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Full text of "O'Hare Field--Chicago International Airport"

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VOL.4 ANALYSIS OF CAPACITY 
AND MASTER PLAN 






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VOLUME IV 



CHICAGO-O'HARE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT 



ANALYSIS OF CAPACITY 



AND MASTER PLAN 



City of Chicago 

Richard J . Daley - Mayor 

William E. Dowries, Jr. - Commissioner of Aviation 



TRANSPORTATION LIBRARY 

SEP 1994 

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY 



Landrum and Brown 
Airport Consultants 

Airborne Instruments Laboratory 
A Division of 
Cutler-Hammer, Inc. 



HE 
31* 



LANDRUM AND BROWN 

309 Vine Street 

Cincinnati 2, Ohio 



3 5556 020 436 044 



April, 1962 



The Honorable William E. Downes, Jr. 
Commissioner of Aviation 
Department of Aviation 
City Hall 
Chicago 2, Illinois 

Dear Commissioner Downes: 

In accordance with your letter of instruction August 4, 1961 , we have 
proceeded with a Chicago-O'Hare International Airport Aircraft Acceptance Rate 
Study and Extended Master Plan Analysis. 

This letter transmits our report to you and encompasses the Airborne 
Instruments Laboratory report to us concerning this Acceptance Rate and Master Plan 
Study. 

To our knowledge, this is one of the first instances that a study and an 
analysis of this type has been prepared. We believe that it will be of substantial value 
in the establishment of newer and more complete planning criteria for the Chicago- 
O'Hare International Airport and for airport planning in general . 

We, in association with Airborne Instruments Laboratory, wish to express our 
appreciation to you, your department, the Federal Aviation Agency, the airlines 
and other aviation interests which aided in the development of the data for this report 
and made these findings possible. 

Respectfully submitted, 



LANDRUM AND BROWN 



COL/wg 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



INTRODUCTION 



STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEMS 



THE BASIC CRITERIA AND ASSUMPTIONS 



THE PROCEDURE 



THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 



THE RECOMMENDATIONS 



CHAPTER I 

CHAPTER II 

CHAPTER III 

CHAPTER IV 

APPENDIX 



Air Traffic 



Master Plan Schematics 



Page No, 



6 
8 
11 
16 
18 
32 



Cost Analysis 40 

Effect of Increased Capacity on Other Airport Areas 60 



Airborne Instruments Laboratory Report 
( Piease refer to front of Appendix for Appendix Table 
of Contents ) 



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LIST OF EXHIBITS 

EXHIBIT I - Daily Commercial Airline Movements 

EXHIBIT II - Cost Analysis Chart 

EXHIBIT III - Schematic Master Plan "A" 

EXHIBIT IV - Schematic Master Plan "B" 

EXHIBIT V - Schematic Master Plan "C" 

EXHIBIT VI - Schematic Master Plan "D" 



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INTRODUCTION 



INTRODUCTION 

At the initiation of the planning and financing program for the development 
of the Chicago-O'Hare International Airport in 1957, it was necessary to study the 
then current airport master plan in substantial depth. 

Working in collaboration with officials of the City of Chicago; Naess and 

Murphy, Architects and Engineers; and the Federal Aviation Agency authorities, the 

master plan finally published in November of 1960 was developed by the City's Airport 

Consultants. j 

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The adjustments in the original master plan were composed primarily of a 

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substantial increase in the size of the terminal and service complexes, increase in R 



B 

length of runways and adjustment to certain dimensional criteria. L 

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The master planning which was performed from mid year 1957 until mid year 

1960 encompassed the broad principle of an open parallel runway system with terminal, 

hangar and service area complexes sized to balance out with the traffic capacities 

and geometrical limitations of the ultimate master plan. During these studies, substantial 

analyses and consideration in depth was made with the Federal Aviation Agency ( then R 

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Civil Aeronautics Administration ) Technical Development Center in Indianapolis. In T 

these analyses and studies of the Chicago-O'Hare International Airport air and ground 

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traffic systems^ Midway and Glenview Airports were considered as operating facilities 

for the future. 

In 1957 and 1958 simulator studies at the Technical Development Center ( based 

on theoretical jet operating data ), the state of the art at the time these studies were 

made, and general planning practices indicated a master plan as submitted in 1960. 

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Aviation is a fast moving and fast changing industry. One cannot be critical F 

of the practice of planning for maximum runway lengths of 8^,000 feet in the late 1940 ! s D 

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or the use of the 10,000 foot runway length that was general criteria in the mid 50's. ~ 

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Recognizing this principle, it is logical that advancement in the knowledge of the art, 

improvements in technology and changes in aircraft and airport operations will effect 

changes and improvements in planning. 

In keeping with this philosophy the City of Chicago, Department of Aviation 



instructed its airport consultants to review the broad airport and area traffic control j 

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master plan to ascertain if the landing and take-off quantities during peak periods may 

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be increased by extending or adding facilities at Chicago-O'Hare International Airport. R 



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Airborne Instruments Laboratory in recent years has performed numerous analyses L 

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for private industry and the Federal Aviation Agency of aircraft handling techniques, 

air space utilization and air traffic control systems. During July 1959, this organization 
was selected by the Federal Aviation Agency to develop a technique for accurately 
predicting airport capacity and assessing airport of national improvements by economic 

analyses. Since jet aircraft have started operating in large numbers while the work R 

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has been underway, the results thus include the actual effects of jet aircraft on airport 

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capacity. I 

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In 1961 the City of Chicago directed Landrum and Brown to retain Airborne 

Instruments Laboratory and coordinate the preparation of a report considering the 

various factors involved in the air space and airport planning affected by the advances 

in knowledge of the art and technology. 

This report is submitted in accordance with this instruction. 


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The formation of the report is broadly as follows: I 

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First: A statement of the problems D 

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Second: The basic criteria and assumptions g 

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Third: The procedure followed in developing the data and the report. 

Fourth: The findings and conclusions 

Fifth: The recommendations 

Sixth: Chapter I dealing with the air traffic 

Seventh: Chapter IS dealing with a general master clan staging T 

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Eighth: Chapter III dealing with the cost analysis considering capital, 

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maintenance and operation and aircraft operating costs. 

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Ninth: Chapter IV dealing with the effect of the increased capacity L 

available through master planning extension on other airport 
areas. 
Tenth: Appendix presenting as a separate unit the report of Airborne 

Instruments Laboratory from which certain data shown in the 

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covering report is drawn. r 

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IT IS MOST IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE DATA AND r 

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ANALYSIS IN THIS REPORT SHOW 1965 AND 1970 TRAFFIC ON THE BASIS A 

OF THE FORECASTED AIR CARRIER MOVEMENTS AT CHICAGO-O'HARE 

INTERNATIONAL. ACTUALLY, THE SCHEDULED AIR CARRIER AIRCRAFT 

MOVEMENTS IN THE FEBRUARY, 1962 AIRLINE GUIDE INDICATE 68 PEAK HOUR 

( 1 800 TO 1 900 HRS . ) AIRCRAFT ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES AS COMPARED TO 

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69 IN THE FORECAST AND ANALYSIS FOR 1965. F 

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THIS CONDITION IS CAUSED BY A GREATER SHIFT OF TRAFFIC FROM 

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MIDWAY TO CHICAGO-O'HARE INTERNATIONAL THAN WAS CALCULATED IN g 

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THE PLANNING FORECASTS. 

IF THIS RATIO OF AIRPORT USE CONTINUES, ONE SHOULD 

GENERALLY RELATE THIS REPORT DATA FOR 1965 TO 1962 AND 1970 TO 1967 

OR POSSIBLY EARLIER . 

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THE PROBLEM M 



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STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEMS ■ 

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The problems presented for answer in this report are as follows: I 

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1 . What time schedule of developing each phase of the master plan is S 

necessary to justify the expenditure of the capital and maintenance 

and operation funds from an aircraft operating standpoint, in other 

words, when do costs of aircraft delays and operation become greater 

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than the cost of providing the new facility. C 



2. What is the maximum peak or operating quantity in aircraft landings 

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and take-offs that may be achieved by the addition of a third parallel N 

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runway versus the basic open parallel runway system. T 

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3. Is the cost of construction of such facilities justified by savings in ^ 

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aircraft operating costs. 

4. With a maximum expansion of aircraft handling capacity at Chicago- 
O'Hare International, how long would this one airport serve the air 

traffic quantity imposed upon it by traffic in Chicago area. 

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5. Are the area air traffic control systems adequate to serve the arrivals and I 

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departures that could be accommodated with an extended airport plan. | 

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6„ Is there a system of runway orientation that would be better than that A 



shown in the current airport master plan. 

This statementof the problems established the basic scope of the study. 

The following sections of the report endeavor to provide definitive answers to 

the problems. 

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CRITERIA AND ASSUMPTIONS 



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THE BASIC CRITERIA AND ASSUMPTIONS I 

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The basic criteria and assumptions used in the preparation of the various 

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studies and analyses are stated primarily as follows: » 

1 . Midway Airport will remain in operation as a commercial and general 

aviation airport and will possibly develop to a major commercial 

facility. 

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2. All other airports in the area should be considered secondary to 


obtaining full capacity at both Chicago-O'Hare International and Midway M 

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Airports under both VFR and !FR conditions. ^ 

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3. Effect of aircraft noise on areas surrounding the airport are not to be £ 

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calculated as a depressing factor on airport development. 

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4. Military flying at Chicago-O'Hare International is assumed to not occur 

during peak commercial traffic periods. 

5. Landing area criteria, airport geometry and design will follow as a 

minimum, the standards of the Federal Aviation Agency intercontinental 

H 
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classification. P 

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6. A new control tower will be constructed as soon as practical. ^ 

7. General aviation activities at Chicago-O'Hare International Airport ' 
will not include light single engine aircraft, pleasure and instructional 
flying. 

8. The master plan as currently approved can be changed where such change 

would indicate an increase in economic use or an increase in air 

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traffic handling capability. R 



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9. Traffic forecasted in the I960 Master Plan Report with certain minor I 

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adjustments are the levels that are to be used for this study. 

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10. The Glenview air base operation is assumed to be a minor or non- 
existing operation during IFR conditions. 

1 1 . The schematic master planning is to be developed to present a general 

solution for guidance in preparation of a final revised master plan 

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which will be prepared later. ^ 



These assumptions and criteria were developed in conference with City M 

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of Chicago officials and have been followed closely as possible throughout the M 

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accomplishment of the studies. j 

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PROCEDURE S 



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THE PROCEDURE 

At the initiation of this study the responsibilities by working groups were 
assigned generally as follows: 

A. Landrum and Brown were to perform the following duties: 
1 . Coordinate planning program, 

2. Obtain and provide to Airborne Instruments Laboratory, data 

necessary for them to perform their studies, 

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3. Review and evaluate as practicable, data provided by Airborne 



Instruments Laboratory, M 

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4. Prepare and consolidate economic analyses, ^ 

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5. Consolidate reports and report submission. A 

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B. Airborne Instruments Laboratory had as assigned duties: 

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1 . Examine air space traffic flow and air space capacity for the Chicago 

area to determine any limitations on Chicago-O'Hare International 

Airport runway capacity, 

2. Review the airport layout to devise the optimum runway usage based on C 

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airport capacity, air traffic and other considerations. Review to consider p 



added parallel runways. 

3. Determine capacity ratings and delay to operations corresponding 
with the stages of master plan development. Such determination to 
consider late dated wind and weather information and operations -under 
IFR and VFR conditions. 

4. Recommend the staging of runway construction needed to meet the c| 

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traffic load based on both economic considerations and the efficiency . 

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of operation. 

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The two consulting groups coordinated closely in the development of planning N 

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data and the research and analysis of basic data to accomplish the objectives 



set forth . 

Airborne Instruments performed substantial field work and studies of the 
current operations at Chicago-O 'Hare International. Such studies predominantly 

occurred in the late Fall or early Winter of 1961 . They also performed numerous 

R 
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interviews with City of Chicago officials, Federal Aviation Agency traffic control C 



personnel, airline pi lot and operations personnel, Air Transport Association personnel ^ 

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and other operating groups in the City of Chicago and in the general and commercial 

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aviation industry. Following this research Airborne Instruments Laboratory performed 



analysis of optimum air space use, the cost of delay, the optimum runway orientation N 

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and quantity, the arrival departure capacity of each stage of the proposed airport 

development and related the delay units to the forecasted traffic quantities to resolve 
a total delay cost applied to each stage of the plan development by year of 

development. The primary years used for this study were 1965 and 1970. H 

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Landrum and Brown proceeded with detailed peak analysis related to a study j 

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performed in July and August of 1961 and followed this analysis with an analysis of ■* 

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schedules as tabulated in the February, 1962 Airline Guide. Daily and peak hour 

analyses concentrated dominantly on commercial operations with the percentages of 

general aviation and military operations being drawn from previous studies and reports 

of both Landrum and Brown and Airborne Instruments. Landrum and Brown then 

prepared in collaboration with the City of Chicago, Department of Aviation, the H 

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capital cost estimates of the facilities shown in the schematic master plan. . 

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These various data were then consolidated by both planning groups into 
this report. 



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FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 



THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 

The pertinent findings and conclusions that have developed during this study 
are as follows: 

1 . The basic master planning developed in the 1957 to 1960 era is sound 
and should be expanded in the light of more recent knowledge. 

2. Added airport capacity may be achieved by the addition of third parallel 



3. A 90°open parallel system is not a sound answer to the development of 
Chicago-O'Hare International Airport. Primary reasons are; 1) 



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runways in the 14-32 and 9-27 directions. E 

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achievable runway lengths are insufficient, 2) IFR traffic conflict with A 

Midway makes such operation inefficient, and 3) overall capacity will be q 

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less than that available with the recommended master plan. 

4. The air space in the Chicago area is adequate to serve Chicago-O'Hare 

International and Midway Airports to their maximum capacity with 

an extended plan at Chicago-O'Hare International. C 

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5. Substantial extensions are necessary immediately to the Chicago-O'Hare p 

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International Airport runway and taxiway system to forestall extensive air 

K 

and ground delays. I 

6. Although mi litary agreement permits substantial use of Chicago-O'Hare 

International facilities during peak periods, the military has been 

cooperative in reducing their operations and scheduling their operations 

to occur in other than commercial peak periods. q 

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- 11 - 



7. The Glenview Naval Air Station Air Field operation creates a severe 

IFR conflict with Chicago-O'Hare International. 

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8. An increased aircraft arrival and departure rate will require an . 

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enlargement of the ultimate terminal complex for aircraft parking or 

wil I require a substantially higher density of aircraft parking position 

utilization than used in present day practice. 

9. The third parallel runways in the 14-32 and 9-27 direction can be R 

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accomplished without detriment to the overall operation of the airport. 

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10. Planning indicates that Plan "A" and "B" if developed immediately would m 

E 
produce a saving in operating cost and traffic delays. 

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1 1 . Plan "D" ( third parallel runways ) will not produce immediate savings. 



Depending on the split of operations between Chicago-O'Hare N 

S 

International and Midway and the development of Midway, savings may 
possibly be achieved by developing Plan "D" in the period 1965 to 1970. 

12. The movement of aircraft operations from Midway to Chicago-O'Hare 

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International has been at a much faster rate than indicated in the 1960 H 

A 

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Master Plan Report. T 

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13. Military operations can be conducted on Saturday and Sunday with a 

I 
minimum effect on commercial operations. 

14. The Airborne Instruments Laboratory peak capacity estimates are lower 
than the volumes estimated by Landrum and Brown and the Technical 

Development Center in 1958. 

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15. Practical capacity can best be determined by evaluating the delay to H 

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operations using techniques recently made available. The delay value j 



- 12 - 



and feeding rates should reflect the normal random arrival and 
departure patterns experienced in everyday operations. 

16. As compared to the previous capacity estimates, the Airborne 

Instruments Laboratory findings, which evaluate delay, are based on 

later actual jet performance and reflect the reduction in capacity 

resulting from jet aircraft operations. Additionally, experience has 

R 
made it necessary to revise traffic forecasts to show a greater per cent p 


of jet aircraft in operation, thus further affecting capacity forecasts. M 

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17. It appears that Plan "C" will be necessary to increase the terminal N 

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complex area and improve aircraft ground circulation, although 



Airborne Instruments Laboratory estimates indicate Plan "C" as having 

N 
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no greater capacity than Plan "B". 

18. Present runways 9-27 and 4-22 shown as extended under Plan "A" do 

not meet all Federal Aviation Agency intercontinental category and 

instrumentation requirements. C 

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A 

19. If al I air carrier traffic were maintained at the Chicago-O'Hare P 

T 

International Airport, the Plan "D" facilities according to preliminary r 

estimates would reach their reasonable limits in the early 1970's. 



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SOURCE- TABLE VII, LANDRUM B BROWN REPORT 

VOL.4 ANALYSIS OF CAPACITY AND MASTER PLAN 



EXHIBIT 



15 



RECOMMENDATIONS 



THE RECOMMENDATIONS 

After consideration of the various findings and conclusions presented in 
these studies, it is recommended that: 

1 o The November, 1960 Master Plan Report be supplemented with this 
report and that the two reports be followed as basic planning 
documents. 

2. The November, 1960 Master Plan be extended to include third 
parallel runways in the 9-27 and 14-32 direction. 

3. Plan "A" and "B" facilities be developed as soon as practical and that 
such development include detailed master plan, engineering and 
operating analysis. 

4. The development of Plan "C" facilities be constructed when operating 
experience indicates their need. 

5. The Plan "D" development be delayed until need for these additions are 
required for economic and capacity purposes. 

6. A new control tower be constructed as soon as possible. 

7. A lead time of not less than 30 months be allowed for financing and 
development of any of the facilities under Plans "C" and "D" . 

8. Runway 2R-20L be continued in the Master Plan, but continue to be a 
last priority development. 

9. That agreements with the military be extended to insure minimum 
conflict with commercial operations. 

10. All latest landing and operational aids be programmed and developed 

- 16 - 



as soon as practical. 
1 1 . Master planning be extended in depth to consider long range 

adequacy of the terminal and service areas in view of increased 
capacity possibilities. 

12. Ability be retained to expand runway 14R-32L to the magnitude of 
14,000 feet or greater. 

13. The schematic master plans shown on Exhibits III through VI not be 
considered as final, but as general guides for a finally updated master 
plan. 

14. The master planning as related to Plan "D" be kept as flexible as 
possible. Also, that the Plan "D" development program not be "frozen" 
and that it be reassessed to take advantage of later knowledge before 
construction of Plan "D" is committed. 

15. A survey be made to ascertain the operational practicability of 
conducting general aviation terminal functions in an area apart from 
the main terminal complex. 

Please refer to Appendix for more detailed operational conclusions and 
recommendations . 



- 17 - 



CHAPTER I 
AIR TRAFFIC 

AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS 

AIRCRAFT TYPES 

PEAK ANALYSIS 

MILITARY AIR TRAFFIC 

ALL COMMERCIAL TRAFFIC AT 

CHICAGO-O'HARE INTERNATIONAL 



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CHAPTER I 
AIR TRAFFIC 
GENERAL 

The basis for all studies included in this report is the forecast of air traffic 
made by Landrum and Brown. This forecast is the same as was used in the 
preparation of the Chicago-O'Hare International Airport, November, 1960 
Volume 2, Master Plan Report. There was, however, a revision made to the 
division of aircraft by type that compose the peak hour air carrier movements at the 
airport for the years 1965, 1970 and 1980. In addition, Airborne Instruments 
Laboratory has in collaboration with Landrum and Brown, for the purpose of their 
study, developed a more detailed estimate of percents of all aircraft by type for the 
years 1965 and 1970. 

The forecasts of annual movements were predicated upon three basic assumptions 
which were used throughout this analysis. These are as follows: 

1 . Midway Airport will remain in operation as a commercial airport 

and it wi 1 1 retain approximately 40 percent of Chicago's air passengers. 

2. Pleasure and instructional flying activities by very light aircraft will be 
discouraged at Chicago-O'Hare International. 

3. Military flying by the Air National Guard and other such units will be 
discouraged beyond the amount of flying of this type that is now being 
performed. The analysis of the runway acceptance rates performed by 
Airborne Instruments Laboratory included this type of flying in 1965 but 
excluded it in the analysis for the years 1970 and 1980. 

- 18 " 



I 
I 



The rapid increase in aircraft movements at O'Hare in 1961 over previous 
years caused by the transfer of a.xonsiderable portion of airline activities from the 
Midway Airport to O'Hare, has caused the actual number of 1961 movements to 
approach the 1965 estimates more rapidly than expected. The increased 1961 air 
traffic has proved to be advantageous in that it has provided a more realistic basis 
for determining the types of air carrier aircraft which will be in use in future years 
than was available in 1959. For this reason, the estimates of air carrier aircraft by 
type during peak movements period has been revised from the original estimates. 

The following tables present those estimates used in this analysis. Table I 
provides the estimates of annual aircraft movements and the anticipated peak hour 
movements. Table II indicates the division of air carrier aircraft by type anticipated 
to compose the peak hour movements. These two tables are the result of studies and 
projections made by Landrum and Brown. Table III is the result of Airborne Instruments 
Laboratory analyses and projections; it is a division of Landrum and Brown estimates 
into aircraft types suitable to the analysis performed by them. 



-19- 



TABLE I - EXPLANATION 

The estimates of annual aircraft operations for the years 1965 and 1980 
were taken directly from the Volume 1 and Volume 2 Chicago-O'Hare international 
Airport reports prepared by Landrum and Brown. The only change made to the 
original estimates of air carrier and general aviation movements has been the 
combining of the scheduled domestic air carrier and scheduled international air 
carrier movements into a single heading identified as "Scheduled Air Carrier" 
movements. The Volume 1 and 2 reports also refer to the final estimates prepared by 
Landrum and Brown as the "Ultimate" period of development, however, this period 
has been identified as 1980 for this and for other subsequent studies prepared for 
the City of Chicago. Because the Volume 1 Air and Surface Traffic Report fully 
describes the bases for the estimates of all annual aircraft movements, the details 
will not be repeated. 

Since the preparation of the Volume 1 and 2 reports there has been a marked 
decrease in the military aircraft activities performed at the O'Hare International 
Airport. During 1960 and 1961 this type of activity was between 16,500 and 25,000 
movements per year respectively. An estimate of 23,500 movements per year has been 
used for the purpose of this report in accordance with the best estimate of military 
authorities. Although this type of activity is subject to considerable variation, it is 
believed that the experience of the recent past years is indicative of the military 
activity to be expected for the early years of the forecast period. It should be noted 



- 20 - 



that, because of its subjectivity to variation, this military activity has been 
considered separately in the annual aircraft movement estimates and has been 
considered both as an important factor and also as non-existent in the studies 
prepared by Airborne Instruments Laboratory. 

The 1970 estimate of scheduled air carrier annual movements is an 
interpolation between the 1965 and 1980 movement estimates and is considered to be 
reasonable. As was indicated in the Volume 1 report, it is believed that the aircraft 
activities of the non-scheduled airlines, general aviation and military will and 
should be held at a relatively constant amount throughout the operational period of 
the airport. 

The estimates of the peak hour aircraft activities shown in Table I have been 
determined by using the annual movement estimates shown in this table but are based 
upon an actual operating day at the Chicago International Airport. In response to a 
survey made by Landrum and Brown on July 21 , 1961 the airlines serving Chicago 
through ihe O'Hare International Airport indicated the actual number of aircraft at 
gate position for the entire day. From this gate occupancy data, the peak period of 
air carrier activity was determined and the number of 39 aircraft landings and take-offs 
was estimated. This estimate was based upon the assumption that originating and 
terminating flights occupied a gate position for one half hour and that the actual 
landing or take-off movement occurred almost simultaneously with the time of gate 



21 - 



occupancy. It is believed, therefore, that this estimate is somewhat conservative. 

A review of the monthly operating records for O'Hare indicated that the 
airline aircraft activity is increasing at an increasing rate and that the peak month 
for 1961 would have 1.16 times more activity than the survey month of July. The 
July 21 peak hour air carrier landings and take-offs were, therefore, increased 
accordingly and were then related to the annual aircraft movements to determine 
the peak hour air carrier estimates shown in Table 1 . According to the Volume 1 
report, all other aircraft activities at the airport would generate 40 peak hour 
movements, of which 21 would be general aviation. The subsequent reduction of 
military activity as used in this report wil I reduce this type of activity to about 6 peak 
hour movements. In keeping with the annual air traffic estimates, the general 
aviation and military peak hour movements were not increased during the forecast 
period. 



-22- 



ANNUAL AND PEAK HOUR 



TABLE I 



AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS 



1965 



970 



1980 



Traffic Type 


Annual 


Peak Hour 


Annual 


Peak Hour 


Annual 


Peak Hour 


Scheduled Air Carrier 
Non-Scheduled 


289,300) 

) 
30,800) 


69 


342,835) 

) 
30,800) 


81 


448,720) 

) 
30,800) 


106 


General Aviation 


90,800 


21_ 


90,800 


21 


90,800 


21 


Total 


410,900 


90 


464,435 


102 


510,320 


127 


Mi litary 


23,500 


_6 


23,500 


6 


23,500 


6 


Grand Total 


434,400 


96 


487,935 


108 


533,820 


133 



-23 - 



TABLE II - EXPLANATION 

Actual operating experience at the Chicago-O'Hare international Airport has 
shown that the distribution of air carrier operations by type of aircraft as estimated in 
1958 and recorded in the Volume 1 and 2 reports are subject to adjustment. This 
information is necessary to the study performed by the Airborne instruments Laboratory, 
thus Table li has been recomputed for the year 1965, considering increased jet 
activity. 

The revised 1965 estimate of air carrier aircraft by types is based upon the 
Federal Aviation Agency forecast of transport aircraft in service of all United States 
air carriers as in 1965. This forecast was adjusted to conform with the percent of total 
United States air carrier traffic that is anticipated to serve Chicago through the O'Hare 
International facility. The distribution of air carrier aircraft by type for the 1980 
estimate was not revised, it had been based upon the Curtis Report, which is still 
considered satisfactory at this time. The 1970 estimates are an interpolation between 
the revised 1965 estimate and the 1980 estimate. 

The percentages of aircraft by types, determined as just described were applied 
directly to the peak hour air carrier aircraft movements to determine the numbers of the 
various types of aircraft and are shown in Table II . 



-24 - 



PEAK HOUR AIR CARRIER AIRCRAFT BY TYPE TABLE II 



Peak Hour Movements 



Aircraft Type 1965 1970 1980 

Jet Aircraft 43 55 80 

Turbo Prop 12 16 26 

Reciprocating 14 10 

Total 69 81 106 



-25- 



TABLE II! -EXPLANATION 

The table was prepared by Airborne Instruments Laboratory as a necessary 
part of the work to be performed. The explanation of its derivation is provided in 
the Appendix of this report. 

TOTAL AIRCRAFT POPULATION BY TYPE - PERCENT TABLE III 



Aircraft Type 


1965 


1970 


Heavy Jet ( A ) 


40% 


55% 


Heavy Prop. Transports ( B ) 


30 


20 


Heavy Twins ( 8,000 - 36,000 lbs. ) ( C ) 


12 


15 


Light Twins and Heavy Singles ( D ) 


12 


10 


Light Singles ( E ) 


_6 


_____ 


Total 


100% 


1 00% 



-26- 



MILITARY AIR TRAFFIC 

As described in the explanation of Table I which defines the estimates of air 
traffic anticipated to serve the Chicago-O'Hare Airport, the military activity of 
this airport is subject to considerable variation. Estimates of this type of activity have 
ranged from 81 ,000 annual movements as recorded in the Volume I Report to a present 
day level of about 16,500 movements per year. It is therefore obvious, that should 
the military air traffic reach its peak activity during the peak air carrier operating 
period, the runway system at this airport would experience an overloading condition. 
However, because the military air traffic is primarily composed of Air National Guard 
activities, it is believed the voluntary operating restrictions, if adhered to, can reduce 
the operating problems for so long as this type of activity is a necessary part of this 
airport. 

Exhibit I has been prepared to indicate periods during which operating 
problems can be reduced. This exhibit indicates the estimated number of hourly air 
carrier aircraft operations that occur during a 24 hour period. It has been developed 
from the February, 1962 schedules of air carriers serving the O 'Hare Airport as taken from 
the Airline Guide. To estimate the number of hourly movements, it has been assumed 
that the aircraft landing or take-off occurred at the time indicated on the schedule and 
for that reason the movements are believed to be somewhat higher than under actual 
operating conditions. This exhibit indicates the estimated weekly aircraft movements 
and the ^Saturday and Sunday movements. 



-27- 






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28 



EXHIBIT I 



I 



A review of the exhibit indicates that during the week, the peak airline 
activity occurs between 1800 and 1900 hours and also that the Saturday and Sunday 
movements are considerably less than those that occur during the normal week day 
peak period. Thus, it can be seen that military activities can be performed during 
the weekend periods without seriously conflicting with peak air carrier activity 
periods. It can also be seen that there are many hours during the day when military 
activities are carried out without serious conflict to normal air carrier operations 
except for the conflict between military and air carrier type of aircraft and operating 
procedures. 



-29 - 



AIRCRAFT OPERATION VOLUMES WITH 

ALL CHICAGO COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS 

AT CHICAGO-O'HARE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT 

The preceding data in this chapter concerning aircraft operations, consider the 
operation of both Midway and Chicago-O'Hare International airports and has analyzed 
the volumes that would be anticipated at Chicago-O'Hare International . 

The following preliminary traffic analysis has been made for 1965, 1970 and 
1980,, utilizing data prepared for the master plan report. This data is the product of 
previously prepared forecasts and is to indicate a general range of activity at Chicago- 
O'Hare International if all operations were transferred to this airport for these periods. 

These estimates based on data prepared in the period 1958 to 1960 produces 
the following volumes of total commercial aircraft operations for Chicago-O Hare 
International if it were used as one airport for the City of Chicago. 

Year Annual Scheduled Air Carrier Movements 



1965 410,100 

1970 483,400 

1980 635,000 

Applying the same ratio of peak hour to annual traffic as uti lized in the earlier 
forecast produces peak hour operation quantities as follows: 



-30- 



Peak Hour Movements 



Scheduled Air Carrier General 

Year and Non-Scheduled Aviation Total 



1965 95 21 116 

1970 111 21 132 

1980 143 21 164 

On the basis that a reasonable VFR peak hour operating rate for the runway 
system in Plan "D" is 125 to 135 movements, it appears that the generally forecasted 
traffic volumes would exceed the peak hour capacity rating of the extended facilities 
in the early 1 970's. 



-31 - 



CHAPTER SI 
MASTER PLAN SCHEMATICS 

PLAN "A" AND EXISTING FACILITIES 
PLAN "B" 
PLAN "C" 
PLAN "D" 



CHAPTER il 
MASTER PLAN 
GENERAL 

The prime responsibility of Airborne Instruments Laboratory was to review the 
approved Chicago-O'Hare International Airport Master Plan by stages of development 
and to recommend changes to increase capacity. Therefore, the Volume 2 - "Master 
Plan Report" dated November, 1960 and its pertinent master plan exhibits were used in 
entirety. The "Ultimate Stage Development Plan"; Exhibit XS of the 1960 Master Plan 
Report is the Federal Aviation Agency approved master plan for this airport. 

An interim airfield development plan prepared by the City of Chicago ( Plan "A" ) 
has been included in this analysis. The additions shown in this plan, Exhibit III are 
programmed for earlyconstruction to increase the operational capabilities of the airport 
until other major master planned construction can be instituted. 

Drawing from the recommendations of Airborne Instruments Laboratory, Landrum 
and Brown has prepared extended master plan staging for analysis. This master plan 
staging is indicated on Exhibits IV, V and VI. 

All of the planning in this study has been based upon criteria established by the 
Federal Aviation Agency in its "Airport Planning Guide" as well as its various Technical 
Standard Orders and Engineering Bulletins. Criteria and studies developed by other research 
organizations, including Airborne Instruments Laboratory, the original Civil Aeronautics 
Administration Technical Development Center and the experience of Landrum and Brown in 



-32 - 



the fields of airfield and Terminal area master planning and traffic and economic analysis, 
have been used to develop the schematic master plan. 

Sn its special analyses, Airborne Instruments Laboratory has used all of these criteria 
and others which were pertinent to its work. These are explained in the "Analysis of 
Capacity and Staging of Runway Construction at Chicago-O'Hore International Airport" prepared 
by Airborne Instruments Laboratory and shown in Appendix "A" of this report. 

The schematic master plan shown on Exhibits III through VI are not intended as final 
and fixed recommendations. Further study of each stage of the plan will be required to 
refine the final recommended plan. Such further studies would include among others: 

1) methods of reducing construction quantities without reducing operating capacity; 

2) engineering analyses of grades and locations, and 3) optimum dimensioning of each 
proposed facility. 

A brief description of each stage of the plan development is as follows: 
PLAN "A" 

Exhibit III indicates by shaded areas, the items considered necessary to bring the 
present airfield facilities up to an optimum point to properly serve immediate needs. 

The items included in Plan "A" are: 

1 . Extend runway 14L - 32R to 1 1 ,600 feet; add parallel taxiway and 
"highspeed turnoffs; add hold aprons and add lighting and other attendant 

facilities. 

2. Construct apron perimeter taxiway extension and access road overpass. 



-33 - 



3. Extend taxiway from hangar area to runway 14L - 32R. 

4. Improve lighting and taxiway turnoffs for runway 14R - 32L. 

5. Extend runway 9C - 27 C to 9,000 feet; add lighting; and add 
taxiways, turnoffs and hold aprons. 

6. Extend runway 4 - 22 to 7,500 feet; add taxiways, turnoffs and 
hold aprons; and add lighting. 

Of these items 3 and part of item 1 may be considered as non-mandatory items. 
PLAN "B" 

Shaded areas on Exhibit IV indicate the extensions to Plan "A" that are encompassed 
in Plan "B". Although Plan "B" is shown separately from Plan "A" for operating analysis, 
Plan "B" is needed immediately to accommodate 1962 experienced levels of traffic. Thus 
Plan "B" should be accomplished concurrent with Plan "A". 

Included in Plan "B" is: 

1 . Construction of runway 9R - 27L; addition of parallel taxiways, and highspeed 
turnoffs, hold aprons, lighting and attendant facilities. 
PLAN "C" 

The Plan "C" master plan items are shown on Exhibit V as an extension to Plan "B". 

These items include: 

1 . Construct new runway 9L - 27R 10, 100 feet long; parallel taxiways with high- 
speed turnoffs hold aprons lighting and other attendant facilities. 

2. Construct new runway 2-20 8,400 feet long; parallel taxiways with highspeed 
turnoffs; hold aprons; lighting and other attendant facilities. 



- 34- 



These two runways although shown at this point in the staging plan, may possibly 
follow a later sequence. 

The development of item 1 will depend on the need of added runway length, the 
need of added clearance from structures, the need of added terminal complex area and the 
need for improved aircraft ground circulation. 

The construction of runway 2 - 20 is also of marginal staging. As this runway will 
replace or supplement runway 4- 22, its need of timing will depend on the experienced 
adequacy of runway 4-22. It is foreseen that runway 2-20 can be needed for better 
aircraft operation, improved clearances of structures and facilities, and increased length. 

Regardless of the time schedule for these facilities, they should be provided for in 
the master plan. Thus, the ability to provide the actual construction can be protected 
and the facilities constructed when the future situation dictates. 
PLAN "D" 

Exhibit VI presents the general plan proposed for future third parallel runways. 
According to the aircraft arrival and departure estimates prepared by Airborne Instruments 
Laboratory, these runways will increase this airport's capacity in the magnitude of 25%. 

Items included in this plan are: 

1 . A new third parallel runway 9-27 with parallel taxiway and highspeed 
turnoffs; hold aprons; lighting and attendant facilities. 

2. A new third parallel runway 14 - 32 with parallel taxiway and highspeed 
turnoffs; hold aprons; lighting; and other attendant facilities. 



-35 - 



ie <?w 



NEW CONSTRUCTION 



J EXISTING PAVEMENT CONTINUING IN 
USE FROM PREVIOUS PLAN 

EXISTING PAVEMENT NO LONGER 
REQUIRED 





CHICAGO O HARE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT 

SUGGESTED SCHEMATIC 
PLAN "A" 



LANDRUM S BROWN 



ORT CONSl 



""« AS SH 



CITY OF CHICAGO 

RICHARD J DUI' WATOft 



- PAGE 36 



LEGEND 

HI NEW CONSTRUCTION 

I 1 EXISTING PAVEMENT CONTINUING IN 

USE FROM PREVIOUS PLAN 




CHICAGO O HARE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT 

SUGGESTED SCHEMATIC 
PLAN "A" 



LANDRUM S BROWN 



CITY OF CHICAGO 




,.««* 



PAGE 37 



NEW CONSTRUCTION 




CHAPTER II! 
COST ANALYSIS 
CAPITAL COSTS 

MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION COSTS 
ANNUAL FACILITY COST UNDER FINANCING PLAN 
FACILITY VS AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS COST 



CHAPTER III 
COST ANALYSIS 
GENERAL 

One of the primary objectives of this study has been to compare the operating 
costs of each development phase at Chicago-O'Hare International to the costs of 
operating the aircraft serving the airport. Through this comparison of costs, it is 
believed that the timing of each new construction phase can be determined. 
Exhibits III, IV, V, and VI represent the basic plans for which both the aircraft operating 
costs and the construction costs were determined. 

The airport operating costs for each phase of construction are composed of the 
expenses required to finance the construction program and of the expenses required to 
maintain and operate the new airfield facilities. The financing cost is based upon the 
estimated construction costs and these costs as estimated are shown in Tables IV-A, B, 
C, and D. Tables V-A and B show the determination of the financing costs based 
upon Federal participation in the cost of the construction programs and the financing 
costs without such Federal participation. Table VI indicates the maintenance and 
operating costs that will be incurred by each new construction phase. Each of the tables 
has a brief explanation of its derivation immediately preceding it. 

The operating cost comparison is shown in Table VII. This table summarizes the 

estimated City expenses for operating the new facilities based upon Federal participation 

in construction costs. The aircraft operating costs were determined by Airborne 

Instruments Laboratory for each development phase and are summarized in this table. 

A complete explanation of the derivation of these costs is provided in the Appendix of 

this report. 

- 40- 



TABLE IV - A, B, C, AND D - EXPLANATION 

These tables indicate the estimated cost of construction for each of the four 
phases of development used in this analysis. Plan A has been programmed by the City 
of Chicago for immediate construction. 

In every case of runway extension or new runway construction, the estimated 
costs include the construction costs for the following items: 

1 . Runway extension or new runway site preparation, grading, drainage 
and paving. 

2. Taxiway, turnoff and hold apron site preparation, grading, drainage and 
paving. 

3. High intensity runway lights and distance markers ( except high intensity 
lights for the runway 14R - 32L improvement ). 

4. Taxiway lights. 

5. Centerline runway lights. 

6. Narrow gauge runway lights. 

7. Centerline turnoff raxiway lights. 

In addition to these costs, the cost of drainage ditch relocations, road and railroad 
relocations and the cost of relocating instrument landing aids were included in the total 
cost as they applied to each specific runway extension or new construction. The cost of 
land acquisition was shown as a separate item. Engineering, administration and contingency 
costs were estimated to be 15 per cent of the total construction costs for Plan A, B, and C, 
because these development phases lie within the immediate airfield area. A 20 per cent 
factor was used for the development of Plan D because this construction lies beyond the 
present improved airfield area. 

-41 - 



The construction costs for Plans A and B were prepared by the City of Chicago 
and reviewed by Landrum and Brown. The costs for Plans C and D were prepared by 
Landrum and Brown and are based upon the City estimates. The runway and taxiway 
construction work to be performed is shown on the development plans in Exhibits III, 
IV, V, and VI. 

It has been assumed that the present Federal Government policy of sharing in 
construction costs will apply to all phases of development. Following this policy, it 
has been assumed that the Federal Government would share 50 per cent of the 
construction costs for all necessary site preparation work, grading, drainage, paving, 
normal airfield lighting, and land acquisition. It was also assumed that the Government 
would share 75 per cent of the cost for high intensity lighting, centerline and narrow 
gauge lighting and instrument landing aids. 

It should be noted that a necessary adjunct to the satisfactory operation of Plan D 
is the installation of an aircraft ground taxiway control system. Such a system, known as 
T.R.A.C.E., is now under development but will not be operational for several years. 
Therefore, because of its unknown status, the cost of instal ling T.R .A .C .E . at the 
airport was generally estimated and shown as a completely separate item of cost under 
Plan D. It is assumed that the Federal Government will share 75 per cent of the cost of 
this item. 



-42 - 



DEVELOPMENT COST ESTIMATES 



TABLE IV -A 



CHICAGO-O'HARE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT 



PLAN "A" DEVELOPMENT 



Plan "A" 
Construction Item 


Total 
Cost 

$ 




City 
Share 

$ 




FAA 
Share 

$ 


Land Land Land 
Total City FAA 

$ $ $ 


Extend & Improve 
Runway 14L-32R 


8,106, 


f 000 


3,830, 


,500 


4,275,500 


2,310,298 1,155,149 1,155 



Overpass Taxiway 



3,846,000 1,923,000 1,923,000 



Taxiway to N. W.-End 
Runway 14L-32R 



1,361,000 680,500 680,500 



Improve Runway 
14R-32 L 



935,000 358,750 576,250 



95,069 47,535 47,534 



Extend & Improve 
Runway 9L-27R 



2,586,000 1,210,500 1,375,500 



Extend & Improve 














Runway 4-22 


1,215,000 
18,049,000 


547,250 
8,550,500 


667,750 
9,498,500 


941,570 


470,785 


470,785 


Sub-Total 


3,346,937 


1,673,469 


1,673,468 


Eng., Admin . Cont. 














at 15% 


2,707,350 
20,756,350 


1,282,575 
9,833,075 


1,424,775 
10,923,275 


- 


- 


- 


Total 


3,346,937 


1,673,469 


1,673,468 


SUMMARY 














Plan "A" 


Total $ 


City $ 


FAA $ 








Construction 


20,756,350 


9,833,075 


10,923,275 








Land 


3,346,937 


1,673,469 


1,673,468 








Grand Total 


24,103,287 


11,506,544 


12,596,743 









-43- 



DEVELOPMENT COST ESTIMATES TABLE IV - B 

CHICAGO-O'HARE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT 
PLAN "B" DEVELOPMENT 



Plan "B" 


Total 
Cost 

$ 


City 
Share 

$ . 


FAA 
Share 

$ 


Land 
Total 

$ 


Land 
City 

$ 


Land 
FAA 

$ 


Construction 
Runway 9R-27L 


9,930,000 


4,747,500 


5,182,500 


599,063 


299,531 


299,532 


Eng. Admin. & Cont. 
at 15% 


1,489,500 
11,419,500 


712,125 
5,459,625 


777,375 
5,959,875 








Total 


599,063 


299,531 


299,532 


SUMMARY 














Plan "B" 


Total $ 


City $ 


FAA $ 








Construction 


11,419,500 


5,459,625 


5,959,875 








Land 


599,063 


299,531 


299,532 








Grand Total 


12,018,563 


5,759,156 


6,259,407 









-44- 



DEVELOPMENT COST ESTIMATES 



TABLE IV - C 



CHICAGO-O'HARE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT 



PLAN "C" DEVELOPMENT 



Plan "C" 
Construction Items 


Total 
Cost 

$ 


City 
Share 

$ 


FAA 
Share 

$ 


Construct Runway 
9L-27R 


7,122,200 


3,365,050 


3,757,150 


Construct Runway 
2-20 


5,230,950 


2,438,100 


2,792,850 


Sub-Total 


12,353,150 


5,803,150 


6,550,000 


Eng., Admin. & Cont. 
at 15% 


1,852,973 


870,473 


982,500 


Grand Total 


14,206,123 


6,673,623 


J^ 532, 500 



- 45- 



DEVELOPMENT COST ESTIMATES TABLE IV-D 

CHICAGO-O'HARE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT 
PLAN "D" DEVELOPMENT 



Total City FAA Land Land Land 

Cost Share . Share Total City FAA 

Plan "D" $ $ $ $ $ $ 



T.R.A.C.E. 1,000,000 250,000 750,000 



Construct 

Runway 9FR-27FL 9,138,420 4,363,410 4,775,010 400,000 200,000 200,000 

Construct 

Runway 14FR-32FL 8,950,010 4,257,505 4,692,505 - - - 



Sub-Total 18, 088,430 8,620,915 9,467,515 400,000 200,000 200,000 

Eng. Admin. ,& Cont. 
at 20% 3,617,686 1,724,183 1,893,503 - 



Total 21,706,116 10,345,098 11,361,018 400,000 200,000 200,000 

SUMMARY 

Plan "D" Total $ City $ FAA $ 

Construction 21,706,116 10,345,098 11,361,018 
Land 400,000 200,000 200,000 

Grand Total 22,106,116 10,545,098 11,561,018 



-46 - 



TABLES V-A AND B - EXPLANATION 

The debt service requirements ( 1 .25 times principal and interest on the bond 
funds required to finance the runways ) were estimated based upon the following: 

1 . Total project costs estimated by the airport consultants, 

2. Debt service provisions as specified in the ordinance for the Chicago- 
O'Hare International Airport revenue bond series of 1959. 

3. Bond term and interest rate consistent with those of the revenue bond series 
of 1959. 

The above criteria provided what was felt to be a reasonable basis upon which 
to estimate the debt service requirements for purposes of this general comparison of 
financial expenses of the four runway plans. The specific application of these 
criteria are presented in the following paragraphs. Each of the major elements used 
in making the estimate are discussed under appropriate headings. 
PROJECT COSTS 

Project costs consist of three major items: 

1. Land, construction, fee and contingency costs. 

2. Capitalized interest. 

3. Financing costs. 

The land, construction, fees and contingency costs have been discussed 

previously. Capitalized interest was estimated based on the capitalizing of interest 

on the amount to be financed during a two year period at a rate of 4.75%. This is 

in keeping with the method used on the currently outstanding revenue bonds and 

was applied consistently to all four of the runway plans. This was considered to be 

-47- 



reasonable for purposes of this comparative analysis. 

Financing costs were estimated to be .5%. This is a higher percentage than 
was used in the 1959 revenue bond series, but it was felt to be reasonable since the 
financing involved is substantially less than the 1959 issue and the cosi of the 
financing might be proportionally higher on a smaller issue. 

Project costs used in these analyses were estimated on two bases: 

1 . Total Costs. 

2. Total costs, less Federal Aid. 
DEBT SERVICE AND COVERAGE 

The debt service was estimated on the basis of financing either total project 
costs or total project costs less Federal Aid. In estimating the amount of debt service 
on each cost basis,the ratio of debt service to the amount to be financed, as shown, 
was the same as applicable to the currently outstanding revenue bonds. This is 
predicated upon a level payment of principal and interest over a thirty-four year period 
at a 4.75% interest rate with a 25% of principal and interest coverage requirement. 
These are considered reasonable bases since they are in accordance with Section 2.16 
of the bond ordinance which provides: 

Section 2.16. Additional Bonds for Further Improvements and Extensions. 

In addition to the foregoing provisions of Section 2.15, additional Bonds may 

be issued under and secured by this Ordinance at any time or from time to 

time ranking on a parity with the Bonds then outstanding and issued under this 

Ordinance for the purpose of constructing additional improvements and 

extensions to the airport and shall be authorized by a Supplemental Ordinance 

-48 - 



to be adopted by the City Council, which shall prescribe the additional 
amounts to be allocated and credited to the Sinking Fund Account, Debt 
Service Reserve Account and Reserve Maintenance Account^ and which 
shall direct their issue and execution whenever the following conditions 
are met: 

( a ) The amounts required to be credited to the date of the adoption of 
the Supplemental Ordinance authorizing such additional Bonds to the 
Interest Account, Debt Service Reserve Account, Sinking Fund Account, 
Reserve Maintenance Account, and Emergency Reserve Account must have been 
credited to said accounts. 

( b ) Such additional Bonds must be due and payable not earlier than the 
maturity date of any of the then ^outstanding Bonds authorized pursuant to this 
Ordinance. 

( c ) If at the time any Bonds issued pursuant to Section 2.02 or Section 2.15 
are outstanding, in whole or in part, the Net Revenues of the Airport, from all 
existing facilities and those proposed to be financed by such additional Bonds, as 
estimated by the Airport Consultant on the assumption that such Bonds issued 
pursuant to Section 2.02 or Section 2.15 will remain outstanding in whole or in 
part until maturity date thereof, for each fiscal year ( commencing with the first 
full fiscal year next following the date of completion, as estimated by the 
Consulting Engineer, of the additional improvements and extensions for the 
purpose of which such additional Bonds are to be issued, and ending not earlier 

-49 - 



than the last full fiscal year next preceding maturity date of such Bonds 
issued pursuant to Section 2.02 or Section 2.15 ), shall be not less than 
one and twenty-five hundredths times the sum of Principal and Interest 
Requirements for each such fiscal year of all Bonds then outstanding and of all 
such additional Bonds proposed to be issued. 

It should be noted that the reference to Bonds issued under Sections 2.02 and 
2.15 of the ordinance pertain to Bonds issued for Construction of the facilities contemplated 
in the 1959 revenue bond issue. 



-50 - 



ANNUAL DEBT SERVICE TABLE V-A 

CHICAGO-O'HARE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT 
BASED ON CITY'S COSTS ONLY 



O 



ver- 



Item 




Plan 
A 


Plan 
B 


Plan 
C 


Plan 
D 


pass 
Taxi way 


T 


,R 


.A 


.C 


.E. 


Projec 


t Costs 























Construction Land $9,295,094 $5,759,156 $6,673,623 $10,545,098 $1,923,000 $250,000 

Fees & Contingency 

Costs 

Capitalized Interest* 883,034 547,120 633,994 1,001,784 182,686 23,750 

Financing Costs ** 46,475 28,796 33,368 52,725 9,615 1,250 

Total Project Costs $10,224,603 $6,335,072 $7,340,985 $11,599,607 $2,115,301 $275,000 

Debt Service 

Debt Service Rate 5.99% 5.99% 5.99% 5.99% 5.99% 5.99% 

Debt Service *** 612,454 379,471 439,725 694,816 126,707 16,473 

Debt Service Coverage 153,114 94,868 109,931 173,704 31,677 4,118 



Total Debt Service 

and Coverage $ 765,568 $ 474,339 $ 549,656 $ 868,520 $ 158,384 $ 20,591 



* 4-3/4% of Total Costs annually for 2 years. 

** Estimated - .5% of Total Construction Land Fees and Contingency Costs. 

*** Based on level of debt service over 34 years at 4-3/4% ( consistent with currently outstanding 

bond term and interest rate ). 
**** 25% of the Annual Debt Service. 

Note: The "Construction, Land, Fees, and Contingency Costs" shown above for Plan "A" do not 

include those costs for the Overpass Taxiway. This taxiway is shown as a separate item above 
The costs for this Overpass Taxiway are, however, included in Plan "A" as shown in 
Tables |V-A and VII. 

-51 - 



ANNUAL DEBT SERVICE TABLE V - B 

CHICAGO-O'HARE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT 

BASED ON TOTAL COSTS 

Over- 
Plan Plan Plan Plan pass 
Item A B C D Taxi way T.R.A.C .E . 

Project Costs 

Construction Land $19,680,387 $12,01 8,563 $14,206 ,1 22 $22, 106, 1 16 $3,846,000 $1,000,000 

Fees & Contingency 

Costs 

Capitalized Interest* 1,869,436 1,141,764 1,349,582 1,869,600 365,370 95,000 

Financing Costs** 98,40 2 60,093 71,031 110,530 19,230 5,000 

Total Project Costs $21 ,648,225 $13,220,420 $15,626,735 $24,086,246 $4,230,600 $1,100,000 

Debt Service 

D ebt Servi ce Ra te 5 . 99% 5 . 99% 5 . 99% 5 . 99% 5 . 99% 5 . 99% 

Debt Service*** 1,296,729 791,903 936,041 1,442,766 253,413 65,890 

Jf Jf *jU JU 

Debt Service Coverage 324,182 197,976 234,010 360,692 63,353 16,473 



Total Debt Service 

and Coverage $ 1,620,911 $ 989,879$ 1,170,051 $ 1,803,458 $ 316,766 $ 82,363 



* 4-3/4% of Total Costs annually for 2 years. 

** Estimated - .5% of Total Construction Land Fees and Contingency Costs. 

*** Based on level of debt service over 34 years at 4-3/4% ( consistent with currently outstanding 

bond term and interest rate ). 
**** 25% of the Annual Debt Service. 

Note: The "Construction, Land, Fees, and Contingency Costs shown above for Plan "A" do not 
include those costs for the Overpass Taxiway. This taxiway is shown as a separate item 
above. The costs for this Overpass Taxiway are, however, included in Plan "A" as shown in 
Tables IV-Aand VII. 

- 52 - 



TABLE VI - EXPLANATION 

In the preparation of the maintenance and operation cost estimated only direct 
added cost is tabulated. No increase has been shown for allocated or overhead costs. 

The maintenance and operation expense estimate for the development stages of 
Chicago-O'Hare International Airport, is composed of five cost items. These cost items 
are: 

1 . the electric power cost, 

2. the electric maintenance cost, 

3. the grass mowing cost, 

4. the pavement maintenance cost, and 

5. the snow removal cost. 

The electric power usage based upon number of lights, wattage of lights and 
annual hours of utilization was calculated for each segment of a development stage. 
These electric power usages were totaled to give the electric power usage for each 
development stage. The total usage for the development stage was then multiplied by 
the average cost per kilowatt-hour to give the electric power cost for the development 
stage. In view of historic expense, no increase in unit electrical cost is anticipated. 

The total hours of electric maintenance for each development stage was 
estimated. This figure was then used to determine the number of electrical mechanics 
that would be required for electric maintenance. The number of electrical mechanics 
was multiplied by the annual salary of an electrical mechanic giving the cost of 

- 53- 



electric maintenance. This figure was increased at an annual rate of 3% to denote 
anticipated rises in labor costs. 

The cost of grass mowing was arrived at by multiplying the number of 
additional acres to be mowed on each segment by the cost of mowing an acre. The 
cost of all segments was totalled to obtain the cost for the development stage. This 
figure was increased annually at the rate of 3%. 

The pavement maintenance cost was determined by multiplying the number of 
square yards of pavement in each segment by a previously determined cost per square 
yard for pavement maintenance. All segment costs for a development stage were 
added together to determine the total cost for the development stage. This cost 
figure was increased annually at the rate of 3%. 

The cost of snow removal per square yard was calculated and the number of 
square yards of pavement in each segment was multiplied by this figure. These costs 
were then totalled for each development stage to give the total cost for each stage of 
development. The amount thus determined was increased 3% annually. 



-54- 



MAINTENANCE AND OPERATING COST ESTIMATES TABLE VI 

CHICAGO-O'HARE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT 



Development Plan 
Plan "A" 
Plan "B" 
Plan "C" 
Plan "D" 



1965 


1970 


1980 


Cost $ 


Cost $ 


Cost $ 


170,800 


195,700 


260,500 


122,300 


139,800 


185,600 


111,237 


125,600 


166,100 


165,764 


189,500 


254,200 



TOTAL PLAN "A" INCLUDING OVERPASS TAXIWAY 



1 965 1 970 



Total Plan "A" 170,800 195,700 

Overpass Taxi way 12,500 14,400 

Plan "A" without Taxi way Overpass 158,300 181,300 



55 - 



TABLE VI! - EXPLANATION 

This table analyzes the City of Chicago operating expense for the airfield 
improvements versus the combined operating expense of all types of aircraft. The costs 
for operating the improvements include the bonded indebtedness and the maintenance 
and operating expenses determined by Landrum and Brown and are the same as shown 
in Tables V- A and B and VI. The aircraft operating expenses have been determined 
by Airborne Instruments Laboratory and are described in their Report which is included 
in the Appendix of this study. 

Because each of the planned development phases includes the use of the 
previously constructed plan, the total operating expense to the City is a summation of the 
previously developed costs. A column indicating the accrued City operating expense is 
shown in this table. The net saving or expense indicates the total savings or expense for 
operating the improved facilities according to whichever is greater. A summary of this 
table reveals the following facts: 

1 . If Plan "A" is constructed, the added operating expense for facilities will be 

$1,094,752 in 1965 and the operating expense to aircraft operations will be 

$17,754,000. 
2. If Plan "B" is constructed in conjunction with Plan "A" and is available for 

use in 1965, the total added operating cost for facilities would be $1 ,691 ,391 

However, a net saving of $3,905,909 would be distributed to all aircraft 



owners. 



-56 - 



3. If Plan "D" were constructed by 1965, the total added operating expenses for 

facilities would be $3,386,568 and the saving in aircraft operations would 

be $761,200. The net expense would then be $2,625,368. 
4„ If Plan "B" were in operation in 1970, the added operating expense for 

facilities would be $1 ,733,791 and the operating cost of aircraft operations 

would be $18,915,700. 

5. If Plan "C" were in operation in 1970, the added operating expense for 
facilities would be $2,409,047 and the expense for aircraft operations would 
be $1,170,100. 

6. If Plan "D" were in operation in 1970, the total added operating expense for 
facilities would be $3,467,067. There would be a net saving of $822,933 over 
the aircraft operation costs if this plan were constructed following the construction 
of Plan "C" or a net expense of $347, 167 if it were constructed following 

Plan "B" . It is noted that the saving of Plan "D" over Plan "C" is less than the 
Debt Service cost required by the construction of Plan "D". 



- 57 - 





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TABLE VII.LANDRUM 6 BROWN REPORT 

VOL.4 ANALYSIS OF CAPACITY AND MASTER PLAN 



EXHIBIT 



59 



CHAPTER IV 
EFFECT OF INCREASED AIRFIELD CAPACITY 
ON OTHER OPERATING AREAS 
HANGAR AREA 
TERMINAL AREA 
SERVICE AREA 
OTHER AREAS 



EFFECT OF INCREASED AIRPORT CAPACITY CHAPTER IV 

ON OTHER OPERATING AREAS 

GENERAL 

It appears from the data developed in this report that the capacity of Chicago- 
O'Hare International can be increased beyond that shown in the November 1960 Master 
Plan Report. Perhaps this increase will reach in the magnitude of 25%. There are many 
factors that are affected by such an increase in potential activity. 

Scope of this study does not allow research and consideration of all areas of 
influence, however, it is proper that broad thoughts concerning items that will be 
influenced should be mentioned. 

Certain of these areas are as follows: 
TERMINAL AREA 

A potential increase of traffic handling capacity of 25% over that used in previous 
planning could and probably would cause overcrowded conditions, particularly at ultimate 
staging, in certain terminal complex areas. Certain of the functions and areas that would be 
affected by such an increase are: 

A. Aircraft parking positions. Depending on aircraft parking configurations 
the present complex is adequate to accommodate 90 to 100 aircraft parking 
positions. Conceivably these quantities could increase with a 25% increase 
in capacity in the magnitude of 115 to 120 aircraft parking positions. 

B. Public and employee auto parking and circulation. Added potential capacity 
would add vehicular parking and circulation traffic levels to those planned 

-60 - 



for in the basic program. 

C. Terminal structure areas. A potential increase in traffic may cause over- 
crowding in existing facilities or require master planned extensions to 
existing facilities beyond that allowed for in the current master plan. 

D . Areas of influence other than A, B , and C above made up of activities 
attendant to the operation of the terminal complex will require consideration 
in view of this possible added potential . 

SERVICE AREA 

Introduction of a third parallel runway 9-27 and the possible adjustments in the 
long range future to runway 2R-20L will produce a substantial change in the planning of the 
cargo facilities. In earlier planning the long range cargo area has been shown to develop 
in the zone between relocated Mannheim Road and runway 2R-20L. A new runway 9-27 
would remove a substantial section of this previously planned cargo area and would require 
a revision of the master planning for this major function. 

Additional vehicular traffic of all types will also necessitate further depth of study 
of a possible underpass for the service road from the cargo-service complex to the terminal 
complex under the perimeter taxiway. Current planning has assumed that for an 
indefinite period this service road connection can be operated as a grade crossing of the 
service road over the perimeter taxiway. 
HANGAR AREA 

The present hangar area is composed of approxi mately 237 acres of which 1 57 acres 

have been committed to airport users. 

-61 " 



This acreage appears to be adequate for future needs. Consequently, there appears 
to be no problem in this area from an increase in airport aircraft handling capacity. 



-62 - 



OTHER AREAS 

Certain other areas on the perimeter of the airport will be either directly or 
indirectly affected by the substantial increase in traffic handling capability produced 
by the Plan "D" program shown in this report. 

n 

In extended analyses of the master planning and in adjusting for the effect 
of Plan "D" on the various areas on the airport, certain thoughts are presented for 
consideration . 

Certain of these elements are as follows: 

1. International facilities. Preliminary analyses indicate fairly conclusively 
that the traffic handling capability of Plan "D" will more than saturate 
the terminal and service complexes as now planned. One element that 
might be studied to relieve, in part, this saturation, would be to relocate 
the International facilities either to the Douglas Plant area or to the 
Southerly side of the airport. 

2. General aviation facilities. Extended master planning studies will require 
an ultimate relocation of the general aviation service facilities from the 
terminal complex to another area of the airport. Alternate sites for such 
operation should consider the Doulgas Plant area, the Airline Hangar area 
and the Southerly portion of the airport. 

Such extended master planning analyses of the general aviation operation 
should consider the origination and destination of general aviation ground 
traffic and the staging of Plan "D" or a similar plan for general aviation. 

-63- 



The aircraft delay economics versus design and construction economics for 
such planning should be resolved when planning reaches the point that 
relatively accurate estimating can be accomplished. 
3. Other planning criteria. In the studying of the master plan, the current 
master plan should be adjusted and followed until the extended master 
planning factors are resolved. During this period of extended planning, it 
will be extremely wise to keep Plan "D" facility planning as flexible as 
possible so that adjustments may be made in the future in accordance with 
later known engineering and planning facts, and a "freeze" of the master 
plan for Plan "D" facilities should be delayed until any doubts of its 
ultimate achievement are eliminated. 



-64- 



APPENDIX 



98 



ANALYSIS OF CAPACITY AND STAGING OF 
RUNWAY CONSTRUCTION AT CHICAGO-O'HARE AIRPORT 

by 

Martin A. Warskow and Howard C. Burns 



REPORT NO. 8914-1 
April 1962 



Prepared for 

THE DEPARTMENT OF AVIATION 

OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO 

AND 

LANDRUM AND BROWN 



AIRBORNE INSTRUMENTS LABORATORY 
A DIVISION OF CUTLER-HAMMER, INC. 

Deer Park, Long Island, New York 



ACKNOWLEDGMENT 

We acknowledge the assistance and information given 
us by the Chicago Air Traffic Supervisor and by many person- 
nel in the FAA Air Traffic Control Center and the ' Hare and 
Midway towers. We have been given extensive information and 
guidance by many airline personnel. The City Department of 
Aviation has provided help and many records as needed. Landrum 
and Brown have cooperated closely in making available the 
results of earlier studies and numerous airport development 
plans . 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

Abstract vii 

I . Foreword . 1 

II. Introduction 3 

A. Procedure 4 

B. Assumptions 5 

III. Airspace Considerations 7 

A. General 7 

B. Airspace Capacity 7 

C. System Control Procedures 11 

D. Airport Control Procedures 12 

E. Need for Control Aids 14 

F. Glen'view Naval Air Station 16 

IV. Analysis of Wind, Obstructions, and Airport 19 
Layout 

A. Analysis of Wind Effect 19 

B. Major Obstructions 22 

C . Limitations on Runway Direction 22 

V. Airport Capacity 25 

A. Method of Determining Airport Capacity 25 

B. Runway Combinations Considered 30 

C. Selection of Priority of Runway Use 35 

D. Results of Capacity Analysis 4l 

VI. Analysis of Operating Costs 43 

A. Basis for Analysis 43 

B. Runway Delay Analysis 44 

C. Taxiway Delay Analysis 46 

D. Excessive Flight Time in the Air 46 



Page 
VII. Conclusions and Recommendations 49 

VIII. References 53 

Appendix—Priority of Runway Use 55 



ii 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 

Figure 

1 Scheduled Traffic Volume for Chicago Area 
Related to Direction of Travel 

2 Chicago Peak Day Low-Altitude Enroute IFR 
Traffic Count 

3 196l Arrival and Departure Routes for ' Hare 
Airport 

4 Wind Conditions for Runway Combinations of 
Plan B 

5 Delay/Ope rating Rate Analysis for Runways 27C 
and 32R 

6 Distribution of Average Delay of 4 and 
6 Minutes 

7 Typical Hourly Distribution of Traffic 

8 Analysis of Open-Vee Runways 

9 Analysis of Intersecting Runways 

10 Airport Development—Plan A 

11 Airport Development—Plan B 

12 Airport Development—Plan C 

13 Airport Development— Plan D 

14 Priority of Runway Use—Plan A 

15 Priority of Runway Use—Plans B and C 

16 Priority of Runway Use— Plan D-l 

17 Priority of Runway Use— Plan D-2 

18 Practical Capacity Compared with Forecast 
Peak Hour Demand — 1965 

19 Extent by Which Demand Exceeds Capacity — 1965 

20 Practical Capacity Compared with Forecast Peak 
Hour Demand — 1970 

21 Extent by Which Demand Exceeds Capacity— 1970 

22 Excess Air Time Resulting from Lack of New Run- 
way 9R-27L 

23 Comparison of Operating Costs --1965-1970 

24 Comparison of Operating Costs— 197O-I98O 



iii 



LIST OF TABLES 

Table Page 

I Hourly Traffic Distributions 31 

II Summary of Practical Capacity 32 

III Runway Configuration Availability 38 

IV Summary of Operating Cost Analysis 45 



v 



ABSTRACT 

Current and projected aircraft traffic indicates 
that O'Hare is and will continue to be one of the world's 
busiest and largest airports. To efficiently accommodate 
the projected volume of aircraft operations requires that 
the airport master plan incorporate runway configurations 
having maximum capacity. This study has shown that the run- 
way layout for O'Hare can be programmed to accommodate the 
forecast traffic. The various factors of airspace use, run- 
way needs based on wind and weather , runway capacity, and 
airport operating costs have all been assessed. 

Current traffic flow and procedures in the Chicago 
Terminal Area have been examined. Probable developments in 
airspace use, air traffic control, and traffic growth have 
been considered in assessing the capability of handling traf- 
fic at O'Hare without undue delay. These studies show that 
the Chicago Terminal Area airspace has the potential to 
properly accommodate the anticipated growth of traffic at 
O'Hare and Midway airports. 

An analysis of recent weather observations indicates 
that a near all-weather capability can be provided by runways 
in the 9-27 and 14-32 directions. However, because some of 
the weather that favors the 4-22/2-20 direction is severe and 
unusual (strong winds and slippery runways), it has been found 
desirable to retain a minimum runway capability in the 4-22/ 
2-20 direction. 

Practical airport capacity has been determined 
using proven techniques for predicting the delay that will 
result from various runway operating rates. These studies 
show that parallel runway capability is needed daily over a 



VI 1 



period of several hours to efficiently handle the high 
movement rates . To accommodate the traffic forecast for 
the future, a runway configuration is required using three 
parallels in each of the two major directions. Because of 
their relative orientation, it is practical to use the three 
parallels in combination with a fourth intersecting runway, 
this provides additional capacity for about 50 percent of the 
time . 

An analysis of the cost of aircraft operations 
during approach, landing, takeoff, and taxiing has shown 
that the adequacy, or inadequacy, of runways has a tremendous 
effect on costs. These analyses show that runways 14L-32R, 
9C-27C, and 4-22 should be lengthened to accommodate aircraft 
requirements, and that runway 9R-27L should be constructed 
promptly. The staging of the additional runways recommended 
can be determined by examining cost-benefit ratios, and oper- 
ating cost information has been provided for such an analysis 



vlll 



I . FOREWORD 

Since the current O'Hare master plan (reference 1) 
was prepared in early 1959 * further progress has been made 
in forecasting airport capacity and in determining the effect 
of runway configuration on airport capacity (reference 2). 
The sudden growth of airline traffic at O'Hare and the con- 
tinued growth forecast for the future emphasized the need to 
assess the O'Hare capacity and master plan runway configura- 
tion . 

The City of Chicago therefore requested the firm of 
Landrum and Brown to retain Airborne Instruments Laboratory 
(AIL) in connection with capacity studies, and to incorporate 
the results of these studies into the master plan. A brief 
statement of the AIL effort follows: 

1. Examine airspace traffic flow and airspace 
capacity for the Chicago area to determine 
any limitations on O'Hare runway capacity. 

2. Review the airport layout to devise the 
optimum runway usage based on airport 
capacity, air traffic, and other considera- 
tions . 

3. Determine capacity ratings and the delay 

to operations that correspond to the stages 
of master plan development. 

4. Recommend the staging of runway construc- 
tion needed to meet traffic growth based 
on both economic considerations and the 
efficiency of operations. 



II. INTRODUCTION 

' Hare was planned as one of the world's major 
airports. Its layout has been scaled to accept the largest 
commercial aircraft in volume operation. The advent of 
large turbojet aircraft, and the shift of traffic from 
Midway to O'Hare indicate that in 1962 ' Hare may become 
the world's busiest airport. Thus, runway capacity becomes 
an Important consideration. Because of the high proportion 
of large turbojet aircraft (about 40 percent) and their oper- 
ating requirements, the physical size of the airport is 
unusually large. This results in lower runway capacities 
than with smaller aircraft. It also results In long taxi 
distances . The direct cost of operating the large turbojet 
aircraft is high (average $15.00 per minute), making it 
essential to minimize ground delay due to either runways or 
taxiways . 

This study has given prime consideration to the 
efficiency of operations, both in the air and on the ground. 
We have determined the time that aircraft use in taxiing, 
waiting for a runway, or flying unnecessarily far because of 
lack of a runway. These times have been converted into costs. 
The magnitude of the costs indicates how essential proper 
airport design is to efficient aircraft operation. Both the 
runway layout and runway location with respect to the terminal 
are of great importance—that is, the runway layout will 
affect the delay to runway operations, and the runway loca- 
tion and exit layout will affect the taxi distance and thus 
the time spent in taxiing. By evaluating airport operations 
on a time and cost basis, Information is provided for making 
an economic evaluation of an improvement. 



A. PROCEDURE 

The procedure used in this study involved several 
steps : 

1. To thoroughly examine airspace and traffic 
flow , both enroute and in the terminal area, 

2. To extend the master plan analysis of wind 
for the current application, 

3. To determine whether obstructions around 
the airport would have an effect on the 
desired instrument runway direction and 
use, 

4. To devise the optimum runway operating modes, 

5. To determine airport capacity by stages, 

6. To determine (a) the optimum runway con- 
figuration and (b) when new runway con- 
struction is required, 

7. To indicate when new runway construction is 
required by determining the effect of the 
staging of runway construction on annual 
aircraft operating costs. 

On the basis of the completed analysis, conclusions 
have been drawn with regard to the staging of runway and taxi- 
way construction considered necessary to meet the forecast 
traffic demands. The conclusions take into consideration the 
optimum runway configurations, the runway lengths, the navaids 
required, and the procedural improvements desired to obtain 
maximum operating efficiency. 

It has been helpful to review various TDEC (Technical 
Development and Evaluation Center) reports, particularly "Simu- 
lation Tests of the Factors Affecting IFR Traffic Capacity at 
Chicago O'Hare Airport, ,r dated February 1958, which was a study 
covering 77 simulation experiments. These studies were com- 
pleted in December 1957 before operational experience was 
available on jets in the air traffic control system. Although 
planning has changed since 1957 with respect to O'Hare and the 
air traffic control system, the report contains good background 
material . 



B. ASSUMPTIONS 

We have made the following basic assumptions 

1. Midway Airport is now and will remain a 
major airport, accommodating general 
aviation and airline traffic of the type 
that can be accommodated on the runways 
available. Therefore, our considerations 
with regard to ' Hare should, to the max- 
imum extent possible, permit full utiliza- 
tion of Midway Airport. 

2. All other airports in the area should be 
considered secondary to attaining full 
capacity at both ' Hare and Midway. 

3. The noise resulting from aircraft opera- 
tions during landing and takeoff is a con- 
tinuing problem. However, because ' Hare 
is surrounded on all sides by built-up 
areas, we have not limited our considera- 
tion of runway use because of noise. 

4. At ' Hare Airport the only runway direc- 
tion that has been committed from a long- 
range standpoint (compatible with air- 
space use) is the runway 14-32 direction. 
This commitment for the principal operating 
direction was determined largely by air- 
space considerations. Other major runways 
remain to be built, and their direction 
might be changed subject to land use 
requirements, approach-zone conditions, and 
airspace considerations. 

5. The traffic forecast in the master plan 
(reference l) has been used as the basis 
for our analysis. Landrum and Brown 
refined these forecasts to provide AIL 
with more detailed information within the 
basic forecasts. The forecasts are: 



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III. AIRSPACE CONSIDERATIONS 

A. GENERAL 

The Transitional Control Area for ' Hare/Midway 
operations is contained in a rectangular region of 6000 square 
miles whose boundaries are roughly 40 miles east, south, and 
west, and 30 miles north of the ' Hare/Midway airport complex. 

This airway structure is defined by a group of 
near-parallel east-west airways interconnected by an irregular 
pattern of north-south airways and designated VOR radials. 

Geographically, the airports are ideally located to 
permit feeding and "bleeding" from and to an easterly or 
westerly direction. This is compatible with the requirements 
of the bulk of the traffic (Figure l) . 

The absence of military climb corridors or other 
restrictive reservations allows complete freedom in establish- 
ing airways and formulating control procedures. 

With the exception of minor conflicts between Midway, 
O'Hare, and Glenview Naval Air Station, the surrounding area 
is relatively free of complication from other major airports. 

B. AIRSPACE CAPACITY 

No simple formula exists to calculate the capacity 
of a terminal area or an airway. Many related factors must 
be considered, including population (types of aircraft), 
navigational facilities, navigational facility spacing, air- 
way utility (single direction or two-way), intersecting air- 
ways, and control techniques (Radar, DME, or altitude/time 
separation) . 



7 



Information is available,, however, on what is 
being accomplished in high-density areas on a current basis. 
The statistics of today's operation in Chicago and other 
high-density areas, a critical study of the Chicago airspace 
layout, and a comparison of Chicago airspace layout and traf- 
fic load with those of the New York area have been used in 
assessing airspace limitations. 

The fewer airports of the Chicago area, their good 
location relative to traffic flow, and the heavy concentra- 
tion of traffic flow to the east and west (Figure 1) make the 
Chicago airspace layout less complex than that of the New York 
area. At New York's major airports, the bulk of the originating 
and terminating traffic flows from or to the west and south, 
permanent military restrictions require a compromise in con- 
trol procedures, and the three existing major airports lie in 
close proximity to each other. The ability to establish air- 
ways and formulate optimum control procedures In the Chicago 
area will permit an air route capability at least equal to 
and probably greater than that possible in the New York area. 
Therefore, some comparisons of existing loads and future poten- 
tial of the two areas are of interest. During fiscal year 196l, 
the three major airports serving New York (LaGuardia, Idlewild, 
and Newark) handled 420,623 total instrument operations. The 
two Chicago airports (O'Hare and Midway) handled 304,898 total 
instrument operations during the same period (FAA Air Traffic 
Activity, Fiscal 1961). Another comparison for the fiscal year 
1961 shows that the New York Air Route Traffic Control Center 
handled 45 percent more aircraft than the Chicago Air Route Con- 
trol Center--719,898 and 496,730 aircraft, respectively. 

An examination of the Chicago Peak Day figures 
(Figure 2) for 22 March 1961 indicates that the highest total 
movements occurred on two adjacent sectors of Victor 100 
(128 movements), two adjacent sectors of Victor 429 (108 and 
128 movements), and one segment of Victor 172 (129 movements). 
In comparison, the New York Peak Day report for 26 May 1961, 



8 



shows that activity on Victor 16, between Coyle and Fire 
Island, exceeded 215 movements, with the Wolf/Fire Island 
segment recording 258 movements. Washington's Peak Day 
charts for 24 March 1961 record 243 movements between 
Doncaster and Washington. 

Peak-day statistics traditionally show the great- 
est activity in the basic altitude structure close to ter- 
minals. This is logical, because both high- and intermediate- 
altitude flights violate this structure in descending to land 
or in climbing to altitude after takeoff. 

Excessive airspace loading is a consequence of 
enforced convergence into limited channels, and is especially 
true of final approach areas to all major airports. Because 
increased activity in ' Hare ' s approaches may be expected, it 
is of interest to note past achievement in such areas. In 
reference 3j it is noted that on a peak day New York handled 
342 aircraft between Coyle and Point Pleasant, and that 
Chicago handled 325 movements between Gary and the outer 
marker . 

The decrease in loading reflected in current peak 
day figures reflects a more even distribution of traffic 
within available airspace. 

High-altitude over-flights pass to the south. 
Intermediate-altitude over-flights do not appear significant 
and could be routed around the area. 

Thus, Chicago area peak airway loads are not as 
great as those in the New York area. Yet, studies have shown 
room for expansion and growth in New York. In a study pre- 
pared by AIL (reference 4) for The Port of New York Authority, 
the airways comprising the New York area were analyzed in 
great detail. The conclusions indicated that existing air- 
space would, with judicious selection of site, support a fourth 
major airport for serving the New York metropolitan area. 



Because of the traffic flow in the Chicago area, 
and the physical separation of the airports, there is ample 
maneuver and approach area to serve both airports if instru- 
ment runways are properly chosen. This applies to today's 
IFR feeding techniques and those projected for the future -- 
as in Project Beacon. (The single exception applies to con- 
figurations using the runway 32 direction at O'Hare. Feeder 
stack locations must avoid Midway's final approach area and 
are therefore less than optimum. The capacity achieved by 
these configurations may be less, therefore, than that of the 
same configuration with optimum feeder stack locations. This 
will be more significant when simultaneous parallel approaches 
to these runways are in progress.) 

As a further indication of the capability of the 
Chicago airspace to handle greater volumes of traffic, the 
record of a simulation experiment is of interest. Recently, 
at NAFEC, we observed a simulation experiment to evaluate the 
feasibility of a central IFR facility. The traffic samples 
used duplicated actual Chicago Peak Day activity to which 
18 satellite operations were added; the total was then 
increased by 20 percent. Although this was primarily an 
airport control demonstration, Chicago center sectors that 
would be involved were part of the simulation. These sectors 
were closely observed, and at no time did there appear to be 
difficulty or undue pressure. Movement rates for the area 
approximated 160 operations per hour. 

Thus, our study indicates that existing airways 
are capable of handling more than the existing traffic, and 
that sufficient airspace is available for additional airways. 
Our constant monitoring of industry's technological activities 
in air traffic control equipment, plus our own endeavors in 
these fields, point to a constantly increasing efficiency in 
the use of airspace. We feel justified, therefore, in con- 



10 



eluding that enroute and (except as noted) terminal area 
capacity will not become a limiting factor in airport accept- 
ance rate . 

C. SYSTEM CONTROL PROCEDURES 

Terminal area air traffic control procedures are 
frequently changed to keep abreast of shifting traffic loads 
and aircraft performance requirements. Thus, current Chicago 
procedures (Figure 3) will gradually be revised in many ways. 
However, some of our analysis involves the current procedures, 
and a short description of the current status of these proce- 
dures is therefore included. 

Aircraft are normally cleared to the feeder fix by 
the Chicago Center with either altitude or radar separation. 
Shortly before arrival at the clearance limit, the center 
transfers control of the aircraft to O'Hare approach control. 

O'Hare approach control, immediately upon receipt 
of control or at some subsequent time, will vector the air- 
craft to the ILS localizer. Upon intercepting the localizer, 
navigation reverts to the pilot and control is transferred to 
the O'Hare local controller. 

Physically, the approach control activities described 
above are handled by two radar controllers—east and west. The 
east controller vectors arrivals from the Beacon and Northbrook 
feeder fixes and the west controller vectors the aircraft from 
the Lakewood and Acorn feeder fixes. Intermeshing of the two 
operations on the localizer is accomplished by verbal coordina- 
tion between the two controllers. 

1. ARRIVAL ROUTING 



Aircraft to O'Hare from the southwest converge at 
Joliet, and proceed to the Acorn feeder fix via Victor 429. 
Aircraft from the west proceed via Victor 6 to its intersec- 



11 



tion with Victor 429, at which point they intermix with 
the traffic from the southwest. 

Aircraft from the northwest enter the area via 
Victor 100 and proceed directly to the Lakewood feeder fix. 

Aircraft from the east enter the area via 
Victor 100 and proceed directly to the Northbrook feeder 
fix. 

Aircraft from the southeast converge at Chicago 
Heights and proceed north on Victor 7 to the beacon feeder 
fix. 

2. DEPARTURE ROUTING 

Departure routings from O'Hare are straightf orward, 
with the aircraft proceeding almost immediately in the direc- 
tion of destination. As a result , a minimum of time is spent 
in the metropolitan control area. 

Departures to the east., north, and northeast proceed 
to and disperse at Papi, or turn off on Victor 228. 

Departures to the west., southwest, and northwest 
proceed via Victor 172 to Malta, at which point they diverge 
appropriately to their destination. 

Departures to the south are handled uniquely- -that 
is, a double "hand-off" is effected. O'Hare departures work 
Midway departure control immediately after departure and are 
afforded a direct southerly routing through the Midway vector 
area and are then handed off to the Chicago Center. Formerly, 
this routing was circuitous--aircraf t proceeded via Victor 172, 
Victor 429, and Victor 38 to Peotone. 

D. AIRPORT CONTROL PROCEDURES 

The airport control procedures will have an effect 
on the spacing between landing aircraft and therefore are of 



12 



great importance in a capacity analysis. The procedure 
having the greatest effect on capacity is the increasing 
practice of using IFR flight plans in VFR weather; there- 
fore,, much consideration was given to this procedure. 

In practice , an aircraft operating on an IFR 
flight plan will progress through the system as described 
and, irrespective of existing weather, will be provided with 
minimum or greater radar separation from other aircraft in 
the system. Any reduction in this spacing by the local con- 
troller (as might occur in VFR weather) can be accomplished 
only between the turn-on point and the end of the landing 
runway . 

If the turn-on point is in line with the landing 
runway, the remaining distance is too short to appreciably 
reduce the original spacing. If a circling approach is made 
to a runway other than that served by the localizer to which 
the turn-on is made, the distance from turn-on to touchdown 
is increased and, in some instances, spacing can be reduced. 
On the other hand, this increased distance could actually 
increase the spacing if the second aircraft is slower than 
the first. It is apparent, therefore, that if all aircraft 
operated on IFR flight plans and were processed through the 
system to a single runway, the arrival rate would be low and 
the "over-threshold" to "over-threshold" Interval relatively 
long, regardless of the weather. 

Two techniques exist for increasing the overall 
runway operational capacity. One is to sandwich departures 
between successive IFR arrivals using the time between arrivals 
that would otherwise be wasted. The other is to fill the gaps 
with VFR arrivals. Both methods are in general use and are 
used separately or in combination, depending upon the weather, 
the number of VFR arrivals, and the arrival/departure ratio. 
Because these conditions change constantly, control personnel 



13 



must be allowed the widest latitude in the selection of con- 
trol procedures. However, to prevent "wave-off s" or exces- 
sive spacing, and to simplify the complex ground handling 
problems, they should be provided with electronic aids devel- 
oped for these functions. 

E. NEED FOR CONTROL AIDS 

The local and ground controllers at ' Hare are at 
present in an unenviable position. Many critical airport 
areas are completely out of visual range from the tower 
because of structural obstruction. At night this condition 
worsens considerably because of the effects of the gigantic 
field lighting system. The ends of some of the runways are 
so far removed from the tower that a minor visibility reduc- 
tion makes observation of threshold or "start-roll" points 
difficult or impossible. The net result is that pilots of 
taxiing aircraft are considerably "on their own" and must 
provide their own separation from other aircraft, foregoing 
much valuable advisory assistance that would otherwise be 
available from control tower personnel. 

Most certainly O'Hare needs a new and higher tower. 
However, this will not, in itself, completely solve the prob- 
lem. The additional height, though improving overall visual 
capability, will also subject control personnel to differences 
in visibility common between elevated levels and the ground. 
At New York's Idlewild Airport, conditions have been observed 
where ground visibility appeared almost unlimited while the 
tower cab was completely shrouded in fog. 

Airport Surface Detection radar (ASDE) provides the 
potential to solve this problem. Its picture of the airport 
and moving aircraft thereon, regardless of weather, is of 
great help to the ground controller for taxi control and to 



14 



the local controller for runway clearance. ASDE Is opera- 
tional at Idlewild, Newark,, Boston, Seattle, and other civil 
airports. It should be available to the ' Hare local and 
ground controllers. 

Another operational aid needed by the local con- 
troller is the Bright Tube Radar Display, which provides an 
unshrouded radar picture of the terminal area. The removal 
of the shroud or radar tent immediately provides a means of 
information readily available to more control personnel. 
Easier coordination results in increased cooperation. The 
ability of the local controller to extract information from 
the radar scope will greatly augment his visual assessment 
of the situation. 

A future development that will aid in controlling 
the taxiing of aircraft is automatic taxi control equipment 
(TRACE) now under development. This equipment electronically 
detects the position of aircraft at predetermined, critical 
areas on the airport and in the approach zone . This informa- 
tion is displayed in the tower. Because the information 
received can be computer-analyzed, a subsequent decision can 
be computer-generated and transmitted automatically to the 
pilot. It provides a means of reducing radio communications 
and controller workload. Equipment such as this will become 
essential as traffic and runway complexity increase. Applica- 
tions of TRACE that are of importance to attaining ' Hare ' s 
potential capacity are briefly discussed. 

The Appendix to this report indicates that the 
capacity of an airport depends extensively on the controller's 
ability to sandwich departures between successive arrivals. 
His decision to do so depends on his assessment of the proxim- 
ity of the approaching aircraft. There is little argument that 
many wave -of fs would have resulted in completed landings and 
many withheld departure clearances would have been issued if 



15 



precise position information removed some of the uncertainty. 
TRACE promises to provide a means for achieving greater 
capacity by assisting the controller in these functions. 

The maximum use of two parallel runways on the 
same side of the terminal will be limited by the runway- 
crossing problem--the necessity for all aircraft using the 
outer runway to cross the inner runway. TRACE offers a means 
of automating this crossing function., permitting the con- 
troller to operate the runways at a higher capacity. 

F. GLENVIEW NAVAL AIR STATION 

This facility lies north-northeast of O'Hare, and 
the boundaries of the two airports are separated by scarcely 
more than 6 miles. 

Two instrument runways exist at Glenview--17-35 
(8000 feet) and 14-32 (5314 feet). In addition, two VFR run- 
ways are provided by 9-27 (5088 feet) and 3-21 (4949 feet). 

During instrument weather , and as long as O'Hare 
operates from the west, some independence of operation of the 
two airports is possible with the most rigid discipline and 
under radar control procedures. With an easterly feed, such 
as that involving Priority 1 of Plans B and D, continued IFR 
independence seems impractical. 

The turn-on point for an arrival approaching 
Glenview's runway 35 and involving a 7-mile final, would lie 
over, or in close proximity to, ' Hare ' s 27C/27R outer markers. 
The same point for Glenview' s runway 32 would appear about 
2 miles from O'Hare' s 27C/27R turn-on point. 

Departures or the possibility of a missed approach 
using the reciprocal of these runways would have only 4 to 
5 miles to turn away from O'Hare' s approaches to avoid violating 
the 3 -mile radar criteria. This allows no deviation of O'Hare 



16 



approaches north of the runway 9 localizer. It appears that, 
with the implementation of Plan B and successive expansion, 
Glenview approaches would best be handled as ' Hare arrivals 
until they have turned north and cleared ' Hare ' s localizers. 
It is expected that Glenview departures under these conditions 
will use either runway 32 or 35 and cause a minimum of compli- 
cation to ' Hare activity. 

Existing limited activity at Glenview will not 
seriously disrupt ' Hare ' s capacity, but the existence of 
the facility constantly poses a threat of possible "rejuvena- 
tion." 

Although the airport is fundamentally a military 
responsibility, the ramifications of a rejuvenated Glenview 
to ' Hare are great enough to suggest that the City of Chicago 
should make certain Glenview does not become too active. 



17 



IV. ANALYSIS OF WIND, OBSTRUCTIONS, AND AIRPORT LAYOUT 

A. ANALYSIS OF WIND EFFECT 

In developing the existing master plan, Landrum 
and Brown completed a thorough analysis of available wind 
data. Today, newer and more complete wind data are avail- 
able, and it was therefore considered advisable to use the 
new data for reassessing the various runway configurations. 
The purpose of the wind analysis was threefold: 

1. To use the recent wind data that have 
become available, 

2. To combine wind and weather data with 
the amount of traffic at a particular 
time — that is, to weight the occurrence 
of wind and weather by the volume of 
traffic occurring at the time of the 
observation, 

3. To develop a priority of runway use that 
would result in maximum operating effi- 
ciency and to use the wind data to indi- 
cate the extent of use of each combina- 
tion of runways. 

AIL obtained from the U. S. Weather Bureau weather 
records for the years 1959 and I960, which were subdivided 
Into seven major weather groupings: 

1. Weather below 100 and 1/4, 

2. Weather above No. 1 and including 200 
and 1/2, 

3. Weather above No. 2 and including 600 
and 1-3/4, 

4. Weather above No. 3 and including 900 
and 2-1/2, 

5. Weather above No. 4 and including 1500 
and 5, 

6. Weather above 1500 and 5^ 

7 . Weather above 1000 and 3 . 



19 



In addition to giving the standard summary of 
occurrences of weather for the above groupings , the number 
of occurrences of weather was combined with the traffic at 
the time of occurrence to enable examination of wind and 
traffic on this basis. Furthermore, group 7 was obtained 
both in standard form and weighted by traffic for each month 
of the year. A copy of this data has been made available to 
the City of Chicago. 

Before summarizing the results of the weather 
analysis , a comment must be made regarding the grouping of 
weather data as it was finally used. After extensive con- 
sideration of the air traffic flow and the control tower 
procedures used today., and as may be used in the future (Sec- 
tion III), it was determined that our runway use and capacity 
analysis should be based on the following two weather group- 
ings: 

1. Below 1500 and 5 when complete IFR 
procedures would be used, 

2. Above 1500 and 5 when a combination 
of VFR and IFR procedures would be 
used . 

It was also found that the optimum directions of 
runway use from an air traffic flow standpoint and from the 
airport layout standpoint were to keep runways 14-32 and 9-27 
as the principal runways. Accordingly, the wind data were 
then applied to determine the extent of use of a third runway 
direction (either 4-22 or 2-20). 

In our wind analysis we have used as a criterion 
a crosswind component of 15 knots at not more than 80 degrees 
to the runway. This corresponds to the preferential runway 
criteria now published in Special Civil Air Regulation No. 
SR442, which has been in use for many months at New York Inter- 
national Airport where the traffic is similar to that at ' Hare 
In specific cases we have also examined the effect of a higher 
crosswind component of 20 knots. 



20 



The wind analysis has indicated the following 
results (the priority of runway use and the extent of the 
use of various runway combinations will be covered in sue 
ceeding sections). 

1. There is some difference in the amount of 
weather included in certain groups when 
the wind occurrence was weighted by traf- 
fic; for example (in the grouping of 
weather as we used it)., where IFR weather 
was defined as including all weather below 
1500 and 5j the extent of occurrence of 
this weather was 22.3 percent and when the 
weather occurrence was weighted with traf- 
fic occurrence , it was found that 24.8 per- 
cent of the traffic occurred during IFR 
weather. This figure of 24.8 percent was 
used as the basis where extent of IFR oper- 
ation was needed in analysis. 

2. Using the preferred directions of runways 
14-32 and 9-27 and using these as bidirec- 
tional runways (and with wind components 
not exceeding 15 knots),, all weather below 
1500 and 5 will be accommodated with the 
exception of 0.5 percent of the total 
weather (some 2000 flights based on fore- 
cast 1965 civil traffic). For weather 
below 1000 and 3, this reduces to 0.29 per- 
cent or 1200 flights, and below 700 and 2 
this reduces to . 17 percent or 700 flights. 
This amount could be reduced by accepting 
greater crosswind components . 

3. By limiting the crosswind component to 
15 knots or less, and using the 9-27 and 
14-32 directions to the maximum, the 4-22 
or 2-20 direction of runway will be used 
3.8 percent of the time based on wind and 
traffic conditions and 3.2 percent based 
on wind conditions alone. The small need 
for this runway is more easily visualized 
by reference to Figure 4, which shows the 
wind conditions covered by each priority 
of runway use. The airport development 
program provides a less efficient runway 
system for operation in this direction. 
Therefore, it is probable that a higher 
crosswind component will frequently be 
used to permit more operation in the 



21 



9-27/14-32 directions (as is the current 
practice at O'Hare and other airports 
having similar runway limitations). For 
example, for a 20-knot crosswind, the use 
of this direction will be reduced to 
0.75 percent (some 3000 flights based on 
forecast 1965 civil traffic). 

B. MAJOR OBSTRUCTIONS 

In considering additional instrument runway 
approaches, a brief examination of any major obstruction 
problems was made and particularly the effect of radio 
towers west of the airport. The tower that is most critical 
is WBBM, which has an elevation of 1420 (753 feet above air- 
port). Because this tower is 7.8 miles from the end of the 
runway 9-27 group, it is not an obstruction, even if it were 
in the approach zone. Therefore, these approaches can be 
considered for instrument approach, provided that procedures 
and equipment are properly used. Therefore, the approaches 
to these runways must have either a front- or back-course 
localizer and a marker in the vicinity of the tower, or closer 
to the airport. Approach altitudes can be chosen to fit an 
approach to the airport without exceeding normal glide-path 
requirements . 

C. LIMITATIONS ON RUNWAY DIRECTION 



A large part of O'Hare Airport is already built or 
is under construction; this places limitations on considering 
any new runway directions. These limitations were examined 
with Landrum and Brown and City of Chicago personnel. It was 
found that the key limitation is that the runway 14-32 direc- 
tion has been established as a permanent direction by the two 
runways already built. Because of the major funds committed 
to these runways, this direction should be maintained. It is 
also desirable to maintain the 9-27 direction because a good 
runway exists in this direction, and the central terminal area 



22 



development is tied in with the 9-27 direction. From a land 
use standpoint (within the airport boundaries) it is possible 
to accomplish some rotation of the 2-20/4--22 directions to 
5-23 if cross-runways at right angles had been desirable. 
However, previous studies indicated approach zone problems 
in these directions. 

It is feasible with the good terrain existing around 
O'Hare Airport to equip any of the runways required with instru- 
ment landing systems , and the conclusions are based on having 
four instrument landing systems with back-course capability and 
associated equipment for use at the airport. 



23 



V. AIRPORT CAPACITY 

A. METHOD OF DETERMINING AIRPORT CAPACITY 

The technique used to determine airport capacity 
has been thoroughly described, both as to its theoretical 
basis and its application, in AIL Report No. 76OI-I (ref- 
erence 2), and it will only briefly be reviewed here to 
familiarize the reader with its most important points. 

The technique will forecast the actual number of 
operations that can be accommodated at an airport. It uses 
mathematical models, or formulas, which have been tested 
against actual airport operations to prove that the technique 
is accurate. The models use spacing data, such as the time 
from " over-the-threshold" of one aircraft to "start-roll" of 
the succeeding aircraft. The variation of spacing with air- 
craft types, weather, operating rate, and runway length have 
been determined. To forecast when spacings may change, par- 
ticularly for IFR, the actual observed spacings are adjusted 
by the improvement factor that may occur by the forecast date. 

In our assessment of airport operations, we have 
found that the best measure of the efficiency of operations 
Is to determine the delay resulting from various movement 
rates. Our extensive field measurement work has been accom- 
plished in 18 control towers at many of the nation's busiest 
airports. From the field measurements at many of these towers 
we have been able to accurately determine the delay, if any, 
to each departure. From these measurements we have then deter- 
mined the "average delay" resulting from the average movement 
rate. The mathematical models used for forecasting will pre- 
dict the average delay that will result from various movement 
rates . 



25 



Since average delay is frequently used in our 
capacity analysis, some further explanation of it is war- 
ranted. Figure 5 is the delay/operating rate curve devel- 
oped to represent actual VPR operations on ' Hare runways 27C 
and 32R. Note that for a given operating rate, say 65 move- 
ments, the average delay is 4 minutes. This is the average 
delay to all departures (since arrivals are normally given 
priority in VFR, their delay is negligible and departure 
delay becomes critical) . All aircraft do not experience a 
4-minute delay, but some will have no (0) delay and others 
may have a delay as high as 18 minutes. The average delay, 
however, is 4 minutes (Figure 6). Note that 12 percent have 
no (0) delay, 50 percent have delays of 3 minutes or more, 
and 1 percent have a delay of 18 minutes. 

Figure 5 is typical of 37 curves that have been 
developed by the mathematical model to properly analyze 
' Hare capacity in its many IFR and VFR operating modes. 
From these we selected one operating rate as the practical 
capacity. For Figure 5 > the practical capacity is 65 move- 
ments, which results in the 4-minute average delay. The 
values of delay used to select practical capacity are: 

4 minutes departure delay for mixed runway oper- 
ation (both landings and takeoff s on 
same runway), or for a runway used for 
departures only. 

3 minutes arrival delay when a runway is used for 
IFR arrivals only. 

2 minutes arrival delay when a runway is used for 
VFR arrivals only. 

These values of delay are those due to runway load- 
ing only and do not include airspace delay. 



26 



When operating at the rate where a 4 -minute 
average delay to departures results , the airport is work- 
ing very near its practical capacity. If these rates are 
exceeded, the delays can build up rapidly to unacceptable 
values, but movement rate increases very little. Note that 
in Figure 5 the practical capacity at a 4-minute departure 
delay is 65. At a 6-minute departure delay--a 50 percent 
increase in delay--the operating rate is 69--a 6-percent 
increase in operating rate. 

In our field experience we have observed high 
average delays and listened to the pilot and controller 
reaction to the long wait (on the part of the pilot) and 
to the pressure to do more (on the part of the controller). 
For example, we observed a 5-hour period when an average of 
66 movements per hour (no jets) was handled on one runway 
with an average departure delay of 4.5 minutes. Some of 
the pilots experienced an 18 to 20 minute delay and indi- 
cated their impatience. The controllers were continually 
under pressure. 

The practical capacity of an airport will be com- 
pared with the traffic demand. The peak hour forecasts 
apply to an average peak day (about 50 such days occur 
during a year). Thus, there will be several days when the 
peak hour exceeds the forecast and therefore the planned 
operating rate. The practical capacity must be selected at 
a level that permits such unusual overloads without too 
severe a consequence. 

During IFR operation, delay to arrivals must gen- 
erally be absorbed while arrivals are waiting in holding 
stacks. Large delays will result in considerable stacking, 
which is expensive and inefficient. Even the relatively low 
average delay we are using for IFR arrivals (3 minutes) can 
cause severe stacking problems because of the distribution 



27 



of delay represented by average delay. In VPR operation, 
delay to arrivals must be absorbed principally by path 
stretching, and here a 2-minute average is the maximum to 
be considered for airport planning purposes. 

Delay, either in the air or on the ground, is 
expensive and should be minimized. The approximate cost of 
a 4-minute average departure delay at O'Hare is $1440 per 
hour using the 1965 aircraft population and operating at the 
forecast peak demand of 90 movements per hour. To this must 
be added any delay that occurs in the air. The comparative 
6-minute delay cost is $2160. Thus, delay is expensive. 

Airspace for O'Hare IPR routings and feeding into 
the airport is adequate to efficiently service the runways. 
However, because of factors other than runway loading, some 
delay will occur in the airspace. This delay must be added 
to the predicted runway delay, and it thus increases the oper- 
ating cost of delay beyond the values shown. 

It should be noted that in the original work 
accomplished on the delay concept (reference 2), we used a 
6-minute average delay to departures to indicate practical 
capacity. Since then we have studied this further and have 
concluded that the 4-minute average delay and the other delay 
values indicated above are more practical. 

It has been found that the following factors must 
be specified in determining airport capacity: 

1. The layout of each runway as to length, exit 
taxiways, and the relation of that runway to 
other runways on the airport . 

2. Any features that restrict ground flow and 
that affect capacity, such as inadequate runup 
areas and runway crossings. 

3 . The aircraft population operating at the air- 
port, particularly during the peak hours of 
operation. 



28 



4. The weather pattern at the airport. 

5. Air traffic techniques and patterns used 
to feed and control departures. 

6. The hourly distribution of traffic as it 
occurs on peak days and during peak hours. 

All of these factors were analyzed and determined 
with respect to O'Hare airport. The following discussion 
indicates the use and effect of Factors 3 and 6 on capacity. 
(The use and effect of Factors 1, 2, 4, and 5 are described 
elsewhere in this report.) 

Factor 3--The aircraft population was generally 
forecast by Landrum and Brown. Their 
forecast was divided by AIL into air- 
craft types suitable for our analysis: 



Type 
A 



D 



E 



Heavy jets (such as 
707, DC-8, and 880) 

Heavy propeller 
transports and light 
jets (such as DC-6 
and DC-7j Electra, 
and 727) 

Heavy twins (8,000 
to 36,000 pounds) 

Light twins and 
heavy singles 

Light singles 



1965 


(Percent ) 


1970 (Percent) 


VFR 


IFR 


VFR IFR 


40 


47 


55 60 


30 


33 


20 20 



12 
12 

6 



10 
7 
3 



15 



10 



15 



Factor 6--The hourly distributions of traffic 
were developed to conform to Landrum 
and Brown peak hour and annual fore- 
casts. The distribution is based 
principally on hourly traffic as 
recorded in the November and December 
Air Traffic Guide . Figure 7 shows some 
of the distributions. Table I lists 
the various distributions used. 



29 



There will be an unbalance of 
arrivals and departures for short 
periods of time,, particularly 
during peak hours. However, since 
arrivals equal departures over the 
longer periods (2 or 3 hours) with 
which we are principally concerned, 
our capacity analyses have been 
based on an equal number of arrivals 
and departures. 

The curves developed are based on "steady-state" 
conditions—that is, the average delay predicted for a 
specific operating rate will result when that operating 
rate is sustained over a period of time (for example, Fig- 
ure 5). For short periods of operation, the average delay 
is less than that predicted. Because the traffic demand 
builds to a peak (as at 1800 ) and then drops off again 
(after an hour or two), the capacity value determined from 
curves, such as Figure 5* can be exceeded by about 10 percent 
before exceeding the 4-minute average delay. This has been 
considered in selecting the capacities listed in Table II. 

B. RUNWAY COMBINATIONS CONSIDERED 

An airport's immediate value lies in its ability 
to serve the needs of its customers. Although limitless 
associated economic activities are involved, an airport's 
life blood is the smooth flow of aircraft traffic into and 
out of its passenger terminal area. It has been shown that 
the airspace surrounding ' Hare Airport has the capability 
of handling great amounts of air traffic. With this assump- 
tion, it becomes paramount to discover and eliminate existing 
bottlenecks and prevent the occurrence of other bottlenecks 
on the airport itself. Possibly the area most sensitive and 
most susceptible is that of the runway configuration. 

During the ' Hare study, our investigations extended 
beyond the simple acceptance rate of the various runway com- 



30 



TABLE I 
HOURLY TRAFFIC DISTRIBUTIONS 



VTR 



IFR 









i<>(.;, 




1970 






Peak 


Normal 


Peak 


Normal 


Hour 


Percent 


Day 


Day 


Day 


Day 


00-01 


1.0 


L2 


li 


14 


13 


01-02 


2.0 


24 


22 


27 


25 


02-03 


1.0 


12 


11 


14 


13 


03-04 


0.5 


6 


5 


7 


6 


04-05 


0.5 


6 


5 


7 


6 


05-06 


0.5 


6 


5 


7 


6 


06-07 


2-5 


30 


2, 


34 


31 


07-08 


5.0 


60 


54 




63 


08-09 


6.5 


78 


70 


88 


82 


09-10 


6.5 


78 


70 


88 


82 


10-11 


5-0 


60 


54 


< 


63 


11-12 


4.5 


54 


49 


61 


57 


12-13 


6.0 


72 


64 


82 


75 


13-14 


6.0 


72 


64 


82 


75 


14-15 


4.5 


54 


49 


61 


57 


15-16 


4.5 


54 


49 


61 


57 


16-17 


6.5 


78 


70 


88 


82 


17-18 


7.0 


84 


76 


95 


88 


18-19 


7-5 


90 


8] 


102 


.4 


19-20 


7-0 


84 


76 


'5 


88 


20-21 


7-0 


84 


76 


>5 


88 


21-22 


4.0 


48 


43 


55 


! 1 


22-23 


2-5 


30 


27 


34 


31 


23-00 


2.0 


24 


22 


27 


25 





Peak 


Normal 


Peak 


Normal 


Percent 


Day 


Day 


Day 


Day 


1.0 


11 


10 


L3 


12 


2.0 


2] 


19 


2> 


21) 


1.0 


LI 


10 


13 


12 


0.5 


5 


5 


6 


6 


0-5 


5 


5 


6 


£ 


0-5 


5 


5 


r 


■ 


2-5 


27 


2^ 


32 


29 


5-5 


59 


53 


70 


.. 


6.5 


70 


62 


82 


76 


6.5 


70 


- 2 


£2 


7* 


5-5 


59 


53 


70 


64 


5-0 


53 


48 


63 


59 


6.0 


• . 


58 


76 


70 


6.0 


'■■< 


58 


76 


70 


5-0 


53 


• 


63 


59 


4.5 


ki 


43 


57 


"8 


6.0 


6k 


58 


76 


70 


6.5 




! i2 


82 


76 


7.0 


75 


67 




82 


6-5 


69 


62 


82 


• 


6-5 


69 


o2 


82 


"■: 


4-5 


48 


43 


57 


c 3 


2.5 


27 


24 


32 


29 


2.0 


21 


19 


25 


24 



Total 



1.200 



1080 



1360 



1258 



1068 



960 



1265 



1172 



Note: Distributions include only civil traffic, 



31 





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PM 






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32 



binations . One stage of the ' Hare airport development 
program can have as many as eight combinations of run- 
way use, each with a different capacity. We have therefore 
established a "Priority of Use" of runways and determined 
the extent of use of each runway combination. To determine 
priority, we have considered meteorological data (Figure 4), 
the economic aspects of ground handling (taxi distance), 
runway capacity, and air traffic control procedures. 

In assessing the various plans, it was necessary, 
where parallel runways did not exist, to explore the pos- 
sibility of using two non-parallel runways when wind condi- 
tions would permit. 

Our earlier work had determined that, under specific 
conditions, this configuration could result in a capacity 
equal to that of parallel runways. Under other conditions, 
the net result was no more than single runway capacity. 

Simple geometric theorem dictates that, with non- 
parallel runways, either the runways or their extended center- 
lines will intersect. If the runways do not share a common 
point, a configuration will exist that is commonly referred to 
as an "open-vee." If the runways physically cross each other, 
an intersecting runway configuration exists. In each case, if 
the two runways are used, departures will be assigned to one 
runway and arrivals to the other. 

Practical operation of the open-vee is possible 
only when the direction of use results in divergence of 
arrivals and departures. In the reverse direction, the pos- 
sibility of conflict between a departure and a missed approach 
delays a departure clearance to the point where a succeeding 
arrival may preclude such clearance or, if issued, may result 
in a wave-off for the second arrival. This configuration was 
one of the many analyzed under Contract FAA/BRD-136 (ref- 
erence 2) . 



33 



Figure 8 shows the capacity deterioration when 
the configuration is used in a converging direction. It 
must be emphasized that the capacity figures used are for 
populations different from those existing or forecast for 
! Hare and will not,, therefore, agree with capacity curves 
developed specifically for that airport. An example of open- 
vee operation at O'Hare exists when runways 9C and l4R are 
used, with arrivals on l4R and departures on 9C . The capac- 
ity of those runways equals that of parallel runways. This 
runway combination does not appear as a priority in any of 
the plans because winds that permit this type of operation 
also permit mixed operations on parallel runways l4R and 14L 
(with increased operational capability) . 

Considering these same air strips, but operating 
them in the 27C and 32L directions, would result in greatly 
decreased capacity and would involve complicated control 
procedures, with possible departure delays and arrival wave- 
off s . 

Intersecting runways have the characteristics of 
both directions of operation of an open-vee configuration. 
Regardless of how they are operated, the first portion of a 
departure and arrival is In a converging configuration, and 
the last portion is in a diverging direction. The capacity 
of the combined runways is directly proportional to the ratio 
of convergence to divergence. This effect is shown in Fig- 
ure 9. These curves, like Figure 8, apply to populations not 
compatible with those at O'Hare. 

An example of near-optimum intersection location 
at O'Hare is demonstrated by runways 27C and 32R (Plans A 
and B) . We have taken advantage of this capability in the 
determination of airport capacity at O'Hare. 

For simplicity, the transition from the present to 
the future has been separated into five stages of development 
or plans. 



34 



PLAN A (Figure 10) 

The existing configuration is used with runway 4-22 
extended to 7500 feet, runway 14L-32R extended to 11,600 feet, 
and runway 9C-27C extended to 9000 feet. 

PLAN 3 (Figure 11) 

Includes Plan A and adds new runway 9R-27L. This 
addition provides a second set of parallel runways. This is 
essentially the same as Landrum and Brown. 

PLAN C (Figure 12) 

Includes Plan B except that a new northeast/south- 
west runway 2-20 replaces old runway 4-22 and a new east/west 
runway 9L-27R replaces old runway 9C-27C. This Is essentially 
the Landrum and Brown . 

PLAN D-l (Figure 13) 

Includes Plan C and adds a third parallel runway 
to the 9-27 complex. Because of its proposed location, this 
parallel runway will be referred to as runway 9 far right -27 
far left (9FR-27FL) . 

PLAN D-2 (Figure 13) 

Includes Plan D-l and adds a third parallel runway 
to the 14-32 complex. Because of its proposed location, this 
parallel runway will be referred to as runway 14 far right-32 
far left (14FR-32FL) . 

C. SELECTION OF PRIORITY OF RUNWAY USE 

In each of the plans evaluated, certain decisions 
could be made based on known factors . 

1. Independent parallel runway operation will 

result in capacities that cannot be exceeded 
by any other configuration having the same 
number of runways . 



35 



2. The capacity of a crossed runway con- 
figuration can vary from that achieved 
by parallel runways to that achieved by 
a single runway. 

3 . Because of its low capacity relative to 
' Hare demand, single runway operation 
should be avoided. 

4. The first and second choices of direction 
(if they are approximately near reciprocal 
directions) will be used almost exclusively 
throughout the year. 

5. Economic factors involving operations 
using first and second choice directions 
will result in a substantial annual oper- 
ating cost increase or reduction because of 
the significant number of annual operations 
that will use these configurations. 

For each plan, certain ground rules have been 
applied to the selection of runways and in subsequent capac- 
ity and coverage evaluations. Crosswind limitations (though 
they are usually more critical for arrivals than departures 
in actual practice) have, for the purposes of this study, 
been applied equally to both. Wind coverage, and consequently 
cost analyses, have been based on an acceptable maximum 15-knot 
crosswind component (specifically, the preferential runway use 
criteria specified in Special Civil Air Regulation No. SR442-- 
using a 15-knot crosswind component instead of the specified 
15-knot velocity) . 

In Plan A, the feeding of ! Hare ' s runway 32 is handi- 
capped by the Midway operation; the runway 14 direction was there 
fore selected as Priority 1. 

In Plans B, C, and D, ' Hare ' s main directions are 
approach to the west (runway 27), to the east (runway 9), and 
to the southeast (runway 14) . Adequate airspace for an inde- 
pendent operation of both airports is accomplished. 

A brief summary follows of the operating modes and 
runway configurations for each of the plans. The priority of 



36 



runway use is the same in both VFR and IFR weather. These 
priorities are also listed in Table III. A detailed analy- 
sis of each plan and its priorities is included In the 
Appendix. 

1. OPERATIONAL SUMMARY FOR PLAN A (Figure 14 ) 

Parallel runway capacity (possibly limited from the 
southeast) will be available for 84.8 percent,, mixed single 
plus cross-runway use will be available for 3.5 percent , and 
single runway mixed operation (arrivals and departures) will 
be available for 10.6 percent of the total use time (Table III) 

The annual cost of this plan will be considerably 
greater than that of the other plans , because a runway 14 ILS 
feed is to be maintained not only for Priority 1 operation 
but also for that part of all other priority operations that 
can accept circling approaches. Excessive delays indicated 
by limited-capacity Priority 3 and low-capacity Priority h, 
6, and 7 operations (total use time 14 . 1 percent) will further 
increase costs . 

2. OPERATIONAL SUMMARY FOR PLANS B AND C (Figure 15) 

With the east-west direction established as highly 
desirable,, this plan permits use of two parallel runways 
plus a good cross runway in these directions. Runup area 
limitations may cause problems but should not seriously affect 
capacity. This high-capacity operation is possible 50.8 per- 
cent of the time. Parallel runway operations are available an 
additional 45.4 percent, leaving single runway operation for 
2.7 percent of the total time (unless higher crosswinds are 
accepted) . 

Plan C includes new runway 9L-27R to replace run- 
way 9C-27C The substitution of runway 9L/27R in Plan C 
for runway 9C/27C in Plan B should be undertaken only when 



37 



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38 



its advantages are needed. These advantages include 
increased terminal and apron area, greater runway length, 
better taxi access to the runway for takeoff, complete 
compliance with IFR clearance standards, and increased 
separation from parallel runway 9R-27L for IFR parallel 
approaches. Until the new runway is provided and while 
operating with Priority 1, all departing aircraft must 
taxi from the terminal to runway 32R in a counterclockwise 
direction, thereby increasing taxi distance on some depar- 
tures. On the other hand, this substitution of 9L-27R for 
9C-27C will Increase overall taxi costs and will result in 
a slight decrease In Priority 1 capacity (compared with 
Priority 1 of Plan B) because of the relocated runway 32R/ 
27R intersection. This intersection moves from the 2600-foot 
point to the 3900-foot point from the threshold of runway 27. 
On runway 32R, the intersection is relocated from the 1200-foot 
point to the 2400-foot point from the start-roll end of run- 
way 32R. 

Plan C also includes runway 2L-20R instead of run- 
way 4-22. Runway 2L-20R has operational advantages over run- 
way 4/22, particularly because of improved taxi facilities 
and greater runway length. Our study indicates that runway 
2L-20R will not be used extensively; therefore, its construc- 
tion should be deferred until the need for this runway has 
been proven. The Master Plan should make provision for an area 
suitable for construction of this runway with IFR clearances. 

3 . OPERATIONAL SUMMARY FOR PLANS D-l AND D-2 
(Figures 16 and 17) 



The addition of a third parallel runway results in 
new operational possibilities. Lacking actual field experience 
with this type of configuration (three parallel runways and an 
intersecting runway being used together), planning must be 
theoretical. However, the logic and techniques applied to 
plans based on actual experience should result in relatively 
sound theories when applied to this plan. It is possible to 



39 



partially segregate arrival and departure categories by 
assigning each their own runway. Departures have therefore 
been allocated exclusive use of the center parallel runway. 
This selection was made because of three considerations. 

The first consideration is that a runway crossing 
problem will exist between the two parallel runways located 
on the same side of the terminal. The user of the outer run- 
way will be forced to cross the center runway to get to the 
outer runway or the terminal. This crossing may be delayed 
because of center runway activity. If departures were 
assigned to the outer runway and were stopped at the cross- 
ing, it would block all succeeding departures while the outer 
runway remained inactive . By assigning arrivals to the outer 
runway, an arrival facing a crossing problem would be holding 
off the runway and succeeding arrivals could continue to use 
the runway . 

The second consideration is that of automating the 
runway crossing problem. In previous studies, AIL has found 
that the capability of close parallel runways may be reduced 
by the ground crossing problem to two-thirds that available if 
no crossing problem existed. Automation of the runway crossing 
to unload the controller and communications will permit attain- 
ing about four-fifths the full capacity. Confining departures 
to the center runway simplifies the automation problem. 

The third consideration is the probability that 
simultaneous approaches (where there is a minimum weather 
limitation) will eventually be approved and any additional 
lateral spacing between parallel approach courses will be 
appreciated by both control and pilot personnel. The tempo 
of arrival and departure activity will tax ground handling 
capability to the utmost. The ability of conventional com- 
munications to handle the load is questionable. Implementa- 
tion of additional frequencies also introduces additional 



40 



coordination problems, which always reduce efficiency. It 
is mandatory, therefore, that planning for this phase include 
an automated approach and ground handling technique . 

Plan D-l will permit use of four runways in the 
east-west direction — three parallel runways and one inter- 
secting runway. This combination can be used 50.9 percent 
of the time, three parallel runways will be available 31-0 per- 
cent of the time, and dual parallel runways will be available 
14.3 percent of the time, leaving single runway operation for 
2.7 percent of the time (Table III). 

Plan D-2 will be the same as Plan D-l, except that 
it will extend the availability of the three parallel runways 
to 45.4 percent of the time, leaving the single runway opera- 
tion again at about 2.7 percent. 

D. RESULTS OF CAPACITY ANALYSIS 

After an analysis of the many factors that affect 
capacity, the practical airport capacity has been selected 
for the various airport configurations; this capacity is sum- 
marized in Table II and illustrated in Figures 1.8 through 21. 

The VFR peak hour for 50 days is that used in ref- 
erence 1 and has been assumed as 7-5 percent of the peak day. 
The VFR peak hour for the remaining average VFR day has been 
determined by finding the daily average traffic for the 
remainder of the year (from the 1965 annual forecast) and 
using 7.5 percent as the peak hour. The IFR peak hour for 
1965 is the hourly air carrier traffic plus one-half the 
general aviation peak hour traffic . The IFR peak hour for 
1970 is the hourly air carrier traffic plus two-thirds the 
general aviation peak hour traffic . 

Final conclusions as to runway needs and staging 
must consider the economic analysis that follows. It is 
evident that, with Plan A, many days of overloaded conditions 



41 



will occur. The extent of time in an overload condition 
obviously decreases with the construction of added runways. 
All plans , however, suffer to some extent by the use of 4-22 
or 2-20 runways. The actual use of this direction will be 
much lower than wind analysis indicates if higher acceptable 
crosswind components permit increased operation on the higher- 
priority runways . 



42 



VI. ANALYSIS OF OPERATING COSTS 

A. BASIS FOR ANALYSIS 

Operations at an airport involve sizable operating 
costs,, not only to the airport management but also to the 
airport users. In making airport improvements,, it is desirable 
to assess their economic benefits. 

A computer technique of economic analysis has been 
developed as described in reference 2 (the application of the 
benefit/cost ratio was contributed by Porter and O'Brien who 
assisted AIL in this work) . The technique makes use of the 
capacity analyses of runway operations by converting the delay 
into annual operating costs. The annual operating costs are 
then compared with the annual cost of construction and main- 
tenance of the facility to determine the benefit/cost ratio, 
(in this study, we have evaluated only the operating costs, 
because Landrum and Brown will provide the construction and 
maintenance costs.) 

For O'Hare, three major items of operating costs 
were determined: 

1. The annual cost of the delay to aircraft 
resulting from runway operations. 

2. The annual cost of taxiing aircraft between 
runways and terminals. 

3. The annual cost of excessive air flight 

time resulting with some runway configurations. 

The costs were totaled and compared for each runway 
configuration. The difference in costs can then be evaluated 
with construction and maintenance costs to determine the 
benefit/cost ratios. 



43 



A common unit operating cost was used for the three 
items. It is an average cost that is to be used for compari- 
son purposes. The cost used is the direct flight operating 
cost of aircraft as reflected in the CAB i960 Direct Flight 
Cost Reports. As an example, the costs for the Boeing 
707-120 are: 

Hourly cost to 

American Airlines: Plight Operations $377-23 

Maintenance 295-61 

Depreciation 121.13 

$793-97 

Similar costs for all airlines were used to develop 
an average weighted cost of $864.25 per hour for the 707-120. 

The CAB figures were also used for other types of 
aircraft operating at O'Hare. For smaller aircraft, not 
included in the CAB report, the costs listed in reference 2 
were used. The hourly costs range from $15 per hour for light 
aircraft to the $864 per hour for jets. These costs were then 
combined to give weighted average costs of operation: 

1965 $480 per hour 
1970 $562 per hour 

B. RUNWAY DELAY ANALYSIS 

In Section V, information was given to indicate the 
procedure for developing operating rate/delay curves for each 
runway combination. These curves were used to determine the 
delay to operations for each hour, for each runway config- 
uration, and for the predicted traffic demand (only civil traf- 
fic, no military traffic was used in the analysis). The hourly 
delays were converted to annual delays and then to annual oper- 
ating costs (based on the percent of use of a runway config- 
uration) . Table IV lists the results of this analysis. 



44 



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45 



C . TAXIWAY DELAY ANALYSIS 

Taxi distances between runways and terminals were 
determined for the various runway plans. These distances 
were then converted to time., using taxi speeds to suit the 
various airport areas. 

On arrivals, taxi distance was measured from a 
point 6000 feet down the runway to each terminal finger. On 
departures , taxi distance was used from the gate to the end 
of the takeoff runway. All plans assume the existence of a 
bridge across the access road. Table IV lists the results of 
this analysis. Here, as in the runway delay analysis, only 
civil traffic was used. 

D. EXCESSIVE FLIGHT TIME IN THE AIR 



Observation of air operations points up the excess 
air time being used by many flights with the current runway 
conf iguration--Plan A. This is the only plan where this con- 
dition exists (Figure 22), but it is an added cost of oper- 
ation for Plan A as compared with Plans B, C, and D (Figure 23) 

The analysis that follows shows comparative annual 
air time costs for two conditions of operation: (l) landing 
straight-in on runway 14, versus landing straight-in on run- 
way 27* and (2) approaching on runway 14 (ILS), and circling 
to runway 27 or 32 versus landing straight-in on runway 27 or 
32. 

Using only the number of easterly arrivals in excess 
of westerly arrivals, we have developed the economic aspects 
of the two directions. We found that 10,300 of the arrivals 
who will land on runway 14 could land on runway 27- These 
aircraft, as a result of the extended flight path, would pay 
a penalty of 580 hours of flight time. We have subtracted 
about 33-1/3 percent from this figure as possible VFR traffic 



46 



that might take advantage of shorter flight paths and conclude 
that arrivals from the east annually pay $186,000 in additional 
flight time . 

Extending this analysis, we found that an additional 
25,500 arrivals from the east will let down on runway 14 (ILS), 
then circle to and complete landing on runway 27 or 32. The 
indicated penalty to this group is 2980 hours and, again elim- 
inating potential VFR traffic, results in an additional cost 
of $953*000. These figures are conservative because the bulk 
of the VFR traffic will be small aircraft, whereas VFR cost 
reduction has been based on the average operational cost. 
Some indication of the relative merits of feeding from the east 
can now be seen in the potential savings in air time alone-- 
about $1,139,000 annually. 

In summary : 

Losses in flight time for runway 14 landings $ 186,000 

Losses in flight time for runway 27 or 32 953, 000 
landings 

Total $1,139,000 

The present traffic flow is logical for the existing 
configuration but can and should be changed as soon as an 
additional runway can be built. Until recently, ' Hare was 
satellite and subservient to Midway. This was appropriate and 
allowed Midway to achieve a commendable level of operation. 
To accomplish this, Midway required the utmost in freedom of 
operation. Because Midway used a major northwest/southeast 
configuration, it was reasonable that ' Hare ' s major runway 
should be aligned in this direction. Because operation from 
any other direction would have curtailed Midway to some extent, 
it was also logical to instrument runway 14/32 and to assign 
top priority to runway 14 . Although Midway's stature has 
decreased as ' Hare has grown, it still remains a major factor 



47 



in the metropolitan complex, and until new parallel runways 
become available at O'Hare, runway 14 will remain the primary 
approach runway. 

The instrument landing system was developed to allow 
approaches during low ceiling and visibility conditions. It 
is now also used as a let-down facility when relatively high 
ceilings and visibilities exist and when a circling landing 
will ultimately be made on a runway up to 180 degrees out of 
alignment with the facility being used. Changing feeder stacks 
to serve runways (to accommodate changes in wind direction) 
is extermely unwieldy, especially during peak activity and, 
because of the inefficiencies temporarily injected, will be 
avoided if other action can be substituted. At O'Hare, this 
condition will exist with runway 14 until parallel runways 
9-27 are provided. 

E. SUMMARY AND PROJECTION TO 1980 

The summary of operating costs through 1970 is listed 
in Table IV and Figure 23. As an indication of the importance 
of the greater runway capacity available in plan D-2, the oper- 
ating cost for 1980 has been examined. New aircraft types with 
increased operating costs will undoubtedly be in operation in 
1980. However, for purposes of this examination, the 1970 costs 
and 1970 capacity analysis have been used with 1980 traffic 
forecast. Thus, it is considered that the results tabulated 
below, and shown in Figure 24, will be on the conservative side. 

Annual Taxi Annual Runway Unit Cost 
Cost 

Plan C-1970 12,243,400 

Plan D-1970 12,758,000 

Plan C-1980 15,034,900 
Plan D-1980 15,658,000 



Delay Cost 


per Movemen 
43.25 


t Total 


7,842,400 


20,085,800 


3,037,000 


34.01 


15,795,800 


19,175,400 


60.00 


34,210,300 


5,445,800 


37.00 


21,103,800 



48 



VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

1. The Chicago area has ample and unrestricted airspace 
that has the capability of readily handling the forecast air 
traffic for the area. Although terminal area airspace must 

be judiciously allocated, it has the potential of feeding both 
' Hare and Midway airports to their maximum capacity. The one 
exception is the "tight" airspace for feeding dual approaches 
to O'Hare runways 32R and 32L, but even here the use of alti- 
tude and area segregation should substantially eliminate any 
restrictions. However Glenview must remain a minor IFR facil- 
ity. 

2. The staging of runway construction should be based 
on (a) peak hour capacity analysis, (b) aircraft operating 
costs on the airport compared with runway operating and amor- 
tization costs, and (c) having adequate runways available 
despite normal runway shutdowns due to maintenance or incidents 
The timetable therefore indicates that: 

a. In 1965^ Plan A will be seriously deficient 
in peak hour capacity for an average of 
100 days per year, whereas Plan B will be 
seriously deficient in peak hour capacity 
for an average of 8 days per year. 

b. Plan B reduces operating costs over those 
of Plan A by about $5,597,300 per year. 

c. -The O'Hare traffic demand needs parallel 
runway (or better) capability. Therefore, 
the second set of parallel runways should 
be made available promptly to permit some 
flexibility of scheduling runway shutdowns 
and still retain parallel runway capability. 
Procedures should be adopted as soon as 
possible for simultaneous parallel approaches. 

Since 1962 traffic will approach the 19^5 fore- 
cast, it is obvious that the construction needed to supplement 



49 



Plans A and B should proceed Immediately. The timing of con- 
struction of Plans C and D should be determined on the basis 
of examining cost/benefit ratios (which are determined by 
Landrum and Brown) . It appears that the completion of Plan D 
will be justified by about 1970. 

3. Upon completion of Plan B construction, the terminal 
area procedures should be revised to establish the use of run- 
way priorities as presented herein. 

4. The Master Plan should be expanded as follows: 

a. Accept Plan D-2 as the master plan with new 
parallel runways spaced 1000 feet, mainly to 
alleviate runway crossing problems. 

b. Use 4-22 as a low priority runway and observe 
the actual need for a runway in this direc- 
tion. Keep runway 2L-20R in the Master Plan 
with provision for instrument runway clearances. 
Should the need for this runway prove greater 
than expected, consider constructing runway 
2L-20R and keeping existing runway 4-22 in 
operation as a semi -parallel runway configura- 
tion. In assessing use of this runway, it 
should be noted that it is used as an inter- 
secting runway 11 percent of the time. With 
respect to Runway 2R-20L, because of the low 
use of these directions, the availability of 
this runway will not appreciably reduce runway 
delay or taxi costs. In addition, its length 

is limited for much of the O'Hare traffic. 
Therefore, there is no economic justification 
for this runway. 

c. Runway length in the 9-27 and 14-32 directions 
should be equalized as much as possible to 
eliminate special use of any runway. Although 
land should be reserved for maximum length, 
the actual length in use should be consistent 
with normal aircraft performance . 

d. Runways 27R, 27C, 14R, and 14L should be estab- 
lished as major instrument runways (front-course 
ILS markers, etc.) with all back-courses kept 
available with suitable markers for bidirectional 
operation. Runway 27 F/L and 14 F/R instrumenta- 
tion should later replace 27L and 14R instrumen- 
tation. 



50 



e. Construction of runway 9L-27R should be deferred 
until it is needed to provide room for terminal 
expansion, greater runway length, and/or improved 
taxiway access, because it will not provide any 
increase in capacity and requires longer taxi 
times and therefore causes increased operating 
expense . 

5. A tremendous variation in runway capacity has been 
demonstrated as the different runway configurations are used. 
Implementation of runway priority plans will ensure the most 
efficient runway use. 

6. The high capacities predicted can be attained only 
with much attention to the controller workload. New proce- 
dures, division of workload, and new equipment will be needed 
to attain these capacities. The attainment of these items for 
controllers is the responsibility of the FAA, but the City of 
Chicago can no doubt accomplish much through cooperation on 
facilities and airport management (for example, improved 
control tower facilities, ASDE radar, Bright Tube Radar Display 
in tower, ground control aids (TRACE) for assisting takeoff 
control, etc . ) . 

7. This report has suggested operational plans for the 
various stages of O'Hare's growth. These plans have been 
developed after closely studying control techniques at facil- 
ities throughout the country. Although not confined to, these 
studies included O'Hare, Midway, Idlewild, LaGuardia, Los Angeles 
International, and Washington National Airports. Although it 

is believed that these plans are sound, it must be emphasized 
that they are not exclusive and that successful operation of 
the airport does not depend on strict adherence. The procedures 
suggested will probably be improved in actual operation—that 
is, be improved by, control personnel who will, in the final 
analysis, be responsible for the successful operation of the 
airport . 

8. The high civil demand forecast for O'Hare makes it 
desirable to minimize or eliminate military operations on the 
airport . 

51 



9. Several minor improvements in Plan A are recommended 

a. The runway 22 hold pad should be constructed 
on the east side of the runway. 

b. Improved taxiway access should be provided 
from the northerly terminal area to the 
taxiway parallel to runway 9C-27C. This 
taxiway would be used in off peak hours to 
taxi to runway 32R for takeoff. (During 
busy hours, aircraft going to runway 32R. will 
have to taxi counterclockwise around the 
terminal to avoid conflict with landing air- 
craft turning off runway 27c.) 

c. The use of runway 32R for a major departure 
runway causes end-of -runway access problems 
for those aircraft coming over the Roadway 
Bridge and then running up or awaiting clear- 
ance. It may be necessary to provide runway 
access from the center as well as the ends 

of the runup pad. 

d. The use of runway 4 for a major departure 
runway in Plan B, Priority 2, will also cause 
end-of-the-runway access problems. Improved 
access to the runway from the outer circular 
taxi strip should be provided. 

e. A taxiway should be constructed from the western 
end of runway 27c to a point on the runway 14R 
taxiway adjacent to the first turnoff to elimi- 
nate conflict between arrivals and departures 

on runway 14R . 



52 



VIII . REFERENCES 



1. "Chicago O'Hare International Airport, Master Plan 
Report," Vol II, City of Chicago, November I960. 

2. "Airport Runway and Taxi-Way Design," Report No. 7601-1, 
Airborne Instruments Laboratory, July I960, and contin- 
uing studies . 

3. "Enroute IFR Air Traffic Survey--Peak Day 1958," Federal 
Aviation Agency, Bureau of Air Traffic Management. 

4. "A New Major Airport, New York/New Jersey," Report 

No. 8076-1, Vol I, June I960, Vol II, January 1961, Air- 
borne Instruments Laboratory. 



53 



APPENDIX 
PRIORITY OF RUNWAY USE 

For simplicity , the transition from the present 
to the future (as regards runway use and priority) has been 
separated into five stages of development of plans. Although 
the selection of a specific runway configuration will, for 
the most part, depend on wind and weather phenomena, each has 
been assigned a numerical priority based primarily on hourly 
traffic handling capacity, and, to some extent, related economic 
factors . 

The techniques used to determine capacity are 
described in a previously published AIL report (reference 2). 

I. PLAN A (Figure 14) 
PRIORITY 1 

Percent of use: 46.7 

Mixed operations (arrivals and departures) 
on runways l4R and l4L 

Runway l4R has been selected to handle IFR arrivals. 
The designation "IFR arrival" identifies an aircraft operating 
on an IFR flight plan that will be processed through the sys- 
tem regardless of the weather. The use of runway l4R over l4L 
has certain economic advantages because of a shorter taxi dis- 
tance. Most of the larger aircraft will be in the IFR cate- 
gory, and additional taxi distance is most costly to this group. 

Total capacity will be the sum of the individually 
operated single runway capacities. Runway l4R will land air- 
craft at intervals dictated by IFR spacing. Where possible , 
the between-landing interval will be used for departures. 
Additional spacing may be required between arrivals to allow 
large jet departures to clear the runway. 



55 



Runway l4L has been designated to handle VFR 
arrivals during VFR conditions—that is, this runway is an 
"overflow" arrival runway. Bunched VFR arrivals will be 
landed at VFR-spaced intervals. Frequent large gaps normally 
occur in this type of operation because of the runway's 
ability to rapidly absorb the demand. It is common practice, 
therefore, to hold departures until one of these gaps occurs 
and then dispatch a number of successive departures. It is 
apparent that l4R will be the main arrival and l4L will be 
the main departure runway. Capacity studies indicate that 
the operational capacity (arrivals plus departures) of run- 
way l4L exceeds that of l4R . 

PRIORITY 2 



Percent of use: 38. 1 

Mixed operation (arrivals and departures) 
on runways 32R and 32L 

With the exception of a 180-degree change in direc- 
tion, the operational description applied to Priority 1 
applies also to Priority 2. Some reduction in capacity at 
both Midway and O'Hare may result from feeder fix complica- 
tions, and an additional penalty to Midway may result from 
the higher minima applicable to runway 31 L/R operation at 
that airport. As in Priority 1, the total capacity will be 
the sum of the individually operated single runways. 

PRIORITY 3 

Percent of use: 3.5 

Arrivals and jet departures on runway 9C 
and conventional departures on runway 4 

Priority 3 uses a crossed -runway configuration with 
an almost ideal intersection. High operational rates could 
be achieved, except that the limited length of runway 4 will 
make it mandatory that large jet departures use runway 9C . 
Unless normal gaps occur in the arrival sequence at reasonable 



56 



intervals, arrivals will have to be held off to release 
departures, and wave-off s will be a frequent possibility. 
Although the total use time of this configuration is 3.5 per- 
cent, the annual total operations are great enough to indi- 
cate that significant amounts of traffic could be involved. 
It is expected, however, that the acceptance of higher cross- 
wind components will reduce this figure. 

PRIORITY 4 

Percent of use: 7*9 

Single runway mixed (arrivals and depar- 
tures) operation on runway 27C 

Unless crosswind components greater than 15 knots 
are accepted, Priority 4 will be required 8.1 percent of the 
total time. Again, because of the large annual activity, 
significant amounts of traffic could be involved. When using 
this priority, hourly capacity will be extremely low and the 
excessive delays will result in a costly operation. (This is 
characteristic of any large airport where the demand con- 
sistently exceeds the capability of a single runway, a condi- 
tion that is indicated at ' Hare for eight or more hours each 
day.) 

PRIORITY 5 

Percent of use: 0.0 

Single runway mixed (arrivals and depar- 
tures) operation on runway 27C 

Except for l80-degree change in direction, Priority 5 
duplicates Priority 4 in operation and inadequacy. Fortunately, 
meteorological studies indicate that this configuration will 
not be required. 

PRIORITY 6 

Percent of use: 2.4 

Single runway mixed (arrivals and depar- 
tures) operation on runway 22 



57 



Potential use of this runway is limited to con- 
ventional aircraft (except during high northeasterly wind 
conditions). Its limited length will normally make its use 
by large jets undesirable. As in other single runway 
descriptions, capacity will be low and excessive delay can 
be expected. Costs will be high unless higher crosswinds 
are accepted. 

PRIORITY 7 

Percent of use: 0.3 

Single runway mixed (arrivals and depar- 
tures) operation on runway 4 

Except for a change in direction, Prior- 
ity 7 is similar to Priorities 4, 5> and 6. Furthermore, 
the extended approach course for runway 4 violates, and would 
possibly complicate, control at Midway. Fortunately, the nec- 
essity for this operation is low. 

II. PLANS B AND C (Figure 15) 

In establishing the priority of runway use, it was 
decided that runway 9L/27R (Plan C) would be substituted for 
runway 9C/27C (Plan B) only to expand the terminal area. 
Actually, because of the relocated runway 32R/27R intersection, 
this substitution will -slightly increase taxi costs and will 
result in a slight decrease in capacity for Priority 1. (The 
intersection would be moved from the 2500-foot point to the 
3900-foot point from the threshold of runway 27 , and from the 
1200-foot point to the 2400-foot point from the start-to-roll 
end of runway 32R.) Operationally, this arrangement is desirable 
only from the standpoint of additional runway length and taxiways 

PRIORITY 1 



Percent of use: 39.8 

Single runway mixed (iFR arrivals and depar- 
tures) operation on runway 27L, and cross run- 
way operation on runway 27C/32R (VFR arrivals 
on 27C, departures on 32R) 



58 



This combination of runways provides considerable 
economic benefit and high capacity. Arrival and departure 
taxi distances are optimum and the airport is fed from the 
east . 

Runway 27L has been selected as the IFR arrival 
runway. A mixed runway operation frequently results in a 
one-for-one procedure,, and the departure rate therefore 
duplicates the arrival rate. If IFR arrivals were assigned 
to runway 27C, a slow arrival rate would also result in a 
slow departure rate on the cross runway. VFR arrivals have 
therefore been assigned to runway 27C, because the shorter 
interval between arrivals results in an increased arrival 
frequency which, in turn, permits a higher departure fre- 
quency . 

The gaps between the IFR arrivals landing on run- 
way 27L are used by sandwiching departures between successive 
arrivals. As explained previously, joint use of a single 
runway requires additional runway time for a departure. The 
normal interval between successive VFR arrivals would be 
inadequate for this procedure. 

Runway 27L will be the main arrival runway and will 
operate to capacity, runway 32R will be the main departure 
runway, and runway 27C will be an overflow arrival runway. 
Because of the ability of runway 27C to rapidly absorb bunched 
VFR arrivals, frequent gaps will occur because of the normal 
lack of demand. These gaps can be used for dispatching suc- 
cessive departures which will result in some capacity increase 

PRIORITY 2 



Percent of use: 11.1 

Single runway mixed (IFR arrivals and depar- 
tures) operation on runway 9R* cross -runway 
operation on runway 9C/4 (VFR arrivals on 9C, 
departures on 4) 



59 



Priority 2 operation has been selected because it 
increases the overall capacity when using runway 4. (This 
type of operation is limited, however, because of the length 
of runway 4 and will restrict the controller in selecting 
the departure runway . ) 

Operationally, Priority 1 procedures are identical 
with those for Priority 2. However, jet departures will 
normally require or prefer runway 9R or 9C and arrival spacing 
for this runway must be adjusted accordingly. The capacity of 
runway 9R (and therefore the overall capacity of the system) 
will be lowered because of the jet loading of this runway. 

PRIORITY 3 

Percent of use: 22.2 

Single runway mixed (IFR arrivals and depar- 
tures) operation on runway 27L, and single 
runway mixed (VFR arrivals and departures) 
operation on runway 27C 

Taxi distances to and from runway 27L are shorter 
than those of runway 27C . Because the bulk of IFR arrivals 
will Involve large aircraft and because taxi distance greatly 
affects their operating cost, these aircraft have been given 
special consideration. 

In operation, IFR arrivals will land on runway 27L 
and the runway utility will be increased by sandwiched depar- 
tures. Runway 27C will act as an overflow arrival runway and 
the main departure runway. If frequent arrival gaps occur, 
the normal operation will consist of groups of high-frequency 
arrivals followed by a succession of departures. Should an 
appropriate gap fail to appear, additional spacing will be 
introduced into the arrival sequence to intermix departures. 
Capacities will be good, but below those developed by a com- 
bined single and cross-runway configuration. The economic 
benefits of east-to-west operation and low average taxi dis- 
tances make this type of operation desirable. 



60 



PRIORITY 4 

Percent of use: 8.8 

Single runway mixed ( IFR arrivals and depar- 
tures) operation on runway 9R and single run- 
way mixed (VFR arrivals and departures) oper- 
ation on runway 9C 

Except for a l80-degree change in direction, the 
procedures for Priority 4 operation duplicate those for 
Priority 3 operation. 

PRIORITY 5 



Percent of use: 7.1 

Single runway mixed ( IFR arrivals and depar- 
tures) operation on runway l4R and single 
runway mixed (VFR arrivals and departures) 
operation on runway l4L 

Priority 5 operation will be used for southeasterly 
wind conditions that exceed the runway 9 crosswind criteria. 
This will result in increased taxi costs. The total capacity 
will be approximately the same as that for Priority 3 and 4 
operation. Priority 5 operation, though not particularly 
desirable, is dictated by wind conditions and, therefore, 
unavoidable. Some reduction in use time may be achieved if 
higher crosswind components can be accepted. 

PRIORITY 6 

Percent of use: 7.2 

Single runway mixed (IFR arrivals and depar- 
tures) operation on runway 32L and single 
runway mixed (VFR arrivals and departures) 
operation on runway 32R 

Except for a change in direction, the procedures 
and factors that determine IFR arrivals are similar to those 
for Priority 3, 4, and 5 operation. Some reduction in capacity 
may result from squeezed feeder stacks because of the proximity 



61 



of Midway. Although meteorological studies indicate con- 
siderable need for this runway combination, acceptance of 
higher crosswind components may reduce the total annual 
operations affected. Unfortunate ly, the strong northwest 
winds that would require this type operation frequently 
result from a windshift after a frontal passage that may 
result in slippery runways. Crosswind landings are critical 
under these conditions. 

PRIORITY 7 

Percent of use: 2.4 

Single runway mixed (arrivals and depar- 
tures) operation on runway 22 

Conditions demanding the use of this priority will 
reduce O'Hare activities to a token operation. Should these 
conditions remain for sustained periods, delays will reach 
proportions where cancellation or alternate airport selection 
must be made. The capacity of the single runway operating 
under this priority is not compatible with ' Hare ' s obvious 
demand. It is questionable whether the existing or proposed 
taxiways will sustain the backlog of operations that will 
result from the slow movement rate. 

PRIORITY 8 

Percent of use: 0.3 

Single runway mixed (arrivals and depar- 
tures) operation on runway 4 

Except for a 180-degree change in direction, 
Priority 8 operation is similar to that under Priority 7. 
Except for circling approaches, use of this runway is compli- 
cated by the ' Hare/Midway relationship. A long, straight -in 
approach to O'Hare' s runway 4 is in direct conflict with the 
extended centerline of Midway's runway 13/31. 



62 



III. PLAN D-l (Figure 16) 

Specific runway assignments have been made for 
IFR and VFR traffic. However, this plan has been developed 
for conditions in the future _, and it is expected that traf- 
fic densities will preclude entirely Independent VFR arrival 
procedures-. Although aircraft may continue VFR for the major 
portion of flight, it is anticipated that they will enter the 
airport area at specific points and will be integrated into 
and handled similar to IFR arrivals. 

PRIORITY 1 



Percent of use: 39.8 

VFR arrivals on runway 27 F/L, VFR and IFR 
arrivals on runway 27R and departures on 
runways 27L and 32R 

Runway 27R will be used for IFR arrivals. Its 
capacity will be limited only by separation criteria and the 
ability of control personnel to achieve minimum separation. 
Runway 27L will be the main departure runway and capacity 
will be limited onlv by aircraft behavior. If short pre- 
departure check times and rolling takeoffs become common, this 
runway will have a high capacity. The crossed-runway capacity 
of runways 27R and 32R will be modified somewhat because a 
balanced simultaneous parallel approach load will require 
assignment of IFR arrivals equally to both arrival runways. 
Excess departures will continue to be handled on runway 32R 
but on a one-for-one basis rather than as bunched arrivals 
followed by bunched departures. 

PRIORITY 2 

Percent of use: 11.1 

IFR arrivals on runway 9L, departures on 
runway 2, departures on runway 9R* and 
VFR arrivals on runway 9 far right 



63 



Except for a change in direction and the substitu- 
tion of runway 2 for runway 32R, operation under this priority 
closely parallels that of Priority 1. To maintain a four- 
runway operational configuration, additional air time is 
required. As in all plans , total time used represents runway 
use dictated by 1 5 -knot crosswind criteria. This does not 
mean that straight-in feeds will necessarily be used for the 
entire time indicated. As long as circling approaches are 
practical, it is probable that aircraft will be fed from the 
east with let-down on runway 27 (similar to current procedure 
using runway 14 for let-down) and circling to runway 9. 

PRIORITY 3 

Percent of use: 22.1 

IFR arrivals on runway 27R, departures on 
runway 27R., departures on runway 27L, and 
VFR arrivals on runway 27 far left 

This priority is similar to Priority 1 except for 
the loss of runway 32. Use of this priority would be dictated 
by winds of a westerly or southwesterly direction that exceed 
runway 32 criteria. Although such a condition might allow use 
of runway 20R, the location of the intersection plus the fact 
that the runway 20R centerline extension would conflict with 
all east/west runways precludes use of this priority. Capac- 
ity, therefore, is limited to that provided by the three 
parallel east/west runways. Priority 3 operates economically, 
however, because aircraft are fed from the east and taxi dis- 
tances are short. 

PRIORITY 4 



Percent of use: 8.8 

IFR arrivals on runway 9L, departures on 
runway 9L, departures on runway 9R., and 
VFR arrivals on runway 9 far right 

Except for a change in direction, runway assignment 
follows that of Priority 3 operation. 



64 



PRIORITIES 5, 6, 7 , AND 8 

The logic of runway assignment and the total time 
each priority is used duplicates those of the same priorities 
of Plans B and C. 

IV. PLAN D-2 (Figure 17) 

The operation of three parallel runways is described 
in Section V of this report. The only significant difference 
between Plans D-l and D-2 is the addition of a third parallel 
runway to the northwest/southeast conf iguration--runway 14 far 
right and runway 32 far left. The sequence of and total use 
time of Plan D-2 duplicates that of Plan D-l. Of major impor- 
tance , however, is the fact that with Plan D-2 three-parallel 
runway capacity will exist an additional 14.3 percent of the 
time--that is, a total of 96.2 percent. 



65 



PEAK HOUR 1800-1859 



24 



O 



50 



EIGHT-HOUR PERIOD 1400-2159 
28 



187 



I 

O 




273 



SOURCE! AIRLINE TRAFFIC 
GUIDE, SEPTEMBER 1961 



19 



FIGURE 1. SCHEDULED TRAFFIC VOLUME FOR CHICAGO AREA RELATED 
TO DIRECTION OF TRAVEL 




FIGURE 2. CHICAGO PEAK DAY LOW-ALTITUDE ENROUTE IFR TRAFFIC 
COUNT 




Eh 
PS 

o 

(X, 

H 
< 



k 

o 

Pd 
o 

co 

w 

Eh 

r^ 
o 
PS 

w 

PS 
P 
Eh 



a. 
H 
ft 

P 



i-h" 

< 
> 
H 

PS 
PS 
< 

H 

VD 



CO 



p 

H 




PRIORITIES 



2 

3 

5 m 



8 



I — ~~1 

mm 



WINDS WHEN RUNWAY 
4-22 IN USE 



NOT COVERED 



FIGURE 4. WIND CONDITIONS FOR RUNWAY COMBINATIONS OF PLAN B 



540 





480 


in 




Q 




z 




o 
o 


420 


UJ 




en 




z 




in 


360 


UJ 




cr 




3 




1- 


300 


<r 




Q. 




UJ 




O 




O 


240 


1- 




>- 




< 




-J 


180 


Q 




UJ 




O 




<I 


120 


UJ 




>• 




<. 






60 





















V 














^\ 










^\ 27C 






32R 









































































10 20 30 40 50 

TOTAL MOVEMENTS PER HOUR 



60 



70 



FIGURE 5. DELAY/OPERATING RATE ANALYSIS FOR RUNWAYS 27C AND 32R 



100 
90 
80 
70 

60 



or 


50 


h- 


40 


ii i 




o 


30 


LC 




UJ 




Q. 


ZU 




10 












































































4 ki | M 1 UP 


/HIITDJfr 




— 1 




/ 


1 I 1 1. i 






/ ,6-MINUTE AVERAGE 


u 7 


Ji- 














/ 


r t 
















L --i 




















1 


1 1 





3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 
DELAY IN MINUTES 



FIGURE 6. DISTRIBUTION OF AVERAGE DELAY OF 4 AND 6 MINUTES 



100 
90 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 












































1 








/ 


WITHOUT Mil ITA 


RY 


















/ 


































7 


























1965 VFR 




1 

1 


















1 








W]TH nllT MM ITARY 


r — 


— -l 






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i 
I 


■ 


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— 






























u — _ 



































































03 



05 



07 



09 



II 13 

HOUR 



23 



FIGURE 7. TYPICAL HOURLY DISTRIBUTION OF TRAFFIC 



ARRIVAL RATE (\ ) = DEPARTURE 
RATE (X 2 ) 

VFR SPACING 

CONTINENTAL AIRPORT POPULATION 

SHADED AREA OF CURVE 2 INDICATES 
VARIATION RESULTING FROM DEGREE 
OF DEPENDENCE BETWEEN RUNWAYS 



© H- 



-*j |*-|000 FT 
J I I I LJI 



-9000 FT- 



ARRIVALS 




1000 FT 



ARRIVALS 




DEPARTURES 



© 




DEPARTURES 
1000 FT 





























I 










IN 


T" 
























































i 












V 


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r* 































































20 4 60 8 100 

TOTAL MOVEMENTS PER HOUR (X, + X 2 ) 



120 



140 



FIGURE 8. ANALYSIS OF OPEN-VEE RUNWAYS 



ARRIVAL RATE (X ) = DEPARTURE 
RATE (X 2 ) 

VFR SPACING 

CONTINENTAL AIRPORT POPULATION 

9000-FOOT RUNWAYS WITH 1000-FOOT 
TURN-OFFS 



DEPARTURE 



-7 500 FT- 



3 



DEPARTURE _ 



l»-4500 FT— • 



< 
_l > 



DEPARTURE _ 



150 



OFT »j 






© © © © 


10 ' i i U ' 1 1 


= = = Q.-: © Sm^= #.= 


_ 2s, #(4 , £._] 5» 

9 _ 1 , 1_| 


=T 


f 3 T 


S3 


t i 


t ± 


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2 7 4 t J 


- I t £ 


s /i 1 / 


2 /ft 


t -i 


r, s H r j 


k jt 2 I 


1 ± t -i 


£ I - I 


2 5 tt _, E 


s -it -i £ 


o JF ± + 


° ill 


> 4 -U -T T 


< 4X 4 t 


- 1 It _Z ' 


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±k ~L t 


2 3 -?t 7 -rC 


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< ^-^ ^ 2- 


2 -J^"2- 2! ^^ 


S/?. / y*' 


^ z ^^ ^^ 


^^^^"^ 


o ^^Sc^ --* 1 " 



10 20 30 40 50 60 

TOTAL MOVEMENTS PER HOUR (X, + X 2 ) 



70 



80 



FIGURE 9. ANALYSIS OF INTERSECTING RUNWAYS 




EXISTING RUNWAYS 
NEW CONSTRUCTION 



27C 



V"- 



32R 



32L 



FIGURE 10. AIRPORT DEVELOPMENT --PLAN A 




27L 



FIGURE 11. AIRPORT DEVELOPMENT— PLAN B 



□ EXISTING RUNWAYS 
H NEW CONSTRUCTION 



27R 




i 27L 



32L 



FIGURE 12. AIRPORT DEVELOPMENT --PLAN C 



EXISTING RUNWAYS 
NEW CONSTRUCTION 



I4F/R 




FIGURE 13. AIRPORT DEVELOPMENT --PLAN D 




NUMBERS IN 
CIRCLES INDICATE 
PRIORITY 



FIGURE 14. PRIORITY OF RUNWAY USE --PLAN A 



I4R 




32L 










CD 



® 



* PLAN B - RUNWAYS 9C/27C, 4/22 
PLAN C - RUNWAYS 9L/27R, 2L/20R 

NUMBERS IN CIRCLES INDICATE PRIORITY 



FIGURE 15. PRIORITY OP RUNWAY USE--PLANS B AND C 




27R 



9F/R 32 L 27F/L 



© 











© 



(D 



NUMBERS IN CIRCLES INDICATE PRIORITY 



FIGURE 16. PRIORITY OF RUNWAY USE--PLAN D-l 



I4F/R 




27R 



32F/L 32L 27F A 











® 



NUMBERS IN CIRCLES INDICATE PRIORITY 



FIGURE 17. PRIORITY OP RUNWAY USE--PLAN D-2 



KEY 
DEMAND 

PLAN A CAPACITY 
PLAN B CAPACITY 
PLAN D-2 CAPACITY 



400 




40 60 80 100 
MOVEMENTS PER HOUR 



FIGURE 18. 



PRACTICAL CAPACITY COMPARED WITH FORECAST PEAK 
HOUR DEMAND- -196 5 



IA 280 



^240 



200 



o 160 



A 120 



80 



S 40 



Q 



PLAN - 



20 40 60 



PLAN B 




PLAN D-2 



20 40 60 

MOVEMENTS PER HOUR 



20 40 60 



FIGURE 19. EXTENT BY WHICH DEMAND EXCEEDS CAPACITY--1965 



. KEY 
DEMAND 

PLAN B CAPACITY 
PLAN C CAPACITY 
PLAN D-2 CAPACITY 



IA 



UJ 

> 

o 



CO 

>- 

Q 



400 
360 
320 
280 
240 
200 
160 
120 
80 
40 



3> 



=aj 



NOTE: DEMAND IS NOT 
NECESSARILY 
COINCIDENT WITH 
CAPACITY 

© PLAN B, PLAN C, PLAN D-2 
© PLAN B, PLAN C 



"1 



\ 



i 



20 40 60 80 100 120 
MOVEMENTS PER HOUR 



140 160 



FIGURE 20. 



PRACTICAL CAPACITY COMPARED WITH FORECAST PEAK 
HOUR DEMAND--1970 



320 




20 40 



20 40 60 20 40 60 
MOVEMENTS PER HOUR 



FIGURE 21. EXTENT BY WHICH DEMAND EXCEEDS CAPACITY--1970 




\l.8 MINUTES ?3 MINUTES / / 

\ ^ £3jt»iNUltb / 3.6 MINUTES 

// 
// 

1.8 MINUTES 
3 MILES OUT 



\* 



FIGURE 22. EXCESS AIR TIME RESULTING FROM LACK OF NEW 
RUNWAY 9R-27L 



1965 
410,900 MOVEMENTS 

OPERATING COST *480 PER HOUR 
20 



1970 
464,435 MOVEMENTS 

OPERATING COST *562 PER HOUR 



CO 
CE 



o 

Q 



o 

CO 

o 



CO 

o 
o 



cr 



a. 
o 



3> 




KEY 



EXCESS AIRTIME COST 
RUNWAY DELAY COST 
TAXI TIME COST 
COST PER MOVEMENT 




PLAN PLAN PLAN 
A B D-2 



PLAN PLAN PLAN 
B C D-2 



FIGURE 23. COMPARISON OF OPERATING COSTS 



1970 
464,435 MOVEMENTS 

OPERATING COST *562 PER HOUR 
36 



1980 
570,320 MOVEMENTS 
OPERATING COST *562 PER HOUR 




KEY 



RUNWAY DELAY COST 
TAXI TIME COST 
COST PER MOVEMENT 




PLAN PLAN 
C D 



PLAN PLAN 
C D 



FIGURE 24. COMPARISON OP OPERATING COSTS- -1970 - 1