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/Aarine Biological Laboratory bbrary 

Voods Hole, /Aas5achuselt5 

Gift of Mrs. Norman T. Allen 

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A summary of the activities of the entire organization in the development of 
improved weapons of v^'arfare has been puWished as Scientists Against Time 
by James Phinney Baxter, 3rd. Details about the different parts of the organi- 
zation are presented in a series of volumes with the common title, Science in 
World War 11, which has been prepared under authority from: 

Vannevar Bush, President, Carnegie Institution of Washington 
Director, Ofl&ce of Scientific Research and Development 

James B. Conant, President, Harvard University 

Chairman, National Defense Research Committee 

Alfred N. Richards, Vice-President in charge of Medical Affairs, 
University of Pennsylvania 

Chairman, Committee on Medical Research 

Karl T. Compton, President, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Chief, Office of Field Service 

Science in World War II 















DIVISIONS 13, 15, 16, 17, 18 AND COMMITTEE ON ] 








Office of Scientific Research and Development 

Organizing Scientific 
Research for War 

The Administrative History of the 
Office of Scientific Research and Development 




Vannevar Bush 


An Atlantic Monthly Press Boo\ 
Litde, Brown and Company • Boston 







Published February 1948 





Published simultaneously 
in Canada by McClelland and Stewart Limited 



Under the terms of the contract for the pubUcation of Organizing 
Scientific Research for War and of the other volumes in the long his- 
tory of the activities of the Office of Scientific Research and Develop- 
ment, entitled Science in World War II, the publisher has agreed to 
waive its right under the copyright of each separate volume after ten 
years from the date of publication of such volume. Thereafter the 
volume in question will be in the public domain and dedicated to 
the public. 

This volume of the history of OSRD is a description of the adminis- 
trative framework of the organization that developed, improved, and 
brought into use certain new weapons. It is not intended to be a com- 
plete documentary record of the making of the inventions that happen 
to be mentioned in it. 

The author of this volume receives no royalty from its sale. 

This splendid agency but a few months hence will go out of 
existence. The contribution that it has made to the winning of 
the war is inestimable. Without such contribution, it is safe 
to say that victory still would await achievement. However, the 
office has been essentially a war agency, and it is now engaged 
in liquidation. To its distinguished and internationally known 
head. Dr. Vannevar Bush, and the staff of great scientists he 
gathered around him to aid in the development of new 
weapons, the Nation owes much. 

— Excerpt from Report No. 1125 of 
the Committee on Appropriations 
of the House of Representatives, 
October 17, 1945 



ORLD WAR II was the first war in human history to be 
affected decisively by weapons unknown at the outbreak of hostilities. This 
is probably the most significant military fact of our decade: that upon the 
current evolution of the instrumentalities of war, the strategy and tactics of 
warfare must now be conditioned. In World War II this new situation 
demanded a closer linkage among military men, scientists, and industrialists 
than had ever before been required, primarily because the new weapons 
whose evolution determines the course of war are dominantly the products 
of science, as is natural in an essentially scientific and technological age. 

The Office of Scientific Research and Development, one crucial aspect of 
whose history is ably told in this volume, was the medium through which, 
in the main, scientists were joined in effective partnership with military 
men. Such a partnership was really a new thing in the world and was a 
partnership between groups which one might at first thought consider in- 
herently incompatible. The military group, both because of the extreme 
demands and extreme responsibilities of the profession of arms and because 
of long and honorable tradition, is formally organized to a very high degree. 
The scientific group, both because of the individualistic approach essential 
to research and because of the sufficiency of the loosest of organization for 
all practical purposes in normal times, is much more a gathering of indi- 
viduals than a group in the professional or structural sense. 

For two such entities to develop a pattern of highly effective collaboration 
— and that such a pattern was developed is clear in the record — demanded 
much in the beginning from each. New lessons in understanding and evalu- 
ation had to be learned both by the military and by the scientific. Old pre- 
conceptions had to be overcome and old prepossessions foregone by both. 
In the earlier part of the period it was inevitable that there should be much 
expenditure of time and energy in these vital developments, inevitable also 
that there should be disagreement and even outright friction. Honest and 
strongly held opposing convictions often had to be reconciled. Obduracy 
and narrow interests occasionally had to be rooted out. Both parties gener- 
ally, however, were imbued with the same patriotism and actuated by the 
same sense of urgent responsibility, which speeded the establishment of 
sound interdependent effort. 


It was at the administrative center where all the widely ramified activities 
and contacts of the scientific efifort could be seen from a somewhat detached 
point of view that the process of adjustment and comprehension was most 
sharply sensed. Hence it is that Dr. Stewart's account of the administrative 
history of the OSRD is of the greatest value for the future and of the great- 
est interest to those concerned with organization and the patterns of govern- 
ment. It offers the data on which may be based sound appraisal of how 
sincere and hard-working men of professions ordinarily widely separate can 
set about and accomplish the development of unity. 

It was the function of the administrative office of OSRD to channelize 
and focus an amazing array of variegated activities, to co-ordinate them 
both with the military necessities which they were designed to help to meet 
and with the requirements of the powerful industrial structure on which 
their effective application relied. In the contracting system which it devel- 
oped, in the methods for safeguarding the public interest through sound 
patent policy which it created, in the means for effective and cordial liaison 
with co-operating agencies which it effected, and in a dozen other ways, 
the office brought to being a pattern of administration which apdy met a 
new and unique need and which stands as a richly suggestive guide for 
other undertakings. 


Washington, D.C. 
November 4, ig^O 



HE present volume is one of a series devoted to the history 
of the Office of Scientific Research and Development. It is confined to the 
administrative operations of that office. Other volumes will report upon its 
scientific achievements. Four volumes will be devoted to the work of the 
National Defense Research Committee, one volume to the Office of Field 
Service, and two volumes to the Committee on Medical Research. These eight 
volumes will cover in much greater detail the operations of OSRD as already 
reported in a single volume by James Phinney Baxter, 3rd, entided Scientists 
Against Time. 

In the preparation of the present volume the author has received the 
assistance of many people. Approximately half of it is based upon manu- 
scripts prepared initially by others while the remainder was prepared with- 
out the benefit of such manuscripts. The files of the office were available 
without restriction and only occasionally has it been necessary to tread 
lightly in order to avoid using material bearing a security classification. 

In addition to the assistance which he received from many other persons, 
the author wishes particularly to acknowledge his indebtedness to W. F. 
Davidson, Charles H. Schauer, Mrs. Virginia B. Shapley, Arthur M. Walker, 
Lincoln R. Thiesmeyer, George W. Corner, Chester C. Stock, W. S. Bowen, 
Eugene W. Scott, Cleveland Norcross, Miss Lee Anna Embrey, Mrs. Alice 
Day, John J. Charuhas, Carey G. Cruikshank, Robert A. Lavender, Roy C. 
Bowker, Marvin L. Faris, W. A. Osborne, George W. Bailey, E. TefJt 
Barker, Mrs. Jean B. May, John E. Burchard, and the Division and Panel 
Chiefs of NDRC and CMR. The writer is also indebted to James Phin- 
ney Baxter, 3rd, for making available some of the material he had collected 
for his volume; to Miss Emily B. Mitchell for her work in collecting and 
checking material, and to Miss Mary Kathryn Horn for her assistance in 
preparing the manuscript. 

The manuscript has benefited greatly by numerous suggestions from 
Vannevar Bush and Fred Fassett. 

The manuscript was complete when the author left Washington in June, 
1946. He wishes to> express his appreciation to Dr. John S. Burlew for sug- 
gesting changes which make it current as to the date of publication. 


The preparation of a volume like the present requires selection from a 
great mass of material and the choice among various modes of presentation. 
For the decisions on these points and on all others, the author assumes full 





PART ONE: Harnessing Science 







The Beginnings 3 

National Defense Research Committee (of the 

Council of National Defense) 7 

Office of Scientific Research and Development 35 

NDRC of OSRD — The Committee 52 

NDRC of OSRD — The Chairman's Office 68 

NDRC of OSRD — The Divisions, Panels, and 

Committees 79 

Committee on Medical Research of OSRD 98 

Other OSRD Research Groups 120 

Office of Field Service of OSRD 128 

PART TWO: Liaison 



Liaison with the Armed Services 
Liaison with Allied Governments 



PART THREE: Supporting Operations 


The Administrative Office 


The Contract 


Fiscal Affairs 


Patent Policy 

XVI Priorities and Property 

XVII Security 

XVIII Scientific Manpower 



XIX Acceptance of Voluntary Services 278 

XX Publicity, Public Relations, and Publications 285 

PART FOUR: Demobilization 

XXI Demobilization of OSRD 299 

XXII Retrospect and Prospect 321 

Epilogue 333 

Appendices 335 

Index 353 



Part One: Harnessing Science 




,HAT PHASE of the European war which many Americans 
were complacently dubbing the "phony war" ended suddenly on May lo, 
1940, when the Germans struck at France through Belgium and the 
Netherlands. The speed of the German advance came as a great surprise 
to many who had placed their faith in the Maginot Line and its northward 
extension. The dramatic character of unfolding events lent sharp point to 
the concern of a group of American scientists who realized the extent to 
which the United States was unprepared to fight a modern war. 

Historians may differ as to the reasons why with all of its remarkable sci- 
entific advances the United States lagged so dangerously in the development 
of weapons, but none will deny the fact. During the two decades between 
the end of World War I and the beginning of World War II, the people 
of the United States had pinned their faith on the impossibility of another 
world war, although their government had not been willing to bear any 
share of the responsibility for the success of the one international organiza- 
tion which had the slightest chance of making aggression unlikely. Appro- 
priations for military purposes were relatively small as the American people 
nurtured the fond hope that by its action the United States could set an 
example of small armaments which would be followed by the rest of the 

Yet small appropriations are by no means the key to America's scientific 
unpreparedness for war; for during at least the last decade of that period. 
Congress appropriated every cent requested for military research and devel- 
opment. Perhaps the armed services were so blind to the possibilities that 
they did not ask for adequate funds for research and development, or 
perhaps the Bureau of the Budget cut the requests for funds for this pur- 
pose; in any event, the initial responsibility for low appropriations for 
research and development resides in the executive branch and not in the 

Whether the armed services would have made any better preparation 
for modern war had they had more money is another subject for fruitless 
speculation. They certainly had showed limited imagination in opening 


new fields with the funds at their disposal, although this does not foreclose 
the possibility that they might have exercised greater imagination had they 
had more money. More significant is the fact that when large amounts of 
money were available, there was no corresponding increase in vision as to 
how it might be used for the development of new and more effective 

In any event, it was apparent to a few key scientists in the spring of 1940 
that the United States was in imminent danger of being forced into a war 
for which the country was pathetically unprepared from the standpoint of 
new weapons. While others may have had the same feeling, four in par- 
ticular discussed the matter among themselves and took steps to enlist the 
support of President Roosevelt to improve the situation. They were Van- 
nevar Bush, President of the Carnegie Institution of Washington; Karl T. 
Compton, President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; James B. 
Conant, President of Harvard University, and Frank B. Jewett, President 
of the National Academy of Sciences and of the Bell Telephone Labora- 
tories. Of this group. Bush was the one who carried the major part of the 
responsibility of impressing the need for action upon President Roosevelt 
and his advisers and of persuading the heads of the military forces of the 
need for a more effective mobilization of science for a program of improve- 
ment of weapons of warfare. 

A great source of the fundamental strength of the United States has been 
in the very high proportion of its scientific and engineering talent devoted 
to the ordinary economy of peacetime. The contributions of the scientists 
and the engineers underlie the tremendous economic development which 
constitutes the basis for the support of a modern mechanized army and navy. 
The great need was to bring this scientific and engineering strength quickly 
and effectively to bear upon the preparation for defense in modern warfare. 
The situation was not unique, for the same need had been felt in other 
major conflicts in which the country had engaged. 

Thus, the National Academy of Sciences was created by an act of Con- 
gress approved on March 3, 1863, in order better to focus scientific talent 
in the Civil War. The Academy was composed of distinguished American 
scientists and engineers from the fields of mathematics, astronomy, physics, 
engineering, chemistry, geology, and paleontology; botany, zoology, anat- 
omy, physiology, biochemistry, pathology, and bacteriology; anthropology 
and psychology. Election to membership in the Academy was based on 
established eminence in some field of science; the number of members was 
originally limited to 50, but the limitation was later removed and in 1940 
the number of members was approximately 300. 

The act creating the Academy provided that it should "whenever called 
upon by any department of the Government investigate, examine, experi- 
ment, and report upon any subject of science or art." The actual expense 


of such investigations was to be borne from appropriations which might be 
made for the purpose, but the Academy was to receive no compensation for 
itself for any services to the Government. Between the time of its creation 
and World War I, the Academy undertook many noteworthy investigations 
in fields of science for the Government. At the time of World War I, the 
fields of science and the problems in them vital to national defense had 
grown to such proportions that President Wilson requested the Academy 
to expand its facilities for service by creating a National Research Council 
as its agent for the better handling of its governmental and other obUgations. 

A more definite status was given the Council by Executive Order No. 
2859 of May II, 19 1 8, which empowered the Academy to estabUsh the 
Council as a permanent body. That order also provided that on nomination 
of the Academy the President would designate representatives of the Gov- 
ernment to be members of the Council and further provided that the heads 
of Government departments would co-operate with the work of the Council 
in every way that it required. For the most part, the Council operated 
through divisions in the following fields: foreign relations, educational rela- 
tions, physical sciences, engineering and industrial research, chemistry and 
chemical technology, geology and geography, medical sciences, biology and 
agriculture, anthropology and psychology. . 

In general, the membership of the divisions was made up of official repre- 
sentatives of all the principal national societies or organizations in the fields 
covered by the divisions, of representatives of Government, and of distin- 
guished members at large. The active work of the divisions was carried on 
by committees, either permanent or special, composed of men specially 
qualified for the specific undertakings. Many of the committees were joint 
committees with the Academy. In the spring of 1940, more than 11 00 men 
were actively engaged on National Research Council work as members of 
the Council, its divisions or committees, and the Council was handling a 
large number of research problems and studies for the Army, Navy and 
other departments of Government. 

Useful though the Academy had been in the Civil War and the Research 
Council in World War I, the situation in the spring of 1940 appeared to 
demand a new approach. The number of men in the armed services capable 
of knowing what was needed was small. They, with all other ofl&cers, would 
obviously be swamped with the gigantic task of building an army and navy 
of the size which would be needed if the United States were to be ade- 
quately prepared. The Academy and the Research Council were instruments 
of undoubted usefulness, but the basic statute incorporating the Academy 
was predicated upon the theory that the Academy would act when called 
upon by the Services. Moreover, it was primarily an advisory rather than 
an operating body. The Academy was fortunate in having a man like 
Jewett as its President during the war years, for his industrial background 

r - 


coupled with his great native ability pecuHarly fitted him to appreciate the 
requirements which modern war would make upon scientific and industrial 
establishments. However, what was needed was an organization which 
could make its own assessment of what the armed services needed and 
which could then, preferably with the assistance of the Services but over 
their opposition if necessary, go about the business of getting the necessary 
weapons developed. 

Previous efforts to bring civilian science into the program of weapon 
development were based on the theory that the Services would know what 
they needed and would ask the scientists to aid in its development. Modern 
science has progressed to the point where the military chieftains were not 
sufficiently acquainted with its possibilities to know for what they might 
ask with a reasonable expectation that it could be developed. The times 
called for a reversal of the situation, namely letting men who knew the 
latest advances in science become more familiar with the needs of the mili- 
tary in order that they might tell the military what was possible in science 
so that together they might assess what should be done. It was this con- 
ception which Bush and his colleagues sold to President Roosevelt and 
to which General Marshall and Admiral Stark gave their blessing prior to 
the issuance of the order of the Council of National Defense, which on 
June 27, 1940, established the National Defense Research Committee of the 
Council of National Defense. 



June 27, 1940, to June 28, 1941 


HE Council of National Defense had been created in 1916 
"for the co-ordination of industries and resources for the national security 
and welfare"; it consisted of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, Agri- 
culture, Commerce and Labor. (U. S. Code, Title 50, section i.) The Coun- 
cil was authorized to organize subordinate bodies for its assistance in special 
investigations, including the creation of committees of specially qualified 

The order of the Council which created the National Defense Research 
Committee (NDRC) was issued with the approval of the President on 
June 27, 1940. Of the eight members of the Committee, two were desig- 
nated by virtue of their positions as President of the National Academy of 
Sciences and Commissioner of Patents respectively, four were appointed 
without reference to other ofi&ces, and two were selected by the Secretary 
of War and the Secretary of the Navy respectively. Members of the Com- 
mittee served as such without compensation. The original members of the 
Committee were: Vannevar Bush, President of the Carnegie Institution of 
Washington, electrical engineer, Chairman; Rear Admiral Harold G. Bowen; 
Conway Peyton Coe, Commissioner of Patents, attorney; Karl Taylor Comp- 
ton, President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, physicist; James 
Bryant Conant, President of Harvard University, chemist; Frank Baldwin 
Jewett, President of the National Academy of Sciences and President of the 
Bell Telephone Laboratories, electrical engineer; Brigadier General George 
V. Strong; Richard Chace Tolman, Professor of Physical Chemistry and 
Mathematical Physics, California Institute of Technology, physicist. 

Brigadier General R. C. Moore succeeded General Strong as Army 
member of the Committee on January 17, 1941; otherwise the member- 
ship was unchanged during the one year and one day the Committee func- 
tioned under the Council of National Defense. 

One of the most significant facts about this group was the sense of urgency 
with which it was imbued; the need for speed in developing new and im- 
proved weapons was the central core of all its operations. The fact that the 
civihan members were well known to each other, both personally and pro- 
fessionally, made it easy for them to work together effectively with a mini- 
mum loss of time. 


Authority of the NDRC 

The Committee was directed to correlate and support scientific research 
on the mechanisms and devices of warfare, except those relating to prob- 
lems of flight included in the field of activities of the National Advisory 
Committee for Aeronautics. It was directed to aid and supplement the 
experimental and research activities of the War and Navy Departments; 
and it was authorized to "conduct research for the creation and improve- 
ment of instrumentalities, methods and materials of warfare." The Com- 
mittee was authorized in carrying out its functions to utilize, to the extent 
that such facilities were available for the purpose, the laboratories, equip- 
ment and services of the National Bureau of Standards and other Govern- 
ment institutions. Within the limits of appropriations allocated to it, it was 
authorized to transfer funds to such institutions and to enter into contracts 
with individuals, educational or scientific institutions (including the Na- 
tional Academy of Sciences and the National Research Council), and in- 
dustrial organizations for studies, experimental investigations, and reports. 

The final paragraph of the order authorized the Committee to promulgate 
rules and regulations for the conduct of its work, which rules and regula- 
tions were to be subject to the approval of the Council and the President. 
The Committee never exercised the authority granted in this paragraph, 
the only rules which it adopted being of a procedural nature not requiring 
such approval. 

In his letter of June 15, 1940, appointing Bush Chairman of the Com- 
mittee, President Roosevelt stated specifically that it was not intended that 
the work of the Committee should replace any of the "excellent work" 
which the Army and Navy were carrying on either in their own laboratories 
or by contract with industry. The Committee was directed to "supplement 
this activity by extending the research base and enlisting the aid of the 
scientists who can effectively contribute to the more rapid improvement of 
important devices, and by study determine where new effort on new instru- 
mentalities may be usefully employed." 

Anticipating questions concerning the relation of the new Committee to 
existing agencies, the President in his letter pointed out that the National 
Academy of Sciences and the National Research Council had been formed 
primarily to advise the agencies of Government on scientific matters when 
called upon for such service. He expressed the opinion that these organiza- 
tions would respond cordially to requests from the Committee for advice 
on "such broad scientific problems as may arise." He thought that the 
National Bureau of Standards and other Government laboratories might 
well be able to carry on effectively some of the research which the Com- 
mittee deemed necessary. Research on problems of flight having been en- 


trusted earlier to the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, it was 
excluded from the jurisdiction of the NDRC, but the two committees were 
expected to maintain close relationship. 

One field later to attract a great deal of public interest was specifically 
mentioned in the President's letter. A committee headed by Dr. Lyman J. 
Briggs, Director of the National Bureau of Standards, which had earlier 
been appointed to "study into the possible relationship to national defense 
of recent discoveries in the field of atomistics, notably the fission of uranium" 
was instructed to report to Bush inasmuch as the NDRC might consider 
it advisable to support special studies on this subject. 

Organization of the Committee 

Although the order establishing the Committee was dated June 27, 1940, 
the letters of appointment from the President were dated June 15, and the 
members of the Committee held two informal conferences prior to the 
issuance of the order. Thus, prior to the first formal meeting on July 2, 
1940, members of the Committee had been able to give preliminary con- 
sideration to a number of those problems which confront any new group. 

At its first formal meeting on July 2, 1940, the Committee elected Tolman 
as its Vice-Chairman and selected as its Secretary Irvin Stewart, Director 
of the Corrmiittee on Scientific Aids to Learning of the National Research 
Council, a political scientist. At the same meeting it was decided to estab- 
lish divisions for the preliminary consideration of problems, with each divi- 
sion being supervised by a member of the Committee. Within divisions, 
provision was made for the establishment of as many sections as might be 
needed for the handling of particular types of problems assigned to the 
division. The Committee member supervising a division was authorized to 
proceed on his own responsibility in handling the details of assignments to 
his division and its sections with the understanding that the Chairman of 
the Committee would be kept fully informed at all times and that progress 
reports should be made to the Committee from time to time. The Chair- 
man was given authority to allocate problems to divisions and sections. 

Bush as Chairman had the responsibility for co-ordinating the work of 
the Committee with that of other governmental and private agencies as 
well as maintaining direct supervision over a limited number of problems. 
To assist him. Bush selected as his Executive Assistant Carroll Louis Wilson, 
manager of the Boston Office of the Research Corporation, an engineer 
who had served with both Bush and Compton at M.LT. Responsibility for 
the maintenance of close working relationships between the Committee and 
the military services was assigned to General Strong and Admiral Bowen. 

Five divisions were created and sections were established within the divi- 
sions from time to time as the need for them became apparent. A statement 


of the situation at a particular time would resemble a single frame of a 
moving picture. As of June i, 1941, however, shortly before the reconstitu- 
tion of the Committee as a part of the Office of Scientific Research and 
Development, the organization was as follows: 

Division A (Armor and Ordnance) 
R. C. Tolman, Chairman 
Charles C. Lauritsen, Vice-Chairman (physicist, California Institute of 

Section B (Structural Defense) 

John E. Burchard, Chairman (architectural engineer, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology) 
Section H (Investigations on Propulsion) 

C. N. Hickman, Chairman (physicist, Bell Telephone Laboratories) 
Section S (Terminal Ballistics) 

H. D. Smyth, Chairman (physicist, Princeton University) 
Section T (Proximity Fuzes for Shells) 

M. A, Tuve, Chairman (physicist, Carnegie Institution of Wash- 
Section E (Fuzes and Guided Projectiles) 

Alexander Ellett, Chairman (physicist. University of Iowa) 

Division B (Bombs, Fuels, Gases, Chemical Problems) 
J. B. Conant, Chairman 

Roger Adams, Vice-Chairman (chemist. University of Illinois) 
W. K. Lewis, Vice-Chairman (chemical engineer, M.I.T.) 
Synthetic Problems 

Roger Adams, Division Vice-Chairman 
Section A-i (Explosives) 

G. B. Kistiakowsky, Vice-Chairman (chemist, Harvard Uni- 
Section A-2 (Synthetic Organics) 

Roger Adams, Chairman 
Section A-3 (Detection of Persistent Agents) 

W. C. Johnson, Chairman (chemist. University of Chicago) 
Section A-4 (Toxicity) 

Roger Adams, Acting Chairman 
Physical Chemical Problems 

W. K. Lewis, Division Vice-Chairman 
Section L-i (Aerosols) 

W. H. Rodebush, Chairman (chemist, University of Illinois) 
Section L-2 (Protective Coatings) 

G. O. Curme, Jr., Chairman (chemist. Carbide and Carbon 
Chemicals Corp.) 


Section L-3 (Special Inorganic Problems) 

W. K. Lewis, Chairman 
Section L-4 (Nitrocellulose) 

W. K. Lewis, Chairman 
Section L-5 (Paint Removers) 

J. C. Elgin, Chairman (chemical engineer, Princeton Uni- 
Section L-6 (Higher Oxides) 

W. K. Lewis, Chairman 
Section L-7 (Oxygen Storage) 

C. R. Hoover, Chairman (chemist, Wesleyan University) 
Section L-8 (Gas Drying) 

O. A. Hougen, Chairman (chemical engineer. University of 
Section L-9 (Metallurgical Problems) 

A. E. White, Chairman (metallurgist. University of Michigan) 
Section L-io (Exhaust Disposal) 

W. H. MacAdams, Chairman (chemical engineer, M.LT.) 
Section L-ii (Absorbents) 

W. A. Noyes, Jr., Chairman (chemist, University of Rochester) 
Section L-12 (Oxygen for Airplanes) 

E. F. DuBois, Chairman (physiologist, Cornell University) 
Section L-13 (Hydraulic Fluids) 

G. H. B. Davis, Chairman (chemical engineer. Standard Oil 
Development Co.) 
Miscellaneous Chemical Problems 

Section C-i (Automotive Fuels; Special Problems) 

T. Midgley, Chairman (chemist, Ethyl GasoUne Corp.) 
Section C-2 (Pyrotechnics) 

G. B. Kistiakowsky, Vice-Chairman 
Section C-3 (Special Problems) 

G. A. Richter, Chairman (chemist) 

Division C (Communication and Transportation) 
F. B. Jewett, Chairman 
C. B. Jolliflfe, Vice-Chairman (radio engineer. Radio Corporation of 

Hardey Rowe, Vice-Chairman (chief engineer. United Fruit Company) 
R. D. Booth, Vice-chairman (electrical engineer, Jackson and More- 
J. T. Tate, Vice-Chairman (physicist. University of Minnesota) 
Section C-i (Communications) 
C. B. Jollifle, Chairman 


Section C-2 (Transportation) 

Hartley Rowe, Chairman 
Section C-3 (Mechanical and Electrical Equipment) 

R. D. Booth, Chairman 
Section C-4 (Submarine Studies) 

J. T. Tate, Chairman 
Section C-5 (Sound Sources) 

Harvey Fletcher, Chairman (physicist, Bell Telephone Lab- 

Division D (Detection, Controls, Instruments) 
K, T. Compton, Chairman 

A. L. Loomis, Vice-Chairman (physicist, Loomis Laboratories) 
Section D-i (Detection) 

A. L. Loomis, Chairman 
Section D-2 (Controls) 
Warren Weaver, Chairman (mathematician. Rockefeller 
Section D-3 (Instruments) 

G. R. Harrison, Chairman (physicist, M.I.T.) 
Section D-4 (Heat Radiation) 

A. C. Bemis, Chairman (physicist, M.I.T.) 

Division E (Patents and Invention) 
C. P. Coe, Chairman 

The Committee on Uranium, with L. J. Briggs, Director of the National 
Bureau of Standards, as Chairman, reported directly to the Chairman 
of NDRC. 

The names of division and section members and technical aides have 
been omitted from the above account and will be omitted throughout be- 
cause of space limitations. They are given the recognition they deserve in 
the volumes reporting the activities of the divisions and sections. 

At its first meeting the Committee decided to operate primarily through 
contracts. This decision was never modified, and at no time did the Com- 
mittee establish its own laboratories or attempt to conduct scientific research 
through its own staff. The preliminary investigations leading to the recom- 
mendation of contracts normally originated with sections which communi- 
cated their recommendations through the chairman of the appropriate 
division to the Committee. The Committee reserved to itself the right to 
decide whether and upon what terms it would enter into contracts. 

By formal resolution the Committee announced that it would make use 
of existing agencies wherever possible and in particular the National 
Academy of Sciences and the National Research Council in matters fall- 
ing within their particular competence; it would act directly or create new 


agencies only when it could find no existing agency competent to handle a 
particular problem or when the exigencies of the situation made such direct 
action desirable. 

The quorum for the Committee was set at five members. 

Arrangements were made through the Advisory Commission to the 
Council of National Defense for the Committee to obtain the advice of the 
Legal Division of the Treasury Department. The individual assigned by the 
Treasury Department to this task was Oscar S. Cox, assistant to the general 
counsel of the department. Cox appreciated the importance of the task 
assigned to the Committee and his advice and counsel throughout the 
formative days of the Committee as well as during some of its more active 
operations were invaluable. When he moved from the Treasury Depart- 
ment to the Office for Emergency Management and to the Department of 
Justice, the Committee continued to benefit by his advice. In particular he 
deserves a great deal of credit for the form of contract adopted by the 
Committee which proved a very successful vehicle for the conduct of re- 
search on military devices in a period of great stress. 

The Committee met at intervals of approximately one month. At first it 
considered proposals laid before it by members at any meeting without a 
requirement of advance circulation. At the meeting on March 7, 1941, 
however, it was agreed in principle that proposals would be circulated to 
members sufficiendy in advance of the meeting at which they were to be 
considered to permit the Army and Navy members to compare the pro- 
posals with research already under way in the Services in order that they 
might be prepared to advise the Committee on the relation of the proposals 
to such research. It was recognized, nevertheless, that at times it might be 
necessary to dispense with such advance circulation in the case of urgent 
projects. This procedure became standard practice; it gready aided in speed- 
ing up the deliberations of the Committee by permitting the members to 
focus their discussion on those points about which they were not satisfied 
by the presentation in the proposal itself. 

The action of the Committee in adopting a proposal consdtuted an 
authorization to the Chairman to negotiate a contract. The Chairman in 
turn delegated to the Secretary the responsibility for reaching an agreement 
with the proposed contractor and preparing the contract for signature. In 
most cases, preliminary discussions had already been held between the sci- 
entific personnel of NDRC and members of the scientific staff of the 
proposed contractor. Those conversations had established the fact that the 
scientific stafE at the designated institution felt that it had the facilities and 
the manpower to undertake the proposed research and that the NDRC 
scientists believed that the work would be well done at the institution. The 
general outline of the scientific work had been agreed upon and the maxi- 
mum amount of money to be expended was that which had been recom- 


mended to and approved by the Committee. The Secretary's staff put the 
information submitted by the division into the standard form contract 
v^^hich was then submitted to the division for checking to be sure that the 
contract adequately reflected the desires of the division. If approved by the 
division, the contract was then sent to the contractor for signature. After 
signature by the contractor, the contract was signed on behalf of the Gov- 
ernment by the Chairman, or in his absence by the Vice-Chairman, pursuant 
to authorization of the Committee. 

In the early days of NDRC, the arrival of a contract on the campus was 
apparently the first intimation the administrative authorities of some aca- 
demic institutions had that they were under discussion. The first contract 
submitted to an institution was frequendy followed by a substantial amount 
of correspondence before the institution was prepared to sign. Later con- 
tracts with the same institution usually went through more rapidly as the 
administrative authorities apparently needed merely to check with the 
scientific staff to be sure that the work called for by the contract was con- 
sidered to be within the capabilities of the staff. 

Relations with the National Academy of Sciences and the 

National Research Council 

The relation of these two bodies to the newly created NDRC was set out 
m a memorandum sent by Jewett, as President of the Academy, to some 
700 academic institutions on June 26, 1940. The description of the Academy 
and Council given in the preceding chapter was taken largely from that 

That the NDRC would have special relationships with the Academy and 
the Council was foreseen in the order establishing NDRC which specifi- 
cally mentioned the Academy and the Council as institutions with which 
the NDRC might enter into contracts. Moreover, the President's letter of 
June 15, 1940, appointing Bush as Chairman of the Committee expressed 
his confidence that the Academy and the Council would respond cordially 
to requests from the Committee for advice on such broad scientific problems 
as might arise. 

At its first meeting, the Committee passed a resolution requesting the co- 
of)eration of the Academy and the Council, especially through the Council 
sections of physics, chemistry, and engineering and through the special 
committees on problems relating to national defense. A memorandum 
attached to the resolution stated as an example that the sections of physics, 
chemistry and engineering from time to time would be requested to take 
over certain types of problems and arrange for their allocation to various 
members of the academic profession working in their own laboratories on 
a volunteer basis. The problems would, for the most part, be basic problems 


not of a confidential nature, in connection with which secrecy would be of 
relatively little importance. They would also be of a nature that the research 
need not be undertaken under great pressure and a reasonable amount of 
time could be allowed for the completion of the study in question. 

As an illustration of the type of study which the Committee requested 
of the National Research Council there may be cited a resolution passed 
by the Committee at its meeting on August 29, 1940, requesting the Coun- 
cil to set up a special committee or committees to make a study of eutectic 
diagrams of ammonium nitrate and other substances, and of ammonium 
perchlorate and other substances, a study of the problem of finding a plastic 
that could be used as a substitute for optical glass, and a study of protective 
coatings to take the place of tin. 

After a number of specific studies had been requested of the Council, the 
Committee at its meeting on January 17, 1941, authorized a general contract 
with the Academy for the preparation of reports by the Council upon sub- 
jects to be agreed upon by the Committee and the Council, the cost of such 
reports to be defrayed by the Committee in a total amount not to exceed 
a specified sum. Under this contract, reports were called for from time 
to time and the amount of the contract was adjusted accordingly. In addi- 
tion, specific contracts were made for more extended studies. The Council 
called innumerable meetings of specialists in particular fields to assist the 
sections of NDRC in focussing upon particular problems the attention of 
competent men. 

The relations between the Committee, the Academy and the Council 
were cordial and profitable. Especially close relations were established and 
maintained between the Committee on Medical Research and the Council 
after the creation of OSRD. To help defray the indirect costs of the 
Academy in meeting these requests as well as the constantly increasing 
requests of the Army and Navy, the OSRD appropriation bills carried an 
item specifically for the purpose. 

Scope of Activities 

The respective jurisdictions of the NDRC and of the National Advisory 
Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) were clarified by a memorandum 
joindy signed on behalf of the two organizations in February 1941. The 
memorandum stated that the NACA was definitely engaged in research on 
aerodynamics, on power plants, on materials and on structures, and that 
the work on power plants included aeronautical fuels and lubricants. It 
further recited that the NACA had not engaged in research on ordnance, 
on radio communications or on medical problems in connection with aero- 
nautics. The general scope of NDRC jurisdiction was noted, and it was 
agreed that the language of the order creating it contemplated that the 


NDRC might engage in research on devices and mechanisms of warfare 
having aerodynamic or aeronautical aspects, provided the NACA was not 
itself engaged in that particular kind of research. 

The working arrangement was summarized as follows: 

The NDRC should not ordinarily enter upon research within the field of ac- 
tivities of the NACA as indicated by the lines of work of the present Committees 
and Subcommittees which direct NACA research, but may properly be concerned 
with research having to do with aerodynamic or aeronautical matters outside of 
the field thus defined. Moreover, when a problem is of such breadth that it has 
features within the scope of activities of the NACA and also features pertinent to 
nonaeronautical aspects of warfare, then either organization may properly con- 
duct such research, provided that economies appear to result from a unitary 
consideration. In such cases it would appear to be desirable that the matter be 
discussed between officers of the two organizations before the research is under- 

With the scope of the Committee's activities outlined in general terms 
in the order creating it, borderline situations were inevitable. One spectac- 
ular problem upon which national attention was being focussed was that 
of the shortage of natural rubber and the need for large-scale production 
of synthetic rubber. Should rubber be considered a material of war to which 
the Committee should give attention? 

The NDRC decided to place a strict interpretation upon the scope of its 
authorized activities. This interpretation was formalized by a resolution 
adopted at the fifth meeting of the Committee on November 29, 1940. The 
resolution read as follows: 

Resolved, that the National Defense Research Committee by reason of the order 
of the Council of National Defense which established it, is concerned with 
scientific research on and development of new instrumentalities or materials of 
war, or of new materials or methods to be used primarily in the manufacture of 
instruments of war; and of the improvement of existing instrumentalities or 
materials of war, or of existing material or methods to be used primarily in the 
manufacmre of instruments of war. Where a material or method is widely used 
or useful in industry, in addition to its use in the manufacture of instruments of 
war, as for example in the case of substitute materials of wide utility, the research 
and development involved do not lie within the province of the National De- 
fense Research Committee, but rather within the province of many existing in- 
dustrial and scientific research agencies, and in particular, when appropriate re- 
quests for investigation or research in such fields are made by government 
agencies, within the province of the National Academy of Sciences and the Na- 
tional Research Council. 

This resolution was transmitted to the members of the various sections 
of the Committee with a letter stating that in case of doubt as to whether 


a particular matter was one of primary concern to national defense, the 
Committee would be guided by the Army and the Navy. The resolution 
was also released for publication in order that scientists might become 
acquainted with the Committee's policy. 

The initial decision hmiting the scope of NDRC acdvities is believed to 
have been sound. In a period of total war it becomes difl&cult to say what 
part of the economy is not related to national defense. It would have been 
easy for the NDRC to have construed its charter as opening a much wider 
field of activities. In view of the liberality with which funds were appro- 
priated during the war years, it is quite probable that the Committee would 
have been able to obtain funds to support a broader program. In practice, 
the limiting factor upon the Committee was always that of manpower. 
Widening the scope of the Committee's activities would not have added to 
the number of men available to work on the program. It would have 
resulted in a dilution of effort which might have obtained significant results 
in other areas, but in all probability only at the expense of work bearing 
more immediately on weapons. By deliberately confining its efforts to a 
relatively narrow field, the Committee was able to concentrate manpower 
in those areas which seemed most likely to be productive of the best results. 
It may be charged that by refusing to enter certain lines of activity, the 
Committee was responsible for delay in obtaining answers to other impor- 
tant problems confronting the nation. The easy answer to such a charge 
would be to point to what the Committee did with the available manpower 
and inquire whether the diversion of that manpower to the other problems 
would have been in the over-all national interest. The members of the Com- 
mittee never had any doubt as to the accuracy of the original decision to 
limit the scope of NDRC activities. 

The decision was adhered to in practice with minor exceptions. Some 
work in the field of metallurgy, for instance in connection with armor plate, 
was obviously within the Committee's scope; but once a division had been 
established to work on metallurgical problems, its activities tended to ex- 
pand to include some of a more general nature which might well have 
been excluded. Similarly, at the request of the Quartermaster Corps, the 
Committee undertook a number of studies on Quartermaster problems with 
considerable reluctance. While it was felt that the problems should have 
been handled elsewhere, they were undertaken by the Committee because 
there appeared to be no other way of handUng them in time to be most 
useful to the war effort. 

One result of the strict limitation of activities adopted by the NDRC 
was the later estabhshment within the War Production Board of an Office 
of Production Research and Development with which NDRC maintained 
cordial relations. 


Origin of Projects 

The one project specifically assigned to the Committee by the President 
was that of "the possible relationship to national defense of recent discov- 
eries in the field of atomistics, notably the fission of uranium." A committee 
on this subject which had previously been set up by the President was 
directed by him to report to the NDRC. . r v f 

The Committee received a flying start by the submission to it ot lists ot 
projects upon which the Services were engaged, together with lists of other 
projects which the Services thought were important but which they had 
neither funds nor manpower to handle. Those lists were studied by Comp- 
ton, the projects were apportioned among the NDRC divisions, and hrst 

attention was paid to them. 

From the outset, NDRC asserted the right to exercise an independent 
judgment as to the projects which it should start as well as the method of 
attack upon them. Although the Committee was established to aid the 
Army and the Navy, it insisted that the method of rendering that assistance 
was for its own decision. Thus, upon occasion it refused to undertake a 
particular piece of research requested by the Services because of its feeling 
That the manpower required could be better spent on more important 
projects or on those more likely to succeed. Conversely, upon occasion the 
NDRC initiated and supported projects in spite of the indifference or even 
over the opposition of the Services. Many of its projects were initiated 
without support from the Army and Navy, although for most of these the 
support of the Services was forthcoming later. In most cases, however, work 
undertaken by NDRC was at the direct request of either the Army, the 

Navy or both. , , . i 

Clearly the Services were in a good position to know their own weaknesses 
and therefore to indicate places where results were needed. This was recog- 
nized by the Committee and every attempt was made to accomplish results 
requested by the Services. Similarly, when scientists working with the Com- 
mittee felt that particular scientific techniques or developments might have 
military applications, they were brought to the attention of appropriate 
military authorities in an effort, usually successful, to stir up Service interest 
in such developments. 

Problems of Contract 

The decision that the Committee would not engage direcdy in research 
made the development of an effective contract essential. Research presup- 
poses the possibility of failure and a research contract should recognize that 
fact An exploration of the unknown carries an inherent possibihty that the 


results may not be worth the cost. If the Committee were to confine its 
operations to those areas with the greatest possibiUty of success, it would 
stay out of fields where successful research might yield the greatest benefit. 
Ideally, the best scientific imaginations in the country should be given free 
play on problems of military value without being harassed by excessive 
supervision or the observation of forms designed for other occasions. 

Yet Government funds were being expended. In times past, there had 
been abuses in the expenditure of some Government funds, and for the pre- 
vention of such abuses in the future a formidable mass of regulations had 
been devised. The heart of the contract problem was to reconcile the need 
of the scientist for complete freedom with assurances that Government funds 
would not be improperly expended. One of the most significant contribu- 
tions of NDRC and OSRD was the writing and administration of a form 
of contract which reconciled these two requirements. 

The development of the contract form will be treated in detail in a later 
chapter. One early decision of the Committee must be mentioned here, how- 
ever. It was the adoption of the principle that research should not in itself 
yield a financial profit. Inasmuch as academic institutions are not run to 
earn financial profits, no difficulty was anticipated or experienced in obtain- 
ing recognition of this principle in contracts with such institutions. In the 
case of industrial establishments, the same principle was applied upon the 
theory that profit is a function of the production activities of an industrial 
establishment, not of its research department. There was no difi&culty in 
obtaining recognition of the no-profit principle on the part of large indus- 
trial concerns with well-established production departments. The principle 
did render it difficult for the Committee to work with small industrial or- 
ganizations, especially where the desired research was of a type which 
would not be likely to fit into such productive capacity as the company 

While the no-profit principle was accepted by the Committee, it did recog- 
nize that research should pay its own way. There was early discussion as 
to whether the NDRC contracts should pay the full cost of the research 
done under them, including a proportionate part of the indirect expenses 
incurred by any going concern, or only those direct costs added to opera- 
tions as a result of the NDRC contract. The decision taken at the outset to 
pay the full cost was amply justified by experience. 

A difficult problem which arose immediately was the disposition of patent 
rights on developments made as a result of NDRC contracts. The point is 
one which is treated at considerable length in later pages. It may be noted, 
however, that the differences of opinion with respect to patent rights con- 
stituted a serious stumbling block in the negotiation of NDRC contracts 
for several months. The net effect would have been seriously to delay NDRC 
operations except for the fact that potential contractors began research under 


letters of intent issued by the Committee and expended their own funds 
without reimbursement for several months while a mutually acceptable 
patent clause was being whipped into shape. 

Another element causing delay in the writing of contracts initially was 
the desire on the part of each prospective contractor to crystallize his own 
thinking as to the type of obligations he was prepared to assume. On its 
part, NDRC was discovering on the basis of its limited experience addi- 
tional clauses which it desired to have inserted in the simple form of con- 
tract originally adopted. It was quite possible, therefore, for NDRC to send 
out a draft contract for signature, have that draft considered by the con- 
tractor and returned with the request for amendment, and send it again to 
the contractor with still further changes which the NDRC itself desired to 
propose. Each contractor had changes to propose in the standard form 
which differed from the changes proposed by other contractors. The NDRC 
staff drafting contracts was small while the number of new contracts and 
new contractors proposed by NDRC steadily increased as did the variety of 
changes requested by contractors. The result was a succession of hectic days 
until it became possible to reduce the problems to a limited number of 
categories which could be dealt with as such rather than as a constant suc- 
cession of individual variations. The attempt originally was to draft con- 
tracts in the order in which they were proposed by the Committee. This 
had to be abandoned in favor of a plan for a limited type of mass produc- 
tion of those contracts which could follow the standard form as drafted 
or with very slight variations. Those contracts, of which there was a sub- 
stantial number, which required prolonged negotiation because of rather 
decided differences of opinion between the Committee and the proposed 
contractors, were pulled out in a separate operation which did not interfere 
with the simpler contracts. One by one the more difficult contracts were 
disposed of, but there were many cases where the contractor worked for a 
number of months before receiving a signed contract upon which he could 
obtain reimbursement. As an indication of the time lag in the early days, 
it may be mentioned that as of January 17, 1941, the NDRC had recom- 
mended 184 contracts while only 50 had been signed. 

Selection of Contractors 

At the outset the Committee faced squarely the problem of the best way 
to utilize the scientific personnel of the country. Many leading scientists had 
become seriously concerned over the progress of events in Europe and were 
keenly desirous of engaging in scientific work which might better prepare 
the United States for any eventuality. There was a concurrent desire on the 
part of some key individuals in the military services to avail themselves of 
the ability and the eagerness of the scientists. In trying to bring the two 


together, the Committee faced the necessity of making certain decisions. 
What scientists should be put to work on miUtary problems and on what 
specific problems? Should scientists be left to work in their own labora- 
tories or be brought together in other laboratories already existing or 
to be created? What steps should be taken to insure that laboratory work 
would be carried on under conditions compatible with military security? 

An obvious first step was to find out what existing facilities were avail- 
able for the work of the Committee, for the Committee early decided that 
existing agencies should be used wherever possible. A companion decision 
was that before any action would be taken requiring the withdrawal of a 
key individual from an institution for work elsewhere, the effect of the 
withdrawal upon the research work of the institution should be considered. 

At the first preliminary meeting of the Committee on June i8, 1940, 
Conant was given the job of accumulating information about the research 
facilities and personnel of a group of leading educational institutions. Jewett, 
as President of the Academy, agreed to assemble similar information from 
a much larger group of educational institutions, while, as a member of 
NDRC, he investigated the available research facilities of a number of in- 
dustrial organizations. At the same time Compton was to ascertain (i) mili- 
tary developments under way in Government laboratories with special 
attention to programs likely to be slowed down in the interest of imme- 
diate production, (2) developments considered desirable by the armed 
services but not under way, and (3) military research programs which it 
would be desirable to supplement. 

Conant sent a letter to fifty of the leading educational research centers 
on June 28, 1940, pointing out that the NDRC would not replace any of 
the research work being carried on by the armed services and the NACA 
either in their own laboratories or through co-operation with civilian insti- 
tutions, but would supplement those activities "by extending the research 
base and enlisting the co-operation of institutions and scientists who can 
effectively contribute to the more rapid development of important instru- 
mentahties of warfare." The institutions were requested to supply an out- 
line of their special faciUties and personnel for research in indicated fields 
and also to include a description of specific research projects on which the 
staff were presently engaged and which might have an application in devices 
or mechanisms of warfare. The fields mentioned in the letter were physical 
chemistry, organic chemistry, physics, optics, electricity, acoustics, me- 
chanics, physical metallurgy, and civil, mechanical, electrical and chemical 
engineering. The letter also requested the names of the leading staff mem- 
bers who might be prepared to conduct research on special problems in 
the fields in which the institution was exceptionally qualified for research 
as well as a notation on the special equipment for research in any of those 


Conant's letter followed by two days a letter sent out by Jewett as Presi- 
dent of the National Academy of Sciences to approximately 700 academic 
institutions. Jewett's letter oudined the relations between the Academy, the 
Research Council and the NDRC and requested concise information with 
respect to special facilities for the conduct of research in the fields of science, 
special competence of the staff in any department of science to conduct 
research, and names of individuals on the staff with outstanding ability as 
research investigators in the fields of science. 

The replies to Conant's and Jewett's letters were abstracted in a loose-leaf 
mimeographed document entided "Research Facilities of Certain Educa- 
tional and Scientific Institutions" which, with additions from time to time, 
was sent to members of the Committee, Division Chairmen, Vice-Chairmen 
and Section Chairmen. In the early days of the Committee particularly it 
was a standard reference work used to supplement the already extensive 
information about research facilities possessed by the key personnel of 
NDRC as a result of their normal activities. 

Although no comparable survey of industrial research facilities was made 
by the Committee, members of the Committee, especially Jewett, and mem- 
bers of the divisions and sections possessed in the aggregate a large amount 
of information about such facilities and the extent to which they were 
being used for military research. 

In placing contracts, the Committee kept constandy in mind the necessity 
of avoiding an overload upon those facilities which were already being 
called upon by the Army and the Navy direcdy. 

One factor uppermost in the minds of the Committee was the need for 
speed. No one knew when the occasion would arise for the instrumentalities 
and weapons which the Committee hoped to create. It was desirable to have 
as much of this material as possible in the hands of American troops when- 
ever they might be called upon to do batde. Before that, they should have 
the equipment in sufficient dme to permit adequate training in its use. 
Before that, there must be production and in many cases, production in 
quantity. Before that came development, which in turn was preceded by 
research; and first of all was the need for the selecdon of the problems and 
the institutions to work upon them. The time interval between the incep- 
tion of an idea and the use of the finished product upon the batdefield 
would normally run into several years. There was ever present in the minds 
of the Committee the possibility that the need would arise before the equip- 
ment could be completed. There was thus a sense of urgency in the selecdon 
of contractors. Of course, it would have been nice to make some kind of 
geographical distribudon of contracts, to build up research facilities in 
insdtutions not presendy possessing them, to have some mathemaucally 
determined basis for the allocadon of research among institutions. But the 
need for speed hung like a sword over the head of the Committee and 


speed meant that problems should be assigned to those institutions with the 
facilities and the manpower which promised the best results in the shortest 
possible time. 

Where problems which might properly be handled by the Committee 
had a lower order of urgency, a wider distribution of contracts was possible. 
This was also the case where problems were of such a nature as to permit 
their division into a number of unrelated parts upon each of which a few 
men at a number of different institutions might be engaged. In the field 
of chemical warfare, for instance, there were cases where a competent 
chemist with a small number of assistants could attack a discrete problem. 
On the other hand, concentration was demanded by many problems in the 
field of physics where each part had an intimate connection with all other 
parts of an over-all system. 

In the beginning the Committee attempted to place contracts with aca- 
demic institutions in a manner which would cause the least disturbance to 
educational programs. If the contingency against which the Committee was 
created should occur, there would be need for all the scientists whom the 
academic institutions could train. Any unnecessary disruption of the train- 
ing program in science was obviously to be avoided. As far as possible, 
contracts were placed in such a manner as to permit the key scientist to 
remain in his own laboratory available for consultation with advanced 

In certain areas, disruption of educational programs could not be avoided. 
Thus, while the attention of the country was drawn to the losses incident 
to modern submarine warfare, there was no great center of information 
and activity with reference to underwater phenomena which could serve 
as the focal point of a big program of antisubmarine warfare. Two such 
centers were established by the Committee at an early date — one under a 
contract with Columbia University at New London, Connecticut; the other 
under a contract with the University of California at San Diego, California. 
A similar situation existed in the field of radar. While some work in long- 
wave radar had been done in this country, the field of microwave radar 
was unexplored. Any comprehensive program in this field would have to 
start from scratch. After considerable search for an appropriate contractor, 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology was selected as being both quali- 
fied from the standpoint of men and facilities to initiate a microwave radar 
research program and willing to undertake the substantial responsibilities 
attached to such an undertaking. Rocket development was another back- 
ward area in which need for concentration was apparent, and there was no 
staff at any institution with closely related peacetime activities. The Cali- 
fornia Institute of Technology and George Washington University, sep- 
arated by a continent from each other, were pressed into service on two 
distinct phases of rocket activity. 


In each of these special cases and in others which arose from time to time, 
it was necessary for the contracting institution to recruit additions to its 
staff on a large scale. As the activities expanded, each institution added 
substantially to its scientific staff and even more to the supporting technical 
personnel below the staff level. 

The headaches incident to building up the new staffs were many. Scien- 
tific staff members could be obtained for the most part only from other 
academic institutions. Granted a desire to assist most effectively in the de- 
fense program, each institution had its student body to consider as well as 
research programs in progress which it hoped to complete. Obtaining a staff 
was not made any easier by the fact that NDRC contracts ran for stated 
periods which did not correspond with the academic year, so that the scien- 
tist leaving his own institution to accept employment under NDRC con- 
tract at another institution was faced with the possibility that he might 
find himself without employment for several months. A real burden was 
thrown upon university administrative authorities who had to arrange 
teaching schedules and maintain a balance between those men who would 
be released for war work elsewhere and those who would be denied release 
in order that teaching obligations might be met. The institutions employ- 
ing scientists from other institutions on war work were in turn confronted 
with occasional difficulties in the relations between the members of their 
teaching staffs and the men working on contract. Salary differentials began 
to creep in, particularly as the manpower situation became tighter and 
competent men had more than one opportunity to engage in war research. 
The steps taken by NDRC to cope with the situation so far as its contracts 
were concerned are reported later in the present narrative. Universities and 
colleges will continue to feel the effects for a number of years, although it 
is probable that salary increases were inevitable and that colleges are suffer- 
ing no more in this respect than other segments of an economy struggling 
to readjust itself to the aftermath of a great war. 

Inasmuch as the Radiation Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology grew to be the largest single activity of NDRC, a word as to 
the method of selection of the contractor is indicated. On October 25, 1940, 
when the contract was originally proposed. Bush reported that both he and 
the Microwave Section of Division D, acting independently of each other, 
had made surveys of Government laboratories, including those of the Bu- 
reau of Standards and of the Army and Navy, as well as of commercial 
laboratories and had come to the conclusion that no existing laboratory 
was equipped or manned to carry out the research contemplated under the 
microwave program. The requirements for the laboratory involved an im- 
mediate need for substantial space, the equipment of a subsidiary hangar 
laboratory at a nearby airport, top-flight scientific staff capable of expan- 
sion and the ability and willingness on the part of the contractor to under- 


take a substantial expansion which was almost inevitable if the research 
program should prove successful. The investigation by the Microwave 
Section led it to conclude that the only available institution at which the 
work could be done with the desired speed was the Massachusetts Insti- 
tute of Technology. Although Compton was President of Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, he informed the Committee that he had taken 
no part in the discussions leading to the recommendation of the Micro- 
wave Section; and following the practice uniformly observed by the Com- 
mittee, he took no part in the decision to locate the laboratory at the 
institution which he headed. 

Fiscal Considerations 

A considerable portion of the first meeting of the Committee was de- 
voted to a discussion of the amount of money which it should request be 
allocated to it. One method of approach was that of estimating the number 
of scientists who could effectively be employed on new research on instru- 
ments of warfare without disrupting other academic or industrial research 
to an unwarranted extent, together with an average total cost of maintain- 
ing a scientist effectively employed with proper aid and materials. An- 
other approach was that of estimating the number of problems before the 
Committee members as a result of preliminary studies and the probable 
extension of that number. Comparisons were made with the total research 
budgets of academic institutions, industries and Government. The Com- 
mittee endeavored to arrive at an amount which would be sufficient to 
permit an adequate attack on the problems facing it and yet would be no 
greater than probably could be expended effectively under its direction. 
After extended discussion, it was agreed that $10,000,000 would be the 
proper amount and the Chairman was authorized to request the allocation 
of that sum by the Bureau of the Budget and the President. 

In retrospect, the requested amount appears low in view of the fact that 
in their five most active years the NDRC and OSRD contracted for the 
expenditure of over $500,000,000. Much of this amount, however, went for 
purposes not contemplated by the Committee at its first meeting; expendi- 
tures mounted rapidly when the emphasis was changed from research to 
development following the attack on Pearl Harbor. Although the Commit- 
tee received only approximately $6,500,000 of the requested $10,000,000 
for its first year's operation, its activities were not hampered by lack of 
funds; and it is unlikely that the cost of its operations would have been 
much different had the allocated amount been two or three times as great 
as it was. 

The order establishing the Committee contemplated that use would be 
made of existing Government laboratories and that funds would be trans- 


ferred from the Committee to the agency operating a laboratory to defray 
the cost of the requested work. A procedure for effecting such transfers 
worked out in conjunction with the Council of National Defense and the 
Bureau of the Budget was adopted at the second meeting of the Com- 
mittee. Under it, the Committee initiated negotiations with the appropriate 
Federal agencies for the provision of specialized services necessary to the 
Committee's research program. After agreement with the servicing agency, 
a statement of the project was transmitted to the Council of National De- 
fense for administrative clearance, for clearance as to the availability of 
funds and for accounting purposes. After this it was reviewed by the 
Bureau of the Budget primarily to insure that funds were not transferred to 
an agency to support work for which that agency had already received 
appropriations. The most significant point about the rather detailed pro- 
cedure was that it recognized the finality of the NDRC decision as to the 
desirability of the scientific program. 


In setting up the NDRC, President Roosevelt set the pattern for availing 
the Government of the services of top scientists without compensation. 
The order specifically provided that the members of the Committee should 
serve as such without compensation. This was one of the most important 
elements contributing to the success of NDRC. An arrangement which left 
Bush at the Carnegie Institution of Washington, Conant at Harvard and 
Compton at Massachusetts Institute of Technology made it possible for 
the Government to use the services of these men at a critical time when 
it might not have been possible to get them if they had been called upon 
to surrender their regular positions. 

When the NDRC started functioning, it found itself in a similar posi- 
tion. It was frequendy possible to obtain the services of a top-flight scien- 
tist for one or two days a week without compensation when it would 
have been impossible to get him had there been a requirement that he be 
employed full time by the Government. 

It cannot be too often stated that a large part of the success which at- 
tended the efforts of the NDRC and the OSRD is due to the services of 
persons serving without compensation from the Government. Only a few 
whose activities touched upon administration can be named in the pres- 
ent volume. Many of their colleagues are named in other volumes report- 
ing in detail the activities of the NDRC and OSRD in specific subject fields. 

In building its personnel the Committee started from scratch. The Ad- 
visory Commission of the Council of National Defense was instructed by 
the President to lend assistance in the recruiting of personnel for the Com- 
mittee. Initial recruitment was for secretarial and clerical assistance, as the 


first scientists were serving as volunteers. Arrangements were made with 
the Civil Service Commission for the establishment of a series of positions 
as Technical Aide to be filled by qualified scientists. The Technical Aides 
were an important element in the scientific staff; they furnished the con- 
tinuity needed for the day-to-day operations. While many were younger 
men who operated under the supervision of their seniors, others were men 
of distinction comparable to the volunteer scientists heading the organ- 

The story of the recruiting and retention of scientific personnel is told in 
a later chapter as is the story of the administrative personnel. Note need 
be made here only of the fact that at no time during the five years of its 
very active existence was the NDRC or its successor OSRD adequately 
manned. Starting from nothing, the staff was built gradually only after 
the need for particular positions became clear. By the time individuals 
were trained in particular jobs, the organization had grown to the point 
where further recruiting was necessary and additional types of activities 
were added. The outbreak of the war which mushroomed the OSRD pro- 
gram and expenditures was accompanied by a general tightening of the 
manpower situation which made it impossible to recruit personnel in 
adequate numbers. 


The Committee recognized that the Army and the Navy would have 
to be convinced that it could make use of civilian scientists under condi- 
tions compatible with military security; for, after all, to be most useful 
the Committee should work in areas of military weakness, and it would 
hardly be appropriate to indicate those areas to a potential enemy. At 
the same time, it recognized the equal importance of convincing scientists 
that ways could be found to permit them to work effectively within the 
limits of military security. 

As a first step the members of the Committee took an oath of allegiance 
to the United States and required each person accepting appointment in 
any division or section to do so. Clerical personnel were required to take 
an oath not to divulge any secret or confidential information acquired by 
reason of their connection with the Committee unless authorized to do so 
by the Chairman or a member of the Committee. Each person receiving 
an appointment from the Committee received a letter stressing the need 
for the utmost secrecy in regard to all the activities which would come to 
his attention in connection with the appointment. The letter pointed out 
that the problems with which the Committee was concerned originated in 
the Army and the Navy and that only high officers of those Services were 
in a position to decide to whom the results obtained should be communi- 


cated even within the Services themselves. Appointees were further advised 
that the Committee's investigations could not be discussed with any per- 
sons, civilian, military or naval, except as designated by the Committee or 
its duly authorized representatives. 

In order better to impress upon scientists in laboratories the need for 
secrecy, the Committee adopted the policy of appointing the chief investi- 
gator under each contract as "official investigator" and requiring him to 
sign a pledge of secrecy binding him not to disclose any confidential in- 
formation regarding the research except to others engaged in work on 
the specific problem under direction of the Committee, or to persons ap- 
proved by representatives of the Committee. Each official investigator was 
given a commission of appointment which among other things stated that 
he had taken an oath of allegiance to the United States and subscribed 
to the pledge of secrecy. 

The appointment of official investigators led to some administrative com- 
plications, but there is no reason to doubt that the appointments served 
their express purpose of impressing upon the appointee the need for se- 
crecy. The Committee felt it desirable to place such stress upon secrecy 
because the tradition of scientists in academic institutions is to give wide 
distribution to the results of their research. 

Another step in the maintenance of security was that of compartmen- 
taUzation of information. The Committee adopted as a guiding principle 
that no person associated with it desired to have or would be given any 
classified information except that needed for the performance of the par- 
ticular tasks which had been entrusted to him. In practice this meant that 
relatively few individuals were acquainted with the entire program of 
operations of NDRC. Only the members and Secretary of the Committee 
and a few members of the central stafi had a picture of the over-all oper- 
ations of the organization; members of a division were given information 
relating only to the problems of that division and members of a section 
only information relating to the problems of the section. Such compart- 
mentalization had within it the seeds of inefficiency inasmuch as it was 
quite possible for one section to be in possession of information which might 
be valuable to another section. In theory the Committee members and 
later the Office of the Chairman had the responsibility for seeing that infor- 
mation crossed divisional lines whenever research would be speeded thereby. 
In numerous cases transmission of information across divisional Unes was 
authorized and it was always the prerogative of the Division Chief to 
request information which he believed to be in the possession of another 
division and which would be useful to his activities. Unfortunately, how- 
ever, there were cases in which information in the possession of one divi- 
sion of NDRC was not known to another division, although it would have 
been very useful to the second division. 


Compartmentalization of information had as its purpose the restriction 
of the amount of damage which could be caused if any individual became 
indiscreet. In view of the fact that there were apparendy no serious indis- 
cretions of NDRC or OSRD personnel resulting in the unauthorized dis- 
closure of information, it appears in retrospect that compartmentaHzation 
of information to the extent practiced was not in fact needed. It is highly 
probable, however, that the existence of compartmentalization made the 
armed services more willing to entrust their classified information to the 
NDRC during the early period when the ability of the organization to 
keep secrets had not yet been demonstrated. 

Another aspect of the security problem related to the handling of classi- 
fied information within NDRC. At its first meeting the Committee in- 
structed the Secretary to review the Army and Navy regulations regard- 
ing secret, confidential and restricted matters and to submit a draft of a 
resolution on the subject for the consideration of the Committee. Such a 
resolution was adopted at the second meeting on August 29, 1940. It pro- 
vided (i) that any matter of such nature that special precautions should 
be taken to insure that information concerning it should be permanendy 
or temporarily limited in circulation should be classified as secret, confiden- 
tial or restricted; (2) that matter originating with the Army or the Navy 
should be placed in the classificadon suggested by the originating depart- 
ment and handled in accordance with the procedure established by that 
department for matter of its class except as indicated below; (3) that mat- 
ter originating outside the Army and Navy should be classified by the 
Secretary after consultation with the Army and the Navy; (4) that when 
classification was applied by the Committee, the Army and Navy rules as 
to handling procedure should apply, and in case of conflict between those 
rules the more stringent should be used; (5) that material originating with 
a section or division might be tentatively classified by the originadng unit 
which should transmit it to the Secretary for permanent classification; 

(6) that the Secretary, in consultation with the Chairman of the division 
or section handling the particular matter, should be responsible for deter- 
mining the individuals entitled to receive classified information; and 

(7) that copies of the applicable Army or Navy reguladons regarding 
classified matter should be furnished to each person authorized to receive 
classified information. 

A further aspect of the security problem had to do with the acceptability 
of particular individuals to the armed services from the standpoint of their 
loyalty and discretion. This rapidly became one of the principal headaches 
of NDRC and was the source of irritation and delay throughout the history 
of NDRC and OSRD. The problem was loosely defined as one of "clear- 
ance," a term which had different meanings at different times. The prob- 
lem, which became particularly acute in connection with personnel of 


contractors, is treated at some length in the chapter on maintaining security. 

It was also troublesome in connection with the building of the original 
staff of NDRC. A brief biographical sketch of each individual whom 
NDRC desired to appoint was submitted to the Army and Navy as the 
basis for a ruling by the Services as to whether they were willing that 
classified information be given to the individuals named. As similar re- 
quests were being submitted by other organizations engaged in war work, 
the investigating agencies soon found themselves overloaded; and the length 
of time required to obtain a report became longer and longer. On the one 
hand, the NDRC was being urged to proceed rapidly and on the other it 
became increasingly difficult to get reports upon which to base the release 
to the individuals whose services were needed of information bearing a 
security classification. In view of the outstanding character of the men 
brought into the organization, clearance could be counted upon to be 
forthcoming eventually, but many a headache was occasioned by the neces- 
sity of excluding certain individuals from particular meetings because 
clearance reports had not yet been received. One particular source of an- 
noyance arose from cases of mistaken identity in which the person wanted 
by the NDRC happened to bear the same name as some other person 
whose record was not such as to endear him either to the military serv- 
ices or to any other organization interested in honest operations. 

At the second meeting on August 29, 1940, members of the Committee 
had already begun to report that the work of their divisions had been 
seriously handicapped by the delay in obtaining Army and Navy clearance 
of key personnel. The Committee continued in its opinion, however, that, 
in spite of the unfortunate delays, it was desirable to have all key person- 
nel cleared by the Services. 

The following table gives an indication of the extent and persistence 

of the problem: 

Total number of Total number of names reported by 

Date names submitted Army Navy Both 

Sept. 26, 1940 443 253 336 238 

Oct. 24,1940 550 331 410 324 

Jan. 15,1941 1087 633 851 627 

Mar. 5,1941 1218 978 1 134 953 

April 15,1941 1391 "31 1303 1121 

June 10,1941 1567 1329 1433 1225 

Discussions were continually going on in an endeavor to improve the 
situation, and it never again became as bad as it was in January 1941. The 
whole story is not revealed by the totals. Thus, as of June 10, 1941, reports 
were still outstanding from the Army, the Navy or both on 2 names sub- 
mitted in July, 5 in September, 23 in October and 16 in November 1940. 
Delay in clearance did not prevent progress in the preliminary assess- 
ment of faciHties. Division and Section Chairmen discussed faciliues and 


manpower with men from many institutions. They were free to be rather 
specific in outHning fields of research of possible interest, and, of course, 
were free to receive complete information as to lines of attack which oc- 
curred to the men with whom they were talking. These discussions indi- 
cated the men whose names should be submitted for clearance. It was 
feasible for a Section Chief to encourage an individual to go ahead on his 
own in developing his idea with the expectation that with the receipt of 
clearance a contract would be forthcoming and with it classified informa- 
tion which would aid in focusing the military aspects of the problem. 

At its third meeting on September 27, 1940, the Committee gave further 
consideration to the need of special investigators for consultation with their 
colleagues. The basic principle adopted was that the Committee would 
arrange for the security clearance of key individuals and rely upon their 
judgment as to the persons to whom and the extent to which classified 
information should be disclosed in order that a contract might be carried 
out effectively. Reports of disclosures to persons not yet cleared were re- 
quired to be made through the Section and Division Chief and the Secre- 
tary of NDRC to the Service primarily interested in the work under con- 

As a further check on the possibility of leaks of information, arrange- 
ments were made early in 1941 for a thorough check by the Secret Service 
of the procedures being followed in the Committee's central offices. This 
was the first of a number of such checks made in the central office and 
in certain of the other more important offices. 


Although Washington was not so crowded as it was to become later, the 
problem of acquiring space for any new organization was acute even in 
the summer of 1940. NDRC was particularly fortunate in being able to 
acquire most of its quarters without coming into direct competition with 
other Government agencies which were expanding all over the city at an 
increasing rate. At the first informal meeting of the Committee on June 18, 
1940, Jewett offered the Committee space in the building of the National 
Academy of Sciences, and Bush offered space in the Carnegie Institution 
of Washington, Stewart was asked to look into probable requirements and 
recommend the acceptance of one of the offers, both of which were rent- 

The Academy building had the advantage of being located across the 
street from the War and Navy Departments. It had the disadvantage, 
however, that if the United States should go into the war, the demands 
upon the Academy and the National Research Council might increase to 
the point that the Academy might need all of its space for its own opera- 
tions; and the chance of the NDRC obtaining additional space within the 


building, in the event that war required an expansion of its activities, was 
very sHght, 

The Carnegie Institution building at 1530 P Street, N.W., was less con- 
veniently located relative to the War and Navy Departments, but more 
space was available initially than was to be had at the Academy. Further- 
more, if the NDRC offices were in the Carnegie Institution building where 
Bush had his offices, he would be able to devote more time to the Committee's 
business than if the offices were situated elsewhere. Of great importance 
also was the fact that in the event of war more space rather than less would 
be available at C.I.W. as members of the staff of the Institution would leave 
their normal assignment for war work. 

Upon Stewart's recommendation the Committee accepted Bush's invita- 
tion and established its central offices in 1530 P Street, N.W. As the activi- 
ties of the NDRC and its successor OSRD continued to expand under the 
pressure of impending and actual war, more and more space was surren- 
dered to those activities by the Carnegie Institution. The Committee owes 
a debt of gratitude to Walter M. Gilbert, Executive Officer of C.I.W., who 
willingly volunteered successive contractions of the space available for 
his operations in order that more space might be available for the NDRC; 
and to Charles Smallwood, the building superintendent, who remained 
cheerful under five years of constant demands made upon a building used 
for purposes far different from those for which it was originally designed. 

Although Jewett's offer of space was not accepted for the central offices 
of NDRC, at all times a considerable part of NDRC and OSRD operations 
were housed in the Academy building. In particular, after the establish- 
ment of the Committee on Medical Research, the Washington operations of 
that Committee were carried on from the Academy building in space 
willingly made available, though at considerable inconvenience to the 


The expanding operations of NDRC and of OSRD soon outran the space 
available in the Carnegie Institution and Academy buildings. Harvard Uni- 
versity came to the rescue by turning over, without charge to the Com- 
mittee, a large part of the space at Dumbarton Oaks, a magnificent estate 
in the heart of Washington given to the University by Robert Woods Bliss 
and housing some of the Harvard collections. Even this addition was soon 
outgrown and it became necessary for the Committee to set up parts of its 
activities in different locations in Washington. For most of its life, the 
Committee was carrying on its operations in inadequate space in areas too 
widely separated for the most efficient operation. Even at that, however, 
due largely to the generosity of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, the 
National Academy of Sciences, and Harvard University, the Committee 
fared better in the matter of space than did many of the wartime agencies 
in the Capital. 

national defense research committee 33 

Handling Suggestions from the Public 

Americans are an inventive people and quite properly see no reason why 
any small group of individuals should be considered to have a monopoly 
of good ideas on any subject. The war in Europe had naturally turned 
public imagination toward the invention of instruments of warfare; and 
the creation of the NDRC made it inevitably the target for inventions. 
At the first informal meeting of the Committee, Coe pointed out that 
during World War I such suggestions were received at the rate of ap- 
proximately 2000 per week. Obviously the handling of such suggestions 
would require a substantial staff and if it were to be done by NDRC would 
leave litde time for original thinking by the members and staff of the 

Fortunately, plans were being considered for handHng suggestions from 
the public in a different manner. On July 11, 1940, the Secretary of Com- 
merce created the National Inventors Council within the Department of 
Commerce. The Council performed a valuable service but one quite dif- 
ferent from that which NDRC had been established to perform. Cordial 
relations were established between the Committee and the Council. Com- 
missioner Coe was a member both of the Committee and of the Council 
and so was in a position to keep each informed of the activities of the other. 
Even after the creation of the National Inventors Council suggestions con- 
tinued to be received by NDRC from the public. These were normally 
sent direct to the Council for evaluation and reply to the sender, although 
in a few cases suggestions from persons of established reputation bearing 
directly upon some project under way under NDRC auspices were sent 
directly to the division supervising the project. 

It may be noted in passing that the Inventors Council established a 
procedure for referring to the Army and Navy suggestions which had 
passed through its screening process. The method by which the Army and 
Navy submitted requests to the NDRC will be discussed later; that proce- 
dure envisaged the possibility that one of the Services might request the 
NDRC to do further work upon a suggestion referred to the Services by 
the Council and upon which the Services wished additional work to be 

The Beginnings of Liaison 

Close working relations with the Army and Navy were of prime impor- 
tance to successful NDRC operations. Both Services had been consulted in 
detail prior to the establishment of NDRC and the order establishing the 
Committee was issued with their full concurrence. High Army and Navy 


officers were appointed as members of the Committee. In addition, the 
Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy appointed Uaison officers 
to serve with the Committee in order that there might be direct channels 
which could operate with a minimum of delay. 

As the NDRC grew and divisions and sections were established, liaison 
officers were appointed to follow specific projects or groups of projects. The 
purpose of the liaison at the project level was to assist the scientist to oper- 
ate within the framework of possible military requirements and conversely 
to give the armed services in some detail a glimpse of what science might 
of!er in the various fields of military operation. The story of the liaison 
with the military is told in detail in a later chapter. It is mentioned here 
because it was one of the important points to which the Committee de- 
voted its attention from the beginning. 

By the time the NDRC was established, the United States was well com- 
mitted to assist the Allies against the Axis. The British were feeling the 
effect of the weapons and instrumentalities developed by Germany and 
were acquiring invaluable experience in devising and testing countermeas- 
ures for those weapons. An exchange of information with the British would 
have the advantage of giving the United States the benefit of the British 
experience and the additional advantage of an early trial of weapons and 
equipment which might be developed for the protection of the United 
States. The importance of the object was one which made it desirable to 
start the exchange of information at a high level. This was accomplished 
when President Roosevelt commissioned Conant to proceed to London 
in February 1941, to make arrangements for an exchange of information 
and the estabhshment of an NDRC office in London. This commission was 
given, of course, only after the matter had been thoroughly canvassed with 
the Army and the Navy. Shordy thereafter the British established a com- 
parable office in Washington. 

During the first year of its existence, NDRC succeeded in solving a num- 
ber of perplexing problems in the introduction of civilian scientists into a 
program of research on military devices in a time of rapidly mountmg 
crisis. Its success led to a change in the form of its organization brought 
about largely by President Roosevelt's desire for a similar achievement in 
the field of medical research. 




HILE NDRC was doing an excellent job in its field, big 
gaps remained in the program of preparation for the scientific aspects of 
modern war. A step toward closing those gaps was taken with the issu- 
ance of Executive Order No. 8807 of June 28, 1941, which established the 
Office of Scientific Research and Development. Bush was a leader in urg- 
ing the issuance of the order, the need for which had become apparent on 
at least three counts. 

In the first place, the program of the National Defense Research Com- 
mittee was one designed to stress research on instruments of warfare. 
Between the completion of research and the initiation of a procurement 
program there was a substantial gap which the armed services were slow 
to fill. It was becoming increasingly apparent that for the research spon- 
sored by NDRC to become most effective, it was essential that the re- 
search group carry its projects through the intermediate phase represented 
by engineering development. It is significant that while the original NDRC 
carried only research in its title, the new office covered both research and 

In the second place, there was but little machinery for the correlation 
of research carried on by NDRC with that carried directly by the Serv- 
ices or by the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. The Ad- 
visory Council provided for in the order creating the OSRD helped fill a 
need by providing a place where men conversant with the research pro- 
grams of the Army, Navy, NDRC and NACA might discuss their various 
programs and their relation to each other. 

In the third place, no satisfactory provision had been made for the stimu- 
lation of research in the field of military medicine. The need for such 
research had been apparent for some time but it had been impossible to 
get agreement on a program satisfactory to the various groups involved. 
The success of NDRC in the field of weapons suggested to President Roose- 
velt the desirability of a comparable committee in military medicine, and 
led to the creation of OSRD with parallel committees on weapons and 


Provisions of the Executive Order 

The Office of Scientific Research and Development was brought into 
existence by Executive Order No. 8807 signed by President Roosevelt on 
June 28, 1941, the text of which is printed in the Appendix. The order 
stated that it was issued for the purpose of assuring adequate provision 
for research on scientific and medical problems relating to national defense. 

OSRD was placed within the Office for Emergency Management of the 
Executive Office of the President. It was to be headed by a Director ap- 
pointed by the President, who should discharge his responsibilities and 
perform his duties under the direction and supervision of the President. 
Compensation of the Director was to be at a rate determined by the Presi- 
dent; in practice, the Director served without compensation. It was made 
the duty of OSRD, subject to such policies, regulations and directions as 
the President might prescribe and with such advice and assistance as might 
be necessary from other departments and agencies of the Government to: 

a. Advise the President with regard to the status of scientific and medical re- 
search relating to national defense and the measures necessary to assure con- 
tinued and increasing progress in this field. 

b. Serve as the center for mobilization of the scientific personnel and resources 
of the Nation in order to assure maximum utilization of such personnel and 
resources in developing and applying the results of scientific research to 
defense purposes. 

c. Co-ordinate, aid, and, where desirable, supplement the experimental and 
other scientific and medical research activities relating to national defense 
carried on by the Departments of War and Navy and other departments 
and agencies of the Federal Government. 

d. Develop broad and co-ordinated plans for the conduct of scientific research 
in the defense program, in collaboration with representatives of the War 
and Navy Departments; review existing scientific research programs formu- 
lated by the Departments of War and Navy and other agencies of the Gov- 
ernment, and advise them with respect to the relationship of their proposed 
activities to the total research program. 

e. Initiate and support scientific research on the mechanisms and devices of 
warfare with the objective of creating, developing, and improving instru- 
mentalities, methods, and materials required for national defense. 

f. Initiate and support scientific research on medical problems affecting the 
national defense. 

g. Initiate and support such scientific and medical research as may be requested 
by the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital 
to the defense of the United States under the terms of the Act of March 11, 
1941, entitled "An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States"; and 
serve as the central liaison office for the conduct of such scientific and medical 
research for such countries. 


h. Perform such other duties relating to scientific and medical research and 
development as the President may from time to time assign to or delegate 

to It. 

The Director was authorized to provide for the internal organization 
and management of the OSRD. He was further authorized to appoint 
advisory committees subject to the condition that he should obtain the 
President's approval for the establishment of the principal subdivisions of 
the agency and the appointment of the heads thereof. (The requirement 
of presidential approval was dropped by Executive Order No. 9389 of 
October 18, 1943.) The principal subdivisions at the outset were the Ad- 
visory Council, the National Defense Research Committee, the Committee 
on Medical Research (all three specifically mentioned in the Executive 
Order), the Administrative Office which handled administrative aflairs, 
and the Liaison Office through which exchange of information with Allied 
governments was centralized. Two other principal subdivisions, the Scien- 
tific Personnel Office and the Office of Field Service, were created later, 
and minor subdivisions were established from time to time. 

The order directed the OSRD to utilize laboratories, equipment and 
services of governmental agencies and institutions to the extent that such 
facilities were available for its purposes; transfers of funds for this pur- 
pose were specifically authorized. The Office was further authorized to 
enter into contracts and agreements with individuals, educational and sci- 
entific institutions (including specifically the National Academy of Sciences 
and the National Research Council), industrial organizations and other 
agencies for "studies, experimental investigations, and reports." 

The Director was authorized to take over contracts falling within the 
scope of the order which had heretofore been entered into by (i) the 
NDRC, (2) the Health and Medical Committee estaWished by order of 
the Council of National Defense on September 19, 1940, and (3) the 
Federal Security Administrator in his capacity of Co-ordinator of Health, 
Medical Welfare, Nutrition, Recreation, and other related activities as 
authorized by order of the Council of National Defense on November 28, 
1940. He was further authorized to assume any obligations or responsi- 
bilities theretofore undertaken by these agencies which fell within the scope 
of the order. Under this authority the OSRD assumed the contracts of 
the NDRC and proceeded to enter into contracts pursuant to letters of 
intent which had been issued by NDRC. The volume of contracts assumed 
from the other agencies was negligible. 

Paragraph 6 of the order created an Advisory Council whose function 
was to advise and assist the Director with respect to the co-ordination of 
research activities carried on by private and governmental research groups 
as well as to facilitate the interchange of information and data between 
such groups and agencies. The Council consisted of the Director as Chair- 


man, the Chairman of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 
the Chairman of the National Defense Research Committee, the Chair- 
man of the Committee on Medical Research, one representative of the Army 
designated by the Secretary of War and one representative of the Navy des- 
ignated by the Secretary of the Navy. This Council, which will be discussed 
later in the present chapter, proved useful not only for its direct activities, 
but also because of the co-ordination it implied of research activities within 
the War and Navy Departments respectively. 

The National Defense Research Committee was created by Paragraph 7 
of the Executive Order. Selection of the eight members followed the pat- 
tern of the earlier order of the Council of National Defense, except that the 
four civilians not serving ex-officio were not named in the Executive Order. 
The order also envisaged the possibility that the President might later 
appoint additional members of the Committee, but this was never done. 
The only change in the membership of the NDRC made as a result of the 
establishment of OSRD was the consequence of Bush's selection as Director 
of OSRD. Conant became Chairman of NDRC and Roger Adams, who 
had been a Vice-Chairman of Division B, was appointed to the vacancy 
on the Committee. 

The language of Paragraph 7 which points up the changed character of 
the functions of the NDRC is as follows: 

The National Defense Research Committee shall advise and assist the Director in 
the performance of his scientific research duties with special reference to the 
mobilization of the scientific personnel and resources of the Nation. To this end 
it shall be the responsibility of the Committee to recommend to the Director the 
need for and character of contracts to be entered into with universities, research 
institutes, and industrial laboratories for research and development on instru- 
mentalities of warfare to supplement such research and development activities of 
the Departments of War and Navy. Furthermore, the Committee shall from time 
to time make findings, and submit recommendations to the Director with respect 
to the adequacy, progress, and results of research on scientific problems related to 
national defense. 

It will be noted that a fundamental change was made in the character 
of NDRC. As a committee of the Council of National Defense it had the 
authority to act; as a committee of OSRD it had only the authority to rec- 
ommend. In practice, the Director accepted most of the recommendations 
made by the NDRC as might be expected in view of the caliber of men 
constituting that Committee and the fact that the Director had worked 
closely with them for a year as Chairman of the Committee. It should be 
emphasized, however, that at no time did the Director become a rubber 
stamp for the Committee; nor did the Committee shirk its responsibilities 
on the theory that its actions were merely advisory. Where the reasons for 
a particular recommendation were not clear or convincing to the Director, 


he would go back to the Committee for additional information and con- 
sideration. In some cases, the additional information was sufficient to bring 
the Director's approval; in others, the additional consideration resulted in 
a modification or withdrawal of the recommendation. It is a tribute to the 
caliber and intellectual integrity of the men involved that this close rela- 
tionship continued for well over four years of intensive work under great 
stress with cordial relations on all sides. 

The most conspicuous change brought about by the Executive Order 
was the establishment within OSRD of a Committee on Medical Research 
(CMR) consisting of a Chairman and three members to be appointed by 
the President and three other members to be designated respectively by 
the Secretary of War, the Secretary of Navy and the Administrator of the 
Federal Security Agency, with the latter three members to be selected from 
the staffs of the respective Surgeons General with particular reference to 
their qualifications in the field of medical research. The authority of the 
CMR in the field of military medicine was comparable to that of the NDRC 
in the field of weapons. The provision of Paragraph 8 with respect to the 
authority of the Committee was as follows: 

The Committee on Medical Research shall advise and assist the Director in the 
performance of his medical research duties with special reference to the mobiliza- 
tion of medical and scientific personnel of the nation. To this end it shall be the 
responsibility of the Committee to recommend to the Director the need for and 
character of contracts to be entered into with the universities, hospitals, and other 
agencies conducting medical research activities for research and development in 
the field of the medical sciences. Furthermore, the Committee shall from time to 
time, on request by the Director, make findings and submit recommendations 
with respect to the adequacy, progress, and results of research on medical prob- 
lems related to national defense. 

Concurrent with the establishment of OSRD, the Council of National 
Defense amended its order of November 28, 1940, providing for the co- 
ordination of health, welfare and related defense activities to terminate the 
duties, functions, and activities of the Health and Medical Committee 
relating to medical research on problems affecting the national defense. 
This responsibility was assumed by CMR. 

Following the precedent of the original NDRC, the order provided that 
the members of the Advisory Council, the National Defense Research 
Committee, the Committee on Medical Research and such other commit- 
tees and subcommittees as the Director might appoint with the approval 
of the President should serve as such without compensation but with re- 
imbursement for necessary expenses incident to the performance of their 


In a final paragraph, the order authorized the Director within the lim- 
its of appropriated or allocated funds to employ necessary personnel and 


make provision for necessary supplies, facilities and services. He was also 
instructed, however, to use such statistical, informational, fiscal, personnel, 
and other general business services and facilities as might be made avail- 
able to him through the Office for Emergency Management. 

Executive Order No. 8807 was amended by Executive Order No. 9389 
on October 18, 1943. The purpose of the amendment was to permit the 
Director to provide for the internal organization and management of 
OSRD without the need to obtain the approval of the President for the 
establishment of the subdivisions of the agency and the appointment of 
the heads thereof. 

Legal Basis of OSRD Operations 

The authority conferred upon OSRD by the order creating it was ex- 
panded from time to time by other executive orders and by legislation in 
connection with OSRD appropriations. 

By Executive Order No. 9218 of August 11, 1942, OSRD was authorized 
to exercise the authority contained in Title II of the Second War Powers 
Act, 1942, to "acquire, use, and dispose of any real property, temporary 
use thereof, or other interest therein, together with any personal property 
located thereon, or used therewith, which the Office of Scientific Research 
and Development shall deem necessary for military, naval, and other war 

Executive Order No. 9219, also signed on August 11, 1942, extended to 
the Office of Scientific Research and Development the provisions of Ex- 
ecutive Order No. 9001 of December 27, 1941. That order had given the 
War and Navy Departments and the Maritime Commission certain broad 
powers authorized in Title II of the act of December 18, 1941, entitled "An 
Act to Expedite the Prosecution of the War Effort." The effect of the order 
was to exempt the OSRD from certain statutory restrictions upon contracts. 

The two orders of August 11, 1942, contributed materially to the flexibil- 
ity with which OSRD operated. It is difficult to see how OSRD could have 
operated effectively without the powers they conferred. 

Needed authority was also conferred by legislation in connection with 
appropriation acts. Thus the First Supplemental Civil Functions Appro- 
priation Act, 1 94 1 (Public Law No. 812, 76th Congress) paved the way for 
acceptance of voluntary services which played such an important part in 
NDRC and OSRD operations. 

The Third Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1942, 
approved December 17, 1941, gave the OSRD power to make advance 
payments on contracts — a power absolutely necessary if academic institu- 
tions were to continue to operate the rapidly growing central laboratories. 
It also specifically authorized Government agencies with funds for research 


purposes to transfer such funds to OSRD. This and succeeding appropria- 
tion acts also authorized OSRD to pay varying sums to the National 
Academy of Sciences for administrative and overhead expenses incurred 
by the Academy in carrying out research projects for Federal agencies. 
These payments were a material factor in enabling the Academy to meet 
the numerous calls upon it during the war years. 

Authority to agree to indemnify OSRD contractors from funds later to 
be appropriated for the purpose, against loss or damage to persons or prop- 
erty arising from OSRD work was conferred by the First Supplemental 
National Defense Appropriation Act, 1943, approved July 25, 1942. This 
authority was useful in persuading academic contractors to undertake ex- 
ceptionally hazardous work; but fortunately it never became necessary to 
seek any appropriations under this provision. 

Additional authority was conferred by the National War Agencies Appro- 
priation Act, 1944, approved July 12, 1943. The authority to employ tech- 
nical personnel by contract without regard to civil service or classification 
laws paved the way for the operation of the Office of Field Service; and in 
accordance with a statement made in connection with the request for the 
authority, it was used only for that purpose. Another provision authorized 
the Director to dispose of personal property of all kinds produced or ac- 
quired in connection with the performance of contracts under such terms 
and conditions as he might deem advisable, the principal restriction being 
that receipts from disposition to nongovernmental agencies should be covered 
into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. This broad power was the basis 
for the rapid shifting of equipment and components to places where they 
were most needed in the completion of critical projects. 

Several Administrative Orders were issued by the Director pursuant to 
the authority contained in Executive Order No. 8807. Administrative Order 
No. I was approved by the President on August 20, 1941, to give the presi- 
dential approval required by Paragraph 3 of the Executive Order to the 
establishment of the principal subdivisions of OSRD. They were the Na- 
tional Defense Research Committee with Conant as Chairman; the Commit- 
tee on Medical Research with A. N. Richards (Vice-President in charge of 
Medical Affairs, University of Pennsylvania, pharmacologist) as Chairman; 
the Administrative Office under Stewart as Executive Secretary, and the 
Liaison Office under Carroll L. Wilson as Senior Liaison Officer. NDRC 
and CMR were charged with advising the Director as specified in the 
executive order and with supervising the performance of research in their 
respective fields; and the Liaison Office with conducting scientific liaison 
with countries the defense of which the President had deemed vital to the 
defense of the United States under the terms of the Act of March 11, 1941, 
entitled "An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States." The chart 
accompanying the order also carried the four divisions of NDRC: Division 


A under Tolman, Division B under Roger Adams (replacing Conant), Divi- 
sion C under Jewett, and Division D under Compton. Aside from approving 
the subdivisions, the administrative order conferred upon the Chairman of 
the NDRC the duties and powers of the Director in the absence or disability 
of the Director. It further placed the Executive Secretary in charge of ad- 
ministrative affairs and established him as the contracting officer for the 
agency subject to all the limitations and restrictions applicable to acts of the 

Administrative Order No. 2 of September 24, 1942, v^hich superseded 
Order No. i, reaffirmed the principal subdivisions established in the earlier 
order. In addition, it specifically authorized the Chairmen of the National 
Defense Research Committee and the Committee on Medical Research to 
discharge such duties and to exercise such powers of the Director in the 
field of the respective committees as might be delegated to them from time 
to time by the Director; and further provided that each might delegate any 
of his powers or duties as Chairman to such assistant as he might desig- 
nate with the approval of the Director. It also extended the authority of the 
Executive Secretary as contracting officer and authorized him to delegate 
any of his powers or duties to such assistant as he might designate with the 
approval of the Director. On the chart which accompanied the order Caryl 
P. Haskins (physicist, Haskins Laboratories) replaced Wilson as Senior 
Liaison Officer, Wilson having returned to his old post as Executive Assist- 
ant to Bush. 

Administrative Order No. 3, dated August 21, 1943, was designed to 
supersede Order No. 2. It repeated the substance of the earlier order, substi- 
tuted Franklin S. Cooper (physicist, Haskins Laboratories) for Haskins as 
Senior Liaison Officer, and established a new principal subdivision, the 
Scientific Personnel Office with John V. L. Hogan (radio engineer) as its 
head with the title of Special Assistant to the Director. The new office had 
as its principal duties (i) handling the relationship between OSRD and other 
governmental agencies with respect to scientific personnel; and (2) dealing 
with the problems relating to scientific personnel employed by or associated 
with OSRD or its contractors, particularly problems in connection with 
policies and procedures relating to the evaluation, training, allocation, com- 
pensation and requests for deferment by the Selective Service System of such 
scientific personnel. The head of the Scientific Personnel Office was author- 
ized to delegate any of his powers or duties to such assistant as he might 
designate with the approval of the Director. There is some question as to 
whether the approval of the President to Order No. 3 was indicated in the 
manner required by Executive Order No. 8807; but OSRD proceeded on 
the assumption that the order was effective. 

Administrative Order No. 4, issued on November 8, 1943, was the first 


one that did not require the approval of the President. In addition to the 
four original offices and the Scientific Personnel Office established under 
Administrative Order No. 3, it provided for the creation of the Office of 
Field Service, the operations of which are described in the chapter of that 
name. Karl T. Compton was designated Chief of the Office of Field Service; 
he was authorized to delegate any of his powers or duties to such assistant 
as he might designate with the approval of the Director. 

Administrative Order No. 4 was amended on April 25, 1945, to require 
approval by the Office of Scientific Research and Development Contract 
Settlement Review Board (established by Administrative Order No. 5) of 
contract or subcontract termination claims in excess of $25,000. Certain 
additional administrative authority was conferred upon the Executive Sec- 
retary by the same amendment. A further amendment of the same order 
on July 26, 1945, provided that in the absence or disability of the Director 
and the Chairman of the National Defense Research Committee the Execu- 
tive Secretary should discharge all the duties and exercise all the powers of 
the Director of OSRD. A further amendment of the same order on Decem- 
ber 18, 1945, provided for a Deputy Director of OSRD who should become 
Acting Director in the absence or disability of the Director and the Chair- 
man of the National Defense Research Committee. The provision with 
respect to the Executive Secretary was modified to remove him from the 
line of succession. Stewart resigned as Executive Secretary and was appointed 
Deputy Director on December 18. 

Administrative Order No. 5 of April 30, 1945, provided for the establish- 
ment of the Office of Scientific Research and Development Contract Settle- 
ment Review Board to consist of five members appointed by the Director. 
The function of the Board was to examine and review all proposed termi- 
nation claim settlements under OSRD contracts and subcontracts where the 
amount of the termination claim exceeded $25,000. The Board's recom- 
mendation was to be communicated to the contracting officer who was 
authorized to submit to the Board for recommendation other termination 
claims or matters not otherwise falling within the jurisdiction of the Board. 

The original composition of the Board was O. M. Ruebhausen (General 
Counsel), Chairman; W. F. Davidson (Deputy Executive Officer, NDRC); 
Cleveland Norcross (Executive Assistant to the Executive Secretary); C. G. 
Cruikshank (Fiscal Officer), and R. C. Bowker (in charge of Priorities and 
Property Control). When Norcross became Acting Executive Secretary fol- 
lowing Stewart's resignation, he was succeeded as a member of the Board 
by Paul A. Scherer (Chief, Engineering and Transition Office). Davidson 
became Chairman on February i, 1946, upon Ruebhausen's resignation as 
General Counsel; the vacancy on the Board was filled by E. T. Barker, the 
new General Counsel. 


Relation of OSRD to the National Academy of Sciences and 

THE National Research Council 

On July 1 6, 1941, President Roosevelt addressed a letter to Jewett as 
President of the National Academy of Sciences requesting the Academy to 
aid the recently established Office of Scientific Research and Development 
in the performance of its duties in every way possible. He pointed out that 
the Academy had been organized for the primary purpose of rendering 
scientific advice to the Government. In the existing emergency, the services 
of the Academy and of the National Research Council were again essential 
to the defense of the country; and he expressed the hope that they would 
respond "with the same spirit which resulted in a fine record of accomplish- 
ment under previous stress." The President stated that the creation of OSRD 
was not intended in any way to inhibit the Academy's important function 
of rendering to the agencies of Government the best scientific advice possible. 
On the contrary, it was intended to further this important service by better 
co-ordination with other agencies responsible for specific aspects of the 
application of science to defense. He ended with an expression of his hope 
that the Academy, the Council and their respective officers would render all 
assistance in their power to the OSRD as well as to other agencies of 
Government which they already advised or which might call for their aid. 

Jewett's reply of July 19 to the President's cordial letter was equally cordial. 
In it he assured the President that the Academy, the Council, Dr. Ross Harri- 
son as Chairman of the Council, and he, as President of the Academy, would 
do everything within their power to aid and facilitate OSRD in its task of 
co-ordinating the nation's scientific research facilities in all matters involved 
in the national defense. 

The close contacts which NDRC had established with the Academy and 
the Council were continued and expanded under OSRD. Particularly close 
relations were established between the CMR and the Council, as the latter 
had built up an organization in its Division of Medical Sciences which 
greatly aided CMR in getting under way without loss of valuable time. 

Staff Operations 

Although the responsibility for advising the Director on scientific matters 
was divided between the NDRC and the CMR, business operations were 
handled by a single office. Immediately upon the issuance of the Executive 
Order, Bush appointed Stewart as Executive Secretary of the Office of 
Scientific Research and Development. At their first meetings, both NDRC 
and CMR recommended to Bush that he also appoint Stewart as Executive 
Secretary of the respective Committees, and these appointments were made. 


This threefold secretaryship in the same individual made possible a high 
degree of uniformity in administrative matters while the two Committees 
pursued quite different paths in scientific affairs. 

As Secretary of the Committees, Stewart attended all their meetings and 
prepared minutes of their actions which were submitted to the Director for 
his approval of the recommendations contained therein. When the Director 
had questions about particular recommendations, he normally took them up 
direcdy with the Chairman of the Committee involved. The Director's 
approval of recommendations was communicated to the Executive Secretary 
in a memorandum directing him to take the steps necessary to put the 
recommendations into effect. The necessary authority had previously been 
given in an administrative order designating the Executive Secretary as 
contracting officer for the agency. There were a few differences in the prac- 
tices of the two Committees which were reflected in the contracts drafted 
upon their recommendation. These differences had been approved in prin- 
ciple by the Director and the drafting staff were well acquainted with them. 
The routine of drafting contracts was the same for NDRC and CMR 
recommendations and the same form was used for both. The Administrative 
Office was organized along functional lines and served the two Committees 
with equal facility. 

The Director's immediate staff was kept small at all times. The NDRC 
was so organized that the central scientific staff reported to the Chairman 
of the Committee. The same was true of the Committee on Medical Re- 
search. Wide latitude in the handling of the administrative affairs of the 
office was entrusted to the Executive Secretary. When the Office of Field 
Service was established, the immediate responsibility for its operations was 
placed upon its chief who organized his own staff. The exchange of scien- 
tific information with the British was handled through the Liaison Office 
and the problems of scientific personnel through the Scientific Personnel 
OfiSce. Section T was for a while an anomaly in that it supervised a scien- 
tific operation reporting to the Director outside the framework of NDRC 
and CMR; it was closely organized, however, by Merle A. Tuve, its 

The heads of various groups reported to Bush as Director of OSRD. 
He was given invaluable assistance by Carroll Wilson, who had originally 
been appointed as Executive Assistant to Bush as Chairman of NDRC, had 
organized the Liaison Office and served as the first Senior Liaison Officer, 
and then had been brought back into Bush's immediate ofi&ce as Executive 
Assistant to the Director. In addition to serving as Secretary of the Advisory 
Council, Wilson possessed Bush's complete confidence and served as his 
alter ego in matters to which Bush could not give his personal attention. 
When the load became too heavy for Wilson to carry alone, Lyman Chalk- 
ley, who came to OSRD from the Foreign Economic Administration, was 


appointed as Assistant to the Director. He was especially valuable in follow- 
ing particular assignments for the Director. A few other persons received 
appointments of limited duration as Assistants to the Director. They are 
mentioned where appropriate in connection with the operations for which 
they received appointments. 

The Advisory Council 

The original members of the Advisory Council were Bush, as Chairman; 
Conant, for NDRC; Richards, for CMR; Harvey H. Bundy, representing 
the War Department; and Jerome C. Hunsaker, representing the Navy and 
the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA). Bundy was 
an attorney serving as Special Assistant to the Secretary of War. His close 
relations with Secretary Stimson were invaluable at times in getting action 
out of the very complex organization of the War Department. Hunsaker 
was an aeronautical engineer on the faculty of the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology who had succeeded Bush as Chairman of NACA. He was 
also serving briefly as Co-ordinator of Research and Development in the 
Office of the Secretary of the Navy until the proper man could be found to 
assume that newly established post. When Rear Admiral Julius A. Purer 
succeeded Hunsaker as Co-ordinator of Research and Development, he was 
designated as the Navy member on the Advisory Council in December 1941. 
The effect of this designation was to bring the Council up to its full strength 
as Hunsaker remained as the NACA member. The membership of the 
Council remained unchanged until near the end of the war. Rear Admiral 
A. H. Van Keuren, Director of the Naval Research Laboratory, succeeded 
Admiral Purer in July 1945, and was in turn succeeded by Commodore 
H. A. Schade in November 1945, after the latter had succeeded him as 
Director of the Laboratory. With Secretary Stimson's resignation as Secre- 
tary of War after the end of hostilities, Mr. Bundy also resigned and was 
succeeded as a member of the Advisory Council by Brigadier General 
William A. Borden, Director of the New Developments Division, who was 
in turn succeeded by Colonel Gervais W. Trichel on April 3, 1946. 

The Advisory Council held a total of twenty-eight meetings — ten of 
them between August 8 and December 31, 1941; thirteen during the calen- 
dar year 1942; two in 1943; two in 1944; and one in 1945. 

During the first eighteen months of OSRD operations there were a num- 
ber of important relations with the Services which required top-level han- 
dling. The Advisory Council performed an important function in this 
connection as the members were in a position within their respective organ- 
izations to get needed information or to press for a particular bit of action, 
the absence of which was holding up a program. By the end of 1942, the 


principal lines of activity were well in hand and the need for major action 
by the Advisory Council had passed. 

For a time in 1942 it appeared that the Advisory Council would play 
an important role in obtaining top-level consideration of the adoption for 
field use of OSRD-developed devices in cases where OSRD personnel felt 
that those devices were not receiving adequate consideration within the 
Services. However, the problem of the introduction of new devices had 
much broader aspects than that of the introduction of those of which devel- 
opment had been completed. To meet this problem, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
on May 4, 1942, established the Joint Committee on New Weapons and 
Equipment. Bush was promptly appointed Chairman of the new Committee. 
The other members originally were a general ofi&cer of the Army and a flag 
officer of the Navy; later a general and an admiral were added to represent 
Army and Navy aviation. 

With the creation of the Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equip- 
ment it was no longer either necessary or appropriate for the Advisory 
Council of OSRD to consider the introduction of new weapons into field 
use. Accordingly, the need for frequent meetings of the Council ceased to 
exist, and the five meetings held during 1943, 1944 and 1945 were devoted 
to the consideration of specific problems in the consideration of which the 
Director sought the advice of his colleagues on the Council. 

The usefulness of the Council was not confined to its deliberations in 
formal meetings. The members of the Council were always available for 
consultation by telephone. The fact that they represented particular agencies 
having specific contacts with each other and with OSRD made it an easy 
matter for the Director to handle by telephone conversations matters which, 
in the absence of such a convenient contact, might have resulted in consid- 
erable delays to important programs. Meetings of the Council were informal 
and quite frank. 

One of the most effective devices employed by the Advisory Council was 
the creation of ad hoc committees. When two or more of the agencies 
represented on the Advisory Council were engaged in the same field of 
work in a manner which resulted in confusion, overlap or conflicting 
demands for manpower, or where it was apparent that some unitary con- 
sideration should be given to diverse programs in the same field, the Council 
availed itself of the services of an ad hoc committee to survey the field and 
make recommendations. The first of these committees was appointed early 
in the life of the Advisory Council. By May 25, 1942, the number and im- 
portance of ad hoc committees had reached the point that the procedure 
with respect to them was somewhat formalized. According to an outline 
prepared under that date, proposals for ad hoc committees might originate 
by spontaneous action of the Council as a body, but were more generally 


the result of a proposal by one of its members. In general, they might be 
expected to cover NDRC, Army and/or Navy areas; CMR, Army and/or 
Navy areas; and sometimes might include the NACA. The scope of the 
ad hoc inquiry and the terms of reference of the committee were deter- 
mined by the Council. 

Depending upon whether the OSRD interest was primarily NDRC or 
CMR, arrangements for the ad hoc committee were handled either by the 
Chairman of the NDRC or by the Chairman of the CMR, the designation 
of the responsible Council member being made by the Director. Civilian 
members of an ad hoc committee might be selected from within or outside 
OSRD. The preliminary choice of civilian members by the responsible 
Council member was subject to review by the Army and Navy members 
of the Council and by the Director. Army and Navy members were desig- 
nated by the Service representative and where the NACA was involved, 
the NACA member was selected by Hunsaker. The responsible Council 
member also co-operated with the Chairman of the ad hoc committee by 
attending the first meeting and advising the committee as to the general 
mode of operation and such background of the problem as might be per- 
tinent. When the committee submitted its report, it was dissolved and 
copies of its report were circulated to the members of the Council. Bundy 
and Purer were charged with conveying to their respective Services any 
recommendations of the committee with respect to the work of the Army 
and Navy; Hunsaker had a similar position with respect to NACA; and 
the responsible Council member had the initiative in carrying out the 
recommendations with respect to OSRD. 

Clearance of individuals for military research was a continuing topic 
upon which the individual members of the Council were quite helpful. 
Troublesome problems of liaison with the military services were frequendy 
smoothed with the assistance of the Council. Ways in which to speed up 
the production of newly developed weapons received a great deal of atten- 
tion. Major changes in the organization and procedure of OSRD were dis- 
cussed by the Director with the Council prior to their being put into effect. 
The proper handling of an increasingly inadequate supply of scientific man- 
power was a perennial subject for discussion which was paralleled in the 
early days by discussions of ways by which research laboratories could be 
assisted in obtaining badly needed equipment. 

At one time or another, nearly everything within the jurisdiction of 
OSRD was considered in some of its aspects by the Advisory Council. The 
greatest contribution of that body, however, was the fact that its members 
individually provided an important high-level contact with the agencies 
with which they were associated. Another important contribution of the 
Council as a group was the series of ad hoc committees appointed to study 
critical problems from time to time. Although the function of the Council 


was quite different from that performed by the NDRC and the CMR, its 
existence helped materially in smoothing the way for the operation of those 

Related Assignments of the Director 

The effectiveness of the Office of Scientific Research and Development 
was materially strengthened by other activities of its Director. In addition 
to a number of temporary assignments during the period of OSRD opera- 
tions, he had four wartime assignments and one postwar one which bore 
directly upon the work of the OSRD. Prior to the creation of the National 
Defense Research Committee, Bush had been Chairman of the National 
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, and he continued as a member of 
that body. In consequence he was well acquainted with its personnel, scope 
of activities and methods of procedure. The contacts which he had made 
with the military departments as a member of NACA for some years prior 
to the establishment of NDRC stood him in good stead in his new position. 
Furthermore, his knowledge of the NACA program and operations aided 
the NDRC in avoiding conflicts of jurisdiction with the Nx\CA. 

The establishment of the Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equip- 
ment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JNW) has already been mentioned. Bush's 
chairmanship of that committee meant that the scientific point of view 
could be introduced fairly close to the top levels of military strategy. JNW 
was an appropriate supplement to the activities of OSRD, making it possi- 
ble during the war to get strategic consideration of OSRD-developed equip- 
ment in a way which otherwise might have been impossible. 

The third principal assignment of the Director of OSRD during the 
war was that of scientific adviser to the Manhattan District. The uranium 
program was put under the NDRC at the time of the Committee's creation 
in June 1940. When OSRD was established, the subject was left with NDRC 
for a while and then transferred to a group outside NDRC reporting to the 
Director of OSRD. When the results of research under OSRD auspices had 
shown the possibility of the production of an atomic bomb and had indi- 
cated to some degree the magnitude of operations which would be neces- 
sary to produce the bomb, the project was transferred from OSRD to the 
newly created Manhattan District of the Corps of Engineers of the Army. 
Bush, Conant and Tolman were extremely active as advisers to the Man- 
hattan District from the time of its origin. Bush served as a member of 
the Scientific Advisory Committee to Major General Leslie R. Groves, the 
Director of the Manhattan District, and also as a member of the Military 
Policy Committee of the Manhattan project. 

The fourth of the principal assignments was a series of four questions 
asked Bush by President Roosevelt in a letter of November 17, 1944, with 


a view to securing for times of peace the benefit of the experience gained 
by OSRD in its operations for war. The questions and their answers as 
embodied in the report entided Science - the Endless Frontier are con- 

sidered in a later chapter. 

In addition to these specific assignments, Bush acted as an informal scien- 
tific adviser to President Roosevelt. He had access to the President and 
operated at all times with the assurance of the President's support. 

As the liquidation of OSRD progressed in 1946, it became apparent that 
a great gap would be left with respect to one of its most important indirect 
benefits, namely, that of effecting a general co-ordination of Army and 
Navy research through the common interest in OSRD projects and the 
exchange of information with regard to them. The JNW might have been 
expected to effect the necessary co-ordinadon but its actual operations in 
this connection, particularly in the postwar period, were ineffective. Bush 
was outspoken in clarifying this situation, pointing out that the committee 
as consututed under the Joint Chiefs of Staff was weak in that it lacked 
the direct authority to establish policies or to resolve differences betv^een the 
Services. A basic weakness was the requirement of unanimity for decisions 
of JCS committees and the necessity for referring to the Chiefs themselves 
all matters upon which a dissent was made. Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs 
diemselves could act only by unanimous action. This meant that differences 
could not be setded short of the President. 

To meet these difficukies, the Joint Research and Development Board 
was established on June 6, 1946, by acdon of the Secretaries of War and 
Navy This Board of five members was given a direct grant of authority 
within its field by the two Secretaries and was so constituted as to rule by 
majority vote. It was specifically granted final authority to make allocation 
of responsibility for research and development programs between the Army 
and Navy. In addition, the Board was charged with the responsibility tor 
mving advice and recommendations on the broad problems of scope and 
emphasis of Army and Navy research and development. Perhaps its most 
important function was to consider the implications of strategic planning 
upon research and development, and vice versa. One of the first actions of 
the Board was to organize a Policy Council on which the top Army and 
Navy planners would confer with those responsible for research and devel- 
opment policy. Under the auspices of this Council, the opportunity existed 
for scientists to pardcipate in military planning and strategic thinking at 
the highest level. Bush accepted the chairmanship of JRDB, which pro- 
ceeded prompdy to organize a series of committees and panels to cover the 
broad field under its jurisdicdon. 

It was the genius of OSRD that Bush left it flexible, moulding the organ- 
ization to meet the requirements of the situadon and the personalities with 


whom he had to deal rather than attempting to shape the program to fit 
the organization. In the discussion of instrumentaHties, mechanics and prob- 
lems occupying the remainder of the present volume, this point should 
always be remembered. The objective was to get the best results in the 
hands of the troops at the earliest possible moment. The means employed 
were those which in the light of the surrounding circumstances seemed 
best calculated to achieve this objective. 




HE ONLY change in the membership of NDRC (of OSRD) 
from its establishment on June 28, 1941, to the end of hostilities with Japan 
was in the representatives of the Army and Navy. Shortly after the end of 
hostilities there was a change in the Office of the Commissioner of Patents 
leading to a shift in NDRC membership. Otherwise the same group of men 
who started with the Committee remained with it until the Committee 
adjourned its meeting on January 20, 1947 sine die. 

Even the Service membership was relatively constant during the most 
crucial period of the Committee's activities. Captain Lybrand P. Smith for 
the Navy joined the Committee about two months after its establishment 
and remained until approximately two months before the surrender of 
Germany. For the Army, the eighteen months of General Williams's mem- 
bership were notably productive in stimulating cordial top-level relations 
between NDRC and the Army. 

The complete list of members of the Committee, reconstituted as an 
advisory committee of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, 
is as follows: 

J. B, Conant, Chairman 

R. C. Tolman, Vice-Chairman 

Roger Adams 

K. T. Compton 

F. B. Jewett 

Commissioner of Patents 

Conway P. Coe June 28, 1941, to September 14, 1945 
Casper W. Ooms September 15, 1945 — 

Army Member 

Brigadier General R. C. Moore June 28, 1941, to March 31, 1942 
Major General C. C. Williams March 31, 1942, to September 22, 1943 
Brigadier General Walter A. Wood, Jr. September 22, 1943 to January 7, 1944 
Colonel Lee A. Denson, Jr. January 7, 1944, to February 10, 1945 
Colonel P. R. Faymonville February 10, 1945, to June 28, 1945 
Brigadier General E. A. Regnier June 28, 1945, to March 25, 1946 
Colonel Michael M. Irvine March 25, 1946, to July 19, 1946 
Colonel Edward A. Routheau July 19, 1946 — 

Navy Member 

Rear Admiral H. G. Bowen June 28, 1941, to August 22, 1941 
Captain Lybrand P. Smith August 22, 1941, to March 9, 1945 


Rear Admiral J. A. Purer March 9, 1945, to June 22, 1945 

Rear Admiral A. H. Van Keuren June 22, 1945, to November 13, 1945 

Commodore H. A. Schade November 13, 1945 — 

The committee held monthly meetings through September 1942, then 
changed to a biweekly schedule through October and November, and to 
weekly meetings from December 1942 through the middle of July 1943, at 
which time the biweekly schedule was restored. This was followed until the 
end of the war with Germany; subsequent to that event meetings were held 
at irregular intervals. 


With its change to an advisory capacity the National Defense Research 
Committee was relieved of responsibility for business operations and for 
scientific interchange with Allied governments. These responsibilities were 
entrusted to the Administrative Office with the Executive Secretary as its 
head and to the Liaison Office under the direction of the Senior Liaison 

The reorganized Committee held its first meeting on July 18, 1941, with 
all members present. In a series of procedural resolutions the Committee 
indicated its intention of proceeding as it had during the earlier period. The 
Director of OSRD was requested to appoint Tolman as Vice-Chairman and 
Stewart as Executive Secretary of the Committee. The quorum was set at 
five members. The Chairmen of the several divisions were instructed to 
send to the Executive Secretary in advance of the meetings of the Commit- 
tee summaries of items to be submitted by them for action, with each 
summary to carry the name of the Army and Navy liaison officers who 
participated in discussions leading to the recommendation. The summaries 
were to be circulated to the members of the Committee in advance of meet- 
ings insofar as practicable. 

In another series of resolutions the Committee recommended that the 
Director of OSRD take over existing contracts entered into by the original 
NDRC and carry out the projects for which formal contracts had not been 
completed; that OSRD employ a contract form similar to that which 
NDRC had used; that the compensation of persons working directly for the 
Committee or for its contractors should be so fixed that the employee would 
neither gain nor lose financially from such employment and that the maxi- 
mum consideration paid under contract be so fixed as not to result in a 
profit to the contractor; and that the policies followed by the former NDRC 
with reference to classified matter, overhead allowances in contracts, defer- 
ments and other procedural matters be adopted by the Director to the extent 
that they were applicable. 

Neither the change in the nature of function of NDRC nor the entry of 
the United States into the war brought an immediate change in the organiza- 


tion of NDRC. A major change was made in December 1942; prior to that 
date there were minor shifts within the four divisions among which the 
scientific work of the Committee was divided. The organization of June 15, 
1941, as given previously, was changed in the following respects between 
that date and December 8, 1942: 

Division A 

Section A on "Erosion" was created with L. H. Adams (geophysicist, Car- 
negie Institution of Washington) as Chairman. 

Section S on "Terminal Ballistics" was consolidated with Section B under 
the new title "Structural Defense and Terminal Ballistics." This tide was 
later changed to "Terminal Ballistics and Structural Defense and Offense." 

Section C on "Antisubmarine and Other Ordnance Developments" was 
established with J. T. Tate as Chairman. Tate was also Chairman of the 
section on "Antisubmarine Warfare" in Division C. 

Division B 

With Roger Adams moving up from Vice-Chairman to Chairman of 
Division B, a new system of nomenclature was adopted together with some 
shifting of functions among sections. The final organization was as follows: 

Section B-i Explosives, Physical 
G. B. Kistiakowsky, Chairman 

Section B-i-a Testing and Physical Problems 

D. P. MacDougall, Chairman (chemist, Clark University) 
Section B-i-b Theory of Detonations and Shock Waves 

E. B. Wilson, Jr., Chairman (chemist. Harvard University) 
Section B-i-c Pyrotechnics (October 8, 1941 — August 2, 1942) 

Organic Research (August 2, 1942 — December 9, 1942) 
G. P. Baxter, Chairman, October 8, 1941 — July 7, 1942 (chemist, Har- 
vard University) 
Homer Adkins, Chairman, August 3, 1942 — December 9, 1942 (chem- 
ist. University of Wisconsin) 
Section B-i-d Unrotated Projectile Propellants 

L. P. Hammett, Chairman (chemist, Columbia University) 
Section B-i-e Development Problems 

R. C. Elderfield, Chairman (chemist, Columbia University) 
Section B-2 Explosives, Organic 

F. C. Whitmore, Chairman to July 8, 1942 (chemist, Pennsylvania 
State College) 

R. A. Connor, Chairman, September 15, 1942 — December 9, 1942 
(chemist. University of Pennsylvania) 
Section B-2-a Synthetic Problems 

P. C. Whitmore, Chairman, August 12, 1941 — July 8, 1942 
R. A. Connor, Chairman, October 15, 1942 — December 9, 1942 


Section B-2-b Development Problems 

F. C. Whitmore, Chairman, August 12, 1941 — July 8, 1942 

R. A. Connor, Chairman, October 15, 1942 — December 9, 1942 
Section B-3 Synthetic, Analytical and Inorganic Problems 

C. S. Marvel, Chairman (chemist, University of Illinois) 
Section B-3-a Synthetic Organic 

C. S. Marvel, Chairman 

Section B-3-b Analytical and Inorganic Problems 

W. C. Johnson, Chairman 
Section B-3-c Protective Agents and Fabrics 

Homer Adkins, Chairman 
Section B-3-d Fluorocarbons 

W. S. Calcott, Chairman (chemist, E. I. du Pont de Nemours) 
Section B-4 Toxicity 

H. S. Gasser, Chairman (physiologist, Rockefeller Institute for Medical 
Section B-4-a Testing 

H. S. Gasser, Chairman 
Section B-4-b Immunology 

H. S. Gasser, Chairman 
Section B-4-c Physiological Mechanism 

H. S. Gasser, Chairman, October 7, 1941 — October 13, 1942 

Homer W. Smith, Chairman, October 13, 1942 — December 9, 1942 
(physiologist. New York University) 
Section B-5 Aerosols 

W. H. Rodebush, Chairman 
Section B-6 Absorbents 

W. A. Noyes, Jr., Chairman, August 12, 1941 — August 19, 1942 

D. M. Yost, Chairman, August 19, 1942 — December 9, 1942 (chemist, 
California Institute of Technology) 

Section B-7 Physical, Chemical and Engineering Problems 

E. P. Stevenson, Chairman (chemist, A. D. Little Co.) 
Section B-7-a Hydraulic Fluids (transferred April 24, 1942 to B-8) 

G. H. B. Davis, Chairman 
Section B-7-b Oxygen Problems 

E. P. Stevenson, Chairman 
Section B-7-c Oxygen Mask Development (transferred April 24, 1942 
to B-8) 

E. F. DuBois, Chairman 
Section B-7-d Flame Throwers, Incendiaries and Flares 

E. P. Stevenson, Chairman 
Section B-7-e Miscellaneous Problems 

E. P. Stevenson, Chairman 


Section B-8 (Untitled) 

W. K. Lewis, Chairman, October 9, 1941 — June 30, 1942 

T. K. Sherwood, Chairman, July i, 1942 — December 9, 1942 

Section B-8-a Canister Development in Co-operation with CWS Devel- j 

opment Laboratory) j 

W. K. Lewis, Chairman ' I 

Section B-8-b Protective Coatings 1 

W. K. Lewis, Chairman, October 9, 1941 — November 19, 1941 i 

G. O. Curme, Jr., Chairman, November 19, 1941 — May 28, 1942 ] 

A. J. Weith, Chairman, May 28, 1942 — December 9, 1942 (chemist, { 

Bakelite Corp.) ! 

Section B-8-c Metallurgy (discontinued February 15, 1942) ! 

A. E. White, Chairman - j 

Section B-8-c Hydraulic Fluids i 

G. H. B. Davis, Chairman 

Section B-8-d Vesicant Spray j 

W. K. Lewis, Chairman i 

Section B-8-e Aviation Breathing Equipment ^ 

C. K. Drinker, Chairman (physiologist. Harvard University) 

Section B-8-f Miscellaneous Problems , 

W. K. Lewis, Chairman, April 24, 1942 — June 30, 1942 ■ 

T. K. Sherwood, Chairman, July i, 1942 — December 9, 1942 ; 

Section B-9 (Untitled) ' 

Roger Adams, Chairman i 

Section B-9-a Automotive Fuels, Special Problems i 

T. Midgely, Chairman ■ 

Section B-9-b Special Navy Problems ! 

G. A. Richter, Chairman i 

Section B-9-c Special Problems j 

Roger Adams, Chairman \ 

Section B-9-d Quartermaster Corps Problems \ 

Roger Adams, Chairman I 

Section B-io Petroleum Warfare \ 

R. P. Russell, Chairman (chemist. Standard Oil Development Co.) ,! 


Division C | 

The following new sections were organized in Division C between July i 

1 94 1 and December 1942: 

Section C-4-a Oceanographic Studies I 
C. O'D. Iselin, Chairman (oceanographer. Woods Hole Oceanographic 

Institution) I 

Section C-6 Illumination 1 
H. E. Ives, Chairman (physicist. Bell Telephone Laboratories) 


Section C-7 Naval Architecture 

J. T. Tate, Chairman , 

Section C-8 Camouflage 

A. C. Hardy, Chairman (physicist, M.I.T.) 
Section C-9 Sound Control 

P. M. Morse, Chairman (physicist, M.I.T.) 
Committee on Mine Warfare 

J. T. Tate, Chairman 

Division D 

Alan T. Waterman (physicist, Yale University) became a Vice-Chairman 
of the Division and Section D-M with Melville Eastham (electrical engineer. 
General Radio Co.) as Chairman v^^as created to supervise the model shop 
established in connection with the Radiation Laboratory. 

Committee on Uranium 

This committee was reorganized as a Section on Uranium with L. J. 
Briggs continuing as Chairman. It passed out of the jurisdiction of NDRC in 
December 194 1. 

Division F 

This new division was established in November 1942, shortly before the 
reorganization of the NDRC, with C. G. Suits (physicist, General Electric 
Co.) as Chairman, to supervise a program of radar countermeasures. 

Outside the regular organization of NDRC, the Chairman appointed 
ad hoc committees from time to time at the suggestion of the Advisory 
Council. The reports of those committees influenced the work of NDRC; 
and in two cases — metallurgy and camouflage — had a direct bearing upon 
the way in which the Committee organized to handle its work. 

Distribution of Contracts 

NDRC was a highly decentralized organization. Specific fields of activity 
had been assigned to the several divisions and sections and the initiative as 
to the placing of contracts in each field rested with the division or section 
concerned. The central office had distributed to the Division Chiefs in the 
first few weeks of NDRC operation a loose leaf volume listing specialized 
academic facilities which might be available for NDRC work. As additional 
facilities came to the attention of the central office, information concerning 
them was disseminated to divisions which might make use of them. 

With the initiative as to the selection of contractors left to the divisions 
and sections, it would have been remarkable had the over-all distribution of 
contracts exactly followed any path which might have been laid out in 


advance. Each Division and Section Chief wanted to place contracts with 
institutions which in his opinion could best contribute to the solution of his 
problems; and he was not concerned with the fact that OSRD contracts in 
other fields might have been placed with those institutions. A fairly heavy 
concentration of contracts among institutions in the northeastern part of 
the United States and on the Pacific Coast began to develop, and members 
of the Committee were aware of the fact they were open to possible criti- 
cism because of this concentration. Inasmuch as the NDRC was seeking to 
bring into defense research the best scientific talent in the country, Conant 
had a study made to see how effectively this was being accomplished. As a 
rough measure of leadership in science, he took the starring of names in 
American Men of Science. As the selection of names to be starred in a par- 
ticular field is made by scientists in that field, this gives the scientists' own 
estimate of the standing of their colleagues. Conant's study showed that as 
of October 15, 1941, 52 per cent of the starred chemists were engaged in 
defense work for OSRD, for industry or for the Government. The corre- 
sponding figure for starred physicists was 78 per cent. The difference 
between the two figures was a reflection of the fact that modern war calls 
upon the physicist to a greater extent than upon the chemist. 'Conant pointed 
out that the figures on physicists, when considered in the light of the 
expanding interest in electronics, pointed to the probability of a very serious 
shortage of physicists. 

An analysis of the distribution of starred physicists and chemists showed 
that OSRD was already contracting with institutions employing 98 per cent 
of them. The amount of money in OSRD contracts with the various insti- 
tutions naturally did not correspond exacdy with the distribution of the 
starred scientists among those institutions; and one result of the survey was 
to indicate to the Division Chiefs particular institutions which might be able 
profitably to absorb more OSRD work. 

When war came and with it an expansion of the OSRD program and 
of the Army, Navy and industrial research and development programs, the 
demands for physicists far exceeded the supply, and institutions with com- 
petent physicists either took military research contracts or released men to 
institutions which had contracts. As gas was not used in the war, the demand 
for chemists never reached the proportions of the demand for physicists and 
less difficulty was experienced in placing contracts for needed chemical re- 
search. Engineering colleges and engineering departments of universities 
were not used as fully as they wished to be. In the early days of NDRC 
when the emphasis was upon research, the heavy demand was for physicists 
and chemists. As emphasis switched to development in the later days of 
NDRC, it might have been possible to make more effective use of the staffs 
of engineering departments and engineering colleges; but by that time the 
pattern had been pretty well set and the pressure under which everyone 


was working made it difficult for Division and Section Chiefs to bring in 
new groups. 

Following Pearl Harbor, the NDRC started aggressively to bring more 
industrial concerns into this contracting framework. In a letter addressed 
to a number of industrial organizations on December 30, 1941, Jewett, who 
was the Committee's principal contact with industrial organizations, wrote 
that when NDRC was created some eighteen months previously, it had 
approached academic laboratories and a few industrial laboratories whose 
normal work was closely akin to specific military problems. The reason for 
this selection was partly because it was thought that industrial laboratories 
were largely engaged on urgent problems which might interfere with taking 
on additional work and partly because the most urgent problems confront- 
ing NDRC at the time appeared to be largely in highly specialized fields 
or in the fundamental stage which university laboratories could tackle. 
Jewett pointed out that the result had been a heavy drain on the personnel 
and facilities of academic institutions and a heavy load on a few industrial 
laboratories. While recognizing that the military services might have made 
substantial direct use of industrial laboratories, he was seeking untouched 
potential resources in that field. He pointed out that with the change from 
a defense philosophy to one of all-out war the number and urgency of mili- 
tary development problems were greatly increased, while the inevitable 
restrictions on civil life seemed likely to lessen the pressure of normal 
research and development activities and to make more facilities available 
for the solution of strictly war problems. The letter concluded with a request 
for information as to facilities which the addressees might have available 
for NDRC work. 

A summary of the responses to Jewett's letter was distributed to members 
of the NDRC as well as to Division and Section Chairmen and Technical 
Aides for their use in recommending contracts, particularly those in the 
stage which intervenes between the completion of laboratory trials and the 
undertaking of large-scale production. Jewett also prepared and distributed 
a key to National Research Council Bulletin No. 104, entitled "Industrial 
Research Laboratories," to call to the attention of the divisions some of the 
more prominent physical research listings out of the approximately 2200 
firms recorded in that Bulletin. 

When NDRC was reorganized late in 1942 a memorandum of general 
instructions was issued for the benefit of the new Division and Section 
Chiefs. It enumerated the following points for consideration in the selection 
of contractors: (i) primary emphasis in the selection of contractors should 
be placed on their ability to provide the highest standard of work in the 
least possible time; (2) contracts should be placed with organizations re- 
quiring a minimum of new personnel, machinery, equipment or facilities to 
perform the work; (3) contracts leading to developing of devices which 


may eventually go into large scale production should be carefully placed in 
order to avoid areas already overloaded with war contracts or faced with 
acute labor shortage; (4) contracts should be spread among as many organ- 
izations as is reasonable and feasible; (5) all other things being equal, the 
contract should be placed where the cost is lowest. 

Reorganization of the Divisions 

The first and only major reorganization within NDRC came in Decem- 
ber 1942. The tremendous increase in the Committee's activities which 
followed the outbreak of hostilities and the accelerated pressure to produce 
useful results quickly threw a heavy burden upon the members of the Com- 
mittee. Undoubtedly the original scheme of making the civilian members 
Chairmen of divisions had resulted in greater speed than would have been 
had if this had not been done. With the enormous increase in the Commit- 
tee's program, however, this divisional organization had thrown a heavy ad- 
ministrative burden upon the members, which prevented them from giving 
sufficient attention to the broader policies which were a part of their re- 
sponsibilities. After a preliminary series of conferences with the Division 
chairmen in October 1942, Conant and Edward L. Moreland (Dean of 
Engineering, M.I.T., and Executive Officer of NDRC) submitted to the 
Committee a proposal for a complete reorganization of NDRC. This pro- 
posal became the basis of a recommendation to the Director adopted by 
the Committee at a special meeting on October 15, 1942. The several parts 
of that recommendation were: (i) that the Director abolish the present 
divisions and sections of NDRC as of a date to be determined by the 
Chairman of NDRC; (2) that the Director create approximately fifteen divi- 
sions of NDRC with a tentative allocation of functions set out in the recom- 
mendation; (3) that a subcommittee consisting of Conant, Adams, Comp- 
ton, Jewett and Tolman examine all NDRC projects and contracts and 
allocate each to one of the new divisions or sections; (4) that the same sub- 
committee recommend budgets for the new divisions; (5) that the same 
subcommittee be empowered to recommend to the Director technical per- 
sonnel of each division and section and the creation of new divisions and 
sections with appropriate personnel; (6) that after the reorganization, divi- 
sional proposals be submitted in typewritten form for circulation to the 
Committee members, the proposals to contain all pertinent information and 
to show the relation of the proposed contract to the general scheme of opera- 
tion of the division both from a scientific and a budgetary point of view; 
(7) that the proposals would not be acted upon at the first meeting at 
which they are reviewed unless the need for immediate action is clearly 
demonstrated and unanimous consent obtained. In general where proposals 
involve an important new departure from policy or large sums of money, 


a subcommittee will review the situation and report to the full committee; 
(8) that the Director of OSRD modify existing administrative machinery 
to conform with the new organization. 

Appended to the resolution was a tentatively proposed new divisional 
organization calling for fifteen divisions designated by name with indica- 
tions of the assignment of specific parts of the current program to each of 
the proposed divisions. In submitting the recommendation, Conant sug- 
gested that after the reorganization the Committee should meet at weekly 
intervals to consider proposals for contract and to function actively in re- 
viewing the activities of the several divisions. 

Following the Committee meeting Jewett wrote Conant on October 21 
at some length about the difficulty of organizing NDRC for more efficient 
operations. He described NDRC responsibilities in the following language: 

We must realize that the thing we are charged to administer is the greatest in- 
dustrial research and development project man has ever attempted; that it is the 
most diffuse in the variety of its interests; has the largest funds; is the most dif- 
ficult to operate because of the necessarily wide scattering of its units and projects, 
and is something in which time is more the essense of the job than anywhere else. 

In Jewett's opinion, effective organization required that the Chairman or 
the chief operating officer of NDRC should have a sufficient stafl to super- 
vise all the work adequately. The members of that staff should be intimately 
familiar with the sectors of the work for which they were responsible and 
should be in a position to present matters in their fields for consideration 
by the Committee. 

On October 28, 1942, Bush gave his approval to the general lines upon 
which reorganization was proceeding. The subcommittee appointed by the 
Committee on October 15 made its report on November 6. Upon the basis 
of that report, the full Committee, with Jewett dissenting, recommended 
the establishment of eighteen named divisions and two named panels with 
designated persons as their respective chiefs. The Committee indicated that 
it would report at a later date with reference to the method of handling 
matters relating to physiology and psychology. 

This was one of the few times when the Committee did not act unani- 
mously, and Jewett's dissent was concerned solely with the question of the 
adequacy of provisions for administrative work in the proposed new divi- 
sions and in the office of the Chairman. He believed that more adequate 
provision for the staffs of the divisions and of the Chairman should have 
preceded the establishment of new divisions. 

Moreland, on November 10, 1942, wrote the persons who had been rec- 
ommended as Division Chiefs to tell them of the recommendation and to 
state that when the reorganization had been approved and the Chiefs of 
the new divisions formally appointed, they would be asked to make recom- 



mendations to the Chairman of NDRC as to the organization of their 
respective divisions. The recommendations would cover the number and 
scope of sections into which it was proposed to divide the work of the divi- 
sion. Personnel of the division would be made up of Section Chiefs as 
ex officio members and members at large appointed upon the recommenda- 
tions of the Division Chief. The persons addressed were requested to proceed 
informally in order to be able to move promptly with the establishment of 
the new organization as soon as formal approval should be forthcoming. 
On November lo, Bush sent Conant a long letter of interpretation of the 
NDRC action. In it he indicated that he was prepared to work with Conant 
in steps to strengthen the Chairman's Office by adding to it a number of 
persons charged with the duty of closely following the affairs of groups of 
divisions. At the same time he gave his approval of the proposed reorganiza- 
tion to take effect at a future date when the stage had been set for it. 

At its meeting on November 20, 1942, the Committee proceeded a step 
further in the reorganization by adopting principles of procedure to be 
followed after the reorganization was complete. Those principles recited 
that the Committee would meet every Friday. Reviewing subcommittees 
were appointed for each division and panel. Each reviewing subcommittee 
consisted of three members of the NDRC (later increased to four for some 
divisions). Divisions and sections were instructed to notify members of the 
appropriate subcommittees of all meetings, tests and demonstrations so 
that the members might attend such meetings as far as possible and thus 
keep in close touch with the activities of the division. Each reviewing sub- 
committee was directed to report at least twice a year on the activities of 
the division under review and in addition to make such brief reports from 
time to time as it might deem appropriate. At the meeting at which the 
reviewing subcommittee made its semiannual report, the Division Chief 
was also to report at length outlining the program he proposed for the 
division for the next six months together with a tentative budget. NDRC 
would approve the program as presented or with suitable modifications 
with the understanding that the approval was in principle only and that 
details of the budget would not be binding upon either the Committee or 
the division. In connection with each contract proposal, the Chairman's 
Office was instructed to report whether the proposed contract was a part 
of the program already approved by the Committee. In those cases in 
which the contracts were a part of the approved program, it was antici- 
pated that no detailed discussion would be necessary in the absence of a 
specific request by a member of the Committee for such discussion. Each 
contract proposal for more than $20,000 involving a substantial departure 
from the approved program and total budget would be given special con- 
sideration with the Division Chief normally expected to appear before the 
Committee to explain the proposal. In order that they might be fully in- 


formed it was stated that members of the Committee would have access 
to any and all reports and might visit any of the contractors. 

Committee members were to have no executive authority or responsi- 
bility. All information concerning the progress of work was to flow to the 
Director of OSRD through the Chairman's Office and similarly, com- 
munications from the Director's Office and decisions on matters of policy 
should flow from the Director's Office through the Chairman's Office to 
the Division Chiefs. Administrative problems handled by the Adminis- 
trative Office of OSRD would flow directly to the Division Chiefs. 

The new organization was made effective as of December 9, 1942, for 
most of the divisions and panels and shortly thereafter for the remainder 
of the eighteen original divisions. Division 19 was added April 12, 1943. 
The Engineering Panel, one of the two original panels, was soon dropped 
in favor of the Engineering and Transition Office which was originally 
placed under the Director of OSRD but later became a part of the Office 
of the Chairman of NDRC. Matters of psychology, which had been re- 
served under the initial plan for reorganization, were turned over to the 
Applied Psychology Panel upon its creation on September 18, 1943. 

Functioning under the New Organization 

In practice, Division Chiefs submitted proposals for contracts so as to 
reach the Executive Secretary by 10 a.m. on Wednesday of each week. 
The proposals were given a preliminary review at a conference attended 
by the Executive Officer, Deputy Executive Officers, and staff aides of 
NDRC and the Executive Secretary. The proposals were then bound to- 
gether and laid before the Committee on Friday, at which time the Ex- 
ecutive Officer would invite particular attention to proposals which might 
seem open to question. In cases where urgency had been established by the 
Division Chief, the Committee by unanimous consent could give immedi- 
ate consideration to a proposal just laid before it. The normal procedure, 
however, was for the proposals to lay over until the following Friday to 
give the members of the Committee an opportunity to analyze the pro- 
posals. It was not unusual for a Committee member upon reviewing a par- 
ticular proposal to desire further information which he would seek from 
the Chairman's Office. When that proposal was called up for action, the 
Executive Officer either would have the requested information or he would 
have arranged for the Division Chief or a Technical Aide to appear in 
person before the Committee for further exposition of the proposal. Occa- 
sionally the Committee would have sufficient doubt as to the course of 
action it should take to ask the appropriate reviewing subcommittee to 
meet with the division and canvass the program in detail with a report 
back to the full Committee at a subsequent date. 


The semiannual reviews of division programs threw a substantial bur- 
den upon members of the Committee. Each of the twenty-one divisions 
and panels presented its program to the appropriate reviewing subcom- 
mittee. Some days later the Division Chief accompanied usually by some 
members of his staff appeared before the full Committee to explain his 
program. In the course of the exposition, he reported upon the progress 
made since his last appearance before the Committee and answered such 
questions as the Committee wished to ask. He then proceeded to oudine 
his program for the next six months and to present his estimate of the cost 
of carrying the program into effect. In a subsequent executive session the 
reviewing subcommittee would make its report based upon its analysis 
of the program, following which the Committee would approve the pro- 
gram with such modifications as it deemed desirable. The Division Chief 
was then informed of this approval and of the tentative allocation of a 
designated amount of money for his program for the six-month period. 
These allocations were normally made after the Committee had heard all 
of the division and panels. 

In order that the divisional budgets might be on a comparable basis, 
the Committee normally crowded the twenty-one reviewing sessions into 
a two-week period which provided a very heavy schedule for the members, 
all of whom had other duties in addition to their membership in NDRC. 
In view of the pressure under which the program was being carried, it was 
obviously impossible for the division estimates to be exact. In practice, 
the Committee reserved approximately 10 per cent of its funds for alloca- 
tion to emergency programs arising between the semiannual reviews and 
relied upon the underexpenditures on some budgets to counterbalance the 
overexpenditures on others to take care of programs which could not be 
covered by the 10 per cent margin. In this way the Committee kept fairly 
well on top of the budgetary situation without unduly restricting the ini- 
tiative of the divisions. 

A memorandum of general instructions dated November 23, 1942, em- 
phasized the importance of suitable and adequate reports on the part of 
Division and Panel Chiefs in keeping the Committee informed. 

The following five kinds of technical and scientific reports were required 
for the information of the Services as well as the Committee: 

(i) Bimonthly division and panel summaries. These were designed to 
give a clear over-all picture of the status of all projects in the division with 
special emphasis on progress during the period since the last report. 

(2) Contractor's progress reports. These were to be prepared as required 
by the contract or by the Division Chief within the terms of the contract, 
and were to be accompanied by a brief summary and comment prepared 
by the division or section. 

(3) Contractor's final report. 


(4) Division and panel reports on special subjects as requested from time 
to time for the information of the Committee or the Services. 

(5) Reports on service demonstrations and tests. 

In addition, special reports were to be submitted as requested by the 
Chairman, the Director, or the Services (through the Chairman). 

At the time of the reorganization it had been decided to require the 
submission of monthly administrative reports from the Division and Panel 
Chiefs to keep the Chairman and NDRC informed of the progress of the 
work, its cost and any significant developments that might justify further 
research along parallel or divergent lines. A re-examination of the situation 
a month later led to the conclusion that the other means of obtaining this 
information, such as the meetings of the reviewing subcommittees, were 
sufficient and hence the reports were not required. 

Division Chiefs were required to see that notice of all proposed Service 
trials and tests (other than routine) of NDRC developments was sent to 
the Chairman's Office in order that arrangements might be made for rep- 
resentatives from that office as well as members of NDRC if they desired 
to attend the demonstration. 

The operation of NDRC was described at some length by Conant in a 
memorandum to Bush on April 26, 1944. He pointed out that historically 
the divisions of NDRC were the basic units, with the basic decision on 
scientific policy and the immediate supervision of scientific results resting 
with them. The function of the NDRC itself was to review the judgment 
of the divisions by three different mechanisms: (i) specific contracts, 
(2) reviewing subcommittees, and (3) periodical reviews by the full Com- 
mittee, usually with the Division Chief appearing before it. He concluded: 

The ramifications of the research program being conducted under the National 
Defense Research Committee are obviously so great as to make it impossible for 
such Committee to have any detailed knowledge or pass detailed judgment on 
the week by week development. The Committee is able, however, to review the 
judgments of the individual divisions and to make suggestions to the divisions as 
to the conduct of their work and to the propriety of the contracts which they 
recommend. In particular, they must be concerned with the question of whether 
certain projects should be expanded or contracted or abandoned. The fact that 
the Committee includes an Army and Navy representative closely in touch with 
the research work of these Services enables the Committee to have available in- 
timate knowledge of the Army and Navy programs in passing an over-all judg- 
ment on the recommendations of the separate divisions. 

Expedited or "Crash" Procurement 

Prior to Pearl Harbor, and in the earlier phases of the war. Service 
project requests were predominantly requests for research and development. 
In the later phases of the war, many of the requests tended to become 



emergency requests for the production of items on which the NDRC had 
already done research and development. Such requests in reality amounted 
to procurement for the Services but they were submitted sometimes in the 
form of "new projects" and more often in the form of extensions to exist- 
ing projects. Finally these requests reached such proportions that it became 
necessary to review the whole problem administratively and to set up cer- 
tain rules to regulate it. The resultant program was variously known as 
"crash procurement" and the "Red Ticket Program." 

In May 1944 discussions were held by representatives of the NDRC with 
the Office of the Chief Signal Officer and the Navy Department for the 
purpose of reaching an agreement as to the conditions under which OSRD 
would accept such procurement. The definition agreed upon was "a small 
quantity production of an item which is urgently needed in the field and 
which can be completed or deliveries started several months in advance of 
the date when the manufacturer can commence production line deliveries." 

It was agreed further that such procurement would be undertaken by 
the NDRC only upon receipt from the Services of assurance on the fol- 
lowing points: (i) a statement from the using arm that sufficient military 
urgency exists within the Services to warrant Expedited Procurement by 
NDRC; (2) that the using arm cannot procure the desired equipment 
within the time required to meet the military urgency schedule as set up 
in (i), except through NDRC; (3) that transfer of funds will be available 
for this procurement. 

In considering the acceptance of "crash procurement," the NDRC con- 
sidered whether adequate manpower existed to produce the required equip- 
ment within the time specified and the procurement could be accepted with- 
out causing material interference to other projects of equal importance. 
The Army and Navy agreed that the expedited procurement programs 
should be given sufficiently high precedence ratings to make possible the 
satisfactory procurement of components to meet the desired delivery sched- 

The Director of OSRD felt very strongly that procurement by NDRC 
for the Services should be on a very restricted basis. In a letter of March 19, 
1945, he expressed himself as follows: 

It is my feeling that OSRD should not be called upon to act as a procurement 
agency for the Services, except in very unusual circumstances when we shall 
undertake small quantity production to meet advanced dates required by a mili- 
tary urgency, but rather that we should confine our activity to research and de- 
velopment as well as to act in a consulting capacity for the Services on the pro- 
duction of equipment. 

The crash procurement program resulted in equipment getting into sig- 
nificant use at critical periods; from that standpoint it must be adjudged 


a success. While it was resorted to in connection with developments of 
several divisions, it was most generally used in connection with rockets for 
the Navy and radar for both Army and Navy, in both of which cases the 
procurement ran well into the millions of dollars. The situation, however, 
was not a happy one for NDRC and OSRD, since it was one for which 
the agencies had not been intended and which required inefficient use of 
scientific manpower. Crash procurement hence was embarked upon reluc- 
tandy, and for the sole reason that there seemed no practical alternative 
which would deliver needed new equipment to the front as quickly. 

Absence of such an alternative was not owing to lack of legal power 
on the part of the Army and Navy; both had the same powers as OSRD 
and more. The great size and complexity of organization necessary to the 
armed establishment in total war carried with them as an inevitable con- 
sequence both the necessity for mass procurement and also the necessity for 
extremes of specific detail which can be secured only at the expense of swift 
action. Service procurement procedures, built to obtain large numbers of 
definitely specified items, were highly effective in obtaining millions of 
identical objects which could be specified to the last detail; they were in- 
effective when the problem was one of securing a small number of items 
the detailed specification of which had not been worked out to the final 
decimal and which were wanted in a hurry. Had OSRD declined to enter 
the field of crash procurement, a revision of Service procurement proce- 
dures might have overcome this difficulty. Such revision would of itself 
have required time and might have delayed the delivery of critical equip- 
ment to die fighting fronts. 

As a Committee it was possible for NDRC to advise Bush on matters of 
policy and to instruct its agents along broad lines. Obviously the detailed 
supervision of a research program could not be exercised by the Committee 
as such. The next two chapters will be devoted to the agents used by the 
NDRC in supervising the research program — the Chairman's Office and 
the divisions. 



The Chairman's Office 


.N ADDITION to presiding over its sessions, the Chairman of 
NDRC was the chief executive in charge of its operations. The role of the 
Chairman's Office was in an almost continual state of flux as a result both 
of the tremendous expansion of program and of the changing character of 
the program and of the organization itself. 

In spite of the heavy demands on his time in connection with other war 
activities — the Rubber Survey Committee and the atomic bomb project 
among others — Conant made great personal contributions to NDRC, 
particularly in connection with policy matters, with anticipating needed 
changes in organization and steering the Committee through them, and 
with the selection of a stafif effectively headed by Dean E. L. Moreland 
to handle the heavy burden of regular operations. 

Initially there was no Chairman's Office organization as such. The civilian 
members of the Committee as Chiefs of the NDRC divisions assumed re- 
sponsibility for the administration of the programs within their respective 
fields, except as the contractual and business arrangements were handled 
by the Executive Secretary. With the acceleration of program following the 
entry of the United States into the war there was need for greater co-ordi- 
nation of scientific and technical matters, especially in those fields which 
had not yet developed as the clear responsibility of one of the divisions or 
where there might be overlapping interests. Accordingly, additions were 
made to the staff of the Chairman's Office from time to time as need arose 
and suitable men could be found. Arranged in order of their appointment 
the following persons were members of the staff at one time or another: * 

* In addition, the following persons were appointed as Consultants or Special Assist- 
ants to the Chairman for the purpose of assisting in the preparation of the Summary 
Technical Reports and the "long history" of OSRD (see Chapter XX) during 1945 and 
1946; but they did not participate in the general operations of the Chairman's Office: 
Consultants: K. H. Condit, J. Rinehart; Special Assistants: L. H. Adams, J. C. Boyce, 
C. W. Bray, L. H. Farinholt, W. A. Noyes, Jr., H. Rowe. 





Appointment Dates 

George W. Bailey 

Special Assistant 



1 1-4-43 

Ward F. Davidson 





Deputy Executive Officer 




P. D. Foote 

Special Consultant 




R. W. King 

Executive Assistant 

5-1 1-42 







Marston Morse 





Edward L. Moreland 





Executive Officer 




Fred L. Hovde 

Executive Assistant 




F. T. Letchfield 

Special Assistant 




W. N. Tuttle 





John E. Jackson 

Staff Aide 




Louis Jordan 

Technical Aide 




J. H. Pilkington 


I 2-1-42 


3-1 1-43 

Harris M. Chadwell 

Staff Aide 



4-1 1-44 

Deputy Executive Officer 




A. F. Murray 

Staff Aide 




J. H. Van Vleck 




I 1-5-43 

J. H. Hildebrand 





John H. Teeter 

Staff Aide 




L. W. Bass 

Technical Aide 




Special Assistant 




Caryl P. Haskins 

Executive Assistant 




Deputy Executive Officer 




Colonel W. S. Bowen * 

Staff Aide 




Virginia Shapley 

Technical Aide 




A. F. G. Lucas 

Special Assistant 




S. A, Waksman 

Special Consultant 




J. V. L. Hogan 

Deputy Executive Officer 




G. J. Esselen 





Paul A. Scherer 

Deputy Executive Officer 




Eugene W. Scott 

Deputy Executive Officer 




John H. Sole 

Chief, Division Administradve 




Wendell O. Gould 

Special Assistant 




* On detail from U. S. Army. 

With his appointment as Executive Officer on August 10, 1942, More- 
land moved to Washington and became the active executive head of NDRC. 
In establishing the position Bush had provided that the incumbent should 
exercise, under the direction of the Chairman, such functions of the Chair- 
man of NDRC as executive head of NDRC as should be delegated to him 
by the Chairman and that he should represent the Chairman in his ab- 
sence in all matters concerning NDRC business. Conant followed this up 


on December 31, 1942, by delegating to Moreland all the executive powers 
and duties vested in him. 

One function which steadily increased in importance was the assignment 
of Service projects to divisions for action. As established in June 1942, the 
procedure called for routing all Service requests to the Chairman's Office 
for determination as to which division (or divisions) should be asked to 
consider the proposed work. To insure consistency in assignments, the re- 
sponsibility for these decisions was vested in one person within the Office, 
initially the Executive Officer and later a Deputy Executive Officer. 

In a memorandum on OSRD operations dated July 29, 1942, Bush stipu- 
lated that the supervision of work under contracts entered into pursuant 
to NDRC proposals should be the responsibility in the first instance of the 
division with which the proposal had originated and that the ultimate re- 
sponsibility for decision on any questions involved should lie with the Chair- 
man of NDRC, except for such matters as the latter believed to require 
final determination by the Director. The Chairman was made responsible 
for the co-ordination of the activities of groups working within NDRC 
on similar projects so as to achieve a minimum of duplication. It was thus 
made specific, as previously it had been understood, that the Chairman's 
Office should provide the link which would minimize the delays and 
duplication resulting from the policy of compartmentalization of informa- 
tion. This carried the responsibility both for acting upon any requests for 
interdivision liaison and for keeping the whole program sufficiently well 
in mind to give reasonable assurance that interdivisional discussions would 
be authorized and stimulated whenever profitable. In fact, this latter func- 
tion was so complex that it was never discharged to the satisfaction of 
either the divisions or the Chairman's Office. Nevertheless, the Chairman's 
Office did render a valuable service in arranging for joint action of two 
or more divisions whenever such action was indicated as desirable. 

A memorandum of general instructions was issued on November 23, 
1942, to clarify the relation of the various parts of the organization to 
each other, as part of the reorganization then being effected. It stated that 
the control of the technical and scientific work done under a contract was 
the responsibility of the Chairman and Executive Officer of NDRC. In a 
later paragraph it also stated that when a contract had been executed or a 
letter of intent issued, the direction and control of the technical and scien- 
tific work became a responsibility of the Division Chief. The two state- 
ments can be reconciled on the theory that the Chairman received his au- 
thority from the Director and that he re-delegated (with the consent of 
the Director) to the Division Chief. When Conant reviewed the organiza- 
tion and distribution of functions of OSRD as far as NDRC was concerned 
in a memorandum of April 26, 1944, however, he considered the Division 
Chiefs as agents of the Director rather than of the Chairman of NDRC. 


The reorganization of NDRC in December 1942, with the resultant 
increase in the number of divisions and the withdrawal of administrative 
duties from the members of NDRC, threw an increased burden on the 
Chairman's Office, which, it will be recalled, Jewett was not satisfied it 
was equipped to handle. To meet this situation, primary responsibility for 
following the work of the new divisions was assigned to staff members as 
follows: Hovde, Divisions 3, 5 and 8; Davidson, Divisions i, 2, 4, 7, 18 and 
the Applied Mathematics Panel; Chad well, Divisions 9, 10, 11, personnel 
and relations with the Office of Strategic Services (this later was the field 
of Division 19); Jackson, Divisions 6, 12, 16 and 17; and Murray, Divi- 
sions 13, 14 and 15. These individuals operated in the name of the Chair- 
man. They kept the Chairman and the Executive Officer informed of the 
activities of the divisions, and they interpreted to the divisions the policies 
of NDRC. They also worked closely with the Chairmen of the several 
reviewing subcommittees of NDRC. 

From time to time special assistants were added to the Chairman's Office 
to follow new activities until they could be fitted into the regular plan of 
NDRC operation. This was the case with L. P. Jordan, who followed 
metallurgical problems from May i, 1942 to July i, 1943, by which time 
Division 18 was well under way; L. W. Bass, who followed Quartermaster 
Corps problems from June 30, 1943 to June 12, 1944, when they were made 
the responsibility of a section in Division 11; and C. W. Bray, who fol- 
lowed psychological problems from July 24, 1942 to October 18, 1943, at 
which time the Applied Psychology Panel was set up. Information con- 
cerning the progress of work of the several divisions flowed to the Direc- 
tor of OSRD through the Chairman's Office and, similarly, instructions 
and decisions on matters of policy flowed from the Director through the 
Chairman to the Division Chiefs. 

The Chairman's Office prepared the agenda for the biweekly Committee 
meetings. In preparation for those meetings, staff conferences were held 
on Wednesday before the Friday committee meetings for a preliminary 
review of contract proposals. Any additional details which the staflE consid- 
ered necessary for a full consideration of the proposed contracts were then 
procured by the appropriate staff member prior to the Committee meeting. 
Contract proposals originating in the divisions were normally presented to 
NDRC by the Executive Officer although in special cases either he or the 
Committee might invite the Division Chief to appear in person or by 
representative. To guard against delay in handling urgent contract pro- 
posals between Committee meetings, the Chairman and the Executive Offi- 
cer were authorized to recommend to the Director contract authorizations 
not exceeding a stipulated amount, usually $100,000, between meetings, 
provided that at least one member of the Committee had given prior ap- 
proval to each recommendation. 


Activities of the Chairman's OflSce were woven all through the opera- 
tions of the divisions. Thus appointments of all NDRC personnel required 
the approval of that Office as did the distribution of reports. The semiannual 
divisional budget requests v^ere reviewed; and the recommendations of 
the Chairman's Office usually resulted in a downward revision of the re- 
quested funds because of the better picture of the over-all situation pos- 
sessed by that OfiEce. Based on this review and the action of NDRC, the 
Office prepared the justification of the NDRC portion of the OSRD 
budget estimates for presentation to the Bureau of the Budget and Congress. 

In view of the progress of the war and the shifting of personnel, a 
reorganization of the Chairman's Office took place in the spring of 1944. 
Designed to provide more effective service to the divisions, closer super- 
vision of divisional programs and budgets, and greater assistance to the 
full Committee in its decisions on policies, it divided responsibility among 
Conant, Moreland and three Deputy Executive Officers as follows: Conant, 
Divisions 9, 10, 11; Moreland, Divisions i, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 12; David- 
son, Administration, Engineering and Transition Office, and Applied Math- 
ematics Panel; Hogan, Divisions 5, 13, 14, 15, Vacuum Tube Development 
Committee and the Committee on Propagation; and Haskins, Divisions 16, 
17, 18, 19 and the Applied Psychology Panel. There was a somewhat com- 
parable assignment of divisions among the staff aides whose function it 
was to keep fully informed of the technical and scientific aspects of the 
work of the divisions and panels. In general, they limited their direct 
activities to the divisions to which they were specifically assigned but they 
were also charged with knowing as much as possible about what was 
going on in the other divisions so that as a group they might provide for 
cross fertilization between divisions. 

The selection of Davidson to handle administration left the Executive 
Officer and the other Deputy Executive Officers free to devote more atten- 
tion to the division programs and to broad policy matters. It also meant 
a considerable increase in the speed of handling the great volume of paper 
work necessarily involved in a program of the magnitude which the NDRC 
program had attained; it included such items as consideration of extension 
of time on contracts, assignment of Service projects to divisions, recom- 
mendation to the Director of the appointment of persons serving without 
compensation, general review of NDRC personnel requirements and ap- 
pointments, review of budget requests, and general supervision of the 
Chairman's Office. Davidson devoted full time to the task until Decem- 
ber 1945, by which time the volume had declined substantially and Paul 
A. Scherer, Chief of the Engineering and Transition Office, was able to 
take it on in addition to his other activities. 

In a memorandum dated May 24, 1944, to members, and Division and 
Panel Chiefs of NDRC, Bush outlined the functions of the Chairman's Office 


as follows: (i) It should keep NDRC fully informed as to the progress of 
the divisions in carrying out their programs. (2) It should supplement the 
work of the reviewing subcommittees in interpreting to the divisions the 
policies and programs of NDRC. (3) It should review any borderline mat- 
ter handled by a division, that is, any matter not clearly within the estab- 
lished program and pohcy of NDRC, referring to NDRC important mat- 
ters on which it might be in doubt as to policy. (4) It should recommend 
for consideration by NDRC policies which it considered advisable for 
general conduct of affairs in the field of research and development of in- 
strumentalities of warfare. (5) It should insure that the divisions were 
properly constituted to carry out the functions delegated to them under 
contracts recommended by NDRC. There was a corresponding obligation 
on the Division and Section Chiefs acting as the technical representatives 
on contracts to keep in close contact with the Chairman's Office. 

The review of Service projects forced by the tightening manpower situa- 
tion late in 1944 threw a substantial burden on the Chairman's Office. Both 
new projects and those already under way were reviewed from the stand- 
point of priority and for their probable usefulness in the current war. The 
Committee consistently followed the recommendation of the Chairman's 
Office in determining which projects would be continued. 

With the cessation of hostilities there was no occasion for additional 
NDRC meetings and the Chairman was authorized to work out termina- 
tion schedules within the framework of the OSRD demobilization pro- 
gram. Programs requested from the divisions and panels were reviewed 
and revised in the Chairman's Office. One by one the division offices were 
closed as the technical work under contract was terminated, transferred 
to the Services or abandoned and the usual flow of reports diminished to 
a trickle. As each division folded, its residual work was transferred to a 
Division Administrative Group set up in the Chairman's Ofl&ce. Finally, 
the Chairman's Office itself was terminated on December 31, 1946, and 
the Division Administrative Group was transferred to the office of the 
Executive Secretary of OSRD. 

The position of the Chairman's Office was one of great influence but 
relatively little power. The Division Chiefs were able men of high stand- 
ing, leaders in the fields within which their divisions operated. They 
were accustomed to independence in research and felt little need for the 
interposition of any body between them and the NDRC. The fact that 
Conant and Moreland were recognized as leaders in their respective fields 
made it possible for the Chairman's Office to wield great influence al- 
though they were careful not to take any position which might be con- 
strued as one of compulsion over the divisions. The Of&ce was especially 
effective in keeping a program from being bogged down within a divi- 


sion because of competition with other programs in that division, or be- 
cause of the failure of a Section Chief or responsible section member to 
pursue it with sufficient vigor. With the staff aides keeping him well 
posted on the status of the various programs, Moreland was able by discus- 
sions (sometimes vigorous) with the Division Chiefs to dislodge programs 
which had been delayed. He was continually on the alert for ways to 
speed programs entrusted to the divisions. 

Moreland also made a great contribution in the relations with the Serv- 
ices carried on through his Office. He participated in interminable con- 
ferences with officers of all ranks in both Services. He injected realism 
into the formulation of Service requests and was a vigorous advocate of 
the NDRC position with reference to the proper relations between the 
Services and the Committee. On the one hand he stimulated the Services 
to submit problems to NDRC and to make provision for adequate testing 
and use of the results of NDRC research, while on the other he stimulated 
the proper handling of those requests within the divisions. 

The position of the Chairman's Office was one in which tact combined 
at the proper times with a certain amount of vigor accomplished what au- 
thority and discipline could not have done. The opinions of Conant and 
Moreland carried weight because of their authors rather than because of 
any authority which they were in a position to or desired to exercise. The 
formal records of the Office and the administrative devices told in the 
preceding paragraphs fall far short of presenting a complete picture of 
what in fact was a substantial problem in human relations. 

The Engineering and Transition Office 

In November 1941 the length of time which it took to put into use 
the new and improved military devices emerging from the laboratories 
prompted Bush to become interested in some aspects of production, particu- 
larly that of small quantities of what might be termed "custom made" ap- 
paratus. Some equipment of this type (certain radar is an example) was 
termed by Conant to be "catalytic," because in small quantities it might 
produce a major military or naval effect. 

Shordy before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Elihu Root, Jr., at Bush's 
request formulated a plan for an organization headed by a special repre- 
sentative of the Director to be charged with responsibility for stimulating 
contracts by the Army and Navy for the production of devices which were 
ready to come from the laboratory. The group appointed in December 1941 
pursuant to this recommendation and headed by F. S. Gordon (Vice- 
President, United States Pipe and Foundry Co.) as Special Assistant to 
the Director, was known colloquially as "few-quick." It was intended that 
it would suggest to the appropriate officers of the armed services immediate 


production by hand methods of specific devices as they were evolved. 
Where possible, such suggestions were to be accompanied by recommenda- 
tions as to satisfactory contractors. In turn, the Army and Navy proposed 
to set up special procedures for contracting for such equipment. It was not 
intended that the usual orderly production of the same equipment should 
be in any way affected. The material obtained under the few-quick was 
intended as a stopgap to fill in before completely engineered materials be- 
came available by production methods. 

The few-quick organization got ofl to a flying start with assurances of 
co-operation from Division Chiefs, Army, Navy, and WPB. The ground- 
work consisted of surveying and setting up a file on facilities and personnel 
of small organizations of all sorts distributed about the country. Informal 
contact was established with OSRD division, section, and laboratory per- 
sonnel for the purpose of learning of developments at or near the completion 
stage. Recommendations of few-quick production facilities were offered 
them and the Services, together with any co-operation desired in establish- 
ing a suitable contact and prosecution of the actual construction of the 

Failure of the Services to set up the special procedures immediately re- 
sulted in OSRD undertaking to procure limited quantities of the new 
devices. A basic flaw in the scheme of operation soon became apparent. 
It was that physical duplication of the laboratory model of a device does 
not necessarily assure duplication of laboratory performance; in addition, 
extensive modifications of an engineering nature were sometimes necessary 
to enable the equipment to perform under other than laboratory conditions. 
Correction of this flaw entailed a change of concept for the few-quick opera- 
tion, shifting the emphasis to procurement of engineering abiUties as well 
as model shop facilities. Through close co-operation with the various tech- 
nical, procuring, and using branches of the Services, a plan was set up 
whereby preproduction engineering and model shop production under 
the auspices of OSRD were followed, or possibly overlapped, by Service 
procurement at the same source. The "crash programs," in which OSRD 
during a later phase of the war served as a procurement agency for the 
armed forces in having equipment produced on time schedules otherwise 
impossible, were based on these principles. 

At Bush's request Root made another survey of the transition function 
in March 1942. Following Root's report. Bush in April 1942 created a 
"Transition Office" under Gordon, reporting directly to him, which was to: 
(i) inform itself as to the available facilities for the production of materials 
or devices developed under OSRD auspices; (2) collect information re- 
garding the status with respect to production of various OSRD research 
projects; (3) endeavor to obviate unnecessary overcrowding of particular 
facilities for engineering design and production; (4) arrange for the in- 


troduction of engineers from producers satisfactory to the Services and to 
OSRD into tlie laboratories before the completion of research, so that the 
education of the producers might begin at an early stage; (5) assist in 
shortening the period between the satisfactory completion of tests and 
the placing of contracts by the Services, and (6) co-operate in arranging 
for the rapid hand production of limited quantities. 

During most of 1942, the Transition Office served primarily in a staff 
capacity as an advisory and fact-finding agency in OSRD, with most of 
its work in the electronics field. Facility surveys, establishment of pro- 
cedures with Army and Navy procurement offices for the placement of 
OSRD educational orders for radar equipment, and maintaining current 
information on critical materials for circular distribution in OSRD con- 
sumed most of the available man-hours. 

In the middle of July, 1942, the Transition Office was transferred from 
the Director's Office to the Office of the Chairman of NDRC under 
Moreland as Executive Officer and an Engineering Office headed by 
F. T. Letchfield was created under the same authority. In the NDRC 
reorganization of December 1942, the Transition Office continued under 
Gordon and an Engineering Panel was established under Letchfield. The 
Engineering Panel consisted of appointees by the NDRC divisions from 
their own personnel. The Panel held a few meetings, but the heavy load 
of their own specific problems which its members were already carrying 
prevented its becoming a fully effective operating organization. 

The general instructions to NDRC personnel, divisions, and panels 
issued on November 23, 1942, stated that the Transition Office should be 
consulted on all matters relating to the production on a small or large scale, 
or on planning for such production, of devices or materials developed under 
NDRC, with consultation to be inaugurated when research reached the 
point that a successful result appeared probable. While this established 
the position of the Office on all matters regarding production under 
NDRC auspices, lack of sufficient personnel prevented its covering the 
entire field. 

During this period, individuals in the Transition Office were set up as 
specialists, each having specific cognizance of groups of loosely related 
fields of activity. At the appropriate time, the facilities of the Office were 
offered to assist in Service relations, selection of facilities, supervision of 
contract, and provision of materials, priorities, etc., for the specific job. 

In March 1943, Gordon resigned on urgent demand for his return to 
the organization which had loaned his services originally. R. J. Woodrow 
was appointed Deputy Chief of the Transition Office and assumed its 
administration for several critical months. In November 1943, Paul A. 
Scherer became Chief of the combined Engineering and Transition Office, 
and the Engineering Panel was abolished. The activities of the Office, other 


than in the field of electronics, were primarily in the nature of offering 
advice and information. Attempts were made to assemble lists of electronic 
components of devices under development by NDRC so that advance 
planning for production could be carried on, or the necessity of design 
change due to future unavailability of critical materials could be pointed 

In the fall of 1943, the Office began to operate on a project basis, through 
aiding specific devices in the transition stage rather than offering advisory 
services on an over-all basis. This necessitated close contact for varying 
periods of time with each device going through this phase. A contract 
with New England Power Service Company provided for the supply, at the 
request of the Transition Office and under its supervision, of engineering, 
expediting, and administrative personnel for project work. The success of 
this method of operation led to the establishment of a large manpower 
pool, securing for the Office the services of personnel made available by 
several public utility companies. At the same time a central engineering 
group under E. M. Wagner was built up rapidly to cover various phases 
of electrical, mechanical, and electronic engineering. 

A California branch of the Engineering and Transition OfBce was 
organized in April 1944. It operated as an entity on the West Coast, to 
initiate contacts and develop useful lines of endeavor with contractors and 
laboratories in that area. The California office continued on an expanding 
plane of usefulness until it was closed on December 31, 1945. 

In June 1944, Woodrow resigned as Deputy Chief of the Transition 
Office to go to the Radiation Laboratory in connection with an urgent 
project of substantial magnitude. C. H. Schauer, who had been on the 
staff of the Office since the middle of 1942, was appointed Assistant Chief 
of the Engineering and Transition Office and served as second in command 
to Scherer in the direction of the combined ofi&ces and as active administra- 
tor for the Transition Office. 

Originally established as few-quick with a staff of three, the Engineering 
and Transition Office prior to the war's end consisted of a full-time staff 
of about 50, an additional part-time group of about 20, and an available 
manpower pool of nearly 200. The assistance rendered to laboratories and 
the divisions concerned primarily with work in the electronic field was 
particularly valuable; there can be no doubt that its operations advanced 
the field use of many new devices of an electronic nature by days, weeks, 
and even months in some cases. 

Two major factors continuously shaped and reshaped the evolution of 
the transition function. One of these was rooted in a fundamental of human 
nature: that feeling of the creator that only he can fully and effectively 
oversee the completion and perfection of his creation. The second stemmed 
from the lines of authority and responsibility within the OSRD-NDRC 


organization. Responsibility for expenditure of funds and for results rested 
squarely on the Division Chief at all times. As a result, while he could 
delegate his authority for supervision of few-quick or transition type of 
work to another group, he could not delegate his ultimate responsibility. 
It was necessary to assure the Chief of each division for whom transition 
work was undertaken not only of the ability of the transition group but 
also of its responsibility to him for work undertaken on his behalf. 

The Chairman's Office (which later included the Engineering and 
Transition Office) was an essential part of the NDRC organization, pro- 
viding that minimum of central supervision necessary to hold together, 
however lightly, the highly diversified and rapidly expanding research 
and development program. That program was largely shaped within the 
divisions and panels, the organization and operations of which are dis- 
cussed in the next chapter. 




HE STORY of success of NDRC as an agency for the de- 
velopment of instruments and weapons of warfare is primarily the story 
of the divisions, which were the operating units through which partner- 
ship of military and scientific men was consummated. The story has been 
told with the broadest sweep in the outcome of the war. Releases by the 
Services have recounted many specific aspects of it. In the case of most 
divisions, it is being preserved in volumes written by persons attached to 
the divisions. For a brief account of the major accomplishments of 
NDRC, fortunately there already exists the well written and informative 
volume prepared by President James Phinney Baxter, 3rd, of Williams 
College, entitled Scientists Against Time. 

The story of the results obtained through the activities of the divisions, 
panels and committees is well worth the reading. President Baxter's volume 
contains a fascinating overview. While it would require a hardy soul (and 
a considerable amount of time) to read all the divisional histories being 
prepared for publication, specialists in the various fields covered who are 
interested from the standpoint either of military research or of subject matter 
broadly will find one or more of the volumes on the "must" list. 

The speed which was the keynote of NDRC operations was possible 
only through decentralization of the scientific program. Having picked 
capable men as Division Chiefs, NDRC gave them wide latitude in the 
formulation and execution of their respective programs subject to general 
supervision by the Committee. In the present volume, written from the 
standpoint of administration rather than from that of accomplishment, 
only a generalized account of the divisions can be given. There was con- 
siderable variation in the methods of their operation, which will appear 
from a perusal of the histories of divisional activities. Every activity of 
the central office was predicated upon the existence of the divisions and 
every procedure reported in the present volume tied into the divisions at 
some place. No attempt will be made here to single out all the things 
the divisions did; rather the present chapter will be confined to matters 
concerning the divisions which are not included as a matter of course in 
the operations reported elsewhere. 


General Organization 

The reorganization of NDRC which took place in December 1942 has 
already been described. That reorganization became effective as of Decem- 
ber 9, 1942, for most of the divisions and for the remainder shortly there- 
after. Nineteen divisions and two panels were formed as a result of the 
reorganization and several special committees operating outside the divi- 
sional framework were created as the need for them appeared. 

The Division Chief was the administrative and executive head of a 
division, responsible for its organization and operation, a task which 
experience showed to require full time in most cases. Initially he recom- 
mended the establishment of sections within the division and nominated 
members of the division, section chiefs, and members of sections. In 
administering the division he was instructed to take into account the 
general policies laid down by the Director and the NDRC, the scope of 
particular contracts and the general guidance of and any special emphasis 
recommended by the division members. At least one member of each 
division handling matters calling for engineering skill in a prominent 
manner was required to be an engineer familiar with the engineering and 
production problems in the division's field of operation. Those divisions 
requiring extensive mathematical investigations, computing, or statistical 
work included in their membership at least one person, nominated in 
consultation with the Chief of the Mathematics Panel, who also served 
as a member of that panel. 

Cross membership between divisions concerned with common or closely 
related problems was permitted; but the rule of compartmentalization of 
information applied, and persons who were members of more than one 
division were instructed to divulge only pertinent and necessary informa- 
tion on the work of one division to the members and workers in another 
division. Where joint division action seemed advisable, arrangements for it 
were made through the Chairman's Office. 

The position of a Panel Chief was comparable to that of a Division 
Chief. An important function of the panels was to provide expert con- 
sulting service to the divisions. In addition, they carried out such studies 
in various fields, including the performance of equipment in service, as 
were authorized through appropriate projects. 

It will be recalled that projects could be initiated by the Army, the 
Navy, a lend-lease government or by OSRD itself. Regardless of how a 
project was initiated, the divisions and sections were responsible for 
formulating a program for its prosecution, proposing suitable contractors 
and determining the approximate cost and duration of the work. Every 
contract was required to be recommended by a section with the approval 


of the Division Chief, or by a division. The recommendation was based 
upon a consideration of the program, the available contractors and the 
equitableness of the contract. The proposed program and resulting con- 
tract proposals were then considered by NDRC which normally recom- 
mended them to the Director for action. In the case of projects where 
there was a question as to policy or justification, the Division Chief in 
person, with such aid as he chose to bring, presented the proposal to 
NDRC and was subject to questioning by the members. In the case of a 
project of small magnitude or one not involving questions of policy or 
justification, the Executive Officer of NDRC submitted the proposal on the 
basis of information furnished by the Division Chief. 

In some divisions, individual members undertook to follow the work 
under particular contracts, but in most cases the primary supervision of 
contract operations was the task of the Technical Aides who were full 
time employees selected for this purpose. The Technical Aides ranged 
from young scientists whose task it was to operate under the eyes of their 
seniors to older men of distinction equal to that of the Division Chiefs. 
Taken as a whole the Technical Aides were an exceedingly capable group 
who deserve a large share of the credit for the successful execution of the 
broad policies laid down by the Director and the NDRC. 

All divisions and panels held meetings, for the most part at monthly 
intervals, although each division made its own decisions as to the frequency 
of meetings. At some meetings Army and Navy Liaison Officers were in 
attendance; and the division sought to bring them up to date on the 
progress of research projects, to get Service views on specific aspects 
of the various programs and to get information about operational aspects 
of new developments. Other meetings were held with only division mem- 
bers and Technical Aides present; these afforded opportunity for searching 
reviews of the details of particular projects as well as for vigorous discus- 
sion of directions in which the division was, or should have been, headed. 
Technical Aides or members following particular contracts reported on 
developments since the last previous meeting and were instructed as to 
future lines of research. 

Newly submitted projects were reviewed at the divisional meetings and 
the recommendations of the Division Chief as to lines of attack and 
potential contractors discussed at length. In the case of prospective academic 
contractors, the discussion frequendy hinged around the relative com- 
petence of particular investigators who were available for additional war 
work. Through the attendance of members of its staff, the NDRC Chair- 
man's Office acquired information useful both in assessing the divisional 
program and in discussions of divisional proposals when they reached the 

In some cases the divisional meeting was the battleground upon which 


the controversy over the relative urgency of various projects was waged. 
The normal tendency of each man to assign top urgency to the problem 
upon which he is engaged was true of Technical Aides following different 
aspects of the same general program; it was even more true of the Army 
and Navy Liaison Officers when their projects were in competition for the 
same manpower. The monthly divisional meetings afforded opportunity for 
periodic review of urgency ratings and contributed to keeping attention 
focussed on problems of greatest urgency. 

One important function of the division was the preparation of the divi- 
sional budgets which were reviewed by the NDRC and, as modified, became 
the basis of the NDRC portion of the OSRD budget. These budgets were 
prepared at six-month intervals and they required an assessment of the 
projects under way as well as those which might reasonably be expected 
within the next budget period. 

The main work of a division was done between meetings. Divisional 
staffs varied in size, with each Chief being given as much technical assist- 
ance as he required, within the limits imposed by the shortage of scientific 
manpower. Some divisional programs were carried out through large central 
laboratory contracts with a few smaller supporting contracts; others involved 
many widely scattered contracts. The type of divisional organization varied 
with the type of work done by the division. Some divisions had no sections, 
with all programs being reviewed by the entire division membership. Others 
had sections with varying amounts of autonomy. Where there were sections, 
the statements made about divisional activity apply as well to the activity 
of the sections. Close supervision of contracts was a function of the section 
concerned, although the division meeting afforded an opportunity for the 
division members to review sectional programs at length. 

The first contact with a potential contractor was usually made by the 
Division Chief, accompanied by the Technical Aide who would be assigned 
to the immediate supervision of the contract if one were to be written. 
This contact was normally with the research director in the case of an in- 
dustrial establishment or the appropriate department head in the case of 
an academic institution; he might be accompanied by one or more technical 
people who would be involved in the research program. The OSRD repre- 
sentative would outline the desired program and the reasons for its urgency. 
In the later days of OSRD operations when scientific manpower was at a 
premium, the real job was to convince the research director that the pro- 
posed program was more important than some of the things his staff was 
presently engaged upon. When agreement had been reached to proceed 
with the program, various persons familiar with the problem were brought 
into the discussion, and the program was planned jointly by divisional and 
contractor's personnel. The contractor's monthly progress reports, supple- 
mented by visits to the plants by the Technical Aide and occasionally the 


Division Chief and others, served to keep the division apprised of the prog- 
ress being made by the contractor. 

While the NDRC retained the exclusive right to make recommendations 
to the Director with reference to NDRC activities, it respected the autonomy 
of the divisions. No attempt was made to force a program upon a division 
contrary to its best judgment, though upon occasion the Committee would 
suggest lines of approach which were adopted by a division when it 
was impressed with the reasoning behind the suggestions. At varying inter- 
vals Division Chiefs appeared before reviewing subcommittees of the NDRC 
and before the Committee itself to present their programs in their entirety, 
reciting accompHshments to date and oudining plans for the future. Upon 
occasion, the Committee withheld its approval from particular lines of action 
or from particular contracts, but in the main the divisions could be fairly 
confident that the programs which they recommended would be approved 
by the NDRC. This was in part a reflection of the care with which the 
Division Chiefs and members were originally selected. 

For several months prior to the end of hostilities the civilian members 
of NDRC were impressed with the need for making plans for the eventual 
demobilization of the Committee and they reviewed each proposal from a 
division from the standpoint of its probable eventuation in a form which 
would be useful in the war against Japan. This, of course, involved an 
assumption as to the date upon which the war with Japan would end and 
upon that the Committee never definitely committed itself. However, the 
fact that the Committee took this point of view undoubtedly influenced the 
proposals presented by the divisions as it was quite apparent that the Com- 
mittee was more receptive to programs which would be completed in a 
relatively short time than it would be toward longer range programs. 

This attitude of the Committee, however, was not a completely new one 
to the divisions inasmuch as for some months previously, the problem of 
scientific manpower had become so acute that the Committee was insisting 
upon the concentration of effort in areas which promised results in time to 
be useful against Japan. Exceptions were made in a few cases for projects 
of fundamental importance where the Committee was persuaded that the 
project possessed a long range importance which justified the diversion of 
scientific manpower from projects promising more immediate results. 

The great autonomy allowed divisions was designed to permit the freest 
possible play of the scientific imagination of competent scientists upon prob- 
lems of military research. Review by the NDRC and the Director acted as 
a curb upon the excessive zeal of the protagonist, by requiring the program 
to pass the scrutiny of equally competent scientists with a better view of the 
over-all defense picture. The problem of the administrative side of OSRD 
was to fit all this within the long established framework for the expenditure 
of public funds. 


Resume of Activities 

To give in detail the jurisdiction of all the divisions and panels and to 
pay proper credit to all the individuals who contributed to their programs 
is beyond the compass of the present volume. All that will be attempted here 
is to indicate generally the primary field of activity of each division and 
panel, and to name the Division, Panel, and Section Chiefs, together with 
their Deputy Chiefs. Unfortunately this requires the omission of the names 
of many of the men who contributed in large measure to the excellent work 
of the divisions with which they were associated; but this omission will be 
atoned for by the divisional histories where due acknowledgment can be 
made for their contributions. 

The United States had been at war approximately one year when the 
reorganization took place. For the most part the divisions took over the 
active programs of the sections from which they developed. The authoriza- 
tions for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1945, were somewhat lower than 
the estimates for the same period due to the collapse of Germany. The effect 
of the end of hostilities with Japan is apparent from a comparison of the 
estimates for the eight months period beginning July i, 1945 (prepared 
while the war was still on) and the actual expenditures for the fiscal year 
beginning on that date. With the end of hostilities the OSRD demobiliza- 
tion program began in earnest, and only those expenditures were approved 
which fitted into the demobilization pattern. 

The activities of the several divisions, panels and committees are described 
briefly in the following paragraphs. The scale of those activities is indi- 
cated by the amounts of the contract funds that were authorized by OSRD 
on their recommendations. Each division was in existence from December 9, 
1942 to June 30, 1946, except that Division 19 was not organized until 
April 12, 1943 and Division 12 was terminated on June 30, 1945. 

Division i 

Title: Ballistic Research 
L. H. Adams, Chief 
H. B. Allen, Deputy Chief 

Division i was concerned primarily with studies of the control of gun 
erosion, involving the causes of erosion and the use of erosion-resistant 
materials, and the development of hypervelocity guns. Erosion of gun barrels 
presents a serious problem to the military services. A decrease in erosion 
simplifies the problem of maintenance and makes possible the use of higher 
velocities which increases accuracy of fire against moving targets and im- 
proves armor penetration. 

The scale of the division's activities is indicated by the following authoriza- 
tions upon its recommendation: 


January i, 1943, to June 30, 1943 $ 665,000.00 

July I, 1943, to June 30, 1944 $1,723,000.00 

July I, 1944, to June 30, 1945 $2,669,500.00 

July I, 1945, to February 28, 1946 (estimated) $1,280,000.00 

July I, 1945, to June 30, 1946 (actual) $ 269,684.84 

Division 2 

Title: i. Structural Defense and Ofifense (December 9, 1942 — August 15, 

2. Effects of Impact and Explosion (August 15, 1944 — June 30, 


John E. Burchard, Chief, December 9, 1942 — June 3, 1944 

E. Bright Wilson, Chief, June 3, 1944 — March 15, 1946 

Eugene W. Scott, Acting Chief, March 16, 1946 — June 30, 1946 

Walker Bleakney, Deputy Chief, December 9, 1942 — September i, 1945 

Division 2 studied theoretically and experimentally the effects of explosive 
waves in air, earth and water and the effects of explosions and of projectiles 
on targets such as armor plate or pillboxes. It also handled a number of 
problems bearing on the design of specific weapons as a result of the basic 
knowledge it acquired. The original emphasis was on defense but with the 
progress of the war the effort was focussed on determining the best means 
of destroying enemy defenses and industrial targets. 


January i, 1943, to June 30, 1943 $ 370,202.29 

July I, 1943, to June 30, 1944 $ 639,500.00 

July I, 1944, to June 30, 1945 $1,459,155.59 

July I, 1945, to February 28, 1946 (estimated) $ 479,000.00 

July I, 1945, to June 30, 1946 (actual) $ 232,500.00 

Division 3 

Title: I. Special Projectiles (December 9, 1942 — September 15, 1944) 
2. Rocket Ordnance (September 15, 1944 — June 30, 1946) 
John T. Tate, Chief, December 9, 1942 — July 15, 1943 
C. C. Lauritsen, Acting Chief, July 15, 1943 — September 6, 1943 
Frederick L. Hovde, Chief, September 6, 1943 — June 30, 1946 

Section H 

C. N. Hickman, Chief, September 30, 1943 — June 30, 1946 

R. E. Gibson, Deputy Chief, September 30, 1943 — December 31, 1943 

Section L 
Frederick L. Hovde, Acting Chief, September 30, 1943 — June 30, 1946 


Division 3 engaged in rocket development as essential to the development 
of specific rocket weapons. It studied interior and exterior ballistics of 
rockets, carried out basic research on rocket powders, including methods of 
processing, and developed designs of rocket launchers. A considerable por- 
tion of the funds available to the division between 1943 and 1945 was trans- 
ferred by the Services to the OSRD because of the speed with which the 
division could arrange for the procurement of substantial quantities of rock- 
ets, launchers and accessories. 


January i, 1943, to June 30, 1943 | 9,212,500.00 

July I, 1943, to June 30, 1944 $24,830,000.00 

July I, 1944, to June 30, 1945 $50,805,000.00 

July I, 1945, to February 28, 1946 (estimated) $ 3,321,000.00 

July I, 1945, to June 30, 1946 (actual) $ 349,000.00 

Division 4 

Title: Ordnance Accessories 
Alexander EUett, Chief 

The major activity of Division 4 was the development of more effective 
types of fuzes for bombs, rockets and mortars. 

January i, 1943, to June 30, 1943 $4,912,500.00 

July I, 1943, to June 30, 1944 $6,505,000.00 

July I, 1944, to June 30, 1945 $8,534,200.00 

July I, 1945, to February 28, 1946 (estimated) $1,890,000.00 

July I, 1945, to June 30, 1946 (actual) $ 62,623.20 

Division 5 

Tide: New Missiles 

H. B. Richmond, Chief, December 9, 1942 — January 2, 1945 
Hugh H. Spencer, Deputy Chief, June 22, 1944 — January 2, 1945 
, Chief, January 2, 1945 — June 30, 1946 

Section 5.1 Washington Project (December 9, 1942 — May 1945) 

H. L. Dryden, Chief 
Section 5.2 Pittsburgh Project (December 9, 1942 — May 1945) 

L. O. Grondahl, Chief 
Section 5.3 Block Equipment (December 9, 1942 — May 1945) 

O. E. Buckley, Chief, December 9, 1942 — June 27, 1944 

Pierre Mertz, Chief, June 27, 1944 — May 7, 1945 


Section 5.4 Aerodynamics (December 9, 1942 — May 1945) 

J. C. Hunsaker, Chief 
Section 5.5 Radio (December 9, 1942 — January 18, 1943) 
Mechanisms (January 18, 1943 — May 1945) 

Joseph C. Boyce, Chief 

Division 5 was concerned with the development of special bombs which 
could be controlled after their release from the bomber or which had some 
form of automatic target-seeking mechanism to guide them to their objec- 
tive. The work included both the development of the vehicle and the devel- 
opment of controls. 


January i, 1943, to June 30, 1943 $1,437,150.00 

July I, 1943, to June 30, 1944 $3,394,500.00 

July I, 1944, to June 30, 1945 $8,017,500.00 

July I, 1945, to February 28, 1946 (estimated) $1,166,000.00 

July I, 1945, to June 30, 1946 (actual) $ 32,000.00 

Division 6 

Title: Subsurface Warfare 
John T. Tate, Chief 

Section 6.1 
E. H. Colpitts, Chief 

Division 6 was primarily concerned with the field of subsurface warfare. 
Its original emphasis was upon means, methods and devices useful in anti- 
submarine warfare. As the submarine menace in the Atlantic came under 
control, the emphasis of the division was shifted to prosubmarine activities. 


January i, 1943, to June 30, 1943 $ 6,885,548.42 

July I, 1943, to June 30, 1944 $19,320,000.00 

July I, 1944, to June 30, 1945 $ 7,427,377.00 

July I, 1945, to February 28, 1946 (estimated) $ 742,000.00 

July I, 1945, to June 30, 1946 (actual) $ 250,600.00 

Division 7 

Title: Fire Control 

Harold L. Hazen, Chief 

Section 7.1 Surface Systems 
Duncan J. Stewart, Chief 


Section 7.2 Airborne Systems 

S. H. Caldwell, Chief 
Section 7.3 Servomechanisms 

E. J. Poitras, Chief 
Section 7.4 Optical Range Finders 

Thornton C. Fry, Chief, December 9, 1942 — January 11, 1944 

P. R, Bassett, Chief, January 11, 1944 — May 31, 1946 
Section 7.5 Fire Control Analysis (January 11, 1943 — April i, 1945) 

Warren Weaver, Chief 
Section 7.6 Seaborne Fire Control (November 16, 1943 — June 30, 1946) 

I. A. Getting, Chief 

The field covered by Division 7 included directors for airborne, land based 
and shipborne uses; servomechanisms for transmitting data to and from the 
guns and for elevating and traversing the guns; special range finders and 
testing equipment for assessing aerial gunnery and for evaluating the per- 
formance of directors, and the development of gun sights for special pur- 


January i, 1943, to June 30, 1943 $2,627,701.00 

July I, 1943, to June 30, 1944 $1,626,585.00 

July I, 1944, to June 30, 1945 $2,952,621.00 

July I, 1945, to February 28, 1946 (estimated) $1,299,000.00 

July I, 1945, to June 30, 1946 (actual) $ 504,784.51 

Division 8 

Title: Explosives 

G. B. Kistiakowsky, Chief, December 9, 1942 — February 15, 1944 

Ralph A. Connor, Chief, February 15, 1944 — July 2, 1946 

C. A. Thomas, Deputy Chief, December 9, 1942 — July 31, 1943 

Section 8.1 Physical (December 9, 1942 — March i, 1945) 

C. A. Thomas, Acting Chief, December 9, 1942 — January 14, 1943 
G. B. Kistiakowsky, Acting Chief, January 18, 1943 — February 15, 

Ralph A. Connor, Acting Chief, February 15, 1944 — March i, 1945 

Section 8.2 Organic (December 9, 1942 — March i, 1945) 

Ralph A. Connor, Chief, December 9, 1942 — February 15, 1944 
J. R. Johnson, Chief, February 15, 1944 — March i, 1945 

Division 8 worked primarily on gun propellants, high explosives, shaped 
charges, special types of explosive weapons, propellants for rockets and jet 
propulsion, and a number of related projects. 



January i, 1943, to June 30, 1943 $1,798,000.00 

July I, 1943, to June 30, 1944 $3,314,700.00 

July I, 1944, to June 30, 1945 $5,046,200.00 

July I, 1945, to February 28, 1946 (estimated) $1,942,000.00 

July I, 1945, to June 30, 1946 (actual) $ 921,048.16 

Division 9 

Title: Chemistry 

Walter R. Kirner, Chief 

Divisions 9 and 10 worked closely together and divided the field of chem- 
ical w^arfare betw^een them. In the main. Division 9 concentrated on the 
oflFensive aspects, investigating the possibility of developing new agents and 
working on problems of detection and analysis; in addition it worked on 
the impregnation of clothing for protection against poison gas. 


January i, 1943, to June 30, 1943 $1,356,172.87 

July I, 1943, to June 30, 1944 $2,219,988.00 

July I, 1944, to June 30, 1945 $1,068,300.00 

July I, 1945, to February 28, 1946 (estimated) $ 278,000.00 

July I, 1945, to June 30, 1946 (actual) $ 53)768.15 

DnasioN 10 

Tide: Absorbents and Aerosols 
W. A. Noyes, Jr., Chief 

Section 10. i Protective Devices (July 13, 1944 — September 30, 1945) 
W. C. Pierce, Chief 

Under the division of fields with Division 9, the work of Division 10 in 
the field of chemical warfare was largely devoted to the defensive problem 
of developing absorbents for chemical warfare gases. In addition, it engaged 
in fundamental studies of aerosols, the behavior of gas clouds and the de- 
velopment of screening smokes and smoke generators. 


January i, 1943, to June 30, 1943 $ 999,900.00 

July I, 1943, to June 30, 1944 $1,634,000.00 

July I, 1944, to June 30, 1945 $ 849,539.30 

July I, 1945, to February 28, 1946 (estimated) $ 300,000.00 

July I, 1945, to June 30, 1946 (actual) $ 40,800.94 


Division ii 

Title: Chemical Engineering 
R. P. Russell, Chief, December 9, 1942 — March i, 1943 
E. P. Stevenson, Chief, March i, 1943 — March i, 1945 
H. M. Chadwell, Chief, March i, 1945 — June 30, 1946 

Section ii.i Oxygen Problems 

E. P. Stevenson, Chief, December 9, 1942 — May 2, 1944 
John R. Rushton, Chief, May 2, 1944 — May 31, 1946 

Section 11.2 Miscellaneous Chemical Engineering Problems 
T. K. Sherwood, Chief 

Section 1 1.3 Incendiaries and Petroleum Warfare 
E. P. Stevenson, Chief, December 9, 1942 — December 22, 1942 
Norval F. Myers, Chief, December 22, 1942 — April i, 1943 
H. C. Hottel, Chief, April i, 1943 — May 31, 1946 

The chemical engineering problems handled by Division 11 included 
among others the development of oxygen-producing equipment, incendi- 
aries, fuels and equipment for flame throwing, hydraulic fluids for various 
special applications, oxygen masks and photoflash bombs for aerial pho- 


January i, 1943, to June 30, 1943 $2,801,500.00 

July I, 1943, to June 30, 1944 $3,450,250.00 

July I, 1944, to June 30, 1945 $2,903,564.72 

July I, 1945, to February 28, 1946 (estimated) $ 580,000.00 

July I, 1945, to June 30, 1946 (actual) $ 60,908.81 

Division 12 

Tide: Transportation Development 
Hartley Rowe, Chief 

Section 12.1 Nocturnal Logistics (February 10, 1943 — July i, 1943) 

H. E. Ives, Chief 

On July I, 1943, Section 12.1 was superseded by Section 16.5 with Dr. 
Ives as Chief. 
Section 12.2 Turning Basin (February 18, 1944 — February 12, 1945) 

W. F. Durand, Chief 

The principal attention of Division 12 was devoted to the development 
of various combat vehicles, including the Y^-ton amphibious jeep, the 2^/2 -ton 
amphibious truck popularly known as the "Duck," the snow vehicle known 


as the "Weasel," and a modified amphibious "Weasel" for the use of rescue 
parties in mud, swamps and other difficult terrain. In addition, the division 
operated a large model basin where tests were made on the turning character- 
istics of naval vessels, on marine propulsion problems and on power boat hull 

January i, 1943, to June 30, 1943 $1,400,929.12 

July I, 1943, to June 30, 1944 $ 690,740.00 

July I, 1944, to June 30, 1945 $ 107,696.94 

Division 13 

Title: Electrical Communication 

C. B. JoUiffe, Chief, December 9, 1942 — April 21, 1944 
Haraden Pratt, Acting Chief, April 21, 1944 — February 10, 1945 
, Chief, February 10, 1945 — June 30, 1946 

Section 13. i Direction Finding (December 9, 1942 — July 6, 1944) 

Loren F. Jones, Chief 
Section 13.2 Radio Propagation Problems (December 9, 1942 — July 6, 

J. H. Dellinger, Chief 

Section 13.3 Secrecy (December 9, 1942 — July 6, 1944) 

R. K. Potter, Chief 
Section 13.4 Special Communications Problems (December 9, 1942 — 
July 6, 1944) 

C. A. Priest, Chief, December 9, 1942 — September 25, 1943 
Section 13.5 Precipitation Static (December 9, 1942 — July 6, 1944) 

Haraden Pratt, Chief 
Section 13.6 Miscellaneous (December 9, 1942 — July 6, 1944) 

D. G. Litde, Chief 

Section 13.7 Systems (February 23, 1943 — July 6, 1944) 
A. B. Clark, Chief 

The principal activities of Division 13 were in the field of direction find- 
ing, radio propagation, speech secrecy, very high-frequency transmission 
and technical problems of communications system layout and organization. 

Authorizations : 

January i, 1943, to June 30, 1943 $ 751,304.00 

July I, 1943, to June 30, 1944 % 663,344.30 

July I, 1944, to June 30, 1945 $ 597»73i-37 

July I, 1945, to February 28, 1946 (estimated) $1,731,000.00 

July I, 1945, to June 30, 1946 (actual) $ 61,548.38 


Division 14 

Title: Radar 

Alfred L. Loomis, Chief 

Section 14. i R. C. C. Model Shop (December 9, 1942 — April 6, 1944) 

Melville Eastham, Chief 
Section 14.2 Navigation (December 9, 1942 — April 6, 1944) 

Melville Eastham, Chief 

Division 14 served as the focal point of research and development in the 
microwave radar field. In addition to fundamental research on and basic 
development of radar, the division devoted a major part of its effort to the 
design of equipment to meet particular military problems and to the more 
effective use of equipment already made. The division supervised a radar 
laboratory established in England which worked in close co-operation with 
the Eighth Air Force. A substantial part of the funds allocated to the divi- 
sion between 1943 and 1945 is accounted for by transfers to OSRD from the 
Army and the Navy for the procurement of radar equipment which the divi- 
sion could obtain more rapidly than the Services. 


January i, 1943, to June 30, 1943 $ 7,680,750.00 

July I, 1943, to June 30, 1944 $45,283,850.00 

July I, 1944, to June 30, 1945 $51,265,300.00 

July I, 1945, to February 28, 1946 (estimated) $14,000,000.00 

July I, 1945, to June 30, 1946 (actual) $ 3^36^9-3^ 

Division 15 

Title: Radio Co-ordination 
C. G. Suits, Chief 
J. H. Moore, Deputy Chief 

The work of Division 15 fell into two general fields: developing counter- 
measures against enemy radio communications, radar and guided missiles; 
and determining the susceptibility of American equipment to enemy jam- 
ming or countermeasures and pointing ways to designing less susceptible 
equipment. Countermeasures took the form of "jamming" (sending out 
signals of such strength and character as to mask the wanted signals) or 
the form of a decoy or false signal of some kind. The division supervised 
the operation of a laboratory in England working in continuous contact 
with the Eighth Air Force. 



January i, 1943, to June 30, 1943 $ 5,974,000.00 

July I, 1943, to June 30, 1944 $12,253,880.00 

July I, 1944, to June 30, 1945 $ 8,002,070.00 

July I, 1945, to February 28, 1946 (estimated) $ 3,142,000.00 

July I, 1945, to June 30, 1946 (actual) $ 113,000.00 

Division i6 

Title: Optics 

George R. Harrison, Chief 

Paul E. Klopsteg, Deputy Chief, March 15, 1945 — June 30, 1946 

Section 16.1 Optical Instruments 
Theodore Dunham, Jr., Chief 
Section 16.2 Illumination and Vision (December 9, 1942 — October i, 

1943) ^ 
Brian O'Brien, Chief, December 22, 1942 — October i, 1943 

(Consolidated with 16.5) 
Section 16.3 Camouflage 

A. C. Hardy, Chief, December 9, 1942 — April 23, 1945 
Section 16.4 Infrared 

O. S. Duffendack, Chief 
Section 16.5 Nocturnal Logistics (Transferred from Division 12, Section 
12.1 on July I, 1943) 
H. E. Ives, Chief, July i, 1943 — October 11, 1943 
W. E. Forsythe, Deputy Chief, July i, 1943 — October 11, 1943 

(Consolidated with 16.2 in October 1943) 
W. E. Forsythe, Chief, October 11, 1943 — June 30, 1946 
Brian O'Brien, Deputy Chief, October 11, 1943 — January 31, 1946 

The work of Division 16 embraced optical instruments including aerial 
cameras, glasses and glass substitutes, camouflage materials and camouflage 
detecting methods and various other devices. 


January i, 1943, to June 30, 1943 $1,592,700.00 

July I, 1943, to June 30, 1944 $2,018,350.00 

July I, 1944, to June 30, 1945 $2,078,200.00 

July I, 1945, to February 28, 1946 (estimated) $ 727,000.00 

July I, 1945, to June 30, 1946 (actual) $ 234,675.63 


Division 17 

Title: Physics 

Paul E. Klopsteg, Chief, December 9, 1942 — March 14, 1945 

, Deputy Chief, March 15, 1945 — June 30, 1946 

George R. Harrison, Chief, March 14, 1945 — June 30, 1946 

E. A. Eckhardt, Deputy Chief, December 9, 1942 — March 14, 1945 

Section 17.1 Instruments 

E. A. Eckhardt, Chief 

H. E, Bragg, Deputy Chief 
Section 17.2 Electrical Equipment (December 9, 1942 — August 14, 1945) 

I. M. Stein, Chief 

(Consolidated with 17. i August 14, 1945) 
Section 17.3 Acoustics 

Harvey Fletcher, Chief 

The investigations and developments of Division 17 embraced a wide 
range of physics problems in the field of instruments including, among 
others, land mine detectors, telemetering equipment and strain gauges for 
airplanes, testing the production, perception and control of sound in air 
(including sound ranging), and a concerted attack upon the problems of 
a combat information center in naval vessels. 


January i, 1943, to June 30, 1943 $1,967,369.52 

July I, 1943, to June 30, 1944 $2,686,062.60 

July I, 1944, to June 30, 1945 $2,775,783.95 

July I, 1945, to February 28, 1946 (estimated) $ 761,000.00 

July I, 1945, to June 30, 1946 (actual) $ 226,073.38 

Division 18 

Tide: War Metallurgy 
Clyde Williams, Chief 

Among the studies made by Division 18 were those on armor plate, gun 
steel and gun forgings, heat resistant alloys, and materials for aircraft con- 
struction, as well as the metallurgical examination of captured enemy 


January i, 1943, to June 30, 1943 $ 942,097.36 

July I, 1943, to June 30, 1944 $1,387,725.00 

July I, 1944, to June 30, 1945 $1,341,845.00 

July I, 1945, to February 28, 1946 (estimated) $ 508,000.00 

July I, 1945, to June 30, 1946 (actual) $ 122,685.10 

ndrc: the divisions, panels and committees 95 

Division 19 

Title: Miscellaneous Weapons 
H. M. Chadwell, Chief 

Section 19. i (February 15, 1944 — March i, 1946) 
G. A. Richter, Chief 

Division 19 developed weapons and devices primarily for the Office of 
Strategic Services, for which it also supervised the work of a central re- 
search and development laboratory. The division called upon the other divi- 
sions of NDRC for assistance on problems relating to their specialties. 


April I, 1943, to June 30, 1943 $788,500.00 

July I, 1943, to June 30, 1944 $878,500.00 

July I, 1944, to June 30, 1945 $726,500.00 

July I, 1945, to February 28, 1946 (estimated) $ 95,000.00 

July I, 1945, to June 30, 1946 (actual) $ 22,552.11 

Applied Mathematics Panel 

(December 9, 1942 — June 30, 1946) 

Warren Weaver, Chief 

Thornton C. Fry, Deputy Chief, January 30, 1943 — April 5, 1946 

This panel was established to aid NDRC divisions and the Services by 
providing assistance in the handling of problems needing the special train- 
ing of mathematicians. 


January i, 1943, to June 30, 1943 $ 355,000.00 

July I, 1943, to June 30, 1944 $ 630,000.00 

July I, 1944, to June 30, 1945 $1,477,350.00 

July I, 1945, to February 28, 1946 (estimated) $ 443,000.00 

July I, 1945, to June 30, 1946 (actual) $ 60,500.00 

Applied Psychology Panel 

(September 18, 1943 — June 30, 1946) 

W. S. Hunter, Chief, September 18, 1943 — September i, 1945 
Charles W. Bray, Chief, September 11, 1945 — June 30, 1946 

The work of this panel fell into three general categories: (i) the develop- 
ment of tests to aid in the selection of military personnel for various spe- 


cialized types of duty or for general classification purposes; (2) projects in 
connection with Army and Navy training programs including the develop- 
ment of details of training methods for particular tasks, and (3) projects 
concerned primarily with new equipment. The latter were designed in part 
to assist the equipment designer to lay out his equipment so that it would 
make the minimum demands on the abilities of the operator and in part 
to assist with the development of operational and instructional doctrine so 
that it would be ready for Service use when the equipment came off the 
production line. 

September 18, 1943, to June 30, 1944 $658,000.00 

July I, 1944, to June 30, 1945 $831,000.00 

July I, 1945, to February 28, 1946 (estimated) $211,000.00 

July I, 1945, to June 30, 1946 (actual) $ 53,502.53 

Vacuum Tube Development Committee 

(July 19, 1943— March 27, 1945) 

I. I. Rabi, Chairman 

The endeavor of this committee was to co-ordinate and standardize the 
design and production of vacuum tubes, the diversity of which had become 
a considerable problem in production and procurement. 


July 19, 1943, to June 30, 1944 $66,000.00 

July I, 1944, to March 27, 1945 $45,000.00 

Committee on Propagation 

(January 22, 1944 — June 30, 1946) 

C. R. Burrows, Chairman 

This committee conducted a comprehensive study of radio wave propa- 
gation under varying atmospheric conditions and including a wide band 
of frequencies. 


January 22, 1944, to June 30, 1944 $ 20,000.00 

July I, 1944, to June 30, 1945 $360,000.00 

July I, 1945, to February 28, 1946 (estimated) $315,000.00 

July I, 1945, to June 30, 1946 (actual) $ 73,000.00 


Tropical Deterioration Committee 

(May i8, 1944 — June 30, 1946) 

G. J. Esselen, Chairman 

The task of this committee was to co-ordinate the work being done on 
tropic-proofing military and naval equipment and included the supervision 
of a number of fundamental studies and tests in the field. 


May 18, 1944, to June 30, 1944 $ 43,000.00 

July I, 1944, to June 30, 1945 $182,161.00 

July I, 1945, to February 28, 1946 (estimated) $242,000.00 

July I, 1945, to June 30, 1946 (actual) $ 7,192.08 

Division Administrative Group 

In May 1946, with the end of active division operations in sight, a small 
group of technical and clerical personnel was established as the "Division 
Administrative Group" in the Chairman's Office to carry on the remaining 
activities of the divisions and panels. Consequently, on June 30 the divisions 
and panels were terminated. The DAG's activities covered the same scope 
as the divisions, which by this time was largely one of terminating in an 
orderly manner the existing technical and administrative phases of the out- 
standing contracts and to prepare the division records in such a manner as 
to preserve the values attained by the divisions and their contractors. 

These activities included obtaining the final technical reports from con- 
tractors and approving them for distribution; the examination and technical 
approval of vouchers; the technical recommendations for the disposal of 
property acquired under the contract; the recommendation of technical 
reports for declassification, as well as the arrangement of the files in such 
a manner as to preserve the valuable work accomplished by the divisions 
so that future reference to the subject work will enable one immediately to 
capitalize on the previous experience. The files of each division, when com- 
pleted, were sent to the Central Records Section of the Administrative Divi- 
sion of OSRD for review prior to being transferred to the National Archives. 
When the Chairman's Office was closed on December 31, 1946, the DAG 
was transferred to the office of the Executive Secretary of OSRD, where it 
functioned until it, too, was terminated on March 31, 1947. 




HE Committee on Medical Research (CMR) was established 
as a principal subdivision of OSRD by Article 8 of Executive Order No. 
8807 of June 28, 194 1. As stated in that Article: 

The Committee on Medical Research shall advise and assist the Director in the 
performance of his medical research duties with special reference to the mobiliza- 
tion of medical and scientific personnel of the nation. To this end it shall be the 
responsibility of the Committee to recommend to the Director the need for and 
character of contracts to be entered into with universities, hospitals, and other 
agencies conducting medical research activities for research and development in 
the field of the medical sciences. Furthermore, the Committee shall from time to 
time, on request by the Director, make findings and submit recommendations 
with respect to the adequacy, progress, and results of research on medical prob- 
lems related to national defense. 

The Committee consisted of four members appointed by the President 
and three others designated respectively by the Secretary of War, the Secre- 
tary of the Navy and the Administrator of the Federal Security Agency. 
The latter three were selected from the staffs of the respective Surgeons 
General with particular reference to their qualifications in the field of medi- 
cal research. 

The membership of the Committee was as follows: Alfred Newton 
Richards, Chairman (pharmacologist, University of Pennsylvania); Lewis 
H. Weed, Vice-Chairman (anatomist, Johns Hopkins University; Chairman, 
Division of Medical Sciences, National Research Council); Alphonse R. 
Dochez (professor of medicine, Columbia University); A. Baird Hastings 
(biochemist. Harvard University); Colonel (later Brigadier General) James 
Stevens Simmons (Chief, Division of Preventive Medicine, Office of the Sur- 
geon General); Rear Admiral Harold W. Smith (Chief, Research Division, 
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery) ; Lewis R. Thompson, to November 1942 
(Director, National Institute of Health); Rolla E. Dyer, from November 
1942 (Director, National Institute of Health). 

At its first meeting on July 31, 1941, the Committee requested Bush to 
appoint Weed as its Vice-Chairman and Stewart as Executive Secretary, and 
these appointments were made. 

Although the practice varied somewhat from time to time, the Commit- 


tee normally met every two weeks, with occasional meetings at weekly 
intervals or even more frequently when there was need. After the cessation 
of hostilities the Committee met infrequently until the meeting of January 
20, 1947, which was adjourned sine die. 

Antecedent Committees Concerned with Medical Problems 

Health and Medical Committee. A Health and Medical Committee had 
been formed on September 19, 1940, under the Council of National Defense, 
to "co-ordinate health and medical activities affecting national defense." 
Two months later the Committee was transferred to the Federal Security 
Agency when the Administrator became coordinator of health, medical 
welfare, and related activities. The Committee concerned itself with the 
broader aspects of medical care as the roll of its subcommittees indicates: 
dentistry, medical education, hospitals, industrial medicine, Negro health, 
nursing. It formulated plans for the Ofl5ce of Procurement and Assignment 
of Physicians and Nurses and made various recommendations for changes 
in medical school curricula, internships and residencies, deferment of medi- 
cal students and enrollment of nurses. Although it lay within the province 
of the Health and Medical Committee to enter into contracts with educa- 
tional and research institutions for studies and experimental investigations, 
the Committee decided to leave problems of medical research to the Na- 
tional Research Council. The Committee had made one contract with the 
National Academy of Sciences under which the Division of Medical Sci- 
ences of the National Research Council had initiated work in the field of 
aviation medicine. 

Division of Medical Sciences, National Research Council. In May 1940, 
the Surgeon General of the Army requested advice from the Chairman of 
the Division of Medical Sciences on certain medical problems. In re- 
sponse to this request two committees were promptly formed to advise the 
Surgeons General in the field of transfusions and chemotherapy. As these 
committees met during the succeeding year and as further requests for 
occasional and continuing advice were received from the Services, addi- 
tional groups were created. At the time the CMR was formed there were 
eight major committees and thirty-three subcommittees on military med- 

These committees had performed important services for the Surgeons 
General. They made numerous recommendations regarding therapeutic 
procedures, particularly in chemotherapy and in venereal and tropical dis- 
eases. They assisted in revising the standards for physical examination of 
recruits (MR 1-9). They co-operated with the American Medical Associ- 
ation in preparing a roster of medical graduates and supplied an evalua- 
tion of specialists to the Surgeons General. To the Red Cross they gave 


professional advice and supervision in the procurement of human blood 
plasma for the armed forces. In response to a request of the Services they 
commenced the preparation of six military surgical and three military 
medical manuals which were published in 1942 and thereafter. The Sur- 
geons General designated Colonel (later Major General) Charles C. Hill- 
man, Colonel (later Brigadier General) James Stevens Simmons, and Cap- 
tain (later Rear Admiral) Charles S. Stephenson as their official repre- 
sentatives to the Division of Medical Sciences and medical officers were 
delegated to attend meetings of the various committees. 

Relations between CMR and NRG 

It was against this background that the CMR was formed. There ex- 
isted an integrated and active organization within the NRC which had 
given advice to the Surgeons General for more than a year. It had been 
established for this advisory function and continued to exercise it through- 
out the war. In the course of this activity, members of the NRC commit- 
tees had established cordial personal relationships with the representatives 
of the Surgeons General who attended their meetings and had become 
somewhat familiar with the questions and problems that faced the Services. 
It was clear at the outset, and became clearer as meetings succeeded one 
another, that many of these questions could not be answered ex cathedra, 
that many problems could not be solved without research. Devoting their 
time to a consideration of these matters, the several committees had evolved 
programs for research: some of them precise and detailed, some rather 
nebulous, all of them recognizing a common necessity. It had been impos- 
sible to embark upon this research with vigor because adequate funds 
were not available. 

The major question of policy which confronted the CMR at its first 
meeting on July 31, 1941, was that of its relationship to the NRC. CMR 
would obviously need advice in the formulation of its program. It was 
perfectly free to seek this advice from individuals or committees of its 
own choosing. While it might have ignored the plans and the accumu- 
lated experience of the NRC committees, CMR decided to utilize the ad- 
vice of these committees in formulating its own research plans, a deci- 
sion which Bush approved. The Committee at once took several steps to 
formalize this relationship and make it a cornerstone of future policy. It 
established its working offices within the building occupied by the NRC 
at 2101 Constitution Avenue. It recommended a contract with the Na- 
tional Academy of Sciences to cover expenses incident to meetings of the 
NRC committees and the preparation and distribution of reports. CMR 
appointed the Chairmen of the eight major NRC committees on military 
medicine as Consultants. These Consultants met with CMR at its second 


meeting on August 7, 1941, and outlined the research programs which they 
had planned or envisaged in their various fields. It was declared at that 
time that CMR would lean heavily upon the advice of the NRC commit- 
tees and subcommittees in formulating its program and the Consultants 
undertook to inform their subcommittee Chairmen of the relationship 
between CMR and NRC and of their responsibility to initiate and rec- 
ommend research projects. 

From July 1941 till the end of the war, the NRC committees met fre- 
quently in Washington, the more active groups as often as once a month, 
to consider proposals for research in their special fields. The members at- 
tended these meetings regularly, with considerable interruption to their 
civilian responsibilities and with no financial compensation beyond travel- 
ing and maintenance expenses. As the requirements for research changed, 
expanding in many directions, contracting in some, the organization of 
the committees changed similarly. In August 1945, there were 12 major 
committees and 34 subcommittees with 315 members. The major commit- 
tees, whose Chairmen served as Consultants to CMR, dealt with the fol- 
lowing subjects: aviation medicine; chemotherapeutic and other agents; 
convalescence and rehabilitation; industrial medicine; information; medi- 
cine; neuropsychiatry; pathology; sanitary engineering; shock and transfu- 
sions; surgery, and treatment of gas casualties. 

There were disadvantages to this relationship between CMR and NRC, 
stemming from the dual functions which the NRC committee members 
were required to exercise. They had been appointed by the NRC to NRC 
committees. Insofar as they sat around a table and formulated advice for 
the Surgeons General they were functioning in their capacity as members 
of the NRC committees. When, sitting around the same table, they rec- 
ommended proposals for research to CMR, they were functioning as ad- 
visers or consultants of CMR. When they advised the Surgeons General 
on the basis of CMR research it would be difficult to define their capacity. 
This situation led to some confusion; several members of NRC committees 
went through the war only vaguely familiar with CMR, unaware that it 
paid the expenses of their meetings and incompletely aware that the ulti- 
mate responsibility and entire expense of the research program was its 
province. It is fair to say that this confusion was an annoyance rather than 
a hindrance to the success of the program and that it was minimized by 
general confidence in the integrity of the principals. Given the situation 
as it existed in July 1941, the collaboration was an obvious and desirable 
arrangement. The advantages outweighed the disadvantages by far. Ini- 
tiation of research was expedited by months at a moment when time was 
of the essence. CMR gained the advice of several hundred men, who were 
specialists in their fields, already organized, and somewhat familiar with the 
needs of the military. 


Initiation and Implementation of the Research Program 

The assignment of CMR was to utilize the scientific resources of the 
country for medical research. The necessity for research in military medi- 
cine may, at first glance, seem less real than that in the weapons of war- 
fare assigned to NDRC. Radar, the proximity fuze, and the atomic bomb 
are new and must be developed to be used. But the subjects of military 
medicine are the subjects of civilian medicine. Pneumonia is not new, nor 
malaria, nor burns, nor wounds, nor shock. Medicine has concerned itself 
with their physiology and treatment for years. To the extent that this is 
true, the role of CMR was relatively simple. It is considerably less than a 
half truth. The shift in emphasis and even in direction was enormous. 
Many subjects of minor importance in peacetime become of controlling 
importance in war. Some subjects are born of war. Tropical medicine had 
been considered of rather academic interest to the health of the United 
States. Even the machine age had not adapted our younger generation to 
flying at 40,000 feet or diving at 400 miles an hour. The necessity of medi- 
cal research had been demonstrated by the expressed and visible needs of 
the Services. The Committee on Medical Research was established to resolve 
this necessity. 

The Committee's aims were to recognize the problems of military impor- 
tance, to see that work upon them was undertaken by competent investi- 
gators in laboratories throughout the country, to support the investiga- 
tions by Federal funds. In accomplishing the first of these aims, the 
Committee relied upon the personnel of the NRC committees with their 
Liaison Officers and upon its own staff. No list was ever published of sub- 
jects upon which the Committee wished investigations to be conducted; 
in classified fields such a list could only have been written in unprofitably 
vague terms; in unclassified fields the subjects seemed too obvious to re- 
quire statement. During the first months of its existence, the Committee 
utilized the proposals which the NRC committees had formulated. There- 
after it relied upon laboratories, informed of the requirements by the NRC 
committees and its own staff, to initiate proposals. When these proposals 
were not initiated and when important subjects for investigation were 
neglected or under insufficient study, the Committee requested the per- 
sonnel whom it regarded as most suitable for their performance to un- 
dertake them. 

The investigations were usually implemented by contracts which in- 
volved their full support by Federal funds. Occasionally these contracts 
supplied only "token" funds. In certain fields CMR was able to "encourage" 
research without any formal contractual relationship or with contracts de- 
signed only to cover some particular point. These several arrangements will 


be discussed in the succeeding paragraphs together with some problems of 
personnel which were incident to them. 

Proposals for Contract. A form, known as a "proposal for contract," was 
prepared in which the investigator was required: (i) to describe the sub- 
ject of investigation with its background, present state of knowledge, sig- 
nificance in national defense and plan of attack; (2) to list its personnel, 
materials and financial requirements; (3) to state the investigative facili- 
ties available for the research; (4) to estimate its duration. The proposals 
were submitted by individuals, the so-called "responsible investigators," 
from universities, hospitals, foundations. Federal agencies and commercial 
firms throughout the country. They were directed either to CMR or NRC 
but, in either event, were usually considered by the appropriate NRC sub- 
committees and parent committees before being presented to CMR. 

Nine hundred fifty-one proposals for contract were examined by the 
NRC committees of which 638 were recommended to CMR with varying 
degrees of enthusiasm indicated by the grading "A," "B," or "C," and 313 
were disapproved. At first, rejection of a proposal was made final by NRC; 
later, as the incorrectness of this procedure was realized, responsibility for 
the rejection was assumed by CMR which uniformly upheld decisions of 
the NRC committees in this regard. CMR devoted a major share of the 
time at its meetings to scrutinizing the proposals which were recommended 
to it; regarding them from the point of view of their possible mediate or 
immediate effect in winning the war, their consistency with the program 
already in effect or projected, their personnel and budgets. It approved 501 
of the 638 proposals recommended to it by the NRC; a majority of those 
which it declined had received "B" or "C" ratings by the NRC committees. 
In addition 92 proposals for contract were approved by CMR without prior 
consideration by NRC committees. 

Once a proposal was approved by CMR it was formally recommended 
to the Director of OSRD as a subject for contract with the institution at 
which the work was to be carried on. With four exceptions, which he dis- 
approved, these recommendations were adopted. 

Terms of Contracts. The contracts were usually drawn for six or twelve 
months subject to the usual OSRD termination clause. The contractor 
agreed to conduct investigations in the field which the contract defined, 
to furnish such progress and interim reports as CMR requested and to 
prepare a final report upon completion of the work. Initially, a progress 
report was required every month; after August 1942 the requirement 
became bimonthly. The contracts were in the usual OSRD form, the 
terms of which are discussed in detail in Chapter XIII. At the termination 
of a contract, its renewal was considered by CMR aided, usually, by advice 
of the NRC committee which had originally recommended it. The prog- 
ress and prospects of the research, the changing demands and resources 


of the program, the wishes of the investigator, were all elements in the de- 
cision which was reached. 

''To\en" Contracts. CMR was frequently approached with requests for 
contracts to perform research in which no financial assistance was desired. 
In the first year of its existence it acceded to seven of these requests con- 
cerned with work in which it was properly interested. The procedure was, 
however, felt to be undesirable. Many of the requests appeared to be moti- 
vated by a desire to retain research personnel, or to obtain priorities for 
material, or to gain familiarity with the work of other OSRD contractors 
in the field. In May 1942, CMR therefore decided to reject such proposals 
as a matter of policy. Thereafter only three such contracts were accepted 
and those under exceptional circumstances. CMR continued to aid firms 
to retain key laboratory personnel on problems of particular concern to it, 
but did so as an expression of interest in the work rather than as a formal 

Number and Distribution of Contracts. One hundred seventy-three of 
the 593 contracts negotiated after recommendation by CMR were made in 
the year ending July i, 1942. In the two succeeding years there were 194 
and 109 new contracts, respectively, and, in the period ending January 1946, 
117. The 593 contracts were with 137 organizations in 30 states, the Dis- 
trict of Columbia and the Canal Zone and involved approximately $24,690,- 
000. This sum was distributed among fields of research as follows: 


Infectious Diseases $ 1,469,930.66 

Venereal Diseases 982,022.05 

Tropical Diseases (except Malaria) 421,694.12 

Convalescence 674,693.00 

Neuropsychiatry 324,929.96 


Wounds and Burns 1,339,586.81 

Neurosurgery 608,887.00 

Surgical Specialties 899,114.29 



Blood Substitutes 1,684,846.69 

Shock 820,333.00 
Nutrition, Acclimatization, and 

Water Sterilization 1,476,270.90 


Treatment of Gas Casualties 1,006,572.23 

Insect and Rodent Control Ij377)333-84 

MALARIA 5,501,941.45 


(Adrenal Cortical Hormones and 

Chemistry of Penicillin) 630,056.00 


in all types of infections 1,885,002.60 

CONTRACT 1,120,206.14 


''Encouragement'' of Research in Field of Penicillin. In the summer of 
1 94 1, Dr. Howard Florey of Oxford University came to the United States 
in an attempt to arrange for the large-scale production of penicillin. In his 
own laboratory Dr. Florey had produced enough of the drug to provide 
convincing evidence of its effectiveness against a wide variety of infections 
in small animals but the difficulties which attended its production were 
so great that nearly two years of work had yielded an amount sufficient 
to treat only five patients. 

After visiting the Northern Regional Research Laboratory of the Depart- 
ment of Agriculture at Peoria, Illinois, and the laboratories of several com- 
mercial firms, Dr. Florey came to Washington in August to see the Chair- 
man of CMR. The problem was one of supply. It could not, at that time, 
be solved in England. It might have been dismissed by CMR on the basis 
that the Committee's concern was with research rather than production. 
Fortunately, Richards appreciated the potential importance of the drug and 
the vigor and imagination with which he promoted its production were 
regarded as entitling him to the greatest credit in making penicillin avail- 
able for use during the war. He arranged meetings in October and De- 
cember, 194 1, which were attended by representatives of the Division of 
Chemistry, NRC, the Department of Agriculture and the pharmaceutical 
firms of Merck & Company, Chas. Pfizer & Company, E. R. Squibb & Sons, 
and the Lederle Laboratories. The firms were encouraged to undertake 
the problem of penicillin production in co-operation with each other and 
with the Peoria Laboratory. 

The firms agreed to prosecute the research. They agreed that the find- 
ings of any one group could be conveyed to the others through the me- 
dium of CMR. The Peoria Laboratory agreed to report its findings to all 
the other groups and to have members of its staff make periodic visits to 
their laboratories and give such advice and assistance as seemed indicated. 
During this early part of the program, the Committee's sole financial in- 
vestment was to make some funds available to the Peoria Laboratory. Its 
moral investment was to encourage and maintain the initial interest of the 
commercial firms, to co-ordinate the results of their research, and to ar- 
range with the War Production Board so that the firms might receive pri- 
orities for the equipment of their laboratories and pilot plants. 

The difficulties proved nearly insuperable; but they were gradually 
overcome. As penicillin became available, CMR assumed the responsibility 


of making a clinical evaluation of the drug. This responsibility was dis- 
charged through the NRC Committee on Chemotherapeutic and Other 
Agents, whose Chairman was originally Dr. Perrin H. Long. When he 
entered the Army in June 1942, he was succeeded by Dr. Chester S. Keefer, 
who subsequently became Medical Administrative OfiBcer of CMR. The first 
patient was treated in March 1942. By March 1943, the records of treatment 
of a series of 200 cases had been collected, and sufficient penicillin was 
available so that by arrangement with the Surgeon General of the Army, 
a CMR investigator was invited to inaugurate an experimental study with 
wounded soldiers at Bushnell General Hospital. By the spring of 1944 the 
needs of the Army and Navy and, in part, those of our British Allies 
could be satisfied from current production; considerable amounts became 
available for civilian use. Until February 1943, penicillin for the clinical 
testing program was supplied gratis to CMR by the commercial firms to a 
value of several hundred thousand dollars. Thereafter CMR expended 
nearly $1,900,000 in purchasing the drug for that purpose. 

At the instance of CMR the War Production Board co-operated vigor- 
ously and effectively in the production program. In May 1943, they pro- 
vided AA-i priorities for selected commercial firms. As a result and within 
a year, 21 large plants costing some 20 million dollars had been erected 
and equipped. The monthly production of penicillin, which had approxi- 
mated 60 million units in pilot plants in May 1943, became 117,527 mil- 
lion units in June 1944. In June 1945, it was 646,818 million units. The 
WPB arranged monthly meetings of the penicillin producers at which in- 
formation on production methods could be exchanged and, for purposes of 
this exchange, the Department of Justice agreed to waive application of 
the antitrust laws. On July 16, 1943, WPB issued allocation order M-338 
partitioning all penicillin supplies among the Army, Navy, Public Health 
Service and, for purposes of clinical testing, CMR. On May i, 1944, when 
the amounts available for civilian use became greater than could be han- 
dled by CMR, the WPB established a Civilian Penicillin Distribution Unit 
in Chicago to allocate supplies to 1000 selected hospitals. The problem of 
penicillin production was on its way to certain solution and the part of 
CMR in its conquest was completed. 

Another and similar program was undertaken by CMR in an attempt 
to synthesize penicillin. It had required eighteen months to produce enough 
of the drug by culture methods to treat 200 patients even with the most 
extended effort; and though production eventually overcame all difficulties, 
there was grave doubt as to the outcome of the venture during the fall of 
1 94 1 and the whole of 1942. If the chemical structure of the drug could 
be accurately identified, it might be produced by synthetic means and un- 
limited amounts become available at inconsiderable costs. Studies towards 
this end had therefore been in progress. 


By the fall of 1943 it appeared that a co-ordinated attack on the problem 
might be successful. Upon recommendation of CMR, Bush appointed a 
special committee to survey the field, with Dr. Hans T. Clarke of Columbia 
University as its Chairman. The committee reported that such an attack 
was justifiable and, indeed, expressed the hope that it might yield conclu- 
sive results within six months. It designated three universities, the Depart- 
ment of Agriculture and eleven commercial firms as the most suitable in- 
vestigators and recommended that contracts be entered into with them. 
This was done. The contracts with the commercial firms involved no finan- 
cial support and aside from their patent provisions had the sole purpose 
of providing complete interchange of information among all the contractors. 
Each contractor agreed to give the Government all the information he had 
acquired concerning the purification and chemical structure of penicillin 
prior to signing the contract and to report the progress of his studies at 
monthly intervals. By this means each member of the group was apprised 
of the advances of all other members and, though the chemical structure 
of penicillin was not established by the end of the war, definite progress 
had been made in its elucidation. 

Classification of Contracts. The classification of each contract was deter- 
mined by CMR at the time it was recommended to the Director. Nineteen 
contracts were initially classified as secret, 62 as confidential, 134 as re- 
stricted and the remainder as open, numerous changes in classification 
being made during conduct of the research. Assigning a subject to the 
restricted category prevented publication of its results or distribution of its 
reports except through official channels. This was only a minor complica- 
tion. Assignment to confidential or secret categories, on the other hand, 
involved the numerous major complications mentioned in the chapter on 

These procedures had more than a nuisance value. They delayed the 
initiation of research. They interfered with its accomplishment by obstruct- 
ing the acquisition and interchange of information. The eventual conclu- 
sion of CMR was that there was very little in the field of medical research 
which could not have been adequately protected by its classification as 

Deferment of Research Personnel. During the existence of CMR some 
5431 individuals were employed on its contracts, of whom 644 were Doctors 
of Medicine, 1038 Doctors of Philosophy or Science and 3749 technicians, 
animal caretakers and so on. The amount of time and energy devoted to 
keeping rifles off these individuals' shoulders was out of proportion to any 
conceivable use they could have had to the Army. Yet, the results of the 
research upon atabrine alone kept 100 times as many soldiers on active duty 
as there were men engaged in the entire CMR program. Laboratories cannot 
be run by 4-F's or women or by the Grace of God alone. Investigators cannot 


undertake research without some confidence of retaining their personnel 
throughout its conduct. 

The difficulties were partly formal ones with the Office of Procurement 
and Assignment and the Selective Service System. The former had no 
final jurisdiction; the latter was sometimes difficult to convince of the con- 
nection between research and war; in both cases the procedure for de- 
ferment was cumbersome. Within the limitations imposed upon them both 
agencies co-operated willingly and well with CMR. There were very few 
losses of research personnel by induction. Greater difficulty was encoun- 
tered with the personnel themselves who were understandably loath to re- 
quest repeated deferment against the apparent wishes of the Services. The 
problem was by no means peculiar to CMR but was part of a very large 
and formidable one which is discussed at some length in the chapter on 
scientific manpower. 

The procedure to obtain deferment differed with medical and nonmedical 
personnel. In the case of medical personnel, the avenue of approach was 
through the Office of Procurement and Assignment of the War Manpower 
Commission. Responsible investigators under each contract were instructed 
to see that the names of their staff were included on the roster of essential 
teaching and scientific personnel which was prepared by each institution 
and sent to the State Chairman of Procurement and Assignment. CMR ap- 
preciated that Procurement and Assignment was under compulsion to sup- 
ply a monthly quota of doctors to the armed forces. It therefore instructed 
investigators to utilize 4-F personnel and women as far as possible in their 
research and to include on the roster only those individuals who were 
devoting a large part of their time to the investigation and who were, in 
fact, essential to its effective prosecution. If, despite the presence of his 
name on this list, the individual was classified as i-A or was directed to 
apply for a commission in the Medical Corps by the local Selective Service 
Board, his institution was directed to appeal the decision and to write 
both the State Chairman of Procurement and Assignment and CMR about 
the case. CMR thereupon communicated with both Selective Service and 
Procurement and Assignment, endorsing the request for deferment and 
asserting its interest in the individual. 

The deferment of nonmedical personnel is discussed in the chapter on 
scientific manpower. Beginning in August 1944 the deferment of this 
group was handled for CMR by the Scientific Personnel Office of OSRD. 
Prior to that date CMR had its own contacts with the Selective Service 

One method of operation would have been to concede the induction of 
personnel and then have Army or Navy assign them to work on research 
projects as long as their contribution to it was vital. In cases of special 
urgency this was attempted. The Navy was able to arrange such assign- 


ments in a number of instances. Though the Army felt that it could not 
grant requests of this kind, twelve Medical Officers were made available 
in February 1944 on Bush's request to the Commanding General, Army 
Service Forces, to assist in the clinical testing of new antimalarial drugs 
as part of the antimalarial program which the Army and Navy regarded 
as of primary importance for the prosecution of the war. 

Human Subjects for Experiments. In several contracts it became essen- 
tial to determine the effectiveness upon human subjects of procedures which 
had been evolved in the laboratory, before they could be recommended to 
the Services. The Army was properly unwilling to allow CMR investigators 
the use of miUtary personnel for these purposes except in special fields: 
measures for combating fatigue were studied with soldiers at Fort Sheri- 
dan, IlHnois, Fort Knox, Kentucky, and Camp Young, California, in 1942- 
1943, and extensive studies of water requirements and the effects of water 
deprivation were conducted with desert troops in southern California in 
1943 and 1944. 

This by no means satisfied the needs of the program. After some explora- 
tion, volunteers were obtained from groups of prisoners and conscientious 
objectors who agreed to serve as subjects in experiments which were always 
attended by discomfort and sometimes by danger. The prisoners received 
certificates of merit from CMR and most of them received honoraria of 
from $25 to $100 for their participation in the experiments; the conscien- 
tious objectors received certificates of service but no compensation. The 
details and hazards of each experiment were, of course, fully explained to 
the volunteers before its initiation, and their understanding of the circum- 
stances acknowledged in writing. 

Prisoners were first used in the CMR program in the summer of 1942 
at the Massachusetts State Prison Colony in Norfolk, Massachusetts, when 
65 volunteers were injected with bovine albumin. From the Federal Peni- 
tentiary at Terre Haute, Indiana, 247 subjects became available for an 
investigation into the prophylaxis of gonorrhea conducted for CMR by the 
United States Public Health Service and the Bureau of Prisons, Depart- 
ment of Justice. The largest and most important use of prisoners was made 
in connection with the testing of new antimalarial drugs. Over 1350 vol- 
unteers were concerned in these projects, carried on under supervision of 
the Board for Co-ordination of Malarial Studies, at the United States Peni- 
tentiary in Adanta, Georgia, the Stateville Prison, Joliet, Illinois, the New 
Jersey State Reformatory, Rahway, New Jersey, and the United States 
Army DiscipHnary Barracks, Green Haven, New York. 

When the services of conscientious objectors were desired, application 
was made by CMR to the Camp Operations Division of National Selective 
Service System Headquarters. If its approval were obtained, and if no ob- 
jection were made to the purpose of the experiment by representatives of 


the religious groups who maintained the camps (American Friends, Men- 
nonites, Brethren), the responsible investigators interviewed the occupants 
of a conveniently located camp and asked for volunteers. Two hundred 
forty-one subjects were obtained in this fashion for experiments on prob- 
lems of nutrition, malaria, aviation medicine and acclimatization that in- 
volved, among other things, subsisting for long periods on starvation diets. 

Hospital patients who were to be infected with malaria as a form of 
treatment for their disease were logical candidates for participation in the 
program. Through co-operation of the appropriate State and City Depart- 
ments facilities of the following hospitals were placed at the disposal of 
CMR investigators: Goldwater Memorial Hospital, Bellevue Psychopathic 
Hospital, and Manhattan State Hospital, all in New York City; Massachu- 
setts General Hospital and Boston Psychopathic Hospital, both in Boston; 
Manteno State Hospital, Manteno, Illinois; and Gaston Psychopathic Hos- 
pital, Memphis, Tennessee. 

Results of Contracts. The scientific accomplishments of the research pro- 
gram are summarized in the two volumes of the OSRD history entitled 
Advances in Military Medicine. Only their quantity will be mentioned here. 

A considerable proportion of the civilian medical research conducted in 
the United States during the years 1 942-1 945 was performed under con- 
tract with OSRD. As of May 9, 1946, 11 29 papers describing this work 
had appeared in scientific journals and 869 additional manuscripts had been 
approved for publication. An unpredictable but large number will con- 
tinue to appear over a period of several years as security regulations are 
still further removed. In addition to these journal publications, a number 
of monographs and fasciculi have been and will be prepared. A three- 
volume "confidential" fasciculus totaling 1500 pages describes the back- 
ground and advances in various aspects of chemical warfare and contains 
a complete bibliography of the subject. In the field of malaria, a three- 
volume monograph, entided A Survey of Antimalarial Drugs: ig^i-ig^^, 
was published at the end of 1946. It relates the effectiveness and toxicity of 
over 12,000 drugs that were examined for their antimalarial action and de- 
scribes the methods for synthesis of these compounds. An equally compre- 
hensive monograph on the Chemistry of Penicillin, which is in course of 
publication, describes the results of the concerted efforts of American and 
British investigators to synthesize penicillin. 

Organization of CMR and Supervision of Research Program 

Washington Office. The four civilian members of CMR had important 
responsibilities in their normal capacities, of which it was impossible to 
divest themselves entirely. They all attended the weekly or biweekly meet- 
ings of the Committee in Washington. They all spent approximately one 


half of each week in Washington concerned with its affairs. Until the 
reorganization of the Committee in June 1944, its full-time staff was ex- 
ceedingly small. 

In September 194 1 Dr. A. M. Walker was appointed Assistant to the 
Chairman. Technical Aides were provided for the two most active fields 
in December 194 1. In June 1942, when Walker entered the Army he was 
succeeded by Dr. E. Cowles Andrus as Assistant to the Chairman, respon- 
sible for administration of CMR affairs. 

Initially, the Committee had felt the unwisdom of organizing itself into 
divisions and sections as the NDRC had done. Committees on the very 
subjects which such divisions and sections would embrace already existed 
within NRC and there seemed danger in erecting an overlapping and, in 
a sense, a competing organization. 

On these several counts the Committee was content for over two years 
to maintain but a small staff. Its purely administrative functions, designed 
to facilitate the work of the investigator, were handled adequately in the 
Washington office by the one or two Technical Aides. Such tasks as clear- 
ance and deferment of personnel, priorities for material, circulation of 
reports, inquiries of a thousand sorts, were handled in this fashion. For 
its more important supervisory function, the Committee depended during 
these years upon its own members, upon the NRC committees and upon 
special consultants. A variety of means were employed toward this end. 

Although the Chairman and Vice-Chairman were confined to Wash- 
ington by their respective duties with CMR and NRC, the other two 
civilian members made occasional trips to survey the progress of contracts. 
In February 1942, the Chairman of CMR directed a letter to the Chair- 
man of the Division of Medical Sciences of NRC, asking that the NRC 
committees undertake to supervise and correlate the projects which they 
had recommended to CMR and which were already under way. He sug- 
gested that meetings of investigators would be a useful means of effecting 
co-operation. In the fall of 1942, again utilizing the services of the NRC 
committee chairmen, CMR asked for a critical evaluation of its OSRD 
contracts with the purpose of identifying those which should be prosecuted 
with vigor and those which should be terminated or not recommended for 
renewal. Seventeen chairmen made these surveys in their fields of special 
interest and reported their conclusions in meetings with CMR during 
December of that year. 

Utilizing another method, CMR appointed Special Advisers and Con- 
sultants to inspect and report upon certain aspects of the research program. 
A further attempt to establish co-ordination was made through the medium 
of the progress reports which each investigator was required to submit 
to CMR. These reports were duplicated in the Washington office and 
distributed to responsible investigators in the same field, to members of 


the NRC committees which had recommended the project, to the Offices 
of the Surgeons General and fifteen copies to the London office of CMR 
for distribution in England. 

Reorganization. These attempts at supervision and co-ordination were all 
useful but the majority of them lacked continuity. The request that NRC 
committees undertake supervision of research entailed heavy responsibilities. 
In some fields the committees achieved effective integration; in other in- 
stances little was accomplished. There was no permanent responsible echelon 
interposed between CMR and the investigators which could insure the 
proper execution of contracts. Too much was being attempted by too few. 
An increasing realization of this fact led to a replacement of the original 
and simple organization of the Committee on Medical Research by a more 
elaborate structure in June 1944. 

A Medical Administrative Officer, Dr. Chester S. Keefer, was appointed, 
and to him was delegated the general responsibility of supervising and 
administering the scientific performance of all OSRD contracts in the field 
of medical research. The following divisions and sections were established: 

Division i (Medicine) 
E. Cowles Andrus, Chief (Internal Medicine, Johns Hopkins University) 
Section i (Preventive Medicine) 

Colin M. MacLeod, Chief (Bacteriology, New York University) 
Section 2 (Venereal Diseases) 

J. Earle Moore, Chief (Internal Medicine, Johns Hopkins University) 
Section 3 (Tropical Diseases and Mycotic Infections) 
Section 4 (Convalescence, Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Investigation) 
Emmet B. Bay, Chief (Medicine, University of Chicago) 
Division 2 (Surgery) 
John S. Lockwood, Chief (Surgery, Yale University) 
Section i (Wounds and Burns) 
Section 2 (Neurosurgery) 

Cobb Pilcher, Chief (Surgery, Vanderbilt University) 
Section 3 (Surgical Specialities) 
Division 3 (Aviation Medicine) 

Detlev W. Bronk, Chief (Physiology, University of Pennsylvania) 
Division 4 (Physiology) 
Joseph T. Wearn, Chief (Internal Medicine, Western Reserve University) 
C. N. H. Long, Deputy Chief (Physiology and Biochemistry, Yale 
Section i (Blood Substitutes) 
Section 2 (Shock) 

Dickinson W. Richards, Jr., Chief (Medicine, Columbia University) 
Section 3 (Nutrition and Clinical Investigation) 


Division 5 (Chemistry) 

Milton C. Winternitz, Chief (Pathology, Yale University) 
C. Chester Stock, Deputy Chief (Biochemistry, Memorial Hospital, New 
York City) 

Division 6 (Malaria) 

George A. Carden, Jr., Chief (Internal Medicine, Columbia University) 

Records Section 

Kenneth B. Turner, Chief (Internal Medicine, Columbia University) 

Each contract in eflect at the time of the reorganization or thereafter 
adopted was assigned to the Medical Administrative Ofl&cer or to one of 
the divisions. The Division Chief became responsible to the Medical Ad- 
ministrative Officer, and through him to CMR, for the contracts within 
his field. This was a continuing responsibility. The Chief was in a position 
to accept it because the field of his division was of practicable proportions 
and because he was given the assistance of Technical Aides and Consultants. 
He co-ordinated the work of the several investigators in each subject area 
and kept the CMR informed of the progress of individual investigations 
and of the general state of advancement of the subjects within his division. 
In the case of new projects he maintained close liaison with the NRC com- 
mittees and advised CMR on proposals which had been recommended by 
them. He was free, at his own discretion, to stimulate the submission of 
contract proposals. 

The Records Section established a central office which effected a greater 
degree of order in the acquisition and filing of progress, interim and final 
reports of contract investigators than had previously been the case. It 
distributed progress reports more widely, though to the same general 
groups. It created a roster of contracts, listing under each the number and 
substance of the reports which had been received. In April 1944, the section 
inaugurated a weekly bulletin containing a summary of reports which 
had been received by CMR from open and restricted projects. The re- 
ports were abstracted by their authors or by the section stafi and arranged 
by subjects in a useful and readable fashion. These bulletins were given 
a much wider distribution than the original reports, and by July 1945 the 
edition had increased from looo to 3100 copies, 400 going to England, 
350 to the European Theater of Operations and 200 to the Pacific. 

The reorganization of CMR provided a more effective supervision of 
the execution of contracts, relieved the members of a mass of detail which 
had pressed upon them, and gave them more time for the broader aspects 
of the CMR program. It might well have been effected sooner. 

West Coast Consultant Panel. The administrative activities of CMR and 
NRC were necessarily conducted in Washington. There were no repre- 
sentatives from the West Coast upon CMR and, initially, only eight upon 


the NRC committees. Unavoidable as this lack of representation was be- 
cause of geographical considerations, it had the unfortunate effect of mak- 
ing investigators in that area feel that they were uninformed and inade- 
quately utilized in the research program. This feeling was crystallized in 
September 1942, when thirty investigators from San Francisco directed a 
letter to CMR stating that their usefulness was handicapped by ignorance 
of the work in progress and of the relative urgency of problems in the field 
of military medicine. In point of fact, at the time the letter was written 
8.3 per cent of the active contracts (21 of 254) were in the hands of three 
California universities. The percentage of proposals for contracts from the. 
West Coast which had been rejected by NRC committees and CMR (42 
per cent) was somewhat lower than that (47 per cent) from the country as 
a whole. 

No special effort, however, had been made to keep the West Coast in- 
formed of CMR activities. The Committee invited two representatives of 
the group to visit Washington. After familiarizing themselves with the sit- 
uation in Washington, the representatives consulted with their group in 
San Francisco and in May 1943 made a report in which they recommended 
the appointment of official advisory commissions in natural geographical 
areas and of additional assistants for the NRC committees. Pursuant to the 
first of these suggestions a consultant panel to CMR with a membership 
drawn from residents of California was appointed on July i, 1943. Its func- 
tion was to insure that the investigative resources of the West Coast were 
fully utilized by organizing research projects and by analyzing proposals 
for contract prior to their submission to CMR. The arrangement was a 
reasonable and profitable one. 

Board for the Co-ordination of Malarial Studies. When problems arose 
which required a peculiar degree of co-ordination or which did not fall in 
the purview of any pre-existing group, special boards or committees were 
created to handle them. The best example of this mechanism was provided 
in the field of malaria. 

The search for antimalarial drugs which might prove superior to atabrine 
in potency and preventive effectiveness constituted a particularly difficult 
and laborious study. Each of the 14,000 compounds examined had to be 
prepared or synthesized, and most of them had to be tested for both sup- 
pressive and preventive action on several types of avian malaria and in more 
than one host. The more promising compounds had then to be examined 
for toxicity in animals and man, and their clinical effectiveness determined 
in civilian patients and volunteers. Finally, selected compounds of particu- 
lar promise were tested on soldiers in this country and in foreign theaters. 
Such studies involved the close and continuing co-operation of many 
groups of investigators in different institutions and in different parts of the 
country. An Office for the Survey of Antimalarial Drugs was established in 
July 1942 by Johns Hopkins University under contract with OSRD. Its pur- 


pose was to collect and codify the mass of chemical, pharmacological and 
clinical data which was to be developed in the succeeding years and to make 
this information available to investigators in this country and the British Em- 
pire within the limitations of military security and the commitments which 
had to be made to commercial firms. Initially, the studies of malaria were 
co-ordinated by a series of "conferences on malaria research" called by the 
Subcommittee on Tropical Medicine of the NRC. In January 1943, a more 
formal integration was accomplished by appointment of a Subcommittee 
on Co-ordination of Malarial Studies within the National Research Council. 
Dr. Frederick M. Hanes was Chairman of this subcommittee which at first 
had three subsidiary panels dealing with the biochemistry, clinical testing, 
and pharmacology and antimalarials under the chairmanship, respectively, < 
of Drs. W. M. Clark, J. A. Shannon, and E. K. Marshall, Jr. Later, a fourth 
panel, concerned with the synthesis of antimalarials, was instituted; Dr. 
Clark was its first Chairman, being succeeded by Dr. C. S. Marvel. As the 
work was pushed with greater vigor and assumed greater importance, as 
the magnitude of the malaria problem was more fully realized, and as the 
need for closer co-operation with the malarial studies of the Services became 
apparent, the Chairman of the NRC Division of Medical Sciences suggested 
that an independent Board for the Co-ordination of Malarial Studies be 
estabhshed. Such a board was appointed and held its first meeting in Novem- 
ber 1943. It received its financial support from OSRD funds. As finally 
constituted under the chairmanship of Dr. R. P. Loeb, it included seven 
representatives of the three Surgeons General, the chairmen of the four NRC 
antimalarial panels. Dr. A. R. Dochez, member of CMR, and Dr. G. A. 
Garden, Jr., Chief of the CMR Division of Malaria. 

The Board supervised and directed the malaria program with distin- 
guished success and provided a model of effective co-operation between 
civilian and military groups. The representatives of Army, Navy, and Public 
Health Service were not general Liaison Officers present to ask or receive 
advice from a committee, but were voting members of the Board. They 
were investigators and specialists in malaria in their own right, who were in 
a position within their Services to effectuate measures which the Board 
might recommend. They brought to the attention of the civilian members 
exigent military problems with which the latter were unfamiliar and 
arranged for prompt and adequate field trials of procedures developed in 
the course of civilian investigation. 

Liaison with Allied Governments 

At the meeting on November 19, 1941, Dr. Kenneth B. Turner of 
New York was selected to head the medical section of the OSRD London 
Mission. After familiarizing himself with the plans and procedures of the 
NRC committees on military medicine and visiting a number of OSRD 


research projects, Dr. Turner reached London in February 1942. He re- 
mained there until June 1943 and was succeeded by Dr. Joseph W. Ferre- 
bee. In December 1943, Dr. Ferrebee was in turn replaced by Dr. Hamilton 
Southworth, who was in England representing the Office of Civilian Defense 
and who remained in charge of the CMR section of the London Mission 
until it was closed in June 1945. On one occasion when he returned to this 
country, his place was filled by Dr. L. L. Waters, a CMR Technical Aide 
who had been sent to England with two CMR investigators to work in the 
Porton chemical warfare laboratories. 

The primary purpose of establishing the liaison was to keep CMR in- 
formed of British research in military medicine at a time when security 
classification and delay in mails grossly impeded the usual interchange of 
information. The NRC had already arranged for an exchange of the 
minutes of its committee meetings with those of the British Medical Re- 
search Council, but the exchange was not prompt, and minutes are rarely 
an adequate summary of transactions. The successive Liaison Officers estab- 
lished relations with the Medical Research Council and attended meetings 
of its numerous committees and those of appropriate groups within the 
Royal Army Medical Corps, Royal Navy, Royal Air Force, Emergency 
Medical Service and Ministries of Production, Food, and Home Defense. 
Towards the end of the war their most important contact was with the 
U. S. Army. They visited laboratories where important research was in 

Throughout their stay they sent weekly news letters to CMR and special 
reports of investigations for distribution to the committees and investigators 
who were concerned with similar matters in this country. In return they 
distributed to British investigators copies of the progress reports of CMR 
projects and of the bulletin which was issued by the CMR Records Section 
after April 10, 1944. Another function of the Liaison Officers was to arrange 
and facilitate the visits to England which were periodically made by CMR 
investigators. The activities of the London office were profitable to both 
countries and, if the evidence of formal correspondence be accepted, meas- 
urably increased friendly relations between British and American workers. 

A British counterpart of the CMR section of the OSRD London Mission 
was established in Washington in 1942, and in 1944 Medical Liaison Officers 
in Washington were appointed by Australia, South Africa and Belgium. 

Useful as the London office was it could not, of course, achieve the degree 
of liaison which is obtainable only by direct personal contact between in- 
vestigators. The desirability of sending American investigators to England 
and receiving British investigators in the United States was therefore early 
envisaged by CMR and, both upon its initiative and that of British agencies, 
visits were arranged and carried on throughout the war. All American 
representatives were either OSRD Consultants or were appointed such for 


the purposes of the visit. The missions served important functions. They 
established many cordial personal relationships and provided an under- 
standing of the problems faced by the two countries. They frequently suc- 
ceeded in co-ordinating research programs. They always resulted in a gain 
of information; and if, towards the end of the war, the British profited 
rather more than the United States by this exchange, the reverse was true 
at the war's beginning. 

The British initiated a combined British-American-Canadian surgical 
mission to the Soviet Union which reached Moscow on July 2, 1943, and 
returned to England, its point of departure, on July 30, 1943. Lieutenant 
Colonel Loyal Davis, USAMC, was appointed to represent CMR and NRC 
on this mission. The meetings permitted an exchange of information con- 
cerning the medical and research organization of the two countries. The 
members visited front line and base hospitals and reported on the methods 
of evacuation and surgical techniques employed by the Russians. 

A second mission to the U.S.S.R., sponsored by CMR, was made by Dr. 
A. Baird Hastings, CMR member, and Dr. Michael B. Shimkin of the 
United States Public Health Service, in response to a suggestion by the 
Soviet Government. Drs. Howard W. Florey and A. G. Sanders represented 
Great Britain and Canada on this mission, which reached Moscow on Janu- 
ary 14, 1944, and left on February 11. Manuscripts that had been prepared 
by American workers and reviewed by British and Canadian scientists were 
delivered to the Soviet authorities by Hastings. The reports described the 
status of investigations on ten subjects in which there had been active re- 
search developments; these subjects were discussed with leading Russian 
investigators at a series of conferences. The mission also visited twelve re- 
search and teaching institutes in the Moscow area. A very free and profitable 
interchange of information occurred, and it was hoped that the visit had 
established the basis for an enduring relationship. Plans to send another 
mission to the Soviet Union were interrupted by the termination of hostili- 
ties, but some contact was maintained by an exchange of literature. 

Liaison with the Services 

The reason for the existence of CMR was to aid the Army and Navy in 
saving lives in order better to fight the war. To accomplish this purpose, 
effective liaison was essential. CMR needed to be informed accurately and 
fully of the needs and interests of the Services. Conversely and for equally 
obvious reasons, the Services had to be promptly informed of the results 
gained by research. The formal liaison arrangements appeared adequate for 
these ends. Sitting with the NRC committees, and therefore in a position 
to advise them in the initiation of research projects, were designated repre- 
sentatives of the Surgeons General. Sitting as voting members of CMR, and 


therefore participating in the formulation of its program and apprised of 
its results, were medical officers of policy-making rank: the Chief of the 
Division of Preventive Medicine, Office of the Surgeon General of the Army, 
and the Chief of the Research Division, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery 
of the Navy. 

If the criterion of success is to be results, the liaison must be adjudged 
successful. Many of the advances in military medicine made during the war 
were the consequences of CMR research. Some of these advances were 
promptly transferred to the field. But it would be fatuous to say that the 
arrangements for such transfer were perfect. 

The most effective co-operation was secured when something beyond the 
formal net of liaison was created. Two of several such examples occurred 
in the fields of malaria and aviation medicine. That in malaria has already 
been recited. Representatives of the Surgeons General, who were experi- 
enced field investigators in the subject, functioned as voting members of the 
Board for the Co-ordination of Malarial Studies. In aviation medicine, the 
Chairman of the NRC committee continued his association with its activi- 
ties after entering the Navy, and the Division Chief for CMR was Co- 
ordinator of Research in the Office of the Air Surgeon, Army Air Forces. 
In both fields the committees were accurately informed of the needs of the 
Services. In both fields their research findings were promptly transferred 
into practice. 

The converse is equally true. In other fields of medicine and surgery, in 
which the contacts of NRC committees and CMR with the Services were 
less intimate and personal, the effectiveness of the work was correspondingly 
less. This is evidenced by the value, universally felt, of the information 
brought back by those CMR missions who had contact with troops in the 
field or by medical officers who had served in foreign theaters and, return- 
ing for some other purpose, talked informally to CMR and NRC com- 
mittees. The opinion of CMR that numerous and frequent missions to the 
fighting fronts to orient investigators as to conditions actually confronted 
there were to be desired was overruled by the Surgeon General of the Army 
on the basis of his more intimate knowledge of combat situations. 

Several successful examples of civilian and military co-operation occurred 
at Army General Hospitals and at civilian laboratories. Such investigations 
were carried on in the field of tuberculosis and psychiatry at Fitzsimons 
Hospital, in the penicillin study at Bushnell and Halloran, and in the 
studies on convalescence at Gardiner. The permission extended by the Sur- 
geon General for civilian investigators to use troops for research upon 
fatigue and water deprivation has already been mentioned. 

Liaison is a two-way road. The difficulties of getting information from 
the field to investigators in the States have been mentioned. The corre- 
sponding difficulty of getting information from the States into the field 


was a frequent subject of comment by returning medical oflScers and CMR 
missions from all theaters. Even in the life of portable surgical hospitals 
there are lulls in activity when news of the progress of medical research is 
of interest and value. It is always of interest in more stable installations. 
The earlier publication and wider distribution of the CMR weekly bulletin 
would have gone some distance towards filling this vacuum. Co-operation 
from the Services would have been required but should have been forth- 
coming. The Navy asked and received permission to republish extracts from 
the bulletin in its admirable BuMed News Letter. 

The formation and assignment of CMR was a novel experiment in 
American medicine. Planned and co-ordinated medical research had never 
been essayed on such a scale and, at its inception, there were the gravest 
doubts that it could be successfully executed. Fortunately, the experiment 
was a success; it was effective in meeting the needs posed by war. 

This chapter has concerned itself with the mechanisms of CMR adminis- 
tration. As was the case throughout OSRD, the strength of the organization 
lay in the integrity and disinterestedness of the individuals who directed 
and participated in it. Such administrative difficulties as were encountered 
by CMR came upon it from without. For the most part they applied 
throughout the OSRD organization; they are discussed at considerable 
length in later chapters. 




HILE most of the scientific research and development 
carried on under OSRD auspices was supervised either by NDRC or 
CMR, there were four activities which, at one time or another, were car- 
ried on without the interposition of either of those Committees. Two of the 
four were under NDRC auspices at one time and a third was under CMR 
for a short time. One of them functioned immediately under the Director, 
the other three were supervised by committees created especially for the 
purpose. They were quite disparate in scope and function. Their history is 
another illustration of one of the principal contributing factors to the suc- 
cess of OSRD — its flexibility. Bush might have set a pattern and forced 
all activities into it. Instead he wisely adapted the organization to the task 
confronting it. The organization chart was the servant, not the master, of 
the organization. 

The most important of these special activities was that dealing with 
atomic energy. Of less importance relatively, although highly significant in 
its own right, was that dealing with proximity fuzes for shells. The other 
two — sensory devices and insect control — were the result of special situa- 
tions which kept them from fitting into the conventional NDRC and CMR 
patterns. Each will be described briefly. 

Atomic Energy 

President Roosevelt's letter of June 15, 1940, appointing Bush to the 
National Defense Research Committee informed him of the recent appoint- 
ment of a special committee under the chairmanship of Dr. Lyman }. 
Briggs of the Bureau of Standards "to study into the possible relationship 
to national defense of recent discoveries in the field of atomistics, notably 
the fission of uranium." The President stated that he would request the 
committee to report to Bush as the jurisdiction of the NDRC included 
atomic energy. On July i, 1940, Briggs wrote Bush giving him a brief 
history of the activities of his committee and requesting funds for the con- 
tinuance of one line of research. This program was considered by NDRC 
at its meeting the next day. The Committee on Uranium was constituted 
a special committee of the NDRC under the chairmanship of Briggs and 
with a slight change in membership. NDRC approved in principle the pro- 


gram which had been outlined by Briggs and directed him to make definite 
proposals for consideration when funds had been allocated to the Committee. 

The first funds for the support of the uranium program were voted by 
NDRC at its meeting on October 25, 1940; and each succeeding meeting 
of the Committee saw additional implementation of the program. Recog- 
nizing the potential importance of research on atomic energy, on April 19, 
1941, pursuant to authorization of NDRC, Bush requested Jewett, as Presi- 
dent of the National Academy of Sciences, to appoint a special committee 
to review the program of research in the field and to make recommendations 
for a future program. A committee of distinguished scientists was appointed 
and Jewett sent its report to Bush on May 23. When NDRC met on June 12, 
it felt the need for additional light on the engineering aspects of the pro- 
gram; and accordingly it requested the National Academy to have the 
report reviewed by a committee with a membership competent from that 

With the establishment of OSRD, the Committee on Uranium was con- 
tinued as an NDRC activity but with its title changed to Section on 
Uranium for uniformity of nomenclature. Briggs appeared before the first 
meeting of the reconstituted Committee on July 18, 1941, to outline a 
research program. At the same time, the Chairman laid before the Com- 
mittee the reports submitted by the special Academy committee on atomic 
fission. It had become apparent by this time that success in the preliminary 
research program would lead to a very expensive long-range program which 
would dwarf the other NDRC activities. The Committee accordingly re- 
quested Bush to consider anew the entire uranium program in its relation 
to the activities of the NDRC; he in turn called upon the National Academy 
of Sciences for a further report. 

Upon receiving that report, he discussed the situation with NDRC at its 
meetings on November 28, 1941, and January 2, 1942. At the first of those 
meetings, it was agreed that arrangements should be made to handle the 
program outside the regular activities of NDRC. At the January meeting. 
Bush informed the Committee that he had completed the necessary arrange- 
ments. The problems were divided into those relating to physics and those 
relating to engineering. Three distinct programs were established in physics, 
and a Program Chief designated for each. In the case of the physics program, 
Bush acted upon recommendations made to him by a committee of three 
consisting of Conant as Chairman of NDRC, Briggs, as Chairman of Sec- 
tion S-i of OSRD (the word "uranium" had been dropped for security 
reasons), and the appropriate Program Chief. Contracts on the develop- 
mental and engineering aspects of the program were entered into upon the 
recommendation of a Planning Board composed of outstanding engineers, 
with E. V. Murphree, Vice-President of Standard Oil Development Com- 
pany, as Chief. In practice, orders for large quantities of materials for con- 


tractors on the program were channeled through the Planning Board. 

In June 1942 arrangements were made for a division of the work in the 
field of atomic energy between the OSRD and the War Department. The 
organization within OSRD was again modified. To handle the OSRD part 
of the program, the Director appointed an Executive Committee of S-i 
charged with the duty of recommending contracts and supervising opera- 
tions under those contracts. The members of the Executive Committee were 
Conant as Chairman, Briggs, E. O. Lawrence (physicist. University of Cali- 
fornia), A. H. Compton (physicist. University of Chicago), H. C. Urey 
(chemist, Columbia University) and Murphree. Compton, Lawrence and 
Urey had been Program Chiefs under Section S-i, and Murphree had been 
Chief of the Planning Board. Under the new arrangement the Planning 
Board ceased to exist, but its former members were available for consulta- 
tion by the War Department. The division of functions between the OSRD 
and the War Department contemplated that for the immediate future 
OSRD would continue with experimentation while all large-scale aspects of 
the program would be placed directly under Army control. 

The Executive Committee held its first meeting on June 25, 1942. In that 
and subsequent meetings it recommended contracts for research and devel- 
opment in the field of atomic energy; beginning on July i, 1942, those 
contracts were financed by funds transferred to OSRD from the War 

At its first meeting the Committee recommended the appointment of 
Stewart as its Secretary and the appointment was approved by the Director 
so that the administrative aspects of the Committee's operations could be 
meshed in with the other administrative operations of OSRD. Upon the 
Committee^ recommendation Section S-i of OSRD was abolished and 
the members of that section (except for the members of the Executive 
Committee of S-i) and the Consultants to it were appointed a panel of 
Consultants to the Committee. Dr. Harry T. Wensel (physicist, National 
Bureau of Standards) was appointed as Assistant to the Chairman of the 
Committee and played a very useful role not only in that capacity but later 
with the Corps of Engineers when the entire project was transferred to the 
newly created Manhattan District of that Corps. 

In order to insure co-ordination of the work of the Executive Committee 
with that being conducted by the Manhattan District, it was the practice 
of the Executive Committee to hold executive sessions for the discussion of 
its program and to follow them on the same day with other sessions with 
officers of the Manhattan District. During these sessions, the officers had 
ample opportunity to question the scientists and they in turn to present 
problems on which the Manhattan District could be useful. These meetings 
supplemented the close relations between Manhattan District officers and 
scientists working on specific projects. 


The Executive Committee held meetings on June 25, July 9, July 30, 
August 26, September 13-14, September 26, October 23-24, November 14, 
December 9, and December 19, 1942, and on January 14, February lo-ii, 
March 18, April 29, and September lo-ii, 1943. By the time of the Decem- 
ber 1942 meetings the atomic energy program had progressed to the point 
where it seemed advantageous to transfer the entire responsibility to the 
Manhattan District with research concentrated on those points which fitted 
closely into the Manhattan District program. Those OSRD contracts which 
did not fit into the production program were permitted to lapse while those 
(and they were the major ones) which did support the Army program 
were terminated as of an agreed date by OSRD (usually March 31, 1943) 
and picked up as Manhattan District contracts. At the request of the Man- 
hattan District, OSRD later entered into a few contracts in the general 
field where the District desired to conceal its interest in a particular subject. 
Although OSRD as an organization stepped out of the atomic energy field, 
persons associated with it continued as key scientific advisers to the Man- 
hattan District and to the President. Bush and Conant were members of 
the top-level, "policy" committee considering the uses of atomic energy, 
while Tolman spent most of his time over a long period as the key man 
on General Groves's scientific staff. 

The growth of the OSRD program in atomic energy is indicated by the 
following figures, showing the funds contracted or transferred for it: 

NDRC (of CND) June 27, 1940 — June 28, 1941 $ 468,000.00 

NDRC (of OSRD) June 28, 1941 — December 1941 $ 452,650.00 

Section S-i of OSRD January — June 1942 $ 1,952,168.00 

Planning Board of OSRD January — June 1942 % 2,224,392.77 

Executive Committee of S- 1 (OSRD) June 1942 — September 1943 $13,041,037.57 

Funds through June 30, 1942, were from those allocated or appropriated 
for NDRC or OSRD. All funds used on the program after that date were 
transferred to OSRD by the Army. The money spent on the atomic energy 
program by OSRD paved the way for Army expenditures of approximately 
two billion dollars. The best account of the results obtained appears in the 
volume Atomic Energy jor Military Purposes by Henry De Wolf Smyth. 

Proximity Fuzes for Shells 

The primary field of activity of Section T was proximity fuzes for shells. 
Its success in that field was outstanding. Initially, Section T was one of the 
sections of Division A of NDRC of the Council of National Defense. It 
continued as one of the sections of Division A of the reconstituted NDRC 
until March 31, 1942, when it was transferred out of NDRC and brought 
immediately under the Director. At approximately the same time the cen- 


tral laboratory of the section was moved from the Carnegie Institution of 
Washington to Johns Hopkins University. Work on fuzes for bombs and 
rockets which had been carried on under the former contract was trans- 
ferred to the National Bureau of Standards under Section E of Division A. 

The transfer of Section T was for reasons of administrative convenience, 
not of principle, for there was nothing in the nature of the problem or the 
magnitude of the program to require the shift. Dr. Merle A. Tuve con- 
tinued as Chief of the section. Because of the initially predominant interest 
of the Navy in the subject matter, a naval officer was appointed as special 
assistant to the Director of OSRD to aid the Director in following the 
activities of the section. 

The pattern of Section T activities was the same as that for other OSRD 
activities except that Section T operations were reviewed by the special 
assistant rather than by a committee and that Section T funds were largely 
provided by the Navy. In the later stages an increasingly large proportion 
of the section's operations was devoted to matters more closely tied in with 
procurement than with research. Bush suggested that it would be desirable 
for the section to be taken over by the Navy. Upon the insistence of the 
Navy as expressed in a letter of November 22, 1943, that the section could 
function more effectively as a part of OSRD than it could as a part of the 
Navy, he did not press for immediate transfer. When OSRD prepared its 
demobilization plans nearly a year later, however, the Navy concluded that 
it would be desirable to take over the Section T activities as a unit. The 
first step was a Navy-Johns Hopkins University contract of December i, 
1944, which permitted the transfer of the Section T central laboratory staff 
and facilities. This was followed by a series of Navy contracts replacing 
OSRD contracts in the Section T field. 

The OSRD method of contracting was followed by the Navy in connec- 
tion with the transfer of the section. In fact the Navy vocabulary was en- 
riched by the addition of the phrase, "Section T type contract," to describe 
the relation which the Navy entered into to support the transferred activi- 
ties. A total of approximately $26,400,000, most of it received by transfer 
from the Navy, was spent in support of the Section T program. 

Sensory Devices 

The problem of rehabilitation of wounded soldiers was on the threshold 
of OSRD jurisdiction. The unsatisfactory situation with respect to artificial 
limbs led OSRD upon recommendation of CMR to enter into a contract 
with the National Academy of Sciences under which a Committee on 
Prosthetic Devices was established to survey the field and work toward 
the improvement of devices. The problem of devising and developing in- 
strumental aids for men with sight impaired in the war was one of much 


greater difficulty, which involved techniques of both NDRC and CMR and 
yet clearly fell outside the fields of both. 

After consulting NDRC and CMR, Bush in January 1944 established 
a Committee on Sensory Devices to operate in this area and to report 
directly to him. The Committee members were: George W. Corner, Chair- 
man (anatomist, Carnegie Institution of Washington); Henry A. Barton 
(Director, American Institute of Physics); A. J. Carlson (physiologist, 
University of Chicago); Wallace O. Fenn (physiologist. University of 
Rochester); Stacy R. Guild (otologist, Johns Hopkins University); Karl S. 
Lashley (psychologist, Yerkes Laboratories). 

The Committee immediately tackled the problem of developing a reading 
machine for the blind, i.e., a device for converting printed matter into some 
sort of sensory stimulation other than visual, and a guidance device for use 
by the blind somewhat as a flashlight is used by a sighted person walking 
in the dark. It was clear from the start that invention and engineering 
would not be the chief problem in these somewhat fantastic enterprises. 
The really critical question was how much the blind man could learn about 
the objects and scenes before him through instruments that stimulated his 
hearing or his sense of touch. How far could a buzz in his ears or a tingle 
on his skin be made to give him knowledge of a printed word or of an 
obstacle in his path? The machines must speak in codes that could be 
learned and that could be made to convey images of useful quality. 

It was evident that much of the work in design and construction would 
be of such novel character that the Committee would require facilities for 
working out preliminary developments before going to outside industrial 
and academic laboratories for more exact apparatus. Haskins Laboratories 
was placed under contract for this purpose, and other contracts were placed 
in proper relationship to the central laboratory contract. 

In addition to its program of aid to the blind, the Committee had a 
related program for the development of devices to aid persons of low 
visual acuity. 

As a part of its general demobilization program, OSRD on November i, 
1945, entered into a contract with the National Academy of Sciences for 
work in the field of sensory devices. Under this contract the Academy com- 
bined the work on prosthetic devices with that on sensory devices under 
a single Board for Prosthetic and Sensory Devices. The OSRD Committee 
on Sensory Devices was dissolved and the same persons became members 
of the Committee on Sensory Devices of the Academy Board. The half- 
dozen OSRD contracts in the field were terminated and the contractors 
entered into subcontracts under the prime contract between OSRD and the 
Academy. The final step in the transfer of the program came when OSRD 
transferred the prime contract to the Surgeon General of the Army. The 
principal effect of the transfer was to give the Army a well-organized, 


effective program of research in the fields of prosthetic and sensory devices. 
Approximately $272,500 was committed to the work on sensory devices 
under OSRD auspices. 

Insect Control 

The OSRD Insect Control Committee was created on September 20, 1944, 
pursuant to a recommendation of the CMR to co-ordinate the activities 
within the OSRD relating to insect and rodent control. These activities 
were in turn but a part of the total governmental program which involved 
several departments and included such matters as the mass production of 
DDT, its chemical characteristics, formulations and methods of dispersal 
for its efficient use, its potential danger to insects of economic importance 
and to other desirable forms of life including plants and birds, and its in- 
fluence upon food and food sources. The Committee's function of co- 
ordination was described as follows: 

It will be the task of this Committee to review all research projects having to 
do with insecticides and insect repellents now under way by the OSRD, to recom- 
mend to the Divisions of the CMR and NDRC and to the OFS, which have the 
responsibility for their supervision, the appropriate conduct of these projects in 
order to fit them adequately into the over-all picture; to initiate by recommenda- 
tions to the appropriate Divisions of the NDRC and CMR, and to the OFS new 
projects whenever the Committee finds that such are needed to round out the 
work of the OSRD in the field of insect repellents and insecticides; and to further 
the knowledge of insect control in the military theaters of operation. 

The members of the Committee were: M. C. Winternitz, Chairman, 
Chief of Division 5, CMR; A. B. Hastings, member, CMR; J. T. Wearn, 
Chief of Division 4, CMR; Roger Adams, member, NDRC; W. R. Kirner, 
Chief of Division 9, NDRC; W. A. Noyes, Jr., Chief of Division 10, NDRC; 
A. T. Waterman, Deputy Chief, OFS. 

In order to facilitate the work of the Committee, subcommittees were 
appointed in the fields of biology, chemistry, rodent control, entomology, 
dispersal, and improvement of repellent preparations for skin application. 

The Committee and its subcommittees had appropriate liaison with the 
Army (Technical Division of Chemical Warfare Service, Medical Division 
of Chemical Warfare Service, Army Committee for Insect and Rodent Con- 
trol, U. S. Typhus Commission, Office of the Quartermaster General, Office 
of the Surgeon General, Office of the Chief of Engineers); with the Navy 
(Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, National Medical Research Institute); 
with the United States Public Health Service (Typhus Control Division, 
Malaria Control in War Areas Division, National Institute of Health); with 
the Department of Agriculture (Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quaran- 
tine); and with the Department of the Interior (Fish and Wildlife Service). 


One of the principal activities of the Committee was to maintain a Co- 
ordination Center for the purpose of assembUng information on insect and 
rodent control and making it available to qualified personnel. 

Upon the recommendation of, and under contract with OSRD, the Na- 
tional Academy of Sciences formed an Insect Control Committee in Febru- 
ary 1945, composed of representatives of most of the Government agencies 
working in the field, in order that they might consider broader aspects of 
insect control and the relationship to it of their respective programs. As 
OSRD demobilized, the Academy Committee took over those functions of 
the OSRD Committee of a continuing interest. Then on July i, 1946, it 
became the Chemical-Biological Co-ordination Center of the National Re- 
search Council. 

Within the framework of the organizations heretofore discussed — 
NDRC, CMR, and the groups described in the present chapter — there 
was carried on the work for which OSRD was created. The next chapter 
describes steps taken to obtain the best combat results from the products 
of their endeavor; and most of the remainder of the volume is devoted to 
the supporting activities whose objective was to make possible the effective 
functioning of the groups primarily responsible for results in the fields of 
military research. 



Establishment of the Office of Field Service 


DRC early found that the most effective use of the equip- 
ment it developed required close and continuing collaboration with the 
using service. British branches of the M.I.T. radar laboratory and of the 
Harvard radar countermeasures laboratory were established in the fall of 
1943, in order that scientists could closely follow the use of the laboratory- 
developed equipment by the Eighth Air Force and could adapt that equip- 
ment to meet tactical situations without delay. NDRC contracts with Colum- 
bia University and with the University of California brought similar close 
relations in the United States between the NDRC group working on anti- 
submarine warfare and Navy activities. 

As more and more NDRC-developed equipment appeared in production 
quantities, an expansion of these field activities was clearly indicated. The 
Army and Navy training programs could not turn out enough technicians 
familiar with the equipment and then keep them abreast of the latest models. 
Military dissatisfaction with the performance of new weapons in combat, 
although it might result from improper use in the hands of personnel with- 
out technical knowledge, could delay an entire program of research and 
development. It was a matter of greatest importance that OSRD transfer a 
substantial segment of its scientific brainpower to improving the effective 
use of new weapons already developed. 

In response to urgent calls from the armed forces themselves, some steps 
in this direction had already been taken. Increasingly, OSRD contractors 
were asked to send representatives from their laboratories to military sta- 
tions at home and abroad to help with the introduction, installation and 
maintenance of the equipment they had developed or to aid in training the 
troops in its proper use. Such detailing of personnel to field activity was 
commonly within the subject work of contracts or was added in order to 
make such service available. As the number of men thus dispatched over- 
seas increased, the need for co-ordination of their efforts became evident. 

In addition to the expert help required for introducing new weapons and 
teaching people to operate and maintain them, there was a growing need 
for aid in the broader problem of finding out how they could best be em- 
ployed in actual military or naval operations. This is a part of what is called 


"operational research," or "operational analysis." Generally operational re- 
search included studies of the performance of equipment under operating 
conditions and of the performance of personnel in the operation of the 
equipment, with a view to improved training and doctrine, analysis and 
evaluation of one's own tactics or of the enemy's tactics. Some aspects of 
this work were a normal part of the functions of military personnel; but 
as the techniques were perfected, there was greater need for men trained 
in science and especially in mathematics and statistics. 

Accordingly, after discussing the matter with the Advisory Council, Bush 
announced the creation of the Office of Field Service (OFS) on October 15, 
1943; and on November 8, 1943, he issued Administrative Order No. 4 
which established it as a principal subdivision of OSRD. This new unit 
which was to be headed by a Chief to be appointed by him had its func- 
tions defined as follows: 

Under the general supervision and direction of the Director, the Office of Field 
Service shall direct, supervise and coordinate the rendering by the Office of 
Scientific Research and Development or its contractors to the Armed Services of 
the United States and its Allies of certain field services designed to (i) make the 
most effective possible use of developments by the United States or its Allies on 
mechanisms or devices of warfare or in military medicine, and (ii) minimize the 
effectiveness of any such developments made by the enemy, especially those in 
combat use. Principal among such services shall be operational research, field 
engineering, the organization and operation of laboratories established in military 
fields of operation, the work of ad hoc committees or missions for special study 
of field problems, the analysis of information contained in reports or derived 
from consultations concerning scientific problems arising in connection with 
military combat operations, and, subject to the policies fixed by the Scientific 
Personnel Office, the employment and training of personnel needed for such 

Karl T. Compton, President of M.I.T. and a member of NDRC, was 
named Chief of OFS and Alan T. Waterman, Deputy Chief (physicist, Yale 
University). The principal officers of OFS were the following: 

Chief: Karl T. Compton (October 11, 1943 — July 30, 1945) 

Alan T. Waterman (July 31, 1945 — December 31, 1946) 

Chief: Alan T. Waterman (October 11, 1943 — July 30, 1945) 
John E. Burchard (August i, 1945 — June 30, 1946) 

Chiefs: John E. Burchard (August i, 1944 — August i, 1945) 

George R. Harrison (February 24, 1944 — January 31, 1946) 
Paul E. Klopsteg (April 2, 1945 — January 31, 1946) 
Philip M. Morse (February 20, 1945 — January 31, 1946) 
John T. Tate (December 3, 1943 — January 31, 1946) 


One policy which OFS followed consistently was that it would function 
only on direct request from a branch of the armed forces or from another 
Government agency, and that personnel made available would be loaned 
for an initial period not to exceed six months. It was understood, of course, 
that should the extension of such loans be desired by all parties concerned, 
including the individual himself, this would be effected. The title "Field 
Service Consultant" was given to all OFS field service representatives to dis- 
guise their specific functions and to provide latitude in the performance of 
their duties. 

Major Categories of OFS Activity 

By the time of the surrender of Japan OFS activities had extended to 
every theater of the war and had included every type of assistance foreseen 
in its charter. It had dispatched nearly 300 scientists and technical men on 
missions overseas, two thirds of them to the Pacific; had assigned 200 to 
project activities in the United States; had interviewed several thousand 
technical men; and had devoted considerable energy to answering questions, 
giving advice and looking up personnel in response to a host of assorted 
requests from the armed forces. 

The technical accomplishments and personal adventures of the scientists 
who represented OFS are dealt with in a separate volume, called Combat 
Scientists. These men came from all the divisions of NDRC and from the 
special committees and panels of OSRD. Most of them had some previous 
affiliation with OSRD or its contractors, for OFS learned that the greatest 
need was for the specialist, highly skilled, fully acquainted with the in- 
tricacies and limitations of his equipment, able to command the respect of 
technically trained ofi&cers and facile in teaching the GI how best to employ 
the bewildering gadgets placed in his hands. 

The varied functions of OFS fell into the following major categories: 
(i) procurement and processing of civilian specialists in science and tech- 
nology for loan to war activities, predominantly for temporary duty over- 
seas in theaters of military operations; (2) indoctrination of personnel pro- 
cured for field service in developments of NDRC, in military procedures, 
or in the application of certain scientific techniques to problems of warfare; 

(3) establishment, staffing and supervision of "projects" on direct request 
from the armed forces, both at home and abroad; these covered a broad 
range both geographically and in fields of special scientific knowledge; 

(4) informal assistance from both the central office of OFS and from its 
field men to the Army, the Navy, units of OSRD, or other war activities in 
matters of procuring scientific personnel, exchanging technical information 
or setting up and manning activities that had scientific or technical aspects; 

(5) informal assistance in the placement of officers, enlisted personnel, or 


draftees with technical background; (6) informal assistance to NDRC divi- 
sions in promoting field missions. 

The services rendered by OFS field men included many kinds of consul- 
tation: analysis and outlining of problems in which civilian aid could prove 
helpful; analysis of military and naval operations, resulting in recommen- 
dations for revision of tactics; assistance with installation and maintenance 
of equipment or with training of military personnel in its proper use; analy- 
sis of the performance of new weapons and devices under field combat 
conditions, which might result in modifications back at the laboratories; 
assistance in promoting the flow of technical information between labora- 
tories and production plants and the field users; assistance in the procurement 
of scientific intelligence; counsel on improving the utilization of personnel 
within the armed forces. 

Nature of Requests 

A "project" of OFS was essentially a job for which it procured and 
assigned personnel. The request might be for a single man or a group of 
ment to be sent out for a few weeks to survey scientific aspects of a military 
problem in order to advise specific directions in which further help might 
be needed. On the other hand, it might involve the formation of a more 
or less permanent group at field headquarters, either for operational analy- 
sis or for consistent and continuous attack on problems that developed from 
day to day. Or it might be for the loan of an operations analyst or an 
equipment specialist to a group of civilians already established in one of 
the Services, such as an Operational Research Section of the Air Forces. 

Ordinarily requests for OFS assistance began with informal negotiations. 
When OFS had determined that a request lay within its province and that 
there was some hope for securing the personnel necessary, the originating 
office initiated a formal request. Usually this was merely a paper confirma- 
tion of a request for services that had already been arranged. In this sense, 
OFS operated to a great extent "on the cuff," because its fundamental 
philosophy was to get the requisite manpower on the job at the earliest 
possible moment. 

Promotion of Field Missions for NDRC Dwisions 

Divisions of NDRC found themselves repeatedly blocked in efforts to get 
their representatives into combat areas in order to improve their own tech- 
nical liaison with the using forces. They commonly felt that if their repre- 
sentatives could only demonstrate new devices to the officers in the combat 
areas where the need for them was most acute, this would result in pressure 
from the theaters upon the planning groups in this country and might 


accelerate acceptance and procurement. Although the military in Washing- 
ton were commonly sympathetic and willing to help in arranging such 
missions, they could not insist on sending civilian visitors to an operating 
command in the field. Here the theater commander was the supreme au- 
thority. He could refuse such missions if his staff were not convinced of 
their desirability; yet the real need was for an opportunity to convince the 
staff of the utility of the equipment. The divisions often urged that OFS 
use its good offices in the close contacts with high levels of Army and Navy 
which it was establishing both at home and in the field to bring about an 
invitation from a theater commander for a division representative to visit 
the areas under his control. 

Facilitating Exchange of Scientific Information 

The presence in OFS of men who could be emissaries not only for the 
OSRD development program but also for the technical services was wel- 
comed by all to whom a free flow of technical information was important 
and who had suffered from the inability to communicate freely with the 
ultimate users of newly developed equipment. OFS therefore established 
with NDRC and with the Service laboratories procedures that would lead 
to rapid procurement of technical information, agreeing in turn to supply 
them with firsthand information that came back through miUtary channels 
from the field service representatives. 

Groups of OFS consultants maintaining more or less stationary head- 
quarters in the field developed libraries for the whole command, containing 
not only the material procured through the OFS central office but also tech- 
nical reports from Service branches on the mainland and operational reports 
originating in the theaters. Correspondence and technical reports which soon 
began to flow back from OFS men in the theaters commonly contained 
requests for information, for equipment, or for personnel. Over two hun- 
dred requests were received from the Middle Pacific. Approximately half of 
them were requests for information concerning the production status, avail- 
ability, shipping dates or operating characteristics of radar equipment of all 
kinds. Some of them led to development work by NDRC or by the Services. 
Forty requests for equipment were received, a substantial number of them 
for radar spare parts, preproduction models, or test equipment. Seventy-one 
requests for reports involved nearly 400 separate documents published by 
NDRC, CMR, the Services and other agencies. Films, photographs and 
drawings were sent out to the theaters in large quantity. 

About 150 requests were received from the OFS headquarters in the 
Southwest Pacific. Approximately one third of these were for equipment, 
generally for the development of new equipment to meet problems unique 
to that area. 


Something over one half of the OFS personnel was engaged in the four 
principal lines of activity specifically mentioned in the following pages, 
namely ASWORG, ALSOS, the Operational Research Section in Hawaii 
and the Research Section in the Southwest Pacific. The remainder had 
highly varied and interesting assignments, but from an administrative 
standpoint they operated directly with OFS headquarters in Washington 
rather than through one of the four major activities. 

The Antisubmarine Warfare Operational Research Group 

The Antisubmarine Warfare Operational Research Group (ASWORG) 
had been estabfished under a contract with Columbia University supervised 
by Division 6 of NDRC. Shordy after the creation of OFS, it was made a 
direct activity of that Ofi&ce and it became the largest single project activity 
of OFS both in terms of number of men involved and in geographic dis- 
tribution of their assignments. More than seventy specialists became mem- 
bers of the group, about half of them added after the transfer to OFS juris- 
diction. Representatives of the project were located in North Africa and 
London, in Trinidad, Brazil and Newfoundland, in Hawaii and the Philip- 
pines, at Boston, New York, Quonset, Langley Field, Miami, and Fort 

The contribution of operational research toward solving the antisubma- 
rine problems established the ASWORG organization and its methods so 
firmly that the Navy extended the scope of its responsibilities to activities 
of American submarines in the Pacific, to naval air operations and then 
finally to all types of naval operations. Whereas the group had concentrated 
in the early days on such relatively simple matters as the operation of a 
single aircraft on convoy patrol or submarine search, it was later dealing 
with the complicated operations of whole task forces. The group was re- 
named the Operations Research Group (ORG) in October 1944, and 
transferred to jurisdiction of the Readiness Division in COMINCH.* At 
the end of the war it was taken over from OSRD, with somewhat reduced 
manpower, to become a permanent part of the Navy organization. 

A fundamental concept that characterized this project throughout its 
history was that a large section of the group's membership should remain 
as a central group working with the general staff in Washington, carrying 
on the more theoretical tasks of statistically analyzing operational reports, 
devising and interpreting tactics and assisting in the preparation of tactical 
doctrine. Other members were assigned for temporary duty to the field 
where they would work with the users of new weapons, could apply ideas 
for new tactics in practice, and could recognize new problems to be trans- 
mitted to the central body for further work. Free interchange of informa- 

* Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet. 


tion and personnel between the field units and the home office was essential. 
A rotation of assignments permitted field men to renew their acquaintance 
with laboratory developments and provided an opportunity for training 
members of the group in field work through practical experience. Success 
in early operations led to the establishment of several subgroups to deal with 
submarine operations, air operations, amphibious operations and naval gun- 
fire support, antiaircraft fire, and special problems, including suicide attacks 
by Japanese airplanes against American vessels. 

OFS Activities in Europe 

In the European Theater of Operations (ETO) NDRC already had effec- 
tive mechanisms for supplying technical consultation to both high and low 
echelons through the OSRD London Mission and the work of the British 
branches of the M.I.T. Radiation Laboratory and the Harvard Radio Re- 
search Laboratory. These agencies were functioning effectively and there 
was no need for OFS to exercise jurisdiction over them. It was decided 
rather that OFS should use them when expedient for attachment of new 
missions which it might be asked to sponsor in the European theater. 

Thus, unless the military orders specifically prevented, every OFS man 
going eastward was advised to stop in at the London (or later, Paris) Office 
with a copy of his instructions from OFS. There he was given guidance on 
his mission and help with his fiscal affairs. He was also familiarized with 
a channel for sending reports and requests to OFS which commonly proved 
faster and more direct than the military channels normally available for 
communications of a technical nature. The use of this channel was always 
with the approval of the military and copies of the communications were 
usually sent concurrently through military channels. 

Perhaps the single most important and certainly the most colorful OFS 
project in the European theater was the ALSOS Mission. This was a joint 
Army-Navy-OSRD activity that involved sending a group of outstanding 
physicists, chemists, metallurgists, engineers and other scientists into the 
territory recently won and close on the heels of or even along with the 
advancing armies. Its primary object was to secure an immediate over-all 
picture of German scientific research in the war effort and especially to 
find out with the greatest possible speed what progress German scientists 
had made in the critical field of atomic energy. 

From the days when American troops made a successful landing in Italy 
until the end of the war, OSRD sent some sixty scientists into enemy- 
occupied and finally into enemy territory. They were engaged in assembling 
accurate information regarding the personnel, laboratories, institutions and 
industrial firms engaged in scientific war research for the enemy; prompt 
apprehension and questioning of the scientists and technical men and the 


capture and securing of documents, equipment and facilities; intelligent 
investigation of files, laboratories and workers; translation and evaluation 
of a mass of correspondence and records; and finally an orderly reporting 
to the authorities in America. 

Initiation of OFS Aid in the Pacific 

In contrast to the situation in the Atlantic, when OFS began functioning 
there was no precedent for the widespread acceptance in the Pacific area of 
civilian scientists from OSRD. It was difficult in the early days of the war 
for theater commanders in that area to secure adequate transportation, sup- 
plies and weapons. They were reluctant to permit civilian "super-salesmen" 
to come out and increase their problems of housekeeping and transporta- 
tion, only to whet their appetites for equipment which might not reach 
them for many months. Moreover, the officers for the most part were not 
familiar with benefits which were being derived on the other side of the 
world from close co-operation between scientists and military men. It was 
therefore decided at the beginning that OFS would take the primary re- 
sponsibility for missions to Pacific areas and that one of its first obligations 
would be to establish appropriate liaison with the operational commands, 
a major undertaking in itself. 

In order to explore the possibilities of OFS activities in Pacific operations, 
Compton undertook a series of conferences with the Commanders in Chief 
and other high officers of both Services in the Central, South and Southwest 
Pacific beginning in December 1943. He returned from this tour of the 
Pacific with what he described as "a pocketful of requests" for help from 
OSRD and from the Services. Many of them would involve field service ac- 
tivities. Some were for development work by NDRC; some were merely for 
the latest information on equipment. The stage was now set for extensive 
activity in the Pacific and the greater part of OFS attention during the next 
fifteen months was devoted to filling these requests and the numerous 
others which developed out of them as the personnel dispatched to the 
theater became active. Two major branch offices of OFS were to be set up, 
one in Oahu and the other in Australia. These would logically become foci 
of OFS in the respective theaters and their first functioning would relate 
to these requests. The OFS group in Hawaii retained its base of operations 
at Oahu to the end of hostilities and functioned as a closely knit, coherent 
unit. The OFS office in the Southwest Pacific, on the other hand, moved 
from Brisbane, Australia, to HoUandia, New Guinea, then on to Leyte and 
finally to Manila. Men sent through that office were detailed to duty which 
often took them thousands of miles from the OFS headquarters for many 
months. They were widely dispersed through the theater and had to operate 
almost independendy. 


Establishment and Growth of the Operational Research 

Section in Hawaii 

Dr. Paul E. Klopsteg, Director of Research at the Technological Institute 
of Northwestern University and Chief of Division 17 of NDRC, w^as named 
an Assistant Chief of OFS and left for Oahu in March 1944. After a month 
of intensive consultation with officers of the Army headquarters staff and in 
the technical services he returned with a program of work and a suggested 
plan of organization. This called for the establishment of a "balanced team" 
consisting of specialists who would be constituted as a special group work- 
ing at GHQ and reporting directly to the Army Chief of Staff. Dr. Lauriston 
C. Marshall, formerly director of the British branch of the Radiation Labora- 
tory, was selected as the leader of this balanced team and departed for the 
theater in May. On the basis of his contacts with the officers and a priority 
listing of problems for the theater, Marshall soon recommended that his 
team consist of a permanent staff of twenty-three which would include 
experts in various named fields. This recommendation was approved by 
the Commanding General of the Central Pacific Area. 

As the personnel of the group increased, the team was informally divided 
into groups of experts in the following four fields, each headed by a senior 
man who became a leader and took responsibility for supervision of the 
projects undertaken by his group: weapons and analysis; radar, communi- 
cations and countermeasures; amphibious operations, transportation and 
cargo handling; and work simplification (until December 1944). Co- 
ordination was provided through weekly conferences of all members of 
the team who were not out in forward areas. When additional personnel 
were brought to the theater on short missions, it was the policy to attach 
them to Marshall's team for administrative purposes and for co-ordination. 

Soon after the balanced team was formally established in the theater it 
was designated as the Operational Research Section (ORS) and was assigned 
for administrative purposes to G-3 (operations), which placed it immedi- 
ately under the supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, as a sub- 
section. Although the Section functioned as a part of the Army organization, 
it worked with both Army and Navy, Throughout 1944 and the early 
months of 1945 the total personnel of the group increased steadily. By the 
end of hostilities nearly fifty men had been attached to it, including those 
assigned for short special missions. The Japanese surrender obviated the 
need for ORS and its activities were officially terminated on August 17. 

Although ORS was technically a creation of the Army, Lieutenant Gen- 
eral Robert C. Richardson adopted a generous and farsighted policy in 
authorizing the use of ORS men on work for the Army Air Forces and the 
Navy. Policy considerations of these branches dictated that requests for such 


aid normally be made on an informal basis. Always with the approval of the 
Army Commander, ORS devoted approximately half of its manpower re- 
sources to problems of interest to these other agencies. At one time shordy 
before the Japanese surrender, more than a third of the personnel attached 
to ORS were in forward areas on temporary duty assigned to the Air 
Forces. Most of the work accomplished with units of the Navy could not 
receive official recognition and remains unreported. In several cases material 
prepared by ORS members was written into Navy doctrine as operational 

Development of OFS Headquarters in the Southwest Pacific 

At the end of March, 1944, Dr. George R. Harrison, Dean of Science at 
M.I.T. and Chief of Division 16 of NDRC, was appointed an Assistant Chief 
of OFS and departed for Brisbane, Australia, as the first head of what was 
to be in eflfect a branch office of OFS in the Southwest Pacific, operating 
within the military framework rather than as an independent agency like 
the London Mission. The task of this OFS unit was to provide necessary 
liaison with British military and civilian agencies centered in Australia; 
to serve as an administrative center for travel and fiscal details and com- 
munications of OFS personnel sent to the Southwest Pacific; to maintain 
continuing liaison with the troops in forward areas and discover new prob- 
lems in which OSRD scientists might help; to co-ordinate and supervise all 
OFS missions to that theater; and to improve the flow of technical infor- 

Harrison succeeded in stimulating considerable interest in OSRD assist- 
ance among the officers, and requests additional to those brought back by 
Compton began to come in to Washington. In July 1944, Klopsteg succeeded 
Harrison. He remained until October at which time Dr. H. K. Stephenson, 
a Technical Aide in the Office, took over as Acting Chief, a position he 
retained until the unit was deactivated at the end of hostilities. 

Activities of OFS Consultants who were processed through the Research 
Section of the Southwest Pacific Area (General Mac Arthur's command) 
were even more varied than were those of the Operational Research Section 
at Oahu (Central Pacific Area, General Richardson's command). They in- 
cluded a survey of the destructive action of marine borers; investigation of 
insect infestation of Army food stores; a study of transportation bottlenecks 
and equipment failures; work simplification to expedite handling of com- 
munications traffic; research on immunization and treatment of malaria; 
investigation of fungus infections of the skin; studies of wave propagation 
in jungle and mountainous terrain; establishment of a group of radar spe- 
cialists to co-operate with the Australians in constructing radar equipment 
for ground control; a study of combat experience with smoke munitions, 


flame throwers and mortars; work on radar countermeasures; demonstra- 
tions to introduce weapons developed for jungle warfare by NDRC; and a 
prolonged study of rockets for the support of operations. 

A continual stream of information covering a wide variety of topics 
flowed back to the United States through the Research Section, including 
the field use of insecticides and DDT; tropical deterioration; fungus corro- 
sion of optical instruments; Japanese fire control equipment; Japanese radar, 
rockets, land mines and booby traps; nonmetallic Japanese land mines; and 
many others. 

Whereas the ORS in Hawaii was in daily touch with the staff officers to 
whom it had to report, the Research Section in the Southwest Pacific was 
often separated by 2000 miles of water from the high command, water 
dotted with Japanese-held islands over which scientists were not permitted 
to fly. Personnel sent to Marshall's team could discuss their problems regu- 
larly with each other, could get immediate action on the travel and fiscal 
details that might plague them, could get forward to operational areas 
readily and return frequently to their field base at Fort Shafter. Men sent 
t to the Research Section, on the other hand, had to go out into the jungles, 
depend on local resources in a poorly supplied region, send their communi- 
cations through devious and unreliable channels, fight their way back to 
headquarters with the most meager transportation. Headquarters moved 
repeatedly and the office personnel were constantly changing. In view of 
all these difficulties the substantial accomplishments of the Field Service 
Consultants who went to SWPA are a tribute to their persistence, imagina- 
tion, patience and courage. 

By late April 1945, the tempo of the war in the Pacific had greatly accel- 
erated. Waterman went out, therefore, to confer with the commanders 
about a broad program for increasing OSRD aid in the whole Pacific area, 
for bringing about a more effective set-up of the civilian missions and for 
improving the co-ordination of all OSRD efforts through OFS and its 
military liaison agencies. He obtained the approval of General Mac Arthur 
for an all-out scientific effort through the establishment of a Pacific Branch 
of OSRD with headquarters at Manila. 

Liaison with the Armed Services in Washington 

The Office of the Co-ordinator of Research and Development was desig- 
nated by the Secretary of the Navy as the single channel through which 
arrangements with the Office of Field Service were to be made. Except 
for the expansion of the Antisubmarine Warfare Operations Research 
Group there were so few field service projects undertaken at the formal 
request of the Navy that liaison relations were comparatively simple. 


While OFS was of considerable assistance to the Navy, particularly in 
Hawaii, it commonly had to work informally. Officially the Navy atti- 
tude discouraged the presence of civilians in forward areas. 

Initially the Operations Division was designated as the Army Ground 
Forces liaison office with OFS. In a short time, however, the War Depart- 
ment shifted the responsibility for liaison with OFS to the New Develop- 
ments Division (NDD) which then remained the major Army channel 
for field service activities throughout the war. This division was a special 
staff section composed of officers of the General Staff Corps. Its Direc- 
tor at that time was Major General Stephen G. Henry, an able ofl&cer 
of wide acquaintance in the Army whose enthusiasm for the introduc- 
tion and effective utilization of new weapons and devices was matched by 
his readiness to take maximum advantage of the skills of scientists either 
in or out of uniform. General Henry was ardent in his support of OSRD 
and keenly interested in the concept of transferring scientific talent through 
OFS from research to field use. His personal backing did a great deal 
to smooth the way for OFS in the difficult first days of its dealings with 
the Army. 

In August 1944 General Henry was succeeded as Director of NDD 
by Brigadier General William A. Borden, who was also keenly interested 
in the possibilities for assisting the field forces by sending scientific talent 
to the front and was thoroughly co-operative. Unfortunately the New De- 
velopments Division was never sufi&ciently staffed to do its job completely. 
As it grew, it took on increased responsibilities in connection with other 
aspects of its directive and the officers assigned to take care of OFS mat- 
ters were able to devote only part of their time to OFS projects. Field 
service operations would have progressed more effectively if the Service 
liaison office for the OFS type of activity had been authorized to develop 
a staff of officers and secretaries whose only responsibility was the han- 
dling of OFS matters and whose function included the military process- 
ing of all personnel loaned to that Service. 

Initially OFS had no single channel with the Army Air Forces. Re- 
quests originating in different units came through various offices. This 
created diflSculties and led to arrangements in the summer of 1945, when 
plans for channeling all OSRD field groups through OFS were being for- 
mulated, to set up a single office in the Air Forces that would function in 
parallel with NDD for processing OFS men and handling OFS com- 
munications on AAF matters. Brigadier General J. F. Phillips's division in 
the ofi&ce of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Materiel and Services was 
designated, and Colonel W. G. Brown, who had been AAF Liaison Officer 
with NDRC, was assigned to supervise the processing. The office began to 
function late in July 1945. 


Liaison in the Theaters | 

* i 

Although the basic liaison with the Services at home was generally ex- | 

cellent, there remained the problem of establishing good relations with the j 

theater commanders. In the European areas the matter was already well | 

taken care of by the OSRD Liaison Office. 

In the Central Pacific the problems of OFS organization and liaison 
were relatively minor. The Operational Research Section had a clear stafi , 

position as a subsection of G-3. This made it possible for all branches of ^ 

the Army to request assistance easily. Effective working relations with 
Air Forces and Navy were developed so that the section could serve all 
elements of the command. Members of the "balanced team" could col- 
laborate, could travel about in the theater without too much difficulty. In j 
spite of minor disadvantages in its situation, the organizational pattern of j 
this ORS became a model for effective placement of civilian scientists in 
an operational command in the Pacific. ' 
At first all communications except strictly personal letters had to pass I 
through the hands of NDD and OFS for appropriate distribution. The j 
resultant delays in handling the papers for clearance up through the chain ! 
of command in the theater were incompatible with the urgency of the 
matters discussed. The theater command recognized that this would im- 
pair the efficiency of ORS. Accordingly, ORS was finally permitted to 
transmit, without the usual staff consideration, "technical" letters direcdy i 
to any civilian agency in the theater or on the mainland provided they 
contained the statement, "This letter does not necessarily reflect the views 
of the Commanding General," and that copies were sent concurrently for | 
information to OFS and NDD. This procedure was eventually approved 
also by the command in the Southwest Pacific. , 

In the Southwest Pacific the situation was vastly different. Greater dis- 
tance from home bases, wider dispersal of forces and of the scientists aid- 
ing them, longer and slower lines of communications, periodic remote- 
ness of GHQ from the operating fronts, smaller supply of weapons and 
of transportation, disagreeable climate and uncomfortable working condi- 
tions, repeated shifting of headquarters — these were the difficulties un- 
der which MacArthur's forces and the scientists sent to help them had to 
labor for many months. It is not surprising that it took more than a year 
of experimenting before the most effective way of setting up an OFS 
group in the command was evolved. 

In July 1944 General Mac Arthur issued a clarifying directive which 
established the OFS unit as the Research Section, General Headquarters, 
Southwest Pacific Area, and broadened its responsibilities. It specified that 
the section would serve as a liaison office for the ground, air and naval 


forces with the civiUan research agencies in the United States, Australia 
and elsewhere, and as a clearing house and channel for all work requir- 
ing the use of civilian scientific personnel in that theater. It was likewise 
specified that all communications concerning OSRD activities would be 
co-ordinated with the Research Section. Subsequently the Research Sec- 
tion was transferred from GHQ to be under the direction of the Presi- 
dent of the USAFFE * Board, Colonel William Alexander. A new direc- 
tive was then issued establishing the unit as the Research Section, USAFFE 
Board, and permitting it to remain an entity within the Board. This setup 
interposed one more link in the chain of command because the President 
of the Board reported to the Deputy Chief of Staff, USAFFE, Major 
General Richard J. Marshall. Nevertheless, because the members of the 
USAFFE Board had great freedom to work on their projects in all parts 
of the theater, OFS was able to operate more effectively. 

Establishment of the Pacific Branch, OSRD 

Even before the fall of Germany the need for a more effective focusing 
of the scientific effort against Japan had become apparent. Bush instructed 
that OFS should be the channel for all field operations of OSRD and its 
contractors in the Pacific. Waterman left for Honolulu and Manila in 
April 1945, to work out plans for more effective co-operation with field 

Conferences with Generals MacArthur, Akin, Marquat, Krueger and 
Kenney disclosed that the command felt the need for a highly qualified 
group of men to act as a consulting staff on such pressing problems as 
suicide attacks, disposal of devastating enemy mortar fire, and tactical 
uses of radar, which could not be solved by standard military methods. 
The consultants should be men of such standing in OSRD that they could 
get immediate assistance in men and equipment or information when 
they asked for it. 

Waterman returned in June with a request from General MacArthur 
for the establishment of a Pacific Branch of OSRD (PBOSRD) depend- 
ent upon the theater for facilities and having the greatest possible free- 
dom for work that could be granted by the Commander-in-Chief. It 
would include three types of service: (i) a consulting staff of outstand- 
ing senior scientists, medical men and engineers; (2) a pool of scientific 
specialists closer to the operating units and already processed for assign- 
ments on temporary duty to the fighting fronts; and (3) a headquarters 
administrative office and laboratory facilities for emergency work. 

The theater wished to exercise operational control in the military sense, 

* U. S. Army Forces in the Far East. 


that is, to have the unit report directly to the command and follow the 
customary regulations of military control over personnel, equipment and 
communications. It was proposed the PBOSRD should be an operating 
unit with its Director reporting direcdy to the Chief of Staff so that in 
effect it would be a Special Staff Section of GHQ; in addition, it was to be 
free to communicate directly with OSRD at home on purely technical 

Lieutenant General R. K. Sutherland, Chief of Staff for General Mac- 
Arthur, also decided that General MacArthur should have a senior ad- 
visory specialist as his own consultant on technical matters. He would be 
appointed Special Staff Officer on scientific and technical affairs and would 
report to the Chief of Staff independently of the Director of PBOSRD. 
Obviously the two would have to work in close co-operation. Eventually 
E. L. Moreland, Executive Officer of NDRC, was selected for this impor- 
tant post. Bush accepted the recommendation for the establishment of a 
Pacific Branch of OSRD and appointed Compton as its Director with the 
responsibility of supervising the entire OSRD program in the Pacific. 

Since the Army had approved a plan that would give the technical men 
direct access to the topmost levels of the Pacific command, it was clear 
that OSRD units need feel no further hesitancy to release their most com- 
petent personnel for aid in delivering the knockout blows at Japan. Bush 
and Conant addressed letters to all divisions of NDRC and CMR asking 
that they back the powerful team of Compton and Moreland to the full- 
est extent possible. Those divisions which would be primarily concerned 
with problems of the theater gave Compton recommendations of key 
personnel who would be made available on call for the staff of senior 
consultants. These men were then alerted by OFS, began their process- 
ing and stood by for the theater request. 

It had been agreed that OFS was to assume primary responsibility for 
attention to the needs of this new unit so that the Director of PBOSRD 
could look to a single office in Washington for administrative assistance 
in procurement of personnel, handling of communications and requests 
for information. A contract was proposed with the National Academy of 
Sciences for the establishment and operation of a laboratory at Manila 
and at such other places as might be indicated, together with the sup- 
porting services which a contractor might appropriately provide. The Di- 
rector of PBOSRD was to be Scientific Officer under the contract. 

Although Compton arrived in the theater only a few days before the 
capitulation of Japan, the Pacific Branch was more than a paper organ- 
ization. There was already in the theater a sizeable group of first-line men 
sent out from various OSRD Divisions to the Research Section and Far 
Eastern Air Force. They would have constituted Compton's initial staff. 
The central OFS office in Washington had approximately seventy more 


in process for assignment. The formal requests that would have author- 
ized dispatch of a large contingent were received in Washington in the 
midst of the victory celebration. 

Procurement of Scientific Personnel 

By the close of the war nearly 500 persons had been engaged in the 
work of OFS. During the two years of its active recruiting scientists were 
dispatched to a foreign mission at the rate of one every two days. On 
V-J Day seventy men were in various stages of preparation for departure. 
When OFS began its operations, scientific manpower had been stretched 
almost beyond its elastic limit. The senior staff of OFS had to turn to its 
scientific associates for the names of promising men who might function 
effectively in field service. The alumni placement bureaus of M.I.T., Yale 
and Princeton were consulted. The staffs of many educational institu- 
tions produced the names of a large number of scientists who might even- 
tually be available for OFS work. But, for the most part, the personal 
contacts of the OFS staff in their own specialties and in NDRC were the 
most prolific sources of information. As the calls were increasingly for men 
who knew NDRC equipment, acquaintance with the OSRD divisions be- 
came even more significant to successful recruiting in OFS. The Scientific 
Personnel Office of OSRD, which had extensive records of NDRC con- 
tractors' employees, became at times a source of much information. 

There were calls for men from almost every scientific discipline. The 
importance of new devices is nevertheless strongly reflected in the distri- 
bution of OFS personnel according to their fields of special competence. 
Thirty-seven per cent of them were trained as physicists, electrical en- 
gineers and communications men. Twelve per cent came from chemistry 
or chemical engineering backgrounds and an equivalent group from math- 
ematics. The medical and biological fields contributed 10 per cent. Civil 
engineers, architects and mechanical engineers, constituting 11 per cent of 
the total, were utilized because of their suitability for work on bomb dam- 
age assessment. Five per cent came from training in industrial engineer- 
ing to aid in the expanding work simplification program of the Army 
which OFS supported. Geophysics, seismology and geology were repre- 
sented by 3 per cent of the field service and administrative personnel. The 
balance of 10 per cent included such diverse training as economics, law, 
fire protection engineering, camouflage, naval architecture and library 

Ordinarily the special training of an individual was used directly in his 
OFS assignment, but the versatility and adaptabiUty of scientists from the 
various disciplines was rather cogently demonstrated. Many used their col- 
lateral training rather than the specialties in which they may have made 


their prewar records. Biologists studied the behavior of submarines, con- 
voys and patroUing aircraft. Geologists became administrative officers, 
went out to counsel on countermeasures to enemy land mines, or helped 
Army officers in developing a guide manual for jungle warfare. Although 
generally the field service scientist had to know more about his special 
subject than any officer with whom he might be associated in the theater, 
breadth of training was quite as likely to win him respect and co-opera- 
tion as was intensity. Even more important was the practicality of his 

More than half of the Field Service Consultants had had graduate train- 
ing in science. Forty-two per cent held Doctor of Philosophy or Science, 
Doctor of Medicine, or equivalent degrees. Yet 32 per cent had not gone 
beyond undergraduate college training. This figure may be misleading 
because most of these men either had years of practical experience fully 
as significant as and often more pertinent than the more advanced educa- 
tion, or they had received an intensive indoctrination through work with 
OSRD which would be fully equivalent to graduate study in its intel- 
lectual challenge. 

Length of Affiliation with OFS 

A high percentage of the OFS assignments were renewed at the end 
of the initial six months maximum that was a standard specification. The 
average length of affiliation of the Field Service Consultants was eight and 
one half months. Many assignments were, of course, much shorter, a few 
as brief as a single month, while in the Operational Research Group, 
which had a stable program, the average tenure was eighteen months. 
Experience showed that the usefulness of scientific consultants to a theater 
headquarters was greatly impaired by shifting personnel through replace- 
ment of men sent for short periods. Consequently, without committing 
the man to the military in writing for more than six months at a time, 
OFS began the practice of having a verbal understanding with him and 
with his employer that he would remain in the combat area beyond the 
initial interval if he were still needed. 

Methods of Obtaining Personnel 

OSRD obtained statutory authority to hire technical and professional 
personnel for OFS under personal-services contract without regard to 
Civil Service regulations; the rate of compensation provided was not to 
exceed $25 per day. On a forty-eight hour week this meant that the max- 
imum salary payable under such contracts was $700 per month or $8400 
per year. 


Two types of personal-services contracts were utilized by OFS. One 
involved the full-time services of the individual; 208 people were hired on 
this basis. The other provided for the services of the individual on a peri- 
odic or WAE (when actually employed) basis. In most cases this was 
used to make available the services of people who had critical commit- 
ments elsewhere and could give only a portion of their total working time 
to OFS. Twenty-five people were procured on this basis. Salaries under 
personal-services contracts were arrived at on a basis of negotiation which, 
in general, followed the principle of "no-profit-no-loss" which OSRD had 
adopted; salary arrangements were reviewed by the Scientific Personnel 
Office from this standpoint. 

The delays and complications inherent in switching employment for 
short intervals kept the personal-services contract plan from becoming as 
effective as had been anticipated. A considerable number of OFS con- 
sultants who were in the employ of OSRD contractors were merely bor- 
rowed from their employers on the basis of a detail. As the pressure in- 
creased and the OSRD contractors became the primary sources of field 
men, the proportion of men loaned to the Services through detail to OFS 
likewise increased. The total number of personnel procured on detail 
constituted a little over one fourth of the OFS roster. Several OFS Con- 
sultants were obtained by detail from other Government agencies. 

In some instances employers not under contract with OSRD were 
unwilling to release their personnel to Government payrolls. They were 
willing, however, to make them available provided the Government found 
some mechanism for reimbursing salary, transportation, per diem and in- 
cidental expenses, but leaving the individual legally on the payroll of the 
original employer. This was particularly desirable if a change in employer 
would mean a sacrifice in pension status or seniority schedule. It was also 
desirable where there was some fear that the temporary separation ar- 
ranged for service with OFS might encourage a more permanent one 
afterwards. Accordingly, in April 1944, Bush authorized the execution of 
contracts between OSRD on behalf of OFS and industrial firms or edu- 
cational institutions on a basis comparable to that which had proved 
successful in the operations of NDRC. The contracts were essentially sim- 
ilar to the standard NDRC research and development contracts. Altogether, 
OFS recommended fourteen such contracts covering a total of nineteen 
technical men. 


The first responsibility of OFS, after arranging for the services of an 
individual, was to ascertain that his orientation in OSRD was sufficient 
to permit his being sent as one of its representatives. Unfortunately the 


time available between establishment of contact with the individual and 
his departure for an assignment was so variable that no systematic program 
of orientation could be devised. Under the guidance of the OFS central 
staff each man had to acquire as much information as the time schedule 
and his preoccupation with the many other details of preparing for as- 
signment would permit. Fortunately, as the tempo of the war increased, 
the number of field service consultants who came to their assignments from 
a long background in OSRD increased, so that systematic orientation be- 
came less important. 

OFS was not equipped to provide indoctrination in military protocol and 
etiquette. It had to depend for this on its liaison with the Services. Ordi- 
narily, the Navy undertook its own indoctrination. The Army appeared to 
attach less importance to the subject and left it largely to the common sense 
of the individual to acquire what he could in his contacts while still under- 
going processing or later while on his field assignment. Moreover, the 
time interval in which a man had to be fully prepared for departure was 
generally insufficient to permit more than a perfunctory attempt at for- 
malized indoctrination. Fortunately, the majority of OFS men going out 
either had acquired a "know-how" in dealings with the military from ear- 
lier experience in OSRD, or they were being sent to report in the theater 
through one of the OFS offices there. Here they found colleagues, familiar 
with the procedures, who took appropriate steps to guide them. 

Processing for Assignment 

In addition to procedural formalities involved in his employment or ap- 
pointment by the Government, each individual who accepted an affilia- 
tion with OFS for field service had to undergo an involved series of steps 
to prepare him for the assignment. These came to be known as "process- 
ing." For those who were going overseas this was doubly complicated be- 
cause it involved procurement of military as well as civilian credentials and 
the purchase of uniforms. 

Processing consisted of two major sequences. One involved the things 
which any civilian would need to do to go abroad in peacetime — immuniza- 
tions, obtaining a passport, arranging for the handling of fiscal matters, 
and the preparation of civilian credentials. The other involved special steps 
necessary because of the war and because the individual was proceeding to a 
military combat area. These additional items included: security clearance 
for the handling of classified information; permission from the local Selec- 
tive Service Board to leave the country (applicable only to men in certain 
age groups); a military permit to be attached to the passport and author- 
izing entrance to the war theater (issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 
Washington only upon receipt of a request for the individual by name 


from the theater commander); extra-hazardous insurance to provide broad 
coverage geographically and to include possible injuries or death resulting 
from w^ar conditions; an official appointment to and identification with a 
branch of the armed forces; appropriate military or naval uniforms and 
equipment as prescribed by the sponsoring Service agency for the theater 
and season; official military travel orders; and arrangements for transpor- 
tation to and within the theater. Altogether the processing unit of OFS 
listed nearly a hundred separate items on which some action would be 
necessary in the case of every Field Service Consultant who was to be sent 
overseas. It was exclusively a responsibility of OFS to act on many of these. 
Always there was pressure for speed to accomplish the processing. When 
the military decided that an individual was wanted, he was usually wanted 
post haste. The relationship between some of the processing steps was so 
close that a delay in the handling of one might start a chain of cumulative 
delays. For example, a holdup on security investigation would not permit 
issuance of military credentials, which in turn would delay the time-con- 
suming process of procuring a properly fitted uniform. In view of wartime 
travel restrictions it was highly important that the consecutive items in such 
a sequence be handled systematically and efficiendy. 

Even with the highest priority from the military and great pressure from 
top echelons in OSRD, it was rarely possible to prepare a man for assign- 
ment overseas and get him on a plane within less than a week. Commonly 
the interval that elapsed between the first contact with him in response to a 
theater request and his departure from the country was at least a month. 
This was a source of much distress to the military sponsors, to the central 
staff, to the NDRC divisions, and to the individual, although it did permit 
him a bit more time to arrange his personal affairs and acquire greater 
familiarity with military protocol and etiquette. 

Field Service Consultants who were assigned for duty within the United 
States or in England could serve in civilian clothing. For duty in a combat 
theater it was necessary, however, to wear the uniform of the branch of the 
armed forces to which assignment was made. This was like the uniform 
of an officer, without special insignia of rank, but it did carry identifying 
shoulder patches. In order to procure the uniform an official appointment 
by the Army or Navy was necessary. This was made on recommendation 
from OFS and involved submission of a series of documents regarding the 
man's security clearance, personal health, immunizations, police record, 
draft release and the nature of his proposed assignment with the military 

Men assigned to the Navy were issued a Certificate of Identification 
which authorized them to take passage on naval vessels and to visit naval 
establishments and were given appointments as U. S. Navy Technicians and 
a Letter of Credentials outlining their status and the purpose of their as- 


signment. These credentials were provided by the Office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations on recommendation either from OSRD or from the spon- 
soring office vi^ithin the Navy (Bureau, COMINCH, etc.). A Navy Tech- 
nician wore a patch over the left breast pocket of his blouse. This depicted 
an eagle clutching mechanic's tools. The insignia was given to all such 
civilian appointees regardless of their intended function. Consequently, 
there was no distinction to the observer between a Coca-Cola machine main- 
tenance technician, a mechanic and a physicist or engineer from OSRD. 
Early in its history, OFS was unsuccessful in an attempt to persuade the 
Navy that some special designation should be devised for all civilian scien- 
tists of OFS loaned to the Navy which would give them greater prestige; 
but special insignia were authorized for the members of the Operations 
Research Group, largest of the OFS projects undertaken for the Navy. 

In 1943 the Army could appoint a civilian as "Expert Consultant to the 
Secretary of War" or as "Technical Observer." Technical Observer ap- 
pointments were comparable with U. S. Navy Technician appointments in 
that there was no distinction made between technicians sent out from 
manufacturers to service field equipment and scientists who would operate 
at staff level. The New Developments Division, impressed with the disad- 
vantages of this, managed to secure a revision of Army regulations and 
the authorization of two new types of appointments: "Scientific Consultant" 
and "Operations Analyst." This occurred in the fall of 1944 and thereafter 
OFS personnel were sent out with one or the other of these designations. 
A new shoulder patch with the words "Scientific Consultant" or "Opera- 
tions Analyst" embroidered across it was devised and issued by the Ad- 
jutant General's Office. After this, the Navy, which had declined the OSRD 
proposal that such arrangements be made, became interested and asked 
Compton to propose a similar revision of its regulations. This happened 
so late in the war, however, that the revision was never accomplished. 

Upon recommendation from the OFS transmitted via the New Develop- 
ments Division, or from the sponsoring office in the case of Air Forces 
appointees, the official credentials were issued by the Adjutant General's 
Office. These consisted of two AGO cards, one of which specified that the 
individual was a noncombatant civilian, to be given billeting and messing 
facilities of the type accorded to an officer, the other assigned him an "as- 
similated rank." This was established arbitrarily on the basis of the salary 
he received, according to a schedule prepared by the War Department. 
The assimilated rank was intended to be used only in case of capture 
when, theoretically, the enemy would treat the individual as he would 
an officer of the same true rank under terms of the Geneva Convention. 
Actually, the assimilated rank was frequendy and necessarily referred to 
in connection with billeting and other matters since the individual had to 
fit into Army arrangements, although such use was not intended. 


There was considerable reluctance on the part of the War Department 
to issue appointments carrying assimilated ranks higher than Colonel. 
However, late in the war, when greater confidence was felt in the OSRD 
civilians, a few higher appointments were authorized. When Compton 
and Moreland went to the Southwest Pacific, just before V-J Day, each 
carried the assimilated rank of Major General. 

In order to get a civilian scientist into an operating theater, priority for 
his travel had to be established by the theater. If a request from the theater 
for men to staff a particular project had been received in general terms, 
OFS went about the necessary recruiting and when it had secured appro- 
priate candidates who would presumably be accepted by the theater, their 
processing started. A communication naming them was forwarded to the 
theater so that the official theater request and travel priority could be 
established. One of the aggravating delays in processing occurred fre- 
quently when a theater asked for an individual but failed to establish a 
travel priority. In the Pacific, where OFS had its advanced headquarters, 
the communications were channeled through the OFS scientists in the 
theater who took the responsibility for following up, initiating and expedit- 
ing the necessary military action, so that such oversights were reduced. 

Status of the Field Service Consultant in the Theater 

One advantage of the OFS system for sending personnel out on missions 
was that they were sent as representatives of a high echelon office such as 
the New Developments Division to report to GHQ and to be attached at 
staff level to the command. They might be detailed to work directly with 
the officers and enlisted men of a lower echelon, but they had immediate 
access in the theater across channels to an authoritative body in the Serv- 
ice and through it to a high level in Washington. This meant that they 
were unlikely to get trapped in low priority work, that their communi- 
cations could get through promptly and would carry appropriate weight 
and that they could move about more freely in the theater. 

The scientist who went to any theater outside the United States was 
responsible during his stay only to the Commanding Officer, was subject 
to military discipline and etiquette and was entirely dependent on the co- 
operation of the Commanding Officer to provide billeting, transportation, 
communications facilities and permission to leave the theater. He was ex- 
pected to conduct his correspondence as would an officer, censoring his own 
personal mail but honor bound to keep it personal, enjoying the privilege 
of freedom from postage. His official communications went through the 
appropriate office of the theater staff after review by the officer to whom he 
was directly responsible, thence through the theater AGO to the Service 
liaison office at home. This office forwarded his communications to OFS 


which in turn distributed any necessary information or requests to NDRC, 
CMR or other agencies. In the theater, the civiUan was usually accorded 
membership in the officer's club and liquor locker, received social invita- 
tions, and participated in the various ways of relieving the tedium of work- 
ing under war conditions. 


Immediately after V-J Day, Bush formulated a demobilization policy 
for OFS. The field men overseas were to be recalled as soon as their 
missions could be completed. No new ones were to depart without specific 
individual approval of the Director, and this would be given only for prob- 
lems in which OSRD could properly maintain a continuing responsibility. 
Projects that lost their significance when war ended were to be terminated; 
others which the Services wished to continue temporarily or to take over 
as more permanent peacetime undertakings of the military or naval arms, 
were to be carried by OFS only until suitable arrangements for transfer 
to the Services could be completed. None of this liquidation was to be 
accomplished with such haste that values of the scientific work would be 
destroyed, the amicable relations of OSRD with the Services jeopardized 
or the individual workers concerned left in awkward positions with re- 
gard to employment, but a spirit of positive action for demobilization was 
to prevail. 

Although some delays were anticipated because of the probable scarcity 
of transportation, the overseas travelers managed to get plane transportation 
quickly. By the middle of October, 1945, all OFS men in Europe had 
returned; by November i only a handful were left in the Pacific. In Janu- 
ary 1946, the personal-services contract employees could be counted on one's 
fingers and the Washington staff had been reduced to a skeleton force 
engaged primarily in following up fiscal details, straightening out the records 
for the archives, disposing of classified documents and writing the OFS 
history. Despite its speed, this demobilization was entirely orderly, with 
most of the personnel returning to posts from which they had been on leave. 

The Office of Field Service represented a concerted effort to obtain the 
closest possible relation between the civilian scientist and combat troops on 
terms which would enable the scientist to make his greatest contribution in 
a critical area. The detailed report contained in Combat Scientists shows that 
the effort produced highly significant results which lay the foundation for 
even more effective operations should the need unfortunately arise at some 
future date. 

Part Two: Liaison 




.HE National Defense Research Committee and, later, the 
Office of Scientific Research and Development were created to mobilize the 
scientific strength of the country for the purpose of assisting the Army and 
Navy. Close relationship with the Services, therefore, was imperative to 
define the needs of the forces and to assure that the final output should 
meet the need for which a project was initiated. It was needed to avoid 
duplication of facilities and of effort, and to speed the work from initiation 
toward the final stage of placing the equipment in the hands of the troops. 
Outstanding was the requirement that the relationship should be such as to 
provide for complete interchange of information. To meet such require- 
ments meant that a system of teamwork — novel because of the full stature 
to which its military implications had brought science — had to be estab- 
lished; scientific men and military men had to learn to work as partners. 
That this novel problem was generally solved with full effectiveness is clear 
from the results which were achieved. There were defects at first, as was 
to be expected, for the problem was a new one and methods for working 
it out had to be developed. If in the recital of the history of that develop- 
ment places where defects lingered are cited, that is to indicate where a still 
better job could be done another time. 


The mechanism of liaison with the Services included the Advisory Coun- 
cil of OSRD, already discussed. Liaison in the medical area and in field 
service operations was discussed in the chapters on the Committee on Medi- 
cal Research and the Office of Field Service. The present chapter will be 
confined to liaison relations between NDRC and the Services in the field 
of weapon development. 

War and Navy Department Liaison Officers 

The most direct contacts between NDRC and the Services were through 
the Army and Navy members of the Committee and through the activities 


of the Director of OSRD as Chairman of the Joint Committee on New 
Weapons and Equipment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (see Chapter III). 
Supplementing these, the formal points of contact between OSRD and the 
Services were the War Department Liaison Officer for the NDRC in the 
case of the Army and the Co-ordinator of Research and Development in the 
case of the Navy. These two officers were the official spokesmen for the War 
and Navy Departments and through them cleared the formal expression of 
views of the Departments in their transactions with OSRD. 

From June 27, 1940, when NDRC was formed until July 12, 1941, when 
the Office of the Co-ordinator of Research and Development was created by 
General Orders No. 150 of the Navy Department, liaison with NDRC was 
through the Director of the Naval Research Laboratory. Establishment of 
the Co-ordinator 's Office in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy provided 
a better mechanism for liaison. Rear Admiral Julius A. Purer, as Co-ordinator 
from December 13, 1941, until his retirement after V-E Day, made that 
mechanism function admirably, at times under extraordinary difficulties. He 
served also most effectively as a member of the Advisory Council. Captain 
Lybrand P. Smith joined the Co-ordinator 's Office August i, 1941, as 
assistant to the Co-ordinator and at that time became the Navy member 
of NDRC, continuing as such until Admiral Purer took his place February 
28, 1945, on Captain Smith's retirement. OSRD-Navy relations benefited 
greatly from the continuity of service of these two naval officers and also 
from their special qualifications for their respective positions. 

The numerous changes which occurred in Army representation necessarily 
acted as a handicap. The complexity of the Army organization also was a 
source of trouble. The Army was large. In the number of officers it expanded 
in about two years by a factor of fifty. It was subdivided into the Ground 
Forces, the Air Forces and the Service Forces, of which the first had the 
function of combat; the second, combat and procurement; and the third, 
mainly procurement. Above these was the War Department General Staff 
and the Special Staff of which the New Developments Division when 
formed in October 1943 was a part. 

The Army Ground Forces contained a wealth of information as to combat 
needs of forces in the field, which was often difficult to obtain, largely be- 
cause of the complexity of the Army organization, and the frequent inter- 
position of the technical branches of the Army Service Forces between the 
Ground Forces and OSRD. A bright spot in the Ground Forces organization 
was provided by the boards maintained by each of the arms within the 
Ground Forces for testing proposed equipment to determine its suitability 
for field service. Thus there were the Armored Force Board, the Engineer 
Board, the Coast and Field Artillery Boards, the Antiaircraft and the Tank 
Destroyer Boards. The members of these Boards were usually competent and 
alert to the needs of the troops, with whom they were in close touch. In 


the entire history of OSRD there was no more satisfactory or productive liai- 
son than existed when scientific groups sat down with the Service boards 
to hear their problems at first hand and learn the characteristics of needed 
equipment. In such cases, scientists and military personnel tackled a prob- 
lem together, and action was swift. 

The Army Air Corps became increasingly autonomous during the war. 
Liaison with scientific organizations was in the main direct, though nomi- 
nally and officially through the War Department Liaison Officer. 

The Army Service Forces included a large headquarters besides the several 
procurement agencies of the War Department: for example, the Ordnance 
Department, the Signal Corps, the Corps of Engineers, the Chemical War- 
fare Service. In that headquarters was placed the War Department Liaison 
Officer for NDRC. So placed, his Office operated under handicaps, some of 
which might have been avoided had it been placed under the Secretary of 
War or the General Staff. 

A succession of changes in organization within the War Department 
affected liaison with NDRC. Frequent changes of personnel further tended 
to weaken the effectiveness of liaison. When NDRC was created, the War 
Department detailed Colonel Gladeon M. Barnes of the Ordnance Depart- 
ment as War Department Liaison Officer. Before the office had become 
active he was relieved on July 30, 1940, by Brigadier General Richard H. 
Somers, also of the Ordnance Department. General Somers served in this 
capacity until August 5, 1941, when Colonel (then Brigadier General) 
Barnes was re-detailed. He served until the reorganization of the War De- 
partment in March 1942. 

Theretofore, the functions of development had been a reponsibility of the 
G-4 (supply) Division of the War Department General Staff, of which 
Major General Brehon B. Somervell was chief. In the reorganization these 
functions were transferred with General Somervell to the newly created 
Army Service Forces (for a period called the Services of Supply). In the 
headquarters organization of the Service Forces, the War Department 
Liaison Officer for NDRC was attached to the Development Branch (later 
designated the Research and Development Division). On April 3, 1942, 
Major General C. C. Williams, who had been Chief of Ordnance from 
1918 until 1930, was appointed War Department Liaison Officer and also 
became the War Department member of NDRC. General Williams brought 
broad vision and prestige in the Army to the Office of the War Department 
Liaison Officer, with an understanding of the increased potentialities of 
highly technical equipment in military operations and an appreciation of the 
reliance which must be placed on scientific personnel as a consequence. For 
personal reasons it was necessary for General Williams to retire; he was 
relieved on July 7, 1943. 

General Williams was succeeded by Brigadier General W. A. Wood, Jr., 


Director of the Requirements Division of the Army Service Forces. His 
assistant as War Department Liaison Officer was Colonel Ralph M. Osborne 
of the Field Artillery. General Wood continued as Liaison Officer for a few 
months only, when he in turn was succeeded by Colonel Osborne on Janu- 
ary 4, 1944. On May 15, 1944, Colonel Osborne also became Director of the 
Research and Development Division. After Colonel Osborne's departure for 
overseas duty, Colonel Philip R. Faymonville was designated War Depart- 
ment Liaison Officer on February 10, 1945, but soon after was relieved from 
duty in Washington and on June 28, 1945, Brigadier General Eugene A. 
Regnier, who had become Director of the Research and Development Divi- 
sion, was designated War Department Liaison Officer for NDRC. He con- 
tinued as such to the end of hostilities. 

In the five years and two months from the creation of NDRC to V-J Day, 
seven officers served as War Department Liaison Officer. One of these served 
twice. Three officers only, General Williams, General Somers and Colonel 
Osborne, served as long as one year. In contrast. Rear Admiral Furer, Navy 
Co-ordinator of Research and Development, served three years and five 
months, from a week after Pearl Harbor until after V-E Day. 

Project Liaison Officers 

Those means of liaison with the Services which have been mentioned 
were at the higher levels only, involving few persons and having little day- 
by-day contact with the scientific work that was being done by thousands 
of scientists in hundreds of laboratories throughout the United States. The 
nineteen divisions and several panels and committees of NDRC were work- 
ing each in a different field, and each one was directing work on a number 
of contracts, most of which were on different projects. These activities were 
multifarious. Day-by-day contact between the Army and Navy and the 
activities of OSRD was provided by means of Project Liaison Officers. 

Project Liaison Officers usually were named by the technical branches of 
the War Department or bureaus of the Navy Department, and sometimes 
by the combat arms or by the command. It was their responsibility to pro- 
vide to the scientific group the point of view of the using arm. One Liaison 
Officer ordinarily served as such for a number of projects, usually in the 
same general field. Officers of good quality were required. Sufficient back- 
ground of technical training was needed to enable them to perceive the 
elements of the particular problem, although it was no part of their duty 
to suggest to the scientists how the problem was to be solved. Enough ex- 
perience in the military or naval service was necessary to enable them to 
reflect the point of view of the users. Some Project Liaison Officers were of 
little value because they lacked both technical background and Service 


Project Liaison Officers provided a means for the quick exchange of in- 
formation. Through them arrangements were made for tests. In the late 
stages of a development, they were the intermediaries in the necessary prompt 
selection of a commercial organization for engineering and production. 
These later stages were facilitated by the Eegineering and Transition Office 
of OSRD, which itself was a useful liaison agency with the procurement 
branches of the Army and Navy. Project Liaison Officers existed to speed 
the project from initiation to the final stage of large-scale Service procure- 

Lack of continuity in Liaison Officers on projects caused frequent com- 
ment throughout the war from Chiefs of NDRC divisions. A new Liaison 
Officer lacked knowledge of the work in hand. This situation was about 
equally serious in the Army and Navy. At the Radiation Laboratory both 
Services maintained reasonably large staffs, as did the Navy with the Divi- 
sion 3 rocket work at the California Institute of Technology, so that there 
was always someone present at these places who knew the work; but this 
was not the case with NDRC as a whole. 

As the Liaison Officers most often were designated by the technical 
branches of the armed services, they reflected the attitudes and were sub- 
ject to the prejudices and opinions of their military superiors in those 
branches. Officers who had worked hard with limited resources felt a justi- 
fiable pride in their establishments and resented in some cases the intrusion 
of a civilian group which might possibly supersede their organizations. 
Some few older officers of the technical branches of both Services had an 
attitude of proprietary interest in the development of military equipment. 
They had the feeling, perhaps, that they were the professionals in a field 
which was their own and where civilian scientists were intruders. Coupled 
with this in a few cases was an overzealous branch loyalty tending to lead, 
without deliberate intention, to identifying loyalty to the branch with the 
broader interests of the Service as a whole or of the country. Such mistaken 
branch loyalty seriously handicapped in some cases the relations of OSRD 
to the Services. 

One sometimes troublesome pitfall was oversecurity. The Services at times 
were reluctant to divulge confidential data, though this was essential if 
successful designs were to be undertaken. The Navy in the earlier years was 
particularly security-minded; officers did not want to give information to 
civilians for fear it would be given to others. The assembling of all existent 
information was a first step in undertaking a problem. Actual and not syn- 
thetic data were needed; it was not sufficient to furnish interpreted informa- 
tion in the form of supposably similar cases. Civilian scientists at times were 
inhibited from attacking a problem because they were not given the back- 
ground information. The situation improved very gready during the war, 
as officers of the Army and Navy came to know the civilian scientists. 


Performance of Equipment 

One phase of liaison between NDRC and the Services was related to the 
transmission of operational information from the Army and Navy to the 
divisions, where the information was concerned with the performance of 
instruments or weapons developed by an NDRC organization. The lack of 
an adequate supply of such information points to a chief defect in the liaison 
organization. Operational research groups (or operational analysis groups) 
of scientific personnel working with the armed forces as described in the 
preceding chapter, provided a sound remedy for this defect where such 
groups existed, but they were formed gradually and covered only a fraction 
of the field. Setting up advanced laboratories in England in 1943 by the 
radar and the countermeasures divisions of NDRC solved the problem for 
those two divisions in the European theater. 

It is almost axiomatic that a development engineer must have full knowl- 
edge of the operational setting in which the instrument or weapon under 
development will find itself, and of the performance of the first models of 
the device which go into Service use. Through improving liaison during the 
war years, the Services came to enable the divisions of NDRC to approach 
this requirement more and more closely. Information as to how items already 
in use were performing was at the outset very difficult to obtain, for two 
principal reasons. The overcoming of these causes took time, because the 
situation was inherently a new one for all concerned. 

The first cause was that the reports from which such information could 
be obtained usually were regarded by the Services with such secrecy that 
they were reluctant to make them available to a civilian organization. Gen- 
eral operational information of a really significant sort was likely to be held 
very closely. In the second place the Services did not in general have a 
systematic method of collecting and analyzing operational experience in 
terms of the technical performance of equipment. The paucity of informa- 
tion was not unique with NDRC but was apparent within the Army and 
Navy whose own technical branches did not receive timely information. 
Adequate machinery for obtaining data on performance simply did not exist, 
although the arrangements for "Group A" (described in the next section) 
mitigated the situation somewhat. 

What OSRD did not know it could not correct. In the Army the diffi- 
culty lay in the lack of adequate reporting by the using troops to the tech- 
nical branches of the Army Service Forces, and the lack of an adequate 
follow-up inspection system operated by these branches. It is possible that 
exchange of information could have been expedited by the assignment of 


Liaison OfiEcers to the NDRC divisions concerned, from the using arms 
in addition to those from the technical services. 

Three cases of lack of information will be cited as illustrations of the 
problem. The campaign in North Africa began in November 1942, and 
electronic antiaircraft directors developed under an NDRC division were in 
use during that campaign; but in August of 1943 that division was in- 
formed by Ordnance Department representatives that no data on operation 
in the field of this new and important instrument had yet been received. 
Another division delivered a device to Wright Field for test in April of 
1943; in August, no report had been received and attempts to secure a 
report through the War Department Liaison Officer had been fruitless. In 
a third instance, tests of countermeasures equipment developed by NDRC 
were conducted at the Naval Research Laboratory. An NDRC observer was 
present, but was excluded on the ground of secrecy from the most important 
part of the tests and therefore he learned little for the developing agency. 
Yet this observer was actually the man who had done the laboratory work 
on the instrument under test. 

The work of OSRD as a research and development agency was facilitated 
as this lack of a rapid flow of accurate information was overcome. As 
progress was made toward swifter and more detailed reporting, users and 
suppliers were brought together more efficiently on matters that were in 
embryo. The ideal, of course, in assuring a satisfactory flow of data from 
the theater of operations is to have persons there whose first interest lies in 
research and development and who take part in operations for the purpose 
of making observations pertinent to those subjects. Intimate back-and-forth 
discussions on the spot are the best way of keeping up with the require- 
ments of the troops and of quickly adapting new equipment to the problem 
at hand. Such an ideal, under the conditions of war, can never be fully 
accomplished. In the later stages of the war an approach was made toward 
it through the establishment of the Office of Field Service. 

Group A of Liaison Office 

Liaison with the Army and Navy during the first two years of OSRD 
operations worked to overcome the practical impossibility of obtaining the 
views of the combat forces on particular weapons and to surmount the lack 
of reports on conditions in the theaters of operations, which was handicap- 
ping investigation and development of new weapons. Urgent need existed, 
however, as late as 1943 in nearly every division for information as to what 
the using Services needed and how it should be developed. The Services, by 
that time, were willing to entrust to OSRD military information of the 
highest classification where it was available and might have a bearing on 


the development of weapons. Accordingly, agreements were reached under 
which operational information, particularly that which would show the 
effectiveness of weapons, could be distributed to groups working on similar 
weapons in this country. 

Since the Liaison Office staff had knowledge of all the work going on in 
the NDRC and CMR, it was given the task of obtaining operational infor- 
mation in the form of reports from the U. S. Army and Navy for OSRD. 
A special group, designated as Group A, was established within the Liaison 
Office for this purpose in February 1943. Because of the stringent controls 
required, the group was segregated within the Liaison Office and operated 
as a separate unit. In the case of the more highly classified documents, the 
recipient was required to sign a statement that he had received and read 
the document, and each individual whom he permitted access to the docu- 
ments was likewise required to record the fact that he had obtained the 
information contained in the report. 

During most of the operation of Group A, a staff member paid daily 
visits to the Military Intelligence Reports Center. There he was permitted 
to look over documents being marked for circulation and to note what 
documents he wished for the OSRD. These were duplicated and forwarded 
to the Liaison OflBce. Each report was scrutinized in Group A and then 
routed to the Division Chief or other individual having a direct need for 
the report. In addition to the intelligence reports. Group A distributed to 
the interested divisions of NDRC such reports of an operational character 
as were sent to the Administrative Office by the Services. 

A very important activity which grew out of Group A was the participa- 
tion of OSRD in the formation and operation of the Joint Electronics Intelli- 
gence Agency (JEIA). This was a joint undertaking participated in by the 
Army, the Navy, and OSRD. Each group furnished to JEIA operational 
and technical reports on electronics which it had received through its own 
channels. Each day the reports which had been received the previous day 
were scrutinized by representatives of each of the Services participating in 
the plan. The material was then duplicated and distributed in accordance 
with requests. As a result of this plan, all British reports dealing with elec- 
tronics or closely allied subjects were distributed directly and promptly to 
the working groups in Army, Navy, and OSRD regardless of the channel 
by which they had been received. The average time required for this dis- 
tribution was cut from two months to two days. 

Even with the strict security standard which Group A maintained, in its 
period of greatest activity it received 1200 reports a month and distributed 
3000, including duplicates of reports which required relatively wide distri- 
bution. With the close of the war with Japan, OSRD had little need for 
further operational information, and so most of the reports distribution was 
dropped and termination of the Group A activity was inaugurated, 


Liaison by Committees 

After the first year of the war and perhaps in growing recognition of the 
value of OSRD, there came into existence occasional committees composed 
of both officers and scientists, which were organized to meet special prob- 
lems. This was an important development in the relations of OSRD with 
the Services. Thus there were formed in 1943 two committees under the 
Chairmanship of Dr. J. A. Stratton of the Office of the Secretary of War, 
to survey developments and to recommend Army policy in the use of radar 
for aerial gunnery and blind bombing. Professor Samuel H. Caldwell, Chief 
of Section 7.2, Airborne Fire Control, sat on both committees; and the 
survey was carried out by a group consisting of him, Dr. Harold L. Hazen, 
Chief of Division 7, and A. L. Ruiz, a member of that Division of NDRC. 

Some rather general confusion in the field of aerial gunnery came to a 
climax in early 1944, and at the request of the Army Air Forces NDRC 
set up a committee to survey the problem. Under the terms of the request 
NDRC furnished the Chairman, Dr. John B. Russell, of the Airborne Fire 
Control Committee and the Vice-Chairman, Dr. Saunders McLane of the 
Mathematics Panel. Because of the pressing importance of the subject and 
the competence of the personnel this Committee attracted strong interest 
and soon became a joint Army and Navy project. Its membership included 
representatives of Wright Field, Eglin Field, the AAF Training Command 
and the Navy. The Committee set out to co-ordinate developments in gun- 
nery devices, and to establish effective test and evaluation procedures. It had 
no authorization to impose its conclusions on the using Services; but the 
interest in its work was so strong and its presdge was such that the Com- 
mittee became the highest authority and a most important factor in resolv- 
ing problems in the field of airborne fire control. 

At the request of the Bureaus of Ordnance and Aeronautics, NDRC 
entered into a co-operative undertaking with the Navy at the Patuxent 
River Naval Air Station in the autumn of 1943 with the objective of im- 
proved quantitative understanding of aerial gunnery. An NDRC group at 
Northwestern University worked on the design of computing mechanisms 
and measurement equipment. An elaborate synchronized camera system 
was devised with radio links to tie in the cameras in the fighter and in 
the bomber. Another group worked with the Navy at the Air Station. 
There eventually resulted at Patuxent a complete air measurement system 
and a ground computation system. This undertaking was highly co-operative. 
The Navy participation gradually increased until in early 1945 a Naval 
officer took over Chairmanship of the directing committee, as originally had 
been planned. 

There were many such committees formed during the war, having mem- 


bership comprising scientists and officers of the Army and Navy. Also, 
members of NDRC divisions sat as members of committees of the Joint 
Communications Board of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These committees were 
very valuable in securing close working relations between the scientists and 
the Services. 

NDRC Division Meetings 

As a means of liaison with the Services, meetings were held from time 
to time by the divisions and sometimes by their component sections to 
which were invited representatives of the Army and Navy as well as of the 
British. These meetings served a useful purpose in keeping the Services 
informed of the progress of technical developments on which the divisions 
were engaged; and they served at times to acquaint the division with the 
views of officers with valuable firsthand experience or knowledge. 


The Ordnance Department of the Army was confronted with a particu- 
larly heavy procurement program. In its initiation, assistance was given by 
the Ordnance Association, a nationwide organization of industrial execu- 
tives whose companies furnish supplies, materials and services to the Ord- 
nance Department. The first and principal request made by this association 
as mobilization began was that the Government in placing orders, refrain 
thereafter from changing specifications. In meeting the large demands for 
munitions, the Ordnance Department doubtless was influenced by this con- 
sideration of quantity procurement, to the extent of avoiding as long as 
possible any disturbance of the assembly line. In such a situation officers 
were not responsive to change. The period of time elapsing between the 
appearance of a need by the troops, as for a better tank, to acceptance of 
the idea by the technical service and delivery of the hardware to the theater, 
should have been the shortest humanly possible. A balance was needed 
between the assembly line technique and the urgent necessity for improved 

On the part of the Services the situation called for a broad vision, imagi- 
nation, and an appreciation of the existence in the country of a vast store 
of highly specialized scientific knowledge. Though there were some excep- 
tions, the vision, imagination, and understanding were in general ample to 
meet the need. On the part of science, the situation demanded honest effort 
to master new sets of principles and constant alertness to discern ways in 
which knowledge hitherto applied to far different uses could be made of 
value for military purposes. Again though these were exceptions, the effort 
was in general made, and the alertness in general continued keen. A few 
examples on both sides of the ledger are worth noting. 

liaison with the armed services l6l 

Frangible Bullet 

Interest in the possibility of using frangible bullets for air gunnery train- 
ing, so that live targets might be fired upon, was aroused in the spring of 
1942. After repeated setbacks, which are recounted in Chapter 5 of the 
history * of Division 2, NDRC, the device was finally perfected. By V-J Day, 
frangible bullet training was in use in seven gunnery schools in this country 
and some 11,000 bomber missions had been flown by student gunners in 
which about thirteen million rounds of frangible bullet ammunition had 
been fired. The Training Command had directed that all air firing in gun- 
nery training should be with frangible bullets. 

In the early stages of this project. Ordnance opposition to it, based on its 
departure from experience in ballistics and on its involving a training situ- 
ation of potential high hazard, had raised barriers which conventional Army 
and NDRC liaison procedures seemed ill-equipped to surmount. In the light 
of subsequent developments, it appears probable that had more effective pro- 
cedures been available, the frangible bullet for training could have been in 
use at least a year earlier. 

Hypervelocity Guns and Impro\^d Machine Gun Barrels 

The beginning of work by NDRC on hypervelocity guns was delayed 
because of the doubts expressed by the Services as to its value. Some objec- 
tion to NDRC entering at all into this field was expressed by several old- 
time, influential officers, who felt that this was a subject most likely to be 
advanced by those of long practical acquaintance with ordnance. The atti- 
tude was not universal; thus Colonel Glenn F. Jenks, of the Ordnance Tech- 
nical Staff, prepared a long memorandum on the status of knowledge about 
gun erosion, which he recognized as a limiting factor to increasing the 
velocity of guns. He emphasized the desirability of scientific aid, pointing 
out that no investigation had been made up to that time nor was one in 
progress which would give an understanding of the mechanism of gun 
erosion or a practical solution of the problem. 

NDRC's interest in hypervelocity had been heightened by a plea from 
the British early in the spring of 1941 that this be one of the broad research 
programs on which American scientists should embark. In particular, the 
British authorities suggested that research be directed toward an antiair- 
craft gun that would send a shell to a height of 10,000 feet in three seconds. 
Considering the drop in velocity with range, this meant a gun with a 
muzzle velocity of at least 5000 feet per second, whereas the Army's new 
90-mm antiaircraft gun, then recently adopted, had a muzzle velocity of 
only 2800 feet per second. 

* In the volume entitled Rockets, Guns and Targets. 

1 62 


Later that spring NDRC launched its hypervelocity program independ- 
ently of the Services by setting up a new unit in Division A, known as 
Section A, which later became Division i. Its first task was to tackle the 
problem of gun erosion. Although the Ordnance Department opposed the 
participation of NDRC in an investigation of the general subject of hyper- 
velocity, it did give some support to the erosion studies, especially by making 
available its files of information on this subject. Also it sponsored a confer- 
ence on erosion, held at Watertown Arsenal on October 15, 1941, for the 
purpose of obtaining the comment of Army and Navy representatives on 
the section's proposed program. 

It was not until the next year, however, that even acquiescence in NDRC's 
work on hypervelocity guns could be obtained. Although relations were 
cordial with individuals in the Ordnance Department, that branch of the 
Service did not officially support this work with enthusiasm until almost 
the close of the war. 

Even the application of Division I's findings in the field of gun erosion 
was retarded by an attitude of indifference on the part of some individuals 
in the Ordnance Department. In this case the fault was in a lack of realiza- 
tion of how much abuse our .50-caliber machine-gun barrels would receive 
in combat. The division's representatives were told repeatedly for about 
two years by persons in a position to know that there was no need to 
improve this barrel. The steel barrels then in use, it was said, were so in- 
expensive that it was not worth spending effort on trying to increase their 
life by some small amount, such as 25 per cent. This attitude eventually 
changed when reports from the Army Air Forces and the Navy Bureau of 
Aeronautics showed that the barrels could not always last a long bombing 
mission or a ground strafing operation. 

By the time the need for improvement of this barrel was realized, the 
division's general erosion program was sufficiently far advanced so that it 
was able to offer two means of increasing severalfold the life of this barrel 
when used under the most severe conditions. The improved barrels were 
flown to the Pacific, where they proved outstandingly useful. The division's 
hypervelocity program also paid dividends, for by the end of hostilities it 
had developed several different methods of increasing muzzle velocity to the 
point where they were taken over by the Services for final application to 
new weapons. It is plain to see from the record, however, that this stage 
would have been reached earlier with some of them had Service support 
been wholehearted from the beginning. 

Electronic Antiaircraft Director 

One of the successes of OSRD was its sponsorship and active participa- 
tion in the development of the electronic antiaircraft director called the M9. 


The project was an outgrowth of direct liaison with the Coast Artillery 
Board, representing the using troops. 

In June 1940, before the creation of NDRC, Bell Telephone Laboratories 
presented to the Ordnance Department the idea of developing an electrical 
director if the War Department were interested. They were not encouraged 
and no action was taken. 

On October 3, 1940, the Fire Control Section first visited the Coast Artil- 
lery Board and were told that the most urgent need was for a satisfactory 
antiaircraft director. Rapid action was taken. The highly competent group 
at Bell Laboratories were told that NDRC would support the project and 
they began work at once. This director, in combination with radar and the 
proximity fuze, formed by far the most effective antiaircraft fire control 
system of the Allied or enemy forces, and contributed largely to defeat of 
the V-i attacks on London. 


Relationship with the Services took a different form in the case of the 
large divisions of NDRC, such as Division 14. In 1941 the Navy established 
a liaison office at the Radiation Laboratory at M.I.T. which grew to have 
a permanent staff of about thirty officers, with additional Project Liaison 
Officers temporarily attached. Soon afterward the Army Signal Corps 
established a similar liaison office and later, when the Air Corps was given 
responsibility for procurement of its own radio and radar, it also set up an 
office. These liaison offices were a tremendous help to both organizations. 
They handled all the more formal relations and aided in arranging for visits 
and for tests. Close collaboration existed. Division 14 did not await formal 
Service requests for undertaking projects and never hesitated to propose 
new ideas for projects to Army and Navy representatives. On the other 
hand, the Service representatives discussed their problems informally with 
division and Laboratory personnel. General agreements usually were reached 
before formal requests for projects were processed. An indication of the 
extensive contacts with the Army and Navy is the fact that in early 1945 
an average of fifty officers came to the Radiation Laboratory each day for 
discussions and conferences. 

A point which was stressed in Division 14 relations with the Services was 
that the Army and Navy should not come to the Laboratory with technical 
problems for the design of a piece of equipment of specified dimensions 
and power requirements, but rather they should bring full information of 
the conditions of employment in which radar might aid, and provide full 
access by Laboratory personnel to information on the success or failure of 
various methods which had been tried. After acquiring an understanding 
of the military problem it was then the job of the technical people in the 


Laboratory to evolve suggestions and ideas for the best solution which they 
could visualize. The Laboratory then would come up with a proposal for 
the technical design of equipment, accompanied possibly by proposals for 
new methods of employment. After full analysis and discussion a final 
approach would be agreed on. From that time on the design of the equip- 
ment was left to the men in the Laboratory. 

This governing principle came to be accepted by all concerned. It empha- 
sized the partnership between the civilian scientists and the Services and got 
away from any suggestion that the scientists were working for or under direc- 
tion of the Army or Navy. Many of the most spectacular achievements of 
OSRD resulted directly from this conception of partnership. 

Relations with the Chemical Warfare Service 

From the summer of 1940 until the summer of 1942, the relationship 
first of Division B and later of Divisions 9 and 10 to the Chemical Warfare 
Service (CWS) followed customary channels. These contacts proved, in 
many ways, to be inadequate to insure co-ordination between the CWS and 
the NDRC programs and to guarantee the absence of friction. Accordingly, 
an arrangement was adopted during the first week of August 1942, under 
which a representative of NDRC was placed in the office of the Chief of 
the Technical Division of CWS in a liaison capacity. 

This "Technical Aide for Co-operation with the Chemical Warfare 
Service" was given a course of instruction in Army procedure and in the 
projects of the Technical Division, CWS. He visited various CWS labora- 
tories and proving grounds. He was treated in every way as a member of 
the staff of the Chief, Technical Division, made recommendations on either 
OSRD or CWS projects, and attended staff meetings. 

Several very difl&cult problems had arisen concerning items developed 
by the OSRD, so the Chief, Chemical Warfare Service, appointed a com- 
mittee consisting of two Army oflScers and three representatives of NDRC, 
with an Army officer as Secretary. This committee began meeting late in 
August 1942, and continued to meet at more or less regular intervals for 
about two years. It succeeded in disentangling several very complicated 
situations under the broad powers given to it in the order under which 
it operated. 

In November 1942, the OfBce of the Chief, Technical Division, moved 
from Washington to Edgewood Arsenal, and the staff was reorganized 
simultaneously. Under a program worked out by the CWS-NDRC Tech- 
nical Committee as an experiment, the Technical Aide for Co-operation 
with the CWS was put on the staff of the Chief, Technical Division, with 
power to co-ordinate in his name in the Chemical Warfare Service the same 
subjects over which he had jurisdiction in his capacity as Chief of Division 


10, NDRC. This co-operative venture insured avoidance of duplication of 
efTort. The Office at Edgewood Arsenal and the Technical Aides in Wash- 
ington co-operated in directing the program; and personnel began to be 
interchanged on projects between the Service installations and NDRC con- 
tractors. Under the arrangement approximately fifty men from Division 10 
worked on Army posts at one time or another for periods of a few weeks 
to more than two years. 

During the spring of 1943, this system of unified control was extended 
by placing the Chief of Division 9 on the staff of the Chief, Technical 
Division, so that a large fraction of the NDRC projects pertaining to chem- 
ical warfare formed part of one program with that of Technical Divi- 
sion, CWS. 

During the spring of 1944, the British Mission to the United States sug- 
gested that the large amount of field experimentation being conducted in 
the United Kingdom, in Canada, in the United States, in Panama, in 
Australia, and in India should be co-ordinated. Diverse conclusions had been 
drawn concerning the behavior of chemical warfare materiel, and no effort 
had been made to fill in gaps in existing knowledge consistently. As a result 
of this suggestion, the Project Co-ordination Staff with representation from 
NDRC Divisions 9 and 10, the CWS, the United Kingdom, Canada and 
Austraha was started at Edgewood Arsenal in April 1944. This StafI pub- 
lished a series of reports, the last one of which was a comprehensive survey 
of the effectiveness of chemical warfare materiel. It made recommendations 
through proper channels concerning experiments to be conducted at the 
various field stations throughout the British Commonwealth of Nations 
and in the United States. Finally, it was instrumental in establishing a Far 
Eastern Technical Unit attached to General Mac Arthur's Headquarters; 
this unit contained both Army officers and OSRD personnel. 

This arrangement in the field of chemical warfare illustrates probably 
the closest co-operation between civilian scientists and a technical service in 
the course of OSRD operations, although it is paralleled by the close rela- 
tions between Division 6 and the Tenth Fleet which was mentioned in 
Chapter IX in connection with the Office of Field Service. 

Relations with the Army Air Forces 

Co-operation between OSRD and the Army Air Forces was effective 
though uneven, ranging from the full collaboration which held in the work 
on radar to breaks in continuity resulting in large measure from the anom- 
alous situation of some Air Force agencies which had long been expected 
both to engage in development work of their own and to evaluate develop- 
ments performed by others. This was the situation of Wright Field, for 
example, which the Liaison Officer between Wright Field and NDRC 


contributed greatly to overcoming by devoting untiring effort to furthering 
co-operation between the Armament Laboratory and the scientists. The 
large amount of work which OSRD performed for Navy aviation was done 
without the handicap of this contradictory double responsibility; the Army 
Air Forces were the beneficiaries of some of the work, undertaken at Navy 

In the development of radar, as previously related, the Air Forces main- 
tained a liaison office with a staff of officers at the Radiation Laboratory. 
Relations between this Laboratory of Division 14 and the Air Forces were 
truly co-operative. Division 14 had a group in England (later on the Con- 
tinent also) and this British branch was closely in touch with air operations. 
Thus, in June 1943, the Eighth Air Force cabled Washington asking for 
equipment to permit bombing through overcast. Within six weeks sets were 
developed by the Radiation Laboratory to meet this need and within eight 
weeks bombers were practicing in New England, each step taken being a 
co-operative effort of the scientists and the Air Forces personnel. In Septem- 
ber, sets were installed in England and on November 3, 1943, Wilhelms- 
haven was bombed through overcast. 

There was also real teamwork between OSRD and the Flying Training 
Command. The Central Instructors' School of that command, located for 
a time at Fort Myers, Florida, and later at Laredo, Texas, engaged in many 
joint activities with the Airborne Fire Control section of NDRC's Divi- 
sion 7. By way of illustration, a need was recognized by the middle of 1942 
for means of measuring, on the ground, the performance of various gun- 
sights and computers. Out of that need and with the interested support of 
the Central Instructors' School as well as of the Navy, the University of 
Texas testing machine for aerial gunnery systems was developed, the sup- 
port including sending groups of enlisted men to work with the Fire Con- 
trol Section at Franklin Institute, Philadelphia, and at the University of 

Whatever conclusions may be drawn from the record of Service relations 
with OSRD during the somewhat more than five years of war and prepara- 
tion for war are of interest only as they point lessons for the future. Since 
it appears probable that the most effective organization in a future emer- 
gency will be one in which the country's scientists are assembled and 
directed by scientists and since most research in Service laboratories is of an 
applied nature, liaison must be geared to this conception. If in a future 
national crisis, new weapons of warfare (such as in this war were micro- 
wave radar, rockets, the electronic director, proximity fuzes and the atomic 
bomb) are to be produced rather than old weapons improved, an organiza- 
tion is needed that will know its way in the complex ramifications of the 
scientific world. It is very important for the future that responsible ofl&cers of 


the Army and Navy keep open minds and perceive the limitations as well 
as the proper functions of Service laboratories. 

In the situations in which the liaison between OSRD and the armed 
services was best during the war, there resulted a joint effort which brought 
new weapons to bear on the enemy in a remarkably short time. In these 
cases information on military needs was promptly forthcoming; analysis 
was quickly made; the best scientific and engineering talent of the country 
was applied at once to the problem; preliminary and field tests were carried 
through in days or weeks rather than months. It is unfortunate that such 
co-operation was not always forthcoming; and it is to be hoped that in any 
future emergency the Services will not be hampered in even a few cases 
by men in key positions who have a blind spot where co-operation with 
civilian scientists in a civilian organization is concerned. 




.HE exchange of research information dealing with war 
weapons was initiated by the British after the fall of France and at the 
height of the German night raids on Britain. The first step was a visit to 
Washington in September 1940 of a British Technical Mission headed by 
Sir Henry Tizard, and including representatives of the British Ministries, 
which came empowered to disclose secret weapons on which the British 
were working for the defense of their island. The British had already con- 
cluded exchange arrangements with Canada, and had sent Professor R. H. 
Fowler to the National Defense Council of Canada to serve as Liaison 
Officer between England and Canada. 

Early discussions indicated the value to the American weapons program 
of a full exchange of information and arrangements for future collaboration 
in research. With Army and Navy approval, a number of conferences be- 
tween the personnel of NDRC and the British mission were held during 
September. At the NDRC meeting on September 27, 1940, Sir Henry 
proposed a continuing exchange of information regarding research on and 
plans for weapon development, and also a procedure under which reports 
and information would be passed between NDRC and Professor Fowler 
serving as British Liaison Officer for both Canada and the United States. 
The desirability of this arrangement was confirmed by an exchange of 
letters between Bush and the Secretaries of War and Navy. This decision 
to pool research information, supplemented by a later decision to divide 
research effort, was the starting point for Allied supremacy in new weapons, 
notably radar and subsurface warfare devices. 

Establishment of the London Mission 

Later in 1940, after preliminary discussions with members of the British 
Technical Mission, NDRC decided to send a Mission to Great Britain to 
investigate the scope of military research being carried on in that country 
and to report the fields which appeared most promising as well as most 
necessary to successful defense. An invitation was forthcoming from the 
British Government, and President Roosevelt designated Conant to head 
the Mission. F. L. Hovde, Assistant to the President of the University of 
Rochester, was selected as Resident Secretary of the Mission. Carroll L. 
Wilson, then serving as Assistant to Bush, was appointed Liaison Officer; 


he accompanied Conant, because it was felt that he could better facilitate 
the task of the permanent group in England if he were conversant with 
the problems confronting it. The group reached London in March 1941, 
and Conant and Wilson returned to the United States in April. 

The agreements reached by the Conant Mission set the pattern for liaison 
throughout the war. They provided that NDRC (and later OSRD) would 
exchange war research information directly with the British Ministries and 
without reservation as to commercial matters. Information obtained by 
either Government from its commercial contractors was to be made avail- 
able to the other for Government use only. In practice an informal policy 
was developed that no information from a commercial contractor of one 
Government would be divulged by the other Government to one of its 
contractors without first obtaining the permission of the originating source. 
This policy was formalized in the Radar Exchange Plan described later, 
and was adhered to in all matters which fell outside the scope of that plan. 
As a corollary, it was decided that individuals who held appointments 
within the OSRD or within the British Government, and, at the same time, 
were connected with commercial firms, would be regarded as dual per- 
sonalities. Information was given to them in their capacities as Government 
appointees with the understanding that it was not available to them in 
their capacities as employees of commercial firms. Another principle on 
which agreement was reached by the Conant Mission was that British 
research should concern itself principally with immediate objectives con- 
nected with the defense of Britain, and that long-range development should 
in general be undertaken in the United States. 

While Conant was primarily concerned with general arrangements and 
high policy, succeeding visitors rapidly shifted the emphasis of the London 
Mission, which he had left under the direction of Hovde, to specific prob- 
lems. By June 1941, the Mission had been firmly established and it was 
evident that its function would be a continuing one. Staff members were 
added to it from time to time. 

The London Mission originally operated with a small, permanent staff 
supplemented by a large number of visitors who were sent to England by 
the divisions and sections on specific missions or on visits of a comparatively 
short duration. The scope and volume of OSRD activities increased enor- 
mously after American entry into the war; and with many research prob- 
lems being studied both in England and the United States, it was highly 
desirable that the research groups in each country be kept as fully informed 
as possible of progress in the other. In some fields, particularly in the field 
of radar, co-ordinated research was planned between the groups. Experience 
showed that the interchange of reports was not sufficient to cover a specific 
field. Many research workers in England and America were too busy work- 
ing on their problems to write adequate reports. Reports were slow in 


arriving at their proper destination, and in many cases the individuals in- 
terested did not receive the reports of the corresponding British or Ameri- 
can group. A number of the divisions sent visitors to England, who re- 
turned w^ith a greatly increased fund of knowledge and with up-to-date 
information on research in their particular fields. Detailed information on 
many problems, however, was lacking, and it was not possible for the small 
permanent staff in London to obtain these details, especially in some of the 
more complex fields. As the first step to expansion Hovde returned to the 
United States as Assistant to Conant in accordance with the agreement 
under which the former had originally gone to London, and Bennett 
Archambault replaced him as permanent head of the Mission. After Archam- 
bault's arrival in London in April 1942, the staff was augmented to provide 
permanent representation in all the important research fields. 

Arrangements which had been set up at the time of Conant's visit to 
England provided that the OSRD reports of interest to the British would 
be forwarded to the London Mission for distribution to the Ministries. At 
the same time, it was agreed that the reports from the various Ministries 
would be sent to the Mission for transmittal by pouch to the United States. 
With the establishment of the Central Scientific Office, later the British Cen- 
tral Scientific Office (BCSO), in Washington early in 1941, under Dr. 
Charles G. (now Sir Charles) Darwin and with the able assistance of 
Dr. W. L. Webster, however, there was set up a second channel which 
was available during the war for the transmission of information in both 
directions. Every OSRD report which was sent to England was also sent 
to the BCSO, and in a few instances multiple copies were sent to the latter 
office in order that some individual within it might forward a copy to the 
group in England which he represented. 

The BCSO was of great help when the Liaison Office was establishing 
its procedures in 1941, particularly by centralizing the requests of various 
British agencies in Washington. The staff of the BCSO was also of consid- 
erable assistance in the guidance of prospective travelers to England by 
furnishing details of British research organizations. 

Development of the Liaison Office under OSRD 

Executive Order No. 8807 of June 28, 1941, establishing OSRD directed 
that organization in Article 2(g) to 

Initiate and support such scientific and medical research as may be requested by 
the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the 
defense of the United States under the terms of the Act of March 11, 1941, en- 
titled "An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States"; and serve as the 
central liaison office for the conduct of such scientific and medical research for 
such countries. 


Administrative Order No. i of August 20, 1941, created the Liaison 
Office as one of the principal subdivisions of OSRD, designated its head as 
Senior Liaison Officer and charged it with "the conduct of scientific Haison" 
with the countries defined in Article 2(g) of the Executive Order (the so- 
called "lend-lease" countries). Carroll L. Wilson was named as Senior 
Liaison Officer, with Caryl P. Haskins and Franklin S. Cooper (both bio- 
physicists and, respectively, Director and Assistant Director of Research, 
Haskins Laboratories) as Assistant Liaison OfiEcers. Wilson continued as 
Senior Liaison Officer until October 30, 1942, when he resigned to spend 
his full time as Executive Assistant to Bush. Haskins was then made Senior 
Liaison Officer, and when he resigned to become Deputy Executive Officer 
of NDRC on September 15, 1943, Cooper succeeded him. William W. 
Eaton served as Assistant Liaison Officer between January 20, 1944, and 
March i, 1945, and Eugene W. Scott received a similar appointment on 
February 26, 1945. 

The duties of the Liaison Office from the beginning included direction 
of the London Mission, exchange of reports, arrangement for travel to Eng- 
land, handling of cables between Great Britain and the United States, and 
the clearance of visits of foreign scientists to OSRD projects. Proper distri- 
bution of British reports required the Liaison Office to be conversant with 
the details of all research being sponsored by the OSRD. The problem of 
keeping the Liaison Ofl&ce fully acquainted with the nature and status of 
the problems being studied within the various divisions of the NDRC and 
CMR was one which proved quite difficult of solution. To meet it, the 
Office maintained a current file of contracts and endeavored to arrange for 
the attendance of its personnel at division and section meetings, although 
some divisions objected to the presence of Liaison Ofl&ce personnel, particu- 
larly at executive meetings. 

While some information could be obtained from reading the monthly or 
bimonthly reports of divisions, these reports were often quite general in 
nature, failed to give suflBcient details as to progress, and frequently were 
several months late in publication. Dependence upon reports meant that 
work might have been in progress on a problem for several months be- 
fore information of its existence reached the Liaison Ofl&ce. In such cases 
British reports dealing with similar problems might not be forwarded im- 
mediately to the individuals most concerned. The difficulty was resolved 
late in 1943 and early in 1944 by adding a number of Technical Aides to 
the staff of the Liaison Ofl&ce and assigning to them particular areas of 
research. While the manpower situation was such that there were a number 
of serious delays and it was not possible to add a Technical Aide for each 
division, it became apparent that those divisions which were served by a 
Technical Aide in the Liaison Office and who had similar representatives 


in London obtained, by far, the best and most up-to-date information on 
their research problems. 

In order better to service those NDRC divisions having oflGces in New 
York, the Liaison Office estabUshed a branch in New^ York City in February 
1944 under Mrs. Louise Paddock, v^^ho had been in the Washington office 
from its inception. 

With the rapid increase in the scale of operations and in the number of 
functions, it became necessary to formalize the organization of the Office 
along functional lines. The arrangements for travel of OSRD personnel to 
England, the handling of requests for British subjects to visit OSRD projects 
and meetings, and the dispatch, receipt, and distribution of cables between 
Washington and London were brought into a single unit late in 1942 
which became known as the Overseas Service Division. The first head of 
this unit was Miss Barbara E. Caldon who was succeeded on December 18, 
1944, by Mrs. Frances F. Giggal. By December 31, 1945, 1820 persons had 
engaged in foreign travel under OSRD auspices and the Overseas Service 
Division had carried for them the burden of wartime travel arrangements, 
including such items as passports, visas, travel priorities, immunizations, 
releases by Selective Service Boards, military permits, special clearances and 
a host of others. At its peak the division was handling 250 travelers per 
quarter. The total number of cables handled through December 31, 1945, 
was 7487, with the number running at approximately 700 per quarter for 
some time. 

The volume of British reports increased month by month to the point 
where it became desirable to organize the working group associated in the 
receipt and distribution of this material into a unit, later called the British 
Reports Section. A total of 59,135 separate reports, letters and samples from 
the United Kingdom and Canada was handled through December 31, 1945, 
with the peak reached in the second quarter of 1945 when approximately 
6000 were received. The British Reports Section was supervised by Harold A. 
Traver until late in 1943, when Dr. Dorothy W. Weeks was placed in 
charge. In September 1945, Dr. Weeks became a part time employee and 
Miss Mary L. Carll served as acting head during the periods when Dr. Weeks 
was not present. 

The OSRD Reports Section was established somewhat later than the 
corresponding group for British reports as the flow of American reports in 
volume began later than the flow of British reports. By December 31, 1945, 
however, 82,153 items had been dispatched to the United Kingdom and 
Canada. The peak volume was in the first and second quarters of 1944, in 
each of which over 8000 items were handled. The section was formally 
organized on January i, 1944, with WilUam M. Olive in charge. When he 
left in August 1945, it was placed direcdy under the Assistant Liaison 


As British reports were usually transmitted in a single copy, adequate 
distribution in the United States required duplication on a large scale; 
and the requirement of speed made photostating the preferred method of 
duplication. The total number of pages duplicated through December 31, 
1945, reached approximately 1,835,000. 

The lend-lease transactions were handled by Mrs. Dorothy D. Culpin 
until June 1944. Transportation was in charge of Mrs. Ruth F. Merker 
from August 1943 until June 1945. In June 1944, the two sections were 
combined under Mrs. Merker. The section was discontinued on July i, 1945. 

Group A, whose work has been described in the preceding chapter, 
should be mentioned here to round out the description of the administra- 
tive organization of the Liaison Office. It functioned under the direct super- 
vision of Cooper until September 1943, when William Shurclifl was placed 
in charge. He was succeeded in November 1944 by David Z. Beckler. 

The several Technical Aides in the Liaison Office were grouped into a 
Staff Section, operating under the Assistant Liaison Officer. 

In addition to circulating British reports within OSRD, the Liaison Office 
was called upon to make available to the Services any British reports which 
they had not received through their own channels. This distribution was 
facilitated by the publication at varying intervals, usually semimonthly, of 
an accessions list known as the Services Index, between June 1941 and 
August 1945. The circulation of the Services Index increased the demand 
from the Services for copies of the reports which were listed. Requests for 
21,000 reports were received and processed between March 1942 and 
December 1945. 

OSRD reports for use outside the country were sent to three distributees, 
the OSRD London Mission, the British Central Scientific Office (later the 
British Commonwealth Scientific Office serving also Australia, New Zealand, 
and South Africa), and the National Research Council of Canada. Com- 
plete records were kept of all reports received and distributed. The types of 
reports which were distributed varied from monthly summary reports to 
progress reports on specific subjects. Almost every formal OSRD report was 
distributed to the British and Canadians. Other parts of the British Com- 
monwealth, namely, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, which had 
been admitted to the exchange arrangements received copies of the OSRD 
reports directly related to their research activities. 

The reports sent to the London Mission were distributed to the interested 
Ministries in England. The staff members of the London Mission worked 
out standard distribution schedules; and each report, upon its receipt in 
London, was placed on the proper schedule and distributed accordingly 
unless the staff member concerned made special arrangements. Usually a 
copy of each report was retained in the London Mission for reference pur- 
poses. As the size of the American armed forces in England increased. 


American military establishments made frequent calls upon the Mission for 
copies of OSRD reports. 

The exchange of visitors between the British and American groups grad- 
ually increased throughout the war, reaching its peak in the spring of 1945. 
It became increasingly evident that the best and most rapid method of co- 
ordinating research on specific problems in the two countries was by per- 
sonal visits. This was, of course, a supplement to the exchange of reports. 
The permanent staff members of the London Mission and of the British 
Central Scientific Office were of great help in many cases on specific prob- 
lems. In no case, however, was sufficient staff available to provide coverage 
for a field of activities. 

Those NDRC divisions which solved their problems in particular in- 
stances by dispatching visitors to England were always ready to duplicate 
the procedure when the need arose. In many cases, however, the divisions 
placed the need for a key man in the United States above the value they 
might derive from his visit abroad. In these cases the divisions were de- 
pendent upon reports received from the British research group or from 
OSRD staff members in London. While the staff performed its own func- 
tions well, it was unable to substitute completely for specialists familiar 
with the latest developments in their fields. Both were desirable. 

By the end of 1943 a satisfactory plan was developed for the exchange 
of information supplementing the visits of specialists. It involved an in- 
crease in the technical staff of the Liaison Office, particularly in Washing- 
ton, and the exchange of Washington and London staff members at regu- 
lar intervals. The Field Technical Aides (as the staff members respon- 
sible for following particular fields of activity came to be called) rapidly 
became acquainted with all the work of the NDRC divisions to which 
they were assigned. They had free access to British reports and soon ac- 
quired at least a reading knowledge of all the work going on in England 
in the specific fields in which they were interested. In most cases they 
established excellent relations with the divisions and attended their meet- 
ings and demonstrations. Many of them wrote special reports which were 
forwarded to staff members of the London Mission for their guidance and 
for distribution to the interested British groups. After acquainting them- 
selves with the work being conducted under the NDRC, they visited Eng- 
land where they studied the organization of the specific fields of research 
which were being emphasized there. This knowledge of the organization 
and work being carried on in England and the particular problems of the 
staff members of the London Mission was invaluable to the members of 
the Washington staff and to NDRC in furthering the co-ordination of 
their work. 

Because of its broad knowledge of OSRD operations the Liaison Office 
was assigned in the summer of 1942 a continuing function with respect to 


patents. The Commissioner of Patents had been authorized by Congress 
to hold in secrecy patent appUcations the disclosure of which would en- 
danger national security. Bush agreed that OSRD would advise the Com- 
missioner on applications within its field; and the Liaison Office made the 
initial examination of applications which was followed by a more thorough 
review by NDRC specialists prior to advice to the Commissioner on the 
issuance of secrecy orders. 

Lend-Lease Activities 

By the middle of 1942 the Radiation Laboratory had developed a num- 
ber of radar devices which the British wished to obtain and which the 
development groups wished to provide since the British were in a better 
position than the American forces to try out new weapons. To facilitate 
this, in July 1942, OSRD was designated as a procuring agency by the 
Lend-Lease Administration. This arrangement was continued until the 
cessation of lend-lease activities in September 1945. All the preliminary nego- 
tiations leading to a lend-lease requisition were handled between the Liai- 
son Office and the NDRC divisions, and the final recommendation for 
approval of the requisitions was forwarded by the Liaison Office upon the 
advice of the divisions to the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA). 
Although the bulk of the lend-lease requisitions were on Division 14 or 
Division 15 contractors, almost every NDRC division had at least one 
device transferred to the British by this means. 

There was also a small amount of reverse lend-lease; in this instance the 
materials were acquired in England by the London Mission or one of the 
branch laboratories and sent to the United States for the use of an OSRD 
contractor. The importance of the transfer of experimental equipment is 
but poorly indicated by the dollar value of materials transferred, approxi- 
mately $6,600,000. Lend-lease facilities were also used to transfer some 
apparatus to Canada, but in these cases cash was paid by Canada. The 
OSRD in either case was reimbursed by FEA for the expenses incurred 
in making and supplying the device to the requisitioning agency. 

Special Facilities for Exchange of Radar Information 

Huge sums were spent both in England and the United States on the 
development of radar as a defensive and offensive weapon, and its use was 
an important factor in achieving victory. Proper liaison in this field was 
essential in order to insure the prompt exchange of information and the 
co-ordination of the research programs on radar in Great Britain and 

With the entry of the United States into the war, research and develop- 


ment in the field of radar were intensified and the increased activities of 
American companies placed a new emphasis on the benefits to be derived 
from a freer interchange between them and comparable British firms. At 
this time there was duplication in nearly all lines of radar research and 
development in the two countries. In February 1942, a memorandum was 
prepared by OSRD proposing an agreement among various British and 
American companies whereby information would flow promptly and auto- 
matically between companies certified to receive radar information. The 
two governments undertook to collect and disseminate radar reports for 
their respective companies, but assumed no responsibility for protecting 
commercial rights to the information beyond the maintenance of full rec- 
ords of distribution. 

With the concurrence of the War and Navy Departments the proposed 
plan was presented to Bell Telephone Laboratories, General Electric Com- 
pany, Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company, Radio Corpora- 
tion of America and later to other companies. Each company agreed upon 
the condition that a similar agreement be reached with the principal British 
firms. In August 1942, the Central Radio Bureau in England made a pro- 
posal along the lines of the American memorandum to appropriate British 
firms. Most of the British firms invited to join the interchange plan ac- 
cepted and the plan was put in operation on September i, 1942, between 
six American companies and eight British companies. Several others were 
added later. Certain specific devices and information were excluded from 
the exchange. The actual exchange of reports was carried out in the Liaison 
Office in Washington and the Central Radio Bureau in London. Complete 
records were kept of the reports put into the plan by each company and 
the distribution of the reports to firms in the opposite country. Frequently 
laboratory reports from the Radiation Laboratory were included in the ex- 
change plan, and likewise the British put in many reports from their Gov- 
ernment laboratories. Both the Central Radio Bureau and the Liaison Office 
made the reports available to the Services and to Government laboratories 
generally. In May 1945, the participating firms were solicited for their 
views concerning continuation of the exchange plan, and after several of 
them had expressed the view that the plan should be terminated follow- 
ing the cessation of hostilities with Germany, it was ended on July i, 1945. 

In the spring of 1943, the American program of research on radar was 
being expanded greatly under the auspices of the OSRD and the two Serv- 
ices. Development of radar apparatus also had been progressing favorably 
in Great Britain and a large research program was under way there. It 
was evident that more could be accomplished and technical manpower bet- 
ter utilized if the research programs of the two countries were co-ordinated. 
Accordingly, Karl T. Compton headed an American group which went to 
England in May 1943 to discuss methods of co-ordination. The group 


made extensive visits to the various research estabHshments studying radar. 
They also reached agreement on the co-ordination of radar research pro- 
grams with pohcy-making officials within the several Ministries. Besides 
the general policy decisions, another important development due to this 
visit was the establishment of British branches of American radar labora- 

The members of the Compton Mission were convinced that research in 
the field of radar required that a research group be located close to the 
source of operational information, in this case the operating Air Force. The 
needs of the British offensive bombing groups and their defensive fighter 
squadrons were undergoing rapid and frequently unexpected changes. By 
having a close link between these operating groups and the scientists and 
technicians working on their problems, it would be possible to meet new 
changes in enemy tactics with greater speed, and changes in priority of 
research could be effected on short notice. Furthermore, the information 
concerning enemy jamming techniques and their effectiveness was held in 
extremely high security classification. This increased the difficulties in trans- 
mitting such information through a number of channels across the Atlan- 
tic to research facilities in America. In Great Britain, on the other hand, this 
information could be discussed between representatives of the operational 
groups and the scientific staffs, frequently before any written reports were 
prepared. The only practical method of effective co-ordination of the re- 
search programs on radar countermeasures as far as the OSRD was con- 
cerned was the establishment of an OSRD-sponsored group in Great Brit- 
ain. By the spring of 1942, Great Britain had also become a base for 
American bombing forces, and the size of these forces was increasing con- 
stantly. These Air Forces needed a nearby technical group to which they 
could refer urgent problems. 

It was decided that a laboratory on radar countermeasures could best be 
established in connection with the Division 15 countermeasures contract 
with Harvard University. A comparable branch was established for opera- 
tions in the general field of radar under the OSRD contract with M.I.T. 
for the creation and operation of the Radiation Laboratory. The British 
made facilities available for both branch laboratories near the Telecom- 
munications Research Establishment at Great Malvern. The American Air 
Forces used the facilities of the laboratories to capacity. The contribution 
which the laboratories made to the operations of the Air Forces in Europe 
and to the exchange of radar information with the British was tremendous. 

The Shift in London Mission Activities 

In the winter of 1943-1944, the load of the OSRD Mission in London 
reached its peak and the staff reached its maximum size. By spring, 1944, 


many staff members were occupied almost entirely with duties which they 
had assumed with the United States Forces in Europe. 

The successful invasion of the Continent and the swift freeing of the 
territory of France and Belgium which had been occupied by the Germans 
brought new duties to the staff of the OSRD London Mission. Many mem- 
bers served with intelligence teams which followed swiftly in the path of 
the armies. In addition the London ofl&ce served as a base of operations 
for specialists supplied to the armed forces by the OSRD Office of Field 
Service. When the Combined Chiefs of Staff established the Combined 
Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee composed of representatives of the 
interested British Ministries, United States Forces in the European Theater, 
and United States war agencies represented in London, OSRD was in- 
cluded. Subgroups were organized by subjects, and OSRD had represent- 
atives on each subgroup which dealt with a subject of interest to the 
NDRC or CMR. By the time of the capitulation of Germany in May 1945, 
most of the activities of the London Mission had been shifted to the plan- 
ning of intelligence investigations and to the carrying out of investigations 
in the field. 

In the fall of 1944, it was obvious that London, while quite satisfactory 
as a base of operations for liaison with Great Britain, was not suitable for 
the work required of the field investigators, since it was too far to the rear 
of the actual fighting for proper use of facilities associated with the Air 
Forces. Therefore, in December 1944, quarters were obtained from the 
United States Embassy in Paris and a small branch office of the OSRD 
London Mission was established there under Dr. H. P. Robertson, who 
had been a member of the London staff. Dr. Wallace R. Brode of the 
Washington staff succeeded Robertson in March 1945, and remained in 
charge of the office until it was closed in June. In addition to this OSRD 
office, the two British branch laboratories established an advance service 
base near Paris with the American Air Forces. The Paris Office served as 
a useful facility for OSRD personnel who went to France as members of 
intelligence investigating teams. 

By June 1945, the principal functions for which the London Mission had 
been established were nearly completed. The need for some liaison with 
research groups in England was still evident, however, and it was decided 
to maintain a London Liaison Office for this purpose. By the end of July, 
the reorganization had been accomplished and a small group under Dr. 
H. M. MacNeille remained in London to continue liaison activities. Before 
this change took place, however, arrangements were completed for a change 
in the procedures which had been followed in the transmittal of OSRD 
reports to England. Under the new arrangements, OSRD reports were 
delivered by the Liaison Office in Washington directly to the British Com- 
monwealth Scientific Office, which was given complete information con- 


cerning the distribution which had been estabHshed for each category of 
report. The reports were then forwarded to England through British mail 
channels and distributed by the Ministry of Production to the other Min- 

The duties of the reorganized London Liaison Office were much more 
general in nature than those of its predecessor. Liaison consisting of per- 
sonal contacts with research groups was of necessity largely discontinued 
for lack of staff. The general trend of British postwar research policies 
was carefully followed and the Ofi&ce was supplied with similar informa- 
tion from this country for dissemination to interested British agencies. 
One problem which occupied a large part of the time of the staff members 
of the London OfiEce was the question of declassification and publication 
of the scientific information which had been gathered in the two coun- 
tries during the war. The London Office also continued to collect the re- 
ports of the British Ministries and to forward these to the Liaison Of&ce in 
Washington, until the last of the OSRD London personnel were trans- 
ferred to the Navy on March i, 1946. 

While the operations of the Washington Liaison Office and the London 
Mission serviced CMR as well as NDRC, the former were on a much 
smaller scale than the latter. It was in the medical field, however, that the 
only exchange of information with the U.S.S.R. was carried on by OSRD. 
Medical liaison is discussed in Chapter VII, which deals with CMR. 

The Liaison Office after V-E Day 

After V-E Day plans were immediately put in operation for the closing 
of the branch laboratories in England and the advance service base in 
France. The former activities were closed around the 15th of June and 
the Paris branch was closed on June 30, 1945. The London Mission was 
officially closed late in July 1945, although its liaison activities were main- 
tained by the London Liaison Office until March i, 1946. By the middle 
of the summer, 1945, travel activities in an eastern direction had nearly 
ceased, although travel to the Pacific had shown a slight increase. Most of 
the OSRD personnel stationed in Europe had been returned to the United 
States by the first of August. At that time the curtailment in the research 
activities and the number of contracts being maintained in an active con- 
dition by OSRD led to the decision to close the New York branch of the 
Liaison Office on September i, 1945. Group A ceased its distribution ac- 
tivities and began to call in the reports it had distributed. At about the same 
time, the British Reports Section called for the return of British reports 
from contractors who had received them at the request of the divisions di- 
recting their work. 

The lack of a subject index to British reports had not been particularly 


serious during the active operations of the British reports group for each 
report, when received, had been routed to the appropriate persons in the 
NDRC and CMR. However, if this material were to be of any use as a 
reference hbrary, it was absolutely essential that it be cross-indexed accord- 
ing to subject matter. In September 1945, therefore, Bush requested the 
Liaison Office to make plans to index the British material according to 
subject matter and to start the active indexing as soon as convenient. 

An important part of the closing of OSRD activities was the determina- 
tion of how the information obtained during the war could be utilized for 
postwar military and civilian research. Since the OSRD reports in the 
Liaison Office were a duplicate of those kept as official records, it was 
decided to use them as a nucleus for a complete document collection. The 
Director instructed the Liaison Office to complete its files of OSRD re- 
ports and to take in charge the important collections assembled by certain 
of the divisions. Associated with this problem was the delivery of declassi- 
fied documents to a central agency in order that the results might become 
public knowledge. 

The indexing of the British reports and the assembling of the document 
collection became the most important activities of the Liaison Office in 1946, 
although the recall of documents and declassification duties accounted for 
much of the time of the operating staflE. By June 1946, the divisional docu- 
ment room collections had been nominally acquired and were in the tem- 
porary custody of the Navy Department. Later in the year, arrangements 
were completed to deliver the entire document center to the Joint Research 
and Development Board. This transfer was completed in order to have 
documents available to groups in both Services and to serve as a compre- 
hensive source of technical information for the committees established by 
the Board. 

Other remaining obligations of the Liaison Office were discharged by 
the middle of November, 1946, after which the Liaison Office ceased to be 
active, although the appointment of the Assistant Liaison Officer continued 
in force until the end of December. 

There is ample evidence that the progress of the war was greatly speeded 
by the close working relationship established between American and Brit- 
ish scientists. The exchange of information was valuable, but the best re- 
sults came in those situations where specialists from one country were in 
direct, personal contact with those from the other. The success of this in- 
terchange on a broad basis between Allies commends it as a pattern should 
any need for it arise in the future. 

Part Three: Supporting 




.HE primary function of the Administrative Office was to en- 
able the scientists to function as efficiently as possible within the limits of 
Government regulations. NDRC and CMR were to look after the scientific 
aspects of the OSRD program; it was up to the Executive Secretary to pro- 
vide the supporting mechanism. As the same individual served as Execu- 
tive Secretary of OSRD, NDRC and CMR as well as Secretary of the Ex- 
ecutive Committee of S-i, a single administrative office served for the OSRD 
and its constituent committees. The Executive Secretary was also Contract- 
ing Officer for OSRD. 

From the inception of NDRC, OSRD and CMR until December i8, 
1945, Irvin Stewart was Executive Secretary. From December 1940, Cleve- 
land Norcross was his Chief Assistant; and after Stewart became Deputy 
Director of OSRD on December 19, 1945, Norcross first was made Acting 
Executive Secretary and later Executive Secretary. 

The line between the scientific and administrative aspects of a research 
program is clear in theory but somewhat hazy in particular situations. 
Harmonious working relations between the Secretary's Office and the 
Chairmen of NDRC and CMR prevailed at all times, with the offices 
keeping in close touch with each other on all matters of common interest. 
The Administrative Office was established as a principal subdivision of 
OSRD in the following terms: 

The Administrative Office, at the head of which shall be an Executive Secre- 
tary appointed by the Director. Under the general supervision and direction of 
the Director and subject to the provisions of Section 10 of Executive Order 
No. 8807, the Administrative Office shall have charge of the administrative affairs 
and records of the Office of Scientific Research and Development. 

As further defined in Section 5 of Administrative Order No. 4, amended 
April 25, 1945, the principal duties of the Executive Secretary were the 


Subject to all the limitations and restrictions applicable to the acts of the 
Director and under the general supervision and direction of the Director, the 
Executive Secretary is authorized (i) to negotiate and enter into contracts and 
supplements, amendments, modifications or extensions of contracts heretofore or 
hereafter made in connection with the functions of the Office of Scientific Re- 
search and Development and its officers, (ii) to approve or disapprove the form, 
terms, and/or conditions of subcontracts under prime contracts of the Office of 
Scientific Research and Development, (iii) to incur and release such obligations 
and to settle such contract claims as may be necessary to accomplish such func- 
tions. Provided, That settlement of all contract or subcontract termination claims 
in excess of $25,000 shall be subject to the approval of the Office of Scientific Re- 
search and Development Contract Settlement Review Board, (iv) to authorize 
Office of Scientific Research and Development contractors to settle with sub- 
contractors termination claims not exceeding $10,000, without further review by 
the Government whenever the reliability of the contractor, the amount or nature 
of the claim, or other reasons appear to justify such action, (v) to issue such 
regulations as the Executive Secretary deems necessary to carry out the policies, 
principles, methods, procedures, and standards prescribed by the Contract Settle- 
ment Act of 1944 and the regulations issued thereunder by the Director of the 
Office of Contract Settlement, (vi) to review and approve or disapprove in accord- 
ance with the requirements of the General Accounting Office vouchers submitted 
under contracts and all other types of vouchers, (vii) to authorize or approve 
travel, use of extra-fare trains, superior Pullman accommodations, and seats in 
sleeping or parlor cars for trips of two hours duration or less, and certify long 
distance telephone calls in connection with such functions, (viii) acting as Con- 
tracting Officer of the Office of Scientific Research and Development to designate 
as his "authorized representatives" under contracts the appropriate officials, em- 
ployees, or appointees of the Office of Scientific Research and Development or 
officials, employees or appointees of other Government agencies who have been 
detailed to the Office of Scientific Research and Development, (ix) to exercise the 
powers and duties vested in the Director and/or the Office of Scientific Research 
and Development by Appropriation Acts applicable to the Office of Scientific 
Research and Development, the Surplus Property Act of 1944, the Contract Settle- 
ment Act of 1944, Executive Order No. 9218, and all other applicable laws con- 
cerning acquisition, use and disposition of property, (x) to effect transfers and 
retransfers of funds, and (xi) to delegate any power or duty of the Executive 
Secretary to such assistant or other official of the Office of Scientific Research and 
Development as he may designate with the approval of the Director. 

From July 26, 1945, until the creation of the post of Deputy Director on 
December 19, 1945, the order also provided that the Executive Secretary 
should become Acting Director of OSRD in the absence of the Director 
and of the Chairman of NDRC. 

There were four major divisions of the Administrative Office, the heads 
of which reported to the Executive Secretary: administrative, patent, legal, 
and personnel operations and management. To a considerable extent the 
activities of these divisions, or of units within them, are part and parcel of the 


Operations reported upon in the next few chapters of the present volume, 
just as they are interwoven with the activities described in earher chapters. 
Brief mention will be made here of some of those not reported elsewhere. 

Administrative Division 

General Organization. The Administrative Division was by far the larg- 
est unit in the Administrative Office; it operated directly under Norcross as 
Chief, with Miss Lee Anna Embrey as Administrative Officer. The division 
maintained offices in Boston and New York to service NDRC and CMR 
activities in those places, but the bulk of its work was in Washington. 
Eight sections were established to handle administrative services, central 
records, procedures, projects, contracts, fiscal affairs, priorities and property, 
and security, respectively. The last four of these are discussed in Chap- 
ters XIII, XIV, XVI, and XVII, respectively. 

Administrative Services. The administrative services section handled those 
housekeeping activities which are at the same time essential and taken for 
granted. They included arrangements for space and communication facili- 
ties; maintenance of stocks, equipment and supplies; interbuilding mail 
pickup service; motorcycle messenger and chauffeur service; duplicating 
service; maintenance of equipment and stock inventory records; a service 
for the repair and maintenance of equipment, for the moving of offices, 
and the shipment of any kind of material. The geographical spread of 
OSRD activities, involving service to widely separated offices, and the im- 
mense amount of classified material to be handled made the task more dif- 
ficult than the size of the organization would indicate. Under the capable 
direction of Mrs. Shirley Blackistone this group produced hard-to-get and 
"unavailable" items time after time, and in so doing gave much needed 
aid to the men whose efforts were closer to the end object of OSRD 

Central Records. The OSRD records problem was complicated by the 
multiplicity of offices. Central files were maintained at 1530 P Street. CMR 
files were kept at the CMR offices in the National Academy of Sciences. 
The chemical divisions of NDRC were in Dumbarton Oaks with their 
files. The limitations of space forced the Liaison Office, the patent divi- 
sion, the priorities section and others into different buildings in Washing- 
ton with a consequent scattering of files. In addition each NDRC division 
maintained its own files, usually outside Washington; and in some cases 
there were section files separate from the division files because of the 
distance between section and division headquarters. 

The central records section functioned at 1530 P Street, where the largest 
single group of files was housed. They were organized under the direction 
of Mrs. Louise Wahl, Miss Lucille Graveler and Miss Lola Jaques, who 


served successively as Records Ofl&cers, and Miss Hope Cowles as Techni- 
cal Assistant. 

As OSRD w^as a temporary organization, it was apparent from the be- 
ginning that the files ultimately would be transferred to some other agency. 
In anticipation of that event OSRD obtained on detail a staff member from 
National Archives to aid in assuring that OSRD files would fit in with the 
planning of that agency. No attempt was made to prescribe the type of 
files or filing system to be followed by the divisions and sections. With 
the end of the war, however, the central records section made members of 
its staff available to review division files with a view to eliminating dupli- 
cate and unnecessary records. As each division office closed, its files were 
sent into the central office where they were treated as integral units with 
no attempt to incorporate them into the general files. 

Procedures. The need for co-ordinating the procedural material essential 
to obtain the necessary minimum of uniformity in compliance with over- 
riding Government regulations led to the establishment of the procedures 
section. It performed a useful function in preparing and reviewing pro- 
cedural releases to forestall the issuance of conflicting or unco-ordinated 
instructions, eliminating obsolete materials, classifying proposed releases in 
appropriate categories, seeing that basic materials reached the people who 
should have them, and indicating their relation to previous releases. Un- 
der its direction the various OSRD administrative circulars were grouped 
and cross-referenced in numerical series which gave a fair degree of as- 
surance that all the material issued in that form on a particular subject 
was in a single place and easily accessible. In addition a small staff of ana- 
lysts, under the direction of Miss Embrey assisted by Mrs. Esther Stern, 
from time to time surveyed the operation of various units in the Adminis- 
trative Office with a view to improving and co-ordinating work procedures 
of such units in their relation to each other and to other units of NDRC 
and CMR. 

Project Control. The fact that several branches of the Army and of the 
Navy requested assistance of NDRC early made it desirable to establish 
some convenient method of keeping track of the various requests. An 
arrangement was worked out under which requests were numbered in 
the order of their submission, with a separate series for each requesting 
technical service. Thus the first Signal Corps request received the desig- 
nation SCi, and the first Army Air Corps request ACi. Navy requests 
were identified by the key letter N, followed by another letter indicating 
the originating Bureau and the proper number, NO for the Bureau of 
Ordnance, NA for Bureau of Aeronautics, etc. Project requests were re- 
quired to be submitted formally through the officially designated Service 
liaison to NDRC, i.e., through the Co-ordinator of Research and Develop- 
ment of the Navy or through the War Department Liaison Officer for the 


NDRC. They were addressed to the Executive Secretary; and the project 
control section had the task of following them through the OSRD organ- 

Promptly after its receipt each project was referred for recommenda- 
tion to the NDRC division indicated by the Chairman's Office as appropri- 
ate to receive it. The divisional replies were in turn referred to the Chair- 
man's Office. Recommendations that projects be declined were brought 
before the next meeting of NDRC where the adverse recommendation was 
invariably supported. Recommendations of acceptance were approved with- 
out reference to the Committee until a few months before V-E Day, when 
NDRC began to review all recommendations for consistency with the ter- 
mination program of OSRD. 

In view of the size and complexity of the Army and Navy and of the 
autonomy of NDRC divisions, the attempt to channel projects so as to 
insure appropriate review was not uniformly successful. Requests at times 
were submitted directly to the Chairman's Ofi&ce or to NDRC divisional 
offices by officers or bureaus, although Service regulations required that 
projects come through a central office in each Service. The Chairman's 
Office regularly returned them for proper handling; the divisions some- 
times returned them but at other times acted upon the requests. No fixed 
rule was possible. Speed was essential and divisions would properly start 
work upon informal representations of officers of their acquaintance. In 
many cases the paper request would follow the initiation of research by 
days or weeks. In some cases, however, it developed that the requesting 
officer was expressing his own views which were not shared by his supe- 
riors and that the division was working upon a problem in which there 
was no official interest and no place to use the results. 

The second function of the project control section was the recording and 
distribution of reports. The variety of reports has been mentioned in Chap- 
ter IV. The section had the task of correlating reports with projects and 
with contracts as far as practicable, and of distributing most of them. The 
magnitude of the task is shown by an approximation that the total num- 
ber of separate reports fell between 30,000 and 35,000, and the number of 
copies of each ranged from 2 to 100 or more. The rapidity with which 
OSRD grew, the speed with which it worked, the harassment of inade- 
quate personnel, the autonomy of divisions, the varying habits of con- 
tractors, the need for communicating results as rapidly as possible regard- 
less of form, the high security classification of the contents of most reports 
— all these made for variety in reports and confusion in their handling. 
Several months after V-J Day the task of untangling reports was still un- 
der way. There was a reasonable chance, however, that a complete and 
usable file would be ready by the time a successor organization had been 


Between January 1942 and its merger with the contract section in Decem- 
ber 1945, the project control section was headed at various times by Mrs. 
Olga Walsh, Mrs. Virginia Corcoran, and Miss Frances Cathcart. 

Patent Division 

The patent policy of OSRD and its administration are the subject of 
Chapter XV. Division headquarters were in Washington with Captain 
R. A. Lavender, USN (Retired), as advisor on patent matters and Lieuten- 
ant Colonel P. P. Stoutenburgh as his first assistant. Attorneys, who for 
the most part were Army or Navy officers detailed to OSRD, were assigned 
to follow inventions in the various parts of OSRD. Excluding a much 
larger number working on the atomic energy program under War Depart- 
ment contracts as well as OSRD contracts, the patent division at its peak 
had twelve attorneys with appropriate supporting staffs. Offices were main- 
tained in Washington, Boston, New York and Chicago. 

Legal Division 

Until December 9, 1940, NDRC relied upon Oscar Cox, Assistant Gen- 
eral Counsel of the Treasury Department, for legal assistance in accord- 
ance with arrangements made by the Council of National Defense. On 
that date Beverly Thompson, Jr., joined the staff as Counsel, but Cox 
remained available for consultation and review until late in 1942. Thomp- 
son resigned in April 1942 to enter the Army. His successor as head attor- 
ney was Albert M. Herrmann, who left for the Navy in October 1942. 
John T. Connor, who had joined the legal staff in April 1942, succeeded 
Herrmann as head legal advisor; he became the first General Counsel of 
OSRD, which position he held until he joined the Marine Corps in June 
1944. Connor was succeeded as General Counsel by Oscar M. Ruebhausen, 
who continued in the post until February i, 1946. E. Tefft Barker, a mem- 
ber of the legal staff since 1943, succeeded Ruebhausen as General Counsel. 
He in turn was succeeded on June 11, 1946, by Charles F. Brown as Act- 
ing General Counsel. 

OSRD was fortunate in the composition and attitude of its legal staff. 
As a new and temporary organization with a scientific staff made up 
largely of volunteers impressed with the urgency of their assignment but 
with a background of academic freedom, a minimum of administrative 
restraint, and an abhorrence of "red tape," OSRD was unusually sus- 
ceptible to the influence of its legal staff. Fortunately, that staff was also 
impressed with the importance and urgency of the task to be done and 
concentrated upon finding ways to give scientists the necessary freedom. 
The contract which was the basis of OSRD operations may well prove 


to be one of its principal contributions. That contract was largely the 
work of the legal division. 

At its peak the personnel of the legal division consisted of seven attor- 
neys with the usual supporting personnel. A large part of the legal work 
was necessarily devoted to the negotiation and interpretation of contracts; 
and a special unit was established for contract drafting when that func- 
tion was taken over from the contract section in October 18, 1943. In addi- 
tion, however, the General Counsel participated actively in such matters 
as the organization of the penicillin and malaria programs of CMR, the 
preparatory work behind the report Science — The Endless Frontier, the 
discussions leading to the adoption of the OSRD publication policy, and 
the lengthy negotiations on bills to establish a successor for OSRD and 
for the broader purpose of promotion of postwar research. 

Division of Personnel Operations and Management 

OSRD established its own personnel office in April 1943 upon the 
liquidation of Central Administrative Services (CAS) of the Office for 
Emergency Management. Prior to that date, CAS had performed most 
of the personnel functions in accordance with the provisions of the execu- 
tive order creating OSRD. Glenn Wilbur was the first OSRD personnel 
officer and he returned to the post after a tour of duty in the Navy. Mrs. 
Jean B, May was head of the office while Wilbur was in the Navy. 

The general procedure of appointment contemplated that (i) whenever 
a vacancy was to be filled, the facilities of the Civil Service Commission 
would be used. If a qualified person appeared on the register of the Com- 
mission, he would be selected. If a qualified person could not be produced 
by the Commission within a short period, a person without a Civil Service 
rating could be employed if the Commission regarded his qualifications as 
satisfactory. (2) For every person appointed from other than Civil Service 
rolls, a complete personal history record would be filed with the Civil 
Service Commission to establish the qualifications of the persons appointed. 
The appointment would not carry Civil Service status. (3) Salaries would 
be established in accordance with the Classification Act of 1923. 

At the request of NDRC, the Civil Service Commission early established 
a series of OSRD technical positions in the professional series with the title 
"Technical Aide." The individuals proposed for appointment were to be 
outstanding specialists in such fields as chemistry, armor, ordnance, trans- 
portation, etc. 

Exemption from the provisions of the Civil Service and Classification 
Acts would have saved OSRD much work, although eventually it obtained 
Commission approval for nearly everyone whom it wished to employ. The 
Commission had no specific standards to apply to Technical Aide posi- 


tions and its decisions as to positions and as to the qualifications of tech- 
nical personnel necessarily varied. Many appointments went through with- 
out question, while others were delayed for the length of time necessary 
for Commission personnel to become conversant with the intricacies of a 
unique job and the peculiar fitness for it of a particular individual. The 
tendency to judge the importance of a man's job by the number of persons 
reporting to him had to be overcome also, as the essence of many OSRD 
positions was the ability of the incumbent to work, with little supervision 
or assistance, on terms of equality with scientists in the employ of OSRD 
contractors. At the top levels of the Civil Service Commission there was 
unfailing appreciation of both the importance and the unique character of 
OSRD; the occasional difficulty which arose was always with the lower 
echelons of the Commission which were inconsistent in rulings on techni- 
cal qualifications and found it hard to avoid comparing OSRD positions 
with peacetime scientific positions in permanent Government agencies, with 
which, in fact, they had almost nothing in common. 

In the matter of clerical and stenographic personnel, the Commission 
was operating under conditions of almost unprecedented difficulty, for the 
demands imposed by war for this kind of personnel in Washington were 
far in excess of the supply. The Commission nevertheless gave OSRD 
reliable clerical people qualified to handle highly confidential material, 
and, beyond that, exerted special care to guard against the engaging of 
any who could not be relied on. For a considerable period, OSRD was au- 
thorized to recruit its own personnel in these categories, as a way of coun- 
tering the shortage to some degree. This was a help, but the organization 
was never adequately manned in these supporting ranks. 

What the staff lacked in numbers, however, it made up in loyalty and 
effort. New recruits were impressed with the importance of the task under- 
taken by OSRD until they appreciated the fact that a slight delay in the 
handling of papers in Washington might mushroom into a very significant 
delay in getting new equipment into the hands of troops on the batdefield. 
This spirit was intensified after the United States went into the war by 
the large number of young married women on the staff whose husbands 
were with the fighting forces. 

The existence within OSRD of two offices concerned with personnel — 
the Scientific Personnel Office and the division of personnel operations and 
management — was a source of some confusion. For the most part their 
functions were distinct; SPO dealt principally with the scientific personnel 
of contractors and with the War Manpower Commission while the divi- 
sion dealt with Government employees and relations with the Civil Service 
Commission. There was some overlap. Thus SPO had the responsibility 
for application of the "no-profit-no-loss" policy even in the case of salaries 
of scientists coming on the Government payroll, while the division was 


responsible for Civil Service Commission approval of these same men in 
positions carrying salaries commensurate with their responsibilities as de- 
fined in the Classification Act and Regulations. The situation v^^as one 
requiring close co-operation between the two offices. 

The Administrative Office was the unit through which most of the for- 
mal controls (other than those of a scientific nature) were exercised. Its 
philosophy was that of giving the scientists the greatest amount of leeway 
possible, of working with the divisions and the contractors as members of 
a team whose main job was winning the war. Every effort was made to 
devise controls which would offer the least interference with progress and 
yet would protect the public interest. The scientists were co-operative, and 
with a spirit of good will on both sides, the "red tape" was kept to a min- 
imum and was observed in good temper and with relatively few lapses. 

The writer's intimate association with the Administrative Office makes 
it difficult for him to assess its performance. As a principal subdivision of 
OSRD it was on a parity with NDRC and CMR, but it recognized that its 
mission was to facilitate their operations, just as they in turn existed pri- 
marily to stimulate and direct the scientists in the laboratories of OSRD 
contractors. OSRD was a co-operative undertaking to an unusual extent; 
its success was built upon the way in which it made use of the unique abil- 
ities of many people of varying talents. The results are apparent just as the 
observation tower of a tall building stands out. In both cases a firm foun- 
dation is essential. For OSRD the Administrative Office was an impor- 
tant part of the foundation. 

At its peak the full-time paid employees of OSRD numbered approxi- 
mately 850; of these some 300 were in the Administradve Office. The or- 
ganization of the Office was constantly shifting in the endeavor to give 
better service to the scientists, directly or indirectly, in an infinite number 
of ways. It might be in obtaining an electronic component in short supply, 
the absence of which was blocking a research program, or in working out 
a way to borrow a tank. It might be in arranging a half million dollar 
advance payment to keep a contractor going or in helping to recover a 
dollar disallowed by the General Accounting Office under circumstances 
which left the claimant sour on the whole idea of working with or for the 
Government. It might be in finding ways to help launch a new research 
program or in enabling a scientist to make an essential trip in spite of the 
fact that every mode of transport was completely sold out. 

Successful operation of the Administrative Office involved assuring the 
Comptroller General that Government funds would be properly spent and 
contractors that they could work successfully within the necessary regula- 
tions without grave risk of loss of their funds. It meant convincing the mili- 
tary services that an adequate program had been established to protect their 


highly classified information and convincing the scientists that they could 
function within the limits of military security. It meant devising means of 
insuring the protection of the public interest in the patentable aspects of 
new developments as well as stimulating reluctant contractors to action in 
various ways. It meant handling the administrative relations common to all 
Government agencies and also the governmental contacts involved in over 
2500 contracts with several hundred contractors. It meant finding ways by 
which a group of outstanding individualists could be satisfied to work 
within the framework of decades of "red tape." It meant setting seemingly 
impossible schedules of performance in "paper work" and then meeting 
those schedules. It meant struggling against a growing work load with a 
staff increasingly inadequate in numbers. It meant working under the 
constant demand for speed in every operation because of the recognition 
of the cumulative effect of delays. 

It meant these and a thousand other things, all directed toward speeding 
improved equipment to the battle front and all handled by a temporary 
staff, for the most part trained on the job in the things they had to do. 

Flexibility was the keynote of the operations of the Administrative Office 
as it was of the whole of OSRD. There was little, if anything, unusual in 
the formal organization; there was much that was unusual in the spirit 
which dominated it. The same spirit, derived in part from the pressure of 
war, prevailed throughout OSRD and was one of the most important fac- 
tors in its success. 




.HE decision that NDRC and OSRD would not operate lab- 
oratories directly made it imperative to find a form of contract which 
would permit the achievement of their objectives. That part of the pro- 
gram carried on in the laboratories of other Government agencies occa- 
sioned no difficulty on this score; for with the assistance of the Bureau of 
the Budget, a simple procedure was worked out for the transfer of OSRD 
funds to those agencies, and the supervision of expenditures was a func- 
tion of the appropriate officers of the transferee agencies. The order of the 
Council of National Defense and later the executive order establishing 
OSRD clearly contemplated the use of contracts in all other cases. 

A check of Army and Navy contract forms failed to disclose any which 
promised to be satisfactory. For the most part they were aimed at pro- 
curement or production rather than research; and through the years they 
had become encrusted with layers of requirements designed to establish 
standardized Army or Navy practices. It would have been impossible for 
most academic institutions to work satisfactorily under them, and it would 
have been difficult for NDRC to build up a staff to administer them if they 
were adopted. What was needed was a contract which would combine a 
maximum freedom for the exercise of scientific imagination on NDRC 
problems with those safeguards necessary for the expenditure of public 
funds. Stewart, as Secretary, was given the responsibility for recommend- 
ing an appropriate contract form. 

Contracts for Research and Development 

The contract form adopted by NDRC at its meeting on August 29, 1940, 
was largely the work of Oscar S. Cox, Assistant to the General Counsel of 
the Treasury Department, who had been assigned to assist the Committee 
in legal matters. The performance clause was a relatively simple provision. 
The contractor agreed to conduct studies and experimental investigations 
in connection with a given problem and to make a final report of his find- 
ings and conclusions to the Committee by a specified date. This clause was 
deliberately made flexible in order that the contractor would not be ham- 
pered in the details of the work which he was to perform. The objective 
was stated in general terms; no attempt was made to dictate the method 
of handling the problem. 


The reimbursement provisions were in the alternative, at the option of 
the contractor. One alternative provided for the payment to the contractor 
of a flat sum, payable in monthly installments with a provision that a cer- 
tain percentage (administratively set at 10 per cent) would be held until 
the submission by the contractor of the final report. The other alternative 
provided for the reimbursement of the contractor's actual cost in perform- 
ing the work called for in the performance clause. The contractor was to 
be reimbursed monthly upon the submission of public vouchers certified 
by the contractor and approved by an authorized representative of the 
Committee. It was further stipulated that it was the intention of the parties 
that the contractor would not receive any compensation whatever, other 
than reimbursement for actual costs. 

Another clause provided for reimbursement for special materials, build- 
ings, facilities and equipment within a maximum amount stated in the 
contract. Upon the termination of the contract, the contractor agreed to 
deliver or sell, at the direction of the Committee, any unexpended materials, 
facilities and equipment, the cost of which had been reimbursed under the 
contract. The contractor was granted the first opportunity and refusal to 
purchase, lease or otherwise use the unexpended property upon terms to be 
agreed upon by the Committee and contractor, or in the event of a public 
sale by paying to the Committee an amount equal to the highest outside 
bid at such sale without any deduction for the costs of the sale. 

The contract further provided that, in any event, the contractor could 
purchase the property, within one month from the date of the final report, 
by paying the Committee an amount equal to the cost of reproduction, 
less depreciation. In the case of additional buildings, for the cost of which 
the contractor had been reimbursed under the contract, the contractor was 
required, at the option of the Committee, to purchase the buildings by 
paying the Committee a stipulated percentage of the original cost. During 
the life of the contract or any renewal thereof, the contractor held all prop- 
erty at his own risk and in the event of any loss, theft or destruction, 
replacements were to be made promptly by the contractor at his own ex- 
pense, and the replacements were to be subject to the same terms and con- 
ditions as the original facilities and equipment. 

With respect to patentable discoveries or inventions, the Committee 
reserved the sole power to determine whether or not a patent application 
should be filed and to determine the disposition of the title to and the 
rights under any application or patent that might result from the per- 
formance of the work called for in the contract. The contractor agreed 
(i) that the judgment of the Committee on such matters would be ac- 
cepted as final, (2) that the inventor or inventors would execute all docu- 
ments and do all things necessary or proper to carry out the judgment of 


the Committee, and (3) that he would include the provisions of the patent 
clause in all contracts of employment with persons who did any part of 
the work called for by the contract. 

As practically all the work contemplated by the Committee was to be 
of a classified nature, four articles relating to security were included in the 
contract. The contractor agreed (i) never to disclose any information con- 
cerning the contract or obtained as a result of the work under the contract 
to any person, except employees assigned to the work, without the written 
consent of the Committee or its authorized representative; (2) to submit 
immediately a confidential report to the Committee whenever, for any 
cause, he had reason to believe that an active danger of espionage or sabo- 
tage existed at the site of the work; (3) to report to the Committee the 
citizenship, country of birth, or alien status of any or all of his employees 
at the site of, or having access to, any of the work under the contract, 
whenever requested by the Committee or an authorized representative, and 
(4) to exclude from the site of the work and to discharge or transfer, and 
thereafter to exclude from the site of the work, any person or persons 
designated by the Committee or its authorized representative, for cause, 
as undesirable to have access to the work under the contract. 

In a concluding paragraph the contractor agreed to permit representa- 
tives of the Committee to visit and inspect the work under the contract 
and to report the progress of the work from time to time as requested by 
the Committee or an authorized representative. 

At its meeting on September 27, 1940, the Committee adopted a ter- 
mination clause which provided that at any time the Committee decided 
the work under a contract could not profitably be carried to conclusion, it 
might terminate the contract upon thirty days' notice. In cases where the 
right to terminate was exercised, the Committee agreed to indemnify the 
contractor against loss upon outstanding commitments which he was unable 
to cancel. 

Experience under the contract showed, as was to be expected, the need 
for new provisions and for revision of some of those originally adopted. 
In particular the fiscal provisions required expansion and articles had to be 
inserted to cover certain statutory requirements. By the time the NDRC 
as a part of OSRD recommended that the Director follow the NDRC 
contract, that document had considerably expanded over the simpler one 
of August 29, 1940. A careful study of the standard contract was made in 
1942 under the direction of John T. Connor, the OSRD General Counsel, 
and in January 1943, a revised form was adopted. With only one major 
change that revision, known as Standard Form looi, was used thereafter 
for new OSRD research contracts, and earlier contracts were changed to 
that form as occasion arose to amend them for other reasons. As it repre- 


sents the judgment of OSRD as to the best type of research and devel- 
opment contract, Form looi is printed in full in the appendix.* The text 
as printed there should be consulted in connection with the comments 
which follow. The comments single out certain provisions of the contract 
for the mention of points not apparent from the reading of the text. Sev- 
eral articles form the burden of discussion in later chapters, and no at- 
tempt will be made here to anticipate that discussion. 

The reference numbers in the upper right hand corner of the first page 
of the contract were for convenience. At the time contracts were recom- 
mended by NDRC or CMR, a separate symbol number was assigned by 
the contract section to each recommendation, which served to identify it 
until the contract was signed by both parties. After signature, contracts 
were numbered in accordance with instructions of the General Accounting 
Office. Contracts of the original NDRC were identified by the symbol 
NDCrc (National Defense Council, research committee) followed by a 
number representing the place of the particular contract in a numerical 
series beginning with i. When OSRD was established as a part of the 
Office for Emergency Management, the symbol was changed. OSRD 
contracts recommended by the NDRC were placed in an OEMsr (Office 
for Emergency Management, scientific research) series and those recom- 
mended by the CMR in an OEMcmr series. Office of Field Service per- 
sonal service contracts were assigned to an OEMfs series. 

The Preamble. As OSRD contractors almost invariably started work un- 
der letters of intent which preceded the signing of contracts by weeks or 
months, the preamble recognized that the effective date of the contract 
(which determines the time before which reimbursement cannot be made) 
might be different from the date of signature. The preamble also lays the 
foundation for the "actual cost" provision of the contract, for the limited 
accountabihty of the contractor for supplies and equipment purchased un- 
der the contract, and (in the small number of cases where advance pay- 
ments were authorized) for advance payments by making the finding which 
is required by statute before such payments can be made. 

An innovation in the OSRD contracts was the provision for a Scientific 
Officer. The first NDRC contracts required the contractor to follow the 
instructions of the Contracting Officer or his authorized representative. 
This was logical as the Contracting Officer was the then Chairman of 
NDRC and acting in its name. The same language was continued under 
OSRD contracts although the factual situation was quite different. By 
delegation from the Director, the NDRC and the CMR had the respon- 
sibility for supervision of the respective scientific programs and the Execu- 
tive Secretary had the general responsibility for administration, including 

• See Appendix 2. 


the business and fiscal aspects of contracts. The Executive Secretary was 
also OSRD Contracting Officer; the legal channel for instructions to con- 
tractors was through him. According to the contract, Division Chiefs and 
Technical Aides could address the contractor only as representatives of the 
Contracting Officer, i.e., the Executive Secretary, although their primary 
responsibility was to NDRC or CMR. In order to bring the legal situation 
into accord with the actual facts, a significant change was made in the 
contract form in the spring of 1944. Responsibility under the contract was 
divided in the contract itself. Scientific aspects of the work under the con- 
tract were entrusted to a Scientific Officer named in the contract; business 
and fiscal aspects remained with the Contracting Officer. Such was the 
flexibility, co-operation and unity of purpose within OSRD that the earlier 
system had worked without difficulty, but the adoption of the Scientific 
Officer principle undoubtedly put contract operations upon a sounder basis. 
The practice that was usually followed was to name as Scientific Officer 
the Chief of the NDRC or CMR division having jurisdiction over the 

Article i. This article clearly established the authority of the Scientific 
Officer over the subject work. No attempt was made in the usual case to 
define closely in the contract itself the scientific limitations within which 
the contractor must work. Rather the usual practice was to define the ob- 
jective in general terms. The Scientific Officer closely followed the progress 
of the work and issued appropriate instructions as the work developed. 
This permitted him to focus attention upon likely leads without the re- 
quirement of a contract amendment every time something new developed. 
The same flexibility was permitted with reference to reporting the prog- 
ress of work; the normal practice was to require monthly reports, with 
special reports as needed. 

The provision governing termination was unusual in the ease with which 
extensions of time could be arranged. The OSRD practice was to write 
contracts for relatively short periods, usually six months, with an informal 
understanding that they would be extended if the progress of the work 
warranted. Rate of expenditure under many contracts was irregular and it 
was frequently desirable to extend contracts in time without an increase in 
funds. Under the provisions of Article i this was accomplished simply by 
sending the contractor a letter in duplicate requesting the extension which 
he accepted by signing one copy of the letter and returning it to OSRD. 
The saving in time over the execution of formal contract amendments was 
substantial in view of the volume of OSRD contract operations. 

The prohibition against cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost subcontracts and the 
limitation of fixed fees were in line with policies established by Congress. 
Requirement of approval of subcontracts involving research and develop- 
ment of the kind contemplated by the prime contract was designed to as- 


sure the Scientific Officer of control over the scientific work and to assure 
the Contracting Officer that the contract obligations, such as the patent 
clause, were not evaded through the device of subcontracts. 

The requirement of the Contracting Officer's approval of stipulated types 
of expenditure was a limitation on the general principle that the contractor 
should be free to purchase such equipment as he needed for the conduct of 
the contract work. Flexibility was essential in the interest of speed; and 
approval was required only of certain types of expenditure which were of 
an unusual nature and might absorb too high a proportion of contract funds. 

In the earlier forms of OSRD contract the Contracting Officer acted 
through authorized representatives who were situated in different parts of 
the country as required in the administration of the scientific program. 
With the adoption of the Scientific Officer device the Contracting Officer 
no longer acted through such representatives. His functions were such as 
best could be handled through a central ofl&ce. To avoid the creation of 
bottlenecks, the OSRD Fiscal Officer was made an Acting Contracting Offi- 
cer with authority over most fiscal matters and the head of the property 
control section an Acting Contracting Officer on property matters. Matters 
of policy were reserved for action by the Contracting Officer. The Scientific 
Officer, on the other hand, acted through scientific assistants, who were the 
Section Chiefs or Technical Aides designated to follow particular contracts 
in detail. The system worked well in practice. The term "scientific assistant" 
was ill-chosen in view of the caliber of men supervising scientific work for 
OSRD; "scientific deputy" would have been better. 

Article 2. In contrast with the first NDRC contract form, the later one was 
quite specific as to the items which could be included as reimbursable costs. 
Most of Chapter XIV on fiscal affairs is devoted to the provisions of Arti- 
cle 2. One additional point which may be mentioned is the "cost escape" 
clause. The subject work of OSRD contracts was stated in general terms, 
but the maximum amount for which the Government was obligated was 
definitely stated. By its very nature as an exploration of the unknown, there 
can be no guaranty of successful results of research for a stated sum of money. 
The contract recognized this by the provision that when the contractor 
had spent or obligated the maximum amount specified in the contract, he 
was not required to incur any further expense until the Government had 
first agreed to reimburse the additional expenditure. 

Article 5. The provisions of this article constitute the basis for the discus- 
sion of property matters in Chapter XVI. 

Article 4. The several clauses of Article 4 are discussed in the chapter on 
fiscal affairs (Chapter XIV). 

Article 5. This article had two forms, the "long form" and the "short 
form" patent clause; the reasons for the alternative provisions and the con- 


ditions of their use are discussed in the chapter on patent poUcy (Chap- 
ter XV). 

Article 6. Article 6 Hkewise had alternative forms. The form given in 
the appendix was that used in classified contracts. In contracts v^'hich were 
not classified, the article on security provisions consisted merely of those 
clauses which are designated (b), (d) and (e) in the article printed in the 
appendix. The security provisions are considered at some length in Chapter 

Article 7. The insertion of the provisions of Article 7 was required by 
the statutes and executive orders under which OSRD operated. 

Article 8. This was another article the insertion of which was required 
by law in all contracts involving production. It was not required or inserted 
in contracts of a purely research type not involving the employment of 
laborers and mechanics. 

Contracts for Procurement 

In the early days of NDRC its contracts were for research and the con- 
tract form devised for that purpose was adequate. As results began to flow 
from research, NDRC had need for another type of contract which would 
take into account the different type of facilities demanded. By July 1941, 
a simple purchase agreement form had been devised for the few cases re- 
quiring its use. The purchase was usually for a fixed price and the agree- 
ment included a description of the articles to be purchased, method and 
date of delivery, method of payment (usually installment), provision for 
purchase by OSRD from another source if the contractor defaulted, right 
of OSRD to make changes in drawings and specifications with provision for 
any necessary adjustment of price, assumption of risk by contractor until 
delivery, security provisions, and public policy provisions. 

As more and more of the OSRD work passed from the research and 
development stage into that of limited procurement, OSRD contractors and 
prospective contractors began to question the applicability of the "no-profit- 
no-loss" policy. Recognition was given the situation by Bush in a memo- 
randum of June 7, 1943, discussed in the chapter on fiscal affairs (Chapter 
XIV), which laid the basis for profit on research and development contracts 
having procurement aspects. 

Standard Form 1002 was adopted to meet the situation discussed in the 
Bush memorandum. Many of its provisions were identical with those of 
Form 1 00 1. The principal differences were the more exact description of 
the articles to be delivered and the establishment of a fixed price together 
with provisions for keeping it in line with the contractor's actual cost plus 
a reasonable profit. 


Contracts for Personal Services 

The regular staff of OSRD was recruited through Civil Service as is the 
normal practice of Government agencies. Civil Service procedures w^ere not 
adapted to the type of employment contemplated for the Office of Field 
Service, however, and the National War Agencies Appropriation Act, 1944, 
approved July 12, 1943, carried the following authority for OSRD: 

Salaries and expenses: For all necessary expenses of the OflBce of Scientific 
Research and Development, including . . . the employment by contract or 
otherwise, without regard to civil service or classification laws, at not to exceed 
$25 per day, of engineers, scientists, civilian analysts, technicians, or other neces- 
sary professional personnel . . . 

The contract form used under this authorization provided, in substance, 
as follows: (i) general description of the employee's duties. The employee 
agreed to perform such duties or services as might be assigned to him in 
a specified field, under the supervision and control of the Contracting Offi- 
cer or an authorized representative; (2) term of employment and payment 
for services, including allowances for travel; (3) patent clause embodying 
the substance of the OSRD short form clause; (4) security and public policy 
provisions; (5) provision that all disputes concerning questions of fact 
should be decided by the Contracting Officer, subject to appeal to the 
Director of OSRD. 

Contract Drafting 

Following the Director's approval of NDRC, CMR or other recommenda- 
tions, the contract section of the Administrative Office prepared appropriate 
letters of intent to prospective contractors based upon information furnished 
by the originating division. The supporting papers were then forwarded to 
the legal division for the drafting of the contract. Drafting of standard form 
contracts was done by a drafting unit (originally in the contract section, 
later in the legal division) which concentrated upon those not involving 
difficult questions or negotiations. Contracts involving unusual questions 
were handled individually by other attorneys. The system kept the difficult 
contracts from delaying the simpler ones. 

After the drafting was completed, the legal division endorsed its approval 
as to form on a "recommendation copy" and returned the file to the contract 
section. In the early days the contract was then sent to the General Counsel 
of OEM for his approval as to form, but this requirement was later dropped. 
The recommendation copy was next sent to the supervising technical divi- 
sion for its endorsement if the draft correctly incorporated the division's 


intention, or for modification if it did not. When both the legal and techni- 
cal divisions had approved, the copy was routed by the contract section to 
the Executive Secretary, who endorsed the recommendation copy if it was 
within the scope of the Director's approval. The original and one carbon 
were then sent by the contract section to the contractor for his signature. 

Upon return of the signed copies, the section checked them against the 
recommendation copy and sent them to the Contracting OfiBcer for signature 
on behalf of OSRD. If the contractor decUned to sign because the contract 
did not reflect his understanding of the agreement, the section would refer 
his comments to the legal, technical, or patent division depending upon the 
nature of the misunderstanding. In only a few cases was it impossible to 
agree upon a text satisfactory to both parties, although at times extensive 
negotiations were required before agreement was reached. After signature 
by the Contracting Officer, the contract section would conform all copies of 
the contract, assign a contract number, send the signed original to the Gen- 
eral Accounting Office, return the signed carbon to the contractor, and dis- 
tribute conformed copies to the supervising division, the fiscal section and 
the contract files. 

The records of the section were so maintained that it was possible at a 
glance to determine the exact location of any contract or proposed contract 
at any moment. The Executive Secretary was given a report showing the 
status of each contract under negotiation as of the close of business on each 
Wednesday. While the volume varied, during the winter of 1 943-1 944, on 
the average 225 contracts were in the process of negotiation at all times, 
with new contracts or supplements coming along at the rate of about 45 per 
week. The contract section was organized by Cecil L. Covington. When he 
left for the Navy, Mrs. Pauline Eason and Miss Margaret Simms served 
successively as Chief of the section. 

The research and development contract was the heart of OSRD operations. 
While unintelligent administration can make a good contract unworkable, 
even an enlightened administration will have hard going if the basic con- 
tract is not fitted to the purposes of research. Experience showed the OSRD 
contract to be well adapted to obtain good results. Its form, developed 
directly to meet an unusual situation, has been utilized by the Services in 
some of their research contracts, and the spirit in which it was administered, 
likewise engendered by the recognized need for co-operation, can be ex- 
pected to carry over into the future with good results. 




.LTHOUGH it was a small, temporary organization, OSRD 
handled an amount of money which was quite large according to peace- 
time standards. The responsibility for the administration of funds was one 
of those delegated by the Director to the Executive Secretary; the imple- 
mentation of that delegation was a function of the budget and finance 
office within the Administrative Division, headed by Carey G. Cruikshank 
as Fiscal Officer. Cruikshank, who had a wide background in Government 
fiscal operations, came to OSRD from the Department of the Interior. To 
him goes much of the credit for the smooth functioning of OSRD fiscal 

Serving immediately under Cruikshank was George Sklar as Assistant 
Budget and Finance Officer. The principal divisions of the office were the 
cost accounting section, W. F. Edwards, Chief; audit and claims section, 
M. R. Deutsch, Chief; budget and accounting section, W. B. Roberts, Chief; 
payroll unit, Mrs. Lillian M. Greene, head, and the special services unit, 
Mrs. Mae R. Magee, head. Gordon V. Potter, who had served in the fiscal 
office before joining the Navy, succeeded Roberts as Chief of the budget 
and accounting section on March 8, 1946. 

The magnitude of OSRD fiscal operations is indicated by the following 

Table i 










$ 6,430,000.00* 

$ 6,430,000.00 



$ 3,900,000.00 

$ 29,160,649.00 

























* Received from the Emergency Fund of the President for the operation of the Na- 
tional Defense Research Committee and the Office of Scientific Research and Development. 

t Received from the Foreign Economic Administration for equipment developed by 
OSRD contractors and transferred to foreign governments. 

t Through June 30, 1946. 

fiscal affairs 201 

Table 2 

Breakdown of 








% 1,500,000.00 

% 2,400,000.00 

% 3,900,000.00 





















* Through June 30, 1946. 

t Transfer of $5,000 from CIAA in 1945 not included here. 

Table 3 



Fiscal Allocations Transfers Appropriations Totals 

1941 $ 6,161,691.00 $ 6,161,691.00 

1942 8,294,181.56 $ 3.537,788.79 $ 27,794,869.62 39,626,839.97 

1943 592,287.76 69,842,819.49 72,019,315.10 142,454,422.35 

1944 2,618,276.00 30,312,650.24 129,582,671.50 162,513,597.74 

1945 2,783,359.70 66,129,786.14 98,559,955-25 167,473,101.09 
1946* 6,585,084.99 11,269,230.34 17,854,315-33 

Totals $20,449,796.02 $176,408,129.65 $339,226,041.81 $536,083,967.48 

* Through June 30, 1946. 

Out of the funds shown In Table i, $11,100,237.13 was used for adminis- 
trative expenses during the fiscal years 1 941-1946; this provided for the 
operations of the staff which supervised the use of the remainder of the 

Transfer of Funds 

The transfers to OSRD from the Army and the Navy were in substantial 
amounts as shown in Table 2. Something over half of the transfers for the 
fiscal year 1943 was to supplement the OSRD research and development 
budget. Most of the remaining transferred funds were for "crash" procure- 


ment, i.e., for the production under OSRD auspices of quantities of equip- 
ment developed by OSRD as described in an earlier chapter. 

It will be recalled that OSRD was enjoined to use the facilities of exist- 
ing Government agencies where they were suitable and available. The 
extent of this use is indicated by the following list showing Government 
agencies to which OSRD funds were transferred, together with the amounts 
of such transfers: 


Bureau of Agricultural and Industrial Chemistry 
1944 $46,483.00 

Total $46,483.00 

Bureau of Animal Industry 

1942 $5,000.00 

1943 2,250.00 

1944 6,750.00 

Total $14,000.00 

Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine 

1942 $ 68,100.00 

1943 93.I50-00 

1944 224,480.84 

1945 515,386.00 

1946 141,000,00 

Total $1,042,116.84 

Bureau of Plant Industry 

1941 $5,000.00 

1942 7,400.00 

Total $12,400.00 

Soil Conservation Service 

1945 $1,535-00 

1946 600.00 

Total $2,135.00 

Bureau of Home Economics 

1943 $15,500.00 

1945 15,760.00 

1946 14,847.00 
Total $46,107.00 

Department of Agriculmre Total $1,163,241.84 



Food and Drug Administration 

1943 $18,968.00 

1944 72,288.90 

1945 10,000.00 



u. s. 

Public Health Servi 



$ 45,080.00 









Total $366,643.72 
Federal Security Agency Total $467,900.62 


Fish and Wild Life Service 

1944 $16,200.00 

1945 18,675.00 

1946 6,048.34 




1 of Mines 


$ 96,700.00 











Total $2,141,700.00 
Department of Interior Total $2,182,623.34 


National Bureau of Standards 

1 94 1 $ 140,900.00 

1942 956,600.00 

1943 2,090,554.00 

1944 3,999.500.00 

1945 1,392,500.00 

1946 42,500.00 

Department of Commerce Total $8,622,554.00 



Bureau of Ordnance 

1941 $25,000.00 

1942 25,000.00 

1943 75,000.00 

Navy Department Total $125,000.00 


Quartermaster Corps 

1941 $10,000.00 

Army Medical Center 

1942 $9,000.00 

Ordnance Department 

1943 $30,000.00 

War Department Total $49,000.00 


1945 $7,776-54 

U. S. Coast Guard Total $7,776-54 


1945 :tt'9,252.i4 

Tennessee Valley Authority Total $9,252.14 

Grand total of funds transferred by OSRD to other Federal Agencies for 
research and development $12,627,348.48. 

Policy with Respect to Profit and Loss on Contracts 

In a memorandum of June 7, 1943, to Stewart, Bush discussed the poli- 
cies concerning profits under OSRD contracts. He reviewed the reasons for 
the original adoption of the "no-profit-no-loss" theory in OSRD research 
and development contracts and noted its general acceptance by OSRD con- 
tractors. He then continued that as OSRD projects moved into pilot plant 
production and experimental quantity production, prospective OSRD con- 
tractors were increasingly reluctant to accept OSRD cost-without-profit con- 
tracts, arguing that the facts did not warrant the extension to their cases of 
the "no-profit-no-loss" policy adopted for research and development contracts. 


After having inquired into the facts of several such cases, he had concluded 
that the point was well taken. Thus, unlike contracts involving normal 
research or development work, an OSRD contract calling for a substantial 
amount of straight shop, manufacturing or construction work required the 
use of personnel and facilities upon which commercial organizations usually 
relied for their profits. Use of those facilities on OSRD contracts prevented 
their use on more profitable war orders already on their books. Further- 
more, the shop work under some OSRD contracts was similar to the work 
then being done in the contractors' shops for the armed services on a profit 
basis. In such cases, the necessities of the situation, the public interest in 
starting the work as quickly as possible and equitable treatment of the 
prospective OSRD contractor required that the contract be executed on a 
reasonable profit basis. The amount of profit was not to exceed 7 per cent 
of the estimated cost, exclusive of profit. Contract Standard Form 1002 (See 
Appendix 3) was adopted for use in the relatively few cases where a profit 
was to be allowed. 

General Considerations 

In the early days of NDRC all fiscal functions were performed by Central 
Administrative Services (CAS) of the Office for Emergency Management. 
For its routine operations it was necessary for NDRC to maintain some 
fiscal records duplicating those maintained by CAS. The need for speed 
which was inherent in NDRC and OSRD functions was incompatible with 
the maintenance of fiscal control by another agency overloaded with work 
of other offices and at a different location. Gradually, one function after 
another was transferred from CAS to OSRD, and by November i, 1944, 
the last of the CAS fiscal functions relating to OSRD had been transferred 
to OSRD. 

There were few precedents for the type of operation OSRD was con- 
ducting. The entire program was built around the central idea that certain 
research and development work was urgently needed; that the best results 
could be obtained by leaving the scientist as free as possible to conduct that 
research; and that some method of fiscal control must be found which would 
protect the public interest in the proper expenditure of funds without un- 
duly infringing upon the primary objective of the research program. In 
establishing its fiscal procedures OSRD worked closely with the Bureau 
of the Budget and the General Accounting Office with the hope of estab- 
lishing those procedures upon a solid foundation. 

As will appear from the text printed in Appendix 2 the standard form 
contract contained a list of expenditures which were reimbursable as direct 
costs. One clause covered items specifically certified by the Contracting 
OfiScer as constituting a necessary part of the cost of the subject work. It 


was included in order that OSRD might reimburse contractors for ex- 
penditures made under unusual circumstances and in good faith but which 
might not fall within any of the other cost categories. Occasionally such 
costs would be suspended by auditors or would be questioned in the fiscal 
offices of the contractors. It was possible under this contract provision for 
contractors to request special authorizations from the Contracting Officer 
on such items, and if satisfactory explanations and adequate justifications 
were furnished and the OSRD technical representative approved, they 
were given. 

The OSRD fiscal policies and procedures were compiled by Cruikshank 
in a mimeographed volume entitled Contract Manual (Fiscal) which was 
distributed to OSRD contractors, OSRD personnel concerned, and inter- 
ested Government agencies including the General Accounting Office, Bureau 
of the Budget, War Department, and the Navy Department. The Manual 
was kept current by the issuance of amendments which were sent to the 
recipients of the original volume. The subjects covered in the Manual are 
indicated in the Table of Contents: 

Foreword Travel 

OSRD No-Loss-No-Gain Policy Terminations 

Preliminary Negotiations Property Control 

Letters of Intent Reports and Other Special 

Principles and Provisions of Contracts Requirements 

Direct Costs Subcontracts 

Indirect Costs (Overhead) Vouchering Instructions 

Tax Exemption Advance Payments 

Insurance Approvals of Vouchers 

Salaries Miscellaneous 

Special Expenditures Exhibits 


OSRD research contractors working on a no-profit-no-loss basis soon began 
to complain about the normal requirements of the General Accounting 
Office with respect to detailed itemization and substantiation of vouchers 
submitted under their contracts. The experience of OSRD early indicated 
that the usual vouchering procedures indirectly impaired the efficiency of 
research through delays introduced in obtaining reimbursements for legiti- 
mate costs. Research projects which were relatively small in size involved 
large numbers of insignificant items of cost which made detailed itemiza- 
tion unduly irksome and expensive. OSRD found that most contractors 
capable of performing research work of the type it needed were of estab- 
lished reputation; and it suggested to the Comptroller General that instead 
of requiring the usual itemization and substantiation from research con- 


tractors, there be accepted certifications covering vouchered amounts based 
upon accounts and records which the contractors would agree to keep until 
representatives of the General Accounting OflEce or the OSRD had an 
opportunity to examine them. It was pointed out to the Comptroller Gen- 
eral that many academic organizations did not have accounting procedures 
under which normal Government vouchering requirements could be met. 
Attention was called also to the fact that certain contractors refused to 
execute contracts on a cost basis unless relaxation from the ordinary voucher- 
ing procedure could be secured. Finally the Comptroller General was in- 
formed that much of the research work was secret and that complete item- 
ization and substantiation might result in unforeseen disclosures as to the 
nature of the work. 

The Comptroller General agreed that on the basis of the facts presented 
vouchering relaxation was warranted and issued to the OSRD two decisions 
(B-30282 dated January 4, 1943, and B-30282 of May 19, 1943) which 
formed the basis for the revised vouchering and audit procedures followed 
by OSRD thereafter in the administration of its research contracts. 

The revised vouchering procedure provided flexible control through par- 
tial itemization and substantiation as well as a series of certifications. Con- 
tractors accompanied each voucher with a certification that the amount 
claimed as reimbursement had been expended in performance of the con- 
tract and was properly chargeable thereto, that it was correct and that 
records pertaining thereto would be kept for the required period. The 
OSRD representative supervising the technical work certified, after exami- 
nation of the voucher, that to the best of his knowledge the items for which 
reimbursement was being claimed were required by and used in the per- 
formance of the contract work. After administrative examination and audit 
the OSRD Contracting Officer certified that the items of cost were necessary 
and reasonable and that the usual itemization and substantiation should be 
dispensed with. 

This vouchering plan proved satisfactory to OSRD technical representa- 
tives, generally acceptable to contractors, and adequate for the protection of 
the Government. It was later extended by the Comptroller General to the 
War and Navy Departments for use under research and development 

Advance Payments 

The First War Powers Act (Public Law 354, 77th Congress) and the 
implementing Executive Order No. 9001 (the provisions of which were 
extended to OSRD by Executive Order No. 9219) authorized advance pay- 
ments whenever in the judgment of the agency concerned "the prosecution 
of the war is thereby facilitated." Executive Order No. 9001 furthqr stated 


that advance payments should be made only after careful scrutiny to deter- 
mine that they would promote the national interest. 

Normally OSRD contracts did not provide for advance payments but in 
unusual cases when the contractor could justify the need and after he had 
furnished an acceptable current balance sheet, provision for advance pay- 
ment was made upon the favorable recommendation of the OSRD technical 
representative. In a number of instances academic contractors were unable 
to finance OSRD contract operations since their funds derived from foun- 
dations, grants, state appropriations, etc., were not available for such use, 
and in a few cases other nonprofit organizations were restricted by charter 
from using their funds to finance Government contract operations pending 
receipt of reimbursements. 

Advance payments were restricted to a monthly basis. OSRD technical 
representatives were given an opportunity to make recommendations on all 
advance payment vouchers submitted by contractors. This gave them a 
chance to pass upon the necessity for and reasonableness of each month's 
estimated expenditures and assisted generally in effecting a satisfactory con- 
trol of the situation. Technical representatives were authorized to question 
any apparently unreasonable or unnecessary items included in advance pay- 
ment requests and to recommend approval of lower amounts. Various 
administrative requirements designed to protect the integrity of advance 
payments were included in the Contract Manual {Fiscal), copies of which 
were furnished to contractors. 

At the peak of operations advance payments were being made under 
fifty-six different contracts to twenty-one contractors and approximated 
$10,000,000 per month. The advances were later supported by vouchers 
showing the usually required detail. As fast as the detailed supporting 
vouchers were received, the outstanding unsupported balances of advances 
were liquidated. 

Indirect Costs 

As pointed out in an earlier chapter, NDRC adopted as its guiding prin- 
ciple that research under its contracts should be conducted on a policy of 
"no-profit-no-loss," and further that full costs should be paid. The standard 
contract form listed a number of items as directly reimbursable, but it was 
recognized that there is a substantial indirect cost of a going concern which 
must be allocated as a part of the cost of a particular operation. NDRC 
sought to approximate this indirect cost by an allowance for "overhead," 
which initially was 50 per cent of labor costs in the case of nonprofit institu- 
tions and 100 per cent of labor in the case of profit establishments. 

Desiring to find out how this rule of thumb was working in practice, 
Conant, in August 1941, appointed a committee of disinterested individuals 


to look into it and a number of other items of NDRC fiscal policy. The 
committee consisted of Walter A. Jessup, President of the Carnegie Corpora- 
tion of New York, Chairman; Alan Gregg of the Rockefeller Foundation, 
and Elihu Root, Jr., prominent New York attorney. The Committee report 
of December 1941, recommended that in the case of contracts for over 
$35,000 a separate determination be made of the proper overhead charge 
with reference to the conditions of particular contract and the department 
and institution concerned. It was suggested that the recommendation as to 
the proper overhead percentage might be made after consultations with 
university comptrollers such as R. B. Stewart of Purdue, Lloyd W. Morey 
of the University of Illinois, Robert M. Underbill of the University of Cali- 
fornia, or Horace S. Ford of M.I.T. For smaller contracts the committee 
recommended that the practice of fixing a flat overhead percentage be fol- 
lowed, but with a review and a redetermination of the proper overhead for 
contracts with any institution when the aggregate of its contracts reached 
$150,000. There was a further recommendation that the base for computa- 
tion of overhead be broadened to include all direct costs and that the over- 
head percentage be lowered accordingly. 

Following the receipt of this report Bush asked the persons named in it 
to visit various academic institutions having OSRD contracts to recommend 
overhead allowances for those having total contracts in excess of $150,000. 
In March 1942, after having visited the institutions and discussed overhead 
costs with their presidents and other officials, these gentlemen made specific 
recommendations for overhead percentages at the several institutions. They 
also submitted a proposed plan of allowance for overhead costs on OSRD 
contracts with educational institutions. The plan provided for the computa- 
tion of overhead costs on a sliding scale starting with 50 per cent of salary 
costs on the first $250,000 of OSRD contracts with any one institution, 45 
per cent on the next $250,000, 40 per cent on the next $500,000, 35 per cent 
on the next $1,000,000, and 30 per cent on all above $2,000,000. Special 
consideration would be given to any off-campus project or any single con- 
tract of $100,000 or more, and the exact percentage applicable to such 
contracts should be determined on the basis of the conditions involved. 

This report was submitted for review to an expert accountant with no 
university connections. He suggested generally that it would be preferable 
for OSRD contracts with academic institutions to be written on a "provi- 
sional price" basis and renegotiated after the completion of the work. This 
plan was considered but not adopted. A modification of the overhead plan 
seemed preferable to the complications which might follow the adoption of 
a "provisional price" plan, especially in view of the opposition of con- 
tractors revealed in tentative discussions. 

In the course of the discussions of overhead the suggestion was made 
that the Comptroller General might rule the OSRD contract to be invalid 


as being analogous to the prohibited "cost plus a percentage of cost" type 
of contract. OSRD attorneys and the General Counsel for the Office for 
Emergency Management agreed that the OSRD contract was perfecdy legal; 
and their position was later supported by an unpublished decision of the 
Comptroller General. 

Since OSRD industrial contractors had acceptable cost accounting systems, 
it was undesirable to attempt to set up a schedule for the determination 
of their overhead costs under OSRD contracts. OSRD contract cost account- 
ants normally followed the contractor's cost accounting system when it was 
in accordance with accepted accounting practices; and they normally allowed 
necessary and reasonable expense items charged thereunder as outlined in 
the pamphlet Explanation of Principles for Determination of Costs under 
Government Contracts, which was issued in April 1942 by the War and 
Navy Departments. This booklet (generally known as the "Green Book") 
was a summary of Treasury Decision 5000 which defined and listed ad- 
missible and inadmissible costs under Government contracts. However, 
since that decision was concerned with costs under profit contracts, the 
"Green Book" was not followed blindly in determining legitimate expendi- 
tures under contracts executed on a cost basis. 

While it was impossible to establish any general rule for the appordon- 
ment of overhead costs to OSRD contracts, it was found that the appor- 
tionment could often be made equitably on the basis of the relation which 
the direct labor (hours or dollars) properly chargeable to the pertinent 
OSRD contract bore to the total direct labor involved in all the contractors' 
operations during the same period. 

The expansion of OSRD work with the consequent increase in the scale 
of operations under OSRD contracts meant greatly expanded payrolls and 
increased overhead payments based on those rolls. The situation clearly 
called for a study of the accounts of the larger contractors. A small but 
effective stafi was built up under W. F. Edwards, whose sole funcdon was 
to check overhead expenses of OSRD contractors. No attempt was made to 
inspect the record of indirect costs of smaller contractors. The staf? was too 
small to permit a check under every contract; the amount received under 
the overhead provision of smaller contracts was small; and the audits made 
of other contractors showed that the 50 per cent allowance had closely 
approximated actual costs during the period when the contract operations 
were small. 

The problem of ascertaining the amount of indirect costs was one pecul- 
iarly of the nonprofit institutions. Academic institutions had not been under 
the necessity of handling their accounts in as much detail as the industrial 
concerns, and there was considerable variation among them. Likewise there 
was a substantial range of opinion among university fiscal oflScers as to what 
constituted a proper charge against an allowance for indirect expenses. 


Cruikshank, Edwards and their staff proceeded slowly in an effort to work 
the matter out with the contractors and in the end they were successful 
in carrying the institutions with them in an agreement upon the proper 
elements to be considered, which was no mean achievement. 

A detailed schedule of allowable charges was adopted and inserted in the 
OSRD Contract Manual {Fiscal)^ where it will be available for consulta- 
tion by Government personnel administering research contracts for years 
to come. Overhead costs were first divided among the following nine major 
heads, which are listed merely to give an idea of the type of cost covered 
by the overhead allowance: 

A. Administrative and general expenses 

B. Departmental expenses 

C. Depreciation of building space used for performance of the subject work 

D. Depreciation of equipment used for performance of the subject work 

E. Interest on investment in buildings and equipment used for performance of 
the subject work 

F. Cost of maintenance and operation of facilities 

G. Interest on average outstanding receivables 
H. Cost of the use of technical libraries 

I. Other specific expenses. 

The manual gives a detailed list of items under each of the major heads, 
and suggests formulas for determining the proper allocations. This pro- 
cedure for determination of overhead costs on OSRD academic contracts 
proved to be adequate for the protection of the Government's interests and 
satisfactory to most OSRD contractors. In examining the overhead costs of 
the largest academic and industrial contractors to November 30, 1945, OSRD 
cost accountants found the following situation: (i) approximately 51 per 
cent had received excess overhead payments largely because of the expansion 
of operations under the contracts involved. Refunds to the Government or 
recovery through reduced future payments were obtained; (2) approxi- 
mately 40 per cent broke even; (3) approximately 9 per cent received over- 
head allowances amounting to less than overhead costs, the deficits in most 
cases being small; 6 per cent desired to absorb such losses and 3 per cent 
asked for, and received, contract amendments to make them whole. 

Control and adjustment of overhead payments were effected not only by 
securing refunds when required and reducing overhead percentages when 
necessary, but also in cases where contractors' operations reached high levels 
or were of a fluctuating nature, by execution of formal agreements placing 
a ceiling upon the number of dollars which might be collected within a 
given period under the overhead provision. These ceilings were changed 
from year to year to allow the collection by contractors of their actual over- 
head costs. Overhead computations were based upon the contractor's total 


OSRD business without attempting a further allocation as among different 
OSRD contracts. 

Both academic and industrial contractors displayed a splendid spirit of 
co-operation in assisting OSRD cost accountants to make examinations and 
audits of their accounts and records. In most cases reductions of over- 
head percentages were willingly accepted, and many refunds were made 
on an entirely voluntary basis. In practice the overhead provision as admin- 
istered seems to have served its purpose of leaving the institutions whole, 
neither richer nor poorer for having devoted a part of their facilities to this 
phase of the public interest in a period of great national peril. 

One aspect of the overhead problem was potentially quite troublesome. 
Academic institutions operate without financial profit; there is thus no 
account to which they can charge losses under Government operations 
except as they draw upon funds for their normal educational activities. 
Expenditures under OSRD contracts were made for the purposes of the 
contract. The beneficiary of the expenditures was the Government. They 
would not have been made except at the request of the Government and 
in the reasonable expectation that they would be reimbursed by the Gov- 

Yet, conceivably an expenditure ordered under a contract in good faith 
and made by the institution in good faith under such direction might upon 
audit some months or years later be held by the Comptroller General to 
have been improperly made. In what position would such a ruling leave 
the institution? It received no benefit from the expenditure, but the ruling 
of impropriety might require the institution to dip into its educational 
funds to make restitution to the Government. In an extreme case, an insti- 
tution supported by state funds might find itself legally unable to use its 
funds to meet the adverse ruling of the Comptroller General. Clearly such 
a situation has nothing in common with a profit-making establishment 
being required to return part of the profit earned under a Government 

To the extent of its ability OSRD tried to reassure its academic contractors 
that such a contingency was remote. OSRD endeavored to establish the 
legitimacy of expenditures its contractors were called upon to make. It 
aided contractors in adducing the facts which would assist the Comptroller 
General in reaching a favorable decision. But OSRD obviously could not 
take the final step and assure the contractors that there would be no dis- 
allowances. Further, as OSRD was but a temporary agency, there was the 
chance that it might not even be in existence to aid the contractor in pre- 
paring to meet a disallowance. 

Some contractors contended that in holding the overhead allowance to a 
figure which would cover only actual costs, OSRD left the contractor in a 
position where in the end he might suffer a substantial loss. This contention 


was recognized as a theoretical possibility, but it was not permitted to work 
a change in the calculations of overhead as any allowance would turn into 
a profit if there were no adverse rulings by the Comptroller General. It did 
have an important bearing on some cases, however. Overhead payments had 
been made prior to the examination of costs by OSRD accountants and in 
some cases these payments were found to have been excessive. While agree- 
ing to scale down future payments, some contractors insisted upon retain- 
ing all or a part of the excess as a "reserve" against future disallowances. 
OSRD never recognized the validity of the "reserves" as such. When its 
request for their return was refused in some cases, it sought at least a partial 
refund together with a commitment to return the balance at a future date 
when the contractor's contingent liability was no longer hanging over his 
head. In every case, the requested commitment was given. 


Within a short time after the establishment of the agency, it became 
apparent that grave insurance problems were created by the unique nature 
of certain OSRD activities. Not only did such activities involve the normal 
dangers of all experimental work but additional hazards resulted from the 
military character of the projects and the urgency of their completion. As 
illustration there may be mentioned such diverse activities as the synthesis 
of poison gases, the development of new and more powerful explosives, and 
following the performance of new devices in combat areas. 

One matter which early troubled some OSRD academic contractors work- 
ing on new explosives was the possibility of a disaster of catastrophic pro- 
portions. The chemist's faith in the accuracy of his calculations was not 
always reflected in the university's business office confronted with the specter 
of a series of explosions resulting from improper handling of new explosive 
compounds. An explosion on a truck transporting a new explosive through 
the streets of a city might result in damage claims in an amount suf&cient 
to wipe out an endowment. 

OSRD explored the possibility of seeking Congressional authorization to 
establish a contingent fund out of which to indemnify contractors directly. 
However, the Bureau of the Budget in 1942 rejected the suggestion, point- 
ing out that accurate calculation of the sum was impossible and concluding 
that it would be inadvisable to tie up a large sum of money without some 
factual basis for establishing its sufficiency. 

With the permission of the Bureau of the Budget OSRD then sought 
legislative authorization to promise indemnity to the contractors out of 
funds to be appropriated later. The authorization was granted in the 1943 
Appropriation Act (PubUc Law 678, 77th Congress) in the following 


Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 3679 of the Revised Statutes (31 
U.S.C. 665), the Office of Scientific Research and Development is authorized, in 
making contracts for the conduct of investigations or experiments, to agree on 
behalf of the United States to indemnify the contractor from such funds as may 
be hereafter appropriated for the purpose, against loss or damage to persons or 
property arising from such work. 

Pursuant to this authority, OSRD on July i, 1942, inserted the following 
provision in its standard form contract: 

Indemnity Clause. The Government shall indemnify the Contractor, from such 
funds as may be hereafter appropriated by Congress for such purpose, against 
loss or damage to persons or property arising from performance of its undertak- 
ings hereunder (including settlements made with the written consent of the 
Contracting Officer) not compensated for by insurance or otherwise, in amounts 
found and certified by the Contracting Officer to be just and reasonable; Pro- 
vided, That the Contractor shall give the Contracting Officer prompt notice of the 
institution of, and permit the Contracting Officer at his election to control the 
defense of, all law suits instituted against the Contractor with respect to any such 
alleged loss or damage. 

OSRD appropriation acts for subsequent fiscal years contained the same 
language relating to indemnity and the above provision accordingly was 
continued in the standard contracts. The provision was so restrictive and 
indefinite ("from such funds as may be hereafter appropriated for the 
purpose") that many OSRD contractors were unwilling to rely on it to the 
extent of completely omitting ordinary public liability insurance and similar 
normal business safeguards. 

The problem of protecting contractors against the loss of equipment pur- 
chased under OSRD contracts and subjected to unique hazards was trouble- 
some in 1 94 1 and early 1942, when the standard OSRD contract placed on 
the contractor all risks of loss as to such property. To protect themselves 
against this contingent liability, contractors usually secured property in- 
surance (fire, theft, windstorm, comprehensive, etc.), the cost of which 
was defrayed by the Government. Where operations were hazardous, such 
insurance was very costly, if obtainable at all. 

To meet this situation, the new standard form contract adopted in Janu- 
ary 1943, provided in Article 4 that the contractor should be responsible for 
loss of or damage to equipment purchased under the contract only so far as 
it was attributable to the willful misconduct or lack of good faith of an offi- 
cer of the contractor or of a person having substantially complete charge of 
the establishment where the contract work was performed. Since the Gov- 
ernment assumed almost complete risk of loss and thus acted in its tradi- 
tional role of self-insurer, there was no necessity for insurance protection 
by outside carriers. The provision resulted in a very substantial saving to the 


The general principle underlying OSRD insurance practices was simply 
that OSRD approved a contractor's self-protection by reasonable insurance 
whenever the risks covered were attributable to OSRD work and the loss 
in the event of accident would fall on the contractor. 

There remained the most serious difficulty of all — providing protection 
for scientific personnel voluntarily engaged in extra-hazardous work on 
behalf of OSRD. These fell into three broad categories: (i) salaried Gov- 
ernment employees, (2) OSRD appointees serving without compensation 
(WOC), and (3) contractors' employees and others associated with the 
contractors in the performance of OSRD contracts. 

As salaried Government employees were protected by certain statutory 
benefits, they presented no particular problem. To secure insurance protec- 
tion for WOC (without compensation) personnel was difficult, since OSRD 
could neither directly purchase special insurance for them nor reimburse 
contractors for premium payments. This situation was temporarily allevi- 
ated at a critical time by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York 
to the National Academy of Sciences which permitted the Academy to pay 
insurance premiums in a limited number of cases. The matter was particu- 
larly pressing because the activities undertaken for OSRD might have 
operated to invalidate insurance regularly carried by the appointee; and a 
man willing to undertake certain risks on his own might well think twice 
before taking a step which, in the event of an accident, might leave his 
family unprotected by insurance. 

Most pressing was the problem of contractors' employees. These men, 
who normally were engaged in teaching or some similar academic pursuit, 
were being asked without special compensation to undertake new activities 
involving risk of death or permanent disability. All their existing personal 
health or accident insurance, double indemnity benefits in life insurance, 
and much ordinary life insurance (preferred risks and rates) might be held 
to be voided by these new activities which fell within the usual policy ex- 
clusions of "deliberate self-exposure to great danger" and "risks of war." 

Some of the individuals were technically qualified for State Workmen's 
Compensation benefits as "employees," but the hazardous nature of their 
work made it impossible to persuade underwriters to assume the risks. 
Since most of the activities were secret in nature, full disclosure of the risks 
could not be made to an insurer. Moreover, many of the men qualified for 
Workmen's Compensation would, in the event of accident, receive benefits 
grossly disproportionate to the value of their services, their financial and pro- 
fessional standing and the net amount of their losses (in insurance voidance 
and otherwise) by reason of their OSRD work. Further, the majority of 
those affected were not eligible for Workmen's Compensation either because 
they were employees of universities and other "charitable corporations" 
excluded by state laws, or because they were merely "associated with" con- 


tractors in advisory or other capacities and hence were not quaUfied as 

This situation resulted in a reluctance on the part of contractors to under- 
take OSRD work for fear both of loss of personnel and of possible future 
liability on the contractors' part. Staff crises were precipitated at several 
institutions with employees insisting that their families be accorded some 
measure of protection. 

Several contractors individually attempted to obtain adequate insurance 
protection for their employees and themselves. This proved to be exceed- 
ingly difficult because insurance companies were reluctant to take a small 
number of very dangerous risks. The secrecy surrounding most of the work 
prevented disclosure to the insurer of precise information which would 
enable it to establish some actuarial basis for the premium, and most war 
risks then were incalculable. As a result, few institutions could obtain ade- 
quate coverage and those which did so found the rates to be almost pro- 

Contractors forced to pay large premiums demanded that OSRD reim- 
burse them for the expenditures as necessary costs of performing the contract 
work. After careful investigation of the facts establishing the necessity for 
such insurance and after the General Counsel of OEM had approved the 
legality of the disbursement, such expenditures were approved by the Con- 
tracting Officer. 

It was obvious that a situation in which the contractors affected were 
compelled to make individual deals with different insurers was haphazard 
and uneconomical. Yet, there was no practical way in which OSRD could 
"assume" such risks and act as self-insurer. The legislative permission to 
indemnify contractors was, of course, inapplicable to a situation in which 
the primary necessity was indemnification of personnel rather than con- 
tractors. Reimbursing an individual contractor for premiums caused little 
difficulty but a more economical method of handling the problem was 

The matter was the subject of several conferences between OSRD and its 
contractors, the latter requesting that OSRD undertake to unite their re- 
spective problems and interests so as to effect a coherent and economical 
plan. A number of the leading insurance syndicates in the United States 
declined to attempt a solution of the problem. Finally, however, an accepta- 
ble proposal was secured from a syndicate headed by the Fidelity and 
Casualty Company of New York. After obtaining an opinion from the 
General Counsel of OEM establishing the legality of his action, the Director 
of OSRD approved the acceptance of the proposal. 

The main feature of this plan was the payment of a principal sum of 
$10,000 to any assured who died or suffered total and permanent disability 
"as a direct result of his OSRD activities." Certain other benefits concerning 


maiming, temporary disability, and hospitalization expenses were included. 
The policy did not provide twenty-four-hour coverage since it was intended 
to protect the assureds only against accidents occurring in the course of their 
OSRD work. The substance of the program was embodied in a Master 
Policy executed by the company and delivered to OSRD. Individual certifi- 
cates of insurance were issued by the company to the assureds. The policy 
became effective October 19, 1942; and it was extended through May 30, 
1945, at which time the business was transferred to the Indemnity Insurance 
Company of North America. 

The Master Policy itself was simply a document of convenience incorpo- 
rated by reference into each individual certificate of insurance. Each certifi- 
cate was a contract between the company and the individual assured, with 
the Government and the contractor receiving certain rights (through read- 
justment clauses, etc.) as third party beneficiaries. 

One of the more difficult specific problems was the determination of a 
premium which would be reasonably calculated to protect all parties to the 
transaction. The Government desired to obtain a low premium rate. The 
company's primary concern at the outset was self-protection. The risks were 
incalculable on an actuarial basis; the general nature of the assureds' activi- 
ties was not revealed to the company for security reasons, but its representa- 
tives were informed that all assureds would be performing extra-hazardous 
work and many of them would be directly subject to enemy action in combat 
areas. The possibility of a catastrophe could not be ruled out. 

The agreement fixed the premium at $150 per policy year, later reduced 
to $100. To protect the Government, a readjustment formula was provided, 
under which a recomputation would be made one year after the expiration 
of the Master Policy (to allow time for the disposition of all claims) and 
"excessive" premiums would be returned to the Government. The precise 
formula was stated in the Master Policy. To protect the Company, provision 
was made that when its losses reached a certain figure, it could request 
negotiations for a higher premium and if the negotiations were unsuccessful 
after fifteen days, could cancel upon sixty days' notice. 

As originally put into effect, the plan embraced activities in the conti- 
nental United States and Canada, or within 300 miles of the coasts thereof. 
The Company refused to grant broader coverage at the outset, preferring to 
await developments. On March 24, 1943, coverage was extended to the 
British Isles, Greenland, Iceland, South America, Central America, the 
West Indies, Hawaii and Alaska, including travel to and from such places. 
The premium for this foreign coverage was $25 per month. If the traveler 
were already an assured, the domestic premium was credited and the net 
cost of the foreign extension was $12.50 per month. Later foreign coverage 
was extended to additional areas. 

In order to avoid the administrative nuisance of constant monthly re- 


newals, the danger of lapse through inadvertence, etc., contractors normally 
insured an employee for the full remaining policy term. Insurance for a 
shorter term was placed when it was clear that the proposed assured would 
be engaged in extra-hazardous activities for a shorter period of time and 
there was no probability that any other persons would perform extra- 
hazardous work under the pertinent contract. Since substitutions with 
premium credits were permitted under the Master Policy, this system 
allowed the contractor to maintain a separate running account with the 
company for each OSRD contract. An attempt to treat all contracts with 
the same contractor as a group was abandoned as unsatisfactory in practice. 

A superficially vexing problem was presented by the fact that OSRD 
contracts were normally written for fairly short periods (usually six months), 
with an informal understanding that in all probability they would be re- 
newed for at least a similar period. It would have been manifestly dis- 
advantageous for contractors to have taken out insurance for a period not 
exceeding the then existing term of the contract with subsequent renewals 
from time to time. Such a system would present not only administrative 
complications but also substantial risks of lapse. Contractors frequendy 
continued work when no formal contract supplement was in existence while 
awaiting formal approval and execution of the necessary documents. The 
insurance remained in force at such times. 

Experience under the Master Policy was favorable from an actuarial point 
of view. With the favorable turn of the war, the insurance situation became 
easier and it became possible to obtain a policy carrying a lower premium 
rate. Transfer of some OSRD contracts to the Navy was under discussion 
and the Navy was confronted with the necessity of finding an insurance 
plan comparable to that of OSRD. On its own behalf and on behalf of 
OSRD the Navy began negotiations which eventually resulted in the issu- 
ance of Master Policy FD-502 by the Indemnity Insurance Company of 
North America to the Navy Department, under which world-wide, extra- 
hazardous insurance was available in the principal amounts of $5000, 
$10,000, and $20,000 for individual certificates and at a premium rate of 
$62 per year for $10,000 of insurance. The provisions of the new policy 
closely resembled those of the earlier one. 

In view of the lower premium rate and broader geographical coverage 
of the new policy, extra-hazardous insurance requested by OSRD contractors 
subsequent to April i, 1945, and approved by OSRD was placed under the 
new Master Policy. Insurance under the Fidelity and Casualty Company 
Master Policy was cancelled and coverage was transferred to the new carrier 
in appropriate cases. 

To benefit by the coverage under the Master Policy the Government 
representative negotiating a particular contract determined whether the 
contractor's employees would perform such extra-hazardous activities that 


special insurance should be provided. If so, the contractor was told about 
the insurance provided under the Master Policy and was furnished a set 
of forms. The contractor then sent a request to the Contracting Officer 
asking for approval for the special insurance, and authority to include 
premium payments therefor as an item of "actual cost" under the contract. 

This request was required to be supported by a certification that (a) the 
insurance was necessary for the successful completion of the work, (b) Work- 
men's Compensation was either unavailable or insufficient, and (c) the con- 
tractor had obtained from the individual to be insured an executed "partial 
release." The request was accompanied by the individual application filled 
in to contain the required information concerning the assured, and the 
executed partial release. The limit of insurance was $10,000 per individual. 

The contractor's request for approval with its attachments was sent to 
the OSRD Contracting Officer through the Government representative 
supervising the particular contract for his recommendation and certifica- 
tion that the proposed assured was performing extra-hazardous work under 
the contract in question. Following receipt of approval from the Contract- 
ing Officer, the contractor forwarded an "insurance notice" to OSRD, which 
forwarded it to the Company. Upon the mailing of the notice, insurance 
was effective as of the preceding midnight by the terms of the Master Policy. 
The Company sent an insurance certificate to the contractor for delivery 
to the assured, together with a premium invoice payable within thirty days. 
After payment of the invoice, the contractor billed OSRD on a public 
voucher for the amount of its expenditure. 

Clearance Prior to Final Payments 

Article 2(a) of the standard OSRD contract authorized the Contracting 
Officer to withhold all or any part of the final reimbursement payment 
until receipt of the reports required under the contract. In a few cases there 
were differences of opinion between contractors and the OSRD as to the 
meaning of the term "final" payment. In order to secure reimbursement 
promptly and in the largest possible amount certain contractors conceived 
the idea of covering in two vouchers what would normally have been the 
final payment voucher; and they insisted that the OSRD approve for imme- 
diate payment the one covering the larger portion of the total amount as a 
prefinal payment, leaving OSRD with a final payment voucher in an in- 
significant amount. This procedure would obviously defeat the purpose of 
the withholding provision — to stimulate the contractors to comply promptly 
with the provisions of the contract. 

To meet this situation the practice was adopted of withholding an amount 
not to exceed 10 per cent of the total dollar value of the contract concerned, 
but not less than $1,000 nor more than $50,000, until the contractor had 


filed an acceptable final technical report, property accounting, invention 
disclosure and patent designation as required by the contract. When final 
payment vouchers exceeded the amount to be withheld under this policy, 
only the excess wsls approved for payment, w^ith the remainder suspended 
pending receipt of the final reports. 

The establishment of flexible financial controls, adequate to protect the 
public interest without imposing unnecessary restraints upon the conduct 
of needed research, was a progressive development which kept pace with 
the growth of OSRD. Working closely with the General Accounting Office, 
it was possible to obtain a sympathetic hearing on problems confronting the 
agency. From this experience, precedents developed which will be of sub- 
stantial benefit to other agencies charged with the promotion of military 
research in the future. 




DRC early recognized that the handUng of patent rights 
to inventions made under its auspices would present a major problem not 
easy of solution. The point was discussed at some length at the informal 
conference of June 25, 1940, preceding the organization of the Committee. 
There is no uniform policy applying to inventions made by Government 
employees, and NDRC had a wide range of precedents upon which to base 
its decision with reference to its own employees. NDRC technical personnel 
were employed to supervise research under contracts, not to make inven- 
tions. It was highly desirable that there be no possibility of their being 
charged with using information obtained in the course of their duties to 
establish patent rights for themselves. Accordingly the adopted policy, which 
was put in writing as Administrative Circular 10.06 of September 15, 1943, 
was that technical personnel should assign to the Government the titles to 
inventions and discoveries made by them in the line of their dudes. The 
limited extent to which OSRD employees engaged in making inventions 
of their own is indicated by the fact that as of April 8, 1946, only twelve 
inventions had been reported under this circular. 

Development of the Patent Clause in OSRD Contracts 

At the informal conference of June 25, 1940, Commissioner Coe was 
requested to draft a tentative contract clause providing generally that when- 
ever an invention was made in the course of research work financed in 
whole or in part with funds advanced by the Committee, the NDRC 
should decide whether a patent application should be filed and, on the basis 
of equity, what were the respective rights of the inventor and of the Gov- 
ernment. The matter was again discussed at the first meeting of the Com- 
mittee on July 2, 1940; and on August 29, 1940, the Committee adopted a 
principle which was incorporated in its early contracts in the following 
language: , 

It is understood and agreed that whenever any patentable discovery or inven- 
tion is made by the Contractor or its employees in the course of the work called 
for in paragraph i hereof, the Committee shall have the sole power to deter- 
mine whether or not a patent application shall be filed, and to determine the 
disposition of the tide to and the rights under any application or patent that may 
result. It is further understood and agreed that the judgment of the Committee 


on such matters shall be accepted as final, and the Contractor, for itself and for 
its employees, agrees that the inventor or inventors will execute all documents 
and do all things necessary or proper to carry out the judgment of the Committee. 
The Contractor agrees that it will include the provisions of this paragraph in all 
contracts of employment with persons who do any part of the work called for 
in paragraph i hereof. 

At the same time the Committee authorized the Chairman to appoint 
an Advisory Committee on Patents to advise on general principles and on 
procedure in specific cases. Coe was appointed Chairman of this commit- 
tee and Loyd H. Sutton, a Washington attorney, was designated to serve 
with him. On the basis of a report by this committee, a resolution was 
adopted at the October 25, 1940, meeting of NDRC which directed that 
every contract should provide that no suit should be brought against the 
Government on any patent granted upon an invention made under the 
contract; that, whenever, with the assent of the Committee, the contractor 
should assign to the Government the entire right, title and interest in an 
invention made under a contract, the Committee should pay all costs inci- 
dent to the filing, prosecution and issuance of the application for patent; 
that, wherever, with the assent of the Committee, the contractor retained 
all rights in any invention made under a contract, it should pay such costs; 
and that special circumstances might justify a departure from these gen- 
eral principles in a particular case. 

The patent policy adopted by NDRC up to this time left the contractor 
completely subject to the judgment of the Government as to the disposition 
of rights to inventions made under NDRC contracts. Some industrial con- 
tractors refused to sign contracts with such a provision. The situation was, 
in fact, somewhat anomalous. The United States was at peace and many 
people believed it would not become involved in the war being waged in 
Europe. On the other hand, NDRC was obsessed with the urgency of its 
task, fearing that the United States would be forced into the war while still 
unprepared from a scientific standpoint. To avoid delays it was essential 
that NDRC deal with organizations possessing the best available scientific 
manpower and facilities. Time was of the essence. There was need, not 
only for the facilities of the best equipped and most advanced groups in 
the country, but for their best brainpower as well. In effect NDRC was 
asking America's leading companies to take their best men oItE their own 
problems and put them (at cost) on problems selected by NDRC, and then 
leave it to NDRC to determine what rights, if any, the companies would 
get out of inventions made by their staff members. 

These companies had acquired a great deal of "know-how" as a result 
of years of effort and the expenditure of their own funds, often in large 
amounts. The research they were being asked to undertake was in many 
cases in line with their regular work (which made the companies particu- 


larly valuable to NDRC for it meant avoiding a loss of time while the 
contractor familiarized himself with a new field) and might result in some 
cases in inventions they might be expected to make at some future date at 
the appropriate place in their own programs. In some cases the Government 
contract involved minor adaptations of past inventions made by the con- 
tractors, and in such cases the contribution to the final product attributable 
to the work financed by the Government was relatively insignificant. But 
under the patent clause thus far offered by NDRC a company might be 
excluded from using its inventions under an NDRC contract in its own 
business, and might even find its competitors licensed by the Government 
while licenses were refused to it. 

The Army and Navy had rarely, if ever, asked for rights as extensive as 
those demanded by NDRC. Instead they took licenses which varied in dif- 
ferent situations but left commercial rights in the contractor. NDRC was 
created to aid the country to get ready for war, not to cure any inequities 
which might have grown up under the patent system created by Congress. 
The position expressed in the patent clause was hardly as important as get- 
ting the country ready for a technological war if the situation was as serious 
as it seemed when NDRC was created. It was true, of course, that many 
patriotic citizens did not regard the situation as serious, and the compul- 
sion exerted by an appeal to patriotism in time of war was lacking. 

Such a compulsion might have caused some companies to accept the pro- 
posed patent clause in time of war when they were unwilling to do so in 
time of peace. There was no occasion to find out, for negotiations could 
not be permitted to drag until the United States entered the war. Drag, 
they did, for months, but not at the expense of the scientific research pro- 
gram. The principal companies involved in the early negotiations over the 
patent clause were General Electric, Radio Corporation of America, West- 
ern Electric and Westinghouse Electric. None of them was willing to ac- 
cept the NDRC patent clause; and until agreement could be reached, no 
contract could be signed. All four companies, and others later, worked 
under letters of intent, expediting the needed research and relying upon 
later agreement to pave the way for reimbursement for their costs. 

The Patent Advisory Committee was given the task of obtaining agree- 
ment upon a patent clause. Extended negotiations were had with proposed 
contractors. At its meeting on January 17, 1941, the NDRC adopted in 
principle a recommendation of the Patent Advisory Committee which in 
essence provided that the Government should receive a royalty-free, irrev- 
ocable license for military, naval and national defense purposes under in- 
ventions made under a contract. Minor modifications were made in the 
clause which was textually approved at the March 7, 1941, meeting. A 
further minor modification was made in June 1941. With the formal 
changes made to fit it into the revised OSRD contract form, this patent 


clause came to be known as the "long form" clause. (See Appendix 2, 
Article 5.) 

The main points in this rather lengthy article were: (a) that the con- 
tractor granted to the Government an irrevocable option to purchase a li- 
cense on reasonable terms, arrived at through negotiations, under any 
inventions heretofore owned or controlled by the contractor, concerned 
with the subject matter of the contract; (b) that the contractor granted to 
the Government an irrevocable royalty-free license to make, have made and 
use for military, naval, and national defense purposes any invention made 
during the performance of the work of the contract; (c) that the con- 
tractor would, prior to final settlement, make a complete disclosure of all 
inventions made in carrying out the work under the contract; (d) that 
he would inform the Government of inventions he had covered or would 
cover by application for patent; (e) that the Government should have the 
right to file applications for patent on any invention that the contractor 
elected not to cover by application for patent; (f) that in the event the 
Government filed the application for patent, there would be an assign- 
ment of that invention to the Government subject to a royalty-free, non- 
exclusive, nontransferable license to the contractor. 

The Patent Advisory Committee was unsuccessful in trying to have the 
license required by the long form clause extend to all governmental pur- 
poses. The argument advanced for the more limited license was that the 
whole purpose of NDRC was to contribute to national defense and that 
it would be unfair to require the contractor to give a general license cov- 
ering fields which had nothing to do with national defense. Coe consulted 
the War and Navy Departments and was told that the more limited li- 
cense would be satisfactory to them. The clause adopted by NDRC was 
recommended by the Patent Advisory Committee as the one which would 
"come as near meeting with general acceptance as anything we can draw." 
The NDRC adopted the clause as equitable under the circumstances. 

With the adoption of the long form clause the log jam in the signing of 
contracts with industrial concerns was broken. The long form was not a 
substitute for the earlier clause (which, with the adoption of the long 
form, came to be called the "short form" clause); rather the two forms 
were used concurrently as alternative clauses. Formal changes were made 
in the short form when the OSRD contract form was revised, but in sub- 
stance it did not vary from the time of its original adoption on August 29, 
1940. (See Appendix 2, Article 5.) 

The short form clause was adopted as the standard for contracts recom- 
mended by CMR because of the broad public interest involved in medical 
research. It was also used in contracts in the field of atomic energy, about 
which more will be said later. The third principal category of contracts 
using the short form consisted of so-called "central laboratory" contracts — 


those where it had been necessary for OSRD to contract with an academic 
institution to build up a special staff for work in a field in which there was 
no existing composite group of specialists, e.g., radar, rockets and anti- 
submarine devices. The long form was standard where the contractor had 
an established position or an existing fund of knowledge upon which OSRD 
wished him to build for the development of specialized equipment or in- 

OSRD adhered closely to the two standard forms of patent clause as 
being adequate to meet all situations. Many industrial contractors were 
originally reluctant to accept the long form without change; it seemed that 
patent counsel for nearly every firm wanted to modify the language to 
conform to his favorite modes of expression. Many of the suggestions can- 
celled each other out, although this was not very helpful as the suggestions 
originated with different counsel and were presented by different con- 
tractors. Believing that uniformity of language was essential if the possibili- 
ties of later misconstruction of intent were to be minimized, OSRD permit- 
ted few variations from the standard clause. 

The permitted variations were largely by way of additions to the stand- 
ard clause. Thus in a few cases a clause was added to assure the contractor 
that the Government would hold him harmless under the provisions of 
the Act of June 25, 191 0, for infringement of any patents involving equip- 
ment used under the contract. In a few other cases the subject work was 
more accurately stated in the patent clause than in Article i of the con- 
tract, i.e., certain aspects of a problem not intended to be worked upon, 
but capable of inclusion by a broad construction of Article i, were specifi- 
cally excluded in the patent clause. In another group of contracts the 
interpretation OSRD gave to the long form was spelled out in slightly 
different terms upon the insistence of the contractor; these included such 
points as that the applicability of the license to "processes" was coextensive 
with the license covering "materials," and a refinement of the obligation 
to grant licenses under prior developed inventions. 

The short form clause was used by OSRD in 780 contracts involving 
$338,911,644.92 and the long form in 1410 contracts under which $165,- 
675,748.52 was obligated. The distribution is given in further detail in 
Bush's testimony contained in Hearings on Science Legislation (5. 7297 
and Related Bills), 79th Congress, First Session, Volume 5, pp. 1118-1121. 

An entirely different patent clause was used in a group of contracts di- 
rected toward the synthesis of penicillin or a therapeutic equivalent thereof. 
The commercial organizations most concerned had been carrying on re- 
search in the field at their own expense for some time and they desired to 
continue at their own expense. Some of them had already discovered valuable 
information although mostly not of a patentable nature. OSRD's primary 
interest was to work out a procedure whereby the synthesis of peni- 


cillin for war casualty use could be expedited by a full interchange of infor- 
mation among all research teams so that one team would not waste valuable 
time on work already done by another team. With the advice of the Com- 
missioner of Patents and after clearance with the Department of Justice, 
an arrangement was worked out with the commercial organizations under 
which (i) there would be complete interchange through OSRD of infor- 
mation discovered by all the OSRD contractors; (2) the commercial organ- 
izations would continue to finance their own work, and (3) OSRD would 
have the right to determine the disposition, among the organizations that 
made contributions through OSRD of valuable information or inventions, 
of all patents covering discoveries or inventions made under the contracts 
that were attributable to the interchange of information through OSRD. 
In addition the Government was to receive a royalty-free license for military, 
naval, and national defense purposes under all patents resulting from work 
done by these contractors in the synthetic penicillin field, both before and 
after the execution of the OSRD contracts. Finally, OSRD was given the 
right to require contractors who would ultimately become the titleholders 
of the patents to license other designated organizations, whether or not 
they contributed inventions or relevant information, upon the payment of 
reasonable royalties. 

Administration of the Patent Program 

Bush wanted to place the active administration of the OSRD patent pro- 
gram in the hands of a man familiar with Army and Navy patent prac- 
tices. At his request the Secretary of the Navy assigned to OSRD Com- 
mander (later Captain) Robert A. Lavender, U.S.N. (Retired), who was 
designated as Advisor on Patent Matters on October 16, 1941. Lavender's 
first assistant was Lieutenant Colonel Paul P. Stoutenburgh. 

It was realized that the full enjoyment of the rights under inventions 
made in carrying out the subject work of OSRD contracts could be had 
only by the careful administration of the patent articles. Not only should 
the reports of inventions be complete in their technical details so that the 
Government would be in a position to prepare and file applications promptly, 
but also the original records of the making of the inventions should be ac- 
curate and complete to establish the Government's position before the 
Patent Office in interference proceedings, as well as before the Court of 
Claims in case the Government should be sued later on a patent under which 
it had no license. 

The Division Chiefs were selected as the logical officials, technically and 
administratively, to supervise the reporting of inventions. They had the 
assistance of Technical Aides, each of whom was in close touch with the 
work carried on under certain contracts. The Technical Aides were also 


in close contact with officers in the War and Navy Departments who were 
famihar with the results to be accomplished through the research and the 
applicability of inventions and discoveries to existing or prospective equip- 

The standard procedure was for the Division Chiefs to call upon the 
contractors to file invention reports with them as soon as practicable after 
each invention was completed. The Division Chiefs then transmitted copies 
of the invention reports to the Advisor on Patent Matters, identifying the 
contract under which the invention was developed and the project to 
which it related. These reports were in turn transmitted to the War De- 
partment through the Office of the Judge Advocate General or to the Navy 
Department through the Office of Research and Inventions according to 
which Service had the predominating interest. In accordance with arrange- 
ments entered into with the War and Navy Departments in September 
and October 194 1, the preparation and filing of applications for patent 
arising under OSRD contracts were handled by the patent divisions of 
those departments rather than by OSRD. 

It was recognized that many questions involving a knowledge of patent 
law were bound to arise within the divisions, particularly with reference 
to the sufficiency of original records and the presentation of technical in- 
formation in proper form. It was, therefore, decided that patent attorneys 
should be assigned to the Division Chiefs for consultation on patent mat- 
ters. These patent advisors to the Division Chiefs were stationed, as per- 
sonnel became available, at Cambridge, New York, Chicago, and Washing- 
ton. Because of the diversity of research supervised in the vicinity of Wash- 
ington, separate advisors were located there for chemistry, electronics, 
mechanical and medical activities. It was impossible to obtain a sufficient 
number of civilian patent attorneys to fill all of these positions and, at the 
request of the OSRD, a number of Army and Navy officers were made 

Uniformity and adequacy in handling the details of compliance with 
the patent clause were sought through a series of administrative circulars 
devoted exclusively to patent matters. Efforts were made to insure that 
contractors would keep their records in such form and detail as to simplify 
the reporting of inventions and the preparation of patent applications. 

As an extracurricular activity OSRD assisted the Patent Office, at its re- 
quest, by examining filed applications for patent with a view to recom- 
mending which of them should be kept secret for reasons of national se- 
curity. The persons reviewing filed applications were different from those 
responsible for selecting the claims to be made for inventions under OSRD 
contracts, a precaution dictated by the desirability of avoiding any possi- 
bility that an OSRD application might be influenced by information derived 
from a review of applications of others. 


Under the Act of July i, 1940, as amended (35 U.S.C. 42), an applicant 
against whom a secrecy order has been issued by the Commissioner of 
Patents is entided to make "tender" of his invention to the Government and 
to receive compensation for the use of the invention from the date of such 
use rather than the date of issue of the patent. The purpose of the statute 
v^as to make the latest inventions available to the Government; and the 
Secretaries of War and the Navy were authorized by the Act to negotiate 
with the owner of the invention for the settlement of claims for compen- 
sation while the application was pending, although no claim might be 
filed against the Government in the Court of Claims until after issuance 
of the patent. 

In order that the OSRD divisions might have the benefit of the inven- 
tions claimed in applications tendered to the War and Navy Departments, 
a procedure was established whereby those Departments referred copies 
of the tendered applications to the OSRD divisions through the Advisor 
on Patent Matters. It was realized that the Technical Aides to whom these 
applications were referred were in the best position to furnish available 
information useful in the settlement of any claim. Accordingly, they were 
requested to inform the Advisor on Patent Matters as to whether the al- 
leged invention in the application was new, operative or adaptable to 
immediate use. 

In administering OSRD contracts containing the short form patent 
clause, Lavender operated under a general delegation of authority that 
provided (i) for a reference of each invention either to the War Depart- 
ment or the Navy Department, depending upon which department was 
the source of a request to OSRD to undertake the particular project, for a 
determination as to whether or not an application for a patent should be 
filed on behalf of the Government; (2) that if the interested department 
determined that such an application should be filed, it should file the appli- 
cation and arrange for the assignment of the entire right, title and interest 
to the Government; and (3) that if the interested department determined 
that no patent application should be filed on behalf of the Government, 
it should notify the contractor that it might file in its own behalf, subject 
to the grant to the Government of a nonexclusive, royalty-free license for 
governmental purposes. 

The correspondence load of the Patent Division frequently ran as high 
as 600 to 700 letters a week; by January 31, 1946, 6746 invention reports 
had been processed by the division. Of these, 2601 had been covered by 
applications for patent filed in the United States Patent Office, of which 
1276 were filed by the contractors, 805 by the War Department, and 520 
by the Navy Department. The Services had notified the patent division 
that they would file applications for patent on 513 additional invention 
reports, but that 1432 were not of sufficient interest to warrant the prep- 


aration of applications for patent. The Patent Division at that time had 
not been informed of the election of the Services as to the remaining 2200 
invention reports. 

There are two fields of OSRD research and development which merit 
special mention from a patent standpoint: (i) radar, in which OSRD, the 
War Department, and the Navy Department established a definite patent 
program integrated among the three agencies; and (2) atomic energy, a 
new field opening up untold possibilities for the future in both military 
and civil applications. 

The Government Radar Patent Program 

In early 1942, OSRD, the Army, and the Navy were all engaged in 
research and development in the field of radar. The OSRD program was 
centralized in Divisions 14 and 15, the principal laboratories being the 
Radiation Laboratory at M.I.T., and the Radio Research Laboratory at 
Harvard University. It was under the short form patent clause, which 
meant that the Government had to arrange for the preparation, filing and 
prosecution of the applications for patent under these contracts. 

The first plan was for a small group of attorneys to be employed at the 
Radiation Laboratory to make invention reports in the form of applications 
to be forwarded to the Navy Department for filing and prosecution. It 
soon became apparent from the number of inventions processed in this 
manner, not only that the Navy Department Patent Section was unable 
to secure a sufficient number of attorneys to handle the applications orig- 
inating in OSRD, but also that there was an overlapping of claims of in- 
ventorship as between naval personnel and M.I.T. personnel. This conflict 
focused attention upon other possible conflicts with inventors in the War 
Department laboratories. As a result of a series of conferences of represen- 
tatives of OSRD, the Army and Navy, it was agreed that, in view of the 
enormous sums of money being spent by the Government in the develop- 
ment of radar equipment, a Government Radar Patent Program (GRPP) 
should be established. This program provided for a monthly meeting of 
the representatives of the several laboratories. At each meeting matters of 
policy were decided and the latest technical developments at each laboratory 
reviewed, to the end that possible conflicts in claims of inventorship could 
be determined at that time. 

To resolve possible conflicts, a system for the exchange of information 
known as Exchange Sheets was established, under which the representative 
of each laboratory prepared and transmitted to the others, prior to a meet- 
ing, a brief description of each invention made at his laboratory and con- 
sidered as the subject of an application for patent. Upon receipt of these 
Exchange Sheets each laboratory located any conflicting subject matter that 


had come to the attention of the officers in charge of the various groups, 
and at the next meeting of the GRPP a determination was made as to the 
scope of the invention to be covered in the apphcations to be filed by 
the War and Navy Departments. As the volume of new cases increased, 
the War and Navy Departments established patent sections in Cambridge, 
where they could work closely with the Radiation Laboratory and the 
Radio Research Laboratory. As of January i, 1946, 2600 Exchange Sheets 
had been submitted to the GRPP, 603 being the subject of applications for 
patent filed in the Patent Office. 

The Atomic Energy Patent Program 

When the program on atomic fission was taken over by NDRC in 1940, 
the initial contracts were executed with organizations which already had 
done work in that field or related fields. The program started on a small 
scale, and the chances of success in terms of weapons (which was the NDRC 
interest) were considered relatively modest. The early NDRC and OSRD 
contracts in the field of atomic fission contained the long form patent 
clause under which the contractors would receive titles to patents and the 
Government would receive a royalty-free license. As the project grew, as 
the contracts began to produce successful results, and as the tremendous 
possibilities of those successful results extending far beyond the field of 
military weapons began to take shape. Bush communicated the results of 
the combined efforts to President Roosevelt, who fully grasped the sig- 
nificance of the project and the results of its solution. The President decided 
that Government control should, at least initially, be exercised through the 
handling of patent rights, and he directed Bush to arrange as far as pos- 
sible for the vesting in the Government of the title to patents on inventions 
and discoveries made on the project. 

Because of the unusual public interest involved, all the OSRD contractors 
in the field of atomic fission agreed to accept a change to the short form 
patent clause covering all research and development work in the field un- 
der OSRD contracts, and to make that change retroactive to the beginning 
of work under those contracts. It was agreed that no monetary considera- 
tion would be given by the Government for the patent rights that already 
had been vested in the contractors through operation of the original pro- 
vision, but instead that the necessary legal consideration would be supplied 
by the signing of supplemental agreements to continue the work, as each of 
the contracts involved required renewal. The process of supplementing and 
amending the contracts case by case took a few months, but all necessary 
contract amendments were executed well before the OSRD research and 
development contracts were terminated and the project transferred to the 


Manhattan District in the spring of 1943. The termination agreements 
expressly stated that the Government retained all its patent rights. 

The result was that, under all NDRC and OSRD research and devel- 
opment contracts in the field of atomic energy, the Government received 
the right to determine the disposition of all patents covering inventions 
and discoveries made during the course of the required work. The practice 
was uniformly followed of vesting tide to patents in this field in the 

At the time of the transfer of responsibility for research in the field of 
atomic fission to the Manhattan District, the Secretary of War told Bush 
that in his opinion it was advisable to have one centralized administrative 
group handling all patent rights on the atomic fission project, and he re- 
quested that the OSRD Director be the custodian of such rights. Major 
General Leslie R. Groves, Director of the Manhattan project, pointed out 
that Lavender had already set up a patent administrative organization 
and was familiar with the problems. As a result of those discussions, the 
War Department atomic fission research and development contracts pro- 
vided that the OSRD Advisor on Patent Matters should be the Contracting 
Officer's representative for patent matters. Lavender was the OSRD patent 
advisor and as such acted as the patent advisor for the Manhattan District; 
Bush, as Director of OSRD, received, on behalf of the Government, assign- 
ments of rights to inventions made under the Manhattan District contracts. 

During the period when OSRD was active, there was considerable agi- 
tation in various quarters for modification of the patent system of the 
United States and a feeling in some places that whenever any Government 
funds were spent on a project, all rights to inventions flowing from that 
project should vest in the Government. In general the OSRD position was 
that it was not created to rectify abuses which might exist in the patent 
system; and that until such time as Congress should modify the system or 
Government policies within the existing system, OSRD would be guided 
by practices theretofore followed. The primary result of OSRD activities 
was a large number of contributions to the winning of the war; an inci- 
dental, but important, result was placing in the hands of the Government 
substantial rights under many developments, some of them of great poten- 
tial peacetime significance. 





SRD contractors spent approximately 457 million dollars 
through November 30, 1945; and it is estimated that about 200 million 
dollars of this amount went for material and equipment. The variety of 
items was infinite — from airplanes to white mice, from machine tools to 
dog food, from electronic components to sugar. Though the amount was 
modest compared to the figures for armament procurement, it was large 
in its own right; and its expenditure in view of competing demands was 
an extensive undertaking. 

Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor the Government agency for control- 
ling material and equipment was the Office of Production Management 
(OPM); after that event, the War Production Board (WPB). Production 
was necessarily the keynote in the planning of these agencies. Restrictive 
orders by the hundreds were issued, designed to channel the flow of scarce 
materials into war equipment and to prohibit their use for other purposes. 
The difficulty for research was not a lack of recognition of its importance 
but the fact that the various plans for dividing scarce items were based on 
forecasting requirements for months in advance. Normally the scientist 
could not foresee that his research would progress to the point that in three 
to six months he would need a specified number of radio tubes of stated 
characteristics or a definite number of feet of wire of a certain gage. Yet 
the absence of those tubes or that wire at a critical time might occasion 
serious delay in a large and important program. The problem was to find 
a way in which research could flourish within the system established for a 
production-conscious world. 

A complicating factor was the confidential nature of the majority of 
OSRD research and development contracts. Inability to disclose the subject 
matter of contracts brought many problems. Even if the subject matter 
could have been disclosed, it would have been extremely difficult for any- 
one to judge whether a particular research project of OSRD was more 
important than a Service production contract. The loint Chiefs of Staff 
could determine whether ships or airplanes or tanks were most important 
at a given time, but it was more difficult to weigh the importance of a 
research program which might succeed or fail against an important pro- 
duction program. 


One point always stressed was that only small amounts were needed 
for research and the diversion would be relatively negligible. This was gen- 
erally well received but it had a hollow sound on those occasions when 
a research program demanded a high proportion of the units of an item 
in very short supply. It was the practice to enlist the aid of Army and Navy 
officers familiar with particular projects; they helped to establish the impor- 
tance of the research projects but they were not in a position to judge 
the relative value of those projects and the specific Service production 
contracts with which they might conflict. 

A conspicuous example of the secrecy problem was the case of priorities 
for the development of the atomic bomb. The research and development 
program grew to substantial proportions under OSRD with requirements 
for large quantities of critical items; but the subject matter could never be 
mentioned and it became increasingly difficult to get necessary action from 
WPB. The OSRD priority section breathed a sigh of relief when the 
project was transferred to the Manhattan District where it was given an over- 
riding priority. 

The Army, Navy, Lend-Lease, OSRD, and other war agencies were very 
often put in a preferred status as regards compliance with various limita- 
tion, conservation and other restrictive orders issued by WPB and OPA. 
As OSRD purchased litde equipment direcdy, it contended that the purpose 
of the preferred status could be achieved only by the extension of the pref- 
erence to its contractors. The interpretation of the orders varied, but it was 
only in exceptional cases that OSRD contractors were able to take advan- 
tage of the favored status of OSRD. 

One of the basic theories of WPB in controlling materials was that each 
production contract should carry a project priority rating dependent upon 
a determination of its relative importance in the procurement picture. Un- 
der this system producers were allowed to use a project rating only to get 
the materials which would go into the "end item," viz., the bombs or radios 
or planes. As applied to the activities of OSRD, this principle sometimes 
led to absurd results, as in the case of a research contract calling for the 
delivery of a report. Under a strict interpretation of the theory, the project 
rating in such a case would cover only the paper on which the report was 
written. Other contracts called for the delivery of a model but even here 
a literal interpretation of the end item theory would not cover any of the 
material used in the basic research or in the breadboard or intermediate 
models. Obviously research could not live under such a system. 

Fortunately OSRD was successful in maintaining throughout the war 
that the end item was research and development and the priority rating 
assigned covered all materials, supplies and equipment needed to carry on 
the research and development. As plans for controlling materials changed 
and personnel were transferred in the WPB and the Army and Navy 


Munitions Board, this interpretation was constantly subject to attack. It 
was upheld, however, although not without some minor setbacks and 
continuous struggle. 

Formulation and administration of a priorities program for NDRC and 
OSRD was one of the functions of the Executive Secretary. The small unit 
in the Administrative Office handling priorities was reconstituted as the 
priorities and property control section in the spring of 1942, when the in- 
crease in volume of OSRD activities occurred simultaneously with a tight- 
ening of the materials situation. Marvin L. Paris was the first head of 
the section. When he left to join the Navy in October 1943, he was suc- 
ceeded by Roy C. Bowker. By July 1942, the section had a staff of fifteen, 
of whom eleven were working on priorities. Property control activities con- 
sisted largely of diverting property from terminated contracts to those active 
contracts in which it was most needed. 

NDRC contractors early ran into difficulty in procuring necessary equip- 
ment and materials. The Administrative Office accepted the responsibility 
for seeing that they were available. The guiding principle in OSRD pri- 
ority operations was that the scientist should have what he wanted, when 
he wanted it and with a minimum diversion of his time from research 
activities. This meant that the priorities section acted as an intermediary 
between the contractor and WPB and, upon occasion, between the con- 
tractor and the supplier. It also meant that OSRD carried the brunt of 
the case whenever WPB issued, or considered issuance of, an order the 
effect of which was an undue restraint on research activities. An effort 
was made to keep OSRD contractors informed of all WPB actions affect- 
ing the supply of materials and equipment and to help them with all 
possible short cuts. 

The first procurement difficulties occurred late in 1940 when a few 
contractors found that delivery of a machine tool or a bit of aluminum 
would not be immediately forthcoming. In such cases the Administrative 
Office asked for and received copies of purchase orders which were for- 
warded to the Priorities Committee of the Army and Navy Munitions 
Board (ANMB) and the Office for Production Management with covering 
letters reciting the circumstances. Priority ratings were not always necessary 
where the items were small; and release was often effected by a telephone 
call from a person officially connected with the OPM. In other cases almost 
any priority was sufficient to provide for an early release of the material. 
It was not until early in 1941 that the need for a more precise procedure 
became evident. 

Discussions with OPM officials resulted in the establishment of a proce- 
dure which was communicated under date of February 11, 1941, to OSRD 
contractors. It provided for the submission of an application (OPM Form 
PBS) through NDRC Technical Aides to the Administrative Office. The 


latter then forwarded the forms with covering letters explaining the cir- 
cumstances and stating the urgency of the research project to the priorities 
division of OPM. Ratings were assigned to the certificates which were 
returned to the Administrative Office and thence to the contractor for 
transmission to the supplier. This procedure, while cumbersome because of 
the number of hands through which the papers had to pass, was adequate 
since the number of requests processed was small. A minor change in the 
procedure occurred in March 1941, when the old form was replaced by a 
new one in two parts (Form PDi and PDiA). The method was the same 
except that the second form was sent to the supplier for additional infor- 
mation and then sent on to OPM. 

In the late spring of 1941 materials became more scarce and the procedure 
began to break down because of the increased number of cases sent in for 
processing. Conferences between OSRD and OPM in June 1941, resulted in 
an OPM decision that war research projects of the NDRC could be placed 
in the highest priority category for entire programs (A-i-a). OPM also au- 
thorized the Secretary of NDRC to issue and sign A-i-a priorities for specific 
materials after the projects had been established with the OPM at that 
rating. The only rating higher than an A-i-a at this time was an AA which 
was not assigned to any program but was reserved for issuance in emer- 
gencies for bottleneck items, where, for example, a whole production line 
was about to close through the lack of a single item. 

Under the new procedure as soon as the NDRC voted money for a con- 
tract, a prime priority certificate was made out and sent to the OPM for 
authentication. Along with this certificate went a generalized description of 
the research to be conducted. After OPM had authenticated the prime cer- 
tificate, it was sent to the contractor together with short application forms 
which he could make out for specific items and send to the Administrative 
Office. The procedures within the Administrative Office were such that the 
certificates were usually issued within twenty-four hours after the applica- 
tions were received. 

With NDRC research established in the highest category possible in the 
priorities framework, contractors had relatively little difficulty in obtaining 
the materials and equipment they required. 

This procedure continued without change until March 15, 1942, when 
WPB Priorities Regulation No. 3 became effective. That regulation pro- 
vided that a contractor holding a prime project rating could extend that 
rating merely by a certification on his purchase orders, thereby eliminating 
the mass of paper work required in the issuance of priority certificates cover- 
ing the items included on purchase orders and saving the time previously 
lost in sending applications to Washington. One qualification was that 
extensions of prime ratings could not be made for capital equipment, facili- 
ties and repair, maintenance and operating supplies. It was at this time that 


the WPB (which had replaced the OPM shortly after Pearl Harbor) dele- 
gated responsibility for administering OSRD's priority program to the Army 
and Navy Munitions Board. 

By July 1942, the priority rating structure required revision because the 
AA rating originally intended as an emergency rating for limited assign- 
ment, had been assigned to a considerable number of Service production 
contracts. As a result the A-i-a rating, which had hitherto been used for all 
important war production and for OSRD research as well, became increas- 
ingly ineflfective. The WPB then amended the priorities structure to provide 
for five categories of AA (AA-i, -2, -3, -4, -5) for war work and superim- 
posed AAA as the emergency rating. The Joint Chiefs of StafI recommended 
and the WPB approved certain production and other programs for the 
various ratings. Among these was that research programs and pilot plants 
of the OSRD, Army and Navy should be placed in the AA-3 category. This 
lowered the position of research to fourth place in the priorities structure 
where formerly it had been in second place. The rating covered all materials, 
supplies and equipment needed with the exception of machine tools, build- 
ing construction materials, and office equipment which required special 

Fortunately, OSRD was able to obtain AA-i and AA-2 ratings for certain 
of its contracts and for portions of others where it could be argued that the 
development work had reached the prototype stage or where operational 
use of the devices would begin in a comparatively short time. This was an 
informal arrangement but it helped to solve the problem for some of the 
larger contractors, especially in the field of electronics. 

In July 1942, the WPB also announced the Production Requirements 
Plan. This plan provided that manufacturers and others who could antici- 
pate their requirements for three months in advance could be given ratings 
upon the submission of such information and approval of the program by 
WPB. Only a few of the larger OSRD contractors, such as M.I.T. for the 
Radiation Laboratory and C.I.T. for the rocket program, could take advan- 
tage of this plan and thereby receive sufficiently high priority ratings for 
their purposes. 

In time some new projects for the production of limited amounts of 
equipment for Service use or test were placed in the higher categories, but 
most of the OSRD contractors were forced to struggle along with the AA-3 
rating assigned to research. They were able, of course, to apply for out-of- 
line ratings through the priorities section and so were not permanently 
stymied in the procurement of materials, but this made for much paper 
work and was naturally slow and cumbersome. 

In September 1942, at the request of OSRD the WPB set up an out-of-line 
priority rating procedure which made it possible to receive ratings including 
AAA where designated persons in the safety and technical equipment 


branch of WPB were convinced of the need. It was necessary to prepare 
a complete story concerning the importance of the scarce item on a project, 
but the advantage was that only one person had to be convinced of the 
need. This procedure worked well for two months before it was withdrawn. 

Late in 1942 the WPB announced the Controlled Materials Plan (CMP), 
which was to become operative on April i, 1943. This plan was, like all the 
others, based on anticipating requirements for a number of months in ad- 
vance, but it was different from other plans in that it was limited to copper, 
steel and aluminum. It was believed that by parceling out the available 
production of these basic metals during a certain period the entire produc- 
tion picture could be brought into line. While the amounts of these mate- 
rials needed by OSRD contractors was relatively small, it was necessary to 
use CMP allotment symbols and numbers in ordering other materials so 
that a definite procedure had to be established. OSRD was designated to be 
one of the claimants under the War Department. The CMP remained 
throughout the war and operated satisfactorily from the standpoint of 

Late in 1942 and early in 1943 it became increasingly apparent that the 
lowered position of research at AA-3 in the priorities picture was resulting 
in delays to the research program. Contractors found that many items were 
unobtainable without an AA-i rating. This predicament was especially 
serious in the electronics field where virtually every component or piece of 
electrical testing apparatus had many willing buyers with AA-i ratings. At 
the urging of OSRD the ANMB on April 30, 1943, issued a directive pro- 
viding for AA-I ratings for the procurement of supplies and equipment for 
research projects sponsored by the military and approved by the ANMB. 
Under this procedure OSRD was authorized by ANMB to assign a rating 
of AA-I for the procurement of materials by its contractors. Beginning in 
May 1943, all prime priority certificates were issued directly to contractors 
by the priorities and property control section over the signature of the Chief 
of the section. After V-E Day the priorities system was again revised by 
WPB and a rating of MM was substituted for AA-i for contracts of mili- 
tary importance. OSRD was authorized by ANMB to use the MM rating 
and it was assigned for use by a few contractors just prior to V-J Day. The 
need for ratings diminished very rapidly after V-J Day and the MM rating 
was used thereafter on a spot basis only to facilitate the completion of work 
before contracts terminated. Under the blanket authorization from ANMB 
ratings having a total dollar value of $102,000,000 were issued between May 
1943 and October 1945. 

Coincident with the raising of war research programs to AA-i through 
the ANMB was the revision of the WPB order covering priorities for labora- 
tories in general. This order, P-43, as amended, provided a rating of AA-i 
for qualifying laboratories under the order and AA-2 rating for all other 


laboratories. Provision was also made for obtaining materials under the 
CMP. OSRD encouraged its smaller contractors to use the rating assigned 
by P-43 since the WPB had promised that they would immediately qualify 
for the use of the AA-i if working on an OSRD contract. Many of the 
contractors working on NDRC projects, and all of those working on CMR 
projects, did operate under this plan until the war's end with success. 

One important function of the priorities section was to maintain an ex- 
pediting service to obtain out-of-line ratings on scarce items and to effect 
the release of specially controlled materials. Whenever the production of 
material or equipment did not meet the demand of those purchasers with 
equally high ratings, the orders began to stack up and delivery would be 
quoted at increasingly remote dates. Since research requirements were 
seldom known far in advance, OSRD contractors were at a disadvantage, 
for they would learn from suppliers that there were many orders with either 
higher or equally high ratings ahead of them. The contractor would then 
enlist the aid of OSRD in obtaining whatever relief was necessary to effect 
delivery by the desired date. 

There were two major methods followed by WPB in handling these tight 
situations. One was by the assignment of an out-of-line priority rating in- 
cluding the emergency rating, and the other was by scheduling every order 
for a particular product in each manufacturer's plant. Usually as a situation 
became acute and it appeared that it would remain so, scheduling was insti- 
tuted. In either circumstance complete information had to be presented to 
the WPB industry division having cognizance of the item. If concurrence by 
that group, and usually of representatives of the Army and Navy attached 
to the division, could be obtained, an out-of-line rating could be secured or 
the order scheduled for a satisfactory delivery. From the beginning of 1943 
until the end of hostilities four expediters and a supervisor together with 
secretarial help spent full time on this aspect of priorities work. Figures 
available indicate that more than 10,000 separate requests for expediting 
and special handling were received and acted on by the priorities section. 
It is estimated that less than i per cent of these requests ended in failure; 
those were usually because the request proved to be unjustified or because 
the items requested were not being produced. 

Among the efforts to aid contractors in carrying on research and develop- 
ment was the establishment of the Electronics Research Supply Agency. 
Upon the recommendation of the Army, Navy, OSRD and WPB, this 
organization was established in April 1943, to act for the Defense Supplies 
Corporation as a central source of supply for electronic components and raw 
materials required by Government, institutional and industrial laboratories 
engaged in electronic research and development projects for the Army, 
Navy or OSRD. Between June 1943 and September 1945, OSRD contractors 
made substantial use of this additional source of supply. 


Throughout the war electronic components were extremely scarce due to 
the great demand for large quantities of newly developed electronic devices. 
The Services themselves attempted to alleviate the confused production pic- 
ture first by expediting and then by a system of allocation of component parts 
to their most important production contracts at the expense of the lesser ones. 
In the early days of the war the Army Signal Corps maintained a large 
group of expediters in strategic manufacturing plants with considerable 
success. This was followed by a joint Army and Navy expediting group, 
operating under the name of Army and Navy Communication Production 
Expediting Agency (ANCPEA), which continued its activities until Octo- 
ber 28, 1942, when the Army-Navy Electronic Production Agency (ANEPA) 
was formed. By this time practically all electronics production was in the 
AA-i priority category since that rating was necessary for the procurement 
of component parts. Another organization known as the Procurement 
Precedence of Supplies, Material, and Equipment Committee, was estab- 
lished to operate under the authority of the Joint Communications Board 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The task of this committee was to set up each 
production contract in a precedence category. The precedence categories ran 
from A, which was the best, to L which was last in importance, and there 
was a set of "ground rules" to guide the placing of contracts in the various 
classes. The expressions "precedence category" and "precedence listing" were 
used rather than "precedence rating," for priorities were still in effect and 
this undertaking was to be operative within one priority rating — AA-i. 

When a contract received its precedence number, ANEPA was charged 
with expediting the contract in accordance with the precedence listing. The 
WPB on January i, 1943, recognized this system of precedences to the 
extent that manufacturers were authorized to observe them, but it stated 
that an order without a precedence listing would still be filled in the regular 
manner. In the beginning there was no provision for research, but later a 
listing of D-250 was designated for research programs. In addition there 
was provision that when a laboratory project reached the stage of develop- 
ment where quantity production was envisaged, application could be made 
for a better listing. The priorities section did not limit its expediting activi- 
ties to ANEPA channels so far as research requirements were concerned 
because the D-250 rating was not sufficiently high to be of much benefit. 
In some development and limited production, however, it was necessary to 
work closely with ANEPA because the Services had specifically asked that 
crash programs be undertaken. The Engineering and Transition Office of 
OSRD took over the responsibility for obtaining these specific listings, 

ANEPA was dissolved in June 1944, mainly because of the confusion 
which existed in industry due to the fact that both ANEPA and WPB had 
regional office representatives in the field doing the same job. WPB took 
over most of the expediting activities for the Services. The Precedence Com- 


mittee continued to assign precedence listings which were promulgated 
throughout the electronic industry through its subsidiary organization, the 
Electronics Production List Agency. 

In general it may be said that research and development on war weapons 
fared well under the priorities system; but this was true only because of the 
intensive work of a small group who were constandy fighting the battle on 
behalf of research. Without a system of priorities, research could not have 
competed with production; within the priority system, it maintained its 
position through constant attention and vigorous action. 


In general a contractor was free to purchase any item of personal property 
that he or the Scientific Officer considered necessary for the work called for 
by the contract without the specific approval of the Contracting Officer. An 
exception was motor vehicles, the purchase of which required prior approval. 
Alterations and construction work which cost in excess of $500 on the con- 
tractor's owned or leased premises was permitted only with the specific 
approval of the Contracting Officer. The acquisition of real property by 
purchase or lease likewise required the approval of the Contracting Officer. 

The sense of urgency which OSRD brought to its task made it impera- 
tive that research work not be delayed while the necessity for the purchase 
of a particular piece of equipment was debated. The risk that a contractor 
might purchase in excess of his requirements was less serious than the risk 
of delayed results if an elaborate system of controls were imposed. As a 
matter of fact, the character of OSRD contractors was in itself a consid- 
erable guarantee against reckless spending, and the difl&culty of making 
purchases as the supplies of materials and equipment grew tighter operated 
as an automatic control on purchases. 

The responsibility of the contractor for property in his possession is dis- 
cussed in the chapter on fiscal aspects of OSRD operations. The rules 
governing its disposition were covered in Article 3 of the standard contract 
form (See Appendix 2). 

Property developed or constructed under the terms of a contract was 
controlled by Article i(a) which provided that models, devices, or proto- 
types developed or constructed under the contract were to be delivered as 
directed by the Contracting Officer or his authorized representative (later 
changed to the Scientific Officer or Scientific Assistant). 

Provision for handling property accounting and the disposition of prop- 
erty and improvements became necessary as the first OSRD contracts termi- 
nated. In July 1942, a group to handle property matters was attached to the 
group working on priorities. As long as the war lasted, both groups were 
working essentially on procurement, the priorities unit expediting the deliv- 


ery of new equipment, and the property unit making equipment on hand 
at the expiration of contracts available for use under other contracts. 

Property Accounting 

The first major task of the property group was to issue adequate instruc- 
tions for the use of contractors in preparing the property accounting reports 
required by the contract. Tentative instructions were issued to contractors 
to cover the 350 contracts which had terminated up to the fall of 1942. These 
instructions, as revised in February 1944 (Administrative Circular No. 
15.03), proved adequate even in the liquidation period. 

Upon the termination of a contract a letter was sent to the contractor 
requesting the submission of a property report in the prescribed form, and 
follow-ups were made at appropriate intervals. When the report was re- 
ceived, it was checked for completeness and forwarded to the appropriate 
division for recommendations as to the acceptability of the report and the 
disposition of the property on hand. 

As soon as a property report was considered acceptable and the disposi- 
tion of all property on hand had been completed, a certification to that 
effect was sent to the contract and fiscal sections as notice that the final 
voucher could be paid insofar as property matters were concerned. At the 
same time the contractor was notified that he had completed his property 
accounting. As of January 31, 1946, 1480 contracts had been cleared with 
reference to property. 

Disposition of Property 

While the war continued, the major emphasis in connection with the dis- 
position of property was to provide for its use under other contracts. The 
division supervising a terminated contract was given the first opportunity 
to obtain the property on hand for use on other contracts under its super- 
vision; if not needed by that division, the property was made available for 
use by the contractors of other divisions. 

For a time OSRD maintained a storeroom in Washington to which sur- 
plus equipment not immediately needed on OSRD contracts could be 
shipped. The arrangement was never fully effective because of the diffi- 
culty of getting and keeping a properly qualified technician to run the 
storeroom. Many critical items were issued to contractors, however, before 
the storeroom was Hquidated in 1945 by transferring the property on hand 
to Government laboratories having a use for it. 

The problem of statutory authority for the disposition of property outside 
the agency was solved by the inclusion of the following enabling legislation 
in the various War Agencies Appropriation Acts which provided funds 
for OSRD: 


Provided further, That the Office of Scientific Research and Development may 
sell, lease, lend or otherwise dispose of, under such terms and conditions as it 
may deem advisable, devices, scientific or technical equipment, models, or other 
articles of personality, developed, constructed, produced in or purchased for 
the performance of its scientific or medical contracts, except ardcles acquired for 
administrative purposes, and all receipts from such dispositions shall be covered 
into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. 

In accordance with this authorization, the provisions of the Surplus 
Property Act of 1944, and the regulations issued pursuant to that Act, the 
policy followed for the disposition of property no longer needed for OSRD 
work was (i) to transfer to other Government agencies (particularly the 
War and Navy Departments) that property required for use in continuing 
work initiated by OSRD; (2) to permit contractors, under the terms of 
their contracts, to retain property not needed by the Government, and 
(3) to dispose of any remaining property in accordance with Surplus Prop- 
erty Regulations. Preference to the Army and Navy was in accord with a 
resolution adopted by NDRC in August 1945, that the Army and Navy 
should be given an opportunity to acquire without reimbursement any 
property required for the continuance of the work taken over from NDRC. 
A similar preference was accorded the Public Health Service when it con- 
tinued medical research initiated by CMR. As a result the property on hand 
at the termination of a large number of OSRD contracts was transferred 
to other Government agencies and, although many problems of detail arose, 
the disposition of the property became a relatively simple problem. 

Disposition of Property by Transfer 

Property on hand under one contract was frequently made available for 
use under other contracts upon the recommendation of the appropriate 
Technical Aide simply by directing the contractor in possession of the prop- 
erty to deliver it for use under another of his own contracts or to another 
contractor. The receiving contractor was required to acknowledge accounta- 
bility for the property to OSRD under the terms of the pertinent contract, 
and the original contractor was relieved of accountability. Such transactions 
occurred with regularity from the middle of 1942 until shortly after V-J Day. 

During the same period the work on atomic energy was taken over by 
the War Department, and the work of Section T on fuzes and of Divi- 
sion 6, NDRC, on underwater sound studies was taken over by the Navy 
Department. Property acquired under the approximately 170 contracts in- 
volved was transferred to the interested Services. 

In the case of the large central laboratory contracts, neither the contractors 
nor the Services desired to continue the contracts under the existing arrange- 
ments although the latter were interested in carrying on some portions of 


the work in their own laboratories or elsewhere and definitely desired to 
obtain most of the property. After numerous conferences among OSRD, 
the Army and the Navy, 98 per cent of the property on hand at the Cali- 
fornia Institute of Technology acquired for use in the rocket program under 
Contract OEMsr-418 was transferred to the Army and the Navy; the prop- 
erty at the Allegheny Ballistics Laboratory operated under Contract OEMsr- 
273 by George Washington University was transferred to the Navy; that on 
hand under Contract OEMsr-164 with the Research Construction Company 
went to the Army Air Forces, and that at the Radio Research Laboratory 
operated by Harvard under Contract OEMsr-411 went to the Navy. 

In the case of the Radiation Laboratory operated by the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology under Contract OEMsr-262, there were different 
Service interests in the work and many conflicting requests for the property, 
much of which was highly important to the continuation of general research 
and development work on radar. A plan was devised under which property 
on hand under this contract, except that to be retained by OSRD for basic 
research work, was transferred to the Army and Navy on the basis of 
Service requests and recommendations made to the Contracting Officer of 
OSRD by a Joint Army and Navy Panel especially created for the purpose. 

Disposition of Property by Sale 

Receipts from the sale of property amounted to $1,374,711.65 for the 
twenty-five months ending with December 31, 1945. Most of this amount 
came from the sale of personal property, with about $100,000 being paid by 
contractors for the retention of improvements made under contracts. A sub- 
stantial portion of the total represented proceeds derived from the sale of 
property at cost by the Radiation Laboratory under Contract OEMsr-262 as 
a part of the normal operations of that laboratory. Speed in microwave 
research and in the building of an industry capable of producing equipment 
of Radiation Laboratory design required the loan of a great deal of such 
equipment to other laboratories and to industrial concerns. When these 
loans were liquidated, the proceeds of the sales at cost were turned in to 
the Treasury of the United States. 

The greater portion of the receipts were from perhaps 2000 sales covering 
thousands of individual items of property which contractors exercised their 
right to retain under the terms of their contracts. As most OSRD contracts 
were small, the property on hand at termination was not substantial. It 
normally consisted of small quantities of a wide variety of used property 
from one to five years of age, and many of the items were such as did not 
enter largely in normal trade channels. To determine the fair value of the 
heterogeneous lot of property taxed the wisdom and judgment of those 
concerned. There were, however, certain guides, among them the price 


policies established by the Surplus Property Administration (later War 
Assets Corporation), OP A Maximum Price Regulations for different com- 
modities, depreciation schedules, condition of the equipment, technical 
advice regarding a particularly critical piece of equipment, and the cost of 
disposition if packing, crating and shipping were required; and to all of 
these was added the exercise of common sense. 

Disposition of Improvements 

Disposition of improvements to real property was a troublesome matter. 
Initially there was an effort to determine at the time building construction 
was authorized the disposition which would be made of the construction at 
the end of the contract. From the standpoint of good business operations 
this was a desirable procedure, but from the standpoint of OSRD operations 
in general, it was simply unworkable. Construction was authorized because 
it was needed to speed research; to postpone construction until arrangements 
could be completed for its later disposition would have greatly hampered 
research programs. It would have been impossible for OSRD to have staffed 
itself with enough construction experts to enter into such negotiations with- 
out weeks of delay. Moreover, in the case of academic institutions, the 
changes were frequently of a kind which the institution would never have 
made because they were not needed in the course of its normal operations. 
Whether they might have some residual usefulness would depend upon the 
state of the academic program upon the termination of the contract. Flexi- 
bility in determination was therefore indicated; but, in adopting Article 3(b) 
of the contract form which provided that flexibility, it was recognized that 
the Government would be at some disadvantage when the time came for 
the ultimate determination. 

In accordance with the terms of Article 3(b) of the contract, the con- 
tractor could elect either to retain improvements and return a negotiated 
sum to the Government or to have his premises restored to substantially 
their original condition at the cost of the Government. The disposition of 
improvements offered no serious problem when the contractor needed to 
retain them for use under a Service contract for continuing the work. It 
was usually possible to transfer the OSRD right and interest in the improve- 
ments to the interested Service, with the assumption by the Service of the 
OSRD responsibility for their disposition. In the few cases where substan- 
tial structures were retained by the contractor, he returned a sum usually 
equal to 50 per cent of the original cost of the work. 

Minor alterations, which the contractor would not have made under 
normal circumstances and which often resulted in no permanent benefit, 
presented many problems. In many cases, sums varying from 10 to 50 per 
cent of the original cost were returned by contractors for the retention of 
improvements. In others, particularly on leased premises, it seemed advisable 


to abandon improvements in lieu of restoration where no substantial excess 
value remained. In cases where the situation warranted, an expert appraiser 
employed by OSRD visited the premises and made appropriate recommen- 

Whenever the contractor elected to have the premises restored to substan- 
tially their original condition, he was authorized to proceed immediately 
with the restoration and to charge the net cost to the contract. 

Disposition of Surplus Property 

The Surplus Property Act of 1944 and the various regulations issued 
thereunder established a procedure for disposing of surplus property by an 
authorized disposal agency as defined by the Act. This did not apply to the 
major portion of the property from OSRD contracts which was retained 
by the Government for its own use, nor did it apply to that retained by the 
contractors. Most of the items remaining as surplus came within the classi- 
fication of nominal quantities which the authorized disposal agency would 
not handle or were refused on the basis of a predeclaration inspection be- 
cause of their special nature or poor condition. While some single items and 
groups of items were declared as surplus, this method of disposal did not 
reach the proportions originally anticipated. When used, it resulted in mate- 
rial delays in moving the property from contractors' premises. The few 
pieces of surplus real property were disposed of in accordance with the 
provisions of the Surplus Property Act. 

At various times the suggestion was made that OSRD should distribute 
the property remaining under its contracts to educational institutions to 
enable them to build up their research activities. It was never given favor- 
able consideration within OSRD partly because the policies governing the 
disposition of surplus property were for the determination of Congress and 
partly because OSRD had dealt with only a fraction of the educational in- 
stitutions in the United States and a policy of building up research facilities 
should not be confined to that fraction. In 1944 and early 1945, however, 
when it appeared that large quantities of new and special equipment would 
become surplus, a number of conferences were held with officials of the 
Office of Education and of the Surplus Property Board with a view to 
developing a procedure under which the property could be turned over to 
those agencies which would make it available to educational institutions of 
their designation for research purposes. The decision of the Services to ex- 
pend their peacetime research programs, with the resultant transfer of the 
property to them for that purpose, made it fruitless to pursue those plans 
to a conclusion. Nevertheless, some of the more specialized property doubt- 
less found its way into the possession of institutions able to make the most 
effective use of it under contract with the Services who received it by trans- 
fer from OSRD. 




.HE problem of security was one of the first to concern 
NDRC, and the decisions made in the early days held throughout the 
history of OSRD. While some aspects of the security problem will be ex- 
panded in the following pages, the account of security operations contained 
in the first chapter on the NDRC including the discussion of compartmen- 
talization of information will not be repeated here. 

The problem is simple of recognition, but impossible of satisfactory solu- 
tion in a country where freedom of the individual is a precious heritage. 
No man has the right to imperil the safety of the state by revealing its 
military secrets to an actual or potential enemy. Premature disclosure of the 
existence of a new weapon might eliminate the element of surprise, enable 
the enemy to develop counters for it, and cost the lives of many American 
soldiers. Disclosure to the enemy of progress in the development of a new 
weapon might enable him to improve his own weapons so as to make them 
more devastatingly effective against American troops. Even the disclosure 
that great effort was being concentrated in a particular field might enable 
the enemy to plan his campaign with a relative impunity to certain measures 
because of the assurance that the United States was not adequately pre- 
pared in that area. 

Most American citizens go through life without accumulating police or 
other records which would stamp them as unfit to be trusted with classified 
military information, which is as it should be. At the same time, the mere 
absence of a police record is no assurance that a man can be so trusted. He 
might be completely lacking in discretion, or in an extreme case might even 
be disloyal without any occasion having arisen for the disloyalty to have 
been revealed. 

In the OSRD philosophy, there was need for a balance between security 
precautions on the one hand and speed on the other. Undue security pre- 
cautions would occasion delay and sometimes so restrict the transmission of 
knowledge that the best minds could not be made fully available for a 
project. On the other hand speed at the expense of proper security might 
occasion untold harm. In general the inclination of the scientist was to favor 
speed and to resent the delays imposed by security precautions; but the 
record of the agency shows that the security restrictions were well observed. 

The necessity for freedom of action within limits was well illustrated in 
a few instances where the using Service was exhorting OSRD to the greatest 


possible speed in a particular development, and speed was possible only by 
making use of an individual against w^hom an intelligence service had dis- 
covered something which it interpreted as barring him from the project. 
In such cases OSRD would bring the using Service and the intelligence 
service together to decide which should give way. Agreement was soon 
reached in all such cases. 

The magnitude of Army and Navy operation and the extreme pressure 
incident to war combined occasionally to produce upsetting incidents in 
connection with security. Press releases at times emanated from the Services, 
describing developments on which OSRD had been rigidly enforcing se- 
curity precautions, and naturally disturbing the groups responsible for the 
developments, who found it hard to reconcile OSRD's insistence upon 
secrecy with the unexpected appearance of newspaper accounts telling most 
if not all of the story. OSRD was never quite able to convince the scientists 
that it was not insisting upon precautions which the Army and Navy 
ignored, or to prevail upon the Services to prevent such incidents. 

Personnel Security 

All OSRD employees were investigated prior to the release to them of 
classified information, and there was never any reason to question the 
loyalty and discretion of any of them. During the rapid expansion of the 
OSRD program weeks would elapse while security reports were being 
awaited, before new employees could carry their full share of the load. 
Only the willingness of the staff to carry work overloads for extended 
periods prevented serious delays in the OSRD program during the interval 
before security reports were received. New employees were indoctrinated 
as a matter of routine; and there was a continuing program designed to 
keep employees constandy aware of the need for security. 

As for contractors, the security provisions were embodied in Article 6 of 
the standard OSRD contract form which is printed in the appendix. In sub- 
stance that article required the contractor to (i) refrain from disclosing any 
information concerning the contract or obtained as the result of his per- 
formance under the contract to any person except employees assigned to 
work under the contract, without the consent of the Contracting Officer; 
(2) report to the Contracting Officer whenever there was active danger of 
espionage or sabotage; (3) obtain the consent of the Contracting Officer 
before permitting an alien to be employed on or have access to work under 
the contract; (4) report to the Contracting Officer, on request, the citizen- 
ship of his employees engaged in or having access to, work under the con- 
tract, and (5) refrain from employing on, and to exclude from the site of, 
work under the contract any person designated by the Contracting Officer 
as undesirable to have access to such work. 


Investigation of contractors' personnel was never on as comprehensive a 
scale as for OSRD employees. Primary responsibility for the security of work 
done under contract rested with the contractor. OSRD recognized, however, 
that in many cases contractors had no way of assuring themselves that their 
employees were both loyal and discreet. The contractor might feel perfectly 
secure as to his old employees, but when new employees were being added 
by the dozen, and particularly when the bottom of the manpower barrel 
was reached, he could not have the same assurance as to them. 

OSRD sought to assist the contractors, and also to assure itself, by making 
it possible for a contractor to obtain a security investigation of personnel. It 
specified that clearance should be obtained for all persons who would have 
access to or who would be working with classified information, but these 
conditions were never clearly defined, with the result that the practice varied 
widely among contractors. In some cases OSRD contractors were also doing 
work for the Army or the Navy and the same employees were working on 
OSRD and Service contracts. Arrangements satisfactory to the Services were 
acceptable to OSRD, and few investigations of such employees were made 
for OSRD. In other cases, contractors submitted the names of all employees 
engaged in work on an OSRD contract, regardless of the type of activity 
in which the employee was engaged. Clearly if all contractors had followed 
such a course the investigative machinery would have broken down under 
the load. As it was, the breakdown was perilously close at times. Various 
expedients were adopted from time to time by the investigative agencies 
with a view to cutting down on the amount of time required for routine 
cases in order to permit concentration upon those where there were factors 
which might indicate a real danger of espionage. 

There probably is no satisfactory answer to the problem of reconciling 
speed with absolute security; but if there is, OSRD did not find it. The 
results were surprisingly good, however; at least, OSRD did its job with 
reasonable celerity, there was no known case of improper disclosure or 
"leakage" of information, and there was no infringement upon individual 
rights so far as is known to OSRD. 

Under the plan first adopted, NDRC submitted requests for investigation 
to both Army and Navy, which resulted in some duplication of investiga- 
tions. The system was changed, therefore, to one under which NDRC sub- 
mitted roughly one half its requests to the Army and the remainder to the 
Navy; each Service checked with the other to the extent it felt desirable. 
In the spring of 1942, the Army took over from the Navy the responsibility 
for personnel security investigations with a few limited exceptions. There- 
after OSRD dealt exclusively with the Army, and the Army determined the 
extent to which it made use of other agencies. 

Prior to June 1942, the reports from the Services to NDRC and OSRD 
indicated whether they objected to disclosure of classified information to 


the individuals who were the subjects of the reports. Subsequent to that 
time the investigative agency submitted to OSRD the information developed 
in the course of the investigation and the decision as to its bearing upon 
the release of classified information was made by OSRD. In making its 
decision, OSRD kept constantly in mind that decisions on its part which 
would release classified information to persons who might make improper 
use of it, would inevitably make the Services unwilling to release to OSRD 
information essential to its operations. The situation was complicated by 
the fact that the investigative agencies, to protect the sources of their infor- 
mation, stipulated that OSRD might not involve the agencies or reveal the 
fact that the information upon which OSRD action was based came through 
a particular agency. 

In line with the theory that the contractor was responsible for the security 
of its operations, OSRD never discussed investigations with the individuals 
concerned. If OSRD had informed one man that he was "cleared" for classi- 
fied work on OSRD contracts, it could hardly have avoided discussions with 
other persons as to whether they also were cleared. Instead, until July 1945, 
OSRD notified the contractor who had submitted a man's name that it 
did not object to his employment in cases where the investigation had re- 
vealed no reason for objection. The form was intended to make it clear 
that OSRD was not relieving the contractor of his primary responsibility 
for the security of his operations. As it became clear that some contractors 
were apparently regarding this OSRD notice as superseding their responsi- 
bility, the OSRD policy was changed and the contractors were informed in 
July 1945, that in the future the "no objection" notices would no longer be 
sent out by OSRD. 

A review of the procedures with respect to personnel security shows that 
OSRD might well have been more explicit. A large part of the OSRD work 
was done by academic institutions which had never had occasion to give 
any thought to the handling of classified information or to precautions 
against espionage. Obviously they had no easy way to detect individuals 
who might engage in espionage, although for the most part they might be 
expected to know those of questionable discretion or with loose tongues. 
They had no way of knowing the extent or thoroughness of any investi- 
gation which might follow their submission of personnel questionnaires to 
OSRD and might well assume that the indication of "no objection" was 
complete assurance of both integrity and discretion. The length of time 
required for a report might in itself be taken as an indication of the thor- 
oughness of the investigation rather than for what it was — an index of 
the overloading of the investigative agencies. On the other hand, OSRD 
recognized that in some cases the contractor could develop at least as much 
information by brief but intensive investigation on the site as was to be 
found in the reports reaching OSRD from the investigative agency. 


The number of cases in which the information developed by an investi- 
gation resulted in an adverse decision by OSRD was quite small. In all such 
cases, the OSRD action was merely an instruction to the contractor not to 
release classified information to the individual or to permit him to have 
access to it. Whether the information developed by the investigation re- 
quired any other action was a decision to be made by the investigative 
agency and not by OSRD. 

A limiting factor on the ability of OSRD to expand the program of inves- 
tigations was the size of the investigating staffs. Other agencies needed 
investigations for the same reason OSRD needed them. The investigative 
agencies were not, and in the nature of things could not be, staffed to handle 
an unlimited number of investigations. The number of investigations con- 
ducted for OSRD was in the neighborhood of 45,000 to 50,000. Any increase 
in that number would probably have increased the time lag between the 
submission of a request and the receipt of a report. Greater security might 
have caused greater delay in getting results from OSRD operations. As 
there were no known leaks of information from OSRD operations, OSRD 
has a pragmatic justification for not having gone farther in its security pro- 
gram. Whether less security would have been justified on the chance that 
it might have speeded results might be a subject for speculation; although 
there is no doubt that the measures adopted were conducive to the dis- 
closure of large amounts of highly classified information to OSRD with 
the assurance that it would be secure. 

The employment of aliens by contractors was covered by a provision in 
OSRD classified contracts requiring the Contracting Officer's permission in 
each case. The contractor was required to submit a specially prepared form 
for each alien. The form was then submitted to the proper investigative 
agency which in due course replied by indicating whether or not the alien 
was eligible for employment on War and Navy Department classified con- 
tracts. The decision was accepted by OSRD as equally controlling for 
OSRD contracts. 

Classified Information 

As recounted in an earlier chapter, OSRD attempted to follow the Army 
and Navy rules for handling classified information and in case of discrep- 
ancy between them to observe the more restrictive. When NDRC was estab- 
lished, the Army and Navy regulations recognized three security classifica- 
tions which may be summarized as follows: (i) Secret: Documents, infor- 
mation, or materiel, the unauthorized disclosure of which would endanger 
national security, cause serious injury to the interests or prestige of the 
nation, or any governmental activity thereof, or would be of great advan- 
tage to a foreign nation. (2) Confidential: Documents, information, or 


materiel, the unauthorized disclosure of which, while not endangering the 
national security, would be prejudicial to the interests or prestige of the 
nation, any governmental activity, an individual, or would cause adminis- 
trative embarrassment, or difficulty, or be of advantage to a foreign nation. 
(3) Restricted: Documents, information, or materiel (other than secret or 
confidential) which should not be pubUshed or communicated to anyone 
except for official purposes. 

A fourth category, "Top Secret," was added in 1944 primarily to protect 
operational information as the United States moved toward large-scale 
offensive operations. This classification was to cover certain secret documents, 
information, and materiel, the security aspect of which was paramount, and 
whose unauthorized disclosure would cause exceptionally grave damage to 
the nation. "Top Secret" followed by a short time a Navy classification of 
"Secret Security," which was designed to achieve a greater measure of 
security than a minimum observance of the requirements of the "Secret" 
classification would produce. 

The purpose of classifying information was to indicate the measure of the 
precautions to be taken to prevent its unauthorized disclosure. "Restricted" 
matter was plainly marked as such, largely to prevent its unauthorized dis- 
semination to the public. Aside from being kept in locked files at night, it 
was afforded little more protection than that normally afforded Govern- 
ment papers. From the standpoint of the scientist it caused practically no 
delay in his operations. However, very little of the work on weapons by 
OSRD received a classification as low as restricted. 

"Confidential" and "secret" matter required greater precautions in their 
handling, transmission and filing, the latter classification being more rigid 
in its requirements than the former. The precautions to prevent disclosures 
to unauthorized persons were necessary and were followed; but the inevi- 
table result was to delay research and development. As an illustration may 
be mentioned the requirement of transmission by officer courier or regis- 
tered mail. As OSRD had no officer courier, registered mail was the normal 
method of transmission of papers. OSRD operations were relatively wide- 
spread and different aspects of the same project were frequently under way 
at different places. Registered mail is slow, and the requirement of its use, 
many times multiplied, had a delaying effect. 

The introduction of "Top Secret" and its successor, "Secret Security," 
meant more serious delay, for officer courier or its equivalent was a require- 
ment. As applied to OSRD this would have meant the use of scientists as 
couriers, and the manpower situation was such that they were not available 
for the purpose. There was little reason for research and development to be 
as highly classified as top secret. OSRD took the position that the top secret 
classification required such an inefficient use of manpower that it would 
not normally be justified in accepting top secret projects. The Services were 


invited to carry on their own research so far as they felt it must be done on 
a top secret basis. There was no refusal to accept top secret research; rather 
OSRD called for a conference before top secret projects were submitted so 
that it might be convinced both that the classification was justified and that 
OSRD was the only place where the desired work could be done. No top 
secret project was in fact submitted to OSRD nor was any conference in- 
volving OSRD called to consider submitting one. It is understood, however, 
that several projects which were tentatively proposed as top secret were 
marked down to secret before their submission to OSRD. The normal tend- 
ency to play safe makes for overclassification and the interposition of a 
"caution" sign in the case of top secret projects was a desirable step. 

When the Army or Navy submitted a project to OSRD, it indicated the 
recommended classification, which was invariably adopted by OSRD. Occa- 
sionally, the two Services would submit almost identical projects, but with 
different classifications, and then an attempt would be made to get agree- 
ment as to which OSRD should use. For projects originating in OSRD, the 
tentative classification was established by the originating divisions; as the 
divisions were working on related classified Service projects, there was little 
difficulty in determining the appropriate classification. Circulars were issued 
by the Executive Secretary from time to time on such topics as how to 
determine whether an item should be classified, and how to mark, store, 
transmit or reproduce classified items. 

As a general rule, OSRD contracts bore the same classification as the 
projects to which they were devoted. The correspondence between contracts 
and projects was not complete, however, as in some cases several projects 
were handled under the same contract. Normally, the contract carried the 
highest classification of any project worked on under it, with the contractor 
being separately authorized to handle projects of lower classification accord- 
ing to their respective rules. On occasion this was reversed, so that a contract 
would carry a confidential classification when most of the projects under 
it were so classified, and an occasional secret item would be called to the 
attention of the contractor with instructions to apply to it the rules govern- 
ing secret matter. 

One criticism of the OSRD practice which probably would apply to 
security precautions generally was the persistence of a classification after the 
reason for its establishment had ceased to exist. A periodic review of all 
classified items would doubtless have shown many for which the classifica- 
tion could have been lowered or even removed. The volume of current 
work always seemed to be so great that the time could not be spared for 
such a review until after the end of hostilities when there was a general 
declassification. In retrospect it seems possible that the saving in time re- 
sulting from handling documents of lower classification would have justi- 
fied strenuous efforts to find the time for reclassification at an earlier date. 



Plant Security 

In the case of academic institutions, OSRD proceeded upon the assump- 
tion that there was no occasion for a check on the loyalty or integrity of the 
institution itself although the personnel were subjected to the same check 
as others. A separate check was made in the case of other OSRD contractors 
and subcontractors; approximately 2600 organizations were checked for 
such points as subversive or other disloyal activities, violations of law, faulty 
performance of Government contracts, and fraud against the Government. 
The check was not as thorough as that normally made of individuals but 
was thought to be adequate to bring to light any glaring reasons which 
would preclude the awarding of a classified contract. The individuals within 
the company to whom classified information was to be released were also 
subject to the security check which normally preceded the release of such 

The number of OSRD contractors and the even greater number of plants 
and laboratories where they performed their work made it impossible to 
arrange for physical inspections of all plants and laboratories. In most cases, 
the contractors themselves determined their security requirements by refer- 
ence to the security material furnished them by OSRD or by the War and 
Navy Departments. 

For contractors performing a considerable portion of the total national 
effort in important fields of research and for contractors participating in 
research fields which were recognized by common agreement among the 
federal research agencies involved as requiring special security, the War 
Department provided an inspection service. Twenty-five contractors were so 
inspected on the basis of their work for OSRD, while other OSRD con- 
tractors were inspected on the basis of other war work. The inspections 
made by the War Department were to determine whether the plant security 
system employed was necessary and adequate, whether the work was such 
that intraplant controls of movements were necessary, what areas needed 
special protection, and what other security measures were necessary to pre- 
vent unauthorized access to classified information from within as well as 
from outside the plant. 

These inspections were made for advisory purposes only, and, with the 
exception of measures which the contractor would be expected to take with- 
out consideration of his wartime classified research, all recommendations 
were made to OSRD and not the contractor. It was the responsibility of 
OSRD to review the recommendations and to effect compliance with those 
it believed warranted. 

For its own offices, OSRD adopted a system of photographic badges simi- 
lar to those used by the Army and Navy. Guard service on the buildings in 


Washington was provided by the PubUc Buildings Administration of the 
Federal Works Agency. In addition electrically operated burglar alarms 
were installed in those parts of buildings where the greatest amount of pro- 
tection after ofiEce hours was believed to be essential. 

Organization for Security 

Responsibility for security was delegated by the Director to the Executive 
Secretary. It entailed the formulation of regulations by which classified 
matter was protected, the establishment of procedures by which active se- 
curity programs could be conducted, and the execution of those programs. 
As the Executive Secretary was the Contracting Officer on most OSRD con- 
tracts, he was in a position to issue the necessary instructions to put the 
regulations into effect so far as contracts were concerned. In order to assist 
the Executive Secretary in carrying out his responsibilities as security officer, 
a security section was established in the Administrative Office with William 
A. Osborne as Chief. At the peak of its activity twenty-two persons were 
assigned to the section. 

The security section had the task of conducting the security programs, 
maintaining the records of security activities, and preparing and enforcing 
security regulations. By placing responsibility for the enforcement of regula- 
tions in the group responsible for their preparation, there was assurance that 
the problems involved in administration and enforcement would be con- 
sidered at the same time as the necessity for the regulation itself. This cen- 
tralization also made it possible to keep close watch over the operation of 
security regulations and procedures. A number of inquiries on any point in 
the regulations or a number of inquiries on a point not covered by the regu- 
lations frequently indicated the need for new or revised regulations and 
procedures. The centralization of security functions also simplified the under- 
standing of the over-all security picture of any organization engaged in 
OSRD work. Comprehensive files made most of the information immediately 

On the average the security section handled between 150 and 300 reports 
per week. The number of cases pending completion of investigation usually 
equalled the number of cases submitted for investigation in the previous 
four- to eight-week period. All cases where a possible adverse decision was 
indicated were submitted to the Executive Secretary for review, and occa- 
sionally a particularly difficult case would be discussed with the Director. 

OSRD never seriously considered setting up its own investigative service. 
The Army and Navy had their intelligence services and there were others 
in different parts of the Government. If there had been a comparable OSRD 
service, it might have been possible to get reports more speedily than they 


were furnished by the channels actually employed. There can be no assur- 
ance that this would have been the case, and, on balance, the probabilities 
are that the results would have been otherwise. OSRD had no competence 
in the field of personnel investigations, and as the existing investigative 
agencies were continually short of personnel, there is no reason to believe 
that OSRD would have been more successful in recruiting competent man- 
power in the field. In any event, the manpower shortage which continually 
plagued OSRD's normal operations affords no ground for optimism that 
the situation in the field of investigations would have been different. 

Although OSRD security arrangements worked satisfactorily to the extent 
that no leaks of information are known to have occurred, there were several 
anomalies, particularly in relations with the investigative agencies, which 
should be eliminated in connection with civilian participation in military 
research in the future. 





SIDE from the employment of a limited number of scien- 
tists for its own staff and assistance to contractors in meeting the problems 
of selective service, the initial approach of NDRC to the problems of scien- 
tific personnel was through a contract with the National Academy of 
Sciences. Under that contract the National Research Council established an 
Office of Scientific Personnel in May 1941, with Henry A. Barton, Director 
of the American Institute of Physics, as its Director and George W. Bailey, 
President of the American Radio Relay League, as Chairman of its radio 
section. The first task of the new office was to locate and certify to the 
Signal Corps young electrical engineers who could be commissioned as 
second lieutenants in the Electronics Training Group and sent to England 
for training in the practical operation of radar under battle conditions. The 
successful execution of this assignment was followed by comparable tasks 
for various Navy bureaus as well as the stimulation of a special course in 
the latest developments in electronics to equip instructors in a selected group 
of colleges to train the large number of men who would be needed to 
operate the radar gear then in the process of development. 

By the spring of 1942 the scientific manpower situation had become much 
tighter, and there was a real danger not only that the Army, Navy, OSRD, 
industry and educational institutions would find themselves bidding actively 
for the services of the same individual but also that such competition would 
develop among OSRD contractors trying to build staffs to carry rapidly 
expanding programs. To consider this and other problems hinging around 
scientific personnel. Bush appointed a Committee on Scientific Personnel, 
which held its first meeting in June 1942, with Frank Aydelotte, Director 
of the Institute for Advanced Study, as Chairman and Bailey as Secretary. 
The principal functions of the Committee were to recommend policy in 
regard to scientific personnel of OSRD and to advise contractors with re- 
spect to bases of compensation for scientific workers and handling of prob- 
lems arising from the Selective Service Act, as well as assisting them to obtain 
personnel which they required. 

The problems of scientific manpower became more and more pressing 
as the war progressed. The other demands upon Aydelotte's time were such 


that he felt impelled to resign the chairmanship of the Committee on Scien- 
tific Personnel in December 1942. He was succeeded in April 1943, by John 
V. L. Hogan, a well-known radio engineer. Hogan also was designated as 
Bush's alternate on the Committee on Scientific Research Personnel of the 
War Manpower Commission, which is described below. 

Hogan recommended that OSRD scientific personnel activities be con- 
centrated in a new operating unit of OSRD headed by a single individual 
in place of the existing committee. Bush accepted the recommendation and 
the Scientific Personnel Office (SPO) was established as a principal subdi- 
vision of OSRD by Administrative Order No. 3 of August 21, 1943. After 
providing that the head of the ofi&ce should be appointed by the Director, 
the Order continued in Section 2(e): 

Under the general supervision and direction of the Director and subject to the 
directives and regulations of the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, 
the Scientific Personnel Office shall have charge of administering the duties as 
set forth in Section 2.b. of Executive Order No. 8807 with respect to scientific 
personnel utilized in developing and applying to war purposes the scientific 
research and development sponsored by the OflEce of Scientific Research and 
Development. Principal among such duties shall be (i) handling the relationships 
between the Office of Scientific Research and Development and other govern- 
mental agencies with respect to scientific personnel, and (ii) dealing with the 
problems relating to scientific personnel employed by or associated with the 
Office of Scientific Research and Development or its contractors, particularly prob- 
lems in connection with policies and procedures relating to the evaluation, train- 
ing, allocation, compensation and requests for deferment by the Selective Service 
System of such scientific personnel. 

The head of the SPO was authorized to administer the duties set forth 
in Section 2(e) and to delegate any of his powers or duties to such assistant 
as he might designate with the approval of the Director. Hogan was named 
as head of SPO, to which was transferred the Selective Service unit of the 
Administrative Office, also described below. 

In a memorandum of June 10, 1943, to Hogan, Bush outlined three major 
functions of SPO. The first was to handle relationships between OSRD and 
other agencies on matters relating to scientific personnel. This included 
furnishing the Committee on Scientific Research Personnel (CSRP) of the 
War Manpower Commission information concerning OSRD and OSRD 
contractors' personnel for possible inclusion in the Reserved List (described 
later); maintaining liaison with the National Roster of Scientific and Spe- 
cialized Personnel, as well as with various branches of the Army and Navy 
and other agencies; and making recommendations regarding the flow of 
scientific personnel outward from OSRD. The Chief of SPO served as alter- 
nate to the Director of OSRD as a member of CSRP. The second function 
was to serve as the center for handling matters relating to scientific personnel 


within the OSRD. This included making recommendations regarding the 
flow of personnel among projects within OSRD, serving as a center of in- 
formation for OSRD and its contractors with reference to scientific person- 
nel, handhng relations with the Selective Service system and all deferment 
requests made on behalf of contractors' personnel and OSRD personnel, 
promoting stabilized compensation of scientific personnel, and recommend- 
ing effective utilization of facilities for advanced training of personnel with 
general scientific background to fit them for work in fields where there 
were serious shortages of experienced scientific personnel. The third func- 
tion was to advise the Director and to execute his instructions on general 
policy and procedures relating to the recruitment, evaluation, training, 
allocation, compensation, and requests for deferment of scientific personnel. 
Bailey succeeded Hogan as Chief of SPO in March 1944. By January i, 
1945, the Scientific Personnel Office had a detailed record of over 13,000 
scientific and technical personnel who had contacted the office either by 
correspondence or in person. Persons on this list were assisted in obtaining 
commissions in the armed forces, assignments as noncommissioned officers 
or other grades, civilian positions in the armed forces, teaching positions in 
schools and colleges (including the United States Military Academy), and 
positions with contractors of OSRD. This work was performed under the 
supervision of Miss Sandy X. Demou. 

Salaries of Scientific Personnel 

One matter to which a great deal of attention was given was that of 
salaries for scientific personnel. The "no-profit-no-loss" principle adopted by 
NDRC and followed by OSRD was not easy to apply in the case of salaries 
paid by academic contractors. There was no particular problem in connec- 
tion with salaries paid by industrial contractors as personnel working on 
OSRD contracts were merely a part of the total organization, and the sal- 
aries paid to them conformed to the pattern of the organization. 

The original position of NDRC in the matter of reimbursement of 
salaries paid to regular staff members of academic institutions was that the 
time devoted by the individual to work on an NDRC contract was diverted 
from that which he normally would spend in peacetime research and conse- 
quently should not be the occasion for compensation by the Government 
either to him or to the institution. As academic enrollment dropped due to 
the drafting of students into the Army, and as staff members devoted more 
and more time to work on NDRC contracts, it was recognized that this 
policy was inequitable. Accordingly, the policy was modified and the con- 
tracting institutions were authorized to claim reimbursement for the time 
of staff members spent on NDRC contracts. CMR adhered to the original 
NDRC policy for approximately a year after it had been abandoned by 


NDRC, but was finally forced by circumstances to drop it in favor of the 
new NDRC policy. 

Work done by staff members of academic institutions during their vaca- 
tions was always recognized as presenting a special case. The regular aca- 
demic practice is to pay staff members for work done during an academic 
year which is usually of approximately ten months' duration with the indi- 
vidual staff member free to supplement his income by teaching during his 
vacation. Since work under NDRC contracts during the vacation period 
represented a net loss of salary to the individual, it was recognized as ap- 
propriate that NDRC should pay for work spent on its contracts during 
that time. 

As OSRD contracts increased in size and academic institutions were 
forced to supplement their regular staffs, the matter of proper salary levels 
assumed increasing importance. The supply of well-qualified physicists was 
soon exhausted and the competition for less experienced men and for men 
in related fields became keener. Situations began to develop in which OSRD 
contractors were not only in competition with industrial establishments 
but also with each other. OSRD recognized that, having pressed upon its 
contractors the responsibility for obtaining highly important results from 
research in a relatively short time, there were limits beyond which it should 
not go in dictating policies to be followed by contractors in acquiring nec- 
essary personnel. 

The first problem given the OSRD Committee on Scientific Personnel 
when it was created in June 1942, was that of studying the salary practices 
of OSRD contractors and making recommendations on the subject to 
the Director. Aydelotte's study showed considerable difference of opinion 
among contractors as to the proper policy. Salaries were on the increase 
throughout the national economy. It was not unusual for skilled mechanics 
to receive higher salaries than junior scientists. The latter were leaving 
academic institutions to go into war work paying higher salaries and NDRC 
contractors were finding it necessary to meet competitive salary scales. 
Contractors who had succeeded in building up satisfactory staffs vigor- 
ously defended their salary scales, which they felt were entirely justified 
by the manpower situation and by the salaries paid for comparable posi- 
tions in industry. Contractors who had sought unsuccessfully to build up 
satisfactory staffs were equally vigorous in expressing their opinion that 
the salary situation had begun to get out of hand; and academic institutions 
losing personnel both to OSRD contractors and to industry were gloomy in 
estimating the effect which the general increase in salaries would have upon 
the ability of colleges and universities with limited endowments to carry 
on their postwar work. 

It was, of course, impossible to reconcile the various views; and it would 
have been equally impossible to establish a firm salary schedule which 


would not have within it the seeds of a possible disruption of parts of the 
OSRD research and development program. The conclusions of the study 
were embodied in a circular of March 6, 1943, which stated that salaries 
fixed in good faith by one or more of the following methods should meet 
the test of reasonableness: individual bargaining, objectively (categories of 
positions carrying established salary schedules), comparatively (where there 
were more or less well established rates in the locality), and subjectively 
(considering present earnings of a prospective employee). Differences in 
living costs were recognized as being entitled to consideration in the case 
of men called upon to change their places of residence in order to take 
employment on a project. 

Reserve Officers 

In October 1940, NDRC became acutely aware of the fact that a few 
appointees and a larger number of employees of NDRC contractors were 
holding reserve commissions in the Army or the Navy. The primary value 
of the reserve military organization lay in its immediate availability in an 
emergency. The War Department quite properly recognized only a single 
valid reason for excusing a man from the obligations assumed when he 
became a reserve officer, namely that he could render greater service to 
the Nation in his civilian status. Accordingly, the Department established 
a Reserve Pool in which reserve officers who were key men in industries 
related to national defense and whose retention as key men was absolutely 
necessary might be placed. The Department reserved the right to approve 
or disapprove the request that an officer be assigned to the Reserve Pool 
and to return him to eligible status whenever it deemed necessary. An 
officer in the Reserve Pool was not eligible for promotion, assignment or 
active duty. 

The position taken by Bush was that the armed services were best able 
to judge whether a reserve officer would be of greatest use in the emer- 
gency as an officer or in a civilian capacity. Accordingly the only action 
which NRDC took with reference to deferring the calling of reserve offi- 
cers to active duty was to bring to the attention of the appropriate Service 
pertinent information which should be considered by it in determining 
whether or not to issue the call. 

In addition to the Reserve Pool the Army had another procedure for 
effecting temporary deferment of reserve officers. This was applicable in 
cases where only a short time was needed to permit the reserve officer to 
complete a particular important assignment. It involved placing the name 
of the officer as far down on the list of available reserve officers in a par- 
ticular corps area as would be sufficient in the opinion of the command to 
provide the requested deferment. This did not automatically assure the 


deferment, however, as the actual time of call fluctuated with the rate at 
which reserve officers were needed. 

A number of reserve officers were deferred for NDRC work prior to 
the entry of the United States into the war. After that, deferment was 
extremely difficult to obtain. The matter, which was of much more impor- 
tance to industries engaged in production of military equipment than to 
NDRC, was finally solved by the decision of the War Department to con- 
sider all reserve officers available for call to active military service on and 
after April i, 1942. This decision was communicated to reserve officers 
in February 1942, with the information that those employed in key posi- 
tions in which their continued services beyond March 31, 1942, were 
deemed necessary to the maintenance of national health, safety or interest 
might before that date tender resignation of their reserve appointments. 
The Department reserved the right to decline any resignation so tendered 
as a matter of military necessity. Reserve officers whose resignations were 
accepted became subject to the provisions of the Selective Service Act in 
the same manner as other citizens. 

The situation with respect to reserve commissions in the Navy was a little 
dififerent from that in the Army. The Navy made no provision for a reserve 
pool comparable to that of the Army. In the spring of 1941 it took the 
position that reserve officers should in most cases accept a call to active 
duty or submit their resignations as reserve officers with the understanding 
that the Navy retained complete liberty to determine whether the resig- 
nation should be accepted. There was provision for deferment, however, 
and a number of deferments were granted. After the attack on Pearl Har- 
bor, however, there was little chance of either deferment or acceptance 
of resignation except in the case of older reserve officers who would prob- 
ably be used by the Navy only in a consultant capacity not requiring the 
usual call to active duty. 

Problems of Selective Service 

Ideally a war should be fought with every man in the position where 
he will make the greatest contribution to the over-all war effort. The ideal 
is impossible of attainment in any large country. In its place there is a 
tendency to substitute general rules, and the most general of those rules 
is that every able-bodied young man should be in the armed services. But 
the general rule is recognized as too sweeping and administrative machin- 
ery is established to permit exceptions from it in cases dictated by public 
interest. Blanket exceptions from the application of the general rule in 
the case of activities recognized as essential had led to abuses in World 
War I, so blanket exceptions were not permitted in World War II. 

This is not the place for a review of the operations of the Selective Serv- 


ice Act and the system which it created. A blanket exception of scientists 
from the operations of the Act, if carefully administered, would probably 
have materially aided in the scientific research program underlying the 
war effort, but the exception of an entire group might have entailed such 
bad results because of the example it set that the over-all war effort would 
have suffered. The subject is certainly one which should receive careful 
study over the next few years in order that the whole problem of scientific 
manpower may be better handled in the future if the occasion for it should 
arise, for it was badly handled in World War II. 

The most ambitious attempt of OSRD to meet the scientific manpower 
problem intelligently did not receive a trial, but the importance of the sub- 
ject warrants mention of it here so that it may be considered if a com- 
parable emergency confronts the country in the future. 

Proposed Scientific Corps 

The impact of the Pearl Harbor attack upon the availability of scientific 
manpower promised to be serious. The Army promptly started calling more 
reserve officers into active service, the Navy stepped up its commissioning of 
highly selected scientific and technical men, scientists began to volunteer for 
the Army and Navy although their usefulness to the war effort might be 
greater if they remained in their laboratories, the calls upon Selective Service 
became greater, and the demand for scientific manpower in research and in- 
dustry increased. Bush requested President Robert G. Sproul of the Uni- 
versity of California to come to Washington to make a study of the scien- 
tific manpower situation. After discussing the matter with Bush, Conant 
wrote to Sproul on January i, 1942, suggesting what he described as "the 
most radical solution of our personnel problem; namely, that there be cre- 
ated by law a Scientific Research Corps into which men would be forced 
by fear of the draft, as well as by patriotic motives, and this Research Corps 
would be distributed around in various laboratories to carry on the neces- 
sary research work required by the Nation in time of war." 

Sproul came to Washington and, after canvassing the situation, met with 
the Advisory Council on January 17, 1942, for a discussion of the proposed 
Scientific Corps. The subject was again discussed by the Council on Jan- 
uary 23, at which time it began to take rather definite form. The proposed 
Civilian Scientific Corps was to consist of approximately 25,000 men drawn 
from civilian life, including civilians in the Army, Navy and Civil Service. 
Except for administrative officers, members of the Corps would be required 
to have a bachelor's degree or its equivalent and to have demonstrated spe- 
cial skill in research in an educational, industrial or governmental institu- 
tion or in a research laboratory. The Director of the Corps, appointed by 
the President, would have the power to assign members and to allocate the 


services of the Corps to the Army, the Navy, the OSRD and to industries 
and educational institutions serving those organizations. He would be 
guided in the enrollment and allocation of members of the Corps by a board 
composed of representatives of the Secretaries of War and Navy and the 
Director of OSRD. 

Members of the Corps were to be classified after the fashion of the pro- 
fessional grades of the Civil Service of the United States with their sal- 
aries to be paid by the Service, institution or contractor to which the Corps 
member was assigned, but with the salaries guaranteed by the Corps for 
the duration of the war and for three months thereafter. Members of the 
Corps when assigned to the Army, Navy, OSRD, industries, laboratories, 
or educational institutions would be under the orders of the appropriate offi- 
cer in each organization but would not be subjected to reassignment by 
that organization. Members of the Corps assigned to the Army or Navy 
for service with combat forces would wear a uniform prescribed by the 
Director; other members would wear appropriate insignia. 

Provision was to be made for a reserve category of especially selected 
essential men to constitute not more than 10 per cent of each age group 
beginning at 17 and including the groups 18 and 19, to be placed under 
the control of special boards in each State with Army and Navy officers 
attached to them. These boards would have the power to allocate the men 
under their control to the Army and Navy as enlisted men, to the Civilian 
Scientific Corps, to schools or colleges for additional training, to officer 
training corps or for commissions. They would not be permitted to resign 
or to enter civilian positions unless directed to do so by the board. 

A reserve technical training corps would be established to correspond 
to the senior ROTC in colleges and universities and would be open to 
students in science or engineering who had shown marked ability and 
promise. Provision would also be made for a junior division of the Scien- 
tific Corps in which students of science or engineering with marked ability 
and promise could enlist under conditions laid down by the Director of 
the Corps and be assigned to colleges, universities, and technical schools 
for further training. Upon completion of the training they would be eligible 
for the senior division of the Civilian Scientific Corps or for such service 
in the armed forces as might be determined by the board of that Corps. 
The proposal for the establishment of the Corps did not obtain the sup- 
port of the Army and the President declined to authorize its establishment. 
By Executive Order No. 9078 of February 26, 1942, however, the President 
established the Army Specialist Corps in the War Department under the 
supervision and direction of the Secretary of War to consist of a corps of 
uniformed civilian employees appointed by the Secretary of War. Respon- 
sibility for recruiting persons for the Corps was vested in the Civil Service 
Commission. It was thought for a while that the Army Specialist Corps 


might afiford a means of helping OSRD meet its scientific manpower 
problems, but the Corps had very little impact upon OSRD and gave no 
relief for its manpower problems. 

Reserved List of Scientific Personnel 

The next attempt to meet the scientific manpower situation on more 
than a piecemeal basis was more successful. After consulting with the 
Advisory Council as to ways of holding essential research personnel, Bush 
addressed a memorandum to the War Manpower Commission on Octo- 
ber 16, 1942, suggesting the establishment of a Reserved List of Scientific 
Personnel. He pointed out that comparatively few additional young men 
could be trained so that they would be effective in research during the 
progress of the war and that therefore the country must depend upon those 
individuals who already had the ability, training and professional experi- 
ence to qualify them for scientific research. Men qualified for research in 
crucial fields should not enter any other service but should concentrate 
upon the work which, if not done by them, could not be done at all. The 
decisions as to where these men should be employed should be made by a 
board which could take a broad view of the whole situation, so that men 
who could be of the greatest use in scientific research would be directed to 
and kept at work in the particular field in which they could contribute 
most to the national war effort. The concrete suggestion made by Bush 
was the creation of a board on scientific personnel to include representatives 
of OSRD, Army, Navy, NACA, and the National Roster of Scientific and 
Specialized Personnel. The specific function of the board would be: 

(i) Prepare a list of reserved scientific and technical research workers of profes- 
sional grade engaged on research or development of instruments of war or 
on medical problems important to the war effort and in the employ of 
OSRD, Army, Navy, and NACA or of firms and institutions working under 
contract with those organizations. 

(2) Determine the places in which these individuals could most effectively serve 
the war effort and implement its determinations by suitable recommendations 
to the agencies concerned. 

(3) Inform individuals whose names appeared on the list that changes in their 
connections should not be made without prior reference to the board. 

(4) Maintain a continuing study of the need for scientific personnel in the armed 
services and in civilian agencies to the end that its recommendations might 
reflect the soundest judgment possible as to what would best serve the war 

(5) Maintain continual contact with the personnel sections of Army, Navy, 
OSRD, and NACA in order that it might be able to meet their needs to the 
fullest possible extent. 


It was proposed that the board should furnish information regarding 
particular individuals to the local Selective Service Boards and to the Army 
and Navy. It should have the responsibility to recommend transfers of 
individuals on the Reserved List from one project to another in accordance 
with the varying needs of research and the importance of different projects 
to the total war effort. The names of individuals persistently refusing to 
conform to the recommendations of the board might be removed from the 
List. Bush expressed the belief that individual scientists, Selective Service 
Boards and the armed services would welcome and follow the advice of 
the proposed board on scientific personnel. 

In a letter of February 26, 1943, the War Manpower Commission ac- 
cepted Bush's suggestion with very litde change. The letter proposed the 
establishment within the Commission of an agency to be called the Com- 
mittee on Scientific Research Personnel and to have the composition sug- 
gested by Bush with the addition of a representative of the Office of Pro- 
duction Research and Development of the War Production Board. Mr. 
McNutt placed the upper limit on the proposed Reserved List as 7500 
names until additional permission should be received from him to include 
a larger number. In the same letter he asked for suggestions as to individ- 
uals who might be designated as members of the proposed committee; 
and he promptly accepted the suggestions made by OSRD in its reply 
of March 11, 1943. President Leonard Carmichael of Tufts College, Di- 
rector of the National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel, was 
designated as Chairman of the new committee which had its organiza- 
tion meeting on April 8, 1943. Bush was the OSRD member of the com- 
mittee with Hogan as his alternate. OSRD informed its contractors of the 
proposal to establish the Reserved List and requested them to send in the 
names of qualified persons working under their OSRD contracts for entry 
on that list. The response was immediate in most cases. Through follow-up 
correspondence an attempt was made to keep the list correct as to OSRD 

After a review within OSRD to eliminate names which clearly should 
not have been included, OSRD referred the names and supporting data 
to the Carmichael committee which made its own investigation as to the 
propriety of including each name on the Reserved List. After accepting a 
name for inclusion on the List, the Committee informed the candidate's 
local draft board of his inclusion on the List. At the same time it notified 
the Director of Selective Service who in turn informed the State Selective 
Service Director by whom the candidate's local board was informed of the 
qualifications of the individual and the importance of his position to the 
war effort. In addition a certificate was sent to each individual whose name 
was included on the List. On his part, the registrant entered into an agree- 


ment with the committee not to change his occupation without prior permis- 
sion of the committee. 

As of December 7, 1945, there were approximately 7000 names on the 
Reserved List; of these about 5600 were on the List because of work on 
OSRD contracts. Inclusion on the List, which received consistent support 
by Secretary Stimson, afforded a substantial measure of assurance that an 
individual would not be taken from war research and inducted into the 
Army or Navy. At one stage when the Army was making its greatest 
demand for young men there appeared danger that the List would be 
abandoned and a substantial number of the men on it called into the Army. 
The storm was weathered, however, when the Army itself stressed to 
Selective Service the importance of keeping the List intact. By the time 
the war ended only twenty men on the Reserved List had been inducted. 

OSRD Personnel 

As was the case with contractor's personnel, NDRC had little difficulty 
in obtaining deferments for its own key personnel in the beginning. Al- 
though a few administrative posts were initially made the basis for de- 
ferment requests, most of the requests were for incumbents of scientific 
positions — largely Technical Aides and field service specialists. A Presi- 
dential Order of November 17, 1942, introduced a measure of uniformity 
in the requests for deferment of employees of all Federal departments and 
agencies. A more rigorous procedure was established by Executive Order 
No. 9309 of March 6, 1943, which directed the establishment in each 
agency of an "Agency Committee" to be responsible for requesting occu- 
pational deferment of employees of the agency, with its actions to be sub- 
ject to review by a Presidential Review Committee in the War Manpower 
Commission. The criterion to be followed by the Agency Committee was 
"that the employee's civilian services are essential in that the loss thereof 
would substantially impair activities essential to the war effort (including 
necessary supporting activities and the maintenance of the national health, 
safety and interest)." 

The Agency Committee was to submit to the Review Committee for its 
approval a list of those positions in the agency deemed necessary to carry 
out activities essential to the war effort. All such positions approved by the 
Review Committee were to be known as "key positions." Key positions 
were limited to positions involving serious difficulty of replacement be- 
cause of a scarcity of available qualified personnel and because any in- 
cumbent of the position must have had, in order to perform his duties 
effectively, an extended period of training or specialized experience. 

Only one "key position" in OSRD was approved. All other requests made 


by OSRD were made under the provisions of Part IV (i-b) of Executive 
Order No. 9309 which covered "any employee of the Agency not occupy- 
ing a key position whose civiUan services are essential, if unusual and spe- 
cial circumstances, such as the employee's unique fitness for the work or 
unique familiarity with a specific project in the course of completion 
make such deferment request necessary. No request for deferment shall 
be made under this subparagraph except with the prior specific approval 
of the Review Committee." The Agency Committee procedure did not 
extend to persons serving OSRD without compensation or part time. This 
was immaterial as most such persons were not within the age limits of 
Selective Service. 

The OSRD Agency Committee was originally composed of one repre- 
sentative each of NDRC, CMR, the Liaison Office, and the Committee on 
Scientific Personnel with Stewart as Chairman. When responsibility for 
relations with the Selective Service System was transferred to the newly 
created Scientific Personnel Office in June 1943, Hogan succeeded Stew- 
art as Chairman of the Agency Committee and was in turn succeeded by 
Bailey in March 1944. 

A statutory basis was provided for the procedure initiated under Execu- 
tive Order No. 9309 by Public Law No. 23 of April 8, 1943. 

As it had early become apparent that it was only a question of time until 
practically all administrative employees would be refused deferment, a policy 
of recruiting such employees from among women and men rejected by Selec- 
tive Service for physical reasons (4F) was actively pursued. As a result 
the operations of Selective Service occasioned little difficulty to the admin- 
istrative aspects of OSRD work, aside from occasional flurries when a 
lowering of physical standards brought a lA classification to a man who 
had been put in a responsible position in reliance on his 4F classification. 

The men for whom OSRD sought deferment because of their scientific 
or technical qualifications and responsibilities fell into two groups, Tech- 
nical Aides and contract employees of the Office of Field Service. After the 
issuance of new regulations tightening deferment requirements in Febru- 
ary 1944, OSRD was for a time in danger of having its program interrupted 
by losing part of the Technical Aide staff supervising research contracts. 
A procedure was worked out, however, under which a maximum of 
seventy-five men engaged in highly technical and scientific work might be 
deferred upon the request of the Director of OSRD endorsed by the Sec- 
retary of War or the Secretary of the Navy. Actually forty such requests 
were made, all were approved by the Review Committee, and the men 

A comparable situation arose with respect to OFS contract personnel, 
many of whom were following the performance of new equipment un- 


der battle conditions. A similar arrangement was made for not to exceed 
eighty OFS contract employees; actually only thirty-two requests were 
made, all were approved by the Review Committee and the men deferred. 

Contractors' Personnel 

The Selective Training and Service Act became effective on September i6, 
1940. It was obvious that some of the men working on NDRC projects 
would fall within the provisions of the Act and that even more men who 
might be expected to be engaged in NDRC projects in the future would 
be lost to NDRC through the operations of the Act. As to this latter group, 
NDRC early took and constantly maintained the view that the proper 
use of scientific manpower was a matter of great national importance, and 
that appropriate measures should be taken to utilize that manpower most 
effectively; but that it was not a proper function of NDRC to endeavor 
to withhold from the operation of the Selective Service Act persons of sci- 
entific training who might at a future date be engaged in military research. 
It was equally insistent, however, that the operations of the Selective Serv- 
ice Act must not be permitted to wreck the program of military research 
carried on under NDRC auspices by the indiscriminate drafting of persons 
actually engaged in NDRC research and necessary to its effective con- 

After conversations with the Civilian Committee on Selective Service, 
NDRC called the Selective Service Act to the attention of its contractors 
in October 1940. The letter merely observed that there might be men of 
draft age in the group assigned by the contractor to work on defense re- 
search carried on under contract with the NDRC. If the institution planned 
to petition the local boards to have any of these men deferred, NDRC 
stated that it would be glad to prepare a supplementary statement to ac- 
company the contractor's request. The NDRC statement would be limited 
to presenting the facts with respect to the importance of the NDRC pro- 
gram and the place within that program of the research being carried on 
by the particular contractor. The effect of this was to place NDRC upon 
record as to the importance of the research. It was left entirely to the con- 
tractor to establish with the local board that the particular individual for 
whom deferment was requested fulfilled the requirements which would 
make him a "necessary man" within the meaning of the Selective Service 
regulations. Under the regulations the local boards were directed to place 
in class 2A each registrant found to be a necessary man within the meaning 
of the regulations. Persons placed in class 2A might be deferred for a 
period not longer than six months with the provision that there might be 
additional deferments of not to exceed six months each unless the local 
board should reclassify the registrant. 


This simple procedure was adequate to protect the essential personnel 
of NDRC and OSRD contractors during the period preceding the entry 
of the United States into the war in December 1941. With that entry the 
manpower situation became much tighter, and a special Selective Service 
unit under Miss Miriam Madden was established within the Administrative 
Office whose sole function it was to work with Selective Service headquar- 
ters on the one hand and the local boards and the contractors on the other. 
Miss Mary Lee Jones succeeded Miss Madden as head of the unit on 
August II, 1942, and directed it in a highly competent manner through- 
out the war. 

OSRD contractors were informed on February 4, 1942, of a newly estab- 
lished procedure for requesting occupational deferment of essential person- 
nel employed on OSRD contracts. The memorandum pointed to the prob- 
ability that Selective Service classifications would be reopened and thus 
introduce the possibility of reclassifications. Contractors were advised to 
ascertain immediately the Selective Service status of each employee deemed 
essential to the progress of work under an OSRD contract and to consider 
the advisibility of requesting an occupational deferment. The OSRD policy 
was stated to be that such a request should be made only when the loss of 
the individual's services would result in detriment to the OSRD work at 
hand because of his unusual qualifications or because of the existence of a 
shortage of men of his particular type of training. To meet Selective Service 
requirements, the requests were to be made on Selective Service Form 42A 
filled out by the contractor. In order that they might be adequately reviewed 
within OSRD, the requests were required to be supplemented by a detailed 
statement from the contractor reciting specifically why the particular indi- 
vidual was essential to the progress of the work and what steps the con- 
tractor had taken to recruit other persons of equal or similar qualifications. 
As this information was intended for use only within OSRD, the con- 
tractor was able to use information of a classified nature which could not 
be put on the form itself. The form and letter were sent through the 
appropriate NDRC division for review and endorsement to the Adminis- 
trative Office which in turn reviewed the correspondence and in appro- 
priate cases transmitted the Form 42A to the local Selective Service board 
with a suitable letter reciting OSRD's interest in the case. The Selective 
Service regulations made provision for appeal of adverse decisions by local 
boards, and OSRD required the appeals to be filed through the OSRD if 
they were to be supported by it. 

OSRD kept in sufficiently close contact with the National Selective Serv- 
ice Headquarters to anticipate probable developments in order that it might 
advise its contractors. It was clearly apparent that the constantly increasing 
military needs for manpower would multiply the difficulties encountered 
in obtaining deferment of essential scientific and technical personnel. 


OSRD contractors were advised on November 7, 1942, to employ women 
and older men wherever possible. They were warned on December 17, 
1942, of the increasing difficulty of obtaining extensions of deferments, 
many of which were scheduled for termination in the near future. The 
Hmits within which an OSRD endorsement of a request for a deferment 
would be granted were again stressed and the contractors were put on notice 
that they would have to convince both OSRD and Selective Service that 
they had in fact tried to comply with the Selective Service requirement of 
attempting to obtain a substitute for a necessary man who had been pre- 
viously deferred. The emphasis on the part of OSRD that the Selective 
Service requirements be observed in good faith probably forestalled the 
filing of deferment requests in many doubtful cases. It may have resulted 
in the failure to defer some men -who should have been deferred even 
under the Selective Service regulations. On the other hand, it built up 
within the National Selective Service Headquarters a feeling that OSRD 
was acting in complete good faith and that its representations could be 
relied upon. This was invaluable in getting the backing of the national 
headquarters where appeals had to be taken in important cases. It also 
helped in obtaining favorable acdon from the local boards. By the end of 
1942, OSRD had endorsed requests for deferments for 3602 scientific and 
technical men employed on OSRD projects. The requested deferments were 
granted in all except sixteen of these cases. 

With the establishment of the Scientific Personnel Office as a principal 
subdivision of OSRD in June 1943, responsibility for handling requests 
for deferment of scientific and technical personnel from calls under the 
Selective Service Act was transferred to that office. The Selective Service 
unit was transferred in a body from the Administrative Office to the Sci- 
entific Personnel Office. 

Pressure for the induction of all physically qualified young men con- 
tinued to mount. In August 1943, the local boards were informed by na- 
tional headquarters that one half million fathers would need to be inducted 
before January i, 1944, in order to meet calls from the Services. This did 
not immediately affect OSRD as deferments upon the endorsement of 
OSRD had been based upon occupational qualifications, not upon family 
status. It did serve to increase the pressure upon the local boards to induct 
more nonfathers and it increased their reluctance to grant deferments to 
physically fit unmarried men for any reason. In September 1943, national 
headquarters in Local Board Memorandum 115 B called for increasing 
scrutiny of occupational deferment of registrants between the ages of 18 
and 26. The thoroughness with which the persons deferred on the recom- 
mendation of OSRD had been screened originally was such that this addi- 
tional scrutiny did not affect the situation. 

By an act approved December 5, 1943, Congress directed that men mar- 


ried prior to December 8, 1941, who had maintained a bona fide rela- 
tionship with their famiHes since that date and who had one or more chil- 
dren under 18 years of age born prior to September 15, 1942, should not 
be inducted as long as qualified unmarried men remained available. This 
act again served to increase the pressure for the induction of physically fit 
unmarried young men who had been deferred for occupational reasons. 
At the same time, however, the procedure for appeal from decisions of 
local boards was changed to give jurisdiction of the appeal to the appeal 
board in the area in which the registrant's principal place of employment 
was located. This change operated to the advantage of OSRD as the board 
physically located near the site of work was in a better position to judge 
its importance than one situated several hundred miles away, as had fre- 
quently been the case previously. 

Experience showed that although OSRD had tried to establish a proce- 
dure for screening requests to local boards made in connection with em- 
ployment on OSRD contracts, contractors would occasionally try to supple- 
ment the OSRD efforts by direct representations on their own behalf to the 
local boards or in some cases on appeal. The resulting confusion led OSRD 
to announce in November 1943, that if OSRD endorsement of a request 
for deferment of a contractor's employee was desired the OSRD Scientific 
Personnel Office must conduct all correspondence and communications with 
any branches of the Selective Service system that might be concerned ex- 
cept that the Form 42A should be filled out and signed by the contractor. 
This was not intended as a usurpation of the contractor's rights, as the con- 
tractor was perfectly free to prepare and prosecute the request for defer- 
ment without involving OSRD at all. It did serve to keep contractors from 
involving OSRD in statements which OSRD was not prepared to substan- 
tiate, and it eliminated the confusion which followed the descent of infor- 
mation upon local boards from two different sources in the same case. In 
practice a contractor had very little chance to obtain deferment of person- 
nel on the basis of OSRD contract work without the intervention of OSRD 

January 1944 saw a revision of Local Board Memorandum 115 with many 
changes as to occupational classifications which the local boards were re- 
quested to consider in connection with deferment applications. Among the 
changes was the provision that no registrant of the ages 18 through 21 
should be granted occupational deferment, with very limited exceptions 
requiring the authorization of the State Director in each individual case. 
The number of such cases relying on OSRD endorsement was relatively 
small and the necessary endorsement of the State directors was forthcoming 
in all except a few cases. 

The next move which complicated the OSRD manpower picture is effec- 
tively described in the following quotation from page 73 of the report of thq 


Director of Selective Service entitled Selective Service as the Tide of War 

. . . On February 26, 1944, the President sent to the Director of Selective Service 
and to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission a memorandum which 
read in part: "The present allocations of personnel to the armed forces cannot be 
further reduced, and there is a very real danger in our failure to supply trained 
replacements at the dme and in the numbers required. Selective Service has not 
delivered the quantity of men who were expected ... we are still short approxi- 
mately 200,000 trained men . . . Today, as a result, we are forced to emasculate 
college courses and trained divisions and other units. The Army will not reach its 
planned January strength until sometime in April, or even later if Selective Service 
continues to fall behind on its quotas. The Nation's manpower pool has been 
dangerously depleted by liberal deferments and I am convinced that in this 
respect we have been overly lenient, particularly with regard to the younger 
men . . . Deferments for industry include over a million nonfathers, of whom 
380,000 are under 26 years of age. Of almost a million nonfathers deferred in 
agriculture, over 550,000 are under 26. Agriculture and industry should release 
the younger men who are physically qualified for military service. The present 
situation is so grave that I feel the time has come to review all occupational 
deferments with a view to speedily making available the personnel required by 
the armed forces." 

The President's memorandum was sent to all Selective Service local and 
appeal boards with an instruction to review^ all cases of registrants aged 18 
through 37 who held occupational deferments, "giving particular attention 
to registrants under 26 years of age." A telegram of March 24 from national 
headquarters required the calling of all registrants under 26 to report for 
preinduction examination whether or not they still held occupational de- 
ferments (other than those in agriculture). On March 25 OSRD con- 
tractors were instructed to submit a new form 42A Special for each man 
under the age of 26 for whom they desired deferment regardless of pre- 
vious requests for deferment. 

Naturally all this had an upsetting effect upon OSRD contract opera- 
tions. In the fields in which OSRD was operating most actively many of 
the key men were under 26 largely because they were dealing with rela- 
tively new techniques in which older men had not been trained. Many a 
conference was held by OSRD officials with Selective Service, the War 
Manpower Commission, the Army, and the Navy to insure that too literal 
a compliance with the President's instruction of February 26 should not 
completely wreck large segments of the OSRD program. The contractors 
were vigorous in their statements as to the work which they could not do 
if key individuals were lost, and the men themselves were considerably 
disturbed in their own minds as to where their duty lay. The pressures 
against occupational deferment designed primarily to squeeze out unneces- 
sary deferments tended to throw a shadow over all occupational defer- 


ments. It was not clear how long a man might expect to remain on a par- 
ticular job, and in such circumstances the proffer of an Army or Navy 
commission proved too tempting for a number of scientists. Yet OSRD suc- 
ceeded in retaining the services of practically all of the key men deferred on 
its recommendation. 

On March 24, 1944, the War Manpower Commission created an Inter- 
departmental Agency Committee authorized to endorse deferment requests 
for the employees of the constituent agencies and employees of their con- 
tractors. Failure to include OSRD on the committee required the endorse- 
ment of OSRD requests by the War or Navy Departments or, in the case 
of men on the Reserved List, by the Committee on Scientific Research Per- 
sonnel. As a result of its protest supported by the Army and the Navy, 
OSRD was later added to the Interdepartmental Agency Committee with 
the authority to endorse requests for deferment. 

Even the inclusion of a man's name on the Reserved List and the endorse- 
ment of a request for his deferment by a claimant agency under the pro- 
cedure of the Interdepartmental Agency Committee was no assurance of 
continued deferment of an individual under 26 after the President's memo- 
randum of February 26, 1944. In fact, for a short period there seemed to 
be some danger that the Army and Navy might even withdraw their sup- 
port from the Reserved List. OSRD found itself in the uncomfortable 
position of being requested to take on more and more research and devel- 
opment work for the Services and even to enter into the field of crash pro- 
curement which the Services were poorly equipped to handle, while at the 
same time the removal of key personnel through the operations of Selec- 
tive Service was constandy threatened. Effective support of the Reserved 
List came only after some plain talking in which OSRD pointed out to the 
Army and Navy the extent to which military research programs would 
have to be abandoned unless key scientists under 26 were left in positions 
to carry out those programs. The total number involved was not large, as 
only approximately 1350 individuals under 26 had been included in the 
Reserved List. 

The rapidity with which the situation changed can be illustrated by two 
letters written by Bush to members of the NDRC. As a result of prolonged 
discussions with Selective Service, the Army and the Navy, he wrote Conant 
on March 10, 1944: 

... I am convinced, having reviewed the entire affair, that no qualified scientific 
research man, now working on a piece of research which is vital to the war ef- 
fort, will be called upon to serve in the United States Army as a result of the 
functioning of the Selective Service System, so long as a fully qualified and rep- 
resentative committee considers that he is qualified and his work is important. . . . 

The situation changed so drastically, however, that he wrote Jewett on 
April 6, 1944, that 


There is no doubt that the manpower situation is in a very bad way, and that it is 
likely to injure the scientific effort seriously. There is also no doubt that it has 
already inflicted considerable injury on the effort, for the confused and chaotic 
situation has badly affected morale. 

One new element was introduced into the situation by the requirement 
that the Army and the Navy certify which projects that they had sub- 
mitted or would submit to OSRD in the future were of such a nature as 
to justify a request for the deferment of personnel. This was the occasion 
for a great deal of work. It involved a re-examination by the Army and 
the Navy of all projects which they had submitted to the OSRD. The re- 
examination resulted in the certification of practically ail projects but due 
to the length of time required for the examination within the Services, 
information as to the certification of particular projects came in at dif- 
ferent times. The certified projects then had to be traced through the vari- 
ous contracts under which work was being conducted and the connection 
of each individual for whom deferment might be requested with the par- 
ticular project which had been certified had to be established. For those 
projects which were initiated by OSRD itself there was initially no provi- 
sion for certification. The Army acted as the certifying agency for such 
projects until OSRD a short time later was authorized to certify its own 
projects. The principal effect of the requirement of certification of projects 
was to overload a number of busy people for a substantial period, but the 
net result was the continued endorsement for deferment of the men who 
had been so endorsed prior to the requirement of certification. The initial 
screening which had been established by OSRD was at least as effective 
as that established as a result of the President's memorandum of Febru- 
ary 26 and the ensuing regulations. 

The Radiation Laboratory at M.I.T. had been extraordinarily successful 
in developing radar equipment of which the Services were making very 
effective use. There was strong pressure from the Services for handmade 
preproduction models of various radar devices for actual operational use 
during the interval before equipment would be available from the pro- 
duction lines. Ultra-high-frequency radar was distincdy a young man's 
game built upon information acquired by young men and for the most 
part unknown to older men. The insistence of the Army upon the induc- 
tion of young men led to the requirement by the State Selective Service 
Director in Massachusetts that fifty young men be taken from the Radia- 
tion Laboratory. This would have seriously upset a substantial part of the 
radar program. 

While this situation was developing, the Undersecretary of War, Robert 
P. Patterson, wrote a letter to the New Yor\ Times stressing that the policy 
of the War Department was to insure the utilization of scientific research 
personnel where they were urgently needed on war jobs. This was too 


much for President Compton of M.I.T., who sent a letter to Mr. Patterson 
on May ii, 1944, which read in part as follows: 

. . . they [scientists] have had to struggle for months to prevent a very sub- 
stantial throttling of their efforts by the regulations imposed or permitted largely 
by the War Department. ... the draft policies of recent months have driven 
our scientists from pillar to post in search of some way to carry on. I think it 
no exaggeration to say that half the time and nine tenths of the worries of my 
most effective colleagues have been spent on this subject in the past two months. 
It is also no exaggeration to say that our morale is therefore at an all-time low, 
and that nothing but sense of duty keeps very many men on the job. 

I know that the scientific-military co-operation was proceeding smoothly until 
the War Department announced its policy of recruiting young men at all costs. 
The supplementary explanations or special adjustments that have since been 
devised to avoid the disastrous effects of such an undiscriminating policy have 
produced great confusion and have partially averted the threatened damage. But 
the general performance of draft officials and related agencies now rests on the 
assumption that the War Department insists on securing all possible young 
men, let the chips fall where they may. It is as if the general policy of the War 
Department were designed to make it as difficult as possible for the scientists to 
perform the tasks that the operating men witiiin the Army are pressing for com- 
pletion, and which no other group or agency can possibly carry through. 

As a result of urgent requests by Bush and Compton, Secretary Patter- 
son assured the retention of the particular fifty men by the Radiation Lab- 
oratory. The incident is worth mentioning primarily as an illustration of 
the extent of disruption of normal operations incident to retaining scien- 
tific personnel. While the final result was the deferment of a group of 
essential scientists, the incident, and others like it, was extremely depress- 
ing to the morale of the younger scientists. 

With the end of the war and the consequent cessation of most OSRD 
work the basis for the continued deferment from calls under the Selective 
Service Act of most men who had been deferred on the recommendation 
of OSRD disappeared. After some discussions, National Headquarters of 
the Selective Service System recognized that the long-range national in- 
terest required the resumption of advanced studies for men having high 
technical and scientific qualifications where those studies had been inter- 
rupted. At the request of the Director of War Mobilization and Recon- 
version, Selective Service established the Reconversion Working Committee 
on Deferment and Selective Release consisting of ten Government agencies 
including the OSRD. The committee was directed to (i) indicate to OSRD 
the specific occupations in which shortages of personnel threatened to in- 
terfere with the national health, safety or interest; (2) formulate the specific 
standards indicating that a man is qualified to engage in a selected occu- 
pation; (3) certify to the Director of the Selective Service System those 
individuals meeting the standards established by the committee, and (4) in- 


dicate to the War and Navy Departments the categories of occupations in 
which shortages detrimental to the national interest could be relieved by 
release of men from the armed forces. OSRD was authorized to examine 
all proposals by the committee relating to deferment of teachers, univer- 
sity research workers, and students pursuing scientific courses, and to cer- 
tify such persons for deferment in accordance with item (3). Any regis- 
trant accepted by an accredited college or university as a candidate for a 
master's or doctor's degree in the physical sciences or engineering might 
be certified by OSRD to the Director of Selective Service as essential to 
the national interest in a civilian capacity. The same was true of a regis- 
trant employed by an accredited college or university as a teacher of physi- 
cal sciences or engineering and also under certain conditions of a regis- 
trant engaged in research in the physical sciences or engineering in an 
accredited college or university. The last category of registrants who might 
be so certified consisted of those who had satisfactorily completed at least 
three years of work leading to a bachelor's degree in physical sciences or 
engineering where the registrant had served for a period of not less than 
two years on a project directly connected with the war effort. As of March 
15, 1946, 928 registrants had been certified as essential to the national in- 
terest in a civilian capacity in the foregoing categories which are defined 
in more detail in Local Board Memorandum No. 115-M issued by the 
Selective Service System. 

In summary it may be said that from the time of American entry into 
the war until the cessation of hostilities, there was a series of crises with 
respect to scientific and technical personnel of OSRD contractors. 

Taken by itself, however, the record was startlingly good. A total of 9725 
employees of OSRD contractors were endorsed for deferment and of these 
only 63 were inducted. This would seem to indicate that the Selective 
Service System operated satisfactorily so far as OSRD requirements were 
concerned. The figures do not reflect the constant effort required to main- 
tain the staffs carrying vital programs nor the cost to over-all OSRD oper- 
ations of the amount of time which had to be devoted to Selective Service 

The problem of scientific personnel within OSRD was only a part, al- 
though an important part, of the total problem of the handling of scientific 
manpower in World War II. The outstanding fact from OSRD experi- 
ence supported by observations in other fields is that at no time during 
the war did methods of dealing with the problem of scientific manpower 
reach a stage which could be offered as a model for any future emergency. 
In the nature of the case, this fact had to be expected; everyone involved 
was pressing to get on with the war, with the single motive of finishing 
it successfully and early. But no one — not even the scientists, who were 


in the best position to do so — could at the outset entirely visualize the 
complete revolution in the methods of conducting warfare which impended. 
Hence the handling of scientific manpower had to pass through a transition 
as all concerned gradually reached new conceptions. In spite of the inevitable 
confusion in such a process, the system did work because the individuals 
involved, whatever their convictions and disagreements, were all actuated 
by the overriding desire to get on with the war. 




NE of the most striking features of the organization of both 
NDRC and OSRD was the extent to which use was made of the volun- 
tary part-time services of outstanding scientists (referred to as "WOC" — 
without compensation — in the jargon of personnel administration). The 
pattern was set in the order of June 27, 1940, which created NDRC and 
later in the Executive Order establishing OSRD; in both cases it was 
specified that the top personnel should serve as such without compensa- 
tion. The President of the National Academy of Sciences who served as 
an ex officio member of the NDRC under the terms of both orders was 
the President of Bell Telephone Laboratories. The Director of OSRD and 
the civilian members of NDRC and CMR who received their appoint- 
ments at the hands of the President were receiving compensation from 
outstanding educational and scientific institutions, all of which had Gov- 
ernment contracts. The same pattern was followed by NDRC and CMR 
in setting up their divisions and sections; legal authority was expressly 
given in several appropriations acts for the "acceptance and utilization of 
voluntary and uncompensated services" by OEM agencies. The reason for 
the emphasis placed in the previous sentences on the industrial and profes- 
sional employment of OSRD WOC personnel will appear later in this 
chapter. The extent to which the OSRD relied upon WOC appointments 
was periodically reported to the Bureau of the Budget and the Appropria- 
tions Committee of the House of Representatives. 

Conceivably OSRD could have been built up without utilizing WOC 
services. In that case, it probably would have been manned by different 
personnel; for it is unlikely that Bush, Conant, Compton, Jewett and Rich- 
ards would have resigned the Presidencies of Carnegie Institution of Wash- 
ington, Harvard University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and 
Bell Telephone Laboratories and the Vice-Presidency of the University of 
Pennsylvania, respectively, to accept full-time positions with the Govern- 

The same is true of their colleagues. The public interest would have 
suffered if many of them had left their regular posts for full-time employ- 
ment with the Government. The total war effort was much broader than 
OSRD. The several hundred (the average number in 1944 was about 430) 
WOC appointees of OSRD played very important roles in the winning 


of the war in connection with their regular occupations, and the war effort 
would have been affected adversely had they severed those connections. 
If OSRD had been restricted to persons willing to accept full-time Govern- 
ment employment, it would have lost the benefit of some of the most 
creative imaginations which were brought to bear on its problems. This 
statement can be made without reflecting in the slightest degree upon the 
small but highly capable full-time scientific staff which OSRD had for the 
day-to-day supervision of its scientific research and development program. 

Use of woe appointments brought OSRD the services of scores of out- 
standing scientists who otherwise would have been unavailable. It also 
brought speed because part-time voluntary service could frequently be ob- 
tained by a telephone call, while full-time employment took days of process- 
ing and occasionally weeks of waiting while the prospective employee was 
winding up his affairs in the post which he was leaving. Parenthetically, 
it is inconceivable that any Government agency would have been permit- 
ted to have as many full-time top officials as OSRD would have needed 
had it not been for the WOC appointments. 

It was recognized that the situation was one in which conflicts of inter- 
est were possible. In the interest of speed and success, OSRD needed to 
contract with the outstanding research organizations in the country; for 
its scientific advice it needed to go to the best-qualified men, and they 
were frequently employed by these same organizations. Members of NDRC 
and CMR were officers of Harvard University, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, California Institute of Technology, Columbia University, Uni- 
versity of Illinois, University of Pennsylvania, Johns Hopkins University, 
and Bell Telephone Laboratories. Clearly, no research program could be 
well rounded which ignored these institutions. 

The committees early adopted the rule that no member would partici- 
pate in the discussion of, or vote upon, any proposal affecting the institu- 
tion from which he received his salary. A similar rule was followed in 
the divisions and sections. The rule eventually found embodiment in Ad- 
ministrative Circular 2.02 dated February 17, 1943, which emphasized that 
no OSRD officer or employee should represent the Government in any 
of its business transactions with a nongovernmental organization which 
paid all or part of his salary. All such transactions were to be turned over 
to some member of the division, section or other part of the office having 
no connection with the organization involved. In appropriate cases, an 
Acting Division Chief or Acting Section Chief was appointed to handle 
the case. The circular pointed out that this procedure merely followed 
the example set by Bush who, as OSRD Director, had delegated complete 
exercise of judgment in negotiations with the Carnegie Institution of 
Washington to the Executive Secretary of OSRD and who, as President 
of the Carnegie Institution, had delegated to the Executive Officer of the 


Institution authority to act on its behalf in all future negotiations with 

Bush sought and obtained a ruling on his own case. During the time 
NDRC was a part of the Council of National Defense it had entered into 
several contracts with the Carnegie Institution of Washington of which 
he was President. The Executive Order creating OSRD provided that 
OSRD should assume the NDRC contracts. On August 8, 1941, Bush 
addressed a letter to Wayne Coy, Liaison Officer for the Office of Emer- 
gency Management, requesting legal opinion as to his authority as Di- 
rector of OSRD to take over contracts with the Carnegie Institution of 
Washington and to enter into new contracts with that Institution. Bush 
pointed out that he received compensation as President of the Institution 
but not as Director of OSRD; that the Institution was a nonprofit cor- 
poration, and that contracts between NDRC or OSRD and the Institution 
would be for research work for which the Institution would be paid only 
its out-of-pocket expenses. 

On August 21, 1 94 1, Coy replied enclosing an opinion by Oscar S. Cox, 
counsel for the Office for Emergency Management, concluding that there 
would be no violation of any law if Bush, as Director of OSRD, should 
take over or enter into contracts with the Carnegie Institution. In his opin- 
ion, Cox stated that Section 41 of the Criminal Code was the only one 
which raised any question in the situation. The purpose of that statute was 
to protect the Government in its business transactions with corporations 
from being represented by an officer who might have an interest adverse 
to the United States due to his connection with the corporation involved. 
The danger sought to be avoided was the temptation of the officer to favor 
the corporation at the expense of the Government for his own financial gain. 
The instant case was one in which Bush's relationship to the Institution 
offered no opportunity directly or indirectly for personal financial gain 
from the corporation's "pecuniary projects or contracts," and therefore there 
was no possibility of his having an interest adverse to the Government in 
its transactions with the Institution. Since the Institution itself was a non- 
profit educational corporation, it was not within the intent of the statute, 
as the nature of its operations precluded its officers from any financial in- 
terest direct or indirect in its contracts or business transactions. 

Having taken care to avoid actual conflicts of interest, OSRD felt that 
opinions of the Attorney General (e.g.. Op. Attorney General, Vol. 40, 
Opinion No. 47, April 27, 1942) were adequate to insure that there was 
no impropriety in the use of WOC personnel. This belief was rudely jarred, 
however, by an opinion of the Attorney General dated December 9, 1943, 
involving members of local OPA War Price and Rationing Boards in which 
Sections 109 and 113 of the Criminal Code were construed to be more gen- 
erally applicable than had theretofore been indicated. 


The two statutory provisions involved read as follows: 

18 U.S.C. Section ig8 (Criniinal Code, section log) 

Officers interested in claims against United States. Whoever, being an officer of 
the United States, or a person holding any place of trust or profit, or discharging 
any official function under, or in connection with, any executive department of the 
Government of the United States, or under the Senate or House of Representatives 
of the United States, shall act as an agent or attorney for prosecuting any claim 
against the United States, or in any manner, or by any means, otherwise than in 
discharge of his proper official duties, shall aid or assist in the prosecution or 
support of any such claim, or receive any gratuity, or any share of or interest in 
any claim from any claimant against the United States, with intent to aid or 
assist, or in consideration of having aided or assisted, in the prosecution of such 
claim, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, 
or both. ... 

18 U.S.C. Section 20^ (Criminal Code, section ii^) 

Whoever, being elected or appointed a Senator, Member of or Delegate to Con- 
gress, or a Resident Commissioner, shall, after his election or appointment and 
either before or after he has qualified, and during his continuance in office, or 
being the head of a department, or other officer or clerk in the employ of the 
United States, shall, directly or indirectly, receive, or agree to receive, any com- 
pensation whatever for any services rendered or to be rendered to any person, 
either by himself or another, in relation to any proceeding, contract, claim, con- 
troversy, charge, accusadon, arrest, or other matter or thing in which the United 
States is a party or directly or indirectly interested, before any department, court- 
martial, bureau, officer, or any civil, military, or naval commission whatever, 
shall be fined not more than $10,000 and imprisoned not more than two years; 
and shall, moreover, thereafter be incapable of holding any office of honor, trust, 
or profit under the Government of the United States. . . . 

The language of the opinion in the OPA case was broad enough to indi- 
cate that practically all of the WOC appointees of OSRD might be held to 
be in technical violation of Section 113 and that a few might also be in 
technical violation of Section 109. Discussion with members of the staff of 
the Attorney General confirmed this impression. When a series of hypo- 
thetical cases was discussed by members of the OSRD legal staff with mem- 
bers of the staff of the Solicitor General, the view was informally expressed 
that while most of the cases were not within the spirit of the statute, they 
were all within the technical language of Section 113. Thus an OSRD 
appointee who held an administrative post in an educational institution 
which operated a school for chaplains for the Army was thought to be in 
technical violation of Section 113 because some part of the payment made 
by the Government toward the expenses of the school for chaplains might 
be held to go toward the payment of his salary. While sympathizing with 
the predicament in which OSRD was placed by virtue of the change in the 
Attorney General's interpretation of the statutes, the Department of Justice 


was reluctant to issue a clarifying opinion for OSRD for fear that such an 
opinion would be more broadly applied by other Government agencies not 
having OSRD's peculiar factual situation. It was indicated, however, that 
the Department of Justice would support legislation to exempt OSRD in 
appropriate cases from the operations of Sections 109 and 113. 

The opinion in the OPA case was given considerable newspaper publicity, 
and woe appointees working with OSRD quite understandably became 
somewhat concerned that their efforts to help the United States win the war 
had the immediate consequence of making them criminals under Section 113. 
This arose from the fact that nearly all of them were receiving compensation 
which was "directly or indirectly" attributable in some degree to services 
rendered by themselves "or another" for their educational institutions or 
commercial organizations under one or more of the thousands of Govern- 
ment war contracts that had been let within the past few years. In addition, 
a few of them were on notice that they might also be violating Section 109 
because of activities for their compensating organizations in connection with 
the negotiation or performance of contracts between their regular employers 
and Government agencies other than OSRD. The fact that their activities 
for their regular employers were not related in any way to their duties as 
OSRD appointees and the fact that there was no actual conflict of interests 
had become quite immaterial. 

Fairness to the persons involved required that the situation be explained 
frankly to them and this was done by a memorandum of February 9, 1944, 
to all OSRD employees and appointees. In that memorandum Bush pointed 
out that in view of the broad language of the Attorney General's opinion, 
most woe and WAE (compensated when actually employed) appointees 
and employees of OSRD were probably in technical violation of Section 113 
and a few also in technical violation of Section 109. He stated that he 
planned to ask Congress to amend the law to exempt OSRD WOC and 
WAE appointees from its operations except in cases of actual conflict of 
interest. Even though such an amendment to the statutes should be enacted, 
obviously there would be a considerable delay in obtaining its passage and 
during that period the appointees would continue to be in technical viola- 
tion of the statute. This he could not request of them. The memorandum, 
however, drew attention to the very serious consequences which would be 
caused by any general or hasty withdrawal of key personnel from OSRD 
and requested the appointees to give the matter careful consideration. Bush 
stated that he intended to continue in his OSRD position for he was con- 
vinced that the present technical situation was simply a passing phase that 
would soon be remedied by Congressional action upholding OSRD's method 
of conducting business through the use of voluntary and uncompensated 
services. He expressed the opinion that if a complete remedy were not forth- 
coming, any action of Congress requiring readjustments of some details of 


OSRD's operations could be met in such a way as not to disrupt OSRD 
scientific operations. 

With the approval of the Bureau of the Budget and the Attorney General, 
H.R. 4446 was introduced in the House of Representatives on March 21, 
1944, to exempt certain officers and employees within the OSRD from Sec- 
tions 109 and 113 of the Criminal Code. The bill was in line with similar 
legislation which had been enacted on behalf of persons serving on Selective 
Service Boards, Appeal Boards and Advisory Boards (Public Law 47, 77th 
Congress) and of persons serving as members of Alien Enemy Hearing 
Boards (Public Law 376, 77th Congress) as well as with bills which had 
been introduced to exempt members of the War Price and Rationing Boards 
in the Office of Price Administration from the provisions of Sections 109 
and 113 except in cases involving representation before OPA itself. H.R. 
4446 passed the House of Representatives without objections on June 23, 
1944. Shortly thereafter. Congress enacted the Contract Settlement Act of 
1944 (Public Law 395, 78th Congress) which in its Section 19(e) repeated 
certain of the provisions from the operation of which H.R. 4446 was designed 
to exempt OSRD. Accordingly, H.R. 4446 was amended to extend the ex- 
emptions to Section 19(e) of the Contract Settlement Act of 1944 and the 
amended bill was reported favorably by the Senate Judiciary Committee on 
December 5, 1944. The report came during the closing days of the session 
at a time when unanimous consent was necessary for the passage of any 
bill through the Senate. When the bill was reached on the Senate calendar, 
objection to consideration of it was made by one Senator who as a member 
of the Judiciary Committee had not objected to its favorable report by that 
Committee. Accordingly the bill failed of passage. 

With the convening of the new session of Congress, a new bill, H.R. 1524, 
was introduced in the House of Representatives on January 16, 1945. This 
bill had a somewhat similar fate to that of H.R. 4446. It passed the House 
of Representatives but in the Senate was held up by an objection of the same 
Senator. The exact basis of his objection was not defined and consequently 
the objection could not be met. With the successful outcome of the war, all 
possibility of getting favorable action on the bill vanished. 

Had it been known when the Attorney General issued his opinion in the 
OPA case that it would not be possible for OSRD to obtain legislation pro- 
tecting its woe personnel from the charge of technical violation of the 
Criminal Code, the effect might have been serious. As it was, there was 
up to the very last reason to believe that the exemptions would be forthcom- 
ing. The House twice passed the bill providing the exemptions and there 
was a favorable report without dissent from the Senate Judiciary Committee. 
Under these circumstances for any substantial number of OSRD appointees 
to resign and by so doing seriously retard research and development essen- 
tial to the war effort by completely disrupting the administrative machinery 


would have been precipitate and conceivably could have been construed as 
unpatriotic. Yet it is rather ironical that several hundred of the leading 
scientists in the United States stand in theoretical danger of prosecution 
under the criminal statutes because of their contributions to the winning 
of a war. 

Fortunately it does not seem at all likely that any of them will ever be 
prosecuted for those technical violations, for in practice the OSRD avoided 
situations involving actual conflicts of interest; but there is no denying that 
the theoretical possibility is there. 




.N AN early meeting of NDRC, Compton observed that NDRC 
could either do its job or get credit for doing it, but not both. The emphasis 
was always upon getting the job done. There was frank recognition that 
if NDRC became involved in competition with the Services for credit, one 
result would be a chilling of Service enthusiasm for working with NDRC. 
It would be expecting a great deal of an Army or Navy officer to assume 
that he would seek assistance in meeting a problem if there were likelihood 
of NDRC publicity indicating how good NDRC was and, inferentially, 
what a poor job he had done. Another compelling reason for silence was, 
of course, the fact that most OSRD operations were in the area of classified 
information. Nor did OSRD seek publicity for its policy of avoiding pub- 
licity. Members of the working press were early convinced that OSRD was 
doing an important job, that the job could best be done without publicity, 
that OSRD was honest in its desire to avoid publicity, and in accordance 
with the best traditions of their profession, they co-operated. 

The policy paid big dividends in aiding to build up a free interchange of 
information with the Services and in encouraging the Services to come to 
OSRD for assistance. It had as a disadvantage that the Selective Service 
boards were not adequately informed of the importance of OSRD opera- 
tions and thus the problem of retention of scientific manpower was more 
difficult of solution than it otherwise might have been. In the early days, it 
also contributed to the restlessness of some scientists who had no apprecia- 
tion of the scope of the program and who therefore felt that science was 
not making its proper contribution to the war eflort. This feeling died down 
as more and more scientists were brought into the ever expanding operadons. 

There were a few speeches and a handful of press releases in the early 
days but they were largely devoted to matters of organization. Their issu- 
ance was dictated largely by the desire to acquaint scientists not already in 
the program with the possibility that later they might be. On the other 
hand the subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee of the House of 
Representatives handling the OSRD appropriations was kept informed of 
the principal OSRD activities. Organizational matters were spread on the 
record; but, more important, at the several hearings the Director of OSRD 
and the Chairmen of NDRC and CMR gave o£F-the-record outlines of the 


more important programs and freely answered questions of Committee 
members. As a result the reception by that subcommittee was always friendly 
and OSRD proceeded with the assurance that there was a reasonable prob- 
ability of obtaining as much money as could be spent wisely. 

OSRD maintained no public relations office. For five years the Executive 
Secretary had the responsibility for press relations in addition to his other 
duties; and so light was the task, so co-operative the press, and so little the 
time required that he was able to handle it personally. As the end of the 
war approached it became desirable to arrange a program of publication 
of results of OSRD research, a subject which is discussed below in connec- 
tion with the Committee on Publications. When Burchard succeeded Stewart 
as Chairman of that Committee, he was also placed in charge of press rela- 
tions because of the intimate connection between the two subjects. 

During the last few months of active OSRD operations there was a 
noticeable shift in attitude toward publicity. Service press releases on OSRD- 
developed equipment began to appear, some of which made no reference 
to OSRD but attributed credit for the equipment to Service personnel. The 
error was understandable, for often the person preparing the release had no 
way of knowing the OSRD participation, and he assigned the credit to the 
officers associated with the equipment when he first learned of it. In other 
releases, recognition of OSRD participation took the form of naming indi- 
viduals who were not those who would have been selected by persons 
intimately associated with the development. 

Scientists who had willingly become anonymous to advance the war 
effort were not particularly happy to have the veil lifted to give credit for 
their work to other men. To alleviate the situation a joint Board on Scien- 
tific Information Policy was established in June 1945, by the joint action of 
the Secretaries of War and the Navy and the Director of OSRD. This Board, 
under the chairmanship of John T. Tate, Chief of Division 6 of NDRC 
and Assistant Chief of OFS, issued four reports entitled Radar — a Report 
on Science at War, Electronics Warfare — a Report on Radar Counter- 
measures, Optical Glass Substitutes: A Scientific Answer to Mass Output, 
and U. S. Rocket Ordnance — Development and Use in World War II. A 
fifth report, on war metallurgy, was prepared but not issued. 

All except the third of these reports were printed by the Government 
Printing Office; that one was issued in multilithed form. It was the Board's 
endeavor to have its releases accurately assess the relative contributions made 
under Army, Navy, and OSRD auspices, give credit where it was due, 
and apprise the public (within the limits imposed by military security) of 
the scientific advances in the field of the particular release. The Board's 
activities were curtailed at the cessation of hostilities, so that, unfortunately, 
comparable reports were not made for all fields of OSRD operations. 
Most of the scientific talent of the country was engaged during the war 


years in research of a classified nature under Service, OSRD, or NACA 
auspices. There was no possibiUty of pubHshing the results during the war. 
Papers submitted to scientific journals, even though not prepared as a result 
of military research, were submitted by the editors to a self-imposed censor- 
ship by a National Research Council Committee headed by Dean L. P. 
Eisenhart of Princeton University. 

As the favorable outcome of the war within a foreseeable time became 
increasingly apparent, a more far-reaching publication policy was clearly 
indicated. This policy had to recognize that the five years of scientific 
silence had left a great deal unsaid which scientists needed to hear. The 
problem of releasing this mass of information was not simple and could 
not be solved by the stroke of a pen. The reasons why this was so are worth 
elaborating. They were: 

1. Even if the information were publishable in its extant form, the 
volume would flood the journals and book publishers far beyond their 

2. Even had there been no security restrictions, the papers were not pub- 
lishable by and large in their extant form. Rapid progress reporting had 
been the necessary order of the day. Scientific documentation, which is a 
sine qua non of normal first-rate scientific reporting, had been used only as 
the occasion really demanded. Most papers needed revision to make them 
adequate for the scientific library. The problem of persuading any large 
body of first-rate scientists to engage in this revision after V-E and V-J 
Days would be no easy one. 

3. Within the framework of that material which could be accommodated 
by the scientific press and which was publishable in the scientific sense, 
there would still at the outset be an enormous variation in publishability 
on the grounds of military security. Final decision on this point rested at 
all times in the military. Fragmentary publication might do more harm 
than good. A wholesale campaign for maximum declassification to the only 
generally publishable category "Open" would have to be carried on. 

4. Our understanding with our Allies, particularly the British, had to be 
respected, and any publication program co-ordinated with them. Scientific 
information had been exchanged on a broad scale, and each Government 
had respected the security classifications of the other. It would be bad for 
postwar scientific collaboration if, through hasty action, either side claimed 
unwarranted scientific accomplishments, or either side failed to pay proper 
respect to the contributions of the other. Yet, even with all good will, this 
could happen if the general declassification policy were not the same in both 
countries, for the open paper could not acknowledge the credit due another 
whose work was still held classified. 

5. With somewhat less force, the same situation applied within the 
United States. Often parallel and sometimes competing groups had been 


put on the same problem. Collaborative reporting would not always be 
possible. Under these circumstances, it was important that publication be 
fair and that the race for first publication and its attendant scientific prestige 
should not go by default to those swiftest with the pen. 

6. OSRD had an obligation to protect Government interest in patentable 
subject matter, and no publication program could ignore the responsi- 

These then were the problems of policy with respect to technical articles. 
It was essential for the national welfare that accurate scientific literature be 
available to the general scientific public at the earliest possible date, and 
equally essential that this be consistent with a sound security policy, a sound 
policy of adequate credit to contributors, a sound policy of preservation of 
the national property rights. Important though these questions were for 
OSRD they went beyond OSRD. The first attempt to meet them was on 
a broad plane. 

Publication Board 

Recognizing the desirability of making as much scientific information 
as possible available as early as possible, Bush took steps in the summer of 
1944 to stimulate the establishment of machinery for declassification. After 
consultation with, and with the concurrence of, the Army and the Navy, 
he proposed the establishment within the National Academy of Sciences of 
a board to control the release and promote publication of scientific informa- 
tion. The principal functions of the proposed board would be ( i ) to review, 
for the purpose of determining what portions thereof should be released for 
publication or other public use, all scientific and technical information 
which might be legally released for publication and which (a) had been, 
or might thereafter be developed by, or for, or with funds of any depart- 
ment or agency of the Government, and (b) was, or might thereafter be 
classified (by the War Department, the Navy Department, OSRD or 
NACA) as secret, confidential, restricted, or by other comparable designa- 
tion, or otherwise withheld from the public for purposes of the national 
military security; and (2) to make recommendations to the War and Navy 
Departments concerning the release of scientific information for publication 
or other public use and to take such measures as might be appropriate and 
in the public interest to effectuate the release of such scientific information 
for publication or other public use after release had been approved by the 
War and Navy Departments. Provision was made for the co-ordination of 
the policy of the proposed board with that of countries with which infor- 
mation had been exchanged. 

A draft executive order to establish the proposed board was sent to the 
Bureau of the Budget in September 1944, but the Bureau declined to pre- 


sent it to the President for approval. The Bureau at first was unwiUing to 
approve an organization for the release of scientific information until it had 
decided its position with reference to the postwar governmental organiza- 
tion for scientific research. The Bureau, however, early recognized that 
the public interest would not permit a delay of such proportions as seemed 
likely to be involved in decisions on postwar research, and that the board 
was necessary. But it held that the board should be within the govern- 
mental framework, rather than in a quasi-governmental organization such 
as the Academy, which was the arrangement favored by the Army, Navy, 
and OSRD. Bush refused to accede to a suggestion that it be established 
within OSRD, pointing out that OSRD was temporary and that its per- 
sonnel was largely voluntary and could not be held together after the end 
of the war for purposes of reviewing security classifications. Finally, the 
Bureau of the Budget approved a procedure, and Executive Order No. 
9568 was issued on June 8, 1945, to provide for the release of scientific 

The order authorized the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion 
to review all scientific and technical information which (i) had been or 
might thereafter be developed by, or for, or with funds provided by the 
Government and (2) was or might thereafter be classified or otherwise 
withheld from the public for purposes of the national military security. 
The review was for the purpose of making recommendations for pub- 
lication to the War and Navy Departments. To assist the Director of 
War Mobilization and Reconversion in the performance of his duties, the 
order established an interdepartmental board consisting of the Director as 
Chairman and five Cabinet Officers (the Secretaries of Justice, Interior, 
Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor) or their alternates. The War De- 
partment, the Navy Department, OSRD and NACA (the agencies possess- 
ing most of the classified information) were authorized to designate one 
liaison officer each, with authority to attend and participate in the discussions 
of the board. 

The Director of OWMR was directed to "take such measures as may be 
appropriate to effectuate the release and publication" of scientific informa- 
tion which it had been determined might properly be released for publica- 
tion. In consultation with the Department of State, he was authorized to 
deal with duly accredited representatives of those foreign governments with 
which exchange of classified information had taken place, in order that 
so far as practicable similar policies and procedures should be followed by 
all in dealing with the declassification and publication of scientific informa- 
tion. Machinery for the implementation of the Executive Order was estab- 
lished in the Department of Commerce where an active program of 
declassification was put in effect. 


OSRD Committee on Publications 

Within OSRD the matter of dissemination of scientific information was 
recognized as having the dual aspects of declassification and publication. 
Without the first, the second was impossible; without the second, the first 
would be only partially effective. As the problem involved all the divisions 
of OSRD, Bush appointed a Committee on Publications on October 10, 

1944, consisting of Stewart as Chairman, Conant (NDRC), Richards 
(CMR), Compton (OFS), Tuve (Section T), James P. Baxter, 3rd (OSRD 
historian), and Carroll L. Wilson (Director's Office). Tuve shortly resigned 
when the Section T program was transferred to the Navy; and in April 

1945, Stewart resigned because of the pressure of other duties. He was re- 
placed by John E. Burchard, Deputy Chief, OFS, and at that time Chair- 
man of the Joint Army-Navy-OSRD Committee on Scientific Information 
Policy, a creation of the Secretaries of War and Navy and the Director 
of OSRD. Norcross was made Secretary of the Committee. 

In establishing the Committee Bush instructed it (i) to co-ordinate the 
activities of OSRD in connection with the common features of final reports 
and publications, such as format, printing, distribution, and legal and fiscal 
questions which might be involved, and to avoid undesirable duplication or 
omissions; (2) to submit recommendations for over-all OSRD policy on 
matters which should be so formalized, and (3) through its Chairman to 
represent OSRD in dealing with other Government agencies in connection 
with publication problems arising out of OSRD work. 

He pointed out that the results of the work done under the auspices of 
OSRD should be accurately recorded, well indexed and organized for sub- 
sequent use by those concerned with these matters in the future. Insofar as 
possible the large body of scientific information developed in the course of 
OSRD activities, which could be declassified, should be made available to 
the public promptly and at reasonable cost. Furthermore, in addition to the 
classified reports and information to be made public, the various divisions, 
sections, panels and committees should record their best estimates of the 
lines of future research and development in specific fields which were likely 
to be most promising in application to improved weapons and materials, 
and the advancement of military medicine. 

The problem of declassification, which was basic in the NDRC field, was 
of minor importance in the CMR field. During the first year of OSRD, the 
Secretaries of War and the Navy decided that in the fields of medical 
research, publication of new knowledge should be withheld only if that 
knowledge gave promise of conferring military advantage. It was possible, 
therefore, to publish most of the newly developed knowledge in the medical 
field and hundreds of articles were published. The amount of classified 


medical material was held to a minimum, confined largely to limited sub- 
jects of immediate battlefront importance and to information which might 
be related to strategy. 

In the course of a trip to Europe in the summer of 1945, Burchard talked 
with the persons responsible for the British publications program and laid 
the basis for a mutually satisfactory procedure designed to avoid misunder- 
standings in connection with publication. 

The work of the Committee on Publications can best be followed by 
considering each element in the OSRD publication program as it finally 
took shape. These were: (i) Summary technical reports to the Services; 
(2) Articles in periodicals, both technical and popular; (3) Monographs for 
public distribution; (4) History; (5) Official governmental popular scien- 
tific releases (not a responsibility of the Committee on Publications); 
(6) Contractors' reports. 

I. Summary Technical Reports. Summary technical reports (STR) con- 
stituted the largest and most important part of the OSRD publication 
program. Rendered by every division and panel except in the medical field, 
they included a solid summary of technical achievement, an analysis of 
operational use, and a suggestion for lines of future research, field by field. 
Because of the breadth of coverage, it was inevitable that security classifica- 
tion would be required at the outset for all STR, and would remain for a 
long time on many, and perhaps indefinitely on some. Under these circum- 
stances, no general public distribution was conceivable and the issue was, 
therefore, restricted to 250, most of which are to be deposited with the 
Army and the Navy, with a limited quantity deposited on an archival basis, 
so that if declassification should ensue and duplication were then desirable 
(the contents are likely to be obsolete before declassification), this would 
then be readily possible. 

Responsibility for the content, publication and distribution of STR was 
delegated to the Chairman of NDRC. These reports were prepared by the 
divisions and panels under the general direction of H. M. Chadwell, 
Deputy Executive OflScer of NDRC. 

The Committee on Publications had one further responsibility in this 
matter. Under normal governmental procedure, such publications would 
be printed by the Government Printing Office. These particular volumes 
were very difficult copy technically and speed of production was important. 
The Government Printing Office was heavily overloaded. Conferences were, 
therefore, held with representatives of the GPO and the Procurement Divi- 
sion of the Treasury Department, and, in accordance with a standard gov- 
ernmental procedure, a waiver was procured from the GPO, and a contract 
entered into with Columbia University for the editing and printing of the 
summary technical reports under a special reports group, directed by Wal- 
lace Waterfall. Chadwell was appointed Scientific Officer of the contract, 


Louise Kelley served as Scientific Assistant until February 1946, at which 
time L. H. Farinholt, formerly Technical Aide in Division 8, was given 
this appointment. By November 1946, when Farinholt left OSRD, prac- 
tically all the manuscripts and illustrations for the Summary Technical 
Reports had been submitted by the divisions and panels. From then on the 
Executive Secretary in his capacity as contracting officer was directed to 
exercise supervision of the contract, which is to continue until publication 
of the reports is completed early in 1948. 

2. Articles in Periodicals. Up to June 22, 1945, OSRD referred proposals 
for publication of specific articles relating to work under NDRC auspices 
to the War and Navy Departments, which were asked to state whether the 
publication would assist in the war effort. Unless such a positive affirmation 
was made by one or the other Service, privilege of publication was with- 
held. This policy, desirable in the first part of the war, stemmed publication 
to a trickle, for it was only in rare instances that so positive a statement 
could or would be made. By June 1945, it was evident that a more aggres- 
sive policy was desirable in order to start a flow of properly publishable 
material, both in the popular and in the scientific press. Accordingly, at a 
meeting on June 22, 1945, the Committee on Publications recommended a 
change in policy to the Director. After details of procedure had been worked 
out, the new policy was made effective on August i, 1945. 

This new policy frankly set out to get as much useful and appropriate 
scientific information into the regular technical journals as could be properly 
done before the floodgates were finally opened. It encouraged employees of 
OSRD contractors to prepare technical papers on their own time whenever 
they felt that the subject was one with which they would, as scientists, have 
wished to deal under normal conditions. These papers were submitted to 
the Committee on Publications by Division Chiefs and Panel Chiefs who 
indicated their views as to whether publication was in the public interest 
and as to whether the papers were fair to other workers in the field, espe- 
cially those of our Allies. Each paper was reviewed in the Office of the 
Chairman of the Committee on Publications to be sure that it could be 
published without prejudice to Government patent rights or to the over-all 
publication program of OSRD; at the same time the office of the Chairman 
of NDRC referred the paper to the Army and the Navy with a request for 
a ruling on publishability based solely on the criterion of military security. 
Under this policy a number of papers were passed for publication covering 
a wide variety of fields. 

This was, of course, only a drop in the bucket; and it was highly desirable 
as declassification of fields progressed, as patent applications were filed, and 
as men returned to their home bases outside any jurisdiction of OSRD that 
the entire system of controls be eliminated and publication be restored to a 
close approximation of a peacetime basis. This situation had been reached 
by late January 1946, and at a meeting on January 24, 1946, the Committee 


recommended to the Director and received his approval for the final step 
which became effective February 15, 1946. In this final procedure, articles 
were to be prepared for journals on the volition of individuals and sub- 
mitted in the usual prewar way. Security clearance so far as required would 
be applied for directly to the Services by the writer or the journal. As a final 
step in seeing to it that proper relations were maintained between coworkers, 
both here and abroad, the Committee on Publications furnished to the 
editors of technical journals a list of voluntary referees made up of indi- 
viduals who had had the greatest experience with the various fields through- 
out the war. 

3. Monographs. As journal publication proceeded, it became apparent 
that this program could not completely fill the public need. In a few impor- 
tant instances the situation precluded periodical publication. This was the 
case when the material to be written had to be the collaborative effort of a 
number of scientists, momentarily together, but soon to be dispersed to their 
home institutions, when the length of the subject was such as to preclude 
journal publication, and when speed of production and distribution indi- 
cated that the public would be better served by the use of a commercial 
publisher. The procedure to meet this situation which was evolved by the 
Committee was approved by the Director on September 19, 1945. It stated 
the general OSRD policy that there should be an affirmative program to 
encourage and aid the publication of technical monographs primarily in- 
tended for the public rather than for Army, Navy, or OSRD use, provided 
(i) they either served to mobilize the scientific resources of the Nation or 
supported scientific research for the national defense (cf. paragraph 2 of 
Executive Order No. 8807); (2) satisfactory evidence was produced in each 
case that a public need existed for the proposed monograph, and that exist- 
ing journal media were inadequate to meet that need; (3) the material 
contained in the proposed monograph had been declassified or would be 
declassified prior to publication, and (4) the form and contents of the pro- 
posed monograph did not go beyond what was reasonably necessary to 
mobilize the scientific resources of the Nation or to meet the particular 
public need which would not otherwise be met by existing journals. 

The Chairman of the Committee on Publications was authorized to 
decide as a matter of administrative discretion whether a proposed tech- 
nical monograph fell within the foregoing policy. He was also authorized 
to determine whether or not it would facilitate the prosecution of the war 
to have the printing of particular monographs handled by private publishers 
rather than by the Government Printing Office. Private publishers were to 
be selected only after adequate canvassing of the field to determine which 
publisher could handle the job most satisfactorily from the point of view of 
the Government, based upon normal business factors as well as the services 
he was prepared to render. 

The preferred plan was for the Government to contract with private 


publishers for the publication of monographs. The theory was that by a 
grant of the commercial rights to a publisher the Government would at the 
same time obtain a reduced price for the copies needed for Government 
purposes and insure the widespread publication required by the public 
interest. The recommended publishing arrangements for technical mono- 
graphs called for the payment of royalties payable to the United States, 
with the royalty rate on a sliding scale to preclude excessive profits on un- 
expectedly large sales. Copyrights or exclusive publication privileges were 
not to be granted for a period in excess of that reasonably necessary to 
insure the initial edition (which might include more than one printing). 
No rights other than copyright were to be granted to publishers unless 
unusual conditions made the granting of such rights urgently necessary. 

Under this plan the Director approved the publication of thirty-six mono- 
graphs covering a wide variety of fields, including such subjects as exterior 
ballistics of rockets, ultra-high-frequency techniques as applied to radar, 
very high-frequency techniques developed at the Radio Research Labora- 
tory, sampling inspection, studies in applied statistics, and antimalarials. 

It was always intended that the monograph series should be sharply 
limited. Time could permit only those which the writers were enthusiastic 
to prepare and for which manuscripts could be delivered to publishers 
before the expiration dates of the primary contracts. No contractor was 
expected to produce monograph copy at the expense of the STR series 
which was his first obligation, and no contract was extended for the sole 
purpose of providing a monograph. Consequently, February i, 1946, was set 
as a deadline after which no more monograph proposals could be received. 
This undoubtedly prevented the publication of a few monographs, but in 
terms of the general demobilization plan, this was inevitable. 

The OSRD plans call for the purchase on behalf of the Government of 
some 400 copies of each monograph volume — 250 for the recipients of the 
sets of STR and 125 for deposit with the Library of Congress for its inter- 
national exchanges. The Library of Congress was expressly requested not 
to use these in the national depository system, since any member library 
could purchase the books on the open market. 

4. History. Neither the long nor the short history of OSRD was the 
responsibility of the Committee on Publications save in the single particular 
of arranging for its publication. Here the technique of the monograph series 
was used except that the OSRD contracted directly with the selected pub- 
lisher. The so-called "short history" of OSRD was written by President 
James Phinney Baxter, 3rd, of Williams College, OSRD historian, and was 
published on November i, 1946, under the title Scientists Against Time. 
The "long history" consists of the present volume on administration, two 
volumes describing CMR activities, one volume on OFS, and four volumes 
reporting the work of NDRC divisions and panels. The CMR volumes 


include considerable technical detail, so that they serve some of the purpose 
of an STR. The decision as to the content of the NDRC volumes v^^as left 
to the divisions concerned, subject to a check by the Office of the Chairman 
of NDRC as to security and public relations. 

Conant delegated to Chadwell the responsibility for seeing that this was 
done. After the latter's resignation as Deputy Executive Officer of NDRC 
in April 1946, Farinholt looked after this activity with assistance from Miss 
Winifred Gosline. Chadwell, as Conant's personal deputy, continued to take 
an interest in the project, and presided at a two-day meeting the end of 
August, at which time members of the staff of the Chairman's Office dis- 
cussed the manuscripts with respect to public relations. 

By early November, when the manuscripts of nearly all the volumes were 
in the hands of the publishers, NDRC was relieved of further responsibility. 
Shordy before that time John S. Burlew, formerly Technical Aide of 
Division i, had been appointed a Special Assistant to the Director to re- 
view the volumes and advise him as to their content. Then on Farinholt's de- 
parture Burlew was designated by the Director to handle on the latter's 
behalf all remaining matters relating to the publishing of the "long history," 
except those within the purview of the contracting officer. 

5. Official Government Popular Scientific Releases. These were the re- 
ports issued by the Joint Board on Scientific Information Policy mentioned 
earlier. The Committee on Publications was cognizant of, but had no juris- 
diction over, those releases. 

6. Contractors' Reports. As a result of widespread declassification, a sub- 
stantial number of contractors' reports became available for such public use 
as the supply would permit. In addition to the distribution to the Publica- 
tion Board in the Department of Commerce and to the National Archives, 
OSRD was able in several important instances to collect up to twenty sets 
of these papers and deliver them to the Library of Congress for distribu- 
tion to key libraries throughout the country. As a rule, OSRD also furnished 
the Librarian of Congress with a suggested distribution list which, how- 
ever, was only advisory. Though many of these reports were ephemeral, 
they constitute a substantial addition to the scientific literature of the 
Nation, and their availability in many regional libraries is distinctly advan- 

Science — The Endless Frontier 

One OSRD publication deserves special mention here. On November 17, 
1944, President Roosevelt sent Bush a letter asking for recommendations 
on the following four major points: 

First: What can be done, consistent with military security, and with the prior 
approval of the military authorities, to make known to the world as soon as pos- 


sible the contributions which have been made during our war effort to scientific 

The diffusion of such knowledge should help us stimulate new enterprises, 
provide jobs for our returning servicemen and other workers, and make possible 
great strides for the improvement of the national well-being. 

Second: With particular reference to the war of science against disease, what 
can be done now to organize a program for continuing in the future the work 
which has been done in medicine and related sciences? 

The fact that the annual deaths in this country from one or two diseases alone 
are far in excess of the total number of lives lost by us in battle during this war 
should make us conscious of the duty we owe future generations. 

Third: What can the Government do now and in the future to aid research 
activities by public and private organizations? The proper roles of public and of 
private research, and their interrelation, should be carefully considered. 

Fourth: Can an effective program be proposed for discovering and developing 
scientific talent in American youth so that the continuing future of scientific 
research in this country may be assured on a level comparable to what has been 
done during the war? 

New frontiers of the mind are before us, and if they are pioneered with the 
same vision, boldness, and drive with which we have waged this war, we can 
create a fuller and more fruitful employment and a fuller and more fruitful life. 

Bush called upon four committees to assist him in preparing the re- 
quested recommendations. The first question was referred to the OSRD 
Committee on Publications, the others to special committees headed by 
W. W. Palmer (Professor of Medicine, Columbia University), Isaiah Bow- 
man (President, Johns Hopkins University), and Henry Allen Moe (Secre- 
tary-General, John Simons Guggenheim Memorial Foundation), respec- 
tively. Drawing upon the work of these committees. Bush submitted his 
report on July 5, 1945. The report and the underlying committee reports 
were published by the Government Printing Office under the title Science — 
the Endless Frontier. It furnished the basis for one of the bills introduced 
in Congress for the establishment of a National Research Foundation. 


Executive Order No. 9568 provided a machinery for declassification but 
it did not exclude the possibility of OSRD working directly with the Army 
and Navy for declassification when that seemed appropriate. Thus, in July 
1945, the OSRD recommended to the Army and the Navy that declassi- 
fication of OSRD reports be accomplished by broad fields of research with 
attention being given where necessary to individual projects, contracts and 

By a memorandum of August 7, 1945, the divisions of NDRC were re- 
quested to forward as promptly as possible their recommendations for de- 


classification by broad fields of research. When these had been received, and 
the declassification approved they were to be translated into terms of projects, 
contracts and reports. Initial recommendations for the declassification of 
certain fields were transmitted to the Army and Navy on September 25, 
1945. The War Department Liaison Officer with NDRC promptly replied 
that his office was proceeding upon the basis of a reclassification by Army 
projects. Immediately thereafter, OSRD began to receive lists of projects for 
reclassification. The Navy, however, withheld its concurrence to the program. 

A meeting on November 8, 1945, of representatives of the Army, Navy, 
and OSRD outlined a procedure for declassification which contemplated 
that the Services would indicate fields of OSRD information which might 
be declassified, either in general terms with specific exceptions noted, or by 
Service projects. The Services, NDRC, or the Publication Board might 
initiate requests for declassification of specific reports. It was indicated, 
however, that NDRC would expect to use this latter system only in unusual 
cases. The Army gave approval to the proposed procedure with a few 
minor changes. The Navy expressed agreement with the procedure in prin- 
ciple, but imposed such strict limitations and restrictions that there seemed 
to be little likelihood that much real progress toward declassification could 
be made. 

In practice, upon receipt of the Army's declassification of individual 
projects, the information was transmitted to the Division Chiefs by the 
project control section with the request that appropriate recommendations 
with respect to the declassification of related contracts and reports be sub- 
mitted. The transmittal letter reminded the divisions of possible Navy 
interest in the declassified subject matter and cautioned against recom- 
mendations which would involve Navy projects not yet declassified. On the 
basis of the replies received from the divisions, a considerable number of 
contracts and reports were declassified. 

While OSRD was proceeding with the declassification of Army projects 
and related contracts and reports, the Navy proceeded with the declassifi- 
cation of several lengthy lists of OSRD reports without reference to the 
related contracts or projects. Upon receipt of the Navy's recommendations, 
OSRD declassified the reports. The fact that two different bases for de- 
classification were used operated against an orderly program of declassifica- 
tion. In particular, the difference in the timing of the Army and Navy 
recommendations created gaps which were difficult to fill, in view of the 
rapid termination of NDRC divisions. The final task of reconciling the 
various recommendations and assigning proper classification to each project, 
contract, and report was a large one both for the divisions involved and 
the Administrative Office, with which they were still struggling when this 
was being written. 

Information regarding OSRD material which had been declassified was 


disseminated to the Publication Board and to interested persons in OSRD, 
the Army, and the Navy by means of periodic lists broken down by NDRC 
and CMR projects, contracts and reports. 

OSRD was fortunate in its public relations, particularly in that it did not 
become embroiled in controversies with other agencies. Its limited publicity 
resulted in an unawareness of its existence by most people, but it enjoyed 
an excellent reputation among those who were acquainted with its accom- 
plishments. The flood of scientific publication resulting from its efforts has 
hardly begun; it will be years before the appearance of the last paper which 
is the direct outgrowth of its activities. Although its part in the winning 
of the war was its greatest contribution, as well as the justification for its 
existence, the full impact of its work must await the judgment of the future 
as the civilian counterparts of its military developments begin to exert their 
influence upon life in the United States and in the world at large. 

Part Four: Demobilization 




ROM THE OUTSET Bush had clearly in mind that NDRC 
(and later OSRD) would be a temporary agency and would go out of 
existence with the termination of the emergency which called it forth. The 
scientific personnel of OSRD had been recruited on the definite under- 
standing that they would be released as soon as the emergency was over. 
The program of OSRD had grown so far beyond the original conception 
of NDRC that a substantial portion of the top scientific talent of the country 
had been drawn into the endeavor, and it was quite apparent that the recon- 
version effort following the end of hostilities would need much of the 
scientific talent embraced within OSRD. 

Conant suggested to Bush on July 27, 1944, a plan for handling NDRC 
contracts essential to the war against Japan after the termination of Euro- 
pean hostilities which then seemed to be approaching. He foresaw great 
difficulty in staffing the NDRC organization after the end of the war with 
Germany and an almost insurmountable staff problem during the period 
of liquidation following the end of hostilities with Japan. In his opinion, 
contracts after the close of the European war would, to a large extent, be 
concerned with procurement and manufacture of special equipment for the 
Army and the Navy and the servicing of this equipment and would involve 
almost no research and very little development work. Accordingly, he sug- 
gested that a new executive order be issued establishing a Joint Army-Navy 
Development Committee with power to take over and administer those 
OSRD contracts which in its judgment were essential for the further pros- 
ecution of the war, with OSRD liquidating all its contracts except those 
taken over by the new committee. 

The Conant memorandum was circulated by Bush to the members of 
the Advisory Council on July 28, 1944, together with one of his own, putting 
the members on notice that at its next meeting the Council would approach 
the difficult problem of the matter and timing of OSRD's liquidation and the 
transfer of such of its functions as would continue into the peace. The Conant 
plan and a quite different one by Bush were discussed at considerable length 
by the Council at its meeting August 4, 1944. The members of the Council 


appearing to be in general agreement with the principles outHned by him, 
Bush next sent letters to Bundy and Purer on August 8, 1944, putting a 
general program for the termination of OSRD before the Secretaries of 
War and Navy. The objectives of the program were to continue to render 
to the Services aid essential in the prosecution of the war until both enemies 
had collapsed; to make the transition to peace without confusion, and, con- 
sistent with the above, to give maximum assistance to reconversion and 
re-employment by releasing individual scientists, as war needs made such 
releases practicable, to take up technical problems whose solution was essen- 
tial to orderly reconversion. 

Bush made the following points as being pertinent to the plans for 

1. The scale of operation of OSRD was much larger than could be con- 
tinued during peace on military research and plans for orderly cessation of 
part of it must be made. 

2. Provision for continuance of fundamental research could best be made 
by transferring it to permanent organizations while the war was still 
going on. 

3. As the war had proceeded, the nature of the work of OSRD had be- 
come more and more aimed at immediate application, which approached 
that normally carried by the Services themselves. 

4. The transfer to the Services before the conclusion of the war of a 
considerable fraction of the research burden should accelerate the establish- 
ment of an appropriate organization to handle research within the Services. 

5. There was a real danger that with the collapse of Germany a large 
number of the key personnel of OSRD would feel keenly their obligation 
to work on reconversion problems and that OSRD would find itself with- 
out adequate personnel to administer its expanded program. 

6. While development of weapons of great potential importance should 
proceed at full speed until the end of the war, the number of new weapons 
of secondary importance already developed was probably greater than could 
be brought to bear effectively against Japan while the Pacific war lasted. 

7. With the collapse of Germany scientific and technical men must pave 
the way for the employment of hundreds of men in reconverting industry 
to peacetime operations. 

8. When the war with Germany ended, the Army should have an excess 
of personnel including men competent in scientific and technical fields. 

9. In the plans for the termination of OSRD effort beginning with the 
collapse of Germany, no OSRD program genuinely needed or important 
in the war against Japan should be allowed to lapse or become stultified. 

The plan for the orderly liquidation of OSRD, to become effective upon 
the collapse of Germany, called for dividing the work of OSRD into the 
following categories: 


1. Work which could not come to fruition in time to influence the 
course of the present war should be transferred to the Services, if they felt 
it was of sufficient importance to continue into the peace and if they were 
willing to continue it either in their own laboratories or by arrangements 
with permanent organizations; otherwise, it should be placed on a schedule 
of termination which would allow for final reports and the preservation 
of values already attained. 

2. Active jobs on the final engineering of equipment about to move into 
service should be completed by the groups now doing the work. Any new 
work of this nature should be initiated by the Services themselves on their 
own contracts rather than by OSRD. 

3. Work in OSRD central laboratories, such as those for microwave 
radar and countermeasures, should be transferred to the Services early in 
order that they might continue it during the war and make plans for the. 
continuance of such parts as might be needed in time of peace. 

Bush presented the above program to President Roosevelt in his report 
of August 28, 1944. By a note of September 29, the President indicated that 
he felt that Bush was on the right track and stated that he was referring 
the termination program to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the 
Navy personally. 

In the meantime Bush had sent a memorandum dated September 13, 1944, 
to the technical personnel of OSRD dealing with plans for the demobiliza- 
tion of OSRD. That memorandum emphasized that as long as the war 
with Germany lasted OSRD should proceed at full speed. He stressed that 
the memorandum was designed to initiate the preparation of a plan for 
demobilization, but that the plan was not to be put into effect until a 
specific day which he would set following the surrender or collapse of 
Germany. Planning and action on transfer and termination of certain 
projects must be so arranged that they would not delay or interfere with 
the rapid prosecution of projects usable against Japan. 

The memorandum pointed out that the fall of Germany would materially 
alter the military picture. Some types of weapons needed in the German 
war would not be of equal importance in the war with Japan or would 
not be completed in time to be useful, and, therefore, research in some of 
the fields might well be transferred to the Services or terminated by OSRD. 

He pointed out that termination of OSRD responsibility on NDRC 
projects meant termination of the project itself only in those cases in which 
the project was neither potentially usable against Japan nor of long-range 
continuing interest sufficient so that the Services were willing to take it 
over. NDRC personnel were expected to be willing to assist the Services 
by advice and consultation in connection with transferred projects to the 
extent that their advice might be requested and their time might permit. 
Projects were to be divided among the following classes: 


Group I 

1. Projects which should be terminated after the defeat of Germany because there 
is neither a reasonable probability of their being usable against Japan (Group 2) 
nor are they of long-range continuing interest to the Services (Group 3). These 
should be immediately placed on a schedule of termination which will preserve 
values already attained, and provide for the rendering of final reports. 

Group 2 

2. Projects rated by the Services (and the rating reviewed by NDRC) as having 
an intrinsic value for use against Japan. These should be subdivided further into: 

(a) Those in which OSRD laboratory development can be completed in 3-4 
months (or in exceptional circumstances 5-6 months). Such projects 
should be completed as rapidly as possible under existing OSRD arrange- 
ments, (b) Those in which OSRD laboratory development will require 
more than 3-4 months to complete. Such projects should be transferred 
to the interested Service. 

Group 3 

3. Projects (other than 2 above) rated by the Services as of sufficiently great 
importance to be classified as urgent, long-range, continuing, peacetime devel- 
opments and which the Services are prepared to continue into the peace on some 
scale either by contract or within Service laboratories. Such projects should be 
transferred to the interested Service or to other postwar military research agencies. 

The memorandum stated that after the defeat of Germany NDRC should 
recommend new projects, or the extension of existing ones, only in order 
to complete approved schedules of termination, or in cases where it could 
be clearly shown that a definite result could be obtained in the war against 
Japan under OSRD contract, which could not be obtained by direct Service 

CMR projects were placed in a slightly different category inasmuch as 
the need for medical work would continue after the end of the fighting. 
The time lag between the research on a new weapon and its introduction 
into combat made a reduction of research activity a logical step when the 
end of a war was approaching. There need be no such delay in the intro- 
duction of a new method of treatment of disease. CMR projects were to be 
classified according to the same schedule as NDRC projects, but it was 
anticipated that more time would be given to the termination of CMR 
work, a considerable proportion of which might effectively be taken over 
by the armed services and the Public Health Service. 

The memorandum of September 13 recited that Bush had requested 
NDRC to supply him at an early date with a list showing the assignment 
of NDRC projects among the preceding groups and with the termination 
plans and schedules of each division and panel. These programs were to be 
prepared on the basis of discussion between OSRD personnel and Service 


personnel with whom they worked, but no program was to be considered 
as definite until after it had been recommended by the NDRC as a whole 
and approved by the Director. 

The memorandum was discussed by NDRC at its meeting on October 3, 
1944. By that time it had become apparent that the divisions were having 
difficulty in classifying their projects under Group 2 because of the uncer- 
tainty as to the date on which the defeat of Germany would occur. The 
designation of those projects which would be completed in three or four 
months after the defeat of Germany would be quite different if that defeat 
were assumed for November 1944, than it would if it were assumed for 
July 1945. The point had purposely been left open by Bush who wished to 
avoid anything which might be taken as an estimate as to the exact date 
on which the collapse of Germany would occur. When NDRC attempted 
to apply the memorandum of September 13, it found its program closely 
tied to the assumption as to the date of the German collapse. In view of 
the need for having the divisions and panels prepare their recommendations 
on a uniform basis, NDRC had to make an assumption of the date when 
Germany would fall. The date assumed was November 15, 1944, which 
meant that projects in Group 2(a) would normally be those scheduled for 
completion before February 28, 1945, and those in Group 2(b) would be 
those scheduled for completion subsequent to February 28, 1945. 

Later events proved the assumption to be wrong. Germany did not col- 
lapse about November 15; instead the Battle of the Bulge, which threw 
a part of the American forces into retreat, started December 16, 1944. 

The Division and Panel Chiefs were instructed by NDRC on September 
22, 1944, to prepare their termination programs in accordance with the Bush 
memorandum of September 13. At the same time the Committee instituted 
a more rigid control over the acceptance of new research projects submitted 
by the Services. While NDRC had maintained its complete freedom to 
accept or reject projects submitted by the Army and the Navy, in practice 
for over four years the decision of the Division Chiefs to accept projects 
(they rarely refused them) was not reviewed by NDRC, although it had 
reviewed recommendations of Division Chiefs that projects be refused. 
Beginning in October 1944, however, every new project was passed upon 
by NDRC as a whole, although it did permit the acceptance without such 
review of extensions of existing projects which involved merely the devel- 
opment of specific devices based on research already accomplished. 

Bush requested the Secretaries of War and Navy each to name one man 
with whom he could discuss termination problems. The Secretary of War 
designated Brigadier General W. A. Borden, Director of the New Develop- 
ments Division, and the Secretary of the Navy designated Rear Admiral 
Furer. Under date of September 5, 1944, General Borden informed Bush 
that while the War Department was in full accord with timely planning 


it was apprehensive lest there be some relaxation of efforts before final 
victory was achieved. 

On September 19, 1944, Senator Harry F. Byrd, as Chairman of the 
Joint Committee on Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures, asked 
Bush a number of specific questions about the plans for demobilization of 
OSRD which Bush was able to answer prompdy, as many of the points 
had been anticipated in his memorandum of September 13. Replying to a 
specific question, he stated that OSRD had no postwar plans inasmuch as 
the primary reason for its existence would disappear with the end of 
the war. 

The Bureau of the Budget hopped on the demobilization bandwagon by 
a letter of September 23, 1944, calling for specific information as to plans 
for the termination of OSRD. In addition to sending the Bureau a copy 
of his memorandum of September 13, 1944, Bush replied to three specific 
questions in the sense of the memorandum. 

Obviously, as OSRD activities were carried on principally through con- 
tracts, plans for the demobilization of OSRD were a matter of great im- 
portance to the contractors. The situation with respect to scientific man- 
power had been critical for a long time and the contractors were entided 
to as much notice as possible of OSRD plans which might affect that 
situation. Recognizing this, on October 3, Bush outlined to all OSRD con- 
tractors his plans for the demobilization of OSRD. Again he emphasized 
that, while it was necessary to prepare plans, those plans would not be put 
into effect until after the defeat of Germany. He made no prediction as to 
when that defeat might come. On the contrary, he stated that the con- 
tractors should continue at full speed as in the past with no diminution 
of effort by reason of uncertainty as to the future. With that warning he 
informed the contractors that the OSRD staff had been requested to prepare 
plans to be put into operation soon after Germany's defeat and that in the 
preparation of the plans they would be in touch with the contractors. He 
told the contractors that the Army and Navy would continue to need their 
full co-operation in carrying on those programs which might be of long- 
range interest. He added that while the co-operation between the contractors 
and the Services must necessarily take a form which would be mutually 
acceptable to them, OSRD stood ready to be of assistance if needed. 

Discussion of the OSRD demobilization plan occurred between OSRD 
personnel and Army and Navy personnel at all levels. The official Navy 
view was expressed in a letter to Bush from Furer on October 16, 1944, 
which stated the Navy opinion "that any abatement of interest and active 
participation in the administration and scientific effort of your organiza- 
tion will delay the final victory over Japan, and will therefore also result 
in additional loss of life in our forces." Furer maintained that the Navy 
could not without loss of tempo undertake those parts of the OSRD pro- 


gram which it considered essential, in addition to its own programs, and 
that the Navy did not know how to arrange for the transfer of OSRD 
contracts without loss of time. To Bush's point that if the Services did not 
learn in wartime how to streamline their procedures there was little pros- 
pect that they would do so in peacetime. Purer replied that "it appears 
to me that this is no time to place this additional burden upon the Navy." 
He closed his letter with a statement of three principles which he hoped 
would be acceptable to OSRD and which in substance made the Navy the 
judge of what OSRD should do. 

In his reply of October 28, Bush again emphasized that OSRD was 
planning and not terminating. He pointed out that scientists were aware 
of the time lag of about two years between the undertaking of wartime 
military research and its application on a large scale in practice, and that 
OSRD could not agree that the judgment of the Navy could properly be 
substituted for that which OSRD was required to exercise by the Execu- 
tive Order establishing it. 

As a result of this exchange of correspondence and a number of confer- 
ences the following principles governing the OSRD demobilization were 
agreed upon between OSRD and the Navy and accepted by the Army: 

A. That the OSRD would continue the energetic prosecution of all 
projects which the Services and OSRD considered of value in winning the 
war with Japan, and which the Services were not in a position to take over 
without loss of effectiveness. Senior scientists, administrators, and key 
personnel should be retained even though the release of some of the less 
important workers might be expected if the load decreased. 

B. That the OSRD should use its best efforts to retain sufi&cient OSRD 
and contractors' personnel on any project of predictable value in the Japa- 
nese or German wars which was transferred to the Services or other super- 
visory agency. 

C. That the OSRD should continue to accept new projects if the project 
involved would, in the opinion of the Services and the Director of OSRD, 
contribute to the winning of the present war and could be more expedi- 
tiously completed by OSRD than by the Services or other agency. 

Copies of the demobilization plans of the divisions as approved by NDRC 
were to be furnished by Bush to Admiral Purer and General Borden for 
their comment before action on his part. The program for the formula- 
tion of demobilization plans was given a mixed reception by the divisions. 
The Radiation Laboratory operating under Division 14 was particularly 
disturbed at the suggestion that its activities should be curtailed. Preliminary 
discussion of the transfer of the Radiation Laboratory contract indicated 
that the Army and Navy organizations were so constituted that neither 
could successfully undertake such a contract on behalf of both, and that 
great difficulty would attend effort to set up a single contract for the Army 


or Navy satisfactory to the relatively independent Services in the Army and 
Bureaus in the Navy interested in the operation of the Radiation Labora- 
tory. By the time NDRC met on October 20, 1944, several divisions had 
submitted their demobilization plans; at that meeting demobilization plans 
were approved for Divisions 4, 5, 6, 9, and 10 for submission to the Di- 
rector of OSRD. Not so with Division 14, however. When the Commit- 
tee met on November 3, 1944, to discuss the demobilization plans for Divi- 
sions 14 and 15 two rear admirals and one captain from the Navy, a 
major general, a brigadier general and a colonel from the Army appeared 
before the Committee to argue against the formulation of demobilization 
programs for those divisions. The Service viewpoint was clearly expressed 
that OSRD should engage in an all-out effort on research right up until 
the end of the war on all fronts, even though it was obvious that under 
such a program many of the results would not accrue in time for use in 
the war then being waged. The suggestion that OSRD might step out of 
the picture in favor of direct contracts on the part of the Services received 
a cool reception. 

A number of divisional demobihzation plans were before the Committee 
at its meeting on November 3, but it was apparent that some of them had 
been drawn up on a misapprehension as to the Committee's intention. 
While the Committee had requested the plans to be prepared with a view 
to their being put into effect at a future date, some of the divisions had pre- 
pared plans to become effective immediately. Accordingly, the Committee 
took no action on the plans which had been submitted but decided to send 
out a revised statement of its intention. 

One exception to this reservation of action was Division 12, which had 
felt for some time that it had completed the major part of its activity. 
That division presented a demobilization program independent of the 
over-all demobilization of OSRD calling for the termination of the divi- 
sion's activities by December 31, 1944. This plan was approved by NDRC 
on November 3 and subsequendy referred by the Director of OSRD to 
the Army and Navy for their comments. After both had expressed their 
concurrence in the plan. Bush approved it on November 16, 1944. A lim- 
ited amount of report writing made it impossible for Division 12 to ter- 
minate its activities as of the scheduled date, but it was in fact terminated 
as of June 30, 1945. 

Division 6 presented a special case. In the race between the German 
submarine and the Allied antisubmarine activities, the Allies apparendy 
had established a comfortable lead, and the division had for some time 
been concentrating its activities on the prosubmarine field for use in the 
Pacific war against Japan. The nature of the prosubmarine activities was such 
as to call for the closest possible co-operation with naval operations, and 
the research and development activities had progressed to the point where 


they merged rather definitely with regular naval activities. Quite inde- 
pendently of the over-all demobilization program for OSRD, discussions 
had been under way for some time for the transfer of the entire Division 6 
program to the Navy. NDRC on October 20, 1944, had approved the Divi- 
sion 6 demobilization program, and Army concurrence was forthcoming on 
November 9, subject to Navy comments in view of the fact that the 
division's activities dealt almost wholly with naval matters. Admiral Furer's 
letter of November 8, however, indicated that while the Bureau of Ships 
was making plans to take over those Division 6 activities which fell within 
its jurisdiction, the Bureau of Ordnance was not prepared to take over its 
part of the work, and the Navy therefore requested that NDRC continue 
to handle that part of the activity until such time as another agency could 
be obtained for the continuation of the work. In giving his approval to the 
Division 6 demobilization plan, therefore, Bush did so with the understand- 
ing that the division would bear in mind the problems presented by the 
Bureau of Ordnance. 

Action on the demobilization programs of other divisions was withheld 
by the Director in view of the expressed intention of the NDRC at its 
meeting on November 3 to clear up misunderstandings on the part of the 
divisions as to the demobilization program. The next step in this clarifi- 
cation was taken at the Committee's meeting on November 17, 1944, at 
which the Committee spelled out its intention in somewhat different words 
but to the same purport as before. 

During the time the demobilization program was under discussion the 
Army and the Navy at the request of OSRD classified the various projects 
which they had submitted to OSRD roughly in accordance with the plan 
outlined in the Bush memorandum of September 13. These classifications 
were communicated to the divisions responsible for the various projects. 

At its meeting on January 12, 1945, the Committee recommended a de- 
mobilization program for Division 19. It will be recalled that Division 19 
worked primarily with the Office of Strategic Services which placed it in 
a somewhat different category from the other divisions. 

At its meeting on January 26, 1945, the Committee had before it the 
detailed estimates from the divisions for the fiscal year beginning July i, 
1945, totaling $110,406,000. At the same meeting the Committee agreed 
that it would recommend new contracts and contract extensions through 
August 31, 1945, in appropriate cases. Prior to that decision the Committee 
had limited its consideration of contracts and contract extensions to the 
period ending February 28, 1945, in the absence of a strong showing by a 
division that an extension beyond that date was needed. 

On February 21, 22, 23 and 24, 1945, the Committee held extended 
meetings to review the programs of the several divisions with their re- 
spective Chiefs. This was followed on April 6 by the adoption of a tenta- 


tive budget providing for a preliminary allocation of $78,250,000 among 
the various divisions and panels. 

The Committee took the first direct step to curtail the activities of the 
Radiation Laboratory at its meeting on April 6, 1945. That laboratory had 
reached the stage where the rate of expenditure (including funds trans- 
ferred to OSRD by the Services for equipment produced in the laboratory) 
approximated $4,000,000 per month. To support activity on such a scale 
it w^as necessary for the contractor to make substantial financial commit- 
ments considerably in advance of the date upon which materials were to 
be delivered. The action taken was to put a ceiling upon the amount of 
those forward commitments, but in doing so the Committee agreed that 
upon request of Division 14, it would review the ceiling whenever the 
division could show concretely that it would work undue hardship upon 
the division in carrying out its program. 

On May 7, 1945, Bush, in approving a resolution passed by NDRC, 
made the following suggestions: 

1. New projects should be undertaken only when (a) the subject work 
could be reasonably expected to be completed as far as research and devel- 
opment was concerned but not necessarily as to final reporting before 
June 30, 1946, or (b) the Services had definitely indicated that they would 
take over and the subject work could be placed in form for transfer prior 
to that date. 

2. In reviewing the division programs for the period following August 31, 
1945, NDRC should note carefully the relation of each project to the cur- 
rent war situation and provide an estimate of the date of completion of re- 
search and development and the date at which the results of the project 
might be expected to have an effect on the Japanese war. 

3. For the present, there should be no extensions of contracts beyond 
August 31, 1945, except that in the case of large central laboratories pro- 
vision might be made for one additional month. 

Before the Committee held its next meeting on May 18, 1945, Germany 
had surrendered. On all new projects considered at that and subsequent 
meetings the Committee adopted as a condition of its favorable action that 
the conditions set by Bush on May 7 be met. Also at the May 18 meeting 
Moreland reported that in response to a request from the Bureau of the 
Budget, the Director, after consulting the Chairman's Office, had agreed to 
release $18,000,000 of current OSRD funds of which $15,500,000 was from 
funds which had been set aside for use upon recommendation of NDRC 
and the remaining $2,500,000 from similar funds for CMR. 

On May 26, 1945, Bush addressed a further memorandum to NDRC 
summarizing the policy governing the present consideration of the OSRD 
program. He emphasized the essential soundness of the general policy an- 
nounced in September 1944, and reiterated the obligations laid down at 


that time. He suggested the assumption that organized resistance of the 
Japanese would have substantially ceased by the summer of 1947, which, 
in view of the inherent lag between research and actual field use, indi- 
cated that OSRD research and development on new weapons should ter- 
minate by June 30, 1946. Field service activities in the analysis of the 
use of new weapons and in their effective introduction into combat should 
continue, however, until the end of hostilities against an organized enemy. 
This point of view was concurred in by NDRC at its meeting on June i 
and communicated to the Division Chiefs for their guidance. 

July I, 1945, brought a new fiscal year with hostilities still continuing 
in the Pacific. At its meeting on July 7, 1945, NDRC adopted tentative 
divisional budgets for the period ending February 28, 1946, aggregating 
$35,606,000. Those budgets were recommended on a basis which contem- 
plated that expenditures from March i, 1946, to the end of the fiscal year 
would be at approximately 50 per cent of the rate through February 28, 
1946. At the same meeting the Committee agreed to receive proposals from 
the divisions for new contracts and extensions of contracts to February 28, 

The meeting on August 3, 1945, devoted considerable time to a discus- 
sion of the action which the Committee might take with respect to projects 
and contracts if the defeat of Japan should come unexpectedly. Definite 
decisions were postponed until the next meeting of the Committee. Recom- 
mendations were adopted for the extension of a large number of contracts 
to February 28, 1946, in view of the fact that they were presently sched- 
uled to terminate on August 31, 1945, or less than one month from the 
date of the Committee meeting. Bush, Conant, and Tolman had been 
high in the councils on the development of the atomic bomb and knew 
that the stage was being set for the initial use of the bomb over Japan. 
Although the Committee adopted the recommendations for contract ex- 
tensions, Bush delayed acting upon the recommendations except for a few 
urgent cases. When the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was fol- 
lowed after a short interval by the cessation of hostilities against Japan, 
Bush withheld his approval from the August 3 recommendations. 

The atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6. On August 7, 
Bush sent a memorandum to the members of NDRC stating that the in- 
troduction of atomic bombs required a re-examination of termination plans. 
Japan surrendered on August 14. 

On August 16 Bush informed NDRC and CMR that he would transmit 
to them the orders from the President regarding termination as soon as 
they were received. He suggested that the Committees prepare to put the 
presidential policies into effect by delegating most of the determination 
to the Executive Officer of NDRC and the medical administrative officer 
of CMR under the general supervision of the respective Chairmen and in 


close contact with the Executive Secretary, leaving only important sub- 
ject's to come before the full committees. Bush concluded the memoran- 
dum in the following fashion: 

This memorandum gives me opportunity to remark on a very significant fact. 
The same civilian personnel that started in CMR and NRDC still remains. We 
have the same Executive Secretary. We started together and we finished to- 
gether. I think there never was a more convincing evidence of harmonious 

Bush also wrote the President on August i6, 1945, outlining a program 
for the termination of OSRD for which he requested presidential approval. 
After pointing out that extensive scientific effort would need to be focused 
on the problems of reconversion and education, he outlined the following 

A. Research on the instruments of warfare (carried out through the National 
Defense Research Committee). 

1. Condnue projects of long-term significance which should become the re- 
sponsibility of a Foundation conducting, in part, research on military matters 
until such a Foundation is established, or until they are taken over by the Army 
or Navy, or until it becomes evident that neither provision for their continuance 
may be expected. 

Continue other projects of a fundamental character only for a brief period 
to enable the armed services to take them over and incorporate them in their 
own programs if they so desire. This interval need exceed thirty days only 
under unusual circumstances. 

2. Stop all other work on war weapons which does not appear to have long- 
term significance. It seems obvious that many weapons which are now near 
completion will be obsolete before another war would be likely to occur. Per- 
haps 90 per cent of the present OSRD program in the field of weapons will 
fall in this category. In the case of work on specific weapons of long-term 
significance the program should be handled as outlined above in (i). 

In both types of cases provision will be made for adequate reporting of 
work already done in a form which will permit later investigators to take up 
the work at approximately the point where the OSRD may have discontinued. 
This work on reporting will need to continue beyond the time intervals indi- 
cated above. 

B. Medical Research related to national defense (carried out through the Com- 
mittee on Medical Research). 

Much of the work carried on under the auspices of the Committee on Medical 
Research of OSRD has implications for civilian medicine and public health as 
well as for military medicine. 

1. Transfer to the Services or terminate all research predominantly of military 
application, with the expectation that the military establishments will continue 
under their own auspices such part of the program as they may find desirable. 

2. Transfer to the Public Health Service that part of the CMR program which 


has utility outside the military field and properly within the field of activities 
of the Public Health Service. 

3, Transfer to the auspices of private foundations or private research groups, 
or to such new governmental agency as may be established, medical research 
not to be continued under either military or Public Health Service auspices. 

I am hopeful that the more significant parts of the OSRD program in the 
medical field can be handled in one of these ways. Those parts which cannot 
be so handled, I would propose to schedule for completion not later than Febru- 
ary 28, 1946. In the event that a permanent research agency has not been es- 
tablished by February 28, 1946, the OSRD medical projects of greatest long-' 
term significance will not be terminated without a re-examination with you of 
that policy. In all cases provision will be made for adequate reporting of work 
already done. 

C. Field Service activities. 

OSRD had rather extensive operations in the field in close co-operation with 
the military services. These operations should be discontinued and the men in the 
field called home as speedily as the transportation situation in the various areas 
permits, except for a few special instances where valuable work remains to be 
done for the Services. In these few cases the field service work will be transferred 
to the auspices of the Services if this proves to be possible. 

D. Interchange of scientific information with the British, which has been 
active in all areas, should continue until the end of the program or until in- 
structions are received to the contrary. 

Bush pointed out that the program outlined did not cause a gap between 
the war research activities of OSRD and the scientific research activities 
to be undertaken by the National Research Foundation, the establishment 
of which had been recommended a short time before. Most of OSRD's 
later efforts had been devoted to the development of weapons rather than 
to fundamental research. With the changing art of modern war, the new 
Foundation should take a fresh start and not merely continue research 
which happened to be under way at the time of its organization. Bush 
observed that research on atomic energy had been transferred from OSRD 
to the War Department sometime previously. 

The President did not endorse this program for termination but wrote 
instead, "I am reluctant at this time to see the liquidation of the greater 
part of the organization which, under your leadership, has contributed 
so brilliantly to the winning of the war." The President thought that it 
would be unfortunate to break the continuity of supervision of actual 
research work essential to the success of any scientific project. In his view 
it would be desirable to maintain in their present status those major 
projects under OSRD control until Congress actually established a perma- 
nent Federal research agency. The President suggested that if it should 
appear that Congress did not intend to establish a science foundation, 
he would consult further with Bush as to the appropriate distribution 
of projects in progress. He suggested that a number of the projects which 


OSRD desired to abandon or transfer to other Government agencies might 
be treated as suggested by Bush under the general poHcy outUned by the 
President. He asked that a detailed analysis of the proposals be submit- 
ted to the Director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion 
(OWMR) v^^ith the expectation that OWMR and OSRD could agree as 
to many of the dispositions which Bush proposed. 

Following the President's letter, John W. Snyder, Director of OWMR, 
designated one of his aides, James R. Newman, to discuss the demobiliza- 
tion program with OSRD. Newman met with NDRC on August 24, 1945, 
at which time there was a thorough discussion of the actual status of the 
NDRC program, in which the Committee emphasized that due to the 
shortage of scientific manpower its program for months had been concen- 
trated upon the later stages of weapon development to such an extent that 
only a bare minimum of fundamental research of the type which a research 
foundation would wish to support remained. The Committee adopted the 
following four categories of NDRC-recommended OSRD contracts for 
purposes of termination: 

A. Basic research of such nature as to fall properly within the scope of a peacetime 
governmental research agency supplementing the work of the Services on 
military research. Specific fields shall be described in connection with division 
programs. Continue under NDRC until taken over by permanent agency or 
other disposition is determined. 

B. Research or development projects essentially completed where limited further 
work will permit completion and preservation of values. Continue as deter- 
mined in each case but not beyond December 31, 1945, and generally not be- 
yond October 31, 1945. 

C. Research or development projects of long-range significance, generally con- 
cerned with specific weapons, which the Services may wish to take over and 
continue in Service laboratories or under contract. Continue to give reasonable 
oppormnity to complete arrangements for transfer, but generally not beyond 
October 31, 1945. 

D. Development work on specific devices or weapons not having long-range im- 
plications, servicing new weapons, and aid to the Services on current military 
problems. Terminate promptly with every effort to complete final technical 
reports by September 30, 1945. Continuation beyond that date to be authorized 
only in special cases to permit completion of technical reports. 

Davidson and Stewart were authorized to classify the various contracts 
into the four approved categories in consultation with the Division and 
Panel Chiefs concerned. Davidson immediately got in touch with the 
Division Chiefs by telephone and telegraph and an initial listing of con- 
tracts was submitted to the Director on August 28, 1945. Following the 
Director's approval of the division of contracts among the several classi- 
fications, Davidson and Stewart discussed the schedules with Newman 


on August 29. Approval of the schedule was given by the Director of 
OWMR on August 31, 1945. A comparable schedule of CMR projects was 
approved by OWMR on September 18. The final outcome closely approxi- 
mated that suggested in Bush's letter of August 16, 1945, to the President 
outlining Bush's plans for the termination of OSRD. 

Copies of the approved demobilization schedule for each division and 
panel were sent to the Division and Panel Chiefs, and except for minor 
modifications necessitated by the speed with which the original schedule 
had been drafted, were put into effect. At its meeting on September 14, 
1945, the Committee formally approved the action which had been taken 
since its last meeting and about which the individual members of the 
Committee had been apprised as it was being taken. 

The demobilization program for NDRC was carried out with only slight 
variations from the plan originally approved. This was facilitated by the 
fact that most NDRC contracts still carried an August 31, 1945, termina- 
tion date when Japan surrendered. Most of them either were allowed to 
expire on that date or were given a thirty-day extension to cover the filing 
of reports. Work of continuing importance was carried until October 31, 
or in a few cases for a slightly longer time, in order to let the Services 
make arrangement for its continuance under other contracts or in their 
own laboratories. The limited amount of fundamental research on weapons, 
continued under OSRD auspices pending the creation of a research foun- 
dation, was at the rate of approximately $1,000,000 per year. Except for 
that, the total NDRC activity after January i, 1946, was concentrated on 
report writing and upon the details of closing out a going concern. 

Termination Plans for Medical Research 

The first discussion of demobilization plans by CMR occurred at the 
meeting on August 3, 1944, when Richards reported that the Advisory 
Council at its meeting the next day was to consider future plans for OSRD. 
Although the Committee adopted no formal expression of opinion, the con- 
sensus was that upon the termination of OSRD provision should be made 
for the continuance of some of the fundamental research projects being 
sponsored by the CMR; that some of the contracts should be turned over 
to the Army, the Navy and the Public Health Service; and that an effort 
should be made to advance each CMR-sponsored project to the point at 
which it could be most advantageously turned over to other Government or 
private agencies. 

Discussion was renewed at the next meeting of the Committee on Au- 
gust 17, 1944. Admiral Smith indicated that while the Navy might take 
over some projects, it would not take over OSRD contracts. General Sim- 
mons expressed vigorous opposition to any plan to discontinue the activities 


of CMR prior to the end of the war with Japan or even prior to the expira- 
tion of six months after the conclusion of that war if that should be nec- 
essary. The transfer of large masses of troops from the European to the 
Asiatic theater would add to the medical load, and the War Department 
did not have the organization nor the manpower to administer contracts 
as the CMR had done. Dyer expressed the view that the Committee should 
continue to the end of the war, but he indicated that there would be no 
legal obstacle to the transfer to the Public Health Service at the proper 
time of projects appropriate to its functioning. The members of the Com- 
mittee were in agreement as to the importance of the establishment of 
some Government agency for dealing with problems of postwar medical 

Under date of August 29, Dyer wrote Richards at considerable length 
outlining the manner in which Public Health Service could take over 
projects in its field from CMR and administer them through an organ- 
ization which would have the flexibility of the CMR organization and to 
a considerable extent might draw upon the same personnel as CMR. This 
letter was communicated to CMR at its meeting on August 31. 

By a memorandum to Richards on September 18, 1944, Bush requested 
him to begin the formulation of plans for the termination or transfer of 
work being carried on under CMR auspices. He referred specifically to 
the letter sent by Dyer to Richards on August 29. 

At its meeting on September 21, 1944, CMR discussed at some length 
Bush's memorandum of September 13, on demobilization. Division Chiefs 
were instructed to present their recommendations with respect to the 
allocation of CMR contracts among the categories laid down in the Bush 
memorandum. It was the general feeling of the Committee that plans 
should be made which would permit it to go out of existence as soon 
after the end of the war with Germany as arrangements could be made 
for the effective transfer of important contracts to other agencies. 

With the adverse turn of events marked by the beginning of the Bat- 
de of the Bulge, Richards sought further guidance from Bush, which 
was forthcoming in a letter of December 20, 1944, in which Bush men- 
tioned briefly the various proposals which had been made for a postwar 
health program. He reaffirmed that OSRD would continue to exert its 
full energy as long as the war in Europe lasted and that after the collapse 
of Germany it would continue such efforts as might be needed for the 
effective prosecution of the war against Japan. In general, the CMR pro- 
gram should be to continue military research needed specifically in the 
conduct of the present war, while at the same time steps should be taken 
to facilitate its gradual transition into peacetime arrangements at an ap- 
propriate time. Following consideration of this letter at the meeting on 
January 18, 1945, the Committee instructed the Division Chiefs that they 


might present proposals for contracts to run beyond June 30, 1945, in 
cases falling within the spirit of the Director's letter. 

General Simmons on January 17, 1945, wrote Richards to express the 
strong desire of the Surgeon General that no step should be taken which 
would serve to constrict the field of responsibility of CMR or to limit its 
activity until the war ended and medical problems had become less urgent. 
As long as fighting continued, the Medical Department of the Army 
would not have the facilities or the scientific and administrative personnel 
to take over and continue at a high level of competence the type of research 
being conducted by CMR. Any plan to transfer contracts to the Medical 
Department would result only in loss to the Army. In presenting the letter 
to the CMR at its meeting on February i, the Chairman pointed out that 
the Director's instructions with reference to transfers specifically stated 
that the transfers were to be effected only where this was possible with- 
out loss of effectiveness. 

For some time Bush was concerned about the possibility that with the 
successful outcome of the war against Germany there might be so many 
resignations from the voluntary and paid staff of OSRD that the effective 
supervision of contracts would be imperiled. Accordingly, on February 23, 
1945, he addressed a memorandum to Conant and Richards asking them 
to bear this possibility in mind. He asked that they assure themselves in 
connection with programs submitted for his approval that adequate per- 
sonnel would be available in each division and in the Offices of the Chair- 
men to insure the carrying out of the obligations to be undertaken. In 
presenting the memorandum to CMR on March i, 1945, the Chairman 
stated that he had discussed it with the Division Chiefs and was convinced 
that there would be no difficulty in carrying out the views stated in the 

The emphasis upon the temporary character of OSRD activities and the 
limited extensions of contracts which were granted as a matter of policy 
in order to keep CMR in a fluid state caused considerable resdessness 
on the part of contractors' personnel, who preferred to work under condi- 
tions permitting more long-range planning. The situation was reviewed by 
the Division Chiefs who expressed their views to the Committee in a 
memorandum dated May 16, 1945. They felt that the pattern of CMR 
activities had been well conceived and that the organization could provide 
an equally important service in time of peace. However, they believed 
that the interest of long-range medical research and of investigators and 
institutions was not likely to be well served by a succession of short-term 
extensions of CMR contracts. They had therefore reviewed the CMR con- 
tracts to determine which would be likely to have an additional value in 
military medicine by December 31, 1945. Finding only a small number 
which promised such results, they recommended that on or before De- 


cember 31, 1945, all OSRD contracts entered into on CMR recommenda- 
tion be discontinued or transferred to other Government agencies together 
with funds to provide for their continuation until June 30, 1946. The 
Committee discussed this memorandum on May 17. In view of the un- 
certainties as to the agency which might succeed to CMR-recommended 
contracts, members of the Committee doubted the feasibility of the rec- 
ommendation for transfer prior to December 31, 1945. 

Following the end of the European war, Bush addressed another mem- 
orandum to the CMR on June 4, 1945, repeating that the affairs of the 
Committee should be kept in a "fluid condition" with CMR prepared to 
terminate some contracts and to transfer others. He set December 31, 1945, 
as the date beyond which CMR contracts would not presently be extended. 

Following the end of hostilities with Japan and in line with the Presi- 
dent's request for information on specific programs. Bush sent Richards a 
memorandum on August 24, 1945, requesting Richards to give him a 
summary of CMR projects with proposed plans for their handling. He 
indicated that the plans should be prepared in accordance with these prin- 

1. Medical research of predominatingly military application should be 
transferred to the armed services or terminated. 

2. Research programs with an important value apart from the military 
field, which were properly within the scope of operations of the Public 
Health Service, and which that Service was willing to undertake with the 
expectation of continuing as long as the results and the public interest 
justify continuance, should be transferred to the Public Health Service 
together with funds which had been budgeted for their continuance dur- 
ing the current fiscal year. 

3. Research programs with an important value apart from the military 
field and which could best be conducted by private research groups should 
be transferred to them as far as they were willing to accept responsibility 
for them. 

4. Research programs of substantial potential value which could best be 
furthered under the auspices of a federal agency, a part of the program 
of which was support of medical research, should be continued for the 
present in the expectation that such a federal agency would be created by 
Congress. At present, continuation for this purpose would not be provided 
for beyond February 28, 1946. 

5. Programs not coming under any of the above should be placed on 
such a basis that a completed piece of work would have been accomplished 
not later than February 28, 1946. If the program was of such a nature that 
this could not be done, steps should be taken for a prompt termination. 

The Division Chiefs and the Committee proceeded promptly with the 
classification of contracts in accordance with the Director's instructions; 


and at its meeting on September 6, 1945, the Committee adopted a sched- 
ule assigning each of its contracts to its proper place in accordance with 
the Director's instructions. The Director transmitted the schedule with 
his approval to the Director of OWMR, who in turn approved the program 
without change. Under the program, most CMR contracts were permitted 
to expire at their December 31, 1945, termination date. Many of them 
were replaced by contracts negotiated by the Public Health Service effec- 
tive January i, 1946, using funds appropriated by Congress for the pur- 
pose. A number of contracts were transferred to the Surgeon General of 
the Army by a tripartite agreement among the OSRD, the Surgeon Gen- 
eral, and the contractor. Because of its complexity, that portion of the 
antimalarial program involving clinical testing of new potential antima- 
larials was left under CMR control with the distinct understanding that 
it would be completed not later than June 30, 1946. A limited amount of 
research of a fundamental character was continued by the Committee in 
the expectation that it would be turned over to the National Research 
Foundation upon its establishment; the cost of this program was of the 
order of $250,000 annually. 

Transfer of Contracts 

To implement the OSRD demobilization plan, its legal division was 
requested to devise a procedure under which long-range developments 
could be transferred to the Services with a minimum of delay and admin- 
istrative detail. In collaboration with the Army and Navy, OSRD attor- 
neys worked out a three-party instrument of assignment which was drafted 
in the form of a supplement to the basic OSRD contract concerned. This 
assignment provided, in brief, for the transfer to the interested Service 
of all OSRD's rights, powers, responsibilities and obligations under the 
basic contract, the assumption by the interested Service of such rights, 
powers, responsibilities and obligations, the consent of the contractor to 
such transfer, and the release by the contractor of OSRD, its officials and 
employees from further responsibility with respect to the contract. 

Specifically, this meant that on and after the effective date of the trans- 
fer, the Army or Navy would undertake to process all unpaid vouchers, 
settle or otherwise dispose of all outstanding claims, exercise all rights 
theretofore vested in OSRD to require (a) interim and final technical 
reports, (b) invention disclosures, reports and records, (c) property ac- 
countings and inventories, and would direct the use and ultimate dispo- 
sition of all contract property both real and personal in which the Govern- 
ment had a vested interest. In other words, the receiving Service would, in 
effect, step into the shoes of the OSRD and carry forward to completion 
all business unfinished at the date of the transfer. Unspent contract funds 


were to be transferred to the receiving Service to support the contract. 

The principal reason for using this simple contractual mechanism was 
that it avoided interruption of the progress of the actual research work. 
The first two tripartite supplements assigning contracts to the Quarter- 
master Corps of the Army and to the Bureau of Ships of the Navy, were 
executed in strict conformity with the principles set forth above. Subsequent 
transfers to the Bureau of Ships, the Bureau of Personnel of the Navy, the 
Signal Corps of the Army, and the Office of Strategic Services modified 
the standard tripartite supplement to the extent that the receiving Service 
undertook to reimburse the contractor for only such expenditures as were 
made by him subsequent to the effective date of transfer, leaving OSRD 
to make reimbursement with respect to all expenditures incurred prior 
to the date of transfer. 

The Bureau of Ordnance of the Navy declined to participate in tripar- 
tite assignments of contracts in which it was interested. Thus in the case 
of practically all Section T projects taken over by the Navy, the OSRD 
contract was allowed to expire according to its terms, and a new contract 
was then written between the Bureau of Ordnance and the contractor. 
This method of transfer was not without special problems, however. It 
often happened that the OSRD contractor had altered his facilities for the 
purpose of conducting OSRD work and that he wished to use the altered 
facilities under the Navy contract without losing the privilege of having 
the premises restored to their original condition at Government expense. 
The Bureau of Ordnance wanted the contractor to continue to use mate- 
rials and equipment purchased under the OSRD contract, but it was un- 
willing to assume responsibility for that material and equipment without 
an inventory which could be made only at the expense of considerable 
loss of time on the project to which Ordnance was opposed. Furthermore, 
if the Navy accepted motor vehicles purchased under the OSRD contract, 
they would become Navy property and would be placed in the Navy 
motor pool with little chance of being made available to the contractor. 

After protracted negotiations between OSRD attorneys and attorneys 
for the Navy, it was decided that these special problems could best be 
resolved by a limited tripartite agreement under which (a) the Navy 
would take over OSRD's obligations with respect to bearing restoration 
costs, subject to a definite ceiling on Navy's liability; (b) the contractor 
would release OSRD from such obligations; (c) the Navy would assume 
blanket accountability for all expendable items on hand without inventory, 
and (d) legal title to all motor vehicles would be left in the contractor 
subject to ultimate disposition at Navy direction. 

Where the property situation was not complicated by the existence of 
these special factors, transfers were handled by having the Navy accept 
accountability for all capital items as listed on inventories certified to by a 


Navy Materiel Inspector, and execute a blanket receipt for all expendable 
items which might be in the possession of the contractor without any in- 
ventory thereof being made. Ten transfers were made under tripartite 
agreements, while seven transfers were handled on the above basis. 

In general, as the end of hostilities approached, the Services became 
more reluctant to accept OSRD contracts by transfer. Therefore, OSRD 
contracts were allowed more and more to expire in accordance with their 
termination dates, and the Services undertook to write their own contracts 
for the continuation of the projects. 

Pursuant to the CMR demobilization plan forty-two CMR projects were 
transferred to the Public Health Service. In each case the OSRD contract 
was allowed to terminate and a new contract to take its place was exe- 
cuted between Public Health Service and the contractor concerned. 

Twenty-three contracts in the medical field were transferred to the Office 
of the Surgeon General of the Army. Transfers were accomplished in each 
case by use of the standard tripartite supplement of assignment, except 
that OSRD agreed to reimburse the contractor for all expenditures in- 
curred prior to the date of transfer and undertook to secure from the con- 
tractor technical and invention reports with respect to all work performed 
up to the transfer date. 

Plans for a Successor Agency 

Recognizing the desirability of a continuing participation by civilian 
scientists in military research and accepting the fact that OSRD would 
go out of existence shortly after the end of the war, the Secretaries of War 
and the Navy established, on June 22, 1944, a Committee on Postwar 
Research under the chairmanship of Charles E. Wilson, Vice-Chairman of 
the War Production Board. The Committee was charged with studying 
the postwar research and development needs of the armed services and 
recommending a plan for meeting those needs. It recommended the creation 
within the National Academy of Sciences of a Research Board for National 
Security composed in approximately equal parts of civilian scientists and 
military men, with the latter consisting of equal numbers from the Army 
and Navy. This Board could start functioning without delay, it could be 
financed by transfers from Army and Navy appropriations until Congress 
could make appropriations directly to the Board, and when Congress was 
ready to set up a research organization on a permanent basis, all or any 
desired part of the Board's organization could be transferred to the new 

The Wilson Committee report was accepted by the Secretaries. At their 
request the Academy set up the proposed Board which was ready to func- 
tion until it was completely blocked by the refusal of the Bureau of the 


Budget to permit the transfer of funds to support its activities. Bills were 
then introduced in Congress to establish the Board on a statutory basis, but 
there was no real effort to get action because of the expectation that legisla- 
tion to support scientific research on a broader basis might soon be con- 
sidered by Congress. 

Two bills to effect this were introduced in the Senate. The first (S. 1297, 
79th Congress), by Senator Harley Kilgore of West Virginia, had gone 
through several revisions; it proposed, among other things, the creation of 
a National Science Foundation, one of whose duties would be the promotion 
of military research. The second (S. 1285), by Senator Warren Magnuson 
of Washington, was based largely on the Bush report entitled Science — the 
Endless Frontier and was designed to carry out the recommendations in 
that report. Among other things, it proposed a National Research Founda- 
tion, with a division devoted to military research. The bills differed in a 
number of important respects, but finally after joint hearings on the two 
bills a compromise bill was worked out (S. 1850) which was approved by 
the supporters of both the Kilgore and Magnuson bills. The OSRD and its 
constituent committees were to be transferred to the National Science 
Foundation under the compromise bill. The compromise bill passed the 
Senate, but Congress adjourned while the bill was still before a commit- 
tee of the House of Representatives. 

OSRD was created to do an important but temporary job. The organiza- 
tion was built on a temporary basis, drawing upon the best available men 
for relatively short periods of time without disturbing their regular academic 
or industrial connections in most cases. This was possible largely because of 
the pressure of impending and actual war which made men available whose 
services could not have been obtained on any comparable scale in normal 
times. The leaders of OSRD were always keenly conscious of this fact, 
which, however, completely escaped many people on the outside who, seeing 
the success of OSRD, called for its retention into peacetime. There was 
never any chance that this could be done. Once the pressure of war lifted, 
the key men upon whom its success depended responded to the more urgent 
calls of their regular activities and not all the king's horses nor all the king's 
men could hold the group together. While the name and a shell of an 
organization could be passed on, OSRD as it operated during the war 
definitely ceased with the end of hostilities. Had the inevitability of this 
fact been appreciated in high quarters, the question of a successor might 
not still be open at this late date. 




.HE Office of Scientific Research and Development was highly 
successful in assisting the armed services by research on and development 
of weapons and in the field of military medicine. In part at least this was 
due to the fact that it operated at first under the shadow of an impending 
war and later under the pressure of war itself. This was, of course, a favor- 
able circumstance for the type of operation in which OSRD was engaged 
for it meant that the best scientific talent of the country was available, with- 
out question and without qualification. 

When it started in June of 1940, NDRC's conception of its task was 
essentially a modest one. It was to engage in research designed to produce 
new and improved weapons of warfare. While the charter of the Commit- 
tee would have permitted a broad interpretation of the Committee's field of 
activities, a relatively narrow interpretation was adopted at the outset and 
maintained with reasonable consistency. This permitted a high degree of 
concentration in the field which the Committee marked out for itself. 

The Committee was not as successful in limiting its activities to research. 
The original assumption was that the Committee would engage in research 
which would establish the practicability and usefulness of a weapon or an 
instrument and that further development would be carried on by the Services. 
In practice, research tended to merge into development. Further, the Army 
and the Navy were in the midst of a program of tremendous expansion 
which required that the major attention be devoted to recruiting and train- 
ing personnel and to obtaining the large quantities of equipment which 
could be had only through standardization for large-scale production. They 
were too busy to take over the results of research programs and carry them 
through the development stages. It was difficult to arouse interest in an idea 
until it had been converted into something tangible, complete, ready for 
demonstration and use. With the creation of OSRD, development was added 
to research; and with the passage of time an increasingly large amount of 
attention was devoted to the developmental stages of ideas which had suc- 
cessfully emerged from the research stage. 

Even with the completion of development OSRD was unable to withdraw 
from some programs. The Services were geared to mass production and 
never succeeded in developing an easy procedure for the procurement of a 
few devices to cover the period before the production lines could begin to 


produce in large numbers. Yet there were cases where a Umited number of 
devices put into use before the mass-produced type was available could be 
of critical importance. This fact forced a further considerable expansion of 
the OSRD program into the field of so-called "crash" procurement. As an 
illustration there may be mentioned the equipment for blind bombing 
through overcast. The Radiation Laboratory under OSRD auspices com- 
pleted the research on and development of a device enabling bombers to 
locate their targets through clouds and overcast which would make visual 
bombing impossible. The armed services were enthusiastic about the equip- 
ment and placed orders for substantial quantities. In the interval before the 
first of the mass-produced pieces of equipment came of? the line, the Radia- 
tion Laboratory under OSRD's direction produced twelve sets of equipment. 
The use of these through the winter of 1 943-1 944 permitted a larger num- 
ber of bombing missions and so added a sufficient increment to the damage 
inflicted by the bombers to carry the bombing program over the hump 
by inflicting serious damage on German industry from which it was not 
permitted to recover. 

The growth in the program incident to the expansion of the NDRC and 
OSRD fields of activities is indicated by the change in dollar volume of 
operations. Thus the amount of money obligated by NDRC and OSRD 
largely through contracts and through transfers of funds to Government 
agencies for the several fiscal years was as follows: 

1940-1941 $ 6,161,691.00 

1941-1942 $ 39,626,839.97 

1942-1943 $142,454,422.35 

1943-1944 $162,513,597.74 

1944-1945 $167,473,101.09 

1 945-1 946 $ i7,854>3i5-33 

Total $536,083,967.48 

While the greater portion of this amount was spent for weapons within 
the field of NDRC operations, $24,689,899.42 was devoted to medical re- 
search, $13,041,037.57 to atomic energy (including $920,650.00 while NDRC 
had jurisdiction of the subject) and approximately $26,400,000 to Section T 
activities, mostly proximity fuzes for shells. The greater part of it was obli- 
gated by contracts, which numbered 2515 on December 31, 1945, distributed 
as follows: 

NDRC 1506 

CMR 568 

Atomic energy (where not included in NDRC) 102 

OFS (company contracts) 17 

OFS (personal service contracts) 237 

Section T 62 


Committee on Sensory Devices 7 

Special agreements, e.g., space, overhead 16 

Well over 5700 supplements had been executed 

to these 2515 contracts by the same date. 

The submission of formal requests from the Services for OSRD assistance 
is not a proper index of the w^ork done for them as many projects were 
initiated by OSRD with part, but not all, of them later covered by Service 
request, and for the further reason that requests varied widely in their scope 
and the magnitude of effort required to meet them. Because of the way in 
which CMR work originated, there is no ready method of tabulating Service 
interest in the origin of its programs. The records of the project control 
section, however, show the following distribution by origin of project re- 
quests accepted by NDRC: 


Air Corps 


Coast Artillery Corps 


Corps of Engineers 


Chemical Warfare Service 


Quartermaster Corps 


Signal Corps 


Services of Supply 


Ordnance Department 


Total Army projects 



OflBce of Research and Development 




Coast Guard 


Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air 


Emergency Rescue Equipment Section 


Naval Research Laboratory 


Medicine and Surgery 


Naval Ordnance 


Naval Personnel 


Commander in Chief, Readiness Division 




Total Navy projects 


Joint Army-Navy 


Grand Total 


The records also show that 231 Service requests were not accepted by 
NDRC. While many of these were declined because of competing demands 
for manpower, or because they did not appear possible of completion in 


time for use in the current war, many others were rejected for the purely 
formal reason that the work desired was already under way in connection 
with some other request, 

Shordy after its establishment NDRC discovered that there were areas in 
which the Army and the Navy did not exchange information. Faced with 
a common problem, each Service worked out its own solution, and in some 
cases declined to apprise the other of that solution. The most probable reason 
for the refusal to exchange information in certain fields was the feeling on 
the part of the more advanced Service that the less advanced would not keep 
its secrets. NDRC did not conceive its mission to be the funneling of infor- 
mation from one Service to the other. As a result of NDRC operations, 
however, many barriers to a complete interchange of information between 
the Services were lowered. This was brought about usually by the willing- 
ness of that Service which was behind in a particular area to seek advice and 
assistance from OSRD. Concentration upon the problems of the lagging 
Service enabled OSRD to help bring it abreast or ahead of the other Service 
and thus break down the reluctance to exchange information. 

The degree of independence of each other enjoyed by the various Bureaus 
of the Navy and Services of the Army made it appear at times as if there 
were as many armies and navies as there were bureaus and services. In 
some cases there was an underlying resentment of the intrusion of a group 
of civilians into an area theretofore reserved for men in uniform. In such 
matters as failure to provide necessary test facilities a non-co-operating Serv- 
ice could make it extremely difficult for OSRD to function effectively. At 
the other extreme, there were some Bureaus and Services which were almost 
embarrassingly co-operative. Not only were they glad to turn projects over 
to OSRD, they were even reluctant to see OSRD withdraw from the picture 
when its proper job had been completed. This took the form of an insistence 
that OSRD, having completed its development work, could better produce 
or procure the end item than could the requesting Service and a consequent 
insistence that OSRD remain active in the field although its primary func- 
tion had been completed. 

It will be interesting to see what permanent contribution to the Services 
will result from the OSRD experience. In the midst of war it is natural that, 
because of their preoccupation with the operations of the war, the armed 
services should not undertake to reorient their thinking on research and 
development. With the cessation of hostilities the pressure for improvement 
is removed, and inertia coupled with the resistance of officers who believe 
that the existing system is best makes change extremely difficult. When the 
period of inevitable reduction in the amount of money available for the 
military services actually arrives, there is a fair chance that the officers in 
charge of research and development will concentrate upon protecting the 
operations in their own laboratories or otherwise within their close control, 


and that plans for effective civilian assistance in the development of new 
weapons will be one of the first items dropped in a program of retrench- 
ment. The proposal for a National Science Foundation independent of the 
Services with a division devoted to research on weapons carries the greatest 
promise of effective civilian assistance in the field by assuring funds free of 
Service control. 

Based upon OSRD experience, there are certain points to which persons 
interested in future research on weapons and in the field of military medi- 
cine should give careful consideration. The more important of these as they 
appear to the author will be mentioned briefly. 

Organization for research within the Services. If, unhappily, there should 
be another war, there should be no need for another OSRD. It will be 
needed only if there is a large deficit of military research such as existed in 
1940. With the experience of World War II behind them, our military 
leaders should not permit that to happen. But if it is not to happen, there 
should be more adequate research within the Services and a more adequate 
use made of civilian research by the Services in the years immediately ahead. 

As a first step the Army and the Navy should give research recognition 
at the highest levels. The Army, including the Air Force, should have all of 
its own research programs co-ordinated with each other, reporting through 
a single office and co-ordinated with strategic planning. The Navy should be 
similarly organized. While the mechanism would be dependent upon the 
eventual form of defense organization in the United States (one, two, or 
three departments), these research programs in their turn should be co- 
ordinated with each other after consideration of the possible requirements 
of grand strategy. Competent civilian participation should be provided at all 
levels, for no military man can be assumed or expected to have the compe- 
tence to assess the possibilities of the contributions of the various fields of 
science to the military picture. 

Service laboratories should continue to make their important contribu- 
tions to military research, but they should not be permitted to monopolize 
or dominate the field. For one thing they cannot do the whole job which 
needs to be done, the scientific talent available to them (in or out of uniform) 
is not comparable to that in civilian laboratories, and the failure to make 
adequate use of civilian f.^cilities in peacetime will mean the loss of valuable 
time if it becomes necessary to use those facilities in an emergency. 

The manner in which the Services organize themselves for research will 
greatly influence the way in which civiUan scientists should be brought into 
the picture. Assuming the plan suggested above (co-ordinated research pro- 
grams within and between the Services), a joint civilian-military committee 
within the framework of the armed services could effect the co-ordination 
of civilian with military research much as OSRD did, but upon a continu- 
ing basis. This committee could plan within whatever appropriations were 


available to it so that rapid expansion in the use of civilian research facilities 
would be possible without loss of time if it should become necessary. 

The remarks on the succeeding pages will hold regardless of the form 
adopted for the organization co-ordinating and directing research, although 
the phraseology in which they are expressed might be different if that form 
were known at the time of writing. 

Scientific advice at a high level. In preparation for modern war it is 
essential that the possibility of new weapons be considered in strategy; that 
from the very first, persons with adequate and continuing background in 
science participate in strategic planning. The plans should be made in the 
light of what is possible today or may be possible tomorrow, not in the light 
of what was in existence when a two-, three-, four-, or five-star general or 
admiral went to school. Science moves so fast that only the specialist can 
keep up with it. It is too much to expect an Army or Navy officer, no 
matter how brilliant, to maintain continuing and understanding contact 
with the latest developments in science. It is not too much to expect the 
Services to recognize their limitations in this respect and to build their plans 
for the defense of the country around such recognition. 

Introduction of science at a high level of planning should serve another 
purpose as well. The amount of scientific talent available for military re- 
search will always be limited. In times of emergency in particular, none of 
it should be wasted. Unless the scientific high command is conversant with 
military planning, some part of the scientific effort will be wasted unneces- 
sarily upon projects of marginal utility when it could be more effectively 
used in other directions. The number of devices which can be invented far 
exceeds the number which can be used. Effort should be concentrated on 
those which have the best chance of use. This means that the scientific high 
command must know what to develop and that it must have the courage 
to pull reluctant scientists off less important work for the benefit of the more 
important. The decisions involved are of such importance that they should 
be made only after serious consideration by both the military and the scien- 
tific high commands. 

OSRD experience confirmed the ease with which scientists can become 
immersed in and pleaders for their specialties. The result was a number of 
truly remarkable developments in the field of those specialties. There was 
lacking in the over-all military research picture, however, any kind of a 
scientific council with members drawn from different fields of science and 
relieved of all responsibility for administration whose sole function would 
be to let their imaginations run free in an attempt to foresee the scientific 
and technical possibilities of modern war and to advise the Government on 
steps to realize upon those possibilities. Such a group completely conversant 
with scientific developments and scientific research programs in and out 


of Government might conceive programs broader in their magnitude and 
more daring in their conception than anything yet achieved. 

Independent scientific judgment. Scientists must be free to develop equip- 
ment w^ithout request and, if need be, over the opposition of military services, 
and they must be in a position to get it tested and evaluated sufficiently near 
the top to insure an unprejudiced judgment of its merits. A number of the 
most valuable of the OSRD developments were made in the face of Service 
indifference. The demonstration of the usefulness of the completed device 
to the satisfaction of higher officers was needed to overcome the opposition 
of others. In some cases, however, OSRD completed projects and was unable 
to get the necessary Service testing. In other cases, it was possible with large 
expenditures of time and energy to blast through Service inertia to the 
point where a test could be had. 

This does not mean that the scientist will always be right. He may well 
be wrong, but he should not be blocked by the lack of imagination of an 
officer in a key position, by the opposition of a Service branch which has a 
pet project which it does not want to test against a proposed development, 
or by the reasoning that what the scientist says he may be able to do is 
impossible because the Service has already tried it and could not make it 

Keeping the interest of top-flight scientists. Ways must be found to keep 
the interest of top-flight scientists in miHtary problems during periods of 
peace. The system of reserve officers is not adequate for this purpose. While 
many able men will retain reserve commissions at the end of a war, many 
of the more able will not continue those commissions for long because of 
the competing demands upon their time and the intensity of their interest 
in their peacetime activities. 

It all too frequently happens that the man who retains his reserve com- 
mission is not the most able man in his field. Yet the operation of the 
reserve system is such that when the reserve officers are called to active duty 
in time of emergency, they receive rapid promotion as the armed forces 
expand and they are placed in positions of much greater importance than 
their relative ability merits. Scientists coming into the Services in time of 
emergency find themselves subject to the orders of men who are recognized 
as their inferiors from a scientific standpoint. The situation becomes increas- 
ingly serious as the number of scientists called into uniform increases. If it 
cannot be met within the Services, the machinery for effective co-operation 
between civilian scientists and the Services becomes of even greater im- 

One way to keep from losing the interest of scientists is to make it easy 
for them to work with the Services in the fields of their specialties. The 
mechanics of civilian co-operation must be simplified, particularly in research 


contracts. More important, the officers in charge of Service scientific pro- 
grams must be of such caHber as to merit confidence in themselves and their 
programs. The temptation to impart to the Service laboratories an omnis- 
cience they do not deserve must be resisted, and the civiUan regarded as a 
partner, not as an interloper. Above all, he must be given complete access 
to all the information he needs to be effective as a scientist. 

Close contact with field operations. That persons responsible for design- 
ing and developing equipment for field use should have an opportunity for 
close and immediate observation of its performance under field conditions 
would seem to be obvious. Where, as in the case of the OSRD-supported 
branch laboratories in England, the developing group was in immediate 
contact with the using group in the field, it was possible for the scientist to 
appreciate the needs of the military, to design for them and to furnish modi- 
fied equipment in a remarkably short time. Unfortunately, it was never 
possible for OSRD to work out with the Services a completely satisfactory 
over-all plan for assuring close contact between the scientists and the forces 
in the field. 

The Office of Field Service played an increasingly important role in many 
areas, but the degree of its usefulness varied with particular situations. Thus, 
the Navy made it difficult for civilians to follow the course of new weapons 
in the Pacific although the difficulty of working with some parts of the 
Army was almost as great. The gap between the research worker in military 
medicine and medical officers in the field was at least as great, and Htde 
progress was made in bridging it during the course of OSRD operations. 

The problem inherent in this situation is not easy of solution, and it 
oflfers a challenge to intelligent thinking on the part of the Services. The 
scientists are by no means blameless in the delay in getting more efficient 
field use of weapons and instruments. There was a tendency to place great 
faith in the weapon or instrument itself, and the realization of the impor- 
tance of the man-instrument combination was relatively slow in developing. 
The temptation to continue laboratory work for the perfection of a piece 
of equipment had an appeal which kept men in the laboratories when they 
might have made greater contributions by moving into the field where they 
could observe the operational performance of the equipment under condi- 
tions of use. With the pull of the laboratory for the scientist and the reluc- 
tance of the Services to give him access to operational information or permit 
him to make his own observations, it is understandable that operational 
analysis or field service was slow in starting and sporadic in development. 
While it never attained a position which would warrant its copying in a 
future emergency, it did progress to the point where it merits close study 
as an indication of a path to be followed in the future. 

Scientific manpower. With the winning or losing of a war dominated 
by scientific devices hanging in the balance, the United States never worked 


out a system for the proper handling of scientific manpower. The men re- 
sponsible for getting recruits into the Army and the Navy seemed far 
removed from the men who were responsible for developing the weapons 
with which the war was to be fought. The two operations were carried on 
with great independence of each other and with no one working out an 
intelligent system to permit the objective of the one to be accomplished with- 
out endangering the objective of the other. 

In modern wars new and improved weapons may well prove decisive. 
For the development or improvement of such weapons in time of war, a 
country must depend largely upon its existing reserve of scientists or those 
in the course of training when the war breaks out. This group should be 
recognized and treated as any other national asset. They should not only be 
permitted, they should be forced to work on the development of instruments 
of warfare and should not be squandered in capacities where men of other 
training could be used as effectively. 

This is not to suggest that all scientists should be kept out of uniform. 
It may be that the exact opposite is the proper answer and that immediately 
upon the outbreak of war all scientists should be inducted into the armed 
services and placed under the instructions of a scientific high command. 
The problem is as important as it is difficult. It should be faced squarely in 
the immediate future and the decision as to the proper method of handling 
scientific manpower made well in advance of the time when it may be put 
into effect. Though the answer to the problem is not immediately apparent, 
it is clear that to handle scientific manpower in any future war as clumsily 
as it was handled in World War II will be to invite national disaster. 

The most effective use of manpower reserved for scientific research is also 
a problem of continuing difficulty. OSRD attained speed in research by 
granting autonomy to the divisions. Freedom to make decisions at the 
operating level was essential, but it had as a disadvantage that vested inter- 
ests in continuing a particular line of research tended to arise. Persons not 
sufficiently acquainted with the complete research program understandably 
attached undue significance to the portion with which they were connected, 
with the result that some programs were probably continued beyond the 
point of diminishing returns. Proper balance between centralized authority 
and autonomy is difficult to attain, but as the manpower situation becomes 
more critical, the correct decision becomes more essential. Had the war 
continued for a much longer period, OSRD might well have been forced 
to withdraw some portion of the autonomy granted the divisions. 

Crash procurement. The Army and the Navy are organized for war in 
terms of large bodies of men requiring huge amounts of standardized equip- 
ment which must be obtained in the necessary quantities within narrow 
time limits and must be designed for servicing with minimum delay and 
confusion. Unfortunately in gearing to large things, neither department has 


made adequate provision for obtaining small quantities of new and unique 
instruments and weapons. 

Quantity production, with its emphasis upon interchangeability of parts 
and its discouragement of adaptations, may well continue to be the corner- 
stone of the Service procurement programs. But the Services must devise 
some way of introducing a parallel system of obtaining small quantities of 
new equipment on an urgent basis. The lack of such a provision was glar- 
ingly apparent in OSRD relations with the Services. After the procurement 
agencies placed orders for large quantities of newly developed equipment 
(the first of which unfortunately would not come from the production line 
for from six to eighteen months), the Services seemed helpless to obtain the 
smaller but critical number of those same instruments or weapons which 
could be made by hand or by other than mass production methods and so 
be obtainable in the interval before mass-produced equipment was available. 

The research groups in the Services maintained that the research was 
completed, and consequently the procuring of the "few quick" was not 
properly a research function or one which should be supported by research 
funds. The procurement agencies on the other hand objected to handling 
such items because they were not properly standardized and would not fit 
into the procurement schedules. Both research and procurement groups 
recognized the existence of a gap between them but neither took the initia- 
tive in attempting to fill it. 

During the war, much against its will, OSRD filled the breach. In doing 
so it undoubtedly saved lives and expedited victory, but at the same time it 
relieved the pressure upon the Services to work out a permanent solution 
of the problem. Properly organized for the task, the Services could have 
done a more effective and expeditious job of "crash" procurement than 
OSRD did, and at the same time have left the scientists to work which 
only they could do. The Services should work out an effective method of 
handling such procurement. 

One element operating to keep "crash" procurement within OSRD was 
undoubtedly the reluctance of the scientists working on a device to release 
it to other hands. Thus the situation frequently was one in which the Serv- 
ices on one side and the scientists on the other joined hands to force a 
reluctant OSRD into "crash" procurement. 

Security. Three aspects of the security problem deserve close considera- 
tion: classification, clearance and compartmentalization. 

The higher the classification assigned to a research program, the greater 
is the resultant delay. The cumulative effect of a series of time-consuming 
details may be serious in the course of a large program. The security officer 
should distinguish between a strategic plan properly classified secret and a 
scientific research program which may feed into that plan but may itself 
better be left unclassified. The compromise between the security officer who 


tends to put everything in the highest classification as a matter of caution, 
and the scientist who wants everything in the lowest classification as a 
matter of speed and ease of operation should be under continuous re-exami- 
nation. The fact that part of a program should be carefully protected is not 
always a valid reason for throwing safeguards (and delay) around other 
parts. Time can be saved by adequate and continuous attention to this 
aspect of a research program. 

As for clearance, the military authorities should not wait until an emer- 
gency arises to decide what scientists they can trust. They should be pre- 
pared to evaluate the evidence produced by an investigation and to stand 
back of their findings. Clearly, this would not be an easy matter in view 
of the amount of difficulty a disgruntled person can make, but national 
security is too serious a matter for the issue to be dodged. 

Compartmentalization of information can be carried too far, and prob- 
ably was by OSRD. In theory, it is sound. Its disadvantages can be largely 
overcome by a continuous review by an adequate staff or by periodic con- 
ferences of Program Chiefs in which each would outline his progress and 
his problems in sufficient detail to permit his colleagues to determine where 
an exchange of more detailed information would be profitable. Even pro- 
grams which should be carried on independently of each other may have 
components which are common and on which an exchange of information 
would save valuable time and manpower. 

Contracting. The OSRD contracting procedure was effective. The contract 
was deliberately designed to insure the maximum freedom for the exercise 
of scientific imagination within the limits governing the proper expenditure 
of Government funds. By contrast, the Service research contracts in exist- 
ence at the time NDRC was organized seemed to enmesh the scientists in 
such red tape as to make effective work difficult. 

With the transfer of OSRD projects to the Services incident to the de- 
mobilization of OSRD, a more reasonable contract has obtained a foothold 
in both the Army and the Navy. Whether it will become firmly established 
is still uncertain. Judiciously used, a flexible contract can tie academic and 
industrial research facilities into the miUtary research program in a very 
effective manner. 

In time of war it will be possible to divert up to lOO per cent of the 
country's research facilities to military problems and to expand them if 
necessary. In time of peace, however, these research facilities quite properly 
are used primarily for the advancement of science in the case of academic 
institutions or the improvement of the competitive position of a company 
in the case of industrial laboratories. Even in time of peace, however, some 
portion of both academic and industrial facilities can be obtained for mili- 
tary research. This percentage will vary from institution to institution and 
industry to industry, but it might be reasonable to expect a maximum of, 


say, 10 per cent of laboratory facilities in many places to be available for 
military research under proper circumstances. If this were done it would 
accomplish a threefold purpose. It would acquaint the military with scien- 
tific developments of potential military significance at an early stage; it 
would give the military and the civilians experience in working together; 
and it would lay the basis for the expansion of the facilities devoted to mili- 
tary problems if that should become necessary. For this to take place, how- 
ever, it is essential that the Services work out an acceptable flexible research 
and development contract and administer it intelligently. 

The device of contracting introduces a flexibility impossible in the case of 
Service-operated laboratories. Operations are not confined to a particular 
geographical area or to particular groups of people. If one group is un- 
successful in pursuing a lead, it may be diverted to other work or dropped 
while the original problem is turned over to another group with a different 
background and facilities. New groups can be used for limited periods be- 
cause of special qualifications without an implication of continuing employ- 
ment, and frequently better men can be had than could be obtained on a 
basis of direct employment by the Government. 

OSRD was a unique organization. Successful in its operations, the prin- 
cipal conclusion from its experience is that there should never be need for 
another like it. There were many organizational anomalies, but an all- 
pervading sense of the importance of the task and the urgency of its com- 
pletion. The most remarkable thing about OSRD was the men associated 
with it. Whether they would have functioned as well in time of peace may 
be open to question, but from their performance in OSRD, it is possible 
that they would have done as well at any other job they undertook during 
the war. The history of OSRD is not in fact the story of an organization. 
Rather it is the story of a group of highly gifted, patriotic men, who in time 
of grave national emergency saw a job which needed to be done, sought 
and received authority to do it, and then carried it through in a manner 
which was successful beyond even their fondest dreams. While some of 
their trials and tribulations point the way to future improvements, and the 
record shows mistakes which they made, the statement of the Appropriations 
Committee of the House of Representatives on October 17, 1945, with which 
this volume opened, is an appropriate one with which to close it: 

The contribution which it (OSRD) has made to the winning of the war is in- 
estimable. Without such contribution, it is safe to say that victory still would 
await achievement. ... To its distinguished and internationally known head, 
Dr. Vannevar Bush, and the staff of great scientists he gathered around him to 
aid in the development of new weapons, the Nation owes much. 



URING the first six months of 1947 most of OSRD's re- 
maining obligations were met. Consideration was given to transferring the 
remaining tasks of contract liquidation to the Liquidation Unit in the 
Treasury Department at the end of the fiscal year; but late in June the Bu- 
reau of the Budget decided that OSRD's liquidation had not reached the 
stage where this could be done conveniently and that it would be preferable 
for OSRD to remain in existence for a few months longer, so that this work 
could be performed by persons on its staff already familiar with the special 
problems involved. 

' The staff of the agency, which had numbered 177 on December 31, 1946, 
had dwindled to 74 by June 30, 1947. Then it was cut still further to 26 
paid employees. At the same time, Carey G. Cruikshank, who had been 
Fiscal Officer, succeeded Cleveland Norcross as Executive Secretary. 

The work remaining on the first of July consisted of auditing current 
vouchers submitted by contractors, continuing a survey of contract costs, 
property accounting for 45 contracts, keeping track of the security clearance 
of reports, supervising the publication contracts mentioned in Chapter XX 
(Summary Technical Reports, monographs, and histories), and completing 
the transfer of permanent records to the National Archives. These activities 
will still require some months for their completion. 

The question of a successor agency, mentioned at the end of Chapter XXI, 
is still unsolved. An act for the creation of a National Science Foundation, 
which was passed by Congress on July 22, 1947, was vetoed by the 
President after the first session of the 80th Congress had adjourned. The 
Foundation, named in the Act as the successor of OSRD, was to take over 
its few remaining obligations. Now it appears that they will be disposed of 
before there is time for this subject to be considered by the next session of 

The action of the 8oth Congress in creating the Department of National 
Defense should simplify the co-ordination of research for military purposes. 
The Research and Development Board of the new Department, with its 
committees and panels, provides a means for introducing civilian scientists 
into military planning. There seems reason to hope that the experiences of 
OSRD may thus be of continuing benefit to the country in its preparation 
for an eventuality which we all hope may never transpire. 


Morgantown, West Virginia 
August, ig4y 



Establishing the Office of 

Scientific Research and Development 

IN THE Executive Office of the President 

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes 
of the United States, and in order to define further the functions and duties of 
the Office for Emergency Management with respect to the unhmited national 
emergency as declared by the President on May 27, 1941, for the purpose of as- 
suring adequate provision for research on scientific and medical problems re- 
lating to the national defense, it is hereby ordered: 

1. There shall be within the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive 
Office of the President the Office of Scientific Research and Development, at the 
head of which shall be a Director appointed by the President, The Director shall 
discharge and perform his responsibilities and duties under the direction and 
supervision of the President. The Director shall receive compensation at such rate 
as the President shall determine and, in addition, shall be entitled to actual and 
necessary transportation, subsistence, and other expenses incidental to the per- 
formance of his duties. 

2. Subject to such policies, regulations, and directions as the President may 
from time to time prescribe, and with such advice and assistance as may be neces- 
sary from the other departments and agencies of the Federal Government, the 
Office of Scientific Research and Development shall: 

a. Advise the President with regard to the status of scientific and medical 
research relating to national defense and the measures necessary to assure 
continued and increasing progress in this field. 

b. Serve as the center for mobilization of the scientific personnel and re- 
sources of the Nation in order to assure maximum utilization of such 
personnel and resources in developing and applying the results of scientific 
research to defense purposes. 

c. Co-ordinate, aid, and, where desirable, supplement the experimental and 
other scientific and medical research activities relating to national defense 
carried on by the Departments of War and Navy and other departments 
and agencies of the Federal Government. 

d. Develop broad and co-ordinated plans for the conduct of scientific research 
in the defense program, in collaboration with representatives of the War 
and Navy Departments; review existing scientific research programs for- 
mulated by the departments of War and Navy and other Agencies of 
the Government, and advise them with respect to the relationship of their 
proposed activities to the total research program. 


e. Initiate and support scientific research on the mechanisms and devices of 
warfare with the objective of creating, developing, and improving instru- 
mentalities, methods, and materials required for national defense. 

f. Initiate and support scientific research on medical problems affecting the 
national defense. 

g. Initiate and support such scientific and medical research as may be re- 
quested by the government of any country whose defense the President 
deems vital to the defense of the United States under the terms of the Act 
of March 11, 1941, entitled "An Act to Promote the Defense of the United 
States"; and serve as the central liaison office for the conduct of such 
scientific and medical research for such countries. 

h. Perform such other duties relating to scientific and medical research and 
development as the President may from time to time assign or delegate 
to it. 

3. The Director may provide for the internal organization and management of 
the Office of Scientific Research and Development and may appoint such advisory 
committees as he finds necessary to the performance of his duties and responsi- 
bilities. The Director shall obtain the President's approval for the establishment 
of the principal subdivisions of the agency and the appointment of the heads 

4. In carrying out its functions, the Office of Scientific Research and Develop- 
ment shall utilize the laboratories, equipment, and services of governmental agen- 
cies and institutions to the extent that such facilities are available for such 
purposes. Within the limits of funds appropriated or allocated for purposes en- 
compassed by this Order, the Director may contract with and transfer funds to 
existing governmental agencies and institutions, and may enter into contracts and 
agreements with individuals, educational and scientific institutions (including the 
National Academy of Sciences and the National Research Council), industrial or- 
ganizations, and other agencies, for studies, experimental investigations, and 

5. The Director is authorized to take over and carry out the provisions of any 
contracts which fall within the scope of this Order heretofore entered into by 
(i) the National Defense Research Committee, established by order of the Coun- 
cil of National Defense on June 27, 1940, (2) the Health and Medical Committee, 
established by order of the Council of National Defense on September 19, 1940, 
and (3) the Federal Security Administrator in his capacity of Co-ordinator of 
Health, Medical Welfare, Nutrition, Recreation, and other related activities as 
authorized by order of the Council of National Defense on November 28, 1940. 
The Director is further authorized to assume any obligations or responsibilities 
which have heretofore been undertaken by the above agencies for and on behalf 
of the Government of the United States and which fall within the scope of this 

6. There is created within the Office of Scientific Research and Development 
an Advisory Council consisting of the Director as Chairman, the Chairman of 
the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, the Chairman of the National 
Defense Research Committee (hereinafter described), the Chairman of the Com- 


mittee on Medical Research (hereinafter described), one representative of the 
Army to be designated by the Secretary of War, and one representative of the 
Navy to be designated by the Secretary of the Navy. The Council shall advise and 
assist the Director with respect to the co-ordination of research activities carried 
on by private and governmental research groups and shall facilitate the inter- 
change of information and data between such groups and agencies. 

7. There shall be within the Office of Scientific Research and Development a 
National Defense Research Committee consisting of a Chairman and three other 
members appointed by the President, and in addition the President of the National 
Academy of Sciences, the Commissioner of Patents, one ofiBcer of the Army to be 
designated by the Secretary of War, one officer of the Navy to be designated 
by the Secretary of the Navy, and such other members as the President may 
subsequently appoint. The National Defense Research Committee shall ad- 
vise and assist the Director in the performance of his scientific research duties 
with special reference to the mobilization of the scientific personnel and re- 
sources of the Nation. To this end it shall be the responsibility of the Committee 
to recommend to the Director the need for and character of contracts to be en- 
tered into with universities, research institutes, and industrial laboratories for 
research and development on instrumentalities of warfare to supplement such 
research and development activities of the Departments of War and the Navy. 
Furthermore, the Committee shall from time to time make findings, and submit 
recommendations to the Director with respect to the adequacy, progress, and re- 
sults of research on scientific problems related to national defense. 

8. There shall be within the Office of Scientific Research and Development a 
Committee on Medical Research consisting of a Chairman and three members to 
be appointed by the President, and three other members to be designated respec- 
tively by the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Administrator 
of the Federal Security Agency. The members so designated by the Secretaries of 
War and the Navy and Federal Security Administrator shall be selected from the 
respective staffs of the Surgeons General and the Surgeon General of the Public 
Health Service with particular reference to their qualifications in the field of medi- 
cal research. The Committee on Medical Research shall advise and assist the 
Director in the performance of his medical research duties with special refer- 
ence to the mobilization of medical and scientific personnel of the nation. To this 
end it shall be the responsibility of the Committee to recommend to the Director 
the need for and character of contracts to be entered into with universities, hos- 
pitals, and other agencies conducting medical research activities for research and 
development in the field of the medical sciences. Furthermore, the Committee shall 
from time to time, on request by the Director, make findings and submit recom- 
mendations with respect to the adequacy, progress, and results of research on medi- 
cal problems related to national defense. 

9. The members of the Advisory Council, the National Defense Research Com.- 
mittee, the Committee on Medical Research, and such other committees and 
subcommittees as the Director may appoint with the approval of the President 
shall serve as such without compensation, but shall be entitled to necessary and 
actual transportation, subsistence, and other expenses incidental to the perform- 
ance of their duties. 


10. Within the Hmits of such funds as may be appropriated to the Office of 
Scientific Research and Development or as may be allocated to it by the President, 
the Director may employ necessary personnel and make provision for necessary 
supplies, facilities, and services. However, the Director shall use such statistical, 
informational, fiscal, personnel, and other general business services and facilities 
as may be made available to him through the Office for Emergency Management. 


The White House 
June 28, ig4i 


Standard Form looi. 

Contract No. 
Symbol No. 


effective as of the day of between THE UNITED STATES 

OF AMERICA (hereinafter called "the Government"), represented by the Ex- 
ecutive Secretary (hereinafter called "the Contracting Officer"), Office of Scien- 
tific Research and Development in the Office for Emergency Management, Ex- 
ecutive Office of the President, and 

(hereinafter called "the Contractor"). 

WHEREAS, the Government desires that the Contractor conduct studies and 
experimental investigations as hereinafter specified requiring the services of quali- 
fied personnel; and 

WHEREAS, the Contractor is willing to conduct such studies and experimental 
investigations on an "actual cost" basis as hereinafter specified; and 

WHEREAS, the contemplated work will require that a substantial part of the 
materials, supplies and other articles acquired therefor be either consumed or 
incorporated into equipment or other articles to be constructed or assembled 
during the course of the work; and 

WHEREAS, the Government desires that such studies and experimental in- 
vestigations be conducted under the direction of 

of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (hereinafter called "the 
Scientific Officer") ; and 

WHEREAS, the Contracting Officer finds after careful scrutiny that payment in 
advance on account of actual costs will promote the national interest; 


ARTICLE I. (a) Subject Wor\. The Contractor shall, with the utmost dispatch 
and in accordance with instructions issued by the Scientific Officer, supply the 
necessary personnel and facilities for and conduct studies and experimental in- 
vestigations in connection with 

The Contractor shall report the progress of such studies and investigations from 
time to time as requested by the Scientific Officer, and shall furnish a complete 
final report of its findings and conclusions. Such reports shall be furnished in such 
quantity and form as may be required by the Scientific Officer. The Contractor's 
undertakings under this paragraph are hereinafter called "the subject work." 


(b) Termination. The Contractor shall proceed with the subject work until 

or until such later date as may be authorized in writing by 
the Contracting Officer and agreed to by the Contractor. 

(c) Acceleration of Termination. The Contracting Officer may at any time 
advance the date fixed under paragraph (b) by giving the Contractor thirty (30) 
days' notice in writing that the subject work shall terminate at a specified 
earlier date. Upon receipt of such notice the Contractor shall exercise all reasonable 
diligence to obtain the cancellation of its outstanding commitments hereunder 
running beyond such earlier date, but any reasonable cancellation charges in- 
curred thereby by the Contractor and any reasonable loss upon outstanding com- 
mitments which it is unable to cancel shall be reimbursable hereunder. 

(d) Inspections. The Contracting Officer or the Scientific OflEcer may inspect the 
subject work at all reasonable times. 

(e) Subcontracts. No subcontract executed hereunder shall provide for (i) pay- 
ment on a cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost basis or (ii) the payment of a fixed fee 
in excess of seven per centum of the estimated cost, exclusive of the fee. The 
Contractor shall not enter into subcontracts involving research or development 
of the kind contemplated by this contract without obtaining the written approval 
of the Scientific Officer as to the substance and the Contracting Officer as to the 
form thereof. The Contractor shall refer each prospective subcontract which 
might involve such research or development to the Scientific Officer, who shall 
determine whether or not such research or development is involved. 

(f) Special Property Acquisition. The Contractor shall obtain the approval of 
the Contracting Officer before (i) purchasing motor vehicles, (ii) making any 
building alteration at a cost of $500.00 or more, (iii) constructing buildings, or 
(iv) leasing, purchasing or otherwise acquiring real property, for the cost of any 
of which reimbursement will be claimed hereunder. 

(g) Property Furnished Directly by the Government. The Government may 
furnish to the Contractor materials, supplies, apparatus, equipment or other 
property for use in the performance of the subject work, and such property shall 
be used by the Contractor only for purposes approved by the Scientific Officer. 

(h) Definitions. "Contracting Officer" refers to the present Contracting Officer 
and his successors in office. "Scientific Officer" refers to the present Scientific 
OflScer and his successors in office. Scientific assistants may act for and on behalf 
of the Scientific Officer in every respect under this contract except in connection 
with subcontracts under Article i (e) hereof. The Scientific Officer may designate 
scientific assistants in addition to, or in substitution for, those initially designated 
below, by naming such assistants in writing and lodging a copy of such designa- 
tion with the Contractor by transmitting such copy through the Contracting 
Officer. The following persons are hereby initially designated as scientific assistants: 

ARTICLE 2. (a) Reimbursement for Costs. The Government shall reimburse 
the Contractor, upon the submission of public vouchers supplied by the Govern- 
ment and approved by the Contracting Officer, for the "actual cost" to the Con- 
tractor of performance of its undertakings hereunder in an amount not exceeding 

($ ). 

The Contractor may submit such vouchers at monthly intervals for "actual cost" 


incurred and not previously reimbursed. The Contracting OflEcer may withhold 
all or any part of the final reimbursement payment until receipt of the final report, 
the property accounting, and the patent disclosure and designation required here- 

(b) Cost Escape. Notwithstanding any other provision hereof, when and if 
"actual cost" in such maximum amount shall have been incurred or obligated 
hereunder, the Contractor shall not be required to incur or obligate further 
"actual cost" hereunder unless and until the Government shall first agree in 
writing to reimburse the Contractor therefor. 

(c) Vouchers. All vouchers submitted shall indicate, with respect to each class 
of items listed by the Contractor thereon, the particular subparagraph of para- 
graph (d) below under which reimbursement is claimed, and shall be itemized 
and supported by appropriate substantiating documents as required by the Con- 
tracting Officer. 

(d) Cost Determination. "Actual cost" as used herein includes only the fol- 

(i) Salaries and Wages. Expenditures by the Contractor for the salaries and 
wages of its employees hereunder, plus Federal and State Social Security 
taxes paid by the Contractor thereon; 

(2) Borrowed Personnel. Expenditures by the Contractor to reimburse other 
employers for salaries and wages paid by them to their employees released 
for and engaged in performance of the Contractor's undertakings here- 
under, plus Federal and State Social Security taxes paid thereon by such 
employers ; 

(3) Materials and Services. Expenditures by the Contractor for such materials, 
supplies, apparatus, equipment and other articles (including processing 
and testing thereof by others, and rental of apparatus and equipment 
from others), and for the services of others not reimbursed under sub- 
paragraphs (i) and (2), as are necessary for performance of its under- 
takings hereunder; Provided, That, when the Contractor furnishes articles 
customarily produced or assembled in the regular course of its business, 
it shall be reimbursed therefor at fair and reasonable prices not in excess 
of the lower of (i) those usually charged by the trade for such articles or 
(ii) the lowest net prices charged by it therefor at the time to any 

(4) Overhead. An allowance for overhead costs not otherwise reimbursable 
hereunder in an amount equal to per cent ( ) of the total 
salaries and wages (but not taxes) reimbursable under subparagraphs 
(i) and (2) hereof; 

(5) Communication and Shipping. Expenditures by the Contractor necessary 
for performance of its undertakings hereunder for long distance telephone 
calls, telegrams, cablegrams, radiograms, postage, freight, express, and 

(6) Travel. Expenditures by the Contractor necessary for performance of its 
undertakings hereunder for the transportation expenses of persons directly 
engaged therein, plus reasonable actual subsistence expenses, in an amount 
not exceeding ten dollars ($10.00) per person per day, of such persons 


incurred during periods of travel or, at the Contractor's option, an allow- 
ance, in lieu of actual subsistence expenses of such persons, not exceeding 
(i) six dollars ($6.00) per person for each calendar day or major fraction 
thereof during the period of travel within the continental limits of the 
United States, and (ii) seven dollars ($7.00) per person for each calendar 
day or major fraction thereof during the period of foreign travel outside 
the continental limits of the United States; Provided, That all such 
foreign travel shall be limited to persons directly engaged in the per- 
formance of the subject work hereunder and shall be authorized or ap- 
proved in writing by the Contracting Officer; Provided, further, That 
expenses for transportation hereunder by motor vehicle other than com- 
mon carrier or rented automobile shall be reimbursed on a reasonable 
actual expense basis or, at the Contractor's option, on a mileage basis at a 
rate not exceeding five cents (5^) per mile per vehicle, in lieu of the 
actual expenses of such transportation; 

(7) Insurance. Expenditures by the Contractor hereunder for premiums on 
(i) insurance required by law, and (ii) insurance required or specifically 
approved by the Contracting Officer; 

(8) Subcontracts. Expenditures by the Contractor representing payments to 
subcontractors performing any research or development hereunder; 

(9) Real Property. Expenditures by the Contractor hereunder for leasing, 
purchasing, or otherwise acquiring real property or altering or construct- 
ing buildings; 

(10) Termination. Expenditures by the Contractor in connection with an ac- 
celeration of termination of the subject work; 

(11) Special Costs. Special expenditures by the Contractor which are specifically 
certified by the Contracting Officer in writing to constitute part of the 
"actual cost" of its undertakings hereunder. 

(e) Advance Payments. If the Contractor requests in writing that an advance 
payment be made on account of reimbursable "actual cost," the Government shall 
advance the amount estimated by the Contractor and concurred in by the Con- 
tracting Officer as the probable "actual cost" during any calendar month for 
which no payment has previously been made; Provided, That the Contracting 
Officer may in his discretion withhold approval of any such advance payment to 
protect the interests of the Government; Provided, further, That in case of such 
advance payment, the Contractor shall submit vouchers for its "actual cost" during 
the month for which such advance is made and an accounting for the full amount 
of such advance before the end of the following month, and shall return to the 
Government, when and if requested by the Contracting Officer, the portion of 
such advance for which vouchers have not been so submitted, without prejudice 
to the right of the Contractor to obtain reimbursement payments for "actual cost" 
upon the later submission of vouchers. 

ARTICLE 3. (a) Disposition of Personal Property. At any time prior or subse- 
quent to the termination of the subject work, the Contractor shall deliver at the 
Government's expense, when and as directed by the Contracdng Officer, all or any 
part of materials, supplies, apparatus, equipment or other articles of personal 


property not theretofore expended or delivered hereunder which have been 
furnished by the Government or for the cost of which the Contractor has been 
reimbursed or has the right to claim reimbursement hereunder; Provided, That, 
upon the termination of the subject work, the Contractor shall have the right to 
retain any such property other than (i) that furnished by the Government and 
(ii) articles acquired for administrative purposes, unless notified by the Con- 
tracting Officer that the further prosecution of the war renders such action in- 
advisable, by returning to the Government such sum of money as the Contracting 
Officer may determine to be fair and proper. 

(b) Disposition of Premises Altered or Constructed. After the termination of 
the subject work, the Contractor shall elect, with respect to premises upon which 
any alteration or construction has been done hereunder, whether (i) to retain 
the benefit of such construction or alteration, in which case the Contractor shall 
return to or credit the Government with the portion of the reimbursement by the 
Government for its expenditure therefor determined by negotiation between the 
Contractor and the Contracting Officer to be fair and proper, or (ii) to have such 
premises restored to substantially the same condition as prior to such alteration or 
construction, in which case it shall retain all such reimbursement and the Gov- 
ernment shall pay the net cost of such restoration. The Contractor shall furnish 
on request all information deemed relevant by the Contracting Officer. 

(c) Accountability for Property. Within one hundred twenty (120) days after 
the termination of the subject work, the Contractor shall render an accounting, in 
accordance with the instructions of the Contracting Officer, of all property the 
disposition of which is governed by this Article. 

ARTICLE 4. (a) Responsibility of Contractor. The Contractor shall be re- 
sponsible to the Government for loss of or damage to materials, supplies, apparatus, 
equipment and any other property, real or personal, the disposition of which is 
governed hereby, only if and so far as attributable to the wilful misconduct or lack 
of good faith of an officer of the Contractor or of any other person having com- 
plete or substantially complete charge of the establishment where any under- 
taking hereunder by the Contractor is performed. 

(b) Insurance. The Contractor shall maintain insurance in such forms and 
amounts and for such periods of time as the Contracting Officer may require or 

(c) Indemnity Clause. The Government shall indemnify the Contractor, from 
such funds as may be hereafter appropriated by Congress for such purpose, 
against loss or damage to persons or property arising from performance of its 
undertakings hereunder (including settlements made with the written consent of 
the Contracting Officer) not compensated for by insurance or otherwise, in 
amounts found and certified by the Contracting Officer to be just and reasonable; 
Provided, That the Contractor shall give the Contracting Officer prompt notice 
of the institution of, and permit the Contracting Officer at his election to control 
the defense of, all law suits instituted against the Contractor with respect to any 
such alleged loss or damage. 

ARTICLE 5. Patent Provisions. [Long Form] (a) The Contractor hereby grants 
to the Government of the United States an irrevocable option to purchase a non- 


exclusive license or licenses, subject to the payment of royalties, to make, have 
made, and use, for military, naval, and national defense purposes, and to sell in 
accordance with law, material, and to use processes, under all United States 
patents and applications for patents owned or controlled by the Contractor cover- 
ing inventions heretofore developed and actually or constructively reduced to 
practice and concerned with the subject work. Any such license shall be granted 
upon reasonable terms subject to negotiation at the time the Government may 
desire to exercise its option hereunder. 

(b) The Contractor shall and does hereby, in consideration of the premises and 
in consideration of payments to be made by the Government under this contract, 
grant unto the Government a non-exclusive, irrevocable, royalty-free license, to 
make, have made, and use, for military, naval, and national defense purposes, 
and to sell or otherwise dispose of in accordance with law, material, and to use 
processes, under all inventions made in carrying out the subject work, including 
all inventions [exclusive of inventions covered by paragraph (a)] which for the 
first time were actually or constructively reduced to practice as a result of the 
subject work, whether patented or unpatented. The Contractor shall make to the 
Government, prior to the final settlement under this contract, a complete dis- 
closure of all inventions made in carrying out the subject work and shall designate 
in writing which of the said inventions have been or will be covered by applica- 
tions for patents filed or caused to be filed by the Contractor. The Contractor shall 
have the right, upon notification by the Government, to elect whether it or the 
Government shall file applications for patents on inventions in addition to those 
designated by the Contractor as aforesaid. 

(c) As to all such inventions that are not covered by applications for patents 
as specified in paragraph (b) the Government shall have the right, at the Gov- 
ernment's expense, to file, prosecute, and act upon applications for patents thereon, 
and the Contractor shall secure the execution of the necessary papers and do all 
things requisite to protect the Government's interest in prosecuting such applica- 
tions to a final issue. When an application for patent is filed by the Government 
as aforesaid, all right, title, and interest in and under the patent shall be assigned 
to the Government by the Contractor except that the Contractor may retain a 
non-exclusive license non-transferable except to an assignee of the entire business 
to which said license is appurtenant. 

(d) The Contractor covenants that it has not entered into and will not enter 
into any arrangement to evade the intent of this Article for the Government to 
obtain without further payment a non-exclusive license to patents, applications for 
patents and inventions as called for in paragraph (b) above. 

(e) The execution of this contract shall not constitute a waiver of any rights 
the Government may have under patents or applications for patents. 

ARTICLE 5. Patent Provisions. [Short Form] Whenever any patentable dis- 
covery or invention is made by the Contractor or its employees in the course of 
the subject work, the Contracting Officer shall have the sole power to determine 
whether or not a patent application shall be filed, and to determine the disposi- 
tion of the tide to and the rights under any application or patent that may result. 
The judgment of the Contracting Officer on such matters shall be accepted as 


final, and the Contractor, for itself and for its employees, agrees that the inventor 
or inventors will execute all documents and do all things necessary or proper to 
carry out the judgment of the Contracting Officer. The Contractor shall include 
the provisions of this Article in all contracts of employment with persons who do 
any part of the subject work. 

ARTICLE 6. Security Provisions, (a) During the continuance of the present 
unlimited National Emergency, the Contractor shall not disclose any information 
concerning this contract or obtained as a result of the performance of its under- 
takings hereunder to any person, except employees assigned to such work, with- 
out the written consent of the Contracting Officer or the Scientific Officer. Subse- 
quent to the termination of such Emergency, disclosure of such information shall 
be governed by the applicable laws and regulations governing the disclosure of 
classified information. Disclosure of information concerning this contract or such 
work to any person not entitled to receive it, or failure to safeguard all such 
classified matters within the Contractor's control, may subject the Contractor, its 
employees and subcontractors to criminal liability under the laws of the United 
States, including (i) 50 U.S.C. Chap. 4, (ii) 50 U.S.C. 45-45d, as supplemented by 
Executive Order 8381, dated March 22, 1940, and (iii) 35 U.S.C, 42c. 

(b) The Contractor shall immediately submit a confidential report to the 
Contracting Officer whenever for any cause it has reason to believe that there is 
an active danger of espionage or sabotage affecting any of the subject work. 

(c) The Contractor shall not employ any alien on or permit any alien to have 
access to the subject work or any plans, specifications or records relating to its 
undertakings hereunder without the written consent of the Contracting Officer 
as to each such alien. 

(d) The Contractor, whenever requested by the Contracting Officer or the 
Scientific Officer, shall report to the Contracting Officer the citizenship, country 
of birth or alien status of any or all of its employees at the site of or having access 
to any of the subject work. 

(e) The Contractor shall not employ or continue to employ on, and shall ex- 
clude from the site of, any of the subject work any person or persons designated 
in writing by the Contracting Officer or the Scientific Officer for cause as undesir- 
able to have access to such work. 

ARTICLE 7. Public Policy Provisions, (a) The Contractor warrants that it 
has not employed any person to solicit or secure this contract upon any agreement 
for a commission, percentage, brokerage or contingent fee. Breach of this war- 
ranty shall give the Government the right to annul the contract or, in its discretion, 
to deduct from the contract price or consideration the amount of such com- 
mission, percentage, brokerage or contingent fee. This warranty shall not apply to 
commissions payable by the Contractor upon contracts or sales secured or made 
through bona fide established commercial or selling agencies maintained by the 
Contractor for the purpose of securing business. 

(b) No Member of or Delegate to Congress, or Resident Commissioner, shall 
be admitted to any share or part of this contract or any benefit that may arise 
therefrom, but this provision shall not be construed to extend to this contract if 
made with a corporation for its general benefit. 


(c) The Contractor shall not discriminate in any act performed hereunder 
against any person on the ground of race, creed, color or national origin, and 
shall include such provision in each subcontract. 

(d) In the performance of its undertakings hereunder, the Contractor shall 
comply with policies, directives, and regulations prescribed under Executive Order 
No. 9301, "Establishing a Minimum Wartime Workweek of Forty-Eight Hours," 
and with the minimum workweek prescribed in said Executive Order as and 
when applicable under such policies, directives, and regulations; and shall include 
such provision in each subcontract. 

ARTICLE 8. Eight Hour Law. The Contractor shall compensate laborers and 
mechanics for all hours worked by them hereunder in excess of eight (8) hours in 
any one calendar day at a rate of not less than one and one-half {iVi) times the 
basic rate of pay of such laborers and mechanics, and shall include such provision 
in each subcontract. For each violation of the requirements of this Article a 
penalty of five dollars ($5.00) shall be imposed upon the Contractor or sub- 
contractor for each laborer or mechanic for each calendar day in which such 
employee is required or permitted to work hereunder more than eight (8) hours 
without receiving such additional compensation, and all penalties thus imposed 
shall be withheld for the use and benefit of the Government. 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Government and the Contractor have caused 
this contract to be signed and sealed, intending to be legally bound thereby. 



Executive Secretary, Office of 

Scientific Research and Development 

(Contracting Officer) 



Standard Form 1002. 

Contract No. 
Symbol No. 


, effective as of the day of , between THE UNITED 

STATES OF AMERICA (hereinafter called "the Government"), represented by 
the Executive Secretary (hereinafter called "the Contracting Officer"), Office of 
Scientific Research and Development in the Office for Emergency Management, 
Executive Office of the President, and 

(hereinafter called "the Vendor"). 

WHEREAS, the Vendor maintains and operates manufacturing facilities, and 
the Government desires to purchase certain articles to be manufactured experi- 
mentally for the Office of Scientific Research and Development in performing its 


ARTICLE I. Definitions. "Contracting Officer" refers to the present Contract- 
ing Officer and his successors in office. "An authorized representative" can act 
hereunder only in the limited respects and to the extent specified in provisions 
of this agreement wherein the term "authorized representative" is specifically 
used. "Authorized representative" refers to any person designated as such by the 
Contracting Officer, who initially so designates: 

ARTICLE 2. (a) Subject Articles. The Vendor shall manufacture and sell, and 
the Government shall purchase, the following articles (hereinafter called "the 
subject articles") to be manufactured in accordance with the specifications and 
instructions of the Contracting Officer or an authorized representative: 

(b) Delivery and Acceptance. The Vendor shall deliver the subject articles, 
transportation paid, as directed by the Contracting Officer or an authorized repre- 
sentative, on or before or such later date as may be 
authorized in writing by the Contracting Officer and agreed to by the Vendor. 
The Contracting Officer or an authorized representative shall accept each of the 
subject articles on behalf of the Government if he determines that it has been 
manufactured pursuant to the specifications and instructions therefor. 

ARTICLE 3. (a) Purchase Price. After said delivery and acceptance, the Gov- 
ernment shall pay the Vendor for manufacturing and supplying the subject 
articles, upon the submission of public vouchers supplied by the Government and 
approved by the Contracting Officer, the following price (hereinafter called "the 
purchase price") : 


[Alternative Purchase Price Readjustment Provisions] 

I. [For use in cases wherein there is to be no profit] 

(b) Basis for Readjustment. The Vendor represents that the purchase price (i) 
w^as computed by estimating the cost of manufacturing and supplying the subject 
articles and (ii) includes no profit. Subsequent to final delivery and prior to final 
payment hereunder, the Vendor shall submit to the Contracting Officer a state- 
ment, itemized and substantiated as required by the Contracting Officer, of its 
actual costs hereunder as determined by an accounting method consistent with 
the principles approved in the War Department-Navy Department booklet en- 
titled "Explanation of Principles for Determination of Costs under Government 
Contracts." The Vendor shall also preserve its records and accounts for a period 
of four years from the date of final delivery for any audit deemed necessary by 
the Government. 

(c) Adjustment Downward. If upon the basis of such statement or any such 
audit the Contracting Officer determines that said actual costs have been less than 
the purchase price, (i) the purchase price shall be reduced to the amount of said 
actual costs and (ii) the Vendor shall return to the Government any payments 
in excess of said actual costs. 

(d) Cost Escape. Notwithstanding any other provision hereof, when and if 
said actual costs incurred or obligated in manufacturing or supplying the subject 
articles equal the purchase price, the Vendor shall not be required to incur or 
obligate further said actual costs hereunder unless and until the Government shall 
first agree in writing to an appropriate increase in the purchase price. 

II. [For use in cases wherein a profit is to be provided] 

(b) Basis for Readjustment. The Vendor represents that the purchase price is 
the sum of (i) the total estimated cost of the subject articles in the amount of 

dollars ($ ) plus (ii) a fixed profit of dollars ($ ), 

an amount equal to per cent ( %)* of said total estimated cost. Subse- 

quent to final delivery and prior to final payment hereunder, the Vendor shall 
submit to the Contracting Officer a statement, itemized and substantiated as re- 
quired by the Contracting Officer, of its actual costs hereunder as determined by 
an accounting method consistent with the principles approved in the War Depart- 
ment-Navy Department booklet entided "Explanation of Principles for Deter- 
mination of Costs under Government Contracts." The Vendor shall also preserve 
its records and accounts for a period of four years from the date of final delivery 
for any audit deemed necessary by the Government. 

(c) Adjustment Downward. If upon the basis of any such statement or any 
such audit the Contracting Officer determines that the Vendor's actual profits 
hereunder have exceeded said fixed profit of dollars ($ ), (i) the 
purchase price shall be reduced to an amount equal to the sum of said actual 
costs plus said fixed profit and (ii) the Vendor shall return to the Government 
any payment in excess of said amount. 

(d) Cost Escape. Notwithstanding any other provision hereof, when and if 

* Never to exceed seven per cent (7%) of said total estimated cost, exclusive of the 
fixed profit. 


said actual costs incurred or obligated in manufacturing and supplying the subject 
articles, plus said fixed profit, equal the purchase price, the Vendor shall not be 
required to incur or obligate further said actual costs hereunder unless and until 
the Government shall first agree in writing to an appropriate increase in the pur- 
chase price, but shall fulfill its obligations hereunder by delivering the subject 
articles in the degree of completion at that time. 

ARTICLE 4. Accelerated Termination. At any time prior to final delivery, the 
Contracting Officer may terminate the work hereunder by giving to the Vendor 
seven (7) days' notice in writing. Upon receipt of such notice, the Vendor shall 
exercise all reasonable diligence to obtain the cancellation of its outstanding com- 
mitments hereunder. If such termination causes a material decrease in the amount 
or character of the work hereunder, or in the time required for its performance, 
an equitable adjustment in the amount of the purchase price shall be made, and 
such equitable adjustment shall include an amount reflecting ** all reasonable 
cancellation charges and all reasonable losses upon outstanding commitments 
which the Vendor is unable to cancel. If the parties fail to agree upon such adjust- 
ment, the dispute shall be determined as provided in Article 13; Provided, That 
the Government shall nevertheless pay the Vendor any undisputed balance due 
it hereunder. 

ARTICLE 5. Subcontracts. No subcontract executed hereunder shall provide 
for (i) payment on a cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost basis or (ii) the payment of a 
fixed fee in excess of seven per centum of the estimated cost of the subcontract, 
exclusive of the fee. The Vendor shall not enter into subcontracts involving any 
research or development in connection with the subject articles without obtaining 
the written approval of the Contracting Officer as to the substance and form 
thereof. The Vendor shall refer each prospective subcontract that might involve 
such research or development to the Contracting Officer or an authorized repre- 
sentative, who shall determine whether or not such research or development is 

ARTICLE 6. Default of the Vendor. In the event of the Vendor's default, the 
Government may procure the subject articles from other sources and charge to 
the Vendor any excess cost occasioned the Government thereby, except where such 
delay is due to unforeseeable causes beyond the control and without the fault or 
negligence of the Vendor. If public necessity requires the use of subject articles 
whose rejection would be justified, payment therefor shall be made at an equita- 
ble reduction in the purchase price. 

ARTICLE 7. Purchase of Facilities. [For use only in relevant cases.] 
In addition to paying the purchase price, the Government shall reimburse the 
Vendor, upon the submission of public vouchers supplied by the Government and 
approved by the Contracting Officer, for the actual cost to the Vendor in an 
amount not exceeding dollars ($ ) of necessary equipment or 

facilities especially acquired for the manufacture of the subject articles. The 
Vendor represents that the purchase price includes no charge for the acquisition 
or depreciation of any equipment or facilities for the cost of which reimburse- 

** For profit contracts insert "a reasonable profit." 


ment will be claimed hereunder. Title to such equipment or facilities will vest in 
the Government upon delivery thereof to the Vendor; Provided, That, subsequent 
to the delivery and acceptance of the subject articles, the Vendor shall have the 
right to purchase any such equipment or facilities, unless notified by the Con- 
tracting Officer that the further prosecution of the war would render such action 
inadvisable, by paying the Government such sum of money as the Contracting 
Officer may determine to be fair and proper, 

ARTICLE 8. Responsibility of Vendor: The Vendor shall be responsible to the 
Government for loss of or damage to (i) the subject articles prior to their delivery 
and acceptance and (ii) equipment or facilities for the cost of which reimburse- 
ment has been or will be claimed hereunder, only if and so far as attributable to 
the wilful misconduct or lack of good faith of an officer of the Vendor or of any 
other person having complete or substantially complete charge of the establish- 
ment wherein the work hereunder is performed by the Vendor. The Vendor rep- 
resents that the purchase price includes no charge for any insurance on such 

ARTICLE 9. Patent Provisions, (a) The Vendor hereby grants to the Govern- 
ment of the United States an irrevocable option to purchase a non-exclusive license 
or licenses, subject to the payment of royalties, to make, have made, and use, for 
military, naval, and national defense purposes, and to sell in accordance with law, 
material, and to use processes, under all United States patents and applications for 
patents owned or controlled by the Vendor covering inventions heretofore devel- 
oped and actually or constructively reduced to practice and concerned with the 
work hereunder. Any such license shall be granted upon reasonable terms subject 
to negotiation at the time the Government may desire to exercise its option 

(b) The Vendor shall and does hereby, in consideration of the premises and 
in consideration of payments to be made by the Government under this agree- 
ment, grant unto the Government a non-exclusive, irrevocable, royalty-free license, 
to make, have made, and use, for military, naval, and national defense purposes, 
and to sell or otherwise dispose of in accordance with law, material, and to use 
processes, under all inventions made in carrying out the work hereunder, in- 
cluding all inventions [exclusive of inventions covered by paragraph (a)] which 
for the first time were actually or constructively reduced to practice as a result of 
the work hereunder, whether patented or unpatented. The Vendor shall make 
to the Government, prior to the final settlement under this agreement, a com- 
plete disclosure of all inventions made in carrying out the work hereunder and 
shall designate in writing which of the said inventions have been or will be 
covered by applications for patents filed or caused to be filed by the Vendor. The 
Vendor shall have the right, upon notification by the Government, to elect 
whether it or the Government shall file applications for patents on inventions in 
addition to those designated by the Vendor as aforesaid. 

(c) As to all such inventions that are not covered by applications for patents 
as specified in paragraph (b) the Government shall have the right, at the Gov- 
ernment's expense, to file, prosecute, and act upon applications for patents thereon, 
and the Vendor shall secure the execution of the necessary papers and do all 


things requisite to protect the Government's interest in prosecuting such appUca- 
tions to a final issue. When an appHcation for patent is filed by the Government 
as aforesaid, all right, title and interest in and under the patent shall be assigned 
to the Government by the Vendor except that the Vendor may retain a non- 
exclusive license non-transferable except to an assignee of the entire business to 
which said license is appurtenant. 

(d) The Vendor covenants that it has not entered into and will not enter into 
any arrangement to evade the intent of this Article for the Government to obtain 
without further payment a non-exclusive license to patents, applications for patents 
and inventions as called for in paragraph (b) above. 

(e) The execution of this agreement shall not constitute a waiver of any rights 
the Government may have under patents or applications for patents. 

ARTICLE 10. Security Provisions, (a) During the continuance of the present 
unlimited National Emergency, the Vendor shall not disclose any information 
concerning this agreement or obtained as a result of the performance of the work 
hereunder to any person, except employees assigned to such work, without the 
written consent of the Contracting Officer or an authorized representative. Subse- 
quent to the termination of such Emergency, disclosure of such information shall 
be governed by the applicable laws and regulations governing the disclosure of 
classified information. Disclosure of information concerning this agreement or 
such work to any person not entitled to receive it, or failure to safeguard all such 
classified matters within the Vendor's control, may subject the Vendor, its em- 
ployees and subcontractors to criminal liability under the laws of the United 
States, including (i) 50 U.S.C. Chap. 4, (ii) 50 U.S.C. 45-45d, as supplemented by 
Executive Order 8381, dated March 22, 1940, and (iii) 35 U.S.C, 42c. 

(b) The Vendor shall immediately submit a confidential report to the Contract- 
ing Officer whenever for any cause it has reason to believe that there is an active 
danger of espionage or sabotage affecting any of the work hereunder. 

(c) The Vendor shall not employ any alien on or permit any alien to have 
access to the work hereunder or any plans, specifications or records relating to 
its undertakings hereunder without the written consent of the Contracting Officer 
as to each such alien. 

(d) The Vendor, whenever requested by the Contracting Officer or an author- 
ized representative, shall report to the Contracting Officer the citizenship, country 
of birth or alien status of any or all of its employees at the site of or having 
access to any of the work hereunder. 

(e) The Vendor shall not employ or continue to employ on, and shall exclude 
from the site of, any of the work hereunder any person or persons designated in 
writing by the Contracting Officer or an authorized representative for cause as 
undesirable to have access to such work. 

ARTICLE II. Public Policy Provisions, (a) The Vendor warrants that it has 
not employed any person to solicit or secure this agreement upon any agreement 
for a commission, percentage, brokerage or contingent fee. Breach of this war- 
ranty shall give the Government the right to annul this agreement or, in its dis- 
cretion, to deduct from the purchase price the amount of such commission, per- 
centage, brokerage or contingent fee. This warranty shall not apply to commis- 


sions payable by the Vendor upon contracts or sales secured or made through 
bona fide established commercial or selling agencies maintained by the Vendor 
for the purpose of securing business. 

(b) No Member of or Delegate to Congress, or Resident Commissioner, shall 
be admitted to any share or part of this agreement or any benefit that may arise 
therefrom, but this provision shall not be construed to extend to this agreement if 
made with a corporation for its general benefit. 

(c) The Vendor shall not discriminate in any act performed hereunder against 
any person on the ground of race, creed, color or national origin, and shall include 
such provision in each subcontract. 

(d) In the performance of its undertakings hereunder, the Vendor shall com- 
ply with poHcies, directives, and regulations prescribed under Executive Order 
No. 9301, "Establishing a Minimum Wartime Workweek of Forty-Eight Hours," 
and with the minimum workweek prescribed in said Executive Order as and 
when applicable under such policies, directives, and regulations; and shall in- 
clude such provision in each subcontract. 

ARTICLE 12. WALSH-HEALY ACT Provision. The representations and 
stipulations required by Section i of the Act of June 30, 1936 (Walsh-Healy Act, 
Public Law No. 846, 74th Congress) to be included in all contracts therein 
specified are hereby incorporated and made a part of this agreement with the 
same force and effect as if fully set forth herein. 

ARTICLE 13. Disputes. All disputes concerning questions of fact arising here- 
under shall be decided by the Contracting Officer, subject to written appeal by the 
Vendor within thirty (30) days to the Director of the Office of Scientific Research 
and Development or his duly authorized representative. 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Government and the Vendor have caused this 
agreement to be signed and sealed, intending to be legally bound thereby. 



Executive Secretary, Office of 

Scientific Research and Development 

(Contracting Officer) 





Adams, L. H., 54, 68, 84 

Adams, Roger, 10, 38, 42, 52, 54, 56, 60, 

Adkins, Homer, 54-55 
Akin, Major General Spencer B., 141 
Alexander, Colonel William, 141 
Allen, H. B., 84 
Andrus, E. Cowles, 111-112 
Archambault, Bennett, 170 
Aydelotte, Frank, 256, 259 

Bailey, George W., 69, 256, 258, 267 

Barker, E. Tefft, 43, 186 

Barnes, Colonel Gladeon M., 153 

Barton, Henry A., 125, 256 

Bass, L. W., 69, 71 

Bassett, P. R., 88 

Baxter, G. P., 54 

Baxter, James Phinney, 3rd, 79, 290, 294 

Bay, Emmet B., 112 

Beckler, David Z., 173 

Bemis, A. C, 12 

Blackistone, Mrs. Shirley, 183 

Bleakney, Walker, 85 

Booth, R. D., 11-12 

Borden, Brigadier General William A., 
46, 139, 303, 305 

Bowen, Rear Admiral Harold G., 7, 9, 52 

Bowen, Colonel W. S., 69 

Bowker, Roy C, 43, 234 

Bowman, Isaiah, 296 

Boyce, Joseph C, 68, 87 

Bragg, H. E., 94 

Bray, Charles W., 68, 71, 95 

Briggs, Lyman J., 9, 12, 57, 120-122 

Brode, Wallace R., 178 

Bronk, Detlev W., 112 

Brown, Charles P., 186 

Brown, Colonel W. G., 139 

Buckley, Oliver E., 86 

Bundy, Harvey H., 46, 48, 300 

Burchard, John E., 10, 85, 129, 286, 290- 

Burlew, John S., 295 

Burrows, C. R., 96 

Bush, Vannevar, Joint Development and 
Research Board (JDRB), 50; Joint Com- 
mittee on New Weapons (JNW), 47, 
49-50; National Advisory Committee 
on Aeronautics (NACA), 49; National 
Defense Research Committee (NDRC) : 
organization, 4, 6-9, 24, 26, 31-32, 35, 
reorganization of divisions, 61-62, 65, 

Executive Office, 69-70, Chairman's 
Office, 72, Engineering and Transition 
Office, 74-75, atomic energy project, 
120— 121, liaison with allies, 168, scien- 
tific manpower, 260, demobilization, 
299; Office of Scientific Research and 
Development (OSRD): Director, 38, 
44—46, 49-51, Committee on Medical 
Research (CMR), 98, 100, 107, 109, 
atomic energy project, 120-121, 123, 
230-231, proximity fuzes, 124, sensory 
devices, 125, Office of Field Service 
(OFS), 129, 141-142, 145, 150, patent 
program, 175, 225-226, 230-231, liaison 
with allies, 180, contracts, 66, 197, 204, 
209, 216, scientific manpower, 256-257, 
262, 264-265, 273, 275, voluntary serv- 
ices, 278-280, 282, public relations, 
285, 288-290, 292-296, demobilization, 
Byrd, Senator Harry P., 304 

Calcott, W. S., 55 

Caldon, Barbara E., 172 

Caldwell, Samuel H., 88, 159 

Garden, George A., Jr., 113, 115 

Carll, Mary L., 172 

Carlson, A. J., 125 

Carmichael, Leonard, 265 

Cathcart, Frances, 186 

Chadwell, Harris M,, 69, 71, 90, 95, 291, 

Chalkley, Lyman, 45 

Clark, A, B., 91 

Clark, W. M., 115 

Clarke, Hans T., 107 

Coe, Conway P., 7, 12, 52, 221-222, 224 

Colpitts, E. H., 87 

Compton, A. H., 122 

Compton, Karl T., National Defense Re- 
search Committee (NDRC), 4, 7, 12, 21, 
25-26, 42, 52, 60, 176, 275, 278, 285; 
Office of Field Service (OFS), 43, 129, 
137, 142, 148-149, 290 

Conant, James B., National Defense Re- 
search Committee (NDRC) : co-founder, 
4, 7, 21-22, 26; Chairman of Division A, 
10; Chairman, 38, 41, 46, 49, 52, 58, 
60-62, 65, 68-70, 72-74, 142, 208, 278, 
309; London Mission, 34, 168-170; 
atomic energy program, 1 21-123; scien- 
tific manpower, 262, 273; public rela- 


tions, 285, 290, 295; demobilization, 

299. 315 
Condit, K. H., 68 
Connor, John T., 186, 193 
Connor, Ralph A., 54-55, 88 
Cooper, Franklin S., 42, 171 
Corcoran, Mrs. Virginia, 186 
Corner, George W., 125 
Covington, Cecil L., 199 
Cowles, Hope, 184 
Cox, Oscar S., 13, 186, 191, 280 
Coy, Wayne, 280 

Cruikshank, Cary G., 43, 200, 206, 211 
Culpin, Mrs. Dorothy D., 173 
Curme, G. O., Jr., 10, 56 

Darwin, Sir Charles, 170 

Davidson, W. F., 43, 69, 71-72, 312 

Davis, G. H. B., 11, 55-56 

Davis, Lieutenant Colonel Loyal, 117 

Dellinger, J. H., 91 

Demon, Sandy X., 258 

Denson, Colonel Lee A., Jr., 52 

Deutsch, M. R., 200 

Dochez, Alphonse R., 98, 115 

Drinker, C. K., 56 

Dryden, H. L., 86 

DuBois, E. F., II, 55 

Duffendack, O. S., 93 

Dunham, Theodore, Jr., 93 

Durand, W. F., 90 

Dyer, Rolla E., 98, 314 

Eason, Mrs. Pauline, 199 

Eastham, Melville, 57, 92 

Eaton, William W., 171 

Eckhardt, E. A., 94 

Edwards, W. F., 200, 2 10-2 11 

Eisenhart, Dean L. P., 287 

Elderfield, R. C, 54 

Elgin, J. C, II 

Ellett, Alexander, 10, 86 

Embrey, Lee Anna, 183-184 

Esselen, Gustave J., 69, 97 

Farinholt, L. H., 68, 292, 295 
Paris, Marvin L., 234 
Faymonville, Colonel Philip R., 52, 154 
Fenn, Wallace O., 125 
Ferrebee, Joseph W., 116 
Fletcher, Harvey, 12, 94 
Florey, Howard W., 105, 117 
Foote, P. D., 69 
Ford, Horace S., 209 
Forsythe, W. E., 93 
Fowler, R. H., 168 
Fry, Thornton C, 88, 95 
Purer, Rear Admiral Julius A., 46, 52, 
152, 300, 303-305 


Gasser, H. S., 55 

Getting, L A., 88 

Gibson, R. E., 85 

Giggal, Mrs. Frances F., 172 

Gilbert, Walter M., 32 

Gordon, F. S., 74-76 

Gosline, Winifred, 295 

Gould, Wendell O., 69 

Graveler, Lucille, 183 

Greene, Mrs. Lillian M., 200 

Gregg, Alan, 209 

Grondahl, L. O., 86 

Groves, Major General Leslie R., 49, 123, 

Guild, Stacey R., 125 

Hammett, L. p., 54 

Hanes, Frederick M., 115 

Hardy, A. C, 57, 93 

Harrison, George R., 12, 93-94, 129, 137 

Harrison, Ross, 44 

Haskins, Caryl P., 42, 69, 72, 171 

Hastings, A. Baird, 98, 117, 126 

Hazen, Harold L., 87, 159 

Henry, Major General Stephen G., 139 

Herrmann, Albert M., 186 

Hickman, C. N., 10, 85 

Hildebrand, J. H., 69 

Hillman, Colonel Charles C, 100 

Hogan, John V. L., 42, 69, 72, 257-258, 

265, 267 
Hoover, C. R., 11 
Hottel, H. C, 90 
Hougen, O. A., 11 

Hovde, Frederick L., 69, 71, 85, 168-170 
Hunsaker, Jerome C, 46, 48, 87 
Hunter, W. S., 95 

Irvine, Colonel Michael M., 52 
Iselin, C. O'D., 56 
Ives, H. E., 56, 90, 93 

Jackson, John E., 69, 71 

Jaques, Lola, 183 

Jenks, Colonel Glenn P., 161 

Jessup, Walter A., 209 

Jewett, Frank B., National Academy of 

Sciences, 4-6, 14, 21, 31-32, 44, 121; 

National Defense Research Committee 

(NDRC), 7, II, 21-22, 42, 52, 59, 60- 

61, 71, 273, 278 
Johnson, J. R., 88 
Johnson, W. C, 10, 55 
JoUiffe, C. B., II, 91 
Jones, Loren P., 91 
Jones, Mary Lee, 269 
Jordan, Louis P., 69, 71 


Keeper, Chester S., io6 

Kelley, Louise, 292 

Kenney, General George C, 141 

Kilgore, Senator Harley, 320 

King, R. W., 69 

Kirner, Walter R., 89, 126 

Kistiakowsky, George B., lo-ii, 54, 88 

Klopsteg, Paul E., 93-94^ 129, 136-137 

Krueger, Lieutenant General Walter, 141 

Lashley, Karl S., 125 

Lauritsen, Charles C, 10, 85 

Lavender, Captain Robert A,, 186, 226, 

228, 231 
Lawrence, E. O., 122 
Letchfield, F. T., 69, 76 
Lewis, W. K., lo-ii, 56 
Little, D. G., 91 
Lockwood, John S., 112 
Loeb, R. F., 115 
Long, C. N. H., 112 
Long, Perrin H., 106 
Loomis, Alfred L., 12, 92 
Lucas, A. F. G., 69 

MacAdams, W, H., II 

MacArthur, General Douglas, 138, 140-142 

MacDougall, D. P., 54 

MacLeod, Colin, 112 

MacNeille, H. M., 178 

Madden, Miriam, 269 

Magee, Mrs. Mae R., 200 

Magnuson, Senator Warren, 320 

Marquat, Major General William F., 141 

Marshall, E. K., Jr., 115 

Marshall, General George C, 6 

Marshall, Lauriston C, 136 

Marshall, Major General Richard J., 141 

Marvel, C. S., 55, 115 

May, Mrs, Jean B., 187 

McLane, Saunders, 159 

McNutt, Paul v., 265 

Merker, Mrs. Ruth F., 173 

Mertz, Pierre, 86 

Midgley, T., 11, 56 

Moe, Henry Allen, 296 

Moore, J. Earle, 112 

Moore, J. H., 92 

Moore, Brigadier General R. C, 7, 52 

Moreland, Edward L., 60-61, 68-70, 72- 

74, 76, 142, 149, 308 
Morey, Lloyd W., 209 
Morse, Marston, 69 
Morse, Philip M., 57, 129 
Murphree, E. V., 121-122 
Murray, A. F., 69, 71 
Myers, Nerval F., 90 


Newman, James R., 312 

Norcross, Cleveland, 43, 181, 183, 290 

Noyes, W. A., Jr., 11, 55, 68, 89, 126 

O'Brien, Brian, 93 
Olive, William M., 172 
Ooms, Caspar W., 52 
Osborne, Colonel Ralph M., 154 

Paddock, Mrs. Louise, 172 

Palmer, W. W., 296 

Patterson, Robert P., 274-275 

Phillips, Brigadier General J. F., 139 

Pierce, W. C, 89 

Pilcher, Cobb, 112 

Pilkington, J. H., 69 

Poitras, E. J., 88 

Potter, Gordon V., 200 

Potter, R. K., 91 

Pratt, Haraden, 91 

Priest, C. A., 91 

Rabi, L L, 96 

Regnier, Brigadier General Eugene A., 52, 

Richards, Alfred N., 41, 46, 98, 105, 278, 

285, 290, 313-316 
Richards, Dickinson W., Jr., 112 
Richardson, Lieutenant General Robert C, 

Richmond, H. B., 86 
Richter, G. A., 11, 56, 95 
Rinehart, J., 68 
Roberts, W. B., 200 
Robertson, H. P., 178 
Rodebush, W. H., 10, 55 
Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 4, 6, 8, 

26, 34, 44, 49-50, 120, 123, 168, 230, 

295, 301 
Root, Elihu, Jr., 74-75, 209 
Routheau, Colonel Edward A., 52 
Rowe, Hartley, 11-12, 68, 90 
Ruebhausen, Oscar M., 43, 186 
Ruiz, A. L., 159 
Rushton, John R., 90 
Russell, John B., 159 
Russell, R. P., 56, 90 

Sanders, A. G., 117 

Schade, Commodore H. A., 46, 53 

Schauer, C. H., 77 

Scherer, Paul A., 15, 69, 72, 76-77 

Scott, Eugene W., 69, 85, 171 

Shannon, J. A., 115 

Shapley, Virginia, 69 

Sherwood, T, K., 56, 90 

Shimkin, Michael B., 117 

Shurcliff, William, 173 


Simmons, Brigadier General James Stevens, 

98, 100, 313, 315 
Simms, Margaret, 199 
Sklar, George, 200 
Smallwood, Charles, 32 
Smith, Rear Admiral Harold W., 98, 313 
Smith, Homer W., 55 
Smith, Captain Lybrand P., 52, 152 
Smyth, Henry De Wolf, 10, 123 
Snyder, John W., 312-313, 317 
Sole, John H., 69 
Somers, Brigadier General Richard H., 


Somervell, Major General Brehon B., 153 

South worth, Hamilton, 116 

Spencer, Hugh H., 86 

Sproul, Robert G., 262 

Stark, Admiral Harold R., 6 

Stein, I. M., 94 

Stephenson, Captain Charles S., 100 

Stephenson, H. K., 137 

Stern, Mrs. Esther, 184 

Stevenson, E. P., 55, 90 

Stewart, Duncan J., 87 

Stewart, Irvin, Committee on Medical Re- 
search (CMR), 44, 98, 181; National 
Defense Research Committee (NDRC), 
9, 31-32, 44, 181, 191; Office of 
Scientific Research and Development 
(OSRD), 41, 43-44, 53, 122, 181, 204, 
267, 286, 290, 312 

Stewart, R. B., 209 

Stimson, Henry L., 46 

Stock, C. Chester, 113 

Stoutenburgh, Colonel Paul P., 186, 226 

Stratton, J. A., 159 

Strong, Brigadier General George V., 7, 9 

Suits, C, G., 57, 92 

Sutherland, Lieutenant General R. K., 142 

Sutton, Loyd H., 222 

Tate, John T., 11-12, 54, 57, 85, 87, 129, 

Teeter, John H., 69 
Thomas, C. A., 88 
Thompson, Beverly, Jr., 186 
Thompson, Lewis R., 98 


Tizard, Sir Henry, 168 

Tolman, Richard C, 7, 10, 42, 49, 52-53, 

60, 123, 309 
Traver, Harold A., 172 
Trichel, Colonel Gervais W., 46 
Truman, President Harry S., 3 10-3 11 
Turner, Kenneth B., 113, 115-116 
Tutde, W. N., 69 
Tuve, Merle A., 10, 45, 124, 290 

Underhill, Robert M., 209 
Urey, H. C, 122 

Van Keuren, Rear Admiral A. H., 46, 53 
Van Vleck, J. H., 69 

Wagner, E. M., 77 

Wahl, Mrs. Louise, 183 

Waksman, S. A., 69 

Walker, E. M., iii 

Walsh, Mrs. Olga, 186 

Waterfall, Wallace, 291 

Waterman, Alan T., 57, 126, 129, 138, 141 

Waters, L. L., 116 

Wearn, Joseph T., 112, 126 

Weaver, Warren, 12, 88, 95 

Webster, W. L., 170 

Weed, Lewis H., 98 

Weeks, Dorothy W., 172 

Weith, A. J., 56 

Wensel, Harry T., 122 

White, A. E., II, 56 

Whitmore, F. C, 54-55 

Wilbur, Glenn, 187 

Williams, Clyde, 94 

Williams, Major General C. C, 52, 153 

Wilson, Carroll, 9, 41-42, 45, 168, 171, 

Wilson, Charles E., 319 
Wilson, E. Bright, Jr., 54, 85 
Winternitz, Milton C, 113, 126 
Wood, Brigadier General Walter A., Jr., 

52, 153 
Woodrow, R. J,, 76—77 

Yost, D. M., 55