Skip to main content

Full text of "On tactics and organization; or, English military institutions and the continental systems"

See other formats 


UNIVERSITY   OF   CALIFORNIA. 

Received.^.  °^^£^  .,____, 

Accessions  No*. <&£?&.<&.&  Shelf  No. 


Main  Lib. 


TACTICS    AND    ORGANIZATION. 


By  the  Same  Author : 

The  Invasion  and  Defence  of  England. 

Crown  8vo.,  Sewed,  One  Shilling. 


"Ably  written,  and  full  of  suggestive  matter 
of  the  highest  importance  to  the  security  of  the 
country." —  Glasgow  Herald. 

"  The  Phamplet  is  one  whose  merits  can  best  be 
estimated  by  experts  in  the  art  of  modern  warfare, 
but  which  the  lay  reader  will  welcome  as  an  able, 
thoughtful,  and  original  contribution  to  a  topic  of 
unsurmountable  importance." — Home  News. 


o  TST 


^ 


TACTICS  AND  ORGANIZ 


ENGLISH  MILITARY  INSTITJ^O^AND  THE 
CONTINENTAI 


BY 


CAPT.    F.    N.    MAUDE,     E.E. 


W.   THACKER   &   CO.,    87,    NEWGATE  STREET. 

CALCUTTA— THACKER,    SPINK   &   CO. 

BOMBAY— THACKER   &   CO.,    LTD. 


1888. 


HKIVERSIT7 


CONTENTS. 


Page. 

Preface            ........  1 

England's  Danger  .......  12 

The  Cost  of  Conscription            ...         -         -  25 

The  Next  Franco  -German  War         ...         -  32 

The  German  Officer           .....         -  52 

The  German  Cavalry         -         -         -  88 

Lessons  from  the  Austrian  Cavalry  -         -         -         -  97 

Cavalry  in  War       .......  106 

Cavalry  versus  Infantry  -                                        -          -  115 

A  day  with  the  German  Cavalry        -         -          -  120 

Frederic  the  Great's  Cavalry     -                   -         -    *  152 
Long  Distance  Rides        -         -         -         -         -         -167 

German  Cavalry  Manoeuvres,   1886  -          -          -  177 

The  German  Field  Artillery    .....  185 

The  Tactics  of  Field  Artillery  .....  196 

Attack  Formation  for  Infantry         -         -         -  215 
German  Equipment          -         -         -         -         -         -257 

German  Musketry-            ......  268 

Losses  in  Battle      .......  277 

Discipline  and  the  Breechloader       -         -         -         -  289 

Tactics  of  the  American  War           ....  299 

German  Opinion  on  the  Delhi  Manoeuvres           -         -  313 
Spirit  of  the  Russian  Army    -         -         -         -         -331 

Russian  Infantry  Tactics          -         -         -         -  341 

Russian  Mounted  Infantry       -----  348 

Russian  Commissariat      ......  355 

The  Austrian  Infantry    ......  362 

Tactics  in  India      -------  376 

Entrance  Examination  for  Army     -  386 

The  Training  of  Officers          .....  398 

Professional  Ignorance  in  the  Army         -         -         -  411 
Letters  on  Strategy          -         -         -         -         -         -421 

On  Inspections         -         -         -         -         -         -         -434 

The  Secret  of  Success  in  War          -         -         -         -  443 

European  and  Asiatic  Warfare        -         -         -         -  454 

Cavalry  versus  Infantry  at  Lawrencepore          -         -  463 

Lessons  of  Lawrencepore  Camp       -         ...  476 

Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field    .....  503 


PREFACE. 


IN  the  present  days  when  both  armies 
and  wars  have  ceased  to  be  dynastic  and 
have  everywhere,  except  in  England,  be- 
come national,  it  is  becoming  daily  of  in- 
creasing importance  that  the  nature  of 
modern  war,  the  sacrifices  it  entails,  and 
the  principles  on  which  it  is  conducted, 
should  be  brought  prominently  before  the 
notice  of  the  civilian  public.  More  so 
in  England  where  we  have  no.  strictly 
speaking,  national  army,  but  where  a  Ci- 
vilian House  of  Commons  interferes  so 
largely,  and  a  non-militaire  press  criti- 
cises so  freely,  details  and  movements 
which  it  requires  a  certain  degree  of  mi- 
litary education  to  grasp.  Not  a  very 
large  degree  certainly,  but  as  far  as  it 
goes,  it  should  be  based  on  accurate  prin- 
ciples. There  is  nothing  recondite  in 
these  principles,  they  are  usually  founded 


VI  PREFACE. 

on  pure  common  sense,  and  as  the  great 
German  military  author  Von  der  Goltz  re- 
marks, since  they  deal  with  the  simplest 
things  such  as  men,  guns,  horses,  roads, 
there  is  no  reason  why  they  should  not  be 
treated  of  in  simple  language.  But  the 
trouble  in  this  case  is  to  reach  the  readers. 
A  book  with  a  purely  military  title  is  read 
only  by  purely  military  men,  and  it 
seemed,  therefore,  to  the  writer  that  the 
best  way  to  get  at  the  readers  he  wanted, 
was  through  the  columns  of  the  daily 
press,  which  also  forms  a  way  of  ap- 
proach to  the  minds  of  the  non-book-read- 
ing class  of  soldier,  who,  though  he  will 
shy  at  a  book  in  a  red  cover,  will  wade 
comfortably  through  a  military  leader  in 
a  newspaper  whilst  discussing  his  break- 
fast. Though  most  of  the  articles  were 
written  for  the  moment  only,  yet,  as  a  rule, 
they  are  based  on  principles  whose  im- 
portance is  more  than  ephemeral,  and 
since  as  a  body  they  appear  to  have  been 
well  received  by  the  officers  of  the  army, 


PREFACE.  Vll 

it  lias  seemed  well  to  republisli   them  in 
book  form. 

The  writer's  object  throughout  has  been 
to  present  or  discuss  English  military 
institutions  and  forms,  from  the  point  of 
view  and  in  the  spirit  of  modern  warfare 
as  understood  in  Germany,  and  also  to 
familiarise  his  readers  with  the  great 
principles  which  in  their  application  con- 
stitute the  backbone  of  German  military 
efficiency.  He  is  no  blind  copyist  of 
foreign  military  forms,  and  is  certainly 
not  inclined  to  underrate  the  courage  or 
warlike  capacity  of  his  countrymen,  but 
wishes  only  to  see  those  principles,  not 
forms,  introduced  into  our  service,  which 
seem  most  in  harmony  with,  and  best 
suited  to  develop,  the  full  fighting  value 
of  the  race. 

These  are  but  few:  Discipline,  "  Die 
Offensive  Geist"  or  spirit  of  attack,  and 
delegation  of  responsibility  to  the  junior 
grades.  These  three,  if  once  introduced 
in  full  force,  would,  in  his  opinion,  more 


Vlll  PREFACE. 

than  double  the  fightiqg  power  of  the  army 
and  that  without  a(f<3?ng  one  farthing  to 
the  estimates. 

To  all  wrhose  susceptibilities  he  may 
have  wounded,  by  his  perhaps  too  vigour- 
ous  language,  he  offers  sincere  apologies, 
and  onlv  be°;s  that  it  mav  be  taken  into 

*/  o  »/ 

consideration,  that  a  man  who  feels  strong- 
ly cannot  but  write  strongly,  and  that  every 
line  has  been  dictated  by  a  wish  to  serve 
the  cause  of  his  Queen  and  country  to 
the  best  of  his  ability. 


LETTERS  ON 

TACTICS   AND   ORGANIZATION. 


ENGLAND'S  DANGER. 

fllHE  surprise  created  by  Prince  Bis- 
JL  mark's  changed  policy,  has,  perhaps, 
rarely  been  equalled  in  diplomatic  circles, 
and  it  must  also  have  been  a  serious  shock 
to  his  numerous  followers  in  his  own 
country.  But  a  short  time  ago,  it  was 
a  fixed  idea  in  every  German  officer's 
mind,  that  any  further  interference  by 
Russia  in  Bulgaria  meant  war.  On 
every  side  one  was  assured  that  the  under- 
standing between  Austria  and  Germany 
was  perfect,  and  that  the  time  had  come 
to  put  an  end,  once  and  for  all,  to  the 
aggressive  tendencies  of  the  Slav.  A 
recent  study  of  the  probable  theatre  of 
war  in  that  event,  signed  by  the  pseu- 
donym of  "  Sarmaticus  "  (a  most  able 

M.,  L.  1 


2  England's  Danger. 

work  by  the  way ),  was  received  with  more 
than  usual  enthusiasm  by  the  military 
press.  One  heard  it  discussed  at  almost 
every  mess  table,  and  both,  in  Germany 
and  Austria  the  idea  of  a  loyal  co-oper- 
ation was  looked  forward  to  with  universal 
pleasure.  The  possible  alliance  between 
France  and  Russia  certainly  had  no  terrors 
for  the  army,  as  they  very  cogently  point- 
ed out  that  their  defences  on  both  eastern 
and  western  frontiers  had  specially  been 
based  on  the  idea  of  this  coalition,  and 
with  Austria's  assistance,  a  few  weeks 
would  suffice  to  inflict  such  a  check  on 
France,  that  it  would  be  possible  to  trans- 
fer the  bulk  of  the  troops  engaged  with 
her  to  the  other  frontier,  which,  by  means 
of  their  perfect  system  of  strategic  lines, 
could  be  carried  out  within  ten  days. 
Considering  the  results  obtained  in  thirty 
days  in  1870,  and  that  the  French  Army 
is  by  jio  means  as  efficient  as  a  fighting 
engine  now-a-days  as  it  was  then, — this 
at  least  is  the  opinion  of  those  who  fought 


England's  Danger.  3 

against  it  during  that  campaign,  and  have 
watched  with  the  closest  attention  its 
development  ever  since, — it  appears  quite 
probable  that  the  German  officers  may  be 
right  ;  and  within  six  weeks — in  less  time, 
in  fact,  than  the  unwieldy  Colossus  of  the 
North  can  really  mobilise  her  army — her 
ally  may  be  crushed  and  bleeding,  before 
she  herself  can  have  struck  a  blow. 

Granted  that  this  view  of  the  case  is 
correct,  and  that  Prince  Bismark  is,  as 
the  Germans  love  to  believe  him,  an 
honest  man,  it  is  indeed  hard  to  account 
for  his  action  ;  but  there  is  another  view 
of  the  Prince's  character,  not  altogether 
new  to  those  who  have  studied  his  career. 
In  politics,  Prince  Bismark  is,  and  has 
always  been,  a  thorough  Jesuit,  and  holds 
firmly  to  the  principle,  that  the  end  justi- 
fies the  means.  Witness  the  secret  history 
of  the  Benedetti  treaty  ;  and  is  it  not  possi- 
ble that  he  is  playing  the  same  game  now  ? 

The   chief  problem  he  has  now  to   con- 
tend with  at  home,  is  to  provide  an  outlet 


4  England's  Danger. 

for  his  surplus  population,  every  year 
becoming  larger,  and  at  the  same  time  to 
seize  on  some  of  the  trade,  which  he  and 
every  other  foreigner  believes  to  have  been 
won  from  him  by  us,  by  our  having  taken 
a  mean  advantage  of  their  disasters  at 
the  commencement  of  the  century.  It  is 
useless  to  expect  either  a  Frenchman  or 
German  to  believe  that  we  owe  our  present 
commerical  prosperity  to  the  superior  busi- 
ness qualifications  of  our  merchants.  With 
natural  and  pardonable  national  vanity, 
they  refuse  to  believe  anything  of  the  sort. 
The  Frenchman  attributes  it  to  Napoleon's 
fatal  continental  blockade,  and  to  the  ruin  of 
the  French  navy  caused  by  the  inconsi- 
derate action  of  the  Terrorists  of  the 
Revolution.  Unquestionably,  had  it  not 
been  for  these  latter,  who  decapitated  the 
very  flower  of  their  naval  commanders, 
our  naval  supremacy  would  not  have  been 
so  easily  acquired.  The  Germans  point- 
to  the  ruin  to  Germany's  industries  caused 
by  their  fatal  defeat  in  1806,  and  how 


England's  Danger.  5 

very  real  a  ruin  it  was,  few  who  have  not 
lived  amongst  them,  can  realise.  Almost 
every  family  of  any  repute  gave  up  during 
those  terrible  years  every  vestige  of  jewellery 
or  plate  they  possessed?  and  still  shew  as 
their  proudest  possession,  the  iron  ring 
given  them  by  the  king  as  an  acknowledg- 
ment of  their  sacrifices.  Both  countries 
join  in  believing  that,  if  only  a  violent 
shock  can  be  given  to  the  present  course 
of  trade,  they  will  easily  regain  what  they 
hold  to  be  their  fair  share  of  it.  There 
can  be  no  doubt,  too,  that,  though  the 
army  of  Germany  is  full  of  fight,  the 
voting  part  of  the  nation,  that  part  repre- 
sented by  the  Reichsrath,  desire  peace 
most  ardently  ;  and  it  is  this  very  Reichs- 
rath that  has  always  been  a  thorn  in  the 
side  to  the  Prince. 

Now,  if  Prince  Bismark  can  manage  to 
keep  the  country  out  of  war,  whilst  all 
the  rest  of  Europe  are  embroiled  in  it,  the 
advantages  he  will  derive  are  manifest. 
In  the  first  place,  the  Reichsrath  will  be 


6  England's  Danger. 

satisfied  ;  in  the  second,  the  opportunity 
will  be  given  to  German  commerce  ;  and,  in 
the  third,  he  will  be  able  to  step  in,  when  the 
time  comes,  as  general  peacemaker,  making 
a  sufficient  demonstration  with  his  army  to 
appease  their  martial  appetites. 

Let  us  look  at  the  cards  he  holds. 
Having  assured  Russia  for  the  second  time 
that  all  Bulgaria  is  not  worth  the  bones  of 
a  single  Pomeranian  grenadier  to  Germany, 
it  will  be  easy  to  obtain  her  good  offices 
with  France  ;  and  a  little  judicious  flattery 
to  the  latter  will  suffice  to  inflame  them 
with  the  idea  that,  England  being  now 
engaged  in  a  life  and  death  struggle  with 
Russia,  the  time  has  arrived  to  make  good 
her  claim  to  Egypt.  Whether  that  claim 
is  good  or  bad  matters  little  to  the  French 
nation  ;  it  is,  at  any  rate,  considerably 
better  now  than  it  was  wrhen  they  fought 
us  for  it  in  1800  ;  and  being  quite  the 
most  ignorant  population,  politically,  in 
Europe,  a  very  little  will  suffice  to  heat 
their  passions  to  flashing  point.  There 


England's  Danger.  7 

is,  and  has  been  for  the  last  ten  years,  a 
growing  anti-English  party  in  France, 
who  have  lost  no  opportunity  of  preaching 
a  crusade  against  la  perfide  Albion ;  and 
it  requires  only  a  few  incendiary  articles 
in  the  Parisian  press,  holding  forth  their 
grievances  and  the  booty  to  be  obtained,  to 
more  than  quadruple  its  number  and  vio- 
lence. To  those  who  doubt  this,  we  would 
recommend  a  study  of  the  secret  history  of 
the  retirement  of  the  French  fleet  from 
Alexandria  in  1882.  The  question  how  it 
managed  to  pass  Gibraltar  in  the  night 
without  being  signalled,  has  as  yet  remained 
unanswered  ;  but,  if  it  did  nothing  else,  it 
showed,  once  and  for  all,  how  very  easy  it 
would  be  for  France  to  obtain  a  crushing 
numerical  superiority  in  the  Channel. 
There  is  reason,  amounting  to  almost  cer- 
tainty, to  believe  that  at  that  moment  the 
French  could  have  brought  nearly  thirty 
ironclads  of  first  and  second  class  against 
our  Channel  squadron,  consisting  at  the 
time  of  only  five  second-rate  vessels. 


8  England's  Danger. 

If  France  chose  to  quarrel  with,  us  about 
Egypt  or  the  New  Hebrides,  it  would  not 
be  in  either  of  those  out-of-the-way  places 
she  would  seek  for  a  decision.  After  the 
reminder  the  Germans  gave  them  in  1870, 
it  is  not  likely  they  will  again  forget 
Napoleon's  first  and  leading  principle  of 
war,  viz.,  direct  your  stroke  at  that  portion 
of  the  enemy's  line  which  promises  the 
greatest  consequences  with  the  least  risk, 
and  given  a  sufficient  superiority  in  the 
"  narrow  seas,  "  an  occupation  of  London 
promises  far  the  greatest  results,  with  in- 
finitely less  risk  than  that  incurred  by  a 
distant  expedition  to  Egypt.  Besides, 
whereas  the  whole  mobilization  scheme  of 
France  is  liable  to  be  practically  destroyed, 
as  has  been  recently  proved,  by  such  a  com-- 
paratively  trifling  effort  as  the  campaign 
in  Tonkin,  the  mobilization  of  the  five 
northern  corps  would  create  no  disturbance 
whatever  ;  indeed,  four  of  these  five  corps 
were  mobilized  in  1882  without  exciting 
any  comment  on  either  side  of  the  Channel* 


England's  Danger.  9 

As  for  the  risks  such  a  descent  on  our  coast 
would  entail,  it  must  be  remembered  that 
the  French  look  at  it  from  quite  a  different 
point  of  view  to  ours.  Man  for  man,  they 
consider  themselves  at  least  as  good,  and 
as  far  as  their  military  history  goes,  there 
is  no  reason  why  they  should  not  ;  not 
one  Frenchman  in  a  thousand  ever  heard  of 
the  battles  of  Vittoria,  Salamanca,  or  the 
storming  of  Cuidad  Rodrigo  and  Badajos. 
Bugeaud's  immortal  description  of  the 
British  line  is  quite  as  unknown  to  them 
as  it  was  to  us,  till  Colonel  Hume,  R.E., 
rescued  it  from  oblivion  and  enshrined  it 
in  the  best  English  work  on  tactics  of  the 
century.  Their  ideas  of  Waterloo  are 
either  taken  from  Thiers  or  Victor  Hugo, 
and  two  more  miserable  salves  to  national 
vanity  have  never  been  published.  And 
assuming  the  equality  of  the  troops,  a  very 
casual  study  of  a  railway  map,  in  conjunction 
with  the  mobilization  scheme — (which  is  a 
very  real  and  important  part  of  our  national 
defences,  being  the  only  document  on 


10  England's  Danger. 

which  they  are  based)— and  Viscount 
Wolseley's  pocket-book  are  sufficient  to 
prove  that  the  occupation  of  London  by 
the  evening  of  the  fourth  day  after  the 
landing,  is  not  only  no  visionary  scheme, 
but  one  perfectly  feasible  from  a  military 
point  of  view.  And  what  results  does  not 
such  an  occupation  promise — not  only  the 
absolute  derangement  of  our  trade,  but  the 
rape  of  our  colonies,  and  the  surrender  of 
our  fleet. 

But  would  such  a  complete  catastrophe 
ever  be  tolerated  ?  No,  at  the  very  climax 
of  the  scene,  the  deus  ex  macliina.  Prince 
von  Bismarck  would  step  in,  and  like  a 
second  Canute,  only  more  effectually,  would 
command,  "  thus  far  shall  thou  go  and  no 
further,  "  with  the  threat  of  armed  inter- 
vention to  back  him. 

All  Europe  being  sick  with  fighting,  he 
would  then  be  able  to  pose  as  peacemaker. 
Whatever  he  chose  to  insist  on,  he  could 
assuredly  obtain.  With  his  still  intact 
army,  he  would  be  in  the  position  of  the 


England's  Danger.  11 

Cavalry  leader  with  the  last  closed  squad- 
rons in  hand,  i.e.,  master  of  the  field.  His 
army  and  his  Reichsrath.  contented,  he 
could  afford  to  be  generous,  and  would 
probably  allow  France  undisputed  posses- 
sion of  such  of  our  colonies  as  she  chose 
to  demand,  certain  that,  even  if  she  got 
them,  she  could  not  keep  them,  and  be- 
lieving that  the  national  commercial  genius 
of  his  countryman,  in  which  he,  naturally, 
like  every  other  German,  believes,  would 
suffice  in  the  new  condition  of  affairs,  to 
win  for  them  against  our  competition. 
Would  not  such  a  result  be  better  worth 
playing  for  than  merely  satisfying  Austria 
for  the  wounds  inflicted  at  Sadowa  ?  Nor 
need  Austria  be  forgotten,  for,  after  the 
almost  certain  defeat  of  Russia,  she  might 
be  allowed  to  carve  up  ,the  possessions  of  * 
the  Sultan  in  her  own  way, — whilst  Italy 
might  be  given  a  sop,  in  return  for  renounc- 
ing her  irredenta  theories,  in  .Dalmatia, 
the  Ionian  Isles,  and,  perhaps,  Cyprus. 


THE  COST  OF  CONSCRIPTION. 

LORD  Randolph  Churchill's  recent  speech 
at  Wolverhampton  has  been  severely 
pulled  to  pieces  by  his  critics,  because,  in 
comparing  the  actual  amount  of  money 
spent  by  the  different  nations  of  Europe 
on  their  armaments,  he  made  no  mention 
of  the  actual  loss  sustained  by  these  na- 
tions through  the  action  of  their  conscrip- 
tion laws.  But  none  of  his  detractors 
have  been  good  enough  to  furnish  us  with 
even  a  rough  estimate  of  what  the  cost  of 
conscription  really  is.  They  have  been 
content  to  make  a  mere  assumption,  on  the 
hope  that  it  will  be  blindly  swallowed  by 
their  readers.  Probably  they  themselves 
had  not  the  vaguest  idea  of  what  they 
were  asserting  as  they  wrote  ;  it  is  a  com- 
monplace expression  in  every  one's  mouth, 
and  nobody  seems  inclined  to  look  at  it 
from  a  business  point  of  view.  But  we 
propose  to  go  even  further  than  that,  and 


The  Cost  of  Conscription.  13 

to  consider  it  from  a  socialist  point  of  view 
— not  necessarily  the  same  thing  ;  though 
the  adherents  of  that  school  of  thought 
would  willingly  have  us  believe  it.  We 
may  summarize  the  creed  of  this  school 
briefly  in  three  propositions.  Free  educa- 
tion, national  workshops,  down  with  large 
fortunes,  or,  in  other  words,  a  sliding  scale 
of  taxation  directed  against  the  large  land- 
owners and  capitalists. 

Now,  in  the  first  case,  what  is  meant 
by  the  expression  "  free  education  ?  "  What 
is  the  actual  meaning  of  the  word  "  educa- 
tion" by  itself?  Even  the  Socialist  knows — 
though  he  will  not  always  admit  it — that 
the  mere  power  of  reading  and  writing 
does  not  cover  the  whole  meaning  of  the 
term.  Certainly  the  heads  of  the  society, 
men  like  Lasalle,  Carl  Marx,  even  the  lead- 
ers of  the  "  Commune/7  knew  very  well 
that  it  took  more  than  mere  book-learning 
to  make  them  the  men  they  actually  were  ; 
for,  let  us  not  deceive  ourselves,  those  men 
were  real  leaders  though  in  what  we  consi- 


14  The  Cost  of  Conscription. 

der  a  misguided  movement,  and  they  only 
attained  their  position  through  self-sacri- 
fice, discipline  (in  the  sense  of  the  Roman 
Church)  and  self  -  abnegation.  Twenty 
years  ago,  when  national  education  first 
became  a  popular  cry,  men  were  deputed 
from  England  to  visit  and  examine  into  the 
system  of  free  education  in  vogue  in  Ger- 
many. They  went,  returned  and  reported, 
but  they  misled  entirely  what  every  Ger- 
man knows  to  be  the  keystone  of  their 
educational  edifice,  and  that  was  the  Army, 
or  the  national  University  ;  for,  in  fact, 
the  army  in  Germany  performs  the  same 
function  to  all  who  are  found  physically 
able  to  stand  the  strain,  as  the  Universities 
do  in  England  for  the  upper  classes.  A 
boy  in  England  goes  to  the  University  as 
the  hero  of  a  Grammar  School,  or  even  of 
a  public  school,  but  the  contact  with  many 
other  heroes  of  many  other  schools  soon 
brings  him  to  his  proper  level.  If  he 
avoids  the  University  and  goes  into  business, 
the  struggle  for  existence  soon  teaches  him 


The  Cost  of  Conscription.  15 

the  same.  The  more  adventurous  boys 
emigrate  and  there,  wherever  it  may  hap- 
pen to  be,  soon  learn  in  the  rough  school 
of  life,  their  actual  relative  position  in  so- 
ciety. The  three  years'  service  in  the 
ranks  exercise  just  the  same  effect  on  those 
called  on  to  undergo  it :  it  is  the  practicable 
application  of  the  old  saying,  "  through 
obedience  learn  to  command. "  They  are 
taught  to  obey,  and  hence,,  each  according 
to  his  actual  value  as  a  man,  learns  to  com- 
mand ;  and  even  in  civil  life  no  man  can 
succeed  till  he  has  learnt  that  first  and 
greatest  secret.  But  it  may  be  argued 
(we  are  writing  of  the  German  Army), 
that  this  obedience  is  enforced  in  an  un- 
necessarily brutal  and  inconsiderate  way. 
We  can  only  meet  that  statement  by  an 
almost  direct  contradiction.  It  is  true  that 
German  officers  and  non-commissioned  offi- 
cers cannot  enforce  obedience  with  the 
same  gentleness  that,  as  a  rule,  English- 
men can.  But  the  fault  is  not  one  belong- 
ing to  the  army  specially,  but  to  the  whole 


16  The  Cost  of  Conscription. 

race  ;  and  we  are  perfectly   assured  that, 
compared  to  the  way  in  which  the  ordinary 
German     tradesman     enforces     obedience 
amongst  his   own  employes,    the  apparent 
hardness  of  discipline  in  the  German  Army 
compares  just   as  favourably  as   our  own 
army  discipline  with  that  of  our  "  trade'7 
discipline.     The  truth  is  that — it  lies  in 
human  nature — a  man   will  naturally  en- 
force his  power  against  another  whose  mis- 
conduct touches   his  pocket,    much   more 
severely  than  against  one  whose  bad   be- 
haviour does  not  influence  his   daily-bread 
side  of  the  question  in  the  smallest  degree. 
We  have  only  to  look  at  the  way  in  which 
drunkenness  on  duty  is  punished  in  the 
army  and  in  civil  life.     A  man  in  the  latter, 
drunk  in  a  position  where  sobriety  is  essen- 
tial,   will   lose   his    employment    without 
doubt,    and   is  then  turned   out  into    the 
market  to  find  a  place  as  best  he  can.      A 
soldier  drunk  on  guard  mounting  parade, 
would  get,  well,  three  years  ago,   56   days7 
hard  labour.      Now,  probably  28  days7  C. 


The  Cost  of  Conscription.  17 

B.  would  be  thought  sufficient  ;  and  the 
latter  punishment  is  administered  by  five 
officers  who  literally  do  hear  the  evidence 
without  partiality,  favour,  or  affection  ;  but 
the  former,  by  a  man  almost  incapable  of 
impartiality,  because  his  pocket  has  been 
touched. 

But  we  cannot  dismiss  the  free  educa- 
tion point  of  view  without  alluding  to  the 
advantages  the  soldier  receives  in  return 
for  his  three  years7  submission  to  disci- 
pline. There  is  no  profession  in  the  world 
open  to  the  poorest  and  least  skilled  work- 
men in  which,  relatively  to  the  standard 
of  comfort  of  the  country,  a  man  gets 
better  fed,  lodged,  or  clothed  than  in  his 
army.  And  what  an  incalculable  boon 
must  it  not  be  to  them,  with  regard  to 
their  physical  development,  to  have  their 
constitutions  built  up  and  strengthened  by 
three  years  of  active  out-of-door  life.  If 
here  and  there  a  man  breaks  down  in  the 
struggle,  match  that  against  the  numbers 
who  succumb  to  overcrowding,  unhealthy 

M.,  L.  2 


18  Hie  Cost  of  Conscription. 

occupations,  and  their  own  weaknesses. 
We  are  too  fond  of  legislating  only  for  the 
existing  population,  and  forget  that  the 
young  men  of  the  present  generation  are 
the  prospective  fathers  of  the  next.  Is  it 
nothing  to  prevent  some  fifty  per  cent,  of 
the  male  population  from  contracting  mar- 
riages till  they  are  fall  grown  men,  instead 
of,  as  they  otherwise  would  do,  as  half- 
grown  boys  ?  Let  any  one  who  thinks 
so  make  a  short  tour  through  the  manu- 
facturing districts  of  the  north  of  England. 
Now,  with  regard  to  national  workshops : 
it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that,  practically, 
in  every  country  in  Europe,  every  farthing 
spent  on  clothing,  equipment,  food,  and 
even  arms  (excepting  in  a  few  cases  guns), 
is  laid  out  in  the  country  itself.  Approxi- 
mately the  clothing  and  equipment  of  the 
German  Army  costs  about  £2,000,000  per 
annum,  and  all  this,  or  the  material  for 
it,  is  supplied  by  German  firms,  who 
would  certainly  not  tender  for  the  contract 
unless  they  saw  their  way  to  a  remunera- 


The  Cost  of  Conscription.  19 

tive  return  on  their  capital.  If  the  450,000 
men  of  the  army  were  disbanded  to-mor- 
row, they  would  prefer  to  clothe  them- 
selves in  the  cheapest  market,  and,  as  Eng- 
lish shoddy  can  undersell  almost  anything 
iii  Germany ,  most  of  their  money  would 
go  across  the  Channel.  The  armament  of 
the  infantry  is  almost  entirely  manufac- 
tured in  State  workshops,  and  supplied  at 
cost  prices.  This  is  even  a  closer  approx- 
imation to  the  Socialist  workshops  theory, 
and  accounts  for  probably  somewhere 
about  £50,000,000  of  Government  Paper 
borrowed  at  4^  per  cent,  on  an  average, 
and  we  may  be  sure  that  this  money  is 
not  expended  at  a  loss. 

The  Artillery  of  the  German  Army  is 
practically  entirely  supplied  by  Krupp,  and 
we  may  be  quite  sure  he  does  not  work 
his  mills  at  a  loss.  At  any  rate  over 
10,000  workmen  are  employed  in  his  shops 
at  Essen  alone.  The  men  of  the  German 
Army  would,  as  a  body,  be  satisfied  with 
far  simpler  rations  than  they  actually  get 


20  The  Cost  of  Conscription. 

whilst  serving.  The  advantage  the  butch- 
ers derive  from  them,  we  can  hardly  bring 
to  account,  but  we  fancy  it  is  consider- 
able. Finally,  we  come  to  the  forage  of 
the  horses,  some  100,000  of  which  are 
permanently  kept  on  hand  in  the  ranks, 
over  and  above  the  agricultural  wants  of 
the  community  ;  and  calculating  from  the 
ordinary  German  ration,  of  8  Ibs.  oats, 
10  Ibs.  hay,  and  10  Ibs.  straw,  the  actual 
acreage  of  land  required  for  their  food  is 
somewhere  about  250,000  acres.  Now, 
since  revenue  in  Germany  is  derived  prin- 
cipally from  land-income  and  indirect  taxa- 
tion, it  obviously  hits  the  wealthier  sec- 
tion of  the  community  much  harder  than 
the  poorer  ;  and,  therefore,  through  the 
agency  of  the  army,  not  only  are  450,000 
able-bodied  men  per  annum  taken  off  the 
already  over-crowded  labour  market,  and 
maintained  by  the  community — a  strictly 
socialistic  idea — but  all  the  workmen,  farm- 
labourers  and  tenant-farmers,  in  number 
probably  another  100,000,  are  employed 


The  Cost  of  Conscription.  21 

from  the  same  source.  It  may,  indeed,  be 
argued  that  the  country  is  the  poorer  by 
the  whole  of  the  earnings  of  the  550,000 
thus  employed  in  unproductive  labour,  but 
what  would  be  the  gain  to  it  if  these  same 
half  million  and  more  were  thrown  on  the 
already  over-stocked  labour  market  to-mor- 
row. Obviously  the  result  would  be  only  to 
still  further  increase  the  struggle  for  exis- 
tence, and  thereby  to  lower  the  rate  of  wages 
which  is  already  low  enough,  or  to  increase 
the  emigration  by  a  corresponding  contin- 
gent annually.  The  third  point,  viz.,  the 
diminution  of  large  fortunes — in  our  opinion 
the  worst  feature  of  the  whole,  though  not 
from  the  communistic  point  of  view — is  a 
direct  consequence  of  all  the  best  blood  of 
the  country  being  absorbed  by  the  officers 
of  the  army.  This  is  a  tax  far  more  felt 
by  the  Germans,  and,  for  the  matter  of  that, 
by  all  foreigners  than  by  ourselves  ;  for 
the  proportion  of  the  upper  classes  serv- 
ing in  these  enormous  armies  is  far  larger 
than  it  is  in  our  own.  But  these  are  just 


22  The  Cost  of  Conscription. 

the  men  who,  starting  with  the  better  edu- 
cation and  the  advantages  of  position , 
would  naturally  succeed  in  civil  life,  and 
since  there  is  only  room  for  a  limited  num- 
ber of  successful  ones,  an  equal  number  of 
weaker  ones  would  have  to  go  to  the  wall. 
The  German  Army  is  not  a  money-making 
profession  any  more  than  our  own,  and  the 
officer's  pay  is  a  very  poor  return  for  the 
industry  and  perseverance  they  display  in 
their  duties,  which  are  certainly  enough  to 
command  success  in  any  walk  of  life.  From 
our  point  of  view,  the  only  set-off  against 
their  loss  to  the  commercial  prosperity  of  the 
country,  we  can  find,  lies  in  the  value  of 
the  example  of  duty  for  duty's  sake  they 
set  to  the  rest  of  the  community,  an  ex- 
ample which  more  than  counterbalances  the 
monetary  loss;  for  history  abundantly  proves 
that  in  a  country  in  which  the  sense  of 
duty  to  the  State  is  lost  is  already  far  gone 
on  the  road  to  ruin. 

One  word  as  to  the  "blood-tax"  aspect 
of  the  question.     The  statistics  of  the  Ger- 


The  Cost  of  Conscription.  23 

man  Army  for  he  last  70  years  or  so, 
shows  that  this  accusation  is  practically 
unfounded.  It  would  be  just  as  reason- 
able to  talk  of  the  blood-tax  inflicted  on 
England  by  the  railway  companies,  whose 
annual  percentage  of  victims  amongst 
their  servants  stands  actually  higher,  while 
the  relative  advantages  secured  by  the 
army  stands  far  higher  of  the  two.  Most 
of  us  would  be  glad  to  put  up  with  a  less 
perfect  system  of  rail-road  communication, 
if  we  could  be  certain  thereby  of  securing 
for  our  women  and  children  practical  im- 
munity from  the  danger  of  ever  being  at 
the  mercy  of  the  French  soldiery.  At 
least  that  is  the  feeling  along  the  Rhine 
where  the  memory  of  French  brutality 
still  exist. 

Finally,  let  us  look  at  the  matter  simply 
from  the  point  of  a  business  investment. 
Taking  the  loss  to  the  country  of  the 
wage-earning  power  of  half  a  million  men 
per  annum,  each  supposed  capable  of 
making  £50  a  year  and  adding  £10,000,000 


24  Tlie  Cost  of  Conscription. 

more  for  the  expense  of  maintaining  these 
men  over  and  above  what  it  would  cost 
merely  to  feed  and  clothe  them  as  civilians, 
we  get  a  total  annual  expenditure  of 
£35,000,000  a  year.  Now  the  wealth  of 
Germany  has  practically  trebled  in  the  last 
20  years,  and  if,  as  Professor  Levi  calculates, 
the  wealth  of  the  United  Kingdom  capi- 
talised, is  over  10,000  million  sterling,  we 
cannot  estimate  that  of  Germany,  with  its 
larger  population  and  greater  area,  at  less 
than  6,000  millions.  Let  us  assume  it  only 
to  have  doubled  since  1870.  Then,  for  an 
expenditure  of  £35,000,000  per  annum, 
and  (including  the  losses  in  1870),  2  per 
thousand  of  the  population  in  the  26  years, 
they  can  shew  a  return  of  £3,000,000,000 
or  a  profit  in  money  of  over  £2,000,000,000; 
and  against  that  could  anybody  furnish  us 
with  an  estimate  of  what  the  cost  of  defeat 
would  have  been. 


IMPERIAL   INSURANCE. 

mHOUGH  the  question  of  Imperial  Fe- 
J-  deration  has  now  been  under  discussion 
for  some  time,  as  yet  nothing  in  the  shape  of 
a  workable  scheme  has  been  put  before  the 
public.  It  is  true  that  the  Australian  Colo- 
nies have  agreed  to  pay  an  annual  contribu- 
tion to  the  Imperial  Navy,  but  this  contri- 
bution is  of  an  entirely  voluntary  nature, 
and  is,  practically,  dependent  on  the  tenure 
of  power  of  particular  Colonial  Ministries. 
If  war  were  to  break  out  on  any  one  of  the 
questions  which  the  Colonies  in  their  wis- 
dom do  not  see  fit  to  class  as  an  Imperial 
interest — such,  for  instance,  as  the  mainten- 
ance of  our  influence  in  Turkey — it  is  a 
moral  certainty  that  the  contribution  would 
be  withdrawn.  The  chance  of  raising  a 
storm  against  whatever  Ministries  might 
happen  to  be  in  power  in  the  Colonies  at 
the  time,  on  the  cry  of  "  the  money  of  the 
Colonies  being  lavished  to  maintain  a 


2 6  Imperial  Insurance. 

bloody  war,  entered  into  by  a  Parliament  in 
which  the  Colonies  had  no  representation," 
would  be  altogether  too  good  an  opportunity 
to  be  missed.  It  succeeded  once  before,  and 
history  is  known  to  repeat  itself. 

But  to  concede  to  the  Colonies  representa- 
tion in  the  Imperial  Parliament,  seems  to 
be  altogether  beyond  practical  politics  ;  to 
form  an  Imperial  Assemblage,  almost  equal- 
ly so,  for  the  House  of  Commons  keeps 
the  purse,  and  an  Imperial  Assemblage 
without  money  to  spend  would  be  a  mere 
shadow  at  the  mercy  of  the  Chancellor  of 
the  Exchequer  and  the  British  tax-payer. 

If  this  Imperial  Assemblage  is  to  be  any- 
thing more  than  a  dummy,  it  is  absolutely  ne- 
cessary that  it  must  have  at  its  disposal  money , 
which  could  not  be  interfered  with  by  any 
outside  power  ;  and  the  question,  therefore, 
is — how  is  that  money  to  be  obtained  ?  The 
answer  to  this  is  simpler  than  might  be  sup- 
posed. We  are  all  familiar  with  the  expres- 
sion, "  National  Insurance,"  though  up  to 
the  present  day,  no  working  scheme  of  the 


Imperial  Insurance.  27 

kind  has  been  submitted.  The  fact  is,  taken 
in  its  widest  meaning,  it  is  an  extremely 
complicated  subject  to  deal  with  ;  but  if  we 
subdivide  it,  portions  admit  of  ready  and 
easy  treatment,  and  when  we  are  once  fami- 
liarised with  it  by  practice,  the  remainder 
will  probably  yield  readily  to  treatment. 

The  one  point  on  which,  up  to  date, 
there  is  an  unanimous  consensus  of  opinion, 
is  that  it  is  essential  to  secure  our  trade 
from  interruption  in  time  of  war.  Let  us, 
therefore,  devote  our  attention  to  this 
point  first.  This  trade  is  already  protected 
against  all  ordinary  sea  risks,  such  as  tire 
and  storm,  by  the  private  agency  of  In- 
surance Companies.  Let  us,  therefore,  go  a 
step  further,  and  form  a  Government  In- 
surance Company  against  war  risks,  and 
let  an  Imperial  Conference  or  Board  become 
its  Directors.  The  recent  action  of  many 
shipowners,  in  complying  with  the  Admir- 
alty demands,  so  as  to  have  their  vessels 
available  for  service  in  time  of  war,  proves 
fully  that  the  owners  are  alive  to  the  neces- 


28  Imperial  Insurance. 

sity  of  preparing  for  the  stormy  time  ahead; 
and  we  believe  that  if  such  an  Insurance 
Company  was  formed. on  a  purely  voluntary 
basis,  it  would  be  certain  to  succeed.  The 
rate  of  premium  would  be  a  matter  for  the 
consideration  of  experts.  When  once  in 
working  order,  it  is  obvious  that  it  might 
be  exceedingly  small,  for  had  Government 
started  such  a  business  the  year  after 
Waterloo,  we  believe  that,  up  to  date,  not 
a  single  pound's  worth  of  compensation 
would  have  had  to  be  paid.  Unfortunately 
it  did  not  do  so  ;  hence  it  falls  on  us  to 
make  the  start.  The  annual  value  of  out 
ocean-borne  trade  already  exceeds  slightly 
1,000  million1  pounds  a  year.  One  half- 
penny in  the  pound  on  that  enormous  sum 
would  give  about  five  millions  a  year  to 
begin  on.  With  such  a  sum  as  revenue, 
money  enough  to  supply  us  with  a  fleet  of 
cruisers  such  as  the  world  has  never  seen, 
could  be  borrowed.  This  fleet  should  be 
distributed  on  the  various  trade  routes  in 
proportions  determined  by  the  Directors  of 


Imperial  Insurance.  29 

the  Company.  It  should  be  manned  by 
officers  and  men  of  the  Royal  Navy,  super- 
numerary to  the  ordinary  establishment, 
but  paid  for  by  the  Company,  or  Imperial 
Board,  just  as  India  pays  for  her  army. 
Further,  a  Sinking  Fund  would  have  to  be 
formed  to  provide  for  depreciation,  and  also 
to  meet  the  war  risks,  which,  if  properly 
managed,  would  soon  set  us  in  such  a 
position,  that  our  trade  might  defy  the 
efforts  of  the  navies  of  all  Europe.  Now 
the  advantages  we  should  derive  nationally 
from  such  an  arrangement,  are  briefly  these: 
In  the  first  place,  the  danger  of  breaking 
up  the  union  by  a  war  connected  with  some 
question  with  which  the  Colonies  were  not 
agreed,  would  be  reduced  to  a  minimum  ; 
for  practically  it  would  not  signify  to  them 
whether  we  were  or  were  not  at  war. 
Trade  would  have  no  insurance  against 
war  risks  to  pay,  whilst  our  enormous  fleet 
of  cruisers  would  practically  keep  the  sea 
so  safe,  that  even  passenger  traffic  would 
hardly  be  interfered  with.  Again,  all  dan- 


30  Imperial  Insurance. 

ger  to  our  food  supplies,,  having  been  re- 
moved, the  whole  of  our  fighting  fleet  could 
be  devoted  to  its  proper  task,  viz.,  the  an- 
nihilation of  the  enemy's  ironclads  and  har- 
bours, and  thus  the  danger  to  the  Colonial 
harbours  also  would  be  reduced  to  almost 
nothing  ;  for  they  are  or  will  be  soon 
sufficiently  defended  to  have  nothing  to 
fear  from  anything  except  an  ironclad  of 
greater  power  than  our  cruisers  ;  and  our  ac- 
tual numerical  superiority  in  ironclads,  if  we 
can  concentrate  them  all  on  one  object,  is 
great  enough  to  render  the  chance  of  escape 
for  an  enemy's  battle  ship  too  small  to  be 
taken  into  serious  account. 

That  the  charge  of  one-half  per  cent, 
approximately,  which  we  mention  above, 
would  handicap  our  trade,  is  not  to  be 
thought  of.  For  our  shipping  owners  are 
already  spending  far  larger  sums  in  meet- 
ing the  Admiralty  requirements  for  cruisers  ; 
and  besides,  this  sum  would  only  be  requir- 
ed to  commence  with.  If,  thanks  to  our 
readiness  for  war,  peace  was  not  broken,  or 


Imperial  Insurance.  31 

if  broken,  our  enemies  so  readily  repressed 
at  sea  as  to  reduce  our  losses  to  a  rjiere 
trifle,  in  a  few  years  a  far  lower  percentage 
would  suffice  :  till  the  tax  become  practi- 
cally nominal,  as  already  pointed  out  above. 

One  great  point  in  its  favour  is  that,  no 
elaborate  machinery  would  need  to  be  creat- 
ed for  the  collection  of  these  dues,  for  they 
could  readily  be  paid  to  the  Customs7 
officials  together  with  the  ordinary  duties, 
or  an  arrangement  could  be  made  with  the 
Under- writers  at  Lloyds,  just  as  bankers 
collect  the  income-tax. 

Finally,  such  a  fund  and  such  a  Board 
would  be  absolutely  beyond  the  reach  of 
Vestry  politicians  and  economists.  Mr. 
Healy,  Mr.  Sexton,  and  others  might  con- 
tinue to  obstruct  the  Lower  House  till  the 
Day  of  Judgment,  but  their  noise  could 
not  reach,  or  disturb  the  members  of  the 
Imperial  Board  of  Defence,  who,  themselves 
having  no  constituents  to  fear,  might  do 
their  duty  according  to  their  consciences 
and  the  best  of  their  understanding. 


THE  NEXT  FRANCO-GERMAN 
WAR. 

A  FTER  the  news  that  has  been  coming 
jLjL  to  us  from  the  Continent  during  the 
last  few  days5  the  thoughts  of  a  great 
many  people,  and  of  military  men  in  parti- 
cular, must  be  engaged  with  the  likelihood 
of  another  great  struggle  between  the  armies 
of  Germany  and  France.  Many  books 
and  pamphlets  have  been  published  of  late, 
betraying  the  nervous  anxiety  that  is  uni- 
versal in  either  country,  which  attempt 
to  forecast  the  character  and  the  issues  of 
the  felt-to-be-inevitable  campaign.  Such, 
for  instance;  are  the  two  French  brochures, 
Avant  la  Bataille  and  La  Guerre  Prochaine, 
and  such  is  the  work  of  Colonel  V.  Koets- 
chan,  which  was  published  last  autumn,  ap- 
parently in  answer  to  these,  and  of  which 
a  notice  appeared  some  time  ago  in  these 
columns.  It  created,  as  we  know,  a  con- 


The  next  Franco- German  War.        33 

siderable  sensation  in  France  ;  but  its  con- 
tents differ  so  markedly  from  the  ideas  at 
present  current  in  the  German  Army,  and 
also  are  so  indifferently  adapted  to  meet 
the  circumstances  of  the  case,  that  it  looks 
more  as  if  the  gallant  officer  had  been 
detailed  to  throw  dust  in  the  eyes  of  the 
enemy  than  to  instruct  his  own  army  in 
their  probable  role. 

The  writer  proposes,  therefore,  to  give 
a  general  outline  of  the  probable  course  of 
events,  as  derived  both  from  the  leading 
German  writers  and  from  the  conversation 
current  amongst  the  officers  last  summer. 
In  the  first  place,  taking  the  contingency 
that  Germany  would  have  to  meet  not  France 
alone,  but  the  allied  forces  of  France  and 
Russia,  it  is  opposed  to  all  the  traditional 
policy  and  previous  plans  of  campaign  to 
attack  Russia  before  dealing  with  France. 
The  fundamental  principle  of  Prussian 
strategy  is  to  make  the  nearest  field  army 
its  objective  and  to  destroy  that  thoroughly 
first.  Now,  the  mobilization  and  deploy- 

M,  L.  3 


34        The  next  Franco -German  War. 

ment  of  the  French  Army  is  calculated  to 
be  completed  in  14  days,  whereas  that  of 
Russia  on  paper  takes  nearly  six  weeks  ; 
and  those  who  have  studied  the  latter 
country  in  detail,  and  who  are  acquainted 
with  the  friction  which  has  to  be  overcome 
in  getting  the  mobilization  gear  into  run- 
ning order,  particularly  wThere  it  is  being 
worked,  practically  for  the  first  time  (the 
mobilization  in  1878  was  only  partial,  and 
furnishes  no  criterion  of  the  difficulties 
which  would  attend  a  complete  mobili- 
zation against  Germany),  are  of  opinion 
that,  owing  to  the  scarcity  of  roads  and 
railways  and  the  inefficiency  of  the  person- 
nel of  the  latter,  no  formed  body  of  Russian 
troops,  capable  of  seriously  threatening  the 
security  of  Prussia's  eastern  frontier,  could 
be  got  together  under  six  months.  But 
in  six  months  in  all  probability  the  cam- 
paign against  France  would  be  decided  ; 
six  weeks  sufficed  in  1870  to  destroy  prac- 
tically every  organised  force  in  the  country, 
and  though  a  prolonged  resistance  was 


The  next  Franco-German  War.        35 

afterwards  made  by  newly-raised  levies, 
yet  it  is  not  probable  such  a  state  of  things 
would  recur  again.  Not  only  is  the  German 
Army  prepared  to  deliver  far  more  rapid 
and  crushing  blows  on  the  next  occasion, 
but  there  is  also  a  very  large  peace  party 
in  France,  who,  though  they  may  be  goad- 
ed into  a  fury  by  the  prospects  the  Press 
hold  out  to  them  of  a  rapid  war  of  revenge, 
would  very  soon  come  down  to  their  nor- 
mal temperature  when  they  found  the  re- 
venge going  all  the  other  way.  Even  if 
the  resistance  were  to  be  prolonged,  the 
eastern  frontier  of  Germany  is  so  strongly 
fortified  that  months  would  elapse  before 
a  serious  impression  could  be  made  on  it  by 
the  tardy  forces  of  the  Czar. 

The  same  argument  might  be  used  with 
regard  to  the  French  line  of  fortifications. 
But  three  points  must  be  borne  in  mind  : 
in  the  first  place,  there  are  certain  inherent 
defects  in  the  profile,  flank  defence  and 
situation  of  these  forts  which  do  not  exist 
in  the  east  Prussian  ones  ;  secondly,  they 


36        The  next  Franco- German  War. 

will  have  a  much  shorter  time  for  prepara- 
tion owing  to  their  proximity  to  the  frontier 
than  have  the  German  ones  ;  and  thirdly, 
the  difference  of  the  training  and  discipline 
of  their  garrisons  must  be  taken  into  ac- 
count. 

This  latter  point  cannot  be  overlooked  : 
it  is  the  almost  universal  opinion  of  those 
Englishmen  who  fought  side  by  side  with 
the  French  in  the  Crimea,  and  have  since 
watched  their  career  of  defeat,  that  even  the 
Field  Army  cannot  bear  comparison  with 
the  old  Imperial  Army  ;  and  that,  owing  to 
the  spread  of  democratic  ideas  and  their 
results,  the  condition  of  the  territorial  army 
is  altogether  worse.  There  is  this  essen- 
tial difference  between  the  systems  of  the 
two  countries,  though  on  paper  they  ap- 
pear to  be  identical.  The  German  system 
does  not  make  a  man  a  discontented  radi- 
cal, but,  on  the  contrary,  a  staunch  upholder 
of  authority  ;  the  action  of  the  French  sys-> 
tern  is  precisely  the  reverse.  The  reason 
is  not  far  to  seek,  and  is  too  important  as 


The  next  Franco  -  German  War.       3  7 

bearing  on  the  whole  question  to  be  passed 
over.  The  German  officers  are  socially 
gentlemen;  the  French,  as  a  class,  are  not. 
The  German  soldier  not  only  does  not  con- 
sider himself  the  equal  of  his  officer,  but 
it  is  demonstrated  to  him  practically  that 
he  is  not.  The  German  knows  his  officer 
as  the  man  who  teaches  him  everything 
(not  as  the  one  who  cuts  his  pay  and  inter- 
rupts him  at  his  meals),  and  who  watches 
over  and  protects  him  against  the  tyranny 
of  the  non-commissioned  officer,  which  is 
at  times  a  great  trouble  in  Germany.  In 
fact,  the  officers  as  a  body  have  so  com- 
pletely won  the  respect  of  the  nation  by 
their  courage  in  action,  their  devotion  to 
their  duty,  and  their  high  sense  of  honour, 
that,  on  the  whole,  a  most  willing  obedience 
is  rendered  to  them  ;  and  they  are  enabled 
to  keep  up  the  most  rigid  discipline  in 
Europe  with  perhaps  the  smallest  amount 
of  punishment.  Hence,  when  at  the  close  of 
his  service,  a  rnan  passes  to  the  Reserve,  it 
is  generally  with  a  cordial  feeling  towards 


38        The  next  Franco- German  War. 

his  vorgesetzter  (leader)  which  renders  him 
all  the  more  amenable  in  case  he  is. 
called  out  again.  It  cannot  be  too  often 
insisted  on  that  the  German  military  sys- 
tem is  not,  as  is  frequently  supposed,  a 
manufactory  of  discontent  and  socialism, 
but  is  rather  a  gigantic  finishing  school  in 
which  the  priggishness  born  of  book-learn- 
ing is  knocked  out  of  a  man,  and  his  char- 
acter developed  and  strengthened  by  the 
habit  of  obedience  and  lessons  of  endurance. 
But  in  France  all  this  is  different  :  discip- 
line and  republicanism  are  two  opposing 
forces  which  it  is  impossible  to  bring  toge- 
ther as  the  history  of  the  Revolutionary 
armies  and  the  Napoleonic  dynasty  suffi- 
ciently proves. 

The  German  plan  of  campaign  is  based 
on  a  rapid  offensive.  The  only  way  to 
neutralise  the  French  line  of  forts  is  to  take 
advantage  of  their  comparative  state  of 
unreadiness  :  a  condition  which  must  al- 
ways obtain  more  or  less  in  modern  en- 
trenched camps,  and  rush  them  as  soon 


The  next  Franco- German  War.        39 

after  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  as  possible. 
With  this  view  every  effort  has  been  made 
to  enable  the  troops  on  the  Rhine  to  move 
off  immediately  on  the  declaration  of  war. 
The  Cavalry  divisions  are  always  ready  to 
take  the  field  at  12  hours'  notice,  and  the 
Army  Corps  nearest  the  frontier  will,  in  all 
probability,  move  off  within  48  hours, 
without  waiting  for  the  whole  of  their  Re- 
serves to  come  in.  It  must  not  be  forgot- 
ten that,  in  the  relatively  densely-populated 
valleys  of  the  Rhein,  Saar,  and  Moselle,  the 
Reserves  are  much  more  easily  drawn  in 
than  in  the  sparsely-populated  eastern  dis- 
tricts. 

The  whole  of  these  troops  are  provided, 
or  will  be  shortly,  with  double  lines  of  rail 
to  the  frontier,  and  though  the  German 
writers  still  maintain  that  the  former  rate 
of  24  troop  trains  per  day  on  a  double  line 
cannot  be  exceeded,  yet  from  remarks  I 
have  heard  from  time  to  time,  I  believe 
that  very  important  additions  to  this  num- 
ber have  been  made.  It  cannot  have 


40        The  next  Franco- German  War. 

escaped  the  Germans  that  many  of  their 
through  lines  already  accommodate  a  far 
larger  number  of  trains  than  this  at  vary- 
ing rates  of  speed  :  and  that,  therefore,  if 
attention  is  directed  to  preparing  the  re- 
quisite sidings  for  the  entraining  and  de- 
training of  troops,  no  difficulty  whatever 
exist  in  forwarding  three  times  this  number 
of  trains. 

In  England,  our  traffic  managers  are 
prepared  to  forward  over  any  main  line 
180  troop  trains  per  diem,  and  many  are 
prepared  to  send  more  ;  and  there  seems 
no  reason  why  the  Germans  should  not 
approximate,  at  any  rate,  to  the  same  number. 
To  support  the  troops  thus  set  in  motion 
in  their  attack  on  the  forts,  light  siege 
trains  are  kept  ready  in  all  the  frontier 
fortresses  to  take  the  field  at  the  shortest 
possible  notice  ;  and,  though  I  am  unable 
to  state  the  exact  details  for  horsing  them , 
yet  the  fact  that  the  steady  persistent 
attention  of  the  authorities  has  been  direct- 
ed to  this  subject  for  the  last  ten  years,  is  a 


The  next  Franco- German  War.        41 

guarantee  that  this  branch  will  not  be 
found  much  behind  the  other  arms  in  point 
of  efficiency. 

The  object  with  which  the  French  line 
of  frontier  fortresses  has  been  construct- 
ed, is  to  provide  a  screen  behind  which 
the  Field  Army  can  be  mobilized,  and 
hence  it  is  essential  to  the  Germans  to 
secure  the  possession  of  a  sufficient  num- 
ber of  these  to  permit  of  the  deployment 
of  their  army  beyond  them  at  the  very 
outset  of  the  campaign.  Their  chances 
of  success  depend  chiefly,  as  already  point- 
ed out,  on  the  defective  profile,  defects  of 
site,  and  on  the  difficulty  of  placing  them 
rapidly  in  a  state  of  defence.  This  latter 
defect  is  the  chief  point.  Owing  to  finan- 
cial considerations,  it  is  utterly  impossible 
for  any  nation  to  keep  its  frontier  forts 
always  ready  for  war.  Within  the  range 
of  existing  weapons,  houses,  buildings,  and 
even  woods,  must  be  left  standing  till  the  last 
moment,  and  the  work  of  destroying  and 
clearing  them  away  swells  to  an  enormous 


42        The  next  Franco-  German  War. 

total.  The  mere  matter  of  organising  the 
labour  is  in  itself  a  task  not  to  be  disposed  of 
in  a  day,  and  this  has  to  be  done  at  a  time 
when  the  whole  market  is  disorganised  by 
the  excitement  of  coming  events  and  by 
the  bulk  of  the  labouring  population  being 
called  in  to  the  flag.  The  work  to  be  done 
before  many  of  the  French  fortresses  is 
exceptionally  arduo,us;  the  ground  does 
not  slope  in  easy  undulations,  but  is  very 
complicated ;  and,  in  addition  to  this,  large 
stretches  of  forest  have  not  been  cleared 
away.  The  difficulty  of  adapting  forti- 
fications to  such  a  site  is  almost  insur- 
mountable. Even  before  Paris  we  could 
point  out  places  where  it  would  be  possible 
to  mass  15,000  men  out  of  sight  and 
within  500  yards  of  some  of  the  new  forts, 
and  on  the  frontier  matters  are  even  worse. 
And,  it  must  be  remembered,  that  every 
detail  of  this  nature  can  be  studied  in  peace 
time  by  the  enemy.  Besides,  engineers 
generally  have  presumed  too  much  on  the 
power  of  the  weapons  at  present  in  use, 


The  next  Franco- German  War.        43 

and  have  forgotten  to  take  the  factor  of 
human  nature  into  account.  Everywhere, 
not  only  in  France,  they  have  built  works 
at  such  a  distance  apart  that  the  slightest 
accident  of  a  morning  mist,  or  a  storm,  or 
rain  may  be  sufficient  to  destroy  their 
powers  of  mutual  support.  They  build 
works  which  can  be  defended  by  steady 
resolute  troops,  but  forget  that,  by  the 
very  nature  of  the  case,  these  will  be  the 
last  to  whom  the  defence  is  intrusted. 
Every  efficient  man  will  find  employment 
in  the  Field  Army,  and  practically  the 
least  reliable  will  be  left  behind. 

The  multiplication  of  posts  is  also  a 
danger,  for  it  is  impossible  to  find  com- 
manders of  equal  capacity  for  all,  and  the 
strength  of  a  chain  is  only  equal  to  that 
of  its  weakest  point. 

Again,  it  is  not  necessary  for  the  Ger- 
mans to  attack  in  the  first  instance  the 
large  fortified  camps ;  these  can  be  dealt 
with  at  leisure.  All  they  require  is  the 
possession  of  a  certain  number  of  the 


44        The  next  Franco-  German  War. 

isolated  so-called  barrier  forts  :  these  do  not 
support  each  other  mutually,  and  can 
therefore  be  completely  surrounded.  They 
will  be  attacked  by  batteries  of  a  couple 
of  hundred  field  guns,  supported  by  the 
light  siege  trains,  the  latter  firing  the  new 
gelatine  shells.  (The  secret  of  these  shells 
has  been  well  kept,  and  the  precise  nature 
of  their  detonating  bursters  is  not  known — 
it  is  said  to  be  some  form  of  blasting 
gelatine.)  It  is  difficult  to  picture  the 
condition  of  such  a  fort  after  a  few  hours7 
exposure  to  this  fire.  The  earthworks  will 
probably  not  be  much  damaged,  but  the 
storm  of  shell  and  also  of  Infantry  bullets 
(for  this  is  just  one  of  the  occasions  on 
which  long  -  range  Infantry  fire  can  be 
advantageously  employed)  will  certainly 
prevent  the  appearance  of  any  man  on  the 
ramparts.  And  since,  owing  to  the  con- 
siderable command  of  these  ramparts,  the 
Artillery  fire  can  be  continued  up  to  the 
very  moment  of  assault,  there  is  not  much 
danger  to  be  apprehended  till  the  assault- 


Tke  next  Franco- German  War.        45 

ing  columns  are  actually  in  the  ditch. 
Then  the  defects  of  profile  and  deficiency 
of  flank  defence  corne  into  play.  As  a 
rule — and  the  Germans  are  perfectly  aware 
where  the  rule  is  broken — the  profile  con- 
sists of  a  detached  wall,  a  very  narrow 
ditch,  and  an  altogether  inadequate  height 
of  counterscarp,  in  some  instances  not 
exceeding  15  feet,  down  which  resolute 
men  will  readily  drop.  The  fire  of  the 
light  siege  howitzers  will  have  completely 
ruined  the  wall,  which  is  merely  a  2 -feet 
brick  or  masonry  one,  of  about  the  same 
height  as  the  counterscarp  ;  and  the  only 
difficulty  to  be  overcome  in  crossing  the 
ditch  will  be  the  fire  of  the  caponniers, 
which  will  presumably  have  also  suffered 
considerably.  Even  if  they  have  not,  they 
mount  so  few  guns,  generally  only  two 
breech-loading  smooth-bore  carronades,  on 
non-recoil  carriages,  which  certainly  fire 
faster  than  the  old  muzzle-loader,  though 

'  c5 

only  in  the  proportion  of  three  to  two  ; 
and  the  time  during  which  the  assaulting 


46        The  next  Franco- German  War. 

troops  are  under  their  fire  is  of  so  short 
duration  that  it   is    hardly   possible  they 
will  succeed  in  stopping  the  advance   alto- 
gether.    If  in   the  days  of  the    Peninsula 
14   guns  firing  on  the  breach   at  Badajos 
did    not   suffice    to    stop    the  rush   of  the 
British  troops,  though,  owing    to    the    ob- 
stacles on  the  breach,  they  were  exposed  to 
this  fire  for  about  half-an-hour,  we  see   no 
reason     why     German    troops    should    be 
stopped  by,  say,    one-quarter    of    the   fire, 
lasting  only   a   few    seconds.      Besides,    it 
must  not  be  forgotten  that  there  are    ways 
of  silencing  the  fire  of  guns  from  a  confined 
casemate   now-a-days,  which  were  utterly 
impossible   to    the    attacking     troops     at 
Badajos  :   for  instance,  a  two-pound  cake  of 
dynamite,  fused  and  attached  to  the   end 
of  a  long  bamboo,    can    be   thrust    into    a 
loophole,  where  the  carbonic  oxide   caused 
by  its  explosion  would  poison  all   the   de- 
fenders, or,  may  be  laid   against   the   pro- 
jecting muzzle  of   a  gun,  which  its   deto- 
nation would  bend  or  fracture.     Similarly 


The  next  Franco- German  War.        47 

musketry   loopholes    may   be   masked    by 
bales  of  cotton  or  in  a  dozen  other  ways. 

Once  inside  the  detached  wall,  the  storm  - 
ers  are  in  comparative  safety  and  can 
get  their  breath  for  the  final  rush,  whilst 
Artillery  brought  up  to  case-shot  ranges 
and  firing  parties  of  Infantry  sweep  the 
crest  of  the  parapet  and  prevent  the  enemy 
showing  their  heads.  As  soon  as  a  suffi- 
cient number  of  men  are  collected,  the 
last  rush  can  be  made,  and  it  is  not  likely 
to  meet  with  any  very  serious  resistance. 
There  remains  then  only  the  casemated 
barrack  or  interior  reduit  :  but  against 
its  fire  the  attacking  party  will  find  suffi- 
cient shelter  in  the  shell  craters  on  the 
parapet  and  behind  the  parapet  itself. 
From  this  position  they  will  be  able  to 
bring,  as  a  rule,  the  fire  of  ten  rifles  on 
every  loophole,  so  that,  however  well 
maintained  the  fire  through  these  may  be, 
it  is  not  likely  to  be  very  accurate.  If 
the  defender  still  holds  out,  the  reduit 
must  be  breached,  and  this  may  be  effected 


48        The  next  Franco- German  War. 

in  various  ways — for  choice  perhaps  the  roll- 
ing of  an  enormous  sap-roller  of  pressed 
cotton,  filled  with  half-a-ton  of  dynamite, 
is  as  good  as  any — and  then  the  only  course 
left  for  the  defender  is  to  surrender  or  be 
blown  up  with  his  whole  barrack  ;  in 
either  case  the  enemy  has  gained  the  re- 
quired point.  From  defensive  mines  the 
assailant  has  not  much  to  fear.  To  begin 
with,  it  is  not  likely  that  at  this  early  date 
in  the  campaign  they  will  be  loaded.  This 
perhaps  looks  like  assuming  too  much, 
but  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  whole 
German  plan  is  based  on  the  known  un- 
readiness of  their  enemy.  Had  they  known 
him  in  1870  as  they  do  now,  they  would 
have  followed  up  their  success  on  the  19th 
September  before  Paris  and  have  stormed 
the  city  itself;  and  it  is  now  admitted  by 
the  French  themselves  that  such  an  attempt 
would  probably  have  succeeded,  though 
they  had  been  at  work  on  the  fortifications 
day  and  night  for  six  weeks.  Even  if  the 
mines  were  loaded,  their  explosion  would  not 


The  next  Franco- German  War.        49 

suffice  to  check  good  troops.  The  gigantic 
mine  before  Petersburg  in  1864  did  not 
check  Grant  and  his  .Northerners ;  and 
though  Germans  are  not  Americans,  yet 
they  possess  a  dogged  devotion  to  duty, 
quite  as  high  and  better  under  control  than 
the  personal  determination  which  in  the 
latter  period  of  the  Civil  War  distinguished 
both  parties  ;  and  the  German  leaders  have 
shown  themselves  as  reckless  of  life  and  as 
determined  in  the  prosecution  of  their 
object  as  ever  did  Grant  or  Sherman. 

Besides,  mines  when  fired  make  large 
craters,  which  form  ready-made  trenches 
for  the  assailants,  and  it  is  therefore  un- 
likely that  a  determined  commander,  rely- 
ing on  his  power  of  beating  off  the  assault, 
would  fire  them  at  the  right  moment.  To 
do  so,  and  then  to  repel  the  assault,  would 
be  to  give  the  attack  the  very  cover  it 
would  otherwise  be  compelled  to  earn  by 
days  and  nights  of  sap  and  trench  work. 

The  whole  idea  is  not  in  accordance  with 
the  spirit  of  war  as  inculcated  in  English 

M.,  L.  4 


50        The  next  Franco-  German  War. 

text-books  ;  but  then  the  two  nations  start 
from  utterly  different  premises.  To  us 
men  are  everything;  money  is  nothing. 
In  Germany  their  value  is  reversed.  An 
English  General,  especially  at  the  outset  of 
a  campaign,  cannot  afford  to  risk  his  army, 
for  he  does  not  see  his  way  to  replacing  it. 
How  this  feeling  hampers  an  English 
leader  is  obvious  from  the  history  of  the 
Crimea.  Had  our  commanders  possessed 
the  necessary  determination  to  attack  the 
Star  fort,  two  days  after  the  battle  of  the 
Alma,  it  is  certain  now  that  the  storrn 
would  have  succeeded  ;  and  even  had  it 
cost  us  10,000  men,  and  half  would  pro- 
bably have  sufficed,  what  would  that  have 
been  to  the  sacrifices  the  siege  eventually 
cost  us  ?  It  is  worthy  of  remark  that  our 
system  is  precisely  identical  with  that 
destroyed  by  Napoleon  wherever  it  opposed 
him  in  person.  The  Austrians  and  Prus- 
sians, by  trying  to  gain  by  manoeuvre  what 
could  only  be  gained  by  fighting,  were 
defeated  everywhere  till  they  began  to  learn 


The  next  Franco- German  War.        51 

the  lesson  themselves.  This  lesson,  though 
certainly  written  in  characters  of  blood 
all  over  Europe,  has  been  pretty  generally 
forgotten  by  all  except  the  Germans — most 
of  all  by  the  French. 

It  was  the  Napoleonic  system,  worked 
by  German  heads,  that  crushed  the  latter, 
and  it  will  be  by  the  same  system  that  they 
will  again  be  defeated  in  the  coming  cam- 
paign, for  there  is  no  sign  as  yet  that,  as  a 
nation,  they  have  learnt  the  lesson. 


THE  GERMAN  OFFICER. 

rflHERE  is,  perhaps,  no  question  morefre- 
JL  quently  addressed  to  a  man  supposed 
to  have  a  personal  knowledge  of  the  German 
Army  than  :  "  What  do  you  think  of  the 
German  officers?  "  This  is  a  question  easier 
to  ask  than  to  answer  ;  for  there  are  many 
kinds  of  German  officers — not  only  Infan- 
try, Cavalry  and  Artillery,  but  Prussians, 
Hannoverians,  Hessians,  &c.,  who  all  pos- 
sess more  or  less  their  own  individuality. 
It  may,  therefore,  be  not  without  interest 
to  the  readers  of  this  paper  to  lay  before 
them  as  fall  and  fair  a  description  as 
space  will  permit. 

The  first  point  to  notice  is  the  method  by 
which  officers  are  elected  to  regiments  in 
the  first  instance.  Passing  an  examination 

irives   a  German  no  claim  to  a  commission 

s 

any  more  than  any  number  of  examinations 
would  give  one  a  claim  to  a  military  club.  He 
must  be  an  acceptable  person  to  his  brother 


The  German  Officer.  53 

officers,  as  well  as  to  the  Civil  Service  Com- 
missioners ;  and  we  cannot  help  thinking 
that  many  of  our  own  regiments  would  be 
pleasantertoliveinifthisrule  obtained  with 
us.  His  fate  is  not  settled  without  due  in- 
quiry and  the  lapse  of  sufficient  time  to 
enable  his  brother  officers  to  judge  of  him. 
First,  he  must  be  accepted  by  the  Colonel, 
who,  owing  to  the  territorial  system,  is 
usually  sufficiently  acquainted  with  the 
county  to  which  the  regiment  belongs,  to 
be  able  to  judge  whether  his  social  position 
is  good  enough.  The  Germans  in  this  res- 
pect are  still  the  most  particular  in  Europe  ; 
far  more,  indeed,  than  we  are,  and  so  far  at 
any  rate  they  have  had  no  cause  to  regret  it. 
The  Colonel  having  agreed  to  accept  the 
candidate,  he  is  then  posted  to  the  regiment 
as  an  Avantageur :  he  is  allowed,  and  indeed 
obliged,  to  live  at  the  mess,  but  drills  as  a 
recruit,  precisely  as  our  own  young  officers 
do.  At  the  end  of  a  year,  if  he  is  satisfac- 
tory from  the  Drill  Instructor's  point  of 
view,  the  officers  of  the  regiment  are 


54  The  German  Officer. 

assembled  and  called  upon  to  decide  whether 
they  will  have  him  or  not.  It  is  needless 
to  say  that,  in  an  army  as  strictly  disci- 
plined as  the  German  one,  no  frivolous  ob- 
jections of  the  kind  so  frequently  made  the 
excuse  for  hunting  a  wretched  man  out  of 
the  Service,  by  the  exercise  of  the  most 
cowardly  species  of  bullying,  on  a  par  with 
what,  when  called  "rattening"  at  Sheffield 
amongst  knife-grinders,  entails  penal  ser- 
vitude on  the  delinquents  when  detected, 
are  for  one  moment  allowed  ;  the  objections, 
if  any,  must  be.  stated  in  writing  and  for- 
warded for  the  inspection  of  the  Corps 
Commander,  who,  in  case  he  thought  them 
frivolous  or  malicious,  would  report  to  the 
Emperor,  and  the  consequences  would  be 
sharp  and  severe. 

We  cannot  help  dwelling  a  little  on  this 
point ;  for  it  is  one  of  immense  importance 
to  every  officer  in  the  Army,  considering 
the  terms  on  which  they  have  to  live  to- 
gether in  a  regiment  and  the  vital  necessity 
there  is,  that  on  service  they  may  pull  well 


The  German  Officer.  55 

together  :  it  is  not  fair  on  them  to  pitchfork 
any  successful  candidate  at  an  examination 
into  their  ranks.  When  it  occurs,  as  it 
sometimes  does,  it  inevitably,  and  from 
motives  of  self-defence,  leads  to  the  indivi- 
dual being  bullied  out,  and  that  in  a  man- 
ner, too,  which  is  usually  disgraceful  to  all 
concerned.  These  things  cannot  in  the 
long  run  be  kept  hid  ;  and  when  the 
accounts  filter  across  to  other  armies,  they 
produce  an  impression  far  from  favourable 
to  our  cloth.  We  remember  hearing  some 
years  ago  a  German  officer  of  some  stand- 
ing and  well  acquainted  with  the  British 
Army,  discussing  the  disappearance  of 
Lieutenant  Tribe  (the  general  impression 
in  the  German  Army,  by  the  way,  is  that 
he  was  murdered  by  his  brother  officers), 
and  his  words,  though  spoken  temperately, 
would  have  made  any  Englishman  blush  for 
his  country.  We  were  talking  about  duel- 
ling in  the  German  Army,  and  he  pointed 
out  how  such  a  scandal  could  not  have 
arisen  in  a  Prussian  regiment.  The  aggrieved 


56  The  German  Officer. 

officer  would  have  called  out  one  of  his 
persecutors,  and  the  matter  would  then 
have  been  laid  before  a  court  of  honour, 
composed  of  officers  of  other  regiments, 
who  would  have  decided  whether  there  was 
a  case  for  fighting  or  not  :  /if  the  one  found 
by  the  court  to  be  in  the  wrpnfg  refused  to 
apologise,  he  would  have  been  made  to  fight 
or  go.  If  he  fdugEt^and  killed  or  wounded 
his  antagonist,  he  would  first  of  all  have 
been  tried  by  a  civil  court  and  sentenced  to 
a  considerable  term  of  imprisonment  in  a 
fortress,  and  on  the  expiration  of  that  term, 
his  name  would  have  been  cut  out  of  the 
Army  List  by  the  Emperor.  If,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  aggrieved  man  had  killed 
his  antagonist,  he  too  would  have  had  to 
stand  his  trial :  but  the  Emperor  would 
have  pardoned  him  next  day.  "  I  will 
stand  no  bully  in  iny  Army,"  the  Kaiser 
said  on  one  occasion  ;  "  but  also  I  will  not 
keep  a  man  in  my  Army  who  is  not  pre- 
pared to  defend  his  honour  :"  and  it  would 
be  a  good  thing  for  us  if  the  same  sentiment 


The  German  Officer.  57 

obtained  in  our  own  ;  we  would  be  saved 
many  a  scandal  which  now  furnishes  food 
to  its  detractors  in  the  Radical  Press.. 

But  to  return  to  the  young  officer:  Hav- 
ing been  duly  elected  to  his  regiment,  he  is 
next  put  in  charge  of  one  of  the  older 
sections  of  his  company,  and  generally  has 
the  senior  subaltern  to  look  after  him  ;  but 
not  till  he  has  been  three  or  four  years  in 
the  Service  is  he  entrusted  with  the  re- 
sponsibility of  a  squad  of  recruits.  On  the 
way  he  acquits  himself  of  this  task  his 
future  for  several  years  to  come  depends  ; 
and  the  man,  who  at  the  end  of  the  recruits' 
training  is  considered  to  have  done  best  in 
the  regiment,  may  be  considered  a  marked 
man. 

This  giving  of  full  responsibility  to  a 
young  officer  is  the  keynote  of  the  whole 
German  system,  and  is  undoubtedly  the 
point  to  which  they  owe  the  excellence  of 
their  officers  as  a  body.  The  Captain  is 
responsible  for  every  detail  of  his  company, 
the  only  condition  being  that,  at  the  com- 


58  The  German  Officer. 

pletion  of  the  training,  it  must  attain  a 
certain  standard  of  excellence  which  is  laid 
down  by  order.  But  the  method  of  bring- 
ing it  to  this  standard  is  left  entirely  in  his 
hands.  In  practice,  of  course,  certain  me- 
thods have  approved  themselves  by  long 
experience,  and  hence  there  is  a  certain  ap- 
pearance of  routine  about  the  training  ;  but 
the  Captain  is  in  no  way  bound  to  adhere 
to  that  routine,  and  no  Colonel  or  Major, 
still  less  an  Adjutant,  would  dare  to  inter- 
fere with  him,  except,  perhaps,  by  a  few 
words  of  friendly  counsel.  He  delegates 
his  responsibility  similarly  amongst  his 
Subalterns,  having  due  regard  to  their  age 
and  experience  ;  and  within  those  limits 
the  Subaltern  is  practically  as  independent 
as  his  Captain.  The  consequence  is,  that  a 
body  of  officers  is  formed,  all  of  whom  are 
trained  from  the  day  of  their  joining  to  act 
on  their  own  judgment  ;  and  it  is  only 
through  this  quality,  constantly  cultivated 
through  a  long  series  of  years,  that  the 
leading  of  the  monster  armies  of  the 


The  German  Officer.  59 

present  day  has  been  rendered  possible. 
It  may  be  granted  that,  at  the  outset  of  a 
campaign,  such  a  readiness  to  assume  re- 
sponsibility may  have  its  drawbacks,  as  in- 
deed it  had  at  Spicheren  and  Borny  ;  but, 
on  the  other  hand,  its  universality  through- 
out the  whole  Service  robbed  it  of  half 
its  danger  :  whereas  it  is  hardly  possible  to 
conceive  armies  of  these  dimensions  man- 
oeuvred on  the  principles  of  the  great  Duke. 
It  is  in  this,  and  in  the  uniformity  of  train- 
ing received  at  the  military  schools  and 
also  in  the  regiment,  based  on  general  prin- 
ciples and  never  on  details,  that  the  Ger- 
man superiority  over  all  other  armies  rests. 
A  German  Staff  Officer  in  drafting  an  order 
knows  that  it  is  sufficient  merely  to  indi- 
cate the  object  aimed  at  to  ensure  its  exe- 
cution. Things  may  not  be  done  with  the 
pedantic  uniformity  once  so  dear  to  them 
(and  to  us  perhaps  still)  ;  but  the  orders 
will  be  interpreted  in  the  spirit,  and  by  a 
method  adapted  to  the  actual  circumstances 
of  the  case  on  the  ground,  which  can  never 


60  The  German  Officer. 

be  exactly  the  same  as  they  appeared  to  the 
writer  of  the  order  at  a  distance.  By  this 
means  the  "friction"  of  moving  large  mass- 
es is  reduced  to  a  minimum.  Let  any  one 
interested  in  the  matter  look  up  the  Corps 
Orders  issued  at  various  times  during  the 
1870  campaign  and  printed  in  the  Prussian 
Official — any  one  will  do,  and  consider  how 
far  they  would  have  carried  on  English 
corps  in  the  movement.  Why,  from  the 
divisional  commanders  downwards,  every- 
one would  have  been  sending  in  to  know 
how  he  was  to  carry  them  out. 

An  English  Staff  Officer  has  to  carry  in 
his  head  the  peculiar  idiosyncracy  of  every 
man  under  his  Chief,  and  frame  his  orders 
accordingly.  General  A  perhaps  does  not 
believe  in  Artillery,  and  requires  to  be  in- 
structed in  the  elementary  principles  of  its 
action  on  the  eve  of  battle.  General  B 
thinks  Infantry  can  trot ;  or  General  C 
thinks  that  Cavalry  are  a  useless  hindrance, 
and  does  not  know  what  to  do  with  them  ; 
and  so  on  through  the  scale. 


The  German  Officer.  61 

The  German  officer  is  not,  as  a  rule,  a 
very  highly-read  man,  nor  is  he  the  accom- 
plished linguist  we  are  sometimes  invited 
to  believe  him  to  be.  The  truth  is,  he  is 
altogether  too  much  taken  up  with  the 
practical  duties  of  imparting  instruction  to 
have  time  for  the  study  of  either  contem- 
porary military  literature  or  languages  ; 
and  besides,  with  regard  to  the  former, 
feeling  his  knowledge  to  be  firmly  ground- 
ed on  general  principles  which  never  change 
(to  be  found  in  their  drill  book  but  alas  ! 
not  in  ours),  he  does  not  feel  any  particular 
necessity  for  study,  whilst,  with  regard  to 
languages,  if  he  can  make  an  average 
Frenchman  understand  him,  it  is  about  all 
he  requires. 

Taking  the  ordinary  summer  months,  a 
Subaltern  or  a  Captain  rarely  gets  more 
than  time  enough  for  his  meals  between 
sunrise  and  sunset,  and  the  mere  physical 
labour  of  the  drills  is  very  severe.  We 
have  known  many  a  Lieutenant  who  has 
daily  had  to  cover  from  25  to  30  miles  on 


62  The  German  Officer. 

foot,  and  under  a  pretty  powerful  sun  too. 
No  wonder  that  they  do  not  appear  to  be 
devoted  to  the  manly  sports  of  cricket  and 
lawn- tennis  (the  latter,  by  the  way,  has 
been  specifically  prohibited  by  the  Emperor) 
but,  en  revanche,  they  are  generally  good 
gymnasts  and  swordsmen. 

But  the  truth  is  that,  were  it  not  for 
their  incessant  occupation,  the  life  of  a 
German  officer  would  be  almost  unendur- 
able, and  their  leisure  a  torment.  It  is 
hardly  possible  to  realise  the  terrible  dul- 
ness  of  a  small  German  cantonment.  The 
hot  weather  in  the  plains  here  is  bad  enough, 
but  still  it  is  preferable,  for  we  all  know 
that  sooner  or  later  a  change  will  come. 
But  with  them  there  is  practically  no  pro- 
spect of  release .  Even  if  they  are  on  a 
railway,  trains  are  so  slow  and  the  places 
they  lead  to  so  uninteresting  that  there  is 
not  much  object  in  going  away  :  besides, 
travelling  costs  money,  and  money  is  very 
scarce  in  the  German  Army.  To  make 
matters  worse,  Germans  do  not  seem  able 


The  German  Officer.  63 

to  get  on  together  as  well  as   Englishmen  : 
four  English  Subalterns  huddled   together 
in  a  troopship  manage  to  shake  down  with- 
out much  trouble,  but  four  Germans  would 
not,   even  if  they  all  came  from  the  same 
country  ;  but  where,  as  in  a  regiment,  Nas- 
sauers,    Hessians,    Prussians,  &c.,    are  all 
mixed  together,  agreement  is  scarcely  pos- 
sible.    For  though  the  general  principle  of 
the  Army  is  territorial,  yet  the   absorption 
by   the   Prussians   of  the   armies   of   the 
smaller  States  has  necessitated  a  consider- 
able departure  from  the  system.     In  order 
to  obtain   uniformity  of  drill  and  also  of 
promotion,   the   south   was   deluged   with 
Prussian  Officers,  who,  not  being  the  meek- 
est of  men,  and  having  been  only   recently 
opposed  to  the  others  in  the  field,  did  not 
assimilate  with   the   others   very   readily  ; 
and  those  officers,  transplanted  from  south 
to  north,  found  themselves  isolated  amongst 
unsympathetic   comrades,  and   had  even  a 
worse  time  than  the  others.     All  this  hap- 
pened sixteen  years  ago,  but  amalgamation 


64  The  German  Officer. 

is  as  far  off  as  ever  ;  nor  need  we  wonder 
at  it,  when  we  consider  the  opposition 
shown  to  the  old  members  of  the  Bengal 

o 

Army  when,  after  the  Mutiny,  it  was 
absorbed  by  the  Royal  Army  :  why,  the 
feeling  is  by  no  means  dead  yet,  though  in 
this  case  there  was  neither  difference  of 
nationality,  nor  had  the  two  been  fighting 
against  each  other,  but  shoulder  to  shoulder. 
From  time  to  time  spasmodic  efforts  have 
been  made  to  render  the  wearing  of  uniform 
in  the  English  Army  compulsory,  in  imita- 
tion of  the  custom  prevailing  in  Germany  ; 
but,  as  is  usual  with  the  authorities  when 
they  attempt  a  copy  of  anything  German, 
they  overlook  two  or  three  very  impor- 
tant points.  The  first  of  these  is,  that  if  the 
Queen's  or  the  Emperor's  uniform  is  to  be 
worn  at  all  times  and  in  all  places,  it  must 
be  protected  by  law  against  any  possibility 
of  insult ;  and  since  no  such  an  attempt  on 
it  is  likely  to  be  made  in  places  where 
guardians  of  the  peace  are  on  the  spot  to 
prevent  it,  the  execution  of  the  law  must 


The  German  Officer.  65 

be  cohfided  to  the  wearer  of  the  uniform 
in   person.     This   is   done  in  Germany  by 
empowering,  or  rather  compelling,  the  offi- 
cer never  to  appear  in  public  without  his 
sword,   and  to  defend  himself  or   punish 
any  treasonable  or   disloyal   insult  to    the 
Crown  uttered  within  his  hearing   with    it 
and  with    no  other   weapon.     Now,    in   a 
country  where  Socialism  or  Radicalism  is 
rife,   such  a  privilege  would  be,  and  indeed 
is,  a   very  awkward    one   to    bear,   as   the 
following  example  will  show.     A  German 
officer  a  few  years  ago  entered  a  cafe  in 
one  of  the  Rhine  cities,   and   finding  him- 
self alone,  took  off  his  sword  and  hung  it 
up  before  sitting  down.     It  happened  that 
his  seat  was  at  some  distance  from  the  pegs 
where  he  had  hung  up  his  weapon.     Pre- 
sently a  couple  of  "  demagogues7'  ("  vessels 
filled  with  beer  or  other  liquors   according 
to   Mark  Twain'7)  entered  and  sat  down 
opposite  to  the  officer,  and  quickly  noticing 
that  he  was  unarmed,   began  to   abuse  the 
Emperor  and  the  army.     The  officer  warn- 

M.,  L.  5 


66  The  German  Officer. 

ed  them  twice  that  if  they  did  not  desist, 
he  would  have  to  put  a  stop  to  it,  but  was 
only  jeered  at.  So  he  rose,  went  to  where 
his  sword  was  hanging,  drew  it  and,  return- 
ing, ran  one  of  the  Socialists  through  the 
body.  The  Court  of  Honour  assembled  to 
investigate  his  conduct,  acquitted  him  of 
all  blame  in  having  killed  the  man,  but 
cashiered  him  for  disobedience  of  orders  in 
having  removed  his  sword,  for,  had  he  not 
done  so,  they  said,  the  provocation  would 
not  in  ail  probability  have  been  given.  It 
must  be  noticed,  too,  that  in  these  and 
similar  cases  the  right  to  draw  the  sword  is 
not  merely  permissive,  but  compulsory — 
failure  to  do  so  would  entail  cashiering, 
even  if  the  officer  managed  to  defend  him- 
self with  his  fists.  Instances  of  attacks  on 
isolated  officers  are  by  no  means  unusual 
in  the  large  cities,  particularly  those  which, 
like  Leipzig,  are  centres  of  Socialism.  At 
present  in  England,  particularly  in  the 
south,  the  Queen's  uniform,  when  worn 
by  an  isolated  individual,  is  still  too  rare 


The  German  Officer.  67 

to  excite  anything  but  the  best  feelings  of 
the  civilians  who  encounter  it  ;  but  we 
fancy  that,  at  times,  in  the  northern  towns 
the  obligation  laid  upon  the  German  officer 
woukj.  be  found  rather  trying  to  bear.  But  it 
is  obvious  that,  if  officers  are  to  be  obliged 
to  wear  their  uniform,  some  such  power 
must  be  conferred  upon  them  ;  for  the 
result  of  any  such  attempt  to  assault  the 
wearer  must  be  independent  of  any  ques- 
tion of  the  physical  strength  of  the  latter. 
There  must  be  no  question  of  punching  of 
heads  or  knocking  down,  for  the  issue  of 
that  sort  of  contest  depends  practically  on 
the  physical  superiority  of  one  over  the 
other ;  and,  allowing  all  we  can  for  the 
"  blood  will  tell  "  theory,  circumstances  of- 
ten occur  when  "  blood  "  alone  can  have  no 
chance,  particularly  in  an  army  whose  ser- 
vice is  as  trying  to  the  constitution  as  ours. 
What  chance,  for  instance,  would  a  wretch- 
ed young  subaltern,  sent  home  to  the  dep6t 
more  dead  than  alive  with  fever,  but  pluck- 
ily  sticking  to  his  duty,  have  in  a  row 


68  The  German  Officer. 

with  a  burly  north  country  mechanic  as 
hard  as  nails  and  certainly  not  deficient  in 
pluck? 

Secondly,  the  mere  physically  strain  on 
a  man  of  being  compelled  to  wear  the  same 
hot  stifling  dress  at  all  times  and  in 
all  seasons  must  be  taken  into  account. 
The  heat  in  Germany  in  summer  is  at 
times  terribly  trying,  and  many  a  man  is 
broken  down  by  the  additional  unnecessary 
fatigue  imposed  upon  him  who  would  other- 
wise have  pulled  through  the  season  without 
injury.  When  one  of  these  really  hot 
spells  come,  the  German  certainly  has  to 
undergo  tremendous  hardship,  for  there  is 
simply  no  place  except  his  own  quarters — 
not  generally  very  luxurious  or  airy — 
where  he  can  get  away  from  his  incubus. 
For  choice  I  would  rather  spend  May  and 
June  in  some  central  plain  station,  such  as 
Agra,  or  Muttra,  than  a  summer  at  Stras- 
burg  or  Mayence  in  a  German  uniform. 
-  The  question  of  expense  has  also  appar- 
ently escaped  the  attention  of  pur  would- 


The  German  Officer.  69 

be  Germanisers,  which,  considering  their 
anxiety  to  curtail  the  "  boundless  extrava- 
gance "  of  an  ordinary  subaltern's  mess  bill, 
ought  not  to  be  the  case.  Uniform  in  it- 
self is  invariably  more  expensive  than  plain 
clothes.  Whilst  being  the  outward  visible 
sign  of  a  caste,  so  to  speak,  it  is  incumbent 
on  the  wearer  to  keep  it  up  with  to  a  degree 
of  smartness  altogether  unnecessary  in  plain 
clothes.  Provided  a  man  looks  like  a  gen- 
tleman, his  plain  clothes  may  be  as  simple 
as  he  pleases ;  but  in  uniform  he  is  obliged 
to  keep  up  to  a  certain  standard,  fixed 
without  any  reference  to  his  pocket  what- 
ever. Now,  in  a  regiment  a  man's  means 
are  more  or  less  well  known  :  so,  as  long 
as  he  turns  out  for  his  duty  with  clean, 
spurs,  gloves,  sword,  &c.,  no  one  thinks  of 
being  down  on  a  man  if  his  tunic  or  jacket 
is  a  shade  old  and,  perhaps,  white  at  the 
seams  ;  but  in  the  streets  it  is  different. 
For  the  honour  of  the  regiment  he  must 
turn  out  smartly,  as  people  have  not  time 
to  enquire  into  the  merits  of  the  case. 


70  The  German  Officer. 

This,  at  any  rate,  is  the  way  in  which  the 
system  works  in  Germany,  Austria  and 
Italy  (whether  it  is  that  the  British  sol- 
dier's eye  can  never  get  accustomed  to  the 
cut  of  the  French  uniform  or  not  I  cannot 
say  ;  but  the  feeling  does  not  seem  to  ex- 
ist to  an  appreciable  extent  in  France)  ; 
and  since  human  nature  is  pretty  much  the 
same  everywhere,  I  fancy  it  would  work  in 
the  same  way  in  England,  and  the  young 
subaltern  would  find  himself  plunged  into 
a  sea  of  debt  to  which  his  regimental  sub- 
scriptions would  be  mere  child's  play.  I 
remember  once  discussing  this  question 
with  a  German  officer,  and  after  allowing 
for  the  different  wear  and  tear  of  our  gold 
lace  to  their  silver  lace  (ours  lasts  much 
longer),  we  came  to  the  conclusion  that,  to 
keep  up  to  the  same  standard  of  smartness 
as  that  which  is  simply  compulsory  in  the 
German  Army,  it  would  cost  an  infantry 
subaltern  between  £70  and  £80  a  year,  and 
in  the  cavalry  probably  double.  I  need 
only  mention  one  point  to  show  how  parti- 


The  German  Officer.  71 

cular  they  are  :  It  is  considered  absolutely 
essential  that  for  the  Emperor's  Inspection 
every  officer  as  well  as  every  man  should 
turn  out  brand  new — tunic  and  all — I  re- 
member a  Hussar  bitterly  lamenting  to  me 
that  in  five  years  he  had  had  three  Imperial 
Inspections  and  had  had  to  get  three  jackets, 
each  of  which  cost  him,  by  the  way,  about 
£18  even  in  Germany.  Now  the  British 
officer  possesses  quite  as  much  personal 
vanity  relative  to  society — which  practically 
means  women — as  any  other  soldier,  and 
the  prospect  to  those  careful  guardians  who 
are  always  preaching  against  the  reckless 
extravagance  of  the  wicked  regimental  mess 
looks  gloomy,  indeed,  if  the  wearing  of 
uniform  should  ever  be  rendered  compul- 
sory. 

Whilst  on  the  subject  of  messes,  it  may 
be  as  well  to  mention  that  the  most  strenu- 
ous efforts  have  been  made  of  late  years 
to  provide  every  regiment  with  a  mess  on 
the  English  lines  ;  and  at  this  date  almost 
every  one,  except  some  of  those  in  Alsace- 


72  The  German  Officer. 

Loraine  and  others  on  the  eastern  frontier, 
is  provided  with  them  :  and  since  the  head- 
quarters of  German  regiments  are  practi- 
cally stationary,  they  have,  as  a  rule,  attain- 
ed a  very  fair  degree  of  comfort,  even  of 
luxury,  from  a  German  point  of  view, 
which  point,  however,  differs  somewhat 
widely  from  our  own.  It  has  been  found, 
too,  as  might  have  been  expected,  that 
the  result  has  been  decidedly  in  favour  of 
economy  ;  for  whereas  the  former  custom 
was  for  officers  to  dine  at  table  d'h6tes  at 
the  principal  hotels,  they  now  dine  better 
and  much  more  cheaply  at  their  messes. 
Thus  the  charge  for  a  mess  dinner  at  most 
of  the  messes  with  which  I  am  acquainted 
varied  from  Is.  6d.  to  2s.  The  charge  at 
the  hotels  was  rarely  less  than  3s. — a  consi- 
derable difference.  But  the  spirit  of  mess- 
room  life  is  a  plant  of  slow  growth,  and 
owing  to  the  causes  to  which  I  referred 
in  the  previous  article,  viz.,  difference  of 
nationality,  &c.,  and  German  mess-room  is 
far  from  being  as  comfortable  a  home  as 


The  German  Officer.  73 

an  English   one.     Besides,   the  wearing  of 
uniform,   the  inate   officialism  of  the  Ger- 
man race  forms  a  bar  to  the  pleasant  fami- 
liarity of  our  English  regimental  life.     A 
German  can  never  lay  aside  his    rank,   and 
has  also  a  much  greater  desire    to  assert 
it  than  an   Englishman,   hence  there   is  a 
tendency  to   split  into  cliques  more  or  less 
according  to   rank,  and  to    seek   freedom 
from  formality    in    the    "  bier  kniepe "  in 
preference  to  the  mess.     Thus  every  officer 
has   his   special  beer    club    to    which   he 
resorts   in  the  evenings.     Usually   a  cer- 
tain table  or  room  is  reserved  for  the  offi- 
cers at  the  principal  beer  "  Localen"  and 
round  or  in  it  the  particular  clique  gathers 
every  evening  and  drinks.     To  an  English- 
man,  after  the  novelty  of  the  thing   has 
once  worn  off,  the  monotony    of  these  re- 
unions is  simply  appalling  :  leading  a  help- 
lessly localised  sort  of  life,   there  is  little 
or  nothing  for  them  to  talk  about.     Shoot- 
ing, hunting,   or  cricket   being  almost  un- 
known,   are   not    touched  upon.      Racing 


74  The  German  Officer. 

rarely,  except  with  the  cavalry.  Tactics 
after  the  war  certainly  were  liberally 
handled,  but  of  late  there  is  such  uniformity 
of  opinion  on  all  points  practically  that 
one  learns  very  little  about  them  ;  there 
is  really  nothing  left  for  them  but  garrison 
"guP>"  commonplace  details  of  common- 
place lives — and  anything  more  tedious  can 
scarcely  be  imagined.  But,  though  often 
admitting  himself  to  be  terribly  bored  by 
it,  the  victim  gravitates  there  by  sheer 
force  of  habit.  The  amount  of  beer  con- 
sumed during  these  evenings  is  something 
appalling.  An  average  man  will  generally 
manage  his  six  pints  a  night  :  some  as 
many  as  eighteen  ;  and  whilst  putting  this 
away,  he  will  smoke  from  four  to  eight 
Hamburg  cigars.  The  smoke  and  smell  in 
these  dens  is  indescribable,  and  were  it  not 
for  the  walking  exercise,  they  are  compell- 
ed, in  the  course  of  their  duty,  to  take,  it 
is  difficult  to  understand  how  men  could 
survive  it. 

Here  is   a  type  of  a  German  officer's  day 


The  German  Officer.  75 

in  the  early  summer.  Parade,  five  or  half- 
past  five  :  having  been  called  late,  and  feel- 
ing, perhaps,  a  little  "  gummy/7  he  has  no 
time  or  inclination  for  chota  hazree,  but  hur- 
ries out  to  his  work,  which  we  will  suppose 
to  be  for  the  day  "  Feld  dienst  Uebung" 
(say,  minor  tactics).  The  distance  to  the 
drill  ground  (I  have  a  particular  town  in 
view)  is  six  miles,  the  last  mile  over  a 
heavy  kutcha  track  :  the  drillground  itself 
is  deep  sand — deeper  by  far  than  the  worst 
of  the  Long  Valley,  cut  up  in  places  by 
low  ridges  and  copses  of  stone  pine,  the 
only  shade  within  miles,  and  the  name  of 
this  place  of  torment  is  "  The  Great  Sand." 
Having  doubled  about  over  or  rather 
through  this  desert  till  about  10  A.M.  with 
only  very  occasional  stand  easy's,  the 
march  home  commences,  and  the  company 
swings  in  at  something  over  four  miles  an 
hour,  generally  singing  as  they  go.  They 
get  back  to  barracks  about  11-30,  and  then 
the  officer  has  a  moment  to  rush  off  and 
get  some  breakfast ;  but  his  dinner  hour 


76  The  German  Officer. 

being  at  one  and  orderly  room  at  12-30, 
he  cuts  that  meal  very  short — generally 
some  bread  and  cheese  or  an  anchovy  toast 
with  two  to  three  pints  of  beer — and  then 
rushes  off  to  change  for  orderly  room,  which, 
owing  to  the  very  low  average  of  crime  in 
the  army,  generally  lasts  only  a  few  min- 
utes, and  he  then  has  time  to  look  at  the 
papers  before  dinner.  Dinner  lasts  about 
an  hour,  and  at  about  half-past  two  or  three 
the  companies  fall  in  for  squad  drill  or 
musketry,  as  the  case  may  be,  if  they  do 
not  go  to  the  range  that  afternoon.  At 
four  or  half-past  four  they  change  to  gym- 
nastics, or  twice  a  week  to  bathing  parade, 
which  may  entail  a  couple  of  miles  more 
down  to  the  water.  At  six  o'clock  they 
are  dismissed,  and  from  this  time  forward 
all  the  rest  of  the  day  is  the  officer's  own, 
to  do  what  he  likes  with.  He  generally 
goes  for  a  stroll  with  a  u  Herr  Kamerrade" 
the  objective  of  which  is  invariably  a 
"  bierhaus"  of  some  sort,  and  having  slak- 
ed hi&  thirst,  strolls  back  again  to  get  up 


The  German  Officer.  77 

another  thirst  for  tlie  "  kneipe"  where  he 
arrives  about  8  P.M.  and  sits  down  to  a 
frugal  supper.  As  to  food,  though  not  as 
to: beer,  it  is  a  matter  of  taste  more  than 
necessity,  and  the  average  officer  thinks  a 
Welsh  rarebit  or  half-a-dozen  anchovies  on 
toast  amply  sufficient  animal  food  with 
which  to  settle  his  half-dozen  pints  of  beer. 
The  remainder  of  the  evening  I  have  de- 
scribed above.  It  usually  ends  about  10 
or  11,  and  then  the  party  breaks  up  to 
seek  a  few  hours7  rest  before  beginning  the 
same  weary  monotonous  round  over  again. 
Fortunately,  as  few  of  them  have  ever 
known  any  other  existence,  they  are  per- 
fectly well  satisfied  with  it. 

Promotion  in  the  German  Army  is  rapid- 
ly approaching  that  condition  of  stagn^- 
tion  which  it  attained  before  the  campaigns 
of  1866  and  1870,  when,  it  is  said,  sometimes 
father,  son,  and  grandson  might  be  found 
in  the  same  company.  In  fact,  hitherto  it 
has  practically  only  been  maintained  at  all 
by  the  large  augmentations  the  army  has 


78  The  German  Officer. 

from  time  to  time  received,  and  the  recent 
increase  just  voted  by  the  Reichstag  will 
be  hailed  with  delight  by  many  a  grey- 
headed old  captain.  There  are  no  such 
things  in  the  German  Army  as  five-year 
commands  :  a  man  gets  his  command  and 
holds  on  to  it  as  long  as  he  is  physically 
fit  or  till  promotion.  To  all  applications 
from  general  officers  for  permission  to  retire, 
the  Emperor  points  to  his  own  age  and 
requests  them  to  stay,  and  to  such  an 
appeal  there  can  be  but  one  answer.  The 
general  system  for  promotion  in  the  regi- 
mental ranks  is  seniority  tempered  by  re- 
jection ;  for  higher  commands,  selection 
with  a  leaning  towards  seniority.  Under 
such  a  system  it  is  evident  that,  unless  the 
rejection  is  carried  out  with  considerable 
rigour,  a  complete  block  must  soon  result. 
But  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  rejection 
is  in  any  way  dependent  on  success  or  failure 
in  a  written  examination  :  once  a  German 
officer  has  had  his  commission  confirmed, 
he  is  safe  from  all  further  paper  troubles.  He 


The  German  Officer.  79 

is  judged  entirely  by  his  regimental  superi- 
ors, who,  to  prevent  any  marked  piece  of 
tyranny  being  practised  by  any  sour-temper- 
ed martinet,  are  in  turn  watched  by  a  con- 
fidential and  absolutely  secret  board  of 
officers,  chosen  by  the  Emperor  himself, 
which  travels  about  either  singly  or  collec- 
tively, and  makes  itself  acquainted  with  their 
personal  characters  of  regimental  or  batta- 
lion commanders.  The  idea  of  this  secret 
board  appears  at  first  sight  very  objection- 
able to  our  English  notion  ;  but  after  all 
it  does  not  compare  so  unfavourably  with 
our  own  plan  of  confidential  reports,  with 
the  evils  of  which,  when  employed  by  an 
unscrupulous  man,  our  army  is  unfortunate- 
ly too  well  acquainted.  Any  way,  it  must 
be  admitted,  that  some  such  check  as 
this  is  absolutely  indispensable  to  prevent 
the  large  power  with  which  commanding 
officers  are  entrusted  from  degenerating  at 
times  into  the  most  atrocious  tyranny.  The 
German  subaltern  or  captain  need  have  no 
fear  of  being  judged  without  fair  and  pro- 


80  The  German  Officer. 

longed  trial.  The  large  amount  of  respon- 
sibility with  which,  as  pointed  out  previ* 
ously,  he  is  entrusted  from  the  very  com- 
mencement of  his  career,  gives  his  seniors 
ample  opportunity  of  judging  of  his  fitness 
to  be  entrusted  with  more  ;  and  their  opin- 
ion will  be  the  result  of  observations  ex- 
tending over  a  term  of  years,  and  not  the 
hasty  impression  derived  from  a  hasty 
perusal  of  some  paper  matter  by  an  examin- 
er who  is  totally  unacquainted  with  the 
character  of  the  writer.  Of  course  the 
value  of  this  method  depends  entirely  on  the 
responsibility  granted  to  the  young  officer  : 
without  that  the  whole  scheme  breaks 
down,  and  it  is  therefore,  unfortunately, 
entirely  inapplicable  in  our  own  Service  at 
present.  Such  a  system  cannot  be  worked 
without  friction,  and  occasionally  hard 
cases  are  certain  to  occur  ;  but,  on  the 
whole,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  Ger- 
man officers  are  well  contented  under  it. 
This  may  be  held  to  be  entirely  due  to  the 
absolute  confidence  the  army  feels  in  its 


The  German  Officer.  81 

Commander-in-Chief  and  his  Chief  of  the 
Staff  :  with  such  men  as  these  there  can  be 
no  suspicion  of  favouritism  or  any  other 
unfair  influence.  What  other  army  can 
feel  equal  confidence  in  its  leaders  ? 

It  is  amongst  the  company  and  squad- 
ron leaders  that  the  chief  weeding  out  takes 
place,  and  more  generally  on  account  of 
physical  incapacity  than  for  any  other 
reasons.  As  may  be  gathered  from  our 
previous  description  of  a  German  officer's 
daily  life,  it  is  a  somewhat  trying  one,  and 
a  good  many  men  break  down  under  it  : 
it  must  be  borne  in  mind,  too,  that,  as  a 
rule,  Germans  age  quicker  than  English- 
men, and  have  a  much  greater  tendency  to 
run  to  fat,  On  the  other  hand,  they  suffer 
under  none  of  the  disadvantages  of  climate 
to  which  we  are  exposed,  and  thence  their 
actual  percentages  of  invaliding  and  death- 
rate  are  below  ours.  Financial  embarrass- 
ments also  remove  a  certain  percentage, 
particularly  in  the  Cavalry ;  and  since 
there  is  but  little  of  that  intense  feeling  of 

M.,  L.  6 


82  The  German  Officer. 

camaradie  which  is  so  notable  with  us, 
there  are  men  who  are  only  too  ready  to 
seize  hold  of  any  such  handle  against  a  man 
to  get  him  removed  as  a  disgrace  to  the 
honour  of  the  cloth.  Perhaps  it  is  owing 
to  the  humdrum  monotony  of  their  existence, 
or  the  intensity  of  the  competition  for  sur- 
vival ;  but  at  any  rate  there  seems  to 
be  a  woeful  lack  of  that  loyal  friendship  that 
exists  in  our  own  regiments,  and  which, 
though  it  may  sometimes  act  prejudicially 
to  the  interests  of  the  Service,  is,  on  the 
whole,  a  benefit  rather  than  the  reverse. 
Still,  all  these  means  taken  together  do  not 
suffice  to  keep  promotion  from  stagnation  ; 
and  hence,  since  it  is  absolutely  essential  to 
secure  a  certain  proportion  of  younger 
blood  in  the  higher  ranks,  a  way  is  opened 
for  men  of  special  ability  through  the 
Kriegs  Academie  or  Staff  College.  Candi- 
dates for  this  institution  are  first  selected 
by  the  corps  commanders,  and  have  then 
to  undergo  a  qualifying,  not  competitive, 
examination  in  military  subjects.  The 


The  Gerrn.au  Officer.  83 

course  of  study  is  two  years,  after  which 
they  are  attached  for  two  more  years  to  the 
Head-quarter  Staff  at  Berlin,  under  the  im- 
mediate eye  of  the  Chief  of  the  Staff  him- 
self. During  these  two  years,  besides  the 
routine  of  the  sections  to  which  they  be- 
long, they  are  called  on  to  solve  tactical 
problems  on  the  map,  which,  till  lately, 
were  set  and  examined  by  Moltke  himself. 
One  feature  of  these  exercises  was  that  only 
a  limited  time  was  allowed  for  their  solu- 
tion, and  no  books  of  reference  or  inter- 
communication between  the  students  ad- 
mitted. In  fact,  it  was  a  species  of  weekly 
or  bi-weekly  examination.  Afterwards  the 
class  was  collected,  and  Von  Moltke  -de- 
livered a  verbal  critique,  always  based  on 
the  simplest  rules  of  common  sense  and 
first  principles  ;  and  by  this  method  that 
wonderful  uniformity  of  ideas  and  execu- 
tion, on  which  the  whole  secret  of  the  Prus- 
sian leading  is  based,  has  been  attained. 
On  the  conclusion  of  this  two-year  term, 
the  officers  return  to  regimental  duty,  not 


84  The  German  Officer. 

to  their  own  regiments  but  to  others,  gen- 
erally of  another  branch,  in  which  they  are 
given  promotion  to  the  next  rank.  If  con- 
sidered fit  for  farther  employment,  they 
are  recalled  again  to  Berlin  on  the  occur- 
rence of  a  suitable  vacancy.  The  appoint- 
ments are  generally  for  a  term  of  five  years, 
at  the  expiration  of  which  the  officer  goes 
back  to  another  regiment  again  with  a  step 
in  rank. 

If,  on  the  whole,  promotion  appears  to  be 
slow  in  the  German  Army,  it  must  be  re- 
membered that  when  it  does  come,  it  is 
worth  having.  Rank  has  not  been  cheapen- 
ed to  the  same  extent  by  giving  honorary 
and  relative  rank  to  the  non-combatant 
branches  of  the  Service,  and  the  responsi- 
bilities attaching  to  each  grade  are  much 
higher  than  in  England.  A  captain  enjoys 
far  greater  independence  with  them  than 
a  major  with  us,  and  is  also  a  mounted 
officer.  A  major  commands  a  battalion, 
and  does  it,  too,  without  the  assistance  of  a 
lieutenant-colonel  second-in-command.  The 


T/ie  German  Officer.  85 

difference  in  the  pay  of  the  ranks  is  also 
strongly  marked.  Thus,  a  1st  Lieutenant 
of  Infantry  draws  £54  a  year  regimental 
pay  which,  with  allowances  for  quarters  and 
lights,  &c.,  will  be  increased  to  about  £80. 
A  captain  draws  £180,  or,  with  allowances, 
about  £220  ;  and  a  field  officer  command- 
ing a  battalion,  £270  regimental  pay,  and 
about  £45  allowances  in  addition.  Con- 
sidering the  difference  in  the  value  of 
money  and  the  more  economical  style  of 
life  usual  in  all  Germany,  it  will  be  seen 
that  above  the  rank  of  subalterns  the 
officers  are  not  badly  paid. 

One  thing  will,  I  hope,  be  apparent  from 
this  and  former  articles,  and,  that  is,  that 
the  keystone  of  the  efficiency  lies  entirely 
in  the  integrity  and  ability  of  the  Emperor 
and  his  Chief  of  the  Staff,  and  in  the  ab- 
sence of  all  cliques,  whether  political  or  per- 
sonal, in  the  army.  Were  it  not  for  the 
absolute  confidence  placed  by  the  officers  in 
their  Commander  -  in  -  Chief,  the  system 
could  only  work  with  great  friction  and 


86  The  German  Officer. 

loss  of  efficiency.  But  such  confidence  can 
only  be  felt  in  tried  leaders  placed  socially 
above  party  interests  or  personal  ambitions, 
and  such  men  are  only  to  be  found  in 
Royal  families.  Look  at  France,  and  ask 
whether  any  man  could  feel  the  same  trust 
in  the  present  head  of  the  army  in  that 
unfortunate  country  :  Republicanism  and 
military  efficiency  are  two  hopelessly  irre- 
concilable terms. 

It  will  be  seen,  too,  that,  just  as  in  the 
case  of  short  service,  the  conditions  with 
which  we  have  to  deal  are  so  totally  differ- 
ent from  those  of  the  German  Army,  that 
an  exact  copy  of  their  system  would  not 
be  practicable,  even  if  we  had  the  men  to 
work  it.  But  there  is  one  point,  and  that 
of  the  greatest  importance,  which  is  easily 
and  readily  adaptable  to  our  circumstances, 
and  that  is  the  delegation  of  responsibility 
on  a  larger  scale  to  our  junior  ranks.  This 
system  has,  indeed,  been  in  force  for  years 
in  the  Royal  Artillery,  and  no  one  can  feel 
inclined  to  quarrel  with  the  result  ;  for  as 


The  German  Officer.  87 

regimental  officers,    the  subalterns  of  the 
"  Royal  Regiment  "  are  second  to  none. 

In  conclusion  I  wish,  as  far  as  lies  in 
my  power,  to  clear  the  German  officers 
from  the  charge  one  so  often  hears  against 
them  of  ill-treating  their  men.  During  the 
whole  of  my  experience  I  have  never  once 
seen  a  German  soldier  struck  by  his  officer, 
and  I  am  convinced  that  in  this  respect 
the  men  are  as  well  off  as  our  own.  It  is 
utterly  contrary  to  the  whole  feeling  which 
prevails  in  Germany  on  the  subject  of  the 
honor  of  being  the  wearer  of  the  Emper- 
or's uniform,  which,  be  it  remembered,  is 
treated  with  too  much  respect — far  more 
respect  than,  I  grieve  to  say,  is  shown  to 
Her  Majesty's — for  such  a  thing  to  occur 
without  the  offender  being  immediately 
dismissed  the  Service. 


THE  GERMAN  CAVALRY. 

fjlHERE  is,  perhaps,  no  branch  of  the 
JL  German  Army  from  which  we  have 
more  to  learn  than  from  their  cavalry. 
Taking  into  consideration  the  enormous 
difficulties  they  have  to  contend  with,  the 
results  they  achieve  are  little  short  of  mar- 
vellous. The  first  and  greatest  difficulty 
lies  in  the  shortness  of  their  service,  which 
is  the  same  as  that  of  their  Infantry,  name- 
ly, three  years  ;  the  second  lies  in  the  diffi- 
culty of  securing  suitable  recruits.  The 
Germans  are  not  naturally  a  race  of  horse- 
men, and  the  cavalry  officers  complain  bit- 
terly of  the  little  care  which  is  taken  in  as- 
signing to  them  a  suitable  class  of  recruits, 
only  those  men  being  told  off  to  them  whose 
physical  conformation  renders  it  unlikely 
that  they  will  make  good  marchers  ;  and 
in  except  a  few  favoured  regiments,  which 
get  a  fair  proportion  of  four-year  volun- 
teers, no  particular  attention  is  paid  to  the 


The  German  Cavalry.  89 

previous  associations  or  wishes  of  the  men 
themselves.  These  four-year  volunteers 
are  men  who  volunteer  to  serve  for  four 
years  with  the  colours,  on  condition  of  be- 
ing excused  Service  in  the  Reserve  ;  they 
are  only  allowed  in  the  Cavalry,  and  have, 
I  believe,  the  option  of  choosing  their  own 
regiments.  With  these  exceptions,  the 
mass  of  recruits  are  by  no  means  promising 
material  to  convert  into  horsemen,  for  in 
spite  of  compulsory  education,  general  in- 
telligence and  quickness  are  by  no  means 
the  prevailing  impression  derived  from  their 
features  ;  nor  are  the  long  bodies,  short 
legs,  and  round  thighs  which  procured  them 
exemption  from  Infantry  duties,  particular- 
ly adapted  to  give  them  a  firm  seat  and 
light  hands  on  horseback  ;  nor  does  the 
high  and  clumsy-looking  Hungarian  saddle, 
raising  the  man  six  inches  unnecessarily 
above  his  horse's  back,  render  the  matter 
any  easier.  In  addition  to  all  this,  it  must 
be  remembered  that  the  squadron  officer  has 
neither  riding-master  nor  adjutant  to  help 


90  The  German  Cavalry. 

him  to  drill  his  recruits  or  train  his  horses  ; 
he  has  to  do  all  that  work  himself,  and  the 
time  at  his  disposal  in  which  to  perform  the 
first  part  of  his  task  (viz.,  recruit- train  ing) 
is  barely  six  months,  in  two  or  even  three 
of  which  (especially  in  the  Eastern  districts), 
the  weather  is  too  bad  to  permit  of  any  out- 
door work  whatever.  But  as  a  set-off  to 
these  disadvantages,  the  quality  of  the 
horses  and  the  wise  arrangements  with  re- 
gard to  the  supply  of  remounts  must  be 
taken  into  account.  The  horses  for  medium 
and  light  regiments  are  supplied  almost 
entirely  from  Government  studs,  and  are 
the  produce  of  stallions  bought  by  Govern- 
ment, whose  services  are  available  for  any 
farmers  in  the  country  keeping  suitable 
brood  mares.  As  is  well  known,  large 
quantities  of  Arab  stallions  have  been  im- 
ported ;  and  these,  with  East  Prussian 
mares,  have  produced  a  capital  stock  of 
small  well-bred  and  hardy  horses,  parti- 
cularly docile  and  temperate.  The  Hunga- 
rian horses  tried  in  England  a  few  years 


The  German  Cavalry.  91 

ago,  though  they  were  by  no  means  the 
•best  of  their  class,  still  gave  most  favour- 
able results  as  regards  endurance  in  South 
Africa  and  Egypt ;  but  I  was  told  by  an 
Englishman  formerly  in  the  Ziethen  Hus- 
sars, and  quartered  on  the  Hungarian  fron- 
tier, that  the  best  Hungarians  were  not 
equal  in  endurance  to  the  East  Prussians, 
on  which  his  own  regiment  were  mounted. 
The  patient  and  sensible  method  pursued  in 
training  these  horses  as  remounts  is  really 
the  foundation  of  the  whole  structure ;  the 
course  of  preparation  lasts  two  years,  during 
the  whole  of  which  they  are  only  ridden  by 
picked  men,  and  not  till  the  end  of  the 
second  year  are  they  required  to  work  in 
their  full  kits,  and  then  are  still  spared  and 
saved  as  much  as  possible,  particularly  in 
the  manoeuvres.  It  has  been  found  by  ex- 
perience that  any  attempt  to  get  more  work 
out  of  them  before  their  growth  has  been 
fully  completed,  only  leads  to  their  rapid 
destruction  ;  whereas  horses  that  are  well 
on  in  their  sixth  year  before  put  to  hard 


92  The  German  Cavalry. 

work,  will  last  for  years  ;  and  I  have  seen 
many  a  horse  of  19  and  even  20  years  of 
age  still  doing  his  full  share  of  duty.  Be- 
sides this,  the  two  years  of  steady  training 
have  so  formed  the  animal's  paces  and 
taught  him  his  work,  that  even  the  clum- 
siest recruit  can  hardly  make  him  unsteady, 
and  the  result  is  seen  in  the  extraordinary 
precision  in  which  the  squadrons  work 
when  at  drill.  I  have  seen  squadron 
after  squadron  go  past  at  a  trot  without  a 
single  horse  in  the  ranks  breaking,  and 
the  trot  is  a  real  eight- miles-an-hour  one, 
and  not  the  shambling  crawl  one  too 
often  hears  dignified  by  that  name.  The 
horses  look  small,  and  hardly  up  to  the 
weight  they  have  to  carry.  Taking  the 
average  of  the  hussar  and  dragoon  regi- 
ments I  have  seen,  they  are  certainly 
smaller  than  the  run  of  native  cavalry,  but 
their  endurance  is  incontestable.  The  whole 
of  the  time  they  are  on  the  drill  ground, 
they  are  almost  incessantly  at  the  trot  or 
gallop.  The  only  time  I  can  remember 


The  German  Cavalry.  93 

having  seen   them   at   a  walk   (except,  of 
course,    in    a  march  past)    is   when  they 
break-up  after   a   charge    to   represent  the 
melee.     Take  for  instance,  the  ordinary  de- 
mands made  on  every    squadron   at  the  in- 
spections   in    May  ;  and  in    the    brigade 
and  divisional   manoeuvres    they  are    still 
higher.       "  Every      squadron     must     be 
prepared  to   cover  2,000  yards   at   a  trot, 
600  at   a   gallop,   and    120   about  at   the 
charge  ;     then   break-up   into    the  melee, 
and   on   the    trumpet   sound,    '  Appelle !  ' 
rally  to  the  front   at   a  gallop,  and  charge 
again  in  pursuit  without  remembering  or 
telling-off."     And   this  has  all  to  be  done 
in  marching  order.    The  pace  of  the  charge 
is,  as  a  rule,  good  in   the  manoeuvres    over 
heavy  ground,  &c.     It  may  at  times  appear 
to  us  to  be  slow  ;  but  on   the  drill-ground 
at  Darmstadt,  the  other  day,  there  certainly 
was   no  fault   to  be  found  with  it  on  that 
score  ;  in  fact,  it   was   difficult  to  believe 
that  such   pace   could   be  got  out  of  such 
little  horses.     The  chief  action  of  cavalry 


94  The  German  Cavalry. 

in  the  future  will  undoubtedly  be  charging 
the  enemy's  Cavalry  ;  without  for  one  mo- 
ment admitting  that  its  day  on  the  battle- 
field against  infantry  has  passed,  still,  in 
all  probability  the  Cavalry  combats,  which 
must  necessarily  precede  every  general 
action,  will  afford  every  regiment  at  least 
six  times  as  many  opportunities  for  attack- 
ing as  the  battle  itself.  In  these  combats, 
precision  of  manoeuvres  and  a  boot-to-boot 
charge  will  be  the  chief  factors  of  success, 
and  in  both  of  these  the  Germans  stand  far 
above  us.  To  gain  the  flank  of  the  enemy 
is  always  the  leading  idea,  and  for  this  pur- 
pose all  such  manoeuvres  as  breaking  into 
columns  (or  half-columns),  riding  across 
the  front  of  the  enemy,  then  re-wheeling 
into  line,  executing  a  partial  change  of 
front,  and  delivering  the  charge,  are  con- 
stantly practised  ;  and  it  is  perfectly  aston- 
ishing to  see  the  sections  wheel  up  into 
line  again  after  a  gallop  of  200  or  300  yards, 
without  leaving  day-light  between  the  files, 
and  yet  without  overcrowding.  I  saw 


The  German  Cavalry.  95 

squadron  after  squadron  do  this  the  other 
day  again  and  again,  with  a  precision  I  had 
not  believed  to  be  possible.  Besides  riding 
boot  to  boot  in  the  charge,  the  ranks 
should  be  kept  separate  and  distinct,  no 
rushing  forward  of  horses  in  the  rear  rank 
into  the  front  one,  and  in  both  respects  the 
charges  left  nothing  to  be  desired.  I  have 
heard  it  too  often  said  by  English  Cavalry 
officers,  that  it  is  impossible  to  ride  boot  to 
boot  without  overcrowding.  I  do  not  know 
why  it  should  be  impossible  to  us,  for  it 
certainly  is  not  so  to  the  Germans  ;  but  I 
will  admit  that  our  antediluvian  system  of 
giving  a  base  in  line  movements,  and  not 
teaching  our  men  to  keep  their  dressing  by 
riding  the  time  without  turning  their  heads 
to  the  directing  flank,  renders  it  very 
difficult  to  prevent  it.  But,  if  so,  why  not 
abolish  these  antiquated  ideas  and  try 
new  ones  ?  We  are  not  too  proud  to  copy 
Prussian  helmets,  shoulder-straps,  &c.  ; 
why  not,  then,  copy  something  useful  for  a 
change  ?  One  other  point  is  particularly 


96  The  German  Cavalry. 

worthy  of  notice,  and  that  is  the  practice 
of  invariably  charging  at  a  moving  object, 
and  of  never  delivering  a  charge  in  the 
direction  of  the  line  of  advance,  but  in  a 
more  or  less  oblique  line  to  it,  for  this 
will  generally  be  the  case  in  action.  We 
are  not  likely  ever  to  meet  cavalry  again 
who  will  halt  conveniently  for  us  to  attack 
them  (though  I  have  seen  it  done  some  few 
years  ago  in  the  Long  Valley),  and  it  is 
one  of  the  things  requiring  most  practice 
and  experience  on  the  part  of  the  squadron 
leader  to  wait  for  the  completion  of  the 
wheel  quietly  before  sounding  the  charge, 
instead  of,  as  is  too  often  the  case,  sounding 
before  half  the  troops  have  got  into  the  new 
alignment,  the  result  being  a  straggling, 
loose-jointed  attack,  more  like  a  flight  of 
wild  ducks  across  the  sky  than  the  living 
wall  it  should  be. 


LESSONS  FROM  THE  AUSTRIAN 
CAVALRY. 

SIGNS  are  not  wanting  that  the  Austrian 
Cavalry  are  beginning  to  shake  off 
the  lethargy  into  which  the  events  of  1866 
— disastrous  indeed  for  the  army  as  a 
whole,  but  assuredly  not  for  the  Cavalry 
alone — threw  them  ;  and  that  in  the  next 
war  we  shall  see  them  ready  again  to  assert 
their  position  on  the  battle-field,  we  trust, 
with  the  same  and  even  greater  success 
than  that  which  attended  them  in  1849, 
1859,  and  1866.  It  is  difficult  to  under- 
stand how  it  happened  that  their  con- 
fidence was  so  thoroughly  shaken  by  the 
experience  of  the  latter  campaign  ;  for, 
actually,  they  but  seldom  came  under  the 
action  of  breech-loading  fire,  and  then 
generally  under  conditions  which  would 
have  entailed  their  failure  against  any  of 
the  other  arms  that  have  been  in  use  since 
the  invention  of  gunpowder.  Cavalry 

M.,  L.  7 


98    Lessons  from  the  Austrian  Cavalry. 

charging  brave  unshaken  Infantry,  favoured 
by  the  ground,  or  sacrificing  themselves  to 
cover  the  retreat  of  a  broken  army,  have 
generally  been  severely  handled.  There 
was  nothing  in  the  fact  that  history  here 
repeated  itself  to  justify  them  in  almost 
entirely  resigning  their  position  on  the 
battle-field.  All  that  was  necessary  was 
to  devote  such  care  to  the  preparation  of 
their  leaders,  that  they  would  be  no  longer 
exposed  to  certain  destruction,  from  the 
choice,  by  the  latter,  of  wrong  opportunities; 
and  to  train  the  army  as  a  whole,  so  that 
the  task  of  the  cavalry  on  the  next  battle- 
field might  be  to  pursue  the  retreat  of  the 
enemy,  not  to  cover  that  of  their  own. 
The  task  set  before  them  at  Konigratz  was 
one  certain  to  lead  to  their  destruction. 
Their  own  army  being  already  in  full 
retreat,  they  were  called  on  to  attack  the 
victorious  Prussian  Infantry  and  Artillery 
who  crowned  the  ridges  up  which  they  had 
to  ride.  Across  nearly  2,000  yards  of 
open,  uniformly  sloping  ground,  sodden 


Lessons  from  the  Austrian  Cavalry.    99 

by  the  continuous  rain  of  24  hours,  these 
gallant  horsemen  rode  forward,  and  suc- 
ceeded in  penetrating  at  places  amongst  the 
Prussian  Infantry  and  Artillery,  both  of 
whom  were  morally  in  the  best  possible 
position  for  receiving  them,  for  both  were 
u  on  the  win"  and  the  six  hours'  previous 
fighting  had  weeded  the  ranks  of  the  former 
of  every  man  who  did  not  "  want  "  to  be 
in  at  the  death.  The  woods  and  copses 
down  towards  the  Bistritz  and  northwards 
of  Chlum  had  acted  as  filters.  The  excite- 
ment and  novelty  of  the  first  fire  had  worn 
off,  and  the  men  were  as  cool  as  veterans, 
and  their  fire  proportionately  deadly.  But 
still  the  Austrians  came  dangerously  close 
to  them,  and  would  have  come  closer,  had 
not  every  formed  body  of  Prussian  Cavalry 
within  reach  ridden  up  spontaneously  and 
attacked.  The  fight  then  degenerated  into 
a  gigantic  cavalry  duel  which  gave  time 
for  the  Austrians  to  withdraw  almost 
unmolested.  Surely,  here  we  find  no  cause 
to  justify  the  discredit  into  which  Cav- 


100  Lessons  from  the  Austrian  Cavalry. 

airy  has  fallen,  but  rather  the  contrary. 
Reverse  the  slope  of  the  hill  and  fire,  and 
give  the  Austrians  five  minutes'  start, 
then  the  Prussian  Cavalry  would  have 
been  too  late  ;  and  it  seems  probable  from 
what  actually  was  accomplished  that  the 
first  lines  of  Prussian  Infantry  would  have 
been  very  seriously  dealt  with  indeed. 

Had  the  Austrians  only  turned  to  the 
other  theatre  of  the  war,  they  would  have 
found  ample  cause  to  alter  their  opinions. 
There,  against  the  muzzle-loading  rifle, 
their  services  were  most  brilliant,  but 
because  it  was  against  the  muzzle-loader, 
no  further  notice  was  taken  of  it.  We, 
wish  to  ask,  once  for  all,  of  what  possible 
consequence  it  can  be  to  either  horse  or 
rider  whether  the  bullet  that  stops  him 
came  from  a  breach  or  a  muzzle-loader  ? 
The  weight,  striking  velocity,  and  number 
of  bullets  that  have  to  be  encountered  in 
any  given  interval  of  time,  are  the  factors 
that  signify,  except  in  so  far  as  increased 
rapidity  of  firing  diminishes  accuracy  :  the 


Lessons  from,  the  Austrian  Cavalry.  101 

question  of  the  weapon  itself  is  immaterial. 
As  we  have  frequently  pointed  out,  the 
greater  density  in  which  troops  stood  to 
receive  cavalry  in  those  days  more  than 
compensated  for  the  increased  rapidity  of 
fire  even  of  the  modern  rifle.  Let  us  apply 
this  reasoning  to  the  following  incident, 
viz.,  the  charge  of  Edelsheim's  brigade  at 
Custozza,  which  deserves  to  rank  with  the 
finest  exploits  of  the  arm  in  any  age.  At 
7  A.M,  an  Austrian  Division,  some  2,000 
sabres,  attacked  two  divisions  of  Italian 
Infantry,  about  20,000  strong,  and  drawn 
up  in  two  lines  of  battalion  squares,  cover- 
ing each  others'  intervals.  They  broke 
several  of  these  squares,  and  carried  con- 
fusion right  to  the  rear  of  the  army,  and 
then  came  back  again  between  the  remain- 
ing squares,  receiving,  of  course,  their  fire 
again  as  they  went  back.  But  in  spite  of 
their  losses  they  were  not  at  all  broken, 
but  quickly  rallied  and  re-formed  out  of 
range,  watching  the  Italians,  whom  they 
held  firmly  rooted  to  the  ground,  for  it  was 


102  Lessons  from  the  Austrian  Cavalry. 

felt  that,  the  moment  they  moved,  the 
terrible  Cavalry  would  be  on  them  again  ; 
and  hence  the  services  of  the  two  divisions, 
though  urgently  required  at  another  and 
decisive  portion  of  the  field,  were  lost  to 
the  Italians  for  the  whole  day.  At  five  in 
the  evening  the  Cavalry  attacked  again,  and 
fairly  swept  the  field  of  the  enemy,  captur- 
ing more  than  double  their  numbers  of 
prisoners  and  many  guns.  The  Cavalry 
losses  during  the  day  did  not  exceed  30 
per  cent., — not  an  excessive  price  to  pay  for 
victory.  Even  allowing  the  breech-loader 
to  be  equal  to  five  muzzle-loaders,  which 
is  a  great  deal  more  than  it  actually  is, 
still  the  Cavalry  would  have  neutralised, 
and  eventually  have  annihilated,  nearly 
double  their  numbers,  at  a  cost  of  some 
600  men  and  horses.  How  many  Infantry 
would  be  required  to  effect  the  same,  and 
what  would  their  losses  be  ? 

It  is  not  likely  that  the  troops  the 
Austrians  will  have  to  meet  in  the  coming 
campaign  will  be  superior  in  discipline  or 


Lessons  from  the  Austrian  Cavalry.  103 

courage  to  the  Italians  and,  besides,  they 
will  have  to  be  encountered  in   extended 
orders,   not  in  close, — a  formation  least  of 
all   adapted   to  their  gregarious   instincts. 
Nor  is  it  probable  that  they  possess  the 
requisite  moral  development  to  utilize  to 
the  full  the  power  of  the  breech-loader — a 
fact  of  which  they  seem  to  be  fully  aware 
themselves,  and  which,  to  our  mind,  stands 
out   most  distinctly  from  .the  accounts   of 
the  last  Russo-Turkish  War.     And  hence 
we  draw  from  the  order  recently  issued, 
about    charging    unshaken    Infantry,    the 
most  hopeful  augury  for  the  success  of  the 
Austrians  in  the  coming  campaign  ;  which, 
even  if  postponed  this  year,   must   come 
sooner  or  later.     The  weakest  point  in  the 
present   Austrian   Army   we    consider    to 
lie  in  the  "  Tactics  of  Timidity/7  in  which 
for    the    last    20   years   they    have    been 
trained,    and    which    resemble    only    too 
closely  our  own.     Both  contracts  most  un- 
favourably   with    the    resolute,    offensive 
spirit  inculcated  in  the  Russian  Infantry  by 


104  Lessons  from  the  Austrian  Cavalry. 

Skobeleff,  and,  since  the  war,  by  Drago- 
mirow,  to  meet  which  either  their  Infantry 
tactics   (and  our  own  too)  must  be  diame- 
trically  altered,   or  the  Cavalry   must   be 
called   on  for  sacrifices  beyond   anything 
we  are  accustomed  to  think  off, — a  call  to 
which    we   feel   certain   the   horsemen    of 
both  nations  will  most  loyally  respond,  for, 
after  all,  what  better  right  has  a  foot-soldier 
to   die   for   his   Emperor   or  Queen    than 
another.     As  to  their  probable  success  or 
failure,  it  appears  to  depend  on  the  follow- 
ing simple  consideration  :  the  bulk  of  the 
infantry   fire   in  action  is   inevitably   un- 
aimed,    hence   the   chances   of  being    hit, 
depend    on    the    length    of    time    during 
which  one  is  exposed,  and  the  size  of  the 
target.     The   Cavalry   target   is   one-third 
larger,    but,   on   the   other    hand,    moves 
over,   say,  1,500  yards  in  one-sixth  of  the 
time.     Its   losses  during  the  charge   will, 
therefore,  probably  be  roughly  one  quarter 
of  those  of  an  equal  body  of  Infantry,     It 
will  not,  therefore,  be  liable  to  serious  loss 


Lessons  from  the  Austrian  Cavalry.  105 

till  after  the  actual  shock  ;  and  the  amount 
of  these  losses  can  only  be  modified  by 
the  prompt  advances  of  Infantry,  above 
all  of  Artillery,  to  support  it  at  case  shot 
ranges.  Loud  then  will  be  the  cries  for 
Horse  Artillery,  and  bitterly  will  its 
absence  be  regretted  by  those  whose  mis- 
fortune it  may  happen  to  be  to  pay  with 
their  blood  and  reputation  for  the  short- 
sighted economy  of  their  rulers.  The 
economy  in  horses  to  feed  after  such  an 
engagement  will  probably  be  amply  suffi- 
cient to  satisfy  even  the  mind  of  the 
anonymous  "  General  who  has  command- 
ed an  Army  in  the  Field." 


CAVALRY  IN  WAR. 

THE  publication  of  the  statistics  of  losses 
in  the  German  Army  in  1870,  by  the 
Red  Cross  Society  explodes  one  of  the 
many  fallacies  on  which  English  tactical 
ideas  have  been  of  late  years  based,  viz., 
that  the  sword  and  lance  counted  for  no- 
thing in  the  Franco-German  War.  The 
origin  of  this  fallacy  appears  to  have  been 
a  statement  by  DR.  ENGEL,  a  German 
Medical  Statistician,  that,  after  Sedan,  out 
of  72,000  German  horsemen  in  France, 
only  six  met  their  death  from  the  arme 
blanche,  a  statement  probably  true  enough  ; 
for  after  Sedan  the  Germans  never  again 
encountered  formed  cavalry  in  the  charge. 
But  unfortunately  our  would-be  reformers 
omitted  to  notice  the  words  "after  Sedan" 
and  persuaded  themselves  that  the  absolute 
total  loss  suffered  by  the  German  Army, 
not  Cavalry  only,  but  by  the  whole  Ger- 
man Army,  from  the  above-mentioned 


Cavalry  in  War.  107 

weapons,  only  amounted  to  the  ridiculous 
total  of  six  men  placed  hors  de  combat.  It 
seems  absurd  that  such  a  ridiculous  state- 
ment could  have  received  credit  for  one 
single  moment ;  yet  we  can  vouch  for  it, 
that  it  was  actually  believed  by  a  large 
number  of  Infantry  officers,  and  has  also 
appeared  in  many  military  papers.  Only  a 
few  months  ago,  DK.  W.  H.  RUSSELL  con- 
sidered it  worth  his  while  to  state,  in  con- 
tradiction of  it,  in  the  columns  of  the  Army 
and  Navy  Gazette^  that  with  his  own  eyes  he 
had  seen  more  than  treble  the  number  of 
German  corpses,  carrying  unmistakable 
marks  of  lance  and  sword  lying  on  the 
plateau  of  "  Floing,"  on  which  the  celebrated 
charges  of  GALLIFET  brigades  of  the  French 
Cavalry  took  place  the  morning  after  Sedan. 
But  we  have  it  now,  on  good  authority, 
that  the  Germans  alone  lost  during  the 
course  of  the  war  no  less  than  1,163  men 
killed  and  wounded  by  lance  and  sword, 
though  they  were  successful  in  every  single 
charge  against  French  Cavalry,  and  the 


108  Cavalry  in  War. 

latter  only  succeeded  in  breaking  off  the 
angle  of  a  small  company  square,  formed 
by  some  pioneers  in  front  of  Morsbrunn  on 
the  6th  August  at  Woerth,  and  in  riding- 
down  a  few  skirmishers  at  Vionville,  Beau- 
mont, and  Sedan.  What  the  French  losses 
from  the  same  weapons  were,  we  are  unable 
to  say  ;  for  up  to  date  the  latter  have  given 
us  no  statistics,  but  we  can  arrive  at  an 
approximation  to  them  from  the  following 
facts. 

Whenever  the  German  and  French  Caval- 
ries crossed  swords,  the  former  were  victori- 
ous, and  therefore,  presumably,  disabled 
more  of  their  opponents.  The  attack 
of  FORTON'S  Division  on  the  debris  of 
BREDOW'S  Brigade,  after  the  latter  were 
blown  and  disorganised  by  their  success- 
ful charge  on  infantry  and  guns,  may  be 
fairly  set  against  the  losses  inflicted  under 
similar  circumstances  by  Prussian  Hussars 
on  the  debris  of  MICHEL'S  Brigade  at 
Woerth.  Then  as  a  clear  gain  to  the 
Germans  we  can  register  the  losses  they 


Cavalry  in  War.  109 

inflicted  on  French  Infantry  and  Artillery 
at  Vionville,  where  besides  the  well-known 
charge  of  BREDOW'S  brigade,  referred  to 
above,  the  llth  Hussars  captured  a  battery 
of  guns,  nearly  secured  BAZAINE  himself, 
and  cut  up  some  parties  of  Infantry  ;  and 
the  1st  Garde  Dragoner  rode  into  and 
destroyed  the  French  Infantry  who,  in  the 
full  flush  of  victory,  were  driving  before 
them  the  remains  of  WEDELL'S  Infantry 
brigade.  Nor  should  we  leave  out  of  con- 
sideration the  number  of  fugitives  ridden 
down  after  Woerth,  or  the  gangs  of  Mobiles 
dispersed  and  annihilated  in  the  latter  por- 
tion of  the  war. 

And  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that,  at  the 
commencement  of  the  war,  the  German 
Cavalry  knew  nothing  practically,  of  the 
employment  of  Cavalry  en  masse.  There 
was  not  a  single  Cavalry  officer  in  the 
army  who  had  ever  manoeuvred  a  Division 
together,  and  the  Divisional  commands 
were  only  formed  on  the  29th  July  for 
the  first  time.  Their  old  traditions  had 


110  Cavalry  in  War. 

been  entirely  lost.  For  years  past  they  had 
been  taught  to  believe  the  accepted  axiom 
of  the  Umpire  Staff  that  "  Cavalry  cannot 
charge  unshaken  Infantry/7  Even  BREDOW 
is  said  to  have  returned  that  answer  to  the 
officer  who  first  took  him  the  summons 
to  attack  and  extricate  the  Infantry,  and 
finally,  they  all  wore  blunt  swords  in  steel 
scabbards.  The  latter  may  appear  only  a 
trivial  detail,  but  it  is  far  from  being  so. 
SIR  CHARLES  NAPIER  said  of  the  steel  scab- 
bard in  Scinde  :  "It  is  noisy,  which  is  bad  ; 
it  is  heavy,  which  is  worse  ;  and  it  blunts 
the  swords,  which  is  worst  of  all."  Our 
own  experience  in  the  Sikh  war  should  have 
impressed  this  on  our  memory.  Let  us 
only  quote  one  example  out  of  many.  At 
Chillianwalla  UNETT'S  squadron  of  the  3rd 
Light  Dragoons  (now  the  3rd  Hussars),  70 
strong,  charged  more  than  double  their 
number  of  Sikh  horsemen,  the  latter  being 
wretchedly  mounted,  but  armed  with  cast 
light  dragoon  swords,  sharpened  to  a  razor 
edge,  and  carried  either  without  scabbards  at 


Cavalry  in  War.  Ill 

all,  or  in  wooden  ones.  Though  our  horse- 
men drove  their  enemy  from  the  field,  45 
out  of  the  70  were  killed  or  wounded,  and 
most  of  the  wounded  died  before  help  reached 
them,  and  it  may  also  be  well  to  call  to  mind 
that  after  the  Sikh  wars,  chain  bridles,  steel 
gauntlets,  and  a  curbchain  sewn  into  the  lin- 
ing of  the  sleeve,  were  recommended  to  be 
worn  in  the  Indian  Cavalry  ;  of  all  of  which 
recommendations,  only  the  steel  chain  worn 
by  Infantry  Field  officers,  and  usually  sup- 
posed to  be  a  picketting  chain,  though 
really  a  chain  bridle,  remains  in  the  service. 
Taking  it  all  in  all,  we  can  hardly  believe 
the  losses  inflicted  on  the  French  Army  by 
the  German  Cavalry,  at  less  than  five  times 
those  suffered  by  the  latter,  and  had  the 
swords  been  sharp,  and  every  blow  struck 
home  had  carried  death  with  it,  as  it  should 
have  done,  we  should  be  inclined  to  multi- 
ply the  last  figure  again  by  three,  which 
would  give  us  the  respectable  total  of  about 
15,000  ;  and  as  the  total  loss  of  the  French 
is  not  generally  supposed  to  have  exceeded 


112  Cavalry  in  War. 

the  total  loss  of  the  Germans,  on  the  battle- 
field, it  would  appear  that  the  cavalry  of 
the  latter  actually  inflicted,  or  ought  to  have 
inflicted — given  sharp  swords — a  heavier 
loss  on  the  French,  than  the  French  Artil- 
lery actually  inflicted  on  the  Germans,  or 
15  per  cent.,  against  about  9  per  cent. 

But  in  the  next  war  all  this  should  be 
still  farther  improved  in  favour  of  the 
Cavalry.  Steel  scabbards,  it  is  true,  still 
remain,  but  the  German  Cavalry  officer  is 
fully  alive  to  the  advantage  of  a  sharp 
blade,  and  may  be  trusted  to  do  his  utmost 
to  secure  it.  Their  leaders  too  have  been 
accustomed  to  handle  large  bodies  of  men, 
and  both  men  and  officers  have  been 
thoroughly  indoctrinated  with  the  old  prin- 
ciples of  ZIETHEN  and  SIEDLITZ.  Their 
regulations,  too,  no  longer  leave  them  in  any 
doubt  as  to  unshaken  Infantry.  "  Cavalry 
must  on  occasion  be  prepared  to  charge 
even  unshaken  Infantry  for,"  to  quote 
PRINCE  HOHENLOHE,  "  who  can  tell  whe- 
ther the  Infantry  are  shaken  or  not,  till 


Cavalry  in  War.  113 

the  attempt  has  been  actually  made/7  And 
no  umpire  now  would  dare  to  repeat  the 
old  and  hated  formula,  "  Cavalry  cannot 
charge,  etc./7  without  carefully  weighing 
the  conditions  under  which  the  charge  was 
supposed  to  be  delivered.  Leaving  the 
Russian  Mounted  Infantry  out  of  consider- 
ation for  the  moment,  the  first  act  of  every 
campaign  must  open  with  a  series  of 
gigantic  Cavalry  charges,  in  which  the 
Germans,  at  any  rate,  will  be  prepared  to 
handle  bodies  of  60  squadrons  at  a  time  ; 
and  if  they  learn  to  keep  the  edges  of  their 
swords  keen,  the  losses  of  the  last  war 
may,  judging  by  our  own  experience  of  the 
Sikhs,  be  safely  multiplied  by  ten.  Imagine 
the  terribly  depressing  effect  the  rumour  of 
such  slaughter  would  spread  in  the  ranks 
•of  the  defeated  enemy  ;  we  doubt  whether 
its  Infantry  then,  however  intact  materially, 
could  be  considered  morally  unshaken 
when  face  to  face  with  a  charging  division. 
Even  repeaters  will  make  little  difference  ; 

for  as  long  as  men  possess  human  hearts, 
M.,  L.  8 


114  Cavalry  in  War. 

nerves,  and  minds,  opportunities  will  cer- 
tainly be  given  to  a  well-trained  Cavalry 
leader  ;  and  we  have  ourselves  seen  German 
Infantry  armed  with  repeaters,  fairly  ridden 
into,  on  the  manoeuvre  ground,  without 
their  having  time  to  fire  more  than  a  single 
round. 

Experiments  in  France,  Sweden  and 
Russia  have  all  shewn  that  the  increased 
rapidity  of  fire  of  the  repeater  does  not 
necessarily  imply  an  increased  number  of 
hits,  and  common  sense  alone  is  enough 
to  demonstrate  that  the  reduction  of  calibre 
now  so  popular  in  Europe,  will  not  give 
greater  deadliness.  We  would  recommend 
to  a  few  of  the  small-bore  enthusiasts  a 
course  of  practical  experiment  on  foot  in 
the  jungle  against  charging  tigers,  and 
then  let  them  apply  the  result  of  their 
experience,  if  they  survive,  to  the  case  of 
a  galloping  horse  maddened  by  the  excite- 
ment of  the  charge* 


CAVALRY  VERSUS  INFANTRY. 

WE  make  no  apologies  for  returning  to 
this  subject.  The  indignation  some 
of  our  previous  articles  appear  to  have 
excited  in  the  martial  bosoms  of  numerous 
Infantry  officers,  in  itself,  would  be  excuse 
enough  for  our  doing  so  ;  but  the  important 
bearing  of  this  question  on  the  tactics  of 
future  wars  and  the  necessity  which  exists 
that  the  two  arms,  when  occasion  requires  it, 
should  play  into  each  other's  hands,  is  our 
principal  justification  for  pursuing  it. 

The  main  point  of  our  contention  does 
not  appear  to  have  been  grasped  by  our  In- 
fantry critics,  and,  moreover,  we  have  been 
held  personally  responsible  for  what  is  really 
the  statement  of  two  such  highly  re- 
sponsible and  qualified  authorities  as  the 
Austrian  and  German  General  Staff.  It  is 
they,  not  the  Civil  and  Military  Gazette, 
which  first  asserted  it  as  a  principle  of 
modern  battle  tactics,  that  "  Cavalry  must 


116  Cavalry  versus  Infantry. 

on  occasion,  be  prepared  to  charge  even 
unshaken  Infantry.  "  We  acknowledge 
the  implied  compliment  gratefully  ;  whilst, 
at  the  same  time,  we  disclaim  the  respon- 
sibility of  the  authorship  of  the  paragraph 
which  called  for  it.  Let  us  proceed  to 
throw  a  little  light  on  the  matter.  Both 
Germans  and  Austrians  only  wrote  for 
their  own  Cavalry  against  any  Infantry 
they  were  respectively  likely  to  meet. 
Similarly  we,  in  enlarging  upon  their  text, 
only  wrote  for  our  Cavalry  against  any 
Infantry  we  are  likely  to  meet.  It  is  less 
than  probable  that  under  any  circumstances 
British  Infantry  will  be  called  upon  to  face 
either  Austrian  or  German  Cavalry,  and  it 
is  absolutely  impossible  that  they  will  ever 
have  to  face  the  shock  of  our  own  squadrons. 
Hence  our  remarks  implied  no  disparage- 
ment of  our  own  Infantry.  Further,  when- 
ever the  topic  of  Infantry  versus  Cavalry 
is  broached,  the  Infantryman  always  ima- 
gines Cavalry  charging  down  on  squares 
equal  in  steadiness  to  those  of  the  old 


Cavalry  versus  Infantry.          117 

Peninsula  Army,  and  perfectly  justly 
reasons  that  with  such  men  and  modern 
arms  Cavalry  would  have  no  chance  at  all. 
But,  in  the  first  case,  squares  will  probably 
never  be  seen  on  a  modern  battlefield 
again ;  and,  secondly,  Infantry  of  such 
quality  as  those  of  the  old  Peninsula  Army, 
are  certainly  not  to  be  found  in  the  ranks 
of  any  of  our  possible  enemies.  It  would 
be  well  for  us  to  realise  more  distinctly 
what  manner  of  men  these  were  who  fought 
for  us  and  won  from  even  the  most  virulent 
of  our  enemies,  viz^  NAPOLEON  himself,  the 
admission  that  "  the  British  Infantry  was 
the  finest  in  the  world,  and  it  was  fortu- 
nate there  were  so  few  of  them.  "  It  is 
true  that,  morally,  they  were  of  a  very  low 
class,  and  even  physically  hardly  up  to 
the  standard  of  to-day,  but  they  were 
under  an  iron  discipline  ;  and  discipline  did 
what  Hythe  and  the  Musketry  Book  have 
hitherto  failed  to  do,  viz.,  it  enabled  them  to 
destroy  with  a  couple  of  volleys,  the  finest  In- 
fantry the  Continent  of  Europe  could  show. 


118  Cavalry  versus  Infantry. 

Such  Infantry,  even  with  their  old  arma- 
ment could  probably  stop  any  Cavalry  in 
the  world  ;  but  where  now-a-days  are  we 
to  look  for  their  equals  in  the  conscript 
armies  of  the  continent  ;  certainly  not  in 
the  ranks  of  France  and  Russia,  the  only 
continental  forces  with  which  we  are  ever 
likely  to  cross  bayonets.  The  truth  is  the 
conditions  under  which  the  two  arms  met 
have  varied  enormously  :  the  whole  fea- 
tures of  the  struggle  have  changed.  The 
shock  of  Cavalry  used  formerly  to  be 
delivered  against  Infantry  drawn  up  in 
close  order  under  thorough  discipline,  and 
with  the  very  strong  reason  of  self-preser- 
vation to  induce  them  to  husband,  not  to 
squander,  their  ammunition,  for  once  their 
fire  was  drawn,  they  were  practically  de- 
fenceless. It  is  true  that  now-a-days  the 
individual  man  possesses  the  power  of  fir- 
ing off  an  indefinitely  larger  number  of 
rounds  than  his  predecessor  ;  but  his  mor- 
al development  has  not  kept  pace  with  the 
development  of  his  weapon.  The  increas- 


Cavalry  versus  Infantry.          119 

ed  deadliness  of  the  breech-loader,  with 
the  necessity  it  entails  of  adopting  looser 
formations,  and  the  excitement  produced 
by  the  mere  noise  of  the  heavier  firiug, 
has  withdrawn  troops  from  the  hands  of 
their  leaders  to  a  degree  which  would  have 
appeared  impossible  to  our  forefathers. 
Can  we  imagine  the  DUKE  OF  WELLINGTON'S 
expression  if  he  were  asked  to  believe  that 
Infantry  once  engaged  within  effective 
range  of  the  breech-loader  passed  so  abso- 
lutely out  of  the  control  of  their  com- 
manders, that  it  is  impossible  to  move 
them  either  to  the  right  or  left,  and  fre- 
quently even  impossible  to  make  them  ad- 
vance at  all  except  by  the  impetus  of  fresh 
reserves  from  the  rear.  Yet  these  are  the 
fundamental  ideas  on  which  the  general 
principles  for  the  German  decisive  attack,  by 
far  the  most  thrusting  in  Europe,  are  based. 
Is  it  possible  to  conceive  the  picture  this 
conveys  without  seeing  opportunities  to  be 
seized  by  a  bold  and  resolute  Cavalry  leader  ? 
But  to  turn  to  the  Cavalry  and  take 


120  Cavalry  versus  Infantry. 

their  side  of  the  question,  though  to  do  so 
we  have  to  go  back  to  Ancient  History. 
During  the  Seven  Years'  War,  given  open 
ground  practicable  at  all  for  manoeuvring, 
and  Cavalry  became  the  arbiter  of  the 
battlefield.  At  Rossbach  5,000  horsemen, 
led  by  SEIDLITZ,  and  aided  only  by  a  few 
rounds  from  some  field-guns,  broke  and 
routed  the  whole  French  Army  over 
100,000  strong.  At  Hohenfriedberg  the 
Baireuth  Dragoons,  six  squadrons  in  all, 
broke  69  battalions  of  infantry,  capturing 
all  their  colours  :  and  we  might  fill  several 
columns  with  similar  examples.  And  the 
Infantry  they  broke  were  by  no  means  con- 
temptible ;  as  far  as  armament  was  con- 
cerned, they  were  as  well  equipped  as  the 
Russians  in  the  Crimea,  and  in  point  of 
discipline,  probably  far  superior.  What 
then  led  to  the  comparative  failure  of 
Cavalry  during  the  Napoleonic  era,  for  ex- 
cept our  own,  none  came  really  well  out  of 
that  ordeal.  The  failure  of  the  French  is 
easily  accounted  for.  The  Revolution  not 


Cavalry  versus  Infantry.  121 

only  destroyed  their  horse-supply — never 
a  good  one — but  it  also  cut  off  all  the 
heads  of  the  leaders,  and  it  took  years  to 
supply  their  places  ;  and  when  at  length 
men  like  EXCELMANS,  DESAIX,  MILHAUD, 
began  to  come  to  the  front,  the  supply  of 
men  and  horses  both  failed  them.  This  is 
no  exaggeration,  for  official  returns  prove 
that  the  bulk  of  LATOUR  MAUBURG'S  cele- 
brated dragoons  were  mounted  on  14-hand 
tats,  and  letters  of  English  eye-witnesses 
assert  that  the  cuirrasiers  were  for  the 
most  part  mounted  on  second-rate  diligence 
screws  and  light  cart-horses.  As  for  rid- 
ing it  could  hardly  have  been  worse. 
What  can  we  think  of  Cavalry  which  could 
not  be  trusted  to  charge  at  a  better  pace 
than  a  trot.  Yet  such  was  absolutely  the 
case  :  the  testimony  of  NAPOLEON  himself 
and  JOMINI  proves  it.  That  even  with 
such  Cavalry  brilliant  results  were  obtain- 
ed cannot  be  denied,  but  it  was  not  till 
NAPOLEON  had  practically  destroyed  all  the 
good  Infantry  in  Europe,  and  their  place 


122  Cavalry  versus  Infantry. 

had  to  be  supplied  with  raw  levies  suffer- 
ing under  the  impression  of  previous  de- 
feat. As  regards  the  decay  of  the  Prussian 
Cavalry  the  impoverishment  of  the  country, 
after  the  Seven  Years7  War,  appears  to 
have  been  in  a  large  measure  to  blame  for 
this  ;  and  the  fatal  mistake  of  splitting  up 
their  Cavalry  into  small  bodies  of  Division- 
al Cavalry  had  also  much  to  say  to  it. 
Nevertheless,  their  conduct  at  Jena  and 
Auerstadt  was  far  from  inglorious,  and  it 
must  be  remembered  that  the  Infantry  they 
encountered  was  then  at  the  very  height  of 
its  prestige.  Yet  it  fared  no  better  than 
others  before  our  own  horsemen.  Sala- 
manca, Vittoria,  Waterloo,  all  prove  it. 
Where  could  steadier  Infantry  have  been 
found  than  NAPOLEON'S  Old  Guard  at 
Waterloo,  yet  they  went  down  before  the 
rush  of  VIVIAN'S  and  VANDELEUR'S  squa- 
drons like  standing  corn  before  a  hurricane. 
After  the  peace,  a  night  of  great  dark- 
ness settled  down  over  the  Cavalry ;  in 
Prussia  they  were  discredited,  and  in  France 


Cavalry  versus  Infantry.  123 

they  went  to  sleep  over  their  laurels,  con- 
tent to  believe  that  they  had  done  all  that 
could  be  expected  of  them,  and  that  the 
sole  cause  of  their  defeat  had  been  trea- 
chery. Only  in  Austria  did  they  still  keep 
up  their  reputation  ;  but,  though  many  an 
Englishman  served  in  their  ranks,  only  one 
came  back  to  shew  us  the  way  to  victory, 
and  that  was  NOLAN,  who  fell  at  Balaclava, 
and  whose  book,  now  rarely  to  be  met 
with,  should  be  in  every  Cavalry  mess  in 
the  service.  Of  our  own  performances  in 
India,  we  at  Home  appear  to  have  thought 
but  little,  yet  no  arm  of  the  Service  did 
more  for  us  on  the  battlefield  ;  and  though 
our  enemies7  faces  were  black,  yet  we 
doubt  whether  Cavalry  ever  had  a  tougher 
nut  to  crack  than  the  squares  of  the  old 
Khalsa  Army.  Certainly  no  modern  con- 
script army  would  oppose  such  a  desperate 
resistance  to  horsemen,  inside  the  square,  as 
these  brave  Sikhs  did  with  their  side  arms. 
Meanwhile,  the  armament  of  Infantry 
had  been  making  rapid  progress,  and  with 


124  Cavalry  versus  Infantry. 

each  fresh  invention  it  was  prophesied  that 
the  days  of  Cavalry  on  the  battlefield 
were  at  an  end.  Rifled  arms  shot  three 
times  as  far,  and  five  times  as  accurately  as 
old  Brown  Bess.  Hence,  if  good  Infantry 
with  the  old  arms  could  stop  Cavalry, 
what  could  hope  to  live  against  them  with 
the  new.  Cavalry  officers  in  vain  pointed 
out  that,  though  the  rifle  might  shoot  more 
accurately  if  held  straight,  it  would  not 
do  a  bit  better  than  the  smooth-bore,  and 
indeed  not  as  well  if  held  crooked  ;  that 
though  it  was  true  it  shot  further,  yet  it 
had  the  disadvantage  of  sights  which  had 
to  be  regulated  :  the  invention  theories 
triumphed  on  the  parade  ground,  but  broke 
to  pieces  on  the  battlefield.  The  Austrian 
Infantry,  though  of  long  service,  and  cele- 
brated for  their  steady  fire  with  the  smooth- 
bore, went  all  to  pieces  in  1859,  when  their 
rifles  were  first  put  in  their  hands.  Even 
the  French  Infantry  were  able  to  attack 
and  beat  them  with  the  bayonet,  without 
waiting  for  their  own  Cavalry,  which,  by 


Cavalry  versus  Infantry.  125 

the  way,  was  badly-handled  throughout, 
1866  was  also  a  bad  year  for  the  Cavalry, 
though  not  as  bad  as  is  usually  imagined  : 
the  truth  being  that  the  Austrians  were 
usually  obliged  to  attack  under  conditions 
which  rendered  success  impossible;  yet  even 
then  they  frequently  came  within  an  ace  of 
obtaining  glorious  results,  but  the  storm 
of  opinion  had  fairly  set  in  against  them, 
and  by  1870  it  blew  a  perfect  hurricane. 

On  every  field  day,  in  every  paper,  the 
Cavalry  were  told  that  their  sun  had  set 
for  ever,  and  what  wonder,  under  the  cir- 
cumstances, that  they  came  to  believe  it. 
But  again  the  battlefield  upset  all  the 
theories.  BREDOW'S  brigade  and  the  1st 
Garde  Dragoners  shewed  clearly  what 
Cavalry  could  do  even  under  the  most  un- 
favourable circumstances  and  against  un- 
shaken Infantry.  The  French  Cavalry, 
too,  were  by  no  means  as  unsuccessful  as 
is  generally  supposed  :  where  the  ground 
gave  them  a  chance,  the  Prussian  Infantry 
ran  a  very  close  risk  of  what  must  have 


126  Cavalry  versus  Infantry. 

been  a  crushing  disaster.  It  took  years  of 
labour  though,  on  the  part  of  such  men  as 
PRINCE  FREDERIC  CHARLES,  GENERALS 
KAEHLER  and  V.  SCHMIDT  to  get  a  fair 
hearing,  but  they  at  last  succeeded,  and 
their  work  lives  after  them.  Space  does  not 
permit  of  our  going  closely  into  the  contro- 
versy which  raged  in  the  German  Military 
Press,  but  one  by  one  the  opponents  were 
won  over  to  admit  that  Cavalry  trained  and 
handled  on  the  lines  laid  down  by  FREDERIC 
THE  GREAT  would  still,  in  spite  of  breech- 
loaders and  repeaters,  find  ample  opportu- 
nity of  reaping  as  brilliant  a  harvest  as  their 
forefathers.  The  great  fact  has  been  borne 
in  upon  them,  that  human  nerves  are  not 
susceptible  of  as  rapid  improvement  as  fire- 
arms require  for  their  successful  employ- 
ment. And  that  the  very  intensity  of  the 
struggle  creates  moments  of  crisis  in  which 
all  control  over  the  men  is  impossible,  and 
the  bravest  Infantry,  if  attacked  at  the  right 
moment,  must  be  ridden  over  like  a  flock  of 
sheep.  It  lies  with  the  Cavalry  to  seize  the 


Cavalry  versus  Infantry.          127 

momentj    and  this  their  increased  mobility 
enables  them  to  do. 

Cavalry  is  the  one  arm  of  the  service  in 
which  we  have  both  the  men  and  material 
to  achieve  a  complete  superiority  over  any 
other  nation  in  the  world.     It  is  the  one 
arm  in  which  individual  superiority  of  man, 
horse,  and  leader  can  counterbalance  mere 
numbers,   and  therefore  it  is  of  the  utmost 
importance  to  us  to  develop  its  capacity  to 
the  highest  degree.     And  obviously,  allow- 
ing umpires  to  put  them  out  of   action  in- 
variably,  wherever  they  shew   themselves 
even  for  a  few  moments,  is  not  the  way  to 
encourage  that  spirit  of  keen  daring  which 
is  essential  to  their  success. 

Six  hundred  horsemen  astonished  Europe 
by  breaking  somewhere  about  half  of  the 
Russian  Army,  Horse,  Foot  and  Artillery, 
and  driving  them  in  rout  over  the  Tcher- 
naya.  But  no  umpires  had  ever  taught 
them  to  retire.  Perhaps  the  opportunity 
for  a  similar  rush  may  come  sooner  than 
we  expect.  Let  us  hope  we  may  be  ready. 


A  DAY  WITH  THE  GERMAN 
CAVALRY. 

AS  the  cold  weather  is  approaching, 
bringing  with  it  the  usual  course  of 
squadron  trainings,  route  marching  and 
Cavalry  manoeuvres,  the  following  account 
of  a  visit  to  a  German  Cavalry  Regiment 
may  prove  of  interest  : — 

On  my  way  back  from  India  last  hot 

weather,  I  stopped  at  D to  pay  a 

visit  to  an  old  friend,  an  Englishman  by 
birth,  and  an  officer  in  the  Prussian  Cavalry. 
He  had  only  recentty  been  promoted  to 
the  rank  of  Captain  or  "  Rittmeister,"  as 
the  Captains  in  the  Cavalry  are  called,  and 
had  been  transferred  on  promotion  from 
a  north  country  regiment  to  the  one  in 
which  I  now  found  him,  viz,,  the  red 
"Garde  Dragoner"  (Hessians)  which  was 
hardly  up  to  the  standard  of  the  old  Prus- 
sian Hussar  regiment,  "  Ziethen,"  from 
which  he  came,  but  still  it  was  a  fair  type 


A  Day  with  the  German  Cavalry.    129 

on  which  to  found  an  opinion  as  to  the 
average  efficiency  of  the  whole  of  the 
72,000  horsemen  the  Germans  can  put  in 
the  field. 

The  evening  of  my  arrival  we  inspected 
the  stables,  which  formed  the  ground  floor 
of  the  men's  quarters,  each  squadron  stand- 
ing in  a  block  by  itself :  they  were  long, 
fairly  lofty  buildings,  well  ventilated,  but 
hardly  sufficiently  lighted.  Each  horse 
stood  in  a  stall  by  itself,  which  is  unusual, 
for,  as  a  rule,  they  are  separated  merely  by 
bails,  as  in  our  own  stables.  The  horses  had 
just  been  bedded  down,  and  the  bedding  was 
clean  and  sufficient :  much  of  this,  I  fancy, 
was  due  to  my  friend's  English  notions.  I 
have  generally  seen  Prussian  Cavalry  stand- 
ing in  heaps  of  what  we  should  call  ma- 
nure, but  the  Germans  call  mattrases,  the 
bedding  being  put  down  en  masse  about 
once  a  quarter,  and  only  freshened  up  now 
and  then  by  a  few  handfuls  of  straw  to 
keep  the  upper  surface  clean.  They  say, 
it  keeps  the  stables  warmer,  and  so  it  does  ; 

M.,  L.  9 


130  A  Day  with  the  German  Cavalry. 

but  the  amount  of  free  ammonia  present 
in  the  air  of  one  of  these  stables  makes 
one7s  eyes  stream.  In  this  case  there  was, 
however,  no  fault  to  find,  nor  with  the 
way  in  which  the  harness  was  hung  up  and 
cleaned,  and  the  steel  work  was  not  so  ab- 
solutely ignorant  of  the  burnisher,  as  I  have 
sometimes  seen. 

Next  morning,  mounted  on  one  of  my 
host's  chargers,  a  very  good-looking  East 
Prussian  stud-bred,  about  15-3  in  height,  and 
whose  paces  and  training  were  both  excep- 
tionally good,  I  rode  out  about  6-30  with  the 
squadron  to  the  drill  ground,  distant  about 
four  miles.  The  first  mile  lay  through  the 
suburbs,  but  once  outside  them  we  got  on 
a  capital  riding  path  through  some  rolling 
woodland,  and  immediately  broke  into  a 
trot.  In  Prussia  they  waste  no  time,  and 
this  daily  march  was  thoroughly  utilised 
to  accustom  the  men  and  horses  in  main- 
taining a  perfectly  regular  pace  of  eight 
miles  an  hour  approximately,  as  they  say 
this  is  a  thing  on  which  the  efficiency  of 


A  Day  with  the  German  Cavalry.    131 

large  bodies  mainly  depends,  both  on  the 
road  and  in  the  field,  and  can  only  be 
acquired  by  practice.  An  English  squadron 
would  have  trotted  up  one  hill  and  walked 
down  the  next,  but  they  kept  up  the  same 
unvarying  pace,  because  when  in  a  long 
column  of  two  or  three  regiments,  it  is  im- 
possible to  allow  each  squadron  to  choose 
its  own  pace,  or  even  for  the  leading  one 
to  do  so,  as  the  alteration  would  run 
through  the  whole  from  beginning  to  end 
and  cause  a  lengthening  of  the  column, 
which  might  amount  to  three  times  its 
normal  length,  in  which  case  its  deploy- 
ment would  also  take  three  times  as  long  ; 
and  even  within  the  limits  of  the  squadron 
the  value  of  this  practice  was  most  notice- 
able, for  I  have  seldom  seen  one  on  the 
march  with  its  distances  more  perfectly 
kept,  and  in  marked  contrast  to  what  one 
usually  sees  at  home.  Presently  we  came 
to  the  end  of  the  woodland  and  in  sight 
of  the  parade  ground,  and  the  walk  was 
sounded  :  the  leader  looked  at  his  watch 


132   A  Day  with  the  German  Cavalry. 

and  assured  himself  that  their  time  had  been 
accurately  kept,  and  we  walked  quietly 
down  to  the  drill  field.  The  other  regi- 
ment in  garrison  was  already  there,  and 
its  squadrons  moving  about  independently. 
There  is  something  very  inspiriting  and 
lively  in  watching  German  Cavalry  at  a 
distance  ;  the  movements  are  so  rapid,  the 
order  so  perfectly  kept,  and  the  whole  goes 
with  so  much  swing  that  one's  interest 
never  flags.  I  wish  I  could  say  the  same 
of  our  own,  but  my  memory  goes  back  to 
a  certain  heavy  Cavalry  Regiment  we  used 
to  watch  from  the  windows  of  our  mess 
hut  at  the  Curragh,  which  used  to  crawl 
slowly  round  the  finest  Cavalry  drill  ground 
in  Europe,  rarely  went  out  of  a  walk,  and 
which,  during  six  months  nearly,  was 
never  seen  to  charge.  And  other  visions, 
too,  rise  up  before  me  of  another  medium 
regiment  at  Aldershot,  which  could  never 
keep  up  with  the  two  light  Cavalry  Corps 
with  which  it  was  brigaded,  and  which  was 
captured  and  put  out  of  action  regularly 


A  Day  with  the  German  Cavalry.    138 

every  field  day — and  sometimes  in  the  first 
half-hour.  Why,  it  was  such  a  certain 
thing  that  lady  spectators  used  always  to  ask 
to  betaken  "to  see  the — (I  won't  mention 
it  by  name)  regiment  captured/' 

But  to  return  to  the  Germans.  We  had 
the  band  with  us  this  morning— it  goes 
out  in  turn  one  day  a  week,  with  each 
squadron — so  we  commenced  with  a  march- 
past  to  one  of  the  finest  Cavalry  trumpet 
marches  ever  written.  "  Die  Torgauer." 
The  walk-past  was  excellent,  the  steadiness 
of  the  horses  and  the  position  of  their 
heads  all  showed  their  careful  training  ; 
but  the  trot-past  was  better  still,  the  steady 
swinging  pace,  total  absence  of  all  jostling 
and  breaking,  and  the  way  the  distance 
between  the  ranks  was  kept  being  all  that 
man  could  desire.  I  could  not  help  ex- 
pressing  my  admiration  to  my  friend,  who 
said:  "Ah  !  it's  the  horses  that  do  it:  wait 
till  you  see  the  riders."  He  then  broke 
up  the  squadron  into  divisions,  separating 
out  first  the  second  year  remounts  and 


134    A  Day  with  the  German  Cavalry. 

then  the  recruits  ;  the  remainder  then  rode 
off  independently  to  practise  in  different 
parts  of  the  field.  One  went  off  to  a 
little  fir  copse  where  it  dismounted  and 
proceeded  to  skirmish  :  another  took  one 
side  of  the  ground  where  elementary  heads 
and  posts  were  arranged  ;  a  third  took 
another  side,  along  which  distances  were 
marked  off,  and  proceeded  to  regulate  their 
paces  by  the  watch  ;  and  the  fourth  broke 
up  altogether,  and  each  rider  rode  his  horse 
about  individually,  in  and  out  just  where 
he  pleased. 

We  first  directed  our  attention  to  the 
backward  recruits,  about  20  in  number. 
There  should  have  been  no  recruits  proper- 
ly speaking,  as  the  squadron  inspections 
were  over,  and  all  the  men  should  have 
been  in  the  ranks.  These  men,  or  rather 
boys,  were  not  mounted  on  the  oldest 
horses  in  the  squadron,  but  on  ones  still 
in  their  full  prime,  for  according  to  their 
ideas  nothing  is  more  hopeless  than  to 
attempt  to  train  a  horseman  on  an  old  horse, 


A  Day  with  the  German  Cavalry.    135 

who  has  lost  all  the  life  out  of  his  pace, 
and  knows  the  drill  so  well  that  he  cannot 
go  wrong.  The  men  were  a  most  dis- 
appointing lot — long-bodied,  short-legged, 
round-thighed :  they  would  have  broken 
the  heart  of  any  riding-master  ;  as  for  the 
high  intellectual  culture  conferred  by  com- 
pulsory education  on  all  alike  in  Germany, 
and  which,  according  to  some  people,  had 
more  to  do  with  the  winning  of  Sadowa 
and  Sedan  than  the  superior  leading,  there 
was  not  a  trace  of  it — a  stupider-looking 
lot  it  would  be  hard  to  find  anywhere.  Of 
course  these  were  not  the  shining  lights 
of  the  regiment.  They  were  distinctly 
below  the  average,  but  even  in  the  average 
one  looks  in  vain  for  any  indication  of 
special  intellectual  gifts  superior  to  what 
we  meet  with  in  our  own  soldiers.  I  have 
seen  many  hundred  recruits  of  all  arms  in 
Germany,  and  a  considerable  number  of 
our  own,  and  I  say  it  without  hesitation 
that  the  average  of  our  Cavalry  is  far  supe- 
rior, both  in  intellect  and  physique  (under 


136    A  Day  with  the  German  Cavalry. 

the  latter  head  it  is  impossible  to  compare 
the  two),  and  that  in  all  the  other  arms 
we  more  than  hold  our  own.  That  we  do 
not  know  how  to  develop  and  make  the 
most  of  the  excellent  material  we  get  I  fully 
admit  ;  but  we  have  got  it,  and  we  deserve 
nothing  but  shame  and  disgrace  for  not 
understanding  how  to  make  the  best  of  it. 
But  it  must  not  be  overlooked  in  judging 
the  individual  Prussian  horseman  that  the 
saddle  in  use  with  them  gives  him  an 
ugly  seat,  quite  opposed  to  any  of  our  own 
ideas.  Excepting  in  the  Cuirassiers,  the 
saddle  is  everywhere  the  Hungarian,  too 
well-known  to  need  description.  In  itself 
it  is  an  excellent  saddle,  but  it  is  raised 
unnecessarily  high  above  the  horse's  back, 
and  hence  gives  the  rider  a  top  heavy 
appearance,  and  the  central  web  on  which 
the  shape  of  the  seat  depends  is  too  much 
laced  down  in  front  to  the  fans,  thus  throw- 
ing the  rider  forward  on  his  fork  :  but  it 
has  one  great  advantage  from  the  recruit's 
point  of  view,  and  that  is,  it  is  almost 


A  Day  with  the  German  Cavalry.    137 

impossible  to  fall  out  of  it.  Though  the 
riding  in  this  squad  was  bad,  yet  I  was 
struck  by  the  excellence  of  the  system  of 
instruction  ;  it  was  individual  instead  of 
collective,  and  there  was  none  of  that  mono- 
tonous repetition  of  the  same  words  in 
the  same  order  —  the  curse  of  our  own 
schools. 

From  the  recruits  we  went  to  the  re- 
mounts, a  nice-looking  lot,  about  20  in 
number,  and  looking  like  well-bred  coun- 
try-breds  with  a  dash  of  English  blood 
in  them.  But  for  Dragoons  they  appeared 
very  small — certainly  some  were  barely 
14-1.  Taking  the  regiment  as  a  whole,  it 
was  not  so  well  mounted  as  the  more  north- 
ern regiments,  and  would  not  compare 
favourably  with  a  good  regiment  of  Bengal 
Cavalry.  But  they  possess  one  great  ad- 
vantage, and  that  is,  the  horses  are  incom- 
parably more  docile,  temperate  and  plucky  ; 
there  is  none  of  that  kicking,  fighting  and 
squeaking  and  general  untrustworthiness 
about  them  which  makes  an  average 


138    A  Day  with  the  German  Cavalry. 

country-bred  about  the  most  disagreeable 
mount  in  creation.  If  Prussian  riders  were 
put  on  country-bred  horses  to-morrow,  there 
would  be  considerable  work  for  the  coroner 
by  the  evening.  And  fortunate,  indeed,  it 
is  for  the  Germans  that  they  have  such  ex- 
cellent material,  for  the  difficulties  they 
have  to  contend  with  in  breaking  and 
training  them,  owing  to  the  want  of  suitable 
riders,  is  enormous.  A  German  regiment 
has  no  rough-riders  and  no  riding-master. 
Everything  has  to  be  done  within  the  squa- 
dron itself,  and,  excepting  a  very  few  re- 
engaged non-commissioned  officers,  entirely 
by  young  soldiers  of,  at  the  outside,  three 
years'  service,  or,  say,  23  years  of  age. 
Now  at  that  age  not  one  man  in  a  hundred, 
even  if  he  possesses  the  peculiar  talent  for 
dealing  with  horses,  has  experience  or 
temper  enough  to  be  successful  with  them. 
It  is  a  gift  which  really  only  comes  to  those 
who  combine  both  the  talent  and  the  ex- 
perience, and  it  is  hopeless  to  look  for  it 
in  a  short  service  force  ;  hence  a  tremendous 


A  Day  with  the  German  Cavalry.    139 

degree  of  responsibility  is  thrown  on  the 
squadron  leader  and  his  elder  subalterns. 
They  know  how  much  depends  on  it,  for 
correct  breaking  in  is  the  secret  of  success- 
ful Cavalry  drill ;  and  hence  they  strive 
by  every  means  in  their  power,  by  study 
of  books  and  practice  in  the  field  and  the 
school,  to  fit  themselves  for  it,  and  hence 
one  finds  that  the  knowledge  of  equitation, 
its  object,  methods,  and  means  possessed 
by  the  average  German  Cavalry  officer  is 
of  a  much  higher  order  than  that  met  with 
in  our  own. 

Having  seen  as  much  of  the  recruits 
and  remounts  as  I  desired,  we  then  rode 
on  to  the  division  which  had  dispersed,  and 
in  which  each  man  was  riding  his  horse  in- 
dependently— "  tummelen  "  is  the  German 
expression  for  it,  and  it  is  an  exercise  on 
which  the  new  school  of  German  "  Cavaler- 
isten "  lay  the  greatest  stress.  But  it  is 
only  a  revival  of  their  old  practice  under 
Frederic  the  Great's  generals,  when  indivi- 
dual horsemanship  was  a  far  more  general 


140   A  Day  with  the  German  Cavalry. 

accomplishment  than  it  is  now-a-days. 
The  object  of  it  is  to  accustom  every  horse 
to  leave  the  ranks  and  every  rider  to  control 
his  horse.  Each  man  does  exactly  what 
he  likes  with  his  mount,  and  his  officer  and 
instructors  look  on,  and  from  time  to  time 
fall  out  a  man  to  correct  any  fault  they 
may  have  noticed,  or  to  direct  him  to  ride 
straight  on  a  given  point,  as  if  he  was 
carrying  a  message  to  a  superior  officer. 
The  control  of  the  men  over  their  mounts 
left  little  to  be  desired  ;  they  left  their 
squadron  readily  and  galloped  straight,  and 
the  absence  of  temper  both  amongst  the 
riders  and  horses  struck  me  very  much. 
It  is  curious  how  it  is  that  such  a  violent 
tempered  race  as  the  Germans  should  al- 
ways treat  their  animals  with  such  kind- 
ness, but  as  far  back  as  in  the  Peninsula, 
the  contrast  in  this  respect  between  the 
men  of  King's  German  Legion  and  our 
own  soldiers  was  notorious. 

From  here  we  went  on  to  the  posts  and 
heads,  or  rather  to  what  did  duty  for  them. 


A  Day  with  the  German  Cavalry.   141 

The  arrangements  were  very  rough  :  first 
came  a  log  of  wood  about  as  big  as  a  sand 
bag,  raised  about  2  ft.  6  in.  above  the 
ground  ;  then  a  gibbet  with  a  stuffed  sack 
suspended  to  it  ;  then  another  sack  on  the 
ground,  and  finally  a  straw  cone  like  a 
bottle  casing,  on  a  stick  about  4  ft.  high, 
to  point  at.  One  by  one  the  men  filed  by 
at  a  trot,  canter  and  extended  gallop. 
The  practice  was  distinctly  inferior.  I 
doubt  whether  two  men  in  the  batch  would 
have  got  two  out  of  three  times,  and  not 
once  in  ten  times  did  one  hear  the  edge  of 
the  sword  lead  ;  but  nearly  every  man 
reached  the  ground  with  his  cut  at  the  can- 
ter, though  the  efforts  to  do  so  when  ex- 
tended were  feeble.  The  swords  are  light- 
er and  far  better  balanced  than  our  old 
ones.  The  grip,  too,  is  flat  and  tapers  off 
for  the  smaller  fingers  towards  the  pommel; 
the  hilt  is  basket- shaped  and  covers  the 
hand  well,  but  the  men,  as  a  body,  are 
decidedly  inferior  swordsmen,  and  compare 
very  unfavourably  with  our  own.  The 


142   A  Day  with  the  German  Cavalry. 

horizontal  point  (  No.  1  )  is  delivered  with 
the  back  of  the  hand  down,  not  up,  as  with 
us  :  it  is  certainly  much  easier  to  deliver  and 
has  the  advantage  that  the  blade  can  be 
more  readily  withdrawn  from  an  oppo- 
nent's body.  The  same  battle  between  the 
edge  and  point,  of  course,  goes  on  in 
their  service  as  in  ours,  but  the  supporters 
of  the  edge  appear  to  be  in  the  majority. 
All  agree  that  for  a  finished  swordsman, 
fighting  a  duel  with  ample  room  to  move 
about,  the  point  has  the  superiority  ;  but 
their  men  are  not  finished  swordsmen,  and 
in  the  usual  circumstances  under  which 
they  cross  swords,  viz.,  in  the  charge  and 
subsequent  mMee,  there  is  no  room  to  use 
anything  but  the  edge  or  the  pommel,  and 
it  is  better  that  each  man  should  be  intent 
on  killing  his  enemy  by  violent  attack 
rather  than  be  thinking  of  protecting  him- 
self by  guarding — a  view  in  which  there  is 
much  soundness. 

By  this  time  it  was  about  half-past  eight, 
and   the    squads    all   dismounted  for  a  few 


A  Day  with  the  German  Cavalry.    143 

minutes'  rest  before  being  formed  up  for 
squadron  drill.  So  far  the  impression  pro- 
duced had  not  been  markedly  favourable, 
and  I  was  congratulating  myself  by  think- 
ing that,  with  the  exception  of  the  indivi- 
dual riding  and  leaving  the  ranks,  we  could 
do  most  things  a  good  deal  better  than 
anything  I  had  seen  ;  but  I  soon  had  to 
change  my  opinion.  For  the  first  few 
movements  in  squadron,  the  senior  subal- 
tern took  command  whilst  my  host  remain- 
ed with  me  ;  these  were  all  of  a  simple 
description,  changes  from  squadron  column 
into  line,  by  front  forming  or  wheeling, 
but  they  were  executed  in  perfect  order 
and  at  a  smart  swinging  pace  that  left 
nothing  to  be  desired.  After  a  bit  they 
cantered  down  in  line  towards  the  side 
where  the  practice  jumps  (about  the  same 
as  our  own)  were  situated,  and  then 
breaking  into  column,  still  at  the  canter, 
took  the  whole  in  succession,  without  the 
smallest  check,  like  hounds  streaming 
over  a  stone  wall  :  it  was  one  of  the  pret- 


144   A  Day  with  the  German  Cavalry. 

tiest  things  I  have  ever  seen.     Then  after 
a  few  minutes7  halt,  my  friend  having  fallen 
out  a  non-commissioned  officer  with  a  flag 
and  directed  him  to  ride  with  me,  as  a  target, 
fell  in  himself  and  took  the  squadron  down 
to   the  farthest  end  of  the  ground,    from 
whence   he   purposed  to   attack   me.     My 
pace   was   to  be  limited  to  a  trot,    but   I 
was  free  to  move  in  any  direction  I  pleased. 
The   squadron  commenced  its  advance   in 
column  at  a  trot ;  not  to  diminish  the  dis- 
tance  too   much   I  remained    halted,    till, 
when  about  800  yards  distance,  the  front 
formed  line,  when  I  moved  off  half  left  at 
a  trot ;  but  in  a  moment  the  centre  of  the 
line   was  on  me  again  and  following   me 
round  as  I  moved.     When  the  distance  had 
diminished  to  about  500  yards,   I    turned 
towards  them,  and  almost  immediately  the 
leader   sounded  the  gallop,   and  I   halted 
to  watch  their  approach.     They  came  on 
like  a  wall,  with  no  crowding  or  confusion 
perceptible  ;  but  my  time  for  observation 
was  short,   as  I  had  no  intention  of  being 


A  Day  with  the  German  Cavalry.    145 

ridden  over,  so  I  cleared  off  to  a  flank  and 
watched   them   sweep  past  at  the   charge, 
which  again   was  all  one  could   wish — the 
horses  thoroughly  extended  the  ranks  kept 
distinct,  and  the  cheer  and  attitude  of  the 
men   at   the  moment   of    supposed   shock 
producing  an  excellent  moral  effect.     After 
the   contact  they  broke  up  into   a    melee. 
The  ranks  loosened  and  each  man  rode  his 
horse  round  and  round  through  the  -  others 
at  a  walk,   going  through  the   motions  of 
cutting    and  guarding  :   this  lasted    about 
a   minute  ;   and  then  the  squadron   leader 
separating    himself   from    the    men,    and 
trotting  half  right    of  the    direction,    the 
charge  had  been  delivered  in,  sounded  the 
"rally,"   and  in  a  second  the  men  formed 
up  behind  him   and,  without  a  moment's 
delay,  delivered  a  second  charge  and  broke 
up   in  pursuit  at  full  speed,   recalling   the 
rush  down  the  ground  in  a  fast  polo  tour- 
nament.    Then  the  walk  was  sounded,  and 
presently  the  halt  and  dismount  for  a  fe\v 

minutes7  rest, 

M,L.  10 


146    A  Day  with  the  German  Cavalry. 

I  expected  the  captain  would  by  this 
time  have  thought  his  men  had  had  enough 
for  the  day,  and  on  asking  him  if  he  was 
going  home,  I  was  surprised  at  his  reply  ; 
"  Oh,  no  !  We  have  only  just  begun  ;  we 
will  show  you  lots  more  yet/7  He  then 
sent  for  the  non-commissioned  officer  with 
the  flag  and  directed  him  to  move  off 
down  the  ground  and  manoeuvre  much  as 
before.  I  was  to  ride  behind  or  on  the 
flanks  to  see  things  better,  and  he  would 
lead  the  squadron  by  sign  and  without 
word  of  command  or  trumpet  sound  except 
the  charge.  We  had  halted  near  a  little 
fir  copse  free  from  undergrowth,  and  into 
this  he  sent  the  squadron,  directing  the 
men  to  break  off.  Presently,  when  the 
flag  had  reached  the  further  limit  of  the 
ground,  he  raised  his  sword,  and  the  men 
mounted  and  formed  up  behind  him, 
telling  off  in  a  whisper.  Then  he  moved 
off  at  a  trot  and  wheeled  them  half  left 
and  half  right  by  a  wave  of  the  sword, 
which  was  obeyed  as  readily  as  a  com- 


A  Day  with  the  German  Cavalry.   147 

mand ;  and  then  lie  began  the  advance 
against  the  marked  enemy  and  delivered 
the  attack  as  before,  and  in  my  better 
position  for  observation,  I  could  find  noth- 
ing to  alter  my  previous  impression. 

The  third  and  last  charge  was  delivered 
under  the  supposition  that  the  squadron 
was  the  flank  one  of  a  regiment  advancing 
in  line,  and  that  the  outer  squadron  was 
to  seek  to  gain  the  enemy's  flank  by  a 
wheel  outwards  into  column,  wheeling  into 
line,  a  slight  change  of  direction  to  bring 
them  obliquely  on  the  enemy,  and  then  a 
charge  home.  At  about  500  yards  from 
the  enemy  he  sounded  the  gallop,  and  then 
*'  take  ground  to  the  right  in  column  of 
Eugs"  (half  troops).  The  line  swung  into 
column  with  admirable  precision  and 
changed  direction  about  half  left ;  when 
the  enemy  was  about  300  yards  distant, 
they  wheeled  into  line  without  day-light 
showing  between  the  files,  and  then, 
without  overcrowding,  wheeled  inwards 
yet  a  little  more  and  delivered  their  charge 


148    A  Day  with  the  German  Cavalry. 

home  with  a  rush  and  roar  that  must  have 
swept  anything  before  it.  I  had  never 
seen  anything  to  equal  it,  and  was  com- 
pelled to  admit  in  my  heart  that  the  opin- 
ion I  had  heard  stated  by  one  of  our 
best  cavalry  officers,  who  had  thoroughly 
studied  the  Germans,  was  correct,  and  that 
was  that,  squadron  for  squadron  or  regi- 
ment for  regiment,  we  could  "  not  compete 
with  them."  Before  their  perfectly  wall- 
like  shock  our  better  riders  and  bigger 
horses  would  have  gone  down  like  stand- 
ing corn  before  a  whirlwind. 

An  Indian  cavalry  officer  has  recently 
published  a  work  in  which  he  asserts  that 
cavalry  cannot  deliver  a  boot-to-boot 
charge.  I  wish  he  had  been  with  me  to 
see  it :  the  truth  is  we  have  forgotten  how 
to  teach  them  to  do  it,  but  if  we  are  ever 
to  face  a  European  enemy  again,  we  had 
better  relearn  the  secret,  for,  as  Prince 
Hohenlohe  in  his  recent  "  Conversations 
about  Cavalry ,"  points  out ;  the  moral 
effect  of  this  onset  "like  a  wall"  is  so 


A  Day  with  the  German  Cavalry.   149 

irresistible  that  nothing  in  loose  order  can 
be  got  to  face  it,  and  that  this  is  the  real 
explanation  of  the  fact  that,  in  the  old 
days  of  Seidlitz  cavalry  did  not  often  cross 
swords  for  the  simple  reason  that  nothing 
could  be  got  to  face  this  "  wall-like  "  rush. 
It  was  only  when  during  the  Napoleonic 
era  cavalry  became  mere  men  on  cart- 
horses, and  when  the  traditions  of  the  old 
time  were  forgotten,  that  charges  were 
delivered  in  such  loose  order  that  an  inter- 
penetration  of  the  ranks  became  possible. 

Before  riding  off  the  ground  the  men 
again  dismounted,  and  we  carefully  inspect- 
ed the  horses  which,  as  a  body,  showed 
no  signs  of  distress  in  spite  of  the  fast 
work  they  had  been  doing.  We  got  back 
about  10-30 — it  was  perhaps  rather  later 
— having  been  out  four  hours  and  having 
covered  at  the  least  26  miles  in  marching 
order  and  on  a  pretty  hot  day  :  and  this 
was  in  the  quiet  season,  and  nothing  to 
what  was  -expected  of  them  sometimes  in 
the  brigade  and  divisional  cavalry  manceu- 


150   A  Day  with  the'  German  Cavalrt/: 

vres.  The  afternoon  was  taken  up  by 
a  farewell  banquet  to  a  departing  briga- 
dier :  it  was  a  most  terrible  ordeal,  and  one 
not  to  be  faced  with  impunity  by  a  novice, 
ignorant  of  the  virtue  of  the  magic  nut 
"kola."  It  began  at  2  P.M.  punctually, 
and  it  was  eight  in  the  evening  when  we 
broke  up.  The  drink  was  exclusively 
"bowle,"  a  species  of  cup  made  by  mix- 
ing champagne  and  hook  in  equal  quan- 
tities, flavoured  with  crushed  wood  straw- 
berries and  cooled  with  ice.  Certainly, 
if  the  proverb  in  vino  verita»  is  to  be 
trusted,  the  feeling  between  the  German 
and  English  armies  is  of  the  most  friendly 
nature,  and  the  interest  taken  in  all  our 
exploits  very  warm  indeed.  I  must  say 
that,  apart  from  after  dinner  utterances, 
I  have  always  found  a  most  cordial  feeling 
to  exist  towards  us,  and  have  heard  and 
read  far  fairer  judgments  of  our  doings 
from  German  officers  than  frequently  from 
our  own.  Everywhere  they  have  been 
most  ready  to  show  me  anything  whicU 


A  Day  with  the  German  Cavalry.   151 

they  were  allowed  to,  and  even  where 
permission  could  not  be  granted  to  ine, 
hints  enough  were  given  to  enable  me  to 
pic*  up  what  I  required,  I  only  trust  that 
whenever  any  of  their  representatives  may 
straggle  over  to  this  country,  they  may 
always  be  offered  as  cordial  a  hospitality 
as  it  has  invariably  been  my  good  fortune 
to  enjoy  at  their  hands. 


FREDERIC  THE  GREAT'S 
CAVALRY. 

WE  have  already,  on  several  occasions, 
pointed  out  the  tendency  in  the 
German  cavalry,  and  we  may  add  in  their 
infantry  too,  to  go  back  to  the  traditions 
and  practices  of  their  great  King's  time  ; 
a  review,  therefore,  of  what  those  tradi- 
tions and  practices  were,  may  prove  of 
interest  to  military  readers,  more  especi- 
ally as  it  brings  to  light  many  strong 
points  in  our  own  system  of  training 
which  seem  to  be  in  danger  of  being 
forgotten.  Our  authority  for  the  following 
lines  is  Prince  Hohenlohe's  Conversations 
about  Cavalry,  a  new  book  not  to  be  con- 
founded with  his  Letters  about  Cavalry, 
but  which  originated  from  the  discussion 
produced  by  the  publication  of  the  latter. 
Unfortunately  the  former  has  not  been, 
and  is  not  likely  to  be,  translated,  as  it  is 
of  such  a  strictly  technical  character  that 


Frederic  the  Great's  Cavalry.      153 

it  would  hardly  prove  remunerative  to 
any  publisher,  but  it  is  a  work  which 
might  well  be  undertaken  by  the  Intelli- 
gence Department  either  here  or  at  home, 
as  a  supplement  to  Von  Verdy's  book 
recently  brought  out :  the  latter  book 
treating  of  the  employment  of  cavalry 
when  trained,  the  former  of  how  to  train 
them  for  the  employment.  The  book  is 
so  important  that  we  feel  justified  in 
devoting  a  few  more  lines  to  describe  its 
genesis.  The  leaders  of  thought  in  the 
German  cavalry  held  that  Prince  Hohen- 
lohe's  views,  as  expressed  in  the  above- 
mentioned  letters,  were  decidedly  too 
couleur  de  rose,  as  in  their  opinion  (and  in 
ours  too)  their  performances  in  1870  fell 
far  short  of  what  one  has  a  right  to  expect 
from  70,000  horsemen  if  properly  handled. 
They  said,  and  with  considerable  truth, 
that  not  only  was  the  superior  leading, 
i.e.,  above  the  regimental  unit,  far  below 
what  it  should  be,  but  the  individual 
training  of  men  and  horses  left  very  much 


154      Frederic  the  Great's  Cavalry. 

to  be  desired,  and  that  it  was  a  mistake 
to  let  such  optimistic  views  get  about,  as 
it  had  a  tendency  to  slacken  the  pursuit 
of  perfection.  In  consequence  the  Prince 
held  numerous  conversations  with  one 
of  the  principal  cavalry  experts  of  the  day, 
n  Saxon  officer  of  high  rank,  in  which 
they  went  into  every  point  connected  with 
the  training  of  men,  horses  and  officers 
most  minutely,  and  the  information  thus 
obtained,  he  has  given  us  in  the  form  of 
the  book  now  before  us.  The  first  chapter 
is  devoted  to  discussing  the  views  Prince 
Hohenlohe  advanced  about  the  employ- 
ment of  cavalry  in  the  last  war  :  as  these 
have  already  appeared  in  these  columns, 
the  Saxon  officer's  critique  on  them  will 
not  be  without  interest,  so  we  venture  to 
give  the  conversation  in  extenso  : — 

H. — You  will  at  least  grant  me  that 
whenever  the  cavalry  actually  charged  they 
behaved  splendidly  ? 

S. — As  far  as  they  knew  how  to,  cer- 
tainly ;  but  what  could  be  expected  from 


Frederic  the  Great's   Cavalry.      155 

the  few  loosely  ridden  charges  at  Vionville 
which  you  characterised  as  "normal:" 
what  would  not  properly  closed  attacks 
have  effected  ! 

H. — But  permit  me  to  remind  you  that 
formerly  we  were  taught  that,  out  of  ten 
charges  of  cavalry  versus  cavalry,  in  nine 
one  side  or  the  other  turned  tail  before 
the  shock.  Both  in  1866  and  1870  this 
never  happened :  every  time  the  two 
cavalries  rode  into  each  other  and  fought 
it  out  with  the  sword.  We  surely  cannot 
therefore  be  held  inferior  to  former  caval- 
ries in  dash. 

S. — That  is  the  very  point  I  was  aiming 
at ;  this  riding  into  each  other  is  the  very 
thing  which  discloses  the  weakness  of  the 
modern  cavalry.  I  admit  that  in  point  of 
personal  courage  we  are  at  least  as  good 
as  formerly,  but  the  reason  why  in  those 
days  cavalry  did  not  inter-penetrate  lies 
in  this,  that  they  rode  so  well  closed  up 
that  they  could  not  find  room  to  do  so, 
but  could  only  crash  together.  Frederic 


156      Frederic  the  Great's  Cavalry. 

always  denounced  loose  charges,  because 
out  of  them  a  melee  arose,  and  said,  "  I 
will  have  no  melees.  Cavalry  must  charge 
en  muraille  :  before  this  wall-like  attack  the 
weaker  side  gave  way.  But  the  cavalry 
of  to-day  are  not  able  to  deliver  these  wall- 
like  attacks,  because  their  horses  are  in- 
sufficiently trained. 

H. — But  you  will  at  least  admit  that  at 
Vionville  the  cavalry  was  employed  in 
considerable  "  masses." 

S. — Masses,  that  is  to  say,  numbers, 
certainly  were  used,  but  not  in  "  mass  " 
but  in  driblets.  First  one  regiment  became 
engaged,  and  then  whatever  could  be  laid 
hands  on,  regiment  or  squadron  was  brought 
up  and  hurled  at  the  enerny  without  any 

predetermined  plan. 

#         •%         *         %         *         * 

The  reason  for  all  this  was  that  we  had 
too  few  leaders  who  could  trust  themselves 
to  handle  a  large  cavalry  mass   systemati- 
cally and  lead  it  intact  against  the  enemy. 
....  It  is  not  the  leaders  I  would  blame 


Frederic  the  Great's  Cavalry.      157 

for   this,   but  the  system  which  failed   to 
educate  them  up  to  the  mark. 

H. — I  hardly  understand  you  ? 

8. — Do  you  fancy  that  Seidlitz,  Ziethen, 
Driesen,  &c.,  all  came  into  the  world  as 
finished  cavalry  leaders  ?  They  were  the 
product  of  the  conditions  under  which 
they  lived.  Seidlitz  was  a  genius,  Driesen 
was  not,  but  both  were  able  to  attain  high 
results  with  cavalry  masses. 

H. — But  now-a-days  we  hear  and  read 
amongst  our  "  Cavalleriests  "  nothing  but 
the  necessity  of  following  the  principles 
of  Frederic. 

S. — Theoretically,  yes,  but  not  quite  in 
practice  ;  in  his  general  tactical  rules,  yes, 
but  in  their  application  not  always ;  in 
the  demands  to  be  made  on  them,  yes,  but 
in  their  execution  not  altogether  ;  in  the 
object  with  which  these  masses  should  be 
employed,  yes,  but  in  the  way  how  they 
are  to  be  fitted  for  this  employment  noth- 
ing at  all.  Least  of  all  do  we  read  how 
the  individual  atoms  of  which  they  are 


158      Frederic  the  Great's  Cavalry. 

composed  are  to  be  fitted  for  their  task  — 
I  mean  about  the  individual  detail  training 
of  man  and  horse. 

H.— But  surely  a  mass  of  men,  even  if 
the  units  are  indifferently  trained,  can,  if 
handled  on  Frederic's  system,  achieve  a 
great  deal. 

S.— I  doubt  it. 

H. — Well,  how  about  Murat  ?  His  horse* 
men  were  certainly  individually  below  medi- 
ocrity, and  yet — 

S. — Murat  certainly  never  led  his  cavalry 
according  to  Frederic's  rules.  He  formed 
great  deep  columns  and  set  these  masses  in 
motion  in  a  fixed  direction  ;  not  one  rider 
in  them  could  have  given  his  horse  another 
direction  had  he  wanted  to  do  so  ;  and 
besides  he  attacked  only  at  a  trot  :  certainly 
that  was  not  in  accordance  with  Frederic's 
ideas. 

H. — That  the  riders  had  no  power  over 
their  horses  was  certainly  the  case.  My 
own  uncle,  who  was  bringing  up  a  brigade 
against  Murat' s  great  attack  at  Liebert- 


Frederic  the  Great's  Cavalry.      159 

wolkwitz  (Leipsic),  told  me  that  liis  own 
horse  on  that  occasion  bolted  with  him 
and  dashed  past  Murat's  mass  at  about  ten 
paces  distance.  The  enemy's  horsemen 
cursed  and  swore  at  him,  but  not  one 
had  power  enough  over  his  mount  to  ap- 
proach him,  and  the  whole  crowd  hurried 
past  in  a  wild  confused  "  mass "  in  the 
direction  they  had  been  started  in.  Hence 
it  seems  that  even  if  Murat  started  them 
at  a  trot,  they  soon,  whether  intentionally 
or  otherwise,  broke  into  a  gallop.  Closed 
in  an  orderly  fashion  they  certainly  were 
not :  my  uncle  described  them  as  a  disor- 
ganised "rabble." 

S. — And  what  was  the  result  of  this  at- 
tack with  wild  run-away  horses  ?  They  rode 
down  one  or  two  Russian  batteries,  and  then 
were  driven  back  by  the  onslaught  of  a  few 
regiments  of  the  allies,  in  spite  of  their 

numbers Cavalry  like   this 

which  breaks  out  of  control  and  literally 
"  bolts,  "  though  towards  instead  of  away 
from  the  enemy,  is  of  no  sort  of  use. 


160      Frederic  the  Great's  Cavalry. 

H. — But  surely  things  are  better  with 
us  now-a-days  ? 

S. — Not  very  much.  I  could  give  you 
examples  to  prove  it :  I  almost  fancy  with 
such  troops  it  is  a  pure  chance  in  which 
direction  it  bolts.  Why,  I  remember  a 
case  in  which  a  cavalry  division  of  six 
regiments  was  to  be  relieved  by  a  fresh 
one  of  the  same  strength,  but  through  a 
misunderstanding  the  former  galloped  down 
en  debandade  on  the  latter  and  tore  it  away 
in  flight  with  it. 

H. — I  confess  I  cannot  recall  the  in- 
stance from  my  stock  of  military  history. 

S. — Probably  not,  for  it  happened  on 
the  manoeuvre  ground  ;  but  it  might  just 
as  well  have  happened  in  war.  Such  an 
accident  may  at  any  moment  happen  to 
cavalry  men  who  cannot  control  their 
horses,  however  brave  they  may  be.  Have 
I  not  some  grounds  for  believing  it  to  be 
a  pure  matter  of  chance  in  which  direction 
it  may  bolt  ? 

H. — Certainly  ;    but    is  it   possible    to 


Frederic  the  Great's  Cavalry.      161 

train  men  and  horses  to  such  an  extent 
as  to  prevent  such  an  accident  happening  ? 

S. — Why  not  ?  If  Frederic's  men  could 
do  it,  then  why  not  ours  ? 

H. — Still  I  do  not  yet  understand  why 
you  attribute  the  deficiencies  of  our  leaders 
to  our  method  of  training. 

S. — Our  riding  education  keeps  our 
horses  during  the  whole  of  the  winter  on 
the  level  ground  of  the  riding  school  and 
manege,  from  the  1st  October  to  the  1st 
April.  Then  follows  the  squadron  train- 
ing and  regimental  drills,  also  on  level 
parade  grounds.  Only  during  the  short 
period  of  the  detachment  exercises  and 
manoeuvres^  which  last  only  four  weeks, 
is  it  necessary  for  cavalry  to  ride  straight 
across  whatever  comes  first.  Is  it  possible 
that  the  soldier  can  feel  full  confidence 
that  his  horse  will  carry  him  safely  as  long 
as  he  sits  close — doesn't  jag  at  the  bit  ? 
Is  it  to  be  expected  that  he  can  keep  his 
eyes  on  the  enemy  and  his  squadron 
leader  :  is  it  not  much  more  likely  that 


162      Frederic  the  Greats  Cavalry. 

he  will  be  anxiously  looking  down  at 
every  stone  and  furrow  on  the  ground, 
and  at  the  same  time  keep  worrying  his 
horse's  mouth  and  thereby  destroying  the 
order  of  the  formation  ?  But  a  leader, 
who  has  grown  up  in  this  groove,  how 
can  he  feel  confidence  in  their  ability  to 
reach  the  enemy  closed  up,  when  he  knows 
that  every  potato  -  field  and  every  ridge 
and  furrow  loosens  their  order  ?  Besides, 
between  the  ages  of  40  and  50  the  passion 
for  riding  is  apt  to  die  out,  and  with  our 
system  the  leaders  are  able  to  do  most  of 
this  work  on  foot,  or  halted  quietly  on 
the  middle  of  the  parade  ground. 

H.  —  But  the  divisional  commander's 
place  is  with  his  reserve  :  he  is  hardly 
required  to  ride  at  the  head  of  his  division 
in  the  charge. 

S. — If  the  cavalry  cannot  rally  quickly, 
certainly  he  requires  a  reserve  and  his 
place  is  with  it ;  but  in  the  days  of  the 
great  King  when  rallying  quickly  was  a 
main  point  in  the  training,  you  will  find 


Frederic  the  Great's  Cavalry.       163 

no  instruction  for  the  formation  of  a 
reserve,  because  as  soon  as  the  "  rally " 
sounded  a  closed  reserve  was  speedily 
formed.  These  are  the  King's  instructions 
as  to  the  way  in  which  large  bodies  of 
cavalry  were  to  form  for  attack.  The 

first  treffen  closed  in  line  ;  on  both  flanks 

i*/  ' 

overlapping,  and  a  couple  of  hundred 
paces  in  rear,  from  five  to  ten  squadrons 
of  hussars  to  surround  the  enemy  in  flank 
rear  ;  and  to  pursue  as  also  to  cover  the 
flanks  ;  and  then  a  second  treffen,  usually 
straight  behind  the  first  :  and  in  this  order 
bodies  of  cavalry  of  double  and  even 
treble  the  strength  of  our  present  divisions 
were  expected  to  attack  over  any  kind  of 
ground  that  came  in  their  way,  and  the 
King  took  care  that  they  did  it  too. 

Here  we  will  leave  the  conversation  for  the 
present,  and  add  cne  or  two  remarks  in 
explanation  of  the  above,  leaving  it  to 
another  letter  to  develop  in  detail  the 
principles  of  the  King's  training. 

It    is    a   great   pity    that   none   of    the 


164      Frederic  the  Greafs  Cavalry. 

English  officers  who  served  in  the  old 
Austrian  Army  have  recorded  their  expe- 
riences in  print,  for  there  was  much  that 
we  might  learn  with  advantage  from  them. 
From  all  we  can  gather  they  appear  to 
have  been  far  superior  to  the  Prussians, 
both  better  horsemen  and  more  accustomed 
to  work  in  large  bodies.  They  were  the 
only  cavalry  definitely  trained  to  manoeu- 
vre in  large  masses,  and  it  was  no  un- 
usual sight  to  see  20  and  even  30  squad- 
rons charging  in  line  across  the  exercise 
ground  at  Milan,  and  the  ground  they 
frequently  fought  over  in  Lombardy  was 
of  exceptional  difficulty.  The  Saxon  offi- 
cer's description  gives  one  rather  an  un- 
favourable idea  of  the  German  cavahy  and 
must  not  be  taken  quite  au  pied  de  lettre. 
We  have  repeatedly  seen  their  cavalry 
divisions  manoeuvring  with  a  swing-and- 
go  above  praise,  over  both  potato  and 
turnip  fields  interspersed  with  open  drains 
not  big  enough  to  be  considered  obstacles, 
but  just  the  thing  to  throw  careless  horses 


Frederic  the  Great's  Cavalry.      165 

down,  but  we  never  saw  anything  of  the 
kind  happen.  Indeed,  though  individually 
our  men  would  get  over  ground  far  and 
away  better  than  the  Germans,  in  forma- 
tion we  would  give  the  preference  to  the 
latter.  In  our  last  letter  we  described  a 
squadron  in  column  sweeping  over  a  line 
of  practice  jumps  without  opening  out  or 
checking,  and  we  will  add  one  or  two  more 
examples  to  it.  For  instance,  we  have 
frequently  seen  a  wing  of  a  squadron 
when  manoeuvring  deliberately  made  to 
charge,  so  that  part  of  the  front  had  to 
cross  one  of  these  jumps  (which,  by  the 
way,  never  have  wing  walls),  and  we 
hardly  remember  ever  seeing  an  accident. 
On  another  occasion  a  cavalry  division 
with  three  regiments  in  first  line  charged 
across  a  gully,  at  the  bottom  of  which 
was  a  nasty  blind  drain  and  a  cartroad 
with  very  deep  ruts,  yet  not  a  single  man 
fell  in  the  whole  division,  though  they 
were  galloping  hard  when  they  came 
across  it.  We  have  seen  terrible  grief  in 


166      Frederic  the  Great" s  Cavalry. 

a  far  less  serious  obstacle  on  the  Fox  hills  ; 
and  as  for  the  practice  jumps  down  by  the 
Eed  Church  at  Aldershot,  we  should  like 
to  repeat  the  Duke's  remarks  one  day 
when,  on  his  way  home  from  a  fiasco  in 
the  Long  Valley,  he  ordered  one  regiment 
over  them  :  but  since  in  print  they  would 

have    to   be   given   in    a    series    of — 

,    we    may    as    well     spare 

ourselves  and  the  printer  the  trouble. 


LONG  DISTANCE  RIDES. 

WE  have  received  for  review,  a  small 
pamphlet  by  Colonel  Bengough,  A.  A. 
G.  for  Bangalore,  on  Cavalry  Long  Distance 
1  iides,  a  subject  which  is  at  last  beginning  to 
attract  some,  at  any  rate,  of  the  attention  it 
deserves.  The  pamphlet  consists  of  trans- 
lations from  the  Militair  Wochenblatt  and 
Revue  Militaire  de  la  Etrangere,  of  accounts 
of  different  exercises  of  this  nature  carried 
out  in  Russia  during  the  past  two  years, 
and  a  few  notes  on  celebrated  marches  of 
our  own  army.  We  have  only  one  fault  to 
find  with  it,  and  that  is,  it  is  too  short ; 
particularly  the  portion  which  comes  from 
the  Colonel's  pen  direct.  His  remarks  in 
his  preface  are  so  true,  that  we  venture  to 
reproduce  them  verbatim.  "  There  is,  I 
think,  an  innate  prejudice  amongst  English- 
men against  the  practice  of  exercises  in 
peace  time  as  a  preparation  for  war,  and 
this  is,  I  think,  especially  the  case  amongst 


168  Long  Distance  Rides. 

English  Cavalry  officers.  Relying  on  the 
superior  fitness  for  warfare  of  Englishmen 
and  horses,  we  are  apt  to  ignore  the  neces- 
sity of  special  training/7  Thus,  in  this 
instance  no  doubt,  Cavalry  officers  may 
object  to  "  knocking  their  horses  about "  by 
practising  such  distance  rides,  and  will 
point  to  the  feats  performed  by  Lord  Lake, 
General  Gilbert,  Colonel  Barrow  and  others, 
as  examples  of  what  British  Cavalry  can  do 
when  required.  But  putting  aside  the 
point  that  leaders,  such  as  these,  are  not  al- 
ways to  be  found  when  wanted  (vide  Chil- 
lianwallah),  it  is  surely  well  for  an  officer 
to  know,  from  personal  experience,  what 
his  horses  can,  and  cannot  do. 

It  is  true  that  Lord  Lake  and  others  did 
perform  extraordinary  feats  according  to 
European  standards,  but  with  how  much 
greater  ease  and  efficiency  might  they  not 
have  been  accomplished,  had  both  men  and 
officers  and  horses  been  trained  to  them. 
But  Lord  Lake  unfortunately  has  found 
but  few  imitators  ;  and  probably,  even  at 


Long  Distance  Rides.  169 

the  time,  his  officers  objected  to  "  knocking 
their  horses  about,"  and  were  only  too  glad 
to  relapse  into  their  ordinary  condition  of 
somnolence  when  their  old  leader  left  them. 
At  any  rate,  the  tradition  had  died  a 
natural  death  before  the  days  of  the  Mutiny, 
and  there  was  no  one  at  hand  to  resusticate 
it.  But  he  had  found  out  the  secret  of 
success  in  Asiatic  warfare,  a  secret  which  is 
as  true  now  as  it  was  then  ;  and  that  is, 
that  you  must  not  only  be  able  to  fight, 
but  to  pursue  after  you  have  fought,  and 
that,  ot  catch  runaway  natives,  calls  for 
the  utmost  exertion  of  both  man  and 
horse. 

Troops  trained  on  his  system  and  led  by 
such  leaders,  would  have  crushed  the 
Mutiny  at  its  very  outset ;  for  a  single 
Cavalry  Regiment  from  Umballa,  distant 
from  Meerut  90  miles,  would  have  prevent- 
ed the  mutineers  reaching  Dehli.  But  no  ! 
the  idea  of  Cavalry  riding  90  miles  in  a 
day  was  so  unusual,  that  it  never  appears 
to  have  occurred  to  any  one.  Each  defeat 


170  Long  Distance  Sides. 

of  the  enemy  would  have  been  turned   into 
a  rout,   had  the  Cavalry  only  understood 
what    it   was    to    "  move.'7     And   history 
notoriously  repeats  itself.     Let  us  hope  if  it 
does,  that  this  time,  thanks  to  the  exertions 
of  such  officers  as  Colonel  Bengough  and 
General  Luck,    the   idea   of  a    100    miles' 
march  may  be   as  familiar  to  every  subal- 
tern,   as   the    detail    of  a  guard-mounting 
parade.     What  is  most  wanted,  is  that  men 
should  realise  more  fully  the  capabilities  of 
their  horses  than  they  at  present  do.     The 
conventional   idea    of  a    pony   or  horse  in 
this   country,  is  an  animal   that  can  hardly 
be  ridden  or  driven  10  miles  a  day  without 
cruelty,  though  the  miserable   ekka  pony, 
under-sized  and  half-starved  though  he  is, 
is    a    standing   example    of  the    contrary. 
"War   and  the  preparation  for  war,  are  nei- 
ther of  them  to  be  looked  on  as  an   amuse- 
ment,  and   though  it  may  be  quite  wrong, 
from  a  human  point  of  view,  to    overwork 
nn  animal  in  the  pursuit    of  sport  or   any 
other   amusement,   it  is    sentimental   non- 


Long  Distance  Rides.  171 

sense  to  refuse  to  call  on  either  man  or 
horse  at  times  to  do  their  utmost,  not  only 
during  war,  but  at  times  even  during  the 
preparation  for  war. 

No  Cavalry  soldier  or  mounted  officer  is 
really  efficient  till  he  knows  the  utmost  he 
can  get,  both  out  of  himself  and  his  horse. 
To  under-estimate  his  powers  and,  there- 
fore, not  to  undertake  a  service,  is  as  bad 
as  to  over-estimate  them  and  break  down 
on  the  way.  Either  may  lead  to  a  general 
disaster.  But  these  things  cannot  be  learnt 
without  practice,  and  if  officers  will  not 
practise  these  things  on  their  own  initiative, 
it  must  be  rendered  compulsory  by  regula- 
tion. Indirectly  a  great  advantage  would 
be  derived  from  it.  By  this  course,  for 
instance,  we  should  get  rid  of  all  who 
were  not  physically  fit  for  their  work.  It 
may  be  hard  on  the  individual,  but  it  is 
better  for  the  State  that  a  man  should  break 
down  in  peace,  than  that  his  place  should 
become  vacant  just  when  he  is  most  requir- 
ed, in  war.  There  can  be  little  doubt  that, 


172  Long  Distance  Rides. 

by  careful  attention  to  this  question,  the 
capacity  of  our  horses,  also,  might  be  much 
increased. 

There  is  no  reason  why  horses  of  English 
blood,  such  as  Walers  and  stud-breds,  or 
Arab  crossed  country  -  breds,  should  not, 
with  proper  training,  rival  the  performances 
of  the  Turkoman  horse.  Colonel  Valentine 
Baker  is  probably  as  good  an  authority  on 
horse-flesh  as  we  have  had  in  the  Army, 
and  the  distances  he  gives  as  having  been 
repeatedly  covered  by  Turkomans,  after  a 
raid,  may  be  taken  on  the  word  of  such  an 
expert.  Heavily  laden  with  rider  and  loot, 
and  dragging  their  captives  after  them,  they 
think  nothing  of  distances  to  which  we 
have  never  attained.  It  is  a  pity  that  Colo- 
nel Bengough  has  not  amplified  his  pam- 
phlet by  some  hundred  pages,  and  told  us 
also  what  has  been  done  in  this  direction  in 
the  German,  Austrian  and  Italian  services. 
In  the  former  country,  it  has  for  some  time 
been  the  custom  for  officers  to  ride  long  dis- 
tance races  against  time  ;  the  condition  of 


Long  Distance  Rides.  173 

the  horse,  on  finishing,  being  considered  a 
principal  factor  in  awarding  the  prize. 

It  requires  at  least  as  much  judgment, 
endurance  and  knowledge  of  horse-flesh,  to 
make  the  most  of  your  horse,  over  a  hun- 
dred mile  course,  as  over  a  two-mile  one, 
and  for  this  reason  it  ought  to  appeal  to 
our  national  instincts  just  as  forcibly  ;  and 
on  the  score  of  humanity,  it  is  certainly 
preferable  to  breaking  a  horse's  back  over 
that  murderous  "  ditch  towards  you"  jump 
in  the  N.  Hunt  course.  In  one  single  meet- 
ing at  Crewkerne  in  1883,  nine  horses 
broke  their  backs  over  this  one  obstacle, 
and  in  the  many  accounts  of  long-distance 
races  we  have  studied,  we  cannot  recall  a 
single  case  of  a  horse  having  been  perma- 
nently disabled.  The  long  distances  one 
often  covers  in  the  hunting  field,  hardly 
serve  the  same  purpose  as  the  race,  for  the 
exertion  of  the  run  itself  is  out  of  all  pro- 
portion to  the  distance  covered,  but  still 
the  experience  so  gained  is  not  to  be  under- 
valued. 


174  Long  Distance  Rides. 

Here  are  some  of  the  figures  which  Colo- 
nel Bengough  gives  us.  A  detachment 
from  the  officers'  school  at  Kresnoje  rode 
149  miles  in  40^  hours.  Two  Sotnias  of 
Don  Cossacks  covered  210  miles  in  72 
hours,  under  the  exceptionally  severe  con- 
ditions of  frozen  roads  and  heavy  snow. 
Lord  Lake's  march  was  70  miles  in  24 
hours  in  November.  General  Morgan 
Stewart  did  90  miles  in  35  hours.  Coming 
again  to  the  Russians,  we  find  a  detach- 
ment of  Dragoons  marching  216  miles  in 
77  hours. 

We  trust  when  a  second  issue  of  this 
interesting  pamphlet  is  published,  it  will 
contain  full  accounts  of  General  Luck's 
splendid  march  in  Scinde,  and  also  of  the 
ride  recently  executed  by  a  detachment  of 
the  4th  Madras  Cavalry,  and  a  division  of 
V-l  Royal  Cavalry,  both  of  which  seem  to 
head  the  record,  as  will  be  seen  by  compar- 
ing them  with  the  figures  above,  for  which 
purpose,  we  give  the  distances  again,  viz., 
5th  Cavalry  123  miles  in  35  hours,  and  4th 


Long  Distance  Rides. 

Madras  Cavalry  315  miles  in  134  hours. 
But  though  we  have  proved  ourselves  equal, 
it  will  be  unlike  Englishmen,  if  we  do  not 
strive  to  make  ourselves  unapproachably 
superior  ;  and  we  believe  that  if  proper 
attention  is  directed  to  the  matter,  the 
improvement  will  be  astonishing. 

We  have  not  space  to  go  into  the  details 
of  the  pamphlet  now  before  us,  but  it  does 
not  appear  that  in  any  of  the  marches  there- 
in described,  the  expedient  of  alternately 
leading  and  riding  was  tried.  The  relief 
this  gives  to  the  horse  is  well  -  known, 
though,  judging  by  the  average  perform- 
ance of  Cavalry  on  field  days,  it  is  too 
often  forgotten.  There  are  other  expedients 
for  maintaining  the  strength  of  the  animal 
on  the  march,  such  as  tying  raw  meat  round 
the  bit,  a  favourite  practice  with  hard  riding 
farmers  in  Yorkshire.  Western's  custom  in 
his  long  distance  walk  might  also  be  tried 
of  giving  both  men  and  horses  coca  leaves  to 
chew.  For  the  former  it  would  be  clean- 
lier than  tobacco,  and  the  latter  would  not 


176  Long  Distance  Rides. 

notice  it  if  mixed  with  their  feed.  In 
conclusion,  we  can  only  hope  that  Colonel 
Bengough's  pamphlet  may  be  soon  sold  out, 
and  that  he  may  then  see  his  way  to  giving 
us  a  considerably  amplified  second  edition. 


THE  GERMAN  CAVALRY 
MANCEUVRES,  1886. 

IT  will  be  within  the  memory  of  our 
readers  that  a  considerable  amount  of 
political  capital  was  made  by  the  French 
papers  out  of  the  fact  that  the  German 
Government  refused  to  invite  any  foreign 
officers  to  the  manoeuvres  of  their  Cavalry 
in  Alsace  this  autumn.  The  more  belli- 
cose French  papers  wished  to  make  a  casus 
belli  out  of  it,  and  even  the  moderate  ones 
considered  the  situation  serious.  In  reality 
there  was  nothing  political  in  the  matter  at 
all.  As  a  general  rule  it  is  impossible  to 
find  in  the  vicinity  of  the  open  and  com- 
paratively uncultivated  district  desirable 
for  Cavalry  work,  adequate  accommodation 
for  the  Emperor's  guests  ;  and  the  scene  of 
this  year's  manoeuvres  formed  no  exception 
to  this  rule.  What,  however,  gave  special 
importance  to  these  manoeuvres  was,  that  it 
was  the  first  occasion  on  which  the  new 
Cavalry  regulations  were  practically  tested. 


178   German  Cavalry  Manoeuvres,  786. 

The  special  point  in  which  these  regula- 
tions differ  from  preceding  ones,  is  in  the 
increased  prominence  given  to  the  role  of 
Cavalry  on  the  battle  -  field.  "  Cavalry 
must  be  prepared  to  charge  even  unshaken 
Infantry ;  for  till  the  attempt  has  been 
made  who  can  tell  whether  the  Infantry 
deserve  to  be  considered  unshaken  or  not  ??y 
The  Germans,  at  any  rate,  do  not  believe 
that  breech-loaders  have  driven  their  horse- 
men off  the  field  as  yet. 

Full  reports  of  thes-e  manoeuvres  are  now 
available,  and  they  contain  many  points 
of  interest  to  all  branches  of  the  service.  The 
regiments  employed  were  by  no  means  the 
pick  of  the  German  Cavalry,  but  with  the 
exception  of  the  Hessians,  were  drawn  from 
parts  of  the  Empire — viz.  the  Rhine,  Wur- 
temberg  and  Baden— least  noted  in  this 
way.  These  countries  hardly  possess  the 
stamp  of  horses,  nor  as  yet  the  traditional 
system  of  horse  management  that  the  Prus- 
sians and  Hanover  have  had  for  years  ;  and 
hence  we  are  not  surprised  to  hear  that,  in 


German  Cavalry  Manoeuvres,  '86.    179 

point  of  endurance,  there  has  been  much 
wanting.  The  object  of  the  experiment, 
however,  was  really  to  discover  how  far 
these  countries  had  got  in  the  assimilation 
of  the  Prussian  system.  The  regimental 
management  of  horse  flesh  cannot  be  learnt 
in  a  few  days,  not  even  in  years;  and  since 
uniformity  of  system  is  absolutely  indis- 
pensable to  the  successful  manoeuvring  of 
large  bodies,  it  was  desirable  to  see  how  far 
this  had  been  attained.  The  divisions  were, 
therefore,  rather  scratch  packs ;  and  hence 
the  complaints,  which  appeared  in  the 
papers  at  the  time,  must  not  be  taken  as 
generally  applicable. 

After  four  days  of  Brigade  drill,  the 
Divisional  drills  began  with  an  attack  on 
Infantry,  represented  by  detachments  of 
fortress  artillery,  only  a  skeleton  enemy. 
The  Division  was  formed  in  three  lines.  In 
the  first,  three  regiments  of  Dragoons  ;  200 
yards  in  rear  two  regiments  of  Lancers  ; 
and  about  the  same  distance  on  the  right 
rear  a  third  regiment  of  Lancers,  The 


180  German  Cavalry  Manoeuvres,  786. 

trot  was  sounded  at  4,400  yards'  distance, 
and  the  gallop  at  about  1,000.  Next  came 
an  attack  on  Artillery,  in  the  same  forma- 
tion ;  but  with  the  first  line  at  open  files. 
The  trot  was  again  sounded  at  4,400  yards, 
but  the  gallop  already  at  1,400. 

Next  day,  the  Division  manoeuvred  to 
represent  the  action  of  Cavalry  against  all 
three  arms  during  a  battle.  It  was  sup- 
posed to  be  itself  acting  in  combination 
with  an  Army  Corps.  At  7-30  A.M.,  it 
rendezvoused  to  the  south-east  of  the  village 
of  Weitbruch,  hidden  in  a  roll  of  the  ground, 
and  with  difficult  country  in  front  of  it. 
The  general  idea  pre-suppbsed  the  whole 
of  the  Corps  of  Artillery  in  action.  The 
two  horse  batteries,  attached  to  the  Cavalry, 
marked  the  end  of  the  Artillery  line,  and 
their  combined  fire  was  assumed  to  be 
checking  the  advance  of  the  enemy's  Infan- 
try :  his  Cavalry  was  not  yet  in  sight- 
The  Division  moved  off  at  a  trot ;  and 
availing  themselves  of  a  slight  undulation, 
fell  right  on  the  flank  of  the  Infantry,  in 


German  Cavalry  Manoeuvres,  '86.  181 

three  lines  each  of  two  regiments.  This 
attack  was  considered  successful,  and  the 
regiments  were  still  broken  up  in  the  melee, 
when  suddenly  the  enemy's  Cavalry,  hither- 
to concealed  by  copses,  came  down  on  them. 

We  come  now  to  one  of  the  principal 
points  of  the  new  regulation.  Formerly, 
after  a  charge,  the  "  halt  "  was  sounded  ; 
but  as  this  left  the  troops  still  compara- 
tively in  hand,  and  in  no  way  represented 
the  actual  confusion  incident  on  an  attack, 
the  halt  has  been  abolished,  and  instead, 
the  troops  engaged  disperse  and  form  the 
melee.  It  was  in  the  hope  of  profiting  by 
this  confusion  that  the  other  side  attacked- 
Only  part  of  the  third  line  still  retained  a 
degree  of  order  :  but  nevertheless,  the  re- 
mainder rallied  so  rapidly,  and  charged  so 
promptly,  that  they  were  held  to  have  been 
successful. 

The  last  day  shewed  the  Cavalry  at  their 
best.  The  ground  was  exceptionally  steep 
and  difficult,  but  the  manoeuvres  went  off 
to  eveiy  -  one's  satisfaction.  Throughout 


182   German  Cavalry  Manoeuvres,  '86. 

the  proceedings,  the  principle  of  always 
retaining  a  closed  body  in  hand  was  well 
observed,  and  the  enemy's  horsemen  never 
got  a  chance  ;  and  it  must  be  remembered 
that,  in  peace,  the  fight  against  a  skeleton 
enemy,  owing  to  the  greater  ease  with 
which  its  small  bodies  can  be  handled, 
renders  the  task  of  the  opposing  force  more 
difficult  than  it  would  normally  be.  All 
this  is  a  curious  commentary  on  the  lessons 
of  our  text-books  and  the  decisions  of  our 
Umpires,  who  ever  since  the  introduction 
of  rifled  firearms,  have  foretold  the  downfall 
of  the  Cavalry  as  an  arm  on  the  battle-field. 
As  our  German  critic  pointed  out  the 
other  day,  the  Germans  themselves  believ- 
ed in  this  doctrine,  till  a  happy  inspira- 
tion on  the  part  of  a  young  subaltern 
caused  Bredow's  Brigade  to  be  launched  on 
what  appeared  to  be  the  half  of  the  French 
army  (it  actually  amounted  to  some 
12,000  infantry  and  30  guns)  ;  and  to  the 
surprise  of  all  spectators  rode  it  down  like 
a  pack  of  sheep,,  in  spite  of  the  1,200  yards 


German  Cavalry  Manoeuvres,  '86.  183 

of  open,  fire  -  swept  country  they  had  to 
cross.  Even  then,  it  was  some  years  before 
the  prejudice  could  be  overcome  ;  and  it 
is  chiefly  owing  to  the  opinion  of  Prince 
Frederic  Charles,  and  the  eloquent  writings 
of  Generals  Von  Schmidt  and  Von  Kaehler, 
that  such  a  complete  change  of  opinion  has 
been  brought  out. 

The  repeating  rifle  will  not  alter  mat- 
ters much.  Opportunities  for  surprise  will 
occur  as  frequently  as  ever  ;  and  even  where 
the  ground  does  not  favour  the  Cavalry, 
they  can  take  heart.  For  it  is  a  fact, 
established  by  experiment  in  peace  time,  and 
hence  more  likely  to  be  correct  under  the 
conditions  of  the  battle-field,  that  increased 
noise  does  not  imply  increased  deadliness  of 
fire. 

Against  the  enemies  which  our  Indian 
army  will  probably  meet,  this  latter  point 
deserves  especially  to  be  borne  in  mind. 
They  none  of  them  belong  to  the  races 
whose  nerves  are*  steadied  by  danger  and 
excitement  combined  ;  and  if  only  we  find 


184  Gwman  Cavalry  Man&uvres,  '86. 

the  leader,  our  Cavalry  will  soon  prove  that 
they  are  not  a  mere  auxiliary  arm,  to  be 
trotted  home  as  soon  as  the  firing  begins. 
Only  let  them  give  the  leader  the  weapon 
ready  to  his  hand,  by  studying  in  peace 
time  the  secret  of  success,  which  is  "  uni- 
formity." 


THE  GERMAN  FIELD  ARTILLERY. 

IMMEDIATELY  after  the  campaign  of 
1870,  the  Germans  set  about  rearming 
their  field  artillery :  about  the  end  of  1873  the 
new  gun  was  definitely  approved,  and  in 
less  than  two  years  the  whole  of  their 
artillery  had  received  the  new  equipment. 
When  we  consider  that  this  rearmament 
implied  the  construction  of  about  2,000 
field-guns  with  their  limbers,  waggons,  &c., 
and  the  manufacture  of  new  projectiles,  &c., 
we,  who  are  acquainted  with  the  annual 
capacity  of  Woolwich  Arsenal,  may  well 
blush  for  our  country,  the  greatest  manu- 
facturing country  in  the  world.  The  im- 
provements then  introduced  were  briefly 
these — between  300  and  400  feet  a  second 
increased  initial  velocity,  a  reliable  time- 
fuze  for  shrapnel,  the  double  -  wall  shell 
(analogous  to  our  old  segment  shell,  but 
without  its  defect  of  diminishing  unduly 


186        The  German  Field  Artillery. 

the  bursting  charge),  and  the  introduction 
of  steel  carriages  and  limber  boxes.  The 
enormous  increase  in  power  which  these 
changes  brought  with  them  does  not  seem 
to  have  been  sufficiently  taken  into  consi- 
deration by  those  writers  and  attack-sys- 
tem-mongers, who  still  base  their  ideas  on 
the  well  -  known  but  much  disputed  .and 
somewhat  irrelevant  statement,  that  artillery 
fire  in  1870  only  accounted  for  a  bare  4 
per  cent,  of  the  total  loss  ;  which  may 
indeed  be  true,  but  which  by  no  means 
affords  a  measure  of  the  actual  material 
results  obtained  by  the  gunners  when  they 
concentrated  their  fire  against  suitable  ob- 
jects. What  these  results  actually  were 
may  be  found  in  the  pages  of  Prince 
Hohenlohe's  letters  about  artillery,  the 
most  practical  and  readable  book  on  the 
subject  that  has  ever  appeared  ;  summa- 
rised, they  amount  to  about  this,  that  the 
front  of  a  line  of  guns  was  practically  un  - 
approachable  by  even  good  infantry,  unless 
favoured  by  the  ground.  But  these  above- 


The  German  Field  Artillery.       187 

mentioned  improvements  have  fully  trebled 
the  power  of  the  guns,  whilst  the  means 
and  method  of  employing  them  have  also 
progressed  in  almost  the  same  ratio.  The 
chief  of  these  has  been  the  formation  and 
development  of  schools  of  gunnery  for  both 
officers  and  men,  and  the  provision  of 
suitable  ranges  for  the  practice  of  field- 
firing,  many  corps  possessing  ranges  large 
enough  for  the  development  of  eight  batteries 
at  once.  Before  1870  only  a  school  sup- 
ported by  the  voluntary  subscriptions  of 
the  officers  themselves  existed,  for  the 
Parliament  refused  to  grant  the  necessary 
funds,  but  the  Artillery  had  felt  so  bitterly 
their  own  failures  in  1866,  and  saw  so  clear- 
ly that  it  was  no  good  having  accurate 
guns  if  they  did  not  know  how  to  use  them, 
that  a  school  was  voluntarily  formed  in 
1867,  which  even  in  three  years  bore  fruit 
on  the  battle-fields  of  France.  The  chief 
object  of  instruction  appears  to  be  getting 
the  range  by  trial  shots  (for  to  this  day 
they  are  without  a  rangefinder),  and  this  is 


188       The  German  Field  Artillery. 

developed  to  such  perfection  that  they  claim 
to  be  able  to  guarantee  their  third  round  hit- 
ting. Next  in  importance  comes  the  con- 
trolling of  the  fire  of  long  lines  of  guns  firing 
shotted  cartridges,  and  it  is  obvious  that  here 
the  difficulties  are  enormously  increased, 
compared  with  those  under  which  a  single 
battery  conducts  its  fire.  It  is  difficult  to 
tell  where  one's  own  shells  actually  do 
strike  when  some  thirty  or  forty  are  all 
bursting  in  and  around  the  same  object. 
The  dense  smoke  produced  by  full  charges 
comes  drifting  down  across  the  front  of  the 
other  guns,  or  clings  to  the  damp  ground 
like  a  dense  fog,  and  finally  the  increased 
noise  unsteadies  the  men;  but  though 
practice  can  never  altogether  remove  these 
difficulties,  it  enables  both  men  and  officers 
to  deal  with  them  more  readily  and  with 
greater  coolness.  With  regard  now  to  the 
manoeuvring  capabilities  of  the  batteries, 
there  are  many  points  worthy  of  our  atten- 
tion, for  we  still  stick  too  much  to  the  old 
galloping  style  of  the  smooth-bore  era.  The 


The  German  Field  Artillery.       189 

Austrian  campaign  fully  opened  the  eyes  of 
the  Germans  to  the  changes  which  the  rifled 
guns  entailed  ;  and  in  1870  the  formation  of 
large  batteries  from  the  very  commencement 
of  the  actions  was,  perhaps,  the  leading 
feature,  but  still  much  remained  to  be  done, 
though  the  direction  adopted  was  the  right 
one.  and  it  can  hardly  be  open  to  question 
that  the  progress  made  in  the  last  fourteen 
years  must  be  much  more  considerable  than 
in  the  three  years  before  1870.  But  this  is  a 
point  almost  impossible  to  judge  of  in  peace, 
and  here  we  touch  almost  the  weakest  point 
in  the  whole  German  organisation,  viz.,  the 
maintenance  of  only  four  guns  horsed  for 
battery  in  peace.  In  the  first  place,  the 
march  to  a  field-day  with  only  four  guns 
and  no  second  line  of  waggons  forms  a 
poor  preparation  for  the  same  operation  on 
a  war  -  footing  (six  guns),  and  similarly 
manoeuvring  four  without,  instead  of  six 
guns  with  appendages,  is  a  far  simpler 
operation.  But  a  still  greater  defect  in  the 
present  organisation  is,  that  it  altogether 


190       The  German  Field  Artillery. 

prevents  the  proper  training  of  the  horses 
to  fulfil  the  conditions  required  of  them. 
Few  seem  to  realise  how  great  these  exer- 
tions are;  the  distance  from  the  advance 
guard  to  the  corps  artillery  can  rarely  be 
less  than  five  miles,  and  this  five  miles  has 
to  be  passed  over,  generally  across  country, 
at  a  trot  ;  very  often  it  is  far  greater.  Let 
me  quote  a  few  examples  :— The  Guard 
Corps  Artillery  going  into  action  at  Villers 
Cernay  (battle  of  Sedan)  did  10  miles  on 
end  in  a  single  trot;  the  Corps  Artillery  of 
the  7th  Corps  were  lying  in  bivouac  at  Ot- 
tweiler,  after  a  5-mile  march  on  August  6, 
1870,  when  they  suddenly  received  the  order 
to  march  to  the  battle-field  of  Saarbruck, 
distant  22  miles.  It  was  a  good  chausse,  but 
terribly  hilly;  nevertheless,  they  reached 
the  battle-field  in  three  hours.  "  The  drag 
shoes  could  not  be  used,  it  would  have 
delayed  us  too  much/'  says  General  Dresky 
in  his  report,  and  after  this  the  guns 
went  into  action,  and  the  exhausted  horses 
had  to  toil  some  2,000  yards  through  the 


77*6?  German  Field  Artillery.       191 

saturated  fields.  To  prepare  for  these 
new  conditions,  it  has  become  the  custom 
of  inspecting  officers  to  order  the  batteries 
to  parade,  ready  to  inarch  off  on  their  pri- 
vate parades,  at  a  given  hour,  and  then 
send  orders  to  rendezvous  at  a  point  some 
five  to  six  miles  distant  as  soon  as  possi- 
ble. In  this  way,  at  any  rate,  both  officers 
and  men  get  some  idea  of  the  difficulties 
of  covering  long  distances  at  a  rapid 
rate,  a  thing  which  with  a  long  column 
is  by  no  means  as  easy  as  it  sounds  ;  to 
keep  up  the  same  steady  trot  with  the 
head  of  the  column  up  and  down  hill, 
without  losing  distance,  is  a  thing  which 
cannot  be  done  without  long  practice  and 
experience.  But  no  matter  how  thoroughly 
trained  the  peace  establishment  of  horses 
may  be,  those  brought  in  to  complete  the 
war  establishment  are  necessarily  in  a  very 
different  condition;  called  in  suddenly  from 
their  work  in  the  fields,  &c.,  and  accus- 
tomed generally  only  to  slow  work,  it  is 
hardly  possible  to  call  on  them  suddenly 


192       The  German  Field  Artillery. 

for  such  great  exertions,  and  with  the  rail- 
way concentrations  of  to  -  day,  there  is 
frequently  no  opportunity  of  getting  them 
into  condition  before  the  day  of  battle. 
The  Cavalry,  on  the  other  hand,  owing  to 
their  larger  establishment  of  horses  and 
the  fifth  squadron,  can  take  the  field 
within  a  few  hours,  with  all  their  mounts 
in  thorough  training,  fit  to  march  30  miles 
a  day  for  three  or  four  days  running.  With 
regard  to  the  driving  drill,  the  same  prin- 
ciples which  enable  the  Cavalry  to  manoeu- 
vre in  large  masses  with  certainty,  obtain 
also  in  the  Artillery,  each  battery  follows 
its  commander  just  as  each  squadron  fol- 
lows its  leader  ;  dressing  is  maintained 
by  strict  attention  to  time,  and  not  by 
turning  the  head  towards  the  directing 
flank.  The  battery  commander  gives  the 
direction  of  the  advance,  naming  some 
clearly  visible  object  as  far  to  the  front  as 
possible,  and  the  men  ride  straight  for  it, 
with  only  an  occasional  glance  of  the  eye 
to  correct  the  dressing.  That  dressing 


TJie  German  Field  Artillery.       193 

should  be  kept  by  only  an  occasional  glance 
is  laid  down  distinctly  in  our  own  book, 
but  practically  it  is  not  much  attended  to  : 
if  any  one  doubts  this,  let  him  take  up 
his  position  on  Long  Hill  some  day  and 
watch  an  advance  in  review  order  across 
the  Long  Valley.  He  will  probably  see 
something  like  this, — every  head  turned 
anxiously  to  the  directing  flank,  and  turn- 
ing the  head  inevitably  brings  every  outer 
leg  on  and  the  guns  begin  to  converge; 
presently,  the  drivers  begin  to  notice  that 
they  are  getting  too  close,  and  commence 
to  diverge  ;  they  overdo  it  a  little,  the 
error  increasing  as  you  get  further  to  the 
flanks,  and  then  they  begin  to  swing  in 
again,  repeating  the  movement  da  capo 
till  halted.  Without  exaggeration,  the 
track  of  the  outer  gun  is  frequently  almost 
as  sinuous  as  a  snake's  track  over  sand. 
With  regard  to  the  change  of  position 
of  large  bodies  of  artillery  in  line,  the 
Germans  always  work  by  groups  of  four 
batteries,  each  group  working  practically 
M.,  L.  13 


194       The  German  Field  Artillery. 

independently,  thus  localising  errors  as 
they  arise.  In  other  points  of  drill  there  is 
little,  if  anything,  for  us  to  learn  ;  in  point 
of  turn-out  and  men  there  is  no  compari- 
son possible.  Even  with  regard  to  the 
horses,  the  superiority  of  ours  to  the  eye  is 
enormous,  but  I  fear  it  is  chiefly  to  the  eye, 
for  I  doubt  if  we  possess  many  batteries 
at  the  present  moment  which  could  do 
22  miles  in  three  hours,  without  the  loss 
of  half  of  their  horses.  Their  manoeuvring 
power  over  rough  ground  I  should  not  be 
inclined  to  put  very  high;  the  country, 
as  a  rule,  is  so  open  that  one  seldom  en- 
counters an  obstacle  worth  talking  of,  even 
in  the  manoeuvres  ;  but  I  remember  at 
one  of  these,  seeing  a  whole  horse  artillery 
battery  stopped  by  a  little  ditch  full  of 
water  barely  two  feet  across  ;  the  banks 
were  a  little  soft,  it  is  true,  but  the  gun 
wheels  had  not  sunk  enough  to  cause 
trouble  till  after  they  had  been  standing 
for  some  minutes,  whilst  they  were  trying 
to  coax  or  drag  the  horses  over.  The 


The  German  Field  Artillery.       195 

Crown  Princess  of  Prussia  and  her  suite 
(many  ladies  amongst  them)  galloped  up 
and  took  the  ditch  in  their  stride,  casting 
a  look  of  compassion  back  on  the  poor  gun- 
ners as  they  rode  on  up  the  slope.  ^ 


THE  TACTICS  OF  FIELD 
ARTILLERY. 

fTlHE  recent  action  of  the  Secretary  of 
A  State  for  War  in  reducing  the  most 
mobile  portion  of  our  field  artillery  has 
brought  the  question  of  the  employment  of 
this  arm  of  the  service  more  prominently  be- 
fore us  than  usual,  and  much  has  been  written 
and  spoken  on  both  sides.  But  it  is  cu- 
rious how  weak,  on  the  whole,  has  been 
the  defence  made  by  the  partisans  of  the 
Royal  Horse,  and  it  says  little  for  the 
technical  training  of  their  officers  that  a 
stronger  case  has  not  been  made  out,  not 
merely  for  the  maintenance  of  this  most 
essential  branch  of  the  service,  but  for 
its  large  increase.  As  for  the  other  side 
of  the  question — the  arguments  used  show 
such  an  ignorance  of  the  first  principles  of 
present  tactics  that  they  are  almost  beneath 
criticism.  To  arrive  at  a  right  understand- 
ing of  the  question,  we  must  obviously 


The  Tactics  of  Field  Artillery.     197 

first  realise  clearly  what  it  is  that  horse 
and  field  artillery  will  have  to  do  ;  and 
to  this  end  nothing  will  serve  us  better 
than  to  consider  the  part  allotted  by  the 
leading  German  tacticians  to  the  artillery 
arm  on  the  battle-field.  It  may  be  urged 
that  Continental  battles  will  be  fought  out 
between  armies  numbering  as  many  hun- 
dreds as  we  shall  have  tens  of  thousands  ; 
but  no  one  will  refuse  to  consider  it  de- 
sirable as  an  abstract  proposition  that  we 
should  equal  our  enemies  man  for  man 
and  gun  for  gun.  Cavalry  indeed  appear 
to  be  the  only  arm  of  the  service  in  which 
superior  training  of  men  and  horses  can 
compensate  for  marked  inferiority  of  num- 
bers ;  with  the  other  arms,  equal  weapons 
and  a  more  or  less  uniform  method  of 
training  render  it  improbable  that  even 
the  best  troops  will  win  against  odds  of 
two  to  one.  A  translation  of  Von  der 
Goltz's  Zufalls  Schlacht,  published  in  a 
recent  number  of  this  paper,  will  have  giv- 
en those  who  read  it  a  lively  idea  of  what 


198      The  Tactics  of  Field  Artillery. 

fighting  in  these  latter  days  is  like.  This 
author  points  out  that  pitched  battles  tend 
yearly  to  become  less  likely,  and  that  the 
decisive  struggles  will  spring  from  unfore- 
seen encounters  of  separate  columns,  the 
fractions  of  large  armies,  both  manoeu- 
vring with  the  object  of  outwitting  each 
other.  Two  such  columns,  which  we  will 
assume  to  be  Army  Corps,  whether  on  the 
English  or  German  model  does  not  signify, 
come  into  contact,  and  instantly  all  the 
neighbouring  ones  bend  off  in  the  direction 
of  the  fight.  The  first  object  in  this,  as 
in  every  other  engagement,  will  be  to  es- 
tablish a  crushing  artillery  superiority, 
for  the  side  which  fails  in  this  will  be  com- 
pelled to  adopt  the  defensive  and  that,  too, 
on  an  unprepared  field.  It  is  unfortunate- 
ly the  fashion  with  us  to  lay  an  undue 
value  on  this  form  of  action,  connecting  it 
in  our  minds  with  invulnerable  entrench- 
ments, lined  with  steady  well-armed  troops,, 
and  with  due  notice  given  the  field  may 
no  doubt  be  thus  prepared.  But  the  ac- 


The  Tactics  of  Field:  Artillery.     199 

tual  course  of  events  will  rarely  be  so 
obliging.  Encounters  will  come  on  by 
chance  ;  the  circumstances  of  the  moment 
control  the  employment  of  the  first  troops 
to  arrive,  and  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  that 
they  will  be  allowed  to  entrench  them- 
selves either  in  front  or  rear  of  the  enor- 
mous artillery  lines  which  will  be  the  first 
to  be  formed.  Individual  detachments  may, 
indeed,  make  use  of  their  shovels  to  good 
effect,  but  it  will  be  impossible  to  make  a 
combined  whole  of  their  local  endeavours. 

Let  us  now  see  what  the  essential  condi- 
tions of  securing  this  initial  preponderance 
of  artillery  fire  are  :  is  it  a  matter  of  num- 
bers or  of  individual  power  of  the  guns 
themselves  ?  The  relative  weights  of  the 
projectiles  of  the  field  battery  and  horse 
artillery  guns  are  fixed  on  principles  which 
practically  admit  of  no  change,  and  hence 
it  may  be  assumed  that  even  when  our 
new  armament  is  issued,  there  will  be  no 
essential  difference  between  them.  At 
present  the  shrapnel  of  the  former  contains 


200     The  Tactics  of  Field  Artillery. 

about  20  per  cent,  more  bullets  than  that 
of  the  latter.  Will  that  exercise  a  decisive 
effect  ?  So  very  much  the  greater  propor- 
tion of  the  bullets  of  shells  of  whatever 
calibre  find  their  way  to  the  ground,  that 
if  the  horse  gunners  aim  equally  straight 
and  burst  their  shells  equally  well — and 
there  is  no  inherent  reason  in  the  nature 
of  things  why  they  should  not — it  would 
seem  that  gun  for  gun  they  have  an  equal 
chance  of  holding  their  own.  Hence 
superiority  can  only  be  obtained  by  bring- 
ing a  larger  number  of  guns  into  action. 
Now  here  comes  in  the  value  of  superior 
mobility.  Taking  the  ordinary  distan- 
ces kept  on  the  line  of  march  and  plac- 
ing the  corps  artillery  between  the  two 
leading  divisions  (assuming  the  English 
corps  of  three  divisions),  it  appears  that 
when  the  two  advance  guards  come  into 
action,  the  corps  artillery  will  not  be  far 
off  five  miles  in  rear.  If  the  troops  are 
marching  in  perfect  order  and  on  a  decent- 
ly broad  road,  there  will  be  little,  if  any, 


The  Tactics  of  Field  Artillery.     201 

difficulty    in   their  making   way   for    the 
guns.     Often,   however,   the  roads  will  be 
narrow  and  enclosed,  and  then  the  guns 
will  have  to  go  across  country.     Let  any 
one  picture   to   himself  what   this   means, 
even  in  the  autumn  over  stubble  fields,  and 
then   imagine   a   similar   advance  through 
high  standing  crops  and  sodden  ground,  as 
it   was  at   Sadowa,    when  the  corn  wound 
itself  like  brakes   round  the   wheels,    and 
horses  dropped  dead  in  their  traces  up  the 
last  hill.     Over  such  a  course  horse  artillery 
could  give  field  batteries  twenty  minutes 
and   a  beating  ;  but   once  the  range  accu- 
rately found,  and  20   minutes   may   mean 
extinction.     Now     take    the    case  of    the 
neighbouring  columns      It  will  be  singu- 
larly good  luck   if  a  sufficient  number   of 
accurately  parallel  roads  not  more  than  five 
miles  apart  can  be  found  for  all  the  march- 
ing corps  ;  if  not,   the   distances  between 
them  at  any  given  moment  may  be  enor- 
mous.    History  has  proved  this  on   many 
occasions.     At  Sadowa  and  Vionville,  for 


202     The  Tactics  of  Field  Artillery. 

instance,  the  corps  artillery  was  upwards 
of  fifteen  miles  from  the  spot  on  which 
they  actually  unlimbered  when  the  firing 
was  first  heard,  and  on  both  occasions  the 
distance  had  to  be  covered  across  country. 
Similarly  for  the  other  corps  it  is  hardly 
conceivable  that  their  guns  can  be  less  than 
20  miles  away  from  the  point  on  which 
they  are  required,  and  again  the  distance 
must  be  measured  across  country.  Now, 
judging  from  the  German  artillery,  the  rela- 
tive speed  of  horse  and  field  batteries  may 
be  taken  as  four  to  three»  Thus  horse 
batteries  would  cover  the  20  miles  under 
favourable  circumstances,  i.e.,  open  rolling 
ground  and  good  going  in  three  hours,  field 
guns  in  four,  and  as  the  ground  became 
more  unfavourable  the  lighter  arm  would 
show  to  still  greater  advantage.  Applying 
these  rates  of  movement  to  the  case  of  two 
armies,  each  of  five  corps  meeting  in  a 
chance  battle  and  assuming  the  corps  artil- 
lery of  the  one  army  to  be  all  horse  (as 
Prince  Hohenlohe  recommends),  and  those 


TJie  Tactics  of  Field  Artillery.     203 

of  the  others  to  be  all  field  (on  the  plan  of 

the  English  "  General  who  has  commanded 

an  army  in  the   field  "),  we  find  that  the 

first  army  would  have  the  corps  artillery  of 

the  first  corps  in  action  at  least  15  minutes 

before  the  others — those  of  the  two  next 

corps  on  the  flanks  (assuming  them  to  be 

10  miles  distant  from  the  point  on  which 

they  are  required)    30   minutes  before  the 

others,  and  those  of  the  most  distant   at 

least  one  hour  sooner  than  the  latter  ;  but 

the  addition  of  from  six  to  eight   batteries 

at   a  critical  moment  would  most  probably 

be  decisive :  in  any  case  the  slower  side 

runs  the  risk  of  being  crushed  in  detail. 

But  there  is  yet  another  serious  factor  to 
be  taken  into  account,  and  that  is  the 
supply  of  ammunition  to  these  guns.  Each 
horse  battery  carries  at  present  148  rounds, 
whilst  the  heavy  batteries  only  carry  132, 
and  probably  much  about  the  same  pro- 
portions will  be  adhered  to  in  any  future 
equipment.  Hence  the  lighter  guns  can 
remain  in  action  longer,  or  can  afford  to 


204      The  Tactics  of  Field  Artillery. 

fire  more  rapidly  than  the  heavier  ones.  Of 
course  this  inequality  might  be  got  over  by 
a  better  organisation  of  the  ammunition 
columns,  but  this  is  a  service  of  the  greatest 
difficulty,  far  greater  indeed  than  that  of 
the  supply  of  cartridges  to  the  infantry. 
Good  infantry  properly  handled  can  fight 
out  an  action  with  100  rounds,  for  they 
should  never  be  in  action  long  enough  to 
exhaust  so  much  without  being  reinforced 
by  fresh  troops  from  the  rear.  But  guns 
must  be  always  in  action,  and  seeing  that 
the  average  rate  of  fire  of  one  round  in 
every  two  minutes,  with  a  couple  of  spells 
of  rapid  fire  at  about  double  that  rate,  will 
empty  their  waggons  in  a  little  over  four 
hours,  it  is  very  evident  that  their  re-supply 
is  imperative.  But  the  difficulties  which 
lie  in  the  way  are  almost  insuperable,  for 
they  are  in  the  nature  of  things.  Columns 
are  not  as  well  horsed  as  the  guns,  and 
therefore  not  as  mobile.  They  must  be 
further  to  the  rear  and  hence  have  more 
troops  to  get  past,  and  German  experience 


The  Tactics  of  Field  Artillery.      205 

is  that  infantry  will  make  way  for  guns, 
but  not  for  columns.  Then  the  enormous 
extent  of  ground  they  require  has  to  be 
considered,  and  the  difficulty  of  finding 
even  the  brigades  to  which  they  belong.  It 
is  a  serious  reflection  that,  whereas  the 
supply  of  ammunition  to  the  infantry  is 
considered  to  present  no  special  difficulty 
in  Germany,  the  other  question  is  still  felt 
to  be  practically  insoluble. 

Approaching  this  subject  in  view  of 
the  recent  reduction  in  the  Horse  Ar- 
tillery, and  the  reasons  alleged  for  and 
against  that  measure,  we  pointed  out  in  a 
previous  article,  first,  the  importance  of 
securing  a  numerical  superiority  of  guns 
from  the  very  commencement  of  the  action, 
since  the  side  which  fails  in  this  is  ipso 
facto  compelled  to  assume  the  defensive,  a 
proceeding  which  ninety-nine  times  out  of 
a  hundred  spells  defeat  ;  and,  secondly,  how 
all  important  a  high  degree  of  mobility  was 
to  the  attainment  of  this  predominance  ; 
and  that  therein  lay  the  chief  argument  for 


206      The  Tactics  of  Field  Artillery. 

the  multiplication  rather  than  the  reduction 
of  the  horse  artillery.  We  now  proceed  to 
examine  the  tactics  of  the  arm  when  actu* 
ally  on  the  battle  field. 

The  keynote  of  these  tactics  is  undoubt- 
edly the  formation  of  large  massed  batter- 
ies ;  but  though  on  paper  this  sounds  easy 
enough,  practically  it  is  a  very  different 
matter.  The  conduct  of  the  fire  of  these 
masses  is  beset  with  practical  difficulties 
from  the  very  outset.  One  has  only  to  re- 
flect on  the  way  in  which  the  smoke  hangs 
according  to  the  dampness  of  the  ground, 
the  set  of  the  wind,  and  a  dozen  other  con- 
siderations, to  see  that  it  is  not  quite  as 
plain  sailing  as  might  be  imagined.  It  is 
usual  to  speak  of  long  lines  of  artillery,  and 
the  idea  conveyed  by  this  expression  is  that 
of  a  hundred  or  more  guns,  accurately 
dressed  in  line,  but,  except  where  a  ridge 
of  the  ground  or  a  favourable  set  of  the 
wind  actually  dictates  this  formation,  such 
a  line  will  rarely,  if  ever,  be  formed.  Speak* 
ing  now  of  the  long  rolling  slopes  which 


The  Tactics  of  Field  Artillery.     207 

characterise  the  greater  portion  of  the 
ground,  on  which  the  great  Continental 
wars  of  the  future  will  probably  be  fought 
out,  and  taking  the  brigade  of  three  or  four 
batteries,  it  is  more  probable  that  each 
brigade  will  be  formed  in  echelon  at  some 
200  yards  distant,  either  from  a  flank  or 
from  the  centre.  This  seems  the  most 
practical  method  of  dealing  with  the  smoke 
difficulty  and  also  of  puzzling  the  enemies7 
aim.  At  a  couple  of  thousand  yards  dis- 
tance, in  ground  of  the  nature  premised, 
it  is  hardly  possible  to  detect  that  the  guns 
are  not  actually  in  the  same  alignment. 
The  next  question  that  arises  is,  how  can 
the  fire  of  this  line  or  line  of  groups  be  best 
combined  upon  the  enemy  ?  And  on  this 
point  volumes  literally  have  been  written 
in  both  France,  Germany,  and  Austria  du- 
ring the  past  few  years.  It  is  obvious  that 
the  more  guns  that  can  be  brought  to  bear 
on  a  single  battery,  the  sooner  will  that 
battery  be  put  out  of  action  ;  but  meanwhile 
its  fellows  have  a  comparatively  passive 


208      The  Tactics  of  Field  Artillery. 

target  to  aim  at,  and  may  succeed  in  doing 
irreparable  damage  ;  besides,  the  difficulty 
of  communicating  orders  to  a  large  number 
of  batteries   has   also  to  be  taken  into  ac- 
count.    The  most   practicable   solution   of 
the  difficulty,   as  far   as  regards   the  initial 
artillery    duel   with   approximately    equal 
numbers  on  each  side,   is  to  tell  off  battery 
against  battery,    but  to  combine   the  fire  of 
each  half  battery  on  the   flank  and   centre 
gun  of  the  enemies'  battery.     In  this  way 
three  guns  are  brought  to  bear  on  one,  and 
the  remaining  four  of  the   enemies'  battery 
are  sufficiently  near  the  line  of  the  bursting 
shells,  not  to   be  entirely  uninfluenced  by 
them  ;  besides,  the  control  of  the  fire  with- 
in the  battery  is  very  much  simplified,  and 
there  is  less  risk  of  mistaking  the  bursting 
of  the  shells  of  a  neighbouring  one  for  those 
of  your  own.  All  this  seems  painfully  simple 
on  paper,  but  in  the  field  when  met  with  for 
the  first  time,  these  difficulties  are  very  real 
indeed — it  is  indeed  only  another  instance 
of  the  truth  of  Clausewitz's  saying  : — 


The  Tactics  of  Field  Artillery.     209 

"  In  war  everything  is  simple,  but  to  se- 
cure simplicity  is  hard."  What  is  speci- 
ally needed,  even  when  accurate  range 
finders  are  employed,  is  a  body  of  officers 
specially  trained  by  practice  in  the  field  as 
observers,  and  in  conjunction  with  the 
above  a  number  of  orderlies  trained  to  de- 
liver verbal  messages  accurately.  The  first 
point  is  of  particular  importance  ;  for  when 
a  number  of  guns  are  all  firing  on  the  same 
object  which  itself  is  wrapped  in  smoke  of 
its  own  making,  it  becomes  next  to  im- 
possible to  distinguish  any  one  individual- 
shell.  And  to  get  over  this  difficulty  it  is  pro- 
posed in  Germany  that  in  getting  the  range, 
battery  salvoes,  each  gun  laid  on  the  same 
point,  and  with  a  difference  of  100  yards' 
elevation  should  be  employed,  the  line  of 
bursting  shells  thus  formed  being  compara- 
tively easy  of  identification.  The  second 
point  is  of  equal  importance  ;  for,  if  the  re- 
sult of  the  observations  is  incorrectly  re- 
ported, the  gain  is  entirely  of  a  negative 
description.  Now,  an  ordinary  man,  even 

M.,  L.  14 


210      Tlie  Tactics  of  Field  Artillery. 

if  not  particularly  excited,  will,  unless  he 
has  been  specially  trained  for  the  purpose, 
almost  invariably  repeat  an  order  in  exactly 
the  opposite  terms  in  which  it  was  given, 
and  nothing  but  a  thorough  training  will  pre- 
vent him.  This  may  seem  absurd,  but  we 
recommend  any  officer  who  doubts  it  to  try 
the  experiment. 

In  normal  ground  (i.e.,  gently  rolling) ; 
the  artillery  fight  may  be  divided  into  four 
phases  :  first,  the  preparatory  stage,  at 
ranges  between  2,500  and  1,500  yards  ; 
the  decisive  stage,  against  the  enemies  ar- 
tillery, between  1,500  and  1,000  yards  ; 
the  preparation  of  the  attack  at  the  same 
distance  and  the  final  advance  to  case  shot 
ranges,  whether  to  confirm  the  decision  or  to 
pursue.  One  thing  here  must  be  specially 
dwelt  upon,  and  that  is,  that  it  will  no 
longer  suffice  to  quote  the  experiences  of 
the  last  war  as  to  the  effect,  and  therefore 
as  to  the  duration,  of  each  of  these  stages. 
The  improvement  in  artillery  has  been  so 
great  during  the  past  sixteen  years  that 


The  Tactics  of  Field  Artillery.     211 

previous  data  can  be  no  longer  accepted  as 
guides.  Not  only  has  the  range  and  accuracy 
of  fire  been  doubled,  but  every  nation  in  Eu- 
rope is  now  provided  with  shrapnell  and  a 
reliable  time  fuse.  In  1870  the  French 
shrapnell  could  only  be  burst  at  ranges  of 
about  1,000  and  2,000  yards  ;  and  the  Ger- 
mans, well  aware  of  the  fact,  always  chose 
their  positions  between  these  limits,  so  that 
the  French  shells  proved  wholly  ineffec- 
tive. They  themselves  bad  no  shrapnell  at 
all  for  field  guns,  but  now  they  possess  one 
with  a  fuse  that  can  be  regulated  to  ten 
yards  of  range,  more  than  can  be  said  for 
our  own.  Except  ourselves,  every  nation 
also  possesses  the  double- walled  shell,  some- 
what on  the  principle  of  the  old  Armstrong 
segment  shell,  the  idea  being  that  every 
shell  should  burst  into  an  equal  number  of 
fragments,  none  of  which  should  be  un- 
necessarily large  or  unnecessarily  small. 
This  alone  doubles  the  power  of  each  pro- 
jectile. Hence  it  is  probable  that  both  the 
artillery  duel  and  the  subsequent  prepara- 


212      The  Tactics  of  Field  Artillery. 

tion  will  be  decided  considerably  more 
rapidly  than  formerly,  and  hence,  again,  the 
necessity  for  increased  rapidity  of  move- 
ment, for  the  original  fundamental  prin- 
ciple, that  "  artillery  is  useless  when  lim- 
bered up,"  must  never  be  forgotten.  This 
probability  of  the  decision  being  more 
rapidly  arrived  at  must  never  be  lost  sight 
of  by  the  Staff.  As  it  will  no  longer  be 
possible  to  count  on  the  infantry  having 
time  to  form  up  in  rendezvous  formation 
from  their  long  trailing  columns  of  route, 
and  hence  we  shall  probably  find  a  tendency 
to  recur  to  the  old  Napoleonic  and  Fredri- 
cian  system  of  marching  on  a  broad  front 
straight  across  country,  so  that  it  may  be 
certain  that  the  troops  may  be  ready  on 
the  ground  when  the  time  comes  for  them 
to  attack. 

With  regard  to  movements  under  effec- 
tive infantry  fire,  it  will  appear  blasphemy 
to  infantry  officers  if  we  say  it,  but  actually 
the  artillery  trouble  themselves  very  little 
about  their  possible  losses.  They  say  that. 


The  Tactics  of  Field  Artillery.     213 

to  begin  with,  they  have  just  as  good  a  ri^ht 
to  die  for  their  country,  if  necessary,  as  any 
other  branch  of  the  Service,  and  they  are 
not  afraid  to  take  the  risk.  They  maintain 
that,  no  matter  how  perfect  the  infantry 
weapon  may  be  made  in  itself,  its  accuracy 
depends  entirely  on  the  nerves  of  the  man 
who  holds  it,  and  they  will  take  uncom- 
monly good  care  to  shake  that  man's  nerves 
thoroughly  before  giving  him  his  opportu- 
nity. The  argument  does  not  cut  both 
ways,  for  their  gun  has  no  nerves  and  can- 
not shake.  But  even  if  the  danger  were 
far  greater  than  it  actually  is,  the  moral 
effect,  both  in  raising  the  spirit  of  one's 
own  side  and  depressing  those  of  the  other,  of 
the  advance  of  artillery  to  case  shot  ranges  is 
so  great  that  it  must  be  carried  out  at  all  costs. 
The  advance  of  even  a  couple  of  guns  to 
case  shot  range  has  again  and  again  turned 
the  scale  even  against  most  crushing  odds. 
And  since  the  cause  of  it  lies  deep  in  hu- 
man nature,  it  can  be  relied  on  to  do  so 
again.  There  is,  perhaps,  no  arm  in  the 


214      The  Tactics  of  Field  Artillery. 

service  less  in  want  of  theoretical  instruc- 
tion than  the  Koyal  Artillery,  but  on  the 
other  hand  none  require  practical  teaching 
more,  for  their  tactics  cannot  be  studied  or 
worked  out  on  the  drill  ground  ;  but  oppor- 
tunities on  the  practice  ground  can  only 
be  found  by  a  liberal  expenditure  on  the 
part  of  the  State.  Seeing  the  vital  impor- 
tance of  the  arm  on  the  battle  field,  it  is  to 
be  hoped  that  our  Government  in  India 
will  not  be  behindhand,  but  may  see  their 
way  during  the  coming  cold  weather  to 
bring  together  a  sufficient  number  of  batter- 
ies and  to  furnish  them  with  a  sufficient 
amount  of  ammunition,  to  enable  them  to 
acquire  some  practical  experience  before 
the  inevitable  storm  shall  break. 


THE  ATTACK  FORMATION  FOR 

INFANTRY. 

TiUFTEEN  years  have  elapsed  since  the 
JL  first  encounter  between  troops  armed 
on  both  sides  with  breech-loaders  took 
place,  and  proved  conclusively  for  those 
engaged,  that  the  days  for  column  and  line 
formations  in  the  fighting  line  were  past 
for  ever  and  that  wide  and  far  reaching 
changes  in  the  drill-books  were  immediately 
necessary,  on  pain  of  certain  defeat  in  the 
next  campaign  to  those  who  neglected  the 
warning. 

Such  changes  were  at  once  made  in  all 
continental  armies,  and  for  some  years  past 
every  nation  has  had  a  system,  more  or 
less  workable,  for  the  employment  of  its 
infantry  in  battle. 

But  in  the  year  1886,  and  almost  on  the 
brink  of  a  renewal  of  the  Eastern  Question, 
which  may  involve  our  interference  on 
land,  we  stand  alone  of  all  the  Powers,  as 


216      Attack  Formation  for  Infantry. 

unprovided  with  a  plan  of  attack  for  our 
infantry  as  we  were  in  1870. 

It  is  not  for  want  of  change.     Of  that  we 
have  had  enough  and  to  spare.     But  the 
changes  have  been  introduced  without  suffi- 
cient regard  to  the  conditions  they  were 
intended  to  meet.     In  fact,  the  Field  Exer- 
cises since  1870  have  never  prescribed  any 
formation  for  a  combat  exceeding  the  limits 
of  a  skirmish  or   partial  engagement ;  ap- 
plied in  a  battle,  they  would  hardly   have 
carried  us  beyond  the  limit  of  effective  in- 
fantry fire,  say  700  yards.     But  it  is  only 
within  this  limit  that  the  whole  strain  is 
felt,  and  where  the  want  of  a  system  to 
remedy  the  terrible  confusion  of  battle  is 
most  apparent. 

The  drill  formation  for  the  attack  should 
be  drawn  up  with  reference  to  the  most  diffi- 
cult conditions  with  which  it  will  have 
to  deal.  If  it  will  satisfy  these,  it  will 
easily  adapt  itself  to  less  severe  ones,  but 
the  converse  does  not  follow. 

Unquestionably  the  most   difficult  task 


A  ttack  Formation  for  Infantry.      217 

troops  can  be  called  on  to  execute,  is  the 
frontal  attack  of  a  selected  position  held 
by  men  approximately  equal  to  them  in 
quality  and  in  armament.  To  fix  clearly 
the  nature  of  the  task,  let  us  see  how  the 
writers  of  the  present  day  picture  the 
course  of  a  modern  decisive  attack  on  an 
enemy  in  a  position  of  his  own  choosing, 
strengthened  presumably  by  hasty  entrench- 
ments. Such  a  position  may  be  assumed 
to  consist  of  a  long  undulation  of  ground 
with  open  gentle  slopes,  no  continuous  ob- 
stacle in  front,  and  a  fair  field  of  fire  over 
the  surrounding  country,  up  to  about  2,000 
yards,  at  which  distance  a  corresponding 
and  approximately  parallel  ridge  hides  the 
movement  of  troops  beyond  from  the  eyes 
of  the  defender. 

Let  us  further  assume  that  the  operations 
of  the  previous  day  have  ended  in  the  with- 
drawal of  the  defenders'  cavalry  divisions, 
and  the  discovery  by  the  attacking  cavalry 
of  the  limits  and  general  outline  of  the 
enemy's  position. 


218      Attack  Formation  for  Infantry. 

The  army  itself  has  advanced  to  within 
a  distance  of  some  four  or  five  miles  of  the 
opposing  force,  and  bivouacs  for  the  night, 
covered  by  outposts.  We  will  confine  our- 
selves to  the  infantry  only  of  the  army 
corps  to  which  the  execution  of  the  de- 
cisive blow  has  been  allotted,  only  refer- 
ring to  the  action  of  the  other  arms  when 
absolutely  necessary. 

The  first  step  in  the  conduct  of  an  ac- 
tion is  to  form  a  line  of  guns  to  crush  the 
enemy's  artillery  fire,  and,  secondly,  to 
prepare  the  way  for  the  infantry.  The 
time  required  to  carry  these  two  operations 
out,  it  is  impossible  accurately  to  deter- 
mine, but  experience  shows  that  it  may 
probably  be  measured  by  hours. 

The  troops  on  both  sides  being  consider- 
ed equal  in  quality,  it  will  not  be  safe  to 
attempt  to  form  this  first  line  of  guns  un- 
der cover  only  of  the  cavalry,  as  was  so 
frequently  done  during  the  campaign  of 
1870  (not  always  with  impunity  even  then, 
as  witness  the  attack  by  Zouaves  on  the 


Attack  Formation  for  Infantry.      219 

batteries  of  Manstein's  Corps  (IXth)  in 
front  of  Amanvilliers,  at  the  commencement 
of  the  battle  of  St.  Privat— Gravelotte). 

It  will  be  necessary,  therefore,  to  send  out 
in  front  of  the  artillery  a  covering  force  of 
infantry,  whose  duty  it  will  be  to  prevent 
the  enemy's  establishing  bodies  of  infantry 
near  enough  to  seriously  annoy  the  gunners 
by  long-range  fire,  say  within  1,500  yards. 

Now  at  this  stage  of  the  action  it  cannot 
be  to  the  interest  of  the  defender  to  at- 
tempt a  serious  attack  against  the  batteries, 
the  loss  to  be  faced  is  very  heavy,  and 
the  result  very  uncertain  ;  nor  will  it  pay 
the  covering  party  to  get  too  close,  for  it 
would  be  impossible  to  maintain  their  ex- 
posed position  for  long  within  the  range  of 
aimed  fire.  They  will,  therefore,  probably 
content  themselves  with  getting  within 
about  800  yards  of  the  enemy's  infantry, 
whose  position,  again,  is  fixed  by  the  ne- 
cessity of  being  at  least  500  yards  in  front 
of  their  artillery  in  order  to  avoid  danger 
from  premature  bursting  of  shells. 


220      Attack  Formation  for  Infantry. 

The  attacking  artillery  will,  in  suitable 
ground,  have  chosen  their  first  position  at 
about  2,000  yards,  which  leaves  them  about 
700  yards  behind  the  covering  party  ;  and 
since  the  supports  cannot  lie  out  in  the  open 
between  the  firing  line  and  the  guns,  both  on 
account  of  their  exposure  to  the  enemy's  fire, 
and  also  of  the  danger  of  prematures  men- 
tioned above,  and  since,  also,  they  cannot  be 
drawn  up  immediately  behind  them,  on  pain 
of  becoming  the  stopbutt  for  the  enemy's 
overs,  they  (i.e.,  the  covering  party  and  its 
support)  will  be  separated  from  each  other 
by  a  distance  of  at  least  1,000  yards. 

Hence  it  is  necessary  to  give  consider- 
able strength  to  the  covering  party,  as  its 
position  must  be  held  at  all  costs,  and  its 
reinforcement  is  obviously  attended  with 
great  difficulty.  To  complete  the  prepara- 
tion for  the  attack,  it  is  necessary  to  bring 
up  a  sufficient  number  of  rifles  to  a  range 
at  which  their  aimed  fire  begins  to  acquire 
an  actual  power. 

The  fire  of  the  covering-parties  alone  is 


Attack  Formation  for  Infantry.      221 

not  sufficient  to  accomplish  this  purpose, 
nor  will  they,  in  all  probability,  possess  in 
themselves  sufficient  momentum  to  advance 
to  a  shorter  range  after  prolonged  expo- 
sure to  a  heavy  fire.  Fresh  troops,  there- 
fore, must  be  brought  to  their  support 
through  the  line  of  batteries,  whose  fire, 
ceasing  for  a  moment  to  allow  them  to  pass, 
must  be  then  resumed  with  greater  inten- 
sity to  cover  their  further  advance.  If  this 
advance  be  made  rapidly  and  unexpectedly, 
it  will  probably  bring  with  it  sufficient 
momentum  to  carry  on  the  covering-parties 
some  150  yards  nearer  their  object,  a  reduc- 
tion of  range  which  will  not  fail  to  have  its 
due  effect  on  the  accuracy  of  the  shooting. 
Under  cover  of  this  fire  the  remainder 
of  the  troops  allotted  to  the  preparation 
of  the  attack  approach  ;  these  troops  con- 
sist of  those  units  of  the  first  line  *  not 

*  Scherff  divides  the  field  of  attack  into  two  zones  : — 
Zone  of  preparation  from  700  to  300  yards  about. 

„    of  decision  „     300  to      0      „        ,, 

300  yards  is,  therefore,  about  decisive  range. 


222      Attack  Formation  for  Infantry. 

already  engaged,  and  it  is  their  duty  to  carry 
on  (by  successive  reinforcement)  the  shoot- 
ing-line to  within  decisive  range  of  the 
enemy's  position. 

The  intervals  of  time  at  which  these  suc- 
cessive reinforcements  will  be  required  are 
deduced  from  the  practical  experience  that, 
as  the  range  decreases  and  the  losses  in- 
crease, a  point  is  reached  beyond  which  no 
troops    can    remain    halted   on   the    same 
ground  for  more  than  about  five    minutes. 
They  must  either  advance  or  retire  ;  if  they 
do  not  possess  in  themselves   the  requisite 
momentum  to  carry   them  forward  before 
the  expiration  of  these  five  minutes,  they 
will  retreat  unless  support  reaches  them. 
A  reinforcement  should,  therefore,  always 
be  at  hand,  able  to  reach  the  shooting-line 
in  time  to  prevent  its  retreat  ;  and  a  dis- 
tance of  about  400  yards  practically  satisfies 
this  condition. 

It  is  not  necessary  that  the  front  of  the 
reinforcement  shoud  be  co-extensive  with 
the  front  of  the  shooting-line,  for  the  im- 


Attack  Formation  for  Infantry.      223 

pulse  to  advance  will  make  itself  felt  to  a 
considerable  distance  to  either  flank  of  the 
advancing  body.  In  this  manner  the  fight- 
ing-line advances  till  it  reaches  a  distance 
at  which  the  effect  of  the  fire  becomes 
overwhelming,  say  about  300  yards.  And 
it  now  becomes  the  duty  of  the  second  line 
(or  "  Haupt-treffen  ")  to  give  the  final  im- 
pulse for  storming  the  enemy's  position, 
clearing  him  out  of  it,  and  occupying  its 
further  boundary,  leaving  pursuit  to  the 
third  line. 

If  the  resistance  is  desperate,  the  second 
line  may  be  called  on  to  furnish  supports 
to  the  shooting  line  before  the  limit  of  the 
zone  of  decision  is  reached,  and  may  in- 
deed be  completely  expended  in  the  effort 
to  gain  it ;  in  that  case,  the  duty  of  the 
second  line  devolves  on  the  third  line,  and 
that  of  the  third  line  on  the  reserve. 

But,  in  any  case,  the  assault  once  started 
must  on  no  account  be  checked  till  the 
further  limit  of  the  position  is  reached  (i.e., 
a  point  from  which  the  enemy  can  be  pur- 


224      Attack  Formation  for  Infantry. 

sued  by  fire).  Here  it  must  be  stopped, 
and  at  any  cost ;  for  this  is  just  the  mo- 
ment when  offensive  returns  promise  the 
greatest  chance  of  success,  and  when  even 
against  the  best  troops  a  dashing  charge  of 
a  couple  of  troops  of  lancers  may,  in  the 
absence  of  closed  detachments  of  fresh  in- 
fantry, turn  the  scale. 

It  is  the  special  province  of  the  third 
line  to  meet  this  danger,  or,  failing  the 
third  line,  the  reserve,  which  must  there- 
fore have  followed  the  attack  sufficiently 
closely  to  be  at  hand  when  wanted.  But 
if  the  reserve  itself  has  been  necessarily 
retained  by  the  leader  for  employment  at 
some  moment,  or  on  some  spot  outside 
the  sphere  of  the  attack  itself,  e.g.,  to 
cover  the  outer  flank  of  the  advancing 
lines  against  a  counter  attack,  the  rapid 
advance  of  artillery  and  of  cavalry  into 
the  captured  position  becomes  imperatively 
necessary. 

This  completes  the  picture  of  the  attack^ 
as  drawn  by  the  leading  German  author- 


Attack  Formation  for  Infantry.      225 

rities,*  and  we  have  now  to  apply  our  drill 
regulations  to  it,  and  to  see  in  what  man- 
ner they  may  be  best  adapted  to  the  exe- 
cution of  the  task  before  us. 

The  first  and  most  salient  points  to  notice 
is  the  entire  silence  of  the  regulations  as  to 
the  duties,  relative  strength,  and  formation 
of  the  second  and  third  lines. 

From  a  study  of  the  "  Field  Exercises/' 
one  would  rise  with  the  conclusion  that  a 
single  battalion  possessed  in  itself  (when 
extended  for  attack)  sufficient  strength  and 
depth  to  carry  a  position  held  by  an  equal- 
ly well-armed  enemy  ;  and  all  the  sugges- 
tions hitherto  made  for  their  improvement 
appear  to  be  based  on  the  same  assumption. 
But  that  such  an  assumption  is  untenable 
can  be  shown  from  history  ;  to  give  all  the 
examples  on  which  this  opinion  is  based, 
would  be,  to  reproduce  about  one-third  of 
the  Prussian  official  account  of  the  1870 
campaign,  and  a  similar  fraction  of  the 

*  Scherff's  Kriegiihrung .    Meckel's    Taktik,  Cardinal   v. 
Widdern's  Hadbuch  der  Truppen  Fuhriing,  &c. 

M.,    L.  15 


226      Attack  Formation  for  Infantry. 

best  histories  of  the  Kusso-Turkish  War  of 
1877. 

The  following  quotation  from  Meckel's 
Taktik  (p.  209),  while  it  does  not  explain 
why  it  should  be  so,  will  at  least  place  it 
beyond  doubt  that  in  the  opinion  of  ex- 
perienced men,  depth  is  essential  to  success 
in  the  attack  : — 

"  One  is  inclined  to  underestimate  the 
consumption  of  men  in  the  fight.  It  is 
difficult  to  grasp  the  idea  that  for  a  portion 
of  the  front  on  which  only  one  man  can 
fight  at  a  time,  it  is  necessary  to  have  ten 
men  in  readiness,  and  to  explain  the  matter 
and  theoretically  to  show  the  necessity  for 
so  doing  would  be  difficult ;  here  history 
alone  can  help  us/7 

Let  us  see,  then,  how  far  to  the  front  our 
present  authorised  attack  formation  will 
take  us,  and  how  it  may  most  conveniently 
be  adapted  to  fill  a  place  in  any  complete 
scheme. 

The  necessity  for  an  adequate  covering 
force  for  the  first  artillery  position  has  been 


Attack  Formation  for  Infantry.      227 

already  pointed  out.  This  covering  force, 
as  shown  above,  must  be  strong  enough  to 
resist  any  rush  on  the  guns,  by  its  own 
fire,  both  on  account  of  its  distance  from  its 
support,  and  also  because  bringing  them  up 
would  entail  a  cessation  of  the  fire  from 
the  batteries  at  the  very  moment  when  it 
can  least  be  spared  (i.e.,  when  it  is  necessary 
to  distract  the  enemy's  attention  from  the 
advancing  infantry). 

If  we  take  one  man  to  two  paces  of  front, 
then  allowing  for  losses  in  taking  up  posi- 
tion (necessarily  heavier  than  when  lying 
down  firing  under  cover),  two  companies 
will  be  sufficient  to  cover  each  group  of 
three  batteries.  That  guns  must  fire  over 
infantry,  and  infantry  be  posted  behind 
guns,  is  now-a-days  unavoidable  ;  for  it  is 
necessary,  in  order  to  maintain  an  effective 
fire  on  the  enemy,  to  bring  them  as  close  to 
his  line  of  defence  as  possible  without  incur- 
ring too  high  a  percentage  of  loss,  say  with- 
in 1,500  yards ;  and  hence,  if  the  guns 
were  placed  on  the  flank  of  the  attack,  the 


228      Attack  Formation  for  Infantry. 

range  to  that  portion  of  the  enemy's  line 
opposite  to  the  central  line  of  advance 
would  be  unduly  increased. 

The    question   now    arises,    from    what 
troops  is  this  covering  party  to  be  taken  ? 
Shall  we  break  up   a    single   battalion   to 
cover  the  front  of  the  batteries  ?   or  shall 
they  be  the  leading  companies  of  the  batta- 
lions of  the  first  line  drawn  up   in  the  rear 
of  the  guns,  and  waiting  for  the  moment 
to  advance  ?     The   first   alternative   must 
be  rejected,  at  any  rate,  in  a  pitched  battle, 
though  it  may  not  be  possible  to  avoid  it 
in  a  battle  developed  from  column  of  route  ; 
because,  since  it  is  impossible  to  withdraw 
them,  or  to  close  them  to  a  flank,  when  the 
attack  itself  advances,  each  of  the  battalions 
will  be   thrown   into   confusion   from   the 
very  outset  by  the  inter- mixture  of  men  of 
another  regiment,  and  at  a  time  when   an 
absence  of  confusion  is  specially  important, 
in  order  that  a  thorough  control  of  the  firing 
(by    using  volleys)   may   be   maintained. 
That  the  position   of  these  companies  is 


Attack  Formation  for  Infantry.      229 

much  exposed  is  admitted,  and  also  that 
great  difficulty  may  be  experienced  in 
bringing  up  the  battalions,  each  in  rear  of 
his  respective  company,  but  it  is  submitted 
that  the  possibility  of  preserving  the  units 
intact  exists,  whilst  in  the  first  case  it  is 
entirely  lost. 

The  next  step  will  be  to  commence  the 
infantry  preparation  for  the  attack.  This 
must  be  effected  by  reinforcing  the  covering 
party  in  such  a  manner  that  the  fresh 
troops  bring  with  them  momentum  enough 
to  carry  the  previously  engaged  line  forward 
to  the  distance  to  which  the  fire  of  dense 
lines  of  skirmishers  becomes  thoroughly 
effective,  say  between  600  to  700  yards. 
To  reduce  the  loss  whilst  passing  through 
the  batteries,  and  to  bring  along  the 
requisite  momentum,  the  advance  must 
be  made  in  extended  order,  and  simulta- 
neously. 

It  is  undoubtedly  difficult  to  take  an  ex- 
tended line  down  a  fire-swept  glacis  and  to 
prevent  them  firing  into  the  backs  of  the 


230      Attack  Formation  for  Infantry. 

men  in  front  of  them,  but  there  is  practi- 
cally no  better  way  of  doing  it.  Even  the 
Prussians  have  been  forced  to  admit  that 
the  company  column  can  no  longer  come 
within  2,000  yards  of  artillery  fire,  and  to 
attempt  at  this  state  of  the  action,  when 
the  defender's  attention  is  not  yet  riveted 
on  the  firing-line,  to  bring  troops  up  in  line 
through  the  guns  would  only  lead  to  an 
involuntary  formation  of  loose  (as  opposed 
to  individual)  order,  with  all  the  disadvant- 
ages which  necessarily  result  when  men 
take  the  law  into  their  own  hands. 

At  a  subsequent  period  of  the  engage- 
ment, when  the  enemy's  attention  is 
thoroughly  held  by  the  volleys  of  the  now 
reinforced  covering  party  at  effective  range, 
line  and  even  small  columns  may  be  brought 
up,  but  it  will  scarcely  be  advisable  to  count 
on  even  the  third  reinforcement  being  able 
to  get  to  the  front,  except  in  extended  order. 
The  duration  of  the  fire  fight,  which  will 
now  ensue,  will  depend  on  the  extent  arid 
thoroughness  with  which  the  gunners  have 


Attack  Formation  for  Infantry.      231 

done  their  work.*  Except  where  a  road  or 
ditch  running  parallel  with  the  enemy's 
front  gives  cover,  ten  to  fifteen  minutes 
must  suffice,  for  the  losses  will  rapidly  in- 
crease as  the  enemy  gets  the  range,  and  the 
desire  to  advance  will  evaporate  rapidly, 
till  perhaps  the  advance  of  even  strong 
reinforcements  will  not  be  sufficient  to  over- 
come the  inertia  of  the  firing-line. 

But  the  preparation  once  completed,  the 
advance  to  the  decisive  range  of  about  300 
yards  must  be  pushed  on  with  all  possible 
speed,  in  echelons,  one  echelon  covering  the 


*  It  is  generally  laid  down  that  the  artillery,  after  having 
subdued  the  fire  of  the  opposing  guns,  should  advance  to 
effective  range  of  the  enemy's  infantry.  But,  actually, 
such  an  advance  could  rarely  take  place,  nor  is  it  indeed 
necessary.  In  undulating  country  there  will  generally  be 
but  little  latitude  in  choice  of  positions.  The  first  will 
obviously  be  as  near  to  the  crest  of  the  ridge  as  possible,  so 
as  to  derive  the  advantages  of  concealment  and  command, 
and  an  advance  down  the  slope  of  the  hill  towards  the 
enemy  would  render  the  conditions  for  observing  the  effect 
of  the  fire,  and  for  maintaining  it  to  the  last,  over  the  heads 
af  the  assaulting  troops,  so  unfavourable  that  it  would  be 
better  not  to  make  the  change. 


232      Attack  Formation  for  Infanfry. 

advance  of  the  other  by  its  fire.  The 
characteristics  of  this  phase  of  the  action 
are  rapidly-increasing  losses,  frequent  change 
of  command,  and  growing  confusion,  as 
companies  and  even  regiments  begin  to  mix. 
As  already  mentioned,  those  who  have  had 
to  face  it  say  that  within  about  500  yards 
of  the  enemy's  position  the  fire  becomes  so 
terrible  that  no  troops  can  stand  on  their 
own  ground  against  it  for  more  than  five 
minutes  ;  if  support  does  not  reach  them 
they  will  retire. 

This  condition  regulates  the  distances  to 
be  kept  between  the  successive  lines  of  the 
attack.  A  support  must  always  be  within 
such  a  distance  of  each  echelon  that  it  can 
reach  it  within  the  limit  of  time,  say  about 
400  yards. 

If  the  artillery  fire  has  taken  good  effect , 
and  the  moment  for  the  advance  from  the 
limit  of  effective  fire  (700)  has  been  well 
chosen,  it  is  probable  that  the  shooting- 
line  will  press  on  to  about  500  37ards  with- 
out reinforcement,  but  from  500  to  300  the 


Attack  Formation  for  Infantry.      233 

impulse  for  the  advance  will  have  to  be 
given  from  behind. 

The  number  of  such  impulses  required 
will  depend  on  the  number  of  halts  which 
have  to  be  made,  and  these,  again,  on  the 
length  of  the  rushes,  which  should  be  long 
enough  to  allow  the  lying-down  echelon  to 
fire  from  two  to  three  rounds,  but  not  long 
enough  for  the  enemy  to  change  his  aim 
from  one  echelon  to  the  other  ;  twenty  to 
thirty  seconds  satisfies  both  these  condi- 
tions, approximately,  and  corresponds  to  a 
distance  of  75  to  100  yards  in  marching 
order,  or  100  to  150  if  the  packs  have  been 
taken  off. 

Short  rushes  of  thirty  yards  must  be 
absolutely  condemned,  since  the  number 
of  reinforcements  required  will  be  practically 
proportional  to  the  number  of  advances 
which  have  to  be  made  from  the  halt. 

Taking  100  yards  as  the  limit  of  the  rush 
and  the  conditions  generally  favourable  to 
the  attack,  the  troops  of  the  first  line  will 
suffice  to  reach  the  point  at  which  the  de- 


234      Attack  Formation  for  Infantry. 

cision  commences,  and  their  distribution 
will  have  been  as  follows  : — 

1st  double  company,  covering  the  guns. 

2nd  double  company,  carrying  on  the  1st 
to  the  limit  of  effective  fire. 

3rd  double  company,  to  give  the  first 
impulse  forward  in  the  advance  to  decisive 
distance. 

4th  double  company,  to  carry  on  the 
shooting-line  from  500  to  300  yards. 

At  the  moment  the  advance  from  the 
limit  of  effective  fire  commences,  the  sup- 
porting lines  should  be  following  each  other 
at  distances  of  400  yards  respectively,  and 
should  advance  in  quick  time  without  halt 
or  check,  reinforcing  at  the  double  when 
such  reinforcement  is  necessary. 

Should,  however,  the  resistance  be  obsti- 
nate, the  forces  of  the  first  line  will  not  of 
themselves  suffice,  and  the  second  line  will 
have  to  be  drawn  on.  But  this  line  should 
be  brought  up  as  far  as  psssible  intact,  and 
in  line  ;  it  would  not,  therefore,  answer  to 
form  it  in  two  or  more  groups,  as  this  would 


Attack  Formation  for  Infantry.      235 

detract  too  much  from  its  momentum  in 
the  rush  ;  hence,  if  it  is  called  on  for  rein- 
forcements, these  will  have  to  be  sent  for- 
ward at  the  double.  As  the  rapidity  of  the 
advance  will  have  been  checked  by  the 
obstinate  resistance  that  has  occasioned  this 
call,  and  as  the  second  line  is  supposed 
to  maintain  uninterruptedly  its  movement 
in  quick  time,  the  distance  between  the  two 
lines  will  have  probably  been  considerably 
diminished,  and  there  will  be  no  difficulty 
for  the  reinforcements  to  overtake  the  fight- 
ing line. 

The  third  line  follows  the  second  in  line, 
and  at  a  similar  interval,  prepared  to  take 
the  place  of  the  second,  if  necessary,  while 
the  reserve  accompanies  the  movement 
either  on  the  exposed  flank  or  in  rear  of 
the  centre. 

The  main  points  to  be  insisted  on  are  : 
(1)  the  rapid  advance  of  the  shooting- 
line  from  700  to  300  yards  ;  and  (2nd)  that 
neither  check  nor  halt  is  allowed  to  occur 
amongst  the  troops  in  rear.  With  regard 


236      Attack  Formation  for  Infantry. 

to  both  points,  it  is  obvious  that  the 
amount  of  loss  suffered  is  proportionate 
to  the  time  under  fire ;  and  if  it  were  not 
for  the  absolute  necessity  for  distracting 
the  enemy's  attention  by  the  fire  of  the 
echelons  during  the  advance,  and  also  for 
the  necessity  of  bringing  the  men  up  to 
decisive  range  as  fresh  as  possible,  it  would 
be  better  to  cross  the  whole  intervening 
space  without  firing  at  all,  but  that 
being  practically  out  of  the  question,  we 
can  only  reduce  the  time  occupied  in 
crossing  it  as  much  as  possible.  The 
fire  of  the  echelons  in  this  stage  of 
the  attack  is  principally  useful  as  a  means 
of  distracting  the  enemy's  attention  ;  the 
conditions  are  altogether  unfavourable  to 
accurate  shooting,  and  the  only  chance  to 
reach,  as  rapidly  as  possible,  a  distance 
within  the  point-blank  range  of  the  rifle, 
from  which  to  pour  in  a  fire  which  makes 
up  by  quantity  for  absence  of  quality. 

Hitherto    we  have  only  considered   the 
front  of  a  single  battalion,    and  we  have 


Attack  Formation  for  Infantry.      237 

now  to  combine  the  battalions  of  a  divi- 
sion, which  is  practically  the  unit  of 
attack  in  battle.  It  is  true  that  the  front 
of  a  British  division  formed  for  attack  is 
in  itself  too  narrow,  being  only  about  800 
yards,  but  two  divisions  attacking  along- 
side of  each  other  act  each  for  itself,  in- 
dependently of  the  other. 

We  require  three  lines  and  a  reserve. 
The  usual  proportions  observed  between 
these  lines  in  Germany  is,  one-fourth  of 
the  whole  for  "  Vortreffen,"  one -half  for 
"  Haupt-treffen,"  one-fourth  for  "  Zweiter- 
linie "  (our  third  line),  and  for  reserve  a 
detail  from  another  command. 

Our  division  of  a  brigade  into  three 
parts  renders  a  corresponding  grouping 
impossible,  since  it  is  unadvisable  to  split 
up  the  battalions.  We  are,  therefore,  com- 
pelled to  make  our  lines  all  equal,  i.e.,  each 
of  one  battalion,  and  form  the  reserve  out 
of  one  or  more  divisional  battalions.  The 
most  convenient  formation  therefore  for 
rendezvous  will  be  a  mass  of  brigades 


238      Attack  Formation  for  Infantry. 

alongside  of  each  other,  the  columns 
deploying  as  they  get  within  artillery 
range. 

The  size  of  the  echelon  is  the  next  point 
to  be  determined. 

It  should  be  a  fundamental  principal  to 
make  these  as  large,  and  consequently  as 
few  in  number  as  possible.  Prince  Hohen- 
lohe,  in  his  pamphlet  Ueber  Infanterie 
(p.  94)  says  :  "  I  have  seen  even  more 
complicated  advances  by  rushes  practised. 
The  fighting  line  was  divided  into  three 
sections,  of  which  each  in  turn  ran  forward. 
This  goes  against  the  grain  of  good  troops, 
for  when  one  section  has  gained  ground 
towards  the  enemy  and  has  opened  fire, 
then  honour  and  comradeship  both  demand 
that  the  remainder  should  hurry  up  to 
share  the  danger,  shoulder  to  shoulder. 
The  moment,  too,  in  which  the  first 
echelon  opens  fire,  is  just  the  most 
favourable  for  the  others  to  advance,  for 
the  enemy  will  have  turned  all  his  rifles 
on  the  men  that  ran  forward  first.  Still 


Attack  Formation  for  Infantry.      239 

less  practical  is  the  experiment  I  have 
seen  tried,  of  dividing  the  fighting  line 
into  more  echelons,  of  which  first  the  odd, 
and  then  the  even  numbers  ran  forward. 
The  centre  sections  of  the  line,  that 
remain  lying  down,  have  their  field  of 
fire  so  narrowed  that  they  can  do  but 
little.  For  this  reason  I  have  never  per- 
mitted, within  my  command,  a  fighting 
line  to  advance  in  more  than  two  echelons. 
The  front  of  each  brigade  should,  there* 
fore,  form  a  single  echelon,  and  as  it  is 
only  equal  to  the  front  of  two  companies 
extended  at  four  paces,  which  is  practically 
the  same  thing  as  a  single  German 
company  at  war  strength,  it  will  not  prove 
unduly  difficult  to  handle. 

But  in  any  case  the  difficulty  must  be 
faced,  for  it  is  far  out-weighed  by  the 
advantages  of  unity  of  command  in  the 
fighting  line,  and  consequently  the  greater 
ease  with  which  the  direction  of  advance 
can  be  maintained. 

This  last  point  must  not  be  overlooked  ; 


240      Attack  Formation  for  Infantry. 

it  is  the  natural  tendency  of  troops,  when 
fired  upon,  to  move  in  the  direction  from 
which  they  supposed  the  fire  to  proceed, 
and  a  careful  study  of  the  early  battles  of 
the  Franco-German  War*  will  show  many 
instances  in  which  the  companies  of  batta- 
lions brought  into  action  as  -units  in  line 
of  company  columns,  were,  at  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  action,  found  fighting  many 
hundred  yards  apart.  Such  disposition  is 
obviously  much  less  likely  to  occur  in  an 
advance  composed  only  of  two  echelons, 
than  in  a  line  of  similar  length  advancing 
in  numerous  smaller  fractions. 

It  will  be  seen,  therefore,  that  though 
the  existing  regulations  fall  far  short  of 
the  actual  requirements,  their  general 
principles  may  be  easily  adapted  to 
form  part  of  the  larger  scheme  ;  let  us 
now  see  how  the  recently  proposed  plan  of 
attacking  from  double  company  columns 

*  Vide  storming-  of  the  Vionvilie  ridge  at  the  battle  of 
Vionville  by  the  20th  Regiment  infantry,  16th  August 
1870,  Pr.  Off.  pp.  560-561,  vol  i.  of  original. 


Attack  Formation  for  Infantry.      241 

on    the   two   centre  half  companies    will 
answer. 

It  is  obvious  that  it  can  only  be  applied 
to  the  battalions  of  the  first  line,  and  hence 
it  would  have  little  real  influence  in  pre- 
venting the  mixture  of  different  battalions, 
which  indeed  no  scheme,  in  practice,  can 
ever  prevent. 

But,  even  applied  to  the  first  line,  it 
presents  numerous  and  grave  difficulties. 

In  the  first  place,  the  covering  party  for 
the  artillery  will  be  formed  by  a  line  of  sec- 
tions under  the  command  of  subalterns  and 
sergeants  ;  for  it  is  evident  that  the  captain 
cannot  leave  three  quarters  of  his  company, 
in  order  to  take  command  of  the  remaining 
fraction  ;  and  as  an  alternative,  grouping 
four  sections  under  one  captain,  would  only 
be  anticipating  the  subsequent  unavoidable 
confusion. 

Advancing  another  step  :  when  the  re- 
mainder of  the  half  companies  to  which  the 
sections  in  front  belong,  move  forward  to 
reinforce,  how  are  they,  as  they  emerge 

M.,  L.  16 


242      Attack  Formation  for  Infantry. 

from  the  smoke  of  the  batteries  (whose  fire 
is  maintained  as  long  as  possible,  to  cover 
the  movement  from  the  enemy)  to  recog- 
nise the  sections  to  which  they  belong, 
some  600  yards  in  front  of  them.  Pic- 
ture, for  a  moment,  the  position  of  a  young 
subaltern  in  command  of  some  twenty  men, 
half  on  one  side,  half  on  the  other,  of  a 
gun-carriage,  in  front  of  him  a  veil  of  dense 
smoke  clinging  to  the  damp  ground  ;  a 
shell  bursting  just  to  one  side  causes  him 
and  his  men  to  turn  their  heads  for  a 
moment  in  its  direction,  and,  when  they 
resume  their  advance  the  next  moment, 
what  reasonable  possibility  exists  that  it 
will  be  in  exactly  the  same  line  as  that  in 
which  they  started  in '?  but  the  least  deflec- 
tion will  be  fatal  to  their  chance  of  hitting 
off  the  precise  fifty  yards  of  front  into 
which  they  ought  to  fit. 

It  is,  of  course,  true  that  similar  confusion 
will  arise  in  the  case  of  any  troops  passing 
through  the  guns  ;  but  the  longer  the  line, 
the  more  difficult  will  it  be  to  turn  it  out 


Attack  Formation  for  Infantry.      243 

of  its  true  course.  Even  where,  as  in  the 
case  of  smaller  forces,  the  guns  are  posted 
on  the  flank,  the  disadvantages  of  a  divided 
command  will  be  felt. 

The  shooting  line  consists  of  a  number 
of  sections  (or  half- companies)  of  different 
companies,  the  support  is  of  similar  com- 
position ;  if  one  captain  takes  two  units  in 
the  former,  and  another  two  units  in  the 
latter,  both  labour  under  the  disadvantage 
of  commanding  a  force,  only  half  of  which 
is  made  up  by  their  own  men. 

If  both  captains  stay  behind  with  the 
supports,  the  leading  of  the  fighting  line 
is  in  the  hands  of  the  subalterns,  a  duty  for 
which  they  are  obviously  not  as  fit  as  the 
captains,  or  if  the  places  are  again  reversed, 
the  subalterns  have  the  still  more  difficult 
task  of  keeping  the  supports  in  hand,  and 
preventing  them  from  joining  the  fighting 
line  on  their  own  account. 

Even  in  Germany,  where  few  captains 
get  their  companies  under  twenty  years7 
service,  this  difficulty  has  been  so  much 


244      Attack  Formation  for  Infantry. 

felt,  that  the  extension  of  a  whole  company 
(200  rifles)  in  spite  of  the  length   of  front, 
is  preferred  by  many   writers  as    an  alter- 
native.    Our   small   companies  just   meet 
the  case,    provided  their  numbers  are  well 
kept  up.     If  a  German   captain  can  com- 
mand   a  company    of    from    200  to    250 
rifles,  when  extended,   there  is  no  apparent 
reason   why    an    Englishman    should    not 
command  one  of  half  the  strength,    especi- 
ally when  we  take  into  account  the  larger 
proportion  of  subalterns,   and  non-commis- 
sioned officers,  which  he  has  to  help  him. 
Whether  the  men  are  English  or  foreigners, 
the   difficulty   to   be  overcome  in  leading 
them  will   depend  on  the  thoroughness  of 
their    previous  training ;    if    our    system 
of  company   training  is  so  very  inferior  as 
to  render  the  control  of  an  extended  line  of 
forty  to  fifty  rifles  impossible,  the  sooner 
we  alter  our  system  the  better,  for  it  is  in 
that  possibility  that  the  only  advantage  of 
our  eight-company  battalions  over  those  of 
continental  armies  lies  ;  and  more  real  good 


Attack  Formation  for  Infantry.      245 

will  be  derived  from  making  the  most  of 
our  own  strong  points,  than  by  blindly 
copying  the  form,  not  the  spirit,  of  the 
Prussian  Army. 

The  size  of  the  Prussian  company  was 
due  to  economic  considerations,  and  to  the 
difficulty  of  supplying  a  larger  number  of 
officers,  of  the  social  rank  from  which  they 
alone  were  drawn.  It  has  grown  into  their 
system,  and  they  wisely  make  the  best  of 
it,  but,  like  most  human  institutions,  it  has 
defects,  which  they  frankly  acknowledge. 

These  defects  are  the  same,  practically, 
which  have  been  enumerated  above,  as  be- 
longing to  the  proposed  double-company 
column,  viz.,  the  company,  when  extended, 
is  too  large  for  one  man,  and,  if  to  reduce 
its  front,  half  is  extended,  and  half  follows 
in  support,  the  captain,  to  really  command 
his  company,  must  be  in  two  places  at  the 
same  time.  Even  then  the  front  of  the 
half  company  is  equal  to  that  of  our  whole 
company,  but  there  are  no  complaints  of  its 
being  unmanageable.  The  fact  was  dis- 


246      Attack  Formation  for  Infantry. 

tinctly  noticed,  that  in  action,  when  both 
support  and  fighting  line  belonged  to  the 
same  company,  it  was  very  difficult  to  pre- 
vent the  former  from  joining  the  latter 
without  word  of  command,  an  important 
point  to  remember  when  the  conduct  of  the 
support  has  to  be  left  in  the  hands  of  a 
more  or  less  inexperienced  subalternt 

Now  these  defects,  which  in  themselves 
are  not  as  great  in  the  German  system  as 
they  are  in  the  scheme  we  are  consider- 
ing (viz.,  double  -  company  column  on 
the  two  centre  half-companies),  on  ac- 
count of  the  longer  service  and  better 
training  of  the  German  subalterns,  are  all 
avoided  in  the  old  attack  formation,  in 
which  each  company  is  kept  unbroken  in 
the  hands  of  its  captain  ;  both  support  and 
fighting  line  being  each  in  the  charge  of 
an  experienced  man,  as  long  as  they  remain 
distinct.  It  is  true  that  when  reinforcement 
takes  place,  the  two  become  intermixed,  and 
on  the  parade  ground,  the  senior  captain 
takes  command,  but  the  chance  of  the  two 


Attack  Formation  for  Infantry.      247 

captains  being  both  unwounded  at  this  stage 
of  the  action  are  too  remote  for  considera- 
tion. Moreover,  the  conduct  of  the  firing 
of  the  covering  party,  in  the  preliminary 
stage  of  the  action,  renders  it  particularly 
desirable  that  whole  companies,  and  not 
fractions,  should  be  employed ;  for  this 
is  the  one  stage  of  the  action  in  which 
a  systematic  employment  of  long-range 
volley-firing  is  possible,  promises  most 
results,  and  enables  the  expenditure  of 
ammunition  to  be  still  controlled. 

But  to  obtain  favourable  effects  from 
this  style  of  firing,  it  is  essential  that  the 
fire  of  a  large  number  of  rifles  should  be 
brought  to  bear  on  the  object  (see  Pruss. 
Mus,  Eegs.  of  October  1875),  and  our  com- 
pany is  practically  the  most  convenient 
body  we  can  employ.* 


*  I  have  not  a  corrected  copy  of  our  own  regulations 
at  hand  to  refer  to,  but  till  1883  volleys  by  half -sections 
were  recommended.  It  is  difficult  to  understand  how 
half-sections  came  to  be  considered  as  the  fittest  number 
of  rifles  for  the  purpose,  for  at  that  time  there  had  been 


248      Attack  Formation  for  Infantry. 

In   working  by   companies  we    still  do 
not  absolutely  forfeit  the  chance  of  keep- 
ing the  commands  distinct,  after    the  arri- 
val of  the   first  reinforcement.     Generally 
the  covering  party  will  be  able  to  obtain 
some   cover,    such   as    a    bank,    ditch,    or 
hedge,   behind  which  it   can  be  closed  to 
a  flank  to  make  room  for  the  first  support. 
Such  closing  to  a  flank  is,    of  course,  al- 
ways possible  under  cover,  though  not  out 
in  the  open.     Even  if  the  ground  affords 
no  cover,  the  positions  the  covering  forces 
are  to  occupy  will  have  been  determined  be- 
forehand,   and  they   will   have  entrenched 
themselves  in  them  under  cover  of  dark- 
ness or  the  morning  mist  ;  and  in   many 

no  regular  experimental  inquiry  into  the  subject,  nor  had 
the  officers  then  connected  with  the  Musketry  Department 
any  experience  of  modern  European  war.  On  the  other 
hand,  after  three  years  of  experiment  and  the  most  recent 
experience  of  war,  the  Germans  decided  on  a  company  as 
being  the  smallest  number  of  rifles  to  fire  volleys  at  long 
range,  and  laid  it  down  as  a  general  principle  that  "a 
large  number  of  rifles  should  be  brought  to  bear,"  &c. 
Which  opinion  is  most  likely  to  have  been  well  founded, 
the  reader  may  judge  for  himself. 


Attack  Formation  for  Infantry.      249 

cases  covered  approaches  for  the  supports 
may  also  have  been  arranged. 

Once  within  the  7 00 -yard  limit,  all 
power  of  controlling  the  fire  ceases,  and 
the  personal  influence  of  officers  over  men 
comes  to  an  end.  This  is  inevitably  the 
case,  for  even  supposing  the  men  to 
be  all  heroes,  their  attention  is  fixed  on  the 
enemy  in  front,  and  it  is  impossible  for 
them  to  keep  themselves  informed  of  the 
progress  of  the  casualty  roll  in  rear ;  the 
man  who  commands  them  one  minute  is 
struck  down  the  next,  and  there  is  nothing 
left  for  them  to  do  but  to  join  on  to  the 
first  rush,  from  either  flank,  whose  impulse 
reaches  them,  or  to  follow  the  first  officer 
who  will  lead  them. 

In  moments  of  intense  excitements  and 
danger,  the  mass  of  mankind,  whether 
civilians  or  soldiers,  recognise  a  leader  by 
instinct,  whether  they  have  ever  seen  him 
before  or  not ;  and,  up  to  a  certain  point, 
as  long  as  an  officer  is  willing  to  lead, 
he  may  rely  on  the  men  following  him, 


250      Attack  Formation  for  Infantry. 

no    matter    what    company    he   may   be- 
long to. 

Let  us  now  examine  the  bearing  of  the 
above  on  the  tactical  training  of  the  men 
in  peace.  It  will  be  necessary  to  make  a 
clear  and  marked  distinction  between  the 
skirmishing  attack  of  an  advance  guard  or 
demonstrating  body,  and  the  decisive  as- 
sault by  which  a  battle  is  to  be  won.  For 
the  former,  good  shooting  and  skill  in 
taking  advantage  of  cover  are  the  chief 
essentials  ;  for  the  latter,  rigid  discipline, 
a  discipline  strong  enough  to  enable  troops 
to  face  the  unavoidable  heavy  loss,  with- 
out thought  of  cover  on  the  part  of  the 
individual. 

The  idea  of  drilling  men  like  machines 
can  no  longer  be  entertained  ;  neither  can 
we  meet  the  difficulty  by  reverting  to  the 
old  distinctions  between  troops  of  the  line 
and  light  infantry.  We  can  only  succeed 
by  teaching  the  men  in  the  school-room 
the  conditions  on  which  success  depends, 
and  then  by  impressing  it  on  them  by 


Attack  Formation  for  Infantry.      251 

making  a  sharp  distinction  on  the  parade- 
ground  between  the  two  methods.  It  is 
in  this  point  that  our  drill  regulations 
principally  fail. 

The  attempt  to  adapt  the  old  skirmish- 
ing drill  of  the  peninsula  to  the  modern 
attack  formation  necessarily  failed,  for  it 
was  an  effort  to  reconcile  two  totally  oppo- 
site conditions,  and  it  struck  at  discipline 
precisely  where  it  was  most  important.  The 
object  in  view  in  drilling  men  is  not 
merely  to  ensure  the  execution  of  certain 
formal  movements  on  parade  under  favour- 
able conditions,  but  to  give  them  true 
discipline,  i.e.,  the  spirit  to  face  heavy  loss 
without  flinching — the  one  thing,  in  fact, 
which  constitutes  the  superiorty  of  a  body 
of  soldiers  over  an  armed  rabble. 

But  our  practice  in  peace  practically  ig- 
nores this,  for  it  sanctions  the  relaxation  of 
discipline  at  the  very  moment  when,  on  the 
battlefield,  the  necessity  of  it  is  most  felt. 
On  the  caution  to  extend  for  attack,  the  offi- 
cers return  swords,  the  men  stand  at  ease 


252      Attack  Formation  for  Infantry. 

without  word  of  command,  and  henceforth 
the  movements  are  made  without  attention 
to  either  step,  dressing  (or  even  silence  some- 
times) ;  in  fact,  the  whole  thing  bears  the 
stamp  of  slackness  upon  it. 

In  Germany,  on  the  other  hand,  the  prac- 
tice is  exactly  reversed  ;  when  the  signal 
to  advance  to  the  attack  is  given,  all  troops 
behind  the  fighting-line  are  called  to 
attention,  and  the  advance  is  made  "  in 
Parade  Schritt,"  with  drums  beating  and 
colours  flying.* 

This  may  be  considered  as  going  too  far 

*  Till  quite  recently,  with  fixed  bayonets  as  well ;  but  I 
believe  that  order  has  since  been  cancelled,  though  it  still 
has  many  supporters.  The  fixed  bayonet  was  the  outward 
visible  sign  of  the  inward  determination  to  come  to  close 
quarters.  It  is  true  that  it  interfered  with  the  accuracy  of 
the  shooting  ;  but  as  that  was  always  out  of  the  question 
in  the  excitement  of  the  decision,  the  loss  was  not  serious. 
But  if  the  bayonet  was  fixed  on  the  rifle  in  the  sensible 
manner  adopted  by  the  Turks,  viz.,  under,  not  on  one  side 
of  the  barrel,  the  shooting  would  be  absolutely  improved, 
for  the  weight  of  the  bayonet  corrects  the  tendency  of 
excited  men  to  fire  high.  In  fact,  the  Turkish  rifle  with 
fixed  bayonet  comes  up  to  the  shoulder  so  readily  that  one 
might  snap  shoot  with  it  just  as  well  as  with  a  shot  gun. 


Attack  Formation  for  Infantry.      253 

in  the  opposite  direction  ;  but  the  principle 
is  undeniably  sound,  viz.,  of  fixing  the 
men's  attention  by  compelling  them  to 
attempt  a  difficult  thing,  so  that  their 
minds  are  not  so  open  to  receive  other 
impression  ;  it  is  by  no  means  an  unheard- 
of  expedient  for  steadying  wavering 
troops,  to  halt  them  under  fire  and  put 
them  through  the  manual  ;  and  the  idea, 
in  both  cases,  is  the  same. 

There  is,  in  fact,  a  close  analogy  between 
drill  and  mesmerism  ;  in  both  cases  the 
patients  resign  their  wills  into  the  hand  of 
the  operator,  and  in  both  cases,  ultimately, 
the  will  of  the  operator  or  commander 
becomes  stronger  that  the  natural  disincli- 
nation of  the  subjects  to  do  what  is 
required  of  them. 

This  explains  why  men  will  always  drill 
better  under  an  officer  whom  they  feel  is 
in  earnest,  than  for  one  whom  they  know 
to  be  taking  no  interest  in  it. 

A  horse  is,  in  fact,  even  more  susceptible 
of  discipline  than  a  man ;  for,  though 


254      Attack  Formation  for  Infantry. 

naturally  far  more  timid  than  man,  when 
once  thoroughly  trained,  even  when  de- 
prived of  his  rider,  he  will  keep  his  place 
in  the  ranks,  in  spite  of  the  dangers  which 
surround  him. 

It  is  this  that  renders  steady  drill  all  im- 
portant, as  it  enables  us  to  overcome  the  na- 
tural instinct  of  self-preservation,  and  makes 
it  easier  for  men  to  obey  the  will  of  another 
than  to  make  up  their  minds  to  run  away. 

The  necessity  of  such  drill  is  greater 
now,  perhaps,  than  at  any  former  time  ; 
for  the  mental  strain  occasioned  by  a 
breech-loading  fire  is  far  heavier  and  of 
longer  duration  than  that  produced  by  the 
muzzle-loader. 

At  this  point  the  opinion  of  those  officers, 
whether  French,  German,  Austrian,  or 
Russian,  who  have  fought  against  both  is 
unanimous ;  and  since  we  ourselves  have 
never  had  to  fight  a  battle  against  well- 
trained  troops  armed  with  breech-loaders, 
we  must  of  necessity  be  guided  in  this 
matter  by  those  who  have. 


Attack  Formation  for  Infantry.      255 

If,  then,  in  the  days  of  Brown  Bess,  the 
utmost  discipline  was  considered  necessary 
to  enable  a  line  to  advance  through  a  zone 
of  fire  barely  150  paces  in  depth,  how 
much  more,  therefore,  is  it  now  required, 
when  the  new  arms  have  multiplied  this 
zone  of  danger  by  ten  ! 

Troops  no  longer  fight  in  line,  it  is  true ; 
but,  to  bring  them  up  to  the  shooting  line 
they  must  all  pass  over  a  fire-swept  space, 
either  in  line  or  in  a  formation  in  which 
the  maintenance  of  discipline  is  even  more 
requisite,  and  at  the  same  time  more  diffi- 
cult. 

The  changes  we  require  are  simple. 
Drill  must  cease  to  be  looked  on  merely  as 
a  means  of  securing  a  good  march  past ;  * 
but  it  must  be  fully  recognised  as  the 
method  by  which  men  are  enabled  to 
conquer  their  natural  aversion  to  danger  ; 
and  to  mark  this  idea  the  utmost  smartness 
should  be  insisted  on  in  the  attack. 

*  But  a  good  march  past  will  be  the  inevitable  result 
of  steady  drill. 


256      Attack  Formation  for  Infantry. 

Hardly  more  than  a  word  requires  to  be 
altered  in  the  drill-book,  though  the  spirit 
in  which  it  is  interpreted  must  be  changed. 
But  to  grasp  the  spirit  is  just  the  difficulty, 
for  it  is  entirely  opposed  to  the  tactical 
teaching  which  the  bulk  of  the  army  has 
been  compelled  to  absorb  in  the  struggle 
of  its  members  for  promotion. 

We  have  been  examined  in  minor  tactics 
till  our  intellects  appear  to  have  become 
dwarfed  and  our  judgment  distorted. 
"We  cannot  see  the  wood  for  the  trees.  " 
No  doubt  the  knowledge  we  have  thus 
acquired  may  prove  most  useful  when 
applied  in  its  proper  place  ;  but  its  proper 
place  is  not  the  battle-field,  and  it  is  only 
on  battle-fields  that  the  fate  of  an  Empire 
can  be  decided. 


GERMAN  EQUIPMENT. 

Darmstadt,  May  30,  1886. 

CONSERVATISM    is  unquestionably  a 

\J     good  thing  in  itself,   but  it  is  possible 

to  have  even  a  little  too  much  of  it,  and 

this  is  certainly  the  case  in  matters  military. 

It  will  no  doubt  be  still  in  the  memory  of 

most  of  your  readers  that  about  two  years 

ago  the  German  Government  offered  prizes 

for  new  patterns  of  infantry  equipment,  new 

boots,   new  knapsacks,   new  helmets,   &c. 

These  new  patterns  are  now  in  course  of 

being  tried,  a  company  of  infantry  in  each 

corps  being  furnished  with  them,  and  these 

companies  are  now  executing  trial  marches 

through  all  the  large  garrisons.     I  have  not 

myself  had  the  good  fortune  to  meet  one 

yet,  but  have  picked  up  some  information 

concerning  them  from  officers  I  have  met. 

To  begin  with  the  boots,  it  is  well  known 

that  the  German  infantry  boot  is,  aud  has 

*.,  L,  17 


258  German  Equipment. 

been  for  centuries  almost,  a  loose-fitting 
Wellington  boot,  so  loose,  in  fact,  that  one 
can  see  the  man's  foot  working  about  in  it 
as  he  marches,  and  it  is  almost  impossible 
to  understand  how  he  gets  about  in  it  at 
all.  In  the  Eastern  corps,  a  greased  linen 
rag  is  worn,  twisted  round  the  foot  instead  • 
of  a  sock  ;  but  in  the  Western  and  Southern 
ones  an  ordinary  woollen  sock  is  used.  It 
is  said,  though  with  what  degree  of 
accuracy  I  do  not  know,  that  this  boot  sent 
42,000  men  into  hospital  in  1870  with  sore 
heels,  and  yet  in  the  new  equipment  it  is  to 
be  retained,  with  only  slight  alteration.  It 
appears  that  they  have  tried  our  lace  boot 
and  gaiters,  but  do  not  consider  it  practical  ; 
yet  I  have  never  heard  a  word  against  it 
in  our  own  service,  and  it  has  surely  had 
trial  enough  in  the  field  during  the  last 
10  years.  The  new  knapsack,  too,  is  still  to 
be  carried  on  the  shoulders,  the  chief  altera- 
tion having  been  to  divide  into  it  two  por- 
tions horizontally,  the  upper  half  containing 
absolute  necessaries  and  the  remainder 


German  Equipment.  259 

of  the  ammunition  not  carried  in  the  ball- 
pouches  ;  and  the  lower,  things  which  can 
be  dispensed  with  for  a  day  or  two,  so 
that  on  going  into  action  it  can  be  left 
behind  to  be  brought  on  with  the  company 
waggons.  In  the  new  equipment  120  rounds 
per  man  will  be  carried,  30  in  each  of  the 
two  ball-pouches  worn  in  front  on  the  belt, 
and  60  more  in  two  packets  fastened  one 
on  each  side  of  the  knapsack  in  a  more 
easily  accessible  position  than  formerly. 
The  great-coat  will  still  be  worn  en 
bandouliere,  though  that  arrangement  hin- 
ders the  man  in  the  use  of  the  rifle,  and 
renders  his  position  when  lying  down  far 
from  comfortable.  Entrenching  tools  will 
be  carried  as  at  present  by  25  per  cent,  of 
the  men  only,  an  inconvenient  plan,  for,  in 
the  first  place,  when  it  is  necessary  to 
entrench  there  is  work  for  more  than  that 
proportion  of  the  men  ;  and,  secondly,  you 
cannot  rely  on  the  enemies'  bullets  ob- 
serving the  proportions  sufficiently  accurate- 
ly, hence  after  every  engagement,  a  re- 


260  German  Equipment. 

distribution  of  the  tools  must  take  place  ; 
and  since,  when  fighting  is  taking  place 
almost  daily,  it  is  almost  impossible  to  keep 
written  lists  showing  the  exact  distribution 
of  tools  to  the  men,  you  soon  lose  all  check 
over  them,  and  can  no  longer  prevent  a 
man  throwing  his  shovel  or  pick  away  if 
he  finds  it  inconvenient,  for  it  is  almost 
impossible  to  prove  whether  he  ever  had 
it  or  not.  There  is  another  point  about 
the  ball-pouch  worthy  of  note.  It  is  a 
black  pouch  fitted  to  take  30  cartridges, 
each  kept  tight  in  its  place  by  a  leather 
division.  Instead  of  opening  upwards, 
like  ours,  the  lid  falls  downwards  ;  hence, 
when  standing  or  kneeling,  if  it  is  neces- 
sary to  get  off  a  number  of  rounds  quick- 
ly as  is  the  case  when  receiving  cavalry, 
for  instance,  the  cartridges  are  all  ready  to 
the  man's  hand,  and  he  can  fire  almost  as 
quickly  as  with  the  quick-loader.  Every- 
body knows  what  happens  with  our  own 
pouches.  The  lid  being  pretty  stiff  snaps 
back  immediately  one  takes  a  cartridge 


German  Equipment.  261 

out.  The  cartridges  being  all  loose  gener- 
ally shake  down  (as  soon  as  there  is  room) 
to  the  very  bottom  of  the  pouch,  where, 
without  very  long  fingers,  they  are  difficult 
to  get  at.  It  is  almost  impossible  to  see 
into  the  case,  so  that,  when  a  little  excited 
a  man  is  as  apt  to  fish  out  a  jag,  or  a  snap- 
cap,  or  something  of  the  kind  instead  of 
a  cartridge  ;  in  fact,  taking  it  all  round, 
it  is  as  bad  an  invention  as  the  ingenuity 
of  man  could  devise.  The  battalion  quar- 
tered here  is  one  of  those  served  out  with 
the  new  magazine-rifle,  which  it  has  now 
had  about  two  years.  Of  course,  the  fiction 
of  secrecy  has  to  be  observed.  I  call  it 
fiction,  for  since  a  Frenchman  in  Berlin 
stole  one  of  these  rifles  out  of  the  arm-rack 
of  a  guard-house,  and  sent  it  to  Paris,  all 
hope  of  keeping  its  construction  secret 
terminated.  In  outward  appearance  it  is 
very  similar  to  the  Mauser  ;  it  can  be  used 
either  for  single  shots  or  as  a  magazine* 
rifle.  How  long  it  takes  to  reload  the 
magazine  I  have  been  unable  to  learn.  The 


262  German  Equipment. 

magazine  is  said  to  lie  under  the  barrel,  an 
objectionable  arrangement  for  two  reasons  ; 
for,  in  the  first  place,  the  balance  of  the 
weapon  is  altered  with  every  shot  ;  and  in 
the  second,  the  intense  heating  and  concus- 
sion due  to  rapid  firing  are  apt  to  cause 
unpleasant  chemical  disturbances  in  the 
detonating  compounds  used  in  the  cap, 
and  a  few  accidents  would  soon  disturb 
the  confidence  of  the  troops  in  their  weapon. 
A  new  bayonet  is  also  being  tried  with  this 
rifle.  It  is  not  more  than  11  in.  long, 
and  is,  in  fact,  exactly  like  the  ordinary 
hunting-knife,  made  with  a  socket  to  fit  on 
to  the  barrel,  and  is  in  every  way  a  more 
sensible  arrangement  than  the  long  skewer- 
like  affair  we  carry,  too  weak  to  stand  the 
strain  of  running  a  man  through.  Few 
men  are  deeper  through  the  body  than  10 
in.,  and  it  is  unnecessary  to  burden  every 
man  in  the  army  with  a  needlessly  heavy 
weapon  in  order  to  deal  with  the  few  cases 
of  exceptional  waist  measurement  we  some- 
times come  across.  The  length  of  the 


German  Equipment.  263 

bayonet  has  really  little  to  do  with  the 
matter,  for  once  the  thurst  parried,  the 
shortest  sword  can  get  in  ;  but  it  is  curious 
that,  while  they  were  about  the  question, 
the  Turkish  method  of  fixing  it  underneath, 
instead  of  to  one  side  of  the  barrel,  did  not 
strike  them.  The  only  reason  why  the 
bayonet  should  be  fixed  to  one  side,  and 
not  below  the  barrel,  is  because,  in  the 
old  muzzle-loading  days,  the  latter  position 
would  have  interfered  with  the  use  of  the 
ramrod,  an  implement  which  is  never  re- 
quired (except  for  cleaning  purposes),  un- 
less the  breech  action,  like  ours,  is  liable  to 
jam,  and  there  is  no  reason  now-a-days 
why  any  nation  should  be  content  with  one 
that  does,  for  there  are  at  least  half-a-dozen 
which  cannot  do  so.  But  the  advantages 
of  having  the  bayonet  underneath  the  bar- 
rel are  obvious.  In  the  first  place,  the  rifle 
has  no  tendency  to  turn  sideways  when 
brought  to  the  shoulder  ;  and  in  the  second, 
the  additional  weight  counteracts  the  incli- 
nation a  man  feels  to  shoot  in  the  air  when 


264  German  Equipment. 

excited.  Indeed,  the  extra  preponderance 
given  by  the  bayonet  makes  the  rifle  come 
up  to  the  shoulder  almost  like  a  shot-gun. 
It  may  be  said  that  the  bayonet  is  of  so 
little  importance  at  present,  that  it  is  quite 
immaterial  how  it  is  fixed  ;  but  this  has  by 
no  means  been  our  own  experience  in  the 
Cape  or  Afghanistan,  nor  that  of  the  Ger- 
mans either.  In  nearly  every  village  or 
redoubt  that  is  carried  a  few  desperate  men 
always  hold  out  and  since  in  the  excite- 
ment of  the  attack  the  men  generally  forget 
to  fix  them,  the  butt  is  invariably  used. 
After  the  assault  of  the  Diippel  entrench- 
ments in  1864  there  was  hardly  an  un- 
broken rifle  left  in  those  regiments  of  the 
Prussian  Guard  that  took  part  in  the  as- 
sault, all  the  butts  nearly  were  broken.  I 
find  a  strong  feeling  amongst  Prussian 
officers  that  bayonets  should  be  fixed  before 
the  advance  from  the  preparatory  range  in 
the  attack,  say  600  yards,  commences,  for  the 
fixed  bayonet  appeals  to  the  moral  of  the 
troops ;  it  is,  in  fact,  the  outward  visible  sign 


German  Equipment.  265 

of  the  inward  determination  to  close  with  the 
enemy  ;  as  for  the  objection  that  its  vibra- 
tion interferes  with  the  shooting-,  it  is  too 
trivial  for  notice  almost,  for  owing  to  the 
excitement  produced  by  danger,  and  the 
unsteadiness  due  to  the  physical  exertion 
of  the  running  forward  by  rushes,  the  exe- 
cution done  by  the  advancing  echelons  in 
covering  the  300  or  400  yards  between  the 
limits  of  the  zone  of  preparation  and  that 
of  decision,  is  too  small  to  be  worth  consi- 
deration, the  real  object  of  advancing  by 
rushes  at  all  is  to  prevent  the  enemy  show- 
ing their  heads  out  of  cover  by  filling  the 
air  with  bullets,  to  unsettle  his  aim  by  dis- 
tracting his  attention  first  to  one  body, 
then  to  the  other,  and  to  encourage  your 
own  troops  by  the  noise  of  their  own  fir- 
ing. One  word  more  about  the  physical 
endurance  of  the  German  troops;  in  spite 
of  all  the  disadvantages  of  bad  boots,  heavy 
knapsack,  and  heavy  clothing,  they  manage 
to  get  through  an  amount  of  work  really 
astonishing  to  an  Englishman ;  at  Mainz 


266  German  Equipment. 

the  "  Grosser  Sand,"  as  the  drill-ground 
is  called,  is  nearly  five  miles  from  the 
quarters  of  some  of  the  regiments  ;  they 
parade  about  5-30  A.M.,  almost  always  in 
inarching  order,  reach  the  drill -ground  in 
about  an  hour  and  three-quarters,  and  drill 
steadily  in  deep,  heavy  sand,  far  worse  than 
the  sand  of  the  Long  Valley,  for  a  couple 
of  hours,  and  then  march  back  again,  reach- 
ing their  barracks  about  11.  They  dine  at 
12,  and  then  spend  the  afternoon  either  on 
the  range  or  at  gymnastics,  and  rarely  get 
done  with  their  work  till  6  o'clock  ;  and 
then  in  the  evening  they  are  to  be  seen 
about  the  streets,  looking  as  fresh  as  our 
own  men  who  have  done  about  half  the 
work.  The  natural  consequence  is  that 
they  look  very  healthy  ;  none  but  sound 
men  could  stand  the  work  ;  and  thinking 
that  though  the  men  on  parade  looked  sound 
enough,  the  hospitals  might  tell  a  different 
tale,  I  inquired  what  was  the  percentage 
of  sick  on  an  average,  and  was  astonished 
to  find  that  it  barely  reached  2  per  cent., 


German  Equipment.  267 

though  Mainz  was  an  exceptionally  un- 
favourable quarter  to  take,  since  the  men 
overheated  themselves  so  much  on  the  drill- 
ground,  and  were  consequently  more  liable 
to  chills  when  marching  back  in  the  teeth 
of  the  north-easters,  which  draw  through 
the  gap  between  the  Taunus  and  the  hills 
on  the  right  bank  of  the  Maine  with  excep- 
tional violence. 


GERMAN  MUSKETRY. 
A  RECENT  article  in  a  contemporary, 
•£*-  entitled" the  Science  of  Musketry/' 
displays  such  a  complete  misapprehension  of 
the  principles  taught  in  the  German  Army, 
that  we  think  it  in  the  interests  of  the  ser- 
vice to  show  the  true  points  of  difference 
which  exist  between  our  own  and  the  Ger- 
man system.  Briefly  stated,  the  position 
taken  in  the  article  in  question  was  as 
follows.  The  Germans,  remembering  the 
heavy  losses  sustained  by  their  own  and 
the  Russian  troops  in  recent  campaigns 
from  unaimed  fire  at  long  ranges,  now  go 
in  for  quantity  not  quality  of  fire.  We,  on 
the  contrary,  try  to  make  up  by  quality 
what  we  should  lose  in  quantity  from  want 
of  numbers.  The  actual  fact  is,  however, 
that  the  Germans  in  spite  of  their  admitted- 
ly heavy  losses  from  the  above  mentioned 
causes,  believe  less  in  long  range  "  quan- 
tity'7 fire,  than  any  other  nation  in  Europe, 


German  Musketry.  269 

ourselves  included.  Their  fundamental 
principle  is,  that  battles  are  won  by  the 
steadily  delivered  fire  of  the  masses  at  de- 
cisive ranges  a  very  different  thing  from 
the  mere  quantity  fire  of  our  writer.  They 
point  out  that,  though  long  range  fire  un- 
doubtedly has,  on  occasion,  inflicted  severe 
loss,  yet  the  loss  has  never  been  decisive  ; 
it  has  occurred  more  or  less  gradually,  and 
even  then  has  been  out  of  all  comparison 
to  the  number  of  rounds  expended  :  where- 
as, even  in  the  old  smooth  bore  days,  fire 
withheld  till  the  last  moment,  say  50  to  60 
yards,  has  frequently  proved  instantaneous- 
ly decisive ;  having  destroyed,  in  fact, 
two-thirds  of  the  opposing  force.  Our  own 
Peninsula  experience  exactly  tallies  with 
that  of  the  Germans.  If  space  permitted, 
we  could  give  a  dozen  examples,  both  from 
our  own  and  German  experience,  in  which 
a  single  volley,  at  point  blank  range,  has 
resulted  in  almost  the  complete  destruc- 
tion of  the  attacking  enemy  ;  and  we 
would  specially  direct  the  attention  of  those 


270  German  Musketry. 

officers  who  may  be    exposed  to  the  rushes 
of  Afghans  or  Arabs  to  this  fact. 

But  against  a  foe  armed  with  breech- 
loaders, such  a  retention  of  fire  becomes 
practically  an  impossibility.  The  enemy's 
aim  must  be  shaken  by  our  own  bullets 
whistling  overhead  ;  and  besides,  up  to  date, 
it  has  been  found  that  human  nerves  are 
too  weak  for  men  to  advance  against  the 
leaden  hail  of  the  breech-loader,  unless  en- 
couraged to  do  so  by  the  sound  of  their  own 
firing.  If  the  right  to  fire  is  not  conceded 
to  the  men,  they  will  take  the  law  into 
their  own  hands,  and  return  the  fire  with- 
out orders.  We  use  the  words  "leaden 
hail "  advisedly,  for  they  are  those  instinc- 
tively used  by  all  who  have  faced  it.  Thus 
an  eye-witness  of  the  charge  of  Bonnemain's 
Cuirassiers  at  Woerth  said  he  could  de- 
scribe the  sound  of  the  bullets  striking 
the  cuirasses,  as  like  nothing  else  except 
the  sound'  of  hail  on  a  window  pane. 
Another  officer  of  the  Prussian  Guard  used 
similar  words,  to  describe  the  rattle  of  the 


German  Musketry.  271 

bullets  on  the  hard  ground  in  front.     The 
dust   thrown   up    formed   a    dense    cloud 
through   which   they   could   not   see  fifty 
yards  ahead.     Hence  the  Germans  are  com- 
pelled to   admit  the  use   of  long  range  fire 
in  return,  but  they  regard  it  as  an  evil,  and 
restrict  its  employment  by  strict  conditions, 
so  as  to  reserve  as   much  as  possible  their 
true  massed  fire   for  the   shorter   and  de- 
cisive ranges.     It  is   to  these   latter  that 
the  chief  care  of  the  instructors  is  reserved. 
The  regulations   point    out    that,  though 
every   man  cannot   be  taught   to  shoot  at 
long  distances,  every  man  who  passes  the 
physical  test   for  admission   into  the  army, 
can  be  taught  to  shoot  fairly   well  at  short 
ones  ;  and  hence  no  man  should  be  allowed 
to   attempt  long   ranges   till  he  can  shoot 
well  up   to  about    2 — 300   yards,   i.e.,  the 
point  blank  range  of  the  rifle.   Discipline  and 
drill  will  habituate  him  to  bring  up  his  rifle 
horizontally,    and  if  he  can   get  direction, 
the  flat  trajectory  will  do  the  rest  for   him. 
This  is  the  origin  of  their  being  taught  al- 


272  German  Musketry. 

ways  to  aim  at  the  lowest  point  of  the 
enemy  visible — the  universal  practice  up 
till  April  last  year,  when  it  was  partially 
altered  and  brought  more  in  conformity 
with  our  own  method. 

The  next  great  point  of  difference  be- 
tween our  system  and  theirs  is,  that  they 
consider  accurate  shooting  in  the  field  more 
a  question  of  morale  than  of  practice.  They 
maintain  that  imminent  danger  will  un- 
settle the  nerves  of  the  most  accurate  shot, 
unless  those  nerves  are  steadied  by  the 
controlling  influence  of  discipline.  Our 
recent  experiences  against  badly  armed 
savage  troops  has  caused  us  to  under-rate, 
far  too  much,  the  unsteadying  effect  of  a 
well  aimed  fire,  at  least  in  this  particu- 
lar connection.  In  regard  to  tactical  for- 
mations, we  over-rate  it  far  too  much.  With 
the  Grerman,  the  idea  of  discipline  is  that 
of  a  controlling  moral  force  stronger  than 
the  natural  fear  of  danger  inherent  in  man. 
To  steady  their  men  Avhen  shaken,  Ger- 
man officers  would  halt  and  put  them 


German  Musketry.  273 

through  the  Manual  under  fire.  Thus,  at 
Vionville,  when  Rauch's  Cavalry  Brigade, 
in  advancing  to  charge  French  Infantry, 
lost  their  intervals  owing  to  the  pressure  of 
other  troops  on  the  right,  the  late  Gene- 
ral Von  Schmidt  halted  the  Brigade  under 
severe  infantry  and  artillery  fire,  and  made 
them  correct  their  intervals  by  closing, 
then  went  "  threes  about/7  and  walked  his 
command  back  under  cover.  We  believe 
that  such  a  feat  could  not  possibly  have 
been  executed  by  any  body  of  individually 
brave  men  uncemented  by  discipline,  and 
no  mere-  barrack  room  discipline  would 
have  done  it  either.  The  word,  in  fact,  has 
almost  lost  its  meaning  in  England  ;  and 
yet  it  is  not  eighty  years  ago  since  this 
very  discipline  made  our  thin  red  line  the 
terror  of  the  French  column  of  attack. 

In  Germany,  discipline  and  drill  go  hand 
in  hand,  for  both  are  taught  by  the  same 
instructor,  viz.,  the  company  commander. 
Germany  never  suffered  from  Musketry  In- 
structors, for  every  Captain  was  made  fit 

M.,  L.  18 


274  German  Musketry. 

to  train  his  own  men  ;  and  if  he  could 
not  or  would  not  learn,  then  the  so-called 
"blue  letter7'  politely  requested  him  to 
make  room  for  somebody  who  would.  It 
is  true  that  great  results  did  not  immediate- 
ly flow  from  the  abolition  of  Musketry 
Instructors  in  our  own  service  :  but  this 
has  simply  been  due  to  the  fact  that  you 
cannot,  by  the  mere  stroke  of  a  pen,  change 
habits  of  long  growth,  and  military  habits 
form  no  exception  to  the  general  rule. 
The  German  musketry  system  is  far  more 
perfect  to-day  than  it  was  in  1870 ;  yet  the 
results  obtained,  even  then,  on  the  battle- 
field have  perhaps  rarely  been  surpassed. 
We  give  only  one  example  from  Prince 
Hohenlohe's  work,*  but  one  which  shows 
especially  the  ideas  on  fire  tactics  current 
in  the  German  army  : — 

"  We  were  in  position  to  the  east  of  Gar- 
enne,  fronting  west.  In  front  of  Haybes 
lay  two  companies  of  the  Kaiser  Franz 

*  NOTE. — Briefe   uber   infant! ve   by    Priuxa,    Kraft  v. 
Hohenlobe  myelfiugen. 


German  Musketry.  275 

Regiment,  extended  in  a  single  skirmish- 
ing line.  The  enemy's  artillery  fire  was 
practically  silenced.  Suddenly  out  of  the 
hollow  which  runs  from  the  southern  edge 
of  the  Bois  de  la  Grarenne,  a  dense  infantry 
mass  appeared,  bearing  down  on  the  above- 
mentioned  two  companies  at  a  run.  I  esti- 
mated it  about  5,000  to  6,000  men.  This 
dense  mass  came  on  firing  as  it  ran,  from 
the  rifles  held  horizontally  at  the  hip.  Al- 
though I  at  once  turned  the  full  fire  of  my 
90  guns  on  to  it,  I  felt  extremely  anxious 
for  the  two  companies  ;  for  if  the  enemy 
succeeded  in  getting  within  200  yards  of 
them,  the  fire  on  the  head  of  the  mass  would 
be  masked.  And  though  the  bursting  shells 
created  an  appalling  havoc,  it  still  came 
on  with  the  fury  of  despair.  Presently  I 
had  to  cease  firing  at  the  head  of  the  col- 
umn, which  broke  away  from  the  main 
body  and  bore  down  on  the  two  companies. 
I  turned  my  telescope  on  to  them  ;  and  in 
contrast  to  the  dense  smoke  of  the  French, 
I  saw  only  here  and  there  puffs  of  smoke 


276  German  Musketry. 

from  our  line,  the  whole  of  which  was  ly- 
ing flat  on  the  ground,  rifles  at  the  present. 
Only  the  Captain  walked  slowly  up  and 
down  the  line,  warning  his  men  to  shoot 
steadily  and  slowly.  But  every  shot  drop- 
ped its  man,  and  the  number  of  the  advanc- 
ing foes  became  sensibly  smaller.  Individu- 
als succeeded  in  reaching  our  line,  only  to 
fall  at  the  muzzles  of  the  rifles  ;  and  the 
attack,  so  desperately  carried  out,  burnt 
itself  out.  Only  a  few  survivors  turned  to 
run,  and  these  were  soon  bowled  over  by  our 
pursuing  fire  j  in  ten  minutes,  the  whole 
mass  was  destroyed.  Assuming  that  half 
of  the  column  was  destroyed  by  artillery, 
yet  the  odds  were  still  nearly  as  ten  to  one/' 
Can  England  parallel  the  above,  with  an 
instance  from  our  recent  wars  ?  We  fear 
not  ;  and  if  not,  then,  since  our  arms  are  far 
superior  to  the  needle  gun,  and  our  men 
and  officers  at  least  as  good,  if  not  consider- 
ably better,  it  follows  necessarily  that  our 
system  is  inferior  to  theirs. 


LOSSES  IN  BATTLE. 

IN  military  science,  just  as  in  other  sciences 
accurate  data  are  essential  to  the  for- 
mation of  sound  opinions  ;  yet  perhaps 
nowhere  is  this  necessity  more  frequently 
disregarded.  Regularly  every  year  half  a 
dozen  new  schemes  of  attack  make  their 
appearance  in  print,  and  practically  every 
one  of  them  commences,  or  at  any  rate 
alludes  to  the  celebrated  attack  of  the 
Prussian  Guard  at  St.  Privat,  in  some  such 
terras  as  the  following,  "  the  unprecedented- 
ly  heavy  loss  of  6,000  men  out  of  18,000  in 
ten  minutes,  proved,  once  and  for  all,  the 
impossibility  of  approaching  an  enemy's 
position  in  anything  but  extended  order  ;" 
or  words  to  this  effect.  The  writer  pro- 
bably remembers  having  heard  the  expres- 
sion used  in  some  lecture  on  tactics  at 
Sandhurst  or  Woolwich,  and  is  quite  con- 
tented to  take  it  as  a  gospel  truth,  and  on 
the  strength  of  it  to  propose  the  abolition 


278  Losses  in  Battle. 

of  whatever  does  not  happen  to  suit  his 
doctrine.  It  was  on  evidence  such  as  this, 
that  the  good  old  British  line  was  con- 
demned, and  in  its  stead  the  present  hy- 
brid skirmishing  attack,  the  laughing-stock 
of  half  Europe,  was  introduced.  But  a  re- 
ference to  the  official  account  of  the  battle, 
and  the  lists  of  killed  and  wounded  therein, 
would  have  shewn  our  writers,  that  the 
statement  is  actually  incorrect,  and  the  con- 
clusion drawn  from  it  at  least  equally  so. 

The  story  of  the  battle,  according  to  the 
Prussian  official  record,  is  briefly  this. 
About  5  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  the  IXth 
corps  (next  on  the  right  of  the  Guards) 
was  being  hardly  pressed,  and  to  relieve 
this  pressure,  Prince  August  von  Wurtem- 
berg  ordered,  after  seeking  the  concur- 
rence of  the  Commander-in- Chief,  the  two 
divisional  commanders  to  attack  the  enemy. 
The  troops  had  hardly  moved  off,  when  it 
was  pointed  out  to  the  Prince  that  the 
greater  portion  of  the  Saxons  were  not  in 
sight,  and  that  the  artillery  had  not  been 


Losses  in  Battle.  279 

allowed  time  enough  for  preparation  ;  but 
the  troops  being  in  motion,  the  orders  pre- 
viously given  were  adhered  to.  The  first 
troops  to  commence  the  attack  were  the 
4th  Griiard  Brigade,  consisting  of,  in  all, 
26  companies,  or  about  5,500  men,  "  de- 
ployed in  two  lines  with  skirmishers  in  ad- 
vance." Even  during  its  deployment  at 
St.  Ail,  it  was  overwhelmed  by  a  shower 
of  bullets  ;  and  almost  immediately  after- 
wards it  broke  into  skirmishers  and  advanc- 
ed by  rushes.  The  attack  came  to  a  stand- 
still about  600  paces  from  the  enemy  ;  but 
the  men  held  their  ground  and  did  not 
retire.  They  lay  out  in  the  open  till  the 
final  advance,  which  took  place  some  two 
hours  later,  repulsing  with  the  aid  of  the 
Artillery  fire,  the  counter  attack  of  the  ene- 
my's masses,  when  the  final  attack  took  place, 
they  accompanied  it,  and  continued  fight- 
ing till  far  on  into  the  night.  Meanwhile 
the  1st  Guard  Brigade  (about  5,000  strong) 
had  advanced  from  its  position,  south-west 
of  St.  Marie  aux  Chenes,  still  preserving 


280  Losses  in  Battle. 

its  rendezvous  formation,  viz.,  three  lines 
of  company  columns,  about  120  yards 
apart,  and  proceeded  to  change  direction 
to  the  left  under  a  perfect  rain  of  chassepot 
bullets.  It  then  crossed  the  high  road, 
and  continued  to  gain  ground  to  the  left  ; 
but  the  fire  proved  more  than  it  could  bear, 
the  rear  of  the  column  pressed  on  the  front, 
and  its  change  of  front  to  the  right  does 
not  appear  to  have  been  made  as  on  parade. 
The  attack,  so  disastrously  begun,  was 
pushed  on  with  great  courage,  till  within 
some  six  hundred  yards  of  the  enemy, 
where  its  momentum  died  out  ;  and  like 
the  4th  Brigade  on  its  right,  it  lay  down 
and  held  its  own  till  the  subsequent  rush 
carried  it  on  some  two  hours  later.  From 
the  commencement  of  the  movement,  till 
the  advance  died  out,  about  half-an-hour 
had  elapsed.  Now,  referring  to  the  talk  of 
losses,  we  find  that  the  1st  Guard  Brigade 
lost  altogether,  during  the  whole  day's 
fighting,  72  officers  and  2,100  men  ;  the 
4th  Brigade  almost  exactly  the  same  nuin- 


Losses  in  Battle.  281 

ber;  or  a  fraction  over  30  per  cent,  of 
their  respective  strengths,  in  an  action 
which  lasted  at  least  three,  hours-and-a-half. 
Even  if  we  assume  half  of  the  whole  loss 
to  have  been  suffered  in  the  first  half  hour, 
"the  6,000  out  of  18,000  in  ten  minutes" 
is  reduced  to  2,000  out  of  10,000  in  half 
an  hour  ;  a  very  different  state  of  things. 

It  is  doubtful  whether  a  single  rule  can 
be  deduced  from  this  experience,  which  was 
not  perfectly  well  known  before.  The 
fact  that  troops  in  column  could  not  be 
moved  to  a  flank  under  effective  infantry 
fire,  had  been  demonstrated  many  and 
many  a  year  before,  even  when  infantry 
were  still  armed  with  Brown  Besses,  the 
fate  of  the  French  Imperial  Guard,  under 
the  fire  of  the  52nd  at  Waterloo  is  a  case 
in  point.  There  is  no  difference  in  the  two 
cases,  except  in  the  range,  and  it  was  in 
not  realising  how  greatly  that  range  had 
increased,  that  the  Prussians  made  the  mis- 
take. That  unshaken  Infantry  could  not 
be  attacked  in  front  without  the  support  of 


282  Losses  in  Battle. 

Artillery,  was  also  perfectly  well  known  in 
Frederic  the  Great's  day.  The  fact  is  re- 
peatedly referred  .  to  in  his  writings  ;  but 
here,  as  so  often  is  the  case  on  a  battle  field, 
circumstances  were  stronger  than  rules. 
The  Guards  had  to  advance  to  relieve  the 
pressure .  on  their  comrades  of  the  IXth 
Corps,  and  since  the  German  rifles  only 
carried  about  500  yards,  they  could  only  do 
this  by  attacking.  If  Generals  will  insist, 
or  are  compelled  to  attack  under  such  dis- 
advantageous circumstances,  their  failure 
is  a  matter  of  certainty  ;  but  this  proves 
nothing  against  the  chances  of  success  of 
any  other  form  of  attack.  Yet  it  was  on 
such  evidence  as  this  that  the  "  thin  red 
line  "  was  condemned.  We  wonder  whe- 
ther it  ever  occurred  to  any  of  our  system- 
mongers  to  examine  the  statistics  of  some 
of  our  old  battles  of  the  Peninsula,  e.g., 
Albuera,  where  "  1,800  unwounded  men, 
the  remnant  of  6,000  unconquerable  British 
soldiers,  stood  triumphant  on  the  fatal  hill," 
or  the  losses  individual  Regiments  suffered 


Losses  in  Battle.  283 

at  Quatre  Bras  or  Waterloo.  The  battles 
of  the  Seven  Years'  War  all  tell  the  same 
tale,  and  even  at  Jena  the  Prussians  stood 
their  ground  under  losses  double  and  treble 

c5 

that  of  the  Guard.  And  it  must  be  remem- 
bered that,  as  a  rule,  these  losses  were 
suffered  suddenly,  in  the  manner  most 
try  ing  to  the  "  morale"  of  the  troops  ;  for 
when  the  fire  was  only  effective  at  about  200 
yards,  the  assailants  were  obviously  expos- 
ed to  it  for  a  less  time  than  now,  when  it  is 
killing  at  even  2,000. 

But  if  it  is  objected  that  all  this  happen- 
ed a  very  long  time  ago,  we  will  take  more 
recent  examples  from  the  American  war, 
where  the  accuracy  of  the  shooting  more 
than  compensated  for  the  want  of  rapidity. 
Indeed,  to  our  mind,  there  has  been  no 
fighting  of  late  years  more  instructive  to 
us  Englishmen  than  this  little-understood 
struggle,  for  the  men  on  both  sides  were  of 
our  own  flesh  and  blood.  The  celebrated 
charge  of  Pickett's  Division  at  Gettysburg  is 
a  magnificent  example  of  what  losses  Anglo- 


284  Losses  in  Battle. 

Saxon  troops,  and  not  long-service  or 
highly  disciplined  troops,  can  bear.  It  is 
true  that  it  failed  ;  but  the  reasons  for  the 
failure  were  exactly  the  same  as  at  St. 
Privat,  viz.,  want  of  adequate  artillery  pre- 
paration, and  ignorance  of  the  mechanism 
of  the  attack. 

Let  us  assume,  for  the  sake  of  argument, 
troops  of  the  same  quality,  formed  up  for 
the  attack,  well  out  of  effective  range  and 
sent  into  the  assault  of  St.  Privat  after 
adequate  artillery  preparation.  Let  us  fur- 
ther assume  them  formed  in  three  lines  at 
about  500  yards  interval,  with  a  reserve  in 
rear  of  all,  and  imagine  them  advancing 
and  firing  by  echelons  in  the  old-fashioned 
style,  then  since  they  would  have  covered 
the  whole  distance  up  to  the  walls  of  the 
village,  in  15  minutes,  it  is  not  conceivable 
that  they  would  have  suffered  the  same  loss 
as  the  Prussians  actually  did  in  a  three 
hours7  engagement ;  more  especially  taking 
into  account  the  well-known  fact,  that 
owing  to  the  French  forgetting  to  put 


Losses  in  Battle.  285 

down  their  sights,  as  the  range  decreased, 
this  fire  was  actually  more  deadly  at  long, 
than  at  short  ranges.  Yet  even  had  the 
losses  been  equal,  they  would  not  have 
sufficed  to  have  stopped  troops  of  the  old 
Peninsula  stamp ;  and,  looking  at  the  com- 
position of  those  troops,  both  morally  and 
physically,  our  present  material  is  at  least 
equally  good,  if  not  better.  The  facts  re- 
lating to  the  recruiting  of  our  army  in 
those  days,  as  far  as  the  men's  character  is 
concerned,  are  too  well  known  to  require 
further  reference.  Never  since  the  Penin- 
sula have  we  been  compelled  to  empty  our 
civil  prisons  into  the  ranks  ;  and  it  may 
not  be  so  generally  known,  but  it  is  never- 
theless equally  true,  that  our  standards  of 
height,  age,  and  chest  measurement  were 
even  lower  then,  than  it  is  now. 

So  far  from  the  experiences  of  St.  Privat 
having  led  to  the  abolition  of  line  attacks 
in  the  German  Army,  they  have  had  a  pre- 
cisely opposite  result.  The  basis  of  the 
modern  German  attack  is  the  line  forma- 


286  Losses  in  Battle. 

tion  pure  and  simple  only  "  sublimated  " 
as  a  German  Officer  once  said  to  us.  It  is 
true  the  fighting  line  no  longer  advances 
with  faultless  dressing  and  at  75  paces  a 
minute,  but  it  is  practically  a  line  for  all 
that  for  its  early  reinforcements  bring  it  up 
to  nearly  two  men  to  the  pace.  It  is  a  line 
with  loose  feeling,  the  men  having  just 
room  enough  to  handle  their  arms  with 
effect.  Instead  of  the  advance  by  echelons 
with  volley  firing,  we  have  the  advance  by 
rushes  with  independent  firing.  No  volley 
firing  is  ever  practised  in  the  Grerman  attack. 
Behind  the  fighting  line,  except  under  un- 
usual circumstances,  no  company  columns, 
— which  by  the  way  we  have  been  so  anxi- 
ous to  copy, — are  ever  seen  ;  the  advance 
is  made  in  line,  with  the  strictest  attention 
to  step  and  dressing.  The  full  force  of 
discipline  is  brought  to  bear  on  the  men, 
in  what  is  the  most  trying  moment  of  their 
duty,  viz.,  the  advance  under  fire  without 
being  able  to  reply  to  it.  Had  we  waited 
till  the  actual  facts  were  before  us,  we  too 


Losses  in  Battle.  287 

might  have  preserved  the  advantages  of  our 
old  traditions,  but  instead  of  that  we  tried  to 
graft  a  new  system  on  to  our  old  Light  In- 
fantry drill,  which  was  the  best  for  its  pur- 
pose in  the  world  ;  but  its  purpose  was  not 
the  delivery  of  the  decisive  attack  on  the 
battle  field.  The  changes  we  should  have 
required,  would  have  been  few  and  simple, 
and  if  our  infantry  leaders  had  been  made  to 
understand  the  true  power  of  artillery  fire, 
would  have  given  us  a  form  on  which  we 
might  have  confidently  relied.  The  first 
line,  formed  at  elbow  distance,  to  advance 
at  a  run,  by  echelons  of  half  battalions, 
then  to  lie  down  and  fire,  to  cover  the  ad- 
vance of  the  second  half  battalion  ;  on  a 
large  front,  the  echelons  to  consist  of  whole 
battalions.  The  second  line  to  maintain  a 
uniform  quick  step,  never  halting  or  lying 
down,  but  closing  on  the  first,  to  give  the 
momentum  necessary  for  a  rush.  The 
third  and  fourth  lines,  or  more  if  necessary 
to  advance  in  the  same  way.  The  difficul- 
ties about  intermixture  of  companies,  etc., 


288  Losses  in  Battle. 

are  only  peace-time  matters.  What  does 
it  matter  to  an  officer,  who  commands 
his  men,  when  he  is  lying  with  a  bullet 
through  the  head.  And  as  for  the  men,  in 
such  moments  of  supreme  excitement,  they 
will  follow  any  man  who  is  brave  enough 
to  lead.  And  we  may  bear  this  in  mind 
for  our  consolation,  that  the  experience  of 
both  our  own  army  and  that  of  the 
Americans  proves,  that  troops  with  British 
blood  in  them  require  less  leading  in  an 
attack  than  those  of  any  other  race. 


DISCIPLINE  AND  THE  BREECH- 
LOADER. 

IT  is  now  a  little  over  twenty   years    ago 
that  the  breech-loader  first   made    its 
appearance  on  the  battle-field  ;  and  a  suffi- 
cient mass  of  data  is  now  at  hand  to  enable 
us  to  form  some  opinion  as  to  the  conditions 
for  its  best  and  most  effective  employment. 
In  the  first  place,  it  is  interesting   to   note 
that  almost  all   the   predictions   made   on 
its    behalf  by   its    supporters   have    been 
falsified   by   events.     We   were  told — and 
though  able  and  experienced  soldiers  pro- 
tested    against     these    ideas  —  that     the 
power  of  the  defence  would  be  enormously 
increased  ;  that   the   weapon   would   place 
the   youngest   soldiers  on  an  equality  with 
the  highest-disciplined,  and   therefore   that 
superiority  of  numbers  would  be  the  decisive 
factor  of  success  ;  that   cavalry  would  be 
banished  from  the  battle-field;  that  in  savage 
warfare  one  man   with   the   breech-loader 

M,,  L,  19 


290    Discipline  and  the  Breech-loader. 

would  be  worth  ten  with  the  muzzle-loader  ; 
and  many  other  prophecies  more  wild  and 
far-fetched  have  been  and  indeed  are  still 
being  hazarded.  But  how  have  these 
opinions  borne  the  test  of  the  battle-field  ? 
To  begin  with,  the  force  which  took  the 
offensive  has  almost  invariably  won.  Bel- 
fort,  Plevna  and  Baker's  fight  in  the  Balkans, 
on  the  last  day  of  the  year  1877,  are 
almost  the  only  triumphs  scored  by  the 
defensive  ;  and  in  each  instance  the  condi- 
tions were  of  a  too  exceptional  nature  to 
admit  of  their  being  brought  into  the 
argument.  Belfort  was  fought  by  highly 
disciplined  Germans  against  half  -  starved 
Mobiles.  The  attacks  on  the  redoubts  at 
Plevna  failed  for  want  of  combination  of 
numbers  against  the  decisive  point  owing 
to  the  incompetence  of  the  Eussian  leaders; 
and  in  the  last-quoted  instance  victory  was 
due  to  the  magnificent  fighting  instinct  of 
the  Turk  and  the  determination  of  his 
General,  a  born  leader,  if  ever  there  was  one. 
The  battles  of  Vionville,  and  those  which 


Discipline  and  the  Breech-loader.    291 

took  place  in  the  latter  portion  of  the  war 
after  Sedan,  proved  conclusively  that  real 
discipline  was  still  more  than  a  match  for 
numbers,  even  when  the  numbers  had  the 
advantage  of  a  far  superior  weapon  ;  and 
the  new  cavalry  regulations  of  Austria  and 
Germany  shew  that,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
most  experienced  soldiers  of  the  day,  the 
glory  has  not  yet  departed  from  the  mount- 
ed forces.  But  finally — and  this  is  the 
most  important  point  for  us  to  consider — 
events  have  not  shown  that,  against  savages, 
one  man  with  a  breech-loader  is  equal  to 
ten  with  the  muzzle-loader.  We  may 
search  the  records  of  our  last  twenty  years 
as  closely  as  we  please,  and  yet  we  can  find 
no  single  instance  of  a  British  regiment 
achieving  such  results  by  its  fire  as  the  22nd 
(Cheshire)  Regiment  at  Meannee  and  Duba, 
or,  to  go  further  back,  as  the  52nd  at 
Waterloo,  though  the  latter  case,  of  course, 
was  against  Europeans. 

To  reconcile  the  apparent  contradictions 
in  the  above  statements,  seems  at  first  sight 


292    Discipline  and  the  Breech-loader. 

almost  hopeless.  The  key-note  of  breech- 
loading  tactics  is  the  increased  individuality 
of  the  man.  Hence  we  should  naturally 
expect  to  find  that  the  race  possessing  the 
highest  degree  of  individual  fighting  in- 
stinct should  obtain  the  best  results  from 
it.  But,  actually,  the  facts  are  against  us. 
The  French  possess  a  greater  amount  of 
individuality  than  the  Germans,  and  the 
English  than  either,  yet  neither  have  suc- 
ceeded to  the  same  extent  as  the  Germans. 
The  latter  cannot  equal  our  range-shooting 
even  now,  and  they  have  improved  vastly 
since  1870  :  yet  actually  on  the  battle- 
fields of  that  year,  they  attained  a  decidedly 
higher  average  of  results,  even  against  a 
superior  weapon,  and  when  exposed  to  the 
more  demoralizing  influence  of  heavy 
artillery  fire  than  we  have  since  obtained 
against  half-armed  savages.  To  prove  this 
point  in  the  limit  of  our  space  is  impossible. 
We  can  only  refer  to  a  case  we  quoted  some 
time  ago  of  the  shooting  of  a  company  of 
the  Prussian  Guard  against  the  last  des- 


Discipline  and  the  Breech-loader.    293 

perate  effort  by  the  French  to  break  through 
at  Sedan.  The  company,  certainly  not 
more  than  200  strong,  fairly  shot  to  pieces 
a  French  attack  made  by  some  3,000  des- 
perate men,  and  that  too,  to  within  the  limits 
of  about  500  yards  of  their  muzzles.  The 
charges  of  the  French  cavalry,  most  gallant- 
ly executed,  all  broke  down  before  the 
steady  file-fire  of  the  Germans,  though  on 
several  occasions  it  must  be  admitted  they 
went  within  an  inch  of  succeeding.  But, 
in  the  absence  of  special  fighting  instinct, 
individual  intelligence  and  skill  in  the  use 
of  their  weapons,  to  what  can  we  attribute 
their  extraordinary  success? 

We  believe  there  is  only  one  answer  to 
be  given  to  this,  and  that  is  contained  in 
the  single  word  "  discipline.  "  We  reject 
altogether  the  new-fangled  expression  "  fire 
discipline,  "  a  word  which  we  have  coined 
to  mark  the  fact  that  the  actual  meaning  of 
the  original  word  has  escaped  our  memories. 
Formerly  it  meant  with  us,  what  it  still 
means  in  Germany, — the  power  which 


294    Discipline  and  the  Breech-loader. 

enables  men,  in  presence  of  danger  and 
death,  to  overcome  the  instinct  of  self- 
preservation,  which  makes  it  easier  in  fact 
for  a  man  to  face  certain  destruction  than 
to  make  up  his  mind  individually  to  run 
away  :  now-a-days,  it  is  taken  to  be  synony- 
mous with  clean  defaulter- sheets  and  an 
absence  of  courts-martial — a  very  different 
state  of  things.  In  its  true  sense  discipline 
hardly  exists  in  our  army,  though  in  the 
navy  it  is,  perhaps,  higher  than  it  ever 
was  :  this  is  not  a  result  of  short  service, 
though  it  is  often  asserted  to  be  so.  We 
have  only  to  look  at  the  Austrians,  Germans, 
and  Swedes  to  see  that  it  is  quite  possible 
to  attain  a  higher  standard  than  our  own 
even  with  half  the  service.  In  all  these 
three  armies,  troops  move  quicker,  more 
accurately,  and  handle  their  arms  with 
greater  smartness,  than  we  are  accustomed 
to  see.  The  special  difficulties  with  which 
we  have  to  contend,  such  as  weak  companies, 
etc.,  will  not  suffice  to  account  for  it,  for 
other  armies  have  their  difficulties  too. 


Discipline  and  the  Breech-loader.    295 

Besides,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  we 
do  not  claim  to  be  merely  the  equals  of 
these  other  races,  but  we  are  all  more  or 
less  convinced  that  we  are  decidedly  their 
superiors,  and  the  history  of  our  race  proves 
it.  The  truth  is  we  set  about  our  troop - 
training  from  a  diametrically  opposite  point 
of  view.  The  continental  system  is  more 
a  moral  than  a  physical  one,  though  there 
is  a  good  deal  of  the  latter  too.  Its  object  is 
to  accustom  the  soldier  to  fatigue  and  priva- 
tion, to  train  his  will,  in  fact,  and  make  a 
man  of  him.  It  is  not  so  much  to  develop 
his  muscles,  that  the  long  marches  of  the 
manoeuvres  are  intended,  for  they  soon 
lose  their  tone  when  he  reverts  to  civil  life, 
but  the  knowledge  of  what  has  been 
accomplished  remains  with  him  as  an  abid- 
ing fact,  and  he  feels  capable  of  doing  the 
same  again  when  called  on.  The  iron  drill 
of  the  barrack  yard  is  maintained  as  a 
check  on  the  over-development  of  the 
individual  instincts  ;  and  renders  it  possible 
to  keep  the  men  under  control,  even  under 


296    Discipline  and  the  Breech-loader. 

the  disentegrating  conditions  of  the  battle- 
field. Musketry  is  taught  to  give  the  man 
confidence  in  his  weapon,  but  neither  he 
nor  his  officer  is  allowed  to  x  egard  it  as  the 
be-all  and  end-all  of  a  soldier's  existence. 

With  us  all  this  is  different.  Drill  is 
sacrificed  to  musketry,  and  the  moral  part 
of  the  training  is  altogether  neglected. 
Could  anything  be  more  demoralising  than 
the  enforced  idleness  of  our  infantry  in  this 
country  ?  Can  it  be  expected  that  a  man 
who  has  been  trained  to  believe  that  he 
will  die  if  exposed  to  the  sun  between  the 
hours  of  eight  A.  M.  and  six  P.  M.,  and  that  he 
is  not  physically  capable  of  marching  round 
his  cantonment  with  arms  in  his  hands  for 
six  months  in  every  year,  be  expected  to 
face  the  hardships  of  a  campaign  ?  He 
does  it,  though,  in  spite  of  his  training, 
and  because  he  is  at  heart  an  Englishman. 
And  is  all  this  caution  necessary  ?  We 
believe  not,  for  men  of  the  same  class  are 
employed  on  our  public  works  pretty  well 
without  regard  to  temperature,  and  we  do 


Discipline  and  the  Breech-loader.    297 

not  know  that  their  death-rate  is  so  very 
much,  if  at  all  higher,  than  that  of  the 
infantry.  Our  mounted  troops  are  not 
nearly  as  much  coddled  as  the  others,  and 
their  average  of  health  is,  we  believe, 
decidedly  higher.  Even  if  it  were  not  so, 
it  does  not  do  to  make  a  man  regard  his 
life  as  an  absolutely  inviolable  possession — 
certainly  not,  if  you  want  him  to  risk  it 
freely.  Even  if  a  few  of  the  weaklier  ones 
died,  the  gain  morally  to  the  survivors 
would  be  worth  the  cost.  No  man  is  worth 
his  salt  till  his  will  and  endurance  have 
been  tried  ;  and  even  an  outbreak  of  cholera 
is  not  without  its  value  to  the  survivors. 
Why  not  take  a  lesson  for  ordinary  use 
from  our  practice  when  such  an  outbreak 
occurs.  We  do  not  know  that  the  general 
health  of  the  men  is  impaired  by  going 
under  canvas  ;  and  why  should  they  not 
do  it  oftener. 

We  would  not  recommend  a  return  to 
the  German  barrack- square  system ;  for 
the  class  of  men  we  have  to  deal  with  is 


298    Discipline  and  the  Breech-loader. 

essentially  different,  being  more  intelligent 
and  possessing  more  innate  fighting  in- 
stinct ;  but  we  should  like  to  see  something 
approximating  more  to  the  naval  system, 
which  develops  to  the  utmost  the  alertness 
and  intelligence  of  the  men,  without 
wasting  one  moment  in  pedantic  accuracy 
of  movement,  which  does  not  add  to  fighting 
efficiency.  How  this  can  be  done  we  can- 
not, within  the  limits  of  this  article,  pre- 
tend to  say  ;  but  of  this  we  feel  assured, 
that  not  until  our  training  is  directed  to 
developing  the  morale  of  our  men,  will  we 
be  able  to  derive  the  full  advantages  of  our 
present,  and  still  more,  of  our  future 
armament. 


THE  TACTICS  OF  THE  AMERICAN 
WAR. 

IT  is  curious  to  note  how  little  attention 
has  been  devoted  to  the  study  of  the 
fighting  of  this  most  bloody  of  modern 
wars  ;  and  yet  it  would  seem  that  the 
records  of  these  campaigns  fought  out  to 
the  bitter  end  by  men  of  our  own  Anglo- 
Saxon  races,  would  be  a  far  more  likely 
source  of  information,  from  which  to 
deduce  the  theory  of  an  attack  formation 
specially  designed  to  meet  our  needs,  than 
the  histories  of  struggles  between  French 
and  Germans  or  Russians  and  Turks.  Von 
Moltke  is  reported  to  have  said  that, 
"  nothing  was  to  be  learnt  from  the  struggle 
of  two  armed  mobs."  If  that  is  really  the 
case,  which  we  venture  to  doubt  exceeding- 
ly, the  great  strategist  must  ere  this  have 
been  sorry  he  ever  spoke,  for  armed  mobs 
or  not,  both  Southern  and  Northern  troops 
bore,  and  bore  victoriously,  a  percentage  of 


300      Tactics  of  the  American  War. 

loss,  before  which  even  the  best  disciplined 
troops  in  Germany,  the  Prussian  Guard 
Corps  failed  to  make  headway.  It  is  of  no 
relevence  to  the  argument,  to  say  that 
the  breech-loader  was  not  then  in  use. 
When  a  man  is  hard  hit  himself  or  sees 
his  comrade  rolled  over,  it  never  enters  his 
head  to  consider  whether  the  hit  was 
scored  by  muzzle-loader  or  breech-loader; 
the  fact  itself,  that  he  or  the  other  man  is 
down,  is  the  only  one  he  concerns  himself 
with,  and  when  the  percentage  of  hits  in 
a  given  time  rises  high  enough,  the  attack 
collapses  equally,  no  matter  against  what 
weapon  it  may  be  delivered. 

Actually  though  the  armament  was 
inferior,  the  percentage  of  hits  was  fre- 
quently far  higher  than  in  breech-loading 
campaigns.  There  is  no  action  on  record 
during  recent  years  in  which  the  losses 
rose  so  high,  and  in  so  short  a  time,  as 
in  the  American  fights.  At  Frederisburg, 
Meagher's  Irish  Brigade,  1,200  strong,  lost 
963  men  in  the  attack  of  the  Stone  fence 


Tactics  of  the  American  War.      301 

below  St.  Marye's  heights.  The  confeder- 
ates, standing  six  deep  under  cover  reserved 
their  fire  till  the  attack  came  within  120 
yards.  And  in  a  few  moments  it  was  simply 
destroyed.  At  Gettysburg,  Pickett's  divi- 
sion, some  4,000  strong,  attacking  in  line 
penetrated  into  the  heart  of  the  federal  posi- 
tion but  only  with  some  few  hundred  men, 
(about  300  to  the  best  of  our  recollection,) 
the  remainder  having  fallen  on  the  way, 
the  survivors  held  on  and  did  not  run,  but 
being  unsupported,  they  eventually  surren- 
dered themselves  prisoners.  Surely,  Moltke 
never  spoke  of  such  gallant  soldiers  as  an 
armed  mob,  seeing  that  they  succeeded 
in  driving  an  attack  home  against  four 
times  the  percentage  of  loss  that  stopped 
the  Prussian  guard  at  St.  Privat,  that  f^t"1 
event  to  which  we  owe  the  loss  of  what 
was  best  in  our  drill-book,  the  thin  red 
line.  And  assuming  for  the  moment,  that 
the  saying  attributed  to  him  is  really  true, 
we  cannot  help  fancying  that  he  must  have 
often  bitterly  regretted  it,  when  watching 


302      Tactics  of  the  American  War. 

his  own  men  in  the  manoeuvres  of  late 
years,  attacking  in  what  is  really,  practi- 
cally the  same  formation  which  the  armed 
mobs  worked  out  for  themselves. 

The  points  of  contrast  between  ourselves 
and  the  American  are  far  too  numerous 
to  be  dismissed  without  comment.  They 
began  the  war  with  a  drill-book  and  system 
modelled  on  our  own,  and  they  carried  it 
out  to  its  conclusion,  with  only  a  few 
modifications  of  detail  but  none  of  princi- 
ple. The  normal  prescribed  idea  of  an 
attack  appears  to  have  been  as  follows :  A 
line  of  scouts,  thickened  to  skirmishers 
according  to  the  requirements  of  the 
ground  ;  from  2  to  300  paces  in  rear,  the 
1st  line,  two  deep  precisely  like  our  own, 
then  in  rear  a  2nd  line  and  reserve.  Of 
course  their  lines  did  not  advance  with  the 
steady  precision  of  our  old  peninsula  batta- 
lions. Their  level  of  instruction  was  alto- 
gether too  low,  and  besides  the  extent  of 
fire  swept  ground  had  greatly  increased. 
Eye-witnesses  say,  that  after  the  first  few 


Tactics  of  the  American  War.     303 

yards,  the  line  practically  dissolved  itself 
into  a   dense  line  of    skirmishers,  which 
threw  itself  forward   generally  at  a  run  as 
far  as  their  momentum  would  carry  them. 
Sometimes  if  the  distance  was  short  carry- 
ing the  position  at  the  first  rush,  but  more 
generally  the  heavy  losses  brought  them  to 
a  halt  and  a  standing  fire   fight   ensued. 
They  knew  nothing  of  ScherfFs  great  prin- 
ciple on  which  the  "  Treffen  Abstande,"  or 
distances  between  the  lines  are  based,  but 
they  generally  worked  it  out  in   practice 
pretty  successfully.     The  second  line  came 
up  in  the  best  order  they  could  and  carried 
the  wreck  of  the  first  on  with  it ;  if  they 
were  stopped,  the  reserve  did  the  same  for 
them,  and  either  broke  too  or  succeeded. 
The  principle  that  every  attack  should  be 
prepared  by  artillery  fire,  though  known, 
was  yet  imperfectly  understood,   and   the 
want  of  artillery   and  still  more  the  diffi- 
culty of  the  ground  frequently  led  to  its 
being   disregarded,   but   the    neglect    was 
dearly  paid  for  as  a  rule.     Of  course,  things 


304      Tactics  of  the  American   War. 

did  not  always  work  out  in  practice  as  they 
were  intended  to.  Hot-headed  Brigadiers 
and  inexperienced  Staff  Officers  frequently 
caused  single  lines  to  bo  sent  to  certain 
destruction ;  others  were  responsible  for 
losses  of  distance  and  time  which  left  the 
front  line  unsupported  at  the  critical 
moment ;  but  as  the  war  went  on,  the 
necessity  of  putting  in  men  in  greater 
numbers,  viz.,  providing  by  successive  lines, 
6,  8  and  even  10  men  per  yard  of  front 
made  itself  more  and  more  felt,  and  at  last 
whole  corps  were  sent  to  the  attack  on  a 
front  of  over  3,000  yards  and  in  five  succes- 
sive lines.  There  was  nothing  in  the 
Franco- German  war  to  compare  to  these 
monster  attacks;  in  that  campaign,  attack- 
ing corps  generally  resolved  themselves  into 
three  or  four  isolated  advances  not  exceed- 
ing a  brigade  (6,000  men)  in  strength,  and 
want  of  combination  in  time-and  direction 
frequently  made  itse1'*  most  detrimentally 
felt,  mistakes  not  liable  to  occur  again,  the 
lesson  was  too  bloody.  We  do  not  advo- 


Tactics  of  the  American   War.      305 

cate  these  monster  attacks,  for  there  is  a  limit 
of  front  in  attacking  (about  2,200  yards) 
which  cannot  be  usefully  exceeded,  and  for 
this  a  strength  of  two  British  or  one  Con- 
tinental Brigade  will  usually  suffice ;  greater 
extension  only  leads  to  an  unnecessary  ex- 
penditure of  men. 

Another  point  also  was  established  by 
experience,  viz.,  that  once   an   advance  is 
commenced,   any   stopping  to  fire  is  to  be 
deprecated,  the  impulse  forward  is  lost  and 
can  only  be  recommunicated  by  the  pres- 
sure of  fresh  troops  from  the  rear.     Besides, 
it  leads  to  an  enormous  increase   in   the 
losses.     In  a   general   action  the    bulk  of 
the  firing  is  necessarily  excessively  inaccu- 
rate, for,  on  the  one  side,the  defender's  nerves 
have  been  shaken  by  artillery  fire,  and,  on 
the  other,  excitement  and  the  exertion  of 
running  forward  unsteadies  both  hand  and 
eye  to  such  a  degree  that  very  little  result 
is  to  be  hoped  for  from  the  attacking  fire 
against  targets  the  size  of  those  exposed 
by  troops  well  posted   on   the  defensive. 
M.,  L.  20 


306      Tactics  of  the  American   War. 

The  best  Wimbledon  marksmen  would  make 
very  poor  percentages  against  targets  the 
size  of  a   loophole  in  a  log  fence,  under 
battle  conditions  at  400  yards  or  even  at 
200  when  exposed  to  the  full   intensity  of 
the  defender's  fire,  and,  of  course,  with  the 
muzzle-loader,  it  was  impossible  to  send  in 
the  absolute  storm  of  bullets  the  breech- 
loader can  deliver,  which  more  than  balances 
the  want  of  quantity  by  its  quality.     But 
whether  breech-loaders  or  muzzle-loaders  the 
argument  is  the  same,  the  numbers  of  hits 
on  a  given  target  will  vary  directly  with 
the  time  the  target  is  exposed  to  fire,   and 
hence  one  point  to  be  considered  in  every 
attack,  is   to  reduce  the  time  required  to 
pass  the  dangerous  zone  to  the  minimum 
compatible  with  other  conditions.     These 
other   conditions   are    both    physical   and 
moral.     Physically  it  is  practically  impos- 
sible for  men  fresh  off  the  road  and  carrying 
heavy  kits  to  run  1,000  to  1,500  yards,  or 
even  half  that  distance,   and  morally  it  has 
been  found  impracticable  to  make  infantry 


Tactics  of  the  American   War.      307 

advance  under  fire  without  the  encourage- 
ment of  the  sound  of  their  own  firing. 
In  fact,  the  distance  men  will  march  under 
fire  without  returning  it,  varies  directly 
with  the  quality  of  their  discipline  and 
courage,  a  fact  of  great  importance  in  apply- 
ing the  American  experience  to  our  own  use. 
In  Germany,  since  the  war,  a  compromise 
between  the  various  conditions  has  been 
arrived  at  in  the  following  way: — The 
artillery  preparation  having  been  complet- 
ed, the  infantry  advance  in  a  dense  skir- 
mishing line,  each  man  having  only  just 
room  enough  to  use  his  rifle  with  effect, 
firing  must  not  be  commenced  one  moment 
before  it  can  be  avoided,  but  it  is  the  duty 
of  the  officers  commanding  the  fighting 
line  to  judge  when  that  moment  has  arrived 
and  to  anticipate  by  his  order,  the  men's 
taking  the  law  into  their  own  hands  and 
firing  without  word  of  command.  From 
this  moment,  the  advance  is  continued 
by  echelons,  though  never  more  than  two 
echelons  should  be  employed  and  the  fire 


308      Tactics  of  the  American   War. 

only  continued  long  enough  to  cover  the 
movement  of  the  advancing  echelon.  The 
first  support  move  up  according  to  the  judg- 
ment of  the  officers  on  the  spot,  but  when 
once  the  zone  of  severe  loss  is  entered, 
the  lines  in  the  rear  close  on  the  fighting 
line  mechanically.  Now  comes  in  ScherfFs 
principle  to  which  we  referred  above. 
"Within  the  zone  of  heavy  loss  (say  be- 
tween 600  and  300  yards),  no  troops  can 
stand  their  ground  for  more  than  five 
minutes,  therefore  the  supporting  line  must 
never  be  at  a  greater  distance  from  the  fight- 
ing one,  than  it  can  cover  inside  of  this  five 
minutes,  or  say  500  yards. 

From  this  moment  the  attack  advances 
by  a  succession  of  waves ;  line  after  line  is 
thrown  into  the  struggle,  which  with 
each  reinforcement  gains  ground  some  hun- 
dred yards  or  so  to  the  front;  when  at 
last  the  limit  at  which  decisive  fire  really 
commences,  is  reached,  the  fire  is  raised  ta 
its  utmost  intensity  for  a  few  moments,  and 
then  either  obeying  its  own  impulse  or 


Tactics  of  the  American   War.      309 

the  impetus  of  fresh  troops  from  the  rear, 
the  whole  rushes  forward  and  clears  the 
enemies'  position  to  its  further  limit,  when 
it  throws  itself  down  and  pursues  by  fire 
only  ;  the  duty  of  further  advance  being 
undertaken  by  a  fresh  body  of  troops,  usual- 
ly the  reserve,  if  it  has  not  itself  been  pre- 
viously expended. 

It  will  be  seen  that  except  in  its  being 
more  scientifically  put  together,  this  Ger- 
man attack  is  practically,  precisely  similar 
to  that  employed  by  the  Americans,  with 
the  sole  difference  that  the  breech-loader  has 
conferred  on  the  assailants  the  advantage 
of  being  able  to  make  a  more  extended 
use  of  their  weapons,  and  has  reduced  to  a 
certain  extent  the  disadvantage  of  having 
to  halt.  It  has  not  compensated  the  defend- 
ers to  the  same  extent,  for  by  the  use  of 
entrenchments,  it  was  always  possible  to 
them  to  increase  the  intensity  of  fire  by 
placing  a  large  number  of  successive  ranks 
under  cover.  Thus  in  the  case  of  the 
stone  fence  mentioned  above,  the  confeder- 


310      Tactics  of  the  American   War. 

ates  stood  six  deep,  and  their  fire  was  there- 
fore nearly  as  intense  as  that  which  could 
be  delivered  by  a  single  rank  with  breech- 
loaders. Had  we  in  1871  been  thoroughly 
well-informed  as  to  the  methods  employed 
across  the  Atlantic,  we  should  have  seen 
at  once  that  the  new  weapons  did  not 
necessarily  entail  any  alteration  in  princi- 
ple in  our  drill-book,  and  with  a  little 
alteration  in  detail,  have  attained  at  one 
bound  to  a  point  of  efficiency  not  reached 
even  in  Germany  till  several  years  after 
the  war.  Instead  of  that,  we  allowed  our- 
selves to  be  frightened,  by  the  pamphlets 
of  a  number  of  junior  officers,  for  the  most 
part  hastily  written  and  based  on  imper- 
fect information,  into  abolishing  at  one 
stroke  all  that  was  best  in  our  traditions 
of  the  past,  and  substituting  in  its  stead 
a  something  which  was  neither  line  nor 
skirmishing,  the  principal  object  of  which 
appears  to  be  to  teach  both  our  men  and 
officers  to  shirk  the  losses  inseparable 
from  decisive  action  on  the  field  of  battle ; 


Tactics  of  the  American   War.      311 

had  an  equivalent  number  of  Americans, 
or  of  British  infantry  stood  opposite  the 
French  at  St.  Privat  on  that  fatal  18th  of 
August,  we  believe  they  would  have  carried 
the  place  in  line  and  at  the  first  rush  ; 
had  even  the  Prussians  omitted  their  fatal 
error  of  bringing  heavy  columns  within 
reach  of  the  breech  -  loader  and  attempting 
to  manoeuvre  in  them,  they  would  have  done 
so  too,  for  the  bulk  of  their  losses  fell  on 
them  before  they  extended,  and  the  French 
fire  was  so  wild  that  the  nearer  they  got 
to  them  the  safer  they  became.  Our  losses 
would  have  been  serious,  no  doubt,  but 
seeing  that  the  Prussians  only  lost  30  per 
cent,  in  a  fight  which  lasted  from  early 
evening  till  late  into  the  night,  it  is  not 
reasonable  to  suppose  that,  deducting  the 
losses  due  to  the  mistake  of  the  heavy 
columns,  we  could  have  lost  even  as  high 
a  percentage  in  an  attack  which  at  the  out- 
side should  not  have  been  under  fire  more 
than  twenty  minutes.  For  the  garrison  of 
St.  Privat  were  not  of  a  class  to  stand  the 


312      Tactics  of  the  American   War. 

threat  of  cold  steel.  But  the  evil  has  been 
done,  and  will  require  a  long  time  to  undo, 
for  15  years  the  tactics  of  timidity  have 
been  dinned  into  our  ears,  and  month  after 
month  our  officers  have  been  condemned 
to  pass  examinations  in  books  compiled 
from  others  which  have  long  since  found 
a  resting  place  in  the  dusty  cellars  of 
German  publishers,  and  the  doctrine  of 
self-preservation  as  the  first  law  has  got 
such  a  grip  of  us,  that  it  will  require  all 
the  energy  of  a  great  leader  to  knock  it  out 
of  us.  It  is  not  for  want  of  telling,  for 
our  foreign  visitors  both  here  and  at  home 
have  been  good  enough  to  point  it  out  to 
us,  but  yet  every  year  the  drill  grounds 
witness  the  same  old  farce,  we  were  going 
to  write,  but  in  view  of  what  it  may  mean 
to  us  in  a  not  far  distant  future,  the  word 
tragedy  seems  to  be  nearer  the  mark. 
Napoleon's  favourite  saying  was  : — "  II 
faut  casser  des  ceufs  pour  faire  des  ome- 
lettes. "  Let  us  bear  it  in  mind. 


GERMAN  OPINION  ON  THE   DELHI 

MANCEUVRES. 

A  LECTURE  on  the  lessons  of  the  Delhi 
JLjL  Camp  of  Exercise  has  been  delivered 
by  a  German  officer  in  Berlin.  Thanks  to 
the  Pioneer,  which  has  obtained  a  summary 
of  the  lecture:  the  officers  of  all  arms  in  the 
service  can  now  see  themselves  as  others  see 
them.  The  German  critic  says  : — 

First,  with  regard  to  the  infantry.  The 
men  show  considerable  aptitude  for  skir- 
mishing, and  are  excellent  for  all  light  in- 
fantry duties,  but  the  officers,  as  a  body, 
seem  never  to  have  properly  appreciated  the 
difference  between  an  advance  guard,  skir- 
mishing fight,  and  the  decisive  attack  on 
a  field  of  battle.  The  instructions  for  the 
attack  were  evidently  drawn  up  by  men 
entirely  unacquainted  with  the  European 
battle-fields  of  to-day.  The  attempt  to 
avoid  doubling  up  of  different  companies 
(eindcntbliten)  in  the  fighting  line  by  mak- 


314  German  Opinion  on 

ing  each  little  company  find  its  own  support 
and  reserve,  is  thoroughly  impractical,  for 
it  would  be  impossible  in  actual  warfare 
to  ensure  each  little  detachment  coining  up 
precisely  in  rear  of  the  little  section  of  the 
front  to  which  it  belongs  ;  it  has  the  further 
defect  of  destroying,  at  the  very  commence- 
ment of  the  action,  and  unnecessarily,  the 
Captain's  control  over  his  company.  A  man 
can  command  the  extent  of  front  required  by 
the  small  English  companies,  but  he  cannot 
possibly  keep  in  hand  three  separate  bodies 
some  400  yards  apart.  As  a  consequence 
there  is  no  unity  of  direction  in  the  fighting 
line,  and  fire  discipline  is  almost  impossible 
to  maintain. 

"  Besides,,  the  English  authorities  do  not 
appear  to  realise  the  losses  inseparable  from 
a  general  action,  and  that  to  carry  a  front 
of  some  800  to  a  1 ,000  yards,  it  is  necessary 
to  put  in  a  whole  division.  Battalions  must 
be  intermixed,  before  even  a  distance  of  700 
yards  from  the  enemy  has  been  reached,  and 
by  the  time  the  zone  of  decision  (nbout  300 


the  Delhi  Manoeuvres.  315 

yards)  has  been  attained,  whole  regiments 
will  be  required.  This  danger  can  only  be 
guarded  against  by  accustoming  the  men  in 
peace  to  act  under  the  orders  of  the  officer 
nearest  to  them,  and  on  the  part  of  the  offi- 
cers by  re-dividing  amongst  themselves  the 
commands  as  each  fresh  reinforcement  comes 
into  line.  This  is  the  universal  practice  in 
Germany  at  present.  The  advance  is  alto- 
gether too  slow  :  the  fact  that  losses  increase 
in  proportion  to  the  length  of  time  during 
which  the  target  is  exposed  appears  not  to 
have  occurred  to  thern."^ 

"  The  advance  of  the  fighting  line  by  suc- 
cessive small  fractions  and  by  short  rushes 
of  35  yards,  we  consider  altogether  imprac- 
tical— the  small  fractions  mask  each  other's 
fire  and  the  short  rushes  unnecessarily  tire 
the  men.  Nor  are  these  short  rushes 

*  In  the  German  attack,  from  the  moment  the  signal  for 
the  advance  is  given,  all  troops  in  rear  of  the  fighting  line 
move  off  in  quick  time  and  never  halt  ;  if  the  fighting  line  is 
checked,  they  close  on  it,  and  carry  it  on  with  them.  The 
usual  distance  between  successive  lines  is  about  400  yards. 


316  German  Opinion  on 

long  enough  to  carry  them  out  of  the 
average  cone  of  dispersion  of  the  shots  aim- 
ed at  them,  and  it  is  easier  for  the  defender 
to  keep  on  them  than  it  is  where  each  range 
has  to  be  re  -  estimated  and  the  sights  re- 
adjusted. 

"  But  most  striking  of  all  we  consider  to 
be  the  want  of  any  true  conception  of  the 
value  of  discipline  in  the  fight.  In  camp 
and  quarters  the  discipline  of  the  English 
Army  has  always  been  very  high,  and  for- 
merly, when  they  fought  in  line,  it  was  the 
admiration  of  all  Europe.  The  writings  of 
Generals  Foy  and  Bugeaud,  their  defeated 
enemies,  are  well  -  known  in  all  German 
schools,  and  our  own  countrymen,  who 
fought  shoulder-to-shoulder  with  them  in 
1815,  agree  in  the  same  high  testimony  : 
yet  it  does  not  appear  to  have  occurred  to 
the  modern  school  of  English  leaders  that 
it  was  to  this  high  discipline  that  they 
owed  their  successes,  and  that,  if  that  degree 
of  drill  was  necessary  to  ensure  the  success 
of  an  advance  against  smooth-bore  muskets 


the  Delhi  Manoeuvres.  317 

whose  fire  was  hardly  effective  at  200  yards, 
how  much  more,  therefore,  is  it  necessary, 
when  the  troops  behind  the  fighting 
line  have  all  to  cross  a  fire-swept  zone 
of  some  1,500  yards  in  depth,  without  fir- 
ing a  shot  in  return.  The  innate  love  of 
fighting  which  may  be  expected  in  a  volun- 
teer army,  and  which  none  who  have  read 
the  records  of  the  Peninsular  and  Cri- 
mean wars  and  of  their  campaigns  in  India 
will  deny  them,  renders  an  iron  discipline 
all  the  more  essential  if  the  troops  in  rear 
are  to  be  prevented  from  taking  the  law  into 
their  own  hands  and  joining  the  fighting  line 
without  orders.  This  was  exactly  what 
the  Prussian  Guard  Corps  did  at  St. 
Privat. 

"  In  Germany  we  look  upon  discipline  as 
the  main  sheet  anchor  on  which  we  rely  to 
overcome  man's  inherent  fear  of  death  and 
danger  and  tighten  up  its  bands  all  the  more 
when  the  critical  moment  arrives.  In  the 
English  Army,  on  the  contrary,  exactly  the 
reverse  course  is  followed,  and  when  the 


318  German  Opinion  on 

attack  commences  all  the  outward  forms  of 
discipline  are  abandoned. 

"  Turning  now  to  the  cavalry.  The  mate- 
rial leaves  nothing  to  be  desired  ;  such  men 
and  such  horses  as  the  British  Cavalry  regi- 
ments in  India  have,  are  not  to  be  seen  in  any 
other  country  in  the  world.  The  English- 
man is  a  born  rider,  and  sits  his  horse  with 
an  ease  and  confidence  our  men  can  rarely 
attain  to.  The  Native  Cavalry  also  ride 
well,  and  even  their  horses  are  quite  up  to  the 
averages  of  our  Hussar  regiments.  With 
such  advantages,  it  is  extraordinary  that  the 
cavalry  is  not  better  than  it  is.  But  here, 
again,  the  want  of  experience  in  handling 
large  bodies  of  cavalry,  the  fatal  fallacies 
which  the  breech-loader  brought  in  its  train, 
have  all  borne  fruit.  The  general  ideas 
on  cavalry  taught  in  the  English  schools 
and  the  strong  prejudice  against  them 
existing  in  the  minds  of  the  Umpire  Staff, 
who  almost  invariably  order  them  out  of 
action  if  they  attack  either  infantry  or  guns, 
have  acted  most  prejudicially  on  all  con- 


the  Delhi  Manoeuvres.  319 

cerned.  We  ourselves  knew  what  it  was  to 
suffer  similarly — before  the  glorious  day  of 
Vionville,  and  can  sympathise  with  our 
gallant  comrades  in  arms  ;  but  they  labour 
also  under  the  disadvantage  of  a  defective 
system  of  drill  and  elementary  training 
of  men  and  horses.  Absolute  uniformity  of 
time  and  pace  are  the  very  essentials  of  com- 
bined action  in  cavalry  tactics  ;  but  little 
attention  is  paid  to  either. 

"  The  independence  of  the  squadron  and 
the  use  of  the  squadron  column  are  two  other 
points  ;  but  neither  is  as  yet  properly  appre- 
ciated. Owing  to  the  defective  training  of 
the  young  horses,  and  to  the  fact  that  the 
men  are  not  taught  to  ride  straight  to  their 
front  (keeping  their  dressing  by  time  and 
an  occasional  glance  of  the  eye  instead  of  by 
turning  the  head  to  the  directing  flank),  the 
long  advances  in  line  are  not  well  made,  and 
the  charge,  though  delivered  at  a  high  rate 
of  speed,  is  wanting  in  cohesion,  the  files 
opening  out  and  the  ranks  not  being  kept 
sufficiently  distinct.  The  melee  and  pursuit 


320  German  Opinion  on 

are  not  enough  practised.  Finally,  the  sys- 
tematic training  of  the  horses  to  cover  long 
distances  at  speed  has  been  hitherto  ignored. 
Great  inequality  also  exists  between  the  dif- 
ferent regiments,  both  of  the  Native  and 
British  Cavalry.  It  is  almost  impossible  to 
compare  the  two  ends  of  the  scale  in  either 
case,  and  this  re-acts  very  prejudicially  on 
their  enployment  in  brigade. 

"  The  Native  Cavalry  also  suffer  from  the 
disadvantage  of  drawing  their  young  officers- 
largely  from  the  ranks  of  the  infantry,  and 
who,  having  been  trained  for  some  years  in 
the  latter  arm,  fail  to  acquire  that  complete 
confidence  in  their  new  one  which  every 
cavalryman  should  have.  Further,  never 
having  been  grounded  in  the  principles  of 
military  equitation,  they  do  not  possess  the 
necessary  routine  knowledge,  nor  a  sense  of 
its  important  bearing  on  efficiency. 

"  The  efficiency  of  artillery  depends  to 
such  a  large  extent  on  accurate  shooting  that 
it  is  impossible  to  form  an  opinion  of  it  in 
manoeuvres.  As  with  the  other  arms,  the 


the  Delhi  Manoeuvres.  321 

men  and  horses  are  of  the  first  class  and  their 
discipline  good  ;  but  want  of  experience  in 
the  handling  of  large  masses  on  the  part  of 
superior  officers  is  apparent,  and  they  were, 
moreover,  much  bumpered  by  the  provisional 
instructions  published  for  the  guidance  of 
the  higher  commands  during  the  manoeu- 
vres. The  principle  that  Artillery  should 
not  fire  over  Infantry  shows  an  extraordi- 
nary inability  to  grasp  the  conditions  of  a 
modern  battle  and  practically  deprives  the 
Infantry  of  the  co-operation  which  is  so 
essential  to  success.  Even  in  a  fight  of  one 
corps  against  another  it  would  be  impossible 
for  the  Artillery  to  prepare  the  attack  from 
a  position  on  its  flank,  because,  taking 
2,000  yards  as  the  distance  between  the 
two  fronts,  the  outer  battery  of  the  line 
would  be  some  4,000  yards  distant  from 
the  point  of  attack,  and  where  several  corps 
are  fighting  alongside  of  each  other,  the  idea 
is  perfectly  impracticable.  It  is  a  poor 
compliment  to  pay  their  Infantry  to  say 
they  cannot  stand  what  every  other  army 

M.,L.  21 


322  German  opinion  on 

in  Europe  stands  willingly  enough.  The 
truth  is  the  different  arms  of  the  Service  in 
the  English  Army  are  not  sufficiently  closely 
united  :  there  is  too  much  caste  spirit,  they 
fail  to  perceive  that  each  only  exists  for  the 
other,  and  that  the  efficiency  of  an  army  is 
measured  by  the  product,  not  the  sum,  of  the 
efficiency  of  each  arm." 

The  above  has  been  reprinted  by  permis- 
sion, in  order  to  serve  as  a  contrast  to  an 
English  officer's  opinion  on  the  German 
system  of  attack. 

"  One  cannot  make  omelettes  without 
breaking  eggs,  and  no  loss  must  be  shirked 
to  win  a  battle.  All  the  petty  dodges  by 
which  other  armies  strive  to  avoid  the  heavy 
losses  which  every  attack  must  cost,  and 
which  usually  defeat  their  own  object,  by 
either  retarding  the  advance  or  by  weakening 
the  spirit  of  the  troops  themselves,  are  sternly 
rejected  by  the  Germans.  Their  object  is  to 
win.  There  is  a  considerable  reaction  against 
the  ideas  published  by  so  many  writers  after 
the  war,  that  losses  are  to  be  avoided  instead 


the  Delhi  Manoeuvres.  323 

of  faced.  Meckel,  in  his  c  Taktik/  points 
out  that  the  losses  in  the  Seven  Years'  War 
were  far  heavier  in  proportion  than  those  in- 
curred in  1870  ;  yet  he  says  there  is  no 
record  that  after  the  battles  of  Zorndorf, 
Hochstadt,  or  Leuthen,  the  officers  of  Fre- 
deric's army  employed  their  spare  time  in 
trying  to  discover  systems  by  which  battles 
might  be  fought  without  bloodshed.  And 
as  it  was  then,  so  it  is  now — great  results 
can  only  be  obtained  with  proportionate  sacri- 
fice. In  fact,  the  bottom  has  been  knocked 
out  of  all  the  universal  nostrums  for  victory 
by  practice  and  common-sense.  Even  out- 
flanking tactics  are  considerably  discredited 
now,  for  it  has  been  discovered  that  unless 
the  enemy  is  altogether  incapable  of  manoeu- 
vring, every  flank  attack  must  at  last 
result  in  a  local  front  attack,  besides  which, 
when  troops  are  acting  in  large  masses,  each 
battalion  is  rigidly  limited  as  to  its  front  by 
the  presence  of  the  other  bodies  on  either 
hand.  Hence  direct  attacks  must  not  be 
shirked,  and  it  is  only  by  the  intelligent 


324  German  opinion  on 

co-operation  of  the  artillery  that  the  terrible 
sacrifices  they  entail  can  be  reduced."  This, 
indeed,  seems  to  be  the  main  difference  be- 
tween the  German  practice  and  that  of  other 
nations,  notably  our  own.  Of  course,  all 
systems  refer  to  this  co-operation,  but  where 
they  fail  for  the  most  part  is  in  the  intelli- 
gence to  work  together  properly.  This  is 
particularly  the  case  in  the  English  service. 
In  reading  the  innumerable  discussions  and 
letters  on  the  subject  with  which  we  are  de- 
luged by  infantry  officers,  one  notices  the 
almost  universal  failure  to  appreciate  pro- 
perly the  part  played  by  the  artillery.  The 
tendency  is  to  rely  too  exclusively  on  the 
infantry  fire  of  the  attack  to  render  its 
approach  possible,  and  this  causes  a 
slowness  and  drag  to  the  advance  which 
would  probably  entail  double  the  loss, 
because  the  target  is  exposed  for  double 
the  time.  This  loss  is  by  no  means 
compensated  by  the  increased  losses  in- 
flicted on  the  defender,  for  when  once  the 
advance  by  rushes  across  the  zone  of  aimed 


the  Delhi  Manoeuvres.  325 

fire  commences,  the  fire  of  the  stationary  de- 
fender from  behind  cover  is  relatively  much 
more  accurate  than  that  of  the  assailant,  ex- 
hausted and  excited  as  the  latter  must  be  by 
the  advance  itself.  The  German  idea  is  rather 
to  take  full  advantage  of  the  power  of  the 
artillery,  supported,  as  far  as  possible,  by 
infantry  fire,  and  then  to  push  rapidly  on 
by  rushes,  only  halting  and  firing  enough  to 
let  the  men  get  their  wind,  and  to  distract 
the  enemy's  attention  by  giving  him  a  chang- 
ing target,  till  they  get  so  close  that  every 
rifle  discharged  horizontally  should  "  bag  " 
its  man.  After  four  or  five  minutes  of  con- 
centrated fire,  the  main  body  comes  up  in 
line,  and  gives  the  impetus  for  the  assault 
itself.  But  the  Germans  also  recognise  that 
against  good  infantry  the  shooting-line  will 
not  be  able  to  reach  this  distance  without 
frequent  and  strong  reinforcement.  Indeed, 
one  often  hears  it  said  amongst  the  older 
officers — and,  of  course,  sees  it  in  print  too — 
that  within  the  zone  of  aimed  fire, .  troops 
once  halted  can  only  be  got  to  advance  by 


326  German  opinion  on 

bringing  up  fresh  troops  into  the  fighting- 
line.  We  think,  too,  that  though  Von  Scherff 
has  many  opponents  in  the  service,  the  prin- 
ciple on  which  he  bases-the  distances  between 
supporting  lines  on  the  battle-field — viz., 
"that  no  man  can  stand  halted  for  five 
minutes  in  effective  range  of  the  breech- 
loader, and  hence  that  fresh  support  must  be  at 
hand  to  reinforce  before  that  five  minutes  is 
over  " — meets  with  very  general  acceptance. 
The  rapidity  with  which  an  attack  conduct- 
ed on  these  ideas  comes  on,  is  scarcely  credi- 
ble, and  when  one  stands  on  the  defenders' 
side  and  sees  behind  the  fighting-line,  line 
upon  line  of  support  all  pressing  forward  at 
the  same  steady  pace — for,  from  the  mo- 
ment the  attack  proper  is  begun,  the  main 
body  and  troops  behind  never  interrupt  their 
advance,  but  come  on  "  in  parade  order/7  with 
bands  playing,  colours  flying,  and  the 
strictest  attention  to  dressing,  &c., — the 
moral  effect  is  not  to  be  mistaken,  The 
actual  time  occupied,  assuming  the  advance 
to  commence  at  700  yards  from  the  enemy, 


the  Delhi  Manoeuvres.  327 

may  usually  be  estimated  at  from  twelve 
to  fifteen  minutes.  The  advance  of  the 
Guards'  Brigade  at  the  last  Queen's  re- 
view at  Aldershot  took  about  half-an-hour, 
and  was  then  300  yards  distant  from  the 
object  of  the  attack.  As  regards  fire  disci- 
pline : — During  the  period  of  preparation 
before  the  advance  by  rushes  begins,  the 
units  of  a  German  battalion  are  practically 
intact  in  the  hands  of  their  own  officers, 
and  volleys,  fire  pauses,  &c.,  can  all  be  con- 
trolled. Once  the  advance  begins,  indepen- 
dent firing  can  alone  be  relied  on.  The 
intermixture  of  the  companies,  &c.,  which 
we  seek  to  avoid  by  the  ingenious  but  im- 
practicable scheme  of  Colonel  Macdonald, 
the  Germans  grasp  boldly.  It  is,  after  all, 
a  peace-time  difficulty  only.  It  is  annoy- 
ing in  peace,  certainly,  to  see  one's  company 
taken  out  of  one's  hands  by  the  senior 
Captain  coming  up  with  his  fresh  one  from 
behind  ;  but  in  war-time  it  is  extremely 
tmlikely  that  both  Captains  would  be  still 
unhurt  at  this  period  of  the  action.  It  is 


328  German  opinion  on 

utterly  unavoidable  to  prevent  the  mixture 
of  regiments,  sometimes  even  of  brigades,  in 
a  general  action,  and  the  only  way  to  mini- 
mise the  evil  is  to  adopt  the  system  in  use  in 
Germany,  of  dividing  up  the  fighting-line 
into  fresh  commands  as  reinforcements  come 
up,  and  thus  accustoming  officers  and  non- 
commissioned officers  to  rapidly  assume  com- 
mand of  the  men  nearest  to  them.  A  step 
in  advance,  and  a  practical  one,  would  be  for 
the  battalion  commander  to  fall-out  officers 
from  time  to  time  during  the  progress  of  the 
attack  to  mark  the  casualties.  It  is  only  the 
same  principle  as  gun-drill  with  reduced 
detachments.  As  far  as  the  mere  form  of 
attack- drill  goes,  there  is  but  little  to  choose 
between  those  one  sees  in  Germany  and  the 
one  in  our  own  field  exercises  ;  but  the 
point  in  which  the  Germans  have  a  real 
superiority  over  us  is  the  spirit  in  which 
the  form  is  interpreted.  Put  in  the  briefest 
way,  the  spirit  amounts  to  this.  There  are 
two  dangers  against  which  the  attack  has  to 
contend, — the  first  is  numerical  loss  ;  the 


the  Delhi  Manoeuvres.  329 

second,  the  weakening  of  the  resolution  of 
the  men  entailed  by  the  first.  The  for- 
mer can  only  be  reduced  by  intelligent 
co-operation  between  the  artillery  and 
infantry  in  the  preparatory  stage,  and  by 
rapidity  of  movement  when  once  the  execu- 
tion begins.  But  against  the  latter,  only 
the  discipline  and  training  of  the  troops  can 
guard.  Men  must  be  trained  to  face,  not 
to  shirk  losses  ;  troops  taught  to  be  over- 
cautious in  the  attack — like  the  Austrians, 
French,  and  our  own — are  already  more 
than  half-beaten  before  the  action  begins,  so 
the  Germans  say.  Here,  indeed,  is  some- 
thing worth  copying,  and  something  which 
would  add  immeasurably  more  to  our  effi- 
ciency than  all  the  brown  belts,  spiked 
helmets,  &c.,  with  which  our  tailors'  bills 
have  been  increased  and  our  tempers 
upset  during  the  last  twenty  years.  Let 
us  have  some  settled  system  of  musketry 
instruction  and  tactics,  and  cease  to  harass 
officers  and  men  by  a  never-ending  fire 
of  circulars  from  the  Adjutant  -  General's 


330   German  opinion  on  Delhi  Manoeuvres. 

office.  Let  us  learn  to  regard  the  art  of  war 
from  as  practical  a  point  of  view  as  possi- 
ble, and  leave  trifles  such  as  buttons  and 
lace  to  be  looked  after  by  trifling  minds. 


THE  SPIRIT  OF  THE  RUSSIAN 
ARMY. 

"nnHE  letter  killeth,  the  spirit  giveth  life,  " 
JL  is  as  true  a  saying  when  applied  to 
military  as  to  spiritual  matters.  Only 
those  who  have  learnt  by  experience,  can 
realise  to  what  an  extent  the  most  profound 
study  of  official  forms  and  statistics  can 
mislead  a  man  in  his  estimate  of  the  fight- 
ing value  of  a  foreign  army,  and  in  none  is 
this  more  the  case  than  in  the  Russian 
army.  From  a  paper  point  of  view,  the 
impression  conveyed  is  undoubtedly  highly 
favourable ;  organisation  and  tactics  are  all 
founded  on  the  latest  and  most  approved 
principles,  copied,  in  fact,  generally  from 
those  of  the  German  army  ;  and  materials 
for  forming  this  opinion  are  abundant 
enough. 

But  a  study  of  the  spirit  reveals  a  totally 
different  state  of  things,  and  owing  to   the 


332        Spirit  of  the  Eussian  Army. 

lethargy  of  our  Intelligence  Department, 
the  materials  available  are  both  scanty  and 
inaccurate. 

Yet  it  is  of  infinitely  greater  consequence 
that  our  Staff  and  regimental  officers 
should  be  imbued  with  a  knowledge  of  the 
morale  of  the  army,  which  they  are  most 
likely  to  be  engaged  with,  than  that  they 
should  have  at  their  finger  ends  the  masses 
of  figures  and  forms  with  which  our  books 
are  flooded  ;  and  it  is  our  object  to  supply, 
as  far  as  possible,  this  admitted  want. 
But  at  the  outset  one  is  met  with  the 
difficulty  presented  by  the  enormous  area 
of  the  Russian  Empire,  and  the  different 
characteristics  of  its  inhabitants.  Practi- 
cally we  may  disregard  the  idiosyncrasies  of 
the  inhabitants  of  Nova  Zembla  and  other 
remote  parts,  and  confine  ourselves  to  those 
troops  most  likely  to  be  opposed  to  us  in 
India. 

From  the  map  of  the  distribution  of  the 
army  of  ^Russia  in  peace,  it  appears  most 
likely  that  these  will  be  drawn  chiefly  from 


Spirit  of  the  Russian  Army.        333 

the  central  provinces  of  Russia,  i.e.,  from 
around  Moscow  and  Nijni  Novgorod,  both 
because  she  would  hardly  dare  to  denude 
her  western  frontiers  of  troops  ;  and  also 
because  her  best  line  of  communications 
lies  by  the  Petersburg -Orenburg  Railway 
and  down  the  Volga,  from  thence  across 
the  Caspian  in  Nobel's  new  petroleum  fleet 
to  Tchekislar,  the  northern  terminus  of  the 
railway  to  Askabad.  Even  in  1854,  when 
she  was  assured  of  the  benevolent  neutrality 
of  both  Prussia  and  Austria,  it  was  consi- 
dered dangerous  to  move  troops  from  those 
frontiers  for  the  Crimea  ;  and  now,  when 
for  the  former  a  united  Germany  has  been 
substituted,  burning  with  hatred  against  her, 
when,  in  fact,  it  is  openly  said  in  the  German 
army  that  the  maintenance  of  peace  depends 
almost  altogether  on  the  life  of  one  man, 
it  is  not  probable  that  she  will  care  to  risk 
more  than  she  did  on  the  former  occasion. 
The  army  of  the  Caucasus  is  also  not  likely 
to  be  available  for  operations  against  Indian 
troops,  as  they  will  probably  find  occupa- 


334        Spirit  of  the  Russian  Army. 

tion  enough  looking  after  the  Turks,  sup- 
ported, let  us  hope,  by  English  battalions 
and  money. 

Throughout  the  central  provinces  of 
Russia,  owing  to  the  similarity  of  the 
country,  climate,  and  occupation  of  the 
inhabitants,  there  is  a  singular  uniformity 
in  their  character.  The  difference  in  in- 
telligence between  the  town  and  country- 
man is  probably  less  than  in  any  other 
kingdom  in  Europe,  and  the  country-people 
form  five- sixths  of  the  total  population  ; 
hence  the  proportion  of  townsmen  in  a  line 
battalion  is  less  than  in  any  other  army  ; 
but  it  is  the  townsman  who,  by  his  greater 
intelligence,  adopts  the  characteristics  of 
modern  fighting  most  readily.  The  Russian 
"  Moujik,  "  with  his  dull  half- animal  orga- 
nisation, has  been  sufficiently  often  de- 
scribed ;  but  the  bearing  of  his  idiosyn- 
crasies on  military  matters  has  not  been 
sufficiently  taken  into  account.  Perfect 
discipline,  coupled  with  a  high  degree  of 
individual  initiative  in  all  ranks,  are,  it  will 


Spirit  of  the  Eussian  Army.        335 

be  admitted,  the  two  most  essential  factors 
of  success  on  the  battle-field  ;  but  though 
in  the  former  requisite  the  Russian  army 
is  well  found,  in  the  latter  it  is  almost 
entirely  deficient.  Probably  in  no  army  in 
the  world  are  the  men  less  fitted  to  fight 
in  extended  order.  Their  sheep-like  ten- 
dency to  run  into  flocks  when  under  fire, 
has  been  noted  by  every  author  who  has 
written  of  them,  and  it  appears  just  as 
strongly  in  the  accounts  of  the  Seven  Years' 
"War  as  in  those  of  the  Crimea  and  Bulgaria. 
In  no  other  language  can  we  find  a  saying 
analogous  to  this  : — "  It  is  pleasanter  to 
die  in  company,  and  old  mother  Russia 
has  sons  enough. "  Rather  a  contrast  to 
the  "  Come  on,  Bill :  bio  wed  if  there  ain't 
thousands  of  them/7  of  the  escaped  guard- 
room prisoner  to  his  chum  as  they  were 
running  out  on  the  morning  of  Inkerman  to 
have  "  a  pot  at  the  Russians."  Huddled 
together,  they  have  stood  over  and  over 
again  to  be  shot  down,  till  at  last  the 
instinct  of  self-preservation  has  seized  the 


336        Spirit  of  the  Russian  Army. 

whole  mass,  and  they  have  turned  and  run 
in  perfect  panic.  When  they  did  run  in 
Turke)?-,  every  conceivable  impediment  to 
their  progress  was  recklessly  thrown  aside, 
and  not  only  arms  and  accoutrements, 
but  even  their  paper  roubles,  which  could 
not  have  weighed  much,  were  cast  aside. 
But  it  is  said  that  during  the  latter  portion 
of  the  war,  those  battalions  which  had 
provided  themselves  with  entrenching  tools, 
sacrificed  everything  else,  but  stuck  to 
their  shovels. 

Panic,  however,  has  not  often  seized 
them,  and  on  many  occasions  they  have 
borne  almost  incredible  losses  without 
giving  way, — witness  the  battles  of  Zorn- 
dorf,  Friedland,  Borodino,  and  the  storming 
of  Ismail.  Further,  it  must  be  remembered 
that  this  very  stolidity  renders  them  pecu- 
liarly susceptible  to  the  mesmerism  of  a 
real  leader,  such  as  Souvaroff  or  Skobeleff. 
Probably  no  troops  could  have  been  rallied 
and  brought  on  again  and  again  over  the 
same  ground,  in  the  way  the  latter  sue- 


Spirit  of  the  Russian  Army.        337 

ceeded  in  doing  against  the  Green  Hill 
redoubts  at  Plevna.  And  again,  though 
the  absence  of  intelligence  makes  it  parti- 
cularly difficult  to  teach  them  musketry  as 
a  fine  art,  it  renders  them  less  liable  to 
give  way  to  the  tendency  so  fatal  in  the 
Latin  races  to  fire  fast  and  without  aiming. 
And  what  of  the  officers  who  command 
these  men  ?  Socially  these  have  changed 
very  much  since  the  days  of  the  Crimea. 
The  enormous  numerical  increase  in  the 
army,  together  with  the  almost  complete 
ruin  which  has  overtaken  the  landed 
proprietors  since  the  emancipation  of  the 
serfs,  has  rendered  it  utterly  impossible  to 
obtain  a  sufficient  supply  of  educated 
gentlemen  to  fill  these  positions.  Of  course 
in  the  picked  regiments  of  the  Guard,  or 
in  those  divisions  brought  together  for  the 
Emperor's  inspections  at  Tsarkoe-Selo,  men 
as  good  as  in  any  other  army  are  to  be 
met  with  ;  but  in  the  distant  garrisons,  life 
is  so  wearisome  and  monotonous,  that  very 
soon  what  little  education  they  ever  had  is 
M.,  L.  22 


338        Spirit  of  the  Russian  Army. 

forgotten,  and  they  relapse  into  a  state  of 
semi-somnolence,  modified  by  vodki.  Those 
amongst  them  who  think — horrified  and 
disgusted  by  the  things  they  see  around 
them,  and  particularly  by  the  police  duties 
they  have  to  perform,  —  inevitably  become 
Nihilists ;  and  frequently  both  active  and 
dangerous  ones.  Hence  there  arises  in 
regiments  a  feeling  of  distrust  and  suspicion, 
which  condemns  each  to  almost  perpetual 
solitude.  Let  us  see  what  a  well-known 
German  authority  (Sarmaticus)  says  of 
them  in  describing  Warsaw  :  "  Numbers  of 
officers  in  uniform  are  seen  in  the  streets, 
but  they  are  the  very  opposite  of  those  we 
are  accustomed  to  in  our  own  towns. 
Kussia  is  no  soil  for  the  growth  of  those 
smart  young  soldiers  of  the  Unter  den 
Linden  type.  Here  there  is  none  of  that 
careless  half  swaggering  manner,  willingly 
forgiven,  because  we  know  that  behind  it 
there  is  breeding  and  honour  not  unmixed 
with  heroism.  The  Russian  officer  is,  as 
far  as  concerns  his  exterior,  the  very  personi- 


Spirit  of  the  Russian  Army.        339 

fication  of  monotony  and  heaviness — for 
he  is  never  seen  except  wrapped  in  his 
grey  Russian  overcoat  of  coarse  thick  cloth 
which  gives  ungainliness  to  every  figure. 
The  coat  has  to  protect  the  wearer,  both 
against  the  cold  of  winter  and  the  burning 
heat  of  summer.  This  simplicity  may  have 
something  practical  to  recommend  it,  but 
a  stranger  can  hardly  conceal  his  astonish- 
ment, when  he  is  himself  clad  in  the  lightest 
possible  garments  at  seeing  these  heavily 
cloaked  figures  wandering  about  with  the 
thermometer  at  80°  in  the  shade.  The 
Russian  officer  is  further  characterised  by 
his  unsociable,  generally  solitary  appear- 
ance. One  seldom  sees  a  group  of  them  ; 
never  one  made  up  of  the  different  arms, 
or  commands.  They  take  no  notice  of 
each  other.  The  mutual  salute  is  unknown 
to  them.  Society  takes  no  notice  of  them, 
particularly  in  Warsaw.  When  they  enter 
public  rooms,  such  as  cafes,  etc.,  no  special 
places  are  reserved  for  them  ;  but  they  slink 
shyly  into  a  corner,  as  if  wishing  to  escape 


340        Spirit  of  the  Russian  Army. 

observation  ;"  and  more  to  the  same  effect. 
It  is  a  pity  that  we  have  not  a  description 
of  the  English  officer  by  the  same  author, 
in  order  to  make  a  comparison  ;  but  the 
usual  opinion  in  Germany  of  the  English- 
man as  a  leader  is  very  favourable,  not  to 
say  flattering  ;  and  there  is  no  reason  to 
suppose  that  this  author  would  have 
regarded  us  less  favourably  than  the  others. 
So  far,  therefore,  as  the  individual  quality 
of  officers  and  men  alike,  in  the  Russian 
army  is  concerned,  we  would  seem  to  have 
much  better  ground  than  mere  patriotism 
for  asserting  that  the  English  soldier  is 
distinctly  superior.  Nor  have  we  any 
ground  for  supposing  that  our  troops,  in 
steadiness  and  discipline  in  mass,  are 
inferior  to  any  of  the  world.  Granting 
these  two  premises,  the  conclusion  that 
whenever,  in  a  hard-fought  campaign,  it 
should  be  our  lot  to  meet  the  Russians  on 
anything  like  equal  terms,  we  should  be 
victorious,  does  not  seem  open  to  doubt. 


RUSSIAN  INFANTRY  TACTICS. 

IN  continuation  of  our  previous  article  on 
this  subject,  the  following  notes  from 
General  Dragomirow's  writings  will  not  be 
without  interest,  and  will  enable  the  reader 
to  form  some  idea  of  the  ruling  tendency 
in  Russian  tactics.  We  must  begin  by 
stating,  that,  though  the  General  writes 
very  forcibly,  yet  he  is  continually  preach- 
ing the  necessity  of  moderation  in  all 
things  ;  shooting  must  not  be  sacrificed 
to  discipline,  nor  discipline  be  allowed  to 
hamper  the  dash  and  spirit  of  an  attack  ; 
but  that  the  proper  balance  should  through- 
out be  maintained.  It  must  be  borne  in 
mind,  too,  that  he  is  writing,  for  Russians, 
and  not  for  Englishmen.  He  is  writing, 
that  is  to  say,  for  troops  that  are  second  to 
none  in  the  world  for  stolidity  in  the  mass  ; 
but  whose  powers  of  individual  action, 
having  been  always  suppressed  in  training, 
are  probably  less  than  those  of  any  other 
soldiers  of  Europe. 


342          Russian  Infantry  Tactics. 

General  Dragomirow  begins  by  stating 
the  obvious,  but  frequently  forgotten  fact, 
that  the  soldier  must  be  taught  in  peace, 
only  that  which  will  be  of  use  to  him  in  war  ; 
before  the  enemy  a  man  does  not  think 
logically,  but  only  does  what  he  has  learnt 
to  do.  To  counteract  the  tendency  to 
purely  mechanical  obedience,  inculcated  in 
close  order  drill,  great  stress  must  be  laid 
on  his  mental  or  moral  training  ;  he  must 
be  taught  to  think  logically  and  carry  his 
conclusions  out  rapidly ;  the  feeling  of 
responsibility  should  also  be  developed ; 
u  garrison  duty  and  guard-mounting  are  the 
best  means  for  those  ends."  The  endu- 
rance of  the  soldier  should  be  cultivated  by 
gymnastics  (but  not  too  much  of  them), 
and  by  always  drilling  and  marching  in 
full  marching  order  ;  Suvarow's  maxim 
should  never  be  forgotten,  "  light  at  drill, 
heavy  on  the  march  ;  heavy  at  drill,  light 
on  the  march. "  With  regard  to  shooting, 
he  says — "If  too  much  weight  is  given  to 
good  shooting,  we  get  a  man  who  shoots 


Russian  Infantry  Tactics.  343 

more  or  less  well  at  long  ranges,  but  who 
is  not  particularly  anxious  to  go  in  with, 
the  bayonet :  and  eventually  too  much  im- 
portance cornes  to  be  attached  to  the  use 
of  the  ground  as  cover/7 

The  General  disapproves  altogether  of 
teaching  men  to  take  advantage  •  of  the 
ground  as  cover.  He  is  of  opinion  that  it 
destroys  the  dash  of  the  men,  and  is,  more- 
over, a  waste  of  time,  "  as  every  five-year 
old  child  can  play  at  hide  and  seek/7  The 
expression  of  these  views  in  this  uncom- 
promising manner,  drew  down  on  him  the 
pens  of  General  Todleben?  Seddeler,  Kou- 
roupatkine  and  Kaulbars,  but  their  voices 
have  been  raised  in  vain,  and  the  idea  that  it 
is  deleterious  to  insist  too  much  on  the  use 
of  cover  in  the  attack,  has  gained  ground 
both  in  Russia  and  Germany.  These  two 
countries,  it  must  be  remembered,  have  both 
recently  emerged  from  a  victorious  war,  and 
have  both  enormous  armies.  Hence  it  is 
not  unnatural  that  they  should  favour  a 
form  of  attack  which  brings  the  greatest 


344          Russian  Infantry  Tactics. 

possible  force  to  bear  on  the  position  to  be 
taken  in  the  shortest  possible  time. 

With  regard  to  the  use  of  the  bayonet 
and  charges  in  close  order,  Dragornirow 
speaks  up  very  warmly.  In  1876,  writing 
in  answer  to  a  pamphlet  by  a  General  Sku- 
garewiski,  proposing  a  wholesale  copy  of 
the  ideas  of  Boguslawski,  Wedmar  and 
other  Prussian  authors,  he  said,  "  if  many 
Prussian  writers  maintain  that  it  is  impos- 
sible to  keep  up  close  order  formations 
under  the  Infantry  fire  of  to-day,  then 
from  their  point  of  view,  it  is  quite  con- 
sistent— for  to  confess  its  possibility,  and 
yet  to  admit  that  they  themselves  failed  to 
do  so,  is  more  than  one  can  expect  from 
human  nature  ;  but  victory  crowned  their 
efforts,  consequently  they  are  all  heroes  ; 
and  what  heroes  failed  to  do,  nobody  else 
can  succeed  in  doing/7 

It  is  a  pity  some  of  our  own  authorities 
did  not  take  the  same  view  of  the  matter, 
for  the  above-mentioned  Prussian  authors 
only  stated  their  private  views,  which  were 


Russian  Infantry  Tactics.  345 

deduced  entirely  from  their  personal  experi- 
ence as  company  leaders,  and  never  received 
the  sanction  of  the  superior  commands. 
In  fact,  the  chief  of  the  General  Staff,  Colonel 
Bronsart  von  Schellendorf  was  authorised 
to  write  a  reply  on  the  subject,  the  gist  of 
which  was,  that  though  the  fighting  line  no 
longer  could  work  in  close  order,  yet  all  the 
successive  lines  behind  it  must  do  so,  and 
that,  to  carry  a  position  by  assault,  such  a 
mass  of  men  must  be  brought  to  bear  on  it, 
that  the  fighting  line  becomes  a  close  order 
formation  in  all  but  name,  and  these  con- 
tinue to  be  the  guiding  ideas  in  Germany 
to  this  day.  Quite  recently  we  ourselves 
saw  the  final  assault  delivered  by  a  line  of 
men  ten  deep  and  1,000  yards  of  front. 

On  the  subject  of  entrenchments  and  in- 
struction in  their  formation  during  peace, 
the  opinions  of  the  General  will  be,  no 
doubt,  most  acceptable  to  the  hard-worked 
British  subaltern  if  to  nobody  else.  "  What 
is  the  good,"  he  writes,  "  of  throwing  up 
entrenchments  which  nobody  is  going  to 


346          Russian  Infantry  Tactics. 

attack."  To  the  objection,  that  without 
this  training,  men  and  officers  would  re- 
main unacquainted  with  the  form  and  trace 
of  the  works,  he  replies  "  what  does  that 
matter  ?  Are  there  not  specialists  available 
for  superintendence,  and,  besides,  in  most 
minds  the  knowledge  of  these  forms  arid 
rules  only  destroys  the  sound  common  sense 
view  of  the  matter."  One  cannot  help 
wondering,  however,  what  SkobelefFs  men 
on  the  green  hills  before  Plevna  would  have 
said  on  this  subject,  when,  having  carried 
the  Turkish  redoubts  overnight  on  that 
famous  27th  of  August,  neither  specialists 
nor  tools  were  to  be  found,  and  they  labour- 
ed with  bare  hands,  swords,  bayonets,  and 
canteens  to  get  some  sort  of  cover  against 
the  hailstorm  of  Turkish  bullets.  But  the 
opposition  of  Todleben  and  others  have  in 
this  case  proved  too  strong,  and  the  Russians 
are  now  all  supplied  with  portable  shovels 
and  practised  in  their  use. 

To  field  firing  he  attaches  great  impor- 
tance,   both    on  account  of  the  practice  it 


Russian  Infantry  Tactics.          347 

gives  to  the  men  in  shooting,  and  also 
because  it  shews  what  formations  for  attack 
are  useful,  and  what  are  not.  Complicated 
forms  disappear,  and  the  constant  craving 
for  innovations  with  them.  The  com- 
manders learn  to  command  from  the  posi- 
tion they  would  actually  have  to  occupy 
in  war ;  and  the  men  become  accustomed 
to  this  method  of  leading.  Every  one's 
attention  being  directed  on  the  target,  there 
is  none  to  spare  for  such  trifles  as  faultless 
dressing,  etc.  ;  "  and  further  on  he  proposes 
that  trenches  or  cover  should  be  constructed 
in  which  troops  should  be  stationed  during 
the  fire,  to  accustom  them  to  the  sound  of 
the  bullets  flying  over  head.  This  is  prac- 
tical with  a  vengeance,  but  he  has  been  out- 
done in  this  direction  by  a  Prussian  General 
of  distinction,  who,  some  ten  years  ago, 
proposed  in  all  seriousness  that  on  one  day 
in  each  of  the  manoeuvres,  ball  cartridges, 
in  the  proportion  of  one  to  ten  blank  ones, 
should  be  issued  to  the  troops. 


RUSSIAN  MOUNTED  INFANTRY. 

WRITING  of  the  Russian  Army,  we 
have  already  pointed  out  how  wide 
the  distinction  is  in  that  service,  between 
the  letter  of  their  regulations  and  the  spirit 
in  which  these  are  interpreted.  Some  ob- 
servations made  by  Colonel  Baikov,  of 
the  Russian  General  Staff,  in  a  pamphlet 
published  recently,  will  serve  to  throw  fur- 
ther light  on  this  distinction  ;  and  coming 
from  the  pen  of  a  Russian  officer,  will  be 
free  from  any  suspicion  of  national  pre- 
judice. 

The  most  recent  Russian  regulation  for 
the  instruction  of  Cavalry  in  dismounted 
duties,  dated  1884,  lays  down  clearly  that 
the  charge  (mounted)  is  the  prime  raison 
d'etre  of  Cavalry,  and  that  a  dismounted 
combat  is  only  to  be  undertaken  when  the 
nature  of  the  ground  and  circumstances  ren- 
der its  adoption  the  only  plan  by  which  the 
mission  of  Cavalry  can  be  fulfilled.  This 


Russian  Mounted  Infantry.         349 

principle,  interpreted  liberally,  as  it  would 
be  in  a  country  where  the  nature  and  duties 
of  Cavalry  are  well  understood,  would  leave 
nothing  to  be  desired  ;  but,  according  to 
the  Russian  Colonel,  the  true  character  of 
the  arm  is  so  little  understood  that  the 
slightest  inequality  of  the  ground,  or  the 
existence  of  anything  which  can  be  made 
out  to  be  "  unfavourable  circumstances,'7 
causes  the  Cavalry  at  once  to  draw  rein  and 
have  recourse  to  their  carbines. 

We  must  point  out  that  Colonel  Baikov 
himself  belongs  by  no  means  to  the  ad- 
vanced German  school  of  Cavalry  tacticians. 
His  writings  nowhere  imply  a  belief  in  the 
power  of  Cavalry  to  decide  a  general  action 
by  its  use  in  masses  ;  and  hence  his  re- 
marks on  the  utter  want  of  dash  and  con- 
fidence displayed  by  his  countrymen,  de- 
serve greater  attention  than,  perhaps,  they 
would  otherwise  be  entitled  to.  Thus, 
writing  of  the  German  Cavalry  divisions  in 
1870,  he  roundly  asserts  that  they  proved 
themselves  helpless  even  against  the  In- 


350         Russian  Mounted  Infantry. 

fantry  of  the  Grard  Mobile,  which  was  far 
from  being  the  case.  In  the  advance  on 
Sedan,  when  the  Imperial  army  was  still 
in  existence,  on  more  than  one  occasion 
the  German  Hussars,  finding  themselves 
opposed  by  Infantry  in  villages,  deliberate- 
ly dismounted,  and  having  no  firearms, 
stormed  and  carried  these  villages  with  the 
sword  ;  and  in  the  campaigns  on  the  Loire, 
where  the  wooded  nature  of  the  ground 
prevented  their  getting  at  the  enemy,  they 
successfully  manoeuvred  him  out  into  the 
open,  and  then  charged  and  destroyed  him. 
In  more  than  one  regimental  history  may 
the  account  of  such  an  action  be  read  with 
the  ominous  words  after  it — "no  pris- 
oners were  taken.77 

But  Colonel  Baikov's  views  were  gener- 
ally accepted  in  his  country,  and  the 
Russian  Cavalry  started  for  the  Balkans, 
holding,  as  an  axiom,  "  that,  in  the  face  of 
the  breech-loader,  Cavalry  is  helpless  :  " 
ignoring  the  truth  of  the  maxim  so  stead- 
fastly held  by  Souvaroff — "the  arm  itself 


Eussian  Mounted  Infantry.         351 

is  nothing,  it  is  the  man  who  stands  be- 
hind it ;  "  a  principle,  by  the  way,  that  we, 
of  all  nations,  should  take  most  to  heart. 

Starting  with  this  fixed  idea,  it  was  only 
natural  that  the  record  of  the  Russian  horse 
during  this  campaign  should  be  one  of  con- 
tinual failure  :  and  it  is  equally  natural 
that,  from  such  a  failure,  additional  argu- 
ments in  favour  of  this  mistaken  notion 
should  be  drawn.  With  regard  to  this,  let 
us  quote  the  Colonel's  own  words — "  masses 
of  magnificent  (  ?)  Cavalry,  sent  to  com- 
plete the  blockade  of  Plevna,  did  not  even 
succeed  in  stopping  the  march  of  the  con- 
voys ;  they  only  retarded  it.'7 

Here  is  another  characteristic  illustra- 
tion: "A  reconnoissance,  composed  of 
picked  men,  all  good  shots,  was  despatched 
against  the  enemy's  rear,  in  command  of 
an  officer  noted  for  his  audacity.  Starting 
in  the  evening,  after  a  short  march,  it  dis- 
mounted and  sent  back  its  horses  ;  then, 
after  having  marched  about  three  miles,  it 
met  with  a  party  of  armed  villagers,  and 


352         Russian  Mounted  Infantry. 

giving  up  its  mission,  it  returned  to  its 
quarters,  firmly  convinced  that  it  had  done 
all  that  it  ought  to  have  done." 

Since  the  war,  matters  have  not  improved. 
It  has  become,  in  fact,  quite  the  excep- 
tion in  the  manoeuvres  to  see  two  bodies 
of  Cavalry  charge.  The  regulations  them- 
selves are  much  to  blame  for  this  state  of 
things  ;  for  though,  as  above-mentioned, 
they  recognised  the  importance  of  the 
charge,  so  little  attention  has  been  paid  to 
the  proper  meaning  of  the  terms  used,  that 
"  a  too  literal  interpretation  may  be  made 
of  them,  particularly  by  men  whose  minds 
are  void  of  all  critical  sense,  little  accus- 
tomed to  serious  study,  and  possessing 
only  a  trace  of  historical  knowledge  of  their 
arm."  This  last  sentence,  by  the  way, 
throws  a  good  deal  of  light  on  the  average 
capacity  of  the  Russian  officer. 

The  guiding  idea,  in  fact,  of  these  in- 
structions, is  that  a  dismounted  Cavalry 
man  becomes,  ipso  facto,  an  Infantry  man, 
and  is  expected  to  attack  in  the  same 


Russian  Mounted  Infantry.         353 

manner,  and  to  hold  his  own  with  the  same 
determination.  According  to  Colonel  Bai- 
kov,  this  is  utterly  impracticable  ;  and  the 
attempt  to  make  them  do  this  can  only 
lead  to  an  unnecessary  waste  of  men  and 
horses.  In  the  defence  of  a  position  against 
Infantry  to  the  last,  the  complete  destruc- 
tion of  the  led  horses  becomes  a  matter  of 
certainty.  Our  authority  is  himself  of  opin- 
ion that  the  action  should  be  broken  off 
before  the  enemy  comes  within  some  300 
paces  of  the  line.  In  fact,  he  wishes  to  see 
Cavalry  employed  on  the  defensive,  only  as 
a  feint,  to  induce  a  premature  deployment 
of  the  enemy's  forces,  but  not  to  wait  and 
become  seriously  engaged. 

As  to  mounted  Infantry  attacking  In- 
fantry proper,  Colonel  Baikov  points  out 
the  extreme  extravagance  in  material  en- 
tailed by  such  a  course.  A  whole  mount- 
ed Infantry  division  can  hardly  put  in  line 
as  many  rifles  as  a  couple  of  battalions  ; 
and  in  executing  an  attack, .  must  be  pre- 
pared to  lose  at  least  thirty  per  cent. 
M->L.  23 


354         Russian  Mounted  Infantry* 

of  their  strength,  even  if  successful.  But 
to  empoly  a  whole  division  of  mounted  men  to 
destroy  a  couple  of  battalions  only,  is  hardly 
an  economical  method  of  making  war.  It 
may  be  stated,  in  conclusion,  that  Colonel 
Baikov's  views  on  the  dismounted  action 
of  Cavalry  are  practically  identical  with 
those  held  by  the  leading  German  author- 
ities, and  derive  their  chief  importance  for 
us  from  the  side-lights  they  throw  on  the 
interior  condition  of  the  Russian  Army. 
From  this  point  of  view,  they  deserve  the 
attentive  study  of  all  English  officers. 


THE  RUSSIAN  COMMISSARIAT. 

IN  the  event  of  war  in  the  coming 
Spring,  the  most  serious  difficulty 
with  which  the  Russian  Army  will  have  to 
contend,  will  not  be  the  enemy  in  its  front, 
but  its  own  Commissariat  in  rear.  The 
supply  of  troops  in  war  is  based,  in  Russia, 
on  a  system  of  contracts,  which  are  given 
out  to  large  firms,  to  deliver  food,  clothing, 
etc.,  at  the  terminal  stations  of  the  lines  of 
supply,  where  the  goods  are  inspected  and 
passed'  by  the  Intendance,  and  forwarded 
to  the  front.  In  all  times  and  places,  Army 
contractors  have  enjoyed  a  more  or  less 
unenviable  reputation.  Even  in  our  own 
comparatively  uncorrupt  service,  there 
have  been  rumours,  the  reverse  of  flatter- 
ing to  this  class,  as  regards  their  honesty. 
The  Committee  of  Enquiry  appointed,  after 
the  Egyptian  war  of  1883,  and  generally 
known  as  Dr.  Cameron's  Committee,  dis- 
closed some  extremely  awkward  facts  ;  but 


356         The  Russian  Commissariat. 

even  the  greatest  American  adept  in  the 
Civil   War  must  confess  himself  outdone 
before   the   evidence  brought  out   by   the 
enquiries   in   Russia   after    the   campaign 
against   Turkey.      At  its   commencement, 
the  Russian  papers  were  jubilant  over  the 
progress   the   army   had    made   since   the 
Crimea  ;  but  news  from  the  theatre  of  war 
very  soon  made  it  evident,  that  the  progress 
of  the  supply  departments   had    certainly 
been   great,   but    entirely   in    the   wrong 
direction.     A  Petersburg  journal  published 
early  in  the  campaign,  the  following  com- 
plaint : — "  c  We  are  dying  of   famine  '  is 
the  cry  of  the  whole  army  ;  4  the  preserved 
meat  distributed  to  us  is  in  such  an   ad- 
vanced state  of  decomposition,   that    not 
only  is  it  unfit  for  food  ;  but  to  avoid  an 
epidemic,  we  have  been  compelled  to  bury 
tons  of  it.'" 

That  this  was  no  growl  of  professional 
grumblers,  such  as  exist  in  every  service, 
is  proved  by  the  following  extract  from  the 
official  report  of  a  Committee  composed  of 


The  Russian  Commissariat.         357 

the  Professors  of  the  University  of  Kieff, 
assembled  to  report  on  some  army  biscuit, 
"  Out  of  100  parts  of  this  biscuit,  we  have 
found  that  30  parts  consist  of  ingredients 
devoid  of  nutrition,  such  as  corn-husks,, 
straw,  sand  and  dirt.  The  water  era- 
ployed  in  their  manufacture  was,  properly- 
speaking,  not  water  at  all,  but  a  reddish 
brown  fluid,  resembling  cocoa  in  appearance, 
and  swarming  with  living  organisms, 
which,  by  keeping  it  in  incessant  move- 
ment, prevented  the  deposit  of  inorganic 
matter.  The  manufactory  where  these 
biscuits  were  produced,  was  low  and  damp  ; 
and  from  motives  of  economy,  the  kilns  in 
which  they  were  dried,  were  only  raised  to 
a  temperature  of  70°  C.  instead  of  1203 
C. — the  minimum  necessary  to  destroy  such 
germs.  The  consequence  has  been,  that 
each  of  the  biscuits  has  become  a  hot-bed 
for  the  propagation  of  these  bacteria,  which 
have  spread  to  the  outside,  and  formed  a 
coating  of  greenish  brown  mould." 

The  Commission  absolutely  declined  to 


358         77*0  Russian  Commissariat. 

experiment  with  these  articles  of  so-called 
food  on  dogs,  still  less  on  human  beings. 
But  thousands  of  tons  of  these  same  biscuits 
were  issued  to  the  armies  •  who,  having 
nothing  else,  were  compelled  to  eat  them 
or  starve.  The  other  articles  supplied  to 
the  army  were  no  better.  Their  clothing- 
was  shoddy,  and  their  shoe-soles  brown 
paper  ;  but  in  that  respect  they  were 
probably  no  worse  off  than  our  own  men 
in  the  Crimea. 

We  could  fill  page  after  page  with  ex- 
tracts of  the  same  character  from  Russian 
papers  ;  and  if  we  take  into  account  the 
rigour  of  the  Russian  Press  censorship,  we 
may  be  sure  that  only  a  tithe  of  the  total 
ever  saw  the  light.  For  a  proof  of  their 
truth,  we  have  only  to  look  at  the  epidemic 
of  disease  that  fell  on  the  army  after  the 
treaty  of  San  Stephano.  Of  course  the 
filthy  habits  of  the  Russian  soldiers  had 
much  to  say  to  the  outbreak  of  disease,  but 
hardships  and  privation  unquestionably 
aggravated  the  evil.  The  cause  of  all  this 


The  Russian  Commissariat.         359 

is  directly  traceable  to  the  corruption 
which  pervades  every  grade  of  Russian 
Society,  If  ever  the  Russians  get  India, 
the  Bengali  Baboo  will  have  met  his  match  ; 
and  what  between  backshish  and  the  un- 
pronounceable Russian  equivalent,  this 
country  will  be  anything  but  an  earthly 
paradise.  The  contractor  has  to  bribe  at 
both  ends  ;  first,  the  heads  of  departments 
to  get  his  tender  accepted,  and  next  the 
officers  who  pass  the  goods  on  delivery. 
The  amount  of  the  former  class  of  bribes 
is  almost  incredible.  Thus  in  one  of  the 
numerous  enquiries  held  after  the  war,  it 
appeared  that  a  contractor,  named  Rykoff 
— -besides  paying  several  hundred  thousand 
roubles  to  various  dignitaries  in  St.  Peters- 
burg—had to  give  one  million  to  a  General 
Bernard  (not  a  Russian  name  by  the  way) 
in  order  to  get  his  tenders  passed  ;  and  at 
the  beginning  of  the  campaign  it  was 
rumoured  all  over  the  town,  that  a 
Mademoiselle  Tchisloon,  an  actress,  had 
received  a  present  of  one  million,  in  ex- 


360         The  Russian  Commissariat. 

change  for  her  influence  with  the  Grand 
Duke  Nicholas  the  elder,  from  the  firm  of 
Gorvitz  and  Kohan,  one  of  the  most  noto- 
rious of  the  gang  of  fraudulent  contractors. 
In  the  above-mentioned  enquiry  into  the 
case  of  Rykoff,  who  was  also  the  director 
of  a  bank,  it  was  shewn  that  the  deposits 
in  this  bank  increased  enormously  during 
the  year  1877  j  and  that  the  greater  por- 
tion of  these  came  from  the  officers  of  the 
Intendance  at  the  theatre  of  war. 

Nevertheless,  it  does  not  appear  to  be 
the  fault  of  any  one  set  of  individuals,  that 
this  state  of  things  exists.  It  is  rather  due 
to  the  universal  corruption  of  the  whole 
race.  Even  well  wishers  of  their  country 
such  as  Stepniak,  admit  as  much.  In  his 
extremely  interesting  work,  Le  Tsar  et 
Tsarisnor,  he  gives  sketches  of  individuals, 
who,  from  time  to  time,  have  striven  to 
fight  against  the  tide,  but  who,  as  usual, 
were  swept  down  by  it.  Thus  a  great 
contractor  said  at  the  close  of  the  war  : — 
"  I  assure  you,  it  would  not  only  be  more 


The  Russian  Commissariat.         361 

agreeable  to  us,  but  even  more  profitable, 
to  supply  good  articles,  than  to  squander 
our  money  in  bribery,  to  secure  our  con- 
tracts. But  what  can  we  do  ;  for  the 
Commandants  and  receivers  insist  on  being 
bribed  to  pass  our  goods,  whatever  their 
quality.'7 

Stepniak  concludes  his  exposition  of  the 
mischief  in  these  words  : — "  I  leave  it  to 
the  reader  to  decide  which  are  the  most 
to  blame,  the  contractors,  speculators  by 
profession,  or  the  Generals,  Colonels,  etc.,  to 
whom  the  State  has  entrusted  its  honor, 
and  who  are  responsible  for  the  lives  and 
welfare  of  their  men/7  It  is  not  an  army 
supplied  on  these  principles  which  will 
cross  the  desert  from  Herat  to  Candahar. 


THE   AUSTRIAN    INFANTRY. 

AT  the  present  moment,  when  there  is  still 
every  reasonable  prospect  of  a  collision 
between  the  Austrians  and  Russians  taking 
place,  the  following  remarks  on  the  Austrian 
Infantry  may  not  be  altogether  without 
interest. 

As  in  the  case  of  other  armies,  a  mere 
study  of  the  drill  book  enables  us  to  form 
but  an  imperfect  idea  of  the  tactical  effici- 
ency of  an  army  :  that  depends  entirely  in 
the  spirit  in  which  the  instructions  in  the 
book  are  carried  out.  Looked  at  from  the 
German  point  of  view,  the  Austrian  In- 
fantry Field  Exercise  leaves  little  to  be 
desired,  though  it  may  perhaps  be  consi- 
dered to  be  too  much  a  handbook  of  tactics 
instead  of  a  drill  book  ;  but  the  method  in 
which  the  evolutions  contained  in  it  are 
executed  on  the  manoeuvre  ground  shows 
that,  to  this  day,  the  demoralisation  caused 
by  the  Prussian  breech-loading  fire  in  1866, 
has  not  yet  run  its  course. 


The  Austrian  Infantry.  363 

It  will  be  in  the  memory  of  most  of  our 
readers  how,  after  1859,  the  Austrians 
abandoned  all  their  time-honoured  tradi- 
tions and  hastily  copied  the  French  system 
of  bayonet  attack,  from  which  they  had 
suffered  so  severely,  only  to  meet  a  second 
and  worse  series  of  disasters  from  the  steady 
aimed  fire  of  the  Prussians,  whose  strength 
lay,  then,  as  it  does  now,  more  in  the 
excellence  of  their  fire  discipline  than  in 
the  perfection  of  their  armament ;  and  since 
1866  the  Austrians  have  fallen  into  the 
same  error,  only  in  the  opposite  direction. 
Instead  of  recognising  the  truth  of  that 
fundamental  axiom  of  German  tactics,  that 
steady  Infantry  are  unassailable  in  their 
front  and  that,  therefore,  to  be  attacked 
successfully  they  must  be  made  into  un- 
steady Infantry  first  (a  task  which  can  only 
be  performed  by  the  concentrated  fire  of 
Artillery,  which,  if  sufficiently  powerful  and 
long  continued,  will  reduce  the  steadiest  of 
Infantry  to  any  degree  of  unsteadiness  de- 
sired), they  have  given  up,  to  a  great  extent, 


364  The  Austrian  Infantry. 

their  offensive  tendency,  and  gone  in  for 
entrenchment  combined  with  offensive  re- 
turns, undertaken  by  special  reserves.  In 
fact,  there  is  a  strong  tendency  to  that  most 
attractive  but  dangerous  method  of  the  offen- 
sive-defensive— feasible  enough  with  such 
men  and  the  comparatively  limited  numbers. 
Wellington  was  accustomed  to  command, 
but,  with  the  vast  armies  of  conscript  boys 
armed  with  breech-loaders,  whose  mere  noise 
creates  a  difficulty  in  leading  unknown  in 
former  days,  the  most  dangerous  trap  into 
which  a  modern  leader  can  fall. 

To  say  a  word  against  hasty  entrench- 
ments at  the  present  moment  will  be 
considered  heresy,  perhaps,  after  the  experi- 
ences of  the  Turkish  war  ;  but  though  in 
that  campaign  they  no  doubt  enabled  the 
Turks  successfully  to  resist  being  beaten 
by  their  adversaries,  only  on  one  occasion 
did  they  enable  the  former  to  beat  the 
latter,  and  the  qualities  of  the  individual 
Turkish  soldier,  together  with  the  small 
numbers  on  that  day  aod  the  personal 


The  Austrian  Infantry.  365 

influence  Baker  Pasha  exerted  over  his  men, 
will  account  for  this  solitary  successful 
deviation  from  the  rule.  The  indifferent 
success  achieved  by  the  French  in  1870, 
by  the  same  method,  might  well  have  at- 
tracted the  notice  of  the  authorities,  but 
unfortunately  it  did  nothing  of  the  sort  ; 
the  chief  deduction  they  drew  from  this 
campaign  was  that  the  use  of  entrench- 
ments materially  reduced  the  French  losses, 
and  not  that  it  did  not  prevent  them  being 
beaten,  which  appears  to  us  to  be  the 
important  point  in  the  matter.  It  is  true 
they  have  managed  to  avoid  the  pitfall  into 
which  the  unfortunate  French  fell,  namely, 
the  system  of  local  counter-attacks  made 
with  the  bayonet  and  direct  to  the 
front.  The  idea  here  was,  that  the  losses 
inflicted  on  the  assailants  in  his  advance 
(losses  which,  thanks  to  the  shelter-trench 
the  defender  did  not  share)  would  perform 
the  same  part  as  that  performed  by  the 
Artillery  in  the  stage  of  preparation  ;  but, 
unfortunately  for  them,  losses  inflicted  on 


366  The  Austrian  Infantry. 

advancing  troops  are  not  as  severely  felt 
as  those  inflicted  on  stationary  ones,  and 
hence  these  counter-attacks,  though  the 
Prussian  official  bears  testimony  to  the 
great  gallantry  with  which  they  were  made, 
were  invariably  beaten  off  with  such  loss 
that,  when  the  retreating  force  reached  its 
previous  position,  it  could  not  be  halted, 
and  the  trench  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
pursuing  Prussians.  This  fault,  as  we  say, 
the  Austrians  have  avoided,  the  regulation 
laying  particular  emphasis  on  the  use  cf 
fire  only,  both  in  defence  and  in  the  pursuit 
of  the  enemy. 

But  it  is  in  the  attack  itself  that  their 
chief  weakness  shows  itself.  Instead  of 
relying  on  the  Artillery  to  reduce  the 
enemy  to  the  requisite  degree  of  unsteadi- 
ness (as  we  pointed  out  above),  they  sought 
to  find  shelter  from  the  enemy's  bullets  in 
the  nature  of  the  ground,  and  to  approach 
the  enemy  by  showing  as  small  a  target  as 
possible  :  in  fact,  to  have  recourse  to 
skirmishing,  instead  of  attacking.  Of  course 


The  Austrian  Infantry.  367 

we  do  not  mean  to  imply  that  skirmishing 
is  not  a  very  excellent  thing  in  its  proper 
place,  but  we  submit  that  the  decision  of 
a  great  battle  has  not  and  never  will  be 
decided  by  skirmishes.  Setting  aside  the 
fact  that  it  is  rarely  possible  to  choose  the 
ground  over  which  one  must  attack  (that, 
generally,  depending  on  larger  strategic 
considerations  and  the  fact  that  when 
200,000  or  300,000  men  stand  facing  each 
other,  each  battalion  is  limited  in  its  choice 
of  ground  to  the  strip  immediately  in  its 
front),  the  practice  of  teaching  men  to  run 
forward  in  a  crouching  doubled-up  position 
singly  or  by  twos  and  threes,  to  rally  on 
a  spot  of  cover  or  roll  in  the  ground  in 
front,  all  tend  to  delay  the  rapidity  of  the 
advance  and  to  inspire  an  exaggerated  fear 
of  the  enemy's  bullets  in  the  men.  Now, 
since  no  attack  should  be  commenced  until 
the  enemy  is  too  shaken  to  deliver  a  steady 
aimed  fire,  it  follows  that  the  longer  one 
is  exposed  to  the  unaimed  fire,  the  more 
likely  one  is  to  get  hit.  Obviously  a  man 


368  The  Austrian  Infantry. 

gets  more  thoroughly  wet  by  exposure 
to  half-an-hour's  steady  rain  than  by  two 
minutes  only  of  it.  The  moral  effect  of  it 
can  only  be  most  depressing.  To  see, 
even  in  peace  time,  half-a-dozen  men  trying 
to  get  behind  a  single  shrub  that  would  not 
have  stopped  a  charge  of  shot,  and  not  to 
see  any  officer  checking  them  for  so  doing, 
is  not  calculated  to  give  one  a  high  idea  of 
the  offensive  value  of  such  troops.  Again, 
to  see  a  company  moving  up  to  a  roll  of 
the  ground  some  30  yards  in  their  front, 
by  groups  of  twos  and  threes  creeping  up 
to  it,  and  taking  perhaps  10  minutes  before 
the  whole  movement  was  completed,  is 
scarcely  more  satisfactory  ;  yet  that  may 
be  seen  morning  after  morning  going  on 
in  the  fields  near  the  Prater  in  Vienna. 
We  had  long  looked  upon  our  own  attack 
as  the  slowest  in  the  universe,  but  we  are 
glad  to  be  able  to  state  that  the  Austrian 
attacks  are  slower,  and  it  may  well  be 
doubted  whether  such  an  excess  of  caution 
is  necessary  even  against  breech-loaders. 


The  Austrian  Infantry.  369 

The  heaviest  percentage  of  loss  suffered 
by  a  single  regiment  or  battalion  which  we 
know  of,  in  breech-loading  days,  was  that  of 
the  "Garde  Schiitien  Battaillon"  at  St.  Privat 
— about  60  per  cent,  in  the  whole  action;  and 
if  we  assume  that  5 -6th  of  that  loss  was 
actually  suffered  before  their  advance  was 
stopped  (it  could  hardly  have  been  more), 
still  it  only  amounted  to  50  per  cent,  in 
one  regiment  in  one  day.  Now,  as  we  pointed 
out  in  a  previous  letter,  in  the  Seven  Years' 
War,  on  more  than  one  occasion  both  sides 
lost  almost  50  per  cent,  and  in  the  case  of 
Hochkirch,  at  least,  neither  side  ran,  but 
simply  mutually  left  off  fighting  out  of 
sheer  weariness.  Then  it  is  on  record  that 
a  single  volley  from  steady  troops  armed 
with  the  Brown  Bess,  and  both  from  British 
and  German  troops  has  stretched  between 
60  and  70  per  cent,  of  the  attacking  force 
dead  in  their  tracks.  Surely  this  sudden 
loss  is  considerably  more  striking  and  demo- 
ralising than  50  per  cent,  in  thirty  minutes  ; 
and  yet,  to  quote  Meckel  again  : — "  We 

M.,  L.  24 


370  The  Austrian  Infantry. 

do  not  hear  that  Frederic's  officers  spent 
their  winter  evenings  in  discussing  papers 
on  how  to  avoid  the  recent  heavy  losses 
experienced  in  the  past  campaigns. " 

Now,  it  must  be  remembered  that  the 
spirit  of  the  Russian  Army  is  at  present 
even  more  markedly  offensive  than  even 
in  the  Prussian  Army  :  for  the  past  few 
years,  indeed,  there  seems  to  have  been 
almost  a  crusade  in  favour  of  SuvarofFs 
views  and  the  bayonet.  Some  writers  have 
gone  even  so  far  as  to  advocate  no  firing 
whatever  in  the  attack,  on  the  ground  that 
it  only  delays  the  advance.  They  are, 
in  fact,  reasoning  too  exclusively  from  their 
own  experience,  just  as  the  Austrians  have 
done  in  the  other  direction  from  theirs. 
The  Russians  were  exposed  to  the  unaim- 
ed  rain  of  Turkish  bullets,  and  naturally 
found  that  the  longer  they  stayed  out  in  it, 
the  wetter  they  got.  The  Austrians  suffered 
from  aimed  fire,  and  hence  seek  to  diminish 
the  area  of  the  target ;  and  as  the  Prussians 
never  went  in  for  long  range  fire,  the  time- 


The  Austrian  Infantry.  371 

of-exposure  view  of  the  question  has  not 
struck  them  in  the  same  way  :  in  connection 
with  this  .we  may  note  the  similar  difference 
between  the  French  and  German  tactics. 
Were  the  fight  to  be  between  the  two 
Infantries  only,  we  should  be  inclined  to 
back  the  Russians  heavily  ;  but,  fortunately 
there  are  yet  two  other  arms  to  be  taken 
into  account,  viz.,  the  Cavalry  and  Artillery; 
and  as  far  as  our  information  goes,  the 
Russians  are  far  behind  the  Austrians  in 
their  knowledge  of  how  to  manoeuvre 
either  the  one  or  the  other  on  the  battle- 
field. If  they  attempt  these  offensive 
tactics  against  troops  possessing  the  degree 
of  discipline,  and  musketry  instruction  the 
Austrians  certainly  possess  without  ade- 
quate support  from  their  Artillery,  they  are 
assuredly  doomed  to  failure.  They  suc- 
ceeded only  against  the  Turks  (and  that 
by  no  means  always),  because  the  latter  had 
somewhat  hazy  ideas  as  to  the  object  of  the 
sights  on  their  rifles,  most  of  them  believing 
with  the  British  sailor  in  the  Crimea,  who 


372  The  Austrian  Infantry. 

being  asked  by  his  comrade  :  "  What  shall 
I  gie  ?im,  Bill  ?"  replied  :  "  Gie  'im  the 
whole  blooming  ladder,  Jim7' — evidently 
supposing  that  the  action  of  raising  the 
sights  increased  the  muzzle  velocity  of  the 
bullet. 

With  reference  to  the  Cavalry,  it  is  true 
the  Austrians  can  no  longer  boast  of  being 
the  best  in  Europe  as  they  could  in  1859  : 
that  boast  belongs  now  to  the  Prussians, 
pace  Sir  Charles  Dilke  ;  but  they  are  far 
from  being  mere  Mounted  Infantrymen,  and 
hence  there  is  every  probability  that  the 
Austrians  Staff  will  always  be  better  in- 
formed than  their  opponents  ;  for,  to  gain 
information,  it  is  necessary  not  merely  to 
screen  your  own  side,  but  to  pierce  the  veil 
of  the  other.  Now,  though  the  defensive 
power  of  Mounted  Infantry  is  great,  their 
offensive  power  against  Cavalry  is  small, 
for  to  attack  they  must  dismount,  and  there- 
by their  rapidity  of  moving  is  at  once 
reduced  to  the  rate  of  ordinary  Infantry. 
In  fairly  open  ground  the  result  of  an 


The  Austrian  Infantry.  373 

engagement  in  which  the  Mounted  Infantry 
dismount  must  in  the  end  inevitably  be 
that  they  will  be  driven  at  last  into  a 
hollow  square  with  their  led  horses  in  the 
middle,  when  the  whole  will  form  an  easy 
prey  to  the  Horse  Artillery  on  the  side  of 
the  Cavalry.  Their  own  Horse  Artillery 
is  tied  to  their  skirts,  for  it  evidently 
cannot  risk  itself  far  away  from  its  dis- 
mounted escort.  Obviously  if  the  Infantry 
mount  they  are  at  the  mercy  of  the  trained 
horsemen.  The  immense  superiority  of  the 
Austrians,  and  particularly  of  the  Hunga- 
rians, over  the  Russians  as  a  race  of 
Horsemen,  together  with  the  far  superior 
level  of  intelligence  in  their  ranks  and 
amongst  their  officers,  must  also  be  taken 
into  account.  It  requires  more  than 
patriotism  and  religious  enthusiasm  to 
make  an  efficient  Cavalry  scout,  and  a  very 
elementary  acquaintance  with  the  recent 
history  of  the  Russian  Cavalry  will  suffice 
to  prove  the  truth  of  this  statement. 

Finally,   reverting  to    the   Infantry,    we 


374  The  Austrian  Infantry. 

have  still  to  notice  that,  in  spite  of  their 
not  going  in  for  the  same  degree  of  pre- 
cision and  rigid  steadiness  under  arms 
that  characterises  the  Germans,  their  move- 
ments in  close  order  are  executed  with 
great  rapidity  and  a  sufficient  degree  of 
accuracy.  The  Prussians  maintain  that 
nothing  but  discipline  founded  on  drill 
will  stand  the  strain  of  actual  service  ;  the 
Austrians  look  more  to  military  education, 
and  there  has  been  a  hot  fight  between  the 
partisans  of  the  two  systems  in  their 
respective  military  publications.  Though 
we  entirely  agree  with  the  Germans,  yet 
we  must  confess  to  having  been  agreeably 
surprised  by  the  drill  of  the  Austrians. 
Their  alignments  were  always  taken  up 
with  precision  and  rapidity  in  spite  of  the 
absence  of  markers  ;  and  when  they  doubled 
they  really  got  over  the,  ground — which 
is  not  always  the  case.  Were  it  not  for  the 
absence  of  energy  and  go  in  the  attack,  we 
should  be  inclined  to  back  them  at  long 
odds  in  the  coming  struggle  ;  and  though 


The  Austrian  Infantry.  375 

on  paper  numbers  appear  heavily  against 
them  if  pitted  against  Russia  single-handed, 
yet  we  believe  that  in  the  field  the  prover- 
bial corruption  and  peculation  in  the  supply 
departments  of  the  latter  will  make  her 
strength  far  less  formidable  than  it  appears 
to  be. 


TACTICS  IN  INDIA. 

FUDGING  by  the  tactics  practised  by 
ll  the  British  Army  on  Indian  parade 
grounds,  there  appears  to  be  an  idea  in 
the  minds  of  our  Military  authorities  that 
one  and  the  same  form  is  equally  appli- 
cable to  all  the  various  conditions  with 
which  we  may  have  to  contend.  But  a 
little  reflection  will  show  that  this  is  very 
far  from  being  the  case.  To  cut  your  coat 
according  to  your  cloth,  or,  in  other  words, 
to  adapt  your  means  to  your  end,  is  as 
necessary  a  rule  in  tactics  as  in  any  other 
undertaking ;  and  the  attempt  to  make 
one  form  of  attack  fit  all  cases,  and  that 
form,  too,  one  of  which  extended  order  is 
the  basis,  shows  that  the  conditions  we 
shall  have  to  encounter  in  this  country 
have  neither  been  studied  nor  understood. 
It  seems  to  have  been  forgotten  that  for- 
mations in  extended  order  are  not  in  them- 
selves the  strongest  form,  but  have  been 


Tactics  in  India.  377 

rendered  compulsory  in  European  armies 
by  the  universal  adoption  of  breech-loaders, 
whose  fire,  in  the  hands  of  really  trained 
troops,  renders  any  other  method  impos* 
sible. 

Again  tactics  depend  in  a  great  measure 
on  the  ground,  and  it  by  no  means  follows 
that  a  system  which  has  given  good  re- 
sults in  the  undulating  country  in  which 
the  last  three  great  campaigns  in  Europe 
have  been  fought  out  will  give  equally  good 
results  in  the  level  plains  of  India.  For 
instance,  long  range  fire  from  a  command- 
ing position,  from  which  the  strike  of  the 
bullets  (or  shells)  can  be  readily  observed, 
will  give  very  different  results  over  a  dead 
level  plain  covered  with  scrub  and  brush- 
wood. Fighting  across  a  rolling  valley 
some  2,000  yards  or  more  across,  every 
body  of  troops  must  be  seen  as  it  advances 
down  the  slope  ;  hence  the  point  on  which 
the  brunt  of  the  attack  will  fall  can  be  re- 
cognised and  reinforced  by  troops  at  least 
equally  distant.  But  standing  on  the  level, 


378  Tactics  in  India. 

unless  a  convenient  mirage  happens  to 
throw  the  ground  up,  the  advance  of  the 
first  line  (i.e.,  fighting  line)  support  and 
main  body  effectually  hides  the  advance  of 
the  .second,  third  and  fourth  line — or  more 
— which  may  be  directed  on  the  decisive 
point.  Behind  the  screen  of  smoke  and 
dust  formed  by  the  fighting  line,  Artillery 
and  Cavalry  might  move  without  being  ob- 
served till  within  some  600  yards  of  the 
enemy's  position,  when  their  sudden  ap- 
pearance, so  totally  at  variance  with  any- 
thing to  be  found  in  the  book,  might  have 
a  disquieting  effect  on  the  defender,  to  say 
the  least.  It  may  be  granted  that  sooner 
or  later  we  must  expect  to  cross  swords 
with  European  troops  in  India  ;  but  before 
this  happens,  we  may  have  many  and  many 
a  tussle  with  native  armies,  and  perhaps  not 
always  in  the  hills.  At  any  rate  our  pri- 
mary purpose  in  India  is  to  put  down  at 
once  any  rising  or  rebellion  in  the  country 
itself.  The  reason  why  we  are  always 
supposed  to  be  on  a  war  footing,  and  why 


Tactics  in  India.  379 

transport  for  flying  columns  is  kept  up 
(on  paper)  at  various  centres,  is  evidently 
not  because  the  Russians  are  expected  to 
appear  at  any  odd  moment  on  the  scene  ; 
and  for  this  reason  we  think  it  might  be 
better  not  to  give  up  entirely  the  practice 
of  those  methods  we  ought  to  employ 
against  anon-European  foe.  It  is  no  good 
saying  that  when  the  time  comes,  we  shall 
adapt  our  tactics  to  circumstances.  Ex- 
perience proves  that  we  shall  not  :  neither 
generals  nor  soldiers  can  at  once  on  the 
first  battle  -  field  emancipate  themselves 
from  the  chains  of  custom.  If  ever  there 
was  an  occasion  for  the  employment  of  the 
good  old  British  plan  of  attack,  that  was 
Maiwand  ;  but  our  commander  proved  him- 
self incapable  of  taking  the  responsibility 
of  casting  the  drill  book  overboard. 

Besides  extended  order, the  breech-loaders 
have  developed  the  tendency  to  outflank- 
ing ;  but  outflanking  tactically  is  only  pos- 
sible when  the  assailant  possesses  a  nume- 
rical superiority,  a  condition  which  can 


380  Tactics  in  India. 

rarely  occur  in  our  case.  They  have  fur- 
ther caused  us  to  rely  more  on  fire  than  on 
shock,  and  thence  robbed  our  advance  of 
the  moral  power  of  its  rapidity.  We  say 
"  our "  advisedly  and  with  regret,  for  it 
has  not  done  so  in  all  countries.  The  ad- 
vance of  the  German  column  of  attack  (for 
it  is  really  a  column,  with  distances  of  400 
to  500  yards  instead  of  600  yards)  is  at 
least  as  rapid  and  carries  with  it  a  greater 
moral  effect  than  that  of  the  old  line  for- 
mation, but  to  apply  it  slavishly  to  our 
own  condition  would  be  like  using  a  steam 
hammer  to  break  a  nut.  Now,  it  is  uni- 
versally admitted  that  the  Oriental  mind  is 
much  more  impressed  by  the  moral  effect 
of  a  rapid  resolute  advance  than  by  gra- 
dual extermination  at  a  distance,  and,  in- 
deed, in  this  they  are  not  singular.  Only 
breech-loaders  in  European  hands  renders 
such  a  rapid  resolute  advance  impossible, 
whereas  Tower  muskets,  old  Enfields  with 
a  proportion  of  Jezails  do  not.  We  do  not 
wish  to  be  understood  as  advocating  blood- 


Tactics  in  India.  381 

less  victories — far  from  it  :  we  wish  to  kill 
and  destroy  as  resolutely  as  Clausewitz  ; 
but  we  wish  to  see  the  killing  done  at 
short  ranges,  with  the  minimum  expendi- 
ture of  ammunition  possible.  On  the  score 
of  safety  to  ourselves  we  have  also  a  word 
to  say  in  favour  of  the  old  line  formation 
being  still  practised.  We  have  had  numer- 
ous experiences  of  late  years  showing 
what  desperate  men,  armed  only  with  sword 
and  spear,  can  do  against  even  European 
troops  and  first  rate  native  regiments  arm- 
ed with  the  Snider,  the  best  weapon  to 
stop  a  rush  with  at  present  in  use.  Is  it 
safe  to  count  on  ordinary  native  regiments 
armed  with  a  less  efficient  stopping  weapon 
as  they  soon  will  be,  doing  so  too  ?  The 
fate  of  one  regiment  in  the  Soudan  does 
not  promise  well. 

With  regard  to  our  native  troops,  we  are 
counting  altogether  too  much  on  the  na- 
ture of  the  arm  and  too  little  on  that  of 
the  man.  All  experience  proves  that  the 
weapon  must  be  adapted  to  the  man  and 


382  Tactics  in  India. 

not  vice  versa.  Even  in  Europe  the  breech- 
loader has  not  proved  itself  quite  the  uni- 
versal aid  to  victory  it  was  prophesied  to 
be.  The  most  enthusiastic  believer  in 
Native  Infantry  will  hardly  maintain  that 
they  are  steadier  or  better  adapted  to  the 
breech-loader  than  the  Infantry  of  the  old 
French  Imperial  Army  ;  yet  some  8,000  of 
these,  supported  by  Artillery  and  armed 
themselves  with  a  very  fair  weapon,  were 
ridden  over  by  the  rush  of  700  Prussian 
horse,  of  whom  not  more  than  40  at  the 
outside  were  bowled  over  before  the  actual 
shock,  and  this  though  the  Prussians  had 
some  1,500  yards  of  open  to  cross.  Since 
the  introduction  of  the  breech-loader,  we 
ourselves  have  not  been  called  on  to  face 
Cavalry  on  the  battle-field,  but  if  we  ever 
have,  is  it  likely  that  Native  Infantry  will 
do  better  than  the  French  ?  We  are  not 
so  conservative  as  to  wish  to  see  our  native 
troops  rearmed  with  the  "  Brown  Bess/7 
but  we  wish  to  see  more  attention  paid  to 
training  them  to  overcome  the  difficulties 


Tactics  in  India.  383 

inseparable  from  the  new  arm.  These  diffi- 
culties are  all  summed  up  in  the  expression 
"  fire  discipline,  "  and  we  would  begin 
by  teaching  them  true  fire  discipline  in 
close  order  before  troubling  about  open — 
teaching  them  to  walk  in  fact  before  asking 
them  to  run.  But  to  do  this  the  close 
order  drill  of  the  British  Army  would  have 
to  be  altered  thoroughly  in  spirit,  though 
not  in  letter. 

Instead  of  the  aimless  changes  from  co- 
lumn to  line  and  line  to  column  round  the 
sides  of  a  barrack  square,  changes  of  front 
on  a  line  of  markers,  &c.,  we  would  sub- 
stitute something  more  in  accordance  with 
the  company  column  close  order  drill  of 
the  Austrian  and  German  armies.  With 
the  conditions  they  fight  under  it  seems 
out  of  date,  and  their  young  officer  fre- 
quently make  fun  of  it,  but  the  higher 
authorities  see  in  it  a  means  to  an  end,  and 
insist  on  its  execution  as  rigidly  as  ever. 
But  it  would  suit  our  requirements  excep- 
tionally well,  for  our  probable  enemies,  as 


384  Tactics  in  India. 

already  stated,  are  not  likely  to  compel  us 
to    adopt    extended    order.     Briefly,    the 
changes  would  consist  in  (1)  the    abolition 
of  markers    (except  for  parade)  ;   (2)  for- 
mations of  line   from   column  at    oblique 
angles  ;  (3)  the  habit  of  covering  all   such 
formations  by  the   volley  fire  of  the  first 
company  up  ;   (4)  advance   across  country 
in  echelon  of  half  battalions  on  a  distinct 
objective,  the  halted  wing  covering  the  ad- 
vance of  the  others  by  volleys,   and  con- 
cluding with  a  bayonet  charge  ;   (5)  the 
practice  of  long  advances  in  line,  observing 
the   utmost  discipline.     It  is  not  a  long 
list,  but  troops  which  could  execute  these 
movements  with  the  steadiness  and  preci- 
sion with  which  either  of  the  above-men- 
tioned   armies   do,    would    be    capable   of 
smashing  any  non-European  army    what- 
ever.    The  class  of  attack  we  should  pro- 
pose against  such  an  enemy  would  rely  for 
success  on  its   rapidity,   boldness,  and  the 
infliction  of  crushing  loss  in  the  minimum 
space  of  time.     Where  the  ground  admit- 


Tactics  in  India.  385 

ted,  we  would  place  the  Infantry  in  the 
centre  in  two  lines  with  a  reserve,  with  the 
Artillery  and  Cavalry  on  the  flanks.  The 
Artillery  would  accompany  the  Infantry 
on  the  flanks  precisely  as  in  the  old  days 
up  to  case  shot  fire,  and  not  till  the  ad- 
vance began  to  mask  their  fire  would  the 
latter  open  theirs.  Six  aimed  volleys  a 
minute,  which  can  certainly  be  delivered 
by  steady  troops  with  a  breech-loader  (Fre- 
deric the  Great's  Grenadiers  fired  five) 
should  at  this  range  be  sufficient  to  break 
anything.  And  troops  trained  to  do  this 
would  be  already  on  the  high  road  to  suc- 
cess in  European  war.  It  is  not  so  many 
years  ago  that  we  could  do  it,  and  our 
German  critics  are  never  tired  of  asking  us 
why  we  retraced  our  steps.  "  The  basis  of 
all  modern  Infantry  tactics,  ever  since  the 
days  of  Frederic,  has  been  the  line  ;  the 
tactics  of  to-day  are  the  purest  line  tactics, 
except  only  that  in  the  fighting  line  the 
enemy's  fire  renders  dressing  and  the  touch 
impossible,  and  that  where  Frederic  found 

M,  L,,  25 


386  Tactics  in  India. 

two  lines  and  a  reserve  sufficient,  it  is  now 
necessary  to  put  in  four  or  five.  Whereas 
the  dangerous  zone  was  formerly  about  200 
yards,  it  is  now  2,000  ;  and  if  the  disci- 
pline of  Frederic  the  Great  was  necessary 
to  make  man  face  the  losses  of  those  days, 
how  much  more  is  it  necessary  now  ?  " 

Many  of  our  own  writers  appear  to 
imagine  that  it  was  merely  "  cussedness  " 
on  the  part  of  the  old  leaders,  and  espe- 
cially of  the  Iron  Duke,  to  lay  such  stress 
on  discipline;  but  the  Germans  know  other- 
wise :  they  know  from  experience  that 
nothing  can  be  done  without  it,  and  the 
only  way  to  teach  it  is  to  begin  at  the 
beginning  and  not  at  the  end.  When  the 
time  for  extension  comes  disciplined  men 
can  be  trusted  to  themselves,  undisciplined 
ones  would  disband  half-way. 


THE  ENTRANCE  EXAMINATION 
FOR  THE  ARMY. 

THE  present  system  of  open  competition 
for  the  army  has  now  been  in  exis- 
tence for  a  sufficient  period  to  form  some 
opinion  as  to  its  working,  and  to  see  how 
far  the  gloomy  predictions  with  which  it 
was  first  greeted  have  been  falsified,  or 
the  re  verse.  Certainly,  ,it  cannot  now  be 
maintained  that,  hitherto,  it  has  given  us 
socially  an  inferior  class  of  men  ;  the  aver- 
age of  the  names  represented  in  the  Army 
List  is  very  much  what  it  was  before.  The 
sons  of  rich  plutocrats,  who  it  was  feared 
would  deluge  the  army,  have  shown  even 
less  anxiety  to  face  the  entrance  competi- 
tion, and  the  subsequent,  comparatively 
speaking,  hard  work  and  dangers  of  army 
life,  than  they  did  when  a  position  above 
their  own  in  society  was  to  be  had  by  the 
mere  payment  of  a  sum  of  money  ;  and 
the  financial  prospects  of  the  young  Bri- 


388    Entrance  Examination  for  Army. 

tish  officer  have  hitherto  not  proved  tempt- 
ing enough  to  attract  that  class  of  popu- 
lation to  whom  money  is  a  primary  consi- 
deration. The  bulk  of  our  young  officers 
are  now,  as  formerly,  the  sons  of  officers 
or  country-gentlemen,  to  whom  the  honor- 
able nature  of  the  career,  with  its  risks, 
hardships  at  times,  and  the  chances  of 
distinction,  are  still  the  chief  inducements  ; 
and  the  remainder,  those  who  come  from 
a  lower  stratum,  are  also  animated  by  the 
same  ideas,  and  as  a  rule  make  excellent 
officers.  It  cannot  be  denied  that,  so  far, 
the  results  are  most  satisfactory  ;  it  would 
have  been  and  will  be  little  short  of  a  na- 
tional disaster,  if  the  career  of  an  officer 
ever  becomes  commercially  sufficiently 
lucrative  to  tempt  men  to  enter  it,  purely 
for  the  sake  of  gain.  An  army  to  be  effi- 
cient must  be  officered  by  a  class  actuated 
more  by  a  sense  of  duty  and  honour  than 
by  financial  motives  ;  and,  so  far,  the  abo- 
lition of  purchase  has  had  a  good  effect, 
in  removing  what,  at  times,  must  have 


Entrance  Examination  for  Army.    389 

been  a  terrible  temptation  to  a  poor  man, 
with  others  dependent  on  him,  to  shirk 
his  duty — we  allude  to  the  loss  of  his  pur- 
chase money  in  case  of  death.  To  the 
credit  of  the  old  army,  it  must  be  said 
that  but  few  instances  of  men  yielding  to 
it  did  occur,  but  anyone  who  reads  jour- 
nals and  diaries  of  past  wars  will  be  able 
to  recall  occasional  remarks  which  shew 
that  the  temptation  was  frequently  felt. 
A  Colonel  of  a  regiment,  in  those  days, 
going  into  action,  risked,  besides  his  life, 
say  £10,000,  less  the  capitalised  value  of 
his  widow's  pension,  in  addition  to  his 
life  ;  and  the  knowledge  of  the  fact  could 
hardly  have  encouraged  him  in  the  perform- 
ance of  his  duty,  where  that  led  him  into 
unusual  danger.  Theoretically,  of  course, 
no  such  idea  should  have  entered  his  head  ; 
but,  practically,  it  is  impossible  but  that, 
at  times,  it  must  have  done  so. 

It  was  chiefly,  however,  the  physical 
deterioration  of  the  officers  as  a  body  that 
the  critics  prophesied.  We  were  told  that 


390    Entrance  Examination  for  Army. 

instead  of  fine  sturdy  young  fellows,  we 
should  be  inundated  with  shoals  of  narrow- 
chested,  short-sighted,  prematurely-aged 
bookworms  ;  but,  up  to  date,  we  must 
confess  that  we  see  no  falling  off  in  this 
respect,  but  rather  the  contrary,  and  the 
reasons  for  this  are  not  far  to  seek.  Just 
as  the  career  offered  by  the  army  proves 
unattractive  to  those  whose  sole  desire  is 
to  make  money,  so  also  it  fails  to  attract 
those  deficient  in  health,  energy,  and  grit, 
to  stand  its  hardships  and  risks,  which  at 
times  are  severe  enough,  as  we  who  are 
serving  our  country  in  India  know  to  our 
cost.  At  the  same  time  it  is  not,  and 
never  has  been  the  case,  that  intellectual 
gifts  have  ever  been  the  exclusive  property 
of  the  physically  misshapen  ones.  With 
the  exception  of  a  few  geniuses,  whose 
brains  have  grown  at  the  expense  of  their 
bodies,  bodily  energy  and  skill  in  all  games 
usually  go  with  sharp  wits.  Every  pub- 
lic-school man  will  remember  that  it  was 
not  the  big  idle  fellows  in  the  lower  forms, 


Entrance  Examination  for  Army.    391 

but  as  a  rule  the  boys  in  the  sixth  form, 
on  whom  the  credit  of  the  school  in  games 
and  athletics  rested.  Even  in  football, 
where  weight  and  numbers  told  tremen- 
dously (in  the  Rugby  game),  it  was  gener- 
ally the  sixth  that  thrashed  the  school,  and 
in  cricket,  racquets,  ete.,  it  was  indeed  rare 
not  to  find  some  of  the  best  men  in  the 
highest  form. 

Not  long  ago  when  it  was  proposed  in 
the  papers  to  give  marks  in  the  Army 
Entrance  Examination  for  proficiency  in 
athletic  sports,  we  were  bidden,  in  nu- 
merous letters  from  despairing  parents,  to 
contemplate  the  hard  fate  of  a  fine  active 
youth,  who  was  a  good  cricketer,  rider, 
and  shot,  but  who  never  could  master  the 
terrible  ordeal  of  an  examination.  But 
we  have  devoted,  first  and  last,  a  good 
deal  of  observation  to  this  particular  style 
of  youth,  and  have  come  to  the  conclusion 
that  he  is  on  the  whole  very  rare,  and 
generally  by  no  means  the  class  of  man  we 
want  in  the  army.  The  fact  that  he  can- 


392    Entrance  Examination  for  Army. 

not  bend  his  mind  to  master  the  subjects 
required  of  him,  points  to  an  incurable 
tendency  to  idleness  and  a  want  of  pur- 
pose— in  other  words,  to  want  of  character. 
At  the  early  age  at  which  these  examina- 
tions are  held,  this  is  almost  the  only  way 
in  which  we  can  test  his  character,  and  it 
Is  character,  determination,  and  persever- 
ance, above  all,  that  we  require  in  an  offi- 
cer. Let  any  one  review  the  list  of  his 
old  school-fellows,  and  follow  the  history 
of  the  boys  who  answered  the  above  de- 
scription, and  he  will  be  surprised  to  see 
how  few  of  them  have  ever  come  to  any 
good.  Some  of  them  out  in  the  Colonies, 
who  have  been  thrown  on  their  own  legs 
have  done  well,  but  of  those  who  stayed 
at  home  a  good  many  will  be  found  to  be 
serving  Her  Majesty  in  the  ranks,  and  not 
doing  that  over  and  above  well.  But  the 
proof  of  the  truth  of  what  the  defenders  of 
the  competition  system  urged  was  in  exis- 
tence all  the  time,  though  we  do  not  re- 
member to  have  seen  it  noticed.  Wool- 


Entrance  Examination  for  Army.    393 

wich  has  for  long  been  conducted  on  a 
competitive  basis  alone,  whereas  Sandhurst 
formerly  was  not  ;  the  two  institutions 
competed  annually  in  every  form  of  sport, 
for  some  thirteen  years,  until,  in  fact,  the 
system  at  Sandhurst  was  altered  ;  but 
though  the  latter  school  had  nearly  half 
as  many  again  to  choose  from  as  the  for- 
mer, the  challenge- shield  for  athletics 
never  once  left  the  hall  of  the  R.  M.  A., 
nor  was  it  ever  beaten  at  football  and 
very  seldom  at  cricket.  Now,  in  those 
days  the  competition  for  Woolwich  was 
at  its  highest,  whilst  Sandhurst  was  recruit- 
ed almost  entirely  by  nomination.  But 
now  that  the  system  has  changed,  and 
that  whilst  the  competition  for  Woolwich 
has  materially  diminished,  and  that  for  the 
Army  has  increased,  Woolwich  no  longer 
occupies  her  former  proud  position,  and 
the  difference  in  age  between  the  two  es- 
tablishments is  not  in  itself  sufficient  to 
account  for  its  loss,  for  the  best  men  at 
Woolwich  were  by  no  means  always  to  be 


394    Entrance  Examination  for  Army. 

found  amongst  the  seniors  in  age.  Simi- 
larly, going  a  step  further,  we  find  that, 
at  the  time  the  competition  for  Woolwich 
was  at  its  hottest,  the  corps  of  Royal 
Engineers  stood  much  higher  in  the  athletic 
world  than  it  does  now.  The  Association 
Football  Cup  has  not  been  held  at  Cha- 
tham for  a  good  many  years,  nor  have  we 
seen  monster  scores  at  cricket  made  in 
those  years  repeated.  To  the  best  of  our 
belief,  that  made  in  1875,  of  756  runs,  for 
7  wickets  only,  against  a  strong  team  of 
the  I.  Zingari,  has  never  yet  been  beaten 
anywhere.  But  a  still  stronger  proof  of 
the  position  we  advance  may  be  found  in 
the  comparatively  low  death-rate  from  sick- 
ness, which  rules  in  both  the  scientific 
corps.  It  is  noticeable  in  the  Artillery, 
who  are  quartered  in  much  the  same  places 
and  lead  the  same  lives  as  the  rest  of  the 
army  ;  but  it  is  much  more  so  in  the 
case  of  the  Engineers,  of  whom  a  far  lar- 
ger proportion  in  civil  employment  are 
exposed  to  infinitely  worse  climatic  condi- 


Entrance  Examination  for  Army.    395 

tions  than  any  other  branch  of  the  service. 
There  is  no  comparison  between  the  ex- 
posures to  be  faced  in  the  Survey  Depart- 
ment, in  irrigation  work,  or  on  Frontier 
railways,  with  that  usually  undergone  in 
cantonments  ;  and  then  again,  the  very 
small  allowance  of  leave  allowed  to  the 
corps,  and  which  keeps  many  a  man  year 
after  year  in  the  plains,  must  be  taken  in- 
to account.  Now,  pushing  our  investiga- 
tion a  step  further,  we  will  consider  the 
men  who  of  all  others  in  the  army  would 
be  most  likely  to  shew  the  effects  of  over- 
examination — viz.,  those  who  pass  first  of 
their  class  out  of  Woolwich,  probably  the 
most  examined  men  in  the  world — taking 
the  Army  List,  as  a  rule,  we  find  that 
there  is  not  much  difference  between  them 
and  at  any  rate  the  first  half  of  their 
class  ;  but  there  are  a  number  of  excep- 
tions, viz.,  men  who  have  specially  distin- 
guished themselves  ;  and  nearly  every 
one  of  these  is  conspicuous  for  physical 
stamina.  Surely  then,  if  the  educational 


396    Entrance  Examination  for  Army. 

screw,  applied  with  its  utmost  pressure, 
has  not  succeeded  in  turning  out  a  physical 
monstrosity,  there  is  no  reasonable  cause 
for  anxiety  for  the  result  of  a  lesser  strain. 

Whether  the  greatly  increased  sobriety 
of  living,  and  general  diminution  of  extra- 
vagance is  to  be  attributed  to  the  change 
of  men,  or  is  merely  due  to  the  improve- 
ment in  this  respect  which  has  been  going 
on  throughout  society,  we  are  not  prepar- 
ed to  say,  though  we  should  be  inclined 
to  favour  the  former  idea  ;  for  the  same 
qualities  which  induce  a  boy  to  stick  to 
his  work  and  persevere,  are  of  course  those 
which  will  best  help  him  against  the  temp- 
tation to  display.  It  would  be  interesting 
to  see  tables  of  the  number  of  officers  who 
retired  "broke"  from  Her  Majesty's  Ser- 
vice since  the  present  regime,  and  during 
an  equal  period  of  the  old  one.  We  fancy 
the  younger  generation  would  shew  up 
very  favourably. 

In  conclusion,  we  think  that  fifteen  years 
of  the  new  system  have  proved  conclusive- 


Entrance  Examination  for  Army.    397 

ly  that  the  reformers  were  right,  in  this 
case  at  any  rate  ;  and  we  have  no  fear 
that,  in  point  of  physique,  we  shall  ever 
run  short  of  the  stuff  leaders  are  made  of. 
The  country  at  least  gives  good  material 
to  the  army,  and  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
army  to  manufacture  the  finished  article 
out  of  the  raw  stuff. 


THE  TRAINING  OF  OFFICERS. 

THE  authorities  have  wisely  laid  down 
that  all  officers  should,  before  joining, 
go  through  a  course  of  instruction  on  the 
general  principle  on  which  the  three  arms 
are  handled,  and  on  which  modern  war  is 
conducted.      Whether    the   text-books   in 
these  sciences,  or  the  method  in  which  the 
examinations    are   conducted,    are    equally 
wisely  chosen,  is  a  question  we  do  not  here 
intend  to  investigate  :  we  only  propose  to 
deal  with  the  stock  objection  usually  urged 
against  them  at   the   mess  table — "What 
"  possible  use  is  it  to  the  average  regiment- 
"  al  officer  to  know  how   to  lead  an  army 
"  corps  or  conduct  a  campaign  ?  "     It  ap- 
pears to  be  altogether  lost  sight  of,   that 
the  conduct  of  a  campaign  or  the  leading 
of  an  army   corps    depends  entirely   upon 
the  reports  of  the  outposts,  which  have  to 
be  furnished    almost  exclusively  by  junior 
regimental  officers.     Even  an  Infantry  offi- 


The  Training  of  Officers.          399 

cer's  outpost  reports  may  prove  of  the 
greatest  service  to  his  country,  or  the  re- 
verse. Apart  also  from  this,  almost  every 
officer  possesses  some  ambition  to  distin- 
guish himself  in  some  way  ;  and  in  the 
majority  of  instances  their  ambition  takes 
the  form  of  a  desire  to  get  on  some  Gen- 
eral's Staff  or  another.  This  they  generally 
hope  to  achieve  by  the  influence  of  a  remote 
relationship  between  themselves  and  the 
General  Commanding  ;  or,  where  even  this 
fails  them,  they  trust  to  the  chapter  of  acci- 
dents, to  be  detailed  some  day  as  Orderly 
Officer  to  some  Commanding  Officer  or 
other.  But  if  they  are  utterly  unacquaint- 
ed with  the  broad  principle  of  tactics,  how 
can  they  hope  to  distinguish  themselves  in 
this  very  responsible  position  ? 

Let  us  take  a  few  instances  in  which  the 
fate  of  battles,  even  of  nations,  has  depend- 
ed on  the  action  of  these  very  humble 
subordinates.  First  let  us  take  the  gal- 
lopers. On  the  night  of  the  14th  June  1815, 
a  young  French  aide-de-camp  was  given  a 


400          The  Training  of  Officers. 

most  important  order  to  convey  from 
NAPOLEON'S  head-quarters  to  the  leading 
corps  of  the  central  column  (VANDAMME'S), 
to  move  off  at  daybreak  and  cross  the 
Sambre  into  Belgium.  Probably  a  good 
deal  of  the  blame  which  fell  on  him  was 
deserved  by  the  Chief  of  the  Staff  himself, 
for  not  sending  the  order  in  duplicate  ;  but 
the  young  officer  himself  cannot  be  held 
blameless,  for  had  he  been  thoroughly  up 
in  his  work,  he  would  have  taken  with  him 
his  servant  at  least ;  but  as  it  was  he  went 
alone,  his  horse  fell  in  a  ditch,  he  himself 
was  stunned,  and  the  order  never  reached 
VANDAMME  at  all.  The  result  was  a  delay 
of  over  four  hours  to  the  general  advance. 
That  delay  practically  lost  NAPOLEON  his 
campaign.  Next  day,  the  15th,  another 
aide-de-camp,  not  sufficiently  acquainted 
with  the  general  plan  of  campaign,  took  upon 
himself  to  deflect  the  march  of  D'ERLON'S 
column,  from  Quatrebras  on  Ligny.  The 
result  was  that  25,000  men  wandered 
about  all  day  between  the  two  battle-fields 


The  Training  of  Officers.  401 

and  came  into  action  on  neither,  though  on 
both  their  presence  would  have  been  deci- 
sive. What  trouble  his  aides-de-camp  were 
to  WELLINGTON,  the  "  despatches  "  prove 
abundantly.  In  one  of  the  originals  he  de- 
scribes all  of  them  as  being  d — d  bad,  but 
in  the  printed  edition  the  expression  has 
been  euphemised  a  little. 

But  to  come  to  more  recent  times,  and 
we  will  avoid  mentioning  any  of  the  in- 
stances in  our  own  service  where  the  delivery 
of  an  order  to  the  wrong  man,  or  a  want  of 
grasp  or  situation  nearly  led,  and  —  in  civi- 
lized warfare — would  have  led  to  most  dis- 
astrous results,  but  will  confine  ourselves 
to  examples  from  the  Franco-German  War, 
by  which  no  English  officer's  feelings  can 
be  hurt.  At  the  battle  of  Woerth,  it  was 
the  mistake  of  an  Orderly  Officer  who  took 
an  order  to  the  wrong  corps  which  caused 
what  should  have  been  merely  a  skirmish 
of  outposts  to  develop  into  a  desperate 
fight,  which  might  have  proved  disastrous 
to  the  Germans,  had  it  not  been  for  the 
M.,L.  26 


402  The  Training  of   Officers. 

wonderful  elasticity  of  their  system,  and 
their  fundamental  principle  always  to  march 
towards  the  sound  of  the  guns.  With  an 
army  trained  to  absolute  obedience  of 
orders,  not  one  corps  would  have  moved 
towards  the  field  without  definite  order  ; 
and  the  result  would  have  been  defeat  in 
detail  to  the  whole  probably. 

It  was  the  report  of  an  outpost  which  led 
to  the  battle  of  Borny  (14th  August)  before 
Metz.  The  charge  of  BREDOW'S  Brigade5 
which  practically  saved  the  Prussian  3rd 
Corps  from  a  crushing  defeat  at  Vionville 
on  the  16th  of  August,  was  due  to  the  sug- 
gestion of  a  young  Infantry  officer  of  six 
years7  service,  detailed  as  galloper  for  the 
day  to  the  Staff  of  a  General  of  Division. 
But  the  importance  of  this  kind  of  general 
knowledge  is  even  more  striking  in  the 
case  of  the  Cavalry,  and  there  is  no  more 
royal  road  to  distinction  than  the  sending  in 
of  a  clear  and  accurate  outpost  report.  It  is 
enough  merely  to  turn  over  the  pages  of  the 
Prussian  official  account  of  the  campaign 


The  Training  of  Officers.          403 

to  see  this  ;  everywhere  we  find  the  names 
of  Captains  and  subalterns  whose  informa- 
tion led  to  the  most  important  results.  The 
flank  march  to  Sedan  was  undertaken  on 
the  strength  of  such  a  report.  It  happened 
to  be  a  Major  who  made  it,  but  the  chance 
might  equally  have  fallen  to  a  junior.  We 
might  multiply  these  instances  almost  ad 
infinitum,  but  we  think  we  have  said  enough 
to  shew  that  the  requirements  which  our 
authorities  seek  to  enforce,  and  against 
which  so  many  of  our  young  officers  kick, 
are  by  no  means  as  unreasonable  as  is 
usually  imagined. 

As  a  nation,  we  do  not  excel  as  copyists. 
Even  in  such  trivial  matters  as  French 
fashions  and  French  plays,  our  efforts  are 
hardly  satisfactory  :  and  in  military  mat- 
ters we  succeed  even  worse.  If  we  fail 
in  such  trifles,  as  helmetspikes,  badges  of 
rank,  etc.,  we  can  hardly  wonder  our  at- 
tempts at  apeing  the  educational  system 
of  Continental  nations  are  far  from  satis- 
factory. 


404          The  Training  of  Officers. 

The  Germans  do  not  now-a-days  ex- 
amine their  officers  for  promotion  on  paper, 
as  many  Englishmen  appear  to  imagine. 
They  did  once — before  the  battle  of  Jena — 
hold  such  examinations  ;  since  then,  they 
have  abandoned  them. 

After  a  young  officer  has  completed  his 
course  at  the  military  school,  it  seems  that 
he  is  not  required  to  submit  another  paper 
examination,  unless  he  aspires  to  their  Staff 
College.  Their  system  is  first  to  ground  a 
man  well  in  the  general  principles  of  war, 
and  then  to  perfect  him  to  teach  others, 
under  a  due  sense  of  his  own  responsibility. 
Intelligent,  not  pedantic  uniformity,  is  what 
they  seek  to  secure  ;  for  the  working  of 
their  vast  armies  of  to-day  is  only  render- 
ed possible  by  the  intelligent  co-operation 
of  every  unit  in  it.  The  slightest  indica- 
tion of  the  end  aimed  at,  should  be  suffi- 
cient to  secure  its  execution,  not  according 
to  prescribed  form,  but  by  the  sensible 
application  of  the  given  means. 

This  system  was  not  built  in  a  day,  but, 


The  Training  of  Officers.          405 

on  the  contrary,  they  have  been  working  at 
it  ever  since  1 807,  and  thanks  to  this  steady 
perseverance,  they  are  now  able  to  work 
with  an  absence  of  friction,to  which  probab- 
ly no  other  army  in  the  world  can  equal. 

Let  anyone  try  to  picture  to  himself  the 
confusion  which  would  arise,  if  at  the  pre- 
sent moment,  after  our  system  of  examina- 
tions for  promotion  has  been  in  full  swing 
for  some  years,  an  English  commander  were 
to  attempt  to  direct  an  army,  with  orders 
as  terse  and  simple  as  those  of  Prince  Fre- 
deric Charles,  for  the  advance  on  Le  Mans, 
or  those  of  the  King  for  the  change  of 
front  on  Sedan.  To  carry  out  such  opera- 
tions, we  should  require  detailed  instruc- 
tions sufficient  to  fill  a  Blue  Book ;  though 
we  must  admit  that  the  Indian  army  would 
probably  do  with  one-third  the  number  of 
pages  that  the  Home  army  would  require. 

The  German  system,  briefly  stated,  is  to 
give  the  young  officer  a  vivid  picture  of  the 
difficultes  to  be  met  with  and  overcome  in 
war.  He  is  made  acquainted,  in  almost 


406          The  Training  of  Officers. 

dramatic  writing,  with  the  aspect  and  course 
of  a  modern  battle  ;  he  is  warned  against 
the  fatal  lethargy  which  overcomes  even 
the  most  determined  men,  after  the  fatigues 
of  long  marching,  and  the  nervous  tension 
of  a  hard-fought  action.  He  is  taught  to 
picture  the  long  columns  of  route  toiling 
on  through  rain  and  mud  or  sun  and  dust, 
and  to  remember  that  at  such  times  only  the 
simplest  duties  can  be  performed  correctly. 
Clause witz's  saying,  "  In  war  everything 
is  simple,  but  to  secure  simplicity  is  the 
difficulty  "  is  constantly  brought  before  him. 

Our  system  is  almost  the  exact  opposite 
of  the  above.  The  subject,  whatever  it 
may  be,  whether  outpost-duty  or  strategy, 
is  stripped  of  all  flesh  and  blood  till  noth- 
ing but  the  dry  bones  of  form  remain,  and 
the  study  of  it  becomes  correspondingly 
uninteresting.  The  contemplation  of  the 
human  form  divine,  especially  of  the  oppo- 
site sex,  is  fascinating  enough  ;  but  few 
ever  see  beauty  in  a  skeleton. 

Compare  the  two  systems  in  Clausewitz 


The  Training  of  Officers.          407 

and  Hamley  ; — the  former  without  weary- 
ing the  reader  with  detailed  studies  of 
campaigns,  gives  a  living  speaking  picture 
of  the  conditions  of  actual  war,  and  shows 
where  the  difficulty  of  forming  a  decision, 
between  two  such  apparently  simple  alter- 
natives, as  turning  a  flank,  or  breaking  the 
enemy's  centre,  really  lies.  The  latter 
gives  a  dry  (and  generally  inaccurate) 
history  of  a  campaign,  in  which  the  true 
picture  of  war  never  occurs.  This  is  what 
makes  the  study  of  a  subject,  which  is 
usually  so  attractive  to  all  minds,  so 
painfully  tedious  and  repugnant  to  the  un- 
fortunate victim  of  the  examination  mania. 
Let  us  take  a  look  at  the  genesis  of  the 
modern  text-books.  They  were  written 
suddenly  to  supply  a  want  felt  by  the  then 
officiating  garrison  instructors.  Having 
for  the  most  part  no  actual  experience  of 
war,  and  being  bitten  with  the  Prussian 
mania,  they  bought  up  the  books  in  use 
before  the  war,  or  those  hastily  written 
immediately  after  it,  and  did  the  best  they 


408          The  Training  of  Officers. 

could  with  them.     But  the  war  itself  was 
the  fire  which  purified  the  Prussian   sys- 
tem from  the  dross  of  form  with  which  a 
long  peace  had  covered   it.     It   simplified 
their  ideas  of  outpost  and  advanced  guard 
duties  and  the  details  of  minor  tactics  to  a 
surprising  extent.     It  taught  them  that  it 
was  better  to  march  twenty  miles   a  day, 
and  take  their  chance  of  an  occasional  shot 
from  an  ambush,   than  to   wear  the  men's 
strength  out  in   a  minute  attention  to  ad- 
vance-guard duties;  that  it  was  better  to 
sleep  soundly  on  ninety-nine  nights,   and 
run  the  risk  of  the  loss  of  a  few  men  on 
the    hundredth,    than  to  wear   out    thou- 
sands by  overcautious  attention  to  outpost 
schemes.     It  taught  them,  in  fine,  to  adapt 
means  to  an  end,  and  not  to   suppose  that 
any  absolutely  perfect  normal  form  existed, 
applicable   to  all   conditions.     "With  riper 
years   and   better  judgment,    the   authors 
who    so  hastily  scribbled  their  views  on 
battles   generally,    have    reconsidered    the 
matter,  and  come  to  quite  a  different  set  of 


The  Training  of  Officers.          409 

conclusions  ;  but  their  later  books  have 
remained  untranslated,  and  hence  are  al- 
most unknown  to  the  bulk  of  English 
readers  and  students,  who  still  plod  on 
amidst  details  of  company  columns  and 
other  matters  as  obsolete  on  the  battle- 
field as  the  tactics  of  Marathon.  Only  the 
other  day  we  had  to  give  up  our  brand 
new  outpost  scheme,  for  that  of  the  old 
Peninsula  days  ;  and  we  certainly  owe  the 
two  most  crushing  disasters  of  our  recent 
wars,  Maiwand  and  Isandlhana  to  an  at- 
tempt to  fight  an  Asiatic  battle  with  Alder- 
shot  tactics.  Recently  we  heard  a  German 
officer  of  long  experience  give  the  follow- 
ing opinion, — "  Had  you  Englishmen  not 
been  bound  by  the  letter  of  your  drill-book, 
but  had  understood  its  spirit,  you  would 
have  saved  yourselves  a  world  of  unneces- 
sary change. "  Since  1870  the  whole 
tendency  of  our  tactics  has  been  to  go  back 
to  the  old  line  formations.  The  dense  line 
of  skirmishers  in  front,  is  only  the  line 
without  its  touch — its  spirit,  not  its  letter 


410          The  Training  of  Officers. 

— and  the  formations  in  rear  of  it,  by  which 
we  bring  our  weight  to  bear  on  the  point 
of  attack  are  lines  with  the  same  rigid 
discipline  as  those  with  which  Frederic 
carried  the  Austrian  batteries  at  Leuthen  ; 
and  indeed  the  discipline  is  all  the  more 
essential,  for,  whereas  the  old  line  had  only 
some  two  hundred  paces  to  cross  under 
fire,  and  had  a  difficulty  in  re-loading  its 
muskets  when  once  discharged,  the  modern 
line  may  have  1,500  yards  of  open  to  cover, 
and  the  men  must  be  restrained  from  fir- 
ing their  rifles  into  the  backs  of  the  fight- 
ing line. 


PROFESSIONAL  IGNORANCE  IN 
THE  ARMY. 

THE  article  which  appears  under  the 
above  heading  in  the  current  number 
of  the  Nineteenth  Century,  deserves  the 
particular  attention,  both  of  soldiers  and 
civilians,  not  only  because  of  the  explana- 
tion it  affords  of  the  fact  that,  in  spite  of 
the  high  degree  of  military  instinct  possess- 
ed by  our  officers  as  a  body,  their  know- 
ledge of  the  practical  part  of  their  profes- 
sion still  leaves  much  to  be  desired ;  but 
also  on  account  of  the  experience  and 
knowledge  of  the  writer,  COLONEL  LONS- 
DALE  HALE,  R.  E.,  who  has  spent  the  last 
twenty  years  in  instructing  officers  of  every 
rank  and  branch  of  the  service,  and  can 
therefore  write  with  a  grasp  of  his  subject 
second  to  none. 

The  root  of  the  present  evil,  COLONEL 
HALE  finds  in  the  work  of  the  Commission 
on  Military  Education,  assembled  shortly 


412  Professional  Ignorance  in  the  Army. 

before  the  war  of  1870.  This  Commission 
had  taken  evidence,  and,  more  or  less  su- 
perficially, studied  the  German  system. 
The  war  and  its  result  convinced  them,  as  it 
convinced  nearly  everybody  else,  that  every- 
thing German  must  be  good  ;  and  hence 
they  set  to  work  to  make  a  blind  copy  of  it, 
and,  as  is  always  the  case,  when  we  try  to 
copy  another  nation,  left  out  the  principal 
point  altogether.  That  point  was  that  in  the 
Oerman  Army  the  drill  instructors  were  also 
the  tactical  instructors  of  the  army  :  the  two 
went  inseparably  hand  in  hand.  Hence  in 
the  schools,  which  were  only  auxiliaries  to 
the  troops,  it  was  only  necessary  to  teach 
auxiliary  subjects  such  as  military  topo- 
graphy and  fortification.  But  in  our  own 
service  the  idea  of  officers  teaching  anything 
except  drill  had  long  since  vanished.  Hence 
it  followed,  when  the  German  system  was 
blindly  applied  to  us,  that  we  presented  the 
ridiculous  appearance  of  an  army  instructed 
in  everything  except  in  the  one  thing  for 
which  it  existed,  viz.,  for  fighting. 


Professional  Ignorance  in  the  Army.  413 

Certainly  the  difficulties  which  then  front- 
ed the  authorities  were  no  small  ones  :  and 
perhaps  the  way  they  took  to  circumvent 
them  was  as  good  as  could  be  expected 
under  the  circumstances.  To  make  the 
senior  officers  as  a  body  suddenly  responsi- 
ble for  the  instruction  of  their  men  in  sub- 
jects which  they  themselves  had  never  had 
an  opportunity  of  learning  could  only  have 
ended,  even  with  all  the  good-will  in  the 
world,  in  hopeless  confusion.  Uniformity 
of  system  is  the  fundamental  necessity  in 
all  tactics ;  and  how  was  it  possible  to  se- 
cure that  when  every  one  studied  or  read 
what  seemed  good  in  his  own  eyes  ?  It 
was  therefore  better  to  set  about  forming 
a  class  of  instructors  in  one  uniform  school 
at  the  Staff  College,  and  through  them 
spreading  instruction  downwards  by  means 
of  garrison  classes.  Of  course  the  garrison 
instructors  can  only  teach  theory,  not 
practice;  but  it  would  have  been  impos- 
sible to  step  in  one  jump  from  the  old  sys- 
tem to  the  new  and  make  Commanding 


414  Professional  Ignorance  in  the  Army. 

Officers  responsible  both  for  the  drill  and 
fighting  efficiency  of  their  men.  The  truth 
is,  both  COLONEL  HALE  and  the  authority 
who  penned  the  "  professional  ignorance 
circular "  of  last  Autumn,  both  seem  in 
rather  too  much  of  a  hurry.  They  point 
to  the  German  system  and  expect  to  see 
the  same  results  arrived  at  inside  of  twenty 
years,  and  without  the  pressure  of  a  great 
national  calamity  ;  which  it  took  the  Prus- 
sians fifty  years  and  Jena  to  effect.  We 
might  add  twenty  years  more,  for  fully 
that  length  of  time,  before  the  fatal  disas- 
ters of  1806,  men  like  SCHARNHORST,  CLAU- 
SEWITZ,  KLEIST  and  others  had  been  pre- 
paring the  way  for  the  revolution  which 
followed  the  war. 

The  parallel  between  the  Prussian  Army 
before  Jena  and  our  own  at  the  present 
moment,  or,  better,  fifteen  years  ago,  is 
closer  than  might  be  imagined.  The  old 
Prussian  officers  were,  as  ours  still  are, 
responsible  solely  for  the  drill-efficiency  of 
their  commands,  and  did  not  attempt  to 


Professional  Ignorance  in  the  Army.  415 

teach  their  men  tactics.  There  were  not 
wanting,  just  as  in  our  own  service,  men 
who  had  studied  the  fighting  of  the  armies 
of  the  revolution,  to  warn  them  of  the  com- 
ing danger  and  to  write  voluminous  essays 
on  how  to  meet  it,  in  many  of  which  the 
ground-work  of  all  modern  tactical  ideas 
are  to  be  traced  ;  and  also  there  were  com- 
mittees assembled  to  discuss  these  proposals 
and  to  adapt  them  to  the  needs  of  the 
army.  But,  as  is  always  the  case,  com- 
mittees are  like  councils  of  war  and  never 
fight — in  other  words — never  come  to  a 
decision  ;  and  hence  when  the  fatal  hour 
struck,  the  Prussians,  in  spite  of  their 
splendid  gallantry,  which  they  probably 
never  exceeded,  were  beaten  through  an 
ignorance  of  the  very  first  principles  of 
tactical  training.  No  one  can  read  with- 
out emotion  the  description  of  these  splen- 
didly drilled  battalions  advancing  with 
faultlessly  dressed  lines,  in  slow  time  (75 
paces  to  the  minute),  and  with  bands  play- 
ing and  colours  flying, — and  then  brought 


416  Professional  Ignorance  in  the  Army. 

to  a  halt  by  numerically  inferior  forces 
hidden  away  in  villages,  hedgerows  and 
ditches,  simply  because  the  drill  book  had 
not  taught  them  how  to  attack  either  one 
or  the  other.  In  FREDERIC'S  days  this  had 
been  the  duty  of  the  old  free  battalions  or 
light  troops  ;  but  these  had  been  disbanded 
on  the  close  of  the  Seven  Years7  War,  and 
though  repeated  proposals  had  been  made 
to  supply  their  places  by  the  regular  for- 
mation of  light  companies,  the  committees 
had  come  to  no  decision  ;  and  the  army  took 
the  field  without  them.  The  discipline  and 
devotion  of  the  Prussian  troops  on  the  field 
of  Jena  has  perhaps  never  been  exceeded. 
They  went  into  action  with  the  precision  of 
a  review,  and  suffered  heavier  losses  without 
quitting  their  ground  than  perhaps  any 
other  troops,  except  the  Confederates,  in 
history  ;  but  just  on  that  account  the  lesson 
they  teach  is  the  more  valuable,  and  it  is  to 
be  hoped  we  may  take  it  to  heart  in  time. 

In  another  aspect  too  we  have  been  even 
less   fortunate   than  the  Prussians,     They 


Professional  Ignorance  in  the  Army.  417 

had  still  a  large  number  of  the  veterans 
of  the  Seven  Years'  War  amongst  them, 
men    who   had   felt   the   responsibility    of 
command  and  who,  though  too  old  for  the 
field  (only  one  of  them  was  as  old  as   VON 
MOLTKE  in  1870),  were  yet  not  too  old  for 
work  in  council.     They  had  been  engaged 
in  a  two-year  campaign  against  the  French 
only  fourteen  years  before,  and,  moreover, 
fighting  had  been  going  on  so  continuously 
around  them  that,  as  a  body,  their  officers 
were  far  more  imbued  with  a  knowledge 
of   the  psychical  aspect  of  war  than  our 
own  were  at  the  commencement  of  our  re- 
formation.    Hence  their  writings  were  of  a 
far  more  practical  stamp  than  the  average 
of  our  own.     Even  before   Jena,   SCHAKN- 
HORST  and  others  like  him  tried  to  teach 
war  as  it  really  is,    a  struggle  in   which 
human  nature  is  the  essential  factor,  but 
with  which  our  own  text-books,  as  a  rule, 
decline  to  reckon ;  but  just  as  with  us  he 
was  a  professor,  not  a  leader.     Hence  his 
teaching  could  not  bear  fruit  till  disaster 
M.,  L.  27 


418  Professional  Ignorance  in  the  Army. 

had  forced  the  necessity  of  a  change  on  the 
army.  In  our  case  not  more  than  some 
half  dozen  men  had  seen  modern  European 
war  and  they  had  seen  it  as  spectators 
without  responsibility  ;  and  though  most 
of  them  were  men  of  great  ability,  and  de- 
voted themselves  heart  and  soul  to  the 
spread  of  the  true  gospel,  they  were  not 
able  to  upset  the  other  school  in  a  moment. 
Hence  for  years  our  officers  have  not,  in 
spite  of  examinations,  had  a  real  oppor- 
tunity of  learning,  and  the  progress  has 
not  been  as  great  as  it  should  be.  But, 
pace  COLONEL  HALE  and  last  year's  autumn 
circular,  an  immense  degree  of  good  has 
been  done.  Officers  without  number  have 
been  induced  by  the  pressure  of  examina- 
tions to  devote  their  minds  to  study  and 
have  found  the  study  far  from  as  dry  and 
monotonous  as  they  expected.  They  have 
been  led  to  think  for  themselves,  and  by 
degrees  the  common-sense  of  the  majority 
is  making  itself  felt,  and  men  and  future 
leaders  with  sound  tactical  judgment  are 


Professional  Ignorance  in  the  Army.  419 

being  formed.  And  now  the  time  is  coming 
when  the  steps  suggested  in  COLONEL 
H ALE'S  paper  may  be  taken  in  hand,  viz., 
the  extension  of  responsibility  and  the  mak- 
ing of  every  officer  the  tactical,  as  well  as 
the  disciplinary,  leader  of  his  men.  Now, 
too,  the  screw  may  be  put  on  those  amongst 
the  seniors  who  refuse  to  accept  the  new 
order  of  things.  They  must  be  distinctly 
told  that  they  must  either  learn  to  lead  their 
own  men  or  go.  Warnings  have  not  been 
wanting  to  show  the  direction  in  which 
things  have  been  tending,  and  if  they  have 
not  chosen  to  heed  the  warnings,  they  have 
no  one  to  blame  but  themselves. 

The  last  few  pages  of  COLONEL  BALE'S 
paper  are  particularly  interesting,  as  he 
there  describes  in  full  the  working  of  the 
German  system  and  thfc  method  in  which 
the  senior  officers  are  continually  engaged 
in  tactically  instructing  their  juniors.  He 
shews  us  a  General  of  a  Cavalry  Division 
utilizing  his  own  spare  time  in  taking  out 
a  party  of  young  officers  and  instructing 


420  Professional  Ignorance  in  the  Army. 

them  during  a  ten  days7  trip  in  reconnois- 
sance  and  skeleton  manoeuvres — precisely 
the  same  lines  we  suggested  in  a  recent 
article  on  the  training  of  officers.  As  the 
General  in  question  was  himself  an  English- 
man, it  at  least  shews  that  there  is  no 
innate  impossibility  of  an  English  General 
following  his  example. 


LETTERS  ON  STRATEGY. 

PRINCE  HOHENLOHE,  whose  letters 
about  Cavalry,  Infantry  and  Artillery 
are  already  well  known  to  the  reading  por- 
tion of  Her  Majesty's  Army,  has  recently 
given  a  new  work  to  the  public,  whose  title 
is  above  quoted.  It  is  written  in  the  same 
easy,  readable  style  as  his  other  books,  and 
is  rather,  as  he  himself  says,  an  attempt 
to  clothe  the  dry,  hard  skeleton  of  strate- 
gical fact  with  the  flesh  and  blood  of  ex- 
perience, and  to  point  out  to  his  readers 
the  way  of  improvement  by  private  study. 

It  contains  a  detailed  investigation  of 
the  three  Campaigns  of  Jena,  Solferino, 
and  the  first  portion  of  the  Franco-German 
War,  based  on  the  official  histories  and 
also  on  the  writings  of  Clausewitz,  Blum£ 
and  Bronsart  von  Schellendorf,  the  former 
and  latter  of  which  have  both  been  trans- 
lated into  English,  but  Blum4  as  yet  is 
only  accessible  in  French  or  German. 


422  Letters  on  Strategy. 

That  the  book  is  readable  it  is  almost  un- 
necessary to  state  :  everything  the  Prince 
writes  is  eminently  so  ;  but  our  particular 
reason  for  noticing  it  at  length  is  that  no- 
where else  in  our  studies  have  we  come 
across  a  book  in  which  the  distinction 
between  the  modern  or  Grerman  school  of 
thought,  and  the  old-fashioned  or  English 
school  is  so  sharply  drawn,  or  the  superi- 
ority of  the  former  more  clearly  shown. 
Modern  Grerman  strategy  in  fact  is  simply 
the  outcome  of  a  prolonged  and  thorough 
study  of  the  Napoleonic  methods  ;  it  is  a 
case  in  which  the  vanquished  understood 
far  better  than  the  victor  how  to  profit  by 
the  lessons  he  received.  The  French  never 
appear  really  to  have  grasped  the  true 
secret  of  Napoleon's  successes,  but  have 
tried  to  estimate  his  method  by  applying 
to  them  the  ideas  of  a  former  generation. 
Unfortunately  we  followed  the  latter  instead 
of  the  former,  and  the  consequence  is  that 
we  are  brought  up,  on  ideas  which  were  once 
and  for  all  exploded  on  the  field  of  Jena, 


Letters  on  Strategy.  423 

if  not,  indeed,  sooner.  The  passage  in 
which  Hohenlohe  contrasts  the  ideas  cur- 
rent in  the  two  armies  at  the  commence- 
ment of  this  campaign  is  well  worthy  of 
study,  particularly  by  those  who  only 
know  of  the  campaign  from  the  writings  of 
General  Hamley.  He  contrasts  the  bold 
confident  advance  of  Napoleon  straight  on 
to  the  capital,  and  formed  in  one  gigantic 
battalion  square  of  400,000  fighting  men, 
ready  to  form  front  at  once  in  any  direc- 
tion, with  the  refined  strategical  cobwebs 
the  Prussians  endeavoured  to  weave  about 
him.  It  is  all  very  well  for  Hamley  to 
laugh  the  Prussian  efforts  to  scorn, 
but  unfortunately  the  Prussian  plan  was 
based  precisely  on  the  very  ideas  that  the 
whole  of  the  rest;  of  his  book  is  written  to 
demonstrate.  It  was,  in  fact,  an  attempt 
to  compensate  by  manoeuvres  for  the  want 
of  numerical  fighting  strength,  and  though 
ruined  by  weakness  of  execution,  was 
really  as  skilful  an  attempt  as  could  well  be 
made,  and  in  the  hands  of  a  resolute  leader 


424  Letters  on  Strategy. 

who  understood   how  to  seize  his  oppor- 
tunities  would,    in   all    probability,    have 
led  to  the  Emperor's  complete  destruction. 
These  opportunities  were  given  by  Napo- 
leon's   deliberately    departing  from  two  of 
the  most  important  of  his  usual  ideas,    viz., 
instead   of  sending   his    Cavalry  boldly  in 
advance  to  hunt  up  the  Prussian   Army, 
he  kept  them  too  close  in,  and  hence  failed 
to  discover  where  the  latter    actually  was  ; 
and,  secondly,  as  a  consequence  of  the  first, 
being  in  ignorance  of  the   enemies7    where- 
abouts, he  determined  to  choose  the  capital 
for  his  objective,  instead  of  the  field    army, 
trusting   that   anxiety  for  the  safety  of  the 
former  would  induce  the  latter   to    attempt 
to  bar  his    path.     But    the    Prussians    did 
not   fall   into  the  trap  :  instead  of  doing  so 
they  laid  a  very  pretty  one  for   Napoleon, 
by  taking  up  a  position  of  great  strength  on 
his  flank  which  he  was  compelled  to  attack, 
and  for  24  hours  the  fate  of  his  army  hung 
in  the  balance,  though,  knowing  the  school 
in  which  his  adversaries  had  been  educated, 


Letters  on  Strategy.  425 

the  fact  does  not   appear   to   have   caused 
him  the  least  anxiety. 

And  he  was  right.  The  Prussians  could 
not  move  without  orders,  and  before  the 
orders  arrived  the  time  had  gone  by.  Had 
the  present  Prince  Hohenlohe  stood  in  his 
namesake's  place,  the  morning  of  the  14th 
October  would  have  seen  the  greater  part 
of  the  French  Army  struggling  in  the  Saale 
for  dear  life.  The  Prince  does  not  say  so, 
but  we  feel  sure  he  would  have  done  it. 
Unfortunately  it  was  not  the  fashion  in 
those  days  to  march  "  zum  kanonen 
donner,  "  and  the  saying  :  "  Meine  stiefeln 
und  die  Korps  Artillerie "  was  then  un- 
known. But  what  is  particularly  pleasing 
in  the  Prince's  style  is  that  though  he 
points  out  where  faults  and  omissions 
occurred,  he  only  does  so  to  find  out  why 
they  happened  ;  whereas  the  ordinary 
military  critic  roundly  calls  the  leader  a 
fool  for  making  an  obvious  mistake,  and 
implies  that  he  himself  would  have  done 
much  better.  Hohenlohe  goes  in  to  find 


426  Letters  on  Strategy. 

out  the  reason,  and  usually  succeeds  in 
finding  a  very  good  one.  We  may  men- 
tion here  that  this  is  also  a  characteristic 
of  Clausewitz  in  his  histories  of  campaigns, 
and  it  tends  to  show  up  much  more  dis- 
tinctly wherein  the  actual  difficulty  of 
command  consists. 

The  failure  of  the  Prussians  in  1806  he 
shews  to  have  been  due  not  only  to  too 
great  a  belief  in  the  power  of  manoeuvre 
(or  strategy)  alone  as  opposed  to  the  power 
of  the  sword  (or  battle),  but  also — and  this 
is  particularly  important  for  us  to  note — 
to  the  too  rigid  ideas  about  discipline 
which  was  the  characteristic  of  Frederic's 
small  armies,  and  of  our  own  great  Duke's. 
The  failure  of  the  Austrians  he  also  attri- 
butes to  the  same  reason  :  of  the  accusation 
of  treason,  so  freely  lavished  on  the  Aus- 
trian leaders  by  their  disappointed  country- 
men, he  will  know  nothing,  but  points  out 
how  inevitably  each  step  in  their  career  of 
defeat  depended  on  the  want  of  initiative 
entrusted  to  the  subordinate  leaders. 


Letters  on  Strategy.  427 

But  it  is  in  his  third  study,  on  the  cam- 
paign of  1870,  that  the  chief  interest  of 
the  work  lies.  In  this  all  comes  out :  the 
steady  way  in  which,  working  up  from  the 
Clausewitz's  explanation  of  the  reasons  for 
Napoleon's  successes,  the  German  "  General 
Stab  "  had  perfected  a  system  for  working 
the  gigantic  armies  of  modern  days,  every 
step  can  be  read,  and  the  contrast  between 
our  own  method  becomes  more  apparent. 
Everywhere  the  guiding  principle  appears 
to  have  been,  Clausewitz's  famous  saying  : 
u  Im  Kriege  is  alles  einfach,  aber  das 
einfache  ist  schwer  "  (in  war  everything  is 
simple,  but  to  secure  simplicity  is  difficult). 
Read  in  the  pages  of  Hamley,  and  with  his 
comments  the  war  of  1870  appears  alto- 
gether destitute  of  strategical  interest,  and 
this  not  because  his  information  is  ridicu- 
lously inaccurate,  but  because,  according 
to  his  method,  the  difficulty  to  be  sur- 
mounted in  the  moving  of  these  enormous 
masses  does  not  "  spring  in  one's  eyes,  " 
to  use  a  continental  idiom.  His  idea  appears 


428  Letters  on  Strategy. 

to  be  to  strip  war  of  all  that  constitutes 
war  and  degrade  it  to  the  level  of  a  game 
of  chess,  or,  indeed,  lower,  for  the  combi- 
nations of  a  chessboard  are  many  thousand 
times  greater  than  those  of  a  campaign, 
in  which,  after  all,  there  are  practically 
only  three  alternatives  to  be  faced,  namely, 
to  fight  defensively  or  offensively,  to  turn 
the  right  flank  or  the  left,  or  to  pierce  the 
centre.  Stated  this  way  nothing  could  be 
simpler,  and  the  youngest  subaltern  may 
feel  himself  justified  in  calling  Napoleon  or 
Moltke  a  fool  ;  but  looked  at  from  Clause- 
witz's  standpoint,  which  after  all  Hohen- 
lohe  only  develops,  and  the  game  assumes 
a  totally  distinct  aspect. 

In  their  school  we  are  taught  the  mean- 
ings of  the  words  responsibility,  danger 
and  friction — words  which  are  familiar 
enough  to  every  man  who  has  seen  service. 
Time  and  space,  too,  are  matters  which 
Hamley  usually  leaves  out  of  account  when 
it  suits  his  purpose  :  but  the  Germans  never 
do  so.  In  fact,  one  may  summarise  the 


Letters  on  Strategy.  429 

whole  matter  in  these  words  : — The 
text-book  in  which  every  aspirant  for  Staff 
employment  in  the  British  Army  (theore- 
tically) must  pass  his  examination,  bears  on 
every  page  the  stamp  of  an  amateur  :  those 
of  the  German  Army  equally  evidently  the 
stamp  of  a  trained  professional  expert. 
The  remarks  on  the  circulation  of  orders 
in  the  Prince's  book  are  specially  worthy 
of  consideration,  for  they  bring  forward, 
in  a  particularly  striking  manner,  the 
difficulties  which  have  to  be  overcome,  and 
the  extraordinary  degree  of  initiative  left 
to  subordinate  leaders  ;  and  in  this  connec- 
tion also  we  would  refer  to  Cardinal  von 
Widdern's  "  Hand  Buch  fur  Truppen 
fiihrung,"  a  work  which  has  been  translat- 
ed into  French  and  largely  drawn  on 
in  our  own  "  Staff  College  Lectures.77 
But  to  attempt  to  apply  the  rules  and 
regulations  contained  in  these  two  works, 
cut  and  dried,  to  an  English  Army  trained 
on  its  present  lines,  would  only  be  to  court 
disaster.  Any  such  attempt  should  be 


430  Letters  on  Strategy. 

preceded  by  the  most  careful  previous 
preparation  of  our  officers  to  assume  res- 
ponsibility, and  also  to  insure  in  them  a 
uniformity  of  military  opinion  which  at 
the  present  moment  we  are  far  from 
possessing.  It  is  not  that  our  race  is  in 
any  degree  inferior  either  in  readiness  to 
assume  such  responsibility  or  in  ordinary 
military  instinct  :  the  history  of  our  Navy 
abundantly  proves  the  contrary  ;  but  it  is 
simply  owing  to  the  system  under  which 
we  are  trained,  and  though  one  may  grate- 
fully acknowledge  the  progress  made  in 
this  direction  of  late  years,  yet  it  must  be 
much  more  thorough  before  any  good  can 
really  come  of  it. 

In  the  limits  of  our  space  it  is  utterly 
impossible  to  exhaust  the  subject,  but  we 
trust  we  have  written  enough  to  stimulate 
the  curiosity  of  all  those  who  are  interested 
in  their  duty.  The  number  of  these  is  far 
larger  than  is  generally  supposed  :  they  read 
and  discuss  everything  they  can  lay  hands 
on  ;  but  the  sound  common-sense  of  the 


Letters  on  Strategy.  431 

average  Englishman  revolts  at  the  illogical 
nonsense  they  are  compelled  to  swallow, 
and  in  despair  they  revert  to  the  idea  that 
their  own  common-sense  is  a  better  guide 
than  the  books  :  and  so  it  would  be  if  it 
was  first  properly  trained.  Nobody  who 
lietens  to  the  military  conversation  in  messes 
and  clubs  can  fail  to  notice  this.  Good  sense 
is  never  wanting,  but  what  is  wanting  is  a 
grasp  of  all  the  conditions  of  the  problem 
under  discussion.  But  it  is  just  there  that 
they  fail — they  are  not  sufficiently  grounded. 
The  three  arms  do  not  mutually  under- 
stand each  other,  and  the  regimental  officer 
does  not  understand  the  Staff,  and  vice 
versd.  Nothing  in  this  respect  is  more 
instructive  than  to  listen  to  the  remarks  of 
the  subalterns  after  a  company  training  or 
a  manoeuvre.  They  are  intensely  keen  and 
interested,  but  some  umpire  or  Staff  Officer 
has  ridden  up  and  ordered  them  out  of 
action,  and  they  are  indignant.  If,  instead 
of  a  blunt  order,  the  umpire  or  Staff  Officer 
had  explained  the  matter  briefly,  all  the 


432  Letters  on  Strategy. 

ruffled  feathers  would  have  been  smoothed 
and  a  lesson  readily  learnt.  As  it  is  the 
man's  esprit  de  company  has  been  hurt, 
and  he  swears  never  to  take  any  interest 
in  the  matter  again —  and  if  he  wasn't  after 
all  an  Englishman,  full  of  a  love  of  fight- 
ing and  sport,  probably  he  would  keep  his 
word.  It  is  particularly  the  Cavalry  who 
suffer  in  this  way,  and  just  because,  as  a 
rule,  the  Cavalry  Officer  really  does  take 
a  keener  interest  in  his  work  than  the 
•  Infantry  man  (the  writer,  be  it  said, 
belongs  to  neither).  This  species  of  snub  is 
•pll  the  more  bitterly  felt,  and  some  umpires 
at  home  would  be  astonished  at  the  depth 
of  feeling  and  flow  of  profanity  their 
decisions  had  awakened  if  they  were  to 
overhear  the  conversations  at  dinner  at  the 
Naval  and  Military,  or  in  the  carriages  of 
the  1-40  up  to  town. 

We  dwell  particularly  on  this  point,  for 
to  develop  the  cheerful  readiness  to  assume 
responsibility  one  must  begin  very  low 
down.  It  is  a  plant  of  tender  growth  and 


Letters  on  Strategy.  433 

requires  careful  handling.  Either  it 
withers  up  altogether  or  it  deteriorates 
into  a  rank  weed  more  dangerous  still,  for 
it  grows  into  eccentric  shapes,  and  there  is 
no  counting  on  the  direction  it  may  take 
when  at  last  given  its  head. 


.,  L.  28 


ON  INSPECTIONS. 

/CONSIDERING  the  amount  of  inspect- 
\J  ing  that  goes  on  annually  in  the 
British  Army,  it  is  curious  to  note  how 
little  the  spirit  of  the  inspection  is  grasped 
even  amongst  the  keenest  soldiers.  Indeed, 
it  is  amongst  this  very  class,  as  a  rule,  that 
this  institution  is  most  vigorously  denounc- 
ed. Hardly  a  magazine  article  or  letter  to 
a  paper  on  tactical  changes  or  improve- 
ments in  musketry  training,  appears,  with- 
out somehow  or  other  a  sneer  at  marching 
past  and  parade  drill  being  dragged  into  it 
somewhere.  But  yet  our  forefathers  who 
instituted  the  system  were  practical  sol- 
diers, and  by  no  means  the  empty-headed 
fools  it  is  now-a-days  the  custom  to  consider 
them  ;  and  if  we  take  the  trouble  to  go 
carefully  into  the  object  they  had  in  view 
in  introducing  inspections,  we  shall  see 
that  they  by  no  means  deserve  the  discredit 
into  which  they  have  now  fallen.  The 


On  Inspections.  435 

truth  is  that  the  soldiers  of  the  beginning 
of  the  century  had,  as  a  body,  far  more 
practical  acquaintance  with  European  war, 
than  any  of  our  present  leaders  can  boast 
of,  and  their  experience  convinced  them  of 
the  fact  that  success  in  battle  depends  far 
more  on  the  spirit  of  the  troops  than  on 
the  efficiency  of  their  armament  :  a  fact 
which  the  intelligent  study  of  the  history 
of  the  campaign  of  1870  proves  beyond 
shadow  of  a  doubt.  It  was  not  the  arma- 
ment of  the  Germans  in  that  war  which 
carried  them  to  victory  ;  for  the  French 
armament  was  far  superior  to  theirs,  inas- 
far  as  concerns  the  Infantry;  but  it  was 
the  magnificent  spirit  which  animated  the 
Germans  which  led  them  to  shirk  no  loss 
in  the  execution  of  their  orders. 

Now,  it  is  the  main  object  of  inspections 
to  afford  the  superior  leaders  a  means  by 
which  they  can  estimate  the  spirit  by  which 
the  troops  are  animated.  All  the  other  ob- 
jects are  merely  subsidiary.  But,  to  ensure 
true  results  from  an  inspection,  it  is  neces- 


436  On  Inspections. 

sary  that  the  inspecting  officer  should  un- 
derstand precisely  what  he  wishes  ito  arrive 
at ;  and  not  be  misled  by  a  show  of  spuri- 
ous efficiency,  attained  by  too  exclusive 
attention  to  mere  parade  work.  To  an 
experienced  eye  this  presents  no  difficulty. 
There  are  hundreds  of  indications  that  be- 
tray at  once  the  regiment  which  attempts 
to  deceive  by  bar  rack -square  drill  alone. 
The  barrack-square  alone  will  never  give 
the  stamp  of  real  efficiency,  which  the 
General  who  knows  his  work  wishes  to  see. 
It  is  in  itself  intensely  monotonous.  The 
men  feel  it  to  be  so  ;  and  in  a  short  time 
the  want  of  living  interest  in  their  work 
dulls  the  intelligence  of  men  and  officers, 
and  leaves  an  unmistakable  impression  on 
their  faces.  It  is  felt  in  the  very  atmos- 
phere of  the  mess  and  barracks.  A  sensi- 
ble course  of  real  fighting  training,  such 
as  that  carried  out  in  the  Prussian  Army, 
leads  to  an  exactly  opposite  result.  The 
minds  and  perceptions  of  the  men  having 
been  quickened  and  their  interest  kept 


On  Inspections.  437 

thoroughly  alive  in  their  work,  their  faces 
reflect  the  fact  in  a  way  which  cannot  be 
misunderstood  ;  and  one  feels  as  one  rides 
down  their  ranks  or  sees  their  battalions 
Hweep  by,  the  same  feeling  of  conscious 
superiority  which  animates  the  men  them- 
selves. 

To    those  who  have  tried  to  study  the 
action  of  mind  upon  mind,   there  will  be 
nothing  extraordinary  in   this    statement. 
History  has   again  and   again  proved  how 
overwhelming   the  force  of   thousands  of 
minds  all  concentrated   on  the  same  idea, 
whether  a  mistaken  one  or  not,   can  be, 
How  else  indeed  can  the  extraordinary  out- 
breaks of  mob  violence  which  from  time 
to  time  frighten  the  world,  be  accounted 
for  ?     Similarly,  it  is   impossible   for   the 
individual  mind  of  a  reviewing  officer  to 
be  altogether    unaffected  by  the  dominant 
thought  of  the  thousands  whom  he  may  be 
inspecting.     Where  that  thought  is  merely 
to  get  through  the  work  in  hand  as  quick- 
ly,  with  as  little  trouble  as  possible ;  and 


438  On  Inspections. 

where  neither  men  or  officers  take  a  mutual 
pride  in  each  other,,  the  resultant  thought 
which  reaches  the  inspecting  officer  is  one, 
which  no  amount  of   clean   accoutrements 
or   mechanical   perfection    of    movements, 
obtained  by  a  system  of  harassing  punish- 
ment, can  conceal.     Of  course  the  mind  of 
the  reviewing  officer  must,   to  borrow    a 
musical  simile,  be  in  itself  capable  of  vi- 
brating  in    harmony   with   the  dominant 
chord,  just  as  a  glass  may   be   made  ta 
vibrate  in  harmony  to  a  given  note,  or  may 
be  broken  by  a  discordant  one.     It  may  so 
happen  that,  during  a  prolonged  period  of 
peace  time,  in  which  true  military  instinct 
has  become  obliterated  by   too   great   an 
attention  to  pedantic  details,  both  men  and 
officers  may  mistake  the  false  chord  for  the 
true  one  ;  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  this 
state  of   things  has  at  times  been  arrived 
at,  and  that  the  outcry  against  inspections 
and  marches  past  is  merely  the  reaction 
from  a  former  false  and  overstrained   state 
of  affairs.     But  it  would  be  a  mistake  to 


On  Inspections.  439 

blind  ourselves  to  the  fact  that  the  other 
condition  can  and  does  exist  in  countries 
and  regiments,  where  the  perception  for 
military  truth  is  clearer.  Let  those  who 
doubt  it,  go  to  Germany  and  see  for  them- 
selves. We  have  known  many  English 
officers  who  went  there  determined  not  to 
be  convinced,  but  who  returned  as  enthusi- 
astic as  others  ;  and  there  is  no  other  ex- 
planation possible,  for  there  is  nothing 
otherwise  about  a  German  march  past  parti- 
cularly adapted  to  catch  the  military  eye. 
As  a  show  it  is  far  less  attractive  than  one 
of  our  own,  the  heavy  dull-blue  uniform, 
clumsy  boots  and  accoutrements  compare 
most  unfavourably  with  our  own  brighter 
turn-out ;  yet  as  the  column  sweeps  by, 
with  almost  faultless  precision  and  dress- 
ing, one  is  irresistibly  carried  away  by  the 
feeling  of  soldierly  pride,  the  conviction  of 
concentrated  effort  to  excel.  One  experi- 
ences the  same  feeling  in  watching  one  of 
our  own  battalions  that  has  been  trained 
on  an  intelligent  system.  But  with  us  it 


440  On  Inspections. 

is  the  exception,  not  the  rule  ;  and  one 
never  feels  it  with  a  regiment  which  has 
been  drilled  solely  for  marching  past. 

Let  us  compare  the  feeling  produced  on 
the  inspecting  officer  by  a  regiment  of  each 
class.  In  the  latter,  as  one  rides  down  the 
ranks,  men  and  officers  alike  appear  bored; 
they  may  hold  themselves  up  and  handle 
their  arms  smartly,  but  it  is  by  compulsion 
and  not  through  personal  pride  in  them- 
selves and  their  regiment.  In  the  former 
all  look  alert  and  confident,  and  even  where, 
as  with  the  Volunteers  for  example,  the 
same  precision  of  movement  cannot  be  ex- 
pected, the  effect  produced  on  the  review- 
ing officer  is  the  same.  English  soldiers 
possess,  perhaps,  a  larger  share  of  innate 
military  instinct  than  those  of  any  other 
nation,  and  they  are  quick  to  recognise 
whether  their  training  really  gives  them  a 
fighting  superiority  over  others  or  not.  It 
is  only  necessary  to  watch  them  in  manoeu- 
vres or  to  listen  to  their  conversation  dur- 
ing them  to  be  convinced  of  this.  The 


On  Inspections.  441 

intense  earnestness  they  then  show  some- 
times becomes  dangerous.  For  instance, 
we  remember  on  one  occasion  seeing  a  gal- 
lant infantry  regiment  charged  and  put 
out  of  action  by  the  Blues.  The  men  fixed 
bayonets  without  word  of  command  and 
implored  their  officers  to  "let  them  go 
in  at  the  Tin-bellies  "  as  they  irreverently 
called  them.  On  another,  we  recall  an  old 
and  most  respectable  veteran  drownir^  his 
sorrow  in  the  flowing  bowl,  because  on 
three  consecutive  days  his  regiment  had 
been  taken  prisoners  and  put  out  of  action. 
It  is  too  much  the  custom  of  our  officers 
to  speak  of  the  men  as  a  totally  distinct 
race  from  the  rest  of  the  world,  thinking 
only  of  idleness,  beer,  and  the  canteen. 
They  are  nothing  of  the  kind,  but  have  a 
keener  instinct  for  sport,  emulation  and  war 
— even  imitation  war — than  any  continent- 
al race  whatever.  Only  it  is  absolutely 
necessary  to  give  them  the  opportunity  of 
showing  it.  Comparing  the  manoeuvre 
work  of  other  nations  and  our  own,  both 


442  On  Inspections. 

in  the  big  manoeuvres,  the  company  train- 
ing and  in  siege  works — in  the  last  of  which 
the  work  is  carried  on  by  reliefs  night  and 
day,  and  the  conditions  approximate  in 
their  disagreeableness  far  more  nearly  to 
those  of  actual  war  than  in  the  others — 
and  we  can  positively  assert  the  superiority 
of  our  own  men's  intelligence  and  interest 
in  their  duties.  As  for  their  military  feel- 
ing in  war,  it  has  never  been  questioned. 
Even  our  enemies  have  always  testified  to 
it  ;  and  only  the  other  day,  the  German 
Military  Attache  with  the  Tel-el-Kebir 
force  wrote  in  the  Militiar  Wochenblatt  that, 
as  the  York  and  Lancaster  regiment  went 
past  him  to  join  in  the  fight  of  Kassasin, 
he  never  saw  troops  go  into  action  with 
a  better  spirit  than  they  showed.  Let  us 
only  seek,  by  the  adoption  of  a  more 
rational  system  for  giving  play  to  this 
feeling  to  develop  and  foster  it  ;  and  we 
shall  soon  hear  no  more  about  the  depress- 
ing influence  of  the  inspection  and  march 
past. 


THE   SECRET   OF  SUCCESS 
IN  WAR. 

WHEN  the  Ashantis  observed  the  ad- 
vancing forces  of  Great  Britain  en- 
gaged in  running  a  wire  from  tree  to  tree  to 
keep  up  communication  with  the  base,  they 
at  once  concluded  that  this  was  in  honour  of 
some  "  fetish  "  whose  aid  the  British  forces 
had  thus  acquired  ;  and  therefore  to  propi- 
'  tiate  him,  or  her,  as  the  case  might  be,  to 
favour  their  own  side,  they  proceeded  to 
tie  strings  from  tree  to  tree,  in  a  similar 
manner.  They  had  got  the  form,  but  did 
not  understand  the  spirit.  Similarly,  when 
England  saw  with  astonishment,  first  the 
six  weeks7  campaign  of  Sadowa,  and  then 
the  almost  equally  rapid  destruction  of  the 
French  Imperial  Army,  she  looked  about 
to  find  the  German  "fetish"  which  had 
done  it  ;  and  for  the  moment  found  it  in 
spiked  helmets,  black  ball  pouches,  and 
similar  unessential  details.  Other  nations 


444     The  Secret  of  Success  in   War. 

went  a  little  farther.  They  did  not  adopt 
spiked  helmets,  but  they  sought  salvation 
in  minor  changes  of  organisation,  such  as 
four  companies  to  a  battalion  instead  of  six, 
and  similar  copies  of  the  form  only  and  not 
the  spirit,  not  much  more  intelligent  than 
the  string  of  the  Ashantis, 

To  obtain  any  real  result,  our  analysis 
must  be  pushed  much  deeper,  right  down 
into  the  soul  of  things.  "  The  Genius  of 
"  the  Prussian  Army  dwells  in  the  hearts 
"  of  its  officers,  "  said  Riichel,  one  of  those 
who  commenced  the  work  of  army  regener- 
ation in  Prussia  even  before  the  great 
catastrophe  of  Jena ;  and  it  is  indeed  amongst 
the  officers  that  we  must  seek  for  it.  But 
it  is  so  deeply  ingrained  in  their  very  flesh 
and  blood  that  it  does  not  exactly  "  spring 
"  in  the  eyes  "  of  the  casual  observer.  Pro- 
bably many  a  German  himself  is  hardly 
conscious  how  far-reaching  are  the  conse- 
quences of  that  delegation  of  responsibility 
to  which  he  owes  his  authority.  But  when 
once  properly  focussed,  it  is  seen  that  it  is 


The  Secret  of  Success  in   War.      445 

this  very  delegation  of  responsibility  which 
gives  to  that  army  its  extraordinary  power 
and  efficiency  ;  which  enables  it  to  manoeu- 
vre in  defiance  of  all  formerly-recognised 
strategy  and  yet  invariably  to  win. 

Let  us  try  to  trace  its  development. 
The  armies  of  FREDERIC  THE  GREAT'S  day 
were  simply  dead  machines,  no  part  of  which 
could  move  without  orders  received  through 
the  proper  channel ;  and  for  an  order  to 
filter  through  that  channel  entailed  a  waste 
of  time  which  often  proved  fatal.  It  did  not 
suit  FREDERIC'S  own  method  of  conducting 
a  war  to  emancipate  his  army  from  this 
control,  otherwise  we  may  be  sure  he  would 
have  done  it — indeed  he  did  emancipate 
his  cavalry  from  it  completely  ; — but  as  he 
did  not,  and  as  in  those  days  every  other 
army  was  only  a  blind  copy  of  the  Prussian, 
much  as  they  are  to-day,  it  is  natural  that 
we  should  find  them,  at  the  close  of  a  long 
period  of  peace,  even  more  rigid  in  their 
movements  than  before  ;  for  centralisation 
of  authority  is  just  as  certain  a  product  of 


446     The  Secret  of  Success  in   War. 

peace-time  as  decentralisation  is  of  war. 
The  French  Revolutionary  armies  were  an 
exceptional  product  of  an  exceptional  era, 
and  NAPOLEON  had  the  wit  to  utilise  their 
good  points  to  the  utmost.  He  took  them 
where  he  found  them  ;  and  certainly  there 
is  no  evidence  in  his  writings  to  show  that 
he  was  conscious  of  the  power  thus  con- 
ferred on  him.  But  the  disasters  of  Jena 
forced  the  Germans  to  look  into  the  matter, 
and  CLAUSEWITZ,  SCHARNHORST  and  others 
were  not  slow  in  perceiving  the  advantages 
which  their  enemy  derived  from  the  fact 
that  his  junior  officers  were  always  ready 
to  act  on  their  own  responsibility,  accord- 
ino*  as  circumstances  dictated.  In  most 

o 

armies,  even  in  the  French  as  soon  as 
NAPOLEON  was  gone,  this  was  looked  upon 
as  an  irregularity  to  be  suppressed,  instead 
of  a  force  of  enormous  power,  when  duly 
controlled  in  its  proper  channel.  Even  our 
own  IRON  DUKE  would  have  none  of  it, 
when  at  Waterloo  MERCER'S  troop  of 
Royal  Horse  Artillery  saved  the  day  by 


The  Secret  of  Success  in   War.      447 

deliberate  disobedience  of  orders.  MERCER 
received  no  thanks  for  it  ;  on  the  contrary, 
the  DUKE  expressed  his  intense  displeasure. 
In  Austria  and  Russia  it  was  the  same. 
Indeed,  in  the  Russian  Army  which  fought 
us  in  the  Crimea  the  troops  had  become 
almost  too  automatic  to  run  away  when 
they  were  beaten.  We  ourselves  were  so 
bad  that  it  was  possible  for  one  brigade  of 
cavalry  to  fight  against  fearful  odds  in 
full  view  of  the  other,  without  its  occurring 
to  the  leader  of  the  other  one  to  go  to  its 
assistance.  The  French  still  kept  a  little 
of  the  old  spirit  in  1859,  and  thereby 
succeeded  in  defeating  an  Army  in  every 
other  respect  decidedly  its  superior. 

Meanwhile  the  Germans  had  been  system- 
atically training  this  new  force,  and  the 
result  would  have  quickly  attracted  notice 
in  1866,  had  not  the  attention  of  the 
lookerson  been  drawn  off  to  subsidiary 
points,  such  as  the  breech-loader,  or  the 
supposed  high  average  of  general  intelli- 
gence in  the  ranks.  Taken  alone,  both 


448     The  Secret  of  Success  in   War. 

those  factors  would  have   been  powerless. 
In  the  war  with  Austria  let  us  reverse  the 
roles  and  put  the  Prussian  staff  and  army 
in  the  position   of  the   Austrians.     They 
would  have  pounced  on  the  isolated  columns 
as   they   issued  from  the  mountains,   and 
rolled  them  up  in  detail.     The  Germans 
knew  that   they   ran    this   risk,    but   they 
seemed  also  to  know  that,   owing  to  the 
innate  viciousness  of  the  Austrian  system, 
the  latter  would  be  unable  to  avail  them- 
selves of  their  advantage.     One  can  hardly 
suppress  a  smile  at  the  self-complaisance 
of  critics  of  the  HAMLEY  school,  who  point 
out  gravely  the  violation  of  all  strategical 
principles  on   the   part   of  the    Germans. 
Can  they   really   suppose  that   a   man    of 
MOLTKE'S  capacity  acted  in  ignorance   of 
the  A.  B.  C.  of  his  art  ?     Have  they  never 
heard  of  his  favourite  motto  "Erst,  wagen, 
dann  wag  en,  " — First  ponder,  then  risk  ? 

But  it  was  in  1870  that  the  full  power 
of  this  latent  force  was  really  shown.  The 
wheels  of  the  machine  had  been  greased 


The  Secret  of  Success  in   War.     449 

with  the  oil  of  experience,  and  the  army 
worked  more  like  a  sentient  organism  than 
an  automaton.  When  the  feelers  and 
tentacles  of  an  octopus  come  in  contact 
with  its  prey,  they  close  in  spontaneously 
without  waiting  for  orders  from  the  rudi- 
mentary brainless  just  so,  when  the  outpost 
of  the  German  Army  came  in  contact  with 
the  French,  they  closed  in  on  them  and 
crushed  them.  Woerth,  Spicheren,  Borny, 
Vionville,  were  all  fought  on  the  same 
plan.  No  sooner  was  the  first  sound  of  the 
guns  heard,  than  instinctively  every  limb 
of  the  army  closed  in  on  the  victim,  and 
before  night-fall  a  sufficient  numerical  supe- 
riority to  ensure  victory  had  been  achieved. 
Safe  in  the  knowledge  that  his  comrades 
within  sound  of  his  guns  would  come  to 
his  assistance  on  their  own  initiative,  each 
leader  was  ready  to  engage  on  his  own 
responsibility,  no  matter  what  the  odds 
against  him  appeared  to  be.  There  was 
no  waiting  for  orders  while  a  comrade  was 
being  destroyed ;  but  every  man  within 
M.,  L.  29 


450      The  Secret  of  Success  in  War. 

call  streamed  into  the  decisive  point. 
Hence,  again,  the  Prussian  staff  were  able 
to  set  the  principles  of  the  old  strategists 
at  defiance.  At  Gravelotte,  they  fought 
with  their  faces  turned  homewards,  in 
the  same  position  that  proved  so  fatal 
to  the  Austrians  at  Marengo.  In  the 
investment  of  Metz  they  dared  to  establish 
themselves  along  the  circumference  of  a 
circle  some  42  miles  in  extent  in  face  of 
an  army  concentrated  in  the  centre  and 
able  to  attack  on  any  point  along  the  radius 
of  only  seven  miles  in  length.  But  this 
daring  was  successful  ;  for  they  knew 
that  no  sooner  were  the  sounds  of  the 
coming  action  heard,  than  everybody  of 
troops  within  reach  would  stream  into  the 
decisive  point,  without  waiting  for  special 
orders. 

Perhaps  the  system  did  not  work  always 
perfectly  ;  for  nothing  human  every  does. 
In  the  next  war  it  will  probably  do  better 
still,  but  the  nett  result  was  successful 
beyond  expectation,  and  we  will  go  so  far 


The  Secret  of  Success  in   War.     451 

as  to  maintain  that  in  no  other  way  could 
such  a  result  have  been  attained.  But 
what  reason  can  there  be  why  we  should 
not  in  turn  set  to  work  and  develop  the 
same  force.  Surely  a  readiness  to  assume 
responsibility  is  not  a  special  gift  belonging 
to  the  German  race ;  the  capacity  exists 
just  as  much  and  probably  more  in  our 
own.  Delegation  of  responsibilty  is  the 
key-note  of  our  success  in  commerce,  in 
manufactures,  and  specially  in  the  manage- 
ment of  our  railways  and  great  lines  of 
ocean  steamers ;  and  why  should  not  the 
same  system  applied  to  the  army  obtain 
the  same  results.  And  it  will  not  be  so 
difficult  to  adopt  it  as  might  be  supposed, 
though  it  would  be  absurd  to  hope  for 
immediate  results.  It  is  a  plant  of  slow 
growth,  and  needs  a  considerable  amount 
of  fostering.  But  when  once  it  begins  to 
be  understood  among  the  regimental  officers 
that  each  in  his  separate  station  will  be 
held  individually  responsible  for  the  fighting 
efficiency  of  his  men,  then  emulation  will 


452      The  Secret  of  Success  in   War. 

be  excited,  and  the  very  elements  which 
at  present  seem  to  block  the  way  will 
become  its  firmest  support.  It  is  the 
tenacity  of  power  once  conferred  that 
makes  the  higher  leaders  so  averse  to  con- 
ceding anything  to  their  subordinates  ;  and 
it  is  the  feeling  of  being  denied  their 
proper  share  of  responsibility  that  makes 
the  younger  ones  restless  and  inclined  to 
kick.  No  man  will  do  as  good  work  for 
another  as  he  will  for  himself — it  is  not  in 
human  nature  that  he  should.  But  make 
him  feel  that  his  career  is  really  at  stake 
on  the  quality  of  work  he  does,  and  he 
will  stick  to  it  like  a  slave.  A  man  worth 
having  must  have  an  outlet  for  his  energies 
somewhere,  and  if  he  cannot  find  it  in  his 
work,  he  will  seek  it  on  the  race  course  or 
cricket-field,  or  wherever  else  his  special 
idiosyncracy  leads  him.  But  train  that 
energy  its  the  proper  direction,  and  it  will 
be  all  clear  gain  to  the  efficiency  of  the 
army.  English  officers  are  not  essentially 
different  from  those  of  other  armies,  for 


The  Secret  of  Success  in   War.      453 

human  nature  is  pretty  uniform  all  the 
world  over.  If  there  is  a  difference,  it  lies 
indeed  in  the  direction  of  superior  keenness 
on  our  part  ;  for  wherever  an  Englishman 
serves  side  by  side  with  a  foreigner,  he 
nearly  invariably  distinguishes  himself 
above  his  fellow  ;  and  the  histories  of  those 
Englishmen  who  served  either  in  the 
Austrian  or  the  German  Army  is  proof 
enough  of  the  truth  of  this.  Give  us  the 
same  system,  and  we  have  not  a  shadow  of 
doubt  that,  in  a  few  years7  time,  our  officers 
will  be  as  far  superior  to  those  of  other 
countries  as  our  civilians  are  in  everything 
in  which  their  individuality  is  allowed  full 
play. 


EUROPEAN  AND  ASIATIC 
WARFARE. 


seems  to  be,  amongst  the  numer- 
JL  ous  would-be  reformers  of  our  army, 
a  considerable  numbers  of  individuals  who 
apparently  have  not  realised  the  fact  that 
making  war  in  India  or  beyond  the  Sulei- 
man Mountains,  is  a  very  different  affair 
from  fighting  the  French  in  France  or  the 
Netherlands.  One  hears  it  said  that  foreign 
armies  can  move  about  without  tents  and 
followers  ;  why  should  not  ours  do  so  too  ? 
It  seems  to  be  entirely  overlooked  that 
modern  European  campaigns  are  fought 
with  national  armies  ;  whilst  we  are  still 
compelled  to  fight  with  a  standing  one,  and 
whatever  we  may  eventually  decide  to  do 
with  the  Home  Army,  the  Indian  one  can 
never  be  anything  else  than  what  it  is  now. 
But  the  difference  this  makes  in  the  con- 
duct of  a  war  is  far  greater  than  is  usually 
imagined.  Whereas  the  European  leader, 


European  and  Asiatic  Warfare.    455 

confident  in  his  numbers,  can  boldly  adopt 
the  Napoleonic  system,  the  Indian  General 
is  compelled  to  fall  back  on  the  methods 
which  proved  so  fatal  to  all  the  nations  of 
Europe  when  opposed  to  the  former.  It 
was  NAPOLEON  who  first  discovered  that  the 
fighting  power  of  a  nation  depended  on  the 
product  of  its  inhabitants  and  its  wealth. 
A  country  too  impoverished  to  maintain 
and  equip  properly  a  standing  army,  could 
yet,  by  a  reckless  expenditure  of  men,  suc- 
ceed in  defeating  its  enemy ;  whilst  a 
country  with  great  wealth  but  numerically 
small  forces — or  which  comes  to  the  same 
thing — which  was  willing  to  spend  its  all 
on  its  army  could,  by  maintaining  that 
army  at  a  maximum  of  efficiency,  success- 
fully hold  the  field  against  numerical  superi- 
ority. But  a  country  which  did  neither 
was  certain  to  go  to  the  wall. 

The  first  case  was  proved  over  and  over 
again  against  the  Austrians  in  Italy  :  their 
standing  army,  splendidly  drilled  and  well- 
equipped,  was  opposed  to  the  half-clad 


456    European  and  Asiatic   Warfare. 

starving  soldiers  of  France.  But  Austria 
was  a  country  not  rich  enough  to  replace 
such  an  army  if  it  was  sacrificed,  and  there- 
fore her  Generals  dare  not  risk  it  on  a  bold 
stroke,  but,  after  the  manner  of  second-rate 
leaders  of  all  times,  they  proposed  to  make 
war  by  manoeuvring  and  not  by  fighting. 
NAPOLEON  knowing  that  the  resources 
behind  him  in  men  were  practically  inex- 
haustible, and  being  also  a  great  leader, 
risked  all  to  win  all,  and  succeeded.  But 
there  was  another  point  against  the  Aus- 
trian— for  the  matter  of  that  against  all 
the  old  armies — and  unfortunately  the 
drawback  exists  still  in  our  own.  Each 
individual  soldier  costs  so  much  time  and 
money  to  train  that  he  was  far  too  valu- 
able to  be  lightly  expended  :  hence  he 
could  not  be  called  on  for  rapid  marches, 
or  to  face  the  exposure  to  the  weather  in 
bivouac  ;  the  losses  entailed  by  three  days7 
forced  marching,  and  three  nights'  bivouac 
are  nearly  equal  to  those  of  a  general  ac- 
tion ;  hence  he  could  only  move  slowly, 


European  and  Asiatic   Warfare.    457 

and  had  to  be  provided  with  luxuries  in 
the  shape  of  tents,  and  in  course  of  time 
became  so  accustomed  to  these  things,  that 
his  leaders  felt  he  could  not  do  without 
them.  NAPOLEON  was  hampered  by  none 
of  these  things  ;  if  it  was  necessary  to 
expose  his  men  to  hardship  and  to  the  toil 
of  unheard-of  marches,  he  never  hesitated, 
even  if  he  left  one-third  of  his  strength 
on  the  road  ;  and  herein  lay  the  secret  of 
his  extraordinary  mobility.  Of  course 
these  drawbacks  in  a  standing  army  are  to 
be  overcome  by  the  force  of  character  of 
great  leaders,  and  FREDERIC  THE  G-REAT  and 
WELLINGTON  both  proved  that  it  could  be 
done,  but  the  disadvantage  necessarily 
exists,  and  tells  on  all  except  men  of  their 
stamp,  who  never  have  been  numerous  in 
any  army.  The  Germans  were  the  first  to 
realise  the  new  order  of  things,  and  with 
characteristic  thoroughness  prepared  to  meet 
it.  In  spite  of  the  poverty-stricken  state 
of  the  country  after  1807,  they  set  about 
raising  men  in  greater  numbers  in  propor- 


458    European  and  Asiatic  Warfare. 

tion  to  population  than  has  ever  been  done 
before  or  since,  and  though  their  armies  were 
almost  destitute  of  equipment,  in  a  few  years' 
time  they  were  able  to  turn  the  tables  on  their 
adversary,  by  the  use  of  the  same  means — 
a  reckless  expenditure  of  men.  When  the 
war  was  over,  she  alone  of  the  Allies  saw 
that  in  a  continuation  of  this  method  lay 
the  true  secret  of  success  in  modern  war  j 
the  rest  all  went  back  to  the  standing  army 
and  in  a  short  time  the  old  faults  cropped 
up  again,  as  the  wars  of  1859,  1866  and 
1870,  conclusively  proved.  But  Germany 
alone  saw  that  a  poor  country  financially 
could  succeed  against  a  far  richer  one,  if 
she  was  prepared,  to  hurl  masses  of  men 
on  the  decisive  point  before  her  enemy,  and 
to  shirk  no  losses,  either  in  battle,  on  the 
road,  or  in  bivouac — to  win  the  first  fight ; 
and  therein  lay  her  strength  against  her  far 
richer  neighbours,  Austria  and  France. 
Now  she  has  set  the  fashion;  every  country 
in  Europe  is  compelled  to  conform  to  it, 
and  if  we  were  wise  in  England,  we  should 


European  and  Asiatic  Warfare. 

do   the   same,  for,  if  our  country  is  ever 
invaded,  our  riches  will  not  avail. 

But  out  here  things  are  on  a  perfectly 
different  footing.  We  are  here  as  a  stand- 
ing army  on  a  war  footing,  and  our  bus- 
iness must  be  to  save  every  man  for  the 
fighting  line,  by  every  means  in  our  power  ; 
and,  therefore,  if  it  conduces  to  the  effi- 
ciency of  our  man,  to  save  than  a  great 
portion  of  the  labour  of  grooming  their 
horses,  cooking  their  food,  and  so  on,  we 
are  wise  to  do  so,  provided  always  that, 
when  the  time  comes  for  fighting,  we  can 
clear  for  action  and  rough  it  if  necessary. 
The  difficulty  is  to  keep  this  proviso  al- 
ways before  both  men  and  officers.  As 
sure  as  a  regiment  gets  accustomed  to  its 
little  luxuries,  it  is  inclined  to  think  it  is 
needlessly  harassed  if  called  on  to  do  with- 
out them.  Colonels  hate  to  see  their  men 
frittered  away  on  working  parties  or  duties, 
which  at  first  sight  look  as  if  they  might 
be  done  by  native  labour  instead  ;  but  it 
is  impossible  to  take  them  all  into  the 


460    European  and  Asiatic  Warfare. 

General's  confidence,  and  shew  them  why 
it  cannot  be  avoided,  though  there  may  be 
a  thousand  reasons  for  it.  Certain  it  is 
that  it  lays  an  increased  load  on  the  should- 
ers of  the  leader,  but  it  only  renders  it 
more  incumbent  on  him  to  win  the  confi- 
dence and  affection  of  those  he  leads, 
which,  if  he  cannot  do,  he  is  not  fit  to 
command.  But,  it  will  be  urged,  look 
how  you  diminish  the  mobility  of  your 
troops,  by  dragging  after  them  a  train  of 
camp-followers  and  impedimenta  ;  how  will 
you  compete  with  the  Cossacks,  who  roam 
the  primeval  desert  without  any  bandobast 
at  all.  We  believe  we  shall  compete  with 
them  very  well  indeed  ;  for  an  Englishman 
can  stand  just  as  much  hardship  and  priva- 
tion, when  put  to  it,  as  any  Russian  ;  and 
since  the  latter  will  have  more  than  double 
if  not  treble  the  distance  of  land  transport 
behind  him  that  we  shall  have,  we  should 
expect  under  equal  conditions  to  leave  only 
one  man  behind  for  every  two  or  three  of 
theirs,  and  by  reasonable  precautions  for 


European  and  Asiatic   Warfare.    461 

their  health  to  reduce  that  proportion  by 
half.  As  for  the  slowness  of  movement 
which  our  impedimenta  entail,  the  way  to 
correct  that  is,  by  better  organisation,  to 
render  them  more  mobile,  so  that  they  may 
be  able  to  keep  up  as  nearly  as  possible 
under  all  circumstances.  Of  course,  we  do 
not  propose  to  drag  useless  lumber  about 
the  desert,  but  we  wish  to  protest  only 
against  ultra-extreme  notions  of  copying 
the  Russians,  Germans  or  any  one  else's 
arrangements  for  a  totally  different  climate, 
and  state  of  affairs.  Our  strength  at  the 
outbreak  of  a  war  lies  in  our  wealth,  our 
weakness  in  our  paucity  of  numbers  ;  and 
therefore  our  object  must  be  not  to  spare  a 
lakh  if,  by  spending  it,  we  can  put  an  addi- 
tional hundred  rifles  into  the  fighting 
line.  As  for  saving  them  when  once  they 
are  there,  by  the  adoption  of  timid  tactics, 
instead  of  decisive  ones,  that  is  another 
matter.  Once  on  the  battle-field,  to  win  is 
every  thing  ;  for  no  one  can  count  the 
cost  of  defeat,  especially  in  such  an  army 


462    European  and  Asiatic  Warfare. 

as  ours.  GOD  help  us  if  ever  we  fall  into 
the  hands  of  a  leader  who  seeks  to  find 
safety  in  the  choice  of  a  position,  or  to 
avoid  loss  by  burrowing  in  the  earth  like 
a  mole.  It  is  true  that  in  this  he  may 
avoid  being  beaten,  but  avoiding  a  beating 
and  winning  a  victory,  are  too  very  oppo- 
site things.  Nothing  is  of  worse  omen  for 
us  in  the  coming  struggle  than  the  talk 
one  constantly  hears  of  shelter  trenches, 
cover,  and  defensive  position,  as  if  these 
were  all  that  a  campaign  requires. 


CAVALRY  v.  INFANTRY  AT 
LAWRENCEPORE. 

THE  close  of  the  Cavalry  Divisional  ma- 
noeuvres at  Lawrencepore  was  marked 
by   a  sharp    action  between    Cavalry    and 
Infantry,    which  seems  worthy   of  special 
study  in  detail. 

The  opposing  forces  consisted  of  the  1st 
and  3rd  Brigades,  with  one  battery  R.  H. 
A.,  under  General  Luck  on  one  side,  and 
the  2nd  Brigade,  with  one  battery  R.  H.  A., 
and  four  companies  of  the  Highland  Light 
Infantry,  under  Colonel  Palmer,  on  the 
other.  The  former  had,  during  the  course 
of  the  morning,  succeeded  in  establishing 
its  superiority  over  the  latter  in  a  couple 
of  dashing  charges  in  the  open,  and  it 
may,  therefore,  be  presumed  that  the  beaten 
force  had  suffered  considerably  in  its  moral 
cohesion ;  in  actual  war  of  course  the  victor 
would  have  availed  himself  to  the  utmost 
of  his  advantage,  and  pressing  close  on  the 


464  Cavalry  versus  Infantry. 

heels  of  the  vanquished,  would  have  driven 
them  before  him  towards  Attock  "to  the 
last  breath  of  man  and  horse."  But  this 
phase  of  war  cannot  of  course  be  depicted 
on  the  manoeuvre  ground.  Accordingly, 
when  the  decision  as  to  the  result  of  the 
last  charge  had  been  given,  Colonel  Palmer's 
Brigade  was  allowed  to  withdraw  unmolest- 
ed, whilst  his  assailants  dismounted  and 
looked  round  their  horses,  or  should  have 
done  so.  These,  in  spite  of  their  bivouac 
and  the  hard  work  they  had  already  gone 
through  in  the  previous  operations  of  the 
morning  and  on  preceding  days,  were  on 
the  whole  in  highly  creditable  condition, 
particularly  in  the  K.  D.  G/s,  and  when 
time  was  called,  were  as  fit  to  undertake 
the  work  before  them,  as  horses  ever  would 
be  in  the  field  itself. 

About  half  past  two  the  contact  squad- 
rons were  thrown  out,  and  immediately 
afterwards  the  division  itself  moved  off  in 
two  lines  in  echelon  from  the  right,  each 
in  line  of  squadron  columns.  We  may 


at  Lawrencepore.  465 

here  make  Von  Moltke's  almost  invariable 
remark  on  these  occasions.  "  Gentlemen, 
there  are  too  many  scouts,  one  man  in  open 
ground  can  see  as  much  as  twenty/' 
Considering  that  the  ground  they  were 
now  moving  over  was  a  very  gently 
undulating  plain,  in  which,  except  to  the 
left  front,  concealment  was  scarcely  possible, 
and  that  it  is  a  first  principle  when  two 
forces  are  within  striking  distance  of  each 
other  to  keep  every  man  and  horse  in  hand 
for  employment  in  the  decisive  shock,  it 
might  perhaps  have  been  better  to  have 
scouted  the  front  and  right  of  the  Division 
by  officers7  patrols  alone,  a  proceeding 
which  would  have  economised  a  whole 
squadron  of  the  King's  Dragoon  Guards, 
whose  presence  as  a  last  closed  reserve  at 
the  decisive  point  would,  as  matters  turned 
out,  have  been  of  the  greatest  assistance. 
Meanwhile  the  Division  continued  its 
advance  at  the  trot  and  walk,  dense  dust 
clouds  drifting  over  the  columns  and 
suffocating  both  men  and  horses.  Viewed 
M,  L.  30 


466  Cavalry  versus  Infantry 

from  behind,  it  resembled  a  travelling  mass 
of  London  fog,  which  betrayed  every 
movement  for  miles  round.  But  this  was 
one  of  the  conditions  of  the  country,  and 
fortunately  the  defenders  were  in  no  con- 
dition to  take  advantage  of  the  information 
thus  derived.  After  toiling  through  this 
heavy  sand  for  a  long  two  miles,  the 
whereabouts  of  the  enemy  began  to  be 
made  out,  and  the  battery  of  Royal  Horse 
Artillery  which  had  been  corning  gallantly 
along  in  spite  of  the  ground,  and  had 
shown  no  particular  difficulty  in  keeping 
pace  with  the  Cavalry,  notwithstanding 
it  had  to  move  on  a  longer  arc  than  the 
latter,  came  into  action  on  a  slight  rise  of 
the  ground,  and  opened  fire  at  about  2,200 
yards  on  the  enemy's  guns.  The  first 
round  drew  the  fire  of  the  Infantry,  which 
was  now  discovered  to  be  posted,  some  on 
the  bridge  crossing  the  Chiel  River,  and 
others,  (the  greater  part,)  lining  the  ditch 
at  the  foot  of  the  embankment  of  the  road. 
Next  on  their  left  came  the  guns,  and 


at  Lawrencepore.  467 

again  beyond  these  stood  the  enemy's 
squadrons,  halted  in  the  open.  The  distance 
was  very  great,  and  against  the  dark  back- 
ground of  trees  which  here  border  the  road 
they  were  almost  invisible.  We  cannot 
pass  by  this  premature  opening  of  fire  on 
the  part  of  the  Infantry  without  remark  ; 
with  the  exception  of  a  dismounted  patrol 
of  Native  Cavalry  under  cover  behind  some 
low  walls,  and  at  a  distance  of  fully  1,200 
yards  from  the  Infantry,  there  was  no  other 
object  except  the  guns  in  sight,  and  we, 
therefore,  presume  they  were  the  object 
tired  at,  for  it  would  be  too  ridiculous  to 
waste  half-a-dozen  company  volleys  on  a 
detachment  whose  presence  or  absence  on 
the  field,  was  a  matter  of  complete  indiffer- 
ence to  everybody. 

But  to  open  fire  at  2,000  yards,  and 
more  with  rifles  only  sighted  to  1,400 
yards,  and  at  a  target  as  unsatisfactory 
as  a  battery  of  Artillery,  and  for  the  sake 
of  the  shadowy  chance  of  killing  a  couple 
of  horses  or  men,  which  would  not  inter- 


468          Cavalry  versus  Infantry 

fere  with  the  fire  efficiency  of  the  battery 
in  the  least,  to  renounce  the  palpable 
advantage  of  concealment  and  ambuscade  ; 
is  pushing  the  doctrine  of  long  range  firing 
beyond  the  limits  of  sober  reason  ;  and  we 
trust  that  such  ideas  are  the  exceptions  and 
not  the  rule  in  the  British  Infantry.. 

But  to  return  to  the  Cavalry.  The 
problem  now  before  the  leader  was  an 
extremely  difficult  one.  His  enemy,  safe 
behind  a  broad  river  bed,  which,  though 
fordable  pretty  nearly  everywhere,  was 
sure  to  disorder  the  attacking  squadrons 
considerably,  and  with  his  flank  resting 
on  the  bridge,  which  might  be  expected  to 
be  held  by  the  Infantry  in  force,  declined 
to  risk  himself  out  in  the  open.  His  only 
chance  lay,  therefore,  in  a  turning  move- 
ment executed  without  detection,  which 
should  take  the  Infantry  in  rear,  whilst  at 
the  same  time  he  attacked  it  in  front ;  and 
for  this  purpose  the  nature  of  the  ground 
on  his  left  flank  was  fortunately  favourable. 
Accordingly  the  three  squadrons  of  the 


at  Lawrencepore.  469 

King's  Dragoon  Guards  and  two  of  the 
5th  Bengal  Cavalry,  were  ordered  to  move 
round  under  cover  of  a  village  and  some 
topes  of  trees,  and  to  attack  the  road  in 
rear  after  making  a  complete  circuit  round 
the  enemy's  flank.  The  flanking  party 
under  Colonel  Cooke  trotted  off,  the  centre 
halted  under  cover,  and  the  artillery  duel 
went  on.  It  seemed  an  age  to  wait,  for  by 
this  time  the  excitement  of  mimic  war,  very 
keen  in  its  way,  was  thoroughly  aroused, 
and  as  we  watched  the  heavy  dust  cloud 
which  marked  the  movement,  it  seemed 
impossible  but  that  the  secret  should  be 
betrayed.  But  no,  the  fire  of  the  guns  still 
continued,  backed  up  by  the  purposeless 
volleys  of  the  Infantry.  At  last  the  moment 
to  advance  came,  the  central  portion  of  the 
attack,  some  12  squadrons  in  all,  moved  off 
in  a  single  line  of  squadron  columns  at 
deploying  intervals,  trotting :  as  they  crossed 
the  wave  in  the  ground  which  had  hitherto 
hid  them  they  frontformed  and  the  next 
moment  broke  into  a  gallop  with  1,500 


470  Cavalry  versus  Infantry 

yards  over  heavy  sandy  ground  to  cross 
under  fire  before  the  shock.  No  sooner 
were  they  seen,  than  the  Infantry  fired  and 
the  guns  blazed  up  all  they  knew,  and 
instinctively  the  Cavalry  quickened  their 
pace.  About  half  the  distance  was  covered, 
on  the  left  the  pillar  of  dust  was  closing 
rapidly  on  the  enemy's  flank,  but  still  their 
frontal  fire  did  not  slacken.  The  enemy's 
squadrons  were  seen  to  be  advancing.  It 
was  now  a  race  for  the  river,  to  get  across 
and  re-form  before  the  enemy  could  come 
up.  The  horses  now  were  nearly  racing, 
it  was  a  tremendous  effort  they  were  called 
on  to  make  ;  and,  after  such  a  long  day's 
work,  we  doubt  whether  any  Cavalry  in 
the  world  could  have  responded  better. 
Only  300  yards  more  to  go  now,  when 
suddenly  the  Infantry  fire  slackened,  and 
we  saw  men  doubling  to  the  rear  and 
scrambling  up  the  embankment,  and  the 
next  moment  firing  broke  out  on  the  further 
side  of  the  road.  Now  the  Cavalry  were 
plunging  down  into  the  bed  of  the  river 


at  Lawrencepore.  471 

and  emerging  on  its  further  side,  but  the 
18th  Bengal  Lancers  were  already  too 
close  ;  and,  had  the  action  been  in  earnest,  the 
left  wing  must  infallibly  have  been  thrown 
headlong  down  into  the  nullah  again:  and 
now  for  a  couple  of  closed  squadrons,  but, 
alas !  they  were  not  at  hand.  The  next 
moment  the  dust  cloud  drifted  over  all,  and 
every  thing  vanished  from  sight.  The 
cease  fire  was  sounding  as  we  galloped 
across  to  learn  the  fate  of  Colonel  Cooke's 
attempt.  A  glance  round  reassured  us  ; 
in  the  roadside  ditch  lay  a  line  of  about 
100  Infantry,  on  the  bridge,  stood  a  couple 
of  dozen  more,  two  guns  were  unlimbered 
and  still  smoking  from  the  last  discharge. 
The  Cavalry  were  halted  about  100  yards 
in  front  of  them.  The  surprise  appeared 
to  have  been  almost  complete,  the  Cavalry 
approach  had  not  been  detected  till  they 
were  almost  within  charging  distance,  then 
two  companies  of  Infantry  had  been  hurried 
across  the  road  and  a  couple  of  guns.  The 
Infantry  in  their  excitement  had  instinct- 


472  Cavalry  versus  Infanfry 

ively  adopted  the  practice  of  the  drill 
ground,  and  had  thrown  themselves  into 
the  ditch  for  protection,  and  in  so  doing 
had  sacrificed  their  field  of  fire.  The 
guns  had  hardly  had  time  to  fire  a  single 
round.  Actually,  the  attack  would  have 
swept  over  them,  crossed  the  road  and 
come  down  on  the  rear  of  the  remaining 
Infantry  and  guns,  but  just  too  late  to 
save  their  friends  of  the  centre.  A  lively 
discussion  was  going  on  all  round  as  to 
the  effect  of  the  charge,  and  we  regret  to 
state  that  there  was  a  good  deal  of  the 
"  Oh,  but  Cavalry  can't  charge  unshaken 
Infantry  "  kind  of  idea  in  the  air. 

But  let  us  go  into  the  question  a  little 
closer,  and  try  to  see  the  picture  it  would 
have  presented  in  real  war.  For  more 
than  half- an -hour  the  defender's  guns  and 
Infantry  had  been  under  a  heavy  shell  fire, 
which  could  not  have  failed  to  have  had  a 
decidedly  unsteadying  effect  on  the  nerves 
of  the  latter.  Whilst  the  central  attack 
covered  nearly  1,000  yards,  volley  after 


at  Lawrencepore.  473 

volley  had  been  poured  into  them  without 
any  visible  result  in   checking  their  pace. 
We   stick  to  this   assertion,   for  we  abso- 
lutely refuse  to  believe  that,  if  700  Prus- 
sian   Cavalry    could   not   be    stopped    by 
8,000  rifles  and  5   batteries  pouring  shell 
and   bullets    into   them    for   1,500    yards 
over   hard  ground,   Indian   Cavalry  could 
be   stopped  by  the  fire  of   six  guns  and 
four  hundred  rifles   over  8,000   yards    of 
soft  ground.     No  doubt,   allowing  for  the 
superior    coolness   of    our    own    Infantry 
over  that  of  the  French,  a  good  number 
of  casualties  would  have  been  caused  ;  but 
these  would  have  been  hidden  by  the  dust, 
and  would  have  had  no  appreciable  result 
in  checking  the  momentum  of  the  mass. 

It  is  not  in  human  nature  to  witness  the 
approach  of  a  thousand  galloping  horses 
without  a  certain  amount  of  trepidation, 
and  now,  just  when  excitement  is  at  its 
height,  comes  the  cry,  "  we  are  surround- 
ed/' If  those  men,  even  in  peace,  were  too 
excited  to  see  that  they  sacrificed  all  the 


474  Cavalry  versus  Infantry 

advantages  of  a  clear  field  of  fire  by  getting 
in  the  ditch,  is  it  likely  they  would  have 
shown  more  intelligence  in  war  ?  As  it 
was,  the  Cavalry  were  within  300  yards 
before  fire  was  opened  on  them ;  300  yards 
at  charging  pace,  even  on  blown  horses, 
would  be  covered  in  20  seconds.  Even 
allowing  the  Infantry  to  get  off  three 
rounds  in  the  time,  and  that  one  in  three 
brought  down  its  man,  there  would  still 
have  been  about  250  left,  to  dash  over  the 
Infantry  and  cross  the  road.  In  all  pro- 
bability not  one  bullet  in  fifty  would  have 
dropped  its  man  or  horse,  and  the  two 
rounds  of  case  might  have  accounted  for  20 
between  them  ;  so  that  the  total  loss  to  be 
anticipated  would  have  been  under  30  men, 
and  even  against  repeaters  it  would  pro- 
bably have  not  exceeded  36.  But,  is  a  loss 
of  36  men  going  to  stop  a  British  Cavalry 
regiment  like  the  King's  Dragoon  Guards  ? 
The  question  needs  only  to  be  put  in  this 
form  to  show  its  absurdity.  The  proper 
position  for  the  Infantry  to  have  occupied 


at  Lawrencepore.  475 

would  have  been  the  bridge  itself.  From 
there  they  would  have  commanded  the 
whole  field  of  attack,  have  taken  the  Cavalry 
in  flank,  and  have  been  themselves  practi- 
cally unassailable.  Instead  of  that,  only 
about  20  men  were  there,  and  these  were 
so  excited  by  the  combat,  that  they  formed 
rallying  square  and  fixed  bayonets,  thus 
sacrificing  their  fire  at  the  very  moment  it 
was  most  required.  A  more  instructive 
day  we  have  seldom  witnessed,  but  of  its 
lessons,  other  than  this  one,  we  must  speak 
another  time. 


LESSONS  OF  THE  LAWRENCE- 
PORE  CAMP. 

riENERAL  LUCK  deserves  the  most  sin- 
vl  cere  thanks  of  his  countrymen  for  the 
energy  he  has  displayed  in  organising  and 
carrying  out  the  manoeuvres  at  the  Law- 
rencepore  Camp.  It  must  not  be  supposed 
that  concentrations  of  troops  on  this  scale 
for  peace  manoeuvres  can  be  carried  out 
in  this  or  indeed  any  other  country,  except, 
perhaps,  Russia,  even  by  a  Commander-in- 
Chief,  by  the  mere  stroke  of  a  pen. 
Civilians  are  too  apt  to  imagine  that  armies 
only  exist  for  the  purpose  of  spending 
their  hardly  collected  revenues,  and  forget 
that  if  it  was  not  for  the  existence  and 
fighting  efficiency  of  the  army  there  would 
soon  be  no  revenue  to  collect  at  all.  Trans- 
port and  Commissariat  officers,  too,  can 
hardly  be  expected  to  show  the  same  keen- 
ness in  undertaking  extra  severe  work, 
the  glory  of  which  they  do  not  share  to 


Lessons  of  Lawrencepore  Camp.     477 

the  same  extent  as  the  combatant  officers. 
Even  these  latter  possess  a  certain  amount 
of  inertia  which  requires  to  be  overcome  ; 
and  to  reconcile  all  these  conflicting  in- 
terests, and  to  induce  them  to  work  harmo- 
niously, is  a  task  which  calls  for  all  the 
qualifications  of  a  leader  which  a  man  may 
possess. 

It  is  no  small  thing  to  be  called  on  to 
carry  out  for  the  first  time  a  concentra- 
tion on  such  a  scale,  and  the  consciousness 
of  having  made  a  brilliant  success  of  it 
will  not  be  the  least  of  the  GeneraPs  re- 
wards. But  though  the  meeting  has  been 
undoubtedly  successful,  we  shall  fail  to 
derive  the  full  benefit  therefrom,  unless  the 
authorities  see  their  way  to  publishing  for 
the  information  of  all  the  army  a  careful 
and  thorough  critique  of  the  operations 
themselves  and  of  the  lessons  to  be  derived 
therefrom.  This  is  unquestionably  a 
Government  duty,  for  no  one  else,  except 
those  acquainted  with  the  official  details  of 
events,  can  be  in  a  position  to  do  the 


478     Lessons  of  Lawrencepore  Camp. 

subject  justice.  In  manoeuvres,  it  is  always 
the  case  that,  owing  to  considerations  of 
supply,  &c.,  unrealities  are  liable  to  occur, 
which  may  mislead  the  outside  critic  into 
dealing  undeserved  censure  to  both  leaders 
and  troops  concerned.  But  to  dispense 
with  criticism  altogether  would  be  wilfully 
to  limit  the  usefulness  of  the  work  done  to 
the  individual  regiments  and  staff  who  took 
part  in  it,  instead  of  enabling  the  army  to 
derive  profit  from  it  as  a  whole.  But  pend- 
ing the  appearance  of  such  an  official  cri- 
tique, we  purpose  to  consider  a  few  of  the 
points  in  the  detail  training  of  the  men 
and  horses  engaged,  which  require  no  spe- 
cial knowledge  of  the  motives  of  the  lea- 
ders to  understand. 

Let  us  begin  with  the  very  rudiments 
of  the  whole  thing.  "  The  efficiency  of 
Cavalry  depends  in  the  first  place,  funda- 
mentally, on  the  control  of  the  individual 
rider  over  his  horse."  That  is  a  principle 
as  old  as  the  time  of  Scipio,  who  was  one 
of  the  most  distinguished  Cavalry  leaders 


Lessons  of  Lawrencepore  Camp.     479 

of  any  age,  and  it  is  as  true  now  as  when 
first  formulated.  But  in  the  manoeuvres 
recently  brought  to  an  end  it  was  apparent, 
even  to  the  casual  observer,  that  in  this 
respect  very  much  indeed  was  wanting, 
particularly  in  the  Native  Cavalry  regiments. 
Neither  men  nor  officers  appeared  to  realise 
the  intense  importance  of  each  man  being 
absolute  master  of  his  horse's  movements 
and  paces. 

Some  regiments  would  have  three-quar- 
ters of  their  horses  galloping  when  they 
should  have  been  trotting,  and  there  was 
an  enormous  amount  of  jostling  and 
unsteadiness  in  the  ranks,  which  would 
all  be  preventible  if  the  men  really  con- 
trolled their  horses.  In  this  respect  the 
British  regiment  set  an  example  which 
deserves  to  be  copied  by  all  the  rest. 
There  are,  unfortunately,  a  number  of 
Native  Cavalry  officers  who  seem  to  look 
upon  this  unsteadiness  as  something  "  swag- 
gering "  in  itself — a  sort  of  expression 
of  the  fearless,  wild,  irregular  spirit,  too 


480     Lessons  of  Lawrencepore  Camp. 

brave   to   require   the   trammels    of   disci- 
pline,   which   gave   the  old  irregular  regi- 
ments  their   superiority  over  regular  regi- 
ments of  Hindustan.     There  could   be   no 
greater   mistake — the   old   regiments  were 
only  irregular  in  the  sense  of  their  being 
raised   on   a  different   plan  ;  their  superi- 
ority was  due  to  their  being  composed  of 
better  and  braver  individual  horsemen,  who 
preserved   their   control   over   their  horses 
by  means  of  the  cruel  but  effective  native 
bits    and     standing     martingales.      What 
other   irregularity   there   was   about  them 
was  in  itself  a  defect,  and  one  which  would 
have  had  bad  results,  had  it  not  been  for 
the  personal  gallantry  of  their  leaders  and 
the  inefficiency  of  their  enemies.     It  can- 
not too  often  be  insisted  on  that  steadi- 
ness in  the  ranks  is  the  first  object  to  strive 
for  ;  every  case  of  bumping,  jostling,    &c., 
is  a  worse  than  useless  expenditure  of  ener- 
gy,   and    eventually    inevitably    detracts 
from  the   cohesion   of  the  ultimate  shock. 
If  half-a-dozen  horses    have  worn  them- 


Lessons  of  Lawrencepore  Camp.     481 

selves  out  prematurely  by  fretting  they  will 
lag  behind  in  the  advance,  and  the  squad- 
ron will  fail  to  deliver  the  boot  to  boot,  wall- 
like  charge,  before  which  no  enemy  has  ever 
been  known  to  stand.  It  may  indeed  dash 
boldly  in  on  its  enemy,  and  then  a  melee 
will  ensue,  the  issue  of  which  will  depend 
on  the  last  close  squadron  in  reserve  ;  but 
if  the  charge  had  been  properly  delivered, 
there  would  have  been  no  melee,  and  con* 
seqently  no  reserve  would  have  been  re- 
quired. It  is  unquestionable  a  matter  of 
very  great  difficulty  to  obtain  this  stea- 
diness of  manoeuvre  with  the  material  at 
our  disposal.  Country-bred  horses  are 
proverbial  for  their  bitting,  kicking,  and 
squealing  manners,  but  very  much  more 
might  be  done  than  at  present  by  stricter 
attention  to  a  few  points  of  detail,  too  fre- 
quently overlooked.  We  allude,  first,  es- 
pecially to  the  bitting.  There  is  nothing, 
it  is  well  known,  that  makes  an  animal 
more  restive  than  a  badly  fitted  bit,  and 

yet  there  is  no  reason  why  a  native  regi- 
M.,L.  31 


482     Lessons  of  Lawrencepore  Camp. 

ment  that  buys  its  own   equipment   should 
not   have   every   horse   as  carefully  bitted 
as   in  the   German  and  Austrian  services. 
Even  with   existing  bits  much   might  be 
done,   by   attention   to  the  position  of  the 
bit  in  the  mouth  ;  it  should   be   so    placed 
that  when  the  curb  rein  is  taken  up,  the 
chain  should  rest  in  the  chin-groove.     It 
is   a   simple   rule  of  universal  application, 
yet  in  fully  70  per  cent,  of  the  cases  that 
came  under  our  immediate  observation,  the 
chain  was  some  two  inches    too   high,    and 
riding   right   on   the    sharp   ridges   which 
form  the  lower   outline     of   the   animal's 
jaw.      Secondly,  we   would  call  attention 
to  the   seat  of  the  riders  :  far  too  many  of 
these  were  in  the  position  known   as   the 
cc  extreme  chair  seat,"  that  is  to  say,  with 
their  knees  almost  on   a  level  with  their 
horses7  withers,  and  the  lower  part   of  the 
legs  pressing  against  the  horse's  shoulders, 
in  such  a  position  that  it  was  impossible 
for  the  rider  to  control  the  lateral  move- 
ments   of   his    mount.     We    know    that 


Lessons  of  Lawrencepore  Camp.     483 

this  seat  is  extremely  fashionable  in  India, 
and  also  in  certain  hunting  circles  at  home 
where  we  have  seen  it  cause  more  "  volun- 
taries77 with  refusing  horses  than  we  could 
count.  Of  course  in  the  hunting  field, 
if  a  man  likes  to  adopt  a  seat  which  gives 
him  no  control  over  his  horse,  he  is  at 
liberty  to  do  so  ;  but  in  the  ranks  of  a 
cavalry  regiment,  he  is  not.  Only  that 
seat  can  be  tolerated  which  enables  the 
horseman  to  collect  his  mount  between 
his  hands  and  legs  in  such  a  manner  that 
the  latter  simply  cannot  do  otherwise 
than  conform  to  his  rider's  wishes.  We 
do  not  by  any  means  advocate  the 
other  extreme,  or  "tongs  across  a  wall' 
style,  which  used,  many  years  ago,  to  be 
in  vogue  in  some  Cavalry  regiments,  but 
we  simply  want  to  see  every  man  in 
Native  Cavalry  regiment  sitting  his  horse 
in  the  way  laid  down  in  the  Cavalry 
regulations,  which  is  almost  precisely  the 
same  seat  as  that  adopted  by  most  of  our 
best  steeplechase  riders  in  England.  The 


484     Lessons  of  Lawrencepore  Camp. 

same  irregularity  is  not  permitted  in  a 
British  regiment,  and  it  was  only  neces- 
sary to  compare  the  superior  steadiness 
of  the  latter  with  the  others,  to  see  the 
advantage  of  strict  adherence  to  the  regu- 
lation system.  Now  that  every  young 
officer  on  joining  a  Native  Cavalry  corps 
is  compelled  to  go  through  a  course  of 
equitation  in  a  British  regiment,  we  hope, 
before  long,  to  notice  a  marked  improve- 
ment in  the  horsemanship  of  the  Native 
Army,  only  it  will  require  close  attention 
on  the  part  of  officers  commanding  to 
prevent  the  three  months'  course  degene- 
rating into  a  mere  waste  of  time.  A 
great  deal  indeed  requires  yet  to  be  done 
in  British  Cavalry  schools  before  the  latter 
are  perfect.  Equitation  is  taught  too 
much  as  a  matter  of  drill  and  by  rule  of 
thumb,  than  as  a  science  ;  a  man  requires, 
not  only  to  know  when  to  apply  a  given 
aid,  but  he  should  also  understand  why 
he  should  do  so,  and  this  kind  of  know- 
ledge is  not  acquired  by  listening  to  a 


Lessons  of  Lawrencepore  Camp.     485 

riding-master's  formula  of   "  left  rein   and 
right   leg,    take   them  into    the   corners/' 
Of  all   arts   in  the    world,    horsemanship 
is   perhaps   the     hardest   to    acquire  ;    to 
some    men,   it   is   absolutely    impossible  ; 
it   cannot  be   found   in  books,  neither  can 
it  be  attained  by   practice  alone.     A  man 
with  natural  aptitude   for   the   work  may 
improve    himself   immensely   by   reading, 
but  an   ordinary   individual   can   only   be 
taught   by  the   example  and  viva  voce  in- 
struction of  one  who  is   not   only   himself 
an   adept,   but  is   able   to  explain  why  he 
is    so,    and   the   talent   of   being    able   to 
explain   oneself  is   not   usually   found   in 
the   average   capacity  we   have  a  right  to 
expect  from  the  ranks.     It   is   an   officer's 
position,    and  one  that  can  only  be  proper- 
ly  filled   by   a   man    whose   whole   heart 
and  soul  is  in  his   work.     It   is   with   the 
greatest  regret  that   we  notice  the  gradual 
decadence  of  true  soldierly  sports  in    the 
Indian     Army, — sports     which     required 
a   man   to   acquire   a   full   control   of  his 


486    Lessons  of  Lawrencepore  Camp. 

horse,  such  as  mounted  combats   of  sword 
v.  sword   and  lance  v.  sword.     The  aver- 
age  swordsmanship   of  British   officers   is 
of  a   very   low  order  ;  except  amongst  the 
riding  masters,  it  is   rare  to   find   a   man 
capable   of    defending   himself  at    all    in 
single  combat.    Most  men  when  asked  how 
they  propose   to    do  so  in   case   of   war, 
say  at  once  that  they  would  have  recourse 
to   their   revolvers  ;   but   they   forget  that 
it    requires    practice,   and  a    considerable 
degree   of  practice  too,   to   make   sure   of 
hitting  a  man  from  the   saddle,    and   that 
the  result   of  hitting   him  is  by  no  means 
always  sudden  death.     Whereas     a    well 
delivered  cut  or  point  with  a  sharp  sword 
should    be    absolutely    certain  to   disable 
him.     It  was  not  always  thus  in  the  Indian 
Army.  In  the  Mahratta  War,  we  had  officers 
who,  as  swordsmen,  were  certain  of  killing 
their    man,    and   who  never   hesitated  to 
accept  the  challenges  of  the  enemy's  picked 
swordsmen  ;    and   in  the  Sikh  war  and  the 
mutiny,  there  were  many  others.  Where  are 


Lessons  of  Lawrencepore  Camp.     487 

their  successors  we  should  like  to  know  ? 
It  will  be  urged  that  now-a-days  we  have 
polo,  pig  sticking,  paper  chases,  &c.  ;  but 
good  as  these  undoubtedly  are  in  the  their 
way,  they  are  by  no  means  the  same  thing. 
In  all  it  is  the  management  of  the  horse 
at  speed  which  is  the  main  thing  ;  in 
swordsmanship,  it  is  the  controlling  of 
an  animal  which  usually  wants  to  get  away 
at  speed.  Let  any  one  try  the  difference 
between  letting  his  horse  extend  himself 
after  a  pig  and  collecting  him  when  in  the 
same  state  of  excitement  to  a  quiet  canter 
and  making  him  turn,  half  passage,  and 
change  just  as  the  rider  pleases.  We  fancy 
he  will  find  the  latter  by  far  the  more 
difficult  task  of  the  two. 


LESSONS  FROM  LAWRENCE- 
PORE. 

II. 

IN  our  last  letter  we  confined  ourselves 
almost  entirely  to  the  two  rudimentary 
points  of  bits  and  seats,  and  in  this  we 
propose  to  restrict  ourselves  equally  to  simi- 
lar elementary  matters,  for  it  is  precisely 
in  these  simple  things  that  we  find  a  distinct 
inferiority  on  our  side  relatively  to  the 
Germans.  But,  again,  it  is  on  these  very 
points  that  the  efficiency  of  the  whole  mass 
depends.  Given  uniformity  of  pace  and 
straight  riding,  and  there  seems  no  limit  to 
the  number  of  squadrons  which  can  be 
worked  together  ;  given  the  reverse  condi- 
tions, and  a  limit,  and  a  very  low  one  too, 
is  soon  reached.  The  first  point  we  have 
to  notice  is  this  :  riding  down  the  front  of 
well- trained  regiments  one  is  struck  by  the 
fact  that  every  horse  is  standing  square  to 
the  alignment,  and  that  every  rider  has  taken 


Lessons  from  Lawrencepore.        489 

up  his  reins  and  has  his  horse  in  hand  ready 
to  move  off  simultaneously  with  the  others 
at  the  last  sound  of  the  word.     But  out 
here  this  sort  of  thing  is  very  rarely  seen  : 
horses  are  standing  in  all  sorts  of  positions 
at  all  sorts  of  angles  to  the  front,  and  even 
when  supposed  to  be  at  attention,  the  men 
are  not  ready  to  move  off  together  as  they 
should  be.     The  consequence  is,  that  when 
the  word  to  advance  is  given,  particularly  if 
at  a  trot,  horse  A  jostles  horse  B.     B  passes 
it  on  to  (7,  who  probably  resents  it  by  a 
kick.     D   gets  restive  and   breaks  into  a 
canter,  and,  if  the  horses  are  fresh,  the  line 
degenerates  into  a  surging,  plunging  mass, 
whose  cohesion  is  already  destroyed  before 
half  the  advance  is  completed.     As  a  rule, 
the  blame  for  this  condition  of  things  is 
laid  on  the  backs  of  the  horses.     It  is  said, 
and   rightly,   that   our   animals   are  more 
restive,   younger,    and,    consequently,   less 
trained  than  those  of  continental  cavalries  ; 
but  we  contend  that  this  is  beginning  at  the 
wrong  end  of  things.     We  are  quite  pre- 


490        Lessons  from  Lawrencepore. 

pared  to  admit  that  the  horses  are  more 
difficult  to  manage,  but  we  maintain  that 
if  the  rider  of  horse  A  had  been  sitting  in  a 
proper  cavalry  seat  he  would  have  had  his 
horse  square  in  the  ranks,  and,  therefore 
would  not  have  jostled  horse  B;  and  that 
had  not  C  already  been  worried  out  of 
temper  with  an  awkard  bit,  he  would  not 
have  let  out  and  frightened  D  into  a  canter. 
According  to  our  own  view  of  the  matter, 
the  individual  riding  of  our  men,  both 

O  ' 

Native  and  European,  is  so  far  superior  to 
that  of  the  Germans,  that  we  ought  to  be 
able  to  sacrifice  the  primary  advantage  of 
the  better,  because  longer,  training  of  the 
horse,  and  yet  shew  a  marked  superiority 
over  them. 

But  this  we  are  far  from  being  able  to 
do.  A  few  years  ago  we  were  able  to  make 
the  comparison  between  some  of  the  best 
squadrons  of  British  Cavalry  and  some  Ger- 
man ones,  which  bore  by  no  means  the 
reputation  of  being  the  crack  regiments  of 
their  own  Army.  The  former  went  by 


Lessons  from  Lawrencepore.        491 

about  half  as  fast  again  as  the  regulation 
permitted,  in  a  plunging,  jostling  forma* 
tion,  similar  to  that  known  as  a  "  Kudel  " 
in  the  Austrian  service,  i.e.,  an  organised 
rabble.  The  latter  swept  by  with  an  even- 
ness of  motion,  conveying  the  idea  of  a 
maximum  of  power  with  a  minimum  ex- 
penditure of  energy,  the  very  reverse  of  the 
other.  The  individual  riding  of  the  former 
was  far  superior  to  that  of  the  latter  ; 
but  a  mere  change  in  the  horses  would  not 
have  enabled  our  men  to  do  much  better 
than  before,  a  complete  change  of  system  is 
required  to  effect  that. 

But  it  is  not  only  the  individual  troopers 
who  require  to  be  taught  to  ride  straight  to 
their  front — that  certainly  is  the  first  con- 
dition of  success  ;  but  the  second  one  is 
that  their  officers  should  be  taught  to  lead 
them  straight.  This  sounds  very  simple, 
but  is  not  half  as  easy  as  it  looks.  It  would 
astonish  many  a  first-rate  rider  to  find  how 
very  different  it  is  to  ride  a  bee  line  in  a 
given  direction  by  himself,  and,  with  the 


492        Lessons  from  Lawrencepore. 

full  sense  of  the  responsibility  of  having 
a  whole  regiment  depending  on  him  on 
his  shoulders.  A  perfect  knowledge  of  pace 
and  absolute  confidence  in  one's  self  are 
the  first  requisites,  and  the  two  qualifica- 
tions are  by  no  means  common.  The 
importance  of  good  troop -leaders  seems 
hardly  to  be  appreciated  in  Native  Cavalry 
regiments  ;  absolute  confidence  in  self  is 
not  one  of  the  native  race  characteristics, 
and,  therefore,  it  is  all  the  more  important 
that  the  difficulty  of  this  duty  should  not 
be  enhanced  by  giving  the  native  troop- 
leader  a  showy  young  horse  to  manage, 
whose  paces  he  can  hardly  control.  In  this 
respect  the  British  regiment  was  a  model 
to  all  at  the  camps  ;  the  base  troop-leaders 
keeping  their  line  with  a  steadiness  and 
precision  worthy  of  all  praise. 

So  far  all  the  points  we  have  referred  to 
are  within  the  scope  of  the  existing  regu- 
lations ;  but  if  we  are  really  determined 
to  secure  efficiency,  it  will  be  necessary  to 
go  a  step  further  and  attack  the  sacred 


Lessons  from  Lawrencepore.        493 

regulations  themselves,  and  that  too,  some- 
what more  thoroughly  than  has  hitherto 
been  done.  We  have  indeed  adopted  forma- 
tions and  ideas  relative  to  the  employment 
of  cavalry  masses  in  a  pretty  wholesale 
manner  from  the  Germans,  but  this  appears 
to  us  to  be  again  beginning  at  the  wrong 
end  ;  for  instance,  it  is  premature  rather 
to  adopt  a  formation  of  attack  for  division 
which  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  the 
charge  will  be  delivered  boot  to  boot.  Ca- 
valry that  can  do  that,  can  indeed  afford 
to  dispense  with  keeping  two-thirds  of  their 
force  behind  the  first  line  ;  but  we  doubt 
whether  we  have  yet  attained  to  such  a 
pitch  of  excellence  as  will  enable  us  to  dis- 
pense, to  the  same  extent,  with  reserves  as 
the  Germans  do.  It  must  be  remembered 
that  the  latter  themselves  have  only  thought 
fit  to  sanction  the  reintroduction  of  the  old 
Frederician  system  after  many  years  of  con- 
sistent hard  work,  and  in  this  hard  work 
they  have  been  assisted  by  the  perfection 
to  which  this  squadron  system  had  already 


494        Lessons  from  Lawrencepore. 

reached  before  the  new  path  was  entered 
on.      But   the   keynote   of  this   squadron 
efficiency  is  felt  in  Germany  to  be  the  squad- 
ron column.    It  is  true  that  we  have  adopt- 
ed  the  name   in   recent    regulations,   but 
adopting  a  name  is  a  very  different  and  far 
simpler  thing  than  assimilating  the  spirit 
of  it.    The  German  squadron  is  the  ultimate 
tactical  unit,  as  distinct  and  independent 
as   a   battery    of    Artillery.      A    German 
Cavalry  regiment  is  composed  of  four  prac- 
tically  independent  units,  each   of  which 
merely   follows  its  leader  ;   and   the   four 
leaders,   in   their  turn,   look  only  to    the 
regimental  leader.     With  us  it  is  different ; 
our   squadrons   are   all   tied   to   the    base 
squadron,    and   hence   the  efficiency  of  the 
whole  hangs,  in  the  first  instance,    on   the 
two    men  who   may  be   giving  the   base. 
But   these   two  may  be,  and  generally  will 
be,  young  officers,  and  though,   after   what 
we   saw   and   heard  the  other  day,  we  will 
not  say  that  no  young  officers   are   capable 
of  filling  the  posts  ;  yet,  as  a  general   rule, 


Lessons  from  Lawrencepore.        495 

it  is  not  wise  to  place  the  whole  of  the 
responsibility  for  the  regiment's  efficiency 
on  two  of  the  junior  officers.  In  the  German 
regiment  the  resposibility  for  direction  and 
intervals  lies  on  the  four  picked  men  who 
hold  the  captain's  rank,  who,  it  must  be  re- 
membered, represent  the  survival  of  the 
fittest  out  of  a  number  of  subalterns — 
a  very  different  state  of  things  it  will 
be  allowed.  Besides,  with  the  adoption 
of  the  German  system,  the  necessity  for 
the  base  itself  would  disappear  altogether, 
and  with  it  a  whole  host  of  other  evils. 
Next  to  the  defects  above  alluded  to,  we 
believe  the  base  system  to  be  answerable 
for  more  overcrowding  and  jostling  in  the 
ranks  than  anything  else,  and  it  is  difficult 
to  see  how  it  can  be  otherwise.  In  striving 
to  keep  their  dressing  by  it,  men  turn  their 
heads  inward,  and  unconsciously,  in  so 
doing,  apply  the  outer  leg,  causing  their 
horses  to  close  inwards ;  presently  they 
find  themselves  getting  too  close  and  try 
to  turn  outwards,  but  the  next  files  are 


496        Lessons  from  Lawrencepore. 

upon  them,  and  they  cannon  up  against 
them.  The  disturbance,  once  started,  un- 
dulates through  the  whole  front  of  the  line, 
getting  more  and  more  violent  the  longer 
and  faster  the  advance,  till,  when  at  last 
the  charge  is  sounded,  the  men  instinctively 
open  out  to  avoid  the  intensity  of  its 
effects,  and  the  shock  is  delivered  in  open 
files.  What  would  Frederic  the  Great 
have  said  to  them  all.  His  language  on 
even  less  provocation  used  to  be  more  for- 
cible than  polite.  The  base  system,  indeed 
is  as  obsolete  as  are  the  markers  in  the 
Infantry,  and  probably  originated  about 
the  same  century.  No  other  nation  in 
Europe  considers  it  necessary  to  use  either, 
even  with  their  short  service  armies  ;  and 
why  on  earth  should  we,  with  men  who 
ought  to  be  double  as  well  drilled  as  any 
of  them, — seeing  that  we  have  more  than 
double  the  time  to  do  it  in, — be  compelled 
to  adhere  to  this  fossil  remnant  of  a  paleo- 
zoic age.  It  may  be  said  that  the  book  dis- 
tinctly says  that  the  head  is  not  to  be  turned 


Lessons  from  Lawrencepore.        497 

to  the  directing  flank,  but  that  the  dress- 
ing is  to  be  kept  by  an  occasional  glance  of 
the  eye  only  ;  but  this  is  asking  altogether 
too  much  from  human  nature.  The  scope  of 
an  ordinary  man's  vision  is  only  about  120°, 
and  unless  he  is  absolutely  taught  to  squint, 
which  would  form  a  new  and  interesting 
section  in  the  drill-book,  we  do  not  see  how 
he  can  be  expected  to  enlarge  the  sphere  of 
his  vision  30  degrees  on  either  side  of  his 
front.  As  long  as  the  base  is  there,  men 
will  look  to  it  ;  suppress  it,  and  teach  them 
thoroughly  Schmidt's  favourite  axiom  that 
"  Tempo  ist  Richtung,  "  and  they  will  soon 
learn  to  get  along  as  well  as  the  old  Austrian 
Cavalry  used  to  do,  when  there  were  not  only 
no  bases,  but  not  even  a  squadron  leader — 
for  every  officer  rode  in  the  ranks,  and  in  the 
Uhlans  carried  a  lance  as  well.  It  may,  and 
probably  will,  be  asked,  why,  if  we  admit 
the  superiority  of  our  individual  riders,  our 
own  Cavalry  should  not  be  as  good  as  that 
of  the  Germans  ?  Our  answer  is  that  it  is 
the  fault  of  our  system.  In  Germany  every 
*>*•  32 


498        Lessons  from  Lawrencepore. 

officer's  credit,  as  an  officer,  and  his  future 
chance  of  promotion  depend  entirely  on  his 
success  in  bringing  his  men  up  to  a  given 
standard  ;  practically  he  may  within  wide 
limits  adopt  any  system  he  pleases  to  bring 
about  the  result ;  and  hence,  as  the  compe- 
tition is  intensely  keen,  by  degrees  they 
have  learnt  how  to  confine  their  attention  to 
what  are  the  absolute  essentials  of  success 
only.  One  by  one  each  fad  has  been  tested 
and  thrown  aside,  and  at  last  only  some 
three  or  four  fundamental  truths  stand  out, 
viz.,  that  the  horseman  should  have  complete 
control  over  the  horse  ;  that  the  horse  itself 
should  be  thoroughly  broken  ;  that  men 
should  be  taught  to  ride  straight  to  their 
front  ;  and,  finally,  that  "  Tempo  1st  Rlch- 
tung,"  i.  e.j  that  if  the  time  is  rigidly  adhered 
to,  the  dressing  will  manage  itself.  Thanks 
to  this  system,  they  are  able,  with  a  mate- 
rial which,  in  our  opinion,  is  far  inferior 
to  our  own,  to  attain  a  precision  of  manoeu- 
vre which  is  still  far  ahead  of  the  best  we 
have  seen  either  in  this  country  or  at  home. 


Lessons  from  Lawrencepore.        499 

III. 

THE  premature  break-up  of  the  Lawrence- 
pore  camp  appears  to  have  been  due  to 
the  serious  losses  in  horse  flesh  suffered 
by  the  17th  Bengal  Cavalry  on  the  last 
field  day.  This  regiment,  it  will  be  re- 
membered, has  been  only  recently  raised, 
and,  consequently,  has  an  abnormal  per- 
centage of  young  horses  in  the  ranks. 
Under  these  circumstances,  of  course,  no 
blame  can  fairly  be  laid  to  the  charge  of 
the  officers  of  the  regiment,  and  my  only 
object  in  alluding  to  it  is  to  call  attention 
to  the  moral  to  be  deduced  therefrom. 

Young  or  immature  horses  are  not  as 
capable  of  doing  fast  work  under  heavy 
weights  as  those  whose  frames  and  sinews 
are  thoroughly  set.  Hence,  if  Cavalry  are  to 
be  really  efficient  for  the  field,  it  is  essential 
that  the  strength  of  the  horses  should  be  in- 
creased to  such  an  extent  as  will  enable  the 
squadrons  to  move  out  on  a  full  war  foot- 
ing with  every  man  mounted  on  a  fully 
developed  horse.  English  horses  appear  to 


500        Lessons  from  Lawrencepore. 

mature  more  rapidly  than  country-bredsy 
Walers,  or  Arabs,  and  hence  we  should 
fix  the  limit  for  the  latter  at  not  less  than 
6^  years.  This  would  entail  an  augmen- 
tation of  between  20  and  25  horses  per 
squadron,  which  would  on  mobilisation  be 
united  to  form  a  depot  squadron.  Though 

at  first  the  system  would  necessitate  a  con- 

«/ 

siderable  grant  from  Government  to  enable 
the  requisite  number  to  be  purchased,  yet 
after  a  time  the  economy  effected  by  the 
avoidance  of  the  losses  which  now  annually 
occur  from  overworking  the  young  un- 
developed horses  would  more  than  repay  the 
outlay.  This  is  the  system  in  vogue  in  the 
German  Army,  which  is  without  doubt  the 
most  economically  managed  force  in  the 
world,  and  I  strongly  recommend  its  adop- 
tion in  our  own. 

In  Germany  it  has  been  recognised  for 
the  last  forty  years,  that  to  put  an  un- 
developed horse  in  the  ranks  is  simply  to 
cause  his  break-down  in  less  than  half  the 
time  that  he  would  otherwise  serve.  Their 


Lessons  from  Lawrencepore.        501 

remounts  reach  the  regiments  as  four-year 
olds,  and  do  not  take  part  in  the  regular 
heavy  work  of  the  regiments,  with  full 
marching  order  weights  up,  till  they  are 
rising  seven.  They  will  then  continue  to 
do  the  fast  work  required  of  them,  and  to 
stand  the  hardships  of  the  manoeuvres, — 
which  are,  if  anything,  greater  than  those 
of  war — sometimes  till  the  age  of  24,  but 
generally  till  20.  Had  they  been  worked 
young,  they  would  have  broken  down 
between  12  and  15,  and  more  than  double 
the  annual  number  of  remounts  would  be 
required  to  keep  up  the  strength  of  the 
squadron. 

The  two  years'  training  is  a  systematic 
gymnastic  education  of  each  individual 
horse,  with  special  reference  to  the  weak 
points  of  his  muscular  development.  The 
squadron  commander  is  hampered  by  no 
regulation,  but  he  can  take  each  horse  in 
turn  and  develop  him  as  he  pleases.  In 
this  way  by  the  time  their  education  is 
completed,  the  horses  have  acquired  a 


502        Lessons  from  Lawrencepore. 

uniformity  of  pace  and  endurance,  which 
at  once  does  away  with  the  principal  diffi- 
culty we  have  to  contend  with  in  trying  to 
get  our  squadrons  thoroughly  in  hand. 

We  believe  it  would  pay  both  regiments 
and  the  Government  if  the  latter  were  to 
advance  the  money  requisite  for  the  pur- 
chase of  the  horses  at  a  low  rate  of  interest, 
and  for  the  regiments  to  repay  the  loan  by 
means  of  an  annual  sinking  fund,  some- 
thing on  the  lines  proposed  for  the  pur- 
chase of  land  by  tenants  in  Ireland.  Sure- 
ly if  it  is  worth  while  stretching  a  point  to 
conciliate  the  discontented  and  seditious 
tenant  farmer  of  Hibernia,  the  loyal  zemin- 
dars of  Hindustan,  who  furnish  the  back- 
bone of  Native  Cavalry,  deserve  equal  con- 
sideration. 


CAVALRY  ON  THE  BATTLE-FIELD. 

THE  efficiency  of  an  Army  may  be  looked 
upon  not  as  the  sum  of  the  efficiency 
of  the  three  arms  but  as  their  product  ; 
where,  therefore,  there  is  a  tendency  to 
underrate  the  efficiency  of  one  arm,  the 
Army  as  a  whole  must  suffer. 

The  battle-field  is  the  place  on  which 
the  Army  is  put  to  its  most  severe  test, 
and  if  it  fails  there,  it  is  but  a  poor  satisfac- 
tion to  reflect  on  the  excellent  service  any 
one  particular  arm  might  have  been  capable 
of  rendering  under  other  conditions. 

It  is  not  intended  in  any  way  to  under- 
rate the  importance  of  good  Cavalry  in 
advance  of  the  Army:  the  Cavalry  actions, 
which  will  necessarily  precede  any  pitched 
battle,  may  be  considered  as  part  of  the 
battle  itself,  and  here  Cavalry  meets  Ca- 
valry, and  is  led  by  its  own  leaders  ;  but 
on  the  battle-field,  in  commands  of  the 
three  arms,  it  is  still  under  the  general 


504         Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

direction  of  leaders,  almost  invariably  (in 
England),  belonging  to  other  branches  of 
the  service,  to  whom  its  qualifications  are 
not  as  well-known.  It  has  always  been  a 
fault  in  the  British  Army,  that  its  officers 
have  been  too  much  specialists,  not  merely 
of  their  arm,  but  of  the  branch  of  that 
arm  to  which  they  belong.  The  horse 
gunner  (though  his  position  is  only  tem- 
porary) differentiates  himself,  from  his 
comrade  in  the  field  batteries,  and  the  field 
battery  man  from  the  garrison  gunner  ; 
the  light  Cavalry  from  the  heavier  and  the 
light  Infantry  from  the  line  ;  "  and  yet 
there  are  not  three  artilleries  but  one  artil- 
lery ;  "  so  likewise  the  Heavy  is  "  horse/7 
the  Lancer  "  horse/'  the  Hussar  "horse/7 
and  yet  there  are  not  three  "  horses  "  but 
one  "  horse  "  ;  and  so  we  might  continue  to 
paraphrase  the  artillery  man's  creed  that 
appeared  a  few  months  ago  in  the  Army 
and  Navy  Gazette. 

To  what   extreme  length    this    feeling 
may  go,  the  example  of  Lord  Cardigan, 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.        505 

looking  on  at  the  charge  of  the  heavy 
brigade  at  Balaclava,  shews  us  ;  and  there 
can  be  no  question  that  the  efficiency  of 
the  Army  does  not  profit  by  it. 

Bringing  together  large  bodies  of  the 
three  arms  in  large  garrisons,  or  camps 
of  exercise,  does  much  to  break  down 
these  caste  barriers,  but  even  here  a  great 
deal  is  lost  if  one  arm  of  the  service  con- 
stantly finds  itself  sacrificed  at  field  days 
to  gratify  the  amour-propre  of  another. 

That  this  is  frequently  the  case,  a  few 
months  at  Aldershot  will  satisfy  any  un- 
prejudiced observer. 

No  sooner  does  the  Infantry  fire  com- 
mence than  the  Cavalry  are  hurried  out  of 
the  way,  and  often  remain  for  an  hour  spec- 
tators of  a  fight,  where  opportunities  to  teach 
them  their  actual  importance  on  the  battle- 
field (from  which,  too,  the  Infantry  might 
learn  how  invaluable  their  support  may  be 
in  time  of  need)  are  of  constant  occurrence. 

Even  when  they  do  charge,  no  matter 
how  favourable  the  circumstances  may  be. 


506         Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

they  are  almost  invariably  ordered  back  by 
the  umpire,  and  frequently  with  a  want  of 
tact  that  is  keenly  felt. 

Again  and  again  in  the  course  of  a  drill 
season  cases  may  be  noted,  where  Cavalry 
have  favoured  by  the  ground,  the  smoke, 
and  the  dust,  charged  so  suddenly  that  the 
Infantry  have  not  had  time  to  fire  more 
than  a  single  shot  before  the  horses  were 
halted  over  their  rifles,  and  yet  the  umpires 
have  ordered  them  back. 

The  Cavalry  are  themselves  very  much 
to  blame  for  this  state  of  things,  for  many 
have  allowed  themselves  to  be  convinced 
of  their  incompetence  by  biassed  critics  of 
other  arms  ;  others  have  gone  after  strange 
gods  and  worshipped  the  mongrel  deity 
known  as  the  Mounted  Infantry  man  ; 
whose  efficiency  under  peculiar  circum- 
stances cannot  be  denied,  but  who  under 
more  normal  conditions  cannot  be  com- 
pared to  the  horse  soldier  proper.  Of 
those  who  still  believe  in  their  own  service, 
but  few  have  taken  the  trouble  to  write  on 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.        507 

the  subject,  and  even  the  limited  number 
of  books  and  papers  produced  have  been 
but  sparingly  read. 

There  is  a  great  difficulty  in  the  way  of 
those  officers,  who  not  being  linguist,  are 
confined  to  English  sources  of  information, 
for  hardly  a  single  pamphlet  on  Cavalry 
(from  the  successful  side)  has  been  trans- 
lated into  our  language. 

Out  of  the  hundreds  of  translations 
from  the  German  with  which  we  were  de- 
luged immediately  after  the  war,  four-fifths 
at  least  were  written  by  junior  officers, 
with  the  impression  produced  by  the  appa- 
rently fruitless  charges  they  themselves 
had  assisted  to  repulse,  still  fresh  in  their 
minds.  They  did  not  attempt  to  account 
for  the  reason  of  the  failure,  why  should 
they  ?  The  Cavalry  were  led  by  their  own 
leaders  presumably  in  the  formations  these 
leaders  considered  best  fitted  for  the  task 
before  them,  and  how  was  an  Infantry  man 
to  criticise  them  in  the  execution  of  their 
own  special  work. 


508         Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

Their  subsequent  writings  are  still  inac- 
cessible except  to  the  reader  of  German, 
and  here  we  often  find  considerable  modi- 
fications of  opinion. 

There  remains,  it  is  true,  the  official  his- 
tory of  the  campaign,  but  the  official  his- 
tory gives  merely  a  record  of  facts  with- 
out comment,  and  to  supply  the  comment 
requires  not  only  considerable  labour,  but 
an  accurate  acquaintance  with  the  ground 
from  personal  observation. 

Besides,  either  a  Cavalry  officer  or  an 
Infantry  officer  writing  about  the  action 
of  his  own  arm  against  the  other,  is  always 
open  to  the  charge  of  professional  bias  ; 
and  hence,  an  excuse  may  be  found  for  the 
attempt  on  the  part  of  one  belonging  to 
neither  branch  of  the  service,  to  view  the 
matter  without  partiality,  favour  or  affec- 
tion for  either. 

A  want  of  national  pride  is  not,  as  a 
rule,  a  characteristic  of  the  average  Eng- 
lishman, least  of  all,  in  anything  relating 
to  horse  flesh,  yet  curiously  enough,  in 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.        509 

military  matters,  we  have  shewn  an  almost 
invariable  readiness  to  be  guided  by  the 
experience  of  other  races  in  preference  to 
those  of  our  own. 

Yet  in  adapting  a  system  of  tactics  to  a 
nation,  no  worse  error  can  be  made,  for 
history  conclusively  proves  that,  whenever 
the  attempt  has  been  made  to  treat  the 
individuals  of  an  Army,  without  reference 
to  their  national  idiosyncrasies,  the  result 
has  almost  invariably  been  disastrous,  our 
line  tactics  copied  from  the  Prussians  being 
about  the  only  exception. 

We  can  understand  the  Germans,  and 
Austrians,  beaten  and  crushed  by  Napoleon, 
attaching  undue  weight  to  the  methods 
and  means  by  which  he  defeated  them,  but 
we,  as  comparatively  disinterested  specta- 
tors, and  with  in  many  cases  diametrically 
opposite  experiences  to  go  on,  ought  to 
have  known  better  than  to  have  followed 
their  example. 

In  the  seven  years7  war,  the  Prussian 
Cavalry  were  practically  the  arbiters  of  the 


510         Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

battle-field  at  Zorndorf,  Seidlitz's  squad- 
rons destroyed  half  the  Russian  Army  at 
Rossbach,  the  same  leader  annihilated  the 
French,  and  at  Hohen  Friedberg,  the  Bair- 
euth  Dragoons  (six  strong  squadrons), 
broke  21  battalions  of  Infantry,  took  4,000 
prisoners,  66  stand  of  colours,  and  5 
pieces  of  artillery,  yet  fifty  years  after- 
wards we  find  it  accepted  almost  as  an 
article  of  faith  all  over  the  continent,  that 
Cavalry  cannot  face  the  bayonets  of  a  square. 

Now  in  the  fifty  years  which  had  elapsed, 
no  essential  change  whatever  had  been 
made  in  the  armament  of  Infantry,  and  so 
far  from  its  drill  and  discipline  having 
improved,  there  is  every  reason  to  suppose 
that  it  had  gone  quite  the  other  way  ;  the 
Prussian  Infantry,  who  fought  at  Mollwitz 
were  trained  to  deliver  five  volleys  per 
minute,  and  we  may  be  sure  that  every 
effort  was  made  by  their  enemies  to  approxi- 
mate to  the  same  rapidity. 

But  when  the  long  service  armies  of  the 
continent  had  practically  ceased  to  exist, 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.        511 

this  rate  of  fire,  demanding  as  it  did,  the 
most  constant  exercise  and  extraordinary 
discipline  could  no  longer  be  maintained, 
and  we  doubt  whether  in  1808  there  was 
a  single  battalion  in  all  Europe  capable  of 
firing  even  three  rounds  in  the  minute, 
hence,  the  conclusion  is  obvious,  that  if 
such  Infantry  as  the  above  could,  as  a 
general  rule,  stop  Cavalry,  the  fault  must 
have  lain  with  the  Cavalry  themselves. 

Let  us  look  more  closely  into  the  nature  of 
the  tasks  performed  by  Frederic's  horsemen. 

In  the  seven  years7  war,  the  Infantry 
universally  carried  a  smooth-bore  flint  lock, 
firing  a  heavy  powder  charge  and  a  12  to 
14-bore  spherical  bullet,  the  discipline  was 
everywhere  of  a  high  order,  and  there  being 
no  particular  inducement  to  open  fire  at  long 
ranges,  but,  on  the  contrary,  the  strongest 
possible  one  for  reserving  it,  we  may  assume 
that  it  generally  was  so  withheld  till  the 
enemy  were  within  about  100  yards. 

How  the  importance  of  these  facts  have 
generally  been  overlooked,  and,  considering 


512          Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

what  a  race  of  sportsmen  we  are,  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  understand  how  this  has  come  about. 

No  officer  with  Indian  experience  needs 
to  be  told,  that  if  you  want  to  stop  a 
charging  tiger,  a  Martini- Henry  rifle  (mili- 
tary cartridge)  is  not  the  thing  to  do  it 
with,  but  where  the  distance  is  too  short 
to  make  accuracy  a  factor  of  much  import- 
ance, a  12-bore  smooth-bore  is  much  better. 

To  the  best  of  our  recollection,  the  initial 
velocity  of  the  old  Brown  Bess  (a  12- 
bore)  as  determined  by  Hutton's  pendulum 
experiments  at  Woolwich,  about  1770,  was 
rather  over  2,000  feet  a  second,  which  is 
practically  the  same  as  that  of  the  shorter 
12-bore  of  to-day  with  a  5 -dram  charge, 
and  hence  its  effect  in  stopping  a  charg- 
ing animal  must  have  been  just  as  much 
greater  than  that  of  the  Martini,  as  we 
know  that  of  the  latter  to  be. 

Further,  the  normal  square  formation  of 
those  days  on  the  continent,  gave  a  depth 
of  six  ranks,  and  therefore  the  front  of  a 
square  in  which  the  men  were  drilled  to  fire 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.        513 

even  three  rounds  a  minute,  could  deliver 
in  the  last  20  seconds  of  the  attack,  i.e., 
the  last  200  yards  of  the  rush,  at  least  as 
many  rounds  as  a  two  deep  square  of  to- 
day (taking  its  rate  of  fire  at  9  rounds 
a  minute,  which  is  three  more  than  the 
number  of  aimed  volleys  that  the  best  drilled 
Infantry  in  Europe  can  get  off),  and  with 
far  greater  stopping  effect. 

Yet  in  spite  of  this,  Zeithen  and  Seidlitz 
practically  broke  everything  they  rode  at ; 
at  Zorndorf,  indeed,  the  Russian  Infantry 
actually  stood  sixteen  deep,  and  we  may 
be  pretty  certain  that  every  man  managed 
to  let  off  his  piece  somehow  ;  but  Seidlitz's 
men  fairly  hewed  their  way  through  them. 

But  though  as  we  have  seen  above,  the 
conditions  of  the  fight  changed  but  little, 
and  that  little  in  favour  of  the  Cavalry, 
yet  no  such  achievements  can  be  credited  to 
the  French  Cavalry  of  the  Napoleonic  era. 

The  truth  is,  that,  as  a  whole,  the  Cavalry 
of  France  were  of  an  extremely  inferior 
description.    Of  all  the  arms  of  the  service, 
*•> L-  33 


514         Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

it  suffered  most  from  the  destruction  of 
the  aristocracy  ;  and  the  utter  exhaustion 
of  the  country  districts  produced  by  the 
reign  of  terror,  rendered  the  supply  of 
horses  of  the  requisite  stamp  a  practical 
impossibility,  and  though  subsequently, 
Napoleon  mounted  almost  the  whole  of  his 
horsemen,  at  the  expenses  of  the  countries 
he  conquered,  it  was  not  till  1807  that 
he  reached  the  sources  from  whence  the 
best  continental  remounts  are  drawn  (viz., 
East  Prussia  and  Hungary).  At  the  same 
time,  as  the  original  volunteers  of  the 
Revolution  began  to  be  replaced  by  the 
conscripts  of  the  empire,  the  dash  and 
courage  of  the  Cavalry  declined  still  fur- 
ther, till,  as  we  mentioned  above,  it  began 
to  be  accepted  as  an  axiom,  that  the  horses 
would  not  face  the  bayonets  of  a  square, 
that  Cavalry  had  done  its  duty,  when  it 
had  driven  Infantry  into  square,  and  had 
drawn  its  fire,  and  finally  that  the  proper 
pace  of  Cavalry  for  the  charge  was  the 
trot  !  Could  Cavalry  fall  lower  than  that  ? 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.        515 

How  thoroughly  this  spirit  had  pene- 
trated the  French  cuirassiers,  their  con- 
duct at  Waterloo  shows ;  who,  after  reading 
Mercer's  or  Kennedy's  account  of  their 
charges  that  day  on  our  squares,  can 
doubt  that  had  they  ridden  home,  some,  at 
least  of  our  squares,  must  have  gone  down  ? 

Let  us  take  another  instance,  showing 
what  they  achieved  against  raw  troops. 

In  the  pursuit  of  Bliicher's  Silesian  Army 
from  Vauchamps  in  February  3814,  the 
French  Cuirassiers  had  succeeded  in  getting 
right  across  the  Russians  line  of  retreat. 

"  A  hostile  regiment  of  cuirassiers  formed 
to  make  an  attack  on  three  Russian  batta- 
lions at  our  head.  These  happened  to  be 
the  newly-formed  battalions  just  arrived. 
Their  commanding  officers  halted  and 
made  ready  ;  they  allowed  the  enemy  to 
advance  to  sixty  paces  before  they  gave 
the  word  *  Fire. ' 

Instead  of  the  1st  and  2nd  ranks  of  the 
leading  columns  only  giving  fire,  the  whole 
three  battalions  fired  at  once,  and  exhibited 


516         Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

the  spectacle  of  three  c  pote  a  few. T — 
Nothing  hindered  the  cuirassiers  from 
breaking  into  the  closed  battalions  (not 
squares),  for  not  a  horse  or  a  man  had 
fallen,  but  they  had  turned  about/7  ^Note. 
b.  Miifflings  Aus  Meinem  Leben,  Part  1, 
Section  II,  page  134.)  But  though  all  this 
time,  our  own  experiences  were  directly 
opposed  to  those  of  the  French,  our  writers 
continued  to  impress  on  us  even  then  the 
comparative  uselessness  of  the  arm.  Surely 
the  horsemen  who  broke  the  French  squares 
at  Salamanca  and  Waterloo,  deserved  a  bet- 
ter recognition  of  their  services,  than  to  be 
classed  with  the  cuirassiers  of  Vauchamps  ? 
The  breaking  of  the  Imperial  Guard 
squares  at  Waterloo  deserves  more  atten- 
tion than  has  usually  been  granted  to  it ; 
for  there  can  be  no  doubt  of  the  extremely 
high  quality  of  those  troops.  Not  quite 
a  case  of  the  survival  of  the  fittest  perhaps, 
for  both  bullet  and  bayonet  have  a  habit 
of  seeking  their  billets  in  the  bodies  of  the 
bravest ;  but  still,  war- seasoned  to  a  degree, 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.        517 

we  can  now-a-days  hardly  realise  ;  these 
were  not  the  class  of  troops  to  be  shaken 
by  the  mere  noise  of  galloping  horses,  yet 
before  the  charge  of  Vivian's  squadrons, 
they  went  down  like  standing  corn  before 
the  rush  of  an  earthquake  wave. 

Then  during  the  long  peace  on  the  conti* 
nent,  we  were  reaping  constant  experience 
in  India. 

We  are  inclined,  as  a  rule,  to  under-esti- 
mate  our  eastern  successes,  presumably 
owing  to  the  colour  of  our  enemies,  but 
surely,  no  one  will  deny  that  the  Sikhs, 
born  soldiers  every  man  of  them,  were  at 
least  as  hard  a  foe  to  conquer  as  any  army 
of  European  conscripts. 

Moving  with  a  precision  equal  to  that  of 
our  best  Infantry,  then,  probably  the  best 
drilled  in  the  world,  they  were  also  re- 
markable for  the  rapidity  of  their  fire,  arid 
when  broken  by  our  horsemen,  they  were 
just  as  expert  in  defending  themselves  with 
their  short  sharp  swords,  as  our  Arab  foes 
proved  to  be  in  the  Soudan  ;  yet  they  were 


518         Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

practically  invariably  ridden  down  by  our 
Cavalry,  no  matter  in  what  formation  they 
stood  to  receive  us.  At  Sobraon  their 
entrenchments  even  proved  no  protection, 
for  a  regiment  of  native  horse,  having  ridden 
over  the  first  two  lines,  absolutely  jumped 
their  horses  into  the  bridgehead  itself. 

Though  the  mutineers  were  not  equal  in 
individual  courage  and  discipline  to  the 
Sikhs,  still  they  were  by  no  means  a  foe  to 
be  despised,  and,  as  a  rule,  received  our 
charges  with  steadily  delivered  volleys,  but 
with  even  less  success  than  the  latter. 

But  in  both  these  campaigns,  the  fire- 
arm in  use  was  still  the  old  smooth-bore  ; 
let  us  take  a  few  instances  in  which  the 
Infantry  carried  the  muzzle-loading  rifle, 
which  possessed  almost  equal  accuracy  and 
considerably  greater  stopping  power  than 
the  present  breech-loader,  and  on  whose 
qualities  just  as  exaggerated  expectations 
were  founded,  as  have  recently  been  pro- 
phesied of  the  breech-loader. 

The  greater  importance   of  the  struggle 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.       519 

on  the  Bohemian  theatre  of  war  in  1866, 
has  caused  too  little  attention  to  be  paid  to 
the  battles  which  took  place  on  the  Italian 
side  ;  but  the  successes  of  the  Austrian 
Cavalry  at  Custozza  deserve  more  than 
passing  mention. 

Prince  Hohenloke  in  his  "Briefe  uber 
Cavallerie"  (page  35),  gives  the  following 
summary  of  its  action  taken  from  the 
Austrian  official  accounts  : — 

"  At  the  commencement  of  the  battle  of 
Custozza,  the  two  Austrian  Brigades  Pulz 
and  Brigonowitch,  together  fifteen  squad- 
rons (average  strength  of  squadrons  accord- 
ing to  morning  states,  150  to  160  horses)  ; 
hence,  at  the  outside,  2,400  men  attacked 
the  Italian  Infantry  Divisions,  Humbert 
and  Bixio  in  front  ;  they  rode  down  the 
skirmishers,  broke  several  squares,  and 
carried  terror  and  confusion  into  the  most 
distant  line.  In  the  highly  cultivated 
Italian  fields,  most  of  the  Infantry  batta- 
lions found  cover  behind  the  rows  of  trees 
and  opened  a  deadly  fire  on  the  Cavalry 


520        Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

as  they  retired.  But  the  result  of  this 
attack  TV  as  to  disable  36  battalions  for  the 
whole  day. 

"  But  the  Cavalry  was  neither  destroyed 
nor  even  lamed  for  the  whole  day  (the 
first  attack  took  place  at  7  A.  M.),  they  held 
these  divisions  in  check,  by  their  confident 
bearing,  thus  preventing  them  going  to  the 
help  of  the  rest  of  the  Army,  and  at  5  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon,  they  attacked  a  second 
time,  and  spread  such  terror  amongst  the 
Infantry  that  whole  battalions  came  for- 
ward to  lay  down  their  arms  to  them. 
Thus,  these  2,400  Cavalry  held  in  check  all 
day  upwards  of  25,000  Infantry,  and  even- 
tually made  more  prisoners  than  the  whole 
of  their  strength. 

"At  another  point  on  the  battle-field, 
3  divisions  (Ziige)  *  of  Sicilian  Lancers, 
by  a  timely  attack,  broke  and  destroyed 
four  out  of  five  battalions  of  Infantry  ; 
true,  their  losses  were  heavy,  but  2  officers, 

*  The  Austrian  Ziige  would  be  about  40  strong. 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.        521 

84  men  and  79  horses,  is  not  a  prohibitive 
price  to  pay  for  the  destruction  of  four 
battalions,  and  for  the  panic  spread  amongst 
the  remainder,  by  which  the  enemy  was 
prevented  from  establishing  himself  in  a 
position,  whose  loss  would  have  entailed 
the  loss  of  the  whole  battle  ? 

"  These  results  were  obtained  in  perhaps 
the  most  difficult  country  in  the  world, 
enclosed  by  walls,  gardens,  vineyards,  &c., 
which  frequently  restricted  the  Cavalry  to 
the  roads.  " 

From  the  battle  of  Koeniggratz,  he  also 
quotes  an  example,  which  came  under  his 
personal  observation  and  which  we  repro- 
duce here,  for  it  is  precisely  one  of  those 
cases  of  Cavalry,  seizing  their  opportunity 
so  promptly,  as  to  give  the  Infantry  no 
time  whatever  to  make  use  of  their  arms, 
and  hence  even  had  the  charge  been  against 
repeaters,  the  result  would  have  been  the 
same.  An  Austrian  battalion,  which  had 
pierced  the  whole  of  the  Prussian  line  in  the 
"Swiep  Wald,"  came  out  into  the  open  on 


522         Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

its  northern  border  ;  a  single  squadron  of  the 
10th  Hussars  (not  more  than  100  strong) 
charged  it,  and  took  the  whole  battalion, 
viz.,  16  officers,  665  men  prisoners,  and 
that  too  without  suffering  any  loss  at  all, 
the  attack  was  so  sudden. 

Now,  though  these  successes  were  obtain- 
ed against  the  muzzle-loading  rifle,  yet  for 
several  reasons  they  are  worthy  of  our 
attention. 

It  must  not  be  forgotten  that,  on  its  first 
introduction,  its  partisans  were  so  satisfied 
with  it,  that  they  prophesied  destruction 
to  everything  that  ventured  within  800  or 
1,000  yards,  just  as  confidently  as  those  of 
the  new  rifles  do  now.  But  both  parties 
reason  on  insufficient  data,  they  ignore 
almost  entirely  the  nervous  constitution  of 
the  men  who  have  to  do  the  shooting,  it 
seems  almost  superfluous  to  point  out  that 
the  conditions  of  the  battle-field  are  not 
those  of  the  practice  ground,  but  actually 
it  is  not  so,  for  the  tendency  of  our  modern 
English  tacticians  is  to  neglect  this  dis- 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.       523 

tinction,  and  to  devote  more  and  more 
of  the  time  which  should  be  spent  in 
disciplining  the  men  to  fruitless  efforts,  to 
attain  a  degree  of  accuracy  in  individual 
fire  on  the  range  which  is  utterly  unobtain- 
able in  action. 

It  is  impossible  to  hope,  with  European 
armies,  to  emulate  the  accuracy  of  fire  in 
the  field,  of  races  like  the  Boers,  was  for  the 
most  part  depend  for  their  living  on  their 
rifles,  with  them  the  judging  of  distance, 
&c.,  is  done  just  as  instinctively  as  the 
slingers  and  stone  throwers  of  antiquity 
used  to  do  it ;  but  to  attain  this  instinct  in 
the  short  service  armies  of  to-day,  is  utterly 
and  entirely  impossible.  Even  if  distance 
and  trajectories  had  nothing  to  do  with 
the  matter,  there  are  the  hearts  and  nerves, 
of  the  human  beings  to  be  reckoned  with 
to  hit  an  individual  man  at  600  yards,  one's 
sights  must  be  as  correctly  aligned  as  the 
cross  hairs  of  a  theodolite  in  levelling  or 
traversing,  but  we  wonder  what  the  value  of 
a  surveyor's  observations  would  be,  if  made 


524         Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

under  the  conditions  under  which  an  In- 
fantry soldier  is  expected  to  aim  at  Cavalry. 

Discipline  and  discipline  only,  is  the  one 
thing  on  which  any  reliance  can  be  placed ; 
not  the  fiction  which  we  call  discipline 
now-a-days,  but  the  iron  discipline  of  the 
Peninsula  and  Waterloo,  which  enabled 
the  thin  red  line  to  await  in  perfect  silence 
and  with  shouldered  armies,  the  onset  of  the 
terrible  French  column  of  attack,  whose 
mere  appearance  was  frequently  enough 
to  frighten  other  Continental  troops  off  the 
ground. 

But  with  short  service,  the  adoption  of 
extended  order  formations,  and  worst  of 
all,  the  spread  of  democratic  ideas,  this 
class  of  discipline  is  daily  becoming  more 
and  more  rare. 

It  is  worthy  of  remark  that  in  1859,  the 
officers  of  the  Austrian  Army  in  Italy 
were  struck  by  the  difference  between  the 
steadily  delivered  volleys  of  the  smooth- 
bore days,  and  the  hasty,  ill-regulated  fire 
which  the  same  troops  delivered  as  soon  as 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.        525 

the  long  range  rifle  was  issued  to  them. 
Yet  all  that  time  the  Austrian  Infantry 
were  in  point  of  discipline  and  length 
of  service  about  the  best  on  the  Continent. 

The  cause  of  this  unsteadiness  is  not 
hard  to  find,  it  was  merely  the  alarm  fell 
by  the  men,  when  they  found  that  the 
exaggerated  results  they  had  been  led  to 
expect  were  not  realised  in  practice. 

If  the  mere  increase  of  range,  entailing 
as  it  necessarily  did,  the  addition  to  the 
rifle  of  sights  to  be  fumbled  with,  caused 
such  a  marked  fall  in  the  fire  discipline  of 
the  army,  it  is  obvious  that  the  difficulty 
to  be  overcome  now-a-days  with  both  sights 
and  increased  rapidity  of  firing  to  be  con- 
trolled, is  much  greater. 

Finally,  in  estimating  the  value  of  results 
obtained  against  the  muzzle-loading  rifle, 
we  have  yet  to  take  into  account  the  fact 
that,  all  these  charges  were  delivered  against 
closed  formation,  on  squares  six  deep, 
hence  if  we  take  the  killing  power  of  the 
bullets  to  have  been  only  equal  instead  of 


526         Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

as  they  actually  were,  superior  to  those 
of  the  breech-loader,  and  if  we  allow  that 
the  breech-loader  fired  six  times  as  fast  as 
the  muzzle-loader  and  with  equal  accuracy, 
then  it  follows  that  one- sixth  the  number 
of  Infantry  given  in  the  examples  above 
would  have  poured  out  the  same  number 
of  bullets  as  were  actually  delivered,  and 
presumably  with  no  better  result. 

Instead  of  2,400  Cavalry,  shattering 
25,000  Infantry,  they  would  only  have 
shattered  about  4,000,  yet  still  the  game 
would  have  been  worth  the  candle. 

But  the  comparison  is  still  most  unfair 
on  the  Cavalry,  for  horses  can  be  got  to 
gallop  at  a  line  of  skirmishers  lying  down 
far  more  readily  than  at  the  bayonets  of  a 
square,  and  it  must  be  admitted  that  the 
controlled  volleys  of  a  six  deep  square 
must  necessarily  be  more  deadly  to  face 
than  that  of  a  single  line  delivered  six  times 
as  fast. 

Besides,  it  is  now  an  ascertained  fact  on 
the  range  that  when  a  certain  very  moderate 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.        527 

rate  of  fire,  depending  on  the  discipline 
of  the  troops  concerned,  is  exceeded,  the 
proportion  of  hits  begin  to  vary  inversely 
with  the  number  of  rounds  fired. 

(This  rate  with  the  best  trained  troops 
does  not  exceed  six  rounds  a  minute,  only 
one  round  a  minute  more  than  Frederic  the 
Great's  Infantry  fired  with  their  old 
muzzle-loaders.) 

Turning  now  to  the  question  of  the 
actual  results  obtained  by  Cavalry  against 
the  breech-loaders,  we  admit  that  the  results 
of  the  encounters  between  the  Austrian 
and  the  Prussian  needle  gun  were  far  from 
encouraging  for  the  former. 

The  accounts  given  by  the  two  opposing 
armies  differ  so  widely  that  it  is  almost 
impossible  to  bring  them  together,  yet  it  ap- 
pears that  where  the  Austrians  failed,  it  was 
principally  due  to  want  of  proper  prepara- 
tion of  the  attack,  and  to  accidents  of  the 
ground  which  was  not  sufficiently  recon- 
noitred. On  the  other  hand,  we  attribute 
the  success  of  the  Prussian  Infantry  to  the 


528         Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

intrinsic  value  of  the  men,  and  not  to  the 
technical  qualities  of  the  arm  they  carried, 
for  the  needle  gun  had  neither  long  range, 
accuracy,  or  stopping  power. 

Thus  in  the  great  Cavalry  charges  at 
Sadowa,  the  circumstances  were  all  against 
the  Austrian  horse,  for  the  attacks  had  to 
be  delivered  uphill  (slope  about  2°)  over 
heavily  sodden  ground,  and  on  horses  not 
exactly  in  galloping  condition,  for  hard- 
ship and  short  rations  had  told  severely  on 
them. 

Instead  of  a  shaken  foe,  they  had  to  ride 
at  the  steadiest  of  Continental  Infantry 
flushed  with  a  hitherto  victorious  advance, 
and  who  were  not  in  the  least  taken  by 
surprise. 

Nor  must  the  fact  be  overlooked  that 
the  Prussians  had  been  undergoing,  during 
the  preceding  six  hours  of  fighting  a  ri- 
gorous process  of  selection.  Of  course,  the 
bullets  had  chosen  their  victims  with  their 
usual  impartiality,  but  in  the  long  ad- 
vance up  the  hill  from  the  valley  of  the 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.        529 

Bistritz.  Ample  opportunity  had  been 
afforded  to  everyone  whose  heart  was  not 
in  the  right  place,  to  withdraw  from  the 
fight  for  the  remainder  of  the  day,  and  we 
can  be  pretty  certain  that  there  was  not 
a  man  on  the  ridge  that  did  not  wish  to  be 
there,  besides  the  excitement  and  novelty 
of  the  situation  had  worn  off,  and  the  fire 
was  actually  delivered  (according  to  the 
testimony  of  eye-witnesses)  with  unusual 
precision  and  coolness. 

The  actual  amount  of  damage  that  under 
these  conditions  they  succeeded  in  inflict- 
ing on  the  Prussians,  it  is  impossible  to 
decide  on  the  contradictory  evidence  5  one 
thing,  at  any  rate,  they  proved,  and  that  is, 
that  there  is  still  work  for  Cavalry  to  be 
done  on  the  battle-field,  which  no  other 
arm  can  do  as  well ;  for  even  their  enemies 
admit  that  their  action  saved  the  Austrian 
Army  from  what  would  otherwise  have  been 
almost  as  crushing  a  calamity  as  Sedan. 

But  it  is  from  the  Franco-German  War  in 
particular,  that  our  principal  lessons  are  to 
M.,  L.  34 


530        Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

be  learnt,  here  the  evidence  is  much  clearer 
and  the  condition  of  armament  practically 
similar  to  those  of  the  present  day. 

The  opponents  of  the  Cavalry  arm  have 
generally  fastened  on  the  French  failures 
against  German  Infantry,  and  ignored  the 
German  successes  against  French  Infantry, 
notwithstanding  that  the  latter  were  armed 
with  a  far  superior  weapon. 

As  they  usually  base  their  arguments  on 
the  nature  of  the  weapon  and  not  on  that 
of  the  man  who  holds  it,  this  appears  to  us 
rather  an  unfortunate  line  to  take. 

Let  us  begin  with  the  French  first. 
Their  Cavalry  was,  it  is  well  known,  far 
from  first  class  ;  it  was  indifferently  mount- 
ed, insufficiently  trained,  and  unaccustomed 
to  act  together  in  masses,  or  in  combina- 
tion with  other  arms,  and  was  at  least  as 
deeply  bitten  by  the  terror  of  the  new  arm 
as  all  the  other  Cavalries  in  Europe. 

Let  us  take  the  charges  in  order — 

The  first  took  place  at  the  battle  of 
Woerth  (6th  August),  and  was  delivered 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle- Field.        531 

by  MichelFs  Brigade,  which  in  common 
with  the  rest  of  the  Cavalry  of  MacMahon's 
Army,  had  been  suffering  from  want  of 
forage  for  some  days  and  was  far  from 
being  in  condition  to  face  a  1,200  yard 
gallop  over  sodden  clayey  ground  (for  just 
as  before  Sadowa,  exceptionally  heavy  rain 
had  fallen  on  the  preceding  night). 

The  Prussians  (Xlth  Corps)  had  just 
succeeded  in  carrying  the  farm  of  Albrechts- 
haiiser  and  the  village  of  Morsbrunn,  and 
were  in  the  act  of  changing  front  half 
right;  before  them,  the  French  were  re- 
tiring in  considerable  disorder,  when  sud- 
denly Michell's  Brigade  appeared  on  the 
scene.  What  followed  had  better  be  given 
in  the  words  of  the  Prussian  official, 
which  can  hardly  be  suspected  of  undue 
bias  towards  the  French  Cavalry  :  "  The 
field  of  attack,  which  had  apparently  not 
been  previously  reconnoitred  by  the  Cavalry 
was,  for  them,  extremely  unfavourable, 
because  single  lines  of  trees,  felled  close 
above  the  ground,  and  deep  ditches,  hin- 


532        Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

dered  the  movement  of  closed  masses,  whilst 
the  Infantry  had  a  clear  field  of  fire  over 
the  otherwise  open  and  gently  sloping 
ridges." 

"  In  first  line  came  the  8th  Cuirassiers 
in  Squadron  Columns,  followed  on  the 
right  by  3  Squadrons  of  the  9th  Cuiras- 
siers in  line,  the  4th  Squadron  in  Column 
of  Divisions  behind  ;  still  further  to  the 
right  rear  were  the  6th  Lancers/7 

"  At  first,  with  no  enemy  in  sight,  this 
mass  of  over  1,000  horsemen  moved  for- 
ward at  random  towards  Morsbrunn,  bear- 
ing heroically  the  Infantry  fire  directed  on 
their  left  flank  from  the  Albrechtshauser, 
whilst  seeking  to  gain  the  enemy,  still 
occupied  in  the  act  of  forming  at  Mors- 
brunn." 

"  The  latter  were  preparing  to  advance 
with  the  32nd  Regiment  in  front,  the  94th 
in  second  line,  the  2nd  and  4th  Companies 
of  the  former  regiment  were  on  the  heights 
north-west  of  Morsbrunn,  the  1st  and  3rd 
Companies  were  still  in  the  streets  of  the 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle- Field.        533 

village.  The  2nd  Battalions  of  both  regi- 
ments had  already  debouched  on  the  left 
of  the  place,  the  32nd  in  two  half  battalions 
in  line  at  close  intervals,  the  latter  in  com- 
pany columns  ;  the  3rd  Pioneer  Company 
was  likewise  present.  The  Fusilier  Batta- 
lions of  these  regiments  were  still  to  the 
south  of  Morsbrunn,  the  companies  of  the 
80th  Regiment  coming  from  the  "  Bruch  " 
mill  were  only  approaching  the  northern 
entrance  of  the  village." 

"  When  the  first  line  of  troops  appeared 
on  the  heights,  they  were  received  by  so 
violent  a  musketry  fire  from  the  copses, 
south-east  of  Eberbach,  that  their  further 
progress  was  impeded  for  the  time  being. 
They  were  then  charged  by  the  hostile 
masses  of  horse.7' 

"  The  Infantry  might  have  found  shelter 
in  the  contiguous  vineyards  and  hop  plan- 
tations, and  some  trees  in  front  also  offered 
immediate  cover." 

"  They  received  the  venturesome  attack, 
however,  just  as  they  stood,  and  without 


534        Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

forming  either  battalion  or  rallying  squares 
in  those  formations  which  permitted  of  the 
greatest  effect  being  obtained  from  their 
fire.  The  8th  Cuirassiers  delivered  their 
first  charge  upon  the  Infantry  which  had 
jtist  debouched  from  the  village.  Here  the 
Cuirassiers  came  under  the  simultaneous 
fire  of  the  two  companies  and  of  the  two 
half  battalions  of  the  32nd  Regiment,  which 
latter  had  deployed  and  changed  front  half 
right." 

"In  a  few  moments  the  Cuirassiers 
suffered  fearful  losses  ;  the  remainder  charg- 
ing past  the  right  and  left  of  the  Infantry 
and  partly  breaking  through  the  skirmish- 
ers of  the  2nd  Company,  endeavoured 
to  gain  the  open  ground  through  the  village 
or  round  its  northern  side,  but  fell  foul  of 
the  two  companies  in  the  village  streets 
and  the  skirmishers  of  the  80th  Regiment 
on  the  northern  side/1 

"  The  9th  Cuirassiers  fared  no  better." 
"  They  were  received  at  a  distance  of  300 
paces  by  a  well-aimed  fire  from  the  Pioneer 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.        535 

Company,  which  was  posted  in  a  broad 
group  on  the  left  of  the  Infantry.  One 
angle  of  the  group  was  broken  by  the 
Cavalry  as  it  charged  by  :— 

"  The  Lancers  forming  the  last  line  of 
attack  struck  the  left  wing  of  the  Prussian 
Infantry.  The  8th  Company,  32nd  Regi- 
ment, wheeled  to  the  left,  and  deploying 
into  line  delivered  a  volley,  followed  by  an 
effective  c  Schnell  feuer '  upon  the  charging 
Cavalry ;  those  who  passed  scatheless,  press- 
ed forward  past  Morsbrunn." 

"  This  chivalrous  advance  of  the  Cavalry 
had  enabled  the  French  Infantry  of  the 
extreme  right  wing  to  withdraw  un- 
molested.7' 

The  advantage  purchased,  therefore,  by 
the  loss  of  some  750  men,  was  the  relief  of 
the  retiring  French  Infantry  from  pursuit, 
and  the  gain  of  time  enough  to  enable  the 
latter  to  establish  themselves  in  a  fresh 
position,  from  which  they  were  afterwards 
able  to  renew  their  offensive  against  the 
Albrechtehauser  which  they  retook,  causing 


536        Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

a  retograde  movement  along  the  whole  of 
the  Prussian  left  wing.  Then,  however, 
under  the  pressure  of  a  renewed  advance, 
the  French  finally  gave  way,  and  the 
Prussians,  at  last,  established  themselves 
in  the  Niederwald. 

In  all  we  may  take  it  that  the  Cavalry 
postponed  the  decision  of  the  day  for  three 
full  hours  (for  it  must  be  remembered,  it 
was  the  advance  of  the  Prussian  left  that 
decided  the  battle),  and  if  we  estimate 
what  those  three  additional  hours  cost  the 
Germans,  or  what  it  saved  the  French  in 
the  pursuit,  for  had  the  Germans  had  three 
hours'  more  daylight,  the  number  of  prison- 
ers would  have  been  far  greater  than  it 
actually  was,  we  think  it  will  be  admitted 
that  the  price  paid  for  it  was  not  too  high. 

And  yet  this  charge  was  made  under 
such  unfavourable  conditions  that  success 
could  hardly  have  been  hoped  for.  In  ad- 
dition to  the  difficulties  of  the  ground  al- 
ready mentioned  and  its  saturated  condi- 
tion, there  lay  a  hollow  road  right  across 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.        537 

the  line  of  their  advance.  The  distance 
too  was  considerable,  namely,  1,500  yards, 
and  was  covered  "  at  the  most  rapid  pace  " 
and  under  a  flanking  fire  from  the  Al- 
brechtshaiiser.  As  two  out  of  the  three 
regiments  appear  to  have  been  in  column, 
in  this  part  of  the  action  at  any  rate,  this 
fire  must  have  seriously  loosened  their 
order. 

Finally,  it  appears  that  the  charge  itself 
was  delivered  in  column  ;  at  least,  in  the 
official  account  no  mention  is  made  of  the 
8th  Cuirassiers  and  6th  Lancers  deploy- 
ing, and  if  this  actually  was  the  case,  then 
the  elements  of  a  disaster  were  all  present. 

Let  us  assume,  on  the  contrary,  an  equal 
body  of  well  mounted,  first  rate  Cavalry 
under  an  experienced  and  resolute  leader, 
allowed  proper  latitude  by  his  Commander- 
in-Chief.  To  begin  with,  he  would  not 
have  formed  up  behind  the  corner  of  a 
wood,  within  range  of  the  enemies'  shells 
(which  occasioned  severe  loss  to  Michell's 
Brigade)  and  from  which  he  could  not 


538        Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

escape  except  over  ground  cut  up  with 
deep  trenches,  &c.,  but  would  have  chosen 
a  position  under  cover,  from  whence  he 
could  have  delivered  an  effective  blow  on 
the  enemies'  flank. 

Such  a  position  might  have  been  found 
in  the  valley  of  the  Eberbach,  near  where 
the  road  from  Gunstett  to  Laubach  crosses 
the  streams,  and  an  outpost  on  the  steeple 
of  the  village  of  Forstheim  could  have 
kept  him  informed  as  to  the  progress  of  the 
attack. 

It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  remark  that 
he  would  have  previously  reconnoitred  the 
ground,  but  even  had  he  failed  to  do  so, 
the  ground  is  so  much  clearer  than  to  the 
northward  that  the  consequence  of  neg- 
lect would  not  have  been  so  fatal. 

From  this  position  the  Prussian  line 
could  have  been  approached  under  cover 
to  within  about  150  paces,  from  its  right 
flank,  and  had  the  charge  been  delivered, 
with  the  Lancers  in  first  line  at  open  files, 
the  8th  Cuirassiers  in  second  and  the 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.        539 

remaining  regiment  in  third,  the  results 
obtained  would  probably  have  satisfied  any 
Cavalry  leader. 

The  charge  of  Bounemain's  Cuirassiers 
hardly  deserves  discussion,  for  had  the 
Prussian  only  been  armed  with  slings  and 
bows,  the  Cavalry  would  have  been  equally 
powerless  against  them  in  the  vineyards 
and  orchards  in  which  they  were  posted. 
But  even  here  time  was  gained  by  the 
French  to  organise  another  Infantry  coun- 
ter-attack, which  must  certainly  have  caused 
considerable  loss  to  the  enemy. 

The  battle  of  Spicheren-Forbach  on  the 
same  day  offered  no  opportunity  to  the 
French  Cavalry  ;  with  the  exception  of  a 
couple  of  squadrons  on  the  left,  who,  acting 
as  mounted  Infantry,  did  good  service, 
no  other  chance  presented  itself ;  but  their 
action  on  the  16th  August  at  Vionville, 
though  unsuccessful,  deserves  the  closest 
study. 

Their  first  charge  on  that  day  took  place 
about  11-30  o'clock,  and  its  object  was  to 


540        Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

cover  the  left  flank  of  Frossard's  (2nd) 
Corps  which  was  beginning  to  retire. 

The  following  account  is  taken  from  the 
late  Colonel  Koehler's  pamphlet  "  Die  Rei- 
terei  in  Der  Schacht — Vionville — Mars  la 
Tour"  (page  15). 

"  At  this  time,  there  stood  between  Re- 
zonville  and  Villiers  au  Bois  the  following 
regiments  of  French  Cavalry: — The  3rd  Lan- 
cers and  3  Divisions,*  each  of  two  Brigades 
or  1  Lancer  Regiment,  4  Regiment  of  Chas- 
seurs, 4  of  Dragoons  and  4  Cuirassiers, 
in  all  13  regiments,  counting  (inclusive  of 
previous  losses)  about  5,000  horse." 

"On  receiving  General  Frossard's  order  to 
charge  "  Des  que  1'occasion  se  presertera  " 
General  Desvaux  (Commanding  the  Cavalry 
Division  of  the  Guard)  ordered  General 
Du  Preuil  (3rd  Brigade  one  Regiment  of 
Cuirassiers,  one  of  Carabineers)  to  take 
his  Cuirassiers  and  move  up  in  support 
of  the  3rd  Lancers  to  the  south  of  the 

*  The  Cavalry  Division  of  the  Imperial  Guard— The 
Division  "  Forton  "  and  the  Division  "  Valebregue." 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.        541 

Chaussee.  The  movement  was  executed, 
and  the  regiment  drawn  up  parallel  to  the 
ridge  and  a  little  behind  it,  under  cover 
from  the  enemies'  fire." 

"About  11-30,  according  to  the  French 
accounts  the  fire  which  had  hitherto  been 
very  lively,  moderated  ;  and  one  saw  the 
French  skirmishers,  who  were  retreating 
at  a  run  and  without  order,  appear  on  the 
ridge.  They  were  closely  followed  by  the 
Prussian  batteries,  which  immediately 
crowned  the  ridge  and  opened  fire  on  the 
French  squadrons.  Two  squadrons  of  the 
3rd  Lancers  advanced,  but  having  had  no 
definite  objective  assigned  to  them,  they 
presently  retired." 

"  General  Du  Prenil  reported  to  General 
Desvaux  everything  was  in  retreat,  and  the 
game  moment  he  received  orders  to  attack.  " 

"  His  troops  were  so  far  from  the  Prus- 
sian Infantry  line  (2,500  paces)  that  failure 
was  certain,  unless  their  attack  was  pre- 
pared by  artillery  fire.  This  objection  was 
raised,  but  General  Frossard  replied — 


542        Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

6  Attack  at  once,  or  we  are  all  lost.7  " 
"  Accordingly  General  Du  Prenil  moved 
off  the  first  echelon  at  the  gallop  and  fol- 
lowed with  the  2nd  at  150  yards  distance, 
but  as  its  pace  appeared  too  great,  he  order- 
ed them  to  reduce  it  and  rode  with  his 
staff  on  one  of  its  wings.  Meanwhile  the 
first  echelon  still  moving  at  full  speed  had 
left  the  second  far  behind  it.  The  Prussian 
skirmishers  formed  rallying  squares/' 

"  The  attack  had  got  well  within  range 
of  the  Infantry  when  suddenly  its  course 
was  checked  by  the  debris  of  De  Fortors7 
camp,  biscuit  boxes,  baggage  waggons,  etc., 
which  had  been  abandoned  in  the  morn- 
ing scare.  Thus  hindered  in  its  advance, 
the  first  echelon  was  compelled  to  give 
ground  to  the  left,  and  the  more  they  went 
on,  the  worse  became  the  pressure  result- 
ing from  this  deviation,  till  the  two  squad- 
rons were  thrown  into  disorder.  When, 
therefore,  they  were  received  at  30  yards' 
range  by  a  terrible  fire,  the  whole  line 
broke  and  poured  into  the  defiles  between 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.        543 

the  Prussian  squares.  The  Colonel  and  his 
Adjutant  broke  into  one  square,  but  the 
remainder  receiving  fire  from  all  sides  were 
compelled  to  retire  and  were  destroyed. " 

This  unmasked  the  second  Echelon  ;  it 
was  received  at  300  yards  with  independ- 
ent fire,  which  emptied  a  few  saddles,  but 
continued  its  advance  in  good  order,  as  the 
firing  checked  for  a  moment,  "  but  at  100 
yards  the  Prussians  answered  the  command 
charge  !  with  such  a  terrible  rain  of  bullets 
that  half  the  line  was  dismounted.  The 
remainder  came  in  collision  with  obstruc- 
tion, or  fell  into  a  ditch  10  paces  in  front 
of  the  squares."  So  far  the  French  ac- 
count (see  Colonel  Bonie's  pamphlet,  page 
45,  Eng.  Translation.)  The  Prussians  give 
the  following  story — 

"  This  charge  struck  in  first  line  on  the 
companies  of  the  10th  Infantry  Brigade 
who  were  pressing  forward  east  of  Fla- 
vigny.  The  2nd  Battalion  of  the  52nd 
Eegiment  under  Captain  Hildebrandt,  stood 
prepared  to  receive  it  in  line  with 


544        Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

shouldered  arms ;  at  250  paces  they  opened 
with  independent  fire,  before  which  the 
enemies'  charge  broke  powerless.  The  leader 
of  the  52nd,  Captain  Hildebrandt,  is  killed  ; 
to  the  left  and  right  other  bodies  of  the 
enemies7  horse  rushed  by — the  rear  rank 
turned  about  and  fired  after  them.  The 
Fusilier  companies  of  the  12th  Regiment 
on  one  side  and  the  companies  of  the  6th 
Infantry  Division,  between  Flavigny  and 
the  Chaussee  on  the  other,  received  them 
with  an  equally  accurate  and  steady  fire, 
and  only  a  small  remnant  of  tho  Cuiras- 
siers escaped  by  flight/7 

The  chief  point  to  be  noticed  in  the 
above  is,  that  the  Prussian  account  ac- 
tually enhances  the  performance  of  the 
Cavalry,  for,  instead  of  attacking  rallying 
squares,  in  which  the  nerve  of  the  men  is 
sure  to  have  been  shaken  by  the  hurry 
and  also  by  the  admission  of  their  own 
weakness,  which  is  implied  by  its  being 
considered  necessary  for  them  to  run  into 
groups  for  mutual  support,  they  were 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.        545 

actually  charging  intact  Infantry  in  line,  a 
far  more  difficult  task. 

It  is  true  that  the  Prussians  do  not  ad- 
mit that  their  line  was  penetrated  by  a 
single  individual,  but  the  fact  that  their 
commander  was  killed,  shews  that  the 
Cavalry  at  least  got  pretty  close. 

Their  failure  under  the  circumstance  to 
break  perfectly  unshaken  Infantry,  sup- 
ported by  Artillery  and  protected  in  the 
front  by  obstacles  and  not  taken  by  sur- 
prise, proves  nothing  in  favour  of  the 
breech-loader,  for  the  result  would  have 
been  the  same,  and  indeed  was  the  same 
(the  28th  at  Quatrebras)  in  the  days  of  old 
Brown  Bess.  But  to  continue  the  narrative. 
"  To  cover  the  retreat  of  the  horsemen, 
Marshal  Bazaine  ordered  up  a  battery  of 
the  guard,  and  himself  accompanied  it. 
Some  20  men  of  the  17th  Prussian  Hussars 
who  were  pursuing  the  defeated  French- 
men, suddenly  turned  on  the  battery,  and 
in  spite  of  the  last  volley  from  the  latter 
at  80  paces,  penetrated  into  it,  and  cut 
»..  *•  35 


546         Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

down  almost  the  whole  of  the  detachments, 
in  spite  of  their  desperate  resistance.  The 
Marshal  and  his  staff  were  even  compelled 
to  draw  their  swords  in  self-defence." 

To  have  captured  Bazaine,  would,  indeed, 
have  been  perhaps  the  most  unfortunate 
thing  they  could  have  done,  but  under 
normal  circumstances  to  capture  the  Com- 
mander-in- Chief  of  an  army  in  this  man- 
ner, literally  to  tear  out  its  heart  from  its 
midst,  would  be  an  achievement  of  the 
highest  merit  to  the  Cavalry  concerned. 

"The  llth  Hussars,  delayed  in  their  ad- 
vance by  the  swampy  ground  east  of 
Fravigny,  did  not  succeed  in  taking  part  in 
the  pursuit,  but  riding  up  the  slope  ,of 
the  ridge  (311)  south  of  Rezonville,  they 
fell  upon  and  rode  down  and  dispersed, 
swarms  of  French  Infantry  and  Cavalry." 

This,  however,  was  in  itself  no  mean  per- 
formance, and  since  in  the  whole  fight  the 
regiment  only  lost  1  man  and  8  horses 
killed,  and  1  Officer,  18  men  and  5  horses 
wounded ;  was  obtained  with  very  little  loss. 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.         547 

"  Heavy  flanking  fire  from  the  Chauss^e, 
Rezonville,  Vionville,  and  the  retreat  of  the 
17th  Hussars  compelled  their  retirement/7 

Shortly  after  12  o'clock,  when  the  2nd 
French  Corps  was  retreating,  partially  in 
considerable  disorder,  the  6th  Cavalry  Divi- 
sion received  orders  from  the  General  Com- 
manding the  3rd  Army  Corps  (v.  Alvensle- 
ben)  "  to  advance  towards  Rezonville  as  the 
enemies7  Infantry  were  retiring  in  confusion/7 

But  before  the  division  could  be  brought 
up,  a  change  in  the  situation  took  place. 
The  French  strongly  reinforced,  resumed 
their  advance,  and  hence  it  was  not  to 
pursue  beaten  troops,  but  to  parry  a  threat- 
ened thrust  that  the  Divisional  Com- 
mander decided  to  bring  up  both  Brigades 
and  to  direct  them  on  the  dense  masses  of 
the  enemy  advancing  from  Rezonville. 

The  advance  was  made  in  the  following 
order — 

14th  BRIGADE.  15th  BRIGADE. 

15th  Lancers  3rd  Hussars. 

6th  Cuirassiers  3rd  Lancers  16th  Hussars. 


548        Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

On  the  right  the  15th  Brigade  with  the 
3rd  Hussars  on  the  right  and  the  16th 
Hussars  a  little  held  back  to  the  left  as  a 
kind  of  second  line.  On  the  left  the  14th 
Brigade  with  the  15th  Lancers  in  front, 
two  squadrons  of  the  3rd  Lancers  on  their 
right  rear,  three  squadrons  of  the  6th 
Cuirassiers  on  their  left  rear.  The  advance 
was  made  in  squadron  columns  at  deploy- 
ing intervals. 

The  15th  Brigade  did  not  succeed  in 
attacking,  they  only  advanced  at  the  trot 
and  did  not  even  deploy,  because,  owing  to 
the  pressure  from  the  right,  the  intervals 
were  lost,  and  the  Brigade  became  a  dense 
mass  of  squadron  columns  at  close  in- 
terval. Received  in  this  highly  unfavour- 
able formation  by  heavy  rifle  fire  from  thick 
lines  of  skirmishers,  Colonel  v.  Schmidt 
(on  whom  the  command  had  devolved 
owing  to  General  v.  Rauch  having  been 
wounded)  seeing  no  prospect  of  success 
sounded  the  halt,  and  having  re-established 
the  intervals  by  closing  to  the  flanks,  after 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.        549 

a  few  moments'  pause,  wheeled  about  by 
divisions  (Ziigs)  and  retired  at  a  walk. 

Under  continuous  and  most  violent  In- 
fantry and  Artillery  fire,  full  intervals 
were  taken,  still  at  the  walk  and  only  when 
this  movement  had  been  satisfactorily  com- 
pleted, was  the  trot  sounded. 

The  3rd  Hussars  lost  80  men  and  100 
horses.  The  16th  not  quite  so  many. 

The  14th  Brigade  also  failed  to  attack. 
The  15th  Lancers  were  thrown  into  dis- 
order by  portions  of  the  retreating  men 
of  the  17th  Hussars  who  were  being  pur- 
sued by  a  squadron  of  French  Hussars. 

The  disorder  was  promptly  remedied, 
and  to  steady  the  young  soldiers,  they 
were  first  formed  up  with  the  same  steadi- 
ness and  precision  as  on  the  drill  ground, 
though  in  effective  range  of  the  enemies' 
Infantry. 

The  6th  Cuirassiers  failed  to  find  an  ob- 
ject to  attack,  as  the  enemy  had  renounced 
his  offensive  and  his  advanced  parties,  ran 
and  threw  themselves  into  the  ditches  of 


550        Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

the  Chaussees  where  they  were  practically 
inaccessible. 

The  whole  movement,  however,  had  not 
been  without  considerable  influence  on  the 
course  of  the  battle.  The  enemies7  Infan- 
try renounced  their  offensive  and  retired  to 
their  shelter  trenches  and  did  not  reappear 
again,  their  batteries  also  retired,  and  the 
5th  and  6th  Infantry  Divisions  were  relieved 
from  their  seriously  threatened  situation. 

We  would  only  notice  here,  1st,  that  the 
German  Cavalry  were  in  those  days  not 
nearly  so  highly  trained  to  manoeuvre  in 
masses  as  they  are  to-day,  and  that,  there- 
fore, the  probabilities  of  the  confusion  evi- 
dent in  the  above  manoeuvre  recurring  in  the 
future  are  proportionally  reduced,  and,  2nd- 
ly,  the  very  trifling  losses*  actually  suffered, 
in  spite  of  the  length  of  time  to  which  the 
Brigade  was  exposed,  both  to  Infantry  and 
Artillery  fire.  The  rest  speaks  for  itself. 

*  The  Division  suffered  throughout  the  day  from  shell 
fire  and  charged  again  at  nightfall,  yet  its  total  loss  only 
amounted  to  300  horse,  or  about  10  per.  cent. 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.        551 

We  now  come  to  the  great  event  of  the 
day,  viz.,  v.  Bredow's  celebrated  attack  ; 
though  often  described,  there  are  still  some 
point  about  it  which  have  escaped  atten- 
tion. The  following  account  of  this  charge 
was  kindly  communicated  to  the  writer  by 
the  officer  who  suggested,  and  afterwards 
carried  the  order  for  it ;  it  is  specially  in- 
teresting as  shewing  how  the  course  of  a 
great  action  may  be  influenced,  by  the 
judgment  of  even  a  junior  officer  and  as 
the  officer  in  question  belonged  to  the  In- 
fantry, and  is  a  firm  believer  in  his  own 
arm  of  the  service,  it  cannot  be  questioned 
on  the  score  of  partiality  to  the  Cavalry. 

On  the  day  of  the  battle,  this  officer, 
then  a  Subaltern  of  about  8  years7  service, 
was  detailed  as  galloper  to  the  General 
Commanding  the  6th  Division  ;  somewhere 
between  1  and  2  o'clock,  he  and  his  chief 
took  up  a  position  on  the  high  ground 
west  of  Vionville  where  they  were  under 
a  heavy  shell  fire  ;  he  was  the  only  officer 
remaining  with  the  General,  the  remainder 


552         Caralry  on  the  Batde-Fidd. 

of  the  staff  having  been  despatched  with 
orders,  etc.,  to  different  parts  of  the  field. 

In  front  of  them  just  in  advance  of 
Vionville,  lay  the  remnants  of  the  24th  Re- 
giment of  Infantry,  extending  in  a  single 
line  of  skirmishers  from  the  Chaussee  to  the 
Roman  Road,  they  were  without  support 
or  reserve  of  any  kind,  and  had  no  hope 
of  receiving  either  for  many  hours,  their 
ammunition  was  running  low,  and  the  men 
were  completely  exhausted ;  (it  will  be 
remembered  that  the  heat  this  day  was  in- 
tense and  the  ground  hard  and  dry). 

Opposite  them  and  some  1,000  yards  dis- 
tant lay  the  French  third  Division  drawn 
up  in  two  lines  and  deployed  ;  and  sup- 
ported by  the  whole  of  the  Corps  Artillery 
of  Canrobert,  in  all  9  Batteries  and  15 
Battalions  ;  of  course,  at  the  time  he  and 
his  General  were  unaware  of  the  exact 
strength  of  the  French,  but  the  appearance 
the  latter  presented  was  that  of  an  almost 
continuous  double  line  of  deployed  Batta- 
lions backed  by  Artillery. 


Cavalry  on  the  Batfle-Field. 

Suddenly  the  General  turned  to  his  aid 
and  said,  "  I  am  so  tired,  I  am  going  to 
sleep  ;  call  me  if  you  notice  anything,"  and 
dropping  his  reins  on  his  horse's  neck,  he 
fell  fast  asleep. 

Shortly  after,  his  galloper  saw  a  large 
body  of  French  Cavalry  which  he  estimat- 
ed at,  at  least,  a  division,  ride  up  and  take 
post  in  the  angle  between  the  Roman  Road 
and  the  country  road  leading  from  Rezon- 
ville  to  Tillers  aux  Bois  ;  and  feeling  that 
if  they  realised  the  condition  of  the  Prus- 
sian Infantry  and  charged,  the  latter  were 
in  no  position  to  stop  them ;  he  woke  his 
chief,  and  having  pointed  out  the  new  ar- 
rivals, he  proposed  that  he  should  go  at 
once  and  call  on  the  nearest  Cavalry  to 
charge  first,  and  thus  anticipate  them. 

The  General  at  first  objected  that  to 
charge  unshaken  Infantry  was  impossible, 
but  soon  realising  the  state  of  affairs,  he 
said,  ;%  Well,  go  and  find  the  nearest 
Cavalry  and  call  on  them  to  assist  us." 

The  galloper  accordingly  rode  off,  and  on 


554        Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

his  way  was  met  and  stopped  by  the  chief 
of  the  Staff  of  the  Army  Corps  who  ask- 
ed him  where  he  was  going,  etc.     On  be- 
ing told,  he  also  expressed  his  opinion  about 
Cavalry  and  unshaken  Infantry,  but  on  the 
absolutely    helpless  condition  of  the  24th 
Regiment  being   pointed   out   to   him,  he 
agreed  that  something  must  be   done,  and 
pointing    out    the    position    of  Bredow's 
Brigade,    said,    "  Go   and   call  on  them  to 
attack,  and  if  they  require  a  positive  order 
before  doing  so,  I  will  be  back  in    a  few 
minutes   with   one  from   the  Corps    Com- 
mander/7 

It  was  an  awkward  position  for  a  young 
Infantry  Subaltern,  to  have  to  ride  up  and 
call  on  the  most  distinguished  German 
Cavalry  leader  of  the  day  almost  (Bredow 
had  made  his  name  in  1866)  to  perform  an 
almost  impossible  task,  but  there  was  no 
help  for  it,  so  he  rode  on  and  delivered  his 
message,  which  was  received  with  gentle 
incredulity,  and  the  usual  "  Cavalry  can't 
charge  unshaken  Infantry  ; "  but  whilst 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.        555 

he  was  trying  to  explain  the  urgency 
of  the  situation,  the  chief  of  the  staff 
returned  with  the  definite  order  to  charge, 
upon  which  Bredow  drew  his  sword,  and 
turning  to  his  trumpeter  ordered  him  to 
sound  the  trot.  The  brigade  (only  six 
squadrons)  moved  off,  took  ground  to  the 
left  under  cover  of  the  little  valley  running 
northward  from  Vionville,  wheeled  into 
line,  trotted  up  the  slope,  and,  having  sighted 
the  French,  dashed  at  them  at  full  gallop 
practically  in  one  line  without  second 
or  third  ones. 

The  galloper  riding  back  to  his  General, 
saw  the  whole  sweep  by  him,  and  to  his 
intense  astonishment  he  saw  that  up  to 
the  moment  of  actual  contact,  though  the 
whole  French  line  blazed  at  them  all  they 
knew,  both  in  front,  and  in  flank  from  the 
wood  along  the  Roman  Road,  not  more 
than  fifty  horses  at  the  outside  went  down. 

As  is  well  known  they  dashed  over 
both  lines  of  Infantry  and  through  the 
batteries,  part  of  them  stayed  behind 


556         Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

slaughtering  the  gunners,  but  the  greater 
part  went  right  on  at  the  French  Cavalry 
which  now  attacked  them,  outnumbering 
them  nearly  five  to  one  and  with  fresh 
horses.  What  followed  we  quote  from  the 
Prussian  official  (page  388,  English  transla- 
tion, VoL  I.) 

"  General  v.  Bredow  sounds  the  recall. 
Breathless  from  the  long  ride,  thinned  by 
the  enemies'  bullets,  without  reserves  and 
hemmed  in  by  hostile  horsemen,  they  once 
more  cut  their  way  through  the  previously 
over-ridden  lines  of  Artillery  and  Infantry  ; 
harassed  by  a  thick  rain  of  rifle  bullets 
and  with  the  foe  in  rear,  the  remnant  of 
the  two  regiments  of  Prussian  Cavalry 
hastens  back  to  Flavigay.  The  victims  of 
this  charge,  courageous  unto  death,  had 
not  fallen  in  vain.  The  advance  of  the 
6th  Corps  was  checked,  and  was  now,  it  is 
stated  by  order  of  Marshal  Bazaine — en- 
tirely abandoned,  at  any  rate,  the  French 
made  no  fresh  advance  from  the  direction 
of  Kezonville  this  day." 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.        557 

The  first  point  in  their  account  which 
will  probably  strike  the  reader,  is  the  tri- 
fling loss  with  which  the  primary  object 
of  the  charge,  viz.,  the  breaking  of  the 
enemies'  Infantry  was  executed,  yet  a  little 
reflection  will  show  that  this  was  not 
under-estimated  by  the  observer,  for  the  time 
which  the  Cavalry  took  to  gallop  the  1,500 
yards  or  so  which  separated  them  from  the 
Infantry,  can  hardly  have  exceeded  five 
minutes,  while  their  subsequent  advance, 
their  melee  with  the  enemies'  horse  and 
eventual  retreat  occupied  at  least  five  times 
as  long,  hence  if  the  loss  was  equally  dis- 
tributed over  the  whole  time  (which  is  not 
Kkely  to  have  been  the  case,  for  in  the 
melee  and  retreat  it  must  have  been  more 
rapid),  the  proportion  of  the  total  loss  of 
450  horses  falling  to  the  first  five  minutes 
would  only  be  ^th  of  the  whole,  or  about 
75,  and  of  which  a  considerable  number 
must  have  been  due  to  Artillery  fire. 

Assuming  that  the  gunners  fired  no 
better  than  the  Austrian  Artillery  at 


558         Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

Tobitschau  in  1866  when  Bredow's  Regi- 
ment attacked  18  Austrian  guns  across  1,500 
yards  of  open  ground,  and  captured  them 
with  a  loss  of  only  13  men,  then  three 
times  this  number  or  39  would  represent 
the  loss  due  to  Artillery  fire  leaving  only 
33  accounted  for  by  the  Infantry.*  The 
total  number  of  rifles  bearing  on  the  Cavalry 
(taking  the  position  of  troops  shown  on 
the  Prussian  Official  Map  of  Vionville  PI, 
5.  A.)  can  hardly  have  been  less  than  8,000, 
and  the  men,  who  held  them  shewed  at  St. 
Prisat  two  days  afterwards  that  they  were 
by  no  means  deficient  in  courage,  yet  a 
body  of  Cavalry  of  less  than  a  tenth  of  their 
strength  succeeded  in  reducing  the  whole 
of  them  to  a  state  of  absolute  inaction  for 
the  remainder  of  the  day.  It  will  be 
noticed  too  what  a  hold,  the  Umpires  Dog- 
ma of  "  Cavalry  can't  charge  unshaken 

*  My  friend's  statement,  that  the  loss  of  the  Cavalry  in 
the  actual  charge  was  comparatively  trifling-,  was  also 
corroborated  by  the  evidence  of  two  other  eye-witnesses. 
Officers  of  Artillery  belonging  to  the  batteries  on  the 
flank  round  which  the  attack  took  place. 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle- Field.        559 

Infantry  "  had  taken  in  the  minds  of  the 
German  leaders  ;  even  Bredow  appears  to 
have  considered  his  case  too  hopeless  to 
make  it  worth  while  to  form  a  reserve  or 
second  line  ;  yet  the  event  proved  that 
the  Infantry  was  not  quite  so  unshaken 
as  had  been  imagined. 

That  the  above  was  no  isolated  case  the 
subsequent  charge  of  the  1st  Guard  Dra- 
goons, sufficiently  proves. 

After  the  delivery  of  Bredow's  charge, 
a  lull  occurred  along  the  front  of  the 
French,  but  about  two  hours  later,  the  4th 
French  Corps  having  completed  its  turning 
movement,  commenced  to  advance  in  great 
force  on  Mars  la  Tour,  at  this  time  the 
Xth  Corps  was  rapidly  approaching  the 
battle-field  ;  the  38th  Infantry  Brigade  had 
arrived  and  was  at  once  sent  to  check  the 
French.  Moving  past  Mars  la  Tour  to  the 
east  they  struck  the  2nd  Division  (Grenier) 
of  the  4th  French  Corps  just  behind  the 
ravine  that  run  from  St.  Marcel  westward 
into  the  valley  of  the  Yrou  (Ulsonbach). 


560         Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

After  a  desperate  fight  they  were  driven 
back  by  numbers,  with  a  loss  of  57  per 
cent. 

*  "  The  1st  Dragoon  Guards,  standing 
south-east  of  Mars  la  Tour  received  orders 
from  General  v.  Voigts  Rhetz  to  cover 
the  retreat  of  the  38th  Brigade,  and  at  any 
cost  to  stop  the  advance  of  the  enemy. 

"  It  was  about  5  o'clock  in  the  afternoon 
when  this  order  arrived,  the  regiment  was  in 
squadron  column  at  deploying  intervals 
right  in  front.  The  Adjutant  was  sent 
out  to  reconnoitre  the  ground  and  position 
of  the  enemy,  and,  on  his  return,  reported 
dense  masses  of  the  enemies'  Infantry  pres- 
sing on  in  pursuit  of  the  38th  Brigade, 
and  that  the  ground  east  of  the  village 
was  intersected  by  hedges  and  ditches  and 
most  unfavourable  for  the  proposed  move- 
ment. But  in  spite  of  this  discouraging 
intelligence,  the  Colonel  lost  not  a  move- 
ment in  the  execution  of  his  order/7 

*  Kochlers  Kecterrie  bei  Viomtrille,  p,  41. 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.        561 

"  Headed  by  the  5th  Squadron,  then  the 
3rd  and  1st  with  the  4th  in  reserve  the 
regiment  trotted  in  column  of  divisions 
(Ziigs)  in  a  N.-E.  direction  past  Mars 
la  Tour ;  under  the  enemies7  fire  which 
soon  began  to  tell,  they  had  to  diminish 
their  front  to  column  of  threes  and  then 
again  deploy  into  divisions  (Ziigs)  in 
order  to  overcome  the  difficulties  of  the 
ground,  and  in  doing  so,  slight  disorder 


arose/7 


"  The  leading  division  was  detached  to 
attack  the  enemies7  right  flank.77 

"  The  rear  division  had  to  gallop  the 
whole  way  in  order  not  to  lose  distance.7' 

"  Meanwhile  the  13th  Regiment  of  the 
line  (French)  had  crossed  the  steep  ravine 
in  which  the  Ulzonbach  flows  and  were 
advancing  on  the  plateau  in  front — with 
the  43rd  of  the  line  on  their  left  rear.77 

"  The  1st  Guard  Dragoons  received  heavy 
fire  from  the  former  throughout  the  above 
indicated  movement.77 

"  The  losses   increased  with  every  mo- 

M.,  L,  g 


562         Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

ment ;  the  Colonel  therefore  decided  to 
attack  at  once  without  waiting  for  the  1st 
Squadron  following  in  rear." 

"  He  accordingly  right  wheeled  into  line  ; 
the  1st  Squadron  as  soon  as  it  had  room, 
right  formed  and  joined  the  others  as  a 
right  echelon.  This  brought  the  regi- 
ment into  their  proper  order  of  battle,  the 
1st  Squadron  on  the  right,  but  the  squad- 
rons themselves  in  inversion.  Soon  after 
the  wheel  into  line,  the  gallop  sounded  and 
immediately  afterwards,  the  charge. " 

"  The  Brigade  Commander  and  his  staff 
joined  the  attack  on  the  right  wing." 

"The  enemies'  skirmishers  ran  into 
groups  and  received  the  Dragoons  with  a 
terrible  fire.  A  Mittrailleur  Battery  from 
across  the  ravine  poured  round  after  round 
into  them ;  but  they  broke  into  the  enemies7 
groups,  and  a  desperate  struggle  ensued 
round  the  French  Eagle." 

"  But  the  enemies'  career  was  stopped  and 
the  pressure  on  the  retreating  Prussians 
relieved." 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.        563 

"  The  regiment  lost  about  one- third  of 
its  effective." 

Now  in  this  case  we  have  not  only  un- 
shaken Infantry  ridden  at  and  broken,  but 
troops  advancing  in  the  full  flush  of  victory, 
besides  the  Cavalry  had  to  cope  with  the 
difficulties  of  the  ground  and  actually  exe- 
cuted a  series  of  manoeuvres  at  the  trot 
under  both  Artillery  and  Infantry  fire  be- 
fore delivering  their  charge. 

The  fighting  round  Sedan  afforded  several 
opportunities  to  the  French  Cavalry  which, 
although  unsuccessful,  still  deserve  con- 
sideration. 

The  charge  of  the  5th  (French)  Cuiras- 
siers on  the  27th  Prussian  Infantry  at 
Beaumont  failed,  owing  to  the  steadiness 
and  discipline  of  the  latter,  but  still  the 
commander  of  the  company  on  which  the 
brunt  of  the  attack  fell  had  to  guard  him- 
self with  his  sword  against  a  non-com- 
missioned officer  of  Cuirassier  and  some 
of  the  Fusiliers  were  thrown  to  the  ground 
by  the  horses. 


564         Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

The  French  loss  was  upwards  of  100 
men  and  10  officers,  the  enormous  percen- 
tage of  officers  points  rather  to  the  French 
having  hung  back,  and  had  they  been  as 
ready  to  follow  their  leader  as  the  Germans 
at  Vionville,  the  result  might  have  been 
greater. 

The  following  account  of  the  charge  of 
Margueritte's  (French)  Brigade,  we  extract 
in  spite  of  its  length  verbatim  from  the 
Prussian  Official  (Vol.  II,  p.  373). 

Overwhelmed  by  the  shells  of  the  Prus- 
sian Batteries  and  more  and  more  closely 
pent  in  by  the  Infantry  pressing  forward 
from  the  west  and  north,  the  left  wing  of 
the  7th  French  Corps  now  also  began  to 
fall  off  in  its  power  of  resistance.  As 
General  Douay  had  been  obliged  to  de- 
spatch his  Infantry  reserves  to  other  parts 
of  the  battle-field,  the  Cavalry  in  a  self- 
sacrificing  spirit  once  more  threw  itself 
into  the  struggle.  From  the  Bois  de  la 
Garenne  appeared  General  Margueritte 
with  his  five  light  regiments,  which 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.        565 

were  joined  by  Savaress's  Lancer  Brigade 
of  the  12th  Corps  and  several  Cuirassier 
squadrons  of  Bonnemain's  Cavalry  Divi- 
sion. 

Whilst  these  bodies  of  Cavalry  com- 
menced to  move  across  the  plateau  in  a 
westerly  direction,  General  Margueritte, 
who  had  ridden  forward  in  person  to  re- 
connoitre, was  mortally  hit  by  a  musket 
bullet  before  the  commencement  of  the 
charge.  General  Gallifet  assumed  the  com- 
mand, placed  himself  at  the  head  of  the 
Division,  and  led  it  against  the  Prussian 
Infantry,  part  of  which  had  at  this  time 
reached  the  crest  of  the  heights  in  skir- 
mishing lines,  while  the  remainder  was  still 
making  its  way  up  the  steep  slopes. 

The  vigorous  flanking  fire  of  the  Prus- 
sian Batteries  and  the  very  unfavourable 
character  of  the  ground  in  places  loosened 
from  the  commencement  of  the  charge,  the 
coherence  of  the  French  horse.  Broken 
and  with  thinned  ranks,  yet  undismayed, 
the  squadrons  delivered  their  charge  home 


566         Cavalry  on  the  Battle- Field. 

against  those  detachments  of  Infantry  which 
were  in  their  path.  These  latter  received 
the  impetuous  onset  with  a  firm  bearing, 
and  mostly  in  a  broad  front  behind  protec- 
tive hedges  and  ditches.  Only  where  there 
was  no  cover  whatever  or  where  the  hos- 
tile Cavalry  attacked  simultaneously  from 
several  directions,  did  the  skirmishing  lines 
form  into  knots  for  defences. 

"  On  the  whole  the  Cavalry  charge  might 
be  divided  into  three  consecutive  attacks, 
of  which  the  first  apparently  fell  foul  more 
particularly  of  the  43rd  Brigade,  the  second 
of  the  troops  coming  from  Floing.  The 
wild  confusion  in  which  the  struggle  now 
surged  backwards  and  forwards  for  half  an 
hour  at  the  western  edges  and  slopes  of  the 
plateau  defies  any  faithful  description  in  de- 
tail ;  a  few  collisions  alone  stand  out  more 
conspicuously  from  the  general  picture/7 

"  French  Squadrons  broke  forward  from 
Cazal  against  the  43rd  Brigade,  and  in 
spite  of  the  effective  case  fire  directed  upon 
them,  reached  the  line  of  the  eight  guns 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.         567 

in  action  at  the  edge  of  the  heights  south 
of  Floing.  The  gunners  were  compelled 
to  defend  themselves  with  their  sponge 
staves  and  side  arms,  and  Major  V.  Uslar, 
Commanding  the  Division,  had  a  personal 
contest  with  several  troopers.  But  the  5th 
Company  94th  Regiment  under  Captain  V. 
Schnellenbiihle  succeeded  in  repulsing  the 
enemy  by  a  vigorous  fire,  the  company 
also  successfully  repulsed  an  attack  made 
by  French  Cuirassiers  on  its  rear. 

The  skirmishing  lines  of  the  43rd  Bri- 
gade and  of  the  detachments  which  had 
accompanied  them  on  the  right  wing  were 
attacked  simultaneously  by  Hussars,  cui- 
rassiers and  chasseurs  d'Afrique  and  broken 
through  in  places.  The  file  fire  of  the 
supporting  companies,  however,  scattered 
the  hostile  Cavalry  in  all  directions,  causing 
even  some  of  them  to  plunge  down  the  steep 
slope  of  the  ridge.  Two  squadrons  of  the 
1st  Cuirassiers  succeeded  in  forcing  their 
way  through  the  Prussian  Infantry  to 
Gaulier,  and  in  breaking  out  suddenly  from 


568         Cavalry  on  the  Batik-Field. 

the  northern  issue  of  the  village  on  the 
two  squadrons  of  the  13th  Hussars  posted 
in  front  of  it.  At  first  Major  V.  Griesham 
merely  launched  two  divisions  against  the 
enemy,  the  other  he  took  some  distance  in 
the  rear,  and  after  forming  up  led  them 
forward  in  echelon  from  the  right  wing, 
whilst  at  the  same  time  the  pioneer  com- 
pany posted  in  the  valley  of  the  Meuse, 
and  the  nearest  detachments  of  Infantry 
concentrated  their  fire  upon  the  French 
Cuirassiers.  These  now  bent  aside  to- 
wards Floing  ;  still  many  were  overtaken 
by  the  Hussars  and  made  prisoners,  while 
others  were  shot  down,  a  small  number, 
breaking  through  to  the  northward  reached 
the  neighbourhood  of  St.  Albert,  causing 
consternation  among  the  advancing  regi- 
mental wagons  and  a  field  hospital,  but 
their  careers  was  shortly  terminated  by  the 
Infantry  which  met  them. 

The  12th  and  parts  of  the  1st  and  2nd 
Companies,  83rd  Eegiment,  were  attacked 
by  lancers  which  rode  over  a  skirmishing 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.        569 

division  in  open  order.  The  remainder 
of  the  men  found  protection  behind  a 
hedge,  and  allowing  the  enemy  to  approach 
within  thirty  paces  received  them  with  a 
withering  volley.  The  remainder  of  the 
French  band  of  horse  careering  past  Floing 
fell  into  the  hands  of  other  advancing  de- 
tachments. 

On  the  left  wing  of  the  Prussian  Infantry 
the  Musketeer  Battalions,  46th  Regiment 
had  ascended  about  half  way  up  the  slope 
when  they  were  attacked  by  French  Lancers. 
This  attack  was,  however,  repulsed  by  the 
fire  of  the  3rd,  5th,  and  7th  Companies, 
the  8th  successfully  co-operating  from  the 
cemetery.  The  hostile  Cavalry  bending 
away  northward  threw  themselves  into 
Floing,  but  there  came  under  the  fire  of 
the  2nd  Company  5th  Rifle  Battalion,  which 
hurried  up  from  a  side  street,  and  to  which 
they,  for  the  most  part,  succumbed.  Leav- 
ing the  4th  Company  temporarily  as  reserve 
in  the  village,  this  Battalion,  mingled  with 
detachments  of  Hessian  Regiments,  and,  in 


570         Cavalry  on  the  Battle- Field. 

general,  on  the  right  of  the  46th,  then  like- 
wise scaled  the  steep  slope.  Advancing 
from  edge  to  edge,  the  rifles  had  just 
established  themselves  in  a  shelter  trench 
abandoned  by  the  enemy  on  the  upper 
border  of  the  plateau,  when  a  fresh  Cavalry 
charge  took  place.  Two  squadrons  of 
cuirassiers  mounted  on  grey  horses  first 
charged  the  5th,  3rd,  and  2nd  Companies, 
46th  Regiment,  whose  left  wing  was  espe- 
cially hard  pressed.  But  after  an  effective 
shower  of  bullets  had  also  warded  off  this 
attack,  the  repulsed  horseman  fell  under 
the  flanking  fire  of  a  body  of  stragglers 
rapidly  assembled  by  1st  Lieutenant  Bende- 
mann,  and  had  some  difficulty  in  escaping 
entire  annihilation.  Some  squadrons  of 
chasseurs  which  had  followed  on  the  left 
flank  of  the  cuirassiers,  fell  in  with  the 
three  companies  of  the  5th  Rifle  Battalion, 
the  skirmishers  of  which  they  partly  rode 
down.  The  fire,  however,  of  the  closed 
supports  compelled  the  hostile  horsemen  to 
bear  away  to  the  right  :  a  volley  from  the 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.        571 

2nd  Company,  which  had  formed  a  knot 
on  the  left  wing,  completely  dispersed  them. 
Some  French  Hussars  which  charged  the  3rd 
Kifle  Company  immediately  afterwards,  but 
were  driven  off  by  the  file  fire  of  this  and 
of  the  46th  in  support,  likewise  bending 
away  to  the  right  succeeded  in  reaching 
the  rear  of  the  other  two  Rifle  Companies. 
The  supports  and  also  the  skirmishers  of 
the  latter  on  higher  ground  at  once  faced 
about  ;  an  annihilating  fire  received  the 
Hussars,  who  now  took  refuge  in  an  hollow 
of  the  ground  in  front.  The  skirmishers 
of  the  1st  and  2nd  Rifle  Companies  had 
been  obliged  meanwhile  to  face  to  their 
original  front  in  order  to  protect  them- 
selves from  other  hostile  Cavalry  ;  they 
were,  however,  successful  in  also  com- 
pelling the  new  adversary  to  retire.  The 
attack  of  the  French  Cavalry  which  had 
been  executed  with  the  greatest  impetuosity 
and  self-sacrifice,  had  thus  come  to  a  close 
on  this  wing,  and  had  also  failed  in  a 
similar  manner  at  other  points  of  the  battle- 


572         Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

field.  At  some  places,  indeed,  their  lines 
of  skirmishers  had  been  suddenly  broken 
through  at  the  first  onset ;  but  the  fire  of 
the  supports  had  in  all  cases  destroyed  the 
force  of  the  fierce  charge.  The  subsequent 
attacks  met  with  still  greater  resistance,  as 
the  Prussian  Infantry  had  now  reached  the 
edge  of  the  plateau  in  considerable  force, 
and  found  the  means  of  ensconcing  itself 
under  cover  of  the  ground.  More  and 
more  annihilating  waxed  their  fire  against 
the  already  scattered  squadrons,  which  were 
speedily  thrown  into  complete  disorder. 
Dead  and  wounded  riders  and  horses  lay  in 
heaps  on  the  height :  many  who  survived 
the  bullet  were  precipitated  headlong  into 
the  Gaulier  quarries  and  there  found  their 
last  resting  place.  Besides  General  Mar- 
gueritte,  Generals  Girard  and  Tilliard  had 
fallen,  General  d'Salignac  Fenelon  was 
wounded,  the  regiments  which  had  taken 
part  in  the  charge  had  on  an  average  lost 
half  their  men. 

'  The  Prussian  Infantry  had  suffered  but 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.        573 

inconsiderable  loss  ;  yet  a  comparatively 
large  number  of  men,  more  especially 
riflemen,  had  been  wounded  in  single 
combat  by  the  cut  and  point  of  the  enemy's 
Cavalry.  The  remnant  of  the  latter  sought 
refuge  in  the  ravines  of  the  Bois  de  la 
Garenne." 

"  Although  success  was  denied  to  the 
attack  of  these  gallant  bands  of  horse,  and 
their  self-sacrificing  advance  could  no 
longer  avert  the  already  sealed  fate  of  the 
French  Army,  yet  the  latter  looks  back 
with  justifiable  pride  upon  the  fields  of 
Floing  and  Cazal,  where,  on  the  day  of 
Sedan,  their  Cavalry  honourably  succumbed 
to  the  victorious  adversary.77 

Now  in  this  case,  there  was  no  attempt 
at  surprise,  for  the  Cavalry  was  seen  the 
moment  they  left  the  shelter  of  the  woods 
and  every  available  gun  was  turned  on 
them. 

The  ground  was  intersected  by  banks  and 
ditches  and  was  decidedly  unfavourable  for 
Cavalry.  The  distance  to  be  crossed  was 


574         Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

at  least  1,000  yards.  The  Cavalry  them- 
selves had  already  suffered  severely,  and 
finally  the  German  were  anything  but 
demoralised.  Yet  for  half-an-hour,  it  is 
admitted,  the  course  of  the  struggle  "  defied 
description,"  that  no  advantage  of  this  half 
hour's  grace  was  taken  by  the  rest  of  the 
Army  was  no  fault  of  the  Cavalry.  But 
had  this  charge  been  made  to  form  the 
screen  for  an  organised  attempt  to  break 
out,  and  had  the  attempt  succeeded,  the 
Cavalry  attack  could  hardly  have  been 
spoken  of  disparagingly  as  a  failure,  but 
would  rather  have  gone  down  to  posterity 
as  one  of  the  finest  examples  of  its  employ- 
ment in  history. 

This  finishes  the  list  of  charges  delivered 
during  the  Franco-German  war. 

Taking  the  nett  results  obtained  by  the 
Prussian  Cavalry,  we  find  that  in  spite  of 
the  increase  of  range  and  rapidity  of  fire  of 
the  new  arm,  Cavalry  can  still  manoeuvre 
under  their  fire,  when  held  by  troops  at 
least  as  steady  and  well  drilled  as  any  of 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle- Field.        575 

the  Latin  races  are  likely  to  put  in  the 
field,  and  by  proper  choice  of  ground  and 
opportunity  can  ride  them  down  with 
comparatively  trifling  loss.  Even  when 
these  troops  are  good  enough  to  render  an 
attack  by  Infantry  difficult,  if  not  impos- 
sible. 

There  was  no  perceptible  difference  in 
composition  between  Gremier's  Division 
which  defeated  the  38th  Brigade,  and  the 
troops  of  Canrobert  Corps  which  went 
down  before  Bredow,  but  the  latter  suc- 
ceeded with  a  loss  of  450  horses  about  in 
reaching  and  breaking  the  French  lines  ; 
the  former  failed  with  a  loss  of  over 
3,000.  Yet  though  the  former  has  been 
christened  "  Todten  Rott  "  Cheveauchade 
de  mort  "  death  ride/7  etc.,  no  such  epithet 
has  been  applied  to  the  latter. 

If  the  nature  of  the  ground  over  which 
Von  Wedell's  (38th)  Brigade  attacked  is 
urged  in  defence  of  their  failure,  we  will 
instead  compare  Bredow's  success  with  the 
failure  of  the  Guard  Corps,  unquestionably 


576         Cavalry  on  the  Battle- Field. 

the  finest  Infantry  on  the  continent,  against 
the  same  corps  (Canroberts)  two  days  later 
at  St.  Privat.  This  attack  was  beaten  off 
by  Infantry  fire  alone,  the  Artillery  had 
run  out  of  ammunition  (vide  General  H. 
Brackenburg's  account  in  Les  Mareschaux 
de  France  given  as  a  note  to  page  112  in  the 
Wellington  Prize  Essay),  and  was  made 
over  the  same  glacis  like  ground  that 
Bredow  galloped  over. 

As  for  the  French  charges,  they  were 
doomed  to  failure  from  the  first,  owing 
chiefly  to  the  difficulties  of  the  ground 
which  they  encountered  and  to  their 
omission  to  reconnoitre  it  previously,  their 
Cavalry  were  inferior  in  mounting,  horse- 
manship, and  discipline,  and  the  foe  they 
attacked,  proved  themselves  under  perfect 
control,  reserving  their  fire  for  short  ranges, 
whilst  so  far  from  being  demoralised,  they 
were  invariably  in  full  career  of  victory, 
when  the  attacks  fell  on  them. 

Now,  even  in  the  palmiest  days  of  Cavalry, 
it  has  never  been  maintained  that  such 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.        577 

Infantry  could  be  attacked  with  certainty 
of  success  under  such  conditions. 

Theories  based  on  practice  ground  condi- 
tions are  not,  as  a  rule,  of  much  value  in 
war,  but  here  the  result  of  theory  agrees 
so  closely  with  practice  that  we  venture  to 
give  one. 

Coeteris  paribus  the  number  of  hits  on  a 
target  will  depend,  1st,  on  its  size ;  2nd,  on 
length  of  time  during  which  it  is  exposed 
to  tire. 

Now,  in  the  Infantry  attack,  the  foot 
soldier  will  be  lying  down  or  kneeling 
during  at  least  one  half  the  time  of  its 
duration,  therefore  we  can  take  the  mean 
height  of  the  target  he  exposes  at  half  a 
man's  height. 

The  horseman,  erect  in  his  saddle  the 
whole  time,  exposes  approximately  three 
times  the  surface  (actually  considerably  less, 
for  the  legs  of  a  horse  do  not  present  much 
surface  and  might  practically  be  neglected). 

The  mean  density  of  the  Infantry,  even 
according  to  our  own  drill  book,  commenc- 
*•>  *•  37 


578         Cavalry  on  the  Battle- Field. 

ing  with  an  extension  of  one  file  to  every 
four  paces  and  finishing  with  a  double  line, 
gives  at  least  a  man  to  the  pace,  and  in  the 
Prussian  attack  where  the  final  rush  is  often 
made  6  to  10  men  deep,  it  is  much  greater. 

But  if  Cavalry  attack  Infantry  armed 
with  the  breech-loader,  the  same  reasoning 
which  has  compelled  the  latter  to  adopt 
extended  order,  is  applicable  to  the  former, 
and  hence  they  should  attack  at  open  files 
(say  1  horse  length  interval)  in  successive 
lines. 

Hence,  whereas  the  height  of  the  Cavalry 
target,  compared  with  the  Infantry  target, 
is  as  3  to  1,  its  density  is  only  as  about 
1  to  4,  or,  in  other  words,  the  Infantry  offer 
a  larger  mark  in  the  proportion  of  4  to  3. 

Now,  taking  the  Prussian  Infantry  attack 
as  the  fastest  at  present  in  use,  at  least 
16  minutes  are  required  to  traverse  the 
800  yards,  from  which  distance  the  attack 
proper  may  be  said  to  commence  (allowing 
sufficient  time  for  the  firing  1  minute  at  each 
of  5  halts  and  5  minutes  at  decisive  range). 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle- Field.        579 

But  Cavalry  cover  the  same  distance 
in  less  than  two  minutes,  for  they  would 
certainly  travel  faster  than  15  miles  an 
hour. 

Hence  the  time  of  exposure  is  only  ^th 
of  that  of  Infantry,  so  that  combining  the 
two,  we  find  that  in  attacking  over 
800  yards  of  open,  Infantry  would  receive 
rather  more  than  10  times  as  many  hits  as 
Cavalry. 

That  is  to  say,  supposing  the  ground 
equally  suitable  for  both  arms,  Cavalry 
would  attain  the  same  temporary  result  for 
300  horses  and  men  hit,  as  Infantry  would 
with  a  loss  of  over  3,000;  and  the  permanent 
retention  of  the  advantage  gained  would, 
in  both  cases,  depend  on  the  support  of 
Artillery,  and  reserves,  only  in  the  case  of 
the  Cavalry,  the  support  would  have  to  be 
brought  up  with  greater  promptitude. 

But  there  are  yet  three  factors  with 
which  we  have  to  reckon  :  1st. — The  moral 
effect  of  the  advancing  horseman  on  the 
defenders  which  will  vary  with  the  quality 


580         Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

and  discipline  of  his  troops  and  the  diffi- 
culty of  adjusting  the  sights  to  the  rapidity 
varying  ranges  and  of  restraining  the  fire 
which  may  all  be  included  under  the  head 
of  moral  effect. 

2ndly. — It  takes  more  bullets  to  put  a 
man  on  horseback  out  of  action  than  a 
man  on  foot.  A  man  may  be  most  severely 
hit  and  yet  retain  strength  enough  to  stick 
in  his  saddle  for  the  last  100  yards;  whereas, 
a  man  on  foot  with  a  broken  leg  or  a  bullet 
through  his  lungs  must  drop  ;  the  tenacity 
of  life  in  the  horse  is  well  known,  and  we 
do  not  believe  that  any  Military  Rifle 
in  Europe  (excluding  the  Snider)  will  stop 
a  horse  at  full  gallop  under  a  couple  of 
hundred  yards,  unless  the  bone  of  the  legs 
is  broken  or  the  heart  or  brain  pierced. 

And,  thirdly,  the  moral  effect  on  the 
Cavalry  themselves  of  their  rapid  motion. 

Horses  indeed  may  be  tired  and  done, 
though  they  are  fully  as  susceptible  of 
excitement  as  human  beings,  but  the  man 
on  his  back  will  be  barely  conscious  of  it, 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.        581 

whereas  no  matter  how  wild  for  blood  a 
foot-soldier  may  be,  the  exhaustion  of  his 
physical  power  caused  by  a  long  and  trying 
inarch  must  tell ;  and  in  addition  under  the 
same  head  we  must  include  the  discipline 
of  the  horse  itself,  Discipline  may  be 
defined  as  the  tyranny  of  habit,  which 
makes  it  easier  for  a  terrified  man  to  do 
that  which  he  does  not  want  to  do  than  to 
make  up  his  mind  to  break  through  the 
bonds  of  teaching  and  runaway,  and  in  this 
sense  horses  are  more  susceptible  to  disci- 
pline than  conscript  soldiers,  riderless  horses 
almost  invariably  stick  to  their  squadrons 
and  for  the  purpose  of  aiding  the  first 
stock,  it  is  almost  immaterial  whether  they 
have  a  man  on  them  or  not. 

The  limit  of  800  yards  is  not  an  arbitrary 
one  ;  but  is  approximately  the  limit  at  which 
.the  preparatory  fire  fight  changes  into  the 
definite  advance  to  the  attack. 

The  choice  of  this  limit  is  indeed  un- 
favourable to  the  Cavalry,  for  no  con- 
sideration is  taken  of  the  losses  which  the 


582         Cavalry  on  the  Battle- Field. 

Infantry  must  necessarily  suffer  in  working 
up  to  that  distance  and  remaining  there, 
often  for  hours,  while  the  Artillery  prepare 
the  attack  and  the  masses  of  Infantry  on 
whom  the  actual  assault  devolves  are  being 
collected.  Whereas,  even  if  the  ground 
is  most  unfavourable  and  no  cover  from 
sight  offers  itself,  the  Cavalry  may  often 
approach  comparatively  unharmed  to  the 
enemies'  line,  under  cover  of  the  smoke  and 
confusion  of  the  fight. 

It  is  all  very  well  for  umpires  having 
nothing  else  to  do  but  to  look  out,  to  take 
notice  of  such  an  approach  in  peace  time, 
but  the  assumption  that  this  approach 
would  have  been  noticed  in  actual  war  by 
the  troops  threatened  is  not  well  founded. 
Even  if  a  special  officer  is  told  off  in  each 
Battalion,  merely  to  watch  the  course  of 
the  action  and  report  it,  every  one's  atten- 
tion is  so  necessarily  concentrated,  on  that 
particular  portion  of  the  enemy,  which  at 
that  moment  appears  to  be  injuring  him 
most,  that  it  would  only  be  with  the 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle- Field.        583 

greatest  difficulty  that  the  men  could  be 
brought  to  fire  in  the  direction  indicated 
by  the  look-out  officer. 

But  even  when  the  Cavalry  are  unfor- 
tunate enough  to  be  seen  at  the  very  com- 
mencement of  their  advance,  say,  at  2,000 
yards,  they  have  still  their  rapidity  of 
movement  to  rely  on,  and  probably  most 
experienced  Cavalry  officers  would  prefer 
that  the  Infantry  should  open  on  them  at 
that  extreme  range,  relying  on  the  almost 
moral  certainty,  that  the  latter  would  for- 
get to  put  their  sights  down,  as  the  range 
decreased. 

The  conclusion  we  would  draw  from  the 
whole  of  the  above,  is  by  no  means  that 
Cavalry  will  under  all  and  every  circum- 
stances ride  down  Infantry ;  on  the  con- 
trary, we  believe  fully  in  the  axiom  laid 
down  in  the  German  Infantry  drill  book 
that  steady  Infantry,  as  long  as  it  preserves 
its  discipline  and  controls  its  fire  is  un- 
approachable in  front  ;  but  we  maintain 
that  in  the  armies  either  we  or  the  Germans 


584        Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field. 

are  likely  to  have  to  deal  with  ;  such  In- 
fantry will  rarely  be  met  with,  and  then 
only  at  the  commencement  of  the  action. 

Breech-loaders  have  introduced  a  new 
factor  to  the  battle-field,  and  that  is  "  noise  " 
and  the  excitement  resulting  therefrom 
which  will  have  to  be  reckoned  with  in 
future. 

The  precise  degree  to  which  troops  will 
be  affected  by  it  will  depend  to  a  large  ex- 
tent, if  not  entirely,  on  national  tempera- 
ment. 

The  introduction  of  the  breech-loader 
sounded  the  death  knell  of  the  Latin  Races, 
and  we  are  inclined  to  believe  it  will  be 
equally  disadvantageous  to  all  semi-civilized 
races  including  the  hordes  of  Russians,  we 
may  some  day  have  to  meet. 

Wherever  the  attack  has  been  properly 
prepared  and  the  nature  of  the  ground 
permits,  both  of  the  covered  approach  of 
Cavalry  to  the  enemies'  position  and  the 
delivery  of  the  charge,  we  believe  that  the 
actual  shock  which  should  drive  the  ene- 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.        585 

mies'  Infantry  out  of  his  position  (unless 
he  is  heavily  entrenched)  can  be  delivered 
by  Cavalry  with  less  loss  than  by  Infantry, 
but  its  rapid  support  by  Artillery  followed 
up  by  foot  soldiers  will  be  essential  to 
hold  the  ground  then  won. 

These  conditions  will  not,  indeed  cannot, 
occur  so  frequently,  as  to  rob  the  Infantry 
of  their  share  in  the  decision,  but  when 
they  do  occur,  they  may  be  confidently 
seized. 

The  attacks  should  be  carried  out  by 
advance  of  the  Cavalry  round  the  flanks, 
riot  through  the  lines  of  the  Infantry,  for 
as  pointed  out  by  Prince  Hohenlohe,  the 
cessation  of  the  Infantry  fire  even  for  a 
few  moments  is  such  a  relief  to  the  nerves 
of  the  defender,  that  it  immediately  as  it 
were,  steadies  him  afresh. 

This  alone,  will  reduce  the  numbers  of 
such  opportunities,  for,  on  a  crowded  battle- 
field, it  will  be  hard  to  find  room  for  the 
advance  of  any  body  larger  than  a  squad- 
ron, except  round  the  outer  flanks  of  the 


586         Cavalry  on  the  Battle- Field. 

whole  army,  in  which  case  we  may  expect 
it  to  be  met  by  a  corresponding  movement 
on  the  part  of  the  enemies'  squadrons. 

Space  prevents  further  investigation  of 
the  actual  employment  of  the  arm  on  the 
battle-field  in  detail  ;  but  in  conclusion  we 
would  ask,  whether  any  Cavalry  man  can 
ask  for  a  better  opportunity  for  his  arm, 
than  that  presented,  by  the  flank  of  the 
attack  in  its  last  stage,  when  supports  and 
reserves;  have  long  been  absorbed  into  one 
dense  line,  when  the  attention  of  all  is 
rivetted  on  the  enemy  in  front,  the  firing 
has  reached  its  maximum  degree  of  inten- 
sity, and  neither  voice  nor  signal  can  make 
itself  heard  or  seen.  Is  it  conceivable  that 
at  such  a  moment  the  few  who  may  have 
become  aware  of  the  approach  of  the  ene- 
mies' horse,  can  make  their  influence  felt 
sufficiently,  in  the  heterogeneous  mass 
of  different  regiments,  brigades  and  divi- 
sions under  them,  to  turn  their  attention 
on  the  new  assailant  ?  We  believe  not, 
and  the  Cavalry  which  first  learns  to 


Cavalry  on  the  Battle-Field.        587 

seize  such  opportunities,  will  go  far  to 
re-establishing  the  balance  between  quality 
and  numbers  and  will  demonstrate  the 
truth  of  our  opening  sentence,  that,  "  the 
efficiency  of  an  army  varies  with  the  pro- 
duct not  the  sum  of  the  efficiencies  of  the 
three  arms/7 


The  In  vasion 
and  Defence 

OF  ENGLAND. 

By  Capt  F.  N.  Maude. 


Crown   Octavo.    Rupees  1*8. 


THACKER,    SPINK    AND    CO., 

5    &    6,    Government    Place, 
CALCUTTA. 


THACKER,  8PINK  &  CO/8  PUBLICATIONS. 


Modern  Hinduism  :  being  an  Account  of  the 

Religion  and  Life  of  the  Hindus  in  Northern  India.  By 
W.  J.  WILKINS,  of  the  London  Missionary  Society, 
Author  of  "Hindu  Mythology,  Vedic  and  Puranic." 
Demy  8vo.  Rs.  8. 

Hindu  Mythology,  Vedic  and  Puranic.  By 
W.  J.  WILKINS,  of  the  London  Missionary  Society,  Cal- 
cutta. Profusely  illustrated.  Imperial  i6mo.  Cloth  gilt, 
elegant,  Rs.  7. 

The  Hindoos  as  they  are  ;  a  Description  of 

the  Manners,  Customs,  and  Inner  Life  of  Hindoo  Society, 
Bengal.  By  SHIB  CHUNDER  BOSE.  Second  Edition, 
Revised.  Crown  8vo.  Cloth.  Rs.  5. 

Landholding  and  the  Relation  of  Land- 
lord and  Tenant  in  Various  Countries  of  the  World.  By 
C.  D.  FIELD,  M.A.,  LL.D.  Second  Edition.  8vo. 
Cloth.  Rs.  16. 

Echoes  from  Old  Calcutta:    being  chiefly 

Reminiscences  of  the  Days  of  Warren  Hastings,  Francis, 
and  Impey,  By  H.  E.  BUSTEED. 

Ancient  India  as  described  by  Ptolemy. 

With  Introduction,  Commentary,  Map  of  India.  By 
J.  W.  MCCRINDLE,  M.  A,  8vo.  Cloth,  lettered. 
Rs.  4-4. 


THACKEB,  SPINK  AND  CO.,  CALCUTTA. 


TRACKER,  SPINK  &  CO.'S  PUBLICATIONS, 


Ancient  India  as  described  by  Megas- 

thenes  and  Arrian.  With  Introduction,  Notes,  and  a  Map 
of  Ancient  India.  By  J.  W.  McCRiNDLE,  M.A.  8vo. 
Rs.  2-8. 

The  Commerce  and  Navigation  of  the 

Erythraean  Sea  ;  Periplus  Maris  Erythrsei  and  of  Arrian's 
Account  of  the  Voyage  of  Nearkhos.  With  Introduction, 
Commentary,  Notes,  and  Index.  By  J.  W.  McCRiNDLE, 
M.A.  8vo.  Rs,  3. 

Ancient  India  as  described  by  Ktesias 

the  Knidian ;  being  a  Translation  of  the  Abridgment 
of  his  *  Indika,'  by  Photios.  With  Introduction, 
Notes,  and  Index.  By  J.  W.  McCRiNDLE,  M.  A. 
8vo.  Rs.  3. 

Book  of  Indian  Eras,  with  Tables  for  calculat- 
ing Indian  Dates.  By  ALEXANDER  CUNNINGHAM,  C.  S.  I. , 
C.I.E.,  Major-General,  Royal  Engineers.  Royal  8vo. 
Cloth.  Rs.  12. 

Our  Administration  of  India  :  being  a  com- 
plete Account  of  the  Revenue  and  Collectorate  Administra- 
tion in  all  Departments,  with  special  reference  to  the 
Work  and  Duties  of  a  District  Officer  in  Bengal.  By 
H.  A.  D.  PHILLIPS.  Rs.  4-4. 

The  Trial  of  Maharaja  Nanda  Kumar : 

A  Narrative  of  a  Judicial  Murder.  By  H.  BEVERIDGE, 
Bengal  Civil  Service.  Demy  8vo.  Rs.  10. 


THACKEE,  SPINK  AND  CO.,  CALCUTTA. 


THACKER,  SPINK  &  GO/8  PUBLICATIONS, 


Tales   from   Indian    History:    being    the 

Annals  of  India  retold  in  Narratives.  By  J.  TALBOYS 
WHEELER.  Crown  8vo.  Cloth,  gilt.  Rs.  3-4. 

Kashgaria  (Eastern  or  Chinese  Turkes- 
tan), Historical,  Geographical,  Military,  and  Industrial. 
By  Col.  KUROPATKIN,  Russian  Army.  Translated  by 
Major  GOWAN,  H.  M.'s  Indian  Army.  8vo.  Rs.  6-8. 
(los.  6d.) 

Mandalay   to   Momien  :  a  Narrative  of  the 

Two  Expeditions  to  Western  China  of  1868  and  1875, 
under  Cols.  E.  B.  Sladen  and  H.  Browne.  Three  Maps, 
numerous  Views  and  Woodcuts.  By  JOHN  ANDERSON, 
M.D.  Thick  demy  8vo.  Cloth.  Rs.  5. 

Myam-Ma :  the  Home  of  the  Burman. 

By  TSAYA  (Rev.  H.  POWELL).     Crown  8vo.     Rs.  2. 

A  Critical  Exposition   of  the  Popular 

"Jihad,"  showing  that  all  the  Wars  of  Mahammad 
were  defensive,  and  that  Aggressive  War  or  compulsory 
Conversion  is  not  allowed  in  the  Koran,  &c.  By 
Moulavi  CHERAGH  ALI,  Author  of  "  Reforms  under 
Moslem  Rule,"  "Hyderabad  under  Sir  Salar  Jung." 
Svo.  Rs.  6. 


THACKEE,     SPINK     AND     CO., 

5  &  6,   Government  Place, 
CALCUTTA. 


1888. 


SELECTED   LIST 


OP 


llustrated  and  General  Publications 


THACKER,  SPINK  &  CO.,   CALCUTTA. 


7.  THACKER  &  CO.,  87,  NEWGATE  ST.,  LONDON. 


TI tacker,  Spink  If  Co.,  Calcutta. 


The  Tribes  on  My  Frontier:  an  Indian  Naturalist's 
Foreign  Policy.  By  EHA.  With  50  Illustrations  by 
F.  C.  MACRAE.  In  Imperial  16mo.  Uniform  with  "Lays 
of  Ind,"  "Biding,"  "Hindu  Mythology,"  &c.  Third 
Edition,  Ks.  5-8  (8s.  6d.) 

This  remarkably  clever  work  most  graphically  and  humorously 
describes  the  surroundings  of  a  country  bungalow.  The  twenty 
chapters  embrace  a  year's  experiences,  and  provide  endless 
sources  of  amusement  and  suggestion.  The  numerous  able  illus- 
trations add  very  greatly  to  the  interest  of  the  volume,  which 
will  find  a  place  on  every  table. 

XL— The     Butterfly :      Contem- 


i. — A  Durbar. 
IL— The  Eats, 
in. — The  Mosquitos. 
iv. — The  Lizards, 
v.— The  Ants. 
VL— The  Crows. 
VIL— The  Bats. 
Tin. — Bees,   Wa^ps,  et   hoc    genus 

omne. 

IX. — The  Spiders, 
x.— The      Butterfly  :       Hunting 
Him. 


plating  Him. 
XIL— The  Frogs. 
XIIL— The  Bugs. 
xiv.— The  Birds  of  the  Garden, 
xv.— The   Birds   at    the    Mango 

Tope. 

xvi.— The  Birds  at  the  Tank, 
xvn. — The  Poultry  Yard, 
xvm. — The  White  Ants. 
xix. — The  Hypodermatikosyringo- 

phoroi. 
xx. — Etcetera. 

"  It  is  a  very  clever  record  of  a  year's  observations  round  the  bungalow 

in  '  Dustypore.'     .     .     .     .     It  is  by  no  means  a  mere  travesty 

The  writer  is  always  amusing,  and  never  dull." — Field. 

"  The  book  is  cleverly  illustrated  by  Mr.  F.  C.  Macrae.  We  have  only 
to  thank  our  Anglo-Indian  naturalist  for  the  delightful  book  which  he  has 
sent  home  to  his  countrymen  in  Britain.  May  he  live  to  give  us  another 
such." — Chambers'  Journal. 

"A  most  charming  series  of  sprightly  and  entertaining  essays  on  what 

may  be  termed  the  fauna  of  the  Indian  bungalow We  have 

no  doubt  that  this  amusing  book  will  find  its  way  into  every  Anglo-Indian's 
library." — Allen's  Indian  Mail. 

"  This  is  a  delightful  book,  irresistibly  .funny  in  description  and  illustra- 
tion, but  full  of  genuine  science  too There  is  not  a  dull  or 

uninstructive  page  in  the  whole  book." — Knowledge. 

"It  is  a  pleasantly-written  book  about  the  insects  and  other  torments  oi 
India  which  make  Anglo-Indian  life  unpleasant,  and  which  can  be  read 
with  pleasure  even  by  those  beyond  the  reach  of  the  tormenting  thicgs 
*  Eha '  describes." — Graphic. 

"  The  volume  is  full  of  accurate  and  unfamiliar  observation,  and  the 
illustrations  prove  to  be  by  no  means  without  their  value." — Saturday 
Review. 


W.  ThacJcer  fy  Co.,  London.  iii 

A  Natural  History  of  the  Mammalia  of  India, 

Burniah  and  Ceylon.  By  E.  A.  STERNDALE,  F.R.Q.S., 
F.Z.S.,  &c.,  Author  of  "Seonee,"  "The  Denizens  of  the 
Jungle,"  "The  Afghan  Knife,"  &c.  With  170  Illustrations 
by  the  Author  and  Others.  In  Imperial  16mo.  Uniform 
with  "  Riding/'  "  Hindu  Mythology,"  and  "  Indian  Ferns." 
Rs,  10.  (12s.  6d.) 

"It  is  the  very  model  of  what  a  popular  natural  history  should  be." 
— Knowledge. 

"An  amusing  work  with  good  illustrations." — Nature. 
"  Full  of  accurate  observation,  brightly  told." — Saturday  Review. 
41  The  results  of  a  close  and  sympathetic  observation." — At/ienceum. 
"  It  has  the  brevity  which  is  the  soul  of  wit,  and  a  delicacy  of  allusion 
which  charms  the  literary  critic." — Academy. 

"  The  notices  of  each  animal  are,  as  a  rule,  short,  though  on  some  of  the 
larger  mammals — the  lion,  tiger,  pard,  boar,  &c. — ample  and  interesting 
details  are  given,  including  occasional  anecdotes  of  adventure.  The  book 
will,  no  doubt,  be  specially  useful  to  the  sportsman,  and,  indeed,  has  been 
extended  so  as  to  include  all  territories  likeiy  to  be  reached  by  the  sports- 
man from  India.  .  .  .  Those  who  desire  to  obtain  some  general  infor- 
mation, popularly  conveyed,  on  the  subject  with  which  the  book  deals,  will, 
we  believe,  find  it  useful." — The  Times. 

"  Has  contrived  to  hit  a  happy  mean  between  the  stiff  scientific  treatise 
and  the  bosh  of  what  may  be  called  anecdotal  zoology." — The  Daily  News. 

Handbook  to  the  Ferns  of  India,  Ceylon,  and 

the  Malay  Peninsula.  By  Colonel  R.  H.  BEDDOME,  Author 
of  the  "  Ferns  of  British  India/'  "  The  Ferns  of  Southern 
India."  Three  hundred  Illustrations  by  the  Author. 
Uniform  with  "Lays  of  Ind,"  "Hindu  Mythology," 
"Riding,"  "Natural  History  of  the  Mammalia  of  India," 
&c.  Imperial  16mo.  Rs.  10.  (12s.  6d.) 

"  The  great  amount  of  care  observed  in  its  compilation  makes  it  a  most 
valuable  work  of  reference,  especially  to  non  scientific  readers  ;  for,  in  pre- 
paring it,  as  many  of  the  technicalities  as  could  be  safely  dispensed  with  are 
Jeft  aside A  magnificent  volume  of  nearly  500  pages,  illus- 
trated with  300  admirable  woodcuts." — Garden. 

"  It  is  the  first  special  book  of  portable  size  and  moderate  price  which 
has  been  devoted  to  Indian  Ferns,  and  is  in  every  way  deserving  of  the  ex- 
tensive circulation  it  is  sure  to  obtain." — Nature. 

"  Will  prove  vabtly  interesting,  not  only  to  the  Indian  people,  but  to  the 
botanists  of  this  couatry." — Indian  Dally  News. 

"  This  is  a  good  book,  being  of  a  useful  and  trustworthy  character.  The 
species  are  familiarly  described,  and  most  of  them  illustrated  by  small 
figures." — Gardeners*  Chronicle. 

"  Those  interested  in  botany  will  do  well  to  procure  a  new  work  on  the 
*  Ferns  of  British  India.'  The  work  will  prove  a  first-class  text-book." — 
Free  Press. 


iv  Thacker,  Spink  fy  Co.,  Calcutta. 

Lays  of  Ind.  By  ALIPH  CHEEM.  Comic,  Satirical,  and 
Descriptive  Poems  illustrative  of  Anglo-Indian  Life. 
Seventh  Edition.  Enlarged.  With  70  Illustrations. 
Cloth  elegant,  gilt  edges.  Ks.  7  (10s.  6d.) 

"  Aliph  Cheem  presents  us  in  this  volume  with  some  highly  amusing 
ballads  and  songs,  which  have  already  ia  a  former  edition  warmed  the 
hearts  and  cheered  the  lonely  hours  of  many  an  Anglo-Indian,  the  pictures 
being  chiefly  those  of  Indian  life.  There  is  no  mistaking  the  humour,  and 
at  times,  indeed,  the  fun  is  both  '  fast  and  furious.'  One  can  readily 
imagine  the  merriment  created  round  the  camp  fire  by  the  recitation  of 
*  The  Two  Thumpers,'  which  is  irresistibly  droll.  .  .  .  The  edition 
before  us  is  enlarged,  and  contains  illustrations  by  the  author,  in  addition 
to  which  it  is  beautifully  printed  and  handsomely  got  up,  all  which  recom- 
mendations are  sure  to  make  the  name  of  Aliph  Cheem  more  popular  in 
India  than  ever." — Liverpool  Mercury. 

"The  'Lays'  are  not  only  Anglo-Indian  in  origin,  but  out-and-out 
Anglo-Indian  in  subject  and  colour.  To  one  who  knows  something  of 
life  at  an  Indian  '  station '  they  will  be  especially  amusing.  Their 
exuberant  fun  at  the  same  time  may  well  attract  the  attention  of  the  ill- 
defined  individual  known  as  the  'general  reader.'  " — Scotsman. 

"  This  is  a  remarkably  bright  little  book.  '  Aliph  Cheem,  supposed  to 
be  the  nom  de  plume  of  an  officer  in  the  18th  Hussars,  is,  after  his 
fashion,  an  Indian  Bon  Gaultier.  In  a  few  of  the  poems  the  jokes, 
turning  on  local  names  and  customs,  are  somewhat  esoteric  ;  but  taken 
throughout,  the  verses  are  characterised  by  high  animal  spirits,  great 
cleverness,  and  most  excellent  fooling." — World. 

"  To  many  Anglo-Indians  the  lively  verses  of  '  Aliph  Cheein  '  must  be 
very  well  known  ;  while  to  those  who  have  not  yet  become  acquainted 
with  them  we  can  only  say,  read  them  on  the  first  opportunity.  To  those 
not  familiar  with  Indian  life  they  may  be  specially  commended  for  the 
picture  which  they  give  of  many  of  its  lighter  incidents  and  conditions, 
r»nd  of  several  of  its  ordinary  personages." — Bath  Chronicle. 

"  Satire  of  the  most  amusing  and  inoffensive  kind,  humour  the  most 
genuine,  and  pathos  the  most  touching  pervade  these  'Lays  of  Ind.' 
.  .  From  Indian  friends  we  have  heard  of  the  popularity  these 
'Lays'  have  obtained  in  the  land  where  they  were  written,  and  we 
predict  for  them  a  popularity  equally  great  at  home." — Monthly  Homoeo- 
pathic Review. 

"  Former  editions  of  this  entertaining  book  having  been  received  with 
great  favour  by  the  public  and  by  the  press,  a  new  edition  has  been  issued 
in  elegant  type  and  binding.  The  Author,  although  assuming  a  nom  de 
plume,  is  recognised  as  a  distinguished  cavalry  officer,  possessed  of  a  vivid 
imagination  and  a  sense  of  humour  amounting  sometimes  to  rollicking  and 
contagious  fun." — Capital  and  Labour. 


W.  Thacker  &  Co.,  London. 


Riding  :  On  the  Flat  and  Across  Country.  A  Guide 
to  Practical  Horsemanship.  By  Capt.  M.  H.  HAYES. 
Illustrated  by  Sturgess.  Second  Edition.  Revised  and 
Enlarged.  Imperial  16mo.  Bs.  7  (10s.  6d.) 

"  The  book  is  one  that  no  man  who  has  ever  sat  in  a  saddle  can  fail  to 
read  with  interest." — Illustrated  Sporting  and  Dramatic  News. 

"  An  excellent  book  on  riding." — Truth. 

"Mr.  Hayes  has  supplemented  his  own  experience  on  race-riding  by 
resorting  to  Tom  Cannon,  Fordham,  and  other  well-known  jockeys  for 
illustration.  '  The  Guide '  is,  on  the  whole,  thoroughly  reliable  ;  and  both 
the  illustrations  and  the  printing  do  credit  to  the  publishers." — Field. 

11  It  has,  however,  been  reserved  for  Captain  Hayes  to  write  what  in  our 
opinion  will  be  generally  accepted  as  the  most  comprehensive,  enlightened, 
and  *  all  round  '  work  on  riding,  bringing  to  bear  as  he  does  not  only  his 
own  great  experience,  but  the  advice  and  practice  of  many  of  the  best 
recognised  horsemen  of  the  period." — Sporting  Life. 

"  Captain  Hayes  is  not  only  a  master  of  his  subject,  but  he  knows 
how  to  aid  others  in  gaining  such  a  mastery  as  may  be  obtained  by  the 
study  of  a  book." — The  Standard. 

Riding  for  Ladies,  'with  Hints   on  the  Stable. 

A  Lady's  Horse  Book.  By  Mrs.  POWER  ODoNOGHUE, 
Author  of  "  A  Beggar  on  Horseback,"  "  Ladies  on  Horse- 
back," "  Unfairly  Won,"  &c.  With  91  Illustrations,  by 
A.  CHANTREY  CORBOULD,  and  portrait  of  the  Author. 
Elegantly  printed  and  bound.  Imperial  16mo.  Rs.  10. 
(12s.  6d.) 


xin. — A  Lesson  in  Leaping. 

xiv. — Managing  Refusers, 
xv. — Falling. 

xvi. — Hunting  Outfit  Considered. 

xvn. — Economy  in  Riding  Dress, 
xvin. — Hacks  and  Hunters. 

xix. — In  the  Hunting  Field. 

xx. — Shoeing,     xxi. — Feeding. 
XXIL— Stabling,  xxin. — Doctoring 
xxiv.— Breeding.       xxv.— "  Tips." 


I.— Ought  Children  to  Ride  ? 

II. — "  For  Mothers  and  Children." 
in. — First  Hints  to  a  Learner, 
iv. — Selecting  a  Mount. 

v.,  VI. — The  Lady's  Dress. 
VII. — Bitting,     vin. — Saddling. 
ix. — Sit,  Walk,  Canter,  and  Trot. 

x. — Reins,  Voice,  and  Whip. 
XL — Riding  on  the  Road. 
XII. — Paces,  Vices,  and  Faults. 

"Mrs.  Power  O'Donoghue  (more  power  to  her — not  that  she  wants  it) 
shows  no  sign  of  'falling  off.'  Indeed,  she  shows  her  readers  how  to 
become  riders,  and  to  stick  on  gracefully.  She  sketches  her  pupils  'in 
their  habits  as  they  ride, '  and  gives  them  a  bit  of  her  mind  about  bits,  and 
tells  them  about  spurs  on  the  spur  of  a  moment." — Punch. 

"Mrs.  O'Donoghue  is -great  on  the  subject  of  a  lady's  riding  dress,  and 
lays  down  some  useful  information  which  should  not  be  forgotten.  .  .  . 
From  fii  st  to  last  she  never  errs  on  the  side  of  anything  approaching  to 
bad  taste,  which  is  more  than  can  be  said  for  some  equestriennes." — Field. 

"  It  is  characteristic  of  her  book,  as  of  all  books  of  any  value,  that  it  has 
a  distinctive  character.  Sound  common  sense,  and  a  thoroughly  practical 
way  of  communicating  instruction,  are  its  leading  traits." — Daily  News. 


vi  Thacker,  Spink  $  Co.,  Calcutta. 

Splendidly  Illustrated  book  of  Sport.     In  Demy  4to ;  Rs.  25  ;  elegantly 
bound.     (£2  2s.) 

Large  Game  Shooting  in  Thibet,  the  Hima- 
layas, and  Northern  India.  By  Colonel  ALEXANDER  A.  KIN- 
LOCH.  Containing  descriptions  of  the  country  and  of  the 
various  animals  to  be  found  ;  together  with  extracts  from  a 
journal  of  several  years'  standing.  With  thirty  illustrations 
and  map  of  the  district. 

"An  attractive  volume,  full  of  sporting  adventures  in  the  valleys  and 
forest  hills  extending  along  the  foot  of  the  Himalayas.  Its  pages  are  also 
interesting  for  the  graphic  description  they  give  of  the  beasts  of  the  field, 
the  cunning  instinct  which  they  show  in  guarding  their  safety,  the  places 
which  they  choose  for  their  lair,  and  the  way  in  which  they  show  their 
anger  when  at  bay,  Colonel  Kinloch  writes  on  all  these  subjects  in  a 
genuine  and  straightforward  style  aiming  at  giving  a  complete  description 
of  the  habits  and  movements  of  the  game." — British  Mail. 

11  If  Carlyle  had  ever  condescended  to  notice  sport  and  sportsmen  he  might 
probably  have  invented  some  curious  and  expressive  phrase  for  the  author 
of  this  book.  It  is  the  work  of  a  genuine  shikari  .  .  .  The  heads  have 
been  admirably  reproduced  by  the  photograph.  The  spiral  or  curved  horns, 
the  silky  hair,  the  fierce  glance,  the  massive  jaws,  the  thick  neck  of  deer, 
antelope,  yak  or  bison,  are  realistic  and  superior  to  anything  that  we  can 
remember  in  any  bookshelf  full  of  Indian  sport." — Saturday  Review. 

"The  splendidly  illustrated  record  of  sport.  The  photo-gravures,  es- 
pecially the  heads  of  the  various  antelopes,  are  lifelike  ;  and  the  letterpress 
is  very  pleasant  reading." — Graphic. 

Denizens  of  the  Jungles  ;  a  series  of  Sketches  of  Wild 
Animals,  illustrating  their  form  and  natural  attitude.  With 
letterpress  description  of  each  plate.  By  R.  A.  STERNDALE, 
F.K.G.S.,  F.Z.S.  Author  of  "  Natural  History  of  the  Mam- 
malia of  India,"  "  Seonee,"  &c.  Oblong  folio.  Rs.  10.  (16s.) 


T. — Denizens  of  the  Jungles. 
Aborigines  —  Deer  —  Mon- 
keys. 

ii.—"  On  the  Watch."     Tiger, 
in. — "Not   so  Fast  Asleep  as  he 
Looks."    Panther — Mon- 
keys. 
!V. — "  Waiting  for  Father."  Black 

Bears  of  the  Plains, 
v. — "  Rival     Monarchs."      Tiger 

and  Elephant. 
VI. — "Hors  de  Combat."      Indian 


vii.— "A  Race  for  Life."      Blue 

Bull  and  Wild  Dogs, 
vni. — "Meaning    Mischief."      The 
Graur — Indian  Bison. 

ix.— "More    than    His     Match. 
Buffalo  and  Rhinoceros. 
x. — "A     Critical     Moment.' 
Spotted   Deer   and    Leo- 
pard. 

xi.—"  Hard  Hit.'      The  Sambur. 

xii. — "Mountain      Monarchs." 
Marco  Polo's  Sheep. 


Wild  Boar  and  Tiger. 

Useful  Hints  to  Young  Shikaris  on  the  Gun  and 
Rifle.  By  "THE  LITTLE  OLD  BEAR."  Reprinted  from 
the  Asian.  Crown  8vo.  Es.  2-8. 


W.   ThacJcer  $  Co.,  London.  vii 

IN  THE  PRESS. 
Fourth  Edition,  revised,  with  additional  Illustrations. 

Veterinary  Notes  for  Horse-Owners. — An  everyday 
Horse  Book.     By  Captain  M.  HORACE  HAYES,  M.RC.Y.S. 

"  The  work  is  written  in  a  clear  and  practical  way." — Saturday  Review. 

"  Of  the  many  popular  veterinary  books  which  have  come  under  our 
notice,  this  is  certainly  one  of  the  most  scientific  and  reliable.  .  .  . 
Some  notice  is  accorded  to  nearly  all  the  diseases  which  are  common  to 
horses  in  this  country,  and  the  writer  takes  advantage  of  his  Indian  experi- 
ence to  touch  upon  several  maladies  of  horses  in  that  country,  where 
veterinary  surgeons  are  few  and  far  between.  The  description  of  symptoms 
and  the  directions  for  the  application  of  remedies  are  given  in  perfectly 
plain  terms,  which  the  tyro  will  find  no  difficulty  in  comprehending  :  and, 
for  the  purpose  of  further  smoothing  his  path,  a  chapter  is  given  on  veterin- 
ary medicines,  their  actions,  uses,  and  doses." — The  Field. 

"Simplicity  is  one  of  the  most  commendable  features  in  the  book. 
What  Captain  Hayes  has  to  say  he  says  in  plain  terms,  and  the  book  is  a 
very  useful  one  for  everybody  who  is  concerned  with  horses." — Illustrated 
Sporting  and  Dramatic  News. 

"  We  heartily  welcome  the  second  edition  of  this  exceedingly  useful 
book.  The  first  edition  was  brought  out  about  two  years  since*  but  the 
work  now  under  notice  is  fully  double  the  size  of  its  predecessor,  and,  as  a 
matter  of  course,  contains  more  information.  Captain  Hayes,  the  author, 
is  not  only  a  practical  man  in  all  things  connected  with  the  horse,  but  has 
also  studied  his  subject  from  a  scientific  point  of  view." — The  Sportiny  Life. 

"  Captain  Hayes,  in  the  new  edition  of  '  Veterinary  Notes,'  has  added 
considerably  to  its  value  by  including  matter  which  was  omitted  in  the 
former  editions,  and  rendered  the  book,  if  larger,  at  any  rate  more  useful 
to  those  non-professional  people  who  may  be  inclined  or  compelled  to  treat 
their  own  horses  when  sick  or  injured.  So  far  as  we  are  able  to  judge,  the 
book  leaves  nothing  to  be  desired  on  the  score  of  lucidity  and  comprehen- 
siveness."—  Veterinary  Journal. 

"  Captain  Hayes  has  succeeded  in  disposing  of  two  editions  of  his  manual 
since  it  was  issued  in  1877 — a  sufficient  proof  of  its  usefulness  to  horse- 
owners.  The  present  edition  is  nearly  double  the  size  of  the  first  one,  and 
the  additional  articles  are  well  and  clearly  written,  and  much  increase  the 
value  of  the  work.  We  do  not  think  that  horse-owners  in  general  are 
likely  to  find  a  more  reliable  and  useful  book  for  guidance  in  an  emergency." 
— The  Field. 

Training  and  Horse  Management  in  India.    By 

Captain  M.  HORACE  HAYES,  author  of  "  Veterinary  Notes 
for  Horse  Owners,"  "  Hiding,"  &c.  Third  Edition.  Crown 
8vo.  Rs.  5.  (8s.  6d.) 

"  No  better  guide  could  be  placed  in  the  hands  of  either  amateur  horse 
man  or  veterinary  surgeon." — The  Veterinary  Journal. 

"  A  useful  guide  in  regard  to  horses  anywhere Concise, 

practical,  and  portable." — Saturday  Review. 


ThacJcer,  SynnJc  $*  Co.,  Calcutta, 


Indian  Notes  about  Dogs  :  their  Diseases  and  Treat- 
ment. By  Major  C .  Third  Edition,  Ee vised.  Fcap. 

8vo.,  cloth.     lie.  1-8. 

Indian  Racing  Reminiscences.  Being  Entertaining 
Narratives  a] id  Anecdotes  of  Men,  Horses,  and  Sport. 
By  Captain  M.  HORACE  HAYES,  Author  of  "  Veterinary 
Notes,"  "Training  and  Horse  Management,"  <fec.  Illustrated 
with  22  Portraits  and  20  Engravings.  Imperial  16rno. 
Ks.  5-12.  (8s.  Gd.) 

"  Captain  Hayes  has  done  wisely  in  publishing  these  lively  sketches  of 
life  in  India.  The  book  is  full  of  racy  anecdote." — Bell's  Life. 

"All  sportsmen    who   can    appreciate  a  book  on  racing,  written  in  a 
cho.tty  style,  and  full  of  anecdote,  will  like  Captain  Hayes's  latest  work."— 
Field. 

''  It  is  a  safe  prediction  that  this  work  is  certain  to  have  a  wide  circle 
of  readers." — Broad  Arrow. 

"  The  book  is  valuable  from  the  fact  that  many  hints  on  the  treatment  of 
horses  are  included,  and  the  accuracy  and  extent  of  Captain  Hayes's  veter- 
inary skill  and  knowledge  are  well  known  to  experts." — Illustrated  Sporting 
and  Dramatic  News. 

"  Many  a  racing  anecdote  and  many  a  curious  character  our  readers  will 
find  in  the  book,  which  is  very  well  got  up,  and  embellished  with  many 
portraits. " — Bailys  Magazine. 

Hindu  Mythology :  Vedic  and  Puranic.  By  Rev. 
W.  J.  WILKINS,  of  the  London  Missionary  Society,  Cal- 
cutta. Illustrated  by  very  numerous  Engravings  from 
Drawings  by  Xative  Artists.  Uniform  with  "  Lays  of 
Ind,"  "Biding,"  &c.  Es.  7.  (10s.  6d.) 

"His  aim  has  been  to  give  a  faithful  account  of  the  Hindu  deities  such 
as  an  intelligent  native  would  himself  give,  and  he  has  endeavoured,  in 
order  to  achieve  his  purpose,  to  keep  his  mind  free  from  prejudice  or 
th(  sological  bias.  To  help  to  completeness  he  has  included  a  number  of 
drawings  of  the  principal  deities,  executed  by  native  artists.  The  author 

-has  attempted  a  work  of  no  little  ambition  and  has  succeeded  in  his 
attempt,  the  volume  being  one  of  great  interest  and  usefulness;  and  not 
the  less  so  because  he  has  strictly  refrained  from  diluting  his  facts  with 

.  comments  of  his  own.     It  has  numerous  illustrations." — Home  News. 

"  Mr.  Wilkins  has  done  his  work  well,  with  an  honest  desire  to  state 
facts  apart  from  all  theological  prepossession,  and  his  volume  is  likely  to 
be  a  useful  book  of  reference." — Guardian. 

"  In  Mr.  Wilkins's  book  we  have  an  illustrated  manual,  the  study  of 

which  will  lay  a  solid  foundation  for  more  advanced  knowledge,  while  it 

-will  furnish  those  who  may  have  the  desire  without  having  the  time  or 

-opportunity  to  go  further  into  the  subject,  with  a  really  extensive  stock  of 

accurate  information." — Indian  Daily  News. 


W.  Thacl-er  $  Co.,  London.  ix 

Echoes  from  Old  Calcutta :  being  chiefly  Reminiscences 
of  the  days  of  Warren  Hastings,  Francis,  and  Impey.  By 
H.  E.  BUSTEED.  Second  Edition.  Considerably  Enlarged 
and  Illustrated.  Es.  6.  (8s.  6d.) 

"  Dr.  Busteed  has  made  an  eminently  readable,  entertaining,  and  by  no 
means  uninstructive  volume  ;  there  is  not  a  dull  page  in  the  whole  book." 
— Saturday  Review. 

" The  book  will  be  read  by  all  interested  in  India." — Army  and  Navy 
Magazine. 

"The  papers  deal  with  some  of  the  most  interesting  episodes  in  the 
political  and  social  history  of  Calcutta,  and  while  some  fresh  light  is 
thrown  on  all  of  them,  more  than  one  of  them  are  placed  in  an  entirely 
new  aspect." — Calcutta  Review. 

"  The  story  of  that  frail  East  Indian  beauty,  who  became  Princess  of 
Benevento,  has  never  been  told  in  detail  before,  and  Dr.  Busteed  could 
scarcely  have  found  a  livelier  or  more  picturesque  subject  to  illustrate 
Anglo-Indian  life  a  hundred  years  ago." — Times  of  India. 

"  Not  only  can  no  one  who  reads  these  papers  fail  to  appreciate  either 
their  interest  or  their  literary  merit,  but  it  is  only  necessary  to  compare 
them  with  what  has  been  previously  published  on  the  same  subjects,  to  see 
that  they  form  a  contribution  of  no  mean  value  to  the  history  of  the  times 
with  which  they  deal." — The  Englishman. 

"  There  are  a  thousand  fresh  facts  related,  and  a  spirit  of  narrative 
displayed  by  the  author,  which  gives  to  these  incidents  the  freshness 
of  a  first-telling.  The  history  of  the  Grand  incident  is  particularly  well 
done." — Pioneer. 

Indian  Horse  Notes :  an  Epitome  of  useful  Information 
arranged  for  ready  reference  on  Emergencies,  and  specially 
adapted  for  Officers  and  Mofussil  Residents.  All  Technical 
Terms  explained  and  Simplest  Remedies  selected.  By 

Major   C ,  Author  of  "  Indian  Notes    about    Dogs." 

Second  Edition,  Revised  and  considerably  Enlarged.    Fcap. 
8vo.,  cloth.     Rs.  2. 

Horse  Breeding  in  India:  being  a  Second  Edition  of 
"  The  Steeple  Chase  Horse ;  how  to  select,  train,  and  ride 
him,  with  Notes  on  Accidents,  Diseases,  and  their  Treat- 
ment." By  Major  J.  HUMFREY.  Crown  8vo.  Rs.  3-8. 

Amateur  Gardener  in  the  Hills.  Hints  from  various 
Authorities,  adapted  to  the  Hills.  By  AN  AMATEUR. 
Crown  8vo.  Rs.  2-8. 


Thacker,  Spinlc  $  Co.,  Calcutta. 


Eighth  Edition.     Crown  8vo.     Rs.  7.     (10s.  6d.) 

The  Management   and    Medical   Treatment  of 

Children  in  India.  By  EDWARD  A.  BIRCH,  M.D.,  Surgeon 
Major  Bengal  Establishment.  Second  Edition,  Revised. 
Being  the  Eighth  Edition  of  "Goodeve's  Hints  for  the 
Management  of  Children  in  India. " 

Dr.  Goodeve. — "I  have  no  hesitation  in  saying  that  the  present  edition 
is  for  many  reasons  superior  to  its  predecessors.  It  is  written  very  care- 
fully, and  with  much  knowledge  and  experience  on  the  author's  part, 
whilst  it  possesses  the  great  advantage  of  bringing  up  the  subject  to  the 
present  level  of  Medical  Science." 

The  Medical  Times  and  Gazette,  in  an  article  upon  this  work  and 
Moore's  "Family  Medicine  for  India,"  says: — The  two  works  before 
us  are  in  themselves  probably  about  the  best  examples  of  medical 
works  written  for  non-professional  readers.  The  style  of  each  is  simple, 
and  as  free  as  possib'e  from  technical  expressions.  ^The  modes  of  treat- 
ment recommended  are  generally  those  most  likely  to  yield  good  results  in 
the  hands  of  laymen ;  and  throughout  each  volume  the  important  fact  is 
kept  constantly  before  the  mind  of  the  reader,  that  the  volume  he  is  using 
is  but  a  poor  substitute  for  personal  professional  advice,  for  which  it 
must  be  discarded  whenever  there  is  the  opportunity. 

A  Tea  Planter's  Life  in  Assam.  By  GEORGE  M, 
BARKER.  With  Seventy-five  Illustrations  by  the  Author. 
Crown  8vo.  Rs.  5.  (7s.  6d.) 

"  Mr.  Barker  has  supplied  us  with  a  very  good  and  readable  description, 
accompanied  by  numerous  illustrations  drawn  by  himself.  What  may  be 
called  the  business  parts  of  the  book  are  of  most  value." — Contemporary 
Review* 

"Cheery,  well-written  little  book." — Graphic. 

"  A  very  interesting  and  amusing  book,  artistically  illustrated  from 
sketches  drawn  by  the  Author." — Mark  Lane  Express. 

A  Complete  List  of  Indian  Tea  Gardens,  Indigo 

Concerns,  Silk  Filatures,  Sugar  Factories,  Cinchona 
Concerns,  and  Coffee  Estates.  With  their  Capital, 
Directors,  Proprietors,  Agents,  Managers,  Assistants,  &c., 
and  their  Factory  Marks  by  which  the  chests  may  be 
identified  in  the  market.  5s. 

"  The  strong  point  of  the  book  is  the  reproduction  of  the  factory  marks, 
which  are  presented  side  by  side  with  the  letterpress.  To  buyers  of  tea 
and  other  Indian  products  on  this  side,  the  work  needs  no  recommenda- 
tion."— British  Trade  Journal. 

The  Tea  Estates  of  Ceylon,  their  Acreage  and 
Proprietors.  Is.  6d.,  or  with  the  "Indian  Tea 
Gardens,"  6s. 


W.   ThacJicr  fy  Co.,  London. 


Merces'  Indian   and  English  Exchange   Tables 

from  Is.  4d.  to  Is.  8d.  per  hupee.  Xew  Edition.  In  this 
Edition  the  rate  rises  by  32nds  of  a  penny,  to  meet  the 
requirements  of  Financiers.  The  progression  of  the  numbers 
is  by  units  ;  thus,  in  most  instances,  saving  a  line  of 
calculation.  Accuracy,  facility  of  reference,  and  perfectly 
clear  printing,  render  it  the  most  perfect  work  in  existence. 
Demy  8vo.  Ks.  10.  (15s.) 

Supplement  containing  1/5  to  1/5M.     Rs.  3-8.  (5s.) 
ditto  1/4  to  1/4|.     Rs.  3-8.  (5s.) 

"  In  this  new  edition  of  Mr.  Merces'  useful  work,  the  calculations  have 
been  extended  to  thirty-seconds  of  a  penny,  and  all  sums  from  £1  to  £100, 
and  from  1  to  100  rupees,  are  made  to  advance  by  units." — Economist. 

"  We  heartily  recommend  these  tables,  both  for  their  reliability  and 
for  the  great  saving  in  time  that  will  be  gained  by  their  employment."— 
Financier. 

Our  Administration  of  India :  being  a  complete 
Account  of  the  Revenue  and  Collectorate  Administration 
in  all  Departments,  with  special  reference  to  the  Work 
and  Duties  of  a  District  Officer  in  Bengal.  By  H.  A.  D. 
PHILLIPS.  Rs.  4-4.  (6s.) 

"  In  eleven  chapters  Mr.  Phillips  gives  a  complete  epitome  of  the  civil, 
in  distinction  from  the  criminal,  duties  of  an  Indian  Collector.  The 
information  is  all  derived  from  personal  experience.  A  polemical  interest 
runs  through  the  book,  but  this  does  not  detract  from  the  value  of  the 
very  complete  collections  of  facts  and  statistics  given." — London  Quarterly 
Review. 

"  It  contains  much  information  in  a  convenient  form  for  English  readers 
who  wish  to  study  the  working  of  our  system  in  the  country  districts  of 
India." — Westminster  Review. 

"  A  very  handy  and  useful  book  of  information  upon  a  very  momentous 
subject,  about  which  Englishmen  know  very  little." — Pall  Mall  Gazette. 

The    Eeconnoitrer's    Guide    and    Field    Book, 

adapted  for  India.  By  Lieut. -Col.  M.  J.  KING-HARMAN, 
B.S.C.  Second  Edition,  Revised  and  Enlarged.  In  roan. 
Rs.  3. 

It  contains  all  that  is  required  for  the  guidance  of  the  Military 
Reconnoitrer  in  India  :  it  can  be  used  as  an  ordinary  Pocket  Note 
Book,  or  as  a  Field  Message  Book;  the  pages  are  ruled  as  a 
Field  Book,  and  in  sections,  for  written  description  or 
sketch. 

"  To  officers  serving  in  India  this  guide  will  be  invaluable." — Broad 
Arrow. 


TJ i acker,  Spink  $"  Co.,   Calcutta. 


Tlie  Culture  and  Manufacture  of  Indigo,  with  a 
Description  of  a  Planter's  Life  and  Resources.  By  WALTER 
MACLAGAN  REID.  Crown  8vo.  With  nineteen  full-page 
Illustrations.  Rs.  5.  (7s.  6d.) 

"  It  is  proposed  in  the  following  Sketches  of  Indigo  Life  in  Tirhoot  and 
Lower  Bengal  to  give  those  who  have  never  witnessed  the  manufacture  of 
Indigo,  or  seen  an  Indigo  Factory  in  this  country,  an  idea  of  how  the  finished 
marketable  article  is  produced  :  together  with  other  phases  and  incidents 
of  an  Indigo  Planter's  life,  such  as  may  be  interesting  and  amusing  to 
friends  at  home." — Introduction. 


Tales  from  Indian  History :  being  the  Annals  of 
India  retold  in  Narratives.  By  J.  TALBOYS  WHEELER. 
Crown  Svo.,  cloth  gilt.  Rs.  3-4.  (5s.) 

"  No  young  reader  who  revolts  at  the  ordinary  history  presented  to  him 
in  his  school  books  will  hesitate  to  take  up  this.  No  one  can  read  a  volume 
such  as  this  without  being  deeply  interested." — Scotsman. 

"  While  the  work  has  been  written  for  them  (natives),  it  has  also  been 
written  for  the  people  of  England,  who  will  find  in  the  volume,  perhaps  for 
the  first  time,  the  history  of  our  great  dependency  made  extremely  attractive 
reading." — Saturday  Revieiv. 

The  Student's  Manual  of  Tactics.  By  Capt.  M. 
HORACE  HAYES.  Specially  written  for  the  use  of  candidates 
preparing  for  the  Militia,  Military  Competitive  Examina- 
tions, and  for  promotion.  Crown  Svo.  Rs.  4-4.  (6s.) 


Definitions. 

I.  Composition  of  an  Army. 
II.  Infantry, 
in.  Artillery, 
iv.  Cavalry. 

v.  Formations  :  Time  and  Space, 
vi.  Outposts, 
vn.  Screening  and  Reconnoitring. 


vin.  Advanced  Guards. 

ix.  Rear  Guards. 
x.  Marches. 

xi.  The  Attack, 
xn.  The  Defence, 
xin.  Villages, 
xiv.  Woods. 

xv.  Machine  Guns. 


"  There  is  no  better  Manual  on  Tactics  than  the  one  which  Captain 
Hayes  has  written." — Naval  and  Military  Gazette. 

"  '  The  Student's  Manual  of  Tactics '  is  an  excellent  book.  Principles  are 
reasoned  out,  and  details  explained  in  such  a  way  that  the  student  cannot 
fail  to  get  a  good  grasp  of  the  subject.  Having  served  in  both  the  artillery 
and  infantry,  and  being  a  practical  writer,  as  well  as  *  a  coach,'  the  author 
of  this  manual  had  exceptional  qualifications  for  the  task  he  has  accom- 
plished."— Broad  Arroiv. 


W.   Thaclter  9*   Co.,  London.  xni 

UNDER  PATRONAGE  OF  THE  SECRETARY  OF  STATE. 
In  Royal  Svo.     Ks.  22.     (31s.  6d.) 

Statistics  of  Hydraulic  Works,  and  Hydrology 

of  England,   Canada,  Egypt,    and  India.       Collected  and 
reduced  by  Lowis  D'A.  JACKSON,  C.E.,  Author  of  "Canal 
and    Culvert   Tables,"     "  Hydraulic    Manual,"     "  Aid  to 
Engineering  Solution,"  &c. 
"...  Though  apparently  compiled  primarily   for  the  benefit   of   the 

India  Public   Works'  Department,  the  book  contains  much  information. 

which   is   not    generally    known   in    England    evtn   amongst    engineers, 

especially   as  regards   the  gigantic   scale  on   which   hydraulic   works  are 

carried  out  in  foreign  countries." — The  Builder. 

Game,  Shore,  and  Water  Birds  of  India.    By  Col. 

A.  LE  MESSURIER,  E.E.,  with  111  Illustrations.     A  vade 

mecum  for  Sportsmen.      Embracing  all  the   Birds   at    all 

likely  to  be  met  with  in  a  Shooting  Excursion.    Svo.   Fold- 

ing  lengthways  for  the  Pocket.     Es.  10.     (15s.) 

'*  To  the  man  who  cares  for  bird  shooting,  and  the  excellent  sport  which 

is   almost   illimitable   on  the  lakes  or  '  *  tanks "  in  the  Carnatic  or  the 

Deccan,    Colonel  Le  Messurier's  present  work  will  be  a  source  of  great 

delight,  as  every  ornithologic  detail  is  given,  in  conjunction  with  the  most 

artistic  and  exquisite  drawings.     .     .     .     No  sportsman's  outfit  for  Upper 

India  can  be  considered  complete  without  this  admirable  work  of  reference." 

— Broad  Arrow. 

A  Manual  of  Surveying  for  India,  detailing  the 
mode  of  operations  on  the  Trigonometrical,  Topographical 
and  Eevenue  Surveys  of  India.  Compiled  by  Sir  H.  L. 
THUILLIER,  K.C.S.L,  and  Lieut. -Col.  E.  SMYTH.  Prepared 
for  the  use  of  the  Survey  Department,  and  published  under 
the  authority  of  the  Government  of  India.  Eoyal  8vo. 
Es.  16.  (30s.) 

The  Hindoos  as  they  are :  a  description  of  the  Manners. 

Customs,   and   Inner   Life  of  Hindoo  Society.      Bengal. 

By    SHIB   CHUNDER   BOSE.      Second  Edition.      Eevised. 

Crown  Svo.     Es.  5. 

"Lifts  the  veil  from  the  inner  domestic  life  of  his  countrymen." — West- 
minster Review. 

A  Memoir  of  the  late  Justice  Onoocool  Chunder 
Mookerjee.  By  M.  MOOKERJEE.  Third  Edition.  12mo. 
Ee.  1.  (2s.  6d.) 

The  Biography  of  a  Native  Judge,  by  a  native,  forming  a  most 
interesting  and  amusing  illustration  of  Indian  English. 

"  The  reader  is  earnestly  advised  to  procure  the  life  of  this  gentleman, 
written  by  his  nephew,  and  read  it." — The  Tribes  on  my  Frontier. 


Iliacker,  Spink  $  Co.,  Calcutta. 


Hints  on  the  Study  of  English.  By  E.  J.  EOWE? 
M.A.,  and  W.  T.  WEBB,,  M.A.,  Professors  of  English  Litera- 
ture, Presidency  College,  Calcutta.  New  Edition,  Revised, 
Crown  Svo.,  cloth.  Rs.  2-8.  [1887. 

This  Edition  has  been  carefully  revised  throughout,  and  contains 
a  large  amount  of  new  matter,  specially  adapted  to  the  requirements 
of  Native  Students  and  Candidates  for  University  Examination. 

"  Messrs.  Howe  and  Webb  have  thoroughly  grasped  not  only  the  rela- 
tions between  the  English  tongue  and  other  tongues,  but  the  fact  that 
there  is  an  English  tongue.  .  .  .  We  are  thoroughly  glad  to  see  native 
Indian  students  of  English  taught  the  history  and  nature  of  our  language 
in  a  way  in  which,  only  a  few  years  back,  no  one  would  have  been  taught 
at  home." — Saturday  Review. 

"In  the  work  before  us,  Messrs.  Howe  and  Webb  have  produced  what, 
for  the  special  purpose  for  which  it  is  intended,  viz. — the  instruction  of 
native  and  Eurasian  students — is  by  far  the  best  manual  of  the  English 
language  we  have  yet  seen." — Englishman. 

"  So  far  as  it  goes,  this  is  one  of  the  most  satisfactory  books  of  the  kind 
that  we  have  seen.  No  point  touched  upon  is  slurred  over  ;  a  great  deal 
of  matter  is  condensed  into  a  small  compass,  and  at  the  same  time  expresse 
in  a  simple,  easy  style.  .  .  .  Taking  it  as  a  whole,  this  is  a  scholarly  little 
work ;  and,  as  such,  its  usefulness  will  not  be  limited  to  one  small  class  of 
students." — Times  of  India. 

"  I  wish  to  say  that  the  book  shows  wonderful  toil  and  care,  and  is  above 
the  average  even  for  purely  English  readers :  for  the  particular  purpose,  it 
is,  I  should  suppose,  admirable." — Extract  from  a  letter  from  the  Rev.  W.  W. 
Skeat,  M.A.,  Professor  of  Anglo-Saxon  in  the  University  of  Cambridge. 

A  Companion  Reader  to  "Hints  on  the  Study  of  English." 
(Eighteenth  Thousand.)  Demy  8vo.  Price  Ks.  1-4. 

"  The  passages  selected  are,  in  most  cases,  admirably  adapted  for  the 
purpose  in  view,  and  the  notes  generally  give  the  student  neither  less  than 
he  ought  to  expect,  nor  more  than  he  ought  to  get." — Englishman. 

"  We  have  no  hesitation  in  saying  that  Messrs.  Howe  and  Webb  have 
rendered  excellent  service  to  the  cause  of  education  in  their  selections  and 
their  method  of  treatingthem  forthe  purpose  intended." — Indian  Daily  News. 

"  The  authors  of  the  '  Hints '  have  rendered  an  additional  service  to  the 
cause  of  English  education,  by  supplying  a  '  Companion  Header,'  of  whose 
merits  it  would  not  be  easy  to  speak  too  highly.  ...  It  is  not  merely  a 
Reader,  but  a  most  suggestive  and  judicious  guide  to  teachers  and  students." 
— Friend  of  India. 

Indian  Lyrics.  By  W.  .  TREGO  WEBB,  M.A.,  Bengal 
Education  Service.  Square  8vo.,  cloth  gilt.  Es.  4  (7s.  6d.) 

"  He  presents  the  various  sorts  and  conditions  of  humanity  that  comprise 

the  round  of  life  in  Bengal  in  a  series  of  vivid  vignettes He 

writes  with  scholarly  directness  and  finish." — Saturday  Review. 

"A  pleasant  book  to  read." — Suffolk  Chronicle. 

"The  style  is  pretty  pleasant,  and  the  verses  run  smooth  and  melodious." — 
Indian  Mail. 


IF.   Thack(?r  $  Co.,  London.  xv 

Landholding ;  and  the  Relation  of  Landlord  and 

Tenant  in  Various  Countries  of  the  "World.      By  C.  D. 
FIELD,  M.A.,  LL.D.     8vo.,  cloth.     Ks.  17-12,  (36s.) 

"The  latter  half  of  this  bulky  volume  is  devoted  to  an  exhaustive  de- 
scription and  examination  of  the  variovs  systems  of  Land  Tenure  that  have 
existed  or  which  now  exist  in  British  India.  .  .  .  We  may  take  it 
that  as  regards  Indian  laws  arid  customs  Mr  Field  shows  himself  to  be 
at  once  an  able  and  skilled  authority.  In  order,  however,  to  render  his 
work  more  complete,  he  has  compiled,  chiefly  from  Blue-books  and  similar 
public  sources,  a  mass  of  information  having  reference  to  the  land  laws  of 
most  European  countries,  of  the  United  States  of  America,  and  our 
Australasian  colonies.  .  .  .  The  points  of  comparison  between  the 
systems  of  land  tenure'  existing  up  till  recently  in  Ireland,  and  the  system 
of  land  tenure  introduced  into  India  by  the  English  under  a  mistaken 
impression  as  tothe  relative  position  of  ryots  and  zemindars,  are  well  brought 
out  by  Mr.  Field.  He  indicates  clearly  the  imminence  of  a  Land  Question 
of  immense  magnitude  in  India,  and  indicates  pretty  plainly  his  belief  that 
a  system  of  tenancy  based  on  contract  is  unsuited  to  the  habits  of  the 
Indian  population,  and  that  it  must  be  abolished  in  favour  of  a  system  the 
main  features  of  which  would  be  fixty  of  tenure  and  judicial  rents." — Field. 

"  A  work  such  as  this  was  urgently  required  at  the  present  junction  of 
discussion  upon  the  landowning  question.  Mr.  Justice  Field  has  treated 
his  subject  with  judicial  impartiality,  and  his  style  of  writing  is  power- 
ful and  perspicuous." — Notes  and  Queries. 

"  Mr.  Justice  Field's  new  work  on  '  LANDHOLDING,  AND  THE  KELATION 
OF  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT  IN  VARIOUS  COUNTRIES,'  supplies  a  want 
much  felt  by  the  leading  public  men  in  Bengal.  ...  He  gives 
a  complete  account  of  the  agrarian  question  in  Ireland  up  to  the  present 
day,  which  is  the  best  thing  on  the  subject  we  have  hitherto 
seen.  Then  he  has  chapters  as  to  the  Horn  an  law,  the  Feudal 
system,  English  law,  Prussian,  French,  German,  Belgium,  Dutch,  Danish, 
Swedish,  Swiss,  Austrian,  Italian,  Greek,  Spanish,  Portuguese,  Russian 
and  Turkish  land  laws,  which  .  .  .  will  enable  controversialists  to 
appear  omniscient.  On  the  Indian  law  he  tells  us  all  that  is  known  in 
Bengal  or  applicable  in  this  province." — Friend  of  India  and  Statesman. 

Banting  in  India,  with  some  Remarks  on  Diet 

and  Things  in  General.     By  Surgeon-Major  JOSHUA  DUKE. 
Third  Edition.     Cloth.     Ke.  1-8. 

Queries  at  a  Mess  Table.    What  shall  we  Eat  ? 

What  shall  we  Drink  1     By  Surgeon- Major  JOSHUA  DUKE. 
Ecap.  8vo.,  cloth,  gilt.     Rs.  2-4. 

Culinary  Jottings.  A  Treatise  in  Thirty  Chapters,  on 
Reformed  Cookery  for  Anglo -Indian  Exiles.  Based  upon 
Modern  English  and  Continental  principles.  "With  thirty 
Menus  of  Little  Dinners  worked  out  in  detail,  and  an 
Essay  on  our  kitchens  in  India.  By  "  WYVERN."  Svo., 
cloth.  Rs.  5-8. 


xvi  Tluu'ker,  Spuilt  fy  Co.,  Calcutta, 


A  Text-Book  of  Indian  Botany,  Morphological, 

Physiological,  and  Systematic.  Profusely  Illustrated.  By 
W.  H.  GREGG,  B.M.S.,  Lecturer  on  Botany  at  the  Hugli 
Government  College.  Cr.  8vo.  Es.  5  ;  interleaved,  Es.  5-8. 

Manual  of  Agriculture  for  India.  By  Lt.  FREDERICK 
POGSON.  Illustrated.  Crown  8vo.,  cloth,  gilt.  Es.  5 
(7s.  6d.) 

CONTENTS. — Origin  and  general  character  of  soils — Ploughing  and 
Preparing  the  ground  for  sowing  seed — Manures  and  Composts — Wheat 
cultivation  —  Barley  —  Oats  —  Rye  —  Rice  —  Maize  —  Sugar  -  producing 
Sorghums — Common,  or  n on- sugar-producing  Sorghums — Sugar-cane  Crops 
— Oil-seed  Crops — Field  Pea,  Japan  Pea,  and  Bean  Crops — Dall,  or  Pulse 
Crops — Root  Crops — Cold  Spice  Crops — Fodder  Plants — Water-nut  Crops 
— Ground-nut  Crops — The  Rush-nut,  vel  Chufas — Cotton  Crops — Tobacco 
Crops — Mensuration — Appendix. 

Roxburgh's   Flora   Indica ;    or,   Description    of 

Indian  Plants.  Reprinted  literatim  from  Gary's  Edition. 
8vo.,  cloth.  Es.  5  (10s.  6d.) 

The  Future  of  the  Date  Palm  in  India.  (Phoenix 
Dactylifera.)  By  E.  BONAVIA,  M.D.,  Brigade-Surgeon, 
Indian  Medical  Department.  Crown  8vo.,  cloth.  Es.  2-8. 

Kashgaria    (Eastern    or    Chinese     Turkestan), 

Historical,  Geographical,  Military,  and  Industrial.  By  Col. 
KUROPATKIN,  Eussian  Army.  Translated  by  Major  GOWAN, 
H.M's.  Indian  Army.  8vo.  Es.  6-8.  (10s.  6d.) 

Mandalay  to  Momien :  a  Narrative  of  the  Two  Expedi- 
tions to  Western  China  of  1868  and  1875,  under  Cols. 
E.  B.  Sladen  and  H.  Browne.  Three  Maps,  numerous 
Views  and  Wood-cuts.  By  JOHN  M.  D.  ANDERSON. 
Thick  demy  8vo.,  cloth.  Es.  5.  [1876. 

British  Burma  and  its  People:  being  Sketches  of 
Native  Manners,  Customs,  and  Eeligion.  By  Capt. 
C.  J.  E.  S.  FORBES.  8vo.,  cloth.  Es.  4-2.  [1878. 

Myam-Ma:    The    Home    of  the    Burman.      By 

TSAYA  (Eev.  H.  POWELL).  Crown  8vo.  Es.  2.  [1886. 

A  Critical  Exposition  of  the  Popular   "  Jihad," 

showing  that  all  the  Wars  of  Mohammad  were  defensive, 
and  that  Aggressive  War  or  Compulsory  Conversion  is  not 
allowed  in  the  Koran,  &c.  By  Moulavi  CHERAGH  ALT, 
Author  of  "Eeforms  under  Moslem  Eule,"  "Hyderabad 
under  Sir  Salar  Jung."  -8vo.  Es.  6. 


W.  Thacker  $  Co.,  London.  xvii 

Ancient  India  as  described  by  Ptolemy :  Being  a 
Translation  of  the  Chapters  on  India  and  on  Central  and 
Eastern  Asia  in  the  Treatise  on  Geography  by  Klaudios 
Ptolemaios,  the  celebrated  Astronomer  :  with  Introduction, 
Commentary,  Map  of  India  according  to  Ptolemy,  and 
a  very  copious  Index.  By  J.  W.  McCmNDLE,  M.A.  8vo., 
cloth,  lettered.  Ks.  4-4. 

The  Life  of  H.M.  Queen  Victoria,  Empress  of 
India.  By  JOHN  J.  POOL,  Editor,  "  Indian  Missionary." 
With  an  Original  Portrait  from  a  Wax  Medallion  by  Signor 
C.  Moscatti,  Assistant  Engraver,  Her  Majesty's  Mint,  Cal- 
cutta. Crown  8vo.  Paper,  Re.  1.  Cloth,  Re.  1-4. 

Poppied  Sleep.  By  Mrs.  H.  A.  FLETCHER,  Author  of 
"  Here's  Rue  for  You."  Crown  8vo.  Re.  1-8. 

The  Bengal  Medical  Service,  April,  1885.     Com 

piled  by  G.  F.  A.  HARRIS,  Surgeon,  Bengal  Medical  Service. 
Royal  8vo.     Rs.  2. 

A  Gradation  List  giving  Medical  and  Surgical  Degrees  and 
Diplomas,  and  Universities,  Colleges,  Hospitals,  and  War 
Services,  etc.,  etc. 

Ague  ;  or  Intermittent  Fever.  By  M.  D.  O'CONNELL, 
M.D.  8vo.,  sewed.  Rs.  2. 

Book  of  Indian  Eras. — With  Tables  for  calculating 
Indian  Dates.  By  ALEXANDER  CUNNINGHAM,  C.S.I.,  C.I.E., 
Major-Geril.,  R'.E.,  Bengal.  Royal  8vo.,  cloth.  Rs.  12. 

Protestant  Missions.— The  Fourth  Decennial  Statistical 
Tables  of  Protestant  Missions  in  India,  Ceylon,  and  Burmah. 
Prepared,  on  information  collected  at  the  close  of  1881,  by 
the  Rev.  J.  HECTOR,  M.A.,  Free  Church  of  Scotland ;  the 
Rev.  H.  P.  PARKER,  M.A.,  Church  Missionary  Society,  and 
the  Rev.  J.  E.  PAYNE,  London  Missionary  Society,  at  the 
request  of  the  Calcutta  Missionary  Conference,  and  with 
the  concurrence  of  the  Madras  and  Bombay  Missionary 
Conferences.  Super-Royal  8vo.  Rs.  2-8. 

A  Map  of  the  Civil  Divisions  in  India,  including 
Governments,  Divisions,  and  Districts,  Political  Agencies  and 
Native  States.  Folded.  Re.  1. 


xviii  Thacker,  Spink  $  Co.,  Calcutta. 

The  Laws  of  Wealth.  By  HORACE  BELL.  Third  Edition. 
Ecap.  8vo.  8  Ans. 

Calcutta   to  Liverpool   by    China,   Japan,  and 

America,  in  1877.     By  Lieut,-General  Sir  HENRY  NORMAN. 
Second  Edition.     Fcap.  8vo.,  cloth.     Es.  2-8.     (3s.  6d.) 
The  only  book   published  on  this  interesting  route  between 
India  and  England. 

Guide  to  Masuri,  Landaur,  Dehra  Dun,  and  the 

Hills  North  of  Dehra;  including  Koutes  to  the  Snows 
and  other  places  of  note ;  with  Chapters  on  Garhwal 
(Tehri),  Hardwar,  Eurki,  and  Chakrata.  By  JOHN 
NORTHAM.  Es.  2-8. 

A  Handbook  for  Visitors  to  Agra  and  its  Neigh- 
bourhood. By  H.  G.  KEENE,  C.S.  Eourth  Edition. 
Eevised.  Maps,  Plans,  &c.  Ecap.  8vo.?  cloth.  Es.  2-8. 

A  Handbook  for  Visitors  to  Delhi  and  its  Neigh- 
bourhood. By  H.  G.  KEENE,  C.S.  Third  Edition.  Maps. 
Ecap.  8vo.,  cloth.  Es.  2-8. 

A  Handbook  for  Visitors  to  Allahabad,  Cawn- 

pore,  and  Lucknow.  By  H.  G.  KEENE,  C.S.  Second 
Edition,  re- written  and  enlarged.  Ecap.  Svo.  Es.  2-8. 

Hills  beyond  Simla.  Three  Months'  Tour  from  Simla, 
through  Bussahir,  Kunowar,  and  Spiti,  to  Lahoul.  ("In 
the  Footsteps  of  the  Eew.")  By  Mrs.  J.  C.  MURRAY- 
AYNSLEY.  Crown  Svo,  cloth.  Es.  3. 

Son  Gruel;  or,  What  he  met  i'  the  Mofussil  (after  two 
Noble  Lords).  Cantos  I  and  II.  Ecap.  Svo.  Ee.  1  each. 

An  Historical  Account  of  the  Calcutta  Collec- 

torate.  From  the  days  of  the  Zemindars  to  the  present  time. 
By  E.  Ci  STERNDALE,  author  of  "Municipal  Work  in  India." 
8vo.,  cloth.  Es.  2. 

Life:  An  Explanation  of  it.  By  W.  SEDGWICK,  Major, 
E.E.  Crown  8vo.,  cloth.  Es.  2. 

Elementary  Statics  and  Dynamics.     By  W.  N. 

BOUTFLOWER,  B.A.,  late  Scholar  of  St.  John's  College, 
Cambridge,  and  Professor  of  Mathematics,  Muir  Central 
College,  Allahabad.  Crown  Svo.  Es.  3-8. 


W,  Thacker  fy  Co,,  London.  xix 

The   Landmarks  of  Snake  Poison  Literature. 

By  VINCENT  EICHARDS,  F.E.C.S.  Crown  8vo.  Second 
Edition.  Rs.  2-8. 

A  Key  to  the  Entrance  Course,  1888.  (Calcutta 
University  Entrance  Examination,  1888.)  By  E.  J.  EOWE, 
M.A.  Fcap.  8vo.  Ks.  2-4  ;  post  free,  Es.  2-6. 

Indian-English  and  Indian  Character.    By  ELLIS 

UNDERWOOD.     Ecap  8vo.     Es.  1. 
The  Trial  of  Maharaja  Nanda  Kumar.    A  Narrative 

of  a  Judicial   Murder.     By   H.   BEVERIDGE,    C.S.     8vo., 

cloth.     Es.  10. 
Cherry  Blossoms :    A  Volume  of    Poetry.      By  GREECE 

CH.  DUTT.     Crown  8vo,,  6s. 

The  Indian  Tribute  and  the  Loss  by  Exchange. 

The  failure  of  Bimetallism  as  a  remedy  for  India's  growing 
burden.  By  T.  I.  POLLARD,  author  of  "  Gold  and  Silver 
Weighed  in  the  Balance."  Crown  8vo.,  cloth.  Es.  2-8. 

Gold   and    Silver  Weighed  in  the  Balance:  A 

measure  of  their  value,  &c.  By  T.  I.  POLLARD,  author  of 
"The  Indian  Tribute,  &c."  Crown  8vo.,  cloth.  Es.  2-8. 

Seonee :  or,  Camp  Life  on  the  Satpura  Eange.  A  Tale  of 
Indian  Adventure.  By  E.  A.  STERNDALE,  Author  of 
"Mammalia  of  India,"  "Denizens  of  the  Jungles."  Illus- 
trated by  the  Author.  With  an  Appendix.  Second  and 
cheaper  edition,  post  8vo.  Es.  6.  (8s.  6d.) 

"  He  has  strung  these  detached  reminiscences  together  after  a  new  plan, 
and  has  varied  them  with  descriptions  of  Indian  life,  native  and  Anglo- 
Indian,  which  are  very  pleasant  reading." — Home  News. 

"  Mr.  Sterndale's  interesting  narrative  of  Indian  life." — Broad  Arrow. 

Soundness  and  Age  of  Horses.  With  one  hundred 
illustrations.  A  Complete  Guide  to  all  those  features 
which  require  attention  when  purchasing  Horses,  distin- 
guishing mere  defects  from  the  symptoms  of  unsound- 
ness,  with  explicit  instructions  how  to  conduct  an  exa- 
mination of  the  various  parts.  By  Capt.  M.  H.  HAYES. 
Post  Svo.  Es.  6  (8s.  6d.) 

"A  very  concise  and  comprehensive  veterinary  and  legal  guide." — Army 
and  Navy  Magazine. 

"  A  capital  little  volume,  admirably  illustrated,  replete  with  sound  legal 
knowledge  made  perfectly  clear  to  the  mind  of  the  layman.  It  is  a  book 
for  cavalry  officers  and  hunting  men.'  — Broad  Arrow 


xx  Thacker,  Spirik  fy  Co.,  Calcutta. 

Modern  Hinduism:  Being  an  Account  of  the  Eeligion 
and  Life  of  the  Hindus  in  Northern  India,  By  W.  J. 
WILKINS,  of  the  London  Missionary  Society,  Author  of 
"Hindu  Mythology,  Vedic  and  Puranic."  Demy  8vo. 
Price  Ks.  8. 

The  Sepoy  Officers'  Manual.  Second  Edition.  Kevised. 
By  Capt.  E.  G.  BARROW.  Es.  2-8. 

The  Indian  Articles  of  War-    Annotated.    By  Capt. 

H.  S.  HUDSON,  27th  Madras  Infantry.     Crown  8vo,  cloth. 

Plain  Tales  from  the  Hills  :    A  Collection  of  Stories. 

By  EUDYARD  KEPLING,  Author  of  "  Departmental  Ditties 
and  other  Verses."  Crown  8vo,  cloth.  Es.  4.  (6s.) 

"  They  are  brilliant  sketches  of  character,  native  and  European,  and 
reflect  with  striking  vividness  the  incidents  and  surroundings  of  station 
life,  its  shadows  as  well  as  its  pleasures,  its  humorous  no  less  than  its  tragic 
side.  It  is  decidedly  an  entertaining  book,  and  those  to  whom  Indian  life 
is  at  all  familiar  will  find  it  doubly  so." — Bookseller. 

"  There  are  rattling  stories  of  flirtation  and  sport,  with  a  good  deal  of 
the  Lever  swing;  there  are  funny  stories  of  practical  jokes  and  sells,  full 
of  the  irresponsible  vivacity  of  the  youngsters  whom  such  toys  delight. "- 


"  Mr.  Kepling  knows  and  appreciates  the  English  in  India,  and  is  a  born 
story-teller  and  a  man  of  humour  into  the  bargain.  It  would  be  hard  to 
find  better  reading." — Saturday  Review. 

Departmental    Ditties    and    other    Verses.     By 

EUDYARD   KEPLING.      Third    Edition.     With    additional 
Verses.     Imp.  8vo.     Es.  2  (4s.  6d.) 

HOW  Will  it  End  ?  «  The  one  in  Madness ;  both  in  Misery ! " 
A  Story  of  Anglo-Indian  Life.  By  the  late  M.  W.  Crown 
8vo,  sewed.  Ee.  1-4. 

Reminiscences  Of  Behar.  By  an  Old  Planter.  Crown 
8vo,  cloth.  Es.  3-8. 

From  the  City  of  Palaces  to  Ultima  Thule.    with 

a  Map  of  Iceland,   Icelandic  Vocabulary,  Money  Tables, 
&c.     Crown  8vo,  sewed.     Ee.  1. 

Musketry  Made  Easy  for  Native  Officers  and  Non- 
Commissioned  Officers,  Native  Army.  By  Lieutenant 
E.  E.  S.  TAYLOR,  Adjutant,  38th  Bengal  Infantry.  Ar- 
ranged in  Questions  and  Answers.  English  and  Hindi. 
Second  Edition.  As.  8. 


W.  Thaclter  &  Co.,  London.  xxi 


WORKS  IN  THE  PRESS. 

On  the  Breaking  of  Horses.  By  Capt.  M.  H.  HAYES. 
50  Illustrations  by  J.  H.  OSWALD  BROWN.  Square. 

The  Points  of  the  Horse.  A  Familiar  Treatise  on  Equine 
Conformation.  By  Capt.  M.  H.  HAYES.  Illustrated  by 
J.  H.  OSWALD  BROWN. 

Describes  the  points  in  which  the  perfection  of  each  class  of 
horses  consists;  illustrated  by  very  numerous  reproductions  of 
Photographs  of  Living  Typical  Animals:  forming  an  invaluable 
guide  to  owners  of  horses. 

Hand-Book  to  the  Drill  in  "  Extended  Order." 

Part  III.     Field  Exercise.     1884.     With  Plates. 

Firminger's    Manual    of  Gardening  for    India. 

A  New  Edition,  thoroughly  Eevised  and  Ke-written.  With 
many  Illustrations.  By  J.  H.  JACKSON,  Editor,  Indian 
Agriculturist. 

Ince's  Guide  to  Kashmir.  Eevised  and  Ke-written.  By 
Surgeon-Major  JOSHUA  DUKE.  With  Maps. 

Major  Capel.  A  Novel.  By  Mrs.  H.  A.  FLETCHER,  Author 
of  "  Here's  Eue  for  You  "  and  l '  Poppied  Sleep." 

Leviora :  being  the  Ehymes  of  a  Successful  Competitor. 
By  F.  F.  BIGNOLD,  Bengal  Civil  Service.  8vo. 

English  Etiquette  for    Indian   Gentlemen.    By 

W.  TREGO  WEBB,  Bengal  Educational  Department.  Fcap. 
8vo. 

The  book  comprises  chapters  on  General  Conduct,  Calls,  Dining-out, 
Levees,  Balls,  Garden-parties,  Railway-travelling,  &c. 

Also  a  chapter  on  Letter-writing,  proper  Modes  of  address,  &c., 
together  with  hints  on  How  to  draw  up  Applications  for  Appointments,  with 
Examples. 

Musketry  Instruction  in  the  form  of  Question  and 
Answer.  By  Captain  L.  E.  DUMOULIN. 

Questions  and  answers  on  Prisjes,  Returns,  Registers,  Rifle 
Ranges,  Testing  Rifles  and  Ammunition,  &c.  The  Schools  of 
Musketry.  Description  of  M.  H.  Rifle.  Penetration  of  M.  H. 
Bullet.  Questions  and  answers  on  the  whole  of  the  above.  The 
extra  "  subject."  Fire  Tactics. 

Letters  on  Tactics  and  Organization.  By  "A  TRUE 
BEFORMER." 


Thaclcer,  Spink  $  Co.,  Calcutta. 


LAW    PUBLICATIONS. 

Manual  of  Revenue  and  Collectorate  Law  :  with 
Important  Eulings  and  Annotations.  By  H.  A.  D. 
PHILLIPS,  Bengal  Civil  Service.  Crown  Svo.  cloth. 
Ks.  10.  (21s.) 

The  Indian  Contract  Act ;  Act  IX.  of  1872.    With  a 

Commentary,  Critical,  Explanatory,  and  Illustrative.  By 
C.  C.  MACRAE.  Svo.  Ks.  10.  (18s.) 

The  Negotiable  Instruments  Act,  1881 :  being  an 
Act  to  define  and  amend  the  Law  relating  to  Promissory 
Notes,  Bills  of  Exchange  and  Cheques.  Edited  by  M.  D. 
CHALMERS,  M. A.,  Barrister-at-Law,  Author  of  "A  Digest 
of  the  Law  of  Bills  of  Exchange/'  &c.,  and  Editor  of 
Wilson's  "Judicature  Acts.'7  8vo.,  cloth.  Es.  7.  (10s.  6d.) 

A  Commentary  on  Hindu  Law  of  Inheritance, 

Succession,  Partition,  Adoption,  Marriage,  Stridhan,  and 
Testamentary  Disposition.  By  Pundit  JOGENDRO  NATH 
BHATTACHARJI  SMARTA  SIROMANI,  M.A.,  D.L.  Demy  8vo. 
Price  Es.  12,  cloth,  gilt. 

"  All  the  important  questions  of  Hindu  Law  are  discussed  in  this  work  in 
accordance  with  those  rules  and  principles  which  are  recognized  among 
Hindu  jurists  as  beyond  dispute.  By  going  through  the  work  the  reader 
will  become  familiar  with  the  Hindu  lawyers'  modes  of  thought  and 
reasoning,  and  will  be  prepared  to  argue  or  discuss  any  point  of  Hindu  Law. 

"  Babu  Bhattacharji  is  the  greatest  name  in  the  recent  history  of  the 
University.  He  has  already  made  his  mark,  having  written  a  really 
original  work  on  Hindu  Law,  which  must  assert  itself  against  the  crude 
compilations  and  false  views  of  European  writers." — Reis  and  Ray y at, 
December  26th,  1885. 

The  Indian  Limitation  Act;  Act  XV.  of  1877.  (As 
amended  by  Act  XII.  of  1879,  and  subsequent  enact- 
ments), with  Notes.  By  H.  T.  RIVAZ,  Barrister-at-Law, 
Advocate,  N.-W.-P.,  and  Punjab.  Third  Edition,  Royal 
8vo.,  cloth.  Rs.  10. 

A  Ohaukidari  Manual ;  being  Act  VI.  (B.C.)  of  1870,  as 
amended  by  Acts  1.  (B.C.)  of  1871  and  1886.  With  Notes, 
Rules,  Government  Orders,  and  Inspection  Notes.  By  G. 
TOYNBEE,  CS,  Magistrate  of  Hooghly.  Crown  8 vo. cloth.  R,  1, 


W.  Thacker  $  Co.,  London.  xxiii 


Manual  of  the  Revenue  Sale  Law  and  Certificate 

Procedure  of  Lower  Bengal,  being  Act  XI.  of  1859;  Act 
VII.  (B.C.)  of  1868;  and  Act  VII.  (B.C,)  of  1880  :  The 
Public  Demands  Kecovery  Act,  including  Selections  from 
the  Kules  and  Circular  Orders  of  the  Board  of  Ke venue. 
With  Notes.  By  W.  H.  GRIMLEY,  B.A.,  C.S.  8vo. 
Es.  5-8  ;  interleaved,  Bs.  6. 

The  North- Western  Provinces'  Rent  Act,  being 
Act  XII.  of  1881,  as  amended  by  Act.  XIV.  of  1886. 
With  Notes,  &c.  By  H.  W.  EEYNOLDS,  C,S,  Demy  8vo., 
cloth,  Es.  7. 

The  Bengal  Tenancy  Act.  Being  Act  VIII.  of  1885. 
With  Notes  and  Annotations,  Judicial  Eulings,  and  the 
Kules  framed  by  the  Local  Government  and  the  High  Court 
under  the  Act.  For  the  guidance  of  Revenue  Officers  and 
the  Civil  Courts.  By  M.  FINUCANE,  M.A.,  C.S.,  Director 
of  the  Agricultural  Department,  Government  of  Bengal,  and 
E.  F.  EAMPINI,  M.A.,  C.S.,  Barrister-at-Law,  District  and 
Session  Judge,  Second  Edition.  [In  the  Press. 

The  Inland  Emigration  Act ;  with  Orders  by  the 
Lieutenant-Governor  of  Bengal ;  Forms  by  Government  of 
Bengal ;  Eesolution  of  the  Government  of  India ;  Eesolu- 
tion  of  the  Government  of  Assam ;  Eules  made  by  the 
Chief  Commissioner  of  Assam,  and  Orders  by  the  Lieutenant- 
Governor,  1ST.  W.  P.  Interpaged  with  blank  pages  for  notes. 
Crown  Svo.  Es.  2-4. 

The  Hindu  Law  of  Inheritance,  Partition,  and 
Adoption  according  to  the  Smritis.  By  Dr.  JULIUS  JOLLY, 
Tagore  Law  Lecturer,  1883.  Es.  10. 

The  Bengal  Local  Self-Government  Act  (B,C, 
Act  III  of  1885),  and  the  general  Eules  framed  thereunder. 
With  Critical  and  Explanatory  Notes,  Hints  regarding 
Procedure,  and  reference  to  the  Leading  Cases  on  the  Law 
relating  to  Local  Authorities,  To  which  is  added  an 
Appendix  containing  the  principal  Acts  referred  to,  &c,, 
&c. ;  and  a  Full  Index,  By  F.  E,  STANLEY  COLLIER, 
B.C,S.,  Editor  of  "  The  Bengal  Municipal  Act,"  Crown 
8vo^  Es.  4. 

An  Income  Tax  Manual,  being  Act  II.  of  1886,  The 
Eules,  Eulings  and  Precedents,  &c,,  and  Notes,  By  W.  H. 
GRIMLEY,  B.A.,  C.S,,  Commissioner  of  Income  Tax,  Bengal. 
Eoyal  8vo.  Es.  3-8 ;  interleaved,  Es.  4. 


xxiv  Thacker,  Spiiik  fy  Co,,  Calcutta. 

The  Pocket  Penal,  Criminal  Procedure  and  Police 

Codes;  also  the  Whipping  Act  and  the  Kailway  Servants' 
Act.  With  General  Index.  1  Vol.  Es.  4. 

The  Pocket  Civil  Procedure  Code,  with  Court  Fee, 
Indian  Evidence,  Specific  Eelief,  Indian  Eegistration, 
Limitation,  and  Stamp  Acts.  With  General  Index. 
1  Vol.  .Es.  4. 

The  Indian  Penal  Code  and  other  Laws  and  Acts 

of  Parliament  relating  to  the  Criminal  Courts  of  India, 
With  Notes.  By  J.  O'KINEALY,  Judge  of  the  High  Court, 
Calcutta.  Third  Edition.  Eoyal  8vo.  Es.  12  (24s.) 

Legislative  Acts  of  the  Governor  General  of  India  in 
Council;  published  annually  with  Index.  Eoyal  8vo., 
cloth.  1872,  Es.  10 ;  1873,  1874,  and  1875,  Es.  5  each  ; 
1876,  Es.  6;  1877,  Es.  10;  1878,  Es.  5  ;  1879,  Es.  5; 
1880,  Es.  4  ;  1881,  Es.  8  ;  1882,  Es.  15-8  ;  1883,  Es.  5  ; 
1884,  Es.  5;  1885,  Es  5.;  1886,  Es.  5s.;  1887. 

Indian   Case-Law   On   Torts.— By  E.  D,  ALEXANDER, 

Bengal  Civil  Service.     Crown  8vo.,  cloth.     Rs.  4. 

Introduction  to  the  Regulations  of  the  Bengal 

Code.  By.  C.  D.  FIELD,  M.A.,  LL.D.  (specially  reprinted  for  the 
use  of  students,  etc.).  In  crown  8vo.,  cloth.  Us.  3. 

The  Law  of  Evidence  in  British  India.    By  C.  D. 

FIELD,  M.A.,  LL.D,  Judge  of  the  High  Court,  Calcutta.  Fourth 
Edition.  Rs.  18. 

The  Indian  Limitation  Act  XV.  of  1887.    Edited 

with  Notes  of  Cases,  by  R.  D.  ALEXANDER,  C.S.,  Judge,  Allahabad. 
Crown  8vo.  Es.  2-4. 

The  Indian  Contract  Act  No.  IX.  of  1872.  To- 
gether with  an  Introduction  and  Explanatory  Note?,  Table  of 
Contents,  Appendix,  &c.  By  H.  S.  CUNNINGHAM,  M.A.,  one  of  the 
Judges  of  H.M.'s  High  Court  of  Judicature,  Calcutta;  and  H.  H. 
SHEPHARD,  M.A.,  Barrister-at-Law.  Fifth  Edition. 

The  Practice  of  the  Presidency  Court  of  Small 

Causes  of  Calcutta.  The  Presidency  Small  Cause  Courts  Act 
(XV.  of  1882),  with  Copious  Notes;  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure, 
with  Notes  and  References ;  the  Rules  of  Practice,  Institution,  and 
Court  Fees;  and  a  complete  Index.  By  R.  S.  T.  MACEWEN, 
Barrister-at-Law,  one  of  the  Judges  of  the  Presidency  Court  of  Small 
Causes  of  Calcutta.  Thick  8vo.  Rs.  11.  Cash  10. 


W.  TJiacker  $  Co.,  London.  xxv 

'Jhe  Code  of  Criminal   Procedure.     Together  with 

Rulings,  Circular  Orders,  Notifications,  &c.,  of  all  the  High  Courts  in 
India,  and  Notifications  and  Orders  of  the  Government  of  India  and 
the  Local  Governments.  Edited,  with  Copious  Notes  and  full  Index, 
by  W.  F.  AGNEW,  and  GILBERT  S.  HENDERSON,  M.A.,  Barristers- at  - 
Law.  Second  Edition.  Royal  8vo.,  cloth,  Rs.  18. 

Ihe  Law  of  Specific  Relief  in  India;  being  a  Com- 

mentary  on  Act  I.  of  1877.  By  CHARLES  COLLETT,  late  of  the  Madras 
Civil  Service,  of  Lincoln's  Inn,  Barrister-at-Law,  and  formerly  a  Judge 
of  the  High  Court  at  Madras.  Demy  8vo.  Rs.  10.  Cash  9.  (14s.) 

The  Law  of  Intestate  and  Testamentary  Suc- 
cession in  India ;  including  the  Indian  Succession  Act,  &c.,  with  a 
Commentary.  With  Notes  and  Cross  References.  By  GILBERT  S. 
HENDERSON,  M.A.,  Barrister-at-Law.  Royal  8vo.  Rs.  16. 

Manual  of  Indian  Criminal  Law :  being  the  Penal 
Code,  Criminal  Procedure  Code,  Evidence,  Whipping, 
General  Clauses,  Police,  &c.,  Acts,  with  Penal  Clauses 
of  Legal  Practitioners'  Act,  Eegistration,  Arms,  Stamp, 
&c.,  Acts.  Fully  Annotated,  and  containing  all  applicable 
Rulings  of  all  High  Courts  arranged  under  the  appropriate 
Sections  up  to  date.  By  H.  A.  D.  PHILLIPS.  Thick 
crown  8vo.  New  Edition.  Es.  10. 

The  Stamp  Law  of  British.  India,  as  constituted  by 
the  Indian  Stamp  Act  (I.  of  1879).  Eulings  and  Circular 
Orders  of  the  four  High  Courts;  Notifications;  Eesolutions; 
Eules ;  and  Orders  of  the  Government  of  India  and  of  the 
various  Local  Governments  ;  together  with  Schedules  of  all 
the  stamp  duties  chargeable  on  Instruments  in  India  from 
the  earliest  times.  Edited,  with  Notes  and  Index,  by 
WALTER  E.  DONOGH,  M.  A.,  of  the  Inner  Temple,  Barrister- 
at-Law.  Demy  8vo.  Es.  8. 

Code  of  Civil  Procedure  (Act  XIV.  of  1882).  With 
Notes,  &c.  By  J.  O'KINEALY,  C.S.,  Judge  of  the  High 
Court,  Calcutta,  Second  Edition,  Eoyal  8vo.  Es.  16. 

Law  of  Intestate  and  Testamentary  Succession 
in  India,  including  the  Indian  Succession  Act  (x.  of  1865), 
with  a  Commentary,  and  the  Parsee  Succession  Act, 
Hindu  Wills  Act,  Probate  and  Administration  Act,  Dis- 
trict Delegates  Act,  Acts  xii.  and  xiii.  of  1855,  Eegimental 
Debts  Acts,  Acts  relating  to  the  Administrator-General 
Certificate  Act,  and  Oudh  Estates  Act,  with  Notes  and 
Cross  Eeferences  and  a  General  Index.  By  GILBERT  S. 
HENDERSON,  M,A.  Barrister-at-Law.  Es.  16. 


xxvi  Thacker,  Spink  <&  Co.,  Calcutta. 

Comparative    Criminal    Jurisprudence,    being    a 
synopsis  of   the   law,  procedure,  and   case   law   of   other 
countries,  arranged  as  far  as  possible  under  the  correspond- 
ing sections  of  the  Indian  Codes.     By  H.  A.  D.  PHILLIPS. 
Vol.  I.  Crimes  and  Punishments.     Vol.  II.  Procedure  and  Police. 
This  work  will  include  extracts  from  the  Penal  and  Criminal  Procedure 
Codes  of  the  State  of  New  York,  of  Louisiana,  of  France,  Belgium,  and 
Germany,  the  English  statute-law  and  case-law  (up  to  date),  as  well  as  the 
most  important  decisions  of  the  Courts  of  various  American  State?,  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  and  the  Court  of  Cassation  in  Paris  ; 
also  extracts  from  the  best  works  on  criminal  law  and  jurisprudence. 

[In  the  Press. 

The    Indian   Law   Examination    Manual.  —  By 

FENDALL  CURRIE,  Esq.,  of  Lincoln's  Inn,  Earrister-at-Law. 
Third  Edition.     Demy  8vo.     Es.  5. 

CONTENTS  : — Introduction — Hindoo  Law  —  Mahomedan  Law — Indian 
Penal  Code— Code  of  Civil  Procedure — Evidence  Act — Limitation  Act — 
Succession  Act — Contract — Registration  Act — Stamp  Acts  and  Court  Fees 
— Mortgage — Code  of  Criminal  Procedure — The  Easement  Act — The 
Trust  Act — The  Transfer  of  Property  Act — The  Negotiable  Instruments 
Act. 

The  Bengal  Municipal  Manual,  containing  the  Muni- 
cipal Act  (B.  C.  Act  III.  of  1884)  and  other  Laws  relating 
to  Municipalities  in  Bengal,  with  the  Kules  and  Circulars 
issued  by  the  Local  Government,  and  Notes.  Second 
Edition,  Eevised  and  Enlarged.  By  F.  E.  STANLEY 
COLLIER,  B.C.S.  Crown  8vo.,  cloth.  Es.  5. 

The  Law  of  Mortgage  in  India,  including  the  Transfer 
of  Property,  with  Notes  of  Decided  Cases.  The  Second 
Edition  of  the  Tagore  Law  Lectures,  1876.  Eevised  and 
partly  rewritten.  By  EASHBEHARY  GHOSE,  M.A.,  D.L. 

[In  the  Press. 

Tfce  Bengal  Local  Self-Government  Act  (B.O. 

Act  III.  of  1885)  and  the  general  Eules  framed  thereunder. 
With  Critical  and  Explanatory  'Notes,  Hints  regarding 
Procedure,  and  Eeference  to  the  Leading  Cases  on  the  Law 
relating  to  Local  Authorities.  To  which  is  added  an 
Appendix  containing  the  principal  Acts  referred  to,  &c.,  &c. ; 
and  a  full  Index.  By  F.  E,  STANLEY  COLLIER,  B.C.S. 
Editor  of  the  "  Bengal  Municipal  Act."  Second  Edition. 


W.  T/tacJcer  $  Co.,  London.  xxvii 

TAGORE  LAW  LECTURES. 

The  Hindu  Law ;  being  a  Treatise  on  the  Law  administered 
exclusively  to  Hindus  by  the  British  Courts  in  India. 
(1870  and  1871.)  By  HERBERT  Co  WELL.  Royal  8vo., 
2  vols.,  cloth,  each  Es.  8. 

History   and    Constitution   of  the   Courts   and 

Legislative  Authorities.     (1872.)     By  HERBERT  COWELL. 
]STew  Edition.    (1884).    Demy  8vo.     Rs.  6. 

Mahomed  an  Law.     By  SHAMA  CHURN  SIRCAR. 

Digest  of  Laws  according  to  Sunni  Code.    Ks.  9.     (1873.) 
Sunni  Code  in  part  and  Imamyah  Code.     Es.  9.       (1874.) 

The  Law  relating  to  the  Land  Tenures  of  Lower 

Bengal.     (1875.)     By  ARTHUR  PHILLIPS.     Ks.  10. 

The  Law  relating  to  Mortgage  in  India.  (1876.) 
By  RASH  BEHARI  GHOSE. 

The  Law  relating  to  Minors  in  Bengal.  (1877.) 
By  E.  J.  TREVELYAN.  Royal  8vo.,  cloth.  Ks.  10. 

The  Hindu  Law  of  Marriage  and   Stridhana. 

(1878.)    By  GOOROO  Doss  BANERJEE.    Koyal  8vo.    Rs.  10. 

The  Law  relating  to  the  Hindu  Widow.     By 

TRAILOKYANATII  MITTRA,  M.A.,  D.L.     Ks.  10,     (1879.) 

The  Principles  of  the  Hindu  Law  of  Inheritance. 

By  RAJCOOMAR  SARVADHICARI,  B.L.     Ks.  16.     (1880.) 

The  Law  of  Trusts  in  British  India.    By  W.  F. 

AGNEW,  Esq.     Ks.  12.     (1881). 

The  Law   of   Limitation    and  Prescription  in 

British  India.     By  OPENDRA  NATH  MITTER.     (1882.) 

The  Hindu  Law  of  Inheritance,  Partition,  and 

Adoption,  according  to  the  Smritis.    By  Dr.  JULIUS  JOLLY 
(1883.)     Rs.  10. 

The  Law  relating  to  Gifts,  Trusts,  and  Testa- 
mentary Dispositions  among  the  Mahomedans.  By  SYED 
AMEER  ALL  (1884.)  Rs.  12. 


Thacker,  Spink  fy  Co.,  Calcutta. 


THE    INDIAN    MEDICAL    GAZETTE. 

A  Eecord  of  Medicine,  Surgery,  and  Public  Health,  and  of 
General  Medical  Intelligence,  Indian  and  European.  Edited 
by  K.  MoLEOD,  M.D. 

Published  Monthly.  Subscriptions  Us.  18  per  Annum,  in- 
cluding Postage. 

The  Indian  Medical  Gazette  has  for  more  than  twenty  years 
earned  for  itself  a  growing  and  world-wide  reputation  by  its 
solid  contributions  to  Tropical  Medicine  and  Surgery.  It  is  the 
Sole  representative  medium  for  recording  the  work  and  ex- 
perience of  the  Medical  Profession  in  India;  and  its  very 
numerous  Exchanges  with  all  the  leading  Medical  Journals 
in  Great  Britain  and  America  enable  it  not  only  to  diffuse  this 
information  broadcast  throughout  the  world,  but  also  to  cull  for 
its  Indian  readers,  from  an  unusual  variety  of  sources,  all  in- 
formation which  has  any  practical  bearing  on  medical  works  in 
India. 

The  Indian  Medical  Gazette  is  indispensable  to  every  Member 
of  the  Medical  Profession  in  India  who  wishes  to  keep  himself 
abreast  of  medical  progress,  for  it  brings  together  and  fixes  the 
very  special  knowledge  which  is  only  to  be  obtained  by  long 
experience  and  close  observation  in  India.  In  this  way  it  con- 
stitutes itself  a  record  of  permanent  value  for  reference,  and  a 
journal  which  ought  to  be  in  the  library  of  every  medical  man 
in  India  or  connected  with  that  country. 

The  Gazette  covers  altogether  different  ground  from  The 
Lancet  and  British  Medical  Journal,  and  in  no  way  competes 
with  these  for  general  information,  although  it  chronicles  the 
most  important  items  of  European  Medical  Intelligence.  The 
whole  aim  of  the  Gazette  is  to  make  itself  of  special  use  and 
value  to  Medical  Officers  in  India,  and  to  assist  and  support 
them  in  the  performance  of  their  difficult  duties. 

It  is  specially  devoted  to  the  best  interests  of  The  Medical 
Services,  and  its  long-established  reputation  and  authority 
enable  it  to  command  serious  attention  in  the  advocacy  of  any 
desirable  reform  or  substantial  grievance. 

The  Contributors  to  The  Indian  Medical  Gazette  com- 
prise the  most  eminent  and  representative  men  in  the  profession, 
and  the  contents  form  a  storehouse  'of  information  on  tropical 
diseases  which  would  otherwise  be  lost  to  the  world. 


W.  Thacker  $  Co.,  London. 


XXIX 


INDEX  TO   LAW    BOOKS. 

PAGE 

Bengal  Code,  Regulations         Field     24 

Bengal  Local  Self-Government            Collier 23 

Criminal  Jurisprudence,  Comparative...         ...  Phillips...         ...  26 

Criminal  Law     ...         ...         ...         ...         ...  do.      ...         ...  25 

Criminal  Procedure  and  Penal  Codes   ("The 

Pocket") ("Pocket")      ...  24 

Civil  Procedure,  Evidence,  &c.  ("The  Pocket  ")  do.              ...  24 

Civil  Procedure  ...         ...         ...         ...         ...  O'Kinealy         ...  25 

Contract  Act      ...         ., Cunningham  and  Shephard  24 

Criminal  Procedure       ...         ...         ...         ...  Agnew  and  Henderson  25 

Courts  and  Legislative  Authorities     ...         ...  Cowell  ...         ...  27 

Chaukidari  Manual       ..  Toynbee            ...  22 

Emigration  Act,  Inland 23 

Evidence,  Law  in  British  India           Field     24 

Examination  Manual Currie 26 

Gifts,  Trusts  and  Testamentary,  Mahomedan  . . .         Ameer  Ali       ...  27 

Hindu  Law         Cowell 27 

Hindu  Widows  ...         Mittra 27 

Inheritance,  &c.,  Hindu            ...         ...         ...  Siromani           ...  22 

Inheritance,  &c.       „      ...         ...           ..         ...  Jolly      ...         ..  23 

Inheritance,  &c.       „      ...         ...         ...         ...  Sarvadhicari    ...  27 

Intestate  and  Succession           ...         ...         ...  Henderson        ...  25 

Income  Tax  Manual      Grimley           ...  23 

Land  Tenures,  Bengal               ...         ...         ...  Phillips             ...  27 

Legislative  Acts             ...         "Annual"      ...  24 

Limitation  and  Prescription     Mitter 27 

Limitation  Act Alexander        ...  24 

Limitation           Bivaz 22 

Municipal  Act,  Bengal Collier 26 

Mahomedan  Law           ...         ...         ...         ...  Sircar    ...         ...  27 

Minors     Trevelyan         ...  27 

Marriage  and  Stridhana            Banerjee           ..,  27 

Mortgage            ...         ...         ...         ...         ...  Ghose    ...         ...  26 

Negotiable  Instruments...         ...         ...         ...  Chalmers          ...  22 

Penal  Code  ("  The  Pocket  ") "Pocket"        ...  24 

Penal  Code          O'Kinealy         ...  24 

Rent  Act  (N.W.P.)       Reynolds           ...  23 

Revenue  and  Collectorate  Law            Phillips 22 

Revenue  Sale  and  Certificate Grimley             ...  23 

Stamp  Law         Donogh 25 

Small  Cause  Court  Act,  Presidency ..  McEwen           ...  24 

Specific  Relief Collett 25 

Tenancy  Act,  Bengal Finucane  and  Rampini  23 

Torts        Alexander        ...  24 

Trusts       Agnew 27 

Tagore  Law  Lectures Various            ...  27 


xxx  Thacker,  Spink  &  Co.,  Calcutta. 

INDEX  TO  GENERAL  PUBLICATIONS. 

PAGE 

All,  Critical  Exposition  of  "Jihad"  ...         ...         ...         ...         ...  16 

Aliph  Cheem,  Lays  of  Ind          4 

Anderson,  Mandalay  to  Momien          ...         ...         ...         ...         ..  16 

Barker,  Tea  Planter's  Life  in  Assam  ...           10 

Beddome,  Ferns  of  India,  Ceylon,  &c. ...         ....         ...         ...         ...  3 

Bell,  Laws  of  Wealth 18 

Beveridge,  Trial  of  Nanda  Kumar       19 

Bignold,  Leviora              ..         ...         ...         ...         ...         ...         ...  21 

Birch,  Management  of  Children  in  India       ...         ...         ...         ...  10 

Bonavia,  Date  Palm  in  India    ...         ...         ...         ...         ...         ...  16 

Bose,  The  Hindoos  as  they  are 13 

Boutflower,  Statics  and  Dynamics        ...         ...         ...         ...         ...  18 

Busteed,  Echoes  from  old  Calcutta      ...         ...         ...            .         ...  9 

C ,  Major,  Indian  Horse  Notes      ...         ...         ...         ...         ...  9 

C ,  Major,  Indian  Notes  about  Dogs         8 

Ceylon  Tea  Estates         10 

City  of  Palaces  to  Ultima  Thule          20 

Cunningham,  Indian  Eras          17 

Duke,  Banting  in  India             15 

Duke,  Queries  at  a  Mess  Table            15 

Dutt,  Greece  Chunder,  Cherry  Blossoms        ...         ...         ...         ...  19 

Eha,  Tribes  on  my  Frontier      ...         ...         . .           ...         ...         ...  2 

English  Etiquette  for  Indian  Gentlemen        21 

"Field,  Landholding         ...         ...         ...         ...         ...         ...         ...  15 

Firminger,  Gardening  for  India           ...         ...         ...         ...         ...  21 

Fletcher,  Major  Capel 21 

Fletcher,  Poppied  Sleep 17 

Forbes,  British  Burma 16 

Gordon's  City  of  Palaces            ...  17 

Gregg,  Text-Book  of  Indian  Botany    ...         ...          ...          ...         ...  16 

Harris,  Bengal  Medical  Service            17 

Hayes,  Riding  on  the  Flat  and  Across  Country        ...         ...         ...  5 

Hayes,  Veterinary  Notes  for  Horse  Owners  ...         ...         ...         ...  7 

Hayes,  Indian  Racing  Reminiscences ...         ...         ...         ...         ...  8 

Hayes,  Training  and  Horse  Management       7 

Hayes,  On  Tactics          12 

Hayes,  Soundness  in  Horses      ...         ...         ...         ...         ...         ...  19 

Hayes,  Points  of  the  Horse       21 

Hayes,  On  Horse  Breaking        21 

How  Will  it  End  ?          20 

Hum frey,  Horse  Breeding  in  India      ...         ...         ...         ...         ...  9 

Ince,  Guide  to  Kashmir            ...         ...         ...         ...         ...         ...  21 

Indian  Tea  Gardens,  &c.,  A  Complete  List 10 

Jackson,  Statistics  of  Hydraulic  Works,  &c 18 

Keene,  Handbook  to  Agra        18 

Keene,  Handbook  to  Allahabad           ...         ...         ...         ...         ...  18 

Keene,  Handbook  to  Delhi       ...         ...         ...         ...         ...         ...  18 

Kepling,  Departmental  Ditties ...         ...         ...         ...         ...         ...  18 

Kepling,  Plain  Tales  from  the  Hills      20 

Kinloch,  Large  Game  Shooting...          ...         ...         ...         ...         ..  6 

Kuropatkin,  (Gowan)  Kashgaria          ...         ...         ...         ...         ,..  16 


IF.  Thaclcer  &  Co.,  London.  xxxi 


Index  to  General  Publications— continued. 

PAGE 

Lays  of  Ind,  by  Aliph  Cheem  ...         ...         ...         ...         ...         ...  4 

Le  Messurier,  Game,  Shore  and  Water  Birds  of  India         13 

Map  of  Civil  Divisions  of  India            ...         ...         ...         ...         ...  11 

McCrindle,  Ancient  India         ...         ...         ...         ...         ...         ...  17 

Merces,  Indian  and  English  Exchange  Tables           ...         ...         ...  11 

Military  Hand  Book,  Drill  in  Extended  Order          21 

Articles  of  War           ...         ...         Hudson            20 

Musketry  Instruction. „         ...         Dumoulin        ...         ...  21 

Musketry  Made  Easy             ...         Taylor              20 

Sepoy  Officers'  Manual           ...         Barrow            ...         ..  'JO 

Reconnoitrer's  Guide              ...         King-Harman...         ...  11 

Letters  on  Tactics  and  Organization            ...  21 

't\        Tactics Hayrs               12 

Mookerjee,  Memoir  of  Onoocool  Chunder  Mookerjee           ...         ...  13 

Murray-Aynsley,  Hills  beyond  Simla  ...          ...         ...         ...         ...  18 

Norman,  Calcutta  to  Liverpool...         ...         ...         ...         ...         ...  18 

North  am,  Guide  to  Masuri,  &c...         ...         ...         ...         ...         ...  18 

O'Connell,  Ague 17 

O'Donoghue,  Hiding  for  Ladies            5 

Phillips,  Our  Administration  of  India ...         , . ,         ...         ...         ...  11 

Pogson,  Agriculture  for  India  ...         ...         ...         ...         ...         ...  16 

Pollard,  Indian  Tribute  and  the  Loss  by  Exchange              19 

Pollard,  Gold  and  Silver  weighed  in  the  Balance      ...         ...          ...  19 

Pool,  Queen  Victoria      1 7 

Protestant  Missions        ...         ...         ...         ...         ...         ...          ..,  17 

E-eid,  Indigo  Culture  and  Manufacture           ...         ...         ...         ...  12 

Reminiscences  of  Behar ...         ...         ...         ...         ...         ...         ...  20 

Richards,  Landmarks  of  Snake  Poison  Literature     ...           19 

Rowe,  Key  to  Entrance  Course,  1888 19 

Rowe  and  Webb,  Hints  on  the  Study  of  English       ...         ...         ...  14 

Rowe  and  Webb,  Companion  Reader  to  the  Study  of  English         ...  14 

Roxburgh's  Flora  Indica            ...         ...         ...         ...         ...         ...  16 

Sedgwick,  Life 18 

Son  Gruel 18 

Sterndale,  Mammalia  of  India  ...         ...         ...         ...         ...         ...  3 

Sterndale,  Denizens  of  the  Jungles       ...          ...         ...         ...         . .  6 

Sterndale,  Seonee...         ...         ...         ...         ...         ...         ...         ...  19 

Sterndale,  Calcutta  Collectorate            18 

Thacker's  Indian  Directory        ...         ...         ...         ...         ...           .  32 

Thuillier,  Manual  of  Surveying  for  India        ...          ..           ...          ...  13 

Tribes  on  my  Frontier 2 

Tsaya  (Powell)  Myam-Ma         16 

Underwood,  Indian-English  and  Indian  character      ...         ...         ..  19 

Useful  Hints  to  Young  Shikaris           6 

Webb,  English  Etiquette  for  Indian  Gentlemen       21 

Webb,  Indian  Lyrics      ...         ...         ...         ...         ...         ...         ...  14 

Wheeler,  Tales  from  Indian  History 12 

Wilkins,  Hindu  Mythology        8 

Wilkins,  Modern  Hinduism      ...          ...         ...         ..           ...          ...  20 

Wyvern,  Culinary  Jottings        15 


Thacker,  Spink  $  Co.,  Calcutta. 


PUBLISHED  IN  CALCUTTA  ANNUALLY. 

.  Super  Royal  8vo.     Leather  backs,  865. 

TRACKER'S   INDIAN    DIRECTORY, 

Embracing  the  whole  Empire  governed  by  the .  Viceroy  of 
India  and  also  the  Native  States;  with  complete  and  detailed 
information  of  the  Cities  of  Calcutta,  Bombay  and  Madras. 
With  Almanac,  Army  List,  and  general  information. 

"  There  is  no  occasion  to  apologize  for  classing  '  Thacker's  Indian 
Directory  '  with  books  for  review.  It  represents  more  labour  and  thought 
than  many  a  solid  contribution  to  literature,  and  although  it  is  merely  a 
compilation,  no  small  degree  of  industry  and  method  have  been  bestowed 
upon  it.  Every  year  sees  the  Directory  grow  in  size,  and  advance  in 
utility.  This  year  we  have  a  portly  volume  which  suggests  the  possibility 
of  its  shortly  emulating  its  unwieldy  prototype,  Kelly's  London  Directory. 
Before  everything,  the  volume  before  us  is  in  reality  what  it  professes  to 
be — a  Directory  for  India.  Besides  an  enormous  mass  of  information  of 
the  purely  Directory  kind,  which  must  have  taken  a  world  of  labour  to 
collect  and  collate,  the  volume  comprises  complete  Army  Lists  for  Bengal, 
Madras,  and  Bombay,  including  the  volunteers  ;  lists  of  officers  in  the 
various  Government  Departments  ;  lists  of  the  Tea,  Indigo,  Coffee,  and 
other  estates  in  the  country  ;  and  much  valuable  information  regarding 
the  Telegraphs,  Postal  Rules,  Law  Courts,  Charities,  and  a  host  of  other  sub- 
jects. Nothing  more  strikingly  represents  the  change  that  has  come  over 
India  in  recent  years  than  this  great  Directory.  Here  is  seen  at  a  glance 
the  vast  development  of  our  industries,  the  growth  of  the  white  population, 
the  increased  pressure  of  competition,  and  all  the  manifold  interests  which 
go  to  make  up  the  complex  fabric  of  Anglo-Indian  life  in  these  days." — 
Englishman,  Calcutta. 

"  The  work  now  '  includes  in  the  Mof ussil  Directory  an  account  of  every 
district  and  principal  town  in  British  and  Foreign  India  and  every  native 
State,'  thus  forming  a  complete  guide  to  the  whole  of  our  possessions  in  the 
East.  The  value  of  such  a  work,  if  it  is  accurate  and  trustworthy,  is 
obvious  and  almost  goes  without  saying  ;  and,  after  putting  its  pages  to  the 
test  of  a  careful  scrutiny  where  our  personal  experience  enables  us  to  do  so, 
we  are  able  to  pronounce  it  apparently  deserving  of  all  commendation.  .  .  . 
The  alphabetical  list  of  residents  throughout  India  in  the  three  great 
provinces,  with  their  addresses,  must  be  of  great  service  to  those  who  have 
business  with  our  Eastern  Empire." — The  Times  (London). 

"Aims  at  being  a  directory  to  the  whole  of  India.  It  contains  separate 
classified  and  street  directories  of  each  of  the  cities  of  Calcutta,  Bombay, 
and  Madras,  a  remarkably  comprehensive  and  detailed  Mofussil  directory, 
and  a  vast  amount  of  general  information  relating  to  India,  its  government, 
commerce,  postal  arrangements,  festivals,  and  official  establishments.  .  .  . 
The  expansion  of  the  work  will  be  welcomed  as  a  response  to  the  growing 
requirements  of  commerce  with  India." — Manchester  Guardiar. 


W.  I.  Richardson,  Printer,  4  and  5,  Great  Queen  Street,  Lincoln's  Inn  Fields,  W.C. 

1000  I  6  |  88 


RETURN  TO  the  circulation  desk  of  any 
University  of  California  Library 

or  to  the 

NORTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 
Bldg.  400,  Richmond  Field  Station 
University  of  California 
Richmond,  CA  94804-4698 

ALL  BOOKS  MAY  BE  RECALLED  AFTER  7  DAYS 

•  2-month  loans  may  be  renewed  by  calling 
(510)642-6753 

•  1-year  loans  may  be  recharged  by  bringing 
books  to  NRLF 

•  Renewals  and  recharges  may  be  made 
4  days  prior  to  due  date 

DUE  AS  STAMPED  BELOW 


20Q5 


DD20   12M   1-05 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CAUFORNIA  LIBRARY