members resident in U.S.A. may, if they choose, pay their
subscription ($5) into the account of the Treasurer (Mr. F.
C. S. SCHILLER) at the Fifth Avenue Bank, corner of 44th
Street, New York, U.S.A.
NEW SERIES. No. 43.] [JuLY, 1902.
MIND
A QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF
PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.
-3SS-
I.-ON MENTAL CONFLICT AND IMPUTATION.
BY F. H. BEADLEY.
THE purpose of this article is very limited. It proposes to
deal to a certain extent with the subject of divided will, the
conflict in the mind of ideas generally, and specially of the
ideas in desire and impulse. It will inquire into the alleged
facts of action contrary to will with special reference to the
general nature of volition. And its aim will be to point out
the principles on which in practice we impute actions to our
selves or again disown them. I have for some time desired
to write this article in order, while trying to throw further
light on its subject, to defend and in part to supplement the
account of Will which I gave in MIND, No. 49. And I was
led to desire this largely in consequence of a very interesting
" Study in Involuntary Action " by Mr. Shand. 1 The proper
course doubtless would be to treat systematically the whole
topic of desire and volition, but that course (if I could follow
it anywhere) is not possible here. Any paper of the present
kind must at least endeavour to speak for itself, however
1 In MIND, Oct., 1895. Compare other articles by the same writer, in
MIND, Oct., 1894, and July, 1897, and one by Dr. Stout in July, 1896. I
perhaps may be permitted to say that I at the time wrote a brief
reply to Mr. Shand's criticism. An unfortunate accident, however, pre-
vented this from appearing at the proper moment, and so I thought it
better to wait, not foreseeing the length of the delay. I have also made
use in this paper of Dr. Stout's article, though I cannot assent to his
definition of will. Compare also his Analytic Psychology and his
Manual.
19
290 F. H. BRADLEY :
narrow its limits, but I hope that it may find support in
other articles that have preceded and will follow.
Volition I take to be the realisation of itself by an idea, an
idea (it is better to add) with which the self here and now is
identified, 1 or it is will where an idea, with which the self
feels itself one, makes its own content to exist.
I hope on another occasion to explain this thesis more
fully, 2 but I set it down here as that which the present
discussion will in the main support and defend. I have not
forgotten that Mr. Shand has written, " It will be difficult
for any one who has reflected on the type of abortive volition
in involuntary actions to any longer maintain that the realisa-
tion of the idea is essential to volition " (MiND, N.S., No. 23,
p. 291). In fact, I may say that the study of his interesting
papers has done a good deal to confirm me in my view. The
one defensible account of will (I must hold) is that which
makes it consist in the self-realisation of an idea, and I cannot,
even with Mr. Shand's help, perceive that a serious objection
to this doctrine can be based on anything in those actions
which he terms " involuntary ".
I will at once proceed to state the objection urged against
will's being essentially the realisation of an idea, the objection,
that is, which Mr. Shand would base on the facts as he appre-
hends them. I will then try to show that, even when the
facts are so taken, the objection will not hold good, and I will
point out the falsity of that assumption which underlies it.
I will then deal briefly with the nature of mental conflict and
of action contrary to volition. And I will end by asking how
the result gained will bear on imputation. But by imputation
we are here to understand the mere fact that we accept or
disown certain actions, and I shall not inquire if in thus dis-
owning or accepting them we are morally right.
Will, we are told by the objection, cannot consist in the
realisation of an idea, since there are facts which are incon-
sistent with such a definition. And the fact, which we are
here concerned with, is the alleged instance of action which
realises an idea but is contrary to will. 3 There may be two
1 In MIND, No. 49, I left out this addition, not because I did not hold
the doctrine, but because, having to treat a very large subject in a very
small space, I tried, rightly or wrongly, to simplify the matter. The
meaning of the phrase will be discussed in a later article.
2 1 may, however, in the mean time, refer the reader to MIND, No. 49,
and again to MIND, N.S., Nos. 40 and 41.
3 Mr. Shand proposes to call this by the name of " involuntary action ".
I do not myself see how we can fix the sense of " involuntary " as " contra-
voluntary," when the term has a wider meaning which is so well
ON MENTAL CONFLICT AND IMPUTATION. 291
ideas present, it is said, at once to the mind, two ideas which
move us towards two incompatible actions, and which, so
moving us, conflict with one another. Each of these ideas,
it is added, is felt as mine and is identified equally with my-
self. And we may take as an example the morbid desire for
drink in collision with the effort after duty. When in the
result an action comes in either direction, then by the defini-
tion either action alike should be will. But under at least
some conditions when we have drunk we insist that we have
not willed, but that our real will has been overpowered by the
morbid idea. Hence the difference which constitutes the
essence of will does not (it is objected) lie in an idea identi-
fied with the self. The difference must lie elsewhere, and
Mr. Shand would appear to find it in an inexplicable Will.
Now I do not accept the above description of the facts as
correct, for I cannot admit without very serious qualification
the simultaneous presence of each idea. But before entering
on this matter I desire to lay stress on another point. Even
if it were true that the self is identified at once with two con-
flicting ideas, the self need still not be identified with them
alike and equally. There may be a difference here which will
amount to a distinction and to an alternative between Yes
and No ; and this difference will be a reason for our attribut-
ing the result of one idea to ourselves and for our disavowal
of the other. To this aspect of the case Mr. Shand, I think,
has not done justice. The difference here of higher and
of lower, with the possible consequence of an alternative
between will and no-will, is very far from consisting in the
presence or absence of mere morality. A highly immoral
act may in a sense be an act which is higher, and it may
come in an eminent degree from my self and my will. And
in short it is necessary to enter into an examination of the
whole question from this side. We must ask in the case of
ideas which move us, and again in the case of mental states
generally, in what way one of these is higher and more mine
than another. All of them are "mine," we are agreed, but
there may be a special sense or senses in which they can be
distinguished also as more and less " mine," and can even be
distinguished as " mine " and " not-mine ".
1. We all recognise the distinction between on the one
side our true self, or our self taken as a whole, and on the
established. I fear that the result of such a struggle against language
must be confusion, and I cannot perceive that the struggle is necessary.
I should add that I do not forget that Mr. Shand rests his case against
the above definition of will on other grounds also. I shall deal with
.these on another occasion.
292 F. H. BRADLEY :
other side a lower and chance self of some moment. There
is a central group and order of certain feelings, ideas and
dispositions, which we should call essential to our selves.
And hence, when we fail to act in accordance with certain
habits, interests and principles, or even act in a way opposed
to them, the self that is realised is felt to be accidental and
other than our true self. This is all so familiar that it would
be superfluous to dwell on it, and taking it for granted I will
pass on to insist on a further point. This distinction does
not rest on the interference of an inexplicable something
which is called the " Will ". For it holds, in the first place,
obviously between one volition and another l as well as
between volition and other aspects of our nature. And in
the second place it holds in cases where no volition at all is
present. And a distinction applicable between volitions, and
applicable also neither solely nor specially to volitions, can-
not reasonably, I submit, be based on an empty "Will".
" I was not myself when I could act in such a manner," " I
was not myself when I could so think of you," " I do not feel
myself at all to-day," " It was not like him to make that stupid
mistake" we have here some ordinary examples. We do
not find in all of these cases the presence of volition, but we
find in every case alike the false or the chance self in opposi-
tion to the genuine self. I in short fail to see how volition-
can here be specially concerned, since the same opposition
seems on the contrary to prevail through every part of our
being.
But, it may be objected, this distinction after all is but an
affair of more and less. Outside of morality we may have
perhaps a self which is higher or lower, but we never find a
self which is really mine against a self which is not-mine, and
which stands on one side of the chasm which divides Yes-
from No. An objection of this kind is common everywhere,
but it seems really one-sided and superficial. Everywhere a
difference in degree may amount to a distinction in kind.
Everywhere, when you compare things with a view to some
end, and so measure them by some standard, 'more' and
' less ' may be opposed as what is right and is not-right.
And in the narrow sense of ' moral ' these distinctions are
1 If the Will were taken as something known and possessed of a known
character, then, of coiarse, volitions could have more or less of this
character, and so be distinguished among themselves. But if this same
character were found also to exist in every part of our nature, there
would be so far no reason for ascribing it to the Will. I am, however, in
the text, speaking of a Will which, itself unknown, interferes from the
outside.
ON MENTAL CONFLICT AND IMPUTATION. 293
not all moral, and they are not confined to the moral world.
Wherever in theory or practice one particular course must be
taken, it seems even obvious that the course chosen, because
it is better, will become for that reason the one course which
is not bad. I am not at present raising any question with
regard to imputation, and I do not say that everywhere the
worse course, if taken, would be disowned by myself. This
is a further question with which at present we are not con-
cerned. What I wish to point out here is that everywhere
and through all regions of our nature we find a distinction
between the self which is, we may say, essential and the self
which is accidental. And this distinction, however much it
rests upon difference in degree, can and does come before us
as a difference in kind between mine and not-mine.
It is the concrete matter and substance of our selves with
which we have been so far concerned. And hence the dis-
tinction, so far as it has at present been drawn, may, if we
please, be called material.
2. I pass from this to consider other ways of distinguish-
ing higher from lower and mine from not-mine. There are
several of these which in comparison with the foregoing may,
if we please, be called formal. Everywhere the more univer-
sal, we may say, is the higher and more mine, and it is on
this principle that all our formal distinctions rest. But it
was really this same principle which was involved above in
our ' material ' distinction. For, since our self is in its
essence a system and concrete universal, the more general
and the more material will in the end be identical. The
higher, because it is higher, will for that reason be wider,
and it will also be lower in the sense of being more deep-
rooted and fundamental. But, though at bottom the same,
these principles may diverge in practice and may even be op-
posed. The more general may often be only more abstract,
and the increase in abstraction may be at the price of greater
onesidedness and emptiness. Hence the higher will here be
higher in one respect only, while viewed from another side it
may be lower and worse. It is in a word but higher formally.
On the other hand that which is less abstract may often be
really more universal. For it may extend far more widely, it
may represent more of the whole, and, containing a greater
amount of the essential matter, may so in the best sense be
more material. But this opposition, we must remember, is
not absolute, and whatever is higher materially would, if
it became explicit, be higher also formally. On the other
side in practice there is a relative division and a divergence
of two principles. And hence I will go on to point out some
'294 F. H. BRADLEY I
varieties of what may be called formal superiority. There
are real differences between these, but the differences all
come from one ground.
(a) In theory and practice alike a course will be formally
higher when it explicitly and consciously asserts a principle
instead of embodying it unconsciously. It is a higher thing,
we may say, to act, knowing why we act, than it is to act
simply. On the other hand, if you compare two actions
while taking them as wholes, that which is conscious of
no principle may of course really be the higher. For the
principle asserted formally by the other action may be defec-
tive and narrow. In other words to act with a reason is, so
far as it goes, higher than to act without one, but in any
particular case the man who can give no reason may have
more reason on his side. We know the one-sided theorists
who always go upon a principle and who usually go wrong,
because their principle is too abstract or (it comes to the
same thing) is too narrow. And on the practical side the
same defect is familiar. When, to take an extreme case,
I protest that ' I do not care what the thing is, I will
do it because I have said so and because I choose ' such
a course is in one sense extremely high. I am appealing
to the idea of the self which is a law to itself and is a
principle superior to anything in particular. On the other
hand I am applying this principle not as an individual
system and whole, but as an empty abstraction. The
connexion therefore between my principle and the particu-
lar act is accidental and external, and is perhaps supplied l>y
the meanest and narrowest caprice. Still, if you consider it
formally, my act is really higher and is more mine than if
without consciousness of any principle I had acted rightly.
In the end there will be no divergence between what is best
materially and best formally, but in any given case an opposi-
tion between the two may arise. And we must admit that
to be conscious of a principle is, so far as it goes, a genuine
superiority.
(6) I will pass on to another kind of superiority which also
is formal, and which exhibits the same principle in a different
application. We know both in theory and practice what it
is to adopt a course at once and unreflectingly, and what it is
on the other hand first to pause and then to say, ' Yes, I will
take it'. I am not referring to the instances where incom-
patible suggestions leave us paralysed, and where, after
oscillation or forgetfulness, one of these suggestions returns
and determines our action. I am speaking of cases where
we do not merely pause, but where we pause and reflect. We
ON MENTAL CONFLICT AND IMPUTATION. 295
have a special end which is strong enough to prevent action
until some course has been mentally qualified as its means.
Or from the mere habit or, again, the idea and conscious
principle of waiting, in the presence of a difficulty, until we
have seen the thing from all sides we in the presence of
some suggestion or suggestions repress and suspend action.
The suggestion or suggestions, whether in theory or practice,
are, we may say, negated ; they are for the moment alienated
from my self and made into objects. This does not of
course mean that they cease altogether to be felt, but it
means that, in becoming objects and in being held before
me, they tend so far to be felt less, and are kept in check by
a principle with which the self is identified. These facts are
so important that it is better to recognise them, even while
ascribing them to a faculty or a miracle, than it is to ignore
them altogether ; but I cannot perceive that we are driven
to a choice between such alternatives. In the earlier stages
of the mind there is of course no reflexion at all. Ideas
which conflict in our minds leave us helpless and a prey to
various kinds of oscillation. It is later, when possessed by
some idea which we are unable to realise, that we make the
means to this end, and again what opposes it, into the objects
of our thought. And as the end becomes more generalised,
and, we may say, pushed further back by conflict and com-
petition among its details, the end naturally will come to hold
under it a number of alternatives. And these alternatives
are by the agency of this end, with which our self is
identified, brought before us as objects. In this way arises
the habit and the principle of suspending action in the
presence of difficulty or doubt, and of considering the
possible courses. But it is still and always that higher end,
under which the alternatives fall, which is the fixed and active
principle. It is the identification of my self with this higher
principle, whether in unconscious habit or conscious idea,
which checks the suggestions 1 and neutralises them, while
1 1 use the plural because I presume that, under normal conditions, if a
suggestion in theory or practice really were and remained single, and
strong enough to overcome what may be called my psychical inertia, I
should certainly follow it. What restrains me is the presence in some
sense of an alternative, and the only question is as to how general or
how special this alternative is, and again at what point it is brought to
consciousness. In connexion with the doctrine of the text I would advert
to the phrase ' to collect oneself '. My self is dispersed by being identi-
fied with conflicting suggestions and scattered in their disorderly struggle.
It is collected when the various incompatible courses are taken all alike
as not the end and as inferior to the end, but at the same time as
possible means to the end. It is this which at once both negates and
296 F. H. BRADLEY:
keeping them as objects before nie and in a sense apart from
me. And it is because my self is on the one side identified
with this principle of a higher self, that a suggestion can be
felt by it as on the other side embodying the lower self of the
moment. And here in these cases we find the source of my
felt constraint and self-alienation, and here is once more the
reason of a further experience. When after reflexion's pause
a suggested course coalesces with the idea of my higher self,
or at least ceases to arouse the opposition of a principle higher
than itself, that course becomes, as we say, adopted. My self,
before which the suggestion was held as something alien and
incompatible, now feels itself one with the suggestion and
experiences that as its own self-assertion and development.
Hence the process of the idea comes to me now as my truth
or again as my reality that is to be. And it is because the
possible alternatives have one and all been previously negated
and so separated from my self, that my self is now free to
discharge its collected and undivided energy in this single
direction. And the coalescing of the self with that suggested
modification of itself which was for a time held aloof, natur-
ally brings with it the heightened experience of reunion after
estrangement. Here is the origin of that "electric thrill"
which Prof. James seems to find inexplicable by psy-
chology, and, if I may say so, endeavours to exploit for a
mistaken end 1 . But, without attempting here to dwell
subordinates the suggestions, and, while checking their independent
action, retains them as objects. And it is by identifying myself with
this central principle that I become collected and confront the detail as
my property.
1 The great reputation which Prof. James deservedly enjoys as a
psychologist compels me somewhere to notice his doctrine of moral
responsibility. But even that very sincere respect and admiration which
I feel for his work in psychology does not, I am sorry to say, make it
possible for me to speak of this doctrine respectfully. When in the
presence of two alternatives (so Prof. James informs us), one of
which is remote and ideal, while the other presses on me with sensational
urgency, I will the former with an effort this is something unaccount-
able. It is, among other things, an action in the line of the greatest
resistance. It is also the real essence of volition, and, being an affair of
the purest chance, it is a conclusive instance of Free Will. And the fact
that when I am tempted there is absolutely no reason why I will one
thing and not the other this fact, Prof. James assures us, is a pledge
that morality is not an illusion. But "chance" appears with Prof.
James to have several senses. In his Will to Believe (p. 155) it is said to
mean than under absolutely identical conditions the same result need not
follow. This is, as I understand it, really to contend that the same A is
at once and in precisely the same sense both B and not-B, a contention
which obviously would destroy and remove the whole notion of truth.
Every one who anywhere desires to ask and to speak about the true and
ON MENTAL CONFLICT AND IMPUTATION. 297
farther on a large and interesting topic, we may pass to
our conclusion. In theory and in practice alike a course
that has been adopted after reflexion will be so far superior.
It will at least in one respect be a higher expression of my
true self. The reason of this is that such a course has been
separated from union with my self as the mere self of here
the false, must begin by postulating in effect that any such contention is
absurd. And even in the Will to Believe I find indications that such an
undiluted absurdity is not what really is offered. There are signs, I think,
that what Prof. James actually means is that the two cases really do
differ, but that, not perceiving in what without prejudice to his conclusion
such a difference could consist, he has been led to deny its existence.
There appears to me to be at any rate a very serious confusion in his
Psychology. Prof. James there states the alternative as being be-
tween Free Will and Determinism, so that whatever is not Determinism
is ipso jacto Free Will. He then seems to define Determinism as the
doctrine which holds that the duration and the intensity of any effort
which we put forth, are "fixed functions of the object" (ii., 571) or
*' mathematically fixed functions of the ideas " before our minds (574).
And any other doctrine but this (so I understand) is defined as Free Will.
This is to say that in volition you are ordered to strike out (a) the
influence of what is actually in the mind though not before it, and (6) the
influence of everything in the shape of a disposition whether natural or
acquired. You are to accept this mutilated view, which not only in the
case of volition but throughout psychology you probably consider to
be quite untenable or else, according to the sense in which I am
forced to understand Prof. James, you are compelled to embrace the
alternative of pure chance. And the only comment upon such an issue
which I could offer would be this. I do not understand how any one with
the abilities and knowledge possessed by Prof. James could present
such an issue to his readers unless his mind were influenced by ideas
extraneous to psychology. And when he himself appears to hold Deter-
minism, as thus defined, to be for the most part satisfactory to himself,
I can hardly suppose that I have rightly apprehended his meaning.
With regard to " action in the line of greatest resistance," I will add a
few words. We have here once again, as I understand it, the false alter-
native to a doctrine which itself is false, and the application to the soul
of these mechanical doctrines is not likely to result on either side in any-
thing satisfactory. The fact referred to, I presume, is this, that ideas and
principles have not motive power in proportion to the amount of psy-
chical perturbation which immediately corresponds to them. We there-
fore can choose the alternative which produces, and which we know will
produce, most temporary trouble and unrest. But I am unable to per-
ceive that this fact is in any way even abnormal to say nothing of its
supporting the worship of blind Chance. We find the same thing regu-
larly in the world that is merely intellectual. Where I refuse to adopt a
principle of explanation which would make things easier in a particular
case, if to do this would conflict with my more general principles this is
to follow (if you must say so) the line of greatest resistance. But for
myself I must decline to adopt metaphors which seem to me to be false
and misleading (<?/". here Dr. Stout, MIND, N.S., No. 19, and Manual,
p. 596).
About the claim to base moral responsibility upon mere chance, and to
make it literally an affair of sheer accident, there is but little to be said.
298 F. H. BRADLEY:
and now. And it has been brought, consciously or uncon-
sciously, under the principle of the self that is above the
detail of one moment, and is in the best sense universal.
But this formal superiority, we must remember, may be one-
sided. It may on the whole be consistent with, and may even
conduce to failure. The self that has risen above the par-
ticulars of the moment's detail may remain idly suspended
and incapable of re-entering them with collected force. Or,
And, again, whatever seemed called for from me has been said now a long
time ago. I must be allowed to express my opinion that apart from its
theoretical absurdity such a claim is morally revolting, or would become
so if it really could be seriously urged. Prof. James, it is true, seeks
to attenuate this paradox. He limits, as I understand, my moral respon-
sibility, and makes it begin and end with those cases where I decide with
an effort in the presence of temptation. It is only here, he urges, or
seems to urge, that my conduct is really a matter of pure chance, and
that I, in consequence, am a responsible agent and not " the dull rattling
of a chain, etc." (i., 453). But, if I had to choose. I should myself
prefer the unlimited absurdity ; for that is more consistent, and I cannot
see that it is any more absurd. And if I am asked how, if these doctrines
are really what I think them, they can possibly come to be upheld, I must
answer as follows. I am forced to believe that these results are not got
by an unprejudiced inquiry made direct into the real claims of our actual
moral nature. Wherever they are reached, they appear to be reached
by reasoning downwards from alternatives now long ago argued to be
vicious. They come from our looking at morality while one eye glances
at theological dogma. They are got, I must be allowed to add, by our
neglecting to ask ourselves whether in the end what we mean is anything
positive. If, in the presence of his moral experience a man objects to
every form of Determinism which he finds offered him, on the ground
that none of these forms is adequate to the fact such a man may be
mistaken, but he most assuredly is so far not irrational, and I at least
so far could not refuse him my respect and even my sympathy. But if,
assuming first (and it is a great assumption) that some doctrine capable
of satisfying us wholly in this matter is possible, any one goes on to set
up that which he takes (perhaps without sufficient inquiry) to be the
opposite of Determinism, and then asserts this opposite without so much
as asking if, considered morally, it is itself even tolerable it is impossible
for me to treat any such conclusion with respect. And I have thought
it better, even at the risk of giving offence, to express in plain language
what I think and feel on this unfortunate subject. Such thoughts and
feelings are not very exceptional, and I should like to make it more
difficult for any one quite to ignore them. And since Prof. James has
himself, as I think rightly, expressed himself freely on this matter, I
am the more inclined to hope that I have not been wrong in doing so
likewise. It is really the high standard which elsewhere he has kept
before our eyes which has in a manner forced me to protest against
what I cannot but regard as a dangerous lapse.
Nothing in the above remarks must, of course, be taken to apply to the
theory of Pluralism as against Monism. It would certainly be quite in-
correct to identify Pluralism with a doctrine of absolute chance, or with
the claim that such an idea is the foundation of morality. On Prof.
James's doctrine of volition and consent I shall hope to comment in a-
future article.
ON MENTAL CONFLICT AND IMPUTATION. 299
if driven into action, this self may be driven in the end
by external accident and chance caprice, and the result will
in the end really not have come from or depend upon the
inner principle. And it is another case of the same defect
where, without morbid suspension, the principle has been
taken too abstractly, for here once more there will be no
vital connexion with the particular result. Still, in one
respect and in general, an act adopted after reflexion will be
so i'ar higher and more mine.
(c) From this I will go on to consider another variety of
formal distinction. When we have before us A and B, the
ideas of two incompatible courses, we may or we may not
recognise these ideas as in the proper sense alternatives. If
we so recognise them, then each is qualified for us by the
negation of the other. When, in other words, we think of
A, we think of it as A which excludes B, and in the same way
we qualify B by the exclusion of A. And, taken thus as alter-
natives, A and B are so far placed on the same level, and you
cannot say that one of them is formally superior to the other.
But the case is different where A comes before us as qualified
by the negation of B, but where on the other hand B is not
actually thought of as excluding A. In this case B, however
incompatible with A, does not come before us as containing the
negation of A. And hence, taken formally, A and B are so far
not on a level, since, as I think of them, while A embraces
and subordinates B, B on the other hand does not contain any
explicit negation of A. B is therefore, we may say, thought of
as standing under and subject to A, while the subjection of A
is not made any part of B's content. And A will therefore
clearly so far be higher and will be so far more mine. It
will be higher because it is wider and more inclusive, and is
in this respect nearer to the idea of my true self as an indi-
vidual and concrete whole. It is however scarcely necessary
to point out that, here as before, a formal superiority may be
barely formal, and may amount practically to nothing. But
once again, so far as it goes, we are bound to recognise it.
And trivial or trifling as this distinction perhaps may appear,
we shall find that in its application it may possess great
importance.
3. There remains a principle of distinction which, though
connected with the foregoing, does not directly fall under
them. An idea which is pleasant or more pleasant is so far
higher and more mine, and an idea that is painful or more
painful is, on the other hand, less mine and lower. In a
given individual case this principle may of course prove one-
sided and so far false, but still, as far as it goes, it will
300 F. H. BRADLEY :
remain always true. And, taking the world as a whole, we
have some reason to believe that any divergence between
this principle and the foregoing principles is but local and
relative. We make no assertions about the goodness or bad-
ness of pain and pleasure per se, and we leave that to the
Hedonist and to others who insist on taking abstractions for
realities. We find in fact that pain is connected with con-
tradiction and defect, while pleasure on the other side goes
with increase of being and with harmony. And, if we are
wise, we shall not seek forcibly to divide these aspects. We
shall not attempt to derive the one of them from the other,
or to make either of them in abstraction the absolute good.
But, avoiding this error, we may fairly say that the pleasant
and the more pleasant is so far higher and more mine, while
with pain the opposite is true. We might call this distinction
material, on the ground that pleasure and pain are not forms
but are sensations or feelings. We might again, if we chose,
insist ithat this distinction is but formal, since it to some
extent varies independently of that which is material. But
in my opinion we shall do better if we leave these terms
alone. They are of little value anywhere, and used here
they would probably even be mischievous.
I would, before proceeding, once more remind the reader
that all these distinctions in degree may, under some condi-
tions, amount to differences in kind. Everywhere that which
from one point of view is but more and less, becomes from
another point of view right and wrong, and true and false,
and mine and not-mine. The interval bridged by degrees
becomes, in other words, the open chasm between Yes and
No. And now, in view of the above distinctions, I would
submit that, apart from mere morality, there may be differ-
ences between a higher and a lower self. To hold that when
my self is identified with ideas, these ideas must, outside of
the moral sphere, all equally be mine is surely indefensible.
We have found enough differences in the daylight, and have
seen no need to invoke the darkness of an inexplicable Will.
I will pass on now to consider the actual facts of mental
conflict and the struggle of ideas and desires to move me in
opposite directions. And it will be convenient in this article
to speak of these ideas throughout as being also desires, even
where they really are not so. 1 It was, we saw, maintained
1 Tne main difference here lies in the presence or absence of pleasure
felt in the idea (see MIND, No. 49). I shall in the present article take
some account of this difference with regard to imputation, and I hope to
touch on the general nature of desire in a future article. It v, ill be
ON MENTAL CONFLICT AND IMPUTATION. 301
that I could have before me at once two incompatibly moving
ideas, and that my self could be at once identified with each
of these ideas as actually present together. And it was added
that, though either of these ideas might be realised in fact,
we 'had not in each case alike with this the presence of
volition. And from this a conclusion was drawn as to the
nature of will. On the other side, the reader will remember,
I have already urged that, even from the ground of these
alleged facts, the conclusion does not follow. And I will now
give my reasons for not accepting the facts ,as alleged. The
subject is of course a very old matter for discussion, and it
must always remain difficult on account of the number of
questions which it involves.
What in the first place, let us ask, are incompatible ideas or
desires ? They are such as, being diverse, would qualify the
same point incompatibly. 1 But when we have such in-
compatible ideas or desires, we need not know them to be
incompatible. We may have them, and know that we have
them, and yet may be unaware that they are contrary. And
in the first and in the simplest case of such unawareness the
ideas have never as yet collided. They come before us as
one single complex of idea and desire. They are, in fact, but
diverse elements contained in one desire and one idea, and
within this whole they are so far simply together, and coupled,
we may say, by a mere " and ". 2
But as soon as action begins, these elements naturally
prove incompatible. In their movement towards reality our
ideas collide, and the ' and,' which joined them in harmony,
at once disappears. In our attempt to act we either alto-
gether fail to produce an action, or, if we succeed, we succeed
but in part, and perhaps with painful results. And, led thus
to pause and to consider, we may perceive that our desires
interfere one with the other. Hence they are known now to
be incompatible, and can no longer come before us as mere
positive elements in one whole. And on this (a), one desire
and one idea, as being far stronger than the other, may simply
understood, of course, that I recognise desire nowhere where an idea is
not present. The general head for me is that of 'moving idea,' and
' desire ' I take to be but one kind that falls under this head. It is
merely for the convenience of the reader that in this article I make the
two co-extensive, and I would beg him, in justice to me, to remember
this.
1 This means in the end that they would, being diverse, simply qualify
the same point (see MIND, N.S., No. 20, or Appearance, Appendix,
Note A).
2 For a full explanation of this, I must refer the reader to a former
article in this series, MIND, N.S., No. 41.
302 F. H. BRADLEY :
extrude it. The weaker idea may once and for all be driven
out as an idea, and the result, which it leaves behind it, may
be inappreciable, or at least too weak to reinstate it. And in
this case the conflict of desires, in the proper sense, is at an
end. But (6), if for any reason the desires are more equally
balanced, such an extrusion will not happen, and in its stead
a process of ebb and flow and of oscillation may set in. The
ideas are not yet qualified for our minds explicitly one by the
negation of the other, but practically, as soon as either begins
to occupy us, the other also appears and struggles to expel its
opposite. Each for the moment succeeding is in its turn
forthwith driven out by the other, for neither by itself or
again with the other can content us. In this alternation
when, for a time, one idea is excluded, then for that time the
desire which corresponds is in the strict sense at an end.
But an idea, thus expelled after fluctuation, cannot fail more
or less to survive in its effects. A mass of excited feeling
which was joined with it will remain behind, and this feeling
will be incongruous with, and will struggle against the other
idea which, for a time, has prevailed. The dog who, desiring
to eat the forbidden, has been rebuked by his master, may
for the moment have ceased in the proper sense to desire it.
The idea of eating has been driven out, but the felt flow of
saliva, with other elements of excited feeling, will remain.
There is hence a psychical group incongruous with the idea
of ready obedience, and struggling to restore its own opposite
idea. And in the case of aversion the same thing will natur-
ally hold good. We may have overcome our aversion in the
sense that the idea of escape or destruction is banished. But
none the less,feelings andmovements which correspond to that
idea may survive, and to an extent greater or less may strive
against the prevalence of the counter idea. We may take as
an instance of this the resolve to swallow some nauseous
drug. We, in short, have not here, in the proper sense, the
actual aversion or actual desire, but we still must be said to
be averse or desirous. 1
(c) What will be the end of this alternation of contrary
desires ? If the need for action is felt to be imminent, the
chance pressure of some moment will force, we may say,
accidentally one idea into reality. But, apart from this, the
oscillation will tend normally to cease, as, from whatever
cause, the excitement dies gradually down, and the ideas
1 1 hope to return to this whole subject. On the nature of aversion, I
must, for the present, refer the reader to MIND, No. 49, p. 21. The
ordinary doctrine on this head I still venture to think very seriously
mistaken.
ON MENTAL CONFLICT AND IMPUTATION. 303
move us less strongly. We (i) may relapse into a state
where we even forget the incompatibility and the conflict.
And here, once again, we unite our opposite ideas and desires
as elements in one positive whole, and simply re-join them
by an ' and '. Or (ii) preserving some memory of their hos-
tility, we may seek more or less unconsciously to reconcile
them by an imagined harmony. We invent or we enter-
tain the idea of some fancied situation, and, placed in this
by a change or an addition of some element, our jarring fact
undergoes an imaginary transformation, or at least tends,
more or less unawares, to be ignored in a certain aspect. In
this new complex, our contrary desires are both co-ordinated
on equal terms, or again one of them becomes without nega-
tion in some way disregarded, or else taken as subordinate to
and positively included in the other. Thus a man without
conflict may desire both to remain in bed and to rise, because
in some way his present does not come before him, altogether
and without condition, as this ' now' that now is. Or dream-
ing of how things might have been if he had married the
woman that now is his neighbour's, he may succeed unre-
buked by his conscience in desiring her sinfully. What is
done here is to imagine, more or less consciously, that some
condition is added or removed, with the result that the case
is altered, and is really no longer the actual case in hand.
And so for the moment the incompatibility, though in truth
unremoved, is removed from the view, and the confused
whole can be desired without collision. 1
(d) We may, however, led by willing insight or driven by
hard experience, have been brought to perceive that our two
ideas A and B are really incompatible. And (i), in the first
place, we may have qualified A by the idea of negating B,
either in part or entirely, without at the same time qualify-
ing B's content by the negation of A. B may be unable even
to suggest itself as the exclusion of A, or, if so suggested, it
may be unable to maintain itself as A's negative. On the
other hand A, in its character of superiority to B, may
perhaps be forgotten, but can never be consciously driven
1 Cf. here James, Psychology, ii., 565. With this mode of removing
practical conflict we should, of course, compare the theoretical solution
of contradiction by way of distinction and division. In connexion with
the doctrine of the text I should add that I, of course, reject the doctrine
according to which the real and the imaginary can for me be distinct
without an actual difference in their contents. While, e.g., I feel cold, I
can certainly imagine that I feel warm, but certainly not without, in
doing so, more or less abstracting from the conditions of my here and
now. The widespread error on this subject makes, wherever it exists, a
rational doctrine of belief and judgment impossible.
304 F. H. BRADLEY :
out or held in subordination by its opposite. And hence
the conflict of desires is, under these conditions, at an end.
For a desire in the proper sense is not present without an
idea, and it is now impossible for the idea B to maintain itself
in collision with A. B, in short, cannot as against A any
longer appear as an independent idea. It can appear, but,
where A is present, it can appear only as held in subordination
to A. It is so far, therefore, a mere element included now in
A's content, and hence we must say that, as the idea B, it
has so far ceased to exist. On the other hand, there may
remain (as we have seen) a group of excited feelings and
movements, which, if it could gain an independent expression,
would be once more this desire and this idea of A's contrary.
We may recall the instance of the dog mastered but still
hankering and licking his lips. So again in determinedly
swallowing a nauseous drug there may be a struggle of
hostile feelings and even movements. But so long as B, the
idea of rejection, is not allowed to appear except as that
which is to be and shall be crushed, it is held down as
included in and subject to A, and hence, though in a sense
averse, we actually have not the aversion B. It is so again
when .we start- on some painful errand with the i desire, first
of all, to return home and to bid farewell. If this idea B,
which in an independent form would be in actual collision
with our starting, is subordinated to that idea, and appears
but as a thing which under the conditions is excluded we
have again no conflict of ideas or, in the proper sense, of
desires. We have at most a hindrance and a resistance of
elements which, so long as they are prevented from taking a
higher form, fall short of a conflicting desire.
But, before proceeding, I would advert to a common error.
It is absurd in volition to talk about the prevalence of the
stronger motive and idea, before at least we have tried to
make ourselves aware of the ambiguity of these phrases.
And even to inquire whether our action takes the line of the
less or the greater resistance, is, I will venture to add, in
principle irrational. It is to discuss a problem, which to say
the least is not merely mechanical, with a mind biassed
and in part blinded by physical metaphors. The defeated
idea may survive, we have seen, in a mass of feeling hostile
to our action. And in this case the volition may be made
difficult, and the available energy lessened. But upon the
other hand, the result of conflict may on the whole be quite
different, and the resistance, we may fairly say, has gone to
increase the positive force. It is after all the whole self, and
not the mere balance of its contents, which is realised in the
ON MENTAL CONFLICT AND IMPUTATION. 305
act. And in many cases the excitement of the struggle, and
even the very survival of the sensations and pains that
belonged once to the defeated idea, pass to the credit of the
idea with which the self is finally identified. The intensest
volition, we might almost maintain, is that which has natur-
ally developed itself from the smallest balance in the greatest
sum of collision. Facts such as these will be for ever ignored
by the crude gospel of Necessity, and for ever perverted into
a plea for miracle by the blind apostle of ' Free Will'. They
will be recognised as what they are by no one who has not
rejected the prejudice on which both superstitions alike are
based.
The idea B, though subordinated, as we saw, by its contrary
A, may still be represented by a mental group which survives
and struggles to restore it. And, where decisive action is im-
possible, this group is a persistent source of constant danger
to A. For, though B still may be unable to assert itself openly
against A in the character of A's opposite, it may none the
less, if for some moment its subordination by A is forgotten,
assert itself independently and positively. And the result of
this will naturally be a desire, and perhaps an act, contrary
to A. We have already glanced at this perpetual origin of
insidious self-deceit. It may be dangerous, even where you
honestly disapprove, to dwell too insistently on disapproval.
For the constant negation of B by A is in a sense after all the
continual repetition of B. And B is an element which, though
subordinated, is perhaps forever struggling to break loose and
to appear and act independently. And hence your supposed
repetition of B's subjection may unawares have passed into
the habitual toleration of its presence. You tend in effect to
lapse into the holding of both ideas as positive, coupled with
the mental proviso that the one is taken really as subjected
to the other. And from this basis B may in the oblivion of
some moment have gone on to become independent uncon-
ditionally, and, before you can take warning, may have
suddenly realised itself in an act. 1
(ii) But in the end A and B may become qualified explicitly
each by the negation of the other. Each may possess so
much mental support, whether direct or indirect, that we
may have been forced or led to recognise them as equal and
conflicting alternatives. The. idea and the desire B will now
explicitly include not-A in its content, while A is determined
in like manner by the exclusion of B. And a question, we
saw, was asked as to what will result when both of these
1 Cf. here MIND, N.S., No. 41, p. 25.
20
306 F. H. BRADLEY :
opposites are present. But we must meet this question, for
the present at least, by denying the fact which it assumes.
These moving ideas A and B cannot, while really taken thus
as alternative, be present together, and we are able to think
this possible only because we really do not take them as
opposites. We, for the moment, may merely ignore their
reciprocal exclusion, or we more or less consciously may
fancy some wider arrangement in which they cease to con-
flict. But while each appears simply and unconditionally as
containing the negation of the other, I am confident that
both practical ideas, as ideas, do not come before us at once.
Apart from some compromise, in which they are more or less
conditioned and modified, they cannot each at the same
moment be identified with myself. One will banish the
other, or they will oscillate in a wavering alternation. This
process will be painful because -of the excited group which
supports each desire, a group which, itself unbanished and
unsubjected, throughout struggles blindly yet insidiously, and
moves to gain expression in an idea and a desire, and so to
dominate in its turn. The pain of oscillation will indeed
itself be a further motive for the self to terminate the conflict,
and, where immediate action is not possible, to attempt at
least to silence one claimant by a resolve. But each excited
group, while it remains, will seek to recommence its struggle
for a voice, and in the end for a despotism. On the other
hand, as powers that openly assert themselves each as the
opposite of the other, they cannot in this character both
rise above ground and appear at once as possessors of the
self.
We have been led to enter on an old and well-known
problem, the question whether a man can knowingly and
willingly do what is bad. It is possible, of course, to answer
this question in the affirmative, and to explain the admitted
fact rationally by the psychical weakness of one contrary
(MiND, No. 34). But, if our foregoing conclusion was correct,
such an answer will not wholly stand. We must deny the
possibility of a volition where opposite ideas are present
together, if it is true that these ideas cannot co-exist where
they actually are opposite. If ' bad ' be taken explicitly as
the contrary of ' good,' and if both ideas are understood simply
and unequivocally and without mediation and qualification,
' bad ' and ' good ' cannot co-exist, nor can one of them be
realised as against the other. And in the practical problem
before us the meanings of ' good ' and ' bad ' are clearly fixed
as so opposite. Since all will must be directed upon exist-
ence here and now, and is not possible except as a change in
ON MENTAL CONFLICT AND IMPUTATION. 307
and of that existence, 1 an act proposed to be done, whether
good or bad, will be good or bad for me now and here. And
the ' here ' and ' now ' will inevitably force these terms to con-
flict as alternatives. Hence, if our view is right, they will be
unable, as practical, to appear both at once, and the assertion
of bad against good must be pronounced impossible. We fail
to see this because the opposition tends unconsciously to be
modified. The bad will become perhaps merely bad for
others or, again, for myself at another time and place, or
it may come to mean no more than what in general the
world would mistakenly call bad. And so understood, the
bad has of course become compatible with the good. In the
same way when a man exclaims ' Though I know it is bad, I
still do not care,' or where he even experiences an added and
evil pleasure in opposing goodness, he is after all not really
doing the bad as bad. He is pursuing still and he always
must pursue his own good. The bad in general, or bad for
others, or bad conditionally, is now subordinated to his posi-
tive good, and is included in that. Wherever the opposite
ideas, in short, are seen to be opposite unconditionally, there
may be oscillation or extrusion of one by the other, but the
presence of both practical ideas at once is not possible in fact. 2
We may conclude, then, that if I acted knowingly for the bad,
the bad must i])so facto have become good, and otherwise (we
shall hereafter see) the act would certainly not be my
volition. 3
1 1 shall deal with this point in a later article.
2 1 am, of course, following here, as every one must follow, Aristotle ;
but how far at the same time I may diverge from him I do not inquire.
His " incorrigible man," at least as commonly understood, seems certainly
an impossible monster.
3 For this latter consequence see below, pp. 309-10. The reader may object
that the doctrine of the text refutes itself by proving too much. By the
same reasoning, he may urge, it would be impossible also to will the good
knowingly as against the bad, and with this we should be brought into col-
lision with a large mass of fact. The answer is that, if the bad were
present with the good as its independent opposite, in that case you cer-
tainly could not act for the good. But when the bad is not so present but
comes before you merely as negated by the good and as a subordinate
element in that, the case is radically altered. You may reply, "But
then the same thing will hold with the bad. Where the good as an inde-
pendent positive idea is absent, the good may on its side be merely
subordinate to the bad." Yes, but, I answer, you are now supposing
what is downright impossible. The good, where I am conscious morally,
cannot fail to be present as a positive idea. The good and the bad are
certainly opposed, but none the less they do not stand on a level. The
bad without the good would be nothing at all, but the good does not, ex-
cept in a narrow and special sense, depend on the bad. The bad is, in
short, essentially subordinate to the good. To call it a mere kind of
308 F. H. BRADLEY:
There is, however, a possible objection which I will briefly
notice before we proceed. "If," it may be said, "you
cannot have at once two alternative desires and ideas,
surely this will mean that you are unable to think at all
of any contrary alternatives, and such a doctrine, it is
evident, you cannot maintain." To this I reply (a) that
to entertain theoretically and to think of incompatible ideas
is, in the first place, not the same thing as to have two such
ideas tending to realise themselves as existences in our mental
being. It is not even the same thing as theoretically to pre-
dicate these ideas of what we call our reality. That which
makes an idea theoretical will tend to prevent its further
realisation in existence. And that again which makes it a
' mere idea ' an idea, that is, which is not judged to be true
of our world will once more tend to separate it further from
our psychical being. And the failure to perceive this is at
once a common and most mischievous error. In the second
place (b) when, without judging them to be true of our real
world, we entertain the ideas of incompatibles and reflect on
their nature, it is not the fact that, as we hold them before
us, these ideas are wholly and barely incompatible. On the
contrary, the idea of them as co-existing in this other world
of mere thinking seriously modifies their nature. Their trans-
ference to this other world removes the point of union through
which in our world they conflict, and by a change of condi-
tions it so far makes them actually compatible. And the
thought that, if this condition were removed, A and B certainly
would clash, is not the positive maintenance before us of A
and B immovably in a state of clashing. It is rather the
idea of the exclusion of their collision by and from the ' real '
world into another world where by a distinction this collision
is prevented from taking place. With these too brief remarks
I must pass from an important and wide-reaching subject. 1
We have now to some extent examined the facts of mental
conflict and of what may be called divided will. We previ-
ously, as the reader may recall, laid down those principles on
which one idea is judged by us to be higher and to be more
mine than another. And we may now proceed to the ques-
goodness would certainly not be correct, but that would be far less false
than to speak of good and bad as being two independent positive kinds.
But I cannot, of course, enter into such a large subject here. We should
be led once more to think of the self-contradiction inherent in the bad,
and again to reflect on the absurdity of assuming that every idea h
legitimate contrary.
1 Cf. here MIND, N.S., No. 20, p. 4*2.
ON MENTAL CONFLICT AND IMPUTATION. 309
tion of imputation in connexion with the definition of will.
But in speaking of imputation, I mean merely to consider
the fact without inquiring how far it can be morally
justified.
The results we have reached enable us to deal rapidly
with the subject of action against will. We have seen that
the alleged fact, as it was offered to us, does not really
exist. If we use ' desire ' in the proper sense in which it in-
volves an idea, we cannot really have an actual conflict of
opposite desires, and in the end we might insist that we can-
not experience the presence of more than one desire at the
same time. But apart from this we found at any rate that,
while A not-6 holds its place, we cannot have also the simple
and unconditional appearance of B not-a. And, given two
opposite ideas explicitly qualified as opposite, we certainly
could not in fact go on to realise either in a volition. If,
however, for the sake of argument we suppose that B
(whether we take it as independent and merely positive or
again as an independent B not-a) has actually realised itself
in the presence of A not-&, that would be a case of volition.
The act would be so far clearly my will, but for other reasons,
we shall go on to see, I might probably disown it as really
mine. But I must repeat that I cannot myself admit any
such case to be possible. 1
I am far from denying that, while the idea of A uot-b is
held fast, B in spite of this can in a sense realise itself and
pass into act. In the case of abnormal ideas we must allow
that, in a sense, this can happen. But, as soon as we con-
sider the real sense in which it happens, we must deny that
an act of this sort is a volition. The act would be a volition
if B had broken loose from its subjection to A, and had come
before us as itself positive and without any reference to A.
But as long as B is held subordinate and does not appear
except as negated by A, a different answer must be given.
You cannot say that a subjected element contained within an
idea is itself an idea proper. And since you, therefore, cannot
assert that an idea has, in the proper sense, here realised
1 The reader must bear in mind that this case supposes that both ideas
are held to the last clearly each in its own individual character. If that
character becomes obscured or confused, then, whatever else happens,
the idea B certainly will not have realised itself as against A not-6. If
the two alternatives or incompatibles come in the act before the mind as
one inconsistent ideal whole, it is clear that such an idea as this is not the
idea of either, and could not itself possibly pass into fact. The supposed
case, in short, demands that each idea maintains its individuality and its
relation to the other, and where, and so far as, these ideas work practic-
ally, I do not believe this maintenance to be possible.
310 F. H. BRADLEY :
itself, you by the definition are unable to affirm the presence
of will. In such an act we no more have a volition than in
an analogous case we should have a judgment. If, while
mentally holding fast the idea A not-6, I were somehow to
give utterance merely to B, that utterance would be no judg-
ment nor the true expression of any idea really in my mind.
And in the same way the escape into act of a subordinate
element contained under an idea is not in the proper sense
the realisation of an idea, and it is so, by consequence, no
volition. 1
Our conclusion, however, must be different if, as usually
happens, there are opposing ideas which oscillate. In this
case B for the moment may have broken loose from subordina-
tion to A, and may in its turn have subjected A to itself, or, as
is more probable, for the moment B may simply have extruded
A from the mind as an idea, tinder these conditions, if B
realises itself in act, we have clearly got a volition, and I
do not know why we should hesitate to assert this con-
fidently. How far that volition may on other grounds be
more or less disowned as mine, is again a further and a
different question.
As long as we keep to theory and confine ourselves to that
which is in general true, we can deal more or less satisfac-
torily, I believe, with any case that can be offered. It would
be far otherwise if we attempted to lay down rules by which
to settle particular cases in practice. We have already noticed
a class of actions which, in theorynot puzzling, would prove
really intractable by any rules of art. There are cases, we
saw, where the collision has been more or less unconsciously
and surreptitiously removed. Neither of the opposite ideas
has here been forgotten or openly extruded, but one or both
of them has in some way been so qualified that they are con-
joined together in one whole, and now co-exist peaceably.
The action that results cannot, of course, realise this incon-
sistent ideal whole, and the action, therefore, as failing at
least in part to carry out its idea, will so far not be my will.
If volition, it will be volition only to a certain extent, which
1 The same, I would repeat, must be said of the realisation of one of the
two struggling aspects of a self -discrepant ideal whole. That is not in
any proper sense the realisation of an idea, and it is, therefore, not will.
In order for the volition of B not-a in the presence of A not-ft to happen,
what would be required would be the maintenance of each idea us at om-c
distinct and as related to the other. And we have seen that for a theoret-
ical purpose these ideas can be so held before vis. But the very condition
which makes that possible is, so far as I see, removed ipao J'acto by the
ideas becoming practical. In order to become practical they, in short,
are forced in some way to change their character.
ON MENTAL CONFLICT AND IMPUTATION. 311
will be different in each case. 1 But to know in each case
what was actually in the mind of the agent, to find the
degree of his illusion, and to estimate his responsibility, in-
direct and direct, both by way of commission and by way of
negligence, is not a possible achievement. And to draw up
rules for constructing such an estimate would at best be
pedantry.
I will add another instance of this difficulty, mainly be-
cause it tends to illustrate the account which I have given of
will. If I have the idea of another person as performing a
certain act or as being in a certain condition, and if then the
act or the condition really follows in me, this, to speak in
general, would not be a case of volition. And we must say
the same thing if I merely imagine myself as being in a
certain psychical state, and if my imagination is thereupon
realised in fact. The result will in neither case be volition,
and it will probably fail of being so in two ways. The result in
the first place may not have followed as a genuine consequence
from my mental state, and, if so, it cannot be the self-
realisation of an idea. And, even if the result has so followed,
it is still not a volition. For the idea of another's act, or the
mere imagination of my own act, is obviously not that ideal
content which the result has realised. For the idea in each
case, as I held it, was modified by a condition which divided
it from simple union with my self as existing here and now.
And since this character is not and could not be carried out
in the result, my actual idea has not been realised, and the
result, therefore, is not will. That which has been carried
out in act is no more than a partial aspect of my idea, and-it
therefore in the proper sense is itself no idea at all. On the
other hand, if the qualification of my idea as alien or as
imaginary for the moment lapses and falls out (and there is,
of course, a tendency to this lapse), the case is altered essen-
tially. The idea at once becomes a mere unconditioned idea
of the result, and, if that result is as a direct consequence
realised, we have genuine volition. 2 This distinction, taken
in general, appears to be clear and simple, but to decide in
1 The question would turn mainly, I presume, on the amount of connex-
ion or disconnectedness between the elements of the ideal whole which
is before the mind of the actor, and on what we are able to speak of there
as one idea. We should also have to ask how far a volition can fail to
realise itself and can yet remain a volition. This difficult question will
be taken up in a later article.
2 It may possibly be objected that, unless I also believe that the result
will take place, that result is not volition. But unless the term ' belief ' is
improperly used here so widely that the objection disappears, I cannot
assent to this doctrine. I shall return to this point in a future article.
312 F. H. BRADLEY:
detail on the point at which an idea has actually lost its
qualification as merely alien or imaginary, might hardly be
possible. And the attempt in such cases to estimate by rule
the amount of rny responsibility for the result, in the case of
that result being unwilled, or again being willed, would at
best be useless. It would probably end in that which has
too deservedly given an ill name to casuistry.
We have seen the general conditions according to which
the act which results from a mental conflict is either to be
taken as a volition or disowned in that character. The alleged
case of an idea realising itself openly in the face of its opposite
we could not accept. It is not a fact, but is a very natural
misinterpretation of fact. But, if the reader decides to
regard it otherwise, the principles we have laid down will
still enable us to deal with it. By these principles I judge
ideas and desires to be higher and lower, and to be mine and
not-mine, and I can apply these distinctions to the alleged
case in two different ways. I may narrow the definition of
will so that the case falls outside and can be disowned as
volition. And, if so, will is " the self-realisation of an idea
with which the self is identified, provided that this idea is
not too much opposed materially or formally to that which is
higher than itself and is essentially mine ". In view of the
ambiguity of language, such a proviso would, perhaps, be
defensible, but for two reasons I do not propose to adopt it.
In the first place, I have convinced myself that the fact
alleged is not really a fact, and in the second place, even if it
were a fact, I consider that the proviso is not wanted. The
idea realising itself openly against its contrary would in this
case be a volition, and we certainly must go on to allow that
this volition would be mine. But with so much the question
is very far from disposed of. The act would be my volition,
but it need not be my volition in the sense that I should im-
pute it to my genuine self, and consider that I on the whole
was accountable for its existence.
I am not inquiring here as to what in the end can be
morally justified, and I am not even sure that such a question
is able to be answered. I am asking merely about the way in
which a man naturally judges concerning responsibility. And,
when we view things so, we are led, it seems to me, to the
following result. Human responsibility is not a thing which
is simple and absolute. It is not a question which you can
bring bodily under one head, and decide unconditionally by
some plain issue between Yes and No. It is, on the con-
trary, if taken as a whole, an affair of less and more, and it is
in the main a matter of degree. And not being simple, it
ON MENTAL CONFLICT AND IMPUTATION. 313
cannot be dealt with by any one simple criterion, but must
be estimated, as we have seen, by several principles of value.
It is indefensible to insist that I am absolutely accountable
for all that has issued from my will, and am accountable for
nothing else whatever. 1 If I have willed anything I am of
course in a sense responsible for so willing, but what that
amounts to on the whole is a very different question. Being
so far responsible I may on the whole be so little responsible
for the act, that without hesitation I disclaim it and disown
it as mine. If an abnormal idea, foreign both to my natural
self as a whole and to the self which I have acquired, becomes
so intense as for the moment to extrude or master opposite
elements, the result may be formally a volition ; but to make
me on the whole responsible for such an act would be bar-
barous pedantry. For legal purposes we are of course
compelled to do the best that we can. We have to abstract
from the individuality of each case, we are forced to apply hard
distinctions and more or less to ignore what refuses to square
with them. 2 But when we try to judge morally, no such
abstraction in the end is permitted. And here the question
1 This doctrine is open to question, not merely on its positive side, but
also otherwise. To say that I am to think myself better or worse for
nothing except what directly or indirectly has issued from my will, is to
come into collision with a body of sentiment which is not easily repu-
diated. Any doctrine of this kind starts on a path which in the end
leads to a choice between opposite abysses (Appearance, chap. xxv.).
On this subject of moral responsibility I must be allowed here to protest
against the assumption that it is tractable only when you introduce
theistic ideas. On the contrary, I submit that it is precisely the intrusion
of these ideas which has turned the question into a battle-field for rival
dilemmas. For myself, when I am offered the idea of a moral creator
who tries to divest himself by some ludicrous subterfuge of his own moral
responsibility, or the idea of a non-moral potter who seems to think it a
fine thing to fall out with his pots when, I say, I am offered these decrepit
idols as a full and evident satisfaction of the highest claims of the human
conscience, I am led to wonder if the writer and myself, when we use
the same words, can possibly mean the same thing. It is even a relief
to turn back to the old view that the Deity is a person limited like our-
selves, a person face to face with mere possibility and with chance and
change, and in truth, like ourselves, in part ignorant and in part in-
effectual. Such a doctrine, I readily grant, need not interfere with our
human morality, but I must be allowed to doubt if those who more or less
consciously would seek to revive it, can realise what it means. It would
in the end leave the limited Deity together and along with ourselves in
a Universe, the nature and sense and final upshot of which would in
the end be unknown. I cannot myself admit that non-interference
with our moral distinctions need be bought at the price of such
ignorance. And there are also those who, accepting a more unlimited
ignorance, would, in my opinion, be found in a less irrational position.
a Thus for criminal purposes, I believe in at least most codes, a man
must be mad or not mad. But it is notorious that, apart from the
314 F. H. BKADLEY :
if an act is mine is very far from being simple. It must be
considered from various points of view, and the answer, if we
reach one, will be a conclusion drawn from more estimates
than one. It will scarcely rid itself of degree and of ' more '
and ' less,' and be able to arrive at a clear verdict of ' Yes '
or ' No '.
There would be little advantage in our attempting to enter
further into this subject, and I will end by repeating those
principles which we laid down at the beginning of this article.
(1) If I can bring and retain A not-6 before my mind, and
cannot do this with B not-a, A is so far higher and is so far
mine more truly than is B. (2) The same conclusion follows
if, taken on the whole, A is more pleasant than B, or less pain-
ful. And if any idea has moving force out of proportion to
its pleasantness or, again, to its freedom from pain, that is,
to some extent and so far as it goes, a sign of the idea's
alienation. It is, so far as it goes, a reason for taking the
idea as not genuinely mine. This is, however, a criterion
which cannot be applied indiscriminately. In the first place,
where an idea moves us at once and before it is attended to,
the criterion seems inapplicable, at least directly. And the
ground which is here excluded is really large. And in the
second place we must lay stress on the words " taken as a
whole ". It is too commonly forgotten that, when we are
moved, the facts are often complex, and that it is a question
not of either pleasure or pain but of a mixture of both.
Thus any idea, no matter how painful, will, if it remains
held before us, produce a feeling of self-assertion with a
tension against fact, and so to some extent must become
pleasant. The view that a man can will that to which he is
averse simply, or even in the proper sense averse actually, is
in principle erroneous. And when Dr. Stout (Manual, p. 604)
adduces fascination as an example of the first kind, I must
consider this indefensible. For if fascination is used nega-
tively for paralysis, there is no act, while if it is used positively
for attraction, the presence of some pleasure seems even evi-
dent. (3) If A is the outcome of and represents something
like a deliberate choice, while this is wanting in the case of
B, B is so far the lower and the less mine. And similarly (4)
if A appears as falling under a principle, while B is taken as
under a principle lower and less general or as under no prin-
ciple at all, A will again to this extent be higher, and will be
so far more mine. (5) And last we come to that most im-
difficulty of such a clean division, moral responsibilty can exist among
the insane in varying degrees. Responsibility in intoxication is again a
well-known puzzle which law must cut with a knife.
ON MENTAL CONFLICT AND IMPUTATION. 315
portant criterion of all which consists in the material difference
of content. If A represents some main interest of my being,
and if this feature is not contained or is to a less extent con-
tained in B, then, according to the degree in which it is more
absent from B, B is so far lower and is not mine. I need
hardly point out that this last principle has a very wide bear-
ing. It is applicable where there has been no mental conflict,
and where there has been no question about the presence or
the absence of volition. And to some extent this remark
will also hold more or less if applied to those criteria which
precede. But to dwell on this point would perhaps not repay
us.
Will may therefore be denned as the self-realisation of an
idea with which the self is identified, and we have found no
reason for restricting or for modifying this account. But the
reader must remember always that a subordinate element
contained in an idea has no right to be counted as an idea,
if it is taken by itself. And in any case let us avoid anything
like an appeal to an unknown Will. If we find facts which
we cannot explain, let us by all means collect them and class
them, and, if we think we are justified, let us again by all
means set them down as inexplicable. But what in psy-
chology is gained by referring them to an unknown power,
by whatever name we entitle it, I am unable to perceive.
On the other hand, I am persuaded that by our so doing a
great deal may be lost.
II. THE PHYSIOLOGICAL FACTORS OF THE
ATTENTION-PROCESS (I.).
BY W. MCDOUGALL.
IT may perhaps be assumed that every sensible psychologist
knows what he means by ' Attention ' and even that the
meaning of the word Attention, though so difficult to define
shortly and accurately, is now pretty well a matter of agree-
ment. The presentation attended to at any moment is the
central object of mental activity, and the effect of attention
being given to it is not merely or chiefly to give increased in-
tensity and clearness to the presentation, though these effects
are usually produced in some degree ; but rather the essential
effect is to give to the presentation increased ' Lebhaftigkeit '
and ' Eindringlichkeit '. For these two German words, which
so excellently express the facts, it is not easy to find English
equivalents, but perhaps we may translate them as ' activity '
and ' power of penetration ' respectively. We might adopt
as a definition Mr. Shand's statement "Attention tends
universally to render the idea or sensation attended to more
active, evoking such fusion and association as renders further
understanding of the object possible "- 1 But the definition
given by Prof. Ebbinghaus is perhaps preferable, because it
brings out the twofoldness of aspect that characterises every
attention-process, namely, re-enforcement on the one hand
and depression or inhibition on the other. It runs, freely
translated, " Attention consists in some one psychical com-
pound (seelisches Gebilde) coming into a state of lively and
predominant activity at the cost of others, which also are
striving to assert themselves in virtue of certain factors that
tend to promote them," and again " Attention is the result
of a process of selection ; it consists in a narrowing or
concentration of the mind upon a certain number of the
sensations and images which the external conditions obtain-
ing at any moment render possible ".'-'
J " Analysis of Attention," MIND, ft.S., vol. iii.
- Criii>il-.itin- <l. Psychologi^ Band ^ s. 575.
PHYSIOLOGICAL FACTORS OF THE ATTENTION-PEOCESS. 317
The problems that must be solved, before a complete ac-
count of the attention-process can be given, fall naturally
into three groups, which may be denned as follows :
(1) (a) What is the nature of Attention considered as a
state of consciousness? (b) What is the nature of the
physiological state or process underlying this state of con-
sciousness ?
(2) What are the factors that play a part in bringing
about the perpetually changing series of states of attention ?
i.e., what are the factors that select one object from among
many tending simultaneously towards the focus of conscious-
ness and cause it to predominate and to occupy the focus to
the exclusion of all others ? l
(3) How exactly do these factors work ?
To the first of these questions, (1) (a), a pretty complete
answer can now be given ; the problem has been solved by
the purely psychological methods. Nothing of much im-
portance remains to be done in this direction, though no
doubt the terms of our definition, our account of attention
as a psychical state or process, may be capable of further
refinements, as has been shown by Mr. Bradley in his article
in the last number of this journal.
As regards the problems of the second group some pro-
gress has been made. Probably all the factors that may be
conceived to play any considerable part have been in
some degree recognised and discussed. They may be briefly
enumerated as follows :
(1) A general awakeness of the mind 2 is the first condition
of attention, and the higher degree of awakeness or general
activity of the nervous system is the more favourable to
attention.
(2) The degree of sensitivity of the sense-organs.
(3) The intensities of the stimuli playing upon the sense-
organs.
, (4) The relative novelty of these stimuli.
(5) Contrast, simultaneous and successive, between the
stimuli.
(6) The motor adjustments provoked for the better ex-
amination of the object attended to, especially the adjust-
1 1 take it for granted that the obviously true doctrine as to the single-
ness of attention is that laid down by Mr. Bradley in his article ' On
Active Attention ' in the last number of this journal, and I do not propose
further to discuss this point. See p. 20 et seq., MIND, N.S., No. 41.
2 1 adhere to the usage of the words ' mind ' and ' mental ' suggested
by me in a previous article (MiND, N.S., No. 25), i.e., as covering all the
functions of the central nervous system.
818 W. MCDOUGALL :
ments of the sense-organs, and the afferent impulses to which
these adjustments give rise.
(7) The existence in the brain of physiological dispositions
or mental systems capable of being excited to activity by
the stimuli : (a) the size and vigour of these systems ; (6)
the recency of their excitement.
(8) The constellation of foregoing states of the mind,
especially, of course, those associated with any of the pre-
sentations striving to occupy the focus of consciousness.
(9) As a special case of the last, of primary importance in
voluntary sensory attention, an idea of the object or similar
object already present to consciousness, a ' preperception ' as
Lewes has called it.
(10) The emotional interest that the objects are capable of
arousing, i.e., their affective value.
(11) Fatigue of parts of the mind or of certain constituents
of mental process.
(12) Vascular changes.
(13) Voluntary effort.
(14) The inhibition or depression of all mental processes
save those concerned with the object of attention. This
factor occupies a very special position as it is properly the
correlate of the re-inforcement of the one presentation by
some or all of the other factors, just as the negative pole of
a magnet is the necessary correlate of the positive.
(15) A peculiar self-determining activity of the soul that
can, as it were, give the casting vote and turn in this way
or that the balance of the effects of the other contending
factors.
As to this last factor, it may be confidently asserted that
its reality can be neither established nor disproved by any
expression of opinion however pious or philosophical, and
that we can obtain evidence for or against the reality of this
factor by one method only, namely, by the method of residues,
that is to say, by the elucidation of the workings of all other
factors and the demonstration that, when in any particular
case their effects are fully allowed for, there still remains, or
does not remain, an inexplicable factor through the influence
of which the direction of attention is other than the resultant
of the influences of all those known factors. We may there-
fore profitably leave the consideration of it on one side until
such time as our knowledge of the other factors shall have
made immense progress, merely keeping our minds open to
the possibility of its reality.
Voluntary effort, though a factor of immense importance,
is but a special complication of passive, spontaneous, or non-
PHYSIOLOGICAL FACTORS OF THE ATTENTION-PROCESS. 319
voluntary attention, 1 and may also with advantage be left
out of consideration as far as possible until the other factors
shall have been elucidated, except in so far as the considera-
tion of it will aid us in this task.
Of the other factors enumerated above it will be generally
agreed that all play some part in different cases of atten-
tion. But as to the relative importance of these factors the
greatest possible diversity of opinion prevails among authors,
many authors assigning almost exclusive importance to one
or other of them. And this must continue to be the case
until we shall have made considerable progress with the
third group of problems denned above, i.e., until we shall
have gained a much clearer insight than we at present possess
into the mode of action of these factors. As to this last
problem, which after all is by far the most important and
essential of the three, it is no exaggeration to say that the
attempt to solve it has as yet hardly been begun.
In dealing with the former part of the first problem, the
definition of attention as a state of consciousness, the purely
psychological methods sufficed, physiological considerations
could be, and were, dispensed with as of little or no import-
ance. As regards the second problem, our present very
imperfect knowledge of the factors, the detection and partial
definition of them, has also been achieved very largely by
purely psychological methods. But for the solution of the
third problem, and therefore for further progress with the
second, physiological considerations are of the first import-
ance. Perhaps no other problem presented by the mind so
well illustrates the limitations of the purely psychological
methods ; and it is, I think, pretty clear that psychology if,
in face of this problem, it disdains the aid of physiology,
or from considerations of method rejects physiological im-
plications, must remain for an indefinitely long time as it
now is, i.e., in almost complete ignorance. As Dr. Stout says :
" We need some certain and definite physiological doctrine
before we can make any secure advance on the psychological
side ". 2
This is now very generally recognised, so much so that
it is becoming usual for the psychologist to conclude his
chapter on attention with some reflexions on the present
unsatisfactory state of neurology. So far so good. It may
1 Dr. Stout and Mr. Shand have distinguished voluntary, non-voluntary
and involuntary attention. It is difficult to understand why Mr. Bradley
has ignored distinctions so clear, useful and indisputably valid and has
chosen to confuse the terminology once more in his recent article.
2 Analytic Psychology, vol. i., p. 223.
3'20 W. MCDOUGALL I
be hoped, however, that this is but a preliminary step to the
realisation of the fact that the pure psychologist must cease
to be content with a one-sided and partial study of mental
process and that, if he wishes to advance his science, he
must descend into the dark places of physiology and become
himself a neurologist. The pressing need for such all-round
study of mental process is revealed by a review of the
treatment of this third and most important group of the
problems of attention by those who have approached them
from the physiological and psychological sides respec-
tively.
If we turn first to physiology and inquire, What has been
contributed by it directly towards the solution of the
problems of attention ? we find that it is extremely little.
So far as I can discover, all physiologists, in writing of
the workings of the nervous system, have been content to
regard attention as a faculty of the mind, quite in the old
style. This does not necessarily mean that they regard it
as a metaphysical entity, or even as anything incapable of
being described in terms of physiological processes, but
rather that, having no insight into it, they are content for
the present to accept it as an unanalysed special form of
mental activity whose effects may be invoked in explanation
of various phenomena. Thus, Helmholtz is content to ex-
plain many of the phenomena described in the Physiologische
Optik, by invoking the aid of Attention, and when he has
clone so he does not then seek to drive his explanation farther
back. His treatment of the predominance of contours in
the struggle of the two visual fields may serve as an instance ;
his explanation consists simply in the statement that the
contours draw the Attention to themselves.
The most thorough and penetrating attempt to describe
the physiology of mental processes is Prof. Exner's Entivurf
zu einer physiologischen Erhldrung der psychischen Erschein-
ungen. 1 Valuable and illuminating as is this work through-
out, we find that, in his chapter on Attention, Exner like
Helmholtz accepts Attention as an influence mysteriously
given from above, and seeks only to explain how, this
influence being given in this or that direction, it affects the
workings of the lower nervous centres. In this respect the
diagrams in the book are illustrative of Exner's procedure
throughout ; all the lines representing paths of communica-
tion of the lower centres with the higher parts of the brain
begin abruptly on the upper part of the page and run down-
1 Vienna, 1894.
PHYSIOLOGICAL FACTORS OF THE ATTENTION-PROCESS. 321
wards to the lower centres that they have to influence, like
so many telegraph-wires coming down from heaven.
Again, in that very interesting recent work by Prof. Gold-
scheider, Die Bedeutung der Eeize in Lichte der Neuronlehre, 1
we find a similar attitude adopted towards Attention ; it
may be well illustrated by the following quotation : " The
relation of hyperaesthesia to the attention is a reciprocal
one ; the hyperaesthesia draws the attention to the disturbed
part by means of the strong and unaccustomed sensations,
and the attention in turn increases the hyperaesthesia, and is
indeed capable of inducing hyperaesthesia. In what atten-
tion consists we do not know, but it is certain that it is
capable of intensifying sensations."
Of the psychologists proper who have dealt with these
problems Prof. G. E. Miiller did pioneer's work 2 many years
ago, but at the time his paper was written comparatively
little was known of the structure of the nervous system, and
Miiller himself would presumably regard the views advo-
cated as in need of much modification. The central idea
insisted upon was that voluntary attention consists in the
favouring or augmentation of one group of nervous excita-
tions out of all those obtaining at any moment, so that they
act with greater vigour upon the soul, this being effected
by adjustment of the sense-organ concerned, and by a volun-
tary excitement of those sensory paths by means of which
the stimulus attended to is brought into relation with the
soul. 3 Miiller treats very shortly of non-voluntary attention,
and distinguishes five factors that by favouring any one
sensory impression may cause it to act upon the soul to the
exclusion of others and so be attended to, namely, intensity,
suddenness, and large spatial value of stimulus ; the likeness
of the sensation, that the stimulus seeks to produce, to the
idea present to the soul ; the previous excitement of ideas
associated with the sensation.
Prof. James 4 makes the cheery statement that two physi-
ological processes seem capable of giving a complete explana-
tion of the intimate nature of the attentive process, namely,
adjustment of the sensory organs, and the anticipatory pre-
paration from within of the ideational centres concerned with
' the object ; and he casually mentions inhibition as a third
factor of little moment. This is exactly Miiller 's doctrine
over again. Now it is undoubtedly true that these two
1 Leipzig, 1898.
2 Zur Theorie der sinnlichen Aufmerksamkeit, Leipzig, 1873.
3 Ibid., p. 48, etc. * Principles of Psychology, 1891.
21
322 W. MCDOUGALL :
factors are of primary importance in the very special case
of voluntary, expectant, sensory attention. But this being
granted, very much of the intimate nature of the process
remains unexplained even in this very special case. To
mention only two points, Why can we attend to the one
object only ? Why can we not continue to attend to the one
object in one way for more than a moment ? A still more
important deficiency of this ' complete reply ' is the fact that
the essential problem of the determination of the direction of
attention is avoided by assuming the direction to be given by
an act of will ; and later in the chapter James shows that he
has not fully grasped the nature of the problems to be solved
by offering, as alternative views of the process of determina-
tion of direction of attention, the assumption of an undeter-
mined activity of the soul and the view that " Attention only
fixes and retains what the ordinary laws of association bring
' before the footlights ' of consciousness ". Now it is just this
assumption of the all-sufficiency of the ordinary laws of
association to account for the direction of the movements of
attention that has obscured for so long the essential problems.
Prof. Miinsterberg, in his chapter on the association-
theory, 1 very rightly insists on this insufficiency of it to
account for the movements, the direction and the scope of
mental process. He points out that this insufficiency of
the association-theory has provoked by a natural reaction
the theory of apperception, in the sense of an undeter-
mined activity of the soul, and he proclaims that what
is sorely needed is a theory that shall so supplement the
association-theory as to enable it to deal with all those
features of mental activity which this apperception-theory
would remove from the reach of our understandings. He
writes : " On the one hand we have still no physiological
substratum for those variations of the psychical element
which are not included in the changes of kind and strength ;
especially the change of activity (Lebhaftigkeit) from the
penetrating power (Eindringlichkeit) of that to which attention
is directed down to the disappearance point of that which is
inhibited, is still without physiological basis ". 2 And again :
"On the other hand we still lack an insight into the
mechanism which achieves the selection of the psycho-
physical excitations ". 3 Which two defects he sums up in
the phrase " Wir entbehren eine Psycho-physik der Leb-
haftigkeitswerte ". Miinsterberg then develops his ' Aktions-
1 Grundzuge d. Psychologic, Leipzig, 1900.
2 Op. cit., p. 525. 3 Op. cit., p. 526.
PHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOKS OF THE ATTENTION-PROCESS. 323
theorie ' which is essentially a theory of attention. He assigns,
as the physiological equivalent of the Lebhaftigkeit of any
presentation, the energy of the efferent outflow of the excita-
tion-process from the parts of the brain concerned : " Je
vollstandiger die Entladung, desto lebhafter die Empfindung ".
He then points out that practically all motor mechanisms are
grouped as pairs of antagonists, the activity of one member of
each pair tending to inhibit the activity of the other member
of the pair, and proceeds : " The ' action-theory ' assumes,
now, that this undeniable opposition of motor functions is
the real basis for all reinforcing and inhibiting, facilitating
and blocking, in short, for all antagonistic functions of the
nervous system, and so all strengthening and suppression,
selection and diversion of the psycho-physical processes
rests upon this opposition of motor activities ".*
Now, while we may agree that here is a possible explana-
tion of the inhibitory aspect of attention, it is not easy to
see that the reinforcing aspect is accounted for ; in fact rein-
forcement becomes merely a negative function, it means
merely the absence of inhibition.
Again, my observations on the mutual or reciprocal in-
hibitory actions of visual images 2 seem to show that
relations of inhibition and antagonism between the nerve-
processes are not confined to those of the motor side of the
nervous system. 3 It is a further objection to this scheme
that it would seem to account for inhibitions within closely
allied groups of activities only, and it is difficult to see how
it can be extended to explain inhibition exerted by a process
in one sense-province on one that tends to occur in a different
sense-province and to give rise to a motor outflow directed
towards a completely different group of muscles. Again,,
there seems to be no sufficient place in this scheme for the
indisputably important part played by mental dispositions or
systems in determining the direction and the degree of
attention, and no place for the influence of the constellation
of foregoing ideas and images.
Another very serious objection to this theory is that it
assumes that the excitation-process, set up by any stimulus
applied to a sense-organ, flows through the same system of
conduction-paths, whether the impression be attended to or
falls in the field of inattention. And an equally serious
objection may be stated as follows : Since Lebhaftigkeit is
1 Op. cit., p. 534. 2 MIND, N. S., vol. x.
3 Similar evidence has been brought forward recently by Dr. G.
Heymans in his papers, " Untersuchungen ti. psychische Hemmung,"
ZeUschrift /. Psychologic, Bd. 21 and 26.
324 W. MCDOUGALL :
regarded as a function of the ease with which the excita-
tion-process passes through and out of the cortical conduc-
tion-paths into the subcortical motor centres, and since
a process, when through repetition it becomes automatic
and ceases to be accompanied by clear or lively consciousness
or to be easily inhibited by other activities, is certainly carried
on easily and in relatively unobstructed paths, Miinsterberg
is driven to make the unwarranted assumption that all
automatic processes are subcortical, that when a process
becomes automatic it is in every case because new paths
have been formed in the subcortical regions, by which paths
the whole process is effected, the cortical paths ceasing to be
excited. Now, while it is impossible to deny that this may
be the nature of the process of becoming automatic in some
cases, especially perhaps in those simplest instances presented
by reaction-experiments, it is, I think, impossible to accept it
for all or most cases. I have argued this point in a previous
paper l and will not dwell on it here, but will mention only
two objections. In the first place, we have not in the sub-
cortical regions, mapped out as they are into reflex and
instinctive mechanisms, a sufficient anatomical basis for the
carrying out of such an immensely complex process as the
playing of a complicated piece of music by a practised pianist,
his movements being guided by a rapid succession of complex
visual, auditory, and kinaesthetic impulses, and yet this
process may by much repetition become automatic. Again,
the evidence afforded by lesions of the cortex is all against
this view. When the so-called motor-cortex has been re-
moved, skilled acquired movements are lost ; and even in
animals, whose skilled movements are mostly inherited, an
effect of this sort is perceptible ; yet every highly skilled
movement is, in large part at least, automatic. Miinsterberg
is fully aware of this necessary consequence of his theory,
and therefore asserts, that "so long as the excitation must
really pass to the cortex it will never become unconscious
even through the most frequent repetition ".- For this
sweeping statement he adduces no tittle of evidence, nor do
I believe that any evidence can be found to support it. It is
on the contrary in flat contradiction to the well-grounded
views of physiologists, and instead of detailing the evidence
I will simply refer the reader to section vii., chapter ii.,
of the third volume of Sir Michael Foster's Text-book of Phy-
1 " Contribution towards an Improvement in Psychological Method,"
MIND, vol. vii.
Op. cit., p. 542.
PHYSIOLOGICAL FACTORS OF THE ATTENTION-PROCESS. 325
slology (seventh edition) which will repay a careful perusal
in this connexion.
In discussing the mechanism of automatic actions, towards
the close of this section, Foster and Sherrington make the
following deliberate and well-weighed statement : "All the
arguments which go to show that the distinctly conscious
voluntary skilled movement is carried out by help of the
appropriate cortical area, go to show that the cortical area
must play its part in these involuntary skilled movements
also. So that, as indeed we have already hinted, distinct
consciousness is not a necessary adjunct ' to the activity of
a cortical area."
Miinsterberg's theory of the physiological mechanism of
the attention-process is then in flat contradiction to the
well-founded and decided views of physiologists. But it
is not to be supposed that this fact will weaken the faith
of its author in its validity. For Miinsterberg takes a very
high line in regard to physiological details, and in his view
apparently it is the part of the psychologist to stride on
ahead, guided only by the pure light of deductive logic,
while the physiological facts must come tumbling after and
fit themselves to his demands as best they may ; it would
seem in fact that, as he asserts in another connexion, " In
this sense the facts must order themselves according to the
theories and not the theories according to the facts ". 1
Miinsterberg even warns psychologists against the danger of
concerning themselves too much with physiological and histo-
logical facts ; and accordingly he explicitly refuses to attempt
any definite view of the nature of the inhibitory process, and
he writes very loosely of Entladung without attempting to
define what it is that is discharged or from what place or
structures the discharge takes place. Nevertheless he takes
it for granted that the inhibition of an efferent discharge-
process consists in a blocking of the outlets by which the
discharge tends to take place, thus making another unwar-
ranted physiological assumption which I shall have occasion
to dispute at a later stage of this essay.
And Miinsterberg's assumption of a logical superiority
of standpoint that raises him above the need of closely
adjusting his theories to physiological demands seems
particularly unjustifiable in face of the fact that most of
what is new and suggestive in his ' Aktions-theorie ' is due
to the direct application of recent physiological discoveries,
namely Prof. Sherrington 's discovery of the relations of
reciprocal innervation ' of antagonistic muscle-groups.
1 Op cit., p. 406.
326 W. MCDOUGALL :
I venture, therefore, to protest against this high and
mighty attitude of the psychologist towards physiological
details. To my mind there is something a little absurd
in the exalted opinion of the capacity of the human in-
tellect that Miinsterberg seems to share with most philo-
sophers. If we accept the doctrine of biological evolution,
must we not regard the human mind as an instrument
developed for the better dealing with practical difficulties of
the bread-and-cheese order ? How then should it be capable
of going before the facts otherwise than in fear and trembling
and in all humility ? Were it not better that even the
psychologist should place his chief reliance on the inductive
method? And this my somewhat Philistine attitude is
but confirmed by the perusal of this brilliant volume, for it
appears that the validity of the author's way of looking at
matters psychological is contingent upon our lack of an
instrument that would enable a man to view his own brain-
processes, and that, so soon as an instrument shall have
been devised by means of which this feat can be accomplished
(which may well happen at any time in the next hundred
years) Prof. Miinsterberg will have to pack up his psycho-
physical parallelism and all his logical demands and will
have to set out to seek a new philosophical standpoint. (See
pp. 424 and 426.)
One other attempt to express the nature of the physio-
logical state correlated with attentive consciousness must
be noticed. In the just now published second half-volume
of his Grundzuge der Psychologie, Prof. Ebbinghaus devotes
five pages to the consideration of this problem. The essence
of his suggestion is that the idea, the preperception of James
and Lewes, involves the excitement of a definite path or system
of paths in the cerebral cortex, so that on the incidence of
an appropriate sensory stimulus the excitation-process con-
fines itself to the relatively narrow and well-defined conduc-
tion-path while in the absence of such conditions favouring
the concentration of one group of excitation-processes, the
various groups of excitation-processes act upon one another
by facilitations and inhibitions to produce a diffuse and
ineffective excitation of an ill-defined area of the cortex.
This review 1 of the attempts that have been made to
1 No review of contributions to the physiology of attention should
omit to make mention of the valuable but very partial views of Prof.
Ribot, and of Dr. H. Lange, but I have not thought it necessary to con-
sider their views more nearly because these authors have not attempted
to deal with the physiological processes in the intimate way that seems
essential if further progress is to be made, partly also because I shall
PHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOES OF THE ATTENTION-PROCESS. 327
elucidate the intimate nature of the physiological factors of
the attention-process, brief and imperfect as it is, will yet
suffice to show how extremely little progress has yet been
made and to emphasise the fact that the first step must be
to form a conception, as clear and definite as possible, of
the physiological state underlying attentive consciousness,
to translate, in fact, our psychological definition into physio-
logical terms. And any such attempt must start almost
'with a clean slate,' for the physiologists have not yet seri-
ously concerned themselves with the problem, and, of the
few suggestions from the side of the psychologists, Minister -
berg's, as we have seen, appears to be untenable, while those
of Ebbinghaus and of James, though undoubtedly on the
right lines, are very vague and carry us but a little way, in
fact hardly advance us beyond the doctrine set forth by
Miiller at a time when our knowledge of the anatomy and
physiology of the nervous system was relatively meagre.
This question, like most other psychological questions,
has suffered much from the neglect of authors to make
themselves clear as to the meaning of the terms they use,
especially as to whether the terms used denote purely psy-
chical, or purely physiological processes and states. In order
to avoid this source of confusion, as far as in me lies, I
declare at the outset that I accept, and shall speak in terms
of, the hypothesis of interaction between psychical and physi-
ological processes. Of course, if one accepts the now so popular
hypothesis of psycho-physical parallelism, one may hope, and
must strive to bring it about, that the whole of the factors
of the attention-process may be described in physiological
terms ; but if we accept " interaction " and believe that there
are psychical effects produced within the soul by interaction
of the processes determined in it by physiological processes,
we must still regard the elucidation of the physiological
factors as our first business. For the occurrence of modifi-
cation of the physiological processes by the reaction of
psychical processes upon them can only be established by
that method which I have spoken of above as the method
have occasion to refer to them later. I have said nothing of Prof.
Wundt's theory because it seems to me that what is sound in that theory,
namely the reinforcing influence assigned to the afferent impulses from
the muscles concerned in adjusting the sense-organs, is common to many
authors, while the characteristic feature of the theory, the assumption
of an organ of apperception of which the essential function is the physio-
logical inhibition of all excitations save those concerned with the object
attended to, this assumption of an organ of inhibition seems to me to be
exactly parallel to the old-fashioned assumptions of mental faculties as
principles of explanation and to be subject to all their disabilities.
328 W. MCDOUGALL :
of residues ; just as we can only establish or disprove the
occurrence of an undetermined activity of the soul by first
discovering all other factors, and then showing that there
remains, or does not remain, an inexplicable residue, so we
can hope to prove the reality of a determined activity of the
soul, (i.e. an activity, proceeding according to its own peculiar
but definite laws, by which it reacts upon the physiological
processes), only by elucidating first the purely physiological
factors, showing then that the effects are not completely
accounted for, and that there remains a residue of effect
that can only be explained by the assumption of a true
psychical activity.
I shall therefore confine myself in this paper to the at-
tempt to throw light on the physiological factors of the
attention-process, and I shall deal chiefly with the processes
of non-voluntary sensory attention, for this is, as Prof.
Bibot writes, " the true, primitive and fundamental form
of attention "- 1 As I have shown above, we have as yet no
satisfactory account of the physiological state that underlies
the state of attention, the psychological description of the
state has not been translated into physiological terms.
Such a translation, the drawing up of a clear and definite
working scheme of the physiological state, must precede
any attempt to describe the factors that are concerned in
bringing the state into existence. When I first set myself
to this task I was confronted with the necessity of under-
taking a further preparation of the ground ; I realised that
it was necessary to formulate some definite view of the
nature of neural processes in general, a view that should be
as far as possible in harmony with all the physiological data
and that should lend itself well to the description of the
states and processes underlying our states of consciousness.
For it is unfortunately true that no such view has been
generally accepted by physiologists, nor have I been able
to discover that any such view has been even formulated.
Physiologists, as it seemed to me, have been too intently
occupied with the attempt to exhibit the relation of nervous
processes to the physical processes that occur outside living
tissues and that have been so successfully studied, and there
seemed to be urgent need of a scheme which, accepting the
essential form of energy developed in neurones as sui generis,
should describe it as fully as possible in terms of its own
behaviour.
I have therefore proposed a scheme of this nature in a
1 Psychology of Attention, p. 2.
PHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOES OP THE ATTENTION-PROCESS. 329
paper recently published, 1 and I must ask to be allowed to
refer the reader to that paper for the physiological, histological
and other experimental evidence on which it is based and for
the separation of fact from fable, which I do not stop to
indicate here. Here only a brief outline of the scheme need
be given. My scheme extends to the cell bodies of the
neurones and to all their processes the ' theory of similarity
of function ' that is accepted by most, in fact by almost all,
physiologists as true for their axis-cylinder processes ; 2 and it
assigns to the intercellular substances which, lying between
the terminations of fibrils of different neurones or between
such terminations and the bodies of other neurones, constitute
the most essential parts of the synapses (or junctions of neu-
rones), all those specific changes which are the psycho-physical
processes proper, the immediate physiological correlates or
determinants of psychical effects ; and it regards them also
as the principal seats of those resistances, varied and variable
in degree, which determine the passage of the excitation-
process in this or that direction and confine it to relatively
well-defined and narrow paths among the labyrinth of in-
numerable paths possible to it in the absence of such limiting
resistances. In brief outline the scheme runs as follows :
The constituent neurones of the nervous system with all their
branches are regarded, ' in primitivster Weise ' as Miinsterberg
says, as a vast system of channels in all parts of which
potential chemical energy is constantly being transformed,
in virtue of the normal vital activity of the neurones, into a
peculiar form of active energy. This energy, which in the
present state of our ignorance, can be most profitably regarded
as a fluid, tends always to flow, like heat, electricity or water,
from places of higher to places of lower potential, following
the paths of least resistance, and for convenience of descrip-
tion it may be called ' neurin '. Under the influence of
stimuli the neurones generate neurin more rapidly at a rate
proportional to the intensity of the stimulus. In the sen-
sory neurones, which, being connected with the surfaces
of the body or with muscles, tendons, joint surfaces, etc.,
within it, are perpetually played upon by stimuli of varying
intensities, the potential of neurin is maintained at a relatively
high level, while from the motor neurones it escapes readily
1 " The Seat of the Psycho-physical Processes," Brain, Winter 1901.
2 A distinguished exception is Prof. Hering who in a recent pamphlet
(Zur Theorie der Nerventhiitigkeit, Leipzig, 1899), advocates a view the
extreme opposite of this one ; while he would attribute ' specific energies '
to all neurones and to all their parts, I would assign them to the inter-
cellular substances at the synapses only.
330 w. MCDOUGALL :
into the muscles, acting upon them as a stimulus to increased
metabolism ; therefore neurin flows perpetually through the
intricate labyrinth of paths that constitutes the central
nervous system from the afferent towards the efferent neu-
rones. But the channels along which it has to find its way
are not completely or equally open ; while each neurone pre-
sents throughout its length, dendrites, cell-body and axone,
an open channel offering no resistance, each is separated
from all others with which it is functionally connected at
synapses by an intercellular substance which presents a cer-
tain resistance to the passage of neurin from one neurone to
another. In the resting state, as during deep sleep, neurin
flows slowly and equally through all parts, maintaining in some
degree the tonus of the nervous and muscular systems, and
escapes across the resistant synapses by a sort of leakage.
But, when a definite supraliminal stimulus is applied to a
sense-organ, the sensory neurones affected by it produce neurin
much more rapidly than it can escape by leakage across their
efferent synapses, so that the potential of their charge very
rapidly reaches what may be called the level of the threshold
of the synapses, i.e., it reaches such a degree that a rapid
discharge of neurin takes place through the intercellular
substance of the synapses into efferent neurones, 1 i.e., into
neurones of the second of those several layers in which
the neurones leading from sensory to motor organs are
arranged. The sudden arrival of the charge of neurin in
neurones of this layer acts upon them in turn as a stimulus
to the rapid production of neurin, so that they in turn
become rapidly charged up to the level of the threshold of
their efferent synapses and in turn discharge themselves
into neurones of the third layer, and so on, until the neu-
rones of the motor layer discharge themselves into the
muscles and so bring about a contraction. If the stimulus
continues to excite the same sensory neurones this whole
process of charging and discharging of the chain of neurones
is repeated again and again at very short intervals of time,
in the case of the motor neurones at intervals of about one
tenth of a second, at considerably shorter intervals in the
case of the sensory and central neurones. An important
factor in maintaining the onward flow of neurin from sensory
to motor side is the valve-like nature of the synapses in
virtue of which they permit the discharge of neurin in the
1 It is convenient to speak of each neurone in any chain of neurones
forming a conduction-path from sense-organ to muscle as afferent to its
successor and as efferent to its predecessor in the chain.
PHYSIOLOGICAL FACTORS OF THE ATTENTION-PROCESS. 331
forward direction only, i.e., from a relatively afferent to a
relatively efferent neurone, and not at all, or only under
exceptional conditions, in the reverse or backward direction.
And to the passage of the discharge in the forward direction
the synapses present very various degrees of resistance, or,
as it may be more conveniently expressed, they have thres-
holds of very different values.
The normal degree of resistance offered by the synapses of
any conduction-path is the expression of what may be called
the degree of organisation (' Ausschleifung ' of German authors)
of that path, organisation being the more or less permanent
effect of repeated activity of the path ; that is to say, each
passage of the discharge across a synapsis results in some
diminution of the resistance offered by it, in a lowering of its
threshold. The paths of the highest degree of organisation
are the old-established reflex conduction-paths of the cord
and subcortical centres in general, while those of successively
higher levels are, roughly speaking, of lower and lower
degrees of organisation, i.e. are composed of neurones con-
nected together by synapses of higher degrees of resistance.
Every synapsis has thus a certain normal threshold- value in
the unexcited state of the conduction-path of which it forms
a part, which value has been determined by the history of
that synapsis in the individual and in the race. But the
threshold -value of any synapsis varies from moment to
moment according to the state of the neurones between
which it forms a link. When their vital activity is at a
minimum, and the potential of the charge of neurin in them
therefore also at a minimum, the resistance of the synapsis
is at its highest ; but any increase of the potential of the
charge of neurin in either neurone, that on the afferent or
that on the efferent side of the synapsis, so affects the inter-
cellular substance as to diminish its resistance, i.e., the
threshold of the synapsis is lowered in proportion to the
potential of the charge of neurin in either neurone, so that
as this potential rises the synapsis-threshold is depressed to
meet it, as it were. And when the discharge or series of
discharges has taken place the threshold returns nearly but
not quite to its former resting value. The synapses of highest
resistance are those of which the thresholds are subject to
the greatest variations of level produced in this way, while
those of which the resistance is normally low can be subject
to such changes in a much less degree only.
Besides these frequent and rapid variations of the thres-
hold-values of the synapsis, produced by the variations in
the potential of the charge of neurin in afferent or in efferent
332 W. MCDOU V GALL I
neurone, or in both, there occur other considerable variations
due to changes in the intercellular substance produced by
fatigue, by drugs, and probably by changes in the state of
the circulation and in the character of the blood.
It will be seen, then, that this scheme is an attempt to
develop and to render more definite that view of neural
process which Prof. v. Kries l has well called the ' conduction-
hypothesis ' in distinction from the other widely accepted
view, the hypothesis of the individual psychical functioning
of the bodies of nerve-cells. According to this scheme every
psychical state corresponds to the flow of neurin through
a certain set of neurones which form a group of conduction-
paths leading towards the motor organs, which paths may
lie in widely separated parts of the central nervous system
and together form a complicated pattern in three dimensions
of space, a pattern that continually changes from moment
to moment as the stream of consciousness changes ; and of
the total process the immediate correlates or determinants
of consciousness, the physical processes in direct interaction
with the soul, i.e., the psycho-physical processes, are pro-
cesses that occur in the intercellular substances at the
synapses as neurin is discharged through them from afferent
to efferent neurones. The discharge of neurin through each
of the synapses of those parts of such a complex system of
paths which lie within the cortex of the cerebrum contri-
butes a specific element to the total state of consciousness,
an element that may perhaps vary in intensity but is constant
in quality.
This scheme is based on physiological facts, many of which
are detailed in the paper mentioned above, 2 and I hope to be
able further to justify it by showing that it is well suited to
aid us in the description of the physiological changes involved
in mental processes.
I would point out that my conclusion as to the seats of
the psycho-physical processes is not an essential part of the
scheme, so that, if that conclusion be rejected, it will still
be necessary to regard the synapses as the seats of those
variable resistances which define and regulate the paths
followed by any excitation-process, the scheme may still
serve as a useful instrument of description, and the validity
of most of the following descriptions will not be diminished.
When the above view of the nature of neural process is
1 Uber die materiellen Grundlagen der Bewusstseins-Erscheinungen
Leipzig, 1901.
- Brain, 1901.
PHYSIOLOGICAL FACTORS OF THE ATTENTION-PROCESS. 333
' ' ' -/
I, ,\
FIG. 1.
igram to illustrate the number and relations of the various paths within the brain, through which the
excitation-process, initiated in the sensory neurone S may propagate itself to various motor neurones
334 w. MCDOUGALL :
combined with the current view of the anatomical arrange-
ment of neurones and chains of neurones, we see at once
the outline of the physiological definition of the state of
attention. The neurones of the whole nervous system may
be regarded as arranged to form series of superposed arcs,
i.e., conduction-paths of different levels leading from sensory
to motor neurones. Of such levels Dr. Hughlings Jackson
distinguishes three, and Prof. Exner 1 also distinguishes on
physiological grounds three well-marked levels, besides minor
varieties of reflex action, according to the degree to which
consciousness is affected. These levels, with the exception
of the two lowest, are not capable of accurate anatomical
definition, but we may justifiably and profitably regard them
as perfectly distinct layers or planes, and for psychological
purposes we must assume, I think, at least four such levels.
The lowest level may be taken to include all the spinal and
subcortical centres, the second to include those parts of the
cerebral cortex which Prof. Flechsig 2 distinguishes as the
sensory areas, while the higher-level paths must be assumed to
be the chief constituents of the parts which are distinguished
by the same authority as the association-areas. We may
then adopt as the simplest possible working scheme of the
nervous system that represented diagrammatically in figure 1.
In this are indicated the various paths of four levels by which
the excitation-process initiated in one sensory neurone S may
find its way to the muscles. And, since it is essential, in
thinking of the nervous system, to visualise in three dimen-
sions of space, I have enclosed the neurones of each of the
levels within a dotted line, each area so enclosed representing
a plane that in a three dimensional diagram would be per-
pendicular to the plane of the paper. Each neurone is
represented by a line joining two terminal strokes, and the
apposed pairs of such terminals represent synapses. The
value of the resting threshold of a synapsis is represented by
the length of these strokes, the longer stroke representing
the smaller degree of resistance and conversely. The lines
joining any neurone obliquely represent afferent collaterals
or other paths by "vhich it may be excited through other
sensory neurones than that one S in the diagram. The
explanation of the significance of the short lines perpendicular
to the bodies of the neurones will be found on page 345.
This diagram illustrates the following points :
(1) A given sensory stimulus may excite any one or
1 Entwurfz. phys, Erklarung psych. Ersch^ chap, ii., 5.
2 Die Localisation der Geistigen Vorgange, Leipzig, 1896.
PHYSIOLOGICAL FACTORS OF THE ATTENTION-PROCESS. 335
more of a large number of different conduction-paths, and
so may lead to a corresponding number of different motor
outflows.
(2) The same motor outflow may be occasioned by various
sensory stimuli.
(3) The excitation set up in any sensory neurone may
penetrate to paths in any one of the four levels.
(4) The higher the level the greater is the number of
possible paths.
(5) The higher the level of a path the higher is the resting
threshold of its synapses, i.e., the higher is its resistance
in the resting state.
FIG. 2.
The diagram is in accordance with Dr. Hughlings Jackson's
teaching, for it represents the four characteristics of the more
highly and more recently evolved layers as laid down by him,
namely, (1) "Increasing differentiation (greater complexity) " ;
(2) " Increasing specialisation (greater definiteness) ; " (3)
" Increasing integration (greater width of representation) ; "
(4) " Increasing co-operation (greater association) ". l
The diagram may now be applied to the description of the
neural events in the following comparatively simple case of
sensory stimulation. Suppose figure 2 to be cut out and laid
^British Medical Journal, January, 1898.
336 W. MCDOUGALL :
upon a dark ground in a good light. 1 Then, when the optical
image of it falls on my retina, it excites by a purely reflex
action some degree of contraction of my pupil. This effect
is produced by the excitation of the path of level i. So long
as the figure is at all within my field of vision, it continues
to produce this effect however little conscious or unconscious
of its presence I may be.
Under ordinary circumstances the image will, if it falls
upon a lateral part of the retina, cause (or tend to cause),
a reflex turning of the visual axis of the eye towards itself,
or, if it falls on the fovea of one eye, will cause a convergence
of the two visual axes upon itself, and also a contraction of the
muscles concerned in accommodation of the lenses, and it will
at the same time produce some obscure affection of conscious-
ness of the nature of a sensation of light localised in that
part of the visual field. These effects are due to the excite-
ment of a path (say c) of level ii superadded to the excitement
of the path of level i. 2 But these effects are not so certain and
invariable as the former effect, the contraction of the pupil,
for if the light be very strong it may cause the eye to be
turned away and the eyelids to close, a different path of level ii.
(say b) being excited. The paths of level ii. are also liable to
cease to be active under certain special conditions. Thus if
my eyes continue for some time to be directed quite steadily
towards the object ; and especially if, at the same time, by
instillation of atropine, or by other means, the accommodation
mechanism be completely relaxed, 3 the image will disappear
suddenly and completely from consciousness, thus exhibiting
that curious phenomenon which I have described and called
' the complete fading of visual images ' ; 4 and at the same
time the reflex-influence, that guides the direction of the
visual axes, ceases, as is shown by the tendency for the fixa-
tion to waver, which at once appears. When this happens it
1 In the case of this and similar figures I have always used pieces of
perforated zinc, blackened and laid against a sheet of white paper or
glass fitted into an aperture in the window-shutter of a dark room, so
that the figure is the only object in the visual field.
2 In this connexion it is important to note that experiment has shown
that direct stimulation of the visual cortex, the seat of the paths of level
ii., may cause movements of the eyes independently of any activity of
the area for eye-movements in the ' motor ' region of the cortex, and the
same is true of the superior temporal convolution, the auditory area, in
regard to movements of ears, head and neck. (See Foster's Text-book oj
Physiology, pp. 1172, 1188.)
3 Definition being preserved by the use of convex glasses.
4 " Some New Observations in Support of Young's Theory of Colour-
vision," sect, i., MIND, N. S., vol. x.
PHYSIOLOGICAL FACTORS OF THE ATTENTION-PROCESS. 337
is because the excitation-process ceases suddenly to propagate
itself through the paths of level ii.; it fails to overcome the
resistance of the synapses of the path, that resistance having
been increased by the fatigue due to continued activity of
the tract, 1 while in all probability (though this is a point that
I have not yet examined) the image continues to excite some
degree of contraction of the pupil through the continued
activity of the path of level i. It is characteristic of the
paths of level ii. that the activity of any one path is not,
under ordinary circumstances, markedly interfered with by the
activity of other paths of the same level, or by the activity of
paths of higher levels not directly connected with it. Thus
a large number of objects scattered in different parts of
the visual field may simultaneously affect consciousness in
the obscure manner characteristic of paths of level ii. ; and
objects may continue to evoke appropriate movements of
the eyes and a proper degree of accommodation, while my
thoughts are occupied by matters entirely unconnected with
the visual field, as when sometimes in reading my eyes
follow faithfully all the lines of a page while my thought
is occupied with quite other matters than those with which
the printed page is concerned, and only on reaching the foot
of the page do I become aware that I have taken in nothing
of the meaning of either sentences or words.
Unless rny attention is firmly held in other directions the
visual object (figure 2) will usually give rise to a more defi-
nite affection of consciousness than the obscure sensation of
light, it will be to some extent noticed or apprehended, if
only as one of a number of visual objects, and it may be
apprehended in any one of various ways. Thus I may
apprehend it merely as a group of white spots on a dark
ground, or as a triangular area with white discs scattered
over it, or as an opaque perforated framework placed over
a white ground. In any such case the excitation continues
to excite level i. and path c of level ii., and penetrates also
to one or other of the paths of level iii. which also leads
to a certain motor outflow, complicating the motor effects due
to the activity of the two lower paths. Now suppose I
apprehend the figure as a triangular area with white discs
scattered over it, and continue to gaze directly at it, one of
the paths of level iii., say g, is then active, as well as paths
a and c ; presently, without any sense of activity on my part
and without any movement of the eyes having occurred,
1 For evidence of this increase of resistance of synapses during con-
tinued activity, see pp. 592-600 of my article in Brain, 1901.
22
338 W. MCDOUGALL :
the discs appear arranged in rows all parallel to the base of
the triangle. The excitation has penetrated to one of the
paths -of level iv. (say h) and the activity of this path
contributes to consciousness the peculiar constituent which,
being superadded to the constituents contributed by paths
c and g, consists in the awareness of this definite arrange-
ment of the discs upon the triangle, and also leads to a
further complication of the motor outflow, namely a ten-
dency, which, in the absence of previous practice, can
hardly be resisted, for the eyes to move along the direction
of the parallel rows. I continue to gaze passively at the
figure, and presently the discs suddenly rearrange them-
selves, they no longer appear as forming rows parallel to
the base, but form rows parallel to the left side of the
triangle. The path h has ceased to be excited, but another
path, i, of level iv., is active and leads to a different motor
outflow, namely a tendency to move the eyes in a direction
parallel to the left side of the triangle. Presently, again,
the discs assume a third arrangement, namely rows parallel
to the right side of the triangle, the excitation has passed
to a third path, I, of level iv., deserting path i. These
paths of level iv. constitute very simple yet true mental
systems (in their physiological aspect) and the definite
groupings of the discs in this and that way is due to suc-
cessive acts of apperception of the sensory presentation by
these mental systems in turn. Other groupings may appear,
other mental systems, other paths of level iv. may become
active in turn and cause the discs to be apperceived as-
forming concentric circles, or concentric triangles, or lines
radiating out from a central disc. But the three groupings
first mentioned, rows parallel to the sides of the triangle,
predominate in my case, and they may continue to alternate
with one another for a considerable period, no one holding
the field for more than about one or two seconds, even if I
make an effort to hold it fast. After a time my attention
relaxes and spreads out, as it were ; I no longer see any
definite grouping of the discs, the figure becomes again
merely a triangular part of the field with white discs
scattered over it, the excitation ceases to penetrate to any
of the paths of level iv., but continues to reach level iiL
Then perhaps a voice draws rny attention to auditory
stimuli, and while my eye remains steadily fixed upon the
figure (in virtue of a motor disposition formed by previous
practice) its image ceases to excite paths of level iii, and,
continuing to excite paths a and b only, it contributes to con-
sciousness only the obscure and undiscriminated sensation.
PHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOES OF THE ATTENTION-PEOCESS. 339
And if, in virtue of the preformed motor disposition, my eye
still continues steadily directed upon the same spot, path c
may cease to be active, and the whole figure disappears from
consciousness ; or individual discs may disappear and re-
appear suddenly and completely, the different parts of the
path c corresponding to the individual discs ceasing to be
active for moments independently of one another.
The apprehension of the discs as parallel rows lying in
this or that direction and in other groupings constitutes, I
submit, a typical instance of non-voluntary attention, the
same sensory presentation being variously apperceived by
different mental systems in turn, mental systems that have
been built up by previous experiences of horizontal parallel
lines, of circles, of triangles, etc., respectively. And when,
as it is easy to do, I voluntarily call up this or that grouping,
the physiological state set up must be entirely similar. Lest
any one should be inclined to deny that we can properly
describe as a mental system (in its physiological aspect) a
system of paths so relatively simple as those which may be
supposed to be concerned in these different modes of appre-
hension of figure 2, I would point out that the case is exactly
parallel with the cases of such ambiguous figures as Necker's
cube and the well-known staircase-figure, in which cases the
activity of well-defined and relatively complex mental sys-
tems will hardly be denied.
I shall have frequent occasion to return to this figure in
considering the factors that determine these movements of
attention and the direction of these movements, but here I
am only concerned to define the state of attention in terms
of physiological processes. We will consider, therefore*
other ways in which attention may be given to this figure.
Attention may be concentrated on one only of the discs, as
when I judge whether or no it is exactly circular. All the
other discs then fall into the field of inattention, and the
excitation-processes initiated by them are confined to levels
i. and ii. only, while only those set up by the one disc
penetrate to higher levels and excite the paths which con-
stitute the mental system for circles and which lead to a
motor outflow that tends to move the eye around the circum-
ference of a circle. Or again, attention may be concentrated
on a still smaller part of the figure, as when I minutely
examine the texture of the paper at the centre of one of the
discs. Note that this concentration does not necessarily
mean a narrowing of the paths excited ; the width and
complexity of the paths excited in the higher levels depends
chiefly upon the degree of complex development of the mental
340 w. MCDOUGALL:
system to which the excitation penetrates. Thus, in the last
instance, if I were a paper-maker by trade, the mental
systems excited would be far more complex and extensive
when attention was concentrated on a minute area of the
paper than when the whole figure was attended to as regu-
larly grouped discs ; in the former case a small number only
of the elements of the paths of level ii. propagate their excite-
ment to higher levels, but in those higher levels the excitation-
process spreads through a much wider system of paths.
We may conceive the physiological state underlying the
state of attention in a similar manner for all classes of
sensory presentations. Thus, at all times, or almost all
times, during the day, a continuum of undiscriminated
sounds affects my ear, causing through the excitation of
various paths of levels i. and ii. an obscure affection of con-
sciousness. Suddenly my attention is drawn to one of these
sounds, and to take a recent case from my own experience,
I apperceive it as the self-congratulatory clucking of a hen ;
the excitation set up by this particular auditory stimulus
has penetrated to the higher levels and excited the mental
system built up by previous experiences of such maternal
rejoicings. I go on with my work and after a few minutes
my attention is drawn to a sound which I take to be the
voice of a hawker in the distance crying ' hokey-pokey '. But
then by retrospection I discover that the same sound has
been repeated at short intervals, while my attention was not
given to it, and that what I previously apperceived as the
voice of a hen I have apperceived a second time as the voice
of a man ; and now I hear it alternately as one or the other,
the sound seeming to change in quality with each change
of the mode of apperception, and I cannot convince myself
of the truth of either mode. Here the same auditory pre-
sentation repeatedly exciting the same lower-level paths
penetrates to two different higher-level paths, two mental
systems alternately, just as was the case with the visual
presentation of figure 2.
As parallel to the case of concentration of the attention
on a small part of the visual field we may take the discrimina-
tion of an overtone. In this case a group of lower-level
paths is excited by the clang, the complex of auditory stimuli,
but the excitation of only one of these paths penetrates to a
higher-level path and is therefore attended to and discrimin-
ated. Whereas, if the clang be attended to as a whole, be
apperceived as a note of this or that instrument, all the
lower level processes will combine to excite a single higher-
level path, the mental system for this or that instrument.
PHYSIOLOGICAL FACTORS OF THE ATTENTION-PROCESS. 341
We may now consider more intimately the characteristics
of the higher- and lower-level paths respectively, and we
may profitably confine our attention to the differences be-
tween paths of the levels ii. and iv. Paths of level ii. are
characterised by the relatively great constancy and regularity
of their response to sensory stimuli, by the vagueness of the
contribution to the total state of consciousness that they
effect, and by the fact that their activity is but little or not
at all interfered with by that of higher levels and under
ordinary conditions only in a slight degree by the activity
of other paths of the same level. There is, however, some
such reciprocal interference between different paths of level
ii., for when, under the special conditions that I have de-
scribed, 1 one visual sensation causes the total disappearance
from consciousness of another visual sensation due to the
excitation of another part of the same, or of a non-correspond-
ing part of the other, retina, this must mean that the second
image ceases to excite paths of level ii., and this would seem
to be due to an inhibitory effect exerted by the other paths
of level ii. excited by the first image ; for attention to the
first image does not seem necessary to the production of this
effect. That the activity of paths of level ii. is in a high
degree independent of activities of paths of higher levels
may be realised by fixating figure 2 (preferably on a larger
scale) and allowing the eyes to remain quite unmoved ; one's
thought may then range over any remote subject while
nevertheless the white discs continue to affect consciousness
in the obscure manner characteristic of level ii., and if, as
may frequently happen when one's eyes have acquired the
habit of stillness, one or more of the discs ceases to produce
this obscure affection of consciousness, if, that is, it undergoes
complete fading, one usually becomes at once distinctly aware
of the change.
The paths of level iv., or higher-level paths in general, are
characterised (1) by extreme inconstancy and irregularity of
action, i.e., even under the same constellation of sensory
impressions different paths continually become active for
brief periods of time and in turn quiescent, the degrees of
resistance of these paths undergoing rapid changes through
the influence of certain factors that we have to study ; (2) by
the clearness and definiteness that is given through their
activity to the vague state of consciousness due to the activity
of lower levels ; (3) by the impossibility of simultaneous
1 See ' Observations in Support of Young's Theory of Vision,' section ii.,
MIND, vol. x.
342 w. MCDOUGALL:
activity of different paths of level iv. shown by the fact that
only one system of such paths can be active at any moment,
e.g., in the case of figure 2 it is impossible to see more than one
kind of grouping of the discs in the same area at the same
time, and it is impossible to see any one of the groupings if
attention be otherwise occupied either with auditory or other
sensory impressions or with any train of ideas not immediately
related to the figure ; (4) it is further characteristic of these
higher-level paths or systems of paths that the form of the
path is not intimately determined by the character of the sen-
sory stimulus as is the rule with the paths of level ii. ; thus
when figure 2 is viewed from different distances or in different
colours, the paths of level ii. must be different in every case,
while, in all probability, the path of level iv. that is con-
cerned in the apperception of the discs in any particular
grouping is identical in such cases ; the activity of this one
path may be superadded to that of different lower-level
paths.
The paths of level ii. are, then, in my view, the physio-
logical bases of the undiscriminated sensation continuum ;
through them are effected those reactions which Dr. Stout
has called sensation-reflexes. 1 Or they may be called the
physiological bases of pure sensation ; images that fall upon
the peripheral retina and fail to draw attention to themselves,
or upon the central retina while attention is otherwise oc-
cupied, or while I am only half awake and attention is at a
minimum, such visual images give rise to an affection of
consciousness that is as nearly a pure sensation as we, with
our complex mental life, are capable of experiencing. And
when some combination of factors brings it about that the
excitation-process in any one set of these lower paths pene-
trates to paths of a higher level, the lower paths still con-
tribute to the state of consciousness the same elements and
determine the quality and the intensity of the sensation
while the upper paths contribute those peculiar features
which, being added to the sensation, convert it into a percep-
tion.
The power of thus penetrating to the paths of higher
levels, determined by some or all of those factors which we
have to study, constitutes the ' Eindringlichkeit ' of the pre-
sentation attended to ; and the complexity of these upper
paths, their numerous interconnexions, the extreme vari-
ability of the resistances presented by them, and the number
of alternative paths that ma} 7 be opened in turn to the
1 Manual of Psychology, l>k. ii.. chap. ii.
PHYSIOLOGICAL FACTORS OF THE ATTENTION-PROCESS. 343
excitation-process, are the physiological basis of the ' Lebhaf-
tigkeit ' of the presentation and render " the sensation at-
tended to more active, evoking such fusion and association
as renders further understanding of the object possible ".
I believe that we may introspectively distinguish the effects
of the activities of the paths of different levels in the case of
representation of a sensation just as in the case of its actual
presentation through the sense organ. In the paper in
Brain referred to above, 1 I have suggested that the es-
sential physiological difference between a sensory presenta-
tion and its representation or reproduction in memory is that,
whereas the former involves the passage of the excitation-
process through the whole length of the conduction-paths
concerned, from the sense-organ to the muscle, and therefore
the discharge of neurin across all the synapses in the course
of such a path, the latter, the representation, means that the
excitement of the same paths is initiated in their central
parts, so that only the synapses efferent or distal to the
central neurones are the seats of the psycho-physical pro-
cesses ; that is to say, I regard the peculiar quality of
reality as contributed by the psycho-physical processes of
the synapses afferent to those central neurones, and its
absence from the representation is thus accounted for. I
take this to be true of the paths of level ii., but whether it
holds for paths of other levels is less clear. It is, I think,
doubtful whether the representation involves any re-excite-
ment of level i. ; I do not know that there is any evidence
that, for example, the pupil contracts when we call up the
idea of a bright light. And in the case of the paths of levels
higher than level ii. it is possible that the psycho-physical
processes underlying the representation are entirely similar
to those excited by the presentation.
When I voluntarily call up the memory-image of figure 2,
I may intend to see the discs arranged in parallel rows lying
in this or that direction, and this intention involves a tendency
for the eyes to be moved to and fro along this line of direction,
this or that path of level iv. is re-excited and leads to its
appropriate motor outflow. In the case of persons who do
not visualise at all, this intention together with verbal imagery
constitutes probably the whole of the representation. But,
like all probably who visualise well, I can then by a further
distinct voluntary effort call up the images of the white discs
on the dark ground arranged in this or that fashion, i.e. the
re-excitement spreads to the central neurones of the paths of
1 Brain, 1901.
344 W. MCDOUGALL :
level ii. I can then at will throw the discs so visualised into
any one. of the various possible groupings, just as in the case
of the actual image or after-image.
In a paper in this journal l I somewhat rashly suggested
that all the undiscriminated elements or factors of our mental
life should be regarded as purely physiological processes.
This view has been criticised by Mr. Shand - and I accept
in the main those criticisms so far as sensory presentation is
concerned. In making that suggestion I was attempting to
bring under one point of view things that do not really
belong together. But I think that we must recognise a
well-marked distinction in this respect between presentation
and representation. Thus, just as I can take in at a glance
a moderately complex visual object, so I can reproduce such
a moderately complex object in memory, but if then I con-
centrate attention upon a small part of this representation
there remains only the part attended to, this part is not
surrounded by a field of undiscriminated parts, obscure
sensation-elements, such as certainly remain when I con-
centrate attention on a part of the actual visual presentation.
In the latter case, a certain constellation of conditions enables
the excitation of one group of paths of level ii., out of many
groups excited, to penetrate to higher levels ; in the former
case this one group alone is re- excited from above.
I have now defined the physiological state that underlies the
state of attention, but to complete the physiological definition
it is necessary to describe the changes involved in a move-
ment of attention.
The forward passage of the excitation-process through
some system of paths leading from sensory to motor neu-
rones is the basis of what Prof. James has called the ' sub-
stantive parts ' of the stream of thought. Our scheme enables
us to assign in a rude way a physiological basis for the
' transitive parts ' also, for those obscure ' feelings of relation,'
of which the importance has been insisted upon by Herbert
Spencer and James. Let us take again the very simple
case of figure 2. The apperception of the figure as a triangle
covered with rows of white discs lying parallel to its base
means the flow of neurin through paths a, c, <j and h of
figure 1. This state of things, giving rise to a substantive part
of the stream of consciousness, may persist for a small fraction
of a second only or for more than one second, and then
occurs a movement of attention which results in my seeing
the discs as rows parallel to one side of the triangle. This
1 MIND, N. S., vol. vii. - MIND, N. S., No. 2H.
PHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOES OF THE ATTENTION-PROCESS. 345
means that while neurin continues to flow through the paths
a, c and g it no longer flows through path h, but by another
path, i, of level iv. One or more neurones of path h instead
of discharging in the forward direction has discharged in
a lateral direction across a synapsis by which it is connected
with a neurone of the same level, path i, this path having
become the path of lowest resistance in level iv. and there-
fore the path of forward conduction. This lateral discharge
is the psycho-physical process of which the psychical effect
is a ' transitive part ' of the stream of consciousness, which
in this case can only be described as an obscure and some-
what confused feeling of change.
We must assume the existence of such lateral connexions \/
between all neurones of any one level. It is the improve-
ment or organisation of such lateral connexions that con-
stitutes the physical basis of an association between two
ideas, and such an association is set up by the movement
of attention from one idea to the other, i.e., by the discharge
of neurin from the path subserving the one idea through
such lateral connexions or synapses into the path subserving
the other. In the case of the movements of attention that
occur during "fixation of figure 2 the resulting association
manifests itself in the ease with which a similar movement
of attention subsequently recurs on repeating the fixation.
When the movement of attention involves, not merely a
change of the mode of apprehension of one object that
continues to affect the sense-organ in the same way, but
a change of the object also, the ' transitive part ' of the
stream of consciousness becomes much more prominent.
Under ordinary circumstances such a movement of atten-
tion involves a readjustment of the sense-organ, and the
feeling of this readjustment forms a prominent element of
the ' transitive part '. But it is not an essential part, and
it is instructive to study the change when this element is
excluded as far as possible. This we may do with the help
of figure 3.
I fixate the white spot in the centre of the figure and keep
my atttention fixed on b, which I can achieve by voluntarily
throwing the discs into vertical rows and into rows sloping
to the right and to the left successively. While my attention,
is thus given to b, the impression made by the square a is in
the field of inattention. While continuing steadily to fixate
the white spot in the centre (and this I think can only be
done as the result of an artificially acquired habit or motor
disposition) I can then voluntarily turn my attention to a
and apperceive it as rows of discs alternately horizontal,
346
W. MCDOUGALL :
sloping to the left and sloping to the right, while b ceases to
be discriminated. This movement of attention involves not
only a change in the distribution of neurin in the paths of
level iv., as in the case of the simple movements that take
place while the one square only is attended to, but also a
redistribution in the paths of level iii. ; the ' transitive part '
of the stream of consciousness is therefore more prominent,
and, the movement being a relatively difficult one, it may be
of considerable duration, and for a short time I do not attend
to or apperceive any part of the visual field, the clear aware-
ness being replaced by a somewhat confused sense of strain
and change that may seem to fluctuate uncertainly. In
this case the organisation of lateral connexions by the move-
ment of attention is shown by the greater ease with which
a FIG. 3. b
the movement can be effected after several repetitions ; the
movement of attention has established an association be-
tween its terms.
If now we assume that the neurones of any upper-level path,
of any mental system, after forming the main path of forward
conduction and after, in virtue of a movement of attention,
discharging laterally into another path of the same level, con-
tinue to discharge neurin across these lateral synapses, return-
ing only gradually to the resting condition, then we may see in
this persistent but diminishing lateral discharge the physical
basis of that whicli James calls the " felt fringe of relations "
and which Stout calls the ' primary meaning,' ' of that group
of after-effects which renders the word at the end of a
sentence so different to the same word standing alone.
of I'xiich., p. 81 et < >/.
PHYSIOLOGICAL FACTORS OF THE ATTENTION-PROCESS. 347
We must distinguish, then, connexions between neurones,
i.e., synapses, of two orders ; on the one hand, those which
connect neurones forming a path of forward-conduction,
through these the discharge of neurin normally occurs
in the forward direction only ; on the other hand, those
which form lateral connexions between neurones that are
members of different forward conduction-paths, through
these the discharge may take place in either direction.
"Whether these two classes of synapses are sharply marked
off from one another is not clear, but the well-established
fact of exclusively forward-conduction in those which form
parts of paths in the spinal cord, and the fact of the frequent
cases of establishment between ideas of associations that
work equally well in both time-orders, compel us to re-
cognise such a difference in kind among synapses ; for,
however in detail we may picture the physiological basis
of such associations, we must assume that it consists in
paths through which excitement may spread equally well
in both directions.
It seems probable that the differences of behaviour of
synapses in respect to conduction in one or both directions
are the effects of differences of use. If we make this assump-
tion we can explain at once, (1) the valve-like action of the
synapses of the paths of forward-conduction, for in these
the discharge of neurin is normally from afferent to efferent
side only ; (2) the fact that if a series of presentations be
frequently repeated in the same order the individuals become
firmly associated in that order and only slightly in the reverse
order, as with the letters of the alphabet or a series of non-
sense syllables ; (3) the fact that any two or more pre-
sentations that are repeated in contiguity in time, but
in varied time-order, become associated in both orders
equally firmly ; (4) the fact that some individuals are able,
after much practice, to reproduce so vivid an idea of an
object that it becomes of the nature of an hallucination
and hardly distinguishable from an actual sensory presen-
tation of the object, l for in such cases the central excita-
tion would seem to spread backwards to or towards the
sense-organ, and so reaching the sensory neurones re-excite
the whole chain of neurones constituting a path between
sense-organ and muscle.
It will have been noticed that the view here adopted as to
the nature of neural processes underlying our states of
1 See especially the case of G. H. Meyer, quoted by G. E. Muller, Zur
Theorie d. SinnUchen Au/merksawkeit.
348 W. MCDOUGALL:
consciousness has little in common with that widely accepted
view which receives its most complete expression in Prof.
Ziehen's Leitfaden der physiologischen Psychologie. That view,
by assuming that memory-images, or rather the physical
traces that condition them, are somehow deposited in the
cell-bodies of neurones which are set aside as memory-cells,
avoids, or rather refuses to face, the problem of the physical
basis of memory which, it must be frankly admitted, is a
serious difficulty for the conduction-hypothesis which I have
adopted as the basis of my exposition. According to this
hypothesis the physiological basis of a sensation, say the
sensation aroused by the image of figure 2, is the onward
flow of neurin through a complex system of paths from
sensory to motor neurones, and the revival in memory of the
image means the repetition of this flow from the central
parts of the paths onwards to the motor neurones, the
essence of the reproduction, so far as it is faithful, being
that the same group of paths as was simultaneously excited
by the sensation shall tend to be simultaneously re-excited.
I have pointed out in a previous paper J that this tendency
manifests itself in its simplest form in the case of complicated
after-images, of which the contiguous parts of homogeneous
areas are so associated together that they tend to affect
consciousness simultaneously and more or less independently
of other parts.
The problem of the physical basis of memory is, then, to
discover wherein consists the physical disposition in virtue
of which simultaneously excited paths tend to function again
simultaneously. We must, I think, assume that simultaneous
activity of paths of level ii. effects an improvement of con-
ductivity of the lateral connexions between the neighbouring
longitudinal elements of the conduction-paths excited by the
sensory stimulus, that is to say, the simultaneous presence
of charges of neurin in either of two neurones of- level ii.,.
which are laterally connected by a synapsis, must be assumed
to increase in some degree the intimacy of their union at
that synapsis, and it may be that there is always in such a
case .some lateral flow of neurin through such a synapsis.
The physical basis of memory and that of association would
then be regarded as fundamentally similar in nature, both
consisting in diminished resistance or organisation of
synapses.
This view of the physical basis of memory will appear less-
inadequate to the explanation of the facts if we bear in mind
1 MiND, N. S., No. 3'., p. 377.
PHYSIOLOGICAL FACTORS OF THE ATTENTION-PROCESS. 349
the imperfect character of any memory-image resulting from
a single glance at an object. The only tolerably accurate
reproduction of a visual image so seen, seems to be the
short-lived memory-after-image, and the accuracy of this
must be attributed to a persistent activity of, or residual
charge of neurin in, the nervous elements excited by the
sensory stimulus. If however, we allow our eyes to wander
over the visual object and attend first to one part then to
another, the different parts become associated together in
memory through these successive movements of attention in
the way suggested above, and the memory-image becomes
much clearer and its parts more definitely related. Our
clearest memory-images, as those of the faces of our friends,
are always the result of many such movements of attention,
very varied in direction and extent and frequently repeated.
I have now completed in rough outline the scheme which
represents in crude and diagrammatic fashion what I take
to be the physiological states that underlie the state of
attention, the substantive part of the stream of consciousness,
and the movements of attention, the transitive parts of the
stream. I have translated the psychological definition into
physiological terms to the best of my ability. The scheme
is founded in large part on the physiological evidence detailed
in the article in Brain 1 and I hope further to justify it, in
the course of this paper, by showing that it may be success-
fully applied to the description of the mode of action of the
physiological factors.
If this scheme be approximately correct, the problem before
us is to elucidate the working of those factors which bring it
about that one organically connected system of paths in the
higher levels of the brain shall at any given moment be the
one, and only one, path of forward-conduction through those
higher levels ; or, to expand this statement of the problem, we
have to seek answers to the following questions : (1) Why is it
that at any moment the excitation set up in the lower levels
by some one of numerous simultaneous sensory impressions
penetrates to and excites an organised system of paths in
the higher levels of the brain? Why does it not confine
itself to lower-level paths of which the normal or resting
resistance is lowest? (2) What determines this excitation-
process to take this or that one of various alternative higher-
level paths possible to it ? (3) Why is it that, no matter how
favourable the conditions and no matter how great a voluntary
effort we may make, such a higher-level path does not con-
1 Brain, Winter 1901.
350 w. MCDOUGALL :
tinue in activity for more than a very brief period ? (4) Why
is the activity of one such system of higher-level paths in-
compatible with that of others ? that is to say, why can we
attend to one object only at one time and to that object only
in one way at one time ? Can we in fact find a physiological
basis for the narrowness and unity of consciousness ?
I propose to take up in turn each of the factors enumerated
on pages 317-318, and to endeavour to show how they may
be conceived to play their part in determining the four effects
mentioned above, dwelling more particularly on those factors
in regard to which I believe myself able to contribute ex-
perimental evidence, drawn chiefly from the field of visual
perception. In doing so I shall have occasion to describe
certain observations which, it may be hoped, will not be
devoid of all interest even to those whom I am unable to
carry with me in my view of the physiology of the attention-
process.
NOTE ON 'NEURIN'.
Since the appearance of my paper ' On the Seat of the Psycho-physical
Processes ' I have received a number of communications from corre-
spondents to whom I wish to convey my hearty thanks for kindly
criticisms. Several, in fact most, of them have protested against ' neurin '
being described as a fluid ; they tell me that I ought not to be content
to regard it as a fluid. I am anxious to defend my way of representing
' neurin ' because I believe that an important point of method is in
question. In the first place I hasten to point out that, as I ought to
have made clear in my former essay, I hope to justify this conception of
a fluid ' neurin ' by showing in the present series of papers that it is a
good working hypothesis, i.e., that it is a xiseful instrument of description.
And I would point out that this objection seems to arise from a too
confident belief in the objective reality of the distinction that we are
accustomed to draw between matter and energy. It seems to be a
deeply rooted infirmity of the human mind, or at least of the modern
mind, that it can hardly conceive activities of any sort apart from
material bases, so that in the case of those classes of phenomena in
which no material carrier of energies can be discovered it has been found
necessary to invent an ethereal or immaterial matter for the mind to
work upon. Through habitually seeking to represent all phenomena in
mechanical terms, in terms of the motion of little bits of matter, many
of us have come to believe that in so doing we describe the actual events
underlying phenomena. A remedy for this disorder of the intellect is
now fortunately at hand and may be prescribed with good hopes of cure,
namely, the perusal of Prof. Ostwald's Vorlesungen uber Naturphilo-
xophie (Leipzig, 1902). In this work the old problems of physics and
metaphysics are treated with a surprising freshness and originality, and
the superfluous and gratuitous character of the material bases is con-
vincingly displayed. But in the course of his exposition Prof. Ostwald
roundly condemns the use of working hypotheses and hi reference to
fruitful hypotheses of the past he asserts ' that without these hypotheses
the discoverers would probably have accomplished more. The discoveries
have been made not by means of, but in spite of, the hypotheses ' (p. 215).
PHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOES OF THE ATTENTION- PROCESS. 351
I venture to think that the form of the argument is unworthy of the
author and that he errs in assuming that we are all demi-gods. It is
true that when a great physicist declares an atom, or an ether, or an
ethereal vortex-ring to be the most real thing known to him we must
admit that hypothesis may become ' noxious nonsense '. But when Prof.
Ostwald strips modern physics of its hypotheses and then declares that
these hypotheses have been worse than useless, he seems to me like one
who, having thrown down from a building already many storeys high the
scaffolding that obscured its fair and reasonable proportions, proceeds to
assert that because it stands firmly and looks so much handsomer without
the scaffolding therefore it might probably have been built more rapidly
without its aid. Neurology, I take it, is still in that early stage in which
some concessions to the infirmity of our minds must be made, in which,
in fact, working hypotheses may be of the greatest advantage, if not
absolutely necessary aids to progress. And it seems to me that by
regarding ' neurin ' provisionally as a fluid we may reap the advantages
without incurring the dangers of hypothesis. To those who may detect
in ' neurin ' a disagreeable flavour of vitalism I would repeat a remark
recently made by Prof. Hering 'To-day the danger of premature and
therefore inadequate physico-chemical explanations of the phenomena
of life is greater than the danger that the conception of a vital force may
be used as a comfortable halting place where the reason may be laid to
rest on a pillow of obscure ideas ' (Zur Theorie der Nerventhatiykeit,
Leipzig, 1899).
III. SYMBOLIC REASONING (IV.). 1
BY HUGH MACCOLL.
PUEE, ABSTRACT, OR GENERAL LOGIC.
1. THE simplest, the most general, and the most easily
applicable kind of logic is the logic of statements or proposi-
tions. To this, and to this alone, can we correctly give the
name of pure logic. Unlike all other kinds, it has the
immense advantage of being independent of the accidental
conventions of language. How dependent other systems are
on linguistic conventions is shown by the importance they
attach to the grammatical distinction between subject and
predicate (see 3, 4, 11). In pure logic (as I understand it)
"A struck B " and "B was struck by A" are exact equiva-
lents, and any symbol we choose to represent the one may
also be employed to represent the other. So in mathematics.
The statements "A is greater than B," "B is less than A,"
" A B is positive," "B A is negative," are all four
equivalent ; and any symbol, A > B, or B < A, or (A B) p ,
or (B A) N , used to express one of them, will also express
any of the others.
2. Statements or propositions are the indispensable units of
every argument. If one of these units be ambiguous or
wanting in clearness, the validity of the argument becomes
doubtful. We then discuss the meaning of this faulty unit,
taking for our data the grammatical and other linguistic
conventions of the tongue employed ; and this discussion
again must be carried on by means of propositions.
3. It is generally assumed that a proposition must consist
of a subject and a predicate. That, however, is a matter of
convention or definition. If I accept it, I must in my
system make a distinction between the two words statement
and proposition. Let me therefore define a statement as any
sound or symbol (or collection of sounds or symbols) employed
to give information. In this sense the warning " Caw" of a
III. see MIND, January, 1900.
SYMBOLIC EEASONING. 353
sentinel rook, and the Union Jack floating from the mast of
a passing ship, are statements. The former is equivalent to
" Beware ; I see a man coming with a gun " ; the latter is
equivalent to " This is a British ship ". These are elementary
statements statements that cannot be separated into subject
and predicate. In the evolution of human language, that
division came later (see 30).
4. A proposition I define as a statement of the form A B ,
in which A is the subject, and B the predicate. Thus, every
proposition is a statement ; but every statement is not a
proposition. Let A = Alexander, and B = baker. The
proposition A B asserts that Alexander is a baker. If we repre-
sent a proposition A B by a single letter a, we may then (con-
sidering the form alone) say that a is a statement but not a
proposition ; whereas A B , by our definition, is both (see 3,
25). Let B p B. 2 , B 3 , etc., be the separate individuals that
constitute the class B. Then
A B - A Bl + A B * + A B ' + etc.
That is to say (giving the same meanings to A and B as
before), the statement that Alexander is a baker is equivalent
to the statement that Alexander is either Baker No. 1, or Baker
No. 2, or Baker No. 3, etc.
5. Let A = animal, and let B = brown ; also let n be the
total number of animals under consideration. Then the
symbol A X B A 2 B A 3 B . . . A n B asserts that A : is brown, that
A^ is brown, etc. ; that is to say, it asserts that All the
animals of our limited universe are brown. The symbol
A Z B + A 2 B + A 3 B + . . . + AH. B , on the other hand, asserts
that one at least of the animals (either A : or A 2 or A 3 , etc.) is
brown.
6. Let A 1? A 2 , A 3 , etc., be the individuals forming a class A ;
and let B x , B 2 , B 3 , etc., be the individuals forming a class B.
Out of the series A 1? A 2 , etc., let an individual A be taken
at random. The symbol A B , on this hypothesis, asserts that
A is also one of the individuals in the series B 15 B 2 , etc.
Hence, A B % which is an abbreviation for (A B )% asserts that
the statement A B is a certainty (e). Thus A Be may be con-
sidered as synonymous with the traditional "All A is B," or
" Every A is a B ". Similarly, A Br) , which asserts that A B is
impossible (77), is equivalent to the " No A is B " of the
traditional logic ; while A Bj)t denies this, and asserts that
" Some A is B ". In like manner, A B " denies A Bt (that every
A is B), and asserts that " Some A is not B ". The symbol
A Be is equivalent to the combination A B)? ' A B ", and asserts
that A B is possible but uncertain; that is, it asserts that
23
354 HUGH MACCOLL :
one A at least is B, but that every A is not B. Thus
A Be = A X B A 2 B A 3 B . . . A M B , the number n being the number
of individuals in the universe A lf A 2 , A 3 , etc. Similarly we
get A B " = A!* A 2 Bt A 3 Bt . . . A rt Bl ; that is, A. Bl asserts that
Aj is not B, that A 2 is not B, and so on till the last A H .
Hence
A B,, lA Be t = ( Ai B tA B tA Bc An Bty (A 1 B A 2 B A 3 B . . . A W B )'
= (V + A 2 B + A 3 B + . . . + A, B ) (AJ* + A 2 Bl + A 3 Bt + . . . + A, Bt ).
That is to say, A Be asserts, firstly, that one at least of the
series A 15 A 2 , A 3 , etc., is B, and, secondly, that one at least is
not B. Out of the n? terms in the product of the last two
bracket-statements, n terms, namely, A a B A^', A 2 B A 2 Bl , etc.,
may be omitted as self -contradictory; for A^ 8 (which is an
abbreviation for Az BT ) asserts that Az B is true, and A* 81 asserts
that A. X K is false. Thus the syllogisms Barbara and Frissison
may be expressed respectively by
7. But a far simpler, more symmetrical, and more general
way of treating the syllogism is to regard it from the point
of view of pure or abstract logic. From this point of view
all valid syllogisms are but particular cases of the general
formula, or formal certainty (see 31, 32)
(x : y) (y : z) : (x : z),
which I will represent by <j) (x, y, z), or briefly </>, and which
may be read " If whenever the statement x is true, y is true,
and whenever y is true, z is true ; then whenever x is true,
z is true ". It may also be read as " If x implies y, and y
implies z, it follows that x implies z". The symbol $
(A, B, C) will then denote what </> becomes when any
statement A is put for x, B for y and C for z (see 12).
Out of our universe of discourse, consisting say of the in-
dividuals Pp P 2 , P 3 , etc., let an individual P be taken at
random ; and let the symbols A, B, C, as statements, assert
respectively that P will belong to the class A, that P will
belong to the class B, that P will belong to the class C ;
while A', B', C' will be the respective denials of these state-
ments. It is evident that, assuming 1 the existence of the
classes A, B, C in our universe P 1? P 2 , P 3 , etc., and con-
sidering those syllogisms equivalent which have equivalent
premisses and the same or equivalent conclusions, we shall
have
1 This assumption of existence is not necessary except in the case of
Darapti, Felapton, Fesapo and Bramantip.
SYMBOLIC REASONING. 355
Barbara = <j> (A, B, C)
Celarent = Cesare = <jE> (A, B, C')
Darii = Datisi = <f> (B, C, A')
Ferio = Festino = Ferison = Fresison = <f> (A, C, B')
Camestres = Camenes = </> (A, B', C')
Disamis = Dismaris = < (B, A, C')
Baroko - <j> (A, C, B)
Bokardo = </> (B, A, C)
Darapti = < (B, AC, 77)
Felapton = Fesapo = <f> (B, AC', 77)
Bramantip = </> (C, BA', 77).
8. All these can be easily proved ; but to show the method
of bringing all within the sweep of the general formula
(f> (x, y, z}, it will be enough to prove three, namely, Fresison,
Darapti and Bramantip.
Fresison = (C : B') (B : A')' : (A : C)'
= (C : B') (B : A')' (A : C) : 77
= (A : C) (C : B') : (B : A')
= (A : C) (C : B') : (A : B') = <f> (A, C, B')
Darapti = (B : C) (B : A) : (A : C')'.
But, since the classes A, B, C are understood throughout to
exist in our universe P p P 2 , P 3 , etc., we have e = A 1 *' = B" 11 = C 1 '',
Hence
Darapti = B"(B : C) (B : A) : (A : C')'
- B"(B : CA) : (A : C')'
= B"(B : CA) (A : C') : 77
= B"(B : CA) (AC : 77) : 77
- (B : AC) (AC : 77) : B"
= (B : AC) (AC : 77) : (B : 77) - (B, AC, 77)
Bramantip = (C : B) (B : A) : (A : C')'
= 0(C : B) (B : A) : (A : C')', since C" 1 - e
= C" l (C : B) (B : A) : (C : A')'
= O(C : B) (C : A') (B : A) : 77
= O(C : BA') (BA' : 77) : 77
= (C : BA') (BA' : 77) : (C : 77) = <j> (C, BA', 77).
9. It is evident, since x:y = y':x, that <f> (x, y,z) = $ (z, y', x')',
so that all the syllogisms remain valid if we reverse the order
of their constituents, provided we at the same time change
their signs. For example, Camestres and Camenes may
each be expressed, not only in the form <f> (A, B', C'), but
also in the form <f> (C, B, A').
10. In the syllogisms, the statements A, A', B, B', etc., are
understood to be abbreviations for the propositions P A , P At ,
P B , P Bl , etc., all of which have the same subject P, an
356 HUGH MACCOLL:
individual taken at random out of the universe of discourse
Pp P 2 , P 3 , etc. But in the general formula </> (x, y, z), of
which all valid syllogisms are but particular cases, the state-
ments x, y, z need not be understood to Tefer to the same
subject. The formula < (x, y, z} holds good whatever be its
constituent statements x, y, z, which may, one and all, be
certainties, impossibilities or variables. For example, take the
case x^z*, and suppose x = 77^ y = 7). 2 , z = i) 3 , we get
</> 0?1, *7 2 *7 3 ) = (*7l : ^2> 0/2 : Is) : (*/l : */s) = l -2 ' 6 3 = e 4 ;
for 77 : a = (rja')* = 77^ = e, whatever be the particular im-
possibility represented by the symbol 77 out of the series
7) lt 7/2, 773, etc., and whatever be the statement a. Next, take
the case x*y f z*. Assuming x, y, z to be respectively e lt e 2 , r} lt
we get
< (e lt . 2 , 77^ = (e l : e 2 ) (e 2 : 77^ : (e x : i^) - e s r) 2 : r) s = rj 4 : rj 3 =- e 4 ;
for, as before, 77 : a = e, whatever impossibility 77 may be out
of the series 77^ 77. 2 , 773, etc., and whatever the statement a
(see 32).
11. There has been much discussion among logicians as
to the " existential import of propositions," especially as to
whether the proposition " All A is B " implies the existence
of the subject A. The question does not appear to me to
belong to the province of pure logic, which should treat of the
relations connecting different classes of propositions, and not
of the relations connecting the words of which a proposition
is built up. The latter question is one properly of grammar
,nd philology, and not of general or abstract logic. The
answer depends upon the meaning we agree to give to the
word exist. Take, for example, the proposition " Non-ex-
istences are non-existent ". This is a self-evident truism ; can
ive affirm that it implies the existence of its subject non-ex-
istences ? In pure logic we have rf> = e, or more briefly rf^,
which asserts that it is certain that an impossibility is an
impossibility. In pure logic the subject, being always a
statement, must exist that is, it must exist as a statement.
It may be a certainty, an impossibility, or a variable it
may even (in the circumstances) be unmeaning; yet as a
statement it always exists. But in pure logic we sometimes
have to symbolise statements to which (in the circumstances
considered) we can attach no meaning. Such statements
belong, not to the class 77, but to the class o. For example,
A? asserts that A is impossible that is it contradicts some
datum or definition; whereas A asserts that A, in the case
considered, is a meaningless statement that affirms nothing
SYMBOLIC EEASONING. 357
and contradicts nothing (see my recent memoir on "La
Logique Symbolique et ses Applications " in the Bibliotheque
du Congrks International de Philosophic : Librairie Armand
Colin).
THE LOGIC OF FUNCTIONS on KELATIONS.
12. A symbol of the form <j) (x) or i/r (x) or/ (a;), etc., is
called a function of x. It denotes l any statement, or part of
a statement, containing the symbol x. Similarly, <f> (x, y) or
^r (x, y), etc., is called a function of x and y. It denotes any
statement, or part of a statement, containing the symbols x and
y. The symbols <f> (x, y, z), ty (x, y, z), etc., are to be inter-
preted in the same manner. The symbol fa or simply < may
be used as an abbreviation for < (x). Similarly, <f> x ,y, or
simply <, may be used as an abbreviation for <j> (x, y) ; and
so on. The constituents x, y, z, etc., may each denote a word
or collection of words or of other symbols ; and they may
(as generally with me), or may not (as in mathematics),
separately represent complete propositions. When we have
any function < (x, y), then the symbol < (a, /3) denotes what
< (x, y) becomes when a is substituted for x, and /3 for
y, the other words or symbols remaining unchanged. Similarly,
</> (x) and <f> (a), <f> (x, y, z) and $ (a, f3, 7), etc., are to be
interpreted.
13. For example, let w = whale, h = herring, v = virtue ;
and let <f> (w, h) denote the proposition " A small whale can
swallow a large herring". Then <f> (h, w) will denote "A
small herring can swallow a large whale," the symbols w and
h interchanging places, while the rest of the proposition
remains unchanged. It is evident that this convention leads
to the conclusion < e (w, h), <p (h, w). That is to say </> (w,
h) is a certainty and <f> (h, w) an impossibility. We also get
< (w, v); that is to say, the statement that "A small whale
can swallow virtue " is meaningless.
14. The symbols < (x), (f> (x, y), etc., may thus be regarded
as blank forms to be filled up, the blanks being represented by
x, y, etc., and the words or other symbols to be substituted
by a, /3, etc. A statement of the form < (x, y, z) may be
represented by < (a;) or fa when the substitutions for x only
have to be considered ; by <j) (x, y) or fa t y when we have to
1 The definition of a function given here is more general than that
given of a function in mathematics ; and it includes the mathematical
definition. I employed the functional symbol / (x, y, z) to denote the
complex implication (x : y) (y: z) : (x : z) in my second paper on the " Cal-
culus of Equivalent Statements,' published in the Proceedings of the
London Mathematical Society in 1878.
358 HUGH MACCOLL :
consider the substitutions for x and y ; and so on. When we
speak of the form alone, without referring to any particular
substitutions, we may denote the function simply by <.
15. To show how dependent other systems of logic are
upon mere linguistic conventions, which differ more or less
in different countries, let us take the proposition "If A is
the cousin of B, then B is the cousin of A," and denote it
by </> (A, B). Translating this into French, let i/r (A, B)
denote the proposition " Si A est le cousin de B, alors B est
le cousin de A " ; and suppose A to be a boy, and B to be
a girl. We get the paradox < e (A, B), -^ (A, B), which asserts
that the English statement <f> (A, B) is certainly true (e), while
its French translation -fy (A, B) is certainly false (rj). For in
French, " B est le cousin de A " implies that B is of the male
sex, which is contrary to our data ; whereas in English,
" B is the cousin of A " implies nothing as to the sex of B.
16. Let (j) x , as an abbreviation for < (x), denote the implica-
tion " If A is a; of B, and B is x of C, then A is a; of
C " ; and let a = an ancestor, s = a son, c = a cousin, h = the
hat. We get </> a e </>/> </> c * (J> h . That is <f> a is certain, <, im-
possible, <f> c variable (neither certain nor impossible), and
<f> h meaningless.
17. According to writers on 
