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STASDARD   WORKS  PUBLISHED  BY 


X-\v  E  30J  with  a  Supplement  of  upwards  of  4600  New  "Words 

an  1  Meanings. 

WEBSTER'S    DICTIONARY 

OF  THE  ENGLISH  LANGUAGE. 

— The   only   authorized   Editions    of   tins   Dictionary   are 
here    described :    no   others    published     in     England 


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WEBSTER'S  COMPLETE  DICTIONARY 

OF  THE  ENGLISH   LANGUAGE,  AND  GENERAL   BOOK 

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t,  D.D., 

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WEBSTER'S       DICTIONARY. 


From  the  Quabtebly  Ekvikw,  Oct.  1873. 

"  Seventy  years  passed  before  Johxson  was  followed  by  Webster,  as 
American  writer,  who  faced  the  task  of  the  English  Dictionary  with  a 
full  appreciation  of  its  requirements,  leading  to  better  practical  results." 
.  •  i  *. 

"  His  laborious  comparison  of  twenty  languages,  though  never  pub- 
lished, bore  fruit  in  his  own  mind,  and  his  training  placed  him  both  in 
knowledge  and  judgment  far  in  advance  of  Johnson  as  a  philologist. 
"Webster's  '  American  Dictionary  of  the  English  Language '  was  pub- 
lished in  1828,  and  of  course  appeared  at  once  in  England,  where 
successive  re-editing  has  as  yet  kept  it  in  the  highest  place  as  a  practical 
Dictionary." 

"  The  acceptance  of  an  American  Dictionary  in  England  has  Itself 
had  immense  effect  in  keeping  up  the  community  of  speech,  to  break 
which  would  be  a  grievous  harm,  not  to  English-speaking  nations 
alone,  but  to  mankind.  The  result  of  this  has  been  that  the  common 
Dictionary  must  suit  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic."  .... 

"  The  good  average  business-like  character  of  Webster's  Dictionary, 
both  in  style  and  matter,  made  it  as  distinctly  suited  as  Johnson's  was 
distinctly  unsuited  to  be  expanded  and  re-edited  by  other  hands. 
Professor  Goodrich's  edition  of  1847  is  not  much  more  than  enlarged 
and  amended,  but  other  revisions  since  have  so  much  novelty  of  plan 
as  to  be  described  as  distinct  works."  .... 

"  The  American  revised  Webster's  Dictionary  of  1864,  published  in 
America  and  England,  is  of  an  altogether  higher  order  than  these  last 
[The  London  Imperial  and  Student's].  It  bears  on  its  title-page  the 
names  of  Drs.  Goodrich  and  Porter,  but  inasmuun  as  its  especial  im- 
provement is  in  the  etymological  department,  the  care  of  which  was 
committed  to  Dr.  Mahk,  of  Berlin,  we  prefer  to  describe  it  in  short  as 
the  Webster-Mahn  Dictionary.  Many  other  literary  men,  among  them 
Professors  Whitney  and  Dana,  aided  in  the  task  of  compilation  and 
revision.  On  consideration  it  seems  that  the  editors  and  contributors 
have  gone  far  toward  improving  Webster  to  the  utmost  that  he  will 
bear  imprc  cement.  The  vocabulary  has  become  almost  complete,  as 
regards  usual  words,  while  the  definitions  keep  throughout  to  Webster's 
simple  careful  style,  and  the  derivations  are  assigned  with  the  aid  of 
good  modern  authorities." 

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respectable,  and  CEBTATNLY  THE  BEST  PRACTICAL  ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY   EXTANT." 


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15 


STANDARD     WORKS 


FTrLISEZI     IT 


GEORGE    BELL    &    SONS 


V  For  Luf  of  Boasts  Libt.a-.:l?  tee  iue  end  of  the  Vol 


BOHFS   CLASSICAL   LIBRARY 


DEMOSTHENES. 


Y. 


L1"! 


THE  _ — . 

OLYNTHIAC 


AND    OTHER    PUBLIC    ORATIONS 


DEMOSTHENES. 


ftransiatrfr,  mitij  Jiiitrs,  kt. 

BY 

CHARLES   RANN  KENNEDY. 


LONDON :  GEOKGE  BELL  AND  SONS,  YOKE  STKEET, 
COVENT  GARDEN. 

1880. 


LONDON"  : 

PRINTED   BY    WILLIAM   CLOWES    AND   SONS, 

STAMPOBD   STREET   AKP   CHABISG   CEOSS. 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

Preface    .    .    , ' 

Chronological  Abstract         

Orations: — 

First  Olynthiac 37 

Second  Olynthiac •  io 

Third  Olynthiac 52 

First  Philippic 60 

On  the  Peace ^  3 

Second  Philippic sl 

On  Halonnesus °9 

On  the  Chersonese 10° 

Third  Philippic 115 

Fourth  Philippic 132 

On  the  Letter 149 

The  Letter  of  Philip 156 

On  the  Duties  of  the  State 164 

On  the  Navy  Boards * 176 

On  the  Liberty  of  the  Rhodians 189 

For  the  Megalopolitans 204 

On  the  Treaty  with  Alexander 217 

Appendices  : — 

I.  Olynthus 227 

II.  Athenian  Money  and  Mines 251 

III.  The  Thracian  Chersonese 257 

IV.  The  Property  Tax 2" 

V.  The  Trierarchy ■ 3(M 


PREFACE  TO  THE  TRANSLATION. 


My  principal  aim  in  undertaking  this  work  is  to  produce  a 
readable  version  of  Demosthenes,  adhering  to  the  original  as 
closely  as  is  consistent  with  the  primary  object.  Brevity  and 
simplicity  of  style,  together  with  the  choice  of  apt  and  forcible 
words,  are  the  most  essential  elements  of  a  good  translation. 

It  is  sometimes  asked,  and  there  seem  to  be  various 
opinions  on  the  question,  whether  a  translation  should  be 
literal  ?  It  depends,  I  say,  upon  the  object  which  you  pro- 
pose  to  accomplish.  If  you  axe  composing  a  translation  to 
be  used  in  the  Hamiltonian  method  of  teaching,  or  as  a  mere 
help  to  the  idle  student  against  his  day  of  examination,  then 
you  must  be  literal.  And  to  perform  such  a  task  is  not  very 
difficult.  But  if  you  seek  to  accomplish  a  higher  purpose, 
it  is  not  to  be  done  in  this  way :  a  work  of  another  order 
becomes  necessary.  • 

The  primary  object  of  a  good  translation  is,  that  it  may  be 
read  with  pleasure,  or  at  least  without  difficulty,  by  your 
countrymen ;  and  secondary  to  this  is  the  assistii  g  of  the 
student  in  his  perusal  of  the  original.  It  is  true,  that  for 
both  these  purposes  a  certain  degree  of  closeness  is  necessary  : 
but  the  first  of  these  cannot  be  attained  by  a  literal  version, 
on  account  of  the  varying  idioms  of  languages ;  whereas  the 
second  may  be  accomplished  by  a  good  readable  version. 

Nor  does  the  matter  rest  here.  I  say  that  the  classical 
student  will  derive  much  greater  benefit  from  a  readable  ver- 
sion than  he  could  from  a  literal.  I  speak  of  the  real  and  self- 
improving  student,  not  the  cramming  idler,  nor  yet  the  meie 
school-boy     Let  us  only  see  what  his  wants  are. 

VOL.  I.  b 


11  PREFACE    TO    Till     TRANSLATION. 

Such  a  person,  in  studying  a  Greek  author,  is  not  to  lcok 
to  a  translation  for  a  perfect  analysis  of  the  construction  of 
sentences.  This  he  should  find  out  independently,  from  those 
principles  of  grammar  wherewith  his  mind  has  heen  long 
storing  itself,  from  glossaries,  notes  and  commentaries.  A 
translation  which  undertook  to  solve  all  the  student's  gram- 
matical difficulties,  would  he  nothing  more  than  a  long  note  ; 
having  indeed  its  use,  but  not  performing  the  service  of  a 
\  translation. 

The  student,  looking  elsewhere  for  a  thorough  explanation 
of  the  syntax,  may  fiurly  consult  the  translator  as  an  exponent 
of  the  true  meaning  of  every  sentence.  And  this  is  one  piece 
of  service  which  the  translator  renders  him.  But  he  has  a 
*  j  look  for  much  more  than  this ;  viz.  good  English, 
choice  words,  and  all  the  other  elements  of  good  writing ;  in 
the  fall  sense  of  the  original  expressed  in  such  a  way  as 
an  Englishman  would  have  expressed  it  himself,  allowing  for 
unavoidable  discrepancies. 

No  man  will  deny  the  importance  of  these  things.  One  of 
the  objects  of  studying  foreign  languages  is,  to  obtain  a  more 
perfect  mastery  over  your  own.  And  a  translation,  either  in 
prose  or  verse,  may  in  this  respect  be  made  a  useful  medium 
of  instruction,  testing  the  powers  and  capabilities  of  your 
own  tongue  in  comparison  with  those  of  another.  Lord 
Brougham  veiy  truly  observes : 

'•'  Even  to  scholars  the  experiment  is  not  without  interest 
of  trying  how  far  the  two  languages  can  be  used,  so  as  to 
render  in  the  one  the  thoughts  couched  originally  in  the 
other  ;  and  even  to  scholars  the  comparative  trial  of  the 
structures  of  the  two,  their  resemblances,  their  differences,  and 
their  contrasts,  is  very  interesting."' 

To  attain  the  advantage  here  proposed,  it  is  manifest  that 
the  version  must  be  thoroughly  English;  or  there  can  be  no 
comparison  at  all.  But  I  must  turn  now  to  another  view  of 
the  question. 

While  it  is  the  translator's  duty  to  produce  (if  possible) 
inch  a  work  as,  placed  side  by  side  with  the  original,  shall  be 


PREFACE    TO    THE    TRANSLATION.  Ill 

in  point  of  style  and  composition  not  unworthy  of  it,  ho  must 
be  sure  to  preserve  all  needful  accuracy  in  regard  to  the  sense 
and  meaning.  The  term  itself  implies  that  he  must  do  this. 
A  translation  is  different  from  an  imitation. 

He  must  adhere  to  the  original.  He  must  be  accurate. 
But,  how  closely  must  he  adhere?  what  degree  of  accuracy 
must  he  observe  1  are  questions  that  naturally  occur,  and  can- 
not well  be  answered  except  practically,  by  examples.  I  will 
give  just  now  some  examples  to  illustrate  my  views;  but  will 
first  endeavour,  as  far  as  I  am  able,  to  express  my  opinion  in 
general  words. 

It  is  the  business  of  the  translator  to  express  the  full  sense 
briefly,  simply,  forcibly ;  to  add  nothing,  omjt  nothing  ;  never 
to  amplify  or  exaggerate.  He  should  not  servilely  imitate 
constructions,  or  follow  the  order  of  words,  yet  not  depart 
even  from  them  unnecessarily.  The  production  of  good  Eng- 
lish he  will  regard  as  essential;  to  this  everything  must  give 
way  but  the  sense  of  the  author.  Within  tbe  limits  of  these 
two  conditions,  faithful  interpretation  and  good  writing,  ho 
may  turn  and  twist  his  sentences  with  a  considerable  degree 
of  latitude  and  freedom.  But  these  limits  will  alwa}Ts  pre- 
serve him  from  unreasonable  vagaries.  While  he  does  not 
affect  to  teach  grammatical  rules,  they  must  be  the  guide  to 
his  own  version,  or  he  cannot  translate  faithfully,  so  that  he 
will  always  afford  a  clue  to  the  construction,  and  will  never 
mislead. 

To  accomplish  all  this,  not  only  must  you  be  thoroughly 
familiar  with  the  language  which  you  translate,  but  you 
should  have  deeply  studied  your  own,  and  even  know  several 
besides. 

It  is  an  essential  condition  of  producing  a  good  translation, 
that  you  should  be  able  to  produce  a  literal  one.  Only  this  is 
far  from  being  all.  There  are  hundreds  of  good  scholars  who 
are  able  to  do  this,  but  who  are  not  competent  to  write  well. 
And  on  the  other  hand,  clever  men  and  practised  writers  have 
failed  in  translation  because  they  never  took  due  pains  to 
study  the  original  language.  Hence  we  have  had  so  many 
b3 


IV  PREFACE    TO    THE    TRANSLATION. 

bad  translations  from  opposite  causes.  The  literal  translators 
necessarily  fail,  for  want  of  a  sufficiently  high  aim,  a  proper 
conception  of  their  duty.  The  readable  have  been  men  who 
neglected  or  despised  the  niceties  of  scholastic  learning.  There 
are  others  also,  from  whose  acquirements  more  might  have 
been  expected,  who,  carried  away  by  the  fervour  of  their 
imagination,  or  not  liking  the  trouble  of  attending  to  words, 
have  considered  it  sufficient  to  give  the  general  meaning  of 
an  author,  clothing  it  often  in  language  which  is  purely  their 
own. 

To  the  class  of  loose  translators  belongs  Leland.  His  ver- 
sion of  Demosthenes  is  the  best  of  the  English,  and  has  con- 
siderable merit.  He  appears  also  to  have  been  a  pretty  good 
scholar,  so  that  his  faults  are  generally  attributable  rather  to 
negligence  than  ignorance.  I  shall  now  proceed  to  show,  by 
a  few  examples,  what  my  views  of  proper  translation  are. 

The  following  is  from  the  Oration  on  the  Crown ;  and 
I  agree  with  Lord  Brougham,  that  there  is  an  unnecessary 
departure  from  the  simplicity  of  the  original : — 

Town)  to  \prj(piafj.n  roy  tote  Trj  ttuXei  jrtjDtffra vra  Kircvv%tv 
TvuptXdtlv  ewoirjaei'  oi/nrEp  re(p<ig. 

Leland  :  By  this  decree  that  danger,  which  hung  lowering 
over  our  state,  was  in  an  instant  dissipated  like  a  cloud. 

So  also  this  :  Ot'2'  av  bIq  raira  (prjtTtuv.  Leland:  No!  Lei 
not  the  jyresumptuous  assertion  once  be  heard. 

In  the  Oration  on  the  Chersonese,  Demosthenes  says  that 
Philip  has  beaten  the  Athenians,  rw  Trpo-ipoQ  irpoq  toIq  npdy- 
fjatri  yiyreaBai,  that  is,  by  being  before  us  in  his  operations, 
Jirst  at  h  is  work,  first  in  the  field ;  the  last  of  which  trans- 
lations, though  it  might  serve,  as  being  a  smart  idiomatical 
phrase,  wants  comprehensiveness.  Leland  has :  his  superior 
vigilance  in  improving  all  opportunities  ;  which  is  too  vague. 
But  here  let  me  observe,  I  don't  complain  because  Ins  ver- 
sion does  not  show  that  the  dative  case  is  governed  by  the 
preposition,  or  on  any  ground  of  that  kind.  It  was  not  his 
business  to  deal  with  a  point  of  grammar,  but  to  give  a  good 
translation.     You  might  have  it  thus  :    by  commencing  hit 


PREFACE    TO    THE    TRANSLATION.  V 

operations  earlier.     I  object  to  Leland's  version,  because  the 
meaning  is  too  vaguely  expressed. 

In  the  same  oration  we  have  :  Avo  iv  Ev/3oc'^  carEorr/o-e 
rvpdvrovc,  tov  ptv  a.TruvTiKpv  ti]q  Attik^q  £iriTtiyJL<TUQ,  tov  o 
etti  ~SiKta.Qto,  vf.ulg  <?  ovce  ravr  aTreXvaaaQs,  ei  ju7jctv  aXXo 
epovXeade,  dXX'  fta'/airf'  dyea-are  SrjXov  brt  avTtv. 

Leland  :  Euboea  is  commanded  by  his  two  tyrants  ;  the  one, 
just  opposite  to  Attica,  to  keep  you  perpetually  in  awe ;  the 
other  to  Sciathus.  Yet  you  have  not  attempted  to  oppose  even 
this.  No,  you  have  submitted  :  you  have  been  insensible  to 
your  wrongs. 

In  this  passage  there  are  six  instances  in  which  the  trans- 
lator has  needlessly  departed  from  the  original : 

First, — the  word  his  does  not  sufficiently  express  that  Philip 
placed  the  tyrants  in  Euboea.  Observe,  I  don't  complain  of  the 
change  of  construction.  He  was  perfectly  at  liberty  to  invert  it, 
and  say,  two  tyrants  were  placed  by  him  in  Euboea,  had  such 
inversion  been  required  to  make  a  neater  sentence.  The 
objection  is,  that  the  point  of  the  matter  is  expressed  too 
loosely. 

Secondly, — IwiTtLyJiaaQ  is  not  expressed  fully  enough. 

Thirdly, — the  word  perpetually  is  not  in  Demosthenes. 

Fourthly, — oppose  is  not  a  correct  version  of  dntXvaaoQe. 

Fifthly, — the  words  ei  unliv  aXXo  ijSouXirrds  are  omitted. 

Sixthly, — the  last  clause  is  an  entire  mistranslation. 

Francis  thus  translates  the  passage : — 

Philip  hath  established  two  kings  in  Euboea ;  one  at  Ere- 
tria,  which  he  hath  fortified,  opposite  to  the  coast  of  Attica  ; 
the  other  at  Oreum,  to  awe  your  island  of  Sciathos.  Nor  have 
you  asserted  your  own  dignity  by  opposing  these  injuries,  {since 
you  seem  unwilling  to  attempt  any  nobler  design,)  but  even 
indolently  suffered  them  ;  apparently  remitted  to  him  your  own 
proper  rights. 

Francis  has  committed  the  same  error  as  Leland  in  the 
dwiXvaaaQe,  and  has  distinctly  mistranslated  the  £Vtr£tx''7,'c 
which  Leland  has  only  shirked.  Philip  did  not  fortify  Eretria, 
but  established  in  it  the  sway  of  Clitarchus,  his  own  partisan, 


v;  PKKFACE    TO    THE    TRANSLATION. 

and  tku-  :  _  .  him  Eretria  itself,  a  fortress 

Atti  I  ing  ]     : it.  a  point  cPapptu,  for 

r  At -..  from  which  ti  .    :  at  anytime 

..    •         Laced      .  ..    as  did  from  Decelea.  to  attack 
and  rava_    -  .;.•-.  And  so  Jacobs  has  it:  ols  feindlichen 

Hort.     Pabst :  in  drokender ft  ing. 

Fran  me  errors  of  Leland  :  but,  besides  a 

too  great  verbosity,  which  is  his  constant  fault,  I  must  notice 

anof  m  is  too  frequently  committed,  yiz.  the  insertion 

of  explanatory  wc:  per  place  for  which  is  a  note,  and 

not  the  text.     Here  we  haye  the  words  Eretria.  Oreum,  and 
our  Idedi     Dem    thenes;  and  we  might  just  as  well 

mea  of  the  tyrants,  or  any  other  historical  fact 
inb  dueed.     The  translation  should  be  confined  to  the  text 
n     tlil  ral  translation  n  : — 
lie  established  two  tyrants  m  Eubosa,  one  opposite  Attica. 
:■:  a  hostile  fortress,  the  other  against  Sciath.us; 
got  rid  of  t?cese  nuisances,  if  you  would 
donothi,  m  June  allowed  them, ;  you  have  manifestly 

way  to  him. 

»  is  not  wantonly  added,  for  it  is 
1  in  the  -avra,  and  some  such  word  is  necessary  to  be 
iced. 
It  may  further  be  obseryed,  that  the  literal  translation  of 
u  fir/ltr  aAAo  epovXeads  is   hardly  sufficient  to  c  to  an 

Engl  uring  of  the  original,  which,  fully 

t  nuisances,  ax  least,  you  should  have  got  rid 
-    'hough  you  would  do  nothing  else  ;  yet  you  hare  never  done 
fcc     But  this  expansion  would  weaken  the  translation  too 
:h.       Therefore,  I  adopt   a  turn  of  expression  which  in 
jiyalent  to  the  Greek  form,  as  those  who  are 
familiar  with  the  Greek  form  will  understand  :  and  I  b 
'     "*.us  : 

He   atabl  ■' ■       I        tyrants  in  Euheea,   one   like  a  hostile 

rite  Attica,  one  threatening  Sciathus  :  and   these 

a  you  h-ave  never  got  rid  of;  not  even  this  would  you 

attempt :  you  have  submitted  ;  left  ike  road  open  to  him  clearly. 


PREFACE    TO    THE   TRANSLATION.  Til 

In  the  four  preceding  examples  I  cannot  doubt  that  Leland 
understood  the  text  of  his  author.  He  has  translated  him 
loosely  from  carelessness.  And,  it  may  be  observed,  that, 
while  he  has  mistranslated  Demosthenes,  he  has  not  departed 
from  the  general  sense  and  meaning.  But  this  is  not  always 
bo  :  and  persons  addicted  to  very  loose  translating  frequently 
wander  from  the  argument  as  well  as  from  the  words.  Take 
the  next  example  from  the  Oration  on  the  Chersonese  : 

H/jeIq  uiirE  ^pTJ/jLara  EiotytpEiv  ^ov\6f.udu,  ovre  avroi  arpa- 
TtveaOai  ....  our,  eTret^rjTrep  ovtu)q  eyouev,  tu  -qjiirEpa  avrdjv 
TrpaTTEiv  idiXofie)'. 

Which  means  : — 

We  are  unwilling  to  pay  contributions,  or  to  perform  military 
service,  ....  and  yet.  with  such  disposition,  we  are  not  con- 
tent to  mind  our  own  business. 

That  is  ;  the  Athenians  will  neither  take  the  proper  means 
to  carry  on  war,  nor  will  they  abstain  from  public  business  and 
Grecian  politics.  But  Leland  translates  the  last  clause  :  Thus 
we  proceed  quite  regardless  of  our  interests  :  entirely  mistaking 
the  sense,  which  Auger  puts  clearly  enough.  Ainsi  disposes, 
nous  ne  pouvons  nous  resoudre  a  ne  nous  meler  que  de  ce  qui 
nous  regarde. 

Having  thus  noticed  a  few  errors  on  the  side  of  excessive 
freedom,  let  me  turn  to  those  which  are  equally  injurious,  on 
the  side  of  excessive  accuracy  ;  whose  tendency  is,  to  degrade 
translation  into  a  schoolboy  exercise.  I  must  again  have 
recourse  to  examples. 

Take  the  famous  oath  : — 

Mu  tovq  MapafluJyi  icpoKii  hvvEvaai'TCiQ  tojv  irpoyovwv. 

By  your  ancestors  who  met  the  peril  at  Marathon. 

A  person  who  reviewed  Lord  Brougham's  translation  in  the 
Times,  insists  that  it  should  be  translated  thus  : — 

By  those  of  your  forefathers,  who  at  Marathon  were  the  first 
to  encounter  the  brunt  of  danger. 

And  I  equally  insist,  that  the  critic's  translation  is  de- 
testable, as  emasculating  all  the  vigour  of  the  clause.  It  is 
true  that   he  expresses  the  genitive  case  more  fully,  and  I 


Vlll  PREFACE    TO    THE    TRANSLATION. 

would  require  the  schoolboy  to  do  so  in  his  lesson  :  but  that 
is  a  totally  different  affair.  Here  it  is  essential  to  have  the 
fewest  possible  words,  to  preserve  the  spirit  of  the  appeal,  and 
something  niciy  be  sacrificed  for  this  purpose.  My  translation, 
however,  is  not  incorrect  :  it  does  not  exclude  the  partitive 
signification,  but  only  leaves  a  trifling  ambiguity,  which  de- 
ceives no  man.  But  here  are  eight  words  for  -poKncwtv- 
aav-ae,  and  the  wpa  virtually  translated  twice,  by  first  and 
brunt.      Over-accuracy  always  leads  to  verbiage. 

Jacobs  has  :— 

Bei  den  Aknherrn  scltwijr'  1:1'..  die  :u  Marathon  hampften. 

Shortly  before  the  last  passage  we  have  :  Ei  yap  vavra 
irpoeiTo  cucovt-'t,  xcpt  up  ovciva  kiicvvov  ovtiv  ovy^  v— Efi£irav 
ol  —poyoroi,  Wc  ovy\  kare-rvcrci-  or  aov. 

Lord  Brougham  has  :  — 

For  if  she  had  given  xij)  without  a  struggle  all  that  your 
forefathers  encountered  every  danger  to  icin,  who  but  would 
hare  spurned  you,  jEschines  / 

His  reviewer  has  : — 

For  if  voluntarily  and  without  an  obstinate  struggle,  those 
honours  had  been  abandoned,  for  which  our  ancestors  braved 
every  danger,  where  is  the  man  who  would  not  have  spit  on 
with  loathing  1 

Lord  Brougham's  is  far  the  preferable  version.  In  the 
other,  the  words  voluntarily,  obstinate,  and  with  loathing. 
though  intended  to  exhibit  a  wonderful  accuracy,  are  utterly 
unwarranted.  And  as  to  Kareimiatv,  which  Lord  Brougham 
is  charged  with  frittering  away,  the  critic  needs  to  be  in- 
formed, that  metaphors  cannot  always  be  transferred  from 
one  tongue  to  another.  It  happens  sometimes,  that  a  meta- 
phorical expression,  by  frequent  use,  becomes  familiar  to  the 
people  of  the  country,  but  if  literally  translated  into  another 
language,  it  sounds  harsh  or  strange  to  those  who  are  not 
accustomed  to  it.  I  might  call  the  critic  a  goose  in  English, 
but  if  I  called  him  anser  in  Latin,  the  point  would  be  lost. 
The  phrase  dassi  immittit  habenas  sounds  ill,  if  literally  ren- 
dered in  English,  though  it   has  been  so.     We  know  that 


PREFACE  TO  THE  TRANSLATION.  ix 

Ka-aTTTvsTOQ  had  become  a  common  word  of  abuse  at  Athens, 
and,  being  such,  is  well  enough  represented  by  such  a  word  as 
despicable.  I  do  not,  however,  absolutely  say,  that  the  meta 
phor  here  may  not  be  preserved  ;  I  only  object  to  a  criticism 
which  assumes  its  positive  necessity.  But  if  perfect  accuracy 
is  insisted  upon,  why  add  the  words  with  loathing  ?  Jacobs 
has  the  simple  angespuckt. 

I  should  prefer,  in  Lord  Brougham's  version,  the  substitu- 
tion of  what  for  all  that;  and  the  omission  of  you  before 
jEschines.  The  introduction  of  the  last  word,  instead  of  you, 
may  be  good,  to  escape  too  many  monosyllables. 

In  the  Oration  on  the  Crown,  we  have  : — 

Kcu  yap  dvtpa  idi<p  Ka)  7roA.1v  Koirrj  irpot;  rd  KuWiarra  ruiv 
v~ap)(0)'7wv  aei  eel  weipdrrBai  ra  \onrd  iroarretv. 

Lord  Brougham  and  his  critic  both  commit  the  error  of 
attempting  to  translate  Ifia  and  koim;  literally  ;  the  one  hav- 
ing, individuals  in  their  private  concerns,  and  the  state  in  public 
affairs  ;  and  the  other,  a  man  individually,  and  a  state  collec- 
tively. The  former  of  these  is  better  in  point  of  composition, 
the  latter  is  closer  to  the  original ;  but  they  are  both  faulty, 
by  making  prominent  that  which  in  Greek  is  a  mere  nourish, 
and  cannot  be  represented  in  our  language.  It  is  clear  at  once 
that  the  words  individually  and  collectively  add  nothing  to  the 
sense  in  the  above  translation.  It  is  a  rhetorical  antithesis 
not  very  unlike  that  of  fitv  and  Se,  which  is  perpetually  re- 
curring, and  has  an  elegance  and  a  usefuluess  about  it,  which 
we  can  seldom  express.  Sometimes,  indeed,  it  happens,  that 
fiev  and  ?£  may  be  represented  by  such  expressions  as,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  on  the  other;  but  it  is  rare  that  they  assume  so 
much  importance  in  the  sentence. 

Leland  has  avoided  this  puerility  : — 

By  the  most  illustrious  of  their  former  actions  it  is,  that  private 
men  or  jiublic  bodies  should  model  their  succeeding  conduct. 

The  only  thing  which  I  object  to  here  is,  public  bodies,  as 
being  hardly  dignified  enough.     Translate  : — 

For  both  individuals  and  communities  should  ever  strive  to 
Model  their  future  conduct  by  the  noblest  of  their  past. 


X  PREFACE    TO    THE    TRANSLATION*. 

Is  there  anything  here  left  unexpressed  ?  That  is  the  test  of 
a  faithful  translation.  Are  not  the  words  at  cpa  lua  -uarrtiv 
fullv  enough    it  I    by    the  words     individuals   their 

t  i  Or  what  further  is  wanted  1  It  is  uo  alight  advan- 
-   3  w,  that  the  last  translation  is  shorter  than  any 

other.  Y;:.  I  rief  as  it  is,  it  has  oue  word  more  than  the  Greek, 
and  this  shows  how  important  it  is  to  sb  ._-  for  brevity. 
The  best  at  in  ~       world  will  exceed  the  Greek  in  num- 

ber of  wor.-  foi     bvious  ]     sons.     'Anjyi 

is  a  man;  roa-ru.  /  do.  or.  /  am  doing ;  rparnru,  let  him 
do;  ravro,  these  things;  &i\i--ov  roXcfiovvroc,  Philip  being 
at  war,  or.  while  Philip  is  at  war.  These  and  the  like  ex- 
pansions are  inevitable  ;  but  tfa  it  the  more  necessary 
to  aim  at  brevity,  wherever  it  can  be  had.  consistently  with 
good  writing.  The  translator  must  seize  upon  every  001 
sation  which  he  can  lay  hold  of,  to  attain  this  object ;  though 
it  may  cost  him  ten  times  the  trouble  of  the  ordinary  method. 

a.Uo  7]  x&£va£ec  u'/jdc,  he  only  modes  you.  Don't  trans- 
late ::..-;."  ■  1  t".  •  m  but  mock  you,  though  this  be  the 
literal  translation  ;  because,  by  so  doing,  you  lose  an  advan- 
"  .  which  your  own  language  here  affords,  as  a  set-off  against 
many  disadvantages.  The  literal  version  entails  upon  you 
the  extra  word  does,  from  which  you  escape  by  using  the 
idiomatical  turn.  This  may  seem  very  simple  ;  but  I  find  by 
experience,  that  from  inattention  to  such  simple  matters 
hardly  any  translation  in  our  language  is  what  it  a 
-  -  ;\£"'  *>'a«  rd\X6-pia.  (Orat.  de  Halonneso.) 
Translate  :  For  it  is  possible  to  hold  the  property  of  others; 

yon  please,  with  Leland ;  For  a  man  may  possess  ilie 
property  ■:'' 

-   --'  .  Bssed  at  full  is:  For  it  is  possible  to  hold 

well  as  your  own. 

last  five  words  demonstrate  the  meaning  of  mL  Why 
do  I  omit  them  ?  Because  that  full  demonstration  is  pur- 
chased at  the  price  of  too  much  verbiage ;  and  the  idea  is 
sirfficieutly  expressed  without  it,  if  you  read  the  sentence 
properly,  laying  the  emphasis  where  you  ought.     The  trans- 


PREFACE  TO  THE  TRANSLATION.  XI 

lator,  using  that  reserve  which  good  taste  requires,  relies 
on  the  intelligence  of  the  judicious  reader.  And  with  this 
reliance,  I  don't  think  it  necessary  to  put  any  words  in 
italics. 

The  German  translators,  Jacobs  and  Pabst,  express  the  kqi 
by  audi.  But  in  English  neither  also  nor  even,  nor  anything 
short  of  a  paraphrase  can  fairly  represent  it.  Auger  has,  Gar 
on  peut  avoir  le  bien  dautrui.  If  I  am  asked  why  I  do  not 
adopt  the  turn  of  Leland  or  Auger,  who  are  both  shorter 
than  I  am,  my  answer  is,  that  I  wish  to  avoid  the  ambiguity 
of  their  sentences,  which  might  be  construed  as  importing 
that  it  was  lawful  to  have  the  property  of  others ;  and  an 
emphatic  word  like  possible  is  better  than  may  or  can. 

Hots  a  xP>)  irpa£eTE'}   eireic'dv  ri  yevi)rcu;      (First  Philippic.) 

Literally  :  When  will  you  do  what  is  necessary  ?  When 
what  has  happened  ? 

Better  :  When  will  you  perform  your  duty  ?  In  what 
event  ? 

Whei'e  Demosthenes  urges  the  Athenians  av-ovc  i£iivat,  1 
often  translate  it,  to  serve  in  person;  because  the  literal 
expression  is  inadequate  :  and  to  march  out  yourselves  gives 
but  half  the  sense,  as  it  refers  to  naval  expeditions  as  well 
as  land  services. 

Our'  ebut  fii'ire  yevoi^y,  I  neither  am,  nor  wish  to  be. 

AmteXQ  cvuv.  /  have  ever  had  is  sufficient,  without  adding 
and  still  continue  to  have:  for  this  makes  too  many  words. 

'E.^i£^  7rru](W!'  ttXovgioi  ytyuraaiv,  ek  V  dlofov  EVTijXOi. 

From  poor  have  become  wealthy,  from  obscure  honourable. 
But  it  is  a  little  better  to  say :  Have  risen  from  poverty  to 
wealth,  from  obscurity  to  honour. 

Milton  has  imitated  the  Greek  construction: — 
How  camst  thou  speakable  of  mute  ? 
And  in  poetry  I  like  it,  but  it  does  not  suit  so  well  in  prose. 

T«c  evrlviac  i-E-rrffiatre/yde.  Tou  passed  my  audit,  or  you 
approved  my  account.  But  not,  as  more  than  one  translator 
has  it,  you  passed  and  approved  my  accounts. 

I  notice  this  once  for  all,  in  order  to  condemn  the  practice, 


Ill  PREFACE    TO    THE    TRAXSLATIOX. 

common  with  some  translators,  of  putting  two  words  fur  Line. 

This  they  do.  either  because  they  doubt  which  is  the        I  I 

word,  and  think,  if  they  hare  both,  they  must  be  right  :  or 

because  neither  word  seems  sufficient  of  itself,  and  they  are 

anxious  to  convey  eTery  tittle  of  the  sense.     Bat 

to  exercise  a  little  reserve,   than  to  indulge  this  rage  for 

accuracy. 

It  frequently  happens  that  a  turn  car  paraphrase  is  not  only 
allowable,  but  absolutely  necessary  :  as  in  the  follow]: ._ 
ample  from  the  Oration  on  the  Crown  : — 

Uv  yap  c))~ov  Kr7/<7(&u>i  ra  fiev  cvycirai  Sumqeiv  Ci  i/.ie,efie  Of, 
ii~tp  eltXeyzei)   £iLUi.n  .        ~  pan. 

In  this  passage,  which  all  the  English  versions  that  I  have 
seen  mistranslate,  it  is  only  necessary  to  see  that  the  first 
negative  governs  both  clauses,  and  nothing  is  more  simpla 
But  if  we  translate  the  words  without  a  little  management, 
they  make  nonsense  :  as  thus  : — 

For  sturdy  he  cannot  j  JSackma  on  my  act      .:. 

and  would   not  have  indicted  me  myself,  had  he  thought  he 
should  convict  me. 

That  is  wrong,  because,  though  the  Greek  ov  may  apply  to 
both  clauses,  the  English  cannot  is  prevented  from  doing  so 
by  the  change  of  tense.  Otherwise  it  might  have  been  lite- 
rally rendered,  as  in  the  following : — 

Ov\,  n  em  Kvl^ti.  aor  fiev  eyfiaipmr  Xf^of, 
xaiifjc  ci  rufupije  i/Je'pw  TE-Xijyueroc. 

Xot ....  disliking  your  person  and  s?nitt?n  irith  passi  j  - 
the  neic  If 

Here  I  must  give  the  sense  by  a  turn : — 

Surely  it  cannot  be.  that  he  is  able  to  prosecute  JSi 
my  account,  and  would  not  hare  indicted  me  mysilf  had  he 
thought  he  could  tonvict  me. 

But  a  little  fuither  deviation  from  the  original  form 
a  more  effective  translation  : — 

Surely,  it  he   can   _  on   my  account,   he 

would  not  have  forborne  to  indict  me  myself,  had  he  thought  he 
could  convict  me. 


PREFACE   TO    THE   TRANSLATION.  Xlll 

Auger  saw  the  meaning : — 

On  ne  dira  pas  sans  doute  qiCu7i  homme,  qui  pent  lien  a 
cause  de  moi  accuser  Ctesiphon,  ne  meut pas  accuse  moi-meme 
s'il  eiit  cru  pouvoir  me  convaincre. 

Jacobs  is  a  little  too  wide  : — 

Dciiu  Jcann  er  den  Ctesiphon  gericldlich  verfolgen  inn  meir,~ 
etwillen,  so  Jumnte  er  audi  mich  selbst  ankiagen,  wenn  er  den 
Be  we  is  gegen  mich  zufiihren  hoffte. 

Pabst  is  better.  But  all  the  English  translators  whom  I 
have  seen  are  entirely  wrong.  They  seem  to  have  followed 
Taylor.     Leland's  and  Spillan's  1  subjoin: — 

Leland :  He  cannot  pursue  Ctesiphon  on  my  account ;  and 
thai  he  hath  not  directed  his  impeachment  against  me,  can  pjro- 
ceed  *but  from  a  consciousness  that  such  impeachment  could  not 
he  supported. 

Spillan :  For  he  cannot  prosecute  Ctesiphon  through  me,  hut 
if  he  thought  he  could  convict  me,  he  would  not  have  impeached, 
him. 

One  more  example,  and  I  Lave  done.  We  have  at  the 
beginning  of  the  first  Olynthiac  : — 

"Qte  toiwv  rovd'  ovtioq  e\ei,  TvpoaiiKEL  irpoB'ufxuc  edeXeiv  aKOveiv 
ruv  povXop'ivuv  avjApovXevtw'  ov  yap  povov  ti  n  "xpijaifiov 
E(7K£]jl^lc.voq  jfKEi  ne,  rovr  uv  aKOvauvTtQ  Xapoire,  dXXa  cat  rrjc 
vfitrepac  tv^iq  vTroXappiwu)  TroWa  rwv  Ceovtuv  eK  tov  Trapa- 
■%ori[-ia  tiioig  av  hreXdeiv  utte'iv. 

The  literal  translation  is : — 

Since  therefore  this  is  the  case,  you  shoidd  be  willing  cheer- 
felly  to  hear  those  who  desire  to  advise  you.  For  then,  not 
only,  when  men  have  come  prepared  with  useful  counsel,  ivill 
you  hear  and  receive  it,  huj  I  consider  it  also  part  of  your 
good  fortune,  that  it  will  occur  to  some  persons  to  offer  many 
lit  suggestions  at  the  moment. 

In  the  last  clause  there  is  a  change  of  construction,  or  a 
slight  ellipse.     The  argument  runs  thus : — 

Xot  only  will  you  get  useful  counsel  which  men  have  pre- 
pared beforehand,  but  much  more;  for  I  consider,  &c. 

First,  to   improve  the  baldness  of  the  literal  translation, 


XIV  PREFACE    TO    THE    TRANSLATION. 

acouTarrEc  dr  Xnfiocrt  may  be  thrown  into  an  English  form 
thus:  you  wdl  have  the  benefit  of  hearing. 

Secondly,  fca  admits  of  a  turn.  It  refers  to  the  orator 
who  has  come  to  the  assembly,  a  matter  of  common  reference 
with  Demosthenes.  And  the  word  is  so  placed  in  the  sentence 
•  have  no  emphasis  of  importance.  'Eavepperos  tjkei  -iq 
is  little  more  than  enerrai  nc,  or  itTKEfifjiroi  eitrtv  01  Xeyorrtc. 
Just  aa  we  often  translate  6  Trapiuiv  the  orator,  without  deem- 
ry  to  say  the  person  who  comes  forward  on  the 
hustings;  so  we  may  deal  with  qcei  in  this  place. 

Thirdly,  a  turn  may  be  found  for  the  iviotc  dv  irtXdeiv,  ic. 
and  we  may  amend  the  translation  thus: — 

So  shall  you  have  the  benefit  of  hearing  not  only  such  counsel 
ar  orators  have  devized  beforehand,  but  more  than  this; 
for  I  esteem   it  'port  of  your  good  fortune,  that  many  useful 
suggestions  will  occur  to  some  speakers  at  the  moment. 
Or  it  may  thus  be  shortened : — 

So  shall  you  have  the  benefit  of  all  counsel,  vjhether  precon- 
tidered  or  not :  for,  ire. 

The  best  turn  is  given  by  Auger:  — 

Outre  <pue  vou-s  pouvez  •profiler   des  reflexions   sages  quun 
orateur  apporte  a  la  Tribune,  vous  etes  encore  assez  heureux 
pour  O'lil  vierme  sur  le  champ  a  quel  qaes-uns  des  avis  utiles. 
And  this  I  adopt.     But  it  may  be  well  to  compare  this  with 
other  translations. 
Francis  has : — 

In  this  disposition  ilverejore  you  ought  to  hear  with  a  favour  - 
able  attention  whoever  is  willing  to  jyropose  his  advice.  Sot  only 
should  you  hear  thee  salutary  scheme  which  hath  been  formed 
and  matured  by  refection,  but  I  deem  it  an  instance  of  your 
good  fortune,  that  some  of  your  orators  are  capable  of  conceiv- 
ing upon  the  instant  such  expedients  as  may  be  useful  to  the 

public. 

Here  we  see  that  Francis,  by  mistranslating  Xdfjoire  ar, 

arts  from  th.3  logic  of  the  orator,  which   is  this — You 

1  ■:  willing  to  hear  all  men.  for  thus  you  will  not  miss 

any  good  counsel.     Whereas  Francis  mokes  the  second  clauae 


TREFACE  TO  THE  TRANSLATION.  XV 

a  repetition  of  the  injunction,  as  if  Aa'/jotrt  av  signified  you 
ought  to  receive. 

And  Leland  is  in  this  respect  little  better : — 
It  is  your  part  therefore  readily  and  cheerfully  to  attend  Jo 
all  who  are  disposed  to  offer  their  opinions.     For  your  regards 
need  not  to  be  confined  to  those  whose  counsels  are  the  effect  oj 
'premeditation;  it  is  your  good  fortune  to  have  men  among  you 
who  can  at  once  suggest  many  points  of  moment. 
Jacobs  gives  the  argument  correctly  : — 
Denn  nicht  bios,  ivas  Einer  nach  vorldufiger   Ueberlegung 
hier  Xiitzliches  vortriigt,  iverdet  Ihr  an/wren  und  zu  Herzen 
nehmen. 

I  only  object  to  zu  Herzen  nehmen,  as  being  a  little  too 
strong  for  Xdfioire.     He  passes  over  the  q/eet  as  1  do. 

An  anoirymous  German  version  lying  before  me  commits 
the  error  of  Francis : — 

Denn  nicht  bios  das,  was  Einer  nach  vorhergegangener 
Ueberlegung  Xiitzliches  hier  vorbringt,  miisst  Ihn  anhbren 
und  erfassen. 

So  does  Pabst  : — 

Ihr  miisset  nehmlich  nicht  bios  es  anhoren  und  ergreifen 
wenn  jemand  vorbereitet  auftritt,  um  etwas  Xiitzliches  vorzu- 
bringen. 

I  may  seem  to  have  been  a  long  time  in  discussing  a 
question  upon  a  few  words.  But  my  object  is  to  show  how 
translation  should  be  conducted,  what  are  the  difficulties 
attending  it,  and  how  they  are  to  be  overcome.  The  literal 
version  is  but  the  first  stage  of  the  }  rocess,  though  it  is  the 
stumbling-block  with  ill-taught  scholars.  Having  analysed 
your  sentence,  and  made  yourself  perfect  master  of  its  con- 
struction and  meaning,  the  next  thing  is  to  translate  it.  And 
this  part  of  the  affair  is  the  principal  difficulty,  requiring  a 
great  command  of  your  own  language,  and  the  exercise  of  much 
thought  and  discretion.  Nor  am  I  induced  to  say  this  only 
by  observing  the  failures  of  others,  but  from  the  consciousness 
of  my  own  deficiencies,  and  the  conviction  that  I  have  fallen 
very  far  short  of  my  own  aims  and  endeavours. 


XVI  PREFACE  TO  THE  TRANSLATION". 

I  now  come  to  another  question,  which  is  of  some  import- 
ance in  translating  Demosthenes,  viz.  how  the  translator  is 
to  deal  with  all  the  public  and  political  nomenclature  of  the 
Athenians,  the  civil  and  military  titles,  names  of  offices  and 
institutions,  terms  of  law  and  jurisprudence.  On  this  subject 
I  am  not  disposed  in  the  least  to  depart  from  the  principle 
which  I  adopted  many  years  ago,  when  I  made  my  first  essay 
on  Demosthenes,  and  which  I  stated  thus  : — 

"  As  a  general  rule,  I  think  it  better  to  translate  into 
English  than  to  Anglicize  the  Greek.  Thus  I  say  jury,  parish, 
indictment,  in  preference  to  dicast,  deme.  grapke.  It  is  true 
that  in  each  of  these  cases  the  word  but  imperfectly  describes 
the  thing  intended ;  for  instance,  the  proceedings  upon  our 
indictment  are  veiy  different  from  those  of  the  Athenian  pro- 
secution so  described.  But,  on  the  other  ha  ad,  the  vernacular 
term  conveys  the  idea  more  pleasingly  to  the  common  reader  j 
and  be  it  remembered,  a  translation  is  more  for  the  use  off  the 
unlearned  than  of  the  learned.  I  strive  therefore  to  1  ■  • 
little  as  possible  un-English  ;  and  while  I  always  seek  for  the 
word  which  corresponds  most  nearly  with  the  original,  I  am 
satisfied  if  it  corresponds  in  some  essential  points." 

I  adhere  to  the  above  as  the  true  principle  of  translation. 
Only  with  respect  to  the  word  (ijpor,  I  am  now  more  inclined 
to  adopt  the  version  of  township,  which  Mr.  "Whiston  has  used 
in  the  Archaeological  Dictionary. 

The  critic  of  Lord  Brougham,  whom  I  have  before  men- 
tioned, and  who  may  be  taken  to  represent  a  certain  class  of 
scholars,  strongly  censures  his  lordship  for  attempting  to  con- 
vert the  logista?,  liturgies,  liturgi,  etc.,  into  English.  And  yet 
the  same  person  insists  that  ypayrj  shall  be  an  indictment,  and 
uaayytXia  an  impeachment ;  in  which  he  is  right,  but  that 
is  inconsistent  with  his  general  condemnation  of  Lord 
Brotigham's  plan. 

That  indeed  it  is  impossible  fully  to  carry  out  the  opposite 
system,  is  manifest.  For  how  would  you  translate  iypa^ura  fie  ? 
He  brought  a  graphe  against  me .'  But  who  could  tolerate 
this  I 


PREFACE  TO  THE  TRANSLATION.  XVU 

You  must  introduce  into  your  text  a  heap  of  monstrosities, 
to  please  the  ear  of  the  pedant,  and  disgust  every  other. 
Graphe,  deme,  psephism,  dicast,  agora,  bema,  liturgy,  phyle, 
dice,  ecclesia,  symmory,  chorege,  logist,  eutkyne,  stratege,  koplite, 
metie,  cleruchian,  hegemony,  bide,  deter,  lexiarchic,  ecmartyry, 
anacrisis,  hypomosy,  <fcc. 

Nothing  is  easier  than  to  do  this.  You  have  only  to  abdi- 
cate the  functions  of  the  translator,  and  save  yourself  some 
thought  and  trouble. 

But  as  to  the  logic  of  the  matter,  it  is  true,  that  for  many 
of  these  ancient  terms  it  is  not  possible  to  find  a  perfectly 
apposite  translation.  But  it  does  not  follow  that  you  are  not 
to  translate  at  all. 

The  8ov\rj  of  five  hundred  at  Athens  was  very  differently 
constituted  from  any  English  senate  or  council.  But  it  may 
be  translated  by  either  of  those  words,  because  there  is  enough 
of  similarity  for  that  purpose. 

Nor  needs  a  court  of  justice  to  be  called  a  dicastery,  (or,  as 
Mr.  Grote  will  have  it,  a  dikastery,)  because  there  is  a  differ- 
ence in  the  mode  of  legal  procedure  at  Athens  and  in  England. 
All  this  is  sheer  pedantry  ! 

Judicial  tribunals  and  deliberative  bodies  are  things  of 
universal  existence.  A  court,  a  judge  or  juror,  a  council,  a 
member  or  president  of  that  council,  may  just  as  well  be 
found  at  Athens  as  at  Rome,  or  in  London. 

Shall  I  refuse  to  ti'anslate  rave,  a  ship,  because  Attic 
triremes  and  pentecontors  are  different  from  English  steam- 
boats and  men-of-war  ?  Or  shall  I  insist  on  calling  a  Roman 
sword  a  gladius,  because  it  was  different  from  our  own  1  Do 
we  make  no  attempt  to  translate  bur  is,  temo,  dentate,  stiva,, 
because  Virgil's  plough  would  not  suit  a  modern  agricul- 
turist ?  The  pedant  would  give  his  own  pupil  a  sound  whip- 
ping if  he  brought  any  such  excuse. 

Srparjjyot'  is  commonly  translated  general.  Yet  the  func- 
tions of  the  Athenian  HTparrjydc  are  far  from  corresponding 
perfectly  with  those  of  a  modern  general.  For,  besides  that 
he  had  various  civil  duties  to  perform,  both  as  an  admicis- 

VOL.  i.  c 


XVU1  PREFACE  TO  THE  TRANSLATION. 

trative  and  judicial  functionary,  he  was  an  admiral  as  well  as 
general,  there  being  no  such  distinction  between  the  two  ser- 
vices as  we  have  in  England.  But  I  am  content  with  the 
translation  of.  general  for  all  that. 

In  short,  in  the  translation  of  many  common  words  we  are 
compelled  by  the  difference  of  times  and  circumstances  to  be 
guilty  of  some  inaccuracy.  For  example,  wktiv  is  rendered 
to  sail,  in  many  eases  where  not  sails  but  only  oars  impelled 
the  ship  ;  and  it  is  commonly  preferred  to  the  word  navigate, 
as  being  of  more  ordinary  tise.  '\--eIc  is  rendered  knights, 
though  our  word  conveys  a  somewhat  different  idea.  Charta 
«md  papyrus  are  called  paper,  though  the  material  was  dif- 
ferent from  ours.  The  meals,  the  articles  of  dress  of  the 
Greeks  and  Romans,  do  not  correspond  with  ours ;  but  we 
make  the  best  of  it,  and  translate  them.  If  I  call  the  Roman 
led  us,  a  couch,  I  do  not  present  an  idea  of  its  form,  or  of  the 
mode  in  which  Roman  guests  were  placed  at  table.  Y  a 
must  go  to  the  dictionary  of  antiquities,  or  to  some  commen- 
tary, for  an  explanation  of  that.  So,  if  I  translate  Xeirovpyia, 
a  public  office,  service,  or  duty,  I  do  not  exhibit  the  peculiar 
nature  of  the  service  ;  yet  I  give  a  positive  translation  of  the 
word,  which  is  good  as  far  as  it  goes. 

But  I  grant  there  is  some  discretion  to  be  observed.  We 
must  look  also  to  the  other  side  of  the  question.  There  are 
some  terms  entirely  untranslateable.  Archon  cannot  be  con- 
verted into  English  any  more  than  consul.  I  do  not  reduce 
the  Attic  money  to  English,  which  would  cause  confusion ; 
and  for  the  same  reason  I  do  not  imitate  Leland  in  adopting 
the  names  of  the  Roman  months.  Further.  I  would  eschew 
all  fanciful  similarities,  all  undignified  expressions.  I  would 
not  call  any  ancient  vehicle  a  hackney-coach  or  a  cabriolet, 
nor  any  ancient  functionary  a  Lord  Mayor.  Nor  do  I  approve 
of  Francis  converting  raliapxoi  and  (pvXapxc  into  colonels  and 
aids-de-camp.  There  is  some  truth  in  what  Olivet  says  of 
the  use  of  such  terms,  that  to  put  them  in  the  mouth  of 
Demosthenes  is  like  painting  Alexander  or  Caesar  in  a  peruke 
or  an  embroidered  coat 


PREFACE   TO  THE   TRANSLATION.  XIX 

I  agree  also  with  what  Pope  says  with  respect  to  a  transla- 
tion of  Homer : — 

"  The  use  of  modern  terms  of  war  and  government,  such  as 
'platoon,  campaign,  junto,  or  the  like,  into  which  some  trans- 
lators have  fallen,  cannot  be  allowable ;  those  only  excepted, 
without  which  it  is  impossible  to  treat  the  subjects  in  any 
living  language." 

I  have  observed  a  similar  rule  in  the  translation  of  Virgil. 
But  I  must  remark,  that  prose  and  poetry  stand  on  a  some- 
what different  footing.  Archaisms  are  often  allowable  and 
good  in  poetry,  to  give  it  (as  Pope  says)  a  venerable  cast ; 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  many  modern  words  are  fit  for  prose, 
which  would  not  be  suitable  for  poetry — as  campaign. 

In  all  these  things  taste  and  judgment  are  required.  You 
must  take  care  that  your  translations  are  as  apposite  as  pos- 
sible ;  and  when  you  resort  to  words  which  can  give  but  an 
imperfect  idea  of  the  original,  select  only  such  as  are  digni- 
fied, simple,  significant,  having  rather  a  general  and  perma- 
nent, than  a  local  or  ephemeral  character.  I  see,  for  example. 
no  objection  to  words  such  as  the  following  : — 

Prince,  general,  captain,  officer,  commissioner,  deputy,  pre- 
sident, clerk,  secretary,  assessor,  treasure?',  paymaster,  collector, 
board,  rate,  property-tax,  register,  audit,  tribe,  township, 
assembly,  chairman,  bill,  decree,  motion,  resolution,  statute,  ad- 
vocate, jury,  summons,  action,  indictment,  plea,  verdict,  damages, 
fine,  information,  arbitrator,  award,  mortgage,  trespass. 

But  I  will  detain  the  reader  no  longer.  I  wish  I  were  aa 
sure  that  I  had  carried  out  my  principles  well,  as  I  am  that 
the  principles  themselves  are  sound. 


CHRONOLOGICAL  ABSTRACT 


EVENTS  DURING  THE  LIFE  OF  DEMOSTHENES. 


3S5  Demosthenes  is  bom. 

This  was  just  nineteen  years  after  the  termination  of  the  Pelopou- 
nesian  war.     Greece  was  reposing  under  the  peace  of  Antaleidas, 
and  the  power  of  Sparta  had  reached  its  height. 
3S3  Philip  of  Macedon  is  born. 

His  father.  Amvntas  II.,  has  disputes  with  the  Olynthians  con- 
cerning their  encroachment  on  his  territories,  and  applies  to 
Sparta  for  aid. 

Apollonia  and  Acanthus,  two  of  the  Chalcidian  cities,  send  an  em- 
bassy to  Sparta  for  the  same  purpose. 

Sparta  declares  war  against  Olynthus,  and  sends  a  force  under 
Eudamidas  which  takes  possession  of  Potida?a. 
SS2  Phoebidas.  sent  from  Sparta  to  reinforce  Eudamidas,  stops  on  his 
road  at  Thebes,  and  seizes  the  Cadmea,  in  which  he  places  s, 
Lacedaemonian  garrison.  An  oligarchical  government  -  - 
Wished  at  Thebes,  at  the  head  of  which  are  Archie  and  Leon- 
tiades.  devoted  to  Sparta.  A  multitude  of  Theban  exiles  fly  to 
Athens  :  among  thein  Pelopidas. 

Teleutias,  brother  of  Agesilaus.  is  -ent  with  a  larger  force  against 
olynthus:  is  joined  by  a  Theban  contingent,  by  Amvntas.  and 
Derdas  prince  of  Elymia. 

The  Spartans  require  Athens  to  dismiss  the  Theban  exiles. 
Athens  refuses. 

Teleutias  defeats  the  Olynthians  in   a  battle  near  the  city,  and 
shuts  them  in  their  walls. 
S81   Teleutias  is  defeated  by  the  Olynthians,  and  slain. 
3S0  Agesipolis,  one  of  the  kings,  is  sent  with  reinforcements  from 
Sparta  :  takes  Torone.  and  dies  of  a  fever.     Polybiades  succeeds 
to  the  command,  and  besieges  Olynthus. 
3«"9  The  Olynthians  sue  for  peace,  and  submit  to  join  the  Peloponnesian 
confederacy. 

Pelopidas  and  his  associates  return  to  Thebes,  where,  having  slain 
Archias  and  Leontiades.  they  are  joined  by  their  countrymen, 
and  attack  the  Spartan  garrison.  A  body  of  Athenian  volunteer* 
come  to  their  assistance,  and  the  garrison  capitulates. 

D.    H.    HILL   LIBRARY 
North  Carolina  State  College 


CHRONOLOGICAL   ABSTRACT    OF   EVENTS.  2"A 

B.C. 

378  Demosthenes  loses  his  father,  and  is  placed  under  the  care  of  three 
guardians. 

The  Spartans  send  their  king  Cleombrotus  into  Bceotia. 

Chabrias,  with  an  Athenian  force,  occupies  the  pass  at  Eleutheree  ; 
Cleombrotus  enters  by  another  road,  and  having  dispersed  a 
Theban  force  at  Platea,  takes  possession  of  Thespice,  where  he 
leaves  Sphodrias,  with  a  part  of  his  army,  and  then  returns  to 
Peloponnesus. 

The  Athenians,  alarmed  at  the  Spartan  invasion,  condemn  their 
generals  who  had  aided  in  the  recovery  of  the  Cadmea. 

Sphodrias  marches  against  Athens,  to  surprise  the  Pirseus ;  ad 
vances  as  far  as  the  Thriasian  plain,  and  retreats,  after  plunder- 
ing the  country. 

The  Athenians  prepare  for  war  with  Sparta;  strengthen  the 
Piraeus  j  increase  their  fleet,  and  make  alliance  with  Thebes. 

Chios,  Byzantium,  Rhodes,  and  Mitylene  revolt  from  Sparta,  and 
renew  their  confederacy  with  Athens. 

Sphodrias  is  recalled,  and  Agesiiaus  sent  with  a  large  Pelopon- 
nesian  army  into  Bceotia.  He  ravages  the  Theban  territory,  but 
having  encountered  an  Athenian  and  Theban  force,  commanded 
by  Chabrias  and  Gorgidas,  is  repulsed,  and  returns  home,  leaving 
Phcebidas  in  command  at  Thespise. 

Phcebidas,  after  gaining  partial  success  against  Gorgidas,  is  de- 
feated and  slain. 
377  Agesiiaus  again  invades  Bceotia ;  is  joined  by  a  force  of  Olynthian 
cavalry,  gains  some  advantage  over  the  Thebans,  and,  after 
strengthening  the  oligarchical  party  at  Thespiae,  crosses  over  tc 
Megara,  where  he  falls  ill. 

The  Sacred  Band,  consisting  of  three  hundred  men,  is  established 
at  Thebes. 

Acoris,  king  of  Egypt,  at  war  with  Persia,  engages  the  services  of 
Chabrias,  who,  on  complaint  made  by  Artaxerxes,  is  recalled  by 
the  Athenians,  and  Iphicrates  sent  to  assist  the  satrap  Pharna- 
bazus. 
37^  Cleombrotus  is  sent  into  Bceotia,  where  he  is  repulsed  by  the 
Athenians  and  Thebans,  and  returns  home. 

A  Peloponnesian  fleet  is  sent  out  under  the  command  of  Pollis,  to 
intercept  the  corn-ships  bound  for  Athens.  Chabrias  totally  de- 
feats this  fleet  at  Naxos. 

Athens  regains  her  ascendancy  in  the  J5gean  sea,  and  many  of  the 
islands  return  under  her  protection. 

Timotheus  sails  with  a  fleet  to  Corcyra,  which  renews  her  alliance 
with  Athens. 

Jason  of  Pherse  establishes  his  power  or  influence  over  most  of  the 
towns  of  Thessaly. 
375  Timotheus  is  successful  against  the  Peloponnesians  in  the  Ionian 
sea. 

Pelopidas  fails  in  an  attempt  to  surprise  Orchomenos.  is  attacked 
on  his  retreat  by  a  superior  force  of  Spartans  at  Tegyra.  The 
Spartans  are  put  to  the  rout,  and  their  generals  slain. 


^'1  CHRONOLOGICAL    ABSTRACT    OF   EVFJNTS 

B.C. 

374  The  Thebans  send  an  army  into  Phocis,  -which  is  in  allian: 

-  ..rta.  Cleombrotos  crosses  the  Gulf  of  Corinth,  to  the  a»»ist- 
ance  of  the  Phocb.ns,  and  forces  the  Thebans  to  retreat. 

The  Athenians  attempt  to  make  peace  with  Sparta,  but  this  is 
interrupted   by  a   dis  \:erning  some  Zacynthian   exiles 

restored  by  Timotheus,  A  Peloponiu-sian  fleet  under  Mnasippus 
is  sent  to  recover  Corcyra.  The  Athenians  determine  to  relieve 
i;.  and  despatch  Timotheus  with  a  fleet  from  Athens,  who  is 

forced  for  want  of  supplio-       -    about  the  -Egean  isles  and 

the  coast  of  Macedonia  and  Thrace. 

Pharnabazus  and  Iphierates  inv;.  hieh.  after  partial  suc- 

cess, they  are  compelled  to  evacuate.     Iphierates  quarrels  with 
Pnarnabazus.  and  returns  to  Athens. 
373  Mnasippus  lands   in   Corcyra,   and    blockades    the    city,    but  is 
routed  in  a  sally,  and  retires  with  his  fleet  to  Lea 

Timotheus  is  recalled  to  Athens,  and  brought  to  trial,  Iv 
quitted.     Iphierates,  Callistratus,  and  Chabrias,  succeed  to  the 
command. 

The  Athenians  sail  to  Corcyra,  and  capture  a  Syracusan  fleet  sent 
to  the  aid  of  Mnasippus.  Cephallenia  is  brought  over  to  the 
Athenian  alliance. 

The  Thebans  surprise  Pla:a?a.  and  raze  the  city  to  the  ground.  The 
inhabitants,  allowed  t.>  depart,  take  refuge  in  Athens,  and  are 
admitted  to  the  privileges  t>l   .  :~:.:ens. 

Thespife  is  taken,  and  shares  the  " 

372  Iphierates  and  carries  on  the  war  agai:.-    " 

Peloponnesians  with  various  -•      is  ]  i  .paring  to  invade 

Laconia. 
371  The  Athenians  send  ambassadors  to  Sparta,  to  conclude  peace. 
The  Thebans.  invited  to  join  in  the  embassy,  send  Epaminondas. 
;•  is  made  between  the  Peloponnesians  and  the  Athenian  con- 
federacy. Epaminondas  i .  acur  in  the  treaty  on  behalf 
of  Thebes  •  she  was  required  to  acknowledge  the  independ- 
ence of  the                      \vn>. 

Cleombrotus  is  ordered  to  march  from  Phocis  into  Bceotia  :  en- 
counters the  Thebans  under  Epaminondas  at  Leuetra,  is  totally 
defeated  and  slain. 

Jason  of  Pherte  arrives  at  Leuetra  after  the  battle.     By  his  medi- 
ation an   armistice   is   effected,  and   the  Lacedemonian   army 
-    • 

A  congress  is  beld  at  Athens,  and  attended  by  most  of  the  Pelo- 
ponnesian  states,  who  resolve  to  maintain  the  independence 
declared  '  /.das. 

The  Mantineans  rebuild  their  city,  which  had  been  dismantled  b? 
the  Lacedsemon 

Aden  .movement  takes  place  in  Peloponr.  -   - 

The  Arcadians,  encouraged  by  Epaminondas.  resolve  to  build  a  new 
city,  to  become  the  sea*  of  a  federal  government,  to  be  called 
Megalopolis,  Pammenes  is  sent  w:th  a  small  Theban  force  into 
Arcadia. 


DURING    THE    LIFE    OF    DEMOSTHENES.  _'.j 

B.C. 

371  Tegea  and  Orchomenos,  under  the  influence  of  Sparta  and  aristo- 
eratical  institutions,  oppose  the  Arcadian  union.     The  Tegeans 
are  defeated,  and  their  city  taken.     Sparta  declares  war. 
370  Amyntaa  II.  dies,  leaving  three  sons,  Alexander,  Perdiccas,  and 
Philip.     Alexander  ascends  the  throne. 

Jason  of  Pherae  announces  his  intention  of  marching  to  Delphi 
and  presiding  over  the  Pythian  games.  He  collects  a  large  army, 
and  excites  alarm ;  hut  is  murdered  a  short  time  hefore  the 
festival.     His  brothers  Polydorus  and  Polyphron  succeed  him. 

Agesilaus  marches  to  Mantinea.  ravages  the  country,  and  returns  to 
Sparta. 

The  Thebans  prepare  to  invade  Peloponnesus  ;  collect  troops  from 
Phocis,  Locris,  Thessaly.  and  various  states  of  northern  Greece. 

Iphicrates  is  sent  with  an  Athenian  squadron  to  Macedonia,  where 
he  was  encouraged  by  Amyntaa  to  try  for  the  recovery  of  Am- 
phipolis,  but  returns  without  success. 
369  Pelopidas  and  Epaminondas  lead  the  Theban  army  to  Mantinea  : 
are  joined  by  the  Arcadians.  Eleans,  and  Argives,  and  invade 
Laconia.  The  Spartans  are  unable  to  oppose  them  in  the  field, 
but,  reinforced  by  a  small  body  of  Peloponnesian  auxiliaries, 
prepare  to  defend  the  capital.  The  Thebans.  after  ravaging  the 
country,  approach  Sparta,  are  repulsed  in  a  skirmish,  and  retire. 

The  Theban  army  enters  Messenia,  to  accomplish  the  project  of 
Epaminondas  for  the  building  of  a  new  city,  and  the  separation 
of  that  province  from  Laconia.  The  building  is  rapidly  carried 
on  under  Theban  protection.  The  city  is  called  Messene.  and 
peopled  by  the  Mes~enian  insurgents,  with  a  multitude  of  exiles 
and  revolted  Helots.  Epaminondas,  leaving  a  garrison  there, 
prepares  for  his  return  to  Thebes. 

The  Lacedaemonians  send  an  embassy  to  Athens,  to  implore  her 
assistance,  which  is  granted,  and  Iphicrates  is  sent  with  an  army 
to  Peloponnesus. 

Polyphron  of  Pheraa,  having  survived  Polydorus,  is  murdered  by 
his  nephew  Alexander,  who  assumes  the  office  of  Togas,  and 
oppresses  the  Thessalian  towns,  The  Aleuadae  of  Larissa  in- 
voke the  aid  of  Alexander,  king  of  Macedon.  who  marches  to 
their  relief,  and  puts  a  garrison  in  Larissa  and  Cranon  :  but  he 
is  hastily  recalled  to  Macedonia,  in  consequence  of  intrigues 
against  him  by  his  mother  Eurydice  and  her  paramour 
Ptolemy. 

Iphicrates  stations  himself  at  the  Isthmus  of  Corinth,  to  oppose 
Epaminondas,  who  passes  by  a  different  road,  repulsing  the 
Athenian  cavalry. 
36S  The  Thessalians  apply  to  Thebes  for  aid  against  Alexander  of 
Phene.  Pelopidas  is  sent  into  Thessaly,  while  Epaminondas 
marches  for  the  second  time  to  invade  Peloponnesus. 

Dionysius  of  Syracuse  sends  a  body  of  Celts  and  Iberians  to  the 
aid  of  Sparta. 

The  Spartans  send  an  army  to  the  Isthmus,  and  are  joined  by  the 
Corinthians  and  Athenians  under  Chabrias.   Epaminondas  forces 


2-1  CHRONOLOGICAL    ABSTRACT   OF   EVENTS 

B.  C. 

365  their  lines,  and  effects  a  junction  with  his  allies  j  after  a  short 
and  unimportant  campaign  he  makes  an  attempt  on  Corinth,  is 
repulsed  by  Chabrias,  and  returns  home 

Alexander  of  Macedon  is  murdered,  and  Ptolemy  assumes  the 
regency. 

The  Arcadians  carry  on  the  war  with  success  in  the  absence  of 
Epaminondas. 

Pelopidas,  having  marched  to  Larissa.  and  restored  tranquillity, 
is  invited  into  Macedonia,  to  compose  the  disputes  in  the  royal 
family.  He  forces  Ptolemy  to  give  security  lor  preserving  the 
kingdom  to  the  heirs  of  Amynta*  :  takes  hostages  from  him,  and 
receives  the  young  Philip  into  his  charge.  Philip  is  taken  to 
Thebes,  where  he  resides  for  several  years. 

The  satrap  Ariubarzanes  makes  an  ineffectual  attempt  for  the  paci- 
fication of  Greece. 

Alexander  of  Phera?  raises  new  disturbances.  Pelopidas.  sent  on 
an  embassy  to  Thessaly.  is  seized  by  him  and  thrown  into  prison. 
Alexander  obtains  the  assistance  of  Athens,  and  defeats  a  body 
of  Thebans  who  are  sent  against  him.  among  whom  Epaminon- 
das, in  temporary  disgrace  for  the  ill-success  of  his  last  cam- 
paign, was  serving  as  a  private  soldier. 

The  Thebans  destroy  OrciK-menos  in  Bceotia. 
367  Iphicrates  sails  with  an  armament  to  the  coast  of  Macedonia,  for 
the  purpose  of  recovering  Amphipolis;  is  invited  by  Ptolemy  and 
Eurydice  to  assist  them  against  Pausanias,  who  aspired  to  the 
throne.  He  expels  Pausanias,  but  is  unable  to  reduce  Amphipo- 
lis, which  is  supported  by  the  Olynthians. 

Epaminondas  marches  again  into  Thessaly.  and  effects  the  release 
of  Pelopidas. 

Archidamus,  commanding  the  troops  of  Laeedasmon,  Athens,  and 
Corinth,  with  Syracusan  auxiliaries,  gains  a  great  victory  over 
the  Arcadians  and  Argives  on  the  borders  of  Laconia. 

Pelopidas  is  sent  on  an  embassy  to  Susa.  and  obtains  the  Persian 
king's  sanction  for  the  projects  of  the  Thebans  On  his  return  a 
congress  is  held  at  Thebes,  and  attended  by  the  king's  deputy,  but 
the  Greek  states  refuse  to  accept  the  dictation  of  Persia. 

366  Demosthenes    comes    of  age,   and  brings   an   action  against    his 

guardians  for  inal-adminisiration  of  his  estate,  in  which  he  ob- 
tains a  verdict. 
Iphicrates,  with  Charidemus  of  Oreus,  sails  to  attack  Amphipolis, 

but  is  opposed  by  Ptolemy  and  the  Olynthians. 
Epaminondas  marches  into  Achaia.  but  without  much  success.     Of 

the    Achasau    states    Sicyon    only  is   secured   to   the   Theban 

alliance. 
Themison   of    Eretria   -surprises   Oropus.      The    Athenians    send 

Chares   to   recover  it,  but  the  citv  is  put  in  possession  of  the 

Thebans. 
Athens  makes  a  separate  peace  with  the  Arcadians. 
365  Corinth  and  the  Achseans  make  peace  with  Thebes. 

Eiis  and  Arcadia  go  to  war,  contending  for  the  Triphylian  towns. 


DURING   THE    LIFE    OF   DEMOSTHENES. 


365  rtolemy   is  slain  by   Perdiccas  III.    who   ascends   the   throne   of 
Macedon. 

The  Amphipolitans  negotiate  with  Iphicrates  for  the  surrender  of 
their  town,  and  give  him  hostages;  but  he,  being  recalled  to 
Athens,  delivers  the  hostages  to  Charideruus,  who  goes  off  into 
the  service  of  Cotys,  king  of  Thrace,  and  sends  back  the  hostages 
to  Amphipolis. 
864  Sparta  assists  Elis  against  the  Arcadians,  who  defeat  Arehidamus. 

The  Arcadians  invade  Elis,  and  attempt  to  exclude  the  Eleans  from 
the  presidency  of  the  Olympic  games.  The  battle  of  Olympia  is 
fought,  in  which  the  Arcadians  and  Argives  are  defeated  by  the 
troops  of  Elis  and  Achaia. 

Callisthenes  commands  the  Athenian  fleet  on  the  Macedonian 
coast,  and  makes  war  against  Perdicoas,  but  agrees  to  an  armis- 
tice. He  is  superseded  by  Timotheus,  who  takes  Torone  and 
Pot  id  sea. 

The  Thebans  are  again  invited  into  Thessaly,  to  give  assistance 
against  Alexander  of  Pherae.  Pelopidas  goes  with  a  small  troop 
to  Pharsalus.  where  he  collects  an  army  of  Thessalians.  Alex- 
ander is  defeated  in  the  battle  of  Cynoscephala?,  but  Pelopidas  is 
slain.  Peace  is  made  between  Thebes  and  Alexander. 
363  Dissensions  arise  between  Mantinea  and  the  other  Arcadians.  It 
is  proposed  to  make  peace  with  Elis  and  Sparta.  The  Thebans 
prepare  for  another  invasion  of  Peloponnesus.  The  Mantineans 
ally  themselves  to  Sparta. 

Timotheus  takes  Pydna  and  Methone. 

The  Thebans  send  a  fleet  to  Byzantium,  to  detach  it  from  the 
Athenian  alliance.  Laches  is  sent  to  oppose  it,  but  without 
effect, 

Alexander  of  Phene  sends  out  a  squadron  to  infest  and  plunder 
the  small  ^Egean  islands,  and  lays  siege  to  Peparethus.  The 
Athenians  having  sent  Leosthenes  against  him,  he  sails  to  Attica, 
takes  several  Athenian  ships,  and  plunders  the  Piraeus. 
S62  Epaminondas  leads  his  army  into  Peloponnesus,  and,  joined  by  his 
Arcadian  allies,  assaults  Sparta,  but  is  repulsed. 

The  Athenians  send  a  force  of  six  thousand  men  to  the  assistance 
of  the  Spartans.     They  march  to  Mantinea. 

Epaminondas,  retreating  from  Laconia,  marches  to  attack  Man- 
tinea.  His  cavalry  are  defeated  by  the  Athenians,  who  sally  from 
the  town. 

Agesilaus  marches  with  his  army  to  join  the  Athenians  and  Man- 
tineans.  Epaminondas  advances  to  attack  them,  and  the  battle 
of  Mantinea  is  fought,  one  of  the  most  celebrated  in  Grecian 
history.  On  the  one  side  are  Boeotians,  Thessalians,  Eubceans, 
Locrians,  and  other  northern  allies,  together  with  troops  of 
Sicyon,  Argos,  Arcadia,  and  Messenia.  to  the  number  of  thirty- 
three  thousand.  On  the  other,  Lacedemonians,  Athenians, 
Mantineans,  and  troops  of  Elis  and  Achaia;  considerably  less 
in  number.  After  an  obstinate  resistance,  Epaminondas  breaks 
the  centre  of  the  enemy,  but  is  slain  in  the  moment  of  victory. 


£b  CHRONOLOGICAL    ATTRACT   OF   EVENTS 

ooJ  A  general  peace  follows,  but  the  Spartans  alone  refuse  to  aeknow 
_;■  the  independence  of  Messenia. 

Timol  -  --.-ted  by  the  satmp  Ariobarzanes,  takes  Sestus,  Cri 
thote,  and  Elteus,  in  the  Thracian  Chersonese ;  and  afterwards 
lays  siege  to  Samos. 

The  satraps  revolt  from  the  king  of  Persia.  They  are  promised 
assistance  by  Taehos,  king  of  Egypt,  Mausolus,  king  of  Caria, 
and  most  of  the  maritime  parts  of  the  empire. 

Mi'.tocythes  rebels  against  Cotys,  king  of  Thrace,  and  engages  the 
Athenians  to  assist  him,  by  promising  to  cede  to  them  the  Cher- 
sonese.    Cotys  amuses  the  Athenians  by  negotiation,  and  over- 
comes Miitocytb.es. 
361  Samos  capitulates  after  a  siege  of  eleven  months. 

Orontes  betrays  the  conspirators  to  Artaxerxes.  Datames,  satrap 
of  Cappadocia,  is  murdered.  Taehos,  preparing  to  make  war 
against  Persia,  _  ges  Agesilaus  to  command  his  army,  and 
Chabrias  for  his  admiral. 

Agesilaus  is  sen:  with  a  thousand  Spartans  to  Egypt,  but  quarrels 
with  Taehos.  and  transfers  Lis  services  to  Xeei.mabis,  to  whom 
the  Egyptian  army  revolts.  Taehos  flies  to  Persia,  and  Agesilaus 
establishes  Xeetanabis  in  the  dominion  of  Egypt. 

.xerxes  Mnemon  dies,  and  Lis  Svn.  Artaxerxes  Ochus,  ascends 
the  throne  of  Persia. 
360  Timotheus  and  Charidemus  attack  Amphipolis,  which  receive-  suc- 
cour from  Macedonia  and  O'.ynthus,  and  the  Athenians  are  defeated. 

Cotys  marches  into  the  Chersonese,  and  gets  possession  of  Sestus, 

Agesilaus  dies  on  his  return  from  Egypt. 

Pammenes  is  sent  with  Thel-an  troops  to  quell  disturbances  in 
Arcadia:  establishes  the  preponderance  of  Megalopolis. 

Artaxerxes  makes  an  attempt  to  reconquer  Egypt,  which  fails. 
359  Perdiccas  is  slain  iu  a  battle  with  the  lllyrians,  leaving  an  infant 
son.  Amyntas.     Philip  ascends  the  throne  of  Macedon 

At  this  time  the  lllyrians  are  preparing  for  a  new  invasion,  the 
Pteonians  make  an  irruption  from  the  north,  and  there  are  two 
pretenders  to  the  crown — Pausanias,  assisted  by  Cotys,  and 
Argaeus.  supported  by  the  Athenians. 

Philip  accommodates  matters  with  Cotys,  and  marches  against 
us,  whom  he  defeats.     He  returns  the  Athenian  prisoners 
without  ransom,  and  makes  peace  with  Athens.     He  then  re- 
duces the  Pieonians  to  submission,  and  invades  Illyria.    Bardylis, 
the  Illyrian  prince,  I  in  a  great  battle,  and  a  portion  of 

his  dominions  is  ceded  to  Macedonia. 
35$  Cotys.  assisted  by  Charidemus,  lays  siege  to  Crithote  and  Elaeus, 
but  soon  after  is  murdered,  leaving  three  sons,  Amadocus.  Beri- 
sades.  and  Cersobleptes,  among  whom  the  dominions  of  Cotys 
are  divided. 

Charidemus  takes  Cersobleptes  under  his  protection,  and  defeats 
the  Athenian  force. 

Miltocythes  again  raising  disturbances,  is  taken  prisoner  by  Chari- 
demus, who  sends  him  to  Cardia,  where  he  is  put  to  death. 


DURING   THE    LIFE    OF    DEMOSTHENES.  *£i 

B.C. 

355  Philip  lays  siege  to  Arnphipolis. 

The  Olynthians  send  an  embassy  to  Athens,  to  negotiate  an  alliance 
which  is  prevented  by  the  intrigues  of  Philip.  He  conciliates 
the  Olynthians  by  the  cession  of  Anthemus,  and  soon  afterwards 
obtains  possession  of  Arnphipolis.  He  then  marches  to  Pydna, 
which  is  surrendered  to  him. 

Alexander  of  Pherre  is  murdered.  Tisiphonus  and  his  brothei 
Lycophron  get  the  command. 
357  Berisades  and  Amadocus  combine  against  Cersobleptes,  and  aie 
assisted  by  Athenodorus,  the  Athenian  general.  Cersobleptes  is 
forced  to  enter  into  a  convention,  by  which  the  kingdom  is 
equally  divided,  and  the  Chersonese  ceded  to  Athens,  with  the 
exception  of  Cardia. 

The  Athenians  quarrel  with  Philip  about  Arnphipolis.  He  makes 
an  alliance  with  the  Olynthians. 

The  Thebans  send  an  army  into  Eubcea,  from  which,  after  much 
fighting,  they  are  expelled  by  the  Athenians. 

Chares  is  sent  to  take  possession  of  the  Chersonese,  which,  after 
some  opposition  from  Charidemus,  he  effects. 

The  Social  War  breaks  out,  in  which  Byzantium,  Chios,  Cos,  and 
Rhodes  revolt  from  the  Athenian  league.  The  Athenians  attack 
Chios,  and  are  defeated ;  Chabrias  is  slain. 

The  Phocians  send  succour  to  some  of  the  Boeotian  towns,  attempt- 
ting  to  revolt  from  Thebes.  The  Thebans  procure  an  Amphic- 
tyonic  decree  against  the  Phocians  for  having  cultivated  a  portion 
of  the  consecrated  plain  near  Delphi.  This  was  the  origin  of  the 
Sacred  War. 

356  Philip  takes  Potidrea,  with  the  assistance  of  the  Olynthians,  and 

gives  it  up  to  them. 

Alexander  is  born. 

Parmenio,  Philip's  general,  gains  a  victory  over  the  Illyrians. 

Philip  takes  the  mine  district  of  the  Pangajus  from  the  Thasians,  and 
establishes  a  new  colony  at  Cronides,  which  he  names  Philippi. 

The  Athenians  besiege  Byzantium,  but  the  siege  is  raised  by  the 
fleet  of  the  allies.  Chares,  Timotheus  and  Iphicrates  command 
the  Athenian  forces,  but  the  two  latter  are  recalled  on  the  com- 
plaint of  Chares. 

The  allies  ravage  Lemnos,  Imbrus,  and  Samos,  and  levy  contribu- 
tions in  the  iEgean. 

Chares,  for  want  of  supplies,  lends  assistance  to  Artabazus  against 
the  Persian  satraps. 

Philomelus,  the  Phocian  general,  takes  possession  of  Delphi,  and 
defeats  the  Locrians  of  Amphissa.  He  negotiates  an  alliance  with 
Athens  and  Lacedsemon,  while  the  Locrians  obtain  promises  of 
assistance  from  Thebes  and  Thessaly. 

Corcyra  revolts  from  Athens. 
855  The  king  of  Persia  threatens  Athens  with  war  on  account  of  the 
aid  furnished  by  Chares  to  Artabazus. 

The  Athenians  terminate  the  Social  War  by  acknowledging  tha 
independence  of  the  revolted  states. 


28  CRKOXOLOGICAL    ABSTRACT    OF   EVENTS 

B.  0. 

355  Tmioiheus  and  Iphierates  are  brought  to  trial  for  misconduct  in 
the  war.  Timotheus  is  found  guilty,  and  goes  into  exile.  Shortly 
after,  he  dies  at  Chalcis. 

The  Athenians  send  an  expedition  against  Olynthus,  without 
success. 

Chares  takes  Sestus. 

Philomelus  again  defeats  the  Locrians,  and  being  threatened  with 
a  general  war,  seizes  the  treasures  of  Delphi  and  collects  a 
body  of  mercenaries.  The  Thessalians  and  Boeotians,  having 
marched  into  Locris,  are  defeated  by  Philomelus,  who  is  strongly 

.    reinforced  from  Peloponnesus. 

Demosthenes  makes  the  speeches  against  Leptines  and  Androtion. 
354  The  Thebans.  largely  reinforced,  give  battle  to  Philomelus  in  the 
defiles  of  Parnassus.      He  is  defeated  and  slain.      Onomarchus 
succeeds  to  the  command,  and  the  Thebans  retire. 

Philip  sends  Macedonian  troops  to  assist  Callias  of  Chalcis  against 
Plutarch  of  Eretria.  The  latter  applies  to  Athens  for  assistance, 
and  is  opposed  by  Demosthenes,  who  makes  his  first  public  speech 
on  this  occasion.  The  Athenians  determine  to  assist  Plutarch, 
and  Phocion  is  sent  with  an  army  to  Eubcea.  He  defeats  Callias 
and  the  Macedonians  at  Tamynae,  and  establishes  popular 
government  at  Eretria. 

The  Athenians  debate  about  making  war  with  Persia.      Demos- 
thenes dissuades  them  in  his  speech  de  8ym  i 
353  Onomarchus  takes  Thronium,  and  invades  Boeotia.     Here  he  takes 
Orchomenus,  but  is  defeated  by  the  Thebans  at  Chaeronea. 

Lycophron,  now  sovereign  of  Pherae,  enters  into  alliance  with 
Onomarchus,  and  endeavours  to  oppress  the  independent  Thes- 
salians. 

The  Spartans  declare  war  against  Megalopolis,  and  apply  for  ,.- 
ance  to  Athens.      Demosthenes  makes  his  speech  pro  Megalo- 
politanis.  in  which  he  urges  the  Athenians  to  espouse  the  other 
side.     They  remain  neutral. 

Demosthenes  delivers  the  oration  against  Timocrates. 

Philip  takes  Methone  after  a  long  siege,  in  which  he  lost  an  eye. 

The  Macedonian  party  prevail  at  Eretria,  and  dissolve  the  con- 
nexion with  Athens. 

Mausolus,  king  of  Caria,  dies,  and  is  succeeded  by  his  widow 
Artemisia. 

The  Phoenicians  revolt  from  Artaxerxes,  and  enter  into  alliance 
with  Xectanabis.  Cyprus  soon  after  revolts. 
852  Philip,  invited  by  the  Thessalians,  marches  against  Lycophron, 
defeats  Phayllus,  brother  of  Onomarchus,  and  takes  1 
Onomarchus  marches  with  a  large  army  into  Thessaly,  and  defeats 
Philip  in  two  battles,  who  retreats  to  Macedonia  Onomarchus 
then  invades  Boeotia,  defeats  the  Thebans,  and  takes  Coronea ; 
but  is  recalled  to  Thessaly  by  intelligence  that  Philip  had  re- 
turned with  large  reinforcements.  The  decisive  battle  of  Pagasae 
is  fought,  in  which  Onomarchus  is  defeated  and  slain.  Philip 
expels  Lycophron  from  Pherae,  and  takes  the  city  of  Magnesia. 


DURING   THE    LIFE    OF   DEJIOSTIIEXE3.  29 

B.C. 

352       He  then  prepares  to  invade  Phocis,  and  marches  to  Thermopylae, 
but  finds  the  pass  guarded  by  an  Athenian  force,  and  retreats. 

Phavllus.  joined  by  a  large  force  of  auxiliaries  from  Sparta,  Achaia, 
and  Athens,  invades  Bceotia,  but  is  defeated  by  the  Thebans. 

Philip  sends  out  a  fleet.  plundering-  the  Athenian  coast,  and  ravages 
Lemnos,  Imbrus.  and  Scyros  He  himself  marches  into  Thrace, 
where,  after  long  being  occupied  in  the  interior  extending  his 
power  over  the  different  tribes,  he  turns  towards  the  coast  of  the 
Propontis  and  attacks  Heraaum. 

Demosthenes  speaks  the  first  Philippic. 

The  oration  against  Aristocrates  is  delivered. 

Thebes,  Argos,  Sicyon.  and  Messene  send  assistance  to  Megalopolis. 
The  Spartans,  assisted  by  mercenaries  from  Phocis,  after  various 
indecisive  battles,  are  compelled  to  make  peace. 

Artaxerxes  makes   great   preparations   to   recover  Phoenicia  and 
Cyprus. 
351  Phavllus  overruns  the  country  of  the  Epicnemidian  Locrians,  is 
defeated   by  the  Bceotians  at  Ahte.  afterwards  defeats  them  at 
Aryca,  and  dies  :  is  succeeded  by  his  nephew  Phalaecus. 

The  deutocratical  party  at  Rhodes  solicit  the  aid  of  Athens, 
and  are  supported  by  Demosthenes  in  his  speech  de  Libtrtate 
Rhodiorum. 

Artemisia,  queen  of  Criia,  dies,  and  is  succeeded  by  Idrieus,  who, 
at  the  command  of  Artaxerxes,  collects  a  large  armament  for  the 
reduction  of  Cyprus.  Phocion  the  Athenian  is  joined  with 
Evagoras  in  the  command  of  this  expedition. 

The  Thessalians  remonstrate  with  Philip  for  retaining  Pagasaa  and 
Magnesia. 
350  Phalaecus  invades  Bceotia,  and  takes  Chaeronea,  from  which  he  is 
again  driven  by  the  Thebans,  T\ho  invade  and  ravage  1'hocis. 

Philip  takes  Apollonia,  and  threatens  the  Chalcidian  towns.  The 
Ulynthians  send  to  Athens  to  negotiate  alliance. 

Pitholaus,  brother  of  Lycophron,  recovers  Pherae,  and  Philip  is 
invited  to  expel  him.  On  his  return  from  Thessaly  he  marches 
into  the  Chalcidian  peninsula,  and  lays  siege  to  Slagira. 

Cyprus  submits  to  Artaxerxes.  Temnes,  king  of  Sidon,  assisted  by 
Mentor  at  the  head  of  Greek  mercenaries,  defeats  the  Persian 
satraps. 

Demosthenes  brings  an  action  against  Midias,  which  is  afterwards 
compromised. 
349  The  Thebans  receive  a  large  subsidy  from  Persia,  to  enable  them  to 
carry  on  the  war  against  Phocis. 

The  Ulynthians  send  an  embassy  to  Athens  to  implore  assistance. 
A  warm  debate  takes  place,  in  which  L'emosthenes  speaks  the 
first  Olynthiac.  The  Athenians  vote  alliance,  and  despatch 
Chares  with  a  small  force.  The  second  and  third  Olynthiacs  are 
delivered  at  short  intervals  after  this. 

Meanwhile  Stagira  capitulates ;  Torone  is  taken,  and  most  of  the 
Chalcidian  towns  hasten  to  make  terms  with  Philip.  The  Ulyn- 
thians send  another  embassy,  pressing  for  more  effectual  assist- 


SO  CHROXOL  DG1CAL    ABSTRACT    OF   EVENTS 

B.C. 

849      anc;.   A  larger  armament  is  sent  from  Athens,  and  put  unc'er  the 
command  of  Charidemus. 

The  Olynthians,  dissatisfied  with  Charidemus,  send  a  third  embassy, 
and  entreat  the  aid  of  a  native  Athenian  force.  This  is  seat ; 
bat  arrives  too  late. 

Artaxerxes  marches  in  person  against  the  Phoenicians.  Temnes 
betrays  Sidon,  and  the  Phoenicians  submit.  Mentor  is  taken  into 
the  service  of  Persia. 
34S  Philip  takes  Mecyberna,  the  port  of  Olynthus,  and  lays  siege  to  the 
city.  After  various  ineffectual  sallies,  Olynthus  is  betrayed  to 
Philip,  who  razes  it  to  the  ground. 

Phalsecus  is  deposed  from  his  command  by  the  Phocians.  The 
Sacred  "War  languishes. 

Artaxerxes  sends  to  the  Greek  states  to  collect  mercenaries  for  the 
invasion  of  Egypt,  Athens  and  Sparta  refuse  assistance.  The 
Thebans  send  Lacrates  with  a  thousand  men;  the  Argives 
Nicostratus  with  three  thousand.  The  Asiatic  Greeks  furnish  a 
contingent,  and  the  king  marches  in  person  into  Egypt.  The 
conquest  of  Egypt  is  ultimately  effected,  but  the  exact  date  is 
uncenain. 
347  Philip  celebrates  his  triumph  over  Olynthus  by  a  festival  at  Dium 
in  Pieria. 

An  assembly  is  held  at  Athens,  to  consider  the  expediency  of 
rousing  the  Greeks  agjinst  Philip.  jEschines  is  sent  for  that 
purpose  to  Arcadia.  The  negotiations  of  Athens  are  unsucci.-":ul. 

Philip  causes  it  to  be  intimated  at  Athens  that  he  is  desirous  of 
peace.  A  decree  passes  at  Athens  to  send  ambassadors  to  treat 
with  him. 

The  Thebans,  suffering  by  the  depredations  committed  on  their 
territories  from  the  hostile  garrisons  in  Bceotia,  invite  Philip  to 
terminate  the  Sacred  War.  The  Phocians  pray  for  aid  of  the 
Athenians,  and  offer  to  put  them  in  possession  of  Nicsea.  Thro- 
nium,  and  Alponus.  Meanwhile  Phaltecus  regains  his  power  in 
Phocia,  and  refuses  to  admit  the  Athenian  troops. 

Parmenio  besieges  Halus  in  Thessaiy. 

Demosthenes,  Jischines,  and  ei^ht  other  ambassadors,  are  sent  to 
Pella  to  treat  for  peace.  They  return  in  the  beginning  of  the 
following  year. 
846  Parmenio  and  Antipater  are  sent  to  Athens  to  negotiate  the  peace. 
A  congress  of  the  allies  is  held,  and  peace  is  concluded,  on  the 
terms  of  each  party  keeping  his  own  possessions ;  but  the  Pliociana 
and  Cersobleptes  are  not  named  in  the  treaty. 

The  ten  Athenian  ambassadors  are  sent  to  Macedonia  to  receive 
Philip's  oath  of  ratification.  On  arriving  at  Pella,  they  find  that 
Philip  has  marched  into  Thrace.  There  he  had  seized  upon  the 
Sacred  Mount,  and  stripped  Cersobleptes  of  a  considerable  part 
of  his  dominions.  On  his  return  to  Pella  he  takes  the  ambassa- 
dors with  him  to  Pherre,  and  there  ratifies  the  peace.  He  then 
dismisses  them,  hastens  to  Thermopylre,  takes  >'iccea,  Thronium, 
and  Alponus,  and  being  joined  by  the  Boeotians,  marches  into 


DUKIXG    THE    LIFE    OF    DEMOSTHEXE3.  31 


34ti  Phocis.  Archidamus  with  the  Spartan  troops,  and  Phaljscus 
with  his  mercenaries,  retire  to  Peloponnesus,  while  the  Phocian 
towns  are  either  taken  by  storm  or  capitulate. 

The  Athenians,  alarmed  at  this  intelligence,  begin  to  prepare  for 
their  own  defence,  but  are  reassured  by  a  letter  of  Philip. 

A  council  of  Aniphictyons  is  held  at  Delphi,  and  sentence  passed 
on  the  Phocians  for  their  sacrilege.  Philip  becomes  a  member 
of  the  council,  and  is  chosen  to  preside  at  the  Pythian  games. 

The  lost  Bceotian  towns  are  restored  to  Thebes  by  Philip,  and 
Xicrea  given  to  the  Thessaliaus. 

The  Amphictyonic  Council  send  an  embassy  to  Athens,  to  notify 
their  election  of  Philip,  and  demand  her  recognition  of  it. 
Demosthenes  delivers  his  Oration  on  the  Peace,  in  uhich  he  dis- 
suades the  Athenians  from  opposing  the  Amphictyonic  league. 
345  Philip  promises  to  assist  the  Messenians  and  Arcadians  against 
hostilities  threatened  by  Laeedsemon. 

The  Athenians  send  Demosthenes  at  the  head  of  an  embassy  to 
Messene  and  Argos,  to  counteract  the  influence  of  Philip. 

Diopittes  is  sent  with  a  body  of  Athenian  settlers  to  the  Thracian 
Chersonese,  who  become  involved  in  disputes  with  the  Cardians. 

Philip  ravages  Illyria,  and  takes  many  or  the  towns  in  that  dis- 
trict ;  after  which  he  marches  into  Thessaly,  where  the  regnant 
family  had  again  made  head,  and  expels  them,  leaving  strong 
garrisons  in  Pherre  and  Magnesia.  Soon  afterwards  he  causes 
the  whole  country  to  be  divided  into  tetrarchies,  and  governed 
by  his  own  partisans. 
344  Philip  sends  Python  to  Athens,  to  complain  of  the  Athenian  em- 
bassy to  Peloponnesus.  Demosthenes  speaks  the  second 
Philippic. 

Sostratus  the  pirate,  having  seized  the  island  Halonnesus,  is  ex- 
pelled by  Philip.     The  Athenians  demand  its  return. 

Philip  sends  Python  again  to  Athens,  to  adjust  his  disputes.  The 
Athenians  send  Hegesippus  and  other  envoys  to  make  proposals 
for  the  amendment  of  the  treaty. 

The  Cardians  resist  the  attempt  of  Diopithes  to  take  a  portion  of 
their  territories,  and  apply  to  Philip  for  assistance. 
oi'5  Philip  sends  a  letter  to  the  Athenians,  stating  the  terms  which  he 
is  willing  to  consent  to.  Demosthenes  and  Hegesippus  oppose 
them  as  unreajonable.  The  extant  speech  de  Hulonneso  is  sup- 
posed to  be  that  of  Hegesippus. 

Phocion  is  sent  to  protect  Megara  against  a  conspiracy  to  betray  it 
into  the  hands  of  the  Macedonians.  He  secures  it  by  fortifying 
Xicsea,  and  completing  the  long  walls. 

Philip  invades  Cassopia  in  Epirus,  and  annexes  it  to  the  dominions 
of  his  brother-in-law  Alexander. 

Demosthenes,  Hegesippus,  and  Lycurgus  are  sent  into  Achaia  and 
Acarnania,  to  form  a  league  against  Philip,  to  oppose  his  designs 
upon  Ambracia  and  the  western  parts  of  Greece.  They  are^uc- 
cessful,  and  an  Athenian  force  is  sent  into  Ambracia.  Philip 
retreats  from  Epirus. 


32  CHKOXOLOGiC-AL    ABSTRACT    OF   EVE.SM 

B.C. 

343  Aristodemus  with  an  Athenian  force  makes  an  unsuccessful  attempt 
upon  Magnesia. 
.Eschines  is  brought  to  trial  by  Demosthenes  for  misconduct  in  the 

embassy,  and  acquitted. 
Philip  sends  assistance  to  the  Cardians.  and  marches  into  the  inte- 
rior of  Thrace  to  attack  Teres.     Diopithes,  having  collected  a 
larare  body  of  mercenaries,  endeavours  to  interrupt  the  conquests 
of  Philip. 
342  A  Macedonian  force  is  sent  tc  Oreus  in  Eubcea,  and  establishes 
Philistides  as   governor.     Clitarchus,   a  partisan  of  Philip,  is 
secured  in  the  government  of  Eretria. 
Philip  sends  a  letter  to  Athens,  complaining  of  the  proceedings  of 
Diopithes  as  an  infraction  of  the  peace.    Demosthenes  makes  tLe 
speech  de  t 
Philip  completes  the  conquest  of  Thrace,  and   drives  Cersobleptes 
from  his  kingdom.     He  then  marches  toward  the  Propontine 
coast. 
?  11  Demosthenes  speaks  the  third  Philippic.     Early  in  the  year  Philip 
_  d   ria. 

Twenty  Athenian  corn-ships,  intended  for  the  relief  of  Selymbria, 
are  captured  by  Philip.     The  Athenians  complain,  and  the  ships 
are  restored. 
Phocion  is  sent  with  troops  to  Eubcea,  and  expels  Clitarchus  and 
Philistides.     Demosthenes  is  crowned  by  the  people  for  having 
advised  this  expedition. 
Selymbria  is  taken,  and  Philip  proceeds  to  besiege  Perinthus. 
The  Athenians,  under  the  advice  of  Demosthenes,  apply  for  assist- 
ance to  Persia, 
340  Philip  sends  his  letter  to  the  Athenians  (which  is  still  extant),  in 
which,  after  reproaching  them  for  their  conduct,  he  virtually 
declares  war. 
He  sends  an  army  into  the  Chersonese. 
The   Persians  relieve  Selymbria.  and   Philip,  leaving  troops   to 

blockade  it,  lays  siege  to  Byzantium. 
Den.  --.  _  Bvzuntium,  to  oiler  Athenian  succour,  which 

is  accepted,  and  Chares  is  sent  with  a  fleet ;  but  the  Byzantines 
refuse  to  receive  him,  and  Phocion  is  sent  in  his  stead.  At  the 
same  time  assistance  is  sent  from  Chios,  Cos,  and  Ehodes,  and 
also  from  -  of  Greece. 

Philip  is  compelled  to  raise  the  siege  of  Perinthus  and  Byzantium, 
and  his  troops  are  driven  out  of  the  Chersonese.  He  breaks  up 
his  camp,  and  marches  into  Scythia. 

the  satrap  Bagoas,  and  his  son  Axsea 
eds  him. 
339  .Eschines  goes  as  one  of  the  Athenian  deputies  to  the  Amphic- 
tyonic  Council.  He  accuses  the  Locrians  of  Amphissa,  for  having 
cultivated  the  sacred  plain.  The  Dclphians  having  attacked 
Cirrha,  are  put  to  flight,  and  a  resolution  is  passed  to  convoke 
an  extraordinary  meeting  at  Thermopylae.  At  this  meeting, 
unattended  Lv  Athena  or  u*  is  declared  against  the 


DURING    THE    LIFE    OF   DEMOSTHENES.  33 

B.C. 

339  Locrians,  and  Cottyphus  appointed  to  command  an  Amphictvonic 

army.     He  invades  Locris,  but  without  effect. 
Philip^  on  his  return  from  Scythia,  is  attacked  by  the  Triballi,  and 

is  wounded  in  a  hard-fought  battle. 
Phocion  carries   on   successful   operations  against  Philip  in   the 

north,  but  is  severely  wounded  in  an  incursion  into  Macedonia. 
Another  Amphictyonic  assembly  is  convened,  at  which  Philip  is 

elected  general  to    carry  into  effect  the   decree    against  the 

Locrians. 
33S  Philip  marches  through  Thessaly,  and  takes  possession  of  Elatea, 

which  he  begins  to  fortify. 
The  Athenians  in  alarm  hold  an  assembly  of  the  people,  at  which 

Demosthenes  proposes  to  send  an   embassy  to   Thebes.     This 

is  resolved  upou,  and  Demosthenes  himself  heads  the  embassy. 

Meanwhile  the  Athenians  muster  all  their  troops,  and  collect  a 

body  of  ten  thousand  mercenaries. 
An  assembly  is  convoked  at  Thebes,  and  attended  by  Python  on 

Philip's  behalf;   but  Demosthenes  prevails  on  the  Thebans  to 

become  allies  of  Athens. 
Philip  marches  against  Amphissa,  and  defeats  Chares,  who  had 

been  sent  to  succour  the  Locrians.     After  two  indecisive  battles, 

the  hostile  armies  meet  at  Ckasronea.     Philip  is  at  the  head  of 

thirty-two  thousand  men,  chiefly  Macedonians  and  Thessalians. 

On  the  other  side  are  the  forces  of  Athens  and  Thebes,  with  a  few 

auxiliaries  from  Peloponnesus,  somewhat  inferior  in  number. 

Philip  gains  a  decisive  victory. 
The  Athenians  take  energetic  measures  for  the  defence  of  their 

city.    Demosthenes  pronounces  the  funeral  orations  in  honour  of 

the  slain.     Lysicles  the  general  is  condemned  to  death. 
Ctesiphon  proposes  a  decree,  that  Demosthenes  be  crowned  at  the 

Dionysian  festival  for  his  services  in  repairing  the  fortifications, 

and  his  general  merits  as  a  citizen.     For  this  a  prosecution  ie 

instituted  against  him  by  Jischines. 
Philip  grants  peace  to  the  Athenians,  and  puts  a   Macedonian 

garrison  into  Thebes.     The   Boeotian  towns  are   emancipated, 

and  Oropus  given  to  Athens. 
Philip  holds  a  congress  of  the  Greeks  at  Corinth,  and  declares  war 

against  Persia.     He  makes  a  triumphant  march  through  Pelo- 
ponnesus, and  obtains  universal  submission. 
337  Attalus  and  Parmenio  are  sent  with  a  force  into  Asia  Minor,  to 

liberate  the  Greek  cities. 
Philip  is  engaged  in  a  war  with  the  Illyrians,  after  which  he  cele- 
brates his  marriage  with  Cleopatra,  and  is  involved  in  domestic 

broils. 
Arses  is  murdered,  and  Darius  Codomanus  raised  to  the  throne  of 

Persia. 
336  A  great  festival  is  held  at  jEgas  in  Macedonia,  to  solemnize  the 

marriage  of  Philip's  daughter  with  the  king  of  Epirus ;  and 

attended  from  all  parts  of  Greece.    During  the  solemnity,  Philip 

is  murdered  by  Pausanias,  one  of  his  guards. 
D 


34  CHRONOLOGICAL   ABSTRACT    OP   EVENTS 

B.  C. 

too  Demosthenes  receives  speedy  information  of  Philip's  death,  and 
takes  instant  measures  to  free  the  Greeks  from  Macedonia. 
Ambassadors  are  sent  to  the  Greek  states,  and  a  correspondence 
commenced  with  Attalus  in  Asia,  and  also  with  the  Persian  Court. 
A  general  rising  is  meditated  in  Greece,  and  also  among  the 
northern  tribes. 
Alexander  hastens  to  Thermopylae,  joined  by  the  Thessalians,  and 
holds  an  Amphictyonic  council,  at  which  he  is  elected  general  of 
the  Greeks.  Thence  he  marches  into  Boeotia,  and  procures  the 
submission  of  Thebes.  The  Athenians  send  ambassadors  to 
conciliate  him,  and  among  them  Demosthenes,  who,  after  going 
as  far  as  Cithaeron,  returns.  Alexander  then  proceeds  to  Corinth, 
where  at  a  general  congress  he  is  chosen  to  conduct  the  war 
against  Persia. 
335  Alexander  marches  into  Thrace,  defeats  the  Triballi,  crosses  the 
Danube,  and,  after  receiving  the  submission  of  some  barbarous 
tribes,  returns  through  Paeonia  to  attack  the  Illyrian  prince 
Cleitus.  While  he  is  yet  in  lllyria,  he  hears  of  the  revolt  of 
Thebes. 
The  Thebans,  having  blockaded  the  Macedonian  garrison  in  the 
Cadmea,  send  to  divers  Greek  states  for  assistance.  Demosthenes 
persuades  the  Athenians  to  vote  alliance,  and  himself  furnishes 
the  Thebans  with  a  supply  of  arms.  Elis  and  other  cities  of 
Peloponnesus  send  troops  to  the  aid  of  Thebes,  but  they 
march  no  further  than  the  Isthmus,  hearing  of  the  advance  of 
Alexander. 
Alexander  besieges  Thebes,  which  after  a  desperate  resistance  is 

taken  by  storm,  and  razed  to  the  ground. 
The  Athenians  send  a  deputation  to  appease  Alexander,  who  re- 
quires them  to  deliver  up  the  principal  leaders  of  the  war-party, 
among  them,  Demosthenes,  Hyperides,  and  Lycurgus.     But  he 
is  persuaded  by  Demades  to  waive  this  demand. 
334  Alexander  crosses  the  Hellespont  into  Asia  Minor. 
Battle  of  Granicus. 

Memnon  intrigues  with  the  Greek  states,  especially  Lacedaemon,  to 
excite  a  rising  against  Macedonia.     His  death,  which  happens 
soon  after,  is  fatal  to  the  Persian  cause. 
333  Battle  of  Issus. 
332  Siege  of  Tyre. 

The  Lacedaemonians  send  an  embassy  to  Darius. 
Agis,  king  of  Sparta,  sails  to  Crete,  and  reduces  the  island  under 
the  Persian  dominion. 
331  Alexandria  in  Egypt  is  founded. 
Battle  of  Arbela." 

Alexander  enters  the  Persian  capital. 
Agis  forms  a  confederacy  in  Peloponnesus. 
S3C  Antipater  marches  to  suppress  an  insurrection  in  Thrace.     The 
Lacedaemonians,  commanded  by  Agis,  rise  in  arms,  and,  joined 
by  the  Eleans  and  Achaians,  besiege  Megalopolis.     Antipater 


DURING   THE    LIFE    OF    DEMOSTHENES.  35 

B.C. 

330      hastens  to  its  relief,  and  an  obstinate  battle  is  fought,  in  which 

Agis  is  defeated  and  slain. 
iEschines  brings  on  the  trial  of  Ctesiphon,  and  the  two  Orations 

for  the   Crown    are    delivered.      Ctesiphon   is  acquitted,   and 

jEschines  retires  in  exile  to  Rhodes,  where  he  opened  a  school  of 

rhetoric,  and  died  many  years  after. 
Darius  is  murdered. 

325  Alexander  sets  out  on  his  march  for  India. 
327  Poms  is  overcome. 

326  The  army  embarks  on  the  Indus. 
325  Alexander  returns  to  Persia. 

324  An  order  sent  by  Alexander  is  read  at  the  Olympic  games,  com- 
manding the  reception  of  exiles  by  the  Greek  states.  Demos- 
thenes goes  to  Olympia  to  remonstrate  with  the  Macedonian 
envoy.  The  Athenians  send  an  embassy  to  Alexander,  to  com- 
plain of  this  measure. 

Messages  are  sent  to  the  Greek  cities,  requiring  them  to  pay 
divine  honours  to  Alexander. 

Harpalus,  flying  from  Babylon  with  a  large  treasure,  arrives  in 
Athens.  Antipater  demands  that  he  shall  be  given  up  by  the 
Athenians,  who  throw  him  into  prison,  and  pass  a  decree,  on  the 
motion  of  Demosthenes,  to  lodge  his  treasure  in  the  Acropolis. 
A  large  portion  of  it  is  missing,  and,  on  inquiry  being  insti- 
tuted by  the  Areopagus,  Demosthenes  (among  others)  is  charged 
with  having  received  a  bribe  from  Harpalus.  He  is  found 
guilty,  and  sentenced  to  pay  a  fine  of  fifty  talents. 

Unable  to  pay  this,  he  flies  to  Megara,  and  remains  in  exile. 
323  Alexander  dies  at  Babylon. 

The  Athenians  resolve  on  war,  and  send  ambassadors  to  stir  up 
the  Greeks.  A  general  rising  takes  place,  and  Leostbenes  the 
Athenian  is  chosen  commander.  Sparta  remains  neutral,  and 
the  Boeotians  adhere  to  Macedonia. 

Leosthenes  defeats  the  Boeotians  at  Platasa,  and  marches  to  meet 
Antipater  in  Thessaly.  Antipater  is  totally  defeated,  and  takes 
refuge  in  Lamia,  where  he  is  blockaded. 

Macedonian  envoys  are  sent  to  Peloponnesus,  to  counteract  the 
efforts  of  the  Athenians.  Demosthenes  opposes  them  success- 
fully' in  Argos,  Corinth,  and  Arcadia. 

Demosthenes  is  recalled  from  exile  by  the  Athenians,  and  a  ship 
sent  to  bring  him  home. 

Leosthenes  is  killed  in  a  sally  from  Lamia.  Antiphilus  succeeds 
him  as  general. 

The  siege  of  Lamia  is  raised  by  the  advance  of  Leonatus,  who  is 
himself  defeated  and  slain ;  but  Antipater  effects  a  junction  with 
his  army,  and  receives  large  reinforcements  from  Macedonia. 
322  The  Athenian  fleet  is  defeated  by  the  Macedonian. 

A  Macedonian  force  lands  at  Marathon  and  ravages  Attica,  but  is 
defeated  by  Phocion. 

d2 


3G  CHRONOLOGICAL   ABSTRACT   OP   EVENTS. 


322  Antipater  attacks  the  Greets  -with  a  greatly  superior  army  at 
Crannon  in  Thessaly,  and  gains  a  doubtful  victory,  -which  be- 
comes decisive  by  the  general  desertion  of  the  allies. 

Antipater  advances  against  Athens,  which  submits,  and  receives  a 
Macedonian  garrison. 

The  Athenians  are  compelled  to  remodel  their  constitution,  and 
adopt  a  property  qualification,  which  disfranchises  a  large  num- 
ber of  citizens. 

Demosthenes  and  Hyperides,  with  other  orators  of  the  war  party, 
are  demanded  by  Antipater.  Demosthenes  flies  first  to  iEgina, 
and  afterwards  to  Calaurea,  where  he  takes  refuge  in  the  temple 
of  Neptune.  Pursued  by  Archias,  the  Macedonian  emissary,  he 
puts  an  eD-i  to  his  life  by  poison. 


THE 

OEATIONS   OE  DEMOSTHENES. 


THE  FIRST  OLYNTHIAC. 


THE    ARGXT1IEXT. 

Olynthus  was  a  city  in  Macedonia,  at  the  head  of  the  Toronaic  gulf,  and 
north  of  the  peninsula  of  Pallene.  It  was  colonized  by  a  people  from 
Chalcis  in  Euboea,  and  commanded  a  large  district  called  Chalcidice, 
in  which  there  were  thirty-two  cities.  Over  all  this  tract  the  sway  of 
Olynthus  was  considerable,  and  she  had  waged  wars  anciently  with 
Athens  and  Sparta,  and  been  formidable  to  Philip's  predecessors  on 
the  throne  of  Macedon.  Soon  after  Philip's  accession,  the  Olynthians 
had  disputes  with  him,  which  were  at  first  accommodated,  and  he 
gratified  them  by  the  cession  of  Anthemus.  They  then  joined  him 
in  a  war  against  Athens,  and  he  gave  up  to  them  Potidsea,  which 
had  yielded  to  their  united  arms.  After  the  lapse  of  some  years, 
during  which  Philip  had  greatly  increased  his  power,  and  acquired 
considerable  influence  in  Thessaly  and  Thrace,  the  Olynthians 
became  alarmed,  and  began  to  think  him  too  dangerous  a  neighbour. 
The  immediate  cause  of  rupture  was  an  attack  which  he  made  on  one 
of  the  Chalcidian  towns.  An  embassy  was  instantly  sent  to  Athens, 
to  negotiate  an  alliance.  Philip,  considering  this  as  an  infraction  of 
their  treaty  with  him,  declared  war  against  them,  and  invaded  their 
territory.  A  second  embassy  was  sent  to  Athens,  pressing  for  assist- 
ance. The  question  was  debated  in  the  popular  assembly.  Demades, 
an  orator  of  considerable  ability,  but  profligate  character,  opposed  the 
alliance.  Many  speakers  were  heard ;  and  at  length  Demosthenes 
rose  to  support  the  prayer  of  the  embassy,  delivering  one  of  those 
clear  and  forcible  speeches,  which  seldom  failed  to  make  a  strong  im- 
pression on  his  audience.  The  alliance  was  accepted,  and  succours 
voted. 

The  orator  here  delicately  touches  on  the  law  of  Eubulus,  which  had 
made  it  capital  to  propose  that  the  Theoiic  fund  should  be  applied  to 
military  service.  This  fund  was  in  fact  the  surplus  revenue  of  the 
civil  administration,  which  by  the  ancient  law  was  appropriated  to 
the  defence  of  the  commonwealth  :  but  it  had  by  various  means  been 
diverted  from  that  purpose,  and  expended  in  largesses  to  the  people, 


38  THE    ORATIONS   OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

to  enable  them  to  attend  the  theatre,  and  other  public  shows  and 
amusements.  The  law  of  Eubulus  perpetuated  this  abuse.  (See  my 
article  Theorica  in  the  Archreological  Dictionary.)  Demosthenes 
seeing  the  necessity  of  a  war  supply,  hints  that  this  absurd  law  ought 
to  be  abolished,  but  does  not  openly  propose  it. 
There  has  been  much  difference  of  opinion  among  the  learned  as  to  the 
order  of  the  three  Olynthiac  orations ;  nor  is  it  certain,  whether  they 
were  spoken  on  the  occasion  of  one  embassy,  or  several  embassies.  The 
curious  may  consult  Bishop  Thirlwall's  Appendix  to  the  fifth  volume 
of  his  Grecian  History,  and  Jacobs'  Introduction  to  his  translation. 
1  have  followed  the  common  order,  as  adopted  by  Bekker,  whose  edi- 
tion of  Demosthenes  is  the  text  of  this  translation ;  and  indeed  my 
opinion  is,  on  the  whole,  in  favour  of  preserving  the  common  order, 
though  the  plan  of  this  work  prevents  my  entering  into  controversy 
on  the  question.  To  enable  the  reader  more  fully  to  understand  the 
following  orations,  I  have  in  an  Appendix  to  this  volume  given  a  brief 
account  of  Olynthus,  showing  its  position  with  reference  to  Mace- 
donia, and  the  importance  of  its  acquisition  to  Philip.  The  historical 
abstract  prefixed  to  this  volume  is  intended  chiefly  to  assist  the 
reader  in  reference  to  dates.  Such  occurrences  only  are  noticed  as 
may  be  useful  to  illustrate  Demosthenes. 

I  believe,  men  of  Athens,  you  would  give  much  to  know, 
what  is  the  true  policy  to  be  adopted  in  the  present  matter 
of  inquiry.  This  being  the  case,  you  should  be  willing  to 
hear  with  attention  those  who  offer  you  their  counsel.  Be- 
sides that  you  will  have  the  benefit  of  all  preconsidered  advice, 
I  esteem  it  part  of  your  good  fortune,  that  many  fit  sugges- 
tions will  occur  to  some  speakers  at  the  moment,  so  that  from 
them  all  you  may  easily  choose  what  is  profitable. 

The  present  juncture,  Athenians,  all  but  proclaims  aloud, 
that  yon  must  yourselves  take  these  affairs  in  hand,  if  you 
care  for  their  success.  I  know  not  how  we  seem  disposed  in 
the  matter.1  My  own  opinion  is,  vote  succour  immediately, 
and  make  the  speediest  preparations  for  sending  it  off  from 
Athens,  that  you  may  not  incur  the  same  mishap  as  before; 
send  also  ambassadors,  to  announce  this,  and  watch  the  pro- 
ceedings. For  the  danger  is,  that  this  man,  being  unscru- 
pulous and  clever  at  turning  events  to  account,  making 
concessions  when  it  suits  him,  threatening  at  other  times, 
(his  threats  may  well  be  believed,)  slandering  us  and  urging 
our  absence  against  us,  may  convert  and  wrest  to  his  use  some 

1  This  is  a  cautious  way  of  hinting  at  the  general  reluctance  to  adopt 
a  vigorous  policy.  And  the  reader  will  observe  the  use  of  the  first  per- 
son, whereby  the  orator  includes  himself  in  the  same  insinuation. 


THE    FIRST    OLYNTHIAC.  Ij'3 

of  our  main  resources.  Though,  strange  to  say,  Athenians,  the 
very  cause  of  Philip's  strength  is  a  circumstance  favourable  to 
you.1  His  having  it  in  his  sole  power  to  publish  or  conceal 
his  designs,  his  -being  at  the  same  time  general,  sovereign, 
paymaster,  and  everywhere  accompanying  his  army,  is  a  great 
advantage  for  quick  and  timely  operations  in  war ;  but,  for  a 
peace  with  the  Olynthians,  which  he  would  gladly  make,  it 
has  a  contrary  effect.  For  it  is  plain  to  the  Olynthians,  that 
now  they  are  fighting,  not  for  glory  or  a  slice  of  territory,  but 
to  save  their  country  from  destruction  and  servitude.  They 
know  how  he  treated  those  Amphipolitans  who  surrendered 
to  him  their  city,  and  those  Pydneans  who  gave  him  admit- 
tance.2 And  generally,  I  believe,  a  despotic  power  is  mis- 
trusted by  free  states,  especially  if  their  dominions  are 
adjoining.  All  this  being  known  to  you,  Athenians,  all  else 
of  importance  considered,  I  say,  you  must  take  heart  and 
spirit,  and  apply  yourselves  more  than  ever  to  the  war,  con- 
tributing promptly,  serving  personally,  leaving  nothing  un- 
done. No  plea  or  pretence  is  left  you  for  declining  your 
duty.  What  you  were  all  so  clamorous  about,  that  the 
Olynthians  should  be  pressed  into  a  war  with  Philip,  has  of 
itself  come  to  pass,3  and  in  a  way  most  advantageous  to  you. 
For,  had  they  undertaken  the  war  at  your  instance,  they 

1  After  alarming  the  people  by  showing  the  strength  of  their  adver- 
sary, he  turns  off  skilfully  to  a  topic  of  encouragement 

2  Amphipolis  was  a  city  at  the  head  of  the  Strymonic  gulf,  in  that 
part  of  Macedonia  which  approaches  western  Thrace.  It  had  been  built 
formerly  by  an  Athenian  colony,  and  was  taken  by  the  Spartan  general 
Brasidas  in  the  Peloponnesian  war.  Ever  since  Athens  regained  her 
character  of  an  imperial  state,  she  had  desired  to  recover  Amphipolis, 
which  was  important  for  its  maritime  position,  its  exportation  of  iron, 
and  especially  from  the  vicinity  of  the  forests  near  the  Strymon,  which 
afforded  an  inexhaustible  supply  of  ship-timber.  But  she  had  never 
been  able  to  accomplish  that  object.  Philip,  who  at  that  time  possessed 
no  maritime  town  of  importance,  was  for  obvious  reasons  anxious  to  win 
Amphipolis  for  himself ;  and  he  got  possession  of  it  partly  by  force  of 
arms,  partly  by  the  treachery  of  certain  Amphipolitans  who  were 
attached  to  his  interest.  It  seems  the  Athenians  had  been  amused  by  a 
promise  of  Philip  to  give  up  the  town  to  them.  The  non-performance 
of  this  compact  led  to  their  first  long  war  with  him.  Immediately  after 
ihe  capture  of  Amphipolis,  Philip  marched  against  Pydna,  and  was  ad« 
mitted  into  the  town. 

3  Compare  Virgil,  j£n.  ix.  6. 

Turne,  quod  opt-anti  Divum  promittere  nemo 
Auderet,  volvenda  dies  en  attulit  ultra 


40  THE    ORATIOXS    OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

might  have  been  slippery  allies,  with  minds  but  half  resolved 
perhaps  :  but  since  they  hate  him  on  a  quarrel  of  their  own. 
their  enmitv  is  like  to  endure  on  account  of  their  fears  an  J 
their  "wrongs.  You  must  not  then.  Athenians,  forego  this 
luckv  opportunity,  nor  commit  the  error  which  you  have 
often  done  heretofore.  For  example,  when  we  returned  from 
succouring  the  Eubceans.  and  Hierax  and  Strategies  of  Am- 
phipolis  came  to  this  platform,1  urging  us  to  sail  and  receive 
possession  of  their  city,  if  we  had  shown  the  same  zeal  for 
ourselves  as  for  the  safety  of  Euboea,  you  would  have  held 
Amphipohs  then  and  been  rid  of  all  the  troubles  that  en- 
sued. Again,  when  news  came  that  Pydna,2  Potideea,  Me- 
thone.  Pagasa?.  and  the  other  places  (not  to  waste  time  in 
enumerating  them)  were  besieged,  had  we  to  any  one  of  these 
in  the  first  instance  earned  prompt  and  reasonable  succour, 
ve  should  have  found  Philip  far  more  tractable  and  humble 
now.  But,  by  always  neglecting  the  present,  and  imagin- 
ing the  future  would  shift  for  itself,  we,  0  men  of  Athens, 
have  exalted  Philip,  and  made  him  greater  than  any  king 
of  Maoedon  ever  was.  Here  then  is  come  a  crisis,  this 
of  Olvnthus.  self-offered  to  the  state,  inferior  to  none  of  the 
former.  And  methinks,  men  of  Athens,  any  man  fairly  esti- 
mating what  the  gods  have  done  for  us,  notwithstanding 
manv  untoward  circumstances,  might  with  reason  be  grateful 
to  them.  Our  numerous  losses  in  war  may  justly  be  charged 
to  our  own  negligence  ;  but  that  they  happened  not  long  ago, 
and  that  an  alhance,  to  counterbalance  them,  is  open  to  our 
acceptance.  I  must  regard  as  manifestations  of  divine  favour. 
It  is  much  the  same  as  in  money  matters.  If  a  man  keep 
what  he  gets,  he  is  thankful  to  fortune  ;  if  he  lose  it  by  ini- 

1  The  hustings  from  which  the  speakers  addressed  the  people.  It  was 
cut  to  the  height  of  ten  feet  out  of  the  rock  -which  formed  the  boundary 
wall  of  the  assembly ;  and  was  ascended  by  a  flight  of  steps. 

2  Potidaea  was  in  the  peninsula  of  Pallene,  near  Olynthus,  and  was 
therefore  given  by  Philip  to  the  Olynthians,  as  mentioned  in  the  argu- 
ment. Methoneand  Pydna  are  on  the  Macedonian  coast  approaching 
Thessalv.  Paeasse  is  a  Thessalian  town  in  the  Magnesian  district.  It 
was  the  seaport  of  Phene,  capital  of  the  tyrant  Lycophron,  against 
whom  Philip  was  invited  to  assist  the  Thessalians.  Philip  overcame 
Lvcophron,  and  restored  republican  government  at  Phene;  but  Pagasse 
he  ganisoned  himself,  and  also  Magnesia,  a  coast-town  in  the  same 
district. 


THE    FIRST    OLYXTHTAC.  41 

prudence,  he  loses  withal  his  memory  of  the  obligation.  So 
in  political  affairs,  they  who  misuse  their  opportunities  ft  r-ret 
even  the  good  which  the  gods  send  them ;  for  every  prior 
event  is  judged  commonly  by  the  last  result.  Wherefore, 
Athenians,  we  must  be  exceedingly  careful  of  our  future 
measures,  that  by  amendment  therein  we  may  efface  the 
shame  of  the  past.  Should  we  abandon  these  men1  too,  and 
Philip  reduce  Olynthus.  let  any  one  tell  me,  what  is  to  pre- 
vent him  marching  where  he  pleases  ?  Does  any  one  of  you, 
Athenians,  compute  or  consider  the  means,  by  which  Philip, 
originally  weak,  has  become  great  ?  Having  first  taken  Aru- 
phipolis,  then  Pydna.  Potidaea  next,  Methone  afterwards,  he 
invaded  Thessaly.  Having  ordered  matters  at  Phera?.  Pag 
Magnesia,  everywhere  exactly  as  he  pleased,  he  departed  for 
Thrace  :  where,  after  displacing  some  kings  and  establishing 
others,  he  fell  sick  :  again  recovering,  he  lapsed  not  into  indo- 
lence, but  instantly  attacked  the  Olynthians.  I  omit  his 
expeditions  to  Hlyria  and  Paeonia,  that  against  Arymbas/  and 
some  others. 

Why.  it  may  be  said,  do  you  mention  all  this  now  ?  That 
you,  Athenians,  may  feel  and  understand  both  the  folly  of  con- 
tinually abandoning  one  thing  after  another,  and  the  activity 
which  forms  part  of  Philip's  habit  and  existence,  which  makes 
it  impossible  for  him  to  rest  content  with  his  achievements, 
If  it  be  bis  principle,  ever  to  do  more  than  he  has  done,  and 
yours,  to  apply  yourselves  vigorously  to  nothing,  see  what 
the  end  promises  to  be.  Heavens  !  which  of  you  is  so  simple 
as  not  to  know,  that  the  war  yonder  will  soon  be  here,  if  we 
are  careless  ?  And  should  this  happen.  I  fear.  0  Athenians, 
that  as  men  who  thoughtlessly  borrow  on  large  interest,  after 
a  brief  accommodation,  lose  their  estate,  so  will  it  be  with  us; 
found  to  have  paid  dear  fur  our  idleness  and  seh-indulgence, 
we  shall  be  reduced  to  many  hard  and  unpleasant  shifts,  and 
struggle  for  the  salvation  of  our  country. 

To  censure,  I  may  be  told,  is  easy  for  any  man  :  to  show 
what  measures  the  case  requires,  is  the  part  of  a  counsellor. 
I  am  not  ignorant.  Athenians,  that  frequently,  when  any  dis- 
appointment happens,  you  are  angry,  not  with  the  parties  in 

1  Here  lie  points  to  the  Olynthian  ambassadors. 
*  Arymbas  was  a  king  of  the  Molossians  in  Epirtis,  and  nncle  cf 
Olympias,  Philip's  *ife. 


42  THE    ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

fault,  but  with  the  last  speakers  on  the  subject ;  yet  never, 
•with  a  view  to  self-protection,  would  I  suppress  what  I  deem 
for  your  interest.  I  say  then,  you  must  give  a  two-fold  assist- 
ance here  ;  first,  save  the  Olynthians  their  towns,1  and  send 
out  troops  for  that  purpose;  secondly,  annoy  the  enemy's 
country  with  ships  and  other  troops ;  omit  either  of  these 
courses,  and  I  doubt  the  expedition  will  be  fruitless.  For 
should  he,  suffering  your  incursion,  reduce  Olynthus,  he  will 
easily  march  to  the  defence  of  his  kingdom ;  or,  should  you 
only  throw  succour  into  Olynthus,  and  he,  seeing  things  out 
of  danger  at  home,  keep  up  a  close  and  vigilant  blockade,  he 
must  in  time  prevail  over  the  besieged.  Yoxu-  assistance 
therefore  must  be  effective,  and  two-fold. 

Such  are  the  operations  I  advise.  As  to  a  supply  of  money : 
you  have  money,  Athenians ;  you  have  a  larger  military 
fund  than  any  people  ;  and  you  receive  it  just  as  you  please. 
If  ye  will  assign  this  to  your  troops,  ye  need  no  further  sup- 
ply ;  otherwise  ye  need  a  further,  or  rather  ye  have  none  at 
all.  How  then  ?  some  man  may  exclaim  :  do  you  move 
that  this  be  a  military  fund  ?  Verily,  not  I.2  My  opinion 
indeed  is,  that  there  should  be  soldiers  raised,  and  a  military 
fund,  and  one  and  the  same  regulation  for  receiving  and  per- 
forming what  is  due;  only  you  just  without  trouble  tak6 
your  allowance  for  the  festivals.  It  remains  then,  I  imagine, 
that  all  must  contribute,  if  much  be  wanted,  much,  if  little, 
little.  Money  must  be  had ;  without  it  nothing  proper  can 
be  done.  Other  persons  propose  other  ways  and  means. 
Choose  which  ye  think  expedient;  and  put  hands  to  the 
work,  while  it  is  yet  time. 

It  may  be  well  to  consider  and  calculate  how  Philip's 

1  The  Chalcidian  towns.  See  the  Argument.  Philip  commenced  his 
aggressions  upon  the  Olynthians  by  reducing  several  of  these. 

2  There  is  some  studied  obscurity  in  this  passage,  owing  to  the  neces- 
sity under  which  the  speaker  lay  of  avoiding  the  penalty  of  the  law ; 
and  a  little  quiet  satire  on  his  countrymen,  who  seemed  desirous  of 
eating  their  pudding  and  having  it  too.  The  logic  of  the  argument 
runs  thus — My  opinion  is,  that  we  ought  to  have  a  military  fund,  and 
that  no  man  should  receive  public  money,  without  performing  public 
service.  However,  as  you  prefer  taking  the  public  money  to  pay  for 
your  places  at  the  festivals,  I  will  not  break  the  law  by  moving  to  apply 
that  money  to  another  purpose.  Only  you  gain  nothing  by  it ;  for,  as 
the  troops  must  be  paid,  there  must  be  an  extraordinary  contribution, 
or  property  tax,  to  meet  the  exigency  of  the  case. 


THE    FIRST    OLYNTHIAC.  43 

affairs  now  stand.  They  are  not,  as  they  appear,  or  as  an 
inattentive  observer  might  pronounce,  in  very  good  trim, 
or  in  the  most  favourable  position.  He  would  never  have 
commenced  this  war,  had  he  imagined  he  must  fight.  He 
expected  to  cany  everything  on  the  first  advance,  and  has 
been  mistaken.  This  disappointment  is  one  thing  that  trou- 
bles and  dispirits  him ;  another  is,  the  state  of  Thessaly.1 
That  people  were  always,  you  know,  treacherous  to  all  men ; 
and  just  as  they  ever  have  been,  they  are  to  Philip.  They 
have  resolved  to  demand  the  restitution  of  Pagasse,  and  have 
prevented  his  fortifying  Magnesia;  and  I  was  told,  they 
would  no  longer  allow  him  to  take  the  revenue  of  their  har- 
bours and  markets,  which  they  say  should  be  applied  to  the 
public  business  of  Thessaly,  not  received  by  Philip.  Now,  if 
he  be  deprived  of  this  fund,  his  means  will  be  much  straitened 
for  paying  his  mercenaries.  And  surely  we  must  suppose, 
that  Pseonians  and  Illyrians,  and  all  such  people,  would  rather 
be  free  and  independent  than  under  subjection  ;  for  they  are 
unused  to  obedience,  and  the  man  is  a  tyrant.  So  report 
says,  and  I  can  well  believe  it ;  for  undeserved  success  leads 
weak-minded  men  into  folly ;  and  thus  it  appears  often,  that 
to  maintain  prosperity  is  harder  than  to  acquire  it.  There- 
fore must  you,  Athenians,  looking  on  his  difficulty  as  your 
opportunity,  assist  cheerfully  in  the  war,  sending  embassies 
where  required,  taking  arms  yourselves,  exciting  all  other 

1  Philip's  influence  in  Thessaly  was  of  material  assistance  to  him  in 
his  ambitious  projects.  It  was  a-cquired  in  this  way.  The  power  esta- 
blished by  Jason  of  Pheraa,  who  raised  himself  to  a  sort  of  royal  autho- 
rity under  the  title  of  Tagus,  had  devolved  upon  Lycophron.  His  sway 
extended  more  or  less  over  the  whole  of  Thessaly ;  but  was,  if  not 
generally  unpopular,  at  least  unacceptable  to  the  great  families  in  the 
northern  towns,  among  whom  the  Aleuadee  of  Larissa  held  a  prominent 
place.  They  invoked  Philip's  aid,  while  Lycophron  was  assisted  by  the 
Phocian  Onomarchus.  After  various  success,  Onomarchus  was  defeated 
and  slain,  and  Lycophron  expelled  from  Pheraa.  This  established 
Philip's  influence,  and  led  to  his  being  afterwards  called  in  to  termi- 
nate the  Sacred  war.  How  far  the  assertions  of  Demosthenes,  respecting 
the  discontent  of  the  Thessalians,  are  true,  cannot  exactly  be  told. 
They  are  confirmed,  however,  in  some  degree  by  the  fact,  that  at  the 
close  of  the  Sacred  war  Philip  restored  to  them  Magnesia.  A  new 
attempt  by  the  regnant  family  caused  Philip  again  to  be  invited,  and 
Thessaly  became  virtually  a  province  of  Macedonia.  Among  other 
advantages  therefrom  was  the  aid  of  a  numerous  cavalry,  for  which 
Thessaly  was  famous. 


44  THE    ORATIONS    OP   DEMOSTHENES. 

people;  for  if  Philip  got  such  an  opportunity  against  us.  and 
there  was  a  war  on  our  frontier,  how  eagerly  think  ye  he 
would  attack  you  !  Then  are  you  not  ashamed,  that  the 
very  damage  which  you  would  suffer,  if  he  had  the  power, 
you  dare  not  seize  the  moment  to  inflict  on  him  ? 

And  let  not  this  escape  you.  Athenians,  that  you  have  now 
the  choice,  whether  you  shall  fight  there,  or  he  in  your  coun- 
try. If  Olynthus  hold  out,  you  will  fight  there  and  distress 
his  dominions,  enjoying  your  own  home  in  peace.  If  Philip 
take  that  city,  who  shall  then  prevent  his  marching  here  ? 
Thebans  1  I  wish  it  be  not  too  harsh  to  say,  they  will  be 
ready  to  join  in  the  invasion.  Phocians  ?  who  cannot  defend 
their  own  country  without  your  assistance.  Or  some  other 
ally  1  But,  good  sir,  he  will  not  desire  !  Strange  indeed,  if, 
what  he  is  thought  fool-hardy  for  prating  now,  this  he  would 
not  accomplish  if  he  might.  As  to  the  vast  difference  be- 
tween a  war  here  or  there,  I  fancy  there  needs  no  argument. 
If  you  were  obliged  to  be  out  yourselves  for  thirty  days  only, 
and  take  the  necessaries  for  camp-service  from  the  land,  (I 
mean,  without  an  enemy  therein.)  your  agricultural  popu- 
lation would  sustain,  I  believe,  greater  damage  than  what 
the  whole  expense  of  the  late  war '  amounted  to.  But  if  a 
war  should  come,  what  damage  must  be  expected?  There  is 
the  insult  too.  and  the  disgrace  of  the  thing,  worse  than  any 
damage  to  right-thinking  men. 

On  all  these  accounts,  then,  we  must  unite  to  lend  our 
succour,  and  drive  off  the  war  yonder  ;  the  rich,  that,  spend- 
ing a  little  for  the  abundance  which  they  happily  possess, 
they  may  enjoy  the  residue  in  security;  the  young.2  that 
gaining  military  experience  in  Philip's  territory,  they  may 
become  redoubtable  champions  to  preserve  their  own;  the 

1  The  Amphipolitan  war,  said  to  have  cost  fifteen  hundred  talents. 

2  Strictly,  those  of  the  military  age,  which  was  from  eighteen  years 
to  sixty.  Youths  between  eighteen  and  twenty  were  liable  only  to  serve 
in  Attica,  and  were  chiefly  employed  to  garrison  the  walls.  Afterwards 
they  were  compellable  to  perform  any  military  service,  under  the 
penalty  of  losing  their  privileges  as  citizens.  The  expression  in  the 
text,  it  will  be  seen,  is  not  rendered  with  full  accuracy ;  as  those  of  the 
military  age  can  only  be  called  young  by  comparison.  But  a  short  and 
apt  antithesis  was  needed.  Sometimes  I  have  "the  serviceable,"  or 
"  the  able-bodied."  Jacobs :  die  waffenfahigen  Junglinge,  and  else- 
where, die  fiilsligz. 


THE    SECOND    OLTXTHIAC.  45 

orators,  that  they  may  pass  a  good  account l  of  their  states- 
manship; for  on  the  result  of  measures  mil  depend  your 
judgment  of  their  conduct.  May  it  for  every  cause  be 
prosperous. 


THE  SECOND  OLYXTHIAC. 


THE    ARGUMENT. 


The  Athenians  had  voted  an  alliance  with  the  Olynthians,  and  resolved 
to  send  sueeours.  But  the  sending  of  them  was  delayed,  partly  by 
the  contrivance  of  the  opposite  faction,  partly  from  the  reluctance  of 
the  people  themselves  to  engage  in  a  war  with  Philip.  Demosthenes 
stimulates  them  to  exertion,  and  encourages  them,  by  showing  that 
Philip's  power  is  not  so  great  as  it  appears. 

Ox  many  occasions,  men  of  Athens,  one  may  see  the  kind- 
ness of  the  gods  to  this  country  manifested,  but  most  sig- 
nally, I  think,  on  the  present.  That  here  are  men  prepared 
for  a  war  with  Philip,  possessed  of  a  neighbouring  territory 
and  some  power,  and  (what  is  most  important)  so  fixed  in 
their  hostility,  as  to  regard  any  accommodation  with  him  as 
insecure,  and  even  ruinous  to  their  country;  this  really 
appears  like  an  extraordinary  act  of  divine  beneficence.  It 
must  then  be  our  care,  Athenians,  that  we  are  not  more 
unkind  to  ourselves  than  circumstances  have  been;  as  it 
would  be  a  foul,  a  most  foul  reproach,  to  have  abandoned 
not  only  cities  and  places  that  once  belonged  to  us,  but  also 
the  allies  and  advantages  provided  by  fortune. 

To  dilate,  Athenians,  on  Philip's  power,  and  by  such  dis- 
course to  incite  you  to  your  duty,  I  think  improper  :  and 
why  ?  Because  all  that  may  be  said  on  that  score  involves 
matter  of  glory  for  him,  and  misconduct  on  our  part.  The 
more  he  has  transcended  his  repute,2  the  more  is  he  uni- 
versally admired;  you,  as  you  have  used  your  advantages 

1  Every  man,  who  is  required  to  justify  the  acts  for  which  he  is  re- 
sponsible, may  be  said  to  be  "  called  to  account."  But  Demosthenes 
epeaks  with  peculiar  reference  to  those  accounts,  which  men  in  i  fficial 
situations  at  Athens  were  required  to  render  at  the  close  of  theii 
administration. 

2  Jacobs  otherwise :  uber  sein  Yerdienst  gdungen. 


46  THE    ORATIONS   OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

unworthily,  have  incurred  the  greater  disgrace.  This  topic, 
then,  I  shall  pass  over.  Indeed,  Athenians,  a  correct  observer 
•will  find  the  source  of  his  greatness  here,1  and  not  in  himself. 
But  of  measures,  for  which  Philip's  partisans  deserve  his 
gratitude  and  your  vengeance,  I  see  no  occasion  to  speak 
now.  Other  things  are  open  to  me,  which  it  concerns  you 
all  to  know,  and  which  must,  on  a  due  examination,  Athe- 
nians, reflect  great  disgrace  on  Philip.  To  these  will  I 
address  myself. 

To  call  him  perjured  and  treacherous,  without  showing 
what  he  has  done,  might  justly  be  termed  idle  abuse.  But 
to  go  through  all  his  actions  and  convict  him  in  detail,  will 
take,  as  it  happens,  but  a  short  time,  and  is  expedient,  I 
think,  for  two  reasons  :  first,  that  his  baseness  may  appear 
in  its  true  light ;  secondly,  that  they,  whose  terror  imagines 
Philip  to  be  invincible,  may  see  he  has  run  through  all  the 
artifices  by  which  he  rose  to  greatness,  and  his  career  is  just 
come  to  an  end.  I  myself,  men  of  Athens,  should  most 
assuredly  have  regarded  Philip  as  an  object  of  fear  and 
admiration,  had  I  seen  him  exalted  by  honom-able  conduct ; 
but  observing  and  considering  I  find,  that  in  the  beginning, 
when  certain  persons  drove  away  the  Olynthians  who  desired 
a  conference  with  us,  he  gained  over  our  simplicity  by  en- 
gaging to  surrender  Amphipolis,  and  to  execute  the  secret 
article2  once  so  famous;  afterwards  he  got  the  friendship  of 
the  Olynthians,  by  taking  Potidsea  from  you,  wronging  you 
his  former  allies,  and  delivering  it  to  them ;  and  lastly  now 
the  Thessalians,  by  promising  to  surrender  Magnesia,  and 
undertake  the  Phocian  war  on  then  behalf.  In  short,  none 
who  have  dealt  with  him  has  he  not  deceived.  He  has  risen 
by  conciliating  and  cajoling  the  weakness  of  every  people  in 
turn  who  knew  him  not.     As,  therefore,  by  such  means  he 

1  In  this  assembly,  by  the  contrivance  of  venal  orators,  or  through 
the  supineness  of  the  people.  In  the  first  Philippic  there  is  a  more 
pointed  allusion  to  the  practices  of  Philip's  adherents,  who  are  charged 
with  sending  him  secret  intelligence  of  what  passed  at  home.  Such  men 
as  Aristodemus,  Neoptolemus,  perhaps  Demadesand  others  are  referred 
to.    jEschines  had  not  yet  begun  to  be  a  friend  of  Philip. 

2  A  secret  intrigue  was  carried  on  between  Philip  and  the  Athenians, 
by  which  he  engaged  to  put  Amphipolis  in  their  hands,  but  on  the  un- 
derstanding that  they  would  deliver  up  Pydna  to  him.  Demosthenes 
only  mentions  the  former  part  of  the  arrangement,  the  latter  not  being 
honourable  to  his  countrymen. 


THE   SECOND    OLYNTHIAC.  47 

rose,  when  every  people  imagined  he  would  advance  their 
interest,  so  ought  he  by  the  same  means  to  be  pulled  down 
again,  when  the  selfish  aim  of  his  whole  policy  is  exposed. 
To  this  crisis,  0  Athenians,  are  Philip's  affairs  come;  or  let 
any  man  stand  forward  and  prove  to  me,  or  rather  to  you, 
that  my  assertions  are  false,  or  that  men  whom  Philip  has 
once  overreached  will  trust  him  hereafter,  or  that  the  Thes- 
salians  who  have  been  degraded  into  servitude  would  not 
gladly  become  free. 

But  if  any  among  you,  though  agreeing  in  these  state- 
ments, thinks  that  Philip  will  maintain  his  power  by  having 
occupied  forts  and  havens  and  the  like,  this  is  a  mistake. 
True,  when  a  confederacy  subsists  by  good-will,  and  all  parties 
to  the  war  have  a  common  interest,  men  are  willing  to  co- 
operate and  bear  hardships  and  persevere.  But  when  one 
has  grown  strong,  like  Philip,  by  rapacity  and  artifice,  on  the 
first  pretext,  the  slightest  reverse,  all  is  overturned  and 
broken  up.1  Impossible  is  it, — impossible,  Athenians, — to 
acquire  a  solid  power  by  injustice  and  perjury  and  falsehood. 
Such  things  last  for  once,  or  for  a  short  period ;  maybe,  they 
blossom  fairly  with  hope;2  but  in  time  they  are  discovered 
and  drop  away.3  As  a  house,  a  ship,  or  the  like,  ought  to 
have  the  lower  parts  firmest,  so  in  human  conduct,  I  ween,  the 
principle  and  foundat'">u  shoidd  be  just  and  true.  But  this 
is  not  so  in  Philip's  conduct. 

I  say,  then,  we  should  at  once  aid  the  Olynthians,  (the 
best  and  quickest  way  that  can  be  suggested  will,  please  me 

1  The  original  rii'*xc"'T'<re  is  "  shakes  off,"  or  "  throws  off,"  as  a  horse 
does  his  rider,  when  he  rears  and  tosses  up  his  neck.  It  will  be  observed 
that  Demosthenes  is  very  high-flown  in  his  language  here,  passing  from 
one  metaphor  to  another.  Leland  translates  these  words,  "  overthrows 
him,  and  all  his  greatness  is  dashed  at  once  to  the  ground."  Francis  : 
"  hath  already  shaken  off  the  yoke  and  dissolved  their  alliance. " 
Wilson :  "  turneth  all  things  upside  down  and  layeth  it  flat  in  the  end." 
Anger,  better:  suffisent  pour  Vebranler  et  la  dissoudre.  Jacobs  :  reicht 
Alles  umzustilrzen  und  aufzidbsen.     Pabst,  very  nearly  the  same. 

2  So  in  Henry  VII L  Act.  iii.  Sc.  2. 

Such  is  the  state  of  man  :  to-day  he  puts  forth 
The  tender  leaves  of  hope,  to-morrow  blossoms, 
And  wears  his  blushing  honours  thick  upon  him. 

3  Like  the  leaves  of  a  flower ;  pursuing  the  last  metaphor.  So  saya 
Moore,  in  The  Last  Rose  of  Summer :  "  the  gems  drop  away."  Jacobs : 
fallt  sii  von  selbst  zusammen.     Pabst :  sturzt  in  sich  selbst  zusammen. 


48  THE    ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHENTS. 

most,)  and  send  an  embassy  to  the  Thessalians,  to  inform 
some  of  our  measures,  and  to  stir  up  the  rest ;  for  they  have 
now  resolved  to  demand  Pagasa>,  and  remonstrate  about 
Magnesia.  But  look  to  this,  Athenians,  that  our  envoys 
shall  not  only  make  speeches,  but  have  some  real  proof 
that  we  have  gone  forth  as  becomes  our  country,  and 
are  engaged  in  action.  All  speech  without  action  appears 
vain  and  idle,  but  especially  that  of  our  commonwealth ;  as 
the  more  we  are  thought  to  excel  therein,  the  more  is  our 
speaking  distrusted  by  all  You  must  show  yourselves 
greatly  reformed,  greatly  changed,  contributing,  serving  per- 
sonally, acting  promptly,  before  any  one  will  pay  attention 
to  you.  And  if  ye  will  perform  these  duties  properly  and 
becomingly,  Athenians,  not  only  will  it  appear  that  Philip's 
alliances  are  weak  and  precarious,  but  the  poor  state  of  his 
native  empire  and  power  will  be  revealed. 

To  speak  roundly,  the  Macedonian  power  and  empire  is 
very  well  as  a  help,  as  it  was  for  you  in  Timotheus'  time 
against  the  Olynthians;  likewise  for  them  against  Potidaea 
the  conjunction  was  important ;  and  lately  it  aided  the  Thes- 
salians in  their  broils  and  troubles  against  the  regnant 
house :  and  the  accession  of  any  power,  however  small,  is 
undoubtedly  useful.  But  the  Macedonian  is  feeble  of  itself, 
and  full  of  defects.  The  very  operations  which  seem  to  con- 
stitute Philip's  greatness,  his  wars  and  his  expeditions,  have 
made  it  more  insecure  than  it  was  originally.  Think  not, 
Athenians,  that  Philip  and  his  subjects  have  the  same 
likings.  He  desires  glory,  makes  that  his  passion,  is  ready 
for  any  consequence  of  adventure  and  peril,  preferring  to  a 
life  of  safety  the  honour  of  achieving  what  no  Macedonian 
king  ever  did  before.  They  have  no  share  in  the  glorious 
result ;  ever  harassed  by  these  excursions  up  and  down,  they 
suffer  and  toil  incessantly,  allowed  no  leisure  for  their  em- 
ployments or  private  concerns,  unable  even  to  dispose  of 
their  hard  earnings,  the  markets  of  the  country  being  closed 
on  account  of  the  war.  By  this  then  may  easily  be  seen, 
how  the  Macedonians  in  general  are  disposed  to  Philip.  His 
mercenaries  and  guards,  indeed,  have  the  reputation  of  ad- 
mirable and  well-trained  soldiers,  but,  as  I  heard  from  one 
who  had  been  in  the  country,  a  man  incapable  of  falsehood, 
they  are  no  better  than  others.      For  if  there  be  any  among 


THE   SECOXD    OLY>~THIAC.  H 

them  experienced  in  battles  and  campaigns.  Philip  is  jealous 
of  such  men  and  drives  them  away,  he  says,  wishing  to  keep 
the  glory  of  all  actions  to  himself ;  his  jealousy  (among 
other  failings)  being  excessive.  Or  if  any  man  be  generally 
good  and  virtuous,  unable  to  bear  Philip's  daily  intemper- 
ances, drunkenness,  and  indecencies.1  he  is  pushed  aside  and 
accounted  as  nobody.  The  rest  about  him  are  brigands  and 
parasites,  and  men  of  that  character,  who  will  get  drunk  and 
perform  dances  which  I  scruple  to  name  before  you.  My 
information  is  undoubtedly  true:  for  persons  whom  all 
scouted  here  as  worse  rascals  than  mountebanks.  Callias  the 
town-slave  and  the  like  of  him.  antic-jesters.3  and  composers 
of  ribald  songs  to  lampoon  their  companions,  such  persons 
Philip  caresses  and  keeps  about  him.  Small  matters  these 
may  be  thought.  Athenians,  but  to  the  wise  they  are  strong 
indications  of  his  character  and  wrongheadedness.  Success 
perhaps  throws  a  shade  over  them  now;  prosperity  is  a 
famous  hider  of  such  blemishes;  but.  on  any  miscarriage, 
they  will  be  fully  exposed.  And  this  (trust  me,  Athenians) 
will  appear  in  no  long  time,  if  the  gods  so  will  and  you 
determine.  For  as  in  the  human  body,  a  man  in  health 
feels  not  partial  ailments,  but,  when  illness  occurs,  all  are  in 
motion,  whether  it  be  a  rupture  or  a  sprain  or  anything  else 
unsound;  so  with  states  and  monarchs,   whilst  they  wage 

1  The  original  signifies  a  certain  lascivious  dance,  which  formed  a 
part  of  riotous  festivities.  We  gather  from  Instorj;  that  the  orator's 
description  here  is  not  wholly  untrue,  though  exaggerated.  Thirlwall 
thus  writes  of  Philip  :  i-  There  seem  to  have  been  two  features  in  his 
character  which,  in  another  station,  or  under  different  circumstances, 
might  have  gone  near  to  lower  him  to  an  ordinary  person,  but  which 
were  so  controlled  by  his  fortune  as  to  contribute  not  a  little  to  his  suc- 
eeea  He  appears  to  have  been  by  his  temperament  prone  to  almost 
every  kind  of  sensual  pleasure  :  but  as  his  life  was  too  busy  to  allow  him 
often  to  indulge  his  bias,  his  occasional  excesses  wore  the  air  of  an 
amiable  condescension.  So  his  natural  humour  would  perhaps  have  led 
him  too  often  to  forget  his  dignity  in  his  intercourse  with  his  inferiors ; 
but  to  Philip,  the  great  king,  the  conqueror,  the  restless  politician,  these 
intervals  of  relaxation  occurred  so  rarely,  that  they  might  strengthen 
his  influence  with  the  vulgar,  and  could  never  expose  him  to  contempt."' 
It  has  been  observed,  that  Philip's  partiality  foi  drinking  and  dancing, 
his  drollery,  and  a  dash  of  scurrility  in  his  character,  endeared  him 
especially  to  the  Thessalians.     See  Jacobs'  note  on  this  pa?-  - 

*  Kluovs  yrT\nlmi,  players  of  drolls,  mimes,  or  farces.  Our  ancient 
word  droll  signifies,  like  fu/tm,  both  the  actor  and  the  thimi  acted. 

VOL.  I.  I 


50  TI1E    ORATIONS    OP    PEMOSTREXES. 

external  war.  their  weaknesses  are  undiseemed  by  most  men, 
but  the  tug  of  a  frontier  war  betrays  all. 

If  any  of  you  think  Philip  a  formidable  opponent,  because 
they  see  he  is  fortunate,  such  reasoning  is  prudent.  Athenians. 
Fortune  has  indeed  a  great  preponderance — nay.  is  everything, 
in  human  affairs.  Xot  but  that,  if  I  had  the  choice.  I  should 
prefer  our  fortune  to  Philip's,  "would  you  but  moderately  per- 
form your  duty.  For  I  see  you  have  many  more  claims  to 
the  divine  favour  than  he  has.  But  we  sit  doing  nothing; 
and  a  man  idle  himself  cannot  require  even  his  friends  to  act 
for  him,  much  less  the  gods.  Xo  wonder  then  that  he, 
marching  and  toiling  in  person,  present  on  all  occasions, 
neglecting  no  time  or  season,  prevails  over  us  delaying  and 
voting  and  inquiring.  I  marvel  not  at  that ;  the  contrary 
would  have  been  marvellous,  if  we  doing  none  of  the  duties 
of  war  had  beaten  one  doing  all.  But  this  surprises  me.  that 
formerly.  Athenians,  you  resisted  the  Lacedaemonians  for  the 
rights  of  Greece,  and  rejecting  many  opportunities  of  selfish 
gain,  to  secure  the  rights  of  others,  expended  your  property 
in  contributions,  and  bore  the  brunt  of  the  battle ;  yet  now 
you  are  loth  to  serve,  slow  to  contribute,  in  defence  of  your 
own  posst  -  a  db,  and,  though  you  have  often  saved  the  other 
nations  of  Greece  collectively  and  individually,  under  your 
own  losses  you  sit  still.  This  surprises  me,  and  one  thing 
more.  Athenians :  that  not  one  of  you  can  reckon,  how  long 
your  war  with  Philip  has  lasted,  and  what  you  have  been 
d  :n_'  while  the  time  has  passed.  You  surely  know,  that 
while  you  have  been  delaying,  expecting  others  to  act.  ac- 
cusing, trying  one  another,  expecting  again,  doing  much  the 
same  as  ye  do  now.  all  the  time  has  passed  away.  Then  are 
ye  so  senseless,  Athenians,  as  to  imagine,  that  the  same 
measures,  which  have  brought  the  country  from  a  prosperous 
to  a  poor  condition,  will  bring  it  from  a  poor  to  a  prosperous? 
Unreasonable  were  this  and  unnatural :  for  all  things  are 
easier  kept  than  gotten.  The  war  now  has  left  us  nothing 
to  keep ;  we  have  all  to  get.  and  the  work  must  be  done  by 
ourselves.  I  say  then,  you  must  contribute  money,  serve  in 
person  with  alacrity,  accuse  no  one.  till  you  have  gained  your 
objects ;  then,  judging  from  facts,  honour  the  deserving, 
punish  offenders;  let  there  be  no  pretences  or  default  a  on 
your  own  part;  for  yen  cannot  harshly  scrutinize  the  con- 


THE    SECOND    OLTNTHIAC.  51 

duct  of  others,  unless  you  have  done  -what  is  right  yourselves. 
Why,  think  you,  do  all  the  generals l  -whom  you  commission 
avoid  this  war,  and  seek  wars  of  their  cwn  ?  (for  of  the 
generals  too  must  a  little  truth  be  told.)  Because  here  the 
prizes  of  the  war  are  yours;  for  example,  if  Amphipohs  be 
taken,  you  will  immediately  recover  it;  the  commanders 
have  all  the  risk  and  no  reward.  But  in  the  other  case  the 
risks  are  less,  and  the  gains  belong  to  the  commanders  and 
soldiers ;  Lampsacus,"  Sigeum,  the  vessels  which  they  plunder. 
So  they  proceed  to  secure  their  several  interests  :  you,  when 
you  look  at  the  bad  state  of  your  affairs,  bring  the  generals 
to  trial;  but  when  they  get  a  hearing  and  plead  these  neces- 
sities, you  dismiss  them.  The  result  is  that,  while  you  are 
quarrelling  and  divided,  some  holding  one  opinion,  some 
another,  the  commonwealth  goes  wrong.  Formerly,  Athe- 
nians, you  had  boards 3  for  taxes ;  now  you  have  boards  for 

1  A  system  of  employing  mercenary  troops  sprang  up  at  the  close  of 
the  Peloponnesian  war,  when  there  were  numerous  Grecian  bands 
accustomed  to  warfare  and  seeking  employment.  Such  troops  were 
eagerly  sought  for  by  the  Persian  satraps  and  their  king,  by  such  men 
as  Jason  of  Pherte,  Dionysius  of  Syracuse,  or  Philomelus  of  Phocis. 
Athens,  which  had  partially  employed  mercenaries  before,  began  to  make 
use  of  them  on  a  large  scale,  while  her  citizens  preferred  staying  at 
home,  to  attend  to  commerce,  politics,  and  idle  amusements.  The  ill 
effects  however  were  soon  apparent.  Athenian  generals,  ill  supplied 
with  money,  and  having  little  control  over  their  followers,  were  tempted 
or  obliged  to  engage  in  enterprises  unconnected  with,  and  often  adverse 
to,  the  interests  of  their  country.  Sometimes  the  general,  as  well  as  the 
troops,  was  an  alien,  and  could  be  very  little  depended  on.  Such  a 
person  was  Charidemus,  a  native  of  Oreus  in  Euboea,  who  commenced 
his  career  as  captain  of  a  pirate  vessel.  He  was  often  in  the  service  of 
Athens,  but  did  her  more  harm  than  good.  See  my  article  Mercenarii, 
Arch.  Diet. 

2  Chares,  the  Athenian  general,  was  said  to  have  received  these 
Asiatic  cities  from  Artabazus,  the  Persian  satrap,  in  return  for  the 
sen-ice  he  had  performed.  Probably  it  was  some  authority  or  privileges 
in  those  cities,  not  the  actual  dominion,  that  was  conferred  upon  him. 
Sigeum,  which  is  near  the  mouth  of  the  Hellespont,  and  was  a  con- 
venient situation  for  his  adventures,  was  the  ordinary  residence  of 
Chares. 

3  This  refers  to  the  institution  of  the  crvfxixopiai,  or  boards  for  manage- 
ment of  the  property-tax  at  Athens,  as  to  which  see  Appendix  IV.  The 
argument  of  Demosthenes  is  as  follows — The  three  hundred  wealthier 
citizens,  who  were  associated  by  law  for  purposes  of  taxation,  had 
become  a  clique  for  political  purposes,  with  an  orator  at  their  head,  Hie 
intentionallv  uses  the  term  rjyeiiuv.  chairman  of  the  board,)  to  conduct 

e2 


52  THE    ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

politics.  There  is  an  orator  presiding  on  either  side,  a 
general  under  him,  and  three  hundred  men  to  shout;  the 
rest  ot  you  are  attached  to  the  one  party  or  the  other.  This 
you  must  leave  off ;  be  yourselves  again ;  establish  a  general 
liberty  of  speech,  deliberation,  and  action.  If  some  are  ap- 
pointed to  command  as  with  royal  authority,  some  to  be 
ship-captains,  tax-payers,  soldiers  by  compulsion,  others  only 
to  vote  against  them,  and  help  in  nothing  besides,  no  duty 
■will  be  seasonably  performed ;  the  aggrieved  parties  will  still 
fail  you,  and  you  will  have  to  punish  them  instead  of  your 
enemies.  I  say,  in  short;  you  must  all  fairly  contribute, 
according  to  each  man's  ability ;  take  your  turns  of  service 
till  you  have  all  been  afield ;  give  every  speaker  a  hearing, 
and  adopt  the  best  counsel,  not  what  this  or  that  person 
advises.  If  ye  act  thus,  not  only  will  ye  praise  the  speaker 
at  the  moment,  but  yourselves  afterwards,  when  the  condi- 
tion of  the  country  is  improved. 


THE  THIRD  OLYXTHIAC. 

THE    ARGUMENT. 

The  Athenians  had  despatched  succours  to  Olynthus,  and  received,  as 
Libanius  says,  some  favourable  intelligence ;  more  probably,  however, 
some  vague  rumours,  which  led  them  to  imagine  the  danger  was  for 
the  time  averted.  They  began,  very  prematurely,  as  the  result  showed, 
to  be  confident  of  success,  and  talked  of  punishing  Philip  for  his  pre- 
sumption. In  this  they  were  encouraged  by  certain  foolish  orators, 
who  sought  to  flatter  the  national  prejudices.  Demosthenes  in  this 
oration  strives  to  check  the  arrogance  of  the  people ;  reminds  them  of 
the  necessity  of  defensive  rather  than  offensive  measures,  and  espe- 
cially of  the  importance  of  preserving  their  allies.  He  again  adverts 
(and  this  time  more  boldly)  to  the  law  of  Eubulus,  which  he  intimates 
ought  to  be  repealed ;  and  he  exhorts  the  Athenians  generally  to 
make  strenuous  exertions  against  Philip. 

Xot  the  same  ideas,  men  of  Athens,  are  presented  to  me, 
when  I  look  at  our  condition,  and  when  at  the  speeches  which 

the  business  of  the  assembly,  while  they  stood  to  shout  and  applaud  his 
speeches.  The  general,  who  held  a  judicial  court  to  decide  disputes 
about  the  property-tax,  and  who  in  matters  of  state  ought  to  be  inde- 
pendent, was  subservient  to  the  orator,  who  defended  him  in  the 
popular  assembly. 


THE    THIRD    OLTXTHIAC.  53 

are  delivered.  The  speeches,  I  find,  are  about  punishing 
Philip  ;  but  our  condition  is  come  to  this,  that  we  must 
mind  we  are  not  first  damaged  ourselves.  Therefore,  it  seems 
to  me,  these  orators  commit  the  simple  error  of  not  laying 
before  you  the  true  subject  of  debate.  That  once  we  might 
safely  have  held  our  own  and  punished  Philip  too,  I  know 
well  enough ;  both  have  been  possible  in  my  own  time,  not 
veiy  long  ago.  But  now,  I  am  persuaded,  it  is  sufficient  in 
the  first  instance  to  effect  the  preservation  of  our  allies. 
When  this  has  been  secured,  one  may  look  out  for  revenge 
on  Philip  ;  but  before  we  lay  the  foundation  right,  I  deem  it 
idle  to  talk  about  the  end. 

The  present  crisis,  0  Athenians,  requires,  if  any  ever  did, 
much  thought  and  counsel.  Xot  that  I  am  puzzled,  what 
advice  to  give  in  the  matter ;  I  am  only  doubtful,  in  what 
way,  Athenians,  to  address  you  thereupon.  For  I  have  been 
taught  both  by  hearsay  and  experience,  that  most  of  your 
advantages  have  escaped  you,  from  unwillingness  to  do  your 
duty,  not  from  ignorance.  I  request  you,  if  I  speak  my  mind, 
to  be  patient,  and  consider  only,  whether  I  speak  the  truth, 
and  with  a  view  to  future  amendment.  You  see  to  what 
wretched  plight  we  are  reduced  by  some  men  haranguing  for 
popularity. 

I  think  it  necessary,  however,  first  to  recal  to  your  me- 
mory a  few  past  events.  You  remember,  Athenians,  when 
news  came  three  or  four  years  ago,  that  Philip  was  in  Thrace 
besieging  Herasum.1  It  was  then  the  fifth  month,2  and  after 
much  discussion  and  tumidt  in  the  assembly  you  resolved 
to  launch  forty  galleys,  that  every  citizen  under  forty-five 3 
should  embark,  and  a  tax  be  raised  of  sixty  talents.  That 
year  passed  ;  the  first,  second,  third  month  arrived  j  in  that 

1  A  fortress  on  the  Propontis,  (now  Sea  of  Marmora,)  near  Perinthus. 
This  was  a  post  of  importance  to  the  Athenians,  who  received  large 
supplies  of  corn  from  that  district. 

2  Corresponding  nearly  to  our  November.  The  Attic  year  began  in 
July,  and  contained  twelve  lunar  months,  of  alternately  29  and  30  daya 
The  Greeks  attempted  to  make  the  lunar  and  solar  courses  coincide  by 
cyclesofyearSjbutfellintogreatconfusion.  SeeCaleadc  riwm  in  Arch.  Diet. 

* 3  This  large  proportion  of  the  serviceable  citizens,  rQv  iv  rjAtKia, 
shows  the  alarm  at  AtheDS.  Philip's  illness  seems  to  have  put  a  stop 
to  his  progress  in  Thrace  at  this  period.  Immediately  on  his  recovery 
he  began  his  aggression  against  Olynthus.  See  the  Chron  ^logical  Abstract 
prefixed  to  this  volume. 


54  THE    OBATIONB    OF    DEMOSTHEXES. 

month,  reluctantly,  after  the  mysteries,1  you  despatched 
Charidemus  with  the  empty  ships  and  five  talents  in  money ; 
fur  as  Philip  was  reported  to  be  sick  or  dead,  (both  rumours 
came,)  you  thought  there  was  no  longer  any  occasion  for 
succours,  and  discontinued  the  armament.  But  that  was 
the  very  occasion  ;  if  we  bad  then  sent  our  succours  quickly, 
as  we  resolved,  Philip  would  not  bave  been  saved  to  trouble 
us  now. 

Those  events  cannot  be  altered.  But  here  is  the  crisis  of 
another  war,  the  cause  why  I  mentioned  the  past,  tbat  you 
may  not  repeat  your  error.  How  shall  we  deal  with  it,  men 
of  Athens  ?  If  you  lend  not  the  utmost  possible  aid,  see  how 
you  will  have  manoeuvred  everything  for  Philip's  benefit. 
There  were  the  Olynthians,  possessed  of  some  power ;  and 
matters  stood  thus :  Philip  distrusted  them,  and  they  Philip. 
We  negotiated  for  peace  with  them ;  this  hampered  (as  it 
were)  and  annoyed  Philip,  that  a  great  city,  reconciled  to  us, 
should  be  watching  opportunities  against  him.  We  thought 
it  necessary  by  all  means  to  make  that  people  his  enemies  ; 
and  lo,  what  erewhile  you  clamoured  for,  has  somehow  or 
other  been  accomplished.  Then  what  remains,  Athenians,  but 
to  assist  them  vigorously  and  promptly  ?  I  know  not.  For 
besides  the  disgrace  that  would  fall  upon  us,  if  we  sacrificed 
any  of  our  interests,  I  am  alarmed  for  the  consequences,  see- 
ing how  the  Thebans  are  affected  towards  us,  the  Phocian 
treasury  exhausted,  nothing  to  prevent  Philip,  when  he  has 
subdued  what  lies  before  him,  from  turning  to  matters  here. 
"Whoever  postpones  until  then  the  performance  of  his  duty, 
wishes  to  see  the  peril  at  hand,  when  he  may  hear  of  it  else- 
where, and  to  seek  auxiliaries  for  himself,  when  he  may  be 
auxiliary  to  others ;  for  that  this  will  be  the  issue,  if  we 
throw  away  our  present  advantage,  we  all  know  pretty  well. 

But,  it  may  be  said,  we  have  resolved  that  succours  are 
necessary,  and  we  will  send  them  ;  tell  us  only  how.  Marvel 
not  then,  Athenians,  if  I  say  something  to  astonish  the  mul- 
titude.    Appoint   law-revisors  :2    at   then*  session  enact  no 

1  The  Eleusinian  Mysteries,  in  honour  of  Ceres  and  Proserpine,  called 
The  Mysteries  from  their  peculiar  sanctity. 

2  A  provision  was  made  by  Solon  for  a  periodical  revision  of  the 
Athenian  laws  by  means  of  a  legislative  committee,  called  No/xoflercu. 
(See  my  article  NomoOutea,  Arch.  Diet.)   They  were  chosen  by  lot  from 


THE    THIRD    OLY^CTHIAC.  55 

Btaiifees,  for  you  have  enough,  but  repeal  those  which  are  at 
present  injurious  ;  I  mean,  just  plainly,  the  laws  concerning 
our  theatrical  fund,  and  some  concerning  the  troops,  whereof 
the  former  divide  the  military  fund  among  stayers-at-home 
for  theatrical  amusement,  the  latter  indemnify  deserters,  and 
so  dishearten  men  well  inclined  to  the  service.  When  you 
have  repealed  these,  and  made  the  road  to  go 
then  find  a  man  to  propose  what  you  all  know  to  be  desirable. 
But  before  doing  so,  look  not  for  one  who  will  advise  good 
measures  and  be  destroyed  by  you  for  his  pains.  Such  a 
person  you  will  not  find,  especially  as  the  only  result  would 
be,  for  the  adviser  and  mover  to  suffer  wrongfully,  and,  with- 
out forwarding  matters,  to  render  good  counsel  still  more 
dangerous  in  future.  Besides,  Athenians,  you  should  require 
the  same  men  to  repeal  these  laws,  who  have  introduced 
them.  It  is  unjust,  that  then-  authors  should  enjoy  a  popu- 
larity which  has  injured  the  commonwealth,  while  the  ad- 
viser of  salutary  a  suffers  by  a  displeasure  that  mav 
lead  to  general  improvement.  Till  this  is  set  right,  Athenians. 
look  not  that  any  one  should  be  so  powerful  with  you  as  to 
transgres-s  these  laws  with  impunity,  or  so  senseless  as  to 
plunge  into  ruin  right  before  him. 

Another  thing,  too.  you  should  observe,  Athenians,  that  a 
decree  is  worth  nothing,  without  a  readiness  on  your  part  to 
do  what  you  determine.  Could  decrees  of  themselves  compel 
you  to  perform  your  duty,  or  execute  what  they  prescribe, 
neither  would  you  with  many  decrees  have  accomplished 
little  or  nothing,  nor  would  Philip  have  insulted  you  so  long. 
Had  it  depended  on  decrees,  he  would  have  been  chastised 
long  ago.  But  the  course  of  things  is  otherwise.  A 
posterior  in  order  of  time  to  speaking  and  voting,  is  in 
efficacy  prior  and  superior.  This  requisite  you  want ;  the 
others  you  possess.  There  are  among  you,  Athenians,  men 
competent  to  advise  what  is  needful,  and  you  are  exceedingly 
quick  at  understanding  it  :  aye.  and  you  will  be  able  now 

the  judicial  body,  on  a  reference  to  them  by  a  rote  of  the  popular 
assembly.  Demosthenes  says,  ••enact  no  statutes."  instead  of  saying,  '•  let 
the  committee  enact  no  statutes."  This  is  because  the  committee  would 
be  taken  from  the  people  themselves,  and  the  part  are  treated  as  the 
whole.  So  in  speeches  to  juries  we  shall  frequently  observe  that  in 
mentioning  the  decision  of  some  other  jury  he  says,  "you  did  this  or 
that,"  is  it  they  were  the  same  persons. 


CO  THE    0RATI0X3    OF    DEMOSTHEyES, 

to  perform  it,  if  you  act  rightly.  For  what  time  or  season 
"would  you  have  better  than  the  present  1  "When  Trill  you  do 
your  duty,  if  not  now  <  Has  not  the  man  got  possession  of 
all  our  strongholds  ?  And  if  he  become  master  of  this 
country,  shall  we  not  incur  foul  disgrace  !  Are  not  they,  to 
whom  we  promised  sure  protection  in  case  of  war.  at  this 
moment  in  hostilities  ?  Is  he  not  an  enemy,  holding  our 
|  ---ions — a  barbarian1 — anything  you  like  to  call  him? 
But,  0  heavens !  after  permitting,  almost  helping  him  to 
fccomplish  these  things,  shall  we  inquire  who  were  to  blame 
for  them  I  I  know  we  shall  not  take  the  blame  to  ourselves. 
For  so  in  battles,  no  runaway  accuses  himself,  but  his  general, 
his  neighbour,  any  one  rather  ;  though,  sure  enough,  the 
defeat  is  owing  to  all  the  runaways :  for  each  who  accuses 
the  rest  might  have  stood  his  ground,  and  had  each  done  so, 
they  would  have  conquered.  Xow  then,  does  any  man  not 
give  the  best  advice  ?  Let  another  rise  and  give  it,  but  not 
censure  the  last  speaker.  Does  a  second  give  better  advice  ? 
Follow  it,  and  success  attend  you  !  Perhaps  it  is  not  pleasant  : 
but  that  is  not  the  speaker's  fault,  unless  he  omits  some 
needful  prayer.1'  To  pray  is  simple  enough,  Athenians,  col- 
lecting all  that  one  desires  in  a  short  petition :  but  to  decide, 
when  measures  are  the  subject  of  consideration,  is  not  quite 
so  easy  :  for  we  must  choose  the  profitable  rather  than  the 
pleasant,  where  both  are  not  compatible. 

But  if  any  one  can  let  alone  our  theatrical  fund,  and  sug- 
gest other  supplies  for  the  military,  is  he  not  cleverer  \  it 
may  be  asked  I  grant  it.  if  this  were  possible :  but  I  wonder 
if  any  man  ever  was  or  will  be  able,  after  wasting  his  means 
in  useless  expanses,  to  find  means  for  useful.     The  wishes  of 

1  Barbarians  ''among  the  Greek;  _  -  r-ersons  who  were  not  of 
Hellenic  origin.  Alexander,  an  ancestor  of  Philip,  had  obtained  admis- 
sion to  the  Olvmpic  games  by  proving  himself  to  be  of  Argive  descent. 
But  the  Macedonian  people  were  scarcely  considered  as  Greeks  till  a 
much  later  period ;  and  Demosthenes  speaks  rather  with  reference  to  the 
nation  than  to  Philip  personally. 

2  Demosthenes  sneers  at  the  cnstoin  of  introducing  into  the  debate 
sententious  professions  of  good-will,  and  prayers  for  prosperity ;  a  poor 
substitute  (he  would  sav)  for  good  counsel.  Compare  Virg.  Georg. 
III.  154. 

Alitur  vitium  vivitqne  tegendo, 
Dum  medicas  adhibere  manns  ad  vulnera  pastor 
Abnegat,  et  meliora  Deos  sedet  omina  poscens 


THE    THIRD    OLYXTHIAC.  57 

men  are  indeed  a  great  help  to  such  arguments,  and  there- 
fore the  easiest  thing  in  the  world  is  self-deceit ;  for  every 
man  believes  what  he  wishes,  though  the  reality  is  often 
different.  See  then,  Athenians,  what  the  realities  allow,  and 
you  will  be  able  to  serve  and  have  pay.  It  becomes  not  a 
wise  or  magnanimous  people,  to  neglect  military  operations 
for  want  of  money,  and  bear  disgraces  like  these ;  or,  while 
^ou  snatch  up  arms  to  march  against  Corinthians  and  Me- 
garians,  to  let  Philip  enslave  Greek  cities  for  lack  of  pro- 
visions for  your  troops. 

I  have  not  spoken  for  the  idle  purpose  of  giving  offence  :  I 
am  not  so  foolish  or  perverse,  as  to  provoke  your  displeasure 
without  intending  your  good  :  but  I  think  an  upright  citizen 
shoidd  prefer  the  advancement  of  the  commonweal  to  the 
gratification  of  his  audience.  And  I  hear,  as  perhaps  you  do, 
that  the  speakers  in  our  ancestors'  time,  whom  all  that  ad- 
dress you  praise,  but  not  exactly  imitate,  were  politicians  after 
this  form  and  fishion  ; — Aristides,  Nicias,  my  namesake,1 
Pericles.  But  since  these  orators  have  appeared,  who  ask, 
What  is  your  pleasure  ?  what  shall  I  move  I  how  can  I  oblige 
you  ?  the  public  welfare  is  complimented  away  for  a  moment's 
popularity,  and  these  are  the  results  ;  the  orators  thrive,  you 
are  disgraced.  Mark,  0  Athenians,  what  a  summary  con- 
trast may  be  drawn  between  the  doings  in  our  olden  time  and 
in  yours.  It  is  a  tale  brief  and  familiar  to  all ;  for  the  ex- 
amples by  which  you  may  still  be  happy  are  found  not  abroad, 
men  of  Athens,  but  at  home.  Our  forefathers,  whom  the 
speakers  humoured  not  nor  caressed,  as  these  men  caress  you, 
for  five-and-forty  years  took  the  leadership  of  the  Greeks  by 
general  consent,  and  brought  above  ten  thousand  talents  into 
the  citadel ;  and  the  king  of  this  country  was  submissive  to 
them,  as  a  barbarian  should  be  to  Greeks ;  and  many  glorious 
trophies  they  erected  for  victories  won  by  then-  own  fighting 
on  land  and  sea,  and  they  are  the  sole  people  in  the  world  who 
have  bequeathed  a  renown  superior  to  envy.  Such  were  their 
merits  in  the  affairs  of  Greece  :  see  what  they  were  at  home, 
both  as  citizens  and  as  men.  Then  public  works  are  edifices 
and  ornaments  of  such  beauty  and  grandeur  in  temples  and 

1  Demosthenes,  the  general  so  distinguished  in  the  Peloponne3ian 
war,  who  defeated  the  Spartans  at  Pylus,  and  af  "erwards  lost  his  life  in 
Sicily. 


58  THE    ORATIOXS    OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

consecrated  furniture,  that  posterity  have  no  power  to  sur- 
pass them.  In  private  they  were  so  modest  and  attached  to 
the  principle  of  our  constitution,  that  whoever  knows  the 
style  of  house  which  Aristides  had,  or  Miltiades,  and  the 
illustrious  of  that  day,  perceives  it  to  be  no  grander  than 
those  of  the  neighbours.  Their  politics  were  not  for  money- 
making  ;  each  felt  it  his  duty  to  exalt  the  commonwealth.1 
By  a  conduct  honourable  towards  the  Greeks,  pious  to  the 
gods,  brotherlike  among  themselves,  they  justly  attained  a 
high  prosperity. 

So  fared  matters  with  them  under  the  statesmen  I  have 
mentioned.  How  fare  they  with  you  under  the  worthies  of 
our  time  !  Is  there  any  likeness  or  resemblance  )  I  pass  over 
other  topics,  on  which  I  could  expatiate ;  but  observe  :  in 
this  utter  absence  of  competitors,  (Lacedaemonians  depressed, 
Thebans  employed,  none  of  the  rest  capable  of  disputing  the 
supremacy  with  us.)  when  we  might  hold  our  own  securely 
and  arbitrate  the  claims  of  others,  we  have  been  deprived  01 
our  rightful  territory,  and  spent  above  fifteen  hundred  talents 
to  no  purpose;  the  allies,  whom  we  gained  in  war,  these  per- 
sons have  lost  in  peace,  and  we  have  trained  up  against 
ourselves  an  enemy  thus  formidable.  Or  let  any  one  come 
forward  and  tell  me.  by  whose  contrivance  but  ours  Philip 
has  grown  strong.  Well  sir,  this  looks  bad,  but  things  at 
home  are  better.  What  proof  can  be  adduced  )  The  parapets 
that  are  whitewashed  ?  The  roads  that  are  repaired  I  foun- 
tains, and  fooleries  ? 2  Look  at  the  men  of  whose  statesman- 
ship these  are  the  fruits.  They  have  risen  from  beggary  to 
opulence,  or  from  obscurity  to  honour  :  some  have  made  their 
private  houses  more  splendid  than  the  public  buildings  ;  and 
in  proportion  as  the  state  has  declined,  their  fortunes  have 
been  exalted. 

What   has   produced  these  results  1     How  is  it  that  all 
went  prosperously  then,  and  now  goes  wrong  ?     Because  an- 
ciently the  people,  having  the  courage  to  be  soldiers,  controlled 
the  statesmen,  and  disposed  of  all  emoluments ;  any  of  the 
1  As  Horace  says  :  — 

Privates  illis  census  erat  brevis, 

Cormnune  magnum. 

*  Jacobs:  und  solchee  Geadtwate.     The  proceedings  of  Eubulus  are 
iere  more  particularly  referred  to. 


THE    THIRD    OLTXiniAC.  59 

rest  was  happy  to  receive  from  the  people  his  share  of  honour, 
office,  or  advantage.  Xow,  contrariwise,  the  statesmen  dis- 
pose of  emoluments  ;  through  them  everything  is  done  \  you 
the  people,  enervated,  stripped  of  treasure  and  alhes,  are  be- 
come as  underlings  and  hangers-on,  happy  if  these  persons 
dole  you  out  show-money  or  send  you  paltry  beeves  ; '  and, 
the  unrnanliest  part  of  all,  you  are  grateful  for  receiving  your 
own.  They,  cooping  you  in  the  city,  lead  you  to  your  plea- 
sures, and  make  you  tame  and  submissive  to  their  hands.  It 
is  impossible,  I  say,  to  have  a  high  and  noble  spirit,  while  you 
are  engaged  in  petty  and  mean  employments :  whatever  be  the 
pursuits  of  men,  their  characters  must  be  similar.  By  Ceres. 
I  should  not  wonder,  if  I,  for  mentioning  these  things,  suf- 
fered more  from  your  resentment  than  the  men  who  have 
brought  them  to  pass.  For  even  liberty  of  speech  you  allow 
not  on  all  subjects ;  I  marvel  indeed  you  have  allowed 
it  here. 

Would  you  but  even  now,  renouncing  these  practices,  per  • 
form  military  service  and  act  worthily  of  yourselves ;  woula 
you  employ  these  domestic  superfluities  as  a  means  to  gain 
advantage  abroad;  perhaps,  Athenians,  perhaps  you  might 
gain  some  solid  and  important  advantage,  and  be  rid  of  these 
perquisites,  which  are  hke  the  diet  ordered  by  physicians  for 
the  sick.  As  that  neither  imparts  strength,  nor  sutlers  the 
patient  to  die,  so  your  allowances  are  not  enough  to  be  of 
substantial  benefit,  nor  yet  permit  you  to  reject  them  and 
turn  to  something  else.  Thus  do  they  increase  the  general 
apathy.  What  ?  I  shall  be  asked  :  mean  you  stipendiary 
service  ?  Yes,  and  forthwith  the  same  arrangement  for  all, 
Athenians,  that  each,  taking  his  dividend  from  the  public, 
may  be  what  the  state  requires.     Is  peace  to  be  had  1     You 

1  Entertainments  were  frequently  given  to  the  people  aftsr  sacrifices, 
at  which  a  very  small  part  of  the  victim  was  devoted  to  the  gods,  such 
as  the  legs  and  intestines,  the  rest  being  kept  for  more  profane  pur- 
poses. The  Athenians  were  remarkably  extravagant  in  sacrifices. 
Demades,  ridiculing  the  donations  of  public  meat,  compared  the  republic 
to  an  old  woman,  sitting  at  home  in  slippers  and  supping  her  broth. 
Demosthenes,  using  the  diminutive  fioiSia,  charges  the  magistrates  with 
supplying  lean  and  poor  oxen,  -whereas  the  victims  ought  to  be  healthy 
and  large,  reAeia.     See  Virgil,  JEn.  xi.  739. 

Hie  amor,  hoc  studium ;  dum  sacra  secundus  aruspex 
Nuntiet,  ac  lucos  vocet  hostia  pinguis  in  altos. 


60  THE    ORATIONS    OP   DEMOSTHENES. 

are  better  at  home,  under  no  compulsion  to  act  dishonourably 
from  indigence.  Is  there  such  an  emergency  as  the  present  1 
Better  to  be  a  soldier,  as  you  ought,  in  your  country's  cause, 
maintained  by  those  very  allowances.  Is  any  one  of  you  be- 
yond the  military  age  ?  What  he  now  irregularly  takes  with- 
out doing  service,  let  him  take  by  just  regulation,  superin- 
tending and  transacting  needful  business.  Thus,  without 
derogating  from  or  adding  to  our  political  system,  only  re- 
moving some  irregularity,  I  bring  it  into  order,  establishing  a 
uniform  rule  for  receiving  money,  for  serving  in  war,  for 
sitting  on  juries,  for  doing  what  each  according  to  his  age  can 
do,  and  what  occasion  requires.  I  never  advise  we  should  give  to 
idlers  the  wages  of  the  diligent,  or  sit  at  leisure,  passive  and 
helpless,  to  hear  that  such  a  one's  mercenaries  are  victorious  ; 
as  we  now  do.  Not  that  I  blame  any  one  who  does  you 
a  service  :  I  only  call  upon  you,  Athenians,  to  perform  on 
your  own  account  those  duties  for  which  you  honour 
strangers,  and  not  to  surrender  that  post  of  dignity  which, 
won  through  many  glorious  dangers,  your  ancestors  have 
bequeathed. 

I  have  said  nearly  all  that  I  think  necessary.  I  trust  you 
will  adopt  that  course  which  is  best  for  the  country  and 
yourselves. 


THE  FIRST  PHILIPPIC. 


THE    ARGUMENT. 


Philip,  after  the  defeat  of  Onomarchus,  had  marched  towards  the  pass  01 
Thermopylae,  which,  however,  he  found  occupied  by  the  Athenians, 
who  had  sent  a  force  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  his  advance. 
Being  baffled  there,  he  directed  his  march  into  Thrace,  and  alarmed 
the  Athenians  for  the  safety  of  their  dominions  in  the  Chersonese. 
At  the  same  time  he  sent  a  fleet  to  attack  the  islands  of  Lemnos  and 
Imbrus,  infested  the  commerce  of  Athens  with  his  cruisers,  and  even 
insulted  her  coast.  In  Thrace  he  became  involved  in  the  disputes 
between  the  rival  kings  Amadocus  and  Cersobleptes,  espousing  the 
cause  of  the  former ;  and  for  some  time  he  was  engaged  in  the  inte- 
rior of  that  country,  either  at  war  with  Cersobleptes,  or  extending  his 
own  influence  over  other  parts  of  Thrace,  where  he  established  or 
expelled  the  rulers,  as  it  suited  him.  It  was  just  at  that  time  that 
Demosthenes  spoke  the  following  oration,  the  first  in  which  he  called 


THE    FIRST   PHILIPPIC.  61 

^he  attention  of  his  countrymen  to  the  dangerous  increase  of  Philip  a 
power.  He  had  become  convinced  by  the  course  of  events,  and  by 
observing  the  restless  activity  of  Philip,  that  Athens  had  more  to 
fear  from  him  than  from  Thebes,  or  from  any  new  combination  of  the 
Grecian  republics.  The  orator  himself,  perhaps,  hardly  appreciated 
the  extent  of  Philip's  resources,  strengthened  as  he  wad  now  by  the 
friendship  of  Thessaly,  possessed  of  a  navy  and  maritime  towns,  and 
relieved  from  the  presence  of  any  powerful  neighbours.  What  were 
the  precise  views  of  Demosthenes  as  to  the  extent  of  the  impending 
danger,  we  cannot  say.  It  was  not  for  him  to  frighten  the  Athenians 
too  much,  but  to  awaken  them  from  their  lethargy.  This  he  does  in 
a  speech,  which,  without  idle  declamation  or  useless  ornament,  ia 
essentially  practical.  He  alarms,  but  encourages,  his  countrymen  ; 
points  out  both  their  weakness  and  their  strength;  rouses  them  to  a 
sense  of  danger,  and  shows  the  way  to  meet  it ;  recommends  not  any 
extraordinary  efforts,  for  which  at  the  moment  there  was  no  urgent 
necessity,  and  to  make  which  would  have  exceeded  their  power,  but 
unfolds  a  scheme,  simple  and  feasible,  suiting  the  occasion,  and  calcu- 
lated (if  Athenians  had  not  been  too  degenerate)  to  lay  the  founda- 
tion of  better  things. 

Had  the  question  for  debate  been  anything  new,  Athenians, 
I  should  hare  waited  till  most  of  the  usual  speakers1  had 
been  heard ;  if  any  of  their  counsels  had  been  to  my  liking, 
T  had  remained  silent,  else  proceeded  to  impart  my  own. 
But  as  the  subject  of  discussion  is  one  upon  which  they  have 
spoken  oft  before,  I  imagine,  though  I  rise  the  first,  I  am 
entitled  to  indulgence.  For  if  these  men  had  advised  pro- 
perly in  time  past,  there  would  be  no  necessity  for  deliberat- 
ing now. 

First  1  say,  you  must  not  despond,  Athenians,  under  your 
present  circumstances,  wretched  as  they  are ;  for  that  which 
is  worst  in  them  as  regards  the  past,  is  best  for  the  future. 
What  do  I  mean  ?  That  your  affairs  are  amiss,  men  of 
Athens,  because  you  do  nothing  which  is  needful;  if,  not- 
withstanding you  performed  your  duties,  it  were  the  same, 
there  would  be  no  hope  of  amendment. 

Consider  next,  what  you  know  by  report,  and  men  of  expe- 
rience remember;  how  vast  a  power  the  Lacedaemonians  had 
not  long  ago,  yet  how  nobly  and  becomingly  you  consulted 

1  By  an  ancient  ordinance  of  Solon,  those  who  were  above  fifty  years 
of  age  were  first  called  on  to  deliver  their  opinion.  The  law  had  ceased 
to  be  in  force  ;  but,  as  a  decent  custom,  the  older  men  usually  com- 
menced the  debate.  There  would  be  frequent  occasions  for  departing 
from  such  a  custom,  and  Demosthenes,  who  was  now  thirty-three,  assigns 
his  reason  for  speaking  first. 


C2  THE    ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHE>~ES. 

the  dignity  of  Athens,  and  undertook  the  -war1  against  them 
for  the  rights  of  Greece.  Why  do  I  mention  this  ?  To  show 
and  convince  you.  Athenians,  that  nothing,  if  you  take  pre- 
caution, is  to  be  feared,  nothing,  if  you  are  negligent,  goes  as 
vou  desire.  Take  for  examples  the  strength  cf  the  Lace- 
daemonians then,  -which  you  overcame  by  attention  to  your 
duties,  and  the  insolence  of  this  man  now,  by  which  through 
neglect  of  our  interests  we  are  confounded.  But  if  any 
among  you.  Athenians,  deem  Philip  hard  to  be  conquered, 
looking  at  the  magnitude  of  his  existing  power,  and  the  loss 
by  us  of  all  our  strongholds,  they  reason  rightly,  but  should 
reflect,  that  once  we  held  Pydna  and  Potidasa  and  Methone 
and  all  the  region  round  about  as  our  own,  and  many  of  the 
nations  now  leagued  with  him  were  independent  and  free, 
and  preferred  our  friendship  to  his.  Had  Philip  then  taken 
it  into  his  head,  that  it  was  difficult  to  contend  with  Athens, 
■when  she  had  so  many  fortresses  to  infest  his  country,  and  he 
was  destitute  of  allies,  nothing  tbat  he  has  accomplished 
would  he  have  undertaken,  and  never  would  he  have  ac- 
quired so  large  a  dominion.  But  he  saw  well,  Athenians, 
that  all  these  places  are  the  open  prizes  of  war,  that  the 
possessions  of  the  absent  naturally  belong  to  the  present, 
those  of  the  remiss  to  them  that  will  venture  and  toil 
Acting  on  such  principle,  he  has  won  eveiything  and  keeps 
it.  either  by  way  of  conquest,  or  by  friendly  attachment  and 
alliance;  for  all  men  will  side  with  and  resj  it  H  ae,  whom 
they  see  prepared  and  willing  to  make  proper  exertion.  If 
vou,  Athenians,  will  adopt  this  principle  now,  though  you 
did  not  before,  and  every  man,  where  he  can  and  ought  to 
give  his  service  to  the  state,  be  ready  to  give  it  without 
excuse,  the  wealthy  to  contribute,  the  able-bodied  to  enlist ; 
in  a  word,  plainly,  if  you  will  become  your  own  masters,  and 
cease  each  expecting  to  do  nothing  himself,  while  his  neigh- 
bour does  eveiything  for  him,  you  shall  then  with  heavens 
permission  recover  your  own,  and  get  back  what  has  been 
frittered  away,  and  'chastise  Philip.     Do  not  imagine,  that 

1  He  refers  to  the  war  in  which  Athens  assisted  the  Thebans  against 
Lacedaemon,  and  in  which  Chahrias  won  the  naval  battle  of  Xaxos. 
That  war  commenced  twenty- six  years  before  the  speaking  of  the  first 
Philippic,  and  would  be  well  remembered  by  many  of  the  hearers.  See 
the  Historical  Abstract  in  this  volume. 


THE    FIRST    PHILIPPIC. 


63 


his  empire  is  everlastingly  secured  to  him  as  a  god.  Thero 
are  who  hate  and  fear  and  envy  him.  Athenians,  even  among 
those  that  seem  most  friendly;  and  all  feelings  that  are  in 
other  men  belong,  we  may  assume,  to  his  confederates.  But 
now  they  are  all  cowed,  having  no  refuge  through  your 
tardiness  and  indolence,  which  I  say  you  must  abandon  forth- 
with. For  you  see,  Athenians,  the  case,  to  what  pitch  of 
arrogance  the  man  has  advanced,  who  leaves  you  not  even 
the  choice  of  action  or  inaction,  but  threatens  and  uses  (they 
say)  outrageous  1'anguage,  and,  unable  to  rest  in  possession  of 
his  conquests,  continually  widens  then  circle,  and,  whilst  we 
dally  and  delay,  throws  his  net  all  around  us.  When  then, 
Athenians,  when  will  ye  act  as  becomes  you  ?  In  what  event  ? 
In  that  of  necessity,  I  suppose.  And  how  shordd  we  regard  the 
events  happening  now  I  Methinks,  to  freemen  the  strongest 
necessity  is  the  disgrace  of  their  condition.  Or  tell  me,  do 
ye  like  walking  about  and  asking  one  another  : — is  there  any 
news  ?  Why,  could  there  be  greater  news  than  a  man  of 
Macedonia  subduing  Athenians,  and  directing  the  affairs  of 
Greece  1  Is  Philip  dead  ?  Xo,  but  he  is  sick.  And  what 
matters  it  to  you  ?  Should  anything  befal  this  man,  you  will 
soon  create  another  Philip,  if  you  attend  to  business  thus. 
For  even  he  has  been  exalted  not  so  much  by  his  own 
strength,  as  by  our  negligence.  And  again ;  should  anything 
happen  to  him  ;  should  fortune,  which  still  takes  better  care 
of  us  than  we  of  om-selves,  be  good  enough  to  accomplish 
this;  observe  that,  being  on  the  spot,  you  would  step  in 
while  things  were  in  confusion,  and  manage  them  as  you 
pleased;  but  as  you  now  are,  though  occasion  offered  Amphi- 
polis,  you  would  not  be  in  a  position  to  accept  it,  with 
neither  forces  nor  counsels  at  hand.1 

However,  as  to  the  importance  of  a  general  zeal  in  the  dis- 
charge of  duty,  believing  you  are  convinced  and  satisfied,  I 
say  no  more. 

As  to  the  kind  of  force  which  I  think  may  extricate  you 
from  your  difficulties,  the  amount,  the  supplies  of  money, 
the  best  and  speediest  method  (in  my  judgment)  of  pro- 
viding all  the  necessaries,  I  shall  endeavour  to  inform  you 

1  Important  advice  this,  to  men  in  all  relations  of  life.     Good  luck  is 
for  those  who  are  in  a  position  to  avail  themselves  of  it. 
Uli  poma  cadunt  qui  poma  sub  arbore  quterit. 


64  THE    ORATIONS    OF    DEMOSTHENES. 

forthwith,  making  only  one  request,  men  of  Athens.  When 
you  have  heard  all,  determine ;  prejudge  not  before.  And  let 
none  think  I  delay  our  operations,  because  I  recommend  an 
entirely  new  force.  Not  those  that  cry,  quickly !  to-day ! 
speak  most  to  the  purpose ;  (for  what  has  already  happened 
we  shall  not  be  able  to  prevent  by  our  present  armament ;) 
but  he  that  shows  what  and  how  great  and  whence  procured 
must  be  the  force  capable  of  enduring,  till  either  we  have 
advisedly  terminated  the  war,  or  overcome  our  enemies  :  for 
so  shall  we  escape  annoyance  in  future.  This  I  think  I  am 
able  to  show,  without  offence  to  any  other  man  who  has  a  plan 
to  offer.  My  promise  indeed  is  large ;  it  shall  be  tested  by  the 
performance;  and  you  shall  be  my  judges. 

First,  then,  Athenians,  I  say  we  must  provide  fifty  war- 
ships,1 and  hold  ourselves  prepared,  in  case  of  emergency,  to 
embark  and  sail.  I  require  also  an  equipment  of  transports 
for  half  the  cavalry2  and  sufficient  boats.  This  we  must  have 
ready  against  his  sudden  marches  from  his  own  country  to 
Thermopylae,  the  Chersonese,  Olynthus,  and  anywhere  he 
likes.  For  he  should  entertain  the  belief,  that  possibly  you 
may  reuse  from  this  over-carelessness,  and  start  off,  as  you 
did  to  Euboea,3  and  formerly  (they  say)  to  Haliartus,4  and  very 
lately  to  Thermopylaa.  And  although  you  should  not  pursue 
just  the  course  I  would  advise,  it  is  no  slight  matter,  that 

1  The  Athenian  ship  of  war  at  this  time  was  the  Trireme,  or  galley 
with  three  ranks  of  oars.  It  had  at  the  prow  a  beak  (e/j.[}o\ov),  with  a 
sharp  iron  head,  which,  in  a  charge,  (generally  made  at  the  broadside,) 
was  able  to  shatter  the  planks  of  the  enemy's  vessel.  An  ordinary 
trireme  carried  two  hundred  men,  including  the  crew  and  marines. 
These  last  (brifiaTzi)  were  usually  ten  for  each  ship,  but  the  number  waa 
often  increased  The  transports  and  vessels  of  burden,  whether  merchant 
vessels  or  boats  for  the  carriage  of  military  stores,  were  round-bottomed, 
more  bulky  in  construction,  and  moved  rather  with  sails  than  oars. 
Hence  the  fighting  ship  is  called  rax^a,  swift.  It  carried  a  sail,  to  be 
used  upon  occasion,  though  it  was  mainly  worked  with  oars. 

2  The  total  number  was  one  thousand,  each  tribe  furnishing  one 
hundred. 

3  The  expedition  about  five  years  before,  when  the  Thebans  had  sent 
an  army  to  Euboea,  and  Timotheus  roused  his  countrymen  to  expel  them 
from  the  island.  Of  this,  Demosthenes  gives  an  animated  account  at 
the  close  of  the  oration  on  the  Chersonese. 

4  b.  c.  395,  when  the  war  between  Thebes  and  Sparta  had  begun,  and 
Lysander  besieged  Haliartus.  He  was  slain  in  a  sally  by  the  Thebans 
and  Athenians. 


TILE    FIRST   PHILIPPIC.  65 

Philip,  knowing  you  to  be  in  readiness — know  it  he  will  for 
certain ;  there  are  too  many  among  our  own  people  who  re- 
port everything  to  him — may  either  keep  quiet  from  appre- 
hension, or,  not  heeding  your  arrangements,  be  taken  off  his 
guard,  there  being  nothing  to  prevent  your  sailing,  if  he  give 
you  a  chance,  to  attack  his  territories.  Such  an  armament, 
I  say.  ought  instantly  to  be  agreed  upon  and  provided.  But 
besides,  men  of  Athens,  you  should  keep  in  hand  some  force, 
that  will  incessantly  make  war  and  annoy  him  :  none  of 
your  ten  or  twenty  thousand  mercenaries,  not  your  forces  on 
paper,1  but  one  that  shall  belong  to  the  state,  and,  whether 
you  appoint  one  or  more  generals,  or  this  or  that  man  or  any 
other,  shall  obey  and  follow  him.  Subsistence  too  I  require 
for  it.  What  the  force  shall  be,  how  large,  from  what  source 
maintained,  how  rendered  efficient,  I  will  show  you,  stating 
every  particular.  Mercenaries  I  recommend — and  beware  of 
doing  what  has  often  been  injurious — thinking  all  measures 
below  the  occasion,  adopting  the  strongest  in  your  decrees, 
you  fail  to  accomplish  the  least — rather,  I  say,  perform  ana 
procure  a  little,  add  to  it  afterwards,  if  it  prove  insufficient. 
I  advise  then  two  thousand  soldiers  in  all,  five  hundred  to  be 
Athenians,  of  whatever  age  you  think  right,  serving  a  limited 
time,  not  long,  but  such  time  as  you  think  right,  so  as  to 
relieve  one  another  :  the  rest  should  be  mercenaries.  And 
with  them  two  hundred  horse,  fifty  at  least  Athenians,  like 
the  foot,  on  the  same  terms  of  service;  and  transports  for 
them.  Well ;  what  besides '?  Ten  swift  galleys  :  for,  as 
Philip  has  a  navy,  we  must  have  swift  galleys  also,  to  con- 
voy our  power.  How  shall  subsistence  for  these  troops 
be  provided  '?  I  will  state  and  explain ;  but  first  let  me  tell 
you,  why  I  consider  a  force  of  this  amount  sufficient,  and 
why  I  wish  the  men  to  be  citizens. 

Of  that  amount,  Athenians,  because  it  is  impossible  for  us 
now  to  raise  an  army  capable  of  meeting  him  in  the  field  : 
we  must  plunder  -  and  adopt  such  kind  of  warfare  at  first : 

1  Literally  "  written  in  letters  ;"  that  is,  promised  to  the  generals  or 
allies,  but  never  sent.     Jacobs :  fine  Macht  die  auf  dem  Blatte  steht. 
Compare  Shakspeare,  Henry  IV.,  Second  Part,  Act  L 
We  fortify  in  paper  and  in  figures, 
Using  the  names  of  men  instead  of  men. 
J  Make  predatory  incursions,  as  Livy  says,  "populabundi  magis  quam 
justo  more  belli."    Jacobs  :  den  Kriecj  ah  Frcibtuttv JvJiren.    Anothei 

VOL,  I.  V 


()G  TELE    OiUTiOXS    OF   DEilOSTHEXES. 

our  force,  therefore,  mu.-t  not  be  over-large,  (for  there  is  not 
pay  or  subsistence.)  nor  altogether  mean.  Citizens  I  wi.-h  to 
attend  and  go  on  board,  because  I  hear  that  formerly  the 
state  maintained  mercenary  troops  at  Corinth,1  commanded 
by  1'olystratus  and  Iphicrates  and  Chabrias  and  some  others, 
and  that  you  served  with  them  yourselves ;  and  1  am 
told,  that  these  mercenaries  fighting  by  your  side  and  you 
by  theirs  defeated  the  Lacedaemonians.  But  ever  since  your 
hirelings  have  served  by  themselves,  they  have  been  vanquish- 
ing your  friends  and  allies,  while  your  enemies  have  become 
unduly  great.  Just  glancing  at  the  war  of  our  state,  they 
go  off  to  Artabazus 2  or  anywhere  rather,  and  the  general 
follows,  naturally  ;  for  it  is  impossible  to  command  without 
giving  pay.  What  therefore  ask  I  ?  To  remove  the  ex- 
cuses both  of  general  and  soldiers,  by  supplying  pay,  and 
attaching  native  soldiers,  as  inspectors  of  the  general's  con- 
duct. The  way  we  manage  thing's  now  is  a  mockery.  For 
if  you  were  asked  :  Are  you  at  peace,  Athenians  1  No,  indeed, 
you  would  say ;  we  are  at  war  with  Philip.  Did  you  not 
choose  from  yourselves  ten  captains  and  generals,  and  also 
captains  and  two  generals 3  of  horse  ?  How  are  they  em- 
German:  Streifz-uge  zu  machen  (guerilla  warfare).  Leland  :  "harass 
him  with  depredations."  Wilson,  an  old  English  translator:  "rob  and 
spoil  upon  him." 

1  He  alludes  to  the  time  -when  Corinth,  Athens,  Thebes,  and  Argos 
were  allied  against  Sparta,  and  held  a  congress  at  Corinth,  b.  c.  394. 
The  allies  were  at  first  defeated,  but  Iphicrates  gained  some  successes, 
and  acquired  considerable  reputation  by  cutting  oft"  a  small  division 
(mora)  of  Spartan  infantry. 

2  Diodorus  relates  that  Chares,  in  the  Social  war,  having  no  money  to 
pay  his  troops,  was  forced  to  lend  them  to  Artabazus,  then  in  rebellion 
against  the  king  of  Persia.  Chares  gained  a  victory  for  the  satrap, 
and  received  a  supply  of  money.  But  this  led  to  a  complaint  and 
menace  of  war  by  the  king,  which  brought  serious  consequences.  See  the 
Historical  Abstract. 

3  There  were  chosen  at  Athens  eV.^ry  year 

Ten  generals  (one  for  each  tribe),  crpaTtryoi. 

Ten  captains  (one  for  each  tribe),  raliapxot- 

Two  generals  of  cavalry,  Virrapx*"- 

Ten  cavalry  officers  (one  for  each  tribe),  <pvXapxoi. 
In  a  regular  army  of  citizens,  when  each  tribe  formed  its  own  divi- 
sion, both  of  horse  and  foot,  all  these  generals  and  officers  would  be 
present      Thus,  there  were  ten  generals  at  Marathon.     A  change  took 
place  is  later  times,  when  the  armies  were  more  miscellaneous.      Thro* 


THE    FIRST    PHILIPPIC.  67 

ployed  ?  Except  one  man,  whom  you  commission  on  service 
abroad,  the  rest  conduct  your  processions  with  the  sacrificers. 
Like  puppet-niakers,  you  elect  your  infantry  and  cavalry 
officers  for  the  market-place,  not  for  war.  Consider.  Athe- 
nians ;  should  there  not  be  native  captains,  a  native  genera] 
of  horse,  your  own  commanders,  that  the  force  might  really 
be  the  state's  ?  Or  should  your  general  of  horse  sail  to  Lem- 
nos,1  while  Menelaus  commands  the  cavalry  fighting  for  your 
possessions  ?  I  speak  not  as  objecting  to  the  man,  but  he 
ought  to  be  elected  by  you,  whoever  the  person  be. 

Perhaps  you  admit  the  justice  of  these  statements,  but 
wish  principally  to  hear  about  the  supplies,  what  they  must 
be  and  whence  procured.  I  will  satisfy  you.  Supplies,  then, 
for  maintenance,  mere  rations  for  these  troops,  come  to  ninety 
talents  and  a  little  more  :  for  ten  swift  galleys  forty  talents, 
twenty  niinas  a  month  to  every  ship ;  for  two  thousand 
soldiers  forty  more,  that  each  soldier  may  receive  for  rations 
ten  drachms  a  month  ;  and  for  two  hundred  horsemen,  each 
receiving  thirty  drachms  a  month,  twelve  talents.-'  Should 
anv  one  think  rations  for  the  men  a  small  provision,  he 
judges  erroneously.  Furnish  that,  and  I  am  sure  the  army 
itself  will,  without  injuring  any  Greek  or  ally,  procure  every- 
thing else  from  the  war,  so  as  to  make  out  their  full  pay.  I  am 
ready  to  join  the  fleet  as  a  volunteer,  and  submit  to  anything, 
if  this  be  not  so.  Xow  for  the  ways  and  means  of  the  supply, 
which  I  demand  from  you. 

[Statement*  of  ways  and  means^] 

This,  Athenians,  is  what  we  have  been  able  to  devise. 
"When  vou  vote  upon  the  resolutions,  paa6  what  you4  approve, 

Athenian  generals  were  frequently  employed,  and  at  a  still  later  period 
only  one.  Demosthenes  here  touches  on  a  very  important  matter,  which 
we  can  well  understand,  viz.  the  necessity  of  officering  the  foreign  mer- 
cenaries from  home. 

1  To  assist  at  a  religious  ceremony  held  annually  at  Lemnos.  where 
many  Athenians  resided. 

2  As  to  Athenian  money,  see  Appendix  II. 

3  Here  the  clerk  or  secretary  reads  the  scheme  drawn  up  by  Demos- 
thenes, in  the  preparing  of  which  he  was  probably  assisted  by  the  finan- 
cial officers  of  the  state.  What  follows  was,  according  to  Dionysius, 
spoken  at  a  different  time.  The  curious  may  consult  Leland,  and  Jacobs' 
introdu  rtion  to  his  translation. 

*  I.e.   some  measure,  if  not  mine,  whereby  the  war  may  be  waged 
F  2 


o8  THE    ORATIONS    OF    DEMOSTHENES. 

that  you  may  oppose  Philip,  not  only  by  decrees  and  letters, 
but  by  action  also. 

I  think  it  will  assist  your  deliberations  about  the  war  and 
the  whole  arrangements,  to  regard  the  position,  Athenians, 
of  the  hostile  country,  and  consider,  that  Philip  by  the  winds 
and  seasons  of  the  year  gets  the  start  in  most  of  his  opera- 
tions, watching  for  the  trade-winds '  or  the  winter  to  com- 
mence them,  when  we  are  unable  (he  thinks)  to  reach  the 
spot.  On  this  account,  we  must  carry  on  the  war  not  with 
hasty  levies,  (or  we  shah  be  too  late  for  everything.)  but  with 
a  permanent  force  and  power.  You  may  use  as  winter  quar- 
ters for  your  troops  Leninos.  and  Thasus,  and  Sciathus.  and 
the  islands2  in  that  neighbourhood,  which  have  harbours  and 
com  and  all  necessaries  for  an  ariny.  In  the  season  of  the 
vear,  when  it  is  easy  to  put  ashore  and  there  is  no  danger 
from  the  winds,  they  will  easily  take  their  station  off  the  coast 
itself  and  at  the  entrances  of  the  seaports. 

How  and  when  to  employ  the  troops,  the  commander  ap- 
pointed by  you  will  determine  as  occasion  requires.  "What 
you  must  find,  is  stated  in  my  bill.  If,  men  of  Athens,  you 
will  furnish  the  supphes  which  I  mention,  and  then,  after 
completing  your  preparations  of  soldiers,  ships,  cavalry,  will 
oblige  the  entire  force  by  law  to  remain  in  the  service,  and, 
while  you  become  your  own  paymasters  and  commissaries, 
demand  from  your  general  an  account  of  his  conduct,  you 
will  cease  to  be  always  discussing  the  same  questions  without 
forwarding  tliem  in  the  least,  and  besides,  Athenians,  not 
only  will  you  cut  off  his  greatest  revenue — What  is  this ' 
He  maintains  war  against  you  through  the  resources  of  your 
allies,  by  his  piracies  on  their  navigation — But  what  next  ? 
You  will  be  out  of  the  reach  of  injury  yourselves  :  he  will 
not  do  as  in  time  past,  when  falling  upon  Lemnos  and 
Iinbrus  he  carried  oft"  your  citizens  captive,  seizing  the  ves- 
sels at  Gercestus  he  levied  an  incalculable  sum,  and  lastly, 
made   a  descent  at  Marathon  and   carried  off  the    sacred 

effectually.  The  reading  of  iroiijffare,  adopted  by  Jacobs  after  Schaefer, 
is  not  in  congruity  with  the  sentence. 

1  The  Etesian  winds  blowing  from  the  north-west  in  July,  which 
would  impede  a  voyage  from  Athens  to  Macedonia  and  Thrace. 

-  As  Scopelus,  Halonnesus,  Peparethus,  which  were  then  subject  to 
Athens. 


THE    FIRST    PHILIPPIC.  69 

galley '  from  our  coast,  and  you  could  neither  prevent  these 
things  nor  send  succours  by  the  appointed  time.  But  how 
is  it,  think  you,  Athenians,  that  the  Panathenaic  and  Dio- 
nysian  festivals '  take  place  always  at  the  appointed  time, 
whether  expert  or  unqualified  persons  be  chosen  to  conduct 
either  of  them,  whereon  you  expend  larger  sums  than  upon 
any  armament,  and  which  are  more  numerously  attended 
and  magnificent  than  almost  anything  in  the  world  ;  whilst 
all  your  armaments  are  after  the  time,  as  that  to  Methone, 
to  Pagasse,  to  Potidsea  ?  Because  in  the  former  case  every- 
tliing  is  ordered  by  law,  and  each  of  you  knows  long  before- 
hand, who  is  the  choir-master3  of  his  tribe,  who  the  gym- 
nastic 4  master,  when,  from  whom,  and  what  he  is  to  receive, 
and  what  to  do.  Nothing  there  is  left  unascertained  or  un- 
defined :  whereas  in  the  business  of  war  and  its  preparations 
all  is  irregular,  unsettled,  indefinite.  Therefore,  no  sooner 
have  we  heard  anything,  than  we  appoint  ship-captains,  dis- 
pute with  them  on  the  exchanges,5  and  consider  about  ways 

1  A  ship  called  Paralus,  generally  used  on  religious  missions  or  to 
carry  public  despatches. 

*  The  Panathenaic  festivals  were  in  honour  of  P;illas  or  Athene,  the 
protectress  of  Athens,  and  commemorated  also  the  union  of  the  old 
Attic  towns  under  one  government.  There  were  two,  the  greater  held 
every  fourth  year,  the  lesser  anually.  They  were  celebrated  with  sacri- 
fices, races,  gymnastic  and  musical  contests,  and  various  other  amuse- 
ments and  solemnities,  among  which  was  the  carrying  the  pictured  robe 
of  Pallas  to  her  temple.  The  Dionysia,  or  festival  of  Bacchus,  will  be 
spoken  of  more  fully  hereafter. 

3  The  choregus,  or  choir-master,  of  each  tribe,  had  to  defray  the 
expense  of  the  choruses,  whether  dramatic,  lyric,  or  musical,  which 
formed  part  of  the  entertainment  on  solemn  occasions.  This  was  one 
of  the  \urovpylcu,  or  burdensome  offices,  to  which  men  of  property  were 
liable  at  Athens  ;  of  which  we  shall  see  more  in  other  parts  of  our 
author. 

4  The  gymnasiarch,  like  the  choregus,  had  a  burden  imposed  on  him 
by  his  tribe,  to  make  certain  provisions  for  the  gymnasium,  public 
place  or  school  of  exercise.  Some  of  the  contests  at  the  festivals  being 
of  a  gymnastic  nature,  such  as  the  Torch-race,  it  was  his  duty  to  make 
arrangements  for  them,  and  more  particularly  to  select  the  ablest  youths 
of  the  school  for  performers. 

5  For  every  ship  of  war  a  captain,  or  trierarcb,  was  appointed,  whose 
duty  it  was,  not  merely  to  command,  but  take  charge  of  the  vessel,  keep 
it  in  repair,  and  bear  the  expense  (partly  or  wholly)  of  equipping  it. 
Jn  the  Peloponnesian  war  we  find  the  charge  laid  upon  two  joint 
captains,  and  afterwards  it  was  borne  by  an  association  formed  like  the 
Symmoriae   of  the   Property  Tax.      Demosthenes,  when   he  came   t: 


70  THE    OKATIOXS    OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

and  means  ;  then  it  is  resolved  that  resident  aliens  and  house- 
holders '  shall  embark,  then  to  put  yourselves  on  board  instead: 
but  during  these  delays  the  objects  of  our  expedition  are  lost; 
for  the  time  of  action  we  waste  in  preparation,  and  favour- 
able moments  wait  not  our  evasions  and  delays.  The  forces 
that  we  imagine  we  possess  in  the  meantime,  are  found,  when 
the  crisis  comes,  utterly  insufficient.  And  Philip  has  arrived 
at  such  a  pitch  of  arrogance,  as  to  send  the  following  letter 
to  the  Euboeans  : 

[The  letter  is  read.~\ 
Of  that  which  has  been  read,  Athenians,  most  is  true, 
unhappily  true ;  perhaps  not  agreeable  to  hear.  And  if  what 
one  passes  over  in  speaking,  to  avoid  offence,  one  could  pass 
over  in  reality,  it  is  right  to  humour  the  audience  :  but  if 
graciousness  of  speech,  where  it  is  out  of  place,  does  harm  in 
action,  shameful  is  it,  Athenians,  to  delude  ourselves,  and  by 
putting  off  everything  unpleasant  to  miss  the  time  for  all 
operations,  and  be  unable  even  to  understand,  that  skilful 
makers  of  war  should  not  follow  circumstances,  but  be  in 
advance  of  them  ;  that  just  as  a  general  may  be  expected  to 
lead  his  armies,  so  are  men  of  prudent  counsel  to  guide 
circumstances,  in  order  that  then  resolutions  may  be  accom- 
plished, not  their  motions  determined  by  the  event.  Yet 
you,  Athenians,  with  larger  means  than  any  people, — ships, 
infantry,  cavalry,  and  revenue — have  never  up  to  this  day 
made  proper  use  of  any  of  them ;  and  your  war  with  Philip 
differs  in  no  respect  from  the  boxing  of  barbarians.  For 
among  them  the  party  struck  feels  always  for  the  blow;2 
strike  him  somewDere  else,  there  go  his  hands  again;  ward  or 
look  in  the  face  he  cannot  nor  will.     So  you,  if  you  hear  of 

the  head  of  affairs,  introduced  some  useful  reforms  in  the  svstem  of  the 
Trierarchy. 

The  exchange,  ivriZoais,  was  a  stringent  but  clumsy  contrivance,  to 
enforce  the  performance  of  these  public  duties  by  persons  capable  of 
bearing  them.  A  party  charged  might  call  upon  any  other  person  to 
take  the  office,  or  exchange  estates  with  him.  If  he  refused,  complaint 
was  made  to  the  magistrate  who  had  cognisance  of  the  business,  and  the 
dispute  was  judicially  heard  and  decided. 

1  Freedmen,  who  had  quitted  their  masters'  house,  and  lived 
independently. 

2  Compare  Virgil.  _£n.  ix.  577. 

Ille  manum  projecto  tegmine  demens 
Ad  vulnus  tulit. 


THE    FIRST    PHILIPPIC.  71 

Philip  in  the  Chersonese,  vote  to  seni  relief  there,  if  at 
Thermopylae,  the  same;  if  anywhere  else,  you  run  after  his 
heels  up  and  down,  and  are  commanded  by  him;  no  plan 
have  you  devised  for  the  war,  no  circumstance  do  you  see 
beforehand,  only '  when  you  learn  that  something  is  done,  or 
about  to  be  done.  Formerly  perhaps  this  was  allowable : 
now  it  is  come  to  a  crisis,  to  be  tolerable  no  longer.  And  it 
seems,  men  of  Athens,  as  if  some  god,  ashamed  for  us  at  our 
proceedings,  has  put  this  activity  into  Philip.  For  had  he 
been  willing  to  remain  quiet  in  possession  of  his  conquests 
and  prizes,  and  attempted  nothing  further,  some  of  you, 
I  think,  would  be  satisfied  with  a  state  of  things,  which 
brands  our  nation  with  the  shame  of  cowardice  and  the 
foulest  disgrace.  But  by  continually  encroaching  and  grasp- 
ing after  more,  he  may  possibly  rouse  you,  if  you  have  not 
altogether  despaired.  I  marvel,  indeed,  that  none  of  you, 
Athenians,  notices  with  concern  and  anger,  that  the  beginning 
of  this  war  was  to  chastise  Philip,  the  end  is  to  protect  our- 
selves against  his  attacks.  One  thing  is  clear  :  he  will  not 
stop,  unless  some  one  oppose  him.  And  shall  we  wait  for 
this  1  And  if  you  despatch  empty  galleys  and  hopes  from 
this  or  that  person,  think  ye  all  is  well  1  Shall  we  not  em- 
bark ?  Shall  we  not  sail  with  at  least  a  part  of  our  na- 
tional forces,  now  though  not  before  1  Shall  we  not  make 
a  descent  upon  his  coast  1  Where,  then,  shall  we  land  1 
some  one  asks.  The  war  itself,  men  of  Athens,  will  discover 
the  rotten  parts  of  his  empire,  if  we  make  a  trial ;  but  if 
we  sit  at  home,  hearing  the  orators  accuse  and  malign  one 
another,  no  good  can  ever  be  achieved.  Methinks,  where  a 
portion  of  our  citizens,  though  not  all,  are  commissioned  with 
the  rest,  Heaven  blesses,  and  Fortune  aids  the  struggle  :  but 
where  you  send  out  a  general  and  an  empty  decree  and  hopes 
from  the  hustings,  nothing  that  you  desire  is  done;  your 
enemies  scoff,  and  your  allies  die  for  fear  of  such  an  arma- 
ment. For  it  is  impossible, — aye,  impossible,  for  one  man  to 
execute  all  your  wishes  :  to  promise,2  and  assert,  and  accuse 
this  or  that  person,  is  possible ;  but  so  your  affairs  are  ruined. 

1  This  loose  mode   of  expression,   which  is  found  in  the  original, 
I  designedly  retain. 

2  Chares  is  particularly  alluded  to.    The  "  promises  of  Chares"  passed 
into  a  proverb. 


72  THE    ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

The  general  commands  wretched  unpaid  hirelings;  here 
are  persons  easily  found,  who  tell  you  lies  of  his  conduct; 
you  vote  at  random  from  what  you  hear :  what  then  can  be 
expected  ? 

How  is  this  to  cease,  Athenians  1  When  you  make  the 
same  persons  soldiers,  and  witnesses  of  the  general's  conduct, 
and  judges  when  they  return  home  at  his  audit ; '  so  that  you 
may  not  only  hear  of  your  own  affairs,  but  be  present  to  see 
them.  So  disgraceful  is  our  condition  now,  that  every 
general  is  twice  or  thrice  tried2  before  you  for  his  life,  though 
none  dares  even  once  to  hazard  his  life  against  the  enemy : 
they  prefer  the  death  of  kidnappers  and  thieves  to  that  which 
becomes  them ;  for  it  is  a  malefactor's  part  to  die  by  sentence 
of  the  law,  a  general's  to  die  in  battle.  Among  ourselves, 
some  go  about  and  say  that  Philip  is  concerting  with  the 
Lacedsernonians  the  destruction  of  Thebes  and  the  dissolution 
of  republics;  some,  that  he  has  sent  envoys  to  the  king;3 
others,  that  he  is  fortifying  cities  in  Illyria  :  so  we  wander 
about,  each  inventing  stories.  For  my  part,  Athenians,  by 
the  gods  I  believe,  that  Philip  is  intoxicated  with  the  magni- 
tude of  his  exploits,  and  has  many  such  dreams  in  his  imagina- 
tion, seeing  the  absence  of  opponents,  and  elated  by  success ; 
but  most  certainly  he  has  no  such  plan  of  action,  as  to  let  the 
silliest  people  among  us  know  what  his  intentions  are ;  for 
the  silliest  are  these  newsmongers.  Let  us  dismiss  such  talk, 
and  remember  only  that  Philip  is  an  enemy,  who  robs  us  of 
our  own  and  has  long  insulted  us;  that  wherever  we  have 
expected  aid  from  any  quarter,  it  has  been  found  hostile,  and 
that  the  future  depends  on  ourselves,  and  unless  we  are 
willing  to  fight  him  there,  we  shall  perhaps  be  compelled  to 
fight  here.     This  let  us  remember,  and  then  we  shall  have 

1  The  audit  or  scrutiny  of  his  conduct  which  every  officer  of  the 
republic  had  to  undergo,  before  a  jury,  if  necessary,  at  the  end  of  his 
administration.  In  the  case  of  a  general,  the  scrutiny  would  be  like  a 
court-martial.  The  Athenian  people,  (says  Demosthenes,)  as  represented 
by  the  citizen  soldiers,  would  themselves  be  witnesses  of  the  general's 
conduct.  These  same  soldiers,  when  they  came  home,  or  at  least  a 
portion  of  them,  might  serve  on  the  jury ;  and  so  the  people  would  be 
both  witnesses  and  judges. 

2  Chares  was  tried  several  timea  Capital  charges  were  preferred  also 
against  Autocles,  Cephisodotus,  Leosthenes,  Callisthenes. 

'■*  The  king  of  Persia,  generally  called  the  king  by  the  Greeks. 


ON    THE    l'EACE.  7  J 

determined    wisely,   and    have   done   with   idle    conjectures. 

You  need  not  pry  into  the  future,  but  assure  yourselves  it 
will  he  disastrous,  unless  you  attend  to  your  duty,  and  are 
willing  to  act  as  becomes  you. 

As  for  me,  never  before  have  I  courted  favour,  by  speaking 
what  I  am  not  convinced  is  for  your  good,  and  now  I  have 
spoken  my  whole  mind  frankly  and  unreservedly.  I  could 
have  wished,  knowing  the  advantage  of  good  counsel  to  you, 
I  were  equally  certain  of  its  advantage  to  the  counsellor  :  so 
should  I  have  spoken  with  more  satisfaction.  Now,  with  an 
uncertainty  of  the  consequence  to  myself,  but  with  a  convic- 
tion that  you  will  benefit  by  adopting  it,  I  proffer  my  advice. 
I  trust  only,  that  what  is  most  for  the  common  benefit  will 
prevail 


THE  ORATION  ON  THE  PEACE. 

THE    ARGUMENT. 

To  understand  as  well  the  subject  of  this  oration,  as  the  motives  of 
Demosthenes,  who  here  recommends  a  course  of  action  different 
from  the  vigorous  measures  counselled  by  him  on  other  occasions,  it 
is  necessary  to  take  a  short  review  of  the  preceding  events,  and 
observe  the  position  in  which  Athens  stood  at  the  time  when  the 
speech  was  delivered. 

Philip,  after  taking  Olynthus,  turned  his  thoughts  to  new  objects,  of 
which  the  more  immediate  were,  first,  to  get  possession  of  the  Greek 
towns  on  the  Hellespont  and  the  Chersonese ;  secondly,  to  get  a  foot- 
ing in  southern  Greece.  The  first  of  these  seemed  comparatively  easy 
since  the  reduction  of  Olynthus  ;  the  second  was  more  difficult,  and 
could  only  be  accomplished  by  the  aid  or  sufferance  of  certain  Greek 
states.  But  the  continuance  of  the  Sacred  war  afforded  Philip  an 
opportunity  of  which  he  skilfully  availed  himself.  Phalfficus,  son  of 
Onomarchus,  had  maintained  his  ground  against  the  enemy,  and 
both  Tuebans  and  Thessalians  began  to  be  desirous  of  Macedonian  aid. 
But  Athens  was  in  alliance  with  Phocis,  and  Philip  had  seen  some 
few  years  before,  when  the  Athenians  occupied  the  pass  of  Thermopylsa, 
that  they  were  still  capable  of  vigorous  efforts,  if  under  able  direction 
or  any  strong  excitement.  It  became  therefore  his  policy  to  conci- 
liate Athens  for  the  present.  He  caused  it  to  be  announced  by  means 
of  his  agents  and  partisans,  that  he  was  desirous  of  peace,  and  reports 
of  vari  >us  acts  of  kindness  done  by  him  to  Athenian  citizens  in 
Macedonia  were  studiously  disseminated.  This  seems  to  have  been 
the  pernd  at  which  Philip  gained  over  to  his  interest,  or  even  retained 


7  A  THE    ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

% 
in  Lis  service,  divers  active  members  of  the  Athenian  assembly 
Among  them  was  Philocrates.  who  first  made  a  formal  motion,  that 
Philip  should  have  leave  to  open  a  negotiation.  Soon  after  he  carried 
a  decree  to  send  ambassadors  to  Philip,  and  ten  were  despatched, 
among  them  Philocrates  himself,  .Esehines,  and  Demosthenes.  They 
returned  with  a  letter  from  Philip,  and  were  soon  followed  by  three 
Macedonian  envoys  of  high  distinction,  Antipater,  Parmenio,  and 
Euryloehus.  The  Athenians  met  in  assembly;  peace  was  determined 
on,  and  the  ambassadors  were  again  ordered  to  sail  to  Macedonia  to 
receive  the  oath  of  Philip.  In  the  meantime  Philip  had  marched 
into  Thrace,  where  he  defeated  Cersobleptes,  the  king  of  that  country, 
and  took  possession  of  a  part  of  his  dominions.  From  this  expedition 
he  had  not  returned  when  the  Athenian  ambassadors  arrived  at  Pella, 
the  Macedonian  capital.  Here  they  waited  a  month,  and,  on  Philip's 
return,  were  induced  by  that  monarch,  who  had  secretly  prepared  tor 
his  invasion  of  Phocis,  to  accompany  him  as  far  as  Phera?  in  Thessaly. 
From  Phera  they  departed  for  Athens,  and  Philip  marched  straight 
to  Thermopylae  The  Athenians,  deceived  by  his  promises,  were 
lulled  into  security;  Phalaecus.  seeing  no  hope  of  assistance,  withdrew 
from  Phocis,  while  Philip,  strengthened  by  the  forces  of  Thessaly  and 
Thebes,  overran  the  country,  and  took  possession  of  Delphi.  An 
Amphictyonic  council  was  convened  to  sit  in  judgment  on  the  sacri- 
legious Phocians.  Sentence  was  passed  on  them,  which  (besides  other 
penalties)  deprived  them  of  their  seat  in  the  council  of  Amphictyons, 
and  transferred  their  privileges  to  the  king  of  Macedonia, 

The  first  intelligence  of  these  transactions  was  received  at  Athens  with 
consternation.  Measures  were  taken  to  put  the  city  in  a  state  of 
defence,  as  if  an  invasion  were  threatened.  Philip  sent  a  calm  letter 
of  remonstiance,  which  allayed  the  fears  of  the  people,  but  did  not 
abate  their  anger  and  ill-humour.  A  feeling  of  disappointment 
was  mingled  with  shame  for  their  own  credulity,  and  alarm  at  the 
increase  of  Macedonian  influence.  They  saw  too,  with  deep  vexation 
that  Philip,  instead  of  conferring  any  benefit  upon  Athens,  as  they  had 
fondly  hoped  he  would,  had  exerted  himself  to  promote  the  advantage 
of  Thebes,  which,  by  his  assistance,  recovered  her  subject  Boeotian 
towns,  and  even  obtained  some  of  the  Phocian  territory  for  herself. 
Kothing  more  strongly  marked  the  state  of  public  feeling  at  Athens, 
than  her  refusal  at  this  time  to  attend  the  Pythian  games,  at  which 
Philip  had  been  chosen  to  preside  by  the  Amphictyonic  decree.  The 
Athenians  by  absenting  themselves  made  a  sort  of  protest  against  his 
ebction. 

It  was  in  this  state  of  things  that  Macedonian  ambassadors,  accompanied 
by  Thessalian  and  Boeotian,  arrived  at  Athens,  to  demand  from  her  a 
formal  sanction  of  the  decree  by  which  Philip  had  become  a  member 
of  the  Amphictyonic  council.  An  assembly  was  held  to  consider  the 
question.  The  people  were  exceedingly  clamorou*,  and  applauded 
those  orators  who  opposed  the  claim  of  Philip.  .Eschines,  who  sup- 
ported it,  could  scarcely  obtain  a  hearing.  Demosthenes  at  length 
addressed  the  assembly,  and,  without  advising  any  dishonourable 
submission,  or  ever  direct  concession  to  what  the  envoys  required, 
etrongly  dissuaded  his  countrymen  from  taking  any  course  which 


ON    THE    PEACE.  i  O 

might  draw  Athens  into  a  war.  It  was  not  that  Philip  was  less  to  bo 
dreaded  now  than  he  was  before;  on  the  contrary,  his  power  had 
greatly  increased  ;  but  this  was  not  the  time  to  provoke  his  hostility, 
backed  as  he  was  by  Thessaly  and  Thebes ;  and  even  if  Athens  could 
stand  alone  against  such  a  combination,  a  mere  Ampbictyonic  title 
was  not  a  proper  subject  of  quarrel. 
It  appears  that  the  Athenians  came  to  no  formal  vote  on  this  matter, 
but  their  anger  was  so  far  calmed  by  the  arguments  of  Demosthenes, 
that  the  envoys  departed  with  full  confidence  that  the  peace  would 
not  be  broken. 

I  see,  men  of  Athens,  our  affairs  are  in  great  perplexity  and 
confusion,  not  only  because  many  interests  have  been  sacri- 
ficed, and  it  is  useless  to  make  fine  speeches  about  them,  but 
because,  for  preserving  what  remains,  you  cannot  agree  upon 
any  single  expedient,  some  holding  one  opinion,  and  some 
another.  And  besides,  perplexing  and  difficult  as  deliberation 
of  itself  is.  you,  Athenians,  have  rendered  it  far  more  so. 
For  other  men  usually  hold  counsel  before  action,  you  hold  it 
after  :  the  result  of  which  during  all  the  time  of  my  remem- 
brance has  been,  that  the  censurer  of  your  errors  gets  repute 
and  credit  as  a  good  speaker,  whde  your  interests  and  objects 
of  deliberation  are  lost.  Yet,  even  under  these  circum- 
stances, I  believe,  and  I  have  risen  with  the  persuasion,  that 
if  you  will  desist  from  wrangling  and  tumult,  and  listen  as 
becomes  men  on  a  political  consultation  of  such  importance, 
I  shall  be  able  to  suggest  and  advise  measures  by  which  our 
affairs  may  be  improved  and  our  losses  retrieved. 

Well  as  I  know,  Athenians,  that  to  talk  before  you  of  one- 
self and  one's  own  counsels  is  a  successful  artifice  with 
unscrupulous  men,  I  think  it  so  vulgar  and  offensive,  that 
I  shrink  from  it  even  in  a  case  of  necessity.  However,  I 
think  you  will  better  appreciate  what  I  shall  say  now,  by 
calling  to  mind  a  little  that  I  said  on  former  occasions.  For 
example,  Athenians,  when  they  were  advising  you  in  the 
troubles  of  Eubcea  to  assist  Plutarch,1  and  undertake  a  dis- 

1  Callias,  sovereign  of  Chalcis,  had  invited  Philip  into  Eubcea,  to 
assist  him  against  Plutarch,  sovereign  of  Eretria ;  Plutarch  applied  to 
Athens  for  assistance,  and  Phocion  was  sent  with  an  army  into  Eubcea, 
where,  by  the  carelessness  or  treachery  of  Plutarch,  he  was  exposed  in  a 
defile  at  Tamynae,  and  attacked  by  Callias  with  a  superior  force  of  Chalci- 
dians  and  Macedonians.  He  gained  the  victory,  but  to  punish  Plutarch 
expelled  him  from  Eretria.  This  happened  b.  c.  354.  After  Phocion 
quitted  the  island,  a  Macedonian  party  began  to  prevail  at  Eretria,  and 
Philip  got  possession  of  the  city,  defeating  and  taking  prisoner  MoIossur, 
•  bo  Athenian  commander. 


76  THE    ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

creditable  and  expensive  war,  I,  and  I  alone,  stood  forward  to 
oppose  it,  and  was  nearly  torn  to  pieces  by  the  men  who  for 
petty  lucre  have  seduced  you  into  many  grievous  errors. 
A  short  time  later,  when  you  incurred  disgrace,  and  suffered 
what  no  mortals  ever  did  from  parties  whom  they  assisted, 
you  all  acknowledged  the  worthlessness  of  their  counsels 
who  mis-ed  you,  and  the  soundness  of  mine.  Again,  Athe- 
nians, when  I  saw  that  Neoptolemus1  the  actor,  privileged 
under  colour  of  his  profession,  was  doing  serious  mischief  to 
the  state,  managing  and  directing  things  at  Athens  on  Philip's 
behalf,  I  came  and  informed  you,  not  from  any  private 
enmity  or  malice,  as  subsequent  occurrences  have  shown. 
And  herein  I  shall  not  blame  the  advocates  of  Neoptolemus, 
(for  there  were  none,)  but  you  yourselves ;  for  had  you  been 
seeing  a  tragedy  in  the  temple  of  Bacchus,  instead  of  it  being 
a  debate  on  the  public  weal  and  safety,  you  could  not  have 
heard  him  with  more  partiality,  or  me  with  more  intolerance. 
But  I  suppose  you  all  now  understand,  that  he  made  his 
journey  to  the  enemy,  in  order  (as  he  said)  to  get  the  debts 
there  owing  to  him,  and  defray  thereout  his  public  charges  at 
home ;  and,  after  urging  this  argument,  that  it  was  hard  to 
reproach  men  who  brought  over  their  effects  from  abroad,  as 
soon  as  he  obtained  security  through  the  peace,  he  converted 
into  money  all  the  real  estate  which  he  possessed  here,  and 
has  gone  off  with  it  to  Philip.  Thus  two  of  my  warnings, 
justly  and  rightfully  pronounced  in  accordance  with  the 
truth,  testify  in  my  favour  as  a  counsellor.  A  third,  men  of 
Athens,  I  will  mention,  this  one  only,  and  straight  proceed  to 
the  subject  of  my  address.  When  we  ambassadors,  after 
receiving  the  oaths  on  the  peace,  had  returned,  and  certain 
men  were  promising  that  Thespise  and  Platsea2  would  be 
repeopled;  that  Philip,  if  he  got  the  mastery,  would  save  the 
Phocians,and  disperse  the  population  of  Thebes;3  that  Oropus4 

1  Xeoptolemus on  some  professional  enga*?mentat  Pellahad  probably 
l>een  bribed  by  Philip.  He  was  active  in  promoting  the  peace,  and 
afterwards  abandoned  his  country  for  Macedonia. 

2  Thespise  and  Plataea  were  taken  and  rased  to  the  ground  by  the 
Thebans  under  Epaminondas,  b.  c  373. 

3  That  is,  dismantle  the  city,  and  disperse  the  inhabitants  into 
villages  in  order  to  destroy  'heir  power.  An  example  of  such  a  StclKuris 
was  the  dismemberment  of  Mmtin^a  by  the  Spartans  in  the  year 
B.c  385. 

*  Oropus  was  a  border  town,  for  tlu  possession  of  which  Thebes  auJ 


OX    THE    TEACE.  77 

would  be  yours,  and  Euboea  given  as  compensation  for  Am- 
phipolis,  with  rnrre  of  the  like  hopes  and  delusions,  which  led 
you  on,  against  policy,  equity  and  honour,  to  abandon  the 
Phociaus;  you  will  find,  I  neither  aided  in  any  of  these 
deceits,  nor  held  my  tongue.  1  warned  you,  as  you  surely 
remember,  that  I  knew  not  of  these  things  nor  expected 
them,  and  deemed  it  all  idle  gossip. 

These  instances,  wherein  I  have  shown  greater  foresight 
than  others,  I  mention  not  by  way  of  boast,  nor  ascribe, 
Athenians,  to  any  sagacity  of  my  own,  nor  will  I  pretend  to 
discover  or  discern  the  future  from  any  but  two  causes,  which 
I  will  state  :  first,  men  of  Athens,  through  good  fortune, 
which  I  observe  beats  all  the  craft  and  cleverness  of  man ; 
secondly,  because  I  judge  and  estimate  things  disinterestedly, 
and  no  one  can  show  that  any  lucre  is  attached  to  my  politics 
or  my  speeches.  Therefore,  whatever  be  your  true  policy,  as 
indicated  by  the  circumstances,  I  have  a  correct  view  of  it ; 
but  when  you  put  money  on  one  side  as  in  a  balance,  it 
carries  away  and  pulls  down  the  judgment  with  it,  and  he 
that  does  so  can  no  longer  reason  upon  anything  justly  or 
soundly. 

The  first  thing  which  I  maintain  to  be  necessary  is  this. 
Whether  you  seek  to  obtain  allies,  or  contribution, '  or  aught 
else  for  the  state,  do  it  without  disturbing  the  present  peace ; 
not  that  it  is  very  glorious  or  worthy  of  you,  but,  whatever 
be  its  character,  it  had  better  suited  our  interests  never  to 
have  made  peace,  than  to  break  it  ourselves  :  for  we  have 
thrown  away  many  advantages,  which  would  have  rendered 
the  war  then  safer  and  easier  for  us  than  it  can  be  now. 
Secondly,  Athenians,  we  must  take  care  that  these  people 
assembled  and  calling  themselves  Amphictyons2  are  not  by 

Athens  had  long  contended.  Themison  of  Eretria  had  taken  it  from 
Athens,  and  put  it  in  the  hands  of  the  Thebans. 

1  1.  e.  money  contributed  by  allies.  When  the  Athenians  reestab- 
lished their  confederacy,  which  had  been  dissolved  by  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  war,  the  payments  received  from  the  allies  received  the  name  of 
contributions,  a-vvra^is,  as  less  obnoxious  than  tribute,  <popos. 

2  The  Amphictyonic  league,  at  the  head  of  which  Philip  was  now 
placed,  was  a  federal  union  of  Hellenic  (or  Greek)  tribes,  having  for  its 
object  the  maintenance  of  a  common  religion  and  nationality.  The 
various  deputies  met  twice  a-year,  in  the  spring  at  Delphi,  in  the  autumn 
at  Anthela  near  Thermopylae.  They  met,  not  only  to  celebrate  games 
»ud  festivals,  but  to  transact  the  business  of  the  league,  to  determine) 


78  THE    ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

us  necessitated,  or  furnished  with  a  plea,  to  make  a  common 
war  against  us.  I  grant,  if  we  renewed  the  war  with  Philip 
en  account  of  Amphipolis,  or  any  such  private  quarrel,  in 
which  Thessalians,  Argives  and  Thebans  are  not  concerned, 
none  of  them  would  join  in  it,  and  least  of  all — hear  me 
before  you  cry  out — the  Thebans  :  not  that  they  are  kindly 
disposed  to  us,  or  would  not  gratify  Philip,  but  they  see 
clearly,  stupid  as  one  may  think  them,1  that,  if  they  had 
a  war  with  you,  the  hardships  would  all  be  theirs,  while 
another  sat  waiting  for  the  advantages.  Therefore  they 
would  not  throw  themselves  into  it.  unless  the  ground  and 
origin  of  the  war  were  common.  So  if  we  agaiu  went  to  war 
with  the  Thebans  for  Oropus  or  any  private  cause,  I  should 
fear  no  disaster,  because  our  respective  auxiliaries  would  assist 
us  or  them,  if  either  country  were  invaded,  but  would  join 
with  neither  in  aggression.  Such  is  the  spirit  of  alliances 
that  are  worth  regard,  and  so  the  thing  naturally  is.  People 
are  not  friendly  either  to  us  or  the  Thebans,  to  the  extent  of 
equally  desiring  our  safety  and  our  predominance.  Safe  they 
would  all  have  us  for  their  own  sakes;  dominant,  so  as  to 
become  their  masters,  they  would  not  have  either  of  us. 
What  then,  say  I,  is  the  danger?  what  to  be  guarded  against? 
Lest  in  the  coming  war  there  be  found  a  common  plea,  a 
common  grievance  for  all.  If  Argives,  and  Messenians,  and 
Megalopolitans,  and  some  of  the  other  Peloponnesians,  who 
are  in  league  with  them,  are  hostile  to  us  on  account  of  our 
negotiating  with  the  Lacedaemonians  and  seeming  to  take  up 
some  of  their  enterprises;  if  the  Thebans  are  (as  they  say) 
our  enemies,  and  will  be  more  so,  because  we  harbour  their 

questions  of  international  law  and  religion.  The  oracular  sanctity  of 
Delphi  gave  a  dignity  to  these  meetings,  but  the  rivalry  and  jealousies 
of  the  more  powerful  Greek  states  did  not  permit  them  (in  general)  to 
be  controlled  by  Amphictyonic  decrees.  The  three  Sacred  wars  are 
instances  in  which  their  decrees  were  enforced  by  combination;  but  in 
the  two  last,  for  which  Philip's  aid  was  invited,  there  was  but  little 
enthusiasm  in  the  cause  fron>  any  motive  of  religion  or  patriotism.  The 
meeting  at  which  Philip  had  l^.en  chosen  president  was  so  tumultuous 
and  irregular,  that  the  Athenians  would  not  allow  it  to  be  a  legal  con- 
vocation of  the  Amphictyonic  body.  Philip  greatly  resented  this, 
because  his  election  was  considered  to  establish  the  title  of  his  country- 
men to  rank  among  the  Greek  nations. 

1  Boeotian  stupidity  was  proverbial.     So  Horace,  Epist.  II   i.  224. 
Bceotum  in  cra-so  jurares  acre  natum. 


ON    THE    PEACE.  79 

exiles  and  in  every  way  manifest  our  aversion  to  them ; 
Thessalians  again,  because  we  harbour  the  Phocian  exiles, 
and  Philip,  because  we  oppose  his  admission  to  the  Ampliic- 
tyonic  body  j  I  fear  that,  each  incensed  on  a  private  quarrel, 
they  will  combine  to  bring  war  upon  you,  setting  up  the 
decrees  of  the  Amphictyons,  and  be  drawn  on  (beyond  what 
their  single  interests  require)  to  battle  it  with  us,  as  they  did 
with  the  Phocians.  For  you  are  surely  aware,  that  now  the 
Thebans  and  Philip  and  the  Thessalians  have  cooperated, 
without  having  each  exactly  the  same  views.  For  example, 
the  Thebans  could  not  hinder  Philip  from  advancing  and 
occupying  the  passes,  nor  yet  from  coming  last  and  having 
the  credit  of  their  labours.  True,  in  respect  of  territorial 
acquisition,  something  has  been  done  for  them  ;  but  in  regard 
to  honour  and  reputation,  they  have  fared  wretchedly ;  since, 
had  Philip  not  stept  in,  they  would  (it  seems)  have  got 
nothing.  This  was  not  agreeable  to  them,  but  having  the 
wish  without  the  power  to  obtain  Orchomenos  and  Coronea, 
they  submitted  to  it  all.  Of  Philip,  you  know,  some  persons 
venture  to  say,  that  he  would  not  have  given  Orchomenos 
and  Coronea  to  the  Thebans,  but  was  compelled  to  do  sc. 
I  wish  them  joy  of  their  opinion,1  but  thus  far  I  believe 
that  he  cared  not  so  much  about  that  business,  as  he  desired 
to  occupy  the  passes,  and  have  the  glory  of  the  war,  as  being 
determined  by  his  agency,  and  the  direction  of  the  Pythian 
names.  Such  were  the  objects  of  his  ambition.  The  Thes- 
salians wished  not  either  Philip  or  Thebes  to  be  aggrandised, 
since  in  both  they  saw  danger  to  themselves ;  but  sought  to 

1  Demosthenes  did  not  entirely  scout  the  suggestion  made  with  regard 
to  Philip's  views;  but  perhaps  he  thought  that  Philip  could  not  venture 
to  offend  his  Theban  allies  then ;  and  one  of  the  means  of  humbling 
Athens  was,  to  increase  the  power  of  her  neighbour.  If  it  be  asked  why 
Philip  might  not  have  seized  upon  Elatea  at  this  time,  as  well  as  eight 
years  later,  I  should  say,  not  on  account  of  the  peace  with  Athens,  but 
because  he  desired  to  rest  upon  his  Amphictyonic  honours,  and  have  the 
full  benefit  of  the  moral  ascendency  which  he  had  acquired.  It  was  not 
clear  that  his  grand  object,  which  was  rather  to  lead  than  to  conquer 
Greece,  might  not  be  obtained  without  a  war  against  any  of  her  principal 
states.  Afterwards,  when  the  Athenians,  under  the  active  administra- 
tion of  Demosthenes,  baffled  his  efforts  in  the  north,  and  showed  a  deter- 
mination to  counteract  all  his  projects,  it  became  necessary  for  him  to 
strike  a  decisive  blow,  even  at  the  risk  of  irritating  Thebes.  He  ran 
this  risk,  and  succeeded,  but  not  without  danger. 


80  THE    ORATIONS    OF    DEMOSTHENES. 

obtain  these  two  advantages,  the  synod  at  Thermopylae,  and 
the  privileges  at  Delphi ; '  for  which  objects  they  aided  the 
coiifedBracy.  Thus  you  will  find  that  each  party  has  been 
Led  into  many  acts  unwillingly  :  and  against  this  danger, 
being  such  as  I  describe,  you  must  take  precautions. 

Must  we  then  do  as  we  are  bidden,  for  fear  of  the  conse- 
quences 1  and  do  you  recommend  this  1  Far  from  it.  I 
advise  you  so  to  act,  as  not  to  compromise  your  dignity,  to 
avoid  war,  to  prove  yourselves  right-thinking,  just-speaking 
men.  AVith  those  who  think  we  should  boldly  suffer  anything, 
and  do  not  foresee  the  war,  I  would  reason  thus.  We  permit 
the  Thebans  to  have  Oropus ;  and  if  one  asked  us  why,  and 
required  a  true  answer,  we  should  say,  To  avoid  war.  And  to 
Philip  now  we  have  ceded  Amphipoiis  by  treaty,  and  allow 
the  Cardiaus2  to  be  excepted  from  the  other  people  of  tho 
Chersonese ;  and  the  Carian3  to  seize  the  islands  Chios,  Cos, 
and  Rhodoe,  and  the  Byzantines  to  detain  *  our  vessels ;  evi- 
dently because  we  think  the  tranquillity  of  peace  more 
beneficial  tnan  strife  and  contest  about  such  questions.  It 
were  folly  then  and  utter  absurdity,  after  dealing  thus  with 
each  party  singly  on  matters  of  vital  moment  to  ourselves, 
to  battle  now  with  them  all  for  a  shadow  at  Delphi. 

1  The  Thessalians  were  peculiarly  aggrieved  by  their  exclusion 
(during  the  Sacred  war)  from  the  national  synod,  and  from  the  oracle 
and  festivities  of  Delphi.  Their  country  had  been  the  cradle  of  the 
Hellenic  race,  their  deputies  were  the  most  numerous  in  the  council,  and 
their  vicinity  to  the  places  of  meeting  gave  them  a  greater  interest  in 
the  proceedings.  Hence  they  most  eagerly  pressed  for  punishment  of 
the  Phocians  The  tribes  of  Mount  (Eta  proposed,  that  the  male  popu- 
lation of  Fhocis  should  be  precipitated  from  the  Delphian  rock ;  which 
cruel fy  was  not  permitted  by  Philip.  To  gratify  the  Thessalians, 
Philip  put  them  in  possession  of  Nica;a,  one  of  the  towns  near  the  pass 
of  Thermopylae,  but  even  there  he  kept  a  Macedonian  garrison.  The 
Thebans  had  expected  to  have  that  town  themselves,  and  were  disap- 
pointed. 

2  Cardia  was  a  city  at  the  north-western  extremity  of  the  Chersonese, 
and  from  its  position  on  the  isthmus  was  considered  the  key  of  the 
peninsula.  Among  the  towns  ceded  to  Athens  by  Cersobleptes,  Cardia 
had  not  been  included  ;  but  the  Athenians  afterwards  laid  claim  to  it, 
and  Philip  supported  the  Cardians  in  resisting  that  claim. 

3  Idrieus,  king  of  Caria,  who  was  now  in  possession  of  these  island^ 
which  had  revolted  from  Athens  in  the  Social  war. 

1  Compel  thera  to  go  into  their  port  to  paj  barboui  dutie3- 


THE    SECOND    PHILIPPIC  81 


THE  SECOND  PHILIPPIC. 


THE    ARGUMENT. 

Soon  after  the  close  of  the  Phociaa  war,  the  attention  of  Philip  was 
called  to  Peloponnesus,  where  the  dissensions  between  Sparta  and 
her  old  enemies  afforded  him  an  occasion  of  interference.  The 
Spartans  had  never  abandoned  their  right  to  the  province  of  Mes- 
senia,  which  had  been  wrested  from  them  by  Epaminondas;  and 
since  Thebes  was  no  longer  to  be  feared,  they  seem  to  have  conceived 
hopes  of  regaining  their  lost  power.  The  Argives  and  the  Arcadians  of 
Megalopolis  were  in  league  with  Messenia,  hut  Sparta  had  her  allies 
in  the  Peloponnesus,  and  even  Athens  was  suspected  of  favouring 
her  cause.  It  does  not  appear  that  any  open  hostilities  had  taken 
place ;  but  about  this  time  the  fears  of  the  Messenians  induced  them 
to  solicit  the  alliance  of  Philip.  He  willingly  promised  them  his 
protection,  and  sent  a  body  of  troops  into  the  Peninsula.  The 
progress  which  Macedonian  influence  was  making  there  having 
alarmed  the  Athenians,  they  sent  Demosthenes  with  an  embassy  to 
counteract  it.  He  went  to  Messene  and  to  Argos,  addressed  the 
people,  and  pointed  out  the  dangers  to  which  all  Greece  was  exposed 
by  Philip's  ambition.  It  seems  that  he  failed  in  rousing  their  sus- 
picions, or  they  were  too  much  occupied  by  an  immediate  peril  to  heed 
one  that  appeared  remote.  Philip  however  resented  this  proceeding 
on  the  part  of  the  Athenians,  and  sent  an  embassy  to  expostulate 
with  them,  especially  on  the  charge  of  bad  faith  and  treachery  which 
had  been  preferred  against  him  by  Demosthenes.  Ambassadors  from 
Argos  and  Messene  accompanied  those  of  Macedon,  and  complained 
of  the  connexion  that  appeared  to  subsist  between  Athens  and 
Lacedaemon,  hostile  (they  thought)  to  the  liberties  of  Peloponnesus. 
In  answer  to  these  complaints,  Demosthenes  addressed  his  second 
Philippic  to  the  Popular  Assembly ;  repeating  the  substance  of  what 
he  had  said  to  the  Peloponnesians,  vindicating  his  own  conduct,  and 
denouncing  the  Macedonian  party  at  Athens.  The  embassy  led  to  no 
immediate  result;  but  the  influence  of  Demosthenes  at  home  was 
increased. 

In  all  the  speeches,  men  of  Athens,  about  Philip's  measures 
and  infringements  of  the  peace,  I  observe  that  statements 
made  on  our  behalf  are  thought  just  and  generous,1  aud  all 

1  Generous,  as  regards  the  Greek  states,  whose  independence  the 
Athenians  stand  up  for.  This  praise  Demosthenes  frequently  claims 
for  his  countrymen,  and,  compared  with  the  rest  of  the  Greeks,  they 
deserved  it.      Leland  understood  the  word  <pi\auQpwirovs  in  the  same 

VOL.  I.  O 


82  THE    OKATIOX5   OF   DEMOSTHEXE5. 

who  accuse  Philip  are  heard -with  approbation:  yet  nothing 
(I  may  say)  that  is  proper,  or  for  the  sake  of  which  the 
speeches  are  worth  hearing,  is  done.  To  this  point  are  the 
affairs  of  Athens  brought  that  the  more  fully  and  clearly 
one  convicts  Philip  of  violating  the  peace  with  you.  and 
plotting  against  the  whole  of  Greece,  the  more  difficult  it 
becomes  to  advise  you  how  to  act.  The  cause  lies  in  all  of 
as,  Athenians,  that,  when  we  ought  to  oppose  an  ambi- 
tious power  by  deeds  and  actions,  not  by  words,  we  men  of 
the  hustings1  shrink  from  our  duty,  of  moving  and  advising, 
for  liar  of  your  displeasure,  and  only  declaim  on  the 
heinousness  and  atrocity  of  Philip's  conduct ;  you  c  f  the 
ssc  tbly,  though  better  instructed  than  Philip  to  argue 
justly,  or  comprehend  the  argument  of  another,  to  check 
him  in  the  execution  of  his  designs  are  totally  unprepared. 
The  result  is  inevitable,  I  imagine,  and  perhaps  just.  You 
each  succeed  better  in  what  you  are  busy  and  earnest  about ; 
Philip  in  acid  -  u  in  words.  If  you  are  still  satisfied 
with  using  the  better  arguments,  it  is  an  easy  matter,  and 
there  is  no  trouble  :  but  if  we  are  to  take  measures  for  the 
correction  of  th—  tils  to  prevent  their  insensible  progress, 
and  the  rising  up  of  a  mighty  pow  i  _  -  which  we  could 
have  no  defence,  then  our  course  of  deliberation  is  not  the 
same  as  formerly :  the  orators,  and  you  that  hear  them,  must 
prefer  good  and  salutary  counsels  to  those  which  are  easy 
and  agreeable. 

First,  men  of  Athens,  if  anyone  regards  without  un?:  .- 
the  mi^ht  and  dominion  of  Philip,  and  imagines  that  it 
threatens  no  danger  to  the  state,  or  that  all  his  preparations 
are  not  against  you.  I  marvel,  and  would  entreat  you  every 
one  to  hear  briefly  from  me  the  reasons,  why  I  am  led  to 
form  a  contrary  expectation,  and  wherefore  I  deem  Philip  an 
enemy:  that,  if  I  appear  to  have  the  clearer  force  a 

sense.  thoagh  he  translates  it  humane.     We  nse  the  term  philanthropic 

oe  not  unlike  that  of  the  orator ;  but,  as  Leland  truly  observes, 

"  the  distinction  of  Greek  and  barbarian  precluded  the  rest  of  mankind 

from  a  just  share  in  Grecian  philanthropy  : "  and  he  might  have  added, 

that  their  notions  of  slavery  were  not  in  accordance  with  an  enlarged 

Therefore,  I  prefer  a  word  of  a  less  arrogant   meaning. 

Jacobs:  lillig.     Francis:  "tilled  with  sentiments  of  exceeding  mod> 

:  - 

1  A   -  '  nous  qui  montons  a  la  tribune. 


T1TE    SECOND    PHILirPIC.  83 

may  hearken  to  rne  ;  if  they,  who  have  such  confidence  and 
trust  in  Philip,  you  may  give  your  adherence  to  them. 

Thus  then  I  reason,  Athenians.  What  did  Philip  first 
make  himself  master  of  after  the  peace  ?  Thermopylae  and 
the  Phocian  state.  Well,  and  how  used  he  his  power  ?  He 
chose  to  act  for  the  benefit  of  Thebes,  not  of  Athens.  Why 
so  1  Because,  I  conceive,  measuring  his  calculations  by 
ambition,  by  his  desire  of  universal  empire,  without  regard 
to  peace,  quiet,  or  justice,  he  saw  plainly,  that  to  a  people  of 
our  character  and  principles  nothing  could  he  offer  or  give, 
that  would  induce  you  for  self-interest  to  sacrifice  any  of  the 
Greeks  to  him.  Pie  sees  that  you,  having  respect  for  justice, 
dreading  the  infamy  of  the  thing,  and  exercising  proper  fore- 
thought, would  oppose  him  in  any  such  attempt  as  much  as 
if  you  wei'e  at  war  :  but  the  Thebans  he  expected  (and 
events  prove  him  right)  would,  in  return  for  the  services 
done  them,  allow  him  in  everything  else  to  have  his  way,  and, 
so  far  from  thwarting  or  impeding  him,  would  fight  on  his 
side  if  he  required  it.  From  the  same  persuasion  he  be- 
friended lately  the  Messenians  and  Argives,  which  is  the 
highest  panegyric  upon  you,  Athenians;  for  you  are  adjudged 
by  these  proceedings  to  be  the  only  people  incapable  of 
betraying  for  lucre  the  national  rights  of  Greece,  or  bartering 
your  attachment  to  her  for  any  obligation  or  benefit.  And 
this  opinion  of  you,  that  (so  different)  of  the  Argives  and 
Thebans,  he  has  naturally  formed,  not  only  from  a  view 
of  present  times,  but  by  reflection  on  the  past.  For  as- 
suredly he  finds  and  hears  that  your  ancestors,  who  might 
have  governed  the  rest  of  Greece  on  terms  of  submitting  to 
Persia,  not  only  spurned  the  proposal,  when  Alexander,1  this 
man's  ancestor,  came  as  herald  to  negotiate,  but  preferred  to 
abandon  their  country  and  endure  any  suffering,  and  there* 

1  Alexander  of  Macedon,  son  of  Amyntas,  was  sent  by  Mardonius, 
the  Persian  commander,  to  offer  the  most  favourable  terms  to  the  Athe- 
nians, if  they  would  desert  the  cause  of  the  Greeks.  The  Spartans  at 
the  same  time  sent  an  embassy,  to  remind  them  of  their  duty.  The 
spirited  reply  which  the  Athenians  made  to  both  embassies  is  related 
by  Herodotus,  The  Thebans  submitted  to  Xerxes,  and  fought  against 
the  Greeks  at  the  battle  of  Platrea.  The  Argives  were  neutral,  chiefly 
from  jealousy  of  Sparta.  They  demanded  half  the  command  of  the 
allied  army,  as  a  condition  of  their  assistance,  but  this  could  not  be 
complied  with. 

g2 


84  THE    ORATIONS    OF    DEMOSTHENES. 

after  achieved  such  exploits  as  all  the  world  loves  to  mention, 
though  none  could  ever  speak  them  worthily,  and  therefore 
I  must  be  silent;  for  their  deeds  are  too  mighty  to  be 
uttered '  in  words.  But  the  forefathers  of  the  Argives  and 
Thebans,  they  either  joined  the  barbarian's  army,  or  did  not 
oppose  it;  and  therefore  he  knows  that  both  will  selfishly 
embrace  their  advantage,  without  considering  the  common 
interest  of  the  Greeks.  He  thought  then,  if  he  chose  your 
friendship,  it  must  be  on  just  principles;  if  he  attached  him- 
self to  them,  he  shoiild  find  auxiliaries  of  his  ambition. 
This  is  the  reason  of  his  preferring  them  to  you  both  then 
and  now.  For  certainly  he  does  not  see  them  with  a  larger 
navy  than  you,  nor  has  he  acquired  an  inland  empire  and 
renounced  that  of  the  sea  and  the  ports,  nor  does  he  forget 
the  professions  and  promises  on  which  he  obtained  the  peace. 

Well,  it  may  be  said,  he  knew  all  this,  yet  he  so  acted,  not 
from  ambition  or  the  motives  which  I  charge,  but  because 
the  demands  of  the  Thebans  were  more  equitable  than  yours. 
Of  all  pleas,  this  now  is  the  least  open  to  him.  He  that  bids 
the  Lacedaemonians  resign  Messene,  how  can  he  pretend, 
when  he  delivered  Orchomenos  and  Coronea  to  the  Thebans, 
to  have  acted  on  a  conviction  of  justice  ? 

But,  forsooth,  he  was  compelled, — this  plea  remains — he 
made  concessions  against  his  will,  being  surrounded  by  Thes- 
salian  horse  and  Theban  infantry.  Excellent !  So  of  his 
intentions  they  talk;  he  will  mistrust  the  Thebans;  and 
some  carry  news  about,  that  he  will  fortify  Elatea.  All 
this  he  intends  and  will  intend,  I  dare  say;  but  to  attack 
the  Lacedaemonians  on  behalf  of  Messene  and  Argos  he  does 
not  intend;  he  actually  sends  mercenaries  and  money  into 
the  country,  and  is  expected  himself  with  a  great  force.  The 
Lacedaemonians,  who  are  enemies  of  Thebes,  he  overthrows; 
the  Phocians,  whom  he  himself  before  destroyed,  will  he  now 
preserve  1 

And  who  can  believe  this  1     I  cannot  think  that  Philip, 

1  The  simple  tlirety  in  the  original  is  more  forcible  than  if  it  had 
oeen  iiraivuv,  or  the  like.    Compare  Shakspeare,  Coriolanus,  Act  ii.  sc.  2. 
I  shall  lack  voice :  the  deeds  of  Coriolanus 

Should  not  be  uttered  feebly 

For  this  last, 
Before  and  in  Corioli,  let  me  say, 
I  cannot  speak  him  home. 


THE   SECOXD    PHILIPPIC.  85 

either  if  he  was  forced  into  his  former  measures,  or  if  he 
were  now  giving  up  the  Thebans,  would  pertinaciously  oppose 
♦heir  enemies;  his  present  conduct  rather  shows  that  he 
adopted  those  measures  by  choice.  All  things  prove  to  a 
correct  observer,  that  his  whole  plan  of  action  is  against  our 
state.  And  this  has  now  become  to  him  a  sort  of  necessity. 
Consider.  He  desires  empire :  he  conceives  you  to  be  his 
only  opponents.  He  has  been  for  some  time  wronging  you, 
as  his  own  conscience  best  informs  him,  since,  by  retaining 
what  belongs  to  you,  he  secures  the  rest  of  his  dominion  : 
had  he  given  up  Amphipolis  and  Potidrea,  he  deemed  himself 
unsafe  at  home  He  knows  therefore,  both  that  he  is 
plotting  against  you,  and  that  you  are  aware  of  it;  and, 
supposing  you  to  have  intelligence,  he  thinks  you  must  hate 
him;  he  is  alarmed,  expecting  some  disaster,  if  you  get  the 
chance,  unless  he  hastes  to  prevent  you.  Therefore  he  is 
awake,  and  on  the  watch  against  us ;  he  courts  certain  people, 
Thebans,  and  people  in  Peloponnesus  of  the  like  views,  who 
from  cupidity,  he  thinks,  will  be  satisfied  with  the  present, 
and  from  dulness  of  understanding  will  foresee  none  of  the 
consequences.  And  yet  men  of  even  moderate  sense  might 
notice  striking  facts,  which  I  had  occasion  to  quote  to  the 
Messenians  aud  Argives,  and  perhaps  it  is  better  they  should 
be  repeated  to  you. 

Ye  men  of  Messene,  said  I,  how  do  ye  think  the  Olynthiana 
would  have  brooked  to  hear  anything  against  Philip  at  those 
times,  when  he  surrendered  to  them  Anthemus,  which  all 
former  kings  of  Macedonia  claimed,  when  he  cast  out  the 
Athenian  colonists  and  gave  them  Potidaea,  taking  on  himself 
your  enmity,  and  giving  them  the  land  to  enjoy?  Think  ye 
they  expected  such  treatment  as  they  got,  or  would  have 
believed  it  if  they  had  been  told  ?  Nevertheless,  said  I,  they, 
after  enjoying  for  a  short  time  the  land  of  others,  are  for  a 
long  time  deprived  by  him  of  their  own,  shamefully  expelled, 
not  only  vanquished,  but  betrayed  by  oue  another  and  sold. 
In  truth,  these  too  close  connexions  with  despots  are  not  safe 
for  republics.  The  Thessalians,  again,  think  ye,  said  I,  whei. 
he  ejected  their  tyrants,  and  gave  back  Niceea  and  Magnesia, 
they  expected  to  have  the  decemvirate1  which  is  now  esta- 

1  Thessaly  was  anciently  divided  into  four  districts,  each  called  a 
tetraa  aud  this,  as  we  learn  from  the  third  Philippic,  was  restored  soon 


86  THE   ORATIONS    OF   BEHOSTHEKT5. 

blished?  or  that  he  who  restored  the  meeting  at  Pylse'  would 
take  away  their  revenues  <  Surely  not.  And  yet  these 
filings  have  occurred,  as  all  mankind  may  know.  You  behold 
Philip,  I  said,  a  dispenser  of  gifts  and  promises  :  pray,  if  you 
are  wise,  that  you  may  never  know  him  for  a  cheat  and  a 
deceiver.  By  Jupiter,  I  said,  there  are  manifold  contrivances 
for  the  guarding  and  defending  of  cities,  as  ramparts,  walls, 
trenches,  and  the  like  :  these  are  all  made  with  hands,  and 
require  expense;  but  there  is  one  common  safeguard  in  the 
nature  of  prudent  men,  which  is  a  good  security  for  all,  but 
especially  for  democracies  against  despots.  What  do  I  mean? 
Mistrust.  Keep  this,  hold  to  this ;  preserve  this  only,  and 
you  can  never  be  injured.  What  do  ye  desire  ?  Freedom. 
Then  see  ye  not  that  Philips  very  titles  are  at  variance 
therewith  ?  Every  king  and  despot  is  a  foe  to  freedom,  an 
antagonist  to  laws.  Will  ye  not  beware,  I  said,  lest,  seeking 
debverance  from  war,  you  find  a  master  ! 

They  heard  me  with  a  tumult  of  approbation  ;  and  many 
other  speeches  they  heard  from  the  ami  oth  in  my 

presence  and  afterwards  ;  yet  none  the  more,  as  it  appears, 
will  they  keep  aloof  from  Philip's  friendship  and  promises. 
And  no  wonder,  that  Messeniaus  and  certain  Peloponnesians 
should  act  contrary  to  what  their  reason  approves ;  but  you, 

the  termination  of  the  Sacred  war.  The  object  of  Philip  in 
effecting  this  arrangement  was,  no  doubt,  to  weaken  the  influence 
..  great  Thes:-alian  families  by  a  division  of  power;  otherwise 
the  Pheraean  tyranny  might  have  been  exchanged  for  an  oligarchy 
powerful  enough  to  be  independent  of  Macedonia.  The  decemvirate 
here  spoken  of  (if  the  text  be  correct)  was  a  further  contrivance 
to  forward  Philip's  views :  whether  we  adopt  Leland"s  opinion,  that 
each  tetrarchy  was  governed  by  a  council  of  ten.  or  Schaefer's.  that 
each  city  was  placed  under  ten  governors.  Jacobs  understands  the 
word  dt  -  not  to  refer  to  any  positive  form  of  government,  but 

genera".  .  -  _nate  a  tyranny,  such  as  that  which  the  Lacedaemo- 

nians used  to  introduce  into  conquered  cities.  So,  for  example,  the 
Eomans  might  have  spoken  of  a  decemvirate  after  the  time  of  Appius. 
However  this  be,  Philip  seems  to  have  contrived  that  the  ruling  body, 
whether  in  the  tetrarchy  or  the  decadarchy,  should  be  his  own  creatures. 
Two  of  them,  Eudicus  and  Simus,  are  particularly  mentioned  by 
Demosthenes  as  Iraitc 

2.  which  signifies  gales,  Mas  a  name  applied  by  the  Greeks  to 
divers  passes,  ore/      ,  ly  to  the  pass  of  Thermopylce,  which 

opened  through  the   ridg  int   (Eta  imo  the  country  of  the 

Epicnemidian  Locrians.  aud  was  so  called  from  the  hot  sulphureous 
springs  that  gushed  from  the  foot  of  the  mountain. 


THE    SECOND    PHILIPPIC.  87 

who  understand  yourselves,  and  by  us  orators  are  told,  how 
you  are  plotted  against,  how  you  are  inclosed !  you,  I  fear, 
to  escape  present  exertion,  will  come  to  ruin  ere  you  are 
aware.  So  doth  the  moment's  ease  and  indulgence  prevail 
over  distant  advantage. 

As  to  your  measures,  you  will  in  prudence,  I  presume, 
consult  hereafter  by  yourselves.      I  will  furnish   you   with 
such  an  answer  as  it  becomes  the  assembly  to  decide  upon. 
[Here  the  proposed  answer  was  read.~\l 

It  were  just,  men  of  Athens,  to  call  the  persons  who 
brought  those  promises,  on  the  faith  whereof  you  concluded 
peace.  For  I  should  never  have  submitted  to  go  as  ambas- 
sador, and  you  would  certainly  not  have  discontinued  the 
war,  had  you  supposed  that  Philip,  on  obtaining  peace,  would 
act  thus ;  but  the  statements  then  made  were  very  different. 
Aye,  and  others  you  should  call.  Whom  1  The  men  who 
declared — after  the  peace,  when  I  had  returned  from  my 
second  mission,  that  for  the  oaths,  when,  perceiving  your 
delusion,  I  gave  warning,  and  protested,  and  opposed  the 
abandonment  of  Thermopylae  and  the  Phocians — that  I, 
being  a  water-drinker,2  was  naturally  a  churlish  and  morose 
fellow,  that  Philip,  if  he  passed  the  straits,  would  do  just  as 
you  desired,  fortify  Thespise  and  Platrca,  humble  the  Thebans, 
cut  through  the  Chersonese3  at  his  own  expense,  and  give 
you  Oropus  and  Eubcea  in  exchange  for  Amphipolis.  All 
these  declarations  on  the  hustings  T  am  sure  you  remember, 
though  you  are  not  famous  for  remembering  injuries.  And, 
the  most  disgraceful  thing  of  all,  you  voted  in  your  con- 
fidence, that  this  same  peace  should  descend  to  your  poste- 
rity ;  so  completely  were  you  misled.  Why  mention  I  this 
now,  and  desire  these  men  to  be  called  ?  By  the  gods,  I  will 
tell  you  the  truth  frankly  and  without  reserve.  Not  thai 
I  may  fall  a-wrangling,  to  provoke  recrimination  before  you,4 

1  Whether  this  was  moved  by  the  orator  himself,  or  formally  read  as 
his  motion  by  the  officer  of  the  assembly,  does  not  appear. 

2  It  was  Philocrates  who  said  this.  There  were  many  jokes  against 
Demosthenes  as  a  water-drinker. 

3  This  peninsula  being  exposed  to  incursions  from  Thrace,  a  plan 
was  conceived  of  cutting  through  the  isthmus  from  Pteleon  to  Leuce 
Acte,  to  protect  the  Athenian  settlements.  See  the  Appendix  to  this 
volume,  on  the  Thracian  Chersonese. 

4  Similarly  Auger :  "  Ce  n'est  pas  pour  m'attirer  les  invectives  do 
mes  anciens  adversaires  en  les  invectivant  moi-meme."  Jacobs  other- 
wise :  Nichi  um  durch  Schmiihungen  mir  auf  gleiche  Weise  Gehor  bri 


88  THE   ORATIONS   OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

and  afford  my  old  adversaries  a  fresh  pretext  for  getting 
more  from  Philip,  nor  for  the  purpose  of  idle  garrulity.  But 
I  imagine  that  what  Philip  is  doing  will  grieve  you  hereafter 
more  than  it  does  now.  I  see  the  thing  progressing,  and 
would  that  my  surmises  were  false;  but  I  doubt  it  is  toe 
near  already.  So  when  you  are  able  no  longer  to  disregard 
events,  when,  instead  of  hearing  from  me  or  others  that  these 
measures  are  against  Athens,  you  all  see  it  yourselves,  and 
know  it  for  certain,  I  expect  you  will  be  wrathful  and  ex- 
asperated. I  fear  then,  as  your  ambassadors  have  concealed 
the  purpose  for  which  they  know  they  were  corrupted, 
those  who  endeavour  to  repair  what  the  others  have  lost  may 
chance  to  encounter  your  resentment;  for  I  see  it  is  a 
practice  with  many  to  vent  their  anger,  not  upon  the  guilty, 
but  on  persons  most  in  their  power.  Whilst  therefore  the 
mischief  is  only  coming  and  preparing,  whilst  we  hear  one 
another  speak,  I  wish  every  man,  though  he  knows  it  well,  to 
be  reminded,  who  it  was1  persuaded  you  to  abandon  Phocis 
and  Thermopylae,  by  the  command  of  which  Philip  com- 
mands the  road  to  Attica  and  Peloponnesus,  and  has  brought 
it  to  this,  that  your  deliberation  must  be,  not  about  claims 
and  interests  abroad,  but  concerning  the  defence  of  your 
home  and  a  war  in  Attica,  which  will  grieve  every  citizen 
when  it  comes,  and  indeed  it  has  commenced  from  that  day. 
Had  you  not  been  then  deceived,  there  would  be  nothing  to 
distress  the  state.  Philip  would  certainly  never  have  pre- 
vailed at  sea  and  come  to  Attica  with  a  fleet,  nor  would  he 
have  marched  with  a  land-force  by  Phocis  and  Thermopyla? : 
he  must  either  have  acted  honourably,  observing  the  peace 
and  keeping  quiet,  or  been  immediately  in  a  war  similar  to 
that  which  made  him  desire  the  peace.  Enough  has  been 
said  to  awaken  recollection.  Grant,  0  ye  gods,  it  be  not  ail 
fully  confirmed  !  I  would  have  no  man  punished,  though 
death  he  may  deserve,  to  the  damage  and  danger  of  the 
country. 

Each  za  verscliafftn.  Bat  I  do  not  think  that  f^avrtc  \6yov  jrotrjcrtD  can 
hear  the  sense  of  \6yov  rixoifti,  "  get  a  hearing  for  myself."  And  the 
orator's  object  is,  not  so  much  to  sneer  at,  the  people  by  hinting  that 
they  are  ready  to  hear  abuse,  as  to  deter  his  opponents  from  retaliation, 
or  weaken  its  effect,  by  denouncing  their  opposition  as  corrupt.  Leland 
saw  the  meaning :  "  Not  that,  by  breaking  out  into  invectives,  I  may 
expose  myself  to  the  like  treatment." 
1  He  means  .Eschines. 


ox  HAT.oxyEsus.  39 


THE  ORATION  OX   HALONNESUS. 


THE    ARGUMENT. 

The  occasion  from  which  this  Oration  has  received  its  title,  was  a  dis- 
pute between  Philip  and  the  Athenians  concerning  the  small  island 
of  Halonnesus,  which  lies  off  the  coast  of  Thessaiy.  below  the 
entrance  to  the  Thermaic  gulf.  A  group  of  small  islands  here, 
among  which  were  also  Seiathus,  Seopelus.  and  Peparethus,  belonged 
to  Athens.  Halonnesus.  not  long  after  the  termination  of  the 
Phocian  war,  was  taken  by  a  pirate  named  Sostratus.  He,  having 
given  annoyance  to  Philip,  was  expelled  by  that  king  from  the 
island  ;  b,;t  Philip,  instead  of  restoring  it  to  the  Athenians,  kept  it  in 
his  own  hands.  At  this  the  Athenians  took  umbrage,  and  probably 
thought  that  Halonnesus  being  so  near  to  Eubcea.  as  well  as  to  the 
other  islands,  it  might  be  dangerous  to  leave  it  in  Philip's  possession. 
An  embassy  was  .-eut  to  Macedonia.  nc.  343.  to  negotiate  about  this, 
and  also  various  other  subjects  of  dispute  which  at  that  time  existed, 
such  as  Amphipolis,  Potida?a,  and  the  affairs  of  the  Chersonese.  A: 
the  head  of  the  embassy  was  Hegesippus,  a  friend  of  Demosthenes. 
The  claims  made  by  the  Athenians  were  deemed  by  Philip  so  pre- 
posterous, that  he  rejected  them  at  once,  and  dismissed  the  envoys. 
Soon  after,  he  sent  an  embassy  to  Athens,  with  a  letter  written  by 
himself,  in  which  he  pointed  out  thj  extravagance  of  their  demands, 
but  expressed  his  willingness  to  make  certain  concessions.  With 
respect  to  Halonnesus,  he  contended  that  it  had  become  his  by  con- 
quest, the  Athenians  having  lost  it,  but  offered  to  make  them  a 
present  of  the  island.  The  letter  was  read  in  the  assembly.  All 
that  we  know  of  it  is  from  the  following  speech,  in  which  the  orator 
comments  on  its  various  statements,  and  endeavours  to  show  that 
Philip  was  in  the  wrong.  The  whole  of  the  speech  has  not  come 
down  to  us ;  for  it  appears  to  have  contained  a  resolution,  moved  by 
the  orator,  by  way  ot  reply  to  Philip. 

Most  modern  critics,  following  Lihauius,  have  come  to  the  opinion,  that 
not  Demosthenes,  but  Hegesippus,  was  the  author  of  this  Oration. 
The  argument  rests,  not  only  upon  the  style  of  the  Oration  itse'.f, 
which  is  beneath  the  general  character  of  Demosthenes,  but  also  on 
collateral  circumstances,  some  of  which  will  be  noticed  in  the  eour.-e 
of  the  notes.  There  is,  indeed,  good  evidence  that  Demosthenes 
made  a  speech  on  the  same  question,  and  also  that  he  took  the  same 
views  upon  it  as  Hegesippus,  with  whom  he  generally  agreed  in 
politics.  This  may  account  for  the  fact,  that  the  only  extant  speech 
on  the  subject  has  been  attributed  to  Demosthenes,  when  his  own  is 
lost. 

Mks  of  Athens,  never  can  we  who  maintain  your  rights  in 
this  assembly  be  deterred  by  the  complaints  of  Philip  from 


90  THE    OKATIOXS  OF    DEMOSTHENES. 

advising  you  for  the  best.  It  would  be  monstrous,  if  our 
privilege  on  the  hustings  could  be  destroyed  by  his  epistlea 
I  will  first,  men  of  Athens,  go  through  the  articles  of  Philip's 
letter;  and  then  I  will  answer  the  statements  of  the  am- 
bassadors. 

Philip  begins  about  Halonnesus,  saying,  it  belongs  to  him, 
but  he  gives  it  you.  He  denies  your  claim  to  restitution,  as 
he  neither  took  it  from  Athens,  nor  detains  it  from  her.  He 
addressed  the  like  argument  to  us,  on  our  embassy  tu  Mace- 
don;1  that  he  had  won  the  island  from  pirates,  and  it  was 
properly  his  own.  It  is  not  difficult  to  deprive  him  of  this 
argument,  by  showing  its  fallacy.  All  pirates  seizing  places 
wrongfully,  and  fortifying  themselves  therein,  make  excur- 
sions to  anuoy  other  people.  One  who  has  chastised  and 
vanquished  the  pirates  surely  cannot  urge  with  reason,  that 
what  they  robbed  the  owners  of  becomes  his  property.  If 
you  grant  this,  then,  supposing  that  pirates  seized  a  place  in 
Attica,"  or  Lemnos,  or  Iinbrus,  or  Scyrus,  and  some  persons 
dislodged  the  pirates,  what  is  to  prevent  that  place  where  the 
pirates  were,  and  which  belonged  to  us,  from  instantly 
becoming  their  property  who  chastised  the  pirates  ?  Philip 
.s  not  ignorant  of  the  injustice  of  this  plea ;  he  knows  it 
better  than  any  one;  but  he  expects  you  will  be  cajoled  by  a 
set  of  men,  who,  having  undertaken  to  manage  things  here  as 
he  desires,  are  performing  that  service  now.  Moreover,  he 
cannot  fail  to  see,  that  under  either  title,  whichever  you 
adopt,  you  will  have  the  island,  whether  it  be  given,  or 
given  back.3     Why  then  is  it  material  to  him,  not  to  use 

1  This  tends  to  prove  that  Hegesippus  was  the  speaker.  For  he  con- 
ducted the  embassy  referred  to,  and  Demosthenes  did  not  accompany 
him. 

2  The  example  put  by  the  orator  carries  the  argument  no  further, 
looking  on  it  as  a  question  of  international  law.  The  riuht  of  the  new 
conqueror  might  depend  on  the  length  of  time  since  the  first  conquest, 
<jt  any  other  circumstances,  showing  an  acquiescence  therein  by  the 
original  owner.  If  France  now  were  to  take  Gibraltar  from  England, 
this  would  afford  no  casus  bdli  for  Spain  against  France.  No  doubt 
the  general  argument  here  rests  on  the  piratical  character  of  the  first 
seizure.  And  yet  a  successful  robber  becomes  a  conqueror  after  a 
certain  lapse  of  time 

3  This  passage  is  relied  on  by  Weiske  as  a  proof  that  Demosthene? 
made  the  speech  ;  because  it  is  an  undoubted  fact,  that  Demosthenes  was 
ridiculed  by  ^Eschines  and  others  for  the  distinction  which  he  drew 


OX    HALOXXESUS.  91 

the  just  phrase  and  restore  it  to  you,  but  to  use  the  unjust, 
and  make  it  a  present  ?  ■  His  object  is.  not  to  charge  it  to 
you  as  an  obligation,  (for  such  an  obligation  would  be  ridicu- 
lous.) but  to  display  to  all  Greece,  that  the  Athenians  are  glad 
to  receive  their  maritime  dependencies  from  the  Macedonian. 
This  yon  must  not  allow,  men  of  Athens. 

When  he  says  that  he  wishes  to  submit  to  arbitration  on 
these  questions,  he  only  mocks  you.  in  asking  Athenians  to 
refer  a  dispute  with  a  man  of  Pella  concerning  their  title  to 
the  islands.  And  besides,  if  your  power,  which  delivered 
Greece,  is  unable  to  preserve  your  maritime  dominion,  and 
the  judges  to  whom  you  refer,  and  with  whom  the  award 
rests,  preserve  it  for  you.  supposing  Philip  does  not  corrupt 
them :  do  you  not  confessedly,  by  taking  such  course,  re- 
nounce all  possessions  on  the  continent,  aud  demonstrate  to 
the  World  that  you  will  not  contend  with  him  for  any.  when 
even  for  possessions  on  the  sea.  where  you  consider  your 
strength  lies,  you  contend  not  by  arms,  but  litigation  ? 

Further,  he  savs  he  has  sent  commissioners  here  to  settle  a 
judicial  treaty.1  to  be  in  force  not  after  ratification  in  your 

between  the  (living  and  the  giving  back  of  the  island.  It  proves  very 
little,  in  my  opinion.  The  argument  here  used  must  have  occurred  to 
any  orator  who  spoke  on  the  same  side  of  the  question,  and  was  doubt- 
less urged  both  by  Hegesippus  and  Demosthenes.  It  is  far  from  being 
a  captious  quibble.  Daily  it  happens  that  men  refuse  to  take  as  a  gift 
what  they  claim  as  a  right.  But  with  nations  this  is  a  more  important 
matter  than  with  individuals  :  what  is  pride  in  the  one  case,  is  policy 
in  the  other.  The  point  was  first  made  by  Philip  himself.  If  he  was  so 
anxious  about  the  distinction,  the  question  naturally  arose,  why  was  he 
so?   and  the  reason  was  not  difficult  to  see. 

1  Arrangements  (called  <rvuBo\a^  were  sometimes  made  between 
different  countries,  for  the  administration  of  justice  betwe  n  their 
respective  people  These  arrangements  would  embrace  certain  general 
principles  of  jurisprudence,  according  to  which  any  dispute  between  a 
native  and  an  alien  should  be  determined  by  the  tribunal  of  either 
country  ;  the  complainant  always  seeking  justice  in  the  court  of  his 
adversary's  domicile.  Thus,  supposing  such  a  legal  tariff  to  be  agreed 
upon  between  Athens  and  Philip,  an  Athenian  having  a  complaint 
against  one  of  his  subjects  would  prefer  his  suit  in  Macedonia,  but 
the  judge  must  decide  the  cause  not  entirely  by  Macedonian  law,  but  in 
accordance  with  the  articles  of  the  compact ;  and  conversely  if  a  Mace- 
donian were  the  plaintiff.  For  further  information  see  title  S>nnbolon 
in  the  Archaeological  Dictionary.  The  argument  of  the  orator  here  is 
somewhat  captious.  How  the  proposed  arrangement  could  affect  the 
^laim  of  Athens  to  Potidaea,  does  not  appear.     Philip's  letter  indeed 


92  THE    ORATIONS   OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

court,  as  the  law  commands,  but  after  reference  to  him: 
giving  an  appeal  to  himself  from  your  judgment.  He  -wishes 
to  get  this  advantage  of  you,  and  procure  an  admission  in 
the  treaty,  that  you  make  no  complaint  for  his  aggressions  on 
Potidxea,  but  confirm  the  lawfulness  both  of  his  taking  and 
holding  it.  Yet  the  Athenians  who  dwelt  in  Potidsea,  whilst 
they  were  not  at  war,  but  in  alliance  with  Philip,  and  not- 
withstanding the  oath  which  Philip  swore  to  the  inhabitants 
of  Potidrea.  were  deprived  by  him  of  their  property.  I  say, 
he  wishes  to  get  your  absolute  acknowledgment,  that  you 
complain  not  of  these  wrongful  acts,  nor  deem  yourselves 
injured.  That  there  is  no  need  of  a  judicial  treaty  between 
Athens  and  Macedonia,  past  times  may  suffice  to  show. 
Neither  Amyntas,  Philip's  father,  nor  any  other  kings  of 
Macedon,  ever  had  such  a  contract  with  our  state ;  although 
the  intercourse  between  us  was  formerly  greater  than  it  is 
now  :  for  Macedonia  was  dependent  on  us,  and  paid  us 
tribute,1  and  we  then  resorted  to  their  ports,  and  they  to  ours, 
more  frequently  than  now,  and  there  were  not  the  monthly 
sittings  punctually  held,  as  at  present,  for  mercantile  causes,2 
dispensing  with  the  necessity  of  a  law  treaty  between  such 
distant  countries.  Though  nothing  of  the  sort  then  existed, 
it  was  not  requisite  to  make  a  treaty,  so  that  people  should 
sail  from  Macedonia  to  Athens  for  justice,  or  Athenians  to 
Macedonia  :  we  obtained  redress  by  their  laws  and  they  by 
ours.  Be  assured,  therefore,  these  articles  are  drawn  for  an 
admission  that  you  have  no  further  pretence  for  claiming 
Potidaja, 

might  have  thrown  some  light  on  the  question.  It  is  not  improbable 
that  Potidaea  may  have  been  named  for  the  seat  of  Macedonian  jurisdic- 
tion, as  being  more  convenient  for  the  trial  of  international  causes  than 
Pella,  or  any  inland  town.  Athens  then,  agreeing  to  the  arrangement, 
might  be  said  to  have  acknowledged  Philip's  right. 

1  We  have  seen  a  similar  boast  in  the  third  Olynthiac.  But  neither  of 
the  statements  is  to  be  understood  as  strictly  true.  While  the  kings  of 
Macedonia  possessed  no  towns  on  the  coast,  they  (no  douht)  submitted 
to  the  maritime  supremacy  of  Athens,  and  paid  harbour  dues  and  tolls, 
which  might  be  called  tribute  in  loose  language.  Or  it  may  be  a  mere 
oratorical  flourish,  for  which  the  dependency  of  the  maritime  towns  and 
the  friendly  relations  between  Athens  and  Macedonia  afforded  some 
colour. 

1  The  sittings  here  alluded  to  had  not  very  long  been  established. 
Tuey  were  held  in  the  six  winter  monthB  for  the  speedy  trial  of  mer- 
cantile suits. 


OX    HALOXXESUS.  93 

As  to  pirates,  you  ought  jointly,  he  says,  you  and  him- 
self, to  guard  the  sea  against  these  depredators:  but  he  leally 
asks  to  be  introduced  by  us  to  maritime  power,  for  you  to 
confess  that  you  are  unable  even  to  keep  guard  of  the  sea 
without  Philip,  and  further  for  the  privilege  to  be  granted 
him  of  sailing  about  and  touching  at  the  islands,  under  the 
pretence  of  watching  pirates,  so  that  he  may  corrupt  the 
islanders  and  seduce  them  from  you ;  and  besides  restoring 
to  Thasns1  by  means  of  your  commanders  the  exiles  whom 
he  harboured,  he  designs  to  gain  over  the  other  islands,  by 
sending  his  agents  to  sail  with  your  commanders  on  the  joint 
protective  service.  And  yet  some  persons  deny  that  he  wants 
the  sea.  But,  without  any  want,  he  is  equipping  galleys, 
building  docks,  seeking  to  send  out  armaments  and  incur  no 
trifling  expense  for  maritime  enterprises  on  -which  he  sets  no 
value." 

Do  you  think,  then,  Athenians,  that  Philip  would  ask  you 
to  make  these  concessions,  if  he  did  not  despise  you,  and  rely 
on  the  men  whom  he  has  chosen  to  be  his  friends  here  1  men 
who  are  not  ashamed  to  live  for  Philip  and  not  for  their  coun- 
try, and  think  they  cany  home  his  presents,  when  all  at  home 
they  sell ! 

Concerning  the  peace,  which  the  ambassadors  sent  by  him3 
permitted  us  to  amend,  because  we  made  au  amendment, 
which  all  mankind  allow  to  be  just,  that  each  party  should 
hold  his  own,  he  denies  that  he  gave  the  permission,  or  that 
his  ambassadors  so  stated  to  you;  doubtless,  having  been 
instructed  by  his  friends  here,  that  you  remember  not  what  is 
said  before  the  people.  This,  however,  of  all  things  it  is  im- 
possible for  you  to  forget;  since  it  was  in  the  same  assembly 

1  Thasus  is  an  island  off  the  coast  of  Thrace  opposite  the  mouth 
of  the  Nestus.  It  was  celebrated  for  its  wine,  and  also  for  its  marble 
quarries  and  mines.  The  gold  mines  on  the  adjacent  continent  be- 
longed to  the  Tbasians,  when  they  were  seized  by  Philip.  The  island, 
having  been  wrested  from  the  Athenians  in  the  Peloponnesian  war,  was 
afterwards  recovered,  and  at  this  time  they  kept  a  garrison  in  it. 

2  So  Jacobs :  das  ihm  so  gkichgultig  ist.  And  Keiske  so  explains  it 
in  his  index.  The  irony  is  of  course  continued.  Pabst,  however,  contends 
that  this  is  wrong,  and  takes  the  more  ordinary  construction  of  the 
words  :  worauf  er  den  grossten  Wtrth  le.gt. 

3  This  Macedonian  embassy  preceded  the  one  from  Athens,  which 
Hegesippus  conducted,  and  which  conveyed  the  Athenian  proposals  for 
the  amendment  of  the  treaty. 


94  THE    ORATIONS    OF    DEMOSTHE>~ES. 

.5  ambassadors?  addressed  you,  and  that  the  decree  was 
drawn;  and  so  it  is  not  possible,  as  the  words  had  just  been 

.  and  the  decree  was  instantly  read,  that  you  could 
have  passed  a  resolution  which  misrepresented  the  ambas- 
sadors. Wherefore,  this  charge  in  his  letter  is  not  against 
me.  but  against  you.  that  you  sent  a  decree  in  answer  to 
something  which  you  never  heard.  And  the  ambassadors 
themselves,  whom  the  decree  misreore.-sented.  when  you  read 
them  your  answer  and  invited  them  to  partake  your  hos. 
pitality,  ventured  not  to  come  forward  and  say,  u  You  mis- 
represent us.  Athenians,  and  make  us  to  have  stated  what 
we  never  did,"  but  went  their  way  in  silence. 

I  wish,  men  of  Athens,  (as  Python,1  who  was  then  ambas- 
jbtained  credit  with  you  for  his  address.)  to  remind 
you  of  the  very  words  which  he  spoke.  I  am  sure  you  will 
remember  them :  they  were  exactly  like  what  Philip  has  now 
written.  "While  he  complained  of  us  who  decry  Philip,  he 
found  fault  with  you  also,  that  notwithstanding  his  intentions 
-  re  you,  his  preference  of  your  friendship  to  that  of  any 
of  the  Greeks,  you  oppose  him  yourselves,  and  listen  to 
slanderers  who  ask  him  for  money  and  abuse  him  :  that  by 
such  language — when  people  report  that  he  was  calumniated, 
and  you  listened  to  it — his  feelings  are  altered,  finding  him- 
self mistrusted  by  thot  a  he  had  purposed  to  befriend. 
He  therefore  advised  the  public  speakers  not  to  disparage 
the  peace,  for  it  were  better  not  to  break  peace;  but  if  there 
were  aught  amiss  in  the  articles,  to  rectify  it,  as  Philip  would 
concur  in   any  resolution  of  yours.      Should   they  persist  in 

r.   without  proposing  anything  themselves,  by  which 

tee  might  stand  and  Philip  cease  to  be  suspected,  you 
ought  not  (he  said)  to  ati 

You  heard  and  approved  the       M   -_:;ients,  and  said  that 

n's  argument   was  just.     And  just    it   w-as.      But    he 

1  Python  of  Byzantium,  who  was  an  able  speaker  and  diplomatist,  and 
employed  with  great  advantage  bj  Philip  in  hi*  negotiations  with  other 
states.     L'en.   ■  -  i  have  been  the  only  man  ■who  could  cope 

wi'h  him,  and  baud  in  hi-  speech  on  the  Crown,  that  on  one  occasion 
be  redaced  t.  f  a  multitude  of  amba- 

Perhaps  it  w..  ;•  here  referred  to  ;  or  it  rr:iLrht  he  on  that 

which  gave  occasion  to  tne  second  Philippic.     It  is  probable,  but  not 
certain,  that  the  same  Python  who  murdered  Cotvs,  hing  of 

Thrace. 


ON    IIALOKNESUS.  9«) 

made  those  statements,  not  that  any  articles  might  be  can- 
celled, which  were  advantageous  to  Philip,  and  for  the  inser- 
tion of  which  he  had  spent  large  sums  of  money,  but  at  the 
suggestion  of  his  instructors  here,  who  thought  no  man 
would  move  anything  counter  to  the  decree  of  Philocrates, 
which  lost  Amphipolis.  I,  men  of  Athens,  have  never  dared 
to  make  an  unlawful  motion,  but  I  made  one  contravening 
the  decree  of  Philocrates,  which  was  unlawful,  as  I  will  show. 
The  decree  of  Philocrates,  according  to  which  you  lost  Am- 
phipolis, ran  counter  to  the  former  decrees,  through  which 
you  acquired  that  territory.  Therefore  that  decree  of  Philo- 
crates was  unlawful,  and  it  was  impossible  for  the  author  of 
a  legal  motion  to  move  in  accordance  with  an  unlawful 
decree.  But  moving  in  accordance  with  those  former  decrees, 
which  were  lawful  and  preserved  your  territory,  I  moved  a 
lawful  resolution,  and  convicted  Philip  of  deceiving  you,  and 
desiring,  not  to  amend  the  peace,  but  to  bring  your  honest 
counsellors  into  discredit. 

That  he  then  allowed  the  amendment  and  now  denies  it, 
you  all  know.  But  he  says  Amphipolis  belongs  to  him, 
because  you  declared  it  to  be  his,  when  you  resolved  he 
should  keep  what  he  held.1  You  did  indeed  pass  that  reso- 
lution, but  not  that  Amphipolis  should  be  his  :  for  it  is 
possible  to  hold  the  property  of  another,  and  all  holders  hold 
not  their  own.  Many  possess  what  belongs  to  others;  there- 
fore this  sophistry  of  his  is  absurd.  And  he  remembers  the 
decree  of  Philocrates,  but  has  forgotten  the  letter  which  he 
sent  you  when  he  was  besieging  Amphipolis,  in  which  he 
acknowledged  that  Amphipolis  was  yours;  for  he  promised 
after  its  reduction  to  restore  it  to  Athens,  as  it  belonged  to 
her,  and  not  to  the  holders.  So  they,  it  seems,  who  occupied 
Amphipolis  before  Philip's  conquest,  held  the  domain  of 
Athenians,  but,  since  Philip  has  conquered  it,  he  holds  not 
the  domain  of  Athenians,  but  his  own.  Olynthus  too,  Apol- 
lonia  and  Pallene,  belong  to  him,  not  by  usurpation,  but  in 
his  own  right.  Think  you  he  studies  in  all  his  despatches  to 
you,  to  show  himself  by  word  and  deed  an  observer  of  what 

1  The  treaty  had  for  its  basis  the  principle  of  the  vti  possidetis,  to 
adopt  the  expression  of  modern  diplomacy.  According  to  the  true 
construction  of  this,  Amphipolis  would  belong  to  Philip,  and  the 
reasoning  of  the  orator  is  unsound.  But  no  doubt,  in  the  whole  affair 
of  Amphipolis,  and  the  peace  also,  Philip  overreached  the  Athenians. 


96  THE    ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

the  world  calls  justice,  or  rather  has  he  set  it  at  defiance,  when 
a  laud,  ■which  the  Greeks  and  the  Persian  monarch  have 
voted  and  acknowledged  to  be  yours,  he  asserts  to  be  not 
yours,  but  his  own  ? 

As  to  the  other  amendment  which  you  made  in  the  articles, 
that  the  Greeks  not  included  in  the  peace  should  be  free 
and  independent,  and.  if  any  one  attacked  them,  should  be 
Buooooied  by  all  parties  to  the  treaty,  you  deeming  it  equi- 
table and  righteous,  that  not  only  we  and  our  allies,  and 
Philip  and  his  allies,  should  enjoy  the  peace,  while  those  who 
were  neither  our  allies  nor  Philip's  were  exposed,  and  might 
be  oppressed  by  the  powerful,  but  that  they  also  should  have 
security  by  your  peace,  and  we  should  lay  down  our  arms  and 
e.jjoy  peace  in  reality  ;  although  he  confesses  in  the  letter,  as 
you  hear,  that  this  amendment  is  just,  and  that  he  allows  it, 
he  has  taken  their  town  from  the  Pheraeans  and  put  a 
garrison  in  the  citadel,  doubtless  to  make  them  independent ; 
he  marches  against  Ambracia,1  bursts  into  three  Cassopian2 
cities,  Pandosia,  Bucheta.  and  Elatea,  colonies  of  Elis,  after 
ravaging  their  territories,  and  gives  them  in  vassalage  to  his 
kinsman  Alexander.  Proofs  how  much  he  desires  the  freedom 
and  independence  of  Greece  ! 

Respecting  his  continual  promises  of  doing  you  important 
service,  he  says  that  I  misrepresent  and  slander  him  to  the 
Greeks ;  for  he  never  promised  you  anything.  So  impudent 
is  this  man,  who  has  written  iu  a  letter,  which  is  now  in  the 
senate-house,  (when  he  declared  he  would  silence  us  his 
opponents  if  the  peace  were  made.)  that  he  would  confer  on 
you  such  an  obligation  as,  were  he  sure  of  the  peace,  he 
w>uld  instantly  communicate  :  implying  that  these  favours, 
intended  for  us  in  the  event  of  peace,  were  ready  and  pro- 

1  Philip's  expedition  against  Ambracia  followed  the  campaign  in 
Epvrns,  which  took  place  in  b.c.  343.  His  designs  against  Ambracia  were 
defeated  by  the  exertions  of  the  Athenians,  who  formed  a  league  again:-* 
him,  and  sent  troops  to  assist  the  Ambracians.  Demosthenes  in  the 
third  Philippic  speaks  of  an  embassy,  in  which  both  himself,  and 
Hegesippus  were  engaged,  which  had  the  effect  of  stopping  Philip's 
inva^on  of  Ambracia  and  Peloponnesus. 

2  Cassopia  is  a  district  of  Epirus,  which  Philip  invaded  e.c.  343,  and 
added  to  the  kingdom  of  Alexander  his  brother-in-law,  between  whom 
and  Philip's  uncle,  Arynibas.  the  province  of  Epirus  was  divided.  The 
Cassopian  Elaiea  must  not  be  confounded  with  the  Phocian, 


ON    HALONNESUS.  97 

vided.  After  the  peace  was  made,  the  good  things  intended 
for  us  all  vanished,  and  among  the  Greeks  has  been  wrought 
such  ruin  as  you  have  seen.  In  his  present  letter  he  pro- 
mises you,  that  if  you  will  trust  his  friends  and  advocates, 
and  punish  us  who  slander  him  to  the  people,  he  will  greatly 
serve  you.  Such,  however,  will  be  the  character  of  his 
service;  he  will  not  return  you  your  own,  for  he  claims  it 
himself ;  nor  will  his  grants  be  in  this  part  of  the  world,  for 
fear  of  offending  the  Greeks  :  but  I  suppose  some  other 
land  and  locality  will  be  found,  where  his  gifts  may  take 
effect. 

As  to  the  places  which  he  has  taken  during  the  peace, 
taken  from  you  in  contempt  of  the  treaty  and  violation  of 
its  terms,  since  he  has  nothing  to  urge,  but  stands  convicted 
of  injustice,  he  offers  to  submit  to  a  fair  and  impartial  tri- 
bunal, on  a  question  which,  of  all  othei'S,  requires  no  arbitra- 
tion, for  the  number  of  days  determines  it.  We  all  know 
the  month  and  the  day  when  the  peace  was  concluded.  As 
surely  do  we  know  in  what  month  and  on  what  day  Ser- 
rium,  Ergisce,  and  the  Sacred  Mount1  were  taken.  These 
transactions  are  not  so  obscure;  they  need  no  trial;  it 
is  notorious  to  all,  which  month  was  the  earlier,  that  in 
which  the  peace  was  signed,  or  that  in  which  the  places  were 
captured. 

He  says  also  that  he  has  returned  all  our  prisoners  who 
were  taken  in  war.  Yet  in  the  case  of  that  Caiystian,2  the 
friend  of  our  state,  for  whom  you  sent  three  embassies  to 
demand  his  liberty,  Philip  was  so  anxious  to  oblige  you  that 
he  killed  the  man,  and  would  not  even  suffer  him  to  be  taken 
up  for  burial. 

It  is  worth  while  to  examine  what  he  writes  to  you  about 

1  These  were  places  in  Thrace,  taken  by  Philip  from  Cersobleptes. 

2  Carystus  is  a  town  of  Euboea.  The  Proxenus,  or  public  friend  of  a 
foreign  state,  was  one  who  protected  its  interests  in  his  own  country, 
performing  duties  not  unlike  that  cf  a  modern  consul.  A  relation  of 
mutual  hospitality  subsisted  (as  the  word  imports)  between  him  and  the 
citizens  of  the  friendly  state ;  and  he  was  expected  to  entertain  the 
ambassadors,  or  any  persons  who  came  on  public  business.  (See  title 
Hospitium,  Arch.  Diet.)  We  have  no  word  by  which  Proxenus  can  be 
translated ;  nor  any  indeed  which  expresses  the  double  relation  of  host 
and  guest,  as  |«yos  and  hospes  do.  In  German  we  have  Staatsgast- 
freund. 

VOL.  L  H 


98  THE    ORATIONS    OF    DEMOSTHENES. 

the  Chersonese,  and  likewise  to  ascertain  what  his  conduct 
is.  All  the  district  beyond  Agora,1  as  if  it  were  his  own, 
and  belonged  not  to  you,  he  has  given  into  the  posses- 
sion of  Apollonides  the  Cardian.  Yet  the  boundary  of 
the  Chersonese  is  not  Agora,  but  the  altar  of  Terminal 
Jupiter,  which  is  between  Pteleum  and  Leuce-Acte,  where 
the  canal  was  to  be  cut  through  the  Chersonese,  as  the 
inscription  on  the  altar  of  Terminal  Jupiter  shows,  Mark 
the  words : — 

This  holy  altar  built  by  native  hands, 
'Twixt  Pteleum  and  the  Chalky  Beach  it  stands, 
Stands  for  the  limit  of  their  just  domains, 
The  guardian  He  who  in  Olympus  reigns. 

This  territory,  large  as  most  of  you  know  it  to  be,  he 
claims  :  part  he  enjoys  himself,  part  he  has  given  to  others, 
and  so  he  reduces  all  your  property  into  his  possession. 
And  not  only  does  he  appropriate  the  country  beyond  Agora, 
but  also  with  reference  to  the  Cardians,  who  dwell  on  this 
side  Agora,  he  writes  in  his  present  letter,  that  if  you  have 
any  difference  with  the  Cardians,  (who  dwell  in  your  domi- 
nions,) you  must  refer  it  to  arbitration.  They  have  a 
difference  with  you ;  see  if  it  is  about  a  small  matter.  They 
.say,  the  land  they  inhabit  belongs  to  them,  not  to  you;  that 
yours  are  mere  occupations  in  a  foreign  country,  theirs  are 
possessions  in  their  own;  and  that  your  fellow-citizen,  Cal- 
lippus  of  Peeania,2  alleged  this  in  a  decree.  And  here  they 
ai"e  right ;  he  did  so  allege,  and,  on  my  indicting  him  for  an 
unlawful  measure,  you  acquitted  him;  and  thus  he  has 
caused  your  title  to  the  land  to  be  contested.  But  if  you 
could  bring  yourselves  to  refer  this  dispute  with  the  Cardians, 
whether  the  land  be  yours  or  theirs,  why  should  not  the 

'  This  was  a  place  in  the  Uhersonese.  the  whole  of  which,  except 
Cardia,  belonged  to  Athens.  The  orator  contends,  that  the  boundary 
of  the  Chersonese  was  a  line  drawn  across  the  isthmus  from  Pteleum  to 
Leuce-Acte,  the  latter  of  which  places  was  probably  named  from  the 
white  cliffs  on  the  beach.  In  the  centre  of  this  line  was  erected  the 
altar,  which  anciently  separated  the  boundaries  of  those  towns.  Agora 
was  within  the  line.  For  further  information  concerning  the  Chersonese, 
see  the  following  oration,  and  Appendix  III. 

2  Paeania  is  one  of  the  townships,  ifjfuoi,  into  which  Attica  was  divided. 
Libanius  says,  it  was  Hegesippus  who  preferred  this  indictment  against 
Callippus. 


ON   HALONNESUS.  99 

other  people  of  the  Chersonese  be  dealt  with  on  the  same 
principle  ?  His  treatment  of  you  is  so  insolent,  that  he  says, 
if  the  Cardians  will  not  submit  to  arbitration,  he  will  compel 
them,  as  if  you  were  unable  even  to  compel  Cardians  to  do 
you  justice.  As  you  are  unable,  he  says  he  will  himself 
compel  them.  Don't  you  really  find  him  a  great  benefactor  'I 
And  some  men  have  declared  this  epistle  to  be  well  written ; 
men  who  are  far  more  deserving  of  your  detestation  than 
Philip.  He,  by  constant  opposition  to  you,  acquires  honour 
and  signal  advantage  for  himself :  Athenians  who  exhibit 
zeal,  not  for  their  country,  but  for  Philip,  are  wretches  that 
ought  to  be  exterminated  by  you,  if  you  carry  youi  Drains  in 
your  temples,  and  not  trodden  down  in  your  heels.1 

It  now  remains,  that  to  this  well-drawn  epistle  and  the 
speeches  of  the  ambassadors  I  propose  an  answer,  which  in 
my  opinion  is  just  and  expedient  for  Athens. 

1  Libanius  censures  the  coarseness  of  this  expression,  and  contends 
that  Demosthenes  never  could  have  used  it.  Weiske  thinks  differently, 
and  quotes  the  examples  of  coarse  language  adduced  against  his  rival  by 
vEschines.  (Or.  cont.  Ctes.)  Libanius,  however,  thinks  that  the  whole 
style  of  this  oration  is  beneath  the  Demosthenic  character.  The  reader 
must  form  his  own  opinion.  It  has  been  remarked,  both  by  Photius 
and  Dr.  Johnson,  that  there  may  be  much  difference  between  the  best 
and  the  worst  productions  of  an  author.  Yet  there  is  in  most  good 
authors  a  general  character,  by  which  those  who  are  familiar  with  theui 
may  form  a  judgment  of  what  is  genuine. 


H  2 


100  THE    ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHEivES. 


THE  ORATION  ON  THE  CHERSONESE. 


THE   ARGUME5T. 

The  Athenians  had  sent  a  body  of  citizens,  commanded  by  Diopithes, 
to  receive  allotments  of  land  in  the  Chersonese,  and  at  the  same 
time   to  protect  the  interests  of  Athens  by  acting  as  an  army  of 
observation.     They  soon  fell  into  disputes  with  the  Cardians  about 
the  limits  of  their  territory.     Philip,  who  at  this  time  was  engaged 
in  a  Thracian  war,  sent  assistance  to  the  Cardians ;  but  Diopithes, 
having  collected  a  troop  of  mercenaries,  kept  the  field  successfully, 
and,   not   content   with  acting   on  the   defensive,   carried   the  war 
into  Thrace,  assisted  the  enemies  of  Philip,  and  wrested  from  him 
some  of  his  conquests.     Philip,  who,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  last 
oration,  had  written  before  to  the  Athenians  on  the  subject  of  Cardia, 
now  wrote  them  a  letter  complaining  of  the  conduct  of  Diopithes, 
charging  them  with  an  infringement  of  the  peace.    This  letter  arrived 
early  in  the  summer  of  the  year  B.C.  342,  and  an  assembly  was  imme- 
diately called  to  consider  what  measures  should  be  taken.     The  Mace- 
donian party  were  vehement  in  denouncing  Diopithes,  and  urging  his 
recal.     Demosthenes,  seeing  that  Athens,  though  nominally  at  peace 
with  Philip,  was  really  defending  herself  against  his  aggressions,  rose 
to  justify  Diopithes,  insisted  on  the  necessity,  which  he  had  so  strongly 
urged  in  the  first  Philippic,  of  keeping  a  permanent  force  on  the 
northern  coast,  and  contended  that  the  army  of  Diopithes  should  rather 
be  reinforced,  than  recalled  at  a  time  when  its  presence  was  pecu- 
liarly necessary.     He   again  warns  his   countrymen   of  impending 
danger,  and  points  out  the  measures  which,  as  men  of  spirit  and 
prudence,  they  ought  to  pursue. 
This  oration  is  full  of  good  sense  and  manly  eloquence.     It  had  the 
success  which  it  deserved.     Diopithes  was  continued  in  his  com- 
mand;  and  the  exertions  of  Athens  in  the  next  few  years  had  the 
effect  of  preserving  the  Chersonese  and  the  Bosphorus. 
Diopithes  was  father  to  Menander,  the  celebrated  comic  poet,  whose 

plays  have  been  copied  by  Terence. 
For  further  information  on  the  subject  of  the  Chersonese,  see  Appendix 
III.  to  this  volume. 

It  were  just,  men  of  Athens,  that  the  orators  in  your  assem- 
bly should  make  no  speeches  to  gratify  either  friendship  or 
malice,  but  every  one  declare  what  he  considers  for  the  best, 
especially  when  you  are  deliberating  on  public  measures  of 
importance.      However,    since   there   are   persons   who   aru 


OX   THE    CHERS0XES3.  101 

impelled  to  address  you  from  factious  motives,  or  others  winch 
I  cannot  name,  it  becomes  you,  Athenians,  the  majority, 
laying  all  else  aside,  to  determine  and  to  do  what  you  find 
beneficial  to  the  state.  The  serious  question  here  is,  the 
position  of  the  Chei*sonese,  and  the  campaign  in  Thrace, 
which  Philip  has  now  for  upwards  of  ten  months  been 
carrying  on ;  yet  most  of  the  speeches  have  been  about 
Diopithes,  his  conduct  and  designs.  It  seems  to  me,  that  on 
a  charge  against  any  of  these  men,  whom  according  to  the 
laws  you  may  punish  when  you  please,  it  is  in  your  option 
either  to  proceed  immediately  or  at  a  later  time,  and  need- 
less for  me,  or  for  any  one,  to  argue  the  point  strongly  :  but 
for  the  defence  of  our  dominions,  which  Philip,  our  standing 
enemy,  and  now  in  great  force  about  the  Hellespont,  is 
making  haste  to  conquer,  and,  if  we  are  once  too  late,  we 
shall  never  recover,  our  duty  is  to  consult  and  prepare  with 
the  utmost  speed,  and  not  for  clamours  and  charges  about 
other  matters  to  run  off  from  this. 

I  wonder  at  many  things  which  are  commonly  said  here, 
but  I  have  been  particularly  surprised,  Athenians,  at  what 
I  lately  heard  a  man  declare  in  the  Council,1  that  a  states- 
man's advice  should  be,  either  to  make  war  decidedly,  or  to 
observe  the  peace.  True;  if  Philip  keeps  quiet,  neither 
holding  any  of  our  territories  contrary  to  the  treaty,  nor 
packing  a  world  of  enemies  against  us,  there  is  nothing  tc 
say  :  peace  we  must  absolutely  observe,  and  I  see  every 
readiness  on  your  part.  But  if  the  conditions  of  the  peace, 
which  we  swore  to,  are  recorded  and  open  to  inspection ;  if  it 
appears  that  from  the  beginning,  (before  Diopithes  and  the 
settlers,2  who  are  accused  as  authors  of  the  war,  ever  sailed 
from  Athens,)  Philip  has  robbed  us  of  divers  territories,  of 
which  you  still  complain  in  these  unrepealed  resolutions,  and 
has  been  all  along  incessantly  gathering  -the  spoil  of  other 
nations,  Greek  and  barbarian,  for  the  materials  of  an  attack 
upon  you,  what  mean  they  by  saying  we  must  have  war  or 

1  The  Council  or  Senate  of  Five  Hundred,  of  which  Demosthenes 
became  a  member  when  he  was  thirty-six  years  of  age. 

-  The  settlers  called  KA-qpouxoi  were  citizens  sent  out  to  receive  parcels 
of  land  in  some  country  dependent  on  Athens,  but  who  still  retained 
rights  of  Athenian  citizenship,  whether  or  not  they  permanently  resided 
abroad.  The  word  signifies  "  allotment-holders,"  or  "  allottees  of  lands  " 
Jacobs :  die  A  rusiedler. 


102  THE    ORATIONS   OF    DEMOSTHEXES. 

peace  1  We  have  no  choice  in  the  matter :  there  remains 
but  one  most  just  and  necessary  course,  which  these  men 
purposely  overlook.  What  is  it  1  To  defend  ourselves 
against  an  aggressor.  Unless  indeed  they  mean,  that,  so  long 
as  Philip  keeps  aloof  from  Attica  and  Piraeus,  he  neither 
wrongs  you  nor  commits  hostility.1  But  if  they  put  our 
/ights  on  this  principle,  and  so  define  the  peace,  besides  that 
the  argument  is  iniquitous,  monstrous,  and  perilous  for 
Athens,  as  I  imagine  is  evident  to  all,  it  happens  also  to  be 
inconsistent  with  their  complaint  against  Diopithes.  For 
why,  I  wonder,  should  we  give  Philip  licence  to  do  what  he 
pleases,  provided  he  abstain  from  Attica,  while  Diopithes  is 
not  suffered  even  to  assist  the  Thracians,  without  our  saying 
that  he  makes  war?  Here,  it  will  be  granted,  they  are  shown 
in  the  wrong  :  but  the  mercenaries  make  sad  work  ravaging 
the  Hellespontine  coast,  and  Diopithes  has  no  right  to  detain 
vessels,  and  we  must  not  allow  him  !  Well ;  be  it  so  !  I  am 
content.  Yet  I  think,  if  they  really  give  this  counsel  ip. 
good  faith,  as  their  object  is  to  disband  a  force  in  your 
service,  while  they  denounce  the  general  who  maintains  it, 
they  ought  likewise  to  show  that  Philip's  army  will  be  dis- 
banded if  you  follow  their  advice.  Otherwise,  observe,  they 
just  bring  the  country  into  the  same  wray,  through  which  all 
our  past  measures  have  miscarried.2  For  you  surely  know, 
that  by  nothing  in  the  world  has  Philip  beaten  us  so  much,  as 
by  being  earlier  in  his  operations.  He  with  an  army  always 
attending  him,  knowing  his  own  designs,  pounces  on  whom 
he  pleases  in  a  moment  :3  we,  when  we  hear  that  something 

1  Philip  sought  to  conquer  Athens  in  Thrace,  as  Napoleon  to  conquer 
England  in  Egypt  or  Portugal.  And  we  shall  find  that  precisely  the 
same  arguments  were  used  in  our  Parliament,  to  show  the  necessity  of 
continuing  the  French  war,  which  Demosthenes  here  urges  to  alarm  the 
Athenians  against  Philip. 

2  I  follow  the  common  reading  dnoKccKev.  The  explanation  which 
Schaefer  gives  of  his  own  reading  does  not  satisfy  me. 

3  More  closely,  "is  upon  the  enemy,  whom  he  pleases  to  attack,  in  a 
moment."  Francis:  "surprises  upon  the  instant  whom  he  thinfcs 
proper  to  destioy;"  which  is  not  bad,  except  for  the  last  two  words. 
Leland  is  too  wide:  "can  in  a  moment  strike  the  blow  where  he 
pleases."  Jacobs  is  good:  steJd  augenblicklich  Jedem  gegenuber,  den  cr 
angreifen  will.     Compare  Virgil,  Georgic  III. 

Hosti 
Ante  expectatum  positis  stat  in  agmine  castris. 


0>"    THE    CHERSONESE.  103 

is  going  on.  begin  to  bustle  and  prepare.  Methiaks  the 
result  is,  that  he  very  quietly  secures  what  he  goes  for;  we 
arrive  too  late,  and  have  incurred  all  the  expense  for  nothing. 
Our  enmity  and  our  hostile  intention  we  manifest,  and  get 
the  disgrace  of  missing  the  time  for  action. 

Then  be  sure,  Athenians,  now,  that  all  the  rest  is  talk  and 
pretence,  the  real  aim  and  contrivance  is,  that  while  you  re- 
main at  home,  and  the  country  has  no  force  abroad,  Philip 
may  accomplish  what  he  pleases  without  interruption.  First, 
consider  what  is  actually  going  on.  Philip  is  staying  with  a 
large  army  in  Thrace,  and  sending  for  reinforcements,  as  eye- 
witnesses report,  from  Macedonia  and  Thessaly.  Now,  should 
he  wait  for  the  trade-winds,  and  then  inarch  to  the  siege  of 
Byzantium.1  think  ye  the  Byzantines  would  persist  in  their 
present  folly,  and  would  not  invite  you  and  implore  your 
assistance  ?  I  don't  believe  it.  No ;  they  will  receive  any 
people,  even  those  they  distrust  more  than  us,  sooner  than 
surrender  their  city  to  Philip;  unless  indeed  he  is  before- 
hand with  them  and  captures  it.  If  then  we  are  unable  to 
sail  northwards,  and  there  be  no  help  at  hand,  nothing  can 
prevent  their  destruction.  Well !  the  men  are  infatuated  and 
besotted.  Very  likely:  yet  they  must  be  rescued  for  ah. 
that,  because  it  is  good  for  Athens.  And  this  also  is  no" 
clear  to  us,  that  he  will  not  attack  the  Chersonese  :  nay,  it' 
we  may  judge  from  the  letter  which  he  sent  us,  he  says  he 
will  chastise  the  people  in  the  Chersonese.  Then  if  the 
present  army  be  kept  on  foot,  it  will  be  able  to  defend  that 
councry.  and  attack  some  of  Philip's  dominions;  but  if  it  be 
once  disbanded,  what  shall  we  do,  if  he  march  against  the 
Chersonese  ?  Try  Diopithes,  I  suppose.  And  how  will  our 
affairs  be  bettered  ?  But  we  shall  send  succour  from  Athens. 
And  suppose  the  winds  prevent  us  ?  Oh,  but  he  won't  come ! 
And  who  will  insure  that  ?  Do  you  mark  and  consider,  men 
of  Athens,  the  approaching  season  of  the  year,  against  which 
certain  persons  desire  to  get  the  Hellespont  clear  of  you.  and 
deliver  it  up  to  Philip  1     Suppose  he  should  leave  Thrace, 

1  Athens  and  Byzantium  had  not  been  on  good  terms  since  the  Social 
war.  Even  at  this  period  the  Byzantines  looked  with  more  suspicion 
upon  the  Athenians  than  on  Philip.  Yet  less  than  a  year  elapsed  before 
the  predictions  of  Demosthenes  were  fulfilled.  Athens  was  in  alliance 
with  Byzantium,  and  defending  her  successfully  against  Philip. 


104  THE    ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHEXES. 

and  without  going  near  Chersonesus  or  Byzantium,  (I  beg 
you  also  to  consider  this.)  he  should  invade  Chalcis  or 
Megara,  as  he  lately  did  Oreus,1  think  you  it  is  better  to 
resist  him  here  and  suffer  the  war  to  approach  Attica,  or  to 
find  employment  for  him  yonder  ?     I  think  the  last. 

With  such  facts  and  arguments  before  you,  so  far  from  dis- 
paraging and  seeking  to  disband  this  army,  which  Diopithes 
js  endeavouring  to  organize  for  Athens,  you  ought  yourselves 
:o  provide  an  additional  one,  to  support  him  with  money 
and  other  friendly  cooperation.  For  if  Philip  were  asked, 
•''  Which  would  you  prefer,  that  these  soldiers  of  Diopithes, 
whatever  be  their  character,  (I  dispute  not  about  that.) 
should  thrive  and  have  credit  at  Athens,  and  be  reinforced 
with  the  assistance  of  the  state,  or  that  they  should  be  dis- 
persed and  destroyed  at  the  instance  of  calumniators  and 
accusers  1 " — I  think  he  would  say,  the  latter.  And  what 
Philip  would  pray  to  the  gods  for,  certain  persons  among  us 
are  bringing  about ;  and  after  this  you  ask  how  the  state  is 
ruined  ! 

I  wish,  therefore,  to  examine  with  freedom  our  present 
affairs,  to  consider  how  we  are  dealing  with  them,  and  what 
we  are  ourselves  about.  We  like  not  to  contribute  money, 
we  dare  not  take  the  field,  we  cannot  abstain  from  the  public 
funds,  we  neither  give  supplies  to  Diopithes  nor  approve 
what  he  finds  for  himself,  but  grumble  and  inquire  how  he 
got  them,  and  what  he  intends  to  do,  and  the  like ;  and  yet, 
though  thus  disposed,  we  are  not  willing  to  mind  our  own 
business,  but  with  our  mouths  applaud  those  who  speak 
worthily  of  the  state,  whilst  in  action  we  cooperate  with  their 
adversaries.  You  like  always  to  ask  the  speaker — What 
must  we  do?  I  will  ask  you  this — What  must  I  say  ?  For 
if  you  will  neither  contribute,  nor  take  the  field,  nor  abstain 
from  the  public  funds,  nor  give  supplies  to  Diopithes,  nor  le* 
alone  what  he  finds  for  himself,  nor  be  content  to  mind  your 
own  business,  I  have  nothing  to  say.  If  to  these  men,  so 
prompt  to  accuse  and  calumniate,  you  already  give  such  a 
.licence,  as  to  hear  them  complain  by  anticipation  of  projects 
which  they  impute  to  Diopithes,  what  can  one  say ] 

1  Oreus  of  Euboea  was  betrayed  to  Philip  not  long  before  this  time, 
as  explained  in  the  third  Philippic.  The  designs  of  Philip  on  Megara 
were  baffled. 


ON    THE    CHERSONESE.  105 

But  the  probable  effect  of  such  conduct  some  of  y:>u 
should  hear.  I  will  speak  frankly ;  indeed,  I  could  not 
speak  otherwise.  All  the  generals  who  have  ever  sailed  from 
Athens,  (or  let  me  suffer  any  penalty,)  take  money  from  Chians, 
from  Erythrseans,1  from  whom  they  severally  can,  I  mean 
from  the  people  who  dwell  in  Asia.  Those  who  have  one  or 
two  galleys  take  less,  those  who  have  a  greater  fleet,  more. 
And  the  givers  give  not,  either  the  small  or  the  larger  sums, 
for  nothing,  (they  are  not  so  mad,)  but  by  way  of  bargain, 
that  the  merchants  who  leave  their  harbours  may  not  be 
wronged  or  plundered,  that  their  vessels  may  be  convoyed,  or 
the  like.  They  say  they  give  benevolences  :  -  that  is  the 
name  of  the  presents.  And  so  Diopithes,  having  an  army, 
is  well  aware  that  all  these  people  will  give  money  :  for  how 
else  do  you  suppose,  that  a  man  who  has  received  nothing 
from  you,  and  has  nothing  of  his  own  to  pay  withal,  can 
maintain  his  troops  1  From  the  skies  1  Impossible.  He 
goes  on  with  what  he  collects,  begs,  or  borrows.  Therefore 
they,  who  accuse  him  before  you,  in  effect  warn  all  people  to 
give  him  nothing,  as  being  sure  to  be  punished  for  his  inten- 
tions, much  more  for  his  acts,  either  as  principal  or  auxiliary. 
Hence  their  clamours  —  he  is  preparing  a  siege  !  he  is 
giving  up  the  Greeks  !  So  concerned  are  many  of  these 
persons  for  the  Asiatic  Greeks  :  perhaps  quicker  to  feel  for 
strangers  than  for  their  country.  And  this  is  the  meaning 
of  our  sending  another  general  to  the  Hellespont.3  Why,  if 
Diopithes  commits  outrage  and  detains  vessels,  a  small,  very 
small  summons,  men  of  Athens,  can  stop  it  all ;  and  the 
laws  prescribe  this,  to  impeach  the  guilty  parties,  but  not  to 
watch  them  ourselves  at  a  great  expense  and  with  a  large 
navy,  for  that  were  the  extreme  of  madness.  Against  our 
enemies,  whom  we  cannot  bring  under  the  laws,  it  is  right 

1  Erythrae  is  a  city  of  Asia  Minor. 

2  It  is  singular  that  the  same  name  should  be  given  so  many  cen- 
turies after  to  the  illegal  contributions  which  were  extorted  by  some  of 
our  English  kings  from  their  subjects,  under  the  pretence  of  their  being 
voluntary  gifts.  Edward  the  Fourth  and  Henry  the  Seventh  were  most 
-repressive  in  this  way. 

s  The  argument  is — This  is  what  my  opponents  mean  by  recom- 
mending, that  another  general  should  be  sent  to  supersede  and  send 
back  Diopithes.  Such  a  course  is  wholly  unnecessary,  for  you  can 
nuinmon  him  home  bv  an  order  of  state. 


106  THE    ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

and  needful  to  maintain  troops,  and  despatch  a  fleet,  raid  con- 
tribute money:  but  against  ourselves  a  decree,  an  impeach- 
ment, the  state- galley,1  are  sufficient.  Thus  would  men  of 
discretion  act :  malignant  and  mischievous  politicians  would 
K  do.     And  that  certain  of  these  men  are  thus 

sed,  bad  though  it  be,  is  not  the  worst.  For  you  of  the 
assembly  are  so  minded  now,  that  if  any  one  comes  forward 
and  says,  that  Diopithes  is  the  author  of  all  your  misfor- 
tunes, or  Chares,  or  Aristophon.  or  what  citizen  he  likes  to 
name,  y  instantly  isaent  and  shout  approbation;  but  if 
ik  the  truth — Athenians,  you  are  trifling;  of 
all  these  misfortunes  and  troubles  Philip  is  the  cause ;  had 
he  only  kept  quiet,  the  state  would  have  had  no  trouble — you 
are  unable  I  b  diet  these  statements,  yet,  methink- 

are  annoyed,  and  feel  as  if  something  were  lost.     The  reason 
is — and  pray  allow  me.  when  I  speak  for  the  best,  to  speak 

— certain  statesmen  have  long   since   got   you   to   be 

E  and  terrible  in  the  assemblies,  in  warlike  preparations 
feeble  and  contemptible.  If  the  party  blamed  be  one  whom 
you  are  certain  to  find  within  your  reach,  you  say  aye,  and 
are  content :  but  if  one  be  accused,  whom  you  cannot  punish 
without  vanquishing  him  by  arms,  you  appear  confounded 
and  pained  at  the  exposure.  It  ought,  Athenians,  to  have 
.-   the  reverse  ;  your  statesmen  should  have  accustomed 

- 1  be  mild  and  merciful  in  the  assembly,  since  there 
your  dealings  are  with  citizens  and  allies;  in  warlike  prepara- 
tions they  should  have  shown  you  to  be  terrible  and  severe, 
since  in  them  the  contest  is  with  adversaries  and  foes.  But 
by  excessive       ....  and  humouring  they  have  brought  you 

h  a  condition,  that  in  the  assembly  you  give  yourselves 
airs  and  are  flattered  at  hearing  nothing  but  compliments, 
whilst  in  your  measures  and  proceedings  you  are  putting 

\.ing  to  hazard. 

By  Jupiter  !  suppose  the  Greeks  called  you  to  account  for 

the  opportunities  which  you  have  indolently  lost,  and  asked 

you,  saying,  "  Men  of  Athens,  you  send  us  ambassadors  on 

every  occasion,  and  assert  that  Philip  is  plotting  against  us 

e  Paralus.  or  the  Salaminia,  which  were  employed  for  state  pur- 
pose*, and  sometimes  to  fetch  home  criminals  to  be  tried  or  punished. 
Thus  the  Salaminia  was  despatched  to  bring  Alcibiades  back  from 

—  -••■• 


ON   THE   CHERSONESE.  107 

and  all  the  Greeks,  and  that  we  should  take  precautions 
against  the  man,  and  more  to  the  same  effect  :"  (we  must 
admit  and  acknowledge  it ;  for  so  we  do  :)  "  and  yet,  0  ye 
wretchedest  of  mankind,  though  Philip  has  been  ten  months 
away,  and  by  illness  and  winter  and  wars  prevented  from 
returning  home,  you  have  neither  liberated  Eubcea,  nor 
recovered  any  of  your  dominions.  He,  on  the  contrary, 
whilst  you  were  staying  at  home,  at  leisure,  in  health,  (if 
men  so  acting  may  be  called  in  health.)  established  two  rulers 
in  Eubcea,  one  like  a  hostile  fortress  opposite  Attica,  one 
threatening  Sciathus ; '  and  these  nuisances  you  have  never 
got  rid  of;  not  even  this  would  ye  attempt;  you  have  sub- 
mitted, left  the  road  open  to  him  clearly,  and  made  it  mani- 
fest that,  if  he  died  a  hundred  times,  you  would  stir  never  a 
step  the  more.  Then  wherefore  send  embassies  and  make  ac- 
cusations and  give  us  trouble  1 "  If  they  asked  this,  what  could 
we  answer  or  say,  men  of  Athens  1     I  really  cannot  tell. 

There  are  some  persons  indeed,  who  imagine  they  confute 
the  speaker  by  asking,  What  must  we  do  1  I  can  give  them 
a  perfectly  just  and  true  answer — Do  not  what  you  are  now 
doing  :  however,  I  will  enter  into  more  full  detail;  and  I 
trust  they  will  be  as  ready  to  act  as  to  interrogate.  First, 
men  of  Athens,  you  must  be  satisfied  in  your  minds  that 
Philip  is  at  war  with  the  republic,  and  has  broken  the  peace ; 
(pray  cease  reproaching  one  another  about  this ;)  that  he  is 
ill-disposed  and  hostile  to  all  Athens,  to  her  very  ground,  and 
(I  may  say)  to  all  her  inhabitants,  even  those  who  think  they 
oblige  him  most.  Or  let  them  look  at  Euthycrates  and 
Lasthenes  the  Olynthiaus,2  who  fancied  themselves  on  the 
most  friendly  footing  with  him,  but,  since  they  betrayed  their 
country,  are  sunk  to  the  most  abject  state.  But  there  is 
nothing  that  his  wars  and  his  schemes  are  directed  against  so 

1  Clitarchus  was  established  in  Eretria,  which  is  opposite  the  coast  of 
Athens ;  Philistides  in  Oreus,  which  is  in  the  north  of  Eubcea.  The 
island  of  Sciathus  is  a  little  above  Eubcea,  and  off  the  Magnesian  coast 
of  Thessaly.  As  the  group  of  islands,  of  which  Sciathus  was  one, 
belonged  to  Athens,  Oreus  was  a  dangerous  position  to  be  occupied  by 
an  enemy, 

2  They  betrayed  Olynthus  to  Philip,  and  went  to  reside  afterwards  at 
his  court.  But  they  were  universally  scouted  as  traitors,  and  on  their 
complaining  to  Philip,  he  said,  the  Macedonians  were  a  plain-spokea 
people,  who  called  a  spade  a  i-pade. 


108  THE    ORATIOKS    OF    DEMOSTHEXES, 

much,  as  cur  constitution ;  nothing  in  the  world  is  he  so 
earnest  to  destroy.  And  this  policy  is  in  some  sort  natural 
for  him.  He  knows  perfectly,  that  even  if  he  conquer  every- 
thing else,  he  can  hold  nothing  secure,  while  tout  democracy 
subsists :  hut  on  the  occurrence  of  any  reverse,  (and  many 
may  happen  to  a  man.)  all  who  are  now  under  constraint  will 
come  and  seek  :  _  ::i  you.  For  you  are  not  inclined 
yourselves  to  encroach  and  usurp  dominion ;  you  are  famous 
for  checking  the  usurper  or  depriving  him  of  his  conquest; 
ever  readv  to  molest  the  aspirants  for  empire,  and  vindicate 
the  liberties  of  all  people.  He  likes  not  that  a  free  spirit 
should  proceed  from  Athens,  to  watch  the  moments  of  his 
peril :  far  otherwise ;  nor  is  his  reasoning  weak  or  idle. 
First  then,  you  must  assume  him  for  this  reason  to  be  an 
irreconcilable  enemy  of  our  constitution  and  democracy  : 
without  such  conviction  upon  your  minds,  you  will  have  no 
zeal  for  public  duty.     Secondly,  you  must  be  assured  that  all 

I  eraticns  and  contrivances  are  planned  against  our 
countrv.  and.  wherever  he  is  resisted,  the  resistance  will  be  for 
our  benefit     None  of  you  surely  is  so  fooli-:.  :ppose 

that  Philip  covets  those  miseries1  in  Thrace,  (for  what  else 
can  one   call  Drongilus,  and  Cabyle.  and  Mastira,  and  the 

a  which  be  is  taking  and  conquering  now  ?)  and  to  get 
them  endures  toils  and  winters  and  the  extreme  of  danger, 
vets  not  the  Athenian  harbours,  and  docks,  and  galleys, 
and  silver-mines,J  and  revenues  of  such  value :  and  that  he 
will  suffer  vou  to  keep  them,  while  for  the  sake  of  the  barley 
and  millet  in  Thracian  caverns  he  winters  in  the  midst  of 
horrors'  Impossible.  The  object  of  that  and  every  other 
enterprise  is  to  become  master  here.  What  then  is  the 
dutv  of  wise  men  ?  With  these  assurances  and  conv: . 
to  lav  aside  an  indolence  which  is  becoming  outrageous  and 
incurable,  to  pay  contributions  and  to  call  upon  your  allies, 

'  I  thought  it  better  to  adhere  to  the  original,  which  explains  itself, 
than  to  use  any  such  expression  as  "  paltry  villages."'  or  "bicoques,"  or 
dendrn  Baitslhumern,  Jacobs  has  the  simple  Armsdigbeitm. 
*  The  mines  of  Laurium  in  Attica.  See  Appendix  1L 
s  The  original  fiapaBp<f  signifies  a  pi:,  into  which  condemned  crimi- 
nals were  thrown  at  Athens,  It  is  pre::y  much  :he  same  as  if  we  were 
to  speak  of  the  black  hole :  and  the  horrors  of  Thrace  would  convey 
w  an  Athenian  the  same  sort  of  idea  as  the  horrors  of  Siberia  to  aa 

Hlj,'.— -—■;-■ 


ON    THE    CHERSOXESE.  109 

see  to  and  provide  for  the  continuance  of  the  present  force, 
that,  as  Philip  has  a  power  ready  to  injure  and  enslave  all 
the  Greeks,  so  you  may  have  one  ready  to  save  and  to  suc- 
cour all.  It  is  not  possible  with  hasty  levies  to  perform  any 
effective  service.  You  must  have  an  army  on  foot,  provide 
maintenance  for  it,  and  paymasters  and  commissaries,  so 
ordering  it  that  the  strictest  care  shall  be  taken  of  your 
funds,  and  demand  from  those  officers  an  account  of  the 
expenditure,  from  your  general  an  account  of  the  campaign. 
If  ye  so  act  and  so  resolve  in  earnest,  you  will  compel  Philip 
to  observe  a  just  peace  and  abide  in  his  own  country,  (the 
greatest  of  all  blessings,)  or  you  will  fight  him  on  equal 
terms. 

It  may  be  thought,  and  truly  enough,  that  these  are 
affairs  of  great  expense  and  toil  and  trouble  :  yet  only  con- 
sider what  the  consequences  to  us  must  be,  if  we  decline 
these  measures,  and  you  will  find  it  is  our  interest  to  perform 
our  duties  cheerfully.  Suppose  some  god  would  be  your 
surety — for  certainly  no  mortal  could  guarantee  such  an 
event — that,  notwithstanding  you  kept  quiet  and  abandoned 
eveiything,  Philip  would  not  attack  you  at  last,  yet,  by 
Jupiter  and  all  the  gods,  it  were  disgraceful,  unworthy  of 
yourselves,  of  the  character  of  Athens  and  the  deeds  of  your 
ancestors,  for  the  sake  of  selfish  ease  to  abandon  the  rest  of 
Greece  to  servitude.  For  my  own  part,  I  would  rather  die 
than  have  given  such  counsel;  though,  if  another  man 
advises  it,  and  you  are  satisfied,  well  and  good;  make  no 
resistance,  abandon  all.  If  however  no  man  holds  this 
opinion,  if,  on  the  contrary,  we  all  foresee,  that  the  more  we 
let  Philip  conquer  the  more  ruthless  and  powerful  an  enemy 
we  shall  find  him,  what  subterfuge  remains  ?  what  excuse  for 
delay  ?  Or  when,  0  Athenians,  shall  we  be  willing  to  perform 
our  duty?  Peradventure,  when  there  is  some  necessity.  But 
what  may  be  called  the  necessity  of  freemen,  is  not  only 
come,  but  past  long  ago  :  and  surely  you  must  deprecate  that 
of  slaves.  What  is  the  difference  ?  To  a  freeman,  the  greatest 
necessity  is  shame  for  his  proceedings;  I  know  not  what 
greater  you  can  suggest  :  to  a  slave,  stripes  and  bodily  chas- 
tisement ;  abominable  thing's  !  too  shocking  to  mention ! 

I  would  gladly  enter  into  every  particular,  and  show  how 
certain  politicians  abuse  you ;  but  I  confine  myself  to  one* 


liO  THE    ORATIONS   OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

When  any  question  about  Philip  arises,  people  start  up  and 
cry,  What  a  blessing  it  is  to  be  at  peace  !  what  a  burden  to 
maintain  a  large  army !  certain  persons  wish  to  plunder  our 
treasury! — and  more  to  the  same  effect;  by  which  they 
amuse  you,  and  leave  him  at  leisure  to  do  what  he  pleases. 
The  result  is,  to  you,  Athenians,  ease  and  idleness  for  the 
present,  which,  I  fear,  you  may  hereafter  think  dearly  pur- 
chased j-  to  these  men,  popularity  and  payment  for  their 
speeches.  Methinks  it  is  not  you  that  need  persuading  to 
peace,  who  sit  here  pacifically  disposed;  but  the  person  who 
commits  hostilities :  let  him  be  persuaded,  and  all  is  ready  on 
your  part.  Burdensome  we  should  deem,  not  what  we  expend 
for  our  deliverance,  but  what  we  shall  suffer  in  case  of  our  re- 
fusal to  do  so.  Plunder  of  the  treasury  should  be  prevented  by 
a  plan  for  its  safe  keeping,  not  by  abandonment  of  our  in- 
terests. But  this  very  thing  makes  me  indignant,  that  some 
of  you,  Athenians,  are  grieved  at  the  thought  of  your  trea- 
sury being  robbed,  though  it  depends  on  yourselves  to  keep 
it  safe  and  to  chastise  the  peculator,  yet  are  not  grieved  at 
Philip's  conduct,  seizing  thus  successively  on  every  country 
in  Greece,  and  seizing  them  for  his  designs  upon  you. 

What  then  is  the  reason,  men  of  Athens,  that  while  Philip 
is  thus  openly  in  arms,  committing  aggressions,  capturing 
cities,  none  of  these  persons  ever  say  that  he  is  making  war; 
but  they  denounce  as  authors  of  the  war,  whoever  advises 
you  to  oppose  him  and  prevent  these  losses  ?  I  will  explain. 
Their  desire  is,  that  any  anger,  which  may  be  naturally  excited 
by  your  sufferings  in  the  war,  may  be  turned  upon  your  honest 
counsellors,  so  that  you  may  try  them  instead  of  resisting 
Philip,  and  they  themselves  be  accusers  instead  of  paying 
the  penalty  of  their  conduct.  Such  is  the  meaning  of  their 
assertion,  that  there  is  a  war-party  among  you ;  and  such  is 
the  object  of  this  present  debate.  I  am  indeed  sure,  that, 
before  any  Athenian  moved  a  declaration  of  war,  Philip  had 
taken  many  of  our  possessions,  and  recently  sent  succour  to 
Cardia.  If  however  we  choose  to  assume  that  he  is  not  at 
war  with  us,  it  were  extreme  folly  in  him  to  convince  us  of 
our  mistake.  But  when  he  marches  to  attack  us,  what  shall 
we  say  1  He  will  assure  us  that  he  is  not  making  war,  as  he- 
assured  the  people  of  Oreus  when  his  troops  were  in  their 
country,  as  he  assured  the  Pherseans  before  he  assaulted  their 


ON   THE    CHERSONESE.  Ill 

walls,  and  the  Olynthians  at  first,  until  he  was  actually  in 
their  territories  with  his  army.  Shall  we  then  declare,  that 
men  who  bid  us  defend  ourselves  make  war  1  If  so,  we  must 
be  slaves  :  nothing  else  remains,  if  we  neither  resist  nor  are 
suffered  to  be  at  peace.  And  remember,  you  have  more  at 
stake  than  other  people  :  Philip  seeks  not  to  subdue,  but  to 
extirpate  our  city.  He  knows  for  certain,  you  will  not 
submit  to  servitude ;  you  could  not  if  you  would,  being  ac- 
customed to  empire;  and  if  you  get  the  opportunity,  you 
will  be  able  to  give  him  more  annoyance  than  all  the  x*est  of 
the  world. 

You  must  therefore  be  convinced  that  this  is  a  struggle 
for  existence  :  these  men  who  have  sold  themselves  to  Philip 
you  must  execrate  and  cudgel  to  death ;  for  it  is  impossible, 
impossible  to  overcome  your  enemies  abroad,  until  you  have 
punished  your  enemies  (his  ministers)  at  home.  They  will  be 
the  stumbling-blocks  that  prevent  your  reaching  the  others.1 
Why  do  you  suppose  Philip  now  insults  you,  (for  to  this,  in 
my  opinion,  his  conduct  amounts,)  and  while  to  other  people, 
though  he  deceives  them,  he  at  least  renders  services,  he  is 
already  threatening  you  1  For  example,  the  Thessalians  by 
many  benefits  he  seduced  into  their  present  servitude  :  how 
he  cheated  the  wretched  Olynthians,  first  giving  them  Potidsea 
and  divers  other  things,  no  man  can  describe  :  now  he  is 
enticing  the  Thebans  by  giving  up  to  them  Boeotia,  and 
delivering  them  from  a  toilsome  and  vexatious  war.  Thus 
did  each  of  these  people  grasp  a  certain  advantage,  but  some 
of  them  have  suffered  what  all  the  world  know,  others  will 
suffer  what  may  hereafter  befal  them.  From  you — all  that 
has  been  taken  I  recount  not  :  but  in  the  very  making  of 
the  peace,  how  have  you  been  abused !  how  despoiled  !  Of 
Phocis,  Thermopylae  places  in  Thrace,  Doriscus,  Serrium, 
Cersobleptes  himself!  Does  he  not  now  p assess  the  city  of 
Cardia  and  avow  it  1     Wherefore,  I  say,  deals  be  thus  with 

1  The  word  trp6&okos  is  explained  by  Wolf :  "  impedimentum,  sive 
sit  scopulus  in  mari,  sive  vallum  in  terra."  Leland  translates  the  sen- 
tence :  "  else,  while  we  strike  on  these,  as  so  many  obstacles,  our 
enemies  must  necessarily  prove  superior  to  us."  This  is  both  vague 
and  weak.  Auger  avoids  the  simile.  Francis  introduces  "quicksands." 
Pabst :  es  ist  unvermeidlich,  class  Ihr  an  sie  wie  an  Klippen  anstosst, 
vnd  dadurch  auf'gehalten  werdet.  Jacobs :  immer  ivird  durch  sit, 
trie  durch  Felsen  des  A  7istosses,  Euer  Fortgang  gehemmt  we.rden. 


112  THE    ORATIjXS    OF    I/EMOSTHENTS. 

f.ther  people,  and  not  in  the  same  manner  with  yon  ?  Becau?e 
yours  is  the  odIy  state  in  which  a  privilege  is  allowed  of 
speaking  for  the  enemy,  and  an  individual  taking  a  bribe 
may  safely  address  the  assembly,  though  you  have  been 
robbed  of  your  dominions.  It  was  not  safe  at  Olynthus  to 
be  Philip's  advocate,  unless  the  Olynthian  commonalty  had 
shared  the  advantage  by  possession  of  Potidaea  :  it  was  not 
safe  in  Thessaly  to  be  Philip's  advocate,  unless  the  people  of 
Thessaly  had  shared  the  advantage,  by  Philip's  expelling 
their  tyrants  and  restoring  the  Pylaan  synod :  it  was  not  safe 
in  Thebes,  until  he  gave  up  Boeotia  to  them  and  destroyed 
the  Phocians.  Yet  at  Athens,  though  Philip  has  deprived 
you  of  Amphipolis  and  the  Cardian  territory,  nay,  is  even 
making  Eubcea  a  fortress  to  curb  us,  and  advancing  to 
attack  Byzantium,1  it  is  safe  to  speak  on  Philip's  behalf. 
Therefore  of  these  men,  some,  from  beingr  poor,  have  be- 
come rapidly  rich,  from  nameless  and  obscure,  have  become 
honoured  and  distinguished;  you  have  done  the  reverse, 
fallen  fr*m  honour  to  obscurity,  from  wealth  to  poverty; 
Gar  I  deem  the  riches  of  a  state,  allies,  confidence,  attach- 
ment, of  all  which  you  are  destitute.  And  from  your 
•     .  matters  and  suffering  them  to  be  lost,  Philip 

lias  grown  prosperous  and  mighty,  formidable  to  all  the 
:.s  and  barbarians,  whilst  you  are  abject  and  forlorn, 
magnificent  in  the  abundance  of  your  market,  but  in  pro- 
vision for  actual  need  ridiculous.  I  observe  however,  that 
some  of  our  orators  take  different  thought  for  you  and  for 
themselves.  You,  they  say,  should  be  quiet  even  under 
injustice:  they  cannot  live  in  quiet  among  you  themselves, 
though  no  man  injures  them. 

Then  some  one  steps  forward  and  says,  "  Why,  you  won't 
move  any  resolution,  or  run  any  risk ; :  you  are  cowardly  and 
fiiint-hearted."  Let  me  say  this  :  bold,  brutal,  and  impudent 
I  neither  am  nor  wish  to  be;  yet,  methinks,  I  possess  far 
more  courage  than  your  headstrong  politicians.  For  a  man 
who,  neglecting  the  interest  of  the  state,  tries,  confiscates, 

1  Not  that  Philip  had  commenced  any  operations  against  Byzantium, 
but  from  his  march  in  that  direction  Demosthenes  rightly  conjectured 
that  he  had  designs  thereupon. 

■  B_v  nbjeetug  yourself  to  a  ypa^ii  TTapaySfttev.  "indictment  for 
having  proposed  an  illegal  dc  I   also  to  the  general  respon- 

sibility which  a  statesman  incurred  by  advising  important  measures. 


ON    THE    CHERSONESE.  173 

bribes,  accuses,  does  not  act  from  any  courage,  Athenians ; 
the  popularity  of  his  speeches  and  his  measures  serves  for  a 
pledge  of  security,  and  he  is  bold  without  danger.  But  one 
who  acting  for  the  best  frequently  opposes  your  wishes,  whe 
never  speaks  to  flatter  but  always  to  benefit  you,  and 
adopts  a  line  of  policy  in  which  more  depends  on  fortune 
than  on  calculations,  while  he  makes  himself  responsible  to 
you  for  both,  this  is  a  courageous  man,  aye,  and  a  useful 
citizen  is  he;  not  they  who  for  ephemeral  pleasure  have 
thrown  away  the  main  resources  of  the  country ;  whom  I  am 
so  far  from  emulating  or  esteeming  as  worthy  citizens  of 
Athens,  that  if  I  were  asked  to  declare,  what  service  I  had 
done  the  state,  although,  ye  men  of  Athens,  I  could  men- 
tion services  as  ship-captain  and  choir-master,  payment  of 
contributions,  ransom  of  prisoners,  and  similar  acts  of  libe- 
rality, I  would  mention  none  of  them;  I  would  say,  that 
I  espouse  a  different  course  of  politics  from  these,  that 
although  I  might  perhaps,  like  others,  accuse  and  bribe  and 
confiscate  and  do  everything  which  these  men  do,  I  have  never 
engaged  myself  in  such  a  task,  never  been  induced  either  by 
avarice  or  ambition ;  I  continue  to  offer  counsel,  by  which 
I  sink  below  others  in  your  regard ;  but  you,  if  you  followed 
it,  would  be  exalted.  So  perhaps  might  tne  speak  without 
offence.  I  consider  it  not  the  part  of  an  honest  citizen,  to 
devise  measures  by  which  I  shall  speedily  become  the  first 
among  you,  and  you  the  last  among  nations  :  with  the 
measures  of  good  citizens  the  advancement  of  their  country 
should  keep  pace  :  their  counsel  should  still  be  the  salutary, 
rather  than  the  agreeable  :  to  the  latter  will  nature  herself 
incline;  to  the  former  a  good  citizen  must  direct  by  argii- 
ment  and  instruction. 

I  have  ere  now  heard  an  objection  of  this  kind,  that  true 
it  is  I  always  advise  for  the  best,  yet  my  services  are  only 
words,  and  you  want  deeds  and  something  practical.  Upon 
which  I  will  tell  you  my  sentiments  without  reserve.  I  do 
not  think  a  counsellor  has  any  other  business  but  to  give  the 
best  advice:  and  that  this  is  so,  I  can  easily  demonstrate. 
You  are  aware  doubtless,  that  the  brave  Timotheus  once 
harangued  the  people,  urging  them  to  send  troops  and  save 
the  Eubceans,  when  the  Thebans  were  attempting  their  con- 
quest ;  and  to  this  effect  he  spake  : — "  What  1  do  you  delibo- 

VOL.  I.  i 


lli  THE    ORATIONS    OP   I>EM03TH£>~E5. 

'add  be,  -?rhen  you  have  Thebans  in  the  island,  how  to 
deal  with  them,  how  to  proceed  ?  Will  you  nor  cover  the 
sea,  Athenians.  w;th  your  galleys  ?  Will  you  not  start  up 
and  march  to  Piraeus  i  will  you  not  launch  yoai 
Thus  Timotheus  spake  and  you  acted,1  and  through  both 
together  success  was  obtained.  But  had  his  advice  been  ever 
so  good,  as  it  was.  and  you  shrunk  from  exertion  and  dis- 
regarded it.  would  any  of  those  results  have  accrued  to 
Athens  ?  Impossible.  Then  do  likewise  in  regard  to  my 
counsels  or  any  other  man's:  for  action  look  to  yourselves, 
to  the  orator  for  the  best  instruction  in  his  power. 

I  will  sum  up  my  advice,  and  quit  the  platform.  I  say, 
you  must  contribute  money,  maintain  the  existing  troops, 
:ng  what  abuses  you  may  discover,  but  not  on  the 
first  accusation  disbanding  the  force.  Send  out  ambassadors 
everywhere,  to  instruct,  to  warn,  to  effect  what  they  can  for 
Athens.  Yet  further  I  say,  punish  your  corrupt  statesmen, 
execrate  them  at  all  times  and  places,  to  prove  that  men  of 
virtue  and  honourable  conduct  have  consulted  wisely  both  for 
others  and  themselves.  If  you  thus  attend  to  your  affairs, 
and  cease  entirely  neglecting  them,  perhaps,  perhaps  even  yet 
they  may  improve.  But  while  ye  sit  here,  zealous  as  far  as 
clamour  and  applause,  laggards  when  any  action  is  required, 
I  see  not  how  any  talking,  unaided  by  your  needful  exertions, 
can  possibly  save  the  country. 

1  Diocles  and  Chares  conducted  this  expedition,  which  took  place 
7.  and  which,  after  various  combats  in  the  island  of  Eubcea,  ended 
in  the  expulsion  of  the  Thebans.  Just  at  that  time  the  finances  of  the 
Athenians  were  exceedingly  low,  and  the  generosity  of  the  wealthier 
citizens  was  largely  taxed  to  provide  necessaries  for  the  armament. 
Demosthenes  himself  came  forward  as  a  liberal  contributor.  The  Ian- 
euage  of  Timotheus  on  this  occasion  mav  be  compared  with  Virgil's 
Snad,  I".  5  - 

Hon  anna  expedient  totaque  ex  urbe  sequentur. 
Deripieai-'jae  rates  alii  navalibus !     Ite, 
Ferte  citi  fla—imas,  date  vela,  impellite  re~ao2. 


THE   THIRD    PHILIPPIC.  115 


THE  THIRD  PHILIPPIC. 


THE  ARGUMENT. 

This  speech  was  delivered  about  three  months  after  the  last,  while 
Philip  was  advancing  into  Thrace,  and  threatening  both  the  Cher- 
sonese and  the  Propontine  coast.  Xo  new  event  had  happened,  which 
called  for  any  special  consultation ;  but  Demosthenes,  alarmed  by 
the  formidable  character  of  Philip's  enterprises  and  vast  military 
preparations,  felt  the  necessity  of  rousing  the  Athenians  to  exertion. 
He  repeats  in  substance  the  arguments  which  he  had  used  in  the 
Oration  on  the  Chersonese;  points  out  the  danger  to  be  apprehended 
from  the  disunion  among  the  Greek  states,  from  their  general  apathy 
and  lack  of  patriotism,  which  he  contrasts  with  the  high  and  nobfe 
spirit  of  ancient  times.  From  the  past  conduct  of  Philip  he  shows 
what  is  to  be  expected  in  future;  explains  the  difference  between 
Philip's  new  method  of  warfare  and  that  adopted  in  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  war.  and  urges  the  necessity  of  corresponding  measures  for 
defence.  The  peaceful  professions  of  Philip  were  not  to  be  trusted  ; 
he  was  never  more  dangerous  than  when  be  made  overtures  of  peace 
and  friendship.  The  most  powerful  instruments  that  he  employed 
for  gaining  ascendancy  were  the  venal  orators,  who  were  to  be  found 
in  every  Grecian  city,  and  on  whom  it  was  necessary  to  inflict  signal 
punishment,  before  they  had  a  chance  of  opposing  foreign  enemies. 
The  advice  of  DemostheDes  now  is,  to  despatch  reinforcements  to  the 
Chersonese,  to  stir  up  the  people  of  Greece,  and  even  to  solicit  the 
assistance  of  the  Persian  kiug,  who  had  no  less  reason  than  them- 
selves to  dread  the  ambition  of  Philip. 

The  events  of  the  following  year,  when  Philip  attacked  the  Propontine 
cities,  fully  justified  the  warnings  of  Demosthenes.  And  the  extra- 
ordinary activity,  which  the  Athenians  displayed  in  resisting  him, 
shows  that  the  exertions  of  the  orator  had  their  due  effect.  Even 
Mitford  confesses,  with  reference  to  the  operations  of  that  period, 
that  Athens  found  in  Demosthenes  an  able  and  effective  minister. 

Many  speeches,  men  of  Athens,  are  made  in  almost  every 
assembly"  about  the  hostilities  of  Philip,  hostilities  which 
ever  since  the  treaty  of  peace  he  has  been  committing  as  well 
against  you  as  against  the  rest  of  the  Greeks ;  and  all  (I  am 
sure)  are  ready  to  avow,  though  they  forbear  to  do  so,  that 
our  counsels  and  our  measures  should  be  directed  to  his 
humiliation  and  chastisement  :  nevertheless,  so  low  have  our 
affairs  been  brought  by  inattention  and  negligence,  I  fear  it 
is  a  harsh  truth  to  say,  that  if  all  the  orators  had  sought  to 

x  2 


116  THE   ORATIOXS   OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

suggest,  and  you  to  pass  resolutions  for  tb  a  utter  raining  of 
the  commonwealth,  we  could  not  methinks  be  worse  off  than 
we  are.  A  variety  of  circumstances  may  have  brought  us  to 
this  state ;  our  affairs  have  not  declined  from  one  or  two 
causes  only  :  but,  if  you  rightly  examine,  you  will  find  it 
chiefly  owing  to  the  orators,  who  study  to  please  you  rather 
than  advise  for  the  best.  Some  of  whom,  Athenians,  seeking 
to  maintain  the  basis  of  their  own  power  and  repute,  have  no 
forethought  for  the  future,  and  therefore  think  you  also 
ought  to  have  none  ;  others,  accusing  and  calumniating  prac- 
tical statesmen,  labour  only  to  make  Athens  punish  Athens, 
and  in  such  occupation  to  engage  her,  that  Philip  may  have 
liberty  to  say  and  do  what  he  pleases.  Politics  of  this  kind 
are  common  here,  but  are  the  causes  of  your  failures  and 
embarrassment.  I  beg,  Athenians,  that  you  will  not  resent 
my  plain  speaking  of  the  truth.  Only  consider.  You  hold 
liberty  of  speech  in  other  matters  to  be  the  general  right  of 
\\\  residents  in  Athens,  insomuch  that  you  allow  a  measure 
of  it  even  to  foreigners  and  slaves,  and  many  servants  may 
be  seen  among  you  speaking  their  thoughts  more  freely  than 
citizens  in  some  other  states;  and  yet  you  have  altogether 
banished  it  from  your  councils.  The  result  has  been,  that  in 
the  assembly  you  give  yourselves  airs  and  are  flattered  at 
hearing  nothing  but  compliments,  in  your  measures  and  pro- 
ceedings you  are  brought  to  the  utmost  peril.  If  such  be 
your  disposition  now,  I  must  be  silent :  if  you  will  listen  to 
good  advice  without  flattery,  I  am  ready  to  speak.  For 
though  our  affairs  are  in  a  deploi-able  condition,  though 
many  sacrifices  have  been  made,  still,  if  you  will  choose  to 
perform  your  duty,  it  is  possible  to  repair  it  all.  A  paradox, 
and  yet  a  truth,  am  I  about  to  state.  That  which  is  the 
most  lamentable  in  the  past  is  best  for  the  future.  How  is 
this  ?  Because  you  performed  no  part  of  your  duty,  great  or 
small,  and  therefore  you  fared  ill  :  had  you  done  all  that 
became  you,  and  your  situation  were  the  same,  there  would 
be  no  hope  of  amendment.  Philip  has  indeed  prevailed 
over  your  sloth  and  negligence,  but  not  over  the  country : 
yiMi  have  not  been  worsted;  you  have  not  even  bestirred 
yourselves. 

If  now  we  were  all  agreed  that  Philip  is  at  war  with 
Athens  and  infringing  the  p^ace,  nothing  would  a  speaker 


THE   THIRD    PHILIPPIC.  117 

need  to  urge  or  advise  but  the  safest  aud  easiest  way  of 
resisting  him.  But  since,  at  the  very  time  when  Philip  is 
capturing  cities  and  retaining  divers  of  our  dominions  and 
assailiug  all  people,  there  are  men  so  unreasonable  as  to 
listen  to  repeated  declarations  in  the  assembly,  that  some  of 
us  are  kindling  war,  one  must  be  cautious  and  set  this  matter 
right :  for  whoever  moves  or  advises  a  measure  of  defence,  is 
in  danger  of  being  accused  afterwards  as  author  of  the  war. 

I  will  fii"st  then  examine  and  determine  this  point,  whether 
it  be  in  our  power  to  deliberate  on  peace  or  war.  If  the 
country  may  be  at  peace,  if  it  depends  on  us,  (to  begin  with 
this,)  I  say  we  ought  to  maintain  peace,  and  I  call  upon  the 
affirmant  to  move  a  resolution,  to  take  some  measure,  and 
not  to  palter  with  us.  But  if  another,  having  arms  in  his 
hand  and  a  large  force  around  him,  amuses  you  with  the 
name  of  peace,  while  he  carries  on  the  operations  of  war, 
what  is  left  but  to  defend  yourselves  1  You  may  profess  to 
be  at  peace,  if  you  like,  as  he  does :  I  quarrel  not  with  that. 
But  if  any  man  supposes  this  to  be  a  peace,  which  will 
enable  Philip  to  master  all  else  and  attack  you  last,  he  is  a 
madman,  or  he  talks  of  a  peace  observed  towards  him  by 
you,  not  towards  you  by  him.  This  it  is  that  Philip  pur- 
chases by  all  his  expenditure,  the  pi'ivilege  of  assailing  you 
without  being  assailed  in  turn. 

If  we  really  wait  until  he  avows  that  he  is  at  war  with  us, 
we  are  the  simplest  of  mortals  :  for  he  would  not  declare 
that,  though  he  marched  even  against  Attica  and  Piraeus,  at 
least  if  we  may  judge  from  his  conduct  to  others.  Foi 
example,  to  the  Olynthians  he  declared,  when  he  was  forty 
furlongs  from  their  city,  that  there  was  no  alternative,  but 
either  they  must  quit  Olynthus  or  he  Macedonia;  though 
before  that  time,  whenever  he  was  accused  of  such  an  intent, 
he  took  it  ill  and  sent  ambassadors  to  justify  himself.  Again, 
he  marched  towards  the  Phocians  as  if  they  were  allies,  and 
there  were  Phocian  envoys  who  accompanied  his  march,  and 
many  among  you  contended  that  his  advance  would  not 
benefit  the  Thebans.  And  he  came  into  Thessaly  of  late  as 
a  friend  and  ally,  yet  he  has  taken  possession  of  Pherae  :  and 
lastly  he  told  these  wretched  people  of  Oreus,1  that  he  had 

1  When  he  established  his  creature  Philistides  in  the  governmer  t  ol 
Oreus,  as  mentioned  in  the  last  oration  and  at  the  end  of  this. 


118  THE    ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

sent  his  soldiers  out  of  good-will  to  visit  them,  as  he  heaixl 
they  were  in  trouble  and  dissension,  and  it  was  the  part  o*" 
allies  and  true  friends  to  lend  assistance  on  such  occasions. 
People  who  would  never  have  harmed  him.  though  they 
might  have  adopted  measures  of  defence,  he  chose  to  deceive 
rather  than  warn  them  of  his  attack  :  and  think  ye  he  would 
declare  war  against  you  before  he  began  it.  and  that  while 
you  are  willing  to  be  deceived  ?  Impossible.  He  would  be 
the  silliest  of  mankind,  if,  whilst  you  the  injured  parties 
make  no  complaint  against  him,  but  are  accusing  your  own 
countrymen,  he  should  terminate  your  intestine  strife  and 
jealousies,  warn  you  to  turn  against  him,  and  remove  the 
pretexts  of  his  hirelings  for  asserting,  to  amuse  you.  that 
he  makes  no  war  upon  Athens.  0  heavens !  would  any 
rational  being  judge  by  words  rather  than  by  actions,  who  is 
at  peace  with  him  ar.d  who  at  war  ?  Surely  none.  Well 
then ;  Philip  immediat'ely  after  the  peace,  before  Diopithes 
was  in  command  or  the  settlers  in  the  Chersonese  had  been 
sent  out,  took  Senium  and  Doriscus,  and  expelled  from 
Senium  and  the  Sacred  Mount  the  troops  whom  your 
general  had  stationed  there.1  What  do  you  call  such  con- 
duct !  He  had  sworn  the  peace.  Don't  say — what  does  it 
Bignifj  ?  how  is  the  state  concerned? — Whether  it  be  a  trifling 
matter,  or  of  no  concernment  to  you.  is  a  different  question  : 
religion  and  justice  have  the  same  obligation,  be  the  subject 
of  the  offence  great  or  small.  Tell  me  now  ;  when  he  sends 
mercenaries  into  Chersonesus,  which  the  king  and  all  the 
Greeks  have  acknowledged  to  be  yours,  when  he  avows  him- 
self an  auxiliary  and  writes  us  word  so.  what  are  such  pro- 
ceedings ?  He  says  he  is  not  at  war :  I  cannot  however 
admit  such  conduct  to  be  an  observance  of  the  peace;  far 

1  This  general  was  Chares,  to  whom  Cersobleptes  had  entrusted  the 
defence  of  those  places.  The  Sacred  Mount  was  a  fortified  position  on 
the  northern  coast  of  the  Hellespont.  It  was  here  that  Miltoeythes 
intrenched  himself,  when  he  rebelled  against  Cotys  j  and  Philip  took 
p  ss  —ion  of  it  just  before  the  peace  with  Athens  was  concluded,  as 
being  important  to  his  operations  against  Cersobleptes.  The  state- 
ment of  Demosthenes,  that  the  oaths  had  then  been  taken,  is,  as  Jacob 
observes,  incorrect ;  for  they  were  sworn  afterwards  in  Thessaly.  But 
the  argument  is  substantially  the  same  :  for  the  peace  had  been  agreed 
to,  and  the  ratification  was  purposely  delayed  by  Philip,  to  gain  time 
for  the  completion  of  his  designs. 


THE   THIED    PHILIPPIC.  lit) 

otherwise  :  I  say,  by  his  attempt  on  Megara,1  by  his  setting 
up  despotism  in  Eubcea,  by  his  present  advance  into  Thrace, 
by  his  intrigues  in  Peloponnesus,  by  the  whole  course  of 
operations  with  his  army,  he  has  been  breaking  the  peace  and 
making  war  upon  you;  unless  indeed  you  will  say,  that 
those  who  establish  batteries  are  not  at  war,  until  they  apply 
them  to  the  walls.  But  that  you  will  not  say  :  for  whoever 
contrives  and  prepares  the  means  for  my  conquest,  is  at  war 
with  me,  before  he  darts  or  draws  the  bow.  What,  if  any. 
thing  should  happen,  is  the  risk  you  run?  The  aliena- 
tion of  the  Hellespont,  the  subjection  of  Megara  and  Eubcea 
to  your  enemy,  the  siding  of  the  Peloponnesians  with  him. 
Then  can  I  allow,  that  one  who  sets  such  an  engine  at  work 
against  Athens  is  at  peace  with  her  1  Quite  the  contrary. 
From  the  day  that  he  destroyed  the  Phocians  I  date  his  com- 
mencement of  hostilities.  Defend  yourselves  instantly,  and 
I  say  you  will  be  wise  :  delay  it,  and  you  may  wish  in  vain 
to  do  so  hereafter.  So  much  do  I  dissent  from  your  other 
counsellors,  men  of  Athens,  that  I  deem  any  discussion 
about  Chersonestis  or  Byzantium  out  of  place.  Succour 
them — I  advise  that — watch  that  no  harm  befals  them,  send 
all  necessary  supplies  to  your  troops  in  that  quarter;  but  let 
your  deliberations  be  for  the  safety  of  all  Greece,  as  being  in 
the  utmost  peril.  I  must  tell  you  why  I  am  so  alarmed  at 
the  state  of  our  affairs :  that,  if  my  reasonings  are  correct, 
you  may  share  them,  and  make  some  provision  at  least  for 
yourselves,  however  disinclined  to  do  so  for  others  :  but  if, 
in  your  judgment,  I  talk  nonsense  and  absurdity,  you  may 
treat  me  as  crazed,  and  not  listen  to  me,  either  now  or  in 
future. 

That  Philip  from  a  mean  and  humble  origin  has  grown 
mighty,  that  the  Greeks  are  jealous  and  quarrelling  among 

1  Not  long  before  this  oration  was  delivered,  Philip  was  suspected  of 
a  design  to  seize  Megara.  Demosthenes  gives  an  account,  in  his  speech 
on  the  Embassy,  of  a  conspiracy  between  two Megarians,  Pteodoius  and 
Perilaus,  to  introduce  Macedonian  troops  into  the  city.  Phocion  was 
sent  by  the  Athenians  to  Megara,  with  the  consent  of  the  Mej:arian 
people,  to  protect  them  against  foreign  attack.  He  fortified  the  city 
and  port,  connecting  them  by  long  walk,  and  put  them  in  security. 
The  occupation  of  Megara  by  Philip  must  have  been  most  perilous  to 
Atbens,  especially  while  Eubcea  and  Thebes  were  in  his  interest ;  he 
would  thus  have  enclosed  her  as  it  were  in  a  net. 


120  THE    ORATIONS   OF    DEMOSTHENES. 

themselves,  that  it  was  far  more  wonderful  for  him  to  rise 
from  that  insignificance,  than  it  would  now  be,  after  so 
many  acquisitions,  to  conquer  what  is  left;  these  and  similar 
matters,  which  1  might  dwell  upon,  I  pass  over.  But  I 
observe  that  all  people,  beginning  with  you,  have  conceded  to 
him  a  right,  which  in  former  times  has  been  the  subject  of 
contest  in  every  Grecian  war.  And  what  is  this  I  The 
right  of  doing  what  he  pleases,  openly  fleecing  and  pillaging 
tlie  Greeks,  one  after  another,  attacking  and  enslaving  their 
cities.  You  were  at  the  head  of  the  Greeks  for  seventy-three 
years,1  the  Lacedaemonians  for  twenty-nine;2  and  the 
Thebans  had  some  power  in  these  latter  times  after  the 
battle  of  Leuctra.  Yet  neither  you,  my  countrymen,  nor 
Thebans  nor  Lacedaemonians,  were  ever  licensed  by  the 
Greeks  to  act  ps  you  pleased;  far  otherwise.  When  you,  or 
rather  the  Athenians  of  that  time,  appeared  to  be  dealing 
harshly  with  certain  people,  all  the  rest,  even  such  as  had 
no  complaint  against  Athens,  thought  proper  to  side  with 
the  injured  parties  in  a  war  against  her.  So,  when  the 
Lacedaemonians  became  masters  and  succeeded  to  your  em- 
pire, on  their  attempting  to  encroach  and  make  oppressive 
innovations,8  a  general  war  was  declared  against  them,  even 

1  This  would  be  from  about  the  end  of  the  Persian  war  to  the  end  of 
the  Peloponnesian,  b.c.  405.  Isocrates  speaks  of  the  Athenian  sway  a3 
having  lasted  sixty-five  or  seventy  yea^.  But  statements  of  this  kind 
are  hardly  intended  to  be  made  with  perfect  accuracy.  In  the  third 
Olynthiac,  as  we  have  seen,  (page  57),  Demosthenes  says,  the  Athenians 
had  the  leadership  by  consent  of  tlie  Greeks  for  forty-five  years.  This 
would  exclude  the  Peloponnesian  war. 

2  From  the  end  of  the  Peloponnesian  war  to  the  battle  of  ^axos, 
b.c.  376. 

3  The  Spartans,  whose  severe  military  discipline  rendered  them  far 
the  best  soldiers  in  Greece,  were  totally  unfit  to  manage  the  empire,  at 
the  head  of  which  they  found  themselves  after  the  humiliation  of 
Athens.  Their  attempt  to  force  an  oligarchy  upon  every  dependent 
state  was  an  unwise  policy,  which  made  them  generally  odious.  The 
decemvirates  of  Lysander,  and  the  governors  (apuoa-rai)  established  in 
various  Greek  cities  to  maintain  Lacedaemonian  influence,  were  re- 
garded as  instruments  of  tyranny.  It  was  found  that  Spartan  gover- 
nors and  generals,  when  away  from  home,  gave  loose  to  their  vicious 
inclinations,  as  if  to  indemnify  themselves  for  the  strictness  of  domes- 
tic discipline.  It  became  a  maxim  in  their  politics,  that  the  end 
justified  the  means.  The  most  flagrant  proof  was  given  by  the  beizuni 
of  the  Cadmea  at  Thebes :  a  measure,  which  led  to  a  formidable  con 
federacy  against  Sparta,  and  brought  her  to  the  verge  of  destruction. 


THE   THIRD   PHILIPPIC.  121 

by  such  as  had  no  cause  of  complaint  But  wherefore 
mention  other  people  1  We  ourselves  and  the  Lacedae- 
monians, although  at  the  outset  we  could  not  allege  any 
mutual  injuries,  thought  proper  to  make  war  for  the  injustice 
that  we  saw  done  to  our  neighbours.  Yet  all  the  faults  com- 
mitted by  the  Spartans  in  those  thirty  years,  and  by  our 
ancestors  in  the  seventy,  are  less,  men  of  Athens,  than  the 
wrongs  which,  in  thirteen  incomplete  years  that  Philip  has 
been  uppermost,1  he  has  inflicted  on  the  Greeks  :  nay  they 
are  scarcely  a  fraction  of  these,  as  may  easily  be  shown  in 
a  few  words.  Olynthus  and  Methone  and  Apollonia,  and 
thirty-two  cities2  on  the  borders  of  Thrace,  I  pass  over;  aV. 
which  he  has  so  cruelly  destroyed,  that  a  visitor  could  hardly 
tell  if  they  were  ever  inhabited :  and  of  the  Phocians,  so 
considerable  a  people  exterminated,  I  say  nothing.  But 
what  is  the  condition  of  Thessaly  ?  Has  he  not  taken  away 
her  constitutions  and  her  cities,  and  established  tetrarchies, 
to  parcel  her  out,3  not  only  by  cities,  but  also  by  provinces, 
for  subjection  ?  Are  not  the  Eubosan  states  governed  now 
by  despots,  and  that  in  an  island  near  to  Thebes  and  Athens  ? 
Does  he  not  expressly  write  in  his  epistles,  "  I  am  at  peace 
with  those  who  are  willing  to  obey  me  ?"  Nor  does  he  write 
so  and  not  act  accordingly.  He  is  gone  to  the  Hellespont ; 
he  marched  formerly  against  Ambracia;  Elis,  such  an  im- 
portant city  in  Peloponnesus,  he  possesses;4  he  plotted  lately 

1  /.  e.  in  power ;  but,  as  Smead,  an  American  editor,  truly  observes, 
em-rroXa^ei  has  a  contemptuous  signification.  Jacobs:  oben  schicimmt. 
The  thirteen  years  are  reckoned  from  the  time  when  Philip's  inter- 
ference in  Thessaly  began ;  before  which  he  had  not  assumed  an  im- 
portant character  in  southern  Greece. 

*  The  Chalcidian  cities. 

*  This  statement  does  not  disagree  with  the  mention  of  the 
$€Ka5apxla  in  the  second  Philippic.  Supposing  that  Thessaly  was  not 
only  divided  into  tetrarchies,  four  provinces  or  cantons,  but  also 
governed  by  decemvirates  of  Philip's  appointment,  placed  in  divers  of 
her  cities,  then  by  the  former  contrivance  she  might  be  said  SovSevtiv 
icar  Mm),  by  the  latter  koto  ttoKhs.  It  is  not  clear  indeed  whether 
several  decemvirates,  or  one  for  the  whole  country,  is  to  be  understood. 
The  singular  number  is  equally  capable  of  either  interpretation. 

4  That  is  to  say ;  a  Macedonian  faction  prevailed  in  Elis.  The  demc- 
cratical  party  had  some  time  before  endeavoured  to  regain  the  ascen- 
dancy, by  aid  of  the  Phocian  mercenaries  of  Phalrecus ;  but  thej  ad 
been  defeated  by  the  troops  of  Arcadia  and  Elis. 


122  THE   ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

to  get  Megara  :  neither  Hellenic  nor  Barbaric  land  contains 
the  man's  ambition.1  And  we  the  Greek  community,  seeing 
and  hearing  this,  instead  of  sending  embassies  to  one  an- 
other about  it  and  expressing  indignation,  are  in  such  a 
miserable  state,  so  intrenched  in  our  separate  towns,  that  to 
this  day  we  can  attempt  nothing  that  interest  or  necessity 
requires;  we  cannot  combine,  or  form  any  association  for 
succour  and  alliance;  we  look  unconcernedly  on  the  man's 
growing  power,  each  resolving  (methinks)  to  enjoy  the  in- 
terval that  another  is  destroyed  in,  not  caring  or  striving  for 
the  salvation  of  Greece  :  for  none  can  be  ignorant,  that 
Philip,  like  some  course  or  attack  of  fever  or  other  disease,  is 
coming  even  on  those  that  yet  seem  very  far  removed.  And 
you  must  be  sensible,  that  whatever  wrong  the  Greeks  sus- 
tained from  Lacedaemonians  or  from  us,  was  at  least  in- 
flicted by  genuine  people  cf  Greece;  and  it  might  be  felt  in 
the  same  manner  as  if  a  lawful  son,  born  to  a  large  fortune, 
committed  some  fault  or  error  in  the  management  of  it;  on 
that  ground  one  would  consider  him  open  to  censure  and 
reproach,  yet  it  could  not  be  said  that  he  was  an  alien,  and 
not  heir  to  the  property  which  he  so  dealt  with.  But  if  a 
slave  or  a  spurious  child  wasted  and  spoiled  what  he  had  no 
interest  in — Heavens  !  how  much  more  heinous  and  hateful 
would  all  have  pronounced  it !  And  yet  in  regard  to  Philip 
and  his  conduct  they  feel  not  this,  although  he  is  not  only  no 
Greek  and  noway  akin  to  Greeks,  but  not  even  a  barbarian  of 
a  place  honourable  to  mention;  in  fact,  a  vile  fellow  of 
Macedon,  from  which  a  respectable  slave  could  not  be  pur- 
chased formerly. 

What  is  wanting  to  make  his  insolence  complete1?  Besides 
his  destruction  of  Grecian  cities,  does  he  not  hold  the 
Pythian  games,  the  common  festival  of  Greece,  and,  if  he 
comes  not  himself,  send  his  vassals  to  preside  1  Is  he  not 
master  of  Thermopylae  and  the  passes  into  Greece,  and  holds 
he  not  those  places  by  garrisons  and  mercenaries  ?  Has  he 
not  thrust  aside  Thessalians,  ourselves,  Dorians,  the  whole 

1  So  Juvenal,  Sat.  X.  169  : 

iEstuat  infelix  angusto  limit*  mundi, 
Ut  Gyarae  clausus  scopulis  parvaque  Seripho. 
And  Virgil,  Mn.  IX.  644  : 

Ne«  te  Troja  capit. 


TOE   THIRD    PTULIPPIC.  123 

Amphictyonic  body,  and  got  preaudience  of  the  oracle,1  to 
which  even  the  Greeks  do  not  all  pretend?  Does  he  not  write 
to  the  Thessalians.  what  form  of  government  to  adopt  1  send 
mercenaries  to  Porthmus,2  to  expel  the  Eretrian  com- 
monalty; others  to  Oreus,  to  set  up  Philistides  as  ruler? 
Yet  the  Greeks  endure  to  see  all  this;  methinks  they  view  it 
as  they  would  a  hailstorm,  each  praying  that  it  may  not  fall 
on  himself,  none  trying  to  prevent  it.  And  not  only  are  the 
outrages  which  he  does  to  Greece  submitted  to,  but  even  the 
private  wrongs  of  every  people  :  nothing  can  go  beyond  this !  \ 
Has  he  not  wronged  the  Corinthians  by  attacking  Ambracia3 
andLeucas1?  the  Achaians,  by  swearing  to  give  Naupactus1  to 
the  iEtolians  1  from  the  Thebans  taken  Echinus  ? 5  Is  he 
not  marching  against  the  Byzantines  his  allies  %  From  us — 
I  omit  the  rest — but  keeps  he  not  Cardia,  the  greatest  city  of 
the  Chersonese'?      Still  under  these  indignities  we   are  all 

1  This  privilege,  which  had  belonged  to  the  Phoeians,  was  transferred 
to  Philip.  It  was  considered  an  advantage  as  well  as  an  honour  in 
ancient  times ;  for  there  were  only  certain  days  appointed  in  every 
month,  when  the  oracle  could  be  consulted,  and  the  order  of  consulta- 
tion was  determined  by  lot  in  common  cases.  The  Delphians  used  to 
confe>r  the  right  of  pre-consultation  on  particular  states  or  persons  as  a 
reward  for  some  service  or  act  of  piety.  Thus  the  Spartans  received  it ; 
and  Croesus,  king  of  Lydia,  for  the  magnificent  presents  which  he  sent 
to  the  temple. 

2  Porthmus  was  the  port  of  Eretria,  on  the  strait,  opposite  Athens. 
The  circumstances  are  stated  by  Demosthenes  at  the  latter  end  of  the 
speech.  By  expelling,  the  Stj/aos  of  Eretria,  he  means  of  course  the 
popular  party,  die  Volkspartei,  as  Pabst  has  it;  but  they  would  by 
their  own  partisans  be  called  the  people. 

3  Divers  colonies  were  planted  on  the  north-western  coast  of  Greece 
by  the  Corinthians,  and  also  by  the  Corcyneans,  who  were  themselves 
colonists  from  Corinth.  Among  them  were  Leucas,  Ambracia,  Anac- 
torium,  Epidamnus,  and  Apollonia.  Leucas  afterwards  became  insular, 
by  cutting  through  the  isthmus.  Philip's  meditated  attack  was  in 
343  b.  c.  after  the  conquest  of  Cassopia.  Leucas,  by  its  insular  position, 
would  have  been  convenient  for  a  descent  on  Peloponnesus.  We 
have  seen  that  this  design  of  Philip  was  baffled  by  the  exertions  of 
Demosthenes. 

4  Naupactus,  now  Lepanto,  lay  on  the  northern  coast  of  the  Corinth- 
ian gulf.  At  the  close  of  the  Peloponnesian  war  it  came  into  the  hands 
of  the  Achaians,  from  whom  it  was  taken  by  Epaminondas,  but  after 
his  death  they  regained  it.  The  JEtolians  got  possession  of  the  town 
some  time  after,  perhaps  by  Macedonian  assistance. 

5  The  Echinus  here  mentioned  was  a  city  on  the  northern  coast  of  tho 
Maliac  j  llf  in  Thessaly. 


124  THE    ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

slack  and  disheartened,  and  look  towards  our  neighbours,  dis- 
trusting one  another,  instead  of  the  common  enemy.  And 
how  think  ye  a  man,  who  behaves  so  insolently  to  all,  how 
will  he  act,  when  he  gets  each  separately  under  his  control  ? 

But  what  has  caused  the  mischief  ?  There  must  be  some 
cause,  some  good  reason,  why  the  Greeks  were  so  eager  for 
liberty  then,  and  now  are  eager  for  servitude.  There  was 
something,  men  of  Athens,  something  in  the  hearts  of  the 
multitude  then,  which  there  is  not  now,  which  overcame  the 
wealth  of  Persia  and  maintained  the  freedom  of  Greece,  and 
quailed  not  under  any  battle  by  land  or  sea ;  the  loss  whereof 
has  rained  all,  and  thrown  the  affairs  of  Greece  into  confu- 
sion. What  was  this  ?  Nothing  subtle  or  clever  :  simply 
that  whoever  took  money  from  the  aspirants  for  power  or  the 
corruptors  of  Greece  were  universally  detested  :  it  was  dread- 
ful to  be  convicted  of  bribery;  the  severest  punishment  was 
inflicted  on  the  guilty,  and  there  was  no  intercession  or 
pardon.  The  favourable  moments  for  enterprise,  which 
fortune  frequently  offers  to  the  careless  against  the  vigilant, 
to  them  that  will  do  nothing  against  those  that  discharge  all 
their  duty,  could  not  be  bought  from  orators  or  generals; 
no  more  could  mutual  concord,  nor  distrust  of  tyrants  and 
barbarians,  nor  anything  of  the  kind.  But  now  all  such 
principles  have  been  sold  as  in  open  market,  and  those  im- 
ported in  exchange,  by  which  Greece  is  ruined  and  diseased.1 
What  are  they  ?  Envy  where  a  man  gets  a  bribe ;  laughter 
if  he  confesses  it ;  mercy  to  the  convioted ;  hatred  of  those 
that  denounce  the  crime  :  all  the  usual  attendants  upon  cor- 
ruption.2 For  as  to  ships  and  men  and  revenues  and 
abundance  of  other  materials,  all  that  may  be  reckoned  as 
constituting  national  strength — assuredly  the  Greeks  of  our 
day  are  more  fully  and  perfectly  supplied  with  such  advan- 
tages than  Greeks  of  the  olden  time.  But  they  are  all 
rendered  useless,  unavailable,  unprofitable,  by  the  agency  of 
these  traffickers. 

1  'Ato\o>\(  in  reference  to  foreign  affairs  \  vt vixr-riKtv  in  regard  to 
internal  broils  and  commotions.     Compare  Shakspeare,  Macbeth  IV.  3. 

0  nation  miserable, 
"When  shalt  thou  see  thy  •wholesome  days  again] 

2  He    glances    more    particularly    at    Philocrates,    Demades,    and 
Xschines. 


THE   THIRD    PHILIPPIC.  125 

That  such  is  the  present  state  of  things,  you  must  see, 
without  requiring  my  testimony  :  that  it  was  different  in 
former  times,  I  will  demonstrate,  not  by  speaking  my  own 
words,  but  by  showing  an  inscription  of  your  ancestors, 
which  they  graved  on  a  brazen  column  and  deposited  in  the 
citadel,  not  for  their  own  benefit,  (they  were  right-minded 
enough  without  such  records,)  but  for  a  memorial  and  ex- 
ample to  instruct  you,  how  seriously  such  conduct  should  be 
taken  up.  What  says  the  inscription  then  1  It  says :  "  Let 
Arthmius,  son  of  Pythonax  the  Zelite,1  be  declared  an  out- 
law,2 and  an  enemy  of  the  Athenian  people  and  their  allies, 
him  and  his  family."  Then  the  cause  is  written  why  this 
was  done  :  because  he  brought  the  Median  gold  into  Pelo- 
ponnesus. That  is  the  inscription.  By  the  gods  !  only  con- 
sider and  reflect  among  yourselves,  what  must  have  been  the 
spirit,  what  the  dignity  of  those  Athenians  who  acted  so. 
One  Arthmius  a  Zelite,  subject  of  the  king,  (for  Zelea  is  in 
Asia,)  because  in  his  master's  service  he  brought  gold  into 
Peloponnesus,  not  to  Athens,  they  proclaimed  an  enemy  of 
the  Athenians  and  their  allies,  him  and  his  family,  and  out- 
lawed. That  is,  not  the  outlawry  commonly  spoken  of :  for 
what  would  a  Zelite  care,  to  be  excluded  from  Athenian 
franchises  1  It  means  not  that ;  but  in  the  statutes  of  homi- 
cide it  is  written,  in  cases  where  a  prosecution  for  murder  is 
not  allowed,  but  killing  is  sanctioned,  "  and  let  him  die  an 
outlaw,"  says  the  legislator :  by  which  he  means,  that  whoever 
kills  such  a  person  shall  be  unpolluted.3  Therefore  they 
considered  that  the  preservation  of  all  Greece  was  their  own 
concern  :  (but  for  such  opinion,  they  would  not  have  cared, 
whether  people  in  Peloponnesus  were  bought  and  cor- 
rupted :)  and  whomsoever  they  discovered  taking  bribes,  they 

1  Zelea  is  a  town  in  Mysia.  Arthmius  was  sent  by  Artaxerxes  into 
Peloponnesus,  to  sti'*  \r  a  war  against  the  Athenians,  who  had  irritated 
him  by  the  assistance  which  they  lent  to  Egypt.  JSschines  saya 
that  Arthmius  was  the  irp6^tvos  of  Athens,  which  may  partly  account 
for  the  decree  passed  against  him. 

2  Of  the  various  degrees  of  dripta  at  Athens  I  shall  speak  hereafter. 
I  translate  the  word  here,  so  as  to  meet  the  case  of  a  foreigner,  who  had 
nothing  to  do  with  the  franchises  of  the  Athenians,  but  who  by  their 
decree  was  excommunicated  from  the  benefit  of  all  international  law. 

*  That  is,  his  act  being  justifiable  homicide,  he  shall  not  be  deemed 
(in  a  religious  point  of  view)  impure.  As  to  the  Athenian  law  of 
homicide,  see  my  article  Phonos  in  the  Archaeological  Dictionary. 


126  THE    ORATIONS    OF    DEMOSTHENES. 

chastised  and  punished  so  severely  as  to  record  their  names 
in  brass.  The  natural  result  was,  that  Greece  was  formidable 
to  the  Barbarian,  not  the  Barbarian  to  Greece.  'Tis  not  so 
now  :  since  neither  in  this  nor  in  other  respects  are  your 
sentiments  the  same.  But  what  are  they  1  You  know  your- 
selves :  why  am  I  to  upbraid  you  with  e\*srything?  The 
Greeks  in  general  are  alike  and  no  better  than  you.  There- 
fore I  say,  our  present  affairs  demand  earnest  attention  and 
wholesome  counsel.  Shall  I  say  what  1  Do  you  bid  me,  and 
won't  you  be  angry  ? 

\Here  is  read  the  public  document  which  Demosthenes  produces, 
after  which  he  resumes  his  address. *] 

There  is  a  foolish  saying  of  persons  who  wish  to  make  us 
easy,  that  Philip  is  not  yet  as  powerful  as  the  Lacedaemonians 
were  formerly,  who  ruled  everywhere  by  land  and  sea,  and 
had  the  king  for  their  ally,  and  nothing  withstood  them  ;  yet 
Athens  resisted  even  that  nation,  and  was  not  destroyed.  I 
myself  believe,  that,  while  everything  has  received  great  im- 
provement, and  the  present  bears  no  resemblance  to  the  past, 
nothing  has  been  so  changed  and  improved  as  the  practice  of 
war.  For  anciently,  as  I  am  informed,  the  Lacedaemonians 
and  all  Grecian  people  would  for  four  or  five  months,  during 
the  season2  only,  invade  and  ravage  the  land  of  their  enemies 
with  heavy-armed  and  national  troops,  and  return  home 
again :  and  their  ideas  were  so  old-fashioned,  or  rather 
national,  they  never  purchased 3  an  advantage  from  any ; 
theirs  was  a  legitimate  and  open  warfare.  But  now  yo\i 
doubtless  perceive,  that  the  majority  of  disasters  have  been 

1  The  Secretary  of  the  Assembly  stood  by  the  side  of  the  orator,  and 
read  any  puhlic  documents,  such  as  statutes,  decrees,  bills  and  the 
like,  which  the  orator  desired  to  refer  to  or  to  verify.  It  does  not 
appear  what  the  document  was,  which  Demosthenes  caused  to  be  read 
here.  If  we  may  judge  from  the  argument,  it  was  some  energetic  reso- 
lution of  the  people,  such  as  he  would  propose  for  an  example  on  the 
present  occasion. 

2  The  campaigning  season,  during  the  summer  and  fine  time  of  tho 
year.  The  Peloponnesians  generally  invaded  Attica  when  the  corn  waa 
ripe,  burning  and  plundering  all  in  their  route.  Thucydides  in  hifi 
history  divides  the  year  into  two  parts,  summer  and  winter. 

3  Compare  the  old  lines  of  Ennius  : 

Non  cauponantes  helium  sed  belligerantes 
Ferro,  non  aurc,  vitam  cernamus  utrique. 


THE   THIRD    PHILIPPIC.  127 

effected  by  treason  ;  nothing  is  done  in  fair  field  or  combat. 
You  hear  of  Philip  marching  where  he  pleases,  not  because 
he  commands  troops  of  the  line,  but  because  he  has  attached 
to  him  a  host  of  skirmishers,  cavalry,  archers,  mercenaries, 
and  the  like.  When  with  these  he  falls  upon  a  people  in 
civil  dissension,  and  none  (for  mistrust)  will  march  out  to 
defend  the  country,  he  applies  engines  and  besieges  them.  I 
need  not  mention,  that  he  makes  no  difference  between  winter 
and  summer,  that  he  has  no  stated  season  of  repose.  You, 
knowing  these  things,  reflecting  on  them,  must  not  let  the 
war  approach  your  territories,  nor  get  your  necks  broken, 
relying  on  the  simplicity  of  the  old  war  with  the  Lacedsemo- 
nians,  but  take  the  longest  time  beforehand  for  defensive 
measures  and  preparations,  see  that  he- stirs  not  from  home, 
avoid  any  decisive  engagement.  For  a  war,  if  we  choose, 
men  of  Athens,  to  pursue  a  right  course,  we  have  many 
natural  advantages ;  such  as  the  position  of  his  kingdom, 
which  we  may  extensively  plunder  and  ravage,  and  a  thousand 
more  ;  but  for  a  battle  he  is  better  trained  than  we  are.1 

2s  or  is  it  enough  to  adopt  these  resolutions  and  oppose  him 
by  warlike  measures  :  you  must  on  calculation  and  on  prin- 
ciple abhor  his  advocates  here,  remembering  that  it  is  impos- 
sible to  overcome  your  enemies  abroad,  until  you  have 
chastised  those  who  are  his  ministers  within  the  city.  Which, 
by  Jupiter  and  all  the  gods,  you  cannot  and  will  not  do  ! 
You  have  arrived  at  such  a  pitch  of  folly  or  madness  or — 
I  know  not  what  to  call  it  :  I  am  tempted  often  to  think, 
that  some  evil  genius  is  driving  you  to  ruin — for  the  sake  of 
scandal  or  envy  or  jest  or  any  other  cause,  you  command 
hirelings  to  speak,  (some  of  whom  would  not  deny  themselves 
to  be  hirelings,)  and  laugh  when  they  abuse  people.  And 
this,  bad  as  it  is,  is  not  the  worst  :  you  have  allowed  these 
persons  more  liberty  for  their  political  conduct  than  your 
faithful  counsellors  :  and  see  what  evils  are  caused  by  listening 
to  such  men  with  indulgence.  I  will  mention  facts  that  you 
will  all  remember. 

In  Olynthus  some  of  the  statesmen  were  in  Phdip's  inte- 

1  Chaeronea  proved  the  wisdom  of  this  advice.  Similar  counsel  was 
given  by  Pericles  in  the  Peloponnesian  war.  Had  the  Athenians 
attempted  to  meet  the  invading  army  in  the  field,  they  must  inevi- 
tably have  been  defeated  in  the  early  period  of  the  war. 


128  THE    ORATIONS   OP   DEMOSTHEXES. 

rest,  doing  everything  for  him  ;  some  were  on  the  "lonest 
side,  aiming  to  preserve  their  fellow-citizens  from  slavery. 
Which  party  now  destroyed  their  country  ?  or  which  betrayed 
the  cavalry,1  by  whose  betrayal  Olynthus  fell  1  The  creatures 
of  Philip  ;  they  that,  while  the  city  stood,  slandered  and 
calumniated  the  honest  counsellors  so  effectually,  that  the 
Olynthian  people  were  induced  to  banish  Apollonides. 

Nor  is  it  there  only,  and  nowhere  else,  that  such  practice 
has  been  ruinous.  In  Eretria,  when,  after  riddance  of 
Plutarch 2  and  his  mercenaries,  the  people  got  possession  of 
their  city  and  of  Porthmus,  some  were  for  bringing  the 
government  over  to  you,  others  to  Philip.  His  partisans 
were  generally,  rather  exclusively,  attended  te  by  the  wretched 
and  unfortunate  Eretrians,  who  at  length  were  persuaded  to 
expel  their  faithful  advisers.  Philip,  their  ally  and  friend, 
sent  Hipponicus  and  a  thousand  mercenaries,  demolished  the 
walls  of  Porthmus,  and  established  three  rulers,  Hipparchus, 
Automedou,  Clitarchus.  Since  that  he  has  driven  them  out 
of  the  country,  twice  attempting  their  deliverance  :  once 
he  sent  the  troops  with  Eurylochus,  afterwards  those  of 
Parmenio. 

"What  need  of  many  words  ?  In  Oreus  Philip's  agents  were 
Philistides,  Meuippus,  Socrates,  Thoas,  and  Agapseus,  who 
now  hold  the  government :  that  was  quite  notorious :  one 
Euphneus,  a  man  that  formerly  dwelt  here  among  you,  was 
labouring  for  freedom  and  independence.  How  this  man  was 
in  other  respects  insulted  and  trampled  on  by  the  people  of 
Oreus,  were  long  to  tell :  but  a  year  before  the  capture,  dis- 
covering what  Philistides  and  his  accomplices  were  about,  he 
laid  an  information  against  them  for  treason.  A  multitude 
then  combining,  having  Philip  for  their  paymaster,  and  acting 
under  his  direction,  take  Euphrseus  off  to  prison  as  a  dis- 
turber of  the  public  peace.  Seeing  which,  the  people  of 
Oreus,  instead  of  assisting  the  one  and  beating  the  others  to 
death,  with   them  were  not  angry,  but  said  his  punishment 

1  After  Olynthus  was  besieged  by  Philip,  various  sallies  were  made 
from  the  city,  son  e  of  which  were  successful.  But  the  treachery  of 
Lasthenes  and  his  accomplices  ruined  all.  A  body  of  fivo  hundred 
horse  were  led  by  him  into  an  ambuscade,  and  captured  by  the 
besiegers.     See  Appendix  I. 

2  When  he  was  expelled  by  Phocion  after  the  battle  of  Tamynto, 
b.c.  354. 


THE    THIRD    PHILIPPIC.  123 

was  just,  and  rejoiced  at  it.  So  the  conspirators,  having  full 
liberty  of  action,  laid  their  schemes  and  took  their  measures 
for  the  surrender  of  the  city ;  if  any  of  the  people  observed 
it,  they  were  silent  and  intimidated,  remembering  the  treat- 
ment of  Euphneus ;  and  so  wretched  was  their  condition,  that 
on  the  approach  of  such  a  calamity  none  dared  to  utter  a 
word,  until  the  enemy  drew  up  before  the  walls  :  then  some 
were  for  defence,  others  for  betrayal.  Since  the  city  was 
thus  basely  and  wickedly  taken,  the  traitors  have  held  despotic 
rule  ;  people  who  formerly  rescued  them,  and  were  ready  for 
any  maltreatment  of  Euprmeus,  they  have  either  banished  or 
put  to  death  ;  Euphra^us  killed  himself,  proving  by  deed, 
that  he  had  resisted  Philip  honestly  and  purely  for  the  good 
of  his  countrymen. 

What  can  be  the  reason — perhaps  you  wonder — why  the 
Olynthians  and  E^etrians  and  Orites  were  more  indulgent  to 
Philip's  advocates  than  to  their  own  ?  The  same  which 
operates  with  you.  They  who  advise  for  the  best  cannot 
always  gratify  their  audience,  though  they  would ;  for  the 
safety  of  the  state  must  be  attended  to :  their  opponents  by 
the  very  counsel  which  is  agreeable  advance  Philip's  inter^t. 
Oue  party  required  contribution  ;  the  other  said  there  was 
no  necessity :  one  were  for  war  and  mistrust ;  the  other  for 
peace,  until  they  were  ensnared.  And  so  on  for  everything 
else ;  (not  to  dwell  on  particulars  :)  the  one  made  speeches  to 
please  for  the  moment,  and  gave  no  annoyance ;  the  other 
offered  salutary  counsel,  that  was  offensive.  Many  rights  did 
the  people  surrender  at  last,  not  from  any  such  motive  of 
indulgence  or  ignorance,  but  submitting  in  the  belief  that  all 
was  lost.  Which,  by  Jupiter  and  Apollo,  I  fear  will  be  your 
case,  when  on  calculation  you  see  that  nothing  can  be  done. 
I  pray,  men  of  Athens,  it  may  never  come  to  this  !  Better 
die  a  thousand  deaths  than  render  homage  to  Philip,  or  sacri- 
fice any  of  your  faithful  counsellors.  A  fine  recompense  have 
the  people  of  Oreus  got,  for  trusting  themselves  to  Philip's 
friends  and  spurning  Euphrreus !  Finely  are  the  Eretrian 
commons  rewarded,  for  having  driven  away  your  ambassadors 
and  yielded  to  Clitarchus  !  Yes  ;  they  are  slaves,  exposed  to 
the  lash  and  the  torture.  Finely  he  spared  the  Olynthians, 
who  appointed  Lasthenes  to  command  their  horse,  and  ex- 
pelled Apollonides  !    It  is  folly  and  cowardice  to  cherish  such 

VOL    I  k 


130  THE    ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

iiopes,  and,  while  you  take  evil  counsel  and  shirk  every  duty 
and  even  listen  to  those  who  plead  for  your  enemies,  to  think 
you  inhabit  a  city  of  such  magnitude,  that  you  cannot  suffer 
any  serious  misfortune.  Yea,  and  it  is  disgraceful  to  exclaim 
on  any  occurrence,  when  it  is  too  late,  "  Who  would  have 
expected  it  1  However — this  or  that  should  have  been  done, 
the  other  left  undone."  Many  things  could  the  Olynthians 
mention  now,  which,  if  foreseen  at  the  time,  would  have  pre- 
vented their  destruction.  Many  could  the  Orites  mention, 
many  the  Phocians,  and  each  of  the  ruined  states.  But 
what  would  it  avail  them  1  As  long  as  the  vessel  is  safe, 
whether  it  be  great  or  small,  the  mariner,  the  pilot,  every 
man  in  turn  should  exert  himself,  and  prevent  its  being  over- 
turned either  by  accident  or  design  :  but  when  the  sea  hath 
rolled    over   it,   their  efforts   are   vain.      And  we,   likewise, 

0  Athenians,  whdst  we  are  safe,  with  a  magnificent  city, 
plentiful  resources,  lofty  reputation — what1  must  we  do? 
Many  of  you,2  I  dare  say,  have  been  longing  to  ask.  Well 
then,  I  will  tell  you ;  I  will  move  a  resolution  :  pass  it,  if  you 
please. 

"^irst,  let  us  prepare  for  cur  own  defence ;  provide  ourselves 

1  mean,  with  ships,  money,  and  troops — for  surely,  though  all 
other  people  consented  to  be  slaves,  we  at  least  ought  to 
struggle  for  freedom.  When  we  have  completed  our  own 
preparations  and  made  them  apparent  to  the  Greeks,  then  let 
us  invite  the  rest,  and  send  our  ambassadors  everywhere  with 
the  intelligence,  to  Peloponnesus,  to  Rhodes,  to  Chios,  to  the 
king,  I  say;  (for  it  concerns  his  interests,  not  to  let  Philip 
make  universal  conquest;)  that,  if  you  prevail,  you  may 
have  partners  of  your  dangers  and  expenses,  in  case  of  neces- 
sity, or  at  all  events  that  you  may  delay  the  operations.  For, 

1  Smead  remarks  here  on  the  adroitness  of  the  orator,  who,  instead 
rtf  applying  the  simile  of  the  ship  to  the  administration  of  the  state, 
Tfhich  he  felt  that  his  quick-minded  hearers  had  already  done,  suddenly 
interrupts  himself  with  a  question,  which  would  naturally  occur  to  the 
audience. 

2  You,  el  KaOiiiAtvoi.  See  my  observations  in  the  preface.  I  cannot 
forbear  noticing  the  manner  in  which  Francis  translates  the  following 
vfi  AC  epw.  "  Let  Jupiter  be  witness,  with  what  integrity  I  shall  declare 
my  opinion."  The  original  means  nothing  of  the  kind.  It  is  rare 
that  vi)  Aia  can  be  translated  literally  with  effect.  Jacobs  here  hae 
wohlan. 


THE    THIRD    PHILIPPIC.  131 

since  the  war  is  against  an  individual,1  not  against  the  col- 
lected power  of  a  state,  even  this  may  be  useful ;  as  were  the 
embassies  last  year  to  Peloponnesus,  and  the  remonstrances 
with  which  I  and  Polyeuctus,  that  excellent  man,  and  Hege- 
sippus,  and  Clitomachus,  and  Lycurgus,  and  the  other  envoys 
went  round,  and  arrested  Philip's  progress,  so  that  he  neither 
attacked  Ambracia  nor  started  for  Peloponnesus.  I  say  not 
however,  that  you  should  invite  the  rest  without  adopting 
measures  to  protect  yourselves  :  it  would  be  folly,  while  you 
sacrifice  your  own  interest,  to  profess  a  regard  for  that  of 
strangers,  or  to  alarm  others  about  the  future,  whilst  for  the 
present  you  are  unconcerned  I  advise  not  this:  I  bid  you 
send  supplies  to  the  troops  in  Chersonesus,  and  do  what  else 
they  require  ;  prepare  yourselves  and  make  every  effort  first, 
then  summon,  gather,  instruct  the  rest  of  the  Greeks.  That 
is  the  duty  of  a  state  possessing  a  dignity  such  as  yours.  If 
you  imagine  that  Chalcidians  or  Megarians  will  save  Greece, 
while  you  run  away  from  the  contest,  you  imagine  wrong. 
Well  for  any  of  those  people,  if  they  are  safe  themselves. 
This  work  belongs  to  you  :  this  privilege  your  ancestors  be- 
queathed to  you,  the  prize  of  many  perilous  exertions.  But 
if  every  one  will  sit  seeking  his  pleasure,  and  studying  to  be 
idle  himself,  never  will  he  find  others  to  do  his  work,  and 
more  than  this,  I  fear  we  shall  be  under  the  necessity  of 
doing  all  that  we  like  not  at  one  time.  Were  proxies  to  be 
had,  our  inactivity  would  have  found  them  long  ago  ;  but 
they  are  not. 

Such  are  the  measures  which  I  advise,  which  I  propose  : 
adopt  them,  and  even  yet,  I  believe,  our  prosperity  may  be 
re-established.  If  any  man  has  better  advice  to  offer,  let  him 
communicate  it  openly.  Whatever  you  determine,  I  pray  to 
all  the  gods  for  a  happy  result. 

1  Because  a  state  is  a  permanent  power ;  a  single  man  is  liable  to  a 
variety  of  accidents,  and  his  power  terminates  with  his  life. 


L32  THE   ORATIONS  OF  DEMOSTHE:r££. 


THE  FOURTH  PHILIPPIC. 


THE    ARGUMENT. 

The  subject,  of  this  Oration  is  the  same  as  the  last,  viz.,  the  necessity 
of  resistance  to  Philip.  The  time  of  its  delivery  would  appear  to 
have  been  a  little  later,  whilst  Philip  was  yet  in  Thrace,  and  before 
he  commenced  the  siege  of  the  Propontine  towns.  No  new  event  is 
alluded  to,  except  the  seizure  of  Hermias  by  the  satrap  Mentor,  the 
exact  date  of  which  is  uncertain.  The  orator  urges  here,  still  more 
strongly  than  he  had  done  in  the  third  Philippic,  the  necessity  of 
applying  to  Persia  for  assistance.  His  advice  was  followed,  and  a 
negotiation  was  opened  with  that  monarchy,  which  led  to  the  effective 
relief  of  Perinthus.  There  is  a  remarkable  passage  in  this  speech,  on 
the  importance  of  general  unanimity,  which  seems  to  imply  that  dis- 
putes had  arisen  between  the  richer  and  poorer  classes,  chiefly  in 
regard  to  the  application  of  the  public  revenue.  The  view  which  is 
here  taken  on  the  subject  of  the  Theoric  distributions  is  so  different 
from  the  argument  in  the  Olynthiacs,  that  modern  critics  have 
generally  considered  this  Oration  to  be  spurious.  Another  ground 
for  such  opinion  is.  that  it  contains  various  passages  borrowed  from 
other  speeches,  and  not  very  skilfully  put  together.  Yet  the 
genuineness  seems  not  to  have  been  doubted  by  any  of  the  ancient 
grammarians. 

Believing,  men  of  Athens,  that  the  subject  of  your  consul- 
tation is  serious  and  momentous  to  the  state,  I  will  endeavour 
to  advise  what  I  think  important.  Many  have  been  the  faults, 
accumulated  for  some  time  past,  which  have  brought  us  to 
this  wretched  condition  ;  but  none  is  under  the  circumstances 
so  distressing  as  this,  men  of  Athens  ;  that  your  minds  are 
alienated  from  public  business  ;  you  are  attentive  just  while 
you  sit  listening  to  some  news,  afterwards  you  all  go  away, 
and,  so  far  from  caring  for  what  you  heard,  you  forget  it 
altogether. 

Well ;  of  the  extent  of  Philip's  arrogance  and  ambition,  as 
evinced  in  his  dealings  with  every  people,  you  have  been  in- 
formed. That  it  is  not  possible  to  restrain  him  in  such 
course  by  speeches  and  harangues,  no  man  can  be  ignorant : 
or,  if  other  reasons  fail  to  convince  you,  reflect  on  this. 
«>  uenever  we  have  had  to  discuss  our  claims,  on  no  occasion 


THE    FOURTH    PHILIPPIC.  133 

have  we  been  worsted  or  judged  in  the  wrong  :  we  have  still 
beaten  and  got  the  better  of  all  in  argument.  But  do  his 
affairs  go  badly  on  this  account,  or  ours  well  ?  By  no 
means.  For  as  Philip  immediately  proceeds,  with  arms  in 
his  hand,  to  put  all  he  possesses  boldly  at  stake,  whilst  we 
with  our  equities,  the  speakers  as  well  as  the  hearers,  are 
sitting  still,  actions  (naturally  enough)  outstrip  words,  and 
people  atteud  not  to  what  we  have  argued  or  may  argue,  but 
to  what  we  do.  And  our  doings  are  not  likely  to  protect  any 
of  our  injured  neighbours  :  I  need  not  say  more  upon  the 
subject.  Therefore,  as  the  states  are  divided  into  two  parties, 
one  that  would  neither  hold  arbitrary  government  nor  submit 
to  it,  but  live  under  free  and  equal  laws  :  another  desiring  to 
govern  their  fellow-citizens,  and  be  subject  to  some  third 
power,  by  whose  assistance  they  hope  to  accomplish  that 
object ;  the  partisans  of  Philip,'  who  desire  tyranny  and 
despotism,  have  everywhere  prevailed,  and  I  know  not  whether 
there  is  any  state  left,  jut  own,  with  a  popular  con- 

stitution firmly  established.  And  those,  that  hold  the  govern- 
ment through  him.  have  prevailed  by  all  the  means  efficacious 
in  worldly  affairs  :  principally  and  mainly,  by  having  a  person 
to  bribe  the  corruptible  :  secondly,  a  point  no  less  important, 
by  having  at  their  command,  at  whatever  season  they  re- 
quired, an  army  to  put  down  their  opponents.  We,  men  of 
Athens,  are  not  only  in  these  respects  behindhand  :  we  cannot 
even  be  awaked;  like  men  that  have  drunk  mandrake :  or  -  me 
other  sleeping  potion ;  and  methinks — for  I  judge  the  truth 
must  be  spoken — we  are  by  reason  thereof  held  in  such  dis- 
repute and  contempt,  that,  among  the  states  in  imminent 
danger,  some  dispute  with  us  for  the  lead,  some  for  the  place 
of  congress  :  others  have  resolved  to  defend  themselves  sepa- 
rately rather  than  in  union  with  us. 

Why  am  I  so  particular  in  mentioning  these  things  ?     1 

1  I  agree  with  Pabst  and  Auger  that  eWvov  signifies  Philip.  Scb.aef._r 
takes  it  neutrally. 

-  Used  for  a  powerful  opiate  by  the  ancients.  It  is  called  Mandra- 
gora  u...  ■  in  Knglinh,     gee  Othello,  Act  III.  3c  3. 

Xot  poppy,  nor  mandragora, 
Xor  all  the  drowsy  syrups  of  the  world, 
Shall  ever  medicine  thee  to  that  sweet  sleep 
Which  thou  owMst  yesterday. 


134  the  orat:::.~5  of  bemosthents. 

seek  not  to  give  offence  :  so  help  me  all  the  powers  of  heaven  ! 
I  wish,  men  of  Athens  (  make  it  clear  and  manifest  to  you 
all,  that  habitual  sloth  and  indolence,  the  same  in  public 
matters  as  in  privat-  life,  >  not  hnmediateiy  felt  on  every 
occasion  of  neglect,  but  i  -  itself  in  the  general  result.1 
Look  at  Senium  and  Doiiscus  ;  which  were  first  disregarded 
after  the  peace.  Their  names  perhaps  are  unknown  to  many 
of  yon  ~:r  careless  abandonment  of  these  lost  Thrace 

and  Cersobleptes  your  ally.     Ag  g  theae  places  neg- 

lected and  unsupported  by  you.  he  demolished  Porthmus.  and 
raised  a  tyrant  in  Eubcea  like  a  fortress  against  Attica.  This 
-:..  _  :  -:._  :  '.-.  1  M-.  _  n  ~~ : ;  way  nearly  taken.  Ton  were 
insensible,  indifferent  to  all  hi;  iggreesi  ne  :  gave  no  intima- 
tion that  you  would  not  permit  their  continuance.  He  pur- 
chased Anfronea,3  ... i  not  long  after  had  got  Oreus  into  his 
power.  Many  transactions  I  omit :  Phera?.  the  march  against 
Ambracia,  the  massacres  at  Elis,3  and  numberless  others  :  for 
I  have  not  entered  upon  these  details,  to  enumerate  the 
people  whom  Philip  has  oppressed  and  wronged,  but  to  show 
you  that  Philip  will  not  desist  from  wronging  all  people 
and  pursuing  his  conquests,  until  an  effort  is  made  to  prevent 
him. 

There  are  persons  whose  custom  it  is.  before  they  hear  any 
speech  in  the  debate,  to  ask  immediately — "  What  must 
do!" — not  with  the  intention  of  doing  what  they  are  told, 
(or  they  would  be  the  most  serviceable  of  men. )  but  in  order 
I  get  rid  of  the  speaker.  Nevertheless  you  should  be  advised 
what  to  do.  First,  0  my  countrymen,  you  must  le  firmly 
convinced   in  your  minds,  that  Philip  is  at  war  with  our 

1  Anger :  " presentent  a  la  fin  un  total  effrayant." 

*  A  town  in  Thessaly.  We  do  not  kao*  ill  the  details  of  Philip's 
proceedings  in  thai  eonab  seen  enough  to  show,  that 
nnder  the  guise  of  a  protector  he  w^;  r.  I  Eb  abort  :  en .^  the  master 
of  the  Thessalian  people.  Some  of  their  towns  were  actually  in  his 
possession,  as  Pherse  and  Pagasae.  But  that  the  Thessalians  were  never 
entirely  subjugated  to  Macedonia,  and  still  retained  a  hankering  after 
independence,  was  proved  at  a  later  period   by  their  desertion  of 

*  The  Elean  exiles,  having  engaged  in  their  service  a  body  of  the 
Phoeian  mercenaries,  made  an  irmption  into  Elis,  but  were  defeated. 
A  large  number  of  prisoners  were  taken  and  put  to  death.  This 
happened  b.  c  343.    The  government  of  Z..s  m  lime  in  the 


THE    FOURTH    PHILIPPIC.  135 

state,  and  has  broken  the  peace ;  that,  while  he  is  inimical 
and  hostile  to  the  whole  of  Athens,  to  the  ground  of  Athens, 
and  I  may  add,  to  the  gods  in  Athens,  (may  they  exterminate 
him  !)  there  is  nothing  which  he  strives  and  plots  against  so 
much  as  our  constitution,  nothing  in  the  world  that  he  is  so 
anxious  about,  as  its  destruction.  And  thereunto  he  is  driven 
in  some  sort  by  necessity.  Consider.  He  wishes  for  empire : 
he  believes  you  to  be  his  only  opponents.  He  has  been  a 
long  time  injuring  you,  as  his  own  conscience  best  informs 
him  ;  for  by  means  of  your  possessions,  which  he  is  able  to 
enjoy,  he  secures  all  the  rest  of  his  kingdom  :  had  he  given 
up  Amphipolis  and  Potideea,  he  would  not  have  deemed  him- 
self safe  even  in  Macedonia.  He  knows  therefore,  both  that 
he  is  plotting  against  you,  and  that  you  are  aware  of  it ;  and, 
supposing  you  to  have  common  sense,  he  judges  that  you 
detest  him  as  you  ought.  Besides  these  important  consi- 
derations, he  is  assured  that,  though  he  became  master  of 
everything  else,  nothing  can  be  safe  for  him  while  you.  are 
under  popular  government  :  should  any  reverse  ever  befal 
him,  (and  many  may  happen  to  a  man.)  all  who  are  now 
under  constraint  will  come  for  refuge  to  you.  For  you  are 
not  inclined  yourselves  to  encroach  and  usurp  dominion  ; 
but  famous  rather  for  checking  the  usurper  or  depriving  him 
of  his  conquests,  ever  ready  to  molest  the  aspirants  fur  empire, 
and  vindicate  the  liberty  of  all  nations.  He  would  not  like 
that  a  free  spiiit  should  proceed  from  Athens,  to  watch  the 
occasions  of  his  weakness ;  nor  is  such  reasoning  foolish  or 
idle.  First  then  you  must  assume,  that  he  is  an  irreconcile- 
able  enemy  of  our  constitution  and  democracy  ;  secondly,  you 
must  be  convinced,  that  all  his  operations  and  contrivances 
are  designed  for  the  injury  of  our  state.  None  of  you  can  be 
so  silly  as  to  suppose,  that  Philip  covets  those  miseries  in 
Thrace,  (for  "what  else  can  one  call  Drongilus  and  Cabyle 
and  Mastira  and  the  places  which  he  is  said  now  to  occupy  ?) 
and  that  to  get  possession  of  them  he  endures  hardships  and 
winters  and  the  utmost  peril,  but  covets  not  the  harbours 
of  Athens,  the  docks,  the  galleys,  the  silver  mines,  the  reve- 
nues of  such  value,  the  place  and  the  glory — never  may  he 
or  any  other  man  obtain  these  by  the  conquest  of  our  city  } — 
or  that  he  will  suffer  you  to  keep  these  things,  while  for  the 
sake  of  the  barley  and  millet  in  Thracian  caverns  he  winters 


136  THE    ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

in  the  midst  of  horrors.1  Impossible.  The  object  of  that 
and  every  other  enterprise  of  Philip  is,  to  become  master  here. 
So  should  every  man  be  persuaded  and  convinced ;  and 
therefore,  I  say,  should  not  call  upon  your  faithful  and  upright 
counsellor  to  move  a  resolution  for  war  r  such  were  the  part 
of  men  seeking  an  enemy  to  fight  with,  not  men  forwarding 
the  interests  of  the  state.  Only  see.  Suppose  for  the  first 
breach  of  the  treaty  by  Philip,  or  for  the  second  or  third,  (for 
there  is  a  series  of  breaches,)  any  one  had  made  a  motion  for 
war  with  him.  and  Philip,  just  as  he  has  now  without  such 
motion,  had  aided  the  Cardians,  would  not  the  mover  have 
been  sacrificed?3  would  not  all  have  imputed  Philip's  aid  of 
the  Cardians  to  that  cause  1  Don't  then  look  for  a  person  to 
vent  your  anger  on  for  Philip's  trespasses,  to  throw  to  Philip's 
hirelings  to  be  torn  in  pieces.  Do  not,  after  yourselves  voting 
for  war,  dispute  with  each  other,  whether  you  ought  or  ought 
not  to  have  done  so.  As  Philip  conducts  the  war,  so  resist 
him  :  furnish  those  who  are  resisting  him  now4  with  money 
and  what  else  they  demand ;  pay  your  contributions,  men  of 
Athens,  provide  an  army,  swift-sailing  gallies,  horses,  trans- 
ports, all  the  materials  of  war.  Our  present  mode  of  opera- 
tion is  ridiculous ;  and  by  the  gods  I  believe,  that  Philip 
could  not  wish  our  republic  to  take  any  other  course  than 
what  ye  now  pursue.  You  miss  your  time,  waste  your 
money,  look  for  a  person  to  manage  your  affairs,  are  discon- 
tented, accuse  one  another.  How  all  this  comes  about,  I  will 
explain,  and  how  it  may  cease  I  will  inform  you. 

Nothing,  0  men  of  Athens,  have  you  ever  set  on  foot  or 
contrived  rightly  in  the  beginning :  you  always  follow  the 
event,  stop  when  you  are  too  late,  on  any  new  occurrence 
prepare  and  bustle  again.  But  that  is  not  the  way  of  pro- 
ceeding.    It  is  never  possible  with  sudden  levies  to  perform 

1  See  the  note  in  the  Oration  on  the  Chersonese,  page  10S,  where  the 
same  words  nearly  are  repeated. 

2  He  deprecates  here,  as  elsewhere,  the  factious  proceedings  of  certain 
opponents,  who  sought  to  fasten  the  responsibility  of  a  war  on  the 
orator,  by  forcing  him  to  propose  a  decree.  This  (argues  Demosthenes) 
was  unnecessary,  as  they  were  at  war  already. 

3  Pabst,  following  Wolf,  takes  this  in  the  more  limited  sense  of  being 
carried  off  to  prison:  ins  Gefangniss  gnuorfen.  The  English  trans- 
lators, who  have  "  torn  to  pieces."  understand  the  word  in  the  sain* 
sense  that  I  do,  as  meaning  generally  "destroyed,  exterminated.'' 

4  Referring  to  Diopithes  and  his  troops  in  the  Chersonese. 


THE    FOURTH    PHILIPPIC.  137 

any  essential  service.  You  must  establish  an  army,  provide 
maintenance  for  it,  and  paymasters,  and  commissaries,  so 
ordering  it  that  the  strictest  care  be  taken  of  your  funds  ; 
demand  from  those  officers  an  account  of  the  expenditure, 
from  your  general  an  account  of  the  campaign  ;  and  leave  not 
the  general  any  excuse  for  sailing  elsewhere  or  prosecuting 
another  enterprise.  If  ye  so  act  and  so  resolve  in  earnest, 
you  will  compel  Philip  to  observe  a  just  peace  and  remain 
in  his  own  country,  or  will  contend  with  him  on  equal 
terms ;  and  perhaps,  Athenians,  perhaps,  as  you  now  inquire 
what  Philip  is  doing,  and  whither  marching,  so  he  may  be 
anxious  to  learn,  whither  the  troops  of  Athens  are  bound, 
and  where  they  will  make  their  appearance. 

Should  any  man  think  that  these  are  affairs  of  great  expense 
and  toil  and  difficulty,  he  thinks  rightly  enough  :  but  let 
him  consider  wh«t  the  consequences  to  Athens  must  be,  ir 
she  refuse  so  to  act,  and  he  will  find  it  is  our  interest  to 
perform  our  duties  cheerfully.  Suppose  you  had  some  god 
for  your  surety — for  certainly  no  mortal  could  guarantee  a 
thing  so  fortunate — that,  although  you  kept  quiet  and  sacri- 
ficed everything,  Philip  would  not  attack  you  at  last,  yet,  by 
Jupiter  and  all  the  gods,  it  would  be  disgraceful,  unworthy 
of  yourselves,  of  the  dignity  of  your  state,  and  the  deeds  of 
your  ancestors,  for  the  sake  of  selfish  indolence  to  abandon 
the  rest  of  Greeee  to  servitude.  For  my  part,  I  would  rather 
die  than  have  advised  such  a  course  :  however,  if  any  other 
man  advises  it,  and  can  prevail  on  you,  be  it  so ;  make  no 
defence,  abandon  all.  But  if  no  man  holds  such  an  opinion, 
if  on  the  contrary  we  all  foresee,  that,  the  more  we  permit 
Philip  to  conquer,  the  more  fierce  and  formidable  an  enemy 
we  shall  find  him,  what  subterfuge  remains  1  what  excuse  for 
delay  1  Or  when,  0  Athenians,  shall  we  be  willing  to  act  as 
becomes  us  1  Peradventure,  when  there  is  some  necessity. 
But  what  may  be  called  the  necessity  of  freemen  is  not  only 
come,  but  past  long  ago  ;  and  that  of  slaves  you  must  surely 
deprecate.  What  is  the  difference  1  To  a  freeman  shame  for 
what  is  occurring  is  the  strongest  necessity  ;  I  know  of  none 
stronger  that  can  be  mentioned  :  to  a  slave,  stripes  and  bodily 
chastisement ;  abominable  things  !  too  shocking  to  name  ! 

To  be  backward,  men  of  Athens,  in  performing  those  ser- 
vices to   which  the  person   and   property  of  every  one  are 


138  THE    ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

liable,  is  wrong,  very  wrong,  and  yet  it  admits  of  some  excuse, 
but  refusing  even  to  hear  what  is  necessary  to  be  heard,  and 
fit  to  be  considered,  this  calls  for  the  severest  censure.  Your 
practice  however  is,  neither  to  attend  until  the  business 
actually  presses,  as  it  does  now,  nor  to  deliberate  about  any- 
thing at  leisure.  Wher.  Philip  is  preparing,  you,  instead  of 
doing  the  like  and  making  counter-preparation,  remain  list- 
less, and,  if  any  one  speaks  a  word,  clamour  him  down  :  when 
you  receive  news  that  any  place  is  lost  or  besieged,  then  yor_ 
listen  and  prepare.  But  the  time  to  have  heard  and  consulted 
was  then  when  you  declined  ;  the  time  to  act  and  employ 
your  preparations  is  now  that  you  are  hearing.  Such  being 
your  habits,  you  are  the  only  people  who  adopt  this  singular 
course  :  others  deliberate  usually  before  action,  you  deliberate 
after  action. 

One  thing1  remains,  which  should  have  been  done  long 
ago,  but  even  yet  is  not  too  late :  I  will  mention  it.  Nothing 
in  the  world  does  Athens  need  so  much,  as  money  for 
approaching  exigencies.  Lucky  events  have  occurred,  and, 
if  we  rightly  improve  them,  perhaps  good  service  may  be 
done.  In  the  first  place,  those,2  whom  the  king  trusts  and 
regards  as  his  benefactors,  are  at  enmity  and  war  with  Philip. 
Secondly,  the  agent  and  confidant3  of  all  Philip's  preparations 
against  the  king  has  been  snatched  off,  and  the  king  will  hear 
all  the  proceedings,  not  from  Athenian  accusers,  whom  he 
might  consider  to  be  speaking  for  their  own  interests,  but 
from  the  acting  minister  himself ;  the  charges  therefore  will 
be  credible,  and  the  only  remaining  argument  for  our  ambas- 
sadors will  be,  one  which  the  Persian  monarch  will  rejoice  to 
hear,  that  we  should  take  common  vengeance  on  the  injurer 
of  both,  and  that  Philip  is  much  more  formidable  to  the  king, 
if  he  attack  us  first ;  for,  should  we  be  left  in  the  lurch  and 
suffer  any  mishap,  he  will  march  against  the  king  without 

1  He  means  negotiation  with  Persia,  to  obtain  pecuniary  assistance. 

2  The  Thracians,  who  had  always  been  regarded  as  benefactors  of  the 
Persian  king  since  they  assisted  Darius  on  his  invasion  of  Scythia. 
Philip  was  making  war  in  Thrace  at  this  time,  and  had  subjected  a 
considerable  part  of  the  country. 

3  Hermias,  governor  of  Atarncus  in  Mysia,  who  for  his  treasonable 
practices  against  Artaxerxes  was  seized  by  Mentor  and  sent  in  chains 
to  Susa,  where  he  was  put  to  death.  He  was  a  friend  jf  Aristotle,  who 
was  at  his  court,  when  he  was  taken  prisoner.  The  philosr  pher  after- 
wards married  his  sister. 


THE    FOURTH    PHILIPPIC.  139 

fear.  On  all  these  matters  then  I  advise  that  you  despatch 
an  embassy  to  confer  with  the  king,  and  put  aside  that  non- 
sense which  has  so  often  damaged  you — "  the  barbarian," 
forsooth,  "the  common  enemy" — and  the  like.  I  confess, 
when  I  see  a  man  alarmed  at  a  prince  in  Susa  and  Ecbatana, 
and  declaring  him  to  be  an  enemy  of  Athens,  him  that  for- 
merly assisted  in  reestablishing  her  power,  and  lately  made 
overtures2 — if  you  did  not  accept  them,  but  voted  refusal, 
the  fault  is  not  his — while  the  same  man  speaks  a  different 
language  of  one  who  is  close  at  our  doors,  and  growing  up 
in  the  centre  of  Greece  to  be  the  plunderer  of  her  people ; 
I  marvel,  I  dread  this  man,  whoever  he  is,  because  he  dreads 
not  Philip. 

There  is  another  thing  too,  the  attacking  of  which  by 
unjust  reproach  and  improper  language  hurts  the  state,  and 
affords  an  excuse  to  men  who  are  unwilling  to  perform  any 
public  duty  :  indeed  you  will  find  that  every  failure  to  dis- 
charge the  obligation  of  a  citizen  is  attributable  to  this.  I 
am  really  afraid  to  discuss  the  matter ;  however,  I  will  speak 
out. 

I  believe  I  can  suggest,  for  the  advantage  of  the  state,  a 
plea  for  the  poor  against  the  rich,  and  for  men  of  property 
against  the  indigent ;  could  we  remove  the  clamour  which 
some  persons  unfairly  raise  about  the  theatric  fund,3  and  the 

1  In  the  confederate  war,  when  the  Persian  fleet  enabled  Conon  to 
defeat  the  Lacedaemonians  at  Cnidus,  b.o.  394. 

2  Artaxerxes  had  applied  both  to  Athens  and  Lacedaemon  to  aid  him 
in  the  recovery  of  Egypt,  which  for  many  years  had  been  held  in  a 
state  of  revolt.  Both  these  states  refused  to  assist  him.  He  then 
applied  to  Thebes  and  Argos,  each  of  which  sent  an  auxiliary  force. 

3  Boeckh,  Schaefer  and  others,  regard  it  as  conclusive  against  the 
genuineness  of  this  Oration,  that  a  different  view  is  here  taken  on  the 
subject  of  the  Theoric  fund  from  that  which  Demosthenes  had  expressed 
in  the  Olynthiacs.  And  certainly  it  is  a  strong  argument.  It  is  pos- 
sible, however,  that  circumstances  may  have  induced  him  to  modify  his 
opinion,  or  he  may  have  thought  it  dangerous  to  meddle  with  the  law 
of  Eubulus  at  the  present  crisis,  which  called  for  the  greatest  unani- 
mity among  all  classes.  We  may  partly  gather  from  this  speech,  that 
there  had  been  some  agitation  among  the  lower  classes,  occasioned  by 
the  complaints  of  the  wealthy  against  this  law.  Any  agitation  tending 
to  a  spirit  of  communism  must  have  been  extremely  dangerous  at 
Athens,  where  the  people  had  such  power  of  mulcting  the  higher 
classes  by  their  votes  in  the  popular  assembly  and  courts  of  justice.  It 
might  therefore  be  better  to  let  the  peop'e  alone  with  their  theatrical 


140  THE    ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHEXEK 

fear  that  it  cannot  stand  without  some  signal  mischief.  ISo 
greater  help  to  our  affairs  could  we  introduce;1  none  that 
would  inore  strengthen  the  whole  community.  Look  at  it 
thus.  I  will  commence  on  behalf  of  those  who  are  con- 
sidered the  needy  class.  There  was  a  time  with  us,  not  long 
ago,  when  only  a  hundred  and  thirty  talents  came  into  the 
state;2  and  among  the  persons  qualified  to  command  ships 
or-  pay  property-tax,  there  was  not  one  who  claimed  exemp- 
tion from  his  duty  because  no  surplus  existed:3  galleys 
sailed,  money  was  forthcoming,  everything  needful  was  done. 
■Since  that  time  fortune  happily  has  increased  the  revenue, 
and  four  hundred  talents  come  in  instead  of  one,  without  loss 
to  any  men  of  property,  but  with  gain  to  them ;  for  all  the 
wealthy  come  for  their  share  of  the  fund,  and  they  are 
welcome  to  it.4  Why  then  do  we  reproach  one  another  on 
this  account,  and  make  it  an  excuse  for  declining  our  duties, 
unless  we  grudge  the  relief  given  by  fortune  to  the  poor  ]  I 
would  be  sorry  to  blame  them  myself,  and  I  think  it  not 
right.     In  private  families  I  never  see  a  young  man  behaving 

treats,  their  fees  and  largesses,  than  to  provoke  retaliation  by  abridging 
such  enjoyments.  Leland  observes  on  the  subject  as  follows — "All  that 
the  orator  here  says  in  defence  of  the  theatrical  appointments  is  expres- 
sed with  a  caution  and  reserve  quite  opposite  to  his  usual  openne.-s  and 
treedom ;  and  which  plainly  betray  a  consciousness  of  his  being  incon- 
sistent with  his  former  sentiments.  How  far  he  may  be  excused  by  the 
supposed  necessity  of  yielding  to  the  violent  prepossessions  of  the 
people,  and  giving  up  a  favourite  point,  I  cannot  pretend  to  determine. 
But  it  is  certainly  not  very  honourable  to  Demosthenes,  to  suppose  with 
Ulpian,  that  his  former  opposition  was  merely  personal,  and  that  the 
death  of  Eubulus  now  put  an  end  to  it." 

1  Viz.,  than  the  removal  of  this  clamour  and  alarm  about  the  theatric 
fund. 

2  This  must  be  understood  (according  to  Boeckh)  of  the  tribute  only, 
which  came  in  from  the  allies.  The  total  revenue  of  Athens  must  havf 
greatly  exceeded  this. 

3  There  was  as  much  ground  for  legal  exemption  then  as  there  is 
now ;  and  yet  it  was  never  claimed.  Why  should  the  rich  seek  to  be 
relieved  from  their  burdens  because  of  an  abundance  of  revenue  ]  That 
abundance  is  for  the  general  benefit  of  the  state,  not  for  theirs  in  pani 
cular.  Such  appears  to  be  the  argument,  perhaps  not  quite  satisl'ac 
tory ;  but  such  it  is.  Pabst,  apparently  reading  dtp'  eavrov,  has :  der 
nicht  aus  eigenem  Anlrieb  seine  Schiddigkeit  zu  thun  bertit  war,  u-eii 
kein  Geldiiberschuss  vorhanden  war. 

*  ].e  the  Theoric  fund,  in  which  every  member  of  the  common 
wealth  had  a  right  to  share. 


THE    FOURTH    PHILIPPIC.  1-il 

bo  to  his  elders,  so  unfeeling  or  so  unreasonable,  as  to  refuse 
to  do  anything  himself,  unless  all  the  rest  •will  do  what  he 
does.  Such  a  person  would  certainly  be  amenable  to  the 
_ainst  undutifal  conduct :'  for  I  ween  there  is  a  tribute 
assigned  to  parents  both  by  nature  and  by  law.  which  ought 
to  be  cheerfully  offered  and  amply  paid.  Accordingly,  as 
each  individual  among  us  hath  a  parent,  so  should  we  regard 
the  whole  people  as  parents  of  the  state,  and.  so  far  from 
depriving  them  of  what  the  state  bestows,  we  ought,  in  the 
absence  of  such  bounty,  to  find  other  means  to  keep  them 
from  destitution.  If  the  rich  will  adopt  this  principle,  I 
think  they  will  act  both  justly  and  wisely  :  for  to  deprive 
any  class  of  a  necessary  provision,  is  to  uuite  them  in  dis- 
affection to  the  commonwealth. 

To  the  poor  I  would  recommend,  that  they  remove  the 
cause,  which  makes  men  of  property  discontented  with  the 
present  system,  and  excites  their  just  complaints.  I  shall 
take  the  same  course  on  behalf  of  the  wealthy  as  I  did  just 
now.  and  not  hesitate  to  speak  the  truth.  There  cannot.  I 
believe,  be  fated  a  wretch  so  hard-hearted — I  will  not  say 
among  Athenians,  but  among  any  other  people — who  would  be 
sorry  to  see  poor  men,  men  without  the  necessaries  of  life, 
receiving  these  bounties.  Where  then  is  the  pinch3  of  the 
matter  1  where  the  difficulty  i  When  they  see  certain  persons 
transferring  the  usage  established  for  the  public  revenue  to 
private  property,  and  the  orator  becoming  immediately 
powerful  with  you.  yea,  (so  far  as  privilege  can  make  him.) 
immortal,   and  your  secret  vote  contradicting   your  public 

1  Pabst :  dit  ic.nen  ungebuhrlicher  Bthandlung  dor  Eltcrn. 

•jient."  was  a  technical  term  in  the  Attic  '._.. 
noting  a  failure  of  duty  on  the  part  of  husbands,  children,  or  goffl 
towards  their  -wive-,  parents,  or  wards,  for  which  thev  were  liable  to  be 
tried  and  punished  in  a  suit  called  Kaxil&ecus  5uct).     The  juri- ■:: 
orer  this  offence  belonged  to  the  Archon,  who  was  the  protector  of  all 
family  rigL;. 

2  The  expression  "  Where  is  the  rub  !"  woi^ld  be  still  nearer  to  the 
original,  and  the  expression  reminds  one  of  the  line  in  Hamlet : 

To  sleep  !  perchance  to  dream  !  are,  there's  the  rub. 

-  -  the  simile  is  taken  from  the  collision  of  chariots  in  the 
race:  but  this  is  confining  it  too  muL-h.  His  vernacular  exptanaMon 
is:  »or  tmdk  ?  woiktdet Hakmf      Pabst  has  :  icor. 

sich  die  Sache,  und  teas  trsmgi  den  Verdrvss? 


142  THE    ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

clamour.1  Hence  arises  mistrust,  hence  indignation.  We 
ought,  0  ye  men  of  Athens,  to  have  a  just  communion  of 
political  rights;  the  opulent  holding  themselves  secure  in 
their  fortunes,  and  without  fear  of  losing  them,  yet  in  time 
of  danger  imparting  their  substauce  freely  for  the  defence  of 
their  country ;  while  the  rest  consider  the  public  revenue  as 
public,  and  receive  their  share,  but  look  on  private  property 
as  belonging  to  the  individual  owner.  Thus  it  is  that  a  small 
commonwealth  becomes  great,  and  a  great  one  is  preserved. 
To  speak  generally  then,  such  are  the  obligations  of  each 
class;  to  ensure  their  performance  according  to  law,  some 
regulation  should  be  made. 

The  causes  of  our  present  troubles  and  embarrassment  are 
many  and  of  ancient  date  :  if  you  are  willing  to  hear,  I  will 
declare  them.  You  have  quitted,  0  Athenians,  the  position 
in  which  your  ancestors  left  you;  you  have  been  persuaded 
by  these  politicians,  that  to  stand  foremost  of  the  Greeks,  to 
keep  a  permanent  force  and  redress  injured  nations,  is  all 
vanity  and  idle  expense ;  you  imagine  that  to  live  in  quiet,  to 
perform  no  duty,  to  abandon  one  thing  after  another  and  let 
strangers  seize  on  all,  brings  with  it  marvellous  welfare  and 
abundant  security.     By  such  means  a  stranger  has  advanced 

1  Having  admonished  the  higher  classes  to  pay  their  property-tax 
and  perform  their  public  services  cheerfully,  and  without  seeking  to 
be  relieved  at  the  expense  of  the  public  revenue,  he  proceeds  to  re- 
mind the  lower  classes  of  their  duty.  He  warns  them,  that,  while 
they  receive  a  benefit  from  the  funds  of  the  state,  they  must  not  en- 
deavour to  increase  those  funds  unduly  by  an  invasion  of  the  rights 
of  property.  His  language  is  not  open,  but  would  easily  be  under- 
stood by  his  audience.  The  Athenians  ought  not  to  promote  law- 
suits to  increase  court-fees ;  not  to  encourage  prosecutions  against 
wealthy  citizens,  in  order  to  obtain  fines  and  confiscations.  He  in- 
sinuates that  there  was  too  much  cause  for  complaint  already.  T&v 
Ktyovra  is,  not  as  Schaefer  contends,  the  rich  man  pleading  his  cause 
before  the  people,  but,  as  Wolf  explains  it,  the  popular  orator  or  in- 
former, who  speedily  rose  to  favour  and  influence,  of  which  it  was  not 
easy  to  deprive  him.  His  opponent,  speaking  in  a  just  cause,  might  be 
applauded  at  the  time,  but  the  votes  showed  what  was  the  real  bias  of 
the  people.  In  courts  of  justice  at  Athens  the  voting  was  usually  by  a 
secret  ballot ;  (see  my  article  Psephws  in  the  Archaeological  Dictionary;) 
and  there  being  a  large  number  of  jurors,  it  would  be  difficult  to  dis- 
cover by  whose  votes  the  verdict  was  obtained.  It  is  impossible  to  read 
the  frequent  appeals  made  by  Athenian  speakers  to  the  passions  and 
prejudices  of  the  jury,  without  seeing  that  there  was  some  ground  foi 
the  insinuations  of  the  oritor  in  this  passage. 


THE    FOURTH    PHILIPPIC.  143 

to  the  post  which  you  ought  to  have  occupied,  has  become 
prosperous  and  great,  aud  made  large  conquests;  naturally 
enough.  A  prize  there  was,  noble,  great,  and  glorious,  one 
for  which  the  mightiest  states  were  contending  all  along;  but 
as  the  Lacedaemonians  were  humbled,  the  Thebans  had  their 
hands  full  through  the  Phocian  war,  and  we  took  no  regard, 
he  carried  it  off  without  competition.  The  result  has  been, 
to  others  terror,  to  him  a  vast  alliance  and  extended  power ; 
while  difficulties  so  many  and  so  distressing  surround  the 
Greeks,  that  even  advice  is  not  easy  to  be  found. 

Yet,  perilous  as  I  conceive  the  present  crisis  to  be  for  all, 
no  people  are  in  such  danger  as  you,  men  of  Athens;  not 
only  because  Philip's  designs  are  especially  aimed  at  you,  but 
because  of  all  people  you  are  the  most  remiss.  If,  seeing  the 
abundance  of  commodities  and  cheapness  in  your  market, 
you  are  beguiled  into  a  belief  that  the  state  is  in  no  danger, 
your  judgment  is  neither  becoming  nor  correct.  A  market 
or  a  fair  one  may,  from  such  appearances,  judge  to  be  well  or 
ill  supplied  :  but  for  a  state,  which  every  aspirant  for  the 
empire  of  Greece  has  deemed  to  be  alone  capable  of  opposing 
him,  and  defending  the  liberty  of  all — for  such  a  state  ! 
verily  her  marketable  commodities  are  not  the  test  of  pro- 
sperity, but  this — whether  she  can  depend  on  the  goodwill  of 
her  allies;  whether  she  is  puissant  in  arms.  On  behalf  of 
such  a  state  these  are  the  things  to  be  considered;  and  in 
these  respects  your  condition  is  wretched  and  deplorable. 
You  will  understand  it  by  a  simple  reflection.  When  have 
the  affairs  of  Greece  been  in  the  greatest  confusion  1  No 
other  time  could  any  man  point  out  but  the  present.  Ir 
former  times  Greece  was  divided  into  two  parties,  that  of  the 
Lacedaemonians  and  ours  :  some  of  the  Greeks  were  subject 
to  us,  some  to  them.  The  Persian,  on  his  own  account,  was 
mistrusted  equally  by  all,  but  he  used  to  make  friends  of  the 
vanquished  parties,  and  retain  their  confidence,  until  he  put 
them  on  an  equality  with  the  other  side ;  after  which  those 
that  he  succoured  would  hate  him  as  much  as  his  original 
enemies.  Now  however  the  king  is  on  friendly  terms  with 
all  the  Greeks,  though  least  friendly  with  us,  unless  we  put 
mattei's  right.     Now  too  there  are  protectors1  springing  up 

1  This  is  said  with  some  irony :  many  states  offer  to  come  forward  as 
protectors,  but  only  on  condition  of  taking  the  lead:  they  will  not  join 


144  THE    ORATIONS    OF   I>EJIOSTHEN~ES. 

in  every  quarter,  and  all  claim  the  precedency,  though  - 
indeed  have  abandoned  the  cause,  or  envy  and  distrust  each 
other — more  shame  for  them — and  every  state  is  isolated. 
Argives.  Thebans,  Lacedaemonians.  Corinthians.  Arcadians, 
and  ourselves.  But,  divided  as  Greece  is  among  so  many 
parties  and  so  many  leaderships,  if  I  must  speak  the  truth 
there  is  no  state  whose  offices  and  halls  of  council 
appear  more  deserted  by  Grecian  politics  than  ours.  And 
no  wonder  :  when  neither  friendship,  nor  confidence,  nor  fear 
leads  any  to  negotiate  with  us. 

This,   ye   men  of  Athens,  has  come  not  from  any  single 
cause  (or  you  might  easily  mend  it.;  but  from  a  great  variety 
and  lon^  series  of  errors.     I  will  not  stop  to  recount  them, 
but  will  mention  one.  to  which  all  may  be  referred,  bee 
ing  you  nut  to  be  offended,  if  I  boldly  speak  the  truth. 

Your  interests  are  sold  on  every  favourable  opportunity  : 
you  partake  of  the  idleness  and  ease,  under  the  charm 
whereof  you  resent  not  your  wrongs;  while  other  persons 
get  the  reward.'  Into  all  these  cases  I  could  not  enter  now  : 
but  when  any  question  about  Philip  arises,  some  one  starts  up 
directly  and  says — u  We  must  have  no  trifling,  no  proposal  of 
war"' —  l  goes  on  to  say — -What  a  blessing  it  is  to 

be  at  peace  !  what  a  crrievance  to  maintain  a  large  army ! " — 
and  again — B  Certain  persons  wish  to  plunder  the  treasury  " — 
and  other  arguments  they  urge,  no  d  jubt.  in  the  full  convic- 
tion of  their  truth.2  But  surely  there  is  n<j  need  of  per- 
suading you  to  observe  peace,  you  that  sit  here  persuaded 
already.  It  is  Philip  (who  is  making  war;  that  needs  persua- 
sion :  prevail  on  him,  and  all  is  ready  on  your  part.  We 
should   consider  as  grievous,  not  what  we   expend  for  our 

the  common  cause  on  fair  terms.     Many  of  the  translations  o 
swnse  here.     Leland  uDderstands  it  rightly :  "  there  are  several  cities 
which  affect  the  Eer  of  guardians  and  protectors."     Auger  con- 

founds this  sentence  with  the  next:  "il  s*  eleve  de  tous  cotes  plusieurs 
puis>ancts  qui  a^piren;  loutes  a  la  primaute." 

1  Schaefer  rightly  explains  nuas  to  mean  the  price  received  for 
treason.     But  most  of  I  ,rs,  following  Wolf,  understand  it  to 

mean:..  -von  by  Philip.     Tots  oZlkovglv  is  rendered  by  Auger, 

Leland.  and  Francis,  "t .  I  think  it  rather  refers  to,  or  at 

least  includes,  the  enemies  who  profited  by  the  treason,  and  made  con- 
quests from  .-.■  .:se  meaning  Philip  in  particular. 

■  There  is  no  difficulty  in  Hub,  if  we  understand  it  to  be  ironical; 
aod  m>  need  of  any  amendment. 


THE    FOURTH    PHILIPPIC.  145 

deliverance,  but  what  we  shall  suffer  in  case  of  refusal. 
Plunder  of  the  treasury  should  be  prevented  by  devising  a 
plan  for  its  safe  custody,  not  by  abandoning  our  interests. 
Yet  this  very  thing  makes  me  indignant,  that  some  of  you 
are  pained  at  the  thought  of  your  treasury  being  robbed, 
though  it  depends  on  yourselves  to  guard  it  and  to  punish 
the  criminal,  but  are  not  pained  to  see  Philip  plundering 
Greece,  plundering  as  he  does  one  people  after  another,  to 
forward  his  designs  upon  you. 

How  comes  it,  ye  men  of  Athens,  that  of  this  flagrant 
aggressor,  this  capturer  of  cities,  no  one  has  ever  declared 
that  he  commits  hostility  or  injustice,  while  those  who  counsel 
against  submission  and  sacrifice  are  charged  as  the  authors  of 
war  1  The  reason  is,  that  people  wish  to  cast  upon  your 
faithful  counsellors  the  blame  of  any  untoward  events  in  the 
war;  for  war  must  necessarily  be  attended  with  many  mis- 
fortunes. They  believe  that,  if  you  resist  Philip  with  one 
heart  and  mind,  you  will  prevail  against  him,  and  they  can 
be  hirelings  no  longer ;  but  that  if  on  the  first  outcry J  you 
arraign  certain  persons  and  bring  them  to  trial,  they  by 
accusing  such  persons  will  gain  a  double  advantage,  repute 
among  the  Athenians  and  recompense  from  Philip ;  and  that 
you  will  punish  your  friendly  advisers  for  a  cause  for  which 
you  ought  to  punish  the  traitors.  Such  are  the  hopes,  such 
the  contrivance  of  these  charges,  "that  certain  persons  wish 
to  kindle  a  war."  I  am  sure  however,  that,  without  any 
Athenian  moving  a  declaration  of  war,  Philip  has  taken 
many  of  our  possessions,  and  has  recently  sent  succour  to 
Cardia.  If  we  choose  to  assume  that  he  is  uot  making  war 
against  us,  he  would  be  the  simplest  of  mankind  to  convince 
us  of  our  mistake  :  for  when  the  sufferers  disclaim  the  in- 
jury, what  should  the  offenders  do  ?  But  when  he  marches 
to  attack  us,  what  shall  we  say  then  1  He  will  assure  us 
that  he  is  not  making  war,  as  he  assured  the  Orites  when  his 
troops  were  in  their  country,  as  he  assured  the  Pheneans 
before  he  assaulted  their  walls,  and  the  Olynthians  in  the 
first  instance,  until  he  was  in  their  territories  with  his  army. 
Shall  we  then  say,  that  persons  who  bid  us  defend  ourselvej> 

1  Leland  :  "  the  first  unhappy  accident."  Francis  gives  the  right 
meaning,  but  with  too  many  words ;  "the  first  tumults  occasioned  by 
»ny  unfortunate  success."    Spillan  :  "  the  first  alarm." 

VOL.  I.  L 


146  THE    ORATIOXS    0?    DEM0STHEX51'-. 

kindle  a  war  ?  If  so,  we  must  be  slaves ;  for  nothing  else 
remains. 

But  remember :  you  have  more  at  stake  than  some  other 
people.  Philip  desirea  not  to  subjugate  tout  city,  but  to 
destroy  it  utterly.  He  is  convinced,  you  will  not  submit  to 
be  slaves ;  if  you  were  inclined,  you  would  not  know  how, 
having  been  accustomed  to  command :  you  will  be  able, 
should  occasion  offer,  to  give  him  more  trouble  than  any 
people  in  the  world.  For  this  reason  he  will  show  us  no 
mercy,  if  he  get  us  into  his  power  :  and  therefore  you  must 
make  up  your  minds,  that  the  struggle  will  be  one  for  life  and 
death.  These  persons,  who  have  openly  sold  themselves  to 
Philip,  you  must  execrate,  you  must  beat  their  brains  out: 
for  it  is  impossible,  I  say  impossible,  to  vanquish  your  foreign 
enemies,  until  you  have  punished  your  enemies  within  the 
city  :  these  are  the  stumbling-blocks  that  must  cripple  your 
efforts  against  the  foreigner. 

From  what  cause,  do  ye  think.  Philip  insults  you  now;  (for 
his  conduct,  in  my  judgment,  amounts  to  nothing  less:)  and 
while  he  deceives  other  people  by  doing  them  services — this 
at  least  is  something — you  he  threatens  already  ?  For 
example,  the  Thessalians  by  many  benefits  he  seduced  into 
their  present  servitude  :  no  man  can  tell  how  he  (heated  the 
poor  Olynthiaus,  giving  them  first  Potidaea  and  many  other 
places  :  now  he  is  luring  the  Thebans,  having  delivered  up 
Bceotia  to  them,  and  freed  them  from  a  tedious  and 
harassing  war.  Of  these  people,  who  each  got  a  certain 
advantage,  some  have  suffered  what  is  notorious  to  all,  others 
have  yet  to  suffer  what  may  befal  them.  As  to  yourselves , 
the  amount  of  your  losses  I  do  not  mention :  but  in  the 
very  making  of  the  peace  how  have  you  been  deceived  !  how 
plundered !  Lost  you  not  the  Phocians.  Thermopylae,  country 
towards  Thrace,  Doriscus,  Senium,  Cersobleptes  himself? 
Holds  he  not  Cardia  now.  and  avows  it !  Why  then  does  he 
behave  thus  to  other  people,  and  in  a  different  way  to  you  ? 
Because  our  city  is  the  only  one  where  liberty  is  allowed  to 
speak  for  the  enemy,  where  a  man  taking  a  bribe  may  safely 
address  the  people,  though  they  have  been  deprived  of  their 
possessions.  It  was  not  safe  at  Olynthus  to  advocate  Philip's 
cause,  without  the  Olynthian  people  sharing  the  benefit  by 
possession  of  Potidaea.     It  was  not  safe  to  advocate  Philip's 


THE    FOURTH    PHILIPPIC.  147 

cause  in  Thessaly,  without  the  people  of  Thessaly  sharing  the 
benefit,  by  Philip's  expelling  their  tyrants  and  restoring  the 
Pylaean  Synod.  It  was  not  safe  at  Thebes,  until  he  restored 
Boeotia  to  them,  and  destroyed  the  Phocians.  But  at  Athens, 
though  Philip  has  taken  from  you  Amphipolis  and  the 
Cardian  territory,  and  is  even  turning  Euboea  into  a  hostile 
post,  and  advancing  to  attack  Byzantium,  it  is  safe  to  speak 
on  Philip's  behalf.  Yea,  among  these  men,  some  have  risen 
rapidly  from  poverty  to  wealth,  from  meanness  and  obscurity 
to  repute  and  honour,  whilst  you,  on  the  contrary,  have 
fallen  from  honour  to  obscurity,  from  wealth  to  indigence. 
For  the  riches  of  a  state  I  consider  to  be  allies,  confidence, 
good-will ;  of  all  which  you  ai*e  destitute.  And  by  your 
neglecting  these  things,  and  suffering  your  interests  thus  to 
be  swept  away,  Philip  has  grown  prosperous  and  mighty, 
formidable  to  all  the  Greeks  and  barbarians,  whilst  you  are 
forlorn  and  abject,  in  the  abundance  of  your  market  magni- 
ficent, but  in  your  national  defences  ridiculous.1 

Some  of  our  orators,  I  observe,  take  not  the  same  thought 
for  you  as  for  themselves.  They  say  that  you  should  keep 
quiet,  though  you  are  injured;  but  they  cannot  themselves 
keep  quiet  among  you,  though  no  one  injures  them.  Come, 
raillery  apart,  suppose  you  were  thus  questioned,  Aristode- 
mus,2 — "  Tell  me,  as  you  know  perfectly  well,  what  every  one 
else  knows,  that  the  life  of  private  men  is  secure  and  free 
from  trouble  and  danger,  whilst  that  of  statesmen  is  exposed 
to  scandal3  and  misfortune,  full  of  trials  and  hardships  every 

1  The  whole  of  the  foregoing  passage  is  taken,  with  some  little  varia- 
tion, from  the  speech  on  the  Chersonese.  It  certainly  would  seem 
strange,  if  this  Oration  had  been  forged  by  any  grammarian,  that  he 
should  have  borrowed  thus  by  wholesale  from  Demosthenes.  There  is 
perhaps  less  difficulty  in  the  supposition  that  Demosthenes  repeated  his 
own  words. 

2  This  man  was  a  tragic  actor,  and  charged  by  Demosthenes  with 
being  a  partisan  of  Philip.  He  was  the  first  person  who  proposed 
peace  with  Macedonia,  shortly  before  the  embassy  of  ten.  See  the 
Argument  to  the  Oration  on  the  Peace. 

3  I  have  taken  (ptXairiov  in  the  passive  sense,  as  it  is  explained  by 
Reiske  and  Schaefer,  though  it  scarcely  suits  the  character  of  the  word. 
Compare  Shakspeare,  Henry  V.  Act  IV.  Sc.  1. 

0  hard  condition,  twin-born  with  greatness, 
Subjected  to  the  breath  of  every  fool ! 
"What  infinite  heart's  ease  must  kings  neglect, 
That  private  men  enjoy  i 

hi 


14o  THE   ORATION'S   OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

day,  how  comes  it  that  you  prefer,  not  the  quiet  and  easy 
life,  but  the  one  surrounded  with  peril  V' — what  should  you 
say?     If  we    admitted    the    truth   of  what   would    be    your 
best  possible  answer,  namely,  that  all  you  do  is  for  honour 
and  renown.  I  wonder  what  puts  it  into  your  head,  that  you 
ought  from  such  motives  to  exert  yourself  and  undergo  toil 
and  danger,  whilst  you  advise  the  state  to  give  up  exertion 
and  remain  idle.     You  cannot  surely  allege,  that  Aristode- 
mus  ought  to  be  of  importance  at  Athens,  and  Athens  to  be 
of  no  account  among  the  Greeks.     Nor  again  do  I  see,  that 
for  the  commonwealth  it  is  safe  to  mind  her  own  affairs  only, 
and  hazardous  for  you,  not  to  be  a  superlative  busy-body.1 
On  the  contrary,  to  you  I  see  the  utmost  peril  from  your 
meddling  and  over-meddling,   to   the   commonwealth  peril 
from  her  inactivity.     But  I  suppose,  you  inherit  a  reputation 
from  your  father  and  grandfather,  which  it  were  disgraceful 
in  your  own  person  to  extinguish,  whereas  the  ancestry  of 
the  state  was  ignoble  and  mean.    This  again  is  not  so.    Your 
father  was  a  thief,2  if  he  resembled  you,  whereas  by  the 
ancestors    of  the    commonwealth,    as   all   men   know,    the 
Greeks  have  twice  been  rescued  from  the  brink  of  destruc- 
tion.    Truly  the  behaviour  of  some  persons,  in  private  and 
in  public,  is  neither  equitable  nor  constitutional.     How  is  it 
equitable,  that  certain  of  these  men,  returned  from  prison, 
should  not  know  themselves,  while  the  state,  that  once  pro- 
tected all  Greece  and  held  the  foremost  place,  is  sunk  in 
ignominy  and  humiliation  ? 

Much  could  I  add  on  many  points,  but  I  will  forbear.  It 
is  not,  I  believe,  to  lack  of  words  that  our  distresses  have 
been  owing  either  now  or  heretofore.  The  mischief  is  when 
you,  after  listening  to  sound  arguments,  and  all  agreeing  in 
their  justice,  sit  to  hear  with  equal  favour  those  who  try  to 
defeat  and  pervert  them ;  not  that  you  are  ignorant  of  the 
men;  (you  are  certain  at  the  first  glance,  who  speak  for  hire 
and  are  Philip's  political  agents,  and  who  speak  sincerely  for 

1  All  the  translators  have  mistaken  ruv  iAAtw  xAt'ov,  which  is  simplv 
"  more  than  others,"  as  Wolf  explains  it. 

2  This  seems  to  shock  Leland.  who  spoils  the  pungency  of  the  ex- 
pression by  rendering  it :  "Your  father  was  like  you.  and  therefore  ba-e 
and  infamous."  Auger  remarks:  " L'invective  de  Demosthene  est  fort 
tioquente,  mais  bien  violente.  L'amour  de  la  patrie,  contre  laquella 
c&as  doute  agissait  Aris'.odeme,  peut  seul  en  escuser  la  vivacite." 


ON    THE    LETTER.  149 

your  good;)  your  object  is  to  find  fault  with  these,  turn  the 
thing  into  laughter  and  raillery,  and  escape  the  performance 
of  your  duty. 

Such  is  the  truth,  spoken  with  perfect  freedom,  purely 
from  good-will  and  for  the  best  :  not  a  speech  fraught  with 
flattery  and  mischief  and  deceit,  to  earn  money  for  the 
speaker,  and  to  put  the  commonwealth  into  the  hands  of  our 
enemies.  I  say,  you  must  either  desist  from  these  practices, 
or  blame  none  but  yourselves  for  the  wretched  condition  of 
your  affairs. 


THE  ORATION  ON  THE  LETTER. 

THE    ARGUMENT. 

The  Athenians  had  been  persuaded  by  the  advice  of  Demosthenes  to 
solicit  the  aid  of  Persia.  This  was  accorded,  and  events  had  hap- 
pened on  the  Propontine  coast,  which  made  it  peculiarly  needful. 
Towards  the  close  of  the  year  b.c.  342  Philip  commenced  the  siege 
of  Selymbria,  and  early  in  the  following  year,  that  city  having  been 
taken,  laid  siege  to  Perinthus.  But  here  he  met  with  an  obstinate 
resistance :  Perinthus  was  strong  by  nature  and  well  fortified.  The 
satraps  of  Western  Asia  had  supplied  it  with  a  stock  of  provisions 
and  ammunition,  and  a  large  body  of  Greek  mercenaries.  Byzan- 
tium also  had  sent  assistance.  Philip,  after  making  great  efforts  to 
take  Perinthus  by  storm,  turned  the  siege  into  a  blockade,  and 
inarched  northward  against  Byzantium.  Here  he  was  no  more 
successful  than  he  had  been  at  Perinthus.  The  Byzantines  had  well 
prepared  themselves  to  resist  his  attack,  and  received  powerful  aid 
not  only  from  their  old  allies  of  Cos,  Chios,  and  Rhodes,  but  also 
from  other  parts  of  Greece,  and  especially  from  Athens.  In  order  to 
reconcile  the  Byzantines  to  his  countrymen,  with  whom  they  had 
been  at  variance  ever  since  the  Social  war,  Demosthenes  himself 
undertook  a  voyage  to  the  Bosphorus.  By  his  exertions  an  alliance 
was  concluded,  and  an  Athenian  fleet  was  sent  under  the  command  of 
Chares;  but  Chares  being  feared  and  disliked  by  the  Byzantines,  they 
refused  to  admit  him  into  the  town;  and  afterwards  Phocion  was 
despatched  with  a  hundred  and  twenty  ships  and  a  considerable  body 
of  troops.  The  result  of  these  effective  measures  was,  that  Philip 
was  baffled  in  his  attempts  on  both  cities,  and  compelled  to  raise  the 
siege. 

In  the  meantime  important  operations  had  taken  place  elsewhere.  An 
expedition  had  been  sent  under  the  command  of  Phocion  to  Euhoea, 
of  which  we  have  no  detailed  account,  but  the  result  was,  that  the 


150  THE    ORATIONS   OF   DEMOSTHEXES. 

Macedonian  party  was  overpowered,  and  Clitarchus  and  Philistide?, 
the  | ...  p.  were  expelled  from  the  island.     A  fleet  was 

then  sent  by  the  Athenians  into  the  Pagasaean  bay,  which  took  some 
-ilian  towns,  and  seized  Macedonian  merchant-men  on  the 
coast  The  island  of  Haionnesus  was  recovered  from  Philip  by  a 
sudden  iDcnrsion  of  the  ^ns.     This  was  revenged  by  Philip, 

who  ravaged  Peparethus.  and  compelled  the  islanders  to  restore  their 
conquest. 

Philip  saw  that  peace  with  Athens  could  no  longer  be  preserved  even  in 
name.  Under  ibis  conviction,  and  not,  as  Mitford  says,  in  alarm  at 
the  fourth  Philippic,  he  wrote  a  letter  to  the  Athenians,  (the  letter 
which  follows  this  Oration.)  in  which  he  reproaches  them  with  the 
various  acts  of  hostility  which  they  had  committed,  and  concludes 
with  a  virtual  declaration  of  war.  An  assembly  was  held,  at  which 
this  I  mosthenes  is  supposed  to  have  delivered 

the  following  speech  in  reply  to  it.  The  exact  time  when  the  letter 
-  received  is  uncertain:  but  it  would  appear  from  the  internal 
nee,  to  have  been  after  the  siege  of  Perinthus  had  commenced, 
and  before  that  of  B.vzantium.  The  arguments  of  Philip  produced 
no  effect ;  things  bad  gone  too  far  for  reconciliation  ;  and  it  was  not 
difficult  for  Demosthenes  to  obtain  a  decree  for  the  vigorous  prosecu- 
tion of  the  war. 

It  will  be  seen  on  a  perusal  of  the  letter  and  answer,  that  the  orator 
does  not  attempt  to  meet  the  specific  charges  and  complaints  of 
Philip.  We  have  nothing  but  the  old  argument*,  showing  the 
necessity  of  succouring  Perinthus  and  Byzantium,  as  formerly  of 
succouring  Olynthus :  the  real  weakness  of  Philip"s  empire,  and  the 
good  chance  that  by  vigorous  measures  it  might  be  overturned, 
rd  considers  that  it  was  impossible  to  confute  the  reasoning  of 
Philip,  and  therefore  that  bold  invective  was  the  only  thing  that  re- 
mained for  the  orator.  And  even  Leland  says,  it  would  have  been 
difficult  to  answer  the  letter  particularly,  because,  though  Athens 
had  the  better  cause,  she  had  committed  many  irregularities.  I 
cannot  agree  with  this  view  of  the  question.  If  Philip  had  been  the 
good-natured  easy  person  that  Mitford  represents,  who  was  raised  to 
-  ^rface  of  Greek  affairs  by  the  merest  accidents,  and  rather  had 
greatness  thrust  upon  him  by  the  opposition  of  the  Athenians,  than 
either  sought  or  desired  it  himself,  then  indeed  the  acts  of  hostility 
which  Philip  complains  of  might  justly  be  regarded  as  breaches  of 
good  faith,  and  violations  by  Athens  of  the  law  of  nations.  But  I 
read  the  history  of  the  times  very  differently.  Philip  had  been  for 
many  years  pursuing  his  career  of  conquest  steadily  and  successfully. 
The  Chersonese,  Euboea,  all  the  possessions  of  the  Athenians,  their 
commerce  and  their  corn-trade,  were  at  this  time  in  imminent 
danger.  W  ar  between  Athens  and  Macedonia,  if  not  open,  was 
understood :  argument  was  out  of  the  question. 

But  why  should  Philip  addrees  a  letter  of  complaint  to  a  people  so  bent 

on  hostilities?     Why  did  the  wolf  complain  of  the  lamb?    An  ag- 

.      -;ve  power  has  never  lacked  a  pretext  for  making  war  in  either 

lit  times  or  modern.     It  was  a  part  of  Philip's  system,  not  only 

in  his  dealings  with  Athens,  but  with  other  states,  to  make  friend!}' 


ON    THE    LETTER.  151 

overtures  and  pacific  professions,  when  he  meditated  some  decisive 
blow.  By  this  means  he  gained  credit  for  moderation  with  neutral 
states,  and  he  created  a  party  for  himself  within  the  state  which  he 
had  designs  upon.  He  put  colourable  arguments  into  the  mouths  of 
his  adherents,  distracted  the  efforts  of  the  people,  and  at  all  events 
gained  time  for  the  prosecution  of  his  schemes.  It  is  argued  with 
much  force  and  justice  in  the  exordium  of  the  Oration  on  Halon- 
nesus,  that  the  tendency  of  such  correspondence  was,  to  deter  the 
adversaries  of  Philip  from  expressing  their  opinions  freely. 

But  for  motives  of  this  kind,  Philip  would  hardly  have  adopted  the 
strain  of  remonstrance  which  we  read  in  the  Letter.  He  could  never 
seriously  believe,  that  the  Athenians  would  resign  their  claims  on 
Amphipolis,  because  it  belonged  to  Macedonia  in  very  early  times,  or 
would  give  up  the  Persian  alliance  because  it  was  a  disgraceful  con- 
nexion. It  should  be  observed  however  that  the  Athenians  afforded 
him  a  handle  for  using  such  arguments,  by  declaiming  in  the  same 
style  themselves  when  it  suited  them ;  and  Philip  perhaps  was 
pleased  at  the  idea  of  beating  them  with  their  own  weapons.  The 
language  of  the  epistle  is  simple  and  dignified,  and  may  be  regarded 
as  a  good  specimen  of  a  diplomatic  paper.  The  pith  lies  in  the 
last  clause,  which  contains  a  threat  of  war. 

For  these  reasons  it  could  scarcely  have  been  worth  while  for  the 
orator,  to  answer  every  particular  charge  contained  in  the  Letter. 
Nor  can  such  omission  be  deemed  an  agument  against  the  genuine- 
ness of  the  Oration.  This  however  has  been  doubted  by  many  critics; 
and  it  may  be  allowed,  that  a  good  part  of  the  speech  is  not  very 
suitable  to  th^  occasion  upon  which  it  purports  to  have  been  spoken. 

Athenians  !  that  Philip,  instead  of  concluding  peace  with 
us,  only  deferred  the  war,  has  now  become  manifest  to  you 
all.  Ever  since  he  gave  Halus  to  the  Pharsalians,1  and 
settled  the  Phocian  business,  and  subdued  all  Thrace,  making 
fictitious  charges  and  inventing  unjust  pretexts,  he  has  been 
actually  carrying  on  war  against  Athens;  and  now  in  the 
letter  which  he  has  sent  he  avowedly  declares  it.  That  it 
becomes  you,  neither  to  fear  his  power  nor  to  withstand  him 
ignobly,  but  with  men  and  money  and  ships,  in  short,  with 
all  you  have  unsparingly  to  prosecute  the  war,  I  will  en- 
deavour to  show. 

In  the  first  place,  0  Athenians,  you  may  expect  that  the 
gods  are  your  greatest  allies  and  defenders,  when  Philip, 
violating  his  faith  and  disregarding  his  oaths  to  them,  has 

1  Parmenio  was  besieging  Halus  in  Thessaly  during  the  first  embassy 
cf  the  Athenians  for  peace.  Philip  told  the  ambassadors,  he  desired 
their  mediation  between  the  people  of  Halus  and  Pharsalus.  He  after- 
wards took  the  former  city,  and  gave  it  up  to  the  Pharsalians,  who  were 
his  devoted  allies. 


152  THE    ORATIONS   OF    DEMOSTHENES. 

perfidiously  broken  the  peace.  In  the  second  place,  he  has 
exhausted  all  the  tricks  by  which  he  once  rose  to  greatness, 
continually  deceiving  some  people  and  promising  them  signal 
benefits.  It  is  understood  by  the  Perinthians  and  Byzantines 
and  their  allies,  that  he  wishes  to  deal  with  them  in  the  same 
maimer  that  he  dealt  with  the  Olynthians  formerly :  it 
escapes  not  the  Thessalians,  that  he  designs  to  be  the  master 
of  his  allies  and  not  their  chief:  he  is  suspected  by  the 
Thebans,  for  holding  Nicsea1  with  a  garrison,  for  having  crept 
into  the  Amphictyonic  council,  for  drawing  to  himself  the 
embassies  from  Peloponnesus,2  and  stealing  their  confederacy 
from  them  :  so  that  of  his  former  friends  some  are  at  war 
with  him  irreconcilably,  some  are  no  longer  hearty  auxi- 
liaries, all  are  jealous  and  complaining  of  him.  Besides — 
what  is  of  no  small  moment — the  satraps  of  Asia  have  just 
thrown  in  mercenary  troops  for  the  relief  of  Perinthus,  and 
now  that  hostility  has  begun  between  them,  and  the  peril  is 
imminent  if  Byzantium  should  be  reduced,  not  only  will 
they  assist  us  with  alacrity  themselves,  but  they  will  urge 
the  Persian  king  to  supply  us  with  money ;  and  he  possesses 
greater  wealth  than  all  nations  put  together;  he  has  such 
influence  over  proceedings  here,  that  in  our  former  wars  with 
Lacedsemon,  whichsoever  side  he  joined,  he  caused  them  to 
vanquish  their  opponents,  and  now  siding  with  us  he  will 
easily  beat  down  the  power  of  Philip. 

With  these  advantages,  I  will  not  deny,  that  Philip  has  by 
favour  of  the  peace  snatched  from  us  many  fortresses  and 
harbours  and  other  like  conveniences  for  war ;  yet  I  observe, 
that  if  an  alliance  is  consolidated  by  good-will,  and  all  who 
take  part  in  the  wars  have  a  common  interest,  the  union  is 
firm  and  lasting;  whereas,  if  it  be  kept  up  by  deceit  and 
violence,  with    insidious   and   ambitious   views,   (as  this  of 

1  On  account  of  its  neighbourhood  to  the  pass  of  Thermopylae. 

2  The  Messenians  and  Arcadians.  See  the  Argument  to  the  second 
Philippic.  Those  people  had  been  the  allies  of  the  Thebans  since  the 
time  of  Epaminondas,  but  were  now  more  inclined  to  Philip,  as  being 
better  able  to  protect  them.  Jacobs  renders  the  following  words  :  und 
em  Biindniss  mit  Jenen  beabsichtigt  hat,  reading  irpoaipoifievos. 
Mitford,  who  in  his  history  of  Greece  has  given  a  full  translation  of 
Philip's  letter  and  the  speech  in  answer,  renders  this  passage  vaguely ; 
"  The  Peloponnesians  he  requires  to  attend  him  by  their  embassies 
and  to  make  their  alliance  with  him  exclusive." 


ON   THE    LETTER.  153 

Philip  is,;  any  slight  pretence,  any  accidental  failure,  shakes 
to  pieces  and  destroys  it  all  in  a  moment.'  And  by  much 
consideration,  men  of  Athens,  I  find,  not  only  that  the  allies 
of  Philip  have  come  to  distrust  and  dislike  him,  but  that 
even  his  own  subjects  are  not  well-disposed  or  loyal,  or  what 
people  imagine.  Generally  speaking,  the  Macedonian  power, 
as  an  auxiliary,2  is  important  and  useful,  but  by  itself  it  is 
feeble,  and  ridiculously  disproportioned  to  these  gigantic 
enterprises.  Moreover  this  very  man  by  his  wars,  his  expe- 
ditions, and  all  the  proceedings  which  may  seem  to  establish 
his  greatness,  has  rendered  it  more  precarious  for  himself. 
Don't  suppose,  men  of  Athens,  that  Philip  and  his  subjects 
delight  in  the  same  things.  Bear  in  mind,  that  he  desires 
glory,  they  security ;  he  cannot  gain  his  object  without 
hazard ;  they  want  not  to  leave  parents,  wives,  and  children 
at  home,  to  wear  themselves  out  and  risk  their  lives  for  him 
every  day.3 

Hence  one  may  judge,  what  the  feelings  of  the  Macedonian 
people  towards  Philip  are.  As  to  his  guards  and  the  leaders 
of  his  mercenaries,  you  will  fiud  they  have  a  reputation  for 
courage,  yet  live  in  greater  terror  than  men  of  no  repute. 
For  those  are  in  danger  only  from  the  enemy  ;  these  fear 
flatterers  and  calumniators  more  than  battles  :  those  together 
with  the  whole  army  fight  their  opponents  in  the  field  ; 
these  have  their  full  share  in  the  hardships  of  war,  and  it  is 
also  their  peculiar  lot  to  dread  the  humours  of  the  king. 
Besides,  if  any  common  soldier  does  wrong,  he  is  punished 
according  to  his  desert ;  but  with  these  men,  it  is  when  they 
have  achieved  the  most  signal  success  that  they  are  most 
outrageously  vilified  and  abused.  No  reasonable  man  can  dis- 
believe this  statement;  for  he  is  reported  by  those  who  have 

1  Compare  the  second  Olynthiac,  p.  47,  where  this  same  passage 
occurs  with  some  variation. 

2  The  following  is  Mitford's  translation  of  this  passage — "The  Mace- 
donian power  is  become  considerable  by  accretion.  Of  itself  it  is  weak, 
and  utterly  unproportioned  to  support  the  authority  which  musi  ulti- 
mately rest  on  it."  'fhis  is  a  strange  mistake.  Jacobs'  version  is: — 
Kann  zwar  die  makedonische  Macht  ah  Zugabe  einen  Ausschlag  geben, 
on  sick  uber  ist  sie  schwach,  und  in  Kilcksicht  auf  die  Grosse  der  Sache 
r^r-y.cktlich. 

3  Many  of  these  observations  are  applicable  to  Prance,  harassed  and 
worn  out  by  conscriptions  in  the  latter  part  of  Napoleon's  reign. 


154  THE    ORATIONS  OK   DEMOSTHENES. 

liveu.  with  him  to  be  so  covetous  of  honour,1  that,  wishing  all 
the  noblest  exploits  to  be  considered  his  own,  he  is  more 
offended  with  the  generals  and  officers  who  have  achieved 
anything  praiseworthy,  than  with  those  who  have  altogether 
miscarried. 

How  then,  under  such  circumstances,  have  they  for  a  long 
time  faithfully  adhered  to  him  1  Because  for  the  present,  men 
of  Athens,  success  throws  a  shade  over  all  this  :  good  fortune 
covers  the  faults  of  men,  screens  them  wonderfully  :  but  let 
him  fail  in  something,  and  all  will  be  fully  revealed.  It  is 
the  same  as  in  the  human  body.  When  a  man  is  healthy,  he 
has  no  feeling  of  local  disorders  ;  but  when  he  falls  ill,  every 
sore  is  felt,  whether  he  has  a  rupture,  or  a  sprain,  or  any 
member  not  perfectly  sound.  Just  so  with  monarchies  or 
other  states :  whilst  they  are  successful  in  war,  their  weak- 
nesses are  imperceptible  to  most  men ;  but  when  they  have 
suffered  a  reverse,  (which  Philip  very  likely  will,  having  taken 
on  him  a  burden  beyond  his  strength,)  all  their  difficulties 
become  manifest  to  the  world. 

Yet  if  any  Athenian,  seeing  that  Philip  has  been  fortunate, 
therefore  thinks  it  hard  and  terrible  to  contend  with  him, 
such  person,  1  grant,  exercises  a  prudent  forethought.  For 
indeed  fortune  is  the  prime — nay,  the  sole  mover  in  all  the 
business  of  mankind.  Nevertheless  in  many  respects  might 
our  good  fortune  be  preferred  to  Philip's.  The  leadership 
that  we  have  received  from  our  ancestors  takes  its  date,  not 
before  Philip  only,  but  (let  me  say  roundly)  before  all  the 
kings  that  ever  reigned  in  Macedonia.  They  have  paid  tribute 
to  the  Athenians,  but  Athens  has  never  paid  tribute  to  any 
nation.  We  have  more  title  than  Philip  to  the  favour  of  the 
gods,  inasmuch  as  we  have  invariably  shown  more  regard  to 
religion  and  justice. 

1  In  the  similar  passage,  in  the  second  Olynthiac,  p.  49,  I  have 
translated  (piKortp.ia  jealousy,  not,  with  the  majority  of  translators, 
ambition.  My  reason  was,  that  the  Greek  word  appears  to  be  used  in  a 
bad  sense,  which  would  not  be  suitably  expressed  by  ambition.  I  con- 
cede however  that  jealousy  does  not  comprehend  the  whole  meaning 
Nor  would  any  single  word.  Shakspeare's  "jealous  in  honour  "  has  a 
somewhat  different  application.  The  expression  in  the  text  here  is 
Shakspearian.     See  Henry  V.  Act  IV.  Sc.  3. 

But  if  it  be  a  sin  to  covet  honour, 

I  am  the  most  offending  soul  alive. 


OX    THE    LETTER.  155 

How  comes  it  then,  that  Philip  has  obtained  more  successes 
than  you  in  the  former  war  ?  Because,  0  men  of  Athens,  (I 
will  tell  you  candidly.)  he  takes  the  field  himself,  he  toils,  he 
faces  the  danger,  letting  slip  no  opportunity,  omitting  no 
season  of  the  year  :  whilst  we — the  truth  must  be  spoken  — 
sit  idling  here,  delaying  always  and  voting,  and  asking  in  the 
market-place  if  there  is  any  news.  But  what  greater  news 
could  there  be,  than  a  man  of  Macedonia  contemning  Athe- 
nians, and  daiing  to  send  such  an  epistle  as  you  have  just 
heard  ?  Again  :  he  keeps  soldiers  in  his  pay.  aye.  and  some 
of  our  orators  besides,  who,  imagining  they  carry  his  presents 
home,  are  not  ashamed  to  live  for  Phdip,  and  perceive  not, 
that  they  are  selling  for  petty  lucre  all  that  belongs  to  their 
country  and  themselves.  We  neither  attempt  to  disturb  any 
of  his  proceedings,  nor  like  to  maintain  mercenaries,  nor  dare 
to  take  the  field  in  person.  It  is  no  wonder  then,  that  he  has 
gained  advantages  over  us  in  the  former  war  :  it  is  rather 
strange  that  we,  doing  nothing  that  becomes  a  people  at  war, 
expect  to  vanquish  one  who  pursues  all  the  measures  neces- 
sary to  conquest. 

You  must  reflect  on  all  this,  men  of  Athens,  consider  that 
we  have  not  even  the  power  of  saying  we  are  at  peace — since 
Philip  has  now  declared  war  and  commenced  it  in  earnest — 
spare  not  any  treasures,  public  or  private  ;  march  eagerly  all 
to  battle,  wherever  occasion  calls ;  and  employ  better  generals 
than  before.  Let  none  of  you  suppose,  that  by  the  same 
proceedings  '  which  have  damaged  the  commonwealth  it  can 
again  recover  and  improve.  Imagine  not,  that  while  you  are 
as  remiss  as  you  have  been,  others  will  strive  zealously  for 
your  welfare.  Bear  in  mind  how  disgraceful  it  is,  that  your 
fathers  underwent  numerous  hardships  and  fearful  dangers 
warring  with  the  Lacedaemonians,  whilst  you  will  not  coura- 
geously defend  even  the  well-earned  honours  which  they 
bequeathed  you  ;  and  that  a  man  springing  from  Macedonia 
is  so  enamoured  of  danger,  that,  to  enlarge  his  empire,  he  has 

1  Auger  and  the  English  translators  take  5i'  wv — 5io  tovtoiv  to  mean 
persons,  supposing  *yap  to  refer  only  to  the  last  clause  of  the  preceding 
sentence.  I  understand  yap  as  referring  to  the  whole  of  the  orator's 
advice,  not  to  the  last  point  only.  The  reader  will  find  that  in  the 
similar  passage  in  the  second  Olynthiac  (26,  Bekker's  edition)  the  words 
tuv  airrwv  Tpd^tuy  are  introduced;  which  makes  it  more  probable  that 
toi'twv  here  is  neuter.    Jacobs  and  Fibst  take  it  as  I  do. 


156  THE    OKATIOSH   OF   DEMOSTHEX1.S. 

been  wounded  all  over  his  body  fighting  with  the  enemy, 
whilst  Athenians,  whose  birthright  it  is  to  submit  to  none, 
but  to  conquer  all  iu  war.  through  slackness  or  effeminacy 
desert  the  conduct  of  their  ancestors  and  the  interests  of  their 
country. 

Xot  to  be  tedious,  1  say  we  must  all  prepare  ourselves  for 
war ;  the  Greeks  we  must  invite,  not  by  words  but  by  deeds, 
to  espouse  our  alliance.  All  speech  is  idle,  unattended  by 
action  :  and  Athenian  speech  the  more  so  on  this  account, 
that  we  are  reputed  more  dexterous  in  the  use  of  it  than  any 
of  the  Greeks. 


THE  LETTER  OF  PHILIP. 

THE   ARGVKEirT. 

This  is  the  Letter  to  which  the  preceding  Oration  purports  to  be  a 
reply.  For  the  circumstances  which  gave  rise  to  it,  see  the  Argument 
of  the  Oration. 

Philtp  to  the  senate  and  people  of  Athens  greeting  : — 

TThereas  I  have  frequently  sent  ambassadors,  that  we  may 
abide  by  our  oaths  and  agreements,  and  you  paid  them  no 
regard.  I  thought  proper  to  write  to  you  concerning  the 
matters  in  which  I  consider  myself  aggrieved.  Marvel  not 
at  the  length  of  this  epistle ;  for.  there  being  many  articles  of 
complaint,  it  is  necessary  to  explain  myself  clearly  npon  alL 

First  then  :  after  Nieias  the  herald  was  snatched  from  my 
dominions,  you  chastised  not  the  culprits,  but  imprisoned  the 
injured  party  for  ten  months ;  and  my  letters,  of  which  he 
was  the  bearer,  you  read  on  the  hustm_- 

Secondly,  when  the  Thasians  were  receiving  in  their  port 
the  Byzantine  galleys  and  all  pirates  that  chose  to  enter,  you 
took  no  notice,  although  the  treaty  expressly  declares,,  that 
whoever  act  thus  shall  be  enemies. 

Again,  about  the  same  time  Diopithes  made  an  irruptioE 

1  It  is  mentioned  by  Plutarch  that  a  letter  from  Philip  to  his  Queen 
Olympias.  which  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Athenians,  was  returned  un- 
opened. But  whether  it  was  on  this  or  another  occasion,  does  nol 
appear. 


THE    LETTER    OF    PHILIP.  157 

into  my  territory,  carried  off  the  inhabitants  of  Crobyle  and 
Tiristasis1  for  slaves,  and  ravaged  the  adjacent  parts  of  Thrace  ; 
proceeding  to  snch  lawless  extremities,  that  he  seized  Amphi- 
lochus  who  came  to  negotiate  about  the  prisoners,  and,  after 
putting  on  him  the  hardest  durance,  took  from  him  a  ransom 
of  nine  talents.  And  this  he  did  with  the  approbation  of  the 
people.  Howbeit,  to  offer  violence  to  a  herald  and  ambas- 
sadors is  considered  impious  by  all  natious,  and  especially  by 
you.  Certain  it  is,  when  the  Megarians  killed  Anthemo- 
critus,2  your  people  went  so  far  as  to  exclude  them  from  the 
mysteries,  and  erect  a  statue  before  their  gates  for  a  monu- 
ment of  the  crime.  Then  is  it  not  shameful  that  you  are 
seen  committing  the  same  offence,  for  which,  when  you  were 
the  sufferers,  you  so  detested  the  authors  1 

Further,  Callias 3  your  general  took  all  the  towns  situate 

1  Crobyle  must  have  been  in  Thrace.  Tiristasis  is  mentioned  by  Pliny 
as  a  place  in  the  Chersonese.  Probably  then  it  was  near  Cardia,  not  far 
from  the  isthmus. 

*  The  Athenians,  having  charged  the  people  of  Megara  with  pro- 
faning a  piece  of  consecrated  ground,  sent  Anthemocritus  to  admonish 
them  to  desist  from  the  sacrilege.  The  Megarians  put  him  to  death, 
and  drew  upon  themselves  the  wrath  of  their  powerful  neighbours,  who 
passed  the  decree  of  excommunication  here  referred  to.  The  monument 
which  recorded  their  impiety  was  to  be  seen  in  the  time  of  Pausanias, 
on  the  sacred  road  leading  from  Athens  to  Eleusis. 

3  This  is  the  same  Callias,  ruler  of  Chalcis,  whom  we  have  seen 
opposing  the  Athenians  at  the  time  when  Phocion  was  sent  to  assist 
Plutarch  of  Eretria.  (See  the  Oration  on  the  Peace,  p.  75,  note.)  At 
the  battle  of  Tamynae  Callias  had  been  aided  by  Macedonian  troops ; 
but  after  the  departure  of  Phocion,  and  the  decline  of  the  Athenian 
interest  in  Eubcea,  he  formed  the  scheme  of  bringing  the  whole  island 
under  his  own  sway,  or  at  least  of  making  it  independent.  This  did 
not  suit  the  views  of  Philip,  and  Callias,  having  lost  his  favour,  tried  to 
form  a  connexion  with  the  Thebans.  Failing  in  this  attempt,  he 
determined  to  unite  himself  to  Athens,  and  accordingly  came  over  and 
concerted  with  Demosthenes  and  his  party  a  plan  for  a  revolution  in 
Eubcea.  It  was  not  possible  to  accomplish  this  by  negotiation,  owing 
to  the  strength  of  Macedonian  influence,  which  was  confirmed  by  the 
occurrences  at  Oreus  and  Eretria.  (See  the  Oration  on  the  Chersonese, 
p.  107,  note  1.)  At  length,  by  the  exertions  of  Demosthenes,  a  decree 
was  passed  to  send  troops  into  Eubcea ;  and  Phocion,  to  whom  the  com- 
mand was  entrusted,  overpowered  the  Macedonian  garrisons,  and  ex- 
pelled Clitarchus  and  Philistides  from  the  island.  This  was  b.c  341. 
Afterwards,  it  seems,  an  Athenian  force,  under  the  command  of  Callias, 
crossed  the  narrow  strait  that  separates  the  north  of  Euboea  from 
Thessaly,  and  made  the  attack,  which  Philip  here  speaks  of,  on  the 
towns  in  the  bay  of  Pagasee. 


158  THE    ORATION'S    OF   DEMOSTHTSXS. 

in  the  Pagassean  bay,  towns  under  treaty  with  yon  and  in 
alliance  with  me  ;  and  sold  all  people  bound  for  Macedonia, 
adjudging  them  enemies  ;  and  on  this  account  you  praised 
him  in  your  decrees.  So  that  I  am  puzzled  to  think,  what 
worse  could  happen,  if  you  were  confessedly  at  war  with  me : 
for  when  we  were  in  open  hostility,  you  used  to  send  out  pri- 
vateers and  sell  people  sailing  to  our  coast,  you  assisted  my 
enemies,  infested  my  country. 

Yet  more  ;  you  have  carried  your  animosity  and  violence 
so  far,  that  you  have  even  sent  ambassadors  to  the  Persian, 
to  persuade  him  to  make  war  against  me  :  a  thing  which  is 
most  surprising  :  for  before  he  gained  Egypt  and  Phoenicia, 
you  resolved,1  in  case  of  any  asgression  on  his  part,  to  invite 
me  as  well  as  the  other  Greeks  to  oppose  him  :  but  now  you 
have  such  an  overflow  of  nialice  against  me.  as  to  negotiate 
with  him  for  an  offensive  alliance.  Anciently,  as  I  am  in- 
formed, your  ancestors  condemned  the  Pisistratids  for  bringing 
the  Persian  to  invade  Greece  :  yet  you  are  not  ashamed  of 
doing  the  same  thing,  for  which  you  continue  to  reproach  the 
tyrants.2 

In  addition  to  other  matters,  you  write  in  your  decrees, 
commanding  me  to  let  Teres3  and  Cersobleptes  rule  in  Thrace, 
because  they  are  Athenians.  I  know  nothing  of  them  as 
being  included  in  the  treaty  of  peace  with  you.  or  as  inscribed 
on  the  pillars,  or  as  being  Athenians  ;  I  know  however,  that 
Teres  took  arms  with  me  against  you,  and  that  Cersobleptes 
was  anxious  to  take  the  oaths  separately  to  my  ambassadors, 

1  The  time  referred  to  is  b.c.  354.  'when  there  was  a  rumour  of  a 
Persian  invasion,  and  a  proposal  at  Athens  to  declare  war  against  Arta- 
xerxes,  upon  ■which  Demosthenes  made  the  speech  de  Syrnmoriig. 
Phoenicia  and  Egypt  were  recovered  some  years  after  that.  The  argu- 
ment of  Philip  is.  that  since  the  recovery  of  those  provinces  Persia  was 
more  dangerous  than  before,  and  therefore  it  was  more  disgraceful  for  a 
Greek  state  to  be  connected  with  that  monarchy. 

2  If  the  Emperor  of  Russia  at  the  present  day  was  to  reproach  England 
with  the  alliance  of  Turkey,  designating  the  Sultan  as  the  common 
enemy  of  Europe,  we  should  scarcely  think  it  worth  a  serious  reply. 
His  relation  to  us  is  not  unlike  that  of  Philip  to  the  Athenians  :  nor 
would  it  be  very  surprising,  if  some  years  hence  an  English  garrison 
occupied  Constantinople. 

s  Of  Teres  nothing  is  known,  bat  from  this  passage:  he  must  have 
been  a  prince  in  the  interior  of  Thrace.  As  to  Cersobleptes,  so  fre- 
quently mentionc-d  in  the  orations  of  Demosthenes,  see  Appendix  III 
on  the  Thraeian  Chersonese. 


THE    LETTER    OF   PHILIP.  li)9 

but  was  prevented  by  your  generals  pronouncing  him  an 
enemy  of  Athens.  How  can  it  be  equitable  or  just,  when  it 
suits  your  purpose,  to  call  him  an  enemy  of  the  state,  and 
when  you  desire  to  calumniate  me,  to  declare  the  same  person 
your  citizen — and  on  the  death  of  Sitalces,1  to  whom  you  im- 
parted' the  freedom  of  your  city,  to  make  friendship  imme- 
diately with  his  murderer,  but  on  behalf  of  Cersobleptes  to 
espouse  a  war  with  me  ? — knowing  too  as  you  must,  that,  of 
the  persons  who  receive  such  gifts,  none  have  the  least  regard 
for  your  laws  or  decrees  1  However — to  omit  all  else  and  be 
concise — you  bestowed  citizenship  on  Evagoras  of  Cyprus,2 

1  It  is  impossible,  for  the  reasons  stated  in  Jacobs'  note,  that  this  can 
refer  to  the  Sitalces,  King  of  the  Odrysa?,  and  ally  of  the  Athenians, 
whose  wars  and  death  are  related  by  Thucydides.  He  fell  in  a  battle 
with  the  Triballi,  and  was  succeeded  by  his  nephew  Seuthes.  It  was 
his  son  Sadocus,  and  not  he.  that  was  made  a  citizen  of  Athens.  Tour- 
neil  tries  to  get  over  the  difficulty  by  suggesting  that  Seuthes  was  sus- 
pected of  murdering  him ;  but  there  is  no  evidence  that  the  Athenians 
entered  into  treaty  with  Seuthes  till  long  afterwards.  However,  the 
circumstances  here  mentioned  exactly  apply  to  Cotys,  father  of  Cerso- 
bleptes, who  had  the  honour  of  Athenian  citizenship  conferred  on  him, 
for  which  he  showed  very  little  gratitude  in  his  subsequent  conduct, 
and  accordingly,  when  he  was  murdered  by  Python  and  Heraclides  of 
JEnus,  the  Athenians  rewarded  them  with  citizenship  and  a  golden 
crown.  Sitalces  therefore  may  have  been  a  mistake,  or  a  slip  of  the  pen, 
for  Cotys.     Mitford  had  come  to  the  same  conclusion  before  Jacobs. 

2  Evagoras,  the  friend  of  Conon.  who  assisted  the  Athenians  in  the  re- 
establishment  of  their  independence,  was  made  a  citizen  of  Athens,  and 
statues  of  him  and  of  Conon  were  placed  side  by  side  in  the  Ceramicus. 
He  aimed  at  becoming  absolute  master  of  Cyprus,  and  was  engaged  in 
a  long  war  against  the  Persian  king,  in  which  he  was  ultimately  over- 
powered, but,  on  submission  to  Artaxerxes.  was  permitted  to  rule  in  Sala- 
mis.  On  his  death,  b.c  374,  he  was  succeeded  by  his  son  Xicocles,  who 
was  father  of  the  Evagoras  here  referred  to.  Nicocles  did  not  reign 
long,  and  the  young  Evagoras  was  afterwards  driven  from  Salamis  by  a 
successful  usurper.  Cyprus  was  at  this  period  divided  among  several 
princes,  who  afterwards  joined  the  great  rebellion  of  Phoenicia  and 
Egypt  against  Artaxerxes.  Meanwhile  Evagoras  had  passed  into  the 
service  of  the  Persian  king,  and  was  perhaps  dwelling  in  Caria,  when 
Idrieus  the  prince  of  Caria  appointed  him,  together  with  Phocion  the 
Athenian,  to  command  the  armament  collected  for  the  reduction  of 
Cyprus.  This  was  b.c.  351.  Cvprus  was  reduced  in  the  following 
year;  but  Evagoras,  instead  of  being  rewarded,  as  he  expected,  with 
the  principality  of  his  native  town,  was  appointed  to  a  government  in 
Asia,  In  this  he  misconducted  himself,  and  fled  to  Cyprus,  where  he 
was  arrested  and  put  to  death.  The  honour  which  it  appears  he  re- 
ceived, of  Athenian  citizenship,  may  have  been  owing  to  respect  to  his 


160  THE    ORATIONS    OF    DEMOSTHENES. 

and  Dionysius  of  Syracuse,1  and  their  descendants.  Tf  you  can 
persuade  the  people  who  expelled  each  of  those  princes  to  re- 
instate them  in  their  government,  then  recover  Thrace  from 
me,  all  that  Teres  and  Cersobleptes  reigned  over.  But  if 
against  the  parties,  who  mastered  Evagoras  and  Dionysius, 
you  will  not  utter  a  word  of  complaint,  and  yet  continue  to 
annoy  me,  how  can  I  be  wrong  in  resisting  you  1 

On  this  head  I  have  many  arguments  yet  remaining,  which 
I  purposely  omit.  But  as  to  the  Cardians,  I  avow  myself 
their  auxiliary  ;  for  I  was  allied  to  them  before  the  peace, 
and  you  refused  to  come  to  an  arbitration,  although  I  made 
many  offers,  and  they  not  a  few.  Surely  I  should  be  the  basest 
of  men,  if,  deserting  my  allies,  I  paid  more  regard  to  you, 
who  have  harassed  me  all  along,  than  to  those  who  have 
always  been  my  .steadfast  friends. 

Another  thing  I  must  not  leave  unnoticed.  You  have 
arrived  at  such  a  pitch  of  arrogance,  that,  while  formerly 
you  did  but  remonstrate  with  me  on  the  matters  aforesaid,  in 
the  recent  case,  where  the  Peparethians  complained  of  harsh 
treatment,  you  ordered  your  general  to  obtain  satisfaction 
from  me  on  their  account.2  Yet  I  punished  them  less  severely 
than  they  deserved.  For  they  in  time  of  peace  seized  Halon- 
nesus,  and  would  restore  neither  the  place  nor  the  garrison, 
though  I  sent  many  times  about  them.  You  objected3  not 
to  the  injury  which  the  Peparethians  had  done  me,  but  only 

grandfather's  memory  and  his  connexion  with  Phocion.  Or  perhaps 
the  honour  inherited  from  his  grandfather  may  be  referred  to,  or  pos- 
sibly Philip  may  be  confounding  the  elder  and  younger  Evagoras.  At 
all  events,  the  comparison  is  not  a  happy  one. 

1  This  refers  to  the  younger  Dionysius,  twice  expelled  from  Syracuse, 
fir<t  by  Dion,  b.c  356,  afterwards  by  Timoleon,  b.c  343.  He  was  in 
alliance  with  Sparta,  and  sent  troops  to  her  assistance  against  Epami- 
nondas.  His  connexion  with  Athens  began,  after  she  had  made  common 
cause  with  Sparta:  from  that  time  many  Athenians  resorted  to  hia 
court,  and  (among  others)  Plato  is  said  to  have  visited  him. 

2  Peparethus  is  in  the  same  group  of  islands  with  Halonnefas 
Philip's  ravaging  of  Peparethus  is  spoken  of  in  the  Oration  for  the 
Crown.  As  to  these  circumstances,  see  the  Argument  to  the  Oration  on 
Halonnesus. 

3  The  critics  find  a  difficulty  here,  because  brurK-frrTw  commonly 
governs  a  dative  case  ;  and  it  has  been  proposed  to  read  tVeo-Kt^atrOe, 
which  Auger,  Jacobs,  and  Schaefer  prefer.  But  it  might  well  be,  that 
Philip's  Greek  was  not  the  very  best  Attic ;  of  which  th;re  is  more 
than  one  example  to  be  found  in  this  letter. 


THE    LETTER    OF   PHILIP.  161 

to  their  punishment,  well  knowing  that  I  took  the  island 
neither  from  them  nor  from  you,  but  from  the  pirate  Sos- 
tratus.  If  now  you  declare,  that  you  gave  it  up  to  Sostratus. 
you  acknowledge  to  having  commissioned  pirates ;  but  if  he 
got  possession  against  your  will,  what  hardship  have  you 
suffered  by  my  taking  it  and  rendering  the  coast  safe  for 
navigators  1  I  had  such  regard  for  your  state,  that  I  offered 
you  the  island  ;  yet  your  orators  would  not  let  you  accept  it. 
but  counselled  you  to  obtain  restitution,  in  order  that,  if  I 
submitted  to  your  command,  I  might  confess  my  occupation 
to  be  unlawful,  if  I  refused  to  abandon  the  place,  your  com- 
monalty might  suspect  me.  Perceiving  which,  I  challenged 
you  to  a  reference  of  the  question,  so  that,  if  it  wei'e  decided 
to  be  mine,  the  place  should  be  given  by  me  to  you,  if  it  were 
adjudged  yom's,  then  I  should  restore  it  to  the  people.  This 
I  frequently  urged ;  you  would  not  listen  ;  and  the  Pepare- 
thians  seized  the  island.  What  then  became  it  me  to  do  1 
Not  to  punish  the  violators  of  their  oaths?  not  to  avenge 
myself  on  the  perpetrators  of  these  gross  outrages  1  If 
the  island  belonged  to  the  Peparethians,  what  business  had 
Athenians  to  demand  it  1  If  it  was  yours,  why  resent  you 
not  their  unlawful  seizure  '• 

To  such  a  degree  of  enmity  have  we  advanced,  that,  wishinp- 
to  pass  with  my  ships  into  the  Hellespont,  I  was  compelled 
to  escort  them  along  the  coast  through  the  Chersonese  with 
my  army,  as  your  colonists  according  to  the  resolution  of 
Polycrates  were  making  war  against  me,  and  you  were  sanc- 
tioning it  by  your  decrees,  and  your  general  was  inviting  the 
Byzantines  to  join  him,  and  proclaiming  everywhere,  that  he 
had  your  instructions  to  commence  war  on  the  first  oppor- 
tunity. Notwithstanding  these  injuries,  I  refrained  from 
attacking  either  your  fleet  or  your  territory,1  though  I  was 

1  I  take  TTjs  7rJ\ecos  to  be  the  genitive  governed  by  tZv  rpiripoov  and  r>is 
X^pas,  while  all  other  translators  take  it  to  be  dependent  on  dire<jx°w»- 
Leland  and  Spillan  render  it  "  your  city,"  meaning  the  city  of  Athens, 
I  suppose.  Jacobs  and  Pabst  are  to  the  same  effect.  It  appears  to  me, 
that  there  is  no  reference  here  to  any  measures  against  Attica  or  the 
city  of  Athens,  nor  to  any  other  hostilities  against  her  but  such  as 
might  have  been  taken  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  Hellespont. 
Philip  says :  "  I  did  not  attack  either  the  ships  or  the  territory  of  your 
state;"  that  is  ;  "I  neither  attacked  your  fleet  which  was  watching  in 
the  Hellespont  to  prevent  the  passage  of  mine  into  the  Propontis,  nor 
VOL.  I.  M 


162  THE    ORATIONS    OF    DEMOSTHENES. 

in  a  condition  to  take  the  greater  part,  if  not  all ;  and  I  have 
persisted  in  offering  to  submit  our  mutual  complaints  to  arbi- 
tration. Consider  now.  whether  it  is  fairer  to  decide  by  arms 
or  by  argument,  to  pronounce  the  award  yourselves  or  per- 
suade others  to  do  so  :  reflect  also,  how  unreasonable  it  is, 
that  Athens  should  compel  Thasians  and  Maronites  to  a 
judicial  settlement  of  their  claims  to  Stryme,1  yet  refuse  to 
determine  her  disputes  with  me  in  the  same  manner,  espe- 
cially when  you  know,  that,  if  beaten,  you  will  lose  nothing, 
if  successful,  you  will  get  what  is  in  my  possession. 

The  most  unaccountable  thing  of  all.  in  my  opinion,  is  this 
— when  I  sent  ambassadors  from  the  whole  confederacy,2  that 
they  might  be  witnesses,  and  desired  to  make  a  just  arrange- 
ment with  you  on  behalf  of  the  Greeks,  you  would  not  even 
hear  what  the  deputies  had  to  propose  on  the  subject,  though 
it  was  in  your  power,  either  to  secure  against  all  danger  the 
parties  mistrustful  of  me,  or  plainly  to  prove  me  the  basest 
of  mankind.  That  was  the  interest  of  the  people,  but  it 
suited,  not  the  orators.  To  them — as  persons  acquainted  with 
your  government  say — peace  is  war,  and  war  is  peace  :  for 
they  always  get  something  from  the  generals,  either  by  sup- 
porting or  calumniating  them,  and  also,  by  railing  on  your 
hustings  at  the  most  eminent  citizens  and  most  illustrious 

did  I  commit  any  hostilities  in  the  Chersonese,  but  only  marched 
throagh  it,  as  a  measure  of  necessity,  passing  along  the  coast  to  protect 
my  fleet." — The  presence  of  a  land  force  on  the  coast,  to  protect  a  fleet, 
was  not  uncommon  in  Greek  warfare. — Francis  saw  the  difficulty  of 
supposing  an  allusion  to  the  city  of  Athens,  and  has  rendered  it :  "  We 
restrained  ourselves  from  attempting  aught  against  your  republic,  your 
galleys,  and  your  territories."  And  Auger  too,  whose  translation  is :  "  Je 
vous  epargnai ;  je  ne  touchai  ni  a  vos  vaisseaux  ni  i  vos  domaines." 
Xext  to  the  construction  which  I  adopt,  I  should  prefer  taking  the  two 
last  genitives  as  an  epexegesis  of  rrjs  ir6\ews.  By  the  rb.  irKfTara  t) 
itavTa,  I  understand  both  the  ships  and  the  towns  in  the  Chersonese. 
Philip's  boast  would  be  an  extraordinary  one,  according  to  the  majority 
of  the  translators.  Mitford  avoided  the  difficulty  by  rendering  rr,$ 
n6\e;vs,  "your  town-." 

1  Maronea  and  Stryme  were  neighbouring  towns,  on  the  coast  of 
Thrace,  north-east  of  the  island  of  Thasos.  Stryme  was  founded  by 
the  Thasians,  whom  th3  Maronites  endeavoured  to  deprive  of  their 
colony. 

2  This  seems  to  have  been  the  embassy  that  led  to  the  second  Philip- 
pic. See  the  argument  to  that  Oration.  By  '"'the  whole  confederacy." 
he  means  the  Amphictyonic  uuion,  and  affects  to  treat  the  Athenians  as 
belonging  to  it. 


THE  LETTER  OF  PHILIP.  1G3 

foreigners,  they  acquire  credit  with  the  multitude  for  being 
friends  of  the  constitution. 

Easy  were  it  for  me,  at  a  very  small  expense,  to  silence 
their  invectives,  and  make  them  pronounce  my  panegyric. ' 
But  I  should  be  ashamed  to  purchase  your  good-will  from 
these  men,  who — besides  other  things — have  reached  such  a 
point  of  assurance,  as  to  contest  Amphipolis  with  me,  to 
which  I  conceive  I  have  a  far  juster  title  than  the  claimants. 
For  if  it  belongs  to  the  earliest  conquerors,  how  can  my 
right  be  questioned,  when  Alexander  my  ancestor  first  occu- 
pied the  place,  from  which,  as  the  first  fruits  of  the  captive 
Medes,  he  brought  the  offering  of  a  golden  statue  to  Delphi '?  - 
Or,  should  this  be  disputed,  and  the  argument  be,  that  it 
belongs  to  the  last  possessors,  so  likewise  I  have  the  best  title ; 
for  I  besieged  and  took  the  place  from  a  people,  who  expelled 
you  and  were  planted  by  the  Lacedaemonians.3  But  we  all 
hold  cities  either  by  inheritance  from  our  ancestors,  or  by 
conquest  in  war.  You  claim  this  city,  not  being  either  the 
first  occupants  or  the  present  possessors,  having  abode  for  a 
very  short  period  in  the  district,  and  after  having  yourselves 
given  the  strongest  testimony  in  my  favour.     For  I  have 

1  This  observation  laid  Philip  open  to  a  severe  retort.  What  experi- 
ence had  he  of  the  facility  of  bribing  orators  at  Athens  or  elsewhere]  Ir 
he  had  none,  it  was  a  gratuitous  piece  of  slander,  and  an  insult  to  the 
Athenians,  to  suppose  their  leading  statesmen  so  corruptible.  If  he 
spoke  from  experience,  he  proved  the  justice  of  what  Demosthenes 
asserted  of  him,  and  the  danger  to  be  apprehended  from  his  intrigues. 

2  Auger  has  justly  remarked,  that  Philip's  assertion  here  is  contrary 
to  the  historical  evidence  which  has  been  handed  down  to  us.  The  city 
of  Amphipolis  did  not  exist  in  the  time  of  this  Alexander,  but  wa.s 
founded  many  years  after  by  Hagnon  the  Athenian.  Nor  is  there  any 
account  of  his  having  gained  a  victory  over  the  Persians,  though 
Herodotus  speaks  of  the  golden  statue  which  he  erected  v,  Delphi.  He 
was  at  first  compelled  to  follow  in  the  train  of  Xerxes,  though  he  after- 
wards came  over  to  the  Greeks,  and  his  desertion  was  considered  by 
them  as  highly  meritorious.  It  is  not  unlikely,  that  there  were  tra- 
ditions concerning  him  in  Macedonia,  unknown  to  the  southern  Greeks, 
and  Philip  himself  might  well  put  faith  in  them.  Supposing  the  facts 
here  asserted  to  be  true,  the  argument,  as  against  the  Athenians,  who 
set  up  a  prior  title  in  point  of  time,  was  conclusive.  Bat,  except  as  an 
argumentum  ad  hominem,  it  could  be  worth  little  or  nothing. 

3  After  the  death  of  Brasidas,  the  Amphipolitans  paid  divine  honour^ 
to  his  memory,  and  treated  him  as  their  founder,  destroying  every 
vestige  of  Haynon  the  Athenian.  Therefore  they  are  spoken  of  as 
•jeing  a  Lacedaemonian  colony. 

k2 


1C4  THE   ORATIONS    OF   DEi.OSTHEXES. 

frequently  written  in  letters  concerning  it,  and  you  have 
acknowledged  the  justice  of  my  tenure,  first  by  making  the 
peace  whilst  I  held  the  city,  and  next  by  concluding  alliance 
on  the  same  tercns.  How  can  any  property  stand  on  a  firmer 
title  than  this,  which  was  left  to  me  originally  by  my  fore- 
fathers, has  again  become  mine  in  war,  and  thirdly  has  been 
conceded  by  you,  who  are  accustomed  to  claim  what  you  have 
not  the  least  pretensions  to  I 

Such  are  the  complaints  which  I  prefer.  As  you  are  the 
aggressors,  as  by  reason  of  my  forbearance  you  are  making 
new  encroachments,  and  doing  me  all  the  mischief  you  can, 
I  will  in  a  just  cause  defend  myself,  and,  calling  the  gods  to 
witness,  bring  the  quarrel  between  us  to  an  issue. 


THE  ORATION  OX  THE  DUTIES  OF  THE  STATE. 


THE    ARGUJIEXT. 

The  object  of  this  Oration  is,  to  show  the  necessity  of  making  a 
proper  application  of  the  public  revenue,  and  compelling  every 
citizen  to  perform  service  to  the  state.  With  respect  to  the  first 
point,  the  advice  given  in  the  first  and  third  Olynthiacs  is  in  sub- 
stance repeated,  viz.  that  the  Theoric  distributions  should  be  put  on 
a  different  footing ;  that  the  fund  should  either  not  be  distributed  at 
all,  or  that  every  man  should  accept  his  share  as  a  remuneration  for 
service  in  the  army  and  navy,  or  the  discharge  of  some  other  duty. 
This  was  but  a  circuitous  way  of  proposing  (as  before  observed)  that 
the  law  of  Eubulus  should  be  repealed.  (See  the  Argument  to  the 
first  Olynthiae.)  It  is  here  further  recommended,  that  the  duties 
required  by  the  state  should  be  systematically  divided  among  all 
classes,  and  performed  with  regularity.  No  specific  plan  however  is 
pointed  out. 

At  what  time  or  on  what  occasion  this  speech  was  delivered,  we  cannot 
determine.  It  is  mentioned  in  the  exordium,  that  an  assembly  of  the 
people  was  held  to  consider  how  certain  public  moneys  should  be  dis- 
posed of.  But  this  gives  us  no  clue  to  the  circumstances.  There  is 
no  mention  of  Philip,  or  of  any  historical  event  in  connexion  with 
the  subject.  It  is  stated  by  the  orator,  that  he  had  discussed  the  same 
question  before ;  and  perhaps  it  may  be  inferred  from  hence,  that  the 
present  speech  was  later  than  the  Olynthiacs.  Again,  it  may  be  pre- 
sumed to  have  been  earlier  than  the  fourth  Philippic,  in  which 
Demosthenes  appears  to  have  changed  or  modified  his  views  on  the 


OX    THE    DUTIES    OF    THE    STATE.  1G5 

c-ubject  of  the  theoric  fund.  If  however  the  fourth  Philippic  be  not 
genuine,  as  some  persons  contend,  the  last  argument  can  have  n>> 
weight. 

ia  consequence  of  this  uncertainty,  commentators  are  not  agreed  a^  to 
the  date  of  the  Oration  before  us.  Pabst  and  some  others  think  it 
was  spoken  soon  after  the  Olynthiacs.  Mitford.  following  Uljian, 
places  it  before  all  the  Philippics.  Leland  and  Francis  place  it  after 
the  Philippics  ;  but  there  is  very  little  ground  for  their  opinion. 

Dionysius  makes  no  mention  of  this  speech  in  his  letter  to  Ammaei:s ; 
and  some  critics  have  thought  it  spurious. 

With  respect  to  the  present  money  and  the  purpose  for 
which  you  hold  the  assembly,  men  of  Athens,  it  appears  to 

ne  that  two  courses  are  equally  easy  ;  either  to  condemn 
chose  "who  distribute  and  give  away  the  public  funds,  to  gain 
their  esteem  who  think  the  commonwealth  is  injured  by  such 
means,  or  to  advocate  and  recommend  the  system  of  allow- 
ances, to  gratify  those  who  are  pressingly  in  need  of  them. 
Both  parties  praise  or  blame  the  practice,  not  out  of  regard 
to  the  public  interest,  but  according  to  their  several  condi- 
tions of  indigence  or  affluence.  For  my  part,  I  would  neither 
propose  that  the  allowances  be  discontinued,  nor  speak  against 

hem  ;  yet  I  advise  you  to  consider  and  reflect  in  your  minds, 
chat  this  money  about  which  you  are  deliberating  is  a  trifle. 
but  the  usage  that  grows  up  with  it  is  important.  If  you 
will  ordain  it  so,  that  your  allowances  be  associated  with  the 
performance  of  duty,  so  far  from  injuring,  you  will  signally 
benefit  the  commonwealth  and  yourselves.  But  if  for  your 
allowances  a  festival  or  any  excuse  be  sufficient,  while  about 
your  further  obligations  you  will  not  even  hear  a  word,  beware 
lest,  what  you  now  consider  a  right  practice,  you  may  here- 
after deem  a  grievous  error. 

lly  opinion  is — don't  clamour  at  what  I  am  going  to  say 
but  hear  and  judge — that,  as  we  appointed  an  assembly  foi 
the  receiving  of  money,  so  should  we  appoint  an  assembly  for 
the  regulation  of  duties  '  and  the  making  provision  for  war  : 

1  2iWa£w,  which  often  signifies  an  assessment  o:  taxes  or  tribute,  is 
here  used  in  a  more  enlarged  sense,  importing  a  general  arrangement  of 
political  duties,  under  which  every  citizen  is  obliged  to  perform  some 
service  befitting  his  age  and  condition :  for  example,  to  pay  taxes,  or 
serve  in  the  army,  or  hold  some  civil  office.  Thus  the  word  bears  a 
meaning  similar  to  Shakspeare's  Act  of  Order:  Henry  V.  Act  J. 
Be.  2.  I  have  adopted  a  title  to  the  Oration,  which  seemed  nearer  to 
the  sense  than  any  of  the  old.  Leland  ea.ls  it  Tke  Oration  on  the 
Regulation    of  the   State.      Francis,    On   Vie   State   of  the   Republic, 


166  THE    ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

and  every  man  should  exhibit  not  only  a  willingness  to  hear 
the  discussion,  but  a  readiness  to  act,  that  you  may  derive 
your  hopes  of  advantage  from  yourselves,  Athenians,  and  not 
be  inquiring  what  this  or  that  person  is  about.  All  tie 
revenue  of  the  state,  what  you  now  expend  out  of  your 
Tivate  fortunes  to  no  purpose,  and  what  is  obtained  from 
your  allies,  I  say  you  ought  to  receive,  eveiy  man  his  share, 
those  of  the  military  age  as  pay,  those  exempt  from  the  roll ' 
as  inspection-money,2  or  what  you  please  to  call  it;  but  you 
must  take  the  field  yourselves,  yield  that  privilege  to  none  ; 
the  force  of  the  state  must  be  native,  and  provided  from  these 
resources  ;  that  you  may  want  for  nothing  while  you  perform 
your  obligations.  And  the  general  should  command  3  that 
force,  so  that  you,  Athenians,  may  experience  not  the  same 
results  as  at  present — you  try  the  generals,  and  the  issue  of 
your  affairs  is,  "Such  a  one,  the  son  of  such  a  one,  impeached 
such  a  one ;"  nothing  else — but  what  results  ? — first,  that  your 
allies  may  be  attached  to  you  not  by  garrisons,  but  by  com- 
munity of  interest;  secondly,  that  your  generals  may  not 
have  mercenaries  to  plunder  the  allies,  without  even  seeing 
the  enemy,  (a  course  from  which  the  emoluments  are  theirs 
in  private,  while  the  odium  and  reproach  fall  upon  the  whole 
country,)  but  have  citizens  to  follow  them,  and  do  unto  the 
enemy  what  they  now  do  unto  your  friends.  Besides,  many 
operations  require  your  presence,  and  (not  to  mention  the 
advantage  of  employing  our  own  army  for  our  own  wars.)  it 
is  necessaiy  also  for  other  purposes.  If  indeed  you  were 
content  to  be  quiet,  and  not  to  meddle  with  the  politics  of 

Pabst,  Ufber  die  Einrichtung  des  Stoats.  Auger,  Sur  le  Goui-erne- 
ment  de  la  Re}niblique.  Wolf,  De  Ordinanda  Republica.  From 
some  of  these  expressions  it  might  he  inferred,  that  the  speech  was 
about  constitutional  reform. 

1  The  roll  in  which  were  inscribed  the  names  of  all  citizens  qualified 
to  serve  in  the  cavalry  or  heavy-armed  infantry.  Men  past  the  military 
age  were  exempt. 

2  Pabst:  Aufsehergeoiihren.  It  would  be  the  duty  of  these  persons, 
who  received  such  fees,  to  inspect  the  militia  roll,  see  that  it  was  com- 
plete, that  all  the  qualified  citizens  took  their  turns  of  service,  were 
properly  armed  and  equipped,  &c. 

3  I.e.  really  and  effectually  command  it;  not  be  reduced  by  their 
necessities  to  relax  the  discipline  of  the  troops,  or  to  employ  them  on  a 
service  foreign  to  the  interests  of  Athens.  Soe  the  second  Olvnthiac, 
n.  51.  note  1. 


OS!    THE    DUTIES    OF    THE   STATE.  167 

Greece,  it  would  be  a  different  matter  :  but  you  assume  to 
rake  the  lead  and  determine  the  rights  of  others,  and  yet 
have  not  provided,  nor  endeavour  to  provide  for  yourselves. 
a  force  to  guard  and  maintain  that  superiority.  W  hilst 
you  never  stirred,  whilst  you  kept  entirely  aloof,  the  people 
of  Mitylene  '  have  lost  their  constitution  :  whilst  you  never 
stirred,  the  Rhodians 2  have  lost  theirs — our  enemies,  it  may 
be  said — true,  men  of  Athens  :  but  a  strife  with  oligarchies 
for  the  principle  of  government  should  be  considered  more 
deadly  than  a  strife  with  popular  states  on  any  account 
whatsoever. 

But  let  me  return  to  the  point — I  say,  your  duties  must 
be  marshalled ;  there  must  be  the  same  rule  for  receiving 
money  and  performing  what  service  is  required.  I  have  dis- 
cussed this  question  with  you  before,  and  shown  the  method 
of  arranging  you  all,  you  of  the  heavy-armed,  you  of  the 
cavalry,  and  you  that  are  neither,  and  how  to  make  a  common 
provision  for  all.  But  what  has  caused  me  the  greatest 
despondency,  I  will  tell  you  without  reserve.  Amid  such  a 
number  of  important  and  noble  objects,  no  man  remembers 
any  of  the  rest,  but  all  remember  the  two  obols.3  Yet  two 
obols  can  never  be  worth  more  than  two  obols  ;  whilst,  what 
I  proposed  in  connexion  therewith,  is  worth  the  treasures  of 
the  Persian  king — that  a*  state  possessing  such  a  force  of 
infantry,  such  a  navy,  cavalry,  and  revenue,  should  be  put  in 
order  and  preparation. 

Why,  it  may  be  asked,  do  I  mention  these  things  now  ? 
For  this  reason.  There  are  men  shocked  at  the  idea  of  en- 
listing all  the  citizens  on  hire,  whilst  the  advantage  of  order 
and  preparation  is  universally  acknowledged.  Here  then,  I 
say.  you  should  begin,  and  permit  any  person  that  pleases  to 
deliver  his  opinion  upon  the  subject.  For  thus  it  is.  If  you 
can  be  persuaded  to  believe,  that  now  is  the  time  for  making 
arrangements,  when  you  come  to  want  them,  they  will  be 
ready  :  but  if  you  neglect  the  present  time  as  unseasonable, 
you  will  be  compelled  to  make  preparations,  when  you  have 
occasion  for  their  use. 

1  The  establishment  of  oligarchy  at  Mitylene  is  again  alluded  to  in 
the  speech  on  the  Liberty  of  the  Rhodians. 

2  For  further  particulars  with  respect  to  the  Rhodians,  see  the  argu- 
ment to  the  speech  above  referred  to. 

3  The  sum  distributed  as  the  price  of  admittance  to  the  theatres. 


16i>  THE   O  RATIOS   01-    l'EMOSTHEXES. 

It  has  been  said  before  now.  T  believe,  Athenians,  not  by 
you  the  multitude,  but  by  persons  who  would  burst  if  these 
measures  were  carried  into  effect — "What  benefit  have  ~.  _  - 
from  the  harangues  of  Demosthenes  ?  He  comes  forward 
when  he  likes,  he  stuffs1  our  ears  with  declamation,  he  abuses 
the  present  state  of  things,  he  praises  our  forefathers,  he  excites 
and  puffs  up  our  imaginations,  and  then  sits  down."  I  can 
only  say.  could  I  persuade  you  to  follow  some  of  my  counsels, 
I  should  confer  upon  the  suite  such  important  benefits.  - 
I  now  attempted  to  describe  them,  would  appear  incredible 
to  many,  as  exceeding  possibility.  Yet  eTeu  this  I  conceive 
to  be  do  small  advantage,  if  I  accustom  you  to  hear  the  best 
advice.  For  it  is  necessary.  0  men  of  Athens,  that  whosoever 
desires  to  render  your  commonwealth  a  service  should  begin 
by  curing  your  ears.  They  are  corrupted:  so  many  false- 
hoods have  you  been  accustomed  to  hear,  anything  indeed 
rather  than  what  is  salutary.  For  instance — let  me  not  be 
interrupted  by  clamour,  before  I  have  finished  — certain 
persons  lately,  you  know,  broke  open  the  treasury  : J  and  all 
the  orators  cried  out.  that  the  democracy  was  overthrown,  the 
laws  were  annihilated  ;  or  to  that  effect.  Now.  ye  men  of 
Athens — only  see  whether  I  speak  truly — the  guilty  parties 
committed  a  crime  worthy  of  death  :  but  the  democracy  is 
not  overthrown  by  such  means:  Again,  some  oars  were 
stolen  : '  and  people  clamoured  for  stripes  and  torture,  saying 

1  Compare  Shakspeare.  Henry  IT.  Second  Part,  Prologue : 
Stuffing  the  ears  of  men  with  false  reports. 

■  The  oTitrfloSo/ios  was  a  chamber  at  the  back  of  the  Parthenon,  used 
for  a  treasury. 

3  If  this  circumstance  in  any  way  related  to  the  story  of  Antiphon, 
mentioned  in  the  Oration  on  the  Crown,  it  might  help  to  determine  the 
date  of  this  Oration.  But  the  connexion  is  not  sufficiently  apparent. 
Leland  has  the  following  note  on  this  passage:  "We  cannot  well 
suppose,  that  the  depredations  made  in  their  naval  stores  were  really  so 
slight  and  inconsiderable  as  they  are  represented  in  these  extenuating 
terms.  A  design  had  lately  been  concerted  of  a  very  momentous  and 
alarming  nature,  and  an  attempt  made  on  the  naval  stores  at  Athens, 
which  Demosthenes  himself  laboured  with  the  utmost  zeal  to  detect, 
and  punish.  A  man  named  Antiphon  had  been  for  some  time  con- 
sidered an  Athenian  citizen,  till  by  examination  of  the  registers  he 
was  found  to  be  really  a  foreigner,  was  accordingly  deprived  of  all  the 
privileges  of  a  native,  and  driven  with  ignominy  from  the  city. 
Enrasred  at  this  disgrace,  he  went  to  Philip,  and  proposed  to  him  to 
steal  privately  into  Athens  and  set  fire  to  the  arsenal.   The  Macedonian 


OH    THE    DUTIES    OF   THE    STATE.  109 

the  democracy  was  in  danger.  But  what  do  I  say  ?  I  agree 
with  them,  that  the  thief  merits  death  ;  but  I  deny  that  the 
constitution  is  by  such  means  overturned.  How  indeed  it  is 
in  danger  of  subversion,  no  man  is  bold  enough  to  teli  ycu  ; 
but  I  will  declare.  It  is  when  you.  men  of  Athens,  are  under 
bad  leading,'  a  helpless  multitude,  without  arms,  without 
order,  without  unanimity ;  when  neither  general  nor  any 
other  person  pays  regard  to  your  resolutions,  no  one  -will 
inform  you  of  your  errors,  or  correct  them,  or  endeavour  to 
effect  a  change.     This  it  is  that  happens  now. 

And  by  Jupiter,  0  Athenians,  another  sort  of  language  is 
current  among  you,  false  and  most  injurious  to  the  constitu- 
tion :  such  as  this,  that  your  safety  lies  in  the  courts  of 
justice,  and  you  must  guard  the  constitution  by  your  votes. 
It  is  true,  these  courts  are  public  tribunals  for  the  decision  of 
your  mutual  rights ;  but  by  arms  must  your  enemies  be  van- 
quished, by  arms  the  safety  of  the  constitution  must  be  main- 
tained. Voting  will  not  make  your  soldiers  victorious,  but 
they  who  by  soldiership  have  overcome  the  enemy  provide 
you  with  liberty  aud  security  for  voting  and  doiug  what 
you  please.  In  arms  you  should  be  terrible,  in  courts  of 
justice  humane. 

If  any  one  thinks  I  talk  a  language  above  my  position,  this 
very  quality  of  the  speech  is  laudable.     An  oration  to  be 

listened  readily  to  the  proposal,  and  by  bribes  and  promises  encouraged 
him  to  make  the  attempt.  Antiphon  repaired  to  Athens,  and  was 
lodged  in  the  port,  ready  to  put  the  enterprise  into  execution,  when 
Demosthenes,  who  received  intimation  of  the  design,  flew  to  the 
Pirasus,  seized  and  dragged  the  delinquent  before  an  assembly  of  the 
people.  Here  the  clamours  of  the  Macedonian  party  were  so  violent, 
that  the  accusation  was  slighted,  and  Antiphon  dismissed  without  the 
formality  of  a  trial.  He  departed,  triumphing  in  his  escape,  to  pursue 
his  designs  with  greater  confidence.  But  the  court  of  Areopagus, 
whose  province  it  was  to  take  cognizance  of  all  matters  of  treason 
against  the  state,  caused  him  to  be  again  seized  and  examined.  Torture 
forced  from  him  a  full  confession  of  his  guilt,  and  sentence  of  death  wa3 
passed  and  executed  upon  him.  The  detection  of  so  dangerous  a 
design  might  have  quickened  the  vigilance  of  the  people,  and  exaspe- 
rated their  resentment  against  the  least  attempts  made  on  their  military 
stores."     This  seems  to  have  happened  some  time  after  the  peace. 

1  So  Pabst :  schlecht  gdateL  Auger  :  "  mal  gouvernfi. "  Leland  : 
"  without  conduct."  Wolf  takes  it  in  a  different  sense  :  u  male  educati." 
Francis:  "held  in  contempt."  I  take  ^r/^evoi  to  be  used  as  in 
Thucydides,  II.  65,  ovk  ijyero  uciWov  Oir  avrov  v  avros  rr,e. 


170  THE    ORATIONS    OF    DEJIOSTHEXES. 

spoken  for  a  state  so  illustrious,  and  on  affairs  so  important, 
should  transcend  the  character  of  the  speaker,  whoever  he 
be ;  it  should  approximate  to  your  dignity  rather  than  his. 
Why  none  of  your  favourites  speak  in  such  a  style,  I  -will 
explain  to  you.  The  candidates  for  office  and  employment  go 
about  and  cringe  to  the  voting  interest,1  each  ambitious  to  be 
created2  general,  not  to  perform  any  manlike  deed.  Or  if 
there  be  a  man  capable  of  noble  enterprise,  lie  thinks  now. 
that  starting  with  the  name  and  reputation  of  the  state,  pro 
fiting  by  the  absence  of  opponents,  holding  out  hopes  to  you, 
and  nothing  else,  he  shall  himself  inherit  your  advantages  — 
which  really  happens — whereas,  if  you  did  everything  by 
yourselves,  you  would  share  with  the  rest,  not  in  the  actions 
only,  but  also  in  their  results.  Your  politicians  and  that 
class  of  men,  neglecting  to  give  you  honest  advice,  ally  them- 
selves to  the  former  class  :  and  as  you  once  had  boards  for 
taxes,  so  now  you  have  boards  for  politics  j  an  orator  pre- 
siding, a  general  under  him,  and  three  hundred  men  to  shout 
on  either  side  ;  while  the  rest  of  you  are  attached  some  to 
one  party,  some  to  the  other.3  Accordingly— this  is  what 
you  get  by  the  system— such  and  such  a  person  has  a  brazen 
statue  ;  here  and  there  is  an  individual  more  thriving  than 
the  commonwealth  :  you,  the  people,  sit  as  witnesses  of  their 
good  fortune,  abandoning  to  them  for  an  ephemeral  indolence 
your  great  and  glorious  heritage  of  prosperity. 

But  see  how  it  was  in  the  time  of  your  ancestors ;  for  by 
domestic  (not  foreign)  examples  you  may  learn  your  lesson  of 

1  Pabst :  Gehen  mit  sHavischer  Demuth  herum,  urn  sich  die  Begun- 
stigung  durch Stimmen  zu  virschajfen.  Auger:  "  Vous  font  bassement 
la  eour,  et  briguent  vos  suffrages."  Ttjs  M  tQ  x*'poTo?e7<r0ai  xapiros,  I 
understand  to  mean,  "  favour  or  interest  for  being  elected,"  x^-P^  being 
"  the  favour  of  the  voters  towards  the  candidate."  But  Reiske  takes 
X<*pw  to  signify  "  the  courting  of  the  voters  by  the  candidate,"  and  thus 
explains  it :  "  Ea  gratia  activa,  ea  contentio  alii  gratificandi,  studium 
placendi  alii,  penes  quern  sit  potestas  tibi  honorem,  quern  ambis,  suf- 
fragio  tuo  addicendi." 

2  I  have  followed  Reiske  in  giving  a  simple  meaning  to  TeAeafljjvat. 
But  Schaefer  thinks,  and  perhaps  with  reason,  thai  it  means  something 
more.  He  says :  "  Videtur  locutio  esse  oratoris  stomachantis  :  sin<ruli 
operam  dantes  ut  strategiae  initientur  mysteriis  :  Jeder  sich  abmuhend 
zum  Strategos  geweiht  zu  werden.  Pabst  translates  it :  SicJi  zu  Strategen 
weihen  zu  lame* :  thinking  it  refers  to  the  solemnity  of  an  election  by 
votes,  as  contradistinguished  from  an  appointment  by  lot. 

3  See  the  second  Olynthiac,  p.  51,  note  3. 


ON*    THE    DUTIES    OF   THE    STATE.  171 

duty.  Themistocles  who  commanded  in  the  sea-fight  at 
Salamis,  and  Miltiades  who  led  at  Marathon,  and  many 
others,  who  perforated  services  unlike  the  generals  of  the 
present  day — assuredly  they  were  not  set  up  in  brass  nor 
overvalued  by  your  forefathers,  who  honoured  them,  but 
only  as  persons  on  a  level  with  themselves.  Your  forefathers, 
0  my  countrymen,  surrendered  not  their  part  in  any  of  those 
glories.  There  is  no  man  who  will  attribute  the  victory  of 
Salamis  to  Themistocles,  but  to  the  Athenians ;  nor  the 
battle  of  Marathon  to  Miltiades,  but  to  the  republic.  But 
now  people  say,  that  Timotheus  took  Corcyra,1  and  Iphicrates 
cut  off  the  Spartan  division,2  and  Chabrias  won  the  naval 
victory  at  Naxos  :3  for  you  seem  to  resign  the  merit  of  these 
actions,  by  the  extravagance  of  the  honours  which  you  have 
bestowed  on  their  account  upon  each  of  the  commanders. 

So  wisely  did  the  Athenians  of  that  day  confer  political 
rewards ;  so  improperly  do  you.  But  how  the  rewards  of 
foreigners  1  To  Menon  the  Pharsalian,  who  gave  twelve 
talents  in  money  for  the  war  at  Eion4  by  Amphipolis,  and 

1  Timotheus  brought  back  Corcyra  to  the  Athenian  alliance,  b.c.  376. 
The  Lacedreinoniaus  attempted  to  recover  it  three  years  after,  but  were 
defeated. 

2  At  Lechseum  near  Corinth.  See  the  first  Philippic,  p.  66,  note  1. 
The  division  of  the  Lacedaemonian  army  called  popa,  which  Iphicrates 
defeated,  was  little  more  than  four  hundred  men.  The  fame  of  the 
exploit,  so  disproportioned  to  the  numbers  engaged,  was  owing,  partly 
to  the  great  renown  of  the  Spartan  infantry,  which  had  not  been 
defeated  in  a  pitched  battle  for  a  long  period  before,  and  partly  to  the 
new  kind  of  troops  employed  by  the  Athenian  general.  These  were  the 
peltastce  or  targeteers,  who  were  something  between  heavy-armed  and 
light-armed  soldiers,  combining  in  some  degree  the  advantages  of  both. 
Their  shield  (pella)  was  lighter,  their  spear  and  sword  were  longer. 
Until  this  occasion  they  had  never  been  fairly  tried  against  the  heavy 
troops  of  the  line.     Afterwards  they  came  into  more  general  use. 

3  Which  annihilated  the  Spartan  navy,  b.c.  376.  In  this  battle 
Phocion  first  distinguished  himself. 

4  Eion  is  a  city  on  the  Strymon  below  Amphipolis.  In  the  eighth 
year  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  when  Brasidas  had  taken  Amphipolis, 
he  sailed  down  the  Strymon  to  attack  Eion,  but  the  town  had  been  put 
in  a  posture  of  defence  by  Thucydides  the  historian,  who  came  to  its 
relief  with  some  ships  fromThasos.  There  is  no  mention  in  Thucydides 
of  Menon  the  Pharsalian.  Brasidas  had  partisans  in  Pharsalus,  and 
marched  through  Thessaly  on  his  expedition  to  Chalcidice,  aided  by 
some  of  the  nobles  of  that  country.  But  the  Thessalian  people  in 
general  sided  with  the  Athenians,  and  an  endeavour  was  made  to  pre- 
vent his  march.     Afterwards  they  stopped  the  passage  of  the  Spartan 


172  THE    ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHEN*ES. 

assisted  them  with  two  hundred  horsemen  of  his  own  re- 
tainers,1 the  Athenians  then  voted  not  the  freedom  of  their 
city,  but  only  granted  immunity  from  imposts.2  And  in 
earlier  times  to  Perdiccas.3  who  reigned  in  Macedonia  during 
the  invasion  of  the  Barbarian — when  he  had  destroyed  the 
Persians  who  retreated  from  Plataea  after  their  defeat,  and 
completed  the  disaster  of  the  king — they  voted  not  the 
freedom  of  their  city,  but  only  granted  immunity  from 
imposts ;  doubtless,  esteeming  their  couutry  to  be  of  high 
value,  honour,  and  dignity,  surpassing  all  possible  obligation. 
But  now,  ye  men  of  Athens,  ye  adopt  the  vilest  of  mankind, 
menials  and  the  sons  of  menials,  to  be  your  citizens,  receiving 
a  price  as  for  any  other  saleable  commodity.  And  you  have 
fallen  into  such  a  practice,  not  because  your  natures  are  in- 
ferior to  your  ancestors,  but  because  they  were  in  a  condition 
to  think  highly  of  themselves,  while  from  you,  men  of  Athens, 
this  power  is  taken  away.  It  can  never  be,  methinks,  that 
your  spirit  is  generous  and  noble,  while  you  are  engaged  in 
petty  and  mean  employments  ;  no  more  than  you  can  be 
abject  and  mean-spirited,  while  your  actions  are  honourable 
and  glorious.  Whatever  be  the  pursuits  of  men,  their  senti- 
ments must  necessarily  be  similar. 

Mark  what  a  summary  view  may  be  taken  of  the  deeds 
performed  by  your  ancestors  and  by  you.  Possibly  from  such 
comparison  you  may  rise  superior  to  yourselves.  They  for 
a  period  of  five-and-forty  years  took  the  lead  of  the  Greeks 
by  general  consent,  and  carried  up  more  than  ten  thousand 

reinforcements.  AVe  can  have  no  difficulty  therefore  in  believing  thi* 
story  of  Menon.  There  was  little  regular  government  inThessaly;  and 
the  great  families,  among  whom  it  was  parcelled,  would  not  always  agree 
in  their  policy  and  alliances. 

1  The  Penestte  of  Thessaly  were  serfs  or  vassals,  whose  condition  was 
somewhat  like,  though  superior  to,  that  of  the  Laconian  Helots.  They 
were  in  fact  the  ancient  inhabitants,  reduced  to  a  state  of  dependence  by 
the  Thessalian  conquerors. 

2  Such  an  immunity,  when  granted  to  a  foreigner,  would  exempt 
him  from  customs  and  harbour  dues.  In  the  case  of  a  person  like 
Menon,  it  would  be  little  more  than  an  honorary  distinction.  But  to 
a  citizen  or  a  foreigner  residing  at  Athens  an  exemption  from  duties 
and  taxes  would  be  more  important,  as  we  shall  see  hereafter. 

s  It  was  Alexander  who  reigned  in  Macedonia  at  this  time.  This 
then  is  either  a  mistake  of  the  orator,  or  we  may  suppose  with  Lucche- 
eini,  that  Perdiccas,  the  son  of  Alexander,  was  governor  of  a  princi- 
pality, and  therefore  dignified  with  the  kingly  title. 


ON   THE   DUTIES    OF   THE    STATE.  173 

talents  into  the  citadel ;  and  many  glorious  trophies  they 
erected  for  victories  by  land  and  sea,  wherein  even  yet  we 
take  a  pride.  And  remember,  they  erected  these,  not  merely 
that  we  may  survey  them  with  admiration,  but  also  that  we 
may  emulate  the  virtues  of  the  dedicators.1  Such  was  their 
conduct :  but  for  ours — fallen  as  we  have  on  a  solitude2 
manifest  to  you  all — look  if  it  bears  any  resemblance.  Have 
not  more  than  fifteen  hundred  talents  been  lavished  ineffec- 
tually on  the  distressed  people  of  Greece  1 3  Have  not  all 
private  fortunes,  the  revenues  of  the  state,  the  contributions 
fi-om  our  allies,  been  squandered  ?  Have  not  the  allies,  whom 
we  gained  in  the  war,  been  lost  recently  in  the  peace  1 4  But 
forsooth,  in  these  respects  only  was  it  better  anciently  than 
now,  in  other  respects  worse.  Very  far  from  that  !  Let  us 
examine  what  instances  you  please.  The  edifices  which  they 
left,  the  ornaments  of  the  city  in  temples,  harbours,  and  the 
like,  were  so  magnificent  and  beautiful,  that  room  is  not  left 

1  The  trophy,  which  consisted  of  armour  and  spoils  taken  from  the 
enemy,  was  hung  up,  usually  on  a  tree,  near  the  field  of  battle,  and  con- 
secrated to  some  god,  with  an  inscription  showing  the  names  of  the 
conquerors  and  the  conquered.     See  Juvenal,  Sat.  X.  133. 

Bellorum  exuviae,  truncis  affixa  tropasis 
Lorica,  et  fractal  de  casside  buccula  pendens, 
Et  curtum  temone  jugum,  victaeque  triremis 
Aplustre. 

And  Virgil,  £u.  XI.  5. 

Ingentem  quercum  decisis  undique  ramis 
Constituit  tumulo,  fulgentiaque  induit  arma, 
Mezenti  ducis  exuvias ;  tibi,  magne,  tropaeum, 
Bellipotens. 

But  sometimes  pillars  of  brass  and  stone  were  erected,  as  lasting 
memorials  of  important  victories. 

2  I.e.  an  absence  of  competitors. 

3  What  this  refers  to  is  unknown.  It  has  been  suggested,  that  Athens 
may  have  sent  supplies  of  corn  for  the  relief  of  certain  Greek  cities. 
Schaefer,  justly  considering  this  an  unsatisfactory  explanation,  prefers 
the  reading  of  airoo-ToAouj,  which  Pabst  follows,  and  translates,  fur  die 
SeemacJit  der  Hellenen.  There  is  still  however  a  difficulty  in  under- 
standing what  rwv  'EAArji'ajc  means.  The  passage  is  suspicious,  as  being 
a  clumsy  adaptation  of  a  similar  passage  in  the  third  Olynthiac.  See 
p.  58  of  this  volume. 

What  this   particularly  refers  to,  cannot  be  understood  without 
determining  the  date  of  the  Oration. 


174  THE    ORATION'S   OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

for  any  succeeding  generation  to  surpass  them  :  yonder  gate- 
way,' the  Parthenon,  docks,  porticoes,  and  other  structures, 
which  they  adorned  the  city  withal  and  bequeathed  to  us. 
The  private  houses  of  the  men  in  power  were  so  modest  and 
in  accordance  with  the  name  of  the  constitution,  that  if  any 
one  knows  the  style  of  house  which  Themistocles  occupied, 
or  Cimon,  or  Aristides.  or  Miltiades.  and  the  illustrious  of 
that  day.  he  perceives  it  to  be  no  grander  than  that  of  the 
neighbours.  But  now.  ye  men  of  Athens  — as  regards  public 
measures — our  government  is  content  to  furnish  roads,  foun- 
tains, white- washing,  and  trunipery :  not  that  I  blame  the 
authors  of  these  works ;  far  otherwise  :  I  blame  you.  ::  y  i 
suppose  that  such  measures  are  all  you  have  to  execute.  As 
regards  individual  conduct — your  men  in  office  have  (some  of 
them)  made  their  private  houses,  not  only  more  ostentatious 
than  the  multitude,  but  more  splendid  than  the  | 
buildings  ;  others  are  farming  land  which  they  have  pur- 
chased of  such  an  extent,  as  once  they  never  hoped  for  in  a 
dream. 

The  cause   of  this  difference  is.  :  erly  the  ;  . 

were  lords  and  masters  of  all:  any  individual  citizen  was 
to  receive  from  them  his  share  of  hoi-  profit. 

Now,  on  the  contrary,  these  persons  are  the  d  :  emo- 

luments :  everything  is   done  by  their  agency  :  the   people 
are  treated  as  underlings  and  dependents,  and  you  are  . 
to  take  what  these  men  allow  you  fir  j  tic*L 

Accordingly  the  affairs  of  the  republic  are  in  such  a  state, 
that,  if  any  one  road  your  decrees  and  recounted  your  actions 
directly  afterwards,  no  man  would  believe  that  both  came 
from  the  same  persons.  Take  for  example  the  decrees 
that  you  passed  against  the  accursed  Megarians,'  when 
•  ere  cultn  -  I  ie  sacred  ground;  that  you  would 
sally  forth  and  prevent  and   not  allow  it  :  your 

1  The  Propria; -i.  ifcd  be  seen  from  the  Pnyx.  where  Ihe 
people  assembled,  pointed  to  by  the  rotor.  This  was  an 
ornamental  fortification  in  front  of  the  A  crop  -  •  3  . .  red  the  most 
beautiful  structure  iu  Athens.     It  was  constructed  of  white  ma: 

an  iaimense  expense,  in  the  time  of  Pericles,  and  took  five  years  in 
building.  Particular  descriptions  of  it  may  be  found  in  Thiri wall's  and 
Crete's  Histories  of  Greece,  and  various  works  on  the  Antiquities  of 
Athens. 

2  See  the  Letter  of  Philip,  p.  157,  note  2. 


ON    THE    DUTIES    OF   THE   STATE.  175 

regard  to  the  Phliasians,1  when  they  were  driven  lately  into 
exile ;  that  you  would  assist,  and  not  abandon  them  to  the 
murderers,  and  invite  the  Peloponnesians  who  were  inclined 
to  join  you.  All  these  were  honourable,  men  of  Athens,  and 
just  and  worthy  of  the  country  :  but  the  deeds  that  followed 
them,  utterly  worthless.-  Thus  by  decrees  you  manifest 
your  hostility,  yet  cannot  execute  a  single  undertaking  :  for 
your  decrees  are  proportioned  to  the  dignity  of  the  state, 
while  your  power  corresponds  not  with  them.  I  would  advise 
you — and  let  no  man  be  angry  with  me — to  lower  your 
pride  and  be  content  with  minding  your  own  business,  or  to 
provide  yourselves  with  a  greater  force.  If  I  knew  you  to 
be  Siphnians  or  Cythnians3  or  any  other  people  of  that  sort, 
I  would  have  advised  you  to  lower  your  pride;  but,  as  you 
are  Athenians,  I  recommend  the  providing  a  force.  It  were 
disgraceful,  men  of  Athens,  disgraceful,  to  desert  that  post  of 
magnanimity,  which  your  ancestors  bequeathed  to  you. 
Besides,  even  should  you  desire  to  withdraw  from  Grecian 
affairs,  it  is  not  in  your  power.  For  many  feats  have  been 
performed  by  you  from  the  earliest  time;  and  your  esta- 
blished friends  it  were  disgraceful  to  abandon,  your  enemies 
you  cannot  trust  and  suffer  to  become  great.  In  short,  the 
position  which  your  statesmen  hold  relative  to  you — they 
cannot  retire  when  thv?y  choose — is  precisely  that  which  you 
have  arrived  at :  for  you  have  interfered  in  the  politics  of 
Greece. 

I  can  sum  up  all  that  has  been  spoken,  men  of  Athens. 

1  The  Phliasians  had  for  some  time  been  at  enmity  with  their  neigh- 
bours the  Argives,  partly  in  consequence  of  their  attachment  to 
Sparta.  When  the  Thebans  invaded  Peloponnesus,  b  c.  366,  Chares 
was  sent  from  Athens  to  assist  the  Phliasians,  whose  city  was  threatened 
by  the  confederates.  The  events  here  referred  to  must  have  been  of  a 
much  later  date,  though  we  cannot  exactly  determine  it.  We  learn 
from  Diodorus,  that  as  early  as  b.c.  371  some  Phliasian  exiles  made  an 
ineffectual  attempt  to  betray  their  city  to  the  Argives.  It  seems,  this 
attempt  was  afterwards  repeated  with  more  success.  Whether  Philip 
had  anything  to  do  whh  it,  as  Lucchesini  supposes:  or  whether  the 
Argives  alone,  or  in  conjunction  with  their  Peloponnesian  allies, 
effected  the  reduction  of  Phlius,  we  cannot  ascertain.  The  exiled 
party  implored  the  assistance  o£  Athens,  and  obtained  the  promises 
which  the  orator  refers  to. 

2  I  agree  with  Schaefer's  interpretation.  Others  take  the  words 
differently,  as  Auger:  "  Les  actions  qui  devoient  suivre,  oil  sont-elles  J" 

3  Siphnof  and  Cythnos  are  small  islands  in  the  .Egean  sea. 


17G  THE    ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

Your  orators  never  make  you  either  vicious  or  good,  but  vou 
make  them  whichever  you  please  :  for  you  aim  not  at  what 
they  desire,  but  they  at  what  they  suppose  to  be  your  objects. 
You  therefore  must  begin  by  having  noble  purposes,  and  all 
will  be  well.  Either  men  will  abstain  from  unworthy  coun- 
sels, or  will  gain  nothing  by  them,  having  none  to  follow  their 
advice. 


THE  ORATION  OX  THE  XAYY  BOARDS. 

THE   ARGraE5T. 

This  was  (according  to  Dionysius)  the  first  speech  delivered  hy  Demos, 
thenes  before  the  popular  assembly.  The  date  of  it  was  b.c.  354 ;  the 
occasion  as  follows. 

In  the  second  year  of  the  Social  war  Chares,  who  commanded  the 
Athenian  fleet,  either  from  inability  to  maintain  his  troops,  or  from 
motives  of  selfish  avarice,  or  both  causes  combined,  went  into  the 
service  of  Anabazus,  the  Ionian  satrap,  then  in  revolt  against 
Artaxerxes.  To  him  Chares  rendered  important  assistance,  and 
received  a  rich  recompense  in  money.  At  first  this  measure  was 
approved  of  at  Athens ;  but  in  the  beginning  of  the  next  year  an 
embassy  was  sent  by  A  rtaxerxes,  to  prefer  a  formal  complaint  against 
Chares,  for  his  violation  of  the  paace  between  Athens  and  Persia. 
Chares  was  immediately  ordered  to  quit  the  service  of  Artabazus; 
but  the  Athenians  soon  received  intelligence,  that  the  Persian  king 
was  makingvast  naval  preparations,  and  they  conjectured,  not  without 
reason,  that  these  were  intended  to  support  their  revolted  allies. 
Accordingly  they  hastened  to  put  an  end  to  the  Social  war,  in  which 
they  had  met  with  nothing  but  disasters,  and  the  same  year  a  nego- 
tiation was  opened  with  the  allies,  and  a  peace  concluded,  by  which 
their  independence  was  acknowledged. 

Meanwhile  the  Persian  armament  was  still  talked  of  at  Athens,  and 
there  were  rumours  of  a  threatened  invasion,  which  excited  alarm  in 
some,  and  stirred  up  the  patriotism  of  others.  Statesmen  of  the  old 
school  recalled  to  mind  the  glorious  days  of  their  ancestors,  and 
imagined  the  time  was  come  for  taking  vengeance  on  the  common 
enemy  of  Greece.  Isocrates  was  a  pairiot  of  that  class,  as  we  learn 
from  his  extant  oration*.  Others,  less  honest  than  Isocrates,  took 
advantage  of  the  general  agitation,  and  would,  for  selfish  purposes, 
have  precipitated  their  country  into  a  useless  and  unseasonable  war. 
An  assembly  was  held  to  consider  what  measures  should  be  adopted. 
A  proposal  was  actually  made,  to  declare  war  against  Persia,  and 
invite  the  other  state-  of  Greece  to  join  in  the  common  cause. 
Orators  who  supported  this  motion  declaimed  about  the  older  times, 
boasted  of  Marathon  and  Salamis,  fluttered  the   vanity  of  theii 


ON    THE   NAVY    BOARDS.  177 

countrymen,  and  appealed  to  the  national  prejudices.  What  the 
temper  of  the  assembly  was,  may  partly  be  gathered  from  the 
following  Oration.  Demosthenes  rose,  (then  in  his  thirty-first  year  of 
age,  according  to  others,  in  his  twenty-eighth  ;)  and  in  a  calm  and 
temperate  speech  dissuaded  the  Athenians  from  adopting  any  such 
absurd  resolution.  He  pointed  out  the  folly  of  commencing  hostili- 
ties, which  they  had  not  sufficient  means  to  carry  on :  that  the 
project  of  uniting  the  Greeks  for  such  a  purpose  was  chimerical  : 
they  were  too  jealous  of  one  another  and  especially  of  Athens,  to 
join  in  any  aggressive  war,  though  they  might  possibly  combine  to 
resist  a  Persian  invasion,  if  it  were  really  attempted.  At  present 
there  was  no  cause  for  alarm :  if  Athens  would  keep  quiet,  the 
Persian  king  would  leave  her  alone ;  but  if  she  attacked  him  without 
provocation,  he  would  in  all  probability  get  some  of  the  Greek  people 
on  his  own  side.  The  true  way  of  averting  the  supposed  danger  was, 
not  to  begin  the  attack,  but  to  put  the  country  in  a  posture  of 
defence,  so  that,  whether  menaced  with  war  from  Persia  or  from  any 
other  quarter,  they  might  not  be  taken  unprepared.  How  to  make 
their  defensive  preparations,  was  the  chief  thing  to  be  considered ; 
and  to  this  question  Demosthenes  addressed  himself  in  so  masterly 
and  practical  a  style,  that  in  the  youthful  orator  might  already  be 
discerned  the  future  statesman. 

In  this  speech  there  is  no  effort  to  make  a  display  of  eloquence :  it  is 
confined  to  the  giving  of  useful  and  simple  advice.  A  definite  plan 
is  proposed  for  the  regulation  of  the  Athenian  navy,  by  which  the 
number  of  ships  might  be  increased  to  three  hundred,  and  a  pro- 
vision made  for  their  speedy  and  punctual  equipment.  To  effect  this 
object,  Demosthenes  proposes  a  reform,  from  which  the  Oration  takes 
its  title,  in  the  system  of  Symmoriai,  or  Boards  for  the  Management 
of  the  Trierarchy :  for  a  full  exp^nation  whereof  1  must  refer  to 
Appendix  V.  at  the  end  of  this  volume.  The  details  of  the  proposed 
scheme  are  plainly  set  forth  in  the  Oration  itself,  and  will  easily  be 
understood  by  the  reader,  when  he  has  made  himself  acquainted 
with  the  general  features  of  the  existing  law. 

It  is  pleasing  to  see  Demosthenes,  at  the  outset  of  his  political  career, 
coming  forward  to  moderate  the  intemperate  zeal  of  the  people, 
to  allay  the  ferment  excited  by  factious  demagogues  and  foolish 
dreamers — showing  himself  at  the  same  time  attached  to  the  govern- 
ment of  his  country,  and  even  to  the  form  of  her  institutions,  while 
he  is  desirous  of  adapting  them  to  circumstances,  and  correcting  the 
abuses  by  which  their  proper  working  was  impeded.  Here  indeed 
is  struck  the  key-note  of  that  which  for  many  years  continued  to  be 
the  policy  of  this  great  man  :  viz.  to  uphold  the  dignity  of  Athens  on 
the  basis  of  wise  laws,  to  maintain  her  independence  by  the  spirit  and 
exertions  of  her  own  people,  to  rally  round  her,  for  empire  and  for 
safety,  a  host  of  willing  confederates,  united  by  the  bonds  of  common 
interest,  mutual  confidence  and  esteem. 

It  appears  to  me,  0  Athenians,  that  the  men  who  praise 
your  ancestors  adopt  a  flattering  language,  not  a  course 
beneficial  to  the  people  whom  they  eulogise.     For  tttempting 

VOL.    I.  N 


I  I  3  THE    OHATIOX5   OF 

to  speak  on  subjects,  which  no  man  can  fully  reach  by 
.rry  away  the  reputation  of  clever  speakers  them 
but  cause  the  glory  of  those  ancients  to  fall  below  its  es 
tion  in  the  minds  of  the  hearers.  For  my  part.  I  consider 
the  highest  praise  of  our  ancestors  to  be  the  length  of  time 
which  has  elapsed,  during  which  no  other  men  have  been  able 
to  excel  the  pattern  of  their  deeds.  I  will  myself  endeavour 
to  show,  in  what  way.  according  to  my  judgment,  your  pre- 
parations may  most  conveniently  be  made.  For  thus  it  is. 
Though  all  of  us  who1  intend  to  speak  should  prove  ourselves 
capital  orators,  your  affairs,  I  am  certain,  would  prospei 
none  the  more  :  but  if  any  person  whomsoever*  came  forward, 
and  could  show  and  convince  you  what  kind  and  what 
amount  of  force  will  be  serviceable  to  the  state,  and  from 
what  resources  it  should  be  provided,  all  our  present  appre- 
hensions would  be  removed.  This  will  I  endeavour  to  do,  as 
far  as  I  am  able,  first  briefly  informing  you,  what  my  opinion 
is  concerning  our  relations  with  the  king. 

I  hold  the  king  to  be  the  common  enemy  of  all  the  Gi 
yet  not  on  this  account  would  I  advise  you,  without  the  rest, 
to  undertake  a  war  against  him.  For  I  do  not  observe  that 
the  Greeks  themselves  are  common  friends  to  one  another ; 
on  the  contrary,  some  have  more  confidence  in  him  than  in 
certain  of  their  own  people.  Such  being  the  case,  I  deem  it 
expedient  for  you,  to  look  that  the  cause  of  war  be  equitable 
and  just,  that  all  necessary  preparations  should  be  made,  and 
that  this  should  be  the  groundwork  of  your  resolution  For 
I  think,  men  of  Athens,  if  there  were  any  clear  and  n. 
proof  that  the  Persian  king  was  about  to  attack  the  Greeks, 
they  would  join  alliance  and  be  exceedingly  grateful  to  those, 
who  sided  with  and  defended  them  against  him  :  but  if  we  rush 
into  a  quarrel  before  his  intentions  are  declared,  I  fear,  men  of 
Athens,  we  shall  be  driven  to  a  war  with  both,  the  king  and 
the  people  whom  we  are  anxious  to  protect  He  will  suspend 
his  designs — if  he  really  has  resolved  to  attack  the  Greeks — 
will  give  money  to  some  of  them  and  promise  friendship  • 
they,  desiring  to  carry  on  their   private  wars   with  better 

1  Rei*ke  makes  a  difficulty  about  the  oi  ucWovres  xiyeiv.  I  under- 
stand it  thus.  Demosthenes  guessed  that  many  other  orators  would 
follow  him  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  question.  He  endeavours  uy  a 
gentle  sarcasm  to  weaken  the  effect  of  their  argument 

*  This  is  a  modest  allusion  to  h::. 


ON   THE    NAVY    BOARDS.  179 

Buccess,  aud  intent  on  projects  of  that  kind,  will  disregard  the 
commoi.  safety  of  all. 

I  beseech  you,  not  to  betray  our  country  into  such  embar- 
rassment  and  folly.  For  you,  I  see,  cannot  adopt  the  same 
principles  of  action  in  reference  to  the  king  as  the  other 
Greeks  can.  It  is  open,  I  conceive,  to  many  of  them,  to  pro- 
secute their  selfish  interests  and  neglect  the  body  of  the 
nation  :  it  would  be  dishonourable  in  you,  though  you  had 
suffered  wrong,  to  punish  the  offenders  in  such  a  way,  as  to 
let  any  of  them  fall  under  the  power  of  the  barbarian. 

Under  these  circumstances,  we  must  take  care,  that  we  our- 
selves engage  not  in  the  war  upon  unequal  terms,  and  that 
he,  whom  we  suppose  to  entertain  designs  upon  the  Greeks,  do 
not  gain  the  credit  of  appearing  their  friend.  How  can  it  be 
managed  1  By  giving  proof  to  the  world,  that  the  forces  of 
our  state  are  mustered  and  prepared,  and  that  possessing  such 
forces  we  espouse  sentiments  of  justice.  To  the  over-daring, 
who  are  vehement  in  urging  you  to  war,  I  have  this  to  say  : 
— It  is  not  difficult,  in  the  season  for  deliberation  to  earn  the 
repute  of  courage,  or,  when  danger  is  nigh,  to  be  exceeding 
eloquent :  it  is  however  both  difficult  and  becoming,  in  the 
hour  of  danger  to  exhibit  courage,  in  counsel  to  find  better 
advice  than  other  men. 

It  is  my  opinion,  men  of  Athens,  that  a  war  with  the  king 
would  distress  our  republic,  though  any  action  in  the  course 
of  the  war  would  be  an  easy  affair.  Why  so  1  Because,  me- 
thinks,  every  war  necessarily  requires  a  fleet  and  money  and 
posts  ;  and  of  all  these  things  I  perceive  that  he  has  a  greater 
abundance  than  ourselves  :  but  for  action,  I  observe,  nothing 
is  so  much  needed  as  brave  soldiers,  and  of  these,  I  imagine, 
we  and  our  confederates  have  the  greater  number.  My  advice 
therefore  is,  that  we  should  by  no  ^nieans  begin  the  war, 
though  for  action  we  ought  to  be  fully  prepared.  If  indeed 
there  were  one  description  of  force  wherewith  barbarians 
could  be  resisted,  and  another  wherewith  Greeks,  we  might 
reasonably  perhaps  be  regarded  as  arraying  o1."^  elves  against 
Persia :  but  since  all  arming  is  of  the  same  character ;  and 
your  force  must  amount  to  the  same  thing,1  namely,  the 
means  of  resisting  your  enemies,  of  succouring  your  allies,  of 

1  Jacobs :   es   immer  dabei  avf  dieselben   Havptsachen   ankommt. 
Fabst :  zs  bei  einer  KriegsmacM  avf  dieselben  Hauptpunkte  ankommt. 


180  THE    ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

preserving  your  valuable  possessions ;  why,  when  we  have 
professed  enemies,1  do  we  look  out  for  others  1  why  do  we  not 
rather  prepare  ourselves  against  the  former,  and  be  ready  to 
/esist  the  king  also,  if  he  attempt  to  injure  us  1 

And  now  you  invite  the  Greeks  to  join  you.  But  if  you 
will  not  act  as  they  desire,  some  of  them  having  no  good-will 
towards  you,  how  can  you  expect  they  will  obey  your  call  1 
Because,  forsooth,  they  will  hear  from  you  that  the  Persian 
has  designs  against  them.  And  pray,  do  you  imagine  they 
don't  foresee  it  themselves]  I  believe  they  do :  but  at  present 
this  fear  outweighs  not  the  enmity,  which  some  of  them  bear 
towards  you  and  towards  each  other.  Your  ambassadors  then 
will  only  travel  round  and  rhapsodize.2     But  when  the  time 

1  This  refers  principally  to  the  Thebans,  between  whom  and  the 
Athenians  an  enmity  had  subsisted  ever  since  the  severance  of  their 
alliance,  when  the  Athenians,  jealous  of  the  growing  power  of  Thebes 
under  Epaminondas,  went  over  to  the  side  of  Sparta.  This  enmity  was 
increased  by  the  events  of  the  Sacred  war,  which  had  now  been  raging 
for  two  years,  and  in  which  the  Thebans  were  engaged  as  principals  on 
one  side,  while  the  Phocians  received  assistance  from  Athens  and 
Lacedasmon.  The  Locnans  and  most  of  the  tribes  of  Thessaly,  then  in 
alliance  with  Thebes,  are  to  be  reckoned  among  the  enemies,  whom 
Demosthenes  refers  to :  perhaps  also  the  Olynthians  and  the  revolted 
subjects  of  Athens. 

-  I  have  chosen  to  preserve  the  original  word,  which  has  come  into 
use  familiar  enough  in  our  own  langujge.  Francis  has  done  the  same. 
Leland  has:  "the  remonstrances  of  your  ambassadors  will  but  appear 
like  the  tales  of  idle  wanderers."  Jacobs:  werden  eure  Gesandten 
nichts  au.srichten,  sondem  mit  irhem  Spruche  vcie  Bankelsanger 
umhtr  ziehn.  The  meaning  is,  that  they  will  go  about  from  city  to 
city,  and  repeat  the  same  idle  tale  or  sing-song,  which  no  one  will  listen 
to:  as  Pabst  expresses  it :  vergtblich  das-selbe  Lied  wiederlwlen.  The 
rhapsodists  were  a  class  of  persons  who  in  the  early  times  of  Greece 
went  about  reciting  pieces  of  poetry,  and  in  particular  the  Homeric. 
By  the  constant  practice  of  reciting,  they  could  retain  an  immense 
number  of  verses  in  their  memory  ;  and,  before  the  art  of  writing  was 
much  known,  this  talent  was  a  source  of  amusement  and  instruc- 
tion, and  made  the  rhapsodist  welcome  wherever  he  came.  In  the 
time  of  Demosthenes  this  class  of  men  had  fallen  into  disrepute,  and 
indeed  their  occupation  was  nearly  gone.  Afterwards  patyuSelv  came 
to  be  synonymous  with  (p\vape7v,  "to  talk  nonsense,  to  string  words 
together  without  meaning;"  and  in  this  sense  the  word  has  been  appro- 
priated to  our  own  language.  Compare  Shakspeare,  Hamlet,  Act  HI. 
Sc.  4. 

Oh,  such  a  deed, 
As  from  the  body  of  contraction  plucks 
The  very  soul,  and  sweet  religion  makes 
A  rhapsody  of  words. 


OX    THE    XAVT    BOARDS.  1  ;  1 

-jomes.  if  what  we  now  expect  be  really  brought  to  pass.  I  fancy 
uone  of  the  Greek  community  rate  themselves  so  high,  that, 
■when  they  see  you  possessed  of  a  thousand  horse,  as  many  in- 
fantry soldiers  as  one  could  desire,  and  three  hundred  ships, 
they  would  not  come  with  entreaties,  and  regard  such  aid  as 
their  surest  means  of  deliverance.  The  consequences  then  are — 
by  inviting  them  now.  you  are  suppliants,  and.  if  your  petition 
be  not  granted,  you  fail :  whereas,  by  waiting  your  time  and 
completing  your  preparations,  you  save  men  at  their  own 
request,  and  are  sure  they  will  all  come  over  to  you. 

Swayed  by  these  and  the  like  considerations,  men  of  Athens, 
I  sought  not  to  compose  a  bold  harangue  of  tedious  length : 
but  have  taken  exceeding  pains  in  devising  a  plan,  the  best 
and  the  speediest,  for  getting  your  forces  ready.  It  will 
be  for  you.  to  hear  it,  and.  if  it  meet  your  approval,  to  vote 
for  its  adoption. 

The  first  and  most  essential  part  of  preparation,  men  of 
Athens,  is  to  be  so  disposed  in  your  minds,  that  every  c;::z::i 
is  willing  and  earnest  to  perform  his  duty.     For  you  see. 

0  Athenians  :  whenever  you  have  had  a  common  wish,  and 
every  man  has  thought  afterwards,  that  the  accomplishment 
belonged  to  himself,  nothing  has  ever  escaped  you  :  but  when 
you  have  wished  only,  and  then  looked  to  one  another,  each 
expecting  to  be  idle  while  his  neighbour  did  the  work,  none 
of  your  designs  have  been  executed. 

You  being  so  animated  and  determined.  I  advise  that  we 
fill  up  the  twelve  hundred  and  make  two  thousand,  adding 
eight  hundred  to  them  :  for  if  you   appoint  that  number, 

1  reckon  that,  after  deducting  the  heiresses  and  wards,  and 
holders  of  allotments  and  partnership  property,1  and  persons 

1  The  persons  here  enumerated  were  exempt  from  service  of  the 
Trierarchia.  Heiresses  and  wards  were  exempt,  because,  although  they 
might  have  property  enough  to  defray  the  contingent  expense,  yet  the 
service  was  connected  with  a  personal  trust,  which  by  reason  of  sex 
and  age  they  were  incapable  of  performing.  The  colonial  allottees 
(k\t)povxoi)  were  exempt,  by  reason  of  their  absence.  t$:-ep.  101.  note  2.) 
Koivwvol  are  any  partners  or  joint  owners,  who  would  fairly  be  exempt, 
when  the  share  of  each  was  not  sufficient  to  qualify  him ;  as  in  the 
case  suggested  by  Harpocration,  of  brothers  having  an  undivided  in- 
heritance. The  operation  of  the  law  would  be  as  follows.  The  state  in 
the  6rst  instance  looks  to  the  visible  property  of  the  citizens,  such  as 
and,  houses,  stock  in  -.rade  or  agriculture.  A  register  is  formed  of  the 
twelve  hundred  owners  of  property  most  competent  to  serve  the  office 


182  THE    ORATIONS    01    DEM05THEXES. 

in  reduced  circumstances,  you  will  still  have  your  twelve 
hundred  members.  Of  them  I  think  you  should  make 
twenty  boards,  as  at  present,  each  having  sixty  members. 
Each  of  these  boards  I  would  have  you  divide  into  five  sec- 
tions of  twelve  men,  putting  always  with  the  wealthiest  person 
some  of  the  least  wealth,  to  preserve  equality.  And  thus 
I  say  the  members  ought  to  be  arranged  :  the  reason  you  will 
understand,  when  you  have  heard  the  whole  scheme  of  arrange- 
ment. But  how  about  the  ships  ?  I  recommend  you  to  fix 
the  whole  number  at  three  hundred,  and  form  twenty  divisions 
of  fifteen  vessels  each,  giving  five  of  the  first  hundred  and 
five  of  the  second  hundred  and  five  of  the  third  hundred  to 
each  division  ;  then  allot  one  division  of  fifteen  ships  to  every 
board  of  men,  and  let  the  board  assign  three  ships  to  each  of 
their  own  sections. 

When  these  regulations  have  been  made,  I  propose — as  the 

of  trierarch.  This  register  continues  the  same,  until  circumstances 
have  happened  which  call  for  an  alteration;  and,  practically  speaking, 
the  same  families  continue  for  a  long  period  in  the  register.  But  (says 
Demosthenes)  the  thing  worked  so,  that  at  any  given  time,  when  there 
was  a  call  for  service,  the  register  could  not  be  depended  on  for  the 
whole  number.  Thus,  the  name  of  Timon  is  found  in  the  register ;  but 
Timon  is  dead,  and  the  estate  has  descended  to  his  three  sons,  or  his 
three  brothers,  who  are  not  liable,  because  the  share  of  each  is  inade- 
quate. Or  Timon  has  sold  his  property,  and  it  is  in  the  hands  of  three 
or  four  partners.  Or  Timon  has  mortgaged  it,  and  become  himself  too 
poor  to  undertake  the  office.  There  would  not  be  time  always  to 
investigate  the  excuses  alleged  by  the  registered  party,  or  the  condition 
of  his  beirs  or  successors.  That  false  excuses  and  evasions  were  some- 
times resorted  to,  we  learn  from  the  orators.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
presumption  against  a  man,  from  his  name  being  in  the  register,  would 
sometimes  operate  unjustly  to  a  man  in  reduced  circumstances.  The 
law  of  the  excltange  was  indeed  a  mode  of  relief,  but  attended  with 
difficulty.     (See  Appendix  V.) 

We  may  suppose,  that  when  a  registered  estate  was  found  to  have 
devolved  upon  several  joint  proprietors,  the  excuse  would  at  once  be 
admitted  in  the  first  instance ;  though,  if  a  man's  separate  estate,  toge- 
ther with  his  joint  estate,  were  of  the  requisite  amount,  one  can  hardly 
suppose  he  would  escape  ultimate  liability.  Thus,  if  Callias  be  one  oi 
Timon' s  heirs,  his  share  of  that  inheritance  not  being  sufficient  to  serve 
the  trierarchy,  and  his  other  property  not  being  sufficient,  but  both 
together  being  sufficient,  he  would  not  have  his  name  immediately 
substituted  for  Timon 's,  but  the  fact  afterwards  appearing,  either  in  a 
judicial  contest,  or  on  a  general  revision  of  the  register,  his  name  would 
be  entered. 

With  respect  to  the  adjectives  6p<payiKuv,  kc...  I  understand  va>nd".  ■», 
"  persons  of  **■  e  class  of  orphans,"  4c. 


OX    THE    XAVr    BOAED3.  183 

rateable  capital  of  the  country  is  six  thousand  talents  l — in 
order  that  your  supplies  may  be  apportioned,  you  should 
divide  this  capital  and  make  a  hundred  parts  of  sixty  talents 
each  •  then  allot  five  of  these  hundredth  parts  to  each  of  the 
twenty  larger  boards,  and  let  the  board  assign  one  hundredth 
part  to  each  of  their  own  sections  ;  so  that,  if  you  have  need 
of  a  hundred  ships,  sixty  talents  may  be  applied2  to  the 
expeuse,  and  there  may  be  twelve  to  serve  as  commanders  ; 3 
if  of  two  hundred,  there  may  be  thirty  talents  applied  to  the 
expense,  and  six  persons  to  serve  ;  if  of  three  hundred,  there 
may  be  twenty  talents  defraying  the  expense,  and  four 
persons  to  serve. 

In  the  same  manner,  0  Athenians,  I  advise  that,  all  the 
furniture  of  the  ships,  which  is  out  on  loan,4  should  be  valued 
according  to  the  register,  and  divided  into  twenty  parts  ; 
that  you  then  allot  one  good5  portion  to  every  large  board  ; 
that  every  board  distribute  equal  shares  among  their  own 
sections ;  that  the  twelve  in  each  section  call  their  imple- 
ments in,  and  get  the  ships  which  are  severally  allotted  to 
them  in  readiness.  Thus  do  I  think  the  supplies,  the  vessels, 
the  commanders,  and  the  collection  of  implements,  may  be 
most  effectually  provided  and  arranged.  How  the  manning 
may  be  made  sure  and  easy,  I  proceed  to  explain. 

I  say  the  generals  should  divide  the  dockyards  into  ten 
departments,  taking  care  that  there  be  thirty  docks  in  each 
as  near  as  possible  to  one  another  ;  and  when  they  have  done 
this,  let  them  attach  two  boards  and  thirty  ships  to  each 
of  these  departments,  then  allot  the  tribes  and  the  several 
commanders  to  each  dockyard,  so  that  there  may  be  two 
boards,  thirty  ships,  one  tribe.  And  whichever  department 
be  allotted  to  a  tribe,  let  them  divide  it  in  three  and  the 

1  See  Appendix  IV. 

2  I.e.  that  shall  be  the  proportion  of  the  whole  rateable  capital,  upon 
which  a  tax  shall  be  levied  to  meet  the  expense.  It  is  a  short  way  of 
expressing  this.     See  Appendix  IV.  and  V. 

3  Trierarch-s.  The  name  was  kept  up,  when  it  had  become  a  matter 
of  contribution  and  civil  trust,  rather  than  of  naval  service.  So,  the 
Lord  High  Admiral  of  our  own  government  might  never  have  seen 
the  sea. 

4  It  was  customarv  for  individuals  to  borrow  the  naval  implements 
and  stores  from  the  public  arsenal,  when  the  state  had  no  occasion  foi 
them. 

*  Al.  x("\'yT^vi  debtors. 


184  THE     :RATIOX:S    OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

ships  likewise,  and  then  allot  the  third  of  a  tribe  to  each,  so 
that  of  the  whole  dockyards  there  may  be  one  division  belong- 
ing to  every  tribe,  and  the  third  of  a  tribe  may  have  the  third 
part  of  every  division,  and  you  may  know,  in  case  of  neces- 
sity, first,  where  the  tribe  is  stationed,  next,  where  the  third 
of  the  tribe  next,  who  are  the  commanders  and  how  many 
ships  there  are ;  and  the  tribe  may  have  thirty  ships,  and 
every  third  of  a  tribe  have  ten.  Let  the  system  be  only  put 
in  train,  and  though  we  should  forget  something  now — for  it 
is  difficult  to  make  all  the  details  perfect — it  will  be  ascer- 
tained in  the  working  ;  and  there  will  be  one  arrangement 
for  all  the  ships  and  every  division. 

In  regard  to  money  and  real  supplies,  I  know  that  I  am  about 
to  make  an  extraordinary  statement,  yet  still  it  shall  be  made ; 
for  I  am  persuaded  that,  on  a  correct  view,  I  alone  shall  be 
found  to  have  declared  and  predicted  the  truth.  I  say,  we 
tught  not  at  present  to  speak  of  money  :  a  supply  there  is, 
if  occasion  require  it,  ample,  honourable,  and  just  :  if  we  look 
for  it  immediately,  we  shall  not  think  we  have  it  even  in 
reserve  ;  so  far  shall  we  be  from  providing  it  now ;  but  if  we 
leave  it  alo^o,  we  shall  have  it.  What  then  is  this  supply, 
which  hath  no  being  now,  but  will  exist  hereafter  ? — for  cer- 
tainly it  is  like  a  riddle.     I  will  explain. 

You  see  the  extent  of  this  city,  men  of  Athens.  It  contains 
treasures  equal,  I  may  almost  say,  to  the  rest  of  the  states 
put  together.  But  the  owners  are  so  minded,  that — if  all 
your  orators  alarmed  them  with  intelligence  that  the  king 
was  coming,  that  he  was  at  hand,  that  the  danger  was  in- 
evitable— if,  besides  the  orators,  an  equal  number  of  persons 
gave  oracular  warning — so  far  from  contributing,  they  would 
not  eveu  discover  their  wealth  or  acknowledge  the  possession. 
Yet  if  they  knew  that  these  proceedings,  so  terrible  in  report, 
were  actually  begun,  there  is  not  a  man  so  foolish,  who  would 
not  he  ready  to  give  and  foremost  to  contribute.  For  who 
would  rather  perish  with  all  his  possessions,  than  contribute 
a  part  of  his  possessions  to  preserve  himself  and  the  re- 
mainder t  Thus,  I  say,  we  have  money  against  the  time  of 
actual  need,  but  not  before.  And  therefore  I  advise  you  not 
to  search  for  it  now.  Indeed  what  you  would  raise,  if  you 
determined  to  raise  it,  would  be  more  ridiculous  than  nothing 
at  all.    For  example  : — Let  a  tax  be  proposed  of  one  per  cent 


ON    THE    NAVY    BOARDS.  185 

— there  are  sixty  talents.  Let  twice  as  much,  namely  two 
per  cent,  be  proposed — there  are  a  hundred  and  twenty.  But 
what  is  this  to  the  twelve  hundred  camels,  which,  these 
men  say,  carry  the  king's  gold  ?  Let  me  suppose  however, 
that  we  contributed  the  twelfth  of  our  property,  five  hun- 
dred talents.  This  you  would  not  submit  to ;  but  if  you 
did  pay  it,  the  sum  would  be  insufficient  for  the  war.  Your 
proper  course  then  is,  to  complete  your  other  preparations  ; 
let  the  owners  retain  their  money  for  the  present ;  (it  can- 
not be  in  better  keeping1  for  the  state  ;)  and  should  the 
occasion  ever  arrive,  then  take  it  from  them  in  voluntary 
contributions. 

These,  0  my  countrymen,  are  practicable  measures,  these 
are  honourable  and  advantageous,  fit  to  be  imported  as  yom 
proceedings  to  the  king  ;  and  by  them  no  little  terror  would 
be  excited  in  him.  He  knows  right  well,  that  by  three  hun- 
dred galle3rs,  whereof  we  furnished  a  hundred,  his  ancestors  los^ 
a  thousand  ships ;  and  he  will  hear  that  we  ourselves  have  now 
equipped  three  hundred ;  so  that,  were  he  ever  so  mad,  he  could 
hardly  deem  it  a  light  matter  to  provoke  the  hostility  of  out 
republic.  Should  he  however  entertain  an  overweening  con- 
fidence in  his  wealth,  even  this  he  will  find  to  be  a  weaker 
support  than  yours.  He  is  coming,  they  say,  with  gold. 
But  if  he  give  it  away,  he  will  lack  supplies  :  for  even  wells 
and  fountains  are  apt  to  fail,  if  you  draw  from  them  con- 
stantly and  by  wholesale.  He  will  hear  that  the  valuation  of 
our  land  is  a  capital  of  six  thousand  talents.  That  we  shall 
defend  it  against  invaders  from  that  quarter,  his  ancestors 
who  were  at  Marathon  would  know  best  :  and  certainly,  as 
long  as  we  are  victorious,  money  can  never  fail  us. 

Nor  is  there,  as  it  appears  to  me,  any  ground  for  what 
some  persons  fear,  that  having  money  he  will  collect  a  large 
body  of  mercenaries.  I  do  indeed  helieve,  that  against  Egypt3 

1  Direct  taxation  in  time  of  peace,  when  there  is  no  urgent  necessity, 
is  like  killing  the  goose  for  the  golden  eggs. 

2  Egypt  had  been  in  a  state  of  revolt  from  Persia  ever  since  the 
reign  of  Darius  Kothus.  An  attempt  was  made  to  recover  it  by  his 
successor  Artaxerxes  Mnemon,  who  engaged  the  services  of  the  Athe- 
nian Iphicrates,  and  sent  him  with  a  powerful  fleet  and  army  under  the 
satrap  Pharnabazus  h.o.  374.  This  expedition  failed,  owing  to  the  mis- 
conduct of  Pharnabazus.  After  the  accession  of  Artaxerxes  Ochus, 
repeated  efforts  were  made  to  reconquer  this  valuable  province.     At 


186  THE    ORATIONS    OF    DEMOSTHENES. 

and  Orontes,1  and  any  other  barbarians,  many  of  the 
Greeks  would  be  willing  to  serve  in  his  pay,  not  that  he  may 
subdue  any  of  those  adversaries,  but  in  order  to  obtain  sup- 
plies for  themselves  to  relieve  their  several  necessities.  Against 
Greece  however  I  do  not  believe  that  any  Grecian  would 
march.  For  whither  could  he  betake  himself  afterwards  ? 
Go  to  Phrygia  and  be  a  slave  1 — Remember,  a  war  with  the 
barbarian  can  be  for  no  other  stake,  than  for  couutry  and 
life  and  customs  and  freedom  and  everything  of  the  kind. 
"Who  then  is  so  wretched,  that  he  would  sacrifice  himself, 
parents,  sepulchres,  fatherland,  for  the  sake  of  a  paltry  pit- 
tance 1  I  believe,  no  man.  But  further — it  is  not  even  the 
king's  interest,  that  mercenaries  should  conquer  the  Greeks. 
For  they  that  conquer  us  must  have  been  his  masters  already  : 
and  he  desires,  not  to  subdue  us  and  then  be  dependent  on 
others,  but  to  rule,  if  possible,  over  all ;  if  that  be  not  possible, 
at  least  over  his  present  subjects. 

Shoidd  any  one  think  the  Thebans  will  be  on  his  side  — I 
know  it  is  difficult  to  speak  to  you  about  that  people  :  you 
hate  them  so,  you  will  not  like  to  hear  even  the  truth  or  any- 
thing favourable  of  them — however  men  who  are  considering 
important  questions  must  not  omit  any  useful  argument  on 
any  pretext.  My  opinion  then  is,  the  Thebans,  so  far  from 
being  likely  to  join  him  in  any  attack  upon  Greece,  would 

lengih  about  the  year  b.c.  348  or  later  the  king  collected  a  considerable 
force  of  Greek  mercenaries,  and  marched  against  Egypt  in  person 
Mentor  of  Rhodes,  and  the  Theban  Lacrates  greatly  distinguished 
themselves  in  the  king"s  service  on  this  occasion,  and  Egypt  was  again 
brought  under  the  dominion  of  Persia ;  in  which  it  remained  until  the 
overthrow  of  that  empire  by  Alexander. 

1  Orontes  was  satrap  of  iiysia  in  the  reign  of  Artaxerxes  Mnemon. 
He  joined  the  great  conspiracy  of  the  satraps  and  the  king  of  Egypt  in 
the  year  b.c.  362.  He  was  chosen  to  command  their  forces,  and  en- 
trusted with  a  large  fund  which  had  been  collected  to  carry  on  the  war. 
He  was  induced  however  to  change  sides  ;  and  the  trust  which  had  been 
reposed  in  him  enabled  him  to  betray  his  party  to  the  king  most 
effectually.  Other  rebels  followed  his  example ;  and  this  confederacy 
which  at  one  time  had  threatened  the  very  existence  of  the  Persian 
monarchy,  was  suddenly  dissolved.  What  became  of  Orontes  after 
wards,  is  unknown.  The  other  satraps  who  joined  this  coalition  were 
Ariobarzanes  of  Phrygia,  Autophradates  of  Lydia,  Datames  of  Cappa- 
docia,  and  Mausolus  king  of  Caria.  Datames  was  a  man  of  great 
ability.  The  treacherous  manner  in  which  his  destruction  was  accom- 
plished is  recorded  by  Cornelius  Nepos,  who  wrote  his  life. 


ON    THE    XAVY    BOARDS.  187 

give  a  large  sum  of  money,  if  they  had  it,  for  the  opportunity 
of  repairing  their  former  offences  against  her.1  But  supposing 
the  Thebans  to  be  so  utterly  wrongheaded,  of  this  at  least  you 
are  all  aware,  that,  if  the  Thebans  are  in  his  interest,  their 
enemies  must  necessarily  be  in  the  interest  of  the  Greeks. 

I  believe  then,  that  our  cause  (the  cause  of  justice)  and  its 
adherents  will  be  better  armed  against  all  adversaries  than 
the  traitors  and  the  barbarian  can  be.  And  therefore  my 
advice  is — be  not  over-alarmed  at  the  war ;  neither  be  led  on 
to  commence  it.  I  do  not  see  indeed,  that  any  other  people 
of  Greece  have  reason  to  fear  this  war.  For  which  of  them  is 
ignorant,  that  whilst,  looking  on  the  Persian  as  a  common 
enemy,  they  were  in  concord  among  themselves,  they  enjoyed 
many  advantages  ;  but  since  they  have  regarded  him  as  a 
friend  and  quarrelled  about  private  disputes  with  each  other, 
they  have  suffered  greater  calamities  than  could  have  been 
wished  in  pronouncing  a  curse  upon  them  ?  Then  should  we 
fear  a  man,  whom  fortune  and  heaven  declare  to  be  unpro- 

1  The  Thebans  had  always  been  reproached  for  siding  with  Xerxes 
against  the  Greeks.  (See  the  second  Philippic,  p.  S3.)  After  the 
capture  of  Thebes  by  Alexander,  this  old  charge  was  (not  very  fairly) 
revived  against  them  by  their  enemies :  "  studia  in  Persas  non  prce- 
sentia  tantum,  verum  et  Vetera  adversus  Grceciae  libertatem  increpantes; 
quamobrem  odium  eos  omnium  populorum  esse  :"  as  Justin  says.  The 
penalty  which  had  been  denounced  against  them  ever  since  the  Persian 
war  was  then  inflicted,  and  Thebes  was  rased  to  the  ground. 

Here  we  find  Demosthenes  speaking  more  liberally  of  the  Thebans 
than  his  countrymen  were  wont  to  do.  The  Athenians,  besides  theii 
recent  grounds  of  quarrel,  had  a  long  standing  enmity  with  that  people, 
arising  out  of  various  causes.  The  Thebans  had  been  their  most  bittet 
opponents  in  the  Peloponnesian  war,  and  at  its  termination  had  pro- 
posed to  destroy  Athens  altogether.  Their  merciless  treatment  of  the 
Plataeans,  both  in  that  war,  and  afterwards  b.c.  373,  when  they  destroyed 
the  city,  could  never  be  forgotten  by  the  Athenians,  between  whom  anc 
the  Plataeans  the  closest  friendship  had  subsisted  ever  since  the  battle 
of  Marathon.  Neighbourhood  had  brought  the  two  people  into  frequent 
contest  about  their  frontiers;  and  their  estrangement  was  increased 
by  dissimilarity  of  character,  customs,  and  institutions.  Athenian 
sneered  at  Boeotian  stupidity,  while  they  had  reason  to  dread  Thebau 
arms :  and  Thebans  were  jealous  of  a  city,  which  by  its  external  splen- 
dour and  attractions  of  every  kind  so  greatly  eclipsed  their  own. 
Sixteen  years  after  this  speech  was  delivered,  Thebes  and  Athens  were 
united  in  a  mortal  struggle  against  a  common  enemy ;  yet  owing  to 
their  long  dissension,  the  utmost  difficulty  was  found  in  bringing  them 
together;  and  this  was  only  effected  by  the  powerful  exertions  oi 
Demosthenes. 


188  THE    ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

fi  table  as  a  friend,  and  useful  as  an  enemy  ?  Let  us  do  no 
such  thing  !  Yet  do  him  no  injustice  either ;  having  regard 
to  ourselves,  and  to  the  disturbances  and  jealousies  among 
the  other  people  of  Greece.  If  it  were  possible  with  one  heart 
and  with  combined  forces  to  attack  him  alone,  such  an  injury 
I  would  not  have  pronounced  an  injustice.  But  since  this 
cannot  be,  I  say  we  must  be  cautious,  and  not  afford  the 
king  a  pretence  for  vindicating  the  rights  of  the  other  Greeks. 
As  long  as  we  remain  quiet,  any  such  attempt  on  his  part 
would  awaken  suspicion ;  but  if  we  are  the  first  to  commence 
hostilities,  it  will  naturally  be  thought,  that  he  courts  their 
friendship  because  of  his  enmity  with  us. 

Do  not  expose  the  melancholy  condition  of  Greece,  by  con- 
voking her  people  when  you  cannot  persuade  them,  and  mak- 
ing war  when  you  cannot  carry  it  on.  Only  keep  quiet,  fear 
nothing,  and  prepare  yourselves.  Let  it  be  repoi-ted  of  you 
to  the  king — not  (for  heaven's  sake)  that  all  the  Greeks  and 
the  Athenians  are  in  distress  and  alarm  and  confusion ;  which 
is  very  far  from  the  truth — but  that,  if  falsehood  and  perjury 
were  not  considered  as  disgraceful  by  the  Greeks,  as  by  him 
they  are  considered  honourable,  you  would  have  marched 
against  him  long  ago ;  that  you  will  forbear  to  do  this  for 
your  own  sakes,  but  you  pray  unto  all  the  gods,  that  he  may 
be  inspired  with  the  same  madness  that  his  ancestors  were 
formerly.  Should  he  come  to  reflect  on  these  matters,  he  will 
find  that  your  resolutions  are  taken  with  prudence.  He 
knows  assuredly,  that  Athens  by  her  wars  with  his  ancestors 
became  prosperous  and  great,  whilst  by  the  repose,  which  she 
enjoyed  before,  she  was  not  raised  above  any  Grecian  state  so 
much  as  she  is  at  present.  And  as  to  the  Greeks,  he  per- 
ceives that  they  stand  in  need  of  some  mediator,  either  a 
voluntary  or  an  involuntary  one;  and  he  knows  that  he 
should  himself  step  in  as  such  a  mediator,  if  he  stirred  up 
war.  Therefore  the  accounts  that  he  will  receive  from  his 
informants  will  be  intelligible  and  ci'edible. 

Not  to  trouble  }tou,  men  of  Athens,  with  over-many  words, 
[  will  give  a  summary  of  my  advice  and  retire.  I  bid  you 
prepare  yourselves  against  existing  enemies,  and  I  declare 
that  with  tins  same  force  you  should  resist  the  king  and  all 
other  people,  if  they  attempt  to  injure  you ;  but  never  com- 
mence an  injustice  either  in  word  or  deed.     Let  us  look  that 


ON    THE    LIBERTY    OF   THE    RHODIA>~S»  189 

our  actions,  and  not  our  speeches  on  the  platform,  be  worthy 
of  our  ancestors.  If  you  pursue  this  course,  you  will  do  ser- 
vice, not  only  to  yourselves,  but  also  to  them  who  give  the 
opposite  counsel ;  since  you  will  not  be  angry  with  them 
afterwards  for  your  errors  committed  now.1 


THE  ORATION  ON  THE  LIBEETY  OF  THE  RHODIANS. 


THE    ARGVME5T. 

This  Oration  was  delivered  b.c.  351  on  the  following  occasion. 

In  the  island  of  Rhodes,  as  in  divers  other  of  the  Grecian  states,  there 
had  been  many  contests  between  the  democratical  party  and  the 
oligarchical.  At  the  close  of  the  Peloponnesian  war  it  was  in  the 
hands  of  an  oligarchy,  under  the  protection  of  Lacedsemon.  About 
the  year  396  Conon,  being  at  the  head  of  a  considerable  fleet  in  that 
part  of  the  jEgean,  drove  the  Peloponnesians  from  the  port  of 
Rhodes,  and  compelled  the  islanders  to  renew  their  connexion  with 
Athens.  Democracy  was  then  re-established ;  but  four  years  after- 
wards the  opposite  faction  again  prevailed,  a  Spartan  fleet  made  its 
appearance,  the  popular  leaders  and  the  friends  of  Athens  were 
banished  or  put  to  death.  For  the  next  thirty  years  or  more  following 
that  event  little  is  known  of  Rhodian  history.  After  the  destruction 
of  the  Spartan  navy,  Rhodes  with  most  of  the  .Egean  isles  returned 
to  the  Athenian  confederacy,  and  we  may  fairly  presume  that  a  new 
democratical  revolution  was  effected  in  the  island  during  that  period. 
But  in  the  year  35S  a  rupture  of  a  most  serious  kind  took  place 
between  Rhodes  and  Athens,  pregnant  with  disastrous  consequences 
to  both.  This  was  the  breaking  out  of  the  Social  war,  the  immediate 
causes  of  which  are  obscurely  reported  to  us,  though  there  is  suffi- 
cient evidence  to  show,  that  the  provocation  to  revolt  proceeded 
from  the  misconduct,  or  at  least  the  imprudence  of  the  Athenians 
themselves. 

We  learn  from  various  parts  of  Demosthenes,  especially  from  the 
Oration  on  the  Chersonese,  (p.  105.)  how  the  Athenian  commanders 
at  this  period,  sent  out  with  inadequate  forces  and  supplies,  were 
tempted  or  driven  to  commit  irregularities,  amounting  often  to  acts 
of  plunder  and  violence,  in  order  to  maintain  their  armaments  or 
carry  on  their  wars.     Not  confining  their  aggressions  to  the  enemies 


1  The  speech  of  Demosthenes  ^as  so  far  successful,  that  it  calmed  the 
excitement  of  the  Athenians ;  and  they  were  content  to  make  a  show  of 
preparation,  without  adopting  any  actual  measures  of  war.  In  the 
following  Oration  he  refers  with  some  satisfaction  to  this  result. 


190  THE    ORATIONS    OF    DEMOSTHENES. 

of  Athens,  or  even  to  neutrals,  they  harassed  the  allies,  Ly  extorting 
from  them  loans  and  contributions,  and  thus  brought  the  name  of 
their  country  into  general  odium  and  discredit.  It  seems  that  Chares, 
having  the  command  of  a  fleet  destined  to  act  against  Amphipolis, 
and  conceiving  himself  to  hold  large  discretionary  powers,  sailed  to 
Rhodes,  and  by  his  vexatious  and  arbitrary  proceedings  so  irritated 
the  people,  that  they  were  ready  on  the  first  opportunity  to  throw  off 
their  connexion  with  Athens.  The  islands  of  Cos  and  Chios  had 
been  alienated  from  the  Athenians  by  similar  causes,  and  desired  to 
recover  their  independence.  These  three  states  entered  into  a  league 
with  Byzantium,  which  in  fact  had  been  meditated  some  years  before, 
and  raising  a  fleet  powerful  enough  set  the  Athenians  at  defiance, 
commenced  the  Social  war,  which,  after  a  three  years'  continuance, 
was  terminated  (as  we  have  seen)  by  a  peace  humiliating  to  Athens, 
b.c.  355. 

In  the  course  of  this  war  the  allies  received  assistance  from  Mausolus, 
king  of  Caria.  He  had  formed  the  design  of  annexing  Rhodes  to 
his  own  dominions,  to  which  it  was  so  conveniently  adjacent ;  but 
there  was  little  hope  of  accomplishing  this  purpose,  unless  he  could 
sever  it  from  the  Athenian  alliance.  The  oligarchical  party  in  Ehodes, 
still  watching  for  a  new  revolution,  were  easily  brought  over  to  his 
views;  and  at  the  close  of  the  war  a  Carian  garrison  was  introduced  into 
the  island,  which  established  the  oligarchy,  and  in  effect  brought  the 
island  in  subjection  to  a  foreign  yoke.  The  Rhodians  had  no  hopes  of 
recovering  their  liberty ;  they  had  lost  the  protection  of  a  powerful 
state;  while  Mausolus  could  obtain  effectual  aid  from  the  Persian  king, 
whose  vassal  he  was,  and  to  whom  it  was  important  to  acquire  any  of 
the  islands  near  Asia  Minor.  Mausolus  died  in  the  year  b.c.  353,  and 
was  succeeded  by  his  queen  Artemisia.  In  her  reign  the  government 
of  Rhodes  became  oppressive  to  the  people ;  who  at  length  resolving 
to  throw  off  their  yoke,  sent  a  deputation  tn  Athens,  to  implore  her 
assistance.  These  petitioners,  who  were  not  very  favourably  received 
at  Athens,  found  an  advocate  in  Demosthenes. 

3  was  natural  to  expect,  that  there  would  be  a  strong  feeling  at  Athens 
against  a  people  who  had  deeply  injured  her.  A  very  few  years  had 
elapsed  since  the  Social  war,  and  the  events  were  fresh  in  the  memory 
of  all.  To  overcome  this  feeling  of  resentment  was  the  principal 
difficulty  which  an  advocate  of  the  Rhodian  people  had  to  encounter. 
Demosthenes  appeals  to  the  higher  and  nobler  feelings  of  his  country- 
men. Motives  of  honour,  generosity  and  compassion  should  in- 
fluence Athenians :  it  was  not  worth  while  to  remember  the  wrongs 
done  them  by  so  insignificant  a  people  as  the  Rhodian;  they  should 
consider  only  what  was  due  from  them  to  Athens  and  to  Greece.  It 
was  their  duty  as  well  as  their  interest,  to  vindicate  the  liberties  of  a 
Greek  people  under  oppression,  and  more  especially  to  defend  the 
cause  of  popular  government  against  oligarchs  and  tyrants.  Unless 
they  did  so,  their  own  constitution  might  soon  be  in  danger;  for 
there  was  a  perpetual  strife  going  on  between  oligarchy  and  demo- 
cracy, and,  if  all  other  democracies  were  put  down,  the  Athenian  must 
be  assailed  at  last.  It  was  urged  on  the  other  side,  that  interference 
with  Ehodes   might  provoke   the    hostility  of  the    Persian  king. 


OX    THE    LIBERTY    OK    THE    RHODIAXS.  191 

Demosthenes  contends,  that  the  loss  of  Rhodes,  which  did  not 
properly  belong  to  him.  was  not  likely  to  provoke  the  king ;  that  ia 
the  present  stute  of  the  Persian  empire  both  he  and  Artemisia  would 
probably  remain  neutral :  but  that  at  all  events  the  Athenians  ought 
to  espouse  the  cause  of  the  Ehodian  people,  even  at  the  risk  of 
Persian  hostility. 

1  thixk,  men  of  Athens,  that  on  a  consultation  of  such 
moment  you  ought  to  grant  liberty  of  speech  to  every  one 
of  your  advisers.  For  my  own  part,  I  have  never  thought 
it  difficult  to  make  you  understand  right  counsel — for  to 
speak  plainly,  you  seem  all  to  possess  the  knowledge  your- 
selves— but  to  persuade  you  to  follow  it  I  have  found  dif- 
ficult ;  for  when  any  measure  has  been  voted  and  resolved, 
you  are  then  as  far  from  the  performance  as  you  were  from 
the  resolution  before. 

One  of  the  events,  for  which  I  consider  you  should  be 
thankful  to  the  Gods,  is  that  a  people,  who  to  gratify  their 
own  insolence  went  to  war  with  you  not  long  ago,  now  place 
their  hopes  of  safety  in  you  alone.  "Well  may  we  be  rejoiced 
at  the  present  crisis  :  for  if  your  measures  thereupon  be 
wisely  taken,  the  result  will  be,  that  the  calumnies  of  those 
who  traduce  our  country  you  will  practically  and  with  credit 
and  honour  refute.  The  Chiang,  Byzantines,  and  Ehodians, 
accused  us  of  a  design  to  oppress  them,  and  therefore  com- 
bined to  make  the  last  war  against  us.  It  will  turn  out,  that 
Mausolus,  who  contrived  and  instigated  these  proceedings, 
pretending  to  be  a  friend  of  the  Ehodians,  has  deprived  them 
of  their  liberty ;  the  Chiang  and  Byzantines,  who  called  them 
allies,  have  not  aided  them  in  misfortune  :  whilst  you.  whom 
they  dreaded,  are  the  only  people  who  have  wrought  their 
deliverance.  And,  this  being  seen  by  all  the  world,  you  will 
cause  the  people  in  every  state  to  regard  your  friendship  as 
the  token  of  their  security  :  nor  can  there  be  a  greater  bless- 
ing for  you,  than  thus  to  obtain  from  all  men  a  voluntary 
attachment  and  confidence. 

I  marvel  to  see  the  same  persons  advising  you  to  oppose 
the  king  on  behalf  of  the  Egyptians,1  and  afraid  of  him  in  the 

1  This  can  have  no  reference  to  the  expedition,  conducted  by  the 
king  in  person,  when  by  aid  of  the  Greek  mercenaries  he  finally  con- 
quered Egypt.  For  that  expedition  certainly  took  place  at  a  later 
period,  though  the  exact  date  is  a  matter  of  controversy.  See  Thirl- 
wall's   History   of  Greece,  vol.  vi.  p.  142,  note  2.     It  appears  from 


192  THE    ORATIONS   OF   DKMOSTHENES. 

matter  of  the  Bhodian  people.  All  men  know,  that  the  latter 
are  Greeks,  the  former  a  portion  of  his  subjects.  And  I  think 
some  of  you  remember,  that,  when  you  were  debating  about 
the  king's  business,  I  first  came  forward  and  advised — nay,  I 
was  the  only  one,  or  one  of  two,  that  gave  such  counsel — 
that  your  prudent  course  in  my  opinion  was,  not  to  allege 
your  quarrel  with  the  king  as  the  excuse  for  your  arming,  but 
to  arm  against  your  existing  enemies,  and  defend  yourselves 
against  him  also,  if  he  attempted  to  injure  you.  Nor  did  T 
offer  this  advice  without  obtaining  your  approval;  for  you 
agreed  with  me.  Well  then  :  my  reasoning  of  to-day  is  con- 
sistent with  the  argument  on  that  occasion.1     For,  would  the 

Diodovus,  that  there  had  been  various  attempts  made  by  Artaxerxes  to 
recover  Egypt,  and  it  is  likely  enough  that  the  Egyptian  king  applied 
to  Athens  for  succour,  and  that  the  question  of  granting  succour  was  dis- 
cussed at  Athens.  The  Athenians  however  appear  to  have  abstained  from 
all  interference,  not  wishing  to  violate  their  treaty  of  peace  with  Persia. 
Chabrias  indeed  was  appointed  to  command  the  fleet  of  Tachos  in 
361  b.c,  but  Diodorus  expressly  states  that  he  was  not  sent  out  by  his 
country,  but  went  as  a  volunteer  at  the  solicitation  of  Tachos.  On  the 
last  occasion,  when  Artaxerxes  applied  to  Athens  for  assistance  against 
Egypt,  the  Athenians  refused  it,  but  promised  neutrality  The  passage 
of  Diodorus  above  referred  to  is  in  lib.  xvi.  s.  40,  and  the  words  are 
as  follows  : — "  The  Egyptians  having  revolted  from  Persia  at  a  former 
period,  Artaxerxes  Ochus,  not  liking  war,  remained  himself  inactive, 
but  despatched  troops  and  generals,  and  incurred  numerous  failures  by 
the  cowardice  and  ignorance  of  his  commanders.  Wherefore  he  was 
despised  by  the  Egyptians,  but  forced  to  submit,  by  reason  of  his  in- 
dolence and  love  of  peace.  At  this  crisis  however,  as  the  Phoenicians 
and  princes  of  Cyprus  had  followed  the  example  of  the  Egyptians,  and 
broken  into  rebellion  out  of  contempt  for  his  authority,  he  was  roused 
to  anger  and  resolved  on  war  with  his  revolted  subjects.  He  decided 
not  to  commission  generals,  but  to  contend  in  person  for  the  preserva- 
tion of  his  empire."  It  appears  from  another  circumstance  in  the  nar- 
rative of  Diodorus,  that  the  king  had  not  commenced  his  final  invasion 
of  Egypt  when  this  speech  was  delivered.  It  did  not  take  place, 
according  to  the  historian,  till  after  he  had  given  orders  for  the  expedi- 
tion against  Cyprus ;  but  those  orders  were  given  to  Idrieus,  after  he 
had  succeeded  to  the  kingdom  of  Caria,  which  was  at  the  close  of  the 
year  351 ;  and  at  the  time  of  the  speech  Artemisia  was  alive.  There  is 
a  great  difficulty  attending  the  inference  that  we  must  draw  from 
Diodorus,  that  the  king  only  once  invaded  Egypt  in  person  ;  for  it  is 
not  only  inconsistent  with  the  express  statement  of  Isocrates,  quoted  by 
Thirl  wall  in  the  passage  above-mentioned,  but  it  is  not  easily  recon- 
cilable with  the  language  of  Demosthenes  La  this  Oration,  (below, 
page  194.) 

1  The  argument  runs  thus — I  advised  you  then  [in  the  last  Oration] 


ON   THE    LIBERTY    Ot    J"HE    KUODIAKS.  193 

king  take  me  to  his  counsels,  I  should  advise  him  as  I  advise 
you,  in  defence  of  his  own  possessions  to  make  war  upon  any 
Greeks  that  opposed  him,  but  not  to  think  of  claiming  domi- 
nions to  which  he  had  no  manner  of  title.  If  now  it  be  your 
general  determination,  Athenians,  to  surrender  to  the  king  all 
places  that  he  gets  possession  of,  whether  by  surprise,  or  by 
deluding  certain  of  the  inhabitants,  you  have  determined,  in 
my  judgment,  unwisely :  but  if  in  the  cause  of  justice  you 
esteem  it  your  duty,  either  to  make  war,  if  needful,  or  to 
suffer  any  extremity ;  in  the  first  place,  there  will  be  the  less 
necessity  for  such  trials,  in  proportion  as  you  are  resolved  to 
meet  them ;  and  secondly,  you  will  manifest  a  spirit  that 
becomes  you. 

That  I  suggest  nothing  new,  in  urging  you  to  liberate  the 
Rhodians — that  you  will  do  nothing  new,  in  following  my 
counsel — will  appear,  if  I  remind  3^011  of  certain  meastires 
that  succeeded.  Once,  0  Athenians,  you  sent  Timotheus  out 
to  assist  Ariobarzanes,1  annexing  to  the  decree,  "  that  he  was 

not  to  declare  war  against  Persia,  because  such  war  would  have  been 
aggressive,  and  attended  with  serious  difficulties.  At  the  same  time  I 
recommended  you  to  make  defensive  preparations,  as  the  surest  means 
of  averting  hostilities  on  the  side  of  Persia,  or  defeating  them  if  under- 
taken. I  now  advise  you  to  assist  the  Khodians,  on  the  same  principle 
that  I  counselled  measures  of  defence ;  because  they  are  a  Greek  people, 
with  whom  the  Persian  king  has  no  right  to  interfere.  It  is  not  his 
interest  to  interfere  with  them,  if  he  sees  you  in  earnest  (as  you  ought 
to  be)  for  their  defence :  so  I  should  tell  him  myself,  if  I  were  his 
adviser  :  and  therefore  I  calculate  he  will  be  neutral. 

The  state  of  the  Persian  empire  at  this  time  fully  justified  the  calcu- 
lation of  Demosthenes.     See  the  last  note. 

1  Ariobarzanes,  satrap  of  Phrygia,  was  concerned  in  the  rebellion  of 
B.C.  362.  See  p.186,  note.  It  seems  that,  in  soliciting  Athenian  aid, 
which  he  obtained  the  more  easily  on  account  of  his  connexion  with  the 
state — he  having  received  the  honour  of  citizenship — Ariobarzanes  had 
concealed  the  object  of  his  preparations ;  and  therefore  the  Athenians. 
in  sending  Timotheus,  took  the  precaution  of  restricting  his  powers  in 
the  way  mentioned  by  the  orator.  Timotheus,  in  return  for  some 
service  which  he  had  done,  was  helped  by  the  satrap  to  get  possession  of 
Sestus  and  Crithote  in  the  Chersonese.  Cornelius  Nepos  praises  the 
Athenian  general,  because,  instead  of  getting  any  private  recompense 
from  Ariobarzanes,  he  had  looked  only  to  the  advantage  of  his  country ; 
while  Agesilaus,  who  had  gone  out  on  the  same  service,  took  a  pecu- 
niary reward  for  himself.  Timotheus  then  proceeded  to  besiege  Samos, 
which  was  occupied  by  a  Persian  garrison,  and  took  it  in  the  course  of 
the  following  year.     Isocrates  the  orator,  who  acted  as  the  secretary  of 

VOL.  I.  O 


194  THE    ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

not  to  infringe  your  treaty  with  the  king."'  Tirnotheus,  seeing 
that  Ariobarzanes  had  openly  revolted  from  the  king,  and 
that  Sarnos  was  garrisoned  by  Cyprothemis,  under  the  ap- 
pointment of  Tigranes,  the  king's  deputy,  renounced  the 
intention  of  assisting  Ariobarzanes,  but  invested  the  island 
with  his  forces  and  delivered  it.  And  to  this  day  there  has 
been  no  war  against  you  on  that  account.  Men  will  not 
fight  for  aggressive  purposes  so  readily  as  for  defensive.  To 
resist  spoliation  they  strive  with  all  their  might ;  not  so  to 
gratify  ambition  :  this  they  will  attempt,  if  there  be  none  to 
hinder  them  ;  but,  if  prevented,  they  regard  not  their  oppo- 
nents as  having  done  them  an  injury. 

My  belief  is,  that  Artemisia  would  not  even  oppose  this 
enterprise  now,1  if  our  state  were  embarked  in  the  measure. 
Attend  a  moment  and  see,  whether  my  calculation  be  right 
or  wrong.  I  consider — were  the  king  succeeding  in  all  his 
designs  in  Egypt,  Artemisia  would  make  a  strenuous  effort 
to  get  Rhodes  into  his  power,  not  from  affection  to  the  king, 
but  from  a  desire,  while  he  tarried  in  her  neighbourhood.2 
to  confer  an  important  obligation  upon  him,  so  that  he 
might  give  her  the  most  friendly  reception  :    but  since  he 

Timotheus,  was  at  the  siege  of  Samos,  and  praises  the  general  for 
having  taken  it  with  little  or  no  cost  to  Athens. 

The  occupation  of  Samos  hy  the  Persians  was  an  infringement  of  the 
peace  of  Antalcidas,  hy  the  terms  of  which  the  Greek  islands  were  to 
he  independent.  Therefore  the  conduct  of  Timotheus,  in  wresting 
Samos  from  Persia,  afforded  an  apt  illustration  for  the  argument  of 
Demosthenes. 

'  Leland  erroneously  translates  this  as  follows:  "Xor  do  1  think 
that  Artemisia  will  act  contrary  to  these  principles."  The  position  of 
of  the  word  ci)5e  shows  this  to  be  wrong.  Jacobs  renders  it :  Glaube 
irh  nun  aber,  doss  Artemisia  der  Stadt.  u-^nn  sie  sick  au/ dieses 
Unternehmen  evnliesse,  heinen  W ider stand  thun  wiirde. 

2  These  words,  ■n\Ji\mov  aiirris  SiarpifiovTos  eKeivuv.  which  are  loosely 
rendered  by  most  translators,  suppose  the  case  of  Artaxerxes  having 
conquered  E^ypt  in  person.  In  that  event  he  would  be  brought  nearer 
to  Caria,  than  if  he  had  remained  at  Susa.  Then  would  Demosthenes 
put  this  case  here,  if  he  had  not  heard  of  an  expedition  conducted  by 
the  king  in  person?  One  can  hardly  think  he  would.  Leland  and 
other  critics,  assuming  that  Demosthenes  speaks  of  the  final  invasion 
which  led  to  the  conquest  of  Egypt,  explain  the  words,  irparrovros  ws 
\lytTcu  koX  Si^aapT'^Koros,  by  suggesting  that  false  rumours  may  have 
come  to  Athens.  This  however  does  not  solve  the  whole  difficulty;  and 
it  seems  more  probable,  that  there  were  two  occasions  on  which  Arta- 
xerxes marched  in  person  against  Egypt.     See  p.  191,  note. 


ON    THE    LIBERTY    OF    THE    RHODIANS.  V3l 

fares  as  they  report,  having  miscarried  in  his  attempts,  she 
judges  that  this  island — and  so  the  fact  is — would  be  of  no 
further  use  to  the  king  at  present,  but  only  a  fortress  to  over- 
awe her  kingdom  and  prevent  disturbances.  Therefore  it 
seems  to  me,  she  would  rather  you  had  the  island,  without 
her  appearing  to  have  surrendered  it,  than  that  he  should 
obtain  possession.  I  think  indeed,  she  will  send  no  suc- 
cours at  all,1  but,  if  she  do,  they  will  be  scanty  and  feeble. 
As  to  the  king — what  he  will  do,  I  cannot  pretend  to  know ; 
but  this  I  will  maintain,  that  it  is  expedient  for  Athens  to 
have  it  immediately  understood,  whether  he  means  to  claim 
the  Rhodian  city  or  not :  for,  if  he  should,  you  will  have  to 
deliberate  not  on  the  concerns  of  Rhodes  only,  but  on  those 
of  Athens  and  all  Greece. 

Even 2  if  the  Rhodians,  who  are  now  in  the  government, 
had  held  it  by  themselves,  I  would  not  have  advised  you  to 
espouse  their  cause ;  not  though  they  promised  to  do  every- 
thing for  you.  But  I  see,  that  in  the  beginning,  in  order  to 
put  down  the  democracy,  they  gained  over  a  certain  number 
of  citizens,  and  afterwards  banished  those  very  men,  when 
they  had  accomplished  their  purpose.  I  think  therefore, 
that  people  who  have  been  false  to  two  parties,3  would  be  no 
steadier  allies  to  you.  And  never  would  I  have  proffered  this 
counsel,  had  I  thought  it  would  benefit  the  Rhodian  peopk 
only ;  for  I  am  not  their  state-friend,4  nor  is  any  one  of  them 
connected  with  me  by  ties  of  private  hospitality.  And  even 
if  both  these  causes  had  existed,  I  would  not  have  spoken, 
unless  I  had  considered  it  for  your  advantage.  Indeed,  as 
far  as  the  Rhodians  are  concerned,  if  the  advocate  for  their 

1  To  the  Ehodian  government,  in  case  of  Athenian  interference :  aa 
Schaefer  rightly  explains  it. 

2  Leland  mistranslates  this :  "  Yet,  were  these  Ehodians  who  now 
possess  the  city  strong  enough  to  maintain  their  possession,  I  should 
not  have  advised  you  to  grant  them  aid:"  as  if  Demosthenes  actually 
did  advise  the  Athenians  to  aid  the  Ehodian  government.  And  then 
he  has  a  long  note,  which  is  transcribed  by  Jacobs,  to  explain  this  mis- 
translation. The  meaning  of  Demosthenes  is  as  follows  : — If  this  had 
been  a  question  not  between  Ehodes  and  a  foreign  power,  but  only 
between  the  Ehodian  government  and  the  popular  party,  still  I  would 
have  advised  you  to  side  with  the  latter  against  the  former. 

3  /.  e.  to  the  people  at  large,  and  to  the  select  few  whom  they  asso- 
ciated with  themselves  in  the  first  instance. 

*  See  p.  97,  note  2. 

02 


196  THE    ORATION'S    OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

deliverance  may  be  allowed  to  say  so.  T  am  rejoiced  at  what 
has  happened — that,  after  grudging  to  you  the  recover}-  of 
your  rights,  they  have  lost  their  own  liberty  ;  and,  when  they 
might  have  had  an  alliance  on  equal  terms  with  Greeks  and 
their  betters,  they  are  under  subjection  to  barbarians  and 
slaves,  whom  they  have  admitted  into  their  fortresses.1  I 
would  almost  say.  that,  if  you  determine  to  assist  them,  these 
events  have  turned  out  for  their  good.  For.  during  pro- 
sperity. I  doubt  whether  they  would  have  learned  discretion, 
being  Rhodians;2  but  since  they  are  taught  by  experience, 
that  folly  is  mightily  injurious  to  men,  they  may  possibly 
perhaps  become  wiser  for  the  future ;  and  this  I  think  would 
be  no  small  advantage  to  them.  I  say  therefore,  you  should 
endeavour  to  rescue  these  people,  and  not  harbour  resent- 
ment, considering  that  you  too  have  often  been  deceived  by 
miscreants,  but  for  no  such  deceit  would  you  allow  that  you 
merited  punishment  yourselves. 

Observe  also,  men  of  Athens,  that  you  have  wa<red  many 
wars  both  against  democracies  and  against  oligarchies — this 
indeed  you  know  without  my  telling — but  for  what  cause  you 
have  been  at  war  with  either,  perhaps  not  one  of  you  con- 
siders. What  are  the  causes  I  Against  democratical  states 
your  wars  have  been  either  for  private  grievances,  when  you 
could  not  make  public  satisfaction,  or  for  territory,  or  boun- 

1  Yitruvius  relates  a  stratagem,  by  which  Artemisia  got  complete 
dominion  of  Rhodes.  The  Rhodians  had  plotted  with  a  party  in 
Halicarnassus  to  overthrow  the  Carian  government,  and  sent  a  fleet 
with  troops  to  assist  in  the  execution  of  their  design.  The  troops 
landed  and  advanced  to  the  city,  where  the  inhabitants  were  ranged 
under  the  walls  as  if  to  give  them  a  friendly  reception.  But  this  was 
done  by  order  of  Artemisia,  who  had  discovered  the  plot  and  laid  an 
ambush  for  the  Rhodians.  They  were  surrounded  and  slain.  Artemisia 
took  their  ships,  and  put  a  Carian  force  on  board,  which  sailing  to 
Rhodes,  and  being  mistaken  by  the  people  for  their  own  armament 
returning,  got  possession  of  the  Rhodian  capital.  If  the  story  be  weil 
founded,  the  occurrence  was  probably  later  than  this  Oration,  which 
refers  to  no  act  of  hostility  between  the  Rhodians  and  the  ruler  of 
Caria.  It  should  be  noticed,  that  besides  the  capital  city  of  Rhodes, 
there  were  other  considerable  and  much  more  ancient  towns  in  the 
island,  Lindus,  Ialysus,  and  Camirus. 

2  Homer  calls  the  Rhodians  aytpixot,  which  is  translated  magnam'mi 
or  siiperbi,  and  seems  to  be  a  term  of  praise.  Though  the  orator 
speaks  sligb.tinglj'  of  them,  they  became  celebrated  for  their  commerce 
and  their  laws. 


OK    THE   LIBERTY   OF   THE    RHODIA>-S.  197 

daiies,  or  a  point  of  honour,  or  the  leadership  :  against 
oligarchies,  for  none  of  these  matters,  but  for  your  constitu- 
tion and  freedom.  Therefore  I  would  not  hesitate  to  say.  I 
think  it  better  that  all  the  Greeks  should  be  your  enemies 
■with  a  popular  government,  than  your  friends  under  oligar- 
chial. For  with  freemen  I  consider  you  would  have  no  diffi- 
culty in  making  peace  when  you  chose;  but  with  people 
under  an  oligarchy  even  friendship  I  hold  to  be  insecure.  It 
is  impossible  that  the  few  can  be  attached  to  the  many,  the 
seekers  of  power  to  the  lovers  of  constitutional  equality. 

I  marvel  none  of  you  conceive — when  the  Chiaus  and 
Mitylenseans  are  governed  by  oligarchies,  when  the  Rhodians 
and  nearly  all  people  are  about  being  drawn  into  this  slavery 
— that  our  constitution  is  in  the  same  peril  :  and  none 
consider,  it  is  impossible,  if  all  establishments  are  on  the  prin- 
ciple of  oligarchy,  that  they  will  let  your  democracy  alone. 
They  know  too  well,  that  no  other  people  will  bring  things 
back  to  the  state  of  liberty  :  therefore  they  will  wish  to 
destroy  a  government,  from  which  they  apprehend  mischief 
to  themselves.  Ordinary  doers  of  wrong  you  mav  regard  as 
euemies  to  the  sufferers  only  ;  they  that  subvert  constitutions 
and  transform  them  into  oligarchies  must  be  looked  upon, 
I  say.  as  the  common  enemies  to  all  lovers  of  freedom.  And 
besides,  men  of  Athens,  it  is  right  that  you,  liviug  under  self- 
government,  shotdd  show  the  same  feeling  for  a  free  people  in 
misfortune,  that  you  would  expect  others  to  have  for  you  in 
case  of  a  similar  calamity  ;  which  I  trust  may  never  befal  ! 
Though  indeed  it  may  be  said  that  the  Rhodians  have  had 
their  deserts,  the  occasion  is  not  a  fit  one  for  triumph  :  the 
fortunate  should  always  be  seen  to  interest  themselves  for  the 
benefit  of  the  unfortunate,  since  the  future  is  uncertain  to 
all  men.1 

I  often  hear  it  said  before  this  assembly,  that,  when  our 
commonwealth  was  in  misfortune,  certain  people  were  soli- 
citous   for    its   preservation ;     among   whom — I    will   here 

1  The  Melian  orator,  in  the  debate  written  by  Thucydides,  warns  the 
Athenians  not  to  be  cruel  and  oppressive  to  others,  for  fear  of  retaliation 
at  some  future  time  ;  lest,  rendering  no  mercy,  they  should  find  none. 
Demosthenes  recommends  a  still  higher  policy,  to  succour  the  unfor- 
tunate; to  win  golden  opinions  in  the  hour  of  prosperity,  and  secure 
friends  against  the  day  of  misfortune. 


198  THE    ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHEXES. 

mention  a  little  circumstance  of  the  Argives  alone.1  I  would 
not  have  you,  famous  as  you  have  ever  been  for  succouring 
the  distressed,  appear  in  a  matter  of  this  kind  inferior  to  the 
Argives:  who,  inhabiting  a  country  adjacent  to  the  Lacedae- 
monians, seeing  them  to  have  dominion  over  land  and  sea,  did 
not  fear  or  hesitate  to  show  their  attachment  to  you,  but  even 
passed  a  vote — when  ambassadors  had  come  from  Lacedaemon 
(as  we  are  told)  to  demand  certain  Athenian  refugees — that, 
unless  they  departed  before  sunset,  they  should  be  adjudged 
enemies.  Would  it  not  be  disgraceful,  my  countrymen,  if, 
when  the  commons  of  Argos  dreaded  not  the  power  and 
empire  of  the  Lacedaemonians  in  those  times,  you,  who  are 
Athenians,  should  be  frightened  at  a  person  of  barbarian 
origin,  and  a  woman  too  ?  They  indeed  might  allege,  that 
they  have  often  been  defeated  by  the  Lacedaemonians :  whereas 
you  have  often  vanquished  the  king,  and  not  once  been 
defeated  either  by  the  king  himself  or  by  his  subjects  ;  for,  if 
ever  the  king  has  obtained  an  advantage  over  our  state,  he 
has  obtained  it  in  this  way — and  in  no  other — by  bribing  the 
betrayers  of  Greece  and  the  basest  of  her  people.  And  even 
such  advantage  has  not  benefited  him.  At  the  veiy  time,  when 
he  had  enfeebled  Athens  by  aid  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  you 
will  find  him  struggling  for  his  kingdom  with  Clearchus  and 
Cyras.*  Thus  he  has  neither  beaten  us  openly,  nor  done  him- 
self any  good  by  his  intrigues.  There  are  some,  I  observe, 
who  are  used  to  slight  Philip  3  as  a  person  of  no  account,  but 

1  This  occurred  soon  after  the  Peloponnesian  war,  when  Athens  was 
under  the  dominion  of  the  thirty  tyrants,  and  a  large  number  of  Athe- 
nian citizens  were  compelled  to  seek  safety  in  exile. 

2  It  \>as  to  the  pecuniary  assistance  of  Persia,  obtained  by  the 
management  of  Lysander,  that  the  Spartans  were  mainly  indebted  for 
their  success  in  the  Peloponnesian  war.  A  few  years  afterwards  Cyrus, 
who  had  been  most  active  in  the  Spartan  cause,  marched  from  his 
province  in  Asia  Minor  to  contend  for  the  crown  with  his  brother 
Artaxerxes.  Clearchus  commanded  the  Greek  mercenaries  in  his 
service.  The  death  of  Cyrus,  who  was  slain  charging  at  the  head  oi 
his  troops  in  the  battle  of  Cunaxa,  delivered  Artaxerxes  and  his  king- 
dom from  further  danger.  This  expedition  is  the  subject  of  Xenophon's 
Anabasis.  The  retreat  of  the  ten  thousand  Greeks,  (after  the  treacherous 
murder  of  their  generals,)  under  the  skilful  conduct  of  Xenophon 
himself,  is  one  of  the  most  interesting  pieces  of  Grecian  history. 

3  About  a  year  only  had  elapsed  since  the  speaking  of  the  first 
Philippic.  "Whatever  effect  that  speech  may  have  produced  at  the  time, 
it  seems  to  have  made  no  lasting  impression.     The  inaction  of  Philip 


D>"   THE    LIBERTY    OF   THE    RHODIAN'S.  199 

dread  the  king  as  an  enemy  terrible  to  any  that  he  chooses. 
However,  if  we  are  not  to  oppose  the  one,  because  he  is  con- 
temptible, and  yield  everything  to  the  other,  because  he  is 
formidable,  against  whom  shall  we  take  the  field,  0  Athenians? 
There  are  persons  here,  men  of  At  liens,  famous  for  advo- 
cating the  rights  of  others  against  you ;  to  whom  I  would 
give  one  little  piece  of  advice — to  undertake  the  defence  of 
your  rights  against  others,  that  they  may  set  an  example  of 
dutiful  conduct.  It  is  absurd  for  any  one  to  instruct  you  in 
the  principles  of  justice,  without  acting  justly  himself:  and  it 
is  not  just,  that  a  citizen  should  have  considered  the  argu- 
ments against  you,  and  not  the  arguments  in  your  favour. 
Look  you,  I  pray  !  How  happens  it  there  is  none  in  Byzan- 
tium, who  will  admonish  them  not  to  take  possession  of 
Chalcedon,1  which  belongs  to  the  king,  and  you  held  it  once, 
and  by  no  manner  of  title  is  it  theirs  ? — also  that  they  are 
not  to  make  Selymbria,2  a  city  formerly  in  your  alliance, 
tributary  to  themselves,  and  that  Byzantium  is  not  to  deter- 
mine the  limits  of  the  Selymbrian  territory,  contrary  to  the 
oaths  and  the  treaties,  by  which  it  is  declared  that  the  cities 
shall  be  independent  ?  And  none  has  there  been  to  advise 
Mausolus  in  his  lifetime,  none  since  his  death  to  advise  Arte- 
misia, not  to  seize  upon  Cos3  and  Rhodes  and  other  Grecian 

in  the  two  following  years  relieved  the  Athenians  from  any  immediate 
apprehension  of  danger.  They  were  roused  to  new  alarm  by  the 
rupture  of  Philip  with  Olynthus. 

1  Chalcedon,  founded  by  the  Aiegarians  on  the  Asiatic  coast  of  the 
Bosphorus,  was  called  the  city  of  the  blind,  because  the  settlers  had 
overlooked  the  more  beautiful  spot  on  the  European  coast,  where  after- 
wards Byzantium  (site  of  the  modern  Constantinople)  was  built.  The 
fate  of  Chalcedon,  like  many  other  towns  similarly  situated,  was  to  fall 
alternately  under  the  dominion  of  Persia,  Athens,  and  Lacednemon. 
It  wa-  taken  from  the  Lacedaemonians  by  Alcibiades,  but  surrendered  to 
Lysander  after  the  decisive  battle  of  .Egos-Potanios.  The  peace  of 
Antaicidas  restored  it  to  Persia.  At  this  time  the  Byzantines,  who  had 
acquired  considerable  power  since  the  Social  war,  were  endeavouring  to 
draw  it  over  to  their  alliance. 

2  Selymbria  is  on  the  Propontine  coast,  between  Byzantium  and 
Perinthua. 

3  The  island  of  Cos,  celebrated  as  the  birthplace  of  Hippocrates 
the  physician  and  Apelles  the  painter,  lies  a  little  off  the  coast  of 
Curia,  not  :ar  from  Halicarnassus.  It  is  mentioned  in  the  Oration  on 
the  Peace,  lhat  Cos.  Chios,  and  Rhodes  were  seized  npon  by  the  Carian 
government      (See  p.  80.)     Shortly  before  this  time  the  city  of  Cos  had 


2(J0  THE    ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

cities,  which  the  king  their  master  ceded  by  his  treaty  to  the 
Greeks,  and  for  which  the  Greeks  of  chat  period  sustained 
numerous  perils  and  honourable  contests.  Or,  if  they  have 
both  of  them'  such  a  monitor,  yet  seemingly  there  are  none 
to  follow  his  advice. 

I  esteem  it  a  just  measure,  to  restore  the  Rhodian  demo- 
cracy :  yet,  granting  it  were  not  just,  when  I  look  at  the 
conduct  of  these  people,  I  conceive  it  right  to  advise  the 
measure.2  And  why  1  Because,  0  Athenians,  if  all  men 
were  inclined  to  observe  justice,  it  would  be  disgraceful  for 
us  alone  to  refuse;  but,  when  all  the  rest  are  seeking  the 
power  to  do  wrong,  for  us  to  profess  high  principle  and 
undertake  no  enterprise,  would  in  my  opinion  be  not  justice, 
but  cowardice.  I  see  that  men  have  their  rights  allowed 
them  in  proportion  to  their  power  :  of  which  I  can  produce 
an  example  familiar  to  you  all.  There  are  two  treaties 
between  the  Greeks  and  the  king ;  that  which  our  republic 
made,  which  is  universally  praised,  and  this  latter  one,  con- 
cluded by  the  Lacedaemonians,  which  is  the  subject  of  com- 
plaint.3    And  the  definition  of  rights  in  both  the  treaties  is 

been  rebuilt  on  a  scale  of  great  splendour,  and  had  become  one  of  the 
richest  and  most  beautiful  in  Greece. 

1  I.e.  the  Byzantines  and  Artemisia. 

2  Demosthenes  may  seem  here  to  be  setting  up  expediency  against 
right  and  justice  ;  but  his  reasoning,  properly  understood,  does  not 
amount  to  this.  He  means  to  say — in  the  politics  of  nations  it  is  im- 
possible, that  the  same  rules  of  justice,  which  ought  to  regulate  the 
conduct  of  individuals  towards  each  other,  can  be  strictly  applied.  To 
a  great  people,  in  order  that  they  may  perform  their  duty  to  weaker 
states  and  administer  justice  on  a  large  scale,  the  maintenance  of  power 
is  essential.  They  must  not  permit  their  neighbours,  because  they  are 
nominally  at  peace  with  them,  to  commit  aggressions  upon  neutral  states. 
The  end  of  such  acquiescence  would  be  the  destruction  of  their  own 
empire.  Such  is  the  principle  on  which  in  modern  times  our  own  and 
other  governments  have  frequently  gone  to  war,  to  preserve  the  balance 
of'  power  in  Europe.  To  apply  this  argument  to  the  present  case  — 
Persia  has  a  treaty  of  peace  with  Athens:  therefore  Athens  ought  not 
to  attack  Persia.  But  Persia  has  oppressed  Rhodes :  therefore  Athens 
may  break  the  treaty  with  Persia,  because  Persia  has  committed  an 
injustice,  tending  (at  least  in  its  remote  consequence)  to  ruin  Athens. 
In  reality  the  protection  of  Rhodes  against  Persia  is  not  an  act  of 
injustice  ;  but  granting  for  argument's  sake  that  it  is,  Athens  has  done 
right  in  committing  it;  and  the  discus"' in  about  justice  or  injustice  is 
nothing  but  a  verbal  dispute. 

3  The  first  :f  these  treaties  is  supposed  to  be  the  peace  of  Cimon, 


ON    THE    LIBERTY    OF   THE    RHODIANS.  201 

not  the  same.  For,  although  private  political  rights  aro 
granted  by  the  laws  impartially  to  all,  the  same  for  the  weak 
ns  for  the  strong ;  the  rule  of  Hellenic  right  is  prescribed  by 
the  greater  powei's  to  the  less. ' 

Since  then  it  is  your  fixed  resolution  to  pursue  a  just 
policy,2  you  must  look  that  you  have  the  means  to  carry  it 

according  to  which  the  Greek  cities  on  the  coast  of  Asia  Minor  were 
made  independent,  the  Persian  king  was  precluded  from  approaching 
the  coast  within  the  distance  of  a  day's  journey  on  horseback,  and  from 
sending  any  ship  of  war  between  the  Cyanean  islands  at  the  mouth  of 
the  Bosphorus  and  the  Chelidonian  islands  off  the  Lycian  coast. 
Whether  this  peace  was  made  after  the  battle  of  the  Eurymedon,  gained 
by  Cimon  over  the  Persians  b.  c.  466.  or  after  his  expedition  to  Cyprus 
B.C.  449,  has  been  a  matter  of  controversy ;  and  some  historians  have 
doubted  whether  such  a  peace  was  ever  made. 

The  second  of  the  treaties  here  referred  to  is  the  peace  cf  Antalcidas, 
negotiated  by  the  Lacedaemonians  b.c.  387 ;  according  to  which  the 
Greek  cities  were  to  be  independent,  Sparta  retaining  her  dominions  in 
Peloponnesus,  and  Athens  keeping  only  Lemnos,  Imbrus,  and  Seyms; 
the  Greek  cities  of  Asia,  and  the  islands  of  Cyprus  and  Clazomense 
were  acknowledged  to  belong  to  the  Persian  empire.  The  Lacedae- 
monians, by  sacrificing  the  Asiatic  Greeks  to  Persia,  detached  that 
monarchy  from  the  Athenian  alliance,  and  were  enabled  to  maintain 
their  own  ascendancy  over  the  Grecian  states. 

1  The  argument  is  thus  pursued — In  national  affairs  right  follows 
might.  An  illustration  of  this  is  afforded  by  the  two  treaties  with 
Persia.  In  each  case  the  various  claims  and  questions  of  right  were 
settled  upon  a  different  plan,  and  according  to  a  different  rule.  This 
proves  that  there  can  be  no  fixed  principle  of  international  justice,  by 
which  the  relations  of  different  states  to  each  other  can  be  immutably 
preserved.  The  civil  law  of  everv  free  country  prescribes  a  uniform  rule 
of  right  and  justice  for  all.  But  there  is  no  such  rule  in  the  law  of 
nations,  as  experience  demonstrates. 

2  This  observation  is  in  accordance  with  the  argument  as  above 
explained.  He  assumes  that  his  countrymen  were  sincerely  desirous  of 
acting  on  the  principle  of  justice,  but  contends  that  they  could  not 
carry  out  their  purposes  by  abstaining  from  interference  with  other 
nations.  If  they  espoused  the  cause  of  the  oppres.-ed,  they  would  be 
looked  up  to  and  respected  as  the  patrons  of  freedom ;  if  they  kept 
aloof,  they  would  be  despised,  and  their  allies  would  gradually  fall  away 
from  them.  Jacobs  translates  this  clause:  DaEvch  nun  die  Kenntniss 
dessen,  was  zu  thun  redd  ist,  nicht  mangelt.  Leland  and  Francis  read 
nal  iroiitv.  Leland  has  :  "  You  assume  the  character  of  arbitrators  and 
defenders  of  justice."  Francis:  "It  becomes  the  dignity  of  your 
character  to  determine  those  bounds  [of  justice]  for  others,  and  to  act 
in  consequence  of  that  determination."  Pabst  follows  Jacobs  ;  but  their 
version  of  z-yvoiKtvai  ttoiuv  is  incorrect.  Keiske  and  Schaefer  explain  it 
rightly. 


202  THE   ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

out.  Such  means  you  will  possess,  if  you  are  supposed  to  bo 
the  common  protectors  of  Grecian  liberty.  It  is,  doubtless, 
very  difficult  for  jov.  to  adopt  proper  measures.  The  rest  of 
mankind  have  one  battle  to  fight,  namely,  against  their 
avowed  enemies  :  if  they  conquer  those,  nothing  hinders  them 
accomplishing  their  desires.  You,  Athenians,  have  a  double 
contest ;  that  which  the  rest  have,  and  also  another,  prior  to 
that,  and  more  arduous  :  for  you  must  in  council  overcome  a 
faction,  who  act  among  you  in  systematic  opposition  to  the 
state.  Since  therefore  through  these  men  it  is  impossible 
for  any  good  measure  to  be  effected  without  a  struggle, 
the  natural  consequence  is  that  you  lose  many  advantages. 
Perhaps  the  chief  cause  wny  so  many  adopt  this  line  of 
politics  without  scruple,  is  the  support  afforded  them  by  their 
hirers  :  at  the  same  time  you  are  yourselves  chargeable  with 
blame.  You  ought,  0  Athenians,  to  hold  the  same  opinion 
concerning  the  post  of  civil  duty,  as  you  hold  concerning  the 
military.  What  is  that  1  You  consider  that  one,  who  deserts 
the  post  assigned  by  his  general,  should  be  degraded  and 
deprived  of  constitutional  privileges.1  It  is  right  therefore, 
that  men  who  desert  the  political  post  received  from  their 
ancestors,  and  support  oligarchical  measures,  should  be  dis- 
abled to  act  as  your  counsellors.  Among  your  allies  you 
regard  those  to  be  the  most  attached,  who  have  sworn  to  have 
the  same  friends  and  enemies  with  yourselves ;  and  yet  of 
your  statesmen  you  esteem  those  the  most  faithful,  who  to 
your  certain  knowledge  have  sided  with  the  enemies  of 
Athens. 

However — matter  of  accusation  against  these  men,  matter 
of  censure  against  the  people,  is  not  hard  to  discover :  the 
difficulty  is  to  know,  by  what  counsels  or  what  conduct  our 
present  evils  may  be  repaired.  This  perhaps  is  not  the  occa- 
sion to  speak  of  all :  could  you  only  give  effect  to  your  policy 
by  some  useful  effort,  things  in  general  perhaps,  one  after 
another,  would  go  on  improving.  My  opinion  is,  that  you 
should   take   this   enterprise   vigorously   in   hand,    and   act 

1  An  Athenian  who  deserted  the  army  in  time  of  war  was  liable  to 
prosecution  by  a  process  called  AenrocT parioh  ypa<p7].  One  who  deserted 
his  post  or  rank  was.  liable  to  a  \enroTa£tov  ypa<p->].  A  conviction  for 
either  of  such  offences  wa3  followed  by  disfranchisement,  ari/xia.  The 
Generals  were  the  presiding  magistrates,  who  took  cognizance  of  these 
matters. 


OX    THE    LIBERTY    OF    THE   RHODIAX3.  203 

worthily  of  the  state,  remembering,  that  you  love  to  hear 
men  praise  your  ancestors  and  recount  their  exploits  and 
speak  of  their  trophies.  Consider  then,  your  forefathers 
erected  these,  not  that  you  may  view  and  admire  them  only 
but  that  you  may  imitate  also  the  virtues  of  the  dedicators.' 


1  The  speech  of  Demosthenes  produced  no  effect.     Athens  abstaine 
from  interference  ;  the  Rhodians  continued  under  the  government  of  a 
oligarchy,  and  subjection  to  Caria.    (See  pp.  80  and  167  of  this  volume. 
Artemisia  died  soon  after  the  delivery  of  this  Oration,  having  reigned 
two  years.     She  is  said  to  have  been  inconsolable  for  the  death  of  her 
husband  Mausolus,  whose  ashes  she  drank  dissolved  in  scented  water, 
and  to  whose  memory  she  paid  the  most  extravagant  honours.     The 
monument  which  she  erected  was  so  magnificent  as  to  be  considered 
one  of  the  wonders  of  the  world :  and  from  this  the  name  of  Mau- 
soleum has  been  applied  to  all  sepulchres  built  on  a  grand  scale.     She 
invited  the  most  eminent  literary  men  to  her  court,  and  offered  a  reward 
for  the  best  funeral  panegyric.     Theopompus  the  historian,  a  native  of 
Chios,  and  pupil  of  Isocrates,  gained  the  prize.   Artemisia  was  succeeded 
on  the  throne  by  her  brother  Idrieus,  who  reigned  seven  yeare 


204  THE    ORATIONS    OF    DEMOSTHENES. 


THE  ORATION  FOR  THE  MEGALOPOLITANS. 


THE    ARGUMENT. 

Megalopolis  was  an  Arcadian  city  near  the  frontiers  of  Laconia.  It  was 
founded  in  the  rear  b.c.  371,  and,  being  designed  for  the  metropolis  of 
the  whole  Arcadian  people,  who  then  united  themselves  into  one 
body,  it  was  built,  on  a  scale  of  magnitude  corresponding  with  that 
purpose,  having  a  circumference  of  more  than  six  miles,  and  received 
the  name  of  the  great  city.  IsText  to  Athens,  it  is  said  to  have  been 
the  most  beautiful  city  in  Greece.  The  population  was  obtained  by 
migration  from  the  existing  Arcadian  towns,  no  less  than  forty 
of  which  were  required  to  contribute  to  it.  Most  of  these  were 
entirely  deserted  'by  their  inhabitants,  others  were  reduced  to  the 
condition  of  villages  dependent  on  Megalopolis.  A  supreme  council 
of  ten  thousand,  taken  from  the  whole  Arcadian  body,  held  their 
public  deliberations  in  the  capital.  About  half  a  century  afterwards, 
when  it  was  besieged  by  Polysperchon.  there  were  found  to  be  fifteen 
thousand  citizens  capable  of  bearing  arms  in  its  defence. 

The  chief  object  of  building  this  metropoli-  was,  to  establish  a  per- 
manent unioo  among  the  Arcadians  and  preserve  their  national 
independence.  Before  that  time,  the  Arcadians  as  a  body  had 
very  little  influence  in  the  affairs  of  Peloponnesus,  though  they 
occupied  a  large  portion  of  its  territory.  They  had  generally  been 
in  the  alliance  of  Sparta,  whose  armies  they  strengthened  by  a  brave 
and  hardy  race  of  soldiers.  It  was  therefore  the  policy  of  Sparta  to 
keep  them  feeble  and  divided  among  themselves.  In  the  time  of  the 
Peloponnesian  war  Mantinea,  then  the  principal  city  of  Arcadia, 
formed  a  small  confederacy  among  her  neighbours,  renounced  her 
connexion  with  the  Lacedaemonians,  and  joined  an  offensive  alliance 
with  Athens  and  Argos.  But  this  was  soon  put  an  end  to.  The 
Mantineans  were  compelled,  by  the  success  of  the  Lacedaemonian 
arms,  to  abandon  their  confederacy ;  and  at  a  later  period,  b.c  387, 
paid  dearly  for  their  disaffection  to  Sparta,  by  having  their  city 
dismantled  and  being  dispersed  into  villages. 

The  defeat  of  the  Spartans  at  Leuctra  changed  the  aspect  of  affairs  in 
Greece.  The  prestige  of  ancient  victory  was  gone ;  and  it  was  soon 
found  that  the  vast  alliance,  of  which  Sparta  had  been  the  head,  ana 
which  had  enabled  her  for  many  years  to  give  the  law  to  Greece, 
would  crumble  almost  entirely  away.  One  of  the  first  effects  of  this 
change  in  Peloponnesus  was  the  rebuilding  of  Mantinea,  which  was 
soon  followed  by  the  establishment  of  Megalopolis.  But  the  heaviest 
blow  to  the  pride  and  power  of  Lacedasmon  was  the  loss  of  her 
ancient  province  of  Messenia,  which  for  more  than  three  centuries 


FOR   THE   MEGAL0P0LITAN8.  205 

had  oeen  the  fairest  portion  of  her  domain.  Whether  the  Arcadians 
could  have  maintained  their  independence  against  Sparta  without 
foreign  aid,  may  perhaps  be  doubted  ;  but  this  last  revolution  was 
wholly  due  to  the  arms  of  Thebes  and  the  genius  of  Epaminondas. 

That  general,  having  assembled  a  large  army  in  Bceotia,  marched  across 
the  isthmus  and  was  joined  in  Arcadia  by  his  Peloponnesian  allies. 
At  the  head  of  an  overpowering  force  he  invaded  and  ravaged 
Laconia.  Troops  of  divers  people — who  not  many  years  before  had 
followed  the  Lacedaemonians  in  their  wars,  or  would  hardly  have 
dared  to  face  them  in  the  field — Thebans,  Phocians,  Locrians, 
Euboeans,  Thessalians,  Acarnanians,  Argives,  Arcadians,  Eleans, 
marched  now  almost  without  opposition  to  the  gates  of  Sparta;  and 
nothing  but  the  shadow  of  the  Spartan  name  preserved  that  haughty 
capital  from  destruction.  Epaminondas  did  not  venture  to  make 
a  general  assault  upon  the  town,  but,  after  continuing  his  ravages  for 
some  time  longer,  proceeded  to  execute  his  well-laid  scheme,  which 
he  rightly  judged  would  reduce  Sparta  to  the  condition  of  a  second 
or  third-rate  power  in  Greece. 

The  Messenian  population  had  long  been,  like  the  Laconian  helots,  in 
a  state  of  vassalage  to  Sparta,  but  were  ripe  for  insurrection  at  any 
favourable  opportunity,  as  they  had  proved  during  the  Athenian 
occupation  of  Pylus.  The  march  of  Epaminondas  into  Laconia  was 
the  signal  for  a  universal  rising  of  that  people,  who  were  now  again 
to  form  a  nation,  and  to  build  a  capital  city  under  the  protection  of 
the  Theban  general.  But  it  was  not  only  the  existing  inhabitants 
of  the  country,  by  whom  this  task,  of  reconstituting  the  nation,  was 
to  be  accomplished ;  for  which,  after  their  long  servitude,  they  might 
not  have  been  so  well  fitted  by  themselves.  Messenian  exiles  from 
every  quarter,  and  especially  those  of  Naupactus,  who  had  been 
expelled  after  the  Peloponnesian  war,  and  migrated  to  Sicily  and 
Africa,  were  invited  to  return  to  their  ancient  home,  and  assist  in 
the  glorious  restoration.  It  has  been  mentioned  as  a  remarkable 
example  of  the  love  of  country,  that  these  exiles,  during  so  long  an 
absence,  had  jealously  preserved  their  ancestral  usages  and  the 
purity  of  their  original  language.  They  returned  in  great  numbers 
and  formed  the  nucleus  of  a  Messenian  government.  The  new 
city  was  founded  on  the  site  of  the  ancient  Ithome,  Epaminondas 
laying  the  first  stone,  and  received  the  name  of  Messene.  This  was 
b.c.  369. 

The  humiliation  of  Sparta  was  now  complete.  She  had  no  power  to 
disturb  the  new  settlement.  She  was  hemmed  in  by  a  chain  of 
enemies,  who  cut  off  her  communication  with  Peloponnesus  ;  by  the 
Messenians  on  the  west,  the  Arcadians  and  Argives  on  the  north. 
Her  war  with  Thebes  continued  for  eight  more  years.  The  succour 
of  Athens  and  her  few  remaining  allies  saved  her  from  further  dis- 
asters ;  and  the  death  of  her  great  enemy,  Epaminondas,  brought  on 
a  general  peace,  b.c.  361. 

From  the  negotiations  of  this  peace  the  Lacedaemonians  kept  aloof, 
refusing  to  acknowledge  the  independence  of  Messenia,  which  they 
regarded  as  a  deep  disgrace  to  themselves.  Their  spirit,  though 
depressed,  was  not  extinguished ;  and  they  only  waited  for  an  oppor- 


-  THE    ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

tnnity  of  recovering  their  lost  dominion.  Archidamus,  son  of 
Agesilaus,  who  had  acquired  honour  in  the  late  war  by  the  tearless 
victory,  (in  which  he  defeated  the  Arcadians  and  Argives  without 
losing  a  single  Spartan  life,)  kept  alive  the  ambitious  hopes  of  his 
countrymen,  and  continually  stimulated  them  to  fresh  exertions.  He 
was  a  man  of  ardent  character  j  to  recover  Messenia  was  the  principal 
object  of  his  desire ;  in  which  he  had  even  been  encouraged  by 
a  pamphlet  of  lsocrates,  entitled  Archidamus,  and  still  extant.  In 
the  conrse  of  seven  or  eight  years  events  occurred  which  favoured  the 
views  of  this  prince.  There  had  been  disturbances  in  Arcadia.  The 
Sacred  war  had  broken  out,  in  which  the  principal  parties  were  Phocis 
and  Thebes.  An  obstinate  struggle  was  yet  going  on ;  neither  party 
had  gained  any  decisive  advantage,  and  both  were  greatly  weakened. 
The  Phocian  generals  had  carried  the  war  into  the  enemy's  country ; 
some  of  the  Boeotian  towns  had  been  taken ;  and  the  Thebans,  dis- 
tressed at  home,  and  burdened  with  heavy  expenses,  seemed  no  longer 
in  a  condition  to  assist  their  Peloponnesian  allies. 

Under  these  circumstances,  about  the  year  353,  Archidamus  thought  the 
time  had  arrived  to  effect  a  counter-revolution,  which  should  restore 
the  influence  of  his  country.  His  real  aim  was  the  destruction 
of  Megalopolis  and  Messene.  But  to  avow  this  purpose,  or  attempt 
to  execute  it  without  further  pretext  than  the  desire  to  satisfy 
Spartan  ambition,  might  have  drawn  on  him  the  hostility  of  those 
s,  which  were  unconnected  with  the  Theban  alliance.  Accord- 
in-,-  v.  he  conceived  the  idea  of  announcing  a  principle,  which  would 
t  a  certain  advantages  to  the  states  hostile  to  Thebes,  and  induce 
them  to  concur  in  his  own  scheme  of  aggrandizement.  He  gave  it 
out,  that  ancient  rights  ought  to  be  resumed;  that  Athens  should 
have  Oropus,  the  towns  of  Thespise,  Plataea,  and  Orchomenus  should 
be  restored ;  Elis  and  Phlius  should  have  certain  claims  conceded  to 
them.  While  he  published  these  declarations,  he  kept  in  the  back 
ground  that  portion  of  the  scheme,  in  which  Sparta  was  interested, 
viz.  the  recovery  of  Messenia  and  the  dissolution  of  the  Arcadian 
union. 

Notwithstanding  all  the  care  which  Archidamus  took  to  conceal  his 
views,  they  could  not  fail  to  be  apparent ;  and  it  was  soon  understood 
that  the  warlike  preparations  in  Laconia  were  designed  against 
Megalopolis.  Two  embassies  were  sent  at  the  same  time  to  Athens, 
one  by  the  Spartans,  and  one  by  the  Megalopolitans,  each  to  solicit 
assistance  in  the  approaching  war.  The  Spartan  ambassadors  re- 
minded the  Athenians  of  their  former  alliance,  and  showed  what 
advantage  would  accrue  to  them  from  the  plan  of  Archidamus,  by 
which  Thebes  their  old  enemy  would  be  depressed.  The  Megalo- 
politan  deputies  urged  the  justice  of  their  own  cause,  and  the  danger 
that  would  result  from  the  revival  of  Spartan  supremacy. 

There  were  many  speakers  on  both  sides  in  the  Athenian  assembly. 
Demosthenes  espoused  the  cause  of  the  Megalopolitans,  and  delivered 
what  Auger  pronounces  to  be  one  of  the  most  subtle  of  his  orations. 
He  begins  bv  condemning  the  warmth  with  which  both  parties  had 
assailed  their  auversaries.  It  became  them,  (he  argues,)  without  any 
feeling  or  prejudice  for  or  against  either  of  the  contending  states,  to 


FOR    THE    MEGALC  POLITAXS.  2»)7 

decide  the  question  by  reference  to  ^istiee  and  the  good  of  Athena 
Justice  required  that  no  people  should  be  oppressed  by  another. 
Their  alliance  with  Sparta  had  been  based  on  that  principle,  and 
they  had  saved  her  from  ruin ;  but  if  Sparta  commenced  ambitious 
enterprises  inconsistent  with  the  spirit  of  their  alliance,  they  were 
justified  in  breaking  it  off  It  -was  the  interest  of  Athens,  that 
neither  Sparta  nor  Thebes  should  be  too  powerful.  The  dissolution 
of  Megalopolis  would  lead  to  the  re-conquest  of  Messenia.  and  that 
would  destroy  the  balance  of  power  in  Peloponnesus.  The  advantage 
offered  to  Athens  might  be  obtained  in  a  more  honourable  manner, 
without  sacrificing  the  Peloponnesians :  and  as  to  Thebes,  it  was 
better  to  weaken  her  by  conferring  an  obligation  upon  her  allies,  and 
attaching  them  to  Athens,  than  by  allowing  them  to  suffer  injustice. 

It  appears  to  me,  0  Athenians,  that  both  are  in  fault,  they 
who  have  spoken  for  the  Arcadians  and  they  -who  have  spoken 
for  the  Lacedaemonians.  For  as  if  they  were  deputies  from 
either  people,  not  citizens  of  Athens,  to  which  both  direct 
then'  embassies,  they  accuse  and  attack  one  another.  This 
might  be  the  duty  of  the  envoys  ;  but  to  speak  independently 
on  the  question,  and  consider  your  interests  dispassionately, 
was  the  part  of  men  who  presume  to  offer  counsel  here.  I 
really  think — Betting  aside  the  knowledge  of  their  persons 
and  their  Attic  tongue — many  would  take  them  for  either 
Arcadians  or  Laconians. 

I  see  how  vexatious  a  thing  it  is  to  advise  for  the  best. 
For  when  you  are  carried  away  by  delusion,  some  taking  one 
view  and  some  another;  if  any  man  attempts  to  advise  a 
middle  course,  and  you  are  too  impatient  to  listen,  he  will 
please  neither  party  and  fall  into  disgrace  with  both.  How- 
ever, if  this  be  my  case,  I  will  rather  myself  be  thought  a 
babbler,  than  leave  you  to  be  misled  by  certain  people,  con- 
trary to  my  notion  of  Athenian  interests.  On  other  points 
I  will  speak,  with  your  permission,  afterwards;  but  will  begin 
with  principles  admitted  by  all,  and  explain  what  I  consider 
your  wisest  course. 

"Well  then  :  no  man  will  deny  it  to  be  good  for  Athens, 
that  both  the  Lacedaemonians  and  our  Thxban  neighbours 
shotdd  be  weak.  But  things  are  in  this  sort  of  position,  if  we 
may  form  a  conjecture  from  the  statements  repeatedly  made 
in  our  assembly — the  Thebans  will  be  weakened  by  the  reesta- 
blishnient  of  Orchomenus,1  Thespise,  andPlatsea;  the  Lacedse- 

1  The  Bceotian  cities  were  at  an  early  period  connected  by  a  federal 
union,  each  having  an  independent  government.  Thebes  was  at  their 
head,  and  received  a  council  of  deputies  from  the  league.     Every  state 


-   >8  THE    ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

monians  will  grow  powerful  again,  if  they  subdue  Arcadia  and 
take  Megalopolis.  We  must  mind  therefore,  that  we  suffer 
not  the  one  people  to  wax  mighty  and  formidable,  before  the 
other  has  become  weak  :  that  the  power  of  Laceda?mon  do 
not  increase  (unremarked  by  us)  in  a  greater  degree  than  it 
is  well  for  that  of  Thebes  to  be  reduced.  For  we  shall  hardly 
say  this,  that  we  should  like  to  have  Lacedaemonians  instead 
of  Thebans  for  our  rivals.  It  is  not  this  we  are  anxious  for, 
but  that  neither  may  have  the  means  of  injuring  us  :  so  shall 
we  enjoy  the  best  security. 

But  granting  this  ought  to  be  so  l — it  were  scandalous  for- 
sooth, to  take  those  men  for  allies,  against  whom  we  were 
arrayed  at  Man  tinea,  and  then  to  assist  them  against  the 
people,  with  whom  we  shared  the  peril  of  that  day.  I  think 
so  too,  but  with  one  addition — '•  provided  the  others  are 
willing  to  act  justly."    If  all  will  choose  to  observe  peace,  we 

appointed  a  Boeotarcb,  who  took  his  share  of  military  command  and 
some  other  executive  duties.  In  process  of  time  Thebes  asserted  an  im- 
perial authority  over  the  federal  cities  and  mo>t  of  them  were  compelled 
to  submit.  Plata?a  espoused  the  alliance  of  Athens,  and  for  a  long 
lime  enjoyed  her  protection,  but  in  the  Peloponnesian  war  fell  a  victim 
to  Theban  revenge.  The  exiles  returned  and  rebuilt  the  city  after  the 
peace  of  Antalcidas,  but  it  was  again  destroyed  by  the  Thebans  b.c.  373. 
Thespia?  was  destroyed  about  the  same  time:  having  long  been  suspected 
of  disaffection  to  Thebes  and  favour  to  Athens.  The  Thebans  had  dis- 
mantled its  waMs  in  the  Peloponnesian  war.  though  the  flower  of  the 
Thespian  youth  had  fallen  in  their  cause  at  the  battle  of  Delium. 
Orchomenus  was  taken  and  depopulated  by  the  Thebans  b.c  3i3S.  They 
bad  resolved  on  that  measure  some  years  before,  but  were  induced  by 
Epaminondas  to  change  their  intention.  Afterwards,  being  alarmed  by 
a  conspiracy  of  certain  Orehomenian  exiles,  they  fell  upon  the  city, 
massacred  the  adult  citizens,  and  sold  the  women  and  children  for 
slaves.  During  the  Phocian  war,  and  shortly  before  or  after  the  date  of 
this  Oration,  Orchomenus  was  seized  upon  by  the  Phocian  general, 
Onomarchus,  and  occupied  as  a  fortified  post.  At  the  close  of  that  wai 
it  was  delivered  by  Philip  to  the  Thebans,  who  razed  it  10  the  ground 
After  the  battle  of  Chseronea  Philip  caused  all  these  three  cities, 
Plata?a.  Thespia?.  and  Orchomenus,  to  be  restored. 

Viz.  that  neither  Lacedaemonians  nor  Thebans  should  be  powerful 
&c.  Most  of  the  translators  seem  to  have  neglected  the  word  5eIV  in 
this  clause.  Jacobs  has  :  Aier  dieaca  AUea  rugcgt&en.  Auger:  "Nona 
conviendrons  peut-tkre  de  ce  point."  Pabst  and  Francis  commit  the 
same  error.  Leland  errs  only  in  giving  too  much  force  to  SetV :  "  But  it 
will  be  said — yes  '.  this  is  indeed  a  point  of  utmost  moment." 

The  force  of  the  argument  is  not  impaired  by  this  trifling  error.  But 
inattention  to  minutiae  sometimes  leads  to  considerable  mistakes ;  and 
I  therefore  notice  it  for  the  sake  of  the  student. 


FOR    THE    MEGALOPOLITAXS.  20$ 

shall  not  help  the  Megalopolitans  ;  for  there  will  be  no  neces- 
sity ;  and  thus  we  shall  be  in  no  opposition  to  our  fellows  in 
arms  :  one  people  are,  as  they  profess,  our  allies  already,  the 
other  will  become  so  now.  And  what  more  could  we  desire  'I 
But  should  they1  attempt  injustice  and  determine  on  war — 
then — if  this  be  the  only  question,  whether  we  ought  or  ought 
not  to  abandon  Megalopolis  to  the  Lacedaemonians,  although 
it  would  be  unjust,  I  concede  the  point;  let  things  take  their 
course,  don't  oppose  your  former  partners  in  danger  :  but  if 
you  all  know,  that  after  taking  that  city  they  will  march  to 
attack  Messene.  let  any  of  the  speakers  who  are  now  so  hard 
upon  the  Megalopolitaus  tell  me,  what  in  that  case  he  will 
advise  us  to  do.  None  will  declare.  However,  you  all  know, 
that  you  would  be  obliged  to  support  them,  whether  these 
men  recommend  it  or  not,  both  by  the  oaths  that  we  have 
sworn  to  the  Messenians,2  and  because  it  is  expedient  that 
their  city  should  be  preserved.  Reflect  therefore  in  your 
minds,  whether  it  would  be  more  noble  and  generous,  to  begin 
your  resistance  to  Lacedaemonian  aggression  with  the  defence 

1  I.e.  the  Lacedaemonians ;  whom  the  orator  does  not  expressly 
name,  because  they  are  uppermost  in  his  mind,  since  the  clause  ending 
tUv  kripwv. 

-  This  engagement  was  probably  entered  into  at  the  general  peace, 
which  was  concluded  after  the  battle  of  Mantinea,  and  by  which  the 
Athenians,  as  well  as  other  states  of  Greece,  recognised  the  independence 
of  Messenia.  Pausanias  mentions,  that  at  this  time,  when  the  assistance 
of  Athens  was  prayed  for  by  the  Messenians,  it  was  promised  in  the 
event  of  a  Spartan  invasion. 

It  is  quite  clear  from  the  argument  of  Demosthenes,  that  the  claim.-; 
of  Megalopolis  upon  the  Athenians  stood  upon  a  different  footing  from 
those  of  Messene,  not  being  grounded  upon  any  former  alliance.  Yet 
in  the  narrative  of  Diodorus,  XV.  94,  we  read  that  the  Athenians  sent 
a  body  of  troops  under  Pammenes  to  quell  an  insurrection  in  Arcadia, 
which  broke  out  in  about  a  years  time  after  the  peace,  and  threatened 
to  dissolve  the  Megalopolitan  community ;  that  Pammenes  reduced  the 
malcontents  to  submission,  and  compelled  those  who  had  seceded  from 
Megalopolis,  and  gone  back  to  their  ancient  homes,  to  return  to  the 
capital.  The  name  of  Pammenes,  a.  distinguished  Theban  general  and 
colleague  of  Epaminondas,  pretty'  well  indicates  (as  Thirl  wall  has 
remarked)  that  07jj8aiW  ought  to  he  read  in  Diodorus  instead  of 
'Adr^valovs.  Besides,  (independently  of  the  proof  afforded  by  this 
Oration,)  what  could  be  more  improbable,  than  that  the  Megalopolitans 
should  so  soon  after  the  battle  of  Mantinea  request  the  assistance  of 
Athens,  their  opponent  ]  (Jn  the  other  hand,  what  more  probable,  thau 
that  they  should  solicit  the  aid  of  Thebes,  their  ally? 
VOL.  I.  » 


310  THE   ORATIONS   OF   DEMOSTHE>"ES. 

of  Megalopolis,  or  with  that  of  Messene.  You  will  now  be 
considered  as  protectors  of  the  Arcadians,  and  striving  for  the 
maintenance  of  that  peace,  for  which  you  exposed  yourselves 
in  the  battle-field  :  whereas  then  it  will  be  manifest  to  the 
world,  that  you  desire  Messene  to  stand  not  so  much  for  the 
sake  of  justice,  as  for  fear  of  Lacedaemon.  Our  purposes  aud 
our  actions  should  always  he  just ;  but  we  must  also  be  careful, 
that  they  are  attended  with  advantage. 

There  is  an  argument  of  this  kind  urged  by  my  opponents, 
that  we  should  attempt  to  recover  Oropus,1  and,  if  we  now 
make  enemies  of  the  men  who  would  assist  us  to  gain  it.  we 
shall  have  no  allies.  I  also  say.  we  should  tiy  to  recover 
Oropus  :  but.  that  Lacedaemon  will  be  our  enemy,  if  we  join 
alliance  with  the  Arcadians  who  wish  to  be  our  friends,  they 
of  all  men,  I  consider,  are  not  at  liberty  to  assert,  who  per- 
suaded you  to  assist  the  Lacedaemonians  in  their  hour  of 
langer.  The  men  who  argue  thus  actually  persuaded  you — 
vhen  all  the  Peloponnesiaus  *  came  to  Atheus  and  desired  to 
narch  with  you  against  the  Lacedaemonians — to  reject  their 

'  Oropus  was  on  the  confines  of  Attica  and  Bceotia,  on  the  coast  oppo- 
site Ereiria  in  Euboea.  It  anciently  belonged  to  Athens,  but  frequently 
changed  masters.  In  the  twentieth  year  of  the  Peloponnesian  war  it 
was  betrayed  to  the  Boeotians  and  Eretrians.  It  became  independent  at 
the  close  of  the  war:  but  a  few  years  after,  the  Thebans  took  adrantage 
of  some  internal  disturbances  to  seize  upon  the  city,  which  they  re- 
moved nearly  a  mile  from  the  coast,  and  annexed  to  the  Boeotian  con- 
federacy. A  new  revolution  some  time  after  restored  it  to  Athens.  But 
in  the  year  366  b.c  Themison,  ruler  of  Eretria,  got  possession  of  it  by 
the  aid  of  some  exiles.  The  Athenians  marched  against  him,  but.  the 
Thebans  also  making  their  appearance  with  an  army,  they  were  induced 
to  leave  Oropus  under  Theban  protection,  until  the  dispute  could  be 
amicably  settled.  The  Thebans  however  kept  it  in  their  own  hands : 
and  so  it  remained  until  after  the  battle  of  Chseronea,  when  Philip  gave 
it  up  to  the  Athenians. 

2  This  statement  accords  not  with  the  narrative  of  Xenophon.  who 
makes  no  mention  of  such  an  application  to  Athens,  though  he  states 
that  the  Athenians  invited  a  congress  to  their  own  city,  which  was 
attended  by  many  of  the  Peloponnesians.  Diodorus  however  relates,  that 
in  the  second  year  after  the  battle  of  Leuctra  the  Spartans  sent  a  force  into 
Arcadia,  and  took  possession  of  Orchomenus  ;  that  they  were  afterwards 
defeated  by  Lycomedes  of  Mantinea,  but  the  Arcadians,  still  fearing 
the  power  of  Sparta,  even  after  they  had  been  joined  by  the  Eleans  and 
Argives,  sent  an  embassy  for  assistance  to  Athens.  Tin  Athenians 
having  refused  their  request,  they  applied  to  the  Thebans,  who  sent  an 
army  under  Epaminondas  and  Pelopidas. 


FOR    THE    MEGALOPOL1TAXS.  Hil 

Overtures,  (ou  which  accouut,  as  a  last  resource,  they  applied 
to  Thebes,)  and  to  contribute  money  and  risk  your  lives  for 
the  safety  of  Lacedaemon.  You  would  hardly,  I  think,  have 
been  disposed  to  save  them,  had  they  told  you,  that  after  their 
deliverance,  unless  you  suffered  them  to  have  their  own  way 
and  commit  injustice  again,  they  should  owe  you  no  thank? 
for  your  protection.  And  indeed,  however  repugnant  it  may 
be  to  the  designs  of  the  Spartans,  that  we  should  adopt  the 
Arcadian  alliance,  surely  their  gratitude,  for  having  been 
saved  by  us  in  a  crisis  of  extreme  peril,  ought  to  outweigh 
their  resentment  for  being  checked  in  their  aggression  now. 
How  then  can  they  avoid  assisting  you  to  gain  Oropus,  or 
being  thought  the  basest  of  mankind  1  By  the  gods  I  can- 
not see. 

I  wonder  also  to  hear  it  argued,  that,  if  we  espouse  the 
Arcadian  alliance  and  adopt  these  measures,  our  state  will  be 
chargeable  with  inconstancy  and  bad  faith.  It  seems  to  me, 
0  Athenians,  the  reverse.  Why  1  Because  no  man,  I  appre- 
hend, will  question,  that  in  defending  the  Lacedaemonians,  and 
the  Thebans '  before  them,  and  lastly  the  Euboeans,2  and 
making  them  afterwards  her  allies,  our  republic  has  always 
had  one  and  the  same  object.  What  is  that  1  To  protect 
the  injured.  If  this  be  so,  the  inconstancy  will  not  be  ours, 
but  theirs  who  refuse  to  adhere  to  justice ;  and  it  will  appear, 
that  while  circumstances  change,  through  people  continually 
encroaching,  Athens  changes  not. 

It  seems  to  me,  the  Lacedaemonians  are  acting  the  part  of 
very  crafty  men.  For  now  they  say,  that  the  Eleans  ought 
to  recover  a  certain  part  of  Triphylia,3  the  Phliasians  Trica- 

'  He  alludes  to  the  war  that  followed  the  seizure  of  the  Cadmea, 
commenced  by  the  invasion  of  Cleombrotus  b.c.  378.  See  the  Historical 
Abstract. 

-  When  the  Thebans  attempted  to  get  possession  of  the  island.  See 
the  Oration  on  the  Chersonese,  p.  113. 

3  Triphylia  was  a  small  province  on  the  Cyparissian  bay,  between 
Elis  and  Messenia.  Concerning  this  there  had  been  many  disputes 
between  the  Eleans  and  the  Arcadians.  The  chief  town  was  Lepreum-, 
which  in  the  Peloponnesian  war  became  the  cause  of  a  rupture  between 
Elis  and  Sparta.  The  Eleans  had  assisted  Lepreum  against  the 
Arcadians,  on  condition  of  receiving  half  the  Leprean  territory  :  for 
which  the  Lepreans  afterwards  paid  a  sort  of  rent  or  tribute  of  one 
talent  to  Olympian  Jupiter.  On  their  refusing  to  pay  this  during  the 
war  the  matter  was  referred  to  Sparta,  who  decided  in  favour  of  the 

p  2 


212  THE    ORATIONS  OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

ranurn.1  certain  other  Arcadians  their  territory,  and  we 
Oropns  :  not  from  a  desire  to  see  us  each  possessing  our  own 
— far  from  this — it  would  be  late  for  them  to  have  become 
generous — but  to  make  it  appear  as  if  they  helped  all  to 
recover  their  claims,  so  that,  when  they  march  themselves  to 
attack  Messene.  all  these  people  may  readily  join  and  assist 
them,  or  be  deemed  ungrateful,  after  having  obtained  their 
concurrence  in  the  question  of  then-  own  several  claims,  for 
not  returning  the  obligation.  My  opinion  is,  first,  that  our 
state,  even  without  sacrificing  any  Arcadian  people  to  the 
Lacedaemonians,  may  recover  Oropus,  both  with  their  aid,  if 
they  are  willing  to  be  just,  and  that  of  others  who  hold  that 
Theban  usurpation  ought  not  to  be  tolerated.  Secondly, 
supposing  it  were  evident  to  us,  that,  unless  we  permit  the 
Lacedaemonians  to  reduce  the  Peloponnese.  we  cannot  obtain 
possession  of  Oropus,  allow  me  to  say.  I  deem  it  more  advi- 
sable to  let  Oropus  alone,  than  to  abandon  Messene  and 
Peloponnesus  to  the  Lacedaemonians.  I  imagine,  the  question 
between  us  and  them  would  soon  be  about  other  matters. 
However — I  will  forbear  to  say  what  occurs  to  me — only 
I  think,  we  should  in  many  respects  be  endangered. 

L^preans:  whereupon  the  Eleans  ■went  over  to  the  alliance  of  Argos  and 
Athens.  In  the  year  B.C.  356,  the  Arcadians  were  in  possession  of 
Triphylia.  when  a  body  of  their  exiles  who  had  fled  to  Elis  assisted  the 
Eleans  to  surprise  Lasion,  one  of  the  Triphylian  towns.  A  war  then 
broke  out  between  Arcadia  and  Elis,  in  which  the  Eleans  greatly 
suffered,  though  at  the  close  of  the  war  they  distinguished  themselves 
by  a  victory,  gained  over  the  Arcadians  and  Argives  at  Olympia.  It 
was  the  time  of  the  festival,  which  the  enemy  had  determined  to 
celebrate  under  the  presidency  of  Pisa ;  the  games  had  actually  begun, 
when  they  were  vigorously  attacked  and  routed  by  the  Eleans  on  the 
.-acred  ground. 

1  Tricaranum  was  a  fortress  in  the  Phliasian  territory.  The  city  of 
Phlius  was  on  the  confines  of  Argolis,  Achaia,  and  Arcadia.  During 
the  Theban  war,  when  most  of  their  allies  had  deserted  the  Lacedae- 
monians, Phlius  continued  faithful,  and  was  exposed  to  the  attacks  of 
her  neighbours.  The  Argives  fortified  Tricaranum,  and  kept  it  as  a 
hostile  post,  making  incursions  to  plunder  the  Phliasian  country,  and 
attack  the  city,  which  at  one  time  was  nearly  surprised  by  an  Argive- 
Arcadian  force  assisted  by  some  exiles.  The  Phliasians,  whose  con- 
Btancy  is  praised  by  Xenophon,  baffled  all  the  attempts  of  their 
enemies.  In  the  year  366  Chares  the  Athenian  was  sent  to  their 
a--istance,  and  took  Thyamia,  another  hostile  fortress  occupied  by  tne 
Sicyonians.  Tricaranum.  it  seems,  remained  in  possession  of  the 
Argives.     See  further  as  to  the  history  of  Phlius,  p.  175,  note  1. 


FOR    THE    MEGALOPOLITANS.  213 

As  to  •what  the  Megalopolitans  have  done  against  you  (as 
they  say)  under  the  influence  of  Thebes,  it  is  absurd  to  bring 
that  now  as  a  charge  against  them,  and  yet,  when  they  proffer 
their  friendship,  with  an  intention  of  doing  you  good  instead 
of  harm,  to  mistrust  and  look  for  an  excuse  to  reject  them. 
without  considering  that,  the  more  zealous  they  prove  this 
people  to  have  been  in  the  Theban  cause,  the  more  •will  they 
themselves  deserve  your  anger,  for  having  deprived  Athens  of 
such  allies,  when  they  applied  to  her  before  they  applied  to 
Thebes.  It  looks  indeed,  as  if  they  wished  a  second  time  to 
turn  these  people  to  another  alliance. 

I  am  sure — to  judge  from  rational  observation — and  I 
think  most  Athenians  will  agree  with  me,  that,  if  the  Lace- 
daemonians take  Megalopolis.  Messene  will  be  in  danger  :  and, 
if  they  take  that  also,  I  predict  that  you  and  the  Thebans 
will  be  allies.  Then  it  is  much  better  and  more  honourable 
for  us,  to  receive  the  Theban  confederacy  as  our  friends,  and 
resist  Lacedaemonian  ambition,  than,  out  of  reluctance  to 
preserve  the  allies  of  Thebes,  to  abandon  them  now,  and  have 
afterwards  to  preserve  Thebes  herself,  and  be  in  fear  also  for 
our  own  safety.  I  cannot  but  regard  it  as  perilous  to  our 
state,  should  the  Lacedaemonians  take  Megalopolis,  and  again 
become  strong.  For  I  see,  they  have  undertaken  this  war, 
not  to  defend  themselves,  but  to  recover  then-  ancient  power  : 
what  were  their  designs,  when  they  possessed  that  power,  you 
perhaps  know  better  than  I,  and  therefore  may  have  reason 
to  be  alarmed, 

I  would  fain  ask  the  men.  who  tell  us  and  say,  they  detest 
the  Thebans  and  the  Lacedaemonians,  whether  they  detest 
whom  they  detest  respectively  out  of  regard  to  you  and  your 
interests,  or  detest  Thebans  for  the  sake  of  Lacedaemonians, 
and  Lacedaemonians  for  the  sake  of  Thebans.  If  for  their 
sakes,  to  neither  as  rational  beings  ought  you  to  listen  :  if 
they  say  for  your  sake,  wherefore  do  they  exalt  either  people 
unduly  ?  It  is  possible,  surely  possible,  to  humble  Thebes 
without  increasing  the  power  of  Lacedaemon.  Aye  :  and 
it  is  much  easier  too.      I  will  endeavour  to  show  you  how. 

It  is  well  known,  that  up  to  a  certain  point  all  men  (how- 
ever disinclined)  are  ashamed  not  to  observe  justice,  and  that 
tliey  openly  oppose  the  transgressors,  especially  where  any 
people  suffer  damage  :  it  will  be  found  moreover,  that  what 


214  TIIE    ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

mars  rverythins',  and  originates  every  mischief,  is  the  unwil- 
lingness to  observe  justice  uniformly.  Therefore,  that  nosueh 
obstacle  may  arise  to  the  depression  of  Thebes,  let  us  declare 
that  Thespiee  and  Orchomenus  and  Plataea  ought  to  be  re- 
established, and  let  us  co-operate  with  their  people  and  call  on 
others  to  assist  us — -just  and  honourable  -were  this,  not  tc 
regard  with  indifference  the  extermination  of  ancient  cities — 
but  let  us  not  abandon  Megalopolis  and  Messene  to  the  ag- 
gressors, nor,  on  the  pretence  of  Thespise  and  Plat  tea,  suffer 
existing  and  flourishing  cities  to  be  annihilated.  If  such  be 
your  declared  policy,  every  one  will  desire,  that  Thebes  should 
no  longer  hold  her  neighbour's  dominion.  If  not — in  the  first 
place,  we  may  expect  to  find  these  men  oppose  the  other 
scheme,  when  they  see  that  the  establishment  of  those  towns 
would  be  their  own  ruin  :  secondly,  we  shall  have  an  inter- 
minable business  of  it  ourselves  ;  for  where  indeed  can  it  end, 
if  we  continually  allow  existing  cities  to  be  destroyed,  and 
require  those  which  are  in  ruins  to  be  restored  1 

It  is  urged  by  the  most  plausible  speakers,  that  the  pillars1 

1  It  was  the  practice  among  Grecian  states  to  inscribe  their  treaties 
on  pillars  of  stone  or  brass,  which,  so  long  as  the  treaties  remained  in 
force,  were  religiously  preserved,  and  exposed  to  view  in  temples  and 
other  public  places.  And  it  was  frequently  provided  in  the  treaty  itself, 
where  the  pillars  recording  it  should  be  deposited.  Thus,  in  the  treaty 
of  peace  between  Athens,  Lacedsemon,  and  their  respective  allies,  in 
the  tenth  year  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  it  was  stipulated  that  pillars 
should  be  erected  at  Olympia,  Delphi,  and  the  Isthmus ;  and  also  in  the 
Acropolis  at  Athens,  and  in  the  temple  of  Apollo  at  Amyclae.  In  the 
treaty  between  Athens,  Eiis,  Argos,  and  Mantinea,  made  in  the  follow- 
ing year,  it  was  agreed  that  stone  pillars  should  be  set  up  by  the  Athe- 
nians on  the  Acropolis,  by  the  Argives  in  the  temple  of  Apollo  in  their 
market-place,  by  the  Mantineans  in  the  temple  of  Jupiter  in  their  market- 
place; and  that  they  should  jointly  erect  one  of  brass  at  Olympia. 
This  (among  many  others)  was  seen  by  Pausanias  in  the  Olympian 
temple. 

There  is  some  difficulty  attending  the  words  that  follow :  ol  Ee  <pcurl  per 
avTols  ovk  elvai  CTr/Aas,  a'AAa  to  aviMpepov  tivai  to  ttoioZv  tt\v  (piKiav.  I 
have  followed  the  interpretation  of  Leland  and  Pabst,  which  makes  good 
sense  and  agrees  with  the  tenor  of  the  argument.  Jacobs  however 
expresses  a  doubt  whether  the  words  will  admit  of  that  interpretation; 
and  Ulpian,  whom  Reiske  follows,  explains  them,  cpaer]  yap  fir]  vrapxttv 
c-TTjAas,  "  they  say  they  have  no  pillars."  Now  it  is  impossible  to  admit 
this  last  explanation,  when  Demosthenes,  without  denying  the  truth  oi 
the  Megalopolitan  statement,  still  insists  that  the  pillars  should  be 
taken  down.  It  may  also  be  urged  that  if  this  be  the  true  meaning, 
the  latter  clause  would  scarcely  harmonize  with  the  former;  for  if  the 


FOR    THE    MEGALOPOLITANS  215 

of  their  treaty  with  Thebes  must  be  taken  down,  if  thej 
mean  to  be  our  steadfast  allies.  These  people  say,  that  with 
them  it  is  not  pillars,  but  interest  that  binds  friendship,  and 
they  consider  those  who  assist  them  to  be  allies.  Granting 
such  to  be  their  views,  my  notion  is  this.  I  say,  we  should 
both  require  of  them  the  destruction  of  the  pillars,  and  of  the 
Lacedaemonians  the  observance  of  peace ;  if  either  party  refuse 
to  comply,  whichever  it  be,  we  should  side  immediately  with 
those  that  will.  Should  the  Megalopolitans,  notwithstanding 
the  maintenance  of  peace,  adhere  to  the  Theban  alliance,  it 
will  surely  be  evident  to  all,  that  they  favour  the  ambition  0i 
the  Thebans  instead  of  justice.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the 
Megalopolitans  in  good  faith  espouse  our  alliance,  and  the  Lace- 
daemonians do  not  choose  to  observe  peace,  they  will  surely 
prove  to  the  world,  that  they  are  striving  not  only  for  the 
restoration  of  Thespiae,  but  for  an  opportunity  of  conquering 
Peloponnesus  while  the  Thebans  are  entangled  in  this  war. 
One  thing  in  certain  men  surprises  me  ;  that  they  dread  the 
enemies  of  Lacedacrnon  becoming  allies  of  Thebes,  and  yet 
see  no  danger  in  the  Lacedaemonians  conquering  them  ; 
although  we  have  actual  experience  furnished  by  the  past, 
that  the  Thebans  always  use  these  allies  against  Lacedaemon, 
whereas  the  Lacedaemonians,  whilst  they  had  the  same  people, 
used  them  against  us. 

I  think  further,  you  ought  to  consider  this.  If  you  reject 
the  Megalopolitans — should  their  city  be  destroyed  and  them- 
selves dispersed,1  the  Lacedaemonians  at  once  become  powei'- 
ful :  should  they  chance  to  escape,  (as  unhoped-for   events 

people  of  Megalopolis  had  no  pillars,  further  argument  was  useless. 
Besides,  it  is  very  unlikely  they  had  none.  The  doubt  of  Jacobs  is 
founded  upon  too  minute  a  view  of  grammatical  nicety.  It  would  have 
been  better  had  the  order  of  words  been,  ov  ar-hXas  a\\a  rb  ovjxfyipuv 
elyai.  At  the  same  time,  the  words  as  they  stand  may,  according 
to  strict  rules  of  grammar,  be  literally  translated  thus  :  "  They  say  thai 
with  them  it  is  not  pillars,  it  is  interest  that  makes  friendship," — the 
flvai  being  repeated  twice.  The  sentence  is  not  so  well  constructed  as 
in  the  other  case;  but  we  cannot  alwavs  expect  from  an  author  the 
most  neat  and  elegant  modes  of  expression.  In  this  clause  lay  an 
emphasis  on  owe  and  on  ffr^\as,  but  not  upon  that,  and  then  the  reading 
will  express  the  true  sense. 

Few  persons  will  approve  of  Schaefer's  conjecture,  substituting  Kwas 
for  ehai,  or  Weiske's  far-fetched  explanation  of — ovk  tivai  forcu5a,uoC  eiwii, 
i.  e.  ovSevos  \6yov. 

1  Into  vi'lages.     See  p.  76,  note  3. 


215  THE  ORATIOXS  of  demostele:nts. 

do  happen.)  they  will  in  justice  be  steadfast  allies  of  tho 
Thebans.1  If  you  accept  them  for  allies,  the  immediate  con- 
sequence to  them  will  be  deliverance  by  your  means — but 
passing  from  their  case — let  us  consider  what  may  be  looked 
for  and  apprehended  with  reference  to  Thebes  and  Lacedsemon. 
Well  then  :  if  the  Thebans  be  vanqvdshed  in  war,  as  they 
ought  to  be.  the  Licedremonians  will  not  be  unduly  great, 
having  these  Arcadians  for  their  rivals,  living  near  them.  If 
the  Thebans  chance  to  recover  and  come  off  safe,  they  will 
at  all  events  be  the  weaker  for  these  men  having  become  our 
allies  and  been  preserved  through  us.  So  that  in  every  point 
of  view  it  is  expedient,  that  we  should  not  abandon  the  Arca- 
dians, and  that  they  should  not  appeal-  (in  case  they  do  escape) 
to  have  owed  their  deliverance  to  themselves,  or  to  any  other 
people  but  you. 

I  have  spoken,  0  Athenians.  (Heaven  is  my  witness,)  not 
from  private  affection  or  malice  towards  either  party,  but 
what  I  consider  advantageous  for  you  :  and  I  exhort  you  not 
to  abandon  the  Megalopolitans,  nor  indeed  any  other  of  the 
weaker  states  to  the  stronger. 

1  The  event  proved  the  justice  of  this  remark.  Demosthenes  co^ld 
not  prevail  on  the  Athenians  to  follow  his  counsel.  They  joined  the 
alliance  of  neither  party.  Archidamus  commenced  war  against  the  Arca- 
dians, who  were  assisted  by  Anros,  Sicyon,  and  Messene.  In  the  course  of 
the  same  year.  Philip  having  defeated  Onomarchus  in  the  great  battle  of 
Pagasee,  the  Thebans  were  enabled  to  send  forces  to  the  succour  of  their 
old  allies.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Lacedaemonians  were  reinforced  by 
some  Phocian  mercenaries ;  and  the  war  was  carried  on  for  two  years 
with  various  success,  and  at  length  terminated  by  a  truce.  The  Arca- 
dian confederacy,  however,  were  alienated  from  Athens,  and  the  bad 
effects  of  this  were  discovered  some  time  after,  when,  alarmed  at  the 
de?igus  of  Sparta,  they  applied  not  to  Athens,  but  to  Philip,  for  assist- 
ance,  and  thus  caused  Macedonian  influence  to  extend  itself  in  Pelopon- 
nesus.    See  the  Argument  to  the  Second  Philippic 


THE   TREATY    WITH    ALEXANDER.  217 


ON  THE  TREATY  WITH  ALEXANDER 


THE    ARGUMENT. 

This  is  one  of  the  Orations  which  has  generally  been  considered  spurious 
yet  as  it  is  published  in  Becker's  and  other  editions  of  Demosthenes, 
it  finds  a  place  in  this  translation. 

It  purports  to  be  an  address  to  the  Athenian  people,  rousing  them  to 
take  arms  against  Alexander  king  of  Macedon,  and  shake  ofF  the 
ignominious  yoke  to  which  they  were  subjected,  on  account  of  certain 
injurious  acts  committed  by  that  monarch  in  violation  of  his  engage- 
ments. It  appears  that  in  the  year  b.c.  335,  a  treaty  was  entered  into 
between  Alexander  and  the  Greek  states,  according  to  which  a  general 
peace  was  to  be  maintained  by  all  the  members  of  the  Greek  com- 
munity, both  with  Macedonia  and  among  themselves,  every  state 
enjoying  political  independence,  and  Alexander  being  the  common 
protector  of  all.  It  is  alleged  that  Alexander  had  broken  the  treaty 
by  sundry  acts  of  interference  with  Greek  cities,  more  especially 
Messene,  where  the  sons  of  Philiades  had  by  his  influence  regained 
possession  of  the  government.  Another  complaint  is,  that  some 
Athenian  ships  returning  from  the  Euxine  had  been  seized  by  Mace- 
donian officers ;  and  that  Athens  had  been  insulted  by  a  Macedonian 
galley  sailing  into  the  Pirasus  without  leave. 

The  date  of  the  speech  may  have  been  b.c.  334,  after  Alexander  had 
crossed  over  into  Asia. 

It  is  right,  0  Athenians,  that  those  who  hid  you  observe 
your  oaths  and  engagements  should,  if  they  do  so  from  con- 
viction, have  your  entire  concurrence.  For  I  think  nothing 
so  becomes  a  people  who  enjoy  self-government,  as  to  be 
regardful  of  equity  and  justice.  The  persons  then,  who  are  so 
vehement  in  urging  this  course,  should  not  trouble  you  with 
declamations  on  the  principle,  while  their  conduct  is  directly 
opposite  ;  but  should  submit  to  inquiry  now,  and  either  have 
you  under  their  direction  in  such  matters  for  the  future,  or 
retire  and  leave  you  to  advisers  who  expound  the  rules  of 
justice  more  truly — so  tnat  you  may  either  tamely  endure 
your  wrongs,  and  lei  the  aggressor  have  his  way,  or,  preferring 
justice  to  every  other  consideration,  you  may  be  above  all 
reproach,  and  consult  your  own  interest  without  delay.1  From 

1  1.  e.  by  taking   arms  against  Alexander,  which   is  a  measure  of 
prudence  as  well  as  justice. 


218  THE    ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHENES. 

the  very  terms  of  the  treaty,  from  the  oaths  hy  which  tho 
common  peace  was  ratified,  you  may  see  at  once  who  the 
transgressors  are, — in  what  important  particulars,  I  will 
briefly  explain.1 

Were  you  asked,  men  of  Athens,  what  would  most  strongly 
excite  your  indignation,  methinks  you  would  all  say,  that  if 
you  were  constrained 2 — I  mean,  if  the  Pisistratids  were  alive 
at  this  day,  and  an  attempt  were  made  to  reinstate  them  by 
force,  that  you  would  snatch  up  your  arms  and  encounter 
every  peril  rather  than  receive  them  ;  or,  yielding,  you  must 
be  slaves,  like  those  that  are  purchased  in.  the  market — and 
far  worse,3  inasmuch  as  no  man  will  kill  a  servant  wantonly, 
while  the  subjects  of  tyrants  are  notoriously  destroyed  without 
trial,  and  have  outrages  also  committed  upon  their  wives  and 
children.  Well  then — Alexander  has,  contrary  to  his  oath 
and  the  express  conditions  of  the  general  peace,  brought  back 
to  Messene  the  sons  of  Philiades,  her  tyrants.4  In  so  doing 
has  he  paid  regard  to  justice — or  has  he  not  rather  acted  on 

1  Eeiske  explains  it  differently :  "  ea  brevitate,  qute  locum  habet  in 
tanta  argumenti  amplitudine ;"  i.e.  "briefly,  considering  the  importance 
and  magnitude  of  the  question." 

2  Schaefer  thinks  the  words  e?  tis  dvayicdfrt  ought  to  be  connected 
with  a.yava.KTT)ffaiTe,  from  which  they  have  been  disjoined  by  an  error  of 
the  copyist.  I  connect  them  with  the  following  clause,  and  explain  it 
thus: — The  orator  was  intending  simply  to  add  TrgoaSQacrBai  ro'vs  Tleicn- 
(TTgoTi'Saj,  but  then  it  occurring  to  him  that  the  family  of  Pisistratus 
were  extinct,  he  inserts  the  hypothetical  clause  el  M<xv  k.  r.  \.,  which 
interrupting  the  first  train  of  thought,  the  sentence  becomes  somewhat 
irregular.  We  need  not  be  surprised  at  examples  of  loose  construction 
among  the  orators.  At  the  present  day  few  of  our  public  speakers 
attend  closely  to  rules  of  syntax.  An  Attic  audience  was  more  fastidious 
than  an  English,  yet  would  tolera'e  occasional  anacolutha.  Many  of 
these  would  be  retained  in  the  published  orations ;  and  some  even  by 
design ;  for  now  and  then  a  loose  mode  of  speech  is  more  happy  than  a 
formal  sentence. 

3  Reiske  takes  to<tovt<j>  fiaWov  in  connexion  with  agndcram-as  &c — 
vnofittvai.  I  agree  with  Pabst  and  Leland,  who  connect  it  with 
$ov\tveiv. 

4  Philiades  was  tyrant  of  Messene  in  the  lifetime  of  Philip.  Hia 
sons,  Neon  and  Thvasylochus,  were  expelled  for  oppressive  conduct, 
but  afterwards  restored  by  Alexander.  They  are  mentioned  in  the 
Orations  on  the  Crown  among  the  list  of  traitors,  by  whom,  as  Demos- 
thenes contends,  Grecian  liberty  was  sold  to  Macedonia.  Polybius 
however  maintains  that  \\xe  reproaches  of  Demosthenes  were  unjust, 
and  that  the  connexion  of  these  men  with  Macedonia  was  for  their 
country's  benefit.     'XVII.  14.) 


ON    THE    TREATY    WITH    ALEXANDER.  21 G 

his  own  arbitrary  principles,  in  contempt  of  you  and  the 
common  agreement  ?  If  then  such  violence  done  to  jour- 
selves  would  rouse  your  utmost  resentment,  you  ought  not  to 
remain  passive,  when  it  has  been  committed  elsewhere  in 
violation  of  the  oaths  taken  to  you  :  nor  should  certain  per- 
sons here  require  us  to  observe  the  oaths,  yet  leave  to  men 
who  have  so  flagrantly  broken  them  a  liberty  like  this.  It 
■cannot  indeed  be  permitted,  if  you  mean  to  do  your  duty  : 
for  it  is  further  declared  in  the  articles,  that  whoever- acts  as 
Alexander  has  done  shall  be  deemed  an  enemy  by  all  parties 
to  the  peace,  himself  and  his  country,  and  that  all  shall  take 
arms  against  him.  Therefore,  if  we  perform  our  engagements, 
we  shall  treat  the  restorer  of  these  exiles  as  an  enemy. 

Perhaps  these  friends  of  tyranny  may  say,  that  the  sons  of 
Philiades  reigned  in  Messene  before  the  treaty  was  made, 
and  therefore  Alexander  restores  them.  But  the  argument  is 
ridiculous — to  expel  tyrants  from  Lesbos,  who  reigned  before 
the  treaty,  that  is,  the  tyrants  of  Antissa  and  Eresus,1  on  the 
plea  that  such  form  of  government  is  oppressive ;  yet  hold 
that  it  makes  no  difference  in  Messene,  when  the  same  nui- 
sance is  established  ! 

Besides — the  treaty  prescribes  in  the  very  commencement, 
that  the  Greeks  shall  be  free  and  independent.  Would  it  not 
be  the  height  of  absurdity,  that  the  clause  making  them  free 
and  independent  should  stand  first  in  the  treaty,  yet  that 
one  who  reduces  them  to  servitude  should  not  be  deemed  to 
have  violated  the  compact  ?  If  then,  0  men  of  Athens,  we 
mean  to  abide  by  our  oaths  and  covenants,  and  do  that  act  of 
justice  which  they  require  of  you,  as  I  just  now  mentioned, 
we  must  certainly  take  up  arms  and  march  against  the 
offenders  with  such  allies  as  will  join  us.  Or  think  ye  that 
opportunity  has  such  force  sometimes,  as  to  carry  out  policy 
without  right2 — and  now,  when  opportunity  and  policy  meet 

1  Antiasa  and  Eresus  are  cities  in  Lesbos. 

2  "  Sic  construe,"  says  Wolf — laxveiv  irpaTretv  rd  crvficpepou  ko.\  &vev 
rod  dinaiov — 'O  Kcupbs  i&xvei  irparTtiv  to  ffVfjuplpov,  Tovriari,  divarai. 
Reiske :  "  Brevius  sic  dictum  est,  quod  plenius  et  planius  ad  hunc 
modum  dixisset:  ourois  Icrxvetv  a'crre  (Sia'fecrflai  rjnas  Kai  &vev  t»v  SiKaiov, 
&c.  tantura  valere  ut  cogat  nos." 

Schaefer :  "  tu  audi  Wolfium." 

Reiske  explains  the  indirect  meaning  of  the  words,  and  Wolf  their 
direct  meaning.     But  the  point  of  the  matter  is  intelligible  enough 


220  THE    ORATION'S   OF   DEMOSTKEXE?. 

together  for  the  same  right,  will  ye  wait  for  any  other  time, 
to  assert  your  own  freedom  and  the  freedom  of  all  Greece  ? 

I  come  to  another  point  under  the  articles.  It  is  written, 
that  if  any  persons  subvert  the  constitutions,  which  existed  in 
the  several  states  when  they  swore  the  oaths  of  ratification, 
they  shall  be  deemed  enemies  by  all  parties  to  the  peace. 
Now  consider,  men  of  Athens :  the  Achaians,  of  Peloponnesus 
were  living  under  popular  government.  Among  them,  the 
Macedonian  has  overthrown  the  democracy  of  Pellene,  ex- 
pelling most  of  the  citizens  :  their  property  he  has  given  to 
their  servants,  and  set  up  Chseron  the  wrestler  as  tyrant.  "We 
are  parties  to  the  treaty,  which  directs  us  to  regard  as  ene- 
mies the  authors  of  such  proceedings.  Then  must  we  obey 
this  article  of  the  convention,  and  treat  them  as  enemies — or 
will  any  of  these  hirelings  be  impudent  enough  to  say  no — 
these  hirelings  of  the  Macedonian,  who  have  grown  rich  by 
betraying  you  ?  For  assuredly  they  are  not  ignorant  of  these 
proceedings  :  but  they  have  arrived  at  such  a  pitch  of  inso- 
lence, that,  guarded  by  the  armies  of  the  tyrant,  they  exhort 
you  to  abide  by  the  violated  oaths,  as  if  perjury  were  his  pre- 
rogative ;'  they  compel  you  to  abolish  your  own  laws,  releas- 
ing persons  who  have  been  condemned  in  courts  of  justice, 
and  forcing  you  into  numerous  other  unconstitutional  acts. 
Naturally  enough.  It  is  impossible  that  men  who  have  sold 
themselves  to  oppose  their  country's  interests,  should  care  for 
laws  or  oaths  :  they  use  their  empty  names,  to  cajole  people 
who  assemble  here  for  pastime,  not  for  discussion,  and  who  little 
think  that  the  calm  of  the  moment  will  lead  to  strange  dis- 
turbances hereafter.  I  repeat,  as  I  declared  at  the  outset — 
hearken  to  them  who  advise  you  to  observe  the  treaty :  unless 
they  consider,  in  recommending  observance  of  the  oaths,  that 
they  forbid  not  the  commission  of  injustice,  or  suppose,  that 
the  establishment  of  despotism  instead  of  democracy  and  the 

without  a  paraphrase  ;  and  in  translating  we  need  not  cut  down  every 
figurative  expression  into  plain  prose.  French  translators  are  apt  to  do 
this,  aiming  chiefly  at  clearness,  in  which  they  excel.  Auger's  version 
is  :  "On  bien,  pensez-vous  que  l'occasion  est  quelquefois  suffisante  pour 
nous  faire  suivre  notre  interet  aux  depens  de  la  j  ustice  ] " 

1  I  have  borrowed  this  expression  from  Leland.  We  might  say — 
"he  had  the  privilege  of  perjury."  But  Leland's  word  better  suits  a 
monarch.  Auger :  "comme  si  ce  Prince  disposoit  du  parjure  en  maitre 
absolu." 


ON  THE  TREATY  WITH  ALEXANDER.  "21 

subversion  of  constitutional  governments  will  be  felt  by 
none. 

But  what  is  yet  more  ridiculous — it  is  in  the  articles,  that 
all  members  of  the  congress,1  all  guardians  of  the  public  safety, 
shall  see  that  in  the  confederating  states  there  be  no  blood- 
shed or  banishment  contrary  to  the  laws  established  in  each, 
no  confiscations  of  property,  nor  divisions  of  land,  nor  abolish- 
ing of  debts,  nor  liberating  of  slaves  for  revolutionary  pur- 
poses. They  however — so  far  from  checking  any  of  such 
proceedings — even  help  to  bring  them  about.  Are  they  not 
worthy  of  death,  when  they  promote  such  plagues  in  our 
cities,  plagues  which  (because  they  are  so  grievous)  the  whole 
body  were  commissioned  to  prevent  I2 

I  will  show  you  a  further  breach  of  the  articles.  It  is 
declared,  that  it  shall  not  be  lawful  for  exiles3  to  make  an 

1  "Which  met  at  Corinth,  where  the  treaty  was  made. 

2  The  nominative  case  to  tTciralav  is  either  al  <rvv6rjKai  or  al  ir6\eis. 

3  From  most  of  the  Greek  cities  there  were  exiles,  banished  for 
political  causes,  and  ready  to  take  advantage  of  any  revolution,  to 
return  to  their  country.  If  these  were  many  in  number,  more  espe- 
cially if  they  were  connected  with  a  party  at  home,  or  supported  by  a 
foreign  power,  they  would  cause  considerable  uneasiness  to  the  govern- 
ment. Such  for  example  were  the  exiles  from  Elis  and  Phlius,  who 
have  already  come  under  our  notice.  (See  pp.  134,  174,  notes.)  Such 
also  were  the  Boeotian  exiles,  while  their  country  was  subject  to  Thebes. 
As  the  treaty  of  Corinth  recognised  the  independence  of  the  Greek 
states,  and  preserved  their  institutions  inviolate,  the  clause  regarding 
exiles  was  in  the  spirit  of  such  arrangement,  and  introduced  as  an 
additional  security.  Alexander  conceded  this,  being  intent  on  the 
Persian  war,  and  wishing  at  that  time  to  conciliate  the  Greeks ;  after- 
wards, caring  less  about  their  favour,  he,  or  his  regent  Antipater,  sought 
to  extend  Macedonian  influence  by  means  of  a  different  kind.  Of  the 
facts  mentioned  here  little  is  known  from  other  sources :  but  this 
restoration  of  the  exiles  is  a  measure  not  only  probable  of  itself,  but  in 
accordance  with  one  taken  by  Alexander  at  a  later  period,  of  which  an 
account  is  given  by  Diodorus.  About  a  year  before  his  death,  Alex- 
ander caused  an  edict  to  be  published  at  Olympia,  by  which  the  Greek 
cities  were  commanded  to  receive  back  their  exiles,  except  such  as 
had  committed  sacrilege  or  murder.  Great  consternation  was  produced 
by  this  order,  the  object  of  which  was  to  make  the  Macedonian 
interest,  by  means  of  the  returned  exiles,  preponderant  in  every  state. 
Demosthenes  was  sent  to  Olympia,  to  remonstrate  with  Nicanor  the 
Macedonian  envoy.  N"icanor  however  had  no  option  but  to  execute  his 
master's  commission.  The  alarm  of  the  Athenians  was  increased  by 
the  appearance  of  a  large  body  of  their  exiles  at  Megara.  They  resolved 
to  send  an  embassy  to  Alexander,  to  entreat  his  forbearance.  This  Avas 
done,  and  the  mission  was  successful :  but  on  Alexander's  deaL1    which 


222  THE    ORATIONS    OF   DEMOSTHEXES. 

excursion  with  arms  from  any  cities  included  in  the  peace,  to 
attack  any  other  city  comprehended  in  the  peace ;  if  they  do, 
the  city  from  which  they  start  shall  be  excluded  from  the 
treaty.  Well !  The  Macedonian  has  earned  his  arms  about 
with  so  little  scruple,  that  he  has  never  yet  laid  them  down, 
but  still  marches  wherever  he  can  with  arms  in  hand,  and 
more  now  than  before,  inasmuch  as  by  an  edict  he  has 
restored  various  exiles  in  different  places,  and  the  wrestling- 
niaster  in  Sicyon.  If  we  are  bound  then  to  obey  the  terms 
of  the  convention,  as  these  men  declare,  the  states  guilty  of 
such  conduct  are  under  treaty  with  us  no  longer.  I  allow, 
if  the  truth  is  to  be  suppressed,  we  must  not  say  they  are 
the  Macedonian  :  but  when  these  traitorous  ministers  of 
Macedonia  never  cease  urging  you  to  fulfil  the  conditions  of 
the  treaty,  let  us  hearken  to  their  counsel,  as  it  is  just,  and 
let  us  deliberate — putting  them  under  your  ban,  as  the  oath 
requires  —  how  to  treat  people  whose  tempers  are  so  im- 
perious and  insolent,  who  are  always  either  forming  or  exe- 
cuting some  designs,  and  making  a  mockery  cf  the  peace. 
How  can  my  opponents  dispute  the  propriety  of  this  1  Do 
they  require  the  clauses  against  our  country  to  be  in  force, 
and  not  allow  those  which  are  for  our  protection1?  Does  this 
appear  to  be  justice  1  Will  they  confirm  whatever  is  against 
us  in  the  oaths  and  favourable  to  our  adversaries — yet  think 
proper  continually  to  oppose  any  fair  advantage  that  is 
secured  to  us  against  them  ? 

To  convince  you  still  more  clearly,  that  the  Greeks  will 
never  charge  you  with  infringing  any  part  of  the  convention, 
but  will  even  thank  you  for  taking  upon  yourselves  to  expose 
the  guilty  parties — I  will,  as  the  articles  are  numerous,  glance 
cursorily  at  a  few  points. 

I  believe  one  article  is,  that  all  the  contracting  parties 
may  navigate  the  sea,  that  none  shall  molest  them,  that  none 
of  them  shall  force  a  vessel  into  port ;  that  whoever  breaks 
this  condition  shall  be  deemed  an  enemy  by  all  parties.  Now, 
men  of  Athens,  you  know  perfectly  well,  that  this  has  been 
done  by  the  Macedonians.     They  have  come  to  be  so  lawless, 

followed  soon  after,  a  rising  of  the  Greeks  took  place,  which  had  well- 
niirh  overthrown  the  Macedonian  power.  This  was  the  war  called  ths 
Laniian,  in  which  the  Athenians  and  their  allies  were  at  first  victorious, 
but  were  finally  crushed  by  Antipater. 


OX  THE  TREATY  WITH  ALFVAXriF.R.  223 

that  they  earned  into  Tenedos  all  our  vessels  from  the  Euxine, 
and  under  pretences  refused  to  release  them,1  until  you 
determined  to  man  a  hundred  ships  of  war  and  launch  them 
immediately,  and  appointed  Menestheus  to  the  command. 
Is  it  not  absurd,  when  the  wrongs  done  by  others  are  of  such 
number  and  magnitude,  that  their  friends  here,  instead  of 
restraining  them  the  transgressors,  should  advise  us  to  observe 
a  compact  so  little  regarded  ?  As  if  it  were  further  declared, 
that  trespass  should  be  allowed  to  one  party,  and  not  even 
resistance  to  the  other !  "Were  not  their  acts  both  lawless 
and  senseless,  when  they  violated  their  oaths  to  such  an 
extent,  as  had  well-nigh  justly  deprived  them  of  their  mari- 
time supremacy  '( 2  And  as  it  is.  they  have  left  you  this  plea 
beyond  a  question,  when  you  choose  to  enforce  it  :  for  as- 
suredly they  have  not  the  less  broken  the  convention,  because 
they  left  off  committing  trespasses  :  they  are  only  fortunate 
in  profiting  by  your  indolence,  that  will  not  even  take  advan- 
tage of  a  right. 

The  most  humiliating  circumstance  is  this — that  whilst  all 
others,  Greeks  and  barbarians,  dread  your  enmity,  these 
upstarts 3  alone  compel  you  to  despise  yourselves,  either  per- 
suading or  forcing  you  into  measures,  as  if  they  were  states- 
men of  Abdera  or  Maronea,4  not  of  Athens.  At  the  same 
time  they  weaken  your  power,  and  strengthen  that  of  your 
adversaries ;  and  yet  (without  perceiving  it)  acknowledge  our 
republic  to  be  irresistible ;  for  they  forbid  her  to  maintain 
justice  justly,5  as  though  she  could  easily  vanquish  her 
enemies,  if  she  chose  to  consult  her  own  interests.  And  their 
notion  is  reasonable.     For  as  long  as  we  can  be  indisputably 

1  Sckaefer  takes  a<pi7crav  in  the  sense  of  enavaavro. 

2  Alexander  having  by  the  treaty  been  declared  generalissimo  of 
the  Greeks,  a  supremacy  both  on  land  and  sea  was  accorded  to  Mace- 
donia, although  that  kingdom  did  not  actually  possess  so  large  a  fleet 
as  Athens.  The  Athenians  furnished  twenty  galleys  to  the  armament 
which  conveyed  Alexander  across  the  Hellespont. 

3  The  original  vzott\ovtoi  (nouveaux  riches,  as  the  French  say.)  is 
noticed  by  Libanius  as  a  term  not  likely  to  be  used  by  Demosthenes. 
So  is  /35e\upeu<reTai.  The  former  appears  to  me  a  very  good  word.  We 
have  none  that  exactly  corresponds  with  it. 

4  These  were  cities  in  Thrace.  Abdera  was  famous  for  the  stupidity 
of  the  inhabitants,  though  it  produced  Dernocritus  the  philosopher. 

5  Because  they  recommend  that  the  Athenians  should  observe  the 
treaty,  and  the  Macedonians  le  allowed  to  break  it. 


2 -4  THE    OKATIOXS   OF   DEMOSTHE5IS. 

masters  of  the  sea  alone,  we  may  find  other  defences  for  the 
land,  in  addition  to  our  existing  force,  especially  if  by 
fortune  these   men.   who  are  now  guarded  bv  the  tyrant's 
armies,  should  be  put  down,  some  of  them  destroyed,  some 
proved  to  :.Jess. 

S     _'  ::on  to  what  I  have  mentioned 

has  the  Macedonian  committed  in  the  aflair  of  the 

ships.     Bu:  the  drag      is  and  overbearing  act  of  the 

"  occurred — their  daring  to  sail 
into  the  Piraeus  [  y  to  our  convention  with  them.     And 

you  mart  not  reg  as  a  light  matter,  men  ot  Athens, 

because  there  was  ne  ship;  but1  as  an  experiment  on 

our  patience,  that  they  may  have  liberty  to  do  it  with  more, 
and  a  contempt  of  the  agreement,  as  in  the  former  instances. 
That  they  meant  to  creep  along  by  degrees,  and  accustom  us 
to  tolerate  such  intrusions,  is  evident  from  this  only — the 
commander  who  put  into  port,  (who  ought  with  his  galley  to 
have  been  instantly  you.)  asked  permission  to 

build  small  boats  in  our  harbours—does  it  not  show  that  then 
contrivance  was,  instead  of  sailing  into  port,  to  be  inside  at 
once  /  And  if  we  allow  small  boats,  we  shall  shortly  allow 
-vessels  of  war  ;  if  a  small  number  at  first,  very  soon  a  large. 
I:    :-   inn  a   know,  to  make  this  excuse,8  that  in 

Athens  there  is  plenty  : -:  . .. . '.  :-  _:.-... 

trouble  from  a  distance,)  and  a  scarcity  in  Macedonia,  (which 
supplies  it  at  the  cheapest  rate  to  all  purchaser-  N . .  They 
looked  both  to  build  vessels  here,  and  to  man  them  in  the 
same  harbour,  although  if  ressed  in  the  treaty,  that 

nothing  of  the  kind  should  be  allowed.     And  these  liberties 
will  increase  more  and  man       With  such  contempt  in  - 
way   ft  jar  republic,  through  their  instructors 

ggest  1     them  what  course  to  pursue.     And  such 
B  the  esl  ;  ommon  with  these  men,  they  have 

med  of  Athene  feeble  and  imbecile, 

1   I  c .        ■ 
fimplr  take  vvokvfrriow  to  be  repeated.  The  words  tim  c'»f<iiwi  k.  t.  A. 
translated:  "They  [in  so  doing]  disregarded  the 

common   articles,  just  as  thev  disregarded  the  articles  before  men- 
tioned :"  that  is  -~   -  ..- 
i.-  \                                         -r.      .-                               . .  .  '  ■.-  --.  ' 
'■  Understand  nqninvn,  "to  say  they  did  it  because,'  &c 


OX    THE    TREATY    WITH    ALEXANDER.  2'2c> 

that  she  has  no  forethought  for  the  future,  nor  takes  any 
account  how  the  tyrant  observes  the  treaty.1 

That  treaty.  0  Athenians,  I  exhort  you  to  obey,  in  such 
manner  as  I  explained,  insisting 2  (under  the  privilege  of  my 
age)  that  you  might  at  the  same  time  exercise  your  rights 
without  reproach,  and  use  without  danger  the  opportu- 
nities which  knpel  you  to  your  good.  Fur  there  is  a  fur- 
ther addition  to  the  articles — "  if  we  will  be  parties  to  the 
common  peace."  This,  "  if  we  will,"'  means  also  a  different 
thing — ••  if  we  ever  ought  to  cease  shamefully  following  others, 
and  forgetting  those  honours,  of  which  we,  beyond  all  people, 
have  won  so  many  froin  the  earliest  time."  Therefore,  with 
j'our  permission,  men  of  Athens,  I  will  move,  as  the  treaty 
commands,  to  make  war  upon  the  transgressors.3 

1  Wolf  has  a  note  on  this  passage,  not  very  complimentary  to  the 
Athenians — "  Recte  quideni  seuserunt,  nisi  Demosthenes  ubique 
mentitur,  qui  talem  nobis  depingit  Atheniensem  populum,  ut  asino 
ignavissimo,  qui  vix  contis  et  iustibus  exeitari  qutat,  eomparandus 
videatur." 

2  I  connect  5ie£e/8ait0<ra,u7)i/  with  KaQairep,  hv  with  xP^a^al-  The 
following  sentence  1  have  rendered  according  to  Schaefer's  interpreta- 
tion ;  but  so  far  agree  with  Reiske,  that  I  think  it  is  too  ill-written  U 
be  worth  a  note. 

3  Almost  all  critics,  ancient  and  modern,  have  pronounced  this 
Oration  to  be  spurious.  Libanius  ascribes  it  to  Hyperides,  Ulpian  to 
Hegesippus.  History  affords  no  confirmation  of  the  fact  that  such  a 
speech  ever  was  made.  And  it  would  also  be  strange,  if  Demosthenes 
had  purposed  to  make  war  against  Alexander,  that  there  should  be  no 
allusion  to  it  in  either  of  the  speeches  on  the  Crown.  Auger  makes  the 
following  remarks  on  the  inferiority  of  the  style  : 

"  Quoique  ce  discours  se  trouve  dans  les  ceuvres  de  Demosthene,  tons 
les  critiques  s'accordent  a  dire  qu'il  n'est  pas  de  Demosthene.  Je  suis 
tres  fort  de  leur  avis.  Je  n'y  trouve  point  cette  vehemence  et  cette 
rapidite  de  style,  cette  nettete.  cette  clarte  lumineuse,  cette  profondtur 
dans  les  idees,  qui  caracterisent  Demosthene." 

Francis  says : 

"  Our  editors  have  preserved  to  us  the  Orations  upon  Halonnesus  anu 
Alexander's  treaty  with  Athens,  even  while  tney  hold  them  written  by 
other  authors,  and  unworthy  of  our  orator's  character.  The  translator 
therefore  hopes  to  be  forgiven  his  not  attempting  to  preserve  what 
in  themselves  are  confessedly  spurious,  and,  if  they  were  genuine,  would 
be  injurious  to  the  reputation  of  his  author.  A  painting  would  do 
little  honour  to  the  cabinet  of  the  curious,  merely  because  ignorance 
and  false  taste  had  once  given  it  to  the  divine  Raphael." 

The  only  commentator  that  I  have  seen,  who  maintains  the  genuine- 
ness of  this  Oration,  is  Leland.     It  is  but  fair  to  hear  his  reasons : 

"Critics  seem  willing  to  ascribe  this  oration  to  Hegesippus,  or  to 


VOL.  I. 


<> 


22Q  THE    ORATIONS   OF    DEMOSTHENES. 

Hyperides.  It  is  observed  that  the  style  is  diffuse,  languid,  and 
disgraced  Ljsome  affected  phrases;  and  that  the  whole  composition  by 
no  means  breathes  that  spirit  of  boldness  and  freedom  which  appears  in 
the  orations  of  Demosthenes.  But  these  differences  may  possibly  be 
accounted  for,  without  ascribing  it  to  another  author.  Dejection  and 
vexation,  a  consciousness  of  the  fallen  condition  of  his  country,  despair 
and  terror  at  the  view  of  the  Macedonian  power,  might  have  naturally 
produced  an  alteration  in  the  style  and  manner  of  the  orator's  address. 
A  great  epic  genius,  when  in  its  decline,  is  said  by  Longinus  to  fall 
naturally  into  the  fabulous,  in  like  manner,  a  great  popular  speaker, 
when  hopeless  and  desponding,  checked  and  controlled  by  his  fears, 
may  find  leisure  to  coin  words,  and  naturally  recur  to  affected  expres- 
sions, when  the  torrent  of  his  native  eloquence  is  stopped.  Nor  is  the 
Oration  now  before  us  entirely  destitute  of  force  and  spirit.  It  appears 
strong  and  vehement,  but  embarrassed.  The  fire  of  Demosthenes  some- 
times breaks  forth  through  all  obstacles,  but  is  instantly  allayed  and 
suppressed,  .as  if  by  fear  and  caution.  The  author,  as  Ulpian  expresses 
it,  speaks  freely,  and  not  freely  :  he  encourages  the  citizens  to  war,  and 
yet  scruples  to  move  for  war  in  form :  as  if  his  mind  was  distracted 
between  fear  and' confidence.  In  a  word,  I  regard  this  Oration  on  the 
Treaty  with  Alexander  as  the  real  work  of  Demosthenes,  but  of 
Demosthenes  dejected  and  terrified,  willing  to  speak  consistently  with 
himself,  yet  not  daring  to  speak  all  that  he  feels.  It  may  be  compared 
to  the  performance  of  an  eminent  painter,  necessarily  executed  at  a 
time  when  his  hands  or  eyes  laboured  under  some  disorder,  in  which  we 
Hud  the  traces  of  his  genius  and  abilities  obscured  by  many  nvjrks  of 
his  present  infirmity." 


APPENDIX    I. 


OLYNTHUS. 

The  taking  of  Olynthus  was  one  of  the  turning-points  of  Philip's 
success,  and  merits  particular  attention. 

Olynthus  was  the  chief  city  of  the  Chalcidic  peninsula,  which  is 
separated  from  the  inland  part  of  Macedonia  by  a  range  of  moun- 
tains, crossing  from  the  Thermaie  to  the  Strymonic  gulf.  The 
peninsula  itself  runs  out  into  three  smaller  peninsulas  or  tongues  of 
land,  the  eastern  of  which  is  overshadowed  by  Mount  Athos,  and  was 
called  Acte;  the  central  was  named  Sithonia,  and  the  western 
Pallene.  The  whole  district  was  called  Chalcidice,  on  account  of  the 
numerous  colonies  planted  there  by  the  Chalcidiaus  of  Eubcea.  In 
early  times,  and  long  before  Athens  took  a  prominent  part  in  Grecian 
affairs,  Chalcis  and  Eretria,  the  chief  cities  of  Eubcea,  had  acquired 
considerable  eminence,  and  sent  out  colonies  not  only  to  the  northern 
parts  of  Greece,  but  to  Sicily  and  Italy.  Of  their  Macedonian  colo- 
nies the  most  ancient  was  Met  hone,  founded  by  the  Eretrians  in 
Pieria.  In  the  Chalcidic  region  there  were  established  upwards  of 
thirty  towns,  many  of  Euboic  origin.  The  principal  among  them 
were,  Apollonia,  Stagira,  Acanthus,  Cleona,  Argilus,  Meude,  Scione, 
Torone,  Mecyberua,  Anthemus,  Sane,  Jineia,  Spartolus,  Potidrea. 
Tiiis  last  city,  so  important  in  Athenian  history,  was  founded  by 
Corinth. 

Olynthus,  which  stood  at  the  head  of  the  Toronaic  gulf,  was  origi- 
nally inhabited  by  a  Bottisean  tribe  ;  but  having  been  taken  by  Arta- 
bazus,  the  Persian  satrap,  who  massacred  the  population,  it  was 
repeopled  by  Chalcidians.1  At  the  close  of  the  Persian  war,  the 
Greek  cities  on  that  coast  became  attached  to  the  general  confe- 
deracy, of  which  Athens-  was  at  the  head.  But  Potidaea  and  many  of 
the  Chalcidian  cities  were  induced  to  revolt  from  Athens,  B.C.  i3-2, 
chiefly  by  the  persuasion  of  Perdiccas,  king  of  Macedonia,  and  under 
promise  of  assistance  from  Peloponnesus.  Perdiccas  at  the  same 
time  advised,  that  the  inhabitants  of  the  smaller  towns  on  the  coast 
should  remove  to  Olynthus,  and  concentrate  their  power  in  that  city, 
which,  on  account  of  its  position,  a  little  imand,  was  less  exposed  to 

(1)  Herodotus,  v.i.  127 

Q2 


228  APPENDIX   I. 

.-in  attack  from  the  sea.  This  was  done,  and  by  such  means  Olyntlius 
became  the  capital  of  the  Chalcidic  population.1 

During  the  Peloponuesian  war,  although  Potidsea  was  taken,  the 
members  of  the  Chalcidian  league  maintained  their  independence 
against  Athens.  In  I  he  third  year  of  the  war  they  defeated  the 
Athenians  near  Spartolus.  It  was  partly  at  their  invitation  that 
Brasidaswas  sent  to  attack  t lie  Athenian  possessions  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood ;  and  it  was  their  jealousy  that  in  a  great  measure  pre- 
vented the  restitution  of  Amphipolis,  after  the  peace  of  jNicias.  In 
the  eleventh  year  of  the  war  the  Olynthians  took  Mecyberna,  which 
was  defended  by  an  Athenian  garrison.  This  place,  which  is  near 
Olyntlms  on  the  Torouaic  gulf,  they  afterwards  made  the  port  of 
their  own  city.2  A  truce  followed  between  Athens  and  Olynthus  ;  and 
1  he  misfortune  of  the  Athenians  in  Sicily  prevented  them  from  making 
any  further  attempt  to  restore  their  empire  in  this  quarler. 

At  the  close  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  when  the  power  of  Athenswas 
annihilated,  a  new  prospect  was  opened  to  the  ambition  of  the  Olyn- 
thians. Potidsea  and  many  other  towns  joined  their  confederacy.  A 
large  military  force  was  kept  on  foot,  and  they  began  to  turn  their 
thoughts  to  the  establishment  of  a  navy,  for  which  their  peninsular 
situation  and  the  abundance  of  ship-timber  in  the  country  were  emi- 
nently favourable.  It  might  have  been  better  for  them,  had  they 
confined  their  attention  (at  least  for  some  time)  to  the  acquisition  of 
maritime  power;  but  the  weakness  of  their  neighbours  tempted  them 
to  make  inland  conquests  in  Thrace  and  Macedonia,  which  led  to 
a  combination  against  them  before  their  strength  was  sufficiently  con- 
solidated. History  is  silent  as  to  any  operations  in  Thrace,  but  we 
are  informed,  that  they  had  acquired  considerable  influence  among 
the  independent  Thracian  tribes,  who  inhabited  the  country  stretch- 
ing eastward  of  the  Strymon  towards  Rbodope ;  and  it  is  probable 
that  they  coveted  possession  of  the  mine  district  of  Pangseus.  But 
the  hostilities  in  which  they  engaged  with  Amyntas  king  of  Mace- 
donia led  to  most  important  results.  At  first  they  were  completely 
successful :  they  either  took  or  seduced  from  his  allegiance  a  great 
number  of  Macedonian  towns.  They  even  got  possession  of  Pella, 
which  afterwards  became  the  capital  of  Macedonia;  and  Amyntas, 
who  had  about  the  same  time  suffered  a  great  defeat  from  the 
Illyrians,  appeared  to  have  lost  all  his  dominions.  Diodorus  says, 
that  lie  surrendered  Pella  to  the  Olynthians  in  the  time  of  his 
distress,  and  they  refused  to  restore  it  when  his  affairs  were  retrieved. 
However  this  be,  it  was  certainly  in  their  hands  shortly  before  the 
year  B.C.  3S3,  when  Sparta  commenced  the  war,  which  I  am  about  to 
mention.3 

(1)  Thucydides,  l.  68.  The  war  in  the  Chalcidic  is  related  in  divers  parts  of  his 
history.     See  particularly  iv.  79;  v.  21,  38,  39,  SO;  vi.  7. 

(2)  Fragment  from  the  end  of  Strabo's  seventh  book,  i-rjc  'O\w0ov  kviveiov  earn. 

(3)  The  history  of  these  events  is  related  by  Xenophun,  Hellen.  lib.  v.  c.  2,  i 
Diodorus  Siculus,  lib.  xv.  c.  19 — 23. 


OLYNTHUS.  22(J 

Amvntas  applied  to  Sparta  for  aid;  but  it  was  tot  bis  solicitation 
so  much,  as  one  from  another  quarter,  that  induced  tbe  Lacedae- 
monians to  interfere-  Apollcnia  and  Acanthus,  the  two  greatest 
(next  to  Olynthus)  of  the  Cbalcidian  cities,  had  seat,  an  embassy  to 
Sparta  for  the  same  purpose,  to  implore  her  protection  against  the 
Olynthians,  who  threatened  them  with  war,  unless  they  would  join 
their  confederacy. 

It  may  seem  surprising,  that  people  situated  as  these  were, 
exposed  to  aggression  from  powerful  states  and  monarchies,  shonld 
not  have  perceived  the  advantage  of  a  federal  union  such  as  that  of 
which  Olynthus  was  the  head.  But  this  was  the  feeiing  of  GreeJ' 
states  in  general ;  they  preferred  independence  to  safety.  The  sanv. 
jealous  feeling  had  overthrown  the  Athenian  empire;  it  was  destir.ei 
to  work  the  ruin  of  Olynthus,  and  lead  ultimately  to  the  subjugation 
of  Greece.  Apollonia  and  Acanthus  had  never  joined  the  league 
which  had  been  formed  under  the  advice  of  Perdiccas;  the  conditions 
of  which,  though  liberal,  involved  a  submission  to  Olynthus  as  the 
ruling  state.  Apollonia  had  once  been  tbe  most  considerable  citv  of 
the  district ;  it  lay  far  inland,  about  twelve  miles  from  Olynthus,  at 
the  foot  of  the  Cisssean  mountains.  Acanthus  was  a  coast-town  on 
the  Strymonic  gulf,  north  of  the  isthmus  of  Mount  Athos,  across 
which  the  famous  canal  was  cut  for  Xerxes.  The  Acanthians  were 
the  first  people  that  revolted  from  Athens,  when  Brasidas  came  into 
their  country.  Their  jealousy  of  Athens  was  now  transferred  to 
Olynthus. 

The  ambassadors  from  these  two  cities  were  introduced  by  the 
Ephors  to  the  Spartan  assembly,  which  was  attended  by  deputies 
from  the  Peloponnesian  allies.  The  Acanthian  envoy  addressed  to 
them  an  elaborate  speech,  in  which  he  set  forth  the  growing  power 
and  ambitious  projects  of  Olynthus,  her  military  force  and  resources, 
tbe  towns  that  she  had  wrested  from  Macedonia,  the  extreme 
ness  of  Amvntas,  and  the  danger  that  threatened  themselves.  He 
stated  that  he  had  left  ambassadors  from  Thebes  and  Athens  at 
Olynthus,  and  that  the  Olynthians  had  passed  a  resolution  to  nego- 
tiate alliance  with  those  cities.  Many  of  the  Chalcidians  were 
ready  to  revolt,  he  said,  if  the  Lacedaemonians  would  send  them 
assistance. 

The  Spartans  and  their  allies  were  prevailed  on  by  these  argu- 
ments, and  it  was  resolved  that  an  army  of  ten  thousand  men  should 
be  raised  in  Peloponnesus,  to  carry  on  the  war.  The  Acanthian 
ambassadors  requested  that  a  Spartan  general  with  a  smaller  force 
should  be  at  once  sent  off;  and  accordingly  Eudamidas  was  de- 
spatched with  two  thousand  men,  to  be  followed  by  his  brother 
Phoebidas  with  reinforcements. 

Eudamidas  marched  to  Thrace,  and  put  garrisons  in  the  towns 
that  were  friendly  to  him.  Potidaea  immediately  revolted,  and  there 
he  established  himself,  and  commenced  hostilities  against  Olynthus. 


230  APPENDIX  I. 

Phoebidas,  who  was  sent  after  him,  stopped  on  his  road  at  Thebes, 
and  seized  the  Cadmea,  a  measure,  which  had  the  immediate  effect 
of  bringing  Thebes  under  subjection  to  Sparta,  though  it  ultimately 
led  to  the  overthrow  of  the  Spartan  empire.  Teleutias,  brother  of 
Agesilaus,  followed  with  the  bulk  of  the  Peloponnesian  army,  and 
passing  Thebes  on  his  way,  received  a  contingent  of  horse  and  foot 
from  that  city.  Amyntas  had  been  ordered  to  join  him  with  as  large 
a  force  as  he  could  collect,  and  Derdas,  prince  of  Elymia,  was  soli- 
cited for  aid  on  behalf  of  Amyntas  his  kinsman. 

When  Teleutias  arrived  at  Potidaea,  he  was  joined  by  these  auxili- 
aries, and  marched  directly  against  Olynthus.  According  to  Xeno- 
phon,  the  first  campaign  was  favourable  to  Teleutias;  the  Olynthians, 
after  a  battle  which  they  had  very  nearly  gained,  were  shut  within 
their  walls,  and  the  Spartans  ravaged  the  country;  though,  after  the 
dismissal  of  the  Macedonian  and  Elymian  troops,  the  Olynthians 
made  destructive  incursions  inlo  the  hostile  states,  and  plundered 
their  territories.  Diodorus  relates  that  the  Spartans  were  defeated 
in  several  battles,  and  mentions  no  victory  won  by  Teleutias.  But 
both  he  and  Xenophon  agree  in  the  result,  which  Xenophon  assigns 
to  the  second  campaign,  viz.  that  Teleutias  fell  in  a  hard-fought 
battle  under  the  walls  of  Olynthus,  in  which  his  army  was  completely 
routed  and  dispersed. 

The  Lacedaemonians,  on  receiving  intelligence  of  this  defeat,  felt 
the  necessity  of  making  still  greater  exertions.  A  large  army,  chiefly 
of  volunteers,  was  raised  in  Peloponnesus,  and  put  under  the  com- 
mand of  Agesipolis,  one  of  the  kings.  He  marched  through  Thessaly, 
which  supplied  him  with  a  troop  of  cavalry ;  and  being  joined  by 
Derdas  and  Amyntas,  whose  zeal  in  the  cause  was  nowise  abated,  he 
marched  straight  against  Olynthus.  His  force  was  so  overpowering, 
that  the  Olynthians  dared  not  meet  him  in  the  field,  but  confined 
themselves  to  the  defence  of  the  city,  which  they  had  well  stored 
with  provisions  against  a  siege.  Agesipolis  ravaged  the  country,  and 
took  Torone,  soon  after  which  he  was  seized  with  a  fever  and  died. 
Polybiades  was  sent  out  as  his  successor,  and  commenced  the  siege 
of  Olynthus  with  great  vigour.  The  Olynthians  were  defeated  in 
various  sallies,  and  the  siege  was  turned  into  a  blockade;  yet  they 
held  out  till  the  following  year,  B.C.  379,  when  they  submitted  to 
Sparta,  on  the  terms  of  becoming  her  dependent  allies.  This  in- 
volved the  necessity  of  following  the  Lacedaemonians  in  all  their 
wars ;  and  accordingly,  we  find  a  body  of  Olynthian  cavalry  serving 
afterwards  under  the  Spartan  general  against  Thebes.1 

In  ten  years  after  this  event  important  changes  had  taken  place 
in  Greece.  The  power  of  Sparta  was  broken  by  the  Theban  war; 
Epaminondas  had  been  at  her  gates,  and  threatened  her  very  exist- 
ence.   Her  nary  had  been  beaten  by  the  Athenians  in  the  ^Egean  and 

(1)  Xenoph.  Hellen.  lib.  v.  c.  4,  s.  64. 


OLYNTHUS. 


231 


Ionian  seas.  Athens  bad  regained  her  maritime  supremacy;  most 
of  the  JDgean  islands,  besides  Corcyra  and  Byzantium,  bad  again 
become  her  allies.  Thebes  was  the  only  state  that  appeared  to  be 
her  rival. 

In  another  ten  years  events  had  happened  of  more  immediate  con- 
cern to  the  Olynthiaus.  During  a  long  peace  they  had  risen  again  to 
prosperity,  and  seem  to  have  resumed  in  a  great  degree  their  sway  or 
influence" over  the  Chalcidian  peninsula.  It  is  not  stated  either  by 
Xenophon  or  Diodorus,  that  all  the  dominion  which  Olynthus  exer- 
cised in  the  peninsula  was  taken  awiy  by  the  Lacedaemonians.  T\  e 
may  rather  suppose  that  her  willing  allies  were  left  to  be  subject  to 
her  as  before;  for  so  long  as  Olyntims  was  subservient  to  Sparta,  it 
was  even  better  for  Sparta  that  she  should  be  at  the  head  of  a  re- 
spectable confederacy.  Certain  it  is  that  the  influence  of  Olynthus 
greatly  revived  after  the  humiliation  of  Sparta.  Demosthenes1  gives 
us  to  understand  that  she  had  become  at  a  much  later  period  more 
powerful  than  she  was  before  the  Spartan  war.  But  at  the  time 
that  we  are  now  speaking  of  a  new  enemy  appeared.  Athens,  having 
become  mistress  of  the  sea,  had  turned  her  attention  to  the  coasts  of 
Macedonia  and  Thrace,  with  a  view  to  recover  the  towns  and  depen- 
dencies which  formerly  belonged  to  her.  Many  expeditions  were 
sent  for  that  purpose,  especially  against  Amphipolis,  the  possession 
of  which  was  greatly  coveted  by  the  Athenians.  These  measures 
necessarily  brought  them  into  conflict  with  the  Olynthiaus.  who  saw 
with  alarm  the  revival  of  an  empire  which  threatened  their  own  in- 
dependence. A  war  ensued,  of  which  we  have  no  full  or  clear  account, 
but  the  general  result  was  to  the  disadvantage  of  Olynthus  ;  for  mauy 
cities  near  her  coast  were  taken  by  the  Athenians,  and  especially 
Methone,  Pydna,  Potidaea,  and  Torone,  the  two  last  of  which  liad 
probably  been  rearmexed  to  the  Olynthian  alliance.  Such  things  had 
occurred,  and  the  relations  between  Athens  and  Olynthus  were  still 
of  a  hostile  character,  when,  at  the  close  of  this  last  decennial  period, 
B.C.  359,  Philip  ascended  the  throne  of  Macedon. 

In  order  that  the  position  of  things  at.  this  time  may  be  under- 
stood, it  is  necessary  to  state  more  particularly  what  had  passed  in 
the  interval. 

Amyutas,  ever  since  the  restoration  of  his  kingdom  by  the  aid  o 
the  Lacedaemouians,  had  remained  firmly  attached  to  that  people , 
and  his  friendship  was  extended  afterwards  to  Athens,  when  the 
Athenians  had  entered  into  a  treaty  of  peace  and  alliance  with  Sparta. 
In  the  year  B.C.  371  a  congress  was  held  at  Athens,  attended  by  the 
Spartans  and  their  allies,  to  settle  the  affairs  of  Gieece.  A  deputy  of 
Amyntas  was  there,  who  publicly  declared  that  Amphipolis  belonged 

(1)  De  Falsa  Leg.  425.  He  also  represents  the  terms  of  peace  with  Sparta  to  have 
been  more  favourable  to  Olynthus:  ottw;  hfioi\ov-o  tov  noKenov  snnCeiTu.  But 
we  must  make  allowance  for  exaggeration  in  this  passage,  where  the  orator  is  drawing 
a  contrast  between  two  periods. 


232  APPENDIX    1. 

to  Athens,  and  that  he  would  support  her  in  the  assertion  of  her 
claim.1  With  sucii  encouragement,  the  Athenians  conceived  hopes 
of  recovering  their  ancient  colony,  and  Iphicrates  was  selected  as 
the  most  suitable  person  to  accomplish  that  object,  on  account  of  his 
jiersoual  friendship  with  Amyntas,  who  had  adopted  him  for  a  son. 
It  does  not  distinctly  appear  when  the  first  expedition  was  sent 
against  Amphipolis.  Amyntas  died  in  the  year  B.C.  370,  and  the 
opportunity  for  obtaining  his  assistance  was  gone.  The  Amphipoli- 
tans  themselves  were  averse  to  the  alliance  of  Athens,  from  which 
they  had  been  entirely  aiienated  ever  since  the  revolution  effected 
by  Erasidas.  However,  in  the  year  B.C.  36S,  Iphicrates  was  sent 
to  the  coast  of  Thrace  on  an  exploring  expedition,  with  a  small 
armament. 

It  happened  soon  after  this,  that  Alexander,  who  succeeded 
Amyntas,  was  murdered,  and  Pausanias,  a  pretender  to  the  crown, 
having  gained  a  large  party  in  Macedonia,  and  collected  some  force, 
invaded  the  country,  and  took  various  towns  on  the  coast.  Eurydice, 
the  queen-mother,  sent  for  Iphicrates,  who  was  still  cruising  in  the 
neighbourhood,  and  reminding  him  of  his  former  attachment  to 
Amyntas,  implored  his  protection  for  her  children,  Perdiccas  and 
Philip,  the  latter  of  whom  was  then  about  fifteen  years  of  age.  Iphi- 
crates espoused  the  cause  of  the  queen,  judging  it,  doubtless,  the  best 
policy  for  Athens.  Turning  then  his  arms  against  Pausanias,  he 
expelled  him  from  the  kingdom  ;  after  which,  being  at  Hberty  to  pro- 
secute his  main  design,  he  took  into  his  service  Charidemus  of  Oreus, 
with  a  body  of  mercenary  troops,  and  commenced  operations  against 
Amphipolis. 

Charidemus,  a  native  of  Oreus  in  Eubcea,  who  from  this  time 
began  to  make  a  figure  in  Athenian  warfare,  was  a  soldier  of  fortune, 
who  had  first  been  a  siinger,  and  afterwards  set  up  a  pirate  vessel, 
with  which  he  infested  the  Jigean  sea.  Having  contrived  to  draw 
together  a  band  of  needy  adventurers  like  himself,  he  became  the 
leader  of  a  mercenary  force,  ready  to  engage  himself  in  the  service  of 
Athens,  or  the  Persian  king,  or  any  other  government  that  would 
employ  him.  Iphicrates  at  this  period  was  glad  to  engage  such  a 
man;  and  Charidemus  was  retained  in  his  service  for  upwards  of 
three  years. 

Of  the  operations  of  Iphicrates  we  have  no  detailed  account.  TVe 
learn  that  he  was  completely  disappointed  in  his  expectations  of  Ma- 
cedonian aid.  After  the  expulsion  of  Pausanias,  the  government  fell 
into  the  hands  of  a  man  named  Ptolemy,  suspected  to  be  the  queen's 
paramour,  and  even  to  have  been  the  murderer  of  Alexander.  So 
far  from  assisting  Iphicrates  to  recover  Amphipolis,  he  exerted  his 

;1  SmefcupcZr  m"«  '<**  a\\u*  'EAX^iw.  is  the  expression  said  to  have  been 
i;sed  br  the  deputy.  ..Eschines.  De  Falsa  Leg.  33:  from  whom  we  fct  most  of  otu 
information  concerning  these  transactions.  Compare  Derr.osth.  coxitis  Aristoc.  5CU. 
Ccrn.  Nepos  in  vie  Jphic. 


OLTXTHUS.  233 

influence  '  the  other  way,  probably  through  fear  of  the  Thcbans.' 
Iphicrates  for  three  years  kept,  up  a  sort  of  blockade  on  the  coast, 
and  at  length  prevailed  ou  the  Amphipolitans  to  negotiate  for  the  sur- 
render of  their  city.  Matters  had  gone  so  far,  that  hostages  were 
given  to  him  for  the  performance  of  the  agreement.  But  an  unac- 
countable event  occurred,  which  baffled  all  the  calculations  of  the 
commander.  Iphicrates,  having  been  recalled  home,  left  the  hostages 
with  Charidemus;  who,  on  receiving  an  order  from  the  Athenians 
to  bring  them  to  Athens,  sent  them  back  to  Amphipolis.  Mitford 
conjectures,  (and  possibly  he  is  right,)  that  the  hostages  had  been 
entrusted  to  the  faith  of  Iphicrates ;  that  Charidemus,  being  under 
an  engagement  to  Iphicrates,  did  not  consider  himself  bound  to  obey 
orders  from  Athens.  The  Amphipolitans  might  regard  the  Athenian 
decree  as  a  breach  of  faith,  and  as  evidence  of  a  treacherous  design. 
Under  some  such  impression,  they  broke  off  all  further  negotiation. 

The  Athenians  then  appointed  Callisthenes  to  command  the  fleet. 
But  now  Perdiccas,  who  had  killed  the  regent  and  assumed  the 
government  of  Macedonia,  appeared  as  their  enemy,  and  declared  war. 
Callisthenes  defeated  him  in  battle,  and  compelled  him  to  solicit 
an  armistice.  But  that  general,  for  some  unexplained  reason,  was 
recalled  to  Athens,  and  put  to  death.  Timotheus  was  his  successor; 
who  so  ably  managed  affairs,  that  in  a  few  years  he  effected  maay 
important  conquests  for  his  country. 

Timotheus,  on  taking  the  command,  engaged  the  services  of 
Charidemus,  it  being  desirable  to  strengthen  his  armament  by  the 
mercenaries  of  that  officer;  for  the  Athenians  had  got  into  the 
practice  of  sending  out  vessels  without  a  proper  complement  of  men,3 
trusting  to  their  generals  to  supply  the  deficiency.  Charidemus 
however,  obtaining  what  he  thought  a  more  profitable  employment 
under  Cotys,  king  of  Thrace,  broke  his  promise  to  Timotheus,  and 
carried  away  his  own  troops  with  some  of  the  Athenian  vessels. 
Timotheus,  left  to  his  own  resources,  vigorously  prosecuted  the  war; 
and  then  it  was  that  Olynthus,  as  the  principal  protector  and  ally  of 
Amphipolis,  came  into  serious  conflict  with  the  Athenians.4 

Whether  this  proceeding  on  the  part  of  Olynthus  was  the  cause, 
or  the  effect,  of  a  change  in  the  policy  of  Macedonia,  we  cannot  tell. 
Perdiccas  abided  by  his  engagement  with  Callisthenes,  and  not  long 

(1)  The  words  awTe'7rpaTTe  Ttj  ao.Xei  do  not  warrant  us  in  supposing:  that  Ptolemy 
made  war  against  Iphicrates.  especially  when  it  is  said  of  Perdiccas  immediately  after, 
6jTo\efit]tT£  tv  iroXei.     JEschin.  ib.  32. 

(2)  Pelopidas,  invited  into  Macedonia  by  the  nobles,  compelled  Ptolemy  to  give 
hostages  for  his  good  conduct,  with  a  view  to  preserve  the  crown  to  the  heirs  of 
Amyntas.  Philip  himself  is  said  to  have  been  one.  But  the  date  and  circumstances 
of  this  transaction  are  matters  of  controversy.  See  Plutarch  in  vi;.  Pelop.  Thirlwal), 
Grecian  Hist.  v.  164.     Leland's  Life  of  Philip,  i.  41. 

(3)  Kevar  m£?i  with  no  more  than  the  bare  nautical  crew.     Demosth.  01.  xxix. 

(4)  The  words  of  Demosthenes,  contra  Aristoc.  669,  are  not  referable,  as  Thirlwall 
intimates,  to  the  time  of  Iphicrates,  but  to  the  time  when  Timotheus  was  commander. 
But  it  is  very  probable  that  foe  Olynthians,  though  not  openly  at  war  with  AUen«, 
had  secretly  ailed  the  Vmphipolitans  against  Iphicrates. 


234  APPENDIX    I. 

afterwards  entered  into  ar  alliance  with  Athens,  and  cooperated  with 
Timotheus  against  the  Olvnthians.1  The  result  was  that  Timotheus 
captured  Potidsea  and  Torone  and  divers  other  towns  on  the  Ciial- 
cidian  coast,  by  which  the  power  of  Olynthus  was  seriously  impaired. 
If  we  could  implicitly  adopt  the  statement  of  Isocrates,2  he  reduced 
ole  of  Chalcidice ;  but  this  would  have  increased  the  power  of 
Athens,  and  the  weakness  of  Olynthus,  to  a  degree  which  is  not 
reconciieab.e  with  the  events  that  followed.  All  that  we  can  fairly 
gather  from  the  words  of  Isocrates  is,  that  the  influence  of  Athens 
was  greatly  extended  in  the  Chalcidian  peninsula,  and  that  some  of 
the  cities  joined  her  alliance,  perhaps  without  receiving  an  Athenian 
garrison.  Isocrates  might  be  disposed  to  exaggerate  the  merits  of 
Timotheus,  who  had  been  his  friend  and  benefactor.  Yet  history 
furnishes  strong  testimony  to  the  abilities  of  that  general.  He 
appears  to  have  had  more  capacity  for  operations  on  a  great  scale 
than  either  Iphicrates  or  Chabrias.  The  good  discipline  which  he 
kept  among  his  troops,  and  the  uprightness  and  moderation  of  his 
character,  were  greatly  instrumental  to  his  success.  J2schines  says, 
that  he  added  seventy-five  cities  to  the  dominions  of  Athens:  Iso- 
crates mentions  only  twenty-four,  referring  perhaps  to  such  only,  as 
were  actually  taken  by  anus.  His  reputation  for  success  was  so 
great,  that  a  picture  represented  him  sleeping  in  a  tent,  whilst 
fortune  was  catching  cities  for  him  in  a  net. 

The  operations  of  Timotheus  against  Olynthus  began  about  the 
year  B.C.  364.  Two  years  after  that  we  find  him  making  war  in  the 
Hellespont,  where  he  took  the  cities  of  Sestos  and  Crithote  in  the 
Chersonese.  He  was  occupied  for  eleven  months  iu  the  siege  of 
Samos,  which  ultimately  capitulated.  Isocrates  boasts  of  his  friend, 
that  with  a  fleet  of  thirty  sail  and  eight  thousand  targeteers,  and 
without  any  cost  to  the  state,  he  had  reduced  an  island,  for  the  con- 
quest of  which  Pericles  had  employed  two  hundred  galleys  aud 
spent  a  thousand  talents  of  the  public  money. 

During  all  this  time,  Amphipolis  had,  with  the  aid  of  the  Olvn- 
thians, successfully  defended  herself.  But  in  the  year  B.C.  360 
Timotheus  resolved  to  make  another  effort  for  the  conquest  of  that 
important  city.  The  Olvnthians,  in  close  alliance  with  the  Amphi- 
politans,  prepared  to  defend  them,  and  engaged  the  services  of 
Charidemus,  who  set  sail  from  Cardia,  but  was  captured  on  his  way 
by  the  Athenian  fleet,  and  compelled  to  unite  his  forces  to  those  of 
Athens.  Timotheus  sailed  up  the  Strymon,  and  landed  his  troops  to 
attack  the  city;  but  here  his  fortune  failed  him.  He  was  attacked 
by  an  army  superior  to  his  own,  and  compelled  to  make  a  disastrous 

(11  Demosth.  01.  ii.  14. 

■  the  Exchange,  1  If.  XaXKiielcinrarras  KaTeiro\4nri<ret'-  These  words  agTee 
with  the  literal  expression  of  Cornelius  Nepos,  Olynthios  tubegit.  (Vit.  Timoth.) 
Compare  Demosth.  Philipp.  i.  41.  Eix^M^1 — m'Ta  toi  totto*  tovtoi*  oirietui  rinrV* 
Dinarch.  coat.  Demosth.  91. 


OLYNTHUS.  235 

retreat.  This  was  the  last  attempt  which  the  Athenians  made  to 
recover  Amphipolis  by  arms.1 

In  the  following  year  Perdiccas  was  slain  in  battle  by  the  Illyrians, 
and  Philip  ascended  his  throne.  At  this  time  the  king  of  Macedonia 
possessed  not  a  single  maritime  town  of  importance.2  Athens  had 
Pydna  and  Met  hone,  Potidoea  and  some  other  towns  of  Chalcidice, 
besides  possessions  in  the  Cliersonese.  She  was  in  alliance  with 
Byzantium  and  other  Propontine  cities.  Thasos,  Lemnos,  and 
Imbrus  belonged  to  her ;  and  also  the  group  of  islands  off  the  coast 
of  Thessaly.  She  had  thus  the  means,  with  her  powerful  navy,  of 
infesting  all  the  northern  continent  of  the  JEgean,  and  making  a 
sudden  descent  where  she  pleased  for  the  purposes  of  war  or  con- 
quest. Olynthus  seemed  the  only  power  capable  of  opposing  her  in 
that  neighbourhood;  but  Olynthus  had  been  much  weakened;  and 
there  can  be  little  doubt,  that,  had  the  affairs  of  Athens  been  con 
ducted  by  a  Pericles,  Olynthus  and  the  whole  of  Chalcidice  must  soon 
have  fallen  under  Athenian  dominion.  Yet  in  the  space  of  a  twelve- 
month from  this  time  the  position  of  things  became  so  totally 
changed,  that  we  find  Olynthus,  the  old  enemy  of  Athens,  courting 
her  alliance,  and  even  Amphipolis  doing  the  same,  not  from  any  fear 
of  Athenian  armaments,  but  from  dread  of  a  more  formidable  power. 
That  power  was  Philip ;  whose  extraordinary  successes  and  rapid 
movements  had  already  excited  alarm  in  his  own  neighbourhood. 

Never  did  any  king  succeed  to  his  throne  under  greater  dis- 
advantages than  Philip.  He  was  only  twenty-three  years  of  age. 
His  kingdom  was  threatened  on  all  sides.  In  the  west  the  Illyrians, 
flushed  with  recent  victory,  were  preparing  for  a  new  inroad.  The 
Pseonians  made  an  incursion  from  the  north,  and  ravaged  his  country. 
At  the  same  time  there  appeared  two  pretenders  to  the  crown ; 
Pausanias,  the  ancient  rival  of  Perdiccas,  who  was  now  assisted  by 
Cotys,  king  of  Thrace ;  and  Argauis,  who  was  supported  by  the 
Athenians.  Argaeus  had  made  them  his  friends  by  promising  to 
forward  their  designs  against  Amphipolis  and  Olynthus  ;3  and  accord- 

(1)  Thirlwall,  v.  189. 

(2)  Anthemus  was  perhaps  on  the  sea,  hut  had  no  importance  except  from  its 
vicinity  to  Olynthus.  Perdiccas  had  probably  taken  it  from  the  Olynthians  in  the 
late  war. 

(3)  Diodorus,  xvi.  3.  The  following  words  respecting  Amphipolis,  e^'ex^'Pi"^  Trjr 
iroAeuf,  a'^eir  auTtji'  olvtovo/xov,  may  seem  perhaps  to  imply,  that  l'hilip  at  this  time 
possessed  the  city,  but  there  is  more  than  one  difficulty  in  the  way  of  such  a  suppo- 
sition. In  the  first  place,  there  is  no  historical  evidence  that  Amphipolis  had  at  this 
time  been  taken  or  occupied  by  Macedonian  troops.  Perdiccas  had  very  lately  been 
in  alliance  with  Athens,  nor  is  there  any  reason  to  suppose  that  he  had  turned 
against  her  at  the  last,  when  Timotheus  attacked  Amphipolis.  Even  if  he  did  so.it 
does  not  follow  that  the  Amphipolitans  received  a  Macedonian  garrison.  In  the  next 
place,  it  is  not  very  likely  that  Philip  would  have  given  up  Amphipolis  if  he  really 
possessed  it ;  especially  at  the  time  indicated  by  Diodorus,  when  he  was  about  to 
attack  the  Athenian  forces.  He  would  hardly  be  desirous  of  conciliating  the  Athenians 
at  that  moment.  On  the  other  hand,  it"  would  be  his  interest  to  conciliate  the 
Olynthians  and  Amphipolitans,  and  ccnfirm  them  in  their  hostility  to  Athens.  With 
such  view  it  would  have  been  a  wise  measure  to  declare  that  Amphipoli-  should  ba 


236  APPENDIX    I. 

ingly  an  Athenian  anna  nenf,  under  the  command  of  Maitias,  -was 
sent  to  Met  hone,  with  directions  to  advance  from  thence,  and  support 
his  cause  in  Macedonia. 

Meanwhile  Philip,  dcubtful  on  which  side  to  defend  himself,  made 
terms  for  the  present  with  the  Pfeonians,  bribed  Cotys  to  abandon 
the  cause  of  Pausanias,  and  proceeded  to  attack  An:a?us  and  the 
Athenians.  They  had  marched  from  Metbone  thirty  miles  into  the 
interior  of  Macedonia,  to  -Egffi.  the  ancient  capital  of  the  kii  ° 
where  they  expected  to  find  a  party  in  their  favour  In  tins  hope 
they  were  disappointed,  and  made  a  hasty  retreat,  but  were  over- 
taken and  attacked  by  Philip.  Their  general  Mantias  had  remained 
at  Methone,  and  the  troops,  after  suffering  a  severe  loss,  retreated  to 
a  hill,  where,  having  no  means  of  escape,  they  capitulated  and  were 
allowed  to  depart  on  giving  up  the  Macedonian  exiles.  Philip  carried 
lils  lenity  so  far,  that  he  restored  to  the  Athenians  all  the  booty  which 
lie  had  taken;  and  being  anxious  at  this  time  to  conciliate  them,  he 
sent  ambassadors  with  a  letter  to  Athens,  proposing  peace  and  amity 
with  the  republic,  and  renouncing  all  claim  of  his  own  to  Ainphipolis. 
The  proposal  was  joyfully  accepted.1 

Xo  sooner  was  this  danger  averted  than  Philip  hastened  to  chas- 
tise the  Paeonians.  It  so  happened,  their  king  Agis  had  jus: 
Philip  invaded  their  country,  overthrew  them  in  battle,  and  reduced 
them  to  entire  subjection.  Immediately  afterwards  he  marched  into 
Illyria,  and  rejecting  the  offers  of  peace  made  by  the  old  king 
Bardylis,  defeated  that  veteran  warrior  in  a  bard-fought  battle,  in 
which  more  than  seven  thousand  Illyrians  were  slain.  Bardylis  then 
obtained  peace,  on  condition  of  ceding  to  Macedonia  all  the  country 
that  lay  to  the  east  of  Lake  Lychuus. 

The  next  step  taken  by  Philip  was  one  yet  bolder,  and  pregnant 
with  more  momentous  consequences.  Without  any  delay,  and  ap- 
parently without  any  ground  of  quarrel,  he  advanced  and  laid  siege 
to  Amphipolis.  We  are  told  by  Diodorus,  that  the  Amphipolitans 
had  afforded  him  some  pretext  for  war.  But  we  need  look  for 
no  further  cause  or  pretext,  than  Philip's  own  interest  and  ambition. 
Great  must  have  been  the  surprise  and  alarm  of  the  Oivntl.. 
see  their  old  enemy,  the  king  of  Macedonia,  at  the  head  of  a  power- 
ful army  flushed  with  conquest,  besieging  a  city  scarcely  less  con- 
siderable than  their  own,  and  connected  by  close  alliance  with  them- 
selves. A  semibarbarous  continental  monarch,  with  a  large  standing 
army,  was  a  power  far  more  to  be  dreaded  than  even  Athen 
mistress  of  the  sea.  Perhaps  they  began  to  see,  that  a  union  on 
liberal  terms  with  Athens  was  the  best  protection  for  the  Greek 
cities  on  the  coast.  At  all  events  they  resolved  to  apply  for  Athenian 
aid,  and  an  embassy  was  sent  for  that  purpose. 

independent  both  of  Athens  and  Macedonia.     'Efex«'P»ffe  then  may  signify  nothing 
more  than  Trapextupn^ei  "be  withdrew  all  claim  to  dominion  over  the  cirr."     See 
Thirlwall.  v.  17 S. 
(1)  DiodoruB,  xvi.  4.    Leland's  Life  of  Philip,  i  86.    Demosth.  contra  Aristoc.  660. 


0LYNIHU3.  237 

Eat  whatever  sensation  the  attack  upon  Amphipolis  might  produce 
s.t  Olyutlius,  it  created  neither  alarm  nor  surprise  among  the  Athe- 
nians. They  were  quite  prepared  for  the  event.  Philip  had  by 
vague  promises  deluded  them  into  a  belief,  that  he  meant  to  take 
Amphipolis  for  them.  No  distinct  engagement  to  that  effect  seems 
ever  to  have  been  made ;  but  after  the  receipt  of  Philip's  letter,  in 
which  he  had  given  a  hint  of  his  friendly  intentions,  Antiphon  and 
Charidemus !  were  sent  from  Athens  to  conclude  terms  of  alliance, 
and  especially  to  treat  with  him  on  the  subject  of  Amphipolis.  They 
did  so,  and  an  understanding  was  come  to,  that  Philip,  if  he  got 
possession  of  that  city,  should  surrender  it  to  Athens,  and  the 
Athenians  should,  as  a  recompense,  deliver  up  Pydna  to  him.  Pydua 
was  strictly  a  Macedonian  town,  and  formerly  belonged  to  the  king- 
dom, while  Athens  had,  on  more  than  one  account,  a  strong  claim  to 
Amphipolis ;  so  that  there  appeared  nothing  objectionable  in  this 
arrangement,  nor  any  great  difficulty  about  carrying  it  into  effect. 

There  was  indeed  no  formal  treaty  to  bind  the  parties ;  but  such 
a  contract,  from  its  very  nature,  could  not  safely  be  reduced  to  writ- 
ing; and  therefore,  when  the  ambassadors  communicated  the  result 
of  their  negotiation  to  the  Athenian  magistrates,  it  was  considered 
perfectly  satisfactory,  and  the  people  were  given  to  understand  that 
Amphipolis  would  soon  be  theirs.2 

Under  this  persuasion,  the  people  of  Athens  not  only  spurned 
the  application  of  the  Olynthians,  but  at  a  later  period,  when  the 
Amphipolitans  themselves,  pressed  by  the  besieging  army,  sent  a 
deputation  to  Athens  and  offered  to  surrender  their  city,  the  offer 
was  refused.3 

We  can  hardly  wonder  at  this  conduct  on  the  part  of  the  Athe- 
nians. To  have  entered  into  terms  with  Olynthus  or  Amphipolis 
after  their  engagement  with  Philip,  might  well  have  been  considered 
not  only  a  breach  of  faith,  but  an  unwise  policy  at  that  time.  There 
appeared  no  reason  to  distrust  Philip.  The  kings  of  Macedonia  had 
frequently  been  allies  of  Athens,  ever  since  the  time  of  the  second 
Perdiccas.  Their  friendship  had  certainly  been  precarious,  but  their 
hostility  had  not  been  very  violent  or  very  mischievous.  Philip  himself 
had  merited  the  gratitude  of  the  Athenian  people  by  his  generosity. 
On  the  other  hand,  Olynthus  had  for  a  long  time  past  been  the  enemy 
of  Athens.  The  Amphipolitans  had  exhibited  a  malignant  hostility 
ever  since  their  revolt  in  the  Peloponnesian  war,  and  their  repudia- 
tion of  the  treaty  with  Iphicrates  caused  their  promises  to  be 
suspected. 

Philip  sent  a  letter  to  the  Athenians,  renewing  his  assurances,4 
and  meanwhile  the  siege  of  Amphipolis  was  pressed  with   vigour. 

(1)  Not  Charidemus  of  Oreus,  but  an  Athenian  of  the  same  name. 
_  (2)  Thirlwall,   v.    192.      Leland's   Philip,   i.   yC.      This   was  the  T6   0pv\o6ncvoi 
o7r6ppi|Toi.  (Olynth.  ii.  19,  page  4S  in  this  volume.) 
'3)  Oljnth  i.  11  ;  ii.  19.  (4)  Contra  Aristoc.  659.     De  Halonn.  23 


>38  APPENDIX    I. 

Diodorus  says,  it,  was  taken  by  storm  ;  Demosthenes,  that  it  was  be- 
trayed. It  is  likely  enough,  that  there  was  an  Amphipolitan  party 
favourable  to  Macedonia,  and  that,  after  the  siege  had  continued  for 
some  time,  and  there  appeared  no  prospect  of  relief,  this  party  in- 
duced the  citizens  to  capitulate. 

To  hold  out  long  would  have  been  impossible ;  for  not  only  had 
Athens  refused  assistance,  but  even  the  Olynthians  had  abandoned 
the  cause  of  their  ally.  Had  the  Olynthians  taken  the  same  vigorous 
measures  against  Pnilip,  which  they  did  against  Timotheus,  the  issue 
might  perhaps  have  been  doubtful.  But  Philip,  anxious  to  get 
speedy  possession  of  Amphipolis,  and  not  to  be  embarrassed  at  so 
critical  a  time  by  a  war  with  the  Olynthians,  bought  off  their  opposi- 
tion by  the  cession  of  Anthemus,  a  town  in  their  neighbourhood, 
which  had  formerly  belouged  to  them.1  Having  thus  disarmed  the 
two  opponents,  from  whom  he  had  most  to  fear,  Amphipolis  became 
an  easy  prey. 

But  Philip  had  now  to  consider,  whether  he  should  keep  his 
promise  to  the  Athenians,  and  offer  to  deliver  up  Amphipolis  in 
exchange  for  Pydna.  He  appears  to  have  made  up  his  mind  with 
very  little  hesitation;  for  immediately  after  the  capture  of  the  one 
city,  he  appeared  with  his  army  before  the  walls  of  the  other.  Here 
also  he  found  a  party  in  his  favour.  Whether  he  had  concerted  any 
plans  with  them  beforehand,  does  not  appear;  but  by  their  assistance 
he  was  admitted  into  Pydna  without  difficulty :  and  it  soon  became 
apparent,  that  he  intended  to  keep  both  cities  on  his  own  account, 
and  set  the  Athenians  at  defiance. 

The  Athenians,  as  might  have  been  expected,  were  not  slow  to 
express  their  resentment  of  such  treachery;  but  how  to  avenge 
themselves  on  the  deceiver,  was  a  more  difficult  matter.  Whether 
Philip  was  able  at  this  time  to  cope  single-handed  with  the  power  of 
Alhens,  may  be  doubted  ;  but  he  was  too  prudent  to  venture  on  such 
a  chance.  An  opportunity  was  open  to  him,  for  obtaining  an  impor- 
tant ally,  and  he  hastened  to  seize  it.  Experience  had  proved,  that 
a  combination  between  two  of  the  three  powers,  (Athens,  Olynthus, 
and  Macedonia,  i  would  turn  the  scale  against  the  third.  Philip  pro- 
posed to  the  Olynthians  to  join  them  in  an  offensive  war  against 
Athens,  to  expel  the  Athenians  from  their  possessions  on  the  Mace- 
donian coast,  and  to  share  the  spoils.  This  offer  was  accepted.  The 
war  that  followed  was  called  the  Amphipolitan  war,  and,  as  far 
as  Philip  and  the  Athenians  were  concerned,  it  lasted  till  the  year 
b.c  316,  when  peace  was  concluded  by  the  Embassy  of  Ten.  On  the 
part  of  Athens,  the  war  was  prosecuted  with  neither  skill  nor  vigour. 
She  incurred  a  large  amount  of  expense  in  fruitless  expeditions,  and 
hardly  obtained  a  single  advantage.2   Her  efforts  were  indeed,  during 

(1)  As  to  the  position  of  Anthemus.  see  Thirlwall,  v.  194. 

(2)  Olynth.  iii.  36.     Tamynae  and  Thermopylae  were  creditable  aff;drs,  but  brought 
no  permanent  advantage  to  Athens 


0LYXTHU3.  239 

a  part  of  this  time,  distracted  by  tbe  Social  war,  and  by  the  affairs  of 
Eubcea  and  tbe  Chersonese.  Tbe  loss  of  Byzantium  and  [he  confe- 
derate islands,  followed  by  that  of  Corey ra,  crippled  her  power,  and 
greatly  reduced  ber  revenues  ;'  nor  was  the  cession  of  the  Cher- 
sonese  by  any  means  a  sufficient  compensation. 

Tbe  most  important  achievement  by  the  united  arms  of  Philip  and 
the  Olynthians,  was  tbe  reduction  of  Potidaea.  An  Athenian  garrison, 
stationed  here,  and  holding  considerable  property  in  tbe  town,  was 
obliged  to  surrender.  Philip,  to  whom  the  merit  of  the  conquest 
was  principally  due,  seized  tbe  Athenian  possessions,  and  gave  them 
up,  together  with  the  town  itself,  to  tbe  Olynthians  :  the  garrison  he 
treated  kindly  and  sent  back  to  Athens.2 

Philip  does  not  appear  to  have  taken  an  active  part  in  any  other 
military  operation  in  favour  of  Olyntbus.  It  cannot  however  be 
doubted,  that  the  war  was  carried  on  in  Chalcidice  between  Athens 
and  Olyntbus  for  several  years,  and  that  divers  of  the  Chalcidiau 
towns  were  again  wrested  from  tbe  Athenian  alliance,  and  brought 
back  to  tbe  Olynthian ;  among  others,  Torone,  which  was  taken  by 
Philip  from  tbe  Olynthians  at  a  later  period.3  TVe  read  of  an  expedi- 
tion sent  by  the  Athenians  against  Olvnthus  somewhere  about*  this 
time,4  which  turned  out  a  failure.  Philip  might  well  leave  Athens 
and  Olynthus  to  fight  it  out  by  themselves,  when  he  knew  that  the 
Athenians  bad  their  hands  so  full ;  and  the  Chalcidmns  were  easily 
persuaded  to  desert  the  cause  of  Alhens,  when  not  controlled  bv  a 
garrison.  Leiaud  sagaciously  observes,5  that  Philip  saw  the 
advantage  of  keeping  his  own  army  undivided,  while  he  left  Potidaea 
and  other  places  to  be  garrisoned  by  the  Olynthians. 

Philip  indeed  was  turning  his  attention  to  another  quarter,  where 
he  had  an  important  conquest  to  make  on  his  own  account.  This 
was  the  mine  district  of  Mount  Pangseus,  which  commenced  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Strymon,  and  extended  eastward  as  far  as  Scapte 
Hyle,  where  lay  the  property  of  Thucydides  the  historian.  From 
the  Pangaean  hills  flowed  the  Hebrus  with  its  golden  sands.  There 
were  mines  here  both  of  gold  and  silver.  The  Thasians,  who  had 
mines  also  in  their  own  island,  had  planted  various  colonies  for 
mining  purposes  on  the  adjoining  continent.     The  principal  of  these 

(1)  Philipp.  iv.  141. 

(2)  Diod.  xvi   8.  Dem.  cont.  Aristoc.  656.     De  Halonn.  79. 

(3)  Demosthenes  more  than  once  enumerates  the  towns  taken  by  Philip  from  the 
Athenians,  apparently  in  historical  order,  thus — Amphipolis,  Pvdna,  Potidaea, 
Methone,  (Olynth.  i.  11,  12;  Philipp.  i.  41.)  Had  any  other  important  town  been 
taken  by  him  during  the  same  period,  Demosthenes  -would  hardly  have  forborne  to 
mention  it.  On  the  other  hand,  he  was  not  so  likely  to  speak  in  these  orations  of 
conquests  made  by  the  Olynthians  alone,  towards  whom  he  desired  his  countrymen  to 
have  none  but  friendly  feelings.  In  the  Oration  de  Chers.  105,  Philip  is  said  to  have 
given  to  the  Olythians  no-nocunv  Kai  n6W  trepu.  His  assistance,  no  doubt,  enabled 
them  to  get  other  places.  In  the  Oration  of  Demosthenes  on  the  Embassy  (426),  it 
is  represented  that  all  the  Chalcidian  cities  had  again  become  allies  of  Olvnthus. 
Compare  vEschines  De  Falsa  Leg.  37. 

(4)  Contra  Midiam,  566,  5TS.  The  date  of  this  expedition  was  probably  the  ve-'a 
B.C.  355.  (5)  Life  of  Philip,  i.  105. 


24;  0  APPENDIX    I. 

was  Datus.  They  Lad  lately  formed  a  new  settlement  more  inland, 
called  Crenides,  in  a  beautiful  spot,  watered  by  numerous  mountain- 
rivulets,  and  abounding  with  veins  of  gold.  The  Thasians  were 
subject  to  Athens ;  and  Philip  had  no  hesitation  in  expelling  them 
from  their  possessions,  and  seizing  upon  the  whole  district.  At 
Crenides  he  established  a  Macedonian  colony;  the  place  was  soou 
enlarged  into  a  considerable  city,  and  called  from  the  founder 
Philippi.  A  new  method  of  working  the  mines  was  adopted,  the 
Waters  being  drained  oif  into  canals;  and  in  a  short  time  they  yielded 
to  the  king  of  Macedonia  such  an  amount  of  revenue,  as  enabled 
him  not  only  to  maintain  a  large  standing  army,  but  to  extend  his 
influence  among  the  Greek  states  by  corruption.  A  gold  coin  was 
struck,  called  Philippeum,  which  quickly  circulated  over  Greece;  and 
from  this  time  Philip  owed  his  success  as  much  to  his  gold  as  to  his 
arms,  according  to  the  general  tradition  of  antiquity,1  as  expressed 
in  the  well-known  lines  of  Horace — 

Diffidit  urbium 
Port  as  vir  Macedo,  et  submit  aemulos 
Reges  muneribus. 

The  last-mentioned  conquest  was  effected  B.C.  356,  not  long  after 
the  reduction  of  Potidsea.  In  the  same  year  his  son  Alexander  was 
born.  For  the  two  following  years  Philip  was  (comparatively 
speaking)  inactive  ;  that  is,  iu  a  military  point  of  view;  for  we  cannot 
doubt  that  he  was  actively  engaged  in  the  affairs  of  his  kingdom, 
directing  its  interna!  administration,  improving  the  revenue,  forti- 
fying and  embellishing  his  towns,2  training  his  army,  collecting 
mercenary  soldiers,  stores  and  materials.  He  commenced  at  the 
same  time  (what  no  Macedonian  king  had  done  before)  the  establish- 
ment of  a  navy,  for  which  the  coast-towns  that  he  now  possessed, 
and  especially  Amphipolis  (whose  situation  was  like  that  of  the 
modern  Antwerp),  afforded  him  abundant  facilities.  He  was  busy  with 
his  negotiations  in  foreign  states,  sending  emissaries  wherever  he 
was  likely,  cither  by  corruption  or  otherwise,  to  promote  Macedonian 
influence.  The  effects  of  this  were  soon  visible  in  Euboea,  where  in 
the  year  354  his  intrigues  fomented  the  quarrel  between  Callias  and 
Plutarch,  and  drew  the  Athenians  into  the  perilous  battle  of 
Tamynae. 

In  the  year  353  Philip  laid  siege  to  Methone,  a  city  on  the  Ther- 
maic  Gulf,  about  five  miles  from  Pydna.  It  was  held  by  the 
Athenians,  and  strongly  fortified.  To  them  it  was  useful  as  a 
sallying-place  into  the  interior  of  Macedonia,  as  had  been  seen  in  the 
case  of  Argseus,  as  well  as  on  former  occasions.3  Philip  was  there- 
fore  extremely    anxious   to   take   it.      The   Methoneans   defended 

(1)  Demosth.cont.Lept.4TG.  Diodorus,  xvi.  8.  Leland's  Life  of  Philip,  i.  110. 
fhirwall,  v   202. 

(2)  Justin,  viii.  3,  where  it  is  relaed  that  he  defrauded  the  contractors  of  their 
money.    But  '.his  is  not  credible,  (3)  Thucydides,  vi.  7. 


OLYNTHUS.  2  A 1 

themselves  with  the  utmost  obstinacy,  and  the  siege  lasted  for  nearly 

twelvemonth. 

While  Philip  was  eagerly  pressing  the  a»*«jk,  he  was  wounded  in 
the  eye  by  an  arrow  siot  from  the  walls.  The  arrow  being  extracted 
was  found  to  h«"e  this  inscription:  "Aster  to  Philip's  right  eye." 
It  is  said  time  Aster,  being  a  skilful  archer,  had  offe.od  his  services 
to  Philip,  assuring  him  that  he  could  kill  any  birds  hying.  "Well !" 
said  Philip,  "  I  will  employ  you  when  I  make  war  upon  starlings." 
Aster,  in  revenge  for  the  slight,  threw  himself  into  Methone.  and 
shot  this  arrow  which  deprived  Philip  of  the  sight  of  one  eye.  Philip 
ordered  the  arrow  to  be  shot  back  with  another  inscription  :  "  If 
Philip  takes  Methone,  he  will  hang  Aster,"  a  threat  that  was  after- 
wards executed. 

The  city  was  open  to  relief  from  the  sea,  and  a  blockade  would 
have  been  unavailing.  The  Athenians  were  actually  sending  fresh 
succours,  when  Philip  ordered  a  general  assault.  A  large  number  of 
besiegers  had  mounted  the  battlements,  when,  to  cut  off  their  retreat, 
Philip  ordered  the  scaling-ladders  to  be  removed,  leaving  his  men  to 
conquer  or  to  perish.  They  fought  with  desperation,  and  carried 
everything  before  them.  The  besieged  laid  down  their  aims.  Philip 
accepted  their  surrender  on  these  conditions,  that  they  should  be 
suffered  to  depart  with  one  suit  of  apparel  only,  that  the  city  and  all 
within  it  should  be  given  up  to  pillage.  Methone  was  razed  to  the 
ground.1 

Immediately  after  this  followed  the  campaign  in  Thessaly,  the 
defeat  and  death  of  Onomarchus,  the  expulsion  of  the  tyrants  of 
Pherse,  the  capture  by  Philip  of  Pagasae  and  Magnesia,  his  march  to 
Thermopylae,  and  his  retreat  on  finding  the  pass  occupied  by  Athe- 
nian troops.  Prom  Thessaly  he  marched  into  Thrace.  In  the  interior 
of  that  country  were  various  tribes,  ruled  by  divers  princes.  One 
at  least  of  these  had  not  long  before  conspired  with  the  Ulyrians  and 
Paeonians  to  make  war  against  Macedonia.3  Philip  resolved  to 
avenge  this  insult,  and  at  the  same  time  to  establish  his  own  influence 
amon.2  the  barbarous  tribes,  who  were  able  to  furnish  useful  recruits 
to  his  armies.3  Here  Philip  was  occupied  for  some  time,  establishing 
friendly  princes  in  their  dominions,  and  expelling  others;4  after 
which  he  suddenly  marched  to  the  Propontine  coast,  and  attacked 
Heraeum,  a  fortress  near  Perinthus,  held  by  the  Athenians,  and  im- 
portant to  them  for  the  protection  of  their  corn-trade.  The  alarm 
which  this  excited  at  Athens,  the  vigorous  resolutions  and  dilatory 
measures  of  the  people  are  particularly  mentioned  by  Demosthenes.5 

(1)  Diodorus,  xvi.  34.     Demosth.  Philipp   i.  50.     Leland's  Life  of  Philip,  i.  194. 

(2)  Diodorus,  xvi.  22. 

(3)  The  Thracian  Feltastze  made  excellent  light  troops,  and  had  often  been  employed 
fcy  the  Athenians.     See  Thucydides,  vii.  9,  27,  30. 

(4)  Tor/9  fitf  U/3a\iov,  toi-s  o<=  KaTajT^jat  l-tux  /WiXewv.      Deme'th.  Olynth.  i.  13. 

(5)  Olynth.  iii.  29.  Demosthenes  intimates,  that  if  the  armament  Srgt  decreed  had 
sailed  in  time,  they  might  have  surprised  Philip  during  his  illness  and  destroyed 
Uirn,  ouk  hv  qyt»x\tfi  rov  hutv  awtitir. 

VOL.  I.  K 


2±2  AP?E>"T>IX    I. 

The  siege  was  began  in  the  latter  end  of  the  yeai  j>52,  nor  does  it 
clearly  appear  whether  or  not  Heraeum  was  taken.  Philip  however, 
fatigued  by  his  long  marches  ana  incessant  toil,  fell  dangerously  ill; 
and  for  a  time  his  military  operations  were  suspended.  No  sooner 
had  he  recovered,  than  he  quitted  Thrace,  and  marching  towards 
Chalcidice,  early  in  the  year  351,  surprised  the  Olynthians  by  making 
a  hostile  inroad  into  the  peninsula.1 

Why  or  on  what  pretence  he  took  such  a  step,  is  doubtful.  It 
appears  however,  that  some  time  before  this  the  Olynthians  had 
broken  off  their  connexion  with  Philip  and  made  friendly  overtures 
to  the  Athenians.2  They  had  discovered  soon  after  the  capture  of 
Potidsea,  that  Philip  would  do  nothing  more  for  them,  that  he  was  begin- 
ning to  make  conquests  on  his  own  account  in  their  neighbourhood, 
.  airing  power  of  a  formidable  characier.  They  were  acquainted 
wiih  the  value  of  the  mine-district,  and  saw  the   g  ntages 

that  he  was  deriving  from  it.  To  them,  living  on  the  confines  of 
Macedonia,  all  Ids  plans  and  procet  military  pre- 

parations, became  speedily  known.  The  fall  of  Methoue,  oue  of 
the  strongest  fortresses  of  Greece,  revealed  tc  them,  that  few  cities 
would  be  protected  by  their  walls  fi  ssault  of  the  Macedonian 

army.     The  late  occurrences  in  Thessaly   and   Thrace   must    have 
greatly  incn  as       I      r  apprehensions.      Philip  had  defeated   in   a 
pitched  battle  the  veterans  of  Onomarchus,  and  made  the  The-- 
his  allies.     Olynthus  was  surroum  r  on  every  side. 

Tor  even  the  sea  was  now  open  to  Philip.     He  had  ncft  indeed  such 
a  navy  as  could  meet  the  Athenians  in  a  fair        ■   .      .    but  he  sent 
out  piratical  expeditions  to  infest  their  commerce  and  plunder  their 
.    -  scenl  upon  Leiunos  and 

Imbrus,  captured  a  fleet  of  merchant-men  off  the  Eubcean  coast, 
and  even  sailed  into  the  bay  of  Marathon  and  carried  off  the  Athe- 
nian St. 

The  time  when  the  Olynthians  began  to  change  their  policy  was 
about  the  year  353,  perl  s       I  Methane.    Overtures 

soon  afterwards  made  to  Athens  f  and  they  were  joy- 

fully accepted.5  let,  although  the  two  el: .  limed  their  friendly 

intercourse,  it  d<  es  not  ;.  pear  that  an  offensive  alliance  had  been 
formed  between  them  against  Macedonia,  and  certainly  the  Olyn- 
thians had  taken   no  hostile  measures.  ..  n  Philip,  as 

(!)  Olymh.  i  -    cetfmow.      "He  made  an  aiirression  (or  an 

attack)  upon  the  01.v:nUi..;;s."     The  words  I 
anv  particular  mode  of  aggress  -   1'jiilip  haa  c 

would  net  have  mentioned  it  sa  >.  - 
.  contra  Aristae  652.     Thai  year  352. 

The  orator  assigns  no  C3use  for  a  rupture  between  Philip  and  the  Olynthia::- 

their  alarm  at  i.  -  .  ns  and  Olyuthus  were  at  t: 

but  not  allies :   reus  ,.  -.-    .      - 

(3)  Justin,  viii.  3.  "Firaticam  exereere  inslituit."     lb.  ix.  1. 

(i)  This  happened  after  his  Thessalian  campaign;  and.  as  Thirlwall  observes,  he 
probablv  made  ips  which  he  found  in  the  harbour  of  Paeasse.    Vol.  v. 

8S4.     jEsca.  De  pals.  Leg.  37.  (5)  Olynth.  L  11;  iii.  30. 


OLYNTHUS.  2*3 

above  mentioiied,  crossed  the  Chaicidian  frontier.  It  is  likely  enough 
that  Philip  considered,  or  chose  to  consider,  the  revival  of  tlieir  con- 
nexion with  Athens  an  act  of  hostility  towards  himself;  and  un- 
doubtedly from  that  time  he  looked  with  an  evil  eye  upon  Olynthus.1 
But  another  cause  of  offence  is  alleged  by  Justin.2  Philip  had  three 
half-brothers,  Archelaus,  Aridseus,  and  Menelaus.  One  of  these, 
Archelaus,  he  had  put  to  death  for  treason;  the  other  two  escaped, 
and  found  refuge  in  Olynthus. 

"Whatever  may  have  been  Philip's  pretext,  he  now  appeared  in  the 
character  of  an  enemy ;  though  what  overt  act  of  hostility  he  com- 
mitted, is  not  disclosed  to  us.  From  the  loose  language  of  the 
orator  I  should  infer,  that  Philip  at  this  time  showed  his  teeth  with- 
out biting;  he  infringed  (as  we  should  say)  the  law  of  nations  by 
some  aggressive  act,  but  his  enterprise,  whatever  it  was,  did  not 
succeed.  He  may  have  crossed  the  mountains  and  attempted  to  sur- 
prise some  towns,  or  seduce  them  from  the  Olynthian  confederacy; 
not  succeeding  in  this,  he  retired,  like  the  lion  who  has  missed  his 
spring,  to  wait  for  a  better  opportunity. 

This  view  is  confirmed  by  the  subsequent  conduct  of  Philip.  It 
was  nearly  two  years  before  war  actually  broke  out,  by  his  invasion  of 
Chalcidice.3  He  had  little  else  meanwhile  to  engage  his  attention. 
The  Sacred  war  was  left  to  run  its  course  without  his  interference. 
Athens  had  a  breathing  time  allowed  her.  A  few  murmurs  were 
heard  from  the  Thessalians,  for  his  holding  Pagasae  and  Magnesia ; 
but  them  he  pacified  by  promises,  and  in  the  year  350  conferred  a 
new  obligation  upon  them  by  the  expulsion  of  Pi:holaus  from  Pherse. 
But  all  this  while  he  was  silently  and  secretly  preparing  for  the 
destruction  of  Olynthus,  which  he  saw  was  essential  to  the  accom- 
plishment of  his  furl  her  objects.  Therefore  he  suspended  his  opera- 
tions against  Athens,  and  lulled  her  into  a  false  security.  She  had 
been  roused  by  the  first  Philippic  in  oo2.  Little  more  than  a  year 
had  passed,  when  all  the  alarm  had  died  away,  and  Philip  was  talked 
of  as  a  person  from  whom  nothing  was  to  be  feared.4  'this  was  just 
what  the  king  of  Macedon  desired.  He  had  rightly  judged,  that  the 
Athenians  would  not  make  a  good  use  of  the  respite  which  he  allowed 

(1)  Olynth.  iii.  30.  (2)  Justin,  vii.  4;  viii.  2,  3. 

(3)  Thirl -a  all  i.HisT.  V.2S9)  conjectures  that  An  llonia  was  taken  soon  after  Jlethone. 
But  the  reason  which  he  assigns  is  unsatisfactory,  namely  the  mention  which 
Demosthenes  makes  of  the  three  cities  Olynthus,  Methone,  and  Apollonia,  in  the 
third  Philippic,  p.  11T.  They  are  only  mentioned  together  on  account  of  their  im- 
portance, and  the  similarity  of  their  fates.  If  Apollonia  had  then  been  taken,  it 
would  have  brought  on  a  war  earlier,  and  piobably  Demosthenes  would  have  spoken 
of  it. 

(4)  Demosth.  de  Rhod.  lib.  197.  It  may  be  thought  that  even  Demosthenes  was 
not  then  fully  alive  to  the  real  state  of  things,  as  he  quotes  what  was  said  of  Philip 
without  contradicting  it.  But  it  was  not  his  business  to  mix  two  questions  together. 
He  may  well  have  thought,  that  it  would  strengthen  Athens  to  pain  Rhodes  for  an 
ally,  and  that  to  keep  the  Athenian  forces  in  active  employment,  was  a  means  of 
preparing  them  for  war  with  Macedonia.  It  might  not  be  prudent  to  tell  the  people 
all  his  reasons.  I  think  however,  that  Demosthents  was  no:  yet  sensible  of  the- 
danger  to  be  apprehended  from  an  extensive  svstem  of  corruption. 

R2 


241  APPENDIX    I. 

them.  He  feared  that,  if  he  attacked  the  Olynthians  at  once,  he 
mhjht  have  to  encouuter  the  whole  force  of  the  Chaleidian  body,  a 
formidable  coir  unction,  when  the  Olyuthians  alone  could  bring  into 
the  field  ten  thousand  infantry  and  a  thousand  horse ;  and  still  more 
difficult  to  overcome,  should  they  be  reinforced  by  Athenian  auxi- 
liaries. His  safest  course  was,  to  divide  his  enemies  and  cripple 
their  means  of  resistance.     How  was  this  to  be  done  ? 

Philip  had  discovered  by  experience,  if  he  had  not  learned  by  his 
residence  at  Thebes,  that  in  most  Grecian  cities  there  were  different 
parties  contending  for  the  upper  hand;  that  the  influence  of  faction 
was  strong ;  that  corruptible  citizens  were  always  to  be  found,  and 
that  the  laws  gave  equal  liberty  of  speecb  to  the  patriot  and  the 
traitor.  Acting  on  this  persuasion,  he  sent  his  emissaries  to  the 
Chaleidian  towns,  and  in  each  of  these,  by  dint  of  artifice  and  intrigue, 
established  a  Macedonian  party.  Gold  was  lavished  without  stint. 
He  had  now  ampler  meaus  than  before ;  since,  in  addition  to  the 
resources  of  his  own  kingdom,  and  what  he  had  gained  by  plunder,  he 
was  receiving  a  large  portion  of  the  revenues  of  Thessaly.1  Bribery 
he  judged  to  be  the  best  economy  ;  it  would  save  him  expense 
in  the  end,  by  rendering  his  conquest  more  easy  ;  and  the  price  of 
corruption  would  be  reimbursed  by  the  spoil  of  the  vanquished.2 

Iu  none  of  these  towns  was  Macedonian  gold  more  efficacious  than 
in  the  capital  itself.  Olynthus  beheld  many  of  her  citizens  grow 
suddenly  rich  ;  their  stock  of  possessions  was  increased,  no  oue  knew 
how ;  they  improved  their  houses  and  displayed  an  unusual  magni- 
ficence.3 Yet  were  the  people  so  blinded,  they  withheld  not  their 
confidence  from  such  men.  It  was  studiously  disseminated,  that 
Philip  had  been  their  benefactor,  that  he  would  be  still,  and  that 
Macedonian  protection  was  their  best  security.  Thus,  instead  of 
preparing  for  their  defence  betimes,  instead  of  throwing  themselves 
into  the  arms  of  Athens,  and  soliciting  her  immediate  co-operation 
against  the  common  enemy,  they  left  him  to  choose  the  moment 
of  attack  and  bejran  to  prepare  when  it  was  too  late. 

Towards  the  end  of  350  B.C.,  Philip  at  the  head  of  a  powerful  army 
marched  into  Chalcidice,  determined  to  effect  its  final  conquest.  He 
made  no  declaration  of  war,  but  summoned  town  after  town,  as  he  ad- 
vanced, to  surrender.  Which  first  opened  its  gates  to  him,  is  uncertain. 
Diodorus,  who  does  not  profess  to  give  the  details  of  the  campaign, 
relates  that  he  laid  siege  to  Stagira  4  aud  razed  it  to  the  ground. 
Apollonia*  shared  the  same  fate.  ~  Other  towns,  intimidated  or  cor- 

(1)  Olvnth.  i.  15. 

VI)  Diodorus,  xvi.  54.     Hence  callidus  emptor  Olynthi.  Juvenal,  Sat.  xii.  45. 

(3)  Detuosth.  De  Fals.  Leg.  426.  Mitford  contends  that  these  were  only  innocent 
presents      Hist.  Gr.  iv.  p.  432. 

(4)  Such  is  the  true  reading,  instead  of  r«i'pav,  xvi.  52 

(5)  Demosth.  Piiilipp.  iii-  117 '.  From  this  passage  it  might  perhaps  be  inferred,  thai 

•o  Chaleidian  cities  were  actually  destroyed  by  Philip.  The  number  i» 
■nrobably  exaggerated.  I  can  imagine  that  his  jealousy  of  the  Chaleidian  race  would 
pvumpi  aim  to"  take  severe  measures.     Potidaea  he  preserved.    Or.  de  Ha_onn  80. 


OLYNTHUS.  245 

rupfed,  listened  to  make  terms  with  the  conq  leror.  After  reducing 
the  whole,  or  nearly  the  whole,  of  the  peninsula,  he  marched  against 
Olynthus. 

What  were  the  Olynthians  doing  all  this  time  ?  On  the  first  intel- 
ligence of  Philip's  invasion  they  sent  to  Athens,  imploring  succour. 
They  seut  to  Philip  also,  to  demand  an  explanation  :  he  assured 
them  positively,  that  he  was  not  at  war  with  them,  and  still  continued 
his  progress.  They  sent  again,  and  received  the  same  answer ; 
Philip  affecting  to  treat  the  Chalcidians  as  independent,  and  refusing 
to  hear  any  remonstrance  on  their  behalf  It  was  not  till  he  had 
approached  within  five  miles  of  the  capital,  that  he  threw  off  the 
mask,  and  told  them  plainly,  that  either  they  must  quit  Olynthus,  or 
he  Macedonia.1 

On  the  arrival  of  the  Olynthian  ambassadors  at  Athens,  an  assem- 
bly was  immediately  called  to  consider  what  should  be  done.  The 
feeling  was  almost  universal,  to  send  assistance  to  Olynthus. 
Demades2  alone  opposed  it ;  but  on  what  grounds  we  are  not  in- 
formed. Probably  he  enlarged  on  the  difficulty  of  contending  with 
Philip  in  Chalcidice,  and  the  want  of  sufficient  funds  to  carry  on  the 
war.  He  was  the  first  Athenian  orator  in  the  pay  of  Macedonia. 
Philip  had  calculated  on  a  burst  of  popular  enthusiasm  at  Athens, 
and  a  warlike  vote  in  favour  of  Olynthus  ;  but  he  calculated  also  ou 
confusion  and  delay,  and,  to  augment  these,  a  clever  and  reckless 
man  like  Demades  was  exceedingly  useful.  The  debate  seems  to 
have  turned  on  questions  of  ways  and  means — how  the  troops  were 
to  be  provided,  when  to  be  despatched — what  number  — whether 
citizens  or  mercenaries,  &c.  Demosthenes,  who  rose  after  many 
speakers  had  been  heard,  breaking  at  once  into  the  subject,  con- 
tended that  an  Athenian  force  should  be  sent  off  immediately,  that 
the  crisis  was  important,  they  ought  to  take  arms  in  person,  and  con- 
tribute to  the  expenses  of  the  war.  He  had  little  difficulty  in  pro- 
curing a  vote  for  a  considerable  armament. 

Some  days  elapsed  before  any  troops  could  be  got  ready,  and  in  the 
meantime  Demades  and  his  party  were  busy  creating  obstacles,  and 
disheartening  the  people.  They  had  for  the  last  two  years,  without 
any  formal  truce,  oeeu  enjoying  a  respite  from  war,  and  were  now- 
called  upon  to  make  new  exertions.  The  first  excitement  caused  by 
the  Olynthian  embassy  had  a  little  cooled.  It  was  thought  necessary 
to  couvene  another  assembly  :  Demosthenes  made  a  second  speech, 
in  which  he  encouraged  the  Athenians,  showed  the  precarious  nature 
of  Philip's  power,  and  the  importance  of  prosecuting  the  war.  At 
length  succours  were  shipped  off;  not  such  a  force  however  as  the 
urgency  of  the  case  required,  and  probably  not  all  that  had  been 

(1)  ftemosth.  Philipp.  iii.  113;  iv.  147. 

(2)  Suidas  in  v.  Amm<<3>ic.  He  was  a  man  of  natural  wit  and  e/oquence,  but  of  a 
coarse  mind  and  profligate  character.  Throughout  his  whole  life  he  was  in  oppo- 
sition to  Demosthenes,  and  quite  his  match  on  some  occasions  Many  anecdotes  ar» 
told  of  him  in  Plutarch's  Lives  of  Fhocion  and  Demosthenes. 


2lG  APPENDIX    I. 

decreed,  but  only  two  thousand  mercenaries,  commanded  by  Chares, 
Hardly  had  they  gone,  when  the  misgivings  of  the  people  were  ex- 
changed for  an  overweening  confidence  :  such  was  the  fickle  temper 
of  the  people.  It  was  imagined,  that  Athens  and  Olynthus  would  be 
more  than  a  match  for  Macedonia,  and  the  general  talk  was  about 
punishing  Philip  for  his  perfidy.  In  this  state  of  the  public  feeling 
another  assembly  was  held  ;  the  cry  was  for  war ;  the  orators  spoke  in 
a  tone  of  exultation,  as  if  what  was  to  be  done  had  been  done  already. 
Demosthenes,  himself  perhaps  not  fully  alive  to  the  danger,  yet 
appreciating  it  far  better  than  the  others,  reminded  his  countrymen 
that  the  question  was  not  about  punishing  Philip,  but  about  saving 
Olynthus.  He  saw  that  very  inadequate  succours  had  been  sent ; 
the  citizens  were  reluctant  to  serve  in  person ;  there  was  a  difficulty 
about  providing  for  the  expenses ;  no  one  had  dared  to  propose  an 
application  of  the  surplus  revenue,  though  Demosthenes  had  hinted 
the  expediency  of  such  a  measure.  He  ventured  now  to  press  this 
point  more  openly,  urged  the  necessity  of  making  a  great  sacrifice, 
and  concluded  with  an  eloquent  appeal,  calling  upon  the  Athenians 
to  maintain  the  ancient  honour  of  their  country.1 

Chares  meanwhile  had  sailed  to  the  Chalcidian  coast.  There  he 
made  a  sudden  descent,  and  cut  off  a  body  of  stragglers  from  Philip's 
army.  Content  with  this  achievement,  and  not  finding  himself  strong 
enough  to  attempt  a  more  serious  diversion,  he  returned  to  Athens, 
and,  in  honour  of  his  victory,  gave  a  public  entertainment,  which  cost 
no  less  than  sixty  talents.  The  money,  it  seems,  was  obtained  from 
the  spoils  of  Delphi,  given  by  the  Phocians  to  Chares  for  some  ser- 
vice that  he  had  done.  While  the  Athenians  were  amused  with  this 
piece  of  vanity,  and  little  thinking  of  the  serious  nature  of  the  case, 

(1)  The  notion,  that  the  three  Olynthiac  Orations  were  connected  with  the  three 
Olynthian  embassies,  though  derived  from  the  respectable  authority  of  Dionysius, 
and  assented  to  by  Leland  and  many  other  critics,  is  wholly  unsupported  by  the 
internal  evidence  of  the  Orations  themselves,  in  whatever  order  we  like  to  arrange 
them.  The  arguments  are  all  of  a  general  character.  The  necessity  of  assisting  the 
Olynthians,  and  assisting  them  vigorously  and  effectively,  is  urged  over  and  over 
again  ;  but  there  is  no  reference  to  that  extremity  of  danger,  as  to  which  Demosthenes 
could  not  have  been  silent,  if  he  had  spoken  on  the  occasion  of  the  third  embassy.  In 
not  one  of  the  speeches  is  there  the  slightest  mention  of  a  second  or  third  embassy, 
or  any  allusion  to  the  operations  of  Chares,  or  Charidemus,  or  Philip.  Neither  his- 
tory nor  probability  confirms  the  fancy  of  Dionysius.  It  is  likely  that  there  would  be 
several  debates  upon  the  original  resolution,  to  embark  in  the  war:  Philochorus  says 
that  on  the  occasion  of  the  first  embassy,  oi  'Aflumioi  avftfiaxiav  tc  exoifja-av-ro  nal 
ftorjOeiav  eneinl/av,  whereas  on  the  two  second  embassies  there  is  no  mention  by  him 
of  any  formal  vote.  And  this  view  agrees  with  the  arguments  of  Libanius.  When 
the  second  message — and  still  more  when  the  third— arrived  from  Olynthus,  there  was 
no  need  of  debate  ;  the  principle  had  been  agreed  to  ;  every  one  saw  that  the  case  was 
3*-essing;  and.  succours  were  sent  off  without  any  opposition.  It  may  be  gathered 
from  Philochorus,  that  ambassadors  came  on  the  second  occasion  from  the  Chalcidian 
body,  so  that  the  deputation  being  more  imposing,  and  the  emergency  more  critical, 
one'neeri  not  be  surprised  that  the  Athenians  did  not  wait  for  a  speech  from  Demos- 
thenes, before  they  sent  off  their  reinforcements.  Besides,  it  is  likely  that  the 
Athenians  were  preparing  reinforcements  in  the  interval  between  the  first  and  second 
expedition,  never  intending  the  trnops  of  Chares  to  be  their  only  succours.  I  fully 
assent  to  what  is  said  by  Jacobs  on  this  point  in  the  introduction  to  his  translation 
of  the  Olynthiacs. 


OLYJN-THUS.  2-i7 

a  second  embassy  came  from  the  Olyntliians  and  their  confederates, 
imploring  immediate  succour,  representing  that  their  country  was 
overrun  by  the  Macedonian  army,  and  they  were  in  the  greatest  dis- 
tress. The  Athenians  sent  off  directly  a  body  of  four  thousand  mer- 
cenaries, of  the  middle-armed  kind,  with  a  hundred  and  fifty  horse, 
and  appointed  Charidemus  to  the  command.1 

Charidemus,  who  was  in  the  Hellespont  when  the  armament  sailed 
from  Athens,  as  soon  as  he  received  notice  of  his  appointment,  has- 
tened to  Olynthus.  Philip  had  by  this  time  reduced  a  considerable 
part  of  Chalcidice,  and  had  sent  some  of  his  forces  into  Pallene, 
probably  to  summon  Potidsea.  Charidemus  put  himself  at  the  head 
of  his  troops,  in  conjunction  with  those  of  Olynthus,  attacked  the 
Macedonians  in  Pallene,  and  took  some  prisoners.  Afterwards,  to 
make  a  diversion,  he  sailed  to  Bottia?a,  where  he  landed  and  ravaged 
the  country.  Keturning  to  Olynthus,  instead  of  pursuing  his  in- 
structions, or  concerting  any  plan  with  the  people  whom  he  was  sent 
to  protect,  he  gave  himself  up  to  vicious  pleasure,  indulging  his 
licentious  humour  so  far  as  to  offer  a  gross  insult  to  the  Olvnthian 
magistrates.2  This  was  not  to  be  tolerated;  nor  were  his  military 
services  any  compensation  for  his  misbehaviour.  The  Olyntliians  had 
no  confidence  in  his  abilities  as  a  general,  aud  not  much  in  the  valour 
of  his  troops,  who  were  mercenary  adventurers  like  himself.  In  the 
extremity  of  their  alarm,  they  sent  once  more  to  Athens,  praying  for 
a  reinforcement  of  native  Athenians.  This  was  granted.  Two  thou- 
sand heavy-armed  citizens,  and  three  hundred  cavalry,  were  shipped 
off,  aud  Chares,  who  was  then  in  Athens,  had  influence  enough  to 
procure  his  own  reappointment  as  general.3 

Philip,  little  disturbed  by  the  proceedings  of  Chares  or  Charidemus, 
had  been  steadily  pursuing  his  object.  Having  entered  the  Sithoniau 
peninsula,  and  received  the  submission  of  Torone,  he  marched  to 
Mecyberna,  whose  gates  were  opened  to  him  by  the  same  treachery. 
He  was  now  within  a  few  miles  of  Olynthus,  and  it  was  here  that  he 
made  the  terrible  denunciation,  which  left  to  the  Olyntliians  no  hope 
of  mercy.  They  marched  bravely  to  meet  him  with  all  the  forces 
they  couid  muster,  and  were  defeateJ.  They  hazarded  a  second 
battle  with  no  better  success,  and  were  shut  up  within  their  walls.4 
Philip  immediately  commenced  the  siege,  and  made  bold  efforts  to 
carry  the  place  by  assault ;  for  he  knew  the  importance  of  time,  and 
feared  the  arrival  of  fresh  succours  from  Athens.  Yet,  so  obstinate 
was  the  defence,  that  all  his  efforts  were  baffled,  and  he  was  repulsed 

(1)  Philochorus,  apud  Dionys.  Epist.  ad  Aram.  ix.  Theopompus,  apuri  Athen  xii.  43. 
Leland  (in  the  Life  of  Philip,  ii.  13)  states  that  Chares  was  sent  for  by  the  Athenians  ; 
but  the  passage  of  iEschines  (De  Fats.  Leg.  37)  refers  to  a  dilferent  time. 

(2)  Theopompus,  apud  Athen.  x.  47.  Elr  tovovtov  irpcnXtttv  ditpaaiar,  unrre 
(teipuKiuv  ti  sxtpd  nit  fiovXris  ->7v  -nT'i/  'O\vv0ia>v  aniiv  hTre^ttpnirev,  b  t>ji<  /u€v  uxtin 
»li>  eueidt?  Kiii  \tipiev,  ervy^ave  6i  fieri't  .Xfpduy  toI  MaKeiovot  aix/iaAwTOV  7.,->*i  >i- 
ftfvov.  The  name  of  Derdas,  the  Elymian  prince,  may  seem  to  suggest  that  ihii 
Derdas  was  a  person  of  rank. 

(3)  Philochorus,  1.  c.  (■})  Diodorus,  xvi   53. 


248  APrExr>ix  i. 

from  the  walls  with  considerable  loss.  The  prompt  arrival  of  Chnres 
mi^ht  have  saved  Olynthus.  But  now  began  to  be  seen  the  effects 
of  Macedonian  bribery.  One  of  the  most  eminent  Olvnthians,  and 
the  commander  of  their  forces,  was  Apollonides.  who  had  serred  his 
country  with  zeal  and  fidelity.  As  long  as  be  was  entrusted  with  the 
conduct  of  affairs,  there  was  little  hope  that  treason  would  prosper. 
The  Macedonian  party  accused  him  before  the  people,  as  the  author 
of  their  misfortunes.  It  is  the  uature  of  men  who  are  in  trouble  to 
lay  the  blame  somewhere.  The  Olynthians  were  unhappily  persuaded 
to  deprive  Apollonides  of  his  command,  and  to  confer  it  uponEuthy- 
crates  and  Lastheues,  the  paid  ageuts  of  Philip.  From  that  moment 
the  doom  of  Olynthus  was  sealed.1 

Meetings  were  now  held  in  the  city  to  propose  negotiations  with 
Philip;  but  the  people  were  not  yet  prepared  for  submission.  The 
Athenians  were  expected:  their  soldiers,  though  outnumbered,  were 
brave  ;  they  had  a  fine  body  of  five  hundred  horse,  wbich  had  greatly 
distinguished  itself  in  the  field.  It  was  resolved  to  try  the  effect 
of  a  sally.  But  the  design  was  betrayed  to  Philip.  Lastheues, 
who  commanded  the  horse,  led  them  into  an  ambuscade,  where  they 
were  surrounded  by  the  Macedonians,  and  made  prisoners  of  war.' 

This  consummate  piece  of  treachery  threw  the  whole  city  into 
consternation.  No  man  any  longer  could  trust  his  neighbour.  The 
besieging  army  surrounded  the  walls.  If  Chares  had  arrived,  it  would 
have  "been  too  late  now.3  Olynthus  was  not  on  the  sea.  so  that  he 
could  throw  his  forces  into  the  town;  and  he  was  not  strong  enough 
to  attack  Philip  in  his  lines.  All  hope  of  raising  the  siege  was  gone ; 
and  the  Olynthians,  in  utter  despair,  were  driven  to  surrender.  The 
only  terms  whicb  they  could  obtain  were,  that  their  lives  should 
be  spared. 

Thus,  in  less  than  a  year  from  the  time  that  he  invaded  Chalcidice, 
Philip  terminated  the  war,  and  entered  Olynthus  in  triumph.  He 
kept  his  promise  to  the  inhabitants,  and  spared  their  lives,  putting  to 
death  only  his  fugitive  brothers,  Meuclaus  and  Aridseus :  *  but  the 
whole  body  of  the  Olynthian  people,  without  distinction  of  sex.  age, 
or  rank,  were  put  up  to  sale  by  public  auction,  and  reduced  to 
slavery.5  The  walls,  the  houses,  the  whole  city  of  Olynthus  was 
demolished ;  and  the  lands  distributed  as  a  reward  amon?  the  officers 
of  Philip.6 

(1)  Philipp.  67.   79.     It   is   true,    as   Thirlwall   (Hist.  Gr.  v.  3141  obsen 
;...'.i\t7i   does  not  necessarily  signify  that  Apollonides  was   expelled,   but  it  may 
signify  that,  and  there  is  no  reason  to  think  that  it  does  not.  So  Leland  takes  it :  (Life 
of  Philip,  ii   a.) 

(2)  Pemosth.  De  Fals.  Leg.  426. 

:at  Chares  did  with  himself,  does  not  appear.  Probably  finding  he  could  not 
relieve  Olvnthus.  he  did  nothing,  and  attempted  nothing.  Some  Athenians  were 
taken  in  Olynthus  by  Philip,  as  we  learn  from  JEschines,  (De  Fals.  Leg.  SO.)  but 
clearly  not  Chares  or  his  troops. 

(4)  Justin,  viii.  S. 

(51  Diodorus,  xvi.  53.     Pinarchus  cont.  Pem.  95.     Pemosth.  De  Fals.  Leg.  4S9. 

(6)  Tlirlwall,  Gr.  Hist.  v.  316,  citing  r^eopompus. 


OLYXTHTJS.  249 

The  total  destruction  of  this  great  city,  which  had  once  defied 
Lacedsemon  in  the  plenitu&e  of  her  power,  excited  a  feeling  of 
dismay  throughout  the  whole  of  Greece  "Has  Philip  destroyed 
Olynthus  ?  "  said  one  ;  "  he  himself  never  raised  such  a  city  !  "  But 
nowhere  was  it  felt  so  deeply  as  at  Athens.  The  grief  and  indigna- 
tion of  the  people  were  mingled  with  shame  and  fear.  The  words  of 
Demosthenes  were  recollected, — that  unless  they  saved  Olynthus,  the 
war  would  soon  be  on  their  own  frontiers.  In  the  first  moment  :jf 
their  anger,  they  passed  a  vote  of  outlawry  against  the  traitors  who 
had  sold  their  country,  making  it  lawful  to  slay  them  wherever  they 
could  be  found.  Chares  came  in  for  his  share  of  their  resentment, 
yet  contrived,  by  means  of  his  influence,  to  escape  any  public  cen- 
sure.1 What  became  of  Cliaridemus  is  unknown :  whether  he  was 
slain  in  battle,  or  whether  he  saved  his  life  and  liberty.  No  more  is 
heard  of  him  in.  Athenian  history. 

Euthycrates  and  Lasthenes  received  the  recompense  of  their 
treason,  though  not  exactly  in  the  way  that  they  expected.  Philip 
maintained  them  at  his  court,  but  only  as  servile  dependents  and 
parasites.  The  Macedonian  courtiers  held  them  in  contempt,  the 
soldiers  reviled  them  for  their  baseness.  On  one  occasion  they  com- 
plained to  Philip.  "  Never  mind,"  said  he ;  "  the  Macedonians  are 
a  blunt  people  ;  they  call  a  spade  a  spade."  2 

The  conquest  of  Olynthus  was  of  the  utmost  importance  to  Philip. 
It  secured  his  dominions  from  being  attacked  by  Athens  or  any  other 
maritime  power.  The  Chalcidian  peninsula  had  separated  one  part 
of  his  kingdom  from  the  other,  and,  while  it  remained  subject  to 
Olynthus,  gave  an  access  to  his  enemies  into  the  heart  of  Macedonia. 
Now  it  became  a  province  of  his  own;  and  the  severe  measures 
which  he  resorted  to,  in  rooting  out  the  hostile  population,  prove 
how  anxious  he  was  to  prevent  all  disturbances  in  that  quarter  for 
the  future.  A  glance  at  the  map  will  show  us  what  progress  Philip 
had  made  in  the  ten  years  since  he  ascended  the  throne.  Prom 
the  bay  of  Pagasas  to  the  mouths  of  the  Nestus  in  Thrace,  all  the 
coast  of  Northern  Greece  had  been  brought  under  his  power. 
Thessaly  was  devoted  to  him.  His  territories  were  extended  on  the 
Illyrian  and  Pseonian  frontiers;  and  he  had  made  an  impression 
upon  Thrace.  In  the  north  he  menaced  the  Athenian  dominions  in 
Chersonesus ;  while  on  the  south  he  came  in  contact  with  Euboea, 
and  alarmed  Athens  for  her  own  safely. 

While  the  Atheniaus  were  lamenting  the  disasters  of  the  late  war, 
and  preparing  to  send  embassies  among  the  Greek  states,  to  raise 
up  a  new  confederacy  against  Macedonia,  Philip  had  given  orders 
for  a  solemn  festival  in  honour  of  the  Muses  to  celebrate  L:s  triumph. 
Archelaus,  one  of  his  predecessors,  had  instituted  this  festival  at 

Ul  Aristotle.  Rhet.  iii.  10.     The  interpretation  of  this  passage  is  doubtful.     See 
Mitford.  Gr.  Hist.  iv.     Le'and's  Life  of  Philip,  ii   30. 
(2)  Demosh.  de  Chers.  9'J  ;  de  Coron.  241.     Leland's  Life  of  Philip,  ii.  31. 


2.50  APPENDIX  I. 

JEzss,  after  the  model  of  the  Olympian.  It  was  held  by  Philip  at 
Dium  in  Pieria,  a  district,  of  his  own  kingdom,  on  the  borders  of 
Thessaly,  sacred  from  the  earliest  time  to  the  goddesses  of  song. 
It  was  solemnized  with  extraordinary  pomp,  with  games,  sacrifices, 
banquets,  and  theatrical  exhibitions,  and  continued  for  nine  days. 
!?sor  was  this  intended  by  Philip  for  an  idle  display.  A  concourse  of 
visitors  flocked  from  alt  parts  of  Greece,  to  enjoy  his  hospitality ; 
and  while  ail  were  dazzled  with  the  trrandeur  of  the  spectacle,  and 
impressed  witli  admiration  of  the  king's  fortune  and  power,  many 
eminent  men  from  foreign  states  were  won  over  to  his  friendship: 
military  adventurers  were  lured  by  his  gifts  and  promises,  and  led  to 
believe  that  the  camp  of  Philip  was  the  piace  to  look  for  honour 
and  reward.1 

It  is  pleasing  to  record  one  or  two  acts  of  clemency  and  generosity 
on  the  part  of  the  conqueror.  At  the  sale  of  Olyuthian  citizens,  at 
which  Philip  himself  was  present,  one  prisoner,  who  was  about  to 
be  put  up  to  auction,  loudly  demanded  his  liberty,  declaring  that 
lie  was  a  friend  to  the  king,  and  desiring  to  be  brought  near  him, 
that  he  might  prove  his  word.  This  having  been  allowed  by  the 
king,  the  man  begged  him  in  a  whisper  to  let  fall  the  skirt  of  his 
robe,  as  he  was  exposed  in  au  indecent  maimer.  Philip  entered 
into  the  joke,  and  said :  "  Yes ;  this  man  is  my  friend :  let  him  be 
set  at  liberty."  2 

At  a  banquet  given  during  the  festival,  Philip,  observing  the 
melancholy  countenance  of  Satyrus  the  actor,  and  that,  while  other 
artists  and  performers  claimed  a  recompense  for  their  services,  lie 
alone  asked  for  nothing,  inquired  the  cause.  "I  am  indifferent," 
replied  Satyrus,  "to  what  the  others  desire;  there  is  one  favour 
I  would  gladly  ask,  and  one  that  Philip  could  easily  grant,  but  I  fear 
he  would  refuse  it  me."  Philip  pressed  him  to  speak  out,  and  de- 
clared that  he  would  deny  him  nothing :  on  which  Satyrus  preferred 
his  request  as  follows : — "  Apollophanes  of  Pydna  was  my  friend. 
"When  he  was  murdered,  his  relations  sent  his  two  daughters,  then 
children,  to  Olynlhus,  as  a  place  of  security.  They  are  among  the 
captives  of  the  fallen  city,  and  are  now  of  marriageable  age.  I  pray 
and  beseech  you  to  give  me  them.  But  I  would  have  you  know  what 
is  the  nature  of  the  boon  I  ask.  It  is  one  from  which  I  seek  no 
personal  advantage.  If  you  deliver  them  to  me,  I  shall  give  them 
each  a  marriage  portion,  and  they  shall  be  treated  in  a  manner  worthy 
of  me  and  of  their  father."  This  speech  was  received  with  a  tumult 
of  applause  from  all  the  company:  Philip  was  greatly  affected,  and 
set  the  girls  free,  although  Apollophanes  their  father  had  been  one 
cf  the  murderers  of  his  brother  Alexander.3 

Diodorus  adds,  that  there  were  numerous  other  instances  in  which 
Philip  displayed  a  similar  generosity. 

(T  Diodorus,  rvi.  55.  (2)  Leland,  1.  e. 

iZ    Demosth.  De  Fals.  Leg.  402.     Diodorus,  1.  c. 


ATHENIAN   LiONEY    AND    MINES.  251 


APPENDIX  II. 


ATHEXIAX  JIOXEY  AXD  MIXES. 

Phidon,  an  ancient  king  of  Argos,  said  to  have  lived  in  the  eighth 
century  before  Christ,  was  the  first  person  in  Greece  who  established 
a  system  of  weights  and  measures,  and  also  a  coinage  in  silver  and 
copper.  It  acquired  the  name  of  the  Jiginetan,  because  the  people 
of  .Pinna,  by  their  commercial  intercourse  with  other  parts  of 
Greece,  brought  it  into  general  use.  There  was  another  system 
called  the  Euboic,  introduced  to  the  Greeks  by  the  people  of  Chalcis 
and  Eretria,  who  at  an  early  period  were  celebrated  for  their  com- 
mercial activity,  and  who  worked  mines  of  silver  and  copper  in 
their  own  island.1 

In  fact  however,  both  these  systems  were  derived  from  the  East, 
having  been  invented  in  very  ancient  times  by  the  Chaldees  of 
Babylon,  and  brought  into  Greece  by  the  commerce  of  the  Phoeni- 
cians. The  standard  of  weights,  which  became  known  as  the 
Euboic,  was  one  used  in  Asia  for  gold.  Herodotus  expressly  in- 
forms us,  that  in  the  reign  of  Darius  I.  the  silver  tribute  collected 
from  the  satrapies  of  the  Persian  empire  was  estimated  by  the 
Babylonian  talent,  the  gold  tribute  by  the  Euboic.2  "Whether 
Herodotus  means  that  the  term  EuImc  was  adopted  by  the  Persian 
government,  or  only  the  weight  so  called  by  the  Greeks,  does  not 
appear. 

The  denominations  under  both  these  systems  were  the  same, 
although  the  scales  ^ere  different;  viz.  the  talent,  the  mina,  the 
drachm,  and  the  obol;  which  bore  ihe  following  invariable  relation 
to  each  other : 


A  talent 

= 

60  minas. 

A  mina 

= 

100  drachms. 

A  dracin 

= 

6  obols. 

The  word  talent  originally  signified  xceight,  that  is,  any  weight,  or 
weight  in  general ;  and  was  also  used  to  signify  a  pair  of  scaler  la 
such  sense  it  is  used  by  Homer.  Afterwards  the  term  was  applied  to 
a  specific  weight,  and  became  the  principal  standard  in  the  Greek 

(1)  For  more  full   information   upon  this  subject  the  reader  is  referred  to  the 
Archaeological  Dictionary,  titles  Kummus  and  Pondera 
U)  Herod,  iii.  59. 


252  APPENDIX    II. 

systems.  Mina  was  a  tern,  of  oriental  origin.  Drachm  and  obol  are 
Greek  words.  Drachm  is  said  by  the  lexicographers  to  signify  a 
handful,  that  is,  as  much  coin  as  could  be  held  in  ihe  clenched  haud.1 
Obol  takes  its  name  from  a  spit,  which  it  somewhat  resembled  in 
figure.": 

The  weights  under  each  system  were  as  follows : 

JEginetan  talent  about  96  lb. 

Euboic  talent  „  38  lb. 

The  denominations  of  money  in  Greece  were  the  same  as  those  of 
weight,  and  the  proportions  the  same  likewise.  Money  (as  is  well 
known)  has  always  been  founded  on  a  system  of  weight.  In  process 
of  time  the  coinage  ceases  to  represent  the  original  standard, 
although  the  name  is  preserved.  Tor  example  a  pound,  in  our  own 
country,  formerly  represented  a  pound  weight  of  metal ;  now  it 
sieniSes  a  sum  of  twenty  shillings.  So  in  Greece  an  Euboic  talent 
(in  a  pecuniary  sense)  anciently  denoted  eighty  pounds  of  silver — 
that  being  the  metal  sreneraily  current  in  Greece — afterwards  ks 
value  would  be  measured  by  the  number  of  drachms  that  were  paid 
for  it;  and,  if  the  drachm-piece  had  fallen  below  the  ancient  standard 
of  weight,  so  would  the  talent. 

The  JUgiuetan  system  was  adopted  in  Peloponnesus  and  most  of 
the  Dorian  states.  The  Euboic  prevailed  in  the  Ionian  settlements, 
and  in  Attica.  Solon  however,  for  certain  political  reasons  which 
will  be  noticed  elsewhere,  lowered  the  standard  of  money,  and  the 
Attic  talent,  according  to  his  regulation,  was  reduced  about  twenty- 
seven  per  cent.3  The  money  computed  on  the  Solonian  scale  is  that 
which  we  have  generally  to  deal  with  in  perusing  the  Attic  writers. 
Judging  from  the  ancient  coins  which  have  been  preserved,  the 
value  of  the  Attic  monev  has  been  thus  estimated  in  English : 

£   $.   d. 

An  obol  =  0    0     1| 

A  drachm  =  0    0    9" 

A  mina  =  3  15    0 

A  talent  =  225     0    0 

The  value  however  has  been  put  by  others  both  higher  and  lower. 

It  must  be  observed  that  the  talent  and  the  mina  are  sums  only, 
the  drachm  and  the  obol  are  coins  also.  And  it  will  be  found  in 
perusing  the  orators,  that  the  Athenians  generally  made  their  com- 
putations in  drachms,  so  that,  when  no  specific  sum  is  mentioned, 
drachms  are  understood. 

The  coinage  at  Athens  was  principally  silver,  consisting  of  drachms 
and  obols,  with  fractious  and  multiples  of  those  pieces.  The  obol 
and  half-obol  were  small  coins,  like  our  silver  penny.     There  were 

(1)  As  if  it  were  opa-tnh-  from  ipdaaa.  It  must  then  have  been  a  copper  coin, 
when  it  received  that  name. 

(2)  'OfieKoi  is  a  spit  or  broach.  Scapula  says  in  his  Lexicon  of  the  Obol:  •■  Ab 
o/StXo*  derivatum  putatur,  quod  o^eXoi.  figuram  haberet,  ita  tamen  ut  non  in  acutum 
desineret." 

(3)  The  Euboic  scale  still  continued  in  use  at  Athens  for  merchandise,  though  the 
*cale  for  money  was  altered.    See  Grote  i  Hist,  of  Greece,  iii.  22S. 


ATHENIAN   MONEY    AND    MINES.  253 

also  copper  coins,  as  the  quarter-obol,  the  chalcus.1     The  following  is 
a  table  of  Attic  coius : 

s.  d. 
(value)  ...      0  \\ 

:   't\ 


.t.  d.* 

(value)  3  0 

The  obol      .     . 

„       1  6 

The  half  obol  . 

»       0  9 

The  quarter-obol 

n      0  6 

The  chalcus     . 

»     o  45 

The  lepton 

„       0  3 

farthings. 


The  four-drachm  piece 

The  two- drachm  piece 

The  drachm  .... 

The  four-obol  piece    .     .        ,,      u  o         jirtumus     .     .       ,, 

The  three-obol  piece   .     .        ,,0  4*       The  lepton       .     .      „  f  I 

The  two-obol  piece 

Thus  the  lowest  Attic  coin  was  pretty  nearly  equal  to  the  French 
centime. 

There  was  no  gold  coined  at  Athens  before  the  time  of  the  Mace- 
donian empire.  Bur  there  was  gold  in  circulation,  the  coiuage  of 
other  countries,  chiefly  the  stater  and  the  daric. 

The  gold  stater  was  equal  in  value  to  twenty  drachms,  or  fifteen 
shillings.  It  was  first  coined  by  Croesus  king  of  Lydia,  or  at  least 
first  became  known  to  the  Greeks  as  a  Lvdian  coin.  There  were 
various  other  staters  brought  into  Greece  from  Asia  Minor  and  t lie 
islands;  for  example,  from  Smyrna,  Cyzicus,  Phoceea,  Samos, 
Siphnos,  Thasos. 

The  daric,  named  after  the  first  Darius,  who  reformed  the  Persian 
currency,  was  of  the  same  value  as  the  stater.  This  coin,  which 
had  an  extensive  circulation,  was  retained  by  the  Macedonian  kings, 
who  melted  down  all  the  sold  coinage  of  Greece,  and  had  their  own 
imasre  stamped  upon  it. 

There  -were  also  half-staters  and  half-darics  in  circulation,  whia 
are  mentioned  by  Greek  writers. 

The  daric  was  stamped  on  one  side  with  the  figure  of  an  archer, 
which  gave  rise  to  a  good  saying  of  Agesilaus,  related  by  Piutareh. 
While  the  Spartan  king  was  overrunning  the  provinces  of  Asia 
Minor,  Tithraustes  the  satrap,  to  get  rid  of  so  formidable  an  enemy, 
sent  Timocrates  of  Rhodes  with  fifty  talents  of  gold  into  Greece,  to 
stir  up  war  against  Laeedsemon.  This  money  was  distributed  in 
Thebes,  Argos,  and  Corinth — Xenophon  says  the  Athenians  had  no 
share  of  it2 — and  the  effects  were  quickly  seen.  The  Spartans, 
alarmed  at  the  confederacy  against  them,  recalled  Agesilaus;  where- 
upon he  declared  "  that  a  thousand  Persian  archers  had  driven  him 
out  of  Asia." 

There  was  but  a  scanty  supply  of  the  precious  metals  in  Greece  at 
an  early  period,  while  the  eastern  mouarchs  collected  the  treasures  of 
Cholcis,  Lydia,  Phrvgia,  Armenia,  and  India.  The  wars  of  Xerxes 
opened  a  more  extensive  intercourse  with  Asia,  and  enriched  the 
Greeks  by  commerce  and  by  plunder.  Thus,  and  by  an  increase  in 
the  produce  of  their  native  mines,  money  became  more  plentiful 
among  them;  and  in  the  time  of  Demosthenes  its  value  was  five 
times  less  than  in  the  days  of  Solon.     The  relative  value  of  gold  to 

\\)  So1ts  name  imports.     XaXnor  is  copper.  (2)  HeU   iii.  5.  1. 


254  APPENDIX    II. 

silver,  in  the  time  of  Herodotus,  was  thirteen  to  one,  in  tne  time  of 
Demosthenes,  ten  to  one. 

The  Greek  islands  that  most  abounded  in  precious  metals  were 
Samos,  Siphnos,  and  Thasos,  in  which  there  was  both  gold  and 
silver.  The  mines  of  Thasos  were  anciently  worked  by  the  Phoeni- 
cians, to  whom  the  Greeks  were  at  an  early  period  indebted  for  their 
supply  of  metal  in  general.  They  brought  the  common  metals  from 
Spain  and  Arabia,  tin1  from  Britain,  and  probably  taught  the  art  of 
mining  to  the  Greeks.  The  Thasians  found  gold  and  silver  on  the 
adjacent  continent  of  Thrace.  But  when  the  island  was  conquered 
by  Cimon,  their  settlements  also  fell  into  tne  hands  of  the  Athe- 
nians, who  worked  the  mines  until  the  close  of  the  Peloponnesian 
war.  The  gold,  which  they  obtained  from  this  district,  they  used 
not  for  coinage,  but  for  commercial  purposes.  Philip  afterwards 
took  possession  of  these  mines,  and  worked  them,  as  we  have  already 
seen,  with  great  advantage.2 

There  were  silver  mines  also  in  Thessaly.  But  the  most  valuable 
in  Greece  were  those  of  Lauriuni  in  Attica,  to  which  Xenophon  has 
devoted  a  long  chapter  of  his  treatise  on  the  Athenian  revenues,  and 
on  which  in  modern  times  a  dissertation  has  been  written  by  Bockh, 
the  celebrated  author  of  the  Staatshamhaltuna  der  Athener,  or 
Public  Economy  of  Athens,  from  whom  English  scholars  have  derived 
most  of  their  information  upon  these  subjects. 

The  mines  of  Laurium  were  the  property  of  the  Athenian  people, 
but  were  worked  by  private  speculators,  to  whom  the  state  granted 
allotments,  receiving  a  certain  sum  by  way  of  premium  or  purchase- 
money,  and  receiving  a  perpetual  rent  of  a  2-Ath  part  of  the  produce. 
These  persons  were  thus  in  point  of  law  tenants  of  the  state ;  but 
for  most  purposes  might  be  regarded  as  the  absolute  owners.  Many 
wealthy  citizens  embarked  their  capital  in  the  mining  business,  which 
they  carried  on  by  means  of  agents  or  subtenants.  Nicias  had  seve- 
ral mines,  with  a  thousand  slaves  at  work  in  them,  for  each  of  whom 
he  received  from  his  lessee  a  clear  rent  of  an  obol  a  day.  Thus  was 
Laurium  an  important  source  of  revenue  to  Athens.  When  Dece- 
leia  was  occupied  by  the  Lacedaemonian  army,  she  suffered  greatly  bj 
losing  the  profit  of  the  mines.  They  had  yielded  a  considerable 
income  in  the  time  of  Themistocles,  who  persuaded  his  countrymen 
to  apply  the  money  to  shipbuilding,  instead  of  distributing  it  among 
themselves.  In  the  time  of  Demosthenes,  though  he  speaks  in  high 
terms  of  the  value  of  this  property,3  the  quantity  of  silver  obtained 
was  diminished ;  and  Strabo  tells  us,  that  in  the  first  century  of  the 
Christian  era  the  Laurian  mines  were  exhausted. 

Foreigners  in  Attica  were  allowed  equal  privileges  with  citizens  in 

(1)  They  purchased  it  in  the  Cassiterides  Insula?  (Stilly  Isles),  so  called  anciently 
from  the  Greek  KaoatTepos,  tin.  The  islanders  are  supposed  to  have  obtained  the 
tin  from  the  mainland  of  Britain. 

(2)  See  p.  240  of  this  volume. 

(3)  See  the  Oration  de  Chcrsuneso,  p.  100;  the  fourth  Philippic,  135. 


ATHENIAN    MONEY    AND    MINES.  20J 

the  renting  of  the  mines:1  so  anxious  was  the  state,  thr'  they  should 
be  let.  To  prevent  frauds  on  the  revenue,  every  mine  in  work  was 
required  to  be  registered,  and  an  indictment  lay  against  any  person 
who  evaded  this  regulation.2 

Xenophon,  who  seems  to  have  thought  that  the  riches  of  Laurium 
were  inexhaustible,  recommended  that  his  countrymen  should  improve 
their  finances  by  abolishing  the  middle-men,  and  letting  the  mines, 
together  with  mining-slaves,  to  the  working  tenants,  in  the  same  way 
that  other  revenues  were  let  to  farm.  He  advised  that  they  should 
buy  slaves  gradually,  until  they  had  got  three  slaves  to  every  citizen  ; 
and  he  calculated  that  the  mines  would  afford  profitable  employment 
for  all,  aud  the  revenue  would  be  immensely  increased. 

The  trade  of  Athens  was  much  promoted  by  the  purity  'of  her 
silver  coin,  which  was  everywhere  exchanged  with  advantage,  while 
that  of  other  states  would  only  pass  at  home.  One  instance  oniy  is 
recorded  of  her  issuing  a  debased  gold  coinage ;  but  this  was  in 
a  time  of  distress,  at  the  close  of  the  Pelopounesian  war.3  The  right 
of  coiniug  money  was  (no  doubt)  vested  in  the  state,  and  forgery  was 
a  capital  crime.* 

The  Attic  coins  were  generally  stamped  with  a  head  of  Pallas  on 
one  side,  and  an  owl  (her  sacred  bird)  on  the  other.  Hence  the 
point  of  the  storv  told  by  Plutarch,  in  his  life  of  Lysander — That 
general  sent  Gylippus  with  a  bag  of  money  to  Sparta.  Gylippus 
unsewed  the  bottom  of  the  bag,  took  out  a  portion  of  the  money,  and 
sewed  it  up  again.  But  unfortunately  for  him,  the  bag  contained  a 
paper  which  gave  an  account  of  the  sum  sent  home.  The  magistrates, 
finding  the  money  short,  were  surprised,  and  made  inquiries.  Gylippus 
had  concealed  ihe  stolen  coins,  which  were  Athenian  with  the  owl- 
stamp,  under  the  tiles  of  his  house  ;  but  his  servant,  who  was  in  the 
secret,  betrayed  him  by  declaring,  that  he  had  observed  a  great  many- 
owls  roost  in  the  Ceramicus.3  The  theft  was  thus  discovered,  and 
Gylippus  tarnished  the  good  name  which  he  had  acquired  by  his  vic- 
tories at  Syracuse. 

Although  the  Attic  money  has  been  reduced  into  terms  of  our  own, 
to  give  the  reader  some  notion  of  its  value,  it  is  plain  enough,  that 
the  relative  values  of  Attic  and  English  money  could  only  be  fully 
determined  by  a  comparison  of  the  quantities  of  the  precious  metals, 
the  different  modes  of  living  in  the  two  countries,  and  many  other 
considerations  of  the  same  kind.  For  these  reasons,  besides  the 
awkwardness  of  making  Demosthenes  talk  of  pounds  shillings  and 
pence,  I  have,  in  the  translation,  adhered  to  the  Attic  terms  for 
money.  The  following  particulars  will  help  to  throw  some  light  on 
the  subject. 

(1)  Xenophon,  Ve  Vectig.  iv.  12.     The  student  should  peruse  this  treat]' ■• . 

(2)  This  was  called  d-fpa^iov  (ktiiWou  ypa<f>ii. 

(3)  But  even  this  instance  is  questioned  by  Grote.     Hist,  of  Greece,  iii.  153. 

(4)  Demosth.  cont.  Lept.  sub  fin. 

(5)  A  pun  on  the  Ceramicus  at  Athens  and  Kt'pajucx,  tiles. 


25G  appendix  n. 

An  Athenian  could  live  respectably  on  1  lie  interest  of  a  talent,— 
that  is,  on  seven  or  eight  minas  a-year.  In  the  speech  written  by 
Demosthenes  against  Bceotus,  the  plaintiff  '  says  he  had  been  sup- 
ported and  educated  out  of  such  an  income.  Isams  speaks  of  an 
estate  of  fifty  minas  as  sufficient  to  live  comfortably,  but  not  to  per- 
form public  services.  The  expenses  of  Demosthenes,  his  mother  and 
sister,  during  his  minority,  amounted  to  seven  minas  annually,  exclu- 
sive of  house  rent.  His  father,  who  was  a  merchant,2  left  to  his 
family  an  estate  of  fourteen  talents,  and  is  represented  as  a  person  of 
considerable  property.  But  we  read  of  larger  fortunes  than  his  at 
Athens.  Conon  possessed  40  talents ;  Kicias  100 ;  Alcibiades  still 
more.  One  of  the  richest  men  was  Callias  son  of  Hipponicus,  whose 
property  was  valued  at  200  talents,  partly  acquired  by  the  plunder 
of  the  Persian  war.  He  had  a  son  Hipponicus  (who  was  killed  at  the 
battle  of  Delium)  who  gave  his  daughter  in  marriage  to  Alcibiades, 
with  a  portion  of  10  talents,  and  a  promise  of  10  more  after  the 
birth  of  a  son ;  the  largest  portion  ever  given  by  a  Greek. 

I  have  spoken  of  seven  or  eight  minas  as  being  the  interest  o{ 
a  taleut ;  that  is,  about  twelve  or  thirteen  per  cent,  per  annum.  Sucli 
in  fact  was  a  common  rate  of  interest  at  Athens,  but  it  was  con- 
sidered low  ;  eighteen  per  cent,  being  frequently  paid  for  loans  on 
good  security.  There  were  no  laws  against  usury ;  and  although 
usurious  money-lenders  were  regarded,  as  they  have  been  in  all  ages, 
with  an  evil  eye  by  the  people,  much  higher  rates  than  those  above 
mentioned  were  exacted  from  needy  borrowers,  and  wherever  the 
risk  was  considerable.  Thus,  we  read  of  thirty  per  cent,  being  paid 
on  a  bottomry  contract  for  one  summer.  The  Iowness  of  personal 
credit,  frequency  of  wars,  instability  of  governments,  and  imperfection 
of  national  law,  besides  other  causes  of  risk,  would  render  all  mercan- 
tile adventures  perilous.  The  chief  money-linders  at  Athens  were 
bankers ;  who  kept  the  cash  of  their  customers  pretty  much  in  the 
same  manner  as  bankers  of  the  present  day,  and  made  a  profit  by 
lending  it  out  to  others.  They  were  serviceable  to  their  customers 
in  various  ways;  as  the  depositaries  of  important  documents;  as 
referees;  as  witnesses  to  payments  and  other  transactions  between 
them  and  third  persons;  and  generally  by  extending  their  credit. 
They  were  usually  men  of  high  repute  in  the  commercial  world. 
Isocrates3  tells  us  that  money  was  lent  to  ihem  without  witnesses; 
and  this  need  not  surprise  us,  when  we  consider  that  writing  mate- 
rials were  not  so  plentiful  or  easy  to  be  had,  and  men  were  obliged 
to  place  more  reliance  on  their  agents. 

The  interest  above  referred  to  has  been  calculated,  after  the 
English  fashion,  by  the  year :  but  it  must  be  remembered  that  it  was 
usually  reserved  at  Athens  by  the  month,  which  makes  it  really 
higher. 

(1)  The  person  for  whom  Demosthenes  composed  the  speech,  pp.  1014,  1023. 
{2)  Thirlw  all's  Hist.  v.  24T.  {3)_Trapeziticus,  358. 


THE    THJRACIAX    CHERSONESE. 


APPENDIX  III. 


THE  THRACIAX  CHERSONESE. 

The  peninsula  known  anciently  by  the  name  of  the  Tnracian 
Chersonese  is  washed  on  its  eastern  coast  by  the  Hellespont,  on  its 
west  by  the  iEgean  sea.  It  stretches  about  fifty-two  miles  in  length 
from  its  most  southern  point  to  the  isthmus  where  it  joins  the  con- 
tinent of  Thrace.  The  isthmus  was  between  four  and  five  miles 
long,  being  the  same  length  as  the  isthmus  of  Corinth.  Tt  contained 
in  Xenophou's  time  eleven  or  twelve  cities.  There  were  many  good 
harbours  on  the  coast,  and  the  land  was  generally  fertile  both  for 
corn  and  pasture.  We  read  in  Thucydides,  that  in  the  time  of  the 
Trojan  war  this  laud  was  cultivated  by  the  Greek  army  for  their 
subsistence.  It  was  here,  according  to  the  legend,  that  Polydorus,  the 
son  of  Priam,  was  murdered  by  the  treacherous  king  Polymnestor.2 

The  southernmost  town  was  Elseus,  opposite  Sigeum  in  the  Troad. 

Here  was  a  tomb  and  temple  of  Protesilaus,  the  first  of  the  Grecian 

warriors  who  leapt  ashore  at  the  siege  of  Troy,  aud  who  was  slain  by 

Hector,  according  to  the  prediction  of  the  oracle.3 

Sors  quoque  nescio  quern  fato  design-it  iniquo, 
Qui  primus  Danaum  Troada  tangat  humum. 

The  temple  was  conspicuous  on  the  shore,  and  held  in  great 
veneratiou.  It  contained  valuable  treasures  in  gold  and  silver, 
which  were  seized  by  Artayctes,  the  Persian  satrap,  during  the 
invasion  of  Xerxes  ;  for  which  the  people  of  Elseus  were  so  incensed 
against  him,  that  afterwards,  when  he  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
Athenian.,  iney  caused  him  to  be  crucified,  and  his  son  to  be  stoned 
to  death  before  his  eyes.4 

Prom  Elseus  the  land  curves  eastward  to  the  promontory  of 
Cynossema,  or  Dog's- tomb,  so  called  from  Hecuba,  the  queen  of 
Priam,  who  was  fabled  to  have  been  changed  into  a  dog  and  buried 
there.5     The  projection  at  this  point  is  sharp  and  angular.6     After- 

(1)  Tbe  student  must  not  confound  this  with  the  Tauric  Chersonese,  (the  modern 
Crim  Tartary,)  which  projects  into  the  Euxine  sea  beyond  the  Borysthenes ;  the 
ancient  name  of  which  is  preserved  in  the  present  town  of  Cherson. 

(2)  Xenophon,  Hell.  iii.  c.  2,  s.  10.  Thucydides,  i.  11.  Herodotus,  vi.  36.  Virgil, 
J£n.  iii.  49.    Euripid.  Hecuba,  8. 

(3i  Ovid,  Epist.  Laodamiae,  93. 

(4)  Herod,  ix.  116,  120.   Thucyd.  viii.  102. 

(5)  Euripid.  Hecuba,  1265.    Ovid,  Metarnorph.  xiii.  560.    Diodorus  Siculus,  xiii.40. 

(6)  Thucyd.  viii.  104.     As  to  the  situation  the  reader  may  consult  Goellers  note. 
VOL.  I.  K 


258  appendix  in. 

wards  it  bends  inward,  and  forms  a  deep  bay,  on  'which  are  the 
towns  of  Madvtus  and  Sestus. 

Sestus  stood  at  the  northern  corner  of  the  bay,  nearly  at  the  point 
■where  the  strait  is  narrowest,  so  as  to  command  the  entrance.  It 
was  an  Jiouc  city,  of  ancient  foundation,  famous  both  in  history  and 
in  song.  The  story  of  Leander  is  familiar  to  all  readers.  Hero 
with  her  torch  in  the  Sestian  watch-tower  lighted  him  over  the 
deep,  as  he  swam  from  Abydos.  Their  love-tale  is  the  theme  of  two 
epistles  of  Ovid;  and  in  modern  times  the  feat  of  Leander  was 
imitated  by  Lord  Byron,  who  swam  across  the  Hellespont  at  the 
same  poiut.  The  classic  lines  in  the  Bride  of  Abydos  have  added  a 
further  interest  to  the  spot : 

The  winds  are  high  on  H 

As  on  thai  night  of  stormy  water. 

When  Love  who  sent  forgot  to  save 

The  young,  the  beautiful,  the  brave, 

The  lonely  hope  of  Sestos'  daughter. 

Oh!  when  alone  along  the  sky 

Her  turret  torch  was  blading  :.  _ 

Though  rising  gale,  and  breaking  foam, 

And  shrieking  sea-birds  warn'd  him  home  j 

And  clouds  aloft,  and  tides  below. 

With  signs  and  sounds  forbade  :    _ 

He  could  not  see,  he  would  net  hear, 

Or  sound  or  sign  fan 

His  eye  but  saw  that  light  of  love, 

The  only  star  it  hail'd  a] 

His  ear  but  rang  with  Hero's  song. 

"Ye  waves,  divide  not  lovers  long ! " 

»  *  *  *  « 

Oh  yet — for  there  my  steps  have  been : 
These  feet  have  press'd  the  sacred  shore  ; 
These  limbs  that  buoyant  wave  ha'.h  boixe— 
Minstrel !  with  thee  to  muse,  to  mourn, 
To  trace  again  those  fields  of  yore, 
Believing  every  hillock  _: 
Contains  no  fabled  hero's  ashes, 
And  that  around  th'  undoubted  scene 
Thine  own  broad  Hellespont  still  dashes, 
Be  long  my  lot !  and  cold  were  he 
Who  there  could  gaze  dt 

The  stream  of  the  Hellespont  flows  rapidly  toward  the  -£-  _. 
and  gave  the  Greeks  the  idea  of  a  river  rather  than  a  sea;  whence 
probably  was  derived  Homer's  epithet  of  broad,  which  has  been  the 
subject  of  much  controversy.1 

The  sea  of  Helie  is  the  sea  where  Helle,  the  sister  of  Phrvxus, 
was  drowned,  failing  from  the  golden  ram ;  according  to  the  ancient 
legend : s 

Et  satis  amissa  locus  hie  infamis  ab  Helle  est ; 

I'tque  rnihi  parcat.  enmine  nomen  ha 
Invideo  Phryxo,  quem  per  freta  tristia  :  1 

Aurea  lanigero  veilere  vexit  ovis. 

Her  tomb  was  at  the  Isthmus.     The  modern  name  of  the  strait  is 

(1)  'Eiri  ir\aT(7'L\\r)f7rinT(f).     Iliad,  vii.  SO  ;   Odvssev.  rxh 
.    Ovid..  Leaad.  Epist.  ML 


THE   THRACTAN    CHERSONESE.  259 

the  Dardanelles,  apparently  a  compound  of  her  name  and  the  Asiatic 
city  of  Dardanus. 

It  was  to  a  rugged  part  of  the  coast  between  Sestus  and  Madvtus, 
that  Xerxes  carried  his  double  bridge  of  boats  across  the  strait, 
about  a  mile  in  length  from  Abydos.  The  army  was  seven  days  in 
crossing.  Then  it  marched  right  up  to  the  isthmus,  aud  turning  off 
to  the  left  passed  along1  the  shore  of  the  Sinus  Melanis,  and  arrived 
at  Doriscus  on  the  Thracian  coast,  where  the  king  held  a  grand 
review  of  his  forces.1 

The  bridge  was  afterwards  broken  by  a  storm,  and  when  Xerxes 
arrived  at  the  Hellespont  on  his  retreat,  he  carried  his  troops  over 
in  sailing  vessels  to  Abydos.  Herodotus  mentions  another  story,  of 
which  he  declares  his  own  disbelief;  that  Xerxes  crossed  over  to 
Asia  in  a  single  vessel  from  Eion  on  the  Strymon,  and  was  only 
saved  from  shipwreck  by  causing  his  Persian  followers  to  jump  over- 
board.2 To  this  last  story,  as  it  would  seem,  Juvenal  alludes  in  the 
following  lines  :3 

Ille  tamen  qualis  rediit  Salamine  relicta. 
In  Corum  atque  Eurum  solitus  saevire  flagellis, 
Barbarus,  ^Eolio  nunquam  hoc  in  carcere  passos, 
Ipsum  compeditras  qui  vinxerat  Ennosifraeuni. 
Sed  qualis  rediit  !  nempe  una  nave  cruentis 
Fluctibus,  ac  tarda  per  densa  cadavera  prora. 

Further  to  the  north  was  the  little  stream  called  iEgos  Potamos, 
or  Goat's  Paver,  near  to  which  the  great  fleet  of  the  Athenians, 
through  the  negligence  of  their  commanders,  was  captured  by 
Lysander  in  the  last  year  of  the  Peloponnesian  war.  It  was  exactly 
opposite  the  Mysian  Lampsacus,  which  was  given  by  the  Persian 
king  to  Themi--tocles,  to  supply  him  with  wine ;  as  Magnesia  for 
his  bread,  and  Myus  for  his  meat.4  This  city  was  long  famous  for 
its  wealth  and  luxury,  and  also  for  the  worship  of  the  god  Priapus, 
who  had  a  temple  there.     To  this  Virgil  alludes  in  the  line:5 

Hellespontiaci  serv:;  tutela  Priapi. 

Further  on  was  the  city  of  Crithote,  and  a  little  beyond  was 
Pactya. 

The  terminus  of  the  Chersonese  at  an  early  period  was  a  supposed 
line  drawn  from  Pactya  to  Cardia,  where  the  wall  was  afterwards 
built.  Cardia  was  a  Milesian  settlement,  and  stood  at  the  head  of 
the  Melanis  Sinus.  In  later  times  it  became  a  city  of  importance, 
and  was  considered  the  key  of  the  peninsula ;  its  possession  giving 
facility  for  a  hostile  inroad  from  the  interior  of  Thrace.6 

For  the  better  understanding  of  that  part  of  Athenian  history 
which  relates  to  the  occupation  of  the  Chersonese  by  Athens,  it  will 
be  needful  to  give  a  brief  account  of  the  Thracian  kingdom. 

(1)  Herod,  vii.  33,  56.  59.  (2)  lb.  viii.  117,  US.  (3)  Juv.  Sat.  x   178. 

(4)  Thucyd.  1.  138.     Cornelius  Nepos  in  vit  Themist. 

(5)  Georgics.iv.  1 11.  See  Pansanias,  ix.  31.  For  the  artifice  by  which  Anaximenes 
khe  Orator  saved  Lampsacus  from  the  wiath  0i  Alexander,  see  Pausanias,  vi.  18- 

(6)  Demoslh.  contra  Aristoc.  CS1. 

S3 


260  APPENDIX   111. 

The  people  inhabiting  the  country  that  lay  between  the  JEgeau 
sea  and  the  Danube,  the  Strymon  and  the  Euxiue,  were  knowr. 
generally  to  the  Greeks  by  the  name  of  Thracians.  They  consisted 
of  numerous  tribes.  Could  they  have  been  united  (says  Herodotus) 
under  a  single  monarch,  they  would  have  been  invincible.1  The 
more  warlike  and  ferocious  among  them  were  the  mountaineers  who 
dwelt  on  the  ridges  of  Haemus  and  Rhodope.  Those  who  lived  in 
the  plain  were  more  peaceable,  especially  those  who  came  into 
contact  with  the  Greek  colonies  on  the  iEgean  and  Propontine 
coasts.  They  were  devoted  to  the  worship  of  Mars  and  Bacchus.2 
With  their  warlike  character  was  mixed  a  wild  religious  enthusiasm  ; 
and  down  to  a  very  late  period  they  were  notorious  among  the  nations 
for  quarrelling  over  their  cups  :  Horace  says, 
Xon  ego  sanius 
Bacchabor  Edonis. 

And  again, 

Xatis  in  usum  lstitiae  scyphis 
Pugnare  Thracum  est. 

In  the  time  of  the  Peloponnesian  war  the  most  considerable  of  the 
tribes  were  the  Odrysse,  who  occupied  the  centre  of  the  country 
below  Mount  Haemus.  The  sway  of  their  king  Sitalces  extended 
from  the  city  of  Abdera  to  the  Euxiue  and  the  mouths  of  the 
Danube.  He  was  in  alliance  with  Athens,  and  in  pursuance  of  his 
engagement  with  her  led  an  innumerable  host  to  attack  Perdiccas 
ana  "the  Chalcidiaus.  His  invasion  excited  the  utmost  terror  all 
through  Macedonia  and  Thessaly;  but  the  Athenians  derived  little 
advantage  from  it ;  for  Sitalces,  after  ravaging  the  enemy's  country 
for  some  time,  entered  into  a  negotiation  with  Perdiccas  and  returned 
home.  Thucydides  expresses  the  same  opinion  with  Herodotus  as 
to  the  formidable  character  of  the  Tiiracian  people,  if  they  could  all 
Lave  been  united.3 

The  first  connexion  of  the  Athenians  with  the  Thracian  Chersonese 
took  place  in  the  following  way.     The  story  is  somewhat  romantic. 

In  the  time  of  Pisistratus*  the  Chersonese  was  inhabited  by  a 
Thracian  tribe  called  Doloncians.  They,  pressed  by  a  war  of  the 
Absinthians,  sent  their  princes  to  Delphi  to  consult  the  oracle; 
which  directed  them  to  invite  the  first  person  who  offered  them 
hospitality  to  come  and  settle  among  them  as  their  chief.  The 
princes  passed  through  Phocis  and  Bceotia  and  came  to  Athens. 
There,  as  they  walked  through  the  town,  their  strange  dress  and 
arms  were  observed  by  Miitiades,  the  son  of  Cypseius ;  who  invited 
them  to  his  house  and  entertained  them.  They  told  him  of  the 
oraeie,  and  entreated  him  to  comply  with  it.  Miitiades  was  a  man  of 
good  family  and  wealth,  and  not  very  well  satisfied  with  his  position 

(1)  Herod,  v.  3,  7. 

(2)  'O  e^r,f!  udiTic  Aioiwoc,  Euripid.  Hecuba,  126".  He  was  the  god  of  th# 
Orphic  mysteries,  perhaps  derived  from  Esvpt.    Herod,  u.  81,  103. 

13]  Tliiicyd.  ii.  95—101. 


THE    TKRACIAX    CHEESOXE;^.  201 

in  Athens,  where  Pisistratus  held  the  supreme  rule.  He  was  there- 
fore not  indisposed  to  accept  the  offer  of  the  strangers.  He  took 
the  precaution,  however,  to  consult  the  oracle  in  person,  and  having 
received  a  favourable  answer,  proceeded  with  the  Doloncians  and  a 
body  of  Athenian  emigrants  to  the  Chersonese,  where  he  was  made 
ruler  of  the  country,  and  building  a  wall  from  Pactya  to  Cardia 
repressed  the  incursions  of  the  Absinthians.1 

Diviue  honours  were  paid  to  Miltiades  after  his  death  by  the 
Chersonesites,  who  looked  upon  him  as  the  founder  of  a  colony.2 
He  was  succeeded  by  his  nephew  Stesagoras.  son  of  Cimon ;  who 
having  been  soon  after  assassinated,  his  brother  Miltiades  was  sent 
by  Hippias  from  Athens,  to  take  possession  of  the  government. 
This  happened  B.C.  51S.  The  young  Miltiades  commenced  his  reign 
by  seizing  the  persons  of  the  Chersonesite  princes,  whom  he  sus- 
pected probably  of  beiug  concerned  in  his  brother's  murder ;  he  then 
established  a  body  of  mercenaries,  and  strengthened  his  connexion 
by  marrying  the  daughter  of  a  Thracian  king. 

About  three  years  after,  viz.  b.c.  515,  Darius  invaded  Scythia. 
He  crossed  by  a  bridge  of  boats  over  the  Thracian  Bosphorus,  and 
marched  through  the  eastern  part  of  Thrace  to  the  Danube,  where 
the  Ionians,  who  commanded  the  fleet,  had  prepared  a  bridge  for  his 
passage.  Many  Thracian  chiefs  joined  his  army,  and  among  others, 
Miltiades ;  for  the  Chersonese,  though  ruled  by  the  Athenian  prince, 
was  tributary  to  the  Persian  empire.  Miltiades  remained  with  the 
Ionians  who  guarded  the  bridge,  while  Darius  was  in  the  enemy's 
country.  He  advised  them  to  break  it  up,  after  the  expiration  of 
the  sixty  days  which  Darius  had  prescribed  for  his  return;  but  this 
advice  was  overruled,  and  Darius  re-crossed  the  Danube  in  safety. 
Megabazus  the  satrap  was  left  in  Thrace  to  complete  the  subjugation 
of  the  country.  Miltiades  returned  to  the  Chersonese,  where  for 
many  years  he  reigned  without  disturbance,  except  for  a  short 
period,  when  he  was  driven  out  by  a  Scythian  invasion.3 

At  length,  however,  after  he  had  reigned  about  twenty-four  years, 
Miltiades  was  compelled  to  fly  from  his  kingdom  for  fear  of  Persian 
hostility.     After  the  suppression  of  the  Ionian  revolt,  B.C.  494, 

(1)  Herod,  vi.  34 — 39.  The  Athenians  had  at  an  early  period  occupied  Sigeum  in  the 
Troad,  and  so  became  known  in  the  Chersonesite  region  before  the  migration  under 
Miltiades. 

(2)  O'uuo-nT?.  See  Thucyd.  v.  11.  Cornelius  Xepos  confounds  the  elder  Miltiades 
with  the  younger. 

(3)  Herod,  iv.  89 — 98.  137;  vi.  40.  Thirhvall,  in  an  appendix  to  the  second  volume 
of  his  history,  contends  that  the  counsel  imputed  to  Miltiades  at  the  Danube  was  a 
fiction,  and  th3t  his  second  flight  from  the  Chersonese  was  occasioned  by  his  having 
taken  Lemnos  from  the  Persians.  The  arguments  which  he  advances  in  support  of 
this  view  are  exceedingly  strong.  Grote,  on  the  other  hand,  in  his  History  of  Greece, 
vol.  iv.  368,  maintains  that  the  story  of  Herodotus,  as  to  the  advice  given  by 
Miltiades,  is  correct ;  but  that  Herodotus  ascribed  the  first  flight  of  Miltiades  from 
the  Chersonese  to  the  wrong  cause  ;  viz.  to  his  fear  of  the  Scythian  incursion  ;  whereas 
the  real  cause  was  the  fear  of  Persia.  The  dates  of  Herodotus  can  scarcely  be  made 
to  agree  with  this  latrsr  view.  Miltiades  was  a  man  very  likely  to  have  invented 
•Jie  story. 


262  appendix  in 

Darius  sent  his  Phoenician  fleet  to  chastise  the  cities  on  the  European 
side  of  the  Hellespont  and  Propontis,  which  had  assisted  his  rebel- 
lious subjects.  Miltiades,  conscious  of  having  merited  the  king's 
displeasure,  either  for  his  treacherous  counsel  on  the  Danube,  or  by 
some  other  act  of  disloyalty,  prepared  for  flight.  He  set  sail  from 
Cardia  with  five  ships,  while  the  Phoenician  fleet  was  anchored  at 
Tenedos.  One  of  the  ships,  containing  his  eldest  son  Metiochus, 
was  captured  by  the  Phoenicians,  who  sent  him  a  prisoner  to  Susa. 
Darius,  instead  of  visiting  the  father's  crime  upon  the  son,  treated 
him  with  the  utmost  generosity;  gave  him  a  Persian  lady  in  marriage, 
and  an  estate  with  her.  Miltiades  escaped  to  Athens,  where  he  was 
again  admitted  to  the  rights  of  citizenship.  He  was  reserved  for  a 
more  glorious  destiny  than  the  government  of  a  Thracian  principality. 
In  a  few  years  afterwards  be  was  the  hero  of  Marathon.  The  cities 
of  Chersonesus,  all  excepting  Cardia,  were  brought  under  subjection 
to  the  Persian  king.1 

So  thin?s  remained  till  after  the  defeat  of  the  second  Persian  in- 
vasion. The  united  fleet  of  the  Greeks  sailed  then  to  the  Hellespont, 
where  finding  the  bridge  of  Xerxes  broken,  the  Peloponnesians  re- 
turned home ;  the  Athenians,  under  Xanthippus.  staved  to  recover 
the  dominion  of  Miltiades.  All  the  Persian  troops  in  the  neighbour- 
hood were  drawn  from  the  different  lowns  into  Sest us,  which  was 
strongly  fortified.  The  Athenians  laid  siege  to  that  city,  and  took  it 
after  a  loug  resistance,  putting  Artayetes  the  satrap  to  death  as  we 
have  already  seen.  Among  other  spoils  which  fell  into  their  hands 
were  the  cables  of  the  famous  bridge,  which  they  carried  home  to  be 
deposited  in  the  temples  of  Athens. 

It  was  Cimon,  the  son  of  Miltiades,  who  completed  the  conquest  of 
Chersonesus.  After  the  departure  of  the  Athenian  fleet  from  Sestus, 
the  Persians  came  over  again,  and  recovered  their  possessions.  Cimon 
sailed  against  them  with  only  four  galleys,  defeated  a  much  larger 
squadron,  and  chased  the  Persians  out  of  the  peninsula,  together 
with  a  body  of  continental  Thracians,  whom  they  had  invited  to  their 
assistance^  To  this  period  we  may  refer  the  following  story  related 
by  Plutarch : 4 — 

The  Athenians  and  their  allies  having  taken  a  great  number  of 
barbarians  prisoners  in  Sestus  and  Byzantium,  Cimon,  being  chosen 
to  divide  the  booty,  put  the  naked  prisoners  in  one  lot,  and  the  rich 
attire  and  jewels  in  another.  The  allies  complaining  of  this  as  an 
unequal  division,  he  said  they  might  take  which  lot  they  pleased, 
and  the  Athenians  would  be  content.  Herophytus  of  Samos  advised 
the  allies  to  take  the  ornaments,  and  leave  the  sJaves  to  the  Athenians. 
This  was  done,  and  Cimon  at  first  was  laughed  at  for  his  liberality ; 
but  soon  after,  the  parents  and  kinsmen  of  the  prisoners  came  from 
Lydia  and  Phrygia,  and  paid  a  high  price  for  their  ransom ;  whereby 

(1)  Herod,  vi.  33.  41.  (21  Herod,  ii.  114—121.    Thucyd.  i.  89. 

(3)  Flutarch  in  vit.  Cimon.  (4)  Ibid. 


THE    THRACIAN   CHEESONESE.  2G5 

Jimon  onleeted  money  enough  to  maintain  his  fleet  for  four  months, 
and  even  to  reserve  something  for  the  Athenian  treasury. 

At  a  later  period,  when  Pericles  held  the  administration  at  Athens, 
it  being  his  policy  to  extend  the  influence  of  his  country  by  esta- 
blishing numerous  colonies,  he  sent  out  a  thousand  Athenians  to  take 
allotments  of  land  in  the  Chersonese,  and  caused  the  wall  across 
the  isthmus,  which  had  been  damaged  by  hostde  inroads,  to  be 
repaired.1 

In  the  last  six  years  of  the  Peloponuesian  war  the  Hellespont  and 
Propontis  became  the  scene  of  most  important  military  operations, 
which  it  will  be  sufficient  briefly  to  notice ; — viz.  the  battle  gained  by 
the  Athenians  off  the  headland  of  Cynossema2 — the  actiou  off  Abydos, 
where  they  defeated  the  Pelopomiesiau  fleet  uuder  Mindarus 3 — the 
victory  of  Alcibiades  at  Cyzicus  in  the  Propontis4 — his  successful 
sieges  of  Chalcedon  and  Byzantium.5  The  importance  of  the  struggle 
in  these  seas  will  be  apparent,  when  we  consider  that  they  were  the 
great  thoroughfare  of  t lie  corn-trade,  on  which  Athens  was  entirely 
dependent  for  the  subsistence  of  her  people.  Euboea,  once  the 
granary  of  Athens,  had  revolted.6  Attica  was  virtually  in  the  hands 
of  the  enemy,  by  means  of  the  garrison  at  Deceleia.  Yet  it  was  im- 
possible to  starve  out  the  Athenians  whilst  they  possessed  a  navy 
which  protected  their  commerce,  and  enabled  them  to  import  com 
from  the  shores  of  the  Hellespont  and  the  Euxine.  This  had  forcibly 
struck  Agis  the  Spartan  king,  who  commanded  at  Deceleia,  as  from 
that  fortress  one  day  he  espied  a  multitude  of  corn-ships  sailing  into 
the  Piraeus.  It  was  no  use,  he  said,  to  exclude  the  Athenians  from 
Attica,  unless  they  stopped  the  passage  of  corn  by  sea  :  and  accord- 
ingly he  advised  that  measures  should  be  taken  to  cut  off  their  com- 
merce. His  advice  was  followed;  and  on  this  in  fact  the  issue  of  the 
war  ultimately  turned.7 

Hitherto  the  Athenians  had  been  victorious  in  the  northern  seas ; 
but  in  the  year  b.  c.  405,  Lysander,  already  famous  by  his  victory  at 
Notium,  sailed  with  a  considerable  fleet  to  Abydos,  then  in  alliance 
with  the  Peloponnesians.  From  hence  he  sailed  to  Lampsacus,  a  few 
miles  north  of  Abydos.  which  he  attacked  by  sea,  while  the  Abydenes, 
under  Thorax  the  Lacedaemonian,  besieged  it  from  the  land  side. 
That  city  had  just  been  taken  by  storm,  when  the  Athenian  fleet, 
consisting  of  ISO  ships,  arrived  at  Elaeus.  It  was  commanded  by 
six  generals,  Conon,  Philocles,  Adimantus,  Alenander,  Tydeus,  and 
Cephisodotus.  Hearing  that  Lampsacus  was  taken,  they  sailed  up 
the  channel,  and,  putting  iu  at  Sestus  for  provisions,  proceeded  to 
JEgos  Potamos,  just  opposite  Lampsacus,  where  the  enemy  still 
oay  at  anchor.     The  width  of  the  channel  at  this  point  was  fifteen 

(1)  Plutarch  in  vit.  Perlcl.  (2)  Thucyd.  viii.  104. 

(3)  Xenoph.  Hellen.  i.  c  1, 1.  5.  (4)  lb.  s.  16. 

(5)  II).  c.  3,  s.  2,  14.  (6)  Thucyd.  viii.  95. 
(7)  Xenoph.  Hellen.  i.  c.  1,  ».  35 


J6i  appeals  in. 

furlcngs ;  the  two  fleets  were  in  sight  of  each  other,  and  a  decisive 
battle  was  expected.1 

Early  the  nest  morning  the  Athenians  crossed  the  Hellespont,  and 
drew  up  in  order  of  battle  opposite  the  harbour  of  Lainpsacus. 
Lysander,  whose  fleet  seems  to  have  been  inferior  in  number,  had 
given  strict  injunctions  to  his  men  to  make  every  preparation  for  a 
sea-fight,  but  not  to  stir  from  their  position.  The  Athenians  con- 
tinued offering  battle  till  late  iu  the  afternoon,  when,  finding  that  the 
enemy  would  not  move,  they  sailed  back  to  ./Egos  Potamos.  Lysander 
ordered  two  or  three  of  his  swiftest  ships  to  follow  them,  and  see 
what  they  did  after  landing :  his  own  troops  he  kept  on  board  till  the 
messengers  returned.  These  operations  on  both  sides  were  repeated 
for  four  days.  The  Athenians  each  day,  after  returning  to  their 
station,  dispersed  themselves  to  Sestus  and  other  places  to  seek 
provisions. 

It  so  happened,  there  was  one  vigilant  eve  which  discerned  the 
stratagem  of  the  Spartan  general.  Alcibiades,  in  disgrace  and  exile 
since  the  affair  of  Notium,  had  retired  to  an  estate  which  he  pos- 
sessed in  the  Chersonese,  not  far  from  Pactya ;  there  he  had  fortified 
three  castles,  to  serve  him,  in  case  of  need,  for  places  of  refuge. 
Erom  one  of  these,  which  stood  near  the  coast,  he  descried  the 
manoeuvres  of  the  hostile  fleets.  Seeing  the  peril  of  his  countrymen, 
he  rode  on  horseback  down  to  the  Athenian  camp,  and  pointed  out  to 
the  generals  two  important  oversights  which  they  had  committed, — 
first,  that  they  had  stationed  their  fleet  on  an  open  beach,  without 
cover  or  shelter;  secondly,  that  they  were  too  far  removed  from 
Sestus,  to  which  they  were  obliged  to  resort  for  a  market,  and  which 
was  nearly  two  miles  off.  He  advised  them  to  sail  to  Sestus  imme- 
diately, where  they  would  enjoy  the  convenience  of  the  town  and 
harbour,  and  have  it  in  their  power  to  fight  when  they  pleased.  He 
reproved  them  also  for  their  negligence  in  suffering  the  crews  to  be 
dispersed,  when  the  enemy  was  so  near.  This  wise  counsel  was 
utterly  disregarded.  Tydeus  and  Menander  reminded  him,  they  were 
the  generals,  not  he,  and  ordered  him  to  be  gone.  He  told  the  few 
friends  who  accompanied  him  out  of  the  camp,  that  if  the  generals 
would  put  themselves  under  his  directions,  he  could  bring  to  their 
aid  a  body  of  Thraciaus,  and  that  he  would  force  Lysander  into  a 
battle  by  attacking  him  on  land.  This  was  looked  upon  as  an  idle 
boast ;  but  very  likely  it  was  no  more  than  the  truth,  for  it  appears 
that  Alcibiades  during  his  sojourn  in  the  Chersonese  had  made  ex- 
cursions beyond  the  isthmus,  and  ingratiated  himself  with  some  of 
the  princes  in  the  interior  of  Thrace.  All  he  could  say,  however,  had 
no  effect.2 

On  the  fifth  morning  the  Athenians  advanced  to  Lampsacus,  and 

(1)  Xenoph.  Hellen.  ii.  c.  1,  s.  16—29. 

(2)  Plutarch  in  vit.  Alcib.  Id.  in  vit.  Lygand.  Diodorus  Siculus,  xiii.  IJ5 
Cornelius  Xepos  in  vit.  Alcib. 


1-KE    THRACliN    CHERSONESE.  265 

returned  as  before,  looking  with  contempt  on  the  Peloponnesians  for 
their  cowardice;  and  lauding:  again,  they  dispersed  themselves  with 
still  greater  carelessness  over  the  country.  The  captains  that  followed 
them  were  ordered  by  Lysander  to  watch  the  moment  of  their  dis- 
persal, then  to  row  back,  and,  when  they  were  half-way,  to  hoist  a 
shield.  He  himself  kept  his  whole  fleet  in  readiness.  The  shield 
was  raised,  and  the  Peloponnesian  galleys,  with  Thorax  and  his  land 
forces  on  board,  were  soon  crossing  the  channel  at  full  speed.  Conou 
saw  their  advance,  and  gave  the  signal  to  his  men  to  come  on  board ; 
but  it  was  too  late ;  they  were  scattered  too  far ;  and  of  the  whole 
fleet  only  eight  ships  besides  his  own  could  be  manned  and  put  to 
sea.  One  of  these  was  the  Paralus  or  state-galley,  which  sailed  off 
to  Athens,  to  bear  the  melancholy  tidings.  Conon  with  the  other 
eight  escaped  from  the  enemy,  and  found  refuge  in  Cyprus ;  from 
which,  some  years  after,  he  issued  forth  to  be  the  restorer  of  his 
country.  Meanwhile  the  rest  of  the  fleet  became,  without  a  struggle, 
the  prize  of  Lysander.  The  few  Athenians  who  had  run  down  to 
their  ships  were  put  to  the  sword ;  the  rest  were  pursued  over  the 
country,  and  nearly  the  whole  body  of  them  were  made  prisoners, 
and  massacred  in  cold  blood  in  the  streets  of  Lampsacus.1 

Thus,  by  the  extraordinary  negligence  of  the  Athenian  commanders, 
Lysander  acquired  the  glory  of  terminating  the  Peloponnesian  war. 

The  Chersonese,  together  with  the  rest  of  her  empire,  was  lost  to 
Athens ;  and  it  was  more  than  forty  years  before  she  recovered  any 
of  her  dominion  in  this  quarter.  The  Spartans  did  not  seize  the 
vacant  possession  for  themselves,  but,  content  with  having  destroyed 
the  Athenian  empire,  and  established  their  own  preponderating  in- 
fluence, left  the  inhabitants  to  a  nominal  independence.  Lysander 
indeed,  having  taken  Sestus,  gave  up  the  whole  town  as  a  property 
to  his  troops ;  but  the  Spartan  government  were  displeased  at  his 
conduct,  and  restored  the  Sestians  to  their  rights.2  We  may  pre- 
sume that  many  Athenian  colonists  wrere  compelled  to  migrate. 
Alcibiades,  deeming  it  uusafe  to  remain  in  the  neighbourhood,  de- 
parted, with  all  the  treasure  that  he  could  carry  away,  into  Bithynia, 
where,  having  been  plundered  by  Thracian  robbers,  he  sought  the 
protection  of  the  satrap  Pharuabazus,  who  assigned  him  a  dwelling 
in  Phrygia,  and  for  a  time  treated  him  kindly,  but  afterwards,  at  the 
instance  of  Lysander,  caused  him  to  be  treacherously  murdered.3 

The  Chersouesite  Greeks,  no  longer  under  the  protection  of  a 
powerful  empire,  were  again  exposed  to  the  inroads  of  their  conti- 
nental neighbours,  insomuch  that  it  was  almost  useless  to  cultivate 
the  land.  In  the  year  B.C.  398  Dercyllidas,  the  Spartan  general,  who 
was  then  with  his  army  at  Lampsacus,  was  informed  by  some  commis- 

(1)  According  to  Pausanias,  ix.  32,  four  thousand  prisoners  were  massacred,  and 
{heir  bodies  left  unburied. 

(2)  Plutarch  in  vit.  Lysand. 

(3)  D'odorus,  xiv.  11.     Plutarch  and  Cornelius  Nepos  in  vit.  Alcibiad. 


2G6  APPEXMX   III. 

sioners  from  hoir.e,  that  a  deputation  of  the  Chersonesites  bad  been 
at  Sparta,  praying  to  have  the  isthmus  fortified  against  the  barbarous 
Thracians.  It  seems  that  little  or  none  of  the  old  wall  was  then  re- 
maining. Dercvliidas  marched  into  Thrace,  and  after  passing  some  time 
at  the  court  of  Seuthes,  king  of  the  Odrysse,  arrived  at  the  isthmus, 
where  he  first  chased  away  the  marauders,  and  then  set  his  troops  to 
work  at  the  fortification,  dividing  the  ground  among  them  in  portions, 
and  stimulating  them  by  rewards.  The  new  wall  was  completed  in 
half  a  year.1 

The  great  kingdom  of  the  Odrysse,  after  the  death  of  Sitalces. 
who  was  slain  by  the  Triballi  B.C.  424,  was  inherited  by  his  nephew 
Seuthes.  He  enjoyed  a  long  and  prosperous  reign.  His  revenues 
are  said  to  have  amounted  to  four  hundred  talents  a-year,  besides 
presents  to  an  equal  amount  in  gold  and  silver,  which  it  was  usual 
for  the  kings  of  Thrace  to  receive.2  Towards  the  end  of  the  fifth 
cenVury  B.C.  this  kingdom  had  devolved  upon  Amadocus  orMedocus: 
but  it  was  divided  and  greatly  weakened.  A  prince  named  Maesades 
ruled  the  southern  and  eastern  parts,  extending  to  the  lower  shores 
of  the  Euxine  and  the  Propontis,  as  far  as  the  city  of  Ganus.  The 
tribes  subject  to  him  were  named  Melanditse,  Thyni,  and  Tranipsse. 
But  he  was  expelled  from  his  kingdom,  and  his  son  Seuthes  was 
brought  up  at  the  court  of  Amadocus.  Seuthes,  when  he  arrived 
at  man's  estate,  endeavoured,  with  the  assistance  of  the  Odrysian 
monarch,  to  recover  his  dominions,  but  Mas  unable  to  do  more  than 
live  by  plunder.3  Alcibiades  had  made  friends  of  both  these  princes 
in  the  vear  B.C.  405,  but  what  position  Seuthes  then  held  we  are  not 
informed.4  Indeed  we  have  so  little  historical  information  about  the 
Thracian  people,  except  when  they  are  brought  into  contact  with  the 
southern  Greeks,  that  it  is  difficult  to  make  out  the  geography  of 
the  country  reigned  over  by  their  kings,  or  the  boundaries  of  the 
various  tribes  that  composed  the  nation.  We  read  occasionally  of 
incursions  made  by  particular  tribes  into  the  territories  occupied  by 
Greek  colonies;  and  it  appears  clear  enough  that  the  mountaineers 
of  Hsemus  and  Pthodope  always  maintained  a  rude  independence 
agaiust  the  Thracian  mouarchs  of  the  plain.5  "When  Xenophon  and 
his  Cyrean  troops,  on  their  retreat  from  Persia,  arrived  on  the  coast 
of  the  Bosphorus,  in  the  year  B.C.  4C0,  Seuthes  applied  to  him  for 
assistance  agaiust  his  rebellious  subjects.  This,  after  some  delay, 
was  granted.  Xenophon  marched  from  Perinthus  into  the  ulterior 
of  the  country,  defeated  the  rebellious  mountaineers,  and  reestablished 
the  power  of  Seuthes,  from  whom  he  with  some  ditficulty  obtained 
the  promised  reward  for  his  soldiers.6  It  has  already  been  mentioned 
that  Dercvliidas  the  Lacedaemonian  was  hospitably  entertained  at  the 

(1)  Xenoph.  Hell.  iii.  c  2,  s.  S.    Diodorus.  xiv.  3S. 

(2)  Thucyd.  ii.  97  ;  iv.  101.  (J)  Xenoph.  Anab.  vii.  c.  2,  s.  32 — 3S. 

(4)  Diodorus.  xiii.  105. 

(5)  Thucyd.  ii.  96.     Xenoph.  Hell.  v.  c.  2,  s.  1/.     Diodorus,  xiv.  12:  xv.  36 
16)  Xenoph   Anab.  vii.  c.  1,  s.  5— c.  1,  ».  55.   • 


TEE    THRACIAN    CHERSONESE.  2 07 

court  of  Seutlies.  TTe  read  that  in  the  year  B.C.  392  Thrasvbulus, 
then  commanding  an  Athenian  fleet  in  the  JEgean,  visited  the  Cher- 
sonese, and  brought  over  Amadocus  and  Seutlies  to  the  alliance  of 
Athens.1  A  few  years  later  Seutlies  was  again  disturbed  by  insur- 
rection, and  in  his  distress  applied  for  the  aid  of  Iphicrates,  who  had 
rendered  himself  famous  by  the  success  of  his  peltastae  or  targeteers. 
By  the  arms  of  that  general  he  recovered  his  dominion.2 

In  the  year  B.C.  3S2  Cotys  succeeded  to  the  monarchy  of  Thrace ; 
but  whether  to  the  kingdom  of  Amadocus  as  well  as  that  of  Seutlies 
does  not  appear.  The  latter  he  certainly  possessed ;  and  it  is  not 
unlikely  that  he  enlarged  his  power  by  conquest  of  the  former.  The 
long  sojourn  of  Iphicrates  in  Thrace — for  since  the  peace  of  Autal- 
cidas  he  had  no  employment  for  his  troops  in  the  south— had  brought 
him  into  connexion  with  Cotys,  to  whom,  after  the  death  of  Seuthes, 
he  transferred  his  services.  Cotys,  to  reward  and  attach  him  more 
closely  to  his  own  interests,  gave  him  his  daughter  in  marriage,  and 
assigned  to  him  for  his  domain  a  Thracian  town  called  Drys,  situated 
near  the  mouth  of  the  Hebrus,  which  Iphicrates  strengthened  by 
fortifications,  and  by  the  introduction  of  a  Greek  colony.3  Thus, 
says  Grote,4  "  Iphicrates  became  a  great  man  in  Thrace,  yet  by  no 
means  abandoning  his  connexion  with  Athens,  but  making  his  posi- 
tion in  each  subservient  to  his  importance  in  the  other.  "While  he  was 
in  a  situation  to  favour  the  projects  of  Athenian  citizens  for  mercan- 
tile aud  territorial  acquisitions  in  the  Chersonese  and  other  parts  of 
Thrace,  he  could  also  lend  the  aid  of  Athenian  navai  and  military  art, 
not  merely  to  princes  in  Thrace,  but  to  others  even  beyond  those 
limits;  since  we  learn  that  Amyntas,  king  of  Macedonia,  became  so 
attached  or  indebted  to  him  as  to  adopt  him  for  his  son." 

Here  it  is  convenient  to  notice  the  loose  and  irregular  practices  of 
which  the  Athenian  generals  of  this  period  were  so  frequently  guilty, 
but  which  scarcely  drew  upon  them  any  rebuke  or  censure  from  their 
own  people.  I  allude  to  their  constant  residence  abroad,  their  roamiug 
in  quest  of  adventures,  their  service  under  foreign  princes,  forming 
connexions  with  them  by  marriage  and  otherwise,  receiving  gifts  of 
cities  aud  fortified  posts,  and  acting  independently  without  the  order 
or  permission  of  the  state.  Much  of  this  may  be  traced  to  the  con- 
sequences of  the  Peloponnesian  war.  A  large  number  of  men  accus- 
tomed to  warfare  were  thrown  out  of  employment,  and  glad  to  find 
any  service  where  pay  aud  plunder  could  be  got.  The  march  of  the 
ten  thousand  Greeks*  into  Persia  was  one  of  the  first  demonstrations 

^1)  Diodorus,  xiv.  94.  (2)  Cornelius  Xepos  in  vit.  Iphicrat. 

(3)  Suidas,  s.  v.  Koti/c  and  .iptc  Anaxandridas  apud  Athen.  iv.  6,  where  there  is 
an  amusing  description  of  the  wedding  feast.  A  good  saying  of  Menestheus.  the  son 
of  Iphicrates,  is  related  hy  Cornelius  Xepos  :  "Is  ciim  interrogaretur,  utrum  pluris 
patrem  matremve  faceret  ;*  matrem  inquit.  Id  cum  omnibus  mirum  videretur  ;  at 
me,  nierito  inquit  facio.  Nam  pater,  quantum  in  se  fuit,  Thracem  me  genuit ; 
contra  mater  Atheniensem."  The  absence  of  Iphicrates  in  Thrace  is  mentioned  bj 
Isaus,  de  Menecl.  Hered.  s.  7.  (4)  History  of  Greece   x.  146. 


508  APPElvDxX   ITL 

given  cf  the  importance  of       -  •    of  meB.     The  remnant  that 

returned  under  Xenophon  were  employed  in  Asia  Minor  by  the  Lace- 
dsemonians.  Athens  owed  her  restoration  to  the  foreign  troops  com- 
manded by  Conon.  Mercenary  soldiers  began  to  be  necessary  for 
ber  wars.  Her  generals,  if  successful,  acquired  an  influence  over 
them,  and  in  proportion  as  the  soldiers  were  attached  to  the  general, 
he  was  less  under  the  control  of  the  state.  Thus  was  the  power  cf 
the  state  weakened,  and  a  change  wrought  in  the  temper  and  feelings 
of  the  people.     Necess  revented  the  Athenians  from  scru- 

tinizing tbe  conduct  of  their  generals  too  nicely.  They  were  com- 
r  n  out  unprovided  with  the  sinews  of  war;  and  the 
generals  had  no  choice  but  to  get  money  in  irregular  wa~-  — 
contributions  from  allies,  by  plunder,  or  by  foreign  service.  "When 
Athens  began  to  recover  her  maritime  empire,  she  ought  to  have 
ished  a  better  rule  of  discipline.  But  she  did  not;  the  people 
imagined  that  they  could  make  foreign  conquests  in  the  same 
scrambling  way  that  they  had  extricated  themselves  from  their  difii- 
culties.  Hence,  not  only  did  they  allow  such  men  as  Iphicrates  and 
Timotheus  to  use  their  armaments  on  expeditions  that  were  not  im- 
mediately connected  with  the  interests  of  Athens,  but  they  tolerated, 
if  they  did  not ei. :        _  -        _      rties  of  such  men 

as  Chares  and  Charidemus.  It  is  true,  the  Athenians  sometimes  pro- 
fited by  these  irregularities,  but  they  lost  by  them  in  the  long  run. 
"We  shall  see  presemly  what  damage  was  done  to  the  affairs  of  Athens 
in  the  Chersonese  by  the  adventurer  Charidemus.  And  even  Iphi- 
crates, greatly  as  he  had  served  his  country  on  former  occasions,  was 
induced  by  his  alliance  with  Cotys  to  commit  open  treason.1 

These  remarks  are  quite  distinct  fro..  :  charge,  which  has 

been  brought  against  i  he  Athenian  people  both  in  ancient  and  modern 
times,  viz.  that  their  leading  men  resided  abroad,  because,  owi  ■  I 
the  jealousy  of  their  fellow-citizens,  they  could  not  live  in  comfort 
and  security  at  home.  Theopompus  was  the  original  author  of  such 
accusation,  which  has  been  repeated  by  Cornelius  Xepos  in  the  Life 
of  Chabrias  : — 

"Nan  enim  libenter  ium  suorum,  quod  ei 

vivebat  laute,  ex  indulgebaf  sibi  j'beralius  quani  ut  invidiam  rulgi 
posset  etTugere.  Est  enim  hoc  commune  vitium  in  magma  liberisque 
civitatibus,  ut  invidia  gloria?  com-;  -  enter  de  his  detrahant, 

quos  eminere  videant  ill  roe  animo  aquo  pauperes  alienam 

opulentam  intnentm  an.     Itaque  Chabrias,  quoad  ei  licebat, 

plurimum  aberat.     Neque  ver  _  :_enis  libenter,  sed 

omnes  fere  principes  fecerunt  idem,  quod  tantum  se  ab  invidia  puta- 
bant  abfuturos,  quantum  a  conspectu  suorum  recessissent.  Itaque 
Conon  plurimum  Cypri  vixit,  Iphicrates  in  Thracia,  Timotheus  Lesbi, 
Chares  in  Big 

(1)  See  pages   5      MS     UB    -.':.  of  this  volume.     Also  Thinwall,  Gt.  Hat.  v. 
Ji)9— 212. 


THE    THRACLLN"    CHERSONESE.  2G9 

Grote,  who  lias  given  proof  of  a  clearer  insight  into  the  spirit  of 
Greek  history,  and  especially  of  Athenian  character,  than  any  English 
historian  who  has  preceded  him,  successfully  refutes  the  sweeping 
charge  of  Theopompus  and  Nepos.  I  cannot  do  better  than  quote 
his  own  words:  ' 

"  That  the  people  of  Athens,  among  other  human  frailties,  had 
their  fair  share  of  envy  and  jealousy,  is  not  to  be  denied ;  but  that 
these  attributes  belonged  to  them  in  a  marked  or  peculiar  manner, 
cannot  (in  my  judgment)  be  shown  by  any  evidence  extant,  and  most 
assuredly  is  not  shown  by  the  evidence  here  alluded  to. 

"  Chabrias  was  fond  of  a  life  of  enjoyment  and  luxurious  indul- 
gence. If,  instead  of  being  an  Athenian,  he  had  been  a  Spartan,  he 
would  undoubtedly  have  been  compelled  to  expatriate,  in  order  to 
gratify  this  taste;  for  it  was  the  express  drift  and  purpose  of  the 
Spartan  discipline,  not  to  equalize  property,  but  to  equalize  the 
habits,  enjoyments,  and  personal  toils,  ot  the  rich  and  poor.  This  is 
a  point  which  the  admirers  of  Lycurgus — Xeuophou  and  Plutarch — 
attest  not  less  clearly  than  Thucydides,  Plato,  Aristotle,  and  others. 
If  then  it  were  considered  a  proof  of  envy  and  ill-temper,  to  debar 
rich  men  from  spending  their  money  in  procuring  enjoyments,  we 
might  fairly  consider  the  reproach  as  made  out  against  Lycurgus  and 
Sparta.  IS'ot  so  against  Aihens.  There  was  no  city  in  Greece  where 
the  means  of  luxurious  and  comfortable  living  were  more  abundantly 
exhibited  for  sale,  nor  where  a  rich  man  was  more  perfectly  at  liberty 
to  purchase  them.  Of  this  the  proofs  are  everywhere  to  be  found. 
Even  the  son  of  this  very  Chabrias — Ctesippus — who  inherited  the 
appetite  for  enjoyment,  without  the  greater  qualities,  of  his  father — 
fouud  the  means  of  gratifying  his  appetite  so  unfortunately  easy  at 
Athens,  that  he  wasted  his  whole  substance  in  such  expenses. 
(Plutarch,  Phocion,  c.  7 ;  Athenams,  iv.  p.  165.)  And  Chares  was 
even  better  liked  at  Athens  in  consequence  of  his  love  of  enjoyment 
and  licence — if  we  are  to  believe  another  fragment  (23S)  of  the  same 
Theopompus. 

"  The  allegation  of  Theopompus  and  Xepos,  therefore,  is  neither 
true  as  matter  of  fact,  nor  sulhcient,  if  it  had  been  true,  to  sustain 
the  hypothesis  of  a  malignant  Athenian  public,  with  which  they 
connect  it.  Iphicrates  and  Chabrias  did  not  stay  away  from 
Atheus  because  they  loved  enjoyments  or  feared  the  envy  of  their 
countrymen;  but  because  both  of  them  were  large  gainers  by  doing 
so,  in  importance,  in  profit,  and  in  tastes.  Both  of  them  loved  war 
and  had  great  abilities  for  war — qualities  quite  compatible  with  a 
strong  appetite  for  enjoyment ;  while  neither  of  them  had  either 
taste  or  talent  for  the  civil  routine  and  debate  of  Athens  wheii  at 
peace.  Besides,  each  of  them  was  commander  of  a  body  of  peltasts, 
through  whose  means  he  could  obtain  lucrative  service  as  well  as 
*"oreigu  distinction ;  so  that  we  can  assign  a  sufficient  reason  why 

(1)  History  of  Greece,  x.  147. 


£73  appendix  in. 

both  of  them  preferred  to  be  absent  from  Athens  during  most  part 
of  the  nine  years  ihar  toe  peace  of  Antaleidas  continued.  After- 
wards, Iphicrates  was  abroad  three  or  four  years  in  service  with  the 
Persian  satraps,  by  order  of  the  Athenians  :  Chabrias  also  went,  a 
long  time  afterwards,  again  on  foreign  service,  i  Egj  :.  at  the  same 
time  when  the  Spartan  king  Agwsnlaira  was  there:  (yet  without 
staying  long  away,  since  we  find  him  goin?  out  on  command  from 
Athens  to  the  Chersonese  in  359 — 35  S  B.C. — Demosth.  cont. 
Aristoc.  p.  677 ;)  but  neither  he,  nor  Agesiiaus,  went  there  to  escape 
the  mischief  of  envious  countrymen.  Demosthenes  does  not  talk  of 
Iphicrates  as  being  uncomfortable  in  Athens,  or  anxious  to  get  out 
of  it :  see  Oral.  cont.  Meidiam,  p.  535." 

The  case  of  Conon  residing  at  Cyprus,  as  Grote  justly  remarks, 
is  far  from  being  an  illustration  of  Athenian  jealousy  or  ill-temper. 
It  is  not  a  case  at  ail  in  point,  as  from  any  common  history  may  be 
gathered. 

But  I  must  return  from  this  digression. 

Events  that  occurred  somewhere  about  the  year  B.C.  362  brought 
into  collision  with  the  Athenians. 

Towards  the  close  of  the  year  B.C.  363  Timotheus,  who  then  com- 
manded the  Athenian  fleet  in  the  JEgean,  was  sen:  to  the  coast  of 
Asia  Minor  to  assist  Ariobarzanes,  satrap  of  Phrygia.  Ariobarzanes 
about,  five  years  before  had  sent  an  ageut  to  Delphi,  named  Piiiliscus, 
who  held  a  congress  for  the  pacification  of  the  G.  T  e 

Thebans  thwarted  his  views,  upon  which  Philiscus  threatened  theui 
with  war,  and  besan  to  levy  troo]  s  .  -  them.1  Tne  Athenians, 
then  in  alliance  with  Lacedaemon  against  Thebes,  conferred  the 
honour  of  citizenship  on  Ariobarzanes  and  his  dep ill  :;e  con- 

nexion thus  formed  with  the  satrap  apparently  led  to  the  mission  of 
Timotheus.    What  were  the  precise  ob;  Athenians,  we  are 

not  informed.  It  appears  however  that  in  the  same  year  the  Thebans 
sent  a  naval  armament  under  the  command  of  Epaminondas  to  the 
Hellespont  and  Propontis,  which  defeated  a  small  force  under  Laches 
at  Byzantium.  Epaminondas  was  well  received  at  that  city,  and 
exerted  himself  (not  without  effect)  to  detach  it  from  the  Athenian 
alliance.3  After  scouring  the  seas  for  some  time,  he  was  obliged  to 
return  home  to  attend  to  more  pressing  affairs,  but  his  appearance  in 
the -Egean  had  greatly  alarmed  the  Athenians ;  and  it  is  probable 
that  they  desired  the  aid  of  the  Persian  satrap,  (especially  in  money,) 
to  counteract  the  efforts  of  the  Thebans  in  that  direction.  Ario- 
barzanes had  views  of  his  own,  which  caused  him  to  need  the 
assistance  of  an  able  general  like  Timotheus.  In  fact,  . 
meditating  revolt  from  his  master  Artaxerxes,  and  wanted  men  and 
officers.  The  Athenians  had  some  suspicion  of  his  intention;  and 
therefore,*  while  they  permitted  their  general  to  cooperate  with  the 

(1)  Xenoph.  Hell.  vii.  e.  I  (X)  Demosth.  contra  Aristoc.  6c" 

(3)  Diod.  xv.  79.    Isocr.  Phii.  59.  (i)  Demosth.  de  Rhod.  Lib.  192,  1.-3. 


THE    THEACIAN    CHERSOXESK  271 

satrap,  to  save  appearances,  they  inserted  a  clause  in  their  decree, 
forbidding  any  infringement  of  their  treaty  with  the  king  of  Persia. 
Agesilaus  was  allowed  by  the  Spartans  to  go  out  on  the  same 
mission,  but  without  any  such  limitation  of  his  powers.  The  result 
of  the  expedition — as  far  as  concerns  our  present  inquiry — was,  that 
Timotheus,  iu  requital  of  the  services  which  he  rendered,  was 
assisted  by  Ariobarzanes  to  get  possession  of  Sestus  and  Crithote; 
and  the  Athenians,  having  thus  again  got  a  footing  on  their  ancient 
territory,  were  encouraged  to  claim  the  whole  dominion  of  tin 
Chersonese.1 

Cotys,  who  considered  the  peninsula  as  rightly  belonging  to  his 
own  kingdom,  by  no  means  acquiesced  in  this  claim.  He  had  already 
made  an  attempt  on  the  town  of  Sestus,  which  was  defeated  by 
Agesilaus,2  and  he  now  prepared  for  war  with  the  Athenians.  He 
engaged  in  his  service  Iphicrates,  who  being  at  this  time  out  of  em- 
ployment, and  in  some  disgrace  on  account  of  his  bad  success  at 
Amphipolis,  did  not  scruple  to  assist  his  father-in-law  against  his 
country.3  Timotheus  nevertheless  took  Elseus,  earned  the  war  into 
Thrace,  and  acquired  a  considerable  amount  of  plunder.  But  he 
had  not  much  leisure  for  operations  in  the  Chersonese ;  for  he  was 
now  called  off  to  the  siege  of  Samos,  where  he  was  occupied  for 
nearly  a  twelvemonth,  until  some  part  of  the  year  B.C.  361.  At  the 
end  of  that  year  he  went  on  his  last  disastrous  expedition  against 
Amphipolis ;  and  we  do  not  find  him  agaiii  employed  as  general  until 
the  occasion  of  the  Social  war.4 

Meanwhile  Cotys  had  been  greatly  alarmed  by  a  rebellion  which 
broke  out  in  his  own  kingdom.  A  Thracian  chieftain,  named  Mil- 
tocytb.es,  at  the  close  of  the  year  362,  rose  in  arms,  aud  seized  upon 
the  Sacred  Mountain.5  He  sent  off  an  embassy  to  Athens,  proposing 
alliance  and  offering  to  give  up  to  her  the  Chersonese.  Ergophilus, 
then  commanding  on  that  coast,  prepared  to  support  him :  but 
Cotys,  probably  under  the  advice  of  Iphicrates,  sent  a  submissive 
letter  to  the  Athenians,  which  induced  them  to  suppose  they  should 
gain  more  by  the  friendship  than  by  the  punishment  of  that  monarch; 
and  accordingly  they  sent  out  a  new  general,  Autocles,  with  a  com- 
mission which  gave  him  discretionary  power  to  act  according  to 
circumstances.  The  result  of  this  double-faced  policy  was,  that 
Miltocythes,  having  no  assurance  of  support,  and  rather  supposing 
the  Athenians  were  against  him,  abandoned  his  stronghold,  and 
withdrew :  Cotys,  being  relieved  from  danger,  soon  gave  the  Athe- 
nians to  understand  that  they  had  merited  no  recompense  from  him. 
They  vented  their  anger  upon  Autocles,  whom  they  brought  to  trial 
for  having  permitted  the  rebellion  to  be  quashed;    and  sent  out 

(1)  Isocratts,  On  the  Exchange,  115,  119.     Cornelius  Nepos  in  vit.  Timoth. 

(2)  Xenoph.  Agesil.  ii.  26.  (3)  Demosth.  contra  Aristoc.  663. 

(4)  See  page  2.'f4  of  this  volume. 

(5)  A  district  about  fifteen  miles  north  of  the  Chersonese,  stretching  west  of  the 
river  Zoralus,  nearly  down  to  the  sea  above  Ganus. 


w  i  U  APPENDIX  III. 

Menon  as  his  successor.  Menon  iu  a  short  time  was  superseded  b3 
Timomachus.  Neither  of  them  gained  any  success  in  their  warlike 
operations  against  Cotys.  He  on  the  contrary  was  able  to  annoy  the 
Athenian  commerce ;  and  the  presence  of  a  naval  force  in  the 
northern  seas  became  necessary  for  the  protection  of  the  corn-trade, 
not  only  against  Cotys,  but  also  against  the  Byzantines  and  others 
who  detained  the  Athenian  vessels  and  intercepted  their  supplies.1 

Towards  the  end  of  the  year  B.C.  361  Cotys  led  an  army  into  the 
Chersonese,  and  contrived,  witli  assistance  from  Abydos,  which  had 
generally  been  hostile  to  Athens,  to  take  Sestus.  Iu  this  enterprise 
he  was  no  longer  aided  by  Iphicrates,  who,  either  drawing  a  dis- 
tinction between  offensive  and  defensive  measures,  or  repenting  of 
his  past  conduct,  or  for  some  other  cause  dissatisfied  with  his  father- 
in-law,  would  serve  no  longer  against  Athens.  He  had,  as  Demos- 
thenes represents,  saved  Cotys  from  ruin — referring  probably  to  the 
rebellion  of  Miitocythes — and  expected  from  his  gratitude,  that  he 
would  change  his  policy  towards  Athens  :  but  instead  of  this,  his 
own  service  was  required  for  further  hostilities.  Refusing  to  comply 
with  this  demand,  and  fearing  the  resentment  of  the  king,  he  retired 
to  Antissa,  and  afterwards  to  Drys.2  The  Athenians  overlooked  his 
treasonable  conduct,  and  employed  him  at  a  later  period  in  the  Social 
war.  Cotys,  deprived  of  his  ablest  officer,  engaged  in  his  stead 
Charidemus. 

Of  this  adventurer's  character  I  have  already  spoken.  After  the 
defeat  of  Timotheus,  under  whom  he  had  served  by  compulsion,  at 
Amphipolis,  he  had  passed  over  to  Asia,  and,  breaking  an  engage- 
ment which  he  had  entered  into  with  Memnon  and  Mentor,  brothers- 
in-law  of  the  satrap  Artabazus,  took  forcible  possession  of  Scepsis, 
Cebren,  and  Ilium,  in  the  Troad.  These  being  inland  towns,  he  bad 
no  means  of  maintaining  himself  against  the  power  of  the  satrap, 
who  soou  collected  his  forces  for  a  siege.  Charidemus,  in  his  distress, 
wrote  a  letter  to  Cephisodotus,  then  the  Athenian  commander  in  the 
Hellespont,  begging  the  loan  of  some  ships  to  convey  him  and  his 
troops  from  Asia,  and  promising  in  return  to  reduce  the  Chersonese 
under  Athenian  dominion.  He  was  lucky  enough  to  escape  without 
such  help;  for  Mentor  and  Memnon,  hearing  of  the  design,  persuaded 
Artabazus  to  let  him  go.  Charidemus,  having  crossed  over  to  the 
Chersonese,  instead  of  performing  his  promise  to  Cephisodotus, 
joined  the  army  of  Cotys,  from  whom  probably  he  expected  a  more 
ample  reward,  and  proceeded  with  him  to  besiege  Elaeus  and  Crithote.3 

The  siege  of  these  places  had  continued  for  some  time  without 

(1)  Demosth.  contra  Aristoc.  655,  658  ;  contra  Polyclem.1207,  1210,  1211,  1213. 

(2)  Demosth.  contra  Aristoc.  663,664.  It  is  possible  that  a  feeling  of  rivalry  against 
Timotheus  influenced  the  conduct  of  Iphicrates.  Timotheus  threatened  him  with  a 
ypaiph  fewar,  but  they  were  afterwards  reconciled,  and  joint  commanders  in  the 
Social  war.  See  Demosth.  contra  Timoth.  1204.  Corneiius  Xepos  in  vit.  Iphic.  and 
Timoth. 

(3)  Demosth.  contra  Aristoc.  670—672. 


THE   THKACIAX   CHEBSOHEPB,  273 

success,  when  the  Athenians  were  relieved  from  further  peril  by  the 
violent  death  of  Cotys,  who  was  assassinated  by  two  natives  of 
JEnus,  Python  and  Heraclides.  Tlie  alleged  motive  of  the  deed 
was  revenge  for  some  insult  which  Cotys  had  offered  to  their  father. 
Cotys  -ttith  much  energy  and  strength  of  character  united  the  rude 
ferocity  common  among  his  people.  He  was  addicted  to  hard 
drinking  and  licentious  habits,  and  it  not  unfrequently  happened, 
that  the  courtiers  and  companions  of  the  king  Mere  the  victims  of 
his  intemperance.  Strange  stories  are  told  of  him  by  Theopompus 
— that  he  used  to  make  excursions  over  his  kingdom,  and  wherever 
he  found  pleasant  spots,  well  wooded  and  wa'ered,  he  established 
places  of  entertainment,  to  which  he  resorted  with  his  generals  and 
officers,  and  gave  himself  up  1o  sensual  enjoyment.  Sacrifices  To  the 
gods  formed  a  part  of  these  festivities,  until  the  habit  of  unrestrained 
indulffence  overcame  his  piety  as  well  as  his  discretion,  and  he  con- 
ceived the  idea  that  lie  was  beloved  by  the  goddess  Minerva.  Full 
of  this  belief,  he  actually  ordered  a  wedding  feast,  and  fitted  up  a 
nuptial  chamber  for  bis  bride.  In  a  state  of  intoxication  be  awaited 
her  arrival;  till  at  length,  becoming  impatient,  he  sent  one  of  his 
guards  to  see  if  the  goddess  had  come.  The  guard  informed  him 
that  there  was  no  one  in  the  chamber,  and  for  this  unwelcome  news 
was  shot  by  the  king  with  an  arrow.  A  second  messenger  shared 
the  same  fate:  a  third,  more  prudent,  told  him,  the  goddess  had 
been  waiting  for  him  some  time.  Another  story  is,  that,  being 
jealous  of  his  queen,  he  killed  her  in  a  most  brutal  manner,  cutting 
her  up  the  middle  with  his  own  sword.  Such  was  the  man,  who  now, 
for  soir.e  outrage  upon  a  Greek  citizen,  fell  a  victim  to  filial  vengeance.1 

The  murderers  Med  to  Athens,  and  were  well  received.  The  Athe- 
nians were  weak  enough  to  pass  a  vote,  conferring  on  them  the 
honour  of  citizenship  and  crowns  of  gold.  [Nothing  could  justify 
this  step.  It  would  have  been  wrong  in  the  Athenians  to  have 
murdered  Cotys  themselves,  whether  as  a  tyrant  or  an  enemy;  and 
if  so,  it  could  not  be  decent  to  reward  others  for  doing  such  a  deed. 
I  mention  this,  because  some  writers  speak  loosely  about  tyrannicide, 
as  it'  t  he  Greeks  were  excusable  for  encouraging  it.  Python,  one  of 
the  brothers,  did  not  regard  the  honour  bestowed  on  him  as  in  any 
way  binding  him  to  the  "interests  of  Athens  ;  for  not  long  afterwards 
he  passed  over  into  the  service  of  Philip.2 

Another  instance  of  the  same  folly,  on  a  more  memorable  occasion 
— when  the  Athenians,  on  the  news  of  Philip's  death,  offered  sacrifice 
to  the  gods,  and  voted  a  crown  to  Pausanias,  his  murderer — is  thus 
animadverted  on  by  Plutarch  in  the  life  of  Demosthenes  : — 

"  Tor  my  part,  I  cannot  say  that  the  behaviour  of  the  Athenians 

(1)  Aristotle,  Polit.  v.  8.  12.     Theopompus  apud  Athen.  xii.  42. 

(2)  Pemosth.  contra  Aristocr.  659,  662.  Whether  this  Python  was  the  same  as  the 
Bvzantine  Pvthon,  who  at  a  later  period  distinguished  himself  as  an  orator  aud 
ambassador  of  Philip,  is  a  matter  of  doubt.  See  Thirlwall,  Gr.  Hist.  v.  221,  (note,) 
who  assigns  good  reasons  for  believing  them  to  be  the  same.    Jacobs'  Dem.  319. 

VOL.  I.  T 


274  APPENDIX    III. 

on  tms  occasion  was  at  all  decent  or  honourable,  to  crown  themselves 
with,  garlands,  to  sacrifice  to  the  gods,  for  the  death  of  a  prince,  who 
in  the  midst  of  his  success  and  victories,  when  They  were  a  conquered 
people,  had  used  them  with  so  much  clemency  and  humanity.  It 
was  a  practice  both  unworthy  and  base,  to  make  him  free  of  their 
city,  aud  honour  him  while  he  lived;  and  yet.  as  soon  as  he  fell  by 
treason,  to  set  no  bounds  to  their  joy,  to  insult  over  his  death,  and 
sing  triumphant  songs  of  victory,  as  if  by  their  own  vaiour  they  had 
couquered  him." 

The  death  of  Cotys  occurred  B.C.  35S.     Three  princes  claimed  the 
succession,  to  the  whole,  or  to  different  parts  of  his  kingdom  :  Cerso- 
bleptes,  Berisades,  and  Amadocus.      Cersobleptes  was  the  sou  of 
Cotys;  the  other  two  were  either  sons,  or  more  distant   relatives. 
They  were  all  very  young,  and  sought  the  aid  of  Greek  gene 
make  good  their  pretensions.    Ciiaridemus   espoused  ihe   cause   of 
Cersobleptes,  whose  sister  he  had  married:  Berisai 
by  Athenodorus,  a  citizen  of  Athens,  with  whom  he  ha 
nuptial    alliance ;    Amadocus    by    Simon    and    Bianor,    who  were 
similarly  connected  with  him.1 

Meanwhile  Cephisodotus,  the  Athenian  commander,  ignc; 
the  plans  of  Charidemus,  arrived  at  Perinthus  with  ten  ships  to 
claim  the  fulfilment  of  the  promises  which  he  had  made  in  the  Troad. 
Charidemus  with  some  cavalry  and  light  troops,  watching  his  oppor- 
tunity, attacked  the  Athenian  soldiers  while  they  were  on  shore 
taking  their  meal,  and  slew  a  considerable  number  of  them.  He 
continued  his  hostilities  for  seven  months,  and  the  Chersoncs 
became  the  scene  of  war.  Cephisodotus  sailed  with  his  squadron 
to  Alopeconnesus,  a  promontory  on  the  south-west  coast  of  the 
Peninsula,  lying  over  against  Imbrus,  where  a  band  of  pirates  had 
established  themselves  ;  but  Charidemus,  marching  across  the  country, 
attacked  the  Athenians,  and  forced  Cephisodotus  into  a  disadvan- 
tageous convention.  As  soon  as  this  was  known  at  Athens. 
indignantly  repudiated.  Cephisodotus  was  recalled,  aud  sentenced 
to  a  tine  of  five  talents.  Athenodorus  was  appointed  to  take  his 
place.2 

No  war  had  bitherto  broken  out  between  Cersobleptes  and  the 
other  two  princes;  nor  does  it  exactly  appear  over  what  parts  of 
the  kingdom  they  respectively  reigned,  except  that  Cersobleptes 
must  have  held  the  country  north  of  the  Chersonese  and  the  Propon- 
tine  coast;  Amadocus  seems  to  have  bad  dominion 
rlebrus.3  It  happened  that  about  this  time  Miltocythes  made  a  new 
attempt  to  get  the  crown,  but  was  betrayed,  aud  delivered  into  the 

11  Dtmosth.  contra  Aristoc.  623.  624.  661,  674.     Isocrates.  De  Pace.  1M.    Orole, 
Htat.  of  Grc-e-ce.  x.  518.     Thirhra 

(2)  De^iosth.  contr..  The  pirates  were  sent  probably  by  Alex 

srider  of  Pliers.  See  Thirlwall,  1.  c.  Reiske  thinks  ditfeTerr.ly.  See  his  Indej  it 
Deuiosth. 

i3)  Deuiosth.  contra  Aristoc.  681. 


THE    THRACIAN    CHTRSOXESE.  27c 

hands  of  Charidemus.  That  general  was  at  Cardia,  whieh  city  haa 
at  his  special  desire  been  reserved  to  him  by  the  terms  of  the  conven- 
tion. Knowing  that  it  was  the  custom  of  the  Thracians  not  to  put 
their  prisoners  to  death,  he  gave  up  Miltocythes,  not  to  Cersobleptes, 
but  to  the  Cardian  peo|ile ;  who,  to  gratify  Charidemus,  took  the 
Captive  and  his  son  out  in  a  boat,  slew  the  son  before  his  father's 
eyes,  and  then  threw  the  father  into  the  sea.  This  act  of  cruelty 
roused  the  anger  of  the  Thracians.  Berisades  and  Amadocus  united 
their  forces  against  Cersobleptes,  who  was  charged  as  the  author  of 
the  crime;  and  concluded  an  alliance  with  Athenodorus,  who  was 
now  upon  the  coast.  The  object  of  the  princes  was  to  enlarge  their 
dominions,  or  secure  themselves  in  what  they  already  possessed  ; 
that  of  the  Athenians  was  to  obtain  a  cession  of  the  Chersonese. 
Cersobleptes,  assailed  by  a  superior  force,  was  driven  into  a  treaty, 
whereby  it  was  agreed  that  the  kingdom  of  Cotys  should  be  equally 
divided  anions  the  three  princes,  and  the  Chersonese  should  be  ceded 
to  Athens.  This  occurred  in  the  beginning  of  the  year  357.  Cha- 
brias,  who  had  been  appointed  to  succeed  Athenodorus,  came  with  a 
single  ship  only  to  the  coast  of  Thrace,  expecting  to  receive  a  formal 
surrender  of  the  Chersonese.  But  Athenodorus  had  in  the  meantime 
been  compelled  for  want  of  mouey  to  disband  his  troops;  Charide- 
mus then  persuaded  Cersobleptes  to  renounce  bis  engagement;  and 
Chabrias,  entirely  destitute  of  means,  was  iu  his  turn  forced  iuto  a 
convention  more  hu-miliating  than  that  of  Cephisodotus.  It  was 
soon  reported  to  the  Athenian  assembly,  where,  after  an  angry 
debate,  the  act  of  Chabrias  was  repudiated,  and  ten  commissioners 
were  chosen  with  instructions  to  go  out  to  Thrace,  and  either  pro- 
cure a  ratification  of  the  treaty,  or  take  measures  for  war.  The  com- 
mission was  despatched,  but,  being  unprovided  with  force,  it  produced 
no  result  but  evasion  and  delay  on  the  part  of  Cersobleptes  and 
Charidemus,  while  Berisades  and  Amadocus  sent  letters  of  complaint 
to  Athens.  There  seemed  no  prospect  of  bringing  the  affairs  to  a 
desirable  issue,  unless  the  Athenians  could  send  an  armament  strong 
enough  to  overawe  their  opponents.  This  was  not  accomplished  till 
the  conclusion  of  the  war  in  Eubcea. 

During  the  above-mentioned  operations  in  Thrace,  the  Athenians 
were  for  about  a  month  engaged  in  a  harassing  war  in  Eubcea,  to 
expel  the  Thebans,  who  had  made  an  attempt  to  establish  their  power 
in  the  island.  Great  exertions  were  made  on  that  important  occa- 
sion, although  the  finances  of  the  state  were  in  a  low  condition.  A 
body  of  mercenaries  was  raised,  who  together  with  the  citizen  troops 
were  put  under  the  command  of  Chares  and  Diodes.  After  various 
skirmishes,  in  which  sometimes  the  Athenians  and  sometimes  the 
Thebans  had  the  advantage,  an  armistice  was  agreed  upon,  and  the 
Thebans  evacuated  Eubcea.1     The  troops  were  then  at  liberty  to  be 

(1)  Diodorus,  xv\  7.  Demosth.  contra  Mid.  570.  De  Cherson.  103.  JE&ch, 
contra  Ctesiph.  65. 

t3 


276  appendix  in. 

sent  elsewnere,  and  accordingly  they  were  shipped  off  to  the  Helles- 
pont under  the  command  of  Chares.  It  was  no  longer  in  the  power 
of  Charidemus  to  resist  the  demands  of  the  Athenians  ;  and  at  length 
he  made,  on  behalf  of  Cersobleptes,  an  actual  surrender  of  all  the 
territories  of  the  Chersonese.  There  was  one  exception  however, 
which,  though  not  deemed  of  importance  at  the  time,  led  to  serious 
disputes  at  a  later  period.  That  was  the  city  of  Cardia;  which  by  a 
special  clause,  at  the  instance  of  Charidemus,  was  declared  to  be  in- 
dependent; on  the  ground,  as  it  would  seem,  that  it  lay  without  the 
boundaries  of  the  Peninsula.  Thrace  was  partitioned  among  the 
three  princes  ;  and  this  was  supposed  to  be  an  additional  security  to 
the  Athenian  power.1 

While  their  ancient  dominion  of  the  Chersonese,  its  territory  and 
its  revenue,2  were  thus  recovered  by  the  Athenians,  events  had 
occurred  elsewhere,  which  greatly  counterbalance!  the  advantage ; J 
and  new  disasters  were  at  hand.  In  this  very  year,  B.C.  357,  the 
Social  war  broke  out.  Byzantium,  Chios,  Cos,  and  Rhodes  revolted 
from  Athens,  and  waged  against  her  a  successful  war  until  their  inde- 
pendence was  acknowledged  B.C.  355.  Corcyra  had  also  thrown  off 
her  allegiance.  Potidsea  was  taken  by  Philip  b.c.  356.  The  Olyu- 
thians  were  wresting  from  Athens  her  dominion  in  Chalcidice.4 

These  misfortunes  appear  to  have  encouraged  the  Sestians,  not- 
withstanding the  compact  entered  into  by  Cersobleptes,  to  dispute  the 
sovereignty  of  Athens  and  assert  their  own  independence.  It  was 
not  till  the  end  of  the  Social  war,  that  the  Athenians  were  able  to 
chastise  them.  Chares  then  besieged  and  took  Sestus.  The  im- 
portance of  the  place,  which  from  its  position,  commanding  the 
passage  of  the  Hellespont,  was  called  the  corn-bin  of  the  Piraeus,5 
was  thought  to  justify  a  rigorous  punishment.  Chares  massacred  all 
the  adult  population,  and  reduced  the  others  to  slavery.  Soon  after 
wards  the  Athenians,  imitating  the  policy  of  Pericles,  sent  out  :■. 
body  of  their  own  citizens  to  take  possession  of  the  vacant  land  in 
Chersonesus,  and  thereby  to  strengthen  and  consolidate  the  empire 
of  Athens.6  Such  resumption  of  their  ancient  rights  appears  to 
have  given  cause  of  offence.  Isocrates,  who  about  this  time  wrote  a 
pamphlet,  in  the  form  of  an  oration,  recommending  his  countrymen 
to  maintain  an  equitable  peace  with  their  allies,  and  to  give  up  a 
useless  struggle  for  empire,  condemns  these  colonial  acquisitions  as 
impolitic  and  unjust.7 

Philip  of  Macedon  had  not  hitherto  taken  any  part  in  the  contests 
of  the  Thracian  kings,  either  among  themselves  or  with  the  Athe- 

il)  Demosth.  contra  Aristoc.  G7fi—G79,  G81,  623. 

(2)  As  to  the  amount  see  Demosth.  contra  Aristoc.  657. 

(3)  The  capture  of  Amphipolis  and  Pydna  by  Philip,  and  his  offensive  league  with 
the  Olynthians.     See  Appendix  I.  pp.  23G— 238. 

(4)  Appendix  I.  239.  (5)  Tn\ia  tvZ  Xleipaieos.     Aristotle,  Rhet.  iii.  10. 
(6)  Diodorus,  xvi.  34.     ^schines,  l)e  Fals.  Leg.  37. 

(7;  Isocrates,  De  Pace,  159.     Compare  Aristotle,  Khet.  ii.  6. 


THE    THEACIAX    rHERSOXF.SE.  -'  I  < 

nians.  Cotys  had,  after  the  death  of  Perdiccas,  espoused  the  cause 
of  the  pretender  Pausanias.  but  had  been  induced  by  presents  or 
promises  to  abandon  it.1  Philip,  occupied  elsewhere,  remained  at 
peace  with  Cotys,  and  for  some  years  made  no  attempt  to  encroach 
ipon  Thracian  ground  beyond  the  bank  of  the  Xestus.  But  about 
the  year  B.C.  353  he  conceived  the  idea  of  forming  an  alliance  with 
Cersobleptes,  and  attacking  the  Athenians  in  the  Chersonese.  How 
far  Cersobleptes  himself  encouraged  this  design,  is  not  very  clear. 
Since  the  treaty,  by  which  he  finally  surrendered  Chersonesus  to  the 
Athenians,  he  had  apparently  been  on  amicable  terms  with  them. 
An  Athenian  fleet  was  constantly  stationed  in  the  Hellespont,  ready 
to  act  if  occasion  required;  and  the  partition  of  the  Thracian 
kingdom  among  three  princes  restrained  the  ambitions  projects  of 
each.2  The  death  of  Berisades  disturbed  this  peaceful  arrangement, 
and  led  to  new  combinations.  He  died  somewhere  about  the  year 
B.C.  353,  leaving  children  under  the  guardianship  of  Athenodorus. 
That  Cersobleptes  meditated  war  against  both  Amadocus  and  the 
sons  of  Berisades,  is  distinctly  asserted  by  Demosthenes.3  Philip 
took  advantage  of  these  occurrences,  to  propose  an  alliance  with 
Cersobleptes,  for  the  conquest  of  Thrace  and  the  expulsion  of  the 
Athenians  from  Chersonesus.  In  furtherance  of  this  purpose  lie 
marched  to  Maronea,  and  had  an  interview  with  Apollonides,  an 
envoy  of  the  Thracian  king.  At  the  same  time  a  negotiation  was 
opened  with  Pammenes  the  Theban  general,  who  some  time  before 
had  been  sent  to  Asia  to  assist  Artabazus  against  the  Persian 
satraps.  It  does  not  appear  from  the  language  of  the  orator,  that 
Pammenes  had  any  direct  communication  with  Philip;  but  rather 
that  he  communicated  only  with  Cersobleptes.  The  project  how- 
ever was  disconcerted  by  Amadocus,  who  refused  to  the  king  of 
Macedon  a  passage  through  his  territory;  and  for  the  present  the 
designs  of  Philip  upon  Thrace  were  suspended.4 

Then  followed  an  extraordinary  measure  on  the  part  of  the  Athe- 
nians, which  we  must  attribute  partly  to  the  weakness  of  their 
government,  partly  to  financial  embarrassment,  and  the  difficulty 
which  they  experienced  in  finding  troops  and  money  for  the  support 
of  their  empire.  Charidemus,  as  we  have  seen,  had  been  one  of 
their  most  active  opponents  in  the  recovery  of  the  Chersonese. 
Yet  no  sooner  had  he  been  brought  to  reason  by  the  arrival  of 
Chares  in  the  Hellespont,  than  the  Athenians  passed  a  decree 
bestowiug  on  him  the  franchise  of  their  city  and  a  golden  crown.3 
His  military  skill  and  his  influence  in  Thrace  were  highly  extolled  at 
Athens,  where  he  contrived  to  secure  a  party  in  his  favour;  and  it 
was  said  that  he  was  the  only  person  c  pable  of  recovering  Ampbi- 
polis.     The  report  of  an  intended  alliance  between  Philip  and  Cer- 

(U  Diodorus,  xvi.  2,  3.  (?,  Demosth.  contra  Aristae.  623,  6S0 

(3)  Ibid.  624.  14)  Jbid.  6S1. 

(5)  Aristotle,  Rhet.  ii.  23.     Libanius  in  Arguxu.  Or.  Demosth.  contra  Aristoc, 


2  i  0  APPENDIX  IIT. 

soblept.es,  of  which  it  seems  Chares  had  informed  his  countrymen  by 
letter,1  excited  alarm  at  Athens;  and  the  partisans  of  Charidenius 
deemed  it  a  favourable  opportunity  to  promote  his  advancement.  It 
was  necessary,  they  said,  to  keep  on  good  terms  with  Cersobleptes, 
and  for  that  purpose  they  should  secure  the  attachment  of  Chaii- 
demus,  his  favourite  minister.  It  was  contended  also,  that  lie  had 
rendered  signal  service  to  Athens  in  the  surrender  of  the  Chersonese. 
One  Aristocrates  now  moved  a  decree,  making  it  a  capital  crime 
against  the  laws  of  Athens  to  kill  Charidenius.  The  people  were 
persuaded  to  pass  this  decree;  but  the  mover  was  afterwards  prose- 
cuted by  Euthycles.  for  whom  Demosthenes  composed  an  elaborate 
speech,  showing  that  the  measure  of  Aristocrates  was  not  only 
contrary  to  the  spirit  of  the  Athenian  law,  but,  was  fraught  with 
danger  to  the  country;  that  Charidemus  was  a  profligate  and 
treacherous  person,  who  had  always  been  the  enemy  of  Athens, 
that  the  effect  of  the  decree  would  be  to  deter  Athenodorus  and  the 
other  Greek  commanders  in  Thrace  from  opposing  Charidemus ;  that 
.  -  aid  Cersobleptes  would  crush  the  rival  princes,  and,  once 
master  of  the  whole  Thracian  kingdom,  would  drive  the  Athenians 
from  Chersonesus.  It  is  from  this  oration  that  we  get  most  of  the 
historical  materials  relating  to  Athenian  affairs  in  Thrace.  The  trial 
tcok  place  in  the  year  B.C.  352.  Notwithstanding  all  the  exertions 
of  the  orator,  Aristocrates  was  acquitted,  and  the  decree  confirmed.2 

Strange  as  it  was  to  pass  such  a  decree  in  favour  of  this  man,  the 

event  in  some  measure  accorded  with  the  declarations  of  his  party. 

^eptes  from  this  time  became  ihe  firm  friend  of  Athens,  while 

Amadocus,  seeing  his  cause  abandoned  by  the  Athenians,  espoused 

liance  of  Philip,  and.  assisted  his  projects  in  Thrace.3 

It  was  in   this   same  year  that  Philip,  after  gaining  his   great 

victory  in  Thessaly,  made  an  expedition  into  Thrace,  which  is  said 

.wall  to  be"  one  of  the  most  obscure  parts  of  his  history.     It 

does  not  appear  that  he  made  at  this  time  any  attack  upon  Cerso 

bleptes,  although  he  approached  so  near  as  to  alarm  the  Athenians 

who  had  settled  in   the  Chersonese.4     His   invasion  was   at   first 

directed  to  the  interior,  and  perhaps  to  the  central  and  northern 

parts  of  the  kingdom,  where  he  was  engaged  for  a  considerable  time, 

ng  hostile  tribes,   and  establishing  his  own   dependents   in 

authority' and  power.     He  may  very  likely  have  assisted  Amadocus 

in  pushing  his  conquests  over  the  territory  of  his  neighbours.     It  i3 

.  stated  by  tne  Athenian  orators,  that  he  made  what  kings  he 

pleased,  and  we  know  not  enough  of  Thracian  history  to  get  more 

precise  information.5      No  certain  account  of  Philip's  movements 

(1)  Demosth.  contra  Aristoc.  682. 

(2)  The  whole  of  this  speech  should  be  perused,  to  obtain  aproper  insight  into  the 
events  of  the  period.     See  ThirlwaU.  Gr.  Hist.  v.  2&0— 293. 

iarpocration  s.  t.  'AjufAaaac.     Demosth.  de  Chers.  105.     Philipp.  it.  133. 
(4]  .Eschines,  De  Fals.  Leg.  37 

(5)  1  socrates,  PhUipp.  S6.     Demosth.  Olyjith.  i.  13.    See  p.  241  of  this  volume. 

In 


TUE    THRACiAX    CHEKfiONESE.  279 

reached  the  Athenians,  until  they  heard  that  he  had  marched  east- 
ward to  the  Fropoutine  coast,  and  laid  siege  to  Herseum.1  The 
importance  of  tliis  place,  which  was  held  by  an  Athenian  garrison 
for  the  protection  of  the  corn-trade,  was  well  understood  by  the 
peoole.  They  instantly  convened  an  assembly,  voted  an  armament 
of  forty  galleys,  to  carry  out  all  the  citizens  under  forty-five  years  of 
age,  and  ordered  sixty  talents  to  be  raised  by  general  contribution. 
It  was  then  the  month  of  November  in  the  year  352.  Notwith- 
standing the  energetic  resolutions  of  the  people,  nine  mouths  were 
consumed  in  preparation.  Keports  came  to  Athens,  that  Philip  was 
dead  or  ill,  and  this  served  as  an  excuse  for  delay.  At  length,  in 
li:e  autumn  of  351,  ten  galleys  were  despatched  with  the  bare  crews 
only,  and  a  sum  of  five  talents.  Charidemus,  who  was  then  at 
Athens,  and  had  probably  been  sent  by  Ccrsobleptes  to  warn  the 
Athenians  of  the  danger,  was  appointed  to  the  command.  Such  a 
force  would  hardly  have  been  sufficient  to  check  the  progress  of 
Philip,  had  he  been  inclined  to  pursue  it.  But  it  was  then  con- 
sidered by  the  Athenians,  that  the  danger  was  past.  And  so  in  fact 
it  was.  for  Philip  had  been  seized  with  a  severe  illness,  and 
returned  to  his  own  kingdom.2 

For  above  four  years  Philip  abstained  from  any  further  aggression 
in  that  quarter.  But  in  the  year  B.C.  3*7,  having  consolidated  his 
power  by  the  reduction  of  Olynthus  and  Chalcidice,  he  prepared  him- 
self for  new  schemes  of  conquest.  His  most  formidable  enemies 
were  the  Athenians.  It  was  necessary  to  humble  them.  Two  methods 
of  doing  so  presented  themselves :  first,  to  put  himself  at  the  head 
of  the  Amphictyonic  confederacy,  invade  Phocis,  terminate  the  Sacred 
war,  and  acquire  a  preponderating  power  in  southern  Greece; 
secondly,  to  invade  the  Chersonese,  drive  the  Athenians  from  the 
coast  of  the  Hellespont  and  Propontis,  and  starve  them  out,  as  the 
Lacedaemonians  had  done,  by  stopping  their  importation  of  corn. 
For  this  last  purpose  it  was  uecessary  to  subdue  the  kingdom  of 
Cersobleptes,  which  lay  between  him  and  the  Chersonese,  and  pro- 
tected tlie  Greek  cities  on  the  northern  shore  of  the  Propontis.  To 
accomplish  his  objects  more  easily,  Philip  had  recourse  to  stratagem.3 

It  may  seem  to  us,  reading  history  after  the  event,  that  Philip 
might  with  ease  have  overrun  the  kingdom  of  Cersobleptes  and  the 
Ciiersonese  in  spite  of  any  resistance  which  the  Athenians  could  have 
offered;  and  that  afterwards  he  might  have  led  an  overpowering  army 
into  Phocis,  and  beaten  down  all  opposition.  Such,  however,  was 
not  the  view  which  he  himself  took  of  the  matter.  It  was  a  maxim 
with  that  politic  prince,  not  to  employ  force,  where  he  could  succeed 

In  Athenaens,  xiii.  557,  mentio.i  is  made  of  Cothelas,  a  Thracian  prince,  \rho  sub- 
aiif  ed  to  Philip,  and  gave  his  i  aughtei  Meda  to  Le  one  of  his  wives  or  concubines. 

'1)  As  to  its  situation  near  Pcrinthus.  see  Herodotus,  iv.  <-0. 

(2)  Demosth.  Olynth.  iii.  29- 

(3J  Demosth.  de  Cor.  254.     De  tdu>.  Leg.  3C7.  3  7. 


280  APPENDIX    III 

as  well  by  negotiation  or  intrigue;  nor  to  let  his  enemies  combine.; 
but  to  separate  and  beat  them  one  after  another.  Nor  were  the  diffi- 
culties iu  his  way  so  inconsiderable.  The  Athenians,  driven  from  the 
Macedonian  and  Chalcidic  shores,  having  fewer  garrisons  to  main- 
tain, and  fewer  objects  to  distract  their  attention,  might  concentrate 
all  their  naval  power  for  the  defence  of  the  Hellespont,  which  they 
felt  to  be  so  important.  The  commerce  of  Macedonia  had  already 
suffered  greatly  by  the  presence  of  their  cruisers.  Again,  they  might 
with  the  Lacedaemonians  send  troops  to  the  assistance  of  Phalaecus, 
and  occupy  the  pass  of  Thermopylae,  as  they  had  done  some  years 
before.  In  such  case  the  issue  of  the  war  in  Phocis  might  be  doubt- 
ful, even  with  the  forces  of  Thebes  and  Thessaly  at  his  disposal.  It 
was  well  known  how  Demosthenes  had  exerted  himself  to  rouse  his 
countrymen  against  Macedonia.  Defeat  would  be  greatly  injurious 
to  Philip's  reputation  and  prospects  ;  and  he  sav.-  a  way  of  gaining 
his  ends  without  incurring  any  such  risk.1 

He  caused  a  negotiation  for  peace  to  be  opened  with  the  Athe- 
nians, and  so  contrived  matters,  that  the  first  formal  proposal  came 
from  the  Athenians  themselves.  His  wishes  were  made  known  at 
Athens  by  some  Euboean  ambassadors,  and  by  other  indirect  commu- 
nications. The  Athenians,  weary  of  an  unprofitable  war,  were  not 
indisposed  to  accept  his  overtures.  A  motion  was  then  made  by 
Philocrates,  that  he  should  have  liberty  to  send  a  herald  to  Athens. 
The  motion  was  carried  ;  and  Philocrates,  having  been  prosecuted 
for  it,  was  successfully  defended  by  Demosthenes,  who  appears  at 
this  time  to  have  been  in  favour  of  a  peace.  Aristodemus  the  actor 
was  sent  to  Macedonia,  to  treat  for  the  ransom  of  the  Athenian  pri- 
soners, who  had  been  taken  at  Olynthus  ;  and  on  his  return  reported, 
that  Philip  was  desirous  not  only  of  peace,  but  of  alliance  with 
Athens.  Thereupon  Philocrates  moved  and  carried  another  decree, 
to  send  ambassadors  to  Philip  with  full  powers  to  negotiate  a  treaty. 
Ton  ambassa  lors  were  appointed  accordingly — ^Eschines,  Demosthe- 
nes, Aristodemus,  Philocrates,  Ctesiphou,  Phrynou,  Iatrocles,  Nau- 
sicles,  Dercyius,  Cimon.  Another  was  added,  to  represent  the 
Athenian  confederacy;  Aglacreon  of  Tcnedos.  They  started  for 
Macedonia  in  the  beginning  of  the  year  316  B.C.2 

The  transactions  of  tins  embassy  are  revealed  to  us  by  the  two 
principal  ambassadors,  .dSschines  and  Demosthenes,  in  their  celebrated 
speeches  on  the  trial  which  took  place  a  few  years  alter,  on  which 
iEschiucs  was  charged  by  his  rival  with  corruption  and  treason.  The 
speeches  must  be  perused  with  the  closest  attention  by  any  one  who 
desires  to  gain  full  information;  and  even  this  will  not.  be  satisfac- 
tory;  for  the  speeches  so  abound  in  contradictious,  and  have  so  little 

(1)  Demosth.  Olynth.  ii.  20.  De  Cherson.  105.  De  Cor.  2?G.  De  Fals.  Leg.  442. 
Diodorus  xvi.  54.     Pausanias,  viii.  7. 

(2)  ASschines,  De  Fals.  Leg.  29,  JO.  Demosth.  de  Cor.  232.  JEschines  conti* 
Cle=.  62. 


THE   THRACLLN"    CHEESOXESE.  281 

the  appearance  of  fairness  and  candour,  that  it  is  difficult  even  to 
form  an  opinion  of  the  truth.1  Here  it  will  be  sufficient  to  notice 
what  concerns  the  subject  before  us. 

Parmenio,  Philip's  general,  was  besieging  Halus  in  Thessr.lv ; 
Philip  himself  was  at  Pella,  preparing  for  a  new  invasion  of  Thrace, 
when  the  ambassadors  arrived.  They  were  admitted  to  an  audience, 
and  addressed  the  king  in  order  of  seniority.  .Esehines  made  a  long 
speech  about  the  ancient  connexion  between  Iphicrates  and  Aniyn- 
tas,  and  the  rightful  claims  of  his  countrymen  to  Amphipolis.  De- 
mosthenes, either  abashed  in  the  presence  of  a  man  against  whom  lie 
had  so  fiercely  declaimed  at  home,  or  feeling  that  no  arguments  of 
bis  could  have  any  effect  on  this  occasion,  after  speaking  a  few  words, 
stopped  suddenly  short,  and  made  an  abrupt  ending.  Neither  of 
them  said  a  word  about  the  terms  or  conditions  of  the  proposed 
treaty.  It  was  known  to  them,  that  Philip  was  about  to  inarch 
against  Cersobieptes  :  yet,  although  that  prince  was  an  a. 
no  remonstrance  was  made  on  his  behaif.  Philip  promised  only,  that 
he  would  make  no  attack  upon  the  Chersonese  pending  his  nego- 
tiation with  the  Athenians.  He  made  a  formal  reply  to  the  state- 
ments of  the  ambassadors,  invited  them  to  supper,  and  afterwards 
dismissed  them  with,  a  letter  to  the  people  of  Atheus,  iu  which  he 
assured  them  of  his  pacific  iuteutions,  and  sincere  wish  to  become 
their  ally  and  benefactor.  It  was  arranged  that  his  own  ministers 
should  speedily  follow  the  ambassadors  to  Athens,  where  the  condi- 
tions of  peace  were  to  be  decided  on.3 

The  ambassadors,  on  their  return,  made  a  report  of  their  proceed- 
ings to  the  senate  and  people,  and  delivered  Philip's  letter.  On  the 
motion  of  Demosthenes,  two  special  days,  the  seventeenth  and 
eighteenth  of  Elaphebolion  (March),  were  appointed  to  consider  the 
offers  of  peace  and  alliance.  Before  that  time  the  ministers  of  Philip 
arrived;  three  distinguished  men,  Parnipnio,  Antipater,  and  Enry- 
lochus.  They  were  hospitably  entertained  by  Demosthenes  himself, 
who  showed  them  marked  attention,  and  from  first  to  last  displayed 
an  earnest  desire  to  press  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty.  A  congress 
of  deputies  from  the  Athenian  allies  was  then  sitting  at  Athens,  who 
passed  a  resolution,  that,  as  the  envoys  sent  to  rouse  the  Grecian 
states  to  the  defence  of  their  freedom  had  not  returned,  it  was  better 
to  wait  for  their  return  before  debating  the  question  of  peace. 
.Eschines  condemns  Demosthenes  for  having  frustrated  this  resolu- 
tion by  his  decree,  which  fixed  an  arbitrary  day  for  the  discussion. 
Demosthenes  probably  thought  that,  as  things  had  gone  so  far,  it 

(1)  See  Thirl  wall.  Gr.  Hist.  v.  33$.  Mitford.  Gr.  Hist.  iv.  c.  39,  s.  4;  c.  40,  s.  2. 
Leland's  Life  of  Philip,  ii.  56. 

.      Esch.  De  Fals.  Leg.  31— 33,  SS,  39.     Demosth.  De  Fals    Leg.  333.  354.     De 

H3lonn.  So.     Plutarch,  in  the  Life  of  Demosthenes,  gives  a  different  account  of  his 

-  ro  Philip  on  the  embassy.     He  represents,  that  Phiiip  took  n  ore  pains  to 

reply  to  Demosthenes  than  to  the  other  ambassadors,  though  in  other  respects  he 

treated  him  with  less  kindness  and  civility. 


282  APPENDIX   III. 

•was  better  to  terminate  the  war  as  soon  as  possible,  and  prevent 
Philip's  designs  upon  the  Chersonese.  On  the  first  day  of  the 
assembly  there  was  a  stormy  debate,  of  which  we  have  no  clear  or 
■nt  account.  Tnere  was  much  discussion,  whether  peace  only, 
or  peace  and  alliance  should  be  agreed  upon.  Various  proposals  were 
made  about  the  restoration  of  Amphipolis,  the  Pliocians,  and  other 
matters.  The  Macedonian  envoys  would  not  hear  of  Amphipolis 
being  given  up  ;  nor  would  they  permit  the  Phocians  to  be  treated 
as  allies  of  Athens.  Of  Cersobleptes  they  did  not  condescend  to 
speak,  but  insisted  on  the  recognition  of  Cardia  as  an  independent 
state  in  alliance  with  Macedonia.  Philocrates  supported  them  in 
all  their  claims,  but  met  with  much  opposition,  and  even  from 
JEschines  himself  if  we  can  trust  the  assertion  of  Demosthenes,  who 
charges  him  with  having  espoused  different  sides  on  the  first  and 
second  days,  as  if  he  had  been  brought  over  in  the  meantime. 
iEscbines  denies  this,  and  alleges  that  it  was  impossible  he  could 
have  spoken  on  the  second  day,  as  Demosthenes  prevailed  on  the 
presidents  to  put  the  question  without  debate.  However  this  be, 
certain  it  is,  that  on  the  second  day  the  treaty  with  Philip  was  con- 
cluded almost  in  the  very  terms  proposed  by  his  ministers.1 

Before  the  ministers  of  Philip  had  departed,  there  came  to  Athens 
a  representative  of  Cersobieptes,  oue  Critobulus,  a  citizen  of  Lamp- 
sacus  ;  who  demanded,  on  behalf  of  the  Thraeian  king,  that  he  should 
be  included  in  the  treaty  as  one  of  the  allies  of  Athens.  This,  if 
^Eschines  is  to  be  believed,  was  opposed  by  Demosthenes,  but  carried 
by  the  people  in  spite  of  him;  whereas  Demosthenes  asserts,  that 
Critobulus  was  afterwards  prevented  from  taking  the  oath  by 
iEscbines.  A  different  account  is  given  by  Philip  himself,  in  his 
letter  to  the  Athenians,  viz.  that  Cersobleptes  desired  to  make  a 
separate  treaty  with  him,  but  was  prevented  by  the  Athenian  generals, 
who  represented  him  to  be  an  enemy  of  the  Athenians.  It  is  not 
indeed  clear,  that  what  Philip  alleges  took  place  at  Athens,  or  had 
any  connexion  with  the  proceedings  of  which  we  are  now  speaking. 
That  Cersobleptes,  however,  was  excluded  from  the  treaty  is  certain; 
and  the  probability  is,  that  Philip's  ministers  at  Athens  would  not 
permit  his  "name  to  be  inser 

An  embassy  was  now  appointed  to  proceed  immediately  to  Mace- 
donia, to  receive  Philip's  oath  in  ratification  of  the  treaty.  The 
.same  ambassadors  were  chosen  as  before.  While  they  were  yet 
preparing  for  departure,  a  letter  was  brought  from  Chares,  v.  ho 
commanded  the  Athenian  fleet  in  the  Hellespont,  announcing  that 
Cersobleptes  had  lost  his  kingdom,  and  Philip  had  seized  the  Sacred 
Mountain.     The  senate,  in  alarm,  passed  a  decree,  ordering  the  am- 

(1)  .Esch.  De  Fals.  Leg.  54 — J6,  39.  Demostt.  De  Fals.  Leg.  345.  jEscn.  contra 
Ctes.  62.  63. 

ch.  De  Fals.  Leg.  38, 39 ;  contra  Ctes.  63,  64.     Demosth.  De  Fals.  Leg.  395, 
S98.     Epist.  Philipp.  ad  Athen.  160. 


THE    THBACIAX    CHERSONESE.  263 

bassadors  to  set  out  instantly  upon  their  mission.  This  was  on  the 
third  of  Munychion,  or  April.1 

Philip  had  in  truth  been  making  the  best  use  of  his  time,  while 
the  Athenians  were  deliberating  about  peace  and  alliance  with  him. 
In  the  very  month  (Elaphebolion)  when  his  ambassadors  were  sent 
to  Athens,  he  was  overrunning  the  kingdom  of  Thrace.  Myrtium, 
Ergisce,  Serrium,  Doriscus,  cities  on  the  iEgean  coast,  yielded  to  Lis 
arms.  He  seized  upon  the  fortresses  of  the  Sacred  Mountain,  de- 
feated Ccrsobleptes  in  divers  battles,  and  compelled  him  to  deliver  np 
his  son  as  a  hostage,  and  engage  to  pay  tribute  to  Macedonia.  No 
attempt  was  made  by  the  Athenian  general  Chares  to  check  the 
progress  of  Philip.  How  far  he  may  have  been  guilty  of  neglect,  as 
iEscbines  insinuates  he  was,  it  is  impossible,  in  the  absence  of  his- 
torical evidence,  to  determine.  Athenian  troops  are  said  to  have 
been  stationed  at  Serrium,  and  on  the  Sacred  Mountain,  and  to  have 
been  driven  away  by  Philip.  We  may  presume  they  were  not  strong 
enough  to  offer  any  resistance  to  his  arms.8 

The  Athenian  ambassadors  proceeded  to  Oreus  in  Euboea,  from 
whence  they  were  to  be  conveyed  by  sea  to  the  nearest  place  where 
they  could  find  the  king  of  Maeedon.  Notwithstanding  this  injunc- 
tion of  the  senate,  they  lost  some  time  at  Oreus,  and  then  took  a 
circuitous  route  to  Pella,  by  which  they  consumed  twenty-three  days. 
At  Pella  they  had  to  wait  nearly  a  month,  while  Philip  was  in  Thrace, 
He  returned  with  the  son  of  Cersobleptes,  and  the  reports  of  his  con- 
quest were  confirmed.  Meanwhile  embassies  from  divers  parts  of 
Greece  had  arrived  at  Philip's  court,  the  most  important  being  those 
from  Thessaly,  Thebes,  and  Lacedsemon.  Warlike  preparations  were 
going  on.  It  was  easy  to  see  that  Phocis  was  their  object,  and  that 
Philip  was  about  to  take  some  decisive  step  for  the  termination  of 
the  Sacred  war.  What  were  the  Athenian  ambassadors  to  do  ?  They 
had  no  power  to  interfere  with  Philip's  designs.  Their  business  was 
simply  to  receive  Philip's  oath  and  signature  to  the  treaty,  the  terms 
of  which  had  already  been  drawn  up.  It  is  true,  there  was  a  clause 
in  their  instructions,  empowering  them  generally  to  consult  the  in- 
terest of  the  commonwealth.  But  it  might  be  dangerous  to  construe 
this  with  too  much  latitude,  and,  unless  it  authorized  them  to  break 
off  the  treaty  altogether,  any  mere  remonstrance  of  theirs  against 
the  proceedings  of  Philip  would  be  disregarded  by  him.  The  result 
may  be  briefly  stated.     Philip  preserved  silence  as  to  his  intentions, 

(1)  JEschin.  De  Fals.  Leg.  40.  Demosth.  De  Fats.  Leg.  389.  De  Coron.  235. 
The  decree  set  forth  in  this  last  passage  is  manifestly  incorrect.  See  Jacobs'  note 
(20)  to  his  translation  of  the  Oration  on  the  Crown. 

(:')  Diodorus,  xvi.  71.  Justin,  viii.  3.  Demosth.  de  Coron.  234,  235.  De  Fals. 
Leg.  390,  447.  448.  .Esch.  De  Fals.  Leg.  37,  38.  It  is  here  stated,  that  Antiochus 
was  sent  to  find  Chares,  and  inform  him,  that  the  people  of  Athens  were  astonished, 
that,  while  Philip  was  marching  against  the  Chersonese,  they  did  not  even  know 
where  their  general  or  his  armament  was.  It  is  not  quite  clear,  whether  the  story 
has  reference  to  this  period.  Compare  Or.  de  Chers.  105.  Philipp.  iii.  114;  iv.  13S. 
iEsch.  contra  Ctes.  C5. 


384  APPENDIX   III. 

and  induced  the  Athenian  ambassadors  to  accompany  him  as  far  as 

Phera,  on  the  pretext  that  he  desired  their  mediation  between  the 
Pharsalians  and  the  people  of  Halus.  The  signature  of  the  treaty 
was  delayed  until  their  arrival  at  Pherse.  Here  he  demanded,  that 
both  Halus  and  the  Phocians  should  be  expressly  excepted  from  h, 
and  the  colleagues  of  Demosthenes,  in  opposition  to  his  o 
allowed  the  clause  to  be  introduced.  This  first  excited  the  suspicions 
of  Demosthenes,  according  to  his  own  account ;  yet,  although  a  letter 
■was  sent  by  his  colleagues  to  Athens,  misrepresenting  the  position  of 
affairs,  he  took  no  step  himself  to  warn  his  countrymen  or  counteract 
the  danger.  The  ambassadors  returned  to  Athens,  where  they  arrived 
on  the  "  f  Scirrophorion  (June),  while  Philip  set  ouT 

march  for  Thermopylae.     The  success  of  his  schemes  was  w : 
An  assembly  was  held  at  Athens  on  the  sixteenth,  when  JL- 
and  PliQocrates  buoyed  up  their  countrymen  with  hopes  of  adv 
to  be  derived  from  Philip's  expedition.     The  capitulation  of  Pha- 
the  occupation  of  Phocia  and  Thermopylae,  the  delivery  of  the 
Boeotian  cities  to  Thebes,  and  the  election  of  Philip  into  the  Am- 
phictyonic  council,  awakened  them  from  their  delusion.1 

Among  the  many  perplexing  questions  which  suggest  themselves 
to  the  historian  concerning  these  transactions,  the  most  interesting 
are  those  which  arise  upon  the  conduct  of  Demosthenes  himself. 
How  came  it  that  he  allowed  the  peace  to  be  concluded,  without 
having  Cersobleptes  and  the  Phocians  comprehended  in  its  provisions  ? 
He  complains  himself  of  their  exclusion.  He  complains  of  the  delay 
on  the  second  embassy,  which  enabled  Philip  to  conquer  Thrace  be- 
fore the  peace  was  ratified.  But,  assuming  that  JSschines  has  not 
r^e,  it  does  not  appear  how  Philip  could  have  been 
prevented  from  completing  his  conquest,  if  the  ambassadors  had 
smght  him  during  his  progress;  for  he  would  still  have  contended, 
that  Cersob.  ■  eing  named  in  the  treaty,  was  not  entitled  to 

its  benefits.  Demosthenes  indeed  might  argue,  that,  as  the  peace 
was  made  with  A~  her  allies,  Cersooleptes,  being  an  ally  of 

Athens,  was  virtually  included  in  it.  But  if  so,  Philip  was  to  blame 
for  violating  the  treaty,  rather  than  ^Eschiues  and  others  for  having 
sanctioned  it:  and  all  parties  were  in  some  measure  to  blame,  for 
having  left  so  important  a  question  open  to  dispute.  But  if  we  look  at 
the  circumstances,  it  can  hardly  be  thought  that  Philip  committed  any 
breach  of  faith  by  pursuing  bis  Thracian  campaign.  The  ambassadors, 
on  their  first  visit  to  Pella.  were  distinct.  of  his  intentions; 

and  therefore,  if  it  had  been  intended  to  give  pro'eciion  to  Cerso- 
-,  there  Dug!  "  "  •    been  an  express  clause  to  that  effect- 

It  mav  be  that  Deinosl         -        ver  having  been  friendly  to  Cerso 
_    -  :ie  success  of  Philip  in  a  Tnracian  war  as 
doubtful,  or  thinking  the   dau.-cr  remote,  did  not  think  it  worth 

:h.  De  Fats.  Leg.  40.  41,  44       Demr.jth.  ce  Oonm.  236,  2il .     De  i 
Pldlipp.  ii.  74.     De  Fai».  ]L£g   355,  oi'j.     Diodorui,  xvi.  66,  .  . 


THE   THBACIAN   CHERSONESE.  285 

while  to  require  such  a  clause ;  or  perhaps  he  considered  that  peace 
was  desirable  for  the  security  of  the  Chersonese.  With  respect  to 
the  Phocians,  it  did  not  appear  at  the  time  when  the  peace  was  first 
made,  what  the  designs  of  Philip  were.  It  might  be  open  to  the 
Athenians,  notwithstanding  the  treaty,  or  even  the  rather  on  that 
account,  to  insist  that  Philip  should  not  pass  the  Straits  of  Ther- 
mopylae for  the  purpose  of  any  hostile  invasion.  And  it  might  well 
seem,  that  there  was  plenty  of  time  for  the  consideration  of  any 
future  question  concerning  Phocis.  vYhen,  however,  Demosthenes 
was  the  second  time  at  Pella,  when  he  found  that  Cersobleptes  had 
been  subdued,  and  vast  preparations  made  for  an  invasion  of  Phocis, 
then  his  eyes  were  opened  to  the  danger ;  he  saw  that  the  peace  was 
a  delusion;  that  the  Phocians  would  be  overwhelmed,  unless  his 
countrymen  came  to  their  assistance;  and  that  there  was  no  secu- 
rity against  Philip's  ulterior  projects.  The  danger  was  augmented, 
in  bis  opinion,  when  Philip  had  prevailed  on  his  colleagues  to  ex- 
clude the  Phocians  express!;  from  the  benefits  of  the  peace ;  and 
then,  it  seems,  he  first  suspected  that  iEschines  was  a  traitor.  His 
true  course  then  was,  to  return  instantly  to  Athens,  to  call  a  special 
meeting  of  the  people,  and  urge  them  to  take  arms  and  march  with 
the  Lacedaemonians  to  the  defence  of  Phocis.  But  for  this  his 
courage  or  presence  of  mind  was  not  sufficient,  and  he  let  things 
take  their  course.  Afterwards,  when  xEsehines  and  Philocrates, 
playing  the  game  of  Philip,  amused  the  Athenian  people  with  reports 
of  his  friendly  intentions,  Demosthenes  raised  a  warning  voice  :  but 
it  was  too  late  ;  the  people,  thinking  that  his  colleagues  were  in 
the  secrets  of  Philip,  believed  them  rather  than  him;  and  Demos- 
thenes himself  did  not  then  assume  that  confident  tone,  either  as 
counsellor  or  accuser,  which  was  likely  to  gain  credence  to  his  asser- 
tions. In  the  speech  which  he  delivered  three  years  afterwards  on 
the  subject  of  the  embassy,  having  a  case  to  make  out  against 
JEschines, — and  there  was  a  very  good  one  as  far  as  regarded  his 
conduct  upon  the  second  journey  to  Pelh  — he  overcharges  it  by 
imputing  blame  to  iEschines  for  mistakes,  in  which  JEscEines  was 
either  not  implicated  at  all,  or  no  more  implicated  than  others:  and 
he  may  have  been  partly  induced  to  do  so  by  the  consciousness, 
that  he  himself  was  to  some  extent  duped  and  deluded  in  common 
with  the  rest  of  his  countrymen,  and  had  neglected  to  provide  those 
guarantees  and  securities  for  his  country,  which  were  indispensable 
in  a  negotiation  with  so  crafty  a  monarch  as  Philip. 

The  general  result  of  the  whole  proceedings  was,  that  Philip  had 
made  a  conquest  of  Thrace ;  he  had  acquired  the  honour  of  termi- 
nating the  Sacred  war,  by  which  he  greatly  increased  his  influence 
and  ascendancy  in  Greece ;  he  had  conferred  obligations  upon  the 
people  of  Thebes  and  Thessaly,  and  been  elected  a  member  of  the 
Amphictyonic  council ;  he  had  got  possession  of  Xicaea,  Thronium, 
and  Alponus,  which  commanded  the  pass  of  Thermopvlse,  and  «ave 


2,86 


APFEXDLi    III. 


him  admittance  into  PLocis  and  Bceotia.  The  only  advantage  which 
Athens  had  gained  by  the  peace,  was  the  security  of  Ohersonesus  ; 
and  even  that,  as  Demosthenes  justly  observed,  was  in  reality 
weakened  by  the  augmentation  of  Philip's  power.1  It  was  at  this 
time  that  Isoerates,  struck  with  admiration  at  the  achievements  of 
Philip,  composed  a  pamphlet  in  the  form  of  an  address  to  that 
monarch ;  iu  which,  eulogizing  his  good  fortune  and  magnanimity,  he 
exhorts  him  to  effect  by  his  influence  a  pacification  of  all  the  Greek 
states,  and  tlieu  to  unite  them  under  his  own  standard  for  a  w;>r 
against  the  Persian  empire. 

For  the  chain  of  events  which  followed,  but  which  cannot  here 
be  enlarged  upon — such  as  the  debate  on  the  embassy  of  Amphic- 
tyons  to  Athens;  the  negotiations  in  Peloponnesus;  the  intrigues 
of  Philip  at  Megara ;  his  invasion  of  Epirus  and  Ambracia ;  the 
establishment  of  his  partisans  in  Eubcea — the  reader  is  referred  to 
the  Historical  Abstract  in  this  volume,  and  the  arguments  aud  notes 
to  divers  Orations.2 

In  the  year  following  the  peace,  that  is,  B  c.  345,  the  Athenians 
sent  a  body  of  their  citizens  to  take  allotments  of  land  in  the 
Chersonese.  The  object  was,  not  so  much  to  make  a  provision  for  a 
poor  class  of  emigrants,  as  to  establish  an  army  of  observation,  to 
strengthen  their  position  in  that  important  peninsula.  At  the  head 
of  them  was  Diopithes,  a  man  of  considerable  military  ability.  The 
colonists  in  taking  possession  of  their  lauds,  (allotted  to  them  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  the  Isthmus,  where  it  was  peculiarly  necessary  to 
establish  a  protective  force,  and  where  probably  they  occupied  the 
ancient  fortresses  of  Alcibiades,)  came  into  collision  with  the 
Cardians,  between  whose  domains  aud  those  of  Athens  the  boun- 
daries were  not  very  well  defined.  Ko  immediate  rupture  took 
place;  but  the  grounds  were  laid  of  a  quarrel  which  afterwards 
became  serious.3  Philip  meanwhile  was  extending  his  power  in  the 
north  and  north-west.  He  attacked  the  Triballi,  with  whom  his 
Thracian  conquests  had  brought  him  into  contact.  He  invaded 
lllyria,  and,  after  ravaging  the  country  and  taking  many  towns, 
returned  home  laden  with  spoil.4  It  was  perhaps  during  his  absence 
on  this  expedition  that  an  embassy  arrived  from  Artaxerxes,  and  was 
received  bv  Alexander,  then  only  twelve  years  old,  who  astonished 
the  Persian  envoys  by  the  questions  he  put  to  them  concerning  the 
state  of  the  Persian  empire,  the  army,  the  roads,  and  the  character 
of  their  king.5  About  the  same  time  Philip,  to  secure  and  con- 
solidate his  power  in  Thrace,  began  to  found  new  cities  iu  different 

(1)  De  Fals.  Leg.  365,  366. 

(2)  See  the  Argument  to  the  Oration  on  the  Peace,  p.  73.  Argument  to  the 
second  Philippic,  p.  81.  Argument  to  the  Oration  on  Halonnesus,  p.  by.  Text  and 
notes  in  pp.  96.  119.  123,  134,  157. 

(3)  Lihanii  Argumentum  in  Demosth.  Or.  de  Cherson. 

(4)  Dit  dorus,  xvi.  69.     Justin,  viii.  fi.     Demosth.  de  Coron.  240. 

(5)  Plutarch  in  Vit.  Alexand.  v.  Leland's  Life  of  Philip,  ii.  149.  Thirlwill 
sasigns  this  story  to  a  later  period :  Or.  Hist.  vi.  i'l. 


THE    THRACIAN   CHERSONESE.  287 

parts  of  the  kingdom,  peopling-  them  either  with  Macedonian 
colonists,  or  with  the  inhabitants  of  countries  which  he  had  con- 
quered and  depopulated.  One  of  these  was  Cabyla,  situated  on  the 
river  Taxus,  among  the  tribe  of  the  Asti  below  Mount  Hsemus. 
Another  was  Philippopolis,  on  the  river  Hebrus,  between  the  ridges 
of  PLsemus  and  Rhodope,  which,  from  the  vile  character  of  the 
population  transported  to  it,  received  the  nickname  of  Poneropolis, 
or  Rogue-town.  Returning  from  his  northern  expeditions,  Philip 
marched  into  Thessaly,  where  a  new  revolution  at  Phcrse  called  for 
his  interlerence ;  and  he  was  for  some  time  occupied  in  settling  the 
government  of  the  Thessalian  provinces  on  a  new  basis,  calculated  to 
secure  Macedonian  ascendancy.2 

Demosthenes  and  his  party  watched  all  the  movements  of  Philip 
with  anxiety.  In  the  second  Philippic,  which  was  spoken  in  the  year 
B.C.  344,  we  find  a  particular  allusion  to  Philip's  proceedings  in 
Thessaly.  But  during  the  same  year  an  event  occurred,  which 
induced  the  Athenians  to  send  envoys  to  Philip,  with  a  formal 
complaint  against  him  for  infraction  of  the  peace.  This  was  the 
seizure  by  him  of  the  island  Halonnesus,  which  had  a  short  time 
before  been  wrested  from  the  Athenians  by  Sostratus  a  pirate. 
Sostratus,  having  committed  plunder  on  the  Macedonian  coast,  was 
expelled  by  Philip,  who,  regarding  the  island  as  a  fair  conquest,  kept 
it  for  himself.  The  Athenians,  taking  a  different  view  of  the  matter, 
resolved  to  demand  restitution;  and  an  embassy  having  been  decreed 
for  that  purpose,  it  was  thought  proper  at  the  same  time  to  speak  of 
other  grievances,  arising  out  of  the  late  treaty  of  peace.  Philip 
thereupon  sent  Python  to  Athens ;  who,  in  a  speech  made  before  the 
people,  which  was  heard  with  applause,  gave  them  strong  but  vague 
assurances  of  his  master's  desire  to  settle  their  disputes  amicably, 
and  to  amend  the  treaty  in  any  way  that  was  reasonable.3  This  led 
to  another  embassy  from  Alliens,  at  the  head  of  which  was  Hegesip- 
pus,  instructed  to  demand  such  concessions  as  from  the  language  of 
Python  it  was  imagined  they  could  obtain.  Among  them  were  an 
alteration  of  that  article  in  ihe  treaty,  which  declared  that  both 
parties  should  retain  what  they  possessed.  It  was  proposed  to 
substitute  a  clause,  "  that  each  should  have  his  own  ; "  the  Athenians 
having  especially  in  view  the  restoration  of  Amphipolis.4  Another 
amendment  was,  that  Greek  states  not  included  in  the  treaty  should 
be  free  and  independent.     This  was  demanded,  in  order  to  prevent 

(1)  Diodorus,  xvi.  71.  Justin,  viii.  5.  Strabo,  vii.  320.  Leland's  Life  of  Philip, 
ii.  147.  Thirlwall,  Gr.  Hist.  vi.  32.  Demosthenes  de  Cherson.  100.  Philip]),  iv. 
135.  It  is  doubtful,  whether  the  orator  is  there  speaking  of  places  conquered  by 
Philip,  or  settlements  founded  by  him.  His  own  knowledge  of  the  facts  waa 
probably  imperfect.    Nor  can  the  date  of  these  settlements  be  determined  accurately. 

(2)  Diodorus,  xvi.  69.  Demosthenes,  Philipp.  ii.  71;  iii.  119.  De  Coron.  241, 
Thirlwall,  Gr   Hist.  vi.  13,  14. 

(3)  Or.  de  Halonneso,  77,  7S,  SI,  82,  and  Liban.  Argument. 

(4)  lb.  83.     Confer  Epist.  Philipp.  !G5. 


288  APPENDIX   III. 

I  *s  making  new  conquests,  or  extending  his  influence  in  Greece; 
and  it  Lad  particular  reference  to  his  aggressions  in  Thessaiy  anJ 
Epulis.'  A  third  proposal  was,  that  those  places  which  Philip  Lad 
taken  after  the  peace  should  be  restored;  meaning  in  particular  tiie 
towns  and  fortresses  in  Thrace  which  he  had  got  possession  of  since 
the  negotiation  had  begun  :  for  the  Athenians  had  now  discovered 
their  mistake  in  not  insisting  that  hostilities  should  be  suspended  on 
both  sides  during  the  progress  of  the  treaty,  and  they  sought  to 
rectify  it  by  an  equitable  construction,  that  the  peace  was  to  be 
bag  rnmenced  before  the  final  ratification.-  A 
referred  on  the  subject  of  Carciia  and  the 
Chersonese,  which  will  be  presently  explained. 

Philip  was  so  incensed  at  these  demands,  that  he  could  hardly 
treat  the  ambassadors  with  common  civility,  and  even  ordered  the 
|  r"  Xenoclices  to  quit  his  dominions,  because  he  had  received  them 
with  hospitality.3  Nevertheless  he  sent  a  letter  by  them  to  Athens, 
in  which  he  discussed  the  various  questions  which  had  been  raised. 
Halonnesus,  he  said,  was  his  own  by  right  of  conquest,  but  he  was 
willing  to  make  a  present  of  it  to  the  Athenians :  an  offer  which 
roused  the  indiimation  of  the  orators.4  TViih  regard  to  Amphipolis 
he  asserted  with  perfect  justice,  that  the  treaty,  which  took  the  basis 
of  the  ufi  possidetis,  had  confirmed  his  title;5  and  he  said  the  Athe- 
nians had  misconstrued  the  language  of  his  ministers.  He  agreed  to 
introduce  a  clause  providing  for  the  independence  of  the  Greek 
raid  offered  to  refer  the  dispute  concerning  Cardia  and  the 
Thraciau  towns  to  arbitration.6 

A  debate  was  held  on  this  letter  in  the  Athenian  assembly,  where 
sthenes  and  his  party  declaimed  against  n  with  vehemence. 
The  oration  on  Halonnesus,  which  is  printed  among  the  works  of 
Demosthenes,  is  asa  the  best  critics  to  Hegesippus. r     That 

their  arguments  prevailed,  and  that  the  offers  of  Philip  were  re 
we  may  infer  from  the  events  that  followed.     Halonnesus  'was  not 
given  up.     S     rtly     terwards  the  Peparethians  made  a  descent  on 
the  island,  and  surprised  the  Macedonian  garrison.    Philip  sen 
troops  to  ret     -       -       .quest,  and  then  revenged  himself  by  r 
the  island  of  Peparethus:  for  which  the  Athenians  again  demanded 
sal  isfaction,  but  in  vain.8 

The  dispute  about  the  Chersonese  was  a  question  of  boundary. 
The  Cardians  had  applied  to  Philip  for  assistance  against  the  en- 
croachmems  of  the  Athenian  settlers;  and  Philip,  as  their  ally — as 
such  he  was  acknowledged  by  the  iate  treaty  of  peace — had  engaged 

(1)  Or.  de  Halonneso.  S4.     Confer  Philipp.  iii.  11£>.  I 
!     I:.  Si.     Confer  Phiiipp.  iii.  114.     De  Coron.  233.  234. 

(3)  Demasth.  De  F.  •        -        "  !  D  of  this  volume,  notes  2  and  3. 

y.ote  I.  r.  de  Haknn.  ST.     Confer  Philipp.  Epist.  161. 

"     Jacobs' Introduction  to  the  Oration  on  Halonnesus 
29Setseq.     lb.  net 
(8)  Philipp.  Epist.  162.     Demosth.  de  Coron.  248.     Plutarch  in  Vit.  Demosth. 


THE   THRACIAN    CHERSONESE.  285 

to  -support  them.1  Cardia  was  (no  doubt)  included  within  the  ancient 
wdl  across  the  Isthmus ;  so  that  its  territories,  or  most  of  them, 
lay  within  the  Peninsula.  The  Athenians,  dissatisfied  with  the 
treaty  which  declared  Cardia  independent,  were  anxious  at  all  events 
to  straiten  its  limits,  while  the  Cardians  contended  that  they,  as  resi- 
dents, had  a  much  better  title  to  land  in  Chersouesus  than  Athenian 
colonists,  who  came  to  a  country  which  was  not  their  home,  still 
retaining  their  rights  as  citizens  of  Athens.  Another  question  arose 
about  the  boundary  of  the  Chersonese  itself.  The  old  wall  must  have 
been  destroyed,  in  or  before  the  time  of  Cotys :  for  there  had  been  a 
talk  of  cutting  a  canal  through  the  Isthmus,  and  a  promise  held  out 
that  Philip  would  do  it  at  his  own  expense.2  The  intended  line  of 
the  canal  was  not  in  the  direction  of  the  wall,  but  further  on,  perhaps 
making  a  shorter  cut,  from  Pteleum  to  Leuce  Acte.3  Midway  be- 
tween these  two  places  stood  an  altar  of  Jupiter,  erected  apparently 
to  mark  their  boundaries.  Hegesippus  contended  that  this  altar  was 
the  land-mark  of  the  Chersonese.  And  his  argument  was  a  little 
helped  by  the  circumstance  of 'the  projected  canal.  Philip,  conceiv- 
ing that  the  town  of  Agora,4  which  stood  midway  between  Pactya 
and  Cardia,  in  the  line  of  the  old  wall,  marked  the  extreme  limit  of 
Chersouesus,  had  taken  possession  of  a  tract  of  land  which  lay  be- 
tween it  and  the  altar.  This,  according  to  Hegesippus,  was  an  act  of 
injustice  to  Athens  ;  and  the  offence  was  not  diminished  by  his  having 
given  a  portion  of  the  land  to  Apollonides  of  Cardia.  Philip  dis- 
dained to  make  any  answer  to  this  complaint,  but,  with  respect  to 
the  boundary  question  between  the  Athenians  and  his  allies,  he 
repeated  his  proposal  of  an  arbitration.  The  Cardians  made  the  same 
offer;  but  it  did  not  suit  the  Athenians,  who,  while  they  asserted 
their  own  title  to  Cardia  itself,  knew  that  it  could  not  be  supported 
by  international  law  in  derogation  of  their  own  compact,  and  that 
there  was  an  unrepealed  decree  at  Athens  which  distinctly  acknow- 
ledged the  rights  of  the  Cardians.  To  find  an  impartial  umpire  would 
have  been  almost  impossible ;  and  neither  party  could  seriously  have 
entertained  the  project.5 

The  remonstrances  on  neither  side  having  produced  any  result, 
Philip,  in  the  year  B.C.  343,  sent  troops  into  Chersouesus  to  assist 
the  Cardians.0  Diopithes,  unable  with  his  Athenians  only  to  resist 
this  accession  of  force,  collected  a  body  of  mercenaries,  and  then, 
returning  to  the  attack,  drove  the  Macedonians  out  of  the  Peninsula. 
Not  content  with  this  advantage,  he  roused  Cersobleptes  and  the 
Thracians  to  take  arms  to  recover  their  independence.  It  has  been 
remarked  by  Pausanias,  that  none  but  the  Romans  ever  effected  a 
complete  conquest  of  Thrace.7     Philip,  absent  at  this  time  inEpirus, 

(1)  Demosth.  De  Fals.  Leg.  3%.     Philipp.  Epist.  161. 

(2)  Philipp.  ii.  73.  (3)  This  place  is  mentioned  by  Lysias,  contra  Alcib.  141. 
(4)  Herodotus,  vii.  58.      (5)  Or.  de  H&lonn.  86,  87.     Philipp.  Epist.  16i. 

(6.  Demosthenes,  De  Coron.  274.     De  Cherson.  104.     Philipp.  iii.  114;  iv.  Kf 
(7 ,  Pausanias,  i.  9. 
VOL.   I.  U 


290  APPEXDIX    III. 

found  it  necessary  on  his  return  to  march  wkii  a  powerful  armj 
against  his  rude  eastern  neighbours,  to  protect  his  infant  settlements, 
and  reestablish  his  power  in  the  country.  But  this  time  it  was  not 
quite  so  easy  a  matter.  Besides  Cersobleptes,  an  Odrysian  prince 
named  Teres,  who  had  formerly  been  Philip's  ally,  bad  now  risen  in 
arms  against  him ;  and  Diopithes  seized  every  opportunity  to  make 
diversions  in  their  favour.  While  Philip  was  engaged  in  the  interior, 
Diopithes  attacked  the  adjoining  parts  of  Thrace,  which  were  subject 
to  Macedonia.  Two  cities,  Crobvle  and  Tiristasis — probably  on  or  near 
to  the  Sacred  Mountain — he  took  b?  storm,  and  made  the  garrisons 
prisoners.  Amphilochus,  a  Macedonian,  who  came  to  demand  their  re- 
lease, was  himself  cast  into  prison,  and  forced  to  pay  a  heavy  ransom.1 

The  length  of  time,  that  Philip  was  occupied  in  Thrace,  proves  the 
great  difficulties  which  he  encouutered.  After  nearly  a  twelve- 
month's campaign  he  was  obliged  to  send  for  large  reinforcements 
from  Macedonia  and  Thessaly;  and  not  being  at  leisure  to  turn  his 
arms  against  Diopithes,  he  sent  a  letter  to  Athens,  to  complain  of  his 
conduct.2  The  charge  was,  that  Diopithes  by  attacking  his  allies,  and 
assisting  his  enemies,  had  violated  the  treaty  of  peace.  The  manifest 
object  was  to  gain  time,  and  to  cripple  the  efforts  of  an  active  gene- 
ral, by  setting  his  countrymen  against  him.  Philip  knew  that  the 
Macedonian  party  at  Athens  would  second  his  endeavours;  and  so  in 
fact  they  did.  A  clamour  was  raised  against  the  general,  not  only 
for  making  war  against  Macedonia,  but  for  divers  irregularities  of 
which  he  had  been  guilty.  Diopithes,  being  at  the  head  of  a  troop 
of  mercenaries,  unprovided  for  by  any  supply  from  home,  had  adopted 
the  same  methods  of  raising  money,  which  Chares  and  others  before 
him  had  done ;  that  is  to  say,  lie  had  begged,  borrowed,  or  extorted 
it  from  merchants,  from  the  islands,  or  cities  on  the  coast  of  Asia. 
The  orators  opposed  to  him  declaimed  loudly  against  these  practices, 
and  pressed  for  his  recall.3  They  were  answered  by  Demosthenes  in 
one  of  the  most  powerful  speeches  which  he  ever  addressed  to  the 
Athenian  assembly. 

The  true  question  for  the  people  to  consider  was  (said  he),  not 
the  conduct  of  Diopithes,  but  the  safety  of  Athens.  If  Diopithes 
had  raised  troops  and  money  by  improper  means,  it  was  the  fault  of 
the  Athenians  themselves,  who  had  not  supplied  him  with  the 
materials  of  war.  There  would  be  time  enough  to  punish  him  here- 
after :  to  recall  him  now,  and  leave  the  Hellespont  and  the  Chersonese 
unguarded,  was  what  Philip  and  his  partisans  most  desired,  but  what 
no  friend  of  his  country  could  advise.  It  was  not  Diopithes  who  had 
first  broken  the  peace,  but  Philip  himself,  by  his  proceedings  in 
Thrace,  in  Epirus,  and  elsewhere.     11  Philip  might  attack  the  allies 

(11  PhVlipp.  Epist.  159,  160.    Demosth.  de  Cherson.  92.  Liban.  Argument. 
i'2)  Demosth.  de  Cherson.  90,  93.  Liban.  Argument. 

(3)  Demosth.  de  Cherson.  95,  9fi.  Olvnth.  ii.  20.  Ccmpare  Isocrates  de  Pac:, 
16-1,  165,  167,  168. 


THE    THRACIAX    CHEKSOXESE.  291 

ol  Athens,  why  might  not  Diopithes  defend  then  ?  Philip  was 
virtually  attacking  Athens  in  Thrace :  all  his  plans  and  operations 
were  directed  agaiust  Athens.  If  their  armament  was  withdrawn 
from  the  Hellespont,  there  would  be  nothing  to  prevent  him  from 
besieging  the  Propoutine  cities  or  invading  the  Chersonese.  Unless 
they  found  employment  for  him  where  he  was,  he  might  attack 
Alegara  or  Euboea,  or  even  march  against  Attica.  Instead  of  dis- 
couraging Diopithes,  they  ought  to  support  him  ;  instead  of  disband- 
ing their  forces,  they  ought  to  increase  them.  It  was  idle  to  wait 
until  Philip  declared  war :  this  he  would  never  do  until  he  was  at 
their  gates.  They  should  exert  themselves  in  every  possible  way  : 
shake  off  their  indolence,  submit  to  pecuniary  contribution  and  to 
military  service ;  send  embassies  among  the  Greek  states  and  excite 
them  to  arms  ;  for  not  Athens  only,  but  all  Greece  was  in  peril. 
Finally,  they  should  denounce  and  punish  the  corrupt  statesmen  who 
sold  their  interests  to  the  enemy,  and  prove  to  men  of  a  different 
stamp  that  they  could  serve  their  country  with  houour  and  advantage. 

Such  was  the  substance  of  this  oration.  The  arguments  were 
sound  aud  just.1  and  produced  the  desired  effect  on  the  hearers. 
Philip's  complaint  was  disregarded;  and  the  Athenians  not  only 
retained  Diopithes  iu  his  command,  but  prepared  to  give  him 
vigorous  support. 

Philip  however  was  not  deterred  by  any  resolution  of  the  Athe- 
nian assembly  from  prosecuting  his  designs.  It  may  be  gathered 
from  his  extant  letter,  that  the  Athenians  had  sent  a  message 
informing  him  that  Teres  and  Cersobleptes  were  allies  and  citizens 
of  Athens,  and  requiring  him  not  to  meddle  with  their  dominions.2 
At  such  an  intimation  the  king  of  Macedon  would  only  smile.  He 
was  determined,  if  possible,  to  crush  the  rebellious  princes  of 
Thrace,  and  knowing  by  experience  how  lightly  they  regarded  the 
observance  of  treaties,  and  how  easily  they  repaired  the  disasters  of 
a  short  campaign,  he  encamped  himself  in  their  country  during  the 
winter  of  1S12-1SI1,  with  the  intention  of  completing  his  conquest 

(1)  Other  writers  however  have  expressed  a  different  opinion.  I  am  surprised  to 
read  the  following  remarks  iu  Thirlwall,  Gr.  Hist.  vi.  36  : — "  Diopithes  Tetained  his 
command,  and  it  may  he  presumed,  after  such  a  mark  of  his  sovereign's  approba- 
tion, was  not  much  more  circumspect  in  his  conduct.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that 
he  had  given  cause  for  such  complaint,  and  that  in  his  invasion  of  Thrace,  at  least, 
if  not  in  his  hostilities  with  Cardia.  he  had  violated  both  the  letter  and  the  spiiit  of 
the  treaty  with  Philip.  The  wisest,  as  well  as  the  most  honourable  course  would 
have  been,  to  disavow  his  proceedings,  and  remove  him  from  his  command.  Demos- 
thenes, we  may  be  sure,  would  have  been  very  willing  that  an  armament  should  have 
been  sent  under  another  general  to  supply  his  place.  But  he  knew  that  a  decree  to  this 
effect  would  probably  be  only  so  far  executed  as  to  disarm  Diopithes.  and  to  leave 
the  Athenian  interests  near  the  seat  of  war  unprotected.  How  far  he  was  misled  by 
the  fallacy  of  his  own  reasoning,  which  appears  to  a  modern  reader  flagrantly 
sophistical,  we  cannot  determine.  His  view  however  of  the  perilous  position  of  his 
country  is  not  the  less  sound,  and  maybe  admitted  as  an  excuse  for  some  indistinct- 
ness of  ideas  as  to  the  precise  line  of  separation  between  offensive  and  defensive 
measures.  Compare  Lelar.d's  Life  of  Philip,  ii.  201 — 210.  Jacobs'  Introduction  t« 
bis  rransia'ion  of  the  speech.  Mitford  iv.  521.  (2)  Phiiipp.  Epist.  160. 

v2 


2   I  appz  :  a  :::. 

in  the  spring,  and  then  proceeding  to  those  ulterior  measures,  foi 
which  his  war  ia  Thrace  was  paving  the  way.1  Demosthenes  had 
conjectured,  that,  although  the  Byzantine  people  were  in 
alliance  with  Phili;>,  he  -would  not  hesitate  to  attack  them,  if  they 
presumed  in  any  manner  to  thwart  his  purposes,  or  even  refused  to 
cooperate  with  him.2  He  saw  how  important  the  possession  of  the 
Propontine  cities  would  be  to  Philip ;  that  it  would  enable  him  to 
intercept  the  commerce  of  \thens  with  the  Euxine  and  the 
Hellespont,  and  in  a  short  time  to  deprive  her  of  Chersonesus. 
The  long  continuance  of  the  campaigns  in  Thrace,  while  it  created 
in  the  minds  of  other  men  a  doubt  of  Philip's  success,  caused 
oneasiness  to  Demosthenes,  who  saw  in  it  an  indication  of  Philip's 
perseverance  in  his  plans.  What  Philip  was  exactly  about,  was 
unknown  to  Demosthenes  himself;  as  we  may  infer  from  the  vague 
manner  in  which  he  speaks  of  Drongilus,  Mastira,  and  other  places 
which  Philip  was  either  taking  or  fortifying.3  It  was  enough  for 
him  that  a  Macedonian  army  was  advancing  tc  g  bourhood  of 

the  Greek  coast:  and  the  very  uncertainty  augmented  his  alarm. 

In  this  state  of  suspense,  an  assembly  was  heid  at  Athens,  and 
Demosthenes  deemed  it  necessary  to  animate  hi?  countrymen  to 
fresh  exertions.  He  delivered  the  oration  which  is  known  by  the 
name  of  the  Third  Philippic,  which  in  substance  repeats  the  argu- 
ments already  urged  in  the  oration  on  the  Chersonese 
Athenians  had  not  done  their  dni  ]  had  not  sent  sufficient 
reinforcements  to  the  Hellespont.  Ciitarchus  and  Philistides,  parti- 
sans of  Philip,  had  been  suffered  to  establish  themselves  in  Eubcea. 
Tiie  peril  was  imminent.  He  urges  them  to  reinforce  Diopithes  both 
with  men  and  money:  to  apply  for  succour  to  Peloponnesus,  to 
Rhodes  and  Chios,  the  ancient  allies  of  Byzantium,  and  also  to  the 
kins:  of  Persia.  This  is  memorable  as  the  first  occasion  on  which 
Demosthenes  advised  an  alliance  with  Persia.  He  was  justified  by 
the  nc  a  I  it  shows  how  critical  the  position  of 

affairs  had  in  his  opinion  become.4 

Philip,  having  completed  the  overthrow  of  Teres  and  Cersobleptes,5 
and  settled  other  affairs  in  the  interior  of  Thrace,  suddenly  marciied 
southward,  and  appeared  in  the  neighbourhood   of  Chersonesus 

(1)  Demosthenes,  de  Cherson.  101.     Philipp.  iv.  135. 

(2  ■  De  Cherson.  S3.     Philip?,  iii.  118,  120;  iv.  149.     De  Coroa.  254. 

(3)  De  Cherson.  100. 

uipp.  iii  111,  125,  126.  129.     Compare  Philipp.  iv.  139,  149. 
(5)  Philipp.  Epist.  161.     I  have  referred  the  pas-ah'e  in  Diodorus,  rvi.  71.  to  the 
first  and  not  the  second  war  with  Cersobleptes,  notwithstanding  the 
assigns,  because  it  agrees  better  with  his  facts.    H 

which  had  been  attacked  by  Cersobleptes,  became  allies  of  Philip  after  his  defeat. 

.  to  the  second  war,  after  which  they  became  hostile  to  Philip, 

and  in  which  thev  probably  rendered   secret  assistance  to  Cersobleptes  and   the 

L  159, 163      Diod- xvi.  74. )     It  does  apply  to  the  first  war, 

after  which  Byzantium  undoubtedly  became  Philip's  ally.     (Dem.  Philipp.  iii.  120. 

after  being  so  humbled  ill 
346  b.c,  and  giving  his  son  as  a  hos*ige  to  Philip,  would  hxre  ventured  to  attack 
:  coast  on  his  otfii  account. 


THE    THRACIAX    CHERSONESE.  293 

His  immediate  purpose  was,  not  to  attack  the  Athenian  general,  but 
to  protect  the  passage  through  the  Hellespont  of  a  Macedonian 
fleet,  which  he  had  ordered  to  sail  to  the  Propontis.  He  was  pre- 
paring to  besiege  Selymbria,  a  city  which  stood  on  the  Propontine 
coast  between  Byzantium  and  Perinthus ;  and,  that  the  siege  might 
be  brought  to  a  speedy  issue,  lie  resolved  to  invest  it  both  by  land 
and  sea.  Speed  was  of  great  importance  to  him  on  this  occasion. 
Selymbria  was  an  ally,  or  subject,  of  Byzantium.1  It  might  receive 
aid  from  that  powerful  city.  Its  capture  might  determine  the  sub- 
mission botli  of  Byzantium  and  Perinthus,  which  had  hitherto 
refused  to  join  hirn  in  any  offensive  measures  against  the  Athenians.2 
Once  master  of  the  whole  Propontine  coast,  it  would  not  be  difficult 
for  him  to  bring  the  Athenians  to  terms ;  and  the  command  of  the 
Bosphorus  would  facilitate  that,  which  had  become  the  great  object 
of  his  ambition,  the  invasion  of  Persia.3  His  intentions  were  a 
profound  secret.  He  knew  that  the  Athenian  forces  in  the  Helles- 
pont were  ready  to  attack  him,  if  they  could  find  an  opportunity, 
and  would  certainly,  unless  he  took  precautious,  intercept  the 
advance  of  his  fleet.  Accordingly,  while  his  vessels  were  sailing  up 
the  Hellespont,  he  himself,  making  a  sudden  irruption  into  Cher- 
sonesus,  marched  along  the  coast  for  their  protection.  The  presence 
of  a  land  force  on  the  shore  was  often  of  great  service  in  the 
maritime  warfare  of  the  Greeks:*  and  Philip  very  likely  desired, 
not  only  to  strike  terror  into  the  Athenians,  but  also  to  mask  his 
real  design  with  respect  to  Selymbria.  It  does  not  appear  that  any 
actual  hostilities  took  place  between  the  troops  of  Athens  and 
Macedonia.  Diopithes  was  probably  not  strong  enough  to  meet 
Philip  in  the  field,  though  his  naval  and  military  force  would  enable 
him  to  protect  the  Chersonesite  cities.  Philip  still  affected  to  be  at 
peace  with  Athens,  and  complains  in  his  letter,  that  the  warlike 
measures  of  Diopithes  and  the  Chersonesites  had  placed  him  under 
the  necessity  of  entering  their  territories.  He  alleges  also,  that  it 
was  in  his  power,  if  he  had  chosen,  to  capture  the  fleet  and  fortresses 
of  the  Athenians  ;  an  assertion  to  which  we  can  hardly  give  credence, 
more  especially  as  it  is  not  consistent  with  his  previous  complaint.5 

When  his  fleet  had  passed  through  the  straits,  Philip  marched 
rapidly  to  Selymbria,  which  was  soon  blockaded  on  all  sides.  The 
Greek  cities  were  so  surprised  by  this  movement,  that  they  had  no 
time  to  send  relief,  and  Selymbria  in  the  course  of  the  year  was 
forced  to  capitulate.  An  incident  occurred  during  this  time  which 
marks  the  dubious  character  of  the  relations  between  Athens  and 
Philip.  Twenty  Athenian  corn-ships,  passing  from  the  Propontis  to 
the  Hellespont,  were  seized  by  Amyntas,  the  Macedonian  admiral, 

(V,  Demosthenes,  de  Rhod.  Libert.  19S.  (2)  Demosthenes,  de  Coron.  254. 

(3)  Polybius,  iii.  6.  (4)  Thiicydide*,  ii.  S(i,  SO;  vii.  53. 

(5)  Philipp.  Kpist.  163.  Tie  ravaging  of  the  Chersonese  mentioned  in  Demostu, 
£e  Corou.  is  not  refr  -able  to  this  occasion. 


201 


APPEXDIX    III. 


and  carried  away  as  prize.     Messengers  were  sent  from  Athens  ta 
demand  restitution;  who  brought  back  the  following  letter:1 — 

"  Philip,  king  of  Macedon,  to  the  Senate  and  people  of  Athens, 
greetiug : — Your  ambassadors,  Cephisophon,  Democritus,  and  Poly- 
critus,  have  been  with  me,  and  conferred  about  the  restoration  of  the 
ships  which  Laomedon  commanded.  I  must  indeed  regard  you  as 
very  simple,  if  you  imagine  I  do  not  see,  that  your  ships  were 
desnatched  under  the  pretence  of  conveying  corn  from  the  Hellespont 
to  Lemuos,  but  really  to  assist  the  Selyinbrians  whom  I  am  besiegiug, 
and  who  are  not  comprehended  in  our  treaty  of  peace.  These  orders 
were  given  to  your  commander,  without  the  sanction  of  the  people 
of  Athens,  by  certain  magistrates  and  other  persons  not  now  in 
office,  who  are  urgent  for  the  people  to  break  off  the  treaty  and  begin 
war  again,  and  are  far  more  anxious  to  accomplish  this  than  to  assist 
the  Selymbrians.  And  they  suppose  that  such  an  event  will  be 
a  source  of  profit  to  them.  I  do  not  think  it  will  be  advantageous 
either  to  you  or  to  me.  Accordingly,  I  restore  the  vessels  which  have 
been  carried  into  my  ports,  and  for  the  future,  if  you  will  not  permit 
vour  statesmen  to  pursue  their  malignant  policy,  but  rebuke  them  for 
it,  I  will,  on  my  part,  endeavour  to  maintain  the  peace.  Farewell." 

The  correspondence  was  a  piece  of  coquetry  on  both  sides.  Philip 
had  made  a  lucky  prize  of  some  merchantmen,  but  was  well  aware 
that  he  might  be  greatly  embarrassed  in  his  operations  by  the  ships 
of  war,  which  the  Athenians  could  send  against  him.  The  Athenians, 
in  order  to  obtain  restitution  of  their  squadron,  had  condescended  to 
use  the  language  of  peaceful  negotiation.  Philip  adopted  the  same 
artifice,  hoping  that  possibly,  by  a  small  sacrifice,  he  might  purchase 
their  neutrality  in  his  contest  with  the  Propontine  cities.  He  soon ' 
found  himself  mistaken. 

Selymbria  having  been  surrendered,  Philip  laid  siege  to  Perinthus. 
There  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  Perinthians  and  Byzantines  had 
not  only  attempted  to  relieve  Selymbria,  but  had  been  concerting 
measures  of  defence  with  Diopithes  and  the  Athenians.  I:  was 
enough  for  Philip  that  they  had  refused  to  join  him  in  an  offensive 
war ;  and  he  had  no  more  hesitation  in  attacking  them,  than  he  had 
formerly  in  besieging  Olyuthus.  Succour  however  was  promptly 
sent  from  Byzantium,  and  the  Propontine  fleet,  assisted  by  the  Athe- 
nian, was  more  than  sufficient  to  protect  Perinthus  from  blockade. 
Philip  resolved  to  take  it  by  storm.  The  Macedonian  army  was 
thirty  thousand  stroug,  and  well  provided  with  all  the  materials  for 
a  siege.  The  usual  methods  were  resorted  to,  of  battery,  scale,  and 
mine.  Movable  towers  were  advanced  against  the  wall,  and  the 
besieged  were  driven  from  their  ramparts  by  a  storm  of  missiles.  A 
breach  was  effected,  but  the  citizens  rushed  to  the  opening  and 
defended  it  obstinately,  until  it  was  repaired  by  a  new  wall.  At 
length,  after  a  hard  struggle,  which  was  continued  by  night  as  weii 

(1*  Demosthenes,  de  Coron.  249—231. 


THE    THEACIAX    CHBBSONKTO.  295 

as  by  day,  the  whole  outer  circle  of  defence  was  carried  by  the  be- 
siegers. *  But  their  difficulties  had  still  to  begin  again.  Perinthus 
was  built  on  a  sloping  isthmus:  the  houses  stood  close  together  on 
a  succession  of  terraces  ;  and  the  passages  were  blocked  up  by  the 
inhabitants,  so  that  each  terrace  formed  a  new  rampart,  gii  which 
a  more  desperate  resistance  had  to  be  encountered.  The  numbers 
and  discipline  of  the  Macedonians  might  still  have  prevailed,  had  not 
a  powerful  reinforcement  been  sent  into  the  town  by  Arsites,  Satrap 
of  Phrygia.  A  negotiation  had,  under  the  advice  of  Demosthenes, 
been  opened  with  the  Persian  king,1  who,  alarmed  at  the  ambition 
and  victorious  progress  of  Philip,  ordered  his  Satraps  to  render  every 
possible  assistance  to  the  Perinthians.  A  large  body  of  mercenaries 
came  to  their  relief,  with  all  kinds  of  provisions  and  military  stores. 
They  were  commanded  by  Apollodorus,  an  Athenian.  Philip,  seeing 
that  all  his  efforts  to  take  the  city  were  unavailing,  withdrew  from 
the  attack ;  and  leaving  one  half  of  his  army  before  Perinthus,  marched 
with  the  other  half  to  surprise  Byzantium,  which,  weakened  by  its 
efforts  to  relieve  the  Perinthians,  he  hoped  to  find  uuprovided  for 
defence.2 

Before  he  left  Perinthus,  or  perhaps  shortly  before  he  commenced 
the  siege,  he  had  sent  a  letter  to  the  Athenians,  which  is  still  extant, 
and  is  a  remarkable  document.  It  is  a  letter  of  reproof  and  menace. 
In  style  it  is  clear  and  forcible,  in  argument  weak,  except  where  it 
confutes  the  false  points  made  by  his  adversaries.  He  complains  of 
various  breaches  of  treaty,  and  violations  of  international  law,  com- 
mitted by  the  Athenians ;  referring  particularly  to  the  operations  of 
Diopithes  in  Thrace.  He  denounces  their  embassy  to  Persia  as  an 
offence  against  the  Greek  community.  He  defends  his  own  conduct 
with  respect  to  Cardia  and  the  Thracian  princes,  and  declares  that 
his  march  into  Chersonesus  was  necessitated  by  the  hostilities  of  the 
Athenian  general  and  the  Chersonesites  themselves.  His  own  pacific 
intentions  had  been  manifested  by  the  Amphictyonic  embassy  after 
the  peace,  when  the  Athenians  spurned  every  proposal  made  to  secure 
the  safety  of  Greece.  For  this  the  orators  were  chargeable,  who  con- 
sulted their  own  interests  rather  than  the  advantage  of  their  country. 
Id  every  respect  the  Athenians  were  the  aggressors :  he  had  given 
them  no  provocation;  he  had  shown  the  utmost  forbearance:  but  as 
this  had  produced  no  effect,  he  must  decide  the  quarrel  by  arms.3 

Such  arguments  might  have  come  well  from  a  king  who  remained 
quietly  at  home,  and  interfered  not  with  his  neighbours.  But  coming 
from  the  conqueror  of  Olynthus,  the"  invader  of  Epirns  and  Thrace,  the 
dictator  of  Thessaly,  the  plotter  in  Euboea  and  AEegara,  they  appear 

(1)  Demosthenes,  Or.  ^d  Epist.  153.  Philipp.  iv.  139,  110.  The  orator  and 
his  countrymen  were  both  reproached  for  this,  but  unjustly.  Demosthenes  has 
also  been  censured  for  receiving  money  from  Persia ;  but  the  real  question  is,  for 
what  purpose  he  received  it,  and  how  he  used  it.  See  p*»  Epist.  160.  Plutarch 
in  Vit.  Demo^th.     ^Eschines  contra  Ctes.  SS,  90. 

(2)  Diodorus.  xvi.  74 — 76.     Pausanias,  i.  29. 

(3)  Philippi  Epistola.     See  p.  156  of  this  volume. 


20 6  APPENDIX    III. 

somewhat  ludicrous,  until  one  reflects  what  the  real  object  of  Philip 
was — viz.  to  encourage  his  own  party  at  Athens,  including  not  only 
his  paid  advocates,  but  all  who  were  afraid  of  war,  or  selfishly 
attached  to  mercantile  pursuits,  or  to  a  life  of  idleness  and  amuse- 
ment. He  might  distract  the  counsels  of  the  Athenians,  impede  their 
warlike  preparations,  and  so  create  a  diversion  in  his  own  favour. 
There  is  a  current  of  ill-humour  in  the  letter,  arguing  that  he 
had  been  annoyed  by  the  Athenian  operations  in  the  Hellespont, 
and  that  he  discerned  symptoms  of  more  than  usual  vigour  in  their 
administration.1 

Demosthenes,  at  this  time  all-powerful  at  Athens,  replied  to  the 
letter  by  an  animated  speech,  in  which,  repeating  the  old  arguments, 
he  urged  his  countrymen  to  redouble  their  exertions  in  the  war.2  They 
had  been  greatly  encouraged  by  the  success  of  their  arms  in  Eubcea, 
from  which,  at  the  close  of  the  year  B.C.  341,  they  expelled  the 
tyrants  Clitarchus  and  Philistides.  It  was  the  generalship  of  Phocion, 
the  counsel  of  Demosthenes,  that  secured  this  important  victory ; 
and  the  latter  was  rewarded  with  a  golden  crown.3 

The  Byzantines,  on  the  approach  of  Philip,  sent  an  embassy  to 
Athens  to  solicit  succour;  and  such  was  the  state  of  public  feeling, 
that  the  Athenians  were  easily  induced  to  forget  former  injuries,  and 
pass  a  decree  in  their  favour.  It  was  resolved,  on  the  motion  of 
Demosthenes,  that  the  pillar,  on  which  the  treaty  with  Philip  was 
inscribed,  should  be  taken  down,  and  an  armament  sent,  instantly  to 
the  Propontis.4  He  himself  went  beforehand  to  encourage  the 
people  of  Byzantium,  and  conclude  a  treaty  of  alliance.5  It  seems 
there  was  a  party  in  that  city  who  preferred  submission  to  Macedonia. 
Demosthenes  silenced  their  opposition,  confirmed  the  waverers,  and 
animated  the  people  to  resistance.6  The  Athenian  armament  arrived  ; 
but  great  was  the  disappointment  of  the  Byzantines  when  they  found 
that  Chares  was  in  command.  Chares  was  the  man  whose  rapacious 
exactions  had  brought  on  the  Social  war ;  who  had  caused  the  revolt 
of  Corcyra;  who  had  massacred  the  Sestian  population.7  He  was 
generally  feared  and  detested  throughout  the  iEgean  and  the  Helles- 
pont. The  citizens  refused  to  receive  his  fleet  into  their  harbour,  so 
that  he  was  forced  to  cruise  about  the  Euxine,  committing  piracy, 
and  subsisting  by  plunder.  An  attack  which  he  made  on  the  Mace- 
donian fleet  was  disgracefully  repulsed.     When  the  news  of  this 

(1)  Mitford  praises  the  energy  of  Demosthenes  at  this  period.  Hist,  of  Greece,  iv 
c.  41,  s.  1. 

(2)  Demosth.  Oratio  ad  Epistola.  See  p.  149  of  this  volume.  Whether  we  have 
this  oration  in  an  entirely  genuine  state,  may  perhaps  be  doubted. 

(3)  Demosthenes,  de  Coron.  253.     Diodorus,  xvi.  74. 

(4)  Philochorus  apud  Dionys.  Epist.  ad  Aram.  i.  11.  (This,  according  to  him, 
was  the  first  formal  breaking  of  the  peace.)     Plutarch  in  Vit.  Demosth. 

(5)  He  had  advised  this  course  in  the  case  of  Olynthus,  wpeafltiav  irifiiretv  »jtu 
Tail'  epeT  Kai  7rape<TTcu  to7?  irpdmaurt.     Olynth.  i.  10. 

(6)  Demosth.  de  Coron.  308.     ,/Eschines  contra  Ctes.  00,  sneers  at  his  rival's  boast, 

(7)  Diodorus,  xv.  -Jj.  Argument.  Iso:t.  de  Pace.  Compare  pp.  189,  27(3,  of  this 
volume. 


THE  THRACIAN  CHERSONESE.  2D7 

came  to  Athens,  it  excited  indignation  among  the  peoplt,  who  re- 
garded the  disrespect  shown  to  their  general  as  an  insult  to  them- 
selves. Demosthenes  had  not  returned ;  and  the  people  in  their 
angry  mood  were  about  to  take  some  rash  step ;  when  Phocion  ad- 
dressed them  in  a  calm  speech,  showing  that  the  fault  lay  in  the 
character  of  their  general,  and  not  in  the  fickleness  of  their  allies.  A 
vote  was  then  carried  to  send  reinforcements,  and  Phocion  himself 
was  put  in  command.  He  sailed  immediately  to  the  Bosphorus,  and 
landing  his  forces  on  the  beach,  encamped  outside  the  walls.  He 
had  an  intimate  friend  in  Byzantium,  one  of  the  principal  statesmen, 
named  Cleon,  who  had  formerly  been  his  fellow-student  in  the 
Academy  at  Athens.  Cleon  pledged  his  own  responsibility  for  the 
good  behaviour  of  his  friend  ;  and  Phocion  was  at  once  admitted  into 
the  city,  where  both  he  and  his  soldiers  excited  the  esteem  and 
admiration  of  the  Byzantines  by  their  zeal,  their  valour,  and  their 
sobriety.1 

Philip  had  in  the  meantime  been  vigorously  carrying  on  the  siege; 
but  Byzantium  was  not  only  strong  by  its  position  and  its  fortifi- 
cations,2 but  had  received  considerable  succours  from  Cos,  Chios, 
Rhodes,  and  other  states  of  Greece.  On  Phocion's  arrival,  the  aspect 
of  affairs  was  so  greatly  changed,  that  Philip  deemed  it  prudent  to 
abandon  his  enterprise.  He  raised  the  siege  both  of  Byzantium  and 
Perinthus,  and  after  ravaging  the  territory  that  lay  between  those 
cities,  retired  to  his  own  kingdom.3  That  on  his  way  he  made  an 
attempt  to  surprise  the  cities  of  Chersonesus,  is  indeed  very  pro- 
bable ;  and  that  ins  failure  was  owing  partly  to  the  courageous 
resistance  of  Diopithes  and  the  inhabitants,  partly  to  the  activity  of 
the  gallant  Phocion.  Plutarch  relates,  that  Phocion,  after  expelling 
Philip  from  Byzantium,  captured  some  of  his  ships,  and  recovered 
places  which  Philip  had  taken  and  garrisoned ;  that  then  he  made 
incursions  into  the  enemy's  territory,  and  levied  contributions ;  but, 
being  at  length  wounded  in  a  battle  with  the  Macedonians,  was 
forced  to  return.  From  this  vague  narrative  it  may  be  collected, 
that  Phocion  sailed  with  his  fleet  to  the  Chersonese,  to  protect  it 
against  Philip's  inroad;  that  having  chased  him  from  thence,  he  pur- 
sued his  victory  into  the  continent  of  Thrace,  and  recovered  some  of 
the  fortresses  which  Philip  had  there  taken.  This  is  more  reason- 
able, than  to  suppose  that  Phocion  invaded  Macedonia ;  and  it  partly 
agrees  with  the  statement  of  Justin,  and  with  that  of  Demosthenes, 
which  implies  that  the  Chersonese  had  been  in  danger.4 

Such  was  the  issue  of  this  memorable  campaign ;  the  first  in  which 
Philip  suffered  defeat  aud  loss  of  reputation.     Perinthus  and  Byzan- 

(1)  Plutarch  in  Vit.  Phoc.  s.  xiv.    Leland's  Life  of  Philip,  ii.  257. 

(2)  Pausanias,  iv.  31. 

(3)  Diodorus,  xvi.  77.  Justin,  ix.  1,  2.  Plutarch  1.  c.  Demosthenes,  de  Coron.  255. 

(4)  It  may  be  presumed  that  the  Chersonesites  would  not  have  passed  the  decree 
cited  by  Demosthenes,  had  not  their  country  been  in  danger  of  conquest.  The 
statement  of  Justin,  (1.  c.)  mullas  urbcs  Chersonetisium  ejepug-.at,  is  an  exaggeration 
of  the  truth.    Compare  Lelanu's  Lite  of  Philip,  ii.  26?. 


298  APPENDIX    III. 

tium  testified  their  gratitude  to  the  Athenians  by  a  joint  decree, 
which  is  preserved  to  us  in  the  oration  of  Demosthenes  on  the 
Crown.  By  this  it  was  resolved,  that  the  rights  of  citizenship,  inter- 
marriage, and  other  honourable  privileges,  should  be  conferred  on 
''.heir  allies — that  three  colossal  statues  should  be  erected  in  the 
larbour  of  Byzantium,  representing  the  people  of  Athens  crowned 
by  the  Byzantines  and  Perinthians — and  that  a  religious  deputation 
should  be  sent  to  the  Isthmian,  Nemean,  Olympian,  and  Pythian 
festivals,  to  proclaim  these  well-earned  honours  to  the  Grecian  world. 
Nor  were  the  Chersonesites  behindhand  in  their  acknowledgments. 
The  inhabitants  of  Sestus,  Eleus,  Madytus,  and  Alopeconuesus, 
honoured  the  senate  and  people  of  Athens  with  a  golden  crown,  and 
built  an  altar  consecrated  to  Gratitude  and  the  Athenian  people,  in 
requital  for  the  preservation  of  their  country,  their  laws,  their  liberty, 
and  their  sanctuaries.  Demosthenes  justly  boasted,  that  these 
glories  were  in  a  great  measure  attributable  to  his  own  counsels  and 
exertions.1 

Of  Diopithes,  whose  able  measures  contributed  so  much  to  the 
discomfiture  of  Philip,  history  says  nothing  further.  We  may  infer 
that  he  died  shortly  afterwards ;  for  Aristotle  mentions  a  present 
having  been  sent  to  him  from  the  King  of  Persia,  which  arrived  alter 
his  death.     The  exact  date  however  is  uncertain.2 

Within  two  years  after  these  occurrences  the  liberties  of  Greece 
were  extinguished  at  Chseronea.  The  Athenians  were  still  permitted 
to  retain  their  possessions  in  Chersonesus,  though  their  real  inde- 
pendence was  gone.  In  the  year  334  B.C.,  twenty  Atheniau  galleys 
assisted  in  the  transportation  of  Alexander's  army  from  Sestus  to 
Abydos.  At  a  somewhat  later  period  the  Chersonese  itself  fell  under 
'Macedonian  dominion.  Lysimachus  built  a  town  at  the  Isthmus,  be- 
tween Pactya  and  Cardia,  which  was  named  after  him  Lysimachia.3 

During  the  reign  of  Philip  the  Thracian  Chersonese  gave  birth 
to  one  great  man — Eumenes  of  Cardia — concerning  whom  Plutarch 
writes  as  follows  : 4 — 

"  Duris  reports  that  Eumenes  the  Cardian  was  the  son  of  a  poor 
wagoner  in  the  Thracian  Chersonese,  but  liberally  educated,  both  as 
a  scholar  and  a  soldier;  that,  while  he  was  very  young,  Philip, 
passing  through  Cardia,  amused  himself  with  seeing  the  youth  of  the 
place  perform  their  gymnastic  exercises;  and,  being  struck  with  (he 
cleverness  and  activity  of  Eumenes,  took  him  at  once  into  his  service. 
But  the  more  credible  story  is,  that  Philip  promoted  him  on  account 
of  the  friendship  which  he  bore  to  his  father,  whose  guest  he  had 
often  been." 

Eumenes  accompanied  Alexander  into  Asia  as  his  principal  secre- 
tary, and  after  his  death  played  a  conspicuous  part  in  the  theatre  of 
the  world. 

(1)  Demosthenes,  de  Coron.  255—257.  (2)  Aristotle,  Rhet.  ii.  S,  11. 

(3)  Strabo,  Excerpta  ex  lib.  »ept.  fine,  26.     Polybius,  xviii.  34. 
(lj  In  Vit.  Eumen.  init. 


£SE   PROPERTY   TAX.  299 


APPENDIX  IV. 


THE  PROPERTY  TAX. 

We  frequently  read  in  Demosthenes  of  contributions1  for  the 
service  of  the  state,  of  the  reluctance  of  the  Athenians  to  pay  contri- 
butions, the  necessity  of  contributing,  &c.  These  expressions  almost 
always  relate  to  an  extraordinary  tax,  in  the  nature  of  a  property  or 
income  tax,  which  was  levied  at  Athens  in  times  of  danger  and 
necessity,  to  defray  the  expenses  of  war. 

In  ancient  times  there  was  no  such  thing  as  a  standing  army  in 
any  Grecian  state,  and  little  occasion  to  employ  a  military  force  for 
any  length  of  time  at  a  distance  from  home.  The  citizens  formed 
a  national  militia  for  the  defence  of  their  country,  and  were  bound  to 
serve  for  a  certain  period  at  their  own  expense.  Afterwards,  when 
wars  became  long  and  frequent,  not  only  was  it  necessary  to  pay  the 
citizens  who  performed  military  duty,  but  large  bodies  of  mercenary 
soldiers  had  to  be  maintained  at  the  public  cost.  For  this  purpose 
the  Athenians  resorted  to  the  extraordinary  tax  above  mentioned, 
when  the  proceeds  of  their  ordinary  revenue  were  found  insufficient. 

The  first  instance  that  we  know  of  this  tax  being  levied  was  in 
the  fourth  year  of  the  Pelcponnesian  war,  when  two  hundred  talents 
were  raised  to  carry  on  the  siege  of  Mitylene.  The  principle  of  its 
assessment  however  was  established  long  before,  according  to  the 
classification  of  the  people  by  Solon,  which  I  am  about  to  explain. 

Solon  distributed  all  the"  citizens  of  Athens  into  four  classes, 
according  to  the  amount  of  their  property,  which  he  caused  to 
be  assessed  and  entered  in  a  public  schedule.  The  highest  class 
were  those  whose  land  yielded  an  annual  income  of  five  hundred 
measures  (rnedimui)  of  corn,  and  hence  they  were  called  Pentacosio- 
medimni.2.  The  second  class  consisted  of  those  whose  income 
amounted  to  three  hundred  measures :  they  were  therefore  called 
Triacosiomedimni ;  and  also  Knights,  because  they  were  reckoned 
able  to  keep  a  war-horse.  The  third  class  were  those  whose  income 
amounted  to  two  hundred  measures  :3  they  were  called  Zeugitse,  or 

(1)  The  expressions  aie  eunpopa,  contribution  or  payment  of  property-tax . 
eiaQepew,  to  contribute,  to  pay,  S>c:  sometimes  eunpipeiv  xp^MaTa>  e\a<t>iptiv  e\t  ~o 
bnnoaiov. 

(2)  The  fitdifivos  was  about  a  bi^ihel  and  a  half.  The  estimate  might  also  be  made 
in  liquid  produce,  and  then  it  was  calculated  by  the  jierpnTi/c ,  or  nine-gallon  measure. 

(3)  I  have  here  followed  Grote's  view  in  preference  to  Bockh  s.  See  his  History 
of  Greece,  iii.  157. 


300  APPE>*DIX    IV. 

yeomen,  because  they  were  able  to  keep  a  yoke  of  oxen.  The  fourth 
and  most  numerous  class  comprised  all  whose  income  was  below  the 
last  amount.     They  constituted  the  free  labouriug  population. 

These  classes  had  their  respective  duties  and  privileges.  The 
highest  honours  of  the  state,  that  is  the  offices  of  the  nine  Archons 
and  Senate  of  Areopagus,  were  reserved  for  the  first  class.  They  also 
took  the  principal  military  commands.  Posts  of  inferior  distinction 
were  filled  by  the  second  and  third  classes,  who  were  bound  to  mili- 
tary services,  the  one  on  horseback,  the  other  as  heavy-armed  soldiers 
on  foot.  Among  these  three  classes — besides  direct  taxation — there 
were  distributed,  according  to  certain  rules,  the  honourable  but 
expensive  duties  that  bore  the  name  of  Uturgiee}  The  members  of 
the  fourth  class  were  disqualified  to  hold  any  office  of  dignity.  They 
served  as  light  troops  in  the  army,  and  manned  the  ships;  but  were 
exempt  from  the  expensive  duties  and  all  direct  taxation. 

Solon  thus  introduced  a  new  feature  into  the  constitution  of 
Athens,  viz.  a  property  qualification.  His  classes  were  distinctions 
not  of  caste,  nor  of  birth,  but  of  wealth  only.  The  scale  is  stated  as 
if  none  but  landed  property  were  taken  into  account.  This  was  to  be 
expected  in  the  infancy  of  a  state  not  yet  enriched  by  commerce. 
Perhaps,  however,  as  Grote  supposes,  property  of  other  kinds  was 
intended  to  be  included,  since  it  served  as  the  basis  of  every  man's  , 
liability  to  taxation. 

As  the  state  became  more  democratical,  the  distinctions  between 
the  four  classes  were  gradually  abolished,  and  the  highest  offices  of 
the  republic  were  thrown  open  to  all.  But  the  principle,  according 
to  which  they  were  assessed  to  the  public  taxes,  was  preserved  from 
first  to  last. 

The  members  of  the  first  three  classes  were  entered  in  the  state- 
schedule  as  possessed  of  a  certain  taxable  capital,  which  was  esti- 
mated by  reference  to  their  income,  but  in  a  proportion  diminishing 
according  to  the  scale  of  such  income;  and  they  paid  taxes  according 
to  the  sums  for  which  they  were  respectively  rated  in  the  schedule. 
The  rateable  property  of  the  first-class  man  was  calculated  at  twelve 
years'  purchase  of  his  income ;  that  of  the  second-class  man  at  ten 
years'  purchase ;  that  of  the  third-class  man  at  five  years'  purchase. 
The  medimnus  then  being  taken  as  worth  a  drachm;  the  first-class 
man,  whose  income  was  exactly  500  drachms,  the  minimum  qualifica- 
tion of  his  class,  stood  rated  in  the  schedule  for  a  capital  of  6,000 
drachms,  or  one  talent;  or,  if  his  income  were  larger,  for  a  capital 
proportionally  increased.  The  second-class  man,  whose  income  was 
exactly  300  drachms,  the  minimum  qualification  of  his  class,  stood 
rated  for  3,000  drachms,  and  so  on,  in  proportion,  for  any  income 
between  300  and  500  drachms.  The  third-class  man,  whose  income 
was  exactly  200  drachms,  the  minimum  qualification  of  his  class, 

(1)  Public  ojices.     See  Appendix  V. 


THE    PROPERTY   TAX.  301 

stood  rated  for  1,000  drachms,  and  so  on,  in  proportion,  for  any 
income  between  200  and  300  drachms.  The  members  of  the  fourth 
class  were  not  taxed,  as  we  have  already  mentioned. 

If  therefore  a  property  tax  had  been  levied  of  one  per  cent.,  the 
poorest  man  of  the  first  class  would  have  paid,  upon  6,000  drachms, 
60  drachms;  the  poorest  of  the  second  class,  upon  3,000  drachms,  30; 
the  poorest  of  the  third  class,  upon  1,000  drachms,  10.  Thus  the 
mode  of  assessment  established  by  Solon  was,  in  some  measure,  like 
a  graduated  income-tax. 

"With  the  advance  of  wealth  and  power  pecuniary  contributions 
became  more  frequent ;  and  then  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  personal 
property  of  Athenians  formed  a  considerable  part  of  their  rateable 
capital.  Also,  while  the  Solonian  principle  of  graduation  was  main- 
tained, the  scale  of  assessment  must  have  been  altered,  and  the 
number  of  classes  was  probably  increased. 

In  the  year  B.C.  377,  in  the  Archonship  of  Kausinicus,  when  the 
Athenians  had  joined  the  alliance  of  Thebes  against  Sparta,  a  new 
valuation  was  made  of  the  whole  taxable  capital  of  the  country, 
which  amounted,  as  Demosthenes  states  in  round  numbers,  to  6,000 
talents,  and  according  to  Polybius,  who  perhaps  gives  the  exact 
estimate,  to  5,750  taleuts.1  This,  it  must  be  understood,  was  the 
capital  estimated  for  the  purpose  of  taxation,  not  the  whole  capital  of 
the  people,  which  was  (as  Bockh  supposes)  five  or  six  times  that 
amount. 

At  the  same  time,  for  the  better  management  of  the  property-tax,  the 
following  method  was  introduced.  From  each  of  the  ten  Attic  tribes 
were  selected  120  of  the  wealthiest  citizens,  making  a  body  of  1,200, 
from  whom  again  were  selected  the  wealthiest  300,  30  from  each  tribe, 
to  exercise  a  general  superintendence.  To  this  select  body  of  300 
the  State  looked  for  immediate  payment  of  the  tax,  in  case  of  need. 
They  might  be  called  upon  to  advance  the  whole  sum  required ;  and 
then  have  to  be  reimbursed  by  contributions  from  the  rest.  To 
facilitate  this,  the  1,200  were  divided  into  20  Symmorite,  or  Boards, 
of  60,  two  for  every  tribe,  whose  business  it  was  to  collect  the  taxes 
from  the  members  of  their  respective  tribes,  a  certain  number  of 
whom  were  assigned  to  each  Board.  The  course  then  wi  s,  that  the 
300  advanced  the  tax;  they  obtained  contribution  from  ihe  900  by 
means  of  the  Boards ;  and  the  Boards  exacted  contribution  from  the 
general  body  of  rate-payers.  Every  Board  had  its  Chairman,2  and 
subordinate  officers  to  collect  the  rates,  summon  defaulters,  &c. 

It  appears  that  in  the  year  referred  to  a  property-tax  was  imposed. 
Demosthenes,  then  an  infant  of  seven  years,  his  father  having  just 
died,  was  returned  by  his  guardians  as  possessing  an  estate  of  fifteen 
talents.  He  was  assessed  by  the  state  at  three  talents,  and  this  was 
the  highest  scale  of  assessment,  as  he  himself  expressly  tells  us  in 

(1)  See  p.  183  of  this  volume.  \t)  'Hit/uwi'- 


302  APPENDIX   IV. 

his  oration  against  Aphobus.1  It  seems  also,  that  the  tax  extended 
as  low  as  to  estates  of  twenty-five  minas.  Bockh  has  supposed,  that 
there  were  four  classes  of  rate-payers  ;  the  first  having  estates  which 
amounted  to  twelve  talents ;  the  second,  estates  amounting  to  six 
talents;  the  third,  estates  amounting  to  two  talents;  the  fourth, 
estates  amounting  to  twenty-five  minas; — that  these  classes  were 
assessed  at  one  fifth,  one  sixth,  one  eighth,  and  one  tenth  of  the 
value  of  their  estates,  respectively.  If  we  adopt  this  hypothesis, 
which,  whether  exact  or  not,  is  equally  good  for  the  purpose  of  illus- 
tration ;  and  if  we  further  assume,  that  a  tax  of  five  per  cent,  was  at 
that  time  levied;2  the  following  tables  will  serve  to  exhibit  specimens 
of  the  entries  in  the  Athenian  rate-book  :— 


FIKST  CLASS. 


Name  of  Person. 

Value  of  Property. 

Taxable  Value. 

Tax. 

Onetor 
Timotheus 
Demosthenes 
Phaenippus 

30  talents 
25  talents 
15  talents 
12  talents 

6  talents 
5  talents 
3  talents 
2  talents,  24  min. 

IS  minas. 

15  minas. 

9  minas. 

"20  drachms. 

SECOND  CLASS. 


Name  of  Person. 


Timocrates 
Philo 

Menestheus 
Antidorus 


Value  of  Property. 


10  talents 
9  talents 
8  talents 
6  talents 


Taxable  Value. 


1  tal.  40  min. 
1  tal.  30  min. 
1  tal.  20  min. 
1  talent 


5  minas. 

450  drachms. 

4  minas. 

3  minas. 


THIRD    CLASS. 


Name  of  Person. 

Value  of  Property. 

Taxable  Value. 

Tax. 

Strepsiades 
Nausicrates 
Phanias 
Euphron 

5  talents 
4  talents 
3  talents 
2  talents 

3750  drachmsj 
30  minas 

2250  drachms 
15  minas 

1ST  drachms,  3  obols. 
150  drachms. 
112  drachms,  3 obols. 
75  drachms. 

(1)  Contra  Aphobum,  815,  816. 

(2)  Bbckh  thinks  that  a  tax  of  five  per  cent,  was  actually  imposed  at  that  time, 
and  that  the  amount  which  it  produced  was  three  hundred  talents.  He  relies  upon 
the  words  of  Demosthenes,  cont.  Androt.  p.  606.  Grote  contends  that  he  is  wrong. 
See  the  note  to  his  History  of  Greece,  p.  15S,  vol.  x. 


THE    rROPERTT  TAX. 


303 


POURTH    CLASS. 


Same  of  Pcrton. 

Value  of  Properly.        Taxable  Yaltu. 

Taz. 

Arehippus 
1      Srratocles 

I      Tisias 

Maatitheus 

1  talent,  30  minas             9  minas 
1  talent                                6  minas 
30  minas                             3  minas 
25  minas                         250  drachms 

45  drachms. 
30  drachms. 
15  drachms. 
12  drachms,  3  obols. 

Many  of  the  details  connected  with  the  Athenian  property-tax 
resembled  those  which  we  have  become  familiar  with,  in  our  own 
country,  and  which,  serve  to  make  the  tax  generally  odious.  Every 
citizen  had  to  make  a  return  of  the  value  of  his  property,  to  be 
entered  in  the  register;  and  his  return  was  open  to  cavil  and  dispute. 
Examples  of  such  disputes  were  common ;  the  officers  being  often 
induced,  from  motives  of  personal  dislike,  to  surcharge  the  rate- 
payer. Thus  numerous  inequalities  crept  into  the  register  from  time 
to  time.  The  process  called  the  Exchange  was  allowed  in  respect  of 
this  tax,  as  well  as  in  respect  of  the  Liturgia}  Any  citizen  who 
believed  himself  to  be  overcharged,  while  his  neighbour,  as  rich  or 
richer  than  himself,  bore  not  his  fair  share  of  the  burden,  might  call 
upon  the  other  to  take  his  place,  or  submit  to  an  exchange  of  pro- 
perry.  This  was  designed  as  a  measure  of  relief,  like  our  own  right 
of  appeal  against  an  unequal  rate ;  but  it  must  have  been  attended 
with  a  vast  deal  of  trouble  and  annoyance.  The  Generals  held  a  court 
for  the  decision  of  all  disputes  relative  to  the  rating,  collecting,  &c, 
and  also  to  the  process  of  the  Exchange-  The  whole  affair  was  under 
their  control  and  superintendence ;  and  it  was  their  business  parti- 
cularly to  see,  that  the  richest  citizens  were  included  in  the  select 
body  of  three  hundred. 

The  tax  could  never  be  imposed  without  a  decree  of  the  people, 
which  fixed  the  amount,  the  number  of  classes,  the  estates  included 
in  each,  the  scales  of  assessment,  &c.  It  is  clear  from  many  passages 
in  Demosthenes,2  that  there  was  great  reluctance  on  the  part  of  the 
people  to  impose  this  tax,  and  that  it  required  some  special  necessity 
to  make  it  tolerable.  Demosthenes  himself,  during  his  minority, 
paid  eighteen  minas  property-tax  to  the  state,  on  a  capital  of  fifteen 
talents  ;3  so  that  in  ten  years  he  paid  one-fiftieth  part  of  his  property. 
This  (says  Bockh)  cannot  be  deemed  an  unreasonable  tax,  when  we 
consider  that  the  canHal  of  Demosthenes  might  in  that  time  have 
been  doubled  by  good,  management  on  the  part  of  his  guardiaus  ;  and 
more  especially,  when  we  consider  the  low  rate  of  the  custom  duties, 
and  the  cheapness  of  the  necessaries  of  fife  at  Athens.  The  graduated 

(1)  See  Appendix  V. 

(2)  See  particularly  the  first  Olynthiac,  p.  44  of  this  volume:  second  Olrnthiac 
p.  52;  on  the  Chersonese,  p.  104;  on  the  Navy  Boards,  pp.  1S4,  185 

"i:  Contra  Aphobum,  l*% 


?04  APPENDIX    V. 

scale  of  assessment,  (according  to  Solon's  plan  of  taxing  the  rich  in 
a  higher  proportion  than  the  poor,)  though  contrary  to  the  English 
principle  of  taxation,  appears  to  me  to  have  been  exceedingly  fair. 
And  it  must  be  observed  in  favour  of  the  untaxed  Athenian  multitude, 
that  they  showed  no  disposition  to  impose  the  burden  unnecessarily 
or  too  often. 

When  the  tax  was  granted,  there  could  be  no  exemption  from  it, 
on  personal  or  any  other  grounds.  The  mines,  being  public  property, 
were  not  included  in  the  assessment.  Aliens  resident  in  Attica  were 
subject  to  the  tax,  but  were  included  in  a  distinct  register  from  the 
citizens,  and  were  rated  on  a  higher  scale. 


APPENDIX  V. 

THE    TEIEEARCHY. 

Athens  owed  her  glory  and  her  empire  to  her  navy.  Until  she 
turned  her  attention  to  the  sea,  she  was  but  a  second  or  third-rate 
power  among  the  states  of  Greece.  The  character  therefore  of  her 
naval  establishment,  and  the  provisions  made  by  law  for  its  main- 
tenance, are  matters  of  considerable  iuterest  to  the  reader  of  Athenian 
history. 

The  situation  of  Attica  was  eminently  favourable  for  maritime  en- 
terprise; being  a  kind  of  peninsula,  with  most,  commodious  harbours, 
in  the  centre  of  the  Grecian  world.  Solon  perceived  these  natural 
advantages,  and  laid  the  foundation  of  a  navy,  by  imposing  on  each 
oi  the  forty-eight  divisions,1  into  which  the  country  was  then  distri- 
buted, the  charge  of  providing  a  ship.  But  it  was  not  till  after  the  first 
Persian  war  that  the  importance  of  a  national  marine  came  to  be 
fully  understood;  and  the  person  who  first  enlightened  the  Athenians 
on  the  subject  was  Themistocles.  It  has  already  been  mentioned, 
that  he  persuaded  them  to  apply  the  rent  of  the  Laurian  silver-mines 
to  ship-building.2  This  was  in  the  year  B.C.  4S3.  Athens  had  been  at 
war  with  iEgina,  and  had  been  compelled  some  years  before  to  borrow 
Corinthian  galleys  to  meet  her  enemy  at  sea.  Peace  had  not  yet  been 
established,  and  the  navy  of  iEgina  was  still  greatly  superior.  The- 
mistocles prevailed  on  his  countrymen  to  increase  theirs  to  two  hun- 
dred ships ;  and  soon  afterwards  he  procured  a  law  to  be  passed,  that 

(1)  NauKpap/ai.  "The  name  seems  to  have  nothing  to  do  with  navigation,  but  to 
be  derived  from  vala.  Nuikpapot  is  another  form  of  vaunXnpos,  in  the  sense  of  a 
householder,  as  vauAov  was  used  for  the  rent  of  a  house."   Thirlwall,  Gr.  Hist.  ii.  52, 

(2)  Page  254.     Herodotus,  vii.  144. 


THE    TRIEItAKCHY.  305 

twenty  triremes,  or  ships  of  war,  should  be  built  every  year.  The 
•wisdom  of  these  measures  was  proved  by  the  victories  of  Artemisium 
aud  Salamis.1     I  subjoin  the  comment  of  Grote  :-'— 

"In  recommending  extraordinary  efforts,  to  create  a  navy,  as  well 
as  to  acquire  nautical  practice,  Themistokles  displayed  all  that  saga- 
cious appreciation  of  the  circumstances  and  dangers  of  the  time,  for 
which  Thucydides  gives  him  credit.  Not  only  was  there  the  straggle 
with  iEgina,  a  maritime  power  equal  or  more  than  equal,  and  within 
sight  of  the  Athenian  harbour,— but  there  was  also  in  the  distance  a 
still  more  formidable  contingency  to  guard  against.  The  Persian 
armament  had  been  driven  with  disgrace  from  Attica  back  to  Asia; 
but  the  Persian  monarch  still  remained  with  undiminished  means  of 
aggression  and  increased  thirst  for  revenge;  and  Themistocles  knew 
well  that  the  danger  from  that  quarter  would  recur  greater  than  ever. 
He  believed  that  it  would  recur  again  in  the  sameVay,  by  an  expe- 
dition across  the  JSgean,  like  that  of  Datis  to  Marathon;  against 
which  the  best  defence  would  be  found  in  a  numerous  and  well- 
trained  fleet.  Nor  could  the  large  preparations  of  Darius  for  renew- 
ing the  attack  remain  unknown  to  a  vigilant  observer,  extending  as 
they  did  over  so  many  Greeks  subject  to  the  Persian  empire.  Such 
positive  warning  was  more  than  enough  to  stimulate  the  active 
genius  ot  Themistocles,  who  now,  prevailed  upon  his  countrymen  to 
begin  with  energy  the  work  of  maritime  preparation,  as  well  against 
JSgina  as  against  Persia.  Not  only  were  two  hundred  new  "ships 
budt,  and  citizens  trained  as  seamen, — but  the  important  work  was 
commenced,  during  the  year  when  Themistocles  was  either  archon  or 
general,  of  forming  and  fortifying  a  new  harbour  for  Athens  at,  Pirseus, 
instead  of  the  ancient  open  bay  of  Phalerum.  The  latter  was  indeed 
somewhat  nearer  to  the  city,  but  Piraeus,  with  its  three  separate 
natural  ports,  admitting  of  being  closed  and  fortified,  v  as  incom- 
parably superior  in  safety  as  well  as  in  convenience.  It  is  not  too 
much  to  say,  with  Herodotus,  that  the  J^inetan  war  was  the  salva- 
tion ot  (  vee,  by  constraining  the  Athenians  to  make  themselves  a 
maritime  power." 

After  the  second  Persian  war,  Athens  became  the  head  of  a  °reat 
naval  confederacy,  comprising  all  the  Mgean  islands  and  a  Sreat 
number  of  sea-port  towns  on  the  continent.  It  was  arranged  which 
of  the  allied  states  were  to  find  mouev,  and  which  of  them  ships. 
Treasurers  were  appointed  by  the  Athenians  to  receive  the  contribu- 
tions, which  at  first  amounted  to  460  talents.  These  began  in  a 
short  time  to  fall  into  arrear,  and  were  exacted  by  compulsion. 
Many  ot  the  allies,  being  reluctant  to  perform  mditary  service,  agreed 
to  contribute  money  instead  of  ships;  and  thus,  whUe  the  fleet  of  the 
Athenians  was  augmented  out  of  the  general  fund,  their  citizens,  by 

(1)  ThirlwaU,  Gr.  Hist.  ii.  260.  (2)  History  of  Greece,  v.  69. 

VOL.     I.  y 


30 G  APPENDIX    V. 

a  system  of  laborious  training,  and  by  constant  and  regular  employ- 
ment, became  decidedly  the  best  seamen  in  Greece.1 

To  be  mistress  of  the  sea  was  necessary  for  the  safety  as  well  as 
for  the  preeminence  of  Athens.  Her  enemies,  the  Lacedaemonians 
aud  their  allies,  could  bring  into  the  field  a  land-force  which  she  was 
unable  to  eucounter;  and  by  ravaging  Attica,  or  occupying  it  with 
their  armies,  could  deprive  her  people  of  all  the  ordinary  means  of 
subsistence.  But  having  the  command  of  the  sea,  she  could  import 
the  necessaries  of  life  from  a  distance,  while  her  own  ramparts  pro- 
tected her  against  all  assaults  from  land,  and  the  long  walls  which 
connected  her  city  and  harbour  gave  her  the  advantages  of  an  island. 
It  was  Themistocles  who  formed  the  design,  but  it  was  Pericles  who 
brought  it  to  the  test,  and  fully  proved  its  wisdom.  To  use  our  own 
expression,  the  wooden  walls  of  Athens  were  her  real  security.  At 
the  commencement  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  she  had  three  hundred 
galleys  fit  for  service.  A  hundred  of  the  best  were  laid  by,  and 
captains  appointed  for  them,  to  be  employed  only  on  extraordinary 
occasions.2 

The  duty  of  providing  ships,  which  in  Solon's  time  had  been  dis- 
tributed among  the  4S  divisions  of  the  people — which  number  was 
increased  by  Clisthenes  to  50 — devolved  afterwards  upon  the  state  at 
large.  Ship-building  was  superintended  by  the  Council  of  Five-hun- 
dred. Each  ship  of  war  was  the  property  of  the  state;  and  in  general 
also  the  furniture  and  stores.  Pay  and  provisions  for  the  crew  and 
the  marines3  were  found  by  the  public.  On  the  Sicilian  expedition 
every  sailor  received  a  drachm  a  day  from  the  treasury.* 

The  command  of  a  ship,  or  the  trierareln,  was  one  of  those  public 
duties,5  which  were  imposed  upon  wealthy  citizens  without  further 
reward  than  the  honour  of  the  service.  Each  appointment  was  made 
by  the  generals  according  to  a  scale  of  property;  aud  the  ships  wisre 
assigned  to  the  different  captains  by  lot. 

It  was  a  duty  attended  with  expense,  as  well  as  personal  responsi- 
bility. The  captain  had  to  find  the  crew,  to  keep  his  galley  in  repair, 
and  to  restore  it,  together  with  the  tackle  and  furniture,  in  as  good 
a  condition  as  he  received  them,  making  allowance  for  ordinary  wear 
and  tear  and  inevitable  contingencies.  But  a  erew  was  not  always 
readily  to  be  got,  and  the  captain  frequently  found  it  necessary  to 
allure  men  to  the  service  by  bounties  or  extra  pay.  Again,  the  ship 
and  stores  might  not  be  in  a  good  condition  when  the  captain  first 
received  them  ;  and  divers  captious  questions  might  arise  on  the 
subject  of  repairs,  mismanagement.  &c.  To  repair  an  old  ship  might 
cost  as  much  as  to  build  a  new  one.  Heavy  liabilities  might  tiius  fall 
upou  the  captain  ;  and  therefore  Cleon,  in  the  Knights  of  Aristophanes, 
threatens  his  rival,  that  he  will  get  liim  appointed  to  an  old  ship  wit! 
a  rotten  mast.   There  were  Admiralty  officers,6  whose  business  it  was 

(1)  Thucydides,  i.  96,  99.        (2)  Thucydides,  i.  V3 ;  ii.  13,  24,  Go.        (3)  'E^aTa.. 
H)  Thl  lydides,  vi.  31.  (o)  Aeiroi/p^iui.  (6)  'Awocr:  o,\eu. 


jSE   TKlERAItCHT.  307 

to  see  to  the  equipment  of  the  vessels  ana  to  expedite  their  sailing; 
On  one  occasion  we  find  them  empowered  by  a  special  decree  tc 
imprison  those  captains  who  had  not  left  the  pier  bv  a  certain  time: 
vhile,  on  the  other  hand,  a  reward  of  a  crown  was  given  to  the  man 
i  .:io  first  brought  his  vessel  off  the  stocks.1 

The  command  lasted  for  a  year,  at  the  end  of  which  a  successor 
was  appointed,  and  it  became  his  duty  lo  enter  upon  the  office  imme- 
diately. If  the  ship  was  absent,  he  was  compelled  to  join  it  under  a 
severe  penalty,  aud  also  to  reimburse  his  predecessor  for  any  ex- 
penses which  he  had  incurred  beyond  the  legal  period.  An  action 
might  be  brought  to  recover  such  expenses:  of  which  we  have  an  ex- 
ample in  the  speech  written  by  Demosthenes  for  Apollodorus  against 
Polycles.2 

The  expense  varied  from  forty  minas  to  a  talent.  During  his  year 
of  service  the  captain  enjoyed  an  immunity  from  all  other  offices  of 
burden;  nor  could  he  be  required  to  serve  again  for  two  years. 

Personal  exemption  from  the  hierarchy  was  very  rarely  granted, 
and  only  as  a  special  honour.  Leptines  passed  a  law  to  prohibit  all 
exemptions,  against  which,  as  being  unjust  to  the  few  persons  who 
enjoyed  the  privilege,  and  useless  as  a  measure  of  public  economy, 
Demosthenes  made  one  of  his  best  early  speeches,  and  procured  its 
repeal.  There  were  however  certain  classes  of  persons  exempted  by 
the  general  policy  of  the  law.  Thus,  the  nine  archons  could  not  be 
called  upon  to  command  ships,  as  being  incompatible  with  their 
magisterial  duties.  Orphans  were  not  liable  to  serve  airy  office  till  a 
year  after  the  expiratiou  of  their  minority.  As  to  the  other  cases 
mentioned  in  the  speech  on  the  Navy  Boards,  I  may  refer  to  my 
note  on  the  passage.3 

Notwithstanding  the  inconveniences  and  hardships  to  which  the 
captains  were  exposed  in  the  performance  of  their  duty,  there  was  no 
reluctance  to  undertake  it  in  the  early  times  of  Athenian  greatness. 
Those  who  could  afford  it  were  glad  of  the  opportunity  to  displav 
their  public  spirit,  their  patriotism,  and  their  valour.  To  command 
the  best  shin,  or  to  have  the  best  outfit,  was  an  object  of  emulation. 
There  were  occasions  when  wealthy  men  made  presents  of  ships  to 
the  state.  Thus  Clinias,  the  father  of  Ale  biades,  brought  his  own 
galley  to  the  battle  of  Artemisium.  And  if  the  best  seamen  were 
not  to  be  had  without  additional  cost,  the  captain  would  willing!? 
defray  it  out  of  his  own  purse.  Of  this  a  splendid  example  is  fur- 
nished by  Thucydides  in  his  description  of  the  armament  which 
sailed  against  Syracuse.4  "  This,"  says  he,  "  was  the  most  costly 
and  maguificent  which  had  ever  been  beat  from  Athens.  It  was  fitted 
out  at  a  vast  expense  both  on  the  part  of  the  captains  and  the  state. 

(1)  See  the  Oration  of  Demosthenes,  de  Coren.  Trierarch.  122S,  and  the  Argument. 

(2)  Or.  contra  Polyclem,  120G.  There  are  n.any  details  in  this  speech,  which 
make  it  usef  i\  for  the  student  to  peruse.  ',3)  Pane  1S1. 

(4)  Thucylides,  vi.  31.  32.  Plutarch,  in  the  Life  of  Alcibiades,  makes  the  fleet  t« 
eonsist  of  nt  arly  a  hundred  and  forty  sail. 


308  APPENDIX   V. 

Ear  the  treasury  gave  a  drachm  a  day  to  every  seaman,  and  provided 
empty  galleys,  sixty  men-of-war,  and  forty  transports ;  while  the 
captains  found  the  crews  for  them,  and  gave  gratuities,  in  addition  to 
their  pay,  to  the  officers  and  superior  rowers.  Their  ensigns  and 
equipments  were  of  the  most  expensive  kind;  for  every  commander 
was  anxious  that  his  own  ship  should  be  remarkable  for  its  speed 
and  beauty."  He  then  notices  the  rivalry  between  the  land  and 
naval  forces ;  the  immense  outlay  incurred  by  private  citizens  for 
their  own  arms  and  accoutrements ;  and  the  provision  which  the 
captains  must  have  made  for  their  future  expenditure  during  the 
campaign.  He  then  describes  the  launching  of  the  fleet,  after  a 
solemn  libation  and  prayers  to  the  gods  for  success,  in  which  an 
immense  concourse  of  spectators  on  shore,  citizens  and  strangers,  all 
joined.  The  galleys,  having  first  sailed  out  in  line,  kept  up  a  race  as 
far  as  iEgina.  Such  was  the  spirit  of  that  day,  when  Athens  had 
risen  to  the  meridian  of  her  glory. 

At  a  later  period  things  had  greatly  changed.  After  the  disasters 
in  Sicily,  neither  the  state  nor  private  citizens  had  the  same  means 
at  their  disposal.  As  a  measure  of  relief,  two  captains  were  fre- 
quently appointed  to  one  ship;  each  of  whom  took  the  command 
alternately,  or  one  paid  the  other  a  sum  of  money  to  take  the  whole 
command.  This  led  afterwards  to  the  practice  of  providing  deputies, 
which  was  found  highly  injurious  to  the  naval  service;  for  the  deputy 
was  generally  a  person  who  took  the  office  for  the  lowest  price,  and 
sought  to  make  a  profit,  of  it.  Having  such  purpose  only  in  view,  he 
would  be  disposed  to  neglect  his  duties,  to  curtail  the  time  of  public 
service,  to  attend  to  Jus  own  business  rather  than  the  business  of  the 
state,  and  to  reimburse  himself  for  his  outlay  by  plunder,  piracy,  and 
extortion.1  Of  the  irregularities  committed  by  Athenian  officers  in 
the  period  subsequent  to  the  Peloponnesian  war,  and  the  mischievous 
consequences  which  resulted  from  them,  so  much  has  already  been 
said  in  this  volume,  that  it  will  be  unnecessary  to  recur  to  the  subject. 
The  appointment  of  deputies  was,  no  doubt,  illegal,  and  subjected 
the  real  servant  of  the  state  to  a  penalty  ;  but  having  been  permitted 
in  times  of  distress  and  difficulty,  it  grew  into  a  custom,  and  was 
connived  at,  except  where  any  actual  mischief  occurred.  Thus,  after 
a  sea-fight  in  which  the  Athenians  were  defeated  by  Alexander  of 
Pherse,  the  captains  who  had  delegated  their  command  were  brought 
to  trial  by  Aristophon,  and  convicted  of  a  treasonable  desertion  of 
duty.2  "Had  not  the  jury  been  merciful,"  says  the  orator,  "nothing 
could  have  saved  them  from  capital  punishment." 

.Other ^abuses  also  crept  into  the  management  of  the  trierarchy. 
The  burden  was  not  always  equally  distributed.  The  appohn  nents, 
which  ought  to  have  beeu  made  according  to  a  scale  of  property, 
were  often   capricious   and   unfair;    and   when   public   virtue   had 

a:  Thii'wall,  Gr.  Hist.  v.  215.  (2)  Demosthenes,  de  Cn7nn.  Trierarch.  1230. 


THE   TRIERAECHT.  309 

decayed,  and  citizens  were  not  easily  found,  who  were  willing  to 
sacrifice  their  private  interests  to  their  country,  an  unjust  appoint- 
ment was  regarded  as  an  act  of  oppression.  Jacobs  truly  observes, 
that  individual  patriotism,  although  it  may  do  wonders  ou  extraordi- 
nary occasions,  ought  not  to  be  made  the  basis  of  a  legal  ordinance; 
and  that  the  Athenians  discovered  their  mistake  in  placing  too  much 
reliance  upon  it.1  Little  can  be  expected  from  the  self-sacrifice  of 
private  citizens,  where  the  state  does  not  perform  its  own  part 
honestly  and  well.  Demosthenes  complains,  that  the  commanders 
were  often  nominated  on  the  spur  of  the  moment,  when  the  arma- 
ment ought  to  have  been  ready  to  sail ;  and  that,  while  they  were 
contesting  their  liability,  and  the  people  were  inquiring  how  the  ways 
and  means  were  to  be  provided,  the  time  for  action  had  slipped 
away.2  The  captains,  thus  suddenly  appointed,  were  put  to  extreme 
hardship ;  since  it  might  be  difficult,  or  even  impossible,  to  procure 
a  crew  by  the  time  of  departure ;  and  we  read  that,  in  order  to 
escape  the  imprisonment,  to  which  they  were  liable  by  law  for 
neglect  of  duty,  they  would  fly  to  the  temple  of  Diana,  which  was  a 
kind  of  sanctuary,  at  Munychia,  or  appeal  as  suppliants  to  the 
popular  assembly.3 

An  attempt  was  made  to  rectify  the  injustice  of  unfair  appoint- 
ments by  a  method  called  the  Exchange,  which  is  said  to  have  been 
introduced  by  Solon.  The  course  was  as  follows  : — If  a  man  charged 
with  the  command  of  a  ship  thought  that  another,  who  was  not 
charged,  was  better  able  to  bear  the  burden,  he  might  propose  to 
transfer  the  office  to  him,  or  to  make  an  exchange  of  estates.  If  the 
other  declined  these  terms,  he  might  be  summoned  before  the 
Generals,  who  exercised  a  jurisdiction  for  the  decision  of  all  disputes 
relating  to  the  naval  appointments.  If  the  case  could  not  be  settled 
by  them  without  a  formal  trial,  it  had  to  be  brought  into  court  before 
a  jury ;  and  the  main  question  for  the  jury  was,  whether  under  all 
the  circumstances  the  complainant  was  entitled  to  the  relief  he 
prayed  for.  If  they  decided  in  his  favour,  the  defendant  was  forced 
to  choose,  whether  he  would  take  the  office  or  the  exchange.  If  he 
took  the  office,  there  would  be  no  further  trouble.  But  if  the  exchange 
was  accepted,  a  complication  of  difficulties  might  arise.  Each  of  the 
parties  was  obliged  to  give  to  the  other  an  inventory  of  his  property 
within  three  days  after  the  making  the  demand ;  and,  to  prevent  any 
fraudulent  concealment,  a  summary  power  was  given  to  each  to 
enter  and  make  search  upon  the  house  and  land  of  his  opponent,  and 
to  seal  up  every  chamber,  closet,  barn,  outhouse,  or  other  place 
where  his  effects  might  be  deposited.  An  oath  was  also  taken  by 
each  that  he  would  make  a  full  disclosure  of  all  that  he  possessed, 
and  a  fair  and  complete  transfer.  Eor  the  whole  property  of  a  man, 
real  and  personal,  together  with  all  claims  and  obligations  attached 

(1)  Introduct:on  to  his  translation  of  the  speech  De  Symnioriis,  p.  f. 

(2)  Philipp.  i   50.    Pa^c  60  of  this  volume.  (3)  Demosthenes  de  Coron,  262. 


310  APPE-YDIX    V. 

thereto,  was  at  once  in  point  of  law  transferred  by  the  exehar.se; 
except,  indeed,  property  in  the  Laurian  mines,  the  ownership  whereof 
was  vested  in  the  state,  and  the  occupant  was  a  mere  lessee.1  Here 
was  another  fertile  source  of  litigation.  Whether  each  party  had 
made  a  bond  fide  disclosure ;  whether  any  effects  had  been  concealed 
or  removed ;  whether  any  false  or  fraudulent  claims  were  put  in; 
these  and  a  multitude  of  similar  questions  were  likely  enough  to 
spring  out  of  such  an  arrangement.  It  was  a  clumsy  contrivance 
altogether.2 

In  the  year  B.C.  358  an  attempt  was  made  to  improve  the  naval 
service  and  lighten  the  burden  of  the  trierarchy,  by  putting  it  under 
the  management  of  Boards,  much  in  the  same  way  as  the  property- 
tax  had  been  some  years  before.3  This  was  by  the  law  of  Periander. 
The  ships  required  at  any  time  were  equally  divided  among  the 
Boards,  who  again  apportioned  the  burden  among  their  own  members, 
so  that  a  single  ship  was  assigned  to  five  or  more  persons,  and  com- 
monly to  sixteen.4  The  trierarchy  so  constituted  was  no  lon?er  a 
personal  service,  but  a  sort  of  pecuniary  obligation  imposed  upon  the 
associated  members.  There  was  of  course  a  real  captain — in  the 
natural  sense  of  the  word — who  might  either  be  one  of  the  managing 
trierarchs,  or  a  deputy  appointed  by  them  ;  but  the  name  of  trierarch 
was  still  given  to  them  all.  Their  duties,  witb  respect  to  the  equip- 
ment of  the  vessels,  keeping  them  in  repair,  &c,  were  the  same  as 
under  the  previous  system.  But  it  seems,  the  wealthier  members 
abused  their  trust  by  letting  out  the  command  for  the  lowest  price, 
and  making  a  profit  by  the  contributions  of  the  other  members.3 
And  in  other  respects  the  arrangements  were  defective,  which  caused 
Demosthenes,  in  the  year  B.C.  354,  to  propose  the  reforms  set  forth 
in  the  Oration  on  the  Xavy  Boards.  His  principal  objects  were,  to 
insure  the  full  complement  of  serviceable  members,  by  adding  eight 
hundred  to  the  twelve  hundred  whose  names  were  on  the  navy  list — 
to  divide  the  boards  into  sections,  each  having  about  the  same 
average  of  property,  and  then  to  apportion  the  ships,  the  stores,  and 
the  allowance  made  by  the  state,  equally  among  them ;  to  make  also 
a  commodious  arrangement  of  the  docks,  so  that  the  captains  might 
always  know  where  to  find  their  own  ships,  and  that  when  the  time 
came  for  sailing  there  might  be  no  confusion  or  delay.6 

The  reform  of  Demosthenes  was  not  carried;  nor  does  he  appear 
even  to  have  brought  it  forward  as  a  motion  before  the  assembly. 
And  for  many  years  he  did  not  recur  to  the  subject. 

(1)  Seep.  25 1. 

(2)  The  speech  of  Demosthenes  against  Phanippus  gives  us  some  account  of  these 
proceedings.  Also  the  speech  against  Apho'ous,  840,  841 :  and  that  against  Midias, 
539,  540.  (3)  See  the  last  Appendix,  p.  301. 

(4)  Called  cnnneXeis — joint  contributors. 

(5)  A  talent  was  a  common  price,  as  we  learn  from  Demosth.  contra  Mid.  564. 

(6)  See  pp.  181 — 184  of  this  Tolume.  On  the  whole  of  this  subject,  as  well  as  that 
of  the  last  Appendix,  the  reader,  if  he  has  time,  should  consult  the  admirable  work 
of  B&ckh. 


THE    TRIERARCHY.  311 

But  after  the  year  B.C.  346,  it  became  apparent  that  the  naval 
service  had  been  greatly  neglected.  Miscarriage  and  defeat  had  at- 
tended almost  all  the  Athenian  expeditions.  This  was  partly  owing  to 
the  want  of  proper  regulations  in  the  war  department  at  home.  The 
expense  of  the  trierarchal  office  was  shirked  by  those  who  could  best 
afford  it,  while,  falling  on  men  of  moderate  and  small  fortunes,  it 
greatly  abated  their  zeal  in  the  performance  of  public  duties.  But 
from  the  time  last  mentioned  Demosthenes  had  been  gradually  rising 
to  the  head  of  the  Athenian  administration.  He  saw  more  than  ever 
the  necessity  for  an  improvement,  and  especially  for  such  a  regula- 
tion of  the  hierarchy  as  would  distribute  the  burden  fairly  among  all 
classes.  In  the  year  B.C.  3-10,  about  or  before  the  time  when  war 
against  Philip  was  formally  decreed,  he  procured  the  passing  of  a  law, 
by  which  the  burden  of  the  trierarchy  was  made  to  fall  more  equally 
upon  property.  It  provided  that  every  man  whose  estate  was  valued 
at  ten  talents  should  take  charge  of  one  galley;  at  twenty  talents, 
two  galleys ;  at  thirty  talents,  three  galleys ;  but  no  man  should  be 
charged  with  more  than  three  galleys  and  one  boat :  while  men 
whose  estates  were  estimated  at  less  than  ten  talents  should  contri- 
bute in  a  fair  proportion  to  the  expense  of  one  galley.  The  result 
was  that  the  poorer  citizens  were  greatly  relieved,  while  men,  who 
had  under  the  old  system  borne  but  a  sixteenth  part  of  the  cost  of  a 
single  ship,  were  charged  with  two  ships  under  the  amended  law. 
Demosthenes  boasts  of  the  important  advantages  which  resulted 
from  his  plan.  There  was  no  longer  any  complaint  of  oppression  or 
unfairness ;  the  duties  were  cheerfully  undertaken ;  the  ships  punc- 
tually sailed  ;  and  none  were  lost  or  captured  during  the  whole  of 
;"he  war.  That  the  author  of  such  a  law  should  have  made  enemies 
among  the  wealthy  few,  who  profited  by  the  old  abuses,  and  espe- 
cially of  those  who  were  opposed  to  war  with  Macedonia,  was  a 
thing  to  be  expected.  He  was  indicted  for  having  proposed  it,  but 
triumphantly  acquitted,  the  prosecutor  not  obtaining  a  fifth  part  of 
the  votes.1 

That  the  Athenians  were  greatly  indebted  to  Demosthenes  for 
their  success  at  Byzantium,  has  been  already  shown  ;2  and  it  is  pos- 
sible that  this  very  law  may  have  contributed  to  the  result.  Such 
is  the  opinion  of  Thirlwall,  who  writes  on  the  subject  as  follows  :3 — 

"  It  seems  probable  that  the  success  of  the  expedition  was  in  a 
great  measure  due  to  Demosthenes,  not  only  as  the  mover  of  the 
decree  which  ordered  it,  but  still  more  on  account  of  a  law  which  lie 
procured  to  be  passed  nearly  at  the  same  time,  and  which  effected  a 
most  important  reform  ill  the  naval  service  of  Athens.  Down  to  this 
time  a  regulation  had  subsisted,  which  affords  a  remarkable  instance 
how,  even  under  the  most  purely  democratical  institutions,  the  grossest 

(1)  Demosthenes,  de  Coron.  260—262.  (2)  Page  296  of  this  volume. 

(3)  History  of  Greece,  vi.  51  Demosthenes  himself  does  not  claim  for  his  law  anj 
credit  on  this  account.     It  had  perhaps  not  been  long  enough  in  operation. 


312  APPENDIX    V. 

injustice  may  be  authorized  by  the  laws  in  favour  of  the  wealthy. 
The  citizens  who  were  liable  to  the  charges  of  the  trierarchy  were 
distributed  into  classes,  each  of  sixteen  members.,  without  any  respect 
to  difference  of  fortune.  By  the  existing  law  these  sixteen  were 
made  to  contribute  equally  to  the  expense  of  one  galley.  Demos- 
thenes had  attempted  at  an  earlier  period  to  remedy  this  abuse, 
which  was  of  course  cherished  by  many  powerful  patrons.  We  do 
not  know  whether  bis  proposal  was  rejected,  or  whether  means  were 
found  to  evade  the  execution  of  it.  The  evil  seems  at  least  to  have 
been  as  crying  as  ever,  when  the  necessity  of  a  vigorous  effort  in 
behalf  of  Byzantium  enabled  him  to  carry  his  plan.  Its  object  was 
to  distribute  the  whole  burden  of  the  trierarchy  with  reference  not 
to  persons,  but  to  property :  so  that  the  part  which  fell  on  each  con- 
tributor should  be  in  exact  proportion  to  his  means.  Demosthenes 
himself  spoke  with  exultation  of  the  success  of  his  measure ;  and  the 
charges,  by  which  his  adversaries  endeavoured  to  detract  from  his 
merit,  are  hardly  intelligible,  and  are  the  less  deserving  of  notice,  as 
they  do  not  seem  to  impeach  the  equity  and  utility  of  the  reform." 


CORRIGENDA. 

Page  22.  For  "  and  retires  with  liis  fleet  to  Leucas,"  read  "  and  slain.  His  fleet 
retires  to  Leucas." 

Page  .3.  Expunge  the  following : — "Iphicrates  is  sent  with  an  Athenian  squadron  to 
Macedonia,  where  he  was  encouraged  by  Amyntas  to  try  for  the  recover)-  of  Amphi- 
polis,  but  returns  without  success." 

Pace  32.  For  "The  Persians  relieve  Selymbria,"  read  "The  Persians  relieve 
Perinthus." 

Page  54.    For  "with  the  empty  ships,"  read  "  with  ten  empty  ships." 


COMPLETE   CATALOGUE 


BOHN'S    LIBRABIES, 


CONTAINING 

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Addison's  Works.  With  the  Notes 
of  Bishop  Huro,  ranch  additional  matter, 
and  upwards  of  100  Unpublished  Letters. 
Edited  by  H.  G.  Bohn.  Portrait  and  8 
Engraving*  on  Steel.    In  6  vols. 

Alfieri's  Tragedies,  including  those 
published  posthumously.  Translated  into 
English  Verse,  and  edited  with  Notes  and 
Introduction,  by  Edgab  A.  Bowbjng,  C.B. 
2  vols. 

Bacon's  Essays,  Apophthegms,  Wis- 
dom of  the  Ancients,  New  Atlantis,  and 
Henry  VIS.,  with  Introduction  and  Notes. 
Portrait. 

Ballads  and  Songs  of  the  Peasantry 

of  England.  Edited  by  Robert  Bell. 

Beaumont  and  Fletcher,  a  popular 
Selection  from.    By  Leigh  Hunt. 

Beckmann's  History  of  Inventions, 

Discoveries,  and  Origins.     Revised  and 
enlarged.    Portrait!.    In  2  vols. 

Bremer's  (Miss)  Works.  Translated  by 
Mary  Howrrr.    Portrait    In  4  vols. 
Vol.  1.  The  Neighbours  and  other  Tales. 
Vol.  2.  The  President's  Daughter. 
VoL  3.  The  Home,  and  Strife  and  Peace. 
Vol  4.  A  Diary,  the  H Family,  &c. 

British  Poets,  from  Hilton  to  Eirke 
White.   Cabinet  Edition.    In  4  vols. 

Browne's  (Sir  Thomas)  Works. 
Edited  by  Simon  Wilkin.    In  3  vols. 

Burke's  Works.     In  6  Volumes. 

Vol.  1.  Vindication  of  Natural  Society, 

On  the  Sublime  and  Beautiful,  and 

Political  Miscellanies. 
Vol.  2.  French  Revolution,  &c. 
Vol.  3.  Appeal  from  the  New  to  the 

Old  Whigs ;  the  Catholic  Claims,  &c. 
VoL  4.  On  the  Affairs  of   India,   and 

Charge  against  Warren  Hastings. 

13 


Burke's  Works — continued. 

Vol.  6.  Conclusion   of   Charge    against 

Hastings ;  on  a  Regicide  Peace,  &c. 
Vol.  6.  Miscellaneous     Speeches,     4c. 
With  a  General  Index. 

Burke's  Speeches  on  Warren  Hast- 
ings; and  Letters.  With  Index.  In 
2  vols,  (forming  vols.  1  and  8  of  the 
works). 

■ Life.    By  Prior.     New  and 

revised  Edition.    Portrait. 

Butler's  (Bp.)  Analogy  of  Religion, 

and  Sermons,  with  Notes.    Portrait. 

Camoens'  Lusiad,  Mickle's  Transla- 
tion.   Edited  by  E.  R.  Hodges. 

Cary's  Translation  of  Dante's  Hea- 
ven, Hell,  and  Purgatory.  Copyright 
edition,  being  the  only  one  containing 
Cary's  last  corrections  and  additions. 

Carafas  (The)  of  Maddaloni:  and 
Naples  under  Spanish  Dominion.  Trans- 
lated from  the  German  of  Alfred  de 
Reumont. 

Carrel's  Counter  Revolution  in  Eng- 
land. Fox's  History',  and  Lonsdale's 
Memoir  of  James  II.    Portrait. 

Cellini  (Benvenuto),  Memoirs  of 
Translated  by  Rosoo*.  Portrait. 

Cervantes'  Galatea,  Translated  by 
Gordon  Gtll. 

Chaucer's  Works.  Edited  by  Robert 
Bell.  New  Edition,  improved.  With 
Introduction  by  W.  W.  Skeat.    4  vols. 

Coleridge's  (S.  T.)  Friend.  A  Series  of 

Essays  on  Morals,  Politics,  and  Religion. 

(S.  T.)  Biographia  Liter- 
aria,  and  two  Lay  Sermons. 

Commines.  (See  Philip  de  Commines.) 


BOHI^S  VARIOUS  LIB  RABIES. 


Conde's  Dominion  of  the  Arabs  is 
Spain.    Translated   by  Mr*.   Fobtxs.    Is 

3  TOll. 

Cowper'a  Complete  Works.  Edited, 
with  Memoir  of  the  Aathor,  by  Soothbv. 
Illustrated  with  60  Bngravingt.   In  8  vols 

Vols.  1  to  4.  Memoir  and  Correspondence. 
Vola  6  and  6.  Poetica'  Works.    PtiUet 
Vol.  I.  Homer's  Iliad.    Plata. 
Vol.  8.  Homer's  Odyssey     Plata. 

Core's    Memoirs   of   the    Duke   of 

Marlborough,     Portrait*.    In  3  vols. 
•»*  An  Atlas  of  the  plans  of  Marlborough 's 
campaigns,  4 to.  ioj.  6d. 

— —  History    of  the    House    of 

Austria.    Portrait*.    In  4  vols. 

Cunningham's  Lives  of  Eminent 
British  Painters.    New  Edition  by  Mrs. 

H EATON.      3  vols. 

Defoe's  Works.  Edited  by  Sir  Walteb 
Soott.    In  7  vols. 

De  Lolme  on  the  Constitution  of  Eng- 
land. Edited,  with  Notes,  by  Job* 
Macgbegob. 

Emerson's  Works.    2  vols. 

Foster's  (John)  Life  and  Correspond- 
ence.   Edited  by  J.  E.  Rtland.   In  2  vols. 

Lectures      at      Broadmead 

Chapel.  Edited  by  J.  E.  Rtland.  Id 
2  vola. 

Foster's  (John)  Critical  Essays.  Edited 
by  J.  E.  Rtland.    In  2  vols. 

— —  Essays — On  Decision  of  Cha- 
racter, Sec.  xc. 

Essays — On  the  Evils  of  Po- 
pular Ignorance,  &c 

■  Fosteriana:  Thoughts,  Re- 

flctions,  and  Criticisms  of  the  late  John 
Fosteb,  selected  from  periodical  papers, 
and  Edited  by  Henkt  Q.  Bohh  (nearly 
600  pages).    5s. 


Fuller's  (Andrew)  Principal  Works. 
With  Memoir.    Portrait. 

Gibbon's  Soman  Empire.  Complete 
and  Unabridged,  with  Notes  ;  Including, 
In  addition  to  the  Author's  own,  these  of 
Gnizot,  Wenck,  Niebuhr,  Hugo,  Neander, 
and  other  foreign  scholars;  and  an  ela- 
borate Index.  Edited  by  an  English 
Churchman.    In  7  vola. 

Goethe's  Works,  Translated  into  Eng- 
lish.   In  8  vols. 
Vols.  Land 2.  Autobiography, 20  Books ; 
and    Travels  In    Italy,  France,  and 
Switzerland.    Portrait. 
Vol.  3.    Faust.    Two  Parts.    By  Miss 

SWA!  WICK. 


Goethe's  Works — continued. 

V.ji.  4.  Novels  and  Tales. 

Vol.  5.  Wilhelna  Meister's  Apprentice- 
ship. 

Vol.  6.  Conversations  with  Eckermann 
and  Soret.  Translated  by  John 
Oxenfobd. 

Vol.  7.  Poems  and  Ballads,  including 
Hermann  and  Dorothea.  Translated 
by  E.  A.  Bowring,  C.B 

Vol.  8.  Goiz  von  Berlichingen,  Tor 
qunto  Tasso,  Egmout,  Iphig»nia, 
Clavigo,  Wayward  Lov  r,  and  Fellow 
Culprits.  By  Sir  Waltkk  Scott, 
Miss  SwAKWicK.ami  E.  A.  Bowring, 
C.B.     With  Engraving. 

Correspondence  with  Schiller 

See  Schiller. 

Greene,  Marlowe,  and  Ben  Jonson, 

Poems  of.      Edited    by    Robebt    Bell. 

With  Biagraphies.    In  1  voL 
Gregory's  (Dr.)  Evidences,  Doctrines, 

and  Duties  of  the  Christian  Religion. 
Gnizot' s  Representative  Gc  verament. 

Translated  by  A  R.  Scoelr. 
. History  of  the  English  Revo 

lution  of  1640.    Translated  by  Wan  as; 

Hazlitt.    Portrait. 
- History  of  Civilization,  Trans- 
lated by  William  Hazlitt.     in  3  vols. 

Portrait. 
Hazlitt's  Table  Talk.   A  New  Edition 

In  one  volume. 
Lectures     on    the    Comic 

Writers,  and  on  the  English  Poeta. 

-  Lectures  on  the  Literature 

of  the  Age  of  Elizabeth,  and  on  Characters 
of  Shakespear'a  Plays. 

. Plain  Speaker. 

Bound  Table ;  the  Conversa^ 


tions  of  James  Nobthootb,  R.A.;   Cha- 
racteristics, ffec. 

Sketches  and   Essays,  and 


Winterslow  (Essays  Written  there).   New 
Edition. 

Hall's  (Bev.  Robert;  Miscellaneous 
Works  and  Remains,   with   Memoir   by 
Dr.  Gregory,  and  an  Essay  on  his  Una- 
racter  by  John  Foster.    Portrait 
Hawthorne's  Tales.    In  2  vols. 

VoL  1.  Twice    Told     Tale*,    and    the 

Snow  Image. 
VoL  2.  Scarlet  Letter,  and  tfc«    House 
with  the  seven  Gables. 
Heine's  Poems,   complete,   from    the 

German,  by  E  A.  Bowring,  C.B     St. 

Hungary:  its  History  and  Revolu- 
tions ;  with  a  Memoir  of  Kosenth  from 
new  and  authentic  sources.     Portrait. 

Hutchinson  (Colonel),  Memoirs  of, 
with  the  Siege  of  Latham  House. 


A   CATALOGUE  OF 


Irving's  (Washington)  Life  and  Let- 
ters. By  his  Nephew,  Pikb&x  E.  Ibvqsg. 
la  2  vols. 

Complete  Works.  In  15  vols. 


Vol.  1.  Saunagundl  and  Knickerbocker 
Portrait  of  the  Author. 

Vol.  3.  Sketch  Book  and  Life  of  Gold- 
smith. 

Vol.  3.  Bracebridge  Hall  and  Abbots- 
ford  and  News!  end. 

VoL  4.  Tales  of  a  Traveller  uid  the 
Alhambra, 

Vol.  6.  Conquest  of  Granada  and  Con- 
quest of  Spain. 

Vols.  6  and  7.  Life  of  Co  lain  bus  and 
Companions  of  Columbus,  with  a  new 
Index.    Fine  Portrait. 

Vol.  8.  Astoria  and  Tour  in  the  Prairies. 

VoL  9.  Mah.  met  and  his  Successors 

Vol.  10.  Conquest  of  Florida  and  Ad- 
ventures of  Captain  Bonneville. 

Vol.  11.  Biographies  and  Miscellanies. 

Vols.  12-15.  Life  of  Washington.  Por- 
trait. 

For  separate  World,  tee  Cheap  Seriet. 

James's  (0.  P.  B.)  Bichard  Coeur-de- 
Liot,  King  of  Enaland.  Portraits.  2  vols. 

Louis  XIV.  Portraits.  2  vols. 

Jameson's  Shakespeare's  Heroines: 

Characteristics  of  Women.  Moral, 
Poetical,  and  Historical. 

Junius's  Letters,  with  Notes,  Ad- 
ditions, and  an  Index.    In  2  vols. 

Lamartine  s  History  of  the  Girond- 
ists.   Portraits.    In  3  vols. 

Eestoration  of  the  Monarchy, 

with  Index.     Portraits.    In  4  vols. 

.  French  Be  volution  of  1848, 

with  a  fine  frontispiece. 

Lamb's  (Charles;  Elia  and  Eliana. 
Complete  Edition. 

Dramatic  Poets  of  the  Time 

of  Elizabeth ;  including  hU  Selections  from 
the  Garrick  Plays. 

Lanzi's  History  of  Painting.  Trans- 
lated by  Roscok.    Portraits.    In  t  vols. 

Lessing's  Dramatic  Works.  Com- 
plete, with  Memoir  by  Helen  Ztmmerx. 
Portrait.    2  vols. 

Laokoon.  (By  Beasley)  Ham- 
burg Dramatic  Notes,  Representation  of 
Death  (by  Miss  Zimmerx),  Frontispiece. 

Locke's  Philosophical  Works,  con- 
taining an  Essay  on  the  Human  Under- 
standing, &c,  with  Notes  and  Index  by 
J.  A.  St.  John.    Portrait.    In  2  vols. 

— —  Life  and  Letters,  with  Ex- 
tracts from  his  Common-Place  Books,  by 
Lord  Kikg 

Lather's  Table  Talk.    Translated  by 
William  Hazlitt.     Portrait. 
20 


Machiavelli'i  History  of  Florence, 

The  Prince,  and  ether  Works.    Portrait. 
Martineau's,     Harriet,    History    of 
England,  from  lSOu-15. 

History  of  the  Peace,  from 

1815-1846.     4  vols. 

Menzel's  History  of  Germany.    Por- 
traits.   In  3  vols. 

Michelet's  Life  of  Lather.   Translated 
by  William  Hazlitt. 

Boman  Bepablie.    Translated 

by  William  Hazlitt. 

French  Bevolution,  with  In- 


dex    Fror.tispiece. 
Mignet's    French    Bevolution  from 

1789  to  1814.    Portrait. 
Milton's  Prose   Works,  with  Index. 
Portraits.    In  6  vols. 

Mitford's  (Mary  B.)  Our  Village.  Im- 
proved Ed.,  complete.  Illustrated.  1  vols. 

Moliere's  Dramatic  Works.  Trans- 
lated by  C.  H  Wall.  In  3  vols.  Portrait. 

Montesquieu's  Spirit  of  the  Laws. 
A  new  Edition  revised  and  corrected. 
2  vols.    Portrait. 

Neander's  Church  History.  Trans- 
lated   with  General  Index.    In  10  vols. 

Life  of  Christ.     Translated. 

First  Planting    of    Christi- 

anity.andAntlgnostikus.  Translated.  La 
2  vols. 

History  of  Christian  Dogmas. 

Translated.    In  2  vols. 

Christian  Life  in  the  Early 

and  Middle  Ages,  Including  his  '  Light  in 
Dark  Places.'    Translated. 

Ockley's  History  of  the  Saracens 
Revised  and  completed.    Portrait. 

Percy's  Beliqaes  of  Ancient  English 
Poetry.  Reprinted  from  the  Original  4 11- 
sioa,  and  Edited  by  J.  V.  Peichabd.  In 
1  vols. 

Philip  de   Commines,  Memoirs    of 

containing  the  Histories  of  Louis  XI.  and 
Charles  VHL,  and  of  Chat.ea  the  Bold, 
Duke  of  Burgundy.  To  which  Is  added, 
The  Scandalous  Chronicle,  or  Secret 
History  oi  Louis  XL  Portrait*,  In 
1  vols. 

Plutarch's  Lives.  By  G.  Long  and 
A.  Stewart.  [In  the  press. 

Poetry  of  America.  Selections  from 
ioo  American  Poets,  from  1776 — 1S76. 
Edited  by  W.  J.  Linton.     Portrait. 

Banke'8  History  of  the  Popes   Trans- 
lated by  E.  Fostkk.    In  3  vols. 
Banke's  Servia  and  the  Servian  Be- 

volution. 


EOHN'S  VARIOUS  LIBRARIES. 


Reynolds'    (Sir     Joshua)     Literary 
Works     Portrait.    In  2  vole. 

Bichter    (Jean  Paul    Fr.)     Levana 

and  Autobiography.     With  Msmoir. 

Flower,  Fruit,   and  Thorn 


Pieces.    A  Novel. 

Boscoe's    Life    and    Pontificate    of 

Leo  X.,  with  the  Copyright  Notes,  and  an 
Index.    Portraits.    In  2  vols. 
■  Life  of  Lorenzo  de  Medici, 

with  the  Copyright  Notes,  8tc.    Portrait. 

Russia,  History  of,  by  Walter  K, 
Kelly.    Portrait*.    In  2  vols. 

Schiller's  Works.      Translated    into 
English.    In  6  vols. 
Vol.  1.  Thirty  Years'  War,  and  Revolt 

of  the  Netherlands. 
Vol.  2.  Continuation    of   the    Revolt 
of   the    Netherlands;    Wallenstein'i 
Camp ;  the  Piccolomini ;  the  Death 
of  Wallenstein;  and  William  TelL 
Vol.  3.  Don  Carlos,  Mary  Stuart,  Maid 

of  Orleans,  and  Bride  of  Messina. 
Vol.  4.  The  Robbers,  Flesco,  Love  and 

Intrigue,  and  the  Ghost-Seer. 
Vol.  6.  Poems.     Translated  by  Edgab 

Bowbxnq,  C.B. 
Vol.  6.  Philosophical  Letters  and  jEs- 
thetical  Essays. 

Correspondence  with  Goethe, 

translated  by  L.  Doka  Schmitz.    2  vols. 

Schlegel's  Philosophy  of  Life  and 

of  Language,  translated  by  A.  J.  WT  Mob- 
bison. 

— History  of  Literature,  An- 
cient and  Modern.  Now  first  completely 
translated  with  General  Index. 

— —  Philosophy  of  History. 
Translated  by  J.  B.  Robertson.  Portrait. 


Schlegel's      Dramatic      Literature. 

Translated.    Portrait. 
Modern  History. 

•  -Esthetic  and  Miscellaneous 

Works. 

Sheridan's  Dramatic  Works  and 
Life.     Portrait. 

Sismondi's  Literature  of  the  South 
of  Europe.  Translated  by  Koacoe.  Por- 
traits.   In  2  vols. 

Smith's  (Adam)  Theory  of  the  Moral 

Sentiments ;  with  his  Essay  on  the  First 
Formation  of  Languages. 

Smyth's     (Professor)    Lectures    on 

Modern  History.    In  2  vols. 

~—  Lectures  on  the  French  Re- 
volution.   In  2  vols. 

Sturm's  Morning  Communings  with 
God,  or  Devotional  Meditations  for  Every 
Day  in  the  Year. 

Sully,  Memoirs  of  the  Duke  of,  Prime 
Minister  to  Henry  the  Great.  Portrait!. 
Tn  4  vols 

Taylor's  (Bishop  Jeremy)  Holy  Living 

and  Dying.     Portrait- 

Thierry's  Conquest  of  England  by 

the  Normans.     Translated  by  William 

Hazlitt.    Portrait.    In  2  vols. 
TJlrici  (Dr.)   Shakespeare's  Dramatic 

Art.  Translated  by  L.  D.  Schmitz.  2  vols. 
Vasari's    Lives    of    the    Painters, 

Sculptors,  and  Architects.    Translated  by 

Mrs.  Fosteb.    6  vols. 

Wesley's  (John)  Life.      By  Robert 

Southey.     New  and  Complete  Edition. 
Double  volume.     With  Portrait.    5f. 

Wheatley  on  the  Book  of  Commos 

Prayer.    Frontupitc. 


HISTORICAL  LIBRARY. 

21  Vols,  at  5s.  each. 


Evelyn's  Diary  and  Correspondence. 

Illustrated  with  numerous  Portraits,  Ac. 
In  4  vols. 

Pepys'  Diary   and   Correspondence. 

Edited  by  Lord  Bkatbrooke.  With  Notes- 
important  Additions,  Including  numerous 
Letters.  Illustrated withmany Portraits. 
In  4  vols. 
Jesse's  Memoirs  of  the  Reign  of  the 
Stuarts,  Including  the  Protectorate.  With 
General  Index,  Upwards  of  40  Portraits- 
In  3  vols. 


Jesse's  Memoirs  of  the  Pretenders 

end  their  Adherents.    8  Portraits, 
Nugent's      (Lord)      Memorials      of 

Hampden,   his    Party,   and    Tunes.     13 

Portraits. 
Strickland's    (Agnes)    Lives  of  the 

Queens    of  England,   from   the  Norman 

Conquest.      From    official    records    and 

authentic  documents,  private  and  publlo. 

Revised  Edition.    In  6  vols. 
Life  of  Mary  Queen  of  Scots. 

2  vols. 

21 


A  CATALOOVF  OF 


COLLEGIATE  SERIES. 


6    yolt.  at  it.  each. 


Ixnjfwdsin's  Theatre  of  the  Gi^ks. 

Illustrated    witb    Lithographs    and    nu- 
merous vr-iodciits 

Keigh  tier's  Classical  Mythology. 
New  Edition.  Revised  by  Ur.  L. 
Schvftz.     With  12  plates. 

Herodotus,   Turner'*  (Dawson    W.) 

Note*  to      With  Map.  &c 


Herodotus,  Wheeler's  Analysis  gad 

Thocydides,  'Wheeler's  Analysis  of. 

New  Testament  (The)  In  Breek. 
Griesb^cL.'6  I  tru  c-;tt  tbt  readings  of 
Mil:  and  Sci.oli,  Parallel  References, 
a  3rrucal  Introduction  sad  fTmmM^tnal 
f  able*,  ftac  roc-ro***ei  tg  Qrtek  MSB. 
3s.  Si;  or  with  Letiooa,  5".  Lexical 
Separately.    2*. 


PHILOSOPHICAL  LIBRARY. 

11    *nU.  at  5*.  eac\  excepting  Oioee  -mwhad  otherwise. 


Comte's  Philosophy  of  the  Sciences. 

By  G .  H  Lk'wtb. 
DrapeT    J.   W.)     A  History  of  the 
Intellectual  Development  ol  Europe.     By 

Joaii  Wtixjais  Deafer,  M.D_  LL.D.  A 
New  E.i3ticii-.  thoroughly  Revised  by  the 
Author.     Lr,  2  vols. 

Segal's  Lectures  on  th.6  Philosophy 

sf  HlKory    ^YacEla?*:!  by  J.  Sibbbx.  M  A. 


Kant's   Critique  of    Pure    Beacon. 

Translated  by  J.  M  D.  MF.rgr.MOHH. 

Logic ,  or,  the  Science  of  Inference, 

A  Popular  Manual.     By  J.  Dfvk 
Miller's  (Professor)  History  Philoso- 
phically  considered      In  *  toIs      3i.  6d. 
9»ch. 
Tennemann's  Manual  of  the  History 
of  Philosophy.  Oon tinned  by  -J.  R  MoaELt. 


ECCLESIASTICAL  AND  THEOLOGICAL 
LIBRARY. 

'  15  Vols,  at  it.  each,  excepting  ihn-tt  marktd  oihervaei. 


Sleek  (P.  in  Introduction  to  the 
Old  Testament,  by  Feiedbich  iuax. 
Edited  by  Jorai>t--  Bleek  and  Adolf 
KAltFHAOsrat.  Translated  from  the  Ger- 
man by  G.  H.  Vena-BUES,  under  the 
superrifHiE  of  the  Rev.  E.  Yesabi.es, 
Canoi  o^  ;.iuc->ln.  New  Edition,  in  2 
vols. 

Chillingly.' !-t-  r  Religion  of  Pro- 
teat^ 


Eusetias'      >?--!er.astieal 


History. 


Hardwiok's  History  of  the  ArticleB 

of  Religion.    To  ^hicb  is  added  a 
Docnmentc  f-on,   -.d.  1536  to  a.d.  1<>15. 
Toget'if  r  o   .h  rUustraiJens  from  ! 
porar    -  vised  by 

Biew.  K.  Pw  ■ 

■22 


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lo*  PssJHK       tatr.'O)  rU-Jttrtttiem. 

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on  the  Nature  of  the  Gods , 

Divination,  Fate,  Laws,  a  Republic,  <6c. 
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BO  EN'S  VABI0U8  LIB  BABIES. 


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on  Oratory  and  Orators.   By 

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