On the fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason, and On the will in nature; two essays. Translated by Mme. Karl Hillebrand

WILLIAM T FEE

BOHN'S PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY.

TWO ESSAYS

BY

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.

CAMBRIDGE : DEIGHTON, BELL & CO.

NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN co.

BOMBAY : A. H. WHEELER £ CO.

ON

THE FOUEFOLD EOOT OF THE
PEINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT EEASON

AND

ON THE WILL IN NATURE.

TWO ESSAYS BY

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.

TRANSLATED BY MME. KARL HILLEBRAND.

REVISED EDITION.

LONDON

GEOEGE BELL AND SONS
1903

CHISWICK PRESS : CHARLES WHITTINQHAM AND CO.
TOOKS COURT, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON.

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

IN venturing to lay the present translation x before the
public, I am aware of the great difficulties of my task,
and indeed can hardly hope to do justice to the Author.
In fact, had it not been for the considerations I am about
to state, I might probably never have published what had
originally been undertaken in order to acquire a clearer
comprehension of these essays, rather than with a view to
publicity.

The two treatises which form the contents of the present
volume have so much importance for a profound and cor-
rect knowledge of Schopenhauer's philosophy, that it may
even be doubted whether the translation of his chief work,
"Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," can contribute much
towards the appreciation of his system without the help at
least of the " Yierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden
Grande." Schopenhauer himself repeatedly and urgently
insists upon a previous thorough knowledge of Kant's
philosophy, as the basis, and of his own " Fourfold Boot,"
as the key, to his own system, asserting that knowledge to
be the indispensable condition for a right comprehension
of his meaning. So far as I am aware, neither the " Four
fold Root" nor the "Will in Nature " have as yet found
a translator ; therefore, considering the dawning interest
which has begun to make itself felt for Schopenhauer's
philosophy in England and in America, and the fact that

1 From the fourth edition by Julius Frauenstadt. " Fourfold Boot,"
Leipzig, 1875 ; "Will in Nature," Leipzig, 1878.

Tl TRANSLATOR S PREFACE.

no more competent scholar has come forward to do the
work, it may not seem presumptuous to suppose that this
version may be acceptable to those who wish to acquire
a more than superficial knowledge of this remarkable
thinker, yet whose acquaintance with German does not
permit them to read his works in the original.

Now although some portions of both the Essays pub
lished in the present volume have of course become an
tiquated, owing to the subsequent development of the
empirical sciences, while others — such as, for instance,
Schopenhauer's denunciation of plagiarism in the cases of
Brandis and Rosas in the beginning of Physiology and
Pathology 1 — can have no interest for the reader of the pre
sent day, I have nevertheless given them just as he left
them and refrained from all suppression or alteration. And
if, on the whole, the " Will in Nature " may be less indis
pensable for a right understanding of our philosopher's
views than the " Fourfold Root," being merely a record of
the confirmations which had been contributed during his
lifetime by the various branches of Natural Science to
his doctrine, that the thing in itself is the will, the Second
Essay has nevertheless in its own way quite as much im
portance as the First, and is, in a sense, its complement.
For they both throw light on Schopenhauer's view of the
Universe in its double aspect as Will and as Representation,
each being as it were a resume of the exposition of one of
those aspects. My plea for uniting them in one volume, in
spite of the difference of their contents and the wide lapse
of time (seventeen years) which lies between them, must be,
that they complete each other, and that their great weight
and intrinsic value seem to point them out as peculiarly
fitted to be introduced to the English thinker.

In endeavouring to convey the Author's thoughts as he

J See " Will in Nature," pp. 9-18 of the original j pp. 224-234 of the
present translation.

TRANSLATOR S PREFACE. Vll

expresses them, I have necessarily encountered many and
great difficulties. His meaning, though always clearly ex
pressed, is not always easy to seize, even for his countrymen ;
as a foreigner, therefore, I may often have failed to grasp,
let alone adequately to render, that meaning. In this case
besides, the responsibility for any want of perspicuity cannot
be shifted by the translator on to the Author ; since the
consummate perfection of Schopenhauer's prose is univer
sally recognised, even by those who reject, or at least who do
not share, his views. An eminent German writer of our time
has not hesitated to rank him immediately after Lessing
and Gothe as the third greatest German prose-writer, and
only quite recently a German professor, in a speech de
livered with the intent of demolishing Schopenhauer's
philosophy, was reluctantly obliged to admit that his works
would remain on account of their literary value. Gothe
himself expressed admiration for the clearness of exposition
in Schopenhauer's chief work and for the beauty of his style.
The chief obstacle I have encountered in translating these
Essays, did not therefore consist in the obscurity of the
Author's style, nor even in the difficulty of finding appro
priate terms wherewith to convey his meaning ; although at
times certainly the want of complete precision in our philo
sophical terminology made itself keenly felt and the selec
tion was often far from easy : it lay rather in the great diffe
rence in the way of thinking and of expressing their thoughts
which lies between the two nations. The regions of German
and English thought are indeed separated by a gulf, which
at first seems impassable, yet which must be bridged over by
some means or other, if a right comprehension is to be
achieved. The German writer loves to develop syntheti
cally a single thought in a long period consisting of various
members ; he proceeds steadily to unravel the seemingly
tangled skein, while he keeps the reader ever on the alert,
making him assist actively in the process and never letting

Vlll

him lose sight of the main thread. The English author,
on the contrary, anxious before all things to avoid
confusion and misunderstanding, and ready for this end
not only to sacrifice harmony of proportion in construction,
but to submit to the necessity of occasional artificial join
ing, usually adopts the analytical method. He prefers to
divide the thread of his discourse into several smaller
skeins, easier certainly to handle and thus better suiting
the convenience of the English thinker, to whom long
periods are trying and bewildering, and who is not always
willing to wait half a page or more for the point of a
sentence or the gist of a thought. Wherever it could be
done without interfering seriously with the spirit of the
original, I have broken up the longer periods in these essays
into smaller sentences, in order to facilitate their compre
hension. At times however Schopenhauer recapitulates a
whole side of his view of the Universe in a single period
of what seems intolerable length to the English reader :
as, for instance, the resume contained in the Introduction
to his "Will in Nature," l which could not be divided without
damage to his meaning. Here therefore it did not seem
advisable to sacrifice the unity and harmony of his design
and to disturb both his form and his meaning, in order to
minister to the reader's dislike for mental exertion ; in
keeping the period intact I have however endeavoured to
make it as easy to comprehend as possible by the way in
which the single parts are presented to the eye.

As regards the terms chosen to convey the German
meaning, I can hardly hope to have succeeded in every
case in adequately rendering it, still less can I expect to
have satisfied my English readers. Several words of fre
quent occurrence and of considerable importance for the
right understanding of the original, have been used at

1 Pp. 2 and 3 of the original, and pp. 216 to 218 of the present
translation.

IX

different times by different English philosophers in senses
so various, that, until our philosophical terminology has
by universal consent attained far greater precision than at
present, it must always be difficult for the writer or translator
to convey to the reader's mind precisely the same thought
that was in his own. To prevent unnecessary confusion
however, by leaving too much to chance, I will here briefly
state those terms which give most latitude for misappre
hension, explaining the sense in which I employ them and
also the special meaning attached to some of them by
Schopenhauer, who often differs in this from other writers.
They are as follows.

(a..) Anschauung (anschauen, literally 'to behold') I
have rendered differently, according to its double mean
ing in German. When used to designate the mental act by
which an object is perceived, as the cause of a sensation
received, it is rendered by perception. When used to lay
stress upon immediate, as opposed to abstract representa
tion, it is rendered by intuition. This last occurs however
more often in the adjective form.

(b.) Vorstellung (vorstellen, literally * to place before ') I
render by representation in spite of its foreign, unwelcome
sound to the English ear, as being the term which nearest
approaches the G-erman meaning. The faculty of repre
sentation is defined by Schopenhauer himself as " an
exceedingly complicated physiological process in the brain
of an animal, the result of which is the consciousness of a
picture there."

(c.) Auffassung (auffassen, literally ' to catch up ') has so
many shades of meaning in G-erman that it has to be
translated in many different ways according to the relation
in which it stands in the context. It signifies apprehension,
comprehension, perception, viewing and grasping.

(d.) Wahrnehmung (^'^ihrnehmen, from wahr, true, and
nehmen, to take), is translated by apprehension or perception,

according to the degree of consciousness which accom
panies it.

But the two words which have proved most difficult to
translate, have been Vernehmen and Willkuhr.

(e.) Vernehmen means, to distinguish by the sense of
hearing. This word conveys a shade of thought which it
is almost impossible to render in English, because we
have no word by which to distinguish, from mere sen
suous hearing, a sort of hearing which implies more than
hearing and less than comprehension. The French en
tendre comes nearer to it than our hearing, but implies
more comprehension than vernehmen.

(/.) As to Willkuhr (arbitrium, literally 'will-choice'),
after a great deal of consideration I have chosen (relative)
free-will as the nearest approach to the German sense, or at
any rate, to that in which Schopenhauer uses it. Willkuhr
means in fact what is commonly understood as free-will ;
i.e. will with power of choice, will determined by motives
and unimpeded by outward obstacles : arbitrium as opposed
to voluntas: conscious will as opposed to blind impulse.
This relative free-will however is quite distinct from absolute
free-will (liberum arbitrium indiferentice) in a metaphysical
sense, i.e. will in its self -dependency. When its arbitrary
character is specially emphasized, we call Willkuhr, caprice,
but this is not the usual meaning given to it by Schopenhauer.

Besides the meaning of these German words, I have still
to define the sense in which I have used the term idea in
this translation ; for this word has greatly changed its mean
ing at different times and with different authors, and is even
now apt to confuse and mislead. Schopenhauer has himself
contributed in one way to render its signification less
clear ; since, in spite of his declaration in the " Fourfold
Hoot " x to the effect, that he never uses the word idea in

1 See p. 113, § 34 of the original, and p. 133 of the present translation.

any other than its original (Platonic) sense, he has himself
employed it to translate Vorstellung, in a specimen he
gives of a rendering of a passage in Kant's "Prolego
mena" in a letter addressed to Haywood, published in
Gwinner's " Biography of Schopenhauer." This he pro
bably did because some eminent English and French philo
sophers had taken the word in this sense, thinking perhaps
that Kant's meaning would thus be more readily under
stood. As however he uses the word 'idea' everywhere
else exclusively in its original (Platonic) sense, I have pre
ferred to avoid needless confusion by adhering to his own
declaration and definition. Besides, many English writers
of note have protested against any other sense being given
to it, and modern German philosophers have more and
more returned to the original meaning of the term.

Some readers may take exception at such expressions as
a priority, motivation, aseity ; for they are not, strictly
speaking, English words. These terms however belong to
Schopenhauer's own characteristic terminology, and have
a distinct and clearly denned meaning ; therefore they had
to be retained in all cases in which they could not be
evaded, in order not to interfere with the Author's intention :
a necessity which the scholar will not fail to recognise,
especially when I plead in my defence that fidelity and
accuracy have been my sole aim in this work.

If moreover Carlyte's words, " He who imports into his
own country any true delineation, any rationally spoken
word on any subject, has done well," are true, I may also be
absolved from censure, if I lay before the public this version
of some important utterances of a great thinker, in the
hope that it may be an assistance in, and an incitement to,
a deeper study of all Schopenhauer's works.

THE TRANSLATOR.

May, 1888.

CONTENTS.

ON THE FOUBFOLD EOOT OF THE PRINCIPLE
OF SUFFICIENT EEASON.

CHAP. PAGE

Translator's Preface . v

Author's Preface to the Second Edition .... xvii

Editor's Preface to the Third Edition xx
Editor's Preface to the Fourth Edition e . . xxviii

I. Introduction 1

II. General Survey of the most important views hitherto held

concerning the Principle of Sufficient Reason . . 6

III. Insufficiency of the Old and outlines of a New Demon

stration 28

IV. On the First Glass of Objects for the Subject, and that form

of the Principle of Sufficient Reason which predominates

in it 31

V. On the Second Class of Objects for the Subject and that
form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason which pre
dominates in it 114

VI. On the Third Class of Objects for the Subject and that
form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason which pre
dominates in it 153

VII. On the Fourth Class of Objects for the Subject, and that
form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason which pre
dominates in it 165

VIIL General observations and results .... 177

xiv CONTENTS.

ON THE WILL IN NATUKE.

PAGE

Preface to the Second Edition 193

Editor's Preface to the Third Edition 213

Editor's Preface to the Fourth Edition 214

Introduction 215

Physiology and Pathology 224

Comparative Anatomy 252

Physiology of Plants 281

Physical Astronomy 305

Linguistic 322

Animal Magnetism and Magic 326

Sinology 359

Eeference to Ethics . . .372

Conclusion , . • ,378

ON THE FOUKFOLD ROOT

OF THK

PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT EEASON,

A PHILOSOPHICAL TREATISE.

Nat /id rbv afttr'tpy, ^VX^ irapadovra rcrpajcrvv,
Ilaydv dei'dou <f>v

THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE
SECOND EDITION.

THIS treatise on Elementary Philosophy, which first
appeared in the year 1813, when it procured for me
the degree of doctor, afterwards became the substructure
for the whole of my system. It cannot, therefore, be
allowed to remain out of print, as has been the case,
without niy knowledge, for the last four years.

On the other hand, to send a juvenile work like this
once more into the world with all its faults and blemishes,
seemed to me unjustifiable. For I am aware that the
time cannot be very far off when all correction will be
impossible ; but with that time the period of my real
influence will commence, and this period, I trust, will
be a long one, for I firmly rely upon Seneca's promise:
" Etiamsi omnibus tecum viventibus silentium livor in-
dixerit ; venient qui sine offensa, sine gratia judicent" T I
have done what I could, therefore, to improve this work
of my youth, and, considering the brevity and uncertainty
of life, I must even regard it as an especially fortunate
circumstance, to have been thus permitted to correct in
my sixtieth year what I had written in my twenty- sixth.

Nevertheless, while doing this, I meant to deal leniently
with my younger self, and to let him discourse, nay, even
speak his mind freely, wherever it was possible. But

1 Seneca, Ep. 79.
6

XV111 THE AUTHOR S PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

wherever he had advanced what was incorrect or super
fluous, or had even left out the best part, I have been
obliged to interrupt the thread of his discourse. And
this has happened often enough ; so often, indeed, that
some of my readers may perhaps think they hear an old
man reading a young man's book aloud, while he frequently
lets it drop, in order to indulge in digressions of his own
on the same subject.

It is easy to see that a work thus corrected after so long
an interval, could never acquire the unity and rounded
completeness which only belong to such as are written in
one breath. So great a difference will be found even in style
and expression, that no reader of any tact can ever be in
doubt whether it be the older or younger man who is speak
ing. For the contrast is indeed striking between the mild,
unassuming tone in which the youth — who is still simple
enough to believe quite seriously that for all whose pur
suit is philosophy, truth, and truth alone, can have im
portance, and therefore that whoever promotes truth is
sure of a welcome from them — propounds his arguments
with confidence, and the firm, but also at times somewhat
harsh voice of the old man, who in course of time has
necessarily discovered the true character and real aims of
the noble company of mercenary time-servers into which
he has fallen. Nay, the just reader will hardly find fault
with him should he occasionally give free vent to his
indignation; since we see what comes of it when people
who profess to have truth for their sole aim, are always
occupied in studying the purposes of their powerful
superiors, and when the e quovis ligno fit Mercurius is
extended even to the greatest philosophers, and a clumsy
charlatan, like Hegel, is calmly classed among them ?
Verily German Philosophy stands before us loaded with
contempt, the laughing-stock of other nations, expelled
from all honest science — like the prostitute who sells her-

THE AUTHOR S PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. XIX

self for sordid hire to-day to one, to-morrow to another ;
and the brains of the present generation of savants are
disorganised by Hegelian nonsense : incapable of reflec
tion, coarse and bewildered, they fall a prey to the low
Materialism which has crept out of the basilisk's egg.
Good speed to them. I return to my subject.

My readers will thus have to get over the difference of
tone in this treatise ; for I could not do here what I had
done in my chief work, that is, give the later additions I
had made in a separate appendix. Besides, it is of no
consequence that people should know what I wrote in my
twenty-sixth and what in my sixtieth year ; the only matter
of real importance is, that those who wish to find their way
through the fundamental principles of all philosophizing,
to gain a firm footing and a clear insight, should in these
few sheets receive a little volume by which they may learn
something substantial, solid, and true : and this, I hope,
will be the case. From the expansion now given to some
portions, it has even grown into a compendious theory of
the entire faculty of knowing, and this theory, by limiting
itself strictly to the research of the Principle of Sufficient
Reason, shows the matter from a new and peculiar side ;
but then it finds its completion in the First Book of " The
World as Will and Representation," together with those
chapters of the Second Volume which refer to it, and also
in my Critique of Kantian Philosophy.

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER

FRANKFURT AM MAIN,

September, 1847.

EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE THIRD
EDITION.

IN the present volume I lay before the public the Third
Edition of the " Fourfold Root," including the emenda
tions and additions left by Schopenhauer in his own inter
leaved copy. I have already had occasion elsewhere to
relate that he left copies of all his works thus interleaved,
and that he was wont to jot down on these fly-leaves
any corrections and additions he might intend inserting in
future editions.

Schopenhauer himself prepared for the press all that
has been added in the present edition, for he has indicated,
by signs in the original context corresponding to other
similar signs in the MS. passages, the places where he
wished his additions to be inserted. All that was left for
me to do, was to give in extended form a few citations he
had purposed adding.

No essential corrections and additions, such as might
modify the fundamental thoughts of the work, will be
found in this new edition, which simply contains cor
rections, amplifications, and corroborations, many of them
interesting and important. Let me take only a single
instance : § 21, on the " Intellectual Nature of Empirical
Perception." As Schopenhauer attached great importance
to his proof of the intellectual nature of perception, nay,
believed he had made a new discovery by it, he also
worked out with special predilection all that tended to

XXI

support, confirm, and strengthen it. Thus we find him in
this § 21 quoting an interesting fact he had himself ob
served in 1815 ; then the instances of Caspar Hauser and
others (taken from Franz's book, " The Eye," &c. &c.) ;
and again the case of Joseph Kleinhaus, the blind sculptor ;
and finally, the physiological confirmations he has found
in Flourens* " De la vie et de 1' intelligence des Animaux."
An observation, too, concerning the value of Arithmetic
for the comprehension of physical processes, which is in
serted into this same paragraph, will be found very re
markable, and may be particularly recommended to those
who are inclined to set too high a value on calculation.

Many interesting and important additions will be found
in the other paragraphs also.

One thing I could have wished to see left out of this
Third Edition: his effusions against the "professors of
philosophy." In a conversation with Schopenhauer in
the year 1847, when he told me how he intended to
" chastise the professors of philosophy," l I expressed
my dissent on this point ; for even in the Second Edition
these passages had interrupted the measured progress of
objective inquiry. At that time, however, he was not to be
persuaded to strike them out ; so they were left to be
again included in this Third Edition, where the reader
will accordingly once more find them, although times have
changed since then.

Upon another point, more nearly touching the real
issue, I had a controversy with Schopenhauer in the year
1852. In arguing against Fichte's derivation of the Non-
Ego from the Ego in his chief work,2 he had said : —

1 See " Arthur Schopenhauer. Von ihm ; u jer ihn. Ein Wort der
Vertheidigung," von Ernst Otto Lindner, and " Memorabilien, Briefe und
Nachlassstiicke," von Julius Frauenstadt (Berlin, 1863), pp. 163-165.

2 Schopenhauer, " Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," second
edition, i.t 37 (third edition, i., 39).

xxn EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION.

"Just as if Kant had never existed, the Principle of
Sufficient Eeason still remains with Fichte what it was with
all the Schoolmen, an ceterna veritas : that is to say, just as
the G-ods of the ancients were still ruled over by eternal
Destiny, so was the God of the Schoolmen still ruled over
by these ceterna veritates, i.e., by the metaphysical, mathe
matical, and metalogical truths, and even, according to
some, by the validity of the moral law. These veritates
alone were unconditioned by anything, and God, as well
as the world, existed through their necessity. Thus with
Fichte the Ego, according to the Principle of Sufficient
Reason, is the reason of the world or of the Non-Ego, of
the Object, which is the product or result of the Ego itself.
He took good care, therefore, neither to examine nor to
check the Principle of Sufficient Eeason any farther. But
if I had to indicate the particular form of this principle by
which Fichte was guided in making the Ego spin the Non-
Ego out of itself, as the spider its web, I should point to
the Principle of the Sufficient Eeason of Being in Space ;
for nothing but a reference to this principle gives any sort
of sense or meaning to his laboured deductions of the way
in which the Ego produces and manufactures the Non-Ego
out of itself, which form the contents of the most senseless
and — simply on this account — most tiresome book ever
written. The only interest this Fichteian philosophy has
for us at all — otherwise it would not be worth mentioning
— lies in its being the tardy appearance of the real anti
thesis to ancient Materialism, which was the most con
sistent starting from the Object, just as Fichte's philosophy
was the most consistent starting from the Subject. As
Materialism overlooked the fact, that with the simplest
Object it forthwith posited the Subject also ; so Fichte
not only overlooked the fact, that with the Subject (what
ever name he might choose to give it) he had already
posited the Object also, because no Subject can be thought

XX111

without it ; lie likewise overlooked the fact, that all deri
vation a priori, nay, all demonstration whatsoever, rests
upon a necessity, and that all necessity itself rests entirely
and exclusively on the Principle of Sufficient Reason, be
cause to be necessary, and to result from a given reason,
are convertible terms ; that the Principle of Sufficient
Reason is still nothing but the common form of the
Object as such : therefore that it always presupposes the
Object and does not, as valid before and independently of
it, first introduce it, and cannot make the Object arise in
conformity with its own legislation. Thus this starting
from the Object and the above-mentioned starting from
the Subject have in common, that both presuppose what
they pretend to derive : i.e., the necessary correlate of their
starting-point."

This last assertion" that the Principle of Sufficient Reason
already presupposes the Object, but does not, as valid before
and independently of it, first introduce it, and cannot make
the Object arise in conformity with its own legislation,"
seemed to me so far to clash with the proof given by
Schopenhauer in § 21 of the "Fourfold Root," as, accord
ing to the latter, it is ike function of the Subject's under
standing which primarily creates the objective world out
of the subjective feelings of the sensuous organs by the
application of the Principle of Sufficient Reason ; so that
all that is Object, as such, after all comes into being only
in conformity with the Principle of Sufficient Reason, conse
quently that this principle cannot, as Schopenhauer asserted
in his polemic against Fichte, already presuppose the Object.
In 1852, therefore, I wrote as follows to Schopenhauer : —

" In your arguments against Fichte, where you say that
the Principle of Sufficient Reason already presupposes the
Object, and cannot, as valid before and independently of it,
first introduce it, the objection occurred to me anew, that
in your " Fourfold Root " you had made the Object of per-

xxiv EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION.

ception first come into being through the application of the
Principle of Sufficient Eeason, and that you yourself, there
fore, derive the Object from the Subject, as, for instance,
p. 73 of the " Fourfold Root " (2nd edition). How then can
you maintain against Fichte that the Object is always pre
supposed by the Subject ? I know of no way of solving
this difficulty but the following: The Subject only pre
supposes in the Object what belongs to the thing in itself,
what is inscrutable ; but it creates itself the representation of
the Object, i.e. that by which the thing in itself becomes
phenomenon. For instance, when I see a tree, my Subject
assumes the thing in itself of that tree ; whereas the repre
sentation of it conversely presupposes the operation of my
Subject, the transition from the effect (in my eye) to its
cause."

To this Schopenhauer replied as follows on the 12th of
July, 1852 :—

" Your answers (to the objection in question) are not the
right ones. Here there cannot yet be a question of the
thing in itself, and the distinction between representation
and object is inadmissible : the world is representation.
The matter stands rather as follows — Fichte' s derivation
of the Non-Ego from the Ego, is quite abstract : — A = A,
ergo, 1 = 1, and so forth. Taken in an abstract sense, the
Object is at once posited with the Subject. For to be
Subject means, to know; and to know means, to have
representations. Object and representation are one and
the same thing. In the " Fourfold Root," therefore, I
have divided all objects or representations into four classes,
within which the Principle of Sufficient Reason always
reigns, though in each class under a different form ; never
theless, the Principle of Sufficient Eeason always presup
poses the class itself, and indeed, properly speaking, they co
incide.1 Now, in reality, the existence of the Subject of
See " Die Welt a. W. u. V.," vol. ii. pp. 17-21, and vol. i. p. 39 of

XXV

knowing is not an abstract existence. The Subject does not
exist for itself and independently, as if it had dropped
from the sky ; it appears as the instrument of some indi
vidual phenomenon of the Will (animal, human being),
whose purposes it is destined to serve, and which thereby
now receives a consciousness, on the one hand, of itself, on
the other hand, of everything else. The question next
arises, as to how or out of what elements the representation
of the outer world is brought about within this conscious
ness. This I have already answered in my "Theory of
Colours " and also in my chief work,1 but most thoroughly
and exhaustively of all in the Second Edition of the " Four
fold Root," § 21, where it is shown, that all those elements
are of subjective origin ; wherefore attention is especially
drawn to the great difference between all this and Fichte's
humbug. For the whole of my exposition is but the full
carrying out of Kant's Transcendental Idealism." 2

I have thought it advisable to give this passage of his
letter, as being relevant to the matter in question. As to the
division in chapters and paragraphs, it is the same in this
new edition as in the last. By comparing each single

the second edition. (The passages referred to by Schopenhauer in the
second edition are in the third edition vol. ii. pp. 18-21, and vol. i. p. 40).

1 Die Welt a. W. u. V., vol. i. p. 22 et seqq., and vol. ii. chap. ii. of the
second edition 5 vol. i. p. 22, § 6, and vol. ii. chap. ii. of the third edition.

2 The passage I have quoted above from Schopenhauer's letter is also
to be found among the letters published in my book, " Arthur Schopen
hauer. Von ihm, liber ihn, u. s. w.," p. 541 et seqq,, and it results from
this, as well as from several other letters which likewise deal with
important and knotty points in his philosophy, that this correspondence
may perhaps not be quite so worthless and unimportant as many —
among them Gwinner, in his pamphlet, " Schopenhauer und seine
Freunde" (Leipzig, 1863) — represent it to be. This pamphlet of Gwin-
ners, by the way, has met with the treatment it deserves in the Pre
face to the collection, " Aus Arthur Schopenhauer's handschriftlichen
Aphorismen und Nachlass. Abhandlungen, Anmerkungen, Fragmente,"
(Leipzig, 1864).

xxvi EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION.

paragraph of the second with the same paragraph of the
present edition, it will be easy to find out what has been
newly added. In conclusion, however, I will still add a
short list of the principal passages which are new.

LIST OP ADDITIONS TO THE THIRD EDITION.

§ 8, p. 13, the passages from " Notandum," &c., to " Ex
necessitate" and p. 14, from " Zundchst adoptirt " down to
the end of the page (English version, p. 14, " Not." &c., to
"Ex nee"; p. 15, from "First he adopts" down to the
end of the paragraph, p. 16, " est causa sui"), in confirma
tion of his assertion that Spinoza had interchanged and
confounded the relation between reason of knowledge and
consequent, with that between cause and effect.

§ 9, p. 17, from " er proUamirt " down to " gewusst haben
wird" (E. v., § 9, p. 19, from " He proclaims it " down to
" by others before.")

§ 20, p. 42, in speaking of reciprocity (WecJiselwirJcung),
from the words " Ja, wo einem Schreiber " down to " ins
Bodenlose gerathen sei." (E. v., § 20, p. 45, from " Nay, it is
precisely" down to " his depth.")

§ 21, p. 61, the words at the bottom, " und raumlich Jcon-
struirt" down to p. 62, " Data erhalt," together with the
quotation concerning the blind sculptor, J. Kleinhaus.
(E. v., § 21, p. 67, the words " and constructs in Space "
down to " of the Understanding,") and the note.

§ 21, pp. 67-68, from " Ein specieUer und interessanter
Beleg" down to " alb ernes Zeug dazu." (E. v., § 21,
p. 73, "I will here add" down to p. 74, "followed by
twaddle.")

§ 21, p. 73, sq., the instances of Caspar Hauser, &c., from
Franz, " The Eye," &c., and the physiological corrobora-
tions from Flourens, " De la vie et de I'intelligence" &c.
(E. v., p. 80, and following.)

EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION, xxvii

§ 21, p. 77, the parenthesis on the value of calculation.
(E. v., p. 83, " All comprehension," &c.)

§ 21, p. 83, the words " da ferner Substanz" down to
" das WirJcen in concrete." (E. v., § 21, p. 90, " Substance
and Matter " down to "in concrete")

§ 29, p. 105, the words "im Lateinischen" down to
" erJcannte." (E. v., § 29, p. 116, from " In Latin" down

tO " KUT l^O-^IJV.")

§ 34, p. 116, the words " Ueberall ist " down to " Praxis
und Theorie" (E. v., § 34, p. 128, the words " Seasonable
or Rational " down to " theory and practice.")

§ 34, p. 121, the verses from Gothe's " West-Ostlicher
Divan."

§ 34, p. 125, AnmerJcung,t]i.e words " Auch ist Brahma "
down to " die erstere," and p. 126, the quotation from I. J.
Schmidt's " Forschungen." (E. v., § 34, p. 138, note,
" Brahma is also " down to " first of these,")

§ 34, p. 127, the words from " Aber der naive " down to
"judaisirten gouverneurs " (E. v., § 34, p. 150, sentence be
ginning " But the artless " down to " infancy," and the
Greek quotation from Plutarch in the note.)

§ 34, p. 128, the words from " Ganz ubereinstimmend "
down to " uberfliissige sein soil." (E. v., p. 151, from
" J. F. Davis " down to " superfluous.")

§ 45, p. 147, the words " Eben daher Jcommt es " down to
" sich erhalt." (E. v., § 45, p. 163, " It is just for this
reason too " down to " their possession.")

§ 45, p. 149, the words " Man suche Das" &c., down to
" gelesen haben." (E. v., § 45, p. 164, from " We should "
down to " read in books.")

§ 49, p. 154, the words " Der bei den Philosophastern,"
down to " zu kontroliren sind" (E. v., § 49, p. 169, from
the words " The conception of our," &c., down to "by per
ception.")

§ 50, p. 156, the words " Denn der Satz vom Grunde "

down to " nur sich selbst nicht" (E. v., § 50, p. 172, from
"For the Principle of Sufficient Eeason," &c., down to
" everything else.")

§ 52, p. 158, the words " Der allgemeine Sinn des Satzes
vom Grunde," down to " der Kosmologische Beweis ist."
(E. v., § 52, p. 173, from " The general meaning " down to
" the Cosmological Proof.")

JULIUS FBAUENSTADT.

BEKLIN, August , 1864.

EDITOR'S PEEFACE TO THE FOURTH
EDITION.

THE present Fourth Edition is of the same content as
the Third ; therefore it contains the same corrections
and additions which I had already inserted in the Third
Edition from Schopenhauer's own interleaved copy of this
work.

JULIUS FBAUENSTADT.
BERLIN, September, 1877,

ON THE FOURFOLD EOOT

OF THE

PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. The Method.

THE divine Plato and the marvellous Kant unite their
mighty voices in recommending a rule, to serve as
the method of all philosophising as well as of all other
science.1 Two laws, they tell us : the law of homogeneity
and the law of specification, should be equally observed,
neither to the disadvantage of the other. The law of
homogeneity directs us to collect things together into kindr,
by observing their resemblances and correspondences, to
collect kinds again into species, species into genera, and
so on, till at last we come to the highest all-comprehensive
conception. Now this law, being transcendental, i.e. es
sential to our Reason, takes for granted that Nature con
forms with it : an assumption which is expressed by the
ancient formula, entia prceter necessitatem non esse multi-

1 Platon, "Phileb." pp. 219-223. "Politic." 62, 63. "Phsedr."
3G1-363, ed. Bip. Kant, " Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Anhang znr
transcend. Dialektik." English Translation by F. Max Miiller. " Ap
pendix to the Transc. Dialectic." pp. 551, and seqq.

B

2 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. I.

plicanda. As for tlie law of specification, Kant expresses
it thus: entium varietates non temere esse minuendas. It
requires namely, that we should clearly distinguish one
from another the different genera collected under one com
prehensive conception; likewise that we should not con
found the higher and lower species comprised in each
genus ; that we should be careful not to overleap any, and
never to classify inferior species, let alone individuals,
immediately under the generic conception : each concep
tion being susceptible of subdivision, and none even
coming down to mere intuition. Kant teaches that both
laws are transcendental, fundamental principles of our
Reason, which postulate conformity of things with them
a priori; and Plato, when he tells us that these rules
were flung down from the seat of the gods with the Pro
methean fire, seems to express the same thought in his
own way.

§ 2. Application of the Method in the present case.

In spite of the weight of such recommendations, I find
that the second of these two laws has been far too rarely
applied to a fundamental principle of all knowledge : the
Principle of Sufficient Reason. For although this principle
has been often and long ago stated in a general way, still^
sufficient distinction has not been made between its ex
tremely different applications, in each of which it acquires
a new meaning ; its origin in various mental faculties thus
becoming evident. If we compare Kant's philosophy with
all preceding systems, we perceive that, precisely in the
observation of our mental faculties, many persistent errors
have been caused by applying the principle of homogeneity,
while the opposite principle of specification was neglected ;
whereas the law of specification has led to the greatest and
most important results. I therefore crave permission to

INTRODUCTION. 3

quote a passage from Kant, in which the application of
the law of specification to the sources of our knowledge is
especially recommended ; for it gives countenance to my
present endeavour : —

" It is of the highest importance to isolate various sorts
of knowledge, which in kind and origin are different from
others, and to take great care lest they be mixed up with
those others with which, for practical purposes, they are
generally united. What is done by the chemist in the
analysis of substances, and by the mathematician in pure
mathematics, is far more incumbent on the philosopher,
in order to enable him to define clearly the part which, in
the promiscuous employment of the understanding, belongs
to a special kind of knowledge, as well as its peculiar value
and influence." *

§ 3. Utility of this Inquiry.

Should I succeed in showing that the principle which
forms the subject of the present inquiry does not issue
directly from one primitive notion of our intellect, but
rather in the first instance from various ones, it will then
follow, that neither can the necessity it brings with it, as a
firmly established a priori principle, be one and the same
in all cases, but must, on the contrary, be as manifold as
the sources of the principle itself. Whoever therefore
bases a conclusion upon this principle, incurs the obligation
of clearly specifying on which of its grounds of necessity he
founds his conclusion and of designating that ground by
a special name, such as I am about to suggest. I hope
that this may be a step towards promoting greater lucidity
and precision in philosophising ; for I hold the extreme

1 Kant, " Krit. d. r. V. Methodenlehre. Drittes Hauptstiick," p. 842
of the 1st edition. Engl. Tr. by F. M. Miiller. " Architectonic of Pure
Reason," p. 723.

4 THE FOTTBFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. I.

clearness to be attained by an accurate definition of each
single expression to be indispensable to us, as a defence
both against error and against intentional deception, and
also as a means of securing to ourselves the permanent,
unalienable possession of each newly acquired notion within
the sphere of philosophy beyond the fear of losing it
again on account of any misunderstanding or double
meaning which might hereafter be detected. The true
philosopher will indeed always seek after light and perspi
cuity, and will endeavour to resemble a Swiss lake — which
through its peacefulness is enabled to unite great depth
with great clearness, the depth revealing itself precisely
by the clearness — rather than a turbid, impetuous moun
tain torrent. " La clarte est la bonne foi des philosophies"
says Vauvenargues. Pseudo-philosophers, on the con
trary, use speech, not indeed to conceal their thoughts,
as M. de Talleyrand has it, but rather to conceal the
absence of them, and are apt to make their readers
responsible for the incomprehensibility of their systems,
which really proceeds from their own confused thinking.
This explains why in certain writers — Schelling, for instance
— the tone of instruction so often passes into that of re
proach, and frequently the reader is even taken to task
beforehand for his assumed inability to understand.

§ 4. Importance of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.

Its importance is indeed very great, since it may truly
be called the basis of all science. For by science we un
derstand a system of notions, i.e. a totality of connected,
as opposed to a mere aggregate of disconnected, notions.
But what is it that binds together the members of a system,
if not the Principle of Sufficient Reason? That which
distinguishes every science from a mere aggregate is pre
cisely, that its notions are derived one from another as from

INTRODUCTION. 5

their reason. So it was long ago observed by Plato : KUI
yap ai £o£cu at a\T]6£ls ov TroXXov a£mt eiffiv, ZWQ av TLQ avrag
drjcrrj airlae Xoyioyj J (etiam opiniones verce non multi pretii
sunt, donee quis illas ratiocinatione a causis ducta liget).1
Nearly every science, moreover, contains notions of causes
from which the effects may be deduced, and likewise other
notions of the necessity of conclusions from reasons, as
will be seen during the course of this inquiry. Aristotle
has expressed this as follows: nava {.-moT^^rj Biavo^riKrj, ?}
Kal jj.£Tt^ovffa TL ZiavoiaQ, irepl airiaq KO\ dp^ag Ian (omnis
intellectualis scientia, sive aliquo modo intellects, participans,
circa causas et principia est)* Now, as it is this very
assumption a priori that all things must have their
reason, which authorizes us everywhere to search for the
why, we may safely call this tvhy the mother of all science.

§ 5. The Principle itself.

We purpose showing further on that the Principle of
Sufficient Reason is an expression common to several a
priori notions. Meanwhile, it must be stated under some
formula or other. I choose Wolf's as being the most
comprehensive : Nihil est sine ratione cur potius sit, quam
non sit. Nothing is without a reason for its being.3

1 " Meno." p. 385, ed Bip. " Even true opinions are not of much
value until somebody binds them down by proof of a cause." [Trans
lator's addition.]

2 Aristot. " Metaph." v. 1. "All knowledge which is intellectual or
partakes somewhat of intellect, deals with causes and principles."
[Tr.'s add.]

3 Here the translator gives Schopenhauer's free version of Wolf's
formula

CHAPTEE II.

GENERAL SURVEY OF THE MOST IMPORTANT VIEWS
HITHERTO HELD CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLE OF SUF
FICIENT SEASON.

§ 6. First Statement of the Principle and Distinction between
Two of its Meanings.

A MOKE or less accurately defined, abstract expression
for so fundamental a principle of all knowledge must
have been found at a very early age ; it would, therefore,
be difficult, and besides of no great interest, to determine
where it first appeared. Neither Plato nor Aristotle have
formally stated it as a leading fundamental principle,
although both often speak of it as a self-evident truth.
Thus, with a naivete which savours of the state of innocence
as opposed to that of the knowledge of good and of evil,
when compared with the critical researches of our own
times, Plato says : dvayKaiov, TTCLVTCL TO. yiyvofj.£va Sia nva
airiav yiyvtaQaC TTO)C yap av \wp\g TOVT&V yiyvono ; * (necesse
est, qucecunque fiunt, per aliquam causam fieri : quomodo
enim absque eafierent ?) and then again : TTOLV %e TO yiyvo^vov
VTT' alrlov TIVOQ e£ avuytcrjg yiyveaQai' iravrl yap a^vvaTOv^plg
yivtaiv ^xe~iy3 (quidquid gignitur, ex aliqua causa

1 Platon, " Phileb." p. 240, ed Bip. «* It is necessary that all which
arises, should arise by some cause ; for how could it arise otherwise ? "
[Tr.'s add.]

2 Ibid. " Timseus," p. 302. " All that arises, arises necessarily from
some cause 5 for it is impossible for anything to come into being without
cause." [Tr.'s add.]

GENERAL SURVEY. 7

necessario gignitur: sine causa enim oriri quidquam, im-
possibile est). At the end of his book " De fato," Plutarch
cites the following among the chief propositions of the
Stoics : p,a\iaTa juev /ecu TTOWTOV ILVUL ^6^ei£} TO fj.rj^ev avaiTtMc;
ytyv£cr0at,ctXXa Kara Trpotiyov/ulvaQ aiTiaQ (maxime id primum
esse videbitur, nihil fieri sine causa, sed omnia causis ante-

In the " Analyt. post." i. 2, Aristotle states the principle
of sufficient reason to a certain degree when he says:
i-n-iGTaadat $e oio/ueda tKaarov aTrXwc, orav rriv r alriav
oloueda yivu)<7Keiv,$i'f]V TO Trpayfj.a. tanv, on eKEivov aiTiaeff-iv,
K-ai fj,r] £vce-%£crdai TOVTO aXXwg eivai. (Scire autem putamus
unamquamque rem simpliciter, quum putamus causam cog-
noscere, propter quum res est, ejusque rei causam esse, nee posse
earn aliter se habere.y In his "Metaphysics," moreover,
he already divides causes, or rather principles, a'p^al, into
different kinds,3 of which he admits eight ; but this division
is neither profound nor precise enough. He is, nevertheless,
quite right in saying, Traawv jufv ovv KOLVOV T&V ap^oiy, ro
irpuiTov dvat, oQev f/ eartv, 77 ytVfrat, f/ ytyvoWKrerat.4 (Omnibus
igitur principiis commune est, esse primum, unde aut est, aut
fit, aut cognoscitur.') In the following chapter he distin
guishes several kinds of causes, although somewhat super
ficially and confusedly. In the " Analyt. post." ii. 11, he
states four kinds of causes in a more satisfactory manner :

1 " This especially would seem to be the first principle : that nothing
arises without cause, but [everything] according to preceding causes."
[Tr.'s add.]

2 " We think we understand a thing perfectly, whenever we think we
know the cause by which the thing is, that it is really the cause of
that thing, and that the thing cannot possibly be otherwise." [Tr.'s
add.]

3 Lib. iv. c. 1.

4 " Now it is common to all principles, that they are the first thing
through which [anything] is, or arises, or is understood." [Tr.'s
add.]

8 THE FOURFOLD HOOT. [CHAP. II.

alriai tie. refftrapEQ' pia pev TO n ?iv elvai' pia. tie TO nvwv OVTUV,
dvajKr) TOVTO etvat' tripa. tie, ij TL TT/OUITOV tKivijtre' TtTaprr) ce,
TO T'IVOQ eviKa.1 (Causes autem quatuor sunt: una quce
explicat quid res sit ; alter a, quam, si qucedam sint, necesse
est esse ; tertia, quce quid primum inovit ; quarta id, cujus
gratia.) Now this is the origin of the division of the causes
universally adopted by the Scholastic Philosophers, into
causce materiales, formales, efficientes et finales, as may be
seen in " Suarii disputationes metaphysicae " 2 — a real com
pendium of Scholasticism. Even Hobbes still quotes and
explains this division.3 It is also to be found in another
passage of Aristotle, this time somewhat more clearly and
fully developed (" Metaph." i. 3.) and it is again briefly
noticed in the book " De somno et vigilia," c. 2. As for the
vitally important distinction between reason and cause,
however, Aristotle no doubt betrays something like a con
ception of it in the " Analyt. post." i. 13, where he shows at
considerable length that knowing and proving that a thing
exists is a very different thing from knowing and proving
why it exists : what he represents as the latter, being know
ledge of the cause ; as the former, knowledge of the reason.
If, however, he had quite clearly recognized the difference
between them, he would never have lost sight of it, but would
have adhered to it throughout his writings. Now this is not
the case ; for even when he endeavours to distinguish the
various kinds of causes from one another, as in the passages
I have mentioned above, the essential difference mooted in
the chapter just alluded to, never seems to occur to him
again. Besides he uses the term ainov indiscriminately
for every kind of cause, often indeed calling reasons of know-

1 " There are four causes : first, the essence of a thing itself; second,
the sine qua non of a thing j third, what first put a thing in motion ;
fourth, to what purpose or end a thing is tending." [Tr.'s add.]

2 " Suarii disputationes metaph." Disp. 12, sect. 2 et 3.
» Hobbes, " De corpore," P. ii. c. 10, § 7.

GENERAL SURVEY. 9

ledge, and sometimes even the premisses of a conclusion,
ahiag, as, for instance, in his " Metaph." iv. 18 ; " Rhet."
ii. 2 ; " De plantis," i. p. 816 (ed. Berol.), but more especially
" Analyt. post." i. 2, where he calls the premisses to a con
clusion simply aiTiai TOV o>v/u7re/oa<r^aro£ (causes of the con
clusion). Now, using the same word to express two closely
connected conceptions, is a sure sign that their difference
has not been recognised, or at any rate not been firmly
grasped ; for a mere accidental hornoiiymous designation
of two widely differing things is quite another matter.
No where, however, does this error appear more conspicuously
than in his definition of the sophism non causce ut causa,
Trapa ro prj airiov utg airiov (reasoning from what is not cause
as if it were cause), in the book "De sophisticis elenchis," c. 5.
By UITLOV he here understands absolutely nothing but the
argument, the premisses, consequently a reason of know
ledge ; for this sophism consists in correctly proving the
impossibility of something, while the proof has no bearing
whatever upon the proposition in dispute, which it is never
theless supposed to refute. Here, therefore, there is no ques
tion at all of physical causes. Still the use of the word airiov
has had so much weight with modern logicians, that they
hold to it exclusively in their accounts of the fallacia extra
dictionem, and explain the fallacia non causce ut causa as
designating a physical cause, which is not the case.
Beimarus, for instance, does so, and G-. E. Schultze and
Fries — all indeed of whom I have any knowledge. The
first work in which I find a correct definition of this
sophism, is Twesten's Logic. Moreover, in all other
scientific works and controversies the charge of a fallacia
non causce ut causa usually denotes the interpolation of a
wrong cause.

Sextus Empiricus presents another forcible instance of
the way in which the Ancients were wont universally to con
found the logical law of the reason of knowledge with the

10 THE FOURFOLD HOOT. [CHAP. II.

transcendental law of cause and effect in Nature, persistently
mistaking one for the other. In the 9th Book " Adversus
Mathematicos," that is, the Book " Adversus Physicos," §
204, he undertakes to prove the law of causality, and says :
" He who asserts that there is no cause (a ma), either has
no cause (air/ a) for his assertion, or has one. In the former
case there is not more truth in his assertion than in its
contradiction ; in the latter, his assertion itself proves the
existence of a cause."

By this we see that the Ancients had not yet arrived at
a clear distinction between requiring a reason as the ground
cf a conclusion, and asking for a cause for the occurrence
of a real event. As for the Scholastic Philosophers of
later times, the law of causality was in their eyes an
axiom above investigation : " non inqidrimus an causa sit,
quia nihil est per se notius" says Suarez.1 At the same time
they held fast to the above quoted Aristotelian classification ;
but, as far as I know at least, they equally failed to arrive
at a clear idea of the necessary distinction of which we are
here speaking.

§ 7. Descartes.

For we find even the excellent Descartes, who gave the
first impulse to subjective reflection and thereby became
the father of modern philosophy, still entangled in con
fusions for which it is difficult to account ; and we shall
soon see to what serious and deplorable consequences these
confusions have led with regard to Metaphysics. In the
" Responsio ad secundas objectiones in meditationes deprima
philosophia" axioma i. he says : Nulla res existit, de qua non
possit quceri, qucenam sit causa, cur existat. Hoc enim de
ipso Deo quceri potest, non quod indigeat ulla causa ut existat,

1 Suarez, " Disp." 12, sect. 1.

GENERAL SUE VET. 11

sea quid ipsa ejus naturce immensitas est CAUSA, SIVE RATIO,
propter quam nulla causa indiget ad existendum. Ke ought
to have said : The immensity of God is a logical reason
from which it follows, that Grod needs no cause ; whereas
he confounds the two together and obviously has no clear
consciousness of the difference between reason and cause.
Properly speaking however, it is his intention which mars
his insight. For here, where the law of causality demands
a cause, he substitutes a reason instead of it, because the
latter, unlike the former, does not immediately lead to
something beyond it ; and thus, by means of this very
axiom, he clears the way to the Ontological Proof of the
existence of G-od, which was really his invention, for Anselm
had only indicated it in a general manner. Immediately
after these axioms, of which I have just quoted the first,
there comes a formal, quite serious statement of the Onto
logical Proof, which, in fact, already lies within that axiom,
as the chicken does within the egg that has been long
brooded over. Thus, while everything else stands in need
of a cause for its existence, the immensitas implied in the
conception of the Deity — who is introduced to us upon the
ladder of the Cosmological Proof — suffices in lieu of a
cause or, as the proof itself expresses it : in conceptu entis
summe perfecti existentia necessaria continetur. This, then,
is the sleight-of-hand trick, for the sake of which the con
fusion, familiar even to Aristotle, of the two principal
meanings of the principle of sufficient reason, has been
used directly in majorem Dei gloriam.

Considered by daylight, however, and without prejudice,
this famous Ontological Proof is really a charming joke.
On some occasion or other, some one excogitates a con
ception, composed out of all sorts of predicates, among which
however he takes care to include the predicate actuality or
existence, either openly stated or wrapped up for decency's
sake in some other predicate, such as perfectio, immensitas,

12 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. II.

or something of the kind. Now, it is well known, — that,
from a given conception, those predicates which are essential
to it — i.e., without which it cannot be thought — and like
wise the predicates which are essential to those predicates
themselves, may be extracted by means of purely logical
analyses, and consequently have logical truth : that is, they
have their reason of knowledge in the given conception.
Accordingly the predicate reality or existence is now ex
tracted from this arbitrarily thought conception, and an
object corresponding to it is forthwith presumed to have
real existence independently of the conception.

*' War' der Gedank' nicht so verwiinscht gescheut,
Man war' versucht ihn herzlich dumm zu nennen." *

After all, the simplest answer to such ontological de
monstrations is : " All depends upon the source whence you
have derived your conception : if it be taken from experi
ence, all well and good, for in this case its object exists
and needs no further proof ; if, on the contrary, it has been
hatched in your own sinciput, all its predicates are of no avail,
for it is a mere phantasm. But we form an unfavourable
prejudice against the pretensions of a theology which needed
to have recourse to such proofs as this in order to gain a,
footing on the territory of philosophy, to which it is quite
foreign, but on which it longs to trespass. But oh ! for
the prophetic wisdom of Aristotle ! He had never even
heard of the Ontological Proof ; yet as though he could
detect this piece of scholastic jugglery through the shades
of coming darkness and were anxious to bar the road to it,
he carefully shows a that defining a thing and proving its
existence are two different matters, separate to all eternity ;

i « Were not the thought so cursedly acute,

One might be tempted to declare it silly."
SCHILLER, " Wallenstein-Trilogie. Piccolomini," Act ii. Sc. 7.

• Aristot., " Analyt. post." c. 7,

GENERAL SURVEY. 13

since by the one we learn what it is that is meant, and by
the other that such a thing exists. Like an oracle of the
future, he pronounces the sentence : TO & eivai OVK ovaia
ovCfvi" ov yap yevoQ TO ov : (ESSE autem uullius rei essentia
est, quandoquidem ens non est genus) which means :
" Existence never can belong to the essence of a thing."
On the other hand, we may see how great was Herr von
Schelling's veneration for the Ontological Proof in a long
note, p. 152, of the 1st vol. of his " Philosophische Schriften"
of 1809. We may even see in it something still more in
structive, i.e., how easily G-ermans allow sand to be thrown
in their eyes by impudence and blustering swagger. But for
so thoroughly pitiable a creature as Hegel, whose whole
pseudo-philosophy is but a monstrous amplification of the
Ontological Proof, to have undertaken its defence against
Kant, is indeed an alliance of which the Ontological Proof
itself might be ashamed, however little it may in general
be given to blushing. How can I be expected to speak with
deference of men, who have brought philosophy into con
tempt ? *

§ 8. Spinoza.

Although Spinoza's philosophy mainly consists in the
negation of the double dualism between God and the
world and between soul and body, which his teacher,
Descartes, had set up, he nevertheless remained true to his
master in confounding and interchanging the relation be
tween reason and consequence with that between cause and
effect ; he even endeavoured to draw from it a still greater
advantage for his own metaphysics than Descartes for his,
for he made this confusion the foundation of his whole
Pantheism.

A conception contains implicate all its essential predi
cates, so that they may be developed out of it explicite by
means of mere analytical judgments: the sum total of

14 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. II.

them being its definition. This definition therefore differs
from the conception itself merely in form and not in con
tent ; for it consists of judgments which are all con
tained within that conception, and therefore have their
reason in it, in as far as they show its essence. We may
accordingly look upon these judgments as the conse
quences of that conception, considered as their reason.
Now this relation between a conception and the judg
ments founded upon it arid susceptible of being developed
out of it by analysis, is precisely the relation between
Spinoza's so-called G-od and the world, or rather between
the one and only substance and its numberless accidents
(Deus, sive substantia constans infinitis attributis l — Deus,
sive omnia Dei attributa) . It is therefore the relation in
knowledge of the reason to its consequent ; whereas true
Theism (Spinoza's Theism is merely nominal) assumes
the relation of the cause to its effect, in which the cause
remains different and separate from the consequence, not
only in the way in which we consider them, but really and
essentially, therefore in themselves to all eternity. For
the word God, honestly used, means a cause such as this
of the world, with the addition of personality. An imper
sonal God is, on the contrary, a contradictio in adjecto.
Now as nevertheless, even in the case as stated by him,
Spinoza desired to retain the word God to express sub
stance, and explicitly called this the cause of the world, he
could find no other way to do it than by completely inter
mingling the two relations, and confounding the principle
of the reason of knowledge with the principle of causality.
I call attention to the following passages in corroboration
of this statement. Notandum, dari necessario unius cujus-
que rei existentis certam aliquam CAUSAM, propter quam
existit. Et notandum, hanc causam, propter quam aliqua res
existit, vel debere contineri in ipsa natura et DEFINITIONE
1 Spinoza, " Eth." i. prop. 11.

GENERAL SURVEY. 15

rei existentis (nimirum quod ad ipsius naturam pertinet
existere), vel debere EXTRA ipsam dari.1 In the last case he
means an efficient cause, as appears from what follows,
whereas in the first he means a mere reason of know
ledge ; yet he identifies both, and by this means prepares
the way for identifying God with the world, which is his
intention. This is the artifice of which he always makes
use, and which he has learnt from Descartes. He substi
tutes a cause acting from without, for a reason of know
ledge lying within, a given conception. Ex necessitate
divince naturce omnia, quce sub intellectum infinitum cadere
possunt, sequi debent? At the same time he calls God
everywhere the cause of the world. Quidquid existit Dei
potentiam, quce omnium rerum CAUSA est, exprimit.3 — Deus
est omnium rerum CAUSA immanens, non vero transiens.* —
Deus non tantam est CAUSA EFFICIENS rerum existentice, sed
etiam essentioe.5 — Ex data quacunque IDEA aliquis EFFECTUS
necessario sequi debat.6 — And: Nulla res nisi a causa ex-
terna potest destrui.7 — Demonstr. DEFINITIO cujuscunque
rei, ipsius essentiam (essence, nature, as differing from
existentia, existence), ajjirmat, sed non negat ; sive rei essen
tiam ponit, sed non tollit. Dum itaque ad rem ipsam tan-
turn, non autem ad causas externas altendimus, nihil in
eadem poterimus invenire, quod ipsam possit destruere. This
means, that as no conception can contain anything which
contradicts its definition, i.e., the sum total of its predi
cates, neither can an existence contain anything which
might become a cause of its destruction. This view, how
ever, is brought to a climax in the somewhat lengthy
second demonstration of the llth Proposition, in which
he confounds a cause capable of destroying or anni-

1 Spinoza, " Eth." P. 1. prop. 8, schol. 2.

2 Ibid. Prop. 1 6. 3 Ibid. Prop. 36, dcmonstr.
* Ibid. Prop. 18. 5 Ibid. Prop. 25.

6 « Eth." P. iii. prop. 1, demonstr. 7 Ibid. Prop. 4.

16 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. II.

hilating a "being, with a contradiction contained in its
definition and therefore destroying that definition. His
need of confounding cause with reason here becomes so
urgent, that he can never say causa or ratio alone, but
always finds it necessary to put ratio sen causa. Accord
ingly, this occurs as many as eight times in the same page,
in order to conceal the subterfuge. Descartes had done
the same in the above-mentioned axiom.

Thus, properly speaking, Spinoza's Pantheism is merely
the realisation of Descartes' Ontological Proof. First, he
adopts Descartes' ontotheological proposition, to which we
have alluded above, ipsa naturce Dei immensitas est CAUSA
SIVE RATIO, propter quam nulla causa indiget ad existen-
dum, always saying substantia instead of Deus (in the
beginning) ; and then he finishes by substantice essentia,
necessario involvit existentiam, ergo erit substantia CAUSA
sui.1 Therefore the very same argument which Descartes
had used to prove the existence of God, is used by Spinoza
to prove the existence of the world, — which consequently
needs no God. He does this still more distinctly in the
2nd Scholium to the 8th Proposition : Quoniam ad natu-
ram substantia pertinet existere, debet ejus definitio necessa-
riam existentiam involvere, et consequenter ex sola ejus
definitione debet ipsius existentia concludi. But this sub
stance is, as we know, the world. The demonstration to
Proposition 24 says in the same sense : Id, cujus natura in
se considerata (i.e., in its definition) involvit existentiam, est

CAUSA SUI.

For what Descartes had stated in an exclusively ideal
and subjective sense, i.e., only for us, for cognitive purposes
— in this instance for the sake of proving the existence of
God — Spinoza took in a real and objective sense, as the
actual relation of God to the world. According to Des
cartes, the existence of God is contained in the conception
1 «Eth."P. i. prop. 7.

GENERAL SURVEY. 17

of God, therefore it becomes an argument for his actual
being: according to Spinoza, God is himself contained
in the world. Thus what, with Descartes, was only
reason of knowledge, becomes, with Spinoza, reason of
fact. If the former, in his Ontological Proof, taught
that the existentia of God is a consequence of the essentia
of God, the latter turns this into causa sui, and boldly
opens his Ethics with : per causam sui intelligo id, cujus
essentia (conception) involvit existentiam, remaining deaf
to Aristotle's warning cry, TO c)' elvat OVK ov<ria ovfovi \
Now, this is the most palpable confusion of reason and
cause. And if Neo-Spinozans (Schellingites, Hegelians,
&c.), with whom words are wont to pass for thoughts,
often indulge in pompous, solemn admiration for this
causa sui, for my own part I see nothing but a contra-
dictio in adjecto in this same causa sui, a before that is
after, an audacious command to us, to sever arbitrarily the
eternal causal chain — something, in short, very like the
proceeding of that Austrian, who finding himself unable
to reach high enough to fasten the clasp on his tightly-
strapped shako, got upon a chair. The right emblem for
causa sui is Baron Miinchhausen, sinking on horseback
into the water, clinging by the legs to his horse and pull
ing both himself and the animal out by his own pigtail,
with the motto underneath : Causa sui.

Let us finally cast a look at the 16th proposition of the
1st book of the Ethics. Here we find Spinoza concluding
from the proposition, ex data cujuscunque rei definitione
plures proprietates intellectus concludit, quce revera ex eadem
necessario sequuntur, that ex necessitate divince natural (i.e.,
taken as a reality), infinita infinitis modis sequi debent :
this God therefore unquestionably stands in the same
relation to the world as a conception to its definition. The
corollary, Deum omnium rerum esse CAUSAM EFFICIENTEM,
is nevertheless immediately connected with it. It is im-

c

18 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. II.

possible to carry the confusion between reason and cause
farther, nor could it lead to graver consequences than here.
But this shows the importance of the subject of the present
treatise.

In endeavouring to add a third step to the climax in
question, Herr von Schelling has contributed a small after
piece to these errors, into which two mighty intellects of
the past had fallen owing to insufficient clearness in think
ing. If Descartes met the demands of the inexorable law of
causality, which reduced his God to the last straits, by sub
stituting a reason instead of the cause required, in order thus
to set the matter at rest ; and if Spinoza made a real cause
out of this reason, i.e., causa sui, his God thereby becoming
the world itself : Schelling now made reason and consequent
separate in God himself.1 He thus gave the thing still
greater consistency by elevating it to a real, substantial
hypostasis of reason and consequent, and introducing us
to something " in God, which is not himself, but his
reason, as a primary reason, or rather reason beyond reason
(abyss)." Hoc quidem vere palmarium est. — It is now
known that Schelling had taken the whole fable from
Jacob Bonnie's " Full account of the terrestrial and celes
tial mystery ; " but what appears to me to be less well
known, is the source from which Jacob Bohme himself
had taken it, and the real birth-place of this so-called
abyss, wherefore I now take the liberty to mention it. It
is the fivtioQ, i.e. abyssus, vorago, bottomless pit, reason
beyond reason of the Valentinians (a heretical sect of the
second century) which, in silence — co-essential with itself
— engendered intelligence and the world, as Irenaeus 2 re
lates in the following terms : \iyovai yap nva eivat iv
'ioparote, teal aKarorofiaaroig i/i^a/jua^i riXtiov Aiutva. Trpoovra*
TOVTOV &= /ecu Trpoap^j/v, KOI TrpOTTaropa, Kal fivdov Ka

1 Schelling, a Abhandlung von der menschHchen Freiheit.

2 Irenseus, " Contr. hseres." lib. i. c. 1.

GENERAL SURVEY. 19

SE ctvrov a^wprjrov Kal aopctrov, d'&iov TE Kal
dyiw>]Tov, EV ficrv^fa Kal ripe/ata iro\\rj yEyovlvai iv aVetpoic
ai&ffi "%pov<i)V. Suvi/Trap^fiv $E ai/rw /ecu ' Evvotav, rjv $E Kal
Xaptv, Kdl 2ty//v oro/ud^ovffi' KCti Evvorjdrjvai TTOTE a'0' EO.VTOV
TOV fivdov TOVTOV dp\rjv TUJV TraVrwv, /ecu KaOdiref)

rrjv 7rpo(3o\rjv ravrrjv (^v Trpo/SaXeV^ai ev£Vo//0^) Ko.ds.fr~
6at, &g iv fjiYirpq.) rrj evvvTrap^ovar), kavry 2ty;;. 'TavTrjv ^e,

iJ,lvr)V TO ffTTEppa TOVTO, KOI (yKv/^ova yevofjiEvrjv, drro-

Nouv, o^zotor TE Kdl 'iaov T(f TTiOo/SaXovrt, Kal p.6vov
TO ^iyeOuQ TOV Flarpoe- Tov SE vovv TOIITOV Kal

fj KaXovai, Kal ap^?)v rwv Trcivrwv.1 (IDicunt enim esse
quendam in sublimitatibus illls, quce nee oculis cerni, nee
nominari possunt, perfectum ^Eonem prceexistentem, quern
et proarchen, et propatorem, et Bythum vacant. Eum
autem, quum incomprehensibilis et invisibilis, sempiternus
idem et ingenitus esset, inftnitis temporum seculis in summa,
quiete ac tmnquillitate fuisse. Una etiam cum eo Cogita-
tionem exstitisse, quam et Gratiam et Silentium (Sigeri) nun-
cupant. Hunc porro Bythum in animum aliquando in-
duxisse, rerum omnium initium proferre, atque hanc, quam
in animum induxerat, productionem, in Sigen (silentium)
quce und cum eo erat, non secus atque in vulvam demisisse.
Hanc vero, suscepto hoc semine, prcegnantem effectam pepe-

1 " For they say that in those unseen heights which have no name
there is a pre-existing, perfect ^Eon ; this they also call fore-rule, fore
father and the depth. — They say, that being incomprehensible and in
visible, eternal and unborn, he has existed during endless ./Eons in the
deepest calmness and tranquillity; and that coexisting with him was
Thought, which they also call Grace and Silence. This Depth once be
thought him to put forth from himself the beginning of all things and to
lay that offshoot — which he had resolved to put forth — like a sperm into
the coexisting Silence, as it were into a womb. Now this Silence, being
thus impregnated and having conceived, gave birth to Intellect, a being
which was like and equal to its Creator, and alone able to comprehend
the greatness of its father. This Intellect also they call the Only-be
gotten and the Beginning of all things." [Tr.'s add.]

20 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. II.

risse Intellectum, parenti suo parem et cequalem, atque ita
comparatum, ut solus pater nee magnitudinis capax esset.
Atque Tiunc Intellectum et Monogenem et Patrem et princi-
pum omnium rerum appellant.)

Somehow or other this must have come to Jacob Bohme's
hearing from the History of Heresy, and Herr von Schelling
must have received it from him in all faith.

§ 9. Leibnitz.

It was Leibnitz who first formally stated the Principle
of Sufficient Reason as a main principle of all knowledge
and of all science. He proclaims it very pompously in
various passages of his works, giving himself great airs,
as though he had been the first to invent it ; yet all he
finds to say about it is, that everything must have a suffi
cient reason for being as it is, and not otherwise : and this
the world had probably found out before him. True, he
makes casual allusions to the distinction between its two
chief significations, without, however, laying any particular
stress upon it, or explaining it clearly anywhere ebe. The
principal reference to it is in his " Principia Philosophise,"
§ 32, and a little more satisfactorily in the French version,
entitled " Monadologie " : En vertu du principe de la raisw
suffisante, nous considerons qu'aucun fait ne sauroit se
trouver vrai ou existant, aucune enonciation veritable, sans
qu'il y ait une raison suffisante, pourquoi il en soit aimi et
non pas autrement.1

§ 10. Wolf.

The first writer who explicitly separated the two chit -f
significations of our principle, and stated the difference
between them in detail, was therefore Wolf. Wolf, how-

1 Compare with this § 44 of his " Theodicee," and his 5th letter to
Clarke, § 125.

GENERAL SURVEY. 21

ever, does not place the principle of sufficient reason in
Logic, as is now the custom, but in Ontology. True, in
§ 71 he urges the necessity of not confounding the principle
of sufficient reason of knowing with that of cause and effect ;
still he does not clearly determine here where in the difference
consists. Indeed, he himself mistakes the one for the other ;
for he quotes instances of cause and effect in confirmation
of the principium rationis sttfficientis in this very chapter,
de ratione sufficienie, §§ 70, 74, 75, 77, which, had he really
wished to preserve that distinction, ought rather to have
been quoted in the chapter de causis of the same work.
In said chapter he again brings forward precisely similar
instances, and once more enunciates the principium cogno-
scendi (§ 876), which does not certainly belong to it, having
been already discussed, yet which serves to introduce the im
mediately folio wing clear and definite distinction between this
principle and the law of causality, §§ 881-884. Principium,
he continues, dicitur id, quod in se continet rationem alterius ;
and he distinguishes three kinds : 1. PRINCIPIUM FIENDI
(causa), which he defines as ratio actualitatis alterius, e.g.,
si lapis calescit, ignis aut radii solares sunt rationes, cur
calor lapidi insit. — 2. PRINCIPIUM ESSENDI, which he
defines as ratio possibilitatis alterius; in eodem exemplo,
ratio possibilitatis, cur lapis calorem recipere possit, est
in essentia seu modo compositionis lapidis. This last con
ception seems to me inadmissible. If it has any mean
ing at all, possibility means correspondence with the
general conditions of experience known to us a priori, as
Kant has sufficiently shown. From these conditions we
know, with respect to Wolf's instance of the stone, that
changes are possible as effects proceeding from causes : we
know, that is, that one state can succeed another, if the
former contains the conditions for the latter. In this case
we find, as effect, the state of being warm in the stone ;
as cause, the preceding state of a limited capacity for

22 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. II.

warmth in the stone and its contact with free heat. Now,
Wolf's naming the first mentioned property of this state
principium essendi, and the second, principium fiendi, rests
upon a delusion caused by the fact that, so far as the
stone is concerned, the conditions are more lasting and
can therefore wait longer for the others. That the stone
should be as it is : that is, that it should be chemically so
constituted as to bring with it a particular degree of specific
heat, consequently a capacity for heat which stands in in
verse proportion to its specific heat ; that besides it should,
on the other hand, come into contact with free heat, is
the consequence of a whole chain of antecedent causes,
all of them principia fiendi ; but it is the coincidence of
circumstances on both sides which primarily constitutes
that condition, upon which, as cause, the becoming warm
depends, as effect. All this leaves no room for Wolf's
principium essendi, which I therefore do not admit, and
concerning which I have here entered somewhat into detail,
partly because I mean to use the word myself later on in
a totally different sense ; partly also, because this explana
tion contributes to facilitate the comprehension of the law
of causality. — 3. Wolf, as we have said, distinguishes a
PRINCIPIUM COGNOSCENDI, and refers also under causa to
a causa impulsiva, sive ratio voluntatem determinans.

§ 11. Philosophers between Wolf and Kant.

Baumgarten repeats the Wolfian distinctions in his
" Metaphysica," §§ 20-24, and §§ 306-313.

Eeimarus, in his " Vernunftlehre," x § 81, distinguishes
1. Inward reason, of which his explanation agrees with
Wolf's ratio essendi, and might even be applicable to the
ratio cognoscendi, if he did not transfer to things what only
applies to conceptions ; 2. Outward reason, i.e. causa. — § 120

1 Doctrine of Reason.

GENERAL SURVEY. 23

et ssqq., he rightly defines the ratio cognoscendi as a condition
of the proposition ; but in an example, § 125, he neverthe
less confounds it with cause.

Lambert, in the new Organon, does not mention Wolfs
distinctions ; he shows, however, that he recognizes a diffe
rence between reason of knowledge and cause ; l for he
says that God is the principium essendi of truths, and that
truths are the principia cognoscendi of G-od.

Plattner, in his Aphorisms, § 868, says : " What is called
reason and conclusion within our knowledge (principium
cognoscendi, ratio — rationatum), is in reality cause and effect
(causa efficiens — effectus). Every cause is a reason, every
effect a conclusion." He is therefore of opinion that
cause and effect, in reality, correspond to the conceptions
reason and consequence in our thought ; that the former
stand in a similar relation with respect to the latter as
substance and accident, for instance, to subject and predi
cate, or the quality of the object to our sensation of that
quality, &c. &c. I think it useless to refute this opinion,
for it is easy to see that premisses and conclusion in judg
ments stand in an entirely different relation to one another
from a knowledge of cause and effect ; although in indi
vidual cases even knowledge of a cause, as such, may be
the reason of a judgment which enunciates the effect.2

§ 12. Hume.

No one before this serious thinker had ever doubted
what follows. First, and before all things in heaven and
on earth, is the Principle of Sufficient Eeason in the form
of the Law of Causality. For it is a veritas ceterna : i.e. it is
in and by itself above Gods and Fate; whereas every
thing else, the understanding, for instance, which thinks

1 Lambert, " New Organon," vol. i. § 572.
8 Compare § 36. of this treatise.

24 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. II.

that principle, and no less the whole world and whatever
may be its cause — atoms, motion, a Creator, ei ccetera — is
what it is only in accordance with, and by virtue of, that
principle. Hume was the first to whom it occurred to
inquire whence this law of causality derives its authority,
and to demand its credentials. Everyone knows the result
at which he arrives : that causality is nothing beyond the
empirically perceived succession of things and states in
Time, with which habit has made us familiar. The fallacy
of this result is felt at once, nor is it difficult to refute. The
merit lies in the question itself ; for it became the impulse
and starting-point for Kant's profound researches, and by
their means led to an incomparably deeper and more
thorough view of Idealism than the one which had hitherto
existed, and which was chiefly Berkeley's. It led to transcen
dental Idealism, from which arises the conviction, that the
world is as dependent upon us, as a whole, as we are depen
dent upon it in detail. For, by pointing out the existence of
those transcendental principles, as such, which enable us to
determine a priori, i.e. before all experience, certain points
concerning objects and their possibility, he proved that
these things could not exist, as they present themselves to
us, independently of our knowledge. The resemblanco
between a world such as this and a dream, is obvious.

§ 13. Kant and his School.

Kant's chief passage on the Principle of Sufficient Reason
is in a little work entitled " On a discovery, which is to
permit us to dispense with all Criticism of Pure Reason." 1
Section I., lit. A. Here he strongly urges the distinction
between "the logical (formal) principle of cognition
' every proposition must have its reason,' and the transcen-

1 " Ueber eine Entdeckung, nach der alle Kritik der reinen Vernunft
entbehrlich gemacht werden soil."

GENERAL SURVEY. 25

dental (material) principle 'every thing must have its
cause,' " in his controversy with Eberhard, who had iden
tified them as one and the same. — I intend myself to criticize
Kant's proof of the a priori and consequently transcen
dental character of the law of causality further on in a
separate paragraph, after having given the only true
proof.

With these precedents to guide them, the several writers
on Logic belonging to Kant's school ; Hofbauer, Maass,
Jakob, Kiesewetter and others, have denned pretty accu
rately the distinction between reason and cause. Kiese
wetter, more especially, gives it thus quite satisfactorily : 1
" Reason of knowledge is not to be confounded with reason
of fact (cause). The Principle of Sufficient Eeason belongs
to Logic, that of Causality to Metaphysics.2 The former is
the fundamental principle of thought ; the latter that of
experience. Cause refers to real things, logical reason has
only to do with representations."

Kant's adversaries urge this distinction still more
strongly. Gr. E. Schultze 3 complains that the Principle of
Sufficient Eeason is confounded with that of Causality.
Salomon Maimon 4 regrets that so much should be said
about the sufficient reason without an explanation of what
is meant by it, while he blames Kant 5 for deriving the
principle of causality from the logical form of hypothetical
judgments.

F. H. Jacobi 8 says, that by the confounding of the two
conceptions, reason and cause, an illusion is produced,
which has given rise to various false speculations ; and he
points out the distinction between them after his own

Kiesewetter, "Logik," vol. i. p. 16.

Ibid. p. 60.

G. E. Schultze, " Logik," § 19, Anmerkung 1, und § 63.

Sal. Mairaon, "Logik," p. 20, 21. 6 Ibid. " Vorrede," p. xxiv.

Jacobi, " Briefe iiber dieLehre des Spinoza," Beilage 7, p. 414.

26 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. II.

fashion. Here, however, as is usual with him, we find a
good deal more of self-complacent phrase-jugglery than of
serious philosophy.

How Herr von Schelling finally distinguishes reason
from cause, may be seen in his " Aphorisms introductory
to the Philosophy of Nature," l § 184, which open the first
book of the first volume of Marcus and Schelling's " Annals
of Medecine." Here we are taught that gravity is the
reason and light the cause of all things. This I merely
quote as a curiosity; for such random talk would not
otherwise deserve a place among the opinions of serious
and honest inquirers.

§ 14. On the Proofs of the Principle.

We have still to record various fruitless attempts which
have been made to prove the Principle of Sufficient Eeason,
mostly without clearly defining in which sense it was
taken : Wolf's, for instance, in his Ontology, § 70, repeated
by Baumgarten in his " Metaphysics," § 20. It is useless
to repeat and refute it here, as it obviously rests on a
verbal quibble. Plattner2 and Jakob3 have tried other
proofs, in which, however, the circle is easily detected. I
purpose dealing with those of Kant further on, as I have
already said. Since I hope, in the course of this treatise,
to point out the different laws of our cognitive faculties,
of which the principle of sufficient reason is the common
expression, it will result as a matter of course, that this
principle cannot be proved, and that, on the contrary,
Aristotle's remark : 4 \6yov fyTovai <Lv OVK t<m \oyog.

1 '* Aphorismen zur Einleitung in die Naturphilosophie."

2 Plattner, " Aphorismen," § 828.

3 Jakob, " Logik und Metaphysik," p. 38 (1794).

4 Aristotle, " Metaph." iii. 6. " They seek a reason for that which
has no reason ; for the principle of demonstration is not demonstration."
[Tr.'s add.] Compare with this citation " Analyt. post." i. 2.

GENERAL SURVEY. 27

yap dp\rj OVK aVo£a£te «ort (rationem eorum
qucerant, quorum non est ratio : demonstrationis enim prin-
cipium non est demonstratio) may be applied with equal
propriety to all these proofs. For every proof is a refe
rence to something already recognised ; and if we continue
requiring a proof again for this something, whatever it be,
we at last arrive at certain propositions which express the
forms and laws, therefore the conditions, of all thought and
of all knowledge, in the application of which consequently
all thought and all knowledge consists : so that certainty
is nothing but correspondence with those conditions, forms,
and laws, therefore their own certainty cannot again be
ascertained by means of other propositions. In the fifth
chapter I mean to discuss the kind of truth which belongs
to propositions such as these.

To seek a proof for the Principle of Sufficient Eeason, is,
moreover, an especially flagrant absurdity, which shows a
want of reflection. Every proof is a demonstration of the
reason for a judgment which has been pronounced, and
which receives the predicate true in virtue precisely of that
demonstration. This necessity for a reason is exactly what
the Principle of Sufficient Eeason expresses. Now if we
require a proof of it, or, in other words, a demonstration of
its reason, we thereby already assume it to be true, nay,
we found our demand precisely upon that assumption, and
thus we find ourselves involved in the circle of exacting a
proof of our right to exact a proof.

CHAPTEE

INSUFFICIENCY OF THE OLD AND OUTLINES OF A NEW
DEMONSTRATION.

§ 15. Cases which are not comprised among the old estdb-
lished meanings of the Principle.

FEOM the summary given in the preceding chapter we
gather, that two distinct applications of the principle
of sufficient reason have been recognized, although very
gradually, very tardily, and not without frequent relapses
into error and confusion : the one being its application to
judgments, which, to be true, must have a reason ; the
other, its application to changes in material objects, which
must always have a cause. In both cases we find the
principle of sufficient reason authorizing us to ask why ? a
quality which is essential to it. But are all the cases in
which it authorizes us to ask why comprised in these two
relations? If I ask: Why are the three sides of this
triangle equal ? the answer is : Because the three angles
are so. Now, is the equality of the angles the cause of the
equality of the sides? No; for here we have to do with
no change, consequently with no effect which must have a
cause. — Is it merely a logical reason ? No ; for the equality
of the angle is not only a proof of the equality of the
sides, it is not only the foundation of a judgment : mere
conceptions alone would never suffice to explain why the
sides must be equal, because the angles are so ; for the
conception of the equality of the sides is not contained in
that of the equality of the angles. Here therefore we

THE OLD AND NEW DEMONSTRATION. 29

have no connection between conceptions and judgments,
but between sides and angles. The equality of the angles
is not the direct, but the indirect reason, by which we know
the equality of the sides ; for it is the reason why a thing
is such as it is (in this case, that the sides are equal) : the
angles being equal, the sides must therefore be equal.
Here we have a necessary connection between angles and
sides, not a direct, necessary connection between two
judgments. — Or again, if I ask why infecta facta, but never
facta infecta fieri possunt, consequently why the past is
absolutely irrevocable, the future inevitable, even this does
not admit of purely logical proof by means of mere abstract
conceptions, nor does it belong either to causality, which
only rules occurrences within Time, not Time itself. The
present hour hurled the preceding one into the bottomless pit
of the past, not through causality, but immediately, through
its mere existence, which existence was nevertheless inevi
table. It is impossible to make this comprehensible or even
clearer by means of mere conceptions ; we recognise it, on
the contrary, quite directly and instinctively, just as we
recognize the difference between right and left and all that
depends upon it : for instance, that our left glove will not
fit our right hand, &c. &c.

Now, as all those cases in which the principle of sufficient
reason finds its application cannot therefore be reduced
to logical reason and consequence and to cause and effect,
the law of specification cannot have been sufficiently at
tended to in this classification. The law of homogeneity,
however, obliges us to assume, that these cases cannot differ
to infinity, but that they may be reduced to certain species.
Now, before attempting this classification, it will be neces
sary to determine what is peculiar to the principle of suffi
cient reason in all cases, as its special characteristic ; be
cause the conception of the genus must always be deter
mined before the conception of the species.

30 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. III.

§ 16. The Roots of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.

Our knowing consciousness, which manifests itself as outer
and inner Sensibility (or receptivity) and as Understanding
and Reason, subdivides itself into Subject and Object and
contains nothing else. To be Object for the Subject and to be
our representation, are the same thing. All our representa
tions stand towards one another in a regulated connection,
which may be determined A PRIORI, and on account of which,
nothing existing separately and independently, nothing single
or detached, can become an Object for us. It is this connec
tion which is expressed by the Principle of Sufficient
Reason in its generality. Now, although, as may be
gathered from what has gone before, this connection
assumes different forms according to the different kinds of
objects, which forms are differently expressed by the Prin
ciple of Sufficient Eeason ; still the connection retains what
is common to all these forms, and this is expressed in a
general and abstract way by our principle. The relations
upon which it is founded, and which will be more closely
indicated in this treatise, are what I call the Root of the
Principle of Sufficient Eeason. Now, on closer inspection,
according to the laws of homogeneity and of specification,
these relations separate into distinct species, which differ
widely from each other. Their number, however, may be
reduced to four, according to the four classes into which
everything that can become an object for us — that is to say,
all our representations — may be divided. These classes will
be stated and considered in the following four chapters.

We shall see the Principle of Sufficient Reason appear
under a different form in each of them ; but it will also
show itself under all as the same principle and as derived
from the said root, precisely because it admits of being
expressed as above.

CHAPTEE IV.

ON THE FIRST CLASS OP OBJECTS FOB THE SUBJECT, AND
THAT FORM OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON
WHICH PREDOMINATES IN IT.

§ 17. General Account of this Class of Objects.

^ I ^HE first class of objects possible to our representative
JL faculty, is that of intuitive, complete, empirical repre
sentations. They are intuitive as opposed to mere thoughts,
i.e. abstract conceptions ; they are complete, inasmuch as,
according to Kant's distinction, they not only contain the
formal, but also the material part of phenomena ; and they
are empirical, partly as proceeding, not from a mere con
nection of thoughts, but from an excitation of feeling in
our sensitive organism, as their origin, to which they con
stantly refer for evidence as to their reality : partly also
because they are linked together, according to the united
laws of Space, Time and Causality, in that complex without
beginning or end which forms our Empirical Reality. As,
nevertheless, according to the result of Kant's teaching,
this Empirical Reality does not annul their Transcendental
Ideality, we shall consider them here, where we have only
to do with the formal elements of knowledge, merely as
representations.

§ 18. Outline of a Transcendental Analysis of Empirical
Reality.

The forms of these representations are those of the inner
and outer sense ; namely, Time and Space. But these are

32 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. IV.

only perceptible when filled. Their perceptibility is Hatter,
to which I shall return further on, and again in § 21. If
Time were the only form of these representations, there
could be no coexistence, therefore nothing permanent and
no duration. For Time is only perceived when filled, and
its course is only perceived by the changes which take place
in that which fills it. The permanence of an object is
therefore only recognized by contrast with the changes going
on in other objects coexistent with it. But the represen
tation of coexistence is impossible in Time alone ; it de
pends, for its completion, upon the representation of Space ;
because, in mere Time, all things follow one another, and
in mere Space all things are side by side ; it is accordingly
only by the combination of Time and Space that the repre
sentation of coexistence arises.

On the other hand, were Space the sole form of this class
of representations, there would be no change ; for change
or alteration is succession of states, and succession is only
possible in Time. We may therefore define Time as the
possibility of opposite states in one and the same thing.

Thus we see, that although infinite divisibility and infi
nite extension are common to both Time and Space, these
two forms of empirical representations differ fundamen
tally, inasmuch as what is essential to the one is without
any meaning at all for the other : juxtaposition having no
meaning in Time, succession no meaning in Space. The
empirical representations which belong to the orderly com
plex of reality, appear notwithstanding in both forms to
gether ; nay, the intimate union of both is the condition of
reality which, in a sense, grows out of them, as a product
grows out of its factors. Now it is the Understanding
which, by means of its own peculiar function, brings about
this union and connects these heterogeneous forms in such
a manner, that empirical reality — albeit only for that
Understanding — arises out of their mutual interpenetra-

FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 33

tion, and arises as a collective representation, forming a
complex, held together by the forms of the principle
of sufficient reason, but whose limits are problematical.
Each single representation belonging to this class is a part
of this complex, each one taking its place in it according
to laws known to us a priori; in it therefore countless
objects coexist, because Substance, i.e. Matter, remains
permanent in spite of the ceaseless flow of Time, and be
cause its states change in spite of the rigid immobility of
Space. In this complex, in short, the whole objective, real
world exists for us. The reader who may be interested in
this, will find the present rough sketch of the analysis of
empirical reality further worked out in § 4 of the first
volume of " Die Welt als Wille und Yorstellung," l where
a closer explanation is given of the way in which the Un
derstanding effects this union and thus creates for itself
the empirical world. He will also find a very important
help in the table, " Prcedicabilia apriori of Time, Space, and
Matter," which is added to the fourth chapter of the second
volume of the same work, and which I recommend to his
attention, as it especially shows how the contrasts of Time
and Space are equally balanced in Matter, as their product,
under the form of Causality.

We shall now proceed to give a detailed exposition of
that function of the Understanding which is the basis of
empirical reality ; only we must first, by a few incidental
explanations, remove the more immediate objections which
the fundamental idealism of the view I have adopted might
encounter.

Vol. i. p. 12, and seqq. of the 1st edition j p. 9 of the 3rd edition.

34 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

§ 19. Immediate Presence of Representations.

Now as, notwithstanding this union through the Under
standing of the forms of the inner and outer sense in repre
senting Matter and with it a permanent outer world, all
immediate knowledge is nevertheless acquired by the Subject
through the inner sense alone — the outer sense being again
Object for the inner, which in its turn perceives the percep
tions of the outer — and as therefore, with respect to the
immediate presence of representations in its consciousness,
the Subject remains under the rule of Time alone, as the
form of the inner sense :l it follows, that only one representa
tion can be present to it (the Subject) at the same time,
although that one may be very complicated. When we
speak of representations as immediately present, we mean,
that they are not only known in the union of Time and Space
effected by the Understanding — an intuitive faculty, as we
shall soon see — through which the collective representa
tion of empirical reality arises, but that they are known in
mere Time alone, as representations of the inner sense, and
just at the neutral point at which its two currents sepa
rate, called the present. The necessary condition men
tioned in the preceding paragraph for the immediate pre
sence of a representation of this class, is its causal action
upon our senses and consequently upon our organism,
which itself belongs to this class of objects, and is there
fore subject to the causal law which predominates in it
and which we are now about to examine. Now as therefore,
on the one hand, according to the laws of the inner and outer
world, the Subject cannot stop short at that one represen
tation ; but as, on the other hand, there is no coexistence

1 Compare Kant, " Krit. d. r. Vern." Elementarlehre. Abschnitt ii.
Schllisse a. d. Begr. b and c. 1st edition, pp. 33 and 34 5 5th edition,
p. 49. (Transl. M. Mviller, p. 29, b and c.)

FIRST CLASS OP OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 35

in Time alone: [that single representation must always
vanish and be superseded by others, in virtue of a law
which we cannot determine a priori, but which depends
upon circumstances soon to be mentioned. It is moreover
a well-known fact, that the imagination and dreams repro
duce the immediate presence of representations ; the inves
tigation of that fact, however, belongs to empirical Psy
chology. Now as, notwithstanding the transitory, isolated
nature of our representations with respect to their imme
diate presence in our consciousness, the Subject nevertheless
retains the representation of an all- comprehensive complex
of reality, as described above, by means of the function of
the Understanding ; ^representations! have, W the strength
of this antithesis, I been viewed,! as something quite dif
ferent when considered as belonging to that complex
than when considered with reference to their immediate
presence in our consciousness. From the former point
of view they were called i real things ; \ from the latter
only, ^presentations I^LT klo^v. This view of the matter,
which is the ordinary one, is known under the name of
Realism. On the appearance of modern philosophy,
Idealism opposed itself to this Realism and has since been
steadily gaining ground. Malebranche and Berkeley were
its earliest representatives, and Kant enhanced it to the
power of Transcendental Idealism, by which the co-exis
tence of the Empirical Eeality of things with their Trans
cendental Ideality becomes conceivable, and according to
which Kant expresses himself as follows : l " Transcen
dental Idealism teaches that all phenomena are represen
tations only, not things by themselves." And again:2

T Kant, " Krit. d. r. V." Kritik des Vierton Paralogismus der transcen-
dentalen Psychologie, p. 369, 1st edition. lEngl. Transl. by M. Miiller,
p 320.)

2 Ibid. 1st edition, pp. 374-375. Note. (Engl. Transl. p. 325.
Note.)

36 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. IV.

" Space itself is nothing but mere representation, and what
ever is in it must therefore be contained in that represen
tation. There is nothing whatever in Space, except so far
as it is really represented in it." Finally he says : x "If we
take away the thinking Subject, the whole material world
must vanish ; because it is nothing but a phenomenon in the
sensibility of our own subject and a certain class of its repre
sentations." In India, Idealism is even a doctrine of popular
religion, not only of Brahminism, but of Buddhism ; in
Europe alone is it a paradox, in consequence of the essen
tially and unavoidably realistic principle of Judaism. But
Realism quite overlooks the fact, that the so-called exis
tence of these real things is absolutely nothing but their
being represented (ein Vorgestellt-werderi), or — if it be in
sisted, that only the immediate presence in the conscious
ness of the Subject can be called being represented icar*
— it is even only a possibility of being represented
The realist forgets that the Object ceases to
be Object apart from its reference to the Subject, and that
if we take away that reference, or think it away, we at
once do away with all objective existence. Leibnitz, while
he clearly felt the Subject to be the necessary condition for
the Object, was nevertheless unable to get rid of the
thought that objects exist by themselves and independently
of all reference whatsoever to the Subject, i.e. indepen
dently of being represented. He therefore assumed in the
first place a world of objects exactly like the world of
representations and running parallel with it, having no
direct, but only an outward connection with it by means
of a harmonia prcestdbilita ; — obviously the most super
fluous thing possible, for it never comes within perception,
and the precisely similar world of representations which
does come within perception, goes its own way regardless

1 Kant, " Krit. d. r. V." " Betrachtung iiber die Summe," &c., p. 383
of 1st edition. (Engl. Transl. p. 331.)

FIRST CLASS OP OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 37

of it. When, however, he wanted to determine more closely
the essence of these things existing objectively in them
selves, he found himself obliged to declare the Objects in
themselves to be Subjects (monades), and by doing so he
furnished the most striking proof of the inability of our
consciousness, in as far as it is merely cognitive, to find
within the limits of the intellect — i.e. of the apparatus by
means of which we represent the world — anything beyond
Subject and Object ; the representer and the represented.
Therefore, if we abstract from the objectivity of an Object,
or in other words, from its being represented (Vorgestellt-
werden), if we annul it in its quality as an Object, yet still
wish to retain something, we can meet with nothing but
the Subject. Conversely, if we desire to abstract from the
subjectivity of the Subject, yet to have something over,
the contrary takes place, and this leads to Materialism.

Spinoza, who never thoroughly sifted the matter, and
never therefore acquired a clear notion of it, nevertheless
quite understood the necessary correlation between Subject
and Object as so essential, that they are inconceivable
without it ; consequently he defined it as an identity in the
Substance (which alone exists) of that which knows, with
that which has extension.

OBSERVATION. — With reference to the chief argument of this para
graph, I take the opportunity to remark that if, in the course of this
treatise, for the sake of brevity and in order to be more easily under
stood, I at any time use the term real objects, I mean by it nothing
but the intuitive representations that are united to form the complex of
empirical reality, which reality in itself always remains ideal.

§ 20. Principle of Sufficient Reason of Becoming.

In the Class of Objects for the Subject just described, the
principle of sufficient reason figures as the Law of Causality,
and, as such, I call it the Principle of Sufficient Reason
of Becoming, principium rationis sufficients fiendi. By it,

38 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

all objects presenting themselves within the entire range
of our representation are linked together, as far as the
appearance and disappearance of their states is concerned,
i.e. in the movement of the current of Time, to form the
complex of empirical reality. The law of causality is as
follows. When one or several real objects pass into any
new state, some other state must have preceded this one,
upon which the new state regularly follows, i.e. as often as
that preceding one occurs. This sort of following we call
resulting ; the first of the states being named a cause, the
second an effect. When a substance takes fire, for instance,
this state of ignition must have been preceded by a state,
1°, of affinity to oxygen ; 2°, of contact with oxygen ;
3°, of a given temperature. Now, as ignition must ne
cessarily follow immediately upon this state, and as it has
only just taken place, that state cannot always have been
there, but must, on the contrary, have only just supervened.
This supervening is called a change. It is on this account
that the law of causality stands in exclusive relation to
changes and has to do with them alone. Every effect, at the
time it takes place, is a change and, precisely by not having
occurred sooner, infallibly indicates some other change l»y
which it has been preceded. That other change takes the
name of cause, when referred to the following one — of
effect, when referred to a third necessarily preceding change.
This is the chain of causality. It is necessarily without a
beginning. By it, each supervening state must have re
sulted from a preceding change : in the case just men
tioned, for instance, from the substance being brought into
contact with free heat, from which necessarily resulted the
heightened temperature ; this contact again depended
upon a preceding change, for instance the sun's rays falling
upon a. burning-glass ; this again upon the removal of a
cloud from before the sun ; this upon the wind ; the wind
upon the unequal density of the atmosphere ; this upon

FIUST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 89

other conditions, and so forth in infinitum. When a state
contains all the requisite conditions for bringing about a
new state excepting one, this one, when at last it arrives, is,
in a sense, rightly called the cause icar' l^o^rjy, inasmuch
as we here have the final — in this case the decisive — change
especially in view ; but if we leave out this consideration,
no single condition of the causal state has any advantage
over the rest with reference to the determination of the
causal connection in general, merely because it happens to
be the last. Thus the removal of the cloud in the above
example, is in so far the cause of the igniting, as it took
place later than the direction of the burning-glass towards
the object; but this might have taken place after the
removal of the cloud and the addition of oxygen might
have occurred later still : in this respect therefore it is the
accidental order of things that determines which is the
cause. On closer inspection, however, we find that it is
the entire state which is the cause of the ensuing one,
so that the chronological order in which its single con
ditions were brought about, is in all essential respects
indifferent. With reference to a given case therefore, the
last occurring condition of a state may be called the cause
/car' i^o\i]vt because it completes the measure of the necessary
conditions, and its appearance thus becomes the decisive
change. For purposes of general consideration, however,
it is only the entire state which, by bringing about its suc
cessor, can be regarded as the cause. The single requisites
which, added together, complete and constitute the cause
may be called causal elements (ursdchliche Momente) or even
conditions, and into these accordingly the cause may be
subdivided. On the other hand, it is quite wrong to call
the objects themselves causes, instead of the states : some
would, for instance, call the burning-glass in the above
example the cause of the ignition ; while others, again,
would call the cloud the cause; others the sun or the

40 THE FOU.atfOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

oxygen, and so on arbitrarily and without order. But it is
absurd to call an object the cause of another object ; first of
all, because objects not only contain form and quality, but
Matter also, which has neither beginning or end ; secondly,
because the law of causality refers exclusively to changes,
i.e. to the entrance and exit of states in Time, wherein it.
regulates that special relation, in reference to which the
earlier state is called cause, the later effect, and the ne
cessary connection between both, the resulting of the one
from the other.

I here refer the thoughtful reader to the explanations I
have given in my chief work.1 For it is of the highest im
portance that our conception of the true and proper mean-
ing of the law of causality and the sphere of its validity
should be perfectly clear and definite : before all things,
that we should recognize, that this law refers solely and
exclusively to changes of material states and to nothing
else whatever; consequently, that it ought not to bo
brought in when these are not in question. The law of
causality is the regulator of the changes undergone in
Time by objects of our outer experience; but these objects
are all material. Each change can only be brought about
by another having preceded it, which is determined by a
rule, and then the new change takes place as being neces
sarily induced by the preceding one. This necessity is the
causal nexus.

However simple therefore the law of causality is, we
nevertheless find it expressed quite differently in all philo
sophical manuals, from the earliest down to the latest
ages : namely, in a broader, more abstract, therefore less
definite way. We are, for instance, informed, now, that it
is that by which something else comes into being ; now,
that it is what produces another thing or gives it reality,

1 " Die Welt a. W. u. V." vol. ii. chap. 4, especially p. 42 and seq. of
the 2nd edition ; p. 46 seq. of the 3rd edition.

FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 41

&c. &c. Wolf says: Causa est principium, a quo exis-
tentia, sive actualitas, entis alterius dependet ; whereas it is
obvious that in causality we have only to do with changes
in the form of uncreated, indestructible Matter, and that
a springing into existence of what did not previously exist
is an impossibility. Want of clearness of thought may, no
doubt, in most cases have led to these views of the causal
relation ; but surely sometimes an arriere-pensee lurks in
the background — a theological intention coqueting with
the Cosmological Proof, for whose sake it is ready to
falsify even transcendental, a priori truths, the mother's
milk of human understanding. We find the clearest
instance of this in Thomas Brown's book, " On the Eela-
tion of Cause and Effect," a work of 460 pages, which, in
1835, had already reached its fourth edition, and has pro
bably since gone through several more, and which, in spite
of its wearisome, pedantic, rambling prolixity, does not
handle the subject badly. Now this Englishman rightly
recognises, that it is invariably with changes that the
causal law has to do, and that every effect is accordingly a
change. Yet, although it can hardly have escaped him, he
is unwilling to admit that every cause is likewise a changet
and that the whole process is therefore nothing but the
uninterrupted nexus of changes succeeding one another in
Time. On the contrary, he persists in clumsily calling the
cause an object or substance, which precedes the change,
and in tormenting himself throughout his tedious book
with this entirely false expression, which spoils all his
explanations, notwithstanding his own better knowledge
and against his conscience, simply in order that his defini
tion may on no account stand in the way of the Cosmo-
logical Proof, which others might hereafter state elsewhere.
— But what can a truth be worth which needs devices such
as these to prepare its way ?

And what have our own worthy, honest German pro-

42 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. IV.

fessors of philosophy been doing in behalf of their dearly
beloved Cosmological Proof, since Kant dealt it the death
blow in his Critique of Pure Reason? — they, who prize
truth above everything. They were, indeed, at their wits'
ends, for — as these -worthies well know, though they do not
say so — causa prima is, just as well as causa sui, a contra-
dictio in adjecto, albeit the former expression is more
generally used than the latter. It is besides usually
pronounced with a very serious, not to say solemn,
air ; nay, many people, especially English Reverends, turn
up their eyes in a truly edifying way when they im
pressively and emphatically mention that contradictio in
adjecto : ' the first cause.' They know that a first cause
is just as inconceivable as the point at which Space
ends or the moment when Time first began. For every
cause is a change, which necessarily obliges us to ask for
the preceding change that brought it about, and so on in
infinitum, in infinitum ! Even a first state of Matter, from
which, as it has ceased to be, all following states could
have proceeded, is inconceivable. For if this state had in
itself been the cause of the following ones, they must like
wise have existed from all eternity, and the actual state
existing at the present moment could not have only just
now come into being. If, on the other hand, that first
state only began to be causal at some given period, some
thing or other must have changed it, for its inactivity to
have ceased; but then something must have occurred,
some change must have taken place ; and this again
obliges us to ask for its cause — i.e. a change which pre
ceded it ; and here we are once more on the causal ladder,
up which we are whipped step by step, higher and higher,
in infinitum, in infinitum ! (These gentlemen will surely
not have the face to talk to me of Matter itself arising out
of nothing ! If so, they will find corollaries at their service
further on.) The causal law therefore is not so acconi-

FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 43

modating as to let itself be used like a hired cab,
which we dismiss when we have reached our destination ;
rather does it resemble the broom brought to life by the
apprentice- wizard in Gothe's poem,1 which, when once set
in motion, does not leave off running and fetching water
until the old master-wizard himself stops it, which he
alone has the power to do. These gentlemen, however,
have no master- wizards among them. So what did they
do, these noble, genuine lovers of truth, ever on the alert,
of course, to proclaim the advent of real merit to the
world as soon as it shows itself in their profession, who
far from wishing to divert attention from the works of
those who are really what they only seem to be, by craftily
ignoring and meanly keeping them dark, are naturally
foremost to acknowledge their worth — aye, surely, as surely
as folly loves wisdom above everything ? What did they
do, I say, to help their old friend, the sorely distressed
Cosmological Proof, now at its' last gasp ? Oh, they hit
upon a shrewd device. " Friend," they said, " you are in
sorry plight since your fatal encounter with that stubborn
old man in Konigsberg, and indeed your brethren, the Onto-
logical and Physico-theological Proofs are in no better
condition. Never mind, you shall not be abandoned by
us (that is what we are paid for, you know) ; only you
must alter your dress and your name — there is no help
for it — for if we call you by your right name, every
one will take to his heels. Now incognito, on the contrary,
we can take you by the arm, and once more lead you into
society ; only, as we have just said, it must be incognito !
That is sure to answer ! First of all, your argument must
henceforth be called the Absolute. This has a foreign,
dignified, aristocratic ring ; and no one knows better than
we do all that can be done with Germans by assuming airs
of importance. Of course all know what the real meaning
1 Gothe, " Der Zauberlehrling."

44 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. IV.

is, and pique themselves upon that knowledge. But you
yourself must come forward disguised, in the form of an
enthymeme. Be sure and leave behind you all those pro-
syllogisms and premisses, by which you used to drag us
wearily up the long climax, for everyone knows how utterly
useless they are. Come forward with a bold face and a
self-sufficient, supercilious air, like a man of few words,
and at one bound you will reach the goal. Exclaim (and
we will chime in), ' The Absolute, confound it ! that must
exist, or there would be nothing at all ! ' Here, strike
the table with your fist. Whence does the Absolute
come ? ' What a silly question ! Did not I tell you
it was the Absolute ? ' — That will do, forsooth ! That
will do ! Germans are accustomed to content themselves
with words instead of thoughts. Do we not train them
to it from their cradle? Only look at Hegelianism !
What is it but empty, hollow, nauseous twaddle ! Yet
how brilliant a career was that of this philosophical
time-server ! A few mercenary individuals had only to
strike up a laudation of this stuff, and they at once
found an echo to their voices in the empty hollow of a
thousand numskulls — an echo which still continues to re
sound, and to extend — and behold ! an ordinary intellect,
a common impostor soon became a sublime thinker. Take
heart, therefore ! Besides, our friend and patron, we will
also second you in other ways, for how, indeed, are we to
get a living without you ? So that carping old faultfinder,
Kant, has been criticizing Reason, and clipping her wings,
has he ? Well, then, we will invent a new sort of Reason,
such as has never been heard of — a Eeason that does not
think, but which has direct intuition — a Reason which sees
Ideas (a high-flown word, made to mystify), sees them
bodily ; or which apprehends directly that which you and
others seek to prove ; or, again, a Reason which has
forebodings of all this — this last for the benefit of those

FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 45

who do not care to make large concessions, but also are
satisfied with very little. Let us thus pass off early incul
cated, popular conceptions for direct revelations of this
new kind of Reason, i.e. for inspirations from above. As
for that old-fashioned Eeason, which criticism has criti
cized away, let us degrade it, call it Understanding, and
send it about its business. Well, and what is to become
of real, true Understanding? — What in the world have
we to do with real, true Understanding ? — You smile in
credulously ; but we know our listeners, and the harum,
horum we see on the students' benches before us. Bacon
of Verulam already in his time said : ' Young men learn to
believe at Universities.' Of this they can learn as much as
they wish from us ; we have a good stock of articles of
faith on hand. Should any misgivings assail you, re
member that we are in Germany, where what would have
been impossible in any other country, has been found
possible: where a dull-witted, ignorant, pseudo-philosopher,
whose ineffably hollow verbiage disorganizes peoples'
brains completely and permanently, a scribbler of non
sense — I am speaking of our dearly beloved Hegel — has
not only been actually proclaimed a profound thinker with
impunity, and even without incurring ridicule, but is
readily accepted as such : yes, indeed, for this fiction has
found credence for the last thirty years, and is believed to
this day! — Once therefore we have this Absolute with
your help, we are quite safe, in spite of Kant and his
Critique. — We may then philosophise in a lofty tone,
making the Universe proceed from the Absolute by means
of the most heterogeneous deductions, one more tiresome
than the other — this, by the way, being their only point of
resemblance. We can call the world the Finite, and the
Absolute the Infinite — thus giving an agreeable variety to
our nonsense — and talk of nothing but God, explaining
how, why, wherefore, by what voluntary or involuntary

46 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. IV.

process lie created or brought forth the -world, showing
whether he be within or without it, and so forth, as if
Philosophy were Theology, and as if it sought for en
lightenment concerning God, not concerning the Universe!"

The Cosmological Proof, with which we here have to do,
and to which the above apostrophe is addressed, consists
thus, properly speaking, in the assertion, that the principle
of the sufficient reason of becoming, or the law of causality,
necessarily leads to a thought which destroys it and de
clares it to be null and void. For the causa prima (abso-
lutum) can only be reached by proceeding upwards from con
sequence to reason, through a series prolonged ad libitum ;
but it is impossible to stop short at the causa prima with
out at once annulling the principle of sufficient reason.

Having thus briefly and clearly shown the nullity of the
Cosmological Proof, as I had in my second chapter already
shown the nullity of the Ontological Proof, the sympa
thizing reader may perhaps expect me to do the same with
respect to the Physico-theological Proof, which is a great
deal more plausible. As, however, this belongs by its
nature to a different department of philosophy, it would
be quite out of place here. I therefore refer him to Kant's
Critique of Pure Reason, as well as to his Critique of
the Faculty of Judgment, where he treats this subject ex
professo ; I likewise refer him, as a complement to Kant's
purely negative procedure, to my own positive one in " The
Will in Nature," l a work which, though small in bulk, is
rich and weighty in content. As for the indifferent reader,
he is free to let this and indeed all my writings pass down
unread to his descendants. It matters not to me ; for I am
here, not for one generation only, but for many.

Now, as the law of causality is known to us a priori, and is
therefore a transcendental law, applicable to every possible

1 The translation of which follows the Fourfold Root in the present
volume.

FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 47

experience and consequently without exception, as will be
shown in § 21 ; as moreover it decides, that upon a given,
definite, relatively first state, a second equally definite one
inevitably ensues by rule, i.e., always ; the relation between
cause and effect is a necessary one, so that the causal law
authorizes us to form hypothetical judgments, and thereby
shows itself to be a form of the principle of sufficient
reason, upon which principle all judgments must be founded
and, as will be shown further on, all necessity is based.

This form of our principle I call the principle of ike
sufficient reason of becoming, because its application in
variably pre- supposes a change, the entering upon a new
state : consequently a becoming. One of its essential charac
teristics is this : that the cause always precedes the effect in
Time (compare § 47), and this alone gives us the original
criterion by which to distinguish which is cause and which
effect, of two states linked together by the causal nexus.
Conversely, in some cases, the causal nexus is known to us
through former experience ; but the rapidity with which
the different states follow upon each other is so great, that
the order in which this happens escapes our perception.
"We then conclude with complete certitude from causality
to succession : thus, for instance, we infer that the igniting
of gunpowder precedes its explosion.1

From this essential connection between causality and
succession it follows, that the conception of reciprocity,
strictly speaking, has no meaning; for it presumes the
effect to be again the cause of its cause : that is, that
what follows is at the same time what precedes. In a
" Critique of Kantian Philosophy," which I have added to
my chief work, and to which I refer my readers,2 1 have

1 Here I refer my readers to " Die Welt als Wille und Vorstelluug,"
vol. ii. chap. 4, p. 41 of the 2nd edition, and p. 45 of the 3rd edition.

2 " Die Welt a. W. u. V." vol. i. pp. 517-521 of the 2nd edition, and
pp. 544-549 of the 3rd edition.

48 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. IV.

shown at length that this favourite conception is inadmis
sible. It may be remarked, that authors usually have re
course to it just when their insight is becoming less clear,
and this accounts for the frequency of its use. Nay, it is
precisely when a writer conies to the end of his conceptions,
that the word ' reciprocity ' presents itself more readily
than any other ; it may, in fact, be looked upon as a kind
of alarm-gun, denoting that the author has got out of his
depth. It is also worthy of remark, that the word Week-
selwirlcung, literally reciprocal action — or, as we have pre
ferred translating it, reciprocity — is only found in the
German language, and that there is no precise equivalent
for it in daily use in any other tongue.

From the law of causality spring two corollaries which,
in virtue of this origin, are accredited as cognitions a priori,
therefore as unquestionable and without exception. They
are, the law of inertia and that of permanence of substance.
The first of these laws avers, that every state in which a
body can possibly be — consequently that of repose as well
as that of any kind of movement — must last for ever with
out change, diminution, or augmentation, unless some cause
supervenes to alter or annul it. But the other law, by which
the eternity of Matter is affirmed, results from the fact, that
the law of causality is exclusively applicable to states of
bodies, such as repose, movement, form, and quality, since it
presides over their temporal passing in or out of being ; but
that it is by no means applicable to the existence of that which
endures these states, and is called Substance, in order pre
cisely to express its exemption from all arising and perish
ing. ' Substance is permanent ' means, that it can neither pass
into, nor out of being : so that its quantity existing in the
universe can neither be increased nor diminished. That
we know this a priori, is proved by the consciousness of
unassailable certainty with which, when we see a body dis
appear — whether it be by conjuring, by minute subdivision,

FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOB THE SUBJECT. 49

by combustion, volatilisation, or indeed any process what
ever — we all nevertheless firmly assume that its sub
stance, i.e. its matter, must still exist somewhere or other
in undiminished quantity, whatever may have become
of its form ; likewise, when we perceive a body suddenly in
a place where it was not before, that it must have been
brought there or formed by some combination of invisible
particles — for instance, by precipitation — but that it, i.e.
its substance, cannot have then started into existence ;
for this implies a total impossibility and is utterly incon
ceivable. The certainty with which we assume this before
hand (a priori) , proceeds from the fact, that our Understand
ing possesses absolutely no form under which to conceive
the beginning and end of Matter. For, as before said, the
law of causality — the only form in which we are able to
conceive changes at all — is solely applicable to states of
bodies, and never under any circumstances to the existence
of that which undergoes all changes : Matter. This is why I
place the principle of the permanence of Matter among the
corollaries of the causal law. Moreover, we cannot have
acquired a posteriori the conviction that substance is per
manent, partly because it cannot, in most instances, be
empirically established; partly also, because every em
pirical knowledge obtained exclusively by means of induc
tion, has only approximate, consequently precarious, never
unconditioned, certainty. The firmness of our persuasion as
to this principle is therefore of a different kind and nature
from our security of conviction with regard to the accuracy
of any empirically discovered law of Nature, since it has an
entirely different, perfectly unshakable, never vacillating
firmness. The reason of this is, that the principle ex
presses . a transcendental knowledge, i.e. one which deter
mines and fixes, prior to all experience, what is in any way
possible within the whole range of experience ; but, pre
cisely by this, it reduces the world of experience to a mere

E

50 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

cerebral phenomenon. Even the most universal among
the non-transcendental laws of Nature and the one least
liable to exception — the law of gravitation — is of empirical
origin, consequently without guarantee as to its absolute
universality ; wherefore it is still from time to time called
in question, and doubts occasionally arise as to its validity
beyond our solar system ; and astronomers carefully call
attention to any indications corroborative of its doubtful
ness with which they may happen to meet, thereby show
ing that they regard it as merely empirical. The question
may of course be raised, whether gravitation takes effect
between bodies which are separated by an absolute vacuum,
or whether its action within a solar system may not be
mediated by some sort of ether, and may not cease alto
gether between fixed stars ; but these questions only admit
of an empirical solution, and this proves that here we have
not to do with a knowledge a priori. If, on the other hand,
we admit with Kant and Laplace the hypothesis, as the
most probable one, that each solar system has developed
out of an original nebula by a gradual process of condensa
tion, we still cannot for a moment conceive the possibility
of that original substance having sprung into being
out of nothing : we are forced to assume the anterior
existence of its particles somewhere or other, as well as
their having been brought together somehow or other,
precisely because of the transcendental nature of the prin
ciple of the permanence of Substance. In my Critique
of Kantian Philosophy,1 I have shown at length, that
Substance is but another word for Matter, the conception of
substance not being realisable excepting in Matter, and
therefore deriving its origin from Matter, and I have also
specially pointed out how that conception was formed
solely to serve a surreptitious purpose. Like many other

1 « Die Welt a. W. u. V." vol. i. p. 550 of 2nd, and 580 of 3rd
edition.

FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOB THE SUBJECT. 51

equally certain truths, this eternity of Matter (called the
permanence of substance) is forbidden fruit for professors
of philosophy ; so they slip past it with a bashful, sidelong
glance.

By the endless chain of causes and effects which directs
all changes but never -extends beyond them, two existing
things remain untouched, precisely because of the limited
range of its action : on the one hand, Matter, as we have
just shown ; on the other hand, the primary forces of
Nature. The first (matter) remains uninfluenced by the
causal nexus, because it is that which undergoes all changes,
or on which they take place ; the second (the primary
forces), because it is they alone ~by which changes or effects
become possible ; for they alone give causality to causes,
i.e. the faculty of operating, which the causes therefore
hold as mere vassals a fief. Cause and effect are changes
connected together to necessary succession in Time ;
whereas the forces of Nature by means of which all causes
operate, are exempt from all change ; in this sense there
fore they are outside Time, but precisely on that account
they are always and everywhere in reserve, omnipresent
and inexhaustible, ever ready to manifest themselves, as
soon as an opportunity presents itself in the thread of
causality. A cause, like its effect, is invariably something
individual, a single change ; whereas a force of Nature is
something universal, unchangeable, present at all times
and in all places. The attraction of a thread by amber,
for instance, at the present moment, is an effect ; its cause
is the preceding friction and actual contact of the amber
with the thread ; and the force of Nature which acts in,
and presides over, the process, is Electricity. The explana
tion of this matter is to be found in my chief work,1 and
there I have shown in a long chain of causes and effects

1 See " Die Welt a. W. u. V." vol. i. § 26, p. 153 of the 2nd, and
p. 160 of the 3rd edition.

52 THE FOTJEFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. IV.

how the most heterogeneous natural forces successively
come into play in them. By this explanation the difference
between transitory phenomena and permanent forms of
operation, becomes exceedingly clear ; and as, moreover, a
whole section (§ 26) is devoted to the question, it will be
sufficient here to give a brief sketch of it. The rule, by
which a force of Nature manifests itself in the chain of
causes and effects — consequently the link which connects it
with them — is the law of Nature. But the confusion
between forces of Nature and causes is as frequent as it
is detrimental to clearness of thought. It seems indeed
as though no one had accurately defined the difference
between these conceptions before me, however great may
have been the urgency for such a distinction. Not only
are forces of Nature turned into causes by such expres
sions as, ' Electricity, Gravity, &c., are the cause of so-and-
so,' but they are even often turned into effects by those wlio
search for a cause for Electricity, Gravity, <fec. &c., which
is absurd. Diminishing the number of the forces of Nature,
however, by reducing one to another, as for instance
Magnetism is in our days reduced to Electricity, is a
totally different thing. Every true, consequently really
primary force of Nature — and every fundamental chemical
property belongs to these forces — is essentially a quali-
tas occulta, i.e. it does not admit of physical, but only of
metaphysical explanation : in other words, of an explana
tion which transcends the world of phenomena. No one has
carried this confusion, or rather identification, of causes
with forces of Nature further than Maine de Biran in his
"Nouvelles considerations des rapports du physique au
moral," for it is essential to his philosophy. It is besides
remarkable, that when he speaks of causes, he rarely uses
the word cause alone, but almost always speaks of cause
ou force, just as we have seen Spinoza above (§8) write ratio
sive causa no less than eight times in the same page. Both

FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 53

writers are evidently conscious that they are identifying
two disparates, in order to be able to make use of the one
or the other, according to circumstances ; for this end they
are obliged to keep the identification constantly before their
readers' mind. —

Now Causality, as the director of each and every change,
presents itself in Nature under three distinct forms: as
causes in the strictest acceptation of the word, as stimuli,
and as motives. It is just upon this difference that the
real, essential distinction between inorganic bodies, plants,
and animals is based, and not upon external, anatomical,
let alone chemical, distinctions.

A cause, in its narrowest sense, is that upon which
changes in the inorganic kingdom alone ensue : those
changes, that is to say, which form the theme of Mechanics,
Physics, and Chemistry. Newton's third fundamental
law, " Action and reaction are equal to one another," applies
exclusively to this cause, and enunciates, that the state
which precedes (the cause) undergoes a change equivalent
to that produced by it (the effect). In this form of
causality alone, moreover, does the degree of the effect
always exactly correspond to the degree of the cause, so as
to enable us accurately to calculate the one by means of
the other.

The second form of causality is the stimulus ; it reigns
over organic life, as such, i.e. over plant life and the vegeta
tive, that is, the unconscious, part of animal life. This
second form is characterized by the absence of the distinc
tive signs of the first. In it accordingly action and re
action are not equal, nor does the intensity of the effect by
any means correspond throughout all its degrees to the
intensity of the cause ; in fact, the opposite effect may even
be produced by intensifying the cause.

The third form of causality is the motive. Under this
form causality rules animal life proper : that is, the exte-

54 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

rior, consciously performed actions of all animals. The
medium for motives is knowledge : an intellect is accord
ingly needed for susceptibility to motives. The true
characteristic of the animal is therefore the faculty of
knowing, of representing (Das Vorstelleri). Animals, as
such, always move towards some aim and end, which
therefore must have been recognised by them : that is to
say, it must have presented itself to them as some
thing different from themselves, yet of which they are
conscious. Therefore the proper definition of the animal
would be : ' That which knows ; ' for no other definition
quite hits the mark or can even perhaps stand the test of
investigation. Movement induced by motives is necessarily
wanting where there is no cognitive faculty, and movement
by stimuli alone remains, i.e. plant life. Irritability and
sensibility are therefore inseparable. Still motives evi
dently act in a different way from stimuli ; for the action
of the former may be very brief, nay, need only be
momentary; since their efficacy, unlike that of stimuli,
stands in no relation whatever to the duration of that
action, to the proximity of the object, &c. &c. A motive
needs but to be perceived therefore, to take effect ; whereas
stimuli always require outward, often even inward, contact
and invariably a certain length of time.

This short sketch of the three forms of causality will
suffice here. They are more fully described in my Prize-
essay on Free Will.1 One thing, however, still remains to
be urged. The difference between cause, stimulus, and
motive, is obviously only a consequence of the various
degrees of receptivity of beings ; the greater their recepti
vity, the feebler may be the nature of the influence : a stone
needs an impact, while man obeys a look. Nevertheless,
both are moved by a sufficient cause, therefore with the

1 See " Die beiden Grunclprobleme der Etkik," p. 30-34.

FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 55

same necessity. For ' motivation ' * is only causality pass
ing through knowledge ; the intellect is the medium of the
motives, because it is the highest degree of receptivity. By
this, however, the law of causality loses nothing whatever
of its rigour and certainty; for motives are causes and
operate with the same necessity which all causes bring
with them. This necessity is easy to perceive in animals
because of the greater simplicity of their intellect, which is
limited to the perception of what is present. Man's in
tellect is double : for not only has he intuitive, but abstract,
knowledge, which last is not limited to what is present.
Man possesses Reason ; he therefore has a power of elective
decision with clear consciousness : that is, he is able to weigh
against one another motives which exclude each other, as
such ; in other terms, he can let them try their strength on
his will. The most powerful motive then decides him, and
his actions ensue with just the same necessity as the roll
ing of a ball after it has been struck. Freedom of Will *
means (not professorial twaddle but) " that a given human
being, in a given' situation, can act in two different ways."
But the utter absurdity of this assertion is a truth as
certain and as clearly proved, as any truth can be which
passes the limits of pure mathematics. In my Essay on
Free Will, to which the Norwegian Society awarded the
prize, this truth is demonstrated more clearly, methodi
cally, and thoroughly than has been done before by anyone
else, and this moreover with special reference to those
facts of our consciousness by which ignorant people
imagine that absurdity to be confirmed. In all that is
essential however, Hobbes, Spinoza, Priestley, Yoltaire,

1 The word "motivation," though it may appear objectionable to the
English reader, seemed unavoidable here, as being Schopenhauer's own
term, for which there is no adequate equivalent in general use in our
language. [Translator's note.]

2 Here usedin theabsolute sense ofliberum arbitriumindiffercnticB. [Tr.]

56 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IT.

and even Kant l already taught the same doctrine. Our
professional philosophers, of course, do not let this inter
fere with their holding forth on Free Will, as if it were an
understood thing which had never been questioned. But
what do these gentlemen imagine the above-named great
men to have come into the world for, by the grace of
Nature? To enable them (the professors) to earn their
livelihood by philosophy ? — Since I had proved this
truth in my prize-essay more clearly than had ever been
done before, and since moreover a Royal Society had
sanctioned that proof by placing my essay among its
memoranda, it surely behoved these worthies, considering
the views they held, to make a vigorous attack upon so
pernicious a doctrine, so detestable a heresy, and thoroughly
to refute it. Nay, this duty was all the more imperative

1 " Whatever conception one may form of freedom of the will, for
metaphysical purposes, its phenomena, human actions, are neverthe
less determined by universal laws of Nature, just as well as every other
occurrence in Nature." " Ideen /u einer allgemeinen Geschichte."
Anfang. I. Kant. " All the acts of a man, so far as they are phenomena,
are determined from his empirical character and from the other con
comitant causes, according to the order of Nature; and if we could investi
gate all the manifestations of his will to the very bottom, there would be
not a single human action which we could not predict with certainty and
recognize from its preceding conditions as necessary. There is no free
dom therefore with reference to this empirical character, and yet it is
only with reference to it that we can consider man, when we are meroly
observing, and, as is the case in anthropology, trying to investigate the
motive causes of his actions physiologically." — " Kritik. d. r. Vern."
p. 549 of the 1st edition, and p. 577 of the 5th edition. (Engl. Transl.
by M. Miiller, p. 474.)

"It may therefore be taken for granted, that if we could see far
enough into a man's mode of thinking, as it manifests itself in his inner,
as well as outer actions, for us to know every, even the faintest motive*
and in like manner all the other causes which act upon these, it would
be possible to calculate his conduct in future with the same certainty as
an eclipse of the sun or moon." — " Kritik. der praktischen Vernunft " ed.
Rosenkianz, p. 230 and p. 177 of the 4th edition.

FIRST CLASS OP OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 57

as, in my other essay " On the Foundation of Morality," l
I had proved the utter groundlessness of Kant's practical
Reason with its Categorical Imperative which, under the
name of the Moral Law, is still used by these gentlemen as
the corner-stone of their own shallow systems of morality.
I have shown it to be a futile assumption so clearly and
irrefutably, that no one with a spark of judgment can
possibly believe any longer in this fiction. — " Well, and so
they probably did." — Oh no ! They take good care not to
venture on such slippery ground ! Their ability consists in
holding their tongues ; silence is all they have to oppose
to intelligence, earnestness, and truth. In not one of the
products of their useless scribblings that have appeared
since 1841, has the slightest notice been taken of my
Ethics — undoubtedly the most important work on Moral
Philosophy that has been published for the last sixty
years — nay, their terror of me and of my truth is so great,
that none of the literary journals issued by Academies or
Universities has so much as mentioned the book. Zitto,
zitto, lest the public should perceive anything : in this
consists the whole of their policy. The instinct of self-
preservation may, no doubt, be at the bottom of these
artful tactics. For would not a philosophy, whose sole aim
was truth, and which had no other consideration in view,
be likely to play the part of the iron pot among the
earthen ones, were it to come in contact with the petty
systems composed under the influence of a thousand per
sonal considerations by people whose chief qualification is
the propriety of their sentiments ? Their wretched fear of
my writings is the fear of truth. Nor can it be denied,
that precisely this very doctrine of the complete necessity
of all acts of the will stands in flagrant contradiction with
all thfe hypotheses of their favourite old- woman's philo-

1 Published in the same volume with the Prize-Essay on " Fre6
Will." See " Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik."

58 THE FOTJEFOLD BOOT. fCHAP. IV.

Sophy cut after the pattern of Judaism. Still, that severely
tested truth, far from being disturbed by all this, as a
sure datum and criterion, as a true SOQ p.oi irov ar&, proves
the futility of all that old- woman's philosophy and the
urgent need of a fundamentally different, incomparably
deeper view of the Universe and of Man ; — no matter
whether that view be compatible with the official duties
of a professional philosopher or not,

V

§ 21. A priori character of the conception of Causality.
Intellectual Character of Empirical Perception.

THE UNDERSTANDING.

In the professorial philosophy of our philosophy-pro
fessors we are still taught to this day, that perception of the
outer world is a thing of the senses, and then there fol
lows a long dissertation upon each of the five senses;
whereas no mention whatever is made of the intellectual
character of perception : that is to say, of the fact, that it
is mainly the work of the Understanding, which, by means
of its own peculiar form of Causality, together with the
forms of pure sensibility, Time and Space, which are pos
tulated by Causality, primarily creates and produces the
objective, outer world out of the raw material of a few sen
sations. And yet in its principal features, I had stated
this matter in the first edition of the present treatise1
and soon after developed it more fully in my treatise " On
Vision and Colours" (1816), of which Professor Rosas has
shown his appreciation by allowing it to lead him into
plagiarism.2 But our professors of philosophy have not

1 Anno 1813, pp. 53-55.

2 For further details see my " Will in Nature," p. 19 of the 1st edition,
and p. 14 of the 3rd. (P. 230 et seqq. of the translation of the " Will in
Nature," which follows the " Fourfold Root" in the present volume.)

FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 59

thought fit to take the slightest notice either of this, or in
deed of any of the other great and important truths which
it has been the aim and labour of my whole life to set
forth, in order to secure them as a lasting possession to
mankind. It does not suit their tastes, or fit into their
notions ; it leads to no Theology, nor is it even adapted to
drill students for higher State purposes. In short, profes
sional philosophers do not care to learn from me, nor do they
even see how much they might learn from me : that is, all
that their children and their children's children will learn
from me. They prefer to sit down and spin a long meta
physical yarn, each out of his own thoughts, for the benefit
of the public; and no doubt, if fingers are a sufficient
qualification, they have it. How right was Macchiavelli
when he said, as Hesiod 1 before him : " There are three
sorts of heads : firstly, those which acquire knowledge of
things and comprehend them by themselves ; secondly,
those which recognise the truth when it is shown them by
others ; and thirdly, those which can do neither the one
nor the other." 2 —

One must indeed be forsaken by all the gods, to imagine
that the outer, perceptible world, filling Space in its three
dimensions and moving on in the inexorable flow of Time,
governed at every step by the laws of Causality, which is
without exception, and in all this merely obeying laws we
can indicate before all experience of them — that such a
world as this, we say, can have a real, objective existence
outside us, without any agency of our own, and that it can
then have found its way into our heads through bare sen
sation and thus have a second existence within us like the
one outside. For what a miserably poor thing is mere
sensation, after all ! Even in the noblest of our organs it
is nothing but a local, specific feeling, susceptible of some

1 Hesiod, epya, 293.

8 Macchiavelli, " II principe," cap. 22.

60 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. IV.

slight variation, still in itself always subjective and, as
such therefore, incapable of containing anything objective,
anything like perception. For sensation is and remains a
process within the organism and is limited, as such, to the
region within the skin ; it cannot therefore contain any
thing which lies beyond that region, or, in other words,
anything that is outside us. A sensation may be pleasant
Or unpleasant — which betokens a relation to the Will —
but -nothing objective can ever lie in any sensation* In
the organs of the senses, sensation is heightened by the con
fluence of the nerve-extremities, and can easily be excited
from without on account of their extensive distribution
and the delicacy of the envelope which encloses them ; it is
besides specially susceptible to particular influences, such
as light, sound, smell ; notwithstanding which it is and re
mains mere sensation, like all others within our body,
consequently something essentially subjective, of whose
changesWe only become immediately conscious in the form
Of the inner sense, Time : that is, successively. It is only
when the Understanding begins to act — a function, not of
single, delicate nerve-extremities, but of that mysterious,
complicated structure weighing from five to ten pounds,
called the brain — only when it begins to apply its sole form,
the causal law, that a powerful transformation takes place,
by which subjective sensation becomes objective perception. Ir
For, in virtue of its own peculiar form, therefore a priori,
i.e. before all experience (since there could have been none
till then), the Understanding conceives the given corporeal
sensation as an effect (a word which the Understanding
alone comprehends), which effect, as such, necessarily
implies a cause. Simultaneously it summons to its assis
tance Space, the form of the outer sense, lying likewise
ready in the intellect (i.e. the brain), in order to remove
that cause beyond the organism ; for it is by this that the
external world first arises, Space alone rendering it pos-

FIEST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 61

sible, so that pure intuition a priori has to supply the
foundation for empirical perception. In this process, as
I shall soon show more clearly, the Understanding avails
itself of all the several data, even the minutest, which are
presented to it by the given sensation, in order to construct
the cause of it in Space in conformity with them. This intel
lectual operation (which is moreover explicitly denied both
by Schelling * and by Fries 2), does not however take place
discursively or reflectively, in abstracto, by means of concep
tions and words ; it is, on the contrary, an intuitive and
quite direct process. For by it alone, therefore exclusively
in the Understanding and for the Understanding, does
the real, objective, corporeal world, filling Space in its
three dimensions, present itself and further proceed, ac
cording to the same law of causality, to change in Time,
and to move in Space. — It is therefore the Understanding
itself which has to create the objective world; for this
world cannot walk into our brain from outside all ready
cut and dried through the senses and the openings of their
organs. | In fact, the senses supply nothing but the raw
materials which the Understanding at once proceeds to
work up into the objective view of a corporeal world, sub
ject to regular laws, by means of the simple forms we have
indicated : Space, Time, and Causality. \ Accordingly our
every-day empirical perception is an intellectual one and has
a right to claim this predicate, which German pseudo-philo
sophers have given to a pretended intuition of dream-worlds,
in which their beloved Absolute is supposed to perform its
evolutions. And now I will proceed to show how wide is
the gulf which separates sensation from perception, by
pointing out how raw is the material out of which the
beautiful edifice is constructed.

1 Schelling, " Philosophische Schriften" (1809), vol.i. pp.237 and 238.

2 Fries, " Kritik der VernunfL" vol. i. pp. 52-56 and p. 290 of the 1st
edition.

62 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

Objective perception makes use, properly speaking, of
only two senses ; touch and sight. These alone supply the
data upon which, as its basis, the Understanding constructs
the objective world by the process just described. The
three other senses remain on the whole subjective; for
their sensations, while pointing to an external cause, still
contain no data by which its relations in Space can be de
termined. Now Space is the form of all perception, i.e. of
that apprehension, in which alone objects can, properly
speaking, present themselves. Therefore those other three
senses can no doubt serve to announce the presence of
objects we already know in some other way ; but no con
struction in Space, consequently no objective perception, can
possibly be founded on their data. A rose cannot be con
structed from its perfume, and a blind man may hear
music all his life without having the slightest objective
representation either of the musicians, or of the instru
ments, or of the vibrations of the air. On the other hand, the
teense of hearing is of great value as a medium for language,
and through this it is the sense of Reason. It is also valu
able as a medium for music, which is the only way in
which we comprehend numerical relations not only in
abstracto, but directly, in concreto. A musical sound or
tone, however, gives no clue to spacial relations, therefore
it never helps to bring the nature of its cause nearer to us ;
we stop short at it, so that it is no datum for the Under
standing in its construction of the objective world. The
sensations of touch and sight alone are such data ; there
fore a blind man without either hands or feet, while able
to construct Space for himself a priori in all its regularity,
would nevertheless acquire but a very vague representation
of the objective world. Yet what is supplied by touch and
sight is not by any means perception, but merely the raw
material for it, For perception is so far from being con
tained in the sensations of touch and sight, that these sen-

FIRST CLASS OP OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 63

sations have not even the faintest resemblance to the
qualities of the things which present themselves to us
through them, as I shall presently show. Only /what
really belongs to sensation must first be clearly distin
guished from what is added to it by the intellect in per
ception. I In the beginning this is not easy, because we are
so accustomed to pass from the sensation at once to its
cause, that the cause presents itself to us without our
noticing the sensation apart from it, by which, as it were,
the premisses are supplied to this conclusion drawn by
i^ie Understanding.

Thus touch and sight have each their own special advan
tages, to begin with; therefore they assist each other
mutually. Sight needs no contact, nor even proximity ; its
field is unbounded and extends to the stars. It is more
over sensitive to the most delicate degrees of light, shade,
colour, and transparency ; so that it supplies the Under
standing with a quantity of nicely defined data, out of
which, by dint of practice, it becomes able to construct the
shape, size, distance, and nature of bodies, and represents
them at once perceptibly. On the other hand, touch cer
tainly depends upon contact ; still its data are so varied
and so trustworthy, that it is the most searching of all the
senses. Even perception by sight may, in the last resort,
be referred to touch ; nay, sight may be looked upon as
an imperfect touch extending to a great distance, which
uses the rays of light as long feelers ; and it is just because
it is limited to those qualities which have light for their
medium and is therefore one-sided, that it is so liable to
deception ; whereas touch supplies the data for cognising
size, shape, hardness, softness, roughness, temperature,
&c. &c., quite immediately. In this it is assisted, partly
by the shape and mobility of our arms, hands, and fingers,
from whose position in feeling objects the Understanding
derives its data for constructing bodies in Space, partly by

64 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

muscular power, which enables it to know the weight,
solidity, toughness, or brittleness of bodies : all this with
the least possible liability to error.

These data nevertheless do not by any means yet give
perception, which is always the work of the Understanding,
The sensation I have in pressing against a table with niy
hand, contains no representation of a firm cohesion of parts
in that object, nor indeed anything at all like it. It is
only when my Understanding passes from that sensation
to its cause, that the intellect constructs for itself a body
having the properties of solidity, impenetrability, and hard
ness. If in the dark, I put my hand upon a flat surface,
or lay hold of a ball of about three inches in diameter,
the same parts of my hand feel the pressure in both cases ;
it is only by the different position which my hand takes
that, in the one or in the other case, my Understanding
constructs the shape of the body whose contact is the cause
of the sensation, for which it receives confirmation from the
changes of position which I make. The sensations in the
hand of a man born blind, on feeling an object of cubic shape,
are quite uniform and the same on all sides and in every
direction : the edges, it is true, press upon a smaller portion
of his hand, still nothing at all like a cube is contained in
these sensations. His Understanding, however, draws the
immediate and intuitive conclusion from the resistance
felt, that this resistance must have a cause, which then
presents itself through that conclusion as a hard body ;
and through the movements of his arms in feeling the
object, while the hand's sensation remains unaltered, he
constructs the cubic shape in Space, which is known to
him a priori. If the representation of a cause and of
Space, together with their laws, had not already existed
within him, the image of a cube could never have proceeded
from those successive sensations in his hand. If a rope be
drawn through his hand, he will construct, as the cause of

FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 65

the friction he feels and of its duration, a long cylindrical
body, moving uniformly in the same direction in that
particular position of his hand. But the representation of
movement, i.e. of change of place in Space by means of
Time, never could arise for him out of the mere sensation
in his hand ; for that sensation can neither contain, nor
can it ever by itself alone produce any such thing. It is his
intellect which must, on the contrary, contain within itself,
before all experience, the intuitions of Space, Time, and toge
ther with them that of the possibility of movement ; and it
must also contain the representation of Causality, in order to
pass from sensation — which alone is given by experience —
to a cause of that sensation, and to construct that cause as
a body having this or that shape, moving in this or that
direction. For how great is the difference between a mere
sensation in my hand and the representations of causality,
materiality, and mobility in Space by means of Time !
The sensation in my hand, even if its position and its
points of contact are altered, is a thing far too uniform
and far too poor in data, to enable me to construct out of
it the representation of Space, with its three dimensions,
and of the influences of bodies one upon another, together
with the properties of expansion, impenetrability, cohe
sion, shape, hardness, softness, rest, and motion: the
basis, in short, of the objective world. This is, on the
contrary, only possible by the intellect containing within
itself, anterior to all experience, Space, as the form of per
ception ; Time, as the form of change ; and the law of
Causality, as the regulator of the passing in and out of
changes. Now it is precisely the pre-existence before all
experience of all these forms, which constitutes the Intellect.
Physiologically, it is a function of the brain, which the
brain no more learns by experience than the stomach to
digest, or the liver to secrete bile. Besides, no other expla
nation can be given of the fact, that many who were born

F

66 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. IV.

blind, acquire a sufficiently complete knowledge of the rela
tions of Space, to enable them to replace their want of eye
sight by it to a considerable degree, and to perform astonish
ing feats. A hundred years ago Saunderson, for instance,
who was blind from his birth, lectured on Optics, Mathe
matics, and Astronomy at Cambridge.1 This, too, is the
only way to explain the exactly opposite case of Eva Lauk,
who was born without arms or legs, yet acquired an accurate
perception of the outer world by means of sight alone as
rapidly as other children.2 All this therefore proves that
Time, Space, and Causality are not conveyed into us by
touch or by sight, or indeed at all from outside, but that
they have an internal, consequently not empirical, but
intellectual origin. From this again follows, that the per
ception of the bodily world is an essentially intellectual
process, a work of the Understanding, to which sensation
merely gives the opportunity and the data for application
in individual cases.

I shall now prove the same with regard to the sense of
sight. Here the only immediate datum is the sensation
experienced by the retina, which, though admitting of great
variety, may still be reduced to the impression of light and
dark with their intermediate gradations and to that of
colours proper. This sensation is entirely subjective: that
is to say, it only exists within the organism and under the
skin. Without the Understanding, indeed, we should never
even become conscious of these gradations, excepting as of
peculiar, varied modifications of the feeling in our eye,
which would bear no resemblance to the shape, situation,
proximity, or distance of objects outside us. For sensation,
in seeing, supplies nothing more than a varied affection of
the retina, exactly like the spectacle of a painter's palette

1 Diderot, in his " Lettre sur les Aveugles," gives a detailed account
of Saunderson.

2 See " Die Welt a. W. u. V." vol. ii. chap. 4.

FIRST CLASS OP OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 67

with divers splashes of colour. Nor would anything more
remain over in our consciousness, were we suddenly deprived
of all our Understanding — let us say by paralysis of the
brain — at a moment when we were contemplating a rich
and extensive landscape, while the sensation was left un
changed : for this was the raw material out of which our
Understanding had just before been constructing that
perception.

Now, that the Understanding should thus be able, from
such limited material as light, shade and colour, to produce
the visible world, inexhaustibly rich in all its different
shapes, by means of the simple function of referring effects
to causes assisted by the intuition of Space, depends before
all things upon the assistance given by the sensation itself,
which consists in this : first, that the retina, as a surface,
admits of a juxtaposition of impressions ; secondly, that
light always acts in straight lines, and that its refraction
in the eye itself is rectilinear ; finally, that the retina pos
sesses the faculty of immediately feeling from which
direction the light comes that impinges upon it, and this
can, perhaps, only be accounted for by the rays of light
penetrating below the surface of the retina. But by this we
gain, that the mere impression at once indicates the direction
of its cause ; that is, it points directly to the position of
the object from which the light proceeds or is reflected.
The passage to this object as a cause no doubt presupposes
the knowledge of causal relations, , as well as of the laws of
Space ; but this knowledge constitutes precisely the furni
ture of the Intellect, which, here also, has again to create
perception out of mere sensation. Let us now examine its
procedure in doing so more closely.

The first thing it does is to set right the impression of
the object, which is produced on the retina upside down.
That original inversion is, as we know, brought about in
the following manner. As each point of the visible object

63 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP, IV.

gends forth its rays towards all sides in a rectilinear direc
tion, the rays from its upper extremity cross those from its
lower extremity in the narrow aperture of the pupil, by
which the former impinge upon the bottom, the latter
upon the top, those projected from the right side upon the
left, and vice versa. The refracting apparatus of the eye,
which consists of the humor aqueus, lens, et corpus vitreum,
only serves to concentrate the rays of light proceeding from
the object, so as to find room for them on the small space
of the retina. Now, if seeing consisted in mere sensation,
we should perceive the impression of the object turned
upside down, because we receive it thus ; but in that case
we should perceive it as something within our eye, for we
should stop short at the sensation. In reality, however,
the Understanding steps in at once with its causal law, and
as it has received from sensation the datum of the direc
tion in which the ray impinged upon the retina, it pursues
that direction retrogressively up to the cause on both
lines ; so that this time the crossing takes place in the oppo
site direction, and the cause presents itself upright as an
external object in Space, i.e. in the position in which it
originally sent forth its rays, not that in which they reached

the retina (see fig. 1). — The purely intellectual nature of
this process, to the exclusion of all other, more especially of
physiological, explanations, may also be confirmed by the

FIRST CLASS OP OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 69

fact, that if we put our heads "between our legs, or lie down
on a hill head downwards, we nevertheless see objects in
their right position, and not upside down ; although the
portion of the retina which is usually met by the lower part
of the object is then met by the upper : in fact, everything
is topsy turvy excepting the Understanding.

The second thing which the Understanding does in con
verting sensation into perception, is to make a single per
ception out of a double sensation ; for each eye in fact
receives its own separate impression from the object we are
looking at ; each even in a slightly different direction :
nevertheless that object presents itself as a single one.
This can only take place in the Understanding, and the
process by which it is brought about is the following : Our
eyes are never quite parallel, excepting when we look at a
distant object, i.e. one which is more than 200 feet from
us. At other times they are both directed towards the
object we are viewing, whereby they converge, so as to
make the lines proceeding from each eye to the exact point
of the object on which it is fixed, form an angle, called the
optic angle; the lines themselves are called optic axes.
Now, when the object lies straight before us, these lines
exactly impinge upon the centre of each retina, therefore
in two points which correspond exactly to each other in
each eye. The Understanding, whose only business it is
to look for the cause of all things, at once recognises
the impression as coming from a single outside point,
although here the sensation is double, and attributes it to
one cause, which therefore presents itself as a single
object. For all that is perceived by us, is perceived as a
cause — that is to say, as the cause of an effect we have
experienced, consequently in the Understanding. As, never
theless, we take in not only a single point, but a consider
able surface of the object with both eyes, and yet perceive
it as a single object, it will be necessary to pursue this

70

THE FOURFOLD HOOT.

[CHAP, iv.

explanation still further. All those parts of the object
which lie to one side of the vertex of the optic angle no
longer send their rays straight into the centre, but to the
side, of the retina in each eye ; in both sides, however, to the
same, let us say the left, side. The points therefore
upon which these rays impinge, correspond symmetrically to
each other, as well as the centres — in other words, they are

Fig. 2,
o

A

homonymous points. The Understanding soon learns to
know them, and accordingly extends the above-mentioned
rule of its causal perception to them also ; consequently it
not only refers those rays which impinge upon the centre
of each retina, but those also which impinge upon all the
other symmetrically corresponding places in both retinae,
to a single radiant point in the object viewed : that is, it
sees all these points likewise as single, and the entire

FIEST CLASS OP OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 71

object also. Now, it should be well observed, that in this
process it is not the outer side of one retina which corre
sponds to the outer side of the other, and the inner to the
inner of each, but the right side of one retina which corre
sponds to the right side of the other, and so forth ; so that
this symmetrical correspondence must not be taken in a
physiological, but in a geometrical sense. Numerous and
very clear illustrations of this process, and of all the
phenomena which are connected with it, are to be found in
Robert Smith's "Optics," and partly also in Kastner's
German translation (1755). I only give one (fig. 2), which,
properly speaking, represents a special case, mentioned
further on, but which may also serve to illustrate the
whole, if we leave the point E out of question. Ac
cording to this illustration, we invariably direct both eyes
equally towards the object, in order that the symmetrically
corresponding places on both retinas may catch the rays
projected from the same points. Now, when we move our
eyes upwards and downwards, to the sides, and in all
directions, the point in the object which first impinged
upon the central point of each retina, strikes a different
place every time, but in all cases one which, in each eye,
corresponds to the place bearing the same name in the
other eye. In examining (perlustrare) an object, we let our
eyes glide backwards and forwards over it, in order to
bring each" point of it successively into contact with the
centre of the retina, which sees most distinctly : we feel it
all over with our eyes. It is therefore obvious that seeing
singly with two eyes is in fact the same process as feeling
a body with ten fingers, each of which receives a different
impression, each moreover in a different direction: the
totality of these impressions being nevertheless recognised
by the Understanding as proceeding from one object, whose
shape and size it accordingly apprehends and constructs in
Space. This is why it is possible for a blind man to become

72 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

a sculptor, as was the case, for instance, with the famous
Joseph KLeinhaus, who died in Tyrol, 1853, having been a
sculptor from his fifth year.1 For, no matter from what
cause it may have derived its data, perception is invariablv
an operation of the Understanding.

But just as a single ball seems to me double, if I touch
it with my fingers crossed — since my Understanding, at once
reverting to the cause and constructing it according to the
laws of Space, takes for granted that the fingers are in
their normal position and of course cannot do otherwise
than attribute two spherical surfaces, which come in contact
with the outer sides of the first and middle fingers, to two
different balls — just so also does an object seem double,
if my eyes, instead of converging symmetrically and en
closing the optic angle at a single point of the object, each
view it at a different inclination — in other words, if I
squint. For the rays, which in this case emanate from one
point of the object, no longer impinge upon those symme
trically corresponding points in both retinas with which my
mind has grown familiar by long experience, but upon
other, quite different ones which, in a symmetrical position
of the eyes, could only be affected in this way by different

1 The Frankfort " Konversationsblatt," July 22, 1853, gives the
following account of this sculptor : — " The blind sculptor, Joseph
Kleinhaus, died at Nauders, in Tyrol, on the 10th inst. Having lost
his eyesight through small-pox when he was five years old, he began to
amuse himself with carving and modelling, as a pastime. Prugg gave
him some instructions, and supplied him with models, and at the age of
twelve he carved a Christ in life-size. During a short stay in Nissl'a
workshop at Fiigen, his progress was so rapid, that, thanks to his good
capacities and talents, his fame as the blind sculptor soon spread far and
wide. His works are numerous and of various kinds. His Chris ts
alone, of which there are about four hundred, bear special witness to his
proficiency, particularly if his blindness is taken into consideration. He
sculptured many other objects besides, and, but two months ago, lie
modelled a bust of the Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria which has
been sent to Vienna."

FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 73

bodies ; I therefore now see two objects, precisely because
perception takes place by means of, and within, the Under
standing. — The same thing happens without squinting
when, for instance, I look fixedly at the furthest of two
objects placed at unequal distances before me, and com
plete the optic angle at it ; for then the rays emanating
from the nearer object do not impinge upon symmetrically
corresponding places in both retinas, wherefore my Under
standing attributes them to two objects, i.e. I see the
nearer object double (see fig. 2, page 70). If, on the con
trary, I complete the optic angle at the nearer object, by
looking steadily at it, the further object appears double. It
is easy to test this by holding a pencil two feet from the
eyes, and looking alternately at it and at some other more
distant object behind it.

But the finest thing of all is, that this experiment may
quite well be reversed: so that, with two real objects
straight before and close to us, and with our eyes wide
open, we nevertheless see but one. This is the most striking
proof that perception is a work of the Understanding and
by no means contained in sensation. Let two cardboard
tubes, about 8 inches long and If inches in diameter, be
fastened parallel to one another, like those of a binocular
telescope, and fix a shilling at the end of each tube. On
applying our eyes to the opposite extremity and looking
through the tubes, we shall see only one shilling sur
rounded by one tube. For in this case the eyes being forced
into a completely parallel position, the rays emanating
from the coins impinge exactly upon the centres of the two
retinas and those points which immediately surround
them, therefore upon places which correspond symmetri
cally to each other; consequently the Understanding,
taking for granted the usual convergent position of the
optic axes when objects are near, admits but one object as
the cause of the reflected rays. In other words, we see but

74 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. IV.

one object ; so direct is the act of causal apprehension in
the Understanding.

We have not space enough here to refute one by one the
physiological explanations of single vision which have been
attempted; but their fallacy is shown by the following
considerations : —

1°. If seeing single were dependent upon an organic
connection, the corresponding points in both retinas, on
which this phenomenon is shown to depend, would corre
spond organically, whereas they do so in a merely geo
metrical sense, as has already been said. For, organically
speaking, the two inner and two outer corners of the eyes
are those which correspond, and so it is with the other
parts also ; whereas for the purpose of single vision, it is
the right side of the right retina which corresponds to the
right side of the left retina, and so on, as the phenomena
just described irrefutably show. It is also precisely on
account of the intellectual character of the process, that
only the most intelligent animals, such as the higher
mammalia and birds of prey — more especially owls — have
their eyes placed so as to enable them to direct both optic
axes to the same point.

2°. The hypothesis of a confluence or partial intersection
of the optic nerves before entering the brain, originated by
Newton,1 is false, simply because it would then be impos
sible to see double by squinting. Vesalius and Caesal-
pinus besides have already brought forward anatomical
instances in which subjects saw single, although neither
fusion nor even contact of the optic nerves had taken
place. A final argument against the hypothesis of a mixed
impression is supplied by the fact, that on closing our right
eye firmly and looking at the sun with our left, the bright
image which persists for a time is always in the left, never
in the right, eye : and vice versa.

1 Newton, " Optics." Query 15.

FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 75

The third process by which the Understanding converts
sensation into perception, consists in constructing bodies
out of the simple surfaces hitherto obtained — that is, in
adding the third dimension. This it does by estimating
the expansion of bodies in this third dimension in Space —
which is known to the Understanding a priori — through
Causality, according to the degree in which the eye is
affected by the objects, and to the gradations of light and
shade. In fact, although objects fill Space in all three
dimensions, they can only produce an impression upon the
eye with two ; for the nature of that organ is such, that
our sensation, in seeing, is merely plauimetrical, not stereo-
metrical. All that is stereometrical in our perception is
a/lded by the Understanding, which has for its sole data
the direction whence the eye receives its impression, the
limits of that impression, and the various gradations of light
and dark: these data directly indicate their causes, and
enable us to distinguish whether what we have before us
is a disk or a ball. This mental process, like the preceding
ones, takes place so immediately and with such rapidity,
that we are conscious of nothing but the result. It is this
which makes perspective drawing so difficult a problem,
that it can only be solved by mathematics and has to be
learnt ; although all it has to do, is to represent the sen
sation of seeing as it presents itself to our Understanding
as a datum for the third process : that is, visual sen
sation in its merely planimetrical extension, to the two
dimensions of which extension, together with the said data
in them, the Understanding forthwith adds the third, in
contemplating a drawing as well as in contemplating reality.
Perspective drawing is, in fact, a sort of writing which can
be read as easily as printed type, but which few are able to
write ; precisely because our intellect, in perceiving, only
apprehends effects with a view to constructing their causes,
immediately losing sight of the former as soon as it has

76 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. IV,

discovered the latter. For instance, we instantly recognise
a chair, whatever position it may be in ; while drawing a
chair in any position belongs to the art which abstracts
from this third process of the Understanding, in order to pre
sent the data alone for the spectator himself to complete.
In its narrowest acceptation, as we have already seen, this is
the art of drawing in perspective ; in a -more comprehensive
sense, it is the whole art of painting. A painting presents
us with outlines drawn according to the rules of perspec
tive ; lighter and darker places proportioned to the effect
of light and shade; finally patches of colouring, which
are determined as to quality and intensity by the teaching
of experience. This the spectator reads and interprets by
referring similar effects to their accustomed causes. The
painter's art consists in consciously retaining the data of
visual sensation in the artist's memory, as they are before
this third intellectual process ; while we, who are not artists,
cast them aside without retaining them in our memory,
as soon as we have made use of them for the purpose
described above. We shall become still better acquainted
with this third intellectual process by now passing on to a
fourth, which, from its intimate connection with the third,
serves to elucidate it.

This fourth operation of the "Understanding consists in
acquiring knowledge of the distance of objects from us :
it is this precisely which constitutes that third dimension
of which we have been speaking. Visual sensation, as we
have said, gives us the direction in which objects lie, but
not their distance from us : that is, not their position. It
is for the Understanding therefore to find out this dis
tance; or, in other words, the distance must be inferred
from purely causal determinations. Now the most im
portant of these is the visual angle, which objects subtend ;
yet even this is quite ambiguous and unable to decide
anything by itself. It is like a word of double meaning :

FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 77

the sense, in which it is to be understood, can only be
gathered from its connection with the rest. An object
subtending the same visual angle may in fact be small
and near, or large and far off ; and it is only when we have
previously ascertained its size, that the visual angle enables
us to recognise its distance : and conversely, its size, when
its distance is known to us. Linear perspective is based
upon the fact that the visual angle diminishes as the dis
tance increases, and its principles may here be easily de
duced. As our sight ranges equally in all directions, we
see everything in reality as from the interior of a hollow
sphere, of which our eye occupies the centre. Now in the
first place, an infinite number of intersecting circles pass
through the centre of this sphere in all directions, and
the angles measured by the divisions of these circles are
the possible angles of vision. In the second place, the
sphere itself modifies its size according to the length of
radius we give to it ; therefore we may also imagine it as
consisting of an infinity of concentric, transparent spheres.
As all radii diverge, these concentric spheres augment in
size in proportion to their distance from us, and the de
grees of their sectional circles increase correspondingly:
therefore the true size of the objects which occupy them
likewise increases. Thus objects are larger or smaller ac
cording to the size of the spheres of which they occupy
similar portions — say 10° — while their visual angle re
mains unchanged in both cases, leaving it therefore un
decided, whether the 10° occupied by a given object belong
to a sphere of 2 miles, or of 10 feet diameter. Conversely,
if the size of the object has been ascertained, the number
of degrees occupied by it will diminish in proportion to
the distance and the size of the sphere to which we refer
it, and all its outlines will contract in similar proportion.
From this ensues the fundamental law of all perspective ;
for, as objects and the intervals between them must ne-

78 THE FOURFOLD HOOT. [CHAP. IV.

cessarily diminish in constant proportion to their distance
from us, all their outlines thereby contracting, the result
will be, that with increasing distance, what is above us
will descend, what is below us will ascend, and all that
lies at our sides will come nearer together. This pro
gressive convergence, this linear perspective, no doubt
enables us to estimate distances, so far as we have before
us an uninterrupted succession of visibly connected objects ;
but we are not able to do this by means of the visual
angle alone, for here the help of another datum is required
by the Understanding, to act, in a sense, as commentary
to the visual angle, by indicating more precisely the share
we are to attribute to distance in that angle. Now there
are four principal data of this kind, which I am about to
specify. Thanks to these data, even where there is no
linear perspective to guide us, if a man standing at a dis
tance of 200 feet appears to me subtending a visual angle
twenty-four times smaller than if he were only 2 feet off,
I can nevertheless in most cases estimate his size correctly.
All this proves once more that perception is not only a thing
of the senses, but of the intellect also. — I will here add the
following special and interesting fact in corroboration of
what I have said about the basis of linear perspective as
well as about the intellectual nature of all perception.
When I have looked steadily at a coloured object with
sharply denned outlines — say a red cross — long enough
for the physiological image to form in my eye as a green
cross, the further the surface on to which I project it,
the larger it will appear to me : and vice versa. For the
image itself occupies an unvarying portion of my retina,
i.e. the portion originally affected by the red cross ; there
fore when referred outwards, or, in other words, recognised
as the effect of an external object, it forms an unchanging
visual angle, say of 2°. Now if, in this case, where all
commentary to the visual angle is wanting, I remove it to

FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 79

a distant surface, with which I necessarily identify it as
"belonging to its effect, the cross will occupy 2° of a distant
and therefore larger sphere, and is consequently large.
If, on the other hand, I project the image on to a nearer
object, it will occupy 2° of a smaller sphere, and is
therefore small. The resulting perception is in both cases
completely objective, quite like that of an external object ;
and as it proceeds from an entirely subjective reason
(from the image having been excited in quite a different
way), it thus confirms the intellectual character of all
objective perception. — This phenomenon (which I dis
tinctly remember to have been the first to notice, in
1815) forms the theme of an essay by Seguin, published in
the " Comptes rendus " of the 2nd August, 1858, where it
is served up as a new discovery, all sorts of absurd and
distorted explanations of it being given. Messieurs les
illustres confreres let pass no opportunity for heaping ex
periment upon experiment, the more complicated the
better. Experience! is their watchword; yet how rarely
do we meet with any sound, genuine reflection upon the
phenomena observed! Experience! experience! followed
by twaddle.

To return to the subsidiary data which act as com
mentaries to a given visual angle, we find foremost among
them the mutationes oculi internee, by means of which the
eye adapts its refractory apparatus to various distances by
increasing and diminishing the refraction. In what these
modifications consist, has not yet been clearly ascertained.
They have been sought in the increased convexity, now of
the cornea, now of the crystalline lens; but the latest
theory seems to me the most probable one, according to
which the lens is moved backwards for distant vision and
forwards for near vision, lateral pressure, in the latter
case, giving it increased protuberance ; so that the process
would exactly resemble the mechanism of an opera-glass.

80 THE FOURFOLD HOOT. [CHAP. IV.

Kepler, however, had, in the main, already expressed this
theory, which may be found explained in A. Hueck's
pamphlet, "Die Bewegung der Krystallinse," 1841. If
we are not clearly conscious of these inner modifications
of the eye, we have at any rate a certain feeling of them,
and of this we immediately avail ourselves to estimate
distances. As however these modifications are not avail
able for the purposes of clear sight beyond the range of
from about 7 inches to 16 feet, the Understanding is only
able to apply this datum within those limits.

Beyond them, however, the second datum becomes avail
able : that is to say, the optic angle, formed by the two
optic axes, which we had occasion to explain when speaking
of single vision. It is obvious that this optic angle be
comes smaller, the further the object is removed : and vice
versa. This different direction of the eyes, with respect to
each other, does not take place without producing a slight
sensation, of which we are nevertheless only in so far
conscious as the Understanding makes use of it, as a
datum, in estimating distances intuitively. By this datum
we are not only enabled to cognize the distance, but the
precise position of the object viewed, by means of the
parallax of the eyes, which consists in each eye seeing the
object in a slightly different direction ; so that if we close
one eye, the object seems to move. Thus it is not easy to snuff
a candle with one eye shut, because this datum is then
wanting. But as the direction of the eyes becomes parallel
as soon as the distance of the object reaches or exceeds
200 feet, and as the optic angle consequently then ceases
to exist, this datum only holds good within the said
distance.

Beyond it, the Understanding has recourse to atmo
spheric perspective, which indicates a greater distance by
means of the increasing dimness of all colours, of the
appearance of physical blue in front of all dark objects

FIEST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 81

(according to Gothe's perfectly correct and true theory of
colours), and also of the growing indistinctness of all out
lines. In Italy, where the atmosphere is very transparent, ,
this datum loses its power and is apt to mislead : Tivoli,
for instance, seems to be very near when seen from Frascati.
On the other hand, all objects appear larger in a mist,
which is an abnormal exaggeration of the datum ; be
cause our Understanding assumes them to be further
from us.

Finally, there remains the estimation of distance by
means of the size (known to us intuitively) of intervening
objects, such as fields, woods, rivers, &c. &c. This mode
of estimation is only applicable where there is uninter
rupted succession : in other words, it can only be applied
to terrestrial, not to celestial objects. Moreover, we have
in general more practice in using it horizontally than ver
tically: a ball on the top of a tower 200 feet high appears
much smaller to us than when lying on the ground 200
feet from us ; because, in the latter case, we estimate the
distance more accurately. When we see human beings in
such a way, that what lies between them and ourselves is
in a great measure hidden from our sight, they always
appear strikingly small.

The fact that our Understanding assumes everything it
perceives in a horizontal direction to be farther off, therefore
larger, than what is seen in a vertical direction, must partly
be attributed to this last mode of estimating distances, inas
much as it only holds good when applied horizontally arid
to terrestrial objects ; but partly also to our estimation of
distances by atmospheric perspective, which is subject to
similar conditions. This is why the moon seems so much
larger on the horizon than at its zenith, although its visual
angle accurately measured — that is, the image projected by
it on to the eye — is not at all larger in one case than in the
other ; and this also accounts for the flattened appearance of

82 THE FOUEFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

the vault of the sky : that is to say, for its appearing to have
greater horizontal than vertical extension. Both pheno
mena therefore are purely intellectual or cerebral, not optical.
If it be objected, that even when at its zenith, the moon
occasionally has a hazy appearance without seeming to be
larger, we answer, that neither does it in that case appear
red ; for its haziness proceeds from a greater density of
vapours, and is therefore of a different kind from that
which proceeds from atmospheric perspective. To this
may be added what I have already said: that we only
apply this mode of estimating distances in a horizontal,
not in a perpendicular, direction ; besides, in this case,
other correctives come into play. It is related of Saussure
that, when on the Mont Blanc, he saw so enormous a
moon rise, that, not recognising what it was, he fainted
with terror.

The properties of the telescope and magnifying glass,
on the other hand, depend upon a separate estimate
according to the visual angle alone : i.e., that of size
by distance, and of distance by size; because here the
four other supplementary means of estimating distances
are excluded. The telescope in reality magnifies objects,
while it only seems to bring them nearer ; because their
size being known to us empirically, we here account for
its apparent increase by a diminution of their distance
from us. A house seen through a telescope, for instance,
seems to be ten times nearer, not ten times larger, than
seen with the naked eye. The magnifying glass, on the
-contrary, does not really magnify, but merely enables
us to bring the object nearer to our eyes than would
otherwise be possible ; so that it only appears as large
as it would at that distance even without the magnify
ing glass. In fact, we are prevented from seeing objects
distinctly at less than from eight to ten inches' distance
from our eyes, by the insufficient convexity of the ocular

FIRST CLASS OP OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 83

lens and cornea ; but if we increase the refraction by
substituting the convexity of the magnifying glass for
that of the lens and cornea, we then obtain a clear image
of objects even when they are as near as half an inch from
our eyes. Objects thus seen in close proximity to us and
in the size corresponding to that proximity, are transferred
by our Understanding to the distance at which we naturally
see distinctly, i.e. to about eight or ten inches from our
eyes, and we then estimate their magnitude according to
this distance and to the given visual angle.

I have entered thus fully into detail concerning all the
different processes by which seeing is accomplished, in
order to show clearly and irrefragably that the predomi
nant factor in them is the Understanding, which, by con
ceiving each change as an effect and referring that effect to
its cause, produces the cerebral phenomenon of the objec
tive world on the basis of the a priori fundamental intui
tions of Space and Time, for which it receives merely a
few data from the senses. And moreover the Understand
ing effects this exclusively by means of its own peculiar
form, the law of Causality; therefore quite directly and
intuitively, without any assistance whatever from reflec
tion — that is, from abstract knowledge by means of concep
tions and of language, which are the materials of secondary
knowledge, i.e. of thought, therefore of Reason.

That this knowledge through the Understanding is in
dependent of Reason's assistance, is shown even by the
fact, that when, at any time, the Understanding attributes
a given effect to a wrong cause, actually perceiving that
cause, whereby illusion arises, our Reason, however clearly
it may recognise in abstracto the true state of the matter,
is nevertheless unable to assist the Understanding, and
the illusion persists undisturbed in spite of that better
knowledge. The above-mentioned phenomena of seeing
and feeling double, which result from an abnormal position

84s THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

of the organs of touch and sight, are instances of such
illusions ; likewise the apparently increased size of the
rising moon; the image which forms in the focus of a
concave mirror and exactly resembles a solid body floating
in space ; the painted relievo which we take for real ; the
apparent motion of a shore or bridge on which we are
standing, if a ship happens to pass along or beneath it ; the
seeming proximity of very lofty mountains, owing to the
absence of atmospheric perspective, which is the result of
the purity of the air round their summits. In these and
in a multitude of similar cases, our Understanding takes
for granted the existence of the usual cause with which it is
conversant and forthwith perceives it, though our Reason
has arrived at the truth by a different road; for, the
knowledge of the Understanding being anterior to that of
the Eeason, the intellect remains inaccessible to the teaching
of the Eeason, and thus the illusion — that is, the deception of
the Understanding — remains immovable ; albeit error — that
is, the deception of the Eeason — is obviated. — That which
is correctly known by the Understanding is reality : that
which is correctly known by the Eeason is truth, or in other
terms, a judgment having a sufficient reason; illusion
(that which is wrongly perceived) we oppose to reality :
error (that which is wrongly thought) to truth.

The purely formal part of empirical perception — that is,
Space, Time, and the law of Causality — is contained a
priori in the intellect ; but this is not the case with the
application of this formal part to empirical data, which has
to be acquired by the Understanding through practice and
experience. Therefore new-born infants, though they no
doubt receive impressions of light and of colour, still do
not apprehend or indeed, strictly speaking, see objects.
The first weeks of their existence are rather passed in a
kind of stupor, from which they awaken by degrees when
tnair Understanding begins to apply its function to the

FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 85

data supplied by the senses, especially those of touch and
of sight, whereby they gradually gain consciousness of the
objective world. This newly-arising consciousness may be
clearly recognised by the look of growing intelligence in
their eyes and a degree of intention in their movements,
especially in the smile with which they show for the first
time recognition of those who take care of them. They
may even be observed to make experiments for a time
with their sight and touch, in order to complete their
apprehension of objects by different lights, in different
directions and at different distances: thus pursuing a
silent, but serious course of study, till they have succeeded
in mastering all the intellectual operations in seeing which
have been described. The fact of this schooling can be
ascertained still more clearly through those who, being
born blind, have been operated upon late in life, since they
are able to give an account of their impressions. Chesel-
den's blind man1 was not an isolated instance, and we
find in all similar cases the fact corroborated, that
those who obtain their sight late in life, no doubt, see
light, outlines, and colours, as soon as the operation is
over, but that they have no objective perception of objects
until their Understanding has learnt to apply its causal
law to data and to changes which are new to it. On first
beholding his room and the various objects in it, Chesel-
den's blind man did not distinguish one thing from
another ; he simply received the general impression of a
totality all in one piece, which he took for a smooth,
variegated surface. It never occurred to him to recognise
a number of detached objects, lying one behind the other
at different distances. With blind people of this sort, it
is by the sense of touch, to which objects are already
known, that they have to be introduced to the sense of

1 Sec the original report in vol. 35 of the " Philosophical Transac
tions" as to this case.

86 THE FOUKFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

sight. In the beginning, the patient has no appreciation
•whatever of distances and tries to lay hold of everything.
One, when he first saw his own house from outside, could
not conceive how so small a thing could contain so many
rooms. Another was highly delighted to find, some weeks
after the operation, that the engravings hanging on the
walls of his room represented a variety of objects. The
" Morgenblatt" of October 23rd, 1817, contains an account
of a youth who was born blind, and obtained his sight
at the age of seventeen. He had to learn intelligent
perception, for at first sight he did not even recognise
objects previously known to him through the sense of
touch. Every object had to be introduced to the sense of
sight by means of the sense of touch. As for the distances
of the objects he saw, he had no appreciation whatever of
them, and tried to lay hold indiscriminately of everything,
far or near. — Franz expresses himself as follows : l —

" A definite idea of distance, as well as of form and size, is only ob
tained by sight and touch, and by reflecting on the impressions made
on both senses; but for this purpose we must take into account the
muscular motion and voluntary locomotion of the individual. — Caspar
Ilauser, in a detailed account of his own experience in this respect, states,
that upon his first liberation from confinement, whenever he looked through
the window upon external objects, such as the street, garden, &c., it ap
peared to him as if there were a shutter quite close to his eye, and covered
with confused colours of all kinds, in which he could recognise or distin
guish nothing singly. He says farther, that he did not convince himself till
after some time during his walks out of doors, that what had at first
appeared to him as a shutter of various colours, as well as many other
objects, were in reality very different things; and that at length the
shutter disappeared, and he saw and recognised all things in their just
proportions. Persons born blind who obtain their sight by an opera
tion in later years only, sometimes imagine that all objects touch their
eves, and lie so near to them that they are afraid of stumbling againsfc
them ; sometimes they leap towards the moon, supposing that they can

1 Franz, " The Eye, a treatise on preserving this organ in a healthy
state and improving the sight." London, Churchill, 1839, pp. 34-36.

FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 87

lay hold of it ; at other times they run after the clouds moving along
the sky, in order to catch them, or commit other such extravagancies.
Since ideas are gained by reflection upon sensation, it is further neces
sary in all cases, in order that an accurate idea of objects may be
formed from the sense of sight, that the powers of the mind should be
unimpaired, and undisturbed in their exercise. A proof of this is
afforded in the instance related by Haslam,1 of a boy who had no
defect of sight, but was weak in understanding, and who in his seventh
year was unable to estimate the distances of objects, especially as to
height ; he would extend his hand frequently towards a nail on the
ceiling, or towards the moon, to catch it. It is therefore the judgment
which corrects and makes clear this idea, or perception of visible
objects."

The intellectual nature of perception as I have shown it,
is corroborated physiologically by Flourens a as follows : —

" II faut faire line grand distinction entre les sens et 1'intelligence.
L'ablation d'un tubercule determine la perte de la sensation, du sens de
la vue; la retine devient insensible, 1'iris devient immobile. L'ablation
d'un lobe cerebral laisse la sensation, le sens, la sensibility de la re'tine,
la mobility de 1'iris ; elle ne detruit que la perception seule. Dans un
cas, c'est un fait sensor ial ; et, dans 1'autre, un fait cerebral ; dans un
cas, c'est la perte du sens ; dans 1'autre, c'est la perte de la perception.
La distinction des perceptions et des sensations est encore un grand
resultat ; et il est demontre' aux yeux. II y a deux moyens de faire
perdre la vision par 1'encephale : 1° par les tubercules, c'est la perte du
sens, de la sensation ; 2° par les lobes, c'est la perte de la perception, de
1'intelligence. La sensibilite n'est done pas 1'intelligence; penser n'est
done pas sentir ; et voila toute une philosophic rcnversee. L'ide"e n'est
done pas, la sensation ; et voila encore une autre preuve du vice radical
de cette philosophic." And again, p. 77, under the heading: Separa
tion de la Sensibility et de la Perception : — " II y a une de mes exp6-
rences qui separe nettement la sensibilite de la perception. Quand
on enleve le cerveau proprement dit (lobes ou hemispheres cerebraux) a un
animal, Panimal perd la vue. Mais, par rapport a I'ceil, rien n'est
change : les objets continuent a se peindre sur la re'tine ; Viris reste
contractile, le nerf optique sensible, parfaitement sensible. Et cepeii-

1 Haslam's "Observations on Madness and Melancholy," 2nd ed.
p. 1921

2 Flourens, "De la vie et de 1'Intelligence," 2nd edition, Paris,
Gamier Freres, 1852, p. 49.

88 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

dant 1'animal ne voit plus ; il n'y a plus vision, quoique tout ce qui est
sensation subsiste , il n'y a plus vision, parce qu'il n'y a plus perception.
Le percevoir, et non le sentir, est done le premier element de V intelli
gence. La perception est partie de ^intelligence, car elle se perd avec
Y intelligence, et par 1'ablation du meme organe, les lobes ou hemispheres
certbraux ; et la sensibility n'en est point partie, puisqu'elle subsiste
apres la perte de ^intelligence et 1'ablation des lobes ou hemispheres"

The following famous verse of the ancient philosopher
Epicharmus, proves that the ancients in general recog
nized the intellectual nature of perception : Novc opij Kal
VOVQ aKovti' Ta\\a *cw^a /cat rv^Xa. (Mens videt, mens audit;
ccetera surda et cceca.) l Plutarch in quoting this verse,
adds : 2 w'c TOV Trepl TO. u/^uarct KOI wra irddovg, av pt] Trapfj TO
fypovovv, ai<rdri<Tiv ov TTOLOVVTO^ (guia affectio oculorum et
aurium nullum affert sensum, intelligentia absents). Shortly
before too he says : 27-parw^oc TOV fyvaiKoii \6yo^ lortV, aVo
tieiKVvav WQ OV& aiffddvEvdai Toirapdirav avtv TOV voiiv virdp\et.
(Stratonis pliysici exstat ratiocinatio, qua " sine intelligentia
sentiri omnino nihil posse " demonstrat.) 3 Again shortly
after he says : oOev aVay/CT?, Trdcriv, oTg TO aladdj'e&dat, Kal
TO votiv virajO^eiv, el TV voiiv aiaBdvtaQcu Tre^vKa^v (quars
necesse est, omnia, quce sentiunt, etiam intelligere, siquidem
intelligendo demum sentiamus)* A. second verse of Epi
charmus might be connected with this, which is quoted
by Diogenes Laertes (iii. 16) :

Efymig, TO GOfyvV iGTIV OV KO.O' tV /JLOVOV,

dXX' oaa ?rep %

1 "It is the mind that sees and hears j all besides is deaf and
blind." (Tr. Ad.)

2 Plutarch, " De solert. animal." c. 3. " For the affection of our
eyes and ears does not produce any perception, unless it be accompanied
by thought." (Tr. Ad.)

3 " Straton, the physicist, has proved that c without thinking it is
quite impossible to perceive.'" (Tr. Ad.)

4 " Therefore it is necessary that all who perceive should also think,
since we are so constituted as to perceive by means of thinking."
(Tr. Ad.)

FIRST CLASS OP OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 89

(Eumaee, sapientia non uni tantum competit, sed qucecunque
vivunt etiam intellectum Tiabent.) Porphyry likewise endea
vours to show at length that all animals have under
standing.1

Now, that it should be so, follows necessarily from the
intellectual character of perception. / All animals, even
down to the very lowest, must have Understanding — that
is, knowledge of the causal law, although they have it in
very different degrees of delicacy and of clearness ; at any
rate they must have as much of it as is required for percep
tion by their senses ; for sensation without Understanding
would be not only a useless, but a cruel gift of Nature.^
No one, who has himself any intelligence, can doubt the
existence of it in the higher animals. But at times it even
becomes undeniably evident that their knowledge of
causality is actually a priori, and that it does not arise
from the habit of seeing one thing follow upon another. A
very young puppy will not, for instance, jump off a table,
because he foresees what would be the consequence. Not
long ago I had some large curtains put up at my bed
room window, which reached down to the floor, and were
drawn aside from the centre by means of a string. The
first morning they were opened I was surprised to see my
dog, a very intelligent poodle, standing quite perplexed,
and looking upwards and sidewards for the cause of the
phenomenon : that is, he was seeking for the change which
he knew a priori must have taken place. Next day the
same thing happened again. — But even the lowest animals
have perception — consequently Understanding — down to
the aquatic polypus, which has no distinct organs of sensa
tion, yet wanders from leaf to leaf on its waterplant, while
clinging to it with its feelers, in search of more light.

Nor is there, indeed, any difference, beyond that of

1 Porph. "De abstinentia,'- iii. 21.

90 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. IV.

degree, between this lowest Understanding and that of
man, which we however distinctly separate from his
Reason. The intermediate gradations are occupied by the
various series of animals, among which the highest, such
as the monkey, the elephant, the dog, astonish us often by
their intelligence. But in every case the business of the
Understanding is invariably to apprehend directly causal
relations : first, as we have seen, those between our own
body and other bodies, whence proceeds objective percep
tion; then those between these objectively perceived bodies
among themselves, and here, as has been shown in § 20,
the causal relation manifests itself in three forms — as
cause, as stimulus, and as motive. All movement in the
world takes place according to these three forms of the
causal relation, and through them alone does the intellect
comprehend it. Now, if, of these three, causes, in the nar
rowest sense of the word, happen to be the object of inves-
gation for the Understanding, it will produce Astronomy,
Mechanics, Physics, Chemistry, and will invent machines
for good and for evil ; but in all cases a direct, intuitive
apprehension of the causal connection will in the last resort
lie at the bottom of all its discoveries. For the sole form
and function of the Understanding is this apprehension, and
not by any means the complicated machinery of Kant's
twelve Categories, the nullity of which I have proved.—
(All comprehension is a direct, consequently intuitive,
apprehension of the causal connection ; although this has
to be reduced at once to abstract conceptions in order to be
fixed. To calculate therefore, is not to understand, and,
in itself, calculation conveys no comprehension of things.
Calculation deals exclusively with abstract conceptions of
magnitudes, whose mutual relations it determines. By it
we never attain the slightest comprehension of a physical
process, for this requires intuitive comprehension of
space-relations, by means of which causes take effect.

FIKST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 91

Calculations have merely practical, not theoretical, value.
It may even be said that where calculation begins, compre
hension ceases ; for a brain occupied with numbers is, as
long as it calculates, entirely estranged from the causal
connection in physical processes, being engrossed in purely
abstract, numerical conceptions. The result, however, only
shows us how much, never what. " Ij experience et le
calcul," those watchwords of French physicists, are not
therefore by any means adequate [for thorough insight] .) —
If, again, stimuli are the guides of the Understanding, it
will produce Physiology of Plants and Animals, Thera
peutics, and Toxicology. Finally, if it devotes itself to
the study of motives, the Understanding will use them, on
the one hand, theoretically, to guide it in producing works
on Morality, Jurisprudence, History, Politics, and even
Dramatic and Epic Poetry; on the other hand, practically,
either merely to train animals, or for the higher purpose of
making human beings dance to its music, when once it has
succeeded in discovering which particular wire has to be
pulled in order to move each puppet at its pleasure. Now,
with reference to the function which effects this, it is quite
immaterial whether the intellect turns gravitation in
geniously to account, and makes it serve its purpose by
stepping in just at the right time, or whether it brings the
collective or the individual propensities of men into play
for its own ends. In its practical application we call the
Understanding shrewdness or, when used to outwit others,
cunning ; when its aims are very insignificant, it is called
slyness and, if combined with injury to others, craftiness.
In its purely theoretical application, we call it simply
Understanding, the higher degrees of which are named
acumen, sagacity, discernment, penetration, while its lower
degrees' are termed dulness, stupidity, silliness, &c. &c.
These widely differing degrees of sharpness are innate, and
cannot be acquired ; although, as I have already shown,

92 THE FOTJKFOLD HOOT. [CHAP. IV.

even in the earliest stages of the application of the Under
standing, i.e. in empirical perception, practice and know
ledge of the material to which it is applied, are needed.
Every simpleton has Reason — give him the premisses, and
he will draw the conclusion; whereas primary, con
sequently intuitive, knowledge is supplied by the Under
standing: herein lies the difference. The pith of every
great discovery, of every plan having universal historical
importance, is accordingly the product of a happy moment
in which, by a favourable coincidence of outer and inner
circumstances, some complicated causal series., some hidden
causes of phenomena which had been seen thousands of
times before, or some obscure, untrodden paths, suddenly
reveal themselves to the intellect.—

By the preceding explanations of the processes in seeing
and feeling, I have incontestably shown that jempirical per
ception is essentially the work of the Understanding ,\ for
which the material only is supplied by the senses in sensa
tion — and a poor material it is, on the whole ; so that] the
Understanding is, in fact, the artist, while the senses are
but the under- workmen who hand it the materials. \ But
the process consists throughout in referring from given
effects to their causes, which by this process are enabled to
present themselves as objects in Space, j The very fact that
we presuppose Causality in this process, proves precisely
that this law must have been supplied by the Under
standing itself ; for it could never have found its way into
the intellect from outside. I It is indeed the first condition
of all empirical perception ; but this again is the form in
which all external experience presents itself to us;|how
then can h s law of Causality be derived from experience,
when it is itself essentially presupposed by experience ?-j-It
was just because of the utter impossibility of this, and
because Locke's philosophy had put an end to all a priority,
that Hume denied the whole reality of the conception of

FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 93

Causality. He had besides already mentioned two false
hypotheses in the seventh section of his "Inquiry concerning
the Human Understanding," which recently have again been
advanced : the one, that the effect of the will upon the
members of our body; the other, that the resistance
opposed to our pressure by outward objects, is the origin
and prototype of the conception of Causality. Hume refutes
both in his own way and according to his own order of
ideas. I argue as follows, j There is no causal connection
whatever between acts of the will and actions of the body ;
on the contrary, both are immediately one and the same
thing, only perceived in a double aspect — that is, on the
one hand, in our self-consciousness, or inner sense, as acts
of the will; on the other, simultaneously in exterior,
spacial brain-perception, as actions of the body.1! The
second hypothesis is false, first because, as I have already
shown at length, a mere sensation of touch does not yet
give any objective perception whatever, let alone the con
ception of Causality, which never can arise from the feeling
of an impeded muscular effort : besides impediments of this
kind often occur without any external cause; secondly,
because our pressing against an external object necessarily
has a motive, and this already presupposes apprehension of
that object, which again presupposes knowledge of Cau
sality. — But the only means of radically proving the con
ception of Causality to be independent of all experience was
by showing, as I have done, that the whole possibility of
experience is conditioned by the conception of Causality.
In § 23 I intend to show that Kant's proof, propounded
with a similar intent, is false.

This is also the proper place for drawing attention to the

1 Compare "Die Welt a. W. u. V." 3rd edition, vol. ii. p. 41.
[The 3rd edition of " Die Welt a. W. u. V." contains at this place a
supplement which is wanting in the 2nd edition, vol. ii. p. 38. — Note bj
the Editor of the 3rd edition.]

94 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

fact, that Kant either did not clearly recognise in empirical
perception the mediation of the causal law — which law is
known to us before all experience — or that he intentionally
evaded mentioning it, because it did not suit his purpose. In
the " Critique of Pure Season," for instance, the relation be-
tween causality and perception is not treated in the " Doc
trine of Elements," but in the chapter on the " Paralogisms
of Pure Reason," where one would hardly expect to find it ;
moreover it appears in his " Critique of the Fourth Para
logism of Transcendental Psychology," and only in the
first edition.1 The very fact that this place should have
been assigned to it, shows that in considering this relation,
he always had the transition from the phenomenon to the
thing in itself exclusively in view, but not the genesis of per
ception itself. Here accordingly he says that the existence
of a real external object is not given directly in perception,
but can be added to it in thought and thus inferred.
In Kant's eyes, however, he who does this is a Transcen
dental Realist, and consequently on a wrong road. For by
his " outward object" Kant here means the thing in itself.
The Transcendental Idealist, on the contrary, stops short
at the perception of something empirically real — that is, of
something existing outside us in Space — without needing
the inference of a cause to give it reality. For perception,
according to Kant, is quite directly accomplished without
any assistance from the causal nexus, and consequently
from the Understanding: he simply identifies perception
with sensation. This we find confirmed in the passage
which begins, " With reference to the reality of external
objects, I need as little trust to inference," &c. &c.2 and
a^ain in the sentence commencing with " Now we may well

1 Kant, " Krit. d. r. V." 1st edition, p. 367 sqq. (English transla
tion by M. Miiller, p. 318 sqq.)

2 Kant, " Krit. d. r. Vern." 1st edition, p, 371. (English translation,
by M. Muller, p. 322.)

FIEST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 95

admit," &c. &C.1 It is quite clear from these passages that
perception of external things in Space, according to Kant,
precedes all application of the causal law, therefore that
the causal law does not belong to perception as an element
and condition of it : for him, mere sensation is identical
with perception. Only in as far as we ask what may, in a
transcendental sense, exist outside of us : that is, when we
ask for the thing in itself, is Causality mentioned as con
nected with perception. Moreover Kant admits the exis
tence, nay, the mere possibility, of causality only in reflec
tion : that is, in abstract, distinct knowledge by means of
conceptions ; therefore he has no suspicion that its applica
tion is anterior to all reflection, which is nevertheless evi
dently the case, especially in empirical, sensuous perception
which, as I have proved irrefragably in the preceding ana
lysis, could never take place otherwise. Kant is therefore
obliged to leave the genesis of empirical perception unex
plained. With him it is a mere matter of the senses, given
as it were in a miraculous way : that is, it coincides with
sensation. I should very much like my reflective readers
to refer to the passages I have indicated in Kant's work, in
order to convince themselves of the far greater accuracy of
my view of the whole process and connection. Kant's ex
tremely erroneous view has held its ground till now in
philosophical literature, simply because no one ventured to
attack it ; therefore I have found it necessary to clear the
way in order to throw light upon the mechanism of our
knowledge.

Kant's fundamental idealistic position loses nothing
whatever, nay, it even gains by this rectification of mine,
in as far as, with me, the necessity of the causal law is
absorbed and extinguished in empirical perception as its
product and cannot therefore be invoked in behalf of an

1 Kant, " Krit. d. r. Vern." 1st edition, p. 372. (English transla
tion, p. 323.)

96 THE FOURFOLD KOOT. [CHAP. IV.

entirely transcendent question as to the thing in itself.
On referring to my theory above concerning empirical per
ception, we find that its first datum, sensation, is absolutely
subjective, being a process within the organism, because it
takes place beneath the skin. Locke has completely and
exhaustively proved, that the feelings of our senses, even
admitting them to be roused by external causes, cannot
have any resemblance whatever to the qualities of those
causes. Sugar, for instance, bears no resemblance at all to
sweetness, nor a rose to redness. But that they should
need an external cause at all, is based upon a law whose
origin lies demonstrably within us, in our brain ; therefore
this necessity is not less subjective than the sensations
themselves. Nay, even Time — that primary condition
of every possible change, therefore also of the change
which first permits the application of the causal law — and
not less Space — which alone renders the externalisation
of causes possible, after which they present themselves
to us as objects — even Time and Space, we say, are sub
jective forms of the intellect, as Kant has conclusively
proved. Accordingly we find all the elements of em
pirical perception lying within us, and nothing contained
in them which can give us reliable indications as to any
thing differing absolutely from ourselves, anything in
itself. — But this is not all. What we think under the con
ception 'matter, is the residue which remains over after
bodies have been divested of their shape and of all their
specific qualities : a residue, which precisely on that account
must be identical in all bodies. Now these shapes and
qualities which have been abstracted by us, are nothing
but the peculiar, specially defined way in which these bodies
act, which constitutes precisely their difference. If there
fore we leave these shapes and qualities out of considera
tion, there remains nothing but mere activity in general,
pure action as such, Causality itself, objectively thought —

FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 97

I that is, the reflection of our own Understanding, the exter-
I nalised image of its sole function ; and Matter is throughout
I pure Causality, its essence is Action in general.1 This is
S why pure Matter cannot be perceived, but can only be
I thought : it is a something we add to every reality, as its
S basis, in thinking it. For pure Causality, mere action, with-
|| out any denned mode of action, cannot become perceptible,
S therefore it cannot come within any experience. — Thus
| Matter is only the objective correlate to pure Understand-
I ing ; for it is Causality in general, and nothing else : just as
I the Understanding itself is direct knowledge of cause and
t effect, and nothing else. Now this again is precisely why
B the law of causality is not applicable to Matter itself : that
is to say, Matter has neither beginning nor end, but is and
remains permanent. For as, on the one hand, Causality is
the indispensable condition of all alternation in the acci
dents (forms and qualities) of Matter, i.e. of all passage in
and out of being ; but as, on the other hand, Matter is
pure Causality itself, as such, objectively viewed : it is un
able to exercise its own power upon itself, just as the eye
can see everything but itself. " Substance " and Mattel
being moreover identical, we may call Substance, action
viewed in abstracto : Accidents, particular modes of action,
action in concreto. — Now these are the results to which true,
i.e. transcendental, Idealism leads. In my chief work I have
shown that the thing in itself — i.e. whatever, on the whole,
exists independently of our representation — cannot be got
at by way of representation, but that, to reach it, we must
follow quite a different path, leading through the inside of
things, which lets us into the citadel, as it were, by
treachery. —

But it would be downright chicanery, nothing else, to

1 Compare " Die Welt a. W. u. V." 2nd edition ; vol. i. sect. 4, p. 9 ;
and vol. ii. pp. 48, 49 (3rd edition, vol. i. p. 10; vol. ii. p. 52). English
translation, vol. i. pp. 9-10 j vol. ii. p. 218.

H

98 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. IV.

try and compare, let alone identify, such an honest, deep,
thorough analysis of empirical perception as the one I have
just given, which proves all the elements of perception to
be subjective, with Fichte's algebraic equations of the Ego
and the Non-Ego ; with his sophistical pseudo-demonstra
tions, which in order to be able to deceive his readers had
to be clothed in the obscure, not to say absurd, language
adopted by him ; with his explanations of the way in which
the Ego spins the Non-Ego out of itself ; in short, with all
the buffoonery of scientific emptiness.1 Besides, I protest
altogether against any community with this Fichte, as Kant
publicly and emphatically did in a notice ad hoc in the
" Jenaer Litteratur Zeitung." ' Hegelians and similar
ignoramuses may continue to hold forth to their heart's
content upon Kant-Fichteian philosophy : there exists a
Kantian philosophy and a Fichteian hocus-pocus, — this is
the true state of the case, and will remain so, in spite of those
who delight in extolling what is bad and in decrying what
is good, and of these Germany possesses a larger number
than any other country.

§. 22. Of the Immediate Object.

Thus it is from the sensations of our body that we
receive the data for the very first application of the causal
law, and it is precisely by that application that the percep
tion of this class of objects arises. They therefore have
their essence and existence solely in virtue of the intel
lectual function thus coming into play, and of its
exercise.

1 Wissenschaftsleere (literally, emptiness of science}, a pun of Schopen
hauer's on the title of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre (doctrine of science),
which cannot be rendered in English. (Tr.'s Note.)

2 Kant, "Erklarung iiber Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre." See the
" Intelligenzblatt " of the Jena Literary Gazette (1799), No. 109.

FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 99

Now, as far as it is the starting-point, i.e. the mediator,
for our perception of all other objects, I have called the
bodily organism, in the first edition of the present work,
the Immediate Object; this, however, must not be taken
in a strictly literal sense. For although our bodily sensa
tions are all apprehended directly, still this immediate
apprehension does not yet make our body itself perceptible
to us as an object ; on the contrary, up to this point all
remains subjective, that is to say, sensation. From this
sensation certainly proceeds the perception of all other
objects as the causes of such sensations, and these causes
then present themselves to us as objects ; but it is not so
with the body itself, which only supplies sensations to
consciousness. It is only indirectly that we know even
this body objectively, i.e. as an object, by its presenting
itself, like all other objects, as the recognised cause of a
subjectively given effect — and precisely on this account
objectively — in our Understanding, or brain (which is the
same). Now this can only take place when its own senses
are acted upon by its parts : for instance, when the body is
seen by the eye, or felt by the hand, &c., upon which data
the brain (or understanding) forthwith constructs it as to
shape and quality in space. — The immediate presence in
our consciousness of representations belonging to this
class, depends therefore upon the position assigned to them
in the causal chain — by which all things are connected —
relatively to the body (for the time being) of the Subject
— by which (the Subject) all things are known.

§.23. Arguments against Kant's Proof of the a priority of
the conception of Causality.

One of the chief objects of the " Critique of Pure
Beason" is to show the universal validity, for all expe
rience, of the causal law, its a priority, and, as a necessary

100 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

consequence of this, its restriction to possible experience,
Nevertheless, I cannot assent to the proof there given of
the a priority of the principle, which is substantially
this : — " The synthesis of the manifold by the imagina
tion, which is necessary for all empirical knowledge,
gives succession, but not yet determinate succession :
that is, it leaves undetermined which of two states per
ceived was the first, not only in my imagination, but in the
object itself. But definite order in this succession —
through which alone what we perceive becomes experience,
or, in other words, authorizes us to form objectively valid
judgments — is first brought into it by the purely intel
lectual conception of cause and effect. Thus the principle
of causal relation is the condition which renders experience
possible, and, as such, it is given us a priori" l

According to this, the order in which changes succeed
each other in real objects becomes known to us as objec
tive only by their causality. This assertion Kant repeats
and explains in the " Critique of Pure Reason," especially
in his " Second Analogy of Experience," 2 and again at the
conclusion of his " Third Analogy," and I request every
one who desires to understand what I am now about to
say, to read these passages. In them he affirms every
where that the objectivity of the succession of representa-
tions — which he defines as their correspondence with the
succession of real objects — is only known through the
rule by which they follow upon one another: that is,
through the law of causality ; that my mere apprehension
consequently leaves the objective relation between phe
nomena following one another quite undetennined : since

1 Kant, " Krit. d. r. Vern." 1st edition, p. 201 ; 5th edition, p, 246.
(English translation by M. Miiller, p. 176.) This is, however, not a
literal quotation. (Tr.'s note. )

2 Ibid. p. 189 of the 1st edition; more fully, p. 232 of the 5th
edition. (English translation by M. Miiller, p. 166.)

FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 101

I merely apprehend the succession of my own representa
tions, but the succession in my apprehension does not
authorize me to form any judgment whatever as to the
succession in the object, unless that judgment be based
upon causality ; and since, besides, I might invert the order
in which these perceptions follow each other in my appre
hension, there being nothing which determines them as
objective. To illustrate this assertion, Kant brings forward
the instance of a house, whose parts we may consider in any
order we like, from top to bottom, or from bottom to top ;
the determination of succession being in this case purely
subjective and not founded upon an object, because it
depends upon our pleasure. In opposition to this instance,
he brings forward the perception of a ship sailing down a
river, which we see successively lower and lower down the
stream, which perception of the successively varying posi
tions of the ship cannot be changed by the looker-on. In
this latter case, therefore, he derives the subjective follow
ing in his own apprehension from the objective following
in the phenomenon, and on this account he calls it an
event. Now I maintain, on the contrary, that there is no
difference at all between these two cases, that both are events,
and that our knowledge of both is objective : that is to say,
it is knowledge of changes in real objects recognized as
such by the Subject. Both are changes of relative position
in two bodies. In the first case, one of these bodies is a
part of the observer's own organism, the eye, and the other
is the house, with respect to the different parts of which
the eye successively alters its position. In the second, it
is the ship which alters its position towards the stream ;
therefore the change occurs between two bodies. Both are
events, the only difference being that, in the first, the
change has its starting-point in the observer's own body,
from whose sensations undoubtedly all his perceptions
originally proceed, but which is nevertheless an object

102 THE FOTJEPOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

among objects, and in consequence obeys the laws of the
objective, material world. For the observer, as a purely
cognising individual, any movement of his body is simply
an empirically perceived fact. It would be just as pos
sible in the second as in the first instance, to invert the
order of succession in the change, were it as easy for the
observer to move the ship up the stream as to alter the
direction of his own eyes. For Kant infers the successive
perception of different parts of the house to be neither
objective nor an event, because it depends upon his own
will. But the movement of his eyes in the direction from
roof to basement is one event, and in the direction from
basement to roof another event, just as much as the sailing
of the ship. There is no difference whatever here, nor is
there any difference either, as to their being or not being
events, between my passing a troop of soldiers and their
passing me. If we fix our eyes on a ship sailing close by
the shore on which we are standing, it soon seems as if it
were the ship that stood still and the shore that moved.
Now, in this instance we are mistaken, it is true, as to the
cause of the relative change of position, since we attribute
it to a wrong cause ; the real succession in the relative
positions of our body towards the ship is nevertheless quite
rightly and objectively recognised by us. Even Kant him
self would not have believed that there was any difference,
had he borne in mind that his own body was an object
among objects, and that the succession in his empirical
perceptions depended upon the succession of the impres
sions received from other objects by his body, and was
therefore an objective succession : that is to say, one which
takes place among objects directly (if not indirectly) and
independently of the will of the Subject, and which may
therefore be quite well recognised without any causal
connection between the objects acting successively on liis
body.

FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 103

x

Kant says, Time cannot be perceived ; therefore no suc
cession of representations can be empirically perceived as
objective : i.e. can be distinguished as changes in pheno
mena from the changes of mere subjective representations.
The causal law, being a rule according to which states
follow one another, is the only means by which the ob
jectivity of a change can be known. Now, the result of
his assertion would be, that no succession in Time could
be perceived by us as objective, excepting that of cause
and effect, and that every other succession of phenomena
we perceive, would only be determined so, and not other
wise, by our own will. In contradiction to all this I must
adduce the fact, that it is quite possible for phenomena to
follow upon one another without following from one another.
Nor is the law of causality by any means prejudiced by
this ; for it remains certain that each change is the effect
of another change, this being firmly established a priori ;
only each change not only follows upon the single one
which is its cause, but upon all the other changes which
occur simultaneously with that cause, and with which that
cause stands in no causal connection whatever. It is not
perceived by me exactly in the regular order of causal
succession, but in quite a different order, which is, how
ever, no less objective on that account, and which differs
widely from any subjective succession depending on my
caprice, such as, for instance, the pictures of my imagina
tion. The succession, in Time, of events which stand in
no causal connection with each other is precisely what we
call contingency.1 Just as I am leaving my house, a tile
happens to fall from the roof which strikes me ; now, there
is no causal connection whatever between my going out and

1 In German Zufall, a word derived from the Zusammenfallen (falling
together), Zusammentreffen (meeting together), or coinciding of what is
unconnected, just as TO avpfitfiriKos from avufiaiveiv. (Compare Aris
totle, " Anal, post.," i. 4.)

104 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

the falling of the tile ; yet the order of their succession —
that is, that my going out preceded the falling of the tile
— is objectively determined in my apprehension, not sub
jectively by my will, by which that order would otherwise
have most likely been inverted. The order in which tones
follow each other in a musical composition is likewise
objectively determined, not subjectively by me, the lis
tener ; yet who would think of asserting that musical
tones follow one another according to the law of cause and
effect ? Even the succession of day and night is un
doubtedly known to us as an objective one, but we as
certainly do not look upon them as causes and effects of
one another ; and as to their common cause, the whole
world was in error till Copernicus came ; yet the correct
knowledge of their succession was not in the least dis
turbed by that error. Hume's hypothesis, by the wa}'»
also finds its refutation through this ; since the following
of day and night upon each other — the most ancient of
all successions and the one least liable to exception — has
never yet misled anyone into taking them for cause and
effect of each other.

Elsewhere Kant asserts, that a representation only shows
reality (which, I conclude, means that it is distinguished
from a mere mental image) by our recognising its necessary
connection with other representations subject to rule (the
causal law) and its place in a determined order of the
time-relations of our representations. But of how few
representations are we able to know the place assigned to
them by the law of causality in the chain of causes and
effects ! Yet we are never embarrassed to distinguish ob
jective from subjective representations : real, from imagi
nary objects. When asleep, we are unable to make tliia
distinction, for our brain is then isolated from the peri-
pherical nervous system, and thereby from external in
fluences. In our dreams therefore, we take imaginary for

FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 105

real things, and it is only when we awaken : that is, when
our nervous sensibility, and through this the outer world,
once more comes within our consciousness, that we become
aware of our mistake ; still, even in our dreams, so long
as they last, the causal law holds good, only an impossible
material is often substituted for the usual one. We might
almost think that Kant was influenced by Leibnitz in
writing the passage we have quoted, however much he
differs from him in all the rest of his philosophy ; espe
cially if we consider that Leibnitz expresses precisely
similar views, when, for instance, he says : " La verite des
choses sensibles ne consiste qu.e dans la liaison des pheno-
rnenes, qui doit avoir sa raison, et c'est ce qui les distingue

des songes. Le vrai Criterion, en matiere des

objets des sens, est la liaison des phenomenes, qui garantit
les verites de fait, a 1'cgard des choses sensibles hors de
nous."1

It is clear that in proving the a priority and the ne
cessity of the causal law by the fact that the objective
succession of changes is known to us only by means of
that law, and that, in so far, causality is a condition for
all experience, Kant fell into a very singular error, and
one which is indeed so palpable, that the only way we can
account for it is, by supposing him to have become so
absorbed in the a priori part of our knowledge, that he
lost sight of what would have been evident to anyone else.
The only correct demonstration of the a priority of the
causal law is given by me in § 21 of the present work.
That a priority finds its confirmation every moment in the
infallible security with which we expect experience to tally
with the causal law : that is to say, in the apodeictic cer
tainty we ascribe to it, a certainty which differs from
every other founded on induction — the certainty, for in-

1 Leibnitz, " Nonveaux Essais sur PEntendement," lib. iv. ch. ii.
sect. 14.

106 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

stance, of empirically known laws of Nature— in that we
can conceive no exception to the causal law anywhere
within the world of experience. We can, for instance,
conceive that in an exceptional case the law of gravitation
might cease to act, but not that this could happen without
a cause.

Kant and Hume have fallen into opposite errors in their
proofs. Hume asserts that all consequence is mere se
quence ; whereas Kant affirms that all sequence must ne
cessarily be consequence. Pure Understanding, it is true,
can only conceive consequence (causal result), and is no
more able to conceive mere sequence than to conceive the
difference between right and left, which, like sequence, is
only to be grasped by means of pure Sensibility. Empirical
knowledge of the following of events in Time is, indeed,
just as possible as empirical knowledge of juxtaposition of
things in Space (this Kant denies elsewhere), but the way
in which things follow upon one another in general in Time
can no more be explained, than the way in which one thing
follows from another (as the effect of a cause) : the former
knowledge is given and conditioned by pure Sensibility ;
the latter, by pure Understanding. But in asserting that
knowledge of the objective succession of phenomena can
only be attained by means of the causal law, Kant commits
the same error with which he reproaches Leibnitz : * that
of " iiitellectualising the forms of Sensibility." — My view
of succession is the following one. We derive our know
ledge of the bare possibility of succession from the form
of Time, which belongs to pure Sensibility. The suc
cession of real objects, whose form is precisely Time,
we know empirically, consequently as actual. But it is
through the Understanding alone, by means of Causality,
that we gain knowledge of the necessity of a succession of

1 Kant, " Kritik d. r. Vern." 1st edition, p. 275 j 5th edition, p. 331.
(English translation by M. Miiller, p. 236.)

FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 107

two states : that is, of a change ; and even the fact that we
are able to conceive the necessity of a succession at all,
proves already that the causal law is not known to us
empirically, but given us a priori. The Principle of Suffi
cient Reason is the general expression for the fundamental
form of the necessary connection between all our objects,
i.e. representations, which lies in the innermost depths of
our cognitive faculty : it is the form common to all repre
sentations, and the only source of the conception of ne
cessity, which contains absolutely nothing else in it and no
other import, than that of the following of the consequence,
when its reason has been established. Now, the reason
why this principle determines the order of succession in
Time in the class of representations we are now investi
gating, in which it figures as the law of causality, is, that
Time is the form of these representations, therefore the
necessary connection appears here as the rule of succession.
In other forms of the principle of sufficient reason, the
necessary connection it always demands will appear under
quite different forms from that of Time, therefore not as
succession ; still it always retains the character of a neces
sary connection, by which the identity of the principle
under all its forms, or rather the unity of the root of all
the laws of which that principle is the common expression,
reveals itself.

If Kant's assertion were correct, which I dispute, our
only way of knowing the reality of succession would be
through its necessity; but this would presuppose an
Understanding that embraced all the series of causes and
effects at once, consequently an omniscient Understand
ing. Kant has burdened the Understanding with an
impossibility, merely in order to have less need of
Sensibility.

How can we reconcile Kant's assertion that our onlv
means of knowing the objective reality of succession is by

108 THE FOTJKFOLD KOOT. [CHAP. IV.

the necessity with which effect follows cause, with his
other assertion l that succession in Time is our only empi
rical criterion for determining which of two states is
cause, and which effect. Who does not see the most
obvious circle here ?

If we knew objectiveness of succession through Causality,
we should never be able to think it otherwise than as
Causality, and then it would be nothing else than Causality.
Fc r, if it were anything else, it would have other distinc
tive signs by which to be recognised ; now this is just
what Kant denies. Accordingly, if Kant were right, we
could not say : " This state is the effect of that one, where
fore it follows it ; " for following and being an effect,
would be one and the same thing, and this proposition a
tautology. Besides, if we do away with all distinction
between following upon and following from, we once more
yield the point to Hume, who declared all consequence to
be mere sequence and therefore denied that distinction
likewise.

Kant's proof would, consequently, be reduced to this :
that, empirically, we only know actuality of succession ;
but as besides we recognise necessity of succession in
certain series of occurrences, and even know before all
experience that every possible occurrence must have a
fixed place in some one of these series, the reality and the
a priority of the causal law follow as a matter of course,
the only correct proof of the latter being the one I have
given in § 21 of this work.

Parallel with the Kantian theory : that the causal nexus
alone renders objective succession and our knowledge of it
possible, there runs another : that coexistence and our
knowledge of it are only possible through reciprocity. In
the " Critique of Pure Reason " they are presented under

1 Kant, " Krit. d. r. Vern." vol. i. p. 203 of the 1st edition ; p. 249 of
the 5th edition. (English translation by M. Miiller, p. 178.)

FIRST CLASS OP OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 109

the title : " Third Analogy of Experience." Here Kant
goes so far as to say that " the co-existence of phenomena,
which exercise no reciprocal action on one another, but are
separated by a perfectly empty space, could never become
an object of possible perception " 1 (which, by the way,
would be a proof a priori that there is no empty space
between the fixed stars), and that " the light which plays
between our eyes and celestial bodies" — an expression
conveying surreptitiously the thought, that this starlight
not only acts upon our eyes, but is acted upon by them
also — " produces an intercommunity between us and them,
and proves the co-existence of the latter." Now, even
empirically, this last assertion is false ; since the sight of a
fixed star by no means proves its coexistence simul
taneously with its spectator, but, at most, its existence
some years, nay even some centuries before. Besides, this
second Kantian theory stands and falls with the first,
only it is far more easily detected ; and the nullity of
the whole conception of reciprocity has been shown in
§20.

The arguments I have brought forward against Kant's
proof may be compared with two previous attacks made on
it by Feder,2 and by G-. E. Schulze.3

Not without considerable hesitation did I thus venture
(in 1813) to attack a theory which had been universally
received as a demonstrated truth, is repeated even now in the
latest publications,4 and forms a chief point in the doctrine
of one for whose profound wisdom I have the greatest
reverence and admiration ; one to whom, indeed, I owe so

1 Kant, " Krit. d. r. Vern." pp. 212 and 213 of the 1st edition. (Eng-
lish translation, pp. 185 and 186.)

2 Feder, " Ueber Raum und Causalitat." sect. 29.

3 G. E. Schulze, " Kritik der theoretischen Philosophie," vol. ii.
p. 422 sqq.

4 For instance, in Fries' " Kritik der Vernunft," yol. ii. p. 85.

110 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. IV.

much, that his spirit might truly say to me, in the words
of Homer :

'Ax\vv d' av TOI O.TT 6<}>9a\p,&v e'Xov, ?} Trplv tirfjtv.1

§ 24. Of the Misapplication of the Law of Causality.

From the foregoing exposition it follows, that the appli
cation of the causal law to anything but changes in the
material, empirically given world, is an abuse of it. For
instance, it is a misapplication to make use of it with refe
rence to physical forces, without which no changes could
take place ; or to Matter, on which they take place ; or to
the world, to which we must in that case attribute an
absolutely objective existence independently of our in
tellect ; indeed in many other cases besides. I refer the
reader to what I have said on this subject in my chief
work.2 Such misapplications always arise, partly, through
our taking the conception of cause, like many other meta
physical and ethical conceptions, in far too wide a sense ;
partly, through our forgetting that the causal law is cer
tainly a presupposition which we bring with us into the
world, by which the perception of things outside us becomes
possible; but that, just on that account, we are not
authorized in extending beyond the range and indepen
dently of our cognitive faculty a principle, which has its
origin in the equipment of that faculty, nor in assuming it
to hold good as the everlasting order of the universe and
of all that exists.

1 I lifted from thine eyes the darkness which covered them before.
(Tr.'s Ad.)

* " Die Welt a. W. u. V." 2nd edition, vol. ii. ch. iv. p, 42 et seqq. ;
3rd edition, vol. ii. p. 46 et

FIRST CLASS OP OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. Ill

§ 25. The Time in which a Change takes place.

As the Principle of Sufficient Reason of Becoming is
exclusively applicable to changes, we must not omit to
mention here, that the ancient philosophers had already
raised the question as to the time in which a change takes
place, there being no possibility of it taking place during
the existence of the preceding state nor after the new
one has supervened. Yet, if we assign a special time to it
between both states, a body would, during this time, be
neither in the first nor in the second state : a dying man,
for instance, would be neither alive nor dead; a body
neither at rest nor in movement : which would be absurd.
The scruples and sophistic subtleties which this question
has evoked, may be found collected together in Sextus
Empiricus " Adv. Mathem." lib. ix. 267-271, and " Hypat."
iii. c. 14 ; the subject is likewise dealt with by Gellius, 1.
vi. c. 13 — Plato1 had disposed somewhat cavalierly of this
knotty point, by maintaining that changes take place
suddenly and occupy no time at all ; they occur, he says,
in the Qaifyvrjc, (in repentino), which he calls an UTOTTOQ
tyvffic, kv \povo) ovcev ovaa ; a strange, timeless existence
(which nevertheless comes within Time).

It was accordingly reserved for the perspicacity of Aris
totle to clear up this difficult point, which he has done
profoundly and exhaustively in the sixth Book of Physics,
chap, i.-viii. His proof that no change takes place sud
denly (in Plato's efaityvrjo) , but that each occurs only
gradually and therefore occupies a certain time, is based
entirely upon the pure, a priori intuition of Time and of
Space ; but it is also very subtle. The pith of this very
lengthy demonstration may, however, be reduced to the
following propositions. When we say of objects that they

1 Plato, " Parmenicles," p. 138, ed. Bip.

112 THE FOTJEFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IY.

limit each other, we mean, that both have their extreme
ends in common ; therefore only two extended things can
be conterminous, never two indivisible ones, for then they
would be one — i.e. only lines, but not mere points, can be
conterminous. He then transfers this from Space to Time.
As there always remains a line between two points, so there
always remains a time between two nows ; this is the time
in which a change takes place — i.e. when one state is in the
first, and another in the second, now. This time, like every
other, is divisible to infinity; consequently, whatever is
changing passes through an infinite number of degrees
within that time, through which the second state gradually
grows out of that first one. — The process may perhaps be
made more intelligible by the following explanation. Be
tween two consecutive states the difference of which is
perceptible to our senses, there are always several inter
mediate states, the difference between which is not per
ceptible to us ; because, in order to be sensuously per
ceptible, the newly arising state must have reached a
certain degree of intensity or of magnitude : it is therefore
preceded by degrees of lesser intensity or extension, in
passing through which it gradually arises. Taken collec
tively, these are comprised under the name of change,
and the time occupied by them is called the time of change.
Now, if we apply this to a body being propelled, the first
effect is a certain vibration of its inner parts, which, after
communicating the impulse to other parts, breaks out into
external motion. — Aristotle infers quite rightly from the
infinite divisibility of Time, that everything which fills it,
therefore every change, i.e. every passage from one state to
another, must likewise be susceptible of endless subdivision,
so that all that arises, does so in fact by the concourse of
an infinite multitude of parts ; accordingly its genesis is
always gradual, never sudden. From these principles and
the consequent gradual arising of each movement, he

FIRST CLASS OP OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 113

draws the weighty inference in the last chapter of this
Book, that nothing indivisible, no mere point can move.
And with this conclusion Kant's definition of Matter, as
" that which moves in Space," completely harmonizes.

This law of the continuity and gradual taking place of all
changes which Aristotle was thus the first to lay down
and prove, we find stated three times by Kant: in his
" Dissertatio de mundi sensibilis et intelligibilis forma,"
§ 14, in the " Critique of Pure Eeason," } and finally in
his "Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science." 2 In
all three places his exposition is brief, but also less thorough
than that of Aristotle ; still, in the main, both entirely
agree. We can therefore hardly doubt that, directly or
indirectly, Kant must have derived these ideas from Aris
totle, though he does not mention him. Aristotle's pro
position — OVK ttrrt a\\rj\a)v i^o/ueva ra vvv (" the moment:?
of the present are not continuous") — we here find expressed
as follows : " between two moments there is always a
time," to which may be objected that " even between two
centuries there is none ; because in Time as in Space, there
must always be a pure limit." — Thus Kant, instead of men
tioning Aristotle, endeavours in the first and earliest of his
three statements to identify the theory he is advancing
with Leibnitz' lex continuitatis. If they really were the
same, Leibnitz must have derived his from Aristotle. Now
Leibnitz 3 first stated this Loi de la continuite in a letter to
Bayle.'1 There, however, he calls it Principe de Vordrz
general, and gives under this name a very general, vague,
chiefly geometrical argumentation, having no direct bearing
on the time of change, which he does not even mention.

1 Kant, <c Krit. d. r. Vern." 1st edition, p. 207 ; 5th edition, p. 253.
(English translation by M. Miiller, p. 182.)

2 Kant, " Metaphysischc Anfangsgriinde der Naturwissenschaft.''
End of the " Allgemeine Anmerkung zur Mechanik."

3 According to his own assertion, p. 189 of the " Opera philos." eel.
Erdmann. 4 Ibid. p. 10^

I

CHAPTEE V.

ON THE SECOND CLASS OP OBJECTS FOB THE SUBJECT AND
THE FORM OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON
WHICH PREDOMINATES IN IT.

§ 26. Explanation of this Class of Objects.

THE only essential distinction between the human raco
and animals, which from time immemorial has been
attributed to a special cognitive faculty peculiar to man
kind, called Reason, is based upon the fact that man owns
a class of representations which is not shared by any
animal. These are conceptions, therefore abstract, as opposed
to intuitive, representations, from which they are neverthe
less derived. The immediate consequence of this is, that
animals can neither speak nor laugh; but indirectly ail
those various, important characteristics which distinguish
human from animal life are its consequence. For, through
the supervention of abstract representation, motivation has
now changed its character. Although human actions result
with a necessity no less rigorous than that which rules the
actions of animals, yet through this new kind of motiva
tion — so far as here it consists in thoughts which render
elective decision (i.e. a conscious conflict of motives) pos
sible — action with a purpose, with reflection, according to
plans and principles, in concert with others, &c. &c., now
takes the place of mere impulse given by present, perceptible
objects ; but by this it gives rise to all that renders human
life so rich, so artificial, and so terrible, that man, in this

SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 115

Western Hemisphere, where Ms skin lias become bleached,
and where the primitive, true, profound religions of his
first home could not follow him, now no longer recognises
animals as his brethren, and falsely believes them to
differ fundamentally from him, seeking to confirm this
illusion by calling them brutes, giving degrading names to
the vital functions which they have in common with him,
and proclaiming them outlaws ; and thus he hardens his
heart against that identity of being between them and
himself, which is nevertheless constantly obtruding itself
upon him.

Still, as we have said, the whole difference lies in this —
that, besides the intuitive representations examined in the
last chapter, which are shared by animals, other, abstract
representations derived from these intuitive ones, are lodged
in the human brain, which is chiefly on this account so
much larger than that of animals. Representations of this
sort have been called conceptions,1 because each compre
hends innumerable individual things in, or rather under,
itself, and thus forms a complex.2 We may also defmo
them as representations drawn from representations, For, in
forming them, the faculty of abstraction decomposes the
complete, intuitive representations described in our last
chapter into their component parts, in order to think each
of these parts separately as the different qualities of, or
relations between, things. By this process, however, the
representations necessarily forfeit their perceptibility ; just
as water, when decomposed, ceases to be fluid and visible.
For although each quality thus isolated (abstracted) can
quite well be thought by itself, it does not at all follow that;
itcanbe^ercei-yecZbyitself. We form conceptions by dropping
a good deal of what is given us in perception, in order to be

1 Begriff, comprehensive thought, derived from begreifen, to compre
hend. [Tr.]

2 Inbegriffy comprehensive totality. [Tr.]

116 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. V.

able to think the rest by itself. To conceive therefore, is
to think less than we perceive. If, after considering divers
objects of perception, we drop something different belong
ing to each, yet retain what is the same in all, the result
will be the genus of that species. The generic conception
is accordingly always the conception of every species
comprised under it, after deducting all that does not
belong to every species. Now, as every possible concep
tion may be thought as a genus, a conception is always
something general, and as such, not perceptible. Every
conception has on this account also its sphere, as the sum-
total l of what may be thought under it. The higher we
ascend in abstract thought, the more we deduct, the less
therefore remains to be thought. The highest, i.e. the
most general conceptions, are the emptiest and poorest, and
at last become mere husks, such as, for instance, being,
essence, thing, becoming, &c. &c. — Of what avail, by the
way, can philosophical systems be, which are only spun out
of conceptions of this sort and have for their substance
mere flimsy husks of thoughts like these ? They must of
necessity be exceedingly empty, poor, and therefore also
dreadfully tiresome.

Now as representations, thus sublimated and analysed
to form abstract conceptions, have, as we have said, forfeited
all perceptibility, they would entirely escape our conscious
ness, and be of no avail to it for the thinking processes to
which they are destined, were they not fixed and retained
in our senses by arbitrary signs. These signs are words.
In as far as they constitute the contents of dictionaries
and therefore of language, words always designate general
representations, conceptions, never perceptible objects ;
whereas a lexicon which enumerates individual things, only
contains proper names, not words, and is either a geo-

1 Inbegriff.

SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOB THE SUBJECT. 117

graphical or historical dictionary : that is to say, it enume
rates what is separated either by Time or by Space ; for,
as my readers know, Time and Space are the principium
individuationis. It is only because animals are limited to
intuitive representations and incapable of any abstraction —
incapable therefore of forming conceptions — that they are
without language, even when they are able to articulate
words ; whereas they understand proper names. That it
is this same defect which excludes them from laughter, I
have shown in my theory of the ridiculous.1

On analyzing a long, continuous speech made by a man
of no education, we find in it an abundance of logical forms,
clauses, turns of phrase, distinctions, and subtleties of all
sorts, correctly expressed by means of grammatical forms
with their inflections and constructions, and even with a
frequent use of the sermo obliquus, of the different moods,
&c. &c., all in conformity with rule, which astonishes us,
and in which we are forced to recognise an extensive and
perfectly coherent knowledge. Still this knowledge has been
acquired on the basis of the perceptible world, the reduction
of whose whole essence to abstract conceptions is the funda
mental business of the Reason, and can only take place by
means of language. In learning the use of language there
fore, the whole mechanism of Reason — that is, all that
is essential in Logic — is brought to our consciousness. Now
this can evidently not take place without considerable
mental effort and fixed attention, for which the desire to
learn gives children the requisite strength. So long as
that desire has before it what is really available and neces
sary, it is vigorous, and it only appears weak when we try
to force upon children that which is not suited to their
comprehension. Thus even a coarsely educated child, in
learning all the turns and subtleties of language, as well

1 See "Die Welt a, W. u. V." vol. i. sect. 13, and vol. ii. ch. 8.

118 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. V.

through its own conversation as that of others, accomplishes
the development of its Reason, and acquires that really
concrete Logic, which consists less in logical rules than in
the proper application of them ; just as the rules of
harmony are learnt by persons of musical talent simply by
playing the piano, without reading music or studying
thorough-bass. — The deaf and dumb alone are excluded
from the above-mentioned logical training through the
acquirement of speech ; therefore they are almost as un
reasonable as animals, when they have not been taught to
read by the very artificial means specially adapted for their
requirements, which takes the place of the natural schooling
of Reason.

§ 27. The Utility of Conceptions.

The fundamental essence of our Reason or thinking
faculty is, as we have seen, the power of abstraction, or the
faculty of forming conceptions : it is therefore the presence
of these in our consciousness which produces such amazing
results. That it should be able to do this, rests mainly on
the following grounds.

It is just because they contain less than the representa
tions from which they are drawn, that conceptions aro
easier to deal with than representations ; they are, in fact,
to these almost as the formula of higher arithmetic to the
mental operations which give rise to them and which they
represent, or as a logarithm to its number. They only
contain just the part required of the many representations
from which they are drawn; if instead we were to try
to recall those representations themselves by means of
the imagination, we should, as it were, have to lug about
a load of unessential lumber, which would only embarrass
us ; whereas, by the help of conceptions, we are enabled
to think only those parts and relations of all these repre-

SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 119

sentations which are wanted for each individual purpose :
so that their employment may be compared to doing
away with superfluous luggage, or to working with extracts
instead of plants themselves — with quinine, instead of
bark. What is properly called thinking, in its narrowest
sense, is the occupation of the intellect with conceptions :
that is, the presence in our consciousness of the class of
representations we now have before us. This is also what we
call reflection : a word which, by a figure of speech borrowed
from Optics, expresses at once the derivative and the
secondary character of this kind of knowledge. Now it is
this thinking, this reflection, which gives man that delibera
tion, which is wanting in animals. For, by enabling him
to think many things under one conception, but always
only the essential part in each of them, it allows him to
drop at his pleasure every kind of distinction, consequently
even those of Time and of Space, and thus he acquires the
power of embracing in thought, not only the past and the
future, but also what is absent ; while animals are in
every respect strictly bound to the present. This delibera
tive faculty again is really the root of all those theoretical
and practical achievements which give man so great a
superiority over animals; first and foremost, of his care
for the future while taking the past into consideration;
then of his premeditated, systematic, methodical procedure
in all undertakings, and therefore of the co-operation of
many persons towards a common end, and, by this, of law,
order, the State, &c. &c. — But it is especially in Science
that the use of conceptions is important; for they are, pro
perly speaking, its materials. The aims of all the sciences
may, indeed, in the last resort, be reduced to knowledge of
the particular through the general; now this is only
possible by means of the dictum de omni et nullo, and this,
again, is only possible through the existence of conceptions.
Aristotle therefore says: civev ptv yap ruv KaQoXov OVK lanv

120 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. V.

ETTKrn/juijv \afie~iv l (absque universalibus enim non datur
scientia). Conceptions are precisely those universalia,
whose mode of existence formed the argument of the long
controversy between the Eealists and Nominalists in the
Middle

§ 28. Representatives of Conceptions. The Faculty of
Judgment.

Conceptions must not be confounded with pictures of
the imagination, these being intuitive and complete, there
fore individual representations, although they are not
called forth by sensuous impressions and do not there
fore belong to the complex of experience. Even when
used to represent a conception, a picture of the imagination
(phantasm) ought to be distinguished from a conception.
We use phantasms as representatives of conceptions when
we try to grasp the intuitive representation itself that has
given rise to the conception and to make it tally with
that conception, which is in all cases impossible ; for
there is no representation, for instance, of dog in general,
colour in general, triangle in general, number in general,
nor is there any picture of the imagination which corre
sponds to these conceptions. Then we evoke the phantasm
of some dog or other, which, as a representation, must in
all cases be determined : that is, it must have a certain
size, shape, colour, &c. &c. ; even though the conception
represented by it has no such determinations. When we
use such representatives of conceptions however, we arc
always conscious that they are not adequate to the concep
tions they represent, and that they are full of arbitrary
determinations. Towards the end of the first part of his

1 Aristot. <c Metaph/' xii. c. 9, " For without universal^ it is impos
sible to have knowledge." (Tr.'s Add.)

SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 121

Twelfth Essay on Human Understanding, Hume expresses
himself in agreement with this view, as also Rousseau in
his "Discours sur I'Origine de 1'Inegalite." * Kant's doc
trine, on the contrary, is a totally different one. The
matter is one which introspection and clear reflection can
alone decide. Each of us must therefore examine himself
as to whether he is conscious in his own conceptions of a
" Monogram of Pure Imagination a priori ; " whether, for
instance, when he thinks dog, he is conscious of something
entre chien et loup ; or whether, as I have here explained
it, he is either thinking an abstract conception through his
Reason, or representing some representative of that con
ception as a complete picture through his imagination.

All thinking, in a wider sense : that is, all inner activity
of the mind in general, necessitates either words or pic
tures of the imagination : without one or other of these it
has nothing to hold by. They are not, however, both ne
cessary at the same time, although they may co-operate to
their mutual support. Now, thinking in a narrower sense —
that is, abstract reflection by means of words — is either
purely logical reasoning, in which case it keeps strictly to
its own sphere ; or it touches upon the limits of perceptible
representations in order to come to an understanding with
them, so as to bring that which is given by experience and
grasped by perception into connection with abstract con
ceptions resulting from clear reflection, and thus to gain
complete possession of it. In thinking therefore, we seek
either for the conception or rule to which a given percep
tion belongs, or for the particular case which proves a
given conception or rule. In this quality, thinking is an
activity of the faculty of judgment, and indeed in the first
case, a reflective, in the second, a subsuming activity. The
faculty of judgment is accordingly the mediator between
intuitive and abstract knowledge, or between the Under-
1 Part the First, in the middle.

122 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. V.

derstanding and the Eeason. In most men it has merely
rudimentary, often even merely nominal existence ; l they
are destined to follow the lead of others, and it is as well
not to converse with them more than is necessary.

The true kernel of all knowledge is that reflection which
works with the help of intuitive representations ; for it
goes back to the fountain-head, to the basis of all concep
tions. Therefore it generates all really original thoughts,
all primary and fundamental views and all inventions, so
far as chance had not the largest share in them. The
Understanding prevails in this sort of thinking, whilst the
Reason is the chief factor in purely abstract reflection.
Certain thoughts which wander about for a long time in our
heads, belong to this sort of reflection : thoughts which
come and go, now clothed in one kind of intuition, now in
another, until they at last become clear, fix themselves in
conceptions and find words to express them. Some, in
deed, never find words to express them, and these are,
unfortunately, the best of all : quce voce meliora sunt, as
Apuleius says.

Aristotle, however, went too far in thinking that no
reflection is possible without pictures of the imagina
tion. Nevertheless, what he says on this point,2 ov^Vore
voti avev ^avraoy^aroc >/ ^X^ (.an^na sine phantasmate nun-
quam intelligif),3 and VTO.V Oewpri, avayKr) apa tydvraafjia. TI
Oeupelv (qui contemplatur, necesse est, una cum phantasmate
contempletur),* and again, voliv OVK eon avev ^avraa^aroQ
(fieri non potest, ut sine phantasmate quidquam intelli-

1 Let any one to whom this assertion may appear hyperbolical, con
sider the fate of Gothe's " Theory of Colours " (Farbenlehre), and
should he wonder at my finding a corroboration for it in that fate, he
will himself have corroborated it a second time.

2 Aristot. " De anima," iii. c. c. 3, 7, 8.

3 " The mind never thinks without (the aid of) an image." [Tr.]

4 "He who observes anything must observe some image along
with it." [Tr.]

SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 123

gatur),1 — made a strong impression upon the thinkers of the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, who therefore frequently
and emphatically repeat what he says. Pico della Mirandola,3
for instance, says : Necesse est, eum, quiratiocinaturetintelligit,
pJiantasmata speculari; — Melanchthon 3 says : Oportet intel-
ligentem phantasmata speculari; — and Jord. Brunus4 says,
dicit Aristoteles: oportet scire volentem, phantasmata speculari.
Poniponatius 5 expresses himself in the same sense. — On
the whole, all that can be affirmed is, that every true and
primary notion, every genuine philosophic theorem even,
must have some sort of intuitive view for its innermost
kernel or root. This, though something momentary 6 and
single, subsequently imparts life and spirit to the whole
analysis, however exhaustive it may be, — just as one drop
of the right reagent suffices to tinge a whole solution
with the colour of the precipitate which it causes. When
an analysis has a kernel of this sort, it is like a bank note
issued by a firm which has ready money wherewith to back
it ; whereas every other analysis proceeding from mere
combinations of abstract conceptions, resembles a bank
note which is issued by a firm which has nothing but other
paper obligations to back it with. All mere rational talk
thus renders the result of given conceptions clearer, but
does not, strictly speaking, bring anything new to light.
It might therefore be left to each individual to do himself,
instead of filling whole volumes every day.

§ 29. Principle of Sufficient Reason of Knowing.

But, even in a narrower sense, thinking does not consist
in the bare presence of abstract conceptions in our con-

1 " De Memoria," c. 1 : " It is impossible to think without (the aid
of) an image." 2 «< De imaginatione," c. 5.

8 " De anima," p. 130. 4 ts De compositione imaginum," p. 10.

6 " De immortalitate," pp. 54 et 70.
8 " Ein Momentancs mid Einheitliches."

124 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. V.

sciousness, but rather in connecting or separating two or
more of these conceptions under sundry restrictions and
modifications which Logic indicates in the Theory of Judg
ments. A relation of this sort between conceptions dis
tinctly thought and expressed we call a judgment. Now,
with reference to these judgments, the Principle of Suffi
cient Reason here once more holds good, yet in a widely
different form from that which has been explained in the
preceding chapter ; for here it appears as the Principle of
Sufficient Reason of Knowing, prindpium rationis suf-
ficientis cognoscendi. As such, it asserts that if a judgment
is to express knowledge of any kind, it must have a suffi
cient reason : in virtue of which quality it then receives the
predicate true. Thus truth is the reference of a judgment
to something different from itself, called its reason or
ground, which reason, as we shall presently see, itself
admits of a considerable variety of kinds. As, however,
this reason is invariably a something upon which the
judgment rests, the German term for it, viz., Grund, is not
ill chosen. In Latin, and in all languages of Latin origin,
the word by which a reason of knowledge is designated, is
the same as that used for the faculty of Reason (ratio-
cinatio) : both are called ratio, la ragione, la razon, la raison,
the reason. From this it is evident, that attaining know
ledge of the reasons of judgments had been recognised as
Reason's highest function, its business /car' ifrxfiv. Now,
these grounds upon which a judgment may rest, may be
divided into four different kinds, and the truth obtained
by that judgment will correspondingly differ. They are
stated in the following paragraph.

§ 30. Logical Truth.

A judgment may have for its reason another judgment ;
in this case it has logical or formal truth. Whether it has

SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 125

material truth also, remains an open question and depends
on whether the judgment on which it rests has material
truth, or whether the series of judgments on which it is
founded leads to a judgment which has material truth, or
not. This founding of a judgment upon another judgment
always originates in a comparison between them which
takes place either directly, by mere conversion or contra
position, or by adding a third judgment, and then the truth
of the judgment we are founding becomes evident through
their mutual relation. This operation is the complete
syllogism. It is brought about either by the opposition or
by the subsumption. of conceptions. As the syllogism,
which is the founding of one judgment upon another by
means of a third, never has to do with anything but judg
ments ; and as judgments are only combinations of concep
tions, and conceptions again are the exclusive object of our
Reason : syllogizing has been rightly called Reason's special
function. The whole syllogistic science, in fact, is nothing
but the sum-total of the rules for applying the principle of
sufficient reason to the mutual relations of judgments ;
consequently it is the canon of logical truth.

Judgments, whose truth becomes evident through the
four well-known laws of thinking, must likewise be regarded
as based upon other judgments ; for these four laws are
themselves precisely judgments, from which follows the
truth of those other judgments. For instance, the judg
ment : " A triangle is a space enclosed within three lines,"
has for its last reason the Principle of Identity, that is to
say, the thought expressed by that principle. The judg
ment, " No body is without extension," has for its last
reason the Principle of Contradiction. This again, " Every
judgment is either true or untrue," has for its last reason
the Principle of the Excluded Middle ; and finally, " No
one can admit anything to be true without knowing
why," has for its last reason the Principle of Sufficient

126 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. V.

Eeason of Knowing. In the general employment of our
Reason, we do not, it is true, before admitting them to be
true, reduce judgments which follow from the four laws of
thinking to their last reasons, as premisses ; for most men
are even ignorant of the very existence of these abstract laws.
The dependence of such judgments upon them, as their
premisses, is however no more diminished by this, than the
dependence of the first judgment upon the second, as its
premiss, is diminished by the fact, that it is not at all ne
cessary for the principle, " all bodies incline towards the
centre of the earth," to be present in the consciousness of
any one who says, " this body will fall if its support is
removed." That in Logic, therefore, intrinsic truth should
hitherto have been attributed to all judgments founded
exclusively on the four laws of thinking : that is to say,
that these judgments should have been pronounced directly
true, and that this intrinsic logical truth should have been
distinguished from extrinsic logical truth, as attributed
to all judgments which have another judgment for their
reason, I cannot approve. Every truth is the reference of
a judgment to something outside of it, and the term in
trinsic truth is a contradiction.

§ 31. Empirical Truth.

A judgment may be founded upon a representation of
the first class, i.e. a perception by means of the senses,
consequently on experience. In this case it has material
truth, and moreover, if the judgment is founded imme
diately on experience, this truth is empirical truth.

When we say, "A judgment has material truth" we
mean on the whole, that its conceptions are connected,
separated, limited, according to the requirements of the
intuitive representations through which it is inferred. To
attain knowledge of this, is the direct function of the

SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 127

faculty of judgment, as the mediator between the intuitive
and the abstract or discursive faculty of knowing — in
other words, between the Understanding and the Reason.

§ 32. Transcendental Truth.

The forms of intuitive, empirical knowledge which lie
within the Understanding and pure Sensibility may, as con
ditions of all possible experience, be the grounds of a judg
ment, which is in that case synthetical a priori. As neverthe
less this kind of judgment has material truth, its truth is
transcendental ; because the judgment is based not only on
experience, but on the conditions of all possible experience
lying within us. For it is determined precisely by that
which determines experience itself : namely, either by the
forms of Space and of Time perceived by us a priori, or by
the causal law, known to us a priori. Propositions such
as : two straight lines do not include a space ; nothing
happens without a cause; matter can neither come into
being nor perish ; 3 x 7 = 21, are examples of this kind
of judgment. The whole of pure Mathematics, and no
less my tables of the Prcedicabilia a priori,1 as well as
most of Kant's theorems in his " Metaphysische Anfangs-
griinde derNaturwissenschaft," may, properly speaking, be
adduced in corroboration of this kind of truth.

§. 33. Metalogical Truth.

Lastly, a judgment may be founded on the formal con
ditions of all thinking, which are contained in the Eeason ;
and in this case its truth is of a kind which seems to me best
denned as metalogical truth. This expression has nothing
at all to do with the " Metalogicus " written by Johannes

1 See " Die Welt a. W. u. V." 3rd edition, vol. ii. ch. iv. p. 55.

128 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. Y.

Sarisberriensis in the twelfth century, for he declares in
his prologue, " quia Logicce suscepi patrocinium, Metalogicus
mscriptus est liber," and never makes use of the word again.
There are only four metalogically true judgments of this
sort, which were discovered long ago by induction, and
called the laws of all thinking ; although entire uniformity
of opinion as to their expression and even as to their
number has not yet been arrived at, whereas all agree
perfectly as to what they are on the whole meant to indi
cate. They are the following : —

1. A subject is equal to the sum total of its predicates,
or a = a.

2. No predicate can be attributed and denied to a sub
ject at the same time, or a = — a = o.

3. One of two opposite, contradictory predicates must
belong to every subject.

4. Truth is the reference of a judgment to something
outside of it, as its sufficient reason.

It is by means of a kind of reflection which I am in
clined to call Reason's self-examination, that we know that
these judgments express the conditions of all thinking,
and therefore have these conditions for their reason.
For, by the fruitlessness of its endeavours to think in
opposition to these laws, our Eeason acknowledges them
to be the conditions of all possible thinking : we then find
out, that it is just as impossible to think in opposition
to them, as it is to move the members of our body in a
contrary direction to their joints. If it were possible for
the subject to know itself, these laws would be known to
us immediately, and we should not need to try experi
ments with them on objects, i.e. representations. In this
respect it is just the same with the reasons of judgments
which have transcendental truth ; for they do not either
come into our consciousness immediately, but only in
concreto, by means of objects, i.e. of representations. In

SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 129

endeavouring, for instance, to conceive a change without a
preceding cause, or a passing into or out of being of
Matter, we become aware that it is impossible ; more
over we recognise this impossibility to be an objective
one, although its root lies in our intellect : for we could not
otherwise bring it to consciousness in a subjective way.
There is, on the whole, a strong likeness and connection
between transcendental and metalogical truths, which
shows that they spring from a common root. In this
chapter we see the Principle of Sufficient Reason chiefly as
metalogical truth, whereas in the last it appeared as
transcendental truth and in the next one it will again be
seen as transcendental truth under another form. In the
present treatise I am taking special pains, precisely on
this account, to establish the Principle of Sufficient Reason,
as a judgment having a fourfold reason ; by which I do
not mean four different reasons leading cont 'ngently to
the same judgment, but one reason presenting itself under
a fourfold aspect: and this is what I call its Fourfold
Root. The other three metalogical truths so strongly
resemble one another, that in considering them one is
almost necessarily induced to search for their common'
expression, as I have done in the Ninth Chapter of the
Second Volume of my chief work. On the other hand, they
differ considerably from the Principle of Sufficient Reason.
If we were to seek an analogue for the three other meta
logical truths among transcendental truths, the one I should
choose would be this : Substance, I mean Matter, is per
manent.

§ 34. Reason.

As the class of representations I have dealt with in
this chapter belongs exclusively to Man, and as all that
distinguishes human life so forcibly from that of animals

K

130 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. V.

and confers so great a superiority on man, is, as we have
shown, based upon his faculty for these representations,
this faculty evidently and unquestionably constitutes that
Reason, which from time immemorial has been reputed
the prerogative of mankind. Likewise all that has been
considered by all nations and in all times explicitly as
the work or manifestation of the Reason, of the Xdyoc,
Aoytjuoy, \oytffriK6v, ratio, la ragione, la razon, la raison,
reason, may evidently also be reduced to what is only
possible for abstract, discursive, reflective, mediate know
ledge, conditioned by words, and not for mere intuitive,
immediate, sensuous knowledge, which belongs to animals
also. Cicero rightly places ratio et oratio together,1 and de
scribes them as quce docendo, discendo, communicando, discep-
tando, judicando, conciliat inter se homines, &c. &c., and2
rationem dico, et, si placet, pluribusverbis, mentem, consilivm,
cogitationem, prudentiam, And 3 ratio, qua una prcestamus
beluis, per quam conjectura valemus, argumentamur, refelli-
mus, disserimus, conficimus aliquid, concludimus. But, in all
ages and countries, philosophers have invariably expressed
themselves in this sense with respect to the Reason, even to
Kant himself, who still defines it as the faculty for prin
ciples and for inference ; although it cannot be denied that
he first gave rise to the distorted views which followed. In
my principal work,4 and also in the Fundamental Pro
blems of Ethics, I have spoken at great length about the
agreement of all philosophers on this point, as well as
about the true nature of Reason, as opposed to the dis
torted conceptions for which we have to thank the pro-

1 Cicer. " De Offic." i. 16. 2 Idem, " De nat. deor." ii. 7.

3 Idem, " De Leg." i. 10.

4 See "Die Welt a. W. u. V." 2nd edition, vol. i. § 8, and also in
the Appendix, pp. 577-585 (3rd edition, pp. 610-620), and again vol. ii.
ch. vi. ; finally " Die b. G-P. d. Ethik," pp. 148-154 (2nd edition,
pp. 146-151).

SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 131

fessors of philosophy of this century. I need not therefore
repeat what has already been said there, and shall limit
myself to the following considerations.

Our professors of philosophy have thought fit to do away
with the name which had hitherto been given to that faculty
of thinking and pondering by means of reflection and con
ceptions, which distinguishes man from animals, which
necessitates language while it qualifies us for its use,
with which all human deliberation and all human achieve
ments hang together, and which had therefore always been
viewed in this light and understood in this sense by all
nations and even by all philosophers. In defiance of all
sound taste and custom, our professors decided that this
faculty should henceforth be called Understanding instead of
Reason, and that all that is derived from it should be named
intelligent instead of rational, which, of course, had a strange,
awkward ring about it, like a discordant tone in music.
For in all ages and countries the words understanding,
intellectus, acumen, perspicacia, sagacitas, &c. &c., had been
used to denote the more intuitive faculty described in our
last chapter ; and its results, which differ specifically from
those of Reason here in question, have always been called
intelligent, sagacious, clever, &c. &c. Intelligent and rational
were accordingly always distinguished one from the other,
as manifestations of two entirely and widely different mental
faculties. Our professional philosophers could not, how
ever, take this into account; their policy required the
sacrifice, and in such cases the cry is : " Move on, truth ;
for we have higher, well-defined i ;i:ns in view ! Make way
for us, truth, in majorem Dei gloriam, as thou hast long-
ago learnt to do ! Is it thou who givest fees and pensions ?
Move .on, truth, move on; betake thyself to merit and
crouch in the corner ! " The fact was, they wanted Reason's
place and name for a faculty of their own creation and
fabrication, or to speak more correctly and honestly, for a

132 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. V.

completely fictitious faculty, destined to help them out of
the straits to which Kant had reduced them ; a faculty
for direct, metaphysical knowledge: that is to say, one
which transcends all possible experience, is able to grasp
the world of things in themselves and their relations, and
is therefore, before all, consciousness of G-od (Gottesbewusst-
sein) : that is, it knows G-od the Lord immediately, con
strues a priori the way in which he has created the Universe,
or, should this sound too trivial, the way in which he has pro
duced it out of himself, or to a certain degree generated it
by some more or less necessary vital process, or again — as
the most convenient proceeding, however comical it may
appear — simply " dismissed " it, according to the custom
of sovereigns at the end of an audience, and left it to get
upon its legs by itself and walk away wherever it liked.
Nothing less than the impudence of a scribbler of nonsense
like Hegel, could, it is true, be found to venture upon this
last step. Yet it is torn-foolery like this which, largely
amplified, has filled hundreds of volumes for the last fifty
years under the name of cognitions of Reason (Vernunfter-
kenntnisse), and forms the argument of so many works
called philosophical by their authors, and scientific by others
— one would think ironically — this expression being even
repeated to satiety. Reason, to which all this wisdom
is falsely and audaciously imputed, is pronounced to be
a " super sensuous faculty," or a faculty " for ideas ; "
in short, an oracular power lying within us, designed
directly for Metaphysics. During the last half-century,
however, there has been considerable discrepancy of opinion
among the adepts as to the way in which all these super-
sensuous wonders are perceived. According to the most
audacious, Eeason has a direct intuition of the Absolute,
or even ad libitum of the Infinite and of its evolutions to
wards the Finite. Others, somewhat less bold, opine that
its mode of receiving this information partakes rather of

SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 133

audition than of vision ; since it does not exactly see, but
merely hears (vernimmt), what is going on in " cloud-cuckoo-
land" (vetytXoKOKKvyia.), and then honestly transmits what
it has thus received to the Understanding, to be worked up
into text-books. According to a pun of Jacobi's, even the
German name for Eeason, " Vernunft" is derived from
this pretended " Vernehmen ; " whereas it evidently comes
from that " VerneJimen " which is conveyed by language
and conditioned by Eeason, and by which the distinct per
ception of words and their meaning is designated, as opposed
to mere sensuous hearing which animals have also. This
miserable jeu de mots nevertheless continues, after half a
century, to find favour; it passes for a serious thought,
nay even for a proof, and has been repeated over and over
again. The most modest among the adepts again assert,
that Eeason neither sees nor hears, therefore it receives
neither a vision nor a report of all these wonders, and has
a mere vague AJindung, or misgiving of them ; but then
they drop the d, by which the word (Ahnung) acquires a
peculiar touch of silliness, which, backed up as it is by the
sheepish look of the apostlefor the time being of this wisdom,
cannot fail to gain it entrance.

My readers know that I only admit the word idea in its
primitive, that is Platonic, sense, and that I have treated
this point at length and exhaustively in the Third Book of
my chief work. The French and English, on the other
hand, certainly attach a very commonplace, but quite clear
and definite meaning to the word idee, or idea ; whereas
the G-ermans lose their heads as soon as they hear the word
Ideen; l all presence of mind abandons them, and they feel
as if they were about to ascend in a balloon. Here there
fore was a field of action for our adepts in intellectual intui
tion ; so the most impudent of them, the notorious charlatan

1 Here Schopenhauer adds, "especially when pronounced Uedahen"
[Tr.]

134 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. V.

Hegel, without more ado, called his theory of the universe
and of all things "Die Idee," and in this of course all
thought that they had something to lay hold of. Still, if
we inquire into the nature of these ideas for which Reason is
pronounced to be the faculty, without letting ourselves be
put out of countenance, the explanation usually given is an
empty, high-flown, confused verbiage, in set periods of such
length, that if the reader does not fall asleep before he
has half read it, he will find himself bewildered rather than
enlightened at the end ; nay, he may even have a suspicion
that these ideas are very like chimaeras. Meanwhile, should
anyone show a desire to know more about this sort of ideas,
he will have all kinds of things served up to him. Now it
will be the chief subjects of the theses of Scholasticism —
I allude here to the representations of God, of an immortal
Soul, of a real, objectively existent World and its laws —
which Kant himself has unfortunately called Ideas of
Reason, erroneously and unjustifiably, as I have shown in
my Critique of his philosophy, yet merely with a view to
proving the utter impossibility of demonstrating them and
their want of all theoretical authority. Then again it will
be, as a variation, only God, Freedom, and Immortality ; at
other times it will be the Absolute, whose acquaintance we
have already made in § 20, as the Cosmological Proof, forced
to travel incognito ; or the Infinite as opposed to the Finite ;
for, on the whole, the German reader is disposed to con
tent himself with such empty talk as this, without perceiving
that the only clear thought he can get out of it is, ' tliat
which has an end ' and ' that which has none.' ' The
G-ood, the True, and the Beautiful,' moreover, stand high
in favour with the sentimental and tender-hearted as
pretended ideas, though they are really only three very wide
and abstract conceptions, because they are extracted from
a multitude of things and relations ; wherefore, like many
other such dbstracta, they are exceedingly empty. As regards

SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 135

their contents, I have shown above (§ 29) that Truth is a
quality belonging exclusively to judgments : that is, a logical
quality ; and as to the other two dbstracta, I refer my readers
partly to § 65 of the first volume, partly to the entire Third
Book of my chief work. If, nevertheless, a very solemn and
mysterious air is assumed and the eyebrows are raised up
to the wig whenever these three meagre dbstracta are
mentioned, young people may easily be induced to believe
that something peculiar and inexpressible lies behind them,
which entitles them to be called ideas, and harnessed to
the triumphal car of this would-be metaphysical Eeason.

When therefore we are told, that we possess a faculty
for direct, material (i.e., not only formal, but substantial),
supersensuous knowledge, (that is, a knowledge which
transcends all possible experience), a faculty specially de
signed for metaphysical insight, and inherent in us for
this purpose — I must take the liberty to call this a down
right lie. For the slightest candid self-examination will
suffice to convince us that absolutely no such faculty re
sides within us. The result at which all honest, competent,
authoritative thinkers have arrived in the course of ages,
moreover, tallies exactly with my assertion. It is as fol
lows: All that is innate in the whole of our cognitive
faculty, all that is therefore a priori and independent of
experience, is strictly limited to the formal part of know
ledge : that is, to the consciousness of the peculiar functions
of the intellect and of the only way in which they can
possibly act; but in order to give material knowledge,
these functions one and all require material from out
side. Within us therefore lie the forms of external, ob
jective perception : Time and Space, and then the law of
Causality — as a mere form of the Understanding which
enables it to construct the objective, corporeal world —
finally, the formal part of abstract knowledge : this last is
deposited and treated of in Logic, which our forefathers

136 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. V.

therefore rightly called the Theory of Reason. But this
very Logic teaches us also, that the conceptions which con-
stitute those judgments and conclusions to which all logical
laws refer, must look to intuitive Imowled ge for their material
and their content; just as the Understanding, which creates
this intuitive knowledge, looks to sensation for the material
which gives content to its a priori forms.

Thus all that is material in our knowledge : that is to say,
all that cannot be reduced to subjective/orw, to individual
mode of activity, to functions of our intellect, — its whole
material therefore, — comes from outside ; that is, in the last
resort, from the objective perception of the corporeal world,
which has its origin in sensation. Now it is this intuitive
and, so far as material content is concerned, empirical
knowledge, which Reason — real Reason — works up into con
ceptions, which it fixes sensuously by means of words ; these
conceptions then supply the materials for its endless combi
nations through judgments and conclusions, which constitute
the weft of our thought-world. Reason therefore has abso
lutely no material, but merely a formal, content, and this is
the object-matter of Logic, which consequently contains only
forms and rules for thinking operations. In reflecting,
Reason is absolutely forced to take its material contents
from outside, i.e., from the intuitive representations which
the Understanding has created. Its functions are exercised
on them, first of all, in forming conceptions, by dropping
some of the various qualities of things while retaining others,
which are then connected together to a conception. Repre
sentations, however, forfeit their capacity for being intui
tively perceived by this process, while they become easier to
deal with, as has already been shown. It is therefore in
this, and in this alone, that the efficiency of Reason consists ;
whereas it can never supply material content from its own re
sources. — It has nothing but forms : its nature is feminine ;
it only conceives, but does not generate. It is not by mere

SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 137

chance that the Reason is feminine in all Latin, as well as
Teutonic, languages ; whereas the Understanding is in
variably masculine.

In using such expressions as 'sound Eeason teaches
this/ or ' Eeason should control passion,' we by no means
imply that Eeason furnishes material knowledge out of its
own resources ; but rather do we point to the results of
rational reflection, that is, to logical inference from prin
ciples which abstract knowledge has gradually gathered
from experience and by which we obtain a clear and com-
prehensive view, not only of what is empirically necessary,
and may therefore, the case occurring, be foreseen, but
even of the reasons and consequences of our own deeds also.
Reasonable or rational is everywhere synonymous with con
sistent or logical, and conversely ; for Logic is only Eeason's
natural procedure itself, expressed in a system of rules ;
therefore these expressions (rational and logical) stand in
the same relation to one another as theory and practice.
Exactly in this same sense too, when we speak of a
reasonable conduct, we mean by it one which is quite con
sistent, one therefore which proceeds from general con
ceptions, and is not determined by the transitory impres
sion of the moment. By this, however, the morality of
such conduct is in no wise determined : it may be good
or bad indifferently. Detailed explanations of all this are
to be found in my " Critique of Kant's Philosophy," x and
also in my " Fundamental Problems of Ethics." 2 Notions
derived from pure Eeason are, lastly, those which have
their source in the/ormaZ part, whether intuitive or reflective,
of our cognitive faculty ; those, consequently, which we are
able to bring to our consciousness a priori, that is, without

1 ''Die Welt a. "VV. u. Y." 2nd edition, vol. i. p. 576 ct scqq. ; 3rd
edition, p. 610 et seg.

2 Schopenhauer, "Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik," p. 152.
2nd edition, p. 149 et scg.

138 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. V.

the help of experience. They are invariably based upon
principles which have transcendental or metalogical truth.
A Eeason, on the other hand, which supplies material
knowledge primarily out of its own resources and conveys
positive information transcending the sphere of possible
experience ; a Reason which, in order to do this, must
necessarily contain innate ideas, is a pure fiction, in
vented by our professional philosophers and a product
of the terror with which Kant's Critique of Pure Eeason
has inspired them. I wonder now, whether these gentle
men know a certain Locke and whether they have ever
read his works? Perhaps they may have done so in
times long gone by, cursorily and superficially, while look
ing down complacently on this great thinker from the
heights of their own conscious superiority : may be, too, in
some inferior German translation ; for I do not yet see that
the knowledge of modern languages has increased in pro
portion to the deplorable decrease in that of ancient ones.
How could time besides be found for such old croakers as
Locke, when even a real, thorough knowledge of Kant's
Philosophy at present hardly exists excepting in a very few,
very old heads ? The youth of the generation now at its
maturity had of course to be spent in the study of
"Hegel's gigantic mind," of the "sublime Schleiermacher,"
and of the " acute Herbart." Alas ! alas ! the great mis
chief in academical hero-worship of this sort, and in the
glorification of university celebrities by worthy colleagues
in office or hopeful aspirants to it, is precisely, that
ordinary intellects — Nature's mere manufactured ware —
are presented to honest credulous youths of immature
judgment, as master minds, exceptions and ornaments of
mankind. The students forthwith throw all their energies
into the barren study of the endless, insipid scribblings of
such mediocrities, thus wasting the short, invaluable period
allotted to them for higher education, instead of using it

SECOND CLASS OP OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 139

to attain the sound information they might have found in
the works of those extremely rare, genuine, truly excep
tional thinkers, nantes in gurgite vasto, who only rise to the
surface every now and then in the course of ages, because
Nature produced but one of each kind, and then "destroyed
the mould." For this generation also those great minds
might have had life, had our youth not been cheated out
of its share in their wisdom by these exceedingly pernicious
extollers of mediocrity, members of the vast league and
brotherhood of mediocrities, which is as nourishing to-day
as it ever was and still hoists its flag as high as it can in
persistent antagonism to all that is great and genuine,
as humiliating to its members. Thanks to them, our age
has declined to so low an ebb, that Kant's Philosophy,
which it took our fathers years of study, of serious appli
cation and of strenuous effort to understand, has again
become foreign to the present generation, which stands
before it like OVOQ Trpo^ \vpav, at times attacking it coarsely
and clumsily — as barbarians throw stones at the statue of
some Greek god which is foreign to them. Now, as this is
the case, I feel it incumbent upon me to advise all cham
pions of a Reason that perceives, comprehends, and knows
directly — in short, that supplies material knowledge out of
its own resources — to read, as something new to them, the
First Book of Locke's work, which has been celebrated
throughout the world for the last hundred and fifty years,
and in it especially to peruse §§ 21-26 of the Third Chap
ter, expressly directed against all innate notions. For
although Locke goes too far in denying all innate truths,
inasmuch as he extends his denial even to our formal
knowledge — a point in which he has been brilliantly recti
fied by Kant — he is nevertheless perfectly and undeniably
right with reference to all material knowledge : that is, all
knowledge which gives substance.

I have already said in my Ethics what I must never-

140 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. V.

theless repeat here, because, as the Spanish proverb says,
" No Tiuy peor sordo que quien no quiere oir " (None so
deaf as those who will not hear) : namely, that if Reason
were a faculty specially designed for Metaphysics, a faculty
which supplied the material of knowledge and could re
veal that which transcends all possible experience, the
same harmony would 4 necessarily reign between men on
metaphysical and religious subjects — for they are iden
tical — as on mathematical ones, and those who differed in
opinion from the rest would simply be looked upon as not
quite right in their mind. Now exactly the contrary takes
place, for on no subject are men so completely at variance
with one another as upon these. Ever since men first
began to think, philosophical systems have opposed and
combated each other everywhere; they are, in fact,
often diametrically contrary to one another. Ever since
men first began to believe (which is still longer), religions
have fought against one another with fire and sword, with
excommunication and cannons. But in times when faith
was most ardent, it was not the lunatic asylum, but the
Inquisition, with all its paraphernalia, which awaited in
dividual heretics. Here again, therefore, experience flatly
and categorically contradicts the false assertion, that
Reason is a faculty for direct metaphysical knowledge, or,
to speak more clearly, of inspiration from above. Surely
it is high time that severe judgment should be passed
upon this Reason, since, horribile dictu, so lame, so
palpable a falsehood continues after half a century to
be hawked about all over Germany, wandering year by
year from the professors' chair to the students' bench,
and from bench to chair, and has actually found a few
simpletons, even in France, willing to believe in it, and
carry it about in that country also. Here, however, French
bon-sens will very soon send la raison transcendentale about
its business.

SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 141

But where was this falsehood originally hatched ? How
did the fiction first corne into the world ? I am bound to
confess that it was first originated by Kant's Practical
Reason with its Categorical Imperative. For when this
Practical Eeason had once been admitted, nothing further
was needed than the addition of a second, no less sove
reign Theoretical Reason, as its counterpart, or twin- sister :
a Eeason which proclaims metaphysical truths ex tripode.
I have described the brilliant success of this invention
in my Fundamental Problems of Ethics l to which
work I refer my reader. Now, although I grant that
Kant first gave rise to this false assumption, am, never
theless, bound to add, that those who want ^o dance are
not long in finding a piper. For it is surely as though
a curse lay on mankind, causing them, in virtue of a
natural afiinity for all that is corrupt and bad, to prefer
and hold up to admiration the inferior, not to say down
right defective, portions of the works of eminent minds,
while the really admirable parts are tolerated as merely
accessory. Very few in our time know wherein the pecu
liar depth and true grandeur of Kant's philosophy lies;
for his works have necessarily ceased to be comprehended
since they have ceased to be studied. In fact, they are
now only cursorily read, for historical purposes, by those
who are under the delusion that philosophy has advanced,
not to say begun, since Kant. We soon perceive there
fore, that in spite of all their talk about Kantian philoso
phy, these people really know nothing of it but the husk,
the mere outer envelope, and that if perchance they may
here or there have taught up a stray sentence or brought
away a rough sketch of it, they have never penetrated to
the depths of its meaning and spirit. People of this sort
have always been chiefly attracted, in Kant's Philosophy,

1 Schopenhauer, "Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik,5' p. 148
and sqq. (p. 146 et scg. of 2nd edition.)

142 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. V.

first of all by the Antinomies, on account of their oddity,
but still more by his Practical Eeason with its Cate
gorical Imperative, nay even by the Moral Theory he placed
on the top of it, though with this last he was never in
earnest ; for a theoretical dogma which has only practical
validity, is very like the wooden guns we allow our children
to handle without fear of danger : properly speaking, it
belongs to the same category as : " Wash my skin, but
without wetting it." Now, as regards the Categorical Im
perative, Kant never asserted it as a fact, but, on the con
trary, protests repeatedly against this being done ; he
merely served it up as the result of an exceedingly curious
combination of thoughts, because he stood in need of a
sheet-anchor for morality. Our professors of philosophy,
however, never sifted the matter to the bottom, so that it
seems as if no one before me had ever thoroughly investi
gated it. Instead of this, they made all haste to bring the
Categorical Imperative into credit as a firmly established
fact, calling it in their purism " the moral law" — which,
by the way, always reminds me of Biirger's " Mam'zelle
Laregle ; " indeed, they have made out of it something as
massive as the stone tables of Moses, whose place it
entirely takes, for them. Now in my Essay upon the
Fundament of Morality, I have brought this same
Practical Eeason with its Categorical Imperative under the
anatomical knife, and proved so clearly and conclusively
that they never had any life or truth, that I should like
to see the man who can refute me with reasons, and so
help the Categorical Imperative honestly on its legs again.
Meanwhile, our professors of philosophy do not allow
themselves to be put out of countenance by this. They
can no more dispense with their " moral law of practical
Eeason," as a convenient deus ex machina, on which to
found their morality, than with Free Will : both are essen
tial points in their old woman's philosophy. No matter if

SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE, THE SUBJECT. 143

I have made an end of both, since, for them, both continue
to exist, like deceased sovereigns who for political reasons
are occasionally allowed to continue reigning for a few
days after their death. These worthies simply pursue
their tactics of old against my merciless demolition of those
two antiquated fictions : silence, silence ; and so they glide
past noiselessly, feigning ignorance, to make the public
believe that I and the like of me are not worth listening to.
Well, to be sure, their philosophical calling comes to them
from the ministry, while mine only comes from Nature.
True, we may at last perhaps discover that these heroes act
upon the same principle as that idealistic bird, the ostrich,
which imagines that by closing its eyes it does away with
the huntsman. Ah well! we must bide our time ; if the
public can only be brought to take up meantime with the
barren twaddle, the unbearably tiresome repetitions, the
arbitrary constructions of the Absolute, and the infant-
school morality of these gentlemen — say, till I am dead and
they can trim up my works as they like — we shall then
see.

Morgen babe denn das Eechte

Seine Freunde wohlgesinnet,

Wenn nur heute noch das Scblechte

Vollen Platz und Gunst gewinnet.

GoTHEj West-Oestlichcr Divan.

But do these gentlemen know what time of day it is ?
A long predicted epoch has set in ; the church is beginning
to totter, nay it totters already to such a degree, that it
is doubtful whether it will ever be able to recover its centre
of gravity ; for faith is lost. The light of revelation, like
other lights, requires a certain amount of darkness as an
indispensable condition. The number of those who have been
unfitted for belief by a certain degree and extent of know
ledge, is already very large. Of this we have evident signs
in the general diffusion of that shallow Rationalism which

144 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. V.

is showing its bulldog face daily more and more overtly.
It quietly sets to work to measure those profound mys
teries of Christianity over which centuries have brooded
and disputed with its draper's ell, and thinks itself
wondrous wise withal. It is, however, the very quintes
sence of Christianity, the dogma of Original Sin, which
these shallow-brained Rationalists have especially singled
out for a laughing-stock ; precisely because nothing seems
clearer or more certain to them, than that existence should
begin for each of us with our birth : nothing therefore so
impossible as that we can have come into the world already
burdened with guilt. How acute ! And just as in times
of prevailing poverty and neglect, wolves begin to make
their appearance in villages ; so does Materialism, ever
lying in wait, under these circumstances lift up its head
and come to the front hand in hand with Bestialism,
its companion, which some call Humanism. Our thirst
after knowledge augments with our incapacity for belief.
There comes a boiling-point in the scale of all intellectual
development, at which all faith, all revelation, and ail
authority evaporate, and Man claims the right to judge for
himself; the right, not only to be taught, but to be convinced.
The leading-strings of his infancy have fallen off, and
henceforth he demands leave to walk alone. Yet his
craving for Metaphysics can no more be extinguished than
any physical want. Then it is, that the desire for philo
sophy becomes serious and that mankind invokes the
spirits of all the genuine thinkers who have issued from
its ranks. Then, too, empty verbiage and the impotent
endeavours of emasculated intellects no longer suffice ; the
want of a serious philosophy is felt, having other aims
in view than fees and salaries, and caring little therefore
whether it meets the approbation of cabinet-ministers, or
councillors, whether it serves the purposes of this or that
religious faction, or not ; a philosophy which, on the con-

SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 145

trary, clearly shows that it has a very different mission in
view from that of procuring a livelihood for the poor in
spirit.

But I return to my argument. By means of an amplifica
tion which only needed a little audacity, a theoretical oracle
had been added to the practical oracle with which Kant
had wrongly endowed Reason. The credit of this inven
tion is no doubt due to F. H. Jacobi, from whom the
professional philosophers joyfully and thankfully received
the precious gift, as a means to help them out of the straits
to which Kant had reduced them. That cool, calm, de
liberate Reason, which Kant had criticized so mercilessly,
was henceforth degraded to Understanding and known by
this name; while Reason was supposed to denote an
entirely imaginary, fictitious faculty, admitting us, as it
were, to a little window overlooking the superlunar, nay,
the supernatural world, through which all those truths
are handed to us ready cut and dried, concerning which
old-fashioned, honest, reflective Reason had for ages
vainly argued and contended. And it is on such a mere
product of the imagination, such a completely fictitious
Reason as this, that G-erman sham philosophy has been
based for the last fifty years ; first, as the free construction
and projection of the absolute Ego and the emanation
from it of the non-Ego ; then, as the intellectual intuition
of absolute identity or indifference, and its evolutions to
Nature ; or again, as the arising of G-od out of his dark
depths or bottomless pit * a la Jakob Bohme ; lastly, as the
pure, self -thinking, absolute Idea, the scene of the ballet-
dance of the self -moving conceptions — still, at the same
time, always as immediate apprehension (Vemehmen) of the
Divine, the supersensuous, the Deity, verity, beauty and as
many other " -ties " as may be desired, or even as a mere

1 " Aits seinem Grrund oder Ungrund"
L

146 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. V.

vague presentiment1 of all these wonders. — So this is Season,
is it ? Oh no, it is simply a farce, of which our professors
of philosophy, who are sorely perplexed by Kant's serious
critiques, avail themselves in order to pass off the subjects
of the established religion of their country somehow or
other, per fas aut nefas, for the results of philosophy.

For it behoves all professorial philosophy, before all
things, to establish beyond doubt, and to give a philoso
phical basis to, the doctrine, that there is a God, Creator,
and Ruler of the Universe, a personal, consequently in
dividual, Being, endowed with Understanding and Will,
who has created the world out of nothing, and who rules
it with sublime wisdom, power and goodness. This obli
gation, however, places our professors of philosophy in
an awkward position with respect to serious philosophy.
For Kant had appeared and the Critique of Pure Reason,
was written more than sixty years ago, the result being,
that of all the proofs of the existence of God which had
been brought forward during the Christian ages, and
which may be reduced to three which alone are possible,
none are able to accomplish the desired end. Nay, the
iuipossibity of any such proof, and with it the impossibility
of all speculative theology, is shown at length a priori
and not in the empty verbiage or Hegelian jargon now
in fashion, which may be made to mean anything one
likes, but quite seriously and honestly, in the good old-
fashioned way ; wherefore, however little it may have been
"to the taste of many people, nothing cogent could be
brought forward in reply to it for the last sixty years, and
the proofs of the existence of God have in consequence
lost all credit, and are no longer in use. Our professors of
philosophy have even begun to look down upon them and
treat them with decided contempt, as ridiculous and super
fluous attempts to demonstrate what was self-evident.
1 " Ahnung without the d." See above, p. 133. (Tr.'s note.)

. SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 147

Ho ! ho ! what a pity this was not found out sooner! How
much trouble might have been spared in searching whole
centuries for these proofs, and how needless it would have
been for Kant to bring the whole weight of his Critique
of Eeason to bear upon and crush them ! Some folks,
will no doubt be reminded by this contempt of the
fox with the sour grapes. But those who wish to see a
slight specimen of it will find a particularly characteristic
one in Schelling's " Philosophische Schriften," vol. i., 1809,
p. 152. Now, whilst others were consoling themselves with
Kant's assertion, that it is just as impossible to prove the
non-existence, as the existence, of God — as if, forsooth, the
old wag did not know that affirmanti incumbit probatio —
Jacobi's admirable invention came to the rescue of our per
plexed professors, and granted G-erman savants of this cen
tury a peculiar sort of Eeason that had never been known
or heard of before.

Yet all these artifices were quite unnecessary. For the
impossibility of proving the existence of God by no means
interferes with that existence, since it rests in unshakeable
security on a much firmer basis. It is indeed a matter
of revelation, and this is besides all the more certain,
because that revelation was exclusively vouchsafed to a
single people, called, on this account, the chosen people of
G-od. This is made evident by the fact, that the notion
of God, as personal Euler and Creator of the world, or
daining everything for the best, is to be found in no other
religion but the Jewish, and the two faiths derived from
it, which might consequently in a wider sense be called
Jewish sects. We find no trace of such a notion in anv
other religion, ancient or modern. For surely no one
would dream of confounding this Creator God Almignty
with the Hindoo Brahm, which is living in me, in you,
in my horse, in your dog — or even with Brahma, who is
born and dies to malic way for other Brahmas, and to whom

148 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. V.

moreover the production of the world is imputed as sin and
guilt1 — least of all with beguiled Saturn's voluptuous son,
to whom Prometheus, defiant, prophesies his downfall. But
if we finally direct our attention towards the religion which
numbers most followers, and in this respect may therefore
be said to rank foremost : that is, Buddhism, we can
no longer shut our eyes to the fact that it is as decidedly
and explicitly atheistic, as it is idealistic and ascetic ; and
this moreover to such a degree, that its priests express
the greatest abhorrence of the doctrine of pure Theism
whenever it is brought to their notice. Therefore, in a
treatise handed to a Catholic bishop by the High Priest
of the Buddhists at Ava,2 the doctrine " that there is a
Being who has created the world and all things, and who
alone is worthy of worship," is counted among the six
damnable heresies.8 This is entirely corroborated by
I. J. Schmidt, a most excellent and learned authority*
whom I consider as having undoubtedly the deepest know
ledge of Buddhism of any European savant, and who, in his
work " Upon the connection between Gnostic doctrines and
Buddhism," p. 9, says : —

" In the writings of the Buddhists not a trace is to be
found of any positive indication of a Supreme Being as the
principle of Creation. Whenever this subject presents
itself consistently in the course of argument, it seems,
indeed, to be intentionally evaded." And again : " The
system of Buddhism knows of no eternal, uncreated,

1 "If Brimha be unceasingly employed in the creation of worlds

how can tranquillity be obtained by inferior orders of being ? " Prabodh
Chandro Daya, translated by J. Taylor, p. 23. — Brahma is also part of
the Trimurti, which is the personification of nature, as procreation,
preservation, and death : that is, he represents the first of these.

2 See " Asiatic Researches," vol. vi. p. 268, and Sangennano's " De
scription of the Burmese Empire," p. 81.

3 See I. J. Schmidt, " Forschungen im Gebiete der alteren Bildungs-
geschichte Mittelasiens." St. Petersburg, 1824, pp. 276, and 180. %

SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 149

one and only Being, having existed before Time and
created all that is visible and invisible. This idea is quite
foreign to Buddhism, and not a trace of it is to be found
in Buddhist works. And just as little mention do we find
of Creation. True, the visible Universe is not without a be
ginning, but it arose out of empty Space, according to con
sistent, immutable, natural laws. We should however err,
were we to assume that anything — call it Fate or Nature —
is regarded or revered by the Buddhists as a divine principle;
on the contrary, it is just this very development of empty
Space, this precipitate from it or this division into count
less parts, this Matter thus arising, which constitutes the
Evil of Jirtintschi, or of the Universe in its inner and outer
relations, out of which sprang Ortschilang, or continuous
change according to immutable laws, which the same Evil
had established." Then again : '* " The expression Creation
is foreign to Buddhism, which only knows Cosmogony ; "
and, " We must comprehend that no idea of a creation of
divine origin is compatible with their system." I could
bring forward a hundred corroborative passages like these;
but will limit myself to one more, which I quote on account
of its popular and official character. The third volume of
a very instructive Buddhist work, "Mahavansi, E-aja-
ratnacari, and Raja-Vali," 2 contains a translation of the
interrogatories to which the High Priests of the five chief
Pagodas were separately and successively subjected by the
Dutch Governor of Ceylon about the year 1766. It is
exceedingly amusing to see the contrast between the inter
locutors, who have the greatest difficulty in understanding
one another's meaning. In conformity with the doctrines
of their faith, these priests, who are penetrated with love

1 I. J. Schmidt, Lecture delivered in the Academy at St. Petersburg
en the 15th Sept. 1830, p. 26.

2 Mahavansi, Raja-ratnacari, and Kaja- Vali, from the Singhalese, by
E. Upham. London, 1833.

150 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. V,

and compassion for all living beings, not excepting even
Dutch Governors, spare no pains to satisfy him by their
answers. But the artless, na'ive Atheism of these priests,
whose piety extends even to practising continence, soon comes
into conflict with the deep convictions founded on Judaism,
imbibed by the Governor in his infancy. This faith has
become a second nature for him ; he cannot in the least
understand that these priests are not Theists, therefore
he constantly returns to his inquiries after a Supreme
Being, asking them who created the world, and so forth.
Whereupon they answer that there can be no higher
being than Buddha Shakia-Muni, the Victorious and
the Perfect, who, though a king's son by birth, volun
tarily lived the life of a beggar, and preached to the
end his sublime doctrine, for the Redemption of mankind,
and for our salvation from the misery of constant re
nascence. They hold that the world has not been made by
anyone/ that it is self-created, that Nature spreads it out,
and draws it in again ; but that it is that, which existing,
does not exist : that it is the necessary accompaniment of
renascence, and that renascence is the result of our sinful
conduct, &c. &c. &c. I mention such facts as these chiefly
on account of the really scandalous way in which G-erman
savants still universally persist, even to the present day, in
looking upon Religion and Theism as identical and sy
nonymous ; whereas Religion is, in fact, to Theism as the
genus to the single species, and Judaism and Theism are
alone identical. For this reason we stigmatize as heathen
all nations who are neither Jews, Christians, nor Mahome
tans. Christians are even taxed by Mahometans and Jews
•with the impurity of their Theism, because of the dogma
of the Trinity. For, whatever may be said to the contrary,

1 Kooyiov TOV$() 0rj<r(V 'Hpa/c\«ro£, OVTZ rig Oeutv ovrz av9ptt)7Td)v
CTTOITJOW. (Neither a God nor a man created this world, says Hera-
clitus.) Plut. (< De animse procreatione," c. 5.

SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 151

Christianity lias Indian blood in its veins, therefore it con
stantly tends to free itself from Judaism. The Critique
of Pure Reason is the most serious attack that has ever
been made upon Theism — and this is why our professors
of philosophy have been in such a hurry to set Kant
aside ; but had that work appeared in any country where
Buddhism prevailed, it would simply have been regarded
as an edifying treatise intended to refute heresy more
thoroughly by a salutary confirmation of the orthodox doc
trine of Idealism — that is, the doctrine of the merely appa
rent existence of the world, as it presents itself to our
senses. Even the two other religions which coexist with
Buddhism in China — those of Taotsee and of Confu
cius — are just as Atheistic as Buddhism itself ; wherefore
the missionaries have never been able to translate the first
verse of the Pentateuch into Chinese, because there is no
word in the language for God and Creation. Even the
missionary Giitzlaff, in his "History of the Chinese Empire,"
p. 18, has the honesty to say : " It is extraordinary that
none of the (Chinese) philosophers ever soared high enough
to reach the knowledge of a Creator and Lord of the
Universe, although they possessed the Light of Nature in
full measure." J. F. Davis likewise quotes a passage,
which is quite in accordance with this, from Milne's Pre
face to his translation of the Shing-yu, where in speaking
of that work, he says that we may see from it " that the
bare Light of Nature, as it is called, even when aided by
all the light of Pagan philosophy, is totally incapable of
leading men to the knowledge and worship of the true
God." All this confirms the fact that revelation is the sole
foundation on which Theism rests ; indeed, it must be so,
unless revelation is to be superfluous. This is a good oppor
tunity for observing that the word Atheism itself implies a
surreptitious assumption, since it takes Theism for granted
as a matter of course. It would be more hon&t to say

152 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. V.

Non-Judaism instead of Atheism, and Non-Jew instead of
Atheist.

Now as, according to the above, the existence of God
belongs to revelation, by which it is firmly established, it
has no need whatever of human authentication. Philo
sophy, however, is properly speaking only an idle, super
fluous attempt to let Reason — that is, the human power of
thinking, reflecting, deliberating — once in a while, try its
own powers unassisted, as a child is now and then allowed
to run alone on a lawn and try its strength without leading-
strings, just to see what will come of it. Tests and experi
ments of this kind we call speculation ; and it lies in the nature
of the matter that it should, for once, leave all authority,
human or divine, out of consideration, ignore it, and go its
own way in search of the most sublime, most important
truths. Now, if on this basis it should arrive at the very same
results as those mentioned above, to which Kant had come,
speculation has no right on that account to cast all honesty
and conscience forthwith aside, and take to by-ways, in
order somehow or other to get back to the domain of
Judaism, as its conditio sine qua non ; it ought rather
henceforth to seek truth quite honestly and simply by any
road that may happen to lie open before it, but never to
allow any other light than that of Reason to guide it : thus
advancing calmly and confidently, like one at work in his
vocation, without concern as to where that road may lead.

If our professors of philosophy put a different construc
tion on the matter, and hold that they cannot eat their
bread in honour, so long as they have not reinstalled G-od
Almighty on his throne — as if, forsooth, he stood in need
of them — this already accounts for their not relishing my
writings, and explains why I am not the man for them ;
for I certainly do not deal in this sort of article, nor have
I the newest reports to communicate about the Almighty
every Leipzig fair-time, as they have.

CHAPTER YI.

ON THE THIRD CLASS OF OBJECTS FOB THE SUBJECT AND
THAT FORM OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON
WHICH PREDOMINATES IN IT.

§ 35. Explanation of this Class of Objects.

IT is the formal part of complete representations — that
is to say, the intuitions given us a priori of the forms
of the outer and inner sense, i.e. of Space and of Time —
which constitutes the Third Class of Objects for our repre
sentative faculty.

As pure intuitions, these forms are objects for the
faculty of representation by themselves and apart from
complete representations and from the determinations of
being empty or filled which these representations first add to
them ; since even pure points and pure lines cannot be
brought to sensuous perception, but are only a priori in
tuitions, just as the infinite expansion and the infinite
divisibility of Space and of Time are exclusively objects of
pure intuition and foreign to empirical perception. That
which distinguishes the third class of representations, in
which Space and Time are pure intuitions, from the first
class, in which they are sensuously (and moreover con
jointly) perceived, is Matter, which I have therefore de
fined, on the one hand, as the perceptibility of Space and
Time, on the other, as objectified Causality.

The form of Causality, on the contrary, which belongs
to the Understanding, is not separately and by itself

154 THE FOTJBFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. VI.

an object for our faculty of representation, nor have we
consciousness of it, until it is connected with what is
material in our knowledge.

§ 36. Principle of the Sufficient Reason of Being. .

Space and Time are so constituted, that all their parts
stand in mutual relation, so that each of them conditions
and is conditioned by another. We call this relation in
Space, position ; in Time, succession. These relations are
peculiar ones, differing entirely from all other possible
relations of our representations ; neither the Understand
ing nor the Reason are therefore able to grasp them by
means of mere conceptions, and pure intuition a priori
alone makes them intelligible to us ; for it is impossible
by mere conceptions to explain clearly what is meant by
above and below, right and left, behind and before, before
and after. Kant rightly confirms this by the assertion,
that the distinction between our right and left glove can
not be made intelligible in any other way than by intui
tion. Now, the law by which the divisions of Space and
of Time determine one another reciprocally with reference
to these relations (position and succession) is what I call
the Principle of the Sufficient Reason of Being, principium
rationis sufficientis essendi. I have already given an example
of this relation in § 15, by which I have shown, through
the connection between the sides and angles of a triangle,
that this relation is not only quite different from that
between cause and effect, but also from that between
reason of knowledge and consequent ; wherefore here the
condition may be called Reason of Being, ratio essendi.
The insight into such a reason of being can, of course, be
come a reason of knowing : just as the insight into the law
of causality and its application to a particular case is the
reason of knowledge of the effect ; but this in no way

THIRD CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 155

annuls the complete distinction between Reason of Being,
Reason of Becoming, and Reason of Knowing. It often
happens, that what according to one form of oar principle
is consequence, is, according to another, reason. The rising
of the quicksilver in a thermometer, for instance, is the
consequence of increased heat according to the law of
causality, while according to the principle of the sufficient
reason of knowing it is the reason, the ground of know-
ledge, of the increased heat and also of the judgment by
which this is asserted.

§ 37. Reason of Being in Space.

The position of each division of Space towards any
other, say of any given line — and this is equally ap
plicable to planes, bodies, and points — determines also
absolutely its totally different position with reference to
any other possible line ; so that the latter position stands
to the former in the relation of the consequent to its
reason. As the position of this given line towards any
other possible line likewise determines its position to
wards all the others, and as therefore the position of the
first two lines is itself determined by all the others, it is
immaterial which we consider as being first determined
and determining the others, i.e. which particular one we
regard as ratio and which others as rationata. This is so,
because in Space there is no succession ; for it is precisely
by uniting Space and Time to form the collective re
presentation of the complex of experience, that the repre
sentation of coexistence arises. Thus an analogue to so-
called reciprocity prevails everywhere in the Reason of
Being in Space, as we shall see in § 48, where I enter
more fully into- the reciprocity of reasons. Now, as every
line is determined by all the others just as much as it de
termines them, it is arbitrary to consider any line merely

156 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. VI.

as determining and not as being determined, and the posi
tion of each towards any other admits the question as to
its position with reference to some other line, which second
position necessarily determines the first and makes it that
which it is. It is therefore just as impossible to find an
end aparte ante in the series of links in the chain of Eeasons
of Being as in that of Reasons of Becoming, nor can we find
any a parte post either, because of the infinity of Space and
of the lines possible within Space. All possible relative
spaces are figures, because they are limited ; and all these
figures have their Eeason of Being in one another, because
they are conterminous. The series rationum essendi in
Space therefore, like the series rationum fiendi, proceeds in
infinitum ; and moreover not only in a single direction, like
the latter, but in all directions.

Nothing of all this can be proved ; for the truth of these
principles is transcendental, they being directly founded
upon the intuition of Space given us a priori.

§ 38. Reason of being in Time. Arithmetic.

Every instant in Time is conditioned by the preceding
one. The Sufficient Reason of Being, as the law of conse
quence, is so simple here, because Time has only one dimen
sion, therefore it admits of no multiplicity of relations.
Each instant is conditioned by its predecessor ; we can only
reach it through that predecessor : only so far as this was
and has elapsed, does the present one exist, All counting
rests upon this nexus of the divisions of Time, numbers
only serving to mark the single steps in the succession ;
upon it therefore rests all arithmetic likewise, which teaches
absolutely nothing but methodical abbreviations of nume
ration. Each number pre-supposes its predecessors as the
reasons of its being : we can only reach the number ten by
passing through all the preceding numbers, and it is only

THIRD CLASS OF OBJECTS FOB THE SUBJECT. 157

in virtue of this insight that I know, that where ten are,
there also are eight, six, four.

§ 39. Geometry.

The whole science of Geometry likewise rests upon the
nexus of the position of the divisions of Space. It would,
accordingly, be an insight into that nexus ; only such an
insight being, as we have already said, impossible by means
of mere conceptions, or indeed in any other way than by in
tuition, every geometrical proposition would have to be
brought back to sensuous intuition, and the proof would
simply consist in making the particular nexus in question
clear; nothing more could be done. Nevertheless we
find G-eometry treated quite differently. Euclid's Twelve
Axioms are alone held to be based upon mere intuition,
and even of these only the Ninth, Eleventh, and Twelfth
are properly speaking admitted to be founded upon diffe
rent, separate intuitions ; while the rest are supposed to
be founded upon the knowledge that in science we do not,
as in experience, deal with real things existing for themselves
side by side, and susceptible of endless variety, but on the
contrary with conceptions, and in Mathematics with normal
intuitions, i.e. figures and numbers, whose laws are binding
for all experience, and which therefore combine the compre
hensiveness of the conception with the complete definite-
ness of the single representation. For although, as intuitive
representations, they are throughout determined with com
plete precision — no room being left in this way by anything
remaining undetermined — still they are general, because
they are the bare forms of all phenomena, and, as such,
applicable to all real objects to which such forms belong,
What Plato says of his Ideas would therefore, even in
Geometry, hold good of these normal intuitions, just as
well as of conceptions, i.e. that two cannot be exactly

158 THE FOURFOLD HOOT. [CHAP. VI.

similar, for then they would be but one.1 This would, I
say, be applicable also to normal intuitions in Geometry,
if it were not that, as exclusively spacial objects, these
differ from one another in mere juxtaposition, that is, in
place. Plato had long ago remarked this, as we are told
by Aristotle : 2 tri (He, Trapa TO. alaQt]ra KCti TO. udr), TO. padrj-
uartKa Tutv irpayfjiar^v tival (j)i](Ti jutra£v, ^m^t'povra rwv JJLEV
alcrdriTwr ry aidia feat aKtvrjTa etVcu, rwv f)£ EiCwv ry ra /uej>
7roX/V ctrra opoia etVat, TO ^e eldoQ avru £v tKaarov {JLOVOV
(item, prceter sensibilia et species, matJiematica rerum ait
media esse, a sensibilibus quidem differentia eo, quod per-
petua et immobilia sunt, a speciebus vero eo, quod illorum
quidem multa qucedam similia sunt, species vero ipsct,
unaquceque sola). Now the mere knowledge that such a
difference of place does not annul the rest of the identity,
might surely, it seems to me, supersede the other nine
axioms, and would, I think, be better suited to the nature
of science, whose aim is knowledge of the particular through
the general, than the statement of nine separate axioms
all based upon the same insight. Moreover, what Aristotle
says: cV TOVTOLQ ^ laoTrjQ kvorijg (in illis cequalitas unites
est) 3 then becomes applicable to geometrical figures.
But with reference to the normal intuitions in Time, i.e.

1 Platonic ideas may, after all, be described as normal intuitions,
which would hold good not only for what is formal, but also for what is
material in complete representations — therefore as complete representa
tions which, as such, would be determined throughout, while compre
hending many things at once, like conceptions : that is to say, as repre
sentatives of conceptions, but which are quite adequate to those
conceptions, as I have explained in § 28.

2 Aristot. "' Metaph." i. 6, with which compare x. 1. "Further, says
he, besides things sensible and the ideas, there are things mathematical
coming in between the two, which differ from the things sensible, inas
much as they are eternal and immovable, and from the ideas, inasmuch
as many of them are like each other; but the idea is absolutely and
only one." (Tr.'s Add.)

* " In these it is equality that constitutes unity." (Tr.'s Add.)

THIRD CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 159

to numbers, even this distinction of juxtaposition no longer
exists. Here, as with conceptions, absolutely nothing but the
identitas indiscernibilium remains : for there is but one five
and one seven. And in this we may perhaps also find a reason
why 7 + 5 = 12 is a synthetical proposition a priori,
founded upon intuition, as Kant profoundly discovered,
and not an identical one, as it is called by Herder in his
" Metakritik " . 12 = 12 is an identical proposition.

In Geometry, it is therefore only in dealing with axioms'
that we appeal to intuition. All the other theorems are
demonstrated : that is to say, a reason of knowing is given,
the truth of which everyone is bound to acknowledge.
The logical truth of the theorem is thus shown, but not its
transcendental truth (v. §§30 and 32), which, as it lies in
the reason of being and not in the reason of knoivvng,
never can become evident excepting by means of intuition.
This explains why this sort of geometrical demonstration,
while it no doubt conveys the conviction that the theorem
which has been demonstrated is true, nevertheless gives no
insight as to why that which it asserts is what it is. In
other words, we have not found its Reason of Being ; but
the desire to find it is usually then thoroughly roused.
For proof by indicating the reason of knowledge only
effects conviction (convictio), not knowledge (cognitio) : there
fore it might perhaps be more correctly called elenchus
than demonstratio. This is why, in most cases, therefore, it
leaves behind it that disagreeable feeling which is given
by all want of insight, when perceived ; and here, the
want of knowledge why a thing is as it is, makes itself all
the more keenly felt, because of the certainty just attained,
that it is as it is. This impression is very much like the
feeling we have, when something has been conjured into or
out of our pocket, and we cannot conceive how. The
reason of knowing which, in such demonstrations as
these, is given without the reason of being, resembles

160 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. VI.

certain physical theories, which present the phenomenon
without being able to indicate its cause: for instance,
Leidenfrost's experiment, inasmuch as it succeeds also in a
platina crucible ; whereas the reason of being of a geo
metrical proposition which is discovered by intuition, like
every knowledge we acquire, produces satisfaction. When
once the reason of being is found, we base our conviction
of the truth of the theorem upon that reason alone, and no
longer upon the reason of knowing given us by the demon
stration. Let us, for instance, take the sixth proposition
of the first Book of Euclid : —

"If two angles of a triangle are equal, the sides also

which subtend, or are opposite to, the equal angles shall
be equal to one another." (See fig. 3.)
Which Euclid demonstrates as follows : —
" Let a b c be a triangle having the angle a b c equal to
the angle a c b, then the side a c must be equal to the side
a b also.

" For, if side a b be not equal to side a c, one of them is
greater than the other. Let a b be greater than a c ; and
from b a cut off b d equal to c a, and draw d c. Then, in the
triangles d b c, a b c, because d b is equal to a c, and b c is
common to both triangles, the two sides d b and b c are
equal to the two sides a c, a b, each to each ; and the angle
d b c is equal to the angle a c b, therefore the base d c is
equal to the base a b, and the triangle d b c is equal to the

THIRD CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 161

triangle a be, the less triangle equal to the greater, — which
is absurd. Therefore a b is not unequal to a c, that is, a b
is equal to a c"

Now, in this demonstration we have a reason of know
ing for the truth of the proposition. But who bases his
conviction of that geometrical truth upon this proof?
Do we not rather base our conviction upon the reason of
being, which we know intuitively, and according to which
(by a necessity which admits of no further demonstration,
but only of evidence through intuition) two lines drawn
from both extreme ends of another line, and inclining
equally towards each other, can only meet at a point which
is equally distant from both extremities ; since the two
arising angles are properly but one, to which the opposite-
ness of position gives the appearance of being two ; where
fore there is no reason why the lines should meet at any
point nearer to the one end than to the other.

It is the knowledge of the reason of being which shows
us the necessary consequence of the conditioned from its
condition — in this instance, the lateral equality from the
angular equality — that is, it shows their connection ; whereas
the reason of knowing only shows their coexistence. Nay,
we might even maintain that the usual method of proving
merely convinces us of their coexistence in the actual
figure given us as an example, but by no means that
they are always coexistent ; for, as the necessary con
nection is not shown, the conviction we acquire of this
truth rests simply upon induction, and is based upon
the fact, that we find it is so in every figure we make.
The reason of being is certainly not as evident in all cases
as it is in simple theorems like this 6th one of Euclid ;
still I am persuaded that it might be brought to evidence in
every theorem, however complicated, and that the proposi
tion can always be reduced to some such simple intuition.
Besides, we are all just as conscious a priori of the necessity

M

162

THE FOURFOLD BOOT.

[CHAP. vi.

of such a reason of being for each relation of Space, as we are
of the necessity of a cause for each change. In complicated
theorems it will, of course, be very difficult to show that
reason of being ; and this is not the place for difficult geo
metrical researches. Therefore, to make my meaning some
what clearer, I will now try to bring back to its reason of
being a moderately complicated proposition, in which
nevertheless that reason is not immediately evident.
Passing over the intermediate theorems, I take the 16th :

" In every triangle in which one side has been produced,
the exterior angle is greater than either of the interior
opposite angles."

This Euclid demonstrates in the following manner (see
fig. 4) :-

" Let a b c be a triangle ; and let the side I c be produced
to d ; then the exterior angle a c d shall be greater than
either of the interior opposite angles bacorcba. Bisect the
side a c at e, and join b e ; produce b e to /, making e f
equal to e b, and join / c. Produce a c to g. Because a e
is equal to e c, and be to e f ; the two sides a e, e b, are
equal to the two sides c e, e f, each to each ; and the angle
a e b is equal to the angle c e f, because they are opposite
vertical angles ; therefore the base a b is equal to the base
e f, and the triangle a e b is equal to the triangle c e f, and
tiie remaining angles of one triangle to the remaining angles

THIED CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 163

of tlie other, each to each, to which the equal sides are
opposite ; therefore the angle I a e is equal to the angle
e c f. But the angle e c d is greater than the angle e c /•
Therefore the angle a c d is greater than the angle a b c"

" In the same manner, if the side b c be bisected, and the
side a c be produced to g, it may be demonstrated that the
angle beg, that is, the opposite vertical angle a c d is
greater than the angle ab e."

My demonstration of the same proposition would be as
follows (see fig. 5) : —

For the angle b a c to be even equal to, let alone greater
than, the angle a c d, the line b a toward c a would have to
lie in the same direction as b d (for this is precisely what
is meant by equality of the angles), i.e., it must be parallel

Fig. 5.

with b d ; that is to say, b a and b d must never meet ; but
in order to form a triangle they must meet (reason of
being), and must thus do the contrary of that which would
be required for the angle b a c to be of the same size as
the angle a c d.

For the angle a b c to be even equal to, let alone greater
than, the angle a c d, line b a must lie in the same direction
towards b d as a c (for this is what is meant by equality of
the angles), i.e., it must be parallel with a c, that is to say,
b a and a c must never meet ; but in order to form a triangle
b a and a c must meet and must thus do the contrary of
that which would be required for the angle a b c to be
of the same size as a c d.

By all this I do not mean to suggest the introduction of

164

THE FOURFOLD BOOT.

[CHAP. vi.

a new method of mathematical demonstration, nor the
substitution of my own proof for that of Euclid, for which
its whole nature unfits it, as well as the fact that it pre
supposes the conception of parallel lines, which in Euclid
comes much later. I merely wished to show what the
reason of being is, and wherein lies the difference between
it and the reason of knowing, which latter only effects con-
victio, a thing that differs entirely from insight into the
reason of being. The fact that Geometry only aims at
effecting convictio, and that this, as I have said, leaves
behind it a disagreeable impression, but gives no insight
into the reason of being — which insight, like all knowledge,

Fig. 6.

is satisfactory and pleasing — may perhaps be one of the
reasons for the great dislike which many otherwise eminent
heads have for mathematics.

I cannot resist again giving fig. 6, although it has already
been presented elsewhere ; because the mere sight of it
without words conveys ten times more persuasion of the
truth of the Pythagorean theorem than Euclid's mouse
trap demonstration.

Those readers for whom this chapter may have a special
interest will find the subject of it more fully treated in my
chief work, " Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," vol. i.
§ 15 ; vol. ii. chap. 13.

CHAPTEE VII.

ON THE FOURTH CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT,
AND THE FORM OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT
REASON WHICH PREDOMINATES IN IT.

§ 40. General Explanation.

THE last Class of Objects for our representative faculty
which remains to be examined is a peculiar but
highly important one. It comprises but one object for
each individual: that is, the immediate object of the inner
sense, the Subject in volition, which is Object for the Know
ing Subject ; wherefore it manifests itself in Time alone,
never in Space, and as we shall see, even in Time under an
important restriction.

§ 41. Subject of Knowledge and Object.

All knowledge presupposes Subject and Object. Even
self-consciousness (Selbstbewusstsein) therefore is not abso
lutely simple, but, like our consciousness of all other
things (i.e., the faculty of perception), it is subdivided into
that which is known and that which knows. Now, that
which is known manifests itself absolutely and exclusively
as Will.

The Subject accordingly knows itself exclusively as
willing, but not as knowing. For the ego which repre
sents, never can itself become representation or Object,
since it conditions all representations as their necessary

166 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. VII.

correlate ; rather may the following beautiful passage
from the Sacred Upanishad be applied to it : Id videndum
non est : omnia videt ; et id audiendum non est : omnia
audit ; sciendum non est : omnia scit : et intelligendum non
est : omnia intelligit. Prceter id, videns, et sciens, et
audiens, et intelligens ens aliud non est.1

There can therefore be no knowledge of knowing, because
this would imply separation of the Subject from knowing,
while it nevertheless knew that knowing — which ia im
possible.

My answer to the objection, "I not only know, but
know also that I know," would be, " Your knowing that
you know only differs in words from your knowing. ' I
know that I know ' means nothing more than ' I know,'
and this again, unless it is further determined, means
nothing more than ' ego.y If your knowing and your
knowing that you know are two different things, just try
to separate them, and first to know without knowing that
you know, then to know that you know without this
knowledge being at the same time knowing." No doubt,
by leaving all special knowing out of the question, we may
at last arrive at the proposition " I know " — the last ab
straction we are able to make ; but this proposition is
identical with " Objects exist for me," and this again is
identical with " I am Subject," in which nothing more is
contained than in the bare word " I."

Now, it may still be asked how the various cognitive
faculties belonging to the Subject, such as Sensibility,
Understanding, Reason, are known to us, if we do not
know the Subject. It is not through our knowing having
become an Object for us that these faculties are known to
us, for then there would not be so many conflicting judg
ments concerning them ; they are inferred rather, or

1 " Oupnekhat," vol. i. p. 202.

FOTJETH CLASS OF OBJECTS FOB THE SUBJECT. 167

more correctly, they are general expressions for the esta
blished classes of representations which, at all times, have
been more or less clearly distinguished in those cognitive
faculties. But, with reference to the necessary correlate
of these representations as their condition, i.e., the Sub
ject, these faculties are abstracted from them (the repre
sentations), and stand consequently towards the classes
of representations in precisely the same relation as the
Subject in general towards the Object in general. Now,
just as the Object is at once posited with the Subject (for
the word itself would otherwise have no meaning), and
conversely, as the Subject is at once posited with the
Object — so that being the Subject means exactly as much
as having an Object, and being an Object means the same
thing as being known by the Subject — so likewise, when
an Object is assumed as being determined in any par
ticular way, do we also assume that the Subject knows
precisely in that particular way. So far therefore it is
immaterial whether we say that Objects have such and
such peculiar inherent determinations, or that the Subject
knows in such and such ways. It is indifferent whether
we say that Objects are divided into such and such classes,
or that such and such different cognitive faculties are
peculiar to the Subject. In that singular compound of
depth and superficiality, Aristotle, are to be found traces
even of insight into this truth, and indeed the critical
philosophy lies in embryo in his works. He says : l
»/ <£u\>) TO. OVTO. TTWC tan itcLVTO. (anima quammodo est uni-
versa, quce sunt). And again: 6 VOVQ eari tifiog eidtiv, i.e.,
the understanding is the form of forms, KO.I rj aiadrja-ic
tiSog aiffdrjTwv, and sensibility the form of sensuous
objects. Accordingly, it is all one whether we say, " sen
sibility and understanding are no more ; " or, " the world is

1 Aristot., " De anima," iii. 8. " In a certain sense the intellect is all
that exists." (Tr.'s Add.)

168 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. VII.

at an end." It comes to the same thing whether we say,
" There are no conceptions," or " Reason is gone and
animals alone remain."

The dispute between Realism and Idealism, which ap
peared for the last time in the dispute between the Dog
matists and Kantians, or between Ontology and Meta
physics on the one hand and Transcendental JEsthetic
and Transcendental Logic on the other, arose out of the
misapprehension of this relation and was based upon its
misapprehension with reference to the First and Third
Classes of representations as established by me, just as
the mediaeval dispute between Realists and Nominalists
rested upon the misapprehension of this relation with
reference to the Second Class.

§ 42. The Subject of Volition.

According to what has preceded, the Subject of know
ledge can never be known ; it can never become Object or
representation. Nevertheless, as we have not only an
outer self-knowledge (in sensuous perception), but an inner
one also ; and as, on the other hand, every knowledge, by
its very nature, presupposes a knower and a known, what
is known within us as such, is not the knower, but the
wilier, the Subject of Volition : the Will. Starting from
knowledge, we may assert that " I know" is an analytical,
" I will," on the contrary, a synthetical, and moreover an
a posteriori proposition, that is, it is given by experience —
in this case by inner experience (i.e., in Time alone). In
so far therefore the Subject of volition would be an
Object for us. Introspection always shows us to ourselves
as willing. In this willing, however, there are numerous
degrees, from the faintest wish to passion, and I have
often shown * that not only all our emotions, but even all

1 See "Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik," p. 11, and in several
other places.

FOURTH CLASS OP OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 169

those movements of our inner man, which are subsumed
under the wide conception of feeling, are states of the
will.

Now, the identity of the willing with the knowing Sub
ject, in virtue of which the word " I " includes and desig
nates both, is the nodus 1 of the Universe, and therefore
inexplicable. For we can only comprehend relations be
tween Objects ;,but two Objects never can be one, except
ing as parts of a whole. Here, where the Subject is in
question, the rules by which we know Objects are no longer
applicable, and actual identity of the knower with what is
known as willing — that is, of Subject and Object — is imme
diately given. Now, whoever has clearly realized the utter
impossibility of explaining this identity, will surely concur
with me in calling it the miracle KUT t&yyv.

Just as the Understanding is the subjective correlate
to our First Class of representations, the Reason to the
Second, and pure Sensibility to the Third, so do we find
that the correlate to this Fourth Class is the inner sense,
or Self-consciousness in general.

§43. Willing. The Law of Motives (Motivation).

It is just because the willing Subject is immediately
given in self-consciousness, that we are unable further to
define or to describe what willing is ; properly speaking, it
is the most direct knowledge we have, nay, one whose im-
mediateness must finally throw light upon every other
knowledge, as being very mediate.

At every resolution that we take ourselves, or that we
Bee others take, we deem ourselves justified in asking,
why ? That is, we assume that something must have pre
viously occurred, from which this resolution has resulted,

1 Weltlcnotcn.

170 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. VII.

and we call this something its reason, or, more correctly, the
motive of the action which now follows. Without such a
reason or motive, the action is just as inconceivable for us,
as the movement of a lifeless body without being pushed or
pulled. Motives therefore belong to causes, and have also
been already numbered and characterized among them in
§ 20, as the third form of Causality. But all Causality
is only the form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason in
the First Class of Objects : that is, in the corporeal world
given us in external perception. There it forms the link
which connects changes one with another, the cause
being that which, coming from outside, conditions each
occurrence. The inner nature of such occurrences on the
contrary continues to be a mystery for us : for we always
remain on the outside. We certainly see this cause neces
sarily produce that effect ; but we do not learn how it is
actually enabled to do so, or what is going on inside.
Thus we see mechanical, physical, chemical effects, as
well as those brought about by stimuli, in each in
stance follow from their respective causes without on
that account ever completely understanding the process,
the essential part of which remains a mystery for us;
so we attribute it to qualities of bodies, to forces of
Nature, or to vital energy, which, however, are all quali-
tates occultce. Nor should we be at all better off as to
comprehension of the movements and actions of animals
and of human beings, which would also appear to us
as induced in some unaccountable way by their causes
(motives), were it not that here we are granted an insight
into the inward part of the process ; we know, that is, by
our own inward experience, that this is an act of the will
called forth by the motive, which consists in a mere re
presentation. Thus the effect produced by the motive, un
like that produced by all other causes, is not only known
by us from outside, in a merely indirect way, but at the

FOURTH CLASS OP OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 171

same time from inside, quite directly, and therefore accord
ing to its whole mode of action. Here we stand as it were
behind the scenes, and learn the secret of the process by
which cause produces effect in its most inward nature ; for
here our knowledge comes to us through a totally different
channel and in a totally different way. From this results
the important proposition : The action of motives (motiva
tion) is causality seen from within. Here accordingly
causality presents itself in quite a different way, in quite
a different medium, and for quite another kind of know
ledge ; therefore it must now be exhibited as a special and
peculiar form of our principle, which consequently here
presents itself as the Principle of the Sufficient Eeason of
Acting, principium rationis sufficients agendi, or, more
briefly, as the Law of Motives (Law of Motivation).

As a clue to my philosophy in general, I here add, that
this Fourth Class of Objects for the Subject, that is, the
one object contained in it, the will which we apprehend
within us, stands in the same relation towards the First
Class as the law of motives towards the law of causality, as
I have established it in § 20. This truth is the corner
stone of my whole Metaphysic.

As to the way in which, and the necessity with which,
motives act, and as to the dependence of their action upon
empirical, individual character, and even upon individual
capacity for knowledge, &c. &c., I refer my readers to my
Prize-essay on the Freedom of the Will, in which I have
treated all this more fully.

§ 44. Influence of the Will over the Intellect.

It is not upon causality proper, but upon the identity of
the knowing with the willing Subject, as shown in § 42,
that the influence is based, which the will exercises over

172 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. VII.

the intellect, when it obliges it to repeat representations
that have once been present to it, and in general to turn
its attention in this or that direction and evoke at plea
sure any particular series of thoughts. And even in this,
the will is determined by the law of motives, in accordance
with which it also secretly rules what is called the associa
tion of ideas, to which I have devoted a separate chapter
(the 14th) in the second volume of my chief work. This
association of ideas is itself nothing but the application of
the Principle of Sufficient Reason in its four forms to the
subjective train of thought ; that is, to the presence of re
presentations in our consciousness. But it is the will of
the individual that sets the whole mechanism in motion,
by urging the intellect, in accordance with the interest, i.e.,
the individual aims, of the person, to recall, together with
its present representations, those which either logically or
analogically, or by proximity in Time or Space, are nearly
related to them. The will's activity in this, however, is so
immediate, that in most cases we have no clear conscious
ness of it ; and so rapid, that we are at times even uncon
scious of the occasion which has thus called forth a repre
sentation. In such cases, it appears as if something had
come into our consciousness quite independently of all con
nection with anything else ; that this, however, is impos
sible, is precisely the Root of the Principle of Sufficient
Reason, which has been fully explained in the above-men
tioned chapter of my chief work.1 Every picture which
suddenly presents itself to our imagination, every judg
ment even that does not follow its previously present
reason, must be called forth by an act of volition having a
motive ; although that motive may often escape our percep
tion owing to its insignificance, and although such acts of
volition are often in like manner unperceived, because they

1 See " Die Welt, a. W. u. V." vol. ii. ch. XIY.

FOURTH CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 173

take place BO easily, that wish and fulfilment are simul
taneous.

§ 45. Memory.

That peculiar faculty of the knowing Subject which
enables it to obey the will the more readily in repeating
representations, the of tener they have already been present
to it — in other words, its capacity for being exercised — is
what we call Memory. I cannot agree with the customary
view, by which it is looked upon as a sort of store-house
in which we keep a stock of ready-made representations
always at our disposal, only without being always con
scious of their possession. The voluntary repetition of re
presentations which have once been present becomes so
easy through practice, that one link in a series of represen
tations no sooner becomes present to us, than we at once
evoke all the rest, often even, as it were, involuntarily. If
we were to look for a metaphor for this characteristic
quality of our representative faculty (such as that of Plato,
who compared it with a soft mass that receives and retains
impressions), I think the best would be that of a piece of
drapery, which, after having been repeatedly folded in the
same folds, at last falls into them, as it were, of its own
accord. The body learns by practice to obey the will, and
the faculty of representing does precisely the same. A re
membrance is not by any means, as the usual view sup
poses, always the same representation which is, as it were,
fetched over and over again from its store-house ; a new
one, on the contrary, arises each time, only practice makes
this especially easy. Thus it comes to pass that pictures
of our imagination, which we fancy we have stowed away
in our memory, become imperceptibly modified: a thing
which we realize when we see some familiar object again
after a long time, and find that it no longer completely
corresponds to the image we bring with us. This could

174 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. VII.

not be if we retained ready-made representations. It is
just for this reason too, that acquired knowledge, if left
unexercised, gradually fades from our memory, precisely
because it was the result of practice coming from habit
and knack ; thus most scholars, for instance, forget their
Greek, and most artists their Italian on their return from
Italy. This is also why we find so much difficulty in re-
calling to mind a name or a line of poetry formerly familiar
to us, when we have ceased to think of it for several years ;
whereas when once we succeed in remembering it, we have
it again at our disposal for some time, because the practice
has been renewed. Everyone therefore who knows several
languages, will do well to make a point of reading occa
sionally in each, that he may ensure to himself their
possession.

This likewise explains why the surroundings and events
of our childhood impress themselves so deeply on our
memory ; it is because, in childhood we have but few, and
those chiefly intuitive, representations : so that we are in
duced to repeat them constantly for the sake of occupation.
People who have little capability for original thought do
this all their lives (and moreover not only with intuitive
representations, but with conceptions and words also) ;
sometimes therefore they have remarkably good memories,
when obtuseness and sluggishness of intellect do not act as
impediments. Men of genius, on the contrary, are not
always endowed with the best of memories, as, for instance,
Eousseau has told us of himself. Perhaps this may be
accounted for by their great abundance of new thoughts
and combinations, which leaves them no time for frequent
repetition. Still, on the whole, gemus is seldom found
with a very bad memory ; because here a greater energy
and mobility of the whole thinking faculty makes up for
the want of constant practice. Nor must we forget that
Mnemosyne was the mother of the Muses. We may ac-

FOTTRTH CLASS OP OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 175

cordingly say, that our memory stands under two contend
ing influences, that of the energy of the representative
faculty on the one hand, and that of the quantity of repre
sentations occupying that faculty on the other. The less
energy there is in the faculty, the fewer must be the repre
sentations, and conversely. This explains the impaired
memory of habitual novel-readers, for it is with them as
with men of genius : the multitude of representations fol
lowing rapidly upon each other, leaves no time or patience
for repetition and practice ; only, in novels, these repre
sentations are not the readers' own, but other people's
thoughts and combinations quickly succeeding each other,
and the readers themselves are wanting in that which, in
genius, counterbalances repetition. The whole thing be
sides is subject to the corrective, that we all have most
memory for that which interests us, and least for that which
does not. Great minds therefore are apt to forget in an
incredibly short time the petty affairs and trifling occur
rences of daily life and the commonplace people with whom
they come in contact, whereas they have a wonderful recol
lection of those things which have importance in them
selves and for them.

It is, however, on the whole, easy to understand that
we should more readily remember such series of represen
tations as are connected together by the thread of one
or more of the above-mentioned species of reasons and
consequences, than such as have no connection with one
another, but only with our will according to the law of
motives ; that is to say, those which are arbitrarily
grouped. For, in the former, the fact that we know the
formal part a priori, saves us half the trouble ; and this
probably gave rise to Plato's doctrine, that all learning is
mere remembering.

As far as possible we ought to try and reduce all that we
wish to incorporate in our memory to a perceptible image,

176 THE FOURFOLD HOOT. [CHAP. VII.

either directly, or as an example, a mere simile, or an ana
logue, or indeed in any other way ; because intuitive per
ceptions take a far firmer hold than any abstract thoughts,
let alone mere words. This is why we remember things we
have ourselves experienced so much better than those of
which we read.

CHAPTEE

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND RESULTS.

§ 46. The Systertiatic Order.

THE order of succession in which I have stated the
various forms of the Principle of Sufficient Eeason in
this treatise, is not systematic ; it has been chosen for the
sake of greater clearness, in order first to present what is
better known and least presupposes the rest. In this I
have followed Aristotle's rule : rai ^uaflr/o-fwe OVK euro TOV
, KCU TtJQ TOV Trpdy/LiaTOG apyjig evioTe apKriov, d\\' odev
j-ddot (et doctrina non a primo, ac reiprincipio ali-
quando inchoanda est, sed unde quis facilius discat).1 But
the systematic order in which the different classes of reasons
ought to follow one another is the following. First of all
should come The Principle of Sufficient Eeason of Being ;
and in this again first its application to Time, as being the
simple schema containing only what is essential in all the
other forms of the Principle of Sufficient Eeason, nay, as
being the prototype of all finitude. The Eeason of Being
in Space having next been stated, the Law of Causality
would then follow ; after which would come the Law of
Motives, and last of all the Principle of Sufficient Eeason
of Knowing ; for the other classes of reasons refer to imme-

1 Aristot. "Metaph." iv. 1. "Sometimes too, learning must start,
not from what is really first and with the actual beginning of the thing
concerned, but from where it is easiest to learn." [Tr.'s add.]

N

178 THE FOURFOLD HOOT. [CHAP. VIII.

diate representations, whereas this last class refers to
representations derived from other representations.

The truth expressed above, that Time is the simple schema
which merely contains the essential part of all the forms of
the Principle of Sufficient Eeason, explains the absolutely
perfect clearness and precision of Arithmetic, a point in
which no other science can compete with it. For all sciences,
being throughout combinations of reasons and consequences,
are based upon the Principle of Sufficient Eeason. Now, the
series of numbers is the simple and only series of reasons
and consequences of Being in Time ; on account of this
perfect simplicity — nothing being omitted, no indefinite
relations left — this series leaves nothing to be desired as re
gards accuracy, apodeictic certainty and clearness. All the
other sciences yield precedence in this respect to Arithmetic ;
even G-eometry : because so many relations arise out of the
three dimensions of Space, that a comprehensive synopsis
of them becomes too difficult, not only for pure, but even
for empirical intuition ; complicated geometrical problems
are therefore only solved by calculation ; that is, Geo
metry is quick to resolve itself into Arithmetic. It is not
necessary to point out the existence of sundry elements of
obscurity in the other sciences.

§ 47. Relation in Time between Reason and Consequence.

According to the laws of causality and of motivation, a
reason must precede its consequence in Time. That this is
absolutely essential, I have shown in my chief work, to
which I here refer my readers * in order to avoid repeating
myself. Therefore, if we only bear in mind that it is
not one thing which is the cause of another thing, but
one state which is the cause of another state, we shall not

1 See "Die Welt a. W. u. V.," vol. ii. ch. iv. p. 41, 42 of the 2nd
edition, and p. 44 of the 3rd.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND RESULTS. 179

allow ourselves to be misled by examples like that given
by Kant,1 that the stove, which is the cause of the
warmth of the room, is simultaneous with its effect. The
state of the stove : that is, its being warmer than its sur
rounding medium, must precede the communication of its
surplus caloric to that medium ; now, as each layer of air
on becoming warm makes way for a cooler layer rushing
in, the first state, the cause, and consequently also the
second, the effect, are renewed until at last the temperature
of stove and room become equalized. Here therefore we
have no permanent cause (the stove) and permanent effect
(the warmth of the room) as simultaneous things, but a
chain of changes ; that is, a constant renewing of two states,
one of which is the effect of the other. From this example,
however, it is obvious that even Kant's conception of
Causality was far from clear.

On the other hand, the Principle of Sufficient Eeason of
Knowing conveys with it no relation in Time, but merely
a relation for our Eeason : here therefore, before and after
have no meaning.

In the Principle of Sufficient Eeason of Being, so far
as it is valid in Geometry, there is likewise no relation in
Time, but only a relation in Space, of which we might say
that all things were co-existent, if here the words co
existence and succession had any meaning. In Arithmetic,
on the contrary, the Eeason of Being is nothing else but
precisely the relation of Time itself.

§ 48. Reciprocity of Reasons.

Hypothetical judgments may be founded upon the
Principle of Sufficient Eeason in each of its significations, as

1 Kant, « Krit. d. r. Vern.," 1st edition, p. 202 j 5th edition, p. 248
(English translation by M. Muller, p. 177.)

180 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. VIII.

indeed every hypothetical judgment is ultimately based
upon that principle, and here the laws of hypothetical
conclusions always hold good: that is to say, it is right
to infer the existence of the consequence from the existence
of the reason, and the non-existence of the reason from
the non-existence of the consequence ; but it is wrong to
infer the non-existence of the consequence from the non-
existence of the reason, and the existence of the reason
from the existence of the consequence. Now it is singular
that in Geometry we are nevertheless nearly always able
to infer the existence of the reason from the existence
of the consequence, and the non-existence of the conse
quence from the non-existence of the reason. This pro
ceeds, as I have shown in § 37, from the fact that, as each
line determines the position of the rest, it is quite indiffe
rent which we begin at : that is, which we consider as the
reason, and which as the consequence. We may easily
convince ourselves of this by going through the whole of
the geometrical theorems. It is only where we have to do
not only with figures, i.e., with the positions of lines, but
with planes independently of figures, that we find it in
most cases impossible to infer the existence of the reason
from the existence of the consequence, or, in other words,
to convert the propositions by making the condition the
conditioned. The following theorem gives an instance of
this : Triangles whose lengths and bases are equal, include
equal areas. This cannot be converted as follows : Triangles
whose areas are equal, have likewise equal bases and
lengths ; for the lengths may stand in inverse proportion
to the bases.

In § 20 it has already been shown, that the law of
causality does not admit of reciprocity, since the effect
never can be the cause of its cause ; therefore the concep
tion of reciprocity is, in its right sense, inadmissible.
Reciprocity, according to the Principle of Sufficient Reason

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND RESULTS. 181

of knowing, would only be possible between equivalent
conceptions, since the spheres of these alone cover each
other mutually. Apart from these, it only gives rise to a
vicious circle.

§ 49. Necessity.

The Principle of Sufficient Reason in all its forms is the
sole principle and the sole support of all necessity. For
necessity has no other true and distinct meaning than that
of the infallibility of the consequence when the reason is
posited. Accordingly every necessity is conditioned : abso
lute, i.e., unconditioned, necessity therefore is a contradicto
in adjecto. For to be necessary can never mean anything
but to result from a given reason. By denning it as
" wlmt cannot not be," on the other hand, we give a mere
verbal definition, and screen ourselves behind an extremely
abstract conception to avoid giving a definition of the
thing. But it is not difficult to drive us from this refuge
by inquiring how the non-existence of anything can be
possible or even conceivable, since all existence is only
given empirically. It then comes out, that it is only
possible so far as some reason or other is posited or present,
from which it follows. To be necessary and to follow from
a given reason, are thus convertible conceptions, and may
always, as such, be substituted one for the other. The
conception of an " ABSOLUTELY necessary Being " which
finds so much favour with pseudo-philosophers, contains
therefore a contradiction : it annuls by the predicate
"absolute" (i.e., "unconditioned by anything else") the
only determination which makes the " necessary " con
ceivable. Here again we have an instance of the improper use
of abstract conceptions to play off a metaphysical artifice such
as those I have already pointed out in the conceptions "im
material substance" " cause in general" " absolute reason"

182 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. VIII.

&c. &c.1 I can never insist too much upon all abstract
conceptions being checked by perception.

There exists accordingly a fourfold necessity, in con
formity with the four forms of the Principle of Sufficient
Reason : —

1°. Logical necessity, according to the principle of sufficient
reason of knowing, in virtue of which, when once we have
admitted the premisses, we must absolutely admit the
conclusion.

2°. Physical necessity, according to the law of causality,
in virtue of which, as soon as the cause presents itself, the
effect must infallibly follow.

3°. Mathematical necessity, according to the principle of
sufficient reason of being, in virtue of which, every relation
which is stated in a true geometrical theorem, is as that
theorem affirms it to be, and every correct calculation
remains irrefutable.

4°. Moral necessity, in virtue of which, every human
being, every animal even, is compelled, as soon as a motive
presents itself, to do that which alone is in accordance
with the inborn and immutable character of the individual.
This action now follows its cause therefore as infallibly as
every other effect, though it is less easy here to predict
what that effect will be than in other cases, because of the
difficulty we have in fathoming and completely knowing
the individual empirical character and its allotted sphere
of knowledge, which is indeed a very different thing from
ascertaining the chemical properties of a neutral salt and
predicting its reaction. I must repeat this again and
again on account of the dunces and blockheads who, in
defiance of the unanimous authority of so many great

1 Compare "Die Welt a. W. u. V.,* vol. i. p. 551 et seq. of the 2nd
edition (i. p. 582 et seq. of 3rd edition) as to " immaterial substance,"
and § 52 of the present work as to " reason in general." (Editor's
note.)

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND RESULTS. 183

thinkers, still persist in audaciously maintaining the con
trary, for the benefit of their old woman's philosophy. I
am not a professor of philosophy, forsooth, that I need
bow to the folly of others.

§ 50. Series of Reasons and Consequences.

According to the law of causality, the condition is itself
always conditioned, and, moreover, conditioned in the same
way; therefore, there arises a series in infinitum a part e
ante. It is just the same with the Reason of Being in
Space : each relative space is a figure ; it has its limits,
by which it is connected with another relative space, and
which themselves condition the figure of this other, and so
on throughout all dimensions in infinitum. But when we
examine a single figure in itself, the series of reasons of
being has an end, because we start from a given relation,
just as the series of causes comes to an end if we stop at
pleasure at any particular cause. In Time, the series of
reasons of being has infinite extension both a parte ante,
and a parte post, since each moment is conditioned by a
preceding one, and necessarily gives rise to the following.
Time has therefore neither beginning nor end. On the
other hand, the series of reasons of knowledge — that
is, a series of judgments, each of which gives logical
truth to the other — always ends somewhere, i.e., either in
an empirical, a transcendental, or a metalogical truth. If
the reason of the major to which we have been led is an
empirical truth, and we still continue asking why, it is no
longer a reason of knowledge that is asked for, but a
cause — in other words, the series of reasons of knowing
passes over into the series of reasons of becoming. But if
we do the contrary, that is, if we allow the series of reasons
of becoming to pass over into the series of reasons of
knowing, in order to bring it to an end, this is never brought

184 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. VIII.

about by the nature of the thing, but always by a special
purpose : it is therefore a trick, and this is the sophism known
by the name of the Ontological Proof. For when a cause, at
which it seems desirable to stop short in order to make it
the first cause, has been reached by means of the Cosmo-
logical Proof, we find out that the law of causality is not
so easily brought to a standstill, and still persists in asking
why : so it is simply set aside and the principle of sufficient
reason of knowing, which from a distance resembles it,
is substituted in its stead; and thus a reason of know
ledge is given in the place of the cause which had been
asked for — a reason of knowledge derived from the concep
tion itself which has to be demonstrated, the reality of
which is therefore still problematical : and this reason, as
after all it is one, now has to figure as a cause. Of course
the conception itself has been previously arranged for this
purpose, and reality slightly covered with a few husks just
for decency's sake has been placed within it, so as to give
the delightful surprise of finding it there — as has been
shown in Section 7. On the other hand, if a chain of
j udgments ultimately rests upon a principle of transcen
dental or of metalogical truth, and we still continue to ask
why, we receive no answer at all, because the question has
no meaning, i.e., it does not know what kind of reason it
is asking for.

For the Principle of Sufficient Reason is the principle of
all explanation: to explain a thing means, to reduce its
given existence or connection to some form or other of
the Principle of Sufficient Reason, in accordance with which
form that existence or connection necessarily is that which
it is. The Principle of Sufficient Season itself, i.e., the
connection expressed by it in any of its forms, cannot
therefore be further explained; because there exists no
principle by which to explain the source of all explanation :
just as the eye is unable to see itself, though it sees every-

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND RESULTS. 185

thing else. There are of course series of motives, since
the resolve to attain an end becomes the motive for the
resolve to use a whole series of means ; still this series
invariably ends a parte priori in a representation belonging
to one of our two first classes, in which lies the motive
which originally had the power to set this individual will
in motion. The fact that it was able to do this, is a
datum for knowing the empirical character here given, but
it is impossible to answer the question why that particular
motive acts upon that particular character; because the
intelligible character lies outside Time and never becomes
an Object. Therefore the series of motives, as such, finds its
termination in some such final motive and, according to the
nature of its last link, passes into the series of causes, or
that of reasons of knowledge: that is to say, into the
former, when that last link is a real object ; into the
latter, when it is a mere conception.

§ 51. 'Each Science has for its Guiding Thread one of the
Forms of the Principle of Sufficient Reason in preference
to the others.

As the question why always demands a sufficient reason,
and as it is the connection of its notions according to the
principle of sufficient reason which distinguishes science
from a mere aggregate of notions, we have called that
why the parent of all science (§4). In each science,
moreover, we find one of the forms of that principle
predominating over the others as its guiding-thread.
Thus in pure Mathematics the reason of being is the
chief guiding-thread (although the exposition of the
proofs proceeds according to the reason of knowing only) ;
in applied Mathematics the law of causality appears
together with it, but in Physics, Chemistry, Geology, &c.,
that law entirely predominates. The principle of sufficient

186 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. VIII.

reason in knowing finds vigorous application throughout
all the sciences, for in all of them the particular is known
through the general ; but in Botany, Zoology, Mineralogy,
and other classifying sciences, it is the chief guide and
predominates absolutely. The law of motives (motiva
tion) is the chief guide in History, Politics, Pragmatic
Psychology, &c. &c., when we consider all motives and
maxims, whatever they may be, as data for explaining
actions — but when we make those motives and maxims the
object-matter of investigation from the point of view of
their value and origin, the law of motives becomes the
guide to Ethics. In my chief work will be found the
highest classification of the sciences according to this
principle.1

§ 52. Two principal Results.

I have endeavoured in this treatise to show that the
Principle of Sufficient Reason is a common expression for
four completely different relations, each of which is founded
upon a particular law given a priori (the principle of suffi
cient reason being a synthetical a priori principle). Now,
according to the principle of homogeneity, we are compelled
to assume that these four laws, discovered according to the
principle of specification, as they agree in being expressed
by one and the same term, must necessarily spring from
one and the same original quality of our whole cognitive
faculty as their common root, which we should accordingly
have to look upon as the innermost germ of all dependence,
relativeness, instability and limitation of the objects of our
consciousness — itself limited to Sensibility, Understanding,
E-eason, Subject and Object — or of that world, which the
divine Plato repeatedly degrades to the ael yiyvoptvov ptv

1 " Die Welt a. W. u. V.," vol. ii. ch. 12, p. 126 of the 2nd edition
(p. 139 of the 3rd edition).

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND BEST7LTS. 187

KCti arroXXviuerov, OVTUQ Se ov^iiroTE ov (ever arising and
perishing, but in fact never existing), the knowledge of
which is merely a £o£a per aiadi'iffewg a'Xoyov, and which
Christendom, with a correct instinct, calls temporal, after
that form of our principle (Time) which I have denned as
its simplest schema and the prototype of all limitation.
The general meaning of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
may, in the main, be brought back to this : that every
thing existing no matter when or where, exists ~by reason of
something else. Now, the Principle of Sufficient Eeason is
nevertheless a priori in all its forms : that is, it has its root
in our intellect, therefore it must not be applied to the
totality of existent things, the Universe, including that in
tellect in which it presents itself. For a world like this,
which presents itself in virtue of a priori forms, is just on
that account mere phenomenon ; consequently that which
holds good with reference to it as the result of these forms,
cannot be applied to the world itself, i.e. to the thing in
itself, representing itself in that world. Therefore we can
not say, " the world and all things in it exist by reason of
something else ; " and this proposition is precisely the Cos-
mological Proof.

If, by the present treatise, I have succeeded in deducing
the result just expressed, it seems to me that every specu
lative philosopher who founds a conclusion upon the Prin
ciple of Sufficient Eeason or indeed talks of a reason at all,
is bound to specify which kind of reason he means. One
might suppose that wherever there was any question of a
reason, this would be done as a matter of course, and that
all confusion would thus be impossible. Only too often,
however, do we still find either the terms reason and cause
confounded in indiscriminate use; or do we hear basis and
what is based, condition and what is conditioned, principia
and principiata talked about in quite a general way without
any nearer determination, perhaps because there is a secret

188 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. VIII.

consciousness that these conceptions are being used in an
unauthorized way. Thus even Kant speaks of the thing
in itself as the reason1 of the phenomenon, and also of a
ground of the possibility of all phenomena,2 of an intelligible
cause of phenomena, of an unknown ground of the possi
bility of the sensuous series in general, of a transcendental
object 3 as the ground of all phenomena and of the reason
why our sensibility should have this rather than all other
supreme conditions, and so on in several places. Now all
this does not seem to me to tally with those weighty, pro
found, nay immortal words of his,4 " the contingency 5 of
things is itself mere phenomenon, and can lead to no other
than the empirical regressus which determines phenomena."

That since Kant the conceptions reason and conse
quence, principium and principiatum, &c. &c., have been
and still are used in a yet more indefinite and even quite
transcendent sense, everyone must know who is acquainted
with the more recent works on philosophy.

The following is my objection against this promiscuous
employment of the word ground (reason) and, with it, of the
Principle of Sufficient Keason in general ; it is likewise the
second result, intimately connected with the first, which the
present treatise gives concerning its subject-matter proper.
The four laws of our cognitive faculty, of which the Prin-

1 Or ground.

a Kant, "Krit. d. r. Vern.," 1st edition, pp. 561, 562, 564; p. 590 of
the 5th edition. (Pp. 483 to 486 of the English translation by M.
Miiller.)

3 Ibid. p. 540 of 1st edition, and 641 of 5th edition. (P. 466 of
English translation.)

4 Ibid. p. 563 of the 1st and 591 of the 5th edition. (P. 485 of
English translation.)

5 Empirical contingency is meant, which, with Kant, signifies as much
as dependence upon other things. As to this, I refer my readers to my
censure in my " Critique of Kantian Philosophy," p. 524 of the 2nd,
and p. 552 of the 3rd edition.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND RESULTS. 189

ciple of Sufficient Eeason is the common expression, by
their common character as well as by the fact that all
Objects for the Subject are divided amongst them, proclaim
themselves to be posited by one and the same primary
quality and inner peculiarity of our knowing faculty, which
faculty manifests itself as Sensibility, Understanding, and
Reason. Therefore, even if we imagined it to be possible
for a new Fifth Class of Objects to come about, we should
in that case likewise have to assume that the Principle of
Sufficient Reason would appear in this class also under a
different form. Notwithstanding all this, we still have no
right to talk of an absolute reason (ground), nor does a
reason in general, any more than a triangle in general, exist
otherwise than as a conception derived by means of discur
sive reflection, nor is this conception, as a representation
drawn from other representations, anything more than a
means of thinking several things in one. Now, just as
every triangle must be either acute-angled, right-angled,
or obtuse-angled, and either equilateral, isosceles or scalene,
so also must every reason belong to one or other of the
four possible kinds of reasons I have pointed out. More
over, since we have only four well-distinguished Classes o£
Objects, every reason must also belong to one or other of
these four, and no further Class being possible, Reason
itself is forced to rank it within them ; for as soon as we
employ a reason, we presuppose the Four Classes as well
as the faculty of representing (i.e. the whole world), and
must hold ourselves within these bounds, never transcend
ing them. Should others, however, see this in a different
light and opine that a reason in general is anything but a
conception, derived from the four kinds of reasons, which
expresses what they all have in common, we might revive
the controversy of the Realists and Nominalists, and then
I should side with the latter.

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ON THE WILL IN NATURE.

AN ACCOUNT OF THE COEEOBOEATIONS

RECEIVED BY THE ATJTHOB'S

PHILOSOPHY

SINCE ITS FIEST APPEARANCE

FROM THE EMPIRICAL SCIENCES.

BY

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.

Translated from the Fourth Edition published by JCLIUS FRAUENSTADT.

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AESCTI.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

TO my great joy I have lived to revise even this little
work, after a lapse of nineteen years, and that joy is
enhanced by the special importance of this treatise for my
philosophy. For, starting from the purely empirical, from
the observations of unbiassed physical investigators —
themselves following the clue of their own special sciences
— I here immediately arrive at the very kernel of my Meta-
physic ; I establish its points of contact with the physical
sciences and thus corroborate my fundamental dogma, in
a sense, as the arithmetician proves a sum : for by this I
not only confirm it more closely and specially, but even
make it more clearly, easily, and rightly understood than
anywhere else.

The improvements in this new edition are confined almost
entirely to the Additions ; for scarcely anything that is
worth mentioning in the First Edition has been left out,
while I have inserted many and, in some cases, important
new passages.

But, even in a general sense, it may be looked upon as a
good sign, that a new edition of the present treatise should
have been found necessary ; since it shows that there is an
interest in serious philosophy and confirms the fact that
the necessity for real progress in this direction is now more
strongly felt than ever. This is based upon two circum
stances. The first is the unparalleled zeal and activity
displayed in every branch of Natural Science which, as

o

194 THE WILL IN NATURE.

this pursuit is mostly in the hands of people who have
learned nothing else, threatens to lead to a gross, stupid
Materialism, the more immediately offensive side of which
is less the moral bestiality of its ultimate results, than the
incredible absurdity of its first principles ; for by it even
yital force is denied, and organic Nature is degraded to a
mere chance play of chemical forces.1 These knights of
the crucible and retort should be made to understand, that
the mere study of Chemistry qualifies a man to become an
apothecary, but not a philosopher. Certain other like-
minded investigators of Nature, too, must be taught, that
a man may be an accomplished zoologist and have the
sixty species of monkeys at his fingers' ends, yet on the
whole be an ignoramus to be classed with the vulgar, if he
has learnt nothing else, save perhaps his school-catechism.
But in our time this frequently happens. Men set them
selves up for enlighteners of mankind, who have studied
Chemistry, or Physics, or Mineralogy and nothing else
under the sun ; to this they add their only knowledge of
any other kind, that is to say, the little they may remember
of the doctrines of the school-catechism, and when they
find that these two elements will not harmonize, they
straightway turn scoffers at religion and soon become
shallow and absurd materialists.2 They may perhaps have
heard at college of the existence of a Plato and an Aristotle,
of a Locke, and especially of a Kant ; but as these folk
never handled crucibles and retorts or even stuffed a

1 And this infatuation has reached sucli a point, that people seriously
imagine themselves to have found the key to the mystery of the essence
and existence of this wonderful and mysterious world in wretched
chemical affinities! Compared with this illusion of our physiological
chemists, that of the alchymists who sought after the philosopher's stone,
and only hoped to find out the secret of making gold, was indeed a mere
trifle. [Add. to 3rd ed.]

2 " Aut (xtfechisnws, Q&t materials mus," is their watchword. [Add. to
3rd ed.]

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 195

monkey, they do not esteem them worthy of further acquain
tance. They prefer calmly to toss out of the window the
intellectual labour of two thousand years and treat the
public to a philosophy concocted out of their own rich
mental resources, on the basis of the catechism on the one
hand, and on that of crucibles and retorts or the catalogue
of monkeys on the other. They ought to be told in plain
language that they are ignoramuses, who have much to
learn before they can be allowed to have any voice in the
matter. Everyone, in fact, who dogmatizes at random,
with the naive realism of a child on such arguments as
G-od, the soul, the world's origin, atoms, &c. &c. &c., as if
the Critique of Pure Reason had been written in the moon
and no copy had found its way to our planet — is simply one
of the vulgar. Send him into the servants' hall, where his
wisdom will best find a market.1

The other circumstance which calls for a real progress
in philosophy, is the steady growth of unbelief in the face
of all the hypocritical dissembling and the outward con
formity to the Church. This unbelief necessarily and un
avoidably goes hand in hand with the growing expansion
of empirical and historical knowledge. It threatens to
destroy not only the form, but even the spirit of Christianity
(a spirit which has a much wider reach than Christianity
itself), and to deliver up mankind to moral materialism — a
thing even more dangerous than the chemical materialism
already mentioned. And nothing plays more into the
hands of this unbelief, than the Tartuffianism de rigueur

1 There too he will meet with people who fling about words of foreign
origin, which they have caught up without understanding them, just as
readily as he does himself, when he talks about "Idealism" without
knowing what it means, mostly therefore using the word instead of
Spiritualism (which being Eealism, is the opposite to Idealism). Hundreds
of examples of this kind besides other quid pro quos are to be found
in books, and critical periodicals. [Add. to 3rd ed.]

196 THE WILL IN NATTJKE.

impudently flaunting itself everywhere just now, whose
clumsy disciples, fee in hand, hold forth with such unction
and emphasis, that their voices penetrate even into learned,
critical reviews issued by Academies and Universities, and
into physiological as well as philosophical books, where
however, being quite in their wrong place, they only damage
their own cause by rousing indignation.1 Under such cir
cumstances as these, it is gratifying to see the public betray
an interest in philosophy.

I have nevertheless one sad piece of news to communi
cate to our professors of philosophy. Their Caspar Hauser
(according to Dorguth) whom they had so carefully
secreted, so securely walled up for nearly forty years, that
no sound could betray his existence to the world — their
Caspar Hauser — I say, has escaped ! He has escaped and
is running about in the world ; — some even say he is
a prince. In plain language, the misfortune they feared
more than anything has come to pass after all. In spite of
their having done their best to prevent it for more than a
generation by acting with united force, with rare constancy,
secreting and ignoring to a degree that is without example,
my books are beginning and henceforth will continue to be
read. Legor et legar : there is no help for it. This is
really dreadful and most inopportune ; nay, it is a positive
fatality, not to say calamity. Is this the recompense for
all their faithful, snug secrecy; for having held so firmly
and unitedly together ? Poor time-servers ! What becomes
of Horace's assurance : —

" Est et fideli tuta silentio
Merces, ? "

For verily they have not been deficient in faithful reticence ;
rather do they excel in this quality wherever they scent

1 They ought everywhere to be shown that their belief is not believed
in. [Add. to 3rd ed.]

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 197

merit. And, after all, it is no doubt the cleverest artifice ;
for what no one knows, is as though it did not exist.
Whether the merces will remain quite so tuta, seems rather
doubtful — unless we are to take merces in a lad sense ; and
for this the support of many a classical authority might
certainly be found. These gentlemen had seen quite rightly
that the only means to be used against my writings, was
to secrete them from the public by maintaining profound
silence concerning them, while they kept up a loud noise at
the birth of every misshapen offspring of professorial
philosophy ; as the voice of the new-born Zeus was drowned
in days of yore by the clashing of the cymbals of the
Corybantes. But this expedient is now used up ; the
secret is out — the public has discovered me. The rage of
our professors of philosophy at this is great, but powerless ;
for their only effective resource, so long successfully em
ployed, being exhausted, no snarling can avail any longer
against my influence, and in vain do they now take this, or
that, or the other attitude. They have certainly succeeded,
so far as the generation which was properly speaking con
temporaneous with my philosophy, went to the grave in
ignorance of it. But this was a mere postponement, and
Time has kept its word, as it always does.

Now there are two reasons why these gentlemen " in
the philosophical trade" — as they call themselves with
incredible naivete — hate my philosophy. The first of
them is, that my writings spoil the taste of the public for
tissues of empty phrases, for accumulations of unmeaning
words piled one upon another, for hollow, superficial,
brain-racking twaddle, for Christian dogmatics under the
disguise of the most wearisome Metaphysics, for sys
tematized Philistinism of the flattest kind made to repre
sent Ethics and even accompanied by instructions for
card-playing and dancing — in short, they unfit my readers
for the whole method of philosophising a- la vwille

198 THE WILL IN NATTJRE.

has scared so many for ever from the puysnit of
philosophy.

The second reason is, that our gentlemen " in the trade "
are absolutely bound in conscience not to let my philosophy
pass and are therefore debarred from using it for the
benefit of " the trade ; " — and this they even heartily regret ;
for my abundance might have been admirably turned to
account for the benefit of their own needy poverty. But
even if it contained the greatest hoards of human wisdom
ever unearthed, my doctrine could never find favour with
them either now or in the future ; for it is absolutely
wanting in all Speculative Theology and Eational Psycho
logy, and these, just these, are the very breath of life to
these gentlemen, the sine qua non of their existence. For
they are anxious before all things in heaven and on earth,
to hold their official appointments, and these appointments
demand before all things in heaven and on earth a Specu
lative Theology and a Eational Psychology : extra Twee non
datur solus. Theology there must and shall be, no matter
whence it come ; Moses and the Prophets must be made
out to be in the right: this is the highest principle in
philosophy ; and there must be Kational Psychology to
boot, as is proper. Now there is nothing of the sort to be
found either in Kant's philosophy or in mine. For, as
we all know, the most cogent theological argumentation
shivers to atoms like a glass thrown at a wall, when it is
brought into contact with Kant's Critique of all Specula
tive Theology, and under his hands not a shred remains
entire of the whole tissue of Eational Psychology ! As to
myself, being the bold continuer of Kant's philosophy, I
have entirely done away with all Speculative Theology and
all Eational Psychology, as is only consistent and honest.1
On the other hand, the task incumbent upon University

1 For revelation goes for nothing in philosophy ; therefore a philo
sopher must before all things be an unbeliever. [Add. to 3rd. ed.].

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 199

Philosophy is at "bottom this : to set forth the chief funda
mental truths belonging to the Catechism under the veil
of some very abstract, abstruse and difficult, therefore
painfully wearisome formulas and sentences ; wherefore,
however confused, intricate, strange and eccentric the
matter may seem at first sight, these truths invariably
reveal themselves as its kernel. This proceeding may be
useful, though to me it is unknown. All I know is, that
philosophy, i.e. the search after truth — I mean the truth
KCIT e^o^v, by which the most sublime and important dis
closures, more precious than anything else to the human
race, are understood — will never advance a step, nay, an
inch, by means of such manoeuvring, by which its course
is on the contrary impeded ; therefore I found out long
ago that University philosophy is the enemy of all genuine
philosophy. Now, this being the state of the case, when a
really honest philosophy arises, which seriously has truth
for its sole aim, must not these gentlemen " of the philo
sophical trade " feel as might stage-knights in paste-board
armour, were a knight suddenly to appear in the midst of
them clad in real armour, who made the stage-floor creak
under his ponderous tread ? Such philosophy as this must
therefore be bad and false and consequently places these
gentlemen "of the trade " under the painful obligation of
playing the part of him who, in order to appear what he
is not, cannot allow others to pass for what they really are.
Out of all this however there unrolls itself the amusing
spectacle we enjoy, when these gentlemen, now that ignoring
has unfortunately come to an end, after forty years, at
last begin to measure me by their own puny standard and
pass judgment upon me from the heights of their wisdom,
as though they were amply qualified to do so by their
office ; but they are most amusing of all when they assume
airs of superiority towards me.

Their abhorrence of Kant, though less op'enly expressed,

200 THE WILL IN NATURE.

is scarcely less great than their hatred of me ; precisely
because all speculative Theology and all Rational Psycho
logy — the bread-winners of these gentlemen — have been
undermined, not to say irrevocably ruined, by him in the
eyes of all serious thinkers. What ! Not hate him ? him,
who has made their " trade in philosophy " so difficult to
them, that they hardly see how to pull through honourably !
So Kant and I are accordingly both bad, and these gentle
men quite overlook us. For nearly forty years they have
not deigned to cast a glance upon me, and now they look
down condescendingly upon Kant from the heights of their
wisdom, smiling in pity at his errors. This policy is both
very wise and very profitable ; since they are thus able to
hold forth at their ease volume after volume upon God
and the soul, as if these were personalities with whom
they were intimately acquainted, and to discourse upon the
relation in which the former stands to the world and the
latter to the body, just as if there had never been such a
thing as a Critique of Pure Eeasoii. When once the
Critique of Pure Reason is done away with, all will go on
splendidly ! Now it is for this end that they have been
endeavouring for many years quietly and gradually to set
Kant aside, to make him obsolete, nay, to turn up their
noses at him, and one being encouraged by the other in
this, they are becoming bolder every day.1 They have no
opposition to fear from their own colleagues, since they all
have the same aims and the same mission and all together
form a numerous coterie, the brilliant members of which,
cor am populo, bow and scrape to each other on all sides.
Thus by degrees things have come to such a point, that
the wretchedest compilers of manuals have the presumption
to treat Kant's grand, immortal discoveries as antiquated
errors, nay, calmly to set them aside with the most

1 One always says the other is right, so that the public in its simplicity
at last imagines them really to be right. [Add. to 3rd ed.j

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 201

ludicrous arrogance and most impudent dicta of their own,
which they nevertheless lay down under the disguise of
argumentation, because they know they may count upon a
credulous public, to whom Kant's writings are not known,1
And this is what happens to Kant on the part of writers,
whose total incapacity strikes us in every page, not to
say every line, we read of their unmeaning, stupefying
verbiage ! Were this to go on much longer, Kant would
present the spectacle of the dead lion being kicked by the
donkey. Even in France there is no lack of fellow- workers
inspired by a similar orthodoxy, who are labouring towards
the same end. A certain M. Barthelemy de St. Hilaire,
for instance, in a lecture delivered in the Academie des
Sciences Morales in April, 1850, has presumed to criticize
Kant with an air of condescension and to use most im
proper language in speaking of him; luckily however in
such a way, that no one could fail to see the underlying
purpose.2

Now others among our German "traders in philosophy"
again try to get rid of the obnoxious Kant in a different
way : instead of attacking his philosophy point-blank, they
rather seek to undermine the foundations on which it is
built. These people however are so utterly forsaken by all
the gods and by all power of judgment, that they attack
a priori truths : that is to say, truths as old as the human
understanding, nay, which constitute that understanding

1 Here it is especially Ernst Reinhold's "System of Metaphysics"
(3rd edition, 1854) that I have in my eye. In my " Parerga " I have
explained how it comes, that brain-perverting books like this go through
several editions. See "Parerga," vol. i. p. 171 (2nd edition, vol. i.
p. 194).

2 Nevertheless, by Zeus, all such gentlemen, in France as well as
Germany, should be taught that Philosophy has a different mission from
that of playing into the hands of the clergy. We must let them clearly
see before all things that we have no faith in their faith — from this
follows what we think of them, [Add. to 3rd ed.]

202 THE WILL IN NATURE.

itself, and which it is therefore impossible to contradict
without declaring war against that understanding also.
So great however is the courage of these gentlemen. I am
sorry to say I know of three,1 and I am afraid there are a
good many more at work at this undermining process,
who have the incredible presumption to maintain the a
posteriori origin of Space as a consequence, a mere rela
tion, of the objects within it ; for they assert that Space
and Time are of empirical origin and attached to those
bodies, so that [according to them] Space first arises
through our perception of the juxtaposition of bodies and
Time likewise through our perception of the succession of
changes (sancta simplicitas ! as if the words " collateral "
and " successive " would have any sense for us without the
antecedent intuitions of Space and of Time to give them a
meaning) ; consequently, that if there were no bodies, there
would be no Space, therefore if they disappeared Space
also must lapse, and that if all changes were to stop, Time
also would stop.2

And such stuff as this is gravely taught fifty years after
Kant's death ! The aim of it is, as we know, to undermine
Kantian philosophy, and certainly if these propositions
were true, one stroke would suffice to overthrow it. For-

1 (a) Eosenkranz, "Meine Keform der Hegelschen Philosophie," 1852,
especially p. 41, in a pompous, dictatorial tone : " I have explicitly said,
that Space and Time would not exist if Matter did not exist. JEther
spread out within itself first constitutes real Space, and the movement
of this sether and consequent real genesis of everything individual and
separate, constitutes real Time." (6) L. Noaok, "Die Theologie als
Keligionsphilosophie," 1853, pp. 8, 9. (c) V. Keuchlin-Meldegg.
Two reviews of Oersted's " Geist in der Natur" in the Heidelberg
Annals, Nov.-Dec., 1850, and May-June, 1854.

2 Time is the condition of the possibility of succession, which could
neither take place, nor be understood by us and expressed in words,
without Time. And Space is likewise the condition of the possibility of
juxtaposition, and Transcendental ^Esthetic is the proof that these con
ditions have their seat in the constitution of our head. [Add. to 3rd e(L]

PEEFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 203

innately however these assertions are of a kind which is
met by derision rather than by serious refutation. For, in
them, the question is one of heresy, not so much against
Kantian philosophy, as against common sense ; and they
are not so much an attack upon any particular philoso
phical dogma, as upon an a priori truth which, as such,
constitutes human understanding itself, and therefore
must be instantaneously evident to every one who is in his
senses, just as much as that 2x2 = 4. Fetch me a peasant
from the plough ; make the question intelligible to him ;
and he will tell you, that even if all things in Heaven and
on Earth were to vanish, Space would nevertheless remain,
and that if all changes in Heaven and on Earth were to
cease, Time would nevertheless flow on. Compared with
German pseudo-philosophers like these, how estimable
does a man like the French physicist Pouillet appear, who,
though he never troubles his head about Metaphysics, is
careful to incorporate two long paragraphs, one on VEspace,
the other on le Temps, in the first chapter of his well-
known Manual, on which public instruction in France is
based, where he shows that if all Matter were annihi
lated, Space would still remain, and that Space is infinite ;
and that if all changes ceased, Time would still pursue its
course without end. Now here he does not appeal, as in
all other cases, to experience, because in this case expe
rience is not possible ; yet he speaks with apodeictic cer
tainty. For, as a physicist, professing a science which is
absolutely immanent — i.e. limited to the reality that is
empirically given — it never comes into his head to inquire
whence he knows all this. It did come into Kant's head,
and it was this very problem, clothed by him in the severe
form of an inquiry as to the possibility of synthetical a
priori judgments, that became the starting-point and the
corner-stone of his immortal discoveries, or in other words,
of Transcendental Philosophy which, precisely by answering

204 THE WILL IN NATURE.

this question and others related to it, shows wh&t is the
nature of that empirical reality itself.1

And seventy years after the Critique of Pure Reason
had appeared and filled the world with its fame, these
gentlemen dare to serve up such gross absurdities, which
were done away with long ago, and to return to former
barbarism. If Kant were to come back and see all this
mischief, he would feel like Moses on returning from
Mount Sinai, when he found his people worshipping the
golden calf, and dashed the Tables to pieces in his anger.
But if Kant were to take things as tragically as Moses, I
should console him with the words of Jesus Sirach : 2 " He
that telleth a tale to a fool speaketh to one in a slumber ;

1 In the Scholium to the eighth of the definitions he has placed at the
top of his " Principia," Newton quite rightly distinguishes absolute, that
is, empty, from relative, or filled Time, and likewise absolute from relative
Space. He says, p. 11 : Tempus, spatium, locum, motum, ut omnibus
notissima, non definio. Notandum tamen quod VULGUS (that is, professors
like those I have been mentioning) quantitates hasce non aliter quam ex
relatione ad sensibilia concipiat. Et inde oriuntur praejudicia quacdam,
quibus tollendis convenit easdem in absolutas et rclativas, veras et ap-
parentes, mathematical et vulgar es distingui. And again (p. 12):

I. Tempus absolutum, verum et mathematicum, in se et natura ma
sine relatione ad externum quodvis, aequabiliter fluit, alioque nomine
dicitur Duratio: relativwn, apparens et vulgare est sensibilis et extem-a
quaevis Durationis per motum mensura (seu accurata seu inaequabilis]
qud vulgus vice veri temporis utitur ; ut Hora, Dies, Mensis, Annus.

II. Spatium absolutum, natura sua sine relatione ad externum quod-
vis, semper manet similare et immobile: relativum est spatii hujus men-
sura seu dimensio quaelibet mobilis, quae a sensibus nostris per situm
suum ad corpora definitur, et a vulgo pro spatio immobili usurpatur :
uti dimensio spatii subterranei} acrei vel coelestis definita per situm suum
ad terram.

But even Newton never dreamt of asking how we know these two
infinite entities, Space and Time ; since, as he here impresses on us, they
do not fall within the range of the senses ; and how we know them more
over so intimately, that we are able to indicate their whole nature and
rule down to the minutest detail. [Add. to 3rd ed.]

2 Bcclesiasticus xxii. 8.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 205

when lie hath told his tale, he will say, 'What is the
matter?'" For that diamond in Kant's crown, Transcen
dental ^Esthetic, never has existed for these gentlemen —
it is tacitly set aside, as non-avenue. I wonder what they
think Nature means by producing the rarest of all her
works, a great mind, one among so many hundreds of mil
lions, if the worshipful company of numskulls are to be
able at their pleasure and by their mere counter-assertion
to annul the weightiest doctrines emanating from that
mind, let alone to treat them with disregard and do as if
they did not exist.

But this degenerate, barbarous state of philosophy which,
in the present day, emboldens every tyro to hold forth at
random upon subjects that have puzzled the greatest
minds, is precisely a consequence still remaining of the
impunity with which — thanks to the connivance of our pro
fessors of philosophy — that audacious scribbler, Hegel, has
been allowed to flood the market with his monstrous
vagaries and so to pass for the greatest of all philosophers
for the last thirty years in Germany. Every one of course
now thinks himself entitled to serve up confidently any
thing that may happen to come into his sparrow's
brain.

Therefore, as I have said, the gentlemen of the 'philo
sophical trade ' are anxious before all things to obliterate
Kant's philosophy, in order to be able to return to the
muddy canal of the old dogmatism and to talk at random
to their heart's content upon the favourite subjects which
are specially recommended to them : just as if nothing had
happened and neither a Kant nor a Critical Philosophy
had ever come into the world.1 The affected veneration
for, and laudation of, Leibnitz too, which has been showing
itself everywhere for some years, proceed from the same

1 For Kant has disclosed the dreadful truth, that philosophy must h<?
quite a different thing from Jewish mythology. [A.dd to 3rd ed.]

206 THE WILL IN NATURE.

source. They like to place him in a line with, nay above,
Kant, having at times the assurance to call him the
greatest of all G-erman philosophers. Now, compared with
Kant, Leibnitz is a poor rushlight. Kant is a master
mind, to whom mankind is indebted for the discovery of
never-to-be-forgotten truths. One of his chief merits is
precisely, to have delivered us from Leibnitz and his subtle
ties : from pre-established harmonies, monads and identitas
indiscernibilium. Kant has made philosophy serious and I
am keeping it so. That these gentlemen should think dif
ferently is easily explained ; for has not Leibnitz a central
Monad and a Theodicee also, with which to deck it out ?
Now this is quite to the taste of my gentlemen ' of the
philosophical trade.' It does not stand in the way of
earning a honest livelihood ; it allows one to subsist ;
whereas such a thing as Kant's " Critique of all Speculative
Theology," makes one's hair stand on end. Kant is con
sequently a wrong-headed man and one to be set aside.
Vivat Leibnitz ! Vivat the ' philosophical trade ! ' Vivat
old woman's philosophy ! These gentlemen really imagine
that, according to the standard of their own petty aims, they
can obscure what is good, disparage what is great, and
accredit what is false. They may perhaps succeed in
doing so for a time, but certainly not in the long run, nor
with impunity. Notwithstanding all their machinations
and spiteful ignoring of me for forty years, have not
even I at last made my way ? During those forty years
however I have learnt to appreciate Chamfort's words :
"En examinant la ligue des sots contre les gens d* esprit, on
croirait voir une conspiration de valets pour ecarter les
maitres"

We do not care to have much to do with those whom we
dislike. One of the consequences of this antipathy for
Kant, therefore, has been an incredible ignorance of his
doctrines. I can scarcely believe my eyes at times, when

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 207

I see certain proofs of this ignorance, and must here sup
port my assertion by a few examples. First let me present
a very singular specimen, though it is now some years old.
In Professor Michelet's " Anthropology and Psychology "
(p. 444), he states Kant's Categorical Imperative in the
following words : " thou must, for thou canst " (du sollst,
denn du Jcannsf). This cannot be a lapsus calami, for he
again states it in the same words in his " History of the
Development of Modern German Philosophy" (p. 38), *
published three years later. Letting alone the fact that he
appears to have studied Kantian philosophy in Schiller's
epigrams, he has thus turned the thing upside down, and
expressed exactly the opposite of Kant's argument ; evidently
without having the slightest inkling of what Kant meant
by that postulate of Freedom on the basis of his Categorical
Imperative. None of Professor Michelet's colleagues, to
my knowledge, have pointed out this mistake, but " hanc
veniam damns, petimusque vicissim" — Another more recent
instance. The above mentioned reviewer of Oersted's book
(see note 1 (c), p. 202), to whose title the present treatise un
fortunately had to stand godfather, comes in that work on
the sentence that " bodies are spaces filled with force "
(krafterfiilUe Edume). This is new to him; so without
the faintest suspicion that he has to do with a far-famed
Kantian dogma, and taking this for a paradoxical opinion
of Oersted's, he attacks it and argues against it bravely,
persistently and repeatedly in both his reviews, which ap
peared at an interval of three years from one another,
using arguments like these : " Force cannot fill Space without
something substantial, Matter ; " then again three years
later : " Force in Space does not yet constitute any thing.

1 Another instance of Michelet's ignorance is to be frund io Schopen
hauer's posthumous writings, see " Aus Arthur Schopenhauer's hand-
schriftlichem Nachlass," Leipzig, A. Brockhaus, 1864, p. 327. [Editor's
note.]

208 THE WILL IN NATURE.

For Force to fill Space, there must be Substance, Matter. A
mere force cap never fill. Matter must be there for it to
fill." — Bravo ! my cobbler would use just such arguments
as these.1 — When I see specimina eruditionis of this sort, I
begin to have my misgivings whether I did not do the man
injustice by naming him among those who endeavour to
undermine Kant ; but in this, to be sure, I had in view his
assertions that " Space is but the relation, the juxtaposition
of things," 2 and that " Space is a relation in which things
stand, a juxtaposition of things. This juxtaposition ceases
to be a conception as soon as the conception of Matter
ceases." 3 For he might possibly have penned these sen
tences in sheer innocence, since he may have known no more
of the " Transcendental Aesthetic " than of the " Meta
physical First Principles of Natural Science ; " though to
be sure, this would be rather extraordinary for a professor of
philosophy. Now-a-days however we must not be surprised
at anything. For all knowledge of Critical Philosophy has
died out, in spite of its being the latest true philosophy that
has appeared, and a doctrine withal, that has made a revolu
tion and epoch in human knowledge and thought. Now
therefore, since it has overthrown all previous systems, and
since the knowledge of it has died out, philosophising no
longer proceeds on the basis of any of the doctrines pro
pounded by the great minds of the past, but becomes a
mere random untutored process, having an ordinary educa
tion and the catechism for its foundation. Now that I have
startled them however, our professors may perhaps take to
studying Kant's works again. Still Lichtenberg says :

1 The same reviewer (Von Reuchlin-Meldegg) when he expounds the
doctrines of the philosophers concerning God in the August number of
the Heidelberg Annals (1855), p. 579, says: "In Kant, God is a thing
in- itself which cannot be known." lu his review of Frauenstadt's
" Letters " in the Heidelberg Annals of May and June (1855) he says that
there is no knowledge a priori. [Add. to 3rd ed.]

2 C. 1. p. 899. 8 p. 908.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 209

" Past a certain age, I think it as impossible to learn
Kantian Philosophy as to learn rope-dancing."

I should certainly not have condescended to record the
sins of these sinners had not the interests of truth
required that I should do so, in order to show the state
of degradation at which German Philosophy has arrived
fifty years after Kant's death in consequence of the
machinations of the gentlemen ' of the trade/ and also to
show what would result, if these puny minds, who know
nothing but their own ends, were to be suffered without
hindrance to check the influence of the great geniuses who
have illumined the world. I cannot look on at this in
silence ; it is rather a case to which G-othe's exhortation
applies :

" Du Kraftiger, sei nicht so still,

Wenn auch sich Andre scheuen :
Wer den Teufel erschreeken will,

Der muss laut schreien."

Dr. Martin Luther thought so also.

Hatred against Kant, hatred against me, hatred against
truth, all however in majorem Dei gloriam, is what inspires
these worthies who live on philosophy. Who can be so
blind as not to see that University philosophy is the enemy
of all true, serious philosophy, whose progress it feels
bound to withstand ? For a philosophy which deserves the
name, is pure service of truth, therefore the most sub
lime of all human endeavours ; but, as such, it is not
adapted for a trade. Least of all can it have its seat in
Universities, where a theological Faculty predominates
and things are irrevocably decided beforehand ere philo
sophy comes to them. With Scholasticism, from which
University philosophy descends, it was quite a different
thing. Scholasticism was avowedly the ancilla theologies,
so that here the name corresponded to the thing. Our
University philosophy of to-day, on the contrary, disclaims

210 THE WILL IN NATURE.

the connection, and professes independent research ; yet in
reality it is only the ancilla disguised, and it is intended no
less than its predecessor to be the servant of Theology.
Thus genuine, sincerely meant philosophy has an adversary
under the guise of an ally in University philosophy. There
fore I said long ago, that nothing would be of greater bene
fit to philosophy than for it to cease altogether to be taught
at Universities ; and if at that time I still admitted the
propriety of a brief, quite succinct course of History of
Philosophy accompanying Logic — which undoubtedly ought
to be taught at Universities — I have since withdrawn that
hasty concession in consequence of the following disclosure
made to us in the Gottingischen Gelehrten Anzeigen of the
1st January, 1853, p. 8, by the Ordinarius loci (one who
writes History of Philosophy in thick volumes) : " It could
not be mistaken that Kant's doctrine is ordinary Theism,
and that it has contributed little or nothing towards trans
forming the current views on G-od and his relation to the
world." — If this is the state of the case, Universities are in
my opinion no longer the right place even for teaching
History of Philosophy. There designs and intentions reign
paramount. I had indeed long ago begun to suspect, that
History of Philosophy was taught at our Universities in
the same spirit and with the same granum sails as Philo
sophy itself, and it needed but very little to make my sus
picions certainty. Accordingly it is my wish to see both
Philosophy and its History disappear from the lecture-list,
because I desire to rescue them from the tender mercies of
our court-councillors.1 But far be it from me, to wish to see
our professors of philosophy removed from their thriving
business at our Universities. On the contrary, what I
should like would be, to see them promoted three degrees
higher in dignity and raised to the highest faculty, as pro-

1 Hofrathe. A title of honour often given for literary and scientific
merit in Germany, and common among University professors. [Tr.'s note.]

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 211

fessors of Theology. For at the bottom they have really
been this for some time already, and have served quite
long enough as volunteers.

Meanwhile my honest and kindly advice to the young
generation is, not to waste any time with University
philosophy, but to study Kant's works and my own
instead. I promise them that there they will learn some
thing substantial, that will bring light and order into their
brains : so far at least as they may be capable of receiving
them. It is not good to crowd round a wretched farthing
rushlight when brilliant torches are close by ; still less
to run after will o' the wisps. Above all, my truth-
seeking young friends, beware of letting our professors
tell you what is contained in the Critique of Pure Reason.
Bead it yourselves, and you will find in it something
very different from what they deem it advisable for you
to know. — In our time a great deal too much study is
generally devoted to the History of Philosophy ; for this
study, being adapted by its very nature to substitute know
ledge for reflection, is just now cultivated downright with
a view to making philosophy consist in its own history. It
is not only of doubtful necessity, but even of questionable
profit, to acquire a superficial half-knowledge of the
opinions and systems of all the philosophers who have
taught for 2,500 years ; yet what more does the most
honest history of philosophy give ? A real knowledge of
philosophers can only be acquired from their own works,
and not from the distorted image of their doctrines as it is
found in the commonplace head.1 But it is really urgent
that order should be brought into our heads by some sort
of philosophy, and that we should at the same time learn

1 '" Potius de rebus ipsis judicare debemus, qiiam pro magno habere,
de hominibus quid quisque senserit scire" says St. Augustine (" De civ.
Dei" 1. 19, c. 3). — Under the present mode of proceeding, however, the
philosophical lecture-room becomes a sort of rag-fair for old worn-out,

212 THE WILL IN NATURE.

to look at the world with a really unbiassed ere. Now
no philosophy is so near to us, both as regards time and
language, as that of Kant, and it is at the same time a
philosophy, compared with which all those which went
before are superficial. On this account it is unhesita
tingly to be preferred to all others.

But I perceive that the news of Caspar Hauser's escape
has already spread among our professors of philosophy ;
for I see that some of them have already given vent to
their feelings in bitter and venomous abuse of me in
various periodicals, making up by falsehoods for their
deficiency of wit.1 Nevertheless I do not complain of all
this, because I am rejoiced at the cause and amused by
the effect of it, as illustrative of Grothe's verse :

" Es will der Spitz aus unserm Stall

Uns immerfort begleiten :
Doch seines Bellens lauter Schall
Beweist nur, dass wir reiten."

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.
FRANKFURT AM MEIN,
August, 1854.

cast-off opinions, which are brought there every six months to be aired
and beaten. [Add. to 3rd ed.]

1 I take this opportunity urgently to request that the public will not
believe unconditionally any accounts of what I am supposed to have said,
even when they are given as quotations ; but will first verify the existence
of these quotations in my works. In this way many a falsehood will be
detected, which can however only be stamped as a direct forgery when
accompanied by quotation marks (" "). [Add. to 3rd ed.]

EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE THIRD
EDITION.

SCHOPENHAUER has left an interleaved copy of his
work " On the Will in Nature," as well as of his
other writings, and has inserted in it those Corrections
and Additions which he intended to use for the Third
Edition. I have therefore included them in this Third
Edition.

The Corrections chiefly concern the style, here and
there an expression being changed, and a word inserted or
omitted. The Additions, on the contrary, concern the
matter of the book ; they amplify it more or less consider
ably, and are tolerably numerous.

The Corrections are incorporated by Schopenhauer with
the text ; whereas the Additions are designated by him ad
" Notes " (Anmerkungen) to be placed at the foot of the
pages with the words, " added to the third edition."
They will therefore be found at the places indicated by
him for them, as foot-notes ; and thus the reader will be
enabled easily to discern how much has been added in this
edition.

As to the value of the present work, Schopenhauer has
expressed himself as follows in the " World as Will and
Representation : "

" It would be a great mistake to consider the foreign
deliverances with which I have connected my own exposi
tion there (in the work " On the Will in Nature ") as the
real substance and argument of that work which, though

214 THE WILL IN NATURE.

small in size, is weighty in import. They are rather a
mere occasion which I take as my starting-point in order
to expound the fundamental truth of my doctrine more
clearly there than has been done anywhere else, and to
apply it all the way down even to the empirical knowledge
of Nature. This I have done most exhaustively and
stringently under the heading " Physical Astronomy," nor
can I ever hope to find a more correct or accurate expres
sion for the kernel of my doctrine than the one given
there." x

I have nothing to add to testimony thus given by
Schopenhauer himself.

JULIUS FRAUENSTADT.

Berlin, March, 1867.

1 " Die Welt a. W. u. V.," vol. ii., c. 18, p. 213.

EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE FOURTH
EDITION.

THE present Fourth Edition is an identical reprint of
the Third : it therefore contains the same Corrections
and Additions which I had already inserted in the Third
Edition from Schopenhauer's own manuscript.

JULIUS FRAUENSTADT.
Berlin, September, 1877.

THE WILL IN NATURE.

INTRODUCTION.

IBEEAK silence after seventeen years,1 in order to
point out to the few who, in advance of the age, may
have given their attention to my philosophy, sundry cor-
roborations which have been contributed to it by unbiassed
empiricists, unacquainted with my writings, who, in pur
suing their own road in search of merely empirical know
ledge, discovered at its extreme end what my doctrine has
propounded as the Metaphysical (das Metaphysische), from
which the explanation of experience as a whole must come.
This circumstance is the more encouraging, as it confers
upon my system a distinction over all hitherto existing
ones ; for all the other systems, even the latest — that of
Kant — still leave a wide gap between their results and
experience, and are far from coming down directly to, and
into contact with, experience. By this my Metaphysic
proves itself to be the only one having an extreme point
in common with the physical sciences : a point up to which
these sciences come to meet it by their own paths, so as

1 So had I written in 1835, when the present treatise was first com
posed, having published nothing since 1818, before the close of which
year " Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung ;' had appeared. For a Latin
version, which I had added to the third volume of" Scriptores ophthalmo-
logici minores" edentc J. Radio, in 1830, for the benefit of my foreign
readers, of my treatise "On Vision and Colours" (published in 1816),
can hardly be said to break the silence of that pause.

216 THE WILL IN NATURE.

really to connect themselves and to harmonize with it.
Moreover this is not brought about by twisting and strain-
in g the empirical sciences in order to adapt them to Meta-
physic, nor by Metaphysic having been secretly abstracted
from them beforehand and then, a la Schelling, finding
a priori what it had learnt a posteriori. On the contrary,
both meet at the same point of their own accord, yet with
out collusion. My system therefore, far from soaring above
all reality and all experience, descends to the firm ground
of actuality, where its lessons are continued by the Phy
sical Sciences.

Now the extraneous and empirical corroborations I am
about to bring forward, all concern the kernel and chief
point of my doctrine, its Metaphysic proper. They con
cern, that is, the paradoxical fundamental truth,

that what Kant opposed as thing in itself to mere pheno
menon — called more decidedly by me representation —
and what he held to be absolutely unknowable, that
this thing in itself, this substratum of all phenomena,
and therefore of the whole of Nature, is nothing but
what we know directly and intimately and find within
ourselves as the will ; 1

that accordingly, this will, far from being inseparable from,
and even a mere result of, knowledge, differs radically
and entirely from, and is quite independent of, know
ledge, which is secondary and of later origin ; and can
consequently subsist and manifest itself without know
ledge : a thing which actually takes place throughout the
whole of Nature, from the animal kingdom downwards ;

that this will, being the one and only thing in itself, the

1 As will be seen by the following detailed exposition, Schopenhauer
attaches a far wider meaning to the word than is usually given, and
regards the will, not merely as conscious volition enlightened by Season
and determined by motives, but as the fundamental essence of all that
occurs, even where there is no choice. [Tr.]

INTRODUCTION. 217

sole truly real, primary, metaphysical thing in a world
in which everything else is only phenomenon — i.e. mere
representation — gives all things, whatever they may
be, the power to exist and to act ;

that accordingly, not only the voluntary actions of animals,
but the organic mechanism, nay even the shape and
quality of their living body, the vegetation of plants
and finally, even in inorganic Nature, crystallization,
and in general every primary force which manifests
itself in physical and chemical phenomena, not ex
cepting Gravity, — that all this, I say, in itself, i.e.
independently of phenomenon (which only means,
independently of our brain and its representations),
is absolutely identical with the will we find within
us and know as intimately as we can know any
thing ;

that further, the individual manifestations of the will are
set in motion by motives in beings gifted with an
intellect, but no less by stimuli in the organic life of
animals and of plants, and finally in all inorganic
Nature, by causes in the narrowest sense of the word
— these distinctions applying exclusively to pheno
mena;

that, on the other hand, knowledge with its substratum,
the intellect, is a merely secondary phenomenon, dif
fering completely from the will, only accompanying
its higher degrees of objectification and not essential
to it ; which, as it depends upon the manifestations of
the will in the animal organism, is therefore physical,
and not, like the will, metaphysical ;

that we are never able therefore to infer absence of will
from absence of knowledge; for the will may be
pointed out even in all phenomena of unconscious
Nature, whether in plants or in inorganic bodies ; in
short,

218 THE WILL IN NATURE.

that the will is not conditioned by knowledge, as lias
hitherto been universally assumed, although know
ledge is conditioned by the will.

Now this fundamental truth, which even to-day sounds
so like a paradox, is the part of my doctrine to which, in
all its chief points, the empirical sciences — themselves ever
eager to steer clear of all Metaphysic — have contributed
just as many confirmations forcibly elicited by the irresis
tible cogency of truth, but which are most surprising on
account of the quarter whence they proceed ; and although
they have certainly come to light since the publication of
my chief work, it has been quite independently of it and as
the years went on. Now, that it should be precisely this
fundamental doctrine of mine which has thus met with
confirmation, is advantageous in two respects. First,
because it is the main thought upon which my system is
founded ; secondly, because it is the only part of my phi
losophy that admits of confirmation through sciences which
are alien to, and independent of, it. For although the last
seventeen years, during which I have been constantly
occupied with this subject, have, it is true, brought me
many corroborations as to other parts, such as Ethics,
^Esthetics, Dianoiology ; still these, by their very nature,
pass at once from the sphere of actuality, whence they
arise, to that of philosophy itself : so they cannot claim
to be extraneous evidence, nor can they, as collected by
me, have the same irrefragable, unequivocal cogency as
those concerning Metaphysics proper which are given
by its correlate Physics (in the wide sense of the word
which the Ancients gave it). For, in pursuing its own
road, Physics, i.e., Natural Science as a whole, must in
all its branches finally come to a point where physical ex
planation ceases. Now this is precisely the Metaphysical,
which Natural Science only apprehends as the impassable
barrier at which it stops short and henceforth abandons its

INTRODUCTION. 219

subject to Metaphysics. Kant therefore was quite right
in saying : " It is evident, that the primary sources of
Nature's agency must absolutely belong to the sphere of
Metaphysics." l Physical science is wont to designate this
unknown, inaccessible something, at which its investigations
stop short and which is taken for granted in all its expla
nations, by such terms as physical force, vital force, forma
tive principle, &c. &c., which in fact mean no more than
x, y, z. Now if nevertheless, in single, propitious instances,
specially acute and observant investigators succeed in
casting as it were a furtive glance behind the curtain
which bounds off the domain of Natural Science, and
are able not only to feel it is a barrier but, in a sense, to
obtain a view of its nature and thus to peep into the meta
physical region beyond ; if moreover, having acquired this
privilege, they explicitly designate the limit thus explored
downright as that which is stated to be the true inner
essence and final principle of all things by a system of
Metaphysics unknown to them, which takes its reasons from
a totally different sphere and, in every other respect, re
cognises all things merely as phenomena, i.e., as represen
tation — then indeed the two bodies of investigators must
feel like two mining engineers driving a gallery, who,
having started from two points far apart and worked for
some time in subterranean darkness, trusting exclusively
to compass and spirit-level, suddenly to their great joy
catch the sound of each other's hammers. For now indeed
these investigators know, that the point so long vainly
sought for has at last been reached at which Metaphysics
and Physics meet — they, who were as hard to bring to
gether as Heaven and Earth — that a reconciliation has
been initiated and a connection found between these two
sciences. But the philosophical system which has wit
nessed this triumph receives by it the strongest and most
1 Kant, " Von der wahren Scliat/uiig der lebendigen Krafte," § 51.

220 THE WILL IN NATURE.

satisfactory proof possible of its own truth and accuracy.
Compared with such a confirmation as this, which may, in
fact, be looked upon as equivalent to proving a sum in
arithmetic, the regard or disregard of a given period of
time loses all importance, especially when we consider what
has been the subject of interest meanwhile and find it to
be — the sort of philosophy we have been treated to since
Kant. The eyes of the public are gradually opening to
the mystification by which it has been duped for the last
forty years under the name of philosophy, and this will be
more and more the case. The day of reckoning is at hand,
when it will see whether all this endless scribbling and
quibbling since Kant has brought to light a single truth of
any kind. I may thus be dispensed from the obligation of
entering here into subjects so unworthy ; the more so, as I
can accomplish my purpose more briefly and agreeably by
narrating the following anecdote. During the carnival,
Dante having lost himself in a crowd of masks, the Duke
of Medici ordered him to be sought for. Those coin-
missioned to look for him, being doubtful whether they
would be able to find him, as he was himself masked, the
Duke gave them a question to put to every mask they
might meet who resembled Dante. It was this: "Who
knows what is good ? " After receiving several foolish
answers, they finally met with a mask who replied : " He
that knows what is bad," by which Dante was immediately
recognised. "What is meant by this here is, that I have
seen no reason to be disheartened on account of the want
of sympathy of my contemporaries, since I had at the same
time before my eyes the objects of their sympathy. What
those authors were, posterity will see by their works ; what
the contemporaries were, will be seen by the reception they
gave to those works. My doctrine lays no claim whatever

1 Baltazar Gracian, " El Criticon," iii. 90, to whom I leave the
responsibility for the anachronism.

INTRODUCTION. 221

to the name " Philosophy of the present time " which was
disputed to the amusing adepts of Hegel's mystification ;
but it certainly does claim the title of "Philosophy of
time to come : " that is, of a time when people will no
longer content themselves with a mere jingle of words
without meaning, with empty phrases and trivial paral
lelisms, but will exact real contents and serious disclosures
from philosophy, while, on the other hand, they will exempt it
from the unjust and preposterous obligation of paraphrasing
the national religion for the time being. " For it is an
extremely absurd thing," says Kant',1 " to expect to be en
lightened by Reason and yet to prescribe to her beforehand
on which side she must incline." — It is indeed sad to live
in an age so degenerate, that it should be necessary to
appeal to the authority of a great man to attest so obvious
a truth. But it is absurd to expect marvels from a phi
losophy that is chained up, and particularly amusing to
watch the solemn gravity with which it sets to work to
accomplish grea,t things, when we all know beforehand
" the short meaning of the long speech." 2 However the
keen-sighted assert that under the cloak of philosophy they
can mostly detect theology holding forth for the edification
of students thirsting after truth, and instructing them
after its own fashion ; — and this again reminds us forcibly
of a certain favourite scene in Faust. Others, who think
that they see still further into the matter, maintain that
what is thus disguised is neither theology nor philosophy,
but simply a poor devil who, while solemnly protesting
that he has lofty, sublime truth for his aim, is in fact only
striving to get bread for himself and for his future young
family. This he might no doubt obtain by other means
with less labour and more dignity ; meanwhile however for

1 Kant, " Krit. d. r. V." 5th edition, p. 755. (English translation by
M. Muller, p. 640.)

2Schiller, « der langen Kede kurzer Sinn." [Tr.]

222 THE WILL IN NATURE.

this price he is ready to do anything he is asked to do,
even to deduce a priori, nay, should it come to the worst,
to perceive, the ' Devil and his dam/ by intellectual intui
tion — and here indeed the exceedingly comical effect is
brought to a climax by the contrast between the sublimity
of the ostensible, and the lowliness of the real, aim. It
remains nevertheless desirable, that the pure, sacred pre
cincts of philosophy should be cleansed of all such traders,
as was the temple of Jerusalem in former times of the
buyers and sellers. — Biding such better times therefore,
may our philosophical public bestow its attention and
interest as it has done hitherto. May it continue as before
invariably naming Fichte as an obligate accompaniment to,
and in the same breath with, Kant — that great mind, pro
duced but once by Nature, which has illumined its own depth
— as if forsooth they were of the same kind ; and this without
a single voice being heard to exclaim in protest 'HpaK\ij$
KUI iridrjKOQ ! May Hegel's philosophy of absolute nonsense
— three-fourths cash and one-fourth crazy fancies— con
tinue to pass for unfathomable wisdom without anyone
suggesting as an appropriate motto for his writings Shake
speare's words : " Such stuff as madmen tongue and brain
not," or, as an emblematical vignette, the cuttle-fish with
its ink-bag, creating a cloud of darkness around it to pre
vent people from seeing what it is, with the device : mea
caligine tutus. — May each day bring us, as hitherto, new
systems adapted for University purposes, entirely made up
of words and phrases and in a learned jargon besides,
which allows people to talk whole days without saying
anything ; and may these delights never be disturbed by
the Arabian proverb : " I hear the clappering of the mill,
but I see no flour." — For all this is in accordance with the
age and must have its course. In all times some such thing
occupies the contemporary public more or less noisily ; then
it dies off so completely, vanishes so entirely, without

INTRODUCTION. 223

leaving a trace behind, that the next generation no longer
knows what it was. Truth can bide its time, for it has a
long life- before it. Whatever is genuine and seriously
meant, is always slow to make its way and certainly
attains its end almost miraculously ; for on its first appear
ance it as a rule meets with a cool, if not ungracious, re
ception : and this for exactly the same reason that, when
once it is fully recognised and has passed on to pos
terity, the immense majority of men take it on credit,
in order to avoid compromising themselves, whereas the
number of genuine appreciators remains nearly as small
as it was at -first. These few nevertheless suffice to make
the truth respected, for they are themselves respected.
And thus it is passed from hand to hand through centuries
over the heads of the inept multitude: so hard is the
existence of mankind's best inheritance! — On the other
hand, if truth had to crave permission to be true from
such as have quite different aims at heart, its cause might
indeed be given, up for lost ; for then it might often be
dismissed with the witches' watch-word : " fair is foul,
and foul is fair." Luckily however this is not the case.
Truth depends upon no one's favour or disfavour, nor
does it ask anyone's leave : it stands upon its own feet, and
has Time for its ally ; its power is irresistible, its life in
destructible.

PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY.

IN classifying the above-mentioned empirical corrobora-
tions of my doctrine according to the sciences from
which they come, while I take the graduated order of
Nature from the highest to the lowest degree as a guiding-
thread to my expositions, I must first mention a very
striking confirmation lately received by my chief dogma in
the physiological and pathological views of Dr. J. D.
Brandis, private physician to the King of Denmark, a
veteran in science, whose " Essay on Vital Force " (1795)
had received Kail's hearty commendation. In his two
latest writings : " Experiences in the Application of Cold in
Disease" (Berlin, 1833), and " Nosology and Therapeutics
of Cachexise " (1834), we find him in the most emphatic
and striking manner stating the primary source of all vital
functions to be an unconscious will, from which he derives
all processes in the machinery of the organism, in health as
well as in disease, and which he represents as the primum
mobile of life. I must support this by literal quotations
from these essays, since few save medical readers are
likely to have them at hand.

In the first of them, p. viii., we find: "The essence of
every living organism consists in the will to maintain its
own existence as much as possible over against the
macrocosm ; " — p. x. : " Only one living entity, one will can
be in an organ at the same time ; therefore if there is a
diseased will in disagreement with the rest of the body in
the organ of the skin, we may hold it in check by applying

PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY. 225

cold as long as the generation of warmth, a normal will,
can be induced by it." P. 1 : " If we are forced to the con
viction that there must be a determining principle — a will,
in every vital action, by which the development suited to
the whole organism is occasioned, and each metamorphosis
of the parts conditioned, in harmony with the whole indi
viduality, and likewise that there is a something capable
of being determined and developed," &c. &c. — P. 11: "With
respect to individual life, the element which determines,
the organic will, if it is to rest satisfied, must be able to
attain what it wants from that which has to be determined.
This occurs even when the vital movements are over
excited, as in inflammation : something new is formed, the
noxious element is expelled ; new plastic materials are
meanwhile conveyed through the arteries, more venous
blood is carried off, until the process of inflammation is
finished and the organic will satisfied. It is however
possible to excite this will to such a degree, as to make
satisfaction impossible. This exciting cause (or stimulus)
either acts directly upon the particular organ (poison, con
tagion) or it affects the whole life ; and this life then begins
to make the most strenuous efforts to rid itself of the
noxious element or to modify the disposition of the organic
will, and provokes critical vital activity in particular
parts (inflammations) or yields to the unappeased will"-
P. 12 : " The insatiable will acts destructively upon the
organism unless either (a) the whole life, in its efforts to
attain unity (tendency to adapt means to end), produces
other activities requiring satisfaction (crises et lyses) which
hold that will in check — called decisive (crises complete?)
when quite successful; crises incomplete, when only partially
so — or (ft) some other stimulus (medicine) produces another
will which represses the diseased one. If we place this in
one and the same category with the will of which we have
become conscious through our own representations, and

Q

226 THE WILL IN NATURE.

bear in mind that here there can be no question of more or
less distant resemblance, we gain the conviction that we have
grasped the fundamental conception of the one unlimited,
therefore indivisible, life which, according to its different
manifestations in various more or less endowed and exer
cised organs, is just as able to make hair grow on the
human body as to combine the most sublime representa
tions. We see that the most violent passion — unsatisfied
will — may be checked by more or less strong excitement,"
&c. &c. — P. 18 : " The determining element — this organic
will without representation, this tendency to preserve the
organism as a unity — is induced by outward temperature
to modify its activity now in the same, now in a remoter
organ. Every manifestation of life, however, whether in
health or in disease, is a manifestation of the organic
will : this will determines vegetation : in a healthy condi
tion, in harmony with the unity of the whole ; in an un
healthy one .... it is induced not to will in harmony
with that unity "... .—P. 23 : " Cold suddenly applied
to the skin suppresses its function (chill) ; cold drinks
check the organic will in the digestive organs and thereby
intensify that of the skin and produce perspiration ; just
so with the diseased organic will: cold checks cutaneous
eruptions," &c. &c. — P. 33 : " Fever is the complete parti
cipation of the whole vital process in a diseased will, i.e. it
is to the entire vital process what inflammation is to
particular organs — the effort of our vitality to form some
thing definite, in order to content the diseased will and
remove the noxious element. — We call this process of forma
tion crisis or lysis (turning-point or release). The first per
ception of the pernicious element which causes the diseased
will, affects the individuality just in the same way as a
noxious element apprehended by our senses, before we
have brought to clear representation the entire relation
in which it stands to our individuality and the means of

PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY. 227

removing it. It creates terror and its consequences, a
standstill of the vital process in the parenchyma, especially
in the parts directed towards the outer world ; in the skin,
and in all the motor muscles belonging to the entire
individuality (outer body) : shuddering, chills, trembling,
pains in the limbs, &c. &c. The difference between them
is, that in the latter case the noxious element, either at
once or gradually, becomes clear representation, because it
is compared with the individuality by means of all the
senses, so that its relation to that individuality can be
determined, and the means of protection against it (dis
regard, flight, warding off, defence, &c.) be brought to
a conscious will; whereas, in the former case, we remain
unconscious of that noxious element, and it is life alone
(or Nature's curative power) which is striving to remove
the noxious element and thereby to content the diseased
will. Nor must this be taken for a simile; it is, on
the contrary, a true description of the manifestation of
life." — P. 58 : " We must however always bear in mind,
that cold acts here as a powerful stimulus to check or
moderate the diseased will and to rouse in its place a
natural will, accompanied by general warmth." —

In almost every page of this book similar expressions are
to be found. In the second of the Essays I have named,
Brandis no longer combines the explanation by the will
so universally with each separate analysis, probably in
consideration that this explanation is properly speaking, a
metaphysical one. Nevertheless he maintains it entirely
and completely, giving it even all the more distinct and
decided expression, wherever he states it. Thus, for in
stance, in § 68 et seq. he speaks of an " unconscious will,
which cannot be separated from the conscious one," and is
the primum mobile of all life, as well in plants as in
animals ; for, in these, it is a desire and aversion manifesting
itself in all the organs which determines all their vital

228 THE WILL IN NATURE.

processes, secretions, &c. &c. — §. 71 : " All convulsions
prove that the manifestation of the will can take place
without distinct power of representation." — §. 72 : " Every
where do we meet with a spontaneous, unconimunicated
activity, now determined by the sublimest human free
will, now by animal desire and aversion, now again by
simple, more vegetative requirements ; which activity, in
order to maintain itself, calls forth several other kinds of
.activity in the unity of the individual." — P. 96 : "A
creative, spontaneous, uncomrnunicated activity shows itself
in every vital manifestation." . . — " The third factor in
this individual creation is the will, the individual's life
itself." . . — " The nerves are the conductors of this indi
vidual creation: by their means form and mixture are
varied according to desire and aversion." — P. 97 : " Assimi
lation of foreign substance . . . makes the blood . . .
It is not an absorption or an exudation of organic matter ;
... on the contrary, here the sole factor of the phe
nomenon is in all cases the creative will, a life which
cannot be brought back to any sort of imparted move
ment. —

When I wrote this (1835) I was still naif enough
seriously to believe that Brandis was unacquainted with
my work, or I should not allude here to his writings ; for
they would then be merely a repetition, application and
carrying out of my own doctrine on this point, not a corro-
boration of it. But I thought I might safely assume that
he did not know me, because he has not mentioned me
anywhere and because if he had known me, literary honesty
would have made it his imperative duty not to remain
silent concerning the man from whom he had borrowed his
chief fundamental thought, the more so as he saw that man
then enduring unmerited neglect, by his writings being
generally ignored — a circumstance which might be con-

PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY. 229

strued as favourable to fraud. Add to this, that it lay in
Brandis' own interest as a writer, and would therefore have
shown sagacity on his part, to have appealed to me as an
authority. For the fundamental doctrine propounded by
him is so striking and paradoxical, that even his Gottingeii
reviewer is amazed and hardly knows what to think of it ;
yet such a doctrine as this was left without foundation
either through proof or induction, nor did Dr. Brandis
establish its relation to the whole of our knowledge of
Nature : he simply asserted it. I imagined therefore that
it was by the peculiar gift of divination, which enables emi
nent physicians to see and do the right thing in cases of
illness, that he had been led to this view, without being able
to give a strict and methodical account of the grounds
of this really metaphysical truth, although he must have
seen how greatly it is opposed to the generally received
views. Had he, thought I, been acquainted with my
philosophy, which gives far greater extension to this truth,
makes it valid for the whole of Nature and founds it both
by proof and induction in close connection with Kant's
teaching, from which it proceeds as a final result of ex
cogitation — how gladly must he have availed himself of such
confirmation and support, rather than to stand alone by an
unheard-of assertion which was never further carried out
and, with him, never went beyond bare assertion. Such
were the reasons that led me to believe myself entitled to
take for granted Dr. Brandis' ignorance of my book.

Since then however I have become better acquainted
v,rith German scientists and Copenhagen Academicians,
to which body Dr. Brandis belonged, and have gained
the conviction that he knew me very well indeed. I stated
my reasons for arriving at this conviction already in 1844
in the 2nd vol. of " Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," l
so that, as the subject is by no means edifying, it is need-
1 Chapter 20, p. 263 j p. 295 of the 3rd edition.

230 THE WILL IN NATURE.

less to repeat them here ; I will merely add that I have
since been assured on trustworthy authority that Dr.
Brandis not only knew my work but even possessed it, as
it was found among his property after his death. — The un
merited obscurity to which writers like myself are long
condemned, encourages such people to appropriate their
thoughts without so much as naming them.

Another medical authority has carried this even farther ;
for, not content with the thought alone, he has appropriated
to himself the expression of it also. I allude to Professor
Anton Rosas of the University of Vienna, whose entire
§ 507 in the 1st vol. of his Textbook of Ophthalmology 2
(1830) is copied word for word from pp. 14-16 of my
treatise " On Vision and Colours " (1816) without any
mention whatever of me, or even the slightest hint that he
is using the words of another. This sufficiently accounts
for the care he has taken not to mention my treatise among
the lists of twenty-one writings on Colours and forty on the
Physiology of the Eye, which he gives in §§ 542 and 567 ;
a caution which was however all the more advisable, as he
had appropriated to himself a good deal more out of that
pamphlet without mentioning me. All that is referred, for
instance, in § 526 to ' them' (man), is only applicable to me.
His entire § 527 is copied almost literally from my pp. 59
and 60. The theory which he introduces without further cere
mony in § 535 by the word "evidently" : that is, that yellow
is f and violet i of the eye's activity, never was ' evident '
to anyone until I made it so ; even to this day it is a truth
known to few and acknowledged by fewer still, and much is
yet wanting — for example, that I should be dead and
buried — ere it be possible to call it ' evident ' without
further ceremony. The matter will even have to wait till
after my death to be seriously sifted, since a close investi
gation might easily bring to ' evidence ' the real difference
1 Rosas, " JIumlbuch der Augenheilkunde " (1830).

PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY. 231

between Newton's theory of colours and my own, which is
simply that his is false, and mine true : a discovery which
could not fail to mortify my contemporaries. Wherefore,
according to ancient custom, all serious examination into
the question is wisely postponed for these few years. Pro
fessor Rosas knew no such policy as this and, as the matter
was not alluded to anywhere, thought himself entitled, like
the Danish Academician, to claim it as lawful prey (de bonne
prise) . Evidently North and South German honesty had
not yet come to a satisfactory understanding. — Moreover
the whole contents of §§ 538, 539 and 540 in Professor
Rosas' book are taken from my pamphlet, nay even in
great part copied word for word from my § 13. Still
once, where he stands in need of a voucher for a fact,
he finds himself obliged to refer to my treatise : that is,
in his § 531 ; and it is most amusing to see the way in
which he even brings in the numerical fractions used by
me, as a result of my theory, to express all colours. It had
probably occurred to him, that appropriating them quite
sans fa^on might be a delicate matter, so he says, p. 308:
" If we wished to express in numbers the first-mentioned
relation in which colours stand to white, assuming white to
be = 1, the following scale of proportion might by the way
be adopted (as has already been done by Schopenhauer) :

yellow = J blue = i

orange = -| violet = J

red = i black = 0
green = ~

Now I should like to know how anyone could do this by
the way, without having first thought out my whole colour-
theory, to which alone these numbers refer, and apart
from which they are mere abstract numbers without
meaning; above all, how anyone could do it who, like
Professor Eosas, professes to be a follower of Newton's

232 THE WILL IN NATURE.

colour-theory, with which these numbers are in direct con
tradiction ? Finally, I should like to know how it came,
that during the thousands of years in which men have
thought and written, no one but myself and Professor
Rosas should ever have thought of using just these parti
cular fractions to denote colours ? For the words 1 have
quoted above tell us, that he would have stated those frac
tions precisely as he has done, even had I not chanced to
do it ' already ' fourteen years before and thus needlessly
anticipated his statement ; they also tell us, that all that is
required is ' to wish,' in order to do so. Now it is pre
cisely in these numerical fractions that the secret of colours
lies : by them alone can we rightly solve the mystery of
their nature and of their difference from one another. —
I should however be heartily glad, were plagiarism the
worst kind of dishonesty that denied German literature ;
there are others far more mischievous, which penetrate
more deeply, and to which plagiarism bears the same pro
portion as picking pockets in a mild way to capital crime.
I allude to that mean, despicable spirit, whose loadstar is
personal interest, when it ought to be truth, and in which
the voice of intention makes itself heard beneath the mask
of insight. Double-dealing and time-serving are the order of
the day. Tartuffe comedies are performed without rouge ;
nay, Capuchin sermons are preached in halls consecrated
to Science ; enlightenment, that once revered word, has
become a term of opprobrium ; the greatest thinkers of
the past century, Yoltaire, Rousseau, Locke, Hume, are
slandered — those heroes, ornaments and benefactors of
mankind, whose fame, diffused throughout both hemi
spheres, can only be increased, if by anything, by the fact
that wherever and whenever obscurantists show them
selves, it is as their bitterest enemies — and with good rea
son. Literary coteries and associations are formed to deal
out praise and blame, and spurious merit is then trumpeted

PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY. 233

forth and extolled, while sterling merit is slandered or, aa
Gothe says, " secreted, by means of an inviolable silence, in
•'vi,ich sort of inquisitorial censure the Germans have attained
great proficiency." l The motives and considerations how
ever from which all this proceeds, are of too low a nature
for me to care to enumerate them in detail. But what a
difference there is between periodicals such as the " Edin
burgh Review," in which gentlemen of independent means
are induced to write by a genuine interest in the subjects
treated, and which honourably upholds its noble motto taken
from Publius Syrus : Judex damnatur cum nocens absolvitur,
and our mean- spirited, disingenuous, G-ermaii literary jour
nals, full of considerations and intentions, that are mostly
compiled for the sake of pay by hired editors, and ought
properly to have for their motto: Accedas socius laudes,
lauderis, ut absens. Now, after twenty years, do I understand
what Gothe said to me at Berka in 1814. As I found him
reading Madame de StaeTs " De TAllemagne" I remarked
in course of conversation that she had given too exag
gerated a description of German honesty and one that
might mislead foreigners. He laughed and said: "Yes,
to be sure, they will not secure their baggage behind and
will have it cut off." He then added in a graver tone:
" But one has to know German literature in order to realise
the full extent of German dishonesty." — All well and
good ! But the most revolting kind of dishonesty in Ger
man literature is that of the time-servers, who pass them
selves off for philosophers, while in reality they are obscu
rantists. The word ' time-serving ' no more needs explana
tion than the thing needs a proof ; for anyone who had the
face to deny it would furnish strong evidence in support of

1 Gothe, "Tag-und Jahreshefte," 1812.

7 This 1 wrote in 1836. The " Edinburgh Review "has since however
greatly deteriorated, and is no longer its old self. I have even seen
clerical time-serving in its pagos, written down to the level of the mob.

234 THE WILL IN NATURE.

my present argument. Kant taught, that man ought to
use his fellow-man only as an end, never as a means : he
did not think it necessary to say, that philosophy ought
only to be dealt with as an end, never as a means. Time
serving may after all be excused under every garb, the
cowl as well as the ermine, save only the philosopher's
cloak (Triboniori) ; for he who has once assumed this, has
sworn allegiance to truth, and from that moment every
other consideration, no matter of what kind, becomes base
treachery. Therefore it was that Socrates did not shun
the hemlock, nor Bruno the stake, while 'for a piece of
bread these men will transgress.' Are they too short
sighted to see posterity close at hand, with the history of
philosophy at its side, recording two lines of bitter con
demnation with unflinching hand and iron pen in its im
mortal pages ? Or has this no sting for them ? — Well to
be sure, if it comes to the worst, ' apres moi le deluge ' may be
pronounced ; but as to ' apres moi le mepris,' that is a more
difficult matter. Therefore I fancy they will answer that
austere judge as follows : " Ah, dear posterity and history
of philosophy ! you are quite wrong to take us in earnest ; we
are not philosophers at all, Heaven forbid ! No, we are only
professors of philosophy, mere servants of the state, mere
philosophers in jest. You might as well drag puppet-knights
in pasteboard armour into a real tournament." Then the
judge will most likely see how matters stand, erase all their
names, and confer upon them the beneficiumperpetui silentii.
From this digression — to which I had been led away
eighteen years ago, by the cant and time-serving I then
witnessed, though they were not nearly as flourishing then
as they are now — I return to that part of my doctrine whieh
Dr. Brandis has confirmed, though he did not originate
it, in order to add a few explanations with which I shall
then connect some further corroborations it has since
received from Physiology.

PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY. 235

The three assumptions which are criticised by Kant in his
Transcendental Dialectic under the names of Ideas of
Reason, and have in consequence since been set aside in
theoretical philosophy, had always stood in the way of a
deeper insight into Nature, until that great thinker brought
about a complete transformation in philosophy. That sup
posed Idea of Eeason, the soul : that metaphysical being, in
whose absolute singleness knowing and willing were knit
and blended together to eternal, inseparable unity, was an
impediment of this sort for the subject-matter of this
chapter. As long as it lasted, no philosophical Physiology
was possible : the less so, as its correlate, real, purely pas
sive Matter, had necessarily also to be assumed together
with it, as the substance of the body.1 It was this Idea
of Reason, the soul, therefore, that caused the celebrated
chemist and physiologist, George Ernest Stahl, at the
beginning of the last century to miss the discovery of
the truth he so nearly approached and would have quite
reached, had he been able to put that which is alone meta
physical, the bare will— as yet without intellect— in the place
of the anima rationalis. Under the influence of this Idea
of Reason however, he could not teach anything but that
it is this simple, rational soul which builds itself a body, all
whose inner organic functions it directs and performs, yet
has no knowledge or consciousness of all this, although
knowledge is the fundamental destination and, as it were,
the substance, of its being. There was something absurd in
this doctrine which made it utterly untenable. It was super
seded by Haller's Irritability and Sensibility, which, to be
sure, are taken in a purely empircial sense, but, to make
up for this, are also two qualitates occultce, at which all ex
planation ceases. The movement of the heart and of the
intestines was now attributed to Irritability. But the
anima rationalis still remained in undiminished honour

1 As a being existing by itself, a tiling in itself. [Add. to 3rd ed.]

236 THE WILL IN NATURE.

and dignity as a visitor at the house of the body.1 — " Truth
lies at the bottom of a well," said Democritus ; and the
centuries with a sigh, have repeated his words. But small
wonder, if it gets a rap on the knuckles as soon as it tries
to come out ! •

The fundamental truth of my doctrine, which places
that doctrine in opposition with all others that have ever
existed, is the complete separation between the will and
the intellect, which all philosophers before me had looked
upon as inseparable ; or rather, I ought to say that they
had regarded the will as conditioned by, nay, mostly even
as a mere function of, the intellect, assumed by them to be
the fundamental substance of our spiritual being. But this
separation, this analysis into two heterogeneous elements,
of the ego or soul, which had so long been deemed an indi
visible unity, is, for philosophy, what the analysis of water
has been for chemistry, though it may take time to be ac
knowledged. With me, that which is eternal and inde
structible in man, therefore, that which constitutes his vital
principle, is not the soul, but — if I may use a chemical term
— its radical : and this is the will. The so-called soul is
already a compound : it is the union of the will and the
intellect (VOVQ). This intellect is the secondary element, the
posterius of the organism and, as a mere cerebral function,
is conditioned by the organism ; whereas the will is what is
primary, the prius of the organism, which is conditioned
by it. For the will is that tiling in itself, which only be
comes apparent as an organic body in our representation
(that mere function of the brain) : it is only through the
forms of knowledge (or cerebral function), that is, only in
our representation — not apart from that representation, not
immediately in our self-consciousness — that our body is
given to each of us as a thing which has extension, limbs

1 Iii which it is lodged in the garret. [Add. to 3rd ed.]

PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY. 237

and organs. As the actions of our body are only acts
of volition portraying themselves in representation, so
likewise is their substratum, the shape of that body, in the
main the portrait of the will : so that, in all the organic
functions of our body, the will is just as much the agent
as in its external actions. True Physiology, at its highest,
shows the spiritual (the intellectual) in man to be the
product of the physical in him, and no one has done this
so thoroughly as Gabanis ; but true Metaphysic teaches
us, that the physical in man is itself mere product, or
rather phenomenon, of a spiritual (the will) ; nay, that
Matter itself is conditioned by representation, in which
alone it exists. Perception and reflection will more and
more find their explanation through the organism ; but
not the will, by which conversely the organism is ex
plained, as I shall show in the following chapter. First
of all therefore I place the will, as thing in itself and quite
primary ; secondly, its mere visibility, its obj edification :
i.e. the body ; thirdly, the intellect, as a mere function of
one part of that body. This part is itself the objectified
will to know (the will to know having entered into repre
sentation), since the will needs knowledge to attain its
own ends. Now the entire world as representation, to
gether with the body itself therefore, inasmuch as it is a
perceptible object, nay, Matter in general as existing only
in representation, — all this, I say, is again conditioned by
that function ; for, duly considered, we cannot possibly
conceive an objective world without a Subject, in whose
consciousness it is present. Thus knowledge and matter
(Subject and Object) exist only relatively one for the
other and constitute phenomenon. The whole thing there
fore, owing to the radical change made by me, stands in a
different light from that in which it has hitherto been
regarded.

As soon as it is directed outwardly and acts upon a

238 THE WILL IN NATURE.

recognised object, as soon therefore as it has passed
through the medium of knowledge, we all recognise the
will at once to "be the active principle, and call it by its
right name. Yet it is no less active in those inner pro
cesses which have preceded such outward actions as their
conditions : in those, for instance, which create and main
tain organic life and its substratum ; and the circulation
of the blood, secretion, digestion, &c. &c., are its work
likewise. But just because the will was only recognised
as the active principle in those cases in which it abandons
the individual whence it proceeds, in order to direct itself
towards the outer world — now presenting itself pre
cisely for this end, as perception — knowledge has been
taken for its essential condition, its sole element, nay,
as the substance of which it consists : and hereby was
perpetrated the greatest varepov Trporepov that has ever
been.

But before all things we must learn to distinguish will
[TFiZZe] (voluntas) from free-will [Willkulir] (arbttrium)1
and to understand that the former can subsist without the
latter; this however presupposes my whole philosophy.
The will is called free-will when it is illumined by know
ledge, therefore when the causes which move it are motives :
that is, representations. Objectively speaking this means:
when the influence from outside which causes the act,
has a brain for its mediator. A motive may be defined

1 By this Schopenhauer means the distinction between the will in its
widest sense, regarded as the fundamental essence of all that happens, —
even where there is no choice, even where it is unconscious, — and
conscious will, implying deliberation and choice, commonly called free
will. We must however carefully guard against confounding this relative
free-will, with absolute free-will (libcmm arbitrium indiffcrentics), which
Schopenhauer declares to be inadmissible. The sense in which I have
used the expression 'free-will' throughout this treatise, is that of rela
tive freedom, i.e. power to choose between different motives, free of all
outward restraint ( Willkuhr). (Tr.)

PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY. 239

as an external stimulus, whose action first of all causes
an image to arise in the brain, through the medium of
which the will carries out the effect proper — an outward
action of the body. Now, in the human species however,
the place of such an image as this may be taken by a
conception drawn from former images of this kind by
dropping their differences, which conception consequently
is no longer perceptible, but merely denoted and fixed by
words. As the action of motives accordingly does not
depend upon contact, they can try their power on the will
against each other : in other words, they permit a certain
choice which, in animals, is limited to the narrow sphere
of that which has perceptible existence for them ; whereas,
in man, its range comprises the vast extent of all that is
thinkable: that is, of his conceptions. Accordingly we
designate as voluntary those movements which are occa
sioned, not by causes in the narrowest sense of the word,
as in inorganic bodies, nor even by mere stimuli, as in
plants, but by motives.1 These motives however pre
suppose an intellect as their mediator, through which
causality here acts, without prejudice to its entire neces
sity in all other respects. Physiologically, the diffe
rence between stimulus and motive admits also of the
following definition. The stimulus provokes immediate
reaction, which proceeds from the very part on which
the stimulus has acted ; whereas the motive is a stimulus
that has to go a roundabout way through the brain,
where its action first causes an image to arise, which
then, but not till then, provokes the consequent reaction,
which is now called an act of volition, and voluntary. The
distinction between voluntary and involuntary movement
does not therefore concern what is essential and primary —

1 I have shown the difference between cause in its narrowest sense,
stimulus, and motive, at length in my " Grund-probleme der Ethik .*
p. 29 et scq.

240 THE WILL IN NATURE.

for this is in both cases the will — but only what is secon
dary, the rousing of the will's manifestation : it has to
do with the determination whether causes proper, stimuli
or motives (i.e. causes having passed through the medium
of knowledge) are the guidance under which that manifesta
tion takes place. It is in human consciousness, — differing
from that of animals by not only containing perceptible
representations but also abstract conceptions independent
of time-distinctions, which act simultaneously and col
laterally, whereby deliberation, i.e. a conflict of motives,
becomes possible — it is in human consciousness, I say, that
free-will (arbitrium) in its narrowest sense first makes its
appearance ; and this I have called elective decision. It
nevertheless merely consists in the strongest motive for a
given individual character overcoming the others and thus
determining the act, just as an impact is overcome by a
stronger counter-impact, the result thus ensuing with
precisely the same necessity as the movement jof a stone
that has been struck. That all great thinkers in all
ages were decided and at one on this point, is just
as certain, as that the multitude will never understand,
never grasp, the important truth, that the work of our
freedom must not be sought in our individual actions but
in our very existence and nature itself. In my prize-
essay on Freedom of the Will, I have shown this as
clearly as possible. The liberum arbitrium indifferentice
which is assumed to be the distinctive characteristic of
movements proceeding from the will, is accordingly quite
inadmissible : for it asserts that effects are possible without
causes.

As soon therefore as we have got so far as to distinguish
will \Wille\ from free-will [Willkuhr], and to consider
the latter as a particular kind or particular phenomenon
of the former, we shall find no difficulty in recognising the
will, even in unconscious processes. Thus the assertion,

PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY. 241

that all bodily movements, even those which are purely
vegetative and organic, proceed from the will, by no means
implies that they are voluntary. For that would mean
that they were occasioned by motives ; but motives are
representations, and their seat is the brain: only those
parts of our body which communicate with the brain by
means of the nerves, can be put in movement by the brain,
consequently by motives, and this movement alone is what
is called voluntary. The movement of the inner economy
of the organism, on the contrary, is directed, as in plant-
life, by stimuli; only as, on the one hand, the complex
nature of the animal organism necessitated an outer sen-
sorium for the apprehension of the outer world and the
will's reaction on that outer world, so, on the other hand,
did it necessitate a cerebrum abdominale, the sympathetic
nervous system, in order to direct the will's reaction upon
inner stimuli likewise. We may compare the former to a
Home Ministry, the latter to a Foreign Office ; but tho
will remains the omnipresent Autocrat.

The progress made in Physiology since Haller has placed
beyond doubt, that not only those actions which are con
sciously performed (functiones animales), but even vital
processes that take place quite unconsciously (functiones
vitales et naturales), are directed throughout by the nervous
system. Likewise that their only difference, as far as
our consciousness of them is concerned, consists in
the former being directed by nerves proceeding from the
brain, the latter by nerves that do not directly com
municate with that chief centre of the nervous system
— mainly directed towards the outside — but with sub
ordinate, minor centres, with the nerve-knots, the ganglia
and their net-work, which preside as it were like vice
gerents over the various departments of the nervous
system, directing those internal processes that follow upon
internal stimuli, just as the brain directs the external

242 THE WILL IN NATURE.

actions that follow upon external motives, and thus receiv
ing impressions from inside upon which they react corre
spondingly, just as the brain receives representations
on the strength of which it forms resolutions ; only each
of these minor centres is confined to a narrower sphere of
action. Upon this rests the vita propria of each system,
in referring to which Van Helmont said that each organ
has, as it were, its own ego. It accounts also for life con
tinuing in parts which have been cut off the bodies of
insects, reptiles, and other inferior animals, whose brain has
no marked preponderance over the ganglia of single parts ;
and it likewise explains how many reptiles are able to live
for weeks, nay even months, after their brain has been re
moved. Now, if our surest experience teaches us that the
will, which is known to us in most immediate conscious
ness and in a totally different way from the outer world, is
the real agent in actions attended by consciousness and
directed by the chief centre of the nervous system ; how
can we help admitting that those other actions which, pro
ceeding from that nervous system but obeying the direc
tion of its subordinate centres, keep the vital processes
constantly going, must also be manifestations of the will ?
Especially as we know perfectly well the cause because of
which they are not, like the others, attended by con
sciousness : we know, that is to say, that all consciousness
resides in the brain and therefore is limited to such parts
as have nerves which communicate directly with the brain ;
and we know also that, even in these, consciousness ceases
when those nerves are severed. By this the difference
between all that is conscious and unconscious and together
with it the difference between all that is voluntary and in
voluntary in the movements of the body is perfectly ex
plained, and no reason remains for assuming two entirely
different primary sources of movement : especially as prin-
cipia prceter necessitatem non sunt multiplicanda. All this is

PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY. 243

so obvious, that, on impartial reflection from this standpoint,
it seems almost absurd to persist in making the body serve
two masters by deriving its actions from two radically dif
ferent origins and then ascribing on the one hand the
movements of our arms and legs, of our eyes, lips, throat,
tongue and lungs, of the facial and abdominal muscles, to
the will ; while on the other hand the action of the heart,
the movements of the veins, the peristaltic movements of
the intestines, the absorption by the intestinal villi and
glands and all those movements which accompany secre
tion, are supposed to proceed from a totally different, ever
mysterious principle of which we have no knowledge, and
which is designated by names such as vitality, archeus,
spiritus animales, vital energy, instinct, all of which mean
no more than a?.1

It is curious and instructive to see the trouble that
excellent writer, Treviranus3 takes, to find out in the
lower animals, such as infusoria and zoophyta, which
movements are voluntary, and which are what he calls auto
matic or physical, i.e. merely vital. He founds his inquiry
upon the assumption that he has to do with two primarily
different sources of movement ; whereas in truth they all
proceed from the will, and the whole difference consists in

1 It is especially in secretive processes that we cannot avoid re
cognising a certain selection of the materials fitted for each purpose,
consequently a free will in the secretive organs, which must even be
assisted by a certain dull sensation, and in virtue of which each secreting
organ only extracts from the same blood that particular secretion which
suits it and no others : for instance, the liver only absorbs bile from the
blood flowing through it, sending the rest of the blood on, and likewise
the salivary glands and the pancreas only secrete saliva, the kidneys
only urine, &c. &c. We may therefore compare the organs of secretion
to different kinds of cattle grazing on one and the same pasture-land,
each of which only browses upon the one sort of herb which suits its own
particular appetite. [Add. to 3rd ed.]

2 Treviranus, " Die Erscheinungen und Gesetze des Organischen
Lebens," vol. L pp. 178-185.

244 THE WILL IN NATURE.

their being occasioned by stimuli or by motives, i.e. in their
having a brain for their medium or not ; and the stimulus
may again be merely interior or exterior. In several
animals of a higher order — crustaceans and even fishes — •
he finds that the voluntary and vital movements, for in
stance locomotion and respiration, entirely coincide: a
clear proof that their origin and essence are identical.
He says p. 188 : In the family of the actinia, star
fishes, sea-urchins, and holothurice (echinodermata pedata
Cuv.), it is evident that the movement of the fluids de
pends upon the will of the animals and that it is a
means of locomotion." Then again p. 288: "The gullet
of mammals has at its upper end the pharynx, which
expands and contracts by means of muscles resembling
voluntary muscles in their formation, yet which do not
obey the will." Here we see how the limits of the move
ments proceeding from the will and of those assumed
to be foreign to it, merge into one another. Ibid., p. 293 :
"Thus movements having all the appearance of being
voluntary, take place in the stomachs of ruminants. They
do not however always stand in connection with the rumi
nating process only. Even the simpler human stomach
and that of many animals only allows free passage to what
is digestible through its lower orifice, and rejects what is
indigestible by vomiting."

There is moreover special evidence that the movements
induced by stimuli (involuntary movements) proceed from
the will just as well as those occasioned by motives
(voluntary movements) : for instance, when the same
movement follows now upon a stimulus, now again
upon a motive, as is the case when the pupil of the
eye is contracted. This movement, when caused by in
creased light, follows upon a stimulus; whereas, when
occasioned by the wish to examine a very small object
minutely in close proximity, it follows upon a motive ; be-

PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY. 245

cause contracting the pupil enables us to see things dis
tinctly even when quite near to us, and this distinctness
may be increased by our looking through a hole pierced
in a card with a pin ; conversely, the pupil is dilated when
we look at distant objects. Surely the same movement of
the same organ is not likely to proceed alternately from
two fundamentally different sources. — E. H. Weber1 re
lates that he discovered in himself the power of dilating
and contracting at will the pupil of one of his eyes, while
looking at the same object, so as to make that object
appear now distinct, now indistinct, while the other eye
remained closed. — Joh. Miiller 2 also tries to prove that the
will acts upon the pupil.

The truth that the innermost mainspring of uncon
sciously performed vital and vegetative functions is the
will, we find moreover confirmed by the consideration, that
even the movement of a limb recognised as voluntary, is
only the ultimate result of a multitude of preceding changes
which have taken place inside that limb and which no more
enter into our consciousness than those organic functions.
Yet these changes are evidently that which was first set
in motion by the will, the movement of the limb being merely
their remote consequence ; nevertheless this remains so
foreign to our consciousness that physiologists try to reach it
by means of such hypotheses as these : that the sinews and
muscular fibre are contracted by a change in the cellular
tissue wrought by a precipitation of the blood-vapour in
that tissue to serum ; but that this change is brought
about by the nerve's action, and this — by the will. Thus,
even here, it is not the change which proceeded originally
from the will which comes into consciousness, but only its
remote result ; and even this, properly speaking, only through

1 E. H. Weber, " Additamenta ad E. H. Weberi tractatum de motn
iridis." Lipsia, 1823.

2 Joh. Miiller, " Handbuch der Physiologic," p. 764.

246 THE WILL IN NATURE.

the special perception of the brain in which it presents
itself together with the whole organism. Now by follow
ing the path of experimental research and hypotheses phy
siologists would never have arrived at the truth, that the
last link in this ascending causal series is the will; it is
known to them, on the contrary, in quite a different way.
The solution of the enigma comes to them in a whisper
from outside the investigation, owing to the fortunate cir
cumstance that the investigator is in this case at the same
time himself the object of the investigation and by this
learns the secret of the inward process, his explanation of
which would otherwise, like that of every other phenomenon,
be brought to a standstill by an inscrutable force. And
conversely, if we stood in the same inward relation towards
every natural phenomenon a.s towards our own organism,
the explanation of every natural phenomenon, as well as of
all the properties of every body, would likewise ultimately
be reduced to a will manifesting itself in them. For the
difference does not reside in the thing itself, but in our re
lation to the thing. Wherever explanation of the physical
comes to an end, it is met by the metaphysical ; and where-
ever this last is accessible to immediate knowledge, the
result will be, as here, the will. That even those parts of
the body whose movements do not proceed from the brain,
do not follow upon motives, and are not voluntary, are
nevertheless ruled and animated by the will, is also shown
by their participation in all unusually violent movements of
the will, i.e. emotions and passions. We see, for instance,
the quickened pulse in joy or alarm, the blush in embarass-
ment, the cheek's pallor in terror or in suppressed anger,
the tears of sorrow, the difficult breathing and increased
activity of the intestines in terror, watering of the mouth
at the sight of dainties, nausea occasioned by that of loath
some objects, strongly accelerated circulation of the blood
and even altered quality of bile through wrath, and of

PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY. 247

saliva through violent rage : this last even to the degree,
that an excessively irritated dog may communicate hydro
phobia by its bite without being itself affected with rabies,
or even then contracting the disease — and the same is also
asserted of cats and of cocks. The organism is further
deeply undermined by lasting grief, and may be mortally
affected by fright as well as by sudden joy. On the other
hand, all those inner processes and changes which only
have to do with the intellect and do not concern the will,
however great may be their importance, remain without
influence upon the machinery of the organism, with the
one exception, that mental activity, prolonged to excess,
fatigues and gradually exhausts the brain and finally under
mines the organism. This again confirms the fact that the
intellect is of a secondary character, and merely the organic
function of a single part, a product of life ; not the inner
most kernel of our being, not the thing in itself, not meta
physical, incorporeal, eternal, like the will : the will never
tires, never grows old, never learns, never improves by
practice, is in infancy what it is in old age, eternally one
and the same, and its character in each individual is un
changeable. Being essential moreover, it is likewise im
mutable, and therefore exists in animals as it does in us ;
for it does not, like the intellect, depend upon the perfection
of the organisation, but is in every essential respect in
all animals the same thing which we know so intimately.
Accordingly animals have all the feelings which belong to
man: joy, grief, fear, anger, love, hate, desire, envy, &c. &c.
The great difference between man and the brute creation
consists exclusively in the degrees of perfection of the in
tellect. This however is leading us too far from our sub
ject, so I refer my readers to my chief work, vol. ii. chap.
19, sub. 2.

After the cogent reasons just given in favour of the
primary agens in the inward machinery of the organism

248 THE WILL IN NATURE.

being the very same will which rules the outward actions
of the body and only reveals itself as the will in this
passage through consciousness because here it needs the
mediation of outwardly directed knowledge, we shall not
be astonished to find that other physiologists besides
Brandis had, by means of strictly empirical research, also
recognised this truth more or less clearly. Meckel,1 in
his "Archiv fur die Physiologic," arrives quite empiri
cally and impartially at the conclusion, that vegetative
existence [in animals], the first growth of the embryo, the
assimilation of nourishment and plant-life, ought properly
to be considered as manifestations of the will, nay, that
even the inclination of the magnetic needle seems to be
something of the same kind. " The assumption," he says,
" of a certain free will in every vital movement may per
haps be justified." " Plants appear to seek light volun
tarily," &c. &c. This book is dated 1819 just after the
appearance of my work ; and as, to say the least, it is doubt
ful whether it had any influence upon him or whether he
was even aware of its existence, I class these utterances
among the independent empirical confirmations of my doc
trine. Burdach also,2 in his great work on Physiology,
arrives by a completely empirical road at the conclusion,
that " self-love is a force belonging to all things indiscrimi
nately." He points it out, first in animals, then in plants,
and lastly in inanimate bodies. But what is self-love after
all, if not the will to preserve our existence, the will to
live ? Under the heading " Comparative Anatomy," I shall
quote a passage from the same book, which confirms my
view still more decidedly. That the doctrine, which teaches
that the will is the vital principle, has begun to spread even
to the wider circles of medical science and to meet with a
favourable reception from its younger representatives, t

1 Meckel, " A. f. d. P." vol. 5, pp. 195-198.

2 Burdach, « Physiologic," vol. i. § 259, p. 383.

PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY. 249

notice with particular pleasure in the theses sustained by
Dr. Von Sigriz on taking his degree at Munich (August,
1835), which commence as follows : 1. Sanguis est deter-
minansformam organismi se evolventis. 2. Evolutio organicd
determinatur vitce internee actione et voluntate.

Lastly, a very remarkable and unexpected corroboration
of this part of my doctrine has to be mentioned, which has
recently been communicated from ancient Hindoo philo
sophy by Colebrook. In his exposition of the philosophical
schools of the Hindoos,1 he quotes the following as the
doctrine of the Nyaga school : " Volition, Yatna, effort or
manifestation of the Will, is a self-determination to act
which gives satisfaction. Desire is its occasion, perception
its motive. Two kinds of perceptible effort of the will
are distinguished : that which springs from desire which
seeks the agreeable, and that which springs from aversion
which shuns the repulsive. Another species, which escapes
sensation and perception, but is inferred from analogy of
spontaneous acts, comprises animal functions, having for
a cause the vital, unseen power." Here the words " animal
functions" are evidently used, not in a physiological,
but in a popular sense : so that here organic life is un
questionably derived from the will. We find a similar
statement in Colebrook' s Eeport on the Vedas2 where he
says : " Asu is unconscious volition, which occasions an act
necessary to the support of life, as breathing, <fec."

Moreover my reduction of vital energy to the will by no
means interferes with the old division of its functions into
reproductive force, irritability and sensibility. This divi
sion remains a deep view of their difference, and gives
occasion for interesting observations.

The faculty of reproduction, objectified in the cellular
tissue of plants, constitutes the chief characteristic of

1 " Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Great Britain," 1824, p. 110.
8 " Asiatic Researches,3' vol. 8, p. 426.

250 THE WILL IN NATURE.

plants and the vegetative element in Man. Where we find
it predominant to excess in human beings, we assume them
to be phlegmatic, dull, indolent, obtuse (Boeotians) ; though
this assumption does not always meet with confirmation.
Irritability, objectified in the muscular tissue, constitutes
the chief characteristic of Animals and the animal element
in Man. Where it predominates to excess, dexterity,
strength, bravery, that is, fitness for bodily exertion arid
for war, is usually to be found (Spartans). Nearly all
warm-blooded animals and even insects far surpass Man
in irritability. It is by irritability that animals are most
vividly conscious of their existence ; wherefore they exult
in manifesting it. There is even still a trace of that exul
tation perceptible in Man, in dancing. Sensibility, objec
tified in the nerves, is Man's chief characteristic, and con
stitutes what is properly human in him. In this no animal
can in the remotest degree compare with Man. Where it
predominates to excess, it produces genius (Athenians).
Accordingly a man of genius is in a higher degree a man.
This explains why some men of genius have been unwilling
to recognise other men, with their monotonous physiog
nomies and universal stamp of commonplace mediocrity,
as human beings : for in them they did not find their
equals and naturally came to the erroneous conclu
sion that their own was the normal standard. Diogenes
sought for men with a lantern in this sense ; — in that work
of genius, the Koheleth (Ecclesiastes) it is said : x " One
man among a thousand have I found, but one woman
among all those have I not found ; " and Gracian in his
Criticon — perhaps the grandest and most beautiful alle
gory ever written — says : " But what was strangest of
all, in the whole country, even in the most populous cities,
they did not meet with a single man ; on the contrary these
cities were inhabited by lions, tigers, leopards, wolves,
1 Ecclesiastes, ch. 7, v. 28.

PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY. 251

foxes, apes, oxen, asses, pigs, — nowhere was there a man !
They only made out after a time that the few existing
human beings, in order to hide themselves and not to wit
ness what was going on, had retired to those desert places
which ought to have been the dwellings of wild beasts."
The same reason indeed accounts for the peculiar inclina
tion of all men of genius for solitude, to which they are
driven by their difference from the rest, and for which their
own inner wealth qualifies them. For, with humanity it
is as with diamonds, the extraordinarily great ones alone
are fitted to be solitaires, while those of ordinary size have
to be set in clusters to produce any effect.

Even the three Gunas, or fundamental qualities of the
Hindoos, tally with the three physiological fundamental
forces. Tamas-Guna, obtuseness, stupidity, corresponds
to reproductive power; Rajas- Guna, passionateness, to
irritability; and Sattwa-Guna, wisdom and virtue, to sen
sibility. When however they add to this, that Tanias-
Guna is the fate of animals, Bajas-Guna the fate of man,
and Sattwa-Guna that of the Gods, this is to be taken in a
mythological, rather than physiological sense.

In Chapter 20th of the 2nd Yol. of my chief work en
titled " Ob j edification of the Will in the Animal Organism,"
I have likewise treated the argument of the present
chapter ; therefore I advise my readers to read it after this,
as a complement to what is here given.1

I may observe, that the passages I have quoted from
pp. 14 and 15 of my Essay on Colours, refer to the first
edition.

1 In my «« Parerga," § 94 of the 2nd vol. (§ 96 in the 2nd edition)
belongs also to the above.

COMPARATIVE ANATOMY.

NOW, from my proposition: that the Will is what
Kant calls the " thing in itself " ' or the ultimate
substratum of every phenomenon, I had however not
only deduced that the will is the agent in all inner, un
conscious functions of the body, but also that the organism
itself is nothing but the will which has entered the
region of representation, the will itself, perceived in the
cognitive form of Space. I had accordingly said that, just
as each single momentary act of willing presents itself
at once directly and infallibly in the outer perception of
the body as one of its actions, so also must the collective
volition of each animal, the totality 2 of its efforts, be faith-
fully portrayed in its whole body, in the constitution of its
organism; and that the means supplied by its organisa
tion for attaining the aims of its will must as a whole
exactly correspond to those aims — in short, that the same
relation must exist between the whole character of its
volition and the shape and nature of its body, as between
each single act of its will and the single bodily action
which carries it out. Even this too has recently been
recognised as a fact, and accordingly been confirmed a
posteriori, by thoughtful zootomists and physiologists from
their own point of view and independently of my doctrine :
their judgments on this point make Nature testify even
here to the truth of my theory.

1 Ding an sick, a Inlc-griff.

COMPARATIVE ANATOMY. 253

In Pander and d' Alton's admirable illustrated work l we
find : " Just as all that is characteristic in the formation of
bones springs from the character of the animals, so does
that character, on the other hand, develop out of their
tendencies and desires. These tendencies and desires
of animals, which are so vividly expressed in their whole
organisation and of which that organisation only appears
to be the medium, cannot be explained by special primary
forces, since we can only deduce their inner reason from
the general life of Nature." By this last turn the author
shows indeed that he has arrived at the point where, like
all other investigators of Nature, he is brought to a stand
still by the metaphysical; but he also shows, that up
to this point beyond which Nature eludes investiga
tion, tendencies and desires (i. e. will) were the utmost
thing knowable. The shortest expression for his last
conclusion about animals would be " As they will, so they
are.'*

The learned and thoughtful Burdach,2 when treating of
the ultimate reason of the genesis of the embryo in his
great work on Physiology, bears witness no less explicitly
to the truth of my view. I must not, unfortunately, con
ceal the fact that in a weak moment, misled Heaven knows
by what or how, this otherwise excellent man brings in
just here a few sentences taken from that utterly worthless,
tyrannically imposed pseudo-philosophy, about ' thought '
being what is primary (it is just what is last and most
conditioned of all) yet ' no representation ' (that is to say,
a wooden iron). Immediately after however, under the
returning influence of his own better self, he proclaims the
real truth (p. 710) : " The brain curves itself outwards to
the retina, because the central part .of the embryo desires

1 Pander and d 'Alton, " Ueber die Skelette der Eaubtliiere," 1822,
p. 7.

2 Burdach, « Pbysiologie," vol. 2, § 474.

254) THE WILL IN NATURE.

to take in the impressions of the activity of the world ; the
mucous membrane of the intestinal canal develops into the
lung, because the organic body desires to enter into relation
with the elementary substances of the universe ; organs of
generation spring from the vascular system, because the
individual only lives in the species, and because the life
which has commenced in the individual desires to multiply."
This assertion of Burdach's, which so entirely agrees
with my doctrine, reminds me of a passage in the ancient
Mahabharata, which it is really difficult not to regard as a
mythical version of the same truth. It is in the third
Canto of " Sundas and Upasunda " in Bopp's " Ardschuna's
Eeise zu Indra's Himmel" l (1824); Brahma has just
created Tilottama, the fairest of women, who is walking
round the circle of the assembled gods. Shiva conceives
so violent a longing to gaze at her as she turns successively
round the circle, that four faces arise in him according to
her different positions, that is, according to the four
cardinal points. This may account for Shiva being repre
sented with five heads, as Pansh Mukhti Shiva. Count
less eyes arise on every part of Indra's body likewise
on the same occasion.2 In fact, every organ must be
looked upon as the expression of a universal manifes
tation of the will, i.e. of one made once for all, of a
fixed longing, of an act of volition proceeding, not from

1 Bopp, " Ardschuna's Keise zu Indra's Himmel, nebst anderen
Episoden des Mahabharata " (Ardshuna's Journey to Indra's Heaven
together with other episodes from the Mahabharata), 1824.

2 The Matsya Parana attributes a similar origin to Brahma's fou
countenances. It relates that, having fallen in love with his daughte
Satarupa, and gazed fixedly at her, she stepped aside to avoid his eye ;
he being ashamed, would not follow her movement 5 whereupon a new
face arose on him directed towards the side where she was and, on her
once more moving, the same thing occurred, and was repeated, until at
last he had four faces. (" Asiatic Researches," vol. 6, p. 473.) [Add. to
3rd ed.]

COMPARATIVE ANATOMY. 255

the individual, but from the species. Every animal form
is a longing of the will to live which is roused by circum
stances ; for instance, the will is seized with a longing to
live on trees, to hang on their branches, to devour their
leaves, without contention with other animals and without
ever touching the ground: this longing presents itself
throughout endless time in the form (or Platonic Idea) of
the sloth. It can hardly walk at all, being only adapted
for climbing ; helpless on the ground, it is agile on
trees and looks itself like a moss-clad bough in order to
escape the notice of its pursuers. But now let us consider
the matter from a somewhat more methodical and less
poetical point of view.

The manifest adaptation of each animal for its mode of
life and outward means of subsistence, even down to the
smallest detail, together with the exceeding perfection of its
organisation, form abundant material for teleological con
templation, which has always been a favourite occupation
of the human mind, and which, extended even to inanimate
Nature, has become the argument of the Physico-theological
Proof. The universal fitness for their ends, the obviously
intentional design in all the parts of the organism of the
lower animals without exception, proclaim too distinctly
for it ever to have been seriously questioned, that here no
forces of Nature acting by chance and without plan have
been at work, but a will. Now, that a will should act
otherwise than under the guidance of knowledge was in
conceivable, according to empirical science and views. For,
up to my time, as has been shown in the last chapter, will
and intellect had been regarded as absolutely inseparable,
nay, the will was looked upon as a mere operation of the
intellect, that presumptive basis of all that is spiritual.
Accordingly wherever the will acted, knowledge must have
been its guide; consequently it must have been its guide here
also. But the mediation of knowledge, which, as such, is

256 THE WILL IN NATURE.

exclusively directed towards the outside, brings with it, that
a will acting by means of it, can only act outwardly, that
is, only from one being upon another. Therefore the will,
of which unmistakable traces had been found, was not
sought for where these were discovered, but was removed
to the outside, and the animal became the product of a
will foreign to it, guided by knowledge, which must
have been very clear knowledge indeed, nay, the deeply ex
cogitated conception of a purpose ; and this purpose must
have preceded the animal's existence, and, together with
the will, whose product the animal is, have lain outside that
animal. According to this, the animal would have existed
in representation before existing in reality. This is the
basis of the train of thought on which the Physico-theo-
logical Proof is founded. But this proof is no mere
scholastic sophism, like the Ontological Proof : nor does it
contain an untiring natural opponent within itself, like the
Cosmological Proof, in that very same law of causality to
which it owes its existence. On the contrary, it is, in
reality, for the educated, what the Keraunological Proof l
is for the vulgar,2 and its plausibility is so great, so potent,
that the most eminent and at the same time least preju
diced minds have been deeply entangled in it. Voltaire,
for instance, who, after all sorts of other doubts, always
comes back to it, sees no possibility of getting over it and
even places its evidence almost on a level with that of a

1 I should like under this name to add a fourth to the three proofs
brought forward by Kant, i.e. the proof a terrore, which the ancient
saying of Petronius : primus in orbe Decs fecit timer, designates and of
which Hume's incomparable " Natural History of Religion " may be
considered as the critique. Understood in this sense, even the theologist
Schleiermacher's attempted proof might have its truth from the feeling
of dependence, though perhaps not exactly that truth which its originator
imagined it to have.

2 Socrates propounded it already in detail in Xenophon. (" Mem."
i. 4.) [Add. to 3rd ed.]

COMPARATIVE ANATOMY. 257

mathematical demonstration. Even Priestley too declares it
to be irrefutable.1 Hume's reflection and acumen alone stood
the test, even in this case ; in his " Dialogues on Natural
Religion, "2 which are so well worth reading, this true pre
cursor of Kant calls attention to the fact, that there is no
resemblance at all between the works of Nature and those
of an Art which proceeds according to a design. Now it
is precisely where he cuts asunder the nervus probandi of
this extremely insidious proof, as well as that of the two
others — in his Critique of Judgment and in his Critique of
Pure Reason — that Kant's merit shines most brilliantly.
A very brief summary of this Kantian refutation of the
Physico-theological Proof may be found in my chief work.3
Kant has earned for himself great merit by it ; for nothing
stands so much in the way of a correct insight into Nature
and into the essence of things as this view, by which they
are looked upon as having been made according to a precon
ceived plan. Therefore, if a Duke of Bridgewater offers
a prize of high value for the confirmation and perpetuation
of such fundamental errors, let it be our task, following in
the footsteps of Hume and Kant, to work undauntedly at
their destruction, without any other reward than truth.
Truth deserves respect : not what is opposed to it. Never
theless here, as elsewhere, Kant has confined himself to
negation ; but a negation only takes full effect when it has
been completed by a correct affirmation, this alone giving
entire satisfaction and in itself dislodging and superseding
error, according to the words of Spinoza : Sicut lux se ipsa
et tenebras manifestat, sic veritas norma sui et falsi est.
First of all therefore we say : the world is not made with
the help of knowledge, consequently also not from the out-

1 Priestley, "Disqu. on Matter and Spirit," sect. 16, p. 188.

2 Part 7, and in other places.

3 See "Die Welt ak W. u. V." vol. i. p. 597. (Yol. i. p. 631 of the
3rd ed.)

a

258 THE WILL IN NATURE.

side, but from the inside ; and next we endeavour to point
out the punctum saliens l of the world-egg. The physico-
theological thought, that Nature must have been regu
lated and fashioned by an intellect, however well it may
suit the untutored mind, is nevertheless fundamentally
wrong. For the intellect is only known to us in animal
nature, consequently as an absolutely secondary and
subordinate principle in the world, a product of the latest
origin ; it can never therefore have been the condition of
the existence of that world.2 Now the will on the contrary,
being that which fills every thing and manifests itself
immediately in each — thus showing each thing to be its
phenomenon — appears everywhere as that which is primary.
It is just for this reason, that the explanation of all teleo-
logical facts is to be found in the will of the being itself in
which they are observed.

Besides, the Physico -theological Proof may be simply
invalidated by the empirical observation, that works pro
duced by animal instinct, such as the spider's web, the bee's
honeycomb and its cells, the white ant's constructions, &c,
&c., are throughout constituted as if they were the result
of an intentional conception, of a wide-reaching providence
and of rational deliberation; whereas they are evidently
the work of a blind impulse, i.e. of a will not guided by
knowledge. From this it follows, that the conclusion from
such and such a nature to such and such a mode of coming
into being, has not the same certainty as the conclusion
from a consequent to its reason, which is in all cases a
sure one. I have devoted the twenty- seventh chapter of the
second volume of my chief work to a detailed consideration

1 The point at which the life -spark is kindled. [Tr.]
8 Nor can a mundus tntelligibilis precede a mundus sensibilis; since it
receives its material from the latter alone. It is not an intellect which
has brought forth Nature j it is, on the contrary, Nature which has
brought forth the intellect. [Add. to 3rd ed.

COMPARATIVE ANATOMY. 259

of the mechanical instincts of animals, which may be used,
together with the preceding one on Teleology, to complete
the whole examination of this subject in the present chapter.
Now, if we enter more closely into the above-mentioned
fitness of every animal's organisation for its mode of life
and means of subsistence, the question that first presents
itself is, whether that mode of life has been adapted to the
organisation, or vice versa. At first sight, the former as
sumption would seem to be the more correct one ; since,
in Time, the organisation precedes the mode of life, and
the animal is thought to have adopted the mode of
existence for which its structure was best suited, making
the best use of the organs it found within itself : thus, for
instance, we think that the bird flies because it has wings,
and that the ox butts because it has horns ; not conversely.
This view is shared by Lucretius (always an ominous sign
for an opinion) :

" Nil ideo quoniam natum est in corpore, ut uti
Possemus ; sed, quod natum est, id procreat us urn." l

Only this assumption does not explain how, collectively, the
quite different parts of an animal's organism so exactly
correspond to its way of lif e ; how no organ interferes with
another, each rather assisting the others and none re
maining unemployed; also that no subordinate organ
would be better suited to another mode of existence, while
the life which the animal really leads is determined by the
principal organs alone, but, on the contrary, each part of
the animal not only corresponds to every other part, but
also to its mode of life: its claws, for instance, are in
variably adapted for seizing the prey which its teeth are
suited to tear and break, and its intestinal canal to digest :
its limbs are constructed to convey it where that prey is to
be found, and no organ ever remains unemployed. The

1 This is expanded, vol. iy. pp. 825-843.

260 THE WILL IN NATURE.

ant-bear, for instance, is not only armed with long claws
on its fore-feet, in order to break into the nests of the
white ant, but also with a prolonged cylindrical muzzle,
in order to penetrate into them, with a small mouth and a
long, threadlike tongue, covered with a glutinous slime,
which it inserts into the white ants' nests and then with
draws covered with the insects that adhere to it : on the
other hand it has no teeth, because it does not want them.
Who can fail to see that the ant-bear's form stands in the
same relation to the white ants, as an act of the will to its
motive ? The contradiction between the powerful fore-feet
and long, strong, curved claws of the ant-bear and its com
plete lack of teeth, is at the same time so extraordinary,
that if the earth ever undergoes a fresh transformation,
the newly arising race of rational beings will find it an
insoluble enigma, if white ants are unknown to them.
The necks of birds, as of quadrupeds, are generally as
long as their legs, to enable them to reach down to the
ground where they pick up their food ; but those of aquatic
birds are often a good deal longer, because they have to
fetch up their nourishment from under the water while
swimming.1 Moor-fowl have exceedingly long legs, to
enable them to wade without drowning or wetting their
bodies, and a correspondingly long neck and beak, this last
being more or less strong, according to the things (reptiles,
fishes or worms) which have to be crushed ; and the
intestines of these animals are invariably adapted likewise
to this end. On the other hand, moor-fowl are provided
neither with talons, like birds of prey, nor with web-feet,

1 I have seen (Zooplast. Cab. I860) a humming-bird (colibri) with a
beak as long as the whole bird, head and tail included. This bird must
certainly have had to fetch out its food from a considerable depth, were
it only from the calyx of a flower (Cuvier, "Anat. Comp." vol. iv.
p. 374) ; otherwise it would not have given itself the luxury, or submitted
to the encumbrance, of such a beak.

COMPARATIVE ANATOMY. 261

like ducks : for the lex parsimonice natures admits of no
superfluous organ. Now, it is precisely this very law,
added to the circumstance, that no organ required for its
mode of life is ever wanting in any animal, and that
all, even the most heterogeneous, harmonize together and
are, as it were, calculated for a quite specially determined
way of life, for the element in which the prey dwells, for
the pursuit, the overcoming, the crushing and digesting of
that prey, — all this, we say, proves, that the animal's
structure has been determined by the mode of life by
which the animal desired to find its sustenance, and not
vice versa. It also proves, that the result is exactly the
same as if a knowledge of that mode of life and of its
outward conditions had preceded the structure, and as if
therefore each animal had chosen its equipment before it
assumed a body; just as a sportsman before starting
chooses his whole equipment, gun, powder, shot, pouch,
hunting-knife and dress, according to the game he intends
chasing. The latter does not take aim at the wild boar
because he happens to have a rifle : he took the rifle with
him and not a fowling-piece, because he intended to hunt
the wild boar ; and the ox does not butt because it happens
to have horns: it has horns because it intends to butt.
Now, to render this proof complete, we have the additional
circumstance, that in many animals, during the time they
are growing, the effort of the will to which a limb is
destined to minister, manifests itself before the existence
of the limb itself, its employment thus anticipating its
existence. Young he-goats, rams, calves, for instance,
butt with their bare polls before they have any horns ;
the young boar tries to gore on either side, before its
tusks are fully developed which would respond to the
intended effect, while on the other hand, it neglects to use
the smaller teeth it already has in its mouth and with
which it might really bite. Thus its mode of defending

262 THE WILL IN NATURE.

itself does not adapt itself to the existing weapons, but
vice versa. This had already been noticed by Galenas1
and by Lucretius 2 before him. All these circumstances
give us complete certainty, that the will does not, as a
supplementary thing proceeding from the intellect, employ
those instruments which it may happen to find, or use the
parts because just they and no others chance to be there ;
but that what is primary and original, is the endeavour to
live in this particular way, to contend in this manner, an
endeavour which manifests itself not only in the employ
ment, but even in the existence of the weapon : so much
so indeed, that the use of the weapon frequently precedes
its existence, thus denoting that it is the weapon which
arises out of the existence of the endeavour, not, con
versely, the desire to use it out of the existence of the
weapon. Aristotle expressed this long ago, when he said,
with reference to insects armed with stings : 3 Sia. TO Qvnov
t\eiv oir\ov t'^a (quia, iram Jiabent, arma habent), and further
on, generally speaking : * Ta tT opyava TT^OQ TO epyov »/ 0vVtc
TToiel, aXX' ov TO tpyov ir/oog TO. ooyava. (Natura enim instru-
inenta ad qfficium, non officium ad instrumenta accommodaf).
From which it follows, that the structure of each animal
is adapted to its will.

This truth forces itself upon thoughtful zoologists and
zootomists with such cogency, that unless their mind is at
the same time purified by a deeper philosophy, it may lead
them into strange errors. Now this actually happened to
a very eminent zoologist, the immortal De Lamarck, who
has acquired everlasting fame by his discovery of the clas-

1 Galenus, " De Usu Partium Anim.," i. 1.

2 Lucretius, v. pp. 1032-1039.

3 Aristot., "De Part. Animal.," iv. 6 : " They have a weapon because
they have passion." [Tr.]

4 Ibid. c. 12 : "Nature makes the tools for the work, not the work
for the tools." [Tr.]

COMPARATIVE ANATOMY. 263

sification of animals in vertebrata and non-vertebrata, so
admirable in depth of view. For he quite seriously main
tains and tries to prove x at length, that the shape of each
animal species, the weapons peculiar to it, and its organs
of every sort destined for outward use, were by no means
present at the origin of that species, but have on the
contrary come into being gradually in the course of time
and through continued generation, in consequence of the
exertions of the animal's will, evoked by the nature
of its position and surroundings, through its own re
peated efforts and the habits to which these gave rise.
Aquatic birds and mammalia that swim, he says, have
only become web-footed through stretching their toes
asunder in swimming ; moor-fowl acquired their long legs
and necks by wading; horned cattle only gradually acquired
horns because as they had no proper teeth for combating,
they fought with their heads, and this combative propen
sity in course of time produced horns or antlers ; the snail
was originally, like other mollusca, without feelers ; but
out of the desire to feel the objects lying before it, these
gradually arose ; the whole feline species acquired claws
only in course of time, from their desire to tear the flesh
of their prey, and the moveable coverings of those claws,
from the necessity of protecting them in walking without
being prevented from using them when they wished ; the
giraffe, in the barren, grassless African deserts, being re
duced for its food to the leaves of lofty trees, stretched
out its neck and forelegs until at last it acquired its sin
gular shape, with a height in front of twenty feet, and thus
De Lamarck goes on describing a multitude of animal
species as arising according to the same principle, in doing
which he overlooks the obvious objection which may be
made, that long before the organs necessary for its preser-

1 De Lamarck, " Philosophie Zoologique," vol. i. c. 7, and " Histoire
Naturelle des Auimaux sans Vertebres," vol. i. Introd. pp. 180-212.

264 THE WILL IN NATURE.

vation could have been produced by means of such endea
vours as these through countless generations, the whole
species must have died out from the want of them. To
such a degree may we be blinded by a hypothesis which
has once laid hold of us ! Nevertheless in this instance the
hypothesis arose out of a very correct and profound view
of Nature : it is an error of genius, which in spite of all
the absurdity it contains, still does honour to its originator.
The true part of it belongs to De Lamarck, as an investi
gator of Nature ; he saw rightly that the primary element
which has determined the animal's organisation, is the will
of that animal itself. The false part must be laid to the
account of the backward state of Metaphysics in France,
where the views of Locke and of his feeble follower, Con-
dillac, in fact still hold their ground and therefore bodies
are held to be things in themselves, Time and Space quali
ties of things in themselves ; and where the great doctrine
of the Ideal nature of Space and of Time and of all that
is represented in them, which has been so extremely fertile
in its results, has not yet penetrated. De Lamarck there
fore could not conceive his construction of living beings
otherwise than in Time, through succession. Errors of
this sort, as well as the gross, absurd, atomic theory of the
French and the edifying physico-theological considerations
of the English, have been banished for ever from Germany
by Kant's profound influence. So salutary was the effect
produced by this great mind, even upon a nation capable of
subsequently forsaking him to run after charlatanism and
empty bombast. But the thought could never enter into
De Lamarck's head, that the animal's will, as a thing in
itself, might lie outside Time, and in this sense be prior to
the animal itself. Therefore he assumes the animal to
have first been without any clearly defined organs, but also
without any clearly defined tendencies, and to have been
equipped only with perception. Through this it learns to

COMPARATIVE ANATOMY. 265

know the circumstances in which it has to live and from
that knowledge arise its desires, i.e. its will, from which
again spring its organs or definite embodiment ; this last
indeed with the help of generation and therefore in bound
less Time. If De Lamarck had had the courage to carry
out his theory fully, he ought to have assumed a primary
animal l which, to be consistent, must have originally had
neither shape nor organs, and then proceeded to trans
form itself according to climate and local conditions into
myriads of animal shapes of all sorts, from the gnat to
the elephant. — But this primary animal is in truth the
will to live ; as such however, it is metaphysical, not phy
sical. Most certainly the shape and organisation of each
animal species has been determined by its own will accord
ing to the circumstances in which it wished to live ; not
however as a thing physical in Time, but on the contrary
as a thing metaphysical outside Time. The will did not
proceed from the intellect, nor did the intellect exist,
together with the animal, before the will made its appear
ance as a mere accident, a secondary, or rather tertiary,
thing. It is on the contrary the will which is the prius,
the thing in itself : its phenomenon (mere representation
in the cognitive intellect and its forms of Space and Time)
is the animal, fully equipped with all its organs which
represent the will to live in those particular circumstances.
Among these organs is the intellect also — knowledge itself
— which, like the rest of those organs, is exactly adapted to
the mode of life of each animal; whereas, according to
De Lamarck, it is the will which arises out of knowledge.
Behold the countless varieties of animal shapes ; how en
tirely is each of them the mere image of its volition, the
evident expression of the strivings of the will which con
stitute its character ! Their difference in shape is only the
portrait of their difference in character. Ferocious animals,
1 Urthier.

266 THE WILL IN NATURE.

destined for combat and rapine, appear armed with for
midable teeth and claws and strong muscles ; their sight
is adapted for great distances, especially when they have
to mark their prey from a dizzy height, as is the case with
eagles and condors. Timid animals, whose will it is to
seek their safety in flight instead of contest, present them
selves with light, nimble legs and sharp hearing in lieu of
all weapons ; a circumstance which has even necessitated a
etr iking prolongation of the outer ear in the most timid of
them all, the hare. The interior corresponds to the exte
rior : carnivorous animals have short intestines ; herbivo
rous animals long ones, suited to a protracted assimilation.
Yigorous respiration and rapid circulation of the blood,
represented by appropriate organs, always accompany
great muscular strength and irritability as their necessary
conditions, and nowhere is contradiction possible. Each
particular striving of the will presents itself in a particular
modification of shape. The abode of the prey therefore
has determined the shape of its pursuer : if that prey takes
refuge in regions difficult of access, in remote hiding
places, in night or darkness, the pursuer assumes the form
best suited to those circumstances, and no shape is rejected
as too grotesque by the will to live, in order to attain its
ends. The cross-bill (loxia curvirostra) presents itself with
this abnormal form of its organ of nutrition, in order to
be able to extract the seeds out of the scales of the fir
cone. Moor-fowls appear equipped with extra long legs,
extra long necks and extra long beaks, in short, the
strangest shapes, in order to seek out reptiles in their
marshes. Then we have the ant-bear with its body four
feet long, its short legs, its strong claws, and its long,
narrow, toothless muzzle provided with a threadlike, gluti
nous tongue for the purpose of digging out the white ants
from their nests. The pelican goes fishing with a huge
pouch under its beak in which to pack its fish, when

COMPARATIVE ANATOMY. 267

caught. In order to surprise their prey while asleep in
the night, owls fly out provided with enormous pupils
which enable them to see in the dark, and with very soft
feathers to make their flight noiseless and thus permit
them to fall unawares upon their sleeping prey without
awakening it by their movements. Silurus, gymnotus and
torpedo bring a complete electric apparatus into the world
with them, in order to stun their prey before they can
reach it ; and also as a defence against their own pursuers.
For wherever anything living breathed, there immediately
came another to devour it,1 and every animal is in a way
designed and calculated throughout, down to the minutest
detail, for the purpose of destroying some other animal.
Ichneumons, for instance, among insects, lay their eggs in
the bodies of certain caterpillars and similar larvce, in
which they bore holes with their stings, in order to ensure
nourishment for their future brood. Now those kinds which
feed on larvce that crawl about freely, have short stings not
more than about one-third of an inch long, whereas pimpla
manifestator, which feeds upon chelostoma maxillosa, whose
larvce lie hidden in old trees at great depth and are not
accessible to it, has a sting two inches long ; and the sting
of the ichneumon strobillce which lays its eggs in larvcp,
dwelling in fir-cones, is nearly as long. With these stings
they penetrate to the larva in which they bore a hole
and deposit one egg, whose product subsequently de-

1 Animated by the feeling of this truth, Kobert Owen, after passing
in review the numerous and often very large Australian fossile marsupi-
alia — sometimes as big as the rhinoceros — came as early as 1842 to the
conclusion, that a large beast of prey must have contemporaneously
existed. This conclusion was afterwards confirmed, for in 1846 he
received part of the fossile skull of a beast of prey of the size of the lion,
which he named thylacoleo, i.e. lion with a pouch, since it is also a
marsupial. (See the " Times " of the 19th of May, 1866, where there
is an article on " Palaeontology," with an account of Owen's lecture
at the Government School of Mines. [Add. to 3rd ed.]

268 THE WILL IN NATURE.

vours this larva.1 Just as clearly does the will to escape
their enemies manifest itself in the defensive equipment
of animals that are the objects of pursuit. Hedgehogs
and porcupines raise up a forest of spears; armadillos,
scaly ant-eaters and tortoises appear cased from head to
foot in armour which is inaccessible to tooth, beak or
claw ; and so it is, on a smaller scale, with the whole class
of Crustacea. Others again seek protection by deceiving
their pursuers rather than by resisting them physically:
thus the sepia has provided itself with materials for
surrounding itself with a dark cloud on the approach of
danger. The sloth is deceptively like its moss-clad bough,
and the frog its leaf; and many insects resemble their
dwelling-places. The negro's louse is black;2 so, to be
sure, is our flea also ; but the latter, in providing itself
with an extremely powerful apparatus for making irregular
jumps to a considerable distance, trusted to these for pro
tection. — We can however make the anticipation in all
these arrangements more intelligible to ourselves by the
same anticipation which shows itself in the mechanical
instincts of animals. Neither the young spider nor the
ant-lion know the prey for which they lay traps, when
they do it for the first time. And it is the same when
they are on the defensive. According to Latreille, the
insect bombex kills the parnope with its sting, although it
neither eats it nor is attacked by it, simply because the
parnope will lay its eggs in the bombex*s nest, and by
doing this will interfere with the development of its eggs ;
yet it does not know this. Anticipations of this kind once
more confirm the ideal nature of Time, which indeed
always becomes manifest as soon as the will as thing

1 Kirby and Spence, "Introduction to Entomology," vol. i. p. 355.
[Add. to 3rd ed.]

2 Blumenbach, "De hum. gen. variet. nat." p. 50. Sommeriog,
« On the Negro," p. 8.

COMPARATIVE ANATOMY. 269

in itself is in question. Not only with" respect to the
points here mentioned, but to many others besides, the
mechanical instincts and physiological functions of animals
serve to explain each other mutually, because the will
without knowledge is the agent in both.

As the will has equipped itself with every organ and
every weapon, offensive as well as defensive, so has it like
wise provided itself in every animal shape with an intellect,
as a means of preservation for the individual and the
species. It was precisely in this account that the ancients
called the intellect the ^yf/zovt/coV, i.e. the guide and leader.
Accordingly the intellect, being exclusively destined to
serve the will, always exactly corresponds to it. Beasts
of prey stood in greater need of intellect, and in fact
have more intelligence, than herbivorous animals. The
elephant certainly forms an exception, and so does even
the horse to a certain extent ; but the admirable in
telligence of the elephant was necessary on account of the
length of its life (200 years) and of the scantiness of its
progeny, which obliged it to provide for a longer and surer
preservation of the individual : and this moreover in coun
tries teeming with the most rapacious, the strongest and
the nimblest beasts of prey. The horse too has a longer life
| and a scantier progeny than the ruminants, and as it has
neither horns, tusks, trunk, nor indeed any weapon save
perhaps its hoofs, it needed greater intelligence and swift
ness in order to elude pursuit. Monkeys needed their extra
ordinary intelligence, partly because of the length of their
life, which even in the moderate-sized animal extends to
fifty years ; partly also because of their scanty progeny,
which is limited to one at a time, but especially because of
their hands, which, to be properly used, required the direc
tion of an understanding. For monkeys depend upon
their hands, not only for their defence by means of outer
weapons such as sticks and stones, but also for their

270 THE WILL IN KATUBE.

nourishment, this last necessitating a variety of artificial
means and a social and artificial system of rapine in general,
the passing from hand to hand of stolen fruit, the placing
of sentinels, &c. &c. Add to this, that it is especially in
their youth, before they have attained their full muscular
development, that this intelligence is most prominent. In
the pongo or ourang-outang for instance, the brain plays
a far more important part and the understanding is much
greater during its youth than at its maturity, when the
muscular powers having attained full development, they
take the place of the proportionately declining intellect.
This holds good of all sorts of monkeys, so that here there
fore the intellect acts for a time vicariously for the yet un
developed muscular strength. We find this process dis
cussed at length in the " Eesume des Observations de Fr.
Cuvier sur 1'instinct et 1'intelligence des animaux," par
Mourens (1841), from which I have quoted the whole pas
sage referring to this question in the second volume of my
chief work, at the end of the thirty-first chapter, and this is
my only reason for not repeating it here. On the whole, intel
ligence gradually increases from the rodents x to the rumi
nants, from the ruminants to the pachyderms, and from
these again to the beasts of prey and finally to the quad-
rumana, and anatomy shows a gradual development of the

1 That the lowest place should be given to the rodents, seems however
to proceed from & priori rather than from & posteriori considerations :
that is to say, from the circumstance, that their brain has extremely
faint or small convolutions ; so that too much weight may have been
given to this point. In sheep and calves the convolutions are numerous
and deep, yet how is it with their intelligence ? The mechanical instincts
of the beaver are again greatly assisted by its understanding, and even'
rabbits show remarkable intelligence (see Leroy's beautiful work : ['
"Letters Philosophiques sur 1'Intelligence des Animaux," lettre 3, p.J
149). Even rats give proof of quite uncommon intelligence, of which
some remarkable instances may be found in the " Quarterly RerieWjH
No. 201, Jan.-March, 1857, in a special article entitled " Rats."

COMPARATIVE ANATOMY. 271

brain in similar order which corresponds to this result of
external observation. (According to Flourens and Fr.
Cuvier.) l Among the reptiles, serpents are the most intelli
gent, for they may even be trained ; this is so, because they
are beasts of prey and propagate more slowly than the rest
— especially the venomous ones. And here also, as with the
physical weapons, we find the will everywhere as the prius ;
its equipment, the intellect, as the posterius. Beasts of prey
do not hunt, nor do foxes thieve, because they have more
intelligence ; on the contrary, they have more intelligence,
just as they have stronger teeth and claws too, because
they wished to live by hunting and thieving. The fox even
made up at once for his inferiority in muscular power and
strength of teeth by the extraordinary subtility of his un
derstanding. Our thesis is singularly illustrated by the case
of the bird dodo or dronte (didus ineptus) on the island
of Mauritius, whose species, it is well known, has died out,
and which, as its Latin name denotes, was exceedingly
stupid, and this explains its disappearance ; so that here
it seems indeed as if Nature had for once gone too far
in her lex parsimonice and thereby in a sense brought
forth an abortion in the species, as she so often does in the
individual, which was unable to subsist, precisely because
it was an abortion. If, on this occasion, anyone were to
raise the question as to whether Nature ought not to have
provided insects with at least sufficient intelligence to pre
vent them from flying into the flame of a candle, our
answer would be : most certainly ; only she did not know
that men would make candles and light them, and natura
nihil agit frustra. Insect intelligence is therefore only in
sufficient where the surroundings are artificial.2

1 The most intelligent birds are also birds of prey, wherefore many ot
them,especially falcons, are highly susceptible of training. [Add. to 3rd ed.]

a That the negroes should have become the special victims of the
slave-trade, is evidently a consequence of the inferiority of their intelli

272 THE WILL IN NATURE.

Everywhere indeed intelligence depends in the first in
stance upon the cerebral system, and this stands in a ne
cessary relation to the rest of the organism ; therefore cold
blooded animals are greatly inferior to warm-blooded ones,
and invertebrate animals to vertebrata. But the organism is
precisely nothing but the will become visible, to which, as
that which is absolutely prius, everything constantly refers.
The needs and aims of that will give in each phenomenon
the rule for the means to be employed, and these means
must harmonize with one another. Plants have no self-
consciousness because they have no power of locomotion ;
for of what use would self-consciousness be to them unless
it enabled them to seek what was salutary and flee what
was noxious to them ? And conversely, of what use could
power of locomotion be to them, as they have no self-con
sciousness with which to guide it. The inseparable duality
of Sensibility and Irritability does not yet appear there
fore in the plant ; they continue slumbering in the repro
ductive force which is their fundament, and in which alone
the will here objectifies itself. The sun-flower, and every
other plant, wills for light ; but as yet their movement to
wards light is not separate from their apprehension of it,
and both coincide with their growth. — Human understand
ing, which is so superior to that of all other beings, and is
assisted by Eeason (the faculty for non-perceptible repre
sentations, i.e. for conceptions ; reflection, thinking faculty),
is nevertheless only just proportionate, partly to Man's
requirements, which greatly surpass those of animals and
multiply to infinity ; partly to his entire lack of all natural
weapons and covering, and to his relatively weaker mus
cular strength, which is greatly inferior to that of monkeys
of his own size ; l lastly also, to the slowness with which his

gence compared with that of other human races j though this by no means
justifies the fact. [Add. to 3rd ed.]

1 As is likewise his capacity for escaping from his pursuers ; fbr in

COMPARATIVE ANATOMY. 273

race multiplies and the length of his childhood and life,
which demand secure preservation of the individual. All
these great requirements had to be satisfied by means of
intellectual powers, which, for this reason, predominate in
him. But we find the intellect secondary and subordinate
everywhere, and destined exclusively to serve the purposes
of the will. As a rule too, it always remains true to its
destiny and subservient to the will. How nevertheless,
it frees itself in particular instances from this bondage
through an abnormal preponderance of cerebral life, whereby
purely objective cognition becomes possible which may be
enhanced to genius, I have shown at length in the aesthetic
part of my chief work.1

Now, after all these reflections upon the precise agree
ment between the will and the organisation of each animal,
if we inspect a well-arranged osteological collection from
this point of view, it will certainly seem to us as if we
saw one and the same being (De Lamarck's primary
animal, or, more properly, the will to live) changing its
shape according to circumstances, and thus producing all
this multiplicity of forms out of the same number and
arrangement of its bones, by prolonging and curtailing,
strengthening and weakening them. This number and
arrangement of the bones, which Geoffrey de St. Hilaire 2
called the anatomical element, continues, as he has tho
roughly shown, in all essential points unchanged: it
is a constant magnitude, something which is absolutely
given beforehand, irrevocably fixed by an unfathomable
necessity — an immutability which I should compare with
the permanence of matter in all physical and chemical

this respect all the four-footed mammalia surpass him. [Add. to
3rd ed.]

1 [See Third Book of the W. a. W. u. V. ; later also, in my " Parerga,"
vol. ii. §§ 50-57 and § 206. (§§ 51-58, and § 210 of the 2nd edition.)

2 " Principes de Philosophic Zoologique," 1830.

T

274 THE WILL IN NATURE.

changes : but to this I shall soon return. Conjointly with
this immutability of the anatomical element, we have the
greatest susceptibility to modification, the greatest plas
ticity and flexibility of these same bones with reference
to size, shape and adaptation to different purposes, all
which we see determined by the will with primary
strength and freedom according to the aims prescribed
to it by external circumstances: it makes out of these
materials whatever its necessity for the time being requires.
If it desires to climb about in trees, it catches at the
boughs at once with four hands, while it stretches the ulua
and radius to an excessive length and immediately prolongs
the os coccygis to a curly tail, a yard long, in order to hang
by it to the boughs and swing itself from one branch to
another. If, on the other hand, it desires to crawl in the
mud as a crocodile, to swim as a seal, or to burrow as a
mole, these same arm-bones are shortened till they are no
longer recognisable ; in the last case the metacarpus and
phalanges are enlarged to disproportionately large shovel-
paws, to the prejudice of the other bones. But if it wishes
to fly through the air as a bat, not only are the os humeri,
radius and alnus prolonged in an incredible manner, but
the usually small and subordinate carpus, metacarpus and
2^halanges digitorum expand to an immense length, as in
St. Anthony's vision, outmeasuring the length of the
animal's body, in order to spread out the wing-membrane.
If, in order to browse upon the tops of very tall African
trees, it has, as a giraffe, placed itself upon extraordinarily
high fore-legs, the same seven vertebra? of the neck, which
never vary as to number and which, in the mole, were con
tracted so as to be no longer recognisable, are now pro
longed to such a degree, that here, as everywhere else, the
neck acquires the same length as the fore-legs, in order to
enable the head to reach down to drinking-water. But where,
as is the case when it appears as the elephant, a long neck

COMPARATIVE ANATOMY. 275

could not have borne the weight of the enormous, unwieldy
head — a weight increased moreover by tusks a yard long
— the neck remains short, as an exception, and a trunk
is let down as an expedient, to lift up food and draw
water from below and also to reach up to the tops of
trees. In accordance with these transformations, we see
in all of them the skull, the receptacle containing the
understanding, at the same time proportionately expand,
develop, curve itself, as the mode of procuring nourish
ment becomes more or less difficult and requires more
or less intelligence ; and the different degrees of the under
standing manifest themselves clearly to the practised eye
in the curves of the skull.

Now, in all this, that anatomical element we have men
tioned above as fixed and invariable, certainly remains in
so far an enigma, as it does not come within the teleolo-
gical explanation, which only begins after the assump
tion of that element ; since the intended organ might
in many cases have been rendered equally suitable for its
purpose even with a different number and disposition of
bones. It is easy to understand, for instance, why the
human skull should be formed out of eight bones: that
is, to enable them to be drawn together by the fontanels
during birth ; but we do not see why a chicken which
breaks through its egg-shell should necessarily have the
same number of skull-bones. We must therefore assume
this anatomical element to be based, partly on the unity
and identity of the will to live in general, partly on the
circumstance, that the archetypal forms of animals have
proceeded one from the other,1 wherefore the fundamental
type of the whole race was preserved. It is this ana
tomical element which Aristotle means by his dvceyxata
and the mutability of its shapes according to diffe-

1 " Parerga," vol. ii. § 91 ; § 93 of the 2nd edition.

276 THE WILL IN NATURE.

rent purposes lie calls TJJV /caret \6yov fyvai*? and explains
by it how the material for upper incisors has been employed
for horns in horned cattle. Quite rightly : since the only
ruminants which have no horns, the camel and the musk-
ox, have upper incisors, and these are wanting in all
horned ruminants.

No other explanation or assumption enables us nearly as
well to understand either the complete suitableness to
purpose and to the external conditions of existence I have
here shown in the skeleton, or the admirable harmony and
fitness of internal mechanism in the structure of each.
animal, as the truth I have elsewhere firmly established :
that the body of an animal is precisely nothing but the will
itself of that animal brought to cerebral perception as
representation — through the forms of Space, Time and
Causality — in other words, the mere visibility, objectivity
of the Will. For, if this is once pre-supposed, everything
in and belonging to that body must conspire towards the
final end : the life of this animal. Nothing superfluous,
nothing deficient, nothing inappropriate, nothing insuffi
cient or incomplete of its kind, can therefore be found in
it ; on the contrary, all that is required must be there,
and just in the proportion needed, never more. For
here artist, work and materials are one and the same.
Each organism is therefore a consummate master-piece of
exceeding perfection. Here the will did not first cherish
the intention, first recognise the end and then adapt the
means to it and conquer the material ; its willing was
rather immediately the aim and immediately the attain
ment of that aim; no foreign appliances needing to be
overcome were wanted — willing, doing and attaining were
here one and the same. Thus the organism presents itself
as a miracle which admits of no comparison with any work

1 See Aristotle, " De Partibus Animalium," iii. c, 2 sub fin&m : irwg
£t T~IC avayKdiaQ (pvaewg K. T, X.

COMPARATIVE ANATOMY. 277

of human artifice wrought by the lamplight of know
ledge.1

Our admiration for the consummate perfection and fit
ness for their ends in all the works of Nature, is at the
bottom based upon our viewing them in the same light as
we do our own works. In these, in the first place, the will
to do the work and the work are two different things ;
then again two other things lie between these two : firstly,
the medium of representation, which, taken by itself, is
foreign to the will, through which the will must pass
before it realizes itself here; and secondly the material
foreign to the will here at work, on which a form foreign
to it has to be forced, which it resists, because the
material already belongs to another will, that is to say,
to its own nature, its forma substantialis, the (Platonic)
idea, expressed by it : therefore this material has first
to be overcome, and however deeply the artificial form
may have penetrated, will always continue inwardly resist-

1 The appearance of every animal therefore presents a totality, a
unity, a perfection and a rigidly carried out harmony in all its parts
which is so entirely based upon a single fundamental thought, that even
the strangest animal shape seems to the attentive observer as if it were
the only right, nay, only possible form of existence, and as if there
could be no other than just this very one. The expression " natural "
used to denote that a thing is a matter of course, and that it cannot be
otherwise, is in its deepest foundation based upon this. Gothe himself
was struck by this unity when contemplating whelks and crabs at Venice,
and it caused him to exclaim : " How delightful, how glorious is a living
thing ! how well adapted for its condition ; how true, how real ! "
(" Life," vol. iv. p. 223). No artist therefore, who has not made it bis
business to study such forms for years and to penetrate into their meaning
and comprehension, can rightly imitate them. Without this study his
work will seem as if it were pasted together : the parts no doubt will be
there, but the bond which unites them and gives them cohesion, the
spirit, the idea, which is the objectivity of the primary act of the will
presenting itself as this or that particular species, will be wanting.
[Add. to 3rd ed.]

278 THE WILL IN NATURE.

ing. It is quite a different thing with Nature's works,
which are not, like our own, indirect, but on the contrary,
direct manifestations of the will. Here the will acts in its
primordial nature, that is, unconsciously. No mediating
representation here separates the will and the work : they
are one. And even the material is one with them : for
matter is the mere visibility of the will. Therefore here
we find Matter completely permeated by Form ; or, better
still, they are of quite the same origin, only existing
mutually one for the other ; and in so far they are
one. That we separate them in works of Nature as
well as in works of Art, is a mere abstraction. Pure
Matter, absolutely without Form or quality, which we
think as the material of a product of Nature, is merely
an ens rationis and cannot enter into any experience;
whereas the material of a work of Art is empirical
Matter, consequently already has a Form. The [distinc
tive] character of Nature's products is the identity of form
and substance; that of products of Art the diversity of
these two.1 It is because Matter is the mere visibility of
Form in Nature's products, that, even empirically, we see
Form appear as a mere production of Matter, bursting
forth from, its inside in crystallisation, in vegetable and
animal generatio cequivoca, which last cannot be doubted,
at any rate in the epizoa.2 — For this reason we may even
assume that nowhere, either on any planet or satellite, will
Matter come to a state of endless repose, but rather that

1 It is a great truth which Bruno expresses (" De Immense et Innu-
merabili," 8, 10) : " Ars tractat materiam alienam : natura materiam
propriam. Ars circa materiam est ; natura interior matcrics" He treats
this subject much more fully, ts Delia Causa," Dial. 3, p. 252 et seqq. Page
255 he declares the forma substantiate to be the form of every product
of Nature, which is the same as the soul. [Add. to 3rd ed.]

a Thus the saying of the Schoolmen is verified : " Materia appetit
formam." See " Die Welt a. W. u. V." 3rd edition, vol. ii. p. 352.
[Add. to 3rd ed.]

COMPARATIVE ANATOMY. 279

its inherent forces (i.e. the will, whose mere visibility it
is) will always put an end again to the repose which has
commenced, always awaking again from their sleep, to
resume their activity as mechanical, physical, chemical,
organic forces ; since at all times they only wait for the
opportunity to do so.

But if we want to understand Nature's proceeding, we
must not try to do it by comparing her works with our
own. The real essence of every animal form, is an act of
the will outside representation, consequently outside its
forms of Space and Time also; which act, just on that
account, knows neither sequence nor juxtaposition, but has,
on the contrary, the most indivisible unity. But when our
cerebral perception comprehends that form, and still more
when its inside is dissected by the anatomical knife, then
that which originally and in itself was foreign to know
ledge and its laws, is brought under the light of know
ledge ; but then also, it has to present itself in conformity
with the laws and forms of knowledge. The original unity
and indivisibility of that act of the will, of that truly
metaphysical being, then appears divided into parts lying
side by side and functions following one upon another,
which all nevertheless present themselves as connected to
gether in closest relationship one to another for mutual
help and support, as means and ends one to the other.
The understanding, in thus apprehending these things, now
perceives the original unity re-establishing itself out of a mul
tiplicity which its own form of knowledge had first brought
about, and involuntarily taking for granted that its own
way of perceiving this is the way in which this animal form
comes into being, it is now struck with admiration for the
profound wisdom with which those parts are arranged,
those functions combined. This is the meaning of Kant's
great doctrine, that Teleology is brought into Nature by
our own understanding, which accordingly wonders at a

280 THE WILL IN NATURE.

miracle of its own creation.1 If I may use a trivial simile
to elucidate so sublime a matter, this astonishment very
much resembles that of our understanding when it discovers
that all multiples of 9, when their single figures are added
together, give as their product either the number 9 or one
whose single figures again make 9 ; yet it is that very
understanding itself which has prepared for itself this sur
prise in the decimal system. According to the Physico-
theological argument, the actual existence of the world has
been preceded by its existence in an intellect : if the world
is designed for an end, it must have existed as representa
tion before it came into being. Now I say, on the con
trary, in Kant's sense : if the world is to be representation,
it must present itself as designed for an end; and this
only takes place in an intellect.

It undoubtedly follows from my doctrine, that every
being is its own work. Nature, which is incapable of false
hood and is as native as genius, asserts the same thing down
right ; since each being merely kindles the spark of life at
another exactly similar being, and then makes itself before
our eyes, taking the materials for this from outside, form
and movement from its own self: this process we call
growth and development. Thus, even empirically, each
being stands before us as its own work. But Nature's
language is not understood because it is too simple.

1 Compare " Die Welt a. W. u. V." 3rd edition, vol. II. p. 375.
[Add. to 3rd edj

PHYSIOLOGY OF PLANTS.

THE corroborations I am now about to bring forward
of the phenomenon of the will in plants, proceed
chiefly from French sources, from a nation whose tenden
cies are decidedly empirical and which is reluctant to
go a step beyond what is immediately given. The infor
mant moreover is Cuvier, whose rigid adherence to the
purely empirical gave rise to the famous dispute between
him and Geoffroy de St. Hilaire. So we must not be as
tonished if the language we meet with here is less decided
than in the preceding German corroborations and if we find
each concession made with cautious reserve.

In his "Histoire des Progres des Sciences Naturelles
depuis 1789 jusqu' a ce jour," l Cuvier says : " Plants have
certain apparently spontaneous movements, which they
show under certain circumstances and which at times so
closely resemble those of animals, that a sort of feeling
and will might almost be attributed to plants on this
account, especially by those who think they can perceive
something of the same kind in the movements of the
inward parts of animals. Thus the tops of trees always
have a vertical tendency, excepting when they incline
towards the light. Their roots seek out good earth
and moisture and, in order to attain these, deviate from
the straight course. Yet these different tendencies can
not be explained by the influence of external causes,

1 Vol. i. p. 245. 1826.

282 THE WILL IN NATTJEE.

unless we also assume the existence of an inner natural
disposition, susceptible of being roused, which differs from

the mere mechanical force in inorganic bodies

Decandolle made some remarkable experiments that proved
to him the existence of a sort of habit in plants which
may be overcome by artificial light, but only after a certain
time. Plants that had been shut up in a cellar which was
continually lit by lamps, did not on this account leave off
closing in the evening and opening again in the morning
for several days. And there are other habits besides which
plants are able to adopt and to abandon. Flowers that
habitually close in wet weather, finish by remaining open
if the wet weather lasts too long. When M. Desfontaines
took a sensitive -plant with him in his carriage, the jolting
movement at first caused it to contract, but at last it ex
panded again as when in complete repose. Therefore
even in these cases, light, moisture, &c., &c., only act in
virtue of an inner disposition, which may be neutralized or
modified by the continuation of that very activity itself ;
and the vital energy of plants, like that of animals, is sub
ject to fatigue and exhaustion. The hedysarum gyrans is
singularly characterized by the movements of its leaves
which continue day and night without needing any sort of
stimulus. Surely, if any phenomenon can cause illusion
and remind us of the voluntary movements of animals, it
is this. Broussonet, Silvestre, Gels and Halle have fully
described it, and have shown that the plant's action depends
entirely upon its own healthy condition."

Again, in the third volume of the same work, p. 166
(1828), Cuvier says : " M. Dutrochet adds some physiolo
gical considerations to which his own experiments had led
him, and which in his opinion prove that the movements of
plants are spontaneous, i.e. that they depend upon an inner
principle which immediately receives the influence of outer
agencies. As he is however reluctant to admit that plants

PHYSIOLOGY OF PLANTS.

have feeling, lie makes use of the word ' nervimotilite.' "• —
Here I must observe, that when we come to examine it
closely, what we think to ourselves in the conception of
spontaneity, is in the end always the same thing as manifes
tation of will, with which spontaneity would therefore be
simply synonymous. The only difference -between them
consists in the conception of spontaneity being derived from
outer perception, while that of manifestation of will is
drawn from our own consciousness. — I find a remarkable
instance of the impetuous violence of this spontaneity, even
in plants, in the following communication contained in the
" Cheltenham Examiner : " x " Last Thursday four enor
mous mushrooms performed a heroic feat of a new kind, in
one of our most crowded streets, by lifting up a huge block
of stone in their strenuous effort to make their way into
the visible world."

In the " Mem. de 1'Acad. d. Sciences de 1'annee " (1821),
Cuvier says 2 : — " For centuries botanists have been search
ing for the reason why in a seed which is germinating the
root invariably grows downwards, while the stalk as
invariably grows upwards, no matter what be the posi
tion in which the seed is placed. M. Dutrochet put some
seeds into holes bored in the bottom of a vessel filled
with damp mould, which he hung up to a beam in his
room. Now, in this case, the stem might have been
expected to grow downwards. Not at all : the roots found
their way to the air below, and the stems were prolonged
so as to traverse the damp mould until they reached its
upper surface. According to M. Dutrochet, the direction
in which plants grow, is determined by an inner principle
and not at all by the attraction of the bodies towards
which they direct themselves. A mistletoe seed that was
fastened to the point of a perfectly moveable needle fixed

1 Repeated in the " Times" of June 2nd, 1841.

2 Vol. v. p. 171. Paris, 1826.

284 THE WILL IN NATURE.

on a peg, with a small plank placed near it, was induced
to germinate. It soon began to send out shoots towards
the plank, which it reached in five days without having
communicated the slightest movement to the needle. The
stems of onions and leeks with their bulbs, deposited in
dark places, grow upwards, although more slowly than in
light ones : they grow upwards even if placed in water : a
fact which suffices to prove that neither light nor moisture
determines the direction of their growth." — Still C. II.
Schultz asserts l that he made seeds germinate in a dark
box with holes bored in the bottom, and succeeded in
inducing the plants to grow upside down, by means of
a mirror fastened to the box, which reflected the sun
light.

In the " Dictionnaire des Sciences Naturelles" (article
Animal) we find: "If, on the one hand, animals show
avidity in their search after nourishment as well as power
of discrimination in the selection of it, roots of plants may,
on the other hand, be observed to direct themselves
towards the side where the soil contains most nourish
ment, nay, even to seek out the smallest crevices in rocks
which may contain any food. If we twist a bough so as
to make the upper surface of its leaves the under one,
these leaves even will twist their stems in order to regain
the position best suited for the exercise of their functions
(i.e. so as to have the smooth side uppermost). Is it quite
certain that this takes place unconsciously ? "

F. J. Meyen has devoted a chapter, entitled " Of the
movements and sensations of plants," to a full investiga
tion of the subject now before us. In this he says 2 :
" Not unfrequently potatoes, stored in deep, dark cellars,

1 C. H. Schultz, " Sur la Circulation dans les Plantes," a prize-essay,
1839.

8 F. J. Meyen," Neues System der Pflanzenphysiologe " (1839), vol. iii,
p. 585.

PHYSIOLOGY OF PLANTS. 285

may be observed towards summer to shoot forth stems
which invariably grow in the direction of the chinks
through which the light comes into the cellar, and to con
tinue thus growing until they at last reach the aperture
which receives the light directly. In such cases potato-
stalks have been known to reach a length of twenty feet ;
whereas under ordinary circumstances, even such as are
most favourable to the growth of the potato, the stalk is
seldom longer than from three to four feet. It is inte
resting to watch closely the course taken by a potato-
stalk thus growing in darkness, in its endeavours to reach
the light. It tries to do so by the shortest road, but not
being firm enough to grow straight across through the air
without support, it lets itself drop on to the floor, and
thus creeps along the ground till it reaches the nearest
wall, up which it then climbs." Even this botanist too is
led by his facts to the following assertion (p. 576) : " On
observing the freedom of movement of oscillatoria and
other inferior plants, we may perhaps have no alternative
but to attribute a species of will to these beings."

Creepers bear distinct evidence as to manifestation of
will in plants ; for, when they find no support near
enough for their tendrils to cling to, they invariably direct
their growth towards the shadiest place, or even towards a
piece of dark-coloured paper, wherever it may be placed ;
whereas they avoid glass, on account of its glitter. In the
" Philosophical Transactions " of 1812, Th. Andrew Knight
relates some very pleasing experiments on this subject
(especially with ampelopsis quinquefolia,)1 although he
strives hard to explain the matter mechanically, and will
not admit that it is a manifestation of will. I appeal to his
experiments, not to the conclusions he draws from them.
A good test might be, to plant several free creepers in a

1 These have been translated for the " Bibliotheque Britanniquc,
Section des Sciences et Arts," vol. Hi

286 THE WILL IN NATURE.

circle round a tree-trunk and to observe whether they all
crept towards the trunk centripetally. On the 6th Nov.
1843, Dutrochet read a treatise on this subject in the
" Acad. de Sciences " called " Sur les Mouvements E-evolutifs
spontanes chez les Vegetaux," which, notwithstanding its
great length, is well worth reading, and is published
among the "Cornptes rendus des Seances de 1* Academic
des Sciences " for Nov. 1843. The result is, that in pisum
sdtivum (green pea), in bryonia alba (wild bryony) and in
cucumis sativus (cucumber) the stems of those leaves
which bear the tendrils, describe a very slow circular
movement in the air, the time in which they complete an
ellipsis varying from one to three hours according to tem
perature. By this movement they seek at random for
solid bodies round which, when found, they twine their
tendrils ; these then support the plant, it being unable to
stand by itself without help. That is, they do the same
thing as the eyeless caterpillar, which when seeking a leaf
describes circles in the air with the upper part of its body.
Dutrochet contributes a good deal of information too con-
cerning other movements in plants in this treatise : for
instance, that stylidium graminifolium in New Holland,
has a column in the middle of its corolla which bears the
anthers and stigma and alternately folds up and unfolds
again. What Treviranus adduces is to the same effect :*
In parnassia palustris and in ruta graveolens, the stamina
incline one after the other, in saxifraga tridactylites in
pairs, towards the stigma, and erect themselves again in.
the same order." — Shortly before however, we read in
Treviranus with reference to this subject : " Of all appa
rently voluntary movements of plants, the direction of
their boughs and of the upper surface of their leaves
towards the light and towards moist heat, and the twining

1 Treviranus, " Die Erscheinungen und Gesetze des Organischen
Lebens " (Phenomena and Laws of Organic Life), vol. i. p. 1 73.

PHYSIOLOGY OF PLANTS. 287

movements of creepers round their supports, are the most
universal. In this last phenomenon especially there is
something which resembles animal movements. While
growing, creepers, it is true, if left to themselves, describe
circles with their tips and by this means reach an object
near at hand. But it is no merely mechanical cause that
induces them to adapt their growth to the form of the
object they have thus reached. The cuscuta does not
twine round every kind of support : for instance, limbs of
animals, dead vegetable matter, metals and inorganic sub-
stances are not used for this purpose, but only living
plants, and not even all kinds — not mosses, for instance —
only those from which it can extract nourishment by its
papillae; and these attract it from a considerable distance."1
The following special observation, communicated to the
" Farmer's Magazine," and reproduced by the " Times "
(13th July 1848) under the title "Vegetable Instinct," is
however still more to the point : "If a basin of water be
placed within six inches of a young pumpkin- stalk, or of a
stem of the large garden pea, no matter on what side, the
stalk will approach the basin during the night and it will be
found next morning with one of its leaves floating on the
water. This experiment may be renewed every night till
the plant begins to fructify. — Even if its position be

1 Brandis, " On Life and Polarity," 1836, p. 88, says : " The roots
of rock-plants seek nourishing mould in the most delicate crevices of
rocks. These roots cling to a nourishing bone in dense clusters. I saw
a root whose growth was intercepted by the sole of an old shoe : it
divided itself into as many fibres as the shoe-sole had holes — those by
which it had been stitched together — but as soon as these fibres had
overcome the obstruction apd grown through the holes, they united
again to a common stem." And p. 87 : " If Sprengel's observations are
confirmed, even mediate relations are perceived (by plants) in order to
obtain this end (fructification) : that is to say, the anthers of the nigdla,
bend down in order to put the pollen on the bees' backs, and the pistils
bend in like manner to receive it from the bees. [Add. to 3rd ed.l

288 THE WILL IN NATURE.

changed every day, a stick fixed upright; within six inches
of a young convolvulus is sure to be found by the plant.
If, after having wound itself for a certain distance round
the stick, it is unwound and wound round again in the
opposite direction, it will return to its original position
or lose its life in the endeavour to do so. Nevertheless,
if two such plants grow close to one another without
having any stick near enough for them to cling to it,
one of them will change the direction of its winding and
they will twine round each other. Duhamel placed some
Italian beans in a cylinder filled with moist earth ; after a
little while they began to germinate and naturally sent
their plumula upwards in the direction of the light and
their radicula downwards into the mould. After a few
days the cylinder was turned round to the extent of a
quarter of its circumference and the same process was
repeated until it had been turned completely round. The
beans were then removed from the earth, when it was
found that both plumula and radicula had twisted at
each turn that had been given, in order to adapt them
selves to it, the one endeavouring to rise perpendicularly,
the other to descend, so that they had formed a complete
spiral. Yet, notwithstanding this natural tendency to
descend, when the soil below is too dry, roots will grow
upwards in order to reach any moist substance which may
be lying higher than themselves."

In Froriep's " Memoranda " for 1833 (No. 832) there is
a short article upon the locomotivity of plants : in poor
soil, where good mould lies near at hand, many plants will
send out a shoot into the good mould ; after a time the
original plant then withers, but the offshoot prospers and
itself becomes the plant. By means of this process, a
plant has been known to climb down from a wall.

In the same periodical (1835, No. 981) is to be found a
communication from Professor Daubeny, of Oxford (taken

PHYSIOLOGY' OF PLANTS. 289

from the " Edinburgh New Philosophical Journal," April-
July, 1835), in which he shows with certainty, by means of
new and very careful experiments, that roots of plants
have, at any rate to a certain degree, the power to make
choice from those substances in the soil which present
themselves to their surface.1

1 In this connection I may mention an analysis of an entirely different
kind, given by the French Academician Babinet in an article in which
he treats of the seasons on the planets. It is contained in the No, of
the 15th January, 1856, of the "Kevue des Deux Mondes," and I will
give the chief substance of it here in translation. The object of it is to
refer to its direct cause the well-known fact, that cereals only thrive in
temperate climates. " If grain did not necessarily perish in winter, if it
were perennial, it would not bear ears, and there would be no harvest.
In the hotter portions of Africa, Asia and America, where no winter
kills the grain, these plants grow like grass with us : they multiply by
means of shoots, remain always green, and neither form ears nor run to
seed. In cold climates, on the contrary, the organism of these plants
seems by some inconceivable miracle to feel, as it were by anticipation,
the necessity of passing through the seed-phase in order to escape dying
off in the winter season (L'organisme de la plante, par un inconcevable
miracle, semble presscntir la necessity de passer par Vttat de graine, pour
ne pas p£rir compUtement pendant la saison rigoureiise). In a similar
way, districts which have a " droughty season," — that is to say a season
in which all plants are parched up with drought — " tropical countries, for
instance Jamaica, produce grain j because there the plant, moved by the
same organic presentiment (par le meme pressentiment organique), in
order to multiply, hastens to bear seed at the approach of the season in
which it would have to dry up." In the fact which this author describes
as an inconceivable miracle, we recognise a manifestation of the plant's
will in increased potency, since here it appears as the will of the species,
and makes preparations for the future in a similar way to animal instinct,
without being guided by knowledge of that future in doing so. Here
we see plants in warmer climates dispensing with a complicated process
to which a cold climate alone had obliged them. In similar instances
animals do precisely the same thing, especially bees. Leroy in his
admirable work " Lettres Philosophiques sur 1'Intelligence des Animaux "
(3rd letter, p. 231) relates, that some bees which had been taken to
South America continued at first to gather honey as usual and to build
their cells just as when they were at home ; but that when they gradually

U

290 THE WILL IN NATURE.

Finally I will not omit to observe, that even so early an
authority as Plato1 had attributed desires, EirtdvpCac, i.e.
will, to plants. In my chief work,2 however, I have entered
into the doctrines of the Ancients on this point, and the
chapter there which treats of this subject may on the
whole serve to complete the present one.

The reluctance and reserve with which we see the
authors here quoted make up their minds to acknowledge
the will, which nevertheless undoubtedly manifests itself
in plants, comes from their being still hampered by the
old opinion, that consciousness is a requisite and con
dition of the will: now it is evident that plants have
no consciousness. The thought never entered into the
heads of these naturalists, that the will might be the prius
and therefore independent of the intellect, with which,
as the posterius, consciousness first makes its appear
ance. As for knowledge or representation, plants have
something merely analogous to it, a mere substitute for it ;
whereas they really have the will itself quite directly : for,
as the thing in itself, it is the substratum of their phe
nomenal being as well as of every other. Taking a rea
listic view, starting accordingly from the objective, the
matter might even be stated as follows : That which lives
and moves in plant-nature and in the animal organism,

became aware that plants blossom there all the year round, they left off
working. The animal world supplies a fact analogous to the above
mentioned change in the mode of multiplying in cereals. This is the
abnormal mode of propagation for which the aphides have long been
noted. The female aphide, as is well known, propagates for 10-12
generations without any pairing with the male, and by a variety of the
ovoviviparous process. This goes on all summer; but in autumn the
maks appear, impregnation takes plaee, and eggs are laid as winter
quarters for the whole species, since it is c*nly in this shape that it is
able to outlive the winter. (Add. to 3rd ed.)

1 Plat. " Tim." p. 403. Bip.

a « Die Welt. a. W. u. V," vol. ii. chap. 23.

PHYSIOLOGY OF PLANTS. 291

when it lias gradually enhanced itself in the scale of beings
sufficiently for the light of knowledge to fall directly upon
it, presents itself in this newly arising consciousness as
will, and is here more immediately, consequently better,
known than anywhere else. This knowledge therefore
must supply the key for the comprehension of all that is
lower in the scale. For in this knowledge the thing in
itself is no longer veiled by any other form than that of the
most immediate apprehension. It is this immediate appre
hension of one's own volition which has been called the
inner sense. In itself the will is without apprehension, and
remains so in the inorganic and vegetable kingdoms. Just
as the world would remain in darkness, in spite of the sun,
if there were no bodies to reflect its light ; or as the mere
vibration of a string can never become a sound without air
or even without some sort of sounding-board : so likewise
does the will first become conscious of itself when know
ledge is added to it. Knowledge is, as it were, the
sounding-board of the will, and consciousness the tone it
produces. This becoming conscious of itself on the part of
the will, was attributed to a supposed inner sense, because
it is the first and most direct knowledge we have. The
various emotions of our own will can alone be the object of
this inner sense; for the process of representation itself
cannot over again be perceived, but, at the very utmost,
only be once more brought to consciousness in rational
reflection, that second power of representing : that is, in
abstracto. Therefore also, simple representation (intui
tion) is to thinking proper — that is, to knowing by
means of abstract conceptions — what willing in itself is to
becoming aware of that willing, i.e. to consciousness. For
this reason, a perfectly clear and distinct consciousness, not
only of our own existence but also of the existence of
others, only arises with the advent of Reason (the faculty
for conceptions), which raises Man as far above the brute,

292 THE WILL IN NATURE.

as the merely intuitive faculty of representation raises the
brute above the plant. Now beings which, like plants,
have no faculty for representation, are called unconscious,
and we conceive this condition as only slightly differing
from non-existence ; since the only existence such beings
have, is in the consciousness of others, as the representation
of those others. They are nevertheless not wanting in
what is primary in existence, the will, but only in what is
secondary ; still, what is primary — and this is after all the
existence of the thing in itself — appears to us, without
that secondary element, to pass over into nullity. We are*
unable directly and clearly to distinguish unconscious exis
tence from non-existence, although we have our own ex
perience of it in deep sleep.

Bearing in mind, according to the contents of the last
chapter, that the faculty of knowing, like every other organ,
has only arisen for the purpose of self-preservation, and
that it therefore stands in a precise relation, admitting
of countless gradations, to the requirements of each
animal species; we shall understand that plants, having
so very much fewer requirements than animals, no
longer need any knowledge at all. On this account pre
cisely, as I have often said, knowledge is the true charac
teristic which denotes the limits of animality, because of the
movement induced by motives which it conditions. Where
animal life ceases, there knowledge proper, with whose
essence our own experience has made us familiar, disap
pears ; and henceforth analogy is our only way of making
that which mediates between the influence of the outer world
and the movements of beings intelligible to us. The will,
on the other hand, which we have recognised as being the
basis and kernel of every existing thing, remains one and
the same at all times and in all places. Now, in the lower
degree occupied by plant-life and by the vegetative life of
animal organisms, it is the stimulus which takes the place

PHYSIOLOGY OP PLANTS. 293

of knowledge as a means of determining the individual
manifestations of this omnipresent will and as a mediator
between the outer world and the changes of such a being ;
finally, in inorganic Nature, it is physical agency in general ;
and when, as here, observation takes place from a higher
to a lower degree, both stimulus and physical agency
present themselves as substitutes for knowledge, therefore
as mere analogues to it. Plants cannot properly be said
to perceive light and the sun ; yet we see them sensitive
in various ways to the presence or absence of both. We
see them incline and turn towards the light ; and though
this movement no doubt generally coincides with their
growth, just as the moon's rotation on its axis coincides
with its movement round the earth, it nevertheless exists,
as well as that of the moon, and the direction of that
growth is determined and systematically modified by
light, just as an action is determined by a motive, and
as the direction of the growth of creeping and clinging
plants is determined by the shape and position of the sup
ports they may chance to find. Thus because plants on
the whole, still have wants, though not such wants as
demand the luxury of a sensorium and an intellect, some
thing analogous has to take the place of these, in order to
enable the will to lay hold of, if not to seek out, the satis
factions which offer themselves to it. Now, this analogous
substitute is susceptibility for stimuli, and I would express
the difference between knowledge and this susceptibility
as follows : in knowledge, the motive which presents itself
as representation and the act of volition which follows from
it, remain distinctly separate one from the other, this separa
tion moreover being the more distinct, the greater the per
fection of the intellect ; — whereas, in mere susceptibility
for stimuli, the feeling of the stimulus can no longer be
distinguished from the volition it occasions, and they
coalesce. In inorganic nature finally, even susceptibility

294 THE WILL IN NATURE.

for stimuli, the analogy of which to knowledge is unmis
takable, ceases, but the diversity of reaction of each body
upon divers kinds of action remains ; now, when the matter
is considered, as we are doing, in the descending scale,
this reaction still presents itself, even here, as a substitute
for knowledge. If a body reacts differently, it must have
been acted upon differently and that action must have
roused a different sensation in it, which with all its dull
ness has nevertheless a distant analogy to knowledge.
Thus when water that is shut up finds an outlet of which
it eagerly avails itself, rushing vehemently in that direction,
it certainly does not recognise that outlet any more than the
acid perceives the alkali approaching it which will induce
it to abandon its combination with a metal, or than the
strip of paper perceives the amber which attracts it after
being rubbed ; yet we cannot help admitting that what
brings about such sudden changes in all these bodies, bears
a certain resemblance to that which takes place within us,
when an unexpected motive presents itself. In former
times I have availed myself of such considerations as these
in order to point out the will in all things ; I now em
ploy them to indicate the sphere to which knowledge
presents itself as belonging, when considered, not as is
usual from the inside, but realistically, from a standpoint
outside itself, as if it were something foreign : that is, when
we gain the objective point of view for it, which is so
extremely important in order to complete the subjective
one.1 We find that knowledge then presents itself as the
mediator of motives, i.e. of the action of causality upon beings
endowed with intellect — in other words, as that which
receives the changes from outside upon which those in the
inside must follow, as that which acts as mediator between
both. Now upon this narrow line hovers the world as

1 Compare " Die Welt. a. W. u. Y." vol. ii. chap. 22 : " Objective
View of the Intellect."

PHYSIOLOGY OF PLANTS. 295

representation — that is to say, the whole corporeal world,
stretched out in Space and Time, which as such can
never exist anywhere but in the brain any more than
dreams, which, as long as they last, exist in the same way.
What the intellect does for animals and for man, as the
mediator of motives, susceptibility for stimuli does for
plants, and susceptibility for every sort of cause for in
organic bodies : and strictly speaking, all this differs merely
in degree. For, exclusively as a consequence of this suscep
tibility to outward impressions having enhanced itself in
animals proportionately to their requirements till it has
reached the point where a nervous system and a brain be
come necessary, does consciousness arise as a function of that
brain, and in it the objective world, whose forms (Time,
Space, Causality) are the way in which that function is per
formed. Therefore we find the intellect originally laid out
entirely with a view to subjectivity, destined merely to serve
the purposes of the will, consequently as something quite
secondary and subordinate ; nay, in a sense, as something
which appears only per accidens ; as a condition of the action
of mere motives, instead of stimuli, which has become neces
sary in the higher degree of animal existence. The image
of the world in Space and Time, which thus arises, is only
the map1 on which the motives present themselves as
ends. It also conditions the spacial and causal connection
in which the objects perceived stand to one another ; never
theless it is only the mediating link between the motive
and the act of volition. Now, to take such an image as
this of the world, arising in this manner, accidentally, in
the intellect, i.e. in the cerebral function of animal beings,
through the means to their ends being represented and the
path of these ephemera on their planet being thus illumined
— to take this image, we say, this mere cerebral phenome
non, for the true, ultimate essence of things (thing in itself),
1 Plan.

296 THE WILL IN NATTJKE.

to take the concatenation of its parts for the absolute order
of the Universe (relations between things in themselves),
and to assume all this to exist even independently of the
brain, would indeed be a leap ! Here in fact, an assumption
such as this must appear to us as the height of rashness
and presumption ; yet it is the foundation upon which all the
systems of pre -Kantian dogmatism have been built up ; for
it is tacitly pre- supposed in all their Ontology, Cosmology
and Theology, as well as in the ceternce veritates to which
they appeal. But that leap had always been made tacitly
and unconsciously, and it is precisely Kant's immortal
achievement, to have brought it to our consciousness.

By our present realistic way of considering the matter
therefore, we unexpectedly gain the objective stand-point for
Kant's great discoveries; and, by the road of empirico-physio-
logical contemplation, we arrive at the point whence his trans
cendental-critical view starts. For Kant's view takes the
subjective for its standpoint and considers consciousness as
given. But from consciousness itself and its law and
order, given a priori, that view arrives at the conclusion,
that all which appears in that consciousness can be nothing
more than mere phenomenon. From our realistic, exterior
standpoint, on the contrary, which assumes the objective —
all that exists in Nature — to be absolutely given, we see
what the intellect is, as to its aim and origin, and to
which class of phenomena it belongs, and we recognise (so
far a priori) that it must be limited to mere phenomena.
We see too, that what presents itself in the intellect can at
all times only be conditioned — chiefly subjectively — that
is, can, together with the order of the nexus of its parts,
only be a mundus phenomenon, which is likewise subjectively
conditioned ; but that it can never be a knowledge of things
as they may be in themselves, or as they may be connected
in themselves. For, in the nexus of Nature, we have
found the faculty of knowing as a conditioned faculty,

PHYSIOLOGY OP PLANTS. 297

whose assertions, precisely on that account, cannot claim
unconditioned validity. To anyone who has studied and
understood the Critique of Pure Reason — to which our
standpoint is essentially foreign — it must nevertheless still
appear as if Nature had intended the intellect for a puzzle-
glass to mislead us and were playing at hide-and-seek with
us. But by our realistic objective road, i.e. by starting
from the objective world as given, we have now come to
the very same result at which Kant had arrived by the
idealistic, subjective road, i.e. by examining the intellect
itself and the way in which it constitutes consciousness.
We now see that the world as representation hovers on the
narrow line between the external cause (motive) and the
effect evoked (act of the will), in beings having knowledge
(animals), in which beings for the first time there occurs a
distinct separation between motive and voluntary act.
Ita res accendent lumina rebus. It is only when it is
reached by two quite opposite roads, that the great result
attained by Kant is distinctly seen ; and when light is thus
thrown upon it from both sides, his whole meaning be
comes clear. Our objective standpoint is realistic and
therefore conditioned, so far as, in taking for granted the
existence of beings in Nature, it abstracts from the fact
that their objective existence postulates an intellect, which
contains them as its representation ; but Kant's subjective
and idealistic standpoint is likewise conditioned, inasmuch
as he starts from the intelligence, which itself, however,
presupposes Nature, in consequence of whose development
as far as animal life that intelligence is for the first time
enabled to make its appearance. — Keeping steadily to this
realistic, objective standpoint of ours, we may also define
Kant's theory as follows : After Locke, in order to know
things in themselves, had abstracted the share of sen
suous functions — called by him secondary qualities — from
things as they appear, Kant with infinitely greater depth

£08 THE WILL IN NATURE.

deducted from them tlie incomparably larger share of the
cerebral function, which includes precisely what Locke
calls primary qualities. But all I have done here has
been to show why all this must necessarily be as it is,
by indicating the place occupied by the intellect in the
nexus of Nature, when we start realistically from the
objective as given, but, in doing so, take the only thing of
which we are quite directly conscious, the will — that true
TTOV arS) of Metaphysics — for our support, as being what
is primarily real, everything else being merely its phe
nomenon. What now follows serves to complete this.

I have mentioned already, that where knowledge takes
place, the motive which appears as representation and the
act of volition resulting from it, remain the more clearly
separated one from the other, the more perfect the intellect ;
that is, the higher we ascend in the scale of beings. This
calls for fuller explanation. As long as the will's activity
is roused by stimuli alone, and no representation as yet
takes place — that is, in plants — there is no separation at
all between the receiving of impressions and the being
determined by them. In the lowest order of animal in
telligence, such as we find it in radiaria, acalepha,
acephala, &c., the difference is still small ; a feeling of
hunger, a watchfulness roused by this, an apprehending
and snapping at their prey, still constitute the whole con
tent of their consciousness; nevertheless this is the first
twilight of the dawning world as representation, the back
ground of which — that is to say, everything excepting the
motive which acts each time — still remains shrouded in
impenetrable darkness. Here moreover the organs of the
senses are correspondingly imperfect and incomplete, having
exceedingly few data for perception to bring to an under
standing yet in embryo. Nevertheless wherever there is
sensibility, it is always accompanied by understanding,
i.e. with the faculty for referring effects experienced to

PHYSIOLOGY OF PLANTS. 299

external causes ; without this, sensibility would be super
fluous and a mere source of aimless suffering. The higher
we ascend in the scale of animals, the greater number and
perfection of the senses we find, till at last we have all
five ; these are found in a small number of invertebrate
animals, but they only become universal in the vertebrata.
The brain and its function, the understanding, develop pro
portionately, and the object now gradually presents itself
more and more distinctly and completely and even already
in connection with other objects; because the service of
the will requires apprehension of the mutual relations of
objects. By this the world of representation acquires
some extent and background. Still that apprehension
never goes beyond what is required for the will's service:
the apprehending and the being roused to reaction by
what is apprehended, are not clearly held asunder: the
object is only perceived in as much as it is a motive.
Even the more sagacious animals only see in objects what
concerns themselves, what has reference to their will or, at
the utmost, what may have reference to it in future : of
this last we have an instance in cats, who take pains to
acquire an accurate knowledge of localities, and in foxes,
who endeavour to find hiding-places for their future prey.
But they are insensible towards everything else ; no
animal has perhaps ever yet seen the starry sky : my dog
started in terror when for the first time he accidentally
caught sight of the sun. A first faint sign of a disin
terested perception of their surroundings may at times be
observed in the most intelligent animals, especially when
they have been trained by taming. Dogs go so far as to
stare at things ; we may often see them sit down at the
window and attentively watch all that passes. Monkeys
look about them at times, as if trying to make up their
mind about their surroundings. It is in Man that the
separation between motive and action, between representa-

300 THE WILL IN NATURE.

tion and will, first becomes quite distinct. But this does
not immediately put an end to the subservience of the
intellect to the will. Ordinary human beings after all only
comprehend quite clearly that which, in some way or
other, refers directly or indirectly to their own selves (has
an interest for them) ; with respect to everything else,
their understanding continues to be unconquerably inert ;
the rest therefore remains in the back-ground and does
not come into consciousness under the radiant light of
complete distinctnees. Philosophical astonishment and
artistic emotion occasioned by the contemplation of
phenomena, remain eternally foreign to them, whatever
they may do ; for at the bottom, everything appears to
them to be a matter of course. Complete liberation and
separation of the intellect from the will and its bondage is
the prerogative of genius, as I have fully shown in the
aesthetic part of my chief work. G-enius is objectivity. The
pure objectivity and distinctness with which things present
themselves in [intuitive] perception — that fundamental and
most substantial source of knowledge — actually stands
every moment in inverse proportion to the interest which
the will has in those things ; and knowing without willing
is the condition, not to say the essence, of all gifts of
aesthetic intelligence. Why does an ordinary artist produce
so bad a painting of yonder landscape, notwithstanding all
the pains he has taken ? Because he sees it so. And why
does he see so little beauty in it ? Because his intellect has
not freed itself sufficiently from his will. The degrees of
this separation give rise to great intellectual distinctions
between men; for the more knowledge has freed itself
from the will, the purer, consequently the more objective
and correct, it is ; just as that fruit is best, which has no
after-taste of the soil on which it has grown.

This relation, as important as it is interesting, deserves
surely to be made still clearer by a retrospective view of the

PHYSIOLOGY OP PLANTS. 301

whole scale of beings, and by recalling the gradual transition
from absolute subjectivity to the highest degrees of objec
tivity in the intellect. Inorganic Nature namely, is abso
lutely subjective, no trace whatever of consciousness of an
outer world being found in it. Stones, boulders, ice-blocks,
even when they fall upon one another, or knock or rub
against one another, have no consciousness of each other
and of an outer world. Still even these are susceptible to
external influence, which causes their position and move
ment to change and may therefore be considered as a first
step towards consciousness. Now, although plants also
have no consciousness of the outer world, and although the
mere analogue of a consciousness which exists in them
must, on the contrary, be conceived as a dull self -enjoyment ;
yet we see that they all seek light, and that many of them
turn their flowers or leaves daily towards the sun, while
creepers find their way to supports with which they are
not in contact; and finally we see individual kinds of
plants show even a sort of irritability. Unquestionably
therefore, there is a connection and relation between their
movements and surroundings, even those with which they
are not in immediate contact ; and this connection we must
accordingly recognise as a faint analogue to perception.
With animal life first appears decided perception — that
is, consciousness of other things, as opposed to that clear
consciousness of ourselves to which that consciousness of
other things first gives rise. This constitutes precisely
the true character of animal-nature, as opposed to plant-
nature. In the lowest animals, consciousness of the outer
world is very limited and dim : each increasing degree of
understanding extends it and makes it clearer, and this
gradual increase of the understanding again adapts itself
to the gradually increasing requirements of the animal, and
thus the process continues through the whole long ascend
ing scale of the animal series up to Man, in whom conscious-

302 THE WILL IN NATTJKE.

ness of the outer world reaches its acme, and in whom the
world accordingly presents itself more distinctly and com
pletely than in any other being. Still, even here, there are
innummerable degrees in the clearness of consciousness,
from the dullest blockhead to genius. Even in normal
heads there still remains a considerable tinge of subjec
tivity in their objective perception of external objects,
knowledge still bearing throughout the character of existing
merely for the ends of the will. The more eminent the
head, the less prominent is this character, and the more
purely objective does the representation of the outer world
become; till in genius finally it attains completely objec
tivity, by which the Platonic ideas detach themselves from
the individual things, because the mind which comprehends
them enhances itself to the pure subject of knowledge.
Now, as perception is the basis of all knowledge, all think
ing and all insight must be influenced by this fundamental
difference in the quality of it, from which arises that com
plete difference between the ordinary and the superior
inind in their whole way of viewing things, which may
be noticed on all occasions. From this also proceeds the
dull gravity, nearly resembling that of animals, which
characterizes common-place heads whose knowledge is
acquired solely for the benefit of the will, as opposed to
the constant play of exuberant intellect which brightens
the consciousness of the superior mind. The consideration
of the two extremes in the great scale which we have here
exhibited, seems to have given rise to the German hyper
bolical expression " Slock " (Klotz), as applied to human
beings, and to the English " blockhead."

But another different consequence of the clear separa
tion of the will from the intellect — therefore of the mo
tive from the action, — which first appears in the human
race, is the deceptive illusion of freedom in our individual
actions. Where, as in inorganic nature, causes, or, as in

PHYSIOLOGY OP PLANTS. 303

the vegetable kingdom, stimuli, call forth, the effect, the
causal connection is so simple, that there is not even the
slightest semblance of freedom. But already in animal
life, where that which till then had manifested itself as
cause or as stimulus, now appears as a motive — and a new
world, that of representation, consequently presents itself,
and cause and effect lie in different spheres — the causal
connection between both, and with it the necessity, are less
evident than they were in plants and in inorganic Nature.
Nevertheless they are still unmistakable in animals, whose
merely intuitive representation stands midway between
organic functions induced by stimuli and the deliberate acts
of Man. The animal's actions infallibly follow as soon
as the perceptible motive is present, unless counter
acted by some equally perceptible counter-motive or by
training; yet here representation is already distinct from
the act of volition and comes separately into consciousness.
But in Man — whose representation has enhanced itself even
to abstract conception and who now derives motives and
counter-motives for his actions from a whole invisible
thought-world which he carries about with him in his
brain and which makes him independent of presence and of
perceptible surroundings — this connection no longer exists
at all for observation from outside, and even for inward
observation it is only knowable through abstract and
mature reflection. For these abstract motives, when ob
served from outside, give an impress of deliberation to all
his movements, by which they acquire a semblance of inde
pendence that manifestly distinguishes them from those of
animals, yet which after all only bears evidence to the fact,
that Man is actuated by a class of representations in which
animals do not share. Then again, in self-consciousness,
the act of volition is known to us in the most immediate
way, but the motive in most cases very indirectly, being
often even intentionally veiled, out of consideration for

304 THE WILL IN NATURE.

our self-knowledge. This process therefore, in coincidence
with the consciousness of that true freedom which belongs
to the will, as thing in itself outside phenomenon, produces
the deceptive illusion that even the single act of volition
is unconditioned and free : that is, without a reason ;
whereas, when the character is given and the motive recog
nised, every act of volition really follows with the same
strict necessity as the changes of which mechanics teach us
the laws, and, to use Kant's words, were character and
motive exactly known, might be calculated with precisely
the same certainty as an eclipse of the moon ; or again, to
place a very heterogeneous authority by the side of Kant,
as Dante says, who is older than Buridan : —

" Intra duo cibi distant! e moventi
D'un modo, prima si morria di fame
Che liber' uomo 1'un recasse a' denti."

Paradiso, iv. I.1

1 Between two kinds of food, both equally
Remote and tempting, first a man might die
Of hunger, ere he one could freely chuse. (Gary's TV.)

PHYSICAL ASTRONOMY.

NO part of my doctrine could I have less hoped to see
corroborated by empirical science than that, in which
the fundamental truth, that Kant's thing in itself (Ding an
sich) is the Will, is applied by me even to inorganic Nature,
and in which I show the active principle in all fundamental
forces of Nature to be absolutely identical with what is
known to us within ourselves as the Will. — It has therefore
been particularly gratifying to me to have found that an
eminent empiricist, yielding to the force of truth, had
gone so far as to express this paradox in the exposition of
his scientific doctrine. I allude to Sir John Herschel and
to his " Treatise on Astronomy," the first edition of which
appeared in 1833, and a second enlarged one in 1849,
under the title " Outlines of Astronomy." Herschel, — who,
as an astronomer, was acquainted with gravity, not only in
the one-sided and really coarse part which it acts on earth,
but also in the nobler one performed by it in universal
Space, where the celestial bodies play with each other,
betray mutual inclination, exchange as it were amorous
glances, yet never allow themselves to come into rude con
tact, and thus continue dancing their dignified minuet to
the music of the spheres, while they keep at a respectful
distance from one another — when he comes to the state
ment of the law of gravitation in the seventh chapter,1
I expresses himself as follows : —

1 Herschel, " Treatise on Astronomy," chap. 7, § 371 of the 1st edition,
1833.

X

306 THE WILL IN NATURE.

" All bodies with which we are acquainted, when raised
into the air and quietly abandoned, descend to the earth's
surface in lines perpendicular to it. They are therefore
urged thereto by a force or effort, the direct or indirect
result of a consciousness and a will existing somewhere,
though beyond our power to trace, which force we term
gravity" l

The writer who reviewed Herschel's book in the October
number of the " Edinburgh Review " of 1833, anxious, as a
true Englishman, before all things to prevent the Mosaic
record2 from being imperilled, takes great umbrage at this
passage, rightly observing that it cannot refer to the will
of God Almighty, who has called Matter and all its proper
ties into being; he utterly refuses to recognise the validity of
the proposition itself, and denies that it follows consistently
from the preceding § upon which Herschel wishes to found
it. My opinion is, that it undoubtedly would logically
follow from that § (because the contents of a conception
are determined by its origin), but that the antecedent
itself is false. It asserts namely, that the origin of the
conception of causality is experience, more especially such
experience as we ourselves make in acting by means of our

1 Even Copernicus had said the same thing long before : " Equifom
existimo Gravitatem non aliud esse quam appetentiam quandam natu-
ralem, partibus inditam a divina providentia opificis universorum, ut in
unitatem integritatemgue steam, se confer ant, in for mam Globi coeuntes.
Quam affectionem credibile est etiam Soli, L/unae caeterisque errantiwn

fulgoribus, inesse, ut eyus efficacia, in ea qua se repraesentant rotunditate
permaneant; quae nihilominus multis modis suos efficiimt circuittis"
("Nicol. Copernici revol." Lib. I, Cap. IX. — Compare "Exposition des
Decouvertes de M. le Chevalier Newton par M. Maclaurin ; traduit de
1'Anglois par M. Lavirotte," Paris, 1749, p. 45). Kerschel evidently saw,
that if we hesitate to explain gravity, as Descartes did, by an impulse
from outside, we are absolutely driven to admit a will inherent in bodies..
Non datur tertium. [Add. to 3rd ed.]

2 Which he has more at heart than all the wisdom and truth in the
world. [Add. to 3rd ed.]

PHYSICAL ASTRONOMY. 807

own efforts upon bodies belonging to the outer world. It
is only in countries like England, where the light of
Kantian philosophy has not yet begun to dawn, that the
Conception of causality can be thought of as originating in
experience (professors of philosophy who pooh-pooh Kant's
doctrines and think me beneath their notice being left out
of the question) ; least of all can it be thought of by those
who are acquainted with my proof of the a priority of that
conception, which differs completely from Kant's proof
and rests upon the fact, that knowledge of causality must
necessarily precede all perception of the outer world it
self as its condition ; since perception is only brought about
through the transition — effected by the understanding —
from the sensation in the organ of sense to its cause, which
cause now presents itself as an object in Space, itself like
wise an a priori intuition. Now, as the perception of objects
mast be anterior to our conscious action upon them, the ex
perience of that conscious action cannot be the origin of the
conception of causality; for, before I can act upon things,
they must first have acted upon me as motives. I have
entered fully into all that has to do with this in my chief
work,1 and in the second edition of my treatise on the
Principle of Sufficient Season, § 21,2 where the assumption
adopted by Herschel finds special refutation ; it is therefore
useless to enter into it once more here. But it would be
even quite possible to refute this assumption empirically,
fcince it would necessarily follow from it, that a man who
came into the world without arms or legs, could never
attain any knowledge of causality or perception of the
outer world. Now Nature has effectually disproved this
by a case, of which I have reproduced the account from its
original source in the above-mentioned chapter of my chief

1 See " Die Welt a. W. u. V." vol. ii. ch. 4, pp. 38-42 (3rd edition,
pp. 41-46).

9 P. 74 (3rd edition, p. /9), p. 92 of the translation in the present, volume

£03 THE WILL IN NATURE.

work, p. 40.1 — In tliis assertion of Herschel's therefore, we
have another instance of a right conclusion drawn from
wrong premisses. Now this always happens when we
have obtained immediate insight into a truth by a right
aperqu, but are at a loss to find out and clearly define our
reasons for knowing it, owing to our inability to bring
them to clear consciousness. For, in all original insight,
conviction exists before proof : the proof being invariably
excogitated afterwards.

The immediate manifestation of gravity is more evident
in each part of liquid, than of solid, matter, owing to the
perfect freedom of motion of the parts among each other.
In order therefore to penetrate into this aper^u, which is
the true source of Herschel's assertion, let us look atten
tively at a torrent dashing headlong over rocks and ask
ourselves whether so determined an impetus, so boisterous
a vehemence, can arise without an exertion of strength, and
whether an exertion of strength is conceivable without
will. And so it is precisely in every case in which we
become aware of anything moving spontaneously, of any
primary, uncommunicated force : we are constrained to
think its innermost essence as will. — This much at any
rate is certain, that Herschel, like all the empiricists in so
many different branches of science whose evidence I have
quoted above, had arrived here at the limit where nothing
more is left behind the Physical but the Metaphysical ;
that this had brought him to a standstill, and that he, as
well as the rest of them, was unable to find anything
beyond that limit, but the will.

Herschel moreover, like most of these empiricists, is
here still hampered by the opinion that will is inseparable
from conciousness. As I have expatiated enough above
upon this fallacy, and its correction through my doctrine,
it is needless for me to enter into it here again.
1 3rd edition, p. 44,

PHYSICAL ASTRONOMY. 309

The attempt lias repeatedly been made, since the beginning
of this century, to ascribe vitality to the inorganic world.
Quite wrongly: for living and inorganic are convertible
conceptions, and with death the organic ceases to be
organic. But no limit in the whole of Nature is so sharply
drawn as the line which separates the organic from the in
organic : that is to say, the line between the region in which
Form is the essential and permanent, Matter the accidental
and changing, — and the region in which this relation is
entirely reversed. This is no vacillating boundary like
that perhaps between animals and plants, between solid
and liquid, between gas and steam : to endeavour to
destroy it therefore, is intentionally to bring confusion into
our ideas. On the other hand, I am the first who has
asserted that a will must be attributed to all that is lifeless
and inorganic. For, with me, the will is not, as has
hitherto been assumed, an accident of cognition and there
fore of life ; but life itself is manifestation of will.
Knowledge, on the contrary, is really an accident of life,
and life of Matter. But Matter itself is only the percepti
bility of the phenomena of the will. Therefore we are
compelled to recognise volition in every effort or tendency
which proceeds from the nature of a material body, and
properly speaking constitutes that nature, or manifests
itself as phenomenon by means of that nature ; and there
can consequently be no Matter without manifestation of
will. The lowest and on that account most universal
manifestation of will is gravity, wherefore it has been
called a primary and essential property of Matter.

The usual view of Nature assumes two fundamentally
different principles of motion, therefore it supposes that
the movement of a body may have two different origins :
i.e., that it proceeds either from the inside, in which
case it is attributed to the will; or from the outside,
and then it is occasioned by causes. This principle is gene-

310 THE WILL IN NATURE.

rally taken for granted as a matter of course and only
occasionally brought explicitly into prominence ; never
theless, in order to make the case quite certain, I will point
out a few passages from the earliest to the latest authors
in which it is specially stated. In Phaedrus,1 Plato makes
the distinction between that which moves spontaneously
from inside (soul) and that which receives movement only
from outside (body) — TO v<f>' iavrov Kivov/uevov KO.I TO, <£
efoOw TU KivtlffOai.2 — Aristotle establishes the principle
in precisely the same way : airav TO Qepopevov >/ v^ eavrov
KtvEirai, fj i>V d\\ov (quidquid fertur a se movetur, aut
db alio~).3 He returns to the subject in the next Book,
chap. 4 and 5, and connects it with some explanatory de
tails which lead him into considerable perplexity, on ac
count precisely of the fallacy of the antithesis.4 — In more
recent times again J. J. Eousseau brings forward the same
antithesis with great naivete and candour in his famous
"Profession de foi du vicaire Savoyard:"5 "Fa/p&rfois
dans les corps deux sortes de mouvement, savoir : mouvement
communique et mouvement spontane ou volontaire : dans le
premier la cause motrice est etrangere au corps mu ; et dans
le second elle est en lui-meme" — But even in our time and
in the stilted, puffed-up style which is peculiar to it, Bur-
dach holds forth as follows : 6 " The cause that determines
a movement lies either inside or outside of that which

1 Plato, « Phfed." p. 319 Bip.

2 " That which is moved by itself and that which is moved from out
side." [Tr.] And we find the same distinction again in the 10th Book " De
Legibus," p. 85. [After him Cicero repeats it in the two last chapters
of his " Somnium Scipionis." Add. to 3rd ed.]

3 " All that is moved, is moved either by itself or by something else."
[Tr.] Aristotle, "Phys." vii. 2.

4 Maclaurin, too, in his account of Newton's discoveries, p. 102, lavs
down this principle as his starting-point. [Add. to 3rd ed.]

6 Kmile, iv. p. 27. Bip.

' Burdach, " Physiologic," vol. iv. p. 323.

PHYSICAL ASTRONOMY. 311

moves. Matter is external existence; it has powers of
motion, but it only brings them into play under certain
spacial conditions and external oppositions : the soul alone
is an ever active and internal thing, and only those bodies
which have souls find within themselves inducement to
move, and move of their own free will, independently of
outer mechanical circumstances."

Now here however I must say, as Abelard once did : si
omnespatres sic, at egonon sic : for, in opposition to this prin
ciple, however great may be its antiquity and universality,
my doctrine maintains, that there are not two origins of
movement differing fundamentally from one another ; that
movement does not proceed either from inside, when it is
ascribed to the will, or from outside, when it is brought
about by causes ; but that both things are inseparable and
take place simultaneously with every movement made by
a body. For movement which is admitted to arise from
the will, always presupposes a cause also: this cause, in
beings that have knowledge, is a motive ; but without it,
even in these beings, movement is impossible. On the
other hand, the movement of a body which is admitted to
have been brought about by an outward cause, is never
theless in itself a manifestation of the will of that body
which has only been evoked by that cause. Accordingly
there is only one, uniform, universal and exceptionless
principle of all movement, whose inner condition is will
and whose outer occasion is cause, which latter may also
take the form of a stimulus or of a motive, according to
the nature of the thing moved.

All that is known to us of things in a merely empi
rical or a posteriori way, is in itself will ; whereas, so far
as they can be determined a priori, things belong ex
clusively to representation, to mere phenomenon. Natural
phenomena therefore become proportionately less easy to
comprehend, the more distinctly the will manifests itself

312 THE WILL IN NATURE.

in them, i.e. the higher they stand on the scale of beings ;
whereas, they become more and more comprehensible
the smaller the amount of their empirical content, be
cause they remain more and more within the sphere of
mere representation, the forms of which, known to us a.
priori, are the principle of comprehensibility. Accordingly,
it is only so long as we limit ourselves to this sphere — •
that is to say, only when we have before us mere repre
sentation, mere form without empirical content — that our
comprehension is complete and thorough : that is, in the
a priori sciences, Arithmetic, Geometry, Phoronorny and
Logic. Here everything is in the highest degree compre
hensible; our insight is quite clear and satisfactory: it
leaves nothing to be desired, since we are even unable to
conceive that anything could be otherwise than it is. This
comes from our having here exclusively to do with the
forms of our own intellect. Thus the more we are able to
comprehend in a relation, the more it consists of mere
phenomenon and the less it has to do with the thing in
itself. Applied Mathematics, Mechanics, Hydraulics, &c.
&c., deal with the lowest degrees of objectification of the
will, in which the largest part still remains within the
sphere of mere representation ; nevertheless even here there
is already an empirical element which stands in the way of
entire comprehension, which makes the transparency less
complete, and in which the inexplicable shows itself. For
the same reason, only few departments of Physics and of
Chemistry continue to admit of a mathematical treat
ment ; whereas higher up in the scale of beings this has to
be entirely done away with, precisely because of the pre
ponderance of content over form in these phenomena. This
content is will, the a posteriori, the thing in itself, the free,
the causeless. Under the heading " Physiology of Plants," I
have shown how — in beings that live and have knowledge—
motive and act of will, representation and volition, separate

PHYSICAL ASTRONOMY. 313

and detach themselves more and more distinctly one from
the other, the higher we ascend in the scale of beings.
Now, in inorganic Nature also, the cause separates itself
from the effect in just the same proportion, and the
purely empirical — which is precisely phenomenon of the
will — detaches itself more and more prominently ; but, just
with this, comprehensibility diminishes. This point merits
fuller investigation, and I request my readers to give their
whole and undivided attention to what I am about to say,
as it is calculated to place the leading thought of my
doctrine in the strongest possible light, both as to compre
hensibility and cogency. But this is all I can do ; for
it is beyond my power to induce my contemporaries to
prefer thoughts to verbiage ; I can only console myself for
not being the man of the age.

On the lowest step of the scale of Nature, cause and
effect are quite homogeneous and quite equivalent. Here
therefore we have perfect comprehension of the causal con
nection : for instance, the cause of the movement of one
ball propelled by impact, is the movement of another,
which loses just as much movement as the first one
receives. Here causality is in the highest degree intelli
gible. What notwithstanding still remains mysterious, is
restricted to the possibility of the passage of movement
— of a thing incorporeal — from one body to another.
The receptivity of bodies in this mode is so slight, that the
effect to be produced has to pass over completely from its
cause. The same holds good of all purely mechanical
influences ; and if they are not all just as instantaneously
understood, it is either because they are hidden from us by
accessory circumstances, or because we are confused by the
complicated connection of many causes and effects. In
itself, mechanical causality is everywhere equally, that is,
in the highest degree, comprehensible ; because cause and
effect do not differ here as to quality, and because where

314 THE WILL IN NATURE.

they differ as to quantity, as in the lever, mere Space ancl
Time relations suffice to make the thing clear. But as
soon as weights come also into play, a second mysterious
element supervenes, gravity : and, where elastic bodies are
concerned, elasticity also. — Things change as soon as we
begin to ascend in the scale of phenomena. Heat, con
sidered as cause, and expansion, liquefaction, volatilization
or crystallization, as effects, are not homogeneous ; there
fore their causal connection is not intelligible. The com-
prehensibility of causality has diminished : what a lower
degree of heat caused to liquefy, a higher degree makes
evaporate : that which crystallizes with less heat, melts
when the heat is augmented. Warmth softens wax and
hardens clay ; light whitens wax and blackens chloride of
silver. And, to go still further, when two salts are seen to
decompose each other mutually and to form two new ones,
elective affinity presents itself to us as an impenetrable
mystery, and the properties of the two new bodies are not
a combination of the properties of their separate elements.
Nevertheless we are still able to follow the process and
to indicate the elements out of which the new bodies are
formed ; we can even separate what has been united and
restore the original quantities. Thus noticeable hetero-
geneousness and incommensurability between cause and
effect have here made their appearance: causality has
become more mysterious. And this becomes still more
apparent when we compare the effects of electricity or of
the Voltaic pile with their causes, i.e. with the friction of
glass, or the piling and oxidation of the plates. Here all
similarity between cause and effect at once vanishes ;
causality becomes shrouded in a thick veil, which men like
Davy, Faraday and Ampere have strenuously endeavoured
to lift. The only thing now discernible through that veil,
are the laws ruling its mode of action, which may bo
brought into a schema such as + E — E, communica-

PHYSICAL ASTRONOMY. 315

tion, distribution, shock, ignition, analysis, charging,
isolation, discharging, electric current, &c. &c., to this
schema we are able to reduce and even to direct the effect ;
but of the process itself we know nothing : that remains
an x. Here therefore cause and effect are completely
heterogeneous, their connection is unintelligible, and we
see bodies show great susceptibity to causal influences, the
nature of which remains a secret for us. Moreover in pro
portion as we mount higher in the scale, the effect seems
to contain more, the cause less. When we reach organic
Nature therefore, in which the phenomenon of life presents
itself, this is the case in a far higher degree still. If, as is
done in China, we fill a pit with decaying wood, cover it
with leaves from the same tree as the wood, and pour a
solution of sulphur repeatedly over it, an abundant crop of
edible mushrooms will spring up. A world of rapidly
moving infiisoria will arise from a little hay well watered.
"What a difference lies here between effect and cause !
How much more does the former seem to contain than the
latter ! When we compare the seed, sometimes centuries,
nay even thousands of years old, with the tree, or the soil
with the specifically and strikingly different juices of in
numerable plants — some healthy, some poisonous, some
again nutritious — which spring from the same earth, upon
which the same sun shines and the same rain falls, all
resemblance ceases, and with it all comprehensibility for
us. For here causality already appears in increased
potency : that is, as stimulus and as susceptibility for
stimulus. The schema of cause and effect alone has re
mained ; we know that this is cause, that effect ; but we
know nothing whatever of the nature and disposition of
causality. Between cause and effect there is not only no
qualitative resemblance, but no quantitative relation : the
relatively greater importance of the effect as compared with
its cause increases more and more; the effect of the

316 THE WILL IN NATURE.

stimulus too does not augment in proportion with the en
hancement of that stimulus ; in fact just the contrary often
takes place. Finally, when we come to the sphere of beings
which have knowledge, there is no longer any sort of re
semblance or relation between the action performed and
the object which, as representation, evokes it. Animals,
however, as they are restricted to perceptible representa
tions, still need the presence of the object acting as a
motive, which action is then immediate and infallible (if
we leave training, i.e. habit enforced by fear, out of the
question). For animals are unable to carry about with
them conceptions that might render them independent
of present impressions, enable them to reflect, and qualify
them for deliberate action. Man can do this. There
fore when at last we come to rational beings, the motive is
even no longer a present, perceptible, actually existing, real
thing, but a mere conception having its present existence
only in the brain of the person who acts, but which is
extracted from many multifarious perceptions, from the
experience of former years, or has been handed down in
words. Here the separation between cause and effect is so
wide, the effect has grown so much stronger as compared
with the cause, that the vulgar mind no longer perceives
the existence of a cause at all, and the acts of the will
appear to it to be unconditioned, causeless : that is to say,
free. This is just why, when we reflect upon them from
outside, the movements of our own body present them
selves as if they took place without cause, or to speak more
properly, by a miracle. Experience and reflection alone
teach us that these movements, like all others, are only
possible as the effects of causes, here called motives, and that,
on this ascending scale, it is only as to material reality that
the cause has failed to keep pace with the effect ; whereas it
has kept pace with it as to dynamical reality, energy. — At
this degree of the scale therefore — the highest in Nature—

PHYSICAL ASTRONOMY. 317

causality has become less intelligible to us than ever.
Nothing but the bare schema, taken in a quite general
sense, now remains, and the ripest reflection is needed to
recognise its applicability and the necessity that schema
brings with it everywhere.

In the Grotto of Pausilippo, darkness continues to aug
ment as we advance towards the interior ; but when once
we have passed the middle, day-light again appears at the
other end and shows us the way ; so also in this case : just
at the point where the outwardly directed light of the
understanding with its form of causality, gradually yield
ing to increasing darkness, had been reduced to a feeble,
flickering glimmer, behold ! we are met by a totally diffe
rent light proceeding from quite another quarter, from
our own inner self, through the chance circumstance, that
we, the judges, happen here to be the very objects that are
to be judged. The growing difficulty of the comprehen
sion of the causal nexus, at first so clear, had now become
so great for perception and for the understanding — the
agent in it — that, in animal actions, the very existence
of that nexus seemed almost doubtful and those actions
appeared to be a sort of miracle. But, just at this point,
the observer receives from his own inner self the direct in
formation that the agent in them is the will — that very
will, which he knows better and more intimately than any
thing that external perception can ever supply. This
knowledge alone must be the philosopher's key to an
insight into the heart of all those processes in unconscious
Nature, concerning which causal explanation — although,
here, to be sure, more satisfactory than in the processes
last considered, and the clearer, the farther those pro
cesses were removed from these — nevertheless had still
left an unknown x, and could never quite illumine the
inside of the process, even in a body propelled by impact or
attracted by gravity. This x had continued expanding till

318 THE WILL IN NATTTEE.

finally, on the highest degrees of the scale, it had wholly
repelled causal explanation. But then, just when the
power of causal explanation had been reduced to a mini
mum, that x revealed itself as tine will — reminding us of
Mephistopheles when, yielding to Faust's learned exor
cisms, he steps forth out of the huge grown poodle whose
kernel he was. In consequence of the considerations I
have here set forth at length, we can surely hardly avoid
recognising the identity of this x, even on the lowest
degrees of the scale, where it was but faintly perceptible ;
then higher up, where it extended its obscurity more and
more ; and finally on the highest degrees, where it cast a
shadow upon all things — till, at the very top, it reveals itself
to our consciousness in our own phenomenal being, as the
will. The two primarily different sources of our knowledge,
that is to say the inward and the outward source, have to
be connected together at this point by reflection. It ia
quite exclusively out of this connection that our compre
hension of Nature, and of our own selves arises ; but then
the inner side of Nature is disclosed to our intellect, which
by itself alone can never reach further than to the
mere outside ; and the mystery which philosophy has so
long tried to solve, lies open before us. For then indeed
we clearly see what the Real and the Ideal (the thing in
itself and the phenomenon) properly are ; and this settles
the principal question which has engaged the attention
of philosophers since Descartes: that is to say, the
question as to the relation between these two, whose com
plete diversity Kant had shown most thoroughly and with
unexampled depth, yet whose absolute identity was imme
diately afterwards proclaimed by humbugs on the credit of
intellectual intuition. But if we decline to avail ourselves
of this insight, which is really the one strait gate to truth,
we can never acquire comprehension of the intrinsic
essence of Nature, to which absolutely no other road leads ;

PHYSICAL ASTEONOMY. 319

for then indeed we fall into an irremovable error. Then,
as I have already said, we maintain the view, that motion
has two radically different primary principles with a solid
partition-wall between them : i.e. movement by means of
causes, and movement by means of the will. The first of
these must then remain for ever incomprehensible as to its
innermost essence, because, after all its explanations, there
is still left that unknown x which contains the more, the
higher the object under consideration stands in the scale of
beings ; while the second, movement by the will, presents
itself as entirely disconnected from the principle of
causality; as without reason; as freedom in individual
actions : in other words, as completely opposed to Nature
and utterly unexplainable. On the other hand, if the
above-mentioned union of our external and internal know
ledge has once been accomplished at the point where both
meet, we then recognise two identities in spite of all
accidental differences. That is to say, we recognise the
identity of causality with itself on every degree of the
scale of beings, and the identity of the x, which at
first was unknown (i.e. of physical forces and vital phe
nomena), with the will which is within us. We recognise,
I say, firstly the essential identity of causality under
the various forms it is forced to assume on the different
degrees of the scale, as it may manifest itself, now as a
mechanical, chemical, or physical cause, now as a stimulus,
and again as a perceptible or an abstract motive : we
know it to be one and the same, not only when a pro
pelling body loses as much movement as it imparts by im
pact, but also when in the combats of thought against
thought, the victorious one, as the more powerful motive,
sets Man in motion, a motion which follows with no less
necessity than that of the ball which is struck. Where we
ourselves are the things set in motion, where therefore the
kernel of the process is well and intimately known to us,

320 THE WILL IN NATURE.

instead of allowing ourselves to "be dazzled and confused by
this light and thereby losing sight of the causal connection
as it lies before us everywhere else in the whole of
Nature; instead of shutting out this insight for ever, we now
apply the new knowledge we have acquired from within
as a key to the knowledge of things outside us, and then
we recognise the second identity, that of our will with the
hitherto mysterious x that remains over after all causal
explanation as an insoluble residue. Consequently we
then say: even in cases in which the effect is brought
about by the most palpable cause, the mysterious x in the
process, the real innermost core of it, the true agent, the
in-itself of all phenomena — which, after all, is only given
us as representation and according to the forms and laws
of representation — is essentially one and the same with
what is known to us immediately and intimately as the
will in the actions of our own body, which body is likewise
given us as intuition and representation. — This is (say
what you will) the basis of true philosophy, and if the
present age does not see this, many following ages
will. Tempo e galant' uomo ! (se nessun altro). — Thus,
just as, on the one hand, the essence of causality, which
appears most clearly only on the lowest degree of the
objectification of the will, is recognised by us again at
every ascending step, even at the highest ; so also, on
the other hand, is the essence of the will recognised by us
at every descending step in that ladder, even at the lowest,
although this knowledge is only immediately acquired
at the very highest. The old error asserts, that where
there is will, there is no causality ; and that where there
is causality, there is no will. But we say : everywhere
where there is causality, there is will ; and no will acts
without causality. The punctum controversice therefore, is,
whether will and causality can and must subsist together
in one and the same process at the same time. What

PHYSICAL ASTRONOMY. 321

makes the knowledge, that this is indeed the case, so diffi
cult, is the circumstance, that we know causality and will
in two fundamentally different ways : causality entirely
from outside, quite indirectly, quite through the under
standing ; will entirely from inside, quite directly ; and that
accordingly the clearer the knowledge of the one in each
given instance, the less clear is the knowledge of the other.
Therefore we recognise the essence of the will least readily,
where causality is most intelligible ; and, where the will is
most unmistakably evident, causality becomes so obscured,
that the vulgar mind could venture to deny its existence
altogether. — Now, as Kant has taught us, causality is
nothing but the form of the understanding itself, knowable
a priori : that is, the essence of representation, as such,
which is one side of the world; the other side is will:
which is the thing in itself. That relative increase and
decrease of clearness in inverse proportion of causality and
of the will, that mutual advancing and receding of both,
depends consequently upon the fact, that the more a thing
is given us as mere phenomenon, i.e. as representation, the
more clearly does the a priori form of representation, i.e.
causality, manifest itself: this is the case in inanimate
Nature ; conversely, the more immediate our knowledge of
the will, the more does the form of representation recede
into the background: this is the case with ourselves.
That is : the nearer one side of the world approaches to
us, the more do we lose sight of the other.

LINGUISTIC.

ALL that I have to record under this head is an obser
vation of my own, made within the last few years,
which seems hitherto to have escaped notice. Yet, that it
is worthy of consideration, is attested by Seneca's utter
ance : l Hira in quibusdam rebus verborum proprietas est, et
consuetude sermonis antiqui qucedam efficacissimis not is
signat. Lichtenberg too says : "If one thinks much one
self, one finds a good deal of wisdom deposited in lan
guage. It is hardly likely that we have laid it all there
ourselves, but rather that a great deal of wisdom really
lies there."

In many, perhaps in all, languages, the action even of
those bodies which are without intellect, nay of inanimate
bodies, is expressed by the words to will, so that the exis
tence of a will in these bodies is thus taken for granted ;
but they are never credited with a faculty for knowing,
representing, perceiving or thinking : I know of no ex
pression which conveys this.

Seneca, when speaking of lightning shot down from
heaven, says : 2 " In his, ignibus accidit, quod arbor ibus :
quaruwi cacumina, si tenera sunt, ita deorsum trahi pos-
suntt ut etiam terram attingant ; sed quum permiseris, in
locum suum exsilient. Itaque non est quod eum species
cujusque rei Jiabitum, qui illi non ex voluntate est. Si
ignem permittis ire quo velit, c&lum repetet" In a more

1 Seneca, " Epist." 81. * Ibid. " Quaest. nat." ii. 24.

LINGUISTIC. 323

general sense Pliny says : nee qucerenda in ulla parte natures
ratio, sed voluntas.1 Nor do we find Greek less fertile in
instances. Aristotle, when explaining gravity, says : /uiKpbv
pev (j.6piov riJQ y?iic> eav ptrewpiadiv atytOrj, fyeptTcii, Kcti pivtiv
OVK cdA.ec (parva quo&da/m terras, pars, si elevata dimittitur,
neque vult manere).2 And: Ael fie Itaaarov Xeyfti/ TOIOVTOV
ft'vac, o (j>vaet(3ov\£rai elrai, KO.I o vVa(0)(ft, a'XXa prj o /3/p KCU
irapa tyvaiv (unumquodque autem tale dicere oportet, quale
naturd sud esse vult, et quod est ; sed non id quod violentid
et prceter naturam est).3 Of great and more than merely
linguistic importance is what Aristotle says in his " Ethica
magna," 4 where not only animals, but inanimate beings (fire
striving upwards and earth downwards) are explicitly in
question, and he asserts that they may be obliged to do
something contrary to their nature or their will : irapa
fyvaiv rt, 17 Trap' a /3 ovXovrai TTUIEIV, — and therefore rightly
places Trap' a /3ouAovrcu as a paraphrase of irapa. tyvaiv. —
Anacreon, in his 29th Ode, £<e Ba'0«/XXov, in ordering the
portrait of his lady-love, says of her hair : "EXt/cac & e\evde-
povg pot TrXoKra^Ltwv, araicra ffvvdetQ, a^)fe, ug 0£'Xwo-i, Kflvdai
(capillorum cirros incomposite jungens, sine utut volunt
jacere) .5 In Grerman, Burger says : " hinab will der Bach,
niclit hinan" (the brook will go downwards not upwards).
In daily life we constantly hear : " the water boils, it will
run over," — " the glass will break," — " the ladder will not
stand;" — " le feu ne veuipas bruler." — " la corde, unefois
tordue,VQuttoujours se retordre" — In Engh'sh, the verb ' to

1 Plin. « Hist, nat." 37, 15.

2 Aristot. " De Ccelo." ii. c. 13, " If a small particle of earth is lifted
and let loose, it is carried away and will not rest." [Tr.'s add.]

3 Ibid. c. 14, " But each thing ought to be named as it wills to be and
really is according to its nature, not as it is by force and contrary to its
nature." [Tr.'s add.]

4 Arist. " Eth. Mag." i. c. 14.

5 " Let the freely curling locks fall unarranged as they will [UJce\."
[Tr.'s add]

324 THE WILL IN NATURE.

will ' is even the auxiliary of the future of all the other
verbs, thus expressing the notion, that there lies a will at
the bottom of every action. In English moreover, the en
deavours of all inanimate and unconscious things, are ex
pressly designated by the word want, which denotes every
sort of human desire or endeavour : " the water wants to
get out," — " the steam wants to find an issue." — In Italian
too we have " vuol piovere ; " " quest1 orologio non vuol
andare" — The conception of willing is besides so deeply
rooted in this last language, that it seems to indicate every
thing that is requisite or necessary: " ci vuol un con-
trappeso ; " " ci vuol pazienza."

A very striking instance of this is to be found even in
Chinese — a language which differs fundamentally from all
those belonging to the Sanskrit family — it is in the commen
tary to the Y-King,1 accurately rendered by Peter Kegis as
follows : " Tang, sen materia coelestis, vult rursus ingredi, vel
(ut verbis doctoris Tsching-tse utar) vult rursus esse in supe-
riore loco ; scilicet illius naturce ratio ita fert, seu innata lex.

The following passage from Liebig ' has decidedly much
more than a linguistic signification, for it expresses an inti
mate feeling and comprehension of the way in which a
chemical process takes place. " Aldehyd arises, which with
the same avidity as sulphurous acid, combines directly with
oxygen to form, acetic acid." — And again:3 "Aldehyd,
which absorbs oxygen from the air with great avidity"
As Liebig uses this expression twice in speaking of the
same phenomenon, it can hardly be by chance, but rather
because it was the only adequate expression for the thing.4

1 « Y-King," ed. J. Mohl, TO!, i. p. 341.

2 Liebig, " Die Chemie in ihrer Anwendung auf Agrikultur," p. 394.

3 Ibid. " Die Chemie in Anwendung auf Physiologie.

* French chemists likewise say : " II est Evident que Us m£taux ne
sont pas tous tgalement abides d'oxygene" . . . . " La difficult^ de la
reduction devait correspond™ ntcessairement a une avidit<S fort grande

LINGUISTIC. 325

That most immediate stamp of our thoughts, language,
shows us therefore, that every inward impulse must neces
sarily be conceived as volition ; but it by no means ascribes
knowledge to things as well. The agreement on this point
between all languages, perhaps without a single exception,
proves that here we have to do with no mere figure of
speech, but that the verbal expression is determined by a
deeply-rooted feeling of the inner nature of things.

du mttal pour Voxygtne" — (See Paul de Remusat, " La Chimie a 1'Ex-
position." " L' Aluminium," " Revue des Deux Mondes," 1855, p. 649).
Vaninus ("De Amirandis Naturae Arcanis," p. 170) had said:
" Argentum vivum etiam in aqua, conglobatur, quemadmodum et in
plumbi scobe etiam: at a scobe non refugit (this is directed against an
opinion expressed by Cardanus) imo ex ea quantum potest colligit :
quod nequit (scil. colligere), ut censeo, invitum relinquit: natura enim
et sua appetit, et vorat." This is evidently more than a form of words.
He here quite decidedly attributes a will to quicksilver. And thus it
will invariably be found that where, in physical and chemical processes,
there is a reference to elementary forces of Nature and to the primary
qualities of bodies which cannot be further deduced, these are always
expressed by words which belong to the will and its manifestations.
[Add. to 3rd ed.]

ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC.

IN 1818, when my chief work first appeared, Animal
Magnetism had only begun to struggle into existence.
But, as to its explanation — although, to be sure, some light
had been thrown upon the passive side of it, that is, upon
what goes on within the patient, by the contrast between
the cerebral and the ganglionic systems, to which Eeil had
drawn attention, having been taken for the principle of
explanation — the active side, the agent proper by means of
which the magnetiser evokes all these phenomena, was
still completely shrouded in darkness. People groped
about among all sorts of material principles of explanation,
such as Mesmer's all-permeating ether, or the exhalations
from the magnetiser's skin, assumed by Stieglitz to be
the cause, &c. &c. At the utmost a nerve- spirit had been
recognised and, after all, this was but a word for an un
known thing. The truth had scarcely begun to dawn upon
a few persons, whom practice had more deeply initiated.
But I was still far from hoping for any direct corroboration
of my doctrine from Magnetism.

Dies diem docet however, and the great teacher, expe
rience, has since brought to light an important fact con
cerning this deep-reaching agent which, proceeding from
the magnetiser, produces effects apparently so contrary to
the regular course of Nature that the long lasting doubt as
to their existence, the stiff-necked incredulity, the condemna
tion of a Committee of which Lavoisier and Franklin were
members, in short, the whole opposition that Magnetism
encountered both in its first and second period (with the sola

ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC. 327

exception of the coarse, unintelligent condemnation without
inquiry, which till very lately, prevailed in England) is quite
excusable. The fact I allude to is, that this agent is nothing
but the will of the magnetiser. To-day not a doubt exists
on this point, I believe, among those who combine practice
with insight ; therefore I think it superfluous to quote the
numerous assertions of magnetisers in corroboration of it.1
Time has thus not only verified Puysegur's watchword and
that of the older French magnetisers : " Veuillez et croyez !"
i.e. " Will with belief ! " but this very watchword has even
developed into a correct insight of the process itself.2
From Kieser's " Tellurismus," still probably the most
thorough and detailed text book of Animal Magnetism we
have, it clearly results, that no act of Magnetism can take
effect without the will ; on the other hand the bare will, with
out any outward action, is able to produce every magnetic
effect. Manipulation seems to be only a means of fixing,
and so to say incorporating, the will and its direction. In
this sense Kieser says : " Inasmuch as the human hand —
being the organ by which Man's outward activity is most
visibly expressed — is the efficient organ in magnetising,
manipulation arises." De Lausanne, a French magnetiser,
pronounces himself with still greater precision on this
point in the Fourth Book of his " Annales du Magnetisme
Animal " (1814-1816), where he says : " L' action du mag-
netisme depend de la seule volonte, il est vrai ; mais Vhomme
ayant une forme exte*rieure et sensible, tout ce qui est a
son usage, tout ce qui doit agir sur lui, doit necessairement

1 I only mention one work which has recently appeared, the explicit
object of which is to show that the magnetiser's will is the real agent :
" Qu'est ce que le Magnetisme ? " par E. Gromier. (Lyon, 1850.)

2 Puysegur himself says in the year 1784: " Lorsque vous aves
magn6tis6 le malade, votre but £tait de I'endormir, et vous y avez rtussi
par le seul acte de votre volonU ; c'est dc memepar un autre acte de volontt
que vous le rtveillez." (Puysegur, " Magnet. Anim." 2me edit. 1820,
«' Cate"chisme Magne"tique," p. 150-17L) [Add. to 3rd ed.]

328 THE WILL TN NATURE.

en avoir une, et pour que la volonte agisse,ilfautqu'elle em
ploye un mode d'action." As, according to ray doctrine, the
organism is but the mere phenomenon, the visibility, the
objectivity of the will; nay, as it is properly speaking
only the will itself, viewed as representation in the brain :
so also does the outward act of manipulation coincide with
the inward act of the will. But where magnetic effects
are produced without manipulation, they take place as it
were artificially, in a roundabout way, the imagination
taking the place of the outer act and even occasionally that
of personal presence : wherefore it is much more diffi
cult and succeeds less frequently. Kieser accordingly
alleges that the word " Sleep I " or " You must ! " said
aloud, has a more powerful effect upon a somnabulist than
the mere inward willing of the maf letiser. — On the other
hand manipulation, and in general outward action, is
really an infallible means of fixing the magnetiser's will
and promoting its activity ; precisely because outward acts
are quite impossible apart from all will, the body and
its organs being nothing but the visibility of the will
itself. This explains the fact, that magnetisers at
times magnetise without any conscious effort of volitio
and almost without thinking, and yet produce the de
sired effect. On the whole, it is not the consciousness of
volition, reflection upon it, that acts magnetically, but pure
volition itself, as detached as possible from all representa
tion. In Kieser' s directions to magnetisers therefore,1 we
find all thinking and reflecting upon their respective doing
and suffering, all conversation between them, forbidden
both to physician and patient ; also all outward impres
sions which arouse representations, the presence of strangers,
and even daylight. He advises that everything should
proceed as unconsciously as possible, as is likewise recom
mended in charm-cures. The true reason of all this is, that

1 Kieser, " Tellur. ; vol. i. p. 400,

ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC. 329

here the will operates in its primariness, as thing in itself ;
and this demands the exclusion, as far as possible, of repre
sentation, as a different sphere, as secondary to the will.
Facts to prove that the real agent in magnetising is the
will and each outward act only its vehicle, may be found
in all the more recent and more trustworthy writings upon
Magnetism, and it would be needless prolixity to repeat
them here. Nevertheless I will quote one case, not as
being especially striking, but as furnished by a remarkable
person and having a peculiar interest as his testimony.
Jean Paul says in a letter : x " Twice in a large company I
have made Frau von K. nearly go to sleep by merely look
ing at her with a firm will, no one else knowing anything
about it, and before that, I had brought on palpitation of
the heart and pallor to such a degree that Dr. S. had to
be summoned to her assistance." 2 Nowadays too, merely
laying and keeping hold of the patient's hands while fixing

1 See " Wahrheit aus Jean Paul's Leben," vol. viii. p. 120.

2 I had the good fortune in the year 1854 myself to witness soms
extraordinary feats of this kind, performed here by Signor Regaz-
zoni from Bergamo, in which the immediate, i.e. magical, power of his
will over other persons was unmistakeable, and of which no one,
excepting perhaps those to whom Nature has denied all capacity for appre
bending pathological conditions, could doubt the genuineness. There
are nevertheless such persons : they ought to become lawyers, clergymen,
merchants or soldiers, but in heaven's name not doctors ; for the result
would be homicidal, diagnosis being the principal thing in medicine. — •
Regazzoni was able at will to throw the somnambulist who was under
his influence into a state of complete catalepsy, nay, he could make her
fall down backwards, when he stood behind her and she was walking
before him, by his mere will, without any gestures. He could paralyze
her, give her tetanos, with the dilated pupils, the complete insensi
bility, and in short, all the unmistakeable symptoms of complete
catalepsy. He made one of the lady spectators first play the piano ; then
standing fifteen paces behind her, he so completely paralyzed her by his
will and gestures, that she was unable to continue playing. He next
placed her against a column and charmed her to the spot, so that she
\vas unable to move in spite of the strongest efforts. — According to my
own observation, nearly all his feats are to be explained by his isolating

330 THE WILL IN NATURE.

the eye steadily upon him, is frequently substituted with
complete success for the customary manipulation ; precisely
because even this outward act is suited to fix the will in a
determined direction. But this immediate power which
the will can exercise over other persons, is brought to light
best of all by the admirable experiments made, even in
public, by M. Dupotet and his pupils in Paris, in which
a stranger is guided and determined at pleasure by the
magnetiser's mere will, aided by a few gestures, and is
even forced into the most extraordinary contortions. An
apparently quite honestly written pamphlet, entitled " First
glance into the wonder- world of Magnetism," by Karl
Scholl (1853). contains a brief account of this.

In the " Communications concerning the somnambulist,
Auguste K. in Dresden" (1843), we find the truth in ques
tion confirmed in another way by what the somnambulist
herself says, p. 53 : " I was half asleep and my brother

the brain from the spinal marrow, either completely, in which case the
sensible and motor nerves become paralyzed, and total catalepsy ensues ;
or partially, by the paralysis only affecting the motor nerves while
sensibility remains — in other words, the head keeps its consciousness,
while the body is apparently lifeless. This is precisely the effect of
strychnine : it paralyzes the motor nerves only, even to complete tetanos,
which induces death by asphyxia ; but it leaves the sensible nerves, and
with them consciousness, intact. Eegazzoni does this same thing by the
magic influence of his will. The moment at which this isolation takes
place is distinctly visible in a peculiar trembling of the .patient. I
recommend a small French publication entitled " Antoine Regazzoni de
Bergame & Francfort sur Mein," by L. A. V. Dubourg (Frankfurt,
Nov. 1854, 31 pages in 8vo.) on Regazzoni's feats and the unmistakeably
genuine character they bear for everyone who is not entirely devoid of
all sense for organic Nature.

In the " Journal du Magnetisme," edit. Dupotet, of the 15th August,
1856, in criticizing a treatise: "De la Catalepsie, memoire couronne","
1856, in 4to, the reviewer, Morin, says : " La plupart des caracteres qui
distinguent la catalepsie, peuvent etre obtenus artinciellement et sans
danger sur les sujets magne'tiques, et c'est meme la une des experiences
les plus ordinaires des stances magn6tiques." [Add. to 3rd ed,}

ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC. 331

wished to play a piece he knew. As I did not like it, I re
quested him not to play it; nevertheless he tried to
do so and then, by means of my firm will that he
should not, I succeeded in making him unable to remem
ber the piece, in spite of all his endeavours." — The thing
is however brought to a climax when this immediate
power of the will is extended even to inanimate bodies.
However incredible this may appear, we have nevertheless
two accounts of it coming from entirely different quarters.
In the book just mentioned,1 it is related and testified by
witnesses, that Auguste K. caused the needle of the com
pass to deviate at one time 7° and at another 4°, this ex
periment moreover being repeated four times. She did
this moreover without any use of her hands, through her
mere will, by looking steadily at it. — The Parisian som
nambulist, Prudence Bernard, again in a public seance in
London, at which Mr. Brewster, the physicist's son and
two other gentlemen from among the spectators acted as
jurors, made the compass needle deviate and follow her
movements by simply turning her head round.2

Now, if we thus see the will — stated by me to be the
thing in itself, the only real thing in all existence, the
kernel of Nature — accomplish through the human indi
vidual, in Animal Magnetism and even beyond it, things
which cannot be explained according to the causal nexus,
i.e. in the regular course of Nature; if we find it in a
sense even annulling Nature's laws and actually perform
ing actio in distans, consequently manifesting a super
natural, that is, metaphysical, mastery over Nature —
what corroboration better founded on fact could I desire
for my doctrine ? Was not even Count Szapary, a magne-

1 " Mittheilungen iiber die Somnambiile, Auguste K., in Dresden."
1845, pp. 115, 116, and 3 16.

2 See extract from the English periodical " Britannia," in " Galignani's
Messenger," of the 23rd October, 1851.

332 THE WILL IN NATURE.

tiser who certainly did not know my philosophy, led by
the results of his own experience, after writing the title
of his book : " A word about Animal Magnetism, soul-
bodies and vital essence," l to add the following remark
able explanatory words : " or physical proofs that th<3
current of Animal Magnetism is the element, and the
will the principle of all spiritual and corporeal life ?" 2 —
According to this, Animal Magnetism presents itself
directly as practical Metaphysic, which was the term use!
by Bacon of Yerulam 3 to define Magic in his classifica
tion of the sciences: it is empirical or experimental
Metaphysic. — Further, because the will manifests itself
in Animal Magnetism downright as the thing in itself,
we see the principium individuationis (Space and Time),
which belongs to mere phenomenon, at once annulled :
its limits which separate individuals from one another,
are destroyed; Space no longer separates magnetiser
and somnambulist ; community of thoughts and of motions
of the will appears ; the state of clairvoyance overleaps
the relations belonging to mere phenomenon and con
ditioned by Time and Space, such as proximity and dis
tance, the present and the future.

In consequence of these facts, notwithstanding many
reasons and prejudices to the contrary, the opinion has
gradually gained ground, nay almost raised itself to cer
tainty, that Animal Magnetism and its phenomena are
identical with part of the Magic of former times, of that
ill-famed occult art, of whose reality not only the Chris
tian ages by which it was so cruelly persecuted, but all, not
excepting even savage, nations on the whole of the earth,

1 Szapa.ry, " Ein Wort iiber Animalischen Magnetismus, Seelenkorper
und Lebensessenz " (1840).

2 " Oder physische Beweise, dass der Animalisch-magnetiseke Strom
das Element, und der Wille das Princip alles geistigen und Korperlichen
Lcbens sei."

3 Bacon, " Instaur. Magna," L. III.

ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC. 333

have been equally convinced throughout all ages. The
Twelve Tables of the Eomans,1 the Books of Moses, and
even Plato's Eleventh Book on Laws, already made its
practice punishable by death, and Apuleius' beautiful
speech 2 before the court of justice, when defending himself
against the charge of practising magic by which his life
was menaced, proves how seriously this matter was taken
even in the most enlightened Roman period, under the
Antouines; since he merely tries to clear himself person
ally from the charge in question, but by no means contests
the possibility of witchcraft and even enters into a host of
absurd details such as are wont to figure in all the me-
diseval trials for witchcraft. The eighteenth century
makes an exception as regards this belief in Magic, and this
is mainly because Balthasar Becker, Thorn asius and some
others, with the good intention of putting an end once for
all to the cruel trials for witchcraft, declared all magic to
be impossible. Favoured by the philosophy of the age,
this opinion soon gained the upper hand, although only
among the learned and educated classes. The common
people have never ceased to believe in witchcraft, even in
England; though here the educated classes contrive to
unite a degrading religious bigotry with the firm incredu
lity of a Saint Thomas (or of a Thomasius) as to all facts
transcending the laws of impact and counter-impact, acids
and alkalis, and refuse to lend an ear to their great coun
tryman, when he tells them that ' there are more things in
heaven and earth than are dreamt of in their philosophy/
One branch of Magic is still notoriously preserved and prac
tised among the lower orders, being tolerated on account
of its beneficent purpose. This is curing by charms (sym-
pathetische Kuren, as they are called in German), the reality
of which can hardly be doubted. Charming away warts,

1 Plin. hist. nat. L. 30, c. 3. [Add. to 3rd ed.]

2 Apuleius, " Oratio cle Magia," p. 104. Bip.

334 THE WILL IN NATURE.

is one of the commonest forms of this practice, and of this
Bacon of Yerulam, cautious and empirical though he was,
attests the efficacy from personal experience.1 The charm
ing away of erisypelas in the face by a spell, is another
instance, and so often succeeds, that it is easy to con
vince oneself of its existence. Fever too is often success
fully combated by spells, &c. &c.2 — That, in all this, the
real agents are not the meaningless words and ceremonies,
but that it is the will of the operator which acts, as in
Animal Magnetism, needs no further explanation after
what has been said above. For such as are still unac
quainted with charm-cures, instances may be found in
Kieser.3 — These two facts therefore, Animal Magnetism and
Charm-curing, bear empirical evidence to the possibility of
magical, as opposed to physical, influence, which possi
bility had been so peremptorily rejected by the past cen
tury ; since it refused to recognise as possible any other

1 Bacon, « Silva Silvarura," § 997.

2 In the "Times" of June the 12th, 1855, we find, p. 10, the fol
lowing : —

" A Horse-charmer.

" On the voyage to England the ship ' Simla ' experienced some heavy
weather in the Bay of Biscay, in which the horses suffered severely, and
some, including a charger of General Scarlett, became unmanageable.
A valuable mare was so very bad, that a pistol was got ready to shoot
her and to end her misery ; when a Eussian officer recommended a
Cossak prisoner to be sent for, as he was a 'juggler' and could, by
charms, cure any malady in a horse. He was sent for, and immediately
said he could cure it at once. He was closely watched, but the only
thing they could observe him do was to take his sash off and tie a knot
in it three several times. However the mare, in a few minutes, got on her
feet and began to eat heartily, and rapidly recovered." [Add. to 3rd ed.]

2 Kieser, " Archiv. fur den thierischen Magnetismus," vol. v. heft 3,
p. 106 ; vol. viri. heft 3, p. 145 ; vol. ix. heft 2, p. 172 ; and vol. ix. heft
1, p. 128; Dr. Most's book likewise: " Uber Sympathetische Mittel
und Kuron," 1842, may be used as an introduction to this matter. (And
even Pliny indicates a number of charm-cures in the 28th Book, chaps.
6 to 17. [Add. to 3rd ed.])

ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC. 335

than physical influences brought about in the way of the
intelligible nexus of causality.

It is a fortunate circumstance, that the rectification of
this view in our time should have come from medical science;
because it ensures us at the same time against the danger
of the pendulum of opinion receiving too strong an impulse
in the contrary direction, and thus carrying us back to
the superstition of ruder ages. Besides, as I have said,
Animal Magnetism and Charm- curing only save the reality
of a part of Magic, which included a good deal more, a
considerable portion of which must, for the present at
least, remain under the old sentence of condemnation or be
left in uncertainty ; whereas another portion will at any
rate have to be conceived as possible, through its analogy
to Animal Magnetism. For Animal Magnetism and
Charm-cures are but salutary influences exercised for cura
tive purposes, like those recorded in the "History of
Magic" as practised by the so-called (Spanish) Saluda-
dores,1 who nevertheless were also condemned by the
Church ; whereas Magic was far oftener practised with an
evil intent. Nevertheless, to judge by analogy, it is more
than probable, that the same inherent force which, by
acting directly upon another individuality, can exercise a
salutary influence, will be at least as powerful to exercise
a prejudicial and pernicious one. If therefore there was
reality in any part of ancient Magic beyond what may be
referred to Animal Magnetism and curing by charms, it
must assuredly have been in that which is called male-
ficium and fascinatio, the very thing that gave rise to
most of the trials for witchcraft. In Most's book, too,
already mentioned,2 a few facts are related which must

1 Delrio. " Disqu. Mag." L. III. P. 2, q. 4, s. 7— and Bodinus, " Mag.
Daemon," iii. 2.

2 See note 2, p. 334, especially pp. 40, 41, and Nos. 89, 91, and
97 of Most's book.

336 THE WILL IN NATTTEE.

undoubtedly be ascribed to maleficium ; in Kieser * also
we find instances of diseases which had been transmitted,
especially to dogs, who died of them. In Plutarch 2 we
find that fascinatio was already known to Democritus,
who tried to explain it as a fact. Now admitting these
stories to be true, they give us the key to the crime of
witchcraft, the zealous persecution of which would there
fore not have been quite without reason. For even if in
most cases it may have been founded upon error and
abuse, we are still not authorized to look upon our fore
fathers as having been so utterly benighted, as to persecute
with the utmost vigour and cruelty for so many ages an abso
lutely impossible crime. From this point of view moreover,
we can also understand that the common people should
still even to the present day persist in attributing certain
cases of illness to a maleficium, and are not to be dissuaded
from this conviction. Now if we are thus induced by the
progress of the age to modify the extreme view adopted by
the last century concerning the absolute nullity of this ill-
famed art — at any rate with respect to some part of it —
still nowhere is caution more necessary than here, in order
to fish out from the chaos of fraud, falsehood and absurdity
contained in the writings of Agrippa von Nettesheim,
Wierus, Bodinus, Delrio, Bindsfeldt, &c. &c., the few
isolated truths that may lie in them. For, frequent
though they may be throughout the world, nowhere have
lies and deceit freer play than where Nature's la^ re
avowedly set aside, nay declared invalid. Here there re
we find the wildest fictions, the strangest freaks of the
imagination worked up into an edifice, lofty as the sides,
on the narrow foundation of the slight particle of truth there
may have been in Magic, and in consequence of this, the

1 Kieser, "Archiv. f. t. M." See the account of Bende Bensen's
illness, vol. ix. to vol. xii.

2 Plutarch, " Symposiacse qusestionis," qu. v. 7. 6.

ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC.

most sanguinary atrocities perpetrated age after age. In
contemplating such things, the psychological reflection on
the unlimited capability of the human intellect for accept
ing the most incredible absurdities and the readiness of
the human heart to set its seal to them by cruelty, prevails
over every other.

Yet the modification which has taken place of late in the
views of German savants respecting magic, is not due
exclusively to Animal Magnetism. The deep foundations
of it had already been laid by the change in philosophy
wrought by Kant, which makes German culture differ
fundamentally from that of the rest of Europe, with
respect to philosophy as well as to other branches of
knowledge. — For a man to be able to smile beforehand at
all occult sympathies, let alone magical influences, he must
find the world very, nay completely, intelligible. But this
is only possible if he looks at it with the utterly superficial
glance which puts away from it all suspicion that we
human beings are immersed in a sea of riddles and mys
teries and have no exhaustive knowledge or understanding
either of things or of ourselves in any direct way. Nearly
all great men have been of the opposite frame of mind
and therefore, whatever age or nation they belonged to,
have always betrayed a slight tinge of superstition. If
our natural mode of knowing were one that handed over
to us things in themselves immediately and consequently
gave us the absolutely true relations and connections of
things, we might then, no doubt, be justified in rejecting a
priori, therefore unconditionally, all prescience of future
events, all apparitions of absent, of dying, let alone of
deceased persons, and all magical influence. But if all
that we know is, as Kant teaches, mere phenomenon, the
forms and laws of which do not extend to things in them
selves, it must be obviously premature to reject all fore
knowledge, all apparitions and all magic; since that

338 THE WILL IN NATTJKE.

rejection is based upon laws, whose a, priori character pre
cisely restricts them to phenomena; whereas things in
themselves, to which even our own inner self must belong,
remain untouched by them. But it is quite possible for
these very things in themselves to have relations with us
from which the above-mentioned occurrences may have
arisen, concerning which accordingly we have to wait for the
decision a posteriori, and must not forestall it. That the
English and French should persist in denying a priori all
such occurrences, comes at the bottom from the influence
of Locke's philosophy, under which these nations still
stand as to all essential points, and by which we are taught
that, after merely subtracting sensation, we know things
in themselves. According to this view therefore, the
laws of the material world are held to be ultimate, and
no other influence than influxus physicus is admitted.
Consequently these nations believe, it is true, in a phy
sical, but not in a metaphysical, science, and there
fore reject all other than so-called "Natural Magic:"
a term which contains the same contradictio in adjecto as
" Supernatural Physics," but is nevertheless constantly
used quite seriously, while the latter was used but once,
and then in joke, by Lichtenberg. On the other hand, the
common people, with their universal readiness to give
credit to supernatural influences, express by it in their own
way the conviction, that all things which we perceive and
comprehend are mere phenomena, not things in themselves ;
although, with them, conviction is only felt. I quote the
following passage from Kant's " Grundlegung zur Meta-
physik der Sitten," as a proof that this is not saying too
much : " There is an observation requiring no great subtlety
of reflection, which we may on the contrary suppose the most
ordinary understanding capable of making, albeit in its
own way and by an obscure distinction of the faculty of
judgment, which it calls feeling. It is this : that all our

ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC. 339

involuntary representations (such as those of the senses)
give us no further knowledge of objects than as they affect
us, whereby we are left in ignorance as to what those
objects may be in themselves ; that, as far as this sort of
representation is concerned therefore, we are still only
able by this means to attain knowledge of phenomena, but
never of things in themselves, even by dint of the utmost
clearness and the most strenuous attention the under
standing is able to give to this point. When once this
distinction is made, however, it stands to reason, that the
existence of something else behind these phenomena,
something which is not phenomenon, i.e. the thing in
itself, has still to be admitted and assumed." *

When we read D. Tiedemann's " History of Magic," a
we are astonished at the persistency with which mankind
have clung to the thought of Magic in all places and at all
times, notwithstanding frequent failure ; and we come to
the conclusion, that this thought must, to say the least, be
deeply rooted in human nature,, if not in things in general,
and cannot be a mere arbitrary creation of the fancy. Al
though Magic is differently denned by the various authors
who have treated of it, the fundamental thought which
predominates in all its definitions is nevertheless unmis-
takeable. For the opinion, that there must be another quite
different way of producing changes in the world besides
the regular one through the causal nexus between bodies,
and one moreover which is not founded at all upon that
nexus, has found favour in all ages and countries. There
fore also the means belonging to this second way appeared
absurd, when they were viewed in the same light as the
first; since the cause applied was obviously not suited

1 Kant, "First Principles of Ethical Metaphysic," 3rd edition, p. 105.

8 D. Tiedemann, " Disputatio de qusestione, quse fuerit artum magi
carum origo." Marb. 1787. A prize-essay written for the Gottingen
Society.

340 THE WILL nr NATTFEE.

to the effect intended and a causal nexus between them
was impossible. But here it was assumed, that apart
from the outer connection between the phenomena of
this world on which the nexus physicus is founded, there
must exist another besides, passing through the very
essence in itself of all things : a subterranean connection as
it were, by means of which immediate action was possible
from one point of the phenomenon on to every other point,
through a nexus metaphysicus ;

that accordingly, it must be possible to act upon things
from inside, instead of from outside, as is usual ;

that it must be possible for phenomenon to act upon
phenomenon by means of that being in itself, which is one
and the same in all phenomena ;

that, just as we act causally as natura naturata, we
might probably be able to act also as natura naturans, and
momentarily to enable the microcosm to play the part of
the macrocosm ;

that, however firm the partition walls of individuation
and separation might be, they might nevertheless occa
sionally permit a communication to take place as it were be
hind the scenes, or like a secret game under the table ; and

that, just as a neutralisation of individual isolation takes
place in somnambulistic clairvoyance, so likewise might a
neutralisation of the will in the individual be possible. Such
a thought as this cannot have arisen empirically, nor can
it have been confirmation through experience that has pre
served it throughout all ages and in all countries : for in
the majority of cases experience must result downright un
favourably to it. I opine therefore, that the origin of this
thought, which has universally held its ground with the
whole of mankind and, in spite of so much conflicting
experience, in defiance of common sense, has never been
eradicated, must be sought at great depth : namely in the
inward feeling of the omnipotence of the will in itself- — of

ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC. 341

that will, which constitutes at once the inner essence of
Man and of the whole of Nature — and in the assumption
connected with it that, somehow or other, this omnipotence
might possibly for once make itself felt, even when pro
ceeding from the individual. People were unable to in
vestigate and distinguish the difference between the capa
bilities of the will as thing in itself and the same will in its
individual manifestation ; but they assumed without fur
ther ado, that under certain circumstances, the will might
be enabled to break through the barriers of individuation.
For the above-mentioned feeling rebelled obstinately
against the knowledge forced upon it by experience, that

" Der Gott der mir im Busen wohnt,

Kann tief mein Innerstes erregen,
Der iiber alien meinen Kraften thront,

Er kann nach Aussen nichts bewegen."

According to the fundamental thought just expounded, we
find that the physical medium used in all attempts at
magic, never was regarded in any other light than in thnt
of a vehicle for a thing metaphysical ; otherwise it coukl
evidently stand in no relation whatever to the effect con
templated. These media consisted in cabalistic words, sym
bolical actions, traced figures, wax images, &c. &c. We see
too that, according to the original feeling, what this vehicle
conveyed, was in the last resort always an act of volition
that had been connected with it. The very natural induce
ment to do this, was the observation, that every moment men
became aware of a completely unaccountable, that is, evi
dently metaphysical, agency of the will, in the movements
or their own bodies. Might not this agency, they thought,
be extended to other bodies also ? To find out a way to
annul the isolation in which the will finds itself in each in
dividual, and to extend the immediate sphere of the will's
action beyond the organism of the person willing, was the
nim of Magic.

342 THE WILL IN NATURE.

A great deal was nevertheless still wanting ere this fun
damental thought, from which Magic seems properly to
have sprung, could pass over at once into distinct con
sciousness and be recognised in abstracto, and ere Magic
could at once understand itself. Only a few thoughtful
and learned writers of former ages — as I mean soon to prove
by quotations — express the distinct thought, that it is in the
will itself that the magic power lies, and that the strange
signs and acts together with the senseless words that
accompanied them, which passed for the means of exorcis
ing and the connecting link with demons, are in fact merely
vehicles and means for fixing the will, by which the act of
volition, which is to act magically, ceases to be mere wish
and becomes deed, or, to use the language of Paracelsus,
" receives a corpus" and the individual will in a sense dis
tinctly proclaims that it is now acting as general will, as
will in itself. For in every act of Magic — charm-cure or
whatever else it may be — the outward action (the connect
ing link) is exactly what the passes are in magnetising :
i.e. not what is really essential, but the mere vehicle,
that by which the will, the only real agent, is directed and
fixed in the material world and enters into reality. As a
rule therefore, it is indispensable. — From the rest of the
writers of those times we gather that, in conformity with
that fundamental thought of Magic, their only aim was to
obtain absolute, arbitrary power over Nature. But they
were unable to elevate themselves to the thought that this
power must be a direct one ; they conceived it, on the con
trary, absolutely as an indirect one. For all religions in
all countries had placed Nature under the dominion of
gods and of demons. Now, it was the magician's endea
vour to subject these gods and demons to his will, to in
duce, nay, to force them to serve him ; and he attributed
all that he succeeded in achieving to their agency, just as
Mesmer attributed the success of his Magnetism to the mag-

ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC. 343

netic rods he held in his hands, instead of to his will which
was the real agent. It was in this sense that all poly
theistic nations took the matter, and even Plotinus,1 but
more especially lamblichns, understood Magic : that is, as
Theurgy, an expression which Porphyry was the first to
use. That divine aristocracy, Pantheism, was favourable to
this interpretation, since it distributed the dominion over
the different forces of Nature among as many gods and
demons — mostly mere personifications of natural forces —
and the magician, by persuasion or by force, subjected now
one, now the other of these divinities to his power and
made them do his bidding. But in a Divine Monarchy,
where all Nature obeys a single ruler, the thought of con
tracting a private alliance with the Almighty, let alone of
exercising sovereignty over him, would have been too auda
cious. Therefore where Judaism, Christianity or Islam
prevailed, the omnipotence of the one God stood in the
way of this interpretation of Magic : an omnipotence which
the magician could not venture to attack. He had no
alternative therefore, but to take refuge with the Devil,
and with this rebellious spirit — perhaps even direct de
scendant of Ahriman — to whom some power over Nature
was still attributed, he now entered into a compact, by
which he ensured to himself his assistance. This was
"necromancy" (the 'black art'). Its antithesis, 'white
Magic,' was opposed to it by the circumstance that, in it,
the magician did not make friends with the Devil, but
rather solicited the permission, not to say co-operation,
of the Almighty himself, to intercede with the angels ;
oftener still, he invoked devils by pronouncing the rarer
Hebrew names and titles of the One God, such as Adon-Ai,
&c. &c., and compelled them to obey him, without promising

1 Here and there, Plotinus betrays a more correct knowledge, for
instance, " Enn." ii. lib. iii. c. 7 j " Enn." iv. lib. iii. c. 12, et lib. ix.
c.3.

344 THE WILL IN NATURE.

them anything in return for their services, in a hell-com
pulsion1 (Hollenzwang). — But all these mere interpreta
tions and outward trappings of the thing were received so
entirely as its essence and as objective processes, that
writers like Bodinus, Delrio, Bindsfeldt, &c., whose know
ledge of magic was second-hand and not derived from per
sonal experience, all assert the essential characteristic of
Magic to be, that it does not act either through forces of
Nature or in a natural way, but through the assistance of
the Devil. This view was, and long remained, current
everywhere, locally modified according to the religions
which prevailed in different countries. The laws against
sorcery and the trials for witchcraft were based upon it ;
likewise, wherever the possibility of Magic was contested,
the attacks were generally directed against this opinion.
An objective view, such as this, was an inevitable conse
quence of the decided Realism which prevailed throughout
ancient and mediaeval Europe and which Descartes was the
first to disturb. Till then, Man had not learnt to direct
the light of speculative thought towards the mysterious
depths of his own inner self, but, on the contrary, had
sought everything outside himself. Above all the thought
of making the will he found within him rule over Nature,
was so bold, that people would have been alarmed by it :
therefore it was made to rule over fictitious beings, sup
posed by the prevailing superstition to have command over
Nature, in order through them to obtain at least indirect
mastery over Nature. Every sort of god or demon more
over, is always a hypostasis, by which believers of all sects
and colours bring to their own comprehension the Metaphysi
cal, that which lies behind Nature, that which gives her
existence and consistence and consequently rules over her.
Thus, when it is said, that Magic acts by the help of demons,

1 Delrio, " Disq. mag." L. ii. qu. 2. Agrippa a Nettesheym, " De
Vanit. Scient." c. 45.

ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC. 345

the meaning which lies at the bottom of this thought still
is, that it is an agency which is not physically, but metaphy
sically exercised : that it is not a natural, but a supernatural,
agency. Now if, in the small amount of fact which speaks
in favour of the reality of Magic: that is, in Animal Mag
netism and charm-cures, we still do not recognise anything
but an immediate action of the will which here manifests its
direct power outside, instead of inside, the individual ; if
moreover, as I am about to show and to substantiate by de
cisive, unequivocal citations, those who are more deeply
initiated into ancient Magic, derive all its effects from the
magician's will alone : this is surely strong empirical evi
dence in support of my doctrine, that the Metaphysical in
general, that which alone exists apart from representation,
the thing in itself of the universe — is nothing but what is
known to us within ourselves as the will.

Now, if the direct power which may occasionally be
exercised over Nature by the will, was conceived by those
magicians as a merely indirect one, acquired by the help of
demons, this still could not prevent its efficiency wherever
and whenever it may have taken place. For, precisely
because, in things of this kind, the will acts in itself, in
its primariness, therefore apart from representation, its
efficiency cannot be frustrated by erroneous conceptions of
the intellect ; on the contrary, the distance here is a wide
one between theory and practice : the errors of the former
do not stand in the way of the latter, nor does a correct
theory qualify for practice. Mesmer, in the beginning,
attributed his agency to the magnetic rods he held in his
hands and later on explained the wonders of Animal
Magnetism by a materialistic theory of a subtle, all-
permeating fluid; nevertheless he produced wonderfully
powerful effects. I once myself knew the proprietor of an
estate, whose peasants were wont by tradition to have their
feverish attacks dispelled by a spell of their master's. Now,

346 THE WILL IN NATURE.

although he "believed he had convinced himself of the im
possibility of all such things, yet he continued good-
naturedly to comply with their wish as usual, and indeed
often succeeded in relieving them. This success he ascribed
to his peasants' firm belief, forgetting that a similar faith
ought also to bring success to the medical treatment which
is so often applied with complete inefficacy to believing
patients.

Now, if Theurgy and Demonomagic, as described above,
were but the mere interpretation and outward trappings of
the thing, the mere husk, at which the majority were con
tent to stop short ; there were nevertheless some, who went
below the surface and quite recognised that the agent in
influences supposed to proceed from magic, was absolutely
nothing but the will. We must not however look for such
deeper observers as these among the discountenancers and
antagonists of Magic, and the majority of the writers on
this subject belong precisely to these : they derived their
knowledge exclusively from Courts of Justice and from
the examination of witnesses, so that they merely describe
the outside of the matter ; and, if at any time they chanced,
through confessions, to gain an insight into the inner
processes, they took good care not to betray that knowledge,
lest, by doing so, they should contribute to diffuse the
terrible vice of sorcery. To this class belong Bodinus,
Delrio, Bindsfeldt, and others. For information as to the
real nature of the thing, we must on the contrary go to
philosophers and investigators of Nature, who wrote in
those times of prevailing superstition. Now, from wliat
they say, it clearly follows, that the real agent in Magic,
just as in Animal Magnetism, is nothing but the will.
Here I must quote some passages in support of this
assertion.1 Theophrastus Paracelsus especially discloses

1 Roger Bacon already in the thirteenth century said :...." Quod si
ultcrius aligua anima maligna cogitat ftrtiter de infectione altcrius,

ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC. 347

perhaps more concerning the inner nature of Magic than
any other writer, and does not even hesitate to give a
minute description of the processes used in it.1 — He says : a
" To be observed concerning wax images : if I bear malice
in my will against anyone, that malice must be carried out
by some medium or corpus. Thus it is possible for my
spirit to stab or wound another person without help from
my body in using a sword, merely by my fervent desire.
Therefore it is also possible for me to convey my opponent's
spirit into the image by my will and then to deform
or paralyze it at pleasure. — You must know, that the
influence of the will is a great point in medicine. For if a
man hate another and begrudge him anything good, it is
possible that if he curse him, that curse may take effect. —
This occurs also with animals and more easily than with
men ; for the spirit of man has far greater power of resis
tance than that of animals."

And p. 375 : " It follows from this, that one image has
magic power over another, not by virtue of the characters
or anything of that kind impressed on the virgin wax;
but the imagination overcomes its own constellation, so as
to become a means for fulfilling the will of its heaven, i.e.
of its man."

p. 334: "All the imagining of man comes from his
heart. The heart is the sun of the microcosm. And all
the imagining of man passes from the small sun of the
microcosm into the sun of the great Universe, into the heart
of the macrocosm. Thus the imaginatio of the microcosm
is a seed which becomes material," &c.

atgue ardenter desideret et certitudinaliter intendat, atque vehementer con-
sideret se posse nocere, non est dubiwm, guin natura obediet cogitationibiis
anlm<B." (See Kogeri Bacon, " Opus Majus," Londini, 1733, p. 252.)

1 Theophrastus Paracelsus, Strassburg edition in two folio vols., vol. i.
pp. 91, 353, et segq. and p. 789 j vol. ii. pp. 362, 496.

2 Vol. i. p. 19.

348 THE WILL IN NATURE.

p. 364 : " It suffices for you to know what rigorous
imagination does, which is the beginning of all magical
works."

p. 789 : " Even my thought therefore is a looking at a
mark. Now I must not turn my eye with my hands in
this or that direction ; but my imagination turns it as I
wish. And this is also to be understood of walking : I
desire, I propose to myself, therefore my body moves, and
the firmer my thoughts, the more sure it is that I shall run.
Thus imaginatio alone is an impulse for my running."

p. 837 : " Imaginatio used against me may be em
ployed with such rigour, that I may be killed by the
imaginatio of another person."

Vol. ii. p. 274 : " Imagination comes from longing
and desire : envy, hatred, proceed from longing, for they
do not arise unless you long for them. As soon as you
wish, the act of the imagination follows. This long-
ing must be quick, ardent, lively, as that of a pregnant
woman, &c. &c. — A general curse is commonly verified.
Why ? It conies from the heart, and the seed lies and is
born in that coming from the heart. Thus parents' curses
also come from the heart. The curse of the poor is like
wise imaginatio. The prisoner's curse, also mere imagi
natio, corn.es from the heart Thus too, when one

man wishes to stab or paralyze, &c., another by means of
his imaginatio, he must first attract the thing and instru
ment to himself and then he can impress it (with his
wish) : for whatever enters into it, may also go out of it
again by the medium of thought as well as by that of the

hands In such imagining, women outdo men ....

for they are more ardent in revenge."

p. 298: " Magica is a great occult wisdom; just a;3

Eeason is a great, open folly No armour avails

against sorcery, for it wounds the inner man, the vital
spirit Some magicians make an image in the shape

ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC. 3-19

of a man they intend [to harm], knock a nail into the sole
of its foot, and the man is invisibly struck with lameness,
until the nail is removed."

p. 307 : " We ought to know, that we may convey the
spirit of any man into an image, solely by faith and by our
strong imagination. — No incantation is needed, and the
ceremonies, drawing of circles, fumigations, seals, &c. <fcc.
are mere humbug to mislead. — Homunculi and images are

made, &c. &c by which all the operations, powers

and will of man are carried out The human heart

is indeed so great a thing, that no one can express it : as
God is eternal and imperishable, so also is the heart of
man. If we men thoroughly recognised our heart, nothing
would be impossible for us on earth Perfect imagina
tion, coming from the stars (astris) arises from the heart."

p. 513 : " Imaginatio is confirmed and rendered perfect
by the belief that it really takes place : for every doubt
injures the effect. Faith must confirm the imagination,

for faith decides the will But just the fact that

man does not always perfectly imagine, perfectly believe,
causes acts to be called uncertain, which nevertheless may
certainly and quite well exist." A passage from Campa-
nella's book, " De sensu rerum et magia," may serve to
elucidate this last sentence. Efficiunt alii ne homo possi
futuere, si tantum credat : non enim potest facere quod non
credit posse facer e (1. iv. c. 18).

Agrippa von Nettesheim1 speaks in the same sense.
" Non minus subjicitur corpus alieno animo, quam alieno
corpori;" and:2 " Quidquid dictat animus fortissime odientis
habet efficaciam nocendi et destruendi ; similiter in ceteris,
quce affectat animus fortissimo desiderio. Omnia enim quce
tune agit et dictat ex characteribus, figuris, verbis, gestibus
et ejusmodi, omnia sunt adjuvantia appetitum animce et
acquirunt mirdbiles quasdam virtutes, turn ab anima labo~

1 " De occulta philosophia," lib. 1, c. 66. 2 Ibid. c. 67.

350 THE WILL IN NATURE.

rantis in ilia Jiora, quando ipsum appetitus ejusmodi
maxime invadit, turn ab injluxu coelesti animum tune
taliter movente"1 — "Inest hominum animis virtus qucedam
immutandi et ligandi res et homines ad id quod desiderat,
et omnes res obediunt illi, quando fertur in magnum exces-
sum alicujus passionis, vel virtutis, in tantum, ut superet
eos, quos ligat. Radix ejusmodi ligationis ipsa est affectio
animce vehemens et exterminata"

And likewise Jul. Cses. Vanniims, "De admir. naturae
arcan." L. iv. dial. 5, § 435 : " Vehementem imagina-
tionem, cui spiritus et sanguis obediunt, rem mente concep-
tam realiter efficere, non solum intra, sed et extra" 2

Just so Job. Bapt. Van Helmont, who takes great
pains to explain away as much as possible of the Devil's
influence, in order to attribute it to the will. I quote a
few passages from the voluminous collection of his works,
Ortus Medicince :

Recepta injecta. § 12. Quum hostis naturce (diabolus)

1 " De occulta philosophia," lib. 1, cc. 66, 67 et 68.

2 Ibid. p. 440 : Addunt Avicenna dictum : " Ad validam alicujus imagi-
nationem cadit camelus." Ibid. p. 478, speaking of charms : fascinations
guis cum muliere coeat, he says : Eguidem in Germania complures allo-
cutus sum vulgari cognomento Necromantistas, qui ingenue confessi sunt,
se firme satis credere, meras fabulas esse opiniones, qua de dcsmonibus
tiulgo circumferuntur, aliquid tamen ipsos operari, vel vi herbarum com-
movendo phantasiam^ vel vi imaginationis et fidei vehementissimce, quam
ipsorum nugacissimis confictis excantationibus adhibent ignarce iwilieres,
quibus persuadent, recitatis magna cum devotione aliquibus preculis,
statim effici fascinum, quare credulce ex intimo cordis effundunt excanta-
tiones, atque ita, non vi verborum, neque caracterum, ut ipsce existimant, sed
spiritibus *), fascini inferendi percupidis exsufflatis proximos effascinant.
Hincfit, ut ipsi Necromantici, in causa propria, vel aliena, si soli sint
operariit nihil unquam mirabile pr<sstiterint : car ent enim fide, quce cuncta
operatur. [Add. to 3rd ed.j

* Schopenhauer has added to spiritibus in parenthesis (sc. vitalibus et
animalibus).

ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC. 351

ipsam applicationem complere ex se nequeat, suscitat ideam
fortis desiderii et odii in saga, ut, mutuatis istis mentalibus
et liberis mediis, transferat suum velle per quod quodque
afficere intendit).1 Quorsum imprimis etiam execrationes,
cum idea desiderii et terroris, odiosissimis suis scrofis prce-
scribit, — § 13. Quippe desiderium istud, ut estpassio imagi-
nantis, ita quoque creat ideam, non quidem inanem, sed exe-
cutivam atque incantamenti motivam. — § 19. prout jam
demonstravi, quod vis incantamenti potissima pendeat ab idea
naturali sagce.

Deinjectis materialibus. §15. Saga, per ens natu-
rale, imaginative format ideam liber am, naturalem et nocuam.
. . . Sagce operantur virtute naturali. . . . Homo etiam
dimittit medium aliud executivum, emanativum et manda-
tivum ad incantandum hominem ; quod medium est Idea fortis
desiderii. Est nempe desiderio inseparable ferri circa optata.

De sympatheticis mediis. §2. Idea? scilicet desiderii,
per modum inftuentiarum ccelestium, jaciuntur in proprium
objectum, utcunque localiter remotum. Diriguntur nempe a
desiderio objectum sibi specificante.

De magnetica vulnerum curatione. § 76. Igitur
in sanguine est qumdam potestas exstatica, quce, si quando
ardenti desiderio excita fuerit, etiam ad absens aliquod ob
jectum, exterioris hominis spiritu deducenda sit: ea autem
potestas in exteriori homine latet, velut in potentia; nee
ducitur ad actum, nisi excitetur, accensa imaginationeferventi
desiderio, vel arte aliqua pari. — § 98. Anima, prorsum
spiritus, nequaquam posset spiritum vitalem (corpbreum equi-
dem), multo minus carnem et ossa movere aut concitare, nisi
vis illi qucepiam naturalis, magica tamen et epiritualis, etc
anima in spiritum et corpus descenderet. Cedo, quo pacto
obediret spiritus corporeusjussui animce, nisi jussus spiritum,

1 " Der Teufel hat sie's zwar gelehrt j

Allein der Teufel kann's nicht machen." — Faust.

[Add. to 3rd ed.]

352 THE WILL IN NATURE.

et deinceps corpus movendo foret ? At extemplo contra hanc
magicam motricem objicies, istam esse intra concretum sihi,
suumque hospitium naturale, idcirco hanc etsi magam vocite*-
mus, tantum erit nominis detorsio et dbusus, siquid&m vcra
et superstitiosa magica non ex anima basin desumit ; cum,
eadem hcec nil quidquam valeat, extra corpus suum movere,
alterare aut ciere. Hespondeo, vim et magicam illam natu-
ralem animce, quce extra se agat, virtute imaginis Dei, latere
jam obscuram in Jiomine, velut obdormire (post prcevarica-
tionem), excitationisque indigam: quce eadem, utut somno-
lenta, ac velut ebria, alioqui sit in nobis quotidie : sufficit
tamen ad obeunda munia in corpore suo : dormit itaque
scientia et potestas magica, et solo nutu actrix in homine. —
§ 102. Satan itaque vim magicam hanc excitat (secus dor-
mientem et scientia exterioris hominis impeditam) in suis
mancipiis, et inservit eadem illis, ensis vice in manu poteniis,
id est sagce. Nee aliud prorsus Satan ad homicidium affcrt,
prceter excitationem dictce potestatis somnolentce. — § 106.
Saga in stabulo absente occidit equum : virtus quondam naiu-
ralis a spiritu sagce, et non a Satana, derivatur, quce opprimat
vel strangulet spiritum vitalem equi. — § 139. Spiritus voco
magnetismi patronos, non qui ex coelo demittuntur, multoque
minus de infernalibus sermo est ; sed de Us, qinfiunt in i]>so
Jiomine, sicut ex silice ignis : ex voluntate hominis nempe
aliquantillum spiritus vitalis influentis desumitur, et id
ipsum assumit idealem entitatem, tanquam formam ad
complementum. Qua nacta perfectione, spiritus mediam
sortem inter corpora et non corpora assumit. Mittilur
autem eo, quo voluntas ipsum dirigit ; idealis igitur entifas
. . . nullis stringitur locorum, temporum aut dimcn-
sionum imperiis, ea nee daemon est, nee ejus ullus effectus ;
sed spiritualis qucedam est actio illius, nobis plane natu-
raUs et vernacula. — § 168. Ingens mysterium propalare
hactenus distuli, ostendere videlicet, ad manum in homine
sit am esse energiam, qua, solo nutu et phantasia sua, qut-at

ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC. 353

agere extra se et imprimere virtutem aliquam, influentiam
deinceps perseverantem, et agentem in objectum longissime

P. Pomponatius also says : Sic contigit, tales esse homines,
qui habeant ejusmodi vires in potentia, et per vim imaginati-
vam et desiderativam cum actu operantur, talis virtus exit
ad actum, et afficit sanguinem et spiritum, quce per evapora-
tionempetunt ad extra et producunt tales effectus.1

Jane Leade, an English mystic visionary of Cromwell's
time and pupil of Pordage, has given us some very curious
disclosures of this kind. She is led to Magic in a very
singular way. For, as the doctrine of their becoming one
with the G-od of their religion is a fundamental cha
racteristic of all Mystics, so is it with Jane Leade also.
Now, with her however, the human will has its share in the
omnipotence of the Divine will as a consequence of the
two having become one, and accordingly acquires magic
power. What other magicians therefore believe to be due
to a compact with the Devil, she attributes to her becom
ing one with her G-od. Her Magic is therefore in the
highest sense ' white Magic.' Besides, this alters nothing
as to the practice and results. She is reserved and mys
terious, as people had to be in those times; still it is
easy to see that the thing is not a mere theoretical corol
lary, but that it has sprung from knowledge and expe
rience obtained in another way.

It is in her " Revelation of Revelations " 2 that we find
the chief passage ; but the following one, which is rather
an abridgment than a literal quotation and is contained
in Horst's " Zauberbibliothek," 3 comes from the same
book : " Magic power enables its possessor to rule over

1 De incantationibus. Opera Basil. 1567, p. 44.

2 German translation, Amsterdam, 1695, pp. 126 to 151, especially
the pages headed " the power of calm will."

8 Horst, " Zauberbibliothek " (Library of Magic), vol. i. p. 325.
A A

854 THE WILL IN NATURE.

and to renew the creation — i.e. the animal, vegetable and
mineral kingdoms — so that, were many to co-operate in one
magical power, Nature might be created anew as a paradise.
. . . How is this magic power to be acquired ? By renas
cence through faith : that is, by our will harmonizing with
the divine wiW." For faith subjects the world to us, inasmuch
as our own will, when it is in harmony with the divine
will, results, as St. Paul tells us, in making everything
submit to and obey us." Thus far Horst. — p. 131 of the
" Revelation, &c.," Jane Leade shows that it was by the
force of his will that Christ worked miracles, as, for in
stance, when he said to the leper : " I will ; be thou
clean." Sometimes however he left it to the will of those
who, he saw, believed in him, saying to them : " * What
will ye that I shall do unto you ? ' in which cases no
less was done for them than they had desired in their
will that the Lord should do. These words of our
Saviour's are well deserving of notice, since the highest
Magia lies in the will, so far as it is in union with the will
of the Almighty: when these two wheels fit into each
other, becoming in a sense one, they are, &c." — Again,
p. 132, she says: "For what could resist that which is
united with the will of God ? The power of such a will is
so great, that it always achieves its end. It is no naked
will deprived of its clothing, or power ; on the contrary, it
brings with it an irresistible omnipotence, which enables it
to uproot, to plant, to put to death and to bring to life, to
bind and to loose, to heal and to injure, which power will
be collected and concentrated in its entirety in the royal,
free-born will. Of this power we shall attain knowledge,
when we shall have been made one with the Holy Q-host,
or when we shall be united in one spirit and being."—
Again, p. 133 : " We must quench or drown altogether the
many multifarious wills which arise out of the mixed
essence of souls, and they must lose themselves in the

ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC. 355

abysmal depth from winch there will then arise and pre
sent itself the virgin will, which was never the slave of
anything belonging to degenerate man ; on the contrary,
it stands in connection with the Almighty Power, quite free
and pure, and will infallibly produce fruits and results
quite similar to those of the divine will . . . wherefrom
the burning oil of the Holy Grhost flows up in Magic, as it
emits its fiery sparks."

Jacob Bohme too * speaks of Magic precisely in the sense
here described. Among other things he says : " Magic is
the mother of the essence of all beings : for it creates itself

and is understood in desire True Magic is not a

being, but the desiring spirit of the being. — In fine: Magic
is action in the will's spirit."

In corroboration, or at any rate in explanation, of the
above view of the will as the real agent in magic, a curious
and interesting anecdote, related by Campanella, from
Avicenna, may here find its place.2 " Mulieres qucedam
condixerunt, ut irent animi gratia in viridarium. Una
earum non ivit. Ceterce colludentes arangium acceperunt
et perforabant eum stilis acutis, dicentes : ita perforamus
mulierem talem, quce nobiscum venire detrectavit, et, pro-
jecto arangio intra fontem, dbierunt. Postmodum mulierem
iUam dolentem invenerunt,. quod se transfigi quasi clavis
acutis sentiret, db ea hora, qua arangium ceterce perforarunt :
et cruciata est valde donee arangii elavos extraxerunt impre-
cantes bona et salutem."

Krusenstern 3 gives a very curious and minute descrip-

1 J. Bohme, " Erklarung von sechs Punkten," under Punkt v.

* Campanella, " De sensu return et magia," 1. iv. c. 18.

8 Krusenstern's words are : " A universal belief in witchcraft, which
is held to be very important by all islanders, seems to me to be connected
with their religion j for they assert that the priests alone possess magic
power, although some of the common people also, it is said, profess to have
the secret, probably in order to make themselves feared, and to exact pre-

356 THE WILL IN NATTJEE.

tion of maleficent sorcery as practised, it is said success
fully, by the priests of the savage tribes on the island of
Nukahiva, the procedure in which is exactly similar to that
of our cures by charms. — This fact is especially remark
able on account of the identity of the thing, notwithstand
ing the distance from all European tradition. With it
ought to be compared Bende Bendsen's account of a head-
acH he caused in another person by sorcery, through the
medium of some of that person's hair which had been cut
off. He concludes with the following words : " As far as
I can learn, what is called witchcraft consists simply in
preparing and applying noxious magnetic charms com
bined with a maleficent influence of the will: this is the
detestable league with Satan." l

The agreement of all these writers, not only among
themselves, but with the convictions to which Animal
Magnetism has led in latter years, and finally even with
what might be concluded from my speculative doctrine on
this point, is surely a most remarkable phenomenon. This

sents. This sorcery, which they call Kaha, consists in inflicting a linger
ing death upon those to whom they bear a grudge, twenty days being how
ever fixed as the term for this. They go to work as follows. Whoever wishes
to practise revenge by means of sorcery, seeks to procure either saliva
or urine or excrements of his enemy in some way or other. These he
mixes with a powder, lays the compound in a bag which is woven in a
special manner, and buries it. The most important secret is in the art
of weaving the bag in the right way and of preparing the powder. As
soon as it is buried, the effects show themselves in the person who is the
object of this witchcraft. He sickens, becomes daily weaker, loses at
last all his strength, and in twenty days is sure to die. If, on the other
hand, he attempts to divert his enemy's revenge from himself by offering
up a pig, or making some other valuable present in order to save his
life, he may yet be saved, even on the nineteenth day, and no sooner is
the bag unburied, than the attacks of illness cease. Ho recovers gradually,
and after a few days is quite restored to health." — " Reise um die
Welt." Ed. in 12mo, 1812, Part i., p. 249 et seq. [Add. to 3rd ed.]

1 Kieser, "Archiv fiir thierischen Magnetismus," vol. ix. s. i. in the
note, pp. 128-132.

ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC. 357

much is at any rate certain, that at the bottom of all the
experiments, successful or unsuccessful, which have ever
been made in Magic, there lies an anticipation of my Meta-
physic. For in them is expressed the consciousness, that
the causal law only connects phenomena, while the inner
nature of things remains independent of it; and also,
that if any direct influence on Nature be possible from
within, it can only take place through the will itself. But
even if Magic were to be ranked as practical Metaphysic,
according to Bacon's classification, it is certain that no
other theoretical Metaphysic would stand in the right
relation to it but mine, by which the world is resolved into
"Will and Representation.

The zealous cruelty with which Magic has always been
persecuted by the Church and to which the papal malleus
maleficarum bears terrible evidence, seems not to have for
its sole basis the criminal purposes often associated with
the practice of Magic or the part assumed to be played
by the Devil, but rather to proceed partly from a vague
foreboding and fear lest Magic should trace back its
original power to its true source ; whereas the Church has
assigned to it a place outside Nature.1 The detestation
shown by the cautious clergy of England towards Animal
Magnetism 2 tends to confirm this supposition, and also
the active zeal with which they oppose table-turning,
which at any rate is harmless, yet which, for the same

1 They scent something of the

" Nos habitat, non tartara sed nee sidera coeli :

Spiritus in nobis qui viget, ilia facit."

(Not in the heavens it lives, nor yet in hell ;

The spirit that does it all, doth in us dwell.)

Compare Johann Beaumont, " Historisch-Physiologisch-und Theolo-
gischer Tractat von Geistern, Erscheinungen, Hexereyen und andern
Zauber-Handeln, Halle im Magdeburgischen, 1721," p. 281. [Add. to
3rd ed.]

a Compare Parerga, vol. i. p. 257 (2nd ed. vol. i. p. 286).

358 THE WILL IN NATURE.

reason, has been violently assailed by the anathemas of the
French, and even of the German, clergy.1

1 On the 4th of August, 1856, the Roman Inquisition issued a circular
to all the bishops, in which it called upon them in the name of the
Church to use their utmost influence against the practice of Animal
Magnetism. The reasons for this are given with striking want of lucidity
and great vagueness, and even here and there are not unmixed with
falsehood ; and it is easy to see that the Church is reluctant to own the
real reason. This circular is published in the "Turin Journal" of
December, 1856, and again in the French " Univers," and reprinted from
this in the " Journal desDSbats" of January 3rd, 1857. [Add. to 3rd ed,]

SINOLOGY.

NOTHING perhaps points more directly to a high
degree of civilization in China than the almost in
credible density of its population, now rated, according
to Giitzlaff, at 367 millions of inhabitants.1 For whether
we compare countries or ages, we find on the whole that
civilization keeps pace with population.

The pertinacious zeal with which the Jesuit missionaries
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries strove to in
culcate their own relatively new doctrines into the minds
of this very ancient nation, and their futile endeavours to
discover early traces of their own faith in that country,
left them no time for a profound study of the belief which
prevails there. Therefore Europe has only lately obtained
some slight knowledge of the religious state of the Chinese.
We now know, that is to say, that in China there exists
first of all a worship of Nature, which is universally
professed, and dates from the earliest times, even, it
is alleged, from before the discovery of fire, wherefore

1 According to a Chinese official Report on the census, printed in
Pekin, and found by the English in the Chinese Governor's palace on
entering Canton, China had 396 millions of inhabitants in 1852, and
allowing for a constant increase, may now have 400 millions. (" Moni-
teur de la Flotte," end of May, 1857.)

The Reports of the Russian Clerical Mission in Pekin give the returns
of 1842 as 414,687,000.

According to the tables published by the Russian Embassy at Pekin,
the population, in 1849, amounted to 415 millions. (" Post-Zeitung,"
1858.) [Add. to 3rd ed.]

360 THE WILL IN NATTJEE.

animals were sacrificed raw. The sacrifices offered up
publicly at certain seasons or after great events by the
Chinese Emperor and the chief dignitaries of the Empire,
belong to this worship. These sacrifices are dedicated
first and foremost to the blue sky and to the earth — to the
blue sky in the winter solstice, to the earth in the summer
solstice — and, after these, to every possible power of Nature :
the sea, mountains, rivers, winds, thunder, rain, fire, <fcc.
&c. A genius presides over each of these, and each genius
has several temples. On the other hand, each genius pre
siding over every single province, town, village, or street,
nay over family funerals and even sometimes over a mer
chant's warehouse, has also temples; only, in the two
last cases they are destined exclusively for private wor
ship. But public worship is besides offered up to former
illustrious Emperors, founders of dynasties and to heroes,
i.e. to all such as have benefited (Chinese) mankind by
word or deed. Even these have their temples : Confucius
alone having no less than 1,650 dedicated to him. This
therefore accounts for the great number of small temples
found throughout the Empire. With this hero-worship
too, is associated the private worship offered up by every
respectable family on the tombs of their ancestors. — Now
besides this worship of Nature and of heroes, which is
universal, there are three other prevailing religious doc
trines in China, more with a dogmatical intent. First
among these is the doctrine of Taossee, founded by Laotse,
an older contemporary of Confucius. This is the doctrine
of Reason, as the inner order of the Universe or inherent
principle of all things, of the great One, the sublime
Gable-Beam (Taiki) which supports all the Eafters, yet is
above them (properly the all-pervading Soul of the World)
and of Tao, i.e. the Way, namely to salvation : that is, to
redemption from the world and its misery. We have an
exposition of this doctrine taken from the fountain-head in

SINOLOGY. 861

Stanislas Julien's translation (1842) of Laotse's Taotelring,
in which we find that theTao-doctrine completely harmonizes
with Buddhism both in meaning and in spirit. This sect
however seems to have fallen very much into the background,
and its teachers to be now looked down upon. — Secondly, we
find the wisdom of Confucius, which has special attractions
for Chinese savants and statesmen. Judging from trans
lations, it is a rambling, commonplace, predominantly
political, moral philosophy, without any metaphysical
support, which has something peculiarly insipid and tire
some about it. — Finally, there exists for the bulk of the
nation Buddha's sublime doctrine full of love. The name,
or rather title, of Buddha in China is Fo or Fhu, whilst in
Tartary the "Victoriously-Perfect" is more frequently
called by his family-name, Shakia-Muni, and also Burkhan-
Bakshi; in Birma and Ceylon, he is generally called
Gotama or Tagdtata, but his original name was Prince
Siddharta.1 This religion which, on account of its intrinsic

1 For the benefit of those who wish to acquire a fuller knowledge of
Buddhism, I here note down those works belonging to its literature, and
written in European languages, which I can really recommend, for I
possess them and know them well ; the omission of a few others, for
instance of Hodgson's and A. Remusat's books, is intentional.

1. " Dsanglun, or the Sage and the Fool," in Tibetan and German,
by I. J. Schmidt, Petersburg, 1843, 2 vols. in 4to, con tains in the preface
to vol. i. (i.e. the Tibetan volume), from pp. xxxi to xxxviii, a very brief,
but excellent, sketch of the whole doctrine, admirably calculated for a
first introduction to the knowledge of it : the whole book even, as a part
of the Kandshur (canonical books), may be recommended. — 2. In the
Memoranda of the Academy of St. Petersburg are to be found several
lectures by the same excellent author (I. J. Schmidt), which were
delivered in German in that Academy in 1829-1832. As they are of
very great value for the knowledge of this religion, it is to be hoped
that they will be collected and published all together in Germany.
— 3. By the same writer : " Forschungen iiber die Tibeter und
Mongolen." Petersb. 1829, in 4to. (Investigations concerning the
Tibetans and Mongols). — 4. By the same writer: " Uber die Verwandt-
schaft der gnostisch-theosophischen Lehren mit dem Buddhaismus,"

362 THE WILL IN NATURE.

excellence and truth, as well as of the great number of its
followers, may be considered as ranking highest among all
religions on earth, prevails throughout the greater part of
Asia, and according to the latest investigator, Spence

1828. (On the relation between the Gnostic-Theosophic Doctrines and
Buddhism.)— 5. By the same: " Geschichte der Ost-Mongolen," Petersb.

1 829, in 4to. (History of the Eastern Mongols.) [This is very instructive,
especially the explanations and appendix, which give long extracts from
writings on Religion, in which many passages clearly show the deep
meaning and breathe the genuine spirit of Buddhism. — Add. to Srded.]
— 6. Two treatises by Schiefner in German, in the " Melanges Asiatiques
tire's du Bulletin Historico-Philol. de 1'Acad. d. St. Petersburg," Tome 1,
1851. — 7. " Samuel Turner's Journey to the Court of the Teshoo-
Lama " (at the end), 1801. — 8. Bochinger, " La Vie ascdtique chez lea
Indous et les Bouddhistes," Strasbourg, 1831. — 9. In the 7th vol. of
the "Journal Asiatique," 1825, an extremely beautiful biography of
Buddha by Deshauterayes.— 10. Bournouf, " Introd. a PHist. d. Boud-
dhisme," vol. i. in 4to, 1844.— 11. " Rgya Tsher Kolpa," traduit da
Tibe"tain, par Foucaux, 1848, in 4to. This is the " Lalita Vistara," i.e.
life of Buddha, the gospel of the Buddhists. — 12. " Foe Koue Ki, relation
desroyaumes Bouddhiques," traduit du Chinois par Abel Re"musat, 1836,
in 4to. — 13. "Description du Tubet," traduit du Chinois en Russe par
Bitchourin, et du Russe enFrancais par Klaproth, 1831. — 14. Klaproth,
" Fragments Bouddhiques," printed separately from the " Nouveaa
Journal Asiatique," Mars, 1831. — 15. Spiegel, "De officiis sacerdotum
Buddhicorum," PaliceetLatine, 1841. — 16. The same author's "Anecdote
Palica," 1845. — [17. " Dhammapadam," palice edidet et latine vertit
Fausboll, Hovnise, 1855.— Add. to 3rd ed.]— 18. Asiatic Researches,
vol. vi. Buchanan, " On the Religion of the Burmas," and vol. xx.
(Calcutta, 1839), Part 2, contains three important articles by Csoma
Korosi, including Analyses of the Books of the Kandshur. — 19.
Sangermano, " The Burmese Empire," Rome, 1833. — 20. Turnour,
"The Mahawanzo," Ceylon, 1836. — 21. Upham, "The Mahavansi,
Raja Ratnacari et Rajavali," 3 vols. 1833. — 22. ejusd. "Doctrine of
Buddhism," 1839, fol.— 23. Spence Hardy, "Eastern Monachism,"
1850.— 24. ejusd. " Manual of Buddhism," 1853. The two last books,
written after a twenty years' stay in Ceylon and from oral information
supplied by the priests there, have given me a deeper insight into the
essence of the Buddhist dogma than any other work. They deserve to
be translated into German, but without abridgement, for otherwise the
best part might be left out. — [25. C. F. Koppen, " Die Religion des

SINOLOGY. 363

Hardy, numbers 369 millions of believers: that is, far
more than any other. — These three religions, the most
widely diffused of which, Buddhism, subsists without any
protection whatever from the State, by its own power
alone — a circumstance which speaks greatly in its favour —
are far from being hostile to one another, and exist quietly
side by side, nay, harmonize even to a certain extent,
perhaps by reciprocal influence, so that the sentence:
" The three doctrines are only one ", has become proverbial.
The Emperor, as such, professes all three ; still many of
the Emperors, even up to the most recent times, have been
especially devoted to Buddhism. This is shown by their
profound respect for the Dalai-Lama, nay, even for the
TesJioo-Lama, to whom they unhesitatingly yield prece
dence. — These three religions are neither monotheistic nor
polytheistic, nor are they even pantheistic — Buddhism, at
any rate, is not ; since Buddha did not look upon a world
sunk in sin and suffering, whose tenants, all subject to
death, only subsist for a short time by devouring each
other, as a manifestation of G-od. Moreover the word
Pantheism, properly speaking, contains a contradiction ; for
it denotes a self-destroying conception, and has therefore
never been understood otherwise than as a polite term of
expression by those who know what seriousness means.
It accordingly never entered into the heads of the clever,
acute philosophers of the eighteenth century, not to take
Spinoza for an Atheist, on account of his having called the
world Deus ; on the contrary, this discovery was reserved for
the sham philosophers of our own times, who know nothing

Buddha," 1857, a complete compendium of Buddhism, compiled not only
with great erudition and serious industry but also with intelligence and
insight from all the other works I have mentioned above and from many
more besides, which contains all that is essential on the subject. — 26.
" The Life of Buddha," from the Chinese of Palladji, in the " Archiv
fur wissenschaftliche Kunde von Kussland," edited by Ennan, vol. xv.
Heft 1, 1856.— Add. to 3rd ed.J

364 THE WILL IN NATUKE.

but words: they even pique themselves on the achieve
ment and accordingly talk about Acomism, the wags !
But I would humbly suggest leaving their meanings to
words — in short, calling the world, the world; and gods,
gods.

In their endeavours to acquire knowledge of the state of
Religion in China, Europeans began as usual, and as the
Greeks and Romans under similar circumstances had done,
by first searching for points of contact with their own
belief. Now as, in their own way of thinking, the concep
tions of Religion and of Theism were almost identified, or
at any rate had grown together so closely, that they
could only be separated with great difficulty ; as moreover,
till a more accurate knowledge of Asia had reached
Europe, the very erroneous opinion had been disseminated
— for the purpose of argument e consensu gentium — that all
nations on earth worship a single, or at any rate a highest,
God, Creator of the Universe : * when they found them
selves in a country where temples, priests and monasteries
abounded, they started from the firm assumption that
Theism would also be found there, though in some very un
usual form. On seeing these expectations disappointed
however, and on finding that the very conceptions of
such things, let alone the words to express them, were
unknown, it was but natural, considering the spirit in
which their inquiries were made, that their first reports of
these religions should refer rather to what they did not,
than to what they did, contain. Besides, for many reasons,
it can be no easy task for European heads to enter fully
into the sense of these faiths. In the first place, they
are brought up in Optimism, whereas in Asia, existence
itself is looked upon as an evil and the world as a scene of

1 This is equivalent to imputing to the Chinese the thought, that
all princes on earth are tributary to their Emperor. [Add. to 3rd
ed.]

SINOLOGY. 365

misery, where it were better not to find oneself. Another
reason is to be found in the decided Idealism which is
essential to Buddhism and -to Hindooism : a view only
known in Europe as a paradox hardly worth a serious
thought, advanced by certain eccentric philosophers ; whereas
in Asia it is even embodied in popular belief. For in Hin-
doostan it prevails universally as the doctrine of Maj a, and
in Thibet, the chief seat of the Buddhist Church, it is
taught in an extremely popular way, a religious comedy
being performed on occasions of special solemnity, in which
the Dalai-Lama is represented arguing with the Arch-fiend.
The former defends Idealism, the latter Realism, and
among other things the Devil says ; " What is perceived
through the five sources of all knowledge (the senses), is
no deception, and what you teach is not true." After a
long argumentation the matter is decided by a throw of
the dice: the Realist (the Devil) loses, and is dismissed
amid general jeering.1 Keeping this fundamental diffe
rence in the whole way of thinking steadily in view, we
shall find it not only excusable, but even natural, that in
their investigation of the Asiatic religions Europeans
should at first have stopped short at the negative stand
point; though, properly speaking, it has nothing to do
with the matter. We therefore find a great deal re
ferring to this negative stand-point which in no way ad
vances our positive knowledge ; it all however amounts
to this: that Monotheism — an exclusively Jewish doc
trine, to be sure — is alien to Buddhists and in general to
the Chinese. For instance, in the " Lettres Edifiantes " a
we find : " The Buddhists, whose views on the migration of

1 " Description du Tubet," traduite du Chinois enRusse par Bitchourin,
et du Russe en Francais par Klaproth, Paris, 1831, p. 65. Also in the
"Asiatic Journal" new series, vol. i. p. 15. [Koppen, "Die
Lamaische Hierarchie," p. 315.— Add. to 3rd ed.]

2 " Lettres Edifiantes," Edit, de 1819, vol. viii. p. 46.

366 THE WILL IN NATURE.

souls are universally adopted, are accused of Atheism."
In the "Asiatic Kesearches" (vol. vi. p. 255) we find:
"The religion of the Birmans (Buddhism) shows them to
be a nation far advanced beyond the barbarism of a
wild state and greatly influenced by religious opinions,
but which nevertheless has no knowledge of a Supreme
Being, Creator and Preserver of the world. Yet the sys
tem of morality recommended in their fables is perhaps
as good as any other taught by the religious doctrines
which prevail among mankind. — And again, p. 258 : " The
followers of Gotama (i.e. of Buddha) are strictly speaking
Atheists." — Ibid., p. 258 : " Gotama' s sect consider the
belief in a divine Being, Creator of the world, to be highly
impious." — Ibid., p. 268, Buchanan relates, that Atuli, the
Zarado or High-Priest of the Buddhists at Ava, in an
article upon his religion which he presented to a Catholic
bishop, " counted the doctrine, that there is a Being who
has created the world and all things in it and is alone
worthy of adoration, among the six damnable heresies."
Sangennano relates precisely the same thing,1 and closes
the list of the six grave heresies with the words : " The last
of these impostors taught, that there is a Supreme Being,
the Creator of the world and of all things in it, and that he
alone is worthy of adoration." Colebrooke too says:8
" The sects of Jaina and Buddha are really atheistic, for
they acknowledge no Creator of the world, nor any
Supreme ruling Providence." — I. J. Schmidt3 likewise
says : " The system of Buddhism knows no eternal, un
created, single, divine Being, having existed before all
Time, who has created all that is visible and invisible.

1 " Description of the Burman Empire," Eome, 1833, p. 81.

2 Colebrooke, " Transactions of the Eoyal Asiatic Society," vol. i. j
" Essay on the Philosophy of the Hindoos," published also among his
" Miscellaneous Essays," p. 236.

* " Investigations concerning the Tibetans and Mongols," p. 180.

SINOLOGY. 367

This idea is quite foreign to Buddhism and there is not the
slightest trace of it anywhere in Buddhistic books." — We
find the learned sinologist Morrison too l not less desirous
to discover traces of a God in the Chinese dogmas and
ready to put the most favourable construction upon every
thing which seems to point in that direction; yet he is
finally obliged to own that nothing of the kind can be
clearly discovered. Where he explains the words Thung and
Tsing, i.e. repose and movement, as that on which Chinese
cosmogony is based, he renews this inquiry and concludes
it with the words : " It is perhaps impossible to acquit
this system of the accusation of Atheism." — And even
recently Upham 2 says : " Buddhism presents to us a world
without a moral ruler, guide or creator." The G-erman
sinologist Neumann too, says in his treatise3 mentioned
further on : "In China, where neither Mahometans nor
Christians found a Chinese word to express the theological

conception of the Deity The words God, soul,

spirit, as independent of Matter and ruling it arbitrarily,
are utterly unknown in the Chinese language. . . . This
range of ideas has become so completely one with the lan
guage itself, that the first verse of the book of G-enesis
cannot without considerable circumlocution be translated
into genuine Chinese." — It was this very thing that led Sir
George Staunton to publish a book in 1848 entitled : " An
Inquiry into the proper mode of rendering the word God
in translating the Sacred Scriptures into the Chinese lan
guage." *

1 Morrison, " Chinese Dictionary," Macao, 1815, and following years,
vol. i. p. 217.

8 Upham, "History and Doctrine of Buddhism," London, 1829,
p. 102.

3 Neumann, "Die Natur-und Religions-Philosophic der Chinesen, nacn
den Werken des Tchu-hi," pp. 10, 11.

4 The following account given by an American sea-captain, who had
come to Japan, is very amusing from the naivete with which he assumes

368 THE WILL IN NATURE.

My intention in giving the above quotations and expla
nations, is merely to prepare the way for the extremely re
markable passage, which it is the object of the present
chapter to communicate, and to render that passage more
intelligible to the reader by first making him realize the
standpoint from which these investigations were made, and
thus throwing light upon the relation between them and
their subject. For Europeans, when investigating this
matter in China in the way and in the spirit described,
always inquiring for the supreme principle of all things,
the power that rules the world, &c. &c., had often been re
ferred to that which is designated by the word Tien (Engl.
T'heen). Now, the more usual meaning of this word is
" Heaven," as Morrison also says in his dictionary ; still it
is a well-known thing that Tien is used in a figurative
sense also, and then has a metaphysical signification. In
the " Lettres Edifiantes " l we find the following explana
tion : " Hing-tien is the material, visible heaven ; Chin-tien
the spiritual and invisible heaven. Sonnerat too,2 in his
travels in East-India and China, says : " When the Jesuits
disputed with the rest of the missionaries as to the mean
ing of the word Tien, whether it was Heaven or God, the

that mankind consists exclusively of Jews. For the " Times " of the
18th October, 1854, relates that an American ship, under command of
Captain Burr, had arrived in Jeddo Bay, and gives his account of the
favourable reception he met with there, at the end of which we find :
" He likewise asserts the Japanese to be a nation of Atheists, denying
the existence of a God and selecting as an object of worship either the
spiritual Emperor at Meaco, or any other Japanese. He was told by
the interpreters that formerly their religion was similar to that of
China, but that the belief in a supreme Being has latterly been entirely
discarded — (this is a mistake) — and he professed to be much shocked at
Deejunoskee (a slightly Americanised Japanese), declaring his belief in
the Deity. [Add. to 3rd ed.]

1 Edition de, 1819, vol. xi. p. 461.

* Book iv. ch. i.

SINOLOGY. 369

Chinese looked upon these foreigners as restless folk and
drove them away to Macao." It was at any rate through
this word that Europeans could first hope to find the track
of that Analogy of Chinese Metaphysic with their own
faith, which had been so persistently sought for ; and it was
doubtless owing to investigations of this kind that the
results we find communicated in an Essay entitled " Chinese
Theory of the Creation " were attained.1 As to Choo-foo-
tze, called also Choo-hi, who is mentioned in it, I observe
that he lived in the twelfth century according to our
chronology, and that he is the most celebrated of all the
Chinese men of learning ; because he has collected to
gether all the wisdom of his predecessors and reduced
it to a system. His work is in our days the basis of
all Chinese instruction, and his authority of the greatest
weight. In the passage I allude to, we find : " The word
Teen would seem to denote ' the highest among the great '
or ' above all what is great on earth : ' but in practice its
vagueness of signification is beyond all comparison greater,
than that of the term Heaven in European languages. . . .
Choo-f oo-tze tells us that ' to affirm, that heaven has a man
(i.e. a sapient being) there to judge and determine crimes,
should not by any means be said ; nor, on the other hand,
must it be affirmed, that there is nothing at all to exercise
a supreme control over these things.'

" The same author being asked about the heart of heaven,
whether it was intelligent or not, answered : it must not be
said that the mind of nature is unintelligent, but it does
not resemble the cogitations of man. . . .

" According to one of their authorities, Teen is call'd
ruler or sovereign (Choo), from the idea of the supreme
control, and another expresses himself thus : ' Had heaven
(Teen) 110 designing mind, then it must happen, that the

1 To be found in the " Asiatic Journal," vol. xxii. anno 1826, pp. 41
'and 42.

B B

370 THE WILL IN NATURE.

cow might bring forth a horse, and on the peach-tree be
produced the blossom of the pear/ On the other hand it
is said, that the mind of Heaven is deducible from what is
the Will of mankind ! "

The agreement between this last sentence and my doc
trine is so striking and so astonishing, that if this passage
had not been printed full eight years after my own work
had appeared, I should no doubt have been accused of
having taken my fundamental thought from it. For there
are three well-known modes of repelling the attack of new
thoughts : firstly, by ignoring them, secondly by denying
them, and lastly by asserting that they are not new, but
were known long before. But the fact that my funda
mental thought was formed quite independently of this
Chinese authority, is firmly established by the reasons I
have given ; for I may hope to be believed when I affirm,
that I am unacquainted with the Chinese language and
consequently unable to derive thoughts for my own use
from original Chinese sources unknown to others. On
further investigation I have elicited the fact, that the
passage I have quoted, was most probably, nay almost
certainly, taken from Morrison's " Chinese Dictionary,"
where it may be found under the sign Teen : only I have
no opportunity of verifying it.' — In an article by Neumann 2

1 A note of Schopenhauer's referring to this says : — " According
to letters from Doss" (a friend of S.'s), "dated 26th February and
8th June, 1857, the passages I have here quoted are to be found in
Morrison's Chinese Dictionary, Macao, 1815, vol. i. p. 576, under ^C
Teen, although in a slightly different order, in nearly the same words.
The important passage at the end alone differs and is as follows:
'Heaven makes the mind of mankind its mind: in most ancient dis
cussions respecting Heaven, its mind, or will, was divined (it stands
thus, and not derived) from what was the will of mankind.' — Neumann
translated this passage for Doss, independently of Morrison's rendering,
and the end was : ' Through the heart of the people Heaven is usually
revealed.' " [Editor's Note.]

3 Neumann, "Die Natur-und Religions-Philosophic der Chint»en,

SINOLOGY. 371

there are some passages which have evidently a common
source with those here quoted from the " Asiatic Journal."
But they are written with the vagueness of expression which
is so frequent in Germany, and excludes clear comprehen
sion. Besides, this translator of Choo-hi evidently did not
himself quite understand the original ; though by this no
blame need be implied, when we consider the enormous diffi
culty of the Chinese language for Europeans, and the
insufficiency of the means for studying it. Meanwhile
it does not give us the enlightenment desired. We must
therefore console ourselves with the hope, that as a
freer intercourse with China has now been established,
some Englishman may one day give us more minute and
thorough information concerning the above-mentioned
dogma, of which we have hitherto received such deplorably
imperfect accounts.

nach dera Werke des Tschu -hi," an article in Illgen's " Periodical
for Historical Theology," vol. vii. 1837, from pp. GO to 63.

REFERENCE TO ETHICS.

FOE, reasons I have stated in the beginning, confirma-
mations of the rest of my doctrine are excluded from
my present task. Still, in concluding, I may perhaps be
allowed to mate a general reference to Ethics.

From time immemorial, all nations have acknowledged
that the world has a moral, as well as a physical, import.
Everywhere nevertheless the matter was only brought to
an indistinct consciousness, which, in seeking for its ade
quate expression, has clothed itself in various images and
myths. These are the different Religions. Philosophers,
on their side, have at all times endeavoured to attain clear
comprehension of the thing and, notwithstanding their
differences in other respects, all, excepting the strictly
materialistic, philosophical systems, agree in this one point :
that what is most important, nay, alone essential, in our
whole existence, that on which everything depends, the real
meaning, pivot or point (sit venia verbo) of it, lies in the
morality of human actions. But as to the sense of this, as to
the ways and means, as to the possibility of the thing, they
all again quite disagree, and find themselves before an abyss
of obscurity. Thus it follows, that it is easy to preach,
but difficult to found, morality. It is just because that
point is determined by our conscience, that it becomes the
touchstone of all systems ; since we demand, and rightly
demand, that Metaphysic should give support to Ethics :
and now arises the difficult problem to show that, con
trary to all experience, the physical order of things

KEFERENCE TO ETHICS. 373

depends upon a moral one, and to find out a connection
between the force which, by acting according to eternal
laws of Nature, gives the world stability, and the morality
which has its seat in the human breast. This is therefore
the rock on which the best thinkers have foundered.
Spinoza occasionally tacks a moral theory on to his Pan
theistic Fatalism by means of sophisms, but more often
leaves morality terribly in the lurch. Kant, when theo
retical Eeason is exhausted, sends his Categorical Im
perative, laboriously worked out of mere conceptions,1 on
the stage, as deus ex machina, with an absolute ought. But
the mistake he made by it only became quite clear when
Fichte, who always took outbidding for outdoing, had spun
it out with Christian Wolfian prolixity and wearisomeness
to a complete system of moral fatalism in his " System of
Moral Doctrine," and subsequently presented it more
briefly in his last pamphlet.2

Now, from this point of view, a system which places the
reality of all existence and the root of the whole of Nature
in the Will, and in this will places the root of the
world, must undeniably carry with it, to say the least, a
strong prejudice in its favour. For, by a direct and
simple way, it reaches, nay, already holds in its hand
before coming to Ethics, what other systems try to reach
by roundabout, ever dubious by-paths. Nor indeed can
any other road ever lead to this but the insight, that the
active and impulsive force in Nature which presents this
perceptible world to our intellect, is identical with the
will within us. The only Metaphysic which really and
immediately supports Ethics, is that one which is itself
primarily ethical and constituted out of the material of
Ethics. Therefore I had a far greater right to call my

1 See my prize-essay " On the Fundament of Morality," § 6.

2 "Die Wissenschaftslehre in allgemeinen Umrisse " (The Doctrine
of Science in a general outline), 18, 10.

374 THE WILL IN NATURE.

Metaphysic "Ethics," than Spinoza, with whom the word
sounds almost like irony, and whose " Ethics " might be
said to bear the name like lucus a non lucendo ; since it is
only by means of sophistry that he has been able to tack his
morality on to a system, from which it would never logi
cally proceed. In general, moreover, he disavows it down
right with revolting assurance.1 On the whole, I can
confidently assert, that there has never yet been a philo
sophical system so entirely cut out of one piece, so com
pletely without any joins or patches, as mine. As I have
said in my preface, it is the unfolding of a single thought,
by which the ancient dirXovQ b pi/doc rrjg a\r]0elag etyv 2 is again
confirmed. Then we must still take into consideration here,
that freedom and responsibility — those pillars on which all
morality rests — can certainly be asserted in words without
the assumption of the aseity 3 of the will ; but that it is
absolutely impossible to think them without it. Whoever
wishes to dispute this, must first invalidate the axiom,
stated long ago by the Schoolmen : operari sequitur esse
(i. e. the acts of each being follow from the nature of that
being), or we must demonstrate the fallacy of the inference
to be drawn from it: unde esse, inde operari. Respon
sibility has for its condition freedom ; but freedom has for
its condition primariness. For I will according to what I
am ; therefore I must be according to what I will. Aseity
of the will is therefore the first condition of any Ethics
based on serious thought, and Spinoza is right when he says :
JEa res libera dicetur, quce ex sola suce naturce necessitate exis-
tit, et a se sola ad agendum determinatur* Dependence,
as to existence and nature, united with freedom as to action,
is a contradiction. Were Prometheus to call the creatures
of his making to account for their actions, they would be

1 For instance, " Eth." iv. prop. 37, Schol. 2.

3 The language of truth is simple. [Tr.'s add.]

8 Self-existence 5 self-dependence. 4 " Elk." i. def. 7. [Tr.]

REFERENCE TO ETHICS. 375

quite justified in answering : " We could only act according
to our being : for actions arise from nature. If our actions
were bad, the fault lay in our nature : this is thine own
work ; punish thyself." l And it is just the same with
the imperishableness of our true being in death ; for this
cannot be seriously thought without the aseity of that
being, and can even hardly be conceived without a funda
mental separation of the will from the intellect. This last
point is peculiar to my philosophy ; but Aristotle had
already proved the first thoroughly, by showing at length
how that alone can be imperishable which has not arisen,
and that the two conceptions condition each other : 2 Tavra
CL\\{]\OLQ aKoXovdet, /cat TO re dyivr]Tov afyQapTOv, KCLL TO
evriTor. . . . TO yap yf.vt}Tov KOI TO tyQapTov
d\\ri\oiQ. — d yevrjTOV TI, tydapTov avayKij3 (hcec
mutuo se sequuntur, atque ingenerabile est incorruptibile, et
incorruptibile ingenerabile. . . . generabile enim et corruptible
mutuo se sequuntur. — si generabile est, et corruptibile esse
necesse est). All those among the ancient philosophers who
taught an immortality of the soul, understood it in this
way ; nor did it enter into the head of any of them to assign
infinite permanence to a being having arisen in any way.
We have evidence of the embarrassment to which the con
trary assumption leads, in the ecclesiastical controversy
between the advocates of Pre-existence, Creation and Tra-
duction.

The Optimism moreover of all philosophical systems is
a point closely allied to Ethics which must never fail in
any of them, as in duty bound : for the world likes to hear
that it is commendable and excellent, and philosophers like

1 Compare "Parerga," i. p. 115, et seqg. (p. 133 of 2nd ed.).

8 Aristot. "De Ccelo," i. 12.

3 " These two go together, the uncreated is imperishable, and the
imperishable is uncreated. . . . For the created and the perishable go
together. . . . If a thing is created it is necessarily perishable." [Tr.]

376 THE WILL IN NATURE.

to please the world. With me it is different : I have seen
what pleases the world, and therefore shall not swerve a
step from the path of truth in order to please it. Thus
in this point also my system varies from all the others
and stands by itself. But when all the others have com
pleted their demonstrations to the song of the best of
worlds, quite at the last, at the background of the system,
like a tardy avenger of the monster, like a spirit from
the tomb, like the statue in Don Juan, there comes the
question as to the origin of evil, of the monstrous, name
less evil, of the awful, heartrending misery in the world : — •
and here they are speechless, or can only find words, empty,
sonorous words, with which to settle this heavy reckoning.
On the other hand, a system, in whose basis already the
existence of evil is interwoven with the existence of the
world, need not fear that apparition any more than a
vaccinated child need fear the smallpox. Now this is
the case when freedom is placed in the esse instead of in
the operari and sin, evil and the world then proceed from
that esse. — Moreover it is fair to let me, as a serious
man, only speak of things which I really know and only
make use of words to which I attach a quite definite
meaning ; since this alone can be communicated with se
curity to others, and Yauvenargues is quite right in
saying : " la clarte est la bonne foi des philosophies " There
fore if I use the words ' Will, Will to live,' this is no
mere ens rationis, no hypostasis set up by me, nor is it a
term of vague, uncertain meaning ; on the contrary, I
refer him, who asks what it is, to his own inner self,
where he will find it entire, nay, in colossal dimensions, as
a true ens realissimum. I have accordingly not explained
the world out of the unknown, but rather out of that
which is better known than anything, and known to us
moreover in quite a different way from all the rest. As
to the paradoxical character finally, with which the ascetic

REFERENCE TO ETHICS. 377

results of my Ethics have been reproached, these results
had given umbrage even to Jean Paul, otherwise so
favourably disposed towards me, and had induced Herr
Riitze also (not knowing that the only course to be
adopted against me was silence) to write a book against
me in 1820, with the best intentions. They have since
become the standing rock of offence in my philosophy;
but I beg my readers to take into consideration, that it is
only in this north-western portion of the ancient con
tinent, and even here only in Protestant countries, that the
term paradoxical can be applied to such things ; whereas
throughout the whole of vast Asia — everywhere indeed,
where the detestable doctrine of Islam has not prevailed
over the ancient and profound Religions of mankind by dint
of fire and sword — they would rather have to fear the re
proach of being commonplace. I console myself therefore
with the thought that, when referred to the Upanishads
of the Sacred Vedas, my Ethics are quite orthodox,1 and
that even with primitive, genuine Christianity they stand
in no contradiction. As to all other accusations of heresy,
I am well armoured and my breast is fortified with triple
steel.

1 I refer those who may wish to be briefly, yet thoroughly, informed
on this point, to the late Pasteur Bochinger's work : " La vie contem
plative, ascetique et monastique chez lez peuples Bouddhistes," Stras
bourg, 1831.

OC

CONCLUSION.

r I "'HE undoubtedly striking confirmations recorded in
JL this treatise, which have been contributed to my
doctrine by the Empirical Sciences since its first appearance,
but independently of it, will unquestionably have been
followed by many more : for how small is the portion
which the individual can find time, opportunity and
patience to become acquainted with, of the branch of litera
ture dedicated to Natural Science which is so actively culti
vated in all languages ! Even what I have here mentioned
however, inspires me with confidence that the time for my
philosophy is ripening ; and it is with heartfelt joy that I
see the Empirical Sciences gradually come forward in the
course of time, as witnesses above suspicion, to testify to
the truth of a doctrine, concerning which a politic, inviolable
silence has been maintained for seventeen years by our
" philosophers by profession " (some of them give them
selves this characteristic name, nay even that of " philoso
phers by trade ") ; so that it had been left to Jean Paul, who
was ignorant of their tactics, to draw attention to it. For
it may have appeared to them a delicate matter to praise
it, and, on due consideration, they may have thought it not
altogether safe to blame it either, and may have judged it
unnecessary besides to show the public, as belonging neither
to the profession nor to the trade, that it is quite possible
to philosophize very seriously without being either unin
telligible or wearisome. Why compromise themselves there
fore with it, since no one betrays himself by silence and

CONCLUSION. 379

the favourite secretive method was ready at hand, the ap
proved specific against merit ; this much was besides soon
agreed upon: that, considering the circumstances of the
times, my philosophy did not possess the right qualifica
tions for being taught professionally. Now the true, ulti
mate aim of all philosophy, with them, is to be taught
professionally, — so much and so truly is it so, that were
Truth to come down stark naked from lofty Olympus, but
were what she brought with her not found to correspond
to the requirements called for by the circumstances of the
times, or to the purposes of their mighty superiors, these
gentlemen "of the profession and trade" would verily
waste no time with the indecent nymph, but would hasten
to bow her out again to her Olympus, then place three
fingers on their lips and return quietly to their compendia.
For assuredly he who makes love to this nude beauty, to
this fascinating syren, to this portionless bride, will have
to forego the good fortune of becoming a Government and
University professor. He may even congratulate himself
if he becomes a garret-philosopher. On the other hand,
his audience will consist, not of hungry undergraduates
anxious to turn their learning to account, but rather of
those rare, select thinkers, thinly sprinkled among the
countless multitude, who arise from time to time, almost as
a freak of Nature. And a grateful posterity is beckoning
from afar. But they can have no idea of the beauty and
loveliness of Truth, of the delight there is in pursuing her
track, of the rapture in possessing her, who can imagine
that anyone who has once looked her in the face can ever
desert, deny, or distort her for the sake of the venal
approval, of the offices, of the money or the titles of such
people. Better to grind spectacle- glasses like Spinoza or
draw water like Cleanthes. Henceforth they may take
whatever course they like : Truth will not change her nature
to accommodate " the trade." Serious philosophy has now

380 CONCLUSION.

really outgrown Universities, where Science stands under
State-guardianship. It may however some day perhaps come
to be counted among the occult sciences ; while the spurious
kind, that ancilla theologice in Universities, that inferior
counterfeit of Scholasticism, for which the highest criterion
of philosophical truth lies in the country catechism, will
make our Lecture-halls doubly re-echo. — " You, that way :
we, this way." — *

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3123 On the fourfold root

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