Observations on method in moral science, being an essay of criticism and suggestion

r

REESE LIBRARY

OF THK

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
Class No.

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

OBSERVATIONS

ON

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

BEING AN ESSAY OF

CRITICISM AND SUGGESTION

ERRATA

Page 6, line 10, for " changes " read " charges."
7, ,, 28, for "Thus" read "Then."
20, ,, 30, for " require " read " acquire."
27, „ 30, for "receives" read "secures."
93', „ 30, far "millions "read "million "without the comma.

EDINBURGH

JAMES THIN, 54 SOUTH BRIDGE
1900

OBSERVATIONS

ON

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

BEING AN ESSAY OF

CRITICISM AND SUGGESTION

BY

WILLIAM MITCHELL BOWACK

EDINBURGH

JAMES THIN, 54 SOUTH BRIDGE
1900

PREFACE

IN submitting these observations on Method in Moral
Science to the public we have described them as an
essay of criticism and suggestion. Might we say here
they are more. They are an attitude of mind. They
are the consequence of the feeling of vague, unex-
pressed dissatisfaction with recognised moral science
in relation to the living necessities of the time.

9578,'?

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

CHAPTER I

/ THERE is no finality in science. Still less is there
finality in moral science. If it was only through the
necessity of readjustment in the light of later investi-
gation, there must always be an element of pertur-
bation in even our widest abstractions. Especially
should such a factor of variance present itself in moral
science, for there the chief factor, man himself, his
motives and conduct, are ever changing. Who would
dare to say that the spiritual insight, the moral ideal,
and the standard of effective achievement of the race
is to-day the same as it was yesterday, or will be to-
morrow ?

We grant you there is a longing for finality ; that
when a great writer in morals, economics, or political
science lays down his pen at the close of the last
chapter of his magnum opus, he hopes, nay, he implicitly
believes, that he has crowned the edifice of the world's
experience, that nothing clouds the light in his latest
effort, and that it is for others to build fearlessly on
the foundation he has laid. And his generation very

A

2 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

probably takes him at his word. It is left to a future
Philistine to give expression to an innate sense of
inadequacy by destructive criticism.

There are two tests of the rightfulness of the claims
of a science to finality or completion. The one is a
consensus of all competent and informed minds ; the
other is predictive certainty. These two tests must be
rigidly withstood. They are the only guarantees of
scientific certitude. Applying these two tests to the
science of morals, to sociology and economics, to morals
and aesthetics, we ask — Is there a consensus upon their

'' principles, even their main principles ? Are the
logical inferences based upon these principles of the

^ value of certitude in forecasting the future ? We fear
the only answer is, that there is no consensus upon any
of their principles, and not the slightest certitude, and
not much probability as to their forecasts of the
future.

Now, we will not deny that among moralists,
economists, and political writers there is an apparent
unanimity on foundational matters, a general tone of
agreement in their writings and speeches. There is a
sort of lingua franca runs current through them, and
which, so long as they are advocating the same views
and the same measures, seems, and indeed is, a
convenient and accurate enough vehicle of thought.
It may be through subsumption, or through that
unconscious thought continuum of suggestion which
pervades all current literature, that apparent consensus
is secured, but there it is a fairly useful polemical
instrument. But let these doctors differ, let these

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 3

savants seek to come to the closest point of intellectual
\ touch, let them seek to define in exhaustive terms, and
forthwith the consensus disappears and a war of first
principles ensues, conducted with all the bitterness
which profound philosophers always exhibit in public
controversy. In point of fact there is not one possible
consensus, but two. There is the irrefragible con-
sensus of scientific precision ; but there is also an
apparent consensus born of inadequate definition.
Two diverse views will not apparently clash where
\ each thinker under the same term thinks a different
thought. For instance, in material science there have
been many apparent harmonies which existed on the
basis of erroneous knowledge. Light and air were
generalised upon, and very beautiful theories formed
of them which logically looked unassailable, yet which
later discoveries dissipated like mist. Thus, in moral
science, the vagueness and lack of precision in the
terms used give an apparent unity to thought which
is really non-existent. It is a consensus blind to
essential difference ; it is apparent, not real, and
disappears at the magic touch of the analyst's wand.

Look at the precision of the exact sciences in
matter and expression, the accuracy of their calcula-
tions of present and future events, the conciseness and
accuracy of their terminology. A chemist announces
that certain combinations of primary substances in
defined quantities at specific temperatures will as a
resultant give a new compound, stable, testable, and
invariable. If the same experiment is repeated in
Pekin and Peru, the resultant will be precisely the

4 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

same. And the whole process can be described in two
or three letters with a number or so attached ; and
these apparently caballistic signs will to every com-
petent chemist in every part of the world convey all
the information necessary for the repetition of the
experiment. Given the material and the directions, and
the realisation of the result is assured. In the same
way in physics and astronomy there is the same exact
correspondence between knowledge, its accurate repre-
sentation, and the forecast of future results.

Is there any corresponding accuracy and fruitfulness on
the moral science side ? We know there is not. Even the
very fundamental conceptions and phraseology of these
sciences seldom convey identity of meaning to any two
minds. Patriotism to a Russian and Britain represents
two very different ideas. Virtue to a Chinaman is
something very different from the conception of virtue
held by a New England Puritan. The ultimate spoken
of by a Brahminical Hindoo has not the slightest
resemblance to the ultimate talked about by a Port
Royal Jesuit. The aesthetics of John Ruskin bear no
relation to the standard of taste in Japan. If a person
opened up a correspondence with distant friends in
Europe, America, or Asia upon any one of the subjects
named, he would require to append an elaborate
explanation of the meaning and the limitations of the
terms used. And if he received replies from his
correspondents, he would be much surprised to find how
much they differed from himself and each other, and
how irreconcilable their views were on which to build
a common platform of accepted knowledge. Certainly,

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 5

even in the event of a consensus, it never would or
could be expressed with the same brevity and precision
with which a fact of the same or parallel importance
in the material or exact sciences could or would be
expressed.

We say that the terms of the moral sciences vaiy
in meaning between one individual and another.
They vary also in meaning to the same individual at

s. one period of his life and another, and under one
experience and another. It is not accretion of know-
ledge merely, or greater expertness, familiarity, and
precision in the use of the same terms. We say the
whole conception and the sense in which the terms are
used are different, are foundationally changed at one
period of life from another. The terms themselves
also change their meaning between one age and
another. Why do we always publish new translations
and editions of standard writers in moral science ? Why
do we have new editions of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and
Hegel ? It is because the newer age has outgrown the
old translations, their terminology has become obsolete
and needs adaptation to later thought, which has
unconsciously drifted from the original meaning.
The later age was reading into the text more than the
original writer intended. The later age was richer in

v its thought continuum, and was making the terms
hold more meaning than when first they were given to
the world. With all this element of vagueness and
variability hi the definition of essential terminology, is
it any wonder that the historical inductions of the past
and observations on the ever-changing present are, if

6 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

not worthless, vitiated and discounted from their
inception ; that the predictive forecasts of even
accomplished moralists, politicians, and economists
are generally valueless, and appraised at that negative
value by the busy world at large. There is no
consensus upon the alphabet of these sciences. There
can, therefore, be no stable basis for foresight to look
forward with certainty into the immediate, and still
less the distant, future.

That these changes are not exaggerated, a reference
to any vocabulary of philosophic terms is sufficient to
show. We take Fleming's " Vocabulary of Philosophy "
(4th Edition, revised by Prof. Calderwood, LL.D.), and
turn to the term "idea," and we find the following
definition, or rather description : —

ts Idea — I. Common modern usuage — (l) In its
widest sense, every product of intellectual action, or
even modification ; (2) In more restricted use, a mental
image of an external object. II. Special usage — (1)
Platonic . . . (2) Kantian
(3) Hegelian . . ." Continuing, the writer
gives us examples of the common modern usage. So
far as we can make out, he quotes ten authorities who
use the term in different senses, or with important
modifications or limitations. Altogether, Fleming's
definition of the term " idea " occupies 6 pages of 228
lines, comprising about 2300 words. Such is the
prospect held out to the good man in a hurry.

In despair we turn from Fleming to Chambers. We
find the following :—" Idea, n.t an image of a thing
formed in the mind, a notion, thought, opinion." We

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 7

cease to be surprised now at Fleming requiring 2300
words to define "idea." If all is in that term Chambers
says there is, we are surprised at Fleming's brevity and
conciseness.

We turn up another term in Fleming. It might be
said that the term " idea " is just such a term as one
would expect diversity of opinion upon. Well, we turn
up the term " conscience." It is a word in every man's
mouth, and meets the eye in every newspaper and
every book. If the word has not one meaning and
one meaning only, British literature is in a very
nebulous, not to say chaotic, condition.

"Conscience (conscientia, . . . joint or double
knowledge), that power by which we have knowledge
of moral law. This word is similarly compounded
with ' consciousness/ Conscience expresses more
abstractly, ' knowledge with ' ; consciousness, the
state of mind as possessing knowledge — knowledge of
self and of present experience. As the name for the
moral faculty, conscience expresses (1) knowledge of
the relation of action to moral law — the more usual
meaning, or (2) knowledge of the agent's relation to
the moral governor — knowledge with God. In its
ultimate and strictly moral sense, it is the power
revealing moral law within mind and of sovereign
practical authority on that account. . . . There
is considerable diversify in philosophic usage, of which
examples follow." ^aST Fleming quotes the views of
Butler, Whewell, Adam Smith, Stewart and Reid, Mill,
Bain, Sidgwick, and Kant. Each of these authorities
use the term " conscience " with limitations or differences

8 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

of some kind or another,, yet of such importance as to
be clearly noticeable and expressible. Are we wrong,
then, in saying that there is no consensus upon the
alphabet of moral science, and that the terms of moral
science differ in meaning between one individual and
another ?

Of equal importance is it that we have no efficient
mode of expressing or conveying accurately and
instantaneously the relative importance of the ab-
stractive factors in a reasoning process in morals.
Indeed, preliminary to that conception, we may say our
present logical methods take no adequate cognisance
of the relative importance of ideas, and have no means
of fixing upon the mind the precise value of subjects of
comparison and argumentation. How differently do
we value specific data. To one person a certain
consideration is all-important. His neighbour treats
it lightly, although equally admitting its bearing upon
the subject in hand. They both use the same terms,
and profess to refer to the same thing. Yet a vital
difference exists. How are we to estimate with exact-
ness, and state with precision and in convenient terms,
this conceptional variation ? One set of facts determine
the public mind to-day. To-morrow they carry a very
different value. Yet how express the change ? The
terms used are still the same. But though there is no
change in the terms of expression, we are conscious of
a change in the thought substance. In public "*
discussion a series of trivialities bearing upon a subject
matter will outweigh a single fundamental truth. A
debater presents seven points bearing upon a question.

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 9

His opponent only presents one — may be has only one
to present. Yet that one may outweigh all the seven.
All the same, the audience does not see this difference
in relative value. There is no way to let them see it.
It is only actual experience, a method of rule of thumb,
that enables a few to prefer the one fundamental
consideration to the seven considerations of lesser
weight presented on the other side. We do not say it
will be easy to remedy this defect ; it is there all the
same. The difference in value of the thoughts com-
pared is unconsciously or vaguely apprehended. It
would be supremely desirable if we could make the
apprehension more specific and more prompt. We
want a better mode or method of co-ordinating our
ideas in terms of relative value. Important ideas
bearing a visual signification of their importance and
of the exact amount of their importance whenever and
wherever used.

To say that these foregoing observations are new
would be absurd. We only state them because they
are universally admitted. They are no less universally
deplored. What we have to do is to find a remedy
more or less effective. It would be a libel upon
humanity, a conscious defeat of the mind in the
search of truth, to sit supine in the face of such ad-
mitted weaknesses.

One practical proposal given to the world through
more than one source was made by Prof. Balfour of
America. After examining a large field of mental and
moral science, he came to the same conclusion that most
people come to, that vagueness, inadequate and variant

10 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

definitions, lie at the root of all the confusion and nearly
all the want of progress in the science of mind and
philosophy. He suggested a conference or congress of
savants, who would take up seriously this question of
definition. He wanted a consensus upon the meaning
to be attached to any term used in mental and moral
science, and all writers and translators rigidly to adhere
to what we may term the official or orthodox interpre-
tation. This seems a hopeful, practical suggestion.
This is an age of conferences — social, scientific, medical,
political, and religious. Why not add one more to
their number? A conference of psychologists, logicians,
moralists, metaphysicians, and philosophers, met, not
to discuss but only to define, sounds promising. Sub-
sections appointed, to divide and apportion the labour,
would in a few years determine the proper meaning
and the only meaning to be applied to all terms used
in philosophical literature, and invent new terms for
such recurrent meanings as have taken refuge and
concealment under one common term. Yet still we
are not satisfied with even the realisation of that pro-
posal.

CHAPTER II

WE would not, however, have the labours of such a
conference stop at an official set of definitions. Much
of the terminology of the moral sciences is not only
inexact, but it is cumbersome and inadequately ex-
pressive. Indeed, this is the fault of all our literature
aiming at the treatment of social and moral pheno-
mena from the scientific standpoint. The most im-
portant of the subject matter investigated is relativity,
and relativity involving a quantitative element ; yet to
express the infinite complexity of quantitative social
and moral relations we have no terms of more precise
meaning than more or less and their variations.

Observe how in higher logic and metaphysics the
processes of accretion and discretion, after a few thought
movements, become involved, obscure, and difficult to
follow, — not from the obscurity of the thought itself,
but from the cumbersomeness of its verbal setting.
In a few removes it requires phrases, and in a few
more would require, and does require, paragraphs to
state precisely and exhaustively the thought differen-
tiated. Is it not the fact that experienced readers in
metaphysics find it a strain to follow the expressed
thoughts of others, though the writer is seeking to

12 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

convey precisely the same idea as is present in their
own mind, by reason of the inexactitude and cumbrous
length of the terms used ? We must find a remedy
for this evil. Chemists were in precisely the same
predicament. It became very difficult to find verbal
terms to express the immense mass of results obtained
by chemical research without having recourse to
phrases and sentences, and indeed in the more com-
plex processes to paragraphs of words. Chemists
had therefore to discard verbal in favour of signifi-
cant forms. In these they found an instrument of
expression, brief, precise, and fully informatory, ex-
pressing quantitative as well as qualitative relations
with equal ease. That meant, of course, a double
trained speciality — a specialist's knowledge of chem-
istry and a specialist's knowledge and training in
terminology. Advanced chemistry became a double
cult, their knowledge veiled from the vulgar in
esoteric signs. We want metaphysicians to do the
same. They are face to face with the same problem.
The elements of their science and their primary com-
binations can no longer be efficiently managed or
expressed in verbal terms. They, like the chemists,
must fall back upon significant forms.

In chemistry sulphuric acid is represented by the
formula H,,SO4, which states to the informed that the
product sulphuric acid contains two items of hydrogen,
one of sulphur, and four of oxygen. We may place
the two forms together for comparison, and contrast
them thus — sulphuric acid, H2SO4. It is to be noted
that they denote the same thing, a chemical compound.

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 13

There is no ambiguity under either form as to the
substance meant. But while the thing indicated re-
quires for expression thirteen characters in the verbal
form, it requires only five in the significant. So far,
then, as economy of labour is concerned, the advantage
is all one way. But while we have exhausted the use-
fulness and potentialities of the verbal mode, we have
not exhausted the advantages of the significant mode.
The significant form states not only that there is a
substance called sulphuric acid, but that it is composed
of three substances — hydrogen, sulphur, and oxygen.
Not only so, but that these component elements are
present as one part of sulphur, two of hydrogen, and
four of oxygen. Still more, the order of chemical com-
bination is given in the order in which the letters
composing the sign are arranged. The verbal formula
expresses the qualitative element only, the significant
formula the quantitative as well. Even the differen-
tiation of sulphuric acid from all other substances is
accentuated by the fulness and exhaustiveness of the
recorded contents of the sign. The difference between
the two modes is that between an ordinary and a
technical dictionary. The one gives you a vague im-
pression ; the other lets you know all that is known of
the subject. The verbal term is barely informatory ;
the significant sign bristles with useful points. And
all these advantages within the compass of five char-
acters.

It is this system we want moral philosophers to
adopt : moralists, economists, psychologists, logicians,
and metaphysicians. We want all the elemental or

14 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

foundational truths of moral science stated in such
brief, precise, and expressive formulae. Every single
character used in the sign must convey a truth. And
not only that individual truth, but its qualitative and
quantitative relations to essential preceding, succeed-
ing, or co-existing phenomena. We want all this ex-
pressed in a combination of characters which will meet
the eye, and be covered by the eye instantaneously.
We don't expect that such a process of signification
will reach far down from the a priori in the multi-
plicity of thought moments and thought movements.
But we are confident it can be realised in the primary
essentials, and with experience would be gradually
extended to a growing or extending circle of thought
combinations. When begun, such a mode of expression
would from its convenience never be lost. Whatever
additions were made would be permanent gain to
facility in dealing with thought.

Neither would we seek to impose this additional
phase of intellectuality upon the general student or the
general reader. But for those who meant to adopt
moral science as their life work, we would make it, as
chemistry does, a sine qua non. All the advantages
claimed by material scientists to accrue through this
superior method of expression would accrue to
moralists. Its brevity and informatory character
would all be theirs. It would be even more useful.
For, in material science the phenomena are stable,
permanent, always accessible ; while the phenomena of
the moral sciences are fleeting, hard to grasp, still
harder to fix. Besides, the personal element in

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 15

material science is almost non-existent. In moral
science the personal equation is one of the most
important elements, and always variant. If these
significant forms are so useful among stable pheno-
mena, how much more useful will such a full and yet
precise and adaptable method be in moral science.
Indeed, not how much more useful, but how absolutely
indispensable.

Under our present cumbrous terminology even
elemental truths require more words than one to
express them. The very simplest combination or
relativity has to be expressed in phrases, and even in
paragraphs. Under this necessity the unity of the
conception is destroyed. It is rolled out through a
succession of terms, and the meaning is apprehended
in a succession of independent efforts or stages. The
apprehension is no longer instantaneous in time. An
appreciable interval of time occurs in picking up the
meaning of each term. An appreciable disintegration
or opening out of thought takes place. You become
unnecessarily conscious that you are dealing with a
complex instead of a simple thought. The subcon-
scious basis of instantaneous becomes lost. That is
the mental feeling even when you are dealing with a
unity instead of a complex. The thought loses its
apparent homogeneity ; it drags its slow length along.
Instead of appearing as one thought, as it is in your
mind apart from the terms used to describe it,
it appears, like the words, multiple. Need it be
said that such a verbal necessity leads to weakness, to

16 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

want of grasp, to a loose vaccuous extension, of mental
effort fatal to discovery or progress.

We can show in another way the gain to mental
science of the use of significant forms. Every concept
and notion, while simple from one point of view, is in
reality a veiled complex. Its multiplicity is not lost,
only merged in unity. Now, whatever the conditions
conditioning or accompanying this unification of
thought may be, the element of time is one. The
particulars of the concept are a matter of separate
gathering. As you collect in your mind all the
individual data, the end of the process dawns upon
you, and the particulars begin to close up and coalesce.
At first you have to cast your mind's eye over all the
particulars to grasp the perfect concept. But with
practice you cease to do this consciously. What before
was many operations becomes one. In perfect mastery
of a concept all sense and all reality of time is lost, the
thought in all its fulness is present to the mind
instantaneously. It is like a point in space without
dimensions. But you could not say that the concept
was only a point in time during the period of its
acquisition, until by practice the rapidity of the mental
operation becomes such that all measure of time is
lost. At first it was an operation, now it has become
an intuition. It is the instantaneous flashing of the
many into the one. Now, it does not matter for our
purpose whether this element of time is the constitu-
tive factor of the concept, or an accompanying factor, a
necessary condition. In either case the facility and
completeness with which a concept can be presented to

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 17

the eye in all its fulness in characters expressive of
qualitative as well as quantitative relations is one of the
utmost value to quick, and therefore to clear and
correct thinking. Indeed, if our view as to this
condition of time is correct, then all progress in
thought contains a corresponding modification of the
time element, rapidity reaching to the point of
instantaneousness or annihilation, and being the
necessary step in advancing from particularity to the
concept, and from the concept to the notion. Con-
versely, diremption, discretion, passes immediately
from a time moment to a time movement syn-
chronously in descending from the one to the many.
Suppose by this or any other arrangement the rapidity
of apprehension was quickened, suppose that in one
given fraction of a second you could apprehend more,
suppose that the thought we now consider a point of
time is in reality a measurable time process and we
shortened this process by ever so little, what might
not be the result ? Say that the thought moment is
now measurable by the -0,000,100 part of a second,
and you could quicken the thought process by ever so
little, say, to -0,000,050 part of a second, what might
that not embrace. The wave length of the colour red
is -0,000,430, and the wave length of orange -0,000,425.
Yet that infinitesimal difference conveys to the mind
the differences in colour we recognise as red and orange.
The most trifling difference, then, in facilities of appre-
hension, in assisting the mind to that instantaneous-
ness of synthesis we call concept or notion, might
have the most radical results. If we were dealing

B

18 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

with material science we would have no hesitation in
saying that it would enable us to discover and appre-
hend a new cycle of abstract principles, a still further
encroachment upon infinity. Is it unreasonable to
express a similar hope in moral science, that our
so-called elements of thought under our present
thought time-rate have a large discoverable area lying
behind them which might be brought into conscious-
ness under more effective conditions of thinking. We
want deeper and closer thinking, and that is a matter
of condensation and rapidity. All thought has a
material instrumentation, and this instrumentation is
an essential and invariable concomitant of all thought.
The efficiency of this instrumentation of thought we
know, as a fact, is increased by all those contrivances
which assist the eye and ear in gathering or conveying
meaning.

If we might state another point in favour of signifi-
cant forms, it is their total detachment from derivative
and other associations. Terms in philosophy are
invariably chosen from their derivative or associative
meaning. They seldom express the meaning with the
required narrowness ; there is always more in them
than the philosopher means and wants. They have
always an unexhausted quantity of association. Even
where a word is taken by a particular writer, and
expressly used by that writer in other than the
ordinary sense, there is ever the tendency of the mind
to take in ever so little of its customary meaning.
The customary meaning is impressed on the memory
every hour of the day and at every turn. Now, sig-

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

19

nificant forms are absolutely impersonal, absolutely
unassociative. They convey not a particle of meaning
per se. The only meaning they convey is what is
consciously and purposely put into them, that and
nothing more.

Turn to any work on logic, and there review a cata-
logue of the judgments and categories. Say we take
the four judgments and twelve categories of Kant. At
the most superficial look at them does it not strike you
that verbal terms are cumbrous and unsuited for com-
plex phraseology ? In the mere statement of them
1 89 letters are used. To express their simplest correla-
tions cumbrous phrases and unpractical paragraphs are
required, involving a most extensive and unnecessary
expenditure of alphabetical powers. Contrast the
brevity and paucity of the signs denoting the elements
of chemistry with the complexity of verbal terms used
to express the elements of mental science. We present
them in the following table : —

Quantity.

Quality.

Relation.

Modality.

1. Unity.

Reality.

Substance and

Possibility and

Accident.

Impossibility.

2. Plurality.

Negation.

Causality and

Existence and

Dependence.

Non-existence.

3. Totality.

Limitation.

Reciprocity.

Necessity and

Contingency.

Instead of the present verbal mode we suggest the
substitution of significant forms always to be used in
the same specific sense. We are not prepared to say
that our proposed signs are the best that can be in-

20 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

vented, but they are sufficient to indicate our meaning,
and we await suggestions.

Q. L. R. M.

1. Q. A. L. S. R. and A. R. 1M. and 2M.

2. Q. B. L. C. R. and D. R. 3M. and 4M.

3. Q. C. L. R. R. 5M. and GM.

An abbreviation of these characters at first will only
lead to facility in writing and a greater concentration
of thought. The present terms are too long and ex-
planatory for continuous use, and they continue to be
used by experts in all their cumbrousness, who have no
need of such assistance, and to whom they are incon-
venient and a barrier to further and equally necessary
thought combinations. We want a synthesis of a
number of primary thoughts at present expressed
under several terms, to be thought of as the synthesis
of a single term is, and that synthesis expressed under
one convenient and significant sign. A better illustra-
tion of our idea would be found in Hegel. Take his
categories of the subjective and objective notion.
They are so well thought out that they may be taken
as independent schemas. Now in these two schemas
the order, the co-existence, and the relations of every
one of the categories could and should be expressed in
a brief formula of letters and numbers expressing all
that Hegel postulates of them. Where no natural
connection or order runs through them, we would have
the numerical order of their definition expressed in
the significant form. Observe we make a distinction
between the verbal terms necessary to pe^fulfea know-
ledge of a concept at the beginning, and the sign made

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 21

briefly to represent the same thought when used by
experts in future reading, investigation, and discussion.
In the latter case comprehensive and expressive
brevity is of the utmost value.

It may be said we have this abbreviated formulae, we
have now and constantly use alphabetical letters and
algebraic forms in our logical and metaphysical writing.
We reply that an alphabetical letter is a sign but not a
significant sign. Nor yet an exclusive sign — that is, it
is not applied exclusively to one content. If verbal
terminology errs in length and inexactitude, the for-
mulae a, by c and x, y, z are empty, non-significant.
The letters and numbers composing the formulary we
have before our mind must express fully and always a
specific informatory content. In every science as much
progress is made through improved instrumentation as
by original investigation ; indeed, the very first step in
progress in art and science is to improve the instru-
mentation. It is no less so in thinking and writing.
We must all be conscious of the additions to intellectual
results which follow upon common- sense practical
arrangements.

CHAPTER III

WE have spoken of the superior position of the material
sciences compared with the moral. If you asked " the
man in the street " which division of science had made
most progress and was most surely founded, he would
never hesitate a moment in replying that the material
sciences had made most progress and were most certain.
This representative general opinion needs some ex-
amination.

This opinion cannot mean that by progress is meant
body of thought, originality of speculation, or persistent
activity in the discussion of problems in moral science.
When were the speculations in philosophy bolder, the
analyses in metaphysics keener, the insight into moral
problems deeper, or the practical efforts at the realisa-
tion of these problems so numerous, so generous, or
involving so much voluntary agency and private effort.
Take the philosophies, the speculations of Kant, Hegel,
Fichte, Comte, Herbert Spencer, and Hartman, and
view them purely as efforts of mind, are not their grasp
of the problems involved, their statement of them and
their solutions of them immeasurably before anything
ever attempted in the world's previous history ? The
logic and metaphysics of Hegel are as superior to the
logic and metaphysics of Aristotle as the physics of

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 23

Lord Kelvin are superior to the physics of Archimedes.
Or take morals pure and simple ; take the speeches of
Wilberforce and Bright, the pulpit oratory of our day,
and say is there any comparison, in their tone — nay,
is there any connection, with the moral sense of the
distant past ? Or take, again, general literature, —
are we not conscious of the fulness, the body of
thought, contained in our best literature now, com-
pared with the thinness and the trivialities of
ancient history. Turn up the leading articles in the
newspapers of even fifty, sixty, eighty, or a hundred
years ago, and the reader is struck with the poverty of
the thought, the thinness, the artificiality of the articles
compared with the freshness, the fulness, and the
touch with actuality of the best newspaper writing of
our own day. Neither can it be in the record of our
accumulated experience in morals. For one book pub-
lished in material science there is certainly a hundred
given to the world on matters pertaining more or less
directly to moral science. In whatever sense, then, it
is said that material science is more progressive than
moral science, it cannot be in the sense of accumulated,
successful, and original effort.

Still, when you compare the results of the two great
divisions of human thought, it is impossible to deny
that their progress is not of the same kind ; and it is
this difference which to the popular mind conveys the
idea of greater progress. To begin with, the observa-
tions and generalisations of material science meet with
general, we may say universal, acceptance. Their
results can be tested by convenient experiments.

24 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

Their forecasts are fulfilled with singular accuracy and
precision. Their knowledge can be conveniently stated
without ambiguity. If there are any gaps in their
knowledge, the fact of their weakness, their limits, and
effects are precisely known. Further, the moment a
new discovery is made, it is at once diagnosed and rele-
gated to its proper place in the science schema, and all
its correlations at once established. There is no loose
knowledge or shadowy knowledge in the realm of
material science.

Now turn to the moral sciences. The philosopher
having thoughts of a perfect synthesis is confronted
with an immense mass of disorganised materials wait-
ing for adjustment, so great, indeed, as to paralyse his
initiative. Then the extreme complexity, the intricacy
of their correlations, their constant variation, present
additional difficulties in dealing with those phenomena.
The degradation or decay of races, movements, and
opinions, has no counterpart in material science. The
element of human will, of determinate conduct, not
only in a right but in a wrong direction, is a constant
factor in moral problems. Besides, human conduct is
determined not only by the past and the present, but
by anticipation of the future. There is no conscious,
well-directed experimental tests. There are not only
immense gaps in moral science, but very few even of
their first principles have received the consensus of the
average of enlightened minds, e.g., the Roman Church
still teaches the metaphysic of the scholastic philosophy.
There is nowhere consensus ; everywhere doubt, dis-
pute, unrest. The new facts or observations are more

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 25

difficult to individualise and synthesise. There is every-
where a sense of incompletion, a waiting for new light.
These are formidable differences in any comparison
between material and moral science, but they are not
all. Very large sections of opinion have arrived at the
conclusion that moral phenomena, the phenomena of
sociology, economics, and ethics, cannot be scientifi-
cally treated, or, at all events, scientifically treated in
the same sense as we apply these terms to material
science. Still a larger number are of opinion that it
is wrong, irreverent, and sinful to apply the rigorous
methods of the exact sciences to the phenomena of
religion and morals.

It is right to notice here that if spiritualists say it is
sinful as well as impossible to apply vigorous scientific
methods to spiritual phenomena, the other school are
equally decided in asserting that the only possible hope
of order in the spiritual chaos is to attack the problem
from the material side. They would extend the
method of strict science into the moral and spiritual
world, and such phenomena as could not be brought
logically under their criteria of truth they would place
in a hypothetical category, or they would ignore, or
they would deny that such came within the circle of
truth. These argue that to start from material science
through biology to supra-organic phenomena is the
order of development pursued by nature. They say
that every stage of thought progress is the encroach-
ment of the material upon the spiritual, and looking at
the broad history of this movement in the past, the
ultimate sinking of the unsystematised spiritual into

26 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

the harmonious scheme of the exact sciences is only
a question of time. They say that there can be no
gap in truth ; that there is an unbroken continuity in
phenomena ; that the universe is a unity, not a duality.
We are not jealous of this claim, nor fear this effort.
Whatever it does, it will either join in a coherent whole
the spiritual and material, or it will show the precise
line of demarcation between the two.

This point of union of the two great divisions of
thought is very close ; this interdependence of mind
and matter is very real. Let us give a practical illus-
tration. Not that there is any dispute as to the fact
of this interdependence, but to bring home afresh the
closeness of the two classes of phenomena. There is a
small gland situated near the base of the neck called
the thyroid gland. It is so small that its functions
were unsuspected and uninvestigated until a few years
ago. Certainly no anatomist considered its functions
of any importance, or that its condition had any rela-
tion to mental states. It came to be noticed, however,
that certain forms of mental disease were coincident
with an impaired or an atrophied condition of this
gland. In those cases the individuals became stout or
gross in body, morose in temper, their memory became
impaired, and they were subject to extravagant delu-
sions. There can be no doubt about these facts.
They have been observed in hundreds of instances.
The proof of the true interdependence of the pheno-
mena is furnished by the cure. It occurred to a physi-
cian that an extract or preparation of this gland, which
is largely developed in some of our lower animals,

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 27

might act as a cure or palliative. The effects were
wonderful. Persons stout, morose, forgetful, and
delusional, after a few months' treatment with this
preparation, became clothed with all the lost decencies
of civilisation and in their right mind. An impaired
physical organ affected body, emotion, moral senti-
ment, and intellect. Seeing thus how close the inter-
dependence of mind and matter is, people with eyes
turned towards the light and with thoughts of syn-
thesis would be foolish to other than welcome the
assaults of science on the remainant moral chaos from
the material side.

It may be said that is an abnormal experience, the
record of physical disease and disaster. Well, be it so.
We will give another dealing with the normal, and
with an important bearing upon the latter part of this
essay.

Music approaches nearest to thought itself in its
freedom from physical limitations and in its creative
and idealistic powers. It has been described as the
highest form of poeitry. That is nonsense. But our
highest poetry set in our finest music is as near the
celestial as anything on this side the grave can be.
Still, music without poetry is a wonderful power. To
some it suggests thought, in others it stirs emotion.
Music arouses awe and devotion. Who has not felt
the thrill run through him, of a cathedral full of wor-
shippers, at the rolling sound of the organ ? • The
identity of the emotion stirred in the mass thrills
even the unsympathetic. The music rpreivftfi an in-
voluntary consensus of devotional or religious emotion.

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

Yet not a word is heard or understood of the hymn or
chant. It is called forth entirely by the music. We
have seen a musician draw tears of pity from a foreign
audience, few of whom knew the words and meaning
of his plaint. Indeed, it was noticeable that those only
who did not know the language were affected to tears.
Music stirs the steps of the dancer and erects the bear-
ing of the soldier. In battle, what breathes such
courage into the soldier's heart as the wild wail of the
bagpipe, or the roll and rattle of the drum ? An
oratorio is a real soul tragedy. Yet, at the same time,
this powerful spiritual form is only ordered vibratory
motion, which can be classed, measured, and num-
bered with the greatest accuracy. We are not con-
fusing the mechanical effort with the psychological
effect. We are only affirming that various mental
states — mental states recognised as belonging to our
highest being — are affected, are stirred to activity or
jarred to painful discord by mechanical force capable
of exact scientific determination. This is really im-
portant. To a large section of humanity emotion and
feeling are more important than intellectuality. Cer-
tainly a large section, indeed the largest section of
humanity, are influenced by motives of an emotional
kind, and constantly live in an emotional atmosphere.
Now that an emotional condition can be reached and
moved by a form of mechanical force extraneous to the
individual, and that form of force can be precisely
measured and estimated, seems to approach the founda-
tions whereon a scientific correlation between thought
and forms of force may be accurately laid. The art

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 29

which can be reduced to most perfect ordered relations
has greatest influence over the subconscious and static
elements of the mind itself. In aesthetics coming
through the material, we approach nearer the inner
arcana of mind itself than through any other agency,
excepting thought itself. Even in respect to thought
we question if it has equal power over the will and
emotions. We know of persons compelled to yield
their will and emotions under the spell of music who
were amenable to 110 other voluntary or involuntary
influence. We have seen crowds swayed by the
passion of music as powerfully as by the appeals and
denunciations of oratory.

Taking all kinds of music, they may be classed under
three heads : Music produced by concussion, such as
the drum and piano ; music produced by air com-
pression, such as the human voice, the trumpet, and
the flute ; music produced by friction, such as the
violin. Notice the first class starts from utmost power
and dies gradually away. In compressional music there
is gradual ascent to point of power, and a gradual fall
away. In friction there is the creation of sustained
vibration approached from the moment of absolute
stillness or rest. But all are sound waves produced by
vibratory motions in material objects.

These vibratory motions powerfully affect our will
and emotions. As we vary the vibrations we vary the
character of the mental state. By varying the vibra-
tions we mean their strength, their volume, their
variety, their velocity, and their depth. It is impos-
sible to doubt that we have here a true correlatic

30 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

correlation in which one of the elements, and that
element determining the character of the others, can
be reduced to conditions favourable to scientific treat-
ment, of which quantitative relativity is one of the
most important. Given the precise velocity and depth
of these wave sounds and we predicate the mental state
around. This is a general law, and is not weakened by
some apparent exceptions.

It is also noticeable that these sound waves are
generally divisible into those affecting the male and
those affecting the female sex. There is a large
ground common to both. Still the male voice starts
on deeper chords and has not the range and sweetness
in the higher notes the female voice has. In the same
way the female voice, starting from a higher note,
takes a higher range than does that of the male.
Now the lower notes are produced by slower and
deeper vibrations, and the higher notes are produced
by the quicker and shallower vibrations.

It seems also to be a law, or, at all events, a correla-
tion, that the slower and deeper vibrations, or, as we
call them, the coarser vibrations, affect the coarser part
of our nature, and the swifter and shallower vibrations
our higher nature. The coarsest form of music is the
tap of the drum, and in all ages and among all peoples,
the French and the Malays alike, the drum has been
used to stir the courage and incite the valour of the
soldier. The plaintive sound of the violin is, with
the wild sigh of the -ZEolian harp, the finest vibratory
form of music, and we have seen sensitive natures
affected to sadness and tears at their sounds.

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 31

It is very noticeable that the Japanese have made
x the same distinction of male and female as applied to
colour, and that the female colour is the shallower and
swifter rays of light, and the male colour the coarser
and slower vibrations. That seems to point out another
correlation. Is there a similar tacit association as to
external form ?

Particular individuals have a penchant for a particu-
lar note or chord, or are specially affected by a particular
musical note. The writer has his special musical and
spiritual affinity. Particular districts affect a particular
class of music. A person's taste for music develops as
his moral character strengthens and improves. In our
rowdy days we affect " For he's a jolly good fellow."
In our dissipated period we sing "Vanicula, vanicula,"
or " Ta-ra-ra boom-de-aye." When we are fathers of
families we sing hymns and enjoy oratorios. If we live
to develop the aesthetic sense or the philosophic con-
sciousness, we enjoy, or say we enjoy, the mysteries of
Wagner and Beethoven. Particular classes have their
particular musical sympathies; nations also. The
musical type of the British people is specifically dis-
tinct from that of the French, and both of these from
the Italian. The music of Germany, Hungary, and
the Slavonic peoples is distinct in character from all
three.

If music stirs or stimulates our emotions and affects
our will, the character of the music specially affected in
any country, the music that has the greatest hold on the
people of that country, will be representative of the
dominant moral characteristics there. But music on

32 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

its material side is a form of phenomena capable of
the most exact scientific determination. In these
circumstances we seem approaching the realisation
of a mechanical equivalent of moral force, with all
the advantages attending such a scientific mode of
estimation.

We see the reason why music has such a great
educational influence, and that musical people develop
/moral qualities superior to those the circumstances of
their environment and their personal experience are
calculated to call forth. Our music teachers will now
see that according to the character of the music taught,
its tone and sympathies and syntheses, will the
moral emotions of their pupils be. The bizarre
musical jargon, taught to develop or exhibit mere
mechanical skill, not only jars upon our nervous system,
but destroys the continuity of that moral synthesis
nature is ever seeking to build up within us. Sweet-
ness, tone, harmony, continuity in music are the
mechanical correlatives of our. higher moral nature.
It is a proverb among the people that those that can-
not be stirred by music are bad at the bottom. In the
case of men that popular observation is often true, and
in the case of women generally true. Like most of
the people's prejudices born of experience and observa-
tion, there is more philosophy in it than meets the
eye.

While we are on this subject we may make another
observation showing how the discovery of new truth
fits into and fills out the common synthesis. In
Marconi's recent invention of wireless telegraphy, the

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 33

static condition of certain molecular particles are
disturbed by the vibratory motion initiated by sound.
The normal molecular condition of these material
particles is restored by a gentle shake or tap. Thus
there is a regular alternation of disturbed and
recovered molecular form. Music seems to operate
in a similar manner upon the cerebral particles or
cerebral cells. The vibratory motion of the note
strikes and disturbs the static condition of rest in these
particles and cells. There is, then, an effluence or
liberation of mind force, which we recognise as a form
of consciousness. The only essential difference we can
see is that in the case of Marconi's instrument the
after- tap restores the normal molecularity ; while, in
the case of cerebral phenomena, the vibratory con-
cussion disturbs the normal molecularity, which is
recovered through, or in consequence of, the efflu-
ence itself. That is, in the disturbance of cerebral
form the recovery of that form does not require a
further specific act. In vital phenomena the recovery
of the normal organic synthesis is automatic, or a part
of that reparative process always going on in the
synthesis. That would establish a fundamental dis-
tinction between merely material phenomena and the
material functioning mind, or being functioned by
mind.

Viewing, then, these inquiries and others like them,
is it not manifest to every one how useful they are in
our endeavour to reduce to order our universal
experience, or any part of it ? If it is said such
speculations come close up to or encroach upon moral

C

34 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

science and moral questions, we reply, so much the
better. It is synthesis we want. If we cannot get it
from the spiritual side, we must endeavour to get it
from the material side. But scientific order we must
have. If there is much in life we cannot scientise,
and we believe there is, we want the line of division
sharply and clearly drawn. Then we will continue our
synthesis from that line on other grounds and by
other methods.

CHAPTER IV

WE have seen that the differences between the
material and moral sciences are no light differences,
but are really fundamental. It does not follow,
however, that, allowing to the fullest extent for
this difference in their subject matter, the moral
sciences are not capable of a strictly scientific treat-
ment. If there is a line beyond which the methods of
material science cease to apply, we can begin at the
other extreme from the deepest spiritual, and, advancing
through experience, touch or overlap, or come within
view of that asserted or assured borderland, where the
supra-organic, the organic, and the material come
within touch of one another.

As, however, the success of the scientific method in
the exact sciences is admitted, and as we could not
hope for a more assured or better ordered synthesis in
moral science than we have already in material science,
it seems best to examine the methods employed in the
two great divisions of thought, and see what methods
are employed in one division and not employed in
the other ; see what course of procedure is more
successful in the one division than in the other ; and,
finally, see if we cannot apply this more successful

36 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

mode to the more complex phenomena of moral
science.

Viewing the principal differences in method as
applied to the two great divisions of mental activity,
we should say they are —

1. The general use of the a priori and deductive
method in the moral sciences.

2. The comparatively limited use of the inductive
method in moral science, and its almost universal use
in the material sciences.

3. The greater brevity and precision with which
operations and results are recorded in the material
sciences as compared with the moral.

4. The power of applying experimental tests in the
physical sciences, and the almost impossibility of
applying them successfully to moral problems.

5. The more exact demonstration of all relativity
in the physical sciences as compared with the moral,
and the measurement of quantitative relativity in terms
of exact number.

These are the principal points of difference that
strike one on a general survey of the methods pursued
in the two great divisions of investigation. It will be
noticed that none of the modes of research are peculiar
to any one division of thought. All five modes of
procedure are used in both the physical and moral
sciences. The differences are purely those of degree,
but of such degree as to constitute essential difference.

As to the first point, the a priori method, it
essentially belongs to moral science, and is, indeed,
the foundation on which all moral science is built.

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 37

But a double logical process, so far from being a
disadvantage, is a source of strength and additional
power.

As to the second point, the comparatively limited
use of induction in the moral sciences, there is more
to be said. Of course, in sciences having an a priori
foundation, deduction is a necessity. But the tendency
of the mind in these cases is to rest there, to be
content with deductive reasoning. Once started with
a stock of a priori principles as the measure and test of
truth, the inclination is to apply them always and at
all times. They suit the lazy and lethargic mind.
Inquiry does not so much daunt them as disturb
them, suggests the need of fresh inquiry, fresh trouble
and intellectual effort. Now there is a vast field for
induction in the moral sciences, and it is a splendid
exercise to build your thought up as well as to lead it
down. The a priori method is carried far too far
down, and is applied to phenomena to which it is
wholly unsuited, and is often a simple excuse for
evading inquiry as to the soundness of main
assumptions. We think, then, that induction should be
far more generally used in moral science than it is.

The third point we have already dealt with in the
first part of this essay.

The fourth point is experimental verification. We
know of no suggestion we can make. We distrust all
specific social experiments. The conditions are too
complex, the power of eliminating disturbing or
unknown elements too unreliable, to render such
experiments of any scientific value whatever.

38 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

We come now to the fifth and last point, that of the
more effective treatment of relativity. This is the real
crux of the problem. Upon its more scientific treat-
ment we depend for what practically means a revolu-
tion in the treatment of moral problems.

It may seem at first sight that this indictment of our
present methods in the treatment of moral problems
is, at most, an insignificant one — that our mountain in
labour has brought forth a mouse. It is not so. The
mass of relativity in the moral sciences is vastly greater
than the corresponding relativity in the physical
sciences, and infinitely more complex. Recognised
specific differences in moral science are those of degree
rather than of kind. The data of the physical sciences
is very largely made up of matters of direct observation,
the differentiation of specific fact. In moral science, on
the other hand, the phenomena to be systematised are
so subtle, so interwoven, so conditioned by the environ-
ment, so coloured by the investigator's own personality,
that relativity forms the bulk of the thought mass to
be treated. In seeking to reduce such relative know-
ledge to scientific order we are confronted with the
following difficulties —

1. The terminology of quantitative relativity as
applied to moral science is loose and inexact.

2. As there is much of the phenomena pertaining
to human experience unimportant and incapable of
classificatory arrangement, it is difficult to know what
to retain or utilise for classificatory purposes.

3. That qualitative relativity cannot be precisely
quantified.

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 39

4. That the process of comparison of various moral
data is difficult, inadequate, and in the main unsatis-
factory.

5. That for the purposes of comparison, large
aggregations of phenomena are required, and this
aggregation requires some better method of generalisa-
tion, reduction, and expression than we have at
present.

6. That we need a better mode of eliminating the
personal equation, and thus render our units of
synthesis more stable and reliable.

In these six affirmations we have the crux of the
whole problem, the barrier to the reduction of moral
phenomena to scientific order. Remove them, or
palliate them, and we take a step nearer the hope
and goal of a final synthesis of knowledge.

We will take up first the inadequacy of verbal
terminology to express quantitative relations. The
verbal terms of quantity in our language are very
numerous. So far as a general impression or general
estimate is sought to be conveyed, there is an
abundance of forms from which to choose. But strip
these terms of their literary setting, place them
together, compare them, and observe their limited
range, their meagre character ; practically they are
only these — much, more, most ; little, less, least. You
may speak of a little more, or rather less, but the
estimate underlying these modifications is only to be
apprehended by those familiar with the tone and
attitude of mind of the speaker, and with some con-
siderable knowledge of the subject matter. At their

40 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

best we must admit how vague these verbal terms of
comparison are. To no two persons do they convey
the same practical meaning. They are applied to the
most delicate judgments and finest comparisons. Yet
the verbal terms, used as instruments of comparison,
are coarse, obtuse, and unscientific.

Here it is material science has, in its method, secured
the greatest advantage over her more spiritual sister.
By the use of numbers her relativity has been fixed
and expressed with the utmost precision. In figures
you have measures of the utmost capacity and of the
most extreme minuteness. You may state in fifteen
or sixteen figures the distance of a star, or you may
discuss the gap between the wave length red,
0-0,000,430, and the wave length of orange, 0*0,000,425.
The power of expression of magnitude and difference
by figures is practically unlimited. There can be no
doubt, also, that they convey a much more definite and
accurate impression to the mind. To say that the
sun is an immense distance from the earth, though a
matter of open-mouthed wonder, is not specifically, if
at all, informatory ; but to state that it is 95,000,000 of
miles from the earth, or that it is 250,000 times further
away than New York is to Edinburgh, or that to get
to the sun by express train would take over 200 years,
you state what is not only striking, but impressive and
informatory. These concrete instances of precise mea-
sure affect the most scientific as well as the most un-
scientific mind. Constant familiarity with them, and
constant consideration of data of exact distance, tends
to their realisation by the mind in a sense as vivid and

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 41

true as that of the surroundings and appurtenances
among which the scientist labours. His conception of
solar and astral distances is as true, and practically
grasped, as that of distance in Great Britain is grasped
by a railway guard on a main line express.

Our difficulty then is, that for the coarser, or rela-
tively coarser, phenomena of material science we have
the most perfect instrument for the statement of pre-
cise relativity ; while for the far greater, more impor-
tant, and more delicate and subtle relativity of moral
science, our vehicle of expression is vague, excessively
limited, and quite obtuse. It will be conceded, that
if we could apply the conciseness and precision of
numbers to the relativity of all moral science, that
science would have made an immense step in advance.
If that should be impossible, to bring any section or
any considerable section of moral science to this
proximately or preliminarily scientific condition would
still be an immense service.

The second difficulty we have to meet arises
from the fact that much of the phenomena pertaining
to human experience is unimportant and not worth
classification. For instance, the fact that the inhabi-
tants of a country take their noon-day meal at twelve
or one o'clock we cannot conceive to be of the slightest
importance, but that the inhabitants of a country
dined invariably on a vegetable or 011 an animal
dietary would be of importance. Further, that com-
paring the morality of one religious communion with
another, that one habitually fasted one day in the
week, or abstained from flesh meats one day of the

42 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

week, might be very important. Still, the reader will
perceive that a vast mass of phenomena are not worth
classifying, because among other reasons the variety of
conduct among individuals corrects variation, departure
from custom on one side being made up by departure
from the general custom on the other. We take it
that a very good rule is that all the statistics you can
induce the Government to collect, and all the statistics
public societies voluntarily collect, are worth the trouble
of careful examination. We think there is not the
slightest danger for many years to come of an over-
gathering of materials. Our complaint would rather
take the form of not sufficient use being made of the
materials already to hand. No one without experience
has any conception of how fertile with obscure truth
the most unpromising statistics are, and how pheno-
mena the most disparate can be brought within the
reign of law. For instance, suicide seems about as
independent an act as any person could commit. So
many causes can operate to produce the condition of
mind leading to the act, that beyond the age and
sex of the individual statistics would seem to have
nothing to reveal. We find, however, that the largest
number of suicides take place in June, and the fewest
in December. That clearly points to heat, and the
relaxation of the will consequent upon it, as the main
cause of suicide. We know the bracing effect of the
cold bath. Winter's cold is bracing. As the weather
cools there is less waste, and the system begins to
build up tissue and power for the winter. Conversely,
with the coming of summer there is a growing waste

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 43

of tissue, and under growing temperatures a weakening
of will leading to a greater proportion of suicides.
For a full appreciation of the usefulness of statistics,
we commend our readers to Mayo Smith's work,
" Statistics and Sociology," where he will find an abun-
dance of curious information.

CHAPTER V

THE last four difficulties in formulation we propose to
meet, in the first instance, by taking concrete instances
and working out the problem on a better method,
which, we believe, we have established. After giving
our illustration, showing the practical working of the
new method, we will summarise the results, and ask
our readers if we have made good our points and
secured a real accession of power in dealing with
moral phenomena.

Suppose in moral science we approach the scientific
determination of the term " morality." It is an abstract
term that embraces a large content. We would, first
of all, simply enumerate all the states of mind or con-
stituent elements included under it. If you ask a
moralist how many factors are included under the term
" morality," he would probably say he could not tell, it
was a matter of dispute. Yet if you asked a naturalist
how many species were contained in a particular class,
he would be ashamed if he could not answer. There-
fore to state with numerical precision the number of
distinctive qualities recognised as belonging to morality
seems a necessary preliminary. We want a consensus
on the constituent elements to begin with. Suppose,

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 45

to open our illustration, we assume a consensus of
eighteen elements, we would enumerate them thus in
alphabetical order : —

Affection.

Friendship.

Prudence.

Benevolence.

Honesty.

Reverence.

Courage.

Industry.

Rightfulness.

Duty.

Love of approval.

Self-restraint.

Firmness.

Patriotism.

Self-respect.

Fidelity.

Patience.

Veracity.

Discussion would open as to the exhaustiveness of
the enumeration. Some might suggest that hope was
a true element in morality. We may admit it is, and
thus bring up our analysis to nineteen elements.
Another critic might say you have double stated some
of these qualities — fidelity and duty are one and the
same. So, also, are patience and firmness. Again,
rightfulness, veracity, honesty, are just different phases
of the same moral quality. If you admit a distinction
between rightfulness and honesty, why have you
omitted justice ?

Of course our reply would be, that duty is a social
moral relation, fidelity a personal one. We would say
that firmness is persistence in action, while patience was
persistence in bearing or submitting to the inevitable
or the unjust, long-suffering. As to rightfulness, we
would say, the sense of right as to our word to our
neighbour and to the property of our neighbour were
two forms of one identical moral element, but that
justice, having not only a social but a state element in
it, rightfulness adjusted to consideration of the highest

46 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

national interest, may be considered as an independent
constituent of morality.

We are aware that under a closer analysis we might,
we may say would, reduce these nineteen elements to
a very few root principles. We view them, however,
from the point of view of practical life, and in our
everyday experience these different phases of morals
are specifically and recognisably distinct. Just as you
can reduce genera to species, species to orders, and
orders to divisions in organic life, you can abstract in
morals until you have only one or two principles left.
But as the higher abstractions in natural history do not
destroy special differences and the usefulness of special
differentiation, so in morals the constituent elements
we have tabulated are clearly marked in action and
recognised in the converse and literature of the day.
In point of fact, while people have a clear understanding
of what is meant by such terms as veracity, honesty,
justice, a generalisation of these terms to a single term,
rightfulness, would not add to, but only obscure the
light. Anyway, the subject has as a preliminary to be
thrashed out.

Assuming, then, the number of elements of morality
to be nineteen, are they all of equal value ? This is
an important point. A large school of psychologists
claim that all moral elements are not only essential but
of equal intrinsic importance. The other school hold
that though all the elements of morality are equally
essential, they are not equally important. Just as the
thyroid gland is as essential to the human body as the
liver, yet no one would say it was as important. As-

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 47

suming, for a moment, that these constituent elements
are of equal importance, then it follows, all these
recognised constituent elements will form one-nine-
teenth part of morality as a social force, will have con-
stituted one-nineteenth part to the creation of that
civilisation of which morality is the foundation. But
suppose these constitutent elements are not of the
same value, suppose some are more important than
others, how are we to measure them ? How are we
to deal with cases where individuals, speaking or think-
ing of morality, treat it as a complex, not a unit ?

The constituent elements of morality are not iden-
tical in value, and the next thing we have to do in its
scientific treatment is to measure or apportion the
relative value of all these elements. We will endea-
vour to form a precise numerical estimate, assuming the
value of morality as m. 1000. Repeating our amended
table of contents, we give our provisional estimate thus :
Morality

m. 1000

•052 Affection.

•052 Friendship.

•040 Patience.

•046 Benevolence.

•052 Honesty.

•052 Prudence.

•068 Courage.

•040 Hope.

040 Reverence.

•068 Duty.

•064 Industry.

•052 Self-restraint.

•052 Firmness.

•064 Justice.

•052 Self-respect.

•046 Fidelity.

•040 Love of approval.

•052 Veracity.

•068 Patriotism.
•332 -380 -288 = m. 1000.

Thus we tabulate and value in specific number the
contents of the term "morality." We claim to have
reduced that term to scientific form. We have

48 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

quantified a judgment of quality in specific number,
have given to all the elements in the content a specific
proportional relation to each other and to the ab-
stract term " morality " which includes them.

Even at a first glance, the superiority of the pro-
posed mode of treatment strikes one. There is a ful-
ness, accuracy, and exhaustiveness in the method that
was not there before under the old form of analysis.
To affirm that duty is an important element in morality
is little, if at all, informatory. To state that the element
of duty in morality is as '068 is informatory. The
statement further indicates that there remained ele-
ments of value, other than duty, to the extent of '932.
You can compare any two elements of the term one
with another. Instead of the vague generality of verbal
terms you have the precision of numbers. The new
mode lends itself to the most subtle and accurate
analysis. As an instrument it is a lancet compared
with a sword. If two writers are engaged in a contro-
versy in which any elements of morality are concerned,
say the influence of courage or duty in a field of moral
activity, it is open to one to say, I hold courage or duty
at this common estimate of -068. It is also open to
the other to say, that in discussing this matter it should
be known that he uses courage as of the importance of
•074, and duty as of the importance of '062. Such
a qualification or reservation would undoubtedly make
the writer's position much clearer than if he said that
in the present controversy he held courage in higher
esteem, and duty in lower esteem, than the common
opinion estimated them at. Certainly there are many

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 49

movements in which only a section of moral elements
are engaged. If morality was one homogeneous force,
all moral movements would be of one value and one
character. But in a moral movement involving only a
part or side of morality, to know and estimate the
value of what is not engaged, of what is not then opera-
tive, would certainly tend to accuracy of judgment
upon the event.

It may be said, the more precise expression of rela-
tions, of differences, adds nothing to our knowledge that
we did not possess before. We answer, that when the
number, length, and depth of the vibrations constitut-
ing what we call light were first ascertained, it was
proclaimed as a great triumph of knowledge over
ignorance hiding under a vague terminology. Is in-
creased exactness less a triumph when applied to
morals ? At the time of the better expiscation of the
phenomena of light, the new discovery was regarded
as a scientific curiosity. Who could foresee it would
ultimately be of any service to humanity ? So we may
say to those who object to greater precision in method
applied to morals, no one knows what the ultimate
consequences will be.

It may be said, you by this method put fetters upon
thought, destroy that plasticity which enters into all
the terms used in moral science, which resembles the
plasticity and adaptability, the characteristic of all
organic form. We say we want all moral phenomena
subjected to rigidly scientific treatment, and to that
end precision of estimate is essential.

It will be said, you will never secure a consensus to

D

50 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

your figures, it is practically impossible; the estimate
of a clergyman, a citizen, a scientist, a lawyer, or a
soldier will all be at radical variance. We answer,
it is just through this difference of opinion, of even
informed opinion, and variety of experience, we hope
to attain to impersonal precision. We will average
these various estimates. It is through the number
and variety of opinions taken that we propose to
eliminate the personal equation and obtain a stable
abstraction. We seek a wide consensus.

CHAPTER VI

WE have found this new aid to method useful in
analysis, enumeration, in comparison, and in the valua-
tion of the constituent composite elements of a term.
These useful data could have been attained no other way.
Further, we have reduced qualitative contents to quanti-
tative equivalents. We are, however, still face to face
with the most difficult problem. So much of moral
phenomena are fleeting, variant, and apparently un-
related, that for any possible schema or any tentative
efforts toward a complete schema, we have this heter-
osity not only to particularise but reduce to manageable
proportions. We must have abstractions not only
of the simplest phenomena, but also of phenomena of
the widest and most varied character, embracing
thousands of particulars and judgments, if we are to
have units representative of movements, peoples, or
eras, points of unification on the one side, and stepping-
stones to higher synthesis on the other. We want to
reduce to order current facts and social forces, not on
an individual or parochial, but on a national scale, to
render our mental picture of the national life an accu-
rate chart understandable by all. We want a brief
recognisable sign of a great complex.

We will turn our attention first to economics, to see

52 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

what light their treatment can throw on the method of
dealing with similar problems in moral science.
Economics are classed among the moral sciences.
They are so classed because, among other reasons,
economic phenomena contain a psychic element. The
psychic element is the determinative element. For
though economics means the science of human material
well-being— the standard of need, the goal of satisfac-
tion, are all determined by psychological conditions.
Wants, desires, aims, all precede their satisfaction. A
consideration of the particular facts of economics is a
study of the materials and processes by which human
ingenuity has gratified them. The wants and inven-
tions of humanity are stereotyped in the material
objects it has created. If man's organism is nature's
realisation in matter of her own inner idea, civilisation
and the conditions and circumstances attending it are
man's realisation of the same idea as it appears to him.
How vast the material of interpretation is. All that
he has reclaimed from the wild, all that he has built,
his means of transport, his manufactures and commerce,
all his art and science. If we wish to study man as he
spontaneously manifests himself, we have the elements
in economic science.

In economics the same difficulty experienced in all
moral science of formulating an immense mass of
heterogeneous and variant particulars was strongly
felt. At the same time the need of abstractions on
the widest national scale was no less a constant and
pressing problem. In the case of commodities, for
example, they had, in the first place, to recognise that

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 53

there were tens of thousands of them, that the prices
of these commodities varied among themselves, and that
prices varied from year to year. Over and above this
difficulty of particulars there were known to be causes
affecting the value of all commodities together — causes
affecting the supply and demand of the nation as a
corporate whole. Now, though it was not a matter of
general concern to discover the causes of particular
changes in value — that might safely be left to the
private buyer and seller — it was of the utmost national
importance to discover and foresee the operation of
those wider influences which affected the prices of all
commodities together.

A solution of this difficulty was found in the dis-
covery of what is called the index number. The
problem it solved was to fix in stable form, for purposes
of comparison, the average of prices in any one year or
for any period. To reach this standard of value they
selected a hundred representative commodities. These
were chosen as varied as possible, to fairly represent
the national want supply. The prices demanded for
these articles in the nation's markets were taken from
official or well-authenticated sources. The average
prices for each commodity for a twelvemonth were
taken. These averages were then added together and
divided by a hundred. The product was the index
number. It was the recognised sign of an abstraction
of millions of particular transactions. Having thus
secured the index number of one year, the index
number of the same commodities was made out for
the year ten years preceding. The results were com-

54 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

pared. The difference between the respective index
numbers was a certain indication of any change in
general prices, and whether that change was in the
nature of a rise or a fall. These index numbers were
made up in decennial periods till the beginning of the
century. The comparisons thus made were perfectly
trustworthy, as the disturbance following upon indi-
vidual or particular variation was overcome by the
extended area which the articles enumerated covered.
Each decennial index number was then compared with
the history and movements of the time. Thus much
light was thrown upon those wider causes which affected
the wants, the purchasing power, the supplies and the
tastes of the general body of the people.

Could there be anything at first sight so natural and
simple and so apparently unimportant. Yet it is very
important that a large class of variant phenomena is
thus fixed, that a large flux of heterogeneous particulars
has been rescued to scientific examination and treat-
ment ; that we have created a useful unit of thought,
before non-existent. Observe that though it is in the
form of numbers, it is an abstraction from particulars,
and as such as true and new a contribution to know-
ledge as any abstraction in the exact sciences. It is
an abstraction in a moral science obtained and only
obtainable through the use of numbers, and can only
be expressed in exact or effective numbers. In so far
as it bears this numerical character it is an innovation.
It is an innovation so far as it substitutes the plasticity
and precision of numbers for the vague generality of
verbal terms. And it is an innovation because it in-

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 55

troduces into moral science an instrument of synthesis
hitherto exclusively confined to the exact sciences.
Further, the phenomena abstracted contain a large
psychic element, and in so far as they can be shown
to be in correlation to the particulars of the abstrac-
tion, in so far do they share in definite scientific
treatment.

Why should such an intrinsically useful and promis-
ing process stop there ? It is true that the phenomena
abstracted and quantified are, in the first instance,
prices, and therefore particulars of number. But we
have seen in the case of the abstract term " morality "
that we have successfully applied a process of quanti-
fication. Is it not possible to apply the idea of the
index number to complex phenomena, embracing not
only judgments of quantity, but also judgments of
quality, relation, and modality ? There is nothing like
experiment or practical illustration. Suppose we state
another case in illustration of the potentialities of the
new method, fixing, through number, fleeting and
variant thought. A banker is much troubled in mind
and judgment by the frequent changes in the circum-
stances determining the price of gold. He tries, as his
forefathers have done, to rely upon his memory and
judgment. He finds his mind has continually to think
his subject out from the beginning. He has not the
means of recording his accumulated experience. He
could not transfer the accuracy of his judgment to
others, or leave the grounds of it as a legacy to those
that come after him. He knows his son or successor
has just to go through the same anxious and

56 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

expensively bought experience that he has done.
Above all, he cannot discuss with another banking
expert the grounds of his judgment, because a common
platform of determined knowledge is not with them.
He resolves to try an index number on the conditions
affecting the price of gold. Being an old university
man, he has been deterred from the experiment,
because he had always been taught that exact quanti-
fication— quantification reduced to precise number — was
only possible to judgments of quantity. He begins by
putting down all the present sources of the world's
production, — the general cost of mining, the world's
consumption or waste, the opening of new fields, the
exhaustion of the old. He would state, as near as he
could, the world's hoarding, temporary or permanent,
the competition of silver, the growing use of paper, and
the extension of credit as affecting the use of gold, its
utilisation in art or use in fashion. There are many
other considerations, but these will suffice. We are
not asking our banker to undertake a new task. It
is done every day by thousands, we believe tens of
thousands, all over the world. But they do it ab initio,
and by rule of thumb every day. Their task is never-
ending, because they have no stable method for
accumulating and correcting their experience. Having
exhausted the enumeration of the constituent elements
of the problem, our banker would estimate every
contingency in precise numbers corresponding to the
relative importance of that contingency in relation to
the whole problem. That would remain to him always
as the alphabet of his scheme. He could correct or

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 57

compare his estimations of value with others. Once
fixed or formulated, he would modify it according to
the changes which affected any of the contingencies.
His first effort would probably be expressed in round
numbers, or relatively round numbers. But as time
went on, his approximations would become more
precise, and more precise expressions would require to
be used. Every week he would revise his estimates.
Year by year the accuracy of his scheme and its
corresponding value would increase, because the
smallest differences and variations, not expressible in
verbal terms, could be expressed in numbers, and
because in numbers there is that invariable consensus
of expressed variation which brings mind in touch with
mind. In a few years such a scheme would be
practically useful ; in a generation it would be a nearly
perfect instrument for estimating current fluctuations
and changes. Yet the subject matter is as complex
and variable and difficult to follow and fix as that of
any problem in morals per se.

Economics offer a wide field for the exercise of this
form of effort. We see no great difficulty in forming
an index number on the standard of comfort of the
people. The materials are there to hand. It is
more difficult, but equally feasible, to form such a
standard for each country in the world, and for each
century of the world's history. Similarly, an index num-
ber on the nation's thrift would be equally useful. But
we would make no limitations. Whenever such a stable
thought unit could be formed we would make the
effort. Even where success did not immediately

58 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

present itself, it is still worth a trial. It is at the
least gathering materials for others to use. Who can
tell in what distantly removed field of investigation
their value will come in ? For instance, from the
statistics forming the index number of material com-
fort, we would seek to form a scientific estimate of
the relative happiness of a people, now and formerly.
And from the statistics of thrift we would seek to
scientifically determine the amount of voluntary
privation or self-denial exerted, matters belonging to
morals per se, and which have not hitherto been
examined under scientific methods.

Take another instance of possible usefulness, this
time from sociology. The trusted whip of the party
wants a sure measure of the public influence of his
party in the country. He wants to be able to tell his
chief at any moment how the party stands relatively to
its position at the last general election. At present
such estimates are occasionally successfully formed by
the leaders in full touch with the organisation of the
party in the country. For instance, the late Mr Adam,
when Liberal whip, announced to Mr Gladstone some
time before the general election the precise, or very
nearly precise, measure of his triumph. The present Sir
John Gorst, when organiser for the Conservative party,
achieved a parallel success. But what is done casually,
or by party managers of exceptional ability, we want
to be done always, and by men of ordinary talent. Let
that party whip form an index number on the strength
of his party in the country. Let him begin with an
index number formed for each constituency. His local

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 59

manager would take the number of the voters at last
election, the attitude of the local press, the number of
men of local interest attached to his party, local
questions of such interest as to affect national con-
siderations, the finances of the party, etc. All these
local managers would estimate the same contingencies
in every constituency. When these local returns came
up they would be easily compared with one another
and corrected. Then to these as a basis would be
added general considerations. The party programme :
Has it been curtailed by practical legislation ? New
questions, new parties, new men, and new agencies, press
or otherwise, must be duly and precisely estimated. The
present members of the House : Do they stand where
they did in the opinion of the country and their own
districts ? The party leaders : Are their powers the
same ? Are they still living forces, or extinct political vol-
canoes ? Is their popularity on the wane ? All these, and
a hundred other points besides, are the materials which
must be gathered, estimated, formulated, and upon the
results your index number formed, which would remain
as the unit and standard of comparison year by year.
Every passing event that affected the party locally or
nationally would call for a readjustment of the index
number. In a few years that instrument of measure-
ment would have acquired practical accuracy. It is
evident such a scheme would become a party posses-
sion and inheritance. It would pass from whip to
whip and from committee to committee year after
year, and from generation to generation. A general

60 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

election would be the final test of the accuracy of its
adjustment.

How valuable for the chief of the staff attached to
the headquarters of an army to have a method by
which to establish an estimate of his own army as an
effective field or fighting force, and at the same time a
standard of comparison of all his possible opponents. He
would require an instrument not only reliable but of
the utmost precision, elasticity, and delicacy of adjust-
ment. We can see no more effective mode than form-
ing an index number of his own fighting force and
corresponding indices of all other armies or possible
antagonists. The chief of the staff would begin with
the men, their numbers, courage, intelligence and
initiative, endurance, and shooting skill. Then he would
take the officers, and estimate their morale, their skill,
and their interest in their profession. He would esti-
mate to a decimal the armament of his men, the
artillery, and the equipment. He would note any
circumstances that would tie any of them up, such as
unfortunate colonial expansion or disaffection in the
state. All these points and many others he would
enumerate, tabulate, and value. He would express his
estimate in definite figures. There is no room for slip-
shod work or vague guessing in things military. The
very effort to enumerate and to express in precise
numerical terms your estimate of every circumstance
bearing upon the problem gives a thoroughness, a
searchingness, if we coin a term, and at the finish a
definiteness of the utmost value to the specialist.

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 61

Having made a schema of his own army, he would form
one for every other army his own was likely or unlikely
to come in contact with. When that work was done
he would realise the position of his own army and its
relative position to all other armies.

CHAPTER VII

HAVING already analysed the content of morality and
approximately quantified its constituent elements, we
will advance another step, and see if we can form a
chart and estimate of the realisation of this moral ideal
among the people, and upon these considerations form
an index number. We want to form a quantitative
estimate of the moral force of the country. We want
to form that, because it is in the interests of the general
cause of truth to know not only what our ideal is, but
how near we approach, how far we fix it, stereotype
it in our conduct. We want an accurate judgment as
to the British nation viewed as a moral unit, a moral
force. We want it as a standard of comparison with
all other nations of the world, as a trustworthy unit for
all the purposes of moral science. The British people
are favourably circumstanced for such a purpose. No
people has had such intimate and friendly relations
with the rest of the world for such a lengthened period.
No nation has such detachment of mind arising from
contact, criticism, and multitudinous interest with so
many stranger or dependent peoples.

For this purpose we will form a tabular estimate of
the moral condition of the principal classes comprising

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 63

the nation. We shall value their realistic relation to
each of the constituent elements of morality. Bear in
mind this tabular statement is not exhaustive. It is
only tentative, hypothetical, and illustrative. For in-
stance, we have left out the female sex, which, as an
old bachelor, may be supposed to be a matter beyond
our personal knowledge. Though, by the way, we
have known bachelors who had a very deep insight
into the thoughts and mysteries of the female sex.
The classes we propose to submit to analysis and
synthesis are — (1) The ordinary man of society; (2) the
military professions ; (3) the legal profession ; (4-) the
church ; (5) science ; (6) commerce ; (7) financial
classes; (8) industry, divided as — 1-8 mining, 2-8
manufacturing, 3 '8 engineering, 4 '8 building, 5 '8
agriculture, 6*8 carrying trades, 7*8 distributing
classes; (9) the arts; (10) unskilled labour; (ll) the
wastrels; (12) the criminal element. These eighteen
classes we propose to compare together in relation to
morality.

We formed this classificatory list as fairly repre-
sentative of the different social and industrial types
of the country. The Government census classifications
are those of employment and condition only ; they do
not contemplate moral conditions and forces per se.
They are simply arithmetical data, gathered upon no
philosophic plan. We had, therefore, to recast the
Government tables, and form from them the classes
and the numbers of the respective classes we exhibit
on the following page.

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

Morality— m. 1000.

Ordinary Society.

I

Legal Profession.

The Church.

1

Commerce.

Financial Classes.

Individual Average, '52.

Affection . .' . -052

•064

•040

•046

•052

•052

•052

•052

Benevolence . . '046

•064

•040

•046

•052

•046

•052

•052

Courage . . . '068

•052

•068

•052

•052

•052

•052

•052

Duty .... -068

•064

•068

•064

•068

•068

•064

•064

Firmness . . . -052

•046

•068

•052

•046

•046

•046

•046

Fidelity . . . -046

•046

•068

•052

•046

•046

•040

•040

Friendship . . -052

•052

•052

•052

•060

•052

•052

•052

Honesty . . . -052

•052

•052

•052

•060

•060

•052

•052

Hope .... -040

•040

•046

•040

•050

•040

•050

•050

Industry . . . '064

•040

•040

•064

•050

•064

•064

•064

Justice . . . -064

•052

•052

•064

•064

•064

•052

•052

Love of Approval . '040

•052

•052

•046

•046

•046

•040

•040

Patriotism . . . -068

•064

•068

•064

•056

•060

•068

•068

Patience . . . -040

•040

•040

•040

•040

•050

•050

•050

Prudence . . . '052

•046

•040

•052

•046

•052

•060

•060

Reverence . . . -040

•046

•D40

•040

•060

•040

•040

•040

Self-control . . '052

•046

•046

•046

•060

•046

•046

•046

Self-respect . . -052

•052

•060

•052

•060

•052

•046

•046

Veracity . . . -052

•052

•060

•052

•060

•060

•052

•052

Aggregate .

•970

1-000

•976

1-028

•996

•978

•978

Average

•051

•052

•051

•054

•052

•051

•051

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1

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METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

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66 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

We gather, then, from the formalisation of this table,
that (hypothetically) the aggregate realisation or effec-
tive standard of morality is as -^ . The aggregate

1 D'ooU

of the numbers of the classes estimated is 1 5,000,000,
practically the whole male working population of the
country. Multiplying the two products together, we
get the figures in what we may call moral units as
253,290,000,000. These figures, however useful as
a basis of calculation, convey no real impression to the
mind ; they are too large and unwieldy. We have
to reduce them to managable and apprehendable pro-
portions. On what principle will we reduce them ?
Manifestly on the principle of least importance to the
subject in hand. We therefore strike out on the
extreme right all figures from 1000 downwards, three
ciphers. That leaves our numerical equation standing
at 253,290,000. But our main figures, the 253 billions,
are also for our purpose useless, because they repre-
sent the permanent static element of the nation. We
strike them out, and our figures stand at 290,000, the
limits of possible variation. Still an index number of
290,000 is too large for ready apprehension and daily
use ; how are we to reduce the remainder to managable
proportions ? If our statistics of the population and con-
dition of the people continue to be taken at decennial
periods, and we see no immediate reason for departing
from the practice, then during that period the per-
manent lapse of 10,000 individuals, that is 1000 a
year, from the average morale of their countrymen is
not an impossible condition, and yet still one that

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 67

would have, or should have, a recognisable influence.
Each individual lapse represents 280 moral points.
The aggregate moral deterioration of 10,000 individuals
would then be represented by 280,000 points. Taking
our remainant of -240,000

we will see what figures are affected by^k
this possible variant J —

•239,720.

We see, then, that the figures of variance are those of
thousand thousands, that is the figures 4th, 5th, and
6th of the equation. We have then to reduce the
figures of our aggregate without touching our numerals
of thousand thousands, among which any changes in
the condition of our formula are sure to present them-
selves. We strike out the 2 and 4, and have left the
four ciphers 0,000. But an index number of four
figures is still too large, and we strike off the left
hand cipher as being likely to be least or latest affected,
and our figures stand as 000 of a remainant as repre-
sentative of our irreducible index number. We may
write it m. 1000. It is rather curious that through
such an intricate course of estimates and averages,
involving over 250 billion units, we should have arrived,
without any intention or anticipation of the result, at
m. 1000 as a fairly accurate representative index
number of the moral position of the country. Of
course it would never remain at that, because, in the
first place, it is only an individual estimate, and there-
fore sure to be altered under public criticism ; and in
the second place, as we have shown, the lapse of
1000 persons more from virtue (no other counter-

68 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

balancing movement on the other side being in evi-
dence) would affect the index number to the extent of
being represented as 972. The sign m. 1000 is short,
convenient, and easily remembered ; it can be written
or spoken with equal facility. If any serious change
should take place in the social condition of the people
(for a very slight change would affect our mystic
number m. 1000), then we can always bring in the
dropped numeral (the 7th figure), and resume our
representation on extended figures. In this scheme
we would make no provision for a return from the
classes of wastrels and criminals to the effective moral
force of the country. An individual that is a wastrel
is a moral and intellectual failure, and does not possess
the quality of forceful regeneration. His virtue now
is negative, to lapse no further and abstain from
actual crime. But he is no longer a moral force. The
same holds good with criminals. Once past the police
bar and your utmost moral efforts result in nothing higher
than passivity, in no recurrence of criminal acts. But
the criminal is for ever lost as a moral force in society.
He never possesses moral initiative, moral influence in
the world. Even if the world forget his crime he
never forgets it himself. How then, it may be asked, do
you secure your moral permanence and progress ? We
answer, because the death-rate is higher among the
wastrels and criminals, while the birth-rate of the
average of our countrymen is higher than the number
of lapses from average conditions. It is an unpleasant
observation to make, but we know it is true.

Of course this return is only the imperfect effort

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 69

of an individual. As it stands, any serious change in
the moral condition of the people is at once indicated
by a change in the figures of our index number.
That is its justification, its test of real efficiency and use-
fulness. No other method yet devised bears the air
and reality of practical method that our proposals do.
They may be imperfect and inadequate, but they are
less imperfect and inadequate than any other method
in existence. They have the further advantage of
every year becoming more exactly representative of
the phenomena they describe and formalise. Moral
estimates are made at every moment and in every act
of our lives. They amount to billions every day. They
are verified in the result. They are made unconsciously,
but they are not the less true on that account. They
have become reflex moral judgments, as instinctively
correct, as exactly in touch with actuality, as the feel-
ing of benevolence vibrates at the sight of misery or
the conscience responds to the call of duty.

Putting aside minute criticism for the occasion, we
ask, — Does not that chart present the phenomena of
national morals in a full and clear light, at least in a
fuller and clearer light than it could be presented in
any other way ? Consider the paragraphs and pages
required to present all the facts and opinions contained
in this schema. It may be said, after all it is only
opinion, individual opinion, you have formulated ; we
are no nearer morality itself than we were before. It
is true it is only an opinion of the truth, but what
other form of truth have we ? The generalisations of
science, and the principles of moralists, and the dogmas

70 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

of religion are only forms of opinion. But is an
individual estimate of moral phenomena so untrust-
worthy ? Our individual conduct is guided and
determined in the affairs of life by a form of uncon-
scious experience, the product of years. The judgment
we form of men and events is a judgment the grounds
of which have been formed by every act of our life,
and modified and corrected by our every experience.
If an ordinary citizen were asked to set out in detail
the grounds of a specific judgment, the statement
would appear a very inconsequent and inadequate
justification of his position. Yet that opinion by itself,
and apart from the manner of its justification, would
be true enough, and dependable enough. It would be
as valid and as trustworthy as the inductions and
deductions of recognised authorities on psychology.
But we do not seek to form our moral unit on one
opinion, or on even several opinions. What we aim at
is a really representative national opinion. We would
ask the assistance of all classes in the formulation of n
really trustworthy moral unit, a unit representative of
the sentiment and conduct of the whole people.
University organisations, churches, and learned
societies we would all ask to join in a work which is
only possible to collective effort. We have hitherto
wholly failed to perceive that there are problems
insoluble by the individual quite soluble by collective
labours. It is a consensus of all informed minds we
want.

Neither would that opinion be formed upon a mere
inarticulate opinion. Large masses of statistics upon

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 71

benevolence, public and private, upon thrift and
indulgence, upon industry and idleness, upon pauperism
and crime, are at hand, which, taken in the aggregate,
furnish a very stable and trustworthy basis to assist
the judgment.

Having formed then, after much labour, an effective
moral unit or standard for our own country, we would
seek to have similar units formed for all other
countries. It is impossible to overlook the fact of the
superior position, progress, and power of some nations
over others. The rate of progress and the acquired
position is not the same in all countries. Indeed, there
are some, such as Spain, which show unmistakable signs
of decay, or, at all events, of atrophy. If, then, we
could get their opinion of the relative value of the
various elements constituting morality, and the
numbers of the various classes of the population
affected, we could trace the cause of decay, and
suggest the way to recovered progress. Even apart
from decay, all our civilisation manifests some modifica-
tion of the ideal type, or possess distinctive characters
which give them individuality. Whether these dis-
tinctive characters are worth imitation may be a matter
of opinion, but there can be no doubt about the
importance of discovering the causes which have led to
the modification.

But why seek to show the utility of all efforts,
however inadequate, to reduce to order the present
chaos of moral phenomena ? The first efforts to collect
and systematise the facts of natural history gave no
promise of the wonderful aggregation of scientific

72 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

thought, included now under the science of biology.
The structure and habits, the organic descent, the
essential unity and slow evolution of all organic forms,
could never have been discovered if the first humble
observers had suspended their efforts because they did
not see that the results would be ultimately worth the
labour. We want to make a start in the scientific
treatment of morals. Only begin is all. Truth grows
upon you. It is discovered in geometric ratio. A
single truth to-day leads to two to-morrow, and four
the day after. Take Darwin's theory of natural
selection. It has revolutionised, and where it has not
revolutionised it has modified, the whole thought of
the world. All past history and literature has to be
rewritten under the additional light he has thrown
upon nature's methods.

CHAPTER VIII

WE have seen, then, under this bolder method we have
attained to truer analyses and more accurate compari-
sons, and wider and more useful abstractions. We
have given illustrations of its applicability to pheno-
mena never before generalised. We have applied it
to phases of economics, military science, sociology, and
morals. We have quantified in terms of numbers
judgments of relation, quality, and modality. We
have only one more step to take. We want the
national life scientifically formulated. We want every
force affecting the nation.il life and character differen-
tiated and specifically enumerated, its value as a factor
in the national life determined, its influence in com-
parison with or in relation to all other national forces
fixed and quantified. Finally, we want all these factors
placed together in a common chart or schema, and an
index number made of them as the standard of com-
parison, the measure of progression or retrogression
for all time, and toward all peoples. In all science
you need a unit of comparison, something on which to
base your measure of all other relativity. In the same
way, in viewing the world as a whole we need a unit of
comparison. And no unit of national force is so simple

74 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

and homogeneous, and so truly altruistically representa-
tive as the British unit.

We want a national psychology, — a psychology not
made up from the introspection of a few highly
cultured, exceptionally circumstanced, and non-repre-
sentative individuals, but a psychology made upon
observations of the many by the many, the recognition
of all well-marked operative forces within the life of
the nation. Efforts towards a national psychology have
been obscured and frustrated by viewing the pheno-
mena of national life as so many manifestations of a few
first principles. We would begin at the other end,
and enumerate, simply distinguish and enumerate, all
forces sufficiently strongly marked to be recognisable,
and that admittedly affected in any way the national
character or life. If we go to the British Museum, in a
moment we can lay our hands upon a catalogue
containing a list of the names of all the divisions,
orders, species, and genera under which organic life is
classified. If we apply to the same source for a cata-
logue of all the living forces affecting the national life,
we are told such a thing is non-existent. Yet the latter
is of more importance than the former. Indeed, the
latter may be said to be of vital importance, while the
former is chiefly of academic interest.

Having made an exhaustive enumeration of the
recognised forces affecting the national life, the next
step would be to realise their respective influence in
relation to the national aggregate. If all the forces
are enumerated, all must have their due influence in
affecting the national life. All, however, will not have

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 75

equal influence. We must, therefore, undertake a work
of comparison, comparing each factor with all the
others and with the aggregate, and then apportion —
not slip-slop fashion as more or less, but in specific
numbers — their intrinsic national value.

When this task is done, every element included, we
will calculate or form our index number for that year
or that decennial period. And this undertaking is per-
fectly possible. We will not say easy, but easier now
than ever before, and easier than many tasks the
human mind has entered on.

Need it be said that such a scheme would be supremely
useful. To know all the factors and their relative in-
fluences which go to constitute the nation's life would
enable us to determine the direction or caste of our
effective thought, the whither towards which we now
unconsciously trend. It would enable us to fix with
precision the chinks in our armour, the moral leakages
which go to sap the national strength. If to the active
man "know thyself" is a recognised truism, if to know
the principles of psychology is a true access of strength
to those who would take a worthy part in the world's
warfare, surely for the nation itself to know all the
forces determining its success or failure as a power in
the world, and a world power, is no less a matter of
moral necessity. We noticed and read in the Spectator
of issue 31st March 1900, an article in relation to an
observation made by Prince Hohenlohe. The obser-
vation was to the effect that, in his opinion, civilisation
had ceased to advance, that the progress of the world
was arrested, that we had entered on one of

76 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

eras in the world's history when the human mind halts
to rest, to consolidate its gains, to enjoy the fruits of
its sacrifices and labours. That was the Prince's
opinion. And he is exceptionally placed to form an
accurate opinion. He has been in touch all his life
with all the governing men and governing forces on
the Continent. This opinion has evoked much contro-
versy. One half of the critics say it is true, the other
half say it is false. The greatest matter for surprise
appears to us, not that it is true, or that the opinion is
false, but that there should be any room for doubt or
controversy about the matter. Why was Prince Hohen-
lohe not able to turn up his Statesman's Year-book
and say as a matter of fact, demonstrable fact, that
civilisation is arrested. Or why are his critics not able
to put their hands upon irrefragible evidence or data to
confute him, and not only confute him, but, as all
scientific data does, make him confess his confutation.
Is it not an intellectual and moral scandal upon our age
that on such an absolutely vital .question we have nothing
but vague conjecture formed by rule-of- thumb methods.
Why, what question can be so important as this in-
determined one, as this question which we have no
method at present to determine. If science is ques-
tioned, it can tell us the rate to half-a-mile some of
our fixed stars are advancing to or receding from the
earth, it can tell by its teeth what the opteryx fed
on, it can tell by the development of the jaw the
character of the rind of the fruit our anthropoid
ancestors supported life upon, but it cannot tell us
whether our civilisation is progressive, stationary, or

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 77

retrogressive. This is the blot we seek to erase, the
gap in our knowledge we seek to fill. We say the
nation owes to itself — to itself now and to the future
of the world — to determine by scientific methods its
present position as a world's force.

What, then, are the practical steps we must take to
form the data for this scheme. To begin with, we
need not expect this work to be rushed through in a
week or a month. It will require time for due delibera-
tion. If it should occupy two or three years we will
consider the time well spent, and the task rapidly
accomplished. We would desiderate a leisurely accom-
plishment, because while you can raise the enthu-
siasm and energy of the people to one effort, even
one prolonged effort, if that effort miscarries or turns
out a failure, a generation will pass before they can be
induced to try another.

Neither would we present the whole scheme for
practical solution at one time. Accurate judgment
is slow to form, it needs concentration of mind. Ob-
scure sources of reliable truth take time to come to
the surface. We think, then, the first efforts should
be exclusively devoted to the simple task of distinguish-
ing, enumerating, and classifying the constituent ele-
ments or plainly recognisable forces going to make up
our corporate national life. After that is accomplished
we would enter on the much more formidable task of
comparing and valuing these several elements of force.

As to the persons who are to undertake this task,
we make a new departure. Individual effort has tried
and failed. We now turn to collective effort. The

78 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

introspections of the favoured few do not represent the
thoughts, emotions, and motives of the working many.
Our psychology is the psychology of the cultured; it
is not representative. It is not the psychology of those
who have built, and who constitute and maintain the
nation. The perfect man is the average man. Your
exceptional man, whether in culture, or emotion, or
in failure and crime, is a monstrosity in the eyes of
nature. Such men are sports, living hypotheses, offer-
ing themselves to nature for adoption, for incorpora-
tion into the real living power, the real living nation —
the people. A nation never was served, never was
made on exceptions, but on the general average of
worth of its citizens. We want, then, the opinion of
our average citizen, the men of affairs, the men who
conduct the business, manage the politics, and make the
sacrifices of the nation. We want their opinion as to
the forces which influenced themselves, which they have
observed at work around them, and which they have
successfully determined their own conduct upon. We
also want their opinion of the relative value of these
forces. These forces are not all of the same power or
have the same influence upon the national life. Our
practical citizens know this, and have appraised these
forces at their true value in everyday affairs. Those that
have estimated them correctly are now prosperous and
successful men ; their judgment has been verified in the
result. Those that have not been successful are living
testimonies to the penalties attached to careless obser-
vation and inaccurate judgment. We want a psycho-
logy of the nation as it really is.

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 79

We appeal, then, to collective effort to enable us to
form our initial unit. This collective effort will be best
secured by obtaining the assistance of the various
public bodies and scientific societies. For example,
besides the universities and churches, we have in Scot-
land above twenty learned societies with skill and
knowledge adequate to such a task. But we would by
no means confine our collective opinion to the learned
and wise. We would take the opinion or criticism of
such bodies as the Chambers of Commerce and Trades
Councils, and others like them. We are dealing with
facts, collecting and arranging our everyday ex-
perience, and only those with that everyday ex-
perience are competent to describe and value them.
We all know the difference between theory and
practice, between the camel evolved from the inner
philosophic consciousness, and the ugly, ill-tempered,
though supremely useful quadruped that does duty
under that name in tropical countries. Believe us,
there are many camels in psychology and morals that
bear not the faintest resemblance to the actualities
that are met in the battle of life.

We have, however, another reason for seeking
stability of judgment in extended personal experience.
The bane of all speculations in moral science is that
element of variance, the personal equation. The very
mental attitude of study and introspection, especially
arduous study and close introspection, is to remove the
thinker from the normal everyday attitude of mind to
that of the abnormal. Not only so, but under these con-
ditions, the personal points, the idiosyncrasies in the

80 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

individual character, assume undue prominence. The
normal, the practical, the immediate touch with the
world is absent, is not livingly present. The result is
that phenomena and states of mind are falsely pro-
portioned. Any way, this element of variance is a
fact manifest to all students in moral science. By
collective, non-personal effort, we remove this personal
equation altogether. It is not only that in collective
eifort you necessarily approach nearer to the opinion of
the average man ; you reduce the importance of any
one variation by the number of factors participating in
the solution of the problem. For instance, one variant
opinion among ten is important, but the same element
of variance in a thousand is comparatively unimportant.
But further, in collective opinion individual variance
counteracts itself. The variance on one side is counter-
balanced by the variance on the other. Taking the
views of moralists and economists, nothing is more
striking than this swing of opinion. As Hume on the
one side and Hegel on the other, as Locke on the one
side and Berkely on the other, exaggerated the
importance of the special truth they respectively gave
to the world, and the real truth lay in the happy mean
embracing and reconciling them, so in the task of
diagnosing the living forces around us there is the
same exaggeration or accentuation of individual views
among contemporary moralists. It is thus no mere
matter of convenience that we seek to base a national
psychology on the widest experience, but a logical
necessity to remove a disturbing element in thought.
This statistical and numerical method (the index

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 81

number), when established as accurately representative
of our present national life, may be successfully and
usefully applied to successive stages in the country's
history — indeed, of any country's history. We have
abandoned the personal, pictorial, dramatic style
of describing history. We have adopted the philo-
sophic mode. We seek to follow movements rather
than events, and causes as much as their visible effects.
But if, under the pictorial histories, we have too much
of the superficial and dramatic, too much of intrigues
and battles and such adventitious events, in the
philosophic mode we have too much theorising and
philosophising, and too few data and particulars to
form the groundwork and justification of philosophic
reason. We need scientific history — history pursued
under strictly scientific methods, of which the collec-
tion and formulation of data is the preliminary and the
main work. If philosophic history is the structural
skeleton, and pictorial history the features and
external form of an era or age, the scientific history is
the flesh and blood, the functional organs of the period.
It sounds prosaic, but we want a more definite con-
ception of the common life, the common wants, and
common acts of the common people. They are our
historical grandfathers and fathers, and we propose to
use them, as all grandfathers and fathers should be
used, for our present personal advantage — we mean
national advantage. For that purpose, starting in the
unsavoury atmosphere of semi- barbarism — and that
semi-barbarism is at its best an unsavoury matter we
believe, despite all " The Tales of a Grandfather " — we

F

82 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

would mark and estimate such qualities or activities as
are still represented in our index number, what have
come down to us. We would also note what our
forefathers had and we have not. We would note the
gradual accretion of the main features of our own
civilisation. We would form an index number for
every century if materials for such a purpose can be
found. We can apportion the relative value of the
main features to the civilisation of their own day, and
estimate their power in relation to that of ours.
Under the record of each century so expressed, we
could see at a glance the gradual accretion of the
complex we call civilisation. Taking modern civilisa-
tion at a 1000, what number would be indicative of the
periods of serfdom and feudalism, of the period before
the Reformation and the period after, of the century of
Cromwell and of Charles, of William of Orange and
the last half of the eighteenth century, of the time of
the French Revolution and the present Victorian age.

CHAPTER IX

WE have said we seek the formulation of a national
psychology, an analysis and differentiation of all the
effective forces constituting or affecting the national life.
We have expressed our distrust of a national psycho-
logy founded upon individual introspection, because in
individual introspection the personal equation, always
an element of variance, is ever present. Apart from
that circumstance, at the most it is only the psychology
of exceptionally circumstanced and specially gifted
individuals. We have further found it inadequate, be-
cause not only does it not show the order of evolution
in the individual and the race — a very important con-
sideration— but it does not throw the slightest light upon
effective and non-effective moral forces. All will admit
the genesis or the potentiality of every human senti-
ment, and motive is engrained or lies hidden in every
human mind. An analysis of the mind of an indi-
vidual in the time of King Arthur or the time of
Socrates, if efficiently conducted, would have revealed
in activity or immanence every moral principle charac-
teristic of the mind of the present day. That there is
any apparent discrepancy is simply because much of
the latent powers were inactive or undeveloped in these

84 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

earlier times. The same thing is characteristic of
present day introspection. We show what is active
or immanent in the individual mind, but we do not
show which of it, or how much of it, is operative, effec-
tive, or influential over conduct. That brings us face
to face with this other truth, not sufficiently recognised,
that modifications of a first principle become, when
the departure is sufficiently pronounced, principles
themselves, — that is, forms of moral forces capable of
clear delineation and of definite function. We take
the term " rightfulness " as a first principle in morals.
Now, in course of ages, that principle has developed
on several well-marked lines. It has in conduct
developed into truthfulness, honesty, justice, and
scientific accuracy. Yet, though all four forms have
descended from the primal principle of rightfulness,
it cannot be denied that truthfulness, honesty, justice,
and scientific accuracy (the attitude of mind impelling
to strict intellectual accuracy and truthfulness) are sepa-
rate social and moral forces, easily recognised, readily
tested, and separately operative. This marks another
crucial objection to our present method in moral science.
We carry on abstraction, and abstraction ever seeking
an all-embracing thought unit. But that process of
abstraction is a process of emasculation, the elimina-
tion of concretion, the exhaustion of particulars, so
that what is left is an empty notion, a soulless ghost
without any but the most distant relation to actuality,
and without the slightest practical use in estimating or
guiding national life.

In diagnosing the national life from the outside,

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 85

viewing it as an externality, we seek to differentiate
all national movements which can be recognised and
which are effectively operative. We thus get rid of
what is simply immanent or what has become obsolete.
We see the relative strength of the different forces.
No true thought in the human mind lies dormant ; it
seeks realisation. There is a time element in the un-
folding of the idea. The when is no haphazard con-
tingency in the passing of the ages. Further, when
we find a national force operative, we will not seek to
reduce it to simpler elements. We will take it as it
is, a complex combination among moral and national
elements resulting in an effective synthesis, producing
results only possible to that combination and while in
that state of combination. Too often we cannot see
the chain in the contemplation of the separate links,
but among national forces combination is the effective
power, the individual links in the chain being unim-
portant. Action, result, are our starting points, and we
form our psychology upon them.

If there is any justification required for this longing
for a new procedure, it lies in the fact that our national
life is now as it never was before. In the fulness
of our ideal, in our sense of obligation, in our sym-
pathy and interdependence with one another, in our
power, our will to give effect to the national aspirations
and progress, we are greater and more forceful than
ever before. At the same time there are forces
operating within the national life of which the world
hitherto has had no knowledge and no experience.
Though they are within our experience now, we cannot

86 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

say that they are within our knowledge. We must
recognise the fact, that within a century our whole
condition and surroundings have been changed, yet
there has been no corresponding change in the writings
and speculations of our moralists and philosophers ; that
their works, so far as present day national forces are
concerned, might have been written in the eighteenth
century as well as the nineteenth. Looking at the
vastness of the changes since the beginning of the
century, there is a suspicion raised in the mind that
our national psychology is incomplete, that there are
forces or conditions among us which have not been
observed and have not received recognition.

Let us take the simple fact that the population of
these islands has increased during this century from
15,000,000 to 40,000,000 souls. The superficial area
of these islands has not extended an inch. Now is it
possible that such a great fact, the fact of the vastly
increased number of persons living in these islands,
should not have many great effects and also many new
effects. Regarding man simply as an organised being,
and considering no other influence but his increased
numbers in a strictly limited area, what consequences
have followed ? Man is no mere mass of dead inorganic
matter. On the contrary, he not only lives, but in
living he is constantly generating vital energy, a form
of force not only sufficient to keep in activity all his
bodily organs, functions, and processes, but sufficient
to expend a large amount in bodily exertion and mental
activity. Few realise what an immense amount of
energy is generated and expended by the aggregate

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 87

population in a single day, a .single hour, aye, even a
single minute. An ordinary man — that is, a person of
average health and strength — will lift one cwt. from the
ground. A woman's greatest strength is not so much
dynamic as static. She can bear a prolonged strain
better arid easier than a man. We are safe in assuming
that the average woman has muscular power equal to
lifting one half the weight a man can. If we assume
the average lifting power of the total population to be
56 Ibs., we make a very liberal allowance for old age,
young persons, and individuals in bad health. The
population of the country is 40,000,000. Forty million
half cwts. is 20,000,000 cwts., 20,000,000 cwts. is
1,000,000 tons. Just think of it, the human vital
energy in the country at any given moment can lift
1,000,000 tons weight. But what of the sum total of
vital energy, nerve force, generated and expended in
a day, in a month, in a year. Probably a light day's
work would be the expenditure of energy in various
forms for an average period of eight hours, an energy
capable of lifting one ton weight. That would give
a mechanical equivalent of 40,000,000 tons of energy
expended by our population every day. Taking 300
days in the year, we have the expenditure of energy
by the British people, in their own country alone, of
the enormous amount of 12,000 million tons annually.
It is presenting the facts and figures in this way that
brings home what an amount of energy man generates
and has at his disposal for expenditure upon matters that
interest or affect him. It is very noticeable that when
a man is not working he still generates force or the

88 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

material from which force is drawn. It is impossible,
then, that the fact of the population of Great Britain
having doubled within a century cannot but be of the
greatest importance, and must affect the national
destiny in many new ways.

This vital force is effluent. Effluence is its normal
condition, the distribution and dissipation of vital
energy is always going on. That sympathy between
individuals results in an interchange or blending of
that subtle force which constitutes what we call life, is,
we think, demonstrable. We think we can also show
that identity of interests or emotions, and even identity
of intellectual thoughts and ideal conceptions, produce
a condition of mutual spiritual concord and sympathy,
which results in a mutual effluence or interchange of
vital forces uniting the individuals in a new unnoticed
vital relation or spiritual tie.

There can be no manner of doubt about the inter-
change of vital sympathy between individuals of
opposite sex. A look, a word, a touch between man
and woman sends a thrill through both, and then
perfect concord and calm. That is a matter of every-
day occurrence, and in the living experience of every
one. Between friends of the same sex the same
phenomena is observable. I meet an old friend in the
street. I was just wanting to meet him. I have at
last secured the solution of a problem that interested
both. I put my arm through his to turn him and talk
to him. Immediately there is a pleasurable and most
perceptible thrill passes between us ; a common
effluence, our sympathies blending, our souls adjusting

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 89

themselves to perfect mutual concord ; and then perfect
concord, perfect candour, and perfect interchange of
views take place. It is particularly noticeable in
crowds. The psychological moment of the tragedy on
the boards of the theatre sends a thrill through the
whole house. That is not a figure of speech. It is a
psychological and physiological fact, the conscious
experience of millions. In large crowds strongly
agitated or moved by sympathy and expectation it is
even more apparent. For instance, on the processions
and services attending the Queen's golden and
diamond jubilees, the intense thrill that passed through
the people where the crowds were massed in greatest
numbers could have been measured by a suitable
instrument. That is, not only would the normal
action of a magnet have been disturbed, but a galvano-
meter would have registered the passage of specific
force. We can speak with greatest accuracy, however,
about such a recent event as the visit of the Prince of
Wales to Edinburgh last year, because then we were
consciously observing the phenomena. That spiritual
force belongs to humanity per se — that is, that it is
produced in every individual, and that when crowds
are simultaneously excited by expectation and attention
toward a common object it becomes pronouncedly
apparent — we satisfied ourselves. Where we were
stationed there were a number of false alarms, all of
which were accompanied by this common, though
quite perceptible thrill. Several local magnates
passed us, and the thrill was again apparent. When
the Prince passed us, and immediately before and after,

90 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

the thrill was as strongly marked as any psychological
event in our life. That it was the general experience
we saw by the looks of those around us. Now, we
particularly noticed that when the crowd dispersed
there was a change in their look, in their pose and
carriage, in their voice and talk, and in their whole
attitude towards each other.

Let us give one or two illustrations of identity of
sympathy and interest affecting intellect. We went to
see Roberts when he played his match at billiards with
Diggle last year. Now, we are not a good player of
billiards ourselves, but we know the game. We had a
good grounding in mathematics and physics, and we
have the theory at our finger ends. We had been
playing regularly before our visit, so that we knew our
score to a nicety. The hall was well filled, and filled
with billiard players, who gave the very closest and
most absorbed attention to the game. We were in a
billiard "atmosphere." The play was brilliant, the
execution perfect ; but of course to a person well
grounded in theory there was nothing new. Still it
was a marvellous exhibition of skill. When we
returned home we played as we never had played
before. Not that we played any new shots, but that
our general play displayed a new and wholly
unexpected accuracy. So impressed were we with
this fact that we returned to Queen Street Hall to see
the last day's play. That evening and for several days
succeeding we shone in billiards until the superficial
and temporary influence under whose spell we tem-
porarily lay passed off, and we relapsed into our normal

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 91

condition of a " perfect duffer." There can be no doubt
of these facts ; they are true. The explanation we give
is that the hall was filled with persons of specific skill
following with absorbed attention particular mechanical
movements. We were all in touch physically and
intellectually. The cerebral centres exercised were
those exercised in the best of play. Through
sympathy the proper cerebral centres producing good
play were stimulated even in those who had not the
highest skill, and who normally exercised cerebral
centres not of true mathematical precision. But in the
case of those who had received the true impressions
from sources outside themselves, the effect was evanes-
cent, and soon passed away.

We have no high artistic feeling. We enjoy the view
of a beautiful picture in the same way as we enjoy the
sight of a beautiful woman, without conscious criticism.
But we have not that fine aesthetic sense that sees
harmonies and beauties veiled from the common gaze.
Returning home by railway (a journey of three or four
hours) with a very old friend, a Fellow of the R.S.A.,
we had a long and sympathetic talk. Reaching home
(it was a Saturday), we looked over the weekly
illustrated journals, The Graphic and The Illustrated
London News. We found we viewed them with an
interest, an insight, and a critical observation which
were to us entirely new. This was so noticeable that
we specifically recorded the circumstance in our
memory, though at the time we had no explanation to
offer. Now, we are convinced that our artistic sense

92 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

was stimulated or coloured by close and sympathetic
contact with our artistic friend.

Again, we were deep in some metaphysical problems
and philosophic speculations while staying in a country
house. The society we met day after day was totally
estranged from that attitude of mind favourable to
such speculations and dreams. In the course of a
month or two,, however, we had as visitors some uni-
versity men. It may have been coincidence, but it is
the fact, that with their advent all our old interest in
and perception of these questions returned, and we
saw our way through the haze that had temporarily
obscured our judgment, and that before we knew that
several of the visitors were interested in identical
inquiries.

This phenomena of sympathetic influence, this effect
of contact and association of mind with mind in the
daily business of life, is what the Roman Catholic
Church refers to as a Catholic atmosphere. The daily
contact, and even contiguity, of persons of identical
interest produce identity of moral sympathy, similarity
of emotions, consensus of opinions. Every person is at
once an efferent and sympathetic vehicle, a factor at
one and the same time, of effluence and receptivity.
This gathering together of the faithful, this attempt to
make of Catholics in this country a separate and pecu-
liar people, is the deliberate policy of " the miracle of
human wisdom." For us, however, we only adduce it
as another illustration that simple residence in a
country, simple contiguity, simple contact, is a matter
not of indifference to every individual so residing. The

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 93

influence is so subtle, so universally present, that, like
the existence of the air we breathe, it requires a special
experience or a special circumstance to make it apparent.
But it is none the less real on that account. If that
influence of mere contiguity is a fact, the increase of
population from below twenty to forty millions is a very
important factor in determining the national character.

That is one element of change ; we will state
another. Last year 1500 millions of the people of
these islands travelled by railway train. Think of it,
1 500 millions ! It is impossible such a fact can be
without influence. What a change from the old days.
Probably 10 millions represented the number of
travellers annually at the beginning of the century.

This extension of travel in numbers, in distances,
and by all classes, is a peaceful revolution. It brings
all classes within sight of and in contact with each other.
It carries centres of enlightenment and energy to every
part of the kingdom. It abolishes "sleepy hollows,"
and nationalises local opinion. It is a movement
toward greater homogeneity. But what of the physical
effect of this universal mode of travel and the psycho-
logical consequences of this physical effect ? We are
conscious of the vibratory sensation experienced while
entrained. An infinity of infinitesimal shocks are
received ; are they without consequences, serious con-
sequences ? We speak of the fatigue of a railway
journey. It is a real fact. Personally, a journey from
Edinburgh to London is as exhausting as a walk of
thirty or forty miles. This fact affecting 1500 million^,
incidents in the national history every year, deserves

94 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

specific scientific attention. But railway travel is not
the only change in our stationary habits or static
conditions. Formerly masters and servants lived beside
or in their places of business. Now everybody lives as
far away from them as possible. The result is our
streets carry a traffic such as never was known before.
The whole body of the citizens are more before each
other, more in public contact with each other, than
ever before. There is a physical blending of the whole
population. Eyes meet, bodies jostle or touch, ears
hear, that would neither see, touch, or hear in any
recognised social function. Our social life is becoming
less private and restricted and more public. But if
man is a magnetic unit, a generator and distributor of
force, then all this public contact means the uncon-
scious unification of national sympathy and the similar
colouring of national thoughts, or the predisposition
to common sympathy and to true thoughts.

Let us give another illustration of the need for a
thorough expiscation of the forces at work in a nation's
life. What psychological experience is more general
and constant than the sound, the roar of the traffic in
our streets. It is impossible such phenomena does not
affect the national mind. People admit it affects their
nerves but not their mind. If it affects their nerves it
does affect their mind. We showed at a former part
of this paper the extraordinary effects of music on
states of consciousness, and that the modus operandi on
the physical side was the impinging of certain vibra-
tory motions in the ether on certain cerebral centres.
We admitted such musical sound forms were in general

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 95

of a beneficial character, or, what is even more impor-
tant, could be made so. The sound of the street traffic
impinges 011 nerve centres ; they also liberate nerve
force. They cannot be controlled. They are terribly
uniform. They affect every class alike. Now is this
sound action a disintegrating force on our long accu-
mulated cerebral static forms ? Our brain is the
personal and national dynamo where accumulated force
rests until liberation. Will music modify or correct
this traffic noise ? Is the growing popularity of music
but the dumb unconscious response of nature to a
growing need, a guard against a hidden danger ?
There may be a good deal of accuracy in Prince
Hohenlohe's opinion after all.

Another problem : What of the psychology, the
position, influence, and functions of the female sex ?
They constitute one-half of the human race. Are
they the static element ; are they the complement
and counterpart of the male sex? Is man, perfect
man, man as a moral and national unit, really a
duality, himself and his spiritual affinity ? We have no
work on the psychology of the female mind by a
female. They have always been psycholised under
the term " man " and by men. And such men, either
crusty, studious old bachelors, some of whom never saw
a woman, and all of whom must, through a sense of
common decency, confess to utter ignorance of the
hidden mysteries appertaining to the female sex and
character. Some, no doubt, are married, and it might
be said that they, at all events, are competent to
diagnose the female mind. Well, we have our doubts

96 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

about it. We strongly suspect the wife diagnoses
accurately the husband ; the husband never diagnoses
exhaustively the wife. She remains a hidden mystery,
an esoteric equation. We anxiously await, for more
reasons than one, a psychology of the human mind,
male and female, by a lady.

Then we have the spread of education, the universal
diffusion of knowledge, the ubiquitous press — these and
a thousand other influences we never had before, to
correct, to mould, and to concentrate public opinion,
to synthesise into one common effort a nerve force
whose mechanical equivalent is the lifting power of
1,000,000 tons. Is it any wonder, then, that we are
a nation in a sense we never were before : that the
nation has reached the stage of self realisation with a
fulness it never before was capable of: that we have
reached the stage of collective consciousness. We
know this is psychological heresy, that the nation is
composed of individuals, and so on. But, nevertheless,
we hold there are collective states of mind which only
exist, and are only possible to men living under cor-
porate conditions. Take an army, and diagnose every
individual in it, from the general to the drummer boy,
and we say there is a moral element left, which only
exists and is only possible to the united army, to the
army as a whole. Take the different races and analyse
their members individually, and there is no essential
difference, that any psychological process can discover,
to distinguish one race from another. But there are
left essential racial differences all the same. We
appeal to those of foreign travel if our statement is not

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 97

true. And this essential characteristic is born of the
collective experience, the environment, the common
history, the common descent, and the prolonged con-
tact and intimate association of all the members of
the race. Take the Jews. Is there no more in their
character than what the psychologies of Locke, Stewart,
Hamilton, Martineau, and Calderwood have recognised.
We think, then, we have indicated what we mean by a
national psychology, why we approach it through ex-
ternality, and why better methods are required to
exhaust the truth in it and reduce it to a coherent
whole.

CHAPTER X

WE have said, in this country as a people we have
reached the stage of national consciousness and national
volition. The nation's heart pulses on one beat. On
crucial national interests it feels as one man, and acts
as one man. Its united intelligence is simultaneously
directed to the solution of its national problems. It has
passed through the stage of blind inarticulate guidance,
and emerged in the light. We ask it to know itself,
to know the truth about itself without prejudice and
tenderness towards its own weaknesses, to know the
sadness of the heart that follows the truth. But if it
is sad to strip the glamour of self-appreciation from our
eyes, at least it leaves us with the steady courage and
prophetic outlook of those who see the truth.

We have reached the stage of intellectual and moral
freedom with all its responsibilities and cares. And
after all, what does our boasted freedom amount to ?
It is only to adjust ourselves consciously and willingly
to the order and on the lines of the unfolding of the
great purpose. To consciously adjust ourselves to
the inexorable. The truth tells us if we do not join
nature's synthesis our fate is extinction. The Force
moving toward Rightfulness will leave us behind.

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 99

What a terrible fate, to live with arrested attention
and atrophied energy, while the world's power moves
011 heedless of our struggles to regain the lost initia-
tive, heedless of our regrets at the lost opportunities.
Our national fate, in these circumstances, would be
like that of the leper. With open eyes and clear
consciousness of the ultimate issue, we would see
the canker spread through our system, see our limbs
drop off one by one, see ourselves shunned as a pariah
among the nations that were prompt and courageous
enough to seize the psychological moment, until even
the thought of national extinction became no longer
a fate abhorrent to our conscience, and we would
willingly seek burial and namelessness under the aegis
of races we might have led. Nature is a merciless,
inexorable mother. She only loves her virile children.
Her weaklings she casts into the Tiber. It is these
thoughts that are ever pressing upon us the inadequacy
of our estimation of the conditions of national vitality,
and which prompt us to turn our highest intelligence
from the contemplation of exhausted problems to
" fresh fields and pastures new," to a probing for new
forces, only the faint rufflings of which appear on the
deep tideway of the nation's life.

But surely, having seen the truth ourselves, we are
not going to rest there, surely we are not going to
limit our aspirations by the narrow limits of even the
most perfect nationality. There is another step to
take, to rise from the national to the racial, to the
altruistic. We say our country is a unique national
unit. It is perfected through its many interests, its

100 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

varied character, its long historic experience, and the
initiative and forcefulness of its people. But surely
to sit still in self-contemplation, in the enjoyment of
the fruits of our sacrifices and victories, would be
national selfishness — base selfishness. Our own national
development is only the means to a greater end, the
realisation of consciousness by the race, an intelligent
volitional racial condition. Altruism is in the air. It
has passed from the phase of pious hope and academic
discussion to a tacit assumption, to a weighty though
inarticulate influence upon our public men and
moralists.

The whole race is now in possession of those prac-
tical, remedial, and modifying forces which have made
our own country prosperous, intelligent, and free — free,
because in the possession of the truth. The whole
race is in possession of the press and telegraph, of the
means of intercommunication, of the common field of
knowledge, and the powerful ties of economic interests.
Old civilisations, blind with the ignorance of ages, are
stretching toward the light. The dry bones live.
We have seen Japan bound at one leap across the
chasm of 2000 years. China only waits for the dis-
solution of a moribund officialism to stretch its limbs
and look around in all the fair proportion of a perfect
manhood. The great body lives. It is only swathed
in obsolete and stifling garments. We can see evidences
on every hand of this new racial movement. The
fundamental movement of the present day is toward
aggregation — racial aggregation. The strengthening
and expanding of strong nationalities, and the contrac-

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 101

Won and elimination of small ones. The world will
soon be ruled from a few great centres. It is the un-
conscious pressure of this movement that spontaneously
impelled the colonies and dependencies of Britain to
come to the help of the Mother country at the outbreak
of this South African war. These are straws showing
the direction of the wind. They drift in one direction,
the realisation of the altruistic ideal. In the beginning
of the century we were at war with the world for our
own national existence and interests. We acquired
colonies and dependencies in our own exclusive interest,
as a means of fostering the wealth and strengthening
the power of Britain. But now we acquire no territory
but on the simple ground that it is in the interests of
the annexed people and of the world at large, of our
common civilisation, that these people come under the
strong common-sense, unfailing justice, and strong right
arm of the British crown. Nay more, we say, and we
believe we say truly, that we would retain no people
under the British flag if it were not their best interest
to remain so. We consciously adapt our rule to fit the
dependent peoples for self-government, and contem-
plate ultimately nothing but a voluntary tie. If that
is not a true altruistic sentiment we do not know what
is. And we are consciously seeking its realisation.
In every journal and speech we trace this tacit assump-
tion that the racial ideal is our ultimate goal — is, in
truth, our new ideal, that the national must give way
to the altruistic conception.

There are many ways we, as a nation, can help to
bring about this racial union. There is no way more

102 METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE

effective than commercial intercourse, the tie of mutual
and extended interests. We can bestow the favour
of a successful rule and a well-tested civilisation upon
dependent peoples who have fallen behind in the
struggle of existence. We do not mean absorption by
conquest, but by invitation. Our pronounced success as
rulers in Egypt and India we believe will, in a few
years, exhibit another mode of extension of empire
other than by arms. Our surplus population is a real
missionary element, moulding the destinies' of the
world, and trending toward unification. More especi-
ally will an altruistic cast be given to their thoughts in
other lands, if they live to manhood in an atmosphere
where the collective consciousness, duties, and interests
are discussed in the light of a higher end, and that
end a mission and a hope. We can offer ourselves to
the world as an object lesson, not in the self-righteous
sense, but as a successful national unit, possessed of all
the data and conscious of all the national forces lead-
ing to success. We would offer ourselves for moral
dissection and imitation. Our religion also is cosmo-
politan in sentiment and capable of universal extension.
Whatever can be said against it, this can be said for it,
that it presents religion in the most lovable form. Its
founder, as we find Him in the four gospels, is one of
the most lovable characters recorded in history. All
through, His teaching is that of reasonable sweetness,
the inculcation of a beautiful yet simple morality. As a
religion it is essentially democratic and kind. "Peace
on earth, good will to men " is its foundational mes-
sage. In contrast with other religions, Christianity

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 103

l^,s nothing to fear. It has a rare power of rousing
missionary zeal and devotion. Finally, we have our
contributions to the living intellectuality of the world
as a tie to synthesise its higher sympathies. Altogether,
the cause of progressive civilisation, the cause of
humanity, looks bright.

CONCLUSION

WE have been induced to reduce the foregoing observa-
tions to writing under a strong conviction that our
recognised moral science, the moral science taught in
our schools and colleges, is, on its present lines, out of
touch with a great deal of actuality, with the living
forces now at work around us. Moral science was
formerly taught and investigated as a basis of religion.
It was regarded as the handmaid of dogmatic theology.
It was only countenanced and taught so far as it was
subservient to the primal interest. That cloud still
hangs over it. Within these limits speculation is an
exhausted quantity. We would now seek to turn that
acumen now wasted to the newer problems awaiting
scientific investigation. In that purpose we include a
more scientific treatment of the phenomena of modern
experience. To assist that consummation we suggested
more specific definitions of the terminology of moral
science and the use of brief and convenient significant
forms. We suggested an improved method of analysis,
comparison, quantification, and formulation. To gather
large masses of particulars together and the phenomena
of periods into convenient abstractions, we showed the
possibility of applying the principle of the index number.

METHOD IN MORAL SCIENCE 105

By this process we represented under a known and
universally recognised formula millions of particulars
and fleeting and changing phenomena. These pheno-
mena can be systematised and made intelligible by no
other process. They are made stable thought units.
Our proposals involved the taking of the nation into our
confidence to secure a real representation of experience.
This collective effort would rid us of the variant per-
sonal equation. We suggested the practical measures
to be adopted to realise our proposals. We stated one
or two instances of the forces now affecting the national
life which have hitherto received no recognition and
been under no investigation. We asserted our heretical
belief in a national consciousness and volition as some-
thing other and over and above the phenomena of
individual consciousness. Finally, we contemplated as
a permanent attitude of mind the scientific treatment
of moral problems starting not from a priori grounds,
not as the manifestation in experience of a few first
principles, but as effective social forces in the forms,
combinations, and conditions we see them operative in
the world around us.

THE FORMATION OF

PHILOSOPHICAL OPINION

BY

WILLIAM MITCHELL BOWACK

©pinions of tbe press

" In this volume we have an attempt to introduce some order
into the chaos of unphilosophical opinion, and the purpose of
the writer, in the first essay at least, is to show that the study
of these informal conceptions yields quite as valuable results
as those which may be obtained from the orthodox investiga-
tion of systematised thought. In order, however, to trace the
lines of development, the informal must be viewed as passing
into the formal, and the influences which determine each
process must be carefully considered. Mr Bowack contends
that by far the most important factor in the moulding of
thought is the natural and social environment of the thinker,
and he adduces many examples from the history of philosophy
to prove his contention, all of which, however, are by no means
equally valuable supports of his theory. In the general growth
of opinion two trends of ideas become prominent. By some

PRESS OPINIONS

the principle of all things is found to be material, and by others
it is regarded as spiritual. Both conceptions take their rise in
animism ; the former passes through crude materialism to
pantheism, and the latter through polytheism to theism. The
natural surroundings of the different races have to a great
extent determined which of these two methods of investiga-
tion is to be adopted. In India and the countries of the East,
where Nature is vast in her manifestations, the helplessness of
man leads him to bow in deeper worship before the majesty of
the world around. By degrees his devotion is confined to the
more important phenomena, and from adoration of them he
passes to the conception of an invisible force which is at the
foundation of everything, but itself unknowable. Spiritualism
is confined, for the most part, to those regions where man has
early become conscious of his power to overcome the forces of
Nature, and to utilise physical phenomena for his own purposes.
His intrinsic capabilities are now the most important principles
in the universe, and are used for the explanation of all mysteries.
Conceptions of this kind gradually pass from superstitious poly-
theism to a more or less rational theism, and the highest point
is reached when the fundamental in thought is perceived to be
the real in phenomena. The history of this process is the
history of the greater part of ancient and modern philosophy,
and Mr Bowack supplements his theory by a brief analysis of
the most famous and influential metaphysical doctrines. The
discussion ends with an optimistic prophecy of future achieve-
ments in philosophy, when there will be given to the world a
new principle, more perfectly adapted to our knowledge, needs,
and hopes, and capable of utilising the ever-increasing array of
scientific facts and the accumulating experience in political,
social, and religious life. The essay on 'The Future Mind'
discusses the question of how, in view of this vast mass of
material, we are to avoid the dangers of extreme specialisation
on the one hand, and of merely verbal reconciliation on the
other. Mr Bowack thinks that a remedy may be found in a
gradual accommodation of thought to the facts with which it
has to deal — the development, on the same lines as the evolution
of habit, of a sort of reflex action of the intellect. He argues

PRESS OPINIONS

that what is possible in one sphere of conscious life should be
possible in another. Our powers of reasoning and synthesis
may be further helped by a reform of the current systems of
grammar and calculation, and by the appointment of a
scientific Revision Committee for the arrangement of accepted
knowledge, and the exclusion of obsolete conceptions. As a
whole, the chief value of Mr Bowack's book lies in the fact
that he has worked into a consistent theory ideas which are
not usually considered together, and in doing so he has given
a fresh and interesting account of the main anthropological and
philosophical investigations of both ancient and modern times."
— Aberdeen Free Press.

"Two thoughtful and readable essays by William Mitchell
Bowack, who shows in the handling of his subject a grasp of
the history of philosophy and considerable power of speculation.
A notable feature in his sketch of the history of philosophy
is his inclusion of what he styles informal philosophy, or the
value of the thought contained in recent investigations into
the religious and speculative opinions of primitive peoples, and
in the light thrown upon such subjects by the long-buried
literary treasures of ancient Egypt, Assyria, India, and China.
Formal philosophy is applied to the works and systems of the
recognised authorities in speculation. It is pretty well ad-
mitted that we shall always have philosophy with us. Every
age has its own problem to solve, and it sounds almost like
proving a truism when the present writer brings forward
examples to show that the multiformity of the formal philo-
sophers is the consequence of their environment or of circum-
stances of time and place. Still he believes that we shall
shortly have a full if not a final synthesis in philosophy which
will receive as full acceptance as the teaching of Newton or
Darwin in the scientific sphere. In the second essay is dis-
cussed the question — What are we to do with our vast accumu-
lations of knowledge in all branches of science and our
ever-accumulating experience in social, political, and religious
life? The author recommends as practical measures the
establishment of a permanent State-appointed Scientific Re-

PRESS OPINIONS

vision Committee to control a national encyclopaedia of accepted
knowledge, the reform of our system of grammar, and the
adoption of a scientific method of all arithmetical relations. A
good many, on the other hand, will with good reason sympa-
thise with Virchow's vigorous protest against the tyranny of
dogmatism, for which a wide entrance is thus laid open. * In
natural science, as in all else,' Virchow truly said, ' real work,
even if it produces only isolated results, is a better security for
the durability of progress than the most ingenious speculation.'
And too often in the history of science has ingenious specula-
tion been temporarily accepted for established truth."' — Glasgow
Herald.

OF THE

UNIVERSITY

EDINBURGH : JAMES THIN, 54 SOUTH BRIDGE

EDINBURGH

PRINTED BY OLIVER AND BOYD
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