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International Conciliation 

Published monthly by the 
American Association for International Conciliation 
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y., 
Postofflce. February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894 







OCTOBER, 1914. No. 83 

American Association for international Conciliation 

Sub-station 84 (407 West 11 7th Street) 

New York Gty 


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The Executive Committee of the Association 
for International Conciliation wish to arouse the 
interest of the American people in the progress of 
the movement for promoting international peace 
and relations of comity and good fellowship 
between nations. To this end they print and 
circulate documents giving information as to the 
progress or interruption of these movements, in 
order that individual citizens, the ne\vspaper 
press, and organizations of various kinds may have 
readily available accurate information on these 
subjects. A list of publications will be found on 
page 124. 


My Fellow-Countrymen: I suppose that every thoughtful man in 
America has asked himself during the last troubled weeks what influence 
the European war may exert upon the United States, and I take the Hberty 
of addressing a few words to you in order to point out that it is entirely 
within our own choice what its effects upon us will be and to urge very 
earnestly upon you the sort of speech and conduct which will best safe- 
guard the nation against distress and disaster. 

The effect of the war upon the United States will depend upon what 
American citizens say or do. Every man who really loves America will 
act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impar- 
tiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned. The spirit of the 
nation in this critical matter will be determined largely by what individ- 
uals and society and those gathered in public meetings do and say, upon 
what newspapers and magazines contain, upon what our ministers utter 
m their pulpits and men proclaim as their opinions on the streets. 

The people of the United States are drawn from many nations, and 
chiefly from the nations now at war. It is natural and inevitable that 
there should be the utmost variety of sympathy and desire among them 
with regard to the issues and circumstances of the conflict. Some will 
wish one nation, others another, to succeed in the momentous struggle. 
It will be easy to excite passion and difficult to allay it. Those respon- 
sible for exciting it will assume a heavy responsibility; responsibiHty for 
no less a thing than that the people of the United States, whose love of 
their country and whose loyalty to its Government should unite them 
as Americans all, bound in honor and affection to think first of her and 
her interests, may be divided in camps of hostile opinions, hot against 
each other, involved in the war itself in impulse and opinion, if not in 
action. Such diversions among us would be fatal to our peace of mind 
and might seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of our 
duty as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself ready 
to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace 
and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend. 

I venture, therefore, my fellow-countrymen, to speak a solemn word of 
warning to you against that deepest, most subtle, most essential breach of 
neutraHty which may spring out of partisanship, out of passionately taking 
sides. The United States must be neutral in fact as well as in name 
during these days that are to try men's souls. We must be impartial 
in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments 
as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference 
of one party to the struggle before another. 

My thought is of America. I am speaking, I feel sure, the earnest 
wish and purpose of every thoughtful American that this great country of 
ours, which is, of course, the first in our thoughts and in our hearts, should 
show herself in this time of peculiar trial a nation fit beyond others to 
exhibit the fine poise of undisturbed judgment, the dignity of self-control, 
the efficiency of dispassionate action, a nation that neither sits in judg- 
ment upon others nor is disturbed in her own counsels and which keeps 
herself fit and free to do what is honest and disinterested and truly 
serviceable for the peace of the world. 

^ Shall we not resolve to put upon ourselves the restraint which will 
bring to our people the happiness and the great and lasting influence for 
peace we covet for them? 



On the 31st March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on the 
instructions of the Servian Government, made the following declaration 
to the Imperial and Royal Government: 

"Servia recognizes that the fait accompli regarding Bosnia has not 
affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions 
that the Powers may take in conformity with Article 25 of the Treaty of 
Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers Servia under- 
takes to renounce from now onward the attitude of protest and opposi- 
tion which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last 
Autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy 
with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good neighborly 
terms with the latter."' 

The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events of 
the 28th June last, have shown the existence of a subversive movement 
with the object of detaching a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary 
from the monarchy. The movement, which had its birth under the eye 
of the Servian Government, has gone so far as to make itself manifest on 
both sides of the Servian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a 
series of outrages and murders. 

Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the decla- 
ration of the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done 
nothing to repress these movements. It has permitted the criminal 
machinations of various societies and associations directed against the 
monarchy and has tolerated unrestrained language on the part of the 
press, the glorification of the perpetrators of outrages, and the participa- 
tion of officers and functionaries in subversive agitation. It has per- 
mitted an unwholesome propaganda in public instruction. In short, it 
has permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Servian popula- 
tion to hatred oi the monarchy and contempt of its institutions. 

This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Government had not 
ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th June last proved its 
fatal consequences to the whole world. 

It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal per- 
petrators of the outrage of the 28th June that the Serajevo assassinations 
were planned in Belgrade, that the arms and explosives with which the 
murderers were provided had been given to them by Servian officers and 

functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana, and, finally, that the 
passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organized and 
effected by the chiefs of the Servian frontier service. 

The above-mentioned results of the Magisterial investigation do not 
permit the Austro- Hungarian Government to pursue any longer the 
attitude of expectant forbearance which it has maintained for years in 
face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in 
the territories of the monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose on 
it the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual 
menace to the tranquility of the monarchy. 

To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government sees itself 
compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government a formal assur- 
ance that it condemns this dangerous propaganda against the monarchy; 
in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is 
to detach from the monarchy territories belonging to it, and that it under- 
takes to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propa- 

In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal 
Servian Government shall publish on the front page of its Official Journal 
of the 26th June (13th July) the following declaration: 

"The Royal Government of Servia condemns the propaganda directed 
against Austria-Hungary — i. e., the general tendency of which the final 
aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy territories belong- 
ing to it, and it sincerely deplores the fatal consequences of these criminal 

"The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and function- 
aries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus com- 
promised the good neighborly relations to which the Royal Government 
was solemnly pledged by its declaration of the 31st March, 1909. 

"The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all idea 
of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabi- 
tants of any part whatsoever of Austria- Hungary, considers it its duty 
formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of 
the kingdom, that henceforward it will proceed with the utmost^ rigor 
against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which it will 
use all its efforts to anticipate and suppress." 

This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the royal 
army as an order of the day by his Majesty the King and shall be pub- 
lished in the Official Bulletin of the army. 

The Royal Servian Government further undertakes: 

1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt 
of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is 
directed against its territorial integrity; 

2. To dissolve immediately the society styled Narodna Odbrana, to 
confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner 
against other societies and their branches in Servia which engage in prop- 
aganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Govern- 
ment shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved 
from continuing their activity under another name and form; 

3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia, both 
as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruc- 

tion, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda 
against Austria-Hungary ; 

4. To remove from the military service, and from the administration 
in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hun- 
garian Government reserves to itself the right of communicating to the 
Royal Government; 

5. To accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of the 
Austro-Hungarian Government in the suppression of the subversive move- 
ment directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy; 

6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 
28th June who are on Servian territory. Delegates of the Austro-Hunga- 
rian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto; 

7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija Tankositch 
and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employe, 
who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial inquiry at 

8. To prevent by effective measures the co-operation of the Servian 
authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, 
to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Scha- 
batz and Loznica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo 
crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier; 

9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations 
regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials, both in 
Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, did not 
hesitate after the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in inter- 
views in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government; and, 

10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of 
the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government expects the reply of the Royal 
Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th July. 

A memorandum dealing with the results of the magisterial inquiry at 
Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under heads (7) and (8) 
is attached to this note. 



The Royal Servian Government have received the communication of 
the Imperial and Royal Government of the loth instant, and are con- 
vinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which may 
threaten to impair the good neighborly relations between the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia. 

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from 
the tribune of the national Skupshtina and in the declarations and actions 
of the responsible representatives of the State — protests which were cut 
short by the declaration made by the Servian Government on the i8th 
March, 1909 — have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great 
neighboring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that 
time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their organs, to 
change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herze- 
govina, the Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this 
connection the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representa- 
tion except one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the 
Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explana- 
tion. Servia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate 
policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to the 
sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace 
that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be 
held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles 
in the press and the peaceable work of societies — manifestations which 
take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and 
which as a general rule escape official control. The Royal Government 
are all the less responsible in view of the fact that at the time of the solution 
of a series of questions which arose between Servia and Austria- Hungary 
they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling 
the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighboring 

For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and sur- 
prised at the statements according to which members of the Kingdom of 
Servia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime 
committed at Serajevo; the Royal Government expected to be invited to 
collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they 
were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to 
take measures against any persons concerning whom representations 
were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial 


and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any 
Servian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose com- 
plicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially 
they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the "Journal 
officiel," on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration: 

"The Royal Government of Servia condemn all propaganda which 
may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all such tenden- 
cies as aim at ultimately detaching from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
territories which form part thereof, and they sincerely deplore the baneful 
consequences of these criminal movements. The Royal Government 
regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal 
Government, certain Servian officers and officials should have taken part 
in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromise the good 
neighborly relations to which the Royal Servian Government was solemnly 
engaged by the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, which declaration 
disapproves and repudiates all idea or attempt at interference with the 
destiny of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, 
and they consider it their duty formally to warn the officers, officials, and 
entire population of the kingdom that henceforth they will take the most 
rigorous steps against all such persons as are guilty of such acts, to pre- 
vent and to repress which they will use their utmost endeavor." 

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal Army 
in an order of the day, in the name of his Majesty the King, by his Royal 
Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next 
official army bulletin. 

The Royal Government further undertake: 

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skupshtina a 
provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of 
incitement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 
and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of 
which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. 
The Government engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution 
to cause an amendment to be introduced into Article 22 of the Constitu- 
tion of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a pro- 
ceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of Article 22 of 
the Constitution. 

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Im- 
perial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the "Narodna 
Odbrana" and other similar societies have committed up to the present 
any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their 
members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand 
of the Imperial and Royal Government and will dissolve the "Narodna 
Odbrana" Society and every other society which may be directing its 
efforts against Austria-Hungary. 

3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to remove without 
delay from their public educational establishments in Servia all that 
serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, 
whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts 
and proofs of this propaganda. 

4- The Royal Government also agree to remove from military service 
all such persons as the judicial inquiry may have proved to be guilty of 
acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to com- 
municate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers 
and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken 
against them. 

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly 
grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and 
Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the collabora- 
tion of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their 
territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as 
agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, 
and with good neighborly relations. 

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it 
their duty to open an inquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually 
may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th June, and who happen to be 
within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in 
this inquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for 
this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Govern- 
ment cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of 
the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in 
concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in 
question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents. 

7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the 
delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voislav Tankossitch. As 
regards Milan Ziganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy and who up to the 15th June was employed (on probation) 
by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest 

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to 
supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evi- 
dence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been 
collected up to the present time, at the inquiry at Serajevo, for the pur- 
poses of the latter inquiry. 

8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures 
which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic of arms and ex- 
plosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will imme- 
diately order an inquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the 
Schabatz-Loznitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the 
authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass. 

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the re- 
marks made by their officials, whether in Servia or abroad, in interviews 
after the crime, and which, according to the statement of the Imperial 
and Royal Government, were hostile toward the Monarchy, as soon as 
the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the 
passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown 
that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, although the 
Royal Government will itself take steps to collect evidence and proofs. 

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal 
Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above 


heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as 
soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out. 

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this 
reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common 
interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, 
to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the 
decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great 
Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by 
the Servian Government on the i8th (31st) March, 1909. 
Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914. 




Issued by the British Foreign Office on August 5, 1914 

Persons Mentioned in the Correspondence 

Count Benckendorff 
Count Berchtold . 
Sir F. Bertie . 
Sir G. Buchanan . 
Sir M. De Bunsen 
M. Cambon .... 
Mr. Crackanthorpe . 

Sir E. Goschen 
Sir Edward Grey . 
Prince Lichnowsky . 
Count Mensdorff 
Sir Arthur Nicolson 
Sir R. Rood 
Sir R. Rumbold 
Marquis Di San Giuliano 
M. Sazonof .... 
M. Suchomlinof . 
Count Szapary 
Prince Troubetzkoy . 

Sir F. Villiers 

M. Viviani . . . . 

. Russian Ambassador at London. 

. Austrian Foreign Minister. 

. British Ambassador at Paris. 

. British Ambassador at St. Petersburg 

. British Ambassador at Vienna. 

. French Ambassador to Germany. 

. First Secretary in British Diplomatic Serv- 
ice at Belgrade. 

. British Ambassador at Berlin. 

. British Foreign Secretary. 

. Germaii Ambassador to Great Britain. 

. Austrian Ambassador to Great Britain. 

. Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. 

. British Ambassador at Rome. 

. Of the British Diplomatic Service. 

. Foreign Minister of Italy. 

. Russian Premier. 

. Russian Minister for War. 

. Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to Russia. 

. General attached to the miHtary household 
of the Czar of Russia. 

. British Envoy Extraordinary and Minister 
Plenipotentiary to Belgium. 

. Premier of France. 


No. 1. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen 

London, Foreign Office, July 20, 1914. 

Sir: I asked the German Ambassador today if he had any news of what 
was going on in Vienna with regard to Servia. 

He said that he had not but Austria was certainly going to take some 
step, and he regarded the situation as very uncomfortable. 

I said that I had not heard anything recently, except that Count 
Berchtold, in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had deprecated 
the suggestion that the situation was grave, but had said that it should 
be cleared up. 

The German Ambassador said that it would be a very desirable thing 
if Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Servia. 

I said that I assumed that the Austrian Government would not do 
anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case against 
Servia, founded presumably upon what they had discovered at the trial. 

The Ambassador said that he certainly assumed that they would act 
upon some case that would be made known. 

I said that this would make it easier for others, such as Russia, to counsel 
moderation in Belgrade. In fact, the more Austria could keep her demand 
within reasonable limits, and the stronger the justification she could pro- 
duce for making any demand, the more chance there would be of smoothing 
things over. I hated the idea of a war between any of the great powers, and 
that any of them should be dragged into a war by Servia would be detest- 

The Ambassador agreed wholeheartedly in this sentiment. 

I am, &c., 


No. 2. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 22.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 22, 19 14. 

Last night I met Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the forth- 
coming Austrian demarche at Belgrade was alluded to by his Excellency 
in the conversation that ensued. His Excellency was evidently of opinion 
that this step on Austria's part would have been made ere this. He in- 
sisted that question at issue was one for settlement between Servia and 
Austria alone, and that there should be no interference from outside in 
the discussions between those two countries. He had, therefore, con- 
sidered it inadvisable that the Austro-Hungarian Government should be 
approached by the German Government on the matter. He had, how- 


ever, on several occasions in conversation with the Servian Minister 
emphasized the extreme importance that Austro-Servian relations should 
be put on a proper footing. 

Finally, his Excellency observed to me that for a long time past the 
attitude adopted toward Servia by Austria had, in his opinion, been one 
of great forbearance. 

No. 3. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen 

London, Foreign Office, July 23, 19 14. 

Sir : Count Mensdorff told me today that he would be able tomorrow 
morning to let me have officially the communication that he understood 
was being made to Servia today by Austria. He then explained privately 
what the nature of the demand would be. As he told fne that the facts 
would all be set out in the paper that he would give me tomorrow, it is 
unnecessary to record them now. I gathered that they would include 
proof of the complicity of some Servian officials in the plot to murder the 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and a long list of demands consequently made 
by Austria on Servia. 

As regards all this, I said that it was not a matter on which I would 
make any comment until I received an official communication, and it 
seemed to me probably a matter on which I should not be able to make 
any comment at first sight. 

But, when Count Mensdorff told me that he supposed there would be 
something in the nature of a time limit, which was in effect akin to an 
ultimatum, I said that I regretted this very much. To begin with, a time 
limit might inflame opinion in Russia, and it would make it difficult, if not 
impossible, to give more time, even if after a few days it appeared that by 
giving more time there would be a prospect of securing a peaceful settle- 
ment and getting a satisfactory reply from Servia. I admitted that, if 
there was no time limit, the proceedings might be unduly protracted, but 
I urged that a time limit could always be introduced afterward; that, if 
the demands were made without a time limit in the first instance, Russian 
public opinion might be less excited, after a week it might have cooled 
down, and if the Austrian case was very strong it might be apparent that 
the Russian Government would be in a position to use their influence in 
favor of a satisfactory reply from Servia. A time limit was generally a 
thing to be used only in the last resort, after other means had been tried 
and failed. 

Count Mensdorff said that if Servia, in the interval that had elapsed 
since the murder of the Archduke, had voluntarily instituted an inquiry 
on her own territory, all this might have been avoided. In 1909 Servia 
had said in a note that she intended to live on terms of good neighborhood 


with Austria; but she had never kept her promise, she had stirred up 
agitation the object of which was to disintegrate Austria, and it was abso- 
lutely necessary for Austria to protect herself. 

I said that I would not comment upon or criticise what Count Mens- 
dorff had told me this afternoon, but I could not help dwelling upon the 
awful consequences involved in the situation. Great apprehension had 
been expressed to me, not specially by M. Cambon and Count Bencken- 
dorff, but also by others, as to what might happen, and it had been repre- 
sented to me that it would be very desirable that those who had influence 
in St. Petersburg should use it on behalf of patience and moderation. I 
had replied that the amount of influence that could be used in this sense 
would depend upon how reasonable were the Austrian demands and how 
strong the justification that Austria might have discovered for making 
her demands. The possible consequences of the present situation were 
terrible. If as many as four Great Powers of Europe — let us say Austria, 
France, Russia, and Germany — were engaged in war, it seemed to me that 
it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money and such an 
interference with trade that a war would be accompanied or followed by 
a complete collapse of European credit and industry. In these days, in 
great industrial States, this would mean a state of things worse than that 
of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in the war, many things 
might be completely swept away. 

Count Mensdorff did not demur to this statement of the possible con- 
sequences of the present situation, but he said that all would depend upon 

I made the remark that, in a time of difficulties such as this, it was just 
as true to say that it required two to keep the peace as it was to say, 
ordinarily, that it took two to make a quarrel. I hoped very much that, 
if there were difficulties, Austria and Russia would be able in the first 
instance to discuss them directly with each other. 

Count Mensdorff said that he hoped this would be possible, but he was 
under the impression that the attitude in St. Petersburg had not been 
very favorable recently, 

I am, &c., 


No. 4. Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff 

■ (Communicated by Count Mensdorff, Vienna, July 24, 19 14.) 


The Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address the fol- 
lowing note to the Servian Government on the 23rd July, through the 
medium of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade: 

I have the honor to request your Excellency to bring the contents of 
this note to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited, 
accompanying your communication with the following observations: 

Already printed, see pages S"?- 

On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed to 
Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above. 

On the very day after this declaration Servia embarked on a policy 
of instilling revolutionary ideas into the Serb subjects of the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy, and so preparing the separation of the Austro- 
Hungarian territory on the Servian frontier. 

Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation. 

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups, whose object, 
either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on Austro-Hungarian 
territory. These societies and groups count among their members Gen- 
erals and diplomatists. Government officials and Judges — in short, men 
at the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom. 

Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, 
which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without 
the organs of the Servian press stirring up their readers to hatred or con- 
tempt for the neighboring monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less 
openly against its security and integrity. 

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means 
the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the youth in the 
frontier provinces. 

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of the 
spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has left such 
sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom. Individuals belong- 
ing formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place 
themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria- 

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been 
exposed for years, the Servian Government has not thought it incumbent 
on it to take the slightest step. The Servian Government has thus failed 
in the duty imposed on it by the solemn declaration of the 31st March, 
1909, and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaking 
given to Austria-Hungary. 

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face of the 
provocative attitude of Servia was inspired by the territorial disinterested- 
ness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Servian 
Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria- 
Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent atti- 
tude toward the political interests of Servia, the Imperial and Royal Gov- 
ernment hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an analo- 
gous line of conduct on its own side. In particular Austria-Hungary 
expected a development of this kind in the political ideas of Servia, when, 
after the events of 19 12, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its dis- 
interested and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandize- 
ment of Servia possible. 

The benevolence which Austria-Hungary showed toward the neigh- 
boring State had no restraining effect on the proceedings of the kingdom, 
which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of which the 
fatal consequences were demonstrated to the whole world on the 28 th 
June last, when the Heir Presumptive to the Monarchy and his illustrious 
consort fell victims to a plot hatched at Belgrade. 


In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment has felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a 
view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary move- 
ment that is threatening the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian 

The Imperial and Royal Government is convinced that in taking this 
step it will find itself in full agreement with the sentiments of all civilized 
nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon that can be 
employed with impunity in political strife and the peace of Europe to be 
continually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade. 

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government holds at 
the disposal of the British Government a dossier elucidating the Servian 
intrigues and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of 
the 28th June. 

An identical communication has been addressed to the imperial and 
royal representatives accredited to the other signatory powers. 

You are authorized to leave a copy of this dispatch in the hands of the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Vienna, July 24, 19 14. 


The criminal inquiry opened by the Court of Serajevo against Gavrilo 
Princip and his accessories in and before the act of assassination committed 
by them on the 28th June last, has up to the present led to the following 

1. The plot, having as its object the assassination of the Archduke 
Francis Ferdinand at the time of his visit to Serajevo, was formed at Bel- 
grade by Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, one Milan Ciganovic, and 
Trifko Grabez, with the assistance of Commander Voija Tankosic. 

2. The six bombs and the four Browning pistols and ammunition with 
which the guilty parties committed the act were delivered to Princip, 
Cabrinovic, and Grabez, by the man Milan Ciganovic and Commander 
Voija Tankosic at Belgrade. 

3. The bombs are hand-grenades, coming from the arms depot of the 
Servian Army at Kragujevac. 

4. In order to insure the success of the act, Ciganovic taught Princip, 
Cabrinovic, and Grabez how to use the bombs, and gave lessons in firing 
Browning pistols to Princip and Grabez in a forest near the shooting ground 
at Topschider. 

5. To enable Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez to cross the frontier 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina and smuggle in their contraband of arms secretly, 
a secret system of transport was organized by Ciganovic. 

By this arrangement the introduction into Bosnia-Herzegovina of 
criminals and their arms was effected by the officials controlling the fron- 
tiers at Chabac (Rade Popovic) and Loznica, as well as by the customs 
ofl&cer Rudivoj Grbic of Loznica, with the assistance of various indi- 


No. 6. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen 


London, Foreign Office, July 24, 191 4. 

Note addressed to Servia, together with an explanation of the reasons 
leading up to it, has been communicated to me by Count Mensdorff. 

In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency I remarked that it 
seemed to me a matter for great regret that a time limit, and such a short 
one at that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the proceedings. The 
murder of the Archduke and some of the circumstances respecting Servia 
quoted in the note aroused sympathy with Austria, as was but natural, but 
at the same time I had never before seen one State address to another 
independent State a document of so formidable a character. Demand 
No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Servia's inde- 
pendent sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that 
Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who 
would have authority within the frontiers of Servia. 

I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should concern myself 
with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of 
Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Servia were not 
the concern of his. Majesty's Government, and such comments as I had 
made above were not made in order to discuss those merits. 

I ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of 
views with other powers, and that I must await their views as to what 
could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation. 

Count Mensdorff replied that the present situation might never have 
arisen if Servia had held out a hand after the murder of the Archduke; 
Servia had, however, shown no sign of sympathy or help, though some 
weeks had already elapsed since the murder; a time limit, said his Excel- 
lency, was essential, owing to the procrastination on Servia's part. 

I said that if Servia had procrastinated in replying a time limit could 
have been introduced later; but, as things now stood, the terms of the 
Servian reply had been dictated by Austria, who had not been content to 
limit herself to a demand for a reply within a limit of forty-eight hours 
from its presentation. 

No. 6. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 24.) 

St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914. 

I had a telephone message this morning from M. Sazonof to the efifect 
that the text of the Austrian ultimatum had just reached him. 

His Excellency added that a reply within forty-eight hours was de- 
manded, and he begged me to meet him at the French Embassy to discuss 
matters, as Austrian step clearly meant that war was imminent. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was both pro- 
vocative and immoral; she would never have taken such action unless 


Germany had first been consulted; some of her demands were quite im- 
possible of acceptance. He hoped that his Majesty's Government would 
not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France. 

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would 
fulfill all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity 
arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations. 

I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excel- 
lencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of 
his Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any 
declaration of solidarity from his Majesty's Government that would entail 
an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France 
by force of arms. Direct British interests in Servia were nil, and a war 
on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public 
opinion. To this M. Sazonof replied that we must not forget that the 
general European question was involved, the Servian question being but 
a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not afford to efface 
herself from the problems now at issue. 

In reply to these remarks I observed that I gathered from what he 
said that his Excellency was suggesting that Great Britain should join 
in making a communication to Austria to the effect that active interven- 
tion by her in the internal affairs of Servia could not be tolerated. But, 
supposing Austria nevertheless proceeded to embark on military measures 
against Servia in spite of our representations, was it the intention of the 
Russian Government forthwith to declare war on Austria? 

M. Sazonof said that he himself thought that Russian mobilization 
would at any rate have to be carried out; but a council of Ministers was 
being held this afternoon to consider the whole question. A further coun- 
cil would be held, probably tomorrow, at which the Emperor would pre- 
side, when a decision would be come to. 

I said that it seemed to me that the important point was to induce 
Austria to extend the time limit, and that the first thing to do was to bring 
an influence to bear on Austria with that end in view ; French Ambassador, 
however, thought that either Austria had md,de up her mind to act at once 
or that she was blufhng. Whichever it might be, our only chance of averting 
war was for us to adopt a firm and united attitude. He did not think there 
was time to carry out my suggestion. Thereupon I said that it seemed to 
me desirable that we should know just how far Servia was prepared to go 
to meet the demands formulated by Austria in her note. M. Sazonof 
replied that he must first consult his colleagues on this point, but that 
doubtless some of the Austrian demands could be accepted by Servia. 

French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continued to press me for a 
declaration of complete solidarity of his Majesty's Government with French 
and Russian Governments, and I therefore said that it seemed to me pos- 
sible that you might perhaps be willing to make strong representations to 
both German and Austrian Governments, urging upon them that an attack 
upon Servia by Austria would endanger the whole peace of Europe. Per- 
haps you might see your way to saying to them that such action on the 
part of Austria would probably mean Russian intervention, which would 
involve France and Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great Brit- 
ain to keep out if the war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered 
that we would sooner or later be dragged into war, if it did break out; we 


should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset make 
common cause with his country and with France; at any rate, he hoped his 
Majesty's Government would express strong reprobation of action taken 
by Austria. 

President of French Republic and President of the Council cannot reach 
France, on their return from Russia, for four or five days, and it looks as 
though Austria purposely chose this moment to present their ultimatum. 

It seems to me, from the language held by French Ambassador, that, 
even if we decline to join them, France and Russia are determined to make 
a strong stand. 

No. 7. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 24,) 

Vienna, July 24, 19 14. 

Before departing on leave of absence, I was assured by Russian Ambas- 
sador that any action taken by Austria to humiliate Servia could not leave 
Russia indifferent. 

Russian Charge d'Ailaires was received this morning by Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, and said to him, as his own personal view, that Austrian 
note was drawn up in a form rendering it impossible of acceptance as it 
stood, and that it was both unusual and peremptory in its terms. Minister 
for Foreign Affairs replied that Austrian Minister was under instructions 
to leave Belgrade unless Austrian demands were accepted integrally by 4 
P. M. tomorrow. His Excellency added that Dual Monarchy felt that its 
very existence was at stake ; and that the step taken had caused great satis- 
faction throughout the country. He did not think that objections to what 
had been done could be raised by any power. 

No. 8. Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 24.) 

Belgrade, July 24, 1914. 

Austrian demands are considered absolutely unacceptable by Servian 
Government, who earnestly trust that his Majesty's Government may see 
their way to induce Austrian Government to moderate them. 

This request was conveyed to me by Servian Prime Minister, who re- 
turned early this morning to Belgrade. His Excellency is dejected, and is 
clearly very anxious as to developments that may arise. 


No. 9. Note Communicated by German Ambassador 

London, July 24, 19 14. 

The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the 
circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian heir presump- 
tive and his consort has taken place disclose unmistakably the aims which 
the Great Servian propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to 
realize them. The facts now made known must also do away with the last 
doubts that the centre of activity of all those tendencies which are directed 
toward the detachment of the southern Slav provinces from the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy and their incorporated into the Servian kingdom is 
to be found in Belgrade, and is at work there with at least the connivance 
of members of Government and army. 

The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years. In an 
especially marked form the Great Servian chauvinism manifested itself 
during the Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to the far-reaching self- 
restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the 
energetic interference of the great powers that the Servian provocations 
to which Austria-Hungary was then exposed did not lead to a conflict. 
The assurance of good conduct in future which was given by the Servian 
Government at that time has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least 
with the tacit permission of official Servia, the Great Servian propaganda 
has continuously increased in extension and intensity; to its account must 
be set the recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has 
become clearly evident that it would not be consistent either with the 
dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
still longer to remain inactive in face of this movement on the other side 
of the frontier, by which the security and the integrity of her territories 
are constantly menaced. Under these circumstances, the course of pro- 
cedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be 
regarded as equitable and moderate. In spite of that, the attitude which 
public opinion as well as the Government in Ser\da have recently adopted 
does not exclude the apprehension that the Servian Government might 
refuse to comply with those demands, and might allow themselves to be 
carried away into a provocative attitude against Austria-Hungary. The 
Austro-Hungarian Government, if it does not wish definitely to abandon 
Austria's position as a great power, would then have no choice but to obtain 
the fulfillment of their demands from the Servian Government by strong 
pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the 
means having to be left to them. 

The Imperial Government want to emphasize their opinion that in the 
present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively 
between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the great powers ought 
seriously to endeavor to reserve it to those two immediately concerned. 
The Imperial Government desire urgently the localization of the conflict, 
because every interference of another power would, owing to the different 
treaty obligations, be followed by incalculable consequences. 


No. 10. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie 

London*, Foreign Office, July 24, 19 14. 

Sir: After telling M. Cambon today of the Austrian communication 
to Servia which I had received this morning, and of the comment I had made 
to Count Mensdorff upon it yesterday, I told M. Cambon that this after- 
noon I was to see the German Ambassador, who some days ago had asked 
me privately to exercise moderating influence in St. Petersburg. I would 
say to the Ambassador that, of course, if the presentation of this ultimatum 
to Servia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, we need not 
concern ourselves about it: but if Russia took the view of the Austrian 
ultimatum, which it seemed to me that any power interested in Servia would 
take, I should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the ultimatum, to 
exercise any moderating influence. I would say that I thought the only 
chance of any mediating or moderating influence being exercised was that 
Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves, who had not direct interests in 
Servia, should act together for the sake of peace, simultaneously in Vienna 
and St. Petersburg. 

M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four 
powers, he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join in it; 
but he pointed out that we could not say anything in St. Petersburg till 
Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some action. But, when two 
days were over, Austria would march into Servia, for the Servians could not 
possibly accept the Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her 
public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Servia, and there- 
fore, once the Austrians had attacked Servia, it would be too late for any 

I said that I had not contemplated any thing being said in St. Petersburg 
until after it was clear that there must be trouble between Austria and 
Russia. I had thought that if Austria did move into Servia, and Russia then 
mobilized, it would be possible for the four powers to urge Austria to stop 
her advance, and Russia also to stop hers, pending mediation. But it 
would be essential for any chance of success for such a step that Germany 
should participate in it. 

M. Cambon said that it would be too late after Austria had once moved 
against Servia. The important thing was to gain time by mediation in 
Vienna. The best chance of this being accepted would be that Germany 
should propose it to the other powers. 

I said that by this he meant a mediation between Austria and Servia. 

He replied that it was so. 

I said that I would talk to the German Ambassador this aftemoon^on the 

I am, &c., 



No. 11. Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold 


London, Foreign Office, July 24, 19 14. 

German Ambassador has communicated to me the view of the German 
Government about the Austrian demand in Servia. I understand the Ger- 
man Government is making the same communication to the powers. 

I said that if the Austrian ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble 
between Austria and Russia, I had no concern with it; I had heard nothing 
yet from St. Petersburg, but I was very apprehensive of the view Russia 
would take of the situation. I reminded the German Ambassador that 
some days ago he had expressed a personal hope that if need arose I would 
endeavor to exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburg, but now I said 
that, in view of the extraordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note, the 
shortness of the time allowed, and the wide scope of the demands upon 
Servia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did not 
believe any power could exercise influence alone. 

The only chance I could see of mediating or moderating influence being 
effective, was that the four powers, Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves, 
should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favor 
of moderation in the event of the relations between Austria and Russia 
becoming threatening. 

The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march 
into Servia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should march to 
help Servia; it would be very desirable to get Austria not to precipitate 
military action and so to gain more time. But none of us could influence 
Austria in this direction unless Germany would propose and participate 
in such action at Vienna. You should inform Secretary of State. 

Prince Lichnowsky said that Austria might be expected to move when 
the time limit expired unless Servia could give unconditional acceptance of 
Austrian demands in toto. Speaking privately, his Excellency suggested 
that a negative reply must in no case be returned by Servia; a reply favor- 
able on some points must be sent at once, so that an excuse against im- 
mediate action might be afforded to Austria. 

No. 12. Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe 


London, Foreign Office, July 24, 19 14. 

Servia ought to promise that, if it is proved that Servian officials, how- 
ever subordinate they may be, were accomplices in the murder of the 
Archduke at Serajevo, she will give Austria the fullest satisfaction. She 
certainly ought to express concern and regret. For the rest, Servian Gov- 
ernment must reply to Austrian demands as they consider best in Servian 

It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria when time 
limit expires can be averted by anything but unconditional acceptance of 
h^r demands, but only chance appears to lie in avoiding an absolute refusal 
and replying favorably to as many points as the time limit allows. 


Servian Minister here has begged that his Majesty's Government will 
express their views, but I cannot undertake responsibility of saying more 
than I have said above, and I do not Hke to say even that without knowing 
what is being said at Belgrade by French and Russian Governments. You 
should therefore consult your French and Russian colleagues as to repeating 
what my views are, as expressed above, to Servian Government. 

I have urged upon German Ambassador that Austria should not pre- 
cipitate military action. 

No. 13. Note Communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 26 


M. Sazonof telegraphs to the Russian Charg^ d 'Affaires at Vienna on the 
nth (24th) July, 19 14: 

"The Communication made by Austria-Hungary to the Powers the day 
after the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period to the 
Powers which is quite insufficient to enable them to take any steps which 
might help to smooth away the difffculties that have arisen. 

"In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalculable and fatal 
to all the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed by 
the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all essential 
that the period allowed for the Servian reply should be extended. Austria- 
Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform the Powers of the results 
of the inquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their 
accusations, should equally allow them sufficient time to study them. 

"In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian 
demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer advice to 
the Servian Government. 

"A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory 
the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, 
and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations. 

"Prince Kudachef is instructed to communicate the above to the 
Cabinet at Vienna. • 

"M. Sazonof hopes that his Britannic Majesty's Government will share 
to the point of view set forth above, and he trusts that Sir E. Grey will 
see his way to furnish similar instructions to -the British Ambassador at 

No. 14. Sir Edward Grey to F. Bertie and to Sir G. Buchanan 


London, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. 

Austrian Ambassador has been authorized to explain to me that the 
step taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum, but a demarche with a time 
limit, and that if the Austrian demands were not complied with within the 


time limit the Austro-Hungarian Government would break off diplomatic 
relations and begin military preparations, not operations. 

In case Austro-Hungarian Government have not given the same informa- 
tion at Paris, (St. Petersburg,) you should inform Minister for Foreign 
Affairs as soon as possible; it makes the immediate situation rather less 

No. 15. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 25.) 

Paris, July 25, 1914. 

I learn from the Acting Political Director that the French Government 
has not yet received the explanation from the Austrian Government con- 
tained in your telegram today.* They have, however, through the Servian 
Minister here, given similar advice to Servia as was contained in your tele- 
gram to Belgrade, of yesterday, f 

* See No. 14. f See No. 12. 

No. 16. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 25.) 

Paris, July 25, 19 14. 

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has no suggestions to make except 
that moderating advice might be given at Vienna as well as at Belgrade. 
He hopes that the Servian Government's answer to the Austrian ultimatum 
will be sufficiently favorable to obviate extreme measures being taken by 
the Austrian Government. He says, however, that there would be a 
revolution in Servia if she were to accept the Austrian demands in their 

No. 17. I Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 25.) 
(Telegraphic.) S^_ Petersburg, July 25, 1914. 

I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and communicated 
to his Excellency the substance of your telegram of today to Paris,* and this 
afternoon I discussed with him the communication which the French Am- 
bassador suggested should be made to the Servian Government, as recorded 
in your telegram of yesterday to Belgrade. f 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said, as regards the former, that the 
explanations of the Austrian Ambassador did not quite correspond with the 
information which had reached him from German quarters. As regards the 
latter, both his Excellency and the French Ambassador agreed that it is 

* See No. 14. f See No. 12. 


too late to make such a communication, as the time limit expires this even- 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said, that Servia was quite ready to do 
as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that no 
independent State could be expected to accept the political demands which 
had been put forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, from a 
conversation which he had with the Servian Minister yesterday, that, in 
the event of the Austrians attacking Servia, the Servian Government would 
abandon Belgrade and withdraw their forces into the interior while they 
would at the same time appeal to the Powers to help them. His Excellency 
was in favor of their making this appeal. He would like to see the question 
placed on an international footing, as the obligations taken by Servia in 
1908, to which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were given 
not to Austria, but to the Powers. 

If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready to 
stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, 
Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Servia might 
propose to submit the question to arbitration. 

On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate 
war by mobilizing until you had had time to use your influence in favor of 
peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive Intentions, 
and she would take no action until it was forced on her. Austria's action 
was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the 
present status quo in the Balkans and establishing her own hegemony 
there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her atti- 
tude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and 
Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now rivers of blood would 
flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war. 

I said that England could play the role of mediator at Berlin and Vienna 
to better purpose as friend, who, if her counsels of moderation were dis- 
regarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to de- 
clare herself Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said that unfortunately 
Germany was convinced that she could count upon our neutrality. 

I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
and warned him that if Russia mobilized Germany would not be content 
with mere mobilization or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would 
probably declare war at once. His Excellency replied that Russia could 
not allow Austria to crush Servia and become the predominant Power 
in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will 
face all the risks of war. He assured me once more that he did not wish to 
precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany, could restrain Austria I 
could regard the situation as desperate. 

No. 18. Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 25.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 25, 1914. 

Your telegram of the 24th July * acted on. 

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that on receipt of a telegram 
at 10 this morning from German Ambassador at London, he immediately 
* See No. 11. 


instructed German Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to Austrian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs your suggestion for an extension of time limit, and to 
speak to his Excellency about it. Unfortunately it appeared from press that 
Count Berchtold is at Ischl, and Secretary of State thought that in these 
circumstances there would be delay and difficulty in getting time Umit 
extended. Secretary of State said that he did not know what Austria- 
Hungary had ready on the spot, but he admitted quite freely that Austro- 
Hungarian Government wished to give the Servians a lesson, and that they 
meant to take military action. He also admitted that Servian Government 
could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands. 

Secretary of S:ate said that a reassuring feature of situation was that 
Count Berchtold had sent for Russian representative at Vienna and had 
told him that Austria-Hungary had no intention of seizing Servian territory. 
This step should, in his opinion, exercise a calming influence at St. Peters- 
burg. I asked whether it was not to be feared that, in taking military action 
against Servia, Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in Russia. 
He said he thought not. He remained of opinion that crisis could be local- 
ized. I said that telegrams from Russia in this morning's papers did not 
look very reassuring, but he maintained his optimistic view with regard to 
Russia. He said that he had given the Russian Government to understand 
and that last thing Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do all 
in his power to prevent such a calamity. If the relations between Austria 
and Russia became threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with your 
suggestion as to the four Powers working in favor of moderation at Vienna 
and St. Petersburg. 

Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note left 
much to be desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated very earnestly 
that, though he had been accused of knowing all about the contents of that 
note, he had, in fact, had no such knowledge. 

No. 19. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 25.) 
(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 25, 19 14. 

I saw the Secretary General this morning and found that he knew of the 
suggestion that France, Italy, Germany, and ourselves should work at 
Vienna and St. Petersburg in favor of moderation, if the relations between 
Austria and Servia became menacing. In his opinion Austria will only be 
restrained by the unconditional acceptance by the Servian Government 
of her note. There is reliable information that Austria intends to seize 
the Salonica Railway. 

No. 20. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 25.) 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 25, 19 14. 

Language of press this morning leaves the impression that the surrender 
of Servia is neither expected nor really desired. It is officially announced 


that the Austrian Minister is instructed to leave Belgrade with staff of 
legation failing unconditional acceptance of note at 6 P. M. today. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs goes to Ischl today to communicate per- 
sonally to the Emperor Servian reply when it comes. 

No. 21. Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 25.) 
(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914. 

The Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply to the Austrian 
note. I am informed .by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
that it will be most conciliatory and will meet the Austrian demands in as 
large a measure as is possible. 

The following is a brief summary of the projected reply: 

The Servian Government consent to the publication of a declaration 
in the Official Gazette. The ten points are accepted with reservatioiis. 
Servian Government declare themselves ready to agree to a mixed commis- 
sion of inquiry so long as the appointment of the commission can be shown 
to be in accordance with international usage. They consent to dismiss and 
prosecute those officers who can be clearly proved to be guilty, and they 
have already arrested the officer referred to in the Austrian note. They are 
prepared to suppress the Narodna Odbrana. 

The Servian Government consider that unless the Austrian Government 
want war at any cost, they cannot but be content with the full satisfaction 
offered in the Servian reply. 

No. 22. Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 25.) 
(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914. 

I have seen the new French Minister, who has just arrived from Con- 
stantinople, and my Russian colleague, and informed them of your views. 

They have net yet received instructions from their Governments, and 
in view of this and of the proposed conciliatory terms of the Servian reply, 
I have up to now abstained from offering advice to the Servian Government. 

I think it is highly probable that the Russian Government have already 
urged the utmost moderation on the Servian Government. 

No. 23. Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 25.) 
(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914. 

The Austrian Minister left at 6:30. 

The Government has left for Nisch, where the Skupshtina will meet on 
Monday. I am leaving with my other colleagues, but the Vice Consul is 
remaining in charge of the archives. 

28 - 

No. 24. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan 


London, Foreign Office, July 25, 19 14. 

You spoke quite rightly in very difficult circumstances as to the atti- 
tude of his Majesty's Government. I entirely approve what you said, as 
reported in your telegram of yesterday,* and I cannot promise more on 
behalf of the Government. 

I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanction 
oui* going to war over a Servian quarrel. If, however, war does take place, 
the development of other issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore 
anxious to prevent it. 

The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian 
demarche makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia 
and Austria will have mobilized against each other. In this event, the only 
chance of peace, in my opinion, is for the other four Powers to join in asking 
the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give 
time for the four Powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg to try and 
arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view, I feel strongly that 
France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly co- 

No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be tolerated by either 
Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial and included the allies or 
friends of both. The co-operation of Germany would, therefore, be essential. 

* See No. 6. 

No. 25. Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold 


London, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. 

The Austrian Ambassador has been authorized to inform me that the 
Austrian method of procedure on expiry of the time limit would be to break 
off diplomatic relations and commence military preparations, but not 
military operations. In informing the German Ambassador of this, I said 
that it interposed a stage of mobilization before the frontier was actually 
crossed, which I had urged yesterday should be delayed. 

Apparently we should now soon be face to face with the mobilization of 
Austria and Russia. The only chance of peace, if this did happen, would 
be for Germany, France, Russia* and ourselves to keep together, and to 
join in asking Austria and Russia not to cross the frontier till we had had 
time to try and arrange matters between them. 

The German Ambassador read me a telegram from the German Foreign 
Office saying that his Government had not known beforehand, and had had 
no more than other Powers to do with the stiff terms of the Austrian iiote to 
Servia, but that once she had launched that note, Austria could not draw 
back. Prince Lichnowsky said, however, that if what I contemplated was 
mediation between Austria and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity 
to accept it. He expressed himself as personally favorable to this suggestion. 

* This is apparently a misprint and should read "Italy." 


I concurred in his observation, and said that I felt I had no title to 
intervene between Austria and Servia, but as soon as the question became 
one as between Austria and Russia, the peace of Europe was affected, in 
which we must all take a hand. 

I impressed upon the Ambassador that, in the event of Russian and 
Austrian mobilization, the participation of Germany would be essential 
to any diplomatic action for peace. Alone we could do nothing. The 
French Government were traveling at the moment, and I had had no time 
to consult them, and could not, therefore, be sure of their views, but I 
was prepared, if the German Government agreed with my suggestion, to 
tell the French Government that I thought it the right thing to act upon it. 

No. 26. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Btinsen 


London, Foreign Office, July 25, 191 4. 

The Russian Ambassador has communicated to me the following 
telegram, which his Government have sent to the Russian Ambassador at 
Vienna, with instructions to communicate it to the Austrian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs: 

"The delay given to Servia for a reply is so limited that the Powers are 
prevented from taking any steps to avert the complications which are 
threatening. The Russian Government trust that the Austrian Govern- 
ment will prolong the time limit, and as the latter have declared their 
willingness to inform the Powers of the data on which they have based 
their demands on Servia, the Russian Government hope that these particu- 
lars will be furnished in-order that the Powers may examine the matter. 
If they found that some of the Austrian requests were well founded, they 
would be in a position to advise the Servian Government accordingly. 
If the Austrian Government were indisposed to prolong the time limit, not 
only would they be acting against interftational ethics, but they would 
deprive their communication to the Powers of any practical meaning." 

You may support in general terms the step taken by your Russian 

Since the telegram to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, was sent, it 
has been a relief to hear that the steps which the Austrian Government were 
taking were to be limited for the moment to the rupture of relations and to 
military preparations, and not operations. I trust, therefore, that if the 
Austro-Hungarian Government consider it too late to prolong the time 
limit, they v/ill at any rate give time in the sense and for the reasons desired 
by Russia before taking any irretrievable steps. 

No. 27. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir H. Rumbold, and 

Sir G. Buchanan 


London, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. 

I have communicated to German Ambassador the forecast of the Servian 
reply contained in Mr. Crackanthorpe's telegram of today.* I have said 

* See No. 21. 


that, if Servian reply, when received at Vienna, corresponds to this fore- 
cast, I hope the German Government will feel able to influence the Austrian 
Government to take a favorable view of it. 

No. 28 


No. 29. Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd 

London, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. 

Sir: — The Italian Ambassador came to see me today. I told him in 
general terms what I had said to the German Ambassador this morning. 

The Italian Ambassador cordially approved of this. He made no secret 
of the fact that Italy was most desirous to see war avoided. 

I am, &c., 


No. 30. Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe 

London, Foreign Office, July 25, 19 14. 

Sir: — The Servian Minister called on the 23d instant and spoke to Sir A. 
Nicolson on the present strained relations between Servia and Austria- 

He said that his Government were most anxious and disquieted. They 
were perfectly ready to meet any reasonable demands of Austria- Hungary 
so long as such demands were kept on the "terrain juridique." If the 
results of the inquiry at Serajevo — an inquiry conducted with so much 
mystery and secrecy — disclosed the fact that there were any individuals 
conspiring or organizing plots on, Servian territory, the Servian Govern- 
ment would be quite ready to take the necessary steps to give satisfaction; 
but if Austria transported the question on to the political ground, and said 
that Servian policy, being inconvenient to her, must undergo a radical 
change, and that Servia must abandon certain political ideals, no inde- 
pendent State would, or could, submit to such dictation. 

He mentioned that both the assassins of the Archduke were Austrian 
subjects — Bosniaks; that one of them had been in Servia, and that the 
Servian authorities, considering him suspect and dangerous, had desired 
to expel him, but on applying to the Austrian authorities found that the 
latter protected him, and said that he was an innocent and harmless in- 

Sir A. Nicolson, on being asked by M. Boschkovitch his opinion on the 
whole question, observed that there were no data on which to base one, 
though it was to be hoped that the Servian Government would endeavor to 
meet the Austrian demands in a conciliatory and moderate spirit. 

I am, &c., 



No. 31. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 26.) 

Vienna, July 25, 1914. 

Servian reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands is not considered 
satisfactory, and the Austro-Hungarian Minister has left Belgrade. War 
is thought to be imminent. 

No. 32. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 26.) 

Vienna, July 26, 19 14. 

According to confident belief of German Ambassador, Russia will 
keep quiet during chastisement of Servia, which Austria-Hungary is re- 
solved to inflict, having received assurances that no Servian territory will 
be annexed by Austria-Hungary. In reply to my question whether 
Russian Government might not be compelled by public opinion to inter- 
vene on behalf of kindred nationality, he said that everything depended 
on the personality of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could 
resist easily, if he chose, the pressure of a few newspapers. He pointed 
out that the days of Pan- Slav agitation in Russia were over, and that 
Moscow was perfectly quiet. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
would not, his Excellency thought, be so imprudent as to take a step 
which would probably result in many frontier questions in which Russia 
is interested, such as Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Rumanian, and Persian 
questions, being brought into the melting pot. France, too, was not at 
all in a condition for facing a war. 

I replied that matters had, I thought, been made a little difficult for 
other Powers by the tone of Austro-Hungarian Government's ultimatum 
to Servia. One naturally sympathized with many of the requirements of 
the ultimatum, if only the manner of expressing them had been more 
temperate. It was, however, impossible, according to the German Am- 
bassador, to speak effectively in any other way to Servia. Servia was 
about to receive a lesson which she required; the quarrel, however, ought 
not to be extended in any way to foreign countries. He doubted Russia, 
who had no right to assume a protectorate over Servia, acting as if she 
made any such claim. As for Germany, she knew very well what she was 
about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter. 

The German Ambassador had heard of a letter addressed by you 
yesterday to the German Ambassador in London in which you expressed 
the hope that the Servian concessions would be regarded as satisfactory. 
He asked whether I had been informed that a pretense of giving way at 
the last moment had been made by the Servian Government. I had, I 
said, heard that on practically every point Servia had been willing to 
give in. His Excellency replied that Servian concessions were all a sham. 
Servia proved that she well knew that they were insufficient to satisfy 


the legitimate demands of Austria-Hungary by the fact that before making 
her offer she had ordered mobilization and retirement of Government 
from Belgrade. 

No. 33. Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 26.) 

Berlin, July 26, 19 14. 

Emperor returns suddenly tonight, and Under Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs says that Foreign Office regret this step, which was taken 
on his Majesty's own initiative. They fear that his Majesty's sudden 
return may cause speculation and excitement. Under Secretary of State 
likewise told me that German Ambassador at St. Petersburg had reported 
that, in conversation with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, latter 
had said that if Austria annexed bits of Servian territory Russia would 
not remain indifferent. Under Secretary of State drew conclusion that 
Russia would not act if Austria did not annex territory. , 

No. 34. Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 26.) 

Berlin, July 26, 19 14. 

Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has just telephoned to 
me to say that German Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed to 
pass on to Austro-Hungarian Government your hopes that they may take 
a favorable view of Servian reply if it corresponds to the forecast con- 
tained in Belgrade telegram No. 52 of 25th July. 

Under Secretary of State considers very fact of their making this 
communication to Austro-Hungarian Government implies that they 
associate themselves to a certain extent with your hope. German Gov- 
ernment do not see their way to going beyond this. 

No. 35. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 26.) 

Rome, July 26, 1914. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomes your proposal for a conference 
and will instruct Italian Ambassador tonight accordingly. 

Austrian Ambassador has informed Italian Government this evening 
that Minister in Belgrade had been recalled, but that this did not imply 
declaration of war. 


No. 36. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir H. Rumbold and 

Sir R. Rodd 


London, Foreign Office, July 26, 19 14. 

Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Ambassador 
here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Germany, and 
myself to meet here in conference immediately for the purpose of dis- 
covering an issue which would prevent complications? You should ask 
Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do this. If so, when bring- 
ing the above suggestion to the notice of the Governments to which they 
are accredited, representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg 
could be authorized to request that all active military operations should 
be suspended pending results of conference. 

No. 37. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie 

(Telegraphic.) London, Foreign Office, July 26, 1914. 

Berlin telegram of 25th July.* 

It is important to knpw if France will agree to suggested action by 
the four powers if necessary. 

*See No. 18. 

No. 38. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 27.) Rome, July 23, 1914. 

Sir: I gather that the Italian Government have been made cognizant 
of the terms of the communication which will be addressed to Servia. 
Secretary General, whom I saw this morning at the Italian Foreign Office, 
took the view that the gravity of the situation lay in the conviction of 
the Austro-Hungarian Government that it w^as absolutely necessary for 
their prestige, after the many disillusions which the turn of events in the 
Balkans has occasioned, to score a definite success. 

I have, &c., 


No. 39. Reply of Servian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note 

(Communicated by the Servian Minister, July 27.) 
Already printed, see pages 8-1 1 

No. 40. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Telegraphic.) (Received July 27.) 

Vienna, July 26, 1914. 

Russian Ambassador just returned from leave thinks that Austro- 
Hungarian Government are determined on war, and that it is impossible 
for Russia to remain indifferent. He does not propose to press for more 
time in the sense of your telegram of the 25th instant, *(last paragraph). 

When the repetition of your telegram of the 26th instant to Parisf 
arrived I had the French and Russian Ambassadors both with me. They 
expressed great satisfaction with its contents, which I communicated to 
them. They doubted, however, whether the principle of Russia being 

* See No. 26. f See No. 36. 


an interested party entitled to have a say in the settlement of a purely 
Austro-Servian dispute would be accepted by either the Austro-Hun- 
garjan or the German Government. 

Instructions were also given to the Italian Ambassador to support 
the request of the Russian Government that the time limit should be 
postponed. They arrived, however, too late for any useful action to be 

No. 41. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Telegraphic.) (Received July 27.) 

Vienna, July 27, 1914. 

I have had conversations with all my colleagues representing the 
Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the Austro- 
Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable; that the 
Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with Servna; 
that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake, and that 
until punishment has been administered to Servia it is unlikely that they 
will listen to proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with 
joy at the prospect of war with Servda, and its postponement or preven- 
tion would undoubtedly be a great disappointment. 

I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send me, to 
express to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope of his Maj- 
esty's Government that it may yet be possible to avoid war, and to ask 
his Excellency whether he cannot suggest a way out even now. 

No. 42. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 27.) 
(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 27, 1914. 

Your proposal as stated in your two telegrams of yesterday,* is ac- 
cepted by the French Government. French Ambassador in London, 
who returns there this evening, has been instructed accordingly. In- 
structions have been sent to the French Ambassador at Berlin to concert 
with his British colleague as to the advisability of their speaking jointly 
to the German Government. Necessary instructions have also been sent 
to the French • representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg, 
but until it is known that the Germans have spoken at Vienna with some 
success, it would, in the opinion of the Alinistry of Foreign Affairs, be 
dangerous for the French, Russian, and British Ambassadors to do so. 

* Nos. 36 and 37. 

No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 27.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 27, 1914. 

Your telegram of 26th July.* 

Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically 
amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called 
* See No. 36. 


together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not, 
therefore, fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to co- 
operate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your idea 
had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the 
four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means 
for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such 
a conference as you proposed was not practicable. He added that news 
he had just received from St. Petersburg showed that there was no in- 
tention on the part of M. de Sazonof to exchange views with Count Berch- 
told. He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a satis- 
factory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything else, to 
await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian 

In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as 
yet Austria was only partially mobilizing, but that if Russia mobilized 
against Germany latter would have to follow suit. I asked him what 
he meant by "mobilizing against Germany." He said that if Russia only 
mobilized in south, Germany would not mobilize, but if she mobilized in 
north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of mobiliza- 
tion was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her 
mobilization. Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to 
be taken by surprise. 

Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburg had 
caused him to take more hopeful view of the general situation. 

No. 44. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 27.) 

St. Petersburg, July 27, 19 14. 

Austrian Ambassador tried, in a long conversation which he had 
yesterday with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to explain away objection- 
able features of the recent action taken by the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment. Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that, although he per- 
fectly imderstood Austria's motives, the ultimatum had been so drafted 
that it could not possibly be accepted as a whole by the Servian Govern- 
ment. Although the demands were reasonable enough in some cases, 
others not only could not possibly be put into immediate execution, seeing 
that they entailed revision of existing Servian laws, but were, moreover, 
incompatible with Servia's dignity as an independent State. It would 
be useless for Russia to offer her good offices at Belgrade, in view of the 
fact that she was the object of such suspicion in Austria. In order, how- 
ever, to put an end to the present tension, he thought that England and 
Italy might be willing to collaborate with Austria. The Austrian Am- 
bassador undertook to communicate his Excellency's remarks to his 

On the Minister for Foreign Affairs questioning me, I told him that 
I had correctly defined the attitude of his Majesty's Government in my 


conversation with him, which I reported in my telegram of the 24th in- 
stant.* I added that you could not promise to do anything more, and 
that his Excellency was mistaken if he believed that the cause of peace 
could be promoted by our telling the German Government that they 
woiild have to deal with us as well as with Russia and France if she sup- 
ported Austria by force of arms. Their attitude would merely be stiffened 
by such a menace, and we could only induce her to use her influence at 
Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend who 
was anxious to preserve peace. His Excellency must not, if our efforts 
were to be successful, do anything to precipitate a conflict. In these 
circumstances I trusted that the Russian Government would defer the 
mobilization ukase for as long as possible and that troops would not be 
allowed to cross the frontier even when it was issued. 

In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that until the issue 
of the Imperial ukase no effective steps toward mobilization could be 
taken, and the Austro-Hungarian Government _ would profit by delay 
in order to complete her military preparations if it was deferred too long. 

* See No. 6. 

No. 45. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 27.) 

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914. 

Since my conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as re- 
ported in my telegram of today,* I understand that his Excellency has 
proposed that the modifications to be introduced into Austrian demands 
should be the subject of direct conversation between Vienna and St. 

* Sec No. 44. 

No. 46. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen 


London, Foreign Office, July 27, 1914. 

German Ambassador has informed me that German Government 
accept in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four 
Powers, reserving, of course, their right as an ally to help Austria if attacked. 
He has also been instructed to request me to use influence in St. Peters- 
burg to localize the war and to keep up the peace of Europe. 

I have replied that the Servian reply went further than could have 
been expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary of 
State has himself said that there were some things in the Austrian note 
that Servia could hardly be expected to accept. I assumed that Servian 
reply could not have gone as far as it did unless Russia had exercised 
conciliatory influence at Belgrade, and it was really at Vienna that moder- 
ating influence was now required. If Austria put the Servian reply aside 
as being worth nothing and marched into Servia, it meant that she was 
determined to crush Servia at all costs, being reckless of the consequences 


that might be involved. Servian reply should at least be treated as a 
basis for discussion and pause. I said German Government should urge 
this at Vienna. 

I recalled what German Government had said as to the gravity of the 
situation if the war could not be localized, and observed that if Germany 
assisted Austria against Russia it would be because, without any refer- 
ence to the merits of the dispute, Germany could not afford to see Austria 
crushed. Just so other issues might be raised that would supersede the 
dispute between Austria and Servia, and would bring other Powers in, 
and the war would be the biggest ever known; but as long as Germany 
would work to keep the peace I would keep closely in touch. I repeated 
that after the Servian reply it was at Vienna that some moderation must 
be urged. 

No. 47. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan 


London, Foreign Office, July 27, 1914. 

See my telegram of today to Sir E. Goshen.* 

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and 
Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand 
aside. His Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression must 

This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the 
orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it hap- 
pens, at Portland, not to disperse for manoeuvre leave. But I explained 
to the Russian Ambassador that my reference to it must not be taken to 
mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised. 

We hear from German and Austrian sources that they believe Russia 
will take no action so long as Austria agrees not to take Servian territory. 
I pointed this out, and added that it would be absurd if we were to appear 
more Servian than the Russians in our dealings with the German and 
Austrian Governments. 

* See No. 37. 

No. 48. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen 

London, Foreign Office, July 27, 1914. 

Sir: — Count Mensdorff told me by instruction today that the Servian 
Government had not accepted the demands which the Austrian Govern- 
ment were obliged to address to them in order to secure permanently the 
most vital Austrian interests. Servia showed that she did not intend to 
abandon her subversive aims, tending toward continuous disorder in the 
Austrian frontier territories and their final disruption from the Austrian 
Monarchy. ' Very reluctantly, and against their wish, the Austrian Gov- 
ernment were compelled to take more severe measures to enforce a funda- 
mental change of the attitude of enmity pursued up to now by Servia. 
As the British Government knew, the Austrian Government had for many 


years endeavored to find a way to get on with their turbulent neighbor* 
though this had been made very difficult for them by the continuous provo- 
cations of Servia. The Serajevo murder had made clear to every one 
what appalling consequences the Servian propaganda had already pro- 
duced, and what a permanent threat to Austria it involved. We would 
understand that the Austrian Government must consider that the moment 
had arrived to obtain, by means of the strongest pressure, guarantees for 
the definite suppression of the Servian aspirations and for the security of 
peace and order on the southeastern frontier of Austria. As the peace- 
able means to this effect were exhausted, the Austrian Government must 
at last appeal to force. They had not taken this decision without re- 
luctance. Their action, which had no sort of aggressive tendency, could 
not be represented otherwise than as an act of self-defense. Also they 
thought that they would ser\-e a European interest if they prevented 
Servia from being henceforth an element of general unrest, such as she 
had been for the last ten years. The high sense of justice of the British 
nation and of British statesmen could not, blame the Austrian Govern- 
ment if the latter defended by the sword what was theirs, and cleared, 
up their position with a country whose hostile policy had forced upon 
them for years measures so costly as to have gravely injured Austrian 
national prosperity. Finally, the Austrian Government, confiding in 
their amicable relations with us, felt that they could count on our sym- 
pathy in a fight that was forced on them, and on our assistance in localizing 
the fight, if necessary. 

Count Mensdorff added on his own account that, as long as Servia 
was confronted with Turkey, Austria never took very severe measures 
because of her adherence to the policy of the free development of the 
Balkan States. Now that Servia had doubled her territory and popula- 
tion without any Austrian interference, the repression of Servian sub- 
versive aims was a matter of self-defense and self-preservation on Austria's 
part. He reiterated that Austria had no intention of taking Servian ter- 
ritory or aggressive designs against Servian territory. 

I said that I could not understand the construction put by the Aus- 
trian Government upon the Servian reply, and I told Count MensdorfF 
the substance of the conversation that I had had with the German Am- 
bassador this morning about that reply. 

Count Mensdorff admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might 
seem to be satisfactory; but the Seiwians had refused the one thing — the 
co-operation of Austrian officials and police — which would be a real guar- 
antee that in practice the Servians would not carry on their subversiv^e 
campaign against Austria. 

I said it seemed to me as if the Austrian Government believed that 
even after the Servian reply, they could make war upon Servia anyhow, 
without risk of bringing Russia into the dispute. If they could make 
war on Servia and at the same time pacify Russia, well and good; but, if 
not, the consequences wovild be incalculable. I pointed out to him that I 
quoted this phrase from an expression of the views of the German Gov- 
ernment. 1 feared that it would be expected in St. Petersburg that the 
Servian reply would diminish the tension, and now, when Russia found 
that there was increased tension, the situation would become increasingly 
serious. Already the effect on Europe was one of anxiety. I pointed 


out that our fleet was to have dispersed today, but we had felt unable to 
let it disperse. We should not think of calling up reserves at this mo- 
ment, and there was no menace in what we had done about our fleet; but, 
owing to the possibility of a European conflagration, it was impossible 
for us to disperse our forces at- this moment. I gave this as an illustration 
of the anxiety that was felt. It seemed to me that the Servian reply 
already involved the greatest humiliation to Servia that I had ever seen a 
country undergo, and it was very disappointing to me that the reply was 
treated by the Austrian Government as if it were as unsatisfactory as a 
blank negative. 

I am, (Src, ' E. GREY. 

No. 49. Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd 

London, Foreign Office, July 27, 19 14. 

Sir: — The Italian Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson today that 
the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed entirely with my proposal 
ior a conference of four to be held in London. 

As regards the question of asking Russia, Austria-Hungary, and 
Servia to suspend military operations pending the result of the conference, 
the Marquis di San Giuliano would recommend the suggestion warmly 
to the German Government, and would inquire what procedure they would 
propose should be followed at Vienna. 

I am, &c., E. GREY. 

No. 50. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 31.) • 

Vienna, July 28, 19 14. 

Sir: — I have the honor to transmit to you herewith the text of the 
Austro-Hungarian note announcing the declaration of war against Servia. 

I have, &c., MAURICE DE BUNSEN. 

Enclosure in No. 50. 

Copy of Note verbale, dated Vienna, July 28. 1914. 


In order to bring to an end the subversive intrigues originating from 
Belgrade and aimed at the territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy, the Imperial and Royal Government has delivered to the 
Hoyal Servian Government a note in which a series of demands were 
formulated, for the acceptance of which a delay of forty-eight hours has 
been granted to the Royal Government. The Royal Servian Govern- 
ment not having answered this note in a satisfactory manner, the Imperial 


and Royal Government are themselves compelled to see to the safeguard- 
ing of their rights and interests, and, with this object, to have recourse 
to force of arms. 

Austria-Hungary, who had just addressed to Servia a formal declara- 
tion, in conformity with Article i of the convention of the i8th October, 
1907, relative to the opening of hostilities, considers herself henceforward 
in a state of war with Servia. 

In bringing the above notice of his Britannic Majesty's Embassy, the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honor to declare that Austria-Hun- 
gary will act during the hostilities in conformity with the terms of the 
Conventions of The Hague of the i8th October, 1907, as also with those 
of the Declaration of London of the 28th February, 1909, provided an 
analogous procedure is adopted by Servia. 

The embassy is requested to be so good as to communicate the present 
notification as soon as possible to the British Government. 

No. 51. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 28.) 

Paris, July 27, 1914. 

Sir: — I have the honor to transmit to you herewith copy of a memo- 
randum from the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the steps to be 
taken to prevent an outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary 
and Servia. 

I have, &c., 


Enclosure in No. 51. 
Note communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Bienvenu-Martin. 


In a note of the 25th of this month, his Excellency the British Ambas- 
sador informed the Government of the Republic that, in Sir E. Grey's 
opinion, the only possible way of assuring the maintenance of peace in 
case of the relations between Russia and Austria becoming more strained 
would be if the representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, and 
Italy in Austria and Russia were to take joint action; and he expressed 
the wish to know if the Government of the Republic were disposed to 
welcome such a suggestion. 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs ad interim has the honor to inform 
his Excellency Sir F. Bertie that he has requested M. Jules Cambon to 
concert with the British Ambassador in Germany and to support ariy 
representation which they may consider it advisable to make to the Berlin 

In accordance with the desire expressed by the British Government 
and conveyed to them by Sir F. Bertie in his note of the 26th of this month, 
the Government of the Republic have also authorized M. Paul Cambon 


to take part in the conference which Sir E. Grey has proposed with a view 
to discovering a means of settling the present difficulties. 

The government of the Republic is likewise ready to instruct the rep- 
resentatives at St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Belgrade to induce the Russian, 
Austrian, and Servian Governments to abstain from all active military 
operations pending the results of this conference. He considers, however, 
that the chance of Sir E. Grey's proposal being successful depends essen- 
tially on the action which the Berlin Government would be willing to take 
at Vienna. Representations made to the Austro-Hungarian Government 
for the purpose of bringing about a suspension of military operations 
would seem bound to fail unless the German Government do not before- 
hand exercise their influence on the Vienna Cabinet. 

The President of the Council ad interim takes the opportunity, &c. 

Paris, July 27, 19 14. 

No. 52. Note Communicated by French Embassy, July 28, 1914 


The Government of the Republic accepts Sir Edward Grey's proposal 
in regard to intervention by Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, 
with a view to avoiding active military operations on the frontiers of 
Austria, Russia, and Servia; and they have authorized M, P. Cambon to 
take part in the deliberations of the four representatives at the meeting 
which is to be held in London. 

The French Ambassador in Berlin has received instructions to consult 
first the British Ambassador in Berlin, and then to support the action 
taken by the latter in such manner and degree as may be considered 

M. Viviani is ready to send to the representatives of France in Vienna, 
St. Petersburg, and Belgrade instructions in the sense suggested by the 
British Government. 

No. 53. M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff 

(Communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28.) 



St, Petersburg, July 27, 19 14. 

The British Ambassador came to ascertain whether we think it desir- 
able that Great Britain should take the initiative in convoking a con- 
ference in London of the representatives of England, France, Germany, 
and Italy to examine the possibility of a way out of the present situation. 

I replied to the Ambassador that I have begun conversations with the 
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under conditions which I hope may be 
favorable. I have not, however, received as yet any reply to the proposal 
made by me for revising the note between the two Cabinets. 

If direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet were to prove impossi- 


ble, I am ready to accept the British proposal, or any other proposal of a 
kind that would bring about a favorable solution of the conflict. 

I wish, however, to put an end from this day forth to a misunderstand- 
ing which might arise from the answer given by the French Minister of 
Justice to the German Ambassador regarding counsels of moderation to 
be given to the Imperial Cabinet. 

No. 54. M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff 

(Communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28, 19 14.) 
(Telegraphic.) (Translation.) 

St. Petersburg, July 15 (28), 19 14. 

My interviews with the German Ambassador confirm my impression 
that Germany is, if anything, in favor of the uncompromising attitude 
adopted by Austria. 

The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the whole of this crisis 
developing, appear to be e.xerting no influence on their ally. 

The Ambassador considers that the Servian reply is insufficient. 

This attitude of the German Government is most alarming. 

It seems to me that England is in a better position than any other 
power to make another attempt to Berlin to induce the German Govern- 
ment to take the necessary action. There is no doubt that the key of 
the situation is to be found at Berlin. 

No. 55. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 28.) 

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914. 

With reference to my telegram of yesterday,* I saw the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs this afternoon and found him very conciliatory and more 

He would, he said, use all his influence at Belgrade to induce the Servian 
Government to go as far as possible in giving satisfaction to Austria but 
her territorial integrity must be guaranteed and her rights as a sovereign 
State respected, so that she should not become Austria's vassal. He did 
not know whether Austria would accept friendly exchange of views which 
he had proposed, but, if she did, he wished to keep in close contact with 
the othej Powers throughout the conversations that would ensue. 

He again referred to the fact that the obligations undertaken by Servia 
in 1908, alluded to in the Austrian ultimatum, were given to the Powers. 

I asked if he had heard of your proposal with regard to conference of 
the four Powers, and on his replying in the affirmative, I told him confi- 
dentially of your instructions to me, and inquired whether instead of such 
a conference he would prefer a direct exchange of views, which he had 
proposed. The German Ambassador,, to whom I had just spoken, had 

* See No. 44. 


expressed his personal opinion that a direct exchange of views would be 
more agreeable to Austria-Hungary. 

His Excellency said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the Powers 
accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that you would 
keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of its taking 

No. 56. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 28.) 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 27, 19 14. 

The Russian Ambassador had today a long and earnest conversation 
with Baron Macchio, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 
He told him that, having just come back from St. Petersburg, he was well 
acquainted with the views of the Russian Government and the state of 
Russian public opinion. He could assure him that if actual war broke 
out with Servia it would be impossible to localize it, for Russia was not 
prepared to give way again, as she had done on previous occasions, and 
especially during the annexation crisis of 1909. He earnestly hoped that 
something would be done before vServia was actually invaded. Baron 
Macchio replied that this would now \)e ciifficult, as a skirmish had already 
taken place on the Danube, in which the Servians had been aggressors. 
The Russian Ambassador said that he would do all he could to keep the 
Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet take place, and he 
told me that he would advise his Government to induce the Servian Gov- 
ernment to avoid any conflict as long as possible, and to fall back before 
an Austrian advance. Time so gained should suffice to enable a settle- 
ment to be reached. He had just heard of a satisfactory conversation 
which the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had yesterday with the 
Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg. The former had agreed that 
much of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia had been perfectly reason- 
able, and in fact they had practically reached an understanding as to the 
guarantees which Servia might reasonably be asked to give to Austria- 
Hungary for her future good behavior. The Russian Ambassador urged 
that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be furnished with 
full powers to continue discussion with the Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, who was very willing to advise Servia to yield all that could be 
fairly asked of her as an independent Power. Baron Macchio promised to 
submit this suggestion to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

No. 57. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 28.) 
(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 27, 19 14. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs greatly doubts whether Germany will be 
willing to invite Austria to suspend military action pending the confer- 


ence, but he had hopes that miHtary action may be practically deferred by 
the fact of the conference meeting at once. As at present informed, he 
sees no possibility of Austria receding from any point laid down in her note 
to Ser\'ia, but he believes that if Servia will even now accept it Austria 
will be satisfied, and if she had reason to think that such will be the advice 
of the Powers, Austria may defer action. Servia may be induced to accept 
note in its entirety on the advice of the four Powers invited to the con- 
ference, and this would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe 
and not to Austria-Hungary alone. 

Telegrams from Vienna to the press here stating that Austria is favor- 
ably impressed with the declarations of the Italian Government have, the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs assures me, no foundation. He said he had 
expressed no opinion to Austria with regard to the note. He assured me 
both before and after communication of the note, and again today, that 
Austrian Government have given him assurances that they demand no 
territorial sacrifices from Servia. 

No. 58. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 28.) 
(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 28, 19 14. 

I communicated to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs this after- 
noon the substance of your conversation with the German Ambassador, 
recorded in your telegram * to Berlin of the 27th July. 

His Excellency is grateful for the communication. He said that it 
confirms what he had heard of your attitude, and he feels confident that 
your observations to the German Ambassador will have a good effect in 
the interest of peace. 

*See No. 46. 

No. 59. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 28.) 
(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 28, 1914. 

I informed the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs today of your con- 
versation with the Russian Ambassador, as recorded in your telegram of 
yesterday * to St. Petersburg. 

He is grateful for the communication and quite appreciates the impos- 
sibility for his Majesty's Government to declare themselves "solidaires" 
with Russia on a question between Austria and Servia, which in its present 
condition is not one affecting England. He also sees that you cannot 
take up an attitude at Berlin and Vienna more Servian than that attributed 
in German and Austrian sources to the Russian Government. 

German Ambassador has stated that Austria would respect the integrity 
of Servia, but when asked whether her independence also would be re- 
spected, he gave no assurance. 

* See No. 47. 


No. 60. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 28.) 

Berlin, July 28, 1914. 

Secretary of State spoke yesterday in the same sense as that reported 
in my telegram of yesterday * to my French and Italian colleagues re- 
specting your proposal. I discussed with my two colleagues this morning 
his reply, and we found, that while refusing the proposed conference, he 
had said to all of us that nevertheless he desired to work with us for the 
maintenance of general peace. We therefore deduced that if he is sincere 
in this wish he can only be objecting to the form of your proposal. Per- 
haps he himself could be induced to suggest lines on which he would find 
it possible to work with us. 

* See No. 43. 

No. 61. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 28.) 

Vienna, July 28, 1914. 
I saw .Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. 

His Excellency declared that Austria-Hungary cannot delay warlike 
proceedings against Servia, and would have to decline any suggestion of 
negotiations on basis of Servian reply. 

Prestige of Dual Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now pre- 
vent conflict. 

No. 62. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 28.) 

Vienna, July 28, 19 14, 

I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs today in the sense of your tele- 
gram of 27th July * to Berlin. I avoided the word "mediation," but said 
that, as mentioned in your speech,! which he had just read to me, you had 
hopes that conversations in London between the four Powers less inter- 
ested might yet lead to an arrangement which Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment would accept as satisfactory and as rendering actual hostilities 
unnecessary, I added that you had regarded Servian reply as having 
gone far to meet just demands of Austria-Hungary; that you thought it 
constituted a fair basis of discussion during which warlike operations 
might remain in abeyance, and that Austrian Ambassador in Berlin was 
speaking in this sense. Minister for Foreign Affairs said quietly, but 
firmly, that no discussion could be accepted on basis of Servian note; that 
war would be declared today, and that well-known pacific character of 
Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a guar- 
antee that war was both just and inevitable. This was a matter that 

* See No, 46, f "Hansard," Vol. 65, No. 107, Cols. 931, 932, 933. 


must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. 
I said that you would hear with regret that hostilities could not be arrested, 
as you feared that they might lead to complications threatening the 
peace of Europe. 

In taking leave of his Excellency, I begged him to believe that if in 
the course of present grave crisis our point of view should sometimes difTer 
from his, this would arise, not from want of sympathy with the many jiist 
complaints which Austria-Hungary had against Servia, but from the fact 
that, whereas Austria- Hungary put first her quarrel with Servia, you were 
anxious in the first instance for peace of Europe. I trusted this larger 
aspect of the question would appeal with equal force to his Excellency. 
He said he had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose 
operations like those impending, which did not aim at territorial aggran- 
dizement and which could no longer be postponed. 

No. 63. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 28.) 

Rome, July 28, 1914. 
Your telegram of 25th July to Paris.* 

I have communicated substance to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who 
immediately telegraphed in precisely similar terms to Berlin and Vienna. 
* See No. 27. 

No. 64. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 28.) 

Rome, July 28, 1914. 

At the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs I submit the follow- 
ing to you: 

In a long conversation this morning Servian Charge d'Affaires had said 
he thought that if some explanations were given regarding mode in which 
Austrian agents would require to intervene under Article V. and Article 
VI., Servia might still accept the whole Austrian note. 

As it was not to be anticipated that Austria would givesuch explana- 
tions to Servia, they might be given to Powers engaged in discussions, 
who might then advise Servia to accept without conditions. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government had in the meantime published a 
long official explanation of grounds on which Servian reply was considered 
inadequate. Minister for Foreign Affairs considered many points besides 
explanation — such as slight verbal difference in sentence regarding renun- 
ciation of propaganda — quite childish, but there was a passage which 
might prove useful in facilitating such a course as was considered prac- 
ticable by the Servian Charge d'Affaires. It was stated that co-operation 
of Austrian agents in Servia was to be only in investigation, not in judicial 


or administrative measures. Servia was said to have wilfully misinter- 
preted this. He thought, therefore, that ground might be cleared here. 

I only reproduce from memory, as I had not yet received text of 
Austrian declaration. 

Minister impressed upon me, above all, his anxiety for the immediate 
beginning of discussion. A wide general latitude to accept at once every 
point or suggestion on which he could be in agreement with ourselves and 
Germany had been given to Italian Ambassador. 

No. 65. Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 28.) 
(Telegraphic.) Nish, July 28, 1914. 

I have urged on the Servian Government the greatest moderation 
pending efforts being made toward a peaceful solution. 

Two Servian steamers fired on and damaged and two Servian mer- 
chant vessels have been captured by a Hungarian monitor at Orsova. 

No. 66. Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 28.) 
(Telegraphic.) Nish, July 28, 1914. 

Telegram received here that war declared by Austria. 

No. 67. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen 

(Telegraphic.) London, Foreign Ofhce, July 28, 1914. 

Explanation given in your telegram of the 27th July* of what was my 
idea in proposing a conference is quite right. It would not be an arbi- 
tration, but a private and informal discussion to ascertain what sugges- 
tion could be made for a settlement. No suggestion wiould be put forward 
that had not previously been ascertained to be acceptable to Austria and 
Russia, with whom the mediating Powers could easily keep in touch 
through their respective allies. 

But as long as there is a prospect of a direct exchange of views between 
Austria and Russia, I would suspend every other suggestion, as I entirely 
agree that it is the most preferable method of all. 

I understand that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has pro- 
posed a friendly exchange of views to the Austrian Government, and if 
the latter accepts, it will no doubt relieve the tension and make the situa- 
tion less critical. 

It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassador here that 
the German Government have taken action at Vienna in the sense of the 
conversation recorded in my telegram of yesterday to you.f 

* See No. 43. t See No. 46. 


No. 68. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen 

(Telegraphic.) London, Foreign Office, July 28, 1914. 

German Government having accepted principle of mediation between 
Austria and Russia by the four Powers, if necessary, I am ready to propose 
that the German Secretary of State should suggest the lines on which this 
principle should be applied. I will, however, keep the idea in reserve 
until we see how the conversations between Austria and Russia progress. 

No. 69. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan 

(Telegraphic.) London, Foreign Office, July 28, 1914. 

It is most satisfactory that there is a prospect of direct exchange of 
views between the Russian and Austrian Governments, as reported in 
your telegram of the 27th July.* 

I am ready to put forward any practical proposal that would facilitate 
this, but I am not quite clear as to what the Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs proposes the Ministers at Belgrade should do. Could he not first 
mention in an exchange of views with Austria his willingness to co-operate 
in some such scheme? It might then take more concrete shape. 

* See No. 55. 

No. 70. Telegrams Communicated by Count Benckendorff, 

July 29, 1914 

(i) Telegram from IM. Sazonof to Russian Ambassador at Berlin, dated 
July 28, 1914. 

In consequence of the declaration of war by Austria against Servia, 
the Imperial Government will announce tomorrow (29th) the mobiliza- 
tion in the military circonscriptions of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, and Kazan. 
Please inform German Government, confirming the absence in Russia of 
any aggressive intention against Germany. 

The Russian Ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled from his post. 
(2) Telegram to Count Benckendorff. 

The Austrian declaration of war clearly puts an end to the idea of direct 
communications between Austria and Russia. Action by London Cabinet 
in order to set on foot mediation with a view to suspension of military 
operations of Austria against Servia is now most urgent. 

Unless military operations are stopped, mediation would only allow 
matters to drag on and give Austria time to crush Servia. 

No. 71. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 29.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 28, 19 14. 

At invitation of Imperial Chancellor, I called upon his Excellency this 
evening. He said that he wished me to tell you that he was most anxious 
that Germany should work together with England for maintenance of 


general peace, as they had done successfully in the last European crisis. 
He had not been able to accept your proposal for a conference of repre- 
sentatives of the Great Powers, because he did not think that it would 
be effective, and because such a conference would, in his opinion, have had 
appearance of an "Areopagus" consisting of two Powers of each group 
sitting in judgment upon the two remaining Powers; but his inability to 
accept proposed conference must not be regarded as militating against his 
strong desire for effective co-operation. You could be assured that he 
was doing his very best both at Vienna and St. Petersburg to get the two 
Governments to discuss the situation directly with each other and in a 
friendly way. He had great hopes that such discussions would take place 
and lead to a satisfactory result, but if the news were true which he had 
just read in the papers, that Russia had mobilized fourteen army corps in 
the south, he thought situation was very serious, and he himself would be 
in a very difficult position, as in these circumstances it would be out of 
his power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He added that 
Austria, who as yet was only partially mobilizing, would have to take 
similar measures, and if war were to result, Russia would be entirely 
responsible. I ventured to say that if Austria refused to take any notice 
of Servian note, which, to my mind, gave way in nearly every point de- 
manded by Austria, and which in any case offered a basis for discussion, 
surely a certain portion of responsibility would rest with her. His Excel- 
lency said that he did not wish to discuss Servian note, but that Austria's 
standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Serv-ia was a 
purely Austrian concern with which Russia had nothing to do. He reiter- 
ated his desire to co-operate with England and his intention to do his 
utmost to maintain general peace. "A war between the Great Powers 
must be avoided," were his last words. 

Austrian colleague said to me today that a general war was most 
unlikely, as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war. I 
think that that opinion is shared by many people here. 

No. 72. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 29.) 


St. Petersburg, July 28, 1914. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs begged me to thank you for the language 
you had held to the German Ambassador, as reported in your telegram * 
to Berlin, substance of which I communicated to his Excellency. He took 
a pessimistic view of the situation, having received the same disquieting 
news from Vienna as had reached his Majesty's Government. I said it 
was important that we should know the real intentions of the Imperial 
Government, and asked him whether he would be satisfied with the 
assurance which the Austrian Ambassador had, I understood, been in- 
structed to give in respect of Servia's integrity and independence. I 
added that I was sure any arrangements for averting a European war 
would be welcomed by his Majesty's Government. In reply his Excel- 
lency stated that if Servia were attacked, Russia would not be satisfied 

* See No. 46. 


with any engagement which Austria might take on these two points, and 
that order for mobiUzation against Austria would be issued on the day 
that Austria crossed Servian frontier. 

■ I told the German Am.bassador, who appealed to me to give moderating 
counsels to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that from the beginning I 
had not ceased to do so, and that the German Ambassador at Vienna 
should now in his turn use his restraining influence. I made it clear to 
his Excellency that, Russia being thoroughly in earnest, a general war 
could not be averted if Servia were attacked by Austria. 

As regards the suggestion of conference, the Ambassador had received 
no instructions, and before acting with me the French and Italian Am- 
bassadors are still waiting for their final instructions. 

No. 73. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 29.) 
(Telegraphic.) Venna, July 28, 19 14. 

I have received note verbale from Ministry for Foreign Affairs, stating 
that, the Servian Government not having replied to note of 23d July * in 
a satisfactory manner, Imperial and Royal Government is compelled itself 
to provide for protection of its rights, and to have recourse for that object 
to force of arms. Austria-Hungary has addressed to Servia formal decla- 
ration, according to Article i of convention of i8th October, 1907, relative 
to opening of hostilities, and considers herself from today in state of war 
with Servia. Austria-Hungary will conform, provided Servia does so, to 
stipulations of Hague conventions of i8th October, 1907, and to declara- 
tion of London of 26th February, 1909. 

* See No. 4. 

No. 74. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 29.) 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

I am informed by the Russian Ambassador that the Russian Govern- 
ment's suggestion has been declined by the Austro- Hungarian Govern- 
ment. The suggestion was to the effect that the means of settling the 
Austro-Servian conflict should be discussed directly between Russian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Peters- 
burg, who should be authorized accordingly. 

The Russian Ambassador thinks that a conference in London of the 
less interested Powers, such as you have proposed, offers now the only 
prospect of preserving peace of Europe, and he is sure that the Russian 
Government will acquiesce willingly in your proposal. So long as oppos- 
ing armies have not actually come in contact, all hope need not be aban- 


No. 75. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 29.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1914. 

I was sent for again today by the Imperial Chancellor, who told me 
that he regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government, to 
whom he had at once communicated your opinion, had answered that 
events had marched too rapidly and that it was therefore too late to ac- 
upon your suggestion that the Servian reply might form the basis of dis- 
cussion. His Excellency had, on receiving their reply, dispatched a mes- 
sage to Vienna, in which he explained that, although a certain desire had, 
in his opinion, been shown in the Servian reply to meet the demands of 
Austria, he understood entirely that, without some sure guarantees that 
Servia would carry out in their entirety the demands made upon her, the 
Austro-Hungarian Government could not rest satisfied in view of their 
past experience. He had then gone on to say that the hostilities which 
were about to be undertaken against Servia had presumably the exclusive 
object of securing such guarantees, seeing that the Austrian Government 
already assured the Russian Government that they had no territorial 

He advised the Austro-Hungarian Government, should this view be 
correct, to speak openly in this sense. The holding of such language 
would, he hoped, eliminate all possible misunderstandings. 

As yet, he told me, he had not received a reply from Vienna. 

From the fact that he had gone so far in the matter of giving advice at 
Vienna, his Excellency hoped that you would realize that he was sincerely 
doing all in his power to prevent danger of European complications. 

The fact of his communicating this information to you was a proof of 
the confidence which he felt in you and evidence of his anxiety that you 
should know he was doing his best to support your efforts in the cause of 
general peace, efforts which he sincerely appreciated. 

No. 76. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 29.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1914. 

I found Secretary of State very depressed today. He reminded me 
that he had told me the other day that he had to be very careful in giv- 
ing advice to Austria, as any idea that they were being pressed would be 
likely to cause them to precipitate matters and present a fait accompli. 
This had, in fact, now happened, and he was not sure that his com- 
munication of your suggestion that Servia 's reply offered a basis for dis- 
cussion had not hastened declaration of war. He was much troubled by 
reports of mobilization in Russia and of certain military measures, which 
he did not specify, being taken in France. He subsequently spoke of 
these measures to my French colleague, who informed him that French 
Government had done nothing more than the German Government had 
done, namely, recalled officers on leave. His Excellency denied German 
Government had done this, but as a matter of fact it is true. My French 


colleague said to Under Secretary of State in course of conversation that 
seemed to him that when Austria had entered Servia, and so satisfied her 
military prestige, the moment might then be favorable for four disinter- 
ested powers to discuss situation and come forward with suggestions for 
preventing graver complications. Under Secretary of State seemed to 
think idea worthy of consideration, as he replied that would be a different 
matter from conference proposed hy you. 

Russian Ambassador returned today and has informed Imperial Gov- 
ernment that Russia is mobilizing in four southern governments. 

No. 77. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen 

(Telegraphic.) London, Foreign Office, July 29, 191 4. 

I much appreciate the language of Chancellor, as reported in your 
telegram of today.* His Excellency may rely upon it that this country 
will continue, as heretofore, to strain effort to secure peace and to avert 
the calamity we all fear. If he can induce Austria to satisfy Russia and 
to abstain from going so far as to come into collision with her, we shall all 
join in deep gratitude to his Excellency for having saved the peace of 

* See No. 75. 

No. 78. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 29.) 

St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914. 

Partial mobilization was ordered today. 

I communicated the substance of your telegram of the 28th instant* 
to Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in accordance, with your 
instructions, and informed him confidentially of remarks as to mobiliza- 
tion which the German Secretary of State had made to the British Ambas- 
sador at Berlin. This had already reached his Excellency from another 
source. The mobilization, he explained, would only be directed against 

Austrian Government had now definitely declined direct conversation 
between Vienna and St. Petersburg. The Minister for Foreign Affairs 
said he had proposed such an exchange of views on advice of German 
Ambassador. He proposed, when informing German Ambassador of this 
refusal of Austria's, to urge that a return should be made to your proposal 
for a conference of four Ambassadors, or, at all events, for an exchange of 
views between the three Ambassadors less directly interested, yourself, 
and also the Austrian Ambassador if you thought it advisable. Any 
arrangement approved by France and England would be acceptable to 
him, and he did not care what form such conversations took. No time 
was to be lost, and the only way to avert war was for you to succeed in 
arriving, by means of conversations with Ambassadors, either collectively 
or individually, at some formula which Austria could be induced to accept 

* See No. 67. 


Throughout Russian Government had been perfectly frank and conciUa- 
tory, and had done all in their power to maintain peace. If their efforts 
to maintain peace failed, he trusted that it would be realized by the British 
public that it was not fault of the Russian Government, 

I asked him whether he would raise objections, if the suggestion made 
in Rome telegram of 27th July,t which I mentioned to him, were carried 
out. In reply his Excellency said that he would agree to anything 
arranged by the four Powers, provided it was acceptable to Servia; he 
could not, he said, be more Servian than Servia. Some supplementary 
statement or explanations would, however, have to be made in order to 
tone down the sharpness of the ultimatum. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to in your tele- 
gram of the 28th instant t was one of secondary importance. Under 
altered circumstances of situation he did not attach weight to it. Further, 
the German Ambassador had informed his Excellency, so the latter told 
me, that his Government were continuing at Vienna to exert friendly in- 
fluence. I fear that the German Ambassador will not help to smooth 
matters over, if he uses to his own Government the same language as he did 
to me today. He accused the Russian Government of endangering the 
peace of Europe by their mobilization, and said, when I referred to all that 
had been recently done by Austria, that he could not discuss such matters. 
I called his attention to the fact that Austrian Consuls had warned all 
Austrian subjects liable to military service to join the colors, that Austria 
had already partially mobilized, and had now declared war on Servia. From 
what had passed during the Balkan crises, she knew that this act was one 
which it was impossible without humiliation for Russia to submit to. Had 
not Russia by mobilizing shown that she was in earnest, Austria would 
have traded on Russia's desire for peace, and would have believed that she 
could go to any lengths. Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me to 
understand that Russia would not precipitate war by crossing frontier 
immediately, and a week or more would, in any case, elapse before mobiliza- 
tion was completed. In order to find an issue out of a dangerous situation, 
it was necessary that we should in the meanwhile all work together. 

t See No. 57, I See No, 69. 

No. 79. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 29,) 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 29, 1914. 

There is at present no step which we could usefully take to stop war with 
Servia, to which Austro- Hungarian Government are now fully committed 
by the Emperor's appeal to his people, which has been published this morn- 
ing, and by the declaration of war. French and Italian Ambassadors agree 
with me in this view. If the Austro-Hungarian Government would convert 
into a binding engagement to Europe the declaration which has been made 
at St. Petersburg to the effect that she desires neither to destroy the in- 
dependence of Servia nor to acquire Servian territory, the Italian Ambassa- 
dor thinks that Russia might be induced to remain quiet. This, however, 
the Italian Ambassador is convinced the Austrian Government would refuse 
to do. 


No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 29.) 
(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 29, 19 14. 

In your telegram of the 27th instant* to Berlin, German Ambassador 
was reported to have accepted in principle the idea of a conference. This is 
in contradiction with the telegram of the 27th instantf from Berlin. 

Information received by the Italian Government from Berlin shows that 
German view is correctly represented in Sir E. Goschen's telegram of the 
27th July.t but what creates difficulty is rather the "conference," so the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs understands, than the principle. He is going 
to urge, in a telegram which he is sending to Berlin tonight, adherence to the 
idea of an exchange of views in London. He suggests that the German 
Secretary of State might propose a formula acceptable to his Government. 
Minister for Foreign Aflfairs is of opinion that this exchange of views would 
keep the door open if the direct communication between Vienna and St. 
Petersburg fails to have any result. He thinks that this exchange of views 
might be concomitant with such direct communication. 

The German Government are also being informed that the Italian 
Government would not be pardoned by public opinion here unless they had 
taken every possible step so as to avoid war. He is urging that the German 
Government must lend their co-operation in this. 

He added that there seemed to be a difficulty in making Germany be- 
lieve that Russia was in earnest. As Germany, however, was really anxious 
for good relations with ourselves, if she believed that Great Britain would 
act with Russia and France he thought it would have a great effect. 

Even should it prove impossible to induce Germany to take part, he 
would still advocate that England and Italy, each as representing one group, 
should continue to exchange views. 

* See No. 46. f See No. 43. 

No. 81. Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd 

(Telegraphic.) London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. 

With reference to your telegram of yesterday.* 

It is impossible for me to initiate discussions with Ambassadors here, as 
I understand from Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Austria will 
not accept any discussion on basis of Servian note, and the inference of all 
I have heard from Vienna and Berlin is that Austria will not accept any 
form of mediation by the Powers as between Austria and Servia. Italian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs must therefore speak at Berlin and Vienna. I 
shall be glad if a favorable reception is given to any suggestions he can make 

* See No. 64. 

No. 82. Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) Constantinople, July 29,1914. 

I understand that the designs of Austria may extend considerably be- 
yond the sanjak and a punitive occupation of Servian territory. I gathered 

this from a remark let fall by the Austrian Ambassador here, who spoke 
of the deplorable economic situation of Salonica under Greek administra- 
tion and of the assistance on which the Austrian Army could count from 
Mussulman population discontented with Servian rule. 

No. 83. Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 29.) 
(Telegraphic.) Nish, July 29, 1914. 

I have been requested by Prime Minister to convey to you expression 
of his deep gratitude for the statement which you made on the 27 th instant 
in the House of Commons. 

No. 84. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen 

(Telegraphic.) London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. 

The German Ambassador has been instructed by the German Chancellor 
-to inform me that he is endeavoring to mediate between Vienna and St. 
Petersburg, and he hopes with good success. Austria and Russia seem to be 
-in constant touch, and he is endeavoring to make Vienna explain in a 
satisfactory form at St. Petersburg the scope and extension of Austrian 
proceedings in Ser\da. I told the German Ambassador that an agreement 
.arrived at direct between Austria and Russia would be the best possible 
solution. I would press no proposal as long as there was a prospect of that, 
but my information this morning was that the Austrian Government had 
declined the suggestion of the Russian Government that the Austrian 
Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be authorized to discuss directly 
with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the means of settling the 
Austro- Servian conflict. The press correspondents at St. Petersburg had 
been told that Russian Government would mobilize. The Gerrnan Govern- 
ment had said that they were favorable in principle to mediation between 
Russia and Austria if necessary. They seemed to think the particular 
method of conference, consultation, or discussion, or even conversations a 
•quatre in London too formal a method. I urged that the German Govern- 
ment should suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers 
could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France 
agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence 
was ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany could 
suggest if mine was not acceptable. In fact, mediation was ready to come 
into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only 
•Germany would "press the button" in the interests of peace. 

No. 85. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 29.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1914. • 

I was asked to call upon the Chancellor tonight. His Excellency had 
just returned from Potsdam. 


He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagra- 
tion might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations 
as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He 
then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He 
said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which 
governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow 
France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was 
not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of 
Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British 
Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisi- 
tions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that 
might ensue. 

I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that 
he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards 
Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so long as Germany's adversaries 
respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was 
ready to give his Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do 
likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany 
might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over 
Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany. 

His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor 
the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an 
understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form 
the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind 
a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it 
was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an as- 
surance of British neutrality in the conflict which the present crisis might 
possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realization of his 

In reply to his Excellency's inquiry how I thought his request would 
appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this stage of 
events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was 
of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty. 

Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I com- 
municated the contents of your telegram of today* to his Excellency, who 
expressed his best thanks to you. 

* See No. 77. 

No. 86. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 29.) 

Rome, July 29, 19 14. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that moment is past for any further 
discussions on basis of Servian note, in view of communication made today 
by Russia at Berlin regarding partial mobilization. The utmost he now 
hopes for is that Germany may use her influence at Vienna to prevent or 
moderate any further demands on Servia. 


No. 87. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie 

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. 

Sir: — After telling M. Cambon today how grave the situation seemed to 
be, I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador today that he 
must not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense 
of false security that we should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the 
peace, which we were now making in common with Germany, failed. But 
I went on to say to M. Cambon that I thought it necessary to tell him also 
that the public opinion here approached the present difficulty from a quite 
different point of view from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco 
a few years ago. In the case of Morocco the dispute was one in which France 
was primarily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in an 
attempt to crush France, was fastening a quarrel on France on a question 
that was the subject of a special agreement between France and us. In the 
present case the dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which 
we felt called to take a hand. Even if the question became one between 
Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It 
would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav — a struggle for 
supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being 
drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved 
and France.became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should 
do; it was a case that we should have to consider. France would then have 
been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her 
alliance, her honor and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from 
engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required 
us to do. I thought it necessary to say that, because as he knew, we were 
taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn 
Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, but it would not be 
fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that this meant 
that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might 
not arise. 

M. Cambon said that I had explained the si'^uation very clearly. He 
understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel and in a struggle for supremacy 
between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to intervene; should 
other issues be raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that 
the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide 
what it was necessary for us to do. He seemed quite prepared for this an- 
nouncement, and made no criticism upon it. 

He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a de- 
mand from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany attacked 
Russia. This assurance, France, of course, could not give; she was bound to 
help Russia if Russia was attacked. 

I am, &c., E. GREY. 

No. 88. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen 

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. 

Sir: — I told the German Ambassador this afternoon of the information 
that I had received, that Russia had informed Germany respecting her 


mobilization. I also told him of the communication made by Count 
Benckendorff, that the Austrian declaration of war manifestly rendered 
vain any direct conversations between Russia and Austria. I said that the 
hope built upon those direct conversations by the German Government 
yesterday had disappeared today. Today the German Chancellor was 
working in the interest of mediation in Vienna and St. Petersburg. If he 
succeeded, well and good. If not, it was more important than ever that 
Germany should take up what I had suggested to the German Ambassador 
this morning, and propose some method by which the four Powers should 
be able to work together to keep the peace of Europe. I pointed out, 
however, that the Russian Government, while desirous of mediation, re- 
garded it as a condition that the military operations against Servia should 
be suspended, as otherwise a mediation would only drag on matters and 
give Austria time to crush Servia. It was of course too late for all military 
operations against Servia to be suspended. Iji a short time, I supposed, the 
Austrian forces would be in Belgrade, and in occupation of some Servian 
territory. But even then it might be possible to bring some mediation into, 
existence, if Austria, while saying that she must hold the occupied territory 
until she had complete satisfaction from Servia, stated that she would not 
advance further, pending an effort of the Powers to mediate between her 
and Russia. 

The German Ambassador said that he had already telegraphed Berlin, 
what I had said to him this morning, 

I am, &c., E. GREY. 

No. 89. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen 

London, Foreign Ofhce, July 29, 1914. 


Sir: — After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about 
the European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private- 
and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situation was very 
grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved we 
had no thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it, 
and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all 
European interests; and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly 
tone of our conversation — which I hoped would continue — into thinking, 
that we should stand aside. 

He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I meant, 
that we should under certain circumstances intervene. 

I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was like- 
a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if things became 
worse, we should intervene. There would be no question of our interv^en- 
ing if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But 
we knew very well that if the issue did become such that we thought 
British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and 
the decision would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other 
Powers had to be. I hoped that the friendly tone of our conversations would 
continue as at present, and that I should be able to keep as closely in touch 
with the German Government in working for peace. But if we failed in our 
efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved prac- 


tically every European interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach 
from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or 
his Government into supposing that we should not take action, and to the 
reproach that, if they had not been so misled, the course of things might 
have been different. 

The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said ; indeed, 
he told me that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as 
his view of the situation. 

I am, &c., E. GREY. 

No. 90. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen 

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. 

Sir: — In addition to what passed with the German Ambassador this 
morning, as recorded in my telegram of the 29th July* to your Excellency, 
I gave the Ambassador a copy of Sir Rennell Rodd's telegram of the 28th 
Julyt and of my reply to it.f I said I had begun to doubt whether even a 
complete acceptance of the Austrian demands by Servia would now satisfy 
Austria. But there appeared, from what the Marquis di San Giuliano had 
said, to be a method by which, if. the Powers were allowed to have any say 
in the matter, they might bring about complete satisfaction for Austria, if 
only the latter would give them an opportunity. I could, however, make 
no proposal, for the reasons I have given in my telegram to you, and could 
•only give what the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said to the 
German Ambassador for information, as long as it was understood that 
Austria would accept no discussion with the Powers over her dispute with 
Servia. As to mediation between Austria and Russia, I said it could not 
take the form simply of urging Russia to stand on one side while Austria 
had a free hand to go to any length she pleased. That would not be media- 
tion, it would simply be putting pressure upon Russia in the interests of 
Austria. The German Ambassador said the view of the German Govern- 
ment was that Austria could not by force be humiliated, and could not 
abdicate her position as a Great Power. I said I entirely agreed, but it was 
not a question of humiliating Austria, it was a question of how far Austria 
meant to push the humiliation of others. There must, of course, be some 
humiliation of Servia, but Austria might press things so far as to involve 
the humiliation of Russia. 

The German Ambassador said that Austria would not take Servian 
territory, as to which I observed that, by taking territory while leaving 
nominal Servian independence, Austria might turn Servia practically into a 
vassal State, and this would affect the whole position of Russia in the 

I observed that when there was danger of European conflict it was 
impossible to say who would not be drawn into it. Even the Netherlands 
apparently were taking precautions. 

The German Ambassador said emphatically that some means must be 
found for preserving the peace of Europe. 

I am, &c., E. GREY. 

* See No. 84. t See No. 64. t See No. 81. 


No. 91. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen 

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 19 14. 

Sir: — The Austrian Ambassador told me today he had ready a long 
memorandum, which he proposed to leave, and which he said gave an 
account of the conduct of Servia toward Austria, and an explanation of 
how necessary the Austrian action was. 

I said that I did not wish to discuss the merits of the question between 
Austria and Servia. The news today seemed to me very bad for the peace 
of Europe. The Powers were not allowed to help in getting satisfaction 
for Austria, which they might get if they were given an opportunity, and 
European peace was at stake. 

Count Mensdorff said that the war with Servia must proceed. Austria 
could not continue to be exposed to the necessity of mobilizing again and 
again, as she had been obliged to do in recent years. She had no idea of 
territorial aggrandizement, and all she wished was to make sure that her 
interests were safeguarded. 

I said that it would be quite possible, without nominally interfering 
with the independence of Servia or taking away any of her territory, to 
turn her into a sort of vassal State. 

Count Mensdorff deprecated this. 

In reply to some further remarks of mine, as to the effect that the 
Austrian action might have upon the Russian position in the Balkans, he 
said that, before the Balkan war, Servia had always been regarded as being 
in the Austrian sphere of influence. 

I am, &c., E. GREY. 

No. 92. Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd 

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. 

Sir: — The Italian Ambassador made me today a communication from 
the Marquis di San Giuliano suggesting that the German objections to the 
mediation of the four Powers, a mediation that was strongly favored by 
Italy, might be removed by some change of the form of procedure, 

I said that I had already anticipated this by asking the German Govern- 
ment to suggest any form of procedure under which the idea of mediation 
between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the German Government 
in principle, could be applied. 

I am, &c., E. GREY. 

No. 93. Telegrams Communicated by Count Benckendorff, 

July 30, 1914 

(i.) Russian Ambassador at Vienna to M. Sazonof 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 15 (28), 1914. 

I spoke to Count Berchtold today in the sense of your Excellency's 
instructions. I brought to his notice, in the most friendly manner, how 


desirable it was to find a solution which, while consolidating good relations 
between Austria-Hungary and Russia, would give to the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy genuine guarantees for its future relations with Servia. 

I drew Count Berchtold's attention to all the dangers to the peace of 
Europe which would be involved by an armed conflict between Austria- 
Hungary and Servia. 

Count Berchtold replied that he was v/ell aware of the gravity of the 
situation and of the advantages of a frank explanation with the St. Peters- 
burg Cabinet. He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian 
Government, who had only decided, much against their will, on the energetic 
measures which they had taken against vServia, could no longer recede, 
nor enter into any discussion about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian 

Count Berchtold added that the crisis had become so acute, and that 
public opinion had risen to such a pitch of excitement, that the Govern- 
ment, even if they wished it, could no longer consent to such a course. This 
was all the more impossible, he said, inasmuch as the Servian reply itself 
furnished proof of the insincerity of Servia's promises for the future. 

(2.) M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff 

St. Petersburg, July 16 (29), 1914. 

The German Ambassador informs me, in the name of the Chancellor, 
that Germany has not ceased to exercise a moderating influence at Vienna 
and that she will continue to do so even after the declaration of war. Up 
to this morning there has been no news that the Austrian army has crossed 
the Servian frontier. I have begged the Ambassador to express my thanks 
to the Chancellor for the friendly tenor of this communication. I have 
informed him of the military measures taken by Russia, none of which, I 
told him, were directed against Germany; I added that neither should they 
be taken as aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary, their explanation 
being the mobilization of the greater part of the Austro-Hungarian army. 

The Ambassador said that he was in favor of direct explanations between 
the Austrian Government and ourselves, and I replied that I, too, was quite 
willing, provided that the advice of the German Government, to which he 
had referred, found an echo at Vienna. 

I said at the same time that we were quite ready to accept the proposal 
for a conference of the four powers, a proposal with which, apparently, 
Germany was not in entire sympathy. 

I told him that, in my opinion, the best manner of turning to account the 
most suitable methods of finding a peaceful solution would be by arranging 
for parallel discussions to be carried on by a conference of the four powers — 
Germany, France, England, and Italy — and by a direct exchange of views 
between Austria-Hungary and Russia on much the same lines as occurred 
during the most critical moments of last year's crisis. 

I told the Ambassador that, after the concessions which had been made 
by Servia, it should not be very difficult to find a compromise to settle the 
other questions which remained outstanding, provided that Austria showed 
some good- will and that all the powers used their entire influence in the 
direction of conciliation. 


(3.) M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff 

(Telegraphic.) St, Petersburg, July i6 (29), 19 14. 

At the time of my interview with the German Ambassador, dealt with 
in my preceding telegram, I had not yet received M. Schebeko's telegram of ' 
the 15th (28th) July. 

The telegram reports the refusal of the Vienna Cabinet to agree to a 
direct exchange of views with the Imperial Government. 

From now on nothing remains for us to do but to rely entirely on the 
British Government to take the initiative in the steps which they may con- 
sider advisable. 

No. 94. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 30.) 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 29, 1914. 

I learn that the mobilization of Russian corps destined to carry out 
operations on Austrian frontier has been ordered. IMy informant is Russian 
Ambassador. Ministry for Foreign Affairs here has realized, though some- 
what late in the day, that Russia will not remain indifferent in present crisis. 
I believe that the news of Russian mobilization will not be a surprise to the 
Ministry, but so far it is not generally known in Vienna this evening. Unless 
mediation which German Government declared themselves ready to offer 
in concert with three other Great Powers not immediately interested in the 
Austro-Servian dispute be brought to bear forthwith, irrevocable steps may 
be taken in present temper of this country. German Ambassador feigns 
surprise that Servian affairs should be of such interest to Russia. Both my 
Russian and French colleagues have spoken to him today. Russian Ambas- 
sador expressed the hope that it might still be possible to arrange matters, 
and explained that it was impossible for Russia to do otherwise than take 
an interest in the present dispute. Russia, he said, had done what she could 
already at Belgrade to induce Servian Government to meet principal 
Austrian demands in a favorable spirit; if approached in a proper manner he 
thought she would probably go still further in this direction. But she was 
justly offended at having been completely ignored, and she could not con- 
sent to be excluded from the settlement. German Ambassador said that if 
proposals were put forward which opened any prospect of possible accept- 
ance by both sides he personally thought that Germany might consent 
to act as mediator in concert with the three other Powers. 

■ I gather from what Russian Ambassador said to me that he is much 
afraid of the effect that any serious engagement may have upon Russian 
public opinion. I gathered, however, that Russia would go a long way to 
meet Austrian demands on Servia. 

No. 95. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 30.) 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 30, 1914. 

Russian Ambassador hopes that Russian mobilization will be regarded 
by Austria as what it is, viz., a clear intimation that Russia must be con- 


suited regarding the fate of Servia, but he does not know how the Austrian 
Government are taking it. He says that Russia must have an assurance 
that Servia will not be crushed, but she would understand that Austria- 
Hungary is compelled to exact from Servia measures which will secure her 
Slav provinces from the continuance of hostile propaganda from Servian 

The French Ambassador hears from Berlin that the German Ambassador 
at Vienna is instructed to speak seriously to the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment against acting in a manner calculated to provoke a European war. 

Unfortunately the German Ambassador is himself so identified with 
■extreme anti-Russian and anti-Servian feeling prevalent in Vienna that he is 
unlikely to plead the cause of peace with entire sincerity. 

Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the 
German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia 
before it was dispatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. _ I 
know from the German Ambassador himself that he indorses every line 
of it. 

No. 96. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey 

(R.eceived July 30.) 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 30, 1914. 

The Russan Ambassador gave the French Ambassador and myself this 
afternoon at the French Embassy, where I happened to be, an account of his 
interview with the Minister for Foreign AfEairs, which he said was quite 
friendly. The Minister for Foreign AfEairs had told him that as Russia had 
mobilized, Austria must, of course, do the same. This, however, should 
not be regarded as a threat, but merel}^ as the adoption of military precau- 
tions simSar to those which had been taken across the frontier. He said he 
had no objection to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the 
Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg continuing their conversation, 
although he did not say that they could be resumed on the basis of the 
vServian reply. 

On the whole, the Russian Ambassador is not dissatisfied. He had be- 
gun to make his preparations for his departiire on the strength of a rumor 
that Austria would declare war in reply to mobilization. He now hopes 
that something may yet be done to prevent war with Austria. 

No. 97. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 30.) 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 30, 191 4. 

French Ambassador and I visited Minister for Foreign Affairs this morn- 
ing. His Excellency said that German Ambassador had told him yester- 
day afternoon that German Government were willing to guarantee that 
Servian integrity would be respected by Austria. To this he had replied 
that this might be so but nevertheless Servia would become an Austrian 
vassal, just as, in similar circumstances, Bokhara had become a Russian 


vassal. There would be a revolution in Russia if she were to tolerate such a 
state of affairs. 

M. Sazonof told us that absolute proof was in possession of Russian 
Government that Germany was making military and naval preparations 
against Russia — more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland. 

German Aml;assador had a second interview with Minister for Foreign 
Affairs at 2 A. M., when former completely broke down on seeing that war 
was inevitable. He appealed to M. .Sazonof to make some suggestion which 
he could telegraph to German Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof 
accordingly drew up and handed to German Ambassador a formula in 
French, of which following is translation: 

"If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with vSen'ia has assumed char- 
acter of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate 
from her ultimatum points which violate principle of sovereignty of Servia, 
Russia engages to stop all military preparations." 

Preparations for general mobilization will be proceeded with if this 
proposal is rejected by Austria, and inevitable result will be a European 
war. Excitement here has reached such a pitch that if Austria refuses to 
make a concession Russia cannot hold back, and, now that she knows that 
Germany is arming, she can hardly postpone, for strategical reasons, con- 
verting partial into general mobihzation. 

No. 98. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 30.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 30, 19 14. 

Secretary of State informs me that immicdiately on receipt of Prince 
Lichnowsky's telegram recording his last conversation with you he asked 
Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be willing to accept 
mediation on basis of occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or some 
other point and issue their conditions from there. He has up till now re- 
ceived no reply, but he fears Russian mobilization against Austria will have 
increased difficulties, as Austria-Hungar\'-, who has as yet only mobiHzed 
against Servia, will probably find it necessary also against Russia. Secre- 
tary of State says if you can succeed in getting Russia to agree to above 
basis for an arrangement and in persuading her in the meantime to take 
no steps which might be regarded as an act of aggression against Austria 
he still sees some chance that European peace may be preserved. 

He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position in 
view of Russian mobilization and military measures which he hears are 
being taken in France. Beyond recall of officers on leave — a measure which 
had been officially taken after, and not before, visit of French Ambassador 
yesterday — Imperial Government had done nothing special in way of 
military preparations. Something, however, would hav^e soon to be done, 
for it might be too late, and when they mobilized they would have to 
mobilize on three sides. He regretted this, as he knew France did not desire 
war, but it would be a military necessity. 

His Excellency added that telegram received from Prince Lichnowsky 
last night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly 


with surprise, and at all events he thoroughly appreciated frankness and 
loyalty with which you had spoken. 

He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very late 
last night; had it been received earlier Chancellor would, of course, not 
have spoken to me in way he had done. 

No. 99. Sd- F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 30.) 
(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 30, 1914. 

President of the Republic tells me that the Russian Government have 
been informed by the German Government that unless Russia stopped 
her mobilization Germany would mobilize. But a further report, since 
received from St. Petersburg, states that the German communication had 
been modified, and was now a request to be informed on what conditions 
Russia would consent to demobilization. The answer is that she agrees 
to do so on condition that Austria-Hungary gives an assurance that she 
will respect the sovereignty of Servia, and submit certain of the demands 
of the Austrian note, which Servia has not accepted, to an international 
discussion. 1 

President thinks that these conditions will not be accepted by Austria. 
He is convinced that peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great 
Britain. If his Majesty's Government announced that England would 
come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and 
Germany as a result of the present differences between Austria and Servia, 
there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify' her attitude. 

I explained to him how difficult it would be for his Majesty's Govern- 
ment to make such an announcement, but he said that he must maintain 
that it would be in the interests of peace. France, he said, is pacific. 
She does not desire war, and all that she has done at present is to make 
preparations for mobilization so as not to be taken unawares. The French 
Government will keep his Majesty's Government informed of everything 
that may be done in that way. They have reliable information that the 
German troops are concentrated round Thionville and Metz ready for war. 
If there were a general war on the Continent it would inevitably draw 
England into it for the protection of her vital interests. A declaration 
now of her intention to support France, whose desire it is that peace should 
be maintained, would almost certainly prevent Germany from going to 

No. 100. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 30.) 
(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 30, 1914. 

German Ambassador told me last night that he thought that Germany 
would be able to prevent Austria from making any exorbitant demands 
if Servia could be induced to submit, and to ask for peace early, say, as 
soon as the occupation of Belgrade had been accomplished. 

I made to his Excellency the personal suggestion that some formula 


might be devised by Germany which might be acceptable for an exchange 
of views. 

I see, however, that you have already made this suggestion. 

No. 101. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen 
(Telegraphic.) London, Foreign Office, July 30, 19 14. 

Your telegram of 29th July.* 

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chan- 
cellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such 

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies 
are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French 
territory as distinct from the colonies. 

From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for 
France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could 
be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become sub- 
ordinate to German policy. 

Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this 
bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the 
good name of this country would never recover. 

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obli- 
gations or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We 
could not entertain that bargain either. 

Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect 
of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany 
offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for trying our 
hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances 
may seem to us to require in any such unfavorable and regrettable develop- 
ment of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates. 

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most 
earnestly that one way of maintaining good relations between England 
and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve 
the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of 
Germany and England will, I believe, be ipso facto improved and strength- 
ened. For that object His Majesty's Government will work in that 
way with all sincerity and good-will. 

And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the 
present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to promote some ' 
arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be 
assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her 
or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I 
have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last 
Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations • 
sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the 
subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute 
than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, 
I arn hopeful that the rehef and reaction which will follow may make 
possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than 
has been possible hitherto. 

* See No. 85. 


No. 102. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen 


London, Foreign Office, July 30, 19 14. 

I have warned Prince Lichnowsky that Germany must not count upon 
our standing aside in all circumstances. This is doubtless the substance 
of the telegram from Prince Lichnowsky to German Chancellor, to which 
reference is made in the last two paragraphs of your telegram of 30th 

* See No. 98. 

No. 103. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan 


London, Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. 

German Ambassador informs me that German Government would 
endeavor to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Servian territory 
in region of frontier, to promise not to advance further while Powers 
endeavored to arrange that Servia should give satisfaction sufficient to 
pacify Austria. Territory occupied would, of course, be evacuated when 
Austria was satisfied. I suggested this yesterday as a possible relief to 
the situation, and, if it can be obtained, I would earnestly hope that it 
might be agreed to suspend further military preparations on all sides. 

Russian Ambassador has told me of condition laid down by M. Sazonof, 
as quoted in your telegram of the 30th July,* and fears it cannot be modi- 
fied; but if Austrian advance were stopped after occupation of Belgrade, 
I think Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' formula might be changed 
to read that the Powers would examine how Servia could fully satisfy 
Austria without impairing Servian sovereign rights or independence. 

If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighboring Servian territory, 
declares herself ready, in the interest of European peace, to cease her 
advance and to discuss how a complete settlement can be arrived at I 
hope that Russia would also consent to discussion and suspension of further 
military preparations, provided that other Powers did the same. 

It is a slender chance of preserving peace, but the only one I can suggest 
if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can come to no agreement at Berlin. 
You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

* See No. 97. 

No. 104. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie 


London, Foreign Office, July 30, 191 4. 

You should inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my telegram 
to Sir G. Buchanan of today,* and say that I know that he has been urging 
Russia not to precipitate a crisis. I hope he may be able to support this last 
suggestion at St. Petersburg. 

* See No. 103. 


No. 105. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie 

London, Foreign Office, July 30, 19 14. 

Sir: — M. Cambon reminded me today of the letter I had written to 
him two years ago, in which we agreed that, if the peace of Europe was 
seriously threatened, we would discuss what we were prepared to do. I 
inclose for convenience of reference copies of the letter in question and of 
M. Cambon's reply. He said that the peace of Europe was never more 
seriously threatened than it was now. He did not wish to ask me to say 
directly that we would intervene, but he would like me to say what we 
should do if certain circumstances arose. The particular hypothesis he 
had in mind was an aggression by Germany on France. He gave me a 
paper, of which a copy is also inclosed, showing that the German military 
preparations were more advanced and more on the offensive upon the 
frontier than anything France had yet done. He anticipated that the 
aggression would take the form of either a demand that France should 
cease her preparations, or a demand that she should engage to remain 
neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia. Neither of these 
things could France admit. 

I said that the Cabinet was to meet tomorrow morning, and I would 
see him again tomorrow afternoon. 

I am, &c., E. GREY. 

Enclosure i In No. 105 

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon 

London, Foreign Office, Nov. 22, 1912. 

My dear Ambassador: — From time to time in recent years the French 
and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has 
always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the free- 
dom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to 
assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between 
experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that com- 
mits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen 
and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and 
British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an 
engagement to co-operate in war. 

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave 
reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become 
essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed 
assistance of the other. 

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an un- 
provoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general 
peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Govern- 
ments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, 
and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. 
If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would 
at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then 
decide what effect should be given to them. 

Yours, &c., E. GREY. 


Enclosure 2 in No. 105 

M. Cambon to Sir Edward Grey 


French Embassy, London, Nov. 23, 1912. 

Dear Sir Edward: — You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22d, 
November, that during the last few years the military and naval authori- 
ties of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time 
to time; that it had always been understood that these consultations 
should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future 
whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces; 
that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not and should 
not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action 
in certain eventualities ; that, however, I had remarked to you that, if one 
cr other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked 
attack on the part of a third power, it would become essential to know 
whether it could count on the armed support of the other. 

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorized to state that, in 
the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear 
either an attack from a third power, or some event threatening the general 
peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the 
question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent 
aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Governments would deliberate 
as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common. If 
those measures involved action the two Governments would take into 
immediate consideration the plans of their General Staffs and would then 
decide as to the effect to be given to those plans. 

Yours, &c., PAUL CAMBON. 

Enclosure 3 in No. 105 

French Minister for Foreign Afifairs to M. Cambon 


The German Army had its advance posts on our frontiers yesterday 
(Friday). German patrols twice penetrated on to our territory. Our 
advance posts are withdrawn to a distance of 10 kilometers from the 
frontier. The local population is protesting against being thus abandoned 
to the attack of the enemy's army, but the Government wishes to make it 
clear to public opinion and to the British Government that in no case will 
France be the aggressor. The whole i6th corps from Metz, reinforced by a 
part of the 8 th from Treves and Cologne, is occupying the frontier at 
Metz on the Luxemburg side. The 15th army corps from Strassburg has 
closed up on the frontier. The inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine are pre- 
vented by the threat of being shot from crossing the frontier. Reservists 
have been called back to Germany by tens of thousands. This is the last 
stage before mobilization, whereas we have not called out a single reservist. 


As you see, Germany has done it. I would add that all my information 
goes to show that the German preparations began on Saturday, the very 
day on which the Austrian note was handed in. 

These facts, added to those contained in my telegram of yesterday, 
will enable you to prove to the British Government the pacific intentions 
of the one party and the aggressive intentions of the other. 

Paris, July 31 [sic], 1914. 

No. 106. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 31.) 
(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 30, 19 14. 

I learned from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who sent for me this 
evening, that the Austrian Government had declined to continue the 
direct exchange of views with the Russian Government. But he had 
reason to believe that Germany was now disposed to give more conciliatory 
advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we should act with France 
and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue with us. 

He said he was telegraphing to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin to 
ask the German Government to suggest that the idea of an exchange of 
views between the four Powers should be resumed in any form which Austria 
would consider acceptable. It seemed to him that Germany might invite 
Austria to state exactly the terms which she would demand from Servia, 
and give a guarantee that she would neither deprive her of independence 
nor annex territory. It would be useless to ask for anything less than was 
contained in the Austrian ultimatum, and Germany would support no 
proposal that did not imply non-success for Austria. We might, on the 
other hand, ascertain from Russia what she would accept, and, once we 
knew the standpoints of these two countries, discussions could be com- 
menced at once. There was still time so long as Austria had received no 
check. He in any case was in favor of continuing an exchange of views 
with his Majesty's Government if the idea of discussions between the 
four Powers was impossible. 

No. 107. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 31.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 30, 1914. 

I do not know whether you have received a reply from the German 
Government to the communication* which you made to them through the 
Gerrrian Ambassador in London, asking whether they could suggest any 
method by which the four Powers could use their mediating influence 
between Russia and Austria. I was informed last night that they had 
not had time to send an answer yet. Today, in reply to an inquiry from 
the French Ambassador as to whether the Imperial Government had pro- 
posed any course of action, the Secretary of State said that he felt that 
time would be saved by communicating with Vienna direct, and that he 
had asked the Austro-Hungarian Government what would satisfy them. 
No answer had, however, yet been returned. 

*See No. 84. 

71 . 

The Chancellor told me last night that he was "pressing the button** 
as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he had not gone 
so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated 
rather than otherwise. 

No. 108. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 31.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, 1914. 

Chancellor informs me that his efforts to preach peace and moderation 
at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilization 
against Austria. He has done everything possible to attain his object at 
Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was altogether palatable at the 
Ballplatz. He could not, however, leave his country defenseless while 
time was being utilized by other Powers; and if, as he learns is the case, 
military measures are now being taken by Russia against Germany also, 
it would be impossible for him to remain quiet. He wished to tell me that 
it was quite possible that in a very short time, today perhaps, the German 
Government would take some very serious step ; he was, in fact, just on the 
point of going to have an audience with the Emperor. 

His Excellency added that the news of the active preparations on the 
Russo-German frontier had reached him just when the Czar had appealed 
to the Emperor, in the name of their old friendship, to mediate at 
Vienna, and when the Emperor was actually conforming to that request. 

No. 109. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 31.) 
(Telegraphic.) BerUn, July 31, 1914. 

I read to the Chancellor this morning your answer to his appeal for 
British neutrality in the event of war, as contained in your telegram of 
yesterday.* His Excellency was so taken up with the news of the Russian 
measures along the frontier, referred to in my immediately preceding tele- 
gram, that he received your communication without comment. He asked 
me to let him have the message that I had just read to him as a memoran- 
dum, as he would like to reflect upon it before giving an answer, and his 
mind was so full of grave matters that he could not be certain of remem- 
bering all its points. I therefore handed to him the text of your message 
on the understanding that it should be regarded merely as a record of 
conversation, and not as an official document. 

His Excellency agreed. 

*See No. loi. 

No. 110. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan 

(Telegraphic.) London, Foreign Ofi&ce, July 31, 1914. 

I learn from the German Ambassador that, as a result of suggestions 
by the German Government, a conversation has taken place at Vienna 


between the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Russian Am- 
bassador. The Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg has also been 
instructed that he may converse with the Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, and that he should give explanations about the Austrian ultimatum 
to Servia, and discuss suggestions and any questions directly affecting 
Austro-Russian relations. If the Russian Government object to the 
Austrians mobilizing eight army corps, it might be pointed out that this 
is not too great a number against 400,000 Servians. 

The German Ambassador asked me to urge the Russian Government 
to show good will in the discussions and to suspend their military prepara- 

It is with great satisfaction that I have learned that discussions are 
being resumed between Austria and Russia, and you should express this to 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs and tell him that I earnestly hope he will 
encourage them. 

I informed the German Ambassador that, as regards military prepara- 
tions, I did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend them unless 
gome limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Servia. 

No. 111. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen 

(Telegraphic.) London, Foreign Office, July 31, 19 14. 

I hope that the conversations which are now proceeding between 
Austria and Russia may lead to a satisfactory result. The stumbling 
block hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of Servian assurances and 
Russian mistrust of Austrian intentions with regard to the independence 
and integrity of Servia. It has occurred to' me that, in the event of this 
mistrust preventing a solution being found by Vienna and St. Petersburg, 
Germany might sound Vienna, and I would undertake to sound St. Peters- 
burg, whether it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers to 
offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full 
satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided that they did not impair 
Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory. As your 
Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her willingness to respect 
them. Russia might be informed by the four Powers that they would 
undertake to prevent Austrian demands going the length of impairing 
Servian sovereignty and integrity. All Powers would of course suspend 
further military operations or preparations. 

You may sound the Secretary of State about this proposal. 

I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get 
any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and 
Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and 
France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at 
St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and 
France would not accept it his Majesty's Government would have nothing 
more to do with the consequences; but, otherwise, I told German Am- 
bassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in. 

You can add this when sounding Chancellor or Secretary of State as 
to proposal above. 


No. 112. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey. 

(Received July 31.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, 19 14. 

According to information just received by German Government from 
their Ambassador at St. Petersburg, whole Russian Army and Fleet are 
being mobilized. Chancellor tells me that " Kriegsgefahr" will be pro- 
claimed at once by German Government, as it can only be against Germany 
that Russian general mobilization is directed. Mobilization would follow 
almost immediately. His Excellency added in explanation that "Kriegs- 
gefahr" signified the taking of certain precautionary measures consequent 
upon strained relations with a foreign country. 

This news from St. Petersburg, added his Excellency, seemed to him 
to put an end to all hope of a peaceful solution of the crisis. Germany 
must certainly prepare for all emergencies. 

I asked him whether he could not still put pressure on the authorities 
at Vienna to do something in general interests to reassure Russia and to 
show themselves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis. He 
replied that last night he had begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, 
and that he had received a reply to the effect that Austrian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs would take wishes of the Emperor this morning in the 

No. 113. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 31.) • ' 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 31, 19 14. 

It has been decided to issue orders for general mobilization. 

This decision was taken in consequence of report received from Russian 
Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is determined not to yield 
to intervention of Powers and that she is moving troops against Russia as 
well as against Servia. 

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active mili- 
tary preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start. 

No. 114. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie and Sir E. Goschen 

(Telegraphic.) London, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. 

•I still trust situation is not irretrievable, but in view of prospect of 
mobilization in Germany it becomes essential to his Majesty's Govern- 
ment, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French (German) Govern- 
ment is prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no 
other Power violates it. 

A similar request is being addressed to German (French Government). 
It is important to have an early answer. 


No. 115. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers 

(Telegraphic.) London, Foreign Office, July 31, 19 14. 

In view of existing treaties, you should inform Minister for Foreign 
Affairs that, in consideration of the possibility of a European war, I have 
asked French and German Governments whether each is prepared to 
respect the neutrality of Belgium provided it is violated by no other Power, 

You should say that I assume that the Belgian Government will main- 
tain to the utmost of her power her neutrality, which I desire and expect 
other Powers to uphold and observe. 

You should inform the Belgian Government that an early reply is 

No. 116. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie 

(Telegraphic.) London, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. 

I have received your telegram of yesterday's date.* 

Nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it has yet gone, British 
treaties or obligations are involved. Feeling is quite different from what 
it was during the Morocco question. That crisis involved a dispute 
directly involving France, whereas in this case France is being drawn into 
a dispute which is not hers. 

I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive 
factor in situation. German Government do not expect our neutrality. 

We cannot undert^e a definite pledge to intervene in a war. I have 
so told the French Ambassador, whfo has urged His Majesty's Government 
to reconsider this decision. 

I have told him that we should not be justified in giving any pledge at 
the present moment, but that we will certainly consider the situation 
again directly there is a new development. 

*See No. 99. 

No. 117. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 31.) 
(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 31, 19 14. 

At 7 o'clock this evening I was sent for by Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
When I arrived the German Ambassador was leaving his Excellency. 

German Ambassador had informed his Excellency that, in view of the 
fact that orders had been given for the total mobilization of Russian army 
and fleet, German Government have in an ultimatum which they have 
addressed to the Russian Government required that Russian forces should 
be demobilized. 

The German Government will consider it necessary to order the total 
mobilization of the German army on the Russian and French frontiers if 
within twelve hours the Russian Government do not give an undertaking 
to comply with German demand. 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs asks me to communicate this to you, 
and inquires what, in these circumstances, will be the attitude of England. 


German Ambassador could not say when the twelve hours terminate. 
He is going to call at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs tomorrow (Saturday) 
at I P. M. in order to receive the French Government's answer as to the 
attitude they will adopt in the circumstances. 

He intimated the possibility of his requiring his passports. 

I am informed by the Russian Ambassador that he is not aware of any 
general mobilization of the Russian forces having taken place. 

No. 118. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received July 31.) 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 31, 19 14. 

I am informed by Count Forgach, Under Secretary of State, that 
although Austria was compelled to respond to Russian mobilization, which 
he deplored, the Austrian Ambassador in London has received instructions 
to inform you that mobilization was not to be regarded as a necessarily 
hostile act on either side. Telegrams were being exchanged between the 
Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor, and conversations were pro- 
ceeding between Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg and Russian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. A general war might, he seriously hoped, 
be staved off by these efforts. On my expressing my fear that Germany 
would mobilize, he said that Germany must do something, in his opinion, 
to secure her position. As regards Russian intervention on behalf of 
Servia, Austria- Hungary found it difficult to recognize such a claim. I 
called his attention to the fact that during the discussion of the Albanian 
frontier at the London Conference of Ambassadors the Russian Govern- 
ment had stood behind Servia, and that a compromise between the views 
of Russia and Austria- Hungary resulted with accepted frontier line. Al- 
though he spoke in a conciliatory tone, and did not regard the situation 
as desperate, I could not get from him any suggestion for a similar com- 
promise in the present case. Count Forgach is going this afternoon to 
see the Russian Ambassador, whom I have informed of the above con- 

The Russian Ambassador has explained that Russia has no desire to 
interfere unduly with Servia; that, as compared with the late Russian 
Minister, the present Minister at Belgrade is a man of very moderate 
views; and that, as regards Austrian demands, Russia had counseled 
Servia to yield to them as far as she possibly could without sacrificing her 
independence. His Excellency is exerting himself strongly in the interests 
of peace. 

No. 119. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie 

London, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. 

Sir: — M. Cambon referred today to a telegram that had been shown 
to Sir Arthur Nicolson this morning from the French Ambassador in 
Berlin, saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we would 


intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that if we 
would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and France it would 
decide the German attitude in favor of peace. I said that it was quite 
wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under the impression that we 
would not intervene. I had refused overtures to promise that we should 
remain neutral. I had not only definitely declined to say that we would 
remain neutral, I had even gone so far this morning as to say to the German 
Ambassador that if France and Germany became involved in war we 
should be drawn into it. That, of course, was not the same thing as taking 
an engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to show that 
we had not left Germany under the impression that we would stand aside. 

AI. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said yesterday. 

I said that we had come to the conclusion in the Cabinet today that 
we could not give any pledge at the present time. Though we should 
have to put our policy before Parliament we could not pledge Parliament 
in advance. Up to the present moment we did not feel, and public opinion 
did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. 
Further developments might alter this situation and cause the Government 
and Parliament to take the view that intervention was justified. The 
preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a 
decisive, but an important factor, in determining our attitude. Whether 
we proposed to Parliament to inter\'ene or not to intervene in a war, 
Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the neutrality 
of Belgium, and it might be that I should ask both France and Germany 
whether each was prepared to undertake an engagement that she would 
not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium. 

M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if 
Germany made an attack on her. 

I said I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had 
gone at present, we could not take any engagement. 

M. Cambon urged that Germa,ny had from the beginning rejected 
proposals that might have made for peace. It could not be to England's 
interest that France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be 
in a very diminished position with regard to Germany. In 1870 we had 
made a great mistake in allowing an enormous increase of German strength, 
and we should now be repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I 
could not submit his question to the Cabinet again. 

I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there 
was some new development, but at the present moment the only answer 
I could give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement. 

I am, &c., E. GREY. 

No. 120. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received August i.) 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me and French Ambassador and 
asked us to telegraph to our respective Governments subjoined formula 
as best calculated to amalgamate proposal made by you in your telegram. 


of 30th July* with formula recorded in my telegram of 30th July.f He 
trusted it would meet with your approval: 

Translation. — "If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops 
on Servian territory; if recognizing that the dispute between Austria and 
Servia has assumed a character of European interest, she will allow the 
Great Powers to look into the matter and determine whether Servia could 
satisfy the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights 
as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia will undertake to main- 
tain her waiting attitude." 

His Excellency then alluded to the telegram sent to German Emperor 
by Emperor of Russia in reply to the former's telegram. He said that Em- 
peror Nicholas had begun by thanking Emperor William for his telegram 
and for the hopes of peaceful solution which it held out. His Majesty had 
then proceeded to assure Emperor William that no intention whatever of 
an aggressive character was concealed behind Russian military prepara- 
tions. So long as conversation with Austria continued, His Imperial 
Majesty undertook that not a single man should be moved across the fron- 
tier; it was, however, of course impossible, for reasons explained, to stop a 
mobilization which "was already to progresss. 

M. Sazonof said that undoubtedly there would be better prospec't of a 
peaceful solution if the suggested conversation were to take place in London, 
where the atmosphere was far more favorable and he therefore hoped that 
you would see your way to agreeing to this. 

His Excellency ended by expressing his deep gratitude to His Majesty's 
Government, who had done so much to save the situation. It would be 
largely due to them if war were prevented. The Emperor, the Russian 
Government, and the Russian people would never forget the firm attitude 
adopted by Great Britain. 

* See No. 103. f ^ee No. 97. 

No. 121. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received Aug. i.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, 19 14. 

Your telegram of 31st July.* 

I spent an hour with Secretary of State urging him most earnestly to 
accept your proposal and make another effort to prevent terrible catas- 
trophe of a European war. 

He expressed himself very sympathetically toward your proposal, and 
appreciated your continued efforts to maintain peace, but said it was im- 
possible for the Imperial Government to consider any proposal until they 
had received an answer from Russia to their communication of today; this 
communication, which he admitted had the form of an ultimatum, being 
that, unless Russia could inform the Imperial Government within twelve 
hours that she would immediately countermand her mobilization against 
Germany and Austria, Germany would be obliged on her side to mobilize 
at once. 

I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand even more 
difficult for Russia to accept b}'' asking them to demobilize in south as well. 

* See No. 1 1 1 . 


He replied that it was in order to prevent Russia from saying all her mobiliza- 
tion was only directed against Austria. 

His Excellency said that if the answer from Russia was satisfactory he 
thought personally that your proposal merited favorable consideration, and 
in any case he would lay it before the Emperor and Chancellor, but he 
repeated that it was no use discussing it until the Russian Government had 
sent in their answer to the German demand. 

He again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request of 
the Emperor of Russia, and the German Foreign Office had even up till last 
night been urging Austria to show willingness to continued discussions — and 
telegraphic and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a 
promising nature — but Russia's mobilization had spoiled everj'-thing. 

No. 122. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey 

(tleceived Aug. i.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, 191 4. 

Neutrality of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st Julv to Sir F. 

I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the 
Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. I gathered 
from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but 
disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war 
ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would return 
any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of 3^our request. 

It appears from what he said that German Government consider that 
certain hostile acts have already been comimitted by Belgium. As an in- 
stance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been 
placed under an embargo already. 

I hope to see his Excellency tomorrow again to discuss the matter further, 
but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me remote. 

In speaking to me today the Chancellor made it clear that Germany 
would in any case desire to know the reply returned to you by the French 

* See No. 114. 

No. 123. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen 

London, Foreign Office, Aug. i, 19 14. 

Sir: — I told the German Ambassador today that the reply* of the 
German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter 
of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in 
this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as 
that which had been give 1 by France it would materially contribute to re- 
lieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation 
of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, 
* See No. 122. 


it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. 1 
said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and 
as I was authorized to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it. 

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Bel- 
gium neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral. 

I replied that I could not say that ; our hands were still free, and we were 
considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our atti- 
tude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neu- 
trality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did 
not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone. 

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate con- 
ditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the 
integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed. 

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral 
on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free. 

I am, &c., E. GREY. 

No. 124. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received August i.) 
(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 31, 1914. 

On the receipt at 8:30 tonight of your telegram of this afternoon,* I 
sent a message to Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting to see him. He 
received me at 10:30 tonight at the ^lysee, where a Cabinet Council was 
being held. He took a note of the inquiry as to the respecting by France of 
the neutrality of Belgium which you instructed me to make. 

He told me that a communication had been made to you by the German 
Ambassador in London of the intention of Germany to order a general 
mobilization of her army if Russia do not demobilize at once. He is urgently 
anxious as to what the attitude of England will be in the circumstances, and 
begs an answer may be made by his Majesty's Government at the earliest 
moment possible. 

■ Minister for Foreign Affairs also told me that the German Embassy is 
packing up. 

* See No. 114. 

No. 125. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received August i.) 
(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 31, 19 14. 

My immediately preceding telegram.* 

Political Director has brought me the reply of the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs to your inquiry respecting the neutrality of Belgium. It is as follows : 

French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, 
and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that 
neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to 
assure defense of her own security, to act otherwise. This assurance has 

* See No. 124. 


been given several times. President of the Republic spoke of it to the King 
of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously 
renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs today. 

No. 126. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received August i.) 
(Telegraphic.) ,. Paris, Aug. i, 19 14. 

I have had conversation with the Political Director, who states that the 
German Ambassador was informed, on caUing at the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs this morning, that the French Government failed to comprehend 
the reason which prompted his communication of yesterday evening. It 
was pointed out to his Excellency that general mobilization in Russia had 
not been ordered until after Austria had decreed a general mobilization 
and that the Russian Government were ready to demobilize if all Powers 
did likewise. It seemed strange to the French Government that in view 
of this and of the fact that Russia and Austria were ready to converse, the 
German Government should have at that moment presented an ultimatum 
at St. Petersburg requiring immediate demobilization by Russia. There 
were no differences at issue between France and Germany, but the German 
Ambassador had made a menacing communication to the French Govern- 
ment and had requested an answer the next day, intimating that he would 
have to break off relations and leave Paris if the reply were not satisfactory. 
The Ambassador was informed that the French Government considered 
that this was an extraordinary proceeding. 

The German Ambassador, who is to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
again this evening, said nothing about demanding his passports, but he 
t ated that he had packed up. 

No. 127. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received Aug. i.) 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, Aug. i, 1914. 

General mobilization of army and fleet. 

No. 128. Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received Aug. i.) 
(Telegraphic.) . Brussels, Aug. i, 1914. 

Belgian neutrality. 

The instructions conveyed in your telegram of yesterday* have been 
acted upon. 

Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and uphold 
her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. 
In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event pi 

* See No. 115. 


the violation of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were 
in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between 
Belgium and her neighbors were excellent, and there was no reason to sus- 
pect their intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared 
against emergencies. ^ 


No. 129. Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received Aug. 2.) 

(Telegraphic.) Luxemburg, Aug. 2, 19 14. 

The Luxemburg Minister of State has just received through the German 
Minister in Luxemburg, M. de Buch, a telegram from the Chancellor of the 
German Empire, Bethmann-Hollweg, to the effect that the military meas- 
ures taken in Luxemburg do not constitute a hostile act against Luxemburg, 
but are only intended to insure against a possible attack of a French army. 
Full compensation will be paid to Luxemburg for any damage caused by 
using the railways, which are leased to the Empire. 

No. 130. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen 

(Telegraphic.) London, Foreign Office, Aug. i, 1914. 

We are informed, that authorities at Hamburg have forcibly detained 
steamers belonging to the Great Central Company and other British mer- 
chant ships. 

I cannot ascertain on what grounds the detention of British ships has 
been ordered. 

You should request German Government to send immediate orders that 
they should be allowed to proceed without delay. The effect on public 
opinion here will be deplorable unless this is done. His Majesty's Govern- 
ment, on their side, are most anxious to avoid any incident of an aggressive 
nature, and the German Government will, I hope, be equally careful not 
to take any step which would make the situation between us impossible. 

No. 131. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen 

(Telegraphic.) London, Foreign Office, Aug. i, 19 14. 

I still believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little 
respite in time can be gained before any great .power begins war. 

The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of 
Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to accept a 
basis of mediation which is not open to the objections raised in regard to the 
formula which Russia originally suggested. 

Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready 
to converse, and I hope that German Government may be able to make use 
of the Russian communications referred to above, in order to avoid tension. 


His Majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any act which 
may precipitate matters. 

No. 132. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen 

(Telegraphic.) London, Foreign Office, Aug. i, 19 14. 

Following telegram from M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff of the 
31st July communicated to me today: 

Translation. — "(Urgent.) Formula amended in accordance with the 
English proposal: 'If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on 
Servian territory, and if, recognizing that the Austro-Servian conflict has 
assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that 
the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Servia can accord to 
the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her sovereign rights 
as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her wait- 
ing attitude.'" 

(Above communicated to all the Powers.) 

No. 133. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen 

(Telegraphic.) London, Foreign Office, Aug. i, 1914. 

M. DeEtter came today to communicate the contents of a telegram from 
M. Sazonof, dated the 31st July, Vv^hich are as follows: 

"The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declares the readiness of his Gov- 
ernment to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. 
Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that 
the discussions should take place in London with the participation of the 
Great Powers. 

"M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the 
direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to 
them. It would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a 
stop provisionally to her military action on Servian territory." 
(The above has been communicated to the six Powers.) 

No. 134. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received Aug. i.) 
(Telegraphic.) Paris, Aug. i, 19 14. 

President of the republic has informed me that German Government 
were trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility; that it was only after 
a decree of general mobilization had been issued in Austria that the Emperor 
of Russia ordered a general mobilization; that, although the measures which 
the German Government have already taken are in effect a general mobiliza- 
tion, they are not so designated ; that a French general mobihzation will 
become necessary in self-defense, and that France is already forty-eight 
hours behind Germany as regards German military preparations; that the 


French troops have orders not to go nearer to the German frontier than a 
distance of lo kilometers so as to avoid any grounds for accusations of 
provocation to Germany, whereas the German troops, on the other hand, are 
actually on the French frontier and have made incursions on it; that, not- 
withstanding mobilizations, the Emperor of Russia has expressed himself 
ready to continue his conversations with the German Ambassador with a 
view to preserving the peace; that French Government, whose wishes are 
markedly pacific, sincerely desire the preservation of peace and do not 
quite despair, even now, of its being possible to avoid war. 

No. 135. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan 

(Telegraphic.) London, Foreign Office, Aug. i, 19 14. 

Information reaches me from a most reliable source that Austrian Gov- 
ernment have informed German Government that, though the situation has 
been changed by the mobilization of Russia, they would in full appreciation 
of the efforts of England for the preservation of peace be ready to consider 
favorably my proposal for mediation between Austria and Servia. The 
understanding of this acceptance would naturally be that the Austrian 
military action against Servia would continue for the present, and that the 
British Government would urge upon Russian Government to stop the 
mobilization of troops directed against Austria, in which case Austria 
would naturally cancel those defensive military countermeasures in Galicia, 
which have been forced upon Austria by Russian mobilization. 

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say that if, in the 
consideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, Russia can agree 
to stop mobilization, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace. Pre- 
sumably the matter should be discussed with German Government,' also 
by Russian Government. 

No. 136. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received August i.) 
(Telegraphic.) Paris, Aug. i, 19 14. 

Minister of War informed Military Attache this afternoon that orders 
had been given at 3 40 for a general mobilization of the French Army. This 
became necessary because the Minister of War knows that, under the system 
of " Kriegszustand," the Germans have called up six classes. Three classes 
are sufficient to bring their covering troops up to war strength, the remaining 
three being the reserve. This, he said, being tantamount to mobilization, 
is mobilization under another name. 

The French forces on the frontier have opposed to them eight army corps 
on a war footing, and an attack is expected at any moment. It is therefore 
of the utmost importance to guard against this. A zone of ten kilom. has 
been left between the French troops and German frontier. The French 
troops will not attack, and the Minister of War is anxious that it should be 
explained that this act of mobilization is one for purely defensive purposes. 


No. 137. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen 

(Telegraphic.) London, Foreign Office, Aug. i, 19 14. 

I saw the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador this morning. He supplied 
me with the substance of a telegram which the Austro-Hungarian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs had sent to the Austrian Ambassador in Paris. In this 
telegram his Excellency was given instructions to assure the French Minister 
for Foreign Affairs that there was no intention in the minds of the Austro- 
Hungarian Government to impair the sovereign rights of Servia or to obtain 
territorial aggrandizement. The Ambassador added that he was further 
instructed to inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there 
was no truth in the report which had been published in Paris to the effect 
that Austria-Hungary intended to occupy the Sanjak. 

Count Mensdorff called again later at the Foreign Office. He informed 
me of a telegram sent yesterday to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at 
St. Petersburg by Count Berchtold, and gave me the substance. 

It states that Count Berchtold begged the Russian Ambassador, whom 
he sent for yesterday, to do his best to remove the wholly erroneous impres- 
sion in St. Petersburg that the "door had been banged" by Austria- 
Hungary on all further conversations. The Russian Ambassador promised 
to do this. Count Berchtold repeated on this occasion to the Russian Am- 
bassador the assurance which had already been given at St. Petersburg, to 
the effect that neither an infraction of Servian sovereign rights nor the 
acquisition of Servian territory was being contemplated by Austria-Hun- 

Special attention was called by Count Mensdorff to the fact that this 
telegram contains a statement to the effect that conversations at St. Peters- 
burg had not been broken off by Austria-Hungary. 

No. 138. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received Aug. 2.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, Aug. i, 1914. 

Your telegram of today.* 

I have communicated the substance of the above telegram to the Secre- 
tary of State for Foreign Affairs, and spent a long time arguing with him 
that the chief dispute was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany 
was only drawn in as Austria's ally. If, therefore, Austria and Russia were, 
as was evident, ready to discuss matters and Germany did not desire war 
on her own account, it seemed to me only logical that Germany should hold 
her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement. Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's readiness to discuss was the 
result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not Russia mobilized against 
Germany, all would have been well. But Russia, by abstaining from an- 
swering Germany's demand that she should demobilize, had caused 
Germany to mobilize also, Russia had said that her mobilization did not 
necessarily imply war, and that she could perfectly well remain mobilized 
for months without making war. This was not the case with Germany. 

*See No. 131. 


She had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the 
German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring 
up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions. The situation 
now was that, though the Imperial Government had allowed her several 
hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had, 
therefore, ordered mobilization, and the German representative at St. 
Petersburg had been instructed within a certain time to inform the Russian 
Government that the Imperial Government must regard their refusal to 
answer as creating a state of war. 

No. 139. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received August 2.) 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, Aug. i, 1914. 

My telegram of 31st July.* 

The Emperor of Russia read his telegram to the German Emperor to 
the German Ambassador at the audience given to his Excellency yesterday. 
No progress whatever was made. 

In the evening M. Sazonof had an interview with the Austrian Ambassa- 
dor, who, not being definitely instructed by his Government, did his best to 
deflect the conversation toward a general discussion of the relations between 
Austria-Hungary and Russia instead of keeping to the question of Servia. 
In reply the Minister for Foreign Afifairs expressed his desire that these rela- 
tions should remain friendly, and said that, taken in general, they were per- 
fectly satisfactory; but the real question which they had to solve at this 
moment was whether Austria was to crush Servia and to reduce her to the 
status of a vassal, or whether she was to leave Servia a free and independent 
State. In these circumstances, while the Servian question was unsolved, 
the abstract discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Rus- 
sia was a waste of time. The only place where a successful discussion of 
this question could be expected was London, and any such discussicn was 
being made impossible by the action of Austria-Hungary in subjecting 
Belgrade, a virtually unfortified town, to bombardment. 

M. Sazonof informed the French Ambassador and myself this morning 
of his conversation with the Austrian Ambassador. He went on to say that 
during the Balkan crisis he had made it clear to the Austrian Government 
that war with Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Servia. 
It was clear that Austrian domination of Servia was as intolerable for Russia 
as the dependence of the Netherlands on Germany would be to Great Britain. 
It was, in fact, for Russia a question of life and death. The policy of Austria 
had throughout been both tortuous and immoral, and she thought that she 
could treat Russia with defiance, secure in the support of her German ally. 
Similarly the policy of Germany had been an equivocal and double-faced 
policy, and it mattered little whether the German Government knew or did 
not know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum ; what mattered was that her 
intervention with the Austrian Government had been postponed until the 
moment had passed when its influence would have been felt. Germany was 
unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburg ; the former 

*See No. 120. 


was a violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had re- 
ported to his Government that Russia would never go to war. M. Sazonof 
was completely weary of the ceaseless endeavors he had made to avoid a 
war. No suggestion held out to him had been refused. He had accepted 
the proposal for a conference of four, for mediation by Great Britain and 
Italy, for direct conversation between Austria and Russia ; but Germany and 
Austria-Hungary had either rendered these attempts for peace ineffective 
by evasive replies or had refused them altogether. The action of the Austro- 
Hungarian Government and the German preparations had forced the Rus- 
sian Government to order mobilization, and the mobilization of Germany 
had created a desperate situation. 

M. Sazonof added that the formula, of which the text is contained in 
my telegram of 31st July,* had been forwarded by the Russian Government 
to Vienna, and he would adhere to it if you could obtain its acceptance be- 
fore the frontier was crossed by German troops. In no case would Russia 
begin hostilities first. 

I now see no possiblity of a general war being avoided unless the agree- 
ment of France and Germany can be obtained to keep their armies mobilized 
on their own sides of the frontier, as Russia has expressed her readiness to 
do, pending a last attempt to reach a settlement of the present crisis. 

*See No. 120. 

No. 140. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received August i.) 
(Telegraphic.) Paris, Aug. i, 19 14. 

The Minister of War again sent for the military attache this evening, as 
he said he wished to keep him informed of the situation. He laid great 
stress on the fact that the zone of 10 kilom. which he had arranged bet^yeen 
the French troops and the German frontier, and which was still occupied 
by peasants, was a proof of the French endeavors to commit no provoca- 
tive act. 

No. 141. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received August 2.) 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, Aug. i, 19 14. 

I am to be received tomorrow by Minister of Foreign Affairs. This 
afternoon he is to see the French and Russian Ambassadors. I have just 
been informed by the Russian Ambassador of German ultimatum requir- 
ing that Russia should demobilize within twelve hours. On being asked by 
the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the inevitable refusal of 
Russia to yield to this curt summons meant war, the German Ambassador 
replied that Germany would be forced to mobilize if Russia refused. Rus- 
sian Ambassador at Vienna thinks that war is almost inevitable, and, that 
mobilization is too expensive to be kept for long. Germany will 'attack 
Russia at once. He says that the so-called mobilization of Russia amounted 
to nothing more than that Russia had taken military measures correspond- 
ing to those taken by Germany. There seems to be even greater tension 


between Germany and Russia than there is between Austria and Russia. 
Russia would, according to the Russian Ambassador, be satisfied even now 
with assurance respecting Servian integrity and independence. He says 
that Russia had no intention to attack Austria. He is going again today to 
point out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that most terrific consequences 
must ensue from refusal to make this slight concession. This time Russia 
would fight to the last extremity. I agree with his Excellency that the 
German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the first, arid that his 
strong personal bias probably colored his action here. The Russian Ambas- 
sador is convinced that the German Government also desired war from the 

It is the intention of the French Ambassador to speak earnestly to the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs today on the extreme danger of the situation, 
and to ask whether proposals to serve as a basis of mediation from any 
quarter are being considered. There is great anxiety to know what Eng- 
land will do. I fear that nothing can alter the determination of Austro- 
Hungarian Government to proceed on their present course if they have 
made up their mind with the approval of Germany. 

No. 142. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received Aug. 2.) 
(Telegraphic) Berlin, Aug. I, 19 14. 

Orders have just been issued for the general mobilization of the navy 
and army, the first day of mobilization to be 2d August. 

No. 143. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received Aug. 2.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, Aug. I, 1914. 

Detention of British merchant ship at Hamburg. 

Your telegram of ist August* acted on. 

Secretary of State, who expressed the greatest surprise and annoyance 
has promised to send orders at once to allow "steamers to proceed without 

* See No. 130. 

No. 144. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received August 2.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, Aug. 2, 1914. 

Secretary of State has just informed mc that, owing to certain Russian 
troops having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia are now in a state of 


No. 145. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received August 2.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, Aug. 2, 19 14. 

My telegram of Aug. i.* 

Secretary of State informs me that orders were sent last night to allow 
British ships in Hamburg to proceed on their way. He says that this must 
be regarded as a special favor to his Majesty's Gov^ernment, as no ether 
foreign ships have been allowed to leave. Reason of detention was that 
mines were being laid and other [precautions being taken. 

* See No. 143. 

No. 146. Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received August 2.) 
(Telegraphic.) Brussels, Aug. 2, 1914. 

The news that a German force has entered Grand Duchy of Luxemburg 
has been officially con5rrned to the Belgian Government. 

No. 147. Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received August 2.) 
(Telegraphic.) Luxemburg, Aug. 2, 1914. 

I have the honor to bring to your Excellency's notice the following facts: 
On Sunday, the 2d August, very early, the German troops, according 
to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Govern- 
ment, penetrated into Luxemburg territory by the bridges of Wasserbillig 
and Remich, and proceeded xjarticularly toward the south and in the direc- 
tion of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of 
armored trains with troops and am.munition have been sent along the rail- 
way line from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where their arrival is expected. 
These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neu- 
trality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of Lcmdon of 1867. 
The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an energetic pro- 
test against this aggression to the rf:'presentatives of his Majesty the Ger- 
man Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical protest will be sent by telegraph 
to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin. 

No. 148. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie 

(Telegraphic.) London, Foreign Office, Aug. 2, 191 4. 

After the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon the following mem- 
orandum : 

"I am authorized to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes 
into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations 


against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protec- 
tion in its power. 

"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of his Majesty's 
Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as 
binding his Majesty's Government to take any action until the above 
contingency of action by the German fleet takes place." 

I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues 
to consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind themselves 
to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France 
and Germany tomorrow, but it was essential to the French Government, 
whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know 
how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. 
We therefore thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not 
bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action 
indicated, but it did give a security to France that would enable her to 
settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet. 

M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him 
the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon 
in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the 
ne'jtrality of Belgium. I said that wtis a much more important matter; we 
were considering what statement we should make in Parliament tomiorrow — ■ 
in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a 
casus belli. I told him what had been said to the Ambassador on 
this point. 

No. 149. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen 

(Telegraphic.) London, Foreign Offlce, Aug. 2, 1914. 

Your telegram of ist August.* 

I regret to learn that 100 tons of sugar was compulsorily unloaded 
from, the British steamship Sappho at Hamburg and detained. Similar 
action appears to have been taken with regard to other British vessels 
loaded with sugar. 

You should inform Secretary of State that, for reasons stated in my 
telegram of ist August, j I most earnestly trust that the orders already 
sent to Ham'ourg to allow the clearance of British ships cover also the 
release of their cargoes, the detention of which cannot be justified. 

* See No. 143. f See No. 130* 

No. 150. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received August 3.) 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, Aug. 3, 191 4. 

Your telegram of 2d August.* 
Detention of British ships at Hamburg. 
No information available. 
* See No. 149. 


No. 151. Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey 

(Received August 3.) 
(Telegraphic.) Brussels, Aug. 3, 1914. 

French Government have offered through their Military Attache the 
support of five French Army corps to the Belgian Government. Fol- 
lowing reply has been received today: 

"We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering 
eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not 
propose to appeal to the guarantee of the powers. Belgian Governm.ent 
will decide later on the action which they may think it necessary'' to take." 

No. 152. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie 

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 3, 1914. 

Sir: — On the ist instant the French Amibassador made the following 
communication : 

"In reply to the German Gov'ernment's intimation of the fact that 
ultimatums had been presented to France and Russia, and to the question 
as to what were the intentions of Italy, the Marquis di San Giuliano 
replied : 

'"The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might 
result, had, in the w'ords of the German Ambassador himself, an aggressive 
object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely defensive char- 
acter of the Triple Alliance, and in such circumstances Italy would remain 

In making this commtmication, M. Cambon was instructed to lay stress 
upon the Italian declaration that the present war was not a defensive 
but an aggressive war, and that, for this reason, the casus faederis under 
the terms of the Triple Alliance did not arise. 

I am, &c., E. GREY. 

No. 153. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen 

(Telegraphic.) London, Foreign Office, Aug. 4, 1914. 

The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the 
King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following 

"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and 
that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870, 
and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a sapremiC 
appeal to the diplomatic intervention of 3^our ]Majesty's Government to 
safeguard the integrity of Belgium." 

His IVIajesty's Government are also informed that the German Govern- 
ment has . delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly 
neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territor\', and promising 
to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its pos- 
sessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat 
Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours. 


We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a 
flagrant violation of the law of nations. 

"His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation 
of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and 
must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not 
be proceeded with, and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. 
You should ask for an immediate reply. 

No. 154. Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey. 

(Received Aug. 4.) 
(Telegraphic.) Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914. 

German Minister has this morning addressed note to Minister for 
Foreign Affairs stating that as Belgian Government have declined the 
well-intentioned proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Govern- 
ment, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if 
necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable in 
view of the French menaces. 

No. 155. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. VUliers 

(Telegraphic.) London, Foreign Office, Aug. 4, 1914. 

You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied 
to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality. His Ma- 
jesty's Government expect that they will resist by any means in their 
power, and that His Majesty's Government will support them in offering 
such resistance, and that His Majesty's Government in this event are 
prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian 
Government at once common action for the purpose of resisting use of 
force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain their inde- 
pendence and integrity in future years. 

No. 156. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen 

(Telegraphic.) London, Foreign Office, Aug. 4, 19 14. 

I continue to receive numerous complaints from British firms as to 
the detention of their ships at Hamburg, Cuxhaven, and other German, 
ports. This action on the part of the German authorities is totally un- 
justifiable. It is in direct contravention of international law and of the 
assurances given to your Excellency by the Imperial Chancellor. You 
should demand the immediate release of all British ships if such release 
has not yet been given. 

No. 157. German Foreign Secretary to Prince Lichnowsky 

(Communicated by German Embassy, August 4.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 4, 1914. 

Please dispell any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British 
Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively 


formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium^ 
Germany will, under no pretense whatever, annex Belgian territory. 
Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged 
our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that 
we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the 
same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress 
upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French 
attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely un- 
impeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard 
Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent 
French advance. 

No. 158. Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey' 

(Received August 4.) ■ 

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914. 

Military Attache has been informed at War Office that German troops- 
have entered Belgian territory, and that Liege has been summoned to- 
surrender by small party of Germans who, however, were repulsed. 

No. 159. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen 


London, Foreign Office, Aug. 4, 1914. 

We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to 
carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indis- 

We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at 

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined 
to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week 
in reply to olir request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must 
repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my 
telegram of this morning* be received here by 12 o'clock tonight. If 
not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that his 
Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to 
uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which 
Germany is as much a party as ourselves. 

* See No. 153. 



Given out by the German Foreign Office on Monday, August 3 


Denkschrift und Aktenstucke zum Kriegsausbruch 

On June 28 last the successor to the Austrian throne, Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, were assassinated 
by the revolver shots of a member of a Servian band of conspirators. 
An investigation of the crime by Austro-Hungarian officials has revealed 
that the plot to take the life of the Archduke was planned and promoted 
in Belgrade with the co-operation of official Servian individuals and was 
carried out with weapons from the Servian Government depot. 

This crime was bound to open the eyes of the whole civilized world, 
not only with regard to the object of Servian politics as relating to the 
existence and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but also with 
regard to the criminal means that the Pan-Servian propaganda did not 
hesitate to employ in order to attain these ends. The ultimate object of 
these policies was to revolutionize gradually and finally to bring about a 
separation of the southwestern region of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy 
from that empire and unite it with Servia. 

The repeated and formal declarations of Servia to Austria-Hungary 
to bring about good neighborly relations did not change this trend of 
Servian politics in the least. For the third time in the course of the last 
six years Servia has brought Europe to the verge of a world war in this 
manner. She could only do this because she believed herself supported 
by Russia in her endeavors. 

As a result of the developments of the year 1908 growing out of the 
Turkish revolution, Russian policies had begun to organize a league of 
the Balkan States directed against the existence of Turkey, under Russian 
patronage. This alliance of the Balkan States which was successful in 
crowding Turkey out of her European possessions in 191 1, came to grief 
over the question of the disposition of the spoils. Russian policy was 
not, however, frightened by this failure. It was the idea of Russian 
statesmen that there should be formed a new Balkan League under Rus- 
sian patronage, whose activities should be directed this time not against 
Turkey, which had been driven from the Balkans, but against the ex- 
istence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The idea was that Servia 


should cede to Bulgaria the section of Macedonia that she had won in the 
last Balkan war and offset the loss by the acquisition of Bosnia and Herze- 
govina at the expense of the Monarchy of the Danube. For this purpose 
Bulgaria, by her isolation, was to be made pliable, Rumania, as the result 
of a propaganda undertaken with the aid of France, was to be chained to 
Russia, and Servia was to be referred to Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

In view of these circumstances Austria had to admit that it would not 
be consistent either with the dignity or self-preservation of the monarchy 
to look on longer at the operations on the other side of the border without 
taking action. The Austro-Hungarian Government advised us of this 
view of the situation and asked our opinion in the matter. We were able 
to assure our ally most heartily of our agreement with her view of the 
situation and to assure her that any action that she might consider it 
necessary to take in order to put an end to the movement in Servia directed 
against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would receive 
our approval. We were fully aware in this connection that warlike 
moves on the part of Austria-Hungary against Servia would bring Russia 
into the question and might draw us into a war in accordance with our 
duty as an ally. However, recognizing the vital interests of Austria- 
Hungary which were at stake, we could neither advise our ally to a com- 
pliance that would have been inconsistent with her dignity, nor could we 
deny her our support in this great hour of need. We were all the more 
unable to do this inasmuch as our interests also were seriously threatened 
as a result of the continuous Servian agitation. If Servia, with the help 
of Russia and France, had been allowed to imperil the existence of the 
neighboring monarchy any longer, this would lead to the gradual downfall 
of Austria and would result in submission to Slavic sway under the Russian 
sceptre, thus making the position of the Germanic race in Central Europe 
untenable. A morally weakened Austria breaking down as the result of 
the advance of Russian Pan-Slavism would no longer be an ally on whom 
we could count and upon whom we could rely, such as we need in view of 
the attitude of our eastern and western neighbors, which has constantly 
grown more threatening. We therefore gave Austria an entirely free hand 
in her action against Servia. We have taken no part in the preparations. 

Austria chose the way, laying before the Servian Government in detail 
the immediate relation between the murder and the general Ser\aan 
movement, not only tolerated by the Servian Government, but supported 
by it, which an investigation of the murder at Serajevo had established. 
At the same time Servia was asked by Austria to put an absolute end to 
these activities and to allow Austria to punish the guilty parties. Austria 
demanded as a guarantee for the carrying out of the proceedings partici- 
pation in the investigation on Servian territory and the definite dissolution 
of the various Pan-Servian societies carrying on an agitation against 
Austria-Hungary. The Imperial and Royal Government set a time hmit 
of forty-eight hours for the unconditional acceptance of her terms. One 
day after the Austro-Hungarian note had been handed to it the Servian 
Government began mobilization. When, after the expiration of the time 
limit, the Servian Government made a reply which, while satisfying the 
demands of Austria-Hungary on certain points, made known emphatically 
with regard to the essential ones its intention to refuse the just demands 
of the monarchy by means of temporizing and the introduction of new 


negotiations, Austria broke off .diplomatic relations with Servia without 
having recourse to further negotiations or allowing herself to be put off 
by Servian assurances, the value of which she knows well enough — to her 

From that moment Austria was actually in a state of war with Servia, 
which was publicly proclaimed by means of the official declaration of war 
on the 28th of the month. 

From the very beginning of the conflict we took the stand that this 
was an affair of Austria which she alone would have to bring to a decision 
with Servia. We have therefore devoted our entire efforts to localizing 
the war and to convincing the other powers that Austria-Hungary was 
compelled to take justified defensive methods and appeal to arms. We 
took the stand emphatically that no civilized nation had the right in this 
struggle against lack of culture [Unkultur] and criminal political rnorality 
to prevent Austria from acting and to take away the just punishment 
from vServia. We instructed our representatives abroad in that sense. 

At the same time the Austro-Hungarian Government informed the 
Russian Government that her (Austria's) move against Servia was en- 
tirely a defensive measure designed to put a stop to Servian agitation, 
but that Austria-Hungary v/as compelled by necessity to demand guar- 
antees of a continued friendly attitude on the part of Servia toward the 
Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Austria-Hungary, the note to Russia 
stated, had no intention of bringing about a disturbance of the balance of 
power in the Balkans. Both the French and the English Governments, 
replying to our explanation that the German Government wished and was 
trying to localize the conflict, promised to work in the same interest. In 
the meantime these efforts did not succeed in preventing Russia's inter- 
ference in the Austro-Servian disagreement. 

The Russian Government issued an official communique_ on July 24, 
according to which it would be impossible for Russia to remain indifferent 
in the Servian-Austrian conflict. The Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Mr. Sazonof, made this position knovv'n to the Imperial Ambassador, 
Count Pourtales. On the afternoon of July 26 the Austro-Hungarian 
Government again explained through its Ambassador in St. Petersburg 
that Austria-Hungaiy had no plans of conquest, but only wished to have 
peace at last on her frontiers. In the course of the same day the first 
reports of Russian mobilization reached Berlin. On the evening of the 
26th the Imperial Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg were 
directed to call the attention of the English, French, and Russian Govern- 
ments energetically to the danger of this Russian mobilization. After 
Austria-Hungary had officially declared to Russia that she did not seek 
the acquisition of any territory in Servia, the decision for world peace la}'- 
entirely in St. Petersburg. The same day the Imperial Ambassador _ at 
St. Petersburg was directed to make the following statement to the Russian 

The military preparatory measures of Russia will compel us to 
take counter-action which must consist in the mobilization of 
the army. Mobilization, however, indicates war. Inasmuch 
as we know France's obligations toward Russia, this mobilization 
would be directed simultaneously against Russia and France. 


We cannot assume that Russia wishes to let loose such a European 
war. Inasmuch as Austria-Hungary will not impair the con- 
tinuance of the Servian Kingdom, we are of the opinion that 
Russia can adopt a policy of waiting. We shall be all the more 
able to support Russia's wish not to allow the integrity of the 
Servian Kingdom to be called into question, since Austria does 
not call this integrity into question herself. It will be easy to 
find a basis of agreement in the further course of the affair. 

On July 27 the Russian Minister for War, Suchomlinof, gave the Ger- 
man Military Attache his word of honor that no mobilization order had as 
yet been issued. He said that for the present preparatory measures were 
being taken, no horses being levied and no reservists being called in. In 
case Austria-Hungary were to cross the vServian boundary, the military 
districts facing Austria, those of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan, would 
be mobilized. Under no circumstances would there be a mobilization of 
the districts lying on the German front: St. Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw. 
In answer to the Military Attache's question as to what was the object of 
mobilization against Austria-Hungary, the Russian War Minister shrugged 
his shoulders and referred to the diplomats. Thereupon the Military 
Attache indicated that measures to mobilize against Austria-Hungary were 
also decidedly threatening to Germany. In the following days reports con- 
cerning the Russian mobilization followed each other in quick succession. 
Among these were reports concerning preparations on' the German border, 
such as the declaration of a state of war in Kovno, the departure of the War- 
saw garrison, and the strengthening of the Alexandrovo garrison. On July 
27 the first reports of preparatory measures by France arrived. The 
Fourteenth Corps discontinued its manoeuvres and returned to garrison 
. duty. 

In the meantime we continued to exert our most energetic influence 
on the Cabinets to insure the localization of the conflict. 

On the 26th Sir Edward Grey had suggested that the differences 
between Austria-Hungary and Servia be laid before a conference of the 
Ambassadors of Germany, France, and Italy, with himself presiding over 
the sessions. To this suggestion we replied that, while we approved his 
tender, we could not take part in such a conference because we could not 
call upon Austria to appear before a European court in her controversy 
with Servia. 

France agreed to Sir Edward Grey's proposal, but it was finally 
brought to naught because Austria, as was to be expected, held herself aloof. 

True to our conviction that an act of mediation could not take into 
consideration the Austro-Servian conflict, which was purely an Austro- 
Hungarian affair, but would have to take into consideration only the rela- 
tions between Austria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our efforts to 
bring about an imderstanding between these two powers. We were also 
willing, after declining the conference idea, to transmit a further proposal 
by Sir Edward Grey to Vienna, in which he urged that Austria-Hungary 
either agree to accept the Servian answer as sufficient or to look upon it 
as a basis for further conversations. The Austro-Hungarian Government, 
in full appreciation of our mediatory activity, replied to this proposal that, 
coming as it did after the opening of hostilities, it was too late. 


In spite of this We continued our mediatory efforts to the utmost and 
advised Vienna to make any possible compromise consistent with the 
dignity of the Monarchy. Unluckily, all of these mediatory acts were 
soon overtaken by the military preparations of Russia and France. On 
July 29 the Russian Government ofhcially announced in Berlin that it had 
mobilized four army districts. At the same time additional reports 
reached us of rapidly progressing military preparations by France on 
land and seal On the same day the Imperial Ambassador at St. Peters- 
burg had a conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
concerning which he reported as follows by telegraph: 

The Minister tried to persuade me to agree in behalf of my 
Government to a conversation of four parties to devise means of 
moving Austria-Hungary to give up those demands touching on 
the sovereignty of Servia. While I agreed to a complete trans- 
mission of the conversation, I took the stand that, since Russia 
had decided on the ominous step of mobilization, it was difficult 
for me to exchange any opinions on this subject, and it almost 
seemed impossible to do so. I said that what Russia now de- 
manded of us in respect to Austria-Hungary was the same thing 
of which Austria-Hungary was accused regarding Servia — a usur- 
pation of the rights of sovereignty; that Austria-Hungary had 
promised to be considerate of Russian interests by declaring her ' 
territorial disinterestedness, a great concession on the part of a 
nation waging war. For this reason, I said, an opportunity 
should be given the Dual Monarchy to settle her dispute with 
Servia alone. There would be time enough to come back to the 
subject of safeguarding Servian sovereignty when peace terms 
were to be concluded. 

I added very earnestly that at the present moment the 
Austro-Servian affair was secondary to the danger of a European • 
conflagration, and I made every effort to show the Minister the 
greatness of this danger. 

It was impossible to change Sazonof 's mind on the point that 
Russia could not desert Servia now. 

Similarly the Military Attache at St. Petersburg reported by telegraph 
on the 29th as follows, regarding an interview with the Chief of the General 
Staff of the Russian Army: 

The Chief of the General Staff asked me to call and informed 
me that he had just come from His Majesty. He stated that he 
had been instructed by the Minister for War to assure me again 
that everything had remained the same as it had been explained 
to me by the ^linister two days ago. He offered me a written 
confirmation and gave me his word cf honor in the_ most formal 
manner that mobilization had begun nowhere, that is to say, not 
a single man or horse had been levied up to that hour, three 
o'clock in the afternoon. He stated that he could not answer 
for the future, but he could declare most emphatically that no 
mobilization was desired by His Majesty in the districts touching 


on our boundary. However, many reports have reached here and 
also Warsaw and Vilna of the levying of reservists in various, 
parts of the empire. I therefore told the General that I was con- 
fronted with a riddle as the result of his announcements to me. 
On his word as an officer he repeated, however, that such reports 
were untrue; that a false alarm may have been raised here and 

In view of the positive, numerous reports before me of actual 
levying, I am compelled to consider the conversation as an attempt 
to mislead us with regard to the extent of the measures that have 
already been taken. 

Inasmuch as the Russian Government, in reply to the several inquiries 
regarding the reasons for its threatening attitude, several times alluded to 
the circumstance that Austria-Hungary had not j'-et begun any conver- 
sations in St. Petersburg, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, at our 
request, was directed on July 29 to begin the conversations with Mr. 
Sazonof. Count Szapary was authorized to make known to the Russian 
Minister the contents of the note to Serbia which had been, as it were, 
overtaken by the declaration of war, and to receive any suggestions that 
might still come from the Russian side, as well as to discuss with Sazonof 
all questions touching directly on the Austro-Russian relations. 

Shoulder to shoulder with England we continued to work without 
cessation for m^ediation, and supported every suggestion in Vienna which 
we believed showed hope of the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the 
conflict. As late as the 30th we transmitted an English proposal to Vienna 
which established this basis of negotiation, that Austria-Hungaiy, after 
succeeding in marching into Ser\'ia, should dictate her terms there. We 
had to assume that Russia would accept this basis. 

While these efforts of ours for mediation, supported by English diplo- 
macy, were being continued with increasing urgency in the time from July 
29 to the 31st, there constantly came new and increasing reports con- 
cerning Russian mobilization measures. The assembling of troops on the 
East Prussian border and the declaration of a state of war in all important 
places on the Russian western boundary no longer left any doubt of the 
fact that Russian mobilization was actively going on against us, while at 
the same time all such measures were denied anew on word of honor to 
our representative at St. Petersburg. Even before the reply to the last 
English-German mediation proposal, the basis of which must have been 
known in St. Petersburg, could reach Berlin from Vienna, Russia ordered 
a general mobilization. On the same day an exchange of telegrams took 
place between his Majesty the Kaiser and King and Czar Nicholas in 
which his Majesty called the Czar's attention to the threatening charac- 
ter of the Russian mobilization and to the continuance of his own activity 
as mediator. 

On July 31 the Czar directed the following telegram to his Majesty: 

I thank you from my heart for your mediation, which permits 
a gleam of hope that everything can yet be settled peaceably. It 
is a technical impossibility for us to halt our military preparations 
which became necessary through Austria's mobilization. We are 


far from desirous of war. So long as the negotiations continue 
with Austria concerning Servia, my troops will not undertake any 
challenging action. I solemnly pledge you my word as to -that. 
I am trusting in the grace of God with all mj'' might and hope for 
the success of your mediation in Vienna, for the welfare of our 
countries and for the peace of Europe. Your sincerely devoted 


To this his Majesty the Kaiser replied: 

Upon your appeal to my friendship and your plea for my help, 
I have undertaken a mediatory action between your Government 
and the A astro-Hungarian Government. While this negotiation 
was und^r way your troops were mobilized against' Austria- 
Hungary, whijh is allied with me, as a consequence of which my 
mediation was almost made illusory, as I have already informed 
you. Notwithstanding this, I continued it. Now I am in 
receipt of reliable reports of serious preparations for war on my 
eastern boundary also. Responsibility for the safety of my 
empire compels me to take counter defensive m.easures. I have 
carried my efforts for the maintenance of world peace to the 
utmost limit. It is not I that bear the responsibility for the 
calamity that now threatens the entire civilized world. Yet at 
this moment it lies in your power to stave it off. No one threat- 
ens the honor and might of Russia, which might have a-^ aited the 
result of my mediation. The friendship for you and ^'■our empire 
which was bequeathed to me by my grandfather on his deathbed 
has always been sacred to me, and I have been faithful to Russia 
when she was hard pressed, especially in her last war. It is still 
possible for you to maintain the peace of Europe if Russia will 
decide to put a stop to the military measures that threaten 
Germany and Austria-Hungary. 

Even before this telegram reached its destination the mobilization of 
the entire Russian fighting force, which had been ordered in the forenoon 
of the same day, openly directed against us, was in full swing. The Czar's 
telegram, however, was sent at 2 o'clock in the afternoon. 

After the mobilization became known in Berlin, the Imperial Ambas- 
sador at St. Petersburg was ordered on the afternoon of July 31 to advise 
the Russian Government that Germany had declared a state of war as 
a counter move to the mobilization of the Russian Army and Navy, which 
would have to be followed by mobilization unless Russia ceased her mili- 
tary preparations against Germany and Austria-Hungary within twelve 
hours, and so advise Germany. 

At the same time the Imperial Ambassador at Paris was directed to 
request an explanation from the French Government within eighteen 
hours as to whether, in the case of a Russo-German war, France would 
remain neutral. 

The Russian Government destroyed the painstaking mediatory work 
of the European State Chancelleries, shortly before its successful outcome, 
by her mobilization, which endangered the safety of the German Empire. 


The mobilization measures, concerning the seriousness of which to the 
Russian Government no doubt was allowed to arise from the beginning, 
together with her continued denial, show clearly that Russia desired the 

The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg delivered the message that 
had been given to him for Mr. Sazonof on July 31 at midnight. 

After the expiration of the time limit set for Russia without the receipt 
of an answer to our inquiry, his Majesty the Emperor and King ordered 
the mobilization of the entire German Army and the Imperial Navy at 
5 P. M. on Aug. I. In the meantime the imperial Ambassador at St. 
Petersburg had been instructed to hand a declaration of war to the Rus- 
sian Government in case no favorable reply was issued before the expira- 
tion of the time limit. However, before a report regarding the execution 
of this order arrived, Russian troops crossed our border and advanced on 
German territory, namely, as early as the afternoon of Aug. i. 

By this move Russia began the war against us. 

In the meantime the Imperial Ambassador at Paris put the question 
that he had been ordered to present before the French Cabinet at 7 P. M, 
on July 31. 

To_ this the French Prime Minister made an ambiguous and un- 
satisfactory reply at i o'clock in the afternoon of Aug. i. This does not 
give a clear picture of the French position, since it was limited to the state- 
ment that France would do what her interests seemed to warrant. A few 
hours later, at 5 in the afternoon, the complete mobilization of the entire 
French Army and Navy was ordered. 

On the morning of the following day France opened hostilities. 

Concluded on Aug. 2, noon. 

The Austro-Hungarian Note to Servia 

From the Norddeutsche A.ilgemeine Zeitung, July 25, 1914. 

Berlin, July 24. 

The Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade at 6 o'clock last night 
handed to the Servian Government a verbal note with the demands of the 
Austro-Hungarian Government. In the note the answer is requested by 
6 P. M., July 25. It reads as follows: 

Already printed, see pages 5-y. 

The Fremdenblatt writes, among other things, as follows: "The crime 
of Serajeyo has revealed to the whole world the dangers that threaten us, 
and has directed our attention to the pressing need of insuring quiet and 
safety to ourselves at any cost. The Austro-Hungarian Minister at Bel- 
grade today made known to the Servian Government the demands which 
we must make to it today. It is the result of long, careful consideration 
and does not go any further than absolutely necessary. We must insist 
on the demands as they stand; for this is a matter of underground passages 
extending from Servia directly to the heart of our South Slavic territories. 
Conditions that we cannot allow to continue have made themselves 
apparent on the threshold of our house as a result of the encroachment 


of the Pan-Servian idea. Servia has covered herself with a network of 
societies which, with the pretext of fostering culture, preach the doctrine 
of hatred of us throughout the country. Emissaries are sent out to Bosnia, 
Herzegovina, and Croatia to incite the populace to revolt and to picture 
to them an imminent union of those territories with the Servian Kingdom. 
The Servian Government, in spite of its emphatic declaration, has done 
nothing to stop this movement; its tolerance has had the effect of silent 
consent. Anything that has been done has been done only for appear- 
ances. There are many persons of high military rank, or professors or 
teachers in the service of the State, who are among the leaders of these 
societies. If one group hopes to attain its end by means of pacts and 
war, the others express their conviction that a terroristic and revolutionary 
stage must precede the diplomatic and military action. The event of 
Serajevo has demonstrated that this plan of campaign is being waged 
against us with terrible emphasis. It has been proved that the murder 
of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife was carried out with the 
support of officials of the kingdom. We have to deal with an irreconcil- 
able, bitterly hostile movement, which shows itself in most varied forms, 
but which, in its entirety, keeps our border populace in a state of excite- 
ment, shatters the confidence of the various races in our monarchy, as to 
our ability to maintain peace with the outside world, and is the main 
point for the beginning of all efforts against us, and causes much precious 
blood to flow on our territories. The results of this agitation have fre- 
quently been felt in our economic life. Thousands of careers have been 
blasted as a result of the alarming crises following the constantly recurring 
Pan-Servian scare. Were we to endure all this without stepping in to 
take decided action against it, the same agitators who continually, for the 
sake of rhetorical effect, accuse us of the misuse of power, would call this 
a sign of weakness, lack of will, and fear. They would state that we do 
not dare to defend ourselves, and in that way they would find new sup- 
porters and would feel encouraged to a doubly strong attack. While we 
are making our will felt, we are bringing the Servian people themselves 
to a realization of their position. They will see that they have been 
deceived, that the movement for a greater Servia will break against an 
iron wall, that the monarchy is determined to spurn them. The feeling 
that we have to deal with a condition that has become unbearable, that a 
stop must be put to it, is so strong among our people that complaints 
concerning the long delay in dealing with the situation are getting louder. 
This impatience and criticism can be understood. But the A.ustro- 
Hungarian Government did not wish to act in anger, not without the most 
careful testing of every circumstance, not without making absolutely cer- 
tain what demands must be made. Servia has been allowed a brief time 
in which to comply with our demands. We do not wish to lengthen the 
period of the crisis that weighs down our economic life and is making all 
Europe uneasy. We want to adjust an untenable relation as quickly as 
possible, convince public opinion in Servia of our determination, and 
finally come to a settlement. We hope that Servia will bow to the desires 
that we have expressed within the time set. There is no more reason to 
doubt our determined will to maintain our position under all circumstances 
than to doubt our sincere wish that better relations may be developed in 
the future between Servia and Austria-Hungary." 


VIENNA, July 24. — The newspapers declare that the note to Servia 
is the beginning of a defense and is not an attack, that it shows the strong 
will of the monarchy, but demands nothing from Servia except what should 
have been done long ago for the maintenance of its respect before Europe. 
The entire press expresses the hope that Servia, by prompt acceptance of 
Austria-Hungary's terms, will remove the suspicion of partnership with 
the murderers, and that she will be far-sighted enough to choose peace 
and not war. 

Austria-Hungary and the Servian Note 

From the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, July 29, 19 14. 

VIENNA, July 27. — The note of the Royal Servian Government of 
July 25, 1914, reads as follows: 

The Royal Government has received the notification of the 
Austro-Hungarian Government of the loth inst., and is convinced 
that its answer will remove every misunderstanding that threat- 
ens to disturb the pleasant neighborly relations between the Aus- 
tro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Servian Kingdom. 

The Royal Government is certain that in dealing with the 
great neighboring monarchy those protests have under no pretext 
been renewed which formerly were made both in Skupshtina and 
in explanations and negotiations of responsible representatives of 
the State and which, through the declaration of the Servian Gov- 
ernment of March 18, 1909, were settled; furthermore, that since 
that time none of the various successive Governments of the 
kingdom, nor any of its officers, has made an attempt to change 
the political and legal conditions set up in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The Royal Government is certain that the Austro-Hungarian 
Government has made no representations of any kind along this 
line except in the case of a textbook concerning which the Austro- 
Hungarian Government received an entirely satisfactory reply. 
Servia, during the Balkan crisis, gave evidence in numerous cases 
of her pacific and temperate policies, and it will be thanks to Servia 
alone and the sacrifices that she alone made in the interest of Euro- 
pean peace if that peace continue. 

On this the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy comments: 

The Royal Servian Government limits itself to the statement that since 
it made the declaration of March i8, 1909, no effort has been made by the 
Servian Government or its officers to alter the position of Bosnia and Herze- 

Thereby it consciously and willfully evades the grounds on which we base 
our course, since we did not make the claim that it and its officials had under- 
taken anything of an official nature along this line. 

Our grievance rather is this, that it failed to suppress movements directed 
against the territorial integrity of the monarchy in spite of the pledges made 
in the note in question. 

Its pledge consisted of this, that the entire trend of its policies was to be 
changed and pleasant, neighborly relations with the Austro-Hungarian Mon- 
archy brought about; not merely to refrain from officially taking up the ques- 
tion of Bosnia's belonging to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. 


The Servian note thereupon continues: " 

The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for utter- 
ances of a private character such as newspaper articles and the 
peaceful work of societies, utterances which are quite ordinary in 
almost all countries and which are not generally under State con- 
trol, especially since the Royal Government, in the solution of a 
great number of questions that came up between Servia and 
Austria-Hungary, showed much consideration as a result of which 
most of these questions were settled in the best interests of the 
progress of the two neighboring countries. 

Comment of the Austro-Hungarian Government: 

The contention of the Royal Servian Government that utterances of the 
press and \he activities of societies have a private character and are not under 
the control of the State is contrary to the practice of modern States, even under 
the freest interpretation of the rights of the press and societies, which are of 
public legal character and both subject to State supervision. Moreover, Ser- 
vian practice is to exercise such control. The charge against the Servian 
Government is that it has entirely. failed to inspect its press and societies whose 
acts hostile to Austria-Hungary were known to it. 

The Servian note continues: 

The Royal Government was therefore painfully surprised to 
hear the contention that Servian subjects had taken part in the 
preparations for the murder committed in Serajevo. It had 
hoped to be invited to co-operate in the investigations following 
this crime and was prepared, in order to prove the entire correct- 
ness of its acts, to proceed against all persons concerning whom it 
had received information. 

Comment of the Austro-Hungarian Government: 

This contention is incorrect. The Servian Government had been carefully 
advised as to certain definite persons who were suspected, and it was not only 
in the position but bound by its internal laws to begin an action spontaneously. 
It did nothing at all along these lines. 

Servia's note continues: 

In conformity with the wish of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment, the Royal Government is prepared to turn over to the court, 
regardless of station or rank, any Servian subject concerning 
whose participation in the crime at Serajevo proofs may be given 
to it. The Government pledges itself especially to publish on the 
first page of the official organ of July 26 the following declaration: 

"The Royal Servian Government condemns every propaganda 
that may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all 
efforts designed ultimately to sever territory from the Austro- 
Hungarian monarchy, and it regrets sincerely the sad conse- 
quences of these criminal machinations." 


Comment of the Austro-Hungarian Government: 

Our demand read as follows: "The Royal Servian Government condemns 
the propaganda that is directed against Austria-Hungary * * * ." The 
change made by the Royal Servian Government in the declaration demanded 
by us infers that such a propaganda against Austria-Hungary does not exist or 
that it is unknown to the Royal Government. This formula is not sincere, and 
conceals something in order that the Servian Government later may reserve an 
avenue of escape, saying that in its declaration it did not disavow the existence 
of the present propaganda, and did not recognize it as inimical to the monarchy, 
whereupon it could mislead further to the contention that it would not be 
pledged to suppress a propaganda like the present one. 

Servia's note continues: 

The Royal Government regrets that, in accordance with ad- 
vices from the Austro-Hungarian Government, certain Servian 
officers and functionaries are taking an active part in the present 
propaganda and that they have thereby jeopardized the pleasant 
neighborly relations to the maintenance of which the Royal Gov- 
ernment was formally pledged by the declaration of March 31, 

The Government (what follows here is similar to the text 
demanded) . 

Comment of the Austro-Hungarian Government: 

The formal declaration demanded by us was as follows: "The Royal Gov- 
ernment regrets that Servian officers and functionaries * * * took part in 
* * * ." Also in this choice of words and in the additional clause "in ac- 
cordance with advices from the Austro-Hungarian Government," it is shown 
that the Servian Government is carrying out the object indicated above — to 
allow itself free rein in the future. 

Servia's note continues: 

The Royal Government further pledges itself: 
I. To introduce a provision in the press law on the occasion 
of the next regular session of the Skupshtina, according to 
which instigations to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy, as well as any publication directed in general against 
the 'territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary, shall be punished 

The Government pledges itself, on the occasion of the coming 
revision of the Constitution, to add to Article XXH, a clause per- 
mitting the confiscation of publications, the confiscation of which, 
under the present Article XXII of the Constitution, would be 

Observation of the Austro-Hungarian Government: 

We had demanded: 

"i. The suppression of all publications that arouse people to hatred and 
contempt for the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and whose tendency is directed 
against the territorial integrity of the monarchy." 

We thus wished to obligate Servia to take measures for having such attacks 


in the press cease in future; we wished, therefore, to be sure that we had won 
certain success in this direction. 

Instead, Servia offers to make certain laws that may lead to the above re- 
sult, to wit: 

(a) A law by which the individuals may be punished for above-mentioned 
statements of the press hostile to the monarchy. This is nothing to us, espe- 
cially, as it is well known that the punishment of individuals for press mis- 
demeanors is possible only in very rare cases, and, under a correspondingly lax 
handhng of such a law, even these few would not be punished. Thus this is 
a suggestion which in no wise answers our demand, and therefore does not offer 
us the slightest guarantee of the result desired by us. 

(b) An addition to Article XXII of the Constitution to the effect that con- 
fiscation be allowed — a suggestion that likewise must fail to satisfy us, since the 
existence of such a law in Servia is of no use to us. What would be of use 
would be the promise of the Government to enforce it. which promise is not 
made to us. 

Therefore these suggestions are thoroughly unsatisfactory, all the more so 
as they are of an evasive nature, since we are not told within what space of 
time these laws will be enacted, and since if the enactment of the laws should be 
refused by the Skupshtina — to say nothing of the possible resignation of the 
Government — all would remain as it was. 

Servia's note cojitinues: 

2. The Government possesses no proof — and the note of 
the Austro-Hungarian Government provides it with none — that 
the "Narodna Odbrana" Society and other similar associations 
have up to the present committed any criminal acts through ariy 
of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will 
accept the demand of the Austro-Hungarian Government and 
dissolve the Narodna Odbrana Society, as well as all societies that 
may work against Austria-Hungary. 

Observation of the Imperial and Royal Government: 

The anti-monarchical propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana and the associa- 
tions affihated with it fills all public life in Servia; it is therefore a quite unreliable 
statement on the part of the Servian Government to maintain that it knows 
nothing about this society. 

To say nothing of the fact that the demand made by us is not entirely 
granted, since we furthermore demanded: 

That the means of propaganda of these associations should be confiscated. 

That the reorganization of the dissolved associations under other names and 
in other forms should be prevented. 

Concerning these two points the Belgrade Government preserves complete 
silence, so that we have no assurance, in the partial agreement given us. that 
an end will be put to the anti-Austrian associations, especially of the " Narodna 
Odbrana," by their dissolution. 

Servia's note continues: 

3. The Royal Servian Government agrees to eliminate forth- 
with from public education in Servia everything that might help 
the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, provided that the 
Austro-Hungarian Government gives it actual proof of this 

Observation of the Imperial and Royal Government: 

Upon this point also the Servian Gcvernment demands proof that, in the 
public instruction courses of Servia, there is an anti-Austrian propaganda, 


although it must be aware that the books employed in the Servian schools con- 
tain such matter, and that a great part of the Servian teachers are in the 
Narodna Odbrana and affiliated associations. 

Moreover, in this case also, the Servian Government has not met a part of 
our demands, since, in its text, it left out this addition desired by us, "as well 
as the body of teachers and the means of teaching are concerned ' ' — an addition 
which clearly shows where the anti-Austrian propaganda in the Servian schools 
is to be sought. 

Servia's note continues: 

4. The Royal Government is also ready to discharge from 
military and civil servdce such officers — provided it is proved 
against them by legal investigation — who have implicated them- 
selves in acts directed against the territorial integrity of the 
Austro-Hungarian monarchy; the Government expects that, for 
the purpose of instituting proceedings, the Austro-Hunganan Gov- 
ernment will impart the names of these officers and employes 
and the acts of which they are accused. 

Observation of the Imperial and Royal Government: 

In view of the fact that the Royal Servian Government makes the discharge 
of the officers and employes in question from military and civil service depen- 
dent on whether they are found guUty after trial, its accession to our demand 
is limited to those cases where such persons have committed acts laying them 
open to legal penalties. Since, however, we demand the elimination of those 
officers and employes who are making an anti-Austrian propaganda, which in 
Servia is not usually punishable by law, it would seem that in this case also 
our demands have not been met. 

Servia's note continues: 

5. The Royal Servian Government must confess that it is 
not quite clear as to the sense and scope of the desire of the Austro- 
Hungarian Government to the effect that the royal Servian 
Government bind itself to allow the co-operation within its terri- 
tory of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government, 
but it "nevertheless declares itself willing to permit such co-opera- 
tion as might be in conformity with international law and criminal 
procedure, as well as with friendly neighborly relations. 

Observation of the Austro-Hungarian Government: 

International law has as little to do with this question as criminal proce- 
dure. The question is purely one of national policing, to be solved by special 
agreement. Servia's statement is, therefore, incomprehensible and, on account 
of its vague form, would give rise to insurmountable difficulties if an endeavor 
were made to arrange the agreement. 

Servia's note continues: 

6. The Royal Government naturally holds itself bound to 
institute an investigation against all such persons as were con- 
cerned in the plot of June 15-28, or are supposed to have been 
concerned in it, and are on Servian so:\ As to the co-operation 
of special delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government in 
this investigation, the Servian Government cannot accept such 


co-operation, since this would be a violation of the laws and 
criminal procedure. However, in individual cases, information 
as to the progress of the investigation might be given the Austro 
Hungarian delegates. 

Observation of the Austro-Hungarian Government: 

Our demand was perfectly clear and not to be misunderstood. We wished: 
(i) The institution of a legal investigation against those implicated in the 

(2) That Austro-Hungarian representatives should take part in the investi- 
gation, ("recherche," in contradistinction to "enquete judicaire.") 

(3) We did not desire that Austro-Hungarian representatives take part in the 
Servian legal proceedings; all we wished them to do was to co-operate in the 
police preliminaries, and help get together and corroborate the evidence for the 
investigation. If the Servian Government misunderstands us it does so pur- 
posely, since the difference between "enquete judicaire" and the simple "re- 
cherches" must certainly be plain to it. Since it wished to be free of all control 
in the proceedings to be instituted, which, if properly conducted, would have 
results highly undesirable for it, and as it has no loophole for plausibly declining 
our co-operation in the police proceedings (analogous cases for such police inter- 
vention exist in great number) it has taken a ground that gives to its refusal the 
appearance of right and to our demand the stamp of impossibility. 

The Servian note continues: 

7. On the very evening on which your note arrived the Royal 
Government caused the arrest of Major Voislar Tankosic, But, 
regarding Milan Ciganovic, who is a subject of the Austro-Hun- 
garian monarchy, and who was employed until June 15 (as candi- 
date) in the Department of Railroads, it has not been possible 
to arrest this man up to now, for which reason a warrant has been 
issued against him. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government is requested, in order 
that the investigation may be made as soon as possible, to make 
known in the specified form what grounds of suspicion exist, and 
the proofs of guilt collected at the investigation in Serajevo. 


Observation of the Austro-Hungarian Government: 

This answer is insincere. Ciganovic, according to our investigation, went 
on a furlough three days after the crime, when it became known that he was 
concerned in the plot, and repaired to Ribari in the service of the Prefect of 
Police of Belgrade. So that it is incorrect to say that, between June 15 and 
28, Ciganovic was already out of the Servian service. To this must be added 
that the Prefect of Police of Belgrade, who himself had brought about the 
departure of Ciganovic, and who knew where the latter was, declared in an 
interview that there was no man of the name of Milan Ciganovic in Belgrade. 

The Servian note continues: 

8. The Servian Government will increase the severity and 
scope of its measures against the smuggling of arms and explosives. 

It goes without saying that it will at once start an investiga- 
tion and mete out severe punishment to the frontier officials 
of the Sabac-Loznica line who failed in their duty and allowed 
those responsible for the crime to cross the frontier. 


9. The Royal Government is willing to give explanations of 
the statements made in interviews by its officials in Servia and 
foreign countries after the crime, and, which, according to the 
Austro-Hungarian Government, were anti-Austrian, as soon as 
the said Government indicates where these statements were made 
and provides proofs that such statements were actually made by 
the said officials. The Royal Government will itself take steps 
to collect the necessary proofs and means of transmission for this 

Observation of the Austro-Hungarian Government : 

The Royal Servian Government must have perfectly good knowledge of 
these interviews. If it requires that the Austro-Hungarian Government pro- 
vide all sorts of details about these interviews and demands a regular investi- 
gation, it shows that it has no desire really to accede to this demand. 

The Servian note continues: 

10. The Royal Government will, in so far as this has not 
already occurred in this note, inform the Austro-Hungarian 
Government of the taking of the measures concerning the fore- 
going matters, as soon as such measures have been ordered and 
carried out. 

The Royal Servian Government is of the opinion that it is 
mutually advantageous not to hinder the settlement of this ques- 
tion, and therefore, in case the Austro-Hungarian Government 
should not consider itself satisfied with this answer, it is ready as 
always to accept a peaceful solution, either by referring the decision 
of this question to the international tribunal at The Hague or by 
leaving it to the great powers who co-operated in the preparation of 
the explanation given by the Servian Government on the i8th- 
31st March, 1909. 

Annex 1~A. From the Austro-Hungarian Material 

Vienna, July 27. — The "dossier" mentioned in the Austro-Hungarian 
circular note to the foreign Embassies concerning the Servian dispute is 
made pubHc today. 

In this memorial, attention is called to the fact that the movement 
originating in Servda, which has as an object to tear away the southern 
portions of Austria-Hungary from the monarchy and unite them to Servia, 
strikes far back into the past. This propaganda, always the same in 
purpose, changing only in means and intensity, reached its climax at the 
time of the annexation crisis, and came out openly at that time with its 
aims. While, on the one side, the entire Ser\'ian press preached for war 
against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, associations were formed — to 
&y nothing of other means of propaganda — which prepared such warfare, 
among which the Narodna Odbrana was the most important. Originating 
in a revolutionary committee, this association became entirely dependent 
on the Servian Foreign Office, under the direction of statesmen and officers, 
among them Gen. Jankovic and former Minister Ivanovic. Among the 


founders are also Major Oja Tankovic and Milan Pribicevic. This asso- 
ciation had as an object the formation and equipment of bodies of volun- 
teers for the coming war against Austria-Hungary. In addition to the 
memorial, a quotation is given from the association's official organ, which 
bears the same name, Narodna Odbrana, and is issued at the association's 
headquarters, wherein, in several articles, the activities and aim of this 
society are set forth. Therein it is stated that part of the main task of 
the Narodna Odbrana is to effect union between its brothers far and near 
on the other side of the border, and with all the rest of our friends in the 

Austria is mentioned as the first and greatest enemy. Just as the 
Narodna Odbrana preaches the necessity of war with Austria, it also 
preaches a holy truth about our national situation. The closing chapter 
contains an appeal to the Government and people of Servia to prepare 
in every way for the struggle which the annexation foreshadowed. 

The memorial tells of the Narodna Odbrana's activities at that time, 
as set forth in a statement of a komitadji raised by the association; it 
maintained a school under the direction of two of its principal members, 
of whom one was Tankovic, for the instruction of bands of men — schools 
which Gen. Jankovic and Capt. Milan Pribicevic inspected regularly. 
Furthermore, the komitadjis were instructed in shooting, bomb-throwing, 
laying of mines, blowing up of railway bridges, &c. After the solemn 
declaration of the Servian Government in 1909 it looked as if the end of 
this organization also had come. But expectations in this direction have 
not only not been fulfilled, but the propaganda was continued by the 
Servian press. The memorial adduces as an instance of this how the 
attack on the Bosnian local chief, Varesanin, was utilized in the public 
prints, which extolled the man responsible for it as a national hero and 
glorified his deed. These sheets were not only circulated in Servia, but were 
smuggled into Austria-Hungary along well-organized secret channels. 

Under the same leadership as when it was founded, the Narodna 
Odbrana recently became the centre of an agitation to which the Schutz- 
enbund, including 762 associations, a Sokolbund, with 3,500 members, 
and various other societies belonged. 

Appearing in the disguise of a culture association, concerned only with 
the intellectual and physical development of the population of Servia as 
well as with its material strengthening, the Narodna Odbrana betrays its 
genuine reorganized programme in the above-mentioned quotations from 
its official organ, in which "the holy truth" is preached — that it is an 
inevitable necessity to carry on this fight of extermination against Austria, 
the first and greatest enemy, with rifle and cannon, and to prepare the 
people in every way for the struggle to liberate the oppressed territories 
where many millions of enslaved brothers are suffering. The appeals 
quoted in the memorial, and addresses of a like character, cast a light on 
the manifold foreign activities of the Narodna Odbrana and its affiliated 
societies, which consist of lecture tours and taking part in celebrations of 
Bosnian societies, at which members for the above-mentioned Servian 
union are openly recruited. At present an investigation is being made of 
the fact that the Sokol societies of Servia intended to unite with similar 
societies in Austria-Hungary in a union kept secret up to now. Men of 
trust and missionaries stirred up adults and unthinking youths. Thus 


Milan Pribice\dc persuaded former Honved officers and a lieutenant 
of gendarmes to leave army service in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy 
under serious circumstances. In the schools where teachers are educated 
an agitation of wide scope was developed. The wished for fight against 
the Austro-Hungarian empire was also prepared militarily to the point 
that Servian emissaries were commissioned to destroy means of transpor- 
tation, etc., and to kindle revolts and panics, in case of the outbreak of 
hostilities. All this is told in a special inclosure. 

The memorial tells further of the connection between this activity of 
the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated organizations with the attempts 
against Cuvaj, the Royal Commissioner at Agram, in July, 191 2; with the 
attempt of Dojcic in Agram in 1913 against Skerlecz, and the unsuccessful 
attempt of Schafer on May 20 in the Agram Theatre. It then takes up 
the connection with the attack on the Crown Prince and his wife, and 
how even children in school are poisoned with thoughts of the Narodna 
Odbrana, and how the conspirators, with the aid of Pribice\dc and Dacic, 
secured the weapons for the attack. Here special stress is laid on the part 
played by Major Tankosic, who delivered the weapons for the murder, as 
also on that of a certain Ciganovic, a former comitadji, now employed on 
the Servian railways at Belgrade, who as early as 1909 figured as a grad- 
uate of the school for instructing bands of men maintained by the Narodna 
Odbrana of that time. Furthermore, it is told how bombs and arms were 
secretly smuggled into Bosnia, which leaves no doubt that this is a well- 
prepared and often utilized road for the secret aims of the Narodna. 

One inclosure contains a quotation from the minutes of the court- 
martial in Serajevo concerning the investigation of the attack on the 
Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife. According to this, Princip, 
Cabrinovic, Grabez, Crupilovic, and Papovic appear as having confessed 
that they, in company with the fugitive Mehmedbasic, organized a plot 
for the murder of the Archduke and that they kept watch on him for this 
purpose. Cabrinovic is said to have confessed that he threw the bomb 
and that Gabrilo Princip carried out the attempt with the Browning 
pistol. Both men acknowledged that in doing the deed they premeditated 
murder. The other parts of the inclosure contain further statements of 
the guilty parties before the Judge conducting the investigation as to the 
origin of the plot and whence the bombs came. These were manufactured 
for military purposes and, judging from the way they were originally 
packed, came from the Servian arsenal at Kragujewac. Finally, the in- 
closure gives information as to the transportation of the three conspirators 
and their arms from Servia to Bosnia. From further testimony of witnesses 
it appears that a subject of Austria-Hungary wished to give information 
to the Austro-Hungarian Consulate at Belgrade that he suspected a plan 
existed for an attempt on the life of the Archduke during his stay in Bosnia. 
It is alleged that this man was prevented from lodging this information 
by Belgrade police officials, who arrested him on some empty pretext just as 
he was entering the Consulate. It is furthermore stated that the testi- 
mony of witnesses shows that the said police officials had knowledge of 
the attempt planned. Since these statements have not yet been investi- 
gated no opinion can be formed for the present as to their validity. In 
the inclosure with the memorial it is stated: Before the reception 
hall of the Servian Ministry of War there are four allegorical pictures of 


which three are representations of Servian victories, while the fourth 
shows the realization of Servia's hostile dreams against the Austro-Hun- 
garian monarchy. Over a landscape that is partly mountains (Bosnia), 
partly plains (Southern Hungary), the Zora, the morning light of Servian 
hopes, is dawning. In the foreground stands the armed figure of a woman, 
on whose shield are the names of the "provinces yet to be freed" — Bosnia, 
Herzegovina, Wojwodina, Syrmia, Dalmatia, &c. 

Annex 1 B. The Chancellor of the German Empire to the Imperial Am- 
bassadors in Paris, London, St. Petersburg 

Berlin, July 23, 19 14. 

The statements of the Austro- Hungarian Government as to the con 
ditions under which the attempt on the life of the Austrian Crown Prince 
and his wife occurred make clear the aims of the Pan-Servian propaganda, 
and the means which it employs to accomplish its ends. Also, in view of 
the facts brought forward, there is no longer any doubt that Belgrade must 
be looked upon as the centre of action of the efforts to tear away the south- 
em Slavic provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and effect 
their union with the Servian Kingdom, and that these efforts develop 
there with the connivance, at least, of officials of the Government and 

The Servian machinations go back many years. Servian Chauvinism 
showed itself in an especially marked form during the Bosnian crisis. 
That there was no conflict as a result of Servia's provocative attitude 
toward Austria-Hungary at this time was due to the moderation of the 
Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic intervention of the 
great powers. The assurances of future good behavior which the Servian 
Government then gave have not been kept. Under the very eyes, or, at 
least, with the silent consent, of official Servia, the Pan-Servian propaganda 
has continually grown in scope and intensity; the latest crime, the threads 
which lead to Belgrade, must be placed to its account. It has become 
unmistakably apparent that it is incompatible both with the dignity and 
the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy that it should 
continue to look on inactively at the plotting across the border, which 
continually jeopardizes the integrity of its territory. Considering the 
conditions, the acts as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
ernment cannot but be looked upon as justified. Nevertheless, the attitude 
adopted recently both by public opinion as well as by the Government in 
Servia does not preclude the apprehension that the Servian Government 
will refuse to comply with these demands, and that she is allowing herself 
to be led into an attitude of provocation toward Austria-Hungary. Unless 
the Austro-Hungarian Government wishes definitely to give up all claim 
to its position as a great power there is nothing for it to do but back up 
its demands on the Servian Government by strong pressure and, if neces- 
sary, by recourse to military measures, in which case the choice of means 
must be left to it. 

I ask your Excellency to express yourself in the above terms to the 
representative of (Mr. Viviani) (Sir Edward Grey) (Mr. Sazonof) and to 


lay particular stress on the view that the above question is one, the settle- 
ment of which devolves solely upon Austria-Hungary and Servia, and one 
which the powers should earnestly strive to confine to the two countries 
concerned. We strongly desire that the dispute be localized, since any 
intervention of another power, on account of the various alliance obliga- 
tions, would bring consequences impossible to measure. 

I shall await with interest a telegraphic report from you as to the result 
of your interview. 

Annex 2. The Imperial Chancellor to the Confederated 
Governments of Germany 

July 23, 1914. 

Kindly make the following announcement to the Government to which 
you are accredited: 

In view of the facts which the Austro-Hungarian Government has 
made known in its note to the Servian Government, the last doubt must 
disappear that the plot to which the Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince and 
his wife were victims was hatched in Servia, with the connivance, at least, 
of officials of the Servian Government. It is a product of the Pan-Servian 
efforts which, during a number of years, have become a source of lasting 
disquietude for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and for all Europe. 

Pan-Servian Chauvinism showed itself in an especially marked form 
during the Bosnian crisis. Only to the far-reaching self-control_ and 
moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic inter- 
vention of the great powers was it due that the provocation which Austria- 
Hungary suffered at this time from Servia did not lead to war. The 
assurances of future good behavior which the Servian Government gave 
have not been kept by it. Under the very eyes, or at least with the silent 
consent, of official Servia, the Pan-Servian propaganda has continually 
grown in scope and intensity. It would be compatible neither with the 
dignity nor the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy if 
the latter continued to look inactively upon the plotting across the border, 
through which the safety and integrity of its territory is menaced. In 
view of the conditions, the acts as well as the demands of the Austro- 
Hungarian Government must be looked upon as justified. 

The answer of the Servian Government to the demands which the 
Austro-Hungarian Government made on the 23d of the month through its 
representative in Belgrade makes clear that those at the head of Servian 
affairs are not incHned to give up the policy hitherto adopted by them, 
nor their activity as agitators. Therefore, the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment, if it does not wish to give up forever its position as a great power, 
has nothing left to it but to back up its demands with strong pressure, and, 
if necessary, by the adoption of military measures. 

Certain elements in Russia consider it a natural right and the duty 
of Russia energetically to take the part of Servia in her dispute with Aus- 
tria-Hungary. In fact, the Novoe Vremya considers itself justified in 
making Germany responsible for the European conflagration that might 
result from such a move by Russia, if it does not compel Austria-Hungary 


to back down. Here the Russian press takes a wrong view. It was not 
Austria-Hungary that brought on the conflict with Servia, but Servia, which 
by unscrupulous favoring of Pan-Servian aspirations even in parts of Aus- 
tria-Hungary's territory, has jeopardized the very existence of the latter, 
and created conditions which finally found expression in the dastardly 
crime of Serajevo. If Russia feels constrained to take sides with Servia 
in this conflict, she certainly has a right to do it. But she must bear 
clearly in mind that in so doing she makes Servia's aspirations to under- 
mine the conditions necessary for the existence of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy, identical with her own, and that she alone must bear the re- 
sponsibility if a European war arises from the Austro-Servian question, 
which all the rest of the great European powers wish to localize. This 
responsibility of Russia is perfectly apparent and is all the heavier since 
Count Berchtold has officially declared to Russia that there is no intention 
of acquiring Servian territory, nor of threatening the continued existence 
of the Servian Kingdom, but that all that is desired is to obtain permanent 
relief from Servian machinations that threaten Austria's existence. 

The attitude of the Imperial German Government in this matter is 
clearly outlined. The agitation conducted by the Pan-Slavs against 
Austria-Hungary has, as its principal aim, the dissolution or weakening 
of the Triple Alliance by means of the destruction of the Danube Empire, 
and, as a result, the complete isolation of the German Empire. Our closest 
interests, therefore, summon us to the side of Austria-Hungary. The 
duty to save Europe if possible from a general war demands also that we 
support the efforts to localize the trouble in accordance with the policy 
which we have successfully followed for the last forty-four years in the 
interests of the preservation of the peace in Europe. But if, contrary to 
hope, the trouble should spread owing to the intervention of Russia, then, 
true to our duty as an ally, we should have to support the neighboring 
monarchy with the entire might of the German Empire. We shall draw 
our sword only if obliged to do so, and we shall do it then in the firm con- 
viction that we bear no responsibility for the calamity which a war must 
needs bring to the nations of Europe. 

Annex 3. Telegram from the Imperial German Ambassador in 
Vienna to the Imperial German Chancellor 

July 24, 1914. 

Count Berchtold today summoned the Russian Charge d'Affaires in 
Order to explain to him in detail and in friendly terms the position of 
Austria regarding Servia. After going over the historical developments 
of the last few years, he laid stress on the statement that the monarchy 
did not wish to appear against Servia in the role of a conqueror. He 
said that Austria-Hungary would demand no territory, that the step was 
merely a definitive measure against Servian machinations, that Austria- 
Hungary felt herself obliged to exact guarantees for the future friendly 
behavior of Servia toward the monarchy, that she had no intention of 
bringing about a shifting of the balance of power in the Balkans. The 
Charg6 d'Affaires, who as yet had no instructions from St. Petersburg, 


took the explanations of the Minister ad referendum adding that he would 
immediately transmit them to Sasanow. 

Annex 4. Telegram of the Imperial German Ambassador in St. 
Petersburg to the Imperial German Chancellor 

July 24, 1914. 

I have just availed myself of the contents of Decree 592 in a long talk 
with Sasanow. The Minister made wild complaints against Austria- 
Hungary, and was much excited. What he said most definitely was this: 
that Russia could not possibly permit the Servian-Austrian dispute to 
be confined to the parties concerned. 

Annex 6. The Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg to 
the Imperial German Chancellor — Telegram 

July 26, 1914. 

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had a long interview today with 
Sasanow. Both, as they told me afterward, received a satisfying impres- 
sion. The assurance of the Ambassador that Austria-Hungary was 
planning no conquests and simply wished to secure quiet at last on her 
boundaries visibly calmed the Minister. 

Annex 6. Telegram of the Imperial German Ambassador in St. 
Petersburg to the Imperial German Chancellor 

July 25, 1914. 

Report for his Majesty from Gen. von Chelius. Today the drilling 
of the troops in the Krasnoe camp was suddenly interrupted and the regi- 
ments are to return at once to their garrison posts. The manoeuvres 
have been given up. The military pupils were promoted to officers today 
instead of in the Autumn. Great excitement reigns in general headquarters 
as to Austria's proceedings. I have the idea that all preparations have 
been made for mobilization against Austria. 

Annex 7. Telegram of the Imperial German Ambassador in St. 
Petersburg to the Imperial German Chancellor 

July 26, 1914. 

The Military Attache requests the transmission of the following report 
to the General Staff: 

I consider it certain that mobilization has been ordered for 
Kieff and Odessa. It is doubtful whether this is the case at 
Warsaw and Moscow, and elsewhere it has probably not been 

Annex 8. Telegram of the Head of the Imperial German Consulate 
in Kovno to the Imperial German Chancellor 

July 27, 1914. 
State of war declared in Kovno. 

Annex 9. Telegram of the Imperial German Envoy in Berne to the - 

Imperial German Chancellor 

July 27, 1914. 
Have learned reliably that Fourteenth French Corps stopped manoeu- 

Annex 10. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the 
Imperial German Ambassador in London 

Important! July 26, 19 14. 

Austria-Hungary has declared officially and solemnly in St. Petersburg 
that she contemplates no acquisition of territory in Servia, and that she 
will not endanger the continuance of the kingdom, but wishes only to 
secure quiet. According to reports reaching here, Russia is about . to 
summon several bodies of reservists immediately, which would be equi- 
valent to mobilization against us. If this news is corroborated, we shall 
be forced against our will to take measures to meet it. Today our eflforts 
are still directed toward localizing the trouble and maintaining the peace 
in Europe. For this reason we ask that the strongest possible pressure 
be brought to bear in St. Petersburg for achieving this end. 

Annex 10 A. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the 
Imperial German Ambassador in Paris 

July 26, 19 14. 
After Austria-Hungary officially declared to Russia that she contem- 
plated no acquisition of territory and would not tamper with the con- 
tinuance of the Servian kingdom, the decision of the question as to whether 
there is to be a European war lies with Russia alone, who has to bear the 
full responsibility. We trust that France, with whom we know we are 
agreed in the desire to maintain the peace in Europe, will use her influence 
in St. Petersburg in a quieting manner. 

Annex 10 B. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the 
Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg 

July 26, 1914. 
After Austria formally declared that she was not interested in acquiring 
territory, the responsibility for a possible disturbance of the peace in 
Europe through Russian intervention lies with Russia alone. We still 


trust that Russia will take no steps that may seriously endanger European 

Annex 11. Telegram of the Imperial German Ambassador in St. 
Petersburg to the Imperial German Chancellor 

July 27, 1914. 

Military Attache reports concerning talk with Minister of War: 
Said 'Sasanow had asked him to explain the situation to me. 
The Minister of War then gave me his word of honor that as yet no 
mobilization order had gone forth, that for the time being merely 
preparatory measures were being taken, but that not one reservist 
had been summoned nor a single horse requisitioned. He said 
that if Austria should cross the Servian frontier, the military 
districts in the direction of Austria — KiefF, Odessa, Moscow, 
Kazan — would be mobilized, that those on the German front — 
Warsaw, Vilna, St. Petersburg — would not be under any cir- 
cumstances. He said that peace with Germany was earnestly 
desired. To my inquiry as to the purpose of the mobilization 
against Austria he shrugged his shoulders and referred me to 
diplomatic channels. I told the Minister that we appreciated 
the friendly attitude toward ourselves but would look upon the 
mobilization against Austria alone as very menacing. 

Annex 12. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the 
Imperial German Ambassador in London 

July 27, 1914. 

Nothing is known here as yet as to a suggestion of Sir Edward Grey 
to hold a four-sided conference in London. It is impossible for us to bring 
our ally before a European court in its diflference with Servia. Our media- 
tory activity must confine itself to the danger of a Russian-Austrian 

Annex 13. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the 
Imperial German Ambassador in London 

July 25, 1914. 

The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between the Austro-Ser\'ian 
and Austro-Russian conflict is quite correct. We wish as little as Eng- 
land to mix in the first, and, first and last, we take the ground that this 
question must be localized by the abstention of all the Powers from inter- 
vention in it. It is therefore our earnest hope that Russia will refrain 
from any active intervention, conscious of her responsibility and of the 


seriousness of the situation. If an Austro-Russian dispute should arise, 
we are ready, with the reservation of our known duties as alUes, to co- 
operate with the other great Powers in mediation between Russia and 

Annex 14. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the 
Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg 

July 28, 1914. 

We are endeavoring continually to cause Vienna to make clear in St. 
Petersburg the purpose and scope of the Austrian action regarding Servia 
in an indisputable and, it is to be hoped, satisfying manner to Russia. 
The declaration of war made in the meantime makes no difference in this 

Amiex 15. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the 
Imperial German Ambassador in London 

July 27, 1914. 

We have started the efforts toward mediation in Vienna immediately* 
in the way desired by Sir Edward Grey. Moreover, we have communi- 
cated to Count Berchtold the wish of Mr. Sasanow for a direct talk with 

Annex 16. Telegram of the Imperial German Ambassador in Vienna 
to the Imperial German Chancellor 

July 28, 1914. 

Count Berchtold requests me to express to your Excellency his deep 
gratitude for communicating to him the English mediation plan. He 
remarks, however, concerning it, that, after the opening of hostilities by 
Servia and the declaration of war made in the meantime, he must look 
upon England's step as belated. 

Annex 17. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the 
Imperial German Ambassador in Paris 

July 29, 1914. 

Reports to us of French preparations for war increase from hour to 
hour. I request that you talk on this matter with the French Govern- 
ment and make it clear to them that such measures would lead to pre- 
cautionary measures on our part. We should be obliged to proclaim the 
danger of war, and even if this should not mean calling in reserves and 
mobilization, it would, nevertheless, increase the tension. We still hoped 
uninterruptedly for the maintenance of peace. 


Annex 18. Telegram of the German Military Envoy in St. 
Petersburg to His Majesty the Kaiser 

July 30, 1914. 

Yesterday Prince Troubetzki told me, after he had caused your Maj- 
esty's telegram to Emperor Nicholas to be delivered at once: "God be 
praised that a telegram from your Emperor has come." He told me a 
little while ago that the telegram had made a deep impression on the 
Emperor, but since mobilization against • Austria had already been or- 
dered, and Sasonow had doubtless convinced his Majesty that it was 
no longer possible to recede, his Majesty unfortunately could do nothing 
to alter matters. I then said to him that the responsibility for the un- 
measurable consequences lay on the early mobilization against Austria- 
Hungary, who was involved after all in a purely local war with Servia, 
that Germany's answer thereto was just and that the responsibility lay 
with Russia, as it had ignored Austria-Hungary's declaration that she 
contemplated no acquisition of territory from Servia. I said that Austria- 
Hungary had mobihzed against Servia, not against Russia, and that there 
was no cause for Russia to plunge into the question. I added that in 
Germany we were unable after the frightful crime of Serajevo any longer 
to understand Russia's words to the effect that "we cannot leave our 
brothers in Servia in the lurch." I told him in conclusion that he must 
not be surprised if Germany's forces were mobilized. 

Annex 19. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the 
Imperial German Ambassador in Rome 

July 31, 1914. 

We negotiated continually with a view to reconciliation between 
Russia and Austria-Hungary, both through direct exchange of telegrams 
from his Majesty the Kaiser to his Majesty the Czar, as well as in our 
relations with Sir Edward Grey. But all our efforts are made much 
more difhcult, if not impossible of realization, by Russia's mobilization. 
In spite of calming assurances, Russia, according to all reports that reach 
us, is taking such far-reaching steps against us also that the situation 
becomes constantly more threatened. 

Annex 20. I. His Majesty to the Czar 

July 28, 10:45 P- M. 

With the greatest disquietude I hear of the impression which Austria- 
Hungary's action against Servia is making in your empire. The un- 
scrupulous agitation which Jias gone on for years in Servia has led to the 
revolting crime of which Archduke Francis Ferdinand was the victim.. 


The spirit which allowed the Servians to murder their own King and his 
wife still rules in that land. Undoubtedly you will agree with me that 
we two, you and I as well as all sovereigns, have a common interest in 
insisting that all those morally responsible for this terrible murder shall 
suffer deserved punishment. 

On the other hand I by no means overlook how difficult it is for you 
and your Government to resist the tide of popular opinion. Remember- 
ing the heartfelt friendship which has bound us closely for a long time, I 
am therefore exerting all my influence to endeavor to make Austria- 
Hungary come to an open and satisfying understanding with Russia. I 
earnestly hope that you will help me in my efforts to set aside all obstacles 
that may yet arise. 

Your very sincere and devoted friend and cousin. 

(Signed) WILHELM. 

Annex 21. 11. The Czar to His Majesty 

Peterhof Palace, July 29, i P. M. 

I am glad that you are back in Germany. In this serious moment I 
ask you urgently to help me. A disgraceful war has been declared on a 
weak nation; the indignation at this, which I fully share, is immense in 
Russia. 1 foresee that soon I can no longer withstand the pressure that 
is being brought to bear upon me, and that I shall be forced to adopt 
measures which will lead to war. In order to prevent such a calamity as 
a European war I ask you, in the name of our old friendship, to do all 
that is possible to you to prevent your ally from going too far. 

(Signed) NICHOLAS. 

Annex 22. HI. His Majesty to the Czar 

I have received your telegram and share your wish for the mainte- 
nance of peace. Nevertheless — as I said to you in my first telegram — I 
cannot consider Austria-Hungary's action "disgraceful war." Austria- 
Hungary knows by experience that Servia's promises, when they are 
merely on paper, are quite unreliable. According to my opinion, Aus- 
tria-Hungary's action is to be looked upon as an attempt to secure full 
guarantees that Servia's promises shall also be turned into deeds. I am 
confirmed in this view by the statement of the Austrian Cabinet that 
Austria-Hungary contemplates no acquisition of territory at the expense 
of Servia. I think, therefore, that it is quite possible for Russia to remain 
in the role of a spectator toward the Austrian-Servian war, without drag- 
ging Europe into the most terrible war that it has ever seen. I think 
that a direct understanding between your Government and Vienna is 
possible and desirable, an understanding which — as I already telegraphed 
you — my Government is endeavoring to help with all its power. Natu- 
rally, military measures by Russia, which Austria-Hungary might take as 


threatening, would hasten a calamity that we both wish to avoid, and 
would undermine my position as mediator, which I have willingly assumed 
after your appeal to my friendship and help. 

(Signed) WILHELM. 

Annex 23. IV. His Majesty to the Czar 

July 30, I A. M. 

My Ambassador has been instructed to call your Government's atten- 
tion to the dangers and serious consequences of mobilization; I said the 
same thing to you in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary mobilized only 
against Servia, and at that she mobilized only a part of her army. If 
Russia, as appears from what you and your Government say, is mobilizing 
against Austria-Hungary, the position of mediator, which you intrusted 
to me in a friendly manner and which I accepted at your urgent request, 
is jeopardized if not rendered untenable. The whole weight of the de- 
cision now rests on your shoulders; they must bear the responsibility for 
war or peace. 

(Signed) WILHELM. 

Annex 23 A. The Czar to His Majesty 

Peterhof, July 30, 1914, 1:20 P. M. 

I thank you from my heart for your prompt answer. I am sending 
Tatisheff this evening with instructions. The military measures now 
being taken were decided upon five days ago for defensive purposes against 
Austria's preparations. I hope with all my heart that these measures 
will not influence in any way your position as mediator, which I highly 
esteem. We need your strong pressure on Austria in order that an under- 
standing may be brought about with us. 


Annex 24. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the 
Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg 

July 31, 1914. 

In spite of still pending mediatory negotiations, and although we 
ourselves have up to the present moment taken no measures for mobiliza- 
tion, Russia has mobilized her entire army and navy; in other words, 
mobilized against us also. By these Russian measures we have been 
obliged, for the safeguarding of the empire, to announce that danger of 
war threatens us, which does not yet mean mobilization. Mobilization, 
however, must follow unless Russia ceases within twelve hours all warlike 
measures against us and Austria-Hungary and gives us definite assurance 
thereof. Kindly communicate this at once to Mr. Sazonof and wire 
hour of its communication to him. 


Annex 25. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the 
Imperial German Ambassador in Paris 

Important! July 31, 19 14. 

In spite of our still pending mediatory action, and although we our- 
selves have adopted no steps toward mobilization, Russia has mobilized 
her entire army and navy, which means mobilization against us also. 
Thereupon we declared the existence of a threatening danger of war, 
which must be followed by mobilization, unless Russia within twelve 
hours ceases all warlike steps against us and Austria. Mobilization in- 
evitably means war. Kindly ask the French Government whether it will 
remain neutral in a Russian-German war. Answer must come within 
eighteen hours. Wire at once hour that inquiry is made. Act with the 
greatest possible dispatch. 

Annex 26. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the 
Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg 

Important! Aug. i, 19 14. 

In case the Russian Government gives no satisfactory answer to our 
demand, will Your Excellency, at 5 o'clock this afternoon (Central Euro- 
pean time), kindly hand to it the following declaration: 

The Imperial Government has endeavored from the beginning of the 
crisis to bring it to a peaceful solution. In accordance with a wish ex- 
pressed to him by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, His Majesty the 
Emperor of Germany, in co-operation with England, applied himself to 
the accomplishment of a mediating role toward the Cabinets of Vienna 
and St. Petersburg, when Russia, withcut awaiting the outcome, pro- 
ceeded to mobilize her entire land and naval forces. 

Following this threatening measure, occasioned by no military prepara- 
tion on the part of Germany, the German Empire found itself confronted 
by a serious and imminent peril. If the Imperial Government had failed 
to meet this peril, it would have jeopardized the safety and even the 
existence of Germany. Consequently, the German Government was 
obliged to address the Government of the Emperor of all the Russias 
and insist upon the cessation of all these military measures. Russia 
having refused to accede to this demand, and having manifested by this 
refusal that her acts were directed against Germany, I have the honor, 
by order of my Government, to make known to Your Excellency the 

His Majesty the Emperor, my august Sovereign, in the name of the 
Empire, takes up the defiance, and considers himself in a state of war 
against Russia. 

I urgently ask that you wire the hour of arrival of these instructions, 
and of their carrying out, according to Russian time. 

Kindly ask for your passports and hand over protection and business 
to the American Embassy. 


Annex 27. Telegram of the Imperial German Ambassador in Paris 
to the Imperial German Chancellor 

Aug. I, 1:05 P. M. 

To my repeated inquiry as to whether France, in case of a German- 
Russian war, would remain neutral, the Premier declared that France 
would do that which might be required of her by her interests. 



Nos. 1-66 (April, 1907, to May, 1913). Including papers by Baron d'Estour- 
nelles de Constant, George Tnimbiill Ladd, Elihu Root, Barrett Wendell, 
Charles E. Jefferson, Seth Low, William James, Andrew Carnegie, Pope Pius 
X, Heinrich Lammasch, Norman Angell, Charles W. Eliot, Sir Oliver Lodge, 
Lord Haldane and others. A list of titles and authors will be sent on application. 

67. Music as an International Language, by Daniel Gregory Mason, 
June, 1913. 

68. American Love of Peace and Eviropean Skepticism, by Paul S. Reinsch, 
July, 1913. 

69. The Relations of Brazil with the United States, by Manoel de Oliveira 
Lima, August, 1913. 

70. Arbitration and International Politics, by Randolph S. Bourne, Septem- 
ber, 1913. 

71. Japanese Characteristics, by Charles William Eliot, October, 1913. 

72. Higher Nationality; A Study in Law and Ethics, by Lord Haldane, 
November, 1913. 

73. The Control of the Fighting Instinct, by George M. Stratton, December, 

A New Year's Letter from Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, December, 


The A B C of the Panama Canal Controversy. Reprinted from The Con- 
gressional Record, October 29, 1913. December, 1913. 

74. A Few Lessons Taught by the Balkan War, by Alfred H. Fried, 
January, 19 14. 

Wanted — A Final Solution of the Japanese Problem, by Hamilton Holt, 
January, 19 14. 

The South American Point of View, by Charles Hitchcock Sherrill, January, 

75. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, by Nicholas 
Murray Butler, February, 1914. 

76. Our Relations with South America and How To Improve Them, by 
George H. Blakeslee, March, 1914. 

77. Commerce and War, by Alvin Saunders Johnson, April, 1914. 

A Panama Primer. Reprinted from The Independent, March 30, 1914' 
April, 1914. 

78. A Defense of CannibaUsm, by B. Beau. Translated from La Revue 
of February 15, 1909, by Preston William Slosson, May, 1914- 

79. The Tradition of War, by Randolph S. Bourne, June, 1914. 

The Causes Behind Mexico's Revolution, by Gilbert Reid. Reprint from 
the New York Times, April 27, 1914. June, 1914. The Japanese in Califor- 
nia, June, 1914. 

80. War and the Interests of Labor, by Alvin S. Johnson. Reprint 
from the Atlantic Monthly, March, 1914. July, 1914. 

81. Fiat Pax, by George Allan England, August, 1914- 

82. Three Men Behind the Guns, by Charles E. Jefferson, D.D., Septem- 
ber, 1914. 

Special Bulletin. The Changing Attitude toward War as reflected in the 
American Press. September, 1914. 

83. Official Documents Bearing upon the European War. Reprinted 
Through the Courtesy of the New York Times, October, 1914. 

Up to the limit of the editions printed, any one of the above will be sent post- 
paid upon receipt of a request addressed to the Secretary of the American 
Association for International Conciliation, Postofl&ce Sub-station 84, New 
York, N. Y. 


Executive Committee 

Nicholas Murray Butler Stephen Henry Olin 

Richard Bartholdt Seth Low 

Lyman Abbott Robert A. Franks 

James Speyer George Blumenthal 

Robert Bacon 

Frederick P. Keppel 

Assistant Secretary for the Southern States 
Dunbar Rowland 

Director of Pan-American Division 
Harry Erwin Bard 


Alfred H. Fried, Vienna, Austria 

Francis W. Hirst, London, England 

T. MiYAOKA, Tokyo, Japan 

Wilhelm Paszkowski, Berlin, Germany 

Organizing Secretaries for South America 

Benjamin Acacia Victorica, American Legation, Buenos Aires 
A. G. Aranjo Jorge, Foreign Office, Rio de Janeiro 
Juan Bautista de Lavalle, San Pedro, 88, Lima 


34ter rue Molitor, Paris XVI*. France 
President Fondateur 

Baron d'Estournelles de Constant 

Honorary President 

Leon Bourgeois, Senator 

Secretaries General 

A. Metin and Jules Rais, Paris 

W. Foerster, Bornim bei Potsdam 

E. Giretti, Brichesario, Italy 

Sangro Ros de Olano, Madrid 


Albert Kahn 

Verhand fur Internationale Verstandigung 

Dr. Friedrich Curtius, Strassburg 
Professor Dr. Otfried Nippold, Frankfort am M. 
Professor Dr. Walther Schucking, Marburg a. L. 

Osterreicher Verhand fur Allgemeine Vdlkerverstdndigung 


Professor Dr. Heinrich Lammasch 

General Secretary 

Arthur Muller 

Gersthoferstrasse 126, Wien XVIII 

World Friendship Society 

British Branch of Conciliation Internationale 


Rt. Hon. Sir Vesey Strong, Browning Hall, Walworth, 

London, S. E. 

Canadian Association for International Conciliation 

Chairman Organizing Committee 

Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King, The Roxborough, Ottawa, Canada