Official history of 82nd Division American Expeditionary Forces : "All American" Division, 1917-1919

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I'lll'iMmil'iriV^'-"^ LIBRARY

3 1833 00856 3691

Major General George B. Duncan

Official History of 82nd Division
American Expeditionary Forces

"All American' Division

Written by Divisional Officers
Designated by the Division Commander

1917-1919

INDIANAPOLIS
THE BOBBS-MERRILL O
PUBLISHEREJ

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Copyright, 1920, by
THE BOBBS-MERRILL CO.

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Printed in the United Statc3 of Americti

BOOK MANUFACTURERS

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PREFACE

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The history of the 82nd Division represents the col-
laboration of a large number of officers and men of this
Division. The undersigned was given the task of pre-
paring in narrative form an account of the operations in
which the 82nd Division participated on the western
front. To this I have added a brief statement of the
organization and early training of the Division. Every
"All American" should be informed of the steps which
have been taken to make this record accurate in the
smallest detail. Immediately after the Armistice, General
Duncan directed every Company, Battalion and Regi-
mental Commander to prepare a written statement of the
history of his unit. Following the completion of this
work, four large parties of officers were taken to the
Meuse-Argonne battlefields. The undersigned accompanied
the detachments from the Infantry Regiments and joined
in the careful study of the terrain which followed. More
than two weeks were spent in rechecking the ground covered
by the Division in the Meuse-Argonne offensive. One Com-
pany officer was present from nearly every Infantry Com-
pany in the Division. Consequently, this published record
has been authenticated by the men who led the front waves
of the attack as well as by higher Commanders with a wider
grasp of the general situation. Many of our impressions

m

iv PREFACE

gained during the great offensive were modified by this
study.

Since completing this story of operations the manu-
script has been carefully examined and approved in each
detail by Colonel Gordon Johnston, Chief of Staff, 82nd
Division during the Mouse- Argonne offensive, Colonel
"Walter Whitman, Commanding the 325th Infantry, and
Lieutenant Colonel Moore, Division Machine Gun Officer.
In addition the following officers have examined and ap-
proved the story of the Meuse-Argonne operations covering
the period September 25, 1918 to October 15, 1918.

Colonel John K. Miller, 326th Inf.
Colonel Richard Wetherill, 328th Inf.
Major Edgar G. Cooper, 319th M. G. Bn.
Major Olin G. Shivers, 320th M. G. Bn.
Major FoNViLLE McWhorter, 321st M. G. Bn.
Captain James W. Morris, 326th Inf.
Captain Bonnie Huff, 326th Inf.
Captain F. Drew, 327th Inf.
Captain Henry B. Hackney, 327th Inf.

Weekly historical conferences were held by General
Duncan at Division Headquarters from December, 1918,
until the middle of April, 1919. All Brigade, Regimental
and Battalion Commanders were present at these meet-
ings. Many company officers were invited before the con-
ferences whenever further evidence was required. These
discussions covered every phase of our operations. All of
this preliminary investigation was completed before the
undersigned attempted to write the Division History.

The several contributed chapters were carefully prepared
by the officers whose names appear at the head of such
chapters.

The statistical Appendixes were prepared from original

PREFACE V

sources by Sergeant-Major J. B. Kass, with some as-
sistance from the office of the Division Adjutant.

Several members of the Division have received citations
and decorations since the Division was demobilized. To
this extent the record is incomplete. Many Appendixes
have been omitted because the funds subscribed were in-
sufficient to authorize a larger publication.

(Signed) G. Edward Buxton, Jr.,
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry, 82nd Division.
Providence,
Rhode Island.

FOREWORD
THE DIGNITY OF THEIR DESTINY

The 82Dd Division has passed into history. It has been
mustered into the army of tradition. The crusaders of
the Middle Ages died to gain possession of an empty tomb.
Yesterday's crusade was fought to preserve a living fire —
the spirit of liberty.

The 82nd Division gave itself freely for this purpose.
It played its part in the forward line and knew the privi-
lege of deadly peril.

The men who came home are conscious of a very
great bond of comradeship. The ties between men who
have endured hardship and battles together are not easily
expressed in words.

We are glad that the 82nd Division contained men of
every blood strain in all the races that make up our nation.
This Division has learned that an American is one who
is willing to give his life for America.

We are glad that we came from every section of the
United States. We can not feel prejudices against states
that reared our battle brothers. Together we have blotted
out the last mental reservations born of the bitterness of
'61. Across the memories of those years our hands have
met in something lasting.

This Division has no illusions concerning war. The
glamour of peace-time pageantry does not fill the mind
of the veteran. He has learned that battles are won by

FOREWORD vii

terribly tired men. His worst enemies were thirst, filth,
cold and utter weariness.

An offensive suggests an endless movement of sleepless
men and animals through countless black nights of rain
and mud. It transforms dawn and dusk into a monstrous
nightmare of waiting for some new horror. It makes the
clean beds of hospitals seem havens of ease and peace.

But the veteran also believes that life without liberty-
is more hateful than war. He still prefers battle to the
loss of country or the betrayal of human institutions which
carry the hopes of men.

Most of all we share the memory of those who did
not come home. These fallen friends are scattered on all
the fronts we held, but most of them sleep in the valley
of the Aire, bordering the Argonne Forest. The battalions
have sent their representatives to visit each wooden cross.
The memoria? services are over.

These men we left in France died very young, but we
have pondered the words of our chaplains, who told us
that old age does not consist of the number of our days
nor do gray hairs constitute understanding. We have had a
vision of generations of French children who will visit the
headstones and memorize the names of those who are forever
the symbol of friendship between the two republics.

The Division misses the old comrades but marvels at the
dignity of their destiny.

CONTENTS

PAGE

I. Camp Goedon to Feance 1

II. The Somme and Lagny Sectobs 11

III. Maebache Sectoe and St. Mihiel Offensive 17

IV. Eaely Days of Meuse-Aegonne Offensive 30

"V. Peepaeing foe the Attack 38

VI. 164th Infantry Beigade Jumps Off 50

VII. CoENAY and Champeochee Ridge 65

VIII. 163bd Infantey Beigade Entees Fight 73

IX. Asteide the Aiee Rivee 84

X. The Sommeeance-St. Juvin Road 97

XI. The Mabcq Beidgehead 109

XII. Clinging to the Sommeeance Ridge 120

XIII. Into the Kriemhilde-Stellung 134

XIV. The Taking of St. Juvin 151

XV. The St. Geoeges Road and Hill 182 158

XVI. Deepening the Salient 174

XVII. Champigneulle and Extension of Left Flank 187

XVIII. A Thin Line's Point of Honob 203

XIX. Aftee the Fighting 214

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

I. Life of Genebal Duncan 223

II. The Abtilleey of the 82nd Division 225

III. Administeative and Supply Functions 246

IV. 307th Engineee Regiment 258

V. The Medical Depaetment 264

VI. Adjutant Geneeal's Depaetment 271

VII. 307th Field Signal Battalion 274

VIII. Complimentary Lettees, Etc 289

IX. MiLITAEY SeEVICE OF WiLLIAM P. BUENHAM 294

X. CeITIQUE of THE FIGHTING Chaeacteeistics 295

XI. Seceet Obdees 302

XII, Decoeations, Peisonees Taken, Mateeial Captubed... 309

Official History of 82nd Division A. E. F.

CHAPTER I
CAMP GORDON TO FRANCE

August 25, 1917 — December 1, 1918

The 82nd Division was assembled, beginning August 25,
1917, at Camp Gordon, fourteen miles from Atlanta, Ga.,
under the command of Major General Eben Swift, N. A.
Lieutenant Colonel Preston Brown was Chief of Staff.
Over one-third of the majors and all higher officers were
from the Regular Army. With a few exceptions the re-
maining officers were graduates of the First Officers'
Training Camp at Fort McPherson and came from Ala-
bama, Florida and Georgia.

After a week spent in organizing the officers, the Divi-
sion received by increments the first drafted personnel from
Alabama, Georgia and Tennessee, together with a small
training cadre of non-commissioned officers, mostly from
the 6th and 17th Infantry Regiments.

The progress made toward discipline and morale during
the first six weeks was interrupted by a War Department
order which transferred the entire enlisted personnel, less
training cadre of 783 men, to several Southern National
Guard units, some of which were in the 31st Division. The
officers of the 82nd Division will not soon forget the regret

2 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

with which they saw these men depart. The men them-
selves unanimously wished to remain with their regiments.
A real unit consciousness had been created during the days
past and every one felt that infanticide was being com-
mitted upon newly born regiments. Immediately there-
after, the Division received a continuous jSood of replace-
ments from Camps Devens, Dix, Upton, Lee and Meade,
until by November 1, 1917, approximately 28,000 men had
entered Camp Gordon, including the handful of troops
assigned to the 157th Depot Brigade. In a few weeks' time
regimental esprit was again developed.

A considerable number, approximately twenty per cent.,
of these men were of foreign birth, and several hundred
were not citizens of the United States. Training was
seriously handicapped by a substantial percentage of men
who were unable to read and write English. There were
those who could neither speak nor understand the common
tongue.

The perplexities of the problem were increased by the
fact that some of these aliens were of enemy origin.
Furthermore, the average American was unable to dis-
tinguish between the German or Austrian Pole and the
Russian Pole, the Czecho-Slovak or Jugo-Slav and men
of the same race from Russia or Serbia. If the soldier was
a Greek, he might be a partisan of King Constantine or
of M. Veuizelos. If an oriental-appearing soldier claimed
to be an Armenian, he was possibly a Turk. Hence, every
opportunity existed for enemy espionage within tho Divi-
sion, and acts of sabotage seemed a reasonable possibility
to the Camp authorities.

This confusion of races and speech was eventually modi-
fied by the elimination of confessed enemy aliens, the
transfer to the Depot Brigade of suspicious cases, the
institution of English language schools throughout the
Division under a Committee of Education, and an influx

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 3

in March, 1918, of 5000 replacements from Camps Dodge,
Travis, Devens, Gordon, Upton and second draft men from
Alabama, Georgia and Tennessee. Over 1,400 alien enemies
were discharged by War Department order.

The occupational classification of the Division's per-
sonnel resulted in the withdrawal of 3,000 specialists trans-
ferred by War Department order. The loss of these
intelligent men, after three months of arduous training,
was keenly felt. The Division believed that the War De-
partment had overlooked one important consideration.
Although the soldier might be a very good plumber, lumber-
man, blacksmith or structural iron worker, a great deal
of Government time and money had been expended in
making him an even more valuable specialist in his present
occupation : namely, that of a non-commissioned officer,
bayonet instructor, hand-grenade expert or machine gunner.

The training program so far outstripped available equip-
ment that regiments were soon turned out for drills and
ceremonies with wooden guns minus all other ordnance
property. After a few weeks, the 1917 Eddystone rifle
was issued without webb equipment and much energy was
concentrated on preliminary training for service practice
at the Divisional Rifle Range in Norcross, Ga.

Two features of the early training during General Swift's
command will always be remembered by the troops: the
emphasis upon road marching and organization singing.

On November 24, 1917, General Swift was ordered
overseas and Brigadier General James B. Erwin assumed
command of the Division. Major Royden E. Beebe was
appointed Chief of Staff. General Erwin was transferred
to a command at Chickamauga Park on December 26, 1917,
and Brigadier General William P. Burnham succeeded.
General Burnham received his promotion to the rank of
major general, April 12, 1918.

During the first three months of 1918, the Division was

4 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

indebted to a small group of French and English officers
who worked with the special units and supervised the first
training in offensive tactics and trench warfare as then
conducted by the belligerents.

The training of specialists in the United States was neces-
sarily of a theoretical character. The Divisional Auto-
matic Rifle School possessed about a dozen Chauchot rifles;
the regiments had none. Colt machine guns were issued
to machine gun companies, although this weapon was never
to be used in battle. The Stokes Mortar platoons never
saw a 3-inch Stokes Mortar while in the United States, and
the 37-mm. gun platoons possessed collectively one of these
weapons during the last two or three weeks of their stay
at Camp Gordon. A limited number of offensive and de-
fensive hand grenades were obtained and thrown by se-
lected officers and non-commissioned officers at the Division
Grenade School. The men of one regiment witnessed a
demonstration in which four rifle grenades were fired.
Everybody was required to walk once through a gas house
and remove his mask to sniff the fumes of a light concen-
tration of chlorine gas and endure a mild attack of
lachrymose gas. The artillery obtained one battery of
American 3-inch guns in November, 1917, and another in
February, 1918, and fired several thousand rounds at the
artillery range in Marietta, Ga. Marked progress was
made, however, in discipline, morale, musketry, bayonet
fighting and the normal extended order and security for-
mations prescribed by American regulations and practice.

The Division Sails.

The several camps were inspected by the War Depart-
ment in February and March, and the report upon the
82nd Division was sufficiently favorable to make it the
second National Army Division to leave the United States,

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 5

and the eighth in order of combat Divisions going overseas.
Division Headquarters left Camp Gordon, Ga., April 10,
1918, proceeding to Camp Upton, N. Y., the point selected
for mobilization and embarkation. The infantry and ma-
chine gun units entrained for Camp Upton at the rate of
two battalions per day. Division Headquarters sailed from
New York City, N. Y., on April 25, 1918, and the last
infantry and machine gun units followed on May 3, 1918.
These elements of the Division arrived consecutively in
Liverpool during the period May 7-17, 1918, and proceeded
by battalions after short halts in various English rest
camps to embark at Southampton, England, for Le Havre,
France.

The 325th Infantry, however, passed through London
en route and was reviewed by the King of England in the
presence of a large London crowd. This visit of the 325th
Infantry is of especial historical significance because it
offered the English their first glimpse of the American New
Army. It is, therefore, most interesting to preserve here
at length the picturesque comment of the London Times.

"The war has given London many scenes — some gay,
some grave — but few have surpassed yesterday's, when
three thousand soldiers of Republican America marched
through the capital to parade before the Sovereign Ruler
of the British Empire.

"In brilliant sunshine between serried ranks of cheering
citizens, these sturdy sons of the New World tramped to
the throbbing call of the drums. Very workmanlike they
looked carrying their full kit; very happy they looked as
they took the salute of their own Ambassador in Grosvenor
Square; very proud they were as they marched past the
great white statue of Queen Victoria and saw the King of
England raise his hand to the Star-spangled Banner that
symbolized their homeland.

"It was a wonderful sight, that visible union of the two
great English-speaking races. The King and his Queen
with their Court stood at the Palace Gates; their subjects

6 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

swarmed on every vantage point and cheered; and the
soldiers of England and America marched past, each with
their racial characteristics, each united by one common
aim, all impelled by the call of the drum.

The First Greeting.

**From early morning Londoners had waited to pay
homage to the men from across the ocean, the 'Sammies'
as they familiarly called them — a name, by the way, which,
if I remember rightly, was first suggested by Mr. Paul
Derrick in The Sunday Times. The first contingent arrived
at Waterloo Station shortly before eight o'clock, and by
half-past nine the York Road approach was dense with a
cheering crowd that gave the men their first intimation of
the warmth of greeting that awaited them.

"With an admiring escort of civilians they swung down
the road to Wellington Barracks, where, with the cama-
raderie that seems to be the birthright of the fighter, they
were soon in laughing converse with British Tommies,
many of whom were present wearing hospital blue. It was
strange to stand in Birdcage Walk and see, behind the rail-
ings, not the familiar scarlet of the Guards of pre-war
days, not the flat-topped cap and close-belted khaki dress
of war-time, but the somewhat exotic-looking head-dress
and canvas leggings that one had usually seen before only
on the film.

"Tall they were, clean-shaven almost to a man ; and their
speech betrayed them. Yet even among themselves it was
not difficult to pick out the slow Southern drawl from the
clipped speech of the Yankee, while the distinctive profile
of the North American Indian was the hall-mark of many
faces.

"Every State in the Union had its representative, for
these were not men of the Regular Army, such as had 'come
across' twelve months ago with General Pershing: they
were the vanguard of the New Army, that almost number-
less force which America is raising to crush for ever the
evil spirit of Prussian militarism.

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

The Heart op London.

"Suddenly, as we stood chatting, exchanging ideas and
the inevitable souvenirs, the bugle called out, shrill and
clear, ' Attention. ' A few moments of waiting as the bands
took up position — the Americans' own band at the head
of the long column, the drums and pipes of the Scots
Guards to lead the second battalion, the band of the Irish
Guards and the drums and fifes of the Grenadiera with the
third battalion — and then the procession swept through the
gates to the long rolling accompaniment of deep-throated
British cheers.

"London in springtime, especially in the Park, is very
beautiful; and so thought many of our visitors yesterday,
judging by their faces as they gazed from the enthusiastic
spectators to the cloud-flecked blue sky, the tender green-
ery of the trees, the lilacs and bluebells and nodding nar-
cissi. So they marched to the Horse Guards, past the
Salamanca Gun beneath the historic window whence an
English King stepped to the scaffold, and on to the War
Office.

"Here the crowd was even more dense and more enthu-
siastic, for on the balcony stood England's Prime Minister,
Mr. Balfour, Mr. Bonar Law, Sir Eric Geddes, Sir Rosslyn
Wemyss, and other famous men ; and above their heads
fluttered 'Old Glory.' Thence through Clubland and Picca-
dilly, and on to the one bit of American soil in London —
the Embassy in Grosvenor Gardens.

A Veteran *s Pride.

"Here stood Dr. Page, hat in hand, with Vice- Admiral
Sims on the one side, and General Slocum on the other.
' Eyes Right ! ' ran the order down the files ; and the strains
of 'John Brown's Body' were well-nigh drowned in the
roar of cheers that seemed never-ending. One little inci-
dent here was worth much to a handful of old men who
marched gallantly beneath a banner inscribed: 'Not for
ourselves, but for our Country.' They were veterans of
the Civil War, and as they came abreast of the trio on
the Embassy steps, all America, as symbolized by those
three men, paid them homage.

8 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

*'And the white-haired veteran of veterans, who brought
up the rear, pluckily marching on by sheer will power, put
new vigour into his step and carried his miniature Stars
and Stripes even more proudly.

"As the column neared the Palace the crowd grew
thicker. Army khaki. Naval serge, hospital blue and civil-
ian drab, all mingled with light and airy feminine frocks,
and cheered the marching men.

"The Victoria Memorial was surrounded many ranks
deep with a loyal throng that waited patiently for the
coming of the King. At first they feared he would watch
the parade from inside the forecourt, but shortly before
the Americans were due a Guard of Honour of the Gren-
adiers, accompanied by the band, and carrying the Colours,
took up a position facing the main gates.

The Royal Party.

"And then the King was seen, walking across the fore-
court and accompanied by Queen Mary and the Queen
Mother. His Majesty wore Field-Marshal's uniform, as
did the Duke of Connaught. There were also present in
the Royal Party Princess Beatrice, Prince Arthur of Con-
naught in military uniform. Princess Arthur of Con-
naught, the little son of the Prince and Princess, and the
various ladies and gentlemen of the respective suites.

"These included Countess Fortescue, Sir Charles Cust,
R. N., Sir Derek Keppel, Mr. Charles Fitzwilliam, the
Earl of Pembroke, Lieutenant-General Sir Francis Lloyd,
Commanding the London District, Sir Arthur Davidson,
Sir Henry Streatfield, the Hon. Henry Stonor, the Hon.
Charlotte Knollys, General the Right Hon. Sir Dighton
Probyn, V. C, and Sir Malcolm Murray.

"As they waited for the parade the King chatted ani-
matedly with General John Biddle, in command of the
American troops, who presented to him a number of staff
officers.

"A number of specially invited guests were present also.
These included Lord Francis Scott (a wounded officer).
Lord Wimborne (who had just previously been received
by the King on surrendering the office of Lord Lieutenant

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82xND DIVISION 9

of Ireland), representatives of the Diplomatic Corps, and
a number of wounded officers.

"The steady roll of distant cheering grew louder, and
soon the head of the column was seen approaching. The
gates of the forecourt were thrown open, and, to the frantic
delight of the hundreds of fortunate spectators in the
vicinity, the King and Queen and their entourage stepped
out into the roadway to greet the American contingent.

Symbol 'df Unity.

"With a swing and a clasli and a roar of cheering they
marched up, steadily tramping onwards, the manhood of
the free Republic saluting the ruler of the free Empire
and receiving in return the salute of the King and Em-
peror. Londoners have witnessed many pageants on this
historic spot; they have watched the incomings and out-
goings of foreign sovereigns, the gorgeous pageants of
crownings, and the stately trappings of death ; but yester-
day's setting was something even greater than these. It
was a symbol of unity, of the final healing of an old and
well-nigh forgotten wound.

"And that instinctive courtesy which is ever present
with English Royalty was noticeable as the King beckoned
Colonel Whitman, commanding the regiment, to break
away from the column and take up his position beside him
while his men marched past.

King and Officers.

"As the Commanding Officer of each battalion reached
the saluting point, he, too, broke away, and was presented
to the King, who shook hands with each of them. They
were Lieutenant-Colonel Wagner, Major Peirce, Major
Hawkins and Captain Battey. The Americans marched
somewhat more stiffly than our own lads, but exceedingly
well, and made not only a very excellent show, but a very
good impression on all observers.

"The King warmly complimented General Biddle and
Colonel Whitman on the general bearing of the troops and
told them how very pleased he was to see so fine a sample
of the forces which America is sending to aid the Allied

10 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

''And so the Americans saw the King. As they marched
back to barracks they were full of the glamour of it all.
Officers and men alike were delighted with the cordiality
of their reception and spoke enthusiastically of the Lon-
doners who had received them so handsomely.

"Nor was it only Londoners that greeted their American
cousins in the presence of their King. Men from almost
every part of the Empire were there, and representatives
of all the Allies. One saw the slouch hat of the Australian
and the 'Baden-Powel' of the New Zealander, the gorgeous
turban of an Indian officer and the Kepi of a French in-
fantryman ; the tasselled cap of a Belgian, and the flowing
cape of an Italian. And, gorgeous in their scarlet and
gold, with bayonets glinting in the sunlight, their imperish-
able colours drooping in the still air, the Guard of Honour
of the Grenadier Guards reminded us of the pageants that
were in the days before the war.

"Thus England greeted America. And America, real-
izing more than ever the meaning of cousinship, will send
many more such troops as those we saw yesterday, to fight
for freedom and justice, and peace — the trinity that holds
them fast for evermore."

King George's Letter of Welcome to American Troops.

"Soldiers of the United States, the people of the British
Isles welcome you on your way to take your stand beside
the Armies of many nations now fighting in the Old World
the great battle for human freedom.

"The Allies will gain new heart and spirit in your
company.

"I wish that I could shake the hand of each one of you
and bid you God speed on your mission.

George R. I.

''April, 1918."

CHAPTER II
THE SOMME AND LAGNY SECTORS

Division Headquarters opened in Escarbotin, Somme,
France, on May 16th. The troops were held at Le Havre
only long enough to exchange U. S. 1917 rifles for Brit-
ish rifles and receive helmets and gas masks, when they
proceeded by rail to the British training area adjoining
Escarbotin. All units were billeted over a considerable
area, comprising numerous villages west of Abbeville. Our
troops started upon an intensive program of training
under the supervision of the 66th British Division, Major
General Bethel, commanding. The Infantry was com-
pletely equipped with Lewis automatic rifles and the
machine gun units with Vickers machine guns. The 37-
mm. and 3-inch Stokes Mortar platoons received their
weapons and other materiel. English horse-transport was
issued to all battalions.

' Other American Divisions swiftly followed to the various
training areas behind the British front, until ten American
Divisions were assembled in British support.

Hard training followed for all units of our Division.
Many officers and non-commissioned officers attended
schools. A British demonstration platoon illustrated the
British idea of bayonet fighting, the attack, ceremonies,
close order drill and physical training games. The coun-
tryside echoed savage shouts of "In — Out — On Guard!"
Our troops assimilated those features which appealed to
11

12 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF S2nd DIVISION

them, especially the games and method of bayonet fighting,
and applied themselves to mastering the Lee-Enfield rifle,
the Lewis automatic rifle and the Vickers machine gun.

On May 28, 1918, the Division vv^as inspected by Field
Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, who talked at length with many
company commanders and concluded with an inspection
of company kitchens.

On May 30, 1918, the Division was informally inspected
by General John J. Pershing, and the troops were required
to demonstrate various features of their training schedule.

The battalions were moved each week to a different town
in the area to afford practice in road marches and to test
the possibilities of their new transport.

Early in June, details of officers and non-commissioned
officers were guests of British front-line units in the new
trenches before Albert and Amiens, where the lines were
becoming newly stabilized after the upheaval which fol-
lowed the successful enemy offensive of March 21, 1918.
It v\^as during one of these tours of duty that Captain
Jewett Williams, 326th Infantry, was killed, June 9, 1918,
the first casualty in action from the 82nd Division. It
was generally assumed by both British and American of-
ficers that the American battalions were to be attached
immediately to British brigades and share the honors and
burdens of redeeming the lost battlefields of Picardy. This
assumption was suddenly overturned by an order entrain-
ing the Division for destination near Toul. The Lee-En-
field rifles, to which the troops had just become accustomed,
and the Lewis automatic rifles and Vickers machine guns
were turned back to the British, and the U. S. 1917 Rifle
(Eddystone) was reissued. The train movement began
June 16, 1918, and lasted two full days. The Division
occupied towns and villages north of Toul, and once again
addressed itself to the task of obtaining and mastering
new weapons.

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 13

The Infantry received Chauchot automatic rifles, and
machine gun companies were equipped with the French
8-mm. Hotchkiss machine guns. At this time all units
of the Division, except the 157th Field Artillery Brigade,
joined the Command. The artillery, however, remained in
training at La Courtine, France.

Face to Face with the German.

Orders were received to relieve the 26th U. S. Divi-
sion, then occupying that part of the Woevre front known
as the Lagny Sector. Reconnaissance was made by the
battalion and company commanders of the battalions se-
lected to be the first in contact with the enemy. These
units were the 2nd Battalion, 325th Infantry (Major Haw-
kins), 1st Battalion, 326th Infantry (Major Wells), 3rd
Battalion, 327th Infantry (Major Hill), and 2nd Battalion,
328th Infantry (Major Buxton). One battalion from each
of the four Infantry regiments was to occupy the front
lines or outpost zone, with one battalion each in support
and the third battalions in reserve. Relief began on the
night of June 25, 1918. All the machine gunners of the
Division, together with selected Chauchot riflemen and the
37 mm. platoons, were temporarily detached from the
Division and sent to Automatic Arms school at Bois
L'Evecque between Toul and Nancy. Here they received
a course of training from French officers. The regimental
machine gun companies joined the front-line infantry bat-
talions on July 5, 1918, and the machine gun battalions
on July 14, 1918. The positions of the artillery of the
26th Division were taken over by French Artillery, and
a limited number of French machine guns joined the front-
line battalions.

The Division held the left flank of the French 32nd
Corps, French VIII Army. The left battalion (328th)

14 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

of the Division was in liaison with the right battalion of
the French II Army. The American unit at once dis-
covered that while the outpost battalions of the VIII Army
were ordered to hold in case of attack until the last man,
the outpost battalions of the II Army were to withdraw
into the zone of resistance a depth of about five kilometers.
This fact was brought to the attention of the VIII Army
and resulted in a correspondence between the VIII and
II Army that was still active when the 82nd Division left
the sector six weeks later.

During the days and nights of life in the Lagny Sector,
the intensive military education of the Division progressed
in marked fashion and the men soon accustomed themselves
to the details of existence in trench warfare. Patrolling
from the outset was conducted in an aggressive manner
and the Division not only maintained an ownership of
No Man's Land, but penetrated deeply into the enemy's
positions on numerous occasions. Several of these forays
without artillery help resulted in collisions, during the
course of which numerous casualties were inflicted upon
the enemy, and some losses suffered in return.

The battalions in support and reserve were able to ac-
complish some important training work with automatic
rifles, rifle and hand grenades, and finally to hold exercises
in the combined use of all infantry weapons on a firing
range.

Contemplated maneuvers were prevented by orders from
the VIII French Army, requiring the 82nd Division to
construct an entirely new defensive system of trenches,
especially in the zone of resistance. The outpost battalions
were compelled to cover battalion fronts extending from
4000 to 5500 meters. This was done by arranging combat
groups echeloned in diamond formation. The support and
reserve battalions were also echeloned in great depth. Con-
crete pill boxes were constructed, new camouflage erected,

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

roads built to the front and additional bands of wiring
provided. The Division was cautioned to be ready to repulse
a serious attack, and working parties consisting of entire
reserve battalions worked nightly in a vain endeavor to
have all complete on August 5, 1918, the date set by the
VIII Army.

On August 4, 1918, Companies K and M, 326th Infantry
(Major Watkins), conducted a trench raid with artillery
assistance against a section of the German position imme-
diately in front of that regiment. The officers and men
had been carefully trained for this operation by French
officers, upon similar works erected in a rear area. The
raiding personnel performed this enterprise in very com-
mendable fashion, penetrating 600 meters into enemy ter-
ritory, killing about a platoon of the enemy and taking
three machine guns, numerous rifles, pistols and other
equipment. During the raid, one American was killed and
four wounded. When every one had returned to the pro-
tection of the American trenches, German artillery fire,
heretofore silent, opened vigorously and two bays filled
with men were hit. Altogether, seventeen men were killed
and fifteen wounded by two shells. A Division order was
published to the Command on August 8, 1918, citing the
troops participating in this operation for their gallantry
and soldierly conduct. This raid was supported by the
320th Machine Gun Battalion with overhead fire.

The first week of August was marked by a noticeable
increase in the activity on both sides. Artillery fire became
more general and German airplane operations became very
active, bombing and firing machine guns at combat groups
and command posts, attacking observation balloons and
engaging our pursuit planes with more numerous fighting
planes.

On August 3, 1918, the 30th Engineers effected a gas
projector attack of seven and one-half tons of various gases

16 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

and, as was later ascertained from enemy sources, caused
many German casualties. This projector attack provoked
enemy retaliation by a severe bombardment of mustard gas
shells on the night of August 7, 1918, while a relief of the
82nd Division by the 89th U. S. Division was in progress.
All front-line Infantry battalions of the 82nd Division had
been withdrawn, and this Division suffered no gas casual-
ties except among the front-line machine gun units, which
had seventeen casualties. The 89th Division suffered very
heavy casualties.

The total casualties in the 82nd Division during its oc-
cupancy of the Lagny Sector were as follows:

Enlisted
Officers Personnel

Killed in action or died of wounds 1 43

Known Prisoners 0 3

Missing 0 0

Wounded, including "Gassed" 21 306

Total 22 352

The relief of the 89th Division was completed on August
10, 1918, and the 82nd Division moved by marching and
60-centimeter railroad to an area west of Toul, with head-
quarters at Blenod-les-Toul.

CHAPTER III

MARBACHE SECTOR AND ST. MIHIEL
OFFENSIVE

Orders were received August 10, 1918, assigning the
Division to the American III Army Corps, with further
directions to join at once on the Marne salient. Within
twenty-four hours this order was revoked and the Division
was directed to undertake a course of training in the area
where then billeted.

After training two days, the Division was assigned to
the IV American Corps for administration and the VIII
French Army for tactical control. Concurrently the Divi-
sion was ordered to relieve the American 2nd Division
in the Marbache Sector. The relief began August 15,
1918, and was completed in two days. On August 20, 1918,
the 82nd Division was transferred to the command of the
American 1st Corps, which became part of the American
First Army, August 30, 1918. The Division pursued the
same methods of relief by battalions within the regiments
as followed in the Lagny Sector. The 125th French Divi-
sion was on the right of the 82nd Division and the 1st
American Division on the left for the first week after the
arrival of the 82nd Division, when the 90th U. S. Division
relieved the 1st Division.

The Marbache Sector lay astride the beautiful Moselle
Valley and included just within its front lines the consid-
17

18 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

erable city of Pont-a-Mousson. The sector had been known
after the first year of war as a rest sector for both French
and German Divisions. Such was still the status of the
sector when taken over by the 82nd Division, but during
the last of August a marked change was evident. Consid-
erable artillery activity developed and the enemy was ex-
ceedingly aggressive in the air. Patrolling and small am-
buscades featured the Infantry activity of both bel-
ligerents.

The 157th Field Artillery Brigade had joined the 82nd
Division just as the Division was entering this sector. It
had received its entire equipment and subsequent training
at La Courtine, where it had been stationed since its ar-
rival in France on June 3, 1918. The advent of this
brigade was most gratifying to the Infantry, which was
quick to perceive the advantage of Artillery support con-
trolled by officers imbued with personal pride in the work
of the Division, and with whom the Infantry had estab-
lished personal relations during the months at Camp
Gordon.

An event took place on August 29^ 1918, in the 325th
Infantry which remained a mystery until long after the
Armistice. Lieutenants Wallace and Williams went out
on a daylight reconnaissance with Corporals Slavin and
Sullivan of Company L, 325th Infantry. This little
patrol left Dombasle Chateau and never returned. When
American prisoners were released after the Armistice Cor-
poral Slavin came back to the regiment. The party had
pushed across the Sielle River and through No Man 's Land
to the German wire. On their way back they were am-
bushed and all the party killed except Corporal Slavin.

A few days before the St. Mihiel offensive of September
12, 1918, it was common knowledge that some major opera-
tion was impending and this assumption carried a most
stimulating result throughout the Command. For a week

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 19

before this offensive, civilians were evacuated from the ad-
vanced areas.

The tentative plan of attack of the 1st Army Corps,
published September 6, 1918, stated the mission of the
82nd Division. The Division from its position on the right
flank of both Corps and Army was given "for its special
mission the exerting of pressure on, and maintaining con-
tact with, the enemy." It was further stated that no
attack was expected from the Division.

In full performance of this mission, all Infantry regi-
ments of the Division pushed to the front strong daylight
patrols on the first day of the drive, September 12, 1918.
These combat groups gained close contact with the enemy,
driving in his outposts and obtaining definite information
concerning the location of his supporting troops. This was
not accomplished without considerable casualties among
the officers and men of the combat platoons. One of the
combat groups from the 327th Infantry on arriving at the
Bel Air Farm was counter-attacked by a strong German
force and compelled to withdraw to our own trenches. The
retirement was covered by a platoon of D Company, 321st
Machine Gun Battalion, under 2nd Lt. Robert Goodall.
The cool and efficient manner in which this detachment
handled its guns was worthy of special commendation.

On September 12, three platoons from F Company,
328th Infantry (Captain Foreman), the most advanced
unit, were pushed forward on the west bank of the Moselle
to ascertain whether or not the German lines had been
withdrawn. Lieutenant Cox with his platoon forced an
entrance into the Maison Gauthier, a well-known strong
point, which covered the southern approach to the town of
Norroy. This formidable position was located about one
kilometer north of our front-line trench. The patrol forced
its way through the enemy wire and drove the German
occupants out of the southern trenches and dugouts.

20 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

Lieutenant Harrison led his platoon farther to the west
against the outer defenses of Norroy.

Lieutenant Gould with his platoon attacked on the left
flank of the battalion sector. All three platoons met with
heavy fire and numerous casualties, but demonstrated the
presence of substantial enemy forces in the long-established
German positions.

After gallantly performing his mission, Lt. Charles Har-
rison was killed while directing the withdrawal of his pla-
toon. The patrols from the 325th Infantry succeeded in
reaching Eply. The 326th Infantry patrols operated in
Bois de la Tete d'Or, west of Bois de la Voivrotte.

The soldierly manner in which these combat reconnais-
sances were executed elicited the following telegram from
Commanding General, 1st Corps, to the Commanding Gen-
eral, 82nd Division:

"Please convey to the officers and men of your Division
my appreciation of the difficult part they had to perform
in the highly successful operation of the 1st Corps to-day.
This part they performed to my full satisfaction."

Throughout the St. Mihiel operations the 163rd Infantry
Brigade was supported by the 320th Machine Gun Bat-
talion (Captain Muldrow) and the 321st Machine Gun
Battalion (Major Moore) shared the experiences of the
164th Infantry Brigade.

It was known that prior to this offensive the enemy order
of battle in this sector from west to east was the 255th
Division, the 84th Landwehr Brigade and the 31st Land-
wehr Brigade. Corps Headquarters wishing to ascertain
whether the enemy had added other units in preparation
for a counter-attack, directed that a strong raid with artil-
lery assistance be made against the German strong point,
Bel Air Farm, just east of the Moselle. In compliance
with this order, Companies E and K, 327th Infantry (Cap-

OFP^ICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 21

tain Welch), advanced against Bel Air Farm and Bois
de la Tete d'Or adjoining, at 18 hours, September 13, 1918.
A smoke screen was thrown down in front of the ob-
jective and the Division Artillery laid a barrage on the
enemy position. One prisoner was taken, from whom was
obtained a confirmation of the enemy order of battle. In
addition a light machine gun was captured and several of
the enemy killed. The German artillery countered by lay-
ing a heavy fire upon our Infantry during the entire
period of the raid and until the return to our own trenches.
The steadiness with which this fire was supported indicated
a high order of discipline and morale. During our with-
drawal the enemy attempted an infantry counter-attack
from the woods east of the farm. This effort was broken
down by the fire of Company B, 321st Machine Gun Bat-
talion (Captain Cunningham). Our casualties numbered:

Company E.

Officers. Men.

Killed 1 5

Wounded, severely 0 9

Wounded, slightly 1 14

Missing or captured 0 1

Gassed 0 15

Total 2 44 3 47

The decision of the American high command to advance
the right brigade of the 90th Division through the famous
Bois le Pretre, drew the 328th Infantry (Colonel Nelson)
on the west bank of the Moselle into a series of offensive
actions not contemplated in the tentative plan of Septem-
ber 6, 1918.

Company

K.

Officers.

Men.

0

0

0

2

0

15

1

8

2

22

82nd division IN ST. MIHIEL 1
— Dotted lines Indicate temporary is
Solid lines indicate organized f i

TFENSIVE, SEPT. 12-16, 1918

isitions of advance units during the day

[li line at midnight

OFP^ICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 23

had pushed into the Bois le Pretre and held a line about
600 meters southwest of Norroy.

The expected Infantry resistance did not develop. A
battalion of the 68th Landwehr, 255th German Division,
had hurriedly abandoned Norroy and the commanding
heights north of that village a brief period before the
arrival of our battalion. The German positions south of
Norroy were strengthened by concrete pill boxes and a
huge anti-tank trench in addition to a very complete trench
system fortified with an unusual quantity of wire defenses.

When our troops entered Norroy one building was burn-
ing as the result of our artillery fire during the afternoon.
One German soldier was captured in a sniping post.
Seventeen French civilians, mostly elderly women, crawled
out from the cellars of their ruined homes and joyfully
welcomed "their deliverers."

At about 22 hours* on the night of September 13 the bat-
talion was organized in depth with Companies G, F and E
and the Machine Gun Company occupying the shallow
trenches on the crest of the ridge north of Norroy. Liaison
had been established with the 90th Division whose front line
now held the continuation of the ridge to the west. Our
battalion had achieved a night advance of more than two
kilometers.

The occupation of our new position was accomplished in
total darkness by company commanders working from
map designations given them in the jumping-off trench.
Two platoons of E Company were placed facing east along
the river canal. Since the units of the 82nd Division east
of the Moselle River did not advance, the 2nd Battalion,
328th Infantry, was now nearly three kilometers in ad-
vance of any support on that side of the river. The Bat-

* Our army adopted the French military practice of using
24-hour clock designations instead of the usual 12-hour system,
aad thus avoided the necessity of using a.m. and p.m.

24 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

talion had been given the mission of protecting the right
flank of the 90th Division, but the right flank of our own
Battalion had no protection whatever, except by a river
fordable in many places. Furthermore, the 328th Infantry
was now placed some two kilometers nearer than the 90th
Division to the direct enfilade fire of the German batteries
on the hill across the river east of Norroy. In addition
to the possibility of a frontal attack by enemy infantry our
unit was compelled to guard against any force which might
come down the open valley of the Moselle and attempt to
encircle our flank between Norroy and Pont-a-Mousson.

The prisoner captured the evening of September 13
stated that his own Battalion was probably entrenched at
Vandieres, two kilometers north of Norroy. This prisoner
had been told by his officers that the Americans killed all
captives.

The civilians found in Norroy had just escaped from a
thraldom endured for four long years. They testified to
the destructive character of the initial American bombard-
ment during the early hours of September 12, 1918. Some
civilians and several German soldiers had been killed in
Norroy during this barrage. These civilians testified that
the Germans left Norroy very hurriedly just before their
evening meal on September 13, 1918. This was evidenced by
the untouched food found upon the mess tables, the complete
battalion records and a large quantity of military equip-
ment abandoned. Great numbers of Belgian hares about
the viMage indicated one prolific source of fresh meat for
the resourceful Germans. Further statements made by
the rescued population of Norroy may be found in the
report of the lieutenant commanding the French military
police attached to the 82nd Division. The following is an
extract from the report:

"The population of NORROY during the German oecu-

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 25

pation consisted of 330 individuals according to the list of
rations which were distributed by the Priest.

"On the 11th, 12th and 13th of Sept., the Germans
evacuated the inhabitants to VANDIfiRES, telling them
that NORROY had been mined and that they had the
intention of destroying same following their withdrawal.
Only 17 individuals who had hidden themselves in cellars
were found at the time of its occupation by the American
troops.

"STATEMENTS MADE BY THE INHABITANTS:
The German Battalion Commander made himself particu-
larly conspicuous by his brutal w^ays. He plundered houses
and confiscated everything, according to his desires. Dur-
ing the day the 12th inst., the Priest having refused to
leave with the Germans was carried away by force. Sev-
eral persons saw the Priest bareheaded, being taken away
by four soldiers. The Mayor was taken away under similar
conditions on the 13th inst.

"The inhabitants received for the month of September,
13 pounds of flour, 1 kilogr. (about 2 pounds) of fat, 1
kilogr. of preserved meat and 400 grammes of dried vege-
tables. The distribution of the foregoing had not been com-
pleted; the Priest had received same from the American
Aid Committee. Inhabitants with means paid for their
rations. The sum of 3,000 Francs which had been collected
was carried off by the Germans in spite of the protest of
the Priest. It appeai-s that a stock of food exists at the
Presbytery.

"A supply of grenades is said to have been placed by
the Germans in cellars of houses bearing the numbers of
40 and 42.

"According to statements made by several individuals,
the enemy is suffering from a lack of foodstuffs. For some
time past no meat rations had been distributed,

"The inhabitants of NORROY were aware of the pres-
ence of American troops in the sector opposite, having been
so informed by the Germans. The Germans, it appears,
were in great fear of them."

Despite our expectation the enemy did not attempt any
counter-attack on the morning of September 14 nor during
the day and night following. Enemy aeroplanes were eon-

26 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

tinually over the town. Furthermore, German artillery
bombarded the town from the north and east with a mix-
ture of mustard gas and high explosive shells throughout
the day and night of September 14, 1918, causing a num-
ber of casualties in that period. Six men in E Company
were injured by the explosion of one shell alone. A heavy
concentration of mustard gas collected in Norroy during
the afternoon and troops in the town were compelled to
wear gas masks continuously for about four hours until
it was possible to remove the men to high ground relatively
free from gas.

The Attack on Yandieres

The 3rd Battalion, 328th Infantry (Major Johnson),
was ordered to relieve the 2nd Battalion during the night
of September 14-15, 1918, and the last platoons effected the
relief just at daylight.

On September 15, 1918, the 90th Division pressed for-
ward to ground west of the village of Vandieres, and the
3rd Battalion, 328th Infantry, with Company C, 321st
Machine Gun Battalion, made a daylight advance to extend
again the flank of the 90th Division. The heights from
which they jumped off sloped away into a level valley
which held the small village of Vandieres, and because of
the open nature of the country, the advance was necessarily
made in full view of all enemy artillery flanking the posi-
tion from the east. The battalion was required to proceed
through almost continuous shell fire, and suffered approxi-
mately 275 casualties in a few minutes. Vandieres was
entered and some units of the command seized high ground
north of Vandieres, from which points all troops were later
withdrawn. The battalion dug in just south of the village,
refusing the right flank and connecting up with the 90th
Division on the left. This advance still further exposed

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 27

the flank of the 328th Infantiy to enemy artillery fire and
constituted a tempting invitation for a German infantry
counter-attack.

The terrible punishment inflicted upon this battalion was
caused almost exclusively by enemy artillery, which was
able to use direct fire at a murderously close range. Casu-
alties inflicted by enemy infantry were slight. No unit
of the Division had thus far been subjected to a test
approaching in severity the experience of the 3rd Bat-
talion on this afternoon. That the platoons continued to
advance in many instances after losing their accustomed
leaders reflects the highest credit on this unit. Among
other ofiicer casualties, Captain Rumph, of I Company,
and Captain Cooper, of M Company, were severely
wounded. The units of the Machine Gun Company were
also conspicuous for great gallantry. The gunners were
well forward in the advance and sustained heavy losses
with unbroken spirit. One very gallant and dramatic part
was played by the drivers of the machine gun carts. These
men drove their mules at a gallop through the barrage
and up to the outskirts of Vandieres. Even after the new
front had been organized, enemy artillery continued to
bombard the new line with gas shells and high explosives.

The 1st Battalion, 328th Infantry (Major Boyle), which
had been in support of the 3rd Battalion during this oper-
ation, relieved the 3rd Battalion after dark the night of
September 15, 1918, and held the new line under constant
harassing fire supported by the 328th Infantry Machine
Gun Company (Captain Carr) until in turn relieved
September 16, 1918, by a battalion of the 90th Division,

The 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 328th Infantry were
cited in Division ordei-s for splendid conduct in taking
Vandieres under very heavy artillery fire.

A Division citation at the same time was given Lieutenant
Colonel Emory J. Pike, Divisional Machine Gun Officer,

28 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82m> DIVISION

who died from wounds received during advance of 3rd
Battalion upon Vandieres. Colonel Pike was voluntarily
assisting some Infantry units when struck down by a
shell. During the advance in the St. Mihiel drive the
forward battalions of the 328th Infantry were under
the tactical supervision of Lieutenant Colonel Richard
Wetherill. Among officer casualties in the other regiments
of the Division during this offensive was Captain Arthur
E. Hamm, Company M, 326th Infantry, who was killed
in an outpost position by a bomb dropped from an aero-
plane. The 327th Infantry suffered many officer casual-
ties, among which were 1st Lieutenant Robert R. Forrester
of Company L and 2nd Lieutenant Leo D. Sheridan of
Company E, both severely wounded by shell Are. 1st
Lieutenant Joe N. Neal, Jr., died from shrapnel wounds
received September 13th. Another loss in the d21th. la-
fantry was that of Captain James E. Welch, Jr., coitrmand-
ing the Third Battalion. About dark on the afternoon of
September 14, 1918, Captain Welch took two soldiers and
went into No Man's Land to search for some members of
his command who had been missing since the raid on Bel
Air Farm the previous afternoon. After going a short
distance they were fired on by German machine guns.
Captain Welch told the soldier nearest our lines to "go
back in if you can." This soldier reported several hours
later. Neither Captain Welch nor the second soldier were
ever seen again. After the Armistice the Regiment sent
a searching party back to this sector, but no crosses were
found marked with the names of the missing pair. It
is believed that they were killed and buried by the enemy
who failed to mark their graves.

The 82nd Division was relieved by the 69th French
Division, the movement being completed September 21,
1918, and all units were camped in the woods around Mav-
bache and Belleville. Division Headquarters moved to

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 29

Liverdun. At this time, Lieutenant Colonel Roy den E.
Beebe was transferred to General Headquarters, and
Colonel Raymond Sheldon became Chief of Staff.

The total casualties of the Division during its tour of
duty in the Marbache Sector numbered :

Mabbache Sector — August nSeptember 10.

EnUsted
Officers Personnel

Killed In action or died of wounds 0 11

Known Prisoners 0 4

Missing 2 2

Wounded, including "Gassed" 4 56

Total 6 73

St. Mihikl Battle— Sepfemfter 11-September 20.

Enlisted
Officers Personnel

Killed in action or died of wounds 4 74

Known Prisoners 0 6

Missing 1 8

Wounded, Including "Gassed" 38 819

Total 43 907

The Division was ordered to embuss September 24, 1918,
for the vicinity of Clermont, west of Verdun. The horse
transport and artillery preceded the Division by marching.
The Division was directed to report to the Commanding
General, American First Army, as Army reserve. The
Division arrived in the new area on September 25, 1918,
and pitched shelter tents in the woods west of the Cler-
mont-Bar-le-Duc Road. Division Headquarters was estab-
lished in Grange-le-Comte, an old French farm-house.

CHAPTER IV
EARLY DAYS OF MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE

September 25, 1918 — October 5, 1918

When the long French bus trains, driven by hundreds
of uniformed Annamites, debarked the last unit of the
82nd Division south of Clermont-en-Argonne on Septem-
ber 25, 1918, the Division stood ready for any emergency
as Army Reserve in rear of the 1st Corps area. The total
strength of the 82nd Division mustered 934 officers, 25,797
enlisted men and 5646 animals.

The vast concentration of troops, transport and materiel
convinced all ranks that the day of an important military
effort was at hand. When, at 1 hour, September 26, 1918,
the bivouacked thousands were awakened by the thunder
of massed artillery in a barrage obviously extending from
the Meuse River west across the Argonne Forest, along tho
front of the French Army on our left, we knew that the
hour had come.

The following three days proved a trying period. Re-
peated warnings from the higher command kept all units
on a continuous alert. In Division Headquarters it was
known only that the Division could expect two hours'
notice prior to a definite movement. Liaison officers from
the Division with the 1st Army and 1st Corps Headquar-
ters kept the Division in touch with the progress of the
attack along the entire front. Liaison was also maintained
with the 92nd Division in 1st Corps Reserve near Clermont.

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 31

The Advance P. C. of the 82nd Division was located
at Grange le Comte Farm, about three kilometers north-
west from Rarecourt, the Headquarters of the 1st Corps.
The 2nd Echelon of Division Headquarters was established
at Passavant. The regiments and separate battalions were
bivouacked in the woods west of the main army road to
Clermont and extending from the vicinity of Grange le
Comte Farm to the region west of Froidos.

The nights were cold and periods of rain were sufficiently
frequent to keep all ranks in an uncomfortable condition.
Animal transport and trucks mired in the forest mud, and
green, drenched wood seriously handicapped the efforts of
cooks and kitchen police. Most of the men of the Division
had now been in continuous bivouac in rain and cold
weather since September 16, at the end of the St. Mihiel
Drive. As a result of this exposure, many men were suf-
fering from diarrhoea, and hard colds were general. Not-
withstanding this situation, the morale of all units was of
the highest type and the attitude of the troops indicated
both resolution and an earnest desire to meet the enemy.
During the occasional periods of sunshine, regimental
bands played lively airs. As far as practicable troops con-
tinued the usual training schedule.

327th Infantry (September 29 — October 1, 1918)

The period of waiting and of fruitless "alerts" con-
tinued until 16 :25 hours, September 29, 1918, when the fol-
lowing telephone message was received by the Chief of
Staff, 82nd Division, from the Chief of Staff, 1st Army :

**You will cause the 82nd Division to stand at the alert
at once and to load on the Supply Trains of the Division
one regiment of Infantry with two days' rations, to be at
the disposal of the 1st Corps. ' '

The First Corps followed immediately with instructions

32 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

to embuss the 327t]i Infantry and send it to Varennes by
main road. Upon arrival, Colonel Ely was to report with
his command to the Commanding General, 28th Division.

"Men to take two extra bandoliers of ammunition and
two days' rations. Don 't lose any time about it. The other
regiment to be alerted."

These orders were communicated to the 164th Infantry
Brigade and at 16:33 hours. Brigadier General Lindsey
telephoned the details of the order to the 327th Infantry.

At 17 hours, the 1st Corps amended the order by tele-
phone stating that the regiment would embuss without
machine gun company, combat trains or supply company.
This last message reached the 327th Infantry at 17:10
hours. The regiment moved out and embussed at 17:53
hours, arriving at Varennes in spite of traffic congested
roads at 23 :00 hours that same night. This highly credit-
able performance of both regiment and supply train caused
Brigadier General Craig, Chief of Staff, 1st Corps, to com-
ment next morning that

"the 327th Infantry reached its destination last night in
good time under considerable difficulty."

Colonel Sweeney, the Chief of Staff, 28th Division,
directed that the regiment bivouac in the woods two kilo-
meters west of Varennes.

On the morning of September 30, Colonel Ely was given
a statement of the situation in the following terms :

"The 28th Division was holding the ridge of hills just
northwest of Apremont. The line of the 35th Division
had extended from Gesnes to Montrebeau Woods and con-
nected with the 28th Division near Apremont. At the
present moment, however, Colonel Sweeney was informed
that the 35th Division was falling back and that the men
were straggling badly."

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 33

Colonel Ely was directed to send the 2nd Battalion, 327th
Infantry (Major Blanchard), to proceed at once along the
army road toward Baulny and occupy the ridge northwest
of Baulny no matter what troops of the 35th Division
might still be on the ridge. This battalion was 'Ho pick
up all stragglers, using extreme measures if necessary."

Colonel Sweeney stated further that an attack would
probably be ordered for that afternoon (September 30) at
14 hours, with Montrebeau Woods, the objective. The 1st
Battalion, 327th Infantry (Major Blalock) received orders
to follow the 2nd Battalion in support, and to take up a
position extending from St. Quentin Mill through Char-
pentry.

The 3rd Battalion (Captain Davis) was ordered to La
Forge Farm, where it remained for two days. The 2nd
and 1st Battalions moved out at once, taking up battle
formations when coming under shell fire. The movement
was made under complete enemy observation and, in con-
sequence, shelling was heavy throughout the advance.
Some troops belonging to the 35th Division were found on
the Baulny Ridge. They were in a disorganized condition
and many units were without officers. An outpost was
established at Chaudron Farm. The attack planned for
14 hours that afternoon was postponed, but Colonel
Sweeney sent a warning that an attack was planned for
5 hours on the following morning, October 1. The enemy
appeared to anticipate an attack, for the Baulny Ridge
was constantly searched by his artillery.

At 3 hours, October 1, 1918, the 327th Infantry was
informed that the 35th Division would be relieved imme-
diately by the 1st Division, and that upon completion of
this relief the 327th Infantry would withdraw to Varenncs.
Relief was completed by the 1st Division at 4 hours, Oc-
tober 1, 1918, and our regiment returned to Varennes,
where it bivouacked. The 1st Division attacked at 5 hours

34 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

that morning. The 327th Infantry was highly compli-
mented by the Chief of Staff of the 28th Division for the
manner in which it had discharged the duty assigned the
regiment. Our men suffered during this period from a
shortage of food, as the regimental trains were unable to
reach the troops until after the reserve rations were
exhausted.

In this action, Captain W. K. Meadows, Company 6, and
Second Lieutenant Preston A. Love, Company D, were
severely wounded and evacuated. There were 117 casu-
alties among the enlisted personnel.

Meanwhile the swift march of events on all fronts of
the World War may be measured by the announcement
from the 1st Coi^ps Headquarters on the night of Sep-
tember 30, 1918, to the effect that "Bulgaria accepts peace
on the Allied terms, which includes disbanding of the Bul-
garian Army and occupation of Bulgarian railroads by the
Allies. ' '

307th Engineers

Immediately upon their arrival in this area, the 307th
Engineers and 307th Engineer Train had been temporarily
detached from the 82nd Division and ordered to proceed
by marching to Clermont-en-Argonne, where they reported
to the Chief Engineer, 1st Army, for work on the Route
Gardee. The Army order effecting this assignment author-
ized the Commanding General, 82nd Division, to recall the
Regiment and Train to duty with the Division whenever
the Division received an order to enter the action or to
leave the vicinity of the Clermont-Varennes-Fleville Road.
In consequence, on the day following the drive, our
Engineers were at work preparing roads, rebuilding de-
molished bridges and filling in mine craters.

In compliance with orders from the 1st Corps, D Com-

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 35

pany, 307th Engineers, reported before daylight on the
morning of September 30, 1918, to Brigadier General
Nolan, commanding the 55th Infantry Brigade, 28th Divi-
sion, in Apremont. At daylight, 50 men, under Lieutenant
Sam H. Andrews, Jr., were sent to an old quarry about
four hundred yards north of Apremont. This position was
organized as a strong point, and in addition to the Engineer
Detachment, was garrisoned by a platoon of machine gun-
ners with four guns and two squads of Infantry. At six
o'clock on the morning of October 1, the enemy laid down
a heavy rolling barrage and made a counter-attack in the
direction of Apremont with a force estimated to comprise
twelve companies of Infantry and one company of machine
gunners. Following is a summary of the report made by
Lieutenant Andrews: ^5 C'^'.'K 'Q'lV

"Immediately after the barrage, the enemy in large
numbers were seen approaching from the north in the
direction of Chatel-Chehery and from the west along the
edge of the woods in a formation resembling platoon col-
umns. They sent five men forward with grenades to take
the quarry which they evidently considered to be no more
than a sentry post. These five men were put out of action
with our rifle fire and the enemy continued their advance
sending forward a machine gun crew, which was put out
of action by Sgt. 1st CI. William L. Eilhardt with hand
grenades. Fire was not opened from the quarry until the
enemy had advanced well abreast of it, at which time all
four machine guns, all automatic rifles and riflemen opened
fire from both flanks, inflicting very heavy casualties. The
enemy succeeded in surrounding the quarry, but the gar-
rison continued to fire from all sides. The enemy deployed
on passing the quarry and attempted to gain admission to
the town by infiltration, but were also repulsed in this
attempt."

Eleven prisoners were taken by the garrison at the
quarry and casualties inflicted upon the enemy estimated
to approximate five hundred men. Two hundred of this

36 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

number were accounted for by the American force in the
quarry. The engagement lasted about an hour. The
other elements of D Company were on the firing line im-
mediately in front of Apremont. Casualties in D Com-
pany were comparatively light, sustaining none killed and
nineteen wounded. Following this action, General Nolan
informed the company commander of D Company, Cap-
tain 6. P. Donnelan, that he had "a damn good com-
pany." On October 3, this unit returned to road work.

82nd Division in Corps Reserve

Conditions remained unchanged with the Division until
October 3, 1918, when the 82nd Division passed into 1st
Corps Reserve. At the same time the 164th Infantry
Brigade, less the 327th Infantry Regiment, was ordered to
proceed at once by marching to the woods west of Varennes
for bivouac. The 327th Infantry was already located west
of Varennes. The 164th Brigade moved on the afternoon
of October 3 north by way of Les Islettes to the vicinity
of Losheres, where it bivouacked for the night. The march
was resumed at 7 hours on the morning of October 4, 1918,
and covered a distance of 12 kilometers to a position east of
Champ Mahaut in concealed bivouac along the road. This
march took our troops through the territory occupied by
the 77th Division at the beginning of the drive and across
a No Man's Land where, for four years, friendly and hos-
tile artillery had torn up the forest and blasted the ground
into a desolate mass of wreckage and shell craters.

Following the order of October 3, moving the 164th
Brigade, a second order came from the 1st Corps directing
the 82nd Division, less artillery and the 164th Brigade to
proceed by marching at 6 hours, October 4, 1918, to the
woods west of Varennes for bivouac. This march was com-
pleted in two days with a bivouac on the night of October

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 37

4th at Camp Mahaut, about three kilometers east of Les
Islettes,

On October 4th, Major General W. P. Burnham was re-
lieved from duty with the 82nd Division and left at once
to become Military Representative of the United States in
Greece. The command of the Division was at once assumed
by Major General George B. Duncan.

An order received October 4, 1918, from headquarters
1st Corps completed preparations for the concentration of
the Division west of Varennes by setting in motion the
157th Field Artillery Brigade. The Brigade was directed
to leave its area near Futeau at 8 hours, October 5, and
proceed via Les Islettes, La Fille Morte, to junction with
the Four-de-Paris- Varennes Road, and thence to bivouac
near the Infantry brigades. Camp Mahaut, two kilometers
northwest of Clermont, was indicated as the staging point
for the night October 5-6. In consequence of these suc-
cessive movement orders, the Division was chiefly occupied
in road marches and bivouacs from October 3 to October 6.

CHAPTER V
PREPARING FOR THE ATTACK

The 6th of October, 1918, is one of the fateful days in
the life of the 82nd Division. All combat units in the
Division except the artillery were concentrated in the
woods about three kilometers west of Varennes. The ar-
tillery had spent the preceding night at Camp Mahaut and
was then a day's march from Varennes, where the Division
P. C. had been established since October 3. General Dun-
can's headquarters was located in a dilapidated cellar,
which afforded slight protection from the elements, and
none from the shell fire which fell at intervals upon this
historic, but now almost obliterated, community. There
was a feeling in all ranks that the moment of supreme
testing for the Division was at hand. With this attitude
of expectancy went a quiet confidence, born of the expe-
riences endured in the weeks before Mont Sec and astride
the Moselle River, and the important task accomplished
in the St. Mihiel offensive.

On October 1, the Division had watched the elements of
the 35th Division withdraw slowly down the main highway
from Clermont toward Bar-le-Duc. We had listened for
days to the ceaseless uproar of battle. Men must be tiring.
Fresh Americans must be needed to replace the appalling
wastage. Heart and mind the Division was ready. On
the 6th of October, two of the three divisions which had
jumped ojffi in the 1st Corps on the morning of September

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 39

26, 1918, were still in the line— the 77th on the left and
the 28th in the center.

As previously said, the 1st Division had, on October 1,
replaced the 35th Division on the right of the Corps. The
gallant drive of the 1st Division had resulted in the for-
mation of a salient which placed that unit at least one and
one-half kilometers north of the 28th Division on its left,
and also in advance of the 5th Corps, on its right. The line
of the 1st Division extended from Bois de Money and
Arietal Farm to Montrefagne Hill. From this point the
left flank ran back to the right of the 28th Division, which
had pushed up the Aire River as far as the southern out-
skirts of Chatel-Chehery. The 1st Division had sent patrols
to Fleville but found it unprofitable to attempt any occu-
pation of that fiercely shelled and exposed area. Small
units from the right brigade of the 28th Division had oc-
cupied La Forge and vicinity on the east bank of the Aire
River. Thence the line of the right brigade of the 28th
Division swept in a southwesterly direction along the edge
of the steep ridges west of the Aire Valley to the neigh-
borhood of Le Menil Farm. The left brigade held the line
from this point southerly to and along the Chene Tondu
Ridge, where it connected with the right of the 77th Divi-
sion which, in turn, continued the line westerly through the
Argonne Forest toward Binarville. Contact with the 38th
French Corps on the left of the 77th had been lost and
the enemy, taking advantage of the densely wooded terrain,
had infiltrated behind this flank, cutting off six companies
of the 77th Division in the Charlevaux Ravine. Contact
with these companies was not regained until the night of
October 7-8.

The upper valley of the Aire River was a No Man's
Land between the 1st and 28th Divisions, penetrated by
small patrols during the night by both enemy and Ameri-
can forces. The country to the east of the Aire afforded

40 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

a certain amount of cover from due north, the ravines
having in general an east and west direction. These ra-
vines, however, were enfiladed from the west of the valley,
where the eastern edge of the Argoiuie Forest rose in a con-
tinuous echelon of rugged hills. No more formidable
natural fortifications are to be found on the entire battle
front than the precipitous ridges extending from Chatel-
Chehery and west of Cornay to the town of Marcq. It was
this enfilade fire of both machine guns and artillery which
was inflicting very serious losses on the left brigade of the
1st Division. Further progress on the entire Corps front
was almost at a standstill, for the enemy had rallied his
full resources to prevent further American progress at this
vital front in the battle line.

Our high command determined upon a bold and hazard-
ous expedient. A surprise attack must be driven into the
enemy flank west of the Aire and north of Chatel-Chehery.
Troops making such an attack would be exposed to counter-
attack and concentrated artillery and machine gun fire
from west and north, northeast and southwest. If the
thrust accomplished its purpose, the forest would be cleared
and the way opened for a substantial American advance
with slight losses by troops now struggling four kilometers
south of Chatel Chehery in the heart of the forest. If this
plan of attack failed, very great disaster might befall the
battalions which presented an open flank to a vigilant
enemy, but if the assault succeeded, two-thirds of the mis-
sion of the 1st Corps, as stated in Field Orders 17, Septem-
ber 25, 1918, would be brilliantly accomplished. This mis-
sion was stated:
*'(a) To reduce the Foret d'Argonne by flanking it

from the east,
(b) To assist in cutting off hostile artillery fire and

observation from the eastern edge of the Foret

d'Argonne.

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 41

(c) Upon arrival at the Corps objective, the 1st Corps
will advance to the American Army objective in
conjunction with the 5th Corps."
In selecting the 82nd Division to perform this thrust into
the flanks of the Argonne Forest, the 1st Corps had hon-
ored this Division with a heavy share of its expressed mis-
sion toward which it had been bending every resource for
eleven terrible days.

Long Awaited Battle Order Arrives

At 12 hours on October 6, the following telephone mes-
sage was received by the Chief of Staff, 82nd Division,
from G-3, 1st Corps:

"General Rhodes will move his outfit at once, from his
present camp by way of the two-way road through La Fille
Morte to the junction of the Four-de-Paris-Varennes road,
thence along that road, to Varennes. The movement to
start at once. The ultimate destination is the vicinity of
Charpentry. General Duncan and General Rhodes will
report at once to General Liggett at his advance P. C.
They will be accompanied by a suitable officer to carry
orders to General Rhodes' outfit for the continuation of
its march beyond Varennes. Reconnaissances will be at
once made of the route prescribed from the present camp
to Varennes so that the movement will not be delayed."

A copy of this order was given to General Rhodes at
Varennes, who dispatched a message to his brigade direct-
ing it to complete the final stage of the march directly to
Varennes and with all possible haste.

General Duncan proceeded with Colonel Sheldon, Chief
of Staff, to the Advance P. C. of the 1st Corps, located
in dugouts behind the ridge three or four kilometers south-
east of Varennes. General Duncan found that General
Rhodes had already been notified and had preceded him.

42 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

General Duncan was informed that Major General
McAndrews, Chief of Staff, G. H. Q., and Brigadier Gen-
eral Drum, Chief of Staff, 1st Army, were in conference
with Major General Liggett, commanding 1st Corps. After
a considerable period, these officers left and General Dun-
can was informed by General Liggett that Brigadier Gen-
eral Craig, Chief of Staff, 1st Corps, would give him
certain instructions affecting the 82nd Division. General
Craig stated that the 82nd Division would make an attack
on the following morning, October 7, 1918. The attack
would be made across the Aire in a westerly direction
between Chatel-Chehery and Cornay. The 28th Division
would give ground permitting the 82nd Division to take
up the territory between the Aire and the 1st Division.
The attack would be made by one brigade supported by
the artillery of the 82nd Division and the 6th Field Artil-
lery from the 1st Division. General Craig stated that this
assault was a military necessity and General Liggett was
very positive in his purpose to have the attack driven
through on the following morning. A written order would
be communicated later to the Division, but meanwhile all
necessary preparation and reconnaissance must be made.

General Duncan telephoned to Division Headquarters
directing that brigade, regimental and battalion com-
manders be assembled in Varennes. He then returned with
Colonel Sheldon to Divisional P. C. at Varennes, arriving
shortly before 16 hours. A majority of the battalion com-
manders of the Division were present in addition to regi-
mental and brigade commanders. The Division commander
repeated the orders received from the Corps and named the
164th Infantry Brigade (Brig. Gen. Lindsey) to make the
attack. He further directed that immediate reconnaissance
be made of both maneuver ground and objective before dark-
ness. General Lindsey with several of his officers proceeded
to the Baulny Ridge and eastern edge of Montrebeau Woods,

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 43

from which point he examined the terrain to the north and
west. Before leaving the Divisional P. C. General Lindsey
had sent word to the units of his brigade to make prepara-
tion for an immediate move. Reconnaissance was incom-
plete when night fell and all officers returned to Varennes.
General Lindsey remained at the Division P. C. while
regimental and battalion commanders went at once to
their commands. General Duncan sent General Lindsey
about 18 hours to the P. C. of the 1st Division located
at Cheppy, to arrange cooperation with Major General
Summerall, commanding. General Lindsey returned to
the Division P. C. about 19:30 hours. Colonel Sheldon
had meanwhile returned to Corps Headquarters to await
the completion of the Corps order. Between 21 and 22
hours, Colonel Sheldon came to the Division P. C. with
the written Corps order. Lieutenant Colonel Wainwright,
G-3, at once drafted Division Field Order No. 20, and
General Lindsey worked simultaneously upon his Brigade
order. Both orders were then submitted to General Dun-
can and approved. The written Brigade order was given
to the Regimental Intelligence Officers about 23:25 hours.

"The leading elements of the brigade will be crossed
over the Aire River via the bridge at La Forge and im-
provised foot bridges between La Forge and Fleville and
formed along the railroad track running along the west
side of the Aire River before the hour for attack, covered
by active patrols. Rate of advance of infantry units from
position of departure, 100 meters in three minutes. Front
line infantry battalions will not be reinforced but will be
passed through by support battalions when they are defi-
nitely slowed down by enemy resistance. Combat liaison
detachment consisting of one company of infantry and
one machine gun platoon will maintain combat liaison with
28th Division on our left; one company of infantry and
one machine gun platoon will maintain combat liaison with
the liaison detachment of the 1st Division on our right
near the bridge at Fleville."

44 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

The order further provided for a rolling barrage to start
at 5 hours, 200 meters west of the railroad track, and to
advance in a westerly direction to the Division and Corps
objectives.

164th Infantry Brigade Moves Forward

Meanwhile the 327th Infantry, 328th Infantry and 321st
Machine Gun Battalion had been moving in the face of
every conceivable difficulty. The 327th Infantry marched
out from camp at 18 hours 10 minutes. Their route was
the Varennes-Baulny-Fleville Road to the Depot de Muni-
tions at point 183, which had been designated as Brigade
P. C. Here the regiment was to receive its final orders
for the morrow's attack. The regiment moved out in the
following order:

1st Battalion,

Machine Gun Company,

Stokes Mortar and 1-pounder platoons,

2nd Battalion,

3rd Battalion.

The 321st Machine Gun Battalion (Captain Holloway)
followed the 327th Infantry. The 1st Battalion of the
327th Infantry reached point 183 at 22 hours and waited
until Captain Drew, the Regimental Intelligence Officer,
arrived from Varennes with the attack order for the bri-
gade. It was then 1 hour 10 minutes, 7 October.

Colonel Ely held a conference with Major Blalock (1st
Bn.) and Major Blanchard (2nd Bn.). They managed to
contrive sufficient light to decipher the attack order, in
pursuance with which Colonel Ely made his dispositions.
Major Blalock with the 1st Battalion would proceed to La
Forge, cross the river and deploy for attack along the

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 45

railroad east of Hill 180. Major Blanchard was sent to
Pleinchamp Farm with the 2nd Battalion in support of
the attack and with the further mission of meeting all
enemy counter-attacks down the Aire Valley from the
direction of Fleville. Captain Davis with the 3rd Bat-
talion remained at the Depot de Munitions in Brigade re-
serve. Major Blanchard moved out shortly thereafter and
at 2:30 hours Major Blalock led his battalion down the
road toward La Forge.

328th Infantry

The 328th Infantry had been ordered to follow the other
units of the Brigade. It left camp on scheduled time at
20 hours in the following order :

1st Battalion (Major Boyle),

2nd Battalion (Captain Tillman),

3rd Battalion (Major Johnson),

Machine Gun Company (Captain Carr).
After leaving the forest and entering the little valley
west of Varennes, the regiment was ordered by the Chief
of Staff to halt and permit the Artillery Brigade to take
the right of way into Varennes. The 1st Battalion dropped
full packs and made up combat packs.

At midnight the Chief of Staff directed that the regi-
ment filter through the Artillery. This resulted in the
most intense traffic congestion. The route of the 328th In-
fantry lay through Varennes, thence along the west bank
of the Aire River to Montblainville, where it crossed the
river to the east and came out upon the main army Va-
rennes-Fleville Road. The Regiment was compelled to
thread its course in small detachments and maintained
organization only by admirable discipline.

General Lindsey, while making his way on foot to Bri-
gade P. C. at the Depot de Munitions, passed the 328th

46 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

Infantry on the main road east of Montblainville shortly
before 3 hours. From the camp in the woods west of
Varennes, the distance by road to the Depot de Munitions
was approximately ten kilometers, with the bridgehead at
La Forge, just east of Chatel-Chehery, some two kilometers
farther.

Lieutenant Colonel Wetherill, commanding the 328th
Infantry, had been informed that guides from the 28th
Division would wait in the vicinity of the Depot de Muni-
tions to conduct the assault battalion to the jumping off line.
These guides were never encountered and it is presumed
that one of the two men from the 28th Division who met
the 1st Battalion of the 327th Infantry on the cross-road
to La Forge was intended as the guide for the assault
battalion of the 328th Infantry.

In consequence, the head of the column of the last named
regiment proceeded past the Depot de Munitions to the
cross-road running to Pleinchamp Farm, without finding
any one from the 28th Division. Colonel Wetherill, con-
vinced that he had proceeded beyond his objective, counter-
marched the troops on the main road until he personally
met an officer, who led him to General Lindsey at the
Depot de Munitions. Captain Holloway, commanding the
321st M. G. Battalion, was sent with Colonel Wetherill
to identify the cross-road leading to La Forge. The
1st Battalion at once deployed in attack formation in the
woods Des Granges, about one kilometer east of La Forge.
This last movement was accomplished about 5 hours 30
minutes, October 7.

An Extraordinary Maneuver

The events of the night of October 6-7 can not be judged
by any ordinary standards, nor can an adequate opinion
be formed of the merits of this maneuver unless there

82nd division IN MEUSE-ARGO (Ef

Dotted lines indicate temporarj ositi

Solid lines indicate organized f

I f 1 1 Hb

E OFFENSIVE, OCT. 6-10, 1918
)sitions of advance units during ttie day
line at midnight

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 47

is some understanding of the physical difficulties which
made the movement a nightmare for those who partici-
pated, A drizzle of rain started at nightfall October 6 and
continued throughout the night. Rains of previous days
had converted all routes into a mire of heavy mud. Before
a vehicle or a truck or a gun or a man of the 82nd Divi-
sion debouched upon the highway, the congestion of traffic
had reached a point prohibitive of anything except the
most painful progress. This road was one of the main
arteries for ammunition, food supplies and other traffic
for both the 28th and 1st Divisions. It was essential that
traffic should be uninterrupted by the movement of the
82nd Division. It will be remembered that the 157th Field
Artillery Brigade, pursuant to orders received at mid-
day, October 6, was during this whole day and night
moving across the No Man's Land bog in the Argonne
Forest, through Varennes, to the vicinity of Charpentry.
Our artillery was therefore mingled with a mass of moving
trucks and horse transport of the 1st Division and the
28th Division. To this swollen stream was added two regi-
ments of Infantry and a battalion of machine gunners.
The night was black beyond the power of any human eye
to penetrate more than a short pace ahead. The Infantry
was compelled to move in the gutters on both sides of
the road. Machine gun carts slipped into such gaps and
intervals as presented themselves. For a half hour at a
time, the whole struggling mass would be at a halt, until
officers and M. P.'s could find the center of the jam and
unravel the tangle. Once Colonel Wetherill and Captain
Tommasello at the head of a column pulled a dead man
and his dead horse off the road to enable our vehicles to
proceed.

In addition to these appalling difficulties it must be con-
sidered that our troops were moving up the Aire Valley
into a No Man's Land between the 1st and the 28th Divi

48 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

sions over a road, every yard of which was familiar to the
enemy by four years of occupation. Enemy flares and star
shells lighted the valley at intervals and made the suc-
ceeding darkness more intense. German gunners pounded
the entire terrain throughout the night with shell fire,
searching the east and west ravines for hidden artillery
and harassing the road without cessation. This was en-
dured with fortitude by troops in totally unfamiliar
country and in darkness which made it impossible to seek
cover or retaliate against an enemy firing from some dis-
tant ridge. Almost every unit suffered some casualties.
Nothing but discipline and cooperation of the highest
order could prevent absolute disintegration. As a peace-
time maneuver, it was obviously a problem impossible of
solution. That it was attended by so considerable a meas-
ure of success was due to the fact that all ranks were
imbued with the conviction that the movement was of para-
mount necessity.

In telling the story of this Division, it must not be for-
gotten that troops from the 82nd Division were face to
face with the enemy before midnight on the 6th of Octo-
ber, 1918, and that any record of days spent in continuous
contact and action in the Meuse-Argonne operations must
accept the 6th of October as the entry of this Division
into the conflict.

A detailed description of the kaleidoscope events of
the next few days will be less confusing if a paragraph
is given to outline the first phase of the Division's opera-
tions in this offensive, namely the period October 6 to
October 10, 1918, inclusive.

The attack of the 164th Infantry Brigade on October
7, 1918, won the first objective a.ssigned. This success
placed the 327th Infantry on Hill 180, the right of the
Brigade sector, and the 328th Infantry on Hill 223, the left
of the sector. On October 8, the 327th Infantry was

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 49

unable to enter Cornay during daylight, but did seize and
occupy the town during the night of October 8-9. On
this same day, the second day of the attack, the 328th
Infantry advanced west two kilometers to the Decauville
railroad. The formidable ridges west of Cornay to Pylone
remained in enemy possession.

On October 9, the Germans counter-attacked the 327th
Infantry in Cornay, and captured the town with heavy
casualties on both sides. We retained possession of Hill
180. The 328th Infantry attacked north along the rail-
road toward Pylone and gained ground, which later in the
day was retaken by the enemy, and the Regiment stood at
night on the same line from which it had jumped off
in the morning. The 326th Infantry from the 163rd In-
fantry Brigade relieved the 28th Division west of Chatel-
Chehery on the morning of October 9 and advanced north-
west, forming a line that night in liaison v/ith the 328th
Infantry and extending southwest.

On October 10, the 325th Infantry, relieving the 327th
Infantry, and the 328th Infantry, attacked north in con-
junction with the 326th Infantry, clearing the enemy en-
tirely from the eastern half of the Argonne Forest, and
seizing all territory south of St. Juvin and the Aire River.

CHAPTER VI

164th infantry BRIGADE JUMPS OFF

Attack op 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, October 7,
1918

The incident of missing guides and the condition of
traffic conspired to prevent a coordinated attack by the
assaulting battalions of the two regiments. Major Blalock
reached the vicinity of La Forge vsdth the 1st Battalion,
327th Infantry, at about 3 hours, 7th October. Roads lead-
ing to this point and the buildings in the vicinity were
under harassing shell fire. The bridge crossing the river
had been destroyed and the majority of the battalion
crossed by fording the river, which was between two and
three feet deep at this point. Passage of the river began
at about 4 hours. Major Blalock personally stood upon
the west bank and a.ssisted man after man to clamber up
the sharp slope. A detachment of divisional engineers had
laid boards from stone to stone and some of the men crossed
on them in single file. The Battalion marched north a
short distance along the west bank of the river and formed
for the attack on the railroad track just east of Hill 180.

Promptly at 5 hours the assault was made by C and D
Companies, supported by Companies A and B, the 327th
Infantry, Machine Gun Company, 37 mm. and the Stokes
Mortar Platoons. A heavy mist hung over the entire valley
and the enemy appeared to be completely surprised by the
advance of this battalion.

50

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 51

Hill 180 is a hump of land about a kilometer in length
in a north and south line. It rises close to the river bank
and dominates the flat marsh land east of the river. The
assaulting companies found some wire on the east slope
and picked up a detachment of prisoners. Captain Harri-
son ( Co. C. ) sent the following message to Battalion Head-
quarters :

"Going good. Captured 39 prisoners and 3 machine
guns. No casualties yet."

The entire hill was in American possession by 8 hours
30 minutes, including the Ravin de Boulasson west of the
hill. Eighty-one prisoners and four machine guns were
captured. At this point the advance was subjected to very
heavy artillery and machine gun fire which swept the
crest of the slope. Enemy fire came from the northeast
near Fleville, northwest from the heights of Comay, west
from the cliff-like ridges that bordered the Argonne Forest
and southwest from Hill 223. Heavy casualties were suf-
fered and the battalion was without support on either
flank. The battalion dug in and returned the enemy fire
with all available weapons. Later in the day Company H,
327th Infantry, and a platoon from Company A, 321st
Machine Gun Battalion, joined Major Blalock, pursuant
to orders. Lieut. W. P. Pinnell, commanding this ma-
chine gun platoon, received wounds from which he later
died. It was on this hill that Lieutenant Schiller of the
same machine gun company was severely wounded.

Attack of 1st Battalion, 328th Infantry, October 7,
1918

The story of this day's events now turns to the opera-
tions of the left regiment of the brigade — the 328th In-
fantry— against Hill 223, about one kilometer southwest

52 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

of Hill 180. This formidable position rises in a steep cliff
on its eastern side just north of Chatel-Chehery and about
one-half kilometer west from the Aire River, The west
slope of the hill is relatively less steep but a sufficient
obstacle to take the breath of a strong man in a steady
climb. From the crest of this hill one may see the Aire
Valley, both north and south. From such an observation
point the road from Varennes to Fleville is visible at many
points. A partial trench system with wire ran lengthwise
on the hill and two concrete emplacements for large mor-
tars had been located by the enemy on the western slope.
The enemy artillery itself had been withdrawn some time
before the American assault and German artillery posi-
tions were located on the semicircular ridge running from
northwest of Hill 223 to Cornay.

When the 1st Battalion of the 328th Infantry formed for
the attack in the woods Des Granges, one kilometer east
of La Fcrge, it was already daylight. Companies A and
C moved out as assault companies and marched about half
way to La Forge. Companies B and D were in support
in the woods named. A heavy fog which rested on the
valley rendered it quite impossible to see more than one
hundred meters in front. The enemy put down a heavy
shell fire extending from the ford at the river along the
road east to the woods Des Granges. Colonel Wetherill,
under these conditions of visibility, could not see his ob-
jective or determine how far the movement of events in
the two hours elapsed since zero-hour had altered his mis-
sion. Furthermore, he felt that artillery support would
be required. The advance was halted and the men of A
and C Companies secured what slight protection was avail-
able in the ditches on each side of the road and in small
folds of the ground in the fields on either side.

In order to make a clearer estimate of the situation the
Regimental Commander proceeded to La Forge and estab-

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 53

lished the Regimental P. C. in a culvert wEich was occu-
pied jointly with a small detachment of signal troops from
the 28th Division. Considerable time elapsed in these
movements and in attempts at reconnaissance and investi-
gation of the assigned objective. For a time it was thought
that the steep slopes of Hill 244, southwest of Chatel-
Chehery, might be the Hill 223 for which they were seek-
ing. As the mist lifted later in the morning, men who
proved to be from the 28th Division, were seen clinging to
the lofty east bank of HiU 244 just west of the town. A
steady stream of machine gun fire came from the plateau
which crowns Hill 244 and swept from time to time the
vicinity of La Forge and the road running east of La
Forge. It was finally determined to make the attack with
B and D Companies, still located in the woods Des Granges,
passing them through A and B Companies, which had
been subjected to heavy shell fire for several hours. Major
Boyle went forward with B and D Companies, and estab-
lished his P. C. at La Forge in conjunction with the Regi-
mental P. C.

Capture of Hill 223

Simultaneously H Company advanced on the left flank
as the liaison unit between the 82nd and 28th Divisions.
The advance of these three companies was performed in
the most gallant manner under artillery fire of barrage-
like intensity. Men fell and survivors filled the gaps. The
line swept to the river and struggled through the water
to the opposite bank. The conduct of these troops was
observed by men of the 28th Division in Chatel-Chehery
and a report commending their bearing was made by Briga-
dier General Nolan of the 28th Division, in Chatel-Chehery,
to the Headquarters of the 28th Division. This assault
started from the woods Des Granges at 11 :15 and reached

54 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

the river at 11 :55. After crossing the river, B Company
and two platoons of D Company advanced northwest en-
veloping Hill 223 from the long spur jutting out north
of the hill. Captain Lewis of D Company with two pla-
toons made for the gap at the south end of Hill 223. The
purpose of this maneuver was to pinch out any forces on
the hill by a simultaneous assault from the north and
south. The hill was completely occupied by these two com-
panies at 13 hours.

Shortly after reaching the hill Captain Douglass of B
Company was wounded and the same fate shortly Befell
Lieutenants Cabaniss and Edens of B Company. Lieu-
tenant Day then took command of B Company. Lieu-
tenant Brown had meanwhile reported with H Company
to General Nolan at his dugout in Chatel-Chehery, the
latter town having been occupied in force that morning
by the 28th Division. H Company was held for a time in
Chatel-Chehery and that evening a part of the Company
reinforced Captain Lewis.

Since the armistice it has been stated by some officers
of the 109th Infantry (28th Division) that Hill 223 was
occupied by their forces prior to the arrival on the hill
of the 328th Infantry.

A painstaking inquiry in this connection reveals the
following situation: Companies B and D, 328th Infantry,
received machine gun fire from the north slope of Hill 223
during their advance. Lieutenant Cabaniss' platoon (B
Company) took some twenty German prisoners on the
north slope of Hill 233. Lieutenant Candler of D Com-
pany proceeded with two platoons of D Company up the
north side of Hill 223 and organized a position on the
military crest on the western side of the hill. Lieutenant
Candler did not see any men from the 28th Division,
Captain Lewis (D Company), who had gone with two
platoons to the south slope of Hill 223, went up to the

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 55

crest of the hill a few minutes after Lieutenant Candler
had arrived from the opposite slope. Captain Lewis found
a lieutenant and not over a squad of men in fox holes on
the extreme peak of the hill near the cliff which overlooks
the river to the east. The lieutenant stated that he had
arrived at about 11 hours that day but had seen no Ger-
mans and had not fired a shot. About the same time Lieu-
tenant Brown of H Company came on the hill from Chatel-
Chehery and saw this little detachment of the 28th Divi-
sion. Hence it is apparent that no attempt had been made
to occupy or organize the hill in sufficient force to hold
it and that Germans and Americans were simultaneously
in possession. It is especially significant that German
prisoners captured on the hill were more than double the
number of the patrol from the 28Lh Division.

Liaison was established with a detachment of the 28th
Division located south of Hill 223 on Hill 244 and it was
agreed that an attack would be made at once in the direc-
tion of the Corps objective — the Decauville railroad, two
kilometers farther west. At about 14 houre Companies
B and D started forward and advanced about two hundred
meters into the valley west of Hill 223. At this point they
were met by machine gun fire from the front and both
flanks, heavy fire coming from the southwest in front of
the 28th Division. This was followed by an Infantry coun-
ter-attack from the west and north under cover of a
machine gun barrage. Our men withdrew up the slopes
of Hill 223 behind the wire on the crest, where hard fight-
ing followed at close range. The Americans succeeded in
pushing back the enemy line from this point, and when
darkness fell both sides were dug in at close range, the
Americans on the crest and the Germans on the upper
slopes of the hill.

Severe casualties were suffered by both companies in re-
pelling this counter-attack. In fact, the German assault

56 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

was so nearly successful that a runner coming into the
Regimental P. C. at La Forge reported on his own au-
thority that the hill had been lost and both companies
wiped out. A written message from the hill shortly after-
ward gave evidence that such was not the case. This
counter-attack fell also upon the 1st Battalion of the 327th
Infantry on Hill 180. Here, too, the attempt was repulsed.
Many casualties were caused in both of these American
regiments by the barrage which fell along our front at
about 17 hours. "While the objective assigned by the Corps
had not yet been reached, a foothold had been obtained
by the 164th Infantry Brigade on two strong natural
positions from which future assaults could be launched at
the heart of the German stronghold in the upper Argonne
Forest.

Attack of the 164th Infantry Brigade, October 8, 1918.

About 23 hours, October 7, Brigade Field Order No. 2
reached the regiments directing that the attack be re-
sumed the following morning, October 8, at 5 hours. H
hour was later changed to 6 hours. Information from
higher authority was as follows:

"The enemy is reported retreating generally towards the
northwest. French are attacking northeast from Lancon.
The Commander-in-Chief directs that a powerful thrust
be made to cut off the ridge and railroad due west."

The plan of attack for the Brigade stipulated that the
Corps objective should be taken by noon. The attack was
to be preceded by harassing fire by our artillery on Hill
151, Cornay, and the ridges east and southwest of Cornay.
In addition a rolling barrage at the rate of one hundred
meters in three minutes was to be laid until the objective
was reached. The 319th Machine Gun Battalion was
placed at the disposal of the Commanding Officer, 327th

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 57

Infantry and reported at Pleinchamps Farm during the
night Oct. 7-8. In addition, the 3rd Battalion, 328th
Infantry, was transferred from Brigade Reserve and
placed at the disposal of Colonel Ely, commanding the
327th Infantry. Throughout this entire flank operation,
the higher command anticipated the probability of enemy
counter-attacks upon the exposed right flank of the brigade.

In the 327th Infantry, Colonel Ely directed that the 1st
Battalion should resume the attack at H hour, supported
by the 3rd Battalion, 328th Infantry (Major Johnson).
The 2nd Battalion, 327th Infantry, less F Company (held
to meet possible attacks from the vicinity of Fleville),
would be the reserve battalion. Major Johnson reported
to Colonel Ely at about 2 hours, 8th of October, and re-
ceived his orders. As the 3rd Battalion, 328th Infantry,
approached Hill 180 just before daybreak, a heavy enemy
barrage caught these troops while the column was fording
the river and continued with such intensity that L and M
Companies were dispersed for the time being and did not
arrive upon the hill in time to participate in the attack,
which was launched promptly at 6 hours.

During the night, orders from Headquarters, 1st Corps,
changed the compass direction of the assault units,^ order-
ing an attack to be directed north rather than in a north-
westerly direction. This change reached the front bat-
talion of the 327th Infantry at about 6 hours 30 minutes
and the correction was effected with some difficulty. I and
K Companies, 328th Infantry, were on the right flank of
Companies D and A, 327th Infantry. The change of ob-
jective, however, was not known to the assaulting battalion
of the 328th Infantry until about 10 hours 30 minutes that
forenoon, when the information reached the battalion com-
mander under very dramatic circumstances. A runner
from the battalion noted a dead runner near the dugout
south of Hill 223, which constituted the regimental P. C.

58 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

He felt in the upper left-hand pocket of the dead runner's
coat and discovered the order which directed an attack to
the north. The assault battalion of the 328th Infantry
had at that time been fighting its way ten degrees north
of west for four and one-half hours, with both flanks
wholly unprotected. The flanks of the 327th Infantry were
similarly exposed.

The 327th Infantry continued its struggle all day against
continuous machine gun and artillery fire from the front
and flanks. The line, however, was unable to advance
beyond the eastern and southeastern borders of the town
of Comay. During the day the 2nd Battalion, 327th In-
fantrj'' (Major Blanchard), crossed the river and took up
a position in support on Hill 180. That same forenoon,
Major Johnson, 328th Infantry, was evacuated and the
command of the 3rd Battalion, 328th Infantry, passed to
Captain Clarkson. Major Blanchard was joined on the
reverse slope of Hill 180 by a platoon from the 319th
Machine Gun Battalion.

Attack of 2nd Battalion, 328th Infantry,.
October 8, 1918

In the 328th Infantrj^, the 2nd Battalion had moved west
across the Aire River with orders to pass the lines of the
1st Battalion on Hill 223 and jump off at 6 hours, October
8, 1918, with a compass direction ten degrees north of
west. Their objective was the Decauville railroad, two
kilometers away. The 328th Infantry Machine Gun
Company and the one-pounder and trench mortar platoons,
also of the 328th Infantry, were moved to Hill 223 and
Chatel-Chehery for the purpose of supporting the attack.

The 2nd Battalion of the 328th Infantry assaulted with
E Company on the right and G Company on the left, and
with F and H Companies in support respectively at six

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82m) DIVISION 59

hundred meters. The record of this battalion on that day
constitutes a very splendid page in the history of the divi-
sion. Under steady and intense machine gun fire from the
northwest and southwest, this battalion maneuvered down
the long western slope of Hill 223, crossed the five hun-
dred yards of open valley, fought its way through a kilom-
eter of heavy woods which covered the precipitous spur
protruding into the center of the valley from the west and
dug in along the Corps objective, the Decauville Railroad,
at 17 hours that afternoon. It had no liaison with the
troops attacking to the north of Hill 180, over a kilometer
away. For most of the day it was without contact with
units of the 28th Division, also attacking in a westerly
direction from Chatel-Chehery. By nightfall this battalion
had taken some 270 prisoners and left more than one
hundred dead Germans on the ground. It had captured
the astonishing total of 123 machine guns, a battery of
four field pieces, two trench mortars, a set of electrical
field signal equipment complete, four anti-tank guns and
a quantity of German small arms and ammunition of sev-
eral varieties.

As the result of a day spent in charging and outflank-
ing machine gun nests and crawling across an exposed val-
ley, the battalion had suffered about 350 casualties, of
whom forty-five were killed. Among the dead was 2rd
Lt. K. P. Stewart, G Company, who, when shot in the leg,
continued to puU himself along, waving encouragement
to his men until a second bullet crashed through his head
and robbed his platoon of a very gallant leader.

One exploit in this day's work will always be retold in
the military tradition of our country. It is entitled to
a place among the famous deeds in arms of legendary
or modern warfare. Early in the attack of this battalion,
the progress of G Company on the left was seriousty im-
peded by heavy machine gun fire from a hill directly south-

60 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82>-d DIVISION

west across the valley from Hill 223, Although this ter-
ritory was south of the zone of action assigned the 82nd
Division, it was necessary to reduce this fire or suffer dis-
astrous consequences.

A force of four non-commissioned officers and thirteen
privates was sent from the left support platoon of G Com-
pany to encircle the hill and silence the enemy guns. This
detachment, under Acting Sergeant Early, encircled the
hill from the southeast and by a very skilful reconnais-
sance passed through the heavy woods on the east crest
and descended to the wooded ravine on the west side of
the hill. The detachment in working through the under-
brush came upon a German battalion estimated to contain
about 250 men, a considerable number of whom were ma-
chine gunners. Orders taken later from the pocket of the
German battalion commander proved that the mission of
this battalion was to launch a counter-attack against the
left flank x)f our attack at 10 hours 30 minutes. About
seventy-five Germans were crowded around their battalion
commander, apparently engaged in receiving final instruc-
tions. A force of machine gunners and infantrymen, how-
ever, were lying in fox holes fifty yards away on the west-
ern slope of the hill. Other machine gun detachments were
located on the north and northeast slopes of this same
wooded hill.

The handful of Americans, led by Corporal Early, ap-
peared as a complete surprise to this German battalion.
The large body of Germans surrounding the German bat-
talion commander began surrendering to our men, whom
the enemy supposed to be the leading element of a large
American force which had enveloped their position.

German machine gunners on the hillside, however,
quickly reversed their guns and poured a hail of bullets
into the bottom of the ravine, killing six and wounding
three of the American detachment. All of the non-com-

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 61

missioned officers were killed or seriously wounded except
Corp. Alvin C. York of Pall Mall, Tenn. With Corporal
York were seven privates, four of whom were mostly
occupied in covering with their rifles the large group of
German infantrymen who had thrown do-vvn their arms at
the first surprise, A few shots were fired by the remain-
ing three Americans, but the chief burden of initiative and
achievement fell upon Corporal York.

Crouching close to the huddle of German prisoners, he
engaged in a rapid fire action with the machine gunners
and infantrymen on the hillside. The return fire struck
just behind him, due to the fact that careful shooting
from the hillside was necessary by the Germans to avoid
injuring their own men a few feet in front of Corporal
York. The American fired all the rifle ammunition clips
on the front of his belt and then three complete clips
from his automatic pistol. In days past, he had won many
a turkey shoot with the rifle and pistol in the Tennessee
mountains, and it is believed that he wasted no ammuni-
tion on this day. Once a lieutenant on the hillside led a
counter-attack of a dozen gunners and infantrymen against
this extraordinary marksman, who shot the lieutenant
through the stomach and killed others before the sur-
vivors took cover. German morale gave way entirely
and the battalion commander surrendered his command.
Corporal York placed himself between two German officers
at the head of the column and distributed the seven Amer-
icans on guard along the flanks and in rear of the hastily
formed column of prisoners. On his way back over the
hill he picked up a considerable number of additional
prisoners from the north and northeast slopes of the hill.
When he reported at the Battalion P. C, Lieutenant
Woods, the Battalion Adjutant, 2nd Battalion, 328th In-
fantry, counted the prisoners and found that they totaled
three officers and 129 enlisted men. The prisoners proved

62 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

to be part of the 45th Reserve Division. The three wounded
Americans were brought in with the column. The six dead
Americans were buried later where they had fallen. Dur-
ing the forenoon Lieutenant Cox passed the scene of this
fight with a portion of F Company. He estimates that
approximately twenty dead Germans lay on the hillside.

After the armistice, Corporal York received the personal
thanks of Major General Duncan, the Division Commander,
Major General Summerall, Commanding 5th Corps, and
General Pershing, the Commander-in-Chief. He also was
given the Congressional Medal of Honor and the Croix de
Guerre.

Throughout the day the assaulting battalions of both
regiments received a continuous and costly fire from the
ridge named Champrocher, running generally west from
Cornay to Pylone, the latter an enemy observation station.
The sides of this ridge rise up like the walls of a tower
and the summit was strongly held with men and machine
guns. One platoon of E Company and a platoon from
F Company, both 328th Infantry, during the day en-
deavored to scale this ridge and silence the fire. Both
thrusts were staunchly made, but were totally inadequate
to gain and maintain possession of this natural fortress.

8rd Battalion, 327th Infantry, October 8, 1918

The 3rd Battalion of the 327th Infantry (Captain
Davis) had meanwhile been held as Brigade reserve at the
Depot de Munitions. About midday, the 8th of October,
1918, this battalion was ordered forward to Hill 223, to
report to the Commanding Officer, 328th Infantry. Colonel
Wetherill directed Captain Davis to assault the Ridge
Champrocher and to hold the road on the summit. This
attack was made at 16 hours the same afternoon. After I
and M Companies had jumped off from Hill 223, orders

Sgt. AMn C. York, Co. G, 328th Infantry
Scene of the memorable exploit

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 63

were received that K and L Companies would be held at
Hill 223 as Brigade Reserve.

The assault was made without an accompanying bar-
rage. Officers and men of the 328th Infantry who wit-
nessed the attack of these two companies from the other
regiment describe its gallantry with unmeasured praise.
I and M Companies advanced in perfect waves like men
at drill. As they crossed the valley, men went down like
ten-pins before a ball, but the survivors gained the crest
of the hill. There were approximately sixty men left in
each company, and this number was not sufficient to retain
a footing upon the ridge against the great numbers of
Germans that swarmed the entire length of the road to
Pylone. The enemy succeeded in creeping about the flanks
of these units and many of our men were shot down by ma-
chine guns from the right and left rear. When darkness
came, it was necessary to withdraw the survivors to pre-
vent their being completely cut off. The remnants of these
companies were placed in support in trenches on Hill 223.

In the afternoon of October 8, D Company, 328th
Infantry, was ordered forward to support the 2nd Bat-
talion, 328th Infantry, and was assigned by Captain Till-
man to a position on the left of the battalion front, where
it participated in the last stage of the advance to the
Decauville railroad. The American troops along this little
60 cm. railroad were confronted by German machine gun-
ners and infantrymen dug in only a few yards west of the
railroad. During the night both sides sniped back and
forth in the brush with little intermission.

All through the night, however, the Americans could
hear the rumble of the German transport moving north
out of the heart of the Argonne Forest where the enemy
had been holding up the advance of the 77th and the left
of the 28th Divisions between three and four kilometers
south of the ground gained by this successful thrust of

64 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

the 82nd Division. It was during the night of October
7-8 that Major Whittlesey's ''Lost Battalion" of the 77th
Division was relieved on the left flank of the 77th Divi-
sion. The center of the Argonne Forest had been made
untenable for prolonged German resistance, and the enemy
was making haste to withdraw invaluable equipment and
supplies.

W^'TH0R4W

CMAJr'TER VII
CORNAY AND CHAMPROCHER RIDGE

As has been said, the 327th Infantry was engaged through
the 8th of October in driving north from Hill 180 to-
ward the Corps objective, Fleville exclusive to Cornay
inclusive. The attack was unable to surmount the machine
gun nests situated near Fleville as well as on the knoll
north of point 176 and the ridges west of Cornay. Shortly
after dark, however, the assaulting companies entered
Cornay. Patrols were sent in different directions through-
out the village and from one German dugout to another.
In addition to the companies which had been attacking
during the day, elements of L and M Companies, 328th In-
fantry, under Captain Sisson and Lieutenant Walton re-
spectively, entered Cornay and took part in the business
of mopping up during the night of October 8-9. While
this was in progress, the town was heavily shelled by
artillery, necessitating the withdrawal of most of our force
to the southern edge of the town. Upon the cessation of
this fire just before dawn the town was reentered. A
considerable number of prisoners captured in the town
were being conducted out of the village before daylight
when the party encountered a strong American patrol who
at once challenged. One of the German prisoners an-
swered in German and the patrol fired, killing and wound-
ing several Germans and wounding one American guard.

Brigade Field Order No. 5 directed that the attack be
65

66 OB^FICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

resumed that morning, October 9, H hour being set at 8
hours 30 minutes. Companies K and L, 327th Infantry,
in Brigade Keserve at Hill 223, had been ordered to
report on the night of October 8 to the Commanding
Officer, 327tli Infantry. L Company was sent to Major
Blalock on Hill 180, and K Company to Captain Brown
at Cornay on the morning of October 9. Both companies,
however, were caught in heavy shell fire during these
moves and reduced by casualties.

CoRNAY Retaken by the Enemy

During the early morning German troops began to in-
filtrate into the woods and orchards surrounding Cornay,
apparently coming from a northeasterly direction. A
heavy fog prevented our troops from perceiving enemy
movements until German detachments were at short range.
The Americans endeavored to advance through the town
and drive out forces closing in upon the village. Con-
siderable bodies of the enemy were immediately encountered
and driven back.

A section of the 327th Infantry Machine Gun Company,
under command of Lieutenant Gilmore, which had just ar-
rived, rendered valuable assistance. Again about 9 hours
30 minutes, the Germans counter-attacked from the orchard
east of Cornay and the ridge west of Cornay. This time
the enemy came in greatly outnumbering force and com-
pelled a gradual withdrawal of our men to the south edge
of the town. Some prisoners taken during the melee as-
serted that large numbers of fresh German troops had
been brought up for the purpose of recapturing the to^Ti.
These new troops were from the German 41st Division, a
first-class division. Captain McCall was now the senior
officer in Cornay since Captain Brown, also of the 1st Bn.,
327th Inf., had been severely wounded. Captain McCall

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 67

decided to take shelter in the buildings near by, where
he hoped to maintain a foothold until expected reinforce-
ments arrived from Hill 180. Consequently he organized
one building with some thirty or forty Americans and an
adjacent house was occupied by Lieutenant Gilmore and
his detachment. Lieutenant Shipp, 328th Inf., in com-
mand of a patrol numbering a dozen men operating in the
center of Cornay, was driven back and after reporting to
Captain McCall, took up a position in a third building.
About this time the enemy was guilty of the following
violation of the Red Cross insignia:

A machine gun was carried forward on a litter covered
by a Red Cross flag into the orchard east of the town.
The men accompanying the litter wore Red Cross bras-
sards on their arms. The gun was placed in a shell hole
and two Red Cross flags stuck in the ground on each side
of the shell hole. One member of the party waved a Red
Cross flag. Lieutenant Gilmore would not permit his men
to shoot, but Lieutenant Shipp, deciding that the pro-
ceeding was a trick, directed his detachment to open on
the party. The German waving the Red Cross flag was
finally shot down, whereupon the enemy immediately
opened fire with the machine gun from the shell hole, kill-
ing some of our men in windows and apertures.

From this time on our troops were constantly subjected
to heavy machine-gun fire under cover of which the enemy
endeavored to envelop the American detachments. About
11 hours 30 minutes, the enemy opened with trench
mortars from the ridge. This fire soon knocked holes in
the walls of the occupied houses, killing and wounding
numerous men. About 12 hours 30 minutes, the enemy
made his final counter-attack. He sent troops forward from
the orchard east of the town ; others from the north end
of Cornay and very considerable forces down the steep
ridge on the west, thus surrounding on three sides the

68 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

Americans, whose fire by this time had been practically
silenced.

Captain McCall permitted a number of men to attempt
to escape by jumping from a window and running down
the road to the south. These men were shot down almost
immediately. At least half of the surviving Americans
were wounded. Captain McCall decided to surrender and
ordered his men to cease firing. Lieutenants Shipp and
Lingo, both of the 328th Infantry, and one private obtained
permission to make a break for Hill 180.

A German prisoner was sent out of the house to wave
a towel and all enemy fire was stopped. Lieutenant Shipp
and his two companions then ran from the house, and
when opened upon by rifle and machine-gun fire, took
refuge in a shell hole outside the town, where they re-
mained until darkness permitted escape to Hill 180.

After a time, the American remnants were picked up
by the enemy and, carrying their own wounded, proceeded
under guard towards Martincourt Farm, Marcq and
Buzancy, where they arrived the following morning. On
their way back from Cornay, while on the sunken road
running up the steep ridge west of that town, an American
barrage, striking the sides of the cliff, killed and wounded
many Germans at the base. That the American prisoners
escaped injury at this point is most remarkable.

Hill 180 Threatened

About 13 hours reports began to arrive at the Battalion
P. C. on Hill 180 that Cornay had been recaptured by the
enemy. This was made further apparent by the appear-
ance of enemy forces in the vicinity of Hill 180. Machine
guns could be seen pushing forward from the orchard
east of Cornay. Enemy fire on Hill 180 increased in in-
tensity.

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 60

Previous to this time, the command of the troops on
Hill 180 had devolved on Major Blanchard, 327th Inf.
Major Blaloek had reported back to Regimental Head-
quarters, where he collapsed and was evacuated. Informa-
tion of the loss of Cornay and the threatening counter-
attack on Hill 180 was sent to Colonel Ely, who requested
a barrage. Our artillery responded promptly and broke
up the enemy concentration, causing substantial losses to
the Germans. The following messages sent to the Brigade
P. C. by Colonel Ely indicate the existing conditions :

"Large force of Boche counterattacked and captured
Cornay just before 13 o'clock. My forces there killed and
captured. Some escaped. Shall counterattack at 18
o'clock with remaining men available, organizing on HiU
180, and have called on artillery to shell Cornay between
parallels 81.6 and 82— from meridian 97 to 98 until 18
o'clock, then jump to NW of Cornay. Our success may
be doubtful. Fresh troops should reinforce us by ford
southeast of Hill 180 and participate in attack.

(signed) Ely."

"Capt. Drew reports enemy seem to be attacking Hill
180 — ad\nses a barrage. No word from Blanchard but
observers here report our men going up reverse slope Hill
180. "Will you please telephone for barrage north and
west of Hill 180.

(signed) Ely."

**Find my men exhausted and gassed. Probably 200
can be mustered for counter-attack, but these practically
exhausted and nearly worthless. Fresh troops imperative
for success. Machine Guns from NE and west playing on
all approaches to Cornay with constant shelling Hill 180
all day. Blaloek collapsed, but here. Fourteen officers lost
in his Bn. before losing Cornay. Heaviest possible Art.
should shell Cornay and surroundings for hours before
assault which must be by dark. Under cover of darkness
for success. Early morning probably best hour for assault.

(signed) Ely."

70 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

''Escaped men report Capt. MeCall after terrific bar-
rage stopped his further progress, gathered all available
men in buildings at edge Cornay, established observation
posts in upper windows : — Observers reported some 50
enemy advancing under Red Cross flag and our men hesi-
tated to fire until enemy opened on all sides. Our men
fought with rifles and m. guns and Chauchots from doors
and windows killing great number and suffering heavy
losses. Corp. Gallup, Co. 'E,' 327th Inf. and Pvt. Levine,
Co. 'L,' 328 Inf. reported that finally Capt. McCall said:
'We have done all we can, men; we shall all be killed if
we stay, ' and the men laid down their rifles and went out ;
a number of men broke and ran, escaping under fire.
Capt. Brown, 327th Inf., wounded in leg during fight and
either captured or killed. All my Regt. have been in
continuously gassed area since midnight, 6th October.
About six gas alarms last night. All of us more or less
gassed and ineffective.

(signed) Ely."

General Lindsey placed this situation before the Division
Commander and was soon afterward informed that the
325th Infantry, which had been in reserve, would be
placed at his disposal that night. The counter-attack
planned for 18 hours, 9th of October, was countermanded
and orders issued for an attack on the morning of October
10th by the relieving regiment. The troops on Hill 180
organized the position and patrolled throughout the night
awaiting the expected attack, which did not come.

Unsuccessful Assault on Ridge Champrocher

While these large events were taking place in the vicinity
of Cornay on October 9 the 328th Infantry was continuing
its attack against a new objective and the 326th Infantry
from the 163rd Brigade of this Division relieved the 28th
Division and jumped off from the line held by the ex-
hausted and depleted units of that hard-fighting Division

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 71

Shortly after dark on the night of October 8, C Com-
pany, 328th Infantry, moved forward from Hill 223 and
endeavored to maintain combat liaison between the 2nd
Battalion, 328th Infantry, on the Decauville railroad and
I and M Companies of the 327th Infantry on the rim of
the ridge Champrocher. Captain Weaver commanding G
Company found that the survivors of the two 327th In-
fantry Companies had been withdrawn and sent a runner
to Colonel Wetherill with this information. He was or-
dered to withdraw to Chatel-Chehery. Also during the
night, A Company, 328th Infantry, was moved from
Chatel-Chehery to reinforce the 2nd Battalion, 328th In-
fantry, whereupon Captain Tillman placed it in support of
E and H Companies. At about 4 hours on the morning of
October 9, A Company was again withdrawn to Chatel-
Chehery.

The mission of the 328th Infantry for October 9 re-
quired an attack due north against the Champrocher from
Pylone east of Cornay. At 7 hours 30 minutes, October
9, the 2nd Battalion received orders to attack north. The
wagon road running east into Cornay was given as the
first objective. During the early morning hours, the fol-
lowing change in dispositions was made pursuant to orders
directing a resumption of attack in a northerly direction.
F Company was turned from the west to north with its
left flank on the Decauville railroad. E Company was
moved from the railroad to the right flank of F Company.
H and D Companies were turned north and placed in
support of E and F Companies. G Company was extended
along the railway, still facing west to protect the open
flank for the entire depth of the battalion. In conjunc-
tion with this attack, A Company and two platoons of C
Company were ordered to assault the ridge east of the
2nd Battalion's objective.

At 8 houi-s 30 minutes October 9, under cover of a fog,

72 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

the assault was launched. F Company proceeding up the
Decauville railroad obtained a footing on the highway run-
ning east from Pylone. E Company was compelled to
descend into the deep valley south of ridge Champrocher
and struggled up the north perpendicular side of that
position, A storm of rifle and machine-gun fire dislodged
the precarious hold of Company F and drove it slowly
back in liaison with E Company, which had succeeded in
reaching the southern edge of the plateau that crowned
the ridge. The two companies together did not muster
more than one hundred men and they were opposed by
the fresh troops from the 41st German Division which was
at this time enveloping Cornay. It was found necessary
to draw back from the ridge and valley, to the hill from
which the attack had started and there await the arrival
of additional troops adequate to the task. Many losses
were suffered from machine-gun and artillery fire and the
valley south of the ridge was smothered by the enemy with
gas shells. A Company and the detachment from C Com-
pany had meanwhile reached the foot of the ridge farther
to the east and nearer Cornay. At this point the enemy
opened fire, and in addition hurled grenades upon the
assaulting party. Our men held their positions through-
out the day, sniping back as opportunity offered. Lieutenant
Coston of A Company and several men of his platoon were
killed early in the day.

About midday, our artillery strafed the ridge and mate-
rially assisted our infantry. D Company relieved E Com-
pany on the front line at 13 hours 30 minutes and later
was in turn relieved by two platoons of C Company, which
had been held in reserve.

CHAPTER VIII
163rd infantry BRIGADE ENTERS FIGHT

Throughout October 7-8, while the 164th Brigade was
driving at the east flank of the upper Argonne Forest,
the units of the 163rd Infantry Brigade (Brig. Gen.
Cronin) in Corps reserve, were expecting hourly the
orders which would place them beside their comrades from
the other brigade. During this period and throughout the
drive the 163rd Infantry Brigade was accompanied by the
320th Machine-Gun Battalion (Captain Muldrow). It will
be recalled that on the afternoon of October 6, 1918, both
infantry brigades were bivouacked west of Varennes. On
the night of October 7-8, the 326th Infantry (Colonel
McArthur) was ordered to Montblainville. The march
began about 22 hours 30 minutes through a black night
filled with hard, driving rain. Here again this night
maneuver was made over roads blocked by moving artil-
lery and transport and through ankle-deep mud. Mont-
blainville was found to be a mass of ruins upon an ex-
posed hill, still subjected to constant enemy shell fire. The
1st and 2nd Battalions with the Regimental Machine-Gun
Company bivouacked in the woods west of the village.
The 3rd Battalion and Headquarters Company camped
in the grove at Farm La Forge. Regimental Headquarters
was located on the Montblainville road near this farm.

The first intimation received at Division Headquartei'S
of the early employment of the reserve brigade appears in
the Division dossier as a telephone message received October
73

74 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

8, 1918, at 11 hours 40 minutes from Chief of Staff, 1st
Corps, to Chief of Staff, 82nd Division.

"The Corps Commander directs that the reserve of
Lindsey's brigade be stationed somewhere south of Cornay
so as to be able to function properly after our final ob-
jective is reached. In case of an advance on the Cornay-
Fleville line to the north, a portion of the brigade in Corps
reserve will be placed at the disposal of the Commanding
General, 82nd Division, but not now. The 163rd Brigade
will probably come in to-night, either to extend your front
or into your own sector. It is of the utmost importance
that the whole area in rear of your lines should be
thorouglily mopped up by the tanks and by the infantry.
If you have not already told him about this, notify
Lindsey. ' '

At 15 hours 45 minutes, 8th of October, 1918, the fol-
lowing order was sent to the Commanding Officer, 326th
Infantry :

"Move one battalion of your regiment at once to La
Palette Ravine, approximately 1/2 km. south of Chatel-
Chehery. Carry reserve rations. Field trains remain at
present location. Combat Trains accompany battalion.
This movement is urgent. Expedite departure of bat-
talion. This battalion remains in Corps reserve. No change
is supply arrangements. By Command of Major General
Duncan — Raymond Sheldon, Chief of Staff."

The following telephone message was received at 19
hours 20 minutes, October 8, at Division Headquarters,
from Chief of Staff, 1st Corps:

"The 82nd Division will take over sector of the 28th
Division before 4 a.m. to-morrow. Orders are now on the
way. The Commanding General, 28th Division, will have
supervision of the relief and will furnish the necessary
guides, etc. This does not include the 28th Artillery, which
will remain in place for the present. The 28th, on being
relieved, will pass to the Corps reserve and will assemble
in the vicinity of Montblainville. The General thinks we

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 73

had better confine the relief to one regiment. That will
leave one regiment for Division reserve. The orders for
to-morrow are just the same as they were to-day."

The order to despatch one battalion to La Palette
Ravine just south of Chatel-Cbehery reached Headquarters,
326th Infantry, at 16 hours, and at 17 hours the 3rd Bat-
talion (Major Watkins) started its march from Mont-
blainville. About 20 hours, Colonel McArthur was called
to Headquarters, 28th Division, at Farm La Forge. Here
an extended conference was held in which Brigadier Gen-
eral Cronin, commanding the 163rd Infantry Brigade and
Colonel Sheldon, Chief of Staff, 82nd Division, were
present, together with Col. Sweeney, Chief of Staff, 28th
Division. As a result of this conference, the 326th In-
fantry was directed at midnight to move the two remaining
battalions forward and relieve the entire 28th Division in
time to jump off in attack at 8 hours 30 minutes, October
9, 1918.

After another night's march through mud and rain, the
1st Battalion (Major Barrett) and the 2nd Battalion
(Major Jones) arrived just before daybreak west of La
Palette ravine on the main forest highway to Pylone.
Eegimental P. C. was established in one of the abandoned
German dugouts on a slope of this ravine. The 1st Bat-
talion proceeded with the relief of the left brigade of the
28th Division, which occupied fox holes on a road running
southwest from Chatel-Chehery and crossing the forest
highway. This jump off line is about 2 kilometers due
southwest from Chatel-Chehery.

The terrain which faced the 326th Infantry is of differ-
ent character from that which confronted the 164th In-
fantry Brigade. While it does not consist of precipitous
ridges like those which overhang Cornay, it presents diffi-
culties quite as troublesome. The objective assigned re-
quired a turning movement in a general northwesterly

76 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

direction to La Besogne, on a front which extended about
2 kilometers west from the Decauville railroad, to which
the 328th Infantry had driven on the previous afternoon.

It will be recalled that the advance of the 328th Infantry
on October 9, 1918, had been halted by very determined
resistance from enemy machine guns and infantry. The
high command suspected at this time that the enemy was
withdrawing generally toward the heights north of the
Aire Valley. This is clearly evidenced in a telephone
communication from the Chief of Staff, 1st Corps, and
inserted in the 82nd Division dossier under date of October
8, 1918. Subsequent events proved the accuracy of this
surmise. Nevertheless, the cfiiantities of enemy materiel
which remained at this time south of the Aire River,
as well as general tactical considerations, compelled the
Germans to make a desperate rear-guard resistance.

'W'est of the often mentioned Decauville railroad, the
Argonne Forest stretches for 6 kilometers toward the
town of Langon. This country is a desolate jungle of
tangled linderbrush and forest, cut by ravines and small
watercourses, with here and there a farm-house and an
open patch of cultivated ground. Occasionally the ground
rises to an eminence of considerable height. Near La
Besogne, the rolling land falls away into a sharp valley,
at the bottom of which clusters a few buildings, which the
map dignifies as La Besogne.

3rd Battalion, 326th Infantry, October 9, 1918

When the 3rd Battalion, 326th Infantry, arrived just
south of Chatel-Chehery during the early night of October
8-9, Major Watkins reported in Chatel-Chehery to Brig-
adier General Nolan, commanding the right brigade of
the 28th Division. In compliance with the plan of relief,
the 3rd Battalion spent the remaining hours of darkness
in La Palette Ravine. At 8 hours 30 minutes it climbed

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 77

the north slope of the ravine and, moving northwest across
Hill 244, passed through the elements of the right brigade
of the 28th Division along the cross-road running southwest
from Chatel-Chehery. It was this same cross-road which
served as the jump off line for the 1st Battalion about
five hundred meters still farther to the southwest.

The advance of the 3rd Battalion was made with Com-
panies I, K and L as assault companies and Company M
in support. The compass direction was northwest to the
Decauville railroad, and thence north with the right flank
on the forest highway leading to Pylone. The advance
to the narrow gauge railroad covered a distance of about
2 kilometers and was uneventful save for light, intermit-
tent shell fire. The advance north along the forest road,
however, brought the battalion in contact with enemy
machine-gun elements, which gave considerable difficulty
in this extremely wild and wooded country. After forcing
a way north for nearly a kilometer, enemy machine-gun
fire increased in volume and a number of casualties were
suffered. Lieutenant Owens of L Company was killed
while leading his platoon forward. The battalion was not
in liaison with the battalion on its left, and fearing the
possibility of an enveloping movement, which would cut
off the battalion. Major Watkins ordered a withdrawal for
several hundred meters to the railroad. Here the battalion
dug in on the left flank of the 328th Infantry and formed
a line which followed the sharp bend in the Decauville
railroad to the southwest, a distance of five or six hundred
meters. Here the 3rd Battalion remained until the attack
of the following morning.

1st Battalion, 326th Infantry, October 9, 1918

The 1st Battalion, 326th Infantry with Company D,
320th Machine Gun Battalion in support, jumped off at
8 hours 30 minutes on the morning of October 9 on the

78 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

line previously described where it had relieved the left
brigade of the 28th Division. At this time the 1st Bat-
talion was in complete liaison with the right elements of the
77th Division, which formed a line to the southwest along
the same cross-road. The barrage which preceded this
advance was excellent, but too rapid for the character of
the terrain, and A and C Companies, the assault com-
panies of the 1st Battalion, were compelled to run from
time to time to keep close to their barrage. This resulted
in these companies gaining some distance upon the two
support companies of the battalion and getting completely-
ahead of the corresponding elements of the 77th Division.
Practically no enemy opposition aside from desultory shell
fire was met during the first stage of the advance. This
situation was one of the factors which opened a gap be-
tween the 1st and 3rd Battalions of this Regiment, The
3rd Battalion maintained liaison with the 328th Infantry
on its right and the 1st Battalion worked with the 77th
Division on its left.

After the front line had proceeded about two Idlometers
northwest, some machine gun resistance was encountered.
In spite of this opposition, a farther advance was made
and a platoon of A Company, under Lieutenant Patton,
succeeded in penetrating eight hundred meters farther north
than the advance of the other elements of the Battalion.
This platoon won a foothold on the slopes of a small
ravine about 1 kilometer due south from La Besogne.
Enemy infantry and machine gunners started to envelop
this platoon, and Lieutenant Patton was compelled to with-
draw a few hundred meters, where he joined the other
forward elements of his battalion. Here A and C Com-
panies dug in and held their ground until the following
morning. Late in the afternoon the leading elements of
the 77th Division again came abreast of the 1st Battalion,
326th Infantry. They remained in liaison throughout the

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 79

night. The 2nd Battalion in support moved forward dur-
ing the day and took up a position for the night on the
line occupied by the 1st Battalion that morning. At about
23 hours, October 9, 1918, a conference was held at the
regimental P. C. and battalion commanders were given
instructions for a resumption of the attack on the follow-
ing morning.

325th Infantry, October 10, 1918

The attack of October 10 was made in the Divisional
sector by the 325th Infantry (Colonel Whitman) and the
326th Infantry (Colonel McArthur). For the time being
the 325th Infantry was placed in the 164th Infantry Bri-
gade and the 328th Infantry transferred to the 163rd In-
fantry Brigade. The 325th Infantry had, up to this point,
been held in reserve and was therefore at full strength.
Its men were relatively in much better physical condition
than the two regiments which had been engaged continu-
ously for three desperate days.

On October 6, Colonel Whitman had made a recon-
naissance in the vicinity of La Forge, opposite Chatel-
Chehery, under the supposition that he would assault at
that point the following morning. Plans were changed,
however, and on the night of the 7th, the 325th Infantry
moved from the camp west of Varennes to the valley of
Charpentry. The march was the usual night maneuver
in a rainstorm on overcrowded roads and under some shell
fire. The regiment sat in the mud for the balance of the
night and during all of October 8. Early on October 9,
the 325th Infantry was moved west across the Aire River
to the vicinity of Chene Tondu.

At 18 hours on October 9 Colonel Whitman was directed
to report to the P. C. of the 164th Infantry Brigade at
Chatel-Chehery. General Lindsey prepared a Brigade

80 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

order for the attack on the following morning. This order
stated in part:

"1. A hostile counter-attack succeeded in driving our
troops off the Corps objective from Fleville to railroad
west of Cornay. The enemy occupied Fleville, Cornay and
the ridge to the southwest. On our right is the 1st Division
and on our left is the 326th Infantry, now on the Corps
objective. The 325th Infantry with artillery support will
counter-attack on 'D' day, 'H' hour and regain the Corps
objective, which runs generally along the 82nd meridian
from Fleville on the east (exclusive) to north and south
railroad, west of Cornay. One battalion of the 325th In-
fantry will attack from Hill- 180 the line Fleville (ex-
clusive) Cornay (inclusive). One battalion will attack
from the ridge extending from point 97.0-80.5 to 96.5-80.5,
that part of the objective between the line Cornay (ex-
clusive) to the north and south railroad west of Cornay.
These Isattalions will pass the line of the 328th Infantry
located in that vicinity. One battalion of the 325th In-
fantry as reserve will be posted under cover south and
west of Hill 223.

"2. Stokes Mortars and one-pounders will be placed as
directed by regimental commander.

"3. A machine gun company will be attached to each
attack battalion. The commanding officer of the 321st
M. G. Battalion has designated Companies B and D to be
reported to commanding officer 325th Infantry for duty.

"4. For artillery plans, see Annex 'A.'

"5. Immediately on reaching the Corps objective, the
position will be organized in depth as the position of re-
sistance, and exploitation patrols will be sent to the woods
and terrain north as far as the Aire River, which will be
the limit of the outpost position.

"6. The 327 Inf. on Cote 180 and in Pleinchamp Farm
will remain as now organized until further orders. The
328th Inf. on the hill to the north and west of Hill 223
will likewise remain as now organized until further orders.
All elements of whatever nature north of the Cote 180 or
of the hill northwest of Hill 223 will be withdrawn by
'H' hour.

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 81

"7. *D' will be Oct. 10th. 'H' will be 5.00 hours.

''8. All elements must be in place to jump off at 'H'
minus 1.

''9. Posts of Command: 82nd Division, La Forge Farm;
164th Inf. Brigade, Chatel-Chehery ; 325th Inf., Chatel-
Chehery.

"Annex 'A': Annex to Field Order 6, 164th Inf.
Brigade. All artillery of Division will support the attack
of the 325th Inf. ; interdiction fire will be kept in front of
infantry; harassing and destructive fire as ordered by
Commanding General, 157th Field Artillery Brigade.
Upon arrival of the Infantry at their objective, all artillery
will be available for harassing and searching fire north of
the final objective. This fire must be so regulated by in-
fantry commander and artillery liaison officer as to best
protect their troops and exploitation patrols."

By 4 hours, October 10th, the 325th Infantry had moved
up from the Chene Tondu and was ready to relieve the
two infantry regiments in accordance with the above order.
The 2nd Battalion (Major Hawkins) was in rear of Hill
180; the 1st Battalion (Major Lott) was in rear of the
328th Infantry along the Dccauville railroad, and the 3rd
Battalion (Major Pierce) was in rear of Hill 223 as sup-
port. B and C Companies constituted the assaulting
waves in the 1st Battalion and E and F Companies in the
2nd Battalion. The 321st Machine Gun Battalion was at
this time concentrated at the following points: Com-
panies B and D near Hill 244 ; Company C at Hill 223 ;
and Company A on Hill 180. From these positions they
assisted the infantry attack. H hour was advanced to 7
hours, October 10. Although furious resistance had been
anticipated, the 325th Infantry advanced on approximately
a two-kilometer front without substantial opposition.
Cornay and the ridge Champrocher were shortly occupied
and the 1st and 2nd Battalions pushed strong groups for-
ward as far north as Martincourt Fann, Marcq and the
Aire River. A few casualties had been inflicted by enemy

82 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

shell fire and an occasional sniper. About forty prisoners
were taken from Cornay and the western ridge. Captain
Brown, 327th Inf., and several other wounded men belong-
ing to the 327th Infantry were recovered in the vicinity
of Cornay and Martincourt Farm. The enemy's counter-
attack of the previous afternoon proved to have been hi;i
final effort, and during the night October 9-10, he withdrew
his forces to the heights north of the Aire.

326th Infantry, October 10, 1918

The advance proceeded with equal success in the sector
occupied by the 326th Infantry. The 3rd Battalion sup-
ported by C Company, 320th M. G. Battalion, jumped off
with Companies K, L and M in assault and advanced in a
northerly direction along the Decauville railroad and the
forest highway on a front of about five hundred meters.
The observation station known as Pylone was captured and
the attack drove due north of Pylone for another one and
one-half kilometers to the Corps objective. This placed
the right of the 326th Infantry on the heights one kilometer
south of the town of Marcq and overlooking the Aire
River and St. Juvin to the north. Some casualties were
caused by enemy shell fire during the day's progress.

The 1st Battalion, 326th Infantry, moved out at H hour
October 10, with Companies A and C in assault and in
complete liaison with the 77th Division. Prior to the
attack a platoon of C Company, 326th Infantry, sent a
patrol to the outskirts of La Besogne and were the first
American soldiers to enter that village. The main forces
of the battalion entered La Besogne with troops of the
77th Division. At this point they were met with heavy
enemy shell fire.

Another incident of this advance was the automatic ex-
plosion of German mines near La Besogne on the road

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 83

which runs from La Besogne to Pylone. A large crater
was blown in the road, but no troops were injured by
the explosion. Companies A and C were then sent for-
ward to Marcq, arriving there at about 23 hours. Company
A remained during the night iu JMareq. Company B was
held at La Besogne with the Battalion P. C. and Companies
C and D outposted between Marcq and La Besogne. After
four years of continuous occupation, the enemy had been
finally ejected from the Argonne Forest and the first phase
of the Division's operations was successfully terminated.

CHAPTER IX
ASTRIDE THE AIRE RIVER

Up to this time, the Division had been fighting west of
the Aire River. The second phase of the Division's par-
ticipation in the Meuse-Argonne offensive required the
82nd Division to tight astride of the Aire River, and it
was not until the night of October 14, 1918, that all of
the combat units had again recrossed that tributary to the
east bank. After October 14, the river was placed once
and for all at the backs of our fighting men.

Reference to the map will show that after flowing in a
northerly direction to a point about three kilometers north
of Comay, the river turns sharply to the west and makes
a twisted passage toward Grand-Pre for six kilometers in
a direction north of west. Still farther west, it effects
a junction with the River Aisne. This western bend to
Grand-Pre marks the north boundary of the Aire Valley.
The little towns on the banks of this brief six kilometers
are now historic names: St. Juvin, Marcq, Chevieres and
Grand-Pre. The same is equally true of the villages which
dot the river's northerly progress from Varennes to St.
Juvin. The names, Montblainville, Baulny, Apremont,
Chatel-Chehery, La Forge, Cornay and Fleville will for-
ever recall the valor of the American soldier.

The river is, during six months of the year, an unin-
teresting stream, forty to fifty feet wide and varying from
two feet to perhaps five feet in depth. In the winter months
it is a muddy flood which inundates the entire Aire Valley
84

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF S2nd DIVISION 85

and assumes the attributes of many well-known American
rivers.

North of the Aire Valley the terrain is very different
from that of the Argonne Forest. The country runs north
to Sedan and the Meuse River in a series of ridges, which
have the regular appearance of an ocean swell. These
ridges are for the most part bare, save for isolated large
patches of woods like the Bois des Loges and the still
larger Bois de Bourgogne due north from Grand-Pre.
Many small islands of trees and thickets stand here and
there, and provided concealment for enemy artillery and
machine gunners.

The Kriemhilde Stellung

Much is said of the Kriemhilde Stellung. Those who
have not seen it will probably imagine a highly organized
German defensive position with a complicated network of
deep trenches and many bands of heavy barbed wire. The
American soldiers who assaulted and cut the Kriemhilde
Stellung know that such was not the fact. This line was
a series of natural positions, hills, ridges and woods which
gave the enemy unrivaled opportunities for coordinated
defense by artillery and cross-fire barrages with machine
guns. Some shallow trenches were of course prepared
and wire obstacles set up, but neither trench nor wire
constituted the barrier which held the American army from
the German throat during the critical days from October
11 to November 1, 1918. In front of the 82nd Division,
the elements of the Kriemhilde Stellung were, first, a
powerful outpost line comprising St. Juvin and Hill
182 immediately north of that town, and the ridge be-
tween St. Juvin and Sommerance known as Ridge 85.5.
North of this outpost line stand the natural fortresses
ChampigneuUe and St. Georges. The Kriemhilde Stellung

S6 OFFICIAL HISTGRt OF 82nd DIVISION

was, however, the last partly organized defensive barrier
south of the Hirson-Mezieres-Sedan railroad. This rail-
road was of fundamental importance to the Germans, run-
ning from the big center at Metz to Mezieres, parallel to
the front of the battle line. Its importance was greatly
increased by the fact that north of the railroad lay the
Ardennes Forest with few roads and no railroads. There-
fore, the retirement of a very large part of the German
army must necessarily be effected along this one railroad.
It was imperative that the German should hold his last
defensive position south of Sedan. In the light of these
facts, it is easy to understand why every prisoner captured
during the month of October stated that his organization
had been ordered to hold its position "at all costs." The
will of the American was equally resolute to break through.

Price Paid by 164th Infantry Brigade

On the morning of October 10, 1918, when the 325th
Infantry attacked through the 327th Infantry and 328th
■ Infantry, the two last-named regiments had been in con-
tinuous heavy fighting for three days and nights. The
men had been without hot food or coffee, and no water
had been available for drinking except the polluted water
of the Aire River. The wounded had been evacuated by
stretcher bearers working under continuous heavy fire, and
many of these stretcher bearers had themselves become
casualties. The losses in both regiments had been severe.
Many dead were buried during October 10, and for forty-
eight hours thereafter parties of pioneers worked at this
melancholy task. In the 327th Infantry the following
officers had been kiUed in action or later died from wounds :
1st Lt. Jerome E. Kemmerer, Co. D; 1st Lt. Walter H.
Levie, Co. I and Lt. James E. Cantwell, unassigned. Nine-
teen officers were wounded, six were gassed and evacuated

t^FENSIYE, OCT. 10-NOV. 1, 1918
psitioiis of advance units during tlie day
iline at uiidniglit

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 87

and three were evacuated sick. Six officers of the regi-
ment were captured in the German counter-attack at
Cornay and one of these officers, Capt. Charles H. Brown,
Co. A, who had been severely wounded and captured, was
later recaptured at Martincourt Farm by the 325th In-
fantry. Of the enlisted men of the 327th Infantry 115
were killed in action or died of wounds; 90 were cap-
tured or classified "missing in action"; 675 were wounded
or gassed and 100 were evacuated, sick.

In the 328th Infantry, the following officers were killed
in action during this flank attack: 2nd Lt. Kirby P.
Stewart, G. Co., 2nd Lt. 0. M. Coston, A Co., and 2nd
Lt. Carl Goldsmith, M Co., 328th Inf., who died at the
outskirts of Cornay leading his platoon in an attack. 2nd
Lt. Walter M. Little, Supply Co., 328th Inf., died later
in the hospital of wounds received October 7. Twelve
officers of the regiment were evacuated wounded ; 9 evacu-
ated gassed ; 3 evacuated sick, making a total of 28 officer
casualties. One hundred and twenty-nine enlisted men were
killed or died of wounds; 387 evacuated wounded; 130
evacuated gassed; 52 evacuated sick; 20 captured, making
a total of 718 lost in this operation.

The importance of this flank attack and the measure of
success achieved is indicated by the telegram sent on the
late afternoon of October 7th by direction of General
Pershing :

"Headquarters, 1st Army Corps — Oct. 7th, 1918

C. G., 82nd Division, G-3, 1095 period The Commander-
in-Chief directed me to congratulate General Julian R.
Lindsey. on the success of his thrust in which I heartily
concur, (sgd) Lifrgett — 4:30 p. m.

* « * * *

Dear General Lindsey: It gives me great pleasure to
transmit this to you. (sgd) G. B. Duncan, Maj. Gen.,
Comdg. 82nd Div."

88 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIYISION

October 11, 1918, a Day op Testing

In many respects, the 11th of October, 1918, tested the
qualities of the 82nd Division more than any day in its
history. The 325th Infantry, 326th Infantry and the
327th Infantry were all three plunged into an exceedingly
desperate fight for a footing in the outpost positions of the
Kriemhilde Stellung line. The 326th Infantry, west of the
Aire, attacked from Marcq in an effort to cross the Aire
River, where it bends toward Grand-Pre, just south of
St. Juvin. The 325th Infantry and 327th Infantry, east
of the Aire, attacked the ridge between St. Juvin and
Sommerance. The 326th Infantry failed, but with a gal-
lantry which will be a source of boundless pride to this
Division. The other two regiments were tried to the ut-
most, but eventually achieved the ridge.

It will be necessary to consider the operations of each
regiment separately and to examine the special situation
with which each was confronted. The dossier of the 82nd
Division shows the receipt of the following messages, which
resulted in the relief of the left brigade of the 1st Division
by the 327th Infantry.

"00:05 hours, 10 Oct. 1918, Col. Montgomery, G-3,
1st A. C. called at 12 o'clock midnight and asked if
we had received our Field Order. When told 'No,' he
stated as follows: 'General Duncan will continue to-mor-
row morning l^/^ hours earlier than to-day (7 a.m.). Your
right boundary extends from Baulny north practically in
a straight line along the western edge of Bois de Boyon
to Sommerance. You will relieve the elements of the 1st
Division west of that boundary. The 1st Division line
extends from Fleville, running northeast to Cote de
Maldah. You will be responsible for the part of the line
west of your eastern boundary. You must effect relief
of the elements of the 1st Division on this line before
daybreak.' "

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82wd DIVISION 89

**10 Oct. 1918, 2 hours, 22 minutes— from General
Duncan to Major Scott. Tell General Lindsey when he
comes in that in sending that one company to his right
that he must send it to arrive by 5 hours if possible to the
line between Fleville and west edge of Bois de Boyon to
relieve the elements of the 1st Division at that point."

In accordance with the above message, K Company,
325th Infantry (Capt. Melton), proceeded before 5 horn's,
October 10, to a point one kilometer south of Fleville, where
the main Fleville road is crossed by an east and west road
to Exermont. No elements of the 1st Division were en-
countered, but a German patrol was met and captured.
Captain Melton outposted the Exermont Road for a dis-
tance of some 500 meters from the main Fleville road.
This company remained in the assigned position until
October 12th.

"11 hours 5 minutes 10th Oct. — ^message to C. G., 164th
Brig. Send one Major and one company from your re-
serve to the east of the River Aire to back up the company
which relieved the elements of the 1st Division between
Fleville and Bois de Boyon. The Major will be in com-
mand of these two companies and will push forward to
the general line Sommerance (exclusive) to the west, where
they will relieve the elements of the IGth Inf. now on that
line. I believe that there is very little in front of you.
Corps is very insistent that they should have exact location
of your front lines and perhaps you can send some officers
down to get location. The Division Commander directs
that you push forward to the line indicated and report the
location of your front line — By direction of the Division
Commander — Raymond Sheldon, Chief of Staff."
*****

"12 hours 25 minutes 10th Oct. 1918— Message from
Col. Ely: I have message dated 10 a.m. from C. 0. 16th
Inf. as follows: C. G., 1st Brig, informs me that your
Division is to relieve our lines from Sommerance west.
We are advancing on that line this a.m. and are about
there now. Please advise when you intend to make relief

90 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

for we will have to move on the east of Sommefrance
in support, (sgd) Koppeck."

*****

''Bonehead 7 (G-3, 1st Corps) reported at 13 hours 5
minutes Oct. 10, 1918, a large concentration of enemy-
troops 1 km. east of St. Juvin. Wants to know if he can
fire upon them. Albany 1 (C. G., 82nd Div.) replied 'Yes'
to above question. Same information had been received
from 1st Division by Albany 7 (G-3, 82nd Div.) and same
reply."

Relief of a Brigade of 1st Division.

Shortly after 11 hours, Companies E and F, 327th In-
fantry, under Captain Conklin, were sent to relieve the
front line of the 16th Infantry north of Fleville. Early
that afternoon the two remaining companies of the 2nd
Battalion and Companies I, L and M of the 3rd Battalion
moved to complete the relief. The 2nd Battalion (Major
Blanchard) took over the positions o^ the outpost bat-
talion, and the 3rd Battalion (Captain Davis) relieved the
support line. The movement was started at 16 hours, 10th
of October, and was completed an hour later. At 17 hours,
the following telephone report was received at Division
Headquarters from the 164th Infantry Brigade:

"Mr. Ely reported at 16 hours: Operations Officer re-
connoitered and reports much gas in Fleville with con-
stant shelling. Am running telephone lines forward.
Blanchard will assume command of the advance lines. May
establish ammunition dump north of Fleville to-night and
will push our advance. Observation and intelligence work
being established. Men in excellent spirits, (sgd) Ely."

After the relief had been completed, the 18th Infantry
informed the 327th Infantry that the 18th Infantry also
was to be included in the relief. The depleted companies
of the 327th Infantry therefore extended their lines to the

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 91

cast until they had covered in addition the position oc-
cupied by the 18th Infantry. The most advanced outpost
groups of the 1st Division were relieved by similar groups
from the 2nd Battalion, 327th Infantry, in little patches
of woods or thickets scattered along the small ridge 00.0-
84.3 to 99.0-84.2. This outpost line is about 500 meters
south of an east and west line through Sommerance.
The main body of the forward battalion of the 1st Divi-
sion was relieved on two lines, the 1st of which was 500
meters south of the outpost detachments.

The 164th Inf. Brig. Field Order No. 7, issued during
the forenoon of October 10, had stated:

"The new position will be simply occupying a defensive
sector. ' '

This interpretation of the relief was not reversed until
late on the night of October 10. At 18 hours, October 10,
1918, the following message was received at Division Head-
quarters from Chief of Staff, 1st Corps:

"Operations for 1st Corps to-morrow will be continued
at 7 o'clock. Line of direction is Sivrey-lez-Buzancy (ex-
clusive)-Briquenay (exclusive) -the heights northwest and
southwest of Le Morthomme. Liaison with 38th Corps on
eastern edge of Bois de Bourgogne-Grand-Pre. "

(Answer.) "General Duncan to Chief of Staff, 1st
Corps: 'I will have to push forward all the artillery
to-night.' "

At about 21 hours, the orders for attack reached the
327th Infantry.

The east boundary of the 82nd Division sector was
now Sommerance (exclusive) -Sivry-lez-Buzancy (ex-
clusive) ; the west boundary Marcq (inclusive) -St. Juvin
exclusive )-Verpel ( exclusive )-Thenorgues (exclusive) -Har-
ricourt (inclusive). The intermediate Corps objective
was the line Imecourt-Champigneulle-Graud-Pre. The
Corps Order called for a halt of one-half hour on this

92 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

line for the purpose of reorganization and movement for-
ward of artillery. The first objective was Sivry-lez-
Buzancy ( exclusive )-Verpel (inclusive). The 1st Corps
directed that divisions advance to the first objective in-
dependently, prepared to advance farther to the Corps
objective at 13 hours. The 1st Corps objective was Sivry-
lez-Buzancy ( exclusive )-Thenorgucs (inclusive). When
this line Avas reached, it was directed that exploitation
be carried out to the front and contact kept with the
enemy. Five tanks were ordered to support the attack of
the 82nd Division. The artillery was to keep harassing
and interdiction fire in front of the infantry with one ac-
companying gun for each front line battalion. C Company,
321st M. G. Battalion, was ordered to support the attack.
The jump-off line designated was the Sommerance-St.
Juvin road.

Colonel Ely directed that the 3rd Battallion, 327th In-
fantry, (less K Company) act as assault battalion, sup-
ported by the 2nd Battalion, with the 1st Battalion (plus
K Company) as Divisional reserve. During the night of
October 10, B Company, 321st M. G. Battalion (Captain
Cunningham), relieved machine-gun elements of the 1st
Division at the cross road, 300 meters south of Sommerance.
Later in the night Captain Cunningham sent a patrol for-
ward into Sommerance to make a reconnaissance. This
patrol was fired on from the center of the village.

Capt. McWhorter with C Company, 321st Machine Gun
Battalion, moved into a support position, just north of
Fleville. During the heavy shell fire which took place
during this change of position. Lieutenant Dutton was
severely wounded and died shortly afterwards in the hos-
pital.

Col. Gordon Johnston came to the 82nd Division as Chief
of Staff at 2 hours 20 minutes, October 11. Colonel
Sheldon was relieved and went to the 77th Division.

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 93

It will now be necessary to turn back to the 325tli In-
fantry and follow their progress through the night of
October 10. At darkness on that day, Regimental Head-
quarters was established on the Cornay Ridge with the
3rd Battalion on the slope in reserve. The 1st and 2nd
Battalions were scattered from that point north to the
Aire River doing patrol work over a large territory. Dur-
ing the day, the battalions of the Regiment had been in
close liaison with the regimental commander. This is evi-
denced by the numerous messages in the regimental dossier
of which the following are of special interest:

To Capt. Marshburn, Co. G, 2:50 p.m. "No Germans
found on this side of the River Aire. Point 84.5-96.8 is
covered by M. G. fire from Boche trenches. Able to
locate M. G. at 86.5-97.8. No Germans seen in St. Juvin,
but about 100 seen to east of St. Juvin in trenches from
85.5-97.4 to 85.4-98.2. The R. R. tracks along river could
not be patrolled on account of M. G. fire. We did not
cross river on account of so many guns opening fire. R. R.
dump at 8.45-96.8 was fired on by our artillery and a few
buildings are on fire. The Germans threw two barrages
and we had to advance toward St. Juvin slowly. We could
only observe St. Juvin, but did not draw fire, (sgd.)
Fawcett."

*****

To C. 0., 325th Inf. "No report of river crossings have
been received from our patrols, (sgd.) Hawkins."
*****

To C. 0., 325th Inf., 17 hours. "Patrols sent toward
Aire River have reached Hill 240 at point 96.3-83.3 and
extend west from there to point 97.4-83.3. Patrols report
they have been held up by enemy and our own artillery.
No sign of enemy infantry, (sgd.) Lott."

*****

Note to Regimental Commander : * ' There has been slight
shelling of Cornay by enemy artillery. Our patrols re-
ceived very severe shelling at times. Men in Cornay have
received fire from Boche plane twice during the day. This
fire they returned. One Lieut, and 10 men from 164th

94 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

Brig, were found wounded in enemy territory and evacu-
ated. The Lieutenant and three men were found 3
km. from our present line by patrol from Co. G. This
Lieut, states that Germans retired about 10 p.m. 9th-
10th Oct. and left them in dugout with three other men.
There seems to have been a relief to our front as about
500 troops were exchanged in region to right of St, Juvin
on Oct. 10. (sgd) Bettes."

In addition to these messages, the following despatch was
received by the division commander from Headquarters,
163rd Infantry Brigade:

At 19 hours 5 minutes: "326th Inf. reports that they
learned from five prisoners that the enemy is evacuating
St. Juvin."

Between midnight and 1 hour, night of October 10-11,
Colonel Whitman received Field Order No. 8, 164th Inf.
Brig., attached to which was 82nd Division Field Order
No. 23. The substance of these orders have already been
outlined in the statement of orders received by the 327th
Infantry during the night of October 10-11. Some further
details not previously covered and contained in both orders
are as follows:

"For this attack, the 164th Brig, is composed of the
325th and 327th Inf. Regiments. Each regiment will
have one battalion in front line; one battalion in support
and one battalion in reserve. Reserve Battalion, 327th
Inf., will be the Division reserve and will follow the sup-
port battalion, same regiment, at 3 kil. The reserve bat-
talion, 325th Inf. will be the brigade reserve and vmW
follow the support battalion, same regiment, at 3 kil. The
Machine Gun Co., 325th Inf., will be attached to the ad-
vance battalion of that regiment, and B Co., 321st M. G.
Bn. to Advance Battalion, 327th Inf. The remaining
machine gun companies constitute the brigade reserve and
will be maneuvered and commanded by the C. O. 321st
M. G. Bn. Field and combat trains will accompany their
units."

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 95

The Brigade order stated that information of the enemy
and our own troops is as set forth in Par. 1 of the Divi-
sional order, which reads:

"(a) The enemy has been driven north of the line
Sommerance-St.Juvin-Grand-Pre. St. Juvin is reported
evacuated.

(6) The 1st Corps attacks at 7 hours, 11th Oct., 1918,
on its present front."

The Division order further provided that :

''Battalions that are to lead the attack in each brigade
will be moved north of the Aire River before daylight.
Crossing will be covered by strong patrols."

"The 163rd Brig, will attack between the west boundary
of the Division and Meridian 98.5 and the 164th Brig,
between the same meridian and the east boundary of the
Division. ' '

Colonel Whitman was confronted with the problem of
getting to the jump-off at 5 hours, October 11th, from his
extended positions north of Comay. The distance from
Cornay Ridge to the St. Juvin-Sommerance road was about
4 kilometers. No fords had been found by the patrols
and the 1st and 2nd Battalions were extended over a
front of two kilometers. The night was dark and the time
was short. It was decided not to waste valuable hours
hunting for fords under such unfavorable conditions. It
was known that the engineers were constructing a foot
bridge at Fleville. This was selected for the point at
which to cross the river. The 3rd Battalion on the Cornay
Ridge was ordered to start immediately. Rush orders were
sent to the 2nd Battalion to assemble and follow. The 1st
Battalion was put in Brigade reserve with orders to follow
at three kilometers. The leading companies felt their way
to the river and waded it in single file, using the foot bridge
as a guide. Daylight found the 3rd Battalion, 325th In-

5& OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

fantry, about II/2 kilometers from the St. Juvin-Som-
meranee Eoad and moving with all possible speed in
column of twos up the river road from Fleville to St.
Juvin. It was apparent to Colonel Whitman that he
would not be in position by 5 hours, but he felt confident
that his dispositions would be complete on the jump-off
line by 6 hours with a full hour remaining for final in-
structions before attacking at 7 hours.

CHAPTER X

THE SOMMERANCE-ST. JUVIN ROAD

TfiE story of events now returns to the 327th Infantry.
Before daybreak the three companies of the 3rd Battalion
moved forward from the lines on which the 2nd Battalion
had relieved the 1st Division and advanced about 500
meters to the St. Juvin-Sommerance Road. As these
companies advanced they found themselves in immediate
contact with the enemy who retired slowly fighting as he
fell back. Our men were in position on this jump-off line
in accordance with orders at 5 hours. The battalion was
extended along this road to cover a kilometer of front.
The right flank was about 250 meters west of the first
building in the western outskirts of Sommerance. After
arrival on this line, machine guns and artillery fire con-
tinued to harass our troops. A heavy mist hung over
the entire country. The battalion appeared to be alone
on a desolate road. Liaison groups could find no evidence
of support on either flank. At 7 hours the battalion ad-
vanced followed by the 2nd Battalion in support. Captain
Cunningham placed his machine gunners with the sup-
port waves and advanced with the infantry. On reaching
the top of the ridge 85.5, a few hundred meters from the
initial point, enemy fire became very intense. Captain
Davis, commanding the 3rd Battalion, was severely
wounded less than twenty minutes after jumping off. Cap-
tain Henley of M Company took command of the bat-
97

98 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

talion, but was himself shot down shortly afterward. All
the remaining officers of this battalion became casualties
within a few minutes after the advance was commenced,
and the men went forward led entirely by non-commis-
sioned officers. No tanks had appeared; no troops had
come up on either side; no friendly artillery barrage was
apparent and bands of wire met the leading wave on
Ridge 85.5, northwest of Sommerance. As the men strug-
gled through these entanglements, they were subjected to
terrific enfilade fire along the wire and from both flanks.
They were also under a continuous rain of missiles from
the front. Major Blanchard, commanding the leading and
support battalions, saw that the 3rd Battalion was melting
into disorganization and took forward the 2nd Battalion
to continue the attack. The 2nd Battalion, E and F Com-
panies leading, arrived abreast of the remnants of the 3rd
Battalion and endeavored to carry on from this point.
During the advance of the 2nd Battalion to the Som-
merance Road, 1st Lt. G. H. Byrd, Adjutant, 2nd Bn.,
was killed by a fragment of shell at Major Blanchard 's
side.

"When the assault had proceeded for about a kilometer
north of the St. Juvin-Sommerance Road, Major Blanchard
perceived that groups of the enemy were filtering south
from one thicket to another and out of the various small
patches of woods that dot this open country. Already
the enemy had collected in considerable numbers in rear
of his right flank. He could see no American troops com-
ing to his support from any direction. It was now about
9 hours 30 minutes. Major Blanchard sent Lieutenant
Hackney to Colonel Ely, who had established an advance
Regimental P. C. in a gully just south of the Sommer-
ance-St. Juvin Road. Lieutenant Hackney explained the
present situation to the regimental commander, who sent
word to Major Blanchard to use his own judgment and

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 99

fall back if he found it necessary. About twenty minutes
after receiving this message, Major Blanchard directed
retirement to the Sommerance Road. This movement was
covered by the machine gunners under Captain Cunning-
ham. The Infantry was withdrawn in orderly fashion by
groups, each retirement being covered by our fire. Captain
Fowle, Regimental Operations Officer, and Lieutenant
Hackney, 2nd Bn. Intelligence Officer, personally placed
each detachment in position on the St. Juvin-Sommerance
Road. Outposts and observation posts were established
300 meters north of this road. Through this screen, the
last of the Infantry and finally the machine gunners
leap-frogged to the rear. A brave effort was checked,
but the 327th Infantry had pierced and held for a time
the outpost of the Kriemhilde-Stellung. The following
officers of the 327th Infantry died that morning: 1st
Lieutenant Byrd (already mentioned), 1st Lt. John "W.
Anderson (Gas Officer, 3rd Bn.) and 1st Lt. Walter B.
Saddler, Co. E. Captain Conkling, F Co., received
wounds from which he later died. Many officers were
wounded and a large number of enlisted men were killed
and wounded. During this engagement Lieutenants
Rowell, Grainger and Moylan, all of Company B, 321st
Machine Gun Battalion, were evacuated for wounds. 1st
Lieutenant Fitzpatrick, Co. E, and 2nd Lt. Theodore H.
Smith, Co. L, with a little handful of men were so far
in front that when the retirement came they were unable
to get back before being cut off by the enemy. Lieutenant
Fitzpatrick was not captured until that night and Lieu-
tenant Smith until the next morning. A number of the
enemy were in turn captured by our troops during this
attack. All prisoners taken were from the 37th German
Division.

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82wd DIVISION

The 325th Infantry on October 11, 1918

The story of the 325th Infantry left that unit at about
6 hours on the Fleville-St. Juvin Road, hastening to get
in position on the St. Juvin-Sommerance Koad. Colonel
Whitman, Captain "Wright, his adjutant, and Major Pierce
were at the head of the column consisting of Companies
M, I, L and the Regimental Machine Gun Company, in
the order named. About 300 meters south of the junc-
tion formed by the Fleville-St. Juvin Road with the
Sommerance-St. Juvin Road, a burst of machine-gun fire
from the right flank swept the column. Several men
fell and our men moved into the ditch on the east side
of the road for protection. This fire came from the crest
and slopes of the hill 200 or 300 meters east of the river
road. This hill was south of the Sommerance-St. Juvin
Road, Fire also came from the slopes of Ridge 85.5
to the north and from the direction of St. Juvin, Colonel
Whitman and Major Pierce worked forward to the Som-
merance Road for a personal reconnaissance, A survey
of the situation showed no friendly troops in sight, but
many enemy snipers and machine gunners on the high
ground immediately ahead. Artillery now opened on the
road on which the regiment lay. It was 6 hours 45 min-
utes. To get into position for the Corps attack, it was
necessary to deploy to the right front and extend for a
kilometer in width from the road junction to the east. No
deployment, however, could be made until the enemy was
dislodged from the hill on the immediate right of our
column. Orders were sent to the two rear infantry com-
panies (I and L) to break off to their right and send a
skirmish line with its left flank on the highway to sweep
the enemy north of the St. Juvin-Sommerance Road.
This was successfully done and the regiment extricated for

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 101

the moment from the peril of close range flank fire. In this
preliminary action, Capt. Charles A. Fowler of Company M
was killed as he leaped to the top of the bank to direct
the deployment of his company.

As the line passed the jump-off road, Company M joined
on the left flank, and at 7:20 the attack moved forward
and started up the slopes of Ridge 85.5 under a heavy
fire which ran along the crest clear to St. Juvin. The
ridge was found to be heavily protected by enemy wire.
Along the top of the crest was a sunken road which ran
due west into St. Juvin. No American troops appeared
on the left flank of the regiment, but St. Juvin was ob-
viously full of Germans who kept up a continuous raking
fire.

The promised tanks had not appeared and no 75 mm.
accompanying gun had reported. There was no friendly
barrage preceding the advance. One platoon of the
Machine Gun Company supported the advance of I Com-
pany and another platoon cooperated with M Company.
The 3rd Platoon used indirect fire over the heads of our
advancing troops. The machine gunners moved forward
with this assault battalion and lost heavily. Our men tore
through the wire, charged and maneuvered against the
German machine gunners and killed and were killed until
the top of the ridge was in our possession. This was ac-
complished at 8 hours 5 minutes. This success could not
have been achieved except W troops of the highest morale.
The right flank company could see no Auiericau troops
on the right, but the thick mist did not permit a far view.
At 8 hours 30 minutes, liaison was established along the
85.5 Ridge with the 327th Infantry. Colonel Whitman,
accompanied by Captain Wright, proceeded along the
fire-swept road half-way to Sommerance and talked with
Captain Fowle, Operations Officer, 327th Inf.

The opposition of the enemy to our advance beyond

102 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

the sunken road on the crest of the ridge became so
intense and the fire from the left flank assumed such pro-
portions that the 325th Infantry was unable to make
further progress. Indeed, it became a very serious ques-
tion whether the regiment could cling to the position won
without suffering virtual annihilation. Colonel "Whitman
sent a runner back on the road toward Fleville with a
message to Major Hawkins, commanding the 2nd Bat-
talion in support, and directed that reinforcement be sent
up. F Company was immediately ordered forward, re-
porting to Colonel Whitman at the crossroads at about
9 hours. This company was used to cover the left flank
of the regiment by filling in the gap between the cross-
roads and the Aire River to the west. The Brigade Order
had given meridian 98.5 as the western boundary of the
brigade. This gave a front of 500 meters immediately
east of the Aire River to the 163rd Infantry Brigade. No
troops appeared, however, to fill this gap and Colonel
Whitman made the disposition already indicated.

About 10 o'clock, Capt. Parley B. Christensen of I
Company was killed on the ridge. The regiment had now
lost two of its company commanders.

325th Infantry Alone on Sommerance Road

It will be remembered that at 10 hours, Major Blaneh-
ard had withdrawn from his point of farthest advance
and was organized on this same ridge between the 325th
Infantry on the west and Sommerance on the east. Both
regiments were now in liaison and Major Blanchard, go-
ing to Colonel Ely, told him that he considered the position
a good one, although very heavy fire was coming from
the front and right flank. At 10 hours the following
message was sent to the C. G., 164th Brig., at the P. C.
in Fleville:

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 103

"Only one officer left in the battalion. Line was ahead
of both flanks and compelled to draw back. Now on
parallel 85.5. Whitman reported on my left. My officers
and men so exhausted they are not effective. Strong re-
sistance— shells — M. G. Prisoners say three regiments in
front. A strong counter-attack could not be stopped by
us. Request reinforcements, (sgd) Ely."

At 10 hours 45 minutes, the following message was
sent to Brigade Headquarters:

"No support on right flank. Both advance battalions
almost decimated. Men fought hard. Not a straggler
met. Have withdrawn to jump-off road. Slight shelter.
Request immediate help, (sgd) Ely."

The Division dossier contains the following record:

"Message No. 131, 11th Oct. 1918— from 164th Brig.—
at 11 "hours 40 minutes: From Col. Ely at 99.5-84.7, 11
hours 30 minutes. Lost 50 per cent of my command.
Boche counter-attacked; filtering in through woods. Un-
able to get in touch on my right. Line now on Som-
merance-St. Juvin Road. Unless I drop back, will prob-
ably be cut off."

*****

General Lindsey notified Division Headquarters of his
reply to Ely as follows: "Drop back under cover of
machine gun fire. Dig in if necessary and hold. Notify
Col. Whitman.' Ely said he had. I ordered artillery fire
in front."

Major Blanchard received a message at 11 hours 30
minutes from Colonel Ely ordering the withdrawal of
troops of the 327th Infantry to a ridge one kilometer
south of the Sommerance-St. Juvin Road. Shortly before
this time. Colonel Whitman received a message from
Colonel Ely stating that the 327th Infantry was with-
drawing about one kilometer south of the Sommerance

104 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

Road. As the 327th Infantry withdrew to the Sommerance-
Fleville Road on practically the same lines from which
they had jumped off that morning, Major Hawkins ad-
vanced with E Company followed by G Company, both
of the 325th Infantry, and took up a position along the
ridge on the right flank of the 325th Infantry line, re-
placing the troops of the 327th Infantry. H Company,
325th Infantry, had been detached from Major Hawkins'
Battalion by the Brigade Commander for military police
work in the vicinity of Fleville.

About 11 hours, Capt. Lamar Y. McLeod, Operations
Officer, was killed, making the third captain lost from the
325th Infantry. Colonel Whitman sent word detailing the
serious situation which confronted him and asked that the
1st Battalion, 325th Infantry, in reserve be sent to his
assistance. General Lindsey directed Colonel Wliitman to
hold the ridge at all costs and added that the 327th In-
fantry would be ordered forward again to the ridge. The
companies of the 3rd Battalion on the crest formed a
salient, the flanks of which were continually swept by
machine gun fire. Companies B and C, 325th Infantry,
arrived at 11 hours 30 minutes and were placed below the
crest to resist any threatened counter-attack. Companies
A and D, 325th Infantry, were sent by General Lindsey
to reinforce the 327th Infantry, but Colonel Ely despatched
them to Colonel Whitman. Upon their arrival at 325th
Infantry Headquarters, both companies were deployed
upon the ridge. The entire regiment was now in the breech
with the exception of H and K Companies.

At 12 hours, Capt. Louis L. Battey, A Co., was killed
while leading his men forward over the bullet-swept
Sommerance Road, The regiment had now suffered a
loss of four company commanders in a desperate half-
day of fighting. Four enemy counter-attacks were made
during the day. All the four attacks were bloodily re-

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82m) BIVTSION 105

pulsed. Our artillery responded promptly to calls for a
barrage. Twice this fire fell upon the ridge and our men
withdrew to the south slope, immediately reoccupying the
hill as the fire lifted, to follow the retiring enemy. A
message sent by Colonel "Whitman at 14 hours to Major
Pierce, 3rd Bn., illustrates the situation :

"At 2:30 P.M. our artillery fire will stop. After that
the ridge must be reoccupied. The troops must advance no
further than that. They must dig in for the night. These
orders are peremptory, (sgd) Whitman."

At 13 hours, a fifth officer of this regiment was killed,
1st Lt._^Farley W. Moody.

327th Infantry Returns to Sommerancb Rxdgb

At 14 hours, General Lindsey sent the following mes-
sage to Lieutenant Colonel Burr, commanding the 1st Bat-
talion, 327th Infantry, in Divisional Reserve.

"Report with your command to Col. Ely, who is
hereby instructed to counter-attack at once from the woods
at 99.5-83.9, straight north and regain the 85.5 ridge, and
there dig in and organize for resistance. Col. Whitman
will be instructed to advance accordingly. The ridge must
be regained, but do not go beyond the ridge to-night."

The 1st Battalion, together with a detail of seventy-five
men from the 2nd Battalion, 327th Infantry, went forward
under command of Colonel Burr and regained the 85.5
ridge at 18 hours 30 minutes. Here the regiment dug in,
organizing the position in depth. At 17 hours 10 minutes,
Colonel Whitman sent the following message to the 3rd
Battalion, 325th Infantry:

"No troops are to be withdrawn from the ridge without
orders from me. The ridge will be held to the last. All

106 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

company commanders have been notified, (sgd) Whi^
man, ' '

Among other messages in the Division dossier, the fol-
lowing are of interest:

No. 137— 11th October 1918— From 164th Brig.— 13
hours 10 minutes : ' ' Telephone from Whitman at 13 hours
10 said that Boche was counter-attacking him from ridge
north of parallel 85 between meridian 98 and 99, but he
does not fear for his left flank. Have put all my available
artillery on that ridge."

* * « * *

From 164th Brig. — 13:15 hours: "My whole brigade
is and has been east of the river since H hour. My left
flank not far from cross roads 98.2-84.9. It seems that
164th Brig, was the only one to get off at H hour. Report
that Division on my right is advancing near parallel 85
is the first I have heard of them. They must have just
jumped off. (sgd) Lindsey."

*****

Message No. 140—11 Oct. 1918— Col. Johnston to Gen.
Lindsey at 14 hours : ' ' You are authorized to take the Divi-
sional Reserve and retake the crest along the 85.5 parallel.
There are supporting troops close in your rear. Having
secured the- crest, dig in and hold line until further
orders. ' '

*****

Col. Johnston to G-3, 1st Corps: "General Liggett was
in and is satisfied with the situation. We had the mis-
fortune to be knocked off that ridge, but we are going to
take the 85.5 parallel. We are using all that we have on
that side (east of the river) and you have those troops
just below (78th Division). We would like to have you
send one battalion to Fleville. Can you do it? Col. Mont-
gomery said he would take it up with the Chief of Staff
and notify us."

In the Division dossier is one memorandum which reveals
an estimate of the troops of the 164th Infantry Brigade
during a very critical time in the operations of this des-

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nb DIVISION 107

perate day. A squadron of the 2nd Cavalry attached to
the 1st Army was performing liaison duty in the 5th
Corps. A captain from this unit, from a post south of
Sommerance, sent the following message to the 1st Brigade,
1st Division, which repeated the message to the 82nd Divi-
sion. This message reached Division Headquarters at 14
hours 45 minutes:

"Major Blanehard, 327th Inf. with 300 men, holding
crest of hill at Sommerance, withdrawing to crest of hill
1 km. south of Sommerance. Morale and confidence of
men very good, but officers badly needed by the 327th
Inf. Most of companies without officers, who were killed
or wounded. Surgeon and bandages requested."
* * # * *

"At 13 hours 40 minutes, from crest of hill 1 km. south
of Sommerance. Captain Fraser, 2nd Bn., 325th Inf. has
reached this point to support 327th Inf. Fresh troops with
splendid morale."

Night found both regiments of the 164th Brigade hold-
ing ridge 85.5 between Sommerance and St. Juvin.

Lieutenant Colonel Burr, now commanding the 327th In-
fantry, received the following message from General
Lindsey :

"Congratulate you upon attaining the ridge. Division
is greatly pleased but anxious about your defense. Under
these circumstances the ridge must not be allowed again
to get into the enemy's hands."

The 2nd Battalion of the 325th Infantry was on the right
of 327th Infantry, and outposted the brigade line near Som-
merance. A patrol from this Battalion got in touch with
the 1st Division about a kilometer to the southeast, in the
vicinity of the Cote de ]\Ialdah. The 1st and 3rd Bat-
talions of the 325th Infantry, partially mingled, extended
along Ridge 85.5 for about one kilometer of front on the

108 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

left of the 327th Infantry. Colonel Whitman's regiment
had that day lost five officers killed and twelve officers
wounded, among whom was Major Pierce, commanding the
3rd Battalion. Major Pierce refused to be evacuated.
Many enlisted men had been killed and more than two
hundred wounded men evacuated. The Regimental Sur-
geon, Major Feaster, had established his advance dressing
station where the first casualties occurred and worked with
his assistant for twenty hours under continuous fire.

The regiment had taken about one hundred and fifty
prisoners and captured twenty machine guns. The Brigade
had been tried to the utmost, but had broken through the
outpost line of the Kriemhilde-Stellung, From the posi-
tion gained that day, our troops never receded.

The action of October 11, 1918, banished any thought
that the enemy intended an extensive withdrawal. On
the contrary, he had evidenced a grim purpose to hold a
terrain so admirably adapted for defense. Neither was he
content to permit the American line to remain in undis-
turbed possession of what had been gained. In the four
counter-attacks launched against us on October 11, the
enemy had shown the utmost prodigality in expending his
infantry and selected machine gunners. His assaults had
crumbled under our fire, which inflicted heavy losses. As
each wave shattered and fell back, substantial numbers of
prisoners were left in our hands.

CHAPTER XI
THE MARCQ BRIDGEHEAD

To complete the account of the operations of the 82nd
Division on October 11, 1918, there remains only the epic
story of the 2nd Battalion, 326th Infantry. This narrative
has already described the advance of the 1st and the 3rd
Battalions of the 326th Infantry on October 10, 1918, in-
cluding the occupation of La Besogne and Marcq by the
1st Battalion.

At 14 hours, October 10, the following message was re-
corded in the Division dossier :

General Duncan to General Cronin: "Hold line of re-
sistance and at the same time press on to the river. Get
a bridgehead across."

After message received from Chief of Staff, 1st Corps,
General Duncan called General Cronin again adding:

**It will be necessary to advance your line of resistance
towards Marcq and drive enemy across the Aire."

At 16 hours 50 minutes, the following telephone message
was sent from Division Headquarters to the Command-
ing Generals 163rd and 164th Brigades:

' * Push patrols across Aire River to your north this af tei

noon and to-night. Direct them to investigate and report

109

no OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

upon available fords and bridges. Enemy identifications
from the north side of the river are desired. Early report
on result of these patrols to be made. ' '

The 2nd Battalion, 326th Infantry, less G Company, was
in reserve until mid-afternoon, October 10. G Company
of this battalion was a combat liaison group between the
1st and 3rd Battalions. About 16 hours, the 2nd Bat-
talion reached Pylone. Here General Cronin met Major
Jones, the battalion commander, and directed that the 2nd
Battalion effect a passing of lines through the 3rd Battalion ;
then continue to the town of Marcq, cross the Aire Eiver
and occupy the town of St. Juvin and Hill 182, north of
the town. Company G rejoined the battalion, which moved
through the 3rd Battalion and advanced to the heights,
south of Marcq. The 326th Infantry Machine Gun Com-
pany was attached to this battalion.

It was dusk when E and G Companies descended from
the ridge into the town of Marcq. Major Jones estab-
lished his P. C. in the edge of the town and directed E
and G Companies to proceed north and cross the river.
E Company was ordered to use the railroad bridge south-
• west of St. Juvin and G Company the Mareq-St. Juvin
Road bridge. The enemy was now shelling Marcq heavily
and this continued throughout the night. No officer or
soldier in either company had an opportunity to recon-
noiter in daylight the thousand meters of terrain between
the town and the river. It was a cloudy night with a
bleak wind blowing. G Company (Captain Jeffers) and
E Company (1st Lieutenant Huff) felt their way down
the road to the marshy lowlands. Here Lieutenant Huff
found the railroad and followed it to the left, while Cap-
tain Jeffers continued with G Company along the road.
Both the railroad bridge and the road bridge were found
to be destroyed. Simultaneous with this discovery, G Com-
pany at the shattered road bridge received a shower of

Culvert near "bloody angle," Junction St. Juvin-Sonimerance Road

Marcq Bridgehead, looking toward St. Juvln

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 111

machine-gun bullets from enemy outposts on the north
side of the river. The presence of E Company at the rail-
road bridge was not noted. Captain Jeffers and Lieutenant
Huff sent officer patrols along the river bank with orders
to discover a ford. The patrols returned after a time and
reported that a most careful reconnaissance had been made
but that no ford could be found. It was stated that the
banks of the river were steep and the water too deep for
wading. A soldier with a rifle, 220 rounds of ammuni-
tion and 50 pounds of other equipment can not swim a
river. The two company commanders held a brief con-
ference and decided to go back to Major Jones in Marcq
for further instructions. The Major directed both officers
to return and search again, step by step, along the river.
Only when certain that no ford existed was the effort to
cross to be abandoned. Again both officers and men were
sent on this mission. This time also no ford was found.

The Aire deepens and broadens substantially in its run
from St. Juvin to Grand-Pre, but there are spots suitable
for crossing had the patrols been able to stumble upon
them in the blackness of that lowering night. Near
the destroyed road bridge the river shallows to a depth
of two or three feet of water. This fact escaped our
patrols. When this situation had been again reported to
Major Jones, the latter telephoned to Colonel McArthur
at the regimental P. C. north of Pylone. Colonel McArthur
conferred with General Cronin, who directed that deter-
mined efforts be made to cross by infiltration. Major Jones
instructed the company commanders that patrols should
make a reconnaissance along the river from the island
southeast of St. Juvin for a kilometer and a half to the
west and filter across by any means possible.

As in all previous attempts no ford was found. Captain
Jeffers then directed eight successive attempts to cross on
the shattered road bridge. It was possible for only one

112 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

man at a time to scramble along this precarious footing,
clinging to sections of the hand-rail. Each of these in-
dividual efforts drew concentrated machine-gun fire which
killed several of our men and effectively blocked the pas-
sage. During the presence of our troops along the river
the enemy continued to shoot up Very lights between St.
Juvin and the north bank of the river. About midnight
the two companies withdrew to the heights south of Marcq.

At this time a conference was held in the battalion
P. C. at which ]\Iajor Jones and the four company com-
manders of the battalion were present. Following the con-
ference Major Jones telephoned Colonel Mc Arthur that it
would be necessary for engineers to construct a bridge
before troops could get across the river. Colonel McArthur
communicated with General Cronin, who ordered a platoon
of engineers to report to Major Jones. This platoon ar-
rived under the personal command of Major Kelly, 307th
Engineers, at 2 hours 30 minutes, October 11. General
Cronin had informed Colonel McArthur meanwhile that
the 2nd Battalion would attack St. Juvin at 5 hours,
October 11. The engineers tore down planks from shell-
wrecked buildings and strapped the timbers together with
their gun slings.

And now came an event of special significance. Through
the first half of the night, while the Infantry patrols were
endeavoring to cross on the demolished road bridge, the
enemy machine guns had chattered out a heavy fire on
this point. When the unmistakable noise of the hasty
bridge building began, all German machine-gun fire on
this area stopped. Only the artillery fire on the general
Marcq area continued. The Germans were now ready to
receive any Infantry at this crossing.

OFFICIAJL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

2nd Battalion, 326th Infantry, October 11, 1918

At 5 hours on October 11, a thick mist made it im-
possible to see more than a hundred meters away. The
battalion moved down the road to the bridge at H hour.
All units were in column of twos and in the following
order : G Company, one platoon Regimental Machine Gun
Company, E Company, one platoon Regimental Machine
Gun Company, H Company and F Company.

Company B (1st Lt. Thomas C. Carter, Jr.) and Com-
pany C (Captain Wert), both of the 320th Machine Gun
Battalion, were disposed in depth on the heights in tho
vicinity of Marcq and given the mission of supporting the
attack with over-head fire.

The enemy was quiet — unusually quiet, and our men
made little noise. It was hoped that the mist might cur-
tain the attack until the battalion got at close range. Cap-
tain Jeffers led on to the narrow bridge, his company be-
hind him in single file. About half of this first company
was over when a terrific burst of machine-gun fire swept
the bridge and the straight road lined with men. The
men of G Company not yet on the bridge turned to the
right and rushed into the water, crossing without great
difficulty under cover of the opposite bank which formed
a bulwark some three feet in height. The machine gun
platoon behind G Company entered the water, followed
immediately by Lieutenant Huff and E Company. Captain
Jeffers led the men of G Company fifty to one hundred
yards on to the open ground just north of the river and
east of the road into St. Juvin. G Company was followed
by the machine gun platoon attached to it. Lieutenant Huff
swung his men to the left, wading down the stream and then
crawling up the north bank of the river which offered a
natural firing position. Some automatic riflemen were

114 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

pushed a few yards forward on the left of the St. Juvin Road.
The plan of attack as directed by Major Jones prior to H
hour called for an enveloping movement against St. Juvin ;
Company G was to flank out the town from the east while
E Company struck from the west. H Company was to
support G Company, F Company to support the thrust
of E Company. By the time that the machine gun platoon
in support of E Company had entered the water and had
been followed by half of H Company, it was impracticable
to use more men along the river bank on each side of the
bridge than were already employed. The two platoons of
H Company swung to the right of the bridge along the
river, the balance of H Company remained under slight
cover beside the road running south of the river to
Marcq, while F Company deployed on the first ridge near
the railroad track.

By this time the volume of enemy machine-gun fire had
grown to barrage intensity. G Company suffered prac-
tical annihilation. Lieutenant E. N. Leiboult, G Company,
and Lieutenant Tate of the Machine Gun Company were
both killed, Lieutenant Ostranger of G Company was
wounded or gassed and Lieutenant Walter A. Richards
of G Company was three times wounded. Captain Lamar
Jcffers was first wounded at the beginning of the action
when he received a machine-gun bullet in the leg; he
continued to direct the action of his company and some
minutes later was shot through the jaw. Captain Jeffers
then summoned Lieutenants Huff and Carter of H Com-
pany to the river bank where he had been brought back
by some of his men. He stated that he was compelled
to turn the command over to them and advised that they
withdraw the men at once before all were killed. Lieu-
tenant Carter assumed command and the position was
maintained for an additional twenty minutes. Our men
dnr'ng this entire period saw few Germans and were

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 115

compelled to clioose as targets the doorways and windows
of St. Juvin. Some fire was also directed at the crest of
the ridge east and west of the town, along which the
enemy appeared to be entrenched.

The Attack Abandoned

A little after 6 hours it was decided to abandon a task
so obviously hopeless and for which so heavy a price had
already been paid. The men were sent back, a squad at
a time, with orders to take wide intervals across the fields
to the foot of the ridge south of the river where the men
were reorganized and dug in along the ridge. When the
withdrawal commenced Lieutenant Frank Carter of H Com-
pany was seriously wounded. Three officers of E Company
became casualties during this fight: 2nd Lieutenant Stone
was wounded, and 1st Lieutenants Lisenby and Rogers
were gassed. Of the officers who went down to the river
on this day all were casualties except two. The enlisted
personnel had suffered about fifty per-cent casualties
among the five hundred men who entered the fight. Dur-
ing the night of October 10, 1918, and throughout October
11th until after the withdrawal of the Infantry, two of
our machine gun platoons maintained a firing position on
the south bank of the river near the burned railroad bridge
and about 500 meters west of the road bridge used by the
Infantry October 11th. One platoon under Lieutenant
Gregorie came from Company C, 320th Machine Gun Bat-
talion and the other under Lieutenant Bell from the 326th
Infantry Machine Gun Company. The enemy artillery
fire became exceedingly heavy just prior to the with-
drawal and during the reorganization south of the river.
The artillery continued to pound our line on the heights
throughout the day.

The Division dossier shows the following messages re-

llfl OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

eeived at Division Headquarters regarding this attempted
river crossing by the 326th Infantry :

From Adjutant, 163rd Inf. Brig, at 7 :20 hours, 11 Oct.
1918. Report from Able 1 (C. 0. 326th Inf.) : "Major
Jones reports three companies on the north bank of the
river. Heavy casualties. Meeting severe machine-gun fire.
Request immediate barrage on St. Juvin and for 100 yds.
on each side of town. Jones has crossed the river. Wat-
kins is within a kilometer of the river and Barrett about
1% km. from the river. Our line is out and we have to
depend on messages. ' '

*****

From Gen. Cronin, 7:35 hours, 11 Oct. 1918. "Many
Germans in St. Juvin. Jones' Battalion very heavy casual-
ties from machine gun fire and guns on the north and
northeast of St. Juvin. Request that the artillery shell
St. Juvin heavily and hill to the northeast. Liaison with
artillery very poor."

*****

From Operations Officer, 157th F. A. Brig., 9:15 hours,
11 Oct. 1918. "One battery of 320th F. A. has been firing
on hill northeast of St. Juvin since 7 a.m. and one bat-
talion of the 320th F. A. has been firing since 8 :40 hours
and the latest reports are that the entire regiment has
been firing on that same target since 9 hours."
*****

From C. O., 163rd Inf. Brig., 9 :40 hours, 11 Oct., 1918.
"Cease firing on St. Juvin. Fire on Cote 182 northeast
of St. Juvin. Artillery fire reported falling short. Need
fire on 182 and counter battery behind 182. Note: Gen.
Duncan called artillery and directed them to comply."
*****

By radio from 326th Inf. Hdqrs., 9:53 hours, Oct. 11
to Surgeon, 82nd Div. "Number wounded. Send trucks
and ambulances to Pylone. (sgd) Kuhland."

*****

From C. 0., 163rd Inf. Brig., 11:06 hours, 11th Oct.
1918. "Our artillery activity has improved in the last
20 minutes. Boche artillery seems to be growing less.

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 117

Phosgene gas evident in our area. I have directed CO.,
326th Inf., that he must push forward, if necessary, around
the gas. ' '

*****

From Farrady 1 (CO., 78th Div.) to Albany 1 (C 0.,
82nd Div.), 12:30 hours, 11th Oct. 1918. "One Brigade
is marching towards Cornay. Another Brigade is moving
north 6 or 7 miles south of the leading brigade. ' '
*****

From Major Wainwright, A. C of S., G-3, 82nd Div.,
13 hours 12 minutes at P. C of 163rd Inf. Brig.: "Gen.
Cronin has been unable to put anybody across the river
and he is sending troops to the right flank to cross and
filter around the east." Col. Johnston told Major Wain-
wright to tell General Cronin to use the artillery liaison
officer for direct work with the artillery and only report
important things for our information. Col. Johnston asked
if the front line of 163rd Brig, is exposed to very heavy
fire. Major Wainwright replied that it was. Col. Johnston
directed the Major to tell Gen. Cronin that if considered
advisable, the General can withdraAV his line back to the
foothill facing the river, maintaining liaison with the right
of the Division on his left. * ' Tell Gen. Cronin that his line
facing St. Juvin need not be so heavily held, but can be
extended by the right flank."

*****

From Col. Johnston to Adjutant, 163rd Inf. Brig,,
14:35 hours. "There is a little change over on the right.
The right brigade is going to make a push and dig in along
the crest of ridge on 85.5 parallel. You push around your
right flank. Tell General Cronin would like him to put
one battalion Division reserve in the vicinity of Fleville.
You should connect with the left of the 164th Inf. Brig.
before dark."

*****

From C 0., 157th F. A. Brig., 15:15 hours, 11 Oct.
1918. "During the last hour and a half had several re-
quests from the infantry to eounter-battery hostile artillery
in the Bois de Loges about 4 km. north of Marcq. About
half hour ago I got the Army Artillery in communication
and they are now shelling these woods with No. 9 special

118 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

gas lachrymose. It is believed that this will have the
effect of stopping these hostile artillery batteries from
annoying our infantry. (Sgd.) Rhodes."

Evidence that the Divisions on our right and left were
also meeting with desperate resistance is found in tele-
phonic messages from our liaison officer at 1st Corps:

"77th Division reports strong resistance on its front.
Line just south of River Aire. Patrol crossing river met
very heavy machine gun and artillery fire."

*****

"5th Corps meeting machine-gun resistance along pres-
ent line."

*****

"38th French Corps unable to pass Aire or Aisne owing
to machine-gun fire."

*****

Message from Col. Johnston to Col. McArthur, 326th
Inf., 20:30 hours, 11 Oct. 1918: "Division Commander
does not intend to make direct attack on St. Juvin. Por-
tion of the sector in front of St. Juvin to be lightly held
by one battalion and one machine gun company and a
couple of 37 mm. guns. Orders given Gen. Cronin still
stand, namely: move by the east and north and establish
contact with the left flank of 164th Inf. Brig. No serious
operations contemplated for to-morrow. Please transmit
to Gen. Cronin as we are unable to reach him by 'phone
at present. Col, McArthur stated that it is difficult to
move troops on account of shell fire. Gen. Cronin had
instructed him to use his own judgment as to the time and
route in moving his men towards the eastern half of the
sector. Col. Johnston answered that the intention was to
move by tlie east and north around St. Juvin avoiding
direct contact at that point. Col. Johnston informed Col.
McArthur that after careful checking right and left all
the way to the rear, it was certain that none of our artil-
lery has been firing upon our troops. ' '

The 1st Battalion, 326th Infantry, had been withdrawn
from the outpost line La Besogne to Marcq at about 2:30

,;l j T--

ifc^R^fTv/

i^

iiM<*i

One group of graves near Sommerance

Horse lines in Aire Valley during the fight

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 119

hours, October 11 and placed in reserve near Pylone.
The 3rd Battalion remained throughout the night of
October 10-11 in a support position south of Marcq. When
the order came to swing some troops to the east across
the Aire and hook up with the left flank of tlie 164th
Infantry Brigade, General Cronin designated the 3rd Bat-
talion, 326th Infantry, for this duty. The battalion began
this move at about 17 hours, October 11, and forded the
river at the island noHheast of Martineourt Farm. The
battalion was swibjeeted to severe artillery fire, which in-
flicted a number of casualties.

It was after dark when Major Watkins reported to
Colonel Whitman. Company M, 326th Infantry, took over
a position on the left flank of tlie 325th Infantry, and
Companies I, K and L were placed in position facing St.
Juvin along the little stream which runs from the St.
Juvin-Sommerance Road to the Aire River.

CHAPTER XII

CLINGING TO THE SOMMERANCE RIDGE

The night of October 11-12 was a long night. The enemy-
artillery was periodically active, and a cold, misty dawn
found our men in fox holes along Ridge 85.5. No ad-
vance was ordered by the Corps, nor did the enemy make
any infantry demonstrations against us during that day.
Advantage of this pause was taken to organize the ground
in depth. In the 325th Infantry, the 1st Battalion was
on Ridge 85.5; the 3rd Battalion in support on the Som-
merance Road, and the 2nd Battalion in Brigade reserve.
Company K, 325th Infantry (Captain Melton), was re-
lieved from its liaison duty with the 1st Division and re-
joined the 3rd Battalion. The 1st Battalion (Lieutenant
Simpson) of the 327th Infantry occupied Ridge 85.5 on the
right of the 325th Infantry, and was supported in echelon
by the 2nd Battalion (Major Blanchard) and 3rd Bat-
talion (Lieutenant Prentiss) respectively. Our front lines
on the ridge were continually combed by enemy machine-
gun fire and the reverse slope was spattered with shell
fire. Our men in the outpost line could not raise their
heads from the fox holes without drawing fire. Our artil-
lery continued to play on St. Jnvin and Hill 182. Five
fires were noted burning in different corners of St. Juvin.
Report from the Division Observation Post at 11 :15 hours,
October 12, stated:

120

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 121

"Martincourt Farm is burning, causing many explo-
sions. German artillery harassing roads just north of
Fleville with high explosives. Some shrapnel falling just
north of Cornay. St. Juvin still on fire. ' '

On the night of October 11-12, the sector on our right
was taken over by the 42nd Division, which relieved the
1st Division. The dossier of the 82nd Division contains
the following message from General Lindsey dated 13
hours, October 12:

From Anson 1. "Have sent staff officer to get 42nd
Division to occupy Sommerance, to whom it belongs."

Telephone message from General Lindsey 's P. C. at
13:45 hours reported that Hill 247, southeasterly from
Sommerance, was occupied by the 42nd Division. The
message adds that among other materiel captured on the
previous day were thirty machine guns, two anti-tank guns
and much ammunition. At 16 hours 20 minutes, Colonel
Whitman received word that the 42nd Division had ad-
vanced its left elements to a point just southeast of Som-
merance. This released the 2nd Battalion of the 325th
Infantry, which moved back in Brigade reserve on the
Sommerance-Fleville Road.

At 14 hours, October 12, the 1st Battalion, 326th In-
fantry, relieved the 2nd Battalion erf that regiment north
of Marcq, where the 2nd Battalion had been holding its
ground since its repulse at the road bridge early in the
morning of October 11. The 2nd Battalion, when relieved,
moved back to a position in support on the heights just
south of Marcq.

328th Infantry Recrosses Aire River

The history of these operations left the 328th Infantry
on the 10th of October in Division reserve and engaged

122 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

in caring for wounded, burying the dead, and l*^rgan-
izing the units that had suffered most heavily. The men
were badly in need of food and sleep and both were secured
during the day. Late in the evening of October 10, orders
were received directing the regiment to assemble at the
cross-roads near Pylone. Daylight, October 11, found the
regiment assembled at that point. Here the men dug in
and remained under cover during the day.

At 15 hours, October 11, orders were received directing
the 2nd Battalion, 328th Infantry, to report to General
Lindsey at Fleville. On arrival at Fleville, the battalion
was placed in Divisional reserve and bivouacked on the
ridge just north of Fleville. The battalion remained in
this position throughout October 12 and 13. After dark
on October 11, the 1st Battalion, 328th Infantry, was
moved forward from Pylone to a position in the Bois de
Marcq, south of the village of Marcq, and in support of
the 326th Infantry. On the morning of October 12, the
328th Infantry was directed to report to General Liadsey
at Fleville.

Pursuant to this order, the 3rd Battalion moved at once
from Pylone to Fleville, where it bivouacked in the
woods just east of the 2nd Battalion of the same regi-
ment. The 1st Battalion was withdrawn from the woods
south of Marcq about noon of October 12 and took up a
position in the woods some 1500 meters east of Fleville
along the east and west road, where it occupied fox holes
recently abandoned by the enemy. Regimental P. C. was
established at Fleville and the men remained hidden from
the observation of enemy airplanes. These positions were
subjected to shell fire with little intermission. Enemy air-
planes were particularly active during this period and for
many days thereafter. This constant observation of our
positions which our own air service could not prevent re-
Lulted in enemy artillery fire of deadly accuracy.

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 123

In anticipation of orders for attack on October 13, the
Regimental Commander, 325th Infantry, sent the follow-
ing message, which reached the Division dossier at 17:55
hours, October 12:

' ' The regimental commander requests that vigorous artil-
lery action including heavy guns be laid on these machine-
gun nests and St. Juvin before advance starts as he be-
lieves that it is inevitable that the movement will be checked
if these machine-gun nests are not destroyed. Colonel
Whitman requests that in case of advance a rolling bar-
rage be furnished."

No attack was ordered, however, for October 13 and our
troops continued to dig themselves in more deeply along
the 85.5 ridge. The dossier contains a number of messages
which indicate the situation during October 13.

From General Rhodes to Chief of Staff, 82nd Division,
Oct. 13, 1918, 9:20 hours. "Liaison officer with the left
regiment, forward battalion, reports that they are very
much worried by snipers and machine guns in St. Juvin
and suggests that 500 heavy shells might relieve the situa-
tion. Do not like to take it up without request from
General Cronin. Suggest that we get in touch with Gen-
eral Cronin and see if he desires it. Col. Johnston, Chief
of Staff, called General Cronin and repeated the above and
asked if he desired any artiUery fire on St. Juvin to
reduce machine-gun nests and stop sniping. General
Cronin said he thought this fire would be useful. Col.
Johnston directed him to take it up with his artillery
direct and indicate as correctly as possible where the fire
would be most useful."

* * * « »

Message from Bonehead 7 (G-3, 1st Corps) to 82nd
Division, 10 hours, 13th October. "Orders to the 78th
Division have been rescinded yesterday, and instead of
moving to our right, they will move west."

* • * • «

Prom 164th Inf. Brig, at 11:10 hours, Oct. 13. "Fie-

124 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

ville and road to the north is being shelled with high ex-
plosives and considerable gas. A few casualties have been
caused. ' '

*****

Bonehead 3 (Chief of Staff, 1st Corps), to Albaay 3
(Chief of Staff, 82nd Div.), 13:50 hours, 13 October.
"Instruct artillery commander that he must use a greater
proportion of shrapnel as the supply of high explosives
is becoming limited. Arrange for the salvaging of
machine-gun strips at once. Supply is rapidly becoming
exhausted and the matter is critical. Take care of burying
the dead. Bonehead 3 was asked if the Pioneer Companies
promised could be given to the Division. Bonehead 3 said
he would take it up with G-1."

*****

Albany 3 to Bonehead 3, 14 hours, 13 October. "All
American dead will be buried to-day. All German dead
will be buried to-morrow. Artillery is using prescribed
amount of shrapnel. One company of pioneers has re-
ported. Our 6-1 has endeavored by all means to obtain
the other three companies promised us, but these have
never reported here. "We are using our machine-gun troops
to salvage the strips and we have 150,000 rounds ready
for use."

*****

Telephone message from G-2, 1st Army Corps, 14:45
hours, Oct. 13, 1918. "Corps observer reports heavy cir-
culation (German) east and west of road between Verpel
and Beffu."

This brief pause in the attack gave an opportunity for
a careful check of battle ejffectives. The very serious
losses which had befallen the 164th Infantry Brigade are
shown by the following message sent during the morning
by General Lindsey to Division Headquarters:

* ' The unconfirmed effective strength of the 327th Inf. is
at present 12 officers and 332 men. This condition requires
consideration. ' '

The following message was sent by Lieutenant Colonel

OFFICIAL HISTORY OP 82nd DIVISION 125

Burr, commanding the 327th Infantry, at 12:35 hours,
October 13 :

"In regard to list of effectives submitted by me, all of
the medical officers of the regiment inform me that of this
number 80 per cent are now totally unfit for duty and the
other 20 per cent under different circumstances would be
placed on sick report. Cause for this disability is sickness,
effects of gas and exhaustion. The 80 per cent indicated as
totally unfit for duty, they informed me, would be unable
to complete any strenuous maneuver. This is no complaint,
but simply a statement of facts submitted for your in-
formation, and if the circumstances demand the effort,
these men will go over the top and go to the limit of their
endurance. The same conditions apply to the officers,
(sgd) Burr."

The Division Post of Command had been moved on
October 9, 1919, from the cellar in Varennes to la Forge
Farm, just south of Montblainville and on the west bank
of the Aire. On the 12th of October, General Duncan
moved his headquarters forward to the chateau at Chehery,
fifteen hundred meters south of FleviUe. The head-
quarters of the 157th Field Artillery Brigade moved into
a wing of the same chateau. General Lindsey's P. C. at
this time was established in Fleville, while General Cronin
moved from Pylone to Cornay on October 12 with an
advance P. C. at Martineourt Farm.

On October 13, by Division order, the 325th Infantry
reverted to the 163rd Infantry Brigade and the 328th
Infantry passed back into the 164th Infantry Brigade.

Enemy planes were exceedingly active throughout Octo-
ber 13 and moderate enemy artillery fire continued upon
our lines.

Enemy CounteivAttack Repulsed

At 16 hours, the enemy laid down a rolling artillery
barrage and followed it with an infantry assault. The

126 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

main force of this blow fell upon the right of the 325th
Infantry and left of the 327th Infantry. The barrage
rolled over our front line and covered our men with mud,
but caused few casualties. Our artillery, in response to
calls from the infantry, laid down an effective counter-
barrage which fell with great promptness and accuracy.
This timely assistance, coupled with the rapid fire of our
infantry and machine gunners, smashed the attack before
it got at hand's grips with our line. The Germans could
be seen running back, and some were observed to throw
away their rifles. The enemy suffered many losses in this
repulse.

The progress of the counter-attack is shown by mes-
sages in the Division dopier :

Message from Austin (Hq., 163rd Inf. Brig.), 16:05
hours, 13 Oct., 1918. "German barrage falling south of
St. Juvin on 326th Inf. position. Enemy making counter-
attack. General Duncan immediately 'phoned General
Rhodes above message, ordering him to put all his guns
on position along parallel 86.5 between 98 and 104. 320th
P. A. 'phoned that they had been requested to fire on St.
Juvin and inquired if they were authorized to do so, it
being out of their sector. General Duncan replied 'Yes.' "
* * * * *

Telephone message from Division 0. P., 16:10 hours, 13
Oct., 1918. "At 16 hours the Germans started a barrage
on the north bank of the river. They are now advancing
in a local counter-attack. I can see several hundred men
in open formation advancing over ridge between 297.4-
285.4 and 298.0-285.5. They seem to be on the ridge ad-
vancing south in open formation. It looks as if they were
coming over the ridge down to the river valley. ' '
*****

From Lt. Jon&s, 164th Inf. Brig. Hdqrs, 16:30 hours,
13 October, 1918. "Boche barrage has cut off our front
line and Boche coming over. Request planes at once."

*****

Major Wainwright, G-3, 82nd Div., by telephone to

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 127

G-3, 1st Corps. "Request aeroplanes at once. Urgent.
Rush. Combat planes."

m * * * *

From 163rd Inf. Brig., 16:35 hours, 13 Oct., 1918. "1st
Bn., 326th Inf., reports that the enemy has laid a bar-
rage down on his side of the river. No damage done thus
far. Our own artillery is coming back well. No signs yet
of enemy infantry activity."

« * * « *

Message from 164th Inf. Brig., 16:40 hours, Oct. 13,
1918. "Colonel Whitman reports that German planes are
flying low over his front lines and firing machine guns
into his lines. He requasts aeroplanes from Corps to drive
them off. When asked about the progress of the Germans
in the counter-attack, Lt. Jones stated that Col. Whitman
said the Boche barrage cut off his front line, the barrage
falling between the 1st and 2nd lines. He did not know
what was happening further than that. Lt. Jones said
it took our artillery about two minutes to get to work."
*****

Message to General Lindsey from Col. Johnston, 16 :45
hours, 13 Oct., 1918. "Have you anything in the block
of woods about 500 meters west of Sommerance?" (Reply)
"I have a reserve and 10 machine guns. I have notified
people on my left of the counter-attack. Things are going
all right." (Col. Johnston.) "If you have troops and
machine guns in this bunch of woods, your men on the
slope of the liill should be well taken care of."

*****

Report from Division 0. P. at 16:55 hours, Oct, 13,
1918. "Boche artillery has weakened. Boche infantry
advancing at about 97.4 to 97.6 and 86.4. Our artillery
still firing. The Boche seem to be on this side of the hill
coming between the St. Georges and St. Juvin Road. Our
men seem to be behind little patches of woods along
86.97."

*****

Col. Johnston to Gen. Lindsey, 17 hours, Oct. 13, 1918.
"The Division Commander directs you to take charge of
the operations on Ridge 85.5 in front of your sector. The
Brigade on your left is being directed to comply with your

128 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

request for troops and is informed that you will command
in this operation."

* * * * *

Colonel Johnston to General Cronin: "The Division
Commander has directed General Lindsey to take command
of troops in this present attack on the other side of the
river on Ridge 85.5, and you will comply with his request
for troops. This refers only to present attack. General
Cronin replied that there was no counter-attack on his
left."

* * * * *

From 42nd Div., 17:05 hours, 13 Oct., 1918. "Infantry
did not come up in our front following the bombardment
now going on. Hostile aeroplanes dropping propaganda."
*****

From Hq., 157th F. A. Brig., 17:15 hours, 13 October,
1918. "3rd Bn. Forward Observer, 319th F. A., reports
that the Germans are retreating across the zone on which
the 319th F. A. is firing. The 319th F. A. now lifting
their fire 500 meters. The German barrage, which was
very severe at first, is decreasing considerably. Col.
Johnston said that he thought it would be good to shoot
shrapnel on the road from St. Juvin to St. Georges. He
thought that as the enemy began to fall back on that road
short bursts of shrapnel would come in handy. Col. John-
ston asked how quickly the artillery got information of
the counter-attack and was informed that when Artillery
Headquarters called the Artillery Regiment, it was found
that our ban-age had already been put doMm 200 meters in
front of the infantry. Col. Johnston was informed that
this operation was seriously interfering with the intended
cutting of enemy wire by artillery and was asked if there
would be time in the morning for observing fire. Col.
Johnston replied that he thought there would be time."
*****

Message from 164th Inf. Brig., 17:20 hours, Oct. 13,
1918. "Boche barrage stopping and Boche have been
driven back in front of the 327th Inf. Positions held by
326th and 325th Inf. and everything is as it was. Our
artillery barrage most effective."

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 129

Report from Division 0. P. 17:25 hours, 13 Oct., 1918.
"At 17 hours the Bochc started new barrage on Som-
merance-St. Juvin Road which at this time has practically
stopped. Was able to follow German advance to top of
ridge along parallel 85.5. Enemy then lost to sight in the
smoke this side of the ridge. Too dark to see now. Only
harassing fire by artillery."

*****

From General Rhodes to General Duncan, 17 :30 hours,
13 Oct., 1918. "320th F. A. observers report Boche re-
tiring. The counter-preparation has been stopped and we
are now pursuing them with shrapnel. On the left the
Boche collected in St. Juvin, but did not attack from
St. Juvin."

Preparing for Attack of October 14, 1918

Meanwhile plans were going forward throughout October
13 for a coordinated attack along the entire front of the
1st Army. "Within the 82nd Division a number of troop
movements were ordered, including relief of the 327th
Infantry by the 328th Infantry. Colonel Wetherill's regi-
ment had remained in bivouac, concealed along the wooded
ridge just north of Fleville. On the afternoon of October
13 the Regimental Commander, Battalion Commanders and
Company Commanders of the 1st Battalion made recon-
naissance of the terrain north to Sommerance during the
heavy shell fire of the German counter-attack. Shortly
after dark the battalions drew their iron rations and am-
munition and marched by battalions northward. The roads
were heavily shelled and a number of casualties were suf-
fered during this advance. Regimental P. C. moved from
Fleville to a position near the crossroads about 250 meters
south of Sommerance. A little after midnight of October
13-14 the 1st Battalion reached Sommerance and relieved
the forward Battalion of the 327th Infantry on the 85.5
ridge.

130 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

During tlie night of October 13 the 2nd Battalion of
the 326th Infantry moved from the support position south
of Marq through Cornay to Fleville and thence along the
Fleville-St. Juvin Road to a ravine about 500 meters south
of the St. Juvin-Sommerance Road. Here the Battalion
was in support of the 3rd Battalion of the 326th Infantry.
Regimental P. C. of the 326th Infantry vras established
in the gravel quarry several hundred meters north of
Fleville. While making a reconnaissance east of Marq,
Lt. Thomas C. Carter of Company B, 320th Machine Gun
Battalion, was instantly killed. The dossier reveals an
interesting discussion of the speed at which the Infantry
should advance behind the artillery barrage.

Telephone message from G-3, 77th Division at 17:55
hours, 13 October, 1918, to 82nd Division :

"Stated he would like to arrange for the artillery bar-
rage. Calls attention to the change in the Corps order
and to the rate of the barrage in the adjoining Corps
(5th Corps), and the instructions from 1st Corps that
Divisions will arrange independently the pace of the bar-
rage. He thought it advisable for all Divisions to take the
rate adopted by the 5th Corps." (100 meters in 6 min-
utes. )

Colonel Johnston reminded G-3 of the 77th Division
that:

"Divisions on the right are fighting in woods where
progress will necessarily be slow. Furthermore, the area
in front of the 82nd Division is open and there are danger-
ous places which we would like to get over quickly. ' '

Colonel Johnston suggested that:

"It would be desirable to arrange a definite zone for the
artillery so that there would be no danger of overlapping. ' '

At 20:20 hours, October 13, General Lindsey was asked

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 131

by Colonel Johnston at what pace he believed the advance
should be made. The General replied:

"Considering the nature of the country in front o^ me,
100 meters in 3 minutes," and added that he did not
care to linger while he was going.

At 21 :30 hours, October 13, a message arrived stating
that:

"Orders from the Army are that the rate of advance
in pending operations will be 100 meters in six minutes."

Orders for Attack of October 14, 1918

The 82nd Division Field Order No. 24 was issued at
22 hours, October 13. Under Par, 1 (Information of the
Enemy and Intention of the High Command), it was
stated :

" (a) The enemy has been driven north of the line Som-
merance-Aire River.

" ( & ) The 1st Army resumes its attack on ' D ' day at ' H '
hour. (Secret instructions provided that the attack would
be made at 8 :30 hours, Oct. 14. ) The 5th Corps on our
immediate right breaches the hostile lines. The 1st Corps
supports the left flank of the attack and pivoting on its
left maintains its advance on successive objectives. The
77th Division is charged with taking St. Juvin, attacking
from the south and east." The boundaries of the 82nd
Division specified were: east — Sommerance, exclusive,
Imecourt, inclusive, Sivry-lez-Buzancy, exclusive. West
— Marcq, inclusive, St. Juvin, exclusive, Verpel, exclusive,
Harricourt, inclusive.

The order provided that the battalion of the 326th
Infantry in the front line south of St. Juvin cross the
river when relieved by the 77th Division. It was ar-
ranged between the brigade commanders of the adjoin-
ing brigades of the 77th and 82nd Divisions that the reliei^

132 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

of the 1st Battalion, 326th Infantry, in ]\Iarcq should be
complete before H hour. The 82nd Division Field Order
prescribed that, within the Division, the attack should be
made by the 328th Infantry on the right, 325th Infantry
in the center and the 326th Infantry on the left. The
327th Infantry was placed in reserve in rear of the 328th
Infantry. All regiments except the 327th Infantry and
the 328th Infantry were to be formed in column of bat-
talions with approximately 500 meters' distance between
battalions. The two regiments excepted were so depleted
that each regiment consisted of less than one battalion in
battle effectives. The rate of advance for the infantry
was set for 100 meters in six minutes. The artillery was
ordered to cut enemy wire at a number of specified points.
In addition to this mission, the artillery was required to
use non-persistent gas before H minus 4 hours on ravines
and woods. All roads of approach and important cross-
roads were to be strongly shelled. The artillery prepa-
ration for attack was to start at H minus 2 hours. The
artillery was further charged with the protection of the
left flank from St. Juvin and Hill 182 by the use of high
explosive and smoke shells. One battery of the 321st
Field Artillery was to be at the disposal of the C. O., 163rd
Infantry Brigade, to execute special fires, and one battery
of the 320th Field Artillery to perform a like duty for
the 164th Infantry Brigade. At H hour a deep barrage
was to precede the infantry advance by 300 meters, to be
fired from H to H plus 60 minutes on the extreme right
and conform to the infantry advance. This barrage was
to be taken up again at H plus 1 hour and 30 minutes
and continued until the infantry had attained the Corps
objective. Smoke shells were to be included in this bar-
rage. One piece of 75 mm. was to accompany each front
line battalion and such guns were to report by 6 hours,
October 14, E Company of the 1st Gas Regiment was

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 133

assigned to support the attack of the 164th Brigade with
smoke and thermite. A plan was prepared for long range
machine-gun fire in support of the advance. The 2nd
Battalion, 325th Infantry, and the 319th Machine Gun
Battalion were named for the Division reserve and the
latter participated in the long range barrages. The axis
of liaison was Chehery-Fleville-St. Juvin. The plan of
Air Service was stated to be without change except that
Chehery was specified as the dropping ground for weighted

CHAPTER XIII
INTO THE KRIEMHILDE-STELLUNG

October 14 proved to be another of the outstanding days
in the battle experience of the 82nd Division — a day in
which the Division gained much territory, took many
prisoners and paid a round price for its important suc-
cesses. The march of events will be examined first from
the messages which reached Division Headquarters where
they were recorded in the dossier.

At 5 hours, October 14, 1918, Headquarters of the 163rd
Infantry Brigade reported that their "advance P. C. is
now in Fleville. " At 5 :50 hours, October 14, Army Artil-
lery phoned the 157th Field Artillery Brigade Head-
quarters and asked if they could be of any assistance to
our barrage. Our artillery replied that "Army Artillery
had already been requested to look after counter-battery
fire and that the 82nd Division Artillery was looking after
its own end of the work. " 8 :10 hours, October 14, the
Adjutant of the 163rd Infantry Brigade stated that "the
325th and 326th Infantry report everything is all right."
7:30 hours, October 14, the 164th Infantry Brigade "re-
ports that hostile balloons and aeroplanes are in vicinity
of 328th Infantry. Request that our planes be sent to
their relief. MessEige communicated to Aero liaison
officer."

134

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 135

82nd Division Liaison Officer with 77th Division — 8:50
hours, 14 Oct., 1918.

"No changes in position since report at 3 hours this
morning. Our artillery has been very active. Considerable
enemy artillery within the lines of this Division."

From Capt. Webster, Adjt. 164th Inf. Brig.— 8 :50 hours,
14 Oct., 1918.

"42nd Div. artillery falling short on the road west of
Sommerance, in our brigade area."

Major Wainwright, G-3, to G-3, 42nd Div.

"We have just received report from our forward ob-
servers that your artillery is falling short west of Som-
merance. ' '

From 164th Inf. Brig.— 8 :50 hours, 14 Oct., 1918.

"Everything started off all right at H hour. In touch
with 42nd Division on our right, (sgd) Tomassello."

From 163rd Inf. Brig.— 9 :05 hours, 14 Oct., 1918.

"Col. Whitman reports enemy planes have been flying
very freely over his lines and are still doing so. They
are not being interfered with to any extent either by our
planes or anti-aircraft guns." Note: Major Wainwright
directed Air Service liaison officer to report matter to
Air Service.

Telephone message from Division 0. P. — 9:10 hours, 14
Oct., 1918.

"We have advanced about 1 km. We are now on Hill
230. Some of our men seen there. We are along ridge at
98.0-85.5 and everything is apparently going good. Ger-
man barrage is behind our men about at the jumping-ofl
position. The Germans are shelling with gas."

Telephone message from 164th Inf. Brig. — 9:30 hours,
14 Oct., 1918.

"Prisoners belonging to 45th Reserve Division captured
east of St. Juvin by 326th Inf."

136 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

Telephone message from Division 0. P. — 9 A3 hours, 14
Oct., 1918.

"Our men along ridge at 98.1-85.5 and are rushing for-
ward at double time. They are going over the ridge.
Prisoners coming back and there seems to be a lot of
them. ' '

From Capt. Webster, 164th Inf. Brig.— 9:50 hours, 14,
Oct., 1918.

"328th Inf. reports 166th Inf. came 300 yds. into their
sector and 328th Inf. vpas subjected to double barrage in
front of advancing infantry of 42nd Div. 328th Inf. con-
nected up with 166th Inf. and 325th Inf. went forward
as per schedule."

9 :50 hours, 14 Oct., 1918— By radio to G-3, 1st Corps,
G-3, 77th Div., G-3, 42nd Div.

"First objective obtained at 9:10 hours, (sgd) G-3,
82nd Div." Note: The 1st objective was an east and west
line about 500 meters south of the St. Juvin-St. Georges
Road.

From Adjutant, 163rd Inf. Brig., 10:10 hours, 14 Oct.,
1918.

"German prisoner states: 'We expect an armistice in a
few days.' "

Col. Johnston to Gen. Lindsey, 10:15 hours, 14 Oct.,
1918.

"The next plan is to put the 155 's on that right switch
trench; that is the trench on your front. We will smear
it completely and look to you to follow there and flank out
the trenches to your left. In other words turn them by
your right flank and let the brigade on your left go slow
to their wire."

From Col. Johnston, to C. G., 164th Inf. Brig., by radio
—11 hours, 14 Oct.

"Will holding of Division reserve on crossroads just
west of Sommerauce interfere with your plans? (sgd)
Johnston."

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 1S7

Aeroplane message dropijcd at 11 hours.

"At 10:40 hours, infantry showed panels at U7 U9 — ^U9
QO— Rl Q3— R4 Q4. At 10:45, infantry showed panels
at L7 U8 — L7 QO — L8 Q2. These advance troops are being
heavily shelled. On crest of hill at R5 U5, many hostile
shells falling. Time 10 :45. On Hill 182, no shells falling.
No panels seen or movement seen. Some gas being used
against our troops. Some anti-aircraft fire received over
St. Juvin. We drove one enemy plane back which was
over our lines. Visibility very poor, (sgd) H. T. Fleeson,
12th Aero Squadron."

Telephone message from 163rd Inf. Brig. — 11 hours, 14
Oct., 1918.

"1st Bn. of 325th Inf. captured 2nd Lieutenant be-
longing to 30th Inf., 15th Bavarian Division. Prisoner
came in to lines last night preceding his regiment. The
Division has been in rest up north. This confirms presence
of 15th Bavarian Division which was first identified by
another prisoner captured last night."

From 163rd Inf. Brig.— 11 :04 hours, 14 Oct., 1918.

"C. 0., 326th Inf. reports that his present front line is
north and east of St. Juvin."

From 163rd Inf. Brig, at 11 :23 hours, 14th Oct., 1918.

"At 11:05 hours Wittenmeyer (Brig. Gen., commanding
right brigade, 77th Div.) seems not to have crossed the
Aire River. I have just given him information again about
fords and foot bridges. 326th Inf. advancing east of St.
Juvin. Support battalion moving to cover the left flank.
One pounders of 326th Inf. fighting successfully near edge
of St. Juvin."

Aeroplane message dropped 11 :27 hours, 14 Oct., 1918.

** Friendly troops advancing north of St. Juvin-Sommer-
ance Road at 11:15 hours. Arched over area at 10:45
hours. Few fires visible, (sgd) Pilot Lt. Beaucher, Ob-
server Lt. Patterson."

138 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

Memorandum to Capt. Morgan from Capt. Dunlap, 11 :30
hours, 14th Oct.

' ' The Chief of Staff directs that you move message center
immediately on receipt of this message from Cornay to
Fleville. I am sending this message by the chauffeur of
the automobile that will move you. Send couriers notify-
ing brigades that you are on the move."

From Capt. Patton, Division 0. P. at 12 hours, 14
October.

"It is certain that American troops were on the Kriem-
hilde-Stellung line some time ago. The support lines are
pa^ssing there now and our troops are occupying it in
force. ' '

Telephone Message from 163rd Brigade, 12 hours, 14
October.

"One Sergeant, one Corporal, one Private, Company 3,
32nd Regiment, 15th Bavarian Division; also 2 Privates,
1st Machine Gun Company, same Regiment and Division
captured by 1st Battalion 325th Infantry on hill east of
St. Juvin. The Sergeant has been in America before the
war and left America to fight because he loved Germany
and hated the Americans."

From General Cronin, 163rd Infantry Brigade, 12 hours,
14 October.

"Request permission for the use of the 2nd Battalion
of 325th Infantry now in Division reserve. The 1st Bat-
talion, 326th Infantry, south of the river in front of St.
Juvin has not arrived east of the river. Apparently it
is held back by the fact that the 77th Division has not
crossed north. I want the Division Reserve in ease I need
it to protect my left flank." Note: "General Cronin in-
formed that he might use the Division Reserve in case of
absolute necessity."

From 163rd Brigade.

"Major Watkins, 3rd Battalion, 326th Infantry, to CO.
326th Infantry. Advanced to east edge of St. Juvin. Took

OFFICIAL HISTORY Or 82nd DIVISION 139

50 prisoners, captured many machine guns. Had few
casualties. Heavy enemy artillery on me now. Nothing
from 77th Division. 'Phone down."

From General Rhodes, Headquarters 157th F. A. Bri-
gade— 12 hours, 14 October.

"The Artillery Liaison Officer* with the 328th Infantry
reports at 12 hours through commanding officer 320th Field
Artillery that an accompanying gun of that Regiment
under Lieut. Gunter has in the course of this morning's
battle knocked out one machine-gun pill box, and that the
gun has been adopted by the Infantry which it accom-
panies. It is being carried along close to the front lines
of our advancing infantry. ' '

From 164th Infantry Brigade at 12 hours, 14 October.
"34 prisoners from the 15th Bavarian Division captured
by C Company, 328th Infantry. ' '

From Major Watkins, 326th Infantry, relayed by 163rd
Infantry Brigade, 12:35 hours.

"I am at 90.5-85.9. Support lines here. Front line
companies 300 yards north. One officer killed and 4 officers
wounded. No contact with 77th Division. One platoon
325th Infantry got in on our left; Lieutenant says he is
in his right place."

From General Lindsey to Capt. Webster, at 12 :18 hours,
14 October.

"Reports from prisoners taken by 328th Infantry in-
dicate our front line at 11:30 hours was within the wire
near trenches at 86.7."

From General Lindsey, 12 :45 hours, 14 October.
"Reference yours concerning post of reserve Battalion
near crossroads west of Sommerance. That will be 0. K."

General Cronin to General Duncan, 12:50 hours, 14
October.

"This Brigade is approaching its objective in good form.

140 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

General Cronin has no present need for Division Reserve.
He will not use it unless pressed and will give notice at
once if he should use it."

Telephone report from Lieut. Doll, Aide-de-Camp to
General Lindsey, 13 :50 hours, 14 October.

"Have been to the nearest hill 230 and observed from
there up to the west of St. Georges. The 328th going good
as far as I can see. Can not see over second Hill 230,
which is on my level. Troops on the right (42nd Division)
are going a little slow; on the left they are keeping up
very well."

From Adjutant, 163rd Brigade at 13 :40 hours.

** Division Reserve has been ordered by General Cronin
to position east of St. Juvin in support."

From 163rd Brigade at 13 :45 hours, 14 October.

"Last report from Major Watkins states front line is
now in the Ravin-aux-Pierres. "

Colonel Johnston to Adjutant; 163rd Brigade at 13:55
hours, 14 October.

"Locate the Battalion of the 326th Infantry that is lost
(1st Bn.). It becomes the Division Reserve Battalion
and will be moved to the crossroads 300 yards west of
Sommeranee and will be held at the disposal of the Division
Commander only."

From Adjutant, 163rd Inf. Brig., 13:12 hours, 14
October.

"General Wittenmeyer reports that 77th Division has
not yet crossed Aire River. 326th Inf. reports that there
are numbers of enemy planes flying over front lines. This
fact probably accounts for a good deal of the accurate
artillery fire which the enemy has been directing on the
326th Inf."

13 :25 hours, 14 October.

"Captain Morgan reports that Division Message center

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 141

is now at Fleville and will be ready for business at 13 :30
hours. ' '

Adjutant, 163rd Inf. Brig, reports at 14:55 hours, 14
Oct., that:

''Headquarters, 326th Inf. is at 99.2-82.8. Headquarters,
325th Inf. at 98.7-85.1. Headquarters, 163rd Inf. Brig.
Fleville."

Adjutant, 164th Inf. Brig, reports at 14:50 hours, 14
October.

"Headquarters 328th Infantry at 99.6-84.55; 327th Inf.
at 99.7-83.3 ; headquarters 164th Infantry Brigade, also the
headquarters of 319th Machine Gun Bn., 320th Machine
Gun Bu. and 321st Machine Gun Bn. all in Fleville. ' '

The messages in the Division dossier for the remainder
of October 14 will be discussed later in this chapter.
Meanwhile, it is desirable to follow more closely the
progress of the attacking regiments of this Division.

328th Infantry on October 14, 1918

The 328th Infantry, pursuant to Field Orders No. 24,
occupied about a kilometer of front on the right flank of
the 82nd Division. The 1st Battalion constituted the
assaulting unit. At 2 hours, October 14, it had relieved
the 327th Infantry on a line about 500 meters north of
the Sommerance-St. Juvin Road, with the right flank of
the attack a little west of a north and south line through
Sommerance. C Company was on the right and D Com-
pany on the left, with A and B Companies in support of
C and D Companies respectively. The 328th Machine
Gun Company (1st Lieutenant De Saussure) was attached
to the 1st Battalion, together with the 37 mm. and trench
mortar platoons of the Headquarters Company. The 2nd

142 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

and 3rd Battalions were in support along the St. Juvin-
Sommerance Road. A platoon of C Company, 321st
Machine Gun Battalion, was attached to the support and
the other platoons of that company cooperated witli the
combat liaison unit between the 328th and 325th Infantry,
Early in the morning a detachment of two non-commis-
sioned officers and two privates were sent from M Com-
pany as runners to the 166th Infantry. One non-com-
missioned officer was wounded and one private killed while
effecting this liaison.

Just prior to H hour, Regimental P. C. was moved
up to a hole on the south side of the St. Juvin-Sommerance
Road. At 8 :30 our artillery laid down a strong creeping
barrage, and a moment later a portion of the barrage of
the 42nd Division fell upon our right flank and elements
of the 166th Infantry came from south of Sommerance,
overlapping our line for two hundred meters west of
Sommerance.

As our infantry arose from the fox holes and started to
attack, it was met with very heavy artillery and machine-
gun fire and considerable gas was laid down in the vicinity
of Sommerance. The machine-gun fire was particularly
severe, and we suffered many casualties before our troops
had advanced one hundred meters. 1st Lt. J. W. Hatton,
leading the front platoon of C Company, was instantly
killed while taking a rifle shot at an enemy machine-gun
nest. Lieutenants Folsom and Coombs of D Company were
both severely wounded. Four sergeants in D Company
went down before this fire. Both C and D Companies ad-
vanced slowly, working around and silencing machine-gun
nests which they found scattered in the little patches of
woods or hidden by small folds of the ground. The lead-
ing companies pushed through the wire which marked
the main line of the Kriemhilde-Stellung position about
500 meters southwest from St. Gteorges. B and A Ooaa-

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 143

panies followed in support with two platoons of H Com-
pany detailed as moppers-up covering the rear.

When D Company had crossed the St. Juvin-St. George
Road, B Company went forward and filled in a gap be-
tween the 328th and 325th Infantry. At this point Lieu-
tenant Royal of B Company was severely wounded, but
continued to direct his platoon. 1st Lt. Y. Lyons Joel,
who commanded the two "mopping up" platoons of H
Company, was severely wounded by shrapnel and died later
in a base hospital. The lG6th Infantry had failed to make
similar progress on our right, and as a result the right
flank of the 328th Infantry became exposed to enfilade fire
from the east.

Shortly after the jump-off, Major Boyle moved his P. C.
forward with the attack, accompanied by Lieutenant De
Saussure of the Machine Gun Company, who had been
previously wounded but refused to be evacuated. But a
short distance had been covered when Lieutenant De Saus-
sure was instantly killed by a shell fragment. Regimental
P. C. at this time moved to a cellar in the western part
of Sommerance, from which point it was in wire com-
munication with Battalion and Brigade P. C. 's.

At about 11 hours, the 2nd Battalion moved forward in
support, following the 1st Battalion at 500 meters. G and
H Companies were leading with E and F Companies in
support. The 3rd Battalion followed the 2nd at the same
distance. The enemy laid down a heavy barrage across
the line of the advancing battalions. At 13 hours, the 2nd
Battalion executed a passing of the lines of tlie 1st Bat-
talion and G Company, with a platoon of H Company
worked three or four hundred meters north of the St.
Juvin-Sommerance Road. The 166th Infantry was a
kilometer southeast of this point and the fire received from
the vicinity of St. Georges, as well as from the front, made
further progress impracticable. In consequence, the

144 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

regimental front line was established just south of the St.
Juvin-St. Georges Road. This line was held by the com-
panies of the 2nd Battalion, plus A Company, while C
Company's line was refused to establish combat liaison
with the left of the 42nd Division. B and D Companies
were withdrawn in support. The regiment was ex-
tended to the utmost in an effort to cling to the advancing
325th Infantry on its left and maintain contact with the
166th Infantry, which had been definitely checked on the
right.

The 1st and 2nd Battalion P. C.'s were consolidated
in a single shell hole in rear of the line, and while this
move was being accomplished Lt. Robert F. Mitchell of
the 328th Machine Gun Company was killed. The strength
of both the 1st and 2nd Battalions had been greatly re-
duced by casualties and the two units were combined under
Major Boyle as an operating Battalion, although all the
companies retained their identity. The 3rd Battalion, now
reduced to ninety men, dug in on a position a kilometer
north of the St. Juvin-Sommerance Road. During October
14 the 327th Infantry, in support, took up a position
along the Sommerance-St. Juvin Road.

325th Infantry on October 14, 1918

The 325th Infantry, because of its advanced position on
the crest of the ridge 85.5, was already on the first objective
assigned by the Corps and, in accordance with the time
schedule prescribed, did not attack until 10 hours. The
1st Battalion, 325th Infantry (Captain Castle), led the
assault, supported by the Stokes Mortars and 37 mm.
platoons. The 325th Machine Gun Company (Captain
Williams) sent six guns to the 1st Battalion and four to
the 3rd Battalion which supported the attack at a distance
of about 1200 meters. The 2nd Battalion was held in

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 145

Division Reserve. The assault Battalion, following closely
behind an excellent barrage, advanced for one and one-half
kilometers, reaching the St. Juvin-St. Georges Road and the
crest immediately north of the road. The 3rd Battalion
also advanced and later the 2nd Battalion moved forward
in line of combat groups as if on drill. Some of the mes-
sages received by Colonel Whitman during the morning
indicate the progress of events.

"10:30. 1st Battalion started over the top as per
schedule. No information received from front line at this
time, but^ rear waves and support Battalion can be seen
from this position. About 40 prisoners have passed through
our hands. Castle."

"10:59. Reports show line advancing as per schedule.
Prisoners are seen coming over the hill in large groups.
Support Battalion is now passing my P. C. I will move
forward at once with my personnel except adjutant and
establish new P. C. Everything looks roseate. Castle."

"12:03. Have established new P. C. at 98.6-85.8 in
ravine. Front line is being held up. Meeting stiff re-
sistance from ridge north of St. Juvin-St. Georges Road.
3rd Battalion should be pushed forward to our first
objective and make preparation to resist counter-attack.
Castle. ' '

"12:45, C. 0. 3rd Battalion. Report position of your
companies. Castle is meeting resistance from ridge north
of St. Juvin-St. Georges Road. Send forward to see if
he needs support and put one company in if necessary.

Whitman."

"C. 0. 325th Infantry, 13:20. Co. L extends right of
leading Battalion of 326th which is halted on St. Juvin-
St. Georges Road. Co. L is on the road from 98.1-98.4.
Co. K from 98.4-99 on parallel 86.2. Co, M is 300 yards
behind L's right. Co. I is 200 yards behind K's right.
Have pushed one platoon Co. L out 150 yards to cover the

146 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

1st Battalion left. The leading Battalion of 326th Infantry
say they are ordered to hold this road. They are digging in
on it. Our Regiment can not go on without putting left
flank in air. Pierce."

"14 hours. To C. 0. 3rd Battalion. Disregard distance
of 1200 metere from 1st Battalion. Take up position on
ridge in rear of Castle. Dig in and hold to the last if
attacked. Get in touch with 328th Infantry on your right
at once. Whitman."

"From C. O. 3rd Bn. 326th Inf. to C. O. 325th Inf.
16 :00. Occupy road to your left and am under heavy
M. G. fire from St. Juvin, flank wholly unprotected. Will
let you know of any change. Wateins."

From Major Hawkins after a reconnaissance :

"1. Our 1st Battalion has passed beyond observation over
ridge through parallel 86.8.

"2. Our 3rd Battalion has 2 companies on line of road
from about 98.3-86.3 to about 98.9-86.6, and 2 companies
in support on reverse slope about 400 meters southeast.

"3. The 326th Infantry front line Battalion has pro-
longed Major Pierce's line on the road leaving left of our
1st Battalion unprotected.

"4. This Battalion will move east of St. Juvin as
directed after reconnaissance. Hawkins."

"14:30 to C. O. 1st Bn. Good work. Hold what you
have. The 326th has been ordered to push forward to
cover your left, and the 328th to cover your right. Do
not go too far ahead of your flanks. Pierce will support
you. Give me exact position of your lines. Do you need
ammunition and if so at what point? Whitman."

"15:45. To C. 0. 325th. No change in dispositions
since I wrote except that company B 320th M. G. Bn. is
placing guns in new support. Support Battalion 328th is
on my immediate right. Everjlhing standing still. I
surmise advance waits on St. Juvin although A and D both
wanted artillery on final objective a while ago. Boche plane

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 147

flying straight back and forth along our line, I think mark-
ing it for fire. None of our planes in sight. Pierce.''

"15:50. To C. 0. 1st Bn. The 326th has been ordered
to push forward to protect your left. Artillery has been
called for 500 yards north of your position. Is 328th as
far advanced a.s you on your right? Am sending am-
munition to your P. C. Hold what you have until your
flanks are covered. Fine work. Whitman.''

"15:07. D Co. reports short of both kinds ammuni-
tion. Suggests details from reserve battalion be sent in
sufficient numbers to carry 7000 rounds both rifle and
Chauchat ammunition to each company. Enemy planes
have been driven off by our planes, but not until they
had done serious damage. D Co. reports heavy losses.
B Co. is now in front line. Request C. 0., 3rd Bn., be
instructed to place two companies in support of my front
line on the St. Juvin-St. Georges Road at once. I have
instructed my companies to dig in for the night. Request
artillery fire heavy barrage for ten minutes at intervals
of 50 minutes and harassing fire between times during
entire night. 326th Inf. stopped on St. Juvin-St. Georges
Road and say they have instructions to go no further.
Our flanks are exposed. Our front line extends from 98.2-
86.5 to 99.2-86.9 (sgd) Castle."

An excellent statement of the general condition of all our
troops at the close of operations on October 14 is found
in the following summary by Colonel Whitman, taken
from the history of the 325th Infantry:

"Nightfall found us well north of St. Juvin-St. Georges
Road and dug in, utilizing shell holes for the combat
groups. Men were tired and wet and cold. Casualties
very heavy.

"Two Stokes Mortars and 2 Pounders were placed near
the St. Juvin-St. Georges Road and were used against
the Ravin aux Pierres and woods north thereof. Stokes
fired 300 rounds. Pounders fired 850 rounds.

148 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

"Rations and water were brought up at night but it
was a difficult matter to get them distributed to the men.
Details were sent to the crossroads for food but it was a
slow process under shell fire. Many men had lost their
raincoats and overcoats. A cold persistent rain reduced
their spirits — the shell holes were deep in mud and water.
It was a time that called for the best stuff in every officer
and man.

"Our positions had undoubtedly been thoroughly studied
by enemy planes during the day. Our front battalion was
conspicuous on the ridge north of the main road ; its flanks
were unsupported. The position was an exposed one, fac-
ing a very strong position of the Boche.

"During the day the following officers were casualties:

Killed

1st Lt. William P. Spratt
1st Lt. Norman A. Garrett
2nd Lt. George W. Huston

Wounded *

Major Thomas L. Pierce
1st Lt. J. H. Thompson
2nd Lt. Everett Shepherd

"This made the third day on which Major Pierce had
been wounded. The very serious nature of the wound
received this day compelled his evacuation."

326th Infantry on October 14, 1918

The 326th Infantry attacked at 8:30 hours, advancing
on the left of the Divisional sector on a front of about
600 meters, extending east from St. Juvin, exclusive. The
3rd Battalion (Major Watkins) was the assault unit, with
Companies K and M leading on the right and left re-
spectively. Companies I and L were in support. Two
platoons of Company K were maneuvered to protect the

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 149

left flank against fire coming from St. Juvin. This platoon
entered the eastern outskirts of the village, destroyed
several machine-gun nests, captured fifteen machine guns,
one cannon and about seventy-five prisoners. This success-
ful exploit enabled the Regiment to move forward past St.
Juvin to its objective.

The advance of this battalion was supported by A Com-
pany, 320th M. G. Bn. (Captain Shivers). Of the many
gallant deeds which were performed by all ranks during
this attack we must credit here that of Lt. Wm. C. Acho-
son, commanding the 3rd Platoon of this machine-gun
company. The platoon was operating with the right flank
of the battalion. At 9 :30 hours the machine gunners cap-
tured and sent to the rear thirty-six prisoners. As the
advance continued, more and more pressure fell upon the
battalion's right flank. All but a few men in this platoon
were killed or wounded by 10 :30 hours. At this time, all
the men at one gun had been killed or wounded. Lieu-
tenant Acheson at once took charge of this gun himself and
continued firing without assistance until he also was killed.

The advance continued to the St. Juvin-St. Georges
Road, where it was held up awaiting the arrival of sup-
porting troops on the right and left. A position was
organized with Companies K, L and M on the road and
Company I perpendicular to the road, facing St. Juvin.
The 2nd Battalion in support followed the assaulting bat-
talion, taking a position in the ravine across the St. Juvin-
Fleville Road, just north of its junction with the road to
Sommerance. Here it remained until about 16 hours, at
which time it moved forward to protect the left flank of
the 3rd Battalion along the St. Juvin-St. Georges Road.
The 1st Battalion, 326th Infantry, was not released from
its position north of Marcq and west of the river until a
little after 13 hours, October 14, when it was relieved by
elements of the 77th Division.

150 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

The plan of attack had contemplated the relief of this
battalion during the night of October 13-14, and following
such relief the battalion was to be used as a reserve in
the operations east of the river. As has already been
indicated in the messages of the dossier, considerable
anxiety was felt because of the non-appearance of the bat-
talion, until the cause for the delay was made known. The
1st Battalion forded the Aire River on the afternoon of
the 14th in small groups because of the intense artillery
fire. While en route, orders reached this unit directing it
to take station at Sommerance in Division reserve.

The 326th Infantry Regimental P. C. was moved to a
ravine south of the St. Juvin-Sommerance Road at a point
99.3-83.3 and on the morning of the 15th moved to the
ravine at the junction of the St. Juvin-Fleville-Sommer-
ance Roads, known throughout the division as the "Cul-
vert" or the "Bloody Angle."

A message from the 1st Battalion, 320th F. A., to the
157th Field Artillery Brigade at 16:35 hours indicates
the final enemy reaction for the day against the center of
our line :

"German counter-attack on 325th Inf. approximately
between meridians 98 and 99. I have laid down barrage
at 87.2 between meridians 98 and 99. The 325th front
line extends from 86.6 to 86.9. Tell 319th F. A. to give
some firing along line 87.5 between meridians 98 and 99."

Note: Artillery Headquarters reports that 238th Field
Artillery (French) and 320th Field Artillery (American)
are executing barrage now (16:30 hours), also that it is
a heavy counter-attack.

This enemy effort was shortly dissipated by this fire.

CHAPTER Xiy
THE TAKING OF ST. JUVIN

No little confusion has resulted from the contradictory
reports concerning the capture of the town of St. Juvin.
There could be no better illustration of the "Fog of War"
which often envelops local details of large operations. Some-
times the confusion is created by the failure of observers
to interpret correctly events watched from a distance. In
other cases subordinates report that a certain course of
action is being undertaken, and the successive transmis-
sion of this information results in the confident assertion
at a Division or Corps Headquarters that the effort has
succeeded; or, the effort succeeds for the moment and is
later reversed by the enemy. These are but some of the
causes which, in the heat of battle, give rise to con-
troversy which may be sincerely maintained by both parties
for a lifetime.

The 82nd Division does not consider that it is a matter
of paramount importance whether the 82nd Division or the
77th Division captured St. Juvin and Hill 182, north of
St. Juvin. Both Divisions can agree that the town was
captured by the 1st Corps, and it is doubtlessly equally
true that St. Juvin fell because of the joint sacrifices of
these two Divisions.

The admiration that the 82nd Division entertains for the
achievements of the 77th Division will forever prevent any
acrimonious sting in a discussion of this question — a ques-
tion which, at the mo^t, will be of interest only to the two
151

152 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

Divisions involved. Nevertheless, those charged with the
duty of presenting an accurate record of the battle history
of the 82nd Division are impelled by a sense of obligation
toward those of our Division who fell in and around St.
Juvin to present here the findings of our painstaking in-
vestigation. We have no disposition to press the official
letter from General Pershing which appears in an Annex
of this history, in which the Commander-in-Chief, months
after the Armistice, congratulates the Division upon the
capture of St. Juvin. Nor again does the 82nd Division de-
sire to over-emphasize the fact that the town of St. Juvin
became untenable for any substantial force of the enemy
after the left of our assaulting line had swept through the
eastern outskirts of St. Juvin during the forenoon of Octo-
ber 14. It is true that no one doubts the military maxim
that in modern warfare, small towns fall when enveloped,
or that the possession of commanding points outside of
towns inevitably requires the evacuation of such centers.
It is therefore unfortunate that a practice has persisted
by which military successes have been measured in terms
of unimportant villages rather than by reference to ter-
rain features, which were the governing factors. The
physical presence of a few soldiers in a cluster of ruined
buildings has often received an emphasis quite unmerited.
It is proposed, however, to discuss briefly the capture
of St. Juvin entirely from the angle of physical presence
within the town. It is also proposed to discuss here the
taking of Hill 182 — that formidable hump covering about
a square kilometer of ground, rising to a plateau crest a
little north of St. Juvin. The town itself is located on
the southern slope of this hill. The St. Juvin-Grand-Pre
Road marks the southern boundary of St. Juvin and runs
in a general northwesterly direction parallel to the Aire
River. At St. Juvin, the river and road are separated
by low, level ground, about 500 meters in width.

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

Orders from Higher Authority

The Field Order of the 1st Corps assigned to the 77th
Division the mission of taking St. Juvin. The plan called
for an attack from the south and east. The sector of the
82nd Division was bounded on the west by St. Juvin, but
the town was specifically excluded from the Divisional
sector. This entirely sensible plan for a coordinated ad-
vance by the two divisions first broke down when the 77th
Division failed on the night of October 13-14 to relieve
the 1st Battalion of the 326th Infantry, which was holding
the lines south of the river and squarely facing St. Juvin.
Consequently, the 77th Division did not attack north
across the river at 8 hours 30 minutes on October 14. In
fact, the 1st Battalion of the 326th Infantry, as previously
said, was not relieved until after 13 hours (1 o'clock in
the afternoon) on the 14th day of October, 1918. As a
consequence, the 82nd Division fought its way forward
through the daylight hours of October 14 with a left flank
more perilously exposed with each hundred meters of
ground gained. Heavy casualties were inflicted by the
fire which came from St. Juvin and more especially from
the crest of Hill 182. The machine guns which operated
from the eastern edge of St. Juvin were for the most
part silenced by the two platoons of K Company, 326th
Infantry, already mentioned, which swept through the
eastern outskirts in a successful raid. Fire from the north-
ern part of the town continued throughout the day. Our
units which pushed past St. Juvin were particularly
harassed from Hill 182. Word was anxiously awaited
at Division Headquarters stating that the 77th Division
was crossing the river and had cleaned up this menace to
our line.

The 82nd Division dossier records a question by Colonel

154 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

Johnston, Chief'of Staff, 82nd Division, to General Cronin,
commanding the left brigade of the 82nd Division, asking
if the General believed it would be better to take St.
Juvin. The General replied that he believed he could
take it. Colonel Johnston directed that the brigade wait
for further instructions on this point. The dossier also
shows a conversation between the same two officers an
hour later, at 14:35 hours. Colonel Johnston said he had
been talking to the 1st Corps about St. Juvin and that the
Corps had told him that if the 77th Division did not hurry
and take St. Juvin, the 82nd Division would have to take
it. Colonel Johnston requested the General to prepare
plans for occupying the town, but to await orders before
making the attack.

At 15:20 hours, the 82nd Division Observation Post on
the high ground back at Marcq reported that no one had
been seen entering St. Juvin from the west, and that their
observation covered the entire town of St. Juvin and
Champigneulle.

At 15 :30 hours, October 14, a message reached Division
Headquarters from Pilot Lieutenant Paradise and Observer
Lieutenant Wright, 12th Aero Squadron, stating that a half-
hour previously they had machine-gunned enemy troops
in trench on Hill 182.

At 16 hours 10 minutes, a telephone message from the
82nd Division O. P. reported that troops could be seen
advancing north along the edge of the woods located east
of Martincourt Farm. This was the first evidence seen
by observers of an advance by troops of the 77th Division
along the west bank of the Aire River. At 18 hours the
liaison officer with the 77th Division telephoned 82nd
Division Headquarters that the 154th Brigade (77th Divi-
sion) reports that two battalions of the brigade got across
the rivor at 16 hours and that one battalion of the 306th
Infantry was crossing behind them between meridians 98

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 155

and 99 and moving forward. The message continues as
follows :

"In addition to two battalions, the Brigade reserve is
in the process of crossing the bridge at Fleville and will
march north together with Brigade Headquarters. A re-
port will be made when they are entirely across. Another
battalion of the 305th Inf. is crossing the bridge about 1
kilo north of Fleville. An officer of Brigade Headquarters
is with that battalion. Col. Smedberg is going to take
these two battalions of the 305th Inf. and Brigade reserve
and march them north. That makes four battalions, and
one more will soon be there. ' '

This message was immediately followed by a message from
77th Division Headquarters that Hill 182 was occupied at
18 hours by the 77th Division.

The final report from the 77th Division Headquarters of
the day 's activities was sent to the 82nd Division at 21 :15
hours October 14th.

"77th Division line extends from — east boundary

97.1-86.4
96.8-86.3
95.9-85.5
94.3-85.5
93.9-86.7
93.0-86.11

Prom the right Brigade, 77th Division, at 19 :30 hours. —
"80 to 90 prisoners have been taken from St. Juvin by the
306th Inf. As yet they have not been brought into the
Division and identifications are not known at this time."

From the right Brigade, 77th Division, at 20:15 hours. —
"We have H Co., 305th Inf., on hill north of St. Juvin.
Two battalions of the 305th Inf. are in support east of St.
Juvin. We have perfect liaison with the 325th Inf. The
C. 0. of the 305th Inf. now with C. 0. of 325th Inf. at

156 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82no DIVISION

98.6-84.9. H Co., 305th Inf., arrived at HiU 182 shortly
after 5 hours."

The sequence of these messages from Headquarters of the
77th Division would indicate that some time after 16 hours,
October 14, the units of the 77th Division occupied St.
Juvin, and that after 18 hours the plateau on Hill 182
was occupied in force.

What Transpired on the Front

But during these hours events were taking place on the
left flank of the 82nd Division, which have since been sub-
stantiated in detail by officers from the 82nd Division who
have gone over the ground step by step with the officers
who led the left flank units of the 82nd Division on the
14th of October, 1918. During the afternoon the 3rd
Battalion of the 326th Infantry, in line just northeast of
St. Juvin, was receiving a very harassing fire from
machine guns located in the northern edge of St. Juvin
and just south of the plateau crest of Hill 182. It became
a matter of immediate necessity to silence this fire and
occupy the terrain. Lt. Andrew K. Benjamin, Co. A,
320th M. G. Bn., with the 1st Platoon of that company,
was supporting the 326th Infantry from a point just east
of St. Juvin. At about 15 :30 hours, Benjamin led his
platoon, plus a small infantry detachment, into St. Juvin
and attacked the German machine gunners established in
the northern half of St. Juvin. He speedily captured three
German officers and twenty German machine gunners and
drove out some other small enemy detachments found in
the northern part of the town. Lieutenant Benjamin then
set up his guns in the north edge of the town, where he
had complete observation on the plateau of Hill 182.
Prisoners were sent under a guard back to the St. Juvin-

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 157

Fleville Road. Before entering the town Lieutenant Ben-
jamin was in a position from which all of the terrain
between St. Juvin and the Aire River was under his ob-
servation, and he had closely watched this territory in
order to discover either the approach of supporting troops
on his left or an enemy attempt to envelop our flank
from the west. When Lieutenant Benjamin's men re-
turned to the Hill after turning over the prisoners they
informed him that they had seen troops of the 77th Divi-
eion advancing in open formation just south of St. Juvin.
They also informed him that a body of the enemy hidden
in the south edge of the town along the Grand-Pre Road
had given themselves up to the 77th Division. Lieutenant
Benjamin remained in position and at the alert throughout
the night. No troops from the 77th Division were seen
or heard in the northern part of the town, nor were any
Americans apparent at any time on the plateau crest of
Hill 182.

At this point it is necessary to interrupt the discussion
of events on Hill 182 in order to follow the march of events
throughout the Division on the night of October 14 and
the morning of the 15th. Attention is here invited, however,
to the discussion of the taking of Hill 182, on the morning
of October 15, which vdll follow in sequence a little later
in this narrative.

The Machine Gun Battalions of the Division rendered
the utmost assistance during the period October 15th to
November 1st, 1918, by firing overhead barrages and cross
fires which searched the ravines and gullies utilized by the
enemy. These firing schedules were carefully prepared by
Major Moore, the Division Machine Gun officer, assisted by
Captain Louis Marchand of the French Mission attached to
the 82nd Division.

CHAPTER Xy

THE ST. GEORGES' ROAD AND HILL 182

82nd Division Field Orders No. 25 issued at 21 hours,
October 14, directed a continuation of the attack at 7 :30
hours, October 15, 1918. The order stated that "the
Kriemhilde-Stellung has been broached by the 82nd Div.'*
It provided that troops be formed for attack at 6 hours,
15th October, jumping off at 7 hours 30 minutes and con-
tinuing without halt to the Corps objective. Artillery-
preparation was to continue throughout the night, using
quantities of non-persistent gas until H minus 4 hours. A
barrage was prescribed 300 meters in front of the jump-
ing-off line at 7 hours 25 minutes to move forward at the
rate of 100 meters in 6 minutes at 7 :30 hours. One para-
graph of the order contains the following:

"Attention is invited to the advisability of covering
the advance with scouts separated by wide intervals. In
the attack supports and reserves will be kept well echel-
oned in depth and will advance in lines of small columns.
It must be impressed upon all that the wide front the
Division is called upon to cover, necessitates considerable
intervals between combat groups. Thickening of front
lines where resistance is encountered by feeding in sup-
ports and reserves must be avoided. Full use will be
made of all auxiliary infantry weapons and the forward
guns of the field artillery."

158

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 169

The Posts of Command in the Division were specified:

82nd Div. Headquarters ... No change.

163rd Brig 98.4-84.9, from 10 hours.

164th Brig Sommcrance, from 10 hours.

157th F. A. Brig No change.

The order of regiments on the Division front was un-
changed. The 328th Infantry still occupied the right flank,
with the 325th Infantry in the center and the 326th In-
fantry on the left. The 327th Infantry continued in
support behind the right flank of the Division.

The orders which reached the 328th Infantry during
the night of October 14-15 were further supplemented
with the direction that the regiment would attack as
soon as the 42nd Division came up abreast of the leading
battalion of the 328th Infantry. Captain Weaver of C
Company, 328th Infantry, went over to the Captain of
the left company of the 166th Infantry and informed him
of the contents of the order received. Captain "Weaver
was told that the 42nd Division would advance at H hom*.

Serious Enemy Attack, October 15, 1918

At about 7 hours the enemy made a very determined
infantry counter-attack along our entire Divisional front,
preceding the assault with a particularly vicious barrage
of artillery and machine-gun fire.

Visibility was very poor on the morning of the 15th and
our men had practically no warning of the approaching
enemy infantry. The German barrage held our men on
the exposed ridge, flattened in fox holes, and a swarm
of the gray-uniformed enemy was on top of our outposts
before the combat groups a little in the rear could grasp
the full significance of the peril. A desperate fight of an
individual character followed at hand-to-hand range in

160 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

all three regiments. Full force of the blow fell upon the
left flank units of the 328th Infantry and the right flank
of the 325th Infantry. Some of our combat groups were
forced back a couple of hundred yards on to the St. Juvin-
St. Georges Road. The support groups on the road, how-
ever, at once advanced to engage the enemy while the
men in the 328th Infantry, a short distance to the right
of the point of impact, stood up in their fox holes and
opened rapid fire with their rifles and Chauchots. Further-
more, troops were pushed forward on the right of our
line from which point they could shoot enfilade volleys
down the German infantry lines.

The spirit of resistance which our men everywhere
evinced shattered the enemy assault and inflicted very
heavy losses. In about fifteen minutes the German sur-
vivors were running back, pursued by American fire.
During this encounter both sides lost in captured about
an equal number of prisoners — perhaps thirty or forty.
There was little inclination to surrender shown by either
side. At 7:25 hours our own bombardment fell as pre-
viously scheduled and hastened the enemy retirement.

328th Infantry on October 15, 1918

The 166th Infantry did not advance at H hour and the
328th Infantry was in consequence unable to advance ex-
cept for a short distance. The left flank of the regiment,
however, endeavored to stretch forward in liaison with
the 325th Infantry. At 8 hours, German skirmishers were
discovered on the right flank of the 328th Infantry, and
in front of the 166th Infantry. Lieutenant Day with a
strong patrol was sent to attack these enemy elements and
succeeded in capturing prisoners and compelling the re-
tirement of German elements encountered.

Throughout the day the enemy poured a terrific shell

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 161

and machine-gun fire upon our lines while enemy planes
flew at low altitudes and machine-gunned our infantry.
Lieutenant McArthur, 328th Inf., moved his 37 mm.
Platoon into the front line and fired point-blank at ma-
chine-gun nests and other targets. The 328th Machine
Gun Company (Captain Jones) occupied the woods on the
right flank of the regiment and did effective work. An
artillery observer occupied a shell hole near the forward
Battalion P. C. and numerous targets were given to the
accompanying 75 mm. guns. Telephone wires were continu-
ally cut by enemy shelling, but the men from the Signal
Platoon worked steadily under enemy observation repair-
ing the breaks. It rained intermittently throughout the
day and at night a steady downpour set in.

325th Infantry on October 15, 1918

In the 325th Infantry, arrangement of troops on the
morning of October 15 was the same as on the previous
day except that the 325th Machine Gun Company was
scheduled to join the 2nd Battalion of the 325th Infantry
in Division reserve. C Company, 320th M. G. Bn., was
assigned to the assaulting battalion of the regiment.

The counter-attack against the 325th Infantry fell with
especial force against Companies B and D which tem-
porarily retired to the St. Juvin-St. Georges Road. Cap-
tain Castle, commanding the 1st Battalion, telephoned at
once to Colonel Whitman and the support Battalion was
immediately thrown forward to stiffen the line. Prompt
action by Captain Taylor with A and C Companies on the
right flank broke up the Boche line in front of the Regi-
ment and the enemy retired leaving seven machine guns
and nine prisoners. Shortly after H hour the 325th In-
fantry advanced to the crest north of the road but could
go no farther. Heavy machine-gun fire from the front.

162 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

and flanks held our men at this point. The Division now
ran out into a salient between St, Juvin and St. Georges,
and it was apparent that no substantial progress would
be possible until the Divisions on our right and left were
able to get forward in turn. During the afternoon our
attack was again pushed in the center, and elements of
the 325th Infantry reached the Ravin aux Pierres. Twenty
machine guns and a number of prisoners were taken.
This ravine was destined to be a very formidable obstacle
and the scene of much hard fighting before it became the
permanent possession of this Division. The ravine was
very deep, with a fairly perpendicular drop on the southern
side. It was filled with a dense growth, and the northeast
end of the ravine ran up into a strong enemy position
northwest of St. Georges. As a result enemy machine
gunners could easily filter into this open end and gain a
position on the flank of our forward elements without
coming under observation. Deep dugouts in the south
wall of the ravine gave the enemy security from our fire,
but were not so happily placed for protection from the
north when we occupied the position. It was from this
ravine that the enemy counter-attack emerged on the
morning of the 15th, and to this shelter that it returned
after the repulse. On the afternoon of the 15th our men
who reached this point were exposed to a fire of such
intensity that the survivors withdrew to the crest north
of the St, Georges Road and dug in for the night. Our
men were now at the point of exhaustion from lack of
sleep and constant exposure to cold and rain.

The 1st Battalion, 325th Infantry, reported 7 officers
and 125 men as fighting effectives, while the 3rd Battalion
of that regiment made a return of 3 officers and 175 men.

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

326th Infantry on October 15, 1918

In the 326th Infantry Colonel McArthur had planned
to make the assault ou the morning of the 15th with the
1st Battalion which was to move from its position in re-
serve near Sommerance and, passing through the 3rd
Battalion in the front line, continue in a northerly direc-
tion to the high ground east of Champigneulle, keeping
in liaison with the 325th Infantry on the right. The 1st
Battalion was delayed in making the considerable move-
ment required, and Major Watkins, knowing that the at-
tack must go off at H hour, did not wait for relief but
initiated the attack with the 3rd Battalion. The advance
here, also, was made in the face of very intense fire. The
Battalion succeeded, however, in getting forward until its
right flank was within a short distance of the Ravin aux
Pierres. The left flank of the Battalion was on the north-
east slope of Hill 182. At this point the 1st Battalion,
with Companies A and D in assault and B and C in sup-
port, passed through the 3rd Battalion and continued the
attack. It was found possible to make only a slight ad-
vance, but a considerable number of prisoners were cap-
tured. Both flanks of the Battalion were receiving fire
and Captain Knowles gave orders to dig in and hold.

The Affair on Hill 182

The order of events now moves farther to the west,
where a very extraordinary affair raged for a half-day
on the top of Hill 182 and left that strategic point in the
possession of the 82nd Division. The 82nd Division re-
gards the exploit on Hill 182 during the forenoon of the
15th as one of the striking episodes in the war and a
brilliant example of success won against great odds by

164 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

a small American miit. The whole business smacks of
modern knight errantry. Capt. Frank M. Williams, com-
manding the 325th Machine Gun Company, had been
directed to take his company to Hill 182 and from there
to support by machine-gun fire the advance of the Divi-
sion's left flank. At about 6 hours Captain Williams
sent runners to his company, then supporting the line of
the 325th Infantry, directing his lieutenant to move the
company on to Hill 182. Captain Williams started alone
for the hill intending to reconnoiter machine-gun positions
before the arrival of his men. The previous experience
of this officer is sufficiently unusual to deserve mention.
For several years he was a Deputy Sheriff in both
Wyoming and Montana, and during that time had won
some twenty individual gun fights against cattle outlaws.
He once won the bronco riding championship at the
big Cheyenne open tournament. Later he had joined
Buffalo Bill's "Wild West" show where he gave exhibi-
tions in riding untamed horses and was pronounced by
Colonel Cody the greatest bronco breaker the Colonel
had ever seen.^ Captain Williams walked through the
eastern part of St. Juvin and saw no American or Ger-
man troops. On the eastern slope of the hill, near the
north edge of the town, he found a lieutenant with a,
platoon from the 77th Division occupying a piece of trench.
The lieutenant informed him that the platoon had become
separated from other troops of the 77th Division and did
not know where they were now located. He had therefore
placed himself on the flanks of the 326th Infantry. He
arrived there during the night and had no information
of the enemy. Captain Williams advised him to send a
runner to find his battalion commander. Captain Wil-
liams then strolled on to the top of Hill 182. The mist
was so heavy that he found it impossible to see more than
approximately a hundred yards to the front. Shortly after

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 165

his arrival a heavy barrage fell on the Hill during which
he took shelter at the north edge of the town where
he found men of Lieutenant Benjamin's platoon. The
Lieutenant had left the hill a few moments previously
for a conference with his Battalion Commander. When
the barrage lifted Captain Williams walked back on to
the crest of the Hill. Here he observed a group of five
German soldiers walking toward him at about a hun-
dred yards' distance with an American prisoner. Cap-
tain Williams walked over to the group empty-handed
and when within a few yards made a lightning reach for
the pistol on his belt and in the fight that followed killed
four Germans and took the fifth prisoner. As the fifth
German raised his arm in surrender, Captain Williams
caught sight of a long enemy skirmish line coming over
the northern end of the plateau attacking directly toward
St. Juvin, The enemy party numbered roundly about
200 men. Using a dead German's rifle, Captain Williams
shot one of the enemy who marched a few paces in ad-
vance of the attacking skirmish line. The German line
took cover and Captain Williams jumped down the bank
on to the sunken road near the cemetery on the western
slope of the hill and ran back under cover toward St.
Juvin. He crossed through the northern part of the town
to the eastern slope where he met his machine-gun com-
pany at the bottom of the hill. Captain Williams, shout-
ing "Follow me!" ran back on to the hill, his leading
gun close behind him. This gun opened fire on the Ger-
man line which was then advancing at close range. The
other guns almost immediately joined. In the fight which
followed the entire German party were killed, wounded
or driven from the hill and about half of our com-
pany were casualties. A column of several hundred of
the enemy was observed in the vicinity of the railroad
yards just west of Hill 182. Our machine gunners turned

166 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

their attention to this force and scattered it with heavy
losses. This German attack was part of the assault made
against our entire front and to which reference has al-
ready been made. The lieutenant and the platoon of the'
77th Division met by Captain Williams on the east slope
of Hill 182 were not present during this fight. "When the
enemy counter-attacked the lieutenant retired with his
platoon and passed through Captain Williams' company
as it came up the east side of St. Juvin. By noon on
October 15 when activities had ceased in the vicinity of
HiU 182 Captain Williams personally went back through
the town until he reached the St. Juvin-Grand-Pre Road
in the vicinity of which he found a Captain from the
77th Division who stated that he was in command of the
right Battalion of the 77th Division. Captain Williams
reported to this officer and stated that his own company
was within this officer's sector and badly in need of rein-
forcements on Hill 182, where it had without assistance
beaten off a very strong counter-attack. Captain Williams
also asked the Battalion Commander if he had any in-
structions to give him. Captain Williams was informed
that the Battalion Commander could not make any dis-
positions until he had reported the situation to higher
authority. Captain Williams returned to his company and
remained alone on Hill 182 throughout the afternoon and
night until 2 hours on the morning of October 16. At
this time about two platoons from the 77th Division came
to the Hill and dug in near the line occupied by the men
from the 82nd Division. Two hours later these platoons
of the 77th Division were relieved by units from the 78th
Division.

Some messages in the Division dossier for October 15
are given herewith:

"From Gen. Cronin at 8 hours, Oct. 15, 1918. PusJtiing
pur counter-attack on the right of the 325th, and Colonel

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 167

Whitman has asked for artillery support. He does not
think he will need the Division Reserve. Thinks he can
handle the situation with some artillery support."

"From Gen. Cronin at 8:45 hours, Oct. 15. Just re-
ceived message from Whitman that his right flank has been
forced back to the position of his left. That flank is un-
protected." Colonel Jolinston inquired if he could push a
battalion in direction of the left flank moving under the
nosG of the Hill near St. Juvin and attack the enemy in
the flank.

"From Adjutant 163rd Inf. Brigade 8:55 hours, Oct.
15. Message from Major Watkins at 8 :49 hours. Off in
good shape. Men in fine spirits. Some machine-gun op-
position. I can handle that. Have taken 30 odd prisoners.
Need some litter bearers."

"From Adjutant 163rd Inf. Brig., 9 hours, 15 Oct.
326th Infantry advancing in good shape. 325th have ad-
vanced to parallel 87 and are holding their own but not
advancing. ' '

"From Adjutant 163rd Inf. Brigade at 9 hours. 325th
holding well. Will advance in a few minutes behind new
artillery barrage. Major Watkins wants 14 ambulances."

"Message from Adjutant 164th Inf. Brigade, 10:10
hours, 15 Oct. 1918. Captain Tomasello, Operations Officer
328th Infantiy, reports 42nd Division can not advance on
account of heavy machine-gun fire. Suggest that they fall
back and call for barrage. Combat liaison will sit tight
and cover flank. The balance of Regiment will go ahead.
Doing all business by runners."

"From 163rd Inf. Brigade at 10:40 hours, 15 Oct. Am
sending 2 officers and 32 men in as prisoners. They were
taken this morning northeast of St. Juvin by 326th In-
fantry at about 8:30 hours. Also report that prisoners
and guard marching down road to Division Headquarters
have been fired on by 77th Di\nsion on our left. Please
take this up and have it stopped."

168 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

"Colonel Johnston to Chief of Staff 42nd Division, 10:45
hours, 15 Oct. Your elements on your left are held up
in front of the wire. This is holding back the entire ad-
vance. If agreeable, we will take St. Georges for you. If
not, we wish you would consider the possibility of moving
your troops by the left flank and using the eastern slope
of Hill 230 to flank out St. Georges from the west. Our
troops can turn the right flank back along the heights and
allow you to use the slopes. The Brigadiers are in direct
communication with one another and it would be agree-
able to us for them to mutually arrange this plan of attack
with the understanding that the western limit of your
artillery fire will remain unchanged."

''Optimist 3 (Chief of Staff 42nd Division) replied:
This seems a good plan and we are willing to try it. Will
notify our left Brigade if you will notify your right and
direct them to proceed with this maneuver."

Colonel Johnston telephoned the substance of this mes-
sage to the Adjutant of the 164th Infantry Brigade.

''From Headquarters 157th Field Artillery Brigade, at
10 :30, October 15, 1918. 320th Field Artillery reports at
10:30 hours heavy artillery shells passing over B Battery
of that Regiment. Shells are falling in our lines. Rotating
bands have fallen at 00.46. Have called up Corps
Artillery, also 42nd Division and reported same to them,
as we believe it is from this Division, their batteries being
directly in rear of the battery reporting this fire."

* ' Report of examination of a detachment of 25 prisoners,
at 10:40, 15 Oct. The prisoners including one lieutenant
were captured this morning about 1 kilometer northeast
of St. Juvin, just south of road leading from St. Juvin
to St. Georges. Prisoners had received orders to carry
out a counter-attack against our troops, but before well
under way were encountered by our forces and cap-
tured. Prisoners stated that our effective machine-gun fire
which came from all sides kept Germans from advancing
and attack broke down. Most of prisoners belong to 1st
Battalion of 210th Regiment, 45th Reserve Division, which

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 169

had been kept in reserve until this morning. When ques-
tioned as to the enemy defenses in the rear and the posi-
tions which were to be occupied in case of retreat, prisoners
stated that no prepared positions existed to their knowl-
edge. In all cases their orders had been to hold their
positions at all costs."

"From 166th Infantry (83rd Brigade, 42nd Division),
at 10 :30 hours, 15 Oct. Do not need any special assistance
in getting through wire if we can get to it. Are held up
by machine-gun tire and not by obstacles. General Lenahan
advises that artillery preparation is now in progress on
St. Georges and Landres-St. Georges and on the road be-
tween the two towns. The fire will be lifted to the 3rd
objective at 11 :15 hours when Infantry will renew attack."

"Liaison Officer with 42nd Division reports at 11:30
hours, 15 October, 1918, that Tank Commander with 42nd
Division started with 25 tanks. He arrived at our lines
with 16 tanks. Went into action with ten tanks with the
advance element. He went across the ravine northwest
199 Woods about center of the sector. He went across the
wire and across trenches receiving very heavy fire. In-
fantry unable to keep up with him. He was forced to
retire with only 7 tanks. His personnel and machinery are
seriously damaged. He says that he can do nothing more
in this vicinity and tanks are now withdrawn from this
line."

"From Capt. Webster, 164th Infantry Brigade, 12:20
hours, 15 Oct. Prisoners captured by 328th patrol at 9 :30
hours at 00.2-86.9 say that they belong to the 31st Regiment,
15th Bavarian Division. Were in reserve and came in
line at 6 hours this morninr^. Report that they were given
notification yesterday officially by a Division Commander
that armistice was hourly awaited."

"From 77th Division, 12:40 hours, 15 Oct. 154th Bri-
gade has two companies on the road 400 yards west of
St. Juvin. Will proceed on St. Juvin-Grand-Pre Road
and mop up between it and the river."

170 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

* ' Reports received by Capt. Dunlap at 12 :42 hours from
the adjutants of both infantry brigades indicated following
fighting strength in those two organizations:

163rd Inf. Brig 98 Officers, 2815 Men

164th Inf. Brig 43 Officers, 1068 Men

"15 Oct, 1918 at 14:15 hours. Maj. Hawkins reports-
326th Inf. and 306th Inf. support lines were mixed up
but have been reorganized by the officers. Roads in vicinity
of St. Juvin passable but very muddy."

''15 Oct. 1918 at 14:25 hours. From Lieut. Mitchell,
Liaison Officer with 77th Division. Just received mes-
sage from Col. Smedburg, 77th Division, stating that he
knows disposition of 77th Division troops on our left, and
that he can have the line straightened out very soon."

"15 Oct. 1918, at 15 hours. 163rd Inf. Brig, reports
that 326th Inf. is held up in its advance on account of
inability of 325th Inf. to advance. 325th Inf. has been
reorganizing. Barrage is being requested and they are
now advancing. 326th suffered from machine-gun fire at
97.0-87.0. Artillery is hammering on this point. Artil-
lery fire on Champigneulle would be very acceptable."

Col. Johnston called on the artillery to fire for 25 min-
utes on Champigneulle and trenches along southwestern
edge of town.

"15 Oct. 1918 at 15:10 hours. From Capt. Webster.
The P. C. of advance Bn, of 166th Inf. now in Sommer-
ance reports that after advancing this morning they had
to withdraw. Are now waiting for advance of 165th Inf.
on their right. Nothing to report on 164th Brig, front."

"15 Oct. 1918 at 15:45 hours. Pigeon message to Al-
bany-7 from Hdqrs. 328th Inf. at 15 hours. Message re-
ceived 15 :40 hours. Place Sommerance. We are under
heavy fire from large caliber guns. Have planes spot these
guns and put our heavies to work on them. Have this
this done at once. (Signed) Tomasello."

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 171

"15 Oct. 1918 at 16:15 hours. From Maj. Wainwright
at P. C. of Gen. Cronin at 16 hours. Report received
that 325th Inf. has advanced through enemy position and
was at that time at Ravin aux Pierres, 326th Inf. on the
left. Asked by Col. Johnston if the men will stay in the
ravine, Maj. Wainwright replied, 'They are attacking now.
Request that the outfit on the right be pushed up to join
them.' "

"15 Oct. 1918 at 16:20 hours. To 164th Inf. Brig.
From Col. Johnston. Brigade on your left pushing out
of the Ravin aux Pierres. Join them."

*'15 Oct. 1918, at 16:20 hours. Telephone message from
Lieut. Carlisle, Liaison Officer with 42nd Division. G-3
of 42nd Division says that there will be no further ad-
vance this afternoon. Another advance to-morrow morning.
Orders will come over later."

"15 Oct. 1918, at 16:20 hours. Army Artillery reports
that the army observer states heavy massing of artillery
and infantry at F-5383, just behind woods Bois Banthe-
ville. Army artillery has two guns reaching it. 157th F.
A. has reported this to air service for bombing work."

"15 Oct. 1918 at 16:30 hours. Anson-1 to Albany-1.
Maj. Boyle, 328th Inf. at 15:30 hours advised that 325th
Inf. is preparing to advance. 328th can not advance until
166th Inf. advances. 166th Inf. is waiting on 165th Inf.,
who are 1000 meters behind. Maj. Boyle has asked for
artillery preparation so he can advance when 166th moves
up."

"15 Oct. 1918 at 16:15 hours. 157th F. A. Brig, re-
ports that Air Service notified them of heavy massing
of artillery and infantry north of Bantheville Woods, at
F-5383. Only two army guns can reach them."

"15 Oct. 1918, at 19 hours. Col. Johnston with G-3, 1st
Corps. G-3 inquired as to possibility of using troops of
82nd Division for taking Champigneulle. Col. Johnston
replied that it was perfectly possible to take Cham-

172 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

pigneulle but that such action would extend the front of
the Division, inasmuch as no other troops are moving up on
either flank. In other words, the Division now holds irom
about 86.2 northwest to about parallel 87, thence swings
southwest to the north slope of Cote 182 and must face
the Boche on this entire line. The right brigade has only
about 1000 men and the left brigade about 2000. We are
perfectly capable of attacking and advancing in any direc-
tion on a front proportionate to our strength, but this
extension of the front would require more and more men
which, of course, must be supplied from the rear eche-
lons. The people on our right are not moving at all, and
the hill north of St. Georges is of course exceedingly im-
portant, as it sweeps the plateau on which we are located.
The P. C. of our right brigade is at the same place as the
P. C. of the front line battalion of the Division on our
right. It does not seem that the taking of ChampigneuUe
would relieve this situation to any extent. G-3 said he
would inform the Division what would be required."

"15 Oct. 1918 at 19:30 hours. Received wireless mes-
sage from 328th Inf. Holding our first line against heavy
artillery fire and machine-gun fire. Repulsed counter-
attack on left flank this morning. Our troops exhausted.
Can not continue advance."

"15 Oct. 1918 at 20:30 hours. Telephone message
from Intelligence Officer of 325th Inf. Our positions to-
night are the same as this morning. The strength of the
2nd Bn. is about 800 men. Two bus. went forward this
afternoon at H hour and found in the ravine German
machine-gun nests. Only one company (K Co.) was able
to penetrate through the ravine and this company went
up the forward slope. 7 prisoners of the 45th Res. Divi-
sion and 10 machine guns were captured. The latter were
turned against the enemy and fired into them, inflicting
heavy losses. This company was driven back to this side
of the ravine by direct fire above them. A few men of
K Co. could not get back and stuck to their positions and
were shot do"\vn fighting. Stated that the rcgt. was in liai-
son on right and left. Stated there was less air activity
to-day than yesterday. Prisoners who had been used as

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 178

litter bearers are now being sent back to hdqrs. Believe
the Germans are heavily entrenched in the ravine and
immediately north of the ravine."

"15 Oct. 1918, 20 hours. Eeport of examination of two
prisoners of the 1st Bn. of the 31st Eegt., 15th Bavarian
Division. Prisoners were captured this morning at 8 hours
in the course of an enemy counter-attack about 700 yds.
south of St. Georges. The prisoners were put in line with
their bn. during the night, reinforcing the 30th Res. Regt.,
which holds the sector from St. Georges to a point ap-
proximately 1 klm. west. Prisoners stated their orders
were to advance and take the position held by our troops
on Hill 206, 1 klm. south of St. Georges. It appears that
our machine-gun fire was so effective that the 7th Co.,
already reduced in strength when going into the line, i3
now almost annihilated. Stated that their average strength
of companies within the 2nd Bn. was as low as 30 to 40
men, the regt. having suffered greatly in recent operations
up north. They had not received replacements. Prisoners
stated that the regt. arrived in Buzancy on the night of
Oct. 12th. The following night they marched south and
remained in the vicinity of Imecourt until placed in line.
They stated that Brig. Hdqrs. was at Vei-pel, and Regt.
Hqrs. was located in a mill southwest of Imecourt, at
99.4-10.3. Further stated having seen elements of a Prus-
sion division in this vicinity but were unable to give
identification. Our artillery fire yesterday and to-day
caused heavy casualties in their bn. The positions which
they occupied immediately south of St. Georges gave little
protection. In the absence of trenches they were com-
pelled to occupy ditches in the form of squares. They
stated that their company commander several days ago
read Germany's reply to President Wilson's message and
added that an armistice might be expected to follow any

CHAPTER XVI
DEEPENING THE SALIENT

Another dreary wet night followed, marked by heavy
shell fire throughout the Divisional Area. At 23 hours,
October 15, Field Orders No. 27 were issued from Divi-
sional Headquarters. This order stated that the 1st Army
Corps would attack at G hours, October 16, 2^918. It
further specified that the 42nd Division would attack on
the right of the 82nd Division, The mission assigned the
82nd Division was to support the attack of the 78th Divi-
sion by protecting that unit's right flank. The Corp
objectives included Champigneulle and Beffu et le Mort-
homme. The 2nd Battalion, 825th Inf., was placed at the
disposal of the Commanding General, 163rd Brigade, for
the purpose of capturing Champigneulle. The 164th Bri-
gade was directed to conform to the advance of the 163rd
Brigade. The Bois des Loges would be gassed vrith non-
persistent gases throughout the night until 5 hours,
October 16. A special paragraph in the Field Order
warned all Commanders against the practice of placing
machine guns in the first wave of assaulting battalions.
The machine guns must accompany second waves and
supports.

327th Infantry Relieves 328th Infantry

During the night of October 15-16 the 327th Infantry,
consolidated into one battalion under Lieutenant Colonel

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 175

Burr, relieved the 328th Infantry on the right flank of
the Division front. At 6 hours the 327th Infantry ad-
vanced by infiltration about two or three hundred meters.
The 42nd Division made no advance whatever, and the
327th Infantry was compelled to dig in with its right
flank faced squarely east for a depth of one kilometer
back to the 42nd Division. This effort created a still more
serious salient and the right flank of the 82nd Division'
was exposed to strong enfilade fire from the east, in addi-
tion to the normal resistance from the north. During the
day the enemy attempted to penetrate between the strong
points of our line, creeping close enough on one occasion
to use hand grenades against one of our groups. The
enemy artillery continued to harass our troops through-
out the day. A detachment from the 328th Infantry in
support was ordered forward and used to reinforce the
refused right flank.

The physical condition of our men was at its lowest ebb
on this day, as messages from many units testified.

Lieutenant Colonel Burr, commanding the 327th In-
fantry, sent the following message to Brigadier General
Lindsey at 10 hours 50 minutes, October 16:

"I again call to your attention the physical condition
of the men of my command. I strongly recommend their
relief to-night. To men in their condition, the weather
conditions of last night were very trying. They will be
in no condition to-morrow morning for any strenuous
operation."

The 328th Infantry at tliis time was reduced by aU
causes to one or two officers and from twenty to forty
men in each infantry company. The 328th Infantry
Machine Gun Company on October 16, 1918, consisted of
twenty-seven men and no officers.

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

325th Infantry on October 16, 1918

The attack of the 325th Infantry in the center of the
Division sector was made by the 3rd Battalion which
passed through the line of the 1st Battalion and in spite
of severe machine-gun resistance pushed K and L Com-
panies into the Ravin aux Pierres. This advance of our
Infantry was supported by a machine gun barrage fired
by B Company, 320th Machine Gun Battalion. The right
flank of the 325th Infantry could not advance and re-
mained just south of the ravine in liaison with the 327th
Infantry.

The following message was received by Colonel Whitman
from the 3rd Battalion, 325th Inf., at 9 :20 hours :

"Left and center of front line in Ravin aux Pierres at
98.0-86.8 to about 98.5-87.0. The right of our line is
just south of the ravine held up by M. G. from right
flank. Troops on our right reported not advancing. Our
second line is just north of road from St. Juvin to St.
Georges. Our 3rd line is 500 meters further to rear.

*' Melton."

Later in the day a heavy fire from the east portion of
the Ravin aux Pierres aided by enemy artillery fire from
the north drove our men out of the ravine. This was
the second day on which we had obtained a foothold in
this important position. On each day the survivors of
the assault had been compelled to evacuate the ravine to
avoid annihilation.

During the afternoon the following message was sent
by Lieutenant Colonel Campbell, 325th Inf., to General
Cronin :

"16th Oct., to Austin-1. Came out through vicious
barrage. All over now. M. G. fire coming over, not bad.

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 177

Varnado killed. Estimate less than 250 in both Battalions
remaining fit for duty. Counter-attack by enemy would
be bad. Lines as stated by phone. I am not a calamity
howler, but the officers and men are all in. Jones in good
position as reserve but, of course, no shelter from elements.
Will get Melton and Castle together and organize. Will
move Jones back slightly and put Melton in support with
his Battalion — less than 100. Castle with 1st Battalion
and Cozine to hold line of road and have advanced parties
in shell holes in front 200 yards. I am starting this now,
execution of same to be m^ide in dark. Campbell.''

The report concerning the death of Captain Varnado
proved later to be incorrect, but forms the background
for one of the most amazing incidents in the history of
the Division.

During the withdrawal of the 325th Infantry from the
ravine a large caliber, high explosive shell burst within
a short distance of this officer. The force of the ex-
plosion tossed him in the air and dropped him in a limp
heap on the ground. One of his non-commissioned officers
ran to his assistance and satisfied himself that his Com-
pany Commander was dead. For five days Captain
Varnado lay unconscious in this ravine. During this
period a cold rain fell almost constantly and the ravine
was heavily shelled with gas and high explosives. At
intervals a machine-gun barrage was poured into this
area. At the end of five days, on October 21, the ravine
was again taken by our troops and Captain Varnado was
found unconscious but still faintly breathing. There were
no wounds upon his body. After a long period in the
hospital he recovered full possession of his strength and
senses and returned to the United States with his regiment
after the War was over.

In addition to the serious physical condition of the
troops there had been a grave deterioration in the con-
dition of all weapons during the many days of exposure

178 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

to rain and mud. The Cliauchat rifles had nearly all
ceased to function.

During October 16 our men were continuously exposed
to the observation and harassing fire of enemy aeroplanes
which flew low over our lines with little interference from
the American Air Service.

The effective strength of the 325th Infantry the night
following was reported as follows:

1st Battalion 5 Officers, 175 Men

2nd Battalion 17 Officers, 361 Men

3rd Battalion 3 Officers, 120 Men

Wlien the 2nd Battalion, 325th Infantry, was assigned to
a special mission by the Divisional Field Order, the 2nd
Battalion of the 326th Infantry was transferred to the
command of Colonel Whitman and during the night of
October 16 this unit relieved the 1st Battalion, 325th In-
fantry, in the front line.

326th Infantry on October 16, 1918

Meanwhile, the 326th Infantry on the left of the Divi-
sion had attacked at H hour, October 16, with the 1st
Battalion in the position of honor, supported by Com-
pany D, 320th Machine Gun Battalion. Elements of
Company D crossed the Agron River and reached the
railway cut at Champigneulle extending along the line at
96.2-86.65 to 96.5-86.8. Company C had passed through
Company A and reached a position on the hill north of
the Ravin aux Pierres along the line 97.5-86.9 to 97.8-87.1.
A platoon of Company D covered the interval between C
and D Companies. These points marked the line of
farthest advance reached by the 326th Infantry in its
operations. Intense artillery and machine-gun fire and

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 179

the isolated nature of the positions forced these Companies
to withdraw under cover of darkness on the night of
October 16. Consequently, night found the front Bat-
talions of the Division on the St. Juvin-St. Georges Road
with outposts covering the ridge north of the Road.

The following are some of the messages contained in the
Divisional dossier for October 16, 1918:

From General Cronin to Divisional Headquarters, 7
hours 35 minutes, 16th Oct., 1918.

"Everything started off on time. Extreme left Bat-
talion had to be somewhat re-arranged to avoid shell fire.
This was accomplished before starting. Everything going
good. ' '

From C. O. 327th Inf. Gen. Lindsey, 8 hours 5 minutes,
16th Oct., 1918.

"325th Inf. advancing; 166th Inf. is not. Am advancing
and keep ia touch by 'phone. Advancing under heavy
machine-gun fire."

From 157th F. A. Brigade, 8 hours 48 minutes, 16th
Oct., 1918.

"321st F. A. Reports that the Infantry line has been
temporarily checked by large machine-gun nests 98.6-87.3.
There are both trenches and woods at that point. Fire is
coming from these woods and trenches from machine guns
and infantry requested fire of one battalion for 15 minutes
just as fast as it could be put into them. Infantry was
told that this would exhaust our ammunition supply but
that two rounds per gun per minute would be fired.

"8 hours 50 minutes. In addition machine-gun nest
located 98.3-87.5. One battalion of 320 F. A. directed
to open fire on this nest with two rounds per gun per
minute for 15 minutes. In the coordinates there is a tele-
graph pole at the base of which ii is reported there are
ten hostile machine guns. ' '

180 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

From Lt. Mitchell, liaison officer, with 78th Division, 9
hours 20 minutes, 16th Oct., 1918.

"78th Division reports that it has relieved 77th Division,
Reports that the attack as ordered went of£ in good shape,
but_ have not heard as yet whether any advance has been
made."

From Chief of Staff 42nd Division to Chief of Staff
82nd Division, 9 hours 20 minutes, 16th Oct., 1918.

''We were all set for 6 o'clock this morning and re-
ceived orders from the army not to attack. The fighting
has been very severe on our right. Only able to gain one
kilometer yesterday. Think the understanding is that we
are to advance with you." Col. Johnston asked how they
can say they are waiting to advance with us when our
line is facing east and northeast to join with them. ' ' This
ties down our right flank. We are now attacking on the
left. Still think it advisable for you to maneuver by the
left flank and take St. Georges and hill north of it. Col.
Johnston was informed that 42nd Division is strictly for-
bidden to use any artillery or make any attack."

From 78th Division, 9 hours 45 minutes, 16th Oct., 1918.

"We are moving all right on our right flank. On the
left Boche is still in Grand-Pre and Chevieres. Prisoners
taken at night during course of relief.

"Col. Johnston. 'Are you going to continue to go on
the right?'

"Answer. 'Yes, we are pushing hard and will stick
with you.'

"Extract from examination of 23 prisoners belonging
to 45th Reserve Division. Prisoners were captured north-
east of St. Juvin in and near Ravin aux Pierres, state
that their units have suffered heavy losses in the fighting
of the last few days. Strength of companies does not
exceed 40 men each. Enemy has no organized defensive
position in the rear. The Agron River can be forded at
and above Champigneulle by horse-drawn vehicles but ow-
ing to its great distance and higher banks crossing further
south can only be effected by means of a bridge. The

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 181

average width of the river is about 6 to 7 meters. Some
replacements have been received in the last few days but
in small numbers only. Prisoners state that they have
been told to hold their positions. Companies holding ad-
vanced positions are invariably commanded by non-com-
missioned officei-s. This policy meets with considerable
criticism on the part of enlisted men. None of the prison-
ers know when their organizations are to be relieved. The
45th Reserve Division prior to its arrival in this sector
was engaged in the Champagne in recent fighting. They
state that their units have suffered heavily from our artil-
lery fire. Several men were very outspoken in their con-
demnation of the present German Government.

"An examination of additional prisoners from this Divi-
sion brought out the statement that the 45th Reserve Divi-
sion had participated in the counter-attack by the enemy
arranged October 15th. A prisoner from the 212th Re-
serve Regiment stated that his regiment had received 300
replacements two days prior to the attack. Prisoner from
210th Reserve Regiment stated his regiment had received
120 replacements, asserted that the 47th Scharfschiitzen
Abteilung (machine gun unit) was holding a position in
rear of their regiments east of ChampigneuUe. ' '

Colonel Johnson to G-3 1st Corps, 11 hours 20 minutes,
16th Oct., 1918.

"How about using the 42nd Artillery on machine-gun
nest? We are getting a great deal of direct fire from
southwest of St. Georges 00.87 on the road to St. Juvin from
St. Georges. Some artillery fire on that point will help."

"G-3 replied that he would have it done."

11 hours 45 minutes, Col. Johnston talking with Ad-
jutant 325th Infantry.

"Asked if regiment was using its field artillery.

"Adjutant replied he thought so.

"Colonel Johnston told him to push those guns and
Stokes Mortars out in front and find them (the enemy).
Asked if anything was known about the Division on our
left. Was told that troops of 78th Div. were still on
Hill 182."

li^ OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

From Gen. Lindsey to Col. Johnston, 11 hours 25
minutes, 16 Oct., 1918.

''C. 0. of advanced Imes in support of 166th Inf. has
just called. He was informed that the location of the
right flank of my advanced Battalion is on the St. Georges-
St. Juvin Road ahout 00.1-87.1 with Company of 166th
further in rear and in liaison with left flank. My ad-
vanced line seems to be stuck out in a V shape. Have
arranged with 166th to echelon forward on the left flank
further to the left of St. Georges and in succession to
the east taking the enemy line on the flank so as to
ease in the 166th and 165th Inf. I believe that similar
action by 325th echeloning forward by the right flank
to the ridge west of St. Georges will enable concentrated
fire to be brought on the strong Hill in vicinity of Hill
230 at 00.4-88.3 and on Cote 253."

From Gen. Lindsey.

"Reports his troops in a V shape formation apex of
the V being at 00.1-87.1. His left wing extends southwest
parallel to the St. Juvin-St. Georges Road and his right
wing running due south parallel to 00. He says that the
greatest enemy activity is coming from woods on Cote 230
at approximately 00.5-88.0 to 88.6."

Col. Johnston to Gen. Cronin, 12 hours, 16 Oct., 1918.

"Have you any information about the people on your
left?"

"They are on the east and northeast slopes of Hill
182."

"Are they moving forward?"

"They are on Contour 180 on northern and eastern

"What help are you getting from the artillery this
morning?"

"Knowles was forced to fall back, due to shortage of
artillery and re-organize in the ravine."

"Are you using the 326th Inf. to help the 325th Inf.?"

"They are fighting together."

"Do you feel it necessary to push the 326th down iq
that ravine?"

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 183

"No. They won't go down in the hollow but will keep
up on the high ground, east of the Agron River."

Col. Johnston to Bonehead 3 (Chief of Staff, 1st Corps),
12 hours 10 minutes, 16th Oct., 1918.

"We have just gotten a report from our left that the
Division on our left is sticking along 180 Contour on Cote
182. Our line about an hour ago was in the ravine fight-
ing up the slopes and we were having a severe fight at
98.7-87.4."

Col. Johnston to Gen. Lindsey, 12 hours 18 minutes, 16
Oct., 1918.

"It is reported that you have troops east of the 00.
meridian. ' '

General replied he had some at 00.1.

Col. Johnston directed him to move his troops west of
the 00. meridian as they were within the artillery boundary
of the 42nd Division, which was preparing to shoot there
now.

At 12 hours 22 minutes Col. Johnston called 42nd Divi-
sion and asked them to stop their artillery fire west of St.
Georges reporting back immediately.

Gen. Duncan to Chief of Staff 1st Corps, 12 hours 45
minutes, 16 Oct., 1918.

"I have just been up to the front and talked with the
Regimental and Brigade Commanders and looked over the
situation. Because of physical fatigue, I don't believe
these men can go forward any more. I think we have
got to hold on to what we have got. The 325th Inf. got
into that ravine and took 12 machine guns in front of
them. The Hun counter-attacked and we lost about 40
men in hand to hand fightin??. The Huns are putting
up tremendous resistance and our men have come to the
limit of their endurance and I don't believe that they are
in physical condition to go any further. We have got to
stabilize on present line, because we haven't men enough
to go on. This is the 10th day of our attack and the
whole front is covered by machine-gun fire from Hill 230

184 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

and then to the left. The men of this Division have
behaved splendidly and have lost heavily. There are not
fifty men to a Company and these are practically at the
end of their strength. The spirit is fine but to-day they
are at the end of their physical endurance."

From 163 Brigade, 12 hours 55 minutes, 16 Oct., 1918.

"Very heavy artillery and machine-gun fire prevents
advance of our left. Our artillery seems to have no effect
in reducing his fire. Same condition exists on our right.
Infiltration across Ravin aux Pierres is possible to some
extent but so far without enough power to advance line.
Liaison good with left Division. Losses considerable. Al-
most all my outfit tired and worn out."

To Gen. Lindsey from Col. Johnston, 13 hours 10 min-
utes, 16 Oct., 1918.

"Albany 1 is very much concerned about your contact
with the right 163rd Brigade. He feels that perhaps you
have got too far to the east and wishes to re-establish
contact. ' '

Gen. Lindsey replied that two hours ago he gave an order
to that effect and had no doubt that it had been complied
with.

To Col. Johnston by radio from Liaison Officer with 42nd
Division, 13 hours 30 minutes, 16 Oct., 1918.

"42nd Division not advancing until further orders."

To Col. Schley from Col. Johnston, 13 hours 40 minutes,
16 Oct., 1918.

"Are your engineer Companies where they can be
readily assembled?"

"No, I don't think so. They are at their own work."

"What would be the most convenient place for concen-
tration of the forward Battalion?"

"Fleville."

"Assemble that Battalion at Fleville as promptly as pos-
sible and notify this Headquarters when they are there."

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 185

Gen. Cronin to Col. Johnston, 14 hours, 16 Oct., 1918.

"We could not stand in the Ravine on account of gas,
but we arc on the south slope and in liaison with our right
and left and we can stick. ' '

"Albany 1 directs you to dig in for the day."

Message from Gen. Cronin, 14 hours 10 minutes, 16 Oct.,
1918.

"Boche plane has just been flying over us registering
presumably for its artillery. Characteristic feature of last
two days has been the freedom with which Boche planes
have been flying over our front lines. I believe this ac-
counts for enemy's very effective artillery fire and the in-
ability of our batteries to be effective in counter battery
work. ' '

Gen. Duncan immediately ordered Air Service to go out
and do something irrespective of weather conditions.

From 157th Field Artillery Headquarters, 14 hours 55
minutes, 16th Oct., 1918.

"A hostile plane was brought down by the machine gun
fire of Battery A, 320th F. A., at 14.25 hours just north-
east of Sommeraueo."

From Gen. Lindsey, 15 hours 3 minutes, 16th Oct., 1918.

"Left flank of 327th pushed forward and joined right
flank of 325th. Both had to drop back to the St. Georges-
St. Juvin on account of machine gun fire and consolidated
with my right at cemetery and left at 99.3-86.6."

From Captain Tomasello, 15 hours 40 minuetes, 16 Oct.,
1918.

"There is a big enemy gun working on the south and
west of Sommerance at the present time. This gun has been
in action for the past 3 days. This fact has been reported
numerous times. Request that Air Service locate this Bat-
tery and report to Army artillery for counter battery."

186 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

Memorandum by Captain Dunlap, 15 hours 55 minutes,
16 Oct., 1918.

"General Cronin requests that 15 Chauchat rifles to-
gether with carriers and ammunition be supplied to his
Brigade to-night."

From Division O. P. at 16 hours, 16 Oct., 1918.

"Enemy shelling Champigneulle with shrapnel. A
number of men standing on the road on the eastern edge
of the town. Visibility very poor. Road running northeast
from St. Juvin being shelled. Friendly troops seen on the
south edge of Bois des Loges. Boche shelling railroad
yards west of St. Juvin. Ravine east of Champigneulle is
filled with smoke and haze. Visibility so poor that enemy
cannot see our troops. Bois des Loges is full of Boche."

By radio from Liaison Officer with 42nd Division, 16
hours 35 minutes, iSth Oct., 1918.

"Both flanks of 42nd Division advancing slowly."

Advance notice by telephone of 1st Corps Order, 16
hours 45 minutes, 16th Oct., 1918.

"The Corps Commander directs that arrangements be
made within the Division for the utilization of not to
exceed one Battalion in each Regiment in line for the day's
work. The support and reserve battalion should be utilized
only in case of great emergency and returned to their po-
sitions when the emergency ceases. Support battalion to
be used in front line on succeeding days. Send front line
battalion to reserve. This will enable the Army com-
mander to count upon constant use of Division for one
month or more. The Corps Commander desires that this
arrangement be put into effect in the 82nd Division at
once. ' '

Message from Chief of Air Service, 16 hours 50 minutes,
16 Oct., 1918.

* ' I would like to have flares displayed from now till dark,
or a white rocket to be fired about every 3 minutes; or
gasoline burned on the ground."

CHAPTER XVII

CHAMPIGNEULLE AND EXTENSION OF LEFT
FLANK

The remaining messages in the Divisional dossier for
October 16, 1918, are concerned with a confusing situa-
tion which arose on our left flank with the 78th Divi-
sion. Our Divisional Headquarters was informed that
troops from the 78th Division had entered the Bois des
Loges and penetrated to the northern edge of the woods.
It was further claimed that the 309th Infantry (78th
Div.), on our immediate left, had entered the town of
ChampigneuUe. Both General Duncan and Colonel John-
ston doubted that the Bois des Loges had been penetrated
to its northern edge. Nevertheless, it was at once agreed
that if such proved to be the fact the left flank of the
82nd Division would be pushed forward to connect with
such advance. Our liaison detachment reported meanwhile
that the right of the 78th Division had not advanced.

General Cronin, however, was directed to push elements
directly north toward ChampigneuUe with a reservation
that if ChampigneuUe proved to be strongly held by the
enemy, General Cronin would not commit himself to a seri-
ous attack. These directions were dictated by the consid-
eration that if ChampigneuUe Nas found strongly held,
it was positive evidence that the enemy had not been ex-
pelled from the Bois des Loges.

Possession of the Bois des Loges by either side, entirely
controlled ChampigneuUe and the Agron Valley.
187

188 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

Division Field Order No. 28 issued at 22 hours, Oct. 16,
1918, contained the following brief directions for the con-
templated operation on the following day:

a. "The 163rd Brigade will support and protect the

right flank of the 78th Division by advancing its
left to the ridge due east of ChampigneuUe.

b. "164th Brigade will hold present front.

c. "Artillery support, no change in plan.

d. "Machine gun, no change.

Paragraph one stated that the attack would be continued
at 6 hours 30 minutes, October 17.

At "H" hour, a detachment from Major Hawkins's Bat-
talion endeavored to advance from Hill 182 and met at
once with intense enemy fire from ChampigneuUe. This
checked for the time any further advance by our left flank
in accordance with instructions already given to General
Cronin.

Later in the morning, however, a determined effort was
made by the 2nd Battalion, 325th Infantry (Major Haw-
kins) to advance north from Hill 182 up the Agron Valley.
This attack advanced for about 500 meters when it was
halted with heavy losses by concentrated machine gun and
artillery fire.

As the right flank of the 78th Division did not advance
during the day the 82nd Division remained stabilized. This
was in compliance with the Corps Order which defined
the mission of the 82nd Division to be the support of the
right flank of the 78th Division.

The orders which Major Hawkins received from General
Cronin prior to the attack just described were as follows :

From Austin-1, to: C. O. 2nd Battalion, 325th Inf. 16th
Oct.

"You will advance with your battalion and establish
a line from ChampigneuUe exclusive to points 97.3-87.4

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 189

South East to 98.0-86.3 connecting on your right with
first battalion 326th Inf. The principal left position will
be in the Hollow 97.3-87.3 and other positions in the
Ravine will be taken along the Western slopes between the
mouth of the Ravine South East to the end of your line.

''You will advance one company at a time at long dis-
tances keeping pace with the 78th Division on our left.
Your movement is designed to protect right flank of the
78th from the east side of the valley of the Agron. You
will not advance to your Northern limit unless protected
from counter attack from Champigneulle either because
Champigneulle is in American hands or the ground pre-
vents counter attack from that direction."

By command Gen. Cronin.

The following are a few of the messages contained in the
Division dossier for October 17:

From Lt. Hare, 163 Brigade, at 13 hours 30 minutes.

"The Battalion commander of the right battalion of the
78th Division reported to the 163rd Brigade that Hill 182
forms a salient on the front as the 78th Division has fallen
back to the St. Juvin-Grande-Pre Road.

"15 hours 15 minutes Oct. 17th, from Lt. Fravier, 317th
Heavy Artillery (French). Reports that at 15 hours Oct.
16th the P. C. of the 317th French Heavy Artillery was
blown up by an explosion of a German ammunition dump.
The P. C. was at 97.7-78.6. There was also an explosion
of a German ammunition dump at about 10 :45 hours this
morning. Delayed fuses were found by the French officers
in dug out near by, indicating that the dumps had been
exploded by this means. In a great many dumps in La
Chene Tondu, delayed action fuses were found. In a dug
out on the Chene Tondu a small thermometer was found
which was so designed as to explode a mine when the
mercury reached a particular height. If a fire had been
built in the dug out the mercury would have risen and the
explosion followed."

From 310th Infantry at 15 hours 35 minutes.
** Germans are massed across the road between Cham-

190 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

pigneiille and Bois des Loges. 78th and 82nd Artillery
to be notified."

From 78th Division 15 hours 40 minutes 17th Oct.

"Germans are massed across the road at point 96.65-
87.80 between Champignculle and Bois des Loges. Artil-
lery requested at 95.4-87.7 to 95.9-87.7."

"16 hours 17 minutes from Chief of Staff, 78th Division.
Artillery fire scattered the Huns."

From Col. Montgomery G-3 1st Corps to Maj. Wain-
wright, 16 hours 15 minutes, 17th Oct.

"The following boundaries between 82nd and 78th Divi-
sion will be established at 5 hours, 18th Oct.

Chatel Chehery to 78th

Marcq to 82ud

Champignculle to 82nd

Resille Farm to 78th

78th Division is charged with carrying out the relief
made necessary by this change of boundary.

H hour is 6:30 hours."

20 hours 45 minutes 17 Oct. Col. Johnston-Col. Herron,
78th Div.

"Col. Herron reports 78th Div. holds the entire Southern
edge of Bois des Loges. Their troops have penetrated and
to-night intend to mop the entire woods to the Northern
edge and there leave light holding]: detachments, withdraw
the main body in tho ^nain body of the woods preparatory
to an attack in a westerly direction. It seems they have
never been able to secure Grand-Pre, still heavy fighting
in that town and strong forces North of it. The French
were driven out of Talma this morning by a heavy counter-
attack.

"Col. Johnston asked in what way the 82nd Div. can best
support their flank and whether he considered it sufficient
if we remain in contact and move forward if their right
does. Col. Herron replied 'ye-', entirr^ly so.' Asked if they
expected to stabilize their right flank to-morrow, Col. Her-
ron replied that as far as he could see now it will
probably remain in place, depending on events in the

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 191

West. Col. Johnston asked how he could best assist them
with fire, and was told to fire on Champigneulle and to
the south and west slopes of the Agron River. Col.
Johnston said he was asking particularly about this to
make certain to avoid complications like yesterday after-
noon when 2 of the 78th Division interior battalions ad-
vanced much further than their troops on the extreme
right flank with whom we were in liaison. Col. Herron
answered he understood that perfectly and that it would be
entirely satisfactory if we maintain contact with their right
flank. ' '

During the 17th of October the regiments of the Divi-
sion carried on considerable patrolling in the face of direct
machine gun fire. Other than this there were no offensive
activities.

The orders issued by General Duncan for a schedule of
relief throughout the regiments bore immediate results. In
consequence of this order the following Field Order was
issued by General Lindsey in the 164th Infantry Brigade :

''Howsoever great the necessity, the indications are that
there will be no immediate relief. All officers must, there-
fore, exert themselves to the utmost toward reorganizing
their commands. Conditions are never so bad but what
they can be hopefully improved by rejuvenated effort.
"The basis of relief schedule will be as follows:
''The 327th Inf., the 328th Inf. and a combination of 300
men and proper proportion of officers taken from both regi-
ments, forming three commands for the advance, support
and reserve. Reliefs will be effected late in the afternoon
before dark, if possible, every day without further orders;
reserve to support, support to advance, advance to reserve
in the usual rotating manner. The 328th Inf. will occupy
the advance this afternoon, the combination the support
and the 327th Inf. to the reserve. The C. 0. 328th Inf.
will designate an officer to command the combination. The
strength of the three commands will be kept about equal.
Both regimental commanders will remain at Sommerance
and by frequent consultation effectively prosecute the above
plan.

192 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

"Fruitful results wiU accrue from energetic efforts to-
wards securing places in reserve where men returning from
the front can be dried out, warmed up, fed up, slept up
and re-clothed and re-equipped.

"Salvaging parties will be immediately organized by
troops in reserve to gather up arms and equipment and
establish a dump. Other parties must be set to work clean-
ing and assorting arms and equipment, other parties to
cleaning out places where fires can be built and straw beds
made. Billets should be carefully classified and numbered
to facilitate occupation after dark. The C. 0. 328th Inf.
is charged with the duty of immediately beginning work
along the lines set forth. The greatest mistake that can
be made is to let officers and men remain idle expecting
relief. As soon as such a sort of resting place is started,
improvement in the morale of the men will be immediately
noticed.

"An inspection of the reserve lines shows that the men
were not properly caring for their rifles, automatic rifles
and machine guns. This condition was much improved in
a brief hour by attention being called to the matter.

"C. 0. 321 M. G, Bn. will assign his companies and
arrange for their relief and rest according to the general
plan above."

82nd Division Field Order No. 29 was published at 20
hours, October 17, 1918, and provided for a continuation
of the offensive at 6 hours 30 minutes on October 18, 1918.
The mission assigned the 82nd Division was again that of
supporting and protecting the right flank of the 78th
Division.

While the east boundary of our zone of action was un-
changed the west boundary prescribed the change indicated
by the message from the 1st Corps received during the
afternoon of October 17. The Commanding General of the
163rd Brigade was directed to relieve, with one battalion
and one machine gun company, the 309th Infantry in the
area between the present left boundary of the 82nd Divi-
sion and the new boundary marked by a line drawn

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF S2jn-d DIVISION 193

through Marcq (inclusive) -Champigneulle (inclusive -Re-
sille Farm (exclusive).

The Commanding Officer of the Battalion from the 82nd
Division making this relief was directed to report upon
receipt of this order to the Commanding Officer, 309th Inf.,
at the latter 's P. C. at the east entrance of St. Juvin on
the St. Juvin-Fleville Road, and arrange necessary details.
The order required that relief be completed by 5 hours,
October 18.

A change was also made in the boundary between the
two Infantry Brigades of the 82nd Division. This change
resulted in extending the front of the 164th Infantry Bri-
gade about one kilometer further to the west. The Com-
manding General of this Brigade was directed to make the
necessary disposition in the new area assigned him before
5 hours, October 18.

In compliance with the change of boundary between the
Brigades, G Company, 328th Infantry (Captain Danforth),
moved to the west and covered the additional front neces-
sary to connect with the 163rd Brigade, which had also
swung a similar distance to the left, where the 2nd Bat-
talion, 326th Infantry, shifted over, relieving the 1st Bat-
talion, 326th Infantry.

The relief of the 309th Infantry, 78th Division, was ac-
complished by the 2nd Battalion, 325th Infantry, within
the time set by Division Orders. It is interesting, however,
to read the report on this relief submitted by Lieutenant
Mitchell, Liaison Officer, with the 78th Division.

"On night of October 17th, I was called by 'phone and
told to report to Division Headquarters and about half an
hour later, I reported to Col. Wainwright.

"The Corps orders of that day had caused a change in
our west boundary, necessitating the relief of troops of the
309th Infantry, 78th Division, in thoir present sector and
placing our troops in positions as held by the 309th Infan-
try in the space referred to.

194 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

"My mission was for the purpose of reconnoiteriug the
positions we were to hold and to find out from the C. G.
163rd Brigade which Regiment was to supply the Bat-
talion that it would take to make the relief. I first went
to Brigade Headquarters and had to wait for their order
to be made before going to Regimental P. C.'s of the 325th
and 326th Irifantry. With an ofticer of Brigade Head-
quarters I arrived at 326th P. C.'s at about 1:30 a.m. I
explained to the Regimental C. 0. the purpose of my mis-
sion and he in reading the Brigade order found it so com-
plicated in its wording that it was hard for them to
understand for some time just what was to be done. It
took some time to decide and I finally said that the ques-
tion most important now was to locate just the Battalion
that was to go into this position I was to locate, and so the
Battalion Commander could be making his arrangements
as it was then getting late. The Battalion was then located
in the Brigade order and the C. O. 326th gave orders for
Major Hawkins to report to him at once. After the Major
had read his orders and had studied the positions we were
to occupy, Major Hawkins and myself then left to go
where his troops were in camp, where he gave instructions
to his Adjutant to have the Companies moving so as to
reach St. Juvin fifteen minutes apart; first company to
arrive at about 3 :45 a.m. With three of his regimental
runners we started out to locate 309th P. C. We were
unable to locate it, so we decided to go to front lines and
get some Company Commander to direct us to it and doing
so we ran across IBattalion headquarters, it being really the
place we wanted. We made our mission known to the Bat-
talion Commander of the 309th Infantry and he had no
instructions about being relieved. He had just finished
making a relief of another Battalion. He phoned his regi-
mental C. 0. and the latter had received no instructions
but told the Battalion Commander to go ahead since we
had the change in boundary and he gave instructions where
to take the Battalion after it was relieved. We then ar-
ranged for runners to go down the road, each runner to
meet a certain company, the runners taking these com-
panies to positions as occupied by the companies being
relieved.

"First troops arrived at about 4:00 o'clock. Between

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISIOl 195

4 :00 and 5 :00 o 'clock two companies of Infantry and one
Machine Gun Company were relieving the Battalion of
309. The other two companies were said to be in the
town at 5 :00 o 'clock, but in some way the runners lost
them and I think it must have been 6 :00 to possibly 7 :00
o'clock before the relief was complete.

** Having the place located and most of the Battalion
relieved, I asked Major Hawkins if I could do anything
else to help him in the relief. He told me that he would
not need me any longer, so I left to go to the P. C. of
309th Infantry, being directed by runner. I talked to Col.
Morgan and explained that the boundary had been changed
by Corps ; that this necessitated our putting in a Battalion
to cover the additional ground it gave us. He stated that
he had never been informed about a relief or change of
boundary and I took my map and gave them the new
boundary line as I had gotten it from my Division Head-
quarters. I also told him in the order I had noticed
that the 78th Division was to attack at 6:30 a.m. and our
Division was to support the attack. I thought it strange
that he did not know of his Division attacking at this
hour, as I had seen the Corps order myself. I left at 6 :10,
came back by Brigade Headquarters, dropped a note to
Major Parker telling him the relief was well on its Avay
when I left and also stopped by our Division Headquarters
and dropped a note to Col. Wainwrif?ht telling him the
relief was well on its way, and was back at my station
at 78th Division Headquarters at 8:00 a.m.

"I talked to the Chief of Staff of the 7«th Division later
in the day and told him that the C. 0. 309th did not know
the 78th Division was to attack. I was informed that the
right Brigade had been ordered not to attack but would
hold, covering their front with strong patrols."

The 2nd Battalion, 325th Infantry, was still under the
orders of the Commanding Officer of the 326th Infantry.
The elements of this Battalion were disposed as follows:

Company G (Lieutenant Bettes) in position at 96 0-86.5.
This Company maintained liaison with the 309th Infantry
in the edge of the Bois des TiOges by means of one platoon
in the woods on the right flank of that battalion.

196 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVLilON

Company H (Lieutenant Martin) held Hill 182 at
97.0-86.2.

Company E (Captain Fraser) held the east slope of the
Hill and tiie St. Georges Road leaving from St. Juvin.

Company F (Captain Fournoy) was in support on the
St. Georges Road in St. Juvin.

Following are a few messages from the Divisional dos-
sier for October 18, 1918 :

From Lt. Carlisle, Liaison Officer with the 42nd Division,
at 8 hours 30 minutes, 18th Oct. 1918.

"The 42nd Division will not advance to-day. The 83rd
Brigade are sending out patrols. The patrols which were
sent out last night have returned. Report that they could
get no further. No information obtained."

From 163rd Brigade 10 hours, 18 Oct., 1918.

"Enemy planes flying low under 1000 foot level.

"Col. Johnston replied that he got in direct touch with
the pui-suit service some time ago and was informed that
they were taking the air at once."

Col. Johnston to Wide-wing, 13 hours 45 minutes, 18
Oct., 1918.

"We have just received a message from the front line
that Boche planes are still flying very low over our sup-
port lines and directing the artillery fire.

"Wide-wing replied that the Air service Liaison Officer
was at Divisional Headquarters for the purpose of taking
care of such matters.

"Col. Johnston replied that this Liaison Officer states
that he is merely representing the Observation end of the
Service and reports to the Corps, who in turn report
somewhere else.

"Col. Johnston asked if there was any objection to the
Commanding General of the 82nd Division reporting direct
to them.

"No definite reply was elicited."

Major Lee (G-2), from Sommerance.

"Reports that at 13:45 hours two enemy planes were

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82i?D DIVISION 197

over the front line battalion directing Boclie artilleiy fire
and causing us heavy losses. They had been over our
lines since 8 hours this morning. Two of our planes showed
up early this morning, stayed for about half hour and
have not been seen since.

"Reports quite a few Boche seen above the Ravin aux
Pierres and some enemy seen in the ravine to the north-
east. ' '

From Major Lee, G-2, 328th Infantry Headquarters, 16
hours 40 minutes, 18th Oct., 1918.

** Regimental Adjutant wants me to report to you that
a German plane fell in flames in the area of Mr. Boyle's
Battalion. It was a Fokker and the pilot escaped in a
parachute. Pilot is now at 328th Infantry Headquarters.
He says he was operating a plane pursuing an American
bombing plane. He was brought down by American planes
that came up and took him by surprise. He said also
that another German plane was brought down in front of
the Division on our right."

Later Message from Major Lee.

*'I have been out to the lines and have found two planes
there. One of them is at 99.5-86.2. That one landed out
of control and is in fair condition with one blade of the
propeller broken and the landing gear smashed up. There
are no papers nor marks of identification. Out of that
plane was taken one pilot, who is badly injured and is being
evacuated to-night. This plane was a single-seater. The
other plane crashed in flames at about 99.9-86.2. This
was the plane from which the pilot landed with a para-
chute. The parachute fell further to the west."

Message dropped from aeroplane, 19 hours 10 minutes,
18 Oct., 1918.

"Artillery of enemy growing more active after 16:45
hours. Darkness setting in now. The air was full of
hostile machines. From 15:30 houre to 16:30 hours there
were 30 Boche pursuit planes over our sector. There was
one formation of 14 planes and three formations of 5 each.
They were pursuit planes painted a bright red all over."

198 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

No Field Orders were issued by llie Division until the
night of October 20. Our troops eoutinued to hold their
line and carried on the usual aggressive patrolling. The
78th on our left continued to strugrTjle with the extraor-
dinary diificulties presented by the Bois des Loges. Two
battalion messages indicated the situation.

From Lieutenant Mitchell, Liaison Officer with 78th
Division, 19th Oct., 1918.

**At 9:30 hours 309th Infantry reports troops in grove
in Bois des Loges. Are being troubled by machine-gun fire
from hostile aeroplanes.

"At 11:15 309th Infantry. Things going well, casual-
ties high. Liaison with 326th Infantry on the right and
310th Infantry on the left. One pounder crew gassed."

From 163rd Infantry Brigade, 14 hours 30 minutes,
19th Oct., 1918.

"Major Hawkins just had a runner from the 309th
Infantry stating their location as about 100 yards inside
the edge of the woods. They are reorganizing and feel
confident to hold. Enemy near. Fire from machine guns
and snipers heavy."

An indication of the growing desperation of our enemy
at this time is found in the following propaganda ad-
dressed to German troops and intercepted by our wireless
on October 19, 1918.

"At its reconstruction, the economic life of Germany
must find the world open; no measures should withhold
from us raw materials and bar to us markets. We are
ready to support any government striving for a peace on
such a basis. Arrangement and rebuilding? of our national
life are the issues on the program of the Christian national
workers' movement.

"You fighters at the front, our hopes on the successful
issue of an uncompromising peace depend upon your
heroic spirit. We remember your noble deeds on the battle-

WITHDRAWN

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 199

field. "We thank you for having spared our motherland
the woes of devastation. At this fateful hour it is more
urgent than ever to hold up the live wall which you have
built for the past four years in order that the enemy may
not trespass the holy ground of our fatherland. You will
not, at this last hour, allow the dreadful horrors of war
to visit our country and homes.

"You at home, for years you have borne the greatest
privations and sacrifices for our sacred cause. More than
ever, it is now necessary to do our duty and with re-
doubled strength, to stand up for the achievements of an
honorable peace.

"The Committee of the German Workingmen 's
Congress.''

On October 19 Colonel Ely rejoined the 327th Infantry
and on October 20th, 1918, Colonel McArthur, command-
ing the 326th Infantry, was evacuated to a rest hospital.
Lieutenant-Colonel Burr was transferred to command the
326th Infantry. On October 20 the 2nd Battalion, 325th
Inf., was returned to its own regiment and the 2nd Bat-
talion, 326th Inf., in turn passed out of the command of
Colonel Whitman. Reliefs were arranged within the regi-
ments and the usual patrolling continued. Our front lines,
however, did not advance.

A few messages follow from the Division dossier.

From Chief of Staff 78th Division to Chief of Staff
82nd Division, 2 hours, 20th Oct., 1918.

"We are pulling back our line. We will hold the general
line, St. Juvin-Grand-Pre Road. This change will be made
before daybreak."

From Major Hawkins, 2nd Bn., 325th Inf., 17 hours,
20 Oct., 1918.

"Colonel Morgan commanding the 309th Infantry has
been fully informed of the position of the 2nd Bat-
talion, 325th Inf., since the first morning we moved next

200 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF S2nd DIVISION

his right flank. Company G, 325th Infantry, has main-
tained actual contact with the right of the 309th line in
the Bois de Loges since 10 hours, 18th Oct., 1918.
Colonel Morgan has expressed himself in the presence of
Colonel McArthur and Major Hawkins as satisfied with
the liaison and out-post protection afforded his right flank
by this Division. Colonel Morgan has been asked by the
Battalion Commander if he wished one or more companies
of this Battalion to reinforce Company G on his immediate
flank, but stated that he thought it unnecessary."

Ravin aux Pierres Taken for the Last Time

82nd Division Field Order No. 30 issued at 21 hours,
October 20, 1918, stated that the 1st Army Corps would
continue to improve its position for a general advance
by local operations on October 21. The order further
provided :

"The 82nd ^Division will develop the enemy's main line
of resistance by pushing out strong exploitation detach-
ments on its front and will seize and hold any advan-
tageous ground from which the enemy may be driven or
may withdraw. Infantry Brigade Commanders are charged
with carrying out local operations on their own fronts as
prescribed but will not involve themselves in a serious
operation or bring on a general attack."

As a result of this order a strong patrol from the 164th
Infantry Brigade pushed up to the woods at about 99.0-
87.1, while troops from the 163rd Brigade seized the slope
north of the Ravin aux Pierres. This third attempt to
secure this formidable ravine proved to be a final and
successful effort. The enemy never afterwards succeeded
in retaking this ground.

A report to Division Commander from Brigadier Gen-
eral Cronin gives the story of this operation.

* ' The operation of this Brigade to-day resulted in estab-
lishing its front line north of the Ravin aux Pierres on

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 201

the line 97.5-86.8 to 98.4-87.15. This line is held by both
regiments; 60 men of the 326th Infantry on the left, and
the 1st Battalion 325th Infantry (something less than 200
men), on the right; the whole under command of Captain
Castle, 325th Infantry. At dark two machine guns were
to be carried across the ravine to the vicinity of the in-
fantry line, the rest of the company, six guns, to be just
south of the ravine. The whole constitutes to-night the
first line of the 325th Infantry. The line is in contact
with the 164th Brigade on its right, who joined us this
afternoon. The 2nd line, 325th Infantry, is along the
St. Juvin-St. Georges Road, and is the same as last night's
first line. Last night's 2nd line has disappeared, as I
passed it through the first line to-day to make the front
line to-night. The 3rd line last night remains the 3rd
line to-night and is on the slopes on a general line 97.7-
85.7 to 98.4-85.5. One platoon is detached to-night from
the 3rd line to occupy the right end of the vacated 2nd
line, with orders to keep out small liaison patrols between
the right flanks of both the 2nd and 3rd lines.

"The line of the 326th Infantry remains the same as
last night, except the 60 men of the 2nd line sent forward
along the east side of the valley, whose meridian is 97.3,
with orders to infiltrate into the ravine from the west.

"Little enemy infantry was noticed, but exposure
brought on heavy artillery and machine-gun fire, but not
to the same extent as yesterday. The Commanding Officers
of both regiments, and Machine-Gun Battalion, carried
out very carefully my instructions given from time to time
during the day. Progress was made by persistent infiltra-
tion aided by Machine Gun and occasional artillery.

"While the line is well advanced, and forms a salient,
it has been carefully prepared for resistance during the
night.'*

Another very human account of this small operation is
contained in a report made by Lieutenant Ulmer of Com-
pany A, 325th Inf., one of the units involved :

"The company had one Officer and 40 men left of an
original strength of 4 officers and 220 men. These 40
men were iDraetically dead from exhaustion and sickness.

202 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

When the company reached its objective, there were but
11 men left; the others having succumbed to fatigue. The
spirit was willing but the flesh was weak. After reaching
the high ground north of Ravin aux Pierres the Battalion
commander was notified and the rest of the Battalion
brought up. A new line was consolidated and wired, and
notliing further of interest occurred, except the system
of regular two-day reliefs."

This exploitation operation was protected by machine-
gun fire and artillery fire of twelve guns, commencing at
5 :30 on the north slope of the ravine. This fire was raised
at 6 hours and continued until 7. Both flanks of the Com-
pany were covered by patrols.

The situation as reported at 4 p.m., by Lieutenant- Colonel
Campbell is shown by his message to Colonel Whitman:

''Oct. 21st.

"I gave D Company back to Castle at his request.
'Phones all out, please try to get them in. Everything
lovely so far. Pretty heavy shelling. Will stick around
for an hour or so and mosey back. Castle is driving this
thing in good style. M. G. positions being reconnoitered
and I think everything O. K. if 326th will look out for
left."

CHAPTER XVIII
A THIN LINE'S POINT OF HONOR

After October 21, 1918, our front lines did not advance.
In the week that followed until November 1, 1918, the
American army was devoting its energy to a preparation
for the final drive which was to determine effective enemy
resistance in front of the American army. A tremendous
concentration of artillery of all calibers took place on a
depth of many kilometers behind our front line. Great
quantities of ammunition were carried up and dumped
in forward locations. Partially rested American Divisions
poured into the back areas ready to relieve the exhausted
remnants of the Divisions which had borne the brunt of
furious continued fighting in the past days and weeks
since the great offensive began. During this period of
preparation the front-line Divisions continued to exist in
cold mud and water-soaked fox holes, always subjected to
harrassing artillery and machine-gun fire. The support
and the reserve lines were subjected to the same degree of
artillery fire as was suffered by the first line. The reliefs
also were accomplished under very trying and dangerous
conditions.

The dossier of the 82nd Division contains many refer-
ences to the conditions under which our men existed. It
indicates that a number of advances were contemplated
if the neighboring divisions succeeded in getting forward.
The salient in which the 82nd Division was placed made

204 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

it prohibitive to advance until adjoining units succeeded
in getting fully abreast of our position in the Ravin aux
Pierres. Attacks were ordered for both October 22 and
October 23 in both the 42nd Division and the 78th Divi-
sion but on neither day did either Division succeed in
coming abreast of our most advanced elements. Conse-
quently the 82nd Division remained in place.

Extracts from the Division dossier:

"From Alto 1 (326th Infantry) at 10 hours 30 minutes,
22nd Oct., 1918. 7 Boche planes over our front lines."

C. 0. 327th Inf. to C. G. 164th Inf. Brigade, 11:10
hours, 22nd Oct., 1918.

"My surgeon just now reported that at least 90 per cent
of men suffering from diarrhoea and exhaustion. He ex-
presses the opinion that great majority unable physically
to endure an advance much less make attack. All other
information confirms this. In my opinion grave conse-
quences would follow any use made of this regiment as
now contemplated and believe entire Brigade equally out
of condition. I feel that these facts should be clearly
made known."

From Lieutenant Mitchell, Liaison Officer with 78th
Division, 11:45 hours, 22nd Oct., 1918.

"Patrols from 310th Infantry during the night encoun-
tered very strong machine-gun fire from enemy at the
south edge of Bois des Loges."

Air message: "Dropped propaganda in the region of
Verpel. 2000 copies of President Wilson's and Germany's
messages. Dropped candy and cigars to Americans."

From C. G. 164th Infantry Brigade to C. 0. 327th In-
fantry, 12 hours, 22nd Oct., 1918.

"Referring to report of your surgeon this morning on
physical condition of your men, the Division Commander

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 205

informed me during a visit this morning that the Division
will probably remain in the line for quite a while yet.
It is therefore imperative that every attempt be made to
build up the physical condition of the officers and men.
Many things can yet be done in addition to those originating
at Brigade Headquarters to improve the officers and men.
Officers and men should be evacuated only when abso-
lutely necessary. Your report will, of course, be forwarded
to Division Headquarters."

From 164th Brigade at 12:30 hours, 22nd Oct., 1918.

"Recommend that Private Alfred R. Simpson, Company
D, 321st Machine-Gun Battalion be decorated for extraor-
dinary valiant conduct in manning and operating alone a
hostile machine gun and successfully covering a withdrawal
of a portion of his command. This at a time when he
constituted the only fighting element between his organ-
ization and the enemy. Immediate and all intermediate
Commanders approve."

From Lieutenant- Colonel Wainwright at 163rd Brigade
Headquarters, 14 hours, 22nd Oct., 1918.

''Engineer companies in reserve have an effective
strength of about 125 men. Recommend that 2 companies
be placed at disposal of General Cronin for dugouts or
else that one company from this Battalion be used together
with a company now working on roads."

General Duncan directed Lieutenant-Colonel Wainwright
to carry out his recommendations.

From 164th Infantry Brigade by request of Colonel
Johnston, 14 hours, 22nd Oct., 1918.

"Recommend that 2nd Lieutenant Francis H. Mason
be decorated for unusual bravery in refusing to be evac-
uated though wounded while in command of patrol on
dangerous mission and subject to heavy machine-gun fire.
This on battlefield in front of Sommerance, October 21,
1918. All immediate and intermediate Commanders have
approved. ' '

206 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

From Division 0. P. at 14:50 hours, 22nd Oct., 1918.

"At 13:30 hours Boche shelling railroad west of St.
Juvin.

"At 13:35 hours Boche shelling Marcq and the ridge.

"At 14:20 hours heavy shelling on St. Juvin which still
continues. Heavy barrage to the left of the 78th Division."

From Captain Patton at Division 0. P. at 16:30 hours,
22nd Oct., 1918.

"3 German planes flying very low shooting at the
ground where engineers were at work on barb wire on top
of the ridge % of a kilometer southwest of Marcq. They
were run off by American planes."

Colonel Johnston to Captain Webster, 164th Brigade,
16 :55 hours, 22nd Oct., 1918.

"General Duncan has approved recommendation of
General Cronin that the relief be effected every other night
instead of each night as at present. This for the informa-
tion of General Lindsey and applies to him also if he so
desires. ' '

From 325th Infantry, 11:20 hours, 23rd Oct., 1918.

"9 enemy planes over our lines at 11:15 hours. 6
planes were painted red. One of our men in St. Juvin
found a can of apricots marked 'For the Belgian Relief.'
This evidently has been left by Germans on their retreat."

From Lieutenant Mitchell with 78th Division, 14:30
hours, 23rd Oct., 1918.

"Airplane reports 78th Division troops on the ridge
north of Farm de Talma and have taken Grand-Pre.
Troops are now north of Grand-Pre at 92.0-87.0, ap-
proximately. ' '

Colonel Johnston to 163rd and 164th Brigades, 15
hours, 23rd Oct., 1918.

"Report from hospital indicates that patients, sick and
wounded, bring practically no equipment with them.

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 207

Please have this checked up right away and see that all
equipment goes back with the patients, so they can be re-
equipped when they come out. We are getting short of
equipment and a lot is disappearing."

"7 hours, 24 Oct., 1918. 325th Inf. and 326th Inf.,
both report heavy gas (phosgene) shelling."

Lieutenant- Colonel "Wainwright to Brigade Commanders
at 16:30 hours, 24th Oct., 1918.

"Instructions for to-day as per Field Order No. 33 will
apply for to-morrow. No order will be issued to-night."

From Lieutenant Mitchell with 78th Division, 20:10
hours, 24th Oct., 1918.

"Memo, from General Craig, Chief of Staff, 1st Corp,
to C. G. 78th Division states that the Division has used
entirely too much ammunition for their preparation for
attack in proportion to successes gained. This complaint
comes from Army Headquarters."

TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS OF LETTERS
FOUND ON DEAD GERMANS GATHERED BY
A PRISONER BELONGING TO THE 30th BAY.
RES. REGT., 15th BAV. RES. DIV., CAPTURED
WEST OF ST. GEORGES, OCTOBER 23, 1918.
LETTERS WERE DATED OCTOBER 23 AND
WERE WRITTEN BY NON-COMMISSIONED OF-
FICERS OF THE 30th BAV. RES. REGT.

"I will write you a few more lines to-day — this time
from the position which we now occupy. Following my
return from K I immediately rejoined my organiza-
tion and was placed in charge of two companies. Now,
however, an officer is here who has been placed in com-
mand. The word 'Position' (Stellung) is really not the
proper expression for same and the line we occupy

208 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

migM be more appropriately named a 'Squatting Place'
(Sitzung). During the entire day we are compelled, on
account of enemy fire, to remain in holes we ourselves have
dug, protected only by shelter halves, waiting for night-
fall when Ave at least can move around a bit. If the oc-
cupation of our line became known to the enemy artillery
there would be nothing left to do, owing to the absence
of dugouts, but to pack up one's belongings and pull out.
Last night the Americans drove us out with their fire so
that, for better or for worse, we had to dig in in a new
position.

"According to rumors we are to be relieved within the
next few days."

Extract from letter by a Corporal belonging to the 12th
Company of the 30th Bav. Regt., dated October 23rd:

"Of the 40 men and 4 officers who manned our position
when we went into line, but 4 men remain. I have been
placed in command, there being no officers left."

Translation of German document issued at Headquarters
of the 5th Array. The document was among the letters
extracts of which are given above:

"German Soldiers!
"Beware!

"The word 'Armistice* passes through trenches and
camps.

"EVENTS HAVE NOT YET REACHED THIS STAGE!

' ' The word is taken by some as a certainty and by others
even as the long-hoped-for peace. This fellow or the other
fellow believes that matters no longer depend on him and
relaxes his watchfulness, courage, endurance, and distrust
of the enemy.

"Events Have Not Yet Reached this Stage!
"An armistice has not yet been concluded.

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

"The War Is Still on Just as it Always has Been I

"At this very moment you must be watchful, staunchly
persevering! At this very moment you are on the enemy's
soil, the rampart of the Fatherland.

"At this grave hour the Fatherland sees in you its sal-
vation and its hope.

* ' Headquarters of the 5th Army. ' *

From C. 0. 3rd Battalion, 325th Inf., 7 hours, 25th
Oct., 1918.

"Patrol along left front last night fired on as it crossed
trail 97.5-86.8. Enemy machine gun dominated ridge in
front of our position. Seem to be located on northern slope
of ravine. Enemy patrol of about 30 ran into one of our
positions and was driven off. We had one man slightly
wounded by grenade. Boche were seen to drag two
wounded away with them. This happened about 4 hours. ' '

From Division 0. P. on the right at 16:20 hours, 25th
Oct., 1918.

"2 of our planes driven back across our lines by
machine gun 'fire coming from the northeast edge of Boifl
des Loges, also from the trenches southeast of Cham-
pigneulle."

Colonel Montgomery, 6-3 1st Corps to Colonel John-
ston, 11:15 hours, 26th Oct., 1918.

"All movements and reliefs directed by Field Order
No. 86 are suspended for 24 hours."

Colonel Montgomery to Colonel Johnston, 11:40 hours,
26th Oct., 1918.

"You will replace the 77th Division and take their
present camp. Furnish the same garrison for the occu-
pation of the security position and continue the work they
are now engaged on."

210 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

Colonel Johnston. "In other words we take that letter
you wrote the 77th and follow it."

Colonel Montgomery. "Yes. The 77th are in Camp
Bouzon and the Chene Tondu."

From Division O. P. on the left at 15:40 hours, 26th
Oct., 1918.

"7 Boche planes over our front lines but driven back
by our anti-aircraft fire."

To C. G. 163rd Brigade from C. 0. 325th Inf., 26th
Oct., 1918.

"The C. 0. 1st Battalion reported at 16 :10 hours 2 planes
firing with Machine Guns on his position along St. Juvin-
St. Georges road. These planes were clearly marked with
U. S. insignia and were numbered 2 and 17. At 16 :15
hours similar report was received from C. 0. 3rd Bat-
talion that same 2 planes fired on his front line in position
north of Ravin aux Pierres. From observation point near
Regimental P. C. these planes were seen firing tracer
bullets. The planes were later seen retiring in a southerly
direction. Request prompt investigation and proper
action. ' '

From 164th Brigade by courier, 9:35 hours, 27th Oct.,
1918.

"Telephone shot out. In front of our left flank Boche
were heard driving stakes and stringing wire through the
night. This was about 300 yards in advance of 99.75-86.30.
Artillery scattered fire over entire front during night.
Sommerance shelled and gassed all night. Heavy shelling
and sneezing gas from 4:20 hours to 5:30 hours this
morning. ' '

To C. G. 82nd Division from St. Disicr, Oct. 28, 1918.

"1800 replacements are on route for your Division.
They should arrive at Auzeville at 1 o'clock Oct. 28th.
At present they are in two trains, one train has 1500 men
and the other 300 men."

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 211

From Lieutenant Mitchell with 78th Division, 11 hours,
28th Oct., 1918.

''Berlin announces the resignation of Ludendorff which
has been accepted by the Kaiser."

From Division 0. P. on the left at 9:05 hours, 29th
Oct., 1918.

"Shelling in the valley south of St. Juvin. Aeroplane
fight in air, about five machines engaged. Visibility poor."

Messages dropped from aeroplane 10 :50 hours, 29th Oct.,
1918. To G-2 82nd Division.

Time of departure 9:10 hours, time of return 10:40
hours, mission reconnaissance.

"Covered St. Georges-Grand-Pre. Pilot Lieutenant
Smith, Observer Lieutenant Wright, Squadron 12, alti-
tude 1000 meters. Boche patrol of nine planes over
Verpel at 9:50 and another patrol of five planes over
Verpel at 10:20. One Allied plane probably hit by anti-
aircraft artillery. Seen to crash just west of Champigneulle
at 10 o'clock. Dropped 2000 sheets of propaganda just
north of Bois des Loges over Beffu et Morthomme at 10 :15."

From 78th Division 15:20 hours, 29th Oct., 1918, to
1st Corps.

"A Boche plane fell about 100 yards in front of 78th 's
front line just north of Marcq."

From Captain Dunlap at Fleville at 19:40 hours, 29th
Oct., 1918.

"First truck of replacements arrived in Fleville 17:50
hours and last truck of replacements arrived at 18:35.
Hospital replacements arrived at 19 hours; all now on
way to organizations."

Note. Between 5000 and 6000 replacements from several
replacement divisions were sent to the 82nd Division dur-

212 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

ing the last week of October, 1918. These men were placed
in camps around the Headquarters of our rear echelon south
of Clermont. Many of these soldiers were recent recruits
from the United States and had not received more than
two or three weeks' training. Fortunately the Division
was relieved before it became necessary to attack with this
untrained material.

From Lieutenant Mitchell with 78th Division, 10 hoxirs,
30th Oct., 1918.

"Streamer message taken from enemy aeroplane that
feU to-day in front of our lines contained names of
American and French aviators captured or killed. Con-
tained names of eleven French aviators and two American
aviators. Stated that information as to eighteen German
aviators would be appreciated."

The following message from Lieutenant Stynes was in
the streamer container:

"Can you store my baggage in University Club, Paris?
1000 francs I loaned mess in the Farmers Loan and Trust
Company. All very well with me. Morriss was killed in
action. ' '

At 11 hours, October 30, 1918, Division Field Order
No. 34 announced the long-delayed relief.

"The 82nd Division less the 157th Artillery Brigade
and Ammunition Train will be relieved in its present
sector by the 77th and 80th on the night of the 30th-31st
October.

"The outpost screen of the 82nd Division consisting of
the 2nd Battalion, 326th Infantry; 3rd Battalion, 325th
Infantry and the 328th Infantry (less detachment com-
bined with the 327tli Infantry) will remain in place and
will be relieved at 24 hours on ' D ' minus one day by Com-
manding Generals 77th and 80th Divisions."

The part of the Division relieved on the night of the
30-31st October, 1918, was directed to move back a short

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 213

distance to the Corps line of resistance. This force con-
sisted of one regiment, 163rd Infantry Brigade, one bat-
talion, 307th Engineers, the 319th Machine Gun Battalion
and Company C, 320th Machine Gun Battalion. The re-
maining elements were directed to assemble in the vicinity
of Apremont and Champ Mahaut.

The outpost screen was not required by orders of the
Corps or Army but was furnished in compliance with
orders of the Division Commander in his final Field Order,
October 30th.

''It will be considered a point of honor to the front
line battalions of the 82nd Division left in the sector to
prevent the entrance of hostile patrols, thus keeping from
the enemy the fact that fresh troops are being assembled
in the rear."

It therefore stands to the credit of these troops that
for twenty-four hours before the attack by the new Divi-
sion on November 1, 1918, our men securely held nearly
five kilometers of front and prevented the enemy from
learning that a great drive was impending.

The outpost screen was relieved before daylight, Novem-
ber 1, 1918. As the troops moved south through Fleville
and Cornay they heard the roar of the tremendous bar-
rage striking north of the Kremhilde-Stellung and those
ridges where so much blood had been given to win a foot-
hold. The Division was conscious that its efforts during
the October battles had helped drive the enemy into open
country where fresh Divisions of fellow-Americans could
more easily complete the task.

Casualties in Meuse-Argonne Offensive

Enlisted
Officers Personnel

KilU^l in action or died of wounds 37 865

Known Prisoners 7 178

Missing 0 25

Wounded, Including "Gassed" 171 4726

Total 215 5794

CHAPTER XIX
AFTER THE FIGHTING

{Contributed by Ldeut. Colonel George E. Roosevelt.)
The night of October 31-November 1, the 82nd Division,
on being relieved by the 80th Division, moved back in
the Argonne Forest, with Division Headquarters at Champ
Mahaut, and the following day, November 2nd, the Divi-
sion continued south, Headquarters moving to Florent.
After remaining there one day, the Division began a
movement to the Vaucouleurs area. The motor transport
moved by Les Islettes, Clermont, Fleury, St. Dizier, Com-
mercy and Void. The infantry proceeded by bus. The
animal-drawn transportation started on November 4 under
the Commander of Trains, and reached Vaucouleurs after
staging four times — at Autrecourt, Chaumont-sur-Aire,
Kceurs-la-Grande and NeuviUe. Beginning November 10,
the Division again moved, this time by marching, to the
Bourmont area, each brigade making the march in three
days. The stay at Bourmont was as short as at Vau-
couleurs, for on November 16, the Division was again on
the march, this time for the Tenth Training Area, with
Division Headquarters at Prauthoy. The march was made
with three stages, and by the 19th of November, the Divi-
sion, less artillery and ammunition train, was billeted in
the towns around Prauthoy, where it was to remain for
the winter. The Prauthoy area had been used in the
previous spring by various American organizations; not-
ably, the 32nd and 79th Divisions, but was by no means
a completely equipped and thoroughly organized area in
which to pass a comfortable winter. In addition, almost im-
214

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 215

mediately upon arrival, the Training Section at General
Headquarters directed that maneuvers of all kinds be com-
menced with great vigor. These maneuvers vs^ere immedi-
ately commenced ; and it was attempted to put into practice
all the lessons learned in the recent fighting. Particular at-
tention was given to correcting deficiencies that had been
noticed, and obtaining the benefit of co-operation of all
means at the disposal of the troops. Some of the problems
were simple problems in liaison, with only the commanders
and methods of communication actually present. In other
problems, all the troops were out, and attention was con-
centrated on the proper tactical employment, and maxi-
mum co-operation, of all arms. The improvement was
very rapid, and most satisfactory. There were many diffi-
culties to contend with — the troops were tired by their
long marches; they were very scattered, and large num-
bers of replacements were arriving to fill up the gaps
caused by death, wounds and sickness, and the inevitable
wear and tear of war. In addition, many changes oc-
curred in the officer personnel, and for a consideralile
time the artillery brigade and ammunition train, which
had moved forward with the 80th Division in the 1st of
November attack, were completely lost. No one at Division
Headquarters, at Fifth Corps Headquarters (the Division
now being part of the Fifth Corps), or anywhere else,
seemed able to discover the location of these units. Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Wainwright left the Division Staff almost
immediately after the withdrawal of the Division from
the line; and Major Lansing Lee and Lt. Col. Troop
Miller left a little later. Their places were taken by Lt.
Col. (then Major) George E. Roosevelt, Maj. James C.
McMannaway, and Lt. Col. James P. Barney, respectively.
In the 163rd Infantry Di-igade, General Cronin was re-
placed by General Bradley, and Colonel Preston and
Colonel Miller took command of the 327th and 326th In-
fantries, respectively. Lt. Col. B. Moore was replaced as

216 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

Division Machine Gun Officer by Maj. I. C. HoUoway,
who had commanded the 321st Machine Gun Battalion
during the fighting.

The maneuver program involved battalion, regimental
and brigade maneuvers, and called for a Division maneuver
to be managed by Corps Headquarters, at least once a
month. The weather, which had previously been cold and
wet, became colder, so that the wet turned to snow. Many
of the men were required to eat out of doors, as no
proper housing facilities were provided. The Division
maneuver showed the great difficulties of conducting such
operations under the existing conditions. Distant organ-
izations were required to bivouac for two nights, and so
many cases of colds and pneumonia developed, that the
Corps Commander, Maj. Gen. Charles P. Summerall,
terminated the maneuvers, and most fortunately, the ex-
periment was not repeated.

During December, the artillery brigade finally rejoined
the Division, and immediately commenced to replace the
horses of the 319th F. A. regiment with tractors. At the time
the regiment was originally organized, it was designated
as tractor-drawn, and recruited and trained on that basis.
During its operations in France, it was supplied with
horses; but after the armistice it again made a valiant
effort to turn horsemen into mechanics and chauffeurs.
Immediately, artillery officers were detailed permanently
with infantry organizations, in order that there tshould be
the most thorough mutual understanding and co-opera-
tions between the two arms, and the extremely satisfactory
results obtained in maneuvers, thoroughly justified this
policy.

It was during December that after considerable effort,
a number of buildings were secured, to be used as mess-
halls, and the untiring efforts of all did a great deal to-
wards improving the conditions under which the Division
was required to work. A Division show was organized

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 217

under Captain Dunlap of Headquarters Troop, and also
the Division horse-sliow, the first in the A. E. F., was
held, and was so successful, that horse-shows of a similar
nature were ordered throughout the A. E. F. The work
of Captain Dunlap, Captain Holbert, the Division Re-
mount Officer; the enthusiasm and inspiration furnished
by Col. Gordon Johnston, the Division Chief of Staff; and
the backing of General Duncan, the Division Commander,
were all of prime importance in successfully carrying out
the horse-show in spite of the conditions of weather that
prevailed.

The month of January saw the further alleviation of
the pressure by the reduction of the training program
from GHQ; and by this time, the Division personnel was
practically completed; the transportation was in excel-
lent shape, both horse and motor; and the organization
running very smoothly and satisfactorily. During this
period, the First Army held conferences on recent opera-
tions for the Division and Brigade commanders ; the Corps
held conferences for the officers, including many of the
battalion commanders; and the Division included schemes
along this line from which a great deal of benefit was
derived. Once a week the brigade and regimental com-
manders met the Division Staff officers for the transaction
of routine business, and in order to listen to the stories
of various officers and men who could throw light on par-
ticularly interesting features of the operations of the
Division. It was partly as a result of these conferences
and stories that Lt. Col. (then Major) G. Edward Buxton,
Jr., was detailed to prepare a complete and accurate Divi-
sion History. In order to verify many important details,
sufficient transportation was provided so that he could take
parties of officers up to the scene of the Division fighting
in the Meuse-Argonne offensive and go over with them
disputed and important points, verifying on the actual
ground the details of exactly what occurred. It was also

218 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

provided that brigade commanders should hold conferences
with their battalion commanders at which either the Chief
of Staff, or the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, should be
present; and in that way, Division Headquarters was able
to keep closely in touch with the thoughts of the men of
the Division.

In February, General Summerall, the Corps Commander,
visited the Division and, in a whirlwind tour, reviewed all
the organizations. This trip required an entire day, and
General Summerall's opinion was expressed in an official
communication contained in the supplementary material
in this volume. In this month, the Division held its sec-
ond horse-show, even more successful than the first, and
as an additional feature, General Summerall reviewed the
Division, brigade and regimental officers mounted, in a
very impressive ceremony. During this ceremony, and to
the entire surprise of the Division officers present, General
Summerall called out Sergeant York, who was carrying the
Division flag, and in an impressive speech, commended
him for his wonderful fight which was to later gain him
the Medal of Honor. The following week, the Corps horse-
show was held, and was won by the 82nd Division. Too
much credit cannot be given to Captain Holbert for the
condition of the horses and transportation ; and to Captain
Patton, of the 325th Infantry, who had charge of the
Division hangar and the care and discipline of the men;
and to Captain Dunlap, who worked untiringly while the
transportation from all the different units was biUeted iu
Prauthoy. The band representing the 82nd Division also
won the competition for bands in the Corps.

Shortly after this, the Commander-in-Chief reviewed the
Division. The field on which the review was held, large
enough to have accommodated an entire Corps, was cov-
ered with snow, and presented a most impressive appear-
ance. In order to consolidate the Division, it was neces-
sary to borrow 50 trucks, and to utilize all the trucks in

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 218

the Division trains. All the distant units had to commence
moving at daylight; whether they marched or were trans-
ported. When the Commander-in-Chief arrived on the
field, the Division was completely formed, with the win-
ners in the Division horse-show in the rear, representing
the transport. Every company was personally inspected
by the reviewing party, and immediately afterwards, the
Division passed in review. A communication from the
Commander-in-Chief to the Division Commander immedi-
ately after this review, is printed in the supplementary
material.

It was shortly after this that intimation was received
that the Division would return home, and excitement of
course became intense. The intimation took the form of
orders to turn in property, and during the last part of
February, trucks, tractors, guns, escort wagons, machine
guns and other property, were turned in at the railhead
at Vaux, or were transported to other places designated.
On February 26th, the move to Bordeaux commenced, and
on March 2nd Division Headquarters was opened at
Castres, on the Garonne River, near Bordeaux. The journey
by train was two days and two nights for those who were
on time, and somewhat longer for others. There were but
two trains per day and the movement covered more than
one week. In addition, as the Division moved without
animals or transportation, and the trains were of the
strategic, and not the tactical, type, containing no flatcars;
there was a general feeling that war-time conditions were
coming to an end, and that the journey home had really
begun. The area near Bordeaux in which the Division
was billeted had never been used for a complete combat
Division before, and inadequate telephone service and in-
sufficient transportation were the principal difficulties with
which we contended. On the other hand, in the Bordeaux
area, troops were required to drill but two hours a day,
and to occupy their spare time many devices werei eia-

220 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

ployed. Major Cunningliam was appointed athletic and
welfare officer ; a baseball league was organized ; shows were
organized in tlie Division, and additional shows secured
from Bordeaux and booked throughout the area; movies
were provided, and leaves on a liberal scale to the nearby
leave areas were arranged. Practically every man entitled
to leave was able to get away.

Of special interest in this connection is the leave train
to Italy which was finally secured and which I believe
was the only leave train sent by the A. E. F, to Italy.
Eleven hundred men were sent on this train, which was
in charge of Major (then Captain) Danforth of the 328th
Infantry, and the men kept up the excellent record that
they had made with the Division in combat. During the
stay in this area the schools which had been started in
Prauthoy were developed still further under the general
supervision of Chaplain Tyler, the senior Chaplain of
the Division, and more than 8000 men were attending the
schools regularly. While in the Prauthoy area, some of
the units had held memorial services for their members
who had been killed in action or died in France. In the
Bordeaux area all the remaining units held such services,
and on most occasions, the Division Commander was
present, and made an address. Reviews were held fre-
quently in order to encourage the snappiness and soldierly
appearance of all units and at one such review General
Lindsey was presented with the Distinguished Service
Medal, and on another, Sergeant York received his Medal
of Honor. During this entire period every effort was
made to impress upon the men of the Division that they
must now prepare to return to civil life, and that the
preparation was fully as important and difficult as their
previous training had been to prepare them for military
life. The following memorandum, which was one of a
number, indicates in a general way how this was car-
ried on:

OFFICIAL mSTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 221

HQ. 82d DIV., AMERICAN B. F., FRANCE

17 March, 1919.
G. S. MEMORANDUM No. 14.

Although the training of the Division at the present
time is very different from the training required in an-
ticipation of operations, it is no less important and fully
as difficult. Within a short time all but a few members
of the Division will return to civil life and they should
be as well lifted to take up civil pursuits as the present
conditions permit. The qualities acquired during the
period of military training should make all members of
this command more useful citizens than they would other-
wise be, and the knowledge of foreign countries and cus-
toms, submission to discipline, individual initiative, pride
of organization and self-sacrifice for a cause, are just as
necessary after discharge from the army as they have been
in the A. E. F. No effort should be neglected to continue
the development of these qualities.

The conditions in the United States will be found very
different from those which prevailed at the time the Divi-
sion left, and the great economic readjustment caused by
the termination of the war is now in process of changing
the conditions and customs with which most of us are
familiar. Every help will be given to the members of this
Division to insure their fitting into the peace-time system
at home in the most advantageous manner possible. But
it must be impressed on all that the future of the indi-
vidual in civil life will depend, primarily, on his own
qualities, character and initiative, and that any assistance
that can be rendered is supplementary.

Members of the command should realize that, because
of their experience as members of the A. E. F. and because
of the part they took in the operations during this war,
they have the opportunity and the obligation to become
leaders in the life of the nation at home and they will be
expected to assume that position. This is an opportunity
and an obligation of the greatest importance, for the future
of the United States now lies in the hands^ of the members
of the A. E. F. if they are properly prepared to grasp the
existing situation. In solving the problems that will be

222 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

presented, the spirit of subordination and of co-operation
so essential in military life will become equally essential
after the return to civil life. All soldiers must now realize
that discipline is an essential requisite to military success.
They should realize likewise that true discipline is the
basis of team play. Team play, rather than individual
or factional struggles, will lead to the true solution of
the difficulties ahead. The splendid record made in the
past should be a spur to even greater accomplishments in
the future, and the pride in having done one thing well
should be the incentive for doing the next thing well; and
the mutual confidence acquired to working together in a
military organization should form the basis of a mutual
confidence in working together when released from military
life.

G. S. Memorandum No. 12 directs that one hour per day

be used in the instruction of members of the command in

many important subjects. In addition to those subjects,

instruction will be given in the principles outlined above.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL

LINDSEY:

George E. Roosevelt, Lieutenant Colonel,
Chief of Staff.

In April the orders for the shipment home finally ar-
rived, and the first units of the Division marched to the
embarkation camp on April 20. All units sailed from
Base Section No. 2, at Bordeaux, and were landed in New
York. At New York the Division was split between Camps
Upton, Dix and Mills, and demobilized as rapidly as the
demobilization machinery could work. The unfortunate
organization to return last was the 326th Infantry, which
was quarantined at Pauillac, and did not start for home
until well on in May; but by June 1 practically every
member of the Division who did not desire further service
in the army had returned to civil life, and the Division
as a military organization had passed into history.

SUPPLEMENTAEY MATEEIAL

RELATING TO THE

HlSTOiiY OF THE 82ND DIVISION, A. E. F.

I

LIFE OF GENEEAL DUNCAN

Major General George B. Duncan assuraed command of the
82nd Division October 4, 1918, just before tlie Division entered
its great offensive in tlie Meuse-Argonne operations.

General Duncan was graduated from the Military Academy
in 1886 and after graduation was assigned to tlie 9tli Infantry,
and served with that regiment for six years in Arizona. His
duties during this time involved the charge of the Apache tribes,
the Ilualpi and the Yava-Supi Indians whose homes were near
the Grand Canyon of the Colorado, la addition to his regular
work with his regiment.

From 1892-4 he served upon the personal staff of Maj. Gen.
John M. Scofield in command of the Army. He was relieved
from this duty early in 1894 to join, as 1st Lieutenant, the 4th
Infantry to which he had been promoted the previous year for
duty as regimental adjutant. He continued in this capacity until
the Spanish-American War. He was then given a Volunteer com-
mission of Captain, Adjutant General's Department, and saw field
service as Adjutant of a brigade in front of Santiago, Cuba, and
later as Adjutant of a division of the first troops landing in Porto
Rico. He joined his regiment, the 4th Infantry, in time to
proceed with it to the Philippines in .January, 1899. He was
promoted Captain in March, 1899.

He served three years in the Philippines as Adjutant of a
brigade and in command of his company, and took an active
part in the field operations of the Army, notably in the Province
of Cabiti. After three years' service in the Philippines, he
returned with his regiment to the States for a period of fifteen
months. He returned to the Philippine Islands in .June, 1903,
where he continued ou duty for six years, during the first part
223

224 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

at the Headquarters of the Department of Luzon, as Acting
Chief Quartermaster of that Department. He was given a
temporary commission of Major of Philippine Scouts in February,
1905, and organized tlie noted Third Battalion of that organiza-
tion. In 1908 he was placed in charge of all Philippine Scouts,
on the staff of the Division Commander, and continued on this
duty until July, 1909, when, on account of illness he was returned
to the States.

He was promoted to Major of Infantry and assigned to the
2nd Infantry upon his return and served with that organization
for two years. In 1911 he took a special course at the Army
Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth, which was followed by the
course at the Army War College at Washington, from v.hich
he w^as graduated in 1912. He was transferred to the 9th
Infantry and served with that organization in Garrison and
upon the Mexican border until April, 1914, when he was detailed
upon the General StafE of the Army and assigned to the War
Department branch of that Staff.

He continued upon this duty until our entry into the present
war, except for a period of five months' service with the 17th
Infantry on the border in 1915, when he was promoted Lieutenant-
Colonel of that regiment in September of that year. He was
promoted a Colonel of Infantry, September 18, 1916. In June,
1917, he was relieved from the General Staff at his own request
and assigned the command of the 26th Infantry, one of the
regiments of the 1st Division about to leave for France.

He took command of the 2Gth Infantry as it was embarking
at New York with the 1st Division, A. E, F., the first troops
to go to France after our entry into the war against Germany;
and held command of the regiment till September 1, 1917. He
was promoted Brigadier General, August 5, 1917, and participated
in the French offensive at Verdun, August 16-19. 1917, with the
94th French Infantry, an attacking regiment. He was awarded
the Croix de Guerre for his part in this battle.

General Duncan was assigned to command the 1st Brigade,
1st Division, September 1, 1917, and had part in its front-line
training in the battle sector east of Nancy, November, 1917. This
Brigade, under General Duncan's command, held the battle-sector
near Toui in January, February and March, 1918, and this was
the first battle-sector command exercised by an American general
officer in France. He went with the 1st Division to Picardy
in April, 1918, and his men were the first troops of the 1st
Division to take part in the battle north of Montdidier.

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 225

Promotiou to Major General came on April 12, 1918, and the
following month he was assigned to the command of the 77th
Division, the first of the National Army divisions to reach France.
After he had trained the division with the British, it was trans-
ferred to the Baccarat sector in June, 1918, and thence to the
Vesle for offensive action in July, 1918. General Duncan com-
manded the 77th in action on the Vesle till August 19, 1918.

He was assigned to the command of the 82nd Division on
October 4, 1918. After the armistice General Duncan received the
Distinguished Service Medal and was made a Companion of the
Order of the BatU.

THE ARTILLERY OF THE 82nd DIVISION

CONTEIBUTED BY

Captain J. G. Penntpackeb, F. A. A., A. C. of S., Gr-3

The graduates of the First OflBcers' Training Camp at Fort
McPherson, Georgia, reported to the Commanding General of
the newly-formed 82nd Division at Camp Gordon, Georgia, on
August 29, 1917. The artillery officers were members of the
1st, 2nd and 3rd Batteries of the 7th Provisional Training Regi-
ment and formed the commissioned personnel of the three
artillery regiments of the 82nd Division— the 319th, 320th and
321st. According to the new Tables of Organization of August,
1917, the Field Artillery Brigade of a Division was to be com-
posed of five separate organizations: three Regiments, one of
which was to be equipped with a six-inch howitzer and two
with three-inch guns, a Trench Mortar Battery, and a Brigade
Headquarters. Brig. Gen. Charles D. Menoher had been desig-
nated by the War Department as the Commanding General of
the 157th Field Artillery Brigade, but at the time of the organiza-
tion of the Brigade General Menoher was in France, nor did
he ever assume command of the Brigade. Colonel E. D'A. Pearce,
the commanding officer of the 319th Field Artillery, acted as
Brigade Commander until Brig. Gen. Charles D. Rhodes waa
assigned in February, 1918, with the exception of the period
from August 29, 1917, to September 9, 1917, when Brig. Gen.
Brady was in command.

The first enlisted men reported on September 5, a small train-
ing nucleus, comiiosed of nou-coiiunissioned officers and privates
in the Regular Army. The bulk of the personnel, from the

g26 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

states of Georgia, Alabama and Tennessee were received during
the next few weeks. In November, however, practically all these
men were transferred to other camps and in place of them men
were received from Texas, Oklahoma, Iowa, Minnesota and all
Of the states east of the Mississippi River, Camps Upton, Devens,
Meade and Lee furnishing the majority of the recriuts.

The training of the artillery was seriously hampered by lack
of equipment. In September one battery of three-inch guns was
received which was shared for training purposes by all three
regiments of the Brigade. Gun squads had the use of the
guns for instruction purposes for a total of about ten hours
during the period of approximately two months before going to
the range for target practice. A large part of the training,
however, was accomplished with wooden guns, the materiel of
the Brigade consisting of these crudely made structures fashioned
from the trunks of small trees, tin cans, spools, gas pipes and
any available material which could be made to represent the
sight, the quadrant, the breech block, traversing and elevating
mechanism and other important parts of the real gun. It re-
quired constant endeavor and almost infinite patience on the
part of the officers and men to overcome handicaps and to develop
accuracy and speed in the gun squads. In the instruction of
the specialists of the batteries and of the various headquarters
serious obstacles were also encountered, there being an absolute
lack of fire control and signal equipment. With tedious labor
signal flags, telephones, buzzei's, battery commanders' telescopes,
plane tables, etc., were manufactured within the organizations. In
this way training in the problems of communication and prepara-
tion of firing data were successfully carried on.

In the fall of 1917 land suitable for an artillery range was
leased by the government at Blackjack Mountain, about one mile
from Marietta, Cobb County, Georgia, and twenty-two miles
northwest of Camp Gordon. Another battery of three-inch field
pieces having been assigned to the 157th Field Artillery Brigade,
two batteries were available for target practice. Firing was
begun early in December and was continued from that time
until the departure of the Brigade in May. This opportunity
for some real firing was not only a valuable experience in
itself but lent added interest to the entire training period.
The visits to Marietta were always looked forward to with
pleasure by the officers and men on account of the realities of
the training on the range and the especially hospitable spirit
of the people of Marietta.

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 227

During this training period botli ttie 319tli and 321st were
designated as motorized regiments. Many men were transferred
out of these organizations who were unsuited for handling trucks
and tractors, their places being filled by men who had had
experience in civil life with gas engines. Motor trucks and
tractors not being available, it was necessary in instructing men
to be mechanics and chauffeurs to resort to the use of drawings
and paper illustrations of the workings of the gas engine. In
the spring several trucks were assigned and the training was
greatly expedited. The 321st, however, never was motorized
and the 319th was horse-drawn throughout the entire period of
preliminary training and of fighting, partial motor equipment
being received only after the armistice. This necessitated the
reorganization of these regiments when horses were received
after arrival in France, and it became necessary to organize
stable details, veterinary details and all other institutions neces-
sary for the care of the artillery horses and the training of
the men in their care and handling.

On May 8th the Brigade began entraining for Camp Mills,
Garden City, Long Island, and on May 19 set sail from New
York. Brigade Headquarters and the 320th Field Artillery sailed
on the British transport City of Exeter, the 319th on the
Lapland and the 321st on the Crctic. These ships formed part
of a convoy of twelve vessels protected by the U. S. S. Mon-
tana and the converted cruiser St. Louis. The voyage was
uneventful. Landing at Liverpool on May 31 the Brigade en-
trained for Winchester, spent two days at the Winnal Downs
Rest Camp and crossed the Channel from Southampton to Le
Havre. Here the regiments again entrained for La Courtine,
where they arrived on June 5, 6, 7 and 8.

At La Courtine the Brigade drew its full equipment of materiel
and transportation, and underveent a thorough two months'
course of training, culminating in a Brigade firing problem
worked out in its most minute details. The armament of the
320th and 321st Regiments consisted of 75 mm. guns, and the
319th received 155 mm. howitzers. It was here that the Brigade
had its first opportunity to fire and become otherwise familiar
with these weapons. An equally important feature of the work
at La Courtine was the developing and training of enlisted and
commissioned sjiecialists in telephone and radio work, operations,
material and Intelligence, as well as balloon and aeroplane
observers.

From La Courtine the Brigade moved by train on August 5-10,

228 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

to the area behind Chateau Thierry to form part of the reserve
of the First Army in the operations along the Vesle. On account
of the favorable progress of the campaign, however, the Brigade
was not needed in this sector and moved by train to Toul. It
was in the little villages in this vicinity, about August 15, that
the German bombing planes, on their nightly visits to Toul,
gave the different units of the Brigade their first experience
under fii*e.

On the night of August 18-19 the Brigade started the march
to the Marbache sector where, on August 22, it completed the
relief of the 2nd Brigade of the Second Division. The 1st Bat-
talion, 319th Field Artillery, and the 1st Battalion, 321st Field
Artillery, had previously been detached from the Brigade, and
attached to the 89th Division. It was a forward gun of Battery
A, 319th Field Artillery, at Manonville, that fired the first shot
of the Brigade at the front, at 3.10 p.m., August 20. These units
rejoined the Brigade just before the St. Mihiel offensive.

The Marbache sector had well constructed dugouts and battery
positions and an intricate system of telephone communication,
the result of four years of French occupation. The sector being
purely a defensive one, the infantry was organized in great
depth, which necessitated, of course, equally deep formation of
the artillery. Accordingly, each battery was divided into
platoons, one posted well forward to defend the outpost position
with barrage fire, and one platoon placed in a rear position
for the final defense of the infantry line of resistance. A very
elaborate system of defensive barrages and counter-preparation
fire was planned. The plan of defense provided, moreover, that
in case of a general assault the forward platoons would at
once fall back to prepared positions. Except for a limited
amount of registration, practically no fire was permitted, how-
ever, until September 12. The first oflicial shot fired at th<
front by the 75 mm. Regiments was fired August 22, on Norroj
by Battery F, 320th Field Artillery, as a reward for the excel-
lent work of its gun squads in competition at La Courtine.

Notice of the St. Mihiel offensive was received in ample time
to construct forward gun positions for practically the entire
Brigade. Much assistance was rendered by the infantry. The
batteries were moved up one and two nights before the attack,
every precaution being observed to maintain secrecy. In the
matter of O.P.'s the Brigade was fortunate, there being
in this sector two of the best on the whole front — Mousson
Hill and Ste. Gen^vifeve. O.P.'s were also established on

at

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 229

the forward slope of Xon Hill, which is directly in
front of Mousson and marks the extreme front of the infantry
lines. Trench mortar emplacements were dug just behind the
town of Les Menils. It was intended to wipe out a quadrangular
section of woods, Bois de la Voivrotte, by means of trench
mortar fire. This woods was a strongly held advance position
in the Boche line, infested with machine guns and mortar em-
placements and provided with deep dugouts. This attack was
unsuccessful. The Germans must have learned of the plan,
for while the projectiles were being fused the Boche put down
a heavy fire of 77's and 150's. Lieutenant Blackman, in charge,
fired the ammunition that was fused and then marched his
men back to their dugouts in the rear of the hill without losing
a man.

The artillery preparation started at H minus 4 hours (1 hour,
September 12). The mission assigned to the Brigade was purely
that of counter-battery work. A large amount of gas — No. 5
and No. 20 (phosgene and mustard) — was furnished for this
purpose. Certain French heavy artillery of the sector was
assigned to the Brigade for assistance. After frequent consulta-
tions with the Corps Artillery Commander, sixteen German bat-
teries were assigned to this Brigade for counter-battery work. In
addition to this other German positions were given. In all a
total of thirty-five German battery positions were definitely
located before our sector. A large amount of Corps and Army
artillery was placed in the sector, but most of it was assigned
to assist the Divisions on our left. The French had in the
sector a splendid S.R,O.T. (Service Rcnseigncmcnt Observation
Terrestrial — ^Terrestrial Information Observation Service) sec-
tion, some of its personnel having been in this sector for four
years. Shortly after the attack started, at 5 a.m., the S.R.O.T.
service evidenced its uncanny accuracy. The telephone at
Brigade Headquarters would ring and S.R.O.T. would state that
an enemy battery, giving exact co-ordinates, was in action. This
target would be assigned to one of the batteries or battalions
of the Brigade and in ten minutes S.R.O.T, would report "Bat-
tery silenced." In addition to counter-battery work considerable
harassing and interdiction fire was undertaken, and one bat-
talion each of 75's and 155's was assigned to fugitive target
work, Boche troops on the roads were fired upon, and one
avion which had made a forced landing was destroyed by fire
from Battery C, 321st Field Artillery.

On September 13, al)out noon, the Division was ordered to
take prisoners for identification on our front. A haitlly planned

^0 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82m) DIVISION

operation was worked up for a raid into Bois Frehaut by the
327th Infantry. This included a smoke screen, box barrage and
severe interdiction fire by tlie 155's. A total of about 10,000
rounds of ammunition was fired by the 75's, and 1500 by the 155's.

The 328th Infantry advanced to Norroy at dusk on September
13th while our Brigade was supporting the raid above mentioned,
but the Brigade assisted this regiment by counter-battery vi'ork
throughout the day and night of September 14th. The Brigade
supported the advance of the 328th Inf. to Vandi^res on Septem-
ber 15th.

The result of the St. Mihiel operation, as far as the Brigade
was concerned, was the establishment of a confidence, born of
performance, that was of inestimable value in the more difficult
operations that were soon to follow. Over 50,000 rounds of
75 mm. ammunition and 13,000 rounds of 155 mm. ammunition
were fired during this period.

On September 20 the 82nd Division was relieved by the 69th
(French) Division, and the Artillery Brigade was assembled in
the vicinity of Marbache. On September 22 the long overland
march to the Argonne was begun, in a rainstorm and a sea
of mud. As with all the troop movements in preparations for
the Argonne drive, all marching was at night. The days of
the 23rd, 24th and 25th were spent near Lagny, Boncourt and
Pierrefitte, respectively, and Beauzee was reached on the morning
of the 26th, when the far-off roar of masses of artillery gave
notice that the big attack was on. From Beauzee the march
was continued in the daytime to Futeau, a little town in the
Argonne Forest about twelve kilometers from the front. Here
the entire Brigade was in bivouac until October 5, in constant
readiness to enter the line. The long night marches had been
especially hard on the horses, and a number had been lost.
This period at Futeau was utilized for the conditioning of horses
and as much training of the personnel as was possible under the
circumstances.

On the afternoon of the 5th of October the Brigade was ordered
to bivouacs north of Les Islettes, and on the morning of the
6th, to move again to just south of the former front line, near
Pierre Croisee. Brigade Headquarters left Futeau at 8 hours,
October 6, the Brigade Commander with the Adjutant and
Operations Officer proceeding to Varennes by auto. At Varennes
information was received from the First Corps, under which
command the 82nd Division had passed, that the Division was
to hold itself in readiness to relieve either the 1st, 28th or 77th

OFFICIAL HISTORY O'F 82nd DIVISION 231

Divisions, or to go into line between any of these. Further
instructions were to send liaison officers to the artillery brigades
of eacli of these Divisions to become familiar with the sectors.
This information was sent back to the regiments of the Brigade
which, between noon and 14 hours, had reached their various
bivouacs. The 82nd Division and the 157th Field Artillery
Brigade established P.C.'s in the town of Varennes. At 13 hours
orders were received from the Division that it was to attack
the next morning at 5 hours. The regiments were at once
ordered to send forward reconnaissance parties that battery
positions might be selected during the few remaining hours of
daylight.

On the morning of Oct. 6th, Col. Pearce of the 319th F.A.
sent forward his Operations Officer, Bn., and Battery Com-
manders to select battery positions. He, himself, accompanied
by his telephone officer went fonvard to Baulny, established
Regimental Headquarters and perfected plans for liaison
throughout the regiment and with the infantry units."

From 1 hour, Nov. 2nd and throughout the 2nd some of the
most important work done by the 319th F.A. was on request
of the infantry to clean out machine gvm nests that were delay-
in tlieir advance.

The road leading over what had been "No Man's Land" for
four years was well-nigh impassable, and the conditions of
congestion and darkness and rain which did so much to impede
the Infantry's advance to their position, were even a greater
obstacle to the forward movement of the artillery. The 320th,
which led the column, resumed the march at 14 hours. Colonel
Williams, with his Operations Officer, Captain Dighton, went
forward to Varennes, where prospective positions were outlined
by the Brigade Commander. Returning along the column the
Colonel picked up in his machine the Battalion and Battery
Commanders, with whom he drove along the Baulny-Fleville
Road to I'Esp^rance Ferme. A reconnaissance which, due to
approaching darkness, was necessarily hasty, was then made of
the ravine eastward to the eastern edge of Moutrebeau Woods.
Heavy shelling of the ravine and woods by enemy batteries also
added to the difficulty. However, positions for all the batteries
were selected. The Regiment was placed approximately in line
in the eastern edge of the woods, with fields of fire to the
northwest. The route was carefully marked. The column came
up in good order, the last gun going into position at 1 hour,
October 7.

232 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

Thf 321st, hov/ever, experienced greater difficulties. Colonel
Deems and four officers arrived at Brigade Headquarters about
16 hours 30, and were assigned an area near I'Esperance Farm,
of which a hurried reconnaissance was made before dark. Bat-
taMon areas were assigned and officers posted at Montblainville,
Baulny and I'Esperance to guide the Regiment into position.
The Post of Command was selected at Chaudron Farm, where
the P.O. of the 320th Field Artillery was also established. Mean-
while the Regiment, under the command of Major Mehard,
marched from the Four-aux-Moines at 15 hours 30. Orders were
to proceed via Pierre Croisee. At 17 hours 30, just as the column
was crossing the almost impassable road across the original
trench system in the Argonne, the following order, unsigned, but
in the handwriting of Major D. M. Beere, Adjutant, 157th Field
Artillery Brigade, was delivered to Major Mehard by an officer
of the 319th Field Artillery:

"The 321st Field Artillery will march north from Pierre
Croisee via Abri du Crochet (99.3-72.6) — Montblainville — main
army road to Baulny — I'Esperance into position. Do not clear
woods into open until dark."

Leaving these instructions with the officer at the head of the
column Major Mehard at once proceeded to a reconnaissance
of the route. At Abri du Crochet instructions were left with
an M.P. on duty to direct the column north. Proceeding north,
however, Major Mehard discovered that the road was im-
practicable for field artillery on account of heavy mud and that
practically all the road north of P 91-36 (one kilometer north-
west of Abri du Crochet) was under artillery and long range
machine-gim fire. He was further informed by infantry officers
that a portion of the road to Montblainville was not within our
lines. Returning at once to Abri du Crochet he left instructions
with the M.P. there to direct the Regiment to the Abri du
Crochet-Varennes Road. He then went by motor-cycle to I'Esper-
ance via Montblainville, to obtain information and reconnoiter
his battalion position. By the time the column reached Abri
du Crochet the M.P. who had received instructions to divert the
column toward Varennes had been relieved and had failed to
transmit these orders to his successor, who was the one first
ordered by Major Mehard to direct the column north. The
column, accordingly, marched north. Shortly before reaching
the crossroads two kilometers northwest of Abri du Crochet
the conditions of the road became so bad and the hostile fire
Increased to such an extent that the column was halted by

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 233

Captain Kemker and 1st Lieutenant Lindsey, who were in the
lead. Information obtained from an infantry officer close by
was that the road to Montblainville was not entirely within
our lines and that it was practically impassible. On the basis
of this the column was counter-marched after considerable diffi-
culty and unavoidable delay. It returned to the Abri du Crochet,
and from there the Varennes road was taken. In Varennes an
officer reported to 157th Field Artillery Brigade Headquarters
for instructions and was directed to take the main army road
to Baulny. From here on the march was a succession of exas-
perating delays caused by the almost hopeless congestion of
traffic on the army road. The column was split into several
parts by convoys of trucks. The march from a point just south
of Baulny to I'Esp^rance was under continuous shell fire. The
net result of the combined adversities of the night was that it
was 5 hours 20 (October 7) before the first battery connnenced
firing and 8 hours before the last battery came into action. The
total distance marched from the Four-aus-Moines was 20
kilometers.

Tlie 319th Field Artillery, at the rear of the column, started
the movement about dark. It was after daylight before the
first batteries were extricated from the tangled confusion of
traffic on the army road and placed in position between Baulny
and Charpentry. One battery of the 1st Battalion started firing
before 7 hours and was soon joined by the remainder of the
1st and 2nd Battalions. The 3rd Battalion moved into position
the following night.

There had been no time on the daylight hours of the 6th
for the selection of observation posts. Having come into position
after dark, and with visibility in the early morning vei-y poor,
it was only with the greatest difficulty that the batteries were
oriented. Not only the batteries but the messengers carrying
the firing orders to the regiments and battalions were delayed
by darkness and traffic jams, and it was 5 hours 40 — 40 minutes
after "H" hour — before batteries of the 320th, the first in posi-
tion, were able to start firing. The rolling barrage ordered for
"H" hour (5 o'clock) was to be fired by the 320th, the 321st
and the 6th Field Artillery of the 1st Division. It was to begin
200 meters west of the railroad, west of Aire River, and progress
at the rapid rate of 100 meters in three minutes to the first
objective of Cornay and Hill 223. This line was to be reached
on schedule by about "H" plus 30, the barrage standing on this
line. It was on or near this line, therefore, that the first firing

234 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

by the 320tli and 321st was done. This ceased at "H" plu3
1 hour 15 minutes, when searching fire was executed until "H"
plus 3 hours between the first objective and the Corps objective,
alon- the Decauville Railroad. The batteries were in action
intermittently all day long in response to calls from the Infantry.
The 319th placed heavy concentration near Chatel-Chehery and
on Coruay and other enemy positions. At 18 hours, the 321st
and the 2nd Battalion of the 320th, at the request of the Com-
manding General, 164th Inf. Br., executed a barrage on the west
slope of Hill 223 to oppose a German counter-attack. The In-
fantry reported the following morning that they found two
companies of Boche had been practically annihilated. Defensive
barrages and harassing fire on enemy sensitive points were
delivered during the night.

On the morning of the 7th observation posts were established
on Hill '^24 Liaison officers were sent by the artillery regiments
to the Headquarters of the 164th Brigade and to the 327th and
328th Infantries, and telephone communication was established
with the 164th Brigade as well as within the artillery brigade.
It being realized that the regiments could not lay telephone
lines back to the artillery P.C. at Varennes, Lieutenant Watts,
the Brigade Telephone Officer, established a forward Brigade
central at Baulny.

For the attack of October 8 a rolling barrage from just in
front of the infantry jump-ofE line to the Decauville Railroad
was fired by the 321st and the 2nd Battalion of the 320th, while
the 1st Battalion of the 320th and the 219th R.A.C. (French)
fired a standing barrage along a 2 kilometer east-and-west line
just north of Cornay, to protect the right flank of the 3-7tll
Infantry The 319th fired concentrations on Cornay, the southern
slopes of Champrocher ridge, Marcq, and battery positions and
sensitive points to the north and west. Cornay, however, proved
a stumbling block to the infantry's advance and just before 11
hours a heavy concentration of almost the entire Brigade was
placed on the town and the heights overlooking it. This fire
silenced machine guns and trench mortars in the town and
enabled the 327th Infantry to enter it. Throughout the day the
wooded slopes west and southwest of Cornay which sheltered
the machine-gun nests that were playing such havoc with our
infantry were deluged with fire. Harassing fire again continued
throughout the night.

The attack of the 32Gth Infantry, which had relieved the 28th
Division, on October 9th was supported by the 53rd Field

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 235

Artillery Brigade, while the 320th and 321st fired a rolling bar-
rage for the attack of the 327th and 328th Infantries. A heavy
concentration on troublesome machine gun nests on the top of
the Champrocher ridge, just southwest of Cornay, was fired
between 11.45 and noon. It was on this afternoon that a vigor-
ous German counter-attack from the north resulted in the recap-
ture of Cornay. ^

Two hours of preparation fire preceded the Infantry advance
of October 10, when the 325th Infantry relieved the 327th and
3-Sth, and, with the 326th on their left, attacked at 7 hours
behind a rolling barrage. Advancing with little resistance to
the ridges north of Cornay, in the course of the afternoon their
patrols reached the Aire and the enemy was definitely cleared
from this portion of the Argonne.

In the course of the 10th instructions were received for prep-
arations for the attack of the 11th, when the Division sector
was shifted eastward astride the Aire River. Up to this time
the batteries had remained in the positions occupied on the
morning of the 7th. The direction of attack, however, had now
been changed from due west to due north and a rapid advance
was expected to result from the attack of the morning Recon-
naissances were conducted, accordingly, for new positions farther
to the north. During the night of the 10-llth the 320th Field
Artillery moved by battalions to the ravine west of Exermont
while the 321st took up new positions in the east and west
ravine just southeast of Fleville. The 1st Battalion of the
319th took position near Apremont, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions

?oTn t '"'"''^'ii'''"- ''"^ •^^^ "^™^"^ ^^^ 1^^ b"'^i"-
took position near Exermont. Division Field Order No. 23 of

October 10 for the attack of the next day ordered the artillery :
"To keep harassing and interdiction fire in front of the nfl

coramanaers will keep artillery commanders constantly informed
^rt'llprv tn h ^^ positions. One regiment of 75 mm Teld

The 320th Field Artillery was assigned to support the 164tb

236 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

Brigade, and the 321st the 163rd Brigade, and preparations were
made for the advance of a portion of the artillery immediately
after "H" hour.

The Field Order of the 164th Brigade assigned one battalion
of the supporting Artillery, the 320th, to the two Infantry Regi-
ments as accompanying artillery. The first Battalion of the
3-^Oth accordingly, moved forward early in the morning and
went into position near Fleville, with two forward platoons
nearly a kilometer north of that town. Visibility was poor on
account of mist and observation and identification of machine-
gun targets was diflicult throughout the day.

Not only was no rolling barrage ordered but, as it turned out,
it would have been of doubtful value, the infantry meeting
serious resistance from south of the assigned jump-ofE line. The
heavy machine-gun fire which the infantry suffered from the
vicinity of St. Juvin, outside of the Division sector, resulted in
an increasing amount of fire being diverted to this vicinity and
Hill 182 to the north, where 60 per cent, of the fire for the day
was delivered.

Frequent reports were received during the day that friendly
artillery was falling on the ridge at 85.5 and causing losses to
our infantry. Though this was carefully checked up in the 157th
Field Artillery Brigade and it was made certain that no bat-
teries were firing in this vicinity at the times indicated, the
reports continued with such persistence that in the evening all
firing was stopped within the Brigade for one hour and a
thorough investigation was made in the Divisions on both flanks
and in the Artillery farther to the rear, with the result indicated
in the following messages, copied from the G-3 dossier :

Telephone message from Albany A-1 (Commanding General,
157th Field Artillery Brigade) at 21.20 o'clock, 11 October:

"During the preceding hour none of the Regiments under his
command has fired a shot. At same time a message from Anson
1 (C.G. 164th Brigade) states that during same period the fire
on troops of Anson I's command was continued unabated. This
seems to prove conclusively that the fire on our own troops was
not done by artillery of the 157th Field Artillery Brigade. The
Brigade Commander^equests that this vindication be given the
san^e publicity which was given to the memorandum complaining
of hostile fire."

Extract from Message to Colonel MacArthur at 20.20 o'clock,
11 October (from Division Headquarters).

"In regard to statement that our troops were being fired on by
friendly artillery, please notify all concerned that the matter

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 237

has been carefully checked right and left and all the way to
ttie rear and none of our artillery is firing in that region. Troops
were suffering under enemy shell fire unquestionably."

Excellent work was accomplished on this day and the days
following by the forward gun from Battery E, 321st F A under
1st Lt. Prentiss S. Edwards. He took position on the early
morning in an orchard about 1200 meters south of St Juvin
and oa a road just east of Marcq. Three important machine-
gun targets were successfully attacked during the morning Dur-
ing the night of October 11-12 the gun was withdrawn to a
position on the reverse slope of the crest where the road runs
west from Martincourt Farm. This gun remained at work con-
tinuously until about October 22, changing position frequently.
Close liaison was maintained with the 326th Infantry but the
majority of targets fired on were obtained by direct observation
and a post which was maintained at the Division O.P. near
Marcq. At least eight macliine-gun targets were destroyed On
one occasion a small ravine into which twenty Boche were seen
to enter was taken under fire. Only five Boche left the ravine
On October 19 fire was directed at four machine gunners stand-
mg beneath a small tree. A direct hit was obtained on the tree
and all four men either killed or disabled. Much sniping fire
was executed on groups of men and wagons on the road running
north from Champigneuelle. A total of 657 rounds were fired
by this piece.

The infantry devoted the 12th to the consolidation of their
position on Ridge 85.5. Most of the artillery fire for the day
was on crossroads and suspected machine-gun positions New
O.P.'s were established, P.O. moved forward, and defensive bar-
rages were adjusted in front of the infantry line. Throughout
the night of October 12-13 a number of small patches of woods
west of St. Georges and along the Ravin aux Pierres and the
Fishhook Ravine were heavilr gassed and in the morning the
same areas were harassed with H.E. and shrapnel. In the
afternoon of the 13th the Brigade was ordered to make six
25-meter openings in the enemy barbed wire protecting the
Kriemhilde Stellung. This mission was assigned to the 238th
R.A.C. (French). The cutting had hardly begun when the Boche
put on a spectacular counter-attack, supported by a heavy bar-
rage. On the call of the infantry both the 320th and 321st
responded with a defensive barrage 200 meters in front of the
infantry line. It was afterward reported that this barrage
was extremely effective, resulting in the repulse of the attack

238 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

During the afternoon and evening the 2nd Battalion of the 320th
Field Artillery, less Battery E, moved forward to positions south
of Sommerance. The movement of Battery E was delayed by
the counter-attack. A heavy program of harassing fire and gas
on wooded areas was maintained throughout the night.

On October 14 a general attack was made by the First Army
in an attempt to carry the Kriemhilde Stellung positions. The
attack, which began at 8 hours 30 minutes, was preceded by two
hours of combing fire on enemy works, assembly areas and com-
munications. Visibility was fair and considerable shrapnel was
used. The rolling barrage for this attack, which was fired by
the 320th, 321st, and the 238th R.A.C. (French) over a 2%
kilometer front, moved at a rate of 100 meters in six minutes,
the rate of 100 meters in three minutes which had been ordered
in all previous attacks having been proved much too rapid.
About four o'clock in the afternoon the 320th fired a 30-minute
defensive barrage along the Ravin aux Pierres. A forward gun
under the command of 2nd Lt. Edward F. Gunter, 320th F.A.,
during this attack destroyed two pill boxes. Heavy fire on
woods, back areas and communications was continued through-
out the afternoon and night. On the afternoon of the 14th the
319th and 321st Field Artillery and the remaining batteries of
the 320th moved forward to the Ravine which runs from Fleville
to Sommerance.

On the 15th the attack to break through the Krienihilde
Stellung was continued. Artillery preparation started about mid-
night October 14-15. It covered crossroads and other sensitive
points, while woods and ravines known to be occupied by the
enemy were gassed with non-persistent gas at "H" minus 4
hours. "H" hour was 7.30. A barrage similar to that of the
preceding day was placed in front of the jmnp-off line at "H"
minus 5 minutes, advancing with the infantry at "H" hour. Very
heavy enemy resistance was met, particularly in the Ravin aux
Pierres, and after a short advance the entire attack was held
up. The artillery had been moved up close to the infantry for
this operation and suffered severely from gas and shrapnel. In
the afternoon the 325th Infantry made a second unsuccessful
attack to cross the Ravin aux Pierres behind a barrage fired
by the 321st and the 328th R.A.O.

The attack was continued on the 16th, the preparation fire
and rolling barrage being almost a repetition of those of the
previous two days. A heavy German counter-attack was made
at 11 hours which was broken up by a rapidly delivered artillery

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 239

barrage. A Boclie plane was brought down in flames near Som-
merance in the afternoon of the 16th by machine-gun fire from
a battery of this Brigade. Battery C, 320th F.A., and the bat-
teries of the 2nd Battalion, 321st F.A., all claim the honor of
having fired the winning shot.

There was very little activity on the 17th. A defensive bar-
rage was put down just south of parallel 88 on the Division
front. Most of the fire of that day was delivered at the request
of the infantry on machine-gun nests and wooded patches. The
238th R.A.C. (French) was relieved by the 219th (French) Port6e.
On this day, Lieutenant Durrett, 320th F.A., was killed by shell
fire at the echelon, this being the only death of an officer that
the Brigade suffered at the front. During the nights of October
17-18 and October 18-19 heavy concentrations of both mustard
and non-persistent gas were placed on Champigneulle in connec-
tion with the attacks on the Bois des Loges by the 78th Division,
which had relieved the 77th Division on our left.

In the meantime it was realized that the Kriemhilde Stellung
could only be broken through by a heavy and coordinated attack
in force by fresh divisions, and our infantry were organizing
their positions for defense. The Brigade had suffered numerous
casualties in their advanced positions and, on the night of
October 21-22 the 1st Battalions of both the 320th and 321st
were withdrawn to positions farther in the rear. From this
time until the offensive of November 1 conditions for the artil-
lery closely approached those of stabilized warfare. Light
harassing schedules were fired at night and close and constant
liaison was maintained with front line infantry battalion com-
manders, at whose call numerous missions were executed, the
targets being, for the most part, machine-gun emplacements. On
October 23 another attack by the 7Sth Division was supported
by this Brigade, by fire on the Bois des Loges and Hill 214,
the 219th R.A.C. (French) laying down a smoke screen. Between
October 18 and 31 numerous attempts were made to carry out
adjustments with aeroplane observation, but the results were
very disappointing, only one fairly successful reguage being
secured. The 319th Field Artillery, however, obtained very satis-
factory results from adjustments by balloon observers. A balloon
from which Maj. John H. Wallace, commanding the 1st Bat-
talion, 319th F.A., was adjusting fire, was shot down by a Boche
plane, Major Wallace making a successful descent by parachute.

On October 26 the Brigade received advance information of
the general attack on November 1 and work was begun on the

240 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

plan of employment. In preparing for this attack one gun from
each batteiT of the 75 regiments was moved forward several
days before to positions later to be occupied by the entire Bat-
tery, and adjustments for the Battery were carried out with
this gun. The movements were made at night and the guns
were carefully camouflaged.

Brigadier General Rhodes was promoted to the ranis of Major
General on October 16 and on October 25 was transferred to the
42nd Division. Colonel Pearce of the 319th again assumed com-
mand of the Brigade, a position which he held until the arrival
of Brig. Gen. Daniel F. Craig on November 3.

On October 30 the 82nd Division, less the 157th Field Artillery
Brigade and the 307th Ammunition Train, was relieved by the
80th Division, which the excepted organizations remained in line
to support. On the night of October 30-31 the batteries were
moved forward to positions close behind the infantry. The
Brigade was assigned two batteries of the 69th C.A.C. (9.2 inch),
sis batteries of the 247th R.A.C. (French) and the 219th R.A.C.
(French). The 247th was attached from "H" plus 2 hours on
"D" day to 0 hour, "D" plus 1 day.

The attack of the First Army on November 1 was intended
to break the enemy's last line of resistance sodth of the Meuse.
It was to be an enveloping attack from the right, the Fifth
Corps on our right leading the 80th Division, while the 78th
Division, on the extreme left both of the 1st Corps and of
the 1st Army, was to make but a small advance on the right
of its sector on the first day, advancing with the balance of
the line, however, on the following day. The first objective of
the 80th Division was the high ground between Imecourt and
Alliepont, a commanding height known to be heavily infested
with machine-gun nests. The Corps objective was the high
ground to the north of Sivry-lez-Buzancy. The 160th Infantry
Brigade, consisting of the 319th and 320th Infantries, was the
attacking Brigade. The Artillery plan for the attack was quite
elaborate. Batteries E and F of the 321st Field Artillery were
assigned as accompanying batteries, one accompanying gun being
assigned to each of the two infantry regiments. The fire of
the remainder of the Brigade was divided into three phases.

"Phase A," the preparation fire, began at "H" minus 2 hours
(8 30 hours), and for the first hour consisted of harassing fire
on roads, sensitive points in the rear areas, machine-gun nests,
and woods. From "H" minus 1 hour to "H" hour the woods
north and northwest of Imecourt were heavily gassed, while

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 241

«nH T^l.^'"''^- ^"^'"^'^^ ^''^ ^ '"^^^^ s^^een on the woods
and heights along the first objective.

"Phase B" was scheduled to begin at "H" hour (5 30 hours)

initial infantry attack. This fire was not to be delivered over
the Whole area in front of the infantry advance, but only in
certain zones where serious resistance was expect;d. The rate
o advance was 100 meters in six minutes to the first objective

mando?th?Br-'%'''''/'^'^- ^^^^^^^^ came under thell:
mand of the Brigade and, with the 219th II.A.C. (French) fired
a box barrage in front of this objective

thiJnoint "tnTr ^''''''!^ '" '"^P"'' '^^ '""'^'^''^ attack from
this point to the second objective, and again consisted of an
accompanying barrage over selected .ones. Forward movexnents
by battalions were scheduled, the 320th making the first mot
Th?. fir f '' ^'""'"^ '" P^^^"«^« «°"th Of Imecourt.

the 320th Infantry and that of the 77th Division on the left-
were halted by machine-gun fire in the difficult tLainaroind

tbe S'r ''"^ r'''' '^^ '' "'-^^ '''' "^«1 ^^rly afternoon that
the Ravin aux Pierres was actually crossed. The advance was
again held up by machine-gun resistance from the ZL on
Hill 214 As a result of these delays the advance of the barrage
fie was held up on infantry request for a total of 190 minutes
Which was added to the time schedule of Phase C. The forward
movement of batteries was similarly delayed and they final v
moved to positions north of St. Georges in the afternoon Snd
during he night of November 1-2. Meanwhile, the 319th In

ran-.T' "" .'"''" "'"^ '^^ '"^ ^^^^«^««' ^^^ moved forward
rapdly and combat liaison between the 319th and 3mh In
antries had been lost and a large gap had developed between'

he "othTi^^Arn' "'^ '^ ''^^ ^^^ ^^^^ the 'battert of
the 320th Field Artillery and 321st Field Artillery and nnrt
Of he 319th Field Artillery, in the darkness, unknowingly took
position. During the night all these batteries suffered from

^^ %hlV^" advance^f'tle^U^ry tr^W^
tTeT^ht ^O^TiToUrr rofot^aL-r th
ront line battalion commanders, by telephone and run^r wa
established, an observer being kept with the battalion
mander for the purpose of adju.tinj; fire. No targets

corn-
were

242 OB^FICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

assigned, however, and no requests for specific fire were made
during the first two days. Neither were the accompanying bat-
teries really used as such, though the two battery commanders
established their posts of command with the respective infantry
regimental commanders to whom they were assigned, maintain-
ing direct liaison with their batteries by telephone and runners.
On the morning of November 2 the attack was resumed at
8 hours. There was no artillery preparation, but the barrage
was fired from a point just north of Sivry, following a general
northerly direction into Buzancy. The barrage was preceded
by concentrations of both heavy and light artillery on enemy
sensitive points. By this time the enemy was in full retreat
and all artillery moved forward. Before the next morning the
entire Brigade had come into position in the vicinity of Ime-
court, commanding officers of all three regiments having P.C.'s
in that town. In the course of the night contact had practically
been lost with the enemy. Owing to the congestion of the roads
and their terrible condition from shell fire it was impossible to
supply more than one regiment with ammunition. Accordingly,
the 321st Field Artillery, with the 3rd Battalion of the 319th
attached, was assigned to support the Divisional infantry, which
on November 3 consisted of the 159th Brigade. A conference
was held between the Regimental Commander of the 321st and
the Infantry Brigade Commander. The only artillery support
that the latter desired was two accompanying guns with each
of the two infantry regiments in line. These guns were furnished
from the Second Battalion and accompanied closely the infantry
advanced on the morning of November 6, at times preceding the
first wave without encountering serious enemy resistance. Diffi-
culty in obtaining targets, however, was again experienced. On
November 4 the Infantry continued to advance with but little
rear-guard resistance from the rapidly retreating enemy. Orders
were issued to each of the artillery battalion commanders to
follow with his batteries at a distance of from 2000 to 3000
yards behind the infantry front line, maintaining close liaison
with the infantry commanders and going into position In case
the advance should be held up.

During the night of November 3-4 harassing fire was directed
on the edge of woods north of Les Taronnes Farm, and on the
following morning some very effective observed fire was executed
on enemy machine guns in the vicinity of La Polka Farm. The
Brigade P.C. moved to Buzancy in the afternoon. No telephone
lines were laid due to the extremely rapid advance of the In-

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 243

fantry. The 219th and 247th (French) reported that they were
unable to advance with the Brigade due to the state of their
transportation, and were relieved. One battalion of French 105
guns, horse-drawn, was assigned to the Brigade, but due to
the congestion on the roads this unit was also released by the
Division Commander. Great difficulty was experienced in get-
ting up ammunition. One trip from Buzancy to Apremont by
the Ammunition Train required thirty-six hours.

The 320th Field Artillery, who, in the meantime, had been
in reserve, moved on November 3 to positions north of Sivry-
lez-Buzancy. This Regiment again moved forward on November
4. At about 11 hours it was found that the infantry advance
had been held up along the ravine southwest of Sommauthe by
machine-gun fire from Ferrae Polka, Ferme d'Isly, and the woods
along the ravine Pre Billet and around Source Grosjean. The
Regimental Commander accordingly ordered the 1st Battalion
into position and, about noon. Battery C fired on these machine-
gun positions. This fire was observed and adjusted. At 15
hours the 2nd Battalion also went into position, and at 16 hours
the entire regiment, on request of the 318th Infantry, fired
a rolling barrage in support of the infantry advance. This fire
was continued for 80 minutes, 2600 rounds being expended. At
about 17 hours fifty rounds of "D" shell were fired on Stonne
at a range of 10,500 meters, word having been received that that
town was congested with German troops. No more "D" shell
was available.

On the morning of November 5 the 320th Field ArtiUery, with
two guns per battery of the 3rd Battalion, 319th F.A., attached
relieved the 321st Field Artillery in support of the entire in-
fantry of the Division. This was the last day in which any
considerable firing was done by this Brigade. The entire Regi-
ment moved forward in the morning in close support of the
infantry, the 1st Battalion on the left and the 2nd Battalion
on the right. In the afternoon Battery B went into position
just south of the Stonne-Beaumont Road and fired on the
village of Yoncq. At 11 hours the 2nd Battalion went into
position 11/2 kilometers southwest of Beaumont and fired at the
request of the 317th Infantry on machine-gun nests near La
Thibaudine Ferme and La Harnot Erie Ferme. After ni^'htfall
at the request of the 2nd Division, 500 rounds were fired on
Yoncq.

In the afternoon of November 5, 1st Lt. George S. Bkiir took
forward an accompanying gun which fired effectively on raacliine-

244 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

gun nests. On the following morning he took this gun forward
with the 18th Infantry, which had relieved the 318th Infantry,
and placed it in position on the southeastern slope of Mont de
Brune, which point marked the farthest advance of any unit
of the Brigade during the operation. From tliis position be-
tween 9 and 12 hours November G, direct hits were scored on
u church steeple in Mouzon in which machine guns were located.
Enemy observation posts across the Meuse River were also fired
on This was the only firing executed by the Brigade on
November 6. In the afternoon this gun was heavily shelled
by an enemy battery. On being bracketed for range Lieutenant
Blair withdrew his men. The gun and one caisson were struck,
the gun being rendered unserviceable.

On November 6 the 80th Division was relieved by the 1st
Division and on November 8 and 9 the 157th Field Artillery
Brigade proceeded to the area Sivry-Im6court-St. Juvin. On
November 10 the Brigade marched to the area of Montblainville-
Apremont, and continued the march the following day to the
neighborhood of Les Islettes, where news of the armistice was
received The Trench Mortar Battery which had remained at
Fleville rejoined the Brigade at this time. It had not served
as a unit but had rendered excellent assistance to the Ammuni-
tion Train in the arduous operations of that organization during
the preceding weeks. Details were also sent from this Battery
at various times to take over captured Boche artillery and am-
munition and turn them on their former owners.

The Brigade remained near Les Islettes until November 18,
and then moved to the vicinity of Ste. Menehould to await orders
to rejoin the 82nd Division. These orders did not arrive for
nearly a month and the Brigade finally arrived in the Tenth
Training area and rejoined the Division on December 17.

The work of the Artillery Brigade while with the 80th Divi-
sion had in the meantime been commended in the following
terms :

Headquaetees Eightieth Division American Expeditionary
Forces

France, 12th December, 1918.
From: Commanding General, 80th Division.
To- Commanding General, 82nd Division.

Subject: Commendation of Artillery Brigade.

1 I desire to convey to you recognition of the excellent service
done by the 157th Field Artillery Brigade while serving with
the Division east of the Argonne, November 1 to 6, 1918.

2. The efficient cooperation witli the infantry, extending to its

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 245

close support by guns, batteries and battalions pushed well to

operS; oTni^n^-'-'^ '"'' f^*"'."^^ ^^^^^ ^o the successful
of fhi son/^T^."^. ^1^'ision and maintained the high standard
ot the 82nd Division and of the Field Artillery
d. It is a pleasure to aclvnowledge this service.

S. D. Stuegis,
Major General.
1st Ind.

t J'ezTe'l-ieirrrSi ^^^ °'""'""^^'- -"^ -"» P'We
By Command of Major General Duncan:

R. L. BoTD,
Major, A.G.D., Adjutant.

2nd Ind.

wts^Tn^o^;/--^';'^^^^^ American E. F. France, 24th December,
1918— To Organization Commanders. ^^"juci,

f^h ^"^ ^^^'^'-'^•e^^ng an official copy of the above letter to organiza-
tion commanders the Brigade Commander wishes to add hL
appreciation of the splendid zeal and fighting spMt of the isfth
throughout the Meuse-Argonne offensive! His p easure and pr de
X^ f^?r commendation is increased bv his knowled-e that
although the Br gade had been in the line without an hou?s
relief since October 6th it found no difficultv in matching the
r^c^aliru^n^r^^r^Srt^^ ^^--^ «^ ^^^ fresh 1S;^?
(Sgd.) E. D'A. Peaece,
Colonel, F. A., U. S. A.,
CoMi Handing.
*******

w. ^1, ^P"l, 1919.

A.;-n' ^ commanding officer and Historical Officer of the
Artillery units of the 82nd Division, certify thatTe have read
the history of operations of the 157th Field Artillerv Bri/nX
prepared for the 82nd Division History S Cai t J G Snv'
o'pe'Son^s:^- ''^ ''"' '^'^ ^^ ^" ^^^^^^^ stafement'^of'^ZS
E. D'A. Peaece,

H. C. Williams,

Ctndg. 320th F.A.
Samuel R. Dighton,

Capt, 320th F.A., Operations Officer.
James L. Fey,

^'\2Uf^Fi^-\f^''^a^> ^^^'* ^•^•' Commander
321st F.A., Mar. 9-Apr. 8, 1919
John R. Slates,

^'tmolr!'''^ ^^^" ^^^** ^'•^" ^''""^ Historical

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPLY FUNCTIONS OF THE
82nd DIVISION
Contributed by
Major F, T. Robson, Acting G-1.
The administrative department or section of the General Staff
of a Division is in charge of an officer known as G-1. This de-
partment is charged with all the administrative and supply func-
tions and correlates the work of the Adjutant's office, Military
Police, Billeting, Quartermaster, Ordnance, Engineer, Medical
and Signal Departments. « ^ r. i

Lt. Col. Geo. W. Maddox, General Staff, was the first G-1.
In June 1918, he organized the department and put it in first
class running order. He was with the Division while it was
with the British; in the Toul and in the Marhache Sectors. He
left in Septemher just after the St. Mihiel drive. Lt. Col. Troup
Miller, General Staff, was the next G-1, through the Meuse-
Argonne offensive and remained until December 3, when he was
sent to the 1st Corps as G-1 there. Lt. Col. J. P. Barney
General Staff, came to the Division as G-1 on December 2, and
left on January, 29, being evacuated to a hospital seriously ill.
Maj. F. T. Robson, Engrs., who had been Assistant G-1 since
June, 1918, was then made Acting G-1.

Roughly the supply system of the A.E.F. is as follows, sup-
plies being divided into four classes:

Class I: Rations, forage, fuel, gasoline, etc. These are known
as the daily automatic supplies and G-1 of the Division
telegraphs the Army two days in advance giving the required
amounts of each kind. Train is then loaded and sent to the
railhead of the Division through the Regulating Station. As
Divisions are all of the same size the daily automatic supply
does not vary greatly. It is customary for the Depot to load
wh=it is known as a "balanced train" consisting of rations for
28,000 men, forage for 6000 animals, 3000 gallons of gasohne.
4 carloads of wood, etc., each day.

Class II : Clothing, blankets, etc. ^ ^ „.«

Class III : All other authorized equipment such as Ordnance,

Engineer, Signal, etc. ,

Class IV- Ammunition, construction material and equipment
and other things depending upon battle conditions

When the troops need Class II, HI or IV supplies, Supply
Officers of the organizations make a requisition and send it to the

A close shave

CJhurch at Sommerance

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 247

Chief of the Department from which the supplies are to come He
consohdates the requisition and sends it to G-1 of the Division
for approval. After being approved it goes to G-4 of the Army
and from there to the Depot that is to supply the goods. After
loading the car is sent to Regulating Station to have the destina-
tion and route prescribed. The main regulating station for the
American Forces has been at Is-sur-Tille. This station was
always informed by telegraph as to the location or proposed
movements of the troops of the A.E.F. and was thus able to
route cars to destination. During battle many changes in loca-
tion occur after the car has left the Regulating Station and
it was usually found advisable to have a convoy with important
shipments to minimize their chance of going astray. Upon
arrival at the railhead the railhead officer turns over to the Divi-
sion Quartermaster all goods arriving for that Division. The
unloading is done by the personnel of the Quartermaster and
the goods taken by trucks of the Supply Train to the distributing
pomt of the Division. Here a segregation is made to the Supply
Officers of the various regiments who in turn distribute to the
supply sergeants of their smaller units. When a Division is
fully equipped and has its complement of animals and motor
vehicles from 25 to 30 cars per day are required.

During rest periods and in quiet sectors the G-1 Office is
operated in one echelon at Division Headquarters. During
offensive engagements, particularly under open warfare condi-
tions, It was found necessary to divide the Office of G-1 into
two echelons for effective work. This was thought absolutely
essential during the Meuse-Argonne offensive. The second
echelon was under control of G-1 with the Adjutant's Depart-
ment and Trains Headquarters, and remained at or near the
railhead properly to control the movement of supplies, replace-
ments, etc., from the rear to this echelon

An advance section of G-1, consisting in the Meuse-Argonne
Offen ive of Maj. F. T. Robson, a stenographer and an office
orderly was at all times with the front echelon of the Division-

nd' .w? "^ '"^ ''"'P ^° "'"^" ^^"^^^ ^^ith the front line
.ind with the rear echelon in order to better control the delivery
of supphes and ammunition and to keep informed of changes
in the disposition of troops due to necessities of combat.

QUARTERMASTER DEPARTMENT

The Quartermaster Department is the largest of the supply
orgamzations of the Army and is charged mainly with the supply

248 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

of rations, food, forage, clothing and other articles that have
to do with the welfare and comfort of the troops. As the tables
of organization do not provide any labor troops for this depart-
ment it was found necessary, immediately uix)n arrival in
France, to organize a detachment of approximately 100 men
and known as the Quartermaster Detachment unassigued. This
unit loads and unloads and handles rations and supplies and
distributes them to various organizations, etc.

The Officer personnel of the Quartermaster Department of this
Division has changed constantly. Capt. A. J. Manning, Finance
Branch, and Lt. L. P. Harrell, are the only officers now with
the Division who accompanied it from the United States. To
these two officers (and to Sergeants 1st Class Warren Merrim,
Max Contor and E. H. Asheraft who maintained an advance
Quartermaster dump at Fl^ville) and to the enlisted men of the
Quartermaster detachment unassigued must be given a large
share of the credit for the excellent work done by the Quarter-
master Department at all times under most trying circumstances.

During the time the Division was with the British and when
in the Toul and Marbache sectors troops were practically sta-
tionary and the railhead did not change. The problem of supply
soon become stabilized and was dependent solely upon the ability
of supply depots to furnish the articles requisitioned for. Dur-
ing the St, Mihiel fight this Division acted as a pivot and the
troops did not move sufficiently to cause the railhead at Belle-
ville to be changed during the combat. Thus again the problem
of supply was not complicated except in so far as the fact
that the Division was astride the Moselle River caused incon-
venience due to an inadequate system of bridges. In fact, during
all engagements of the Division prior to the Meuse-Argonne
offensive the supplying of the troops depended very largely upon
the ability and initiative of the supply officers of the various
regiments.

On September 24 the Division moved to the vicinity of Triau-
court by motor bus and the supply system became much more
complicated. A vast concentration of American troops in a
small area had been made in preparation for a battle which
was to commence on September 26. Railroads were taxed to
their utmost capacity to bring in the rations, forage, amm\inition
and other material required for the offensive. Railheads were
very congested and trains were late in arriving. Roads were
blocked with traffic and the weather was rainy and cold. Road
circulation was limited by the desire for secrecy.

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 249

The first distributing point in tliis area was at a triangle
formed by roads just west of the town of Froidos. This was
used successfully until October 4 when an advance division dump
was located about 1 liiloraeter west of Varennes on the Varennes-
Four-de-Paris Road. This dump was within 4 or 5 kilometers
of the front and in an exposed position, but it was the only
available place where road circulation was obtainable. It was
under constant enemy observation and shell fire. The Quarter-
master personnel lived in German dugouts in the vicinity that
had just been captured. Most of the distribution of rations had
to be done during the night. It was at this period that the
railhead of the Division was changed almost daily. No informa-
tion could be obtained as to where the railhead of the Division
would be the next day and frequently the entire supply train
would go to a railhead to find that it had been changed. The
supplies had to be drawn somewhere else. This necessitated a
great loss of time and the tying-up of motor transportation which
was a serious matter where there was none to spare. However,
we ahvays managed to get our supplies in one way or another
and the Division was always promptly fed. As the troops went
forward the distributing point at Varennes was too far in the
rear and on October 12 it was moved to Apremout, at that time
only about 3 liilometers behind the line, and in plain view of
the Germans down the Aire Valley. All but one company of
the 307th Supply Train was moved to this point also and the
constant circulation and parking of trucks caused nightly shell-
ing and air raids. A day or two later advance dumps for one
infantry brigade and machine-gun battalion was established at
Fleville.

It was about this time that Maj. Catchings Therrell was
appointed advance representative of the G-1 office to correlate
the supply of the troops in the front line and as the front line
had become more or less stabilized, to look after the comfort
of the men. Major Therrell took charge of this work in an
energetic and capable manner and soon had old German baths
at Fleville and Sommerance in operation ; also rest rooms where
the men of the reserve battalions could get a change of clothing
and a dry, warm place to sleep. All this while fighting was
going on a few kilometers in advance. He also moved up and
pooled the kitchens and operated them day and night, sometimes
within a kilometer of the front line.

The 307th Supply Train, a motorized unit, furnished the
delivery system of the Quartermaster Department from the rail-

250 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

head to the distributing point, and all hauling for the entire
Division. This supply train with its repair shop, the 340th
Service Park Unit, fimctioned in a most admirable manner
throughout. Although they were never assigned their full com-
plement of trucks and with spare parts and supplies for motor
equipment extremely hard to secure, yet there never was a
time when the Division was required to call for outside help
to transport its supplies. This was due solely to the high grade
of the personnel and the untiring efforts of the officers and men
of these organizations. To one who is not familiar with road
conditions during the Meuse-Argonne offensive it is impossible
to describe fully the hardships and difficulties under which trucks
had to operate. It would have been bad enough in daylight
but with darkness and shell fire added it is utterly inconceivable
how heavy trucks can be operated at all, much less reach their
destination, sometimes over roads utterly unknown to drivers,
and with insufficient data as to the route.

Short of motor equipment themselves the 307th Supply Train
had to help the Ammunition Train haul ammunition and the
Sanitary Train haul wounded, due to a like shortage in these
organizations.

The road from Clermont to Varennes and northward was at
all times congested with traffic and hours were consumed in
traveling a distance of a few miles. The Germans had blown
two immense craters in this road and proper time could not
be given to fill them. A one-way turn-out was operated that
caused delays of hours. Hauling of rations and supplies went
on by day as far as was consistent with secrecy and the same
trucks with a change of drivers hauled ammunition all night.
A shortage of ambulances made it necessary to haul wounded
and sick men by trucks night after night. In fact a truck was
hardly ever parked.

Under all of these trying conditions the men of the 307th Supply
Train can point with pride to the fact that during the entire
offensive not one of their trucks was so seriously injured or
broken by careless driving or accident as to be left on the road
and abandoned.

On the afternoon of the 29th of September a rush order was
received for a regiment of infantry to reinforce the 28th Division
which was then hard pressed. From 6 to 8 o'clock that evening
8S trucks were loaded with men of the 327th Infantry at a
point on the main road just west of Rarecourt and despatched
over the Clermont-Varennes Road to a point of debarkation near

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 251

Charpentry, a distance of 15 miles. Due to road congestion and
circulation requirements some of these trucks did not report
back until late the next afternoon. This is but a sample of
what was done day after day.

SALES COMMISSARY UNIT No. 30

This unit was attached to the Division when in the Marbache
Sector but received no supplies until sometime in September
shortly before the move to the Argonne. Thus from May to
October the Division depended upon the Y.M.C.A., the K. of C.
and the Salvation Army for canteen service. During the Meuse-
Argonne offensive several carloads of supplies came in and trucks
were sent out with these supplies to distribute them as close
to the front line as possible. Breakfast food, soup, chocolate,
etc., were furnished in large quantities to a Field Hospital which
the Division erected at Apremont. After return of the Division
to a rest area the Sales Commissary continued to exercise its
normal duty until tlie Division was ordered to entrain to the
Bordeaux Area when this unit was detached and seat to the
Le Mans Area.

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT

The Ordnance Department furnishes most of the equipment
required for fighting. A certain amount of ordnance personnel
is scattered tlarougliout the Division, being attached to the various
units. But one small unit, consisting of an oflacer and about
50 men to repair and replace equipment, cannon and machine
guns, functions under Division Headquarters. It is known as
the 307th Mobile Ordnance Repair Shop.

The 307th Mobile Ordnance Repair Shop, while small, is an
extremely efficient organization with technical personnel. Due
to its excellent functioning and to the work of Division Ordnance
Officer little real difficulty was encountered by the troops in
obtaining needed equipment. To perform its duties properly
the Mobile Ordnance Repair Shop was at all times worldng
within range of enemy guns and operated its repair trucks there.
On October 12, 1918, it moved with the Quartermaster Depart-
ment to Apremont where an advance ordnance depot was estab-
lished to reequip men returning from hospitals or wlio had lost
their equipment under battle conditions.

The Ordnance Department has done its work excellently, due
to the good training given by Col. P. H. Worcester in the United

252 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

States and France and to Capt. A. C. Jones who succeeded him
as Division Ordnance Officer on August 27, 1918.

In connection with the Ordnance Department but coming more
directly under the Artillery Brigade Commander and the Divi-
sion Munitions Officers, Lt. Wm. F. Holland and Lt. Charles L.
Andrews, was the 307th Ammunition Train, commanded by Lt.
Col. C. W. McClure, This consisted of a motorized and a horse-
drawn battalion.

The supply of an Artillery Brigade with ammunition is roughly
as follows: 3 days' fire are to be kept at the guns or at least
with the Divisions. Reports are made to the Corps Ordnance
Officer daily of amounts fired during the preceding 24 hours
and allocations made to replace this and any additional amount
that may be required for a "show" that may have been ordered
"pulled off." ' Th&se allocations state the kind of ammuntion and
number of rounds and the location of the dump where they
can be secured. As soon as this information is received it is
up to the Ammuntion Train to immediately get the ammunition.
Theoretically, the motorized battalion procured the ammunition
from the specified array or corps dump and delivered it on the
main road as close to the battery position as possible. Here
the horse-drawn battalion took it direct to the battery positions,
because of lack of animals in the artillery regiments.

This at least was the plan decided upon, but the shortage
of animals in the entire A.E.F. and the continued loss by shell
fire and by sickness caused by working 24 hours a day put a
much greater burden on the motor transportation. Trucks
furnished were in many cases old and worn out and numbered
only about 50 per cent of the authorized quantity. Thus it came
about that the trucks of the Ammunition Train were compelled
to go farther and farther toward the front over almost impas-
sable roads and direct to battery positions under the most
severe enemy fire and the most trying conditions of road con-
gestion, always imder the cover of darkness and without lights
of any kind. When it is remembered that not only is the
chauffeur compelled to operate his truck or a driver his caisson
over a road known to the enemy artillery and under shell fire
and with the contents of his load highly explosive in nature,
too much credit can not be given to the work of the Ammunition
Train of this Division.

This Office does not know of a single instance when cannon
of the Division were silent because of lack of anununition. This
was not the case in many other Divisions. The 82nd Division

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 253

is proud of the work of its Munitions Officers, its Ammuntion
Train, and not only of the chauffeurs and drivers, but also of
the mechanics who kept things in repair. These men, with the
assistance of the 307th Supply Train in time of unusual demands,
always got the ammuntion where it was needed and in sufficient
time.

MOVEMENT BY MOTOR BUSES

On two occasions this Division moved a distance of about 100
miles by motor buses, a system of locomotion developed by the
needs of the Allied armies and used in times of railroad con-
gestion or when the transportation lines were controlled by, or
under fire of the enemy. The motor buses were American White
trucks with a capacity of from 18 to 20 men each and driven
by Chinese chauffeurs. The trucks were operated in companies
of about 50 trucks each with 4 companies in a section. Imme-
diately after the St. Mihiel drive, on September 24, 1918, the
Division was moved from the vicinity of Marbache to Triau court
by these motor buses; about 1200 buses were required for the
movement.

Many new problems in the supply of a Division were presented
by such a move. When a Division moved by rail all the equip-
ment accompanied it; when by bus, none of the animals could
be moved in tliis way, nor could the artillery. The distance of
this move was approximately 100 miles which is a 5-day trip
for the horse-drawn vehicles. Water-carts and rolling kitchens
are necessary for the troops at all times in order that warm
meals may be given. The Division did not have sufficient motor
equipment in its Supply and Ammunition Trains to move these
vehicles nor are the bodies of many trucks large enough to
accommodate a rolling kitchen. This meant that a survey of
rolling kitchens and water-carts had to be made to see what
could be handled by the motor equipment. Those that would
go in the trucks were selected and the balance sent overland
with the horse transpoi't. The kitchens remaining to be loaded
on trucks had to do double duty for the 4 or 5 days that the
horse transport was on the road.

A road circuit for the buses had to be found and the troops
brought to these embusing points, numbering two or three for
a division ; the troops loaded and started on their journey.
These bus columns then traveled over a road designated in
advance and under the same general methods that would govern
the handling of railway traffic. Travel was by night as the

254 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

front lines were approached. As trucks broke down or were
overturned they took their places in rear of the column. This
resulted in some confusion. It is an expeditious method of trans-
porting troops but the supply problem is exceedingly hard until
the horse transport reaches the Division again, and takes its
proper place with the various organizations.

ENGINEER DEPARTMENT

The Engineers of a Division are organized both as Engineer
and as fighting units and in this Division not only performed
the work of Engineers iu the construction of required structures
of all kind, keeping open the lines of communication, etc., but
were actually put in the line in numerous instances. As a
supply department their main problem was to furnish material
for field fortifications and the construction of buildings for the
housing and comfort of troops and maintenance of the lines
of communication. This work was exceedingly well done under
the most trying circumstances. It is more fully set out in
another chapter devoted to the history of the Engineer Regiment
and Train.

BILLETING

When Americans arrived in France it was necessary to adopt
the French system of quartering troops in billets. This system
consists in quartering men, animals and materials In houses,
buildings, stables or any other shelter, belonging either to private
individuals or to the Government. Officers are provided with
rooms in the homes of the inhabitants. The French law re-
quires the municipal authorities to prepare and submit to the
military authorities a list of such available accommodations and,
with a few exceptions, it requires the inhabitant to give over
any part of his property not in daily use. The law also pro\ided
that the troops will share, in common with the inhabitant, light-
ing and heating facilities, and water supply. These accommoda-
tions are furnished at the rate of one franc per day for an officer,
five centimes per day for a soldier, and five centimes per day
for an animal.

Although fifteen officers who spoke French had been sent to
France in advance by the 82nd Division to familiarize them-
selves with this system, they had been so scattered that their
S(>r\ices did not become available for some time after the arrival
of the Division. It was therefore necessary to detail other
officers as Billeting Officez's and Acting Town Majors, to quarter

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 255

the troops, keep a record of billets occupied and adjust any
claims for damage which might arise. 1st Lt. Stuart W. Golds-
borough, Division Headquarters, was put in charge of this work
for the Division.

The instructions for the preparation of billeting records and
for the settlement of claims were incomplete and were con-
stantly changing during our first few months in France. They
were not stabilized until August 81, 1918, when a Manual was
issued by the Services of Supply, for the use of Renting, Requisi-
tion and Claims Officers.

The system of billeting contemplates having the areas divided
into various zones (each of which will accommodate a Division)
with officers permanently in charge of each zone, having com-
plete information as to the available accommodations, a list of
towns, maximum capacity of each in officers, men and animals,
and any other facilities for the troops. It was only after the
Di^dsion had withdrawn from the Argonne, however, that we
made the acquaintance of such an officer, known as an American
Zone Major. It had, therefore, been necessary to obtain all
such information from the French; or, if that was impossible,
by personal reconnaissance.

The difference in language and customs and the fact that
the system was entirely new to Americans had led to many
minor misunderstandings and claims by the French. Almost in-
variably an investigation of such claims showed that they were
justifiable and they were promptly adjusted. The few instances
of exorbitant claims, as well as complaints of extortionate prices
having been charged, can usually be attributed to the impres-
sion given by many Americans that they were able to pay and
must have the best of everything at any price. It was the
constant endeavor of the officials of the Division to promote and
maintain cordial relations with the inhabitants and it is a source
of considerable satisfaction that the Division left France with
the entire good will of the French people with whom it has been
billeted. This good %vill was properly reciprocated by the men
of the Division, because of the courtesy and kindness of the
French, and their unfailing willingness to share the comforts
of their homes with the Americans.

82nd military POLICE COMPANY

When the Division sailed for Prance, the Military Police wag
organized under the old tables of organization. There were
two companies of one hundred and fifty men and three officers

256 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

each, and the same Headquarters which served for the trains
was employed as Battalion Headquarters for the Military Police.
However, shortly after the arrival in France, B Company was
placed on detached service, thus cutting the working strength
in half.

The weeks spent with the British were used mainly in the study
of the British traffic rules and their methods of handling the
police situation and the working out of the necessary changes
due to our different customs and regulations.

On the Toul sector, tlie Military Police work covered a wide
area, for the sector was large and for the most part under
direct enemy observation during the day. This fact compelled
the installation of many posts to regulate the passage of vehicles
and individuals. All movement in and out of the area was
restricted and examination posts kept to prevent unauthorized
travel. Details were also stationed in both Toul and Nancy to
police those cities. Many A.W.O.L.'s from other divisions as
well as our own Avere handled in these places. At MeniMe-Tour,
a Divisional Guard House was established and maintained.

B Company joined the Battalion when the Division entered
the Marbache sector but during the St. Mihiel drive, A Company
was detached and placed at the disposition of the 1st Army.

Details were again scattered over the Divisional Area for the
regulation of traffic and circulation. Advance straggler posts
were maintained close behind the lines and aided in directing
the woimded to dressing stations as well as apprehending
stragglers.

In Nancy a strong detail was required and often as many
as one hundred A.W.O.L.'s or deserters were apprehended in
a 24-hour period. These were marched to the Divisional Guard
House at Belleville, where they were worked on the roads by
the Military Police until called for by their units. A force
was also maintained in the evacuated city of Pont-^-Mousson
to prevent looting by our troops.

When the Horse transportation moved from the Marbache
sector to the Argonne Forest, a detachment of Mounted Military
Police served as an advance party, selecting camp sites and
posting the road. This movement was made entirely at night
and without mishap.

With the entry into the Argonne territory, one hundred men
and two officers were transferred to the 1st Army, C.R.A., and
one company of five officers and two hundred men was organized
according to G.O. 180, 1918.

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 25T

In the Argonne Forest offensive, our straggler posts were
busy, and constant liaison maintained with the Divisions on our
right and left made ix)ssible to effect more efficient straggler
lines. Details were kept at both Infantry Brigade P.O.'s, which
conducted the prisoners of war to the Division P.C., where tliey
were turned over to the Corps Military Police.

The traffic in the Forest was very heavy and only by strong
road details was it kept under control. The Division Military
Police were required to handle the Corps i-oad from Varennes
north for several weeks, due to the shortage of Military Police
at Corps Headquarters. Each traffic post was supplied with a
location list of all units, dumps and railheads of our own
Division and the most important ones of the neighboring divi-
sions. In addition, a road map was in the possession of each
sentry, with which to direct convoys, troops and individuals to
their proper destinations. These aids often proved invaluable
to truck drivers, who had been sent out with too little in-
formation.

Upon the relief of the Division in the Argonne, the Military
Police force was divided into three sections. One went ahead
to the staging area and assisted the placing of units when they
arrived. Another handled the roads between the two areas,
while the third remained in the old area to collect stragglers
and material left by the department troops. This last detail
was also instructed with the embussing of the troops at the
concentration points.

Captain Gordon D. Palmer has been in command of 82ad
Military Police Company since its organization.

Y. M. C. A.
The T.M.O.A. has been operating with the Division ever since
its organization. After arrival overseas and while located in
Northern France the Division was served by the British Branch
of the Y.M.C.A. After the movement of the Division to the
Toul sector the American branch of the Y.M.C.A. served the
Division and at this time the personnel were assigned to sectors
and so continued until major operations began when a permanent
personnel was attached to the Division and moved about with
it. From the date the Y.M.C.A. first joined the Division they
have done much for the welfare and comfort of the troops in
the supply of tobacco, candies, cakes, etc., as well as various
kinds of athletic equipment. In addition many buildings were
built or leased and tents erected In which there was always

258 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

ample writing facilities as well as the necessary equipment for
entertainment in the way of moving pictures, music, and groups
of entertainers, who traveled from place to place.

During the Meuse-Argonne offensive this organization did
excellent work in the distribution of supplies to the fighting
troops and much credit is due Mr. P. H. Gossora, then Divisional
Secretary for the 82nd Division, for his untiring efforts and
efBcient handling of his organization for the benefit of the fight-
ing men.

With few individual exceptions the personnel attached to the
Division have been of high type and satisfactory. In certain
cases they have been of exceptionally high type. There were
many instances of bravery, devotion, and self-sacrifice on the
part of both men and women workers and the following were
cited in Division orders for their meritorious service:

Miss Beenetta A. Millee

Miss Sunshine Sweeney

Miss Mary Sweeney

Mb. H. B. McAfee

IV

307th engineer REGIMENT OF THE 82nd DIVISION

Conteibuted bt

Lieutenant Colonel H. C. Mowee, 307th Engineees

1. The officers of the 307th Engineer Regiment reported for
duty at Camp Gordon, Ga., 27 August, 1917, in compliance with
S.O. 186, 11 August, 1917; they were technical men who had
been trained at the Engineer Training Camps at Washington
and Bellevoir, Va.

2. The enlisted personnel of this regiment was drawn from
the same localities as the men who filled the other regiments
of the Division. The organization was trained in infantry com-
bat and in military engineering. Schools were conducted in
fourteen subjects and every platoon contained specialists in
bridge carpentry, rigging, mine and gallery construction, map-
ping, obstacles, demolition, revetments, highway and railway con-
struction.

3. The Regiment and Train left Camp Gordon for overseas
service 8 May, 1918; sailed from Hoboken 19 May and arrived
at La Havre via Liverpool, Winchester and Southampton
3 June, 1918. Col. J. L. Schley, Corps of Engineers, commanded.

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 259

On 25 June the command rejoined the Division in the Toul
sector and relieved the 101st Engineers.

4. The companies were distributed on the line of resistance
of the sector and vpere employed on field fortifications: dugout,
wire, pill box and dugout construction, operation of sawmills and
engineer dumps. On 4 August two officers and 48 men of this
regiment accompanied a raiding party of about 500 men from
the 32Gth Infantry who entered the German lines opposite
Noviant. Wire entanglements were shot out where necessary
and concentrated charges were vised in mopping up dugouts.
1st Lt. I. F. Witherington and four of his men were wounded.

5. On 7-8 August the 82nd Division was relieved by the 89th
Division and moved south of Toul. After seven days in
Bicquelay this regiment marched into the Marbache sector and
relieved the 2nd Engineers, the command passing on 18 August.
Four engineer companies were put on the resistance lines; one
position was organized through Foret de Facq and the work
started by the French on the second position, running over the
mountain south of Ste. Genevieve, was continued. One company
completed the erection of barracks for the 32Sth Infantry, or-
ganized the "barrage position" near Liverdun and took charge
of all mined bridges over the Moselle River. The sixth company
was employed on camouflaging roads and the care of all division,
corps and army dumps and sawmills in Marbache and
Dieulouard.

6. Here, as in the Toul sector, field fortifications were directed
by the French Army Engineers and all pneumatic and electrical
plant employed on dugout construction was furnished by them.
The position through Foret de Facq was organized with wire,
emplacements and shelters ; the one farther south was an
elaborate system of dugouts, and galleries through the mountain
with wire and trenches on the north slopes and across the river
valley.

7. Colonel Schley, who had been injured near Toul before
the regiment entered the sector, rejoined and resumed command
on 30 August.

8. Upon receipt of orders for the St. Mihiel offensive A Com-
pany was attached to the 163rd Infantry Brigade, F Company
to the 164th Infantry Brigade and C Company to the Artillery
Brigade. Three companies were held by the Division Engineer
for work on lines of communication, care of bridges and for
otiier engineering service.

9. On 12 September D Company opened a sheltered road run-

260 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

ning to Norroy from the Pont-&-Mousson. On the 13th all
obstacles were removed from the main roads to Norroy and
Vandieres. F Company sent one platoon with the 328th Infantry
to cut wire where necessary ; the two platoons not attached to
first infantry lines were kept busy clearing chcveaiix de frise
and wire from lines of advance. On the night of the 15th, B
C and E Companies were taken from the roads and organized
the high ground west of the river from Pont-a.-Mousson to tlie
hill west of Vandieres which had become our exposed right flank.
A Company was held in readiness on the east side of the river;
they kept patrols out, built a foot bridge and restored the de-
molished stone arch bridge of Port-sur-Seille.

10. The platoons of D and F Companies, held at Norroy, opened
up roads to the north through the woods and on the night of
15 September brought in to our dressing station 120 infantrymen
and machine gunners who were given first aid and evacuated
by our battalion surgeon. Among those found in the woods was
Lieutenant Colonel Pike, D.M.G. Officer. Although still limping
from the effects of his injury Colonel Schley managed to spend
most of his time with his foremost units. The regiment lost
during the five days, 2 killed, 22 seriously wounded and 43
slightly wounded and gassed.

11. This command was relieved on the west side of the river
17 September by the 315th Engineers and on the east side 20
September by the French engineers. Animals and animal drawn
transportation started for Auzeville on the east edge of tlie
Argonne Forest 20 September and the regiment followed in
French lorries on the 24th; the entire command arriving and
going into camp that night (24-25).

12. The S2nd Division was desiginated as Army Reserve upon
arrival at the new station ; the engineer regiment was tem-
porarily detached from the division and charged with the repair
and upkeep of the Clermont-Varennes and the Vraincourt-
Neuvilly roads, also the opening of and removal of barriers
from the forest roads in the vicinity of Les Islettes and Four-
de-Paris. On 29 September while planking over the detour
around one of the mine craters in the Neuvilly-Varennes road
D Company was "shanghaied" by the 28th Division without the
knowledge or consent of our regimental, division, corps or army
engineer; they were taken from the army work and sent out
in front of the 2Sth Division's outpost line to organize and
hold a quarry north of Apremont in the face of an imminent
counter-attack. They broke up the attack, captured 11 prisoners

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 261

and killed over 200 of the attacking party. Lt. S. H, Andrews
and eleven men were wounded, fonr were gassed and one was
missing when the garrison was relieved. This regiment was not
permitted to bridge the two mine craters that cauaed the dis-
astrous congestion in traffic between Neuvilly and Varennes, but
with teams and scrapers built a fill bypass to the second or
northern crater.

13. On 3 October the regimental P.O. was moved from Grange-
le-Comte Farm to a captured German camp southwest of
Varennes and on the 5th the 82nd Division was made corps
reserve and established its P.O. in Varennes. The 1st Battalion
of this regiment was charged with the repair and removal of
barriers and road mines from roads in what had been No Man's
Land north of Four-de-Paris and the connecting-up of German
60 cm. track in the forest.

14. Orders (82nd Division Field Order No. 20) were received
at 20 hours 6 October, for the attack across the Aire River from
La Forge to Fleville at 5 hours, 7 October. F Company was
loaded on trucks at Chene Tondu at 22 o'clock with orders to
locate and mark any fordable places in the river between La
Forge and the Fleville-Cornay bridge. The trucks could not get
into Varennes on account of the congestion on the roads, due
to troop movements and F Company detrained and marched
arriving in time to take all soundings, locate and mark the ford
at La Forge, the only site where infantry could cross. The
327th Infantry went over at this point at H hour. On the
night of 7-8, F Company built a foot bridge across the Aire
River just above the ford, to carry infantry and machine-gun
carts; the ford was paved with stone and ramps were dug mak-
ing the crossing open to trucks and artillery. The shell and
machine-gun fire upon this point was very heavy through the
night; the crew was forced to leave the work three times and
Lt. E. S. Allen and sis men were wounded, Lieutenant Allen
going to the hospital with his second wound. The 2nd Battalion,
conmianded by Maj. C. F. Lewis, was stationed near Charpentry.

15. Company E held an outpost in Chatel-Ch^hery through
the night of 9-10 and F Company opened the road through
Apremont and paved and dug ramp approaches to a ford below
the demolished steel bridge at that point. E Company put a
light bi-idge across the Aire at Fleville on the night of the
10th over which two battalions of infantry crossed to attack
on the morning of the 11th. They also prepared a ford at this
point for heavy traffic, and corresponding crossings were pro-

262 OFFICIAL HISTORY OP 82nd DIVISION

vided over the millrace and road-mine craters on the Fleville-
St. Juvin and Fl(5ville-Cornay Roads. A C.P. for the 164th In-
fantry Brigade was prepared in Sommerance and engineer dumps
were started in Cornay, Fl^ville and on the Sommerance-St. Juvin
Head. The engineer train operated from Le Menil Farm.

16. In the meantime the 1st Battalion, under Maj. Eugene
Kelly, was working roads, removing barriers and road mines
following the advance of the 163rd Infantry Brigade in the
woods west of the river. On 10 October A Company undertook
the repair and operation of the 60 cm. German railway north
out of Varennes. They repaired the demolished joints and ex-
tended the line into Cornay by setting over one rail of the
standard gauge to 60 cm. gauge. Rations and ammunition were
handled by this "307th Limited." B Company reconnaissance
patrol into Chevieres on the 10th found the town in flames,
deserted by German troops and no American troops present;
patrols also reached the river through Marcq and Cornay.

17. One platoon of B Company was ordered to report to a
guide at Marcq on the night of 10-11, no mention being made
of the character of service required. The platoon reported with-
out tools, was taken to the demolished steel bridge south of St.
Juvin and directed to have the bridge ready for infantry assault
at 5 hours next morning. They tore plank from German sheds
at the station and with gun slings as lashings put in a floor
system. It is worthy of note that the hostile fire on this point
was suspended fi'om the time our men went to work; a H.E.
shell tore part of the floor up about an hour before daybreak
but this was repaired. When our infantry started across at
H hour a terrific fire was opened on the assaulting troops
forcing a retirement. Captain Catchings, commanding B Com-
pany, was the only casualty among the engineer troops.

18. It was reported on the 14th that the last machine-gun
clips available for the Division had been drawn. C Company
was put on salvage and turned in 80,000 M.G. clips and 2,600,000
rounds of ammunition salvaged from the path of advance. Lt.
J. H. Claxon was killed while removing road mines in the path
of our infantry advance on the Sommerance-St. JuAin road, 14
October. In compliance with oral orders from the Chief of
Staff the 2nd Battalion moved into the support position north
of Sommerance at midnight 15-16 October and the following
night the 1st Battalion moved up and organized a reserve posi-
tion southwest of Sommerance, the 2nd Battalion at the same
time changing position 500 meters forward and west to the

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 263

Fleville-Buzancy road. Here they dug iu on the reverse slope
and organized a position on the forward slope witli trenches
and wire.

19. The regimental P.O. was moved to Fleville on the 16th.
By the night of the IStli the incessant rains and heavy traffic
were making the roads in the divisional area impassable, and
the 1st Battalion was put back on lines of communication ; roads
were repaired, temporary light bridges were reinforced or re-
placed by permanent heavy structures and A Company resumed
the operation of the "Limited" from Varennes to Cliatel-Chehery.
The regimental P.C. was moved to La Forge on the 18th.

20. The engineer train suffered several losses in handling
engineer materials from the big St. Juvin dump which was
shelled several times a day. Men wliile in the line were served
two hot meals daily from the Idtchens which were sent to their
station.

21. The 1st Battalion relieved the 2nd on the night of 22-23.
The 21st Engineers took over the operation of the "Limited" on
the 23rd. The 2nd Battalion began the organization of the
position of security north of Fleville under the corps engineer
but the orders were changed and on tlie 28th the 2nd Battalion
and Engineer Train moved to the new location of the line of
security for tlie 82nd Divisional sector and witli one battalion
of infantry and one M.G. battalion began the organization of
the ground west of Cornay.

22. Major Kelly was relieved from command of the 1st Bat-
talion 23 October by Capt. H. B. Baird and on 26 October CoL
J. L. Schley was made Corps Engineer 5th Corps, and turned the
command over to Lt. Col. H. C. Mower.

23. The 1st Battalion and Headquarters were relieved 30
October by the 305th Engineers and moved to the rear. The
2nd Battalion was relieved on 3 November by the 318th En-
gineers of the 6th Division and overtook the rest of the regiment
at Florent. The losses of the regiment in the Argonne were:

1 Officer and 14 men killed in action.
3 Officers and 71 men wounded.
7 Men gassed.

24. The service of the Engineer Regiment is necessary to the
proper functioning of the Division and involves tlie same hard-
ships, long marches and liard work as does that of the other
brandies of the service; indeed, the two weeks in support line
proved a welcome change. While our scattered companies were
usually "among tliose present" near the front lines aod, inci-

264 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

dentally, always proud of what the rest of the divisional family
was doing, they had to work under shell tire and sleep in fox
holes without the inspiration and satisfaction of contact and
combat with the enemy.

HISTORY OF THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE 82nd
DIVISION

CONTKIBUTED BY

Lieutenant Colonel Fbedeeiok G. Baefield, DrrrsiON Surgeon

Sanitary detachments of four Infantry, three Artillery and
cue Engineer Regiment, together with the personnel of one Field
Hospital and one Ambulance Company were sent from the
Medical Officers' Training Camp, Ft. Oglethorpe, Ga., August 26,
1917, to Camp Gordon, Ga., as a nucleus of the Medical Depart-
ment of the 82nd Division. By a Division order, September 2,
1917, these detachments were assigned to the various Regiments
of the Division, part of their personnel having been withdrawn
for assignment to Train Headquarters and Military Police, Signal
and Machine Gun Battalions and Ammunition Train. From
time to time the commissioned personnel of the regimental and
separate organization detachments was increased by the addition
of newly arriving medical officers. Enlisted personnel was in-
creased in proportion as the organizations grew. Likewise, from
time to time, medical officers and enlisted men were added to
the Sanitary Train. No care was taken to select men suited for
duty in the Medical Department, and it was soon evident that
if the sick and wounded men were to be properly cared for,
quite a change would have to be made in the personnel of the
Medical Detachments and the Sanitary Train. This fact was
constantly presented to the proper authorities and after several
months a number of men of the Medical Department were ex-
changed for those more suited for this kind of work.

While the Division was being trained in military duties, the
Medical Department was likewise undergoing intensive training
in its siKicial duties, in addition to its work of caring for the
sick, administering typhoid vaccine and, where necessary, vac-
cinating against smallpox. This work was considerably increased
by the sending away of practically all of the enlisted men of
the Division in October and the receipt of a similar number
of men from other camps. These men arrived with their records
In very poor shape and it was a very difficult matter to find

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 265

out those who had been protected against typhoid and those
who had not. It is believed, however, that eventually every man
of the Division was protected against typhoid fever and small-
pox. The training of the Medical Department of the Division
was under the direction of Lt. Col. C. E. Koerper, M. C, Division
Surgeon, Maj. William T. Cade, Jr., M. C, Division Sanitary
Inspector, and Maj. Frederick T. Jenkins, M. C, Division Medical
Instructor. Instruction was vigorously carried out until the
departure of the Division for France. During its stay at Camp
Gordon the health of the Division was very good. As was to
be expected, there were numerous cases of mumps and measles.
There was some pneiunonia complicating with measles, and a few
sporadic cases of epidemic meningitis. There were no cases of
typhoid fever. Camp Gordon ranked as one of the most healthful
camps of the U. S. Army.

The Division, less the Artillery and Sanitary Train, arrived
in France during the month of May, 1918, and were with the
British in the Somme area. The sick and wounded of the
Division were cared for by the British Medical Department,
and the training of the Medical Department of the Division was
vigorously pursued. Medical supplies were also obtained through
the British. This experience was very valuable, especially the
training in sanitation, at least one officer and two enlisted men
spending one week at the British School for Sanitation at St.
Valery-sur-Somme. The health of the command during this
period was excellent and nothing of unusual interest occurred.
It was very unfortunate that the Sanitary Train did not accom-
pany the Division to this area, for valuable training was missed
during this period.

The Division was moved to the Toul sector the latter part
of June, and was joined by the Sanitary Train, the medical
units of the S2nd Division relieving and taking over, unit for
unit, the positions of the 26th Division. The Ambulance Section
had assigned to it eight G.M.C. and twelve animal-drawn am-
bulances. The Division was entitled to forty-one G.M.C. am-
bulances, but repeated efforts to obtain them were in vain.
However, S.S.U. Unit No. G47, with thirty Ford ambulances, was
attached to the Division and served with them throughout their
front-line activities. The general plan for the evacuation of the
sick and wounded was from regimental and battalion aid sta-
tions to ambulance dressing stations, thence to held hospital,
acting as a triage, or sifting station, and from the triage to
other field hospitals or to evacuation hospital. It was the policy

266 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

of the Division Surgeon to use the Sanitary Train as a replace-
ment unit for medical detachments of the line organizations, so
that at all times the organizations were kept at full strength
in both commissioned and enlisted personnel. In training areas
and in comparatively quiet sectors suda as the Toul sector it
was the policy to Iteep one motor ambulance, usually a Ford,
and one animal-drawn ambulance for each regiment or separate
battalion, while the G.M.C. ambuhinees made daily rounds col-
lecting the sicli and wounded. Preparatory to any action, the
motor ambulances were recalled and stationed at points as the
need indicated. As a rule. Ford ambulances were used to carry
the injured from regimental or battalion aid stations to am-
bulance company dressing stations, and the G.M.C. from these
points to the divisional triage. The patients were then evacuated
from the triage to the rear by Evacuation Ambulance Com-
panies (Corps troops). When necessary, trucks were called into
service to evacuate patients both from the front to the triage
and from the triage to the rear. In the Toul sector the 325th
Ambulance Company was stationed at Minorville with a dressing
station at Noviant, the 326th Ambulance at Menil-la-Tour with
dressing station at Rehannes Woods, Ambulance Company 327
was stationed at Rongeval Abbey with dressing station at Raule-
court, and the 328th Ambulance Company in reserve at Menil-
la-Tour. Field Hospitals 325 and 327 were stationed in large
barracks at Toul and really operated as base hospitals. Field
Hospital 326 was stationed near Royameix and functioned as
a triage for the right half of the sector and as a gas hospital.
Field Hospital 328 was stationed at Rongeval Abbey and served
as a triage for the left half of the sector. This comparatively
quiet sector furnished an excellent opportunity for training of
the Sanitary Train.

During the period spent in the Toul sector there were only
two occasions during which anything out of the ordinary was
done by the Medical Department — one, the raid put over by the
326th Infantry, at which time alxwit seventy casualties were
handled, and the other occurring during the relief of the 82nd
Division by the 89th Division about August 6. The Germans
launched a gas attack which resulted in about 750 casualties,
a vast majority of which were from the 89th Division. The
Sanitary Train of the 82nd Division had not been relieved by
that of the S9th, so all these cases were handled by the 307th
Sanitary Train through the 326th Field Hospital near ivoyamoix.
These cases were all treated for gas and evacuated to Toul

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 267

within thirty-six hours — a splendid achievement for the S26th
Field Hospital. While in this area utmost attention was
paid to sanitation under the supervision of Capt. Charles B.
Hollis, Division Sanitary Inspector, and the health of the Divi-
sion was excellent.

The Division moved from the Toul sector to the Marbache
sector about the middle of August, 1918, the Sanitary Train
of the 82nd Division relieving that of the 2nd Division, with
Headquarters at Millery. Three Field Hospitals, the 325th, 326th
and 327th, were estiiblished at this place in an excellently
equipped French hospital. The Division occupied both sides of
the Moselle River and this necessitated a plan for the evacuation
of the sick and wounded on both sides of the river in case
bridges should be blown out; therefore dressing stations were
established at Pont-a-Mons by the 325th Ambulance Company,
on the right side of the river, and by the 327th Ambulance
Company at Blenod-les-Pont-a-Mousson, on the left side of the
river. The Headquarters of this company, together with the
328th Field Hospital, which acted as a triage for the left side
of the river, was located in an old tannery at Dieulouard.
Preparatory to the St. Mihiel drive, one medical officer and sixty
men were sent to each infantry bi'igade and these, together
with twelve men from each company of line organizations who
had been specially trained as litter bearers, were used to aid
tnedical detachments in evacuating the sick and wounded ; also
officers and non-commissioned officers were sent to brigade and
regimental headquarters as medical liaison officers. The prin-
cipal casualties of the St. Mihiel drive were sustained by the
32Sth Infantry on the left bank of the river and were evacuated
through the triage at Dieulouard.

The selection of the tannery as a location for a triage was
an unfortunate one. It was just in the rear of a large naval
gun and had absolutely no protection from enemy shell fire. It
was shelled for four consecutive nights. On the morning of
September 17, 1918, it was hit by an enemy shell and six men
were killed and four wounded. Fortunately, there were no
patients at the Hosi)itul at this time, and the highest type of
discipline and courage was shown by the officers and men.

The evacuation of the wounded during the St. Mihiel drive
proceeded in an orderly and efficient manner from the front
line to the dressing stations at Blenod-les-Pont-a-Mousson to
the triage at Dieulouard, thence to the group of hospitals at
Millery and thence to the Evacuation Hospital to the rear. The

268 O'FFICIAL HISTOSX OF 82nt> DIVISION

Medical Departropnt was by this time well trained and fully
capable of proper functioning;.

The vSanifctiry Train, with S.F^. Unit No. 647, moved by French
trucks from the Marbache to tlie Argonne sector the latter part
of Septembej*, 1918. The Train had been spl^ididly ecpiipped
in the Marbaehe sector, having everything necessary for the full
performance of its duties, except ambulances, and this deficiency
was overcome by S.S. Unit No. 647. On account of lack of
transportation, a large part of this equipment was left at Millery,
so when the Sanitary Train began to function in the Argonne
Forest it was vei-y short of equipment in the medical suiHilies.
Later on a few trucks were sent back for a part of the supplies
left at Millery and others were obtained by the energetic work
of Capt. William F. Coleman, S. C, Division Medical Supply
Officer, so that the Sanitary Train was again able to function
with a higher degree of efficiency.

While the Division was in reserve in the Argonne Forest
various dressing stations and field hospitals were established to
meet the medical needs of the Division. On October 6, 1918,
Field Hospitals 326 and 328 were moved to crossroads near
Varennes, the former to act as a Gas Hospital and the latter
as a triage. Field Hospital 325 was held at Clermont as a
hospital for ordinary sick and exhaustion cases, while Field
Hospital 327 was held in reserve. At this time ambulance dress-
ing stations were established at Montblainville and L'Esperance.
Practically all of the wounded up to this time* had been handled
thi-ough the dressing stations at L'Esp(5rance, a very few coming
through the station at Montblainville. On the night of October
8, 1918, the dressing station at Montblainville was moved to
Apremont. Almost immediately it handled a large number of
wounded fi*om the 328th Infantry. The evacuation of the
wounded was very heavy through this station all the time it
was located at Apremont. Tlie village was repeatedly shelled.
On one occasion a shell fell about twenty feet from the door
of the dressing station, killing two men and slightly wounding
one officer and one enlisted man. On October 12, 1918, a dressing
station was established at Pylone, in the rear of the 326th
Infantry. On the same date the dressing station at Apremont
was moved to Chiitel-Ch^h^ry. Most of the wounded on the
left side of the Aire River were collected at Pylone, and as the
road between Pylone and Cornay was impassable, it was neces-
sary to evacuate these through the dressing station at L'Es-
perance, the bridge across the river at Apremont having been

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 269

completed at this time. About October 12, 1918, aU field hospitals
of the Sanitary Train were moved to a German hospital site
near Apremont and here, using buildings and a large amount
of teutage, was established a hospital section with a capacity
of 1000 patients. On the night of October 14, 1918, as the
Division had been steadily moving forward, ambulance dressing
stations were established at Fleville and Pleinchamp Farm. On
account of almost continuous shell fire and the decreased number
of casualties due to the more or less stationary position of the
Division at this time, the ambulance dressing station at Fleville
was abandoned on October 22, 1918, tlie dressing station at
Pleinchamp Farm being capable of handling all wounded; and
all Ambulance Company personnel, except that directly concerned
with the evacuation of the wounded, were sent back to the
Field Hospital Section near Apremont. Tlie Division having
had long continued front line service was greatly deiileted by
the evacuation of both sick and wounded. At the direction of
the Commanding General, those suffering from colds, exhaustion
and diarrhoea were held at tlie Field HospitaLs, given baths,
proper food and medical care and were returned to the front
line in from three to seven days, fully equipped with ordnance
and quartermaster property. The Field Hospitals were caring
for over 800 patients, ^^'ith shells falling in the vicinity of the
hospitals day and night and with nightly bombing activities
going on. The care of this number of sick so near the front
line, and sending them baclv to duty fully equipped, is believed
to be a unique experience in divisional medical history in the
American E. F. To Capt. Catching Therell of the Quartermaster
Department and Capt. A. C. Jones, of the Ordnance Department,
as well as Lt. H. M. Comer, Military Police, is due much credit
for the prompt return of men from the hospitals to their or-
ganizations. While here the Di\ision triage cared for the sick
and wounded of the 78th Division for over forty-eight hours,
the Sanitary Train of this Division having been separated
from it.

On October 27, 1918, the Division Surgeon, Col. C. E, Koerper,
M. C, was relieved from duty with the Division and was suc-
ceeded by Maj. Frederick G. Barfield, M. C. On October 28,
1918, Lt. Col. L. H. Reichelderfer, M. C, was relieved from duty
as Commanding Officer of the 307tli Sanitary Train and suc-
ceeded by Maj. O. O. Feaster, M. C, Capt. Duncan M. Draughn,
M. C, succeeding Major Feaster as Regimental Surgeon of the
325th Infantry. The Field Hospital Section was operated with

270 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

great success, returning a large number of men to the front
line until the Division was relieved from front line duty Novem-
ber 1, 1918. The Regimental and Battalion Aid Stations rendered
excellent service and were moved from time to time as the
needs of the situations demanded. It is obviously impossible
in an article of this length to give their various activities. It
is sufficient to say that at all times the commissioned and en-
listed personnel of the Medical Department gave their best
services, and it is believed that the sick and wounded miderwent
no suffering that could be relieved by their efforts. The Division
triages handled the following number of cases, by sectors :

Toul Sector 2,532

Marbache Sector 1,807

Meuse-Argonne Sector 9,964

Total 14,303

In the evacuation of the sick and woimded from the ambulance
dressing stations to the Division triages all forms of transporta-
tion were used — motor ambulances, animal-drawn ambulances,
ordinary trucks and ammunition trucks; while from the triages
to the evacuation hospitals assistance was rendered by Corps
ambulance companies.

The Division moved by stages, from the Argonne Forest to
the 10th Ti'aiuing Area, and the Sanitary Train established
headquarters at Prangey. Field Hospitals were established near
Prauthoy to care for the ordinary sick and venereal cases of
the Division, while Camp Hospital No. 10 cared for the other
sick of the Division.

S. S. Unit. No. 647, under command of Lt. Leroy Smith, who
had rendered excellent services during the entire front line
activities of the Di^dsion, was now relieved from duty with the
Division and the Sanitary Train received 27 Ford ambulances,
which enabled it to handle the sick of the Division.

While in this area the Medical Department, as well as the
rest of the Division, continued training and special stress was
laid on sanitation. The health of the Division while in this
area v/as excellent. However, the only cases of typhoid fever
In the Division since its formation occurred in this area. Seven-
teen cases of typhoid fever occurred in Battery E of the 321st
F. A. These cases occurred in three series and, in all three,
were traced to typhoid carriers working in the kitchen. En-
ergetic sanitary measures were adopted and the incipient
epidemic was checked.

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 271

The Division moved, in early March, froin the 10th Traiiuug
Area to the Bordeaux Area, and from this time until embarking
for the United States the care of the sick was in charge of
area organizations. While in the 10th Training Area and in
the Bordeaux Area numerous changes occurred in the commis-
sioned personnel of the Medical Department of the Division.
Some officers were sent to schools, some to the United States
for discharge, and some to other organizations in the American
E. F.

The Dental Corps of this Division rendered praiseworthy
service, both in the front line and in training areas. In the
front line they acted as assistants to the Regimental and Bat-
talion Surgeons and in training areas they were busily occupied
improving the dental condition of the Division. From May, 1918,
till the end of March, 1919, 7400 teeth were extracted, 9232 teeth
were treated and a total of 40,062 dental operations were per-
formed by the dental staff of the Division, which consisted on
the average of 21 dental officers.

Hqrs. 82nd Div., D. S. O., American E. F.
April 27, 1919.

VI

DATA CONCERNING
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT, 82nd DIVISION

Lieutenant Colonel R. L. Boyd, Division Adjutant

When the Division was formed, the Adjutant's office was
organized, with Maj. Charles F. Thompson as Division Adju-
tant, Ijet Lt. L. W. DeMotte as Statistical Officer, and Capt.
R. L. Boyd as Personnel Officer; and, inasmuch as the present
general staff organization was not then in force, much of the
work, which later devolved on the several chiefs of staff, was
performed by the Division Adjutant. Owing to the delay in
receipt of orders from Washington a thoroughly organized Per-
sonnel Section did not come into being until some time after
the organization of the Division, consequently the select men were
received and assigned by the Statistical Section, under the direc-
tion of Lieutenant DeMotte; and due to a lack of time and an
accurate knowledge of the occupational qualifications of the
newly arrived recruits they were assigned with little regard
for suitability for service, this being most noticeable in the
case of the Divisional Engineer Regiment, which, as first con-

272 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

Stituted, was made up almost entirely of farmers and laborers
with practically none of the specialists required by such a
technical orgauizatiou.

Shortly after the organization of the Division the occupational
census was inaugurated, but before it was completed all of the
enlisted personnel of the Division, with the exception of 863
men, were transferred to the National Guard of the States of
Georgia, Alabama and Tennessee, and immediately the Division
was refilled by transfer of men from the various National Army
cantonments throughout the United States. In practically no
instance did the qualification cards accompany the men so trans-
ferred, consequently they were again reassigned without proper
attention being given to their qualifications.

During the latter part of November a large personnel section
was organized and an occupational census of the men of the
Division taken. It was completed about January 1, 1918, when
almost immediately requisitions began to come in from Washing-
ton calling for high grade specialists, which resulted in ap-
proximately 3000 of the best men of the Division being
transferred elsewhere, and a promise given that when the Divi-
sion received orders to proceed overseas they would be replaced
by specialists from other cantonments. However, this promise
was not lived up to, for when it was seen that the Division
would proceed overseas at an early date a requisition was placed
for the necessary specialists needed by the variovis organizations,
and the reply received from the Adjutant General's Oflice was
to the effect that it was impracticable to furnish these specialists,
and that the shortage in the Division would be filled by the
"run of the draft." After arrival overseas further requisitions
were placed for these specialists but they were never furnished,
from which it will be seen that the Division was never ade-
quately supplied with the necessary specialists; and insofar as
this Division is concerned this much advertised personnel assign-
ment system proved to be very much of a detriment rather
than a help.

In November, 1917, Major Thompson was appointed Assistant
Chief of Staff (G-2), and Maj. Troup Miller was appointed
Adjutant. Just prior to the departure of the Division for
services overseas Major Miller was appointed Assistant Chief
of Staff (G-1), being succeeded as Adjutant by Lt. Col. Job
R. Thomas, and at the same time the Statistical Section was
merged with the Personnel Section, and at the time of ©mbarka-

OFFICIAI, HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 273

tion the commissioned personnel of the Adjutant's office consisted
of Lt. Col. John R. Thomas, Adjutant ; Capt. George C. AVoodruff
and Capt. Harry C. Kaefring, Assistant Adjutants; Maj. R. L.
Boyd, Personnel Officer; 1st Lt. W. B. Sparks, Jr., and 2nd Lt.
James H. Fee, Assistant Personnel Officers.

On June 13, 1918, Lt. Col. Thomas was relieved from duty
as Division Adjutant and sent to the Array Staff College as
a student, and Major Boyd was assigned as Division Adjutant,
and 1st Lt. Sparks assigned as Personnel Officer, and liis title
changed to Personnel Adjutant under G. H. Q. orders.

While in training with the British Army the necessity for
dividing Division Headquarters into two or more echelons arose,
and the Adjutant's office was assigned to the second echelon.
When an active sector was reached it was found that one of
the most important and interesting features of the Adjutant's
office was securing and forwarding replacement persoimel, which
work did not assume very large proportions in either the Toul
or Marbache sectors, and replacements were handled through
the Trains Headquarters under the supervision of the Adjutant ;
however, when the Division entered the Meuse-Argonne offensive
it was seen that replacements in large numbers must be handled,
consequently Division Headquarters was divided into three
echelons, the Adjutant's office in the thii'd echelon, which, during
this entire offensive, remained at Grange-le-Comte Farm, where
it became necessary to establish a large replacement camp, under
the command of the Division Adjutant, where replacements were
received and held in this camp until they could, under cover of
darkness, be forwarded to the units needing them. At one time
this replacement camp had as many as 2500 men in it.

During this same offensive it was found that the usual plan
of handling battle casualty statistics and reports was not
feasible, as company clerks who remained with their organiza-
tions were being killed and records lost, so the revolutionary
plan of moving all company clerks and company records back
to Division Headquarters was decided on, which resulted in
relieving the company commanders from making reports to Divi-
sion Headquarters, and instead Division Headquarters furnished
the company commander with all statistical figures and records
needed by him. This necessitated securing all information
relative to men killed and wounded from the Division triage,
where a representative of the Adjutant's office was placed, and
daily reports of the men passing through were forwarded to
DivlBlou Headquarters, and each day the company commander

274 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

was furnished with tlie names of his men who had been
evacuated, and in a similar manner information was secured from
the burial parties as to the men killed.

This plan enabled a much more accurate compilation of casual-
ties, and at the same time relieved the company commander
of practically all paper work at a time when it was necessary
for him to devote his attention to battle activities.

When the Division went into the training area, after the armis-
tice, the company clerks were returned to their organizations,
and the former method of paper work was resumed.

At the time the Division received orders to return to the
United States the commissioned personnel of the Adjutant's office
consisted of the following:

Lt. Ool. R. L. Boyd, Adjutant; Maj. George O. Woodruff,
Assistant Adjutant; Capt. Willis B. Sparks, Jr., Personnel
Adjutant; 1st Lt. R. M. Bush, Assistant Personnel Adjutant;
2nd Lt. James H. Fee, Assistant Personnel Adjutant; Capt.
Robert H. Diamond, Officer in charge of casuals; and 2nd Lt.
Joseph M. Austin, Division Postal Officer. However, owing to
many changes in commissioned personnel the Division arrived
back in the United States with the following officers on duty
with the Adjutant's office:

Lt. Col. R. L. Boyd, Adjutant; Maj. Joseph F. Muldrow,
Assistant Adjutant; Capt. Ira N. Sprecher, Personnel Adjutant;
1st Lt. R. M. Bush, Assistant Personnel Adjutant ; 2nd Lt.
Robert E. Cox, Assistant Personnel Adjutant ; and 2nd Lt.
Joseph M. Austin, Postal Officer.

VII
HISTORY OF THE 307th FIELD SIGNAL BATTALION

Contributed by
Dellman O. Hood, Captain Signal Corps, U. S. Army

The 307th Field Signal Battalion, of the 82nd Division, Na-
tional Army, was organized and trained at Camp Gordon,
Atlanta, Ga. The battalion was first commanded by Maj. John
B. Hemphill, of the Regular Array. Major Hemphill continued
In command, in addition to performing the duties of Division
Signal Officer, for several months, until Capt. Kilberth D.
Schaefer, at that time in command of Company B, was promoted
to the grade of Major and placed in command of the battalion.

Major Hemphill left Camp Gordon early in April, 1918, with
the advance party of the Division for France. Upon arrival
overseas he was promoted to the grade of Lieutenant-Colonel.

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 275

With very few exceptions, all of the officers and enlisted men
were men of many years practical experience in telephone,
telegraph and radio communication work. About 60 per cent of
the enlisted personnel were men who had enlisted in the Signal
Reserve Corps. The majority of these men came from the
Middle Western states of Illinois, Wisconsin, Missouri, Indiana
and Ohio. The Radio Company was made up largely of men
from the radio class, Beloit University, of Beloit, Wisconsin.
All of these men had taken special courses in radio telegraphy
at this university and had enlisted in the Signal Reserve Corps.

The Wire and Outpost Companies had on their rosters a large
number of men from the large commercial telephone, telegraph
and railroad companies, who had enlisted in the Signal Reserve
Corps.

The remainder of the enlisted personnel were drafted men
from practically every section of the United States. Upon re-
porting at Camp Gordon these men were classified according to
qualifications, those with previous telephone, telegraph and radio
experience being assigned to the Signal Battalion. Thus, the
battalion was an organization of picked men.

Thanks to the untiring efforts of Lt. Col. Hemphill, much
telephone, telegraph, radio and optical equipment, of the type
to be used in France, was procured. With this equipment a
number of day and night maneuvers were conducted at Camp
Gordon.

Lieutenant Defert and Sergeant Pazin of the French Signal
Corps were attached to the Battalion as instructors and remained
with the organization until its arrival in France. These two
gentlemen had seen two years' active service at the front with
the French army and were a valuable asset in the instruction
of the Battalion.

A Division signal school was organized by the Division Signal
Officer with Lieutenant Defert, Sergeant Pazin and personnel
from the Signal Battalion as instructors. Telephony, buzzer
telegraphy, radio, optical and other means of signaling were
taught to officers and men from the infantry signal platoons,
artillery and machine-gun signal details. Many practical
maneuvers in signal work were conducted for the benefit of
these students. The elaborate system of trenches at Camp Gor-
don was completely wired up by the Signal Battalion under
the direction of Lieutenant Defert and Sergeant Pazin, exactly
as was being done at the front in France.

On May 9, 1918, the Battalion left Camp Gordon for Camp

276 OFFICIAL HISTORY OP 82nd DIVISION

Mills, Long Island. After a few clays' rest at Camp Mills, the
Battalion embarked on the 18th of May aboard the British ship
Virginian for overseas. On May 31 the Battalion disembarked
at Liverpool, England, proceeding from there by train to Win-
chester, England, from which place it proceeded across the
English Channel to Le Havre, France, arriving June 4, 1918.
From Le Havre the Battalion was ordered to Rougeux, Haute-
Marne. Here the Battalion rested a few days until orders were
received to proceed to ToiU, arriving Jvme 23. The following
morning the Battalion began moving into the Lagny sector, north
of Toul, to relieve the 101st Field Signal Battalion of the 26th
Division.

This had been known as a so-called quiet sector, but due to
the activities of the American troops, characterized by the raids
at Seicheprey and Xivray, it was fast becoming semi-active.
Previous to our arrival the German artillery fire had been at
times rather heavy and it was decided to establish Division
Headquarters at Lucey instead of Boucq, which had been the
Division P.O. of the 26th Division. This change necessitated
much readjustment in the communication system with the estab-
lishment of several new trunk, and many local telephone lines.

Despite the fact that our battalion had had no previous ex-
perience in the lines, and no training in France, the relief in this
sector was accomplished with despatch and without a hitch in
the plans.

Another point worthy of mention is that of the close liaison
established with the French artillery, which had relieved the
26th Division Artillery — our artillery being at that time in
training in Southern France. Our operators quickly acquired a
working knowledge of the French language and telephonic liaison
with the French was handled with remarkable despatch. Joint
French and American switchboards were established at all im-
portant posts. Our men and the French Signal men worked in
perfect harmony and soon became real "buddies."

Shortly after moving into this sector it was decided to move
back several of the Regimental P.C.'s. During this movement
about five miles of buried cable — 30 pair, were laid from the
regimental P.C.'s to within a short distance of the front line.
A mechanical trench-digger was used for this purpose, details
of men following the trench-digger laying the cable, and other
details filling in the trench. Near the front lines the work was
Ciuried on at night, but a little farther back where the route
extended through woods it was possible to work during the

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF S2nd DITISION 277

day without detection by tlie enemy. No v.ork was left un-
covered during the day — that is, all unfinished wurlv was carefully
camouflaged, in order to prevent the enemy aeroplanes from
making photographs of the project.

This being a fairly quiet sector, an extensive optical system
was operated with a considerable degree o€ suc^ ?. This sys-
tem, however, was not needed for practical use . ad was main-
tained merely as an emergency means of communication.

T. P. S. (Earth Telegraphy) was installed and used between
Regimental and Battalion P.C.'s. Radio communication was
established between Regimental and Brigade P.C.'s, and from
Brigades to Division. Buzzer-phones were used between Bat-
talion and Company P.C.'s. An E-3 radio set was installed at
Division Headquarters and used for listening-in on German radio
stations. Every radio station, in fact, listened-in and copied all
German messages, which were turned in daily to our Intelligence
section. The telephone, however, was our practical means of
commmiication, all other methods being maintained as emergency
means and for test purposes.

On the night of August 4, 1918, the Gei-man lines north of
Flirey were raided by the 326tli Infantry. The Signal detail
attached to the Regiment from the Outpost Company and com-
manded by 1st Lt. Glenn S. Matthevs's, went "over the top" with
the infantry and maintained telephonic communication through-
out the raid, despite the heavy and almost continuous counter-
barrage laid down by the Germans. The wire used was No. 22
twisted pair, or better known as small "outpost *wist." It was
carried forward on spools containing about one kilometer of
circuit and each spool transported by two signal men. Details
of two men each were dropped about every hundred yards or
more to test in and repair breaks. During this operation the
Signal Battalion had three men wovinded.

On the night Of August 8-9, during the relief of the 82nd
Division by the 89th Division, the German artillery filled the
valley around Bayard, north of Noviant, with a high gas con-
centration. Without a thought to their personal safety. Corporals
McClendon, Aikeus and Grubbs, and Privates Evenson, Fenn,
Hendrix, Blanco and Taylor remained at their posts repairing
broken lines and putting through telephone calls for ambulances,
and medical aid and transmitting important orders. Some of these
men worked with their gas masks on for eight continuous hours,
and every man stuck to his post until completely overcome by
the gas and had to be evacuated to hospitals. All were more

278 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

or less badly gassed and burned with mustard gas, Private
Taylor dying from injuries received. Nevertheless their devotion
to duty was not in vain, for thanks to the valor of these men,
It was possible to summon ambulances promptly and evacuate
the woimded with very little delay. While the casualties were
very heavy, 701, to be exact, there were very few deaths because
the wounded were able to be evacuated without delay and receive
prompt treatment. A new and inexperienced division was com-
ing into the lines for the first time, and but for the bravery
and cool-headedness of this small detail of Signal Corps men,
it would have been several hours before word could have been
sent to the rear and assistance rendered. This is a fair example
of the type of men the Battalion was made up of, and the
importance of their work on the front.

During our stay in the Lagny sector, the Germans attempted
several times to tap our telephone and buzzer-phone lines in and
near the front-line trenches, coming out for this purpose during
the night. They succeeded in making an actual tap one night
near Xivray, but fortunately the tap was soon discovered by
one of our linemen patrolling the lines, and removed.

A thorough code system was used in this area for both tele-
phone and other means, and was very satisfactory for a time,
but it was extremely difficult to hold the line officers down to
using the code when making call.?, and prevent them from
talking "in the clear." It was quite evident that the Germans
were provided with a very efficient listening-in system, and there
is no doubt but that they were able to pick up our telephone
conversations at times. This was evident from the way in which
they shelled the roads leading up to our trenches on practically
every night our troops made a relief. The gassing of our lines
on the night of the relief by the S9th Division is another good
illustration.

On the morning of August 10 our Battalion was relieved by
the 314th Field Signal Battalion of the 89th Division.

Outside the trenches in the Lagny sector our telephone lines
were run on stakes, and farther back it was possible to have
pole line leads of iron and copper wire. The majority of the
wire used, however, v as No. 17 twisted pair, which stood up
better under all conditions and gave very satisfactory transmis-
sion. The small No. 22 twist was very good for raiding parties
where it was only intended to be used for a few hours, but is
not practical for permanent or even semi-permanent use, as it

i

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 279

will not function during wet weather and is easily broken by
concussion from shells.

It was also decided during our stay in the Lagny sector to
make some changes in the distributions of our Signal personnel.
Originally, each regiment was assigned a platoon from the Out-
post Company under command of a Signal Corps lieutenant;
small details from the Wire and Radio Companies were assigned
to each Brigade P.O. under command of a B Company lieutenant,
the remainder of A and B Company personnel working out of
Division Headquarters. It was soon discovered, however, that
the greater part of the maintenance and operations of the
telephone net fell to the lot of Company B, which operated from
Division Headquarters inclusive to Regimental P.C.'s exclusive.
This is a small company of 75 men, which was found inadequate
to handle the work properly in so large an area.

To strengthen these details, each Outpost Platoon detailed six
men to its respective brigade, giving each brigade twelve men
from the Outpost Company, eight from the Wire Company and
ten from the Radio Company. In addition, there were generally
six to eight men available from the Brigade Headquarters In-
fantry detail. One Signal Corps truck was assigned to each
brigade. Each regiment furnished their Signal Corps detail one
G.S. wagon, and in some cases the battalion details were
furnished an ammunition cart to transport their signal property.
Communications from the Regimental P.C.'s forward were
handled by the Outpost Company platoon attached to the regi-
ment. The Radio Company assigned one non-commissioned officer
to each infantry regiment, he being in charge of the radio,
T. P. S. and optical liaison within the regiment. The Infantry
Signal platoon under command of an infantry officer worked in
conjunction with the Signal Corps platoon.

This distribution of personnel remained unchanged during the
remainder of the operation of the 82nd Division at the front.

From August 10 to August 17 the Signal Battalion was in
training at Blenod-les-Tonl, from which place it was oi'dered
with the Division to the Marbache sector, north of Nancy, where
we relieved the First Field Signal Battalion of the Second
Division.

The Marbache sector was also known as a quiet sector and
the signal work was of a similar nature as of that in the
Lagny sector. Much Avork was done, however, in improving the
existing buried cable and aerial telephone lines, many of which
had been in existence for four years, having been constructed

280 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

by the French and now in very poor condition. This work was
in preparation for the oiifensive of the American First Army,
which had for its purpose the elimination of the famous St.
Mihiel Salient.

This was a favorite sector with the Germans for air raids —
the towns of Marbache (Division Headquarters), Dieulouard
and Millery generally being the targets. One night during the
early part of September all trunks from Division Headquarters
forward were put out of commission for a few minutes as a
result of several large aerial bombs dropped by enemy aeroplanes.
Although these bombs exploded fully 200 feet from our telephone
lines, which were on standard poles, yet the concussion was
sufficient to break every line on both forward leads.

It was in this sector that the Divisional Artillery, the 157th
Field Artillery Brigade, joined the Division, relieving the 15th
Field Artillery Brigade, of the 2nd Division. The Artillery Signal
details connected their units with all Signal Corps switchboards
and maintained their own telephone lines. In addition, they
also operated their own radio and projector stations. 1st Lt.
Walter C. Kiesel was detailed from the Signal Battalion as
liaison officer with the artillery brigade.

The Signal Corps and artillery worked in close cooperation,
each using the other's lines in cases of emergency. This proved
to be a very convenient and valuable arrangement for both.

In the St. Mihiel offensive on the morning of September 13,
the Signal Corps men went over the top with their "doughboy"
comrades; 1st Lt. Clayborne Arthur an* the Fourth Outpost
platoon of the Signal Battalion were attached to the 328th
Infantry Regiment. Shortly after the troops arrived at Norroy,
Lieutenant Arthur had his telephone line into the town and
ready to flash back the information that Norroy had been
taken. In this advance Lieutenant Arthur used the small No.
22 twisted pair. The circuit worked fairly well for a short
time, but a heavy rain started and the line was soon unservice-
able. To overcome this, a buzzer-phone was connected to the
line and fairly good transmission obtained by buzzer telegraphy.
A new line of No. 17 twisted pair was laid the following night
and telephonic communication reestablished. During this offen-
sive the Signal Battalion lost two men killed and more than
a dozen wounded.

On September 20, the 90th Division took over the position of
our troops on the left bank of the Moselle River and the French
the position on the right bank. Our Division came out of the

OFFICUL HISTDRT OF 89wd DIVISION 281

lines and withdrew into the area just north of Nancy, Signal
Battalion Headquarters being established at Liverdun. Orders
were received on September 22 to proceed to the Argonne Forest,
where our real work was to begin.

During the stay of the Division in the Marbache sector, a
radio station was established on Mousson Hill, in addition to
the Division, Brigade and Regimental stations. Several optical
stations were also established at observation posts along the
front lines. It was not possible to make much use of the optical
stations, however, as they most invariably drew fire from the
German batteries. The optical station at the Port-sur-Seille ob-
servation post rendered excellent service on several occasions
in sending back warnings of gas attacks. It was an easy matter
for German aeroplanes to come over and locate the position of
these optical stations, thereby disclosing the location of our
O.P.'s and other important posts.

In addition to the Division, Brigade and Regimental switch-
boards, relay boards were located at Pont-^-Mousson, Millery
and Belleville.

Shortly before the Battalion left the Marbache sector Lieuten-
ant Colonel Hemphill v/as transferred to the Eighth Army Corps
as Corps Signal Officer, being relieved by Lt. Col. George E. B.
Daily. It was with profound regret that the 307th said good-by
to Lieutenant Colonel Hemphill. He was Idolized by every
officer and man in the Battalion. Though possessing an extremely
stern personality and always insisting upon the strictest dis-
cipline, his heart was of gold and the 307th Field Signal Bat-
talion was always uppermost in his thoughts. Everyone felt
that his transfer was a serious loss to our Battalion.

The Battalion moved into the Argonne Forest on the night
of September 25, Battalion Headquarters being established in the
woods about 500 meters soutliwest of Rarecourt. On October
4 the Battalion moved up to Varennes which had just been cap-
tured by the 35th Division. Division Headquarters were estab-
lished at Varennes the same day. Both the 163rd and 164th
Brigades were located in the woods west of Varennes with both
Brigade Headquarters in the old German rest camp at Champ-
Mahaut. Two lines were laid from this point to Varennes —
the circuits being tied-in on trees where possible, and across
open fields it was laid out on the ground. All four regiments
and the three machine-gun battalions near by were given tele-
phonic communication. In tidditiou a line was put in from the
joint brigade board to the 77th Division Headquarters board at

282 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

Champ Mahaut. Tliis gave us an emergency outlet to Varennes
via the 77th board and the Corps line.

On the night of October 6, the 327th and 328th Infantry regi-
ments went into the lines along the Aire River east of Chatel-
Chehery and the following morning went over the top.

Our No. 17 twisted pair was now getting scarce, and most
of our new supplies of wire was P. O. D. twist, which although
a little smaller than No. 17, was of much better grade than
No. 22.

The difficult task of carrying the telephone lines forward with
the attack of the 164th Brigade was accomplished by Company
B as far forward as the Regimental P.C.'s and from there for-
ward by the Outpost platoons assigned to the 327th and 328th In-
fantry regiments. Capt. William T. Busch, then in command
of Company B laid two axis lines forward from Varennes to
Chaudron Farm where 164th Brigade Headquarters and the
Advance Information Center were established. TMs work was
accomplished in a driving rain and during the night which was
pitch dark. In addition to this handicap, the men were forced
to work along roads badly congested with truck trains and
artillery moving up to the front. These two circuits from
Varennes to Chaudron Farm were laid out by truck part of
the way and the remainder by wire carts. The wire was reeled
off the rear of the truck by placing the wooden spools upon a
digging bar placed across the rear of the truck. As the wiring
party neared Baulny and Chaundron Farm they were subjected to
heavy artillery fire.

The work of maintaining lines from the 164th Brigade P.O.
to the P.C.'s of the 327th and 328th Infantry regiments was in
charge of 1st Lt. Clarence G. Shriver, 164th Brigade Signal
Officer. His task was extremely difficult. His route extended
across fields that were a sea of mud ; in many places it was
necessary to cross the Aire River and other smaller streams
swollen by the heavy rains. His men were continually under
shell fire, which also wrecked his lines at times almost as fast
as they could be laid out or repaired. In addition artillery
pieces and ammunition carts were continually moving over the
telephone lines and breaking them. The work was being done
in pitch darkness. It was impossible of course to use trucks
so near the front lines and the spools of wire had to be carried
forward by hand. This was usually done by a detail of four
men, with from four to six men additional to work shifts in
carrying the wire and to replace casualties. It was not alto-

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 283

gether a satisfactory method, but the best that could be done
under the circumstances, as all of our equipment was for trench
warfare and practically no equipment for open warfare, except-
ing wire carts, which were as useless as trucks near the front
line. And our Brigade P.C.'s were generally quite near to the
front lines. We made considerable use of our wire carts as far
up as was possible to take them, but their value was consider-
ably cut down due to the small amount of circuit that could
be carried on the cart drums. These carts were built to hold
five miles of single wire, or two and a half miles of metallic
circuit. This wire was not very good for metallic circuits, how-
ever, due to induction and cross talk. A further handicap was
the difficulty in carrying food for the animals and the congestion
of the roads.

Maintaining communications in open warfare under these con-
ditions therefore was an enormous task. Stringing lines on poles,
stakes or trees was out of the question. First, the infantry
advanced too rapidly. Second, there were no poles, no stakes
and in many places no treas. Details followed up, however,
readjusting the lines and getting them off the roads and tying
in on trees where possible. In ordei* to keep up with the fast
moving infantry it was necessary for the advance wiring parties
to lay their lines out on the ground as they advanced. In this
manner we were able to keep up telephone communication as
far forward as regimental P.C.'s practically without interrup-
tion. The lines were continually being broken of course by the
enemy shell fire and our own artillery pieces and ammunition
carts moving over them, but by stationing details every few
hundred yards along the route, repairs were made almost in-
stantaneously.

Communication from the regiments forward, however, was a
different question. It was almost impossible at times, but most
of the time the regimental commanders were able to communi-
cate with their battalion commanders by telephone. This work
was in diarge of 1st Lt. Olayborne Arthur with the 328th In-
fantry and 2nd Lt. Harvey E. Hannaford with the 327th. Lines
were carried forward by hand the same as from brigade to
regiments. Their task was all the more difficult as the men
had to work through machine-gun fire as well as artillery fire
and gas. The lines were shot out more frequently and the
Battalion P.C.'s were changing continually; the supplies of wire
ran out rapidly and it was difficult to bring up fveslh supplies.
In spite of these handicaps, Lieutenants Arthur and Hannaford

284 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

rendered excellent service, going out personally with their men
and making repairs themselves. Too much credit can not be
given to these regimental and battalion signal men; their work
was hazardous ; in fact they were under fire and working
through gas practically all of the time; they had no time to
seek shelter; their work lay in the open.

A division axis was always the first thing to be established,
extending from Division Headquarters along the line of advance
as far forward as the wires could be carried. One main axis
line was carried forward from division to eacli brigade, two
extra lines laid as soon as positions could be consolidated. We
also carried one line forward on the axis for use by the artillery
brigade. The latter maintained their own lines within their
own units. Artillery regiments and brigade were also connected
with the nearest Signal Corps switchboai'd. This work was done
by the artillery and Signal Corps detail Jointly. Small details
were placed along these axis lines at frequent intervals to test
in and repair breaks.

We had received a few replacements after reaching Varennes.
Lieutenant Matthews was missing in action. 2nd Lt. Timothy
J. Murphy reported to us at Varennes on October 3 and was
assigned temporarily to Company B.

On the night of October 6, Lieutenant Murphy was given a
detail of 12 signal men and ordered to lay a line from Chaudron
Farm, which had just been taken by the First Division, to an
O.P. location, well out in front and to the top of Hill 224,
Although it was Lieutenant Murphy's first experience at the
front, he set out with his little detail and the wire was laid
during a high gas concentration and through heavy machine-gun
and shell fire. Two of his men were killed outright and two
wounded. A Y.M.C.A. man from the 1st Division who had
volunteered to direct Lieutenant Murphy toward the location
was also killed. Several times this detail of men were completely
covered with earth from exploding shells. Returning from this
duty about dawn, he carried another line to the First Division
advance P.O. and another to the 164th Brigade P.O. of our
Division, which was then making its famous flanking attack
across the Aire River against Hills 180, 223, La Forge Farm
and Cornay.

On October 8 Lieutenant Murphy was transferred to the Out-
post Company, and assigned in command of the Second Platoon
attached to the 326th Infantry of the 163rd Brigade, who wera
going iu to relieve the 28th Division on the left side of the

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 285

river. 1st Lt. John O. Burnette was in command of the First
Outpost Platoon attached to the 325th Infantry, and Lt. Dell-
mann O. Hood, who had the previous day been promoted to
Captain, was the 163rd Brigade Signal Officer. This relief of
the 28th Division was made during the night in a driving rain
storm on roads and across fields that were a sea of mud. About
this time the 325th Infantry was detached from the 163rd
Brigade and attached to the 164th Brigade, which had suffered
heavily in casualties. Lieutenant Burnette was seriously
wounded on October 9 and evacuated. Sergeant First Class
James M. Davis assumed command of the platoon, and since
has received one Division, and one Regimental citation for the
excellent manner in which he handled it.

The 326th Infantry jumped off at La Pelette Ravine, Signal
Corps men going over with them and installing lines from this
ravine forward with the advanced attacking elements. The
brigade detail under command of Captain Hood followed upon
the heels of the regimental details establishing communications
from brigade to regiment. The work of keeping the brigades
connected with Division Headquarters was being carried out by
details from Company B in command of Captain Busch. It was
possible to do this work with the use of trucks and wire
carts.

This work carried us through the very heart of the Argonne
Woods, through constant shelling, gassing and machine-gun fire.
Rain fell in torrents practically without let up. We were forced
to work during the night through pitch darkness, feeliag and
groping our way along and finding our way as best possible.
Our advance was carried forward through Le Chene-Tondu, La
Besogne, Pylone, Marcq, and later St. Juvin and Hill 182. Gen-
eral Cronin, commanding the 163rd Brigade, generally main-
tained his P.C. at the same place or near by the 325th or 326th
Regimental P.C.'s until our movements became more stationary.
When this was the case we were able to consolidate more or less
regimental and l)rigade signal details and work both ways. Near
Marcq, during the attack upon St. Juvin, it was necessary to
filter our signal men across the Aire River to the right, or east
side, and follow up the attack from the southeast. The Signal
Corps Platoon with the 326th Infantry carried a line from the
Regimental P.C. at Pylone down the Decauville railroad, through
the woods, and across the Aire River to the P.C. of the 325tli
Infantry. The maintenance of this line was an example of the
courage displayed by our men, it being necessary to work through

286 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

a river valley filled with gas and constantly under machine-gun
and artillery fire, at times amounting to nearly a barrage. Ser-
geant Arthur De Haven crossed the Aire River eight times oa
this night before he could complete his line to the 325th. Time
and again he went back and forth to make repairs.

The 163rd Brigade was relieved here by the 77th Division,
and moved its P.C. to Cornay, the 32eth crossing the Aire and
taking up a position to the left of the 325th with Regimental
I'.O. about half a kilometer southeast of St. Juviu.

One of the Battalion P.C.'s of the 326th was located in the
town proper. The relieving battalion of the 77th Division came
up without a Signal Corps detail, or any Signal equipment.
Sergeant Wilbur P. Stanley, of the Signal Corps Platoon with
the 326th Infantry, remained with this battalion of the 77th
Division and maintained communication for them until their
Signal men came up the following day. He was given ten men
from his platoon. During this work he lost one man killed
and two wounded. In addition, we left two telephones and a
four-line switchboard for use by the 77th. They also took
over a line for their use, which we had previously put in from
Pylone to La Besogne, saying that they expected to establish
a Battalion P.C. at the latter place and had no telephone
communication.

Division Headquarters had subsequently moved up from Va-
rennes to La Forge, and from La Forge to Ch^h^ry Farm. We
had anticipated taking over the lines laid by the 28th Division
but these lines were in such bad condition that we had to lay
new lines practically the entire route.

Captain Busch had established an axis up the Chatel-Cheh^ry-
Cornay Road from Chatel-Chehery to Cornay of four trunk lines
with a relay board at Cornay. The 163rd Brigade moved into
Cornay and took over this board. Two lines had previously been
laid from PylSue to Cornay by the 163rd Brigade Signal detail.
These lines were now used for lateral communication with the
77th Division. Our axis lines from Chatel-Ch«5h4ry to Cornay
were later turaed over to the 78th Division and our axis re-run
from Pleinchamp Farm, when our Division Headquarters moved
up to Fl^ville. The 164tli Brigade Headquarters were now
loacted at Fleville. Three lines were carried forward from
Cornay to Martincourt Farm by Sergeant First Class Isaac M.
Lowry, of Captain Busch's detail, to be used later for the divi-
sion axis. This Avas accomplished uuder a heavy bombardment
from German artillery and machine-gun fire. Three lines were

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 287

also laid from Cornay to Fleville to meet the new division axis
there. About October 14 the 163rd Brigade Headquarters were
also moved to Fleville, the 78th Division taking over Cornay.
One of the Fleville-Cornay circuits was used as Brigade lateral
between Fleville and the right brigade of the 78th; another was
taken over by the 319th Field Artillery of our Division, at
Cornay, to connect with the 320th Field Artillery at Fleville,
and the tliird was used for an 82nd Division O, P. located near
Martincourt Farm. From Cornay forward we used one of the
axis lines laid by Sergeant Lowry.

327th and 328th Regimental Headquarters were now located
at Sommerance, about three kilometers northeast of Fleville;
the 325th and 326th along the Sommerance-St. Juvin Road.
Operations had settled down to more or less of a waiting game.
A joint switchboard for the 163rd and 164th Brigades was estab-
lished at Fleville with a network of circuits to Sommerance,
the 325th and 326th P.C.'s. Relay stations were established at
several places along these circuits. Latei'al lines were laid
between all regiments and even between relay stations. In this
manner we established a net whereby we were able to have
communication forward with practically no interruption. If one
side was shot out, we could get through around the other side
or through the middle, and vice versa.

General Cronin, commanding tlie 163rd Brigade, established
an advance P.C. at the 325th Regimental P.C. and General Lind-
sey, of the 164th Brigade, established his at Sommerance. These
two P.C.'s were connected with the regimental switchboards.
Although we had now settled down to stationary fighting, our
troubles had not ceased by any means. In fact we suffered
more casualties in this sector than any of the others. The
enemy shelled the area from Fleville forward to the front lines
almost incessantly. Fleville and Sommerance were subjected to
extremely heavy shell fire and gassing. This of coui'se played
havoc with our lines and kept our men out pretty much all
of the time. The details were so arranged that when a wire
was shot out, a detail would start from each end, clearing trouble
until they met or until the circuit cleared.

The advanced signal working parties were supplied with wire
and equipment from advance signal dumps, established generally
near Brigade Headquarters. The wire and material usually had
to be carried from brigade by hand.

Two men of the 307th Field ^Ugual Battalion have received
Distinguished Service Crosses, three otliers recommended and

288 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

approved; nineteen have received Division citations and four-
teen Regimental citations. General Cronin, in a letter to the
commanding otficer of the battalion, highly commended the work
of the Signal detail attached to his Brigade in command of
myself. Captain Shriver was likewise highly commended by
General Lindsey of the 164th Brigade and our regimental Signal
officers commended by their respective regimental commanders
for our work during the operations of the Division at the front.

The real credit, however, for the success of the battalion in
maintaining lines of information is due the enlisted men of
the organization. Our non-commissioned officers were excellent ;
the morale and spirit of the men admirable. The uppermost
thought in their minds at all times was the success of the
Division and the Signal Battalion.

I also wish to take tliis opportunity of expressing my admira-
tion of the excellent work done by the Signal details of our
artillery. Their men were equally courageous and were always
to be found out on their lines repairing breaks, the same as
ours. They kept up their telephone lines and nets in excellent
shape and never overlooked an opportunity to assist our men in
every way possible. We tried to reciprocate as much as pos-
sible, but could not do as much as we would have liked owing
to our heavy casualties.

During the Meuse-Argonne offensive we used the radio very
little; seldom used the T. P. S., and never used optics. We
made some use of our pigeons on several occasions.

It was almost impossible to establish radio stations at Regi-
mental P.C.'s and where they were established the infantry
officers did not use them, as all messages had to be enciphered and
deciphered, which took up so much time as to render the mes-
sages practically of no value — and then, too, the telephone was
generally available. The radio details were always on hand,
however, ready for use in an emergency.

Soil conditions did not favor the use of the T. P. S. This
means of signaling is fairly good in trench warfare, but of
not much value in open warfare. Optics are out of the question
in open warfare. Furthermore, infantry commanders as a rule
will not allow them to be set up near their P.C.'s, as they
invariably draw fire.

The telephone was our most useful means of communication
and we lent all of our energies toward its maintenance. Onr
success in doing this will readily be attested to by all line
officers of the Division who had occasion to use the telephone.

OFFICIAi HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 289

WE WENT INTO THE FIGHT DETERMINED TO KEEP
UP COMMUNICATIONS AND WE DID IT.

VIII

COMPLIMENTARY LETTERS, ETC.

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

France, February 19, 1919.

Major General George B. Duncan,

Commanding 82n(i Division, A.E.F.

My Dear General Duncan :

It gives me a great deal of pleasure to extend to you and
the officers and men of the 82nd Division my compliments upon
their excellent appearance at the inspection and review on Feb-
ruary 11 near Prauthoy. It was gratifying to see your troops
in such good physical shape, but still more so to know that the
moral tone of all ranks is so high. It is hoped that this will
continue even after their i*eturu to civil life.

Youi' Division is to be congratulated on its record in France.
At the end of June it was placed in a quiet sector of the French
line to release veteran divisions for the battle. From the 12th
to 16th of September it took part in the first American offensive
at St. Mihiel, attacking and occupying Norroy and the heights
north and west of Vandi^res. In this operation it advanced 5
kilometers. In the Meuse-Argonne oifensive the Division at-
tacked on October 7th and was engaged almost continuously for
twenty-five days. Attacking across the river Aire it assisted
the I'Sth and 77th Divisions in advance, and on October 9, cap-
tured Cornay. On October 10. the town of Marcq and on October
16, the strong position of Hill 182 and the town of St. Juvin
were also captured, making a total advance of 12 kilometers.

The officers and men of your Division may proudly carry home
with them the gratitude of the Allies witli whom they fought
and the pride of their fellows throughout our forces.
Sincerely yours,

John J. Peeshino.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
FRANCE

2 February, 1919.
From : Major General C. P. Summerall, Commanding Fifth

Army Corps, American E. P.
To : Commanding General, 82nd Division.

Subject: Horse Show and Review.

1. It is with sentiments of pride and pleasure that I com-
municate to you my commendation of the excellent exliibltioQ
of horses and transportation that it was my privilege to witness

290 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

at the 82nd Division Horse Sliow on February 1. Not only
were the animals and transportation of a very high order, but
they gave evidences of such thoroughness and care in prepara-
tion, such extraordinary ability and attention to detail on the
part of officers and enlisted men, and such devotion, zeal and
pride in the Division as to evidence a high standard of morale
rarely experienced during my service. I desire to congratulate
you and the officers and soldiers of the Division upon the attain-
ment of standards worthy of emulation and imitation. Such
troops reflect credit upon tlie American army and the American
people, and they may be relied upon to acquit themselves with
h»nor in peace as to attain their objectives in war.

2. I desire further to express my deep appreciation of the
honor accorded me by the review of the mounted officers and
soldiers of the Division. The presence of the colors and standards
representing all elements of the Division, and of the massed
band, which was so ably conducted, was an inspiring sight that
I shall never forget. It is an honor to command such troops,
and it is with emotions of deep regret that I contemplate their
separation from the Fifth Corps.

C. P. SUMMERAXL.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
FRANCE

15 February, 1919.
From: Major General C. P. Summerall, Commanding Fifth

Army Corps, American E. F.
To: Commanding General, 82nd Division, American E. F.

Subject: Appreciation of Services.

1. In accordance with orders from Headquarters, American
Expeditionary Forces, the 82nd Division is relieved from the
Fifth Corps.

2. The Division was assigned to the Corps on November 24,
1918, and since that date it has been constantly occupied with
Intensive training. While the work has been arduous and at
times involved much discomfort in severe cold and inclement
woatlier, the response has invariably been cheerful, zealous and
effective. The progress of the Division has been such as to
evince a superior state of discipline and morale. At the con-
clusion of its service in the Corps it is worthy of classification
as an assault di\asion. The functioning of the Staff and of
the elements of command guarantee success in the employment
of the troops.

3. The Corps Commander takes this opportunity to convey to
the Division Commander, Major General George B. Duncan, his
deep appreciation of the loyalty, cheerful co-operation and
marked leadership that he has rendered so abundantly, and to
convey to the officers and soldiers of the Division his high com-
mendation and admiration for the manner in which they have
conducted themselves while in the Fifth Corps. It has been
an honor to command such troops and in the training area,

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 291

as well as in the stress of battle, they have shown themselves
worthy of the trust reposed in them by their country.

C. P. SUMMERALL.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
FRANCE

9 February, 1919.
From : Commanding General, Fifth Army Corps, American B. F.
To: Commanding General, 82nd Division, American E, F.

Subject : Corps Horse Show.

1. It gives me great pleasure to express to you my appreciation
of the excellent exhibits made by the officers and soldiers of
the 82nd Division at the Horse Show of the Fifth Army Corps
on February 8. The horses, equipment and carriages gave
evidences of the great amount of labor and attention to detail
that has been devoted to the preparation of all entries. Not
only the exhibits which secured prizes, but the entire representa-
tion of the Division, was such as to reflect credit upon the
entire connuand. Such results could only have been accomplished
by a prevailing spirit of soldierly pride, marked industry and
an intelligent understanding of the standards to which military
transportation should conform. The results of the exhibit can-
not fail to be far-reaching in enhancing the reputation of the
Division and in stimulating the liveliest interest in maintaining
the entire transportation of the Division in accordance with the
ideas that were manifested at the show.

2. Notwithstanding the fact that the exhibit was held in mid-
winter, with deep snow and during intense cold, the entire
personnel representing the Division showed a keenness and a
disregard of the inevitable discomforts that is worthy of the
highest praise and that constitutes a further proof of the high
standards of morale and fortitude which have distinguished the
Division throughout its service.

3. I especially wish to congratulate the Division upon "Winning
the Divisional Trophy. Its success is the more conspicuous
because of the high order of entries made by competitors.

4. I wish further to express my appreciation of the active
co-operation of the Division Commander and of his Staff, to
whom in the greatest measure is due the hearty and active
response of the Division.

C. P. SUMMEEALL,

Major General.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST ARMY
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, FRANCE
CORRECTED COPY
GENERAL ORDERS

8 February, 1919.
Pursuant to telegraphic instructions from G.H.Q., the 82nd
Division, upon the establishment of its headquarters in the
LeMuns area, is relieved from duty with this Army.

392 OFFICIAL HISTOET OF 821TO DIVISION

Beginning August 15, 1918, the 82nd Division relieved the
2nd Division in the MARBACHE Sector astride the Moselle
River. While occupying this sector as a part of the 1st Army
Corps, A.E.F., the Division was transferred from the command
of the VIII French Army to that of the First Army, A.E.F., at
4.00 P.M. of August 30, 1918.

The 82nd Division participated in the following operations of
the First Army:

St. Mihiel Opeeation

The Division held the right of the line from PORT-SUR-
SEILLE to the Moselle River and attacked west of that river
in conjunction with the 90th Division. The Division captured
and occupied NORROY and the ridge north and west of
VANDIERES.

Meuse-Abgonne Opekation

The Division was in Army and Corps Reserve from September
26th to October 6th. On the night of October 6-7, the Division,
less one Infantry Brigade, entered the line on the 1st Corps
front between the 1st and 28th Divisions along the Aire River
facing CORNAY. Early October 7th the division attacked the
northeast flank of the ARGONNE capturing Hills 180 and 223,
and subsequently the high ground to the west, thus materially
assisting in the clearing of the Argonne.

During the period October 10th to 31st, the Division changed
direction to the north, advanced astride of the Aire River to
the general line east of St. JUVIN, participated in the general
attack of October 14th and several local attacks against CHAM-
PIGNEULLES and the hostile defences east of that town. The
Division was relieved from the front line and passed into 1st
Corps Reserve October 81st.

The Army Conunander takes this occasion to express his
appreciation of the services of the 82nd Division while a part
of the combat forces of this Army, and wishes it God Speed
upon the final phase of its participation in the activities of the
American Expeditionary Forces.

By Command of Lieutenant General Liggett :

H. A. Deum,
Chief of Staff.

Headquarteks, First Army Corps,
Sept. 12, 1918.
Commanding General,

82nd Division, A.E.F.

Please convey to the officers and men of your Division ray
appreciation of the difficult part they had to perform in the
highly successful operation of the First Corps to-day. This part
they performed to my full satisfaction.

H. Liggett.

Received at Hq. 1st x\rmy Corps, September 15, 1918.

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

HEADQUARTERS FIRST ARMT CORPS

11 November, 1918.

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 17

1. During this pause in tlie operations of ttiese lieadquarters,
the Corps Commander desires tliat the units whlcli liave con-
tributed to the constant success of the 1st U. S. Corps be in-
formed of his full appreciation of the services each has rendered
to the common end.

This appreciation must be extended to every element of Corps
and Divisional units for it goes without saying that the vi'ork
of each man, no matter what his station, has contributed power-
fully to the accomplishment of the common aim — the defeat of
the enemy.

It is the desire of the Corps Commander that his sincerest
thanks, best wishes and assurances of his appreciation reach
every member of the units which have contributed to the steady
and unfailing success of the Corps.

By Command of Major General Dickman :

Malin Ckaiu,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL :

W. A. HAVERFIELD,

Lieut. Col, A.G.D.,

Adjutant.

32nd army corps,

General Staff,

3rd Bureau,
No. 3965/8.

Hq. Aug. 4, 1918.

GENERAL ORDER No. 138

The Commanding General of the 32nd Army Corps is glad
to congratulate the companies of the 326th Infantry, commanded
by Major Watkins, which took part in the raid of August 4.

These companies displayed a vigor worthy of American troops.
They attained all their objectives and brought back material and
valuable documents.

This first attack of the 82nd Division shows what may be
expected in the future, of this splendid Division.

Gkneral Passaga,
Commanding the S2nd Army Corps.
Signed: Passaga.
OFFICIAL :
The Chief of Staff.

294 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

IX

STATEMENT OF THE MILITARY SERVICE OF
WILLIAM P. BURNHAM

Born in Pennsylvania 10 Jan., 1860

Cadet M. A 1 July, '77

to 30 June, '80

Pvt., Corpl. and Sgt., gen, ser. and Co. E,

14th Inf 26 Apr. '81

to 5 July, '83

2d Lt., 6th Inf 3 July, '83

Accepted 6 July, '83

1st Lt., 11th Inf 25 Feb., '91

Trs. to 6th Inf 20 July, '91

Trs. to 20th Inf 22 July, '95

Lt. Col., 4th Mo. Inf 16 May, '98

Hon. Must. Out 10 Feb., '99

Capt. of Inf 4 Aug., '98

Assd. to 5th Inf 1 Jan., '99

Trs. to 20th Inf 8 Apr., '01

Trs. to 9th Inf 2 Aug., '06

Maj., 20th Inf 20 Aug., '06

Trs. to 7th Inf 31 May, '07

Trs. to 20th Inf 29 Dec, '10

Unassigned 11 Mar., '11

Assd. to 20th Inf 14 Apr., '11

Lt. Col. of Inf 2 Mar., '12

Assd. to 10th Inf 8 July, '14

Unassigned 5 Aug., '14

Lt. Col., Porto Rican Rgt 1 Oct., '14

Col. Inf 1 May, '16

Brig. Gen., N. A 5 Aug., '17

Maj. Gen., N. A 12 Apr., '18

Discharged as Maj. Gen 2 July, '19

Joined his regiment at Fort Douglas, Utah, August, 1883, to
August, 1887; Fort Leavenworth, Kan., September, 1887 to July,
1889; Fort Lewis, Col., August, 1889, to September, 1889; Fort
Riley, Kan., October, 1889, to August, 1S90; Fort Porter, N. Y.,
September, 1890, to (sick March 3 to March 13, 1891) August,
1891 ; St. John's Military School, Manlius, N. Y., September, 1891,
to August, 1895; Fort Leavenworth, Kan., September, 1895, to
March, 1898; Mobile, Ala., April. 1898, to May, 1898; Camp Alger,
Va., June, 1898, as Lt. Col. 4th Missouri Infantry; mustered oirt

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF S2nd DIVISION 295

February 10, 1899; Augusta, Ga., February, 1899, to April, 1899;
St. Joseph, Mo., May, 1899, to September, 1899; en route to and
at Moro Castle, Santiago, Cuba, October, 1899, to June, 1900;
en route to and at Fort Sheridan, 111., July, 1900, to August,
1900; en route to and at Cabayao, P. I., August 9, 1900, to Jan-
uary, 1901 ; Vigan, P. I., January, 1901, to April, 1901 ; Santiago,
P. I., April, 1901, to May, 1901 ; Vigan, P. I., June, 1901, to Sep-
tember, 1901; Tanauan, P. I., October, 1901, to January, 1902;
en route to and at Fort Sheridan, 111., February, 1902, to October,
1903; Rialto Building, San Francisco, Cal., November, 1903, to
October, 1905 ; Headquarters Department of California, San Fran-
cisco, Cal., November, 1905, to March, 1906 ; Presidio of Monterey,
Cal., April, 1906, to March, 1907; Headquarters Southwestern
Department, St. Louis, Mo., April, 1907, to June, 1907; Head-
quarters of the Columbia Vancouver Barracks, W^ash., July, 1907,
to August, 1909; Headquarters, Department of Missouri, Omaha,
Neb., September, 1909, to February, 1911 ; en route to and at Fort
Shafter, Hawaii, March, 1911, to September, 1911 ; en route to
and at Fort Douglas, Utah, October, 1911, to (sick November 3
to November 4, 1911) August, 1912; Fort Leavenworth, Kan.,
September, 1912, to August, 1914; en route to and at San Juan,
Porto Rico, September 26, 1914, to May, 1917; en route to and
commanding Camp E. S, Otis, C. Z., May 19, 1917, to July 6,
1917; en route to Fort Oglethorpe, Ga., to July 19, 1917; com-
manding 56th Infantry at that post to August 24, 1917; com-
manding 164th Infantry Brigade at Camp Gordon, Ga., August
25, 1917, to April, 1918 ; in addition commanding the 82d Divisioa
from September 2 to November 11, 1917, and December 27, 1917,
to September, 1918; assigned to command of the 82d Divisioa
In April, 1918, and commanded same to September, 1918 in
France; on duty at Athens, Greece, to June, 1919; en route to
United States to July 2, 1919; on duty at Washington, D, C,
July, 1919; en route to and on duty at Fort McDowell, Ga., to
date.

X

CRITIQUE ON THE FIGHTING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
82nd DIVISION

Colonel Gordon Johnston

Chief of Staff, 82nd Division, during Meuse-Argonne Offensive.

Just before the 1st Division jumped off from the line in which
it had relieved the 35th Division I went up to have a look at

296 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

them. I went to the P. C. of the 1st Brigade, near Baulny,
thence to the support battalion, and then on to overlook the front
line, and particularly the eastern slopes of the Aire. I was
very much impressed with the formidable appearance of the
northeast corner of the Argonne forest. The command of that
position over the sector in which the 1st Brigade was to attack
struck me very forcibly and raised a serious doubt in my mind
as to the success of the advance. Being unofficially in this area,
I did not feel inclined to obtrude ray views, but did make inquiry
as to the means for dealing with this menacing position. I was
assured that it was to be smeared with artillery fire and felt
confident that if any one would do such a job thoroughly it would
be General Summerall. Meantime I had been put on duty at
the 1st Corps and being occupied elsewhere could not go with
the 1st Division in their attack. They made a splendid plunge
and then wei'e under such punishment from this very ground
(northeast corner of the Argonne) that the hope of reaching the
German line in their sector had to be abandoned.

It came to my attention on the 6th of October that the 82nd
Division was designated for a flank attack across the Aire to
capture this high ground. I was extremely interested in this
plan and obtained authority to make another reconnaissance. I
went along the left flank of the 1st Brigade to a point about
abreast of Cornay. The extremely hazardous nature of this
attack was most evident. I asked the battalion commanders if
they knew anything about new troops coming in on their left
and they did not. I then searched for General Parker and found
him at the Division P. C. near Very. He likewise knew nothing
of the attack, and we both went in to see General Summerall.
He was not aware of the plan. We looked up the location of
the 82nd Division on the map and after a bit of calculation, none
of us could see how the maneuver was to be executed. We were
all under the impression that the assault troops of the 82nd
would maneuver in the area of the 1st Brigade and that troops
would be formed facing their objectives with the necessary
echelons in depth. Neither of the generals had been asked for
guides nor had anyone consulted them. General Parker said,
"The 1st Brigade couldn't do that in one night and that means
no other Brigade in the Army could do it." General Sunmierall
said, "The 1st Division couldn't do that and I wouldn't ask them
to." General Summerall then called up the Corps, but whatever
the answer was, the couversution didn't last long. I then took
It on myself to call up the P. C. of the S2nd Division. ColoneJ

OFFICIAL HISTORY OP 82nd DIVISION 20T

Sheldon answered. I asked if arrangements for guides liad been
made witti the 1st Division. He replied that he did not know,
but that General Lindsey was at the Division P. C. It was then
about 3 or 4 p.m. I talked with General Lindsey and urged him
to come over to the 1st Division P. C. and discuss matters w^ith
General Parker and General Summerall. General Lindsey came
over and explained the plan of marching north of the roads and
then moving by the flank to attack. When he had gone we were
all rather depressed. It seemed that to commit a large body of
troops to an assault without thorough orientation, careful placing
of troops in position for attack and a thorough co-ordination with
artillery presented very grave difficulties. General Summerall
said that his Division was being destroyed and that he had
begged for fresh troops to make this attack. He felt that no
further progress could be made until this high ground west of
the Aire was taken.

As a matter of fact, only a part of the 82nd Division artillery
got into position in time to lend any assistance. Little help, if
any, was given by the 6th Field Artillery of the 1st Division.
There was no machine gun support on a general scale. The
guides did not function properly and half of the attacking troops
were lost at H hour. All of which increases the honor due to
the Infantry units which delivered the assault and accomplished
their desperate mission October 7th.

Great credit is due to the swift and forceful drive which
General Duncan put into the execution of his task, and the cheer-
ful, buoyant spirit of General Lindsey. His confidence of success
and keenness for the job, which never abated during the horrors
of that forced march on that miserable night of rain and mud
on roads already congested to the limit, contributed most mate-
rially to the success of the Brigade.

Again Fate was with us in the thick fog which covered the
Aire valley that morning. Soon after the jump off, the Boche
knew something was doing but not the direction of the attack.
I saw his interdiction fire, shells falling at crossroads and
searching the ravines east of the main road. As the fog lifted
a little on the high ground, I was amused to see him firing
furiously at half a dozen old abandoned tanks of ours. The fire
was very accurate and several direct hits were obtained. Indeed
so accurate was his fire that I felt quite safe within 200 yards
of a tank at which he was firing.

I could only follow the fight by the musketry fire, but soon felt
that the attack was well under way and realized that a push

298 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

from the south against the Boche might be very useful. So I
hustled back to Corps Headquarters as fast as possible, reported
that the attack was well under way, and that troops were across
the river and fighting on high ground to the west. I asked per-
mission to go over and stir up the 77th Division. General Craig
said that he would start Conger's Brigade of the 28th Division.
He had word just before I left that this Brigade was making
headway along the La Viergette-Marc wood. At about 2 p.m.
I reached the P. C. of 77th Division and told General Alexander
(the Lord forgive me) that the 82nd was cutting right through
to the Decauville road and driving the Boche back and that the
28th were pushing north on the road through La Viergette, and
that now was the time for the 77th to break through also. He
sent me on to General Wittenmeyer, who commanded the right
Brigade. I caught General Wittenmeyer on the way to his front
lines and gave him the same rosy report. He was ready to fight
right away and asked if he could use the wood through La
Viergette (which was out of his sector) to flank the Boche line.
I assumed the responsibility for giving this authority with right
of way reserved to 28th. This was reported to 1st Corps and
confirmed later in the same day. There is every reason to believe
that these efforts distracted some attention of the Boche from
Lindsey's Brigade.

The outstanding lesson of this attack seems to me to be that
with a worthwhile objective, a desperate and chance attack, if
driven with great energy and unswerving determination, promises
success in spite of the crudity in details. The failure to make
fool proof arrangements regarding guides came very near causing
disaster. Lack of traffic control and the fact that troops going
into this action had no "right of way" was another near cause
of failure.

Full recognition of this attack seems to be very slow in coming
from higher Headquarters. I often wondered about this and
once asked General Drum directly why it was. He said, "We
could never understand why you kept milling around in Cornay.
Why didn't you envelop it from the north?" I was astonished
at this and asked if he realized that to do this we would have
been forced to go a good bit further than the 1st Division had
been able to go and that troops executing this movement v.ould
have been compelled to progress fighting in three directions at
the same time. Cornay was merely in the way to our objective,
the high ground beyond, and had to be taken.

I have talked with a number of officers 'who have made studies

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 299

on the ground later and the importance of this attack is steadily
gaining ground in the minds of all of them.

The 82nd Division made some very material contributions to
the science of war. The ideas may not have been original, but
their application was. At least, the fact that our lead in these
matters was promptly followed by others and adopted by higher
formations is a great compliment. The Commander in Chief
called at our P. C. about the middle of October and his remarks
to General Duncan impressed themselves on my mind so vividly
that I feel at liberty to cite them as a quotation. He said, "Gen-
eral, there is no relief in sight for your Division. I know that
the men are very much exhausted and the organization reduced
in strength, but you must not only hold on but continue to push
on. You must remember that war is waged with weary men
and that battles are fought by tired and hungry soldiers. It is
the same on both sides. It is the normal, not the abnormal,
condition of active operations. You must nurse your men all
that you can, but not hesitate to demand sacrifices when the time
for that comes.

"I want to impress on you the importance of the leaders of
smaller units. They must love initiative and must hold what
ground they gain to the utmost. It often happens that a Ser-
geant or even a Corporal may decide a battle by the boldness
with which he seizes a bit of grovmd and holds it. Even if they
cannot hold it, if they fight to the last man ; it may enable other
leaders to gain valuable ground.

"You must impress on all of your officers the desire and
determination to get forward without waiting for some one else.

"You must not be unduly influenced by weariness and exhaus-
tion of your men and must impress your Commanders with that
fact. These are the natural conditions of war and cannot be
avoided."

This visit led to a conviction that it was vital to first check
up carefully our resources in man power; second, to check the
loss of men from the line; third, to check the loss of physical
vigor.

The effort to check up our available man power proved to be
a serious problem. The morning reports did not convey any-
thing more than the paper strength. In the sector of the Division
there is not only a great number of non-combatants or men
engaged on non-combatant duties, but there is also a large float-
ing population for various reasons, much of it quite necessary.
The final solution adopted by General Duncan was to count only

300 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

"fighting effectives." These were defined as soldiers a«tually
present with their platoon commanders with weapons in their
hands engaged in killing the enemy. That was a pretty drastic
cut, but after all that is what all the resources of a Division
should be devoted to, to push and maintain weapons on the line.
A form was issued and each platoon commander required to
make a dailj' battle report and account briefly for his losses or
gains. The strength of all the fighting platoons in a Regiment
was the "fighting effective" strength of that Regiment. The con-
solidation of the first report showed results which gave real
concern. However, the attention of every officer and non-com-
missioned officer was centered on this one subject and the
"fighting effective" strength of all organizations showed a con-
stant improvement. When this had gotten well under way, Gen-
eral Dickman called at the P. C. one day and asked for our
strength on the line. I asked if he wanted the effective strength
and on his reply that he did, gave him the daily report, which
showed about 4000 men (our losses then were about 7000). He
told me that a neighboring Division Commander had just informed
him that he had 22,000 men on the line and wanted to know
where the rest of our men were.

Later Colonel Marshall, G-3, 1st Army, came to our P. C. and
said he had heard we had a new way of figuring strength and
he was on a committee to draft an order on the subject. I gave
him our memorandum and forms. Within a few days the 1st
Army issued a general order which followed very closely our
memorandum.

Then came the drain in man power. It was found that the
triage system was responsible for many unnecessary losses.
When the ambiUances came back, every occupant would be tagged
and passed on with practically no plan of retention. A hospital
was immediately set up at Apremont, messes were opened, cots
and an ample supply of blankets and even some luxuries pro-
vided. At the triage strict orders were given that no officer or
man should be evacuated who could possibly be returned to any
duty within two weeks. Arrangements were made for the re-
tention of 300 beds in a hospital further to the rear with the
understanding that patients would be returned direct to our
rest camp at Apremont for return to any useful duty. Prac-
tically all gas and neurosis cases were stopped here. This
checked the loss in man power to a minimum.

Then came the question of retention of physical vigor. At
Apremont and in connection with the hospital a "rest camp"

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 301

was established. In the rest camp convalescents were cared for
and all patients capable of light duty were put to useful work,
particularly in the care of arms and equipment turned over to
them by the salvage officer. Neurosis cases got no coddling and
very little sympathy. They were also always in sound of the
guns and got a bombing every now and then, or some long range
shelling to cheer them up. Their recovery was unusually rapid.

As soon as the flow back to the front line began, regimental
surgeons were authorized to send back for four days' rest, officers
and men who were most exhausted. These men slept many
hours when they first came back. From time to time a bit of
soup or coffee was forced into their mouths. On about the third
day they were put to light wo^k and on the next day or so were
ready and keen for the front line again. In this way we were
building up continually from the weakest. This with greater
attention to the third line Battalions tided us over the peak of
the load until we could hold our own.

General McArthur paid us a visit one day after we had this
plan in operation and was so impressed that he carried the sys-
tem oat in the 42nd Division immediately. I have heard that it
was recommended to and adopted by a number of other Divisions.

From a technical point of view, the Division was groping
its way toward a development which promised to receive confir-
mation in the use of machine guns. The great fire power of the
machine guns of a Division had never been fully co-ordinated.

While stabilized on the St. Juvin-St. Georges front with a
wedge thrust through the Kriemhilde-Stellung, we were holding
alone four kilos front with about 3000 men. The men were
physically weak and at the same time subject to counter attack.
We were still trying to gain a bit of ground here and there,
but the dangers of an attack in force had to be considered and
therefore the necessity for organizing a defense of artillery and
machine gun fire to cover them or at least disorganize the enemy
before getting to us. A system very much like, that of the Coast
Artillery was adopted. The ground in front was divided into
numbered squares and all firing data prepared so that on the
appearance of a target in our given squares all artillery guns
and all machine guns (direct or indirect) could open fire imme-
diately. Lines of information reached each battery (artillery
or machine gun) so that all could be called at once. The effec-
tiveness of the system was tested when a strong force of Boche
formed up north of St. Juvin and made an attack. The machine
gun barrage fell in two and a half minutes and practically every

302 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

battery of artillery was firing in five and a half minutes. The
effect was terrific, the enemy formation was smashed to bits
instantly and broke to the rear. The howitzer regiment very
neatly got behind them with phosgene and finished the job.
Prisoners taken later confirmed the damage done.

This work developed a very close relation between the artillery
and the machine gunners, each gave targets to the other and
mutual lines of information were laid with one set of observers
working for both arms. This led to the idea of co-ordinating
the work in an offensive action. It was not the idea to take
from Brigade Commanders and others the tactical use of the
machine gun units, but there are many instances in which the
lower formation cannot make the best use of all their ground.
In an action, the fullest fire power of the Division must be
developed in order to insure the progress of the Infantry at the
least cost. No gun can afford to be idle so long as the Infantry
is being punished. Therefore, all machine gun and artillery
units not actually required and until required should be brought
to bear on points where the Infantry might be assisted. So the
Machine Gun Officer and the Artillery commander hold the fire
power of their unengaged units at the direction of the Division
Commander.

In the use of the 37 m/m and 3" Stokes, it seems that* our
sections followed the "hit and run" principle more than anything
else. The idea was to locate a target, go into action and fire as
rapidly as possible for several minutes then "beat it" elsewhere
before the Boche got on.

XI

82nd Div., U. S.
6 October, 1918.

21 Hrs. 30
SECRET
FIELD ORDERS

NO. 20.
MAPS : Foret D'Argonne 1/20,000.
Verdim 1/80,000.

1. Information of the enemy indicates that he is withdrawing
to the KRIEIMHILDE STELLUNG from the AISNE to the
MEUSE. The First American Army and the Fourth French Army
resume their attack on the 7th instant. The SSth French Corps
attacks the FORET D'ARGONNE in a general northeasterly
direction through Lancon. The First Corps (U. S.) attacks on
the present front of the 28th Division at 6 Hours, 7 October, 1918.

2. The 82nd Division, less 1 Infantry Brigade, will attack at 5
Hours, 7 October, 1918. Attack will be made by the 164th In-
fantry Brigade supported by the 157th Field Artillery Brigade.

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 803

3. (a) Sector limits of the attacli.

Right Boundary : FLEVILLE, exclusive — Elevation 151.

Left Boundary: Ferme De GRANGES— La FORGE-
CHATEAU of CHATEL-CHE-
HERY— Meridian 79.8.

(b) Objectives:

First Objective will be the line FLEVILLE, exclusive —
Cornay, inclusive — Hill 223, inclusive — Point 97,3-79.0.

(c) Corps Objective:

Same as the first objective to CORNAY— Elevation 151
(1^ km. West of CORNAY)— Cote 263 (IVa km. West of
CORNAY)— Point 95.5-80.0— To LA VIERGETTE.

(d) 164th Infantry Brigade will relieve the infantry ele-
ments of the 28th Division on the line North of La FORGE
before 24 hours 6 October, 1918. The leading elements of the
Brigade will be crossed over the AIRE River via the Bridge at
La FORGE and improvised foot bridges between La FORGE and
FLEVILLE and formed along the Railroad track running along
the West side of the Aire River before the hour for attack,
covered by active patrols. Rate of advance of Infantry units
from position of departure 100 meters in 3 minutes. Front line
Infantry Battalions will not be reinforced but will be passed
through by support Battalions when they are definitely slowed
down by enemy resistance. Combat Liaison Detachment consist-
ing of one company of Infantry and 1 Machine Gun Platoon will
maintain contact with the 28th Division on our left. One com-
pany of Infantry and one Machine Gun Platoon will maintain
combat liaison with the liaison detachment of the First Division
on our right near the Bridge at FLEVILLE.

(e) ARTILLERY:

157th Field Artillery Brigade will support this attack.
The advancing Infantry will be covered by a rolling barrage
moving at the rate of 100 meters in three minutes. Barrage to
start at 5 Hours and to be placed within Division sector limits
and parallel to the railroad track on the West bank of the AIRE
River.

The initial position of the barrage will be 200 meters West of
the track and to advance in a Westerly direction up to a line
200 meters beyond the first objective. At "H" plus 3 hours the
barrage will be laid beyond the first objective and advanced at
the same rate to a point 200 meters beyond the Corps objective.
In addition to this barrage, artillery concentration will be made
during the advance on known enemy Infantry and Artillery
positions.

(x) Troops will be prepared to advance from the first objec-
tive at "H" plus 3 hours. The Corps objective when reached
will be organized and held at all costs.

4. Axis of Liaison :

Axis of the 1st Division to Chaudron Farme, thence L'ESPER-
ANCE— La FORGE— CHATEL-CHEHERY— CORNAY.

Plan of Liaison, Annex 6 (as amended) to Field Order 17 in
effect.

Plan of communication, supply and evacuation as prescribed in
Field Order 17 (Annex 5).

304 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

5. Post of Command :

P. C. 82nd Division VARENNES.

Advance Center of Information, 82nd Division, CHAU-

DRON FERME.
P. C. 163rd Inf. Brigade witliout change.
P. C. 164tli Inf. Brigade Depot MUNICIONS (00.3-79.3).
P. C. 157th Field Artillery Brigade VARENNES.
G. B. Duncan,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Commanding 82nd Division.

SECRET.
COPY NO. 4.

82 DIV., U. S.
9 October, 1918.
2 :35 o'clock.
FIELD ORDERS

NO. 21.
MAP : FORET D'ARGONNE— 1/20,000.

1. Our attack to-day made substantial gains.

2. The attack ordered by Field Order 68, 1st Array Corps, will
be resumed at 8 Hr. 30, 9th October, by the Division and be
vigorously pushed.

3. (a) The 163rd Infantry Brigade is released from Corps
Reserve, and less one Infantry Regiment will relieve in its sector
the 28th Division (less Artillery and Engineers), the relief being
under the direction of the Commanding General, 28th Division,
and will be completed by 4 hours, 9th October.

Present Sector limits of the 28th Division.

East boundary: Hill 223 (exclusive) Point 96.0-80.5—

MARCQ (inclusive), thence due North to AIRE River.
West boundary: LA VIERGETTE— Point 94.5-80.0— La
BBSOGNE, CHEVIERES.
Present Sector limits of 82nd Division :
Eastern : FLEVILLE-BAULNY Road.
Western : Same as East boundary of 28th Division,
(ft) The 163rd Infantry Brigade, less one Regiment, will
attack in the area of the 28th Division — to the Corps objeative,
parallel 82. Rate of advance not to exceed 100 meters in 3
minutes.

(c) The 164th Infantry Brigade will continue its attack. Rate
of advance not to exceed 100 meters in 3 minutes.

(d) One Infantrv Regiment, 163rd Brigade, Division Reserve —
at CHARPENTRY.

(e) ARTILLERY: The .53rd P. A. Brigade will support the
attack of the 163rd Infantry Brigade and the 157th F. A. Brigade
will support the attack of the 164th Infantry Brigade. Inter-
diction fire will be kept in front of Infantry.

Harassing and destructive fire as ordered by Commanding Gen-
eral, 157th F. A. Brigade, under whose orders the 53i:d P. A.
Brigade comes at 21 hours, 8th October. Upon arrival of the
Infantry at their objective, all artillery will be available for
harassing and searching fire North of the final objective. This

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 305

fire must be so regulated by Infantry Commanders and Artillery
Liaison Officers as to best protect their troops and exploitation
patrols.

(/) 103rd Engineers — Present missions — 307th Engineers, Divi-
sion Reserve.

(g) Signal Troops of 28th Division to be relieved by Signal
Troops of 82nd Division.

(h) Sanitary Troops of 28th Division to be relieved by Sani-
tary Troops of 82nd Division.

(i) Combat Liaison — Combat liaison groups consisting of one
Infantry platoon with machine guns detailed from each Brigade
will assure contact between Brigades. One of these groups will
be detailed by each Brigade for each of its flanks, except that
for the right of the 164th Infantry Brigade there shall be one
Infantry Company.

(.7) RESERVE: Division Reserve will be alerted at "H" Hour.

(X) EXPLOITATION AND ORGANIZATION OF POSITION:

Immediately upon arrival at the objective, the position will be
organized in depth as the position of resistance, and exploitation
patrols will be sent to the North and West as far as the Aire
River, which will be the limit of the outpost position.

4. Administrative instructions are covered in orders to be
issued later.

5. Posts of Command :

82nd Division at and after 12 hours, 9th October, La FORGE
(02.5-75.2).

163rd Inf. Brigade CHENE TONDU

164th Inf. Brigade CHATEL CHEHERY

Geo. B. Duncan,
Major General, Commanding.

G-I

82 DIV., U. S.,
October 11, 1918.

SECRET

ORDERS

NO. 30.

1. The following administrative instructions are published;

2. RAILHEAD: October 12th— FROIDOS.

October 13th— CHEFPY.

DISTRIBUTING POINTS:

(a) Rations — Commencing October 12th and until further
orders, in the forward area, excepting the artillery, will draw
rations from this point after 2 p.m. October 12th. Rations will
be distributed to the artillery by truck to regiments as hereto-
fore. Troops at GRANGE le COMTE Farm will be supplied by
truck from the railhead.

(&) Gas supplies: To be at the Distributing Point at APRE-
MONT.

(c) Gasoline: Gasoline will be supplied at tlie distributing
point at APllEMONT.

306 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

3. MOVEMENT OF UNITS:

(a) M.O.rv.S. and M.S.T.U. will move to APREMONT on Octo-
ber 12th or as soon thereafter as practicable after reconnaissance
of that place by the Division Ordnance Officer and Division Motor
Transport Officer.

(b) Supply Train to APREMONT.

(c) Medical Supply Depot and Triage at VARENNES will move
on October 12th to the German Hospital, one-half kilometer
southwest of APREMONT on the lower APREMONT— le CHBNE
TONDU Road.

(d) Field Hospital at CLERMONT will move to VARENNES
on October 12th.

(e) Supply Companies of Infantry and Machine Gun units will
move from their present location to the forward area and will
be stationed at such places as may be directed by Captain Catch-
ings Therrell of the Division Quartermaster's office. Command-
ing Officers of Suppl;" Companies will keep closely in touch with
their organizations so as to be able to supply them with hot
meals whenever possible.

(/) Second Echelon of Division Headquarters (G-1 office,
Trains Headquarters, Division Surgeon, Division Inspector) to
La FORGE as soon as that place is vacated bv the P^'irst Echelon.

4. DRESSING STATIONS : PYLONE, lESPERANCE, CHATEL
CHEHERY.

5. SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION DUMPS : Commencing Octo-
ber 12th.

Farm des GRANGES— 99.8-79.8.

APREMONT.

IMONTBLAINVILLE (for the 12th and 13th only).

6. The Division Signal Officer will have a telephone placed In
the old railroad station near APREMONT.

7. SALVAGE : All property for salvage will be turned in by the
field trains at the distributing point, and by trucks to the sal-
vage dump at CLERMONT. All machine gun units will make
special effort to salvage their machine gun strips for reloading
by the machine gun units, as there is only a limited supply of
machine gun strips on hand.

8. The Division Ordnance Officer will keep on hand at the
M.O.R.S. at APREMONT a supply of individual ordnance equip-
ment.

9. ENGINEER MATERIAL: Engineer material can be drawn
without formality from the following dumps :

North of IMONTBLAINVILLE : Barbed wire, pickets, picks

and shovels.
South of APREMONT : Barbed wire and pickets.
North of APREMONT: Lumber, barbed wire, picks and

shovels.
Northwest of APREMONT: (Along railroad) German

dump not inventoried.
Le MENIL Farm : German dump not inventoried.
(a) Special Divisional Dumps of barbed wire, stakes and sand
bags are being established at MONTBLATNVILLE and Le
CUENE TONDU. A large dump of all classes of engineer mate-

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 307

rial is in the northwest part of VARENNES. Material can be
drawn therefrom on requisition signed by an officer, setting forth
the purpose for which needed; approval is effected at the dump.

( b ) The Divisional Engineers are located as follows :

Headquarters, 307th Engineers — At La FORGE, just east

of CHATEL CHEHERY.
Headquarters, 307th Engr. Tn.— Le MENIL Farm.

(c) The Engineers will construct a brdige as soon as practi-
cable at CHATEL CHEHERY.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL DUNCAN :

GoKDON Johnston,
Chief of Staff.

SECRET.
Copy No. 5.

82 DIV., U. S.,

14 October, 1918.
21 Hours.
FIELD ORDERS

NO. 25.
MAPS: BUZANCY 1/20,000.

I. INFORMATION OF THE ENEMY AND INTENTION OF
THE HIGH COMMAND.

(a) The Kremhilde Stellung has been breached by the 82nd
Division.

(&) The First Army continues its advance on 15 October at 7
hours 30—15 October, 1918.

II. ZONES OF ACTION AND OBJECTIVES. See attached
tracing.

III. USE OF TROOPS.

(a) Troops will be formed up for attack at 6 hours, 15th Octo-
ber. Order of Brigades in line same as to-day.

( b ) Infantry Action.

Troops advance from jumping off line at 7 hours 80, and con-
tinue without halt to the Corps objective. Rate of Infantry
advance 100 meters in six minutes for the first 1000 meters.

(c) Artillery preparation will commence at once. Ravines and
woods will be strongly gassed with non-persistent gas up to H
minus four hours. Routes of approach, cross roads and other
targets will be strongly shelled.

A barrage will be placed 300 meters in front of jumping off
Ihie 7 hours 25 and held there until 7 hours 30, when it will be
moved forward at the rate of Infantry advance for 1000 meters,
when this barrage will be stopped. Smoke shells will be included
in this barrage.

When barrage stops the fire of the 321st Field Artillery will
be at the disposal of the Commanding General, 163rd Brigade,
and the fire of one battalion, 320th Field Artillery, at the dis-
posal of the Commanding General, 164th Brigade.

Forward guns — no change.

(d) Upon arrival on the Corps objective the position will be
organized in depth, and exploitation made by contact patrols.

308 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

(e) Division Reserve. One Battalion, 325th Infantry, to be
In the vicinity of cross roads at 98.1-85.0, at 6 liours.

(/) Machine Guns. One Machine Gun Company will accom-
pany each support and assault Battalion. Long range machine
guns will fire in accordance with instructions already given.

The 319th Machine Gun Battalion will form a part of the Divi-
sion Reserve, and will tire as directed by Division Machine Gun
Officer.

(^r) Attention is invited to the advisability of covering the
advance with scouts separated by wide intervals. In the attack
supports and reserves will be kept well echeloned in depth and
will advance in lines of small columns. It must be impressed
upon all that the wide front the Di\asion is called upon to cover
necessitates considerable intervals between Combat groups.

Thickening of front line where resistance is encountered by
feeding in supports and reserves must be avoided. Full use will
be made of all auxiliary infantry weapons and the forward guns
of the Field Artillery.

IV. LIAISON.

(a) Axis of Liaison. See attached sketch.

( b ) Combat Liaison : No change except that initial points will
be determined by Brigade Commanders after agreement with
adjacent Brigade Commanders.

(c) Plan of Air Service. No change.

V. No change in administration details.

VI. Posts of command :

82nd Div. — No change.
163rd Brigade— 98.4-84.9 from 10 hours.
164th Brigade— SOMMERANCE from 10 hours.
157th F. A. Brigade — No change.

Geo. B. Duncan,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Commanding.

SECRET.

82nd Division, U. S.,
17 October, 1918,
20 Hours.
FIELD ORDERS

NO. 29.
MAPS : BUZANCY 1/20,000.

1. INFORMATION OF THE ENEMY AND INTENTION OF
THE HIGH COMMAND.

(a) The 78tli Division on our left occupies the Southern edge
of BOIS de LOGES.

{b) The attack of the First Army Corps will be resumed at
6 hours 30, 18 October.

(c) 82nd Division will support and protect the right flank of
the 78th Division, maintaining contact and advancing with that
Division.

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION 309

2. ZONES OF ACTION AND OBJECTIVE.

(a) Objective — AVithout change.

(b) Zones of Action.

East Boundary after 5 hours, 18 October— CHATEL CHE-
HERY (exehisive)— MARCQ (inclusive)— CHAMPIGNEULLE
(inclusive)— RESILLE FARM (exclusive).

Boundary between Brigades after 5 hours, 18 October, point
98.5-86.3; 98.8-88.8; thence along Eastern edge of woods between
Meridians 97 and 98 and between parallels 88 and 90; thence
from the North edge of the woods due North.

3. USE OF TROOPS.

(a) Connnanding General, 163rd Brigade, will relieve with one
battalion and one machine gun company the 309th Infantry in
the area between the present left boundary of the 82nd Division
and the boundary as announced in Paragraph 2. Commanding
Officer of the battalion to make this relief will report upon receipt
of this order to the Commanding Officer, 309th Infantry, at his
P. C. at East entrance of ST. JUVIN on the St. JUVIN-FLE-
VILLE road and arrange relief. Relief will be completed by 5
hours, 18 October.

Patrols from the left Battalion of the Division will constantly
maintain contact with the 78th Division and will be ready to
move forward with the right of that Division.

Commanding General, 164th Brigade, will make the necessary
dispositions in new area assigned him before 5 hours, 18 October.

(&) ARTILLERY: At 6 hours, 18 October, 157th Field Artil-
lery Brigade will place a strong concentration of high explosive
shells and gas in CHAMPIGNEULLE and East of the AGRON
River, thus supporting the advance of the 78th Division. Artillery
will not fire in the BOIS de LOGES. Any known enemy batteries
in action will be taken under counter-battery fire.

(c) Division Observers will carefully watch for enemy concen-
trations that would indicate a counter-attack and report such con-
centrations promptly. Any enemy machine guns in action will be
promptly reported in order that they may be covered by artil-
lery fire.

4. LIAISON— V7ithout change.

5. POSTS OF COMMAND— Without change.

Geo. B. Duncan,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Commanding.

XII

DECORATIONS, PRISONERS TAKEN, MATERIAL
CAPTURED

Decorations

The number of decorations awarded to officers and men of the
division shown below represent tlie figures obtained from the
records prior to the departure of the division from Prance.
Subsequent to that time several additional decorations have been

310 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 82nd DIVISION

awarded by the War Department and several decorations have
been granted by the allied governments.

Kind of Decoration Number of oflBcers

and men decorated.

Congressional Medal of Honor 2

Distinguished Service Medal 3

Distinguished Service Cross 75

Division Citations

There were cited by the Division commander for splendid con-
duct in action against the enemy, or for conspicuous efRcience
in positions of great responsibility, 436 officers and men.

Enemy Prisoners Taken

During the operations against the enemy there were captured
by members of the division the following :

18 Officers
827 Men

Material Captured

The following represents the material captured by the division
in the St. Mihiel and the Meuse Argonne offensive:

St. Mihiel Meuse- Argcnne

Heavy Jlachine Guns 2 121

Light Machine Guns 156

Field Pieces 150's 1

Field Pieces 155's 1

Field Pieces 77's 9

Minnenwefers 3 29

Auto-Tank Guns 3

Aeroplanes 2

In addition to the above, there were captured during the
Meuse-Argonne offensive large quantities of railroad and en-
gineering material.

^nWOR^^U