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THE 


ORIGIN AND GROWTH 


OF 


foe) Ss LOGIC 


WITH AN ACCOUNT OF PLATO’S STYLE 


AND OF THE CHRONOLOGY OF HIS WRITINGS 


BY 


WINCENTY LUTOSLAWSKI 


REISSUE 


LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. 


89 PATEKNOSTER ROW, LONDON 
NEW YORK AND BOMBAY 


; 1905 


All rights reserved 


Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2009 


https://archive.org/details/origingrowthofplOOluto 


TO 


LEWIS CAMPBELL 


ON THE THIRTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF HIS 


‘INTRODUCTION TO THE SOPHISTES AND POLITICUS’ 


THIS WORK IS DEDICATED 
IN GRATEFUL REMEMBRANCE 


OF TRUE FRIENDSHIP AND KINDNESS 


1327093 





PREFACE 


——+—— 


In undertaking the investigations summarised in this 
volume, the author’s chief aim was to explain the origin 
of Logic by a psychological study of the first logician. 
This required a knowledge of the chronology of Plato’s 
writings, not supplied by our historical tradition nor by 
the extant Platonic investigations. English and French — 
scholars mostly believed this problem to be insoluble ; the 
prevalent opinion in Germany, represented by the suc- 
cessive editions of ,Zeller’s and Ueberweg’s handbooks on 
Greek philosophy, was plainly wrong. Under these cir- 
cumstances there was need of a new method in order to 
attain.a greater certainty as to the order in which Plato 
wrote his dialogues. The method here proposed improves 
the stylistic tests used heretofore by formulating the 
theoretical principles on which a new science of Stylo- 
metry should be based (pp. 145-161) and by applying 
~ these principles (pp. 162-193) to five hundred peculiari- 
ties of Plato’s style (observed in fifty-eight thousand 
cases) collected in the course of fifty years by some twenty 
authors working independently (pp. 74-139). his stylo- 
metric method, supplemented by many comparisons of 
the contents of Plato’s works (for instance, pp. 329, 333, 
366, 368, 372, 396, 430, 452, &c.), and by such observa~ 
tions and suggestions as were found available in the 


Vlll ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


Platonic literature of all countries, led the author to 
determine the chronological order of about twenty among 
the most important of the Platonic dialogues. 

On this basis an account of Plato’s logical theories 
and of their development is given here for the first time. 
It is ascertained that the theory of ideas, generally 
believed to be the unique form of Plato’s logic, was only 
a first attempt of the philosopher to settle the difficulties 
of the relation between Knowledge and Being ; and that, 
when past fifty, he produced a new logical system, in 
which he anticipated some conceptions of modern 
philosophy, arriving at the recognition of the substantial 
existence of the individual soul and substituting a 
classification of human notions for the intuition of 
divine ideas. 

This being a work of research, not a general hand- 
book, the reader need not expect a digest of literature. 
The authors chiefly quoted are those who were the first 
to make an important observation, or who have expressed 
more amply the author’s own views on some subject 
briefly treated here, or whose remarkable want of judgment, 
makes them instructive as examples to avoid. A full 
indication of the bibliography on any special question has 
nowhere been attempted except in Chapter III on Plato’s 
style. However, it has been sought to demonstrate the 
merits of some writers as yet insufficiently appreciated 
(for instance, pp. 83, 112, 352). As a Pole, the author 
may possibly be more impartial than the representatives of 
other nations more active in Platonic research. The works 
of British scholars are little known in Germany, and, on 
the other hand, many special German investigations are 
overlooked in France and Great Britain. Here the results 
obtained through unconscious international collaboration 
have been summed up and presented in a general outline, 


PREFACE 1x 


though without bibliographical completeness. The 
absence of alphabetical indices in the majority of works 
on Plato makes it hard to remember by whom a given 
observation was first made. These historical debts have 
been acknowledged in many instances, and wherever 
such an acknowledgment is missing, this should be 
attributed to defective memory. 

The peculiar method of research used in the. present 
work is a result of the author’s previous study of natural 
sciences and mathematics (1881-1885), and he feels much 
indebted to his teachers at the late German University of 
Dorpat!: Carl Schmidt, Arthur von Oettingen, Johannes 
Lemberg, Gustav Bunge, Wilhelm Ostwald, Andreas 
Lindstedt, and Jan Baudouin de Courtenay, all of whom 
in their lectures and also in private intercourse with their 
pupils insisted on exactness of method in scientific in- 
vestigation. His interest in Plato the author owes to 
Gustav Teichmiiller,? from whom however he now differs 
somewhat in his views on the method of Platonic research 
and on Plato’s philosophy (pp. 57-59, 102-103). 


1 To acknowledge this debt of gratitude is all the more a duty, as since 
the change of this German seat of learning into the Russian University of 
Jurjew all its most eminent professors have been obliged to resign, and 
Dorpat University is now but a historical reminiscence, dear to all its 
ancient pupils. 

? Under Teichmiiller’s influence the author wrote ten years ago his 
first work on Plato: Erhaltung und Untergang der Staatsverfassungen, 
nach Plato, Aristoteles und Machiavelli, Dorpat 1887 (Breslau 1888), 
wherein Plato’s views on political revolutions are shown to be the source of 
later theories on that subject. The chief contents of Chapter I of the 
present work have been more amply treated in the author’s Polish publica- 
tions: O Logice Platona, Part I, Krakéw 1891 and Part II, Warszawa 1892, 
condensed in the French Bulletin de l’ Académie des sciences de Cracovie, 
April 1890 and November 1891. Also Chapters V, VII and VIII rest chiefly 
on a Polish work of the author: O pierwszych trzech tetralogiach dziet 
Platona, published by the Académie des sciences de Cracovie, Cracow 
1896; condensed in the same Bulletin for October, November 1895, and 


in the Archiv filr Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. ix. pp. 67-114, October 
1895. 


x ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


The author feels deeply obliged to all who have helped 
him, and in the conviction that the collaboration of many 
is needed to bring full light to bear upon the difficult 
problems dealt with in this volume, he ventures to invite 
his readers also to assist him in his further studies on Plato 
by pointing out such errors or even formal deficiencies, 
however minute, as may be observed (address, care of 
Longmans, Green, and Co., 39 Paternoster Row, London). 


La CoruNa, SPAIN: 
October 1897. 


CoN EAN IPSs 





CHAPTER I 


PLATO AS A LOGICIAN (pp. 1-34) 


Progress of logic questioned, p. 1/-Mill against Platojand Kant, 2—Univer- 
sality and permanence of knowledge to be tested by history of logic, 2— 


Plato the first logician, 3—Exceptional preservation of his works, 3—Its 
reasons, 4— Permanence of the Academy, 5—Protection by the Christian 
clergy, 6—Plato’s logic unknown, 7—Opinion of Plethon, 8—of Gen- 
nadios, 8—Champier, 9—Patrizi and other historians of the XVIth 
century, 10—Morainvillier, 11—Stanley and Gassendi, 12—Reaction 
against Plato in the XVIIth century, 13—Tennemann, 13—He did not 
attempt to represent the evolution of Plato’s logic, 14—Various opinions 
on Platonic ideas, 15—Van Heusde and other writers in the XIXth 
century, 16—Recent logical writers, 17—-They were ignorant of Platonic 
chronology, 18—Susemihl first combined both problems, 19—Ueberweg 
first recognised the difference between Plato’s earlier and later logic, 
20—Misunderstood by Oldenberg, 21—Confirmed by Peipers, 22—Jack- 
son, 23—Benn, 23—Aristotle still held by some historians to be the first 
logician, 23—Many useless dissertations on Plato’s dialectic, 24—and 
theory of ideas, 25—-Conditions of a better study of Plato’s logic, 27— 
Zeller objects to the representation of Plato’s logic, 28—Our aim is to 
learn about Plato’s logic more than he expressed himself in his works, 
29—To explain his psychological evolution, 30—To know him better 
than he could know himself, 31—To find out how he progressed in his 
views, 33—and what was the last stage of his thoughts, 34 


CHAPTER II 


AUTHENTICITY AND CHRONOLOGY OF PLATO’S WRITINGS 
(pp. 35-63) 


Order of dialogues proposed by Patrizi, like that of Serranus, of no import- 
ance, 35—First inquiry by Tennemann, 35—Schleiermacher agrees with 
Tennemann on important points, 36—He left uncertain the order of 
small dialogues, 37—He supposed that Plato had planned from the 


xi ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


beginning the whole of his literary activity, 37—Difference between 
early Socratic criticism and the later Platonic criticism, 37—Progress 
from ethics to metaphysics, from polemical to didactic tone, 38—Ast 
denies the authenticity of all Socratic small dialogues, 38—Socher 
recognises a gradual evolution of Plato, 39—but proclaims the dialectical 
dialogues as spurious, 39—Stallbaum in favour of a late date of the 
Phaedrus, 39—H. Ritter, 40—Hermann establishes a Socratic period 
from which such important works as Parmenides must be excluded, 40 
—In many particulars Hermann agrees with Stallbaum and Schleier- 
macher, 41—All these authors are wrong as to the supposed early date 
of the dialectical dialogues, 42—First origin of the myth of a Megaric 
period, 42—Erroneous identification of the presumed date of a conversa- 
tion and the date of the composition of a dialogue, 43—Based on equally 
wrong identification of the Platonic and the historic Socrates, 43— 
Residence of Plato in Megara based on no valid testimony, 43—but on 
an isolated opinion of an unknown and evidently ignorant witness, 43— 
There was no danger for Plato to remain in Athens, 44—The author of the 
Crito was not a coward, 44—Cicero trustworthy as to Plato’s life, quotes 
Egypt as the first place whereto Plato travelled after Socrates’ death, 
45—Schleiermacher speaks of Plato’s ‘ flight’ without quoting authori- 
ties, 45—Ast increases the duration of the supposed sojourn at Megara, 
46—Influence of Euclides on Plato taken for granted by Stallbaum, 46 — 
This myth repeated by Ritter and Hermann, 47—Its acceptance a con- 
sequence of the same esthetical prejudice which reigned in the method 
of editing Plato’s text before the Zurich edition, 47—Ingenious hypo- 
thesis preferred to careful weighing of the evidence, 48—A change in the 
beautiful theory of ideas esthetically objectionable, 48— Every historian 
built on some wrong leading hypothesis, 49—We must get rid of such 
prejudice and learn to measure probabilities, 49—Plato’s philosophical 
consistency more probable than his cowardice, 49— Hermann recognised 
that Hermodorus’ testimony deserved no confidence, 49—and dis- 
trusted it as to the date of Plato’s first journey, 50—Followers of Her- 
mann and Schleiermacher, 50—Suckow, in a work full of errors, first 
recognised an important truth : the late date of the dialectical dialogues, 
51—He was followed by Munk, 52—True genetic method first applied by 
Susemihl, 52—who recognised the near relation between Phaedrus 
and Theaetetus, 53—Ueberweg the first logician who investigated the 
problem of Platonic chronology, 54—and gave strong reasons for the 
late date of the dialectical dialogues, 55—but he came to doubt the 
authenticity of the Parmenides, 55—In this scepticism he was followed 
by Schaarschmidt, 56—while Grote and Chaignet defended the authen- 
ticity of all the dialogues, 56—Jowett, 56—Philosophers begin after 
Ueberweg to investigate his problem, 57—Tocco defended the authen- 
ticity and late date of the Parmenides and other dialectical dialogues, 
57—Teichmiiller exaggerated the polemical aspect of Plato’s works, 57 — 
but he supported Ueberweg’s conclusions as to the late date of the 
dialectical dialogues, 58—This confirmed by Peipers, who convinced 
Susemihl, §9—but Zeller and the editor of Ueberweg’s ‘History of 
Philosophy’ maintain the old mythus of the Megaric period, 59—and 


CONTENTS Xlil 


are therein followed by other popular writers, 60—New arguments in 
favour of the late date of the dialectical dialogues, collected by Bergk, 
Rohde, Christ, Siebeck, remain little known, 60—Diimmler confirms 
Ueberweg’s finding by new applications of Teichmiiller’s method, 61— 
Anarchy in Platonic literature, 61—Not removed by the efforts of the 
French Académie des sciences morales, 61—-which crowned a work in 
which the chronological problem is regarded as insoluble, 62—This is 
contradicted by the whole progress of these studies, 62—to which the 
comparison of the logical contents will add new conclusions, 63 


CHAPTER III 
THE STYLE OF PLATO (pp. 64-193) 


Style as a mark of identity of a writer, 64—What Plato thought of it, 65— 
Modern science deals with problems beyond the reach of Plato, 65— 
Identification. of handwriting, 66, not easier than that of style, 66— 
Peculiarities of vocabulary, 67—Kinds of words, 68—Their frequency, 
69—Arrangement of words, 70—Other stylistic marks, 71— Stylistic 
investigations easy and useful, 72—A new Lexicon Platonicum and a 
full bibliography of Platonic literature needed, 73 


REVIEW OF FORTY-FIVE PUBLICATIONS ON THE STYLE OF 
PLATO AND LIST OF 500 PECULIARITIES OF PLATO’S STYLE 
(pp. 74-139) 


Engelhardt, 74—Peculiarities 1-5 (anacoluthiae), 76—Kayssler, Braun, 
Lange, 77—Kopetsch: Peculiarities 6-11 (adjj. in tos), 783-79—-Schéne, 
79—Martinius, 81— Campbell, 82—Remained unknown for twenty-eight 
years, 84—Peculiarity 12, 85—Peculiarities 13-20, 86-87—Peculiarities 
21-22, 88—Originality of Plato’s vocabulary, 89—Affinities with the 
latest group, 90—First table of stylistic affinity, 92—Peculiarity 23, 
93—Peculiarities of later vocabulary 24-181, 94-97—Classification of 
these peculiarities, 98—Riddell, 99—Peculiarity 182, 100—Schanz, 
Lingenberg, Imme, 100—Blass, Roeper, 101—Peculiarity 183, 101— 
Peculiarities 184-198, 102—Teichmiiller, 102—Dittenberger, pecu- 
liarity 199, 103—Peculiarities 200-206, 104—Jecht, 105—Peculiarities 
207-222, 106-107—F'rederking, Hoefer, 107—Peculiarities 223-235, 107- 
109—Peipers, 109— Peculiarities 236-249, 109-110— Weber, peculiarities 
250-253, 111—Droste, 111—Newly invented adjectives in «dys and 
dns, 112—Their distribution, 113-114—Peculiarities 254-278, 115-117 
—Kugler, 117—Peculiarities 279-308, 118-120—Schanz, peculiarities 
809-311, 120—-Gomperz, 120—C. Ritter, 121—Peculiarities 312-355, 
122_124—.Walbe, peculiarities 356-875, 125-126—Siebeck, 126—Pecu- 
liarities 376-378, 127-128—Tiemann, peculiarities 379-388, 128-129— 
Lina, 129—Peculiarities 389-447, 130-133—Baron, van Cleef, 133— 
Grunwald, Bertram, 134—Campbell, 135—von Arnim, 136—Peculiari- 
ties 448-457, 137-138—Campbell, peculiarities 458-500, 138-139 


xv1 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


acknowledged, 279—Allusions to the theory of ideas, 280—Analogy 
between individual and state, 281—Relation to the Phaedo, 282—Traces 
of oral teaching, 282—Increased interest in logic, 283—Method of 
exclusion, 283—-Hegemony of justice, 284—-Conception of a self-sufficient 
aim, 285—Relation to Cratylus and Meno, 285—To Symposium, 286— 
and Phaedo, 287—To Laches, 288—Pretended relation to Aristophanes, 
288—Contradicted by Aristotle and Plato, 289—Date of Books ITI.-IV., 
289— Books V._VII. a natural part, 290—Even if added later belong to 
the plan of the whole, 291—Theory of ideas, 291—Terminology, 292-293 
—Intuition of the good, 294—Metaphors explained, 295—Philosophical 
training, 296—Philosopher opposed to the mere practical man, 297— 
Idea of Good, 298—Initiation through mathematical study, 298—Units 
and figures, 299—Solid geometry, 300—Nature of theoretical knowledge, 
300—Contempt for observations, 301—Probabilities neglected, 301— 
Science limited to truth, 301—Dialectic based on absolute principles, 
302—System of human knowledge, 303—Final cause of universe, 303— 
Allegory of the cave, 304—Use of hypotheses in mathematics, 305—Dis- 
tinction between Sidvoia and émorhun irrelevant, 305—as that between 
eikacla and mlortis, 306—Object of opinion defined, 307—Accident and 
substance, 307—Thought independent of the body, 307—Not-Being, 308 
—Relation to the Phaedo, 308—Traces of teaching activity, 309—Re- 
lation to Symposium, 310—Books VIII.-IX.: happiness of the philo- 
sopher, 311—True opinion and science, 312—Book X.: ideas of manu- 
factured things, 3183—Unity of each idea, 3183—Immortality, 314—Truth 
found in thought, 315—Unity of consciousness, 315—Method of revision, 
315—Relation to the Phaedo, 316—Opinion and knowledge, 317—Law 


of contradiction, 318—Contempt of poets, 318 
(Style and date of the Republic.) Early style of Book I., 319—Harlier 
than Cratylus, —All other books later than Phaedo, 322—Books V.— 


VII. probably later than Book IX., 323—The Republic composed in 
about six years, 325 

Il. Phaedrus on rhetoric, 326—Speech of Lysias authentic, 327— 
Use of examples, 328—Widened horizon, 329—Spirit of conciliation, 330 
—Contempt of poets and tyrants, 331—Relation to Symposium, 331— 
Dialecticians, 332-—Proof of immortality, 332—Compared with that of 
the Republic, 334—Later than Phaedo, 334—Compared with the Laws, 
335—Partition of the soul, 336—Classification of men, 337—Authority of 
the philosopher, 338—Metaphorical representation of ideas, 339—Thei 
relation to particulars, 340—Analysis and synthesis, 341—Teaching and 
rhetoric, 342—Programme of a future art, 344—Plato’s and Aristotle’s 
view of writing, 345—Invitation to the Academy, 346—Recognition of 
Isocrates and others, 347—Thompson and Teichmiiller on the Pane- 
gyricus, 348—Date of the Phaedrus, 348—Arguments in favour of an 
early date, 349—Thompson unknown, 352—Relation of the Phaedrus to 
the Phaedo, 353—To the Symposium, 354—To the Republic, 355—To 
the Cratylus and Gorgias, 356—Style of the Phaedrus, 357 

Middle Platonism, 358—Lasted up to Plato’s fiftieth year, 358— 
Transformation of the theory of ideas, 359—Objective idealism, 360— 
Plato compared with Kant, 361 


CONTENTS XVil 


CHAPTER VII 
REFORM OF PLATO’S LOGIC (pp. 363-415) 


Ideas independent of particulars, 363—Problem of the order of ideas, 364— 
General classification, 364—Theaetetus and Parmenides as critical 
dialogues, 365—Qualitative change a kind of movement, 365—This dis- 
tinction unknown in Republic and Phaedrus, 366—Its fundamental 
importance, 367—Highest kinds or categories, 368—Progress from intui- 
tion to discursive investigation, 369—Influence of physical studies, 370. 

I. Theaetetus, 371—Earlier definitions of knowledge, 371—Unity of 
consciousness, 372—Specific energy of the senses, 372—Senses instru- 
ments of the soul, 373—-Common predicates of different perceptions, 373 
—Immediate activity of the soul, 374—TIllusions of the senses, 374— 
Refutation of materialism, 375—Knowledge expressed in judgments, 375 
Affirmation and negation, 376—Unity of judgment, 376—Different 
meanings of Adyos, 377—Definitions not peculiar to knowledge, 378— 
Heraclitus refuted, 878—Training of philosophers, 379—Widened 
horizon, 380—Impartiality of research, 3881—Rhetorie and philosophy, 
381—Ideas and categories, 382—Example of antinomies, 382—Axioms 
in the soul, 383—Activity and passivity, 384—-Conditions of error, 384— 
Difference between earlier and later inconclusiveness, 384—Date of the 
Theaetetus, 385—Zeller’s arguments in fayour of an early date, 386— 
Corinthian war, 386—Peltasts, 387—List of twenty-five ancestors, 388 
—Relation to the Republic, 389—To the Symposium, 389—To Antis- 
thenes and Euclides, 390—To later dialogues, 390—Allusions to Plato’s 
school, 391—To his travels, 392—Dramatic form, 392—Twelve kinds of 
dialogue, 393—Theaetetus later than Republic, 395—Than the Phaedrus, 
397—Probably later than 367 B.c., 398—Stylistic confirmation, 399 

II. The Parmenides, 400—Authenticity, 400—Objectioris to the 
theory of ideas, 402—Ideas as notions, 403—Increasing importance of 
the soul, 404—Perfect ideas and imperfect notions, 404—Hypothetical 
reasoning, 405—Mutual relations of all things, 405—Antinomies of 
reason, 406—Definition of knowledge, 406—Progress of ideas, 407—Late 
date of the Parmenides, 408—Meeting of Parmenides with Socrates, 409— 
Eleatic influence increasing, 410—Stylistic comparison of Theaetetus 
and Parmenides, 411—Date of the Parmenides, 412 

Critical Philosophy, 413—Knowledge existing in an ascending scale 
of souls, 413—Movement chief factor, 413—Mode of exposition, 413— 
Protreptic character, 414—Results obtained, 415 


CHAPTER VIII 
NEW THEORY OF SCIENCE (pp. 416-471) 


I. The Sophist, 416—Historical method, 416—Form of the dialogue, 417— 
Didactic authority, 418—Logical method, 418—Disinterestedness of 
science, 419—Definition and classification, 420—Progressive logical 
exercise, 421—New dialectic, 422— n : No animated ideas, 
424—System of souls, 42—Object of Knowledge, 426—Relations of 
ideas, 427—Influence of experience, 427—Fixity of ideas, 428—Not- 
Being, 428—Origin of error, 429—Judgment analysed, 430—Subject and 
predicate, 431—Variety of predication, 441—Meaning of negation, 432— 


XVill ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


Materialism and idealism, 433—Existence of souls, 433—Criticism of 
earlier metaphysics, 434—Authenticity of the Sophist, 434—Relation to 
the Parmenides, 435—Style of the Sophist, 437_Relation to the Republic) 
438—Confirmation by Hirzel, 438—by Ivo Bruns, 440—Date of the 
Sophist, 441 

II. The Politicus, 442—Appreciation of method, 442—Logical training, 
443—Building up of a system of knowledge, 444—Intolerance, 445 
—Unity and divisions of science, 445—Rules of classification, 446— 
Meaning of ideas, 447—Use of analogy, 449—Examples, 450—Ideal 
standard, 451—Final and efficient cause, 452—Authenticity of the 
Politicus, 453—Schaarschmidt’s arguments, 454—Relation to the Re- 
public, 455—Silence of Aristotle, 456—Huit’s objections, 457—Date of 
the Politicus, 458 

Ill. The Philebus, 458—Its authenticity, 459—Relation to the Re- 
public, 460—Horn’s arguments, 461—Power of reason, 462—Final aim 
of the universe, 463—Juvenile logic, 463—System of notions, 463— 
Ideas only in the soul, 464—Middle terms, 464—Importance of dialectic, 
465—Imperfection of physical science, 466—Genus and species, 466— 
Theory of sensation, 467—Judgments in the soul, 468—Relation of 
Philebus and Politicus, 469—Date of the Philebus, 470 

New dialectic, 470—Different meaning of existence, 471—System of 


knowledge, 471 
CHAPTER IX 
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS OF PLATO’S THOUGHT (pp. 472-516) 


I. The Timaeus, 473—Opinion and knowledge, 473—Priority of the soul, 
474—Unity of the world, 475—Divine rule, 476—Eternal ideas, 477— 
Partial immortality, 478—Reincarnation, 479—Categories, 480—Judg- 
ment and sentence, 480—Physical science, 481—Time and space, 482— 
Matter, 484—-Causality, 485—Date of the Timaeus, 486—Relation to 
the Republic, 488 

II. The Critias, 490 

Ill. The Laws, 491—Theory of ideas, 491—View of philosophy, 492 
—FPriority of the soul, 494—True Being, 495—Soul as self-moving 
principle, 496—Protreptic character of the Laws, 498—Oral teaching, 
499—Nature of the soul, 500—Divine Providence, 501—Telepathy, 502 
—Hierarchy of souls, 502—Insignificance of human life, 503—Aims of 
human activity, 505—Unity of consciousness, 506—Classification of 
faculties, 506—Knowledge and opinion, 507—Experience and reason, 509 
—Unity of science, 511—Metaphysical truth, 512—Power of reason, 513 
—Definitions and names, 514—Eternity of mankind, 515—Reconcilia- 
tion with Athens, 515—Hierarchy of souls, 516 


CHAPTER X 


PLATO’S LOGIC (pp. 517-527) 

Limitations of Plato’s writings, 517—Socratie stage, 519—Theory of 
ideas, 520—Middle Platonism, 521—Critical reform, 522—New dialectic, 
523—Logical rules, 524—Power of the soul, 525—Relation to later 
philosophy, 526— Unique philosophical excellence of Plato, 527 


bo 
=) 


INDEX . - . i : . - i > : ‘ ran) 


ORIGIN AND GROWTH 


OF 


APO Sinn Lal Ma DG 





CHAPTER I 


PLATO AS A LOGICIAN 


WHILE the amount of scientific knowledge, as distin- 
guished from mere opinion and prejudice, constantly 
increases, there is not such progress in its quality, or in 
the degree of certainty attained, as to make knowledge 
undeniable and infallible. This certainty, being not 
inherent in reasoning, but dependent upon the logical 
perfection of our investigations, can be increased only 
through the development of logical method. Yet we 
see that the highest truths of natural science are 
questioned, and not even the law of gravitation is 
held sacred. \Kant said in the introduction to his 
Krituk der reinen Vernunft that the logical rules for- 
mulated by Aristotle have the rare privilege of being a 
permanent and unchangeable scientific acquisition. But 
we have since witnessed vehement attacks on the 
Aristotelian theory of syllogism, and to some logicians of 
our century even our oldest logical principles seem to be 
uncertain. 

After two thousand years of philosophical specula- 
tion, based on concepts of pure reason, came Mill, with 

B 


History of 
logic: in- 
strumental 
to logic. 


Plato the 
first 
logician. 


2 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


his belief that general notions could be built up, by some 
mental process unknown to Kant and to Plato, out of 
particular sensible experiences. And Mill is reputed in 
his own country and elsewhere to be a great logician. 
He stands not alone: his predecessors range from Demo-_ 
critos and Protagoras downwards, and his adherents are 
numerous. If not even our mathematical notions are 
acknowledged to be independent of sensation, then every 
advance in mental philosophy might be questioned, and 
the crowd of ignorant Bavavoo. would exult in proclaiming 
the uselessness of philosophy. 

In these discussions on the foundations of human 
knowledge, small use has been made of historical investi- 
gation concerning the origin of prevailing logical theories. 
Still, it cannot be denied that such inquiries form an 
essential part of logical science itself. If there is some- 
thing like truly universal and permanent knowledge, it 
must have had this character from the beginning, and to 
show its beginning is to explain its permanence. If, on 
the other hand, all our knowledge be mere personal 
opinion, and if it be impossible for man to attain fixed 
and certain knowledge, if every truth pretending to be 
scientifically proven hold good only till it be replaced by 
a better truth, then we can convince ourselves of the 
provisional condition of our certitude by no better means 
than by discovering such changes in the fundamental 
principles of science, in the theory of science itself, which 
we call logic. 

The origin of logic has been largely discussed. Old- 
fashioned historians! thought that logic was as old as 
mankind, and wrote on the logic of Adam or of Pro- 


1 Tt was a general custom in early times to begin the history of every 
science with the creation of man. See, for instance, Jacob Friedrich 
Reimmann, Versuch einer Hinleitung in die Historiam literariam antedi- 
luwvianam, Halle 1709, wherein the author quotes in a humorous way such 
historians of logic. Much later Antonio Genovesi said in his widely read 
Logic (Antoniit Genuensis artis logicocriticae libri V., editio iv*, Neapoli 
1758), p. 7: ‘Ego non negaverim, quin, cum Ada magna sapientia a Deo 


PLATO AS A LOGICIAN 5 


_metheus.? But, leaving aside such conceits, the oldest 
accessible documents for the history of logic are the 
works of Plato. In such difficult matters second-hand 
testimony is worthless, and of philosophers earlier than 
Plato we have only fragments. These fragments—pre- 
served by Plato, Aristotle, and later writers as casual 
quotations—may give rise to conjectures and discussions ; 
they never afford a clear and full representation of their 
authors. We can only infer from them that all philo- 
sophers before Socrates were more interested in the 
nature of Being than in the conditions of Knowledge. 

They used their reason and imagination without making 
reason itself an object of reasoning. 

The first man whom we meet in the history of human 
thought as a logician, or at least the first logician whose 
writings have reached us in a form as complete as they 
were known by his contemporaries, is Plato. 

The complete preservation of his works is amazing, if Excep- 
we consider that no other Attic writer is so well known tional pre- 
to us by his own writings. Of one hundred-and thirty **vation 
works by Sophocles_seven survive; of ninety-two by one 

" Euripides we have but nineteen. Of forty-four comedies bis 
by Aristophanes only eleven are preserved ; and the comic 
author who succeeded Aristophanes in Plato’s time, 
Antiphanes, is said to have written two hundred and sixty 
comedies, of which not one remains. Of the five hundred 
and twenty-six plays written by these four poets, the most 
renowned dramatists of Plato’s age, we know only thirty- 
seven—a fourteenth of the whole. When Plato in his 
fuerit ornatus, usu rationis plurimum valuerit, id est, quin egregius 
fuerit Logicus.’ 

* The strange hypothesis that Prometheus was the first logician is 
due to a misinterpretation of p. 16 c of the Philebus, where Plato speaks of 
“some Prometheus ’ whomight have brought the light of reason from heaven. 
Pierre de la Ramée (Petri Rami Scholae in liberales artes, Basileae 1578, 
p- 312) infers that Prometheus was the first logician according to Plato. He 
also credits Plato with a great logical importance, remarking (p. 325) 


‘logica Platonis non tantum 4 dialogis continetur, ut videtur Laertius dicere, 
sed omnibus fere aspergitur.’ 


Peculiar 
conditions 
for the 
preserva- 
tion of 
Plato’s 
works, 


4 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


Republic proclaimed war against dramatic poets, he could 
not foresee that his verdict would be so mercilessly enforced 
by time. 

No happier was the fate of the orators, against whom 
Plato wrote. ( Lysias)was known to him by four hundred 
and twenty-five speeches, of which but thirty-four remain. 
Of the sixty works ascribed to his rival Isocrates, two- 
thirds have disappeared. We have to judge of the famous 
speeches of these two orators by a fractional part (one 
ninth) of their work. 

Philosophers fared no better. Democritos, reputed 
to have written sixty works, had great influence on his 
time. His notion of atoms still remains the basis of 
our conception of matter, and his ethical principles 
anticipated Christian teaching: but not one of his works 
is left. Of all the philosophical lterature of Plato’s 
time to which he refers, scarcely anything remains. Not 
even the works of Aristotle have reached us in a shape 
nearly so complete or so correct as Plato’s. 

Our most ancient manuscript of Plato is a thousand_ 
years old, and might well proceed from some MS. pre- 
served in Plato’s Academy. It has been shown? that the 


_Phaedo-of—Plato was known to readers two thousand two 


hundred years ago in copies less correct than our present 
editions. A papyrus of the third century B.c, containing 
fragments of the Phaedo embodies evident blunders, 
unknown to our best manuscripts, and differs in few par- 
ticulars from the text as read in the nineteenth century. 
The creation by Plato of a philosophic school per- 
manently fixed in one place during centuries‘ explains 
* I,. Campbell, ‘ On the text of the Papyrus fragment of the Phaedo’ in 
the Classical Review, Oct._Dec. 1891, vol. v. pp. 363-365, 454-457. The 
detailed analysis of all the readings of the papyrus leads to the conclusion 
that ‘the amount both of incrustation and of decay is extremely small’ and 
that ‘the readings of the papyrus are not to be accepted without question.’ 
Cf. H. Usener, ‘ Unser Platontext,’ pp. 25-50, 181-215 in Nachrichten der 
Kéniglichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Gottingen, 1892. 


‘ Up to the year 87 8.c. the Academy was undisturbed. Sulla obliged 
the Academicians to leave the gardens of Academos, but the Platonic 


~- 


PLATO AS A LOGICIAN 9) 


the preservation of his works in so remarkable a state of 
correctness and purity. The accidental name of Academy, 
given to that spot, has been more honoured than that of 


founded by Plato had the character of a religious associa- 
tion, thus possessing a stability greater than any purely 
scientific institution could attain. Such associations were 
respected by the Roman conquerors, and lasted till the 
Christian monasteries gave to Plato’s works a refuge not 
less safe than his own Academy. 

In such a monastery, on the isle of Patmos, at the 
beginning of this century, Clarke found the manuscript 
now preserved\.in the Bodleian Library,: and written 

896 A.D.; one of the most ancient Greek manuscripts in 
existence. This continuity of religious protection was a 
very exceptional circumstance: alone among the authors 
of the fourth century B.c. Plato has been read con- 
tinuously for twenty-three centuries. His school, lasting 
more than nine hundred years, outlived the schools of 
Aristotle and Epicurus. 

It was fortunate, too, that the Academy was still in 
being, when the great improvement of writing materials 7 
occurred in our fourth and fifth centuries. The light papy- 
rus rolls were then copied on stout and lasting parchment : 


school continued to exist in Athens up to 529 a.p., when Justinian dissolved 
the philosophical schools. On Plato’s school see Grote’s Plato, London 1888, 
vol. i. p. 265, Zumpt, ‘ Ueber den Bestand der philosophischen Schulen in 
Athen’ (Abh. der Akad. d. Wiss. zu Berlin aus dem J. 1842, Berlin 1844, 
pp- 27-119), Tl. Kwvoraytwidos, ‘H “Akadijuia jo. mpaypyatela wep THs "AOnynce 
TlAatwvikjs oxoAjs, ev ’EpAdvyn, 1874, Usener, ‘Organisation der wissen- 
schaftlichen Arbeit’ (Preussiche Jahrbiicher, Band 53, 1884), E. Heitz, ‘ Die 
Philosophenschulen zu Athen’ (Deutsche Revue, 1884), O. Immisch, ‘ Die 
Academie Platons’ in Fleckeisens Jahrb. 1894, pp. 421-442. 

5 Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Philologische Untersuchungen, 1881, Hett iv. 

° Gardthausen, Griechische Paldographie, Leipzig 1879, p. 344, gives a 
list of the oldest dated Greek manuscripts and quotes only one older than 
the Clarkianus, a MS. of Euclid, also at Oxford. 

7 On this reform see T. Birt, Das antike Buchwesen in seinem 
Verhdltniss zur Litteratwr, Berlin 1882. 


6 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


one parchment volume, including the matter of many 
papyrus rolls, occupied less space. Such copies are the 
definite form in which we now possess the oldest texts 
of Greek writers, while the papyri have preserved for us 
only tattered fragments. 

Plato’s works, copied on parchment while his Academy 
still flourished, survived in a more correct shape than the 
text of other writers whose works were not continually 
read in a school lasting over nine centuries. And it is no 
mere supposition that they were read, because we know 
that, up to the last scholarch Damascius, many leaders of 
Plato’s Academy spent their lives in writing commentaries 
on the Master’s dialogues. Such commentaries as those 
of Proclus (411-485 a.p.), head of the Academy eight 
hundred years after Plato’s death, show great care for 
correctness of text, a religious awe and conviction of the 
deep meaning of each word. Our oldest manuscripts of 
Plato (Clarkianus and Parisinus A) were written in Greece, 
and this increases the probability of their descent from the 
copies of the Academy, while many other Greek works 
came to us through Alexandria_and Rome. Moreover, 
though Plato’s writings were often edited in Alexandria_ 
and Rome, our oldest manuscripts were written by Greeks 
for Greek scholars, as is shown by the indications of the 
copyists. 

While other pagan writers were despised by the early 
Christian clergy, Plato found admirers among the Christian 
bishops: as, for instance, Eusebius (264-340), St. Augustine 
(854-430), Theodoretus (390-457), and many others. St. 
Augustine thought that Plato came nearer to Christianity 
than any other writer... This means that Christianity 
was built upon Plato more than upon any other philo- 
sopher. The monk who, in the ninth century, copied the 
works of Plato, knowing that these writings were 
admired by the greatest authorities of the Church, 


5 St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, lib. viii. cap. iv-xi. in the edition of 
Migne, tom. vii. pp. 227-236. 


PLATO AS A LOGICIAN 7 
transcribed with the greatest care, feeling the same 
veneration for these texts as Plato’s own followers in the 
Academy. iy 

These unique circumstances explain the survival of 
Plato’s text in a state more correct and authentic than 
that of contemporary poets or orators, and they further 
explain why not one of the works written by Plato 
has perished. There is no valid testimony as to the ex- 
istence of a single work by Plato not contained in our 
collection.® a 

Considering these facts, and the varied contents of 
Plato’s dialogues, we might expect that each part of the 
philosophy of Plato would have been made the subject of 
special investigation by all who were interested in the origin 
of philosophic thought. But, strange to say, Plato’s logic 
remains almost unknown, as may easily be seen from a 
short survey of the chief opinions expressed on this 
subject. Such a survey is tedious, but it helps us to 
establish the proper method of resolving the proposed 
problem: What was the origin and growth of Plato’s 
logic? This problem, under the peculiar circumstances 
of the case, becomes identical with the apparently more 
important problem of the origin of logic generally, and 
the origin of scientific certitude as opposed to unscien- 
tific and transitory opinions. 

Early Platonists up to the fourteenth century are of 
little importance for cur purpose, because their writings 
are very insufficiently preserved and we could not easily 
obtain a clear idea of the progress, if any, made by them in 


Plato’s 
logic 
neglected. 


the study of the Platonic writings. Our present scientific | 


tradition begins with the fifteenth century and the revival 
of classical studies in Italy, so that it suffices to learn 
what has since been done for the knowledge of Plato’s 
logic. 

The first champion in modern times of the general im- 


® On the completeness of Plato’s works see Zeller, Philosophie der 
Griechen, 4° Aufl., II Theil, 1 Abth. Leipzig 1889, pp. 436-440. 


Platonists 
and Aris- 
totelians 
of the 
XYV.-Xvi. 
centuries. 


8 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


portance of Plato’s logic was Georgios Gemistos,!? named 
also Plethon, who came in 1438 from Greece to Italy to 
take part in the Council of Ferrara. He wrote a pam- 
phlet'! on the difference between Plato and Aristotle, 
wherein he insists on the logical merits of Plato, against 
_Aristotle’s assertion at the end of his Organon (183 b 34) 
that he was the first to find a method of reasoning (ué00d0s 
tav Noywov, De Sophisticis Hlenchis, cap. xxxiv. 6, 183 
b 13; cf. Plato, Sophist 227 a, Politicus 266 pv, &c.). 
Plethon accuses Aristotle of acting in this particular like 
a sophist and in a way unworthy of a_philosopher,!” 
because the method of reasoning was well known to 
Plato, as is shown by his writings. 

Gemistos did not take the trouble to go into details, 
but his allusion to Plato’s ‘method of reasoning’ shows 
that he gave much more importance to Plato’s Sophist 
and Politicus than has been usual in this century with 
the great majority of Platonic scholars. 

Georgios Scholarios Gennadios answered with a plea in 
favour of Aristotle, and Plethon rejoined,’ insisting upon 








© Georgios Gemistos, born 1355 in Constantinople, died 1450. He 
appears to have been named Plethon only after coming to Italy in 1438. 
On him see: Fritz Schultze, Georgios Gemistos Plethon und seine reforma- 
torischen Bestrebungen, Jena 1874. 

"The first edition of Plethon’s work was published according to 
Fabricius at Venice 1532, together with a Latin paraphrase of it, written by 
Bernardino Donato. The British Museum has an edition of 1540: Ber- 
nardini Donati Veronensis, De Platonicae atque Aristotelicae philosophiae 
differentia, Venetiis 1540, 8vo. In this publication, after seventy-one pages 
of Latin text, begins the Greek original of Plethon: ‘Tewpytov rod Tewiorod 
Tov Kal TAndwvos, repli av ’ApioroTeAns mpds MAdtwva diapéperat,’ with a separate 
pagination of twenty-three leaves. Both the Latin and the Greek text were 
reprinted at Paris, 1541, 8vo, in the same order. The Latin text of Donato 
differs from the Greek of Plethon in so far as the last chapter is used as 
introduction, and the whole put into the form of a dialogue between 
Policarpus and Callistus, the second representing Plato’s thoughts. Schultze 
quotes only the edition in 4to. published at Basel 1574. Plethon’s pamphlet 
has been reprinted in vol. 160, pp. 889-934, of Migne’s Patrologia Graeca, 
Paris 1866. 

'*, Page 23 of the Venice edition (Migne 928 d): “ApsororéAns . . . mavu 
Topiotikiy TovVTO ToLay Kal piriocdpov TpdToV GAAOTPLOTAaTOV. 


'8 The pamphlet of Gennadios is lost, but Plethon’s reply to it was pub- 
p 


PLATO AS A LOGICIAN 9 


Plato’s superiority. These Greek polemics, continued 
later in the fifteenth century by George of Trebizond 
and Bessarion,'? were more rhetorical than scientific, and 
led to no objective study of Plato’s logic. For those who 
wrote on that subject in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries the chief aim was not to ascertain Plato’s 
logical theories, nor how he found them. They acted 
rather as political opponents, fighting under the standard 
of Plato or of Aristotle. The champions on Plato’s side 
failed to give exact quotations from his text in proof of 
their assertions. 

In such comparisons between Plato and Aristotle some 
authors ascribed to their favourite thinker more than he 
would have claimed himself. In France, for instance, 
Champier!® (1516, 1537) ventured to say that Plato in- 
vented the figures of syllogism; in Italy, Patrizi !’ (1571) 


lished by W. Gass in vol. ii. pp. 54-117 of his work: Gennadius und Pletho, 
Aristotelismus und Platonismus in der Griechischen Kirche, Breslau 1844 : 
‘Plethonis liber contra Gennadii scripta pro Aristotele ex codice Vratisla- 
viensi nune primum editus.’ 

4 Comparationes Philosophorum Aristotelis et Platonis a Georgio 
Trapezuntio . . . Venetiis 1523. Plato is, in this author’s opinion, 
‘rudis, turpis, arrogans, invidiosus, obtreetator in 4 viros Graeciae salva- 
tores,’ &e. 

1S Bessarionis Cardinalis Sabini et Patriarchae Constantinopolitani 
capitula libri primi adversus calumniatorem Platonis, without date, but 
printed at Rome 1469. Another edition, Im calummniatorem Platonis libri 
quatuor, Venetiis 1503, is also in the British Museum. The author 
is anxious to show that Plato used all moods of all the figures of syllo- 
gisms. 

16 Symphoriam Champerii, Symphonia Platonis cum Aristotele et 
Galeni cum Hippocrate, Parrhisiis 1516. Of the same author: Libri VII. 
de Dialectica, Rhetorica, Geometria, Arithmetica, Astrononvia, etc., Basileae 
1537. In this work, chap. v. of part 2,‘ Quid syllogismus secundum Pla- 
tonem,’ contains the assertion ‘ Plato noster syllogismorum tractatu utitur 
arguendo et demonstrando.’ Then, in the next chapter, ‘De syllogismis 
cathegoricis,’ we read ‘Syllogismorum cathegoricorum tres figuras posuit 
Plato.’ 

‘7 Francesco Patrizi (on him see R. Bobba, ‘Commentatori italiani di 
Platone,’ Jan. 1892, Rivista italiana di filosofia) wrote: Discussionum 
peripateticarum tomi IV., Basileae 1581 (first published at Venice 1571). 
On p. 180 Plato is named ‘logices sive dialectices inventor ;’ p. 189: 
‘ syllogismi frequens est apud Platonem mentio.’ In another work, Nova de 


10 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


supposed that Aristotle wrote under his own name 
accounts of Plato’s oral teaching; Ramus! (1578), 
Buratelli® (1573), Mazoni”’ (1576), and Theupolis #! (1576) 
insisted upon the identity of the Platonic and Aristotelian 
teachings. On Plato’s side were also Bernardi ” (1599), 
Calanna * (1599), and Wower * (1608). 

Again, Zabarella” (1587) in Italy and Keckermann 


universis philosophia libris quinquaginta comprehensa, Venetiis 1593 (first 
published in Ferrara 1591), in the chapter ‘ Plato exotericus,’ p. 42, he starts 
the supposition that Plato’s dialogues represent faithfully the historical 
Socrates, while Aristotle has written out the secret doctrine of Plato. He 
adds confidently, ‘in philosophia Aristotelis nihil est certum,’ and ‘in 
philosophia Platonis rarissima sunt ea quae non sint certissima’ (p. 44). 

** P. Ramus says (Scholae in liberales artes, p. 325): ‘Speusippo 
nunquam persuasisset Aristoteles, Aristotelem primum logicae artis aucto- 
rem fuisse, cum hac in arte Speusippi discipulus Aristoteles potius fuisset 
et ex ejus emptis libris suos libros contexuisset.? Against the Aristotelicae 
animadversiones of the same author, published 1543, is directed: T. 
Carpentarit Platonis cum Aristotele in universa philosophia comparatio, 
Lutetiae 1573, wherein Plato is treated in George of Trebizond’s manner. 

'’ Gabriel Buratellus, Conciliatio praecipuarum controversiarum Aris- 
totelis et Platonis, Venetiis 1573. Morhof (Polyhistor literarius, ed. 2°, 
Lubecae 1714, p. 40) is right in saying on the author: ‘potius suo quam 
auctorum ingenio rem egit, ut solent plerumque omnes conciliatores.’ 
Buratelli has been followed in Sweden by J. Hising (Praeside... F. 
Toérner, ideam Platonis breviter delineatam ... proponit J. Hising, 
Upsaliae 1706). 

*© Jacobi Mazonit Caesenatis de triplict hominum vita, Caesenae 1576, 
fol. 148, quaestio 2142: ‘Plato demum veram excogitavit dialecticam, 
quam Aristoteles auxit....’ In a later work, Im wniversam Platonis et 
Aristotelis Philosophiam Praeludia, Venetiis 1597, p. 118 FF., he enu- 
merates the points in which both philosophers agree. 

"1 Stephani Theupoli, Benedicti filii, patricii Veneti Academicarum con- 
templationwm libri decem, Venetiis 1576. 

” J. B. Bernardi, Seminarium philosophicum continens Platonicorum 
definitiones, Venetiis 1599. 

*8 Petri Calannae Philosophia senior, sacerdotia et Platonica, Palermi 
1599. 

** Joann. a Wower, De polymathia tractatio, Basileae 1603, chap. xx. 

* Jacobi Zabarellae Patavini Opera, Lugduni 1587, p. 42. 

*6 Praecognitorum logicorum tractatus, a B. Keckermamo~Dantiscano 
secunda editione recogniti, Hanoviae 1606, II. ii. 15, p. 82. This history of 
logic, published for the first time in 1598, was also reprinted in Keckermanni 
Opera, Genevae 1614. The author proclaims himself a Pole (vol. ii. 
p- 1009 of his works), despite his German name. 


PLATO AS A LOGICIAN Et 


(1598) in Poland strongly favoured Aristotle’s pretension 
to be considered as the founder of logic, while Crispi” 
(1594) denounced Plato as having given rise to a great 
number of heresies. All these works, some containing 
hundreds of pages occupied with Plato’s logic, are devoid 
of scientific value, because their authors disdained the 
systematic and detailed study of Plato’s own logical 
theories, and accepted too easily certain late authorities 
as exponents of Plato’s teaching. 

The first attempt to represent Plato’s logic without 
any polemical aim was made by Morainvillier d’Orgeville* 
(1650) in a work which had little vogue. But Morain- 
villier’s object was not the history of human thought: he 
simply sought in Plato materials for a commentary on the 
teaching of the Church. He places Plato on the same 
footing with Proclus and Plotinus as authorities for 
Platonic teaching, and this is only one instance of the 
want of critical judgment which belonged to historians of 
philosophy of that epoch. 

Thomas Stanley, in his History of Philosophy, and 
P. Gassendi, in his History of Logic, first treated the 
logic of Plato from a purely historical point of view. 


2 J. Baptistae Crispi, De ethnicis philosophis caute legendis, Romae 
1594. The author enumerates on 529 pages in folio the heresies which he 
supposes to have emanated from Plato, and loses no opportunity of showing 
that Aristotle agrees better with the Church. This work is remarkable for 
its excellent indices. 

8 J, de Morainvillier d’Orgeville, Examen philosophiae Platonicae, 
Maclovii 1650, Svo. 634 pages. This work, though it exists in the British 
Museum and the Bodleian Library, is not quoted in the bibliographies 
of Brunet, Graesse and Georgii, nor is the author’s name mentioned 
in the biographical dictionaries of Michaud, Didot, Dezobry, and Bouillet, 
nor in the encyclopaedias of Brockhaus and Meyer. We learn from the 
introduction that the author was vicar of the bishop at Saint Malo and 
that Neoplatonic manuscripts brought from Constantinople by his uncle, 
the Bishop Achilles de Harley de Sancy, were entrusted to him that he 
might study them and use their contents for the benefit of the Church. 
This he did much better than a similar writer, Francesco de Vieri (Com- 
pendio della dottrina di Platone in quello che ella é conforme con la fede 
nostra, 191 pp. Fiorenza 1577), who, in his exposition of Plato’s philosophy 
for the use of the Church, omitted logic altogether. ; 


Historians 
of the 
seven- 
teenth 
century. 


Reaction 
against 
Plato. 


12 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


Both did so very briefly, and they were unable to dis- 
tinguish between logical theories and logical reasoning. 
Stanley ** enumerates the kinds of syllogism used by Plato 
without noticing that the use of syllogisms is no more 
evidence of a knowledge of syllogistic theory than is throw- 
ing a stone of a knowledge of the science of mechanics. 
Gassendi*” wonders how Aristotle could boast of being 
the first inventor of syllogism, since Plato had frequently 
reasoned in syllogisms. To do this without knowing the 
syllogistic art he believed to be no less impossible than to 
make shoes without having learned the art of shoe-making. 
Though Fabricius*! noticed these strange errors committed 
by historians of logic, he gave no detailed account of the 
logic of Plato, so that his observations remained without 
consequence for our subject. 

After Gassendi and Stanley there came in the seven- 
teenth century a general reaction against Plato’s logic. 
Voss (1658) in Holland ® and Rapin * (1678) in France, 


* Thomas Stanley, The History of Philosophy, London 1655-56-60, 
3 vols. vol. ii. pp. 58-67 treats of Plato’s logic. He attributes to Plato ‘ the 
analytical method, the best of methods’ (p. 17) and the use of syllogisms 
(p. 60). 

* Petrus Gassendus, Operay Lugduni Batavorum 1658, vol. i. contains: 
‘De origine et varietate logicae,’ reprinted in Petri Gassendi Logica, 
Oxonii 1718, wherein chap. iv. (pp. 42-49) bears the title‘ Logica Platonis.’ 
The passage mentioned in the text is pp. 25-26 of the same edition. 

1 B. J. A. Fabricii Opusculorum historico-critico-literariorum sylloge, 
Hamburgi 1738, contains, pp. 161-184: ‘Specimen elencticum historiae 
logicae,’ first published at Hamburg in 1690; p. 165: ‘Aliud longe est 
gaudere ratione, aliud esse logicum.’ 

% G. Joh. Vossii de logices et rhetoricae natura et constitutione, Hagae 
comitis 1658 (chap. vili. § 5: ‘ Priorum inventa, etiam quae apud Platonem 
leguntur, levia sunt prae iis, quae Aristoteles repperit’). To the same epoch 
belongs G. Wegneri de origine logices, Oelsnae Silesiorum 1667; C. F. 
Ayrmann, De dialectica veterwm, Vitembergae 1716. M. H. Trierenberg (De 
Ady et vG Platonico, Wittenberg 1676) deals only with the meaning of some 
words in Plato and in later writers. M. R. Dauth’s Plato coecutiens, 
Wittebergae 1686, is only idle talk on Plato’s moral principles. 

33 Pére Rapin, Gliwvres diverses, Amsterdam 1693, 2 vols. In vol. i. 
pp- 269-432 : ‘La comparaison de Platon et d’Aristote avec les sentiments 
des péres sur leur doctrine,’ written according to the dedication before 1678. 
Chap. i. of part III.: La logique de Platon: ‘Si l’on examine soigneuse- 


PLATO AS A LOGICIAN 13 


while acknowledging certain logical merits in Plato, placed 
Aristotle far above him. Samuel Parker * (1666) argued, 
not only that Plato was no logician, but that he was 
not free from logical blunders. Stollen * (1718), writing 
the history of logic, did not mention Plato, while Walch *° 
(1721) and Amort *’ (1730), in their works on the same 
subject, were clearly on the side of Aristotle. Still later, 
a very popular logical writer, Genovesi * (1745), thought 
that Plato’s logic was not essentially different from the 
Socratic teaching. 

Towards the end of the eighteenth century, after some 
less important writings by others,** there appeared the first 


ment la logique de Platon, on trouvera qu’il en a une, dont la fin est de 
délivrer l’esprit de erreur et de l’opinion, pour y introduire la science’ 
(p. 333). But in the same author’s ‘ Réflexions sur la logique’ (vol. ii. 
pp. 370-384) we read (p. 374): ‘il ne parut rien de réglé et d’établi sur la 
Logique devant Aristote.’ 

31 Sam. Parker, A free and impartial censure of the Platonick Philo- 
sophie, Oxford 1666, contains (pp. 34-40) ‘An account of the Platonick 
Logick.’ The author says, against Bessarion, that Plato’s inferences 
‘bottom upon uncertain and inevident principles,’ that ‘they are cir- 
_ cular,’ and ‘ that there is some flaw and incoherence in some of the inter- 
mediate propositions’ (p. 37). Also Wagner (under the pseudonym Realis 
de Vienna, Discursus et dubia in Chr. Thomasii Introductionem ad 
Philosophiam aulicam, Ratisbonae 1691) says (p. 137) ‘Plato ad logicos 
vix referri potest.’ This agrees with the contempt for logic generally pro- 
fessed by J. F. Reimmann in his Critisirender Geschichtscalender von der 
Logica, Francfurt 1699, and other works (Versuch einer Hinleitung in die 
Historiam literariam, Halle 1708, Versuch einer Einleitung in die His- 
toriam literariam antediluvianam, Halle 1709). 

% Gottlieb Stollen, Kwrtze Anleitung zur Historie der Gelahrtheit, Halle 
1718, 3 vols., contains (vol. ii. pp. 115-172) an history of logic. 

6 J. G. Walchit Parerga Academica, Lipsiae 1721, contains (pp. 453- 
848) an history of logic. On Plato he says ‘ingenii vis fuit major in 
Platone quam judicii, quo si quis destitutus, haud aptus erit ad genuinam 
utilemque logicae artem ornandam ’ (p. 520); ‘ Aristoteles logicam redegit 
in formam artis’ (p. 529). 

37 R. D. E. Amort, Philosophia Pollingana, Augustae Vindelicorum 1730, 
contains (pp. 539-544) a chapter—‘ de logica Platonis ’— wherein the author 
endeavours to show the superiority of Aristotle. 

3 Antonit Genuensis artis logicocriticae libri V., ed. iv*, Neapoli 1758 
(first edition 1745). On p. 9 he credits Socrates and Plato with the art of: 
‘recte definiendi, dubitandi opportune, inductionis analyticae.’ 

% J. G. Darjes, Via ad Veritatem, ed. 2*, Jenae 1764 (pp. 210-217: ‘ de logica 


Tenne- 
mann. 


14 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


work on Plato’s logic that was based on Plato’s own 
writings. This also gave some indication of the impor- 
tance of a true chronology of the Platonic dialogues as a 
help towards the right understanding of Plato’s philo- 
sophy. Tennemann’s*° treatise on Plato’s logic under the 
title of Theorie des Vorstellens, Denkens und Erkennens 
occupies the greater part of the second volume of his 
System der Platonischen Philosophie. Compared with 
his predecessors, his great merit is that he quotes Plato 
exactly, and relies on Plato alone as the interpreter 
of the Platonic teaching. But, being unable to resolve 
the problem of Platonic chronology, he did not attempt 
to give an account of the evolution of Plato’s logical 


Platonis’). S.C. Hollmannus, Philosophiae rationalis ed. auctior, Goet- 
tingae 1767 (contains, pp. 53-76, a short history of logic). J. A. Eberhard, 
Allgemeine Theorie des Denkens und Empfindens, Berlin 1776 (pp. 109 sqq.). 
J. J. Engel, Versuch einer Methode die Vernunftlehre aus Platonischen Dia- 
logen zu entwickeln, Berlin 1780; (also pp. 339-512 in Kleine Schriften von 
J. J. Engel, Berlin 1795, deals chiefly with Plato’s Meno, and is intended 
for use in the schools). J.J.H. Nast, De methodo Platonis philosophiam 
docendi dialogica, published first 1787, then reprinted in Opuscula latina, 
Tubingae 1821 (pp. 123-141); complains that the neoplatonists ‘ veros 
philosophi sensus turpiter depravarunt’ (p. 125), but admits that it is 
difficult ‘ veros Platonis sensus eruere’ (p. 133). F. V. Leberecht Plessing, 
Memnonium, Leipzig 1787, and Versuche zur Aufklirung der Philosophie 
des diltesten Alterthwms, Leipzig 1788-1790, vol. i. ; believes, like J. J. Syrbius 
(Institutiones philosophiae primae, ed. 2*, Jenae 1726), that Plato has taken all 
his philosophy from the East, and Aristotle owes everything to Plato ; against 
this view wrote J. J. Combes Dounous, Hssai historique sur Platon, Paris 
1809 (2 vols.). Dieterich Tiedemann, Geist der speculativen Philosophie 
(6 vols.), Marburg 1791-1797 ; (vol. ii. pp. 63-198 deals with Plato, whom he 
credits with the discovery (p. 87) ‘dass die wissenschaftliche Erkenntniss 
unveriinderliche, nothwendige Grundsatze und Begriffe heischt’). J. F. 
Dammann, De hwmanae sentiendi et cogitandi facultatis natura ex mente 
Platonis, Helmstadii 1792 (2 parts). J. Gottlieb Buhle, ‘ Commentatio de 
philosophorum graecorum ante Aristotelem in arte logica invenienda et 
perficienda conaminibus’ (pp. 234-259) in the Commentationes socictatis 
regiae scientiarum Gottingensis ad annos 1791-92, vol. xi. Gottingae 1793, 
insists on the importance of Plato’s logic. 

1 W. G. Tennemann, System der platonischen Philosophie, Leipzig 
1792-95, 4 vols. (vol. ii. p. 215: ‘Plato verwechselte das Denken mit dem 
Erkennen’). Tennemann deals also with Plato’s logic in his Geschichte der 
Philosophie, vol. ii. Leipzig 1799 (pp. 242-344), 


PLATO AS A LOGICIAN Bo 


theories. He quotes chiefly the dialectical works— 
Theaetetus, Parmendes, Sophist, Politicus, Philebus, 
which, according to him, were written soon after the 
death of Socrates, though really they are among Plato’s 
latest works. His predilection for these dialogues enabled 
Tennemann to perceive that Plato’s ideas were for him 
nothing but notions of the human mind-; while Brucker 
and many other writers," including such authorities of our 
own time as E. Zeller, conceived the Platonic ideas as 
independent beings, separated from the material world, 
much as they are represented in certain passages of 
Aristotle. 'Tennemann gave the first impartial exposition 
of the logic of Plato, as it is to be found in Plato’s own 
works, free from later corruptions. But, unaware of the 
order in which the works were written, he quotes early 
and late dialogues indifferently, and makes some serious 
mistakes: as, for instance, in his contention that Plato 
did not distinguish thought from knowledge. He admits 
that Plato had a theory of proof, that he gave valuable 


‘| Most of the ancient Platonists, as Albinus, Plotinus, Porphyrius, 
Jamblichus, Proclus, as well as Plethon and Ficinus in the fifteenth cen- 
tury, explained the Platonic ideas as existent in God. This view has been 
also maintained by :—R. Goclenius (Idea Philosophiae Platonicae, Marpurgi 
1612, p. 176: ‘Plato intelligit ideas . . . in mente divina immortales et 
immutabiles’); Scipio Agnelli (Disceptationes de ideis, Venetiis 1615, 
p. 33: ‘Peripatetici absurdam illam opinionem Platoni tribuunt quae 
tanto Philosopho penitus indigna est. Volunt Platonem existimasse . . 
seorsum a divina mente subsistentes Ideas esse’); R. Cudworth (The Trae 
Intellectual System of the Universe, London 1678 ; also C. E. Lowrey, The 
Philosophy of R. Cudworth, New York 1884); J. L. Mosheim (in his 
Latin translation ‘of R. Cudworth’s Systema intellectuale hujus universi, 
Jenae 1733, vol. i. pp. 662-663); J. Helwig (De ideis platonicis, in 
Electorali Viadrina, 1650). In opposition to this view, there has been put 
forth another opinion, according to which Plato’s ideas were substances 
independent of God and separated from him. This was chiefly sup- 
ported by M. J. Thomasius (Orationes, Lipsiae 1683, pp. 275-300, oratio xiii. : 
‘De ideis Platonicis exemplaribus,’ habita die 9 Aprilis a. 1659) ; J. Brucker 
(Historia philosophica doctrinae de ideis, Augustae Vindelicorum 1723, with- 
out the author’s name, p. 36: ‘ideae Platoni sunt aeterna rerum sensi- 
bilium exemplaria et formae, quae propria substantia gaudent.’ Also in 
J. Bruckeri Historia critica philosophiae, Lipsiae 1742, voi. i. p. 691); 
M. G. E. Schulze (De ideis Platonis, Wittemberg 1786). 


Van 
Heusde. 


16 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


hints as to the method of scientific investigation, and that 
he was probably familiar with that theory of syllogism 
which caused Aristotle to be considered by many historians 
as the first logician. 

Tennemann’s work appeared at a time when other 
writers *? also favoured Plato in greater measure than here- 
tofore. It became generally recognised that Plato alone 
is a trustworthy witness as to his own logic, and the 
philosopher Herbart * insisted upon the importance of 
interpreting Plato by his own writings. 

The next attempt to give an account of Plato’s logic 
was made by van Heusde** in his work on Platonic 
philosophy. Van Heusde’s aim was chiefly to give an 
introduction to the reading of Plato’s dialogues. In his 
appreciation of Plato, enthusiastic as it is, there is a 
strange contempt for the theory of proof, and he sees in 
Plato’s dialogues chiefly a theory of invention. He 
forgets that no truth is really invented before it is proved. 
He neglects to prove his own assertions, and his three 
volumes are less a scientific investigation than a brilliant 
anthology from Plato’s works, with the editor’s comments 
on them. On the pretext that it is not advisable to break 
up an organic whole, van Heusde abstains from comparing 
the text of various dialogues, and limits himself to an 
epitome. He regards Plato’s logic as standing quite apart 
from later logic, and even from the logic of Aristotle. We 


 G. G. Fiilleborn, ‘ Kurze Geschichte der Logik bei den Griechen,’ in Bey- 
trage zur Geschichte der Philosophie, Ziillichau und Freystadt 1794, p. 167 ; 
K. Morgenstern, Entwurf von Platons Leben aus dem englischen tibersetzt 
und mit Zusdtzen versehen, Leipzig 1797 (from the anonymous Remarks on 
the Life and Writings of Plato, Kdinburgh 1760); J. J. Wagner, Worter- 
buch der platonischen Philosophie, Gottingen 1799 (very superficial). 

‘8 J. F. Herbart, De platonici systematis fundamento, first published 
1805, reprinted in vol. i. of Herbart’s Kleinere philosophische Schriften her. 
v. Hartenstein, Leipzig 1842; believes the theory of ideas the most impor- 
tant in Plato’s philosophy, and holds the ideas to be independent sub- 
stances. 

‘“ P. G. van Heusde, Initia philosophiae platonicae, 3 vols., Trajecti ad 
Rhenum 1827-1831-1836 ; a 2nd ed. in 1 vol., Lugduni Batavorum 1842. 


PLATO AS A LOGICIAN Ly, 


may either accept or reject it, but are not expected to 
find.a continuity in the development of logic from Plato 
down to our own times. Van Heusde thinks, and in this 
he shares the opinion of Herbart, that it is useless to seek 
a ‘logic’ in Plato’s dialogues, though they contain a 
‘philosophy of truth’ and a ‘theory of invention.’ He 
speaks throughout of a philosophy of Plato as a whole, 
without any distinction of epochs in Plato’s own develop- 
ment. He seems unaware of the possibility of inferences 
from the comparison of passages, or of such inferences 
about Plato as might go beyond the first impressions of 
an attentive reader of the dialogues. For van Heusde a 


modern representation of any part of Plato’s philosophy 


is no more than an epitome of Plato’s works. 

After the publication of the work of van Heusde, most 
writers on Plato’s logic, or on any portion of it, limited 
their attention to a small number of Plato’s works,** some- 
times to a single dialogue, and this prevented them from 
forming any idea of a logical evolution in Plato. Even 
Prantl, “* who looks upon Plato as a simple predecessor 


45 Such small contributions, which are rather commentaries on some 
passages than historical investigations, rarely show in their titles the limi- 
tation of the subject, as for instance : K. Eichhoff, Logica triwm dialogorum 
Platonisexplicata (Meno, Crito, Phaedo\, Duisburg 1854; R. Kleinpaul, Der 
Begriff der Erkenntniss in Platos Thedtet, Gotha 1867 ; Holzer, Grundziige 
der Erkenntnisstheorie in Platos Staat, Cottbus 1861; H. Dittel, Platos 
Anschawungen tiber die Methode des wissenschaftlichen Gespréchs nach 
den Dialogen Protagoras Gorgias Meno, Salzburg 1869; Fr. Schmitt, Die 
Verschiedenheit der Ideenlehre in Platos Republik und Philebus, Giessen 
1891; W. Brinckmann, Die Erkenntnisstheorie in Platons Thedtet, Berge- 
dorf Programm, Jena 1896. Other authors preferred more general titles : 
F. Ebben, De Platonis idearum doctrina, Bonn 1849; C. F. Cooper, On the 
Genius and Ideas of Plato, Gittingen 1864; P. Durdik, Wie wrtheilt 
Plato iiber das Wissen? Prag 1875; R. Wutzdorff, Die platonischen 
Ideen, Gérlitz 1875; O. Ihm, Ueber den Begriff der platonischen Sé&a und 
deren Verhidltniss zum Wissen der Ideen, Leipzig 1877; J. Wagner, Zu 
Platos Ideenlehre, Nikolsburg 1881; M. Guggenheim, Die Lehre vom 
apriorischen Wissen, Berlin 1885. 

46 Carl Prantl, ‘ Ueber die Entwickelung der Aristotelischen Logik aus 
der Platonischen Philosophie,’ p. 129 sqq., in Abhandlungen der philo- 
sophisch-philologischen Classe der kiniglich-bayerischen Akademie der 


C 


Recent 
logical 
writers. 


18 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


of Aristotle, and gives him in his history of logic an 
exceedingly. modest place, did nothing beyond collect- 
ing a very reduced number of logical quotations—chiefly 
from Plato’s latest works. He said clearly that Plato’s 
ideas had nothing to do with logic (p. 83). 

Other writers, as Janet” and Heyder, *® who compared 
Plato and Aristotle with Hegel, or Waddington, * who 
argued that Plato was wholly independent of eastern 
philosophy, or Fouillée,** who exaggerated the importance 
of the theory of ideas in Plato’s philosophy, or those who, 
like Lukas,*! treated some special problems of Plato’s 
logic,” agree in one respect: that they are ignorant of the 


Wissenschaften, viit* Band 1° Abt., Miinchen 1853; also Geschichte der 
Logik im Abendlande, vol. i. pp. 59-84, Leipzig 1855. 

Paul Janet, Ltude sur la dialectique dans Platon et dans Hegel, 
Paris 1848, 2nd ed. 1860. On the same subject: A. Vera, Platonis, Aris- 
totelis et Hegel de medio termino doctrina, Paris 1845. 

4 Carl L. W. Heyder, Kritische Darstellung und Vergleichung der 
Methoden aristotelischer und hegelscher Dialektik, Erlangen 1845; on Plato 
pp. 59-131; and by the same author: Die Lehre von den Ideen, Frankfurt 
a. M. 1874, wherein only pp. 4-12 deal with Plato. 

* ©. Waddington, Hssais de Logique, Paris 1857 (lecons faites a la 
Sorbonne 1848-1856). In this book, p. 81: Essai ili. De la découverte du 
syllogisme. On p. 93 the author asserts that the word syllogismos is 
unknown in Greece before Aristotle. This is an error, for the word 
occurs in the Cratylus and in the Theaetetws, as the author could have 
easily seen from Ast’s Lexicon Platonicum. Such an error appears quite 
natural when we know that the same author thirty years later thought that 
Serranus edited in Bale in 1578 an edition of Plato ‘qui fait encore 
autorité ’ (Séances et travaux de l Académie des sciences morales, tome 126, 
p. 5: Ch. Waddington, ‘ De l’authenticité des écrits de Platon,’ Paris 1886). 
Anybody who studies Plato knows that the edition of 1578, published in 
Geneva, not in Bale, by Stephanus and not by Serranus, has no authority 
whatever in comparison with the editions of Bekker, Hermann, and 
Schanz. 

6° Alfred Fouillée, La philosophie de Platon, Paris 1869, 2nd ed. Paris 
1888, 4 vols., of which vol. i. contains ‘ Théorie des idées et de l’amour.’ 

3. FB. Lukas, Die Methode der Eintheilung bei Platon, Halle 1888, deals 
only with nine dialogues, but represents very completely the theory and 
practice of classification used in these works. 

52 On special parts of Plato’s Logic there are some very valuable con- 
tributions: J. R. Lichtenstidt, Platons Lehren auf dem Gebiet der 
Naturforschung und der Heilkunde, Leipzig 1826 (pp. 85-96 ; ‘ Empfinden 
und Wahrnehmen’); L. Dissen, De arte combinatoria in Platonis Theaeteto, 


PLATO AS A LOGICIAN 19 


decisive distinction between the philosopher’s earlier and 
later writings. 

On the other hand, the problem of the chronology of 
Plato’s dialogues was much discussed by writers more 
interested in the philological details, or in the historical 
allusions of Plato’s dialogues, than in his logic. Some- 
times, as in the voluminous works of H. Ritter and 
Brandis,** the chronology was discussed without any 
bearing on the subsequent exposition of Plato’s philosophy. 
K. F. Hermann acknowledged a gradual development of 
Plato’s thoughts, and intended to give an account of this 
development, but he published no more than the first 
volume of his work, and treated in it only the chronology 
of Plato’s writings, not the evolution of his philosophy. 

The first to attempt a combination of both problems 


Gottingen 1836, reprinted in: Kleine lateinische und deutsche Schriften, 
Gottingen 1839; G. Bode, Materia apud Platonem qualem habeat vim 
atque naturam, Neu Ruppin 1853; C. Kiesel, De ratione quam Plato arti 
mathematicae cwm dialectica intercedere voluerit, Koln 1840. Of the same 
author: De primis artis logicae praeceptis Platone duce tradendis, 1851 ; 
Hxempla ad illustrandam concludendi doctrinam ex Platonis libris, Diissel- 
dorf 1857; and De conclusionibus platonicis, Diisseldorf 1863; Martinius, 
Ueber die Fragestellung in den Dialogen Platos, Norden 1871; Th. Kock, 
‘Hin Kapitel aus der formalen Logik, angewendet auf Aristoteles und 
Platon’ (in Hermes, vol. xvili. pp. 546-557, Berlin 1883); Saueressig, 
Ueber die Definitionslehre Platos, Oberehnheim 1884; A. Beckmann, Nwm 
Plato artefactorwm ideas statuerit, Bonn 1889. On Plato’s relation to Kant : 
J. Heidemann, Platonis de ideis doctrinam quomodo Kantius et intellexerit et 
excoluerit, Berolini 1863 ; Stickel, Der Begriff der Idee bei Kant wnd bei 
Plato, Rostock 1869; C. Fuchs, Die Idee bei Plato und Kant, Wiener 
Neustadt 1886. On Aristotle and Plato: Fr. Michelis, De Aristotele Platonis 
in idearum doctrina adversario, Brunsbergae 1864; H. Cazac, Polémique 
@ Aristote contre la théorie platonicienne des idées, Tarbes 1889; A. Biach, 
‘ Aristoteles Lehre von der sinnlichen Erkenntniss in ihrer Abhangigkeit 
yon Plato’ in Philosophische Monatshefte, vol. xxvi. pp. 270-287, Heidel- 
berg 1890. 

53 H. Ritter, Geschichte der Philosophie alter Zeit, Hamburg 1836-38. 
The author settles the chronology and authenticity of Plato’s writings in 
vol. ii. pp. 159-208, but in his later account of Plato’s logic on pp. 259- 
388 makes no use of the order of Plato’s work recognised by him. Also 
Brandis, Handbuch der Geschichte der griechisch-rinvischen Philosophie, 
vol. ii. Berlin 1844, accepts a certain order of Plato’s dialogues on pp. 161- 
179, but makes no use of that order in his account of Plato’s Philosophy. 


c 2 


Philo- 
logical 
inquiries. 


Ueberweg 


20 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


was Susemihl,*! who represented the philosophical theories 
of each dialogue separately, in what appeared to him to 
be the historical order of their composition. Susemihl’s 
work was not limited to Plato’s logic, and it consisted 
chiefly in an epitome of each dialogue, with commentaries 
on the theories contained in it. He laid no special stress 
on logic, and at the time of writing did not perceive the 
true order of the dialogues as clearly as he perceived it 
afterwards.” 

After Susemihl, the relation between the philological 
question of the chronology of dialogues and the philo- 
sophical aim of understanding the growth of the theories 
contained in these dialogues was insisted upon by 
Michelis,®* but he dedicates only a few pages of his work 
to the logic of Plato, dealing chiefly, like Ribbing,™ 
with the theory of ideas. 

Ueberweg,” in his treatment of the chronological 
problem, has shown that the comparison of logical 


51 BF. Susemihl, Die genetische Entwickelung der platonischen Philo- 
sophie, Leipzig 1855-1857-1860, represents the Sophist and Politicus as 
earlier than the Banquet and Republic. The same opinion is held by 
S. Ribbing, Genetische Darstellung der platonischen Ideenlehre, Leipzig 1863— 
64 (first published in Swedish at Upsala in 1858), and by W. Rosenkrantz, 
Die Wissenschaft des Wissens, Miinchen 1866-68, vol. ii. pp. 1-54: ‘ Ueber 
die platonische Ideenlehre.’ The‘ genetische Methode ’ had been previously 
advocated by Hermann (Geschichte wid System der Platonischen Philo- 
sophie, It Theil, Heidelberg 1839), but he did not fulfil his promise of a 
systematical exposition of Plato’s philosophy. 

55 Susemihl has changed his former opinions under the influence of later 
investigations, and he recognised in 1884 (Wochenschrift fiir Klassische 
Philologie, 1° Jahrgang, Leipzig 1884, p. 523, in a review of Peipers’ 
Ontologia Platonica) that the Sophist and the Politicus were written after 
the Repwhblic. 

56 F. Michelis, Die Philosophie Platons in ihrer mmneren Beziehung zur 
geoffenbarten Wahrheit, Miinster 1859-60; the author held the Sophist 
and Politicus, as well as the Parmenides, to be earlier than the Republic, 
and even than the Banquet, Phaedo, and Phaedrus. 

57 Ueberweg’s Untersuchungen tiber die Echtheit und Zeitfolge Platoni- 
scher Schriften, Wien 1861, is one of the most important works on the 
subject of Plato’s writings. The only authors before Ueberweg who 
believed the Sophist to be later than the Republic were G. F. W. Suckow 
(Die wissenschaftliche und kiinstlerische Form der platonischen Schriften, 


PLATO AS A LOGICIAN yeaa 


theories is of importance in determining the order of 
the dialogues ; and on that basis he was the first to show 
the very late date of the Sophist and Politicus, which had 
been almost unanimously placed by former philologers 
earlier than the Republic, and by most of them even 
earlier than the Banquet. But Ueberweg limited his 
valuable observations to a few dialogues, and to a few 
striking logical opinions expressed in them. After him 
many writers touched upon different points of Plato’s logic, 
without attempting to give a full account of it and of the 
changes which took place in his logical theories. 

In 1873 the philosophical faculty of the University of 
Gottingen offered a prize for a work on the Platonic 
dialectic. The prize was awarded to a brief dissertation 
on this subject by Oldenberg.** The author tried to find 
a difference between the earlier and the later dialectic 
of Plato, but he neglected Ueberweg’s arguments, and 
ignored Campbell’s introduction to the Sophist and to 
the Politicus; so that, under the influence of the pre- 
vailing authority of Schleiermacher and Hermann, he 
conceived the form of dialectic which appears in the 
Sophist and Politicus to be earlier than that in the 
fiepublic. This he might have avoided, had he cared to 
compare the Laws with these dialogues. 

The general inclination to limit the inquiry to a few 
dialogues has led some authors to strange extravagances : 


Berlin 1855) and Ed. Munk (Die natiirliche Ordnung der platonischen 
Schriften, Berlin 1856), but they thought so chiefly because they imagined 
the conversations between Socrates and his pupils as written in the same 
order as they had been held, and the Sophist is the continuation of the 
Theaetetus at the end of which Socrates goes to meet the accusation of 
Meletus. 

58 H. Oldenberg, De Platonis arte dialectica, Gottingae 1873, very super- 
ficial. Besides this, another dissertation on the same subject, by J. Wolff, 
was also awarded a prize by the philosophical faculty at Géttingen, and 
published in the Zeitschrift fiir Philosophie wnd philosophische Kritik, 
vol. Ixiv. pp. 200-253, vol. lxv. pp. 12-34, and vol. lxvi. pp. 69-85, 185-220 
(Johannes Wolff: ‘Die platonische Dialektik, ihr Wesen und ihr Werth 
fiir die menschliche Erkenntniss’). But Wolff did not understand the 
importance of chronology and he misunderstood Plato in many points. 


Oldenberg 


Peipers 


22 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


as, for instance, in disguising the restricted ground of 
their investigations under very promising titles. D. 
Peipers*? wrote more than seven hundred pages of com- 
mentary ona single dialogue, the Theaetetus, and he divided 
his work into such parts as ‘ Consideration of the second 
part of the Theaetetus, and ‘Consideration of the third 
part of the Theaetetus,’ closing it with a ‘ Consideration 
of the first part of the Theaetetus.’ He devoted to com- 
parisons with other dialogues about one-eighth of his 
volume: not more, in fact, than anybody should have 
given in a good commentary on any single dialogue. 
This very conscientious commentary of Peipers’ is styled 
Erkenntnisstheorie Platos, a misleading title, which has 
so completely deceived some reviewers that, for instance, 
Stein,” in his short history of the Greek theory of know- 
ledge, says that the Platonic theory of knowledge has found 
in Peipers an able exponent. Peipers himself, though 
his work was received by philological reviewers with the 
ereatest consideration,®! writing at a later date on the 
ontology of Plato, gave—not a commentary on some other 
dialogue, but—an exposition of the ontological and of 
some logical theories of Plato, in their chronological order. 
And he had the great merit of finding by this method, 
quite independently of others who had earlier arrived at 
the same result, that the Sophist, the Politicus, and the 
Philebus are later than the Republic. 

Since Peipers, nobody has attempted to give a full 


5 D. Peipers, Die Erkenntnisstheorie Platos, Leipzig 1874. 

6 Li. Stein, Die Hrkenntnisstheorie der Stoa, Berlin 1888, contains, 
pp. 70-77, a short chapter, ‘ Platos Erkenntnisstheorie.’ 

% Susemihl in Bursians Jahresbericht, vol. iii. p. 309, says that Peipers’ 
work is ‘tief eindringend und scharfsinnig gearbeitet, klar und schén 
geschrieben.’ KR. Hirzel in Jenaer Literaturzeitung, 2° Jahrg. Jena 1875, 
p. 469, recognises in Peipers’ work ‘Scharfsinn, Methode, Wissen, 
Klarheit, Durchsichtigkeit,’ and H. Schmidt, in vol. cxi. pp. 477-487 of the 
Jalrbiicher fiir classische Philologie (Leipzig 1875), admits the ‘ Griind- 
lichkeit, Tiefe, Klarheit’ of the same. Not one of these reviewers com- 
plained about the misleading title, as if it were quite natural to name a 
commentary to a single dialogue Hrkenntnisstheorie Platos. 


° 


PLATO AS A LOGICIAN 23 


account of Plato’s logic, but among the recent writers on 
Plato’s philosophy H. Jackson™ has confirmed Ueberweg’s 
and Peipers’ finding as to the late date of the dialectical 
dialogues according to the modification of the theory 
of ideas they contain; and A. Benn® by independent 
observations found in the Sophist the transition from 
the Platonic to the Aristotelian logic, thus implying that 
the Sophist and Philebus were written later than the 
Republic, which contains the classical theory of ideas 
nearly in the form which is criticised by Aristotle. Benn 
also insisted upon the very important fact, that the so- 
called doctrine of ideas was by no means the chief logical 
theory of Plato, and that in his later works his earlier 
opinions are considerably modified. But it did not form 
part of the scope of Benn’s work to give a detailed 
account of these changes, and thus the history of Plato’s 
logical evolution remains as yet untold. Nothwithstand- 
ing the many defenders of Plato’s logical merits, there 
are still historians of logic, as for instance Franck, Kuno 
Fischer, Rabus, Hirzel, who choose to see in Aristotle 
the founder of that science.™ 


® H. Jackson, ‘ Plato’s later theory of ideas,’ in the Jowrnal of Philology, 
vols. X., Xi., xiii., xiv., xv., London 1882-86. 

8% A. W. Benn, The Greek Philosophers, London 1882, vol. i. p. 264. 

5! Plato’s logical merits have been insisted upon by T. G. Danzel (Plato 
philosophiae in formam disciplinae redactae parens et auctor, Lipsiae 1845), 
J.B. Tissandier (Examen critique de la Psychologie de Platon, Paris 1851), 
L. Szezerbowicz (Parmenides filozof z Elei, Warszawa 1868, p. 38), and in 
general histories of logic by C. F. Bachmann (System der Logik, Leipzig 
1828), Troxler (Logik, Stuttgart 1829-1830, 3 vols.), Ch. Renouvier (Manuel 
de philosophie ancienne, Paris 1844), H. Siebeck (‘Die Anfiinge der Erkennt- 
nisslehre in der griechischen Philosophie’ in Zeitschrift fiir exacte 
Philosophie, vol. vii. pp. 357-380, Leipzig 1867), Giov. Cesca (La teorica 
della conoscenza nella filosofia greca, Verona 1887). 

® Aristotle is estimated as the founder of logic by Fr. Calker (Denklehre, 
Bonn 1822), Ad. Franck (EHsquwisse d’wne histoire de la logique, Paris 1838), 
Kuno Fischer (Logik und Metaphysik, Stuttgart 1852), L. Rabus (Logik und 
Metaphysik, Erlangen 1868), R. Hirzel (‘De logica Stoicorum’ in Satura 
philologa, Hermanno Sauppio obtulit amicorwm decas, Berolini 1879). 
What K. Fischer ascribes only to modern philosophy, ‘die freie voraus- 
setzungslose Hrkenntniss’ (p. 17), is to be found already in Plato. 


Differ- 
ences of 
opinions 
about 
Plato’s 
logic. 


24 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


Besides the authors named, a great number have 
written in general terms on Plato’s dialectic, promising 
more in the titles of their works than they could give. 


65 Many works bearing on their titles the name of Plato do not really 
belong to Platonic bibliography, because they contain nothing of any im- 
portance for our knowledge of Plato. Some authors of popular histories of 
philosophy writing about Plato invent freely what they think will interest: 
their readers. Aston Leigh (The Story of Philosophy, London 1881) counts 
among Plato’s pupils Isocrates, his rival and enemy, and regrets that Plato 
was born before his time. A. Lefévre (La philosophie, Paris 1879) makes 
Plato a sceptic. To the same class belongs Courdaveaux (La philosophie 
grecque mise d la portée de tous, Paris 1855). Some other authors go still 
farther in their imagination: E. Welper (Platon und seine Zeit, Kassel 1866) 
represents Plato as defending himself against the love of a girl unknown to 
history, and selling olive-oil in Egypt. E. 1’Ollivier (La méthode de Platon, 
Paris 1883) pays a visit to Plato in the Champs Elysées, where he meets 
him in company of Plotinus and Proclus, speaking Latin. A. T. Haymann 
(Ariston Platon, sein Leben und Wirken im Lichte seiner Zeit, Dresden 
1871) makes the discovery that Plato began at an early age to learn Greek, 
and accumulates within a few pages an incredible number of blunders, though 
he quotes as his source of information Brockhaus’ Conversationslexicon. 
J. de Sales (Ma République, auteur Platon, Paris 1790) and another anony- 
mous author (Platone in Italia, Milano 1804) use the name of Plato to give 
authority to their political predictions. G.A. Heigl (Die platonische Dialek- 
tik, Landshut 1812) mixes up fragments of Plato’s dialogues with his own 
inventions. Enoch Pond (Plato : his Life, Works, Opinions, Portland, Maine 
1847) finds as the chief result of his study of Plato (in Taylor’s trans- 
lation) ‘the divine origin and unspeakable importance of the Bible.’ The 
same conclusion is reached by Dietrich Becker (Das philosophische System 
Platons in seiner Beziehung zum christlichen Dogma, Freiburg. 1862), and 
R. Bobertag (De ratione inter spiritum sanctum et mentem hwmanam ex 
Platonis philosophia intercedente, Vratislaviae 1824). Among books on 
Plato for general readers, G. P. Weygoldt (Die Platonische Philosophie 
nach threm Wesen und ihren Schicksalen fiir hihergebildete aller Stdénde 
dargestellt, Leipzig 1885) has happily avoided striking errors, while 
A. Arnold (Platons Werke einzeln erklirt und in ihrem Zusammenhange 
dargestellt, Berlin 1835-1836, Erfurt 1855; System der platonischen Philo- 
sophie, Erfurt 1858 ; Hinleitwng in die Philosophie durch die Lehre Platos 
vermittelt, Berlin 1841) undertook a task exceeding his knowledge. Besides 
these works there has always been idle talk on Plato in many smaller 
dissertations: G. Schultgen (De Platonis arte dialectica, Wesel 1829) ; 
C. F. Wieck (De Platonica philosophia, Merseburgi 1830); Fr. Hoffmann 
(Die Dialekttk Platons, Miinchen 1832); F. W. Braut (Bemerkungen iiber 
die platonische Lehre vom Lernen als einer Wiedererinnerung, Brandenburg 
1832); H. Brueggemann (De artis dialecticae, qua Plato sibi viam ad 
scientiam vert munivit, forma ac ratione, Berolini 1838); C. Kiihn (De 
dialectica Platonis, Berolini 1843) give much less than might be expected 


PLATO AS A LOGICIAN 25 


Of such contributions to Platonic literature, most are 
devoted to the discussion about Platonic ideas, which 
are held by some to be independent substances,” by others 
to be God’s thoughts,® and again by others to be certain 


from the titles, and do very little more than collect quotations without order 
or method. R. Doehn (De speculativo logices platonicae principio, Gryphiae 
1845) gives a series of comparisons between Plato and other philosophers 
from Anaximander to Hegel. Carl Giinther (‘ Betrachtungen iiber die pla- 
tonische Dialektik ’ in Philologus, Band v. pp. 36-84, Géttingen 1850) and 
E. Alberti (‘ Zur Dialektik des Plato,’ pp. 112-168 in I* Supp. Band of 
Jahrbiicher fiir classische Philologie, Leipzig 1855) have been at least 
more modest in the title of their articles, and Alberti acknowledges that he 
wrote more for his own pleasure than for his readers’ benefit. E.Schulte’s 
Platos Lehre von der Erkenntniss, Fiirstenwalde 1868, is a jest, because 
the reader, whose expectations have been raised by the title, is disappointed 
when he finds some pages of comments on certain passages of a single 
dialogue. F. Faber (De wniversa cognitionis lege, qualem Plato statwit, cum 
aristotelea comparata, Vratislaviae 1865) causes a similar disappointment 
to the reader; and O. Caspari (Die Irrthiimer der altclassischen Philo- 
sophen in ihrer Bedeutung fiir das philosophische Princip, Heidelberg 
1868) seems to know Plato only from references. Schnippel (Die Haupt- 
epochen in der Entwickelung der Erkenntnissprobleme, Gera 1874) gives 
only a summary of the Theaetetus. C. A. Funke (Die Lehre Platos von 
den Seelenvermigen, Paderborn 1878) accuses Plato ‘keinen Begriff vom 
Ich gehabt zu haben.’ Carl Schmelzer (Hine Verteidigung Platos, Bonn 
1885) thinks that Plato’s political theories are not meant seriously, and 
have to be taken as jokes. All these writings, quoted here only to show 
how Plato’s name is abused, are not worth reading. 

87 The ideas were explained as self-existing substances after Herbart 
chiefly by L. Wienbarg (De primitivo idearum platonicarum sensu, Marburgi 
1829), F. W. Graser (Ueber Platos Ideenlehre, Torgau 1861), T. Maguire 
(An essay on the Platonic idea, London 1866), Alfr. Fouillée (Histoire de la 
philosophie, Paris 1875, p. 90), Aemilius Kramm (De ideis Platonis a Lotzet 
judicio defensis, Halae 1879), Al. Chiappelli (Della interpretazione pan- 
teistica di Platone, Firenze 1881, p. 131), W. Pater (Plato and Platonism, 
London 1893), and Zeller. 

68 The old explanation of ideas as of God’s thoughts is upheld in this 
century by Stallbaum (Platonis Parmenides cura G. Stallbawmi, Prolego- 
mena p. 266, and in many other Prolegomena to Platonic dialogues), 
H. F. Richter (De ideis Platonis, Lipsiae 1827), L. Lefrane (De la critique 
des idées platoniciennes par Aristote, Paris 1843), R. Blakey (Historical 
Sketch of Logic, Edinburgh 1851), J. Felix Nourisson (Quid Plato de ideis 
senserit, Lutetiae Parisiorum, 1852. Exposition de la théorie platonicienne 
des idées, Paris 1858), Alfred Fouillée (in his earlier work La Philosophie 
de Platon, Paris 1869), G. Behncke (Platos Ideenlehre im Lichte der 
aristotelischen Metaphysik, Berlin 1873), W. T. Harris (‘ Plato’s Dialectic 


26 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


notions of the human mind.® These differences of 
opinion upon a subject so frequently dealt with by Plato 


and Doctrine of Ideas’ in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, January 
1888, pp. 94-112, April 1888, pp. 113-117). 

® That the Platonic ideas are neither substances nor God’s thoughts, 
but a kind of notions of the human mind, was first supposed in modern 
times by Kant in his Kritik der reinen Vernunft (p. 370 of second edition of 
1787), in so far as he alluded to the possibility of ‘ eine mildere Auslegung’ 
of what Plato said about ideas, Kant’s indication has been followed out 
by G. Faehse (De ideis Platonis, Lipsiae 1795) and also arrived at - 
independently by Tennemann. Then Trendelenburg (Platonis de ideis et 
numeris doctrina ex Aristotele illustrata, Lipsiae 1826), after a careful 
comparison of all quotations from Aristotle, proved that only a wrong 
interpretation of some passages could have led to the supposition 
that the ideas are self-subsistent substances. Trendelenburg thinks: ‘si 
sunt ideae a rebus sejunctae nec tamen alicubi extra eas positae, nihil 
restat, nisi ut menti insint’ (p. 45), which leads him to give that ‘ mildere 
Auslegung’ of ideas to which Kant alluded. Trendelenburg’s argument 
is the more important, inasmuch as he builds his conclusions on the text 
of Aristotle, while the same text wrongly interpreted leads Zeller to admit 
that Plato held his ideas to be substances existing apart from objects of 
experience. Trendelenburg’s view was also sustained by J. G. Mussmann 
(De idealismo sive philosophia ideal, Berolini 1826), Dr. Schmidt (Ueber die 
Ideen des Plato, Quedlinburg 1835), H. Ritter and Brandis (see above note 53). 
After these historians came a very important dissertation of C. Levéque 
(Quid Phidiae Plato debuerit, Parisiis 1852), in which the analogy between 
the philosophic ideas and the ‘in mente insita aeternae pulchritudinis 
effigies ’ was shown with great skill. <A similar argumentation led Hermann 
Cohen (‘ Die Platonische Ideenlehre,’ pp. 403-464 in vol. iv. of the Zeit- 
schrift fiir Vilkerpsychologie, Berlin 1866), independently of Levéque, to 
the understanding that the ideas were ‘ geschaut’ by Plato in the same way 
as the artist sees in his own thoughts the work he intends to produce. But 
Cohen still believed that for Plato each idea was a substance, and only later 
(Platons Ideenlehre und die Mathematik, Marburg 1879) he came to accept 
Lotze’s interpretation (Lotze, Logik, Leipzig 1874, p. 501), according to 
which the ovcia of ideas is only a ‘gelten,’ not a separate substantial 
existence. The idea as a general notion has been also accepted by 
J. Steger (Platonische Studien, Innsbruck 1869-1872, part 1 p. 39), Carl 
Heyder (Die Lehre von den Ideen, Frankfurt a. M. 1874, p. 5: ‘der 
Ausgangspunkt der Ideenlehre war jedenfalls wie nach der einen Seite ein 
logischer, das im Begriff gedachte Allgemeine und Beharvrliche, so anderer- | 
seits ein ontologisch-metaphysischer ; denn dies Allgemeine und Unwandel- 
bare in der Vielheit und in der Verinderung der Erscheinungen ist zugleich 
das wahre Sein und Wesen der Sache’), Dieck (Untersuchung zur plato- 
nischen Ideenlehre, Naumburg 1876, develops Lotze’s view), G. M. Bertini 
(Nuova interpretazione delle idee Platoniche, Torino 1876, p. 18: ‘ quando 
Platone dice che le idee sono, non le trasforma con cid in sostanze individue, 


PLATO AS A LOGICIAN OT 


are plainly due to the neglect of chronology, without 
which a scientific exposition of Plato’s logic or of any 
other part of his philosophy is impossible. 

The works of our predecessors contain valuable hints 
of the way in which Plato’s logic should be studied. 
First of all, most modern writers on the subject advise us 
to trust only Plato himself as to his own logical theories, 
and not to be deluded by later writers, who, without 
a scientific method of investigation, attributed to him 
opinions absent from his writings. A philosopher who 
spent more than fifty years in composing and polishing 
works which are well preserved, may be assumed to have 


Inferences 
from the 
literature 
on Plato’s 
logic. 


expressed his views in them almost as fully as in his oral ° 


teaching, about which we have no direct testimony beyond 
a vague allusion in Aristotle. 

We also see clearly from existing works on the logic 
of Plato that it is indispensable to take into account the 
order of his writings, because we may reasonably expect 
him to have progressed during his long life, and because 
between some of his dialogues there exist contradictions 
so important as to have led Socher and Schaarschmidt to 
doubt the authenticity of the Parmenides, Sophist, Politi- 
cus, and Philebus. If we wish to obtain a clear repre- 
sentation of Plato’s logic we cannot follow Peipers in 
limiting our study to one dialogue; we must include in 


ma dice solo che esse hanno realita in quel modo che possono averla, senza 
cessare di essere quello che sono, cioé idee . . . essenze, forme necessaria- 
mente possibili, ef. p. 79, ibidem), Th. Achelis (‘ Kritische Darstellung der 
platonischen Ideenlehre,’ pp. 90-113 in vol. Ixxix. of the Zeitschrift fiir 
Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, Halle 1881, accepts Lotze’s view), 
August Auffarth (Die platonische Ideenlehre, Berlin 1883, develops the views 
of Cohen and credits Plato with the merit of having been the first representa- 
tive of critical idealism), G. Schneider (Die platonische Metaphysik, Leipzig 
1884, p. 54: ‘Ideen sind ein eigenthiimliches Besitzthum des menschlichen 
Geistes ’), P. Shorey (De Platonis idearum doctrina atque mentis 
humanae notionibus commentatio, Miinchen 1884), F. Weber (Die Entste- 
hung des Begriffes der Idee bei Platon, Briix 1888), ete. This survey 
shows that the great majority of competent Platonists after Tennemann 
have abandoned the old theory of ideas as substances, and only Zeller, in 
dealing with this question as with many others, remains too conservative. 


Zeller’s 
objections, 


28 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


our examination all the dialogues where logical doctrines 
are found. These two conditions, (1) the distinction be- 
tween the age of each dialogue and (2) the inclusion of all 
Plato’s works in the study of each part of his philosophy, 
have never yet been fulfilled by those who have written 
upon this subject. The importance of these two condi- 
tions will appear in their true ight when applied, but it 
is manifest that a scientific knowledge of Plato’s logic is 
impossible unless we form our judgment at least upon all 
his more important works, and unless we know the stages 
through which his thought reached its final shape. 

Some objections to the aim of our study are raised by 
a scholar whose competence and command of Plato are 
incontestable, and whose opinion, therefore, should be well 
weighed before venturing upon a path condemned by 
him. Zeller agrees with van Heusde’s opinion, according 
to which it is unjustifiable to form an artificial system of 
logic by collecting the logical theories which we find 
scattered through the philosopher’s writings. If Zeller 
be right, all attempts to argue about Plato’s logic are 
superfluous, and deserve no attention from historians of 
philosophy. They are condemned beforehand on this 
showing as a useless logical exercise that can lead to no 
scientific result. Zeller himself, in his extensive work on 
Plato, ignores Plato’s logic as such, while he blends 
logical, ethical, metaphysical, psychological problems in 
accordance, as he thinks, with Plato’s own indications. 
He begins with the theory of perception and imagination, 
then deals with virtue, with love, with the formation of 
concepts and their division ; he treats in one page of the 
logical rules of Plato, and proceeds to the theory of 
language, of ideas, and of moral aims, then states 
Plato’s views on matter, reason, and necessity, the 
world’s soul, the world’s beginning and the constitution 
of the stars, the soul’s immortality and metempsychosis, 
the freedom of the will, the relation between body and 
soul, and so forth. 


PLATO AS A LOGICIAN 29 


Now, although a reading of Zeller’s work does not 
give the impression of discontinuity produced by the 
above enumeration, everybody who knows Plato under- 
stands at once that this order of matters selected by 
Zeller is his own invention and cannot be supported by 
Plato’s authority, nor can it give a more faithful idea of 
Plato’s philosophy than a systematic exposition. Zeller 
condemns Tennemann’s work because he represented 
Plato’s philosophy according to modern divisions, which, 
as Zeller thinks, led him into inaccuracies and induced 
him to attribute to Plato thoughts which were not his. 
Every other division of an exposition of Plato’s philo- 
sophy leads to the same danger, and, if we wish to leave 
Plato’s views unchanged by our systematic prejudice, 
the safest plan is to present Platonic philosophy in 
the form of a mere epitome of his dialogues. Many 
authors, in writing on the philosophy of Plato—as, 
for instance, Grote—have thus understood their task. 
But such analyses contain but the repetition of Plato’s 
works; they give no new results. Even had Plato left a 
systematic work on logic we could not be bound by the 
order of his exposition in our historical account. 

The aim of an investigation on the history of philo- 
sophy is not to repeat or to epitomise what each 
philosopher said in his works, for then the best history 
would be a faithful edition of the chief texts. Our aim 
in investigating the logic of Plato is to learn what the 
philosopher thought, even though he gave no full expres- 
sion to his thoughts. This constitutes the labour of the 
historian in all departments—to manifest a reality not 
fully given by any single witness, to draw inferences 
from facts, and in this way to produce new truths. 
In the history of philosophy we are expected to offer a 
better understanding of a philosopher’s thoughts than 
could be immediately derived from the mere reading of 
his writings. 

A philosopher, whom all must admit to be a com- 


Aim of the 
history 

of philo- 
sophy. 


Historical 
method in 
philo- 
sophy. 


Psycho- 
logical 
evolution 


of a philo- 


sopher. 


30 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


petent witness, Kant,” recognised this possibility and 
explained it, pointing out that we may understand a 
philosopher better than he understood himself, just as by 
means of scientific method we understand the properties 
of any being better than they could be understood by the 
being itself. If we wish to gain a scientific knowledge 
of a plant or an animal, we seek to determine its chief 
properties and their interdependence. Then only do we 
obtain scientific knowledge, very much higher than any 
knowledge derived from external description. We seek 
to show by what properties a particular object is dis- 
tinguished from all others and how these properties were 
developed. Taking a philosopher as an object of scientific 
study, we may ask many questions of no interest to him, 
and not directly answered in his writings. We need not 
repeat his mere words nor describe his writings, because 
all such descriptions teach us no more than the works 
themselves. We need not fear to join what is separated 
nor to sunder what is united in his works, if the sunder- 
ing and joining be done upon a rational principle, and if 
the relative date of each expression of opinion be borne in 
mind. 

Our aim is to get an insight into the psychological * 
evolution of our philosopher, though he nowhere mentions 
his evolution—though he disregarded his change of con- 
victions and perhaps even attempted to conceal such 
changes. We seek the true meaning, the bases and conse- 
quences of his theories, though he may mention them 
only occasionally or may give no importance to them. 
We desire to trace the origin of what we admit to be 
important truths of our science, though, at the outset, 


7 Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Riga 1787, p.370: ‘Ich merke nur 
an, dass es gar nichts Ungewoéhnliches sei, sowohl im gemeinen Gesprach 
als in Schriften, durch die Vergleichung der Gedanken, welche ein Verfasser 
iiber seinen Gegenstand iussert, ihn sogar besser zu verstehen als er sich 
selbst verstand, indem er seinen Begriff nicht genugsam bestimmte, und 
dadurch bisweilen seiner eigenen Absicht entgegen redete oder auch 
dachte.’ 


PLATO AS A LOGICIAN aL 


they may not have been expressed with a full knowledge 
of their importance. 

Just as the notion of a heavy body is other in ana- 
lytical mechanics than in current talk, so the scientific 
knowledge of a philosopher differs from the first im- 
pression obtained by reading his works. Those historians 
who, when speaking of Plato, object. to the use of 
the word logic, on the plea that this word was not 
used by him, do not write history: they merely collect 
quotations. Such historical writings always give the 
unprejudiced reader the impression of vain labour, of an 
unskilful repetition of texts. In investigating the history 
of human thought, our object is not only to ascertain 
facts, but to explain their causation. An historian of 
philosophy can do this better than the philosopher in- 
vestigated, since he can make comparisons that are impos- 
sible to the philosopher himself. It is true that a certain 
subjective element enters into every historical study. 
We may suspect that Plato’s idea of his logical system 
differed from the idea we form of it. But if our idea 
corresponds to the true meaning of Plato’s thoughts, and 
if we attribute to him nothing against his testimony, then 
our appreciation of his system may be more trustworthy 
than his own. Possibly he did not always perceive the 
deeper connection between all his thoughts, but there is a 
bond uniting them, which gives the key to his detached 
opinions. 

Thus Tennemann and Prantl understood their task, 
and though their knowledge of Plato’s logic remained in- 
complete, there is a marked progress between the first and 
the second in eliminating the subjective element, though 
neither cared to preserve in his exposition the accidental 
order in which Plato’s logical hints are found in his own 
dialogues. To admit beforehand that an historian must 
have some subjectivity is simpler than to persuade our 
readers that we take from Plato himself the systematic 
order which allows us fully to understand his logic. 


True 
knowledge 
of a philo- 
sopher not 
attained 
by mere 
reading 

of his 
works. 


Logical 
questions 
subsidiary 
to other 
problems. 


The know- 
ledge of 
the true 
order of 
Plato’s 
dialogues 
indispens- 
able for an 
apprecia- 
tion of his 
logical 
develop- 
ment. 


Plato was 
the first 
logician, 
and he 
produced 
two suc- 
cessive 
logical 
theories. 


a2 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


Plato never professes to teach logic; he always intro- 
duces logical questions as subsidiary to psychological, 
metaphysical, and ethical problems. To understand his 
logic we must first determine the changes and the pro- 
eress of his logical views; and this cannot be done with- 
out a careful investigation into the chronology of his 
dialogues. 

The majority of writers dealing with Platonic chro- 
nology had no special interest in his logic: those who 
were interested in his logic seem to have been unaware 
of the importance of the chronological distinctions. It 
is our task to unite both aims, and to show how the 
study of Plato’s logic yields definitive truths as to the 
chronological order of his writings, and how by the 
knowledge of this order we may obtain a deeper insight 
into his logical development. Compared with other 
philosophical sciences, logic has the privilege of steadier 
progress. It is not uncommon to see changes in meta- 
physical convictions occurring in opposite directions—as, 
for instance, from pantheism to spiritualism, and from 
spiritualism to pantheism, from free will to necessity, and 
from necessity to free will. But it is inconceivable that 
a philosopher who had reached the stage of logical reflec- 
tion should fall back into illogical dogmatism, or that 
anybody could forget or cease to apply logical methods 
once found and tested. 

Plato was the first thinker to appreciate the import- 
ance of logic,—not only to seek the truth, but to ask why 
the truth was true, and how it. could safely be distin- 
guished from error. He insisted throughout his works 
on the difference between knowledge and opinion, and 
attempted through more than one solution to fix the limits 
where knowledge begins. His first solution of that problem 
is known as the theory of ideas, and is generally believed 
to have remained his unique theory of knowledge. This 
belief is produced chiefly by the prejudice which prevented 
the great majority of readers from studying, with all the 


PLATO AS A LOGICIAN 33 


attention they deserve, those dialogues which contain a 
new theory of knowledge, differing from the theory of ideas. 
Plato is chiefly known by his poetical masterpieces, the 
Banquet, the Phaedo, and the Republic. His dialectical 
dialogues, the Sophist, the Politicus, the Philebus, being 
more difficult to understand, have not been so widely 
studied. The general assumption is that they were 
written earlier than the poetical masterpieces, and that 
they are less noteworthy. It becomes of the first 1mpor- 
tance to solve this problem: whether the poetical logic of 
the Republic or the dialectical logic of the Sophist is the 
definitive teaching of Plato. 

This is no mere historical question. The two con- 
flicting views on logic are as opposed as ever. Does 
knowledge always exist ? and is our acquisition of it only 
the discovery of pre-existing knowledge ? Oris knowledge 
created by us, produced by our own exertions, not existent 
save in our own minds? ‘The former hypothesis may be 
named idealistic, the latter psychological. 

Plato and his great pupil Aristotle are generally 
counted among the idealists, notwithstanding many 
differences between them. The psychological view is a 
modern one, chiefly supported by Kant. Ifwe could show 
that in his later age the father of idealism came near to 
psychologism, and that he had been misunderstood by his 
pupils and readers for two thousand years,—this dis- 
covery would change the general aspect of the history of 
logic. 

It is worth while to grapple with tedious details in order 
to resolve such a decisive problem, of which the key is to 
be found in a previous solution of chronological difficulties. 
The order of the Platonic dialogues, though it has been 
discussed for a century, is by no means settled, and the 
best authorities on the subject differ. Zeller, who is 
generally esteemed the most competent authority on Plato, 
agrees with Hermann and Schleiermacher in placing the 
Sophist and the Politicus before the Republic and the 

D 


Poetical 
vision of 
eternal 
ideas 
opposed 
to the 
psycho- 
logical 
creation 
of know- 
ledge. 


Plato 

has been 
generally 
counted 
among the 
idealists, 
though 

he pro- 
gressed 
beyond 


idealism 
in his 
latest 
works. 


34 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


Banquet. Other investigators, unknown to each other, 
have accumulated evidence in support of the opposite view. 
Nobody has yet undertaken to piece together the small 
indications contained in these partial investigations, and 
to exhibit the result. Nor can this easily be done in the 
present volume with equal precision for all dialogues. 
But it belongs to our task to show the steady progress 
brought about by these minute investigations, and to 
discuss with due accuracy the date of the chief dialogues 
in order to decide whether Plato, as the outcome of his 
life’s experience, bequeathed to mankind a merely poetical 
idealism, or the foundations of a theory of self-created 
science. Are the dialectical works mere juvenile jokes 
-—a kind of school exercises, or are they the ultimate issue 
of mature thought? This is the chief question for an 
historian of Plato’s logic. 

The treatment of the chronological problem has 
heretofore been twofold—the comparative study of the 
contents of each dialogue, and the study of Plato’s style. 
Our next task is to review the results obtained by both 
methods and to compare them with each other. 


39 


CHAPTER II 


AUTHENTICITY AND CHRONOLOGY OF PLATO’S WRITINGS 


IT is commonly assumed that Tennemann was the first 
to deal with the problem of the Platonic chronology. 
Before the end of the sixteenth century, indeed, Patrizi7! 
wrote a chapter ‘De dialogorum (sc. Platonis) ordine,’ 
but he gave no scientific reasons for the order proposed. 
It was, like the strange order invented by Serranus,” 
rather an order of reading Plato’s works than a guessing 
at the order in which Plato wrote them. 

Tennemann“*’ treats the chronology of Platonic dia- 
logues without going into many details. But at least he 
guessed that the Phaedrus, of which he recognised the 
importance, could not, as had been supposed, belong to 
the earliest period of Plato. He puts the Sophist and the 
Politicus before the Banquet, and believes them to 
have been written in Megara, soon after the death of 


Socrates. 


1 In F. Patritii Nova de universis philosophia libris quinquaginta com- 
prehensa, Venetiis 1593 (the first edition at Ferrara 1591 is not in the 
British Museum) there is a part under the title ‘Plato et Aristoteles 
mystici atque exoterici’ with separate pagination, and fol. 44 begins a 
chapter ‘de dialogorum ordine.’ The order proposed is, with omission of 
some spurious dialogues: Alcibiades, Philebus, Euthydemus, Cratylus, 
Theaetetus, Sophistes, Politicus, Gorgias, Phaedrus, Banquet, Ion, Hippias, 
Protagoras, Meno, Laches, Menexenus, Charmides, Lysis, Republic, Timaeus, 
Critias, Parmenides, Euthyphro, Crito, Apologia, Phaedo, Laws. 

7 Serranus translated Plato’s text for the edition of Plato by Stephanus 
1578, and he introduced the order, or rather disorder, which has been 
maintained in many editions of Plato, including the edition of Didot, Paris 
1846-1856. 


Tenne- 
mann 
and 
Schleier- 
macher 


agree as 
to some 
points, 
except the 
date of the 
Parme- 
nides, 
Phaedrus, 
Phaedo, 
Philebus, 
Huthy- 
demus, 
Cratylus. 


56 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


Tennemann had no such doubts concerning authen- 
ticity as the next eminent writer on that subject, 
Schleiermacher “ (1804), who did not hesitate to pro- 
nounce many dialogues spurious, though they had pre- 
viously been held by every reader for authentic. Some of 
these, not amounting in all to one-seventeenth of the 
texts bearing Plato’s name, namely, Hipparchus, Minos, 
Alcibiades II., Theages, Amatores, Hippias major, Cli- 
topho, Epinomis, have since been generally recognised 
either as spurious or as written by some pupil of 
Plato. Other dialogues condemned by Schleiermacher, 
as Hippias nunor, Io, Alcibiades I., Menexenus, have 
been more recently defended against his suspicions, 
but they are of no importance for the study of Plato’s 
philosophy, and they do not exceed, taken together, the 
volume of a single dialogue such as the Gorgias. In the 
great questions of the date of the Phaedrus and Par- 
menides, Schleiermacher chose the opposite solution to 
that of Tennemann: he believed the Phaedrus to be the 
first work of Plato, and the Parmenides also to have been 
written before or immediately after the death of Socrates. 

As to other dialogues, there are several important points _ 
in which Schleiermacher agreed with Tennemann : both 
place the Lysis, Laches, Charmides, Protagoras before the 
death of Socrates ; both agree that the Huthyphro, Apology, 
Crito had been written about 399 B.c.; both put the 
Meno, Gorgias, Theaetetus, Sophist, and Politicus before 
the Banquet, which they both held to have been written 
about 385 B.c., as Wolf™ had shown in his introduction 
to the Banquet. Also in looking upon the Republic, 
Timaeus, Critias, and Laws as the latest works of Plato, 
Schleiermacher followed Tennemann’s indications. He 
dissented from him chiefly as to the date of the Phaedrus 
and Parmenides, which he placed much earlier, and of 


73 Platons Werke, von F. Schleiermacher, Berlin 1804-1828 (3 parts in 
6 vols.). 
74 Platons Gastmahl, herausgegeben von F. A. Wolf, Leipzig 1782. 


AUTHENTICITY AND CHRONOLOGY OF HIS WORKS 37 


the Cratylus, Euthydemus, Philebus, and Phaedo, which 
appeared to him later than Tennemann had supposed 
them to be. 

As to the smaller dialogues of doubtful authen- 
ticity and little philosophical importance, Schleiermacher 
recognised better than Tennemann the great difficulty 
of assigning to each of them a definite place in the 
general order of Plato’s works. They have no in- 
fluence on our judgment as to any serious aspect of 
Plato’s philosophy, and their study belongs rather to 
literary investigations on the history of the Greek dia- 
logue ‘generally than to the history of human thought. 

Schleiermacher tried to ascertain the sequence in which 
Plato might have written his dialogues, if it were supposed 
that from the beginning he had planned out the whole 
of his literary activity. This starting-point in judging 
about chronological questions was suggested by the in- 
fluence of the mode of German idealism, which prevailed 
in the first years of the present century. According: to 
such a view, a man’s life is an harmonious whole, and a 
man’s works must form a consequent exposition of his 
doctrines, taking the sum of these doctrines as co-existent 
in the author’s mind before his entrance on a literary 
career. Schleiermacher had observed the didactic and 
dogmatic character of the Repwblic, and he believed that 
this alone gave sufficient reason for thinking that this 
work was written after the Sophist and the Politticus, 
which are rather critical than dogmatic. It is strange 
that Schleiermacher should not have profited in this 
regard by the example of Kant’s evolution from dog- 
matism to criticism; he would then have been less 
confident in representing dogmatism as the latest stage 
of Plato’s thought. It is true that Plato, as a disciple of 
Socrates, began with criticism. But there is a great 
difference between such criticisms as we see in the 
Protagoras or the Gorgias, which are of a personal 
character, dealing with simple ethical problems, and the 


Schleier- 
macher 
did not 
admit pro- 
gress from 
dogma- 
tism to 
criticism. 


Ast exag- 
gerates 
the funda- 
mental 
inconse- 
quence of 
Schleier- 
macher. 


38 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


criticism of the Sophist and the Politicus, directed not 
against persons, but against general errors to which 
human reason is naturally hable, and rising from a merely 
ethical to a metaphysical point of view. 

There is greater force in the argument that the latest 
works might be expected to be more didactic than the earlier. 
But according to this standard the Parmenides, Sophist, 
and Politicus are found to be later than the Republic, 
because in them the leader of the conversation proceeds 
with less regard for the diverging opinions of his hearers 
than is shown by the Socrates of the Republic for the 
objections of Adeimantus and Glaucon, or by the Socrates 
of the Phaedo for those of Simmias and Cebes. Schleier- 
macher, while believing that Plato already during Socrates’ 
lifetime developed his theory of ideas so far as it is shown 
in the Phaedrus, was guilty of a curious inconsistency in 
maintaining a Socratic stage of Plato’s philosophy. He 
reckoned as monuments of this Socratic stage precisely 
those dialogues which have been also by all later 
historians called Socratic: the Protagoras, Laches, Char- 
mides, Lysis, as well as the Huthyphro, Apology, and 
Crito. 

This inconsequence of Schleiermacher was noticed 
by Ast ” (1816), who simplified the problem by proclaim- 
ing as spurious all merely Socratic dialogues except the 
Protagoras. He followed Schleiermacher in his worst 
error as to the date of the Phaedrus, while he wrongly 
dissented from him as to the date of the Gorgias and 
Phaedo, which he believed with Tennemann to have 
been written about the time of Socrates’ death. 

In order to sustain the high opinion of Plato’s great 
literary power, Ast denied the authenticity of twenty-one 
dialogues attributed to Plato, amounting to more than 
two-fifths of the matter bearing Plato’s name. This was 
the final consequence of seeking in Plato’s works an 
harmonious whole, without recognising that even the 


> Friedrich Ast, Platons Leben und Schriften, Leipzig 1816. 


AUTHENTICITY AND CHRONOLOGY OF HIS WORKS 39 


greatest writer must undergo a certain mental develop- 
ment, and may not have continued to think at eighty 
what he thought at twenty. 

The view of a gradual evolution of Plato’s thought was 
proclaimed by J. Socher ” some years after the completion 
of Ast’s work. Socher (1820) did not pretend to fix the date 
of each dialogue ; he only attempted to distinguish four suc- 
cessive stages of Plato’s thought. He did not venture to 
impugn the authority of Tennemann, Schleiermacher, and 
Ast by attributing the Parmenides, Sophist, and Politicus 
to Plato’s old age; but, perceiving the difference between 
these dialogues and others that were probably written 
soon after Socrates’ death, he denied their authenticity, 
at the same time re-affirming the authenticity of a dozen 
other dialogues which had been held to be spurious by Ast. 
As to the chief dialogues, whose authenticity was unques- 
tioned, Socher agrees with Ast, Schleiermacher, and 
Tennemann in placing the Republic after the Philebus 
and immediately before the Timaeus and Critias ; but he 
differs from them in so far as he believes the Protagoras 
to have been written after the death of Socrates, and he 
returns, against Schleiermacher and Ast, to Tennemann’s 
opinion in favour of a later date for the Phaedrus. These 
results of the first attempt to treat Plato psychologically 
are not to be despised if we take into account that the 
date of the Phaedrus is of the greatest importance, and 
that critics are still found who maintain that ‘ youth- 
fulness’ of this dialogue, so confidently affirmed by 
Schleiermacher. 

This fancied youthfulness of the Phaedrus was, 
however, also opposed by Stallbaum, who spent his life 
in an original study of Plato. Stallbaum™ followed 
Tennemann in putting the Huthydemus, Protagoras, 


76 J. Socher, Ueber Platons Schriften, Miinchen 1820. 

77 Platonis dialogos selectos rec. G. Stallbawm, vol. i., Gothae et Er- 
fordiae 1827. See also the introductions to the single dialogues frequently 
edited by Stallbaum. 


First 
attempt of 
genetic ex- 
plication 
by Socher, 


developed 
by Stall- 
baum. 


H. Ritter. 


Hermann 
esta- 
blished 


the Socra- 


tic stage 
of Plato’s 
philo- 
sophy, 


40) ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


Cratylus, Charmides, Laches, Lysis before the death of 
Socrates, the Huthyphro, Apology, Crito about 399, the 
Theaetetus, Sophist, Politicus, and Parmenides between the 
death of Socrates and the founding of the Academy, the 
Republic very late, immediately preceding the Timaeus. 
Against Tennemann and Ast he accepted Schleiermacher’s. 
view that the Phaedo and Philebus were written after the 
Banquet. 

A like eclectic method was followed by H. Ritter” 
(1838), in whose opinion the Phaedrus and Protagoras 
were the earliest works of Plato, and therefore older 
than the Apology, Crito, and Phaedo. He dissented from 
Schleiermacher chiefly in placing the Parmenides after 
Socrates’ death, and the Phaedo and Philebus before the 
Banquet. 

A fresh start in the study of the chronology and authen- 
ticity of the Platonic Canon was made by K. F. Hermann” 
(1839), who tried to find in Plato’s genuine dialogues a 
steady progress at once with respect to philosophical 
contents and to literary perfection. His method, very 
different from the method of Schleiermacher and Ast, led 
him to results which, in some particulars, corrected the 
most glaring errors of his predecessors. The imperfection 
of some lesser works, which had been declared by Ast to 
be spurious and unworthy of Plato, was explained by 
Hermann’s admission that the genius of Plato could not 
reach its full height in the first years of his literary 
activity. Hermann succeeded in demonstrating to every 


‘unprejudiced reader the absurdity of ascribing such 


masterpieces as the Phaedrus and the Parmenides to a 
young Athenian of about twenty-five years of age, who 
even at thirty could do no better than the Huthyphro, the 
Apology, and the Crito. Hermann ascribed to Plato’s 


** H. Ritter, Geschichte der Philosophie alter Zeit, Hamburg 1836-1838,. 
vol. ii. pp. 159-522, on Plato. 

™ K. BF. Hermann, Geschichte und System der platonischen Philosophie, 
Heidelberg 1839, only vol. i. published. 


AUTHENTICITY AND CHRONOLOGY OF HIS WORKS 41 


preliminary stage some small dialogues, such as the 
Hippias minor, Io, Alcibiades I., which Schleiermacher 
suspected to have been written by Plato’s pupils. He 
added to these the Charmides, Lysis, Laches, Prota- 
goras, which Schleiermacher had also placed before 
the death of Socrates. The Huthydemus, Meno, and 
Gorgias, placed by Schleiermacher near the Theaetetus, 
were thought by Hermann to belong to the time of 
the Apology, Crito, and Euthyphro. But in this he 
betrayed inconsistency, because these dialogues are in all 
respects riper in thought than the trilogy on the death of 
Socrates. 

The second period, according to Hermann, produced 
the Cratylus, the Theaetetus, the Sophist, and the Poltticus, 
also the Parmenides, and following these after a short 
interval came the Phaedrus and the Menexenus. Hermann 
and Schleiermacher agreed as to the chronology of all the 
dialogues that were held by them to be later than the 
Banquet, viz. the Phaedo, Philebus, Republic, Timaeus, 
Critias, and Laws. It passed almost unnoticed that 
Hermann’s view as to the order of Platonic dialogues did 
not differ essentially from Stallbaum’s; at least, as regards 
the chief works of Plato, beginning with the Theaetetus, 
they agree completely ; and this coincidence is the more 
remarkable since the Theaetetus and the twelve dialogues 
which, according to Stallbaum and Hermann, are later 
(the Sophist, Politicus, Parmenides, Phaedrus, Menexenus, 
Banquet, Phaedo, Philebus, Republic, Timaeus, Critias, 
Laws), form over seven-tenths of the volume of the 
twenty-eight dialogues which Hermann held to be auth- 
entic. Hence we may regard the chief common results of 
Hermann and Stallbaum as the best obtainable by their 
method. 

Their partial agreement with Schleiermacher, and even 
with Ast and Socher, gives them an appearance of scientific 
objectivity which commands rational assent. On the 
other side, as later investigations have shown, all these 


but he 
agrees 
with Stall- 
baum and 
with 
Schleier- 
macher 
as to the 
dialectic 
dialogues, 
and as to 
all dia- 
logues 
later than 
the 
Banquet. 


The 
common 
stock of 
Schleier- 
macher, 


Stall- 
baum, and 
Hermann 
based on 
an error : 
the 
so-called 
Megaric 
period in 
Plato’s 
life. 


First 
origin of 
this old 
error. 


Patrizi 
gives no 
reasons. 
Tenne- 
mann 
identifies 
too much 


42 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


authors are wrong in the most important point, namely 
in their assumption that Plato wrote, or began to write, 
in Megara soon after the death of Socrates, his trilogy 
consisting of the Theaetetus, the Sophist, and the Politicus. 

If we inquire into the origin of this error we shall 
understand why the method of Hermann, as well as that 
of his predecessors, was insufficient, notwithstanding the 
more plausible nature of the assumptions on which it was 
based. The advance made by Hermann consists in his 
having recognised the impossibility of reckoning the 
Phaedrus and the Parmenides among the ‘Socratic’ 
dialogues. But the old error of placing the dialectical 
trilogy soon after the death of Socrates is shared by 
Hermann with all his predecessors. 

It is interesting to observe how this error originated 
and grew in strength until it seemed almost an acknow- 
ledged certainty. It already appears in the old tetralogic 
order of the dialogues, which is retained in nearly all 
manuscripts of Plato’s text, and was probably due to 
Plato’s first successors. According to this order, the 
Theaetetus trilogy is paired with an evidently early dia- 
logue, the Cratylus, and placed immediately after the 
first tetralogy which contains the details of the death of 
Socrates. We know nothing of the reasons which led to 
this order, and probably the editor who first arranged 
Plato’s dialogues in tetralogies was less interested in 
Platonic chronology than we are now. He may have 
grouped together those dialogues which, to a superficial 
judgment, might be considered as treating of the same 
subject, or were united by Plato himself as continuing one 
another. From a similar point of view Patrizi placed the 
Theaetetus trilogy before the Banquet and Phaedrus. 
Tennemann invented more elaborate reasons for such an 
early date of these three dialogues. His judgment was 
determined by the purely external circumstance that at 
the end of the Theaetetus the Platonic Socrates mentions 
the accusation of Meletus. Thence Tennemann infers 


AUTHENTICITY AND CHRONOLOGY OF HIS WORKS 45 


that this dialogue, since it seems to record one of the last 
days of Socrates’ life, must have been written shortly 
after his death. It is the same fallacy which led him to 
assign an early date to the Phaedo. Such an argument is 
built on a simple possibility which is not even a proba- 
bility. It has been often repeated since Tennemann by 
those who identify the Platonic Socrates with the historic 
Socrates, and take Plato’s poetical fiction for literal truth. 
Like Patrizi, they look upon Plato as a man whose merit 
lay in writing down what he had heard from Socrates. 
The absurdity of such a view becomes evident to any one 
who impartially compares Xenophon’s Memorabilia with 
Plato’s dialogues. Tennemann himself felt that a men- 
tion of Socrates’ accusation at the end of a dialogue 
afforded no ground for chronological inferences as to the 
date of the composition of that dialogue, and he cautiously 
added another supposition, that Plato wrote the Theaetetus, 
‘perhaps at the time when he dwelt with Euclides at 
Megara.’ 

Now, the fact of a residence of Plato in Megara is by 
no means certain, and T'ennemann’s belief in it was based 
on no valid historical testimony. He quotes Diogenes 
Laertius as his authority. This author says: (II. 106) 
mpos todtov (sc. Kuclides of Megara) dyow o ‘Eppodwpos 
agpixécbat UXatwva Kai Tovs NouTrovs hirocodous peta THV 
Tov LwKpdtovs TEAEvTHY, OeicavTas THY WpmOTHTAa TOV 
tupavvev. Hlsewhere he states the same thing in fewer 
words : yevowevos oxT@ Kal eixoow éTav cis Méyapa mpos 
Ev«relonv otv Kal addres Ticl Lwxpatixols bTEeyopnoev 
(III. 6). Obviously Hermodorus was of opinion that, at 
the time when some pupils of Socrates, fearing a fate like 
their master’s, fled to Euclides in Megara, Plato joined 
them. This is given, not as an unquestioned fact, but as 
an opinion of Hermodorus. Were we sure that this 
Hermodorus was that same whom Cicero and Suidas 
mention as Plato’s pupil who spread his writings through 
Sicily, this witness would be discredited by his ignorance 


the 
Platonic 
Socrates 
with the 
historic 
Socrates. 


Diogenes 
Laertius 
as 
authority. 


Interpre- 
tation of 
thealleged 
testimony. 


Plato had 
no neces- 
sity to go 
to Megara 
or to 
remain 
there. 


The 
silence 
of 
Cicero. 


Cicero’s 
testimony 


44 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


of well-known facts. For it was not the ‘ tyrants’ whom 
Plato had to dread, but the democracy as revived after 
the expulsion of the Thirty. On authority so shadowy 
we need not believe that the author of the Crito thus fled 
to another city as fearing the anger of the mob. Even 
were the fact so far admitted, it would not follow that 
his sojourn at Megara was long enough for the com- 
position of three dialogues in which so much of his 
cardinal thinking is condensed. But at the outset the 
story 1s suspicious, because of the mention of the tyrants 
and of an improbable danger. If others had to fear 
anything, this was less probable of Plato, as nephew of 
Critias, and belonging to an influential family. And 
Plato’s flight to Megara is contradicted by a witness 
perfectly trustworthy in such things, and quite com- 
petent as to the history of Plato’s life. Cicero (De 
rep. I. x. 16) says ‘audisse te credo Platonem Socrate 
mortuo primum in Aegyptum discendi causa, post in 
Italiam et in Siciliam contendisse ut Pythagorae inventa 
perdisceret.’ 

In this passage Cicero enumerates all the travels of 
Plato, and there was no reason for omitting his journey to 
Megara, had he known of it, or had he thought of Euclides 
as one who had influenced the philosophy of Plato. If 
Cicero quotes Egypt as the first place whereto Plato 
travelled after the death of Socrates, then we may assume 
that Cicero at least knew nothing of that Megaric period 
in Plato’s life which is to-day generally admitted on the 
authority of a witness much less trustworthy than Cicero. 
Again, far from suggesting that Plato was indebted to 
Megaric influence, Cicero says that the Megaric school 
owes much to Plato (Acadenuca II. 42 § 129). 

The trustworthiness of Cicero has been frequently 
questioned in matters of philosophy, and no great im- 
portance attaches to his testimony in a question of 
Platonic doctrine. But in matters of fact, recent in- 
vestigations have shown more clearly than ever that 


AUTHENTICITY AND CHRONOLOGY OF HIS WORKS 45 


Cicero’s judgment as to the date of the Phaedrus was 
sounder than Schleiermacher’s and Ast’s. He was 
interested in Plato’s life, he had visited the Academy ; 
and in a passage where he clearly intends to convey the 
impression that change of place and study are important 
to the philosopher, he could not have left unmentioned 
the Megaric period of Plato’s life, had he heard anything 
of it, and had this Megaric period been of such import- 
ance in Plato’s life as Tennemann thought. Megara is, 
according to our present notions of distance, very near 
Athens, but we must not forget that it belonged to 
another republic, sometimes at war with the Athenians, 
and could only be approached from Attica by sea or by a 
mountainous road. Plato’s journey thither should have 
been included in the enumeration of Cicero, especially if, 
as Ast supposes, it led to a residence of several years. 
Cicero often alludes to Plato’s travels and Plato’s teachers; 
he never mentions Euclides among the latter, nor Plato’s 
emigration to Megara after Socrates’ death. Arguments 
from silence have been frequently abused; but, in this 
particular case, the silence of Cicero, and his unvarying 
omission of Megara when speaking of Plato’s voyages, is 
surely significant. It would prove nothing had Cicero 
not indicated Egypt as the first place to which Plato 
travelled after his master’s death. This circumstance 
confirms the presumption raised by the weakness of the 
evidence on which Tennemann’s acceptance of Plato’s 
residence in Megara is founded. 

Tennemann was cautious; he introduced his supposi- 
tion with a ‘perhaps.’ This ‘perhaps’ has been dropped 
by Schleiermacher without producing any new argument 
in favour of the probability of a residence of Plato 
in Megara (p. 20, part 2, vol.1.). Schleiermacher speaks 
of Plato’s flight (‘Flucht,’ p. 103, part 1, vol. 11.) to Megara 
as a well-established fact, without even the formality 
of quoting Diogenes Laertius. But he shows modera- 
tion in so far as he limits Plato’s literary production 


as tothe 
date of the 
Phaedrus 
has been 
so well 
confirmed, 
that we 
can be- 
lieve him 
trust- 
worthy as 
to facts 

of Plato’s 
life. 


How the 
myth of 
the 
Megaric 
period 
grew, and 
became a 
tradition 
by mere 
repetition. 


Stall- 
baum 
popu- 
larised it 
in his 
edition. 


46 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


in Megara to the Parmenides, leaving the Theaetetus, 
Sophist, and Politicus for a later time. He thus de- 
prives the story of the plausibility which it might other- 
wise receive from the preface to the Theaetetus. Ast, on 
the other hand, boldly declares that the Theaetetus was 
‘undoubtedly ’ written in Megara (p. 185), and this not- 
withstanding his admission that the mention of the 
Corinthian war (Theaetetus 142 A) refers to a date seven 
or eight years later than the death of Socrates. Hence 
Ast accepts as an historical fact that Plato lived at 
Megara for seven or eight years, and is unaware that 
even the presence of Plato in Megara shortly after 399 is 
uncertain. For him it is decisive that the mtroductory 
conversation between Huclides and Terpsion is repre- 
sented by Plato as occurring in Megara. He seems to 
believe that a dialogue alleged to take place in Megara 
must have been written there, as if Plato had need to 
reside in Phlius in order to write the Phaedo, or in Crete 
while he wrote the Laws. And he does not limit this 
special connection with Megara to the Theaetetus; he 
extends it to the Sophist and Politicus (p. 234) which, 
according to him, are really, as they profess to be, mere 
continuations of the Theaetetus. He does not go so far 
as to say that the Politicus was also undoubtedly written 
in Megara, but he sees in the dialectic of this dialogue a 
Megaric influence. 

Stallbaum also admitted without hesitation that Plato 
lived at Megara after the death of Socrates, that Euclides 
had a great influence on his theory of ideas, and that the 
plan of the Theaetetus, Sophist, and Parmenides was 
sketched during Plato’s residence in Megara. In his 
introduction to the Theaetetus *° Stallbaum feels bound to 
give reasons for this view, but his reasons add nothing to 
the feeble arguments of Ast and Schleiermacher. We 


89 Platonis Theaetetus, rec. G. Stallbaum, Gothae et Erfordiae 1839, 
Prolegomena, p. 8: ‘ Theaeteti, Sophistae et Parmenidis scribendi consilinm 
subnatum esse videtur, quo tempore Megaris sit commoratus.’ 


AUTHENTICITY AND CHRONOLOGY OF HIS WORKS 47 


observe here the birth and growth of one of these myths, 
which, like tales of the sea-serpent, are repeated be- 
cause nobody takes the trouble to examine their source. 
Plato, according to Stallbaum, had no reason for introdu- 
cing Euclides in the Theaetetus, and for representing the 
dialogue as having been held at Megara, ie from his 
personal residence in Megara. 

After Stallbaum the myth of a Megaric period in Plato’s 
life, and of the Megaric influence in the Theaetetus, 
Sophist, Politicus became generally received, though 
nobody found the smallest evidence on its behalf. H. 
Ritter, in his History of Philosophy, accepts the legend 
as a matter of course. Hermann (p. 52) quotes Cicero as 
the ‘oldest witness’ to Plato’s travels; but he does not 
notice the omission of Megara among the places men- 
tioned by him, and he relies, like his predecessors, on 
Diogenes Laertius as to the asserted residence in 
Megara. Hermann has no other authority to quote in 
favour of Plato’s residence at Megara than the above 
passages from Diogenes Laertius; still, he believes 
(p. 490) that the time spent by Plato in Megara was one 
of the ‘ most important periods’ in the philosopher’s life : 
as it would be, had he produced there such considerable 
works. 

If we ask how these eminent students of Plato 
could invent facts and give them out for a part of the 
history of Plato’s life, we recognise the same proceeding 
which led Bekker and Stallbaum to some _altera- 
tions of Plato’s text. These editors, if a passage was 
obscure, and if they found in some manuscript a more 
plausible reading, did not ask very much about the origin 
of that manuscript: they corrected the text, in the belief 
that Plato could never have written otherwise than 
according to the most ingenious suggestions of one of his 
copyists. Only with the Zurich edition a new method of 
editing Plato’s text was first proposed, and it was developed 
by Hermann and Schanz. According to this method, 


Hermann 
did not 
even dis- 
cuss any 
possible 
doubts. 


Analogy 
between 
old me- 
thod of 
dealing 
with texts 
and the 
esthetical 
considera- 
tions 
reigning 
in the 
biographi- 
cal mytho- 
logy. 


Truth 
about dia- 
lectical 
dialogues 
was esthe- 
tically un- 
pleasant. 


The aim 
of an har- 
monious 
concep- 
tion of 
Plato’s life 
originated 
the error. 


48 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


the chief point is to know which among the many manu- 
scripts are really trustworthy, and the most obscure 
reading of a trustworthy manuscript, if it has some 
meaning, is preferred to the most elegant and plausible 
reading of an untrustworthy manuscript, even if this last 
reading gave Plato credit for more artistic skill than 
the first. This progress in editing Plato’s text, to which 
Hermann contributed in a very important degree, was not 
extended by him to the method of writing Plato’s life and 
the history of his works. Here he continued to prefer 
ingenious hypothesis to careful weighing of the evidence. 
It was an ingenious hypothesis to explain some of the 
most original works of Plato by the Megaric influence. 
The truth, that these original works—so different from 
everything Plato had written—were a product of a radical 
change of opinion in the philosopher’s old age, was not so 
ingenious and did not agree with the boundless admiration 
professed for Plato’s perfection. 

The theory of ideas, as professed in the Republic, was 
poetically beautiful. It was united to Plato’s name all 
over the world, even by those who only knew of Plato 
that he had imagined a theory of ideas. It gave a better 
esthetic impression to say that those dialogues, in which, 
instead of poetical ideas, we find only abstract notions of 
pure reason, were a preparatory introduction to the Re- 
public than to admit that they were written after the 
Republic, and that they condemned the most popular of 
Platonic theories, almost Platonism itself. Thus all the 
above writers from Tennemann to Hermann were led by 
an esthetic desire to have an harmonious representation of 
Plato’s life, just as earlier editors of Plato’s text were 
anxious rather to read the best and most beautiful text that 
Plato might have written than the text most probably 
written by Plato. They thought that any representation of 
Plato’s development, based on whatever ancient evidence, 
was likely to be true if it agreed with the leading hypothesis 
which was their starting point. The leading hypothesis 


AUTHENTICITY AND CHRONOLOGY OF HIS WORKS 49 


for Schleiermacher was a systematic interdependence of 
all works of Plato, each preparing for the next and prepared 
by the preceding. For Ast it was the esthetical perfection 
which Plato, according to him, sought above everything 
and could always produce. For Hermann it was the 
author’s development from Socratism to the Platonism of 
the Republic. The superficial connection of the Republic 
with the Timaeus made the Republic appear as a sample 
of Plato’s most mature thought, and every dialogue of 
different tendency had to be placed earlier. 

If we wish to know what Plato really was and how he 
became what he was, we must get rid of esthetical pre- 
judice, and look only at the evidential value of the testi- 
monies we are dealing with. We must know all the 
facts and distinguish them from personal opinions on 
those facts. Plato’s residence in Megara is not a fact. It 
is a myth, founded upon a most uncertain tradition, that 
some of Socrates’ disciples fled to Megara after the 
Master’s death. This tradition reaches us through a single 
witness, and is nowhere confirmed by other witnesses 
whom we might expect to know it. It is contradictory to 
what we know of Plato’s personal character from his 
own writings. If we have recourse to hypothetical argu- 
ment, the hypothesis that a philosopher like Plato 
acted according to his philosophical principles is much 
more probable than the hypothesis that Hermodorus 
was right in accusing Plato of cowardice. On the other 
hand there is no reason whatever for building upon the 
testimony of a single untrustworthy witness a theory as 
to the Megaric influence on Plato’s life. 

Hermann himself recognises (p. 106, note 82) that the 
above quoted passages from Diogenes Laertius are the only 
source of the tradition of Plato’s emigration to Megara, 
and he adds with the greatest simplicity that these 
passages betray such a want of knowledge about Plato 
that they deserve no confidence as to the date of the 
journey to Megara. He means that this may have 

E 


Logical 
dealing 
with testi- 
monies 
different. 


Both Her- 
mann and 
Schleier- 
macher 
were more 
estheti- 
cists than 
logicians. 


Their fol- 


lowers. 


Strange 
merit of 
Suckow 


50 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


occurred some years later. But if he does not trust his 
only authority as to the date of this removal, why trust 
it as to the place whither Plato first travelled after 
leaving Athens? Manifestly he selects the testimonies, 
not according to their historical value, but according to 
the esthetical impression they produced on him. He 
liked the idea that the dialectical dialogues were inspired 
by the Megarics; he disliked esthetically the idea that 
these dialogues were the result of a change of opinion 
in Plato after his artistic masterpiece, the Republic. 
Brandis 8! (1844) and Ribbing * followed Schleiermacher, 
with the difference that they put the Parmenides after 
Socrates’ death. Hermann was followed with slight 
differences by Schwegler,*? Steinhart, *! Michelis,* and 
Mistriotes.* 

Suckow *7 (1855) wrote under a misleading title a large 
commentary on the Phaedrus, preceded by a dissertation 
on the authenticity of other dialogues. This work, though 
written under the influence of a strange prejudice, which 
led the author to reject the authenticity of such important 
works as the Politicus, Critias, and Laws, contains a 
curious exemplification of the truth, that a wrong method 
may sometimes lead to correct results. Suckow, being 
unable to understand that no author can bind himself for 


81 Brandis, Handbuch der Geschichte der griechisch-rimischen Philo- 
sophie, Berlin 1835-1866. In vol. ii. Berlin 1844, pp. 134-570, on Plato. 

8 §, Ribbing, Genetisk framstdlining af Platons ideelira, Upsala 1858, 
translated into German: Genetische Darstellung der Platonischen Ideen- 
lehre, Leipzig 1863-1864. 

8% A. Schwegler, Geschichte der Philosophie, Stuttgart 1848; Geschichte 
der griechischen Philosophie, Tiibingen 1859. 

81 Platons stéimnitliche Werke, iibers. von H. Miiller, mit Hinleitungen 
begleitet von Karl Steinhart, Leipzig 1850-1866, 8 vols. 

85 F. Michelis, Die Philosophie Platons in ihrer inneren Beziehung zur 
geoffenbarten Wahrheit, Miinster 1859. 

86 TAarwvirol didAoyot, exdidduevor kat’ exAoyhy br0 Tewpyiov Miorpi@rov, ev 
-AOnvats 1872. 

87 G. F. W. Suckow, Die wissenschaftliche und kiinstlerische Form der 
platonischen Schriften, Berlin 1855; of the same author: De Platonis 
Parmenide, Vratislaviae 1823 (against the authenticity). 


AUTHENTICITY AND CHRONOLOGY OF HIS WORKS dl 


life by rules which he has laid down in one of his works, 
believed that Plato, after having placed in the Phaedrus the 
philosopher above the lawgiver, could never degrade him- 
self to writing the Laws; he took as a sign of authenticity 
such a superficial distinction as the number of chief parts 
and their subdivisions, believing that Plato would write all 
his life and on all subjects according to the same formal 
plans. He sought the key of our problem of the order of 
the Platonic writings in a fragment of the old ‘ Introduc- 
tion to Plato’ by Albinus, who advised the reader to 
begin with the Alcibiades and Phaedrus. After such tire- 
some rubbish, extended over more than 500 pages, 
Suckow suddenly gives in a few words his opinion on the 
order of Plato’s dialogues, according to which Plato’s aim 
was to give an ideal biography of Socrates ; and we learn 
that he considered the following order as the most prob- 
able: Parmenides, Protagoras, Symposium, Phaedrus, 
Republic, Timaeus, Philebus, Theaetetus, Sophist, Apology, 
and Phaedo. ‘This order, radically different from any- 
thing proposed before, implies the first positive recognition 
of an important truth, unknown to all previous inquirers, 
namely that the Theaetetus, Sophist, and Philebus are later 
than the Republic. Unhappily, Suckow did not fulfil 
his promise of giving ampler reasons for this opinion. 
Judging from his book, and from a small dissertation on the 
Parmenides written by him thirty-two years before (1823), 
he was unable to give good reasons and consistent argu- 
ments; but, at all events, we must recognise his merit in 
proclaiming for the first time, amidst a heap of errors, a 
truth of the greatest importance for the understanding 
of Plato’s philosophy. He quotes Morgenstern and 
Tchorzewski, who advocated an early date of the Republic 
on account of its supposed relation to the Hcclesiazusae of 
Aristophanes.*® 

The order proposed by Suckow was substantially the 


88 C, Morgenstern, De Platonis Republica, Halis Saxonum 1794; 
Tchorzewski, De Politia Timaeo et Critia, Kasan 1847. 


13), 


con- 
trasted 
with his 
want of 
judgment. 


Munk 
gives no 


satisfac- 
tory 
reasons for 
his admis- 
sion of the 
late date 
of the dia- 
lectical 
dialogues. 


Susemihl 
first 
attempted 
to free 
himself 
from 


52 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


same as that which shortly afterwards was sustained by 
Munk,* with the difference that Munk extended it to a 
ereater number of dialogues, adding after the Protagoras : 
Charmides, Laches, Gorgias, Ion, Hippias, Cratylus, 
Euthydemus; after the Timaeus : Critias and Meno; after 
the Sophist: the Politicus and Huthyphro; after the 
Apology: the Crito, and putting the Philebus imme- 
diately before the Republic, while Suckow had placed this 
dialogue after the Republic and Timaeus. Munk was less 
reticent than Suckow as to the reasons which decided 
him to adopt an order so very different from the con- 
clusions which were common to Schleiermacher and 
Hermann. He argued that Plato’s chief aim in writing 
his dialogues was to give an extensive biography of 
Socrates, so that each dialogue had its place assigned 
according to the apparent age of Socrates at the supposed 
date of the dialogue. The Theaetetus, from this point of 
view, should be later than the Republic, chiefly because in 
this dialogue Socrates is represented as older than in the 
Republic. On this ground Munk was obliged to look 
upon the Phaedo as the last work of Plato for the mere 
reason that it represented the death of Socrates. It 
may be remembered that for the same reason it has 
been affirmed to be his earliest work. 

Such conclusions illustrate the uselessness of all 
generalisations, leading to a fictitious solution of the pro- 
blem of Platonic chronology by a single ingenious hypo- 
thesis. The true genetic method should include a careful 
study of detail, with many parallel comparisons between 
every dialogue and those immediately preceding or imme- 
diately following. Such a painstaking inquiry, without 
prejudice, without a general formula for the whole of 
Plato’s literary activity, was first attempted by Susemihl 
in a work** which deserves very great consideration for 
its method, though it did not avoid some old errors. 


8 EH. Munk, Die natiivliche Ordnuwng der platonischen Schriften, Berlin 
1856. 


AUTHENTICITY AND CHRONOLOGY OF HIS WORKS 93 


Susemihl (I. 286, 477) recognised that the testimony of 
Diogenes Laertius about a retreat of Plato to Megara 
immediately after the death of Socrates was of no value, 
though he still retained, on no better evidence, the tradition 
of a Megaric period, coinciding with the composition of 
the Huthydemus and Cratylus. But he does not show 
such confidence as Hermann, and he admits that the 
Sophist and Politicus were written at least a dozen years 
after Socrates’ death, though before the Banquet and 
Republic. 

The order of those dialogues supposed to be later than 
the Banquet was the same for Susemihl as it had been for 
Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, and Hermann. But he came 
nearer to the truth than his predecessors as to the place 
of the Phaedrus, which he puts next to the Theaetetus, 
an arrangement which has been confirmed by many later 
investigations. He accepted Hermann’s view that the 
Parmenides followed the Poltticus, and Schleiermacher’s 
as to the connection of the Huthydemus with the Cratylus. 
He differs from both by assuming (with Socher and 
Stallbaum) a very early date for the Meno, which he 
supposed to have been written before the death of 
Socrates. 

Though the question of the chronology of Plato’s 
writings had been raised by an historian of philosophy 
(Tennemann), and for the sake of a philosophical under- 
standing of Plato’s theories, we see from the above survey 
of subsequent writers on that subject, that up to 1860 it 
was a problem dealt with chiefly by philologers, and, ac- 
cording to philological traditions, from a _philological- 
esthetic point of view. Though Schleiermacher, chiefly 
a theologian, enjoys in Germany a certain philosophical 
reputation, he approached our problem as a translator of 
Plato’s works, and translation is a philological business. 
Stallbaum, Hermann, Susemihl gave their lives mostly 
to philological work ; even Ast, though he published some 
philosophical handbooks, cannot be called a philosopher, 


esthetical 
prejudice 
as to the 
order of 
Plato’s 
dialogues, 


but he 
stillagrees 
in many 
points 
with 
Hermann. 


Only 
Ueberweg 
gave 
strong 
logical 
reasons 
for the 
late date 
of the dia- 
lectical 
dialogues, 


compar- 
ing them 
with the 
Timaeus 
and 
Plato’s 
later 
doctrine 
as known 
from 
Aristotle. 


54 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


and the few philosophers who wrote about Platonic 
chronology in the first half of the nineteenth century 
generally accepted without criticism the verdict of one 
or other of the philologers. Now it happened for the 
first time about 1860 that a philosopher, who was chiefly 
a logician, set himself to investigate the question of 
the order of Plato’s dialogues. The opportunity for this 
had been given by the Academy of Sciences of Vienna, 
which offered a prize for a new investigation as to the 
authenticity and chronology of Plato’s works. The prize 
was awarded to Friedrich Ueberweg, then a teacher of 
philosophy in the University of Bonn, and author of a 
Logic later known throughout the philosophical world, as 
well as his next handbook on the History of Philosophy. 
This was the first attempt of a logician to understand 
Plato better than his philological interpreters, and the 
result has shown ever since that good logical training, and 
a perfecting of previous methods, are the surest means 
for attaining real progress in the knowledge of Plato's 
mental development. Ueberweg did not pretend to give 
a general theory concerning the order of Plato’s works, 
nor did he take into consideration all these works; but. 
he proceeded with such excellent method that he suc- 
ceeded for the first time in supporting by valid argument 
the late date of the Theaetetus, Sophist, and Politicus, 
already affirmed by Suckow and Munk on insufficient. 
grounds. Some years before, in his dissertation on the 
Soul of the World (‘Ueber die platonische Weltseele,’ 
Rheinisches Musewm 1853, Vol. ix. pp. 37-84), he had 
incidentally anticipated this opinion (p. 70, note 35); but 
it is only in his Untersuchungen tiber die Echtheit und 
Zeitfolge Platonischer Schriften, published at Vienna in 
1861, that for the first time we find a strong logical 
argument in favour of the very late date of the Sophist,. 
the Politicus, and the Philebus, showing their affinity 
with the Timaeus and that form of the Platonic doctrine 
which is known from Aristotle to be the latest. Besides, 


AUTHENTICITY AND CHRONOLOGY OF HIS WORKS 59 


Ueberweg called attention to certain characteristic marks 
of these dialogues, which make their late appearance 
probable. A ‘younger Socrates ’ is introduced, whom we 
know from Aristotle (Wetaphysic, vil. 1036 b 25) to have 
been Plato’s pupil when Aristotle belonged to the Academy : 
that is, within twenty years of Plato’s death. Also the 
person of the elder Socrates as represented in the Sophist 
and Politicus is very different from the character attri- 
buted to him in the Republic; he is now no longer the 
leader of the conversation, but only a witness of the teach- 
ing of an unnamed foreigner, the ‘ Eleatic guest.’ 

This transformation of Socrates is common to the 
Soplist, Politicus, and Parmenides, with the Timaeus, 
known to be a late work—later, at all events, than the 
Republic. It is shown to be probable on artistic grounds 
that Plato, when he began to teach a doctrine differing 
greatly from what he had placed in Socrates’ mouth in 
earlier times, felt it inconvenient to credit Socrates with 
the new teaching. He chose other persons, named or 
unnamed: first Parmenides, then an Eleatic Stranger, 
later Timaeus, Critias, and Hermocrates, finally the 
Athenian Stranger in the Laws, to represent the author’s 
views. Ueberweg also noticed that the Sophist and the 
Politicus resemble the Timaeus and the Laws in the 
absence of the dramatic action so characteristic of the 
Republic and earlier dialogues. All these hints taken 
together constitute a strong plea in favour of the sup- 
position that the Sophist and Politicus belong to the 
same period of Plato’s life as the Timaeus and the Laws. 
The same remark applies to the Parmenides, in which 
Ueberweg also found many indications of a later time, so 
much so that he believed this dialogue to have been 
written after Plato’s death by one of his pupils. Ueberweg 
collected many historical indications from Plato’s works 
as well as from other witnesses to show the limits 
of time within which many dialogues were written. He 
compared metaphysical, psychological, and ethical theories, 


Charac- 
teristics of 
Socrates 
different 
in these 
dialogues 
from 
what they 
were in 
earlier 
writings. 


Schaar- 
schmidt’s 
doubtsand 
Chaignet’s 
and 
Grote’s 
confidence 
reduced by 
Jowett to 
a just 
measure 
by return- 
ing to 
Schleier- 
macher’s 
and Her- 
mann’s 
tests, 


Other 
philo- 
sophers, 


56 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


and found in these comparisons a confirmation of the late 
date of the Sophist and Politicus, while he had less con- 
fidence in assuming a very late date for the Phaedo. 

Ueberweg’s doubts as to the authenticity of the Par- 
menides were soon afterwards extended to the Sophist and 
Politicus, as well as to many other dialogues, by Schaar- 
schmidt,” who left unattacked only nine out of thirty-five 
works of Plato, while at about the same time Grote,”! and 
after him Chaignet,®! defended the authenticity even of 
those dialogues which since Schleiermacher have been 
almost unanimously held for spurious. Jowett*! reduced 
these extremes of scepticism on one side and over-con- 
fidence on the other to a just measure. Returning to 
Schleiermacher’s verdict as to the authenticity, and reject- 
ing only an insignificant part of the traditional text of Plato, 
he accepted as authentic all the works of real import- 
ance. Though Jowett placed the Sophist and Politicus 
after the Republic in his translation, and though he refers 
to them (and in his last edition also to the Philebus) as 
late dialogues, showing upon many occasions their affinity 
with the Laws, he strangely enough protests against every 
supposition of a change in the fundamental doctrines of 
Plato, and he invokes against Jackson the authority of 
Zeller, a position which seems hard to reconcile with his 
own admission—that the Sophist and Philebus belong to 
Plato’s old age. 

After Ueberweg, the philosophical importance of the 
chronology of Plato’s dialogues began to be generally re- 
cognised, and we see this problem taken over from the 
philologers by philosophers. Later on, under Schaar- 


% C. Schaarschmidt, Die Sanumlung der platonischen Schriften, zur 
Scheidung der echten von den unechten untersucht, Bonn 1866. The same 
scepticism is brought to the last extreme by Krohn, Der Platonische Staat, 
Halle 1876. 

" G. Grote, Plato and the other Companions of Sokrates, London 1865, 
quoted in the following after the new edition in 4 vols., London 1885. 
A. E. Chaignet, La vie et les écrits de Platon, Paris 1871. B. Jowett, The 
Dialogues of Plato translated into English, 5 vols. 3rd ed. Oxford 1892. 


AUTHENTICITY AND CHRONOLOGY OF HIS WORKS 57 


schmidt’s influence, Ueberweg himself came to doubt the 
authenticity of the dialectical dialogues. But an Itahan 
philosopher, Felice Tocco, fourteen years after Ueber- 
weg’s publication supplemented his arguments in favour 
of the late date of the Sophist and Philebus, defending 
also the authenticity and equally late date of the Par- 
menides on account of the modification of Plato’s philo- 
sophical doctrines in these dialogues, attributed by Tocco 
to Pythagorean influence and coinciding with Aristotle’s 
testimony. 

Other philosophers became interested in the problem, 
and sought new arguments by detailed observation, thus 
dividing the general problem into as many special problems 
as there are separate works of Plato. Ueberweg’s method 
of fixing what we may know about the date of each 
dialogue, without prejudging the general plan of all the dia- 
logues, has been developed in an original manner by Teich- 
miiller,** who claimed to have been the first to give a clear 
definition of the literary character of Platonic dialogues. 
He looked upon them as polemical tracts, and thought 
that Plato’s aim was to ridicule his enemies and to in- 
crease the repute of his school. As such literary foes 
Teichmiiller quotes besides Isocrates, in whose relation 
to Plato Spengel * had already seen some indications for 
Platonic chronology, also Xenophon, Lysias, and even 
Aristotle. He further sees in Plato’s dialogues polemi- 
cal digressions referring to Antisthenes, Aristophanes, 
Aristippus, Democritus, and other contemporaries not 
named by Plato. Many allusions thus conjectured by 
Teichmiiller are of some probability, and his works are a 
mine of valuable suggestions for the student of Plato. 
Teichmiiller’s merit is further enhanced by his rare know- 

* F. Tocco, Ricerche Platoniche, Catanzaro 1876, Del Parmenide, del 
Sofista e del Filebo, Firenze 1893, also in vol. ii. pp. 391-469, of the Studi 
di Filologia classica. 

* Teichmiiller, Literarische Fehden, Breslau 1881-1884. Spengel, 


‘Isokrates und Plato,’ Miimchen 1855, in the Abh. d. Akad. d. Wissen- 
schaften zu Miinchen, vol. vii. pp. 729-769. 


as Tocco, 
Teich- 
miiller, 
Peipers, 
continued 
Ueber- 
weg’s 
work. 


Teich- 
miiller 
sees in 
Plato 
chiefly a 
controver- 
sialist, but 
his obser- 
vations 
remain 
valuable 
indepen- 
dently of 
his funda- 
mental as- 
sumption. 


He dis- 
played 

a better 
knowledge 
of foreign 
literature 
on the 
subject, 
and had a 
very clear 
form of ex- 
position. 


From his 
original 
point of 
view 
Teich- 
miiller 
gave an 
independ- 
ent confir- 


58 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


ledge of English, French, and Italian literature on Plato, 
which had never before been taken so much into con- 
sideration by German scholars. And the form of his 
work makes it still more useful. He has learnt from 
English writers how indispensable it is to supply the 
reader with good indices, and his indices make it easy to 
find at once in his many volumes on Plato what one 
wants; while it 1s exceedingly difficult to find a required 
passage in the volumes of Schleiermacher, Ast, van 
Heusde, Hermann, Susemihl, and even Ueberweg, none of 
whom understood the necessity and usefulness of a good 
alphabetical index in a work containing a mass of various 
information. In his own country Teichmiiller has not 
been appreciated according to his merits, because he met 
with a prejudiced critic in Zeller, who reigns as an 
authority on Plato in Germany. But English, French, 
and Italian scholars have recognised his great skill and 
acute judgment, and since his death he has also risen in 
the opinion of his own countrymen. He was a violent 
polemical writer himself, and this led him to generalise 
the polemical digressions found in Plato, and to see in the 
greatest thinker of humanity a controversialist full of 
vanity and personal ambition. Such a view of Plato as a 
general explanation of his literary activity 1s even more 
erroneous than the broad assumptions of Schleiermacher 
and Hermann. But the scattered polemical allusions 
discovered by Teichmiiller lose no importance as chrono- 
logical indications, even though we admit them to be 
only of secondary importance in the writer’s mind. 

It is significant that Teichmiiller, a good logician like 
Ueberweg, should confirm Ueberweg’s conclusions as to 
the date of the dialectical dialogues. He recognised that 
the Parmenides, Sophist, and Politicus belong to the same 
epoch as the Timaeus and the Laws. Some other con- 
clusions of Teichmiiller, such as his very late date of the 
Gorgias (375 B.c.) and Meno (388 B.c.), are more question- 
able. 'Teicbmiiller dissented from all his predecessors in 


AUTHENTICITY AND CHRONOLOGY OF HIS WORKS 59 


his assumption of a very late date for some so-called 
Socratic dialogues—the EHuthyphro, Apology, Crito, 
Cratylus,—which he believed to have been written after 
the Theaetetus. But this opinion, which he advanced 
chiefly on philological grounds, is less important in its 
bearing on the question of Plato’s philosophical develop- 
ment; while it is of the greatest importance to see how 
Teichmiiller’s investigation confirmed Ueberweg’s first 
attempts to prove the late date of the dialectical dialogues. 
Another philosopher who after Teichmiiller undertook 
our problem, Peipers,® reached the same conclusions by 
careful comparison of the ontological theories expressed 
by Plato. He found that the dialectical dialogues, Par- 
menides, Sophist, Politicus, and Philebus, contain an onto- 
logical doctrine which can only be explained as a con- 
tinuation of the standpoint reached in the Phaedrus and 
the Republic. Peipers has also succeeded in showing 
that these dialogues are nearer to the Laws than any 
other writing of Plato, and his argument convinced 
one of the most competent living investigators of Plato, 
Susemihl,®® who publicly acknowledged that he abandoned 
his former opinions, expressed thirty years earlier, as to 
the date of the dialectical dialogues. Susemihl’s impar- 
tiality, which allowed him to make this confession, was 
compensated by the obstinacy of Zeller, who, in his 
authoritative work on Plato, in each successive edition 
maintained the old assumption of a Megaric period to 
which he referred the Sophist, Politicus, and Philebus, 
alleging them to have been written before the Republic. 
Also the editor of the later editions of Ueberweg’s 
History of Greek Philosophy, M. Heinze, adhered to 
the old error of Hermann and Schleiermacher, and 
continued to spread the conviction that the Sophist and 
Politicus were written before the Banquet. If we take 
into account that Ueberweg’s and Zeller’s works on 
Greek philosophy enjoy up to the present time the greatest 
“ Peipers, Ontologia Platonica, Lipsiae 1883. 


mation of 
Ueber- 
weg’s con- 
clusions 
as to the 
late date 
of the 
dialectical 
dialogues. 


Also 
Peipers 
came to 
the same 
results by 
his study 
of Platonic 
ontology, 
which 
convinced 
Susemihl, 


but Zeller 
and 
Heinze in 
the last 
editions 
of their 
histories 
of philo- 
sophy 


adhere 

to the 
Megaric 
mythus, 
as well as 
Weygoldt 
and 
Pfleiderer. 


While the 
general 
reader is 
thus kept 
in ignor- 
ance of 
the latest 
investiga- 
tions, new 
detailed 
inquiries 
of Bergk, 
Rohde, 
Christ, 
Siebeck, 
Diimmler 


60 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


popularity, there will be no exaggeration in saying that 
Ueberweg’s earlier conclusions, which he afterwards 
abandoned, although confirmed with new arguments by 
Tocco, Teichmiller, and Peipers, remain almost unknown 
to general readers of Plato. Ina very popular work on 
Plato, written by Weygoldt, we still find the dialectical 
dialogues placed before the Repwhblic, and the same order 
occurs” in the most recent work of EH. Pfleiderer on 
Socrates and Plato. 

Since Susemihl’s conversion, however, many special 
investigations have fortified Ueberweg’s conclusion in 
favour of a late date for the Sophist and Polvticus. 
Besides such philological investigations as those of 
Bergk,®® Rohde,*” and Christ,°* who declared in favour of a 
very late date for the Theaetetus and consequently also 
for the Sophist and Politicus, we have in the last ten 
years a new confirmation, through an investigation 
by H. Siebeck,® author of a history of psychology. 
Siebeck started from the question whether Plato did 
not quote his own works, as is frequently done by 
Aristotle. He observed certain allusions which led him 
to affirm that Plato not only quotes the Republic and the 


% Weygoldt, Die platonische Philosophie, Leipzig 1885; E. Pfleiderer, 
Socrates und Plato, Tiibingen 1896. The views of this author have to be 
specially dealt with in connection with the date of the Republic, as he sub- 
ordinates the whole order of Plato’s dialogues to a distinction of some succes- 
sive stages in the Republic, wherein he follows Krohn (see note 90). 
Pfleiderer’s conclusions as to the order of other dialogues are not very distant 
from Hermann’s views, with the difference that Pfleiderer against every pro- 
bability places the Huthydemus after the Sophist, and the Phaedo before 
the Symposvum. 

% T. Bergk, Fiinf Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der griechischen Philo- 
sophie und Astronomvie, Leipzig 1883; Griechische Literaturgeschichte, 4° 
Bd. Berlin 1887. 

7 Rohde, ‘ Die Abfassungszeit der platonischen Thedtet’ in Jalrbiicher 
fiir Philologie wnd Pédagogik, vol. exxiii. p. 321, vol. exxv. p. 80; also in 
Philologus, vol. xlix. p. 2, vol. 1. p. 1, vol. li. p. 474 (1890-1892). 

*8 W. Christ,‘ Platonische Studien,’ pp. 453-512 in vol. xvii. of Abh. der 
philos. philol. Classe der Kinigl. bayer. Akad. Miinchen, 1886. 

” H. Siebeck, Untersuchungen zur Philosophie der Griechen, Freiburg 
i. B. 1888. 


AUTHENTICITY AND CHRONOLOGY OF HIS WORKS 61 


Politicus in the Laws, but that he also in the Republic 
announces a later settling of matters dealt with in the 
Sophist and Philebus. 

Also Dimmler,! who continued Teichmiiller’s studies 
on supposed feuds between Plato and his contemporaries, 
added to the considerable stock of arguments in favour of 
a late date of the dialectical dialogues, by a: special inquiry 
into the relations of Plato to Antisthenes, Antiphon, 
Aristippus, Aristophanes, Aristotle, Empedocles, Euri- 
pides, Gorgias, Heraclitus, Hippias, Isocrates, Polycrates, 
Prodicus, Protagoras, Xenophon, and others. 

Besides these works, which deal with a great number 
of writings, there are many special dissertations on each 
dialogue, which constitute, taken together, ample evi- 
dence for a definitive solution of the problem of their 
date. But this literature has grown so much that nobody 
has attempted to collect all such detailed observations and 
to give a clear picture of all arguments urged in favour 
of each hypothesis. We have here specially insisted 
on the date of the dialectical dialogues because of their 
exceptional importance for Plato’s logic, but on each 
other work, as the Republic, Gorgias, Phaedo, Phaedrus, 
hundreds of authors have expressed various opinions, 
generally based only on a very limited knowledge of other 
investigators. So long as all these separate observations 
are not summed up, every new writer on this subject 
runs the risk of repeating discoveries already made, 
or falling into errors easy to avoid. In these cir- 
cumstances a new general work on Plato’s dialogues, 
summarising all the separate observations made in this 
century, becomes indispensable to the progress of further 
investigations concerning Plato’s philosophy. This need 
has been felt by the French Académie des Sciences 
morales et politiques, a learned society which has 
awarded many considerable prizes for works on Plato, 


100 Diimmler, Akademika, Giessen 1889; Chronologische Bevtrige zu 
einigen platonischen Dialogen, Basel 1890. 


increase 
the 
amount of 
evidence 
in favour 
of Ueber- 
weg’s 
opinion. 


The neces- 
sity of an 
impartial 
co-ordina- 
tion of all 
detailed 
investiga- 
tions has 
been ap- 
preciated 
by the 
French 
Acadénvie 
des 
sciences 
morales,. 
but the 
work of 

C. Huit 
awarded a. 
prize does. 
not corre- 
spond to 
the pur- 
pose, the 
author 
neglecting 


the pro- 
blem of 
chrono- 
logy. 


Chrono- 
logy of 
Plato’s 
works 
not an 
insoluble 
problem, 
as has 
been 
generally 
thought in 
France. 


It is at 
least easy 
to prove 
the late 
date of the 
dialectical 
dialogues. 


62 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


among which those of Chaignet and Fouillée were not 
without value. But the last answer to the summons 
of this Academy, a work in two volumes written by 
C. Huit under the title La vie et Vewvre de Platon, 
published in Paris 1893, falls short of the most modest 
critical requirements, and by no means satisfies its purpose. 
The author knows so little of the special literature of 
his subject that he repeats Schaarschmidt’s arguments 
against the authenticity of the most important works 
of Plato without being aware that these arguments have 
been often refuted during the last thirty years. He also 
ignores the steady progress in chronological investiga- 
tions since Ueberweg, and regards the problem of Platonic 
chronology as almost insoluble. 

Such is not the conviction which results from an 
impartial survey of what has been already done for our 
problem. There is a progress in the validity of conclu- 
sions, as well as in the method employed from Tennemann 
to Schleiermacher, from Schleiermacher to Hermann, 
from Hermann to Susemihl, and from Susemihl to 
Ueberweg. Besides these inquiries referring to the 
majority of the works of Plato, there has been real 
progress also in the special investigations referring to 
each single dialogue. All these results should be co-ordi- 
nated in a general subject index showing all arguments 
in favour of and against every hypothesis as to the date 
of each several dialogue. Then only it would be inevitably 
seen that there is overwhelming evidence in favour of 
some conclusions and against others. 

It is not the purpose of the present work to furnish 
the reader of Plato with such an extensive index, but 
chiefly to indicate the agreement of the chief arguments 
advanced in favour of a late date of the dialectical dia- 
logues, in order to show that the logical science founded 
by Plato was advanced during his own lifetime by his 
renewed efforts. 

Before we enter upon the task of tracing this logical 


AUTHENTICITY AND CHRONOLOGY OF HIS WORKS 63 


development through Plato’s works, it is a duty to give 
the reader some information about a special kind of in- 
vestigation, subsidiary to the general study of Platonic 
chronology. We have limited the above review to those 
authors who sought to establish the order of Plato’s dia- 
logues on arguments taken from their contents ; because 
it is our own purpose likewise to compare the contents of 
a series of Platonic dialogues as to their logical theories. 
But, admitting all the importance of the contents, we 
must still contend that the form and style of Plato’s 
writings also give some indications as to their chronolo- 
gical order, and it is useful to compare the conclusions 
arrived at by both methods. The study of the style of 
Plato is much more recent than that of Plato’s philosophy, 
but it has led to very important conclusions as to the 
order of his writings, and it is our duty to consider these 
conclusions before we venture to represent the origin and 
growth of Plato’s logic. 


For this, 
not only 
the 
contents 
should be 
compared, 
but also 
the style, 
which has 
been in- 
vestigated 
only in 
recent 
times. 


/ 64 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


CHAPTER III 


THE STYLE OF PLATO 


Style IF we wish to assure ourselves of the identity of a friend, 
amark Whose thoughts and actions are familiar to us, the simplest 
of the plan is to appreciate his appearance and to verify our im- 
identity of pression by the tone of his voice. Could one of our best 
an author frjends perfectly disguise his voice and his features, it 
indepen would be difficult to recognise him by the manifestations 


aa of his thoughts or by the moral character of his actions. 
contents NOW the external form of a writer is his style, and it be- 


Be his trays him even when he for some reason may be profes- 
writings. sing thoughts very different from those which we usually 
associate with his name. 
Cru A thought can be expressed in various ways in the 
differences Same language; it might even be said that the notion of 
of style any one language includes as many languages as there 
between have been original writers in it. This is truer of Greek 
ak than of any modern language, and is especially true of 
ee. Greek prose writing in the fourth century B.c. A student 
another  2aVing read and understood all the works of Xenophon 
andinthe Might be unable to understand many passages in Plato. 
works of Plato’s language differs from Xenophon’s, though both 
the same wrote Attic prose. 
author. That there are peculiarities of style which distinguish 
a writer among many others is almost self-evident; that 
the style of some writers has changed in the course of 
years is a patent fact; yet many objections have been 
made to stylistic study as a means of settling problems of 
ascription and chronology. Hverybody knows the dis- 
cussions which this method provoked when applied to 


and 


PLATO'S STYLE: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 65 


Shakespeare, though, as regards Shakespeare, the difficulty 
is diminished by the fact that metrical intricacies and the 
poet’s resources are more varied than is the case with prose, 
even the prose of such a writer as Plato. But it is to be 
noted on the other hand that Plato’s literary activity 
was continued through a period twice as long as Shake- 
speare’s. ; 

Since most readers think that style is indefinable, they 
infer that it must afford an insecure basis for scientific 
reasoning. So Plato thought concerning all physical 
movements in the universe. According to him, their 
infinite variety hindered genuine scientific investigation 
(Phileb. 59 ac); they could only be guessed at with 
some degree of probability (Tim. 29 c, 48 D); and such 
guesses constituted ‘a pleasure not to be repented of, and 
a wise and moderate pastime’ (Tim. 59 D: duetapyédyTov 
nOovnY .. méTpLov Traosay Kali Ppdviwov), but they did not 
admit of accurate determination (Tim. 68 c D). 

This Platonic view of natural science extended also to 
linguistics (Crat. 421 pb), and the Master would have 
smiled at those who count words in his writings. But if 
the science of modern mechanics, by application of new 
infinitesimal methods, unknown to Plato, has reached a 
degree. of certainty by which it claims rank as a more 
exact science than any investigation of the human soul, 
then we need not allow Plato’s linguistic scepticism to 
keep us from the ‘moderate pastime’ of investigating his 
style. If an exact definition be possible of the notes 
which distinguish Plato’s style from the style of other 
writers, or by which a work written contemporaneously 
with the Laws differs from a work written at the time 
when Plato founded the Academy, then we may hope to 
ascertain the true order of Platonic dialogues according 
to the stylistic variations observed in them. 

There is no exaggeration in this pretension, since 
questions of identification are generally settled by purely 

F 


Definition 
of style 
difficult, 
and Plato 
would 
have held 
it to be im- 
possible. 


But 
modern 
methods 
enable us 
to deal 
with many 
problems 
beyond 
the reach 
of Plato. 


Identity 
of hand- 


writing 
no more 
definite 
than 
identity 
of style. 


It con- 
sists in a 
number 
of pecu- 
liarities, 
among 
which 
only those 
essential 
need con- 
sideration. 


Essential 
marks of 
style may 
be found 
first by 
investiga- 
tion of the 
vocabu- 
lary of an 
author. 


This in- 
cludes his 


66 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


external tests. The identity of handwriting, consisting 
in many minute signs difficult of definition, is held to be 
so far ascertainable, that on an expert’s decision in such 
matters a man’s life may sometimes depend. The limited 
number of marks of identity contained in a signature is 
sufficient to decide its authenticity for all purposes. A 
banker requires no further security for paying out the 
deposits left with him under his responsibility. Docu- 
ments written by a prisoner, despite his denial of their 
authenticity, may prove his guilt in the eyes of any 
magistrate. 

If handwriting can be so exactly determined as to afford 
certainty as to its identity, so also with style, since style 
is still more personal and characteristic than handwriting. 
But the definition of style requires a deeper study, because 
style is not, like handwriting, accessible to the senses. 
It may be objected that, since style has an almost infinite 
number of characteristic notes, it cannot be reduced to 
one fixed formula. The answer is, that a like infinity of 
characteristics exists in every object of natural science, 
and that science is possible only through the distinction of 
essential marks from those which are unessential. 

What, then, are the essential marks of style? In- 
dividuality of style is developed along two different lines, 
each of which requires special study. An author uses words 
as the raw material for the expression of his thoughts, 
and the choice of words affords him the most obvious 
opportunity for displaying his individual taste. There are 
cases when one given word, and no other, expresses a 
given idea; but this is not the general rule. In most 
phrases there are words which might easily be changed 
for others. In every language there are many words 
which have never been used by some authors, and other 
words used only once by their inventor. The contrivance 
of new compounds, and even of entirely new meanings 
for old and simple words, is of common occurrence in the 


PLATO'S STYLE: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 67 


style of great writers. A knowledge of the words invented 
by an author and only once used by him is an important 
factor in determining questions of style and ascription. We 
need a full index of such words invented by all authors 
who lived in Plato’s time. In comparing them we should 
probably find that Plato proceeded in some respects 
differently from others in his new formations. We should 
be led to observe what methods of composition were used 
by him in each of his works. We should be enabled to 
classify the occasions when he was most inclined to have 
recourse to such new formations, as, for instance, in 
employing mathematical, physical, or dialectical terms ; 
and we should remark a difference between the manner of 
expressing these notions at various epochs of Plato’s life, 
taking as our starting point a few productions undoubtedly 
written very late, as the Laws, and comparing them 
with other works, as to which there is ample evidence 
that they date earlier: for example the Apology. No- 
body doubts that the tenth book of the Republic was 
written after the first book, and many authors agree that 
it belongs to a much later period. In some cases there is 
also a general agreement as to the relative date of two 
dialogues ; thus it is certain that Plato wrote the Politicus 
after the Theaetetus, the Timaeus after the Republic, and 
it 1s scarcely less certain or less generally admitted 
that the Philebus was written after the Laches and 
Charmides. A comparison between such groups would 
lead to definite conclusions as to the direction taken by 
Plato in the modifications of his style. 

Besides this chapter on new words, we need in 
Platonic lexicography another chapter on rare words 
borrowed from poets. It is not usual to introduce into 
philosophical prose words which have been heretofore 
used only in poetry. The language of verse always differs 
from prose language, and the difference is exceptionally 
manifest if we compare the tragedians with the Attic 

F 2 


tendency 
to invent 
new words 
or com- 
pounds for 
certain 
classes of 
notions. 


They vary 
in yarious 
works ad- 
mitted to 
have been 
written at 
different 
epochs. 


Poetical 
words 
used by 
Plato 
more than 
by other 
prose 
writers. 


Use of 
foreign 
words. 


Rare and 
common 
words 
used dif- 
ferently. 


Frequency 
of each 
word in 
Plato not 
yet inves- 
tigated. 


Oppor- 
tunities 
for the use 
of each 
kind of 


68 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


orators. Plato is known to have used liberally words which 
before him were peculiar to dramatic poetry, and it is an 
interesting question to answer, whether this taste be 
equally prominent in all his works, or be chiefly apparent 
in some of them. 

Words borrowed from a foreign dialect would form a 
third class of rare words to be classified and enumerated. 
This classification could be definitely settled only after 
collecting all the lexicographical evidence, because it would 
serve no purpose to form classes out of a few chosen 
examples. 

In the above three classes we should include first 
of all such rare words as are used for the expression of 
some peculiar idea. Their use depends mainly on the 
thoughts they convey, and is essentially different from 
that of common words occurring frequently and not 
generally indispensable in cases where they occur. Among 
these common words the particles are conspicuous. The 
new compounds, poetical and foreign words were closely 
related to the contents of the text; it is not so with 
particles. 

We are still far from possessing a complete index of 
the Platonic vocabulary, informing us precisely how 
often a characteristic word occurs in each dialogue. 
Assuming that no word used by Plato is missing from 
Ast’s Lexicon!®! and Mitchell’s Index,!” it might be 
easily ascertained how many different words, and espe- 
cially how many substantives, verbs, adjectives, etc., he 
used. But a separate effort would be required to calculate 
the frequency of each word in each work. Even if we knew 
the exact number of times each word occurred, there would 
still remain the special task of calculating the oppor- 
tunities for its occurrence. Such calculations are needed 
for but a small part of the vocabulary, because words of 
rare occurrence in all works form the majority. Ast’s 


101 FB, Ast, Lexicon Platonicwm, vols. i.-iii. Lipsiae 1835-1836-1838. 
1022 'T, Mitchell, Index Graecitatis Platonicae, 2 vols. Oxonii 1832. 


PLATO'S STYLE: VOCABULARY 69 


Lexicon contains on 1,975 pages approximatively 10,000 
different words used by Plato, while the whole number of 
words in the text of all the works of Plato amounts 
roughly to 600,000.' 

If each word in Plato’s text be used, on an average, 
sixty times, we might be justified in defining as rare words, 
words which in all the writings of Plato occur less than sixty 
times, or on average less than once in twenty pages (ed. 
Didot). These would form the majority, and a certain 
natural limit of scarcity would soon be detected, by the 
absence of certain degrees of recurrence. Suppose for 
instance that, as appears from some inedited calculations 
by Tadeusz Miciiski, the number of words occurring less 
than ten times is above 7000, and that z, is the number 
of words occurring between ten and twenty times, gene- 
rally x, the number of words occurring between 10n 
and 10(n+1) times, then the limit of rare words will 
be reached when z,=0=2,,,=@%4. -- -. We should at 
once observe that there are no words occurring more than 
m and less than m+y times, and with those occurring 
m+y times would begin the series of common words up 
to such words as occur a maximum of times, possibly 
thousands. Such statistics of Plato’s vocabulary would 
require immense labour. A new Lexicon Platonicum 
with all the above indicated details, in spite of the utmost 
economy of space, could not occupy less than several 
volumes like Bonitz’s Index Aristotelicus. 

Even this would give us knowledge only of one aspect 
of Plato’s style: its vocabulary. But, as Plato himself 
observed, we should examine in a speech not only the 


103 This number of different words used by Plato has been calculated 
by Tadeusz Micitiski upon the assumption that each 100 entries fills 20 pages 
of Ast’s Lexicon, as has been found by counting the entries on 20 pages in 
twenty-five different parts of the lexicon. The total number of words used 
by Plato results approximately from the consideration that the text of all 
the 35 works bearing Plato’s name, including the small spurious dialogues 
and some of doubtful authenticity, fills in Didot’s edition only 1245 pages 
of 54 lines, with 8-11 words in each line. 


words are 
not the 
same. 


A limit 
between 
rare and 
common 
words is 
given 

by the 
average 
frequency. 


Limit of 
scarcity 
reached 
when 
certain 
degrees of 
frequency 
are 
missed. 


Arrange- 
ment of 
words 


distin- 
guished 
already 
by Plato 
from their 
selection. 
Numerical 
ratio of 
the parts 
of speech 
inter- 
mediate 
between 
statistics 
of fre- 
quency 
and the 
proper 
charac- 
teristics of 
arrange- 
ment. 


Inversion 
very char- 
acteristic 
in Plato’s 
later style, 
as may 

be seen 
from two 
samples of 
500 words 
in Prota- 
goras and 
Laws. 


70 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


choice of words, but also their arrangement (Phaedr. 2364). 
The arrangement of words is more difficult to define than 
their number. The same thought may be rendered not 
only by different words but also by a different arrange- 
ment of the same words. 

One of the characteristics of arrangement is the 
numerical proportion between verbs, adjectives, substan- 
tives, and other kinds of words, because in many cases 
the same word appears as adjective or verb or substantive ; 
the repetition of a noun can be avoided by a pronoun, 
and this allows many possible variations. For instance, 
‘a wise man is unable to become unjust’ and ‘ wisdom 
forbids injustice’ express substantially the same thought, 
while in the first we have thrice as many adjectives as 
substantives, and in the second no adjective at all. It is 
highly probable that Plato did not always preserve the 
same proportion in the use of various parts of speech. 
More especially the numerical relations between adjec- 
tives and substantives, between substantives and verbs, 
between these and adverbs, afford very characteristic 
properties of style, which might enable us to notice 
similarities or differences between one composition and 
another. 

The knowledge of these quantitative relations of every 
kind of word is intermediate between the lexicographical 
statistics of the scarcity or frequency of each term and 
the study of the construction of phrases. Here the 
immediate object of study would be the relative position 
of subject and predicate, of nouns and determinatives, 
adverbs and verbs, which may all occupy the first or the 
second place. No author follows a uniform practice in 
this respect, and variation is the rule; but at each period 
of life an author may show a certain predilection for one 
or another order in the phrase. Taking only the first five 
hundred words in the Laws and comparing them with 
the first five hundred words in the Protagoras, we may 
readily see how great are the differences between the two 


PLATO'S STYLE: INVERSION ral 


dialogues as to the use and order of the substantives and 
the adjectives : 

















Number of oC eee 
Substantives . é : : : 63 102 
Adjectives. : : : F 13 31 
Verbs (including participles) . , 91 79 
Adjectives preceding the correlated 7 9 
substantive . , : ‘ ; 
Adjectives following the correlated 0 18 
substantive . : ; 








If further calculations confirmed these, then it would 
appear that in his later style Plato used many more sub- 
stantives and adjectives than in his earlier writings, and 
that he acquired in old age a predilection for putting the 
noun before its qualifying words. But in order to draw 
such conclusions the examination should be extended to 
all the works of Plato, and should include the position of 
adverbs before or after the verb, of genitives before or 
after the noun on which they depend, and of all kinds of 
words in their mutual interdependence. 

If we observe that the Philebus has some hundred 
peculiarities in common with the Laws, and has very few 
constant characters in common with other dialogues, then 
we may be justified in ascribing the Philebus and the 
Laws to the same epoch of Plato’s life, with a certainty 
scarcely less than that which enables us to recognise that 
Plato and Demosthenes both wrote Attic prose. 

But, besides these, there remain some other classes 
of stylistic peculiarities: the length, construction, and 
interdependence of phrases; the rhythm produced in- 
tentionally or resulting naturally from the order of 
words selected; the recurrence or exclusion of certain 
phonetic effects, as, for instance, avoidance of the hiatus 
or the repetition of syllables with the same vowels or 
consonants; a preference for certain sounds; the use 
made of quotations and proverbs; the frequency of 


Further 
caleula- 
tions 
required 
before 
drawing 
general 
conclu- 
sions. 


Stylistic 
tests are 
conclusive 
if their 
number be 
sufficient. 


Variety of 
such tests 
will be 
found 
increasing 
with the 
progress 
of similar 
inquiries. 


Useful- 
ness of 
detailed 
investiga- 
tions 
depends 
upon the 
import- 
ance of the 
chrono- 
logy of 
Plato’s 
writings, 
and is far 
greater 
than that 
of idle 
discussion 
on Plato’s 
philo- 
sophy. 


Zeller’s 
objections 
based on 
insuf- 
ficient 
knowledge 
of the 
existing 
stylistic 
investiga- 
tions, 
which are 
little 


72 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


rhetorical figures and tropes; and many other points which 
would be suggested in the course of such inquiries. 

Such investigations are useful, inasmuch as they lead 
us to a better knowledge of the mental development of 
one of the greatest of all thinkers. Hundreds of German 
dissertations on Plato contain mere repetitions and vague 
generalities, of no importance for our knowledge of this 
philosopher. Had their authors spent the same time in 
studying some special property of Plato’s style, they would 
have made valuable additions to the positive knowledge 
of his development. The task of investigating every 
detail of style seems immense, but the number of persons 
fit for such work is much greater than the number of 
those capable of passing judgment on Plato’s philosophical 
doctrine. Any student, with a moderate knowledge of 
Greek, is made richer for life by a single reading of all 
Plato’s works, and this requires but an hour’s study a day 
during a year. And if in such a reading attention be 
directed mainly to some special peculiarity of Plato’s 
style, the impression produced by the contents need not 
be weakened. Hach year in all countries hundreds of 
students dedicate their time to classical philology. If 
but one in a dozen undertook a study of Plato’s style, 
within ten years our knowledge of Platonic chrono- 
logy would have progressed more than in these twenty 
centuries. 

Of the foregoing programme of investigation but a 
very small part has been executed, and this without any 
systematic common aim. Zeller, criticising chronological 
conclusions based on stylistic investigations (Philosophie 
der Griechen, I. 1. p. 512), objects that the number of 
characteristics investigated is too small, and that only if 
it amounted to hundreds could we thence draw inferences 
as to the chronological order of Plato’s dialogues. Of 
all the investigations made, Zeller quotes only those of 
Dittenberger, Schanz, Frederking, Gomperz, and Hoefer. 
He is apparently unaware that besides these authors there 


PLATO’S STYLE: BIBLIOGRAPHICAL DIFFICULTIES 173 


are many others whose study of Plato’s style does extend 
over hundreds of stylistic peculiarities. It is unfortunate 
that these studies are little known, being chiefly pub- 
lished in school programmes or as university disserta- 
tions. The authors, generally unaware of the work of 
their predecessors, were therefore unable to appreciate 
the cumulative evidence afforded by the. coincidence of 
results obtained through different methods. A full biblio- 
eraphy of Plato’! is as necessary and desirable as a 
complete Lexicon Platonicum,'™ and neither is hkely to 
appear very soon, for such works require an amount of 
material resources which is rarely at the command of 
Platonic scholars. 

Important contributions to the knowledge of Plato 
have been buried in introductions to the text of a single 
dialogue, or in dissertations privately printed for the pur- 


04 The bibliography of Plato is, up to the present time, very incomplete. 
Besides such general works as those of Ueberweg and Zeller, many indica- 
tions of older literature are found in: W. S. Teuffel, Uebersicht der 
Platonischen Literatur, Tiibingen 1874; J.Vahlen, ‘ Zur Litteratur des Plato’ 
(Zeitschrift fiir Oesterreichische Gymnasien, 23° Jahrgang, 1872, p. 518) ; 
W. Engelmann, Bibliotheca scriptorwm classicorum, 8th ed. Lipsiae 1880. 
The current literature is indicated almost exhaustively in the quarterly 
Bibliotheca philologica classica, published since 1873 by S. Calvary in 
Berlin. For a full Platonic bibliography it would be indispensable to sup- 
plement the information contained in these publications by a careful 
comparison of the catalogues of larger public libraries, and even of smaller 
university libraries in Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy. Also the 
numerous antiquarian catalogues issued yearly by many German second- 
hand booksellers contain titles of some smaller publications not easily found 
elsewhere. A Platonic bibliography based on all these sources would very 
much facilitate special investigations, if it contained not only the titles but 
also a short account of the contents of rare publications. But such a work 
implies much travelling, because all the materials could nowhere be found 
together. 

10 The mere cost of reprinting Ast’s Lexicon, whichis now very rare, has 
been estimated at 700/., and as the work is incomplete, a revision and 
thorough comparison with the text of the best edition of Plato would be 
indispensable. The cheapest cost of such a labour has been estimated by 
Dr. C. Ritter (cf. note 134) at 750/., which raises the expense of a new edition 
of Ast’s work to 1,450/., while the number of buyers for such a work could 
scarcely exceed a few hundreds. This removes the probability of such a pub- 
lication being undertaken in the ordinary way. 


known, 
being 
usually 
published 
in small 
tracts or 
in peri- 
odicals. 
No biblio- 
graphy of 
Plato 
exists. 


A survey 
and com- 
parison of 


detailed 
investiga- 
tions 
indispen- 
sable as 
illustra- 
tion of the 
above as- 
sertions, 
though it 
is difficult 
to make 
it exhaus- 
tive. 


First 
investiga- 
tions on 
Plato’s 
style 
made by 
Engel- 
hardt of 
Gdansk. 


From his 
work some 


TA. ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


pose of obtaining degrees. Many are rarely to be found 
in circulation or in public libraries, and for this reason 
writers on Plato often neglect their predecessors. In 
these circumstances it may be useful to give here a short 
review of over forty publications referring to Plato’s style, 
and to insist upon the lesson they teach when their con- 
clusions are compared. It is probable that besides these 
authors others have written on this subject, without 
being aware of the importance of their investigations. 
It is common to all these detailed inquiries that, con- 
sidered separately, they seem inconclusive, while taken 
together they prepare the way for a complete change 
of the prevailmg views on the matter to which they 
neler, 

I. EnGeLHARDT. The merit of priority in considering 
the question of Plato’s style (but without chronological 
applications) belongs to Friedrich Wilhelm Engelhardt, 
late director of the gymnasium in Gdansk (Danzig). 
He published in the course of thirty years (1834-— 
1864) five dissertations on Plato’s style !% in five school 
programmes never mentioned in any later work on that 
subject. His aim was not chronology but grammar, 
and he undertook in the first three dissertations a very 
careful study of the examples of anomalous construction 
in Platonic phraseology. After a long enumeration of all 
‘anacolutha’ found in the works of Plato, he classified 
these stylistic phenomena, and repeated very carefully 
for each class the indication of all passages containing an 
example of that particular construction. 

From these very interesting tables we can easily 
gather some indications bearing on the Platonic chrono- 


se fee 


program. Gymnasii Gedanensis 1834, 1838, 1845. The third dissertation 
contains on pp. 37-46 and 47-48 two indices of the passages enumerated also 
in the first two. By the same author, also as programme of the same gym- 
nasium in Gdarisk: De periodorum Platonicarwm structura, dissertatio 
prima (pp. 1-36), Gedani 1853, dissertatio altera (pp. 1-27), Gedani 
1864 (iv-v). 


~ 


PLATO'S STYLE: ENGELHARDT 75 


logy. In order not to increase the bulk of our refer- 
ences, we must limit our quotations to those stylistic 
marks which may be regarded as characteristic of later 
style, being either limited in their occurrence to the latest 
dialogues, or at least increasing in their frequency. To 
exclude characteristics occurring occasionally in earlier 
dialogues would deprive us of a useful measure of affinity 
between each of them and the latest group. With a view 
to clearness of exposition and arrangement we take for 
granted what will only appear as the ultimate result of 
our inquiry, namely, that the Sophist, Politicus, Philebus, 
Timaeus, Critias, and Laws form the latest group of 
Plato’s works. This, as will be seen in the course of this 
exposition, becomes probable beyond reasonable doubt 
by the totality of stylistic observations, because these six 
dialogues have hundreds of stylistic peculiarities which 
occur nowhere else in Plato, and likewise show an increas- 
ing frequency of peculiarities which in other dialogues are 
exceptional. For easy reference the stylistic peculiarities 
of Plato’s later style follow here in the chronologic order 
of their observation, and are numbered consecutively.* 
Among the twenty classes of altered construction 


* In the following enumerations the dialogues are quoted in their 
probable chronological order; the numbers placed after the name of 
each dialogue indicate the number of occurrences; where no number 
is given, the occurrences have not been counted. The numbers 
are printed in different type to show their relative importance. 2, 3, &e. 
mean that a peculiarity is repeated 2 or 3 times in the dialogue named, but 
is not frequent. 3, 4, &c. mean that the same peculiarity, occurring 3 or 4 
times, must be looked upon as frequent, in view of the size of the 
dialogue, if each occurrence is found on average more than once in 12 pages 
(ed. Didot). Numbers printed thus: 34, mean that a peculiarity is very 
frequent, occurring once or more in every two pages. + means a word not 
used before Plato; (A), a word used by Aristotle; *an Gat cipnucvoy 
according to the author from whom the observation is taken. Dialogues 
of dubious authenticity (Clitopho, Minos, Hipparchus, Epinomis, Theages, 
Hippias Major, Alcibiades I. and II., Amatores) or of no logical import- 
ance (Hippias Minor, Io, Menexenus, Lysis) are omitted in this list. The 
writings on the style of Plato are numbered consecutively in the notes by 
small Roman numbers placed after each title: i-xlv. : 


pecu- 
liarities of 
later style 
can be 
gathered 
and in- 
cluded in 
the follow- 
ing list 

of five 
hundred 
pecu- 
liarities 
of Plato’s 
style. 


Changes 
of con- 
struction 
observed 
by Engel- 
hardt are 
specially 
frequent 
in the 
Laws and 
other late 
dialogues. 


Other 
observa- 
tions of 
Engel- 
hardt are 
not pecu- 
liar to 
later style 
or do not 
refer to all 
the works 
of Plato. 


76 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


enumerated by Engelhardt the following characterise 
the later style : 


1. ‘Anacoluthiae genus quod ex symmetriae studio oritur’ 
(Anacol. Platon. spec. III. p. 39) is a change of construction 
produced by Plato’s increasing taste for symmetry, and consists in 
beginning the second part of the phrase in the same manner as 
the first, as for instance in Phaedr. 233 B: 
emOelKvUTat: 


ToavTa yap 6 épas 
dvotuxovrtas pev, & pn AUmnV Tois MANows TapExet, 
aviapa Trovet vomifew: evtTvxovvras dé Kai Ta py HOovns a&a 
map’ €kelv@yv emaivov davaykdte. Tuyyaverv. Such changes of 
construction were observed by Engelhardt in: Gorg. 1 Crat. 2 
Phaedo 1; Rep. 1 Phaedr. 1; Soph. 1 Phil. 1 Tim. 2 Legg 8. 

2. Change of construction in consequence of the more con- 
venient form of the continuation (ex commodiore sequentis 
structurae forma, p. 39), as, for instance, Tyee 23 Dis 
BU Emen ae: a TO mpearay epapev ayaba elvat, ov mept TOUTOU 6 Adyos 

. Such 
Rep. 5; 


; 
KuvOuvevet 


avrois eivat, Omws alta ye kad’ atta mépuKev ayabd. 
anacoluthiz are found: Meno 1 Huthy d. d.cSynipe is 
Polit. 1 Phil. 4 Tim. 4 Legg. 4. 

3. Two different constructions co-ordinated and dependent 
on the same enunciation (III. p. 41: anacoluthia fit duabus 
structuris conjunctis), as for instance, optat. with av and infinitive 
both dependent on doxet in Lach. 184 B, or ws with genit. partic. 
and infinitive in Charm. 164 &. Such cases were found: Apol. 1 
Charm. 1 Lach. 1 Gorg. 1; Rep. 4; Legg. 9. 

4. Anacoluthia ex transitu orationis suspensae in directam vel 
contra (III. p. 41): Gorg. 1 Symp. 1 Phaedo 4; Rep. 3 Phaedr. 1 
Theaet. 2; Soph. 1 Phil. 1 Legg. 2. 

5. Cases of omitted apodosis are quoted (p. 44) by Engelhardt : 
Gorg. 2 Symp. 2 Phaedo 2; Rep. 1; Phil. 1 Legg. 8 


Stes 


The other kinds of change of construction enumerated 
by Engelhardt do not appear to be specially frequent in 
the latest dialogues. His collections extend over all the 
works of Plato, and include more than four hundred cases. 
Being unaware of the chronological application of his 
work, he perhaps did not attempt a painful completeness 
of quotations. But even if he collected only those 
changes of construction which struck his attention in 
a first reading, we may assume that he had no special 
reason to notice the actual occurrence of such cases in one 
work more than in another. His observations are therefore 
valuable, and they may be accepted as at least approximate. 


PLATO'S STYLE: ENGELHARDT, KAYSSLER 17 


This author’s later investigations on the construc- 
tion of phrases are limited to the Phaedo and Republic, 
so that they afford no matter for comparison. It is 
interesting, however, to notice that according to Engel- 
hardt co-ordination of phrases prevails in Plato over 
subordination, and that the principal sentence generally 
precedes all subordinate clauses. Herein he sees a 
radical difference between Plato and Demosthenes, who 
inverted more frequently the natural order. Engel- 
hardt thinks (Period. Plat. I. p. 26) that this difference 
in the order of co-ordinate and subordinate sentences 
is due to the dialogical character of Plato, as opposed 
to the rhetorical character of Demosthenes. He would 
perhaps have been less confident as to the essential 
difference between the style of Plato and Demos- 
thenes, had he given as much attention to the Laws 
as to the Republic and Phaedo, It remains an inter- 
esting problem to compare the Laws and other dialogues 
as to the construction of phrases, and Engelhardt’s 
classification would be most useful for this purpose. 

II. Kayssnter. Of less importance is a small disser- 
tation by Kayssler'” (1847) on Platonic terminology. The 
author accuses Plato of inconsistency in the use of terms, 
even.as defined by himself, and enumerates the terms 
which he held to be the most important, without any 
attempt at comparing earlier with later dialogues, or 
at using the difference in terminology as an instrument 
of chronological determination. 

Iil-V. J. Braun’! (1847, 1852) and A. Lancs ! 
(1849), quoted by Engelhardt, seem also to have left 


17 Kayssler, Ueber Plato’s philosophische Kunstsprache, Oppeln (Polish 
Opole) 1847 (vi). The inexactitude of quotations is seen from the fact that 
Kayssler affirms p. 13 to have found suvvaywy7 and dialpeois only in Phaedr. 
Soph., while they occur also in Theaet. Rep. Phil. 

ws J. Braun, De hyperbato Platonico i. ii. progr. gymnas. Culmensis 
(Chelmno), 1847, 1852 (vii—viii). 

09 A. Lange, De Constructione periodorwm, imprinis Platonis, Vratis- 
laviae 1849 (ix). 


Other 
authors of 
the same 
epoch are 
less im- 
portant. 


Kopetsch 
of Lyk 
published 
an in- 
teresting 
disserta- 
tion on a 
class of 
adjectives, 
among 
which 
many 
have been 
invented 
by Plato, 
but few 
can be 
included 
in this 
list 
because 
Ko- 
petsch’s 
enumera- 
tion of 
passages 
is incom- 
plete. 


78 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


chronology out of the question in their investigations on 
Plato’s phraseology. To the same time belongs the 
dissertation of F. MicHExis!!° (1849), which deals more 
with Plato’s views on style and grammar than with any 
specialities of Plato’s own style. 

VI. KoprtscH. Some interesting observations are 
contained in the dissertation of Gustav Kopetsch (1860), 
teacher in the gymnasium of Lyk.'!! He also had no 
chronological purpose, but his grammatical aim to collect 
from Plato’s writings every kind of information about 
the use of adjectives in ros and téos gives us an oppor- 
tunity to select from his enumerations such uses of this 
class of words as appear to be peculiar to Plato’s later 
style : 

6. Adjectives in ros composed from a substantive and a verb 
are very rare. Kopetsch enumerates only (pp. 4 and 19): Phaedr. 2 
(opupyAaros 236 B, vupddAnmros 238 D) Tim. 1 (mupixavtos 85 C) 
Critias 1 (yesporoinros 118 c), Legg. 1 (aixypddwros 919 A). 

7. Adjectives in rds, oxytona, formed from compound verbs 
(p. 6): Prot. 2 Meno 3 Phaedo 1; Rep. 1 Phaedr. 1; Polit. 1 Tim. 4 
Legg. 3 (wapaurnros, duaBards, exhexros). 

8. Superlatives in roraros, beginning with dvs or ed (p. 7): 
Phaedo 2 (SvaeXeyxtorarov, evappoordraroyv) Tim. 3 (ducad@roraror, 
SvoKuvyntoraroy, evxuntoratov) Legg. 1 (Sucperaxepiatorarov). Super- 
latives in roraros of other adjectives occur besides: Apol. 1 Prot. 1 
Symp. 3 Rep. 3 Soph. 1 Phil. 3 Tim. 2 (with the preceding Tim. 5). 

9. Adjectives in ros composed of an adjective and verb: 
Phaedo 1 (moAvOpvAnros); Rep. 1 (aoAvOpvAnros) Phaedr. 1 
(icoperpyrov) ; Polit. 2 (6Accxioros) Tim. 1 (vedrpnros) (p. 19). 


Kopetsch quotes many other uses of adjectives in 
tos, but without attempting completeness of quotation 
except in the above cases of very rare occurrence. Of 
some hundred adjectives quoted and classified by this 
author, many might be included in our list, had their 


10 FB. Michelis, De enwntiations natura, sive devi quam in grammatica 
habwit Plato (pp. 1-63), Doctor’s dissertation, Bonn 1849 (x). 

1 G, Kopetsch, De verbalibus in ros et téos Platonicis dissertatio, cut 
intextae sunt breves de Homericis adnotationes, Lyck 1860, programme of the 
German Gymnasium in hyk (xi). 


PLATO’S STYLE: KOPETSCH, SCHONE 79 


occurrence been completely investigated. This was not 
the aim of Kopetsch, since he was not aware of any 
application of his work to Platonic chronology. For 
his purpose it was sufficient to quote a few characteristic 
occurrences of each word. A full investigation of the use 
of adjectives in tos and tégos in the works of Plato remains 
a very interesting problem for future special inquiry. 
Here we quote only two more single words which, 
according to Kopetsch, as well as Ast, occur but seldom 
in Plato : 


10. ayévnros (p. 27): Prot. 1; Phaedr.1; Legg. 1. 
11. peumros (p. 21): Theaet. 1; Legg. 1. 


VII. KR. Scuone. The first author who insisted 
energetically on the importance of stylistic observations 
as leading to chronological conclusions seems to have 
been R. Schéne!!? (1862) in his dissertation on Plato’s 
Protagoras. But he had a very superficial knowledge 
of Plato and of the means of defining literary style. 
Schone, despising enumeration of stylistic characteristics, 
quotes the authority of art critics, who judge whether a 
picture has been painted by Raphael or Murillo, without 
condescending to give special reasons for it, and he wishes 
to introduce into Platonic chronology such artistic intuitive 
judgment without the help of reasoned evidence. Still, 
Schone is right in his fundamental argument as to the 
comparative value of style and contents for chronological 
conclusions. He declares that an author can put in each 
work such contents as he chooses, while his style will 
simply be the result of his effort to write as well as he 
can, if he is so careful about the form of his writings as 
Plato was. Hence style is the surest measure of the 
stage of a great writer’s evolution. Schdne quotes Lessing 
and Goethe as competent authorities for such a view on 

12 Richard Schéne, Ueber Platons Protagoras, Leipzig 1862 (xii). The 
author confesses his indebtedness for a great part of his theories to Prof. 


Weisse’s lectures on Plato delivered in 1860-1861 at the University of 
Leipzig. 


Schéne 
recognised 
the supe- 
riority of 
stylistic 
tests as 
means of 
chrono- 
logical 
conclu- 
sions, but 
failed 

to find 
the right 
method of 
measuring 
differ- 
ences of 
style. 


80 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


the stylistic progress of great writers, and he concludes : 
‘wir diirfen den Stil als ein schlechthin allgemeines und 
sicheres Kriterium betrachten, wo es sich um HKchtheit 
und Zeitfolge der platonischen Schriften handelt’ (p. 21). 
But after having thus clearly set forth the importance 
of stylistic study in determining Platonic chronology, 
Schone fails to find a right method for such investiga- 
tions. He believes an exact analysis of style impossible, 
ignoring the labours of Engelhardt, Braun, Lange, and 
Kopetsch ; and invokes a mysterious power, the ‘ feeling 
of style.’ 

This ‘feeling’ led Schdne to see a higher degree of 
stylistic perfection in narrated conversation than in 
dramatic dialogue. He inferred that all narrated dia- 
logues—the Charmides, Protagoras, Banquet, Phaedo, 
Republic, and Parmenides—are later than all the works 
whose form is dramatic. Schdne did not perceive that 
Plato, after having used the form of narrated dialogues, 
erew tired of the repetitions which it involves, and 
returned to the primitive dramatic mode. Had Schéne 
limited his judgment to the relation between Protagoras 
and the small dramatic works, such as the Laches, Crito, 
Euthyphro, his observation of the stylistic perfection of 
a narrated dialogue could not have led him to the 
absurdity of placing the Laws and even Timaeus earlier 
than the Republic. Thus he discredited the method 
which he was the first to propose. He did not under- 
stand that for a philosopher contents are more important 
than form, and that the artistic skill which Plato 
exercised on his narrated dialogues was peculiar to a 
time when the deepest problems of thought had not yet 
absorbed the writer’s whole attention and endeavour. 
Schone represents Plato as struggling during his maturity 
for perfection in the form of the philosophical dialogue, 
after spending earlier years in elaborating philosophical 
convictions. Thus the Sophist and Philebus appear to 
Schone earlier than the Protagoras. He had the merit 


PLATO’S STYLE: SCHONE, MARTINIUS 81 


and boldness of drawing extreme consequences from his 
theory, arriving at the untenable conclusion that Plato 
renounced dialectical aims for the sake of artistic perfec- 
tion (p. 82). 

VIII. C. Martinius. What Schone attempted by a 
mistaken route has been more successfully carried out 
as regards a special characteristic of Plato’s style by 
C. Martinius"* (1866, 1871), who, himself a teacher, 
began with the conviction that Plato as a teacher must 
have progressed in the art of interrogating, and that 
therefore differences in the form of questions might 
lead to chronological conclusions as to the order of the 
dialogues. Martinius first collected what Plato himself 
had said upon the art of asking questions, and then pro- 
ceeded to classify the interrogations found in Plato’s 
dialogues. Enumerating not less than eighteen differ- 
ent kinds of questions, he invites the reader to continue 
the inquiry as to the occurrence of each of these in 
the entire works of Plato, in order to establish the pro- 
gress made by the philosopher in his practice as a teacher. 
Martinius himself published, five years after his first 
effort, a very short summary and continuation,'™ in which 
he insists on the importance of ‘ Suggestivfragen,’ that 
is, questions which take for granted something not yet 
accepted or discussed. 

Such questions seek to determine something sup- 
posed to be known, while it is really not known, as 
if a prisoner were asked the time when he committed 
a crime which he has not admitted. In Plato’s dia- 
logues the imputed object is not an action but a know- 
ledge, as, for instance, when (Phaedr. 276 A) Socrates 
asks whether another kind of teaching is not much 

13 C. Martinius, ‘ Ueber die Fragestellung in den Dialogen Platos,’ in 
the Zeitschrift fiir das Gymnasialwesen, xx** Jahrgang, Berlin 1866, 
pp. 97-119, and 497-516 (xiii). 

14 ©. Martinius, ‘ Ueber die Fragestellung in den Dialogen Platos und 
tiber eine besondere Higenthiimlichkeit derselben,’ Jahresbericht iiber das 
Progymnasium zu Norden, 1871, 4to., pp. 1-18 (xiv). 

G 


Martinius 
knew the 
right 
method, 
but his 
work 
remained 
incom- 
plete, 
being only 
a pro- 
gramme 
deserving 
the atten- 
tion of 
future 
investi- 
gators of 
Plato’s 
style. 


The pro- 
blem of a 
classifica- 
tion of 
questions 
in Plato’s 
dialogues 
already 
proposed 
by Ueber- 


weg. 


First 
attempt 

of a 
methodic 
solution 

of the 
problem 
of Platonic 
chrono- 


logy by 


82 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


better and more powerful, while he had not yet named 
that other kind and obtained assent as to its existence. 
Such questions were seen by Martinius (ii. pp. 9-13) in 
Gorg. 486 D, Rep. 414 B, 421 cD, Phaedr. 276 A, Theaet. 
158 B, 187 cp, 190 B, Parm. 156 pD, Polit. 278 A, 290 A, 
302 B, Phil. 38 DE, Legg. 646 5, 691 B. We cannot 
include these quotations in our list of characteristics 
of later style, because Martinius did not. profess to give a 
complete enumeration but only examples of each kind 
of questions. He seems not to have continued and 
completed these investigations, which are remarkable 
for their method and originality, and might serve as a _ 
starting point for anybody who undertook to realise 
the programme proposed by the ingenious Hanoverian 
teacher. 

The problem of defining the differences between 
various modes of putting a question in Plato’s dialogues 
had been also slightly broached by Ueberweg (Unter- 
suchungen, p. 207), who observed that in the Sophist, 
the Politicus, and the Philebus, as also in the Timaeus, 
Critias, Laws, the play of question and answer becomes 
more and more conventional and more remote from 
the tone of natural conversation, approaching to the 
form of an uninterrupted lecture. The observation of 
such a peculiarity limited to only six dialogues (Soph. 
Polit. Phil. Tim. Critias Legg.) was in so far a very 
important first step in conscious determination of Plato’s 
later style, since 1t could not well be attributed to chance. 

IX. Lewis CAMPBELL. No single characteristic of 
style, however important, suffices for general conclusions, 
as the case of Schéne shows. It is edifying to see the 
great contrast between Schdne’s confidence and the 
modest caution with which stylistic inferences were 
justified by an author who alone enumerated and com- 
pared more characteristics of the style of Plato than all 
other investigators put together. This contribution to 
the study of Plato’s style, still after thirty years the 


PLATO'S STYLE: CAMPBELL 83 


most important of all, is contained in the introduction 
to an edition of the Sophist and Politicus of Plato by 
Lewis Campbell, then Professor of Greek in the Uni- 
versity of St. Andrews (1867). 

Campbell'® knew none of the authors enumerated 
above, and he approached the study of Plato’s style quite 
independently, with the special purpose of determining 
the date of the dialogues which he edited while main- 
taining their genuineness. He had the original idea of 
going through Ast’s Lexicon Platonicum and of finding 
out what words are peculiar to each dialogue in common 
with the group of Timaeus, Critias, Laws, which are 
recognised to be the latest works of Plato. 

He assumed that a word, for which Ast quotes 
references only from a few dialogues, does not occur else- 
where. This assumption is probably correct in the great 
majority of cases, and is quite justifiable in a first general 
inquiry, though it would be desirable, after collecting 
such words as Ast quotes only from a few dialogues, to 
examine the bulk of Plato’s text in order to be certain 
that they occur nowhere else. When Ast prepared his 
Lexicon Platonicum, more than seventy years ago, he 
could not foresee the importance now attached to precise 
reference; and for some particles, which have been 
specially investigated afterwards, and are peculiarly 
characteristic of Plato’s later style (as, for instance, 
pnv), Ast quotes only a small number of the instances 
remarked by later writers. 

In the introduction to an edition of two dialogues, 
Campbell could not go into so many details as later 
investigators of Plato’s style; he does not quote the 
single passages in which each word occurs, nor even 
all the words observed, and he condenses the results 
of a long and tedious labour into a few pages of dry 


"5 The Sophistes and Politicus of Plato, with a revised text and 
English notes, by the Rev. Lewis Campbell, M.A., Professor of Greek in the 
University of St. Andrews: Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1867 (xv). 


G6 2 


means of 
the study 
of Plato’s 
style. 


Campbell 
based his 
investiga- 
tion on 
Ast’s 
Lexicon, 
and had 
thespecial 
purpose of 
determin- 
ing the 
position 
of the 
dialogues 
he edited. 


His work 
remained 
entirely 
unknown 
to all later 
investi- 
gators of 
Plato’s 
style, and 
he did not 
insist on 
the im- 
portance 
of his dis- 
coveries. 


Thus it is 
necessary 
to explain 
his obser- 


84 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


enumeration (Introduction, pp. xxv—-xxx), which, to 
be fully appreciated, needs more comments than the 
author cared to give. His observations are of such 
novelty, that, giving so many new facts, he left the 
reader to weigh them and to judge the correctness of the 
conclusions drawn with admirable sagacity by the 
author. 

Such readers as he had did not notice the importance 
of the evidence collected. Having brought together ma- 
terials sufficient to prove that the Sophist and Politicus 
must have been written in Plato’s old age, Campbell con- 
cludes with the modest phrase: ‘If our hypothesis of 
the comparatively late origin of these dialogues is correct, 
the non-appearance of the Philosopher coincides with and 
renders more significant the abandonment of meta- 
physical inquiry in the Laws.’ He had laid the first 
foundations of a new solution of the problem of Platonic 
chronology. Twenty-two years later, reviewing a Ger- 
man book, which on a much smaller basis proclaimed 
like results with much greater confidence, Campbell 
said''® with equal candour: ‘Now, if not before, it is 
clearly proved that the Sophistes, Politicus, Philebus, 
Timaeus, Critias, and Leges, in this order, or nearly so, 
form a separate group, and are the latest written . . 
inquiries wholly independent of each other have led to 
this coincidence of result.’ 

An author capable of such self-effacement could not 
impress upon the reader his convictions as definitive 
truths, and, accordingly, Campbell’s investigations re- 
mained entirely unnoticed for nigh thirty years.’ It 


ué The Classical Review, February 1889, pp. 28-29, review of C. Ritter, 
Untersuchungen iiber Plato, by Lewis Campbell. 

17 The first public recognition of the exceptional importance of 
Campbell’s investigations on the style of Plato is contained in the vol. ix. 
pp. 67-114 of the Archiv fiir Geschichte der Philosophie (October 1895) in an 
article ‘ Ueber Echtheit Reihenfolge und logische Theorien von Platos drei 
ersten Tetralogien’ and in the Bulletin del’ Académie des sciences de Cracovie, 
October 1895 pp. 268-277, where the Polish work O pierwszych trzech 


PLATO’S STYLE: CAMPBELL 85 


was also not suspected that the introduction to an edition 
of the text of two isolated dialogues could contain a capital 
inquiry into the vocabulary of all the works of Plato. 
Under these circumstances it may be well to recall 
Campbell’s chief observations, the more so as these should 
be repeated, in order to give them greater exactness 
than can be afforded by our confidence in the relative 
completeness of Ast’s lexicon. 

Assuming, with all competent writers, that the Laws, 
as well as T%maeus and Critias, belong to Plato’s latest 
period, Campbell sought for peculiarities of style which, 
being common to these works, are also observed in others. 
He found the following points in which the Sophist and 
Politicus, partly also the Philebus, are similar to the 
Timaeus, Critias, and Laws: 

12. The Sophist and Politicus are both the middle pair of an un- 
finished tetralogy, sketched out in the second dialogue of the series; so 
are the Timaeus and Critias (Introduction, p. xix). In both tetralogies 
the plan of the four consecutive dialogues was not indicated in 
the first of the series. Neither in the Republic is there any hint 
as to the author’s intention of writing the Timaeus, Critias, and 
Hermocrates; nor is there in the Theaetetus any clear indication con- 
cerning the Sophist, the Politicus, and the Philosopher as an intended 
continuation. In both tetralogies the fourth dialogue remained un- 
written. There is no evidence that Plato ever wrote the Hermocrates 
announced in the Timaeus, or the Philosopher announced in the 
Sophist. The first dialogue of both tetralogies is conducted by 
Socrates, while in the second and third Socrates remains a listener, 


who merely proposes the subject of conversation at the outset. 
The idea of planning out four consecutive dialogues as one larger 





tetralogjach dziet Platona, by W. Lutostawski, is announced. In France 
Campbell’s discoveries became known only after a lecture delivered on 
May 16, 1896, in the Institut de France, in Paris, before the Académie des 
sciences morales et politiques, and published in vol. exlvi. of the Compte 
rendu des séances et travaux de V Académie des sciences morales et politiques, 
also apart with an additional preface : W. Lutoskawski, Swr wne nouvelle 
méthode pour déterminer la chronologie des dialogues de Platon, Paris, 
H. Welter, 1896. More detailed is the account of Campbell’s investi- 
gations in the Polish work of the same author, ‘O pierwszych trzech 
tetralogjach dziet Platona,’ published by the Cracow Académie des Sciences 
in vol. xxvi. pp. 31-195 of the philological memoirs of that society, and also 
in a separate volume, Cracow 1896. 


vations 

in order to 
enable 
others 

to repeat 
them. 


He chiefly 
sought 

for pecu- 
liarities 
which 
denote the 
similarity 
of Sophist, 
Politicus, 
and Phile- 
bus to 
Timaeus, 
Critias, 
and Laws. 
Analogy 
between 
the 
tetralogy 
planned 
in the 
Sophist 


and that 
which is 
sketched 
in the 

Timaeus. 


Socrates is 
no longer 
the chief 
teacher in 
Timaeus, 
Critias, 
Laws, 

nor in the 
Sophist 
and 
Politicus, 
and he 
appears as 
a pupil of 
Diotima 
in the 
Synypo- 
sium, of 
Parme- 
nides in 
the Par- 
mendes. 


86 


ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


whole corresponds to the great length of the last work of Plato, the 
Laws. It is also psychologically plausible that Plato, grown old, had 
more to say, and said it in an ampler manner. His recognised earliest 
productions, the so-called Socratic dialogues, are much shorter than 
the works of his mature age. The most obvious reason which 
prevented him from finishing the two intended tetralogies is the 
shortness of life, and this alone would lead us to ascribe the second 
and third dialogues of these unfinished tetralogies to a later time than 
both first parts: that is later than the Republic, and later than the 
Theaetetus. On the other side the Republic and Theaetetus being 
singled out among all the other works by the circumstance that a 
continuation to them has been given, it seems probable that this 
relation of both to later dialogues is due to their relatively late date, 
because Plato is more likely to have connected his latest works with 
those preceding them, than with works written very much earlier. 
If we take into account also that the Laws differ from all earlier 
dialogues by their volume, and that they may be considered as 
consisting of at least four parts, we may observe that the late 
peculiarity of uniting several dialogues into a larger whole extends 
to Soph. Polit. Tim. Critias Legg. (and toa certain degree 
also to Rep. and Theaet.) 

18. The Sophist and Politicus, as well as Timaeus, Critias, Laws, 
also in some degree the Parmenides and Symposium, are the only 
works of Plato in which Socrates is not the principal figure in the 
conversation, and in which other teachers take his place (Introdue- 
tion, p. xix). While these are named in the Symposium, Parmenides, 
Timaeus, and Critias, they are but unnamed abstract personalities 
in Sophist, Politicus, and Laws. The stranger from Elea, the 
Athenian stranger, are representatives of pure reason and 
experience, while the Platonic Socrates of other dialogues is 
generally a concrete personage, with a certain historic idiosynerasy, 
although freely adapted to the expression of Plato’s theories. The 
predominance of other teachers over Socrates characterises only 
seven dialogues: Soph. Polit. Tim. Critias Legg. and to a 
certain degree Symp. and Parm. 

14. The exposition in the latest works is chiefly didactic (Intro- 
duction, p. xx), and the Socratic dissimulation of knowledge, still 
appearing in the Theaetetus, is definitively forgotten. ‘The 
Philosopher guides his pupil by a path familiar to himself to 
conclusions which he foreknows’ (p. xx). ‘The speakers are 
playing at a laborious game (Parm. 1378) to which they are 
evidently not unaccustomed, and which proceeds according to 
certain rules’ (p.xxi). With no sudden gust of eloquence as in the 
Republic or Theaetetus, but with a gravity akin to solemnity, Plato 
discusses in these works subjects loftier than those proposed at the 
outset, and displays a fixed conviction of human nothingness. 


PLATO'S STYLE: CAMPBELL 87 
This refers to: Parm. Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Critias 
Lege. 

15. From the conversational freedom of the Republic we are led 
to scientific exactness and compression (Introduction, p.xv); there 
is an air of self-imposed restraint; an appearance of studied order 
and arrangement becomes manifest also in the occasional reference 
to earlier dialogues, as in the Soph. 217 c the Parmenides is quoted, 
in the Soph. 2164 the Theaetetus, in Polit. 2848 the Sophist, in 
Tim. 17c the Republic, in the Critias 1068 the Timaeus, and less 
clearly in the Laws 711a, 7124, 739BcD, the Republic. Also 
the ‘preludes’ and ‘ recapitulations,’ disdained in the Phaedrus, 
are quite as common in the Sophist and Politicus as in the 
Laws, the Timaeus, and Critias (p. xxiii). This care for form, 
while the perfection of form wanes, may be best explained 
by the increasing preoccupation with the philosophical contents, 
peculiar to the writer’s old age. The dry light of reason accompanied 
the decline of poetical grace and power. A vein of refined and 
caustic satire succeeds to the simple and playful humour of 
earlier times (p. xix). This special and evident care for exactness 
of expression, leading to a fixed terminology, belongs to: Parm. 
Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Critias Legg. 

16. The periods are more elaborate and less regular than in the 
Republic: (Introduction, p. xxxviii) Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Critias 
Legq. 

17. The natural order of words is more often inverted, and the 
hyperbaton in the use of particles is specially frequent (p. xxxvii): 
Soph. Polit. Phil. Tum. Critias Legg. 

18. The monotonous recurrence of a certain rhythmical cadence 
(Introduction, pp. xx and xl) under the increasing fascination of 
rhythmical linguistic music : Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Critias 
Legg. 

19. Careful balancing of words so as to relieve the tediousness 
of a prolonged phrase by the counterposition of noun and epithet, 
verb and participle, subject and object, and by the alternation of 
emphatic and unemphatic words (Introduction, p. xli) : Soph. Polit. 
Phil. Tim. Critias Legg. 

20. The adjustment of long and short syllables so as to quicken 
or retard the movement of the sentence. Sometimes short 
syllables are accumulated as in choric metres; more often a 
sentence is concluded with an iambic hemistich, or with a dochmiace, 
each generally terminating with a dissyllable, which is often divorced 
from the immediate context (Introduction, p. xlii): Soph. Polit. 
Phil. Tim. Critias Legg. 


For all these peculiarities Campbell quotes examples 


which need not be repeated here, because points 16-20 


The latest 
seven 
dialogues 
have a 
more pro- 
nounced 
didactic 
character 
than all 
earlier 
works. 
We notice 
in them a 
methodic 
proceed- 
ing and 
quotations 
of earlier 
works ; 

a special 
care for 
form and 
termino- 
logy. 
Phraseo- 
logy more 
elaborate. 
Inversion 
frequent. 
Phonetic 
effects 
sought for. 
Symmetry 
in the 
order of 
words and 
evenin the 
order of 
syllables. 


These 
points 


should 

be in- 
vestigated 
again. 
Avoiding 
of the 
hiatus 
later 
observed 
by Blass. 
Of many 
grammati- 
cal pecu- 
liarities 
observed 
and 
quoted by 
Campbell 
only one 
can be in- 
cluded in 
our list 
because 
he did not 
attempt 
complete- 
ness of 
enumera- 
tion. 


Lexico- 
graphy. 
The vo- 
cabulary 
of Plato’s 
later 
works 

is very 
original, 
contain- 
ing many 
words 


88 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


deserve renewed inquiry, as they have not been treated 
exhaustively. 


21. The avoiding of the hiatus, a peculiarity of the same order, 
though not expressly noticed by Campbell in 1867, is implied in the 
influence of rhetorical artifice on Plato, to which Campbell directs 
our attention (p. xl). According to later investigations of F. 
Blass '** (1874) the avoidance of hiatus is limited to the following 
dialogues: Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Critias Legg. 

22. The use of the Ionic dative plural in ot was indicated by 
Campbell (p. xxiv) as a characteristic of later style. Its occurrence 
has been later exactly determined by C. Ritter, and found only 
in: Rep. 6 Phaedr. 3 Polit. 4 Tim. 2 Legg. 85 (C. Ritter, Unter- 
suchungen, p. 9; also Jowett and Campbell, Republic, vol. ii. 
p: 52). 


Some other grammatical peculiarities of later style, 
observed by Campbell, as: perfects with present meaning, 
participles with auxiliary verb, neuter article with the geni- 
tive to express the abstract notion of a thing, ellipse of ro 
pev etc. with 70 62 etc. following, redundant or explicit use 
of the participle, repetition of a verbal notion which has 
been already expressed or implied (Introduction, pp. xxiv— 
Xxvil) cannot be included in our list, because they are in- 
dicated without a complete quotation of their occurrences 
in all the writings of Plato. These points ought to 
be investigated anew by some philologer acquainted with 
Campbell’s work, and they would yield very interesting 
results. 

The most important peculiarity of Plato’s vocabulary 
in his later works 1s its originality, leading the author to 
invent many new words, or to mould old words to new ideas 
with an affectation of variety and minuteness of distinc- 
tion (Introduction, p. xxx). In the Laws Campbell found 
1,065 words occurring nowhere else, on 317 pages of text 
(ed. Stephani; Campbell quotes 345 pages because he did 
not take into account the space without text at the end of 
each book). This yields a proportion of 336 original words 
to each 100 pages, an originality of vocabulary absent from 
earlier works of Plato. The Tumaeus and Critias show 


ORIGINALITY OF PLATO'S VOCABULARY 89 


the same tendency to the use of rare words, as they have 
-on 90 pages 427 words unused elsewhere by Plato. 
This raises the proportion to 474 original words in 100 
pages. It does not imply that Plato in writing the 
Timaeus and Critias tends to a greater use of new and 
rare words than in writing the Laws, for physics exceed 
politics in the opportunities for such usage. In such a 
political treatise as the Laws, 336 new words to 100 pages 
show as great a leaning to an original vocabulary as 427 
new words to 100 pages in a physical treatise. Turning 
to the Sophist and Politicus taken together as one whole, 
in 107 pages there are 255 new rare words not found else- 
where in Plato, a proportion which corresponds to that of 
239 in 100 pages. That this bent towards the use of rare 
words was increasing we can easily see by comparing the 
three dialogues which were avowedly written by Plato in 
succession. In the Theaetetus he employs 93 new words 
unused elsewhere, that is 133 to 100 pages (ed. Steph.), in 
the Sophist 187 to 100 pages, in the Politicus 295 to 100 
pages ; but in the Philebus only 100 to 100 pages, and in 
the Phaedrus 326 to 100 pages. (These last numbers are 
given in vol. ii. of the edition of the Republic by Jowett 
and Campbell, pp. 53-55.) It is to be regretted that 
nobody has as yet calculated these proportions for the 
Parmenides, Republic, and for earlier dialogues. The 
numbers given by Campbell refer only to: Phaedr. 
Theaetet. Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Critias Legg. 

This originality of vocabulary is a very powerful 
argument in favour of the late date of the Sophist 
and Politicus, but cannot be included in our list of 
marks of later style, so long as comparative statistics 
about all the works of Plato in this respect are not estab- 
lished. 

The absence of a fixed terminology, which is observed 
by readers of the earlier dialogues, is less noticeable 
in the Sophist and later works. In all these dialogues 
a great number of rare words recur, besides those used 


used 
only 
once. 


But this 
peculiarity 
has not 
yet been 
investi- 
gated 
through- 
out all the 
works of 
Plato like 
the recur- 
rence of 
fixed 
terms. 


Some 
words 
used in 
Timaeus, 
Critias, 
Laws, 
occur 
besides in 
only one 
of the 
earlier 


dialogues. 


This 
allows a 
measure 
of affinity 
between 
each dia- 
logue and 
the latest 
group. 


90 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


only once, and this repetition of new and rare words 
shows an inclination to ‘fix in language some of the 
leading generalisations of philosophy’ (Introduction, 
p- XXX). 

Taking the Timaeus, Critias, Laws, as containing 
Plato’s latest terminology, Campbell counted the words 
which each dialogue shared with this latest group, and 
which occur nowhere else in Plato. If we reduce the 
numbers given by Campbell to the proportion of 100 
pages, and if we allow a correction consisting in count- 
ing as common and peculiar to Sophist and the group 
of the Laws also those words which, besides these four 
dialogues, have been used only in Politicus—then we 
have in the Sophist to 100 pages 108 new words common 
and peculiar to the Sophist and to the group of the Laws. 
In the Politicus the number of such words rises to 136 
in 100 pages, counting also those which besides occur 
only in the Sophist. Of the other Platonic dialogues, 
the Phaedrus alone shows a vocabulary which in almost 
equal measure approaches that of Plato’s recognised latest 
writings, containing a proportion of 117 rare words to 100 
pages (ed. Steph.), which apart from this dialogue are used 
only in the group of the Laws. This does not necessarily 
prove that the Phaedrus belongs to the same epoch, 
since, the Phaedrus being in more senses than one a pro- 
gramme, and a work of rare poetic richness and artistic 
excellence, it is natural that Plato should have retained 
in use many words there first employed. Among the 
other writings, the Philebus affords a remarkably low 
proportion of such words. They are only sixty-two to 
100 pages, though in many other respects the Philebus 
is more nearly related to the Sophist and Politicus, and 
also to the group of the Laws, than the Phaedrus. This low 
figure is explained by the circumstance that no account 
was taken of such words as occur, besides in Philebus and 
the latest three dialogues, also in Sophist and Politicus. 
Assuming that Plato wrote the Philebus at about the 


PLATO’S LATER VOCABULARY 9] 


same time as the Poltticus, it would be natural that he 
should use in both some rare words peculiar to the group 
of the Laws. Allowing for such words, the figure rises 
to ninety-two rare words in 100 pages (ed. Steph.) com- 
mon and peculiar to the Philebus with the latest three 
dialogues. The importance of these figures is apparent 
on comparison with those of other works in which 
Campbell counted the words peculiar to the group of 
the Laws. These are seen from the table on the next 
page (calculated on Campbell’s table, p. xxxi). 

In this table some anomalies require explanation. 
The Protagoras, being an early dialogue, has more words 
peculiar to the latest group than could have been ex- 
pected. To explain this we should require to know what 
words these are, because if they refer to some special 
subject treated in the Laws as well as in the Protagoras, 
the coincidence would be natural. Later inquiries have 
not confirmed such an affinity between the Protagoras 
and the latest dialogues. On the other side the numbers 
for the Theaetetus and Parmenides are remarkably low. 
This might be explained by the circumstance that Camp- 
bell according to his method did not include in these 
numbers those words which, besides occurring in each 
of these dialogues, are found in some other dialogue 
belonging to the same epoch. The correction of the error 
resulting from this omission can be made here only for 
the Sophist, Politicus, and Philebus, and has altered very 
much the proportions given by Campbell. Really, if a 
word is peculiar to the latest dialogues and is found besides 
in two other works, the occurrence of this word in these 
two works is as much a sign of affinity between them and 
the latest group as (and is perhaps more significant than) 
if the occurrence were limited to one dialogue besides the 
three latest works. The Theaetetus has many words in 
common with the Republic, the Parmenides many words in 
common with the Theaetetus and Sophist, as later investi- 
gations have sufficiently shown. All these words were 


This first 
table of 
affinity 
requires 
correc- 
tions as to 
the Par- 
menides, 
Theaete- 
tus, and 
Philebus, 
which 
have been 
shown by 
later 
investiga- 
tions to be 
nearer to 
the Laws. 


92 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


Statistics of rare words in Plato according to Lewis Campbell. 













































































Number | Number 
Number of | frare* | Proportion to | Of rare| Proportion 
pages. words oc- 100 pages. words | to 100 pages. 
curring in used 
. Abbre- each dia- only 
See of viation = | NO PTO. SINC aa aes a7 OTe 
CBues used, besides dialogue 
nly in and no- 
ed. | ed. | 70 ed. ed. Pi iveds 
-7,,| Limaeus . where = 
Steph. Didot Critias, > | Steph.* | Didot else by Steph.| Didot 
Legg. | Plato. 
Euthyphro . | Euthyph.| 14 113 | 4or3™ |29o0r21|330r25| . 4 ?) ? ? 
Apology . .|Apol. .| 25 193 6 24 SLOSS eta er ? 
Crito) tere. Wa Orbos 12 94 2 17 22 £2 rei ey 9 
Charmides .|Charm..| 24 18 2 8 11 Oo Sn? ? a 
laches . .|Lach. .| 23 18 8 35 44 ee ? ? 
AGS pee) oot be aySe etme | ozo 15 7 35 46 ee5?| 2? ? 
Protagoras .|Prot.. .| 53 394 18 34 46 5 2 a?| ? ? 
Meno. ..j{Meno .| 30 23 4 13 ly = A ? 
Euthydemus | Euthyd..| 36 | 28 7 19 2 LE ese 2 ? 
Gorgias . .|Gorg. .| 81 | 613% 20 25 23.) See? ? 
Cratylus. .|Crat.. .| 57 42 14 24 33 4.0 ?|- ? 2 
Symposium. |Symp. .| 51 39 33 65 85 recot ally ye ? 
Phaedo . ./|Phaedo.| 60 49 42 70 86 Ty | ley ? 
Republic. .|Rep.. .| 270 | 194 | 246% 90 | 126 | ? 2 2 
Phaedrus ./|Phaedr..| 52 39 61 117 156 170 326 | 436 
Theaetetus . Theaet. . 69 | 53 27 40 51 93 133 175 
| rr = 
Parmenides. |Parm. .| 40 | 31 6 ie | Ge 2 2 
Sophistes .j| Soph. . 53 40 577 108 | 142 99 187 247 
Politicus. .j| Polit. . 55 43 75 * 136 ‘| 174 162 295 377 
Philepus). + .-|ehils +. 56 43 52? 92 121 55 100 128 
Timaens. <,|(Lims-. . 75 53) | over over | over 
Gritiss’ 2c loritias 2] is | usl{ goss | see | ros t| 42% | 474 | 667 
> 9 «| { over over 
Laws . . .|Lege. .| 317 | 2368 |overii4e% {Ser | geet} 1065 | 317 | 455 
Menexenus . | Menex. . | 15 114 12 80 105 ? ? 2 
MOMs et oh ea On eee ren |e abe 9 7 60 77 ? ? ig 
| Hipp. Minor | Hipp. I. 13 10 2 15 20 zy 2? ? 
Alcibiades I. | Ale.I. .| 32 25 4 12 16 ? ? 2 
Observations. 


1 The dialogues are in their presumed chronological order, as resulting from the sum 
of stylistic observations, 1834-1896; in some doubtful cases, as for the first six small 
dialogues, the traditional order preserved in Manuscripts (tetralogies) has been main- 
tained. The Republic is placed between Phaedo and Phaedrus, with reference to the greater 
part of it, though it is supposed that the beginning of the Rep. was written before the 
Phaedo, and some other parts after the Phaedrus. Those which have no logical import- 
ance and will not be dealt with in the present work (Menex., Ion, Hipp. I., Alc.) are omitted 
and follow only in this table after the Laws. 

* These numbers are not given by Campbell, but are calculated on his ‘numerical ratios.’ 

* The pages ed. Didot are more equally printed than in any other edition ; and they form 
the best measure of the amount of text. 

* Corrected after elimination of an error resulting from the circumstance that Campbell 
counted in Rep. and Legg. also some pages without text, between every book and the 
following. 

* This number contains the words common to Tim. Critias with Legg., and those occur- 
ring in Tim. Critias, and nowhere else, according to J. and O., Rep. Vol. II. p. 57. 

® This number contains the words common to Tim. Critias with Legg., and those of Legg. 
alone. 

7 Including five such words which also occur in Polit. 

* Including five words which are also found in Soph. 

® Including eight such words, which are also found in Soph. Polit. 

10 This number results from the ratio £ given by Campbell, counting 295 pp. as he 
counted. The proportion is increased through the omission of pages without text. 

4 From the ratio given by Campbell the result would be 34 words; he may have found 
three or four. 


PLATO’S STYLE: CAMPBELL a3 


excluded by Campbell from the number of words 
‘common and peculiar’ to each dialogue with the group 
of the Laws. Thence, partly, the low figures for Theaetetus 
and Parmenides. As to the Parmenides, the very peculiar 
and exceptionally abstract contents of this dialogue also 
make it impossible to find many rare words in it, because 
the greatest number of rare words refer to concrete 
objects. Apart from these easily explained exceptions, 
Campbell’s observations, as represented in the above table, 
show clearly that the Sophist, Politicus, Philebus, also 
the Republic and Phaedrus, have the greatest affinity in 
vocabulary to the latest dialogues. There results the 
following important addition to our list : 

23. Occurrence of rare words common and peculiar to each 
dialogue with the latest group once or more in each page (ed. Didot) 
is confined to: Rep. 246 Phaedr. 61 Soph. 57 Polit. 75 Phil. 52 Tim. 
and Critias 508 Legg. 1146, while such words are scarcer, but 


still occur more than once in two pages in: Symp. 33 Phaedo 42 
Theaet. 27. 


Campbell found by this method over seven hundred 
characteristics of the later style of Plato, each word 
recurring in certain dialogues being as much a pecu- 
liarity of the style of these dialogues as any of the 
more general stylistic properties. He inferred that the 
Theaetetus and Phaedrus form with the Republic an 
earlier group (p. xxxix) than Sophist, Politicus, and 
Philebus, and that these more nearly approach Timaeus, 
Critias, Laws in their style than any other works of 
Plato. He could not have so correctly recognised the 
middle group of Republic, Phaedrus, and Theaetetus, had 
he simply considered the number of characteristic 
pecuharities, without taking into account also their 
nature. The weighing of evidence in every kind of 
statistics is the indispensable condition of correct con- 
clusions, and Campbell has shown a surprising power 
of divination in connecting the Theaetetus and Phaedrus 
with the Republic in face of the purely numerical data he 


The 
affinity of 
Sophist, 
Politicus, 
Philebus, 
with 
Timaeus, 
Critias, 
Laws, is 
evident. 


The 

group of 
Republic, 
Phaedrus, 
T heaete- 
tus also 
recog- 
nised by 
Campbell, 
though his 
evidence 
at first 
sight 
placed the 
Phaedrus 
much 


later and 
the Theae- 
tetus much 
earlier. 


But he 
avoided 
errors, 
carefully 
weighing 
his 
evidence, 
wherein 
his 
method 
surpassed 
the 
method of 
all later 
investi- 
gators. 
The Par- 
menides 
contains 
some sig- 
nificant 
terms re- 
curring 
in later 
works. 
The vo- 
cabulary 
of the 
Philebus 
is poor 
but very 
charac- 


94 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


had collected. All later inquiries have confirmed this 
connection and removed the anomalies which Camp- 
bell’s statistical table still offered. Had Campbell relied 
blindly on numbers alone, he would have concluded 
according to the evidence afforded by his observations that 
the Parmenides is one of the earliest works of Plato, as 
Schleiermacher imagined; that the Theaetetus belongs, as 
Zeller thinks, to about the same period as the Protagoras ; 
and that finally the Phaedrus is later than the Philebus. 
These natural errors he happily avoided and this gives 
to his work a methodic value far above everything done 
after him in the study of Plato’s style, smce later in- 
quirers frequently discredited their method by unjusti- 
fiable generalisations from a single occurrence of a single 
expression in a small dialogue, as for instance of t/ wv in 
the Lysis. 

The Parmenides has a poor vocabulary, but it contains, 
as Campbell has shown, some highly characteristic words 
(Introduction, pp. xxv-xxx compared with Ast’s Lexicon 
as to the number of occurrences). 

24. yevos as a logical term: Phaedr. 1 Parm. 3 Soph. 4 Polit. 1 
Phil. 2 Tim. 7 Legg. 1. 
25. Seopuos, as a bond uniting ideas: Parm. Soph. Polit. Phil. 

Tim. Legg. (This special meaning has not been distinguished by 

Ast, and Campbell does not give the number of occurrences.) 

26. peOeéis: Parm. 3 Soph. 2 (A). 
27. pepit(w: Parm. 4 Soph. 1 Polit. 2 Tim. 3. 
28. mwodvos: Parm. 1 Polit. 1 Tim. 1. 

Also the vocabulary of the Philebus, though less rich 
than that of the Politicus, is quite sufficient to indicate 
the place of this dialogue. Of words used in the Philebus, 
Campbell enumerates the following as very characteristic 
terms common to later dialogues (Intro. pp. xxv-xxx): 

29. yeveots, in the sense of production in general: Soph. Polit. 

Phil. Tim. Legg. (A). 

30. cvpp&is : Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Legg. 
31. vAn, in the general sense of matter or in a sense approach- 


ing this: Polit. Phil. Tim. Critias Legg. 
32. cxi(@: Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. 


PLATO'S STYLE: CAMPBELL 95 


33. diayepi{w: Polit. Phil. Legg. 

84-36. duerpos, Siudkpiots, ooua ( = body in general): Soph. 
Phil. Tim. Legg. 

37-38. ovyxprors, Ouddeots : Soph. Phil. Tim. Legg. (A). 

39. duaxopit: Polit. Phil. Tim. ! 

40-41. diaoyifopa, emikdyny: Soph. Phil. Tim. 

42-43. oreAXopat, amideiv: Soph. Phil. Legg. 

44. dynpews: Polit. Phil. Tim. Legg. 

45. mAdros: Polit. Phil. Critias Legg. 

46-48. cvyxeadaodpmar, evdpiOpos, SoEocopia: Soph. Phil. 

49-51. mis, ovyKpacts, kararavw: Polit. Phil. 

52. dve\itre, in Phil. corresponds to dveiAcEvs in Polit. 

58. pexpurep: Soph. 1 Polit.3 Phil. 1 Tim. 4 Critias 1 Legg. 16. 
(The number of occurrences for this word was found later by 
C. Ritter, see p. 59 of his Untersuchungen iiber Plato. In all 
other dialogues €wo7ep is used, which occurs also concurrently with 
pexpurep and oftener than this, except Tim. Critias Lege. in which 
both words occur an equal number of times, according to Ditten- 
berger.) 


One glance at these words shows for what kind of 
notions Plato sought new terms in his later writings. 
Hight words refer to division and reconstitution of unities 
(30, 32, 33, 35, 37, 39, 49,50) which Plato had proclaimed 
in the Phaedrus (266 B) as a divine art, worthy of the 
greatest admiration. Four words indicate logical opera- 
tions (40, 42, 43, 46), six physical and mathematical 
notions (29, 31, 36, 38, 45, 52). This agrees perfectly 
with what we know of Plato’s latest investigations. His 
dream was a general theory of science and classification 
of human knowledge. 

Campbell’s study of the vocabulary of the Sophist and 
Politicus confirms the above enumerated general analogies 
between these dialogues and the group of the Laws. 
Striking, indeed, is the number of words used by Plato 
only in the Laws and in one of these dialogues. 

The following twenty-six words, first used in the 
Sophist, recur in the Laws (Intro. pp. xxv-xxx) : 

54. *dyxurtpevrixos in Soph. corresponds to *dykiorpeia in 

Legg. 

“a. * évvypoOnpixds in Soph. corresponds to * évvypoOnpevrns in 

Legg. 


teristic, as 
it contains 
a great 
number 
of logical 
terms re- 
curring in 
Timaeus 
or Laws. 


This 
shows the 
influence 
of logical 
studies. 


The 
Sophist 
and 
Politicus 
are still 
richer in 
terms 
proper to 
Plato’s 
later style, 
denoting 


dialecti- 
eal, physi- 
cal, and 
mathe- 
matical 
notions. 


Abund- 
ance of 
words 
borrowed 
from the 
poets and 
unusual 
com- 
pounds. 


96 


ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


56-58. * vouOernrixds, * cvvopodoyia, * cvvdiarova: Soph. Legg. 

59-63. dywroriky, Biaotikds, eikacTiKn, eipwriKds, Pappakorrocia. 

64. dpvOevtixos in Soph. corresponds to é6pGevryns in Legg. 

65-68. Terms expressing logical operations: diayvwors, pepis, 
TapeVvip.ov, mpookowava: Soph. Legg. 

69-73. Poetical words: a@gos, amdertos, Eévos, mapappoovyy (in 
Soph. corresponds to rapadppor in Legg.), rAaorés: Soph. Legg. 

74-79. Compounds and derivatives: dxparis, avacraros, apep- 
pnvevo, oKoroo.via, ToAuNnpds, wloOwors (A): Soph. Legg. 


The following forty-three words occur in the Politicus 


and in the Laws (Intro. pp. xxv-xx1x) : 


80-84. duvrtnpios, Taiyo, mrexTikds, okeracpa (A), cractacTiKds 
(in Polit. corresponds to cractwreia in Legg.): Polit. Legg. 

85-89. Dialectical terms: dropepifw, amorxifw, exkpive (€xxpttros 
Legg.), erwéuw, *yvapiors: Polit. Legg. 

90-100. Physical and mathematical: dyvarodn, apeois (A), 
yupvactns, * Spvoropixy (in Polit. corresponds to * Spvoropia in Legg.), 
emurkevatopar, emliomevow, peTpynots, jetpnTos, *oupmodnyodpa (in 
Polit. corresponds to rodnyetvy in Legg.), irepoxn, by: Polit. Legg. 

101. aedrns: Polit. Legg. 

102-108. Poetical: avra§ws, yerrovd, evovupos, navyaios, xpnris, 
avvdpopos (A), cvvtpodos (A): Polit. Legg. 

109-122. Compounds and derivatives: ddidakros, éyxatpos, 
éxOoots, eumopevtixes (in Polit. corresponds to éuropevoua in Legg.), 
evAaBns, iranorns (in Polit. corresponds to través in Legg.), unvuris, 
povapxia, mpoopiyvupl, mpootuxns, cvykatacKevdlw, npeuaios (A), 


Oupavretv (A), vouobernwa (A): Polit. Legg. 


The following are found only in the Sophist or 


Politicus, and in the Timaeus or Critias : 


123-127. Dialectical: cafaprixos (A), adoxuotos (A), diaxpiBoro- 
youvpat, Tpoopodoyovpat, diabpavea : Soph. Tim. 

128-130. Physical: dim@eiv (A), evxuxdos (used first in a quota- 
tion from the philosopher Fiera? icorakés (also from Par- 
menides) : Soph. Tim. 

131-132. Poetical: diarepa, Hoe eae Soph. Tim. 

133-184. Compounds or derivatives: peOnuepiwds, ra Povnbevra : 
Soph. Tim. 

135-141. dvadurikds, karaxoopnots, Katabpava, mapddXakis, cupTr4, 
cuvupaiva, cvAAayxave: Polit. Tim. 

142. dvaxikAnors (in Polit. corresponds to avaxvkdodpa in Tim.). 

143-144. Swopicpos (A), cvvarrepyateoOa (A): Polit. Tim. 

145-146. * KixAnows, * papy: Polit. Tim. 

147-148. Bpdxos, tnxtos: Soph. Critias. 

149. diadayyava: Polit. Critias. 


PLATO'S STYLE: CAMPBELL 97 


Many words enumerated by Campbell are not limited 
to two dialogues, being in different ways characteristic of 
later style: 

150-155. * dcaropa, * ornmep, kiptos, mapadopos (in Soph, Legg. 
corresponds to mapadpoporns in Tim.), cupduys, xepoaios: Soph. 
Tim. Legg. 

156-158. crevyopat, dyios, xaderdrns: Soph. Critias Legg. 

159-165. * dtavdnots, awavys, rpoBoAn, Tporn (as an astronomical 
term), deomoris, tpurAovs, maura (A): Polit. Tim. Legg. 

166-167. dypduparos, oréyaopa: Polit. Tim. Critias. 

168-170. cvvodos (A), Eaivo, edrpenns: Soph. Polit. Legg. 

171. cuvepéropac: Soph. Tim. Critias Legg. 

172-173. civvopos (A), mepircir@: Polit. Tim. Critias Legg. 

174-176. evvdpos (A), roun (metaphorical), rAéywa: Soph. Polit. 
Tim. Legg. 


Some words are limited to Sophist and Politicus only 
(Intro. pp. XXV1-xXxix) : 


177-181. *audioByrntixos, * yvadeutixes, aitome@dns, amepnucw, 
aouvréuvo : Soph. Polit. 


Here we have a list of 158 characteristic words 
observed by Campbell in more than one of the six latest 
dialogues of Plato, and showing clearly the direction of 
Plato’s tendency to use rare and new words in his old 
age. Besides these Campbell enumerates 93 words used 
by Plato in the Sophist and nowhere else, and 157 
words used only in the Politicus. Among these 250 words 
whose use is limited to a single dialogue, 60 have not 
been used by any other Greek author (14 in Sophist and 
46 in Politicus), and 39 have passed into the language of 
_ Aristotle (14 from Sophist and 25 from Politicus). The 
numerical proportions of all these peculiarities of vocabu- 
lary may readily be seen from the table based on Camp- 
bell’s enumerations, given on p. 98. 

In addition to these, Campbell gives also a list of 
fourteen words which, without being peculiar to the later 
dialogues, occur with greater frequency in them than in 
Plato’s other writings. Among these dpdfw, arepydlopac, 
mpoaipsia0ar, pirov, eudavifw, pavtalecbar, adtrodaacrs, 

H 


Some of 
these 
words are 
found in 
more than 
two dia- 
logues. 


Words 
used only 
in one 
dialogue 
have no 
chrono- 
logical im- 
portance 


Campbell 
has thus 
suffi- 
ciently 
proved the 


ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


98 











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PLATO'S STYLE: CAMPBELL, RIDDELL 99 


pnOév, mpocpnua, the indefinite wovepos, are characteristic 
of the increasing logical interest, while mepiéyw, reps- 
AapBave, wetpynTiKos, wéToxos illustrate the fondness for 
compounds and derivatives. The number of stylistic cha- 
racteristics observed by Campbell in the latest group thus 
reaches 434, of which twelve are of a general character, 
255. refer only to Sophist or Politicus, 153 are common to 
these two with the latest three dialogues (twenty-five to 
the Philebus with the preceding two groups), and fourteen 
refer to the increased frequency of words also used in 
earlier dialogues. Till it be shown that as many 
peculiarities unite the Sophist, Politicus, Philebus with 
some other dialogue, we have good reason to follow 
Campbell in joming them with the group of Timaeus, 
Critias, and Laws. 

X. RippEevu. At the same time, another editor of 
another dialogue of Plato undertook an almost equally 
laborious investigation on the style of Plato, with this 
difference, that the friend who published it took the pre- 
caution of mentioning it in the title of the edition. James 
Riddell,'!* late fellow and tutor of Balliol College, Oxford, 
buried in his edition of the Apology of Plato an appendix of 
135 pages under the title Digest of Platonic Idioms. He 
classifies the idioms used by Plato and quotes examples of 
all dialogues, but without aiming at complete enumera- 
tion, and without being aware of the bearing of such 
stylistic researches on Platonic chronology. Though the 
Apology has more readers than the Sophist, Riddell’s 
Digest of Idioms remained almost as unnoticed, at 
least out of England, as Campbell’s Introduction to the 
Sophist. As Riddell does not compare the relative fre- 
quency of each idiom in each dialogue, little can be 
gained from his enumerations for the chronology, because 
idioms are less often limited in their occurrence to a few 


4s Phe Apology of Plato, with a revised text and English Notes, and a 
digest of Platonic idioms, by the Rev. James Riddell, M.A., fellow and tutor 
of Balliol Coliege, Oxford, 1877 (misprinted for 1867) (xvi). 


m2 


late date 
of the 
Sophist, 
Politicus, 
Philebus. 


Riddell’s 
Digest of 
Platonic 
idioms, 
however 
valuable, 
affords no 
chrono- 
logical 
conclu- 


sions. 


but con- 
firms the 
authen- 
ticity 

of the 
Sophist 
and 
Politicus. 


Other 
authors 
on Plato’s 
style 
neglected 
chrono- 


logy. 


100 ORIGIN: AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


dialogues than peculiar words. Still at least one very 
characteristic idiom observed by Riddell is peculiar to the 
latest dialogues alone : 


182. The periphrastic use of the participle, with auxiliary verb 
substantive (p. 167): Soph. 1 Polit. 4 Tim. 3 Legg. 1. 


For those who assert with Schaarschmidt that the 
style of the Sophist, the Politicus, and Philebus is un- 
Platonic, it may be interesting to learn that Riddell 
found in the Sophist forty Platonic idioms belonging also 
to other dialogues whose authenticity is beyond even 
Schaarschmidt’s suspicions. In the Politicus he found 
thirty-six such idioms and in the Philebus forty-five. Few 
dialogues are as much quoted in the 325 paragraphs of 
this interesting monograph as the Sophist, Politicus, 
Philebus, Timaeus, and Laws. 

XI.-XII. Scuanz, Lincenserc. Shortly after the 
labours of Campbell and Riddell, Schanz!'* (1870) wrote 
on the hypothetical period in Plato, but at that time he, 
like Lingenberg '”’ in his dissertation (1874) on metaphors 
and proverbs in Plato, left the question of chronology out 
of sight. 

XIII. Ine. The same indifference to chronological 
arrangement appears in a dissertation of T. Imme on the 
forms of interrogation! (1873) in Plato. This author 
limited his work to an attempt at classifying interroga- 
tions psychologically, and quoted for each kind only a few 
examples, insufficient for chronological inferences. In 
this case the author’s ignorance of the work of others 
on the same subject has done him much wrong. Had 


9 M. Schanz, Bifurcation der hypothetischen Periode nach Platon, 
1870 (xvii). 

20 ‘W. Lingenberg, Platonische Bilder wnd Sprichwiorter, Koln, without 
date, but published 1874 (xviii). The author enumerates proverbs on God, 
men, products of human activity, proper names, uses and customs, and 
literary proverbs. 

'* Th. Imme Culmensis (of Chelmno), De enwntiationwmn interroga- 
twarum natura generibusque psychologorum rationibus atque usu maxime 
platonico illustratis, doctor. dissert. Lipsiae 1873 (xix). 


PLATO'S STYLE: BLASS, ROEPER 101 


Imme known the dissertations of Martinius, he might 
have made an instructive and interesting addition to our 
knowledge of Plato’s style. But he quotes only examples 
of each kind of interrogation without aiming at an exhaus- 
tive enumeration. 

XIV. Buass. Another scholar, F. Blass,!”? the author 
of the History of Greek Hloquence (1874), made a very 
curious observation, thereby unexpectedly confirming 
Campbell’s conclusions, though unaware of Campbell’s 
work. He remarked that the hiatus is less frequent in 
the Phaedrus than, for instance, in the Symposiwm, and 
that it is still more rare in Sophist, Politicus, Philebus, 
Timaeus, Critias, and Laws, where the hiatus is chiefly 
limited to very frequent words as xai, «i, 7, wy or the 
article, while all kinds of hiatus are frequent in the 
Republic and earlier works. Blass inferred from this 
single observation that Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Critias 
Legg. were the latest writings of Plato. 

XV. RoEPER. When four years later (1878) Roeper!” 
published his investigation on the dual number in Plato, 
he knew none of the twenty contributions to the know- 
ledge of Plato’s style which have been mentioned above. 
He distinguishes two different uses of the dual in Plato : 
in earlier writings the common use as in the current 
language of the fifth century B.c., and in later writings, 
at the time when the dual fell into disuse, Plato em- 
ployed it intentionally to lend a phrase an air of solemnity. 
This usage is shown by Roeper to be frequent in Soph. 
Polit. Phil., though not limited to these dialogues. Very 
characteristic of a time when the use of the dual began 
to be abandoned is : 


183. dvoty with the plural of a substantive (p. 26): Prot. 1; 
Rep. 1; Soph. 1 Polit. 1 Phil. 1 Legg. 2 (Prot. 355 B and Rep. 546 c 





12 FF. Blass, Attische Beredsamkeit, vol. ii. p. 426, Leipzig 1874 (xx) ; 
also on Dittenberger in Bursians Jahresbericht, vol. xxxiii. p. 234, for 1883. 

28 Augustus Roeper, Gedanensis, De dualis usw Platonico (doctor’s dis- 
sertation univers. Bonn), Gedani 1878 (xxi). 


Roeper 
distin- 
guished 

a solemn 
and inten- 
tional use 
of the 
dual from 
the primi- 
tive com- 
mon use. 


102 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


are held doubtful by Roeper, but these passages must be counted 
on the authority of the best MS.). 


Many uses Other peculiarities of later style observed by Roeper, 
of dual —_ but not singled out as such by him, are : 

forms are : . 

pees 184. Article raty (p. 17): Polit. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. 8. 

‘anited io 185. r® dvo0 without substantive (p. 25): Soph. 2 Polit. 1 


Legg. 2 (generally in other passages ra 8vo). 


ees 186. voy (p. 16): Symp. 1; Phaedr. 1 Theaet. 1; Soph. 1 


Srp er Polit. 3 Phil. 4 Legg. 2. 

increasing 187. Adjectives and participles in -av (p. 5): Rep. 1; Soph. 1 

in fre- Polit. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. 3. 

quency. 188. réxva as dual of reyym (p. 5): Rep. 2; Soph. 1 Polit. 1 
Legg. 1. 


189. Subst. in -av (p. 6): Rep. 2; Parm. 1 Polit. 2 Legg. 6. 

190. Dual of substantives neutr. in -n (p. 12): Rep. 2 Phaedr. 1 
Theaet. 1; Soph. 4 Polit. 1 Phil. 1 Tim. 2 Legg. 2 (counting only 
indubitable dual forms; besides these Roeper quotes many passages 
in which such forms may be either plural or dual, occurring chiefly 
in Soph. Polit. Legg.). 

191. Dual in @ (p. 3) ‘nominum, quorum etiam in » formas 
licebat praeferre’: Symp. 1; Rep. 2 Theaet. 1; Polit. 2 Legg. 1. 

192. Dual rovrw gener. communis (p. 4): Rep. 2 Phaedr. 1 
Theaet. 3; Phil. 1 Lege. 2. Similar to this are also zoi@ Theaet. 
175 c and pov Legs. 777 c. 

193. Dual of nouns in -ow II decl. with audow (p. 11): Prot. 1; 
Rep. 2; Parm. 1 Polit. 1 Phil. 1 Critias 1. 

194. opeov (p. 16): Euthyd. 4; Theaet. 1; Legg. 12. This 
coincidence between Euthyd. and Legg. Roeper explains by the 
circumstance that in both dialogues one person is speaking to 
two others, intimately associated. 

195. dv@ instead of dvo, according to the best codices, Clarkianus 
or Parisinus A (p. 20): Rep. 2; Soph. 1 Phil. 1. 

196. roiv dvoiv (p. 25): Crat. 1; Soph. 2 Polit. 1 Phil. 1 Legg. 2. 

197. Dual of verb following plural of subject (p. 30) : Euthyd. 2; 
Rep. 1; Polit. 1 Tim. 2 Legg. 2. 

198. Dual of nouns in -ow with dvoty (p. 10): Prot. 1 Meno 2 
Kuthyd. 2 Gorg. 3; Rep. 1; Parm. 8; Tim. 5 Critias 1 Legg. 2. 


Teich- XVI. TEICHMULLER. A counterpart of Schone’s 
fg theory of perfection in style was Teichmiiller’s !** (1879) 
believed, stylistic test, according to which the dramatic dialogues 
like y = 8 


are written later than the narrated dialogues, because 


! Gustav Teichmiiller, Die Reihenfolge der Platonischen Dialoge, 
Leipzig 1879 (xxii). 


PLATO'S STYLE: ROEPER, DITTENBERGER 103 


Plato in the Theaetetws (143 c) criticises the form of a 
narrated dialogue and introduces the dramatic form as 
more convenient. This easy way of classifying the 
dialogues according to a single peculiarity of style led 
Teichmuller to some conclusions as strange as those of 
Schéne, though less extravagant, because all the later 
dialogues are dramatic in form, and Plato seems actually 
to have given up the form of a narrated dialogue in his 
old age. But the dramatic form cannot be treated as a 
special invention, and to place with Teichmiiller the Meno, 
Gorgias, and Cratylus after the Theaetetus is almost as 
rash as to recognise with Schéne the Timaeus as an 
earlier work than the Republic. Still Teichmiiller was 
led by his argument to the correct conclusion that the 
Sophist, Politicus, Philebus are later than the Republic. 

XVII. DirreENBERGER. A new method of stylistic 
research was proposed by Dittenberger '”? (1881), who, 
though knowing none of his predecessors, happily avoided 
the repetition of work already done, and directed his 
attention to a subject not yet investigated, namely the 
relative frequency of synonyms preferred or rejected in 
Plato’s different works. This effort brought into pro- 
minence some fresh peculiarities of later style : 

199. xadmep occurs (according to Dittenberger, and for some 
dialogues according to later corrections of C. Ritter, p. 58): Lach. 1 
Meno 1 Euthyd.1 Gorg. 1 Crat. 2 Symp. 2; Rep. 6 Phaedr. 4 
Theaet. 2; Soph. 14 Polit. 34 Phil. 27 Tim. 18 Critias 5 Legg. 148. 
In all other dialogues éomep is used instead, and prevails very 
much over xafdrep even in the Republic (212 times against 6 


xaOarep), in the Phaedrus (27 against 4 xa@areo), and in the 
Theaetetus (47 times against 2 xaarep). 


The prevalence of one synonym over another is a 
peculiarity of style not less remarkable than the total 
absence or the appearance of some rare word, and Ditten- 


123 Dittenberger, ‘Sprachliche Kriterien fiir die Chronologie der pla- 
tonischen Dialoge’ in Hermes, vol. xvi. p. 321, Berlin 1881 (xxiii). The 
numbers quoted by Dittenberger have, in some cases, been corrected by 
C. Ritter, and are given here according to these corrections. 


Schone, 
one stylis- 
tic pecu- 
liarity 

to be 
decisive. 


Ditten- 
berger in- 
troduced 
the study 
of pre- 
valence 

of one 
synonym 
over 
another, 
and found 
that cer- 
tain words 
are pecu- 
liar to one 
group of 
dialogues, 
while 
other 
words of 
the same 


meaning 
are used 
in other 
works. 


He com- 
pared the 
changes in 
the style 
of Plato 
with those 
occurring 
in the 


104 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


berger had the great merit of extending the stylistic 
study to the relative frequency of synonyms ; herein he 
developed independently an idea to which Campbell had 
alluded in a footnote (p. xxxii) when he quoted fourteen 
words of increased frequency in the later dialogues. 


200. orep is scarcer than xaOarep only in: Soph. 9/14, Polit. 
16/34 Phil. 9/27 Tim. 10/18 Critias 2/5 Legg. 24/148. This scarcity 
of éorep, a word which is very frequent in all other dialogues of 
Plato, is certainly one of the most characteristic peculiarities of 
Plato’s later style, and coincides with the use of péxpurep for €worep 
noticed above (Nr. 58). 

201. raya tows: Soph. 2 Polit. 8 Phil. 3 Tim. 1 Legg. 11. 

202. ri unv; Rep. 35 Phaedr. 12 Theaet. 13; Parm. 6 Soph. 12 
Polit. 20 Phil. 26 Legg. 48. 

203. ye pnv: Euthyd. 1 Symp. 1; Rep. 2 Phaedr. 1 Theaet. 1; 
Parm. 5 Soph. 6 Polit. 8 Phil. 7 Tim. 7 Critias 1 Legg. 25. 

204. adda... uyv: Symp. 2; Rep. 11 Phaedr. 1 Theaet. 1;. 
Parm. 2 Soph. 2 Polit. 8 Phil. 2 Legg. 2. 

205. cai wyv: Euthyph. 1 Charm. 2 Lach. 3 Prot. 2 Meno 5 
Euthyd. 4 Gorg. 9 Crat. 9 Symp. 9 Phaedo 7 Rep. 44 Phaedr. 3 
Theaet. 11 Parm. 25 Soph. 24 Polit. 24 Phil. 20 Tim. 1 Legg. 36. 


This expression, though occurring in so many earlier 
dialogues, may nevertheless be counted among the pecu- 
liarities of later style, because it becomes very frequent 
only in the later dialogues, in which it supplants adda 
env, preferred to «ai wv in earlier writings of Plato. 


206. adda pny is scarcer than cai pnv only in: Lach. 2/3 Symp. 
2/9; Theaet. 6/11; Soph. 10/24 Polit. 7/24 Phil. 7/20 Tim. 0/1 
Legg. 8/36, while in all other dialogues adda phy prevails over 
kat pny (except Charm. 2 Meno 5 Crat. 9 Rep. 44 Parm. 25 
Critias 0, in which both oceur an equal number of times). This 
relative scarcity of aA\a pny is the more striking inasmuch as the 
strong prevalence of the shorter cai pny cannot be accidental. 


Besides these Dittenberger counted 082 pjv which 
cannot be looked upon as peculiar to later style. He 
added to the strength of his conclusions by the observation 
that yy occurs with increased frequency also in the works 
of other authors who wrote about the time when Plato 
was over sixty. As 7/ wqv in the meaning of an affirmative 
answer was not used in the Attic dialect, Dittenberger 


PLATO’S STYLE: DITTENBERGER, JECHT 105 


inferred that Plato brought it from Sicily. But the 
occurrence of ti wyv in a work like the Lysis, which in 
all other respects has the style of earlier dialogues, tells 
against Dittenberger’s inference. Even granting the 
Sicilian origin of the expression, there had been, for some 
years before the death of Socrates, sufficient intercourse 
between Sicily and Athens to familiarise Plato with 7é 
pynv before he visited Sicily himself. Huis predilection 
for this formula, apparent in all later works, is a result 
of his increasing tendency to strong affirmation, because 
ti pny ; has the character of a great logical certainty, 
excluding every doubt: ‘ What else ?’ z.e. ‘ How could it 
be otherwise ?’ 

Dittenberger’s article was the first investigation of 
Plato’s style which attracted the general attention of 
German philologers, so much so that, of late, the merit of 
introducing statistics of style as a method for determining 
the chronology of Plato’s dialogues has been frequently 
attributed to him. It was a happy circumstance that 
Dittenberger, in his conclusions from a very small number 
of observations, committed no greater error than the 
uncertain assumption that the Lysis came among the 
dialogues of the second group, between the Symposiwm 
and Phaedrus. But he correctly recognised the group 
of the latest six dialogues, and admitted that the Re- 
public, Phaedrus, Theaetetus preceding these are later 
than the Symposiwm, Phaedo, Cratylus, and all Socratic 
dialogues. 

XVIII. Jecut. Since Dittenberger’s publication the 
subject of the statistics of Plato’s vocabulary has been 
widely discussed by writers on the chronology of Plato. 
Blass!” recognised the new method as leading to the 
surest results, while Zeller opposed it as too superficial. 
Dittenberger’s pupil Jecht '° (1881) chose as the subject 
for his doctor’s dissertation the use of 76n in Plato’s 


26 Ricardus Jecht, De usu particulae jin in Platonis dialogis qui 
feruntur (Doctor’s diss. Univ. Halle a. S.), Halis Saxonum 1881 (xxiv), 


style of 
other 
authors. 


Ditten- 
berger’s 
inferences 
were 
correct 
though 
based on 
quite in- 
sufficient 
evidence. 


Jecht in- 
vestigated 
the use of 
Hon in 
Plato’s 
works, and 
found 


106 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


some dif dialogues. From his observations it results that the 
ferences following uses prevail in later dialogues : 


between 207. ovk non; dn... 00K or ovk...76n; (p. 12): Lach. 1 Meno i 

the Gorg. 1; Rep. 3 Parm. 4; Soph. 2 Phil. 1 Legg. 1. 

various 208. evrevbev dn (p. 50): Theaet. 1 Polit. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. 1. 

dialogues. 209. 75n ro (or Ta) pera Tovro (or ravra) to effect a transition 

But he (p. 50): Soph. 1 Phil. 1 Tim. 1. 

did not 210. dn was (p. 8): Euthyd. 1; Rep. 4 Phaedr. 2; Soph. 1 

draw the Polit. 6 Phil. 2 Tim. 3 Legg. 6, including also passages, where 

SRE ST erGGe #8n is separated by other words from as, Evyras, Evvaras, rayras 

Seat in their various cases, with or without preposition. 

fa his 211. was 75n (p. 8): Euthyd. 1 Crat.1; Rep.1; Parm.1 Polit. 1 
Phil. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. 2. 

Be 212. avtis 45n or bn adros (p. 9): Crat. 1 Rep. 3 Theaet. 1 

10ns. 


Parm. 8 Phil. 1 Critias 1 Legg. 1, including also such passages 
where a dc or ye separates 75n from avros. 

213. 76y with perfect designing an action terminated only in 
the present time (p. 21), with the meaning of ‘by this time’ 
(nunmehr): Rep. 2 Soph. 1 Phil. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. 1. 

214. vor idSn (p. 44): Phaedo1 Rep. 2 Phaedr.1; Soph. 1 Phil. 2 
Tim. 1 Legg. 2 (#5 vov does not occur). 

215. vov...75n separated by one or more words (p. 45): 
Charm. 1 Prot. 1 Meno 1; Rep. 1 Phaedr. 1 Theaet. 1; Soph. 2 
Polit. 2 Phil. 1 Legg. 4. 

216. ror 75n meaning ‘then already’ (damals bereits, p. 46): 
Rep. 2 Phaedr. 1; Parm. 1 Soph. 1 Polit. 1 Critias 1 Legg. 3, while 
in some earlier passages as Lach. 181 p, Gorg. 527 p, Phaedo 87 E 
the meaning is ‘not until then’ (‘dann erst’=twm demuwmy), 
which meaning occurs also in Theaet. and Legg. This difference of 
meaning, similar to the difference appearing in the use of ovrws 75n 
(see below Nr. 220), is very characteristic. Impatient youth 
complains that things were ‘not done until then’ (Fr. enjin) ; 
resigned old age is fain to be content that they are ‘done so soon,’ 
or ‘already’ (Fr. déjd). 

217. ror’ dn in apodosi (p. 46): Lach. 2 Prot. 1; Rep. 2 
Phaedr. 1 Theaet. 1; Tim. 1 Critias 1 Lege. 1. 

218. 7j5n between a participle and an adjective belonging to it 
(p. 4): Rep. 1 Theaet. 1 Legg. 2. 

219. pera tairo dn (p. 9): Rep. 2 Tim. 1 Legg. 3. 

220. ovrws 75n (p. 9): Crat. 1 Symp. 2 Phaedo 2; Rep. 1; Parm. 1 
Polit. 1 Tim. 1, including one instance of ovrws dy #5y in Parm. 
145 c. It is important to notice that in the passages of Crat. Symp. 
Phaedo the meaning is ‘then’ or ‘not until then’ (‘dann erst’), 
while beginning with the Republic the four later passages are best 
translated by ‘thus already’ (so bereits), which is parallel to the 
use of ror’ #5n. 


PLATO'S STYLE: JECHT, HOEFER 107 


221. dn cai (p. 138): Charm. 2 Prot. 2 Meno 1 Crat. 1 Symp. 1 
Phaedo 1; Rep. 3; Parm.1 Soph. 2 Polit. 1 Phil. 1 Critias 1 Legg. 3. 
222. dn with plusquam-perfectum (p. 21): Euthyph. 1 Prot. 1 

Crat.1; Rep. 1; Polit. 2 Tim. 2 Legg. 1. 

XIX.-XX. FREDERKING and HoEFER. Dittenberger’s 
article aroused opposition. In order to show that statistics 
of particles are at times inconsistent, Frederking of Dorpat 
undertook (1882) to count how many times Plato used te 
and some other words.'” He counted roughly and failed 
to distinguish the various uses of te. Hence his investiga- 
tion loses all importance, all the more that the counting 
has been better done by Hoefer! (1882), who also studied 
the use of tz and some other particles, adding to the stock 
of peculiarities distinctive of Plato’s later style. Hoefer, 
as his dissertation shows, knew none of his predecessors 
save Dittenberger, though he occasionally quotes Camp- 
bell’s emendations of the Sophist and Politicus, probably 
from the original edition. Obviously he had not read 
Campbell’s Introduction, yet he perceived the importance 
of stylistic studies for Platonic chronology. Moreover, 
he recognised that his observations were too few to allow 
of definite conclusions as to the order of the dialogues, 
wherein he has shown greater caution than some other 
authors. His careful and complete enumerations yield 
the following data : 


223. rovyapovy (p. 40): Soph. 3 Legg. 2, while in some earlier 
dialogues rovyaprot is used instead, occurring Lach. 1 Euthyd. 1 
Gorg. 2 Symp. 1 Phaedo 1; Rep. 3 Theaet. 1, and never later. 
Hoefer points out that Thucydides always used rovyapro: and never 
tovyapovr, While in Aristotle only the second form is used. Isocrates, 
Xenophon, and Demosthenes use both. 

224. kai pny ovde (p. 40): Rep. 2; Parm. 1 Soph. 1 Polit. 1 Legg. 1. 

225. ydp...6n separated by a verb (p. 25): Parm. 1 Legg. 2. 

226. pev...re (p. 17): Rep. 1 Phaedr. 1; Tim. 1 Legg. 2. 

227. re used after a single word (not a sentence), adding a third 
object after two enumerated (p. 9): Rep. 3 Theaet. 3; Polit. 1 Tim. 9. 





27 A. Frederking, ‘Sprachliche Kriterien fiir die Chronologie der pla- 
tonischen Dialoge,’ in Jahrbiicher fiir classische Philologie, 28°" Jahrgang, 
p. 534, 1882 (xxv). 

28 Hermann Hoefer, De particulis platonicis capita selecta (Doctor’s 
diss. Univers. Bonn), Bonn 1882 (xxvi). 


Freder- 
king’s 
objections 
over- 
thrown 

by a more 
exact 
inquiry of 
Hoefer, 
who inde- 
pendently, 
and with- 
out know- 
ing Fre- 
derking, 
counted 
the same 
particles, 
and found 
some uses 
of te and 
to. limited 
to the 
same 
dialogues 
in which 
Kabdarep 
prevails 
over 


Borep. 


108 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


228. re...7e (p. 11): Charm. 1 Gorg. 1 Crat. 1 Symp. 2 Phaedo 2; 
Rep. 35 Phaedr. 12 Theaet. 5; Parm. 1 Soph. 3 Polit. 3 Phil. 2 
Tim. 11 Critias 1 Legg. 50. 

229. re...re connecting single words, not phrases (p. 11): 
Rep. 5 Phaedr. 5; Polit. 1 Tim. Critias 1 Legg.16. Here we see 
how by distinguishing the various uses of a word the affinity of 
dialogues belonging to the later time is made evident, even if at 
first sight a word’s use is not limited to them. This becomes still 
more instructive by the following distinction: 

230. re...7e connecting two words not separated by any other 
part of the phrase, as in Tim. 87 B: to 7’ Hv TO 7’ @wra or Critias 
121 B: maykadoi Te paxdpwoi re (p. 12): Tim. 1 Critias 1 Legg. 1. In 
this way sometimes an expression which at first sight appears not 
to be peculiar to a group of dialogues, may by subsequent distine- 
tions be used to characterise several groups. According to 
Frederking tre...7re was used indistinguishably in early and late 
dialogues, while according to the above distinctions established by 
Hoefer one particular use is limited to the Republic and dialogues 
later than the Republic, while another particular use exists only 
in the three latest dialogues, Timaeus, Critias, Laws. 


Even the 231. The simple re, whose frequent occurrence according to 
simple rte, Frederking gave no chronological indications, is also shown by 
which at Hoefer to furnish some chronological distinctions. It occurs 


first sight (pp. 5-6) : Apol. 1 Crito 1 Charm. 2 Prot. 1 Gorg. 1 Symp. 1 Phaedo 1 
Rep. 25 Phaedr. 23 Theaet.6; Parm. 2 Soph. 3 Polit. 6 Phil. 1 


occurs In- 
differently “Tim. 198 Critias 27 Legg. 155. It results that it is used more 
in early than twice only in Rep. Phaedr. Theaet. Soph. Polit. Tim. Critias 
Legg., and more than twice in every five pages only in Tim. 
and late Sie ; 
; Critias Legg. This word appears to have two epochs of greatest 
dialogues, frequency, the proportion being in Rep. 13 times to 100 pp. 
may be (ed. Didot), rising in Phaedr. to 54 times in 100 pp., rapidly 
used for declining in the later dialogues until in Phil. it occurred only 
chrono- once (corresponding to a proportion of 2 in 100 pp.), to rise 
logical again to a maximum of 373 times in 100 pp. in Tim., 245 times in 
conclu- 100 pp. in Critias, and to decline once more in the Laws to 65 
sions if times in 100 pp. There is no reason whatever to doubt that Plato 
some dis- might have twice increased and then diminished the use of a 
Linchens word. re being frequent in all books of the Laws, it tells against 
eondlin C. Ritter’s opinion that the Philebus was written at the same 
time as the earlier books of the Laws. Although no positive 

between P : : : oe 
d chronological inferences can be drawn from a single stylistic 
des peculiarity, we may doubt whether Plato avoided almost completely 
ferent in one work the use of a word frequently used by him at the same 
HIRES. time in another work, especially as the use of this word is entirely 


independent of the contents. But such observations are never 
decisive so long as they remain isolated. If some other equally 
important stylistic differences between Phil. and Legg. are found, 


PLATO'S STYLE: HOEFER, PEIPERS 109 


then only the presently observed difference will acquire its full 
value. 

232. re connecting phrases, placed immediately after the verb 
(p. 7): Crito 1 Rep. 8 Phaedr. 1; Parm. 1 Phil. 1 Tim. 8 Critias 1 
Legg. 5. 

233. re adding a third phrase to two preceding phrases, which 
are united by kal, re, re... Kui, wey... Te, or ev... d€ (p. 7): Phaedr.3 
Tim. 5 Critias 1 Legg. 9. Hoefer (p. 7) quotes also two other 
cases of re peculiar to Timaeus and Laws only, too special for 
inclusion in our list, but very instructive as samples of acute 
distinction in stylistic statistics, showing the close relation between 
these two dialogues. 

234. re used dvaxodovOws (p. 13): Gorg: 1 Phaedo 2 Rep. 4 
Phaedr. 2 Theaet. 1 Tim. 1. 

235. re... Kai... de (p. 15): Critias 1 (118 p) Legg. 1 (708 4). 


Other particles investigated by Hoefer, as ydp, Tou, ov, 
6y, pévto., and their various combinations are more 
characteristic of the earlier than of the later style. 

XXI. Perrers. Following closely upon these statistics 
of the use of particles appeared the first special work con- 
cerning an important part of Plato’s terminology, the use 
of the words dv and ovc/a. This philological inquiry is 
contained in Peipers’* Platonic ontology (1883), and 
exceeds in volume all preceding treatises on Plato’s style. 
Of his predecessors, Peipers only knew Dittenberger, 
though he quotes Campbell’s commentary to the Sophist, 
which he used without examining the Introduction. He 
observed some differences in the use of the terms investi- 
gated, but did not build on such stylistic tests any 
chronological conclusions, while he correctly inferred the 
very late date of Parm. Soph. Polit. Phil. from their 
philosophical contents. From his exhaustive enumera- 
tions it results that many expressions may be looked upon 
as peculiarities of later style. 


236. dvTws ov, in the meaning of metaphysical being, or ovcia 
évros, in the same meaning, generally é-tws as a metaphysical 
term, are found by Peipers (pp. 30-31, 514, 540) in: Rep. 3 Phaedr.3; 
Soph. 8 Polit. 7 Phil. 2 Tim. 3 Legg. 3. 

237. ovocia meaning ‘aliquid totum et absolutum, rebus nas- 
centibus et incrementa capientibus oppositum ’ (pp. 88-108, 515), 
which is a mixed substance between ideal and material being (of 
mépas and azretpor, auepiotoy and pepiorov, ravroy and Oarepor). This 


Peipers 
found 
some pe- 
culiarities 
of Plato’s 
later style, 
though 
style was 
not the 
object of 
his study. 


He classi- © 
fied the 
various 
meanings 
of the 
words év 
and ovola, 


and found 
certain 
meanings 
of these 
terms very 
frequent 
in the 
latest 
works. 


Peipers’ 
distine- 
tions 
obscure ; 
his work 
should be 
repeated 
from the 
stand- 


110 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


notion is, according to Peipers, very near to the Aristotelian con- 
ception of substance, and is found only in Phil. 8 Tim. 2 Legg. 2. 

238. ovcia=complexus omnium rerum, quas entium nomine 
appellare homines solent (pp. 28-29 and 512): Rep. 1 (486) 
Soph. 1 (261 ©) Tim. 2 (85 4, 37 a). 

239. 6 €ore ‘pp. 38-41 and 541): Crat. 2 Symp. 1 Phaedo 7 ; 
Rep. 8 Phaedr. 1 (247 ©); Parm. 9 Tim. 1 (89 fk). 

240. drtws kai adnOds (p. 124): Rep. 1 Soph. 1 Phil. 1. 

241. 6vrws meaning adnOas (pp. 125 and 513): Crat. 1 Rep. 3 
Phaedr. 2 Theaet. 1; Soph. 6 Polit. 4 Phil. 71 Tim. 6 Legg. 49. 

242. dv or ovoia=res vera, opposita fictitie (pp. 182-152 and 
513): Euthyd. 1 (290 c) Gorg. 2 (472 B, 495 a) Symp. 1 (202 a) 
Phaedo 7; Rep. 9 Theaet. 7; Soph. 13 Polit. 1 Phil. 3 Legg. 25. 

248. ro dv=id quod tam a loci quam a temporis conditionibus 
liberum, neque nascitur, neque interit, sed immutabile et constans 
eodem modo semper se habet, objectum philosophandi (pp. 50 and 
514): Crat. 1 (424 a) Rep. 22 Phaedr. 4 Theaet. 1 Soph. 36 Phil. 2 
Tim. 2 Legg. 2. 

244. ra ovra in the same meaning as above (pp. 63-66) : Crat. 2 
Phaedo 2; Rep.5 Phaedr.3 Theaet. 1; Parm. 2 Soph. 5 Phil. 2 Tim. 4. 

245. ovcia = substance as object of knowledge (pp. 67 and 515) : 
Crat. 9; Rep. 11 Phaedr. 4 Theaet. 5; Parm. 3 Soph. 6 Polit. 3 Tim. 1 
Legg. 5. Some isolated passages quoted by Peipers from other 
dialogues, as Euthyph. 11 a Charm. 168 c p Prot. 349 B Meno 72 B, 
seem not to belong here, as they offer a different meaning of ovcia, 
as ‘nature,’ ‘object,’ ‘ property,’ ‘ definition.’ 

246. ro dv = what exists, opposed to pydev (pp. 11-16 and 512): 
Euthyd. 3 Crat. 2 Symp. 1 (205 8); Rep. 11 Theaet. 11; Soph. 32 
Polit. 1, Phil. Vim. 1 Legs: 5: 

247. ovcia= what exists (pp. 17 and 539): Rep. 2 Theaet. 5; 
Soph. 7 Polit. 1 Tim. 1. 

248. ra dyvta=Ta mpaypata (pp. 19-28, 512, 540): Charm. 3 
Meno 8 EKuthyd. 6 Gorg. 5 Crat. 25 Symp. 2 Phaedo 9; Rep. 4 
Phaedr. 6 Theaet. 8; Parm. 5 Soph. 4 Polit. 3 Phil. 6 Tim. 3 Legg. 6. 

249. 7) é6v=veritas cognitione aut oratione expressa (pp. 222- 
230): Euthyd. 4 Gorg. 1 Crat. 2; Rep. 4 Phaedr. 3 Theaet. 5; Parm. 1 
Soph. 4. 

Peipers’ distinctions are sometimes obscure, and the 
numerous quotations collected in his work are not con- 
veniently arramged. The Laws are treated apart in a 
few pages towards the end of the work (pp. 512-516). 
Peipers did not count the passages quoted, nor did he 
distinguish the number of occurrences in a single passage. 
His work remains a valuable collection of texts, which 
calls for a complete digest by some clearer expositor. 


PLATO'S STYLE: PEIPERS, WEBER TEL 


His conclusions on the order of dialogues do not precisely 
correspond to considerations of style. Against the purely 
statistical evidence, Peipers separates the Phaedrus from 
the Republic by the Banquet, and puts the Theaetetus 
later than the Timaeus, following alleged differences of 
ontological doctrines not easily definable. But he had the 
ereat merit of recognising the very late date of Soph. 
Polit. Phil., as written after the Republic. 

XXII. P. WeseR. After so many investigations on 
Plato’s vocabulary, P. Weber '” (1884) returned to the old 
problem of the construction of phrases in Plato. But he 
seems to have wholly ignored the relation between the style 
and the chronology of Plato’s writings, and he neither 
distinguishes the single dialogues nor enumerates the 
passages, except when dealing with some very rare stylistic 
peculiarity. Under these circumstances Weber’s disser- 
tation is chiefly of interest as contributing to the stylistic 
definition of Plato’s works as a whole, for comparison with 
other authors, but containing very few hints for distinc- 
tions between early and later style: 

250. iva with conjunct. ‘nach Nebenzeiten, and referring to 
a design lasting up to the present time (p. 11): Crito 1 Prot. 2 
Meno 1 Crat. 1 Symp. 2; Rep. 1 Theaet. 3 Parm. 1; Tim. 3 
Legg. 3. 

251. omws with conjunct. ‘nach Hawptzeiten, in vollstandigen 

. Finalsdtzen’ (p. 18): Symp. 1 Legg. 9. 

252. dzws with optativ. praes. ‘nach Nebenzeiten, in volistind- 
igen Finalsatzen’ (p.14): Prot. 1 Phaedr. 1 Tim. 5. 

258. ows av with conjunct. ‘in vollstdndigen und unvoll- 
stdndigen Finalsdtzen’ (pp.14, 21) : Lach. 1 Prot. 1 Gorg. 6 Symp. 1 
Phaedo 1; Rep. 9 Phaedr. 1; Tim. 1 Legg. 22. 

Weber also gives the number of all occurrences of final 
sentences with px, iva, 67a@s, ®s, with various tenses and 
moods, but without distinction of single dialogues, so that 
his work must be repeated if it is to afford chronological 
distinctions. 

XXIII. Droste. A marked contrast to both the 


129 Dy. Philipp Weber, Der Absichissatz ber Plato, Wiirzburg 1884, A 
Doctor’s dissertation of the university of Wiirzburg. This is the xxviiith 
publication on this subject, Peipers’ being the xxviith. 


point of 
stylistic 
investiga- 
tion. 


P. Weber 
also 
ignored 
the rela- 
tion be- 
tween the 
style and 
the chro- 
nology, 
and gave 
only na 
few in- 
stances 
complete 
enumera- 
tions of 
passages, 
by which 
omission 
he de- 
prived us 
of many 
useful in- 
dications. 


Droste 
first dis- 


tinguished 


classes of 
rare words 
according 
to the 
mode of 
their for- 
mation, so 
effecting 

a progress 
in the 
method of 
stylistic 
investiga- 
tions. 


112 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


preceding writers as to the clearness of exposition 
and excellent method of investigation is presented in 
the dissertation of P. Droste ° of Diisseldorf (1886), 
who undertook to represent Plato’s use of adjectives 
terminating in ecdys and dns. Since Campbell nobody 
had examined the formation of new rare words by 
Plato, and Droste knew none of his predecessors ex- 
cept Dittenberger, yet he unconsciously perfected the 
Scotch investigator’s method, distinguishing classes of 
new rare words according to the mode of their formation, 
and not only according to their meaning or origin. This 
endows Droste with a merit scarcely dreamed of by him, 
and manifests at the same time how progress in scientific 
method may be realised apart from wide knowledge. 
Droste dissects Plato’s art of word-building under one of 
its aspects, dealing with words mostly very rare and 
invented by Plato for the expression of his thoughts 
against the general usage of his times: of seventy given 
adjectives, forty-six are never used before (13 in evdys and 
33 in #dns), and thirty-seven are later accepted by Aristotle 
(7 in evd7s and 380 in wdns). Droste minutely compared 
Plato’s use of such adjectives with their employment by 
earlier and later authors. Before Plato these words were 
rare, and since Plato they became very common, as is 
easily seen from the following table : 





philoso- 







































































used by poets: i historians : phers: |, | 
oes —t | 
| | ae) eee ee inn 
Number a : oi{lsiadai|a 
| of different u elsilgial,_,lsleis|s 3 n 
fal hs a | Olan le a to || 3 B&B! eB 5 B 
Sleytr ara ies WAST I en) Se Sha Seri aay Iitate= 
e\S|2 1/61 Ss /8 eles £/8 | 8 |i ¢ ies 
qe Se = of 
adji: in edi ic ae Se A Se era | 6 || 22 || 48 |l43 
adjj. in éSys except | | 
those derived 4/ 1} 2] 10} 22)10) 2) O|}] 7} 11} 17 || 48 |/152 |I\900 
from o¢w | | 








This table is re-arranged according to the table given by Droste (p. 39). It follows that; 
Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Pindar, Herodotus, and Thucydides taken 
all together had used a smaller number of adjj. in evdys than Plato alone, while after Plato 
the use of both kinds of adjj. rapidly increased. | 








180 P, Droste, De adjectivorum in «djs et in &5ns desinentium apud 
Platonem usu (Doetor’s diss. Uniy. Marburg), Marpurgi, without date, pub- 
lished 1886 according to Hinrich’s Catalogue (xxix). 





PLATO’S STYLE: DROSTE 


113 


This interesting comparison proves how well chosen was 
the use of such adjectives, as constituting an important pecu- 
liarity of Plato’s style. The relative occurrence in various 
dialogues is seen from the following table, constructed 
from the materials given by Droste, pp. 18-19, 37-41, re- 
arranged in a more systematic manner than in his tables: 


In 


A Saeed 


Crito. 





Charm. . 


Wael: s 
Meno. . 
Euthyd.. 
Gorg. 


Crat.. 


Symp. 


Phaedo . 





Number of 
different 
adjectives 
terminat- 
ing in 


dys |- Sys 


il 1 


| ee 


Total of | 
occurrences 
of all adjec-| 
tives termi- 

nating in 





-evdys|-Hds5 


1 








a 








OBSERVATIONS.—AIl quoted adjectives are used only once by 


|| Plato, unless the number of occurrences in each dialogue is 


shown. Adjectives invented by Plato and used for the first time 
are printed in heavy type. += not used before Plato; * = not 
used before nor after Plato ; A = accepted by Aristotle ; Aesch. = 
used by Aeschylus; Eur. = used by Euripides ; Her. = used by 
Herodotus ; Xen. = used by Xenophon ; Hom. = used by Homer ; 
Hes. = used by Hesiod ; Iso. = used by Isocrates. 


(1) eveidqs (Aesch. Eur. Her. Xenoph.) occurs Crito 1 
Rep. 2, A.—[1] voo#ins (Iso.) is found in Plato 
more often than any other adjective in #dys, 
occurring 24 times: Crito 1 Charm. 3 Lach. 1 
Symp. 2 Rep. 9 Theaet. 1 Polit. 3 Legg. 3 
(Ale. I. 1) A. 

[1].—[2] + aiviypartédnes, A, seems to be the first 
adjective in dys invented by Plato, occurs 
Charm. 1 Theaet. 1 and Ale. II. 1. 

[1] 195 a. 

[3] oyx@dns (Xen.) A. 

[4] reparddns (Aristophanes) A. 

(2) + dev8xs5 occurs Gorg. 1 Crat. 1 Phaedo 12, A.. 











Or 








25 











(2).—(3) * tpayoer84s—[5] * yAouddns, A 
—[6] *+KodrdAdSns, A,—[7] + pvoddns, 
[8] + cxordédns, A, occurs Crat.1 Phaedo 1 Rep. 2 
Legg. 1—[9] 
Legg. 2—[10] 


Legg. 3.—[12] mvevuaraédns, A. Only these 8 adjec- 


tives in édys are enumerated, occurring 12 times, | 


while according to Droste’s table 9 different adjec- 
tives are used in the Cratylus 13 times. 

(4) *+povoerdtis, A, used Symp. 2 Phaedo 3 Rep. 1 
Theaet. 1 Tim. 1—[13] eiédns (Hom.), used 
Symp. 1 Phaedr. 1 Tim. 1 Critias 1, A—[14] 
dydparodaédns (Xen.) used Symp. 1 Phaedo 1 Rep. 1 
Phaedr. 1 Legg. 1, A. 

+ (2)—+ (4)—(5)__ roAvetdjs 
Phaedo 1 Rep. 3 Phaedr. 3 Soph. 1, A.— 
(6) @coci54s (Hom. Hes.) occurs Phaedo 1 Rep. 1 
Phaedr. 1, Epinomis.—(7) xpvooed7js (Xen.) A— 
(8) cxwedqs (Aristoph.) A—(9) + @vnroerdy5— 
(10) + coparoerdrjc, used Phaedo 5 Rep. 1 Polit. 1 
Tim. 2, A—[14]—[15] wnadins (Thucyd.) A— 
[16] + 8np65ns5: Phaedo 1 Legg. 1—[17] * Bop- 
BopdéSns, A.— [18] +t yedSns: Phaedo 2 Tim. 3 
Critias 1, A. 








+ Enptddns, A, occurs Crat. 5 | 
+ 8:OvpawBGSns—[11] Onpicidns 
(Eur. Xen.), A, occurs Crat.1 Rep.1 Polit. 1Tim.1 | 


(Thucydides) occurs | 


a 





114 


ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 





In 


Rep. . 


Phaedr. . 
Theaet. . 





Number of 


| different 


| adjectives 


terminat- 
ing in 





8 


-evdys|- dys 


-eLd4s 


OBSERVATIONS.—AI] quoted adjectives are used only once by 


Total of 5 Plato, unless the number of occurrences in each dialogue is 
ee annaies: shown. Adjectives invented by Plato and used for the first time 
Bas termi-| used before nor after Plato ; A= accepted by Aristotle; Aesch.= 
SOE greed: by Aeschylus; Eur. = used by Euripides; Her. =used by 


are printed in heayy type. + = not used before Plato ; * = not 


Herodotus ; Xen.= used by Xenophon ; Hom. = used by Homer ; 
- 0575) Hes. = used by Hesiod ; Iso. = used by Isocrates. 








16 


H& bo 


3 


9 


ares 


28 | (1)—* (4)—()—(6)—* (10)—(11): Pupoeid4s (Xen.) 
| used in the meaning ‘hot-tempered,’ chiefly of 
| restive horses: Rep. 8 Legg. 2, distinguished 
from the philosophical term + @vwoerdrg : Rep. 19 
Tim. 1, A—(12) + dyaoer8rjs—(13) + hAvoerhis: 
Rep. 2, A—[1]—+ [8]—[11]—[14]—[19] + Opnva- 
S8ns Rep. 3 Legg. 1—[20] tmvadys (Kur.) A—[21] 
+ drAcypwatdSns, A—[22] + wer_paxrddns, Rep. 2, 
A—[23] + GAutnpiddns, Rep. 1—Legg. 2— 
[241 + omndrarddns—[25] pvdadns (Isocr.) A— 
[26] + kndnvédSys—[27] + Acovrddns, A—[28] 
+ dhedSns, A—[29] + dxAGSNS—[30] weTpaddns 
| (Sophocl.) A, in the order of occurrences ; Droste 
counted 26 instead of 28. 

2 || (5)—(6)—[13]—[14], as in Phaedo and Symposium. 
4 | +(4)—+ [2]-[31] + kompééns, A—[32] * AnpdSns, 
A—[83] + AvOdSy¢s, A. 

















Parm. 
Soph. 
Polktt. 
Phil. . 
Tim. . 





meer | 








e 
Ne ww 


| n 


— 








| 


wee bo 


oo 


1 | [84] + wpayparerddns. 
— | (5)—(14) dvoedys (Sophocl. Her.). 
| + (10)—[11]—[1]—[85] + xpoxddns. 





5 
1 | (15) * weparoerdrs—[36] + wardapidns, A. 
6 | + (4) —+ (10) — + (11) — (16) ooaipoedjs ~(Xen.) 
Tim. 4, A—(17) + AvOoer8%j¢—(18) * depoerdys, 
| A—(19) + «npoer8%4s—(20) + capKoerdrs, A— 
| (21) * orepeoedhs—[11]—[13]—+ [18]—[37] aeons 
| [38] capeddns (Her. Xen.) A—[39] xorddns, 
| Tim. 3, A—[40] + tuavrédns—[41] * olotpdSns, 
| Tim. 1 Legg. 1—[42] + AurpdSns—[43] * pvdSns, 
A—[44] + OopvBdsns, Tim. 1 Legg. 1, A—[48] 
| +yvevpdéSysg has not been counted by Droste, 
though it is quoted p. 34; this increases the 
number of adjectives to 12, of occurrences to 16. 
3 | [13]—+ [18]—[45] zupadns (Aristoph.) A. 








18 | (11)-—(22) * wvpoer8sjs—[1]—* [8]—* [9]—111] 
| —[14]—+ [16]—+ [19] —* [23]—* [41] —* [44] 
—[46] + yobSns, A—[47] taipacrddns. 





In no other dialogue adjectives in evdys or éSys are found, except Epinomis (6) Alec. I. (1] [14] and 
Alc. II. [2], in each of which occur only 1-2 adjectives used by Plato in authentic dialogues, and in 
Ale. I. rpewaédys, taken from Aristophanes. 





New- The most interesting general result of Droste’s in- 
invented vestigation is that not one of the spurious dialogues 
adjectives contains new-invented adjectives in evdys or #dns, and 








~ 


PLATO'S STYLE: DROSTE 115 


that even those introduced by Plato are used only in four 
isolated instances in probably spurious dialogues, as 
Alcibiades I. and II. and Epinomis. This shows the 
originality of vocabulary to be an inimitable peculiarity of 
Plato’s style, and further increases the improbability of 
anybody but Plato having written such original works as 
the Parmenides, Sophist, and Politicus. In these dialectical 
dialogues adjj. in evd7s and dys are scarce, while many 
new-formed adjectives in cxos abound; Droste counted 
2924 such adjectives in the Sophist, and 320 in the 
Politicus, while only 12 occur in the Phaedo. LDroste’s 
dissertation offers important additions to our list of 
peculiarities of later style : 

254. New-invented adjj. in «djs occur (p. 18) Gorg. 1 Crat. 2 
Symp. 2 Phaedo 21; Rep. 24 Theaet. 1; Polit. 1 Phil. 1 Tim. 8 
Legg. 1. (These numbers are not given by Droste; they result 
from the above table.) 

255. New-invented adjj. in dys (pp. 388 and 31-35): Charm. 1 
Crat. 10 Phaedo 4; Rep. 14 Theaet.4; Parm. 1 Polit. 1 Phil. 1 
Tim. 9 Critias 1 Legg. 11. 

256. zodvedns: Phaedo 1 Rep. 8 Phaedr. 3; Soph. 1, A (Table (5), 
Droste, p. 11). 


257. *povoedys: Symp. 2 Phaedo 3; Rep. 1 Theaet.1; Tim. 1, A 
(Table (4), Droste, p. 11). 


In these adjectives the primitive meaning of the 
termination is preserved, though here, too, «idos often 
means species and not form. This use of adjj. in ecdys 
to designate a species corresponds to a logical tendency, 
as Droste well observed, and was never attempted before 
Plato. Plato introduced it into the Greek language 
‘ex necessitate quadam et ex philosophandi angustiis’ 
(p. 19). 

258. Adjj. in «djs designating a species (p. 14) : Phaedo ( (6) (8) 

(9) (10) ) 8 Rep. ( (10) (11) (12) (18) ) 23 Polit. ( (10) ) 1 

Phil. ( (15) )1 Tim. ( (10) (11) (18) (19) (20) (21) ) 7 Legg. ( (22) ) 1. 


Among these adjectives some are specially character- 
istic : 
259. *owparoedys (p. 15): Phaedo 5 Rep. 1 Polit. 1 Tim. 2, A. 


jp 


a 


in edqs 
and #dns 
do not 
occur in 
spurious 
dialogues, 
while they 
are fre- 
quent in 
authentic 
works. 


Plato first 
intro- 
duced the 
use of 
such ad- 
jectives to 
designate 
a species, 
and he 
used them 
frequently 
also in 
other 
meanings 
well 
defined 
by Droste. 


116 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


260. Gupoedys (p. 16), in the same meaning as in Xenophon: 

Rep. 8 Legg. 2 (see table (11) ). 

261. *@vpoedys (p. 15), as philosophical term, used also 

later by A.: Rep. 19 Tim. 1. 

262. Adjectives in eins or dns designating form or colour 
(including dedys) (pp. 10, 18-14, 51): Crito ( (1) ) 1 Gorg. ( (2)) 1 
Crat. ( (2) (8) ) 2 Phaedo ( (2) (7) ) 13 Rep. ( (1) (6) ) 8 Phaedr. 
( (6) ) 1 Soph. ( (14) ) 1 Tim. ( (16) (17) [89] ) 7. (Geoedys is 
used in this meaning only Rep. 501 B Phaedr. 251 a, while in 
Phaedo 95 c and Epinomis it designates a species.) 


More frequent are the adjectives in #dns, which are 
classified by Droste according to their meaning. Those 
derived from éf@ form one class, containing only ed#dns 
and aw#dns, of which the second is used only once 
(Tum, 50 £). 


263. cdwdns: Symp. 1 Phaedr. 1 Tim. 1 Critias 1, A (Droste, 

p. 31, table [13] ). 

264. Adjectives in dns designating similarity (pp. 31-32): 
Crat. ( [10] [11]) 2 Phaedo ( [16] ) 1 Rep. ( [11] [14] [22] [26-80] ) 9 
Phaedr. ([14]) 1 Theaet. ([81] [83]) 2 Polit. ({11]) 1 Phil. ([86]) 1 
Tim. ( [40] [41]) 2 Critias ([45]) 1 Legg. ([11] [16] [41]) 5. 
Among these the following are characteristic : 

265. Onpiodyns: Crat. 1 Rep. 1 Polit. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. 3.—A. 

(in Tim. 91 E it designates a species, while in Legg. 909 a 

it means ‘like brutes,’ and in other passages, as Rep. 571 ©, 

Legg. 906 B, it has a similar meaning). 

266. “dnuwdns: Phaedo 1 Legg. 1. 
267. avdparodadns (p. 32): Symp. 1 Phaedo 1 Rep. 1 Phaedr. 1 

Legg. 1 (in Symp. 215 © and Legg. 880 a it designates a species. 

Droste omitted Phaedo 69 B, where it means similarity). 

268. *oictpadns: Tim. 1 Legg. 1. 

269. Adjectives in odns designating a species (pp. 32-83) : Crito 
({1]) 1 Charm. ([1] [2]) 4 Lach. ([1]) 1 Crat. ( [5-8] [12]) 5 
Symp. ([1] [14]) 2 Phaedo ([17][18]) 3 Rep. ( [1] [24] 6 Theaet. 
((1] [2]) 2 Polit. ( [1] [85]) 4 Tim. ( [11] [18] [42] [48]) 5 Critias 
({18]) 1 Legg. ({14] [47]) 2. 

270. “voo@dns, designating a species: Crito 1 Charm 3 

Lach. 1 Symp. 1 Rep. 5 Theaet. 1 Polit. 3, A. This meaning, 

as for instance Rep. 438 k, is different from the following : 

271. vorwdns: meaning sickly, diseased, opposed to dyervds : 

Symp. 1 Rep. 4 Legg. 3, A. (Droste omitted Rep. 556 £, and 

quotes therefore only three passages in Rep.) 

272. yeodns: Phaedo 2 Tim. 8 Critias 1, A (in Tim. 66 8B 
it does not designate a species, but local connection). 


PLATO'S STYLE: DROSTE, KUGLER Dy 


273. oxorwdns: Crat. 1 Phaedo 1 Rep. 2 Legg. 1, A (of 
these only in Crat. 412 B is a species designated, while the 
other passages use that word in the meaning called by Droste 
‘of local connection,’ as ‘ full of darkness’). 

274. Adjectives in @éns indicating local connection (p. 34) 
meaning ‘full of . . .’: Meno ([3]) 1 Euthyd. ([4]) 1 Crat. ([8]) 1 
Symp. ([1]) 1 Phaedo ([8] [15]) 2 Rep. ([1] [8] [25]) 7 Theaet. 
({82]) 1 Parm. ([84]) 1 Tim. ( [18] [88] [89] [48]) 5 Legg. ([1] 
[8] [19] [46]) 6. This use is distinguished by Droste from the pre- 
ceding, and also from the following, as may be seen by comparing 
the meaning of @pnvadns in Legg. 792 B (274) and Rep. 398 & (275), 
of xoAwdns in Tim. 86 E (274) and Tim. 718,83 B (262). 

275. Adjectives in dys denoting causal relations (p. 34): 
Crat. [9] 5 Rep. [19, 20, 21, 23] 6 Tim. [44] (42D) 1 Legg. [9] 
(650 a, 690 ©) [23] (854 B, 881 £) [44] (671 4) 5. 

Among these the following occur in more than one dialogue : 

276. aditnpiwdns (p. 34): Rep. 1 Legg. 2. 


277. Cnui@dns (p. 34): Crat. 5 Legg. 2 (Droste omitted Crat. 
418 A,B). 


278. @opuvBadns (p. 35): Tim. 1 Legg. 1. 


Droste’s dissertation is a model of stylistic investiga- 
tion made for the purposes of Platonic chronology. We 
see that in the above enumeration the Phaedo very fre- 
quently occurs together with later works, and Droste in- 
ferred that the Phaedo was written after the Phaedrus. 
But this cannot be decided without considering many 
other peculiarities of vocabulary and style, besides the 
adjectives investigated by Droste ; it will then appear 
that the Phaedrus is much nearer to the Republic as 
well as to the latest six dialogues than the Phaedo, 
though in some respects the Phaedo may approach 
the style of the Republic more nearly than does the 
Phaedrus. The natural explanation is that the Phaedo 
immediately preceded the Republic, while the Phaedrus 
followed it. 

XXIV. F. Kuewter. A dissertation published at the 
same time as Droste’s, by F. Kugler,'*! of Basel, on toé 
and its compounds, shows also certain analogies between 


_ 18! BF, Kugler, Dissertatio inauguralis de particulae toi ejusque com- 
positorum apud Platonem usu (Doct. diss. Univ. Basel), Trogen 1886 (xxx). 


Droste’s 
disserta- 
tion a 
model of 
method, 
though one 
of his con- 
clusions is 
erroneous. 


The 
Phaedo 
not later 
than the 
Phaedrus, 
as Droste 
believed. 


Kugler 
found 
many uses 


118 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S: LOGIC 


of row the Phaedrus and the latest group which are lacking in 
prevailing the Phaedo, and many others between the Phaedo and the 


Hs Republic. 


pate 279. yévrou used to oppose to each other two parts of the same 
See phrase (p. 26): Prot. 4 Meno 1 Euthyd. 1 Gorg. 2 Symp. 1 
especially = Phaedo 2; Rep. 4 Phaedr. 2 Theaet. 1; Parm.1 Polit.1 Phil. 1, in- 
the syllo- cluding also some cases of opposition by means of od pévro, and 
gistic use pn) [LeVTOL. 

in conclu- 280. ye . . . péevrae (p. 27): Crito 1 Huthyd. 1 Gorg. 2; Rep. 3 
sions, Phaedr. 1 Theaet. 4; Soph. 1 Phil. 1 Legg. 1. ; 
while 281. ro. between article and substantive (p. 7): Symp. 1 
pévrot Theaet. 1 Soph. 1 Phil. 1. 


282. ro. after the verb (p. 7): Gorg. 1 Phaedo 1; Theaet. 1 
Soph. 1. 

283. kairo. = et vero (pp. 17-18): Gorg. 2; Rep. 1 Theaet. 1; 
Phil. 1 Legg. 3. 

284. roivuy in the conclusion of a syllogism or of a similar 
argument (p. 32): Crito 1 (444) Charm. 2 (1628 syll.) Meno 2 
Gorg. 4 Crat. 1 (4382p syll.) Phaedo 3 (62csyll.) Rep. 18 (868 £, 
603.4 syll.) Phaedr. 4 Theaet. 1 (1928 syll.) Soph. 8 Polit. 4 
Phil. 10}{(including three syll. 33 u, 41D, 56 c) Legg. 14. 


became 
scarcer. 


This increasing use of a word which was afterwards 
so much used by Aristotle in logical conclusions is very 
characteristic of the progress made by Plato in his logical 


terminology. 

285. roivuy ere in transitions (p. 34) : Charm. 1 Phaedo 1; Soph. 3 
Polit. 2 Phil. 2 (the form ér: roivuy is much more often used). 

286. eri O17 rowvvy: Phil. 1 (52.4) Legg. 1 (817 £). 

287. kai Toivuy (p. 384): Soph. 2 Polit. 1 Legg. 3 (while cai... 
Toivuy was used earlier, in Charm. 1 Gorg. 1 Rep. 4 Theaet. 1 and 
also in Phil. 1). 

288. mparov per roivuy (p. 85): Crat. 1 (426c) Phaedo 1 (90 p) 
Rep. 1 Polit. 1 Phil. 2 Legge. 3. 

289. roivuy begins a new argument (p. 35): Apol. 1 Euthyph. 1 
Crito 1 Charm. 3 Gorg. 1 Crat. 9 Symp. 1 Phaedo 6; Rep. 18 
Phaedr. 6 Theaet. 6; Parm. 1 Soph. 10 Polit. 73 Phil. 9 Legg. 21. 

290. roivvy in transitions (p. 35): Crito 1 Crat. 9 Symp. 1 
Phaedo 1; Rep. 14 Theaet. 4; Soph. 4 Polit. 1 Phil. 4 Legg. 9. 

291. 57 roivuy (p. 36): Rep. 1 Phil. 1 Legg. 5. 

292. roivuy 6n: Gorg. 1 Legg. 1. 

293. 75n roivuy (p. 36): Meno 1 Crat. 1; Polit. 1 Phil. 1 Legg. 1. 

294. yy Towvy (p. 36): Crito 1 Charm. 1 Lach. 1 Meno 1 
Symp. 1 Phaedo 1; Rep. 4 Theaet. 3; Soph. 7 Polit. 1 Phil. 2 
Legg. 6. 


PLATO’S STYLE: KUGLER 119 


295. ov—roivur (p. 86): Soph. 1 Legg. 1. 

296. roivuy, instead of being the second word of the phrase as 
usual, is placed in the third place or further (p. 36): Apol. 1 
Euthyph. 1 Charm. 1 Meno 1 Euthyd. 1 Crat. 1 Phaedo 1; Rep. 10 
Phaedr. 1 Theaet. 1; Soph. 5 Polit. 7 Phil. 3 Legg. 8. 

297. ws 87 roe (p. 12), beginning an evident conclusion: Rep. 1 
Phaedr. 1 Tim. 1. 

298. cairo... . dé or dus O€ (p. 19): Apol. 1 Lach. 1 Meno 1 
Euthyd. 1 Gorg. 1; Rep. 3 Phaedr. 2; Parm. 1 Phil. 1 Critias 1 
Legg. 8. ; 

299. adnOn perro (in affirmative answers, p. 23): Lach. 1 Rep. 1 
Soph. 1 Legg. 5. 

300. #rou . . . 7 (p. 14): Prot. 2 Meno 2 Gorg. 2 Crat. 5 
Phaedo 2; Rep. 2 Phaedr. 1 Theaet. 3; Parm. 3 Phil. 2 Legg. 2. 

801. cairo... . adda (p. 19): Lach. 3 Gorg. 1 Crat. 1 Phaedo 1; 
Parm. 1; Polit. 1 Legg. 2. 

302. Simple por (p. 40): Prot. 1 Meno 2 Euthyd. 2; Rep. 1 
Theaet. 1; Soph. 2 Polit. 2 Phil. 1 Lege. 5. 

308. pay ody (p. 40): Soph. 2 Polit. 2 Phil. 4 Legg. 10 (inelud- 
ing one ovv par). 

804. par od (p. 40): Soph. 3 Polit. 2 Phil. 4 Legg. 10. 

805. par py (p. 40): Phaedo 1 Rep. 2 Soph. 1 Phil. 1. 

806. roivuy more than four times oftener than pévto (p. 45): 
Soph. 55/13 Polit. 46/7 Phil. 52/8 Legg. 120/17 while in all other 
works roivvy is much scarcer, occurring in no other dialogue twice 
as often as pevro., the proportion to pévroe being in Rep. Phaedr. 
Theaet. 433, in Euthyphr. Apol. Crito Charm. Lach. Prot. $2, in 
Meno Euthyd. Gorg. Crat. Symp. Phaedo 493, in Parm. 53, in 
Tim. Critias 9. 


_ It would be unjustifiable to draw any inference from 
the absence of both particles in Tim. Critias, or from the 
scarcity of ro(vyy in Parm. The only conclusion allowed 
is, that Soph. Polit. Phil. Legg. have the peculiarity in 
common of an exceptional predominance of totvvy over 
pevtot. From asingle peculiarity no chronological conclu- 
sions can be drawn, but this peculiarity, joined to many 
others, offers a measure of affinity between the dia- 
logues in question. 

307. evrot occurs less than once in two pages only in (p. 45) : 

Crito 2 Prot. 19 Meno 6 Gorg. 23 Symp. 18; Phaedr. 16 Parm. 13; 

Soph. 13 Polit. 7 Phil. 8 Tim. o Critias o Legg. 17 being less 


than once in five pages only in Polit. Phil. Tim. Critias Legg. 
This acquires a special importance if we consider that pévro. went 


These ob- 
servations 
are valu- 
able, but 
Kugler 
attributed 
too great 
import- 
ance to the 
scarcity of 
rolyuy in 
the Par- 
menides. 


Schanz 
indepen- 
dently 
confirmed 
Camp- 
bell’s con- 
clusions. 


Gomperz 
recognised 
the con- 
clusions 
reached 
by both 
Dittenber- 
ger and 
Schanz, 


120 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


out of frequent use in Plato’s time as Kugler has shown by com- 
paring other authors, from Xenophon, in whose writings pevros 
greatly prevails over roiyvvy, down to Demosthenes, who uses 
pevro very rarely. 

308. roivuy is very frequent, occurring once in two pages or 
oftener in: Crito 5 Charm. 20 Lach. 10 Meno 13 Crat. 32; Rep. 133 
Theaet. 39; Soph. 55 Polit. 46 Phil. 52 Legg. 120. 


From these and many other uses of rot Kugler inferred 
quite correctly that the Sophist, Politicus, Philebus 
belong to the same period as Timaeus, Critias, Laws. 

XXV. M. ScHanz. The same conclusion is also 
reached by Martin Schanz,'” the editor of Plato, who 
simultaneously with the dissertations of Kugler and Droste 
published his article on the development of Plato’s style. 
Though he quotes Campbell’s emendations to the Sophist 
in his critical edition of the same dialogue, Schanz seems 
not to have read Campbell’s Introduction. Directing 
his attention to expressions designating truth and being, 
he found : 


309. dvros: Euthyd. 1 Crat. 1; Rep. 9 Phaedr. 6 Theaet. 1; 
Soph. 22 Polit. 11 Phil. 15 Tim. 8 Legg. 50, while in earlier 
works 7 évre is used instead, which is entirely absent from Polit. 
Phil. Tim. Critias Lege., and occurs but once in Soph. 

810. adnéeia (used instead of 77 adnOeia) only in Prot. 8 Phil. 1 
Tim. 1 Legg. 8. 

311. adndas (instead of as adnOés): Apol. 1 Euthyph. 1 Prot. 1 
Meno 2 Euthyd. 1 Phaedo 2; Rep. 8 Phaedr. 1 Theaet. 1; Soph. 6 
Polit. 4 Phil. 7 Tim. 3 Legg. 6. 


XXVI. GompERZ. Only these few observations of 
Schanz, with those of Dittenberger, became generally 
known to German philologers. They did not convince 
Zeller, but they were held sufficient for the stylistic 
definition of the latest group of Plato’s works by another 
most competent historian of Greek philosophy, Theodor 
Gomperz '** (1887),of the University of Vienna. He 

132 Martin Schanz, ‘Zur Entwickelung des platonischen Stils’ in 
Hermes, vol. xxvi. pp. 437-459, for 1886 (xxxi). . 

183 Th. Gomperz, ‘ Platonische Aufsatze,’ in Sitzwngsberichte der Kaiser- 
lichen Akadenvie der Wissenschaften zu Wien, vol. exiv. pp. 741-766, Vienna 
1887 (xxxii). 


PLATO’S STYLE: SCHANZ, GOMPERZ 121 


repeated Dittenberger’s observations, and insisted on their 
decisive importance as to the order of the Platonic dia- 
logues. Gomperz argued that the more or less frequent 
recurrence of words does not lead to such certain con- 
clusions as does the complete absence of certain words in 
certain dialogues; and in this he unconsciously agreed 
with Campbell, who also had chiefly directed his attention 
to the presence or absence of certain words in some 
dialogues. Yet it cannot be denied that observations on 
the comparative frequency or rarity of words give valu- 
able confirmation of conclusions obtained from complete 
changes of vocabulary, and also that the number of 
words increasing in frequency is vastly greater than the 
number of expressions replaced by synonyms. We 
have no reason to disdain supplementary evidence on a 
matter in which, as in other historical problems, even 
the greatest amount of testimony leads only to pro- 
gressive probability. 

XXVII. C. Rirrer. The question of comparative 
recurrence was the object of the first book on Plato’s style, 
a monument of patient labour, by Constantin Ritter 
(1888), now teacher at the gymnasium of Ellwangen in 
Wirtemberg. Until the publication of this book the 
investigations on the style of Plato were published as 
academic dissertations, articles in reviews, or as with 
Campbell, Riddell, Blass, and Peipers, in volumes on a 
different subject. Ritter was the first to write a special 
work on the matter, but he lkewise knew only a few 
among his predecessors. He quotes Blass, Dittenberger, 
Frederking, Schanz, and Roeper, out of all the authors 
who had preceded him in studying Plato’s style. But, 
again, as with Droste, this incomplete bibliographical 
equipment did not prevent Ritter from achieving a 
great progress towards the full solution of our pro- 
blem, and even perfecting earlier methods. He not 
only corrected numerical errors committed by Ditten- 

14 C. Ritter, Untersuchungen iiber Plato, Stuttgart 1888 (xxxiii). 


and he 
insisted 
upon the 
import- 
ance of 
negative 
evidence. 


C. Ritter 
knew only 
five out 

of his pre- 
decessors, 
but he 
achieved a 
great pro- 
eress in 
the study 
of Plato’s 
style by 
measuring 
the oppor- 
tunities 
for the 
occur- 
rence of 
different 
assertions 
and nega- 
tions. 


C. Ritter 
investi- 
gated a 
greater 
number of 
stylistic 
peculiari- 
ties than 
any of his 
German 
predeces- 
sors, and, 
though he 
did not 


122 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


berger, Frederking, and Schanz: he introduced a new 
method of estimating the recurrence of words, undertaking 
to calculate the number of opportunities for the intro- 
duction of at least one important class of words used 
by Plato. Previous writers had only reckoned the words 
occurring—or the number of times each word recurred in 
each dialogue—or the proportion of occurrences to a page 
of text. Nobody had counted the number of opportunities 
for using a given word. This Ritter did, and found for 
various kinds of affirmative and negative answers a better 
basis of comparison than that of the proportion to a page 
of text. He accepted the sum of all such forms of answer 
as the number of opportunities for the occurrence of each 
special form of answer, and referred to this number the 
particular observations of each form. 

This was an important step in advance as regards 
method, to which corresponded also a remarkable progress 
in the knowledge of Platonic chronology. Before Ritter 
only the order of the last six dialogues was well as- 
certained. His merit lies in giving a detailed justification 
of Campbell’s earlier supposition that the group preceding 
the Sophist consisted of the Republic, Phaedrus, and 
Theaetetus. From the numerous observations of Ritter 
the following more especially characterise the latest group 
of six dialogues : 

312. mperoy av ein (p. 6): Tim. 2 Legg. 16. 

313. 7s kai 77 (p. 67): Phil. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. 2. 

314. ws duvaroy (p. 6): Phil. 1 Legg. 4. 

815. xadarepei (p. 58): Polit. 1 Phil. 8 Tim. 1 Legg. 1. 

316. xpewv (p. 6): Soph. 1 Polit. 1 Tim. 8 Critias 2 Lege. 57. 

317. eirov predominates over éAeyov (p. 10): Symp. 3/2 
Parm. 5/3 Soph. 4/1 Polit. 5/4 Phil. 5/4 Tim. 3/0 Critias 1/0 
Legg. 24/6. 

318. Answers suchas ¢ywye, €uovye, and the like (Soxe? prot, €j.0l yoo 
doce) which denote a subjective assent, are very rare, occurring less 
than once in sixty answers (p. 17) : Phaedr. 1/69 Parm. 7/486 Soph. 
1/215 Polit. 3/251 Phil. 3/314 Tim. 0/13 Critias o/o Lege. 0/568 
(in earlier dialogues they occur very often, namely, once in five 


answers in Kuthyph. Meno, once in six answers in Lach. Euthyd. 
Gorg., once in seven to ten answers in Apol. Crito Charm. Crat. 


PLATO’S STYLE: RITTER 123 


Theaet., once in sixteen to eighteen answers in Prot. Phaedo know 
Rep.). Campbell, 
319. card ye rHv €uny (p. 68): Polit. 2 Phil. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. 1. reached 
320. Inversion of the ordinary position of Acyes, as for instance gimilar 
héyets GAnOéorara instead of ayOéorara eyes (p. 56): Soph. 4 goney- 
Polit. 2 Legg. 3. anne 

$21. 7d wdaprav (p. 72): Polit. 2 Tim. 2 Legg. 3 
322. eixds yoor (p. 57): Parm. 1 Soph. 4 Polit. 7 Phil. 5 Legg. 16. 


Other peculiarities of later style extend also over the 
group of Rep. Phaedr. Theaet. : 


323. mdvrn mdvrws (pp. 67, 101): Phaedr. 1 Parm. 1 Tim. 1 
Legg. 2. 

324. elpnra (p. 10): Phaedr. 1 Theaet. 1 Soph.1 Polit. 2 Tim. 3 
Legg. 11. 

325. Superlatives adnéécrara, dpOdrara eyes prevail over 
corresponding positives in affirmative answers (Ritter, p. 19, 
corrected by Tiemann, '’ p. 586) only in: Phil. 22/6 Legg 36/22 
and are half as frequent or oftener in Phaedo 4/8 Rep. 29/48 
Phaedr. 2/2 Theaet. 8/14 Soph. 6/10 Polit. 7/8. 

326. yap ody in short answers (pp. 57, 100): Rep. 4 Theaet. 1 
Parm. 22 Soph. 6 Polit. 5 Phil. 1 Legg. 1. 

327. mavras Kal baad (p. 67): Rep. 1 Phil. 1. 

328. i) Tas... 7) was (p. 57): Rep. 1 Phil. 5 Legg. 6. 

329. pupip fee 5): Rep. 1 Polit. 1 Phil. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. 2. 

330. dvayxaiov, dvaykarata (p. 20): Rep. 8 Soph. 1 Phil. 
Legg. 4. 

331. i) mas; (p. 24, in questions exacting aflirmative answers) : 
Rep. 1 Parm. 1 Soph. 4 Polit. 3 Phil. 5 Legg. 3. 

382. 77; (p. 25): Rep. 4 Parm. 8 Soph. 7 Polit. 6 Phil. 3 
Legg. 38. 

833. més eiwes; (p. 25): Rep. 1 Polit. 8 Phil. 1 Legg. 1. 

334. SjAov os (pp. 2-3): Rep. 2 Phaedr. 3 Soph. 8 Polit. 2 
Phil. 5 Tim. 4 Critias 1 Legg. 14. 

335. ywaxpo (p. 5): Rep. 2 Theaet. 1 Phil. 2 Tim. 1 Legg. 4. | 

336. €pp76n (p. 10): Rep. 1 Theaet. 1 Soph. 1 Polit. 6 Phil. 1 
Tim. 1 Critias 2 Legg. 8 

337. eyot your Soxet (p. 17): Rep. 4 Theaet. 1 Phil. 2 Legg. 1. 

338. ovxodv xpy or adda xpz (p. 22): Rep. 4 Theaet. 1 Parm. 1 
Soph. 2 Polit. 4 Phil. 3 Legg. 1. 

339. cai ras; (p. 23): Rep. 6 Theaet. 2 Parm. 1 Soph. 6 Polit. 1 
Phil. 6 Legg. 11. 

840. kai mas av; (p. 24): Rep. 2 Theaet. 2 Parm. 1 Soph. 1 
Phal, 1. 

341. €€ dvdyxns (p. 67): Rep. 6 Phaedr. 2 Theaet. 1 Soph. 5 
Polit. 4 Phil. 2 Tim. 13 Legg. 22. 


This co- 
incidence 
shows the 
superi- 
ority of 
stylistic 
determi- 
nation of 
chrono- 
logy over 
other 
methods 
which 
constantly 
contradict 
each 
other. 


124 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


342. adynOecrara, opbas, épOérara without Aeyers and dpOdrara 
Aeyers in affirmative answers (pp. 17, 56): Rep. 57 Phaedr. 1 
Theaet. 6; Parm. 22 Soph. 16 Polit. 26 Phil. 32 Legg. 38. 
(Arnim: Soph. 18 Polit. 29 Legg. 40; Tiemann: Rep. 55 Polit. 28 
Phil. 31 Legg. 35.) 

348. d7\ov (pp. 20, and 36, 100): Rep. 24 Phaedr. 1 Theaet. 2 
Parm. 2 Polit. 4 Phil. 1 Legg. 4. 


There remain some peculiarities, which, though more 
frequent in the later dialogues, occur also exceptionally 
in one or other of the earlier works : 


344, ovdayn otdanes or pndayn pndapas (p. 66): Phaedo 1 
Theaet. 1 Parm. 3 Phil. 2 Tim. 2 Legg. 8. 

345. xdAdtotos Kat dpiotos (p. 7): Symp. 1 Phaedr. 1 Tim. 4 
Legg. 4. 

346. eis or xara Svvapw (p. 6): Crat. 1 Rep. 6 Phaedr. 1 Soph. 3 
Polit. 11 Phil. 4 Tim. 10 Critias 1 Legg. 63. 

847. cies or eipnxas in answers (p. 19): Gorg. 1 Rep. 1 Theaet.1 
Soph. 2 Polit. 7 Phil. 8 Legg. 11. 

348. uméhuPes (p. 20): Rep. 2 Theaet. 1 Legg. 5. 

349. mavranact pev ovv (pp. 23, 36): Lach. 1 Rep. 38 Phaedr. 3 
Theaet. 9 Parm. 7 Soph. 10 Polit. 4 Phil. 4 Tim. 1 Legg. 18. 

350. cxed0v without re (p. 3): Apol. 2 Crito 1 Charm. 1 Gorg. 3 
Phaedo 2 Rep. 7 Phaedr. 4 Soph. 26 Polit. 18 Phil. 14 Tim. 9 
Critias 4 Legg. 122. 

351. ra voy as adverb (p. 7): Charm. 1 Prot. 1 Phaedo 1 Rep. 1 
Soph. 5 Polit. 5 Phil. 9 Tim. 5 Critias 3 Lege. 79. 

352. kai pada (p. 23): Euthyph. 1 Euthyd. 1 Phaedo 1 Rep. 47 
Phaedr. 3 Theaet. 4; Parm. 2 Soph. 4 Polit. 2 Phil. 7 Legg. 6. 

353. Questions by means of soios (p. 25): Lach. 1 Crat. 2 
Phaedo 1 Rep. 48 Phaedr. 4 Theaet. 13 Parm. 3 Soph. 32 Polit.36 
Phil. 33 Legg. 47. 

354. mdavv péev ovy prevails over wavy ye in (Ritter, pp. 22-23, 
corrected by Arnim,'* p. 6): Crito 1/0 Rep. 64/40 Phaedr. 3/1 
Theaet. 16/5 Soph. 14/10 Polit. 18/7 Phil. 23/9 Legg. 49/4, and 
is over half as frequent in Lach. 6/10 Prot. 3/3 Phaedo 21/23 
Parm. 15/28. 

355. yapuv (p. 59): Prot. 1 Gorg. 3 Symp. 1 Rep. 12 Phaedr. 8 
Theaet. 4 Soph. 1 Polit. 3 Phil. 3 Tim. 7 Critias 2 Legg. 33. 


These considerable additions to the number of pecu- 
hiarities of Plato’s later style led C. Ritter to the same 
general conclusions as those arrived at by Campbell 
twenty years earlier, namely that Soph. Polit. Phil. 
Tim. Critias Legg. are the last works of Plato, and that 


PLATO'S STYLE: RITTER, WALBE 125 


Rep. Phaedr. Theaet. form a group preceding them. 
At the same time, other inquirers added new observations, 
all confirming this distinction of the above two groups of 
Plato’s works, and happily avoiding repetition of work 
already done. 

XXVIII. Wause. The philological seminary of Bonn 
University, where the dissertations of Roeper and Hoefer 
were written, produced in 1888 a third doctoral disserta- 
tion on the style of Plato, by E. Walbe '!* (1888) who 
counted the occurrences of wés, its compounds and the 
expressions containing it. Of his predecessors he only 
knew Roeper, Dittenberger, Hoefer, and Schanz. Among 
over a hundred uses of was enumerated by Walbe, the 
following deserve our special attention : 


356. Evvaras (p. 3): Soph. 3 Polit. 1 Phil. 2 Tim. 3 Legg. 1. 

357. of Edumavres or Ta EVuravta (p. 11): Soph. 1 Polit. 1 Phil. 1 
Legg. 3. 

358. mas ovros or otros was (p. 36): Crat. 1; Soph. 2 Parm. 2 
Phil. 1 Tim. 2 Critias 1 Legg. 5. 

359. mas édoticovr (p. 37): Polit. 1 Phil. 1 Legg. 1. 

360. ra ravra yévn (p. 35): Soph. 1 Tim. 2. 

861. ra mavra cidn or pépn (p. 35): Rep. 1 Theaet.6 Parm. 4 
Legg. 1. 

362. rovvavriov Grav or day rovvayriov (p. 16): Polit. 1 Phil. 1 
Legg. 3. 

863. ro Evprar (p. 9): Phaedr. 1 Soph. 1 Polit. 1. 

. 364. wav (oov, meaning ‘ every animal’ (p. 20): Rep. 1 Polit. 1 
Phil. 2 Tim. 2 Legg. 5. 

865. Evpras prevails over dras only (p. 4): Soph. 20/8 Polit. 
45/18 Phil. 21/19, while in all other dialogues das is more frequent, 
being in Tim. Legg. over twice as frequent as Evpmas. 

866. was and its compounds occur over four times in a page ed. 
Didot (p. 4) in: Soph. 187 Polit. 239 Phil. 209 Tim. 375 Critias 
67 Legg. 1290, rising in Polit. Tim. Critias Legg. to more than five 
and even up to seven times in a page, while in all other dialogues 
they are much scarcer (Euthyd. 102 Crat. 137 Symp. 142 Rep. 601 
Theaet. 188 Parm. 91, elsewhere less). 


367. dmas, Evumas, Evvdas occur over once in two pages in - 


(p. 4): Apol. 12 Crito 7 Lach. 10 Prot. 22 Euthyd. 17 Parm. 17 
Soph. 31 Phil. 42, and over once ina page in: Polit. 64 Tim. 62 





199 KH. Walbe, Silesius, Syntaxis Platonicae Specimen (Doctor’s diss.), 
Bonn 1888 (xxxiy). 


Walbe’s 
observa- 
tions on 
mas and 
com- 
pounds 
lead to 
the same 
results, 
though he 
made no 
methodic 
use of 
them, 
attaching 
chronolo- 
gical im- 
portance 
only to the 
frequency 
of a few 
words. 


Siebeck’s 
observa- 
tions on 
peculiari- 
ties of 
style 
explained 
by Plato’s 
psycho- 
logical 
evolution. 


This is a 
progress 
in the 


126 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


Critias 11 Legg. 255, in all other dialogues less, being over once 
in three pages only in: Meno 8 Gorg. 28 Phaedo 17 Rep. 78 
Phaedr. 17 Theaet. 20. 

368. wav door (p. 7): Symp. 1 Soph. 1 Polit. 1 Tim. 4 Legg. 3. 

369. mavra (oa or (oa ravta (p. 31): Phaedo 2 Rep. 2 Soph. 1 
Phil. 3 Tim. 2 Legg. 3 (including two occurrences of (6a Evpravta 
in Legg.). 

370. das or drav without article or substantive (pp. 5, 7): 
Symp. 1 Phaedo 1 Phaedr. 1 Parm. 3 Tim. 2 Legg. 4. 

871. ro wav, meaning the universe (omniwm rerwm universitas, 
p- 10), is limited to: Crat.3 Symp. 1 Rep. 1 Theaet. 3 Parm. 1 
Soph. § Polit. 7 Phil. 10 Tim. 38 Legg. 11. 

872. 7d way diadepe (pp. 10-11): Polit. 1 Legg. 2. 

873. maca oY draca avdykn (p. 23): Phaedo 2 Rep. 5 Phaedr. 2 


Theaet. 2 Soph. 2 Phil. 1 Tim. 4 Legg. 2. 
874. mas or compounds used together with cxaoros (p. 387): 
EKuthyd. 1 Rep. 2 Theaet. 1 Parm. 1 Soph. 1 Tim. 6 Legg. 1. 
375. mas used with ddos (p. 88): Rep. 2 Soph. 1 Legg. 3. 
XXIX. SreBEcK. In the same year as Walbe’s dis- 
sertation and Ritter’s work was published an original 
investigation on Plato’s style by H. Siebeck,'*’ author of 
the History of Psychology. Siebeck, as a psychologist, 
sought for characteristics of Plato’s style revealing 
changes in the author’s state of mind which are capable 
of psychological explanation. He chose for his purpose 
the different classes of affirmative answers, and made a 
step further in the right method of calculating opportu- 
nities for the occurrence of each particular answer, not 
taking, as Ritter did, the sum of all answers as a com- 
parative measure, but the sum of all affirmative answers 
only. Siebeck, moreover, classified all these answers and 
distinguished problematic, assertive, and apodictic affirma- 
tions. The apodictic affirmations, as for instance adnOéo- 
tata, opOeTata, Tavtatract, &c., are, as Siebeck shows, 
in all cases when the chronological order of two 
dialogues is known from other certain sources, more 
numerous in the later works. They form in the Republic 
136 AH. Siebeck, Untersuchungen zur Philosophie der Griechen, 2° A., 
Freiburg in B., 1888, pp. 253-266: ‘Nachtriige die platonische Frage 


betreffend, I. Sprachstatistisches ’ (xxxv). Siebeck knew among his pre- 
decessors Dittenberger, Frederking, Hoefer, Schanz, and Gomperz. * 


PLATO’S STYLE: WALBE, SIEBECK 127 


fifty per cent. of all affirmative answers, and in the Laws 
fifty-four per cent. A similar relation is observed in the 
dialectic trilogy. In the Theaetetus Siebeck found thirty- 
eight per cent. apodictic answers, in the Sophist forty-two 
per cent., in the Politicus forty-nine per cent.—while in 
the Protagoras, generally recognised as an early dialogue, 
such answers form only fifteen per cent. of all. More- 
over, in the separate books of the Republic we notice the 
like progress from a more problematic to an apodictic 
certainty. In Book I we find thirty-eight per cent. 
apodictic affirmations, as in the Theaetetus ; i Books II- 
IV they rise to forty-six per cent.; in Books V-IX 
to fifty-four per cent.; in Book X they decline a little, 
being fifty-three per cent. of all affirmative answers. It 
would be an exaggeration to affirm that these numbers 
correspond precisely to the chronological order, because 
the special subject of each work gives greater or fewer 
opportunities for apodictic certainty, and if the Phaedo 
contains forty-nine per cent. apodictic replies, this is no 
sufficient reason for inferring that this dialogue was 
written after the Sophist; still, Siebeck’s method of cal- 
culating the opportunities for different kinds of answers 
marks a progress over Ritter’s first attempt. Siebeck 
also counted the number of simple direct questions, with- 
out any interrogative particle, or with 7 or dpa or pov 
only, in order to find the relative recurrence of these par- 
ticles ; and he found the percentage of questions with dpa 
or pov to be very high in the dialogues of the latest group. 
These investigations increase our list by some charac- 
teristics whose importance outweighs their number : 


876. Over forty in each hundred affirmative answers are 
apodictic (p. 260) only in: Phaedo 83/168 Rep. 669/1342 
Phaedr. 42/76 Parm. 159/394 Soph. 140/329 Polit. 130/268 
Phil. 198/323 Legg. 312/578. In other dialogues the proportion 
is much smaller, coming nearest to the later style in Huthyd. 
45/130 Gorg. 105/321 Crat. 77/238 Theaet. 101/263 "(in these 
dialogues over 30 %). 

377. To each problematic answer correspond at least four 


method of 
stylistic 
study for 
chrono- 
logical 
purposes, 
as can be 
tested on 
those 
works 
whose 
chrono- 
logical 
order is 
otherwise 
known. 


Siebeck’s 
caleula- 
tions add 
very im- 
portant 
informa- 
tion to our 
knowledge 
of Plato’s 
style. 


They 


-show that 


apodictic 
affirma- 
tions and 
certain 
kinds of 


interroga- 
tions in- 
crease in 
frequency 
in the 
latest 


group. 


Tiemann 
supple- 
mented 
Ritter’s 
observa- 
tions and 
corrected 
them on 
some 
points, 
giving 
more 
detailed 
informa- 
tion on 
the use of 
participles 
and of 
some 
kinds of 
answers 
peculiar to 
later style. 


128 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


apodictic answers or more: Phaedo 20/83 Rep. 141/669 Phaedr. 
10/42 Soph. 31/140 Phil. 32/198 Legg. 69/312. In other 
dialogues the problematic answers occur much oftener, being less 
than one to three apodictic answers only in HKuthyd. 12/45 Gorg. 
32/105 Parm. 52/159 Polit. 35/130. 

378. Interrogations by means of dpa form 24 % or more of all 
simple interrogations: Parm. 50/207 Soph. 46/171 Polit. 31/106 
Phil. 56/186 Legg. 95/329, while in all other dialogues dpa is 
much scarcer, the proportion being above 15 % only in: Prot. 
27/140 Crat. 34/172 Phaedo 31/161 Rep. 183/931 Phaedr. 11/72 
Theaet. 39/229, and in other dialogues less. 


XXX. TreMANN. Stylistic investigations on Plato 
became better known after 1888; those of Dittenberger, 
Schanz, Ritter, and Siebeck receiving most attention, but 
still they met with obstinate opposition, and Zeller con- 
tinued to disdain them. J. Tiemann,!*’ under the influence 
of Ritter’s work, investigated the use of some participles 
with efvas, and noticed among others the following 
peculiarities : 


879. Particip. aorist. with etva (p. 559) : Polit. 2 Tim. 1 Lege. 1. 

380. mpemov with etva: Lach. 1 Gorg. 1 Symp. 1 Tim. 2 
Critias 2 Legg. 7. 

381. mpoonker with evar: Rep. 8 Phaedr. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. 2. 

382. Part. praes. with eivac: Euthyph.1 Prot. 1 Meno 2 Gorg. 2 
Crat. 2 Symp. 1 Phaedo 1; Rep. 8 Phaedr. 3 Theaet. 3; Soph. 6 
Polit. § Phil. 8 Tim. 4 Critias 1 Legg. 11. 

888. Pleonastic use of participles (p. 556) : Lach. 1 Prot. 1 Meno 3 
Euthyd. 1 Gorg. 3 Crat. 1 Symp. 2 Phaedo 2; Rep. 14 Phaedr. 4 
Theaet. 3; Soph. 7 Polit. 12 Phil. 7 Tim. 12 Critias 4 Legg. 24. 

384. Periphrastic impersonal expressions (p. 556): Symp. 1 
Rep. 1 Soph. 1 Polit. 2 Tim. 7 Critias 2 Legg. 10. 

385. adn6 without Aéyes in affirmative answers (p. 586) : 
Charm. 3 Lach. 1 Prot. 1 Gorg. 1 Phaedo 1 Rep. 29 Theaet. 9 
Parm. 18 Soph. 7 Polit. 5 Phil. 2 Legg. 4. (The occurrence of 
ann in Prot. and Gorg. has not been noticed by Tiemann, nor by 
C. Ritter, but is mentioned by von Arnim'* p. 9, and has been 
admitted here on his testimony, because an involuntary omission 





137 J. Tiemann, ‘Zum Sprachgebrauch Platos’ in Wochenschrift fiir 
klassische Philosophie, 1889, columns 248-253, 362-366; also in his exten- 
sive review of C. Ritter’s work in the same journal, columns 791-797, 
839-842, Berlin 1889 (xxxvi). The numbers for Parmenides omitted by 
Tiemann have been in some cases added from Arnim’s (see note 144) 
publication. 


PLATO'S STYLE: TIEMANN, LINA 129 


appears more probable than a wrong observation, unless Arnim 
counted as simple ady67 some adnO7n déyets.) adAnOH Eyes, Very 
common in earlier dialogues, is scarcer afterwards. 


Already C. Ritter had noticed that the abridged forms 
6p0as, adnOéotata, dpOorata without rAéyes, as well as 
opOorata even with déyers, were limited to Rep. Phaedr. 
Theaet. Parm., and to the six latest dialogues, occurring 
nowhere earlier (842). Tiemann counted the occurrences 
of each of these forms of affirmative answers, and found 
that dpOds, dpOdrara, and adnOéortata, with or without 
Aéyers, though not limited to the latest works, occur in 
them with increased frequency, and may therefore be 
looked upon as peculiarities of later style : 


386. dp6as with or without A¢cyes in affirmative answers 
(p. 586): Euthyph. 1 Charm. 1 Meno 1 Crat. 1 Phaedo 1 Rep. 35 
Phaedr. 1 Theaet. 5 Parm. 18 Soph. 10 Polit. 17 Phil. 13 Legg. 24. 
(Arnim agrees generally with these numbers, but he found no 
6pas in Meno and Crat., and only two in Phil., 25-26 in Legg.) 

387. ddndeorara with or without Aé€yes in affirmative answers 
(p. 586): Lach. 1 Crat. 1 Symp. 1 Phaedo 4 Rep. 28 Phaedr. 2 
Theaet. 7 Parm. 6 Soph. 5 Polit. 7 Phil. 16 Legg. 23 (Arnim 
Legg. 24). 

388. 6pOdrara with or without Aéyes in affirmative answers 
(p. 586): Rep. 10 Phaedr. 1 Theaet. 1 Parm. 1 Soph. 4 Polit. 8 
Phil. 10 Legg. 12. Arnim: Rep. 11 Phaedr. 2 Soph. 5 Polit. 12 
Phil. 12 Legg. 15 or 16. (In this and the preceding Nos. 385-387 
the numbers for Parmenides, omitted by Tiemann, are quoted 
from Arnim, who slightly differs from Tiemann and Ritter in other 
numbers.) 


XXXI. Lina. Simultaneously with Tiemann, Lina'* 
published at Marburg a dissertation wherein he classi- 
fies no fewer than twenty-one thousand eight hundred 
and eighty-one occurrences of prepositions in Plato’s 
works. From his lists the following confirmation of 
earlier results is gathered : 


88 T. Lina, De praepositionum usu platonico; dissertatio inauguralis 
Marpurgi 1889 (xxxvii). Of his predecessors Lina knew Dittenberger, 
Schanz, and Ritter. 


K 


Lina 
counted 
all uses of 
preposi- 
tions but 
failed to 
find a 


difference 
of fre- 
quency in 
their use 
between 
early and 
late 
dialogues, 
because 
he used 

a wrong 
measure 
of text. 
His obser- 
vations 
teach us, 
however, 
a great 
number 
of pecu- 
liarities of 
later style, 
among 
which 
various 
kinds of 
inter- 
positions 
are pro- 


minent. 


130 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


389. xara with the accusative prevails over all other prepositions 
except ev (p. 9): Crat. 75 Polit. 130 Critias 50 Legg. 697, and 
over ev in Soph. 115 Tim. 253. In these dialogues cara cum acc. 
forms 12-15 % of the whole number of prepositions, while 
in other works it is much scarcer, reaching 9 % only in the 
Theaet. and falling to the fourth rank in Parm. (after év, mpés, ek), 
Phil. (after ¢v, eis, wept), Legg. B. vi. x. xii. (after ev, eis and ek or 
wept). The prevalence of xara in some dialogues is so much the 
more characteristic, as in the whole of Plato’s text ev (4148), mepi 
(8267), mpos (2292), prevail much over xara (2065). 

890. Twenty-one or more prepositions on each page (ed. Didot) 
occur only in: Phaedr. 819 Polit. 916 Tim. 1733 (82 in one 
page) Critias 363 (33 in one page) Legg. 5249 (22 in one page), 
over 19 in: Lach. 352 Phaedo 945 Rep. 3865 Soph. 757; over 83 in 
two pages in: Prot. 678 Symp. 787 Theaet. 885 Parm. 512 Phil. 
778, elsewhere less. (In this case the superiority of Didot’s edition 
over Teubner’s, as a measure of text, is manifest. Lina gives 
for Polit. the proportion of 11 prepositions to one page, the 
same as for Prot., while from the numbers he quotes it results 
that one page ed. Didot contains in Prot. 17°4 prepositions, in 
Polit. 21°3. This should be carefully borne in mind by all 
future inquirers, who wish to determine how often per page a 
word occurs. The proportion of 11 prepositions to one page ed. 
Teubner is given by Lina also for Lach., with 19°5 preposi- 
tions on one page ed. Didot; according to his calculations Symp. 
[189 prepositions on one page ed. Didot] and Phaedo [19°38 
prepositions on one page ed. Didot| would contain more preposi- 
tions [12 on each page ed. Teubner] than the Politicus [11 pre- 
positions on one page ed. Teubner, and 21°3 prepositions on one 
page ed. Didot], while they really contain two prepositions less on 
each page ed. Didot. It follows that the standard of a page varies, 
and that we must be cautious in selecting a measure of text. So 
long as the ideal measure, the number of words of each dialogue, 
remains unknown, there is no safer standard than the pages of 
Didot’s edition for measuring Plato’s text.) 

391. wepi c. accus. prevails over wepi c. gen. (p. 12): Symp. 40/39 
Soph. 76/71 Polit. 92/53 Tim. 116/88 Critias 29/21 Legg. ili. v. 
vi. vii. 182/147. This is a very characteristic peculiarity, because 
in all other dialogues the predominance of zepi c. gen. over rept 
ce. acc. is so great that in the dialogues not specified by Lina 
1552 epi c. gen. correspond to 804 zepi c. ace. 

392. card sundered from the corresponding accus. by 67 (p. 14): 
Meno 1 Rep. 1 Parm. 2 Soph. 2 Polit. 1 Phil. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. 1. 

393. idem, by pe (p. 14): Gorg. 1 Rep. 2 Theaet. 2 Polit. 1 

Phil. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. 2. 

394. idem, by 6¢ (p. 14): Gorg. 1 Crat. 2 Rep. 4 Theaet. 4 

Parm. 8 Soph. 1 Phil. 1 Tim. 5 Critias 3 Legg. 2. 


9 


PLATO'S STYLE: LINA pal 


395. idem, by ré (p. 14): Rep. 2 Phaedr. 1 Theaet. 1 Polit. 1 
Phil. 1 Tim. 4 Legg. 8. 

396. idem, by yé (pp. 14, 75): Charm. 2 Gorg.1Crat. 1 Phaedo 1 
Rep. 1 Theaet. 1 Soph. 1 Polit. 4 Phil. 5 Tim. 1 Legg. 4. 

397. idem, by a genitive (p. 14): Crat. 1 Rep. 1 Phaedr. 1 
Parm. 1 Polit. 1 Legg. 3. 

398. idem, by more than one word (p. 15): Gorg. 1 Crat. 1 
Symp. 1 Parm. 1 Polit. 1 Critias 1 Legg. 2. 

399. epi sundered from the corresponding genitive by 67 (p. 16): 
Theaet. 1 Soph. 1 Polit. 1 Tim. 2 Legg. 2. 

400. idem, by d€ (p. 16): Lach. 2 Prot. 3 Crat. 2 Symp. 2 
Rep. 1 Phaedr. 2 Theaet. 2 Soph. 2 Polit. 2 Phil. 2 Tim. 2 
Legg. 12. 

401. idem, by ye (p. 16): Euthyph. 2 Phaedo 1 Rep. 1 
Theaet. 1 Phil. 1 Legg. 4. . 

402. idem, by ré (p. 16): Euthyph. 1 Crito 1 Charm. 1 
Symp. 1 Phaedo 1 Rep. 7 Theaet. 1 Soph. 1 Polit. 3 Phil. 2 
Tim. 2 Critias 1 Legg. 4. 

408. idem, by a genitive (p. 16): Euthyd. 3 Gorg. 3 Phaedo 1 
Phaedr. 2 Theaet. 2 Polit. 2 Critias 1 Legg. 4. 

404. idem, by pev yap (p. 17): Rep. 1 Theaet. 1 Polit. 1. 

405. idem, by three to five words (p. 17): Crat. 2 Rep. 1 
Phil. 1 Tim. 2 Legg. 3. 

406. mepi, sundered from the corresponding accus. by ye 
(p. 18) : Crat. 1 Legg. 2. 

407. idem, by d¢ (p. 18): Gorg. 8 Rep. 1 Phaedr. 1 Theaet. 2 
Soph. 3 Polit. 3 Phil. 2 Critias 2 Legg. 2. 

408. idem, by pv (p. 19): Gorg. 2 Rep. 1 Phaedr. 1 Theaet. 2 
Soph. 3 Polit. 1 Phil. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. 3. 

409. idem, by ré (p. 19): Phaedo 1 Rep. 2 Phaedr. 1 Polit. 4 
Phil. 1 Tim. 4 Legg. 9. 

410. idem, by a genitive (p. 19): Euthyph. 1 Lach. 1 
Euthyd. 1 Crat.1 Symp. 1 Rep. 3 Phaedr. 2 Polit. 1 Phil. 1 
Legg. 3. 

411. idem, by two or three words (p. 19): Symp. 1 Rep. 2 
Phaedr. 1 Tim. 1. 

412. repi placed after the substantive which depends on it 
(anastrophe) was not very much used by writers earlier than Plato 
(as for instance Thucydides), while in Plato it forms over 17 % 
of all occurrences of this preposition, and after Plato it became 
still more common. But this use is not equally frequent in all 
dialogues; it does not occur in Crito Charm., forms under 5 % 
of all occurrences of epi in Prot. Euthyd. Crat. Phaedo, rises 
above 6 % in Apol. 2/24 Euthyph. 3/37 Meno 5/50 Gorg. 9/92 
Symp. 3/89 Parm. 2/80 Critias 2/21, above 10 % in Lach. 10/78 
Theaet. 14/123 Tim. 13/88; and above 20 % only in: Rep. 60 

K 2 


The very 
frequent 
use of mépi 
in ana- 
strophe 
begins 
with the 
Republic, 
and some 


special 
interposi- 
tions are 
later more 
frequent. 


Also some 
meanings 
are pre- 
valent in 
the latest 
works, as 
it results 
from 
Lina’s 
enumera- 
tions. 


132 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


(22 %) Phaedr. 18 (21 %) Soph. 26. (22 %) Polit. 11 (21 %) 
Phil. 21 (82 %) Legg. 139 (29 %) (calculated from the table 
given by Lina on p. 29). 

413. Between a genitive and a following zép: belonging to it, 
is placed a yé (p. 26): Gorg. 1 Phil. 1. 

414, idem, d¢ (p. 27): Gorg. 1 Rep. 1 Legg. 9. 
415. idem, dy (p. 27): Prot. 1 Phaedr. 2 Soph. 1 Polit. 1 Phil. 1 

Legg. 8. 

416. idem, ré (p. 27): Euthyph. 1 Gorg. 1 Symp. 1 Phaedo 1 

Rep. 17 Theaet. 1 Soph. 1 Polit. 2 Phil. 3 Tim. 1 Critias 1 

Legg. 12. 

417. idem, a genitive (p. 27): Phil. 1 Legg. 2. 

418. Between a genitive depending on zép: and the following 
méptis placed another word (not one of the above particles (413— 
416), but including the genitives counted in 417) or more words 
(p. 27): Apol. 1 Lach. 1 Rep. 1 Phaedr. 3 Theaet. 1 Soph. 3 
Polit. 1 Phil. 3 Legg. 17. 

419. ava Adyorv (in the same meaning as xara Adyov = in pro- 
portion) or ava roy adroy doyov (p. 35): Phaedo 2 Rep. 2 Tim. 6 
Legg. 1. 

420. xara c. genit. after a verbwm dicendi in the same mean- 
ing as wep (p. 837): Charm. 1 Meno 2 Euthyd.1 Crat.1 Symp. 1 
Phaedo 1 Rep. 1 Phaedr. 1 Soph. 1 Legg. 2. 

421. idem, after a verbum agendi (p. 87): Meno 2 Phaedo 1; 
Soph. 1 Phil. 1 Legg. 1. 

422. xara c. accus. to designate the direction of a movement 
(for which generally the genitive is used) meaning towards or to or 
in (pp. 89, 40): Symp. 1 (190 E: xara rv yaorepa) Phaedo 1 (114 a: 
kara THY Niwynv) Rep. 1 (614 dD) Tim. 8 Critias 4 Legg. 1 (905 a). 

423. idem, metaphorically (pp. 39-41): Crat. 1 Symp. 4 (205 p: 
Kata xpnuaticpoy etc.) Rep. 1 (896 p) Phaedr. 2 Theaet. 2 Parm. 2 
Soph. 4 Polit. 1 Phil. 1 Tim. 2 Legg. 4. 

424. xara c. accus. to designate the diffusion of something over 
or through some space or place (p. 41): Prot. 1 (813 D: kara ras 
modes) Crat. 1 Symp. 1 Phaedo 2 Rep. 1 Phaedr. 2 Theaet. 1 
Tim. 78 Critias 1 Legg. 2 (indicatur aliquid per aliquem locum 
diffund). 

425. idem, metaphorically: Rep. 1 Theaet. 1 Parm.1 Soph. 2 
Polit. 1 Phil. 2 Legg. 6. 

426. xara c. acc. to designate a place (= in) in such phrases as 
Kata TOmov, OY KaTa X@pay, OY Kat’ Gotu (kata OAL is not counted, 
because Lina does not quote all the numerous occurrences of this 
phrase) (p. 43): Gorg. 1 Rep. 1 Tim. 4 Critias 4 Legg. 6. 

427. xara pecoy (p. 43): Phaedo 1 (113 a) Rep. 1 Soph. 1 
Tim. 1 Critias 4 Legg. 2. 

428. xara Oadarrav (p. 44): Rep. 1 Polit. 1 Legg. 9. 


PLATO'S STYLE: LINA 133 


429. car’ dyopdy or kar’ ayopas (p. 44): Rep. 2 Theaet. 1 Parm. 1 
Polit. 1 Legg. 7. 

430. xara kaipor (p. 47): Polit. 1 Legg. 2. 

431. xar’ ékeivoy Tov xpévov (p. 47): Polit. 2 Tim. 3 Legg. 5. But he has 

432. ka? tmvoy (p. 47): Tim. 3 Legg. 1. made no 

433. xara Bpayv = paulum, non multum (p. 57): Soph. 2 Tim. 1 
Legg. 2 (In Prot. and Gorg. the same words mean according to 
Lina breviter). 


chrono- 
logical use 


434, xara (ro) 6pOdv (p. 57): Soph. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. 1. oF OG 
485. xara peépos (p. 59): Soph. 1 Legg. 2. OnFEra 
436. xara pépn (p. 59): Rep. 1 Theaet. 1 Parm. 4 Tim. 8 tions, as 
Legg. 2. generally 
437. xara pnva (p. 60): Rep. 1 Legg. 3. all his pre- 
438. xara rvxnv (p. 63): Rep. 1 Phaedr. 1 Soph. 1 Legg. 2. decessors 


439. Spoov xara twa (p. 67): Phaedo 1 Polit. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. 1. except 

440. rd (or rd) Kard re (rd cHpa, Tas éemotnpas, &c.), meaning Campbell 
‘ampliorem quam simplex substantivwm notionem’ (p. 71): ignored 
Euthyd. 1 Gorg. 1 Phaedo 1 Rep. 1 Phaedr. 1 Soph. 1 Critias 1 


the me- 
Legg. 8. thodical 
441. xara c. accus. without any grammatical relation to any aes 


part of the phrase, and meaning ‘ quod attinet ad,’ is found only 
(p. 72): Meno 1 (72 A: xara viv eiedva) Rep. 1 (614 D: kara ro % 2P 
érépw) Theaet. 1 (153 D: xara ra dppara) Phil. 1 (17 c: xara parently 
réxynv) Critias 1 (109 c: kar’ dANous rorovs) Legg. 1 (812 A: kara accidental 
Tiv UmTdbecty). pecu- 

442. xara c. ace. meaning ‘quantum attinet ad’ (p. 72): liarities. 
Symp. 1 (185 B: xaé’ abrdv) Legg. 2 (715 D, 928 B). 

443. xara with the accus. meaning ‘according to somebody,’ 
or after somebody’s fashion (p. 56): Apol. 1 Meno 1 Euthyd. 1 
Gorg. 2 Symp. 2 Phaedr. 3 Theaet. 1 Parm. 1 Legg. 2. 

444. xara mapdderypa or Kata cuvOeay after a verbwm dicendr 
or agendi (p. 52): Meno 2 Soph. 1 Polit. 2 Tim. 2 Legg. 1. 

445. xara forming a hiatus with a following a, e, 7 or o (pp. 22- 

23): Meno 2 Gorg. 1 Symp. 1 Rep. 5 Phaedr. 2 Parm. 3 Polit. 1 
Critias 1 Legg. 5. 

446. xara Oedv (p. 63 divina quadam sorte): Huthyd. 1 
Rep. 1 Soph. 1 Legg. 8. 

447. xara c. ace. in the distributive meaning after a verbwm 
dividendi (except kar’ etdn diaipeioOac which is too frequent for 
enumeration, p. 58): Meno 1 Rep. 1 Phaedr. 1 Soph. 3 Polit. 3 
Tim. 3 Legg. 3. 


XXXII.-XXXTI. Baron. Van Creer. After so Van 
many investigations on the Platonic vocabulary in three OlseEs 
years (1886-1889), the subject remained untouched during imvestiga- 
the following seven years, though some authors wrote on caesar 


the use of 
attraction 
in Plato 
are very 
valuable, 
but as he 
did not 
distin- 
guish the 
single dia- 
logues he 
prevented 
our apply- 
ing his 
work to 
chro- 
nology. 


The same 
applies 


134 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


other aspects of Plato’s style, ignoring the relation 
between style and chronology. Compared with the 
laborious German dissertations, the French thése of 
C. Baron!” on the form of Plato’s writings appears 
almost a rhetorical exercise. A student of the Univer- 
sity of Bonn, Van Cleef,'!° of Ohio, spent much time in 
minute research on the use of attraction in Plato, but 
he deprived us of some additional characteristics of 
Plato’s later style by mixing in his statistical tables 
dialogues of different dates without any distinction of 
single works. He followed Christ in uniting Rep. Parm. 
Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Critias Legg. into one class of 
so-called constructive dialogues; and he observed that 
the use of attraction, while occurring in the sum of Plato’s 
works about thirty-eight times in every one hundred 
pages, 1s reduced in this group to only fourteen cases in 
one hundred pages of text. This result tends to show 
that attraction generally was not a peculiarity of later 
style, but we are left uncertain whether this refers 
equally to all the eight dialogues of the group, or only to 
some of them. The group which Van Cleef calls con- 
structive dialogues contains, besides the recognised six 
latest dialogues, only Republic and Parmenides, so that 
we may admit as probable that the use of attraction 
decreased in Plato’s later style; and as all the passages 
are enumerated by Van Cleef, whoever cared to under- 
take the task of a new classification and methodic dis- 
position of the materials collected by him might draw 
very interesting chronological conclusions, or at least 
afford fresh confirmation to the chronological conclusions 
arrived at otherwise. 

XXXTV.-XXXV. GRUNWALD. BERTRAM. From 
the instructive collection of proverbs found in Plato by 


8 C. Baron, De Platonis dicendi genere, Paris 1891 (xxxviii). 
10 F. L. van Cleef, Ohianus, De attractionis in enuntiationibus relativis 
usu platonico (Doctor’s diss. Bonn University), Bonn 1890 (xxxix). 


PLATO'S STYLE: CAMPBELL a5 


E. Griinwald '! it is again impossible to draw any chrono 
logical inferences, because proverbs are seldom repeated, 
and cannot be regarded as peculiar to any given period 
of Plato’s style. Also Bertram’s interesting contribution 
on the use of metaphor in Plato '” contains nothing that 
could be included in our list. 

XXXVI. CampBeLL. All the foregomg writers on 
Plato’s language, from Roeper to Van Cleef, ignored 
Campbell’s Introduction to the Sophist and Politicus, 
though after the publication of Ritter’s book Campbell 
again on several occasions recalled his first investigations. 
But he published these later articles in journals of 
limited circulation on the Continent, as the Transactions 
of the Oxford Philological Society, or the Bibliotheca 
Platonica.** Consequently the coincidence of results 
between Campbell and the German style statisticians 
was known to none but the Scotch philologer himself, 
while the few generally known German dissertations 
naturally failed to secure a general recognition of the 
results obtained by them alone. There is reason to 
think that Campbell’s more recent investigations on 
Plato’s use of language, filling 175 pages in the second 
volume of the monumental edition of the Republic by 
Jowett and Campbell (3 vols., Oxford 1894), will likewise 
escape the attention of German and French students of 
Platonic style, unaccustomed to look for such original 

M41 Dr. Eugen Griinwald, Sprichwirter wnd sprichwirtliche Redensarten 
bei Plato, Berlin 1893. (Programme des Cours du Collége Royal Francais 
de Berlin) (xl). ; 

‘#2 Heinrich Bertram, ‘ Die Bildersprache Platons,’ Beilage zwm Jahres- 
bericht der kiniglichen Landesschule Pforta, Naumburg a. 8.-1895 (xli). 

43 Transactions of the Oxford Philological Society, 1888-1889, pp. 25— 
42, June 14, ‘On the position of the Sophistes, Politicus, and Philebus in 
the order of the Platonic Dialogues, and on some characteristics of Plato’s 
latest writings,’ by Professor Lewis Campbell of St. Andrews (xlii); and on 
the same subject in Bibliotheca Platonica, an exposition of the Platonic 
Philosophy edited by Thos. M. Johnson, Osceola, Mo. U.S.A. vol. i. July, 
August 1889, N. 1, pp. 1-28: Prof. L. Campbell : ‘On some recent attempt 


towards ascertaining the chronological order of the composition of Plato’s 
dialogues’ (xliii). 


also to 
publica- 
tions by 
Griinwald 
and 
Bertram. 


Camp- 
bell’s 
recent 
publica- 
tions de- 
serve the 
attention 
of Platonic 
scholars 
not less 
than his 
first con- 
tributions 
to Platonic 
literature 
thirty-five 
years ago. 


Von 
Arnim, 
without 
knowing 
Campbell 
or even 
Ritter, 
came to 
the same 
results, 
though his 
method of 
joining 


136 . ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


labours in the Appendices to an edition of a single 
dialogue. It would, however, exceed the limits of the 
present survey to epitomise this last work of Campbell, 
which should stand on the shelves of every philological 
library. Enough to state that this new publication of _ 
Campbell is of no less importance for our knowledge of 
Plato’s style than his Introduction to the Sophist and 
Politicus written thirty years ago, and forms a splendid 
continuation of the work he began in 1861 by his edition 
of the Theaetetus. A full syntax of Plato’s language, 
illustrated by quotations not only from the Republic but 
from other dialogues, it confirms in many details the 
close relation of the Phaedrus and Theaetetus to the 
Republic on one side, and of the Sophist, Politicus, 
Philebus to Timaeus, Critias, Laws on the other side. 

XXXVII. Von Arnnim. The want of centralisation 
in Platonic studies is illustrated by the curious fact that 
quite recently an author who undertook researches on 
one aspect of Plato’s vocabulary, J. von Arnim '“* (1896), 
Professor at the University of Rostock, not only knew 
nothing of Campbell’s publications, but even ignored 
Ritter’s book, having read nothing on the style of Plato 
but the articles of Dittenberger and Schanz. 

On the other hand, it is very instructive to note that 
von Arnim, after careful comparison of twenty-six cha- 


M4 Joannis ab Arnim, De Platonis dialogis, Quaestiones chronologicae, 
ad scholas quae in hac universitate Rostochiensi per semestre hibernwm 
inde a d. XVI M. Octobris A. MDCCCXCVI habebuntur invitant Rector 
et conciliwm. Rostock 1896 (xliv). The numbers given by Arnim are in 
some cases different from the numbers given by C. Ritter. In such cases 
the larger number has been included in our list, because an omission is more 
likely to happen than that one passage should be counted as two, if the work 
is done carefully. But von Arnim sometimes changes his classification, so 
that he quotes different numbers for the same dialogue, as, for instance, twelve 
opdrara Aéyes in the Laws in § 13, and thirteen in § 14; two aanOéorara 
Aé€yers in the Politicus in § 10, and five in $14; one dp@as Aéyeis in the 
Politicus in § 14, and none in § 11, &e. Also his numbers for the pecu- 
liarities which have been collected by C. Ritter and Tiemann show some 
considerable differences, as, for instance, he did not find 6p@és in the 
Philebus, while C. Ritter and Tiemann found it eleven times. 


PLATO'S STYLE: VON ARNIM Lat 


racteristic marks of Plato’s style, came independently to 
the same conclusions as Campbell in 1867, and as Ritter 
in 1888. He recognised that Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. 
Critias Legg. are the latest of Plato’s works, and that 
the group preceding them contains the Republic, Phae- 
drus, Theaetetus, and Parmenides. Many of Arnim’s 
observations are new, and furnish us with several 
additional peculiarities of Plato’s later style: 


448. vai, rdvu ye, rdvv pev ody form less than one-third of all 
affirmative answers (p. 6) : Rep. 195 Phaedr. 11 Theaet. 58 Parm. 97 
Soph. 71 Polit. 54 Phil. 52 Legg. 76, being in Rep. Phaedr. 
Phil. Legg. even less than one-fourth of all affirmative answers, 
while they form in all earlier dialogues over one-third, and in 
Meno Euthyd. Gorg. Crat. even over one-half of all answers. 

449. xadés and Kaas taira ye, as affirmative answers (p. 9): 
Rep. 1 Soph. 2 Polit. 6 Legg. 6. 

450. kd\Nora and kdA\ora ye as affirmative answers (p. 9): 
Phil. 1 Legg. 1. 

451. Rhetorical interrogations meaning affirmative answers (as: 
ri pny; GANA Ti pV; Ti yap K@VEL; GANA Ti peArE ; TL yap ov peAXet 5 
ti 81 yap ov ; ri yap ov ; ri 0’ ov pedXer ; TiS’ ov; mas yap av Gas ; 
TOs yap ov pé\er; TOs yap ov; mas SB ov pédAeL; Kal THs OV; TAS 
Sov ;) were increasing in Plato’s later works. They form over 
20 % of all interrogations in (p. 14): Phaedr. 24/62 Soph. 
49/240 Polit. 46/210 Phil. 59/257 Legg. 105/409, over one- 
tenth in Euthyph. 6/44 Crito 2/14 Rep. 125/925 Theaet. 23/198 
Parm. 38/298, over 5 % in Lach. 4/49 Gorg. 16/239 Phaedo 
12/181 and less in Charm. 3/67 Meno 3/130 Euthyd. 1/68 Crat. 
6/176. 

452. Interrogations by ri prevail over those by és only in 
(p. 15): Phaedr. 12/2 Theaet. 15/8 Phil. 34/25 Legg. 58/55, while 
they are in all other dialogues much scarcer (being in Rep. 49/71 
Parm. 9/29 Soph. 15/34 Polit. 22/24). 

458. Interrogations asking for a better explanation of something 
said before (p. 16) are missed in many dialogues. They are found 
in: Lach. 4 Gorg. 1 Crat. 7 Rep. 62 Phaedr. 6 Theaet. 15 Parm. 3 
Soph. 37 Polit. 41 Phil. 43 Legg. 63. 

454. xadés, kd\\ora, dpiora, 6pGHs, épOdrara, Sixardrara, Kai pan’ 
exotws in affirmative answers with other verbs than Aéyes, 
namely, with eires, eipyxas, av héyots, cim@y, eipnrat, form a class 
missed in earlier dialogues, but found in (p. 11): Rep. 3 Phaedr. 2 
Soph. 3 Polit. 7 Phil. 8 Legg. 17. 

455. xalas, opGas, 
dAnééarata, dvayxatorara, used as affirmative 


épOstata, cadpeorata, 
answers without verb, 


ka\\uoTa, apiota, 


many ex- 
pressions 
in one 
class and 
counting 
them to- 
gether is 
somewhat 
arbitrary. 
He found 
that rheto- 
rical inter- 
rogations 
and also 
interro- 
gations 
asking for 
a better 
explana- 
tion of 
something 
said before 
are pecu- 
liar to 
later style. 


Camp- 
bell’s 
recent 
paper on 
the Par- 
menides 
shows 
that this 
dialogue 
has many 
words 
recurring 
only in 
the latest 
group and 
charac- 
teristic of 
Plato’s 
later 
studies or 
of his in- 
clination 
to intro- 
duce 
poetical 


138 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


are limited to (p. 11): Rep. 59 Phaedr. 2 Theact. 7 Parm. 18 
Soph. 23 Polit. 38 Phil. 19 Tim. 1 Legg. 36. 

456. eixds used in affirmative answers (p. 12): Lach. 1 Prot.1 
Meno 1 Gorg. 1 Crat. 8 Phaedo 5 Rep. 20 Theaet. 3 Parm. 2 
Polit. 5 Phil. 3 Legg. 12 (in earlier dialogues ¢o.wxev prevails). 

457. Instead of the ordinary formula guovye doxet appear later 
a class of other similar expressions (Soxei prot, Soxet ydp pot, pot Soxet, 
Kat €ol Ookel, enol pev Soxet, Kal Emol oVT@ Soxet, 0S’ ewoi GAos Soxet, 
enol your Soxet), Which are found in (p. 12): Lach. 1 Meno 8 Crat. 7 


Symp. 1 Phaedo 1 Rep. 18 Theaet. 2 Phil. 2 Lege. 1. (See above 
No. 337.) 


XXXVIII. CAMPBELL’S LAST OBSERVATIONS. As 
Campbell was the first to apply the study of Plato’s 
vocabulary to Platonic chronology, so it happens that he 
also added thirty years later the final supplement to 
these investigations.” The position of the Parmenides had 
been one of the most difficult problems, and had been 
recognised as such by C. Ritter, who was even led to doubt 
the authenticity of this dialogue. Campbell recently 
undertook to prove that, however exceptional the stylistic 
character of this dialogue may be, it contains a consider- 
able number of words peculiar to the latest group, or at 
least not used before the Republic, namely : 


458. dreppia meaning infinitas: Parm. 1 Phil. 1 Legg. 1 
(numbers according to Ast). - 

459. diapedker@: Parm. 1 Critias 1 Legg. 1. 

460. icov as adverb: Parm. 2 Tim. 2 Critias 1. 

461. ioriov: Parm. 1 Legg. 1. 

462. civdvo: Parm. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. 1 (in Symp. civ re dv" 
quoted from Homer). 

463. pepiords: Parm. 2 Tim. 1. 

464. povws: Parm. 1 Tim. 1. 

465. maypeyeOns: Parm. 2 Legg. 1. 

466. mavrodarés: Parm. 1 Legg. 1. 

467. yuzvacia: Theaet. 1 Parm. 1 Legg. 2. 





145 T,, Campbell, ‘ On the place of the Parmenides in the order of the 
Platonic Dialogues,’ in the Classical Review for April 1896, vol. x. pp. 129 
136. This closes the list of forty-five publications on the style of Plato 
here reviewed, out of which only twenty contained materials suitable for 
our chronological purposes, and included in our list of peculiarities. 


PLATO'S STYLE: CAMPBELL 139 


468. duoimza: Phaedr. 2 Parm. 2 Soph. 1 Legg. 1. 

469. axivnros: Rep. 2 Theaet. 2 Parm. 2 Soph. 4 Tim. 6 
Lege. 8. 

470. avdravia: Rep. 1 Parm. 1 Phil. 1 Legg. 3. 

471. dvouosrns : Rep. 2 Phaedr. 2 Theaet. 1 Parm. 8 Polit. 3 
Tim. 2 Legg. 1. 

472. avoyo®: Rep. 1 Theaet. 3 Parm. 3 Tim. 1. 

473. dmeipos =infimtus: Rep. 5 Phaedr. 1 Theaet. 3 Parm. 9 
Soph. 2 Polit. 2 Phil. 73 Legg. 8. 

474. dmépavros: Rep. 1 Theaet. 2 Parm. 1 Soph. 8 Polit. 1 Phil. 1 


words 
into the 
language 
of prose. 
This valu- 
able addi- 
tion to our 
list makes 
the num- 


Tim. 1 Critias 1 Legg. 1. ber suf- 
475. améxyw =disto: Rep. 1 Parm. 2 Tim. 1 Critias 2 Legg. 2. ficient for 
476. dmi@avos: Phaedr. 1 Parm. 1 Legg. 1. a more 
477. azpenns : Rep. 1 Parm. 2 Legg. 1. methodic 
478. BeBnxa=imsisto: Rep. 1 Parm. 1 Tim. 2 Critias 1. interpre- 


479. ypaupa=liber: Rep. 1 Phaedr. 3 Parm. 7 Polit. 2 Phil. 1 


tation of 


Tim. 5 Critias 4 Legg. 10. pili 
480. deomorcia: Rep. 1 Parm. 3 Legg. 1. b 
481. diaxovw: Rep. 1 Parm. 2 Soph. 1 Polit. 1 Tim. 1. aur" 
482. diapopdrns: Rep. 1 Theaet. 4 Parm. 1 Phil. 2. as 
483. cEurvduac: Rep. 1 Parm. 1 Legg. 1. has been 
484. craveyu = revertor, repeto: Rep. 8 Theaet. 2 Parm, 1 attempted 
Polit. 3 Tim. 1 Legg. 4. heretofore. 


ovk evko\os = difficult: Rep. 1 Parm. 1 Legg. 2 (while 
I 329 pb, 330 A, evxoXos is used in another meaning). 
evmetns : Rep. 8 Phaedr. 1 Parm. 1 Soph. 2 Legg. 2. 
ixvevo: Rep. 1 Phaedr. 1 Parm. 1 Polit. 1 Legg. 2. 


485. 
in Rep. 
486. 
487. 


488. pedicraywar: Rep. 4 Parm. 1 Legg. 1. 
489. undanov: Rep. 1 Parm. 2 Soph. 1 Phil. 1 Legg. 3. 


490. uuros: Rep. 2 Parm. 1 Phil. 5 Tim. 1 Legg. 1. 


491. 
492. 
493. 


manos: Rep. 8 Theaet. 2 Parm. 1 Legg. 3. 
eoxtaypapnpevos: Rep. 3 Parm. 1 Legg. 1. 
otepona, Med.: Rep. 4 Phaedr. 2 Theaet. 1 Parm. 2 Soph. 1 


Phil. 1 Legg. 4. 


The following words occur also exceptionally in some 
earlier dialogue : 


494. 
495. 
496. 
497. 


aucos: Phaedo 1 Rep. 2 Parm. 5 Phil. 1 Tim. 5 Legg. 5. 
avuoorns: Phaedo 1 Parm. 3 Tim. 2. 

deamo¢m: Phaedo 8 Rep. 2 Parm. 1 Polit. 1 Legg. 5. 
mavteh@s: Phaedo 2 Rep. 9 Parm. 2 Soph. 1 Polit. 1 Phil. 1 


Tim. 1 Legg. 2. 


498. 


499. 
500. 


ovyxpiveaOa: Phaedo 2 Parm. 2 Tim. 4 Legg. 2. 
doosmep: Gorg. 2 Rep. 2 Parm. 3 Soph. 1 Tim. 1 Legg. 1. 
ovppetpos: Meno 1 Theaet. 3 Parm. 2 Phil. 4 Tim. 5 


Critias 1 Legg. 7. 


Linita- 
tion of our 
choice of 
peculiari- 
ties of 
later style 
to those 
for which 
complete 
enumera- 
tion of 
occur- 
rences 
might be 
found in 
the 
authors to 
whom we 
owe our 
facts. 


140 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


Some other words quoted by Campbell, as sérpop, 
OMoLO, Opun, Tépas, Tepiéyo, might be included in our ~ 
list, as they occur besides the Parmenides only in later 
dialogues and occasionally in Meno and Cratylus. But 
for the purpose of drawing our conclusions from these 
long enumerations, a round number of five hundred 
stylistic peculiarities (including more than fifty-eight 
thousand observations) is more convenient, and suffices 
to show by what method correct chronological conclu- 
sions can be obtained from such observations. 


On the interpretation of stylistic observations. 


In selecting the above five hundred peculiarities of 
Plato’s style from the much greater number found in the 
writings of so many authors, the choice has been limited 
to characteristics occurring in one or more of the six 
dialogues held independently by Campbell, Dittenberger, 
Schanz, C. Ritter, and von Arnim to be the latest. 
Another limitation was imposed by the circumstance that 
the great majority of authors, ignoring the chronological 
bearing of their researches, often failed to state ex- 
pressly whether a collection of passages containing a 
certain word or expression was intended to be exhaustive, 
and such enumerations could not be included in our list, 
though they might have been very suitable for our pur- 
pose, and were perhaps looked upon as complete by the 
investigators. A further deficiency of our lst results 
from the circumstance that nobody has made such a 
special study of the vocabulary of other dialogues as 
Campbell has of the Sophist and Politicus. This gives 
in the above enumeration a prominence to these two 
dialogues slightly exceeding the real proportional measure. 

Otherwise we may offer the above list as a fair and 
impartial sample of observations made on Plato’s style, 
prepared without any preconceived aim other than the 
knowledge of facts necessary for a methodical inquiry 


INTERPRETATION OF STYLISTIC OBSERVATIONS 141] 


into the question as to how far stylistic observations afford 
means of settling chronological difficulties. 

The method of interpreting stylistic observations 
has been heretofore very defective in almost all the 
authors reviewed. Generally little care or thought has 
been given to the logical co-ordination of results obtained 
through tiresome philological labour. It seems that the 
elementary conditions of a calculation of probabilities 
by their numerical evaluation were utterly ignored by 
all except Lewis Campbell. This discredited the stylis- 
tic method in the eyes of impartial thinkers like Zeller. 
In order to obtain correct conclusions, future inquirers 
should avoid the following errors common to the majority 
of the authors above mentioned : 

1. While a general notion of the necessity of mea- 
suring the length of each dialogue before comparing 
stylistic peculiarities was universally accepted, nobody 
tried to compare methodically the different possible 
measures ; and the pages of Stephanus or of Teubner 
were considered nearly uniform, while they differ widely, 
according to the number of notes in Stephanus and the 
more or less dramatic character of the text in Teubner’s 
edition: so much so that in the latter one page may 
contain twice as many words as another (see, for in- 
stance, p. 7 or 48, ed. Teubner, in Parmenides correspond- 
ing to thirty-four lines in Didot, and p. 425 in Politicus, 
occupying only twenty-one lines in Didot’s edition). That 
this may greatly influence our conclusions, we have seen 
specially in the case of Lina’s statistics of prepositions. 
Here for the first time a more precise measure has 
been found by comparing all the editions of Plato from 
Stephanus up to the present time. The pages of the 
editio princeps (Aldina 1503), though uniformly printed, 
are too large for a measure. Among modern editions 
the most equal pages convenient for comparison are 
those of the edition of Didot. These are used in the 
following calculations ; though the best measure would 


We need 
a better 
method 
for the 
interpre- 
tation of 
facts than 
our pre- 
decessors, 
who did 
not apply 
much 
logic to 
philo- 
logical 
labour. 


No 
uniform 
measure 
of text has 
been used, 
the pages 
of the 
editions 
generally 
quoted 
being 
unequal. 
Of all 
existing 
editions 
that of 
Didot 
has been 
found to 
afford 
the most 
uniform 
measure 
of text. 


The num- 
ber of 
peculiari- 
ties com- 
pared by 
most 
authors 
was 
insuffi- 
cient for 
valid con- 
clusions. 
Isolated 
observa- 
tions were 
given an 
exagger- 
ated im- 
portance 
regardless 
of the 
nature of 
statistical 
evidence 
which 
always 
requires 
great 
numbers. 
Even the 
greatest 
number of 
observa- 
tions used 
heretofore 
by Camp- 
bell would 
have been 
insuffi- 
cient if 


142 ORIGIN: AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


be a hundred or a thousand words. This has not yet 
been applied to the text of Plato. 

2. Nobody except Campbell had a correct idea as to 
the number of peculiarities required for correct conclu- 
sions. Campbell had compared hundreds of peculiarities 
and he was cautious enough to look upon his conclusions 
as only probable, not certain. Dittenberger and Schanz 
believed that a few important observations were sufficient 
for a stylistic classification of dialogues, wherein they 
came near to Teichmiiller and Schoene, who decided the 
question of style on a single stylistic peculiarity. C. 
Ritter was so confident after an observation of forty pecu- 
liarities of later style that he declined further discussion 
with those who did not recognise the correctness of 
his view. Even such a methodical author as Droste 
was led to a wrong conclusion about the Phaedo by a 
very small number of observations. Kugler doubted 
the authenticity of the Parmenides because he found a 
dozen more occurrences of pévro. than he expected in 
this dialogue. Von Arnim placed the Lysis after Sym- 
postum and Phaedo because he found ré uv once used in 
this small dialogue. All such conclusions are based on 
an erroneous conception of the use of statistics. Style 
statistics, like all statistics, require great numbers. Even 
nearly seven hundred peculiarities observed by Campbell 
were insufficient to determine the place of Theaetetus, 
Phaedrus, and Philebus. If Campbell avoided in an 
admirable way the smallest error in his conclusions, 
he owes it not alone to the number of his observations, 
but to his intuitive estimate of their importance. He 
dealt chiefly with very accidental peculiarities, words 
occurring only in two or three dialogues; and this 
explains why his great numbers were only sufficient 
for a determination of the latest group. In our own 
list we have many peculiarities of great importance, 
and thus, though the total number of peculiarities is 
smaller than in Campbell’s calculations, our conclusions 


INTERPRETATION OF STYLISTIC OBSERVATIONS 143 


not only confirm his results, but extend over some earlier 
dialogues, as to the order of which nothing could be 
inferred by previous authors from stylistic observations. 
We must lay it down as a rule for future inquirers 
that no inferences from less than some hundred pecu- 
liarities are valid, and that the correctness of the inferences 
from smaller numbers of observations made by Ditten- 
berger, Schanz, C. Ritter, von Arnim, is due to the cir- 
cumstance that they selected exceptionally important 
peculiarities. 

3, Nobody has hitherto observed that only exactly 
equal amounts of text should be compared in order to 
give precise conclusions. Dialogues of different size 
were compared, instead of taking as a standard measure 
a certain amount of text of each dialogue. For this 
purpose it is necessary to quote the passages in which 
every observed peculiarity occurs. As this has been 
done neither by Campbell, nor by Dittenberger, nor 
Schanz, nor C. Ritter, nor Tiemann, nor Siebeck, on 
whose observations a great part of our list is based, we 
are unable to introduce the required completeness into 
our calculations, but we shall make due allowance for the 


size of the compared dialogues, admitting as a rule that 


the stylistic comparisons are inconclusive unless the pre- 
sumed later work is equal or smaller in size. A greater 
number of later peculiarities in a longer work can lead 
to valid conclusions only under exceptional circumstances. 

4. The different importance of stylistic peculiarities 
has not been accounted for, except by Campbell in one 
way, and by C. Ritter to a certain extent, when he dis- 
tinguished the repeated peculiarities contained in Republic, 
Phaedrus, and Theaetetus, as well as in the latest group. 
This distinction is quite insufficient; and at least four 
degrees of importance must be accepted in order to give 
us the full advantage of the existing observations. 

5. Nobody except Campbell made a proper use of 
accidental peculiarities, which are far the most numerous 


not sup- 
plemented 
by a keen 
apprecia- 
tion of 
their rela- 
tive im- 
portance. 


Samples 
of text 
differing 
in extent 
were com- 
pared 
while only 
equal por- 
tions of 
text are 
compar- 
able. A 
greater 
number of 
peculiari- 
ties of 
style may 
be ex- 
pected 

in a larger 
work. 


A classifi- 
cation of 
peculiari- 
ties ac- 
cording 
to their 
degree of 
import- 
ance is 
necessary. 


Accidental 
peculiari- 
ties were 


generally 
disre- 
garded, 
though 
they 
afford 
very valu- 
able mate- 
rial for 
statistical 
calcula- 
tions. 


Each pe- 
culiarity 
should be 
observed 
apart, not 
united 
withmany 
others 
into one 
artificial 
class, ex- 
cept when 
the class 
as such is 
charac- 
teristic. 
This has 
been 
found only 
in a few 
cases, 
while 
some pe- 
culiarities 
counted 
together 
differ 
widely 


144. ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


class of observations. Very important peculiarities are 
very few, while accidental coincidences may be found by 
the thousand. And their accidental character, even if 
fully recognised as accidental, does not deprive them of 
chronological importance, if sufficient numbers of such 
accidental coincidences are taken into consideration. The 
single occurrence is accidental, though it may be ex- 
ceedingly significant, as, for instance, the occurrence of 
uéOeEis in Parmenides and Sophist. But if one dialogue 
has twice as many accidental coincidences with the Laws 
as another, this result is no more accidental than the 
difference of mortality between England and Spain. 

6. The tendency to limit observation to peculiarities 
appearing to be important had the result that artificial 
classes of similar peculiarities were counted together. 
Sometimes such divisions are justified, as, for instance, Sie- 
beck’s classification of answers into apodictic, problematic, 
and assertive, or von Arnim’s rhetorical interrogations and 
interrogations asking for a better explanation. Also the 
classes of newly invented adjectives, or of adjectives desig- 
nating a species, are perfectly natural and characteristic. 
But in all such cases the single peculiarities forming a 
class should also be counted apart, whereby a much more 
exact numerical evaluation of affinity between different 
works might be secured. This has not been done by 
C. Ritter, nor by von Arnim, or at least they only give 
the total number of occurrences of different expressions 
not forming a natural class, as, for instance, vai, rdvu ye, 
mavu psy ovv, Which have nothing else in common than 
that they are the most frequent answers. This should 
be avoided in future investigations. Many very valuable 
observations were cast away as useless, because they did 
not show at once an evident difference between one group 
of dialogues and another. C. Ritter confesses to having 
traced through all the works of Plato many expres- 
sions, which he did not include in his tables, merely 
because they appeared not to be peculiar to well-marked 


METHOD OF STYLOMETRY 145 


groups. All these observations have their value if they 
are treated by the right method. 


Method of measuring stylistic affinities. 


The above critical observations on the work of our 
predecessors are made in the hope that future inquirers 
will turn them to account. Our aim is not to add new 
facts, nor even to give an exhaustive survey of facts found 
by others. From Riddell’s digest of idioms, from van 
Cleef’s long enumerations, specially from Ast’s Lexicon, 
and from nearly all the publications above quoted, it 
would be easy to collect some thousands of style-charac- 
teristics, instead of the half thousand included in our 
list. But the mere enumeration leads to no valid con- 
clusions, unless we attempt an exact numerical defini- 
tion of the affinities existing between several dialogues. 
For a first attempt to find a numerical equivalent of 
stylistic affinity between various works not by mere 
counting but also by weighing of the evidence, we 
needed a greater number of facts than has been known 
heretofore to any single author; but we found that five 
hundred peculiarities, selected at random from the special 
investigations, were sufficient for our purpose. We feel 
also justified in limiting the comparison to twenty-two 
dialogues of unquestionable authenticity, which at the 
same time happen to be the only works containing some 
hints as to the logical theories of Plato, while the remain- 
ing spurious or doubtful dialogues are of no logical 
importance. Still, so far as these other dialogues have 
been taken into account by some of the authors to whom 
we owe our facts, it appears that they contain a surpris- 
ingly small number of Platonic idioms. It is extremely 
exceptional to find a rare use of language illustrated by 
examples from other dialogues than those of admitted 
authenticity, even on the part of inquirers who had 

L 


from each 
other. 


A much 
greater 
number 
of pecu- 
liarities 
could 
easily be 
gathered 
from the 
authors 
reviewed, 
and a 
perusal 
of Ast’s 
Lexicon 
would 
raise the 
number 
to some 
thou- 
sands. 
But the 
aim of the 
present 
investiga- 
tion is 
only to 
improve 
the 
method of 
interpre- 
tation of 
facts, not 
to give an 
exhaus- 
tive 


survey 

of the 
facts 
observed. 


The most 
numerous 
class is 
formed by 
accidental 
pecu- 
liarities, 
occurring 
only once 
in a dia- 
logue. 
Such 
pecu- 
liarities 
acquire a 
chronolo- 
gical im- 
portance 
only when 
found in 
great 
numbers, 
though 
even a 
single oc- 
currence 
is some- 
times 
more or 
less signi- 
ficant ac- 
cording to 
the mean- 
ing of the 
word, and 
to the as- 


146 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


searched all the texts bearing Plato’s name, including 
those which are generally recognised to be spurious. 

In order to draw our conclusions, we begin by recog- 
nising four degrees of importance, distinguishing stylistic 
peculiarities : . 

I. The most numerous class are accidental peculiarities, 
such as words or idioms occurring only once in a dia- 
logue. Asa word cannot occur less than once, it is not 
less rare or less accidental when occurring once in a small 
dialogue than in a large one. In all such cases the ob- 
served coincidence is liable to be removed by some emenda- 
tion, or might be due to an alteration of text, this being 
less improbable with small words than with longer ones. 
Therefore great numbers of such accidental peculiarities 
are needed to afford a measure of comparison. Within this 
class it would be easy to distinguish several degrees of 
importance. Really accidental is the recurrence of a word 
which was generally used by other authors, but which 
denotes some object about which Plato had no opportunity 
of writing except in two or three of his works. If, for 
instance, Plato uses diddy only in Symposiwm, Critias, 
and Laws, this has no deeper reason than the accidental 
opportunity for the use of a word denoting a thing not 
usually spoken of by Plato. Such words have been 
generally excluded from our list, though they are not 
quite without value if they occur in very great numbers, 
as in every epoch the familiar circle of objects selected 
for examples is characteristic of the author’s turn of 
thought. It is, for instance, not quite accidental that 
yadKos is used six times in works later than the Republic, 
and only once in a work earlier than the Republic. Some- 
times a word used only once in a dialogue may be very 
significant, as, for instance, wetdoyeows in the Phaedo 
(101). Thisis highly characteristic of a time when Plato 
was fond of inventing new logical terms, many of which 
were soon abandoned, like efcacia, Svavora, miotis in the 
special logical meaning which was given to these terms 


METHOD OF STYLOMETRY 147 


in the Republic. This period could not be that imme- 
diately following the death of Socrates, and it would be 
impossible to find a similar accidental occurrence in the 
Apology, while such new-formed words abound in the 
Phaedrus rauch more than inthe Phaedo. A word occur- 
ring only once ina dialogue is still more characteristic if it 
is of constant use in some other work recognised as late. 
But in order to avoid complicating our evaluations, and to 
eliminate from them as much as possible every subjective 
element, we count as accidental all peculiarities occurring 
only once in one dialogue, including in this class also those 
peculiarities whose number of occurrences 1s unknown, as 
for instance all rare words observed by Campbell in the 
Sophist and Politicus. 

II. The next degree of importance belongs to pecu- 
larities repeated, or occurring twice in a small dialogue 
(Kuthyph. Apol. Crito Charm. Lach. Critias), twice or 
thrice in an ordinary dialogue (Prot. Meno Euthyd. Crat. 
Symp. Phaedo Phaedr. Parm. Soph. Polit. Phil.), and two 
to four times in a large dialogue, such as the Gorgias, the 
Theaetetus, and the Timaeus. As to the Republic and 
the Laws, in dealing with these exceptionally large works 
we include in the class of repeated peculiarities every 
word or idiom which occurs twice or more, but less than 
once in twelve pages, as then it will be termed frequent. 
Thus the difference of extent is taken into account, 
although imperfectly, because the best method would be 
to take as a sample of style exactly the same amount of 
text from each dialogue. So long as we deal with each 
dialogue as a whole—and we are obliged to do so in 
consequence of the absence of detailed indications of 
passages in most of our sources—we are bound to the 
inconsequence of including in one class peculiarities of 
widely different degrees of frequency. A peculiarity 
occurring twice in the Huthyphro is found on average 
once in five pages, while one occurring twice in the Phaedo 
is found once in twenty-five pages. But all these repeated 

L 2 


sociations 
it evokes. 
But these 
distine- 
tions must 
be left for 
more 
special 
investiga- 
tions, as 
they would 
introduce 
a sub- 
jective 


element. 


Another 
class is 
formed by 
repeated 
occur- 
rences. 
This class 
includes 
different 
degrees of 
repetition 
according 
to the 
length 

of each 
dialogue. 
It will in- 
volve no 
exageera- 
tion to 
counteach 
repeated 
pecu- 
liarity as 
equivalent 
to two 


accidental 
peculiari- 
ties, 
There is 
also in- 
cluded a 
greater 
frequency 
of some 
very 
common 
expres- 
sions. 


Important 
peculiari- 
tiles are 
words 
occurring 
frequently 
and a 
number 
of special 
observa- 
tions on 
the pre- 
valence 

of one 


148 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


peculiarities may be assumed to be more important than 
the accidental peculiarities, and for the sake of simplicity 
we count each as equivalent to two accidental peculiarities. 
If two hundred peculiarities of the first class were admitted 
as denoting a certain degree of affinity between two 
dialogues in which they are found, then we shall estimate 
a common occurrence of a hundred peculiarities of the 
second class as equivalent evidence for an equal affinity. 
Here we include also the following special peculiarities : 


354. wavy pev ovv more than half as frequent as ravv ye, but not 
prevailing over it. 

367. amas, cvpras, cvvaras More than once in three pages, and 
less than once in two pages. 

390. Between 33 and 38 prepositions in every two pages. 

412. wép after the substantive, forming between 6 and 10 % of 
all occurrences of sept. 

448. vai, ravu ye, wavu pev ody being less than one-third but more 
than one-quarter of all affirmative answers. 

451. Rhetorical interrogations between 5 and 10 % of all 
interrogations. 


These peculiarities might easily be thought more 
important than other repeated peculiarities, so that we do 
not incur the danger of exaggerating observed affinities if 
we count each of them as equivalent to two accidental 
coincidences between an earlier dialogue and the latest 
eroup. 

III. There must be recognised a difference between a 
peculiarity occurring repeatedly and one that occurs much 
oftener. Peculiarities occurring more than twice in a 
small dialogue (Apol. Huthyph. Crito Charm. Lach. 
Critias), more than thrice in an ordinary dialogue (Prot. 
Meno Euthyd. Crat. Symp. Phaedo Phaedr. Parm. Soph. 
Polit. Phil.), more than four times in a large dialogue 
(Gorgias, Theaetetus, Tvmaeus), once in twelve pages or 
more in Republic or Laws, form a class of twmportant 
peculiarities. This class will include a word occurring 
90-117 times in the Laws, 5-26 times in Theaetetus or 
Timaeus, and generally any frequent repetition up to 


METHOD OF STYLOMETRY 149 


once in two pages (ed. Didot), when we shall call it very 
frequent. Besides such peculiarities we include here the 
following special observations whenever they refer to a 
dialogue : 


12. Being the first member of a tetralogy projected later—this 
refers only to Republic and Theaetetus. 

13. Partial prevalence of other teachers over Socrates. This 
refers only to Symposium and Parmenides. For in Sophist 
Politicus Timaeus Critias Laws Socrates is already completely 
supplanted by other teachers, and this constitutes a more important 
characteristic. 

16. Periods less regular. 

17. Natural order of words inverted, as generally observed by 
Campbell. 

18. Recurrence of rhythmical cadence, as generally observed by 
Campbell. 

19. Balancing of words to achieve harmony and symmetry. 

20. Adjustment of longer and shorter syllables, idem. 

23. Words common and peculiar to Timaeus, Critias, Laws 
more than once in two pages, but less than once in a page. 

200. Sozep less frequent than xaOarep. 

206. adda pry less frequent than kai py. 

306. roivuy more than four times oftener than pévro.. 

307. pévroe less than once in two pages, but over once in five 
pages. 

308. roiyvvy more than once in two pages. 

317. eizov prevailing over éAeyor. 

318. Answers denoting subjective assent less than once in sixty 
answers. 

325. Superlatives in affirmative answers more than half as 
frequent as positives, but not prevailing over positives. 

854. mavu pev ovy prevailing over ravvu ye. 

865. £vuras prevailing over das. 

366. mas and compounds between four and five times in one 
page. 

367. daas, EUpras, Evvaras more than once in two pages, but 
less than once in a page. 

376. Apodictic answers between 30 and 40 % of all answers. 

377. To each problematic answer between three and four 
apodictic answers. 

378. Interrogations by means of dpa between 15 and 24 % of 
all interrogations. 

389. xara c. accus. prevailing over all other prepositions 
except ev. 

390. Between 19 and 21 prepositions in one page (ed. Didot). 


synonym 
over 
another 
or on 
some 
general 
properties 
of style or 
literary 
composi- 
tion. 

This class 
includes 
also 
higher 
degrees of 
frequency 
of very 
common 
words, and 
other 
peculiari- 
ties enu- 
merated, 
observed 
by various 
authors. 
Each of 
such im- 
portant 
peculiari- 
ties will be 
counted as 
equivalent 
to three 
accidental 
or to one 
repeated 
and one 
accidental 
pecu- 
larity. 


A fourth 
class is 
formed by 
a very fre- 
quent oc- 
currence 
of any 
word. 
Very fre- 
quent we 
term the 
occur- 
rence of 
any word 
once in 
two pages. 
To this 
class be- 
long also 
some 
special ob- 
servations 
enu- 
merated. 
Kach very 
important 
pecu- 
liarity will 
be counted 


150 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


391. epi c. accus. prevailing over zepi c. genitive. 

412. ~ép: placed after the substantive between 10 and 20 % of 
all occurrences of repi. 

448. vai, wavu ye, wavu pev ovy less than one-quarter of all affirma- 
tive answers. 

451. Rhetorical interrogations between 10 and 20 % of all 


interrogations. 
452. Interrogations by ri prevailing over those by was. 


. 


All these peculiarities are much more important than 
those of class II, and each of them will be estimated as 
equivalent to three peculiarities of class I, or to one of 
class IT and one of class I. 

IV. There remains a class of peculiarities still more 
significant, of which a small number is equivalent to 
more than thrice that number of peculiarities of class I. 
To this belongs first a very frequent occurrence of any 
word or idiom, as for instance, 118 times or more in the 
Laws, 97 times or more in the Republic, generally more 
than once in every two pages (ed. Didot). Besides, we 


include here a small number of the most characteristic 


peculiarities of style, namely : 


12. 

13. 

14. 

15. 
tions. 

21. Avoiding of hiatus. 

23. Occurrence more than once in a page (ed. Didot) of rare 
words common and peculiar to a dialogue with Timaeus, Critias, 
Laws. 

307. jevror less than once in five pages. 

318. Answers of subjective assent entirely absent. 

325. Superlatives in affirmative answers prevailing over corre- 
sponding positives. 

366. was and its compounds over five times in a page. 

367. das, Evpras, Evvaras more than once in a page. 

376. Apodictic answers more than 40 % of all answers. 

377. Problematic answers fewer than one to four apodictic 
answers. 

878. Interrogations by dpa more than 24 % of all interrogations. 

389. xara with the accusative prevailing over ev. 


Belonging to a tetralogy as second or third member. 
Complete substitution of other teachers for Socrates. 
Didactic and authoritative character. 

Quotations of earlier dialogues, preludes and recapitula- 


METHOD OF STYLOMETRY Tal. 


890. More than 21 prepositions in a page. 

412. wépc placed after the word to which it belongs forming 
more than 20 % of all occurrences of zrepi. 

451. Rhetorical interrogations forming more than 20 % of all 
interrogations. 


All these peculiarities being very important, it will 
be fair to count each as equivalent to two repeated, or to 
three accidental, or to one accidental-and one important 
peculiarity. 

In the above classification of peculiarities we have 
endeavoured to reduce to a minimum the relative im- 
portance of each peculiarity, in order to avoid every 
exaggeration of the measure of affinity uniting two dia- 
logues. Any error committed will thus rather diminish 
the apparent affinities than increase them. If a word 
occurs once in each page, or more than two hundred times 
in the Laws, this will be counted as only four times more 
important than a single occurrence. Later inquiries may 
prove that this is a very low estimate of the importance 
of frequency. But any classification of stylistic pecu- 
liarities according to their importance must take into 
account that importance is very far from being propor- 
tional to frequency. If one word occurs ten times in one 
dialogue and ten times in another, this is very far from 
being a link equivalent to ten single occurrences of ten 
different words in both dialogues. Our classification is 
here proposed not as definitive, but only as a first attempt 
at a numerical evaluation of stylistic affinities. Future 
inquirers dealing with many thousands of compared pecu- 
liarities may find reasons for a different classification. As 
our purpose is only to find the lowest figures, which may 
be increased later, but can never be diminished, the above 
distinction of four degrees of frequency and importance 
is sufficient. 

Now, in order to apply our method, we must state 
clearly the highest hypothesis on which it is founded and 
define its terms. This highest hypothesis has been here- 


as equiva- 
lent tofour 
accidental 
pecu- 
liarities. 


The above 
standards 
of equiva- 
lence are 
minimal, 
in order to 
avoid ex- 
aggeration 
of affini- 
ties. Im- 
portance 
is not pro- 
portional 
to fre- 
quency, 
and in- 
creases at 
a much 
smaller 
rate. 

The above 
classifica- 
tion is not 
definitive, 
and aims 
at deter- 
mining 
the 
minimal 
value of 
affinities. 


Law of 
stylistic 
affinity. 
The num- 
bers of 
observed 
peculiari- 
ties in 
two works 
must differ 
at least by 
one tenth 
for valid 
chronolo- 
gical infer- 
ences. 
The total 
number of 
peculiari- 
ties dealt 
with 
should ex- 
ceed 150 
in a dia- 
logue of 
ordinary 
length. 
The Laws 
standard 
of com- 
parison. 


152 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


tofore tacitly admitted, but has not been methodically dis- 
cussed. It is the following LAW OF STYLISTIC AFFINITY. 

Of two works of the same author and of the same size, 
that is nearer in time to a third, which shares with it the 
greater number of stylistic peculiarities, provided that 
their different importance is taken into account, and that 
the number of observed peculiarities is sufficient to deter- 
mine the stylistic character of all the three works. 

As to the meaning of terms in this psychological law 
the following may be observed : 

1. Nearer in time implies nothing as to priority, 
unless independent evidence is forthcoming that some 
one work of the author is the latest. In Plato’s case 
the Laws are generally admitted to be such a work. 
But even were this doubted, a very great number of 
peculiarities observed would finally lead also to the de- 
termination of an order of priority, because the more 
varied style of an author has every chance of belonging 
to a later time. 

2. A greater number of peculiarities does not mean 
any greater number, because if the difference is insig- 
nificant, no valid inference is allowed. We accept pro- 
visionally, as a minimum of difference between two works 
justifying chronological inferences, a difference of one- 
tenth of the observed peculiarities, and in some special 
cases we shall even require a greater difference. 

3. A sufficient number to determine the stylistic 
character must be a greater number than has been used 
generally heretofore, except by Campbell. But this de- 
pends upon the importance of each peculiarity. In the 
present case we shall assume that the occurrence of fifty 
out of five hundred peculiarities allows a probable infer- 
ence, but that this probability approaches certainty only 
when a hundred and fifty peculiarities of later style are 
found in an ordinary dialogue. 

4. The Laws are our standard of comparison for the 
next latest five dialogues, and for earlier works the group 


LAW OF STYLISTIC AFFINITY hae 


of the six latest dialogues, Sophist, Politicus, Philebus, 
Timaeus, Critias, Laws. 

If now we ask how the law of stylistic affinity can 
be verified, the first and nearest answer lies in the psycho- 
logical property of style as a mark of identity, entirely 
depending on the totality of familiar expressions at any 
time in the writer’s consciousness. Every writer could 
find easily in his own experience sufficient evidence in 
favour of this psychological law. It has been suggested 
that it ought to be tested on the writings of a great 
modern writer like Goethe, as we know exactly when he 
wrote each of his works. But this way of testing it 
would cost an immense additional labour, and would still 
remain inconclusive, since an obstinate sceptic might 
object that the psychological development of Goethe 
differed from that of Plato—that the German language 
has peculiarities distinct from those of the Greek 
language, &c. 

We propose, therefore, another and better way of test- 
ing, with special reference to Plato, the law of stylistic 
affinity, and at the same time also our own classification 
of stylistic peculiarities, which is subsidiary to our 
chronological conclusions, and requires even more strict 
verification than the psychological law, which will appear 
obvious to many readers. 

We have sufficient means of testing our method, if 
we take into account that, however little is positively 
known in Platonic chronology, there are some works 
connected by Plato himself into tetralogies, and there- 
fore necessarily following each other, though. perhaps 
at intervals. Further, there can be no doubt that the 
successive parts of a larger work, as a rule, must have 
followed each other, at least if the later part contains 
clear allusions to the preceding text. If, then, our method 
yields conclusions in agreement with these evident facts, 
we may confidently apply it to the solution of more 
difficult problems in Platonic chronology. We submit, 


The law 
of stylistic 
affinities 
must be 
tested. 

A test on 
another 
author 
than the 
author to 
whom we 
apply it 
would be 
incon- 
clusive. 
We have 
means of 
testing 
our prin- 
ciples and 
their con- 
sistency 
on the 
works of 
Plato, 
among 
which 
some are 
positively 
known to 
be later 
than 
others, for 
instance, 
the con- 
tinuation 
of a 
larger 
work is 
later than 


154 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


its be- therefore, to the impartial judgment of our readers the 
ginning. following tests : 

Such tests 1. The first tetralogy sketched out by Plato consists 
could be of Republic, Timaeus, Critias (unfinished), with the Her- 


nina mocrates, which was projected but never written. We 
ieee begin by comparing the first with the last book of the 


if all the —e¢Pwblic, because some intermediate books have been con- 
authors  Sidered by certain critics as later additions, while nobody 
had doubts that the tenth book must be somewhat later than 
quotedthe the first. We find in the first book 28 accidental, 6 
passages repeated, and 3 important peculiarities of later style, 
counted. amounting together to 49 units of affinity. In the tenth 
book, which is a little smaller and offers therefore even 
fewer opportunities for the occurrence of each peculiarity, 


A certain 
number of 


tests is 

Paes we find 35 accidental, 14 repeated, 15 important, and 6 
from the very important peculiarities of later style, equivalent to 
com- 132 units. For the sake of conciseness and easy com- 
parison parison we express this stylistic relation in the follow- 
oe ing formula : 

earlier 

and later 1. Rep. I 827-854 (204 pp. Did.) : 28 (I) 6 (ID) 8 (IID) =49 (1) 
books of ->Rep. X 595-621 (193 pp. Did.): 35 (1) 14 (II) 15 (IID) 6 
the (IV) = 182 (1). 

Republic 


except the 2. It is equally certain that the fourth book of the 
sixthand Republic must be written later than the second. If we 
seventh take for comparison two samples of text of a size nearly 
books, equal to the Symposium, we find the following stylistic 


with the relation : 

following ; 

eighth [Symposium 172 a-223 p (89 pp. Did.): 42 (1) 16 (II) 8 

and ninth, (IIT) = 98 (1). ] , 

ae hee 2. Rep. II 357 a—III 412 a (873 pp. Did.): 47 (1) 20 (II) 22 
(III) 2 (IV) = 161 (1). 

peslen.5s Rep. III 412 s—V 471 c (89 pp. Did.) : 45 (1) 28 (II) 31 

poetapate (III) 2 (LV) = 192 (D. 

certain. [Cf. Phaedrus (39 pp. Did.): 54 (I) 386 (IT) 22 (III) 7 (IV) 

Any book = 220 (1).] 

is later 

than the 3. The above two tests can be confirmed also by com- 


first, the parison of larger samples. If we compare the last three 


THE STYLOMETRIC LAW TESTED £55 


books of the Republic, equal in size to the Theaetetus, 
with an exactly equal amount of B. II-IV, we find the 
following stylistic relation (the indications about the 
style of other dialogues are of course quoted here not as 
tests, but only for comparison) : 
3. Rep. II 368 a—IV 445 & (53 pp. Did.) : 47 (I) 30 (II) 82 (III) 
2 (IV) =211 (I). 
->Rep. VIII-X (534 pp. Did.) : 54 (1) 36 (II) 29 (III) 5 (IV) 
= 233 (I). 
[Theaetetus (53 pp. Did.) : 58 (I) 41 (II) 31 (IIT) = 238 (1).] 
4-7. As there is no doubt that the single books of 
the Republic were written in their present order (except 
B. V—VII, which are supposed to have been completed 
last of all), we may compare different parts of almost 
equal length, in order to see whether the later text always 
offers more peculiarities of later style. Such comparison 
will be easily appreciated in the following short enumera- 
tion : 
4. Rep. I 327-II 367 © (28 pp. Did.): 86 (I) 10 (II) 8 (III) 
= 65 (I). 
ee II 368 a-412 a (30 pp. Did.): 42 (I) 17 (II) 22 (III) 
2 (IV) = 150 (1). 
Cf. Euthydemus (28 pp. Did.): 22 (I) 5 (II) 7 (III) =53 


(I). 
5. Rep. II-IV (60} pp. Did.): 47 (1) 87 (II) 32 (III) 2 (IV) 
=225 (I). 
"Rep. V-VII (60 pp. Did.): 56 (1) 29 (II) 40 (IID) 7 (IV) 
= 262 (I). 


Cf. Gorgias (60 pp. Did.) : 31 (1) 20 (II) 6 (III) =89 (1). 
Cf. Phaedo (49 pp. Did.): 48 (1) 26 (II) 17 (III) 2 (IV) 

= 154 (1). 
6. Rep. II 357 a-III 412 a (874 pp. Did.) : 47 (I) 20 (II) 22 (III) 

2, (IV) =161 (1). 
Rep. VIII-IX (34 pp. Did.): 47 (1) 22 (II) 27 (ITT) 8 (IV) 

= 164), 

7. Rep. IL 368-IV 445 = (53 pp. Did.): 47 (I) 30 (II) 32 (IID) 

2 (IV) =211 (1). 
Rep. V 471 p-VII 541 (44 pp. Did.) : 50 (1) 21 (II) 38 (III) 

7 (IV) = 234 (D. 


In the above seven test cases the earlier part has 
always fewer peculiarities of later style, and in every case 


fourth is 
later than 
the 
second, 
ete. 

In each 
case the 
earlier text 
has fewer 
peculiari- 
ties of 
later style, 
the evi- 
dence 

as to 
priority 
being 


‘given by 


Plato 
himself. 


The same 
results 
from a 
com- 
parison 
between 
parts of 
the 
Republic 
and the 
dialogues 
which are 
later, for 
instance, 
the 
Timaeus 
and 
Critias. 
The 
Critias 
being 
much 
smaller 
than any 
book of 
the 


156 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


the evidence of priority is given by Plato himself, as we 
compared the acknowledged continuation with the pre- 
ceding text. We excluded from our comparisons the 
relation of B. V—VII to the following books, because 
this part of the Republic mm its present form has been 
supposed to be later, and cannot therefore be used as a 
test case. Many other parts of the Republic could be 
compared with equal lengths of text undoubtedly later, 
but the above seven samples give a sufficient notion of 
the text of the Republic, and we may now proceed to 
compare the Republic with Timaeus and Critias. A 
direct comparison between Timaeus and Critias is im- 
possible, because the size of the two dialogues differs 
too much. . 

8. In order to compare the Republic with the T1- 


“maeus, a good test is afforded by the last three books, 


which are equal in size to the Timaeus : 
8. Rep. VIII-X (53} pp. Did.) : 54 (1) 36 (ID) 29 (II) 5 (IV) 

= 283 (1). 

—>Timaeus (53 pp. Did.): 123 (I) 58 (II) 44 (III) 14 (IV) = 

427 (1). 

9. The Critias is almost too small for any comparison, 
being scarcely longer than half a book of the Republi. 
It is certain that the Critias is later than the last book 
of the Republic, and if notwithstanding its small size 
the Critias has more peculiarities of later style, this 
gives an evident confirmation to the law of stylistic 
affinity, and to the rules above admitted. We find: 

9. Rep. X (194 pp. Did.): 35 (1) 14 (II) 15 (III) 6 (IV)= 

182 (I). 

->Critias (11 pp. Did.): 51 (1) 8 (ID) 18 (IID) 12 (IV)= 

169(0); 


This test is specially important, because we have 
taken the last book of the Republic, apparently separated 
from the Critias only by the length of the Tvmaeus, and 
we have found that to the chronologic distance there 
corresponds a considerable stylistic distance between the 


THE STYLOMETRIC LAW TESTED Liv 


two works. We might add as test comparisons each of 


_ the other books of the Republic, and we should find that. 


the Critias exceeds them all in number and importance 
of peculiarities of later style. But this being evident 
after our preceding comparisons, we need not insist 
upon it. 

10. In order to compare the Laws with the Republic, 
we must allow for the difference of size, the Laws being 
43 pp. (Did.) longer. If we add the Gorgias to the 
Republic, we obtain a whole slightly exceeding the Laws 
in size and affording a convenient comparison, because 
nobody doubts that the Gorgias and Republic are both 
earlier than the Laws. It results: 

10. Gorg.+ Rep. as one whole (256 pp. Did.): 76 (I) 124 (II) 

30 (IIT) 4 (LV) = 480 (1). 

->Laws (238 pp. Did.) : 175 (1) 176 (II) 87 (IID) 20 (IV) = 

718 (I). 

The Laws being acknowledged as the latest work of 
Plato, many new tests would result from a comparison 
of the Laws with different combinations of other dia- 
logues equal together in size to the Laws. But as our 
list has been compiled on the principle of a selection of 
peculiarities of later style, and the standard of later style 
has been taken from the Laws and those other works 
which in style come nearest to the Laws, it might be 
denied that such tests confirm the law of stylistic 
affinity. 

11. We turn to the other tetralogy indicated by Plato 
himself, and beginning with the Theaetetus. We com- 
pare first the Theaetetus with the Sophist, which is its 
recognised continuation according to Plato’s own indis- 
putable testimony : 

11. Theaet. (53 pp. Did.) : 58 (I) 41 (II) 31 (III) = 238 (1). 
Soph. (40 pp. Did.) : 139 (I) 36 (II) 59 (III) 20 (IV) = 
468 (I) 

12. The Sophist and Politicus are as closely connected 

as if they were one dialogue, and still there is a difference 


Republic 
shows a 
style later 
than even 
the last 
book of 
the larger 
but earlier 
work. 

To com- 
pare the 
Republic 
with the 
Laws, 

we must 
add some 
text to the 
smaller 
dialogue. 
Then we 
find that 
the style 
of the 
Republic 
is much 
earlier 
than the 
style of 
the Laws. 


The two 
dialogues 
which 
were 
written by 
Plato as 
continua- 
tion of the 
Theaete- 
tus also 
show a 


much later 
style. 


Further 
tests are 
given by 
compar- 
ing those 
dialogues 
about the 
relative 
date of 
which 
there is 
a general 
agree- 
ment, for 
instance 
Phaedo 
with the 
preceding 
Meno, or 
Philebus 
with the 
preceding 
Par- 
menides. 
Also in 
this case 
our 
method 
confirms 
the best 
informa- 
tion 
obtained 
otherwise. 


158 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


of style between them, the latter having more peculiarities 
of later style : 


12. Soph. (40 pp. Did.): 139 (1) 36 (II) 59 (III) 20 (IV)= 
468 (1). 

Polit. (43 pp. Did.): 163 (1) 48 (II) 56 (III) 19 (IV)= 
493 (I). 


13-14. The above twelve test comparisons refer to 
samples of text, for whose chronological order Plato 
himself has given clear indications. They confirm the 
law of stylistic affinity as well as the rules laid down 
for the application of this psychological law, including 
our classification of stylistic peculiarities according to 
the degree of their importance. We need not pause 
here to test our fundamental principles. There are 
some pairs of dialogues, which, though not forming one 
whole or not continuing each other as the above, are 
recognised as standing in a certain chronological relation 
because one of them contains allusions to an exposition 
which appears in the other. Many of such allusions 
are disputable, but there are at least two which are 
sufficiently recognised by all competent authors, includ- 
ing Zeller, to justify their use as tests. These are the 
allusion found in the Phaedo (72 8) to the theory of 
reminiscence first set forth in the Meno (82 B-86 A), and 
the allusion of the Philebus (14 c) to the difficulties of 
defining the relation between the One and the Many 
which are nowhere treated with such consciousness of 
the complexity of the problem as in the Parmenides 
(129 B-E and the whole dialogue). If now we compare 
the style of these four dialogues we find again a complete 
agreement between our own method of settling chrono- 
logical difficulties and the most certain hints about the 
order of some dialogues obtained otherwise : 


13. Meno (23 pp. Did.) : 20 (I) 16 (II) 38 (IIT) =61 (1). 
->Phaedo (49 pp. Did.): 43 (1) 26 (II) 17 (IID) 2 (IV)= 
154 (1). 


THE STYLOMETRIC LAW TESTED 


159 


Here the difference of size could not be accounted 
for, but is compensated by the very great difference of 
style. 

14. Parmenides (31 pp. Did.) : 56 (I) 42 (II) 21 (IIT) 10 (IV) = 

243 (I). 


->Philebus (43 pp. Did.) : 100 (I) 38 (II) 55 (IIT) 16 (IV) = 
405 (I). 


Here also the difference of size 1s more than com- 
pensated by the great difference of style. 

15. Other similar allusions are too uncertain, and 
sometimes evidently mistaken, so that we cannot use 
them as tests. But to remain within the limits of the 
sreatest probability, we may take for granted that the 
three small dialogues referring to the death of Socrates— 
Apology, Euthyphro, Crito—are earlier than the Sym- 
postwm which nearly equals them in size. We find: 


15. Apology Euthyphro Crito as one whole (41 pp. Did.) : 21 (1) 
7 (II) 6 (III) =53. 


—>Symposium (39 pp. Did.) : 42 (1) 16 (IT) 8 (IIT) =98. 


16. It were easy to increase the number of similar 
tests by many others, taking the whole of Socratic 
dialogues as certainly earlier than Philebus, Timaeus 
and Critias, and our list offers sufficient material for 
comparisons which can be readily made by those of our 
readers who think that the above fifteen trustworthy 
tests are insufficient. We add only one test of a different 
character, in order to show how the coincidence of 
accidental characters operates on greater agglomerations 
of texts. Were our method wrong, it might happen 
that a certain number of single dialogues, each of which 
has been found earlier than one of the dialogues of 
another group, taken together as one whole and treated 
as to the distinction of degrees of importance in the 
same way as the Republic, would appear later than the 
group consisting of dialogues which taken individually are 
later. Now, a good test of the consistency of our method 


A similar 
test is 
offered by 
the three 
short 
dialogues 
referring 
to the 
death of 
Socrates, 
which are 
earlier 
than the 
Sym- 
postum. 


An im- 
portant 
test of con- 
sistency is 
found by 
comparing 
groups of 
dialogues. 
A group of 
dialogues 
which in- 
dividually 
contain 
more 
peculiari- 
ties of 
style 

need not 
neces- 


sarily con- 
tain also 

a greater 
number of 
peculiari- 
ties if the 
greater 
number 
were not 
caused by 
the later 
date. 


Our 
method 
thorough- 
ly tested, 
as no 


stylistic 


160 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


is to form two groups of dialogues, one consisting of 
dialogues which by individual comparison have been 
found to be earlier than the Republic, and the other of 
those which have been found to be later. Then, if our 
method and our rules are correct, the later group must 
show a greater number of peculiarities of later style than 
the Republic, while the earlier group must also have 
a smaller equivalent of affinity with the later style. 
Those dialogues which according to individual stylistic 
tests precede the Republic are the Phaedo, Symposium, 
Cratylus, Gorgias, amounting together very nearly to the 
size of the Republic. On the other side, the Theaetetus, 
Parmenides, Philebus, Timaeus and Critias form a group 
also equal in size to the Republic, and consisting of dia- 
logues of which each has been found later than some 
part of the Republic. If we compare both groups with 
the Republic, counting as important only the peculiari- 
ties which occur in each group, at least so many times 
(17) as is needed to call them important, if they occurred 
in the Republic, then we find the following results : 
16. Gorg. Crat. Symp. and Phaedo as one whole (191 pp. Did.): 
50 (I) 84 (ID) 8 (III) = 242 (1). 
->Republic I-X (195 pp. Did.): 81 (I) 110 (II) 30 (IIT) 4 
(IV) = 407 (I). 
—>Theaet. Parm. Phil. Tim. and Critias as one whole (191 
pp. Did.) : 107 (I) 210 (II) 40 (ITT) 9 (IV) =683. 


This test of consistency has also an independent 
value for many competent Platonists who recognise that 
the fepublic is later than Gorgias, Cratylus, Symposium 
and Phaedo, but earher than Theaetetus, Parmenides, 
Philebus, Timaeus and Critias. 

Now, having thoroughly tested our instrument of in- 
quiry, it is fair to apply it to those more difficult pro- 
blems of Platonic chronology, on which other investi- 
eators have heretofore failed to agree. First as to the 
date of the Theaetetus tetralogy, it results from the above, 


THE STYLOMETRIC LAW TESTED 161 


that the Theaetetus must at least be later than the 
first books of the Republic (see test comparison No. 3). 
The difference of style between the Theaetetus and the 
last books of the Republic is too insignificant to allow 
direct. chronological conclusions, though it shows also 
that the Theaetetus has a greater number of peculiarities 
than B. VIII-X: Im order to decide whether the 
Theaetetus is later than the whole of the Republic, we 
shall be obliged to have recourse to a ‘longer way’ than 
our present method. For the present we must be content 
to say that the Theaetetus is evidently later than the 
Symposium and Phaedo, as can be seen from the above 
tests 3 and 5. A further important result from the 
validity of our method is that the Phaedrus is undoubtedly 
later than the Phaedo, and the Phaedo later than the 
Symposium (see above tests 2 and 5). For the relation 
between the Phaedrus and Theaetetus the above obser- 
vations afford no sufficient basis. 

Many new investigations are needed to settle all details 
with the complete certainty which the above reasoning 
shows to be possible in chronological inferences from 
stylistic observations. The present calculations, based on 
the work of others, are by no means sufficient to determine 
the order of all the works of Plato. For this it would be 
necessary to have a list of stylistic. peculiarities ten 
times longer than our list of 500 stylistic characters, 
among which only very few are important, the majority 
being accidental. In order to enable the reader to extend 
comparisons similar to the above to other dialogues and 
groups of dialogues, the measure of relative stylistic 
affinities is given in the following table, which supple- 
ments Campbell’s and C. Ritter’s similar tables by a 
methodic co-ordination of over fifty-eight thousand facts, 
collected by twenty authors, of whom none knew more 
than a few of his fellows : 


method 
before, 
has been 
found con- 
sistent 
and trust- 
worthy. 

It holds 
good in 
doubtful 
cases. 

But cer- 
tain diffi- 
culties 
remain 
unsettled. 
What our 
ealcula- 
tions 
prove may 
be seen 
from the 
following 
table of 
affinities, 
a con- 
densed ex- 
pression of 
over fifty- 
eight 
thousand 
facts 
hitherto 
little 
known. 


ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


162 








Vase) oP *n'2 ey mr GOTT ra -£9§6— Til 
zi he fl UL peyon 100 

sosesseg *(, doy) pr QT 1 TANG : VIF 
‘(8 yp %o © *q) ‘uIeYD OF : OGE—IT 

‘pAuQaAy OUST : SHP 

“Cq) rtporyd “Tv'T : Sip 

"(qP £9 e) Jorg ‘yddqIn| : ITE 

z! "(°O ;7@) OTT “PORT * BEB 

(P rfr:{2 G8) “weg “qddqyng, : 96Z 

2 oP rir 9 14) FMD “TMATING * 68S 

(Gao mP rir? ea ) puaeyo OUI) + TE} 


‘(71 &) duakg “yorq 3g 


“(p ‘o *q 8) “qoun “waeyD :¢. —'T 


| ‘9TqB} OY} SutMoypoF suoreuvpdxe oes spreyop 
rey}OIOT "XY YOog = 9 “XI-TITA 8Y00 = P “TTA-A 8ZOod = 9 
‘AT-IT SY00G = q ‘T Yoo ‘doy =v ‘syoxovaq Ul poppe 8.10949] 
reus Lq poxyreur st orpqndeyy oyy Jo yavd yore ur Ayrrerpnoed yore 
JO doUELIMO00 oY} OSTY ‘Sanoer Aprerpnood oures oyy OIA UT 
SONSOTVIP FXoU OMY OTT} FO SoueU pozVIAdIgge oy} tvodde roqumu 
SI} purged + ‘sorjiaerpnoed onstpAys porpunt, oA JO 4SIT eAoqe 
ay} Ul Aoquunu yuotmo st Aq poywusisop st Ayrerpnoed yorgy 
‘aun ysuf ay, Los 
anboynig yova ur GBurwnaddy sarpwwynoad fo worniaunugy 











| 











“quByLOd UAT 
set 6-g SuLiMo 
-00 SOLVING 





| "pid ‘pe dd 1.61 


























|| le — . 
20-0 | et |—|7 |@ | 6 |ody=Abojody 
| TAOWY OMLVHOOY *T 
| | a = 
| [eet el ae 
‘sme | Aigvuifp =a A} | Be | 
autos Get ee ee a elec 
porns || sz2wn Jo 2 ps2 = hess aal| ‘oTqe} SII} UL 
wou |jzequinu|| +...) 9 | & 5 | WLoT]} LOZ pasn suOTyBIAeITq 
dnoas | SurmoyT | (eet ee 2 || -qev pur “topxo pworsofou 
qseyey || -foy ou} jj» | "|| -oryo poumserd areq} Ut 
oy} OF || Of 4ULeT sanbopnrp ayy fo sauun NT 


hyuuffy || -eambea 


permed [eo 


| 
| 
ul} 


| ‘anSoyerp yoRe Ut | 


|, punoy op As 109RT JO $227 | 
|) -awmynaad fo waquenyy 
\| 








| 
| 


‘OLVId JO SHNAYOTVIG OMLALNAML YOA ALINIAAV OLLSTIALS FO ATaAV 








163 


STYLE OF PLATO 


THE 





, GT €°S . . 
GP a ee ae) Ota oe FOBT 


. (Ged § i . . 
(m9 oP “at? he) ny WPT mm WIVYO 


(19 ul ni: fq) durkg 577810 
Ge ne m®) OUT, 7 UAIVY() 


‘(029 


“—‘queyroduit ¢ ‘Teyueptooe G : SeTyLTeITNOed Mou Jo [e4OT, 























‘piq ‘po ‘dd ¢.6 
Op *§ 








. G' In 8°S . 
(m9 mP GO SFq 98) “ULTEYD 77709110 


"(y® P Sto fq) *dutdg “S104 


(p 7-79 © *q 8) “MIETED O91 
"(y® yP 479 4 2q ) OOTY ‘TAIeTD 


‘(9 mmP Sar? neq) Opevyg *pAqyngy 


‘poyeodor 7 ‘eyueptooe ¢ : Serytaerpnoed Mou JO [eIOJ, 




















>1GG || | 
: 806 | ! 
‘(mP) moOU9W mr Id + 406— TIT | | 
(9 *%q) “Torry “UIIVTD : FEZ | 
‘ 066 | 
‘ P86 ] 
ew 5104) ‘PAYING : OSS ! 
“(rmG) “YORT pr MBO)? OLE | | 5 d 
) ey nr TPH + 696 | | Soult} a Sead 
(9) FBI “810H : BOS | | -00 sommernoag 
; *(°0) UBT 1'FOTT + OS | elie 
‘(p *'Wq) ‘wareg apoeyd :@8s—I | 00 | 8B | — | ¢ heads 6! 
F <i 
‘queqroduit 7 | 
‘194 — TI | | 
('o) ‘gover, Opeeyd :10Ob— II ~ | 
‘OTP | | | 
(fo 19) ‘PAGING “WORT : OTF | | > | 
‘GOP | 
‘ 98E | . d 
(qrdoy]) OUT “JOLT : BBE | samen aoeene 
o/s 3 ‘GSE -90 SoryLIeT[NIeg 
(9) ‘eID “FOI + BSS I eae seach 
=u0e.- I £00.) SE ek Nee Tat 


, i iia a 
(9 oP W? fn nd n®) ne DPT 1 Tey 

















‘Pid, “po ‘dd LTT 
‘ydaqqng = 
olydhyIng °% 











M 


ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


164 




































































*panwrjuodgI—OLVTId AO SHNOOTVIG OAML-ALNHA T, 


(1? mP Avan 1? uri 11) OPP IMO : EGE | | 
‘(y® oP Sr? ‘rd ®) nv} POULL, APOC + GPE ‘qae}10dtar / 
(ie 8°1UG08 2 86e | | sow g-e@ Sura | 
(9 pP rr? © “Q) pr SIOK “JOG + EGS | | -00 SOTyIAVINIT | 
gi ee els) een tas) tid | ae ‘piq ‘po ‘dd 8.21 
(9 nP *q) “pAqingy OUP :g6E—I | 400 | 19 | —| se |B | 6T | M9eT=seyoury ‘g 
‘queqaod tut gy 
‘poyeoda g ‘TeyUNpIONR g :SolyLVTNoed Mou JO [VIOT, | 
"(n® oP 11? ord 8) “JOLG “WORT : 99g | 
(0 p 9 &) p pAqNGY OUP : 876—TII 
___ (a) “FeaQ “B10 + 968 | 
fe) ulm le Tae 1d | 
(iq) ‘PAIN nOUN | O8F | eae = 
*(°O) OpYel “401 ‘ 
Pew ld ae d ' 18 | | | -queqzodunt | 
; GIy & am YOOS ee Ud G86 | | “seutly g-G SuLamo : he Aa 
(9 iP mr* 11? n4). mR’ dd ur }eq) + GGG | | | -00 sontrerynoeg Pid “pe L-81 
‘(i1® mP ac mq ®) FEI) “SION : BBB | | aged i “UTBY) = 
(@) OueH “JO1g :GT@—I | 900 | Th | —|9 |G | ST | sepymumyp “+ 
3 a Ee {eee 
oiier ou} UITMOTLOF SUOLPVUBIAXS 90S S[reyep e ‘ | b ei] «4 
TOYO 10] "YX YOO = 9 ‘XT-TITA 8100 = P ITAA S100 =9 | ora vo | mM pas We ee esi 
‘AT-IT Syoog = q ‘JT yoog ‘doy =e ‘syoyovrq Ul poppv s.1094eT | pams || szeun 30 || Be | 5 o Sg ee | -oqqey STI] UI 
Teuts Aq paxyxeur st orpqndey oxy jo yred yore ut Aqraeypnaed ype | caoce. \\acantee ms | B yall UOT] AOF psn suUOyRLAdG 
JO eouUeLMo00 oY} OSTY ‘Stnoet Aprrer~noed ates oY} YOM UL || ZL oIe esses ete < hay eee eer Stil oie AiG Pea 
SONSOTRIP JXou OMJ OTT} FO SetUVT poyerAcaqqe oy} woddv aoqrunu | nae | eae ot gle | aula Pela | a SEH eae as 
ST} purpog + ‘sorpiaerpnoed oysipAys poapuny oAy Jo ySIT eaoqe | 5. 4.04 || 09 quo sanboppup ay} Jo sawn 
oy} Ul coqumu yuetmo syr Aq poyeustsop st Ay1ermoed yor | gens ee eee | ‘onsoyerp yore ut | : + 
| ‘awry ysuf ay, 4of aanwjary peyog, || PYRO} a[44s Loy] FO $227 | 
| anbojnig yove we burwwaddy saiywoynoad fo uoynwauwnugy | * | -uwoynaad fo “aquUuumnyy || 
| ! 


YOu ALINIGAY OILSITALG HO WIaVy, 








165 


STYLE OF PLATO 


THE 








‘queyzodutt ¢ ‘poyred 
-0l ¢ ‘Teyueploow G :SerytaETTNIed Mou JO [RIO], | | 
| 


oO 


‘(9 mmP G1? sei ) pOPeVT wr IID * 8LE | 
“(9 “o 'q) “pAqyng OUP : 64e—“ITT | | Pell 
WL, “Td + OTS 1 | } 
(fo 8) 1 SAF) nOUPT + OOF | | 
(®q) opeeyg OUP * 2 —II | | 
(iq) dukg 4uty : $Bh | | 
ydog ytpeeyd : OTF | | 
‘(ir iq) “duakg y810p) : ggg | | | 
| | 











"(O) PAWN OUP * ZOE | 





mr UL, “Ipevyy + Gs 


: 4 duit | 
“("q) a PATING ,OUTT : SET | | ng age 
“(p'0) ‘IMod "Ward : BET | peel elena “pic ‘pe “dd ¢.6¢ 
‘(p) ‘aod "ydog : Sgt | eanty | org = 
‘sBor] ‘rpoeyg 701 —I | 400 || Tg |—|7 |6 | 18 spsohnjorg “9 








‘quej1odut 7 ‘pozeed | 
-01 ¢ ‘[eyuepiooe FT : Serytaerpnoed Mou JO [eqOT, | | 


(419 oP at? nt: ‘'4) mr FelQ “SION : ECr | | 
"(79 mP 4-9 *n'G) 7 AWkg 440d : 06F | | 
"GID “SION : 0G | : 
nr }8OFGL, mr tukg : 90g—TIT } 
‘(0) mr tPI) 179d + OOP | 
_— *(p %0) apa “401d + 4I@—IL | | 
‘(oP nr ‘i re) ur tB4) pOUST,. + LGD | “al 
“(oP air-1r? T-1m4) OUPT “FOA : OCH | Hee 7} 

‘(n® mP Sn? ‘or x) ‘duty “481 : £8E | 
"(;Coyy) OUT “JO1d : SBE | | | 

‘dukg “S104) : gE | | 





























ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


166 


"(q) w'S8erT “Ydog : 9FF 

(0) opaeyd “S10H) : OFF 

‘(9 %0) “UaNg ‘Jorouy, : PLE 

(9 nP 1) arto’ “FeIQ : EOE 

“(rn 1h? “q) "duikg 7S10K) : BOB 

Eq) ued RID : TTB 

"@ "to §""q) "ydog ,aporyd : OZ 
‘('o B) ‘rpeerg ‘dukg : e9g—T 


| 
| 


80:0 | eG 





‘poyeodor ¢ ‘Teyueptoow z : sorytterfnoed Mou Jo [RIO], 


‘(9p CbP 
rod ‘Ydog : FHF 
‘ydog opevyg : 1Zp—II 
WIT 1 JOVOUT, : ONG 
*('0) ,Ydog “apoeyg : LHF 
(9) "TY “ovo"uLL, : [EH 
‘(v) ,"Yydog ,waIeg : ggg 
ee ‘WO “FBID : EEZ 
(P 19 m4) “FAD “pATINT : HLB 
‘(2 9 “q) ‘durkg pAqjng :g = —'T 


€°@ 
ie 


) dutkg “810K : 





80-0 19 


Soin 
‘quejcodurt | 
SOUL} @1—F SUTIN | 
“00 SoIyIerNoeg 


4 |@ | 6 


"PIC ‘pe “dd 6.12 
‘pAqungy = 
snumaphying *8 

















‘queycodut 

SOUL} [[-F SUTIN | 

-00 SOT}IATVITNII 
| | 


= 8o5 OT OGal 





‘9[G8} OY} SULMOTTOF SUOTYVUL[Axo o—s STIBIEp 
19490 10 “X FOOT = © “XT-TITA SY00g = p ‘TTA-A SYoog =o 
‘AI-II SH00g = q ‘J Yoog ‘dey =e ‘syayourq ul poppe si0qqoy 
[Tews Aq poxreur st orfqndeyy oy} fo yxed yore ur Ay1xet~noed yore 
fo eouetimo00 oY} OsTY ‘sanoea ApaviMoed oures oT} OA ut 
SONSOTLIP JXOU OY OY} Jo SoULeU pozerAcaqqe oy rvodde caoqumnu 
Sigg pulyeg = ‘seryturnoed onstpAys pexpuny eay Jo 4st, eaoqe 
oy} UW Jequinu guetmo sy Aq poywusisop st Aqrrerpnoed Your 

‘aw yswyf ay, wof 

anboyoig yova ur Brwmaddy sarypwwynoed fo woynsaunugy 








“‘SMUTT 
ayy wo 
peans 
-BOUL 
dnoas 
qso4e] 
ay} 0 |) 04 quey || 

hynuffp | -eambe || 

aayjvjad|| [B4OT, || 
| | 
ia 


‘hywuifp 
fo 
S2VUN JO || 
TequMu || 
SULMOT 


|| -[OF ety || 

















yuh 
-1odwy “TTT 


“qureyod 
-unl AoA “AT 








‘poyeodoy “TT 
‘[RyUepwoy “T 





‘ONSOTeIp Toe Ut | 


punoj 944s AeyRT Fo sa2g | 
-Lipynoad fo waqunyy | 











‘pid ‘po ‘dd ¢.ez 
‘ouapy *), 





‘a[qey Sry ut 
UL} LOF pasn SUOTFRIAI 
“qe pue “tap1o eorsojou 
“oro peunserd ary ut 


| sanbopnrp ay? Jo sau NT 


*“panuyuod— OLVIg Jo SHOSOTVIG OML-ALINEMT, LOA ALINIGAY OLLSITALG go aTav 





167 


THE STYLE OF PLATO 











‘poyeodod g ‘TeJUEpIoNV ET : serpIVITNOEd MoU Jo TeyOJ, 


‘(aP) ‘ydog yy CII 

"(%0) gy} VOU,L, “Aporyg 

(0) Povo, “por gg 

_“(P) Id “yorouy, 

(0) Oper yr dutkg 

('q) a SVIPEID py UHL, 

*(°0) yy SS0r] 

Td 

‘durkg “yer 

‘(9 p ***q) mr OVOT LT, 1 FPID 
"(P°8q) “40g 1'OVRONT, 

‘(e) pp ydog "7oRodd 

s oT 

“UY, Opava 

‘(mP im ard) 'Auadg 7yyeID 
“(p © q) Atpovyg opera 
‘(p *'*q) ~oporyg “durdg 
(0) opaeyg FAN 





‘ 667 
‘807 
‘LOD 

‘ §86 

Gee oull 
‘ 967 
‘DIP 
‘SIP 

‘ 868 

‘ D6E 

‘ $68 
‘LUE 
666 

‘ 686 
‘DGG 
‘D&G 
=P. 

cf Sieiamentl | 


‘queqyiodut 7 ‘peyvod 
-O1 G [RJUNpION’ g : sortAeTTNOId MoU JO [RIO], 


“(ar aP Arr nt) OP°PYT 118.10 
(x19 arP 4r rq ut®) FID yx'S.105) 
(9 0 8°%q) p"¥RIQ “SION 

1859] “Ovo T, 

_ ‘opeetd 1 0404) 

“(oP 12) “duadg ,"9e19 

(%) WHEE “0d 


LLE 
OLE 
676 
:76I7—'TII 
: $07 
906 
‘ 146I— II 











SL-0 | 











68 




















“queqyrodurt 
SOUT} OG—G SuLLMI 


-00 SOTpIVIpNoeg 





9 


06 


Té 





‘Pid ‘pe “dd 9.19 
‘S10 = 
svib1oH) *6 




















ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


168 












































anboyng yova w burwweddn sarrwwynaad fo woynlaunugy 























(9) ‘S8erT opeeyd + SLB | | 
‘(p) “UY, “HTT : G9 | | 
. a . . . | i 
(in? 1°) JOBVOTL mr tPPCUd + EF] ‘suey aod ut 
"(9) “JOROTLL IPT * THB | Solty OZ- F Sura 
(2) popeey pAiisg : BZ ‘PIC "pe “dd ¢.gp 
fie tL | -00 SarqyLaeIpNIeg a Sa tae 
(7,2) ULV “JOVOTLL, = BTS | (eI = 
‘MOd w'd0Y :96I—I || 91-0 | PIT | F | 97 OT | ee snp hyuy ‘OL 
| | | "anOwy 
! | | | | OINOLVIg LSaIT ‘TT 
| ! dual 
: | ‘queqrod ut 
7 (GI ‘ers | | 
: SOUT] 9G-LT SUTIN | 
‘BFS ‘19S ‘BOS ‘SPF ‘egF) Jueyodu 4 ‘poyeod | -90 saryuelnog =| 
“Ol oy ‘[eyUeptoow ore Le ‘orqndey oy} ur oury ! roe te | ‘dd 761 ‘x-I ‘a 
qsay oy} toy Suravedde sorrrernoed oy} Jo NO 1-0 | L0b | PB | 08 hak 18 onqndogy 
ae Has ey 
| ‘queqtodut) 1 
| : 99° 
E a A : | SOUT} GG—-),[ SULTAN Pid nee dd 161 
(Fez pue ez) yurjatodunt g ‘peyvedea 77 ‘yeJUEp | 00 sorirernosg | a[OYA oulO SB 
-1908 Le SI SorpaeNnoed Mou Jo JequInuU [10] 9y4 | | catia | ‘opapy g “unsodwhs 
‘Q[oY A SHOnUT}UOD oUO sv UOyR] ‘dnois sty} UT $20 | Zr | — | & | $8 | og | ‘smphqoup ‘spub.o4) 
| _- —— 
4 | el = 
erarey emit SUrIMOTOY suoreuEtdze eas SsTreqop ser || Ageugio || rg < | = ri > || 
somo OG “KX YOO = © *RI-TITA SHOOT = P “ITAA ®IOOL = | ory ro ‘fo \iedize.| 2 g | 
‘AT-IT 8x00 = q ‘T Yoo ‘doy =e ‘syoyovrq Ut popp¥ s10940] poems llevunjo|f8|EBE| 3 | & | freee een 
yeus Lq poxveur st orpqndeyy or} Jo yavd yore ur Aqraernoed youo | “sour || zoquma | Basa 3 g | ay Soa EAN aanicee 
JO 9oUeTINDO OY} OSPY ‘Smoot Ajiavpnoed owes oY} Yor UL dnoxs || uray || me 5 o an _qe pws ‘repro jeordo ee 
SonSoTep FXou OMY Ol} JO SOULE pozerAc«qqe oy} cvodde roqunu Sac ene ps es : nee i st I 
Sigg paryeg 9 ‘somaerpnoed o1sijAjys porpuny 9AY JO 4ST] eAoqe | ue ya i pe: \— ene NS fe BROS CARES EE Le 
ey} Ul toqumu yuetmo st Aq poyeusisep st Ayivernoed yon Peon I Daas | ‘onSoyerp yous ur | orp ay} fo sammy 
‘away gsuyf ayz 10s anyway [e4OX, | punoy af A4s oye] Jo sarg i 
Ries | -wwpynaoad fo saquenyy 


| 





‘panuyuoo7i—OLVvVTd 40 SHNSOTVIC] OML-ALNHAT, 


HOH ALINIAAY OLLSITALG 


dO @TIAV, 








169 


STYLE OF PLATO 


THE 








} 
} 








qeniestiary 
“ol & ‘Teyuepio0e FT : 


-‘pswad 


soljlierpnoed Meu JO [RIOJ, 


ot 419d nr Gdog : I6E w'Adog yy WIR : £7¢ 
ig arP “79 a) Ar tPOVU ~pOPIVY + EG 
ar ydog nr UI®qd -F7 —'TIT 
(9) ‘qovoyy, ,opevyd “LGB 
‘(yp %9 *y"q 8) “Yovor_y, “apoeyg : FO¢—IL 
999 : Bhp *(0) pr WI, Oporyg : BVH 
“(79) “WHIE, “Iporyd : TIP 
‘(‘doy) » "90g “ydog : HEE 
‘Tpoey ops’ yd ‘OLE 
‘Mod “Gdog :g9g = WIT, “mpowyd : GFE 
‘ydog “yovory, : 18% "(p £9) w250T : TLZ 
‘('q) ‘tpoeyg Opeeyd : 29% “WILT, Iporyd : ggg 
w899T : TGQ = *(°*q) HO “FORO, : TET 
*qovot] “Tpoey dq -98I—'I 





-Ol G ‘TeyUEpINIV ET 


"(%) “410g Operyg : 


‘queqyroduit 7 ‘poyvod 
:Sorjlternoed Mou JO [RqOV, 


nr 19d ar ydog : 68§ 1 599'T £406 
‘(0 ml) 11 999'] ‘UULT, + GLE 
“(por m1 'q) III see mr4tpseyd :97gé—TII 
P) MLL ‘Td : G0v 
*(°0) 1 POLO ‘dwkg : Tg 
‘(9 ip * ' *q) ‘tpoettg opevyg : 79S 
(fr) w'tPeey ,Opreyd : HHS 
‘(19 iy?) mOpovyg ‘dug : ggEg—IT 
"(q) py TPOVY yr Auchg :Egp BHT: QOH 
(q) weg ‘apoeyd + £68 utd n Ydog : ggg 
(ome ee oe ‘ydog ‘apoeryg OVE 


‘886 














bt-0 


86 








| “queqzcod uit 
SOUT} GT—F Surammo 

-00 SOTPLAVITNIIT 
= (8) \-OL | SP 


| 


‘pid ‘po ‘dd ¢.6¢ 
‘dukg = 
wnsodwhy "TT 












































ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


170 


"(0 1-44) PVT, py Atporyg : Eye Ih | 
‘(n9) wld ‘ydog : 69g 

‘SVNMD WIT, : 84g—I1 
yr UL], yy UG : G6 

(p 0) “Td rm WIV : HEF | | 

“WE, “Od : 68h | | 

(9) wry, "ydog : Lap 

(0 B) yy IOd “Apovyd : 60P 

yp ULB “qovot ‘DPS 

‘(9 e) "Tyg “Ydog : Gog 



























































‘899'T : 993 | ‘queq.od uty | 
‘(0 p) ‘ydog ,apovyg : 96g | SOUL} FZ-F SULLAINI © 
. - : . | -00 SOLJITVIpnde 
(9 p) ydog ‘xpoeqg : $1Z | oo Senemnesd || “pig ‘pe “dd g.67 
(p) wd “tpeeyg 6 —T] Té-0 | vat | & | 47 | 9% | SF | OPE dT GT 
: pay 2” | } i i 
3 d | | a eh ee ee 
9148} OY} SUIMOTTOF SuOTVULTdxa oo8 S]reJop || ., leviepualtplllimes a| ¢ > 
xomjO TOT “X HOO = 0 “XT-TITA SH00G = P ITATA SHG =9 | gry co || ae lSale_| | 8 
ATHII 8390gq = q ‘JT yoog ‘dey =e ‘syoyovaq UT PEpP® S1949T || Homa |lsgewn qo\l BS | & iy g a | -o]qe} Sty} UI 
[[vurs Aq poyreur st orpqndoey or} yo gavd yoro ur Aqraetpnoed yore “eaut || xoqumu BS 7% £ | gs | ULOY} 1OF posn SUOeIAITG 
JO 99NeIM990 9Y} OSTY ‘sander Agraerpnoed ouLes oY YOU Ut anos || SutMoy | oe) g a ieee Ae a pue ey eavaoraT || 
SONSOTVIP FXoU OMY YY JO SoUIeU poyerActqqe oyy «avodde zaoqumu 1899 -[0f oy | | a aie pommseid ean ae 
| STUG pullpeg ‘sorypiaerpnoed onstyAys poxpunty, oay Jo 4st] eaoqe |) a3 04 || 04 9u07 || sanboporp ay fo sauoyxr | 
oY} Ul doquinu yuotmo syt Aq peyeusisep st Aytrermoed yoe | fie iffy | -eatnbo ‘ansoyerp yore ur ie + 
. ‘aun ysuyf ayy of aaynvjay peyog, | PUNO; efAys t0zRT Jo sag? 
| anboynig yava ur bGursvaddy saryuoynoad fo uoynuawnuy | * | || -2upynoad fo aquenyy 








‘panuyuoo—OLvig JO SHNA901VIG OML-ALNAM], TOL ALINIGAY OLLSITALG AO WIV], 


Ly 


THE STYLE OF PLATO 





‘SorpTeTpnoed MOU [BIUEpI9NV 7 SapIseq ULL}MOD prom 


ql U9} ‘SBISIOK oY} 9LOFo WojpTIM JT 


‘poyvod 


-01 g ‘TeyuepIoow Z : SeTjlvijnOed MoU JO [R4OT, 


"('o) "WIV 7,}OVeTy, : 

“(i9 moP Arr? SFG) POPOL, wy TPOVY : 
“(h-$q). ovo, yy apoeyg 

‘ydog ,, mar 

nr qdog yy tpeeyd 

nr Hd 1 qdog 

py UV “JoVvory, 

(*q) ‘Uae jf Jovoyy, 

‘(oP 84) mr I1Od w'tperyd : 


T6? 
gcy—'II 


‘ 867 
‘ T8P 
A 7 
‘ 609 
‘987 
OVE 


66 —'I 


40:0 





67 











-queq aod 
SOUT} O[-G Suto 
-00 SOTPITVI[NIIG 

| | 
mop a ha: aie; 





‘yuejzodut ¢ ‘peywed 
ol Z ‘Teyueplooe 77 : Soryiavtpnoed Mou Jo [eyOJ, 


"(4x9 rm S70 $2q) pr }OVOM, py Apovyg : 
(0) WHIT, “WOT : 


696 


‘CP 1h fq) ‘Td “WO : S6¢—III 


nr UY, 7 Ie : 
(P19 fn) “Gdog ,pueg : 
‘(CuP) “Wog ‘wag : 
(9) “SSor] py WHEY, : 


867 
469 
967 
61P 
































‘pid ‘pe ‘dd ¢.0% 
‘= Ta 
oqndey “et 











ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


l~ 


() Td “JOVOTT, : LEE 

















‘piq ‘po dd § 


VOLP—V898 = “q | 


‘pid ‘pedd §y= © 
ap9e—vL¢g ="q | 
‘pid ‘pe ‘dd og 

‘q+ "q+ 'q=q= 

NTs 
onqnday ‘FT 
dNowy) OINOL 

-VIg HIaaIj{ ‘TIT 
































(P) S50] “HLT, + 61Z | 
mene ‘yovouUL, : STS 
‘Cq) Td “Udog : E1Z | | 
(To) 'JOVOTL “POT * ET | 
‘('o) “aod "Udog :88T—T. 
‘(dd ¥6z) VoTp—ve98="4 | 18-0 | OST | & | a | AT | GF 
(Zs . ° . | | 
ie. (*o) ‘wIeg ‘Ipovyd : 9p | | 
‘(q® iP “a1? nm) yr }OVOTLL mr tPOe4d + 8pp— Il | 
w880T 28h — “("q) mr AdOg ptpowyd + HEE } ! 
ani ‘Ipovyd : 16G—T I I | | 
: (dd $1) aL9g—vise="4 || 60-0 | Té@ | —|— | | It 
| | ‘queqacodurt 
1 | SOUT] G6Z-G SuTAIMO 
| -90 SOTFLABI[NIG | 
160 | oe || & | se | 28 | LF 
| 
ee ee elects a | A 
"orqey oT} SULMOT[OF SuOT]RURTdxe des STTRJOp ssmery ||-Agreapin | re ° By . 
PA OaOs (ox “LOC Se ‘XI-IITA 8700g = Pp ‘ITA-A S100g = 9 eyy uo || fo eee Pan ES 9 
‘AT-IT 8¥00q = q ‘T yooq ‘dey=v ‘syoxovaq ul poppe 810990[ poms |/spunyjo| BS | 5 o sg a: || 
[ews Aq poy.reur st orpqndey eyy yo yaed yore ut Aqraeynoed yore sour aod tina Bed | 3 S g 
JO aoueIMo00 oY} OSTy ‘Sander ApraerTNoed owes oT} YOIYM UE |) Gi o7e ke pea fae = ial =e (ok S| 
SONSOTLIP FxXou OMY OY] JO SOUL pozeIAcIqqe oy} tvodde czoqumnu a ee eae cB ea 
sty} puryog ‘soraernoed oystt{ys peapunt eay Jo 4st] eaoqe | Ms tial | i hae = ame 
ay} Ul toquint yuetmo sqr Aq peyeusisep st Apaeynoed you |, fate itp ! ane ‘onSoperp yore ur 
aug gstyf ayy Lof aaaqvpay [eJO4, | punog of4gs azey JO $22? | 
anhoynig yova ur burwveddy sayrwwynoad fo woynsaunsy : | | -awpynoad fo waquinyy | 
| | 
i 











‘aTqey STyy Ur | 
WOT} LOF POSN SUOTZRIAT | 
-qv pus ‘tepaio peorsojfou 
-oryo potunserd «ey Ut 
sanbopprp ay? fo Saw NT 








“panurzuod 


OLVIg JO SHODOTVIG OMM-ALNAM YT, WOX ALINIGAY OLLSITALG fO WIavy, 


~~ 


THE STYLE OF PLATO 








al G ‘[RJMEpTOI® 


8B q UT 





Sauna Mou yueytodut ¢ ‘payved 
g mooo (*q¢ +*q + 'q) efoyM 9u0 
‘SOUIT] IL F *q Ul ‘soully F{[-F sSuT1aM990 


sorplavrpnoed *q ur ‘yueycoduat ore Boma @ SuLtamos0 


soryierpnoed tq uy 


“q Ul payeodon T ‘jeyuaptooe 9 


roku eons pre) todo Va ‘payvodoa 7 ‘Tequepiooe 77 { 'q 


ur poqyeodar ¢ 


Td wld * §8¢ 


‘Teyueplo0e ¢ : soryaertnoed MON 


“we “ovo, : 68h—II 
(19) “Une JOVOUL, : PSF 
pr WR APOC : ELF 
‘(ir 79) “WIR 7 JOVOTT, | BEE 
mr 4dog “ULB - 18 
*('0) "ydog ‘meg : FBZ 
‘WIV “IPOVY : OTZ 

‘('9) gr MOg “WIV : G8I—T 


> (‘dd ¢%) achp—aglp="q 


‘Gn? mP cu) on sea le “Ipseyd 3 37E 


"Pa ) aN 196 


W299] 2096 


‘(9 mP or 1 2 sid) mr PROUT, pr tpeveyqd + Z0g—TIT 


(P fn 14) “voy, “tpoeyg : gge 
"("0) “WII, “Iperyg : 1g¢ 
1 990'T “OVO, : SHE 

“(9 FP 410 £4) ur }9V9Y], “Ipevegd : $ps— IL 
5) ase 1 UI : 68P 
‘(p 9) ‘S8ary ‘weg S8P 


1899] “WLOd : Sep 


‘UI “peryg L8¥ 
"‘S80'T 5, UI : 

‘(P 12 “q) JOON “per = ELF 
SULIV "Java, : 

‘(9 p %) ‘wuaeg “yovory, : gee 








02:0 








vtl 








16 





9T 








6& 











‘piq ‘pe ‘dd ¢g = 


acy —I3Glh = 





ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF .PLATO’S LOGIC 


174 





(8 P) "WMO w'JPOUT, * LBB 




















WaT, “poe '98B—T | | | 
: (‘pig ‘pe dd FF) aThs—OTLF=" | 68-0 | P83) L se Te Og 
P ; : : ; | | | 
(P 9) “WO mt POPT *68V—I1 | | | 
1 BOT ‘ULIG : Gh | 
‘WOd “VOUL : FOV | | 
"(o) ‘yovoyy, “Ipoeyd : G6g eel 
(0) yy S8erT "Ydog : GZg | 
_, wld “Mod :498 | | 
(2 79) mrGdog jy WIV : BEE | 
‘(0 %0) ,WaIeg “yovoyy, : 9BE | 
: 1889] OLB | 
(0%) madog wapoeyd + 96—'T 
‘(dd 6-91) S1L7—V6rF="9 | ATO || BeT || 3 | 02 | IT | es 
“queqodut 
SOUT} GZ—-G SUITING | 
-00 SOT}LIeINIeg 
96:0 | 292 || ZL | O7 | 6B | 9G 
= ee 
OTR} OU} SULMOT[OF SUOTPEULTAXE 998 STIVIOP || oo avy Agounfto || +o > 5 = = 
qoqjo 10g "X HOOT = © “XI-TITA 8{00G = P TIAA 840M = || orn _ a [he vette ecg etel| 
‘AT-IT Sy00g = q ‘J yooq ‘day=e ‘syoyovrq UL poppe s10q99T |! ae ey eal Ee @ | = g Be 
Tews Aq poxreur st orpqnday og jo yavd yore ur Apiazerpnoed yore |) pe o eT || Bx | Seg S i 
JO 99NeIIND00 94} OSTY ‘Samoaa AgrterpNoed sues oT} TOA UT | aera see | S slsh g a ¢ 
SONSOTLIp JXou OMY oYy JO sourvU poyeadmqqe oy} tvedde toqunu | 4.4 || Se a Hee me = 
sty} pulyog + ‘serraerpnoed orsij{4ys poxapuny oeay Fo SIT eaoqge | a a | L ata, a 
ey} Ul taquinu yuormo sqrt Aq poyeusisep st Aqyraerpnoed yorG | hi if | Ge fe | ‘anSoyerp yore ut 


awry, ysiyf ay, wof 
anboypig yova ur burswaddn sarvyrwpynoad fo uowuniaunuy 1 
| 





anyn)ay | ee Teo, | 























punoy e[A4s 1a7RT JO 892g 


-woynoad fo LaquUunyy 


| piq "pe ‘dd ¢.¢¢ = 
a[FS—oT Lt =°0 


‘piq ‘pe ‘dd 6.¢T = 
aT L4—V6FF ='0 


‘pid ‘pe ‘dd F.09 
9+ 90>90=> 
‘TIA-A ‘d 
oyqnday *S] 


‘aTqney STUY Ur | 
UIOT]} LOZ posn SUOTYBIAZIG 
-qe pue ‘tepxo peorsojou | 
-o1yo poumserd meq} Ul 
sanboppup ay} {0 SAUD NT 














‘panuyuoI—OLVIg 40 SHOADNOTVIG OML-ALNEMY, WOX ALINIAAY OMLSITALG HO WIAV], 


175 


STYLE OF PLATO 


THE 





‘poyvodor 





‘TeyUeplooe FT : SeT{LaeTMoed MON 


wld ‘Jeon, : eee 
‘qovoyT, “Ipeeyd :O6I—TII 
(9) wr Td ‘WIV ° 06h 
‘SOOT ‘WIV : SP 
“ULTB ir }9BOELL, : G87 
‘S00 7 UIE : O8F 
"WIV 7 JOVONT, : PLP 
WIV 7 JOVOULL, : LF 
‘(9) ‘qovol], yy Ipoveyd : TLP 
1999] wr Td : 838 
1 959T ‘TIT : 16% 
Try “ydog 06 
"qTOg ‘Ydog : 48gT—'T 


96-0 


t8T 








g 





‘queq10d wat 
| SOUIL] QT-F SuLAAND 
| -00 SoTyIaelpnoeg 





Lv 





‘Oo url queyzodurt 7 ‘payeedoa 


qequepiooe ef ‘*%o ut pozyeoder gy ‘[eyUeplooR [7 
‘To ul poywodod 7 ‘TeyUeprooN G : SoryITeTTNOed MON 


WIV] 1J0VONT, : 69F 
‘Td ‘ydog : ¢gI—IT 

‘(qP) ‘Soory ‘tare : EH 

Td ‘WIV : OLF 

ny UB mr }9BOTUL, : I9€ 

‘ydog yorouy, :9e¢ 

(HP) md “qdog : 08s 

TU “MOd : 68 

TITd ?228 

(P) pr Gdog py JOROTT, * LH 

rUly ‘yYdog : ggg 




















£6 | 6G 

















‘pig ‘pa ‘dd p.¢¢ 
‘P = XI-IIIA ‘A 


oygndoy “OT 





AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


ORIGIN 


176 


| 
| 








“MOU O18 


sorpierpnoed quegtoduat & pur ‘poyvoder ¢ ‘yeyuep 





















































roe g ueYy ‘9 aTOJOq UO4IITM JY “guezzodut 7% | 
‘paywodoa ¢ ‘Tejueplooe @ :sorjraernood MON 
“Gi | 
or EO wr }9POUTL, + 6 G7 | 
nn 1408 mr Uv + §f6—TII | 
‘(yao ‘ULe | : 
“SVIYLT SULT ote ae ee : Bu "queyrod ory 
I) mr ULL + 886 HO ah. '8 II | soul) GTP SuLtan9 
‘OOOTT ‘WIV : OL : . 
; Traiger doa -00 SOTPIAVIPNIG 
Wd “UFOS + §9& Yaos "OVO, + HEE | 
UT, Ud S68 ur Ydog peg + $% —'T T&:0 | 086 | Z | G | 98 | og 
ar (dog py PVOYT, ?  —TII 
“POBOTN"L 1 APSVYUd + [HE—'II 
—: qed B 0} portojzor oq YOUURO TOIT | | 
soryterpnoed Mou OM OTTqndey oy} ut aeodde osye | ‘quejazod uit 
alo, ‘Teyuoeproow EF :e UL soryaurpnoed Mon | sour} 6-g Surmo 
: : ; | -00 sorqlaerpnoe g 
UY, WAR | BLF ise s 
San MAB S27. ‘ydog ‘apeeyd : S87—T 8T-0 | c&I | 9 | 7 | FT | GE 
| | Eee wale 
‘OTR OY} SUIMOT[OF SUOT]RULTAxO dos STLeQOp || saver ||-Agounpty || re Si) Sh ee seal 
etme ers = 8 XT TAP eq OOd Pe LA A POOR =! Saano: || fo odie | 2 | 8 | 
AI-IT 830g = q ‘T Yoo ‘doy =v ‘sjoxowrq Ul poppR 8.10949] meat || squun jo s@ |p| 3 || 
[Rus Aq poyarvur st orpqudey oyy jo yaed yore ur Ayraerpnoed yore as Satetell Boo Sh e | © 
JO aottatIno00 oY} OSTY ‘sanoox Aqtverood ours oy} OITA ul Tose pee ee Sp te es | 
SOMSO[VIP JXOU OM] OY} JO SouvU pozurAcaqqe oy} tvodde ctoqumu ahs cae eae pe A ee Te 
SIT] puryog = ‘sorpiernoed oysitAys poapuny eay JO 4st] oAoqgn | a tal | iF yeu | 
oy} Ul doqumu yuotimo sqyt kq poywusisop st Ayaerpnoed younp fiynunfto | panes ‘ondoprp yore ut 
aun) gst ayy Los see [eiog, punoy of 44s 10yBy Jo 8927 
anboyng yova we bur.wmaddy sayrwwynoad fo Uuorynsaunupy , | || -awpynoad fo waquenn 
| | 


‘pi “pe ‘dd 0.68 
‘Ipesyg = 
snapavyd ‘ST 


‘pid ‘po ‘dd ¢.6T 
~=¥ a 
ouqnday "LT 








‘el qey SIZ Ul 
ULI} LOJ pAsN SUOTFBIAATG 
-qe pue ‘tapro yeorsofou 





-o1yo poumsead ey} Ut | 


sanboypup ayy [0 SAWN 





“‘panuyuoIi—OLVIg JO SHANSOTVIG OML-ALNAM], MOL ALINIGAY OMLSITALG 4O WIAVy, 


LTE 


STYLE OF PLATO 


THE 





| 





‘queqaoduat Ara gf “Queqzodutt 7 


‘poyvodar 7 ‘[eyueplooe gy :Solyternoed MON 
ar$Od arqdog : St-pI— AI 


Mod ‘ydog : 
"O00TT | 

SL 0 0 pa 

“SUIT 7 UT], : 
nae 
"‘B00'T 

UL], 

‘S0O0TT ‘UAL, 
S00] 

“SDT SVIPAD 
‘B99'T ‘TI 
mm M1Od m'Adog 
ooo'T 

“UILT, “HYPO : 
‘WOq “ydog : 





"sorqlaeTpnoed MOU - 


Pama 
GOP 
€9P 
097 
ent 0 0 


‘990 
‘POP 
690 
‘19D 
‘649 
: 8OP 
 66E 
‘G66 


86 
WG ak 


vE-0 





queytodut 7 ‘payveder ¢ ‘feyueplooe 77 suTeyuOD 
ql Wo} 9 OTOJOd UO}JITAM ST SNyojovoyy, JL yng 


‘MOU SB JUNO sSoTpIAVrPNoed yeyuoprooV 


pr D9oT ‘WIR 
‘arog “‘ydog 
“TU, “FPO T 
*‘00'T 





p 4[UO 


‘LOD 
‘ 66€ 
‘806 
dora | 





68-0 





£8 - 


| 














| | 
] } 


‘queyazodut 


SOU} G[-F SuramM9 
-90 SoTJABI[NII J 


OF | Zé 


GP | 9G 








‘quey.oduit 


SOUT} 9Z—G SUTAIND 
-90 SOTJIIVI]NI J 


Té 


TY | 8g 








‘pi ‘po ‘dd %.1¢ 
UIe = 
SAPWUIaUlD T ‘OG 





‘pq ‘pe ‘dd 0.¢¢ 
‘qovoyy, = 
snjajavey,T “61 











. 


ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


178 





‘SHOT SUIVIAD) : BGT-OGT 


‘S80TT “WILT, : GGI-OGT 
‘SUI : SHLT-LbT 
‘UT, : PST-Set 
‘859'T : 6L-HG 
Id wd : eg 
‘IIUd ‘8p-9F 
‘S50'T “TU : 8h-8P 
‘WEE “Ud : 1h ‘Ob ‘88-H8 
Id ‘Md : 38 ‘08-68 —'I 











‘OTV} OYJ SUTMOTLOF SuoTywURTdxo oos sprejop 
TOYO IT "KX YOOY = © *XI-TITA Soo = p “ITA-A Syoog = 0 
‘AI-II S390 = q ‘TJ Yoo ‘doy =x ‘szoxovaq ut poppe s10q90] 
[vs Aq poyxrvur st orpqudoeyy oyy jo yavd youo ur AyLwerpnooed youo 
jo aouaLIMo00 EY} OSTY smoor Agrverpnoed oures oY} Yor ut 


SONSO[VIP JXOU OAY OY} JO SOLUVU pozLIAcAqqe oy} reoddv rzoqumu | 


sty} puryog ‘serpaernoed orsiyAys poxapuny oay Jo 4sit oAoqu 
oy} Ul toqumu yuotmMo szt Aq poywusisop st Ajtaeroed younrp 


‘away ysuyf ayy of 
anboywrg yova ur burvnaddy saryrwwynoad fo uoynsounust 





*‘SAMCIT 

ayy Wo 

peans 

| -Bout 
dnoas 
4soqry] 

| otf} OF 

hyip 

annV ay 


| 








| 





lee 
“queq.10dut 
| SOUT] G-P SUTIN 


| -00 SOTJIIVT[NI0 F 


(06 «GG FE (00T 
| : SMUT OU} 
UI INDI YOIYA FO 
0c | 69 | 98 | GET 














| SOUT] GG—LT Sultana 


‘queqaoduar | 





‘piq ‘pa ‘dd 9.68 
‘ydog = 
asiydog “1% 

INOW LSALVT “AT 


‘dd [6T ‘eToyA euo 
SB ‘SVUYLLO ‘SNanwn 


























'-00 SsorjelNoeg =; ; 
| encore sngapyg ‘sapvuau 
689 | 6 OF OTB LOT | Yd ‘srqojavoy7, 
| | | | 
sie) |e ical bala 
Aquufip |) > 
fo |as/e.| P| 3 | 
|sqoun gov, BS | a8 | 8 a ‘aTqRy Sstyy Ww 
|) zoquinu || +.) 6 | & 3 || wor} tof posn suoryerac«¢q 
|| SULMOT 5 | ih Sy & || -qv puv ‘topo pRotsojou 
| -[OF oy | = —____|| -o1yo pewmseid ney] ut 
| OF QueT | || sanb T 
Shel ! ‘@nee oep uowenm sanbo)vrp ay7 fo SaUwNn 
I®}Og, || pumoy of 44s 109R] Jo saz7 
-uupynoad fo Laquun~y 











*panuyuoori—OLVIg 40 SHOAYOTVIG OML-ALNGUMT, YOX ALINIAAY OLLSTIALY 


40 @Idvy, 








| ed 


STYLE OF PLATO 


THE 








ar Ud ar Pod 
mr 4d ar HOd 
mm EG pr HTOd 
1 899TT 1 MO 
mr 4d mF 19d 
ur Gd mr PIOd 
mt Yd Fd 
58a] “UL, 
mld “Wod 
ot Gd 319d 
mr 4d 30d 
wr 959T “WTO 
1 859T 

mld wd 
W999 “FOG 
1990] 


ny WET, 

Td “19d 

1 OLY “WTO 
*‘900TT 

OT eek 

o OL or Hd 
Wd 

TWEE, “Hod 
Mele O LN 
‘B59T “Od 


‘queqzodumt Area 7 ueqtodun gz ‘poyved 
“OL § ‘TeJUEplooV CY : soTjITeI[NOed AOU Jo [RIO], 


‘VG pares 
‘996 
*G9E 

: 066 
‘908 

* 006 
‘0G-9T 
‘ $87 
‘98 

‘ DOE 

‘ $08 
‘486 

* $66 
‘106 

‘ G8T > a 
* CEP 

DEP 

‘098 

‘Las 

‘OTE 

‘ G66 

606 

‘68T 

‘T8T-LAT 
‘OLT-PLT 

‘TAT 

‘OLT-89T 


— LEE 





\ 



























































fond 


1 299T "IY : 9S 
‘ODeTT "IY :6GE 
"WILDL wd ‘Sig 


SOOT “UT, | PST 


























ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


180 





‘pid ‘po ‘dd Z.¢F 
“q1]0g = 
SNIUNOT “BE 




















BRO) ULL + SLT | 
Ben). TnL - GAT 
Sen nh “L008 
“SBI “ULL, + 99T 
‘o8orT “WHY, : GOT-6ST | | 
SBI): 6PT | ‘sueqzoduar | 
‘UL, : 9FI- : 
paw ‘ SPT GET SOUL} [Z—-P SUTIN | 
peed ‘ G6T 08 | -00 SOTPITVINO GT 
[Ud +69 6h | | 
“SUITE “Td * GP 69:0 SbF | GT | GG | 6E Ut 
Ta, ld: | \ | 
ao ae me | ! MSNA MEE 
Saat eee | UI IMOI TOTAL JO 
#o09'T "Td + €& | : 
“UL Td *T§ —I | 69:0 | S6P | GF | 99 | S&F | S9T| 
=e a ree SuUOTyVURTdxe 9es ee E Hi A = 
‘ \ : : | h Si deahi| <o | 
Tou} TOT "KX NOOR = 2 I-TTTA #00 = P ITAA S00 = 9 |) sa Gh baal Ges ee eee 
‘AT-IT Syood = q ‘T yoog ‘doy =v ‘syoyovIq Ul poppe 810990] poms | sown yo so | § be aS) 2. | 
jpeus kq poyrvur st orpqndeyy oy yo yrvd yoo ur Aqrrertnoed yoo =sour || sequin Ba |g] 8 e | 
JO oouetMo00 oY} OSTY ‘stnoet Aytrerfnoed oures oy} YOR ur | Fea Reo aaeel Bh. oan 
SONSoTVIp FXOU OMY OT} JO SoUTVU pozrrAcaqqe oy} rvodde roqumnu fecie f ee aa 7 | pee a 
sy} purpog ‘serpaerpnoed orst]Ays porpuny oA JO 4ST] eAoge out a diane | : ; — 
oy} Ur toqumu yuormmo syt Aq poyvusisep st Apaernoed you | Agnuf'p Lae neil ‘onZoyerp yore ur. 
‘aug ysuf ayy Lof | aa27p)a97|_[eIOT, | Puno} o[A4s 10yVT JO 8927 | 


anboynrq yova ur burwmeddny saryrwnynoad fo uornsaunugy 




















-wupynoad fo saquien vy 








OLGeR SIG) Ut 
WOT} OF posn SuOTRIAIIq 
-qe puv ‘iep1o0 pRosojou 
-oryo powmserd meyqy Ut 
sanboppup ayy fo sau NT 





*panuyuoI—OLvIg dO SANYOTVIC(T OMIE-AINAM], YO ALINIAGY OLLSITALG dO aTAVy, 








181 


STYLE OF PLATO 


1 
4 


THE 






































| "que}10d uit 
SOUT} 9Z-G SULLA 
| 700 SOTPaeIpNIeg 
‘BBO “G8 | 660 | FSE | FT | Th | 6 | Ld 
w°OO'T *SIE— TI || | : SABrT OT} pects 
pion aoe | | UL andar ORT jo Pid ote es | 
‘B5aTT SLID (08B—I 09-0 | Leh | HT | 77 | 8G | SUT SNIDWAT, “VG | 
*poyerourmnue 
jou o1om Ao} osnvoeq SIT INO UI popnyour you | 
‘IOYV] SUIAINIOL puv suqeTItTg ey} Ur ysay Sutrvodde | 
SpIOM OIVI GE puNoF sey [joqdueD ssey} Sepisog | "que 10d UIT 
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ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


182 











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183 


THE STYLE OF PLATO 











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-nood yore OIA Ur sonSoyerp OA} 4xou oy, ‘Topo PRoLsojouoryo poumserd ayoy} UT AO][OF sarytaerpnoed | 





The 
length has 
a great 
influence 
on the 
equivalent 
of affinity, 
but the 
number of 
peculiari- 
ties found 
in each 
sample 

of text is 
not pro- 
portional 
to the size. 
Single 
peculiari- 
ties are 
insignifi- 
cant, and 
the order 
of small 
dialogues 
remains 
uncertain. 


The 
increase 
of the 
equivalent 
of affinity 
is not pro- 
portional 
to the 
size of the 
sample of 
text inves- 
tigated. 
Only equal 
amounts 


184 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


Among the inferences which can be drawn from the 
above table, nothing is of greater importance than the 
great influence of the size of a dialogue on the number of 
stylistic peculiarities found in it. We see that the 
Critias on its eleven pages contains less than half the 
number of peculiarities found in the Timaeus, which, being 
nearly five times larger, was written immediately before the 
Crituas. Hence it results that eleven pages, being more 
than the size of the Crito and some other small dialogues, 
are insufficient for a stylistic determination, so long as 
we deal only with a few hundred stylistic tests. The 
difficulty might be removed by extending stylistic obser- 
vation over a far greater number of particulars, a task 
which requires only additional research. But we under- 
stand at once that our equivalents of affinity for such 
small dialogues as the Huthyphro or Crito are very far 
from the truth, and that for instance no valid inference 
can be drawn from the apparently greater affinity of the 
Crito with the later style. This shows also the insignifi- 
cance of a single test applied to such a complicated 
problem. One té py; or one xa@arrep occurring any- 
where proves nothing, if even seventeen peculiarities of 
later style found in the Laches and missing in Charmides 
are according to our rules no sufficient evidence for the 
priority of Charmides. 

We are warned also against the error of supposing the 
opportunities for the occurrence of a greater number of 
peculiarities to be proportional to volume. In this respect 
the subdivision of each part of the Republic into several 
samples of text is very instructive. Even those who 
believe the Republic to have been written during many 
years cannot deny that B III-IV are the immediate 
continuation of B. II, and with it form one whole. The 
style of equal samples of text in these books is also very 
uniform. But the influence of the size becomes evident 
if we compare a small sample with a larger one. Part b, 
(357 A—367 EB) of 74 pp. (ed. Didot) contains only an 


STYLOMETRIC INFERENCES 185 


equivalent of 21 units of affinity, while the following 
294 pages, being four times larger, have seven times more 
peculiarities. In another case two succeeding samples of 
text differ much less, namely, c, (471 c—541 8B), being 
nearly thrice as long as c, (449 Aa—471 8), has less than 
twice as many peculiarities of later style. The whole of 
the Republic, being ten times larger than the tenth book, 
contains only a little more than thrice as many pecu- 
harities of later style. From these examples, which 
might be indefinitely multiplied, it becomes evident that 
only equal amounts of text should be compared. Future 
inquirers should base their calculations on an amount 
of text equal for each dialogue, or divide each dialogue 
into such equal samples of text, for instance, of ten 
thousand words each. 

Another lesson of the highest importance is taught by 
the stylistic comparison of the first book of the Republic 
with the following books. Nobody doubts that the 
fiepublic in its present shape is one whole, and that the 
first book, even if mainly composed much earlier, has 
been revised and worked into unity with the following 
text. Now it has a surprisingly early style, having less 
than half as many peculiarities of later style as the first 
sixteen pages of the fifth book, even fewer than the 
Laches, which is inferior in size. This shows on one side 
the early date of the first book, and on the other side it 
shows that no revision can substantially alter those 
peculiarities of style which are the subject of our investi- 
gation. Therefore all explaining away of the late style 
of the Phaedrus and Theaetetus by the supposition that 
we possess these dialogues in a late and revised edition is 
of no value whatever for chronological purposes. If later 
revision could alter stylistic affinities, then the first 
book of the Republic, which must have been revised, 
emended, and corrected in order to be absorbed into 
the larger work, could not have remained as remote 
from the later style as the Laches, while already the 


of text are 
compar- 
able so 
long as we 
deal with 
a few 
hundred 
peculiari- 
ties 
observed. 


The 
author’s 
revision 
does not 
alter the 
essential 
stylistic 
character 
of the 
text, and | 
stylistic 
compari- 
son shows 
the rela- 
tive date 
of a work 
even if 
applied to 
a later 
edition 
corrected 
by the 
author. 
This is 
very > 


important 
for a 
knowledge 
of the date 
of the 
Phaedrus 
and The- 
aetetus 
which 
were re- 
vised by 
Plato 
later. 

The first 
book of 
the Re- 
public un- 
doubtedly 
revised 
and cor- 
rected has 
a surpris- 
ingly early 
style. 


Relation 
between 
Philebus, 
Timaeus 
and dia- 
lectical 
dialogues 
remains 
also un- 
certain 
because 
so many 
special 
peculiari- 
ties of the 
Sophist 
and Poli- 


186 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


second book shows a style later than the Phaedo and 
Symposium. This conclusion is quite independent of any 
speculation on the exact date of the Republic, or on the 
date of the Laches. If anybody supposes that the first 
book of the Republic could have been written as early as 
the Laches (as Siebeck does), then he is bound to account 
for the difference of style between the Laches and the 
second book of the Republic. At all events, we have here 
a work which has been left by Plato as one whole, and 
which nevertheless betrays by stylistic tests the differ- 
ence of the times in which it was begun and continued. 
According to our rules the number of peculiarities of later 
style found in the first book of the Repwblic is insufficient 
for an exact determination of its place among the early 
dialogues, and it may be even later than the Gorgias. 
To settle this question it would be necessary to collect a 
much greater number of observations, and to compare 
with the first book of the Republic a part of the Gorgias 
exactly equal in size. This we are unable to do, as a great 
number of authors from whom we have taken the number 
of occurrences of each peculiarity did not enumerate all 
the passages. 

The relation between the Philebus and Timaeus on 
one side and Sophist and Politicus on the other side 
cannot be decided according to our table, because we have 
included in our list more than one hundred words observed 
by Campbell in the Sophist and Politicus, while no such 
special study has been made of the Philebus, Timaeus, 
and Critias. These words were included in the list 
because the late date of the Sophist and Poltticus is less 
generally recognised than the late date of the Trmaeus, 
Critias, and Philebus ; it therefore appeared necessary to 
bring out with the greatest clearness this late character 
of the two dialectical dialogues, even at the risk of making 
them appear later than the Philebus, Timaeus, and Critias. 
As soon as these later dialogues shall have been investi- 
gated with as much care as Campbell spent on the two 


STYLOMETRIC INFERENCES 187 


continuations of the Theaetetus, the true chronological 
order will not be obscured as it is now in the later part of 
our table. Even now it is easy to eliminate a part of the 
error by excluding a number of peculiarities which have 
been first observed in Sophist and Politicus. If we omit 
peculiarities 12, 13, 54-181 of our list, reducing thus the 
total number to 370 peculiarities under investigation, then 
the Philebus will not be affected by this change, while the 
Laws lose 102 units of affinity, the Timaeus 53, the 
Politicus 86, and the Sophist 69. 

The relative affinity calculated on these reduced 
numbers will .be 0°65 for the Sophist, 0°66 for the Poli- 
ticus, 0°66 for the Philebus, and 0°61 for the Timaeus. 
This calculation shows that the most important figures 
of our table are those of the relative affinity, which are 
very constant, and change little if they are calculated on 
a very much reduced or very much increased number of 
observations, changing less with the increasing number 
of observations. We see that the relative affinity of the 
Sophist, which was found to be 0°65 for 500 peculiarities, 
is just the same for 370 peculiarities. It is probable that 
increasing our list to 5,000 peculiarities, this constant 
relation would not be altered by more than a small 
percentage. We have therefore in the relative affinity a 
powerful instrument for chronological purposes, of the 
same constant character as the physical constants 
measured in natural science. If the density of pure 
iron has been found by a series of experiments to be 7'8, 
everybody understands that further experiments of a 
greater exactness can only alter this constant relation 
very slightly, adding new decimals and showing it to be 
more exactly 7:84, but never 7°5 or 8:0. We claim the 
same permanent character for the relative affinity, calcu- 
lated on a sufficient number of observations. Comparing 
these numbers, calculated on a smaller or greater part of 
our materials, we have found that relative affinities under 
0-1 have no value whatever, and can be changed to the 


ticus have 
been in- 
cluded in 
our list. 


Reducing 
our list by 
130 pecu- 
liarities, 
the 
relative 
affinity of 
the So- 
phist will 
not be 
affected, 
and that 
of the 
Philebus 
rises above 
the So- 
phist and 
even the 
Timaeus. 
The 
relative 
affinity 
has the 
character 
of a 
natural 
constant 
like the 
constants 
in 
physical 


science. 
This gives 
an unpre- 
cedented 
strength 
to our con- 
clusions. 


The latest 
group of 
Plato’s 
works con- 
sists of the 
Sophist, 
Politicus, 
Philebus, 
Timaeus, 
Critias, 
and Laws, 
with a 
relative 
affinity of 
over 

0°5 in 
samples 
of text 
exceeding 
forty 
pages. 


188 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


extent of at least half their value by calculations based on 
a greater number of observations. But the remaining 
relative affinities in our list are exact in their first decimal, 
and any number of observations added can increase them 
only in the second decimal, except in the Philebus for the 
reasons explained above. But even the Philebus, if we 
measure its relative affinity by one decimal, will maintain 
it, whatever number of new observations may be added. 
Thus we claim to have proved the following general 
conclusions about the order of the works of Plato: 

1. The latest works of Plato are: the Sophist, 
Politicus, Philebus, Timaeus, Critias, Laws. This group 
is distinguished from all other works by a relative affinity 
of over 0°5 in samples of text exceeding 40 pages (ed. 
Didot). This means that out of any number of stylistic 
peculiarities investigated (provided those peculiarities are 
selected which are not lmited to one dialogue, and 
provided the number of peculiarities so investigated 
exceeds 300) more than half the number found in the 
Laws will be found in any sample of text of 40 pages of 
these dialogues. As the Critias has only 11 pages, for 
the investigation of the Critias the preceding 29 pages of 
the Timaeus must be added. Or, if we calculate the 
relative affinity of the Critias apart, it must be com- 
pared with an exactly equal amount of text of the 
Timaeus; then it cannot be expected that the relative 
affinity of such a small portion of text should exceed half 
the value of the affinity of larger units, as the relative 
affinity is in close relation to the amount of text to which 
it is applied. With an increasing number of peculiarities 
observed, the influence of the size of a sample of text 
would be less important, and the size of the Critias is 
insufficient to define its stylistic affinity only so long as 
we deal with a reduced number of observations. The 
number of possible peculiarities of style is practically 
infinite, and may easily exceed the number of words 
contained in a sample of text. 


STYLOMETRIC INFERENCES 189 


2. The latest group is preceded by a middle group, 
consisting of Republic B. II-X, Phaedrus, Theaetetus 
and Parmenides. In these the relative affinity is under 
0-5, and even under 0:4 for samples of text of 30-60 
pages. The mean affinity of dialogues belonging to this 
group is only 0:3, or only half as much as the affinity of 
equal dialogues of the latest group. The middle group 
is distinguished from all earlier dialogues by a great 
number of important and very important peculiarities 
appearing here for the first time, as may be seen from the 
table. 

3. The middle group is preceded by a first Platonic 
group, consisting of three dialogues, Cratylus, Symposium, 
and Phaedo, which are characterised by a relative affinity 
inferior to that of equal samples of text of the middle 
group, being about 0:2, and not exceeding 0:21 for samples 
of text of 40-50 pages. The first Platonic group is 
distinguished from all Socratic dialogues by many special 
peculiarities appearing here for the first time, and indi- 
cated in our table. 

4. Among the Socratic dialogues, which show an 
apparent relative affinity of 0:1, or even less, the Gorgias 
appears with probability to be the latest, having 18 
peculiarities in common with the first Platonic and later 
groups, which are missed in other Socratic dialogues. 
But this number, which was held to be sufficient by C. 
Ritter to define the middle group, is according to our 
improved method insufficient, and affords only a certain 
probability, increased by internal evidence resulting from 
the comparison of contents, but requiring further support 
by a much greater number of observations. 

5. Last, not least, we repeat the important conclusion, 
which is perhaps the greatest gain of our investigations, 
viz. that stylistic tests if properly directed afford cer- 
tainty as to the chronological order of Plato’s dialogues ; 
and conclusions from stylistic comparisons cannot be in- 
validated by assuming fictitious later editions, corrections 


The 
middle 
group 
shows a 
relative 
affinity of 
about 0:3. 


The 
Cratylus, 
Sym- 
postum, 
Phaedo 
are earlier, 
having a 
relative 
affinity of 
only 0:2. 
That the 
Gorgias 
is the 
latest 

of all 
Socratic 
dialogues 
is pro- 
bable. 


Certainty 
of stylis- 
tic con- 
clusions 
indepen- 
dent of 


supposed 
revisions. 


Phaedo 
later than 
Sympo- 
sium and 
Cratylus ; 
Par- 
menides 
later than 
Theaetc- 
tus and 
Phae- 
drus ; 
Philebus 
later than 
Sophist. 
Other 
minor 
questions 
will 

easily be 
decided by 
the same 
method if 
applied on 
a larger 
scale. 

Our con- 
clusions 
confirm 
earlier 
conclu- 
sions 
arrived at 
by stylis- 
tic study 
and com- 
pletely 
change 


190 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


and revisions, as it has been seen on the first book of the 
Republic that such later changes cannot affect the essential 
characteristics of style as these are now known. 


The above five conclusions are worth the labour spent 
on our study of Plato’s style. We do not pretend to give 
for certain anything more about the order of dialogues 
within each group, except that the Phaedo is later than 
Symposium and Cratylus, the Parmenides later than 
Theaetetus and Phaedrus, the Philebus later than the 
Sophist. The relative position of Republic, Phaedrus, 
and Theaetetus, of Politicus, Philebus, and Timaeus, can- 
not be decided on the above observations alone. These 
problems are of less importance than the distinction of 
groups, and now that the method of stylistic calculation 
has been shown on a small example of five hundred pecu- 
liarities, it will be very easy to apply it on a much larger 
scale, and to settle all the minor difficulties left to future 
inquirers. It is to be hoped that nobody hereafter will 
attempt to judge about Plato’s style from small numbers 
of observations. Any new observations ought to be 
added to those existing, in order to achieve a progress 
of knowledge in these matters. The group of the latest 
six dialogues, recognised independently by Campbell, 
Dittenberger, C. Ritter, and von Arnim, is now still better 
defined and is established beyond all reasonable doubt. 
The anomaly observed by Campbell as to the Philebus, 
Parmenides, and Theaetetus, is removed, and the true 
place of these three dialogues found in accordance with 
their style. This entirely changes the current traditional 
conception of Platonism, as taught by Schleiermacher 
and Hermann, and still in our own day represented by 
the great name of Zeller. The differences between these 
authors become insignificant in view of their grave and 
common error in placing the dialectical dialogues before 
the Sympostum and Republic. This error produces a 
complete distortion of the true view of Plato’s philo- 


STYLOMETRIC INFERENCES 191 


sophical career. It is as if some eminent critics pro- 
posed to look upon Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft 
as a juvenile eccentricity, and to seek the chief contents 
of Kant’s philosophy in his Principiorum primorwm 
cognitionis metaphysicae nova dilucidatio, published in 
1755, and written under the influence of the then pre- 
vailing philosophy of Leibniz and Wolff. 

We should fall into the error of premature generalisa- 
tion if we pretended to go further in our conclusions and 
to decide anything about the order of Socratic dialogues 
in which the relative affinity sinks below 0-1. Our in- 
strument is not fine enough for these small differences 
between dialogues probably removed forty years from the 
Critias and from the latest books of the Laws. To 
determine their order, another standard is required than 
the Laws, with which they have too little in common. 
The Gorgias being the latest and also the longest of the 
group of Socratic dialogues, the best plan would be to 
collect and classify peculiarities common to each of 
them with the Gorgias. But if five hundred peculiarities 
were needed to fix the order of dialogues later than the 
Gorgias, for those earlier a much greater number of 
observations is required, and can be reached only through 
well-organised labour of many scholars. 

A distinction of only four degrees of importance of 
stylistic marks might ultimately prove insufficient, but 
even if we classify the peculiarities observed otherwise, it 
will always be indispensable to make due allowance for 
the different importance of accidental, repeated, frequent, 
and very frequent peculiarities, as well as for the more or 
less essential character of certain observations. 

One of the most immediate aims for further inquiry 
is to investigate peculiarities inthe order of words and 
in the construction of phrases. By means of a great 
number of such peculiarities it will be possible to 
determine the relative affinity of all dialogues among 
each other, and this alone will probably lead to the 


the 
current 
concep- 
tion of 
Platon- 
ism. 
Proposed 
subjects 
for future 
inquirers. 
They must 
compare 
each dia- 
logue with 
all others, 
and spe- 
cially all 
Socratic 
dialogues 
with the 
Gorgias. 


The classi- 
fication of 
peculiari- 

ties can be 
improved. 


The order 
of words 
and con- 
struction 
of phrases 
should be 


investi- 
gated. 

A revision 
of work 
already 
done is 
also 
necessary. 
Number of 
words in 
each work 
should be 
counted. 
Our 
method 
can easily 
be applied 
to other 
problems 
than 
Platonic 
chrono- 
logy, and 
leads to 

a new 
science of 
stylometry 
subsidiary 
to 
historical 
research, 
like 
palaeo- 
graphy. 
Greater 
certainty 
of results 
obtained 
by the 
investiga- 
tion of 
style than 


192 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


definitive solution of all difficulties of the Platonic 
chronology. 

There is no reason to fear that the amount of time 
spent on such inquiries will be lost. In every science 
there arises at certain points a necessity for much detailed 
research leading to no new conclusions, and only confirming 
previous generalisations. The familiar example of modern 
organic chemistry shows that valuable investigations were 
made by beginners, following a method already fixed, with 
results foreseen by general theory. Such investigations, 
though they teach us few new truths, increase the certi- 
tude of the general theory which they illustrate. Further 
study of Plato’s style will probably not change our know- 
ledge as to the order of the three groups which are now 
found, but it may modify our views concerning the order 
of dialogues within each group, and may help to fix the 
order of earlier dialogues, which is at present uncertain. 

Besides further research on the lines here indicated 
a systematic co-ordination of the results already ob- 
tained is also necessary. There are discrepancies 
between the numbers given by various authors for the 
occurrence of the same peculiarity, and the calculation 
of proportions between different uses might be very much 
improved. The number of words contained in each 
dialogue should be taken as the true measure of text and 
of the opportunity for the occurrence of expressions for 
which no better calculation of opportunities can be 
found. 

When once the importance of this field of research is 
generally recognised, it will very soon appear that the 
exact determination of style is the safest way of settling 
the difficulties, not only of Platonic chronology, but also 
of the chronology of other authors, the date of whose 
writings is unknown. There will be scarcely another 
case in which the mere question of the chronology of 
some writings would be of such unparalleled importance 
for the history of human thought as in the question of 


THE FUTURE OF STYLOMETRY 193 


Platonic chronology. This exceptional importance of 
one particular case will have produced a new science of 
style, which will enable us to decide questions of authen- 
ticity and chronology of literary works with the same 
certainty as palaeographers now know the age and 
authenticity of manuscripts. This future science of 
stylometry may improve our methods beyond the lmits 
of imagination, but our chief conclusions can only be 
confirmed, never contradicted by further research. That 
the dialectical dialogues are later than the Republic is 
now as clearly demonstrated as any other fact in his- 
tory can be. Equally certain is the conclusion that the 
Republic, Phaedrus, Theaetetus, and Parmenides are‘later 
than the Phaedo and Symposium. These facts must be 
accepted now as if they were supported by the clearest testi- 
mony. The certitude attainable by a consistent theory 
is even much greater than the certitude of the best 
evidence; every astronomer believes himself to know 
more of the present and past movements of the moon 
than an historian can know of the movements of Caesar’s 
army. Historical testimonies have always but the 
value of the sensible evidence on which they are based, 
while our results as to the order of Plato’s works rely on 
the higher authority of reason, producing, according to 
Plato, infallible knowledge whenever a good method is 
followed. 


by any in- 
formation 
based on 
mere testi- 
monies. 


Small dia- 
logues dis- 
tinguished 
from other 
works of 
Plato. 


Their 
chrono- 
logical 
order very 
difficult to 
determine 
onaccount 
of their 


size. 


A Socratic 


stage in 


194 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


CEH API: LV 


SOCRATIC STAGE OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


WHEN the Platonic works are compared with regard to 
their volume, we find a numerous class of dialogues 
which do not attain to half the size of the Protagoras, 
and which can be distinguished from the rest as small 
dialogues. No fewer than eight among them, the 
Clitopho, Minos, Hipparchus, Epinomis, Theages, Ama- 
tores, Alcibiades II. and the Greater Huppias, have 
since Schleiermacher been generally regarded as spurious. 
They represent seventy-two pages of text (ed. Didot), less 
than one-third of the Laws, and contain nothing that 
could be included in Plato’s logic. 

The lo, Hippias Minor, Lysis and Menexenus, though 
successfully defended against doubts as to their authen- 
ticity, remain outside the pale of our inquiry. All these 
small dialogues offer greater difficulties than larger works, 
because their limited volume makes a complete appre- 
ciation of their style and doctrine less easy. They 
require a special study through which their mutual 
relations might be determined and a certain place assigned 
to each of them. Such an inquiry would alone fill a 
volume, if it were intended to lead to definitive con- 
clusions, based on a careful weighing of many details. So 
long as their chronological order has not been determined 
by patient and impartial stylometric inquiry, we must 
for our part abstain from all attempt to fix this order 
from the few logical hints which they contain. 

The existence of a Socratic stage in Plato’s logic is 
far more probable than the myth of a Megaric period. 


SOCRATIC STAGE OF PLATO’S LOGIC 195 


We have the clear testimony of Aristotle (Wetaph. 987 
b 1) that Plato owed to Socrates the tendency to form 
exact definitions of ethical notions. It is precisely in 
the small dialogues that we see the illustration of this 
tendency. In another passage Aristotle teaches us that 
the direct philosophical merits of Socrates were inductive 
reasoning and definition by means of general notions 
(Metaph. 1078 b 27). In the small dialogues we find 
accordingly the constant employment of inductive reason- 
ing and repeated attempts to define by means of the 
nearest general notion, in application chiefly to ethical 
purposes. Though faithful even in his later period to 
induction as a method of investigation, Plato gave in his 
dialectical works a far greater importance to deductive 
classification. The thoroughly inductive character of the 
small dialogues is more Socratic than Platonic. The 
influence of Socrates on Plato is not, like the alleged 
Megarian influence, attested only by a late and un- 
trustworthy witness: it is known from numerous 
passages in the writings of Aristotle, and results also 
from the manner in which Socrates is again and again 
represented by Plato as the teacher of true wisdom. 

Were it not for Plato’s strange desire to represent, 
in more than twenty literary masterpieces, his own 
thoughts as enunciated by Socrates, we might have given 
to the latter no more credit than to Anaxagoras, 
Heraclitus, or Parmenides, nor would his name even 
to-day be synonymous with Sage. Hence it is natural 
to suppose a Socratic stage in the development of 
Plato’s philosophy, and to seek for the vestiges of 
this period in his works. 

These vestiges are precisely found in the small 
dialogues, and in the four works in which Socrates is 
represented as triumphant over the sophists. These 
are the traditional sixth tetralogy, consisting of Prota- 
goras, Meno, Euthydemus and Gorgias, which form a 
natural group, though they have not been connected by 

02 


Plato’s 
develop- 
ment very 
probable, 
because 
we know 
from 
Aristotle 
that Plato 
owes 
much to 
Socrates, 


and it 
results 
also from 
the pic- 
ture of 
Plato’s 
teacher 
in his 
dialogues 


Socratic 
influence 
specially 
visible in 
the small 
dialogues 
and in 


the sixth 
tetralogy. 
All these 
works 
have 
chiefly 
moral 
aims. 


Also 
Socrates’ 
philo- 
sophy had 
a pre- 
dominant 
ethical 
character. 


Socratic 
dialogues 
are the 
earliest. 


Of all 
small 
dialogues 
only 
Huthy- 
phro, 
Apology, 
Crito, 


196 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


Plato himself into one series. They have in common 
with the small dialogues the predominating ethical aim, 
and they deal with the definition of virtue and various 
parts of virtue, as well as with the question whether 
virtue can be taught. Such ethical questions are 
abandoned in later works: even in the Philebus, where 
the avowed aim is the solution of an ethical problem, 
the whole argumentation takes a metaphysical and logical 
turn, which is wholly absent from the small dialogues 
and from the four others above named. 

The character of Socrates’ philosophy was also 
mainly ethical, and this authorises us to see the pre- 
dominance of Socratic influence in those dialogues which 
are limited to ethical inquiry. Plato’s own philosophy 
had another character: he was rather a politician, a 
metaphysician, and a logician, than a simple moralist. 
He set perfection above mere virtue, and even despised 
the traditional virtue of the common citizen, which was 
the starting point of Socratic ethics. 

We shall not be far from the truth, if we admit that 
the small dialogues are earlier than the logical investi- 
gations which commence with the Cratylus, and are 
continued in the Phaedo and Republic. For an exact 
determination of their order the data are not yet col- 
lected, because their style is very much less characteristic 
than the style of the latest group. We can only observe, 
that of all peculiarities of later style only very few and 
unimportant examples are to be found in the small 
dialogues. 

For the investigation of the development of Plato’s 
logic only five among them are of any importance: the 
trilogy about the death of Socrates, consisting of the 
Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and the two companion 
dialogues of the Protagoras, namely the Laches and 
Charmides. We omit the first Alcibiades, though its 
authenticity has been sustained by Socher, Stallbaum, 


SOCRATIC STAGE OF PLATO'S LOGIC 197 
Hermann, Steinhart, Andreatta,“® and Kophiniotes,'” 
against Schleiermacher, Ast, Susemihl,'** R. Hirzel’ and 
many others. Strong suspicion is roused by the noticeable 
contradiction between style and contents in this dialogue. 
According to its style the Alcibiades would be later than 
the Symposium, while the general contents place it among 
the small dialogues, as has been recognised by all defenders 
of its authenticity. Quite recently Ivo Bruns,’ by com- 
paring the characterisation of persons in Plato’s dialogues, 
came also to the conclusion that the first Alczbiades 
could not have been written by Plato. 

As to logical contents, the Alcibiades presents, besides 
some theories sufficiently known from other works of 
Plato, a singular identification of the soul with man 
(130 c: pndév GAXO Tov avOpwrov AelweTar cvpBaivewy 7 
wuynv), which recalls a passage from a notoriously 
spurious dialogue (Axiochus 365 E : jets eopev uyy). In 
the Gorgias (464 A) every man is supposed to consist of 
soul and body, and at all times Plato defined man as an 
animal (Crat. 399c, Polit. 2718, Legg. 7658, &c.), 
with a soul (uy) av@pemrov Prot. 312 B, Symp. 192 dD, 
Phaedr. 249 £, Rep. 590 A, &c.) ; the identification of man 
and soul seems to belong to some later Academicians. 
This contradiction between the first Alcibiades and the 
current Platonic teaching on an essential point is not of 
the same kind as many quite superficial contradictions 
quoted by those who oppose the authenticity of some of 
Plato’s other works. Man as consisting of body and soul 
is a familiar notion to Plato’s readers, and if the author of 


M6 Andreatta, Sull’ autenticita del’ Alcibiade primo, Roveredo 1876. 

47 J, K. Kophiniotes in vol. iv. pp. 289-296, 310-315 of the Ephemeris, 
Athens 1881. 

48 Platons Alkibiades I. und IT. iibersetzt von F. Susemihl, Stuttgart 
1864. 

49 R, Hirzel, ‘ Aristoxenos und Platons erster Alkibiades,’ in Rhein. 
Museum, vol. 45, pp. 419-435, Frankfurt a. M. 1890. 

50 J, Bruns, Das literarische Portrét der Griechen 
p. 339. 


Berlin 1896, 


Char- 
mides, 
Laches, 
contain 
logical 
hints. 


Alcibiades 
is pro- 
bably 
spurious. 


Identity 
of man 
and soul 
as pre- 
sented 

in the 
Alcibiades 
is unpla- 
tonic, and 
contra- 
dicts 

the per- 
manent 
teaching 
of Plato. 


Authen- 
ticity of 
EHuthy- 
plo suc- 
cessfully 
defended 
against 
doubts. 


Logical 
contents 
of Huthy- 
phro. 


198 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


the Alcibiades takes the trouble to give a demonstration 
of the identity between man and soul, he must have felt 
that this was an innovation against the general opinion. 
If Plato had given this demonstration himself, he could 
scarcely have disregarded it throughout his other works, 
from the Protagoras to the Laws. Therefore we are 
justified in excluding the first Alcibiades, as well as the 
second, from the list of Plato’s works. 

The doubts raised against the authenticity of the 
Euthyphro, chiefly by Ast, Ueberweg, Schaarschmidt, and 
J. Wagner,'! have been sufficiently refuted by Stallbaum, 
Hermann, Yxem,!? Wells,“? Adam,'* and Jezierski,'® 
so that there is no need to return to this question. All 
arguments against the authenticity of this and many 
other works can be reduced to two principal heads: 1. 
Plato would have written otherwise ; 2. Analogies with 
other dialogues show an imitator’s hand. Such argu- 
ments are necessarily subjective, and we can only 
affirm with certainty that Plato would have written 
otherwise, if we notice, as in the Alcibiades, some essen- 
tial contradiction to well-known and constantly expressed 
Platonic teaching. Nothing of that kind can be said of 
the Huthyphro. 

The logical contents of this little dialogue! corre- 
spond to what might be expected of a work written while 
the influence of Socrates on Plato still remained un- 
altered by further philosophical progress. The rule of 
definition of terms by general notion and_ specific 
difference is applied to a particular case: (12 D: e& pépos 


'51 J. Wagner, Zur Athetese des Dialogs Euthyphron, Brinn 1883. 

182 Yxem, Ueber Platos Huthyphron, Berlin 1842. 

88 The Huthyphro of Plato, with an introduction and notes, by George 
Henry Wells, London 1881. 

‘4 The Euthyphro of Plato, with introduction and notes, by J. Adam, 
Cambridge 1890. 

185 A. Jezierski, Platona Hutyfron, Tarnopol 1890. 

156 On the logic of the Huthyphro, see also V. Poggi, L’ Hutifrone di 
Platone, Roma 1891. 


SOCRATIC STAGE: EUTHYPHRO 199 


TO Gavov Tod SiKxaiov, Se . . &Eevpeiv TO rotoy ugpos), but 
without any methodic digression on logical theory 
such as appears in all the dialectical dialogues. Induction 
and analogy are used frequently (as 13 a, 14 A, &c.) and 
the necessity of establishing permanent notions is insisted 
upon (11 D: éBourouny av pou Tovs NOyous pévev Kal AKLVr- 
Tws lptaGar pwadrov i mpos TH Aatdddov codia ra 
Tavtarov ypipata yevéoOar: see also 5D). EKnumeration 
of examples is shown to be insufficient to give such per- 
manence to a notion (6D: ody & Tu } dvo THY TOBY 
ooiwv, aN éxelvo avTo TO Eidos, © TavTa Ta bova bowd 
éotwv) and the characteristic mark is sought for. 

This characteristic mark is here named eiéos, in the sense 
in which Thucydides used this word when he spoke of an 
eldos vooov (Thucyd. 2, 50). Some authors, as for instance 
M. Waddington,'” thought it possible to draw chrono- 
logical inferences from the absence of the words «ides or 
idga in many small dialogues. M. Waddington is 
evidently not aware of the fact that both words are 
anterior to Plato, and are used by Thucydides and other 
earlier writers in the same sense as by Plato in his early 
dialogues. In the Huthyphro as in the Charmides they 
both occur, idéain the meaning of form, property, or 
characteristic mark (6 E: pd idéa Ta Te avdcta avoota 
eivat), but not in the later meaning of a metaphysical entity. 
From the occurrence of these words, which are not yet 
used as logical terms, we cannot infer that the Huthyphro 
is later than any other small dialogue, such as the Apology 
or Crito, from which these words are absent. 

There is a greater difficulty in the circumstance that 
in the Huthyphro (6 E: xp@pevos avtTn (TH tdéa) 
mapaceiypatt) the idea is said to be a paradeigma, as 
this seems at first sight to approach the later theory of 
eternal forms or paradeigmatic ideas. But such eternal 


17 C, Waddington, ‘ Observations sur le Mémoire de W. Lutostawski,’ 
Compte rendu des séances et travaux de Vacadénvie des sciences morales et 
politiques, vol. cxlvit. N. 7. See above, note 49. 


Induction 
and defi- 
nitions, 
frequent 
use of 
analogy. 


Though 
eldos and 
t6éa both 
occur in 
the 
Huthy- 
phro, 
these 
words 
have not 
yet their 
technical 
meaning. 


The same 
refers to 
mapa- 


deryua. 


Qualities 
distin- 
guished 
from : 
causes. 


Date early 
but un- 
certain. 


200 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


forms are ‘mapadéiywata év 7H gpvoe’ (Parm. 132 D 
=Lep. 597 B, cf. Theaet. 176 £), while here Plato only 
speaks of using the characteristic of holiness as a standard 
for distinguishing holy actions from sinfuldeeds. Such a 
use of the word wapdéevypa does not essentially differ 
from that of Thucydides and the early orators; it 
cannot be regarded as peculiar to Plato. 

An important logical distinction is made in the 
Euthyphro between activity and quality : the quality is a 
result of a determinate activity, but never cause or 
ground of this activity (10 c: e re yiyveta, } Te TaTYXEL, 
ovy OTL YyuyvomEevov eoTL, yiyveTal, GAN STL yiyvETat, 
yeyvomevov gotw: ovd OTL Tacyov ézoTi, TaoxEl, GAN 
OTL Taye, Tacyov éoTiv). This is here explained by a 
number of analogies before it is expressed in a general 
form. 

These few hints of a logical character offer no 
means of determining the date of the Huthyphro. The 
scene of the dialogue proves that it could not have 
been written before the accusation of Socrates. With 
regard to the later limit of time we can infer nothing 
beyond that the Huthyphro precedes the Meno and 
Gorgias on grounds of style,’* composition, and 
contents. 


'8S Stylistic observations place the Huthyphro at the beginning of Plato’s 
literary career. It contains many peculiarities of earlier style : é0mep used 
always instead of kaSamep, T@ dvTs instead of dyTws, wevTo. prevailing over 
Tolvuy ; Eywye, Emorye, Soke? wor forming 19 per cent. of all answers, epi with 
the genitive prevailing over all other prepositions, &c. (See table of 
affinity, p. 163.) 

'8° Schleiermacher, Socher, Schierenberg (Ueber die Zeit der Abfassung 
des platonischen Huthyphro, Lemgau 1830), Stallbaum, Steinhart, Zeller 
agree in placing the Huthyphro before the death of Socrates; Susemihl, 
Georgii (Platos Euthyphron iibersetzt von Georgii, Stuttgart 1875), Bergk, 
Diimmler believe the Huthyphro to be written some years later chiefly on 
account of holiness being here a part of justice, while in the Gorgias it is a 
fifth virtue besides justice. Also H. Ritter, Brandis, Michelis, Ribbing, 
Mistriotes, Peipers, Weygoldt, Windelband, Christ, who admit the date of the 
Euthyphro as uncertain, agree, however, as to the Socratic character and 
early origin of this work. Only Teichmiiller (ii. 355) places the Huthyphro 


SOCRATIC STAGE: APOLOGY, CRITO 201 


The Apology shows, like the Huthyphro, a frequent 
use of induction and analogy (e.g. 25 Bc), and contains 
several repetitions of the well-known Socratic principle, 
that he who knows his own ignorance is wiser than 
those who believe themselves to know what they do not 
know (21 cD, 22 c, 29 A, 33.0, 41 8B). This principle is 
carried to the extreme consequence, that all human 
knowledge is of little worth and that only God is wise 
and infallible (21 B, 23 A). Such a scepticism, bearing 
even upon the future lfe (9 A: oide ovdeis Tov 
@avarov... .also 42 A), does not extend to ethical con- 
victions (30 D: to do injustice is worse than death— 
30 B: virtue imports more than all besides). 

The uncertainty manifested: as to a future life shows 
that the Apology was written earlier than the Meno and 
Gorgias, in which asin all later dialogues Plato professes 
the greatest certainty on this subject. Also the style of the 
Apology, very similar to the style of the Huthyphro, makes 
it probable that both dialogues were written not later 
than within the first years after the death of Socrates, and 
though the Huthyphro represents an earlier scene, there 
is no decisive reason to place it before the Apology.'™ 

The Crito forms the third act in the tragedy of which 
the Euthyphro and Apology represent the first scenes. 
We remark here a curious distinction between honest 
(ypnords) and immoral opinions (474: vrovnpas 6d0€as), 
which is parallel to the later constantly repeated contrast 
between mere opinion and knowledge. This way of 
estimating a judgment according to its moral value, with- 
out asking for a logical standard of truth, is peculiar to 
the Socratic stage of Plato’s logic, and shows us how 


after the Symposium and even after the Theaetetus, under the influence of 
his wrong theory of the stylistic criterion (see above, p. 102). 

160 Zeller and Ueberweg believed the Apology to be a faithful account of 
what Socrates said before his judges. But Riddell (see above, p. 99) and 
Stock (The Apology of Plato, with introduction and notes by 8S. G, Stock, 
Oxford 1887) have sufficiently demonstrated the improbability of this 
supposition. 


In the 
Apology 
we find a 
frequent 
use of 
analogy. 


Charaec 
teristic 
uncer- 
tainty 
about| 
future 
life. 


In the 
Crito 
honest 
and 
wicked 
opinions 
distin- 
guished. 


Compe- 
tent au- 
thorities 
trusted. 


The 
absolute 
authority 
of reason 
not yet es- 
tablished. 


Crito 
probably 
later than 
Apology. 


202 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


Plato was led from the moral teaching of his master 
to his own logical investigations. When he wrote the 
Crito, he seems not yet to have arrived at his later ideal 
of objective knowledge: he is satisfied with an ‘honest’ 
opinion of a competent expert (ézaiwy 47D) whom he 
trusts more than the opinion of the many (d0£a trav 
Tory 47 C). 

In agreement with such a practical standpoint, funda- 
mental differences of opinion between men are recognised 
as inevitable, and here, as in the Huthyphro, are admitted 
to produce hatred and contempt, 1f they touch upon 
ethical subjects (Crito 49c D, Euthyphro 7b). This 
view is very characteristic, because in the Gorgias and 
all later dialogues the Platonic Socrates is represented as 
possessing objective truth about ethical as well as about 
other matters, a truth which can be proved and com- 
municated even to such enemies of philosophy as Kallikles. 


Here we see only competent opinion or the authority of 


the ‘ best’ reason (46B: pndevi ddd teiPecOar 7) TH NOYO 
Os av pot Noytfouévm BérXtTicTOs haivnrat). This ‘ best ’ 
reason is not yet ‘the reason’ familiar to the readers of 
later dialogues. 

From these logical particulars we can only infer that 
the Crito,’*' forming with the preceding two dialogues a 
natural group, is earlier than the Weno and Gorgias. There 
is a great probability that the Crito is later than the 
Apology, because in p. 458 Plato makes a clear allusion 
to his Apology. This allusion might also refer to a coin- 
cidence between the Platonic Apology and the historical 
defence of Socrates, but if we consider that also the style 


‘61 The doubts as to the authenticity of the Crito expressed by Ast, and 
later by Schaarschmidt, have been sufficiently refuted by J. H. Bremi 
(Philologische Beitrdége aus der Schweiz, Zivich 1819, vol. i. p. 131 sqq.), 
Georgii (Apologie und Krito tibersetzt von L. Georgii, Stuttgart 1883), 
J. Adam (Platonis Crito, with introduction, notes, and Appendix, Cambridge 
1888), and many others. The relation of the Crito to the Gorgias is 
dealt with also in Plato’s Apology of Socrates and Crito, on the basis of 
Cron’s edition, by L. Dyer, Boston 1885. 


SOCRATIC STAGE: CHARMIDES 205 


of the Crito shows a slight advance over the style of the 
two preceding dialogues (see above, p. 163), we have 
good reason to admit that Plato himself intended this 
work as the supplement of the preceding. 

Less evident is the chronological relation of the 
Charmides ' to the above three dialogues. It is charac- 
teristic of the stage of logical advance which Plato had 
reached when he wrote this small work, that his So- 
crates commits a paralogism, inferring from the beauty 
of both temperance and quickness that quickness is 
temperate (159 p). Such logical blunders occur also in 
other small dialogues, and we have no reason to suppose 
that Plato was conscious of them. So long as the logical 
interest was not awakened, even a thinker like Plato 
might unconsciously commit logical errors. On the 
other hand, we notice a correct syllogism (161 4: aides 
ovK ayabov . . . cwdpoctyn ayatov . . . ovK apa cwdpo- 
curvy av ein aidws) of the form Cesare, introduced by the 
word cuAdoyiodpevos (1608), which, however, has not 
yet the meaning of a logical term. 

The allusion made by Critias to a possible division 
of sciences into practical and theoretical (165 E: tis 
oyloTiKhs . . TL atv ToLvovTOY Epyov oiov oikia oLKOOOMLKNS) , 
carried out later in the Gorgias, is not developed here ; 
émioTnyn and téyvn are used as synonyms (1658), but 
theoretical knowledge, independent of personal considera- 
tions, is recognised as a great advantage to mankind 


'6 Doubts as to the authenticity of the Charmides put forth by Ast, 
Socher, Suckow, Schaarschmidt, and recently by Troost (Inhalt und 
Echtheit der platonischen Dialoge auf Grund logischer Analyse, Berlin 
1889) have been sufficiently refuted by Schleiermacher, Ochmann (Char- 
mides Platonis num sit genuinus quaeritur, Vratislavie 1827), Stallbaum, 
H. Ritter, Hermann, Steinhart, Munk, Susemihl, Spielmann (Die Echtheit des 
platonischen Dialogs Charmides, Innsbruck 1875), Alberti (‘Gesichtspunkte 
fiir angezweifelte Platonische Gespriiche,’ Philologus, 3°" Suppl. Bd. p. 101, 
Gottingen 1878), and Georgii (Laches und Charmides, iibers. von L. Georgii, 
Stuttgart 1882). Also Zeller, who formerly believed the Charmides to be 
spurious, has since defended the authenticity against Troost (Arch. f. 
Gesch. d. Philos. vol. iv. p. 134). 


In the 
Char- 
mides 
the term 
ovAAo- 


ytoduevos, 


Import- 
ance of 
theoreti- 
cal know- 
ledge re- 
cognised. 


But 
certitude 
of know- 
ledge 
doubted. 


General 
logical 
question 
about 
activities 
acting on 
them- 
selves ad- 
journed as 
requiring 
a future 
great 
thinker. 
Char- 
mides 1s 
early, 
though 
the exact 
date un- 
certain. 


Laches 
belongs to 


204 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


(166D: Kowov ayabov sivar aoyedov Te Tacw avOporro.s, 
yiyverCar katapaves Exactov TOY dvT@V bmn zyEL). 

Again, a sceptical tone is perceptible in the doubt 
whether certitude as to knowledge is possible (1724: 
ayadov sin To eldévat & TE Old TLS KaL & py OldbEV. .~. 
ovdapmov ériatHpn ovdEuia ToLavTn ovca TéepavTa). Very 
characteristic of the Socratic stage of Plato’s logic is the 
appreciation of the knowledge of knowledge according 
to a standard of usefulness (169 B: ov« azrodéyopas . 
Tp av eTicKkeWopar, lt TLAV Huds OPerol, 1T2D: cKepo- 
peOa, & Apa TL Kal ds ovncEL . . TO EldevaL A TE OidEV 
kai & py) oidev). This would not occur in any dialogue 
after the Meno, but is very natural at the time when 
Plato had not entirely emancipated himself from the 
prevailing ethical preoccupations of his teacher. 

A beginning of later Platonic tendencies appears in 
the care with which the question, whether an activity can 
have itself as its object, is discussed. By many examples 
Plato tries to prove that most human activities have not 
this property, that, for instance, there is no perception of 
perception (167 c), no desire of a desire, no will of a willing 
(167 &), no love of love, no fear of fear, because each of 
these activities has an object different from itself, but the 
general question of the existence and possibility of a know- 
ledge of knowledge is here not settled, only adjourned as a 
problem requiring for its solution a great thinker (169 4). 

Nearly all investigators agree in placing the Charmides 
among Plato’s early works. Many believe that it may 
have been written even before the death of Socrates, to 
which it contains not the slightest allusion. But an exact 
chronological determination in this case requires further 
stylistic research, and the attempt of Teichmiuller to dis- 
cover in the Charnuides allusions to the Memorabilia of 
Xenophon has failed. 

At all events the Laches '* belongs to the same period. 


‘68 Ast, Schaarschmidt, and to a certain extent Giltbauer (Philologische 
Streifziige, Freiburg 1886) doubted the authenticity of the Laches, but 


SOCRATIC STAGE: LACHES 205 


It is noteworthy that Plato mentions here as objects of 
knowledge truths which are conceived as independent of 
time (198 D: epi dcwv éotiv érictHn, ovK adn pV 
eival Tepl yeyovotos, eidgvar Orn yeyovev, aAXAn SF TrEpl 
yeyvouéevov, Orn yiyvetac . . . aXX 1) avTH). Such truths 
are found more easily by a single competent man than by 
an incompetent majority (185 A: ef toTw Tus TexvLKOS. . . 
éxelv@ TretOec Oat Evi dvTL, TOs 8 addovs zav), because know- 
ledge is a safer criterion than great number (184 E: érvotHpn 
de? xpiverOar aX ov TAHOE TO pérov KANOS KpLOncEecOaL). 

This short acknowledgment of knowledge as superior 
to opinion rises above the moral standard of honest 
opinions required in the Crito. But Plato does not yet 
pretend, as in later works, to possess such a knowledge. 
He advises his readers to seek the best teacher, without 
sparing money or anything else (201 4), but he offers no 
definitive solution of the proposed difficulties. In all 
the above small dialogues we see discussions leading to 
a Socratic confession of ignorance, and not to a definite 
doctrine. Opinions of others are criticised, but not defi- 
nitely corrected. 

The character of Socrates is similar in these works to 
what we know about the historical Socrates : he is repre- 
sented as a friend of young men, detecting their errors, 
not yet as the ideal master of wisdom. Of a similar 
critical character is the first larger work written by Plato, 
the Protagoras. In this dialogue also logical questions 
are only incidentally touched upon, and it is evident that 
the author cares chiefly for ethical problems. These are 
treated in a manner which presupposes the previous 
particular inquiries given in the small dialogues, and the 
logical power also appears increased. The inconvertibility 
of general affirmative judgments is insisted upon 


these suspicions have been refuted by Stallbaum, Georgii, Bonitz, and 
Tatham (The Laches of Plato, with introduction and notes, London 1888). 
Also Zeller abandoned his earlier doubts as to the authenticity of the 
Laches. 


the same 
period. 


Personal 
authority 
of the best 
teacher. 


In the 
small dia- 
logues no 
definitive 
doctrine. 


Also the 
Protago- 
ras has a 
polemical 
character. 


Incon- 
vertibility 
of general 
affirma- 


tions. 


Law of 
contra- 
diction 
prepared. 


The Pyro- 
tagoras 
seems to 
be later 
than the 
small 
dialogues. 


Defini- 
tions of 
courage. 


206 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


(350 c-351 B) by means of several analogies. If we 
observe that this logical lesson is put into the mouth of 
Protagoras, and not of Socrates, we must admit as 
probable, that the discovery was made outside of the 
Socratic society. The perfect knowledge vainly sought 
for in the Charmides is not yet found by Plato. He still 
expects progress from discussion (848 D). His certitude 
is increased by the acquiescence of others, and not by its 
own absolute infallibility, as in later times, when he 
condemned to death those who thought otherwise 
(Laws 909 A, 958 4: cf. Polit. 308 B). Still he recognises 
knowledge as the chief power in man, reigning over all 
feelings (352 .c, 357 c), and settling all doubts (856E : 
SyroOoaca TO adnbés Hovyiay ay éroincev Exe THY AuyTY 
pévovoay emt TO admOet ...). As one of the logical 
means of arriving at knowledge, Plato states the principle 
that each notion has only one contradictory to itself 
(3320: évl Exdoto TeV evayTioy Ev wovoy zoTly évayTiov 
Kal ov Todd) and exemplifies this rule by many instances, 
but without making any distinction between contrary 
and contradictory terms. 

These observations seem to indicate a further stage of 
logical development than is seen in the small dialogues. 
In the Charmides the subject, though restricted to one 
form of virtue, was to a great extent the same as in the 
Protagoras, and it seems more plausible that the greater 
work should contain no allusion to the smaller than that 
Plato should have written the Charmides after the Prota- 
goras without some allusion to the more general discussion 
on the same problem. The special subject of the Laches 
also is contained in the Protagoras, and the definition 
of courage (Lach. 195 a: tév Sdevdv Kal Oapparéov 
émictin), arrived at in the Laches after a long conversa- 
tion, and shown by Socrates to refer not only to courage 
but to every virtue, is repeated in the Protagoras (860 D: 
4) copia Tov Sewhv Kai pay Sewav avopela éoriv), and 
remains unrefuted (see also Rep. 429 c). 


_ 


SOCRATIC STAGE: PROTAGORAS 207 


Some allusions to contemporaneous facts, contained in 
the Protagoras, seem to show that this dialogue was 
written at least seven years after the death of Socrates. 
Kroschel '* and after him Teichmuller have supposed 
that the mention of weAtacticyn (850A) as a familiar 
example was not probable before the introduction of this 
arm into the Athenian army by Iphikrates, between 393- 
391 z.c. Also Teichmiiller and after him Dimmler see 
in the Protagoras (847 c—350 B) allusions to Xenophon’s 
Memorabilia, which appear to have been published some 
years after the death of Socrates. This agrees with our 
supposition that the Protagoras followed the above five 
small dialogues, and also with the observations on the style, 
according to which the Protagoras is intermediate between 
the small dialogues and the Gorgias (see above, p. 165). 

The Meno is generally held to be a continuation of 
the Protagoras.! Theories of the greatest importance, 
amounting to logical discoveries, are for the first time 
expressed in the Meno, which in size exceeds only by a 
very little the limits of a small dialogue, and amounts to 
less than two-thirds of the volume of the Protagoras. 
Logical exercise, so often recommended in the dialectical 
works, is here first introduced as a methodical way of 
progressing on the path of truth (75 4: in order to enable 
Meno to find the definition of virtue, Socrates proposes 
the definition of form: twa kai yévntal cot werérn). 
The aim of logical definition is indicated as the deter- 
mination of the substance (72B: ovcia) of things, that 

1 J. §. Kroschel, ‘Studien zu Platons Protagoras’ (Jalrbiicher fiir 
classische Philologie, vol. 87, p. 825, 1863), also in his review of Cron’s 
edition of the Protagoras (Zeitschrift fiir das Gymnasialwesen, vol. xx., for 
1866), and in his edition of this dialogue (Gotha 1865, as 34 ed. of Stallbaum). 

16 Nearly all investigators agree that the Meno is later than the Prota- 
goras: Tennemann, Schleiermacher, Hermann, Susemihl, Ribbing, Steinhart, 
Zeller, Ueberweg, Pfleiderer, Natorp, Siebeck, Gomperz, Ritter, J. Bartunek 
(Ueber die Aufeinanderfolge der Dialoge Protagoras, Gorgias und Menon, 
Progr. Rzeszow 1897) &c.; only Stallbaum, Schéne, and F. Horn ad- 
vocated the priority of the Meno on quite insufficient grounds; R. Hirzel 


(Rheinisches Museum, vol. 42, p. 249) sees in the Meno allusions to 
Polykrates’ karnyopia Swxparovs. 


Allusions 
to known 
events as 
chrono- 
logical 
indica- 
tions 
confirm 
the later 
date. 


Meno con- 
tinues the 
question 
raised in 
the Pro- 
tagoras. 


Unity of 
species. 


Dia- 
lectical 
require- 


ments. 


Hypo- 
thetical 
method 


of investi- 


gation. 


Opposi- 
tion of 
general 
and par- 
ticular 
judg- 
ments. 


208 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


which brings unity among the variety of external appear- 
ances (72.0: avto TodTO ® ovdev Stadhgpoval, AANA TavTOV 
elow atacat). This unity is called eZdos, not yet the later 
Platonic idea, but already a distinct logical term, cor- 
responding to species (72 C: & yé Te eidos Ta’Tov dtacat 
Zyoucw, ds 6 ciciv apetat). The unity of species is the 
true essence of the things which it embodies (100 B: adro 
Ka’ auto Ti ToT’ ZoTLW apETH). 

Having thus established the aim of research, Plato 
proceeds to give some rules as to the method. Here appear 
for the first time the ‘ dialectical’ requirements. Xeno- 
phon had once applied (Memor. iv. 5, 12: dvdpas dvane- 
KTuKwTatovs) the word ‘dialectical’ in the sense of ‘ best 
able to conduct conversation,’ but Plato, converting it 
into a logical term, requires of all who wish to discuss 
dialectically that they should base their reasoning on 
recognised notions or premisses (75D: gore 68 tows TO 
SuareKTLKOTEPOV f41) provoy TadnOH amoKpiverOat, ara 
cal dv éxsivor av av Tpocomohoyy Eldzvat 0 epomEvos). 

As a method of verifying doubtful suppositions, Plato 
proposes to look for the consequences following from each 
hypothesis. This method he describes as hypothetical 
argument (86 EH: 2& brobécews cKxoTrsicba . . . WaTrEp ot 
yewpéeTpar), and transfers it from geometry to philoso- 
phical inquiry. He applies it successfully to the problem 
which he could not yet resolve in the Protagoras, and 
finds that virtue, so long as it is not taught, but merely 
practised according to common traditional experience, 
appears not to be, as was supposed in Charmides, Laches, 
and Protagoras, a kind of knowledge. 

Another sign of the awakened logical interest is the 
careful distinction between particular and general affirma- 
tion (73 BE, 89 A). Such progress in respect of formal 
reasoning corresponds to an equally remarkable develop- 
ment of some fundamental logical doctrines about which 
neither in the Protagoras nor in any of the small dialogues 
had Plato expressed any opinion. The theory of innate 


SOCRATIC STAGE: MENO 209 


ideas is not only introduced with a striking audacity, 
but founded on so general a metaphysical axiom as the 
unity of nature (81 D: dte yap ths diacews ataons 
cuyyevods ovens, Kal peuabnxvias THs Wwuyns aravta, 
ovodev Korver Ev povov avauynobevTa . . . TANNA TaVTA... 
aveupéety). 

The metaphysical certainty of a priori knowledge, 
proclaimed by Plato in the Meno, is a new principle in 
the light of which the old Socratic irony and ignorance 
are disappearing. Still the author condescends to give an 
experimental and inductive proof of his assumption, after 
the caution that such a proof is not easy (82 4). The 
choice of the experiment and the manner in which it is 
executed show an educational mastery far greater than 
that visible in the small dialogues (82 B-85 c). 

All doubts about the possibility and reality of infallible 
science have been removed ; the Platonic Socrates boldly 
asserts his absolute certainty of the existence of a science 
far above right opinion (98 B: é7e d¢ éotiv TL aXoiov opO7 
Sofa Kal éemictnun, od Trav por boxe Todto eixalery, 
GXN eitrep TL AAO hainy av eidévat, odiya 8 av hainy, sv & odv 
Kal TOvUTO éxeivwy Ociny av wv ofa), and that this science 
may be awakened in everybody by means of skilful inter- 
rogations (86 A: admOeis Sofar zpwrjce éemeyepOeioat 
eriothpat yiyvovra). The difference between right belief 
and scientific knowledge consists in the co-ordination and 
causal relation peculiar to true knowledge (98 A: aAmOets 
Sofa . . . ov TodXoOd aka eicwv, Ews av Tis a’Tas dHnon 
aitias Noyltop@... eredav b& deOHowv, TpaTOV péev 
eTLOTH MAL ylyvorvTal, Freita povipor' Kat Oia TadTa 
.. . Ovahéper Secpw erictyun opOjs do€ns). Science is 
therefore more valuable than mere belief, even if it be right 
belief. Armed with his new weapon, Plato enters upon 
its application to the ethical field, and introduces the 
immortality of the soul first as a true and beautiful tale 
of priests and poets (81 A), which he then confirms by a 
reflection on the nature of human thought (86 B: ov«ody 

P 


Innate 
ideas. 


A priori 
knowledge 
made pro- 
bable by 
experi- 
ment. 


Know- 
ledge pro- 
claimed as 
essentially 
different 
from 
opinions 
because it 
is founded 
on 
grounds. 


Applica- 
tion to im- 
mortality. 


Date of 
the Meno 
after 

395 B.c. 


The 
Huthy- 
demus 
directed 
against 
unknown 
enemies. 


Philo- 
sophy and 
dialectic 


210 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


gi del 4 AXNOELa Hiv TOV GvTMY éoTly év TH uy), aBavaTos 
av 4 uy) Ein). 

This far-reaching logical importance of the Meno, 
noticed already by Guggenheim'* and Oldenberg,'™ 
tells against those who like Socher and Stallbaum 
believe that the Meno could have been written before the 
death of Socrates. The allusion to the bribery of 
Ismenias, indicated by Boeckh and Schleiermacher, shows 
that the Meno is later than 395 B.c. Less evident is 
another allusion to Polykrates, maintained by Hirzel and 
Diimmler, who place the Meno after the Symposiwm, an 
order which appears impossible, if we take into account 
the stylistic tests (see above, p. 166). What may be 
safely affirmed is that the Meno is later than the Prota- 
goras and all smaller dialogues. 

The logical interest awakened in the Meno bursts out 
only occasionally, but with great intensity in the Huthy- 
demus,'** which has all the appearance of a polemical 
work written for a certain practical purpose, and against 
enemies whem it is not quite easy for us to identify. 
Plato is so proud of his acquired certainty of knowledge 
that he would not give it up even for immortality, if not 
accompanied by knowledge how to use it (289 B). While 
in the Protagoras the word philosophy was still used in 
the meaning of love of wisdom (335 D, 342 D), here we 
see it defined as acquisition of knowledge (288 D: 
fpirocopia KtTijows emictyuns), and the dialectician, who 
had received his first rules in the Meno, becomes the 
highest judge of every particular knowledge (290 c). - 


165 M. Guggenheim, Die Lehre vom apriorischen Wissen im ihrer Bedeu- 
tung fiir die Entwickelung der Ethik und Erkenntnisstheorie in der 
Sokratisch-Platonischen Philosophie, Berlin 1885. 

167 H. Oldenberg, De Platonis arte dialectica, Gottingen 1873. 

16 Doubts as to the authenticity of the Huthydemus, emitted by Ast 
and later by Schaarschmidt, have been sufficiently refuted by A. Polzer 
(Ueber die Echtheit des Euthydemos, Olmiitz 1874) and Bonitz (Platonische 
Studien, Berlin 1886). Bonitz gives also an elaborate classification of 
more than twenty sophisms contained in the Huthydemus. 


SOCRATIC STAGE: EUTHYDEMUS 211 


These dialecticians, thus placed so high above the 
mathematicians and all other inquirers, are evidently 
Plato himself and his school. For the writer of the 
Euthydemus is clearly a teacher, though probably not yet 
the head of the Academy. Philosophy is the subject of 
his teaching, and he passionately defends his science 
against those who call philosophy a worthless and vain 
occupation (304 E£). 

To the right belief, explained in the Meno, Plato adds 
in the Huthydemus his explanation of error and wrong 
belief, whose existence is proved against the Sophists by 
the hypothetical method taught in the Meno (Euthyd. 
284 4, 287 8). Plato gives an interesting collection of 
current sophisms resulting from the use of the same word 
in two different meanings, the misinterpretation of predi- 
cation, the omission of limiting determinations, and the 
double meaning of phrases according to their grammatical 
construction. 

The date of the Huthydemus can be approximately 
determined by its admission of the possibility of teaching 
virtue (as in the Republic and Laws), whence we conclude 
that it was written after the Protagoras and Meno, in 
which the same question is discussed. Those who, like 
Tennemann, Stallbaum, Steinhart, C. Ritter, believe the 
Euthydemus to have been written before the death of 
Socrates cannot account for the logical enthusiasm which 
is here manifested and is absent from all earlier dialogues. 
Those who, like Bergk, Siebeck, and Weygoldt, place the 
Euthydemus after the Symposium are not aware of the 
great difference in style between the Huthydemus and all 
dialogues later than the Cratylus and Symposium (see 
above, p. 166). 

There is no contradiction from the standpoint either 
of logical or of stylistic development in admitting the 
close relation between the Huthydemus and Isocrates’ 
discourse against the Sophists. This relation, first 

P2 


defended 
and placed 
above 
particular 
sciences. 


Many 
sophisms 
refuted 
and their 
origin 
explained. 


Date of 
the Eu- 
thydemus 
has been 
supposed 
by some 
writers to 
be very 
early. 


Allusion 
to Iso- 
crates’ 
discourse 
against 


the 
Sophists 
is a safe 
indica- 
tion, and 
this con- 
firms in- 
ferences 
from style. 


Gorgias 
represents 
the tran- 
sition 
from the 
Socratic 


212 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


noticed by Spengel,!® and Thompson,'” has been since 
investigated by Teichmiiller, Sudhaus,’’ Diimmler, and 
recognised by Zeller and Susemihl, without any note- 
worthy opposition. According to these investigations, the 
Euthydemus roust have been published not before 390 
and probably not much later. Another allusion to Lysias, 
although supported with great ingenuity by Teichmiiller, 
is not quite so evident, and also the references to Anti- 
sthenes, alleged by Teichmiiller, Urban,’” and Diimmler, 
are possible, but not certain. If we admit that Plato 
wrote the Huthydemus ' about 390 B.c., this agrees very 
well with the general character of the dialogue, which 
directs the most acute polemic against wrong education, 
thus seeming to indicate that the author had already 
acquired some educational experience, and gathered 
around him a number of pupils, preparing the foundation 
of that philosophical school which achieved such an un- 
paralleled importance in the history of human thought. 
This educational character reaches a still higher level 
in the Gorgias, which represents the transition from the 
Socratic to the peculiar Platonic philosophy. In its 
ethical character the Gorgias is still Socratic, but the 
method of argumentation and the apodictic certainty with 


169 Spengel, ‘Isokrates und Plato,’ Abhandlungen der Akademie zu 
Miinchen, vol. vii. pp. 729-769, Miinchen 1855. 

0 The Phaedrus of Plato, with English notes and dissertations, by 
W. H. Thompson, London 1868, p. 179. 

171 Sudhaus, ‘Zur Zeitbestimmung des Euthydem, des Gorgias und der 
Republik,’ Rheinisches Musewm, vol. xliv. p. 52, Frankfurt a. M. 1889. 

172 Urban, Ueber die Erwahnungen der Philosophie des Antisthenes in 
den platonischen Schriften, Konigsberg 1882. 

173 Some authors inferred from the use of mapeot: Huthyd. 3014 that 
Plato when he wrote the Hwthydemus had already produced his theory of 
ideas. But this is by no means probable, because wapetvaris used in exactly 
the same manner in some of the small dialogues, as Charm. 1594 and 
Lys. 217d, like mapayiyvec@u in the Laches 189. This use does not 
correspond to the terminology of ideas. Instead of mdpeots KdAAos Tt 
(Euthyd. 301.4) Plato would have said later mdpeor: 1d Kdddos (adTd Kab? 
ard). Generally mapetva: is very little used by Plato in connection with 
ideas. 


SOCRATIC STAGE: GORGIAS 213 


which ethical principles are proclaimed (509 A: oddeis otos 
T égoTly add\Xws Aéyor pH OV KaTayéacTos sivat) belong to 
Plato, are his own creation, and are manifested constantly 
in all his later works. The literary skill displayed in the 
Gorgias reaches a higher perfection than in the small 
dialogues, and even than in the Protagoras, Meno, or 
Euthydemus. Plato has now arrived at a mastery of 
form, which approaches to the highest beauty attained by 
human language, and has been exceeded perhaps only by 
Plato himself in the Phaedo, the Phaedrus, and parts of 
the Symposium, the Republic, and the Theaetetus. 

The teaching of those dialecticians, who were indicated 
in the Huthydemus as treasurers of knowledge, is now 
personified and attributed to ‘Philosophy.’ This Philo- 
sophy is loved more than all human beings, and is 
credited with eternal truths, which never change (482 A: 
% dirocodia asl TOV avTav égoTi Noywv). The power of 
these truths is based on our own consciousness, nor can 
any man contradict them without contradicting himself 
(482 B: % ditocodiay 2&édeyEov . . . 7) 0} cot dporoynoet 
Kadduxdijs, & KadXixres, adda Svadhavice év arravTt TO 
Biw). And to all faithful followers of this his Queen, 
Plato promises after death a happy life, apart from other 
human beings (526 c). In this he still betrays a juvenile 
egoism, which was abandoned later, when he bade the 
philosophers descend like gods among mortals to teach 
them a better life. 

The difference between right belief and scientific 
knowledge, found in the Meno, is here applied to the art of 
persuasion, and leads to the distinction of two kinds of 
rhetoric, one based on knowledge, the other on faith 
(454 E: bvo eiSy OGpev TreOods, TO psy TicTW TapEYomEvoV 
divev Tod eidgvat, TO 8 érvotHpnv) : knowledge alone is in- 
fallible (454 D: ésotipn ovdapas got revdys), while 
belief may be true or false. In full accordance with this 
increasing separation between science and opinion, Plato 
distinguishes more clearly than in the Charmides between 


stage to 
original 
Platonic 
philo- 
sophy. 


Philo- 
sophy per- 
sonified. 
Philo- 
sopher’s 
immor- 
tality. 


Difference 
between 
belief and 
knowledge 
recognised 
and 
applied. 


Logical 
terms. 


To do 
wrong is 
worse 
than to 
suffer 
wrong. 
Pleasure 
is not 
the aim 
of life. 


Great 
politicians 
treated 
with 
contempt. 
This 
shows 
independ- 
ence of 
tradition 


214 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


theoretical and applied or practical sciences (450 c-451 p), 
and he insists on the importance of the division of con- 
cepts (500 D: Bedticrov éotw . . . diatpeto Par, duedopévous 
62 Kal oporoyncavtas addnrOLS . . . oKeWaTOaL, Ti Te Sia- 
pépeTov AXANXOWD). 

The reasoning proceeds on granted premisses, according 
to the rule given in the Meno, and the logical connection 
is carefully shown by means of logical terms (498 E: 
auAdoyical, TL Hpiv cupBaiver 2x THY wpodoynpévor). 
Inevitable repetitions are excused by the logical aim 
(499 A: Kai dis yap Tot Kal Tpis hacw Kanov eivat Ta Kara 
Aeyew Te Kai eTicKoTreta Oat, cf. 508 D). This gives the im- 
pression of an author who is used to personal teaching, 
and has already found the truths he wishes to convey to 
his hearers, but professes to seek them again in company 
with his pupils. What in the Apology (30 D) and Crito 
(49 ac) has been expressed as a personal belief, that one 
should by no means do wrong, is here affirmed as a well- 
founded scientific truth (509 A: radtra ... jyiv otTw 
pavevta Katéxetar Kal dédeTas oldnpois Kal adapmavTivots 
Aoyots), and is so far extended as to imply even the 
necessity of punishment if one has done wrong (482 B, 
527 B). The aim of human life is not, as it seemed to be 
in the Protagoras, pleasure but ‘the good’ (513 D: év 
ehapev eivat Tas TapacKevas éml TO ExacTtov Oeparrevew, 

. . play wiv Tpos 7 Ooviy omerstiv, THY ETépay 52 Tpos TO 
Bérxttctov). The politician’s duty is to make better the 
people whom he leads. 

In the Protagoras and Meno Plato still maintained 
the popular belief that Pericles and Themistocles were 
great and wise men. He only complained that they were 
unable to impart their greatness and wisdom to their 
children or others. But now, from the height of the 
newly founded philosophy, Plato dares to say that these 
idols of the Athenians were bad politicians and corrupters 
of the people (515 £). This bold contempt of the men 
who had generally been esteemed greatest among the 


SOCRATIC STAGE: GORGIAS op ba 


citizens of Athens shows how rapidly the breach is 
widening for Plato between vulgar common sense and 
the teachings of philosophy. He has risen from Socratic 
ignorance and irony to that full independence of tradition 
and public opinion which in all ages characterises a great 
philosopher. 

Another indication of the later date of the Gorgias is 
the hatred of tyranny (525 D) here expressed and henceforth 
maintained by Plato throughout his life. Stylistic inquiry 
places this dialogue after all the above-mentioned works, 
and between the Huthydemus and the Cratylus (see above, 
p. 167). If we admit with Teichmiiller that the Pro- 
tagoras and Huthydemus were written between 393- 


390 B.c., we are not obliged to accept his supposition 


that the Gorgias is fifteen years later. Teichmiiller 
(u. 357) as well as Sudhaus | place the Gorgias after 
Isocrates’ discourse to Nicocles, which is supposed to have 
been written 376 B.c. But the allusions to this discourse 
supposed to be contained in the Gorgias are not evident, 
while Dummler, who also specially investigated Plato’s 
relation to Isocrates, assigns to the Gorgias a much earlier 
date. The most certain conclusions as to the date of the 
Gorgias that can be drawn from the contents have been 
indicated by Natorp '“: the Gorgias is probably later 
than the Protagoras, Meno, and all above-mentioned 
small dialogues. This is also the result reached by Horn 
in his comparison of the ethical theories of these works. 
The Gorgias” closes the Socratic stage of Plato’s 


4 P, Natorp, ‘ Ueber Grundansicht und Entstehungszeit von Platos 
Gorgias’ (Archw fiir Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. ii. p. 394, Berlin 
1889). 

175 The Gorgias is one of the few works of Plato which has escaped the 
searching criticism of those who have doubted the authenticity of many other 
dialogues. Voluminous and instructive commentaries on the Gorgias have 
been published by Findeisen (Platonis Gorgias, Gothae 1796, 624 pp.), 
D. Coray (Zevopayros ’Arouvnmovetmata kal TlAdtwyvos Tépyias exdidovros Kal 
diopbovyTos “Adauaytiov Kopay, ev TMapioiois 1825), Ast (Annotationes in Pla- 
tonis Opera, tom. ii. Lipsiae 1832), Woolsey (The Gorgias of Plato, Boston 
1842), Cron (Beitrige zwr Erkldrung des Platonischen Gorgias, Leipzig 


and public 
opinion. 


Gorgias 
the latest 
of all 
Socratic 
dialogues, 
as results 
from its 
contents 
and style. 


This 
confirms 
the con- 
clusions 
of Natorp 
and Horn. 


Plato’s 
progress 
from 
moral pro- 
blems to 
logical 
inyesti- 
gations. 
His dis- 
covery of 
scientific 
certainty. 


Rules for 
dialectical 
discus- 
sion. 
Infallible 
knowledge 
attained. 


216 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


philosophy, and leads from the ethical problems which 
occupied him in the first years after the death of his 
master to the logical and metaphysical inquiries which 
filled the greatest part of his manhood. 

Looking back over the above survey of Plato’s first 
steps in logic, we see that he started from ethical problems, 
agitated by his teacher, and that his first attempts to find 
a definition of particular virtues and of virtue generally 
were made with moral purposes. In order to be temperate 
it seems to be indispensable to know what temperance 
is, and where is the limit separating this virtue from in- 
temperance. Among such inquiries on particular virtues 
Plato became interested in the more general problem of a 
definition of virtue. This he began to seek, and after 
some vacillation recognised the identity of virtue and know- 
ledge. But he was still unable to attain certainty of 
knowledge ; only after years of educational practice he 
found that such certainty is possible, and not to be sought 
for in the assent of any majority, nor in tradition, nor in 
idle discussion, but in the inward power of the soul which 
sees the truth with absolute certainty. To trace the 
origin of this power, felt by him when he imparted his 
moral convictions to his pupils, he recurred to the 
hypothesis of a previous existence of the soul, and 
deduced also the soul’s immortality. 

We see the influence of his activity as a teacher in the 
rules for dialectic discussion, consisting in starting from re- 
cognised premisses, in dividing and distinguishing notions, 
in following up the consequences of each hypothesis, and 
avoiding unjustifiable generalisation. By these means 
Plato reached a degree of certitude not experienced before. 
He created an ideal of infallible knowledge, far above 
traditional opinions, and he distinguished this scientific 
knowledge from common belief by his ability to show a 
reason for each assertion. The methodic connection of 


1870, G. Lodge (Gorgias, edited on the basis of the Deuschle Cron’s 
edition, Boston 1891, 308 pp.), and many others. 


SOCRATIC STAGE: GORGIAS 21% 
thought gave to his conclusions a permanence and con- 
sistency which unscientific opinion never reaches. 

The new power of philosophy, acquired by logical 
exercises undertaken with ethical purposes, reacted first 
on the moral problems from which Plato started. He 
applied his logical method first to the great questions 
which had been unsuccessfully discussed in his earlier 
writings, and he produced a consistent theory of virtue 
and of the aims of life in the Gorgias. But the logical 
progress achieved will not be limited in its effect to the 
subject for which it has been devised. We see already in 
the Meno, in the Huthydemus, and in the Gorgias, that 
Plato begins to feel an interest in logical method in- 
dependently of its applications, and this logical interest, 
once awakened, will lead him to special logical investiga- 
tions, and to further development of methods in order to 
acquire and communicate to others an infallible know- 
ledge. 

An almost fanatical enthusiasm and love of absolute 
science explains certain exaggerations: the new know- 
ledge referred only to very few principles, but Plato is as 
proud of it as if he had already extended it to all depart- 
ments of Being. He obtained a glimpse of a world 
different from the world in which he lived, and he had 
the audacity to believe more in the reality of this new 
world of his thoughts than in all other authorities. Thus 
he progressed out of the Socratic stage to his own 
philosophy, and created the theory of ideas, which has 
been so often identified with Platonism. 

We cannot agree with Zeller who sees vestiges of this 
theory of ideas already in the Meno, Huthydemus, and 
Gorgias. Here we have only the germ from which the 
theory of ideas was afterwards developed. This germ is 
the consciousness of infallible knowledge arrived at when 
Plato wrote the Meno, becoming a special science in the 
Euthydemus, and in the Gorgias entrusted with the 
direction of human life. This consciousness was in the 


New 
method 
first ap- 
plied to 
the theory 
of virtue 
led then 
to other 
subjects. 


Reality of 
the world 
of thought 
prepared 
in the 
Gorgias. 


Buttheory 
of ideas 
not yet 
expressed. 
Tts germ 
is the con- 
sciousness 
of intui- 
tive 


infallible 
know- 
ledge. 


218 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


beginning purely personal and based on experience in 
teaching. Plato enjoyed it as a new sense, a feeling of 
higher life, and he did not yet undertake to explain it fully. 
The absolute certainty was reached in his own mind, and 
referred really only to a few ethical truths; he had im- 
parted it to some of his pupils, and he generalised the 
faculty of absolute knowledge, postulating such knowledge 
for all departments of being. The complete theoretical 
explanation of the possibility of such knowledge was not 
yet given—scarcely asked for. But the consciousness of 
absolute knowledge, created in the soul of Plato, was 
transmitted from generation to generation, and since his 
time has never deserted European philosophy. 


ral 


CHAPTER. V > 


ORIGIN OF THE THEORY OF IDEAS 


WHEN Plato had discovered in his own consciousness 
the existence of an infallible knowledge (a priori) and 
applied this knowledge to the ethical problems which 
were the chief subject of his teacher’s philosophy, it 
was natural for him to seek an explanation of the nature 
of knowledge itself. A priority of knowledge with its 
accompanying certainty appeared to him first as a psycho- 
logical fact, a feeling concerning certain thoughts. This 
feeling from a psychological point of view might still 
be an illusion. The logical standpoint was not yet 
reached, or at least is not known to have been reached 
by anybody before Plato. The fact of an a priori know- 
ledge proclaimed by Plato in the Meno was for him a 
psychological fact, the difference between the state of 
mind of one who knows and knows reasons of his know- 
ledge, and that of one who believes, and does not care 
to find out why he believes. The dialectician, whom 
Plato had described in the Huthydemus as the master 
of every knowledge, distinguished his knowledge from 
other people’s opinions by the circumstance, that he 
had reasons to quote for his judgments. The doctrine 
of an absolute morality was presented in the Gorgias 
as a knowledge above and beyond all changes of opinion ; 
but Plato had not yet inquired into the ultimate founda- 
tions of the certainty which he experienced and imparted 
to his pupils. The antenatal existence mentioned in the 
Meno was rather an inference from the fact of a priori 
knowledge than the explanation of it. 


Certainty 
of know- 
ledge first 
accepted 
as a psy- 
chological 
fact, then 
investi- 
gated as 
a logical 
problem. 


Not all 
the steps 
of the 
inquiry 
recorded. 


Three 
points of 
view ap- 
pearing 
in the 
Cratylus, 
Sym- 
posium, 
Phaedo. 


Cratylus 
presents 
difficulties 


2920 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


This explanation was the next task undertaken by 
Plato after giving his definitive solution of the moral 
problem in the Gorgias. We cannot expect Plato to 
record for us every step of his new investigations. We 
must ourselves supply the connection between one work 
and another, because the works themselves do not exhibit 
a continuity of evolution. The dialogues were not 
intended as a diary of investigations, but as an artistic 
embodiment of certain conclusions with an ideal indica- 
tion of a method by which they might have been reached, 
not necessarily coinciding with the actual steps through 
which the author had arrived at them. 

Such artistic reminiscences of a long inquiry were 
the Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus, and Gorgias; they 
were never connected by Plato into one whole, nor are 
they a progressive account of the development of the 
author’s theories, but represent only occasional mani- 
festations of his original thoughts. The next movement 
in advance of these ethical dialogues is visible in the 
Cratylus and Symposiwm, which approach the solution 
of the logical problem of a priori knowledge from two 
different sides, which may be described as the linguistic 
and the esthetical. A third note is struck in the Phaedo, 
and it is really only in the Phaedo that the theory of 
ideas takes a definitive shape, and is based on meta- 
physical considerations. All these three dialogues are 
undoubtedly later than the ethical series, because their 
style has many more characteristics peculiar to the latest 
group (see above, pp. 168-169). 


I. The Cratylus. 


(Relative affinity to the latest group, measured on the 
Laws as unity, =0°16 ; see above, p. 168.) 


The Cratylus, which recalls the Huthydemus by the 
humour displayed in it, offers many difficulties to the 
interpreter, because it is not quite easy to distinguish 


ORIGIN OF THE THEORY OF IDEAS: CRATYLUS 221 


what is meant seriously from what is a parody of con- 
temporary linguistics. Cratylus, who is here represented 
as debating with Socrates, might be the same about 
whom Aristotle! says that he was a follower of Hera- 
clitus and a teacher of Plato. But while Aristotle repre- 
sents Plato as faithful in an essential point to the 
doctrine of this his first teacher, we see in the present 
dialogue how he frees himself from a prejudice main- 
tained by Cratylus, according to which philology took 
the place of philosophy, and the truth about being was 
to be sought in etymology. 

It is very characteristic of the dialogue which makes 
the starting point of Plato’s logic, that in order to prove 
that things are not necessarily as they appear, that there 
is an existence independent of appearance, and a certainty 
not lable to doubt, Plato uses an ethical example, and 
quotes as one of such certainties the existence of bad and 
good men (3868). Thus the existence of things is treated 
as independent of the words we use to define them, and 
they are viewed as having their own permanence of 
substance (3864: éyew adta attav twa BeBaotnta Tihs 
ovaias—423D: ovcia doxet eivar ExdoTw, BoTEp Kal 
YpO"a .. + TPATOV avT@ TO yYpwOpaTe Kal TH Povy ~oTwW 
ovala Tis ExaTEpw AVTOY, Kal Tois dNrOLS TaoW boa HEiwTaL 
TaUTNs THs Tpocpycews Tod civar). Neither is Protagoras 
right in affirming that everything is as it appears to 
everybody (386 c), nor Euthydemus in believing that 
everything is for everybody the same always (386 b), for in 
either case no room would be left for the distinction be- 
tween good and bad, and this distinction Plato since writing 
the Gorgias looked upon as incontestable. The opinion 
here ascribed to Euthydemus is found in the dialogue of 


76 Aristotle in the Metaphysics (987a 32) quotes Cratylus as Plato’s 
teacher, and says that he was a follower of Heraclitus. Proclus in his 
commentary on the Cratylus of Plato (ed. J. F. Boissonade, p. 4) identifies 
with this Heraclitean Cratylus the Cratylus of Plato’s dialogue. 


of inter- 
pretation. 


Moral 
judgments 
taken as 
standard 
of 
certainty. 


Protago- 
ras and 
Euthyde- 
mus con- 
demned ; 
with a 
reference 
to the 
dialogue 


Huthy- 
demus. 


Substance 
perma- 
nent, 
while ap- 
pearances 
are 
changing. 
Perma- 
nence of 
notions a 
condition 
of know- 
ledge. 


922 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


this name, and if we compare the passages, the Cratylus 
seems to refer to the Huthydemus : 

Euthyd. 2948: morepov marta Cratyl. 386 D: ovd€ ca’ Ev6v- 
vov povov érictacbov i) Kai dei;—  Snpov ye oipar cot Soxet mace mavra 
kal dei—answers Euthyd. and he polos etvar da kai dei ovde yap 
says: 295A: emdeiEw kal o€ Taira dv oUTws elev vi wey xpnoToi, ot dé 
ta Oavpacta éyorvra. After a  movnpol, ef spolws Gmact kal adel 
sophistical argument he coneludes = dpern Te Kal kakia etn. 
with saying to Socrates: 296D: 
del yap @podoynkas érictacOat Kal 
dpa mavra. This is then proved by Socrates to be wrong 297 a by the 
example of the evident falsehood of a judgment such as ‘good men 
are unjust.’ 


What this substance or nature of things and even 
of actions (387 D) is, Plato does not yet fully explain. 
His first step is only to ascertain that it must be per- 
manent, while appearance is changing. The permanence 
of the substance of things results from the possibility of 
knowledge, which, since it has been established in the 
Meno, is no more liable to doubt, and is here accepted as 
a basis of reasoning. If things never remained the same, 
there would be nothing in them whereof Being might 
be predicated (48398: was oty dv ein ti éxetvo, 5d 
pnoeToTe WTAUTMWS eyEL; .. . Ef OF dsl Ooa’TOS éyer Kal 
TO AUTO éoTL, TAS av TOOTO ye weTAaBAANOL 7} KLVOtTO pNdzV 
eEvaTapevov THs avtod idéas ;). When a thing changes it 
becomes another, and no longer corresponds to the idea we 
first conceived of it. In such continuous changes know- 
ledge becomes impossible, because knowledge refers to 
a determinate being, and if that being becomes another, 
then our knowledge can no more refer to it, since know- 
ledge cannot know an indeterminate object (4404: 
yvaois 6) Tov oddepla yuyvooker 6 yuyvooks pndamas 
éyov). Knowledge itself, if it be knowledge, must remain 
unaltered and without change, because if it changes and 
no longer corresponds to the notion of knowledge, then 
it ceases to be knowledge at all (4404 B: AAN’ odds 


val > / > / 
YYOoW Elvat aval EiKOS, Ei psTaTrinTer TdyTA YpnmaTa 


ORIGIN OF THE THEORY OF IDEAS: CRATYLUS 223 


Kal pnodev péver . . . 2k TOUTOV TOD NOYoOU OUTE TO YVwaO- 
pevoyv ovTe TO yvaoOncopevov av ein). This reasoning is 
of fundamental importance for Plato’s logic, and for the 
origin of logic generally. It returns many times in later 
writings; the existence of a knowledge that is different 
from mere opinion is an axiom and the foundation of 
science. But knowledge cannot deal with ever-changing [Know- 
matter. The aim is to discover fixity in its objects, and \edge can- 
these, the notions of our mind, if grasped by real know- P° deal 
ledge, cannot undergo change. If they change, then |"? ever 
they were not at first obtained by knowledge but by a 
wrong opinion. 

It is inconceivable how Schaarschmidt (pp. 262-263) Material 
could believe that the objects of knowledge referred to so things are 
frequently (as ta dvra) in the Cratylus were materia] °t true 


hanging 
atter. 


things. Plato says clearly that the substance of things, Bes 
Saat wie oa 
as being invariable, is different from material appearances, Bc: 


and he quotes as illustrations of such substances the ction 
knowing subject, the known object, the beautiful, the oy the 
eood (440 B: et 68 ZoTe pév del TO YLyvOoKov, Fate d= knowing 
TO ylyvooKkopevov, zoTe OF TO KAaXNOV, zoTL SE TO Subject 
ayabov, gots 8& By Exactov Tav dvTwyv, od} por “St 
haivetat TavTa Gpoia dvTa, & VvdV Eis Néyomer, pon ovdev eaity 
ovde dopa). He expressly warns his disciples that the 
beautiful is not the same as a beautiful face, since the 
beautiful face can change, while the beautiful remains 

always the same (439 D: avto TO KaXov ToLodTOV asi goTL 

olov éotw). If it did not remain the same, we could nif 

even name it or think of it. 

The negative determination of the substance as Substance 
different from particular things leaves open the inquiry ‘eter- 
whether this substance has an ideal or a real existence, ™ined ne- 
The beautiful might be independent of our own individual &"¥elY- 
reason, and might still exist only in some personal reason, 
being a necessary form of thought, as has been admitted 
by Kant. Or the beautiful might have a separate 
existence aS a power independent of any personal 


No trace 
of sub- 
stantial 
ideas 

in the 
Cratylus. 


Further 
investi- 
gation 

invited. 


Allusions 

to earlier 

exposition 
uncertain, 
and could 
notrefer to 
Phaedrus 

or Theae- 

tetus. 

Use of the 
words 


224 ORIGIN-AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


being, the origin and cause not only of all beautiful 
particular things, but also of our personal notion of the 
beautiful. 

If we look at all the places in the Cratylus where the 
existence of an idea is postulated, we find in none of 
them any hint as to whether Plato in writing this 
dialogue was aware of the above alternative and whether 
he had already made a choice between the two possible 
answers to the question in which manner the substance 
of things exists. In every passage where he uses the 
words «idos, ‘ga or similar expressions (as 389 D: avto 
éxeivo 0 got, 3889 A: ToLovTOY TL O TépuKe) We can render 
them by ‘notion,’ ‘form,’ ‘idea,’ and we need not have 
recourse to the supposition that Plato had already 
imagined a world of self-existing ideas, as in his later 
teaching. 

He is very cautious in taking his first steps in logic, 
and he confesses that the definitive solution of these 
problems is very difficult (440 c), but he exhorts his 
readers to investigate courageously and well, and not to 
desist from that investigation (440 bp). He seems to 
promise further exposition, because Socrates and Cratylus 
at the end of the dialogue mutually advise each other to 
consider the matter. This is in perfect accordance with 
the position of this dialogue as introductory to Plato’s 
special logical studies. 

The necessity of a substance of things, as the true 
object of knowledge, is here alluded to as dreamt of 
many times (4389 C: modus dveipoTtw). Some inter- 
preters have inferred that this implies earlier exposi- 
tions of the same problem, and have accordingly placed 
the Cratylus after other dialogues, as for instance 
Pfleiderer 17 held it to be ‘indubitable’ that the 
Phaedrus and even Theaetetus preceded the Cratylus. 
But we must be cautious in such inferences, because 
Plato did not look upon his works as a continuous series 

'” K, Pfleiderer, Socrates und Plato, Tiibingen 1896, p. 318 Sqq- 


ORIGIN OF THE THEORY OF IDEAS: CRATYLUS 225 


of handbooks, in which each presupposes all that precede. 
An allusion to frequent discussions on a_ particular 
subject may refer much more probably to Plato’s 
oral teaching than to his previous works. The use of 
ovoia in the meaning of the true substance of a thing as 
opposed to its appearance is not found in the ethical 
dialogues preceding the Cratylus, and appears here for 
the first time.' It cannot easily be taken in the later 
meaning of a transcendental idea, because the only marks 
of substance here insisted upon are its permanence, and 
its difference from appearance and opinion. Both can be 
predicated of concepts of our mind, and when Plato began to 
understand something else by an idea, he said so expressly 
in quite different terms, If anybody from the mention of the 
form of a shuttle (889 B: eldos xepxidos) infers that Plato 
in the Cratylus admitted ideas of manufactured articles, 
then of course he would find the Platonic theory of ideas 
already in Thucydides. But in the hight of an impartial 
interpretation, the theory of ideas is only prepared in the 
Cratylus, not yet formulated.'” 

The power of the dialectician, assumed in the 
Euthydemus, is again asserted in the Cratylus. The 
dialectician, however, is here defined as ‘he who knows 
how to ask and to answer questions’ (390 Cc: 0 épwrdap 
émicTapevos Kal amoxpiver@ac); this definition is not 
given here as something new, but as well known and 

"8 Peipers (Ontologia Platonica, p. 67) quotes some passages from 
earlier dialogues, where according to him ovcla refers to ideas, but on con- 
sideration, in all these passages another meaning is obvious. Hwthyph. 
11a ovcia dotov=definition of holiness (Jowett: essence); Charm. 168 p 
ovcia = nature (Jowett) or quality; Protag. 3498 odcia (dy¢éuaros) kab 
mpayua=object and thing (Jowett: ‘essence and thing’); Meno 728 
ovaia weAlrrns=definition of a bee (Jowett: nature of a bee); Gorg. 472 B 
exBadrrew ek Tis ovalas (Jowett : inheritance). In none of these passages is 
ovaia opposed to appearance, asin the Cratylus and in many later works. 

'® That the Cratylus is introductory to the theory of ideas has been 
also recognised by Susemihl (see note 54), who observed that the words eldos 
and idea have in all passages of the Cratylus whenever they occur the 


meaning of ‘ species,’ ‘kind,’ ‘form,’ but not the later meaning of Platonic 
ideas (Genetische Entwickelung, vol. i. p..161). 


Q 


eldos and 
idéa not 
technical. 


The dia- 
lectician 
directs the 
creation 
of new 
words. 


First ele- 
ments of 
every- 
thing 
must be 
first ex- 
plained. 
Natural 
divisions 
of things. 


Origin of 
error in 
the wrong 
use of 
language: 
it is the 
privilege 
of the 
dialec- 
tician to 
use words 


296 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


recognised, though it had not been given in any earlier 
work of Plato. In the Huthydemus, the only earlier 
dialogue where the dialectician is mentioned, the term was 
also assumed as known, and it may have been used by 
Socrates, as it occurs in Xenophon’s Memorabilia. But 
here the privilege of the dialectician to judge every kind 
of knowledge is extended also to the art of creating words. 
The maker of words has to recognise as his master the 
dialectician (390 D : vowoérov épyov dvopma, eric Ta THY EXOVTOS 
StanrexTixoy dvdpa), and here Plato is clearly conscious of 
his dialectical superiority over contemporary philologers, 
and, as he expressly states, over the sophists (891 c) and 
poets (391 D-393 B). 

Related to this is the demand that the first elements 
of everything must be explained unless the whole is 


to remain unexplained; which is here applied to the 


origin of language (426 A: wep. TOY TpoTwY dvomaTwr 
.. paduoTa TE Kal KaOapwTaTa Set Eye amodetEar, 1) Ed 
elogval, OTL Ta ye VaTEpa On PAvapyoe). Things have 
their natural divisions, according to which we must divide 
them if we do not wish toerr (3887 A: cata tay diaow Tod 
Téuvew TE Kal TEuverOar Kal @ TébvKe). Things are as 
they are, according to their own nature (3886 E: xca@’ avta 
Tpos THY avTaY ovciay EyovTa HmEp TéebuKev) and not 
according to our imaginations (386 HE: od pos mpas 
ovde ud nuaov, EXKomEva dyw Kal KdTW TO NpuETepoO 
gpavtadcpatt), which produce error and wrong belief as 
opposed to truth (885 B). Against those who pretended 
that error is impossible (429 D) Plato shows the origin 
of error in the incompetent use of language. Words are 
instruments (388 A: dpyavov) of thought, for educational 
purposes and for logical distinctions (888 c: SdacKadiKov 
Kal SuaxpiTixov THs ovcias); they imitate things (430 B: 
CvoHa plunya TOU mpadypwatos) as their symbols (433 B: 
dnkwpa cvdrAdaBais Kai ypdupact tpdypyaros, also 435 B), 
and yet are not always similar to them (432 pD), because 
a good word-maker is the rarest of all artisans (389 A: 


ORIGIN OF THE THEORY OF IDEAS: CRATYLUS 227 


Snmloupy@v omaviwtatos), and if he does not work after 
the dialectician’s directions, he may have named things 
not according to their nature (432 8). The competent 
use of right words is the dialectician’s privilege (390 c) 
and those who do not possess the dialectical power are 
liable to employ words in a manner contrary to their 
intention, whence mistakes arise (431 B). Thus truth 
differs from falsehood (3885 B). The worst source of error 
is self-deception, because the deceiver never abandons the 
deceived (428 D) and makes him disagree with himself 
(433 B: ef. Gorg. 482 B). 

Here Plato confirms what he said in the Gorgias 
about contradiction as the mark of error, and consistency 
as the condition of truth. Truth is found in the unity 
and similarity of things (488E: padety (Ta ovta)... 
dv addjrar, €l 1 Evyyevf ect, Kai avta bv avtov). What 
method should be used for ascertaining truth Plato de- 
clines to explain (439B: petfov tows éoriv éyvwxévar 4) 
kar éue kat oé), but he insists that knowledge is not to 
be gathered from words (439 B: dyarntov 62 Kal TodTo 
omoroynoacOar Ott ovK 2E GvopaTwy, GAAa TOAD paddoV 
auta @€ avtayv Kali padnréov cai &nrnréov), for the first 
word-maker, if he named things according to their nature, 
must have had a knowledge of them not gained through 
words (438 B). 

Plato thus claims for his philosophical pursuit the 
authority to judge about the propriety of words (425 4), 
to change their meaning and to make new words accord- 
ing to the requirements of his dialectic. He has largely 
used that liberty in his later works, whereas but few new 
words occur in the Socratic dialogues. The Cratylus pro- 
claims the philosopher’s independence of and power over 
language. Faithful to the @ prior character of his 
knowledge, Plato despises statastics (437 D) and inferences 
from a majority of cases. He wants a sound basis and 
beginning for each theory (4386D: 5é? wept ths apyns 
TavTos mpayyatos Tavtt avépt Tov Todd Rovor Eivat Kal. 

Q2 


in the 
proper 
way. 


Consist- 
ency a 
condition 
of truth. 


Philo 
sopher’s 
independ- 
ence of 
language, 
and power 
over 
language. 


Divine 
origin of 
language 
not ac- 
cepted as 
sufficient 
explana- 
tion. 


The 
special 
problem 
here 
brought 
forward 
is not 
decided. 
Only ex- 
tremes re- 
pudiated. 


228° ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


THY TOAAY cKeWw) and betrays his geometrical predilec- 
tions by adducing the familiar analogy of a small error 
unnoticed in the commencement of a geometrical con- 
struction (436D: dvaypaypatev eviote TOD TpwTOU cULKpOD 
Kal adndou >evdous yevomevov, TA ova TayTrONa Hon 
dvTa éropeva Omoroyety GAXAnAoOLs). He does not recognise 
a reference to divine origin as an explanation of anything, 
comparing it with the introduction of gods on the dramatic 
stage, when no better solution is forthcoming (425 D), and 
calling it a clever evasion of the duty of giving reasons 
and proofs (426 4). Still, the religious spirit of the Gorgias 
is not extinct, and God remains free from human con- 
tradictions (488 c), while the future life is assumed as a 
matter of course (403D), with the addition, that it is 
dominated by philosophy (404 4). 

It is curious, however, to see that this increasing con- 
fidence in the power of dialectic and philosophy seems to 
fail him in the concrete problems with which he is chiefly 
concerned in the Cratylus. The avowed purpose of the 
inquiry is to ascertain the origin of language, and the dis- 
cussion, not invariably quite serious, of many etymologies 
ends in a compromise between two conflicting theories. 
As a result of the Cratylus we must recognise the view 
that there is a certain natural phonetic expression of 
thoughts, but that this is adulterated through the word- 
maker's errors, which remain in the language by tacit 
consent of the people speaking any dialect. Both extreme 
theories of language, as the result of an agreement, or as 
a product of divine inspiration, are here repudiated. Plato 
in this dialogue employs a method very familiar to the 
readers of his later writings, consisting in beginning a dis- 
cussion with some secondary topic, and passing from this 
to a deeper consideration of some problem not thought of 
at the outset. Here the question of the origin of language 
is a pretext leading to the metaphysical distinction 
between substance and appearance, and identifying the 
substance of a thing with the object of true knowledge. 


ORIGIN OF THE THEORY OF IDEAS: CRATYLUS 229 


This is a logical investigation, widely different from the 
simpler ethical inquiries which pervade the Socratic 
dialogues. 

The importance of the Cratylus as a first chapter in 
Platonic logic has not been always recognised. Plato has 
even been supposed to imply that consistency is no test of 
truth (Jowett, i. 263). This inference is based on the 
passage in which Plato explains by a geometrical analogy 
the possibility of concealing an initial error of reasoning 
beneath a subsequent ‘enforced’ consistency (436D: to 
Tpatov chanreis 6 TLOuEevos TAXA HON TpOs TOUT’ EBLaleTo 
kat Evy doveiv jvayxagev). Such an artificial and only 
apparent consistency was clearly distinguished by Plato 
from true self-consistency, which had been proclaimed 
already in the Gorgias (482 B: ot cot 6poroynoe Kadduxnd is, 
@® KadnXixdevs) as a test of truth, and is again used as such 
a test in the Cratylus (433B: e tadtTa apdotepa épeis, 
ovy olos T zoe cupgpwvelv cavT). The familiar example 
of a wrong consistency was adduced only in order to 
show the decisive importance of the first principles in 
every science (436 Dp). The ideal consistency required by 
philosophy is not expected by Plato to be found in a 
language (435 c), though he affirmed that language to be 
the most beautiful in which the greatest consistency 
reigned (4835p). To build such an ideal language by 
creating a philosophical terminology was a task which 
Plato subsequently undertook in part, but which he 
almost ridiculed when he wrote the Cratylus (433 E; cf. 
Polit. 261E: pn orrovidlew eri tots ovopaci). 

The Cratylus, a literary masterpiece comparable in its 
originality to the Parmenides, was held by the successors 
of Plato in an esteem attested by the commentary of 
Proklos,'*® and has up to the present day exercised the 
perspicacity of numerous commentators, as can be seen 


180 Hx Procli scholiis in Cratylum Platonis excerpta e. codd. edit. J. F. 
Boissonade, Lipsiae 1820. ; 


Logical 
consist- 
ency ex- 
plained 
by a geo- 
metrical 
analogy. 


Only arti- 
ficial and 
wrong 
consist- 
ency is not 
a test of 
truth. 


Ideal con- 
sistency 
not found 
in lan- 
guage. 


The 

Cratylus 
has been 
esteemed 
by many 
commen- 


tators, 
and its 
authen- 
ticity 
certain. 


Ktymo- 
logies 
quoted to 
a great 
extent 
justified 
by the 
state of 
linguistic 
knowledge 


230 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


from the writings of Dittrich,'®*! Benfey,’’ Hayduck,'* 
Rosenstock,'* Heath,'!* P. Meyer,!** and Bonitz 1” on 
this dialogue. What Schaarschmidt (p. 245 sqq.) said 
against the authenticity of the Cratylus has been sufh- 
ciently refuted by Alberti,!** Lehrs,'** Luckow,'” Drey- 
korn,'*! and H. Schmidt,'” so that even Huit (i. p. 187), 
who popularised in France Schaarschmidt’s doubts as to 
many other dialogues, thought it advisable to dissent in 
this respect from his master, and to defend the authenticity 
of the Cratylus. 

One of the grounds alleged by Schaarschmidt, the 
apparent absurdity of the etymologies proposed, has been 
explained by Schaublin,'’ who compared these etymo- 
logies with other evidence about the knowledge of 
etymology accessible to Plato, and found that among 120 
etymologies attempted by Plato over sixty were perfectly 
justified according to the knowledge of his times, and 
twenty stand even the test of our present knowledge of 
Greek. Schaublin has also carefully compared the 


's!_ Ki. M. Dittrich, De Cratylo Platonis, Berolini 1841. 

2 'T. Benfey, Ueber die Aufgabe des platonischen Dialogs Cratylus, 
Gottingen 1866. 

'88 W. Hayduck, De Cratyli Platonici fine et consilio, Vratislaviae 1868. 

8! P. E. Rosenstock, Platos Cratylus wnd die Sprachphilosophie der 
Neuzeit, Strassburg 1893. 

8 D. Heath, ‘On Plato’s Cratylus,’ in the Journ. of Philol. for 1888, 
vol. xvii. p. 192. 

‘86 P. Meyer, Quaestiones Platonicae, Leipzig 1889, pp. 12-25. 

's7 Bonitz, ‘ Ueber Platos Cratylus,’ Monatsber. Berliner Akadem. 1869, 
p- 703. 

'$ Alberti, ‘Ist der dem Plato zugeschriebene Dialog Cratylus acht?’ in 
Rhewvisches Museum, vol. xxi. p. 180 sgqg., and vol. xxii. p. 477 sqq. 
1866-67. 

'89 Lehrs in Rheinisches Museum, vol. xxii. p. 436, 1867. 

' R. Luckow, De Platonis Cratylo, Treptow 1868. 

'! Dreykorn, Der Kratylus ein Dialog Platos, Zweibriicken 1869. 

'? H. Schmidt, Platos Kratylus im Zusammenhange dargestellt, Halle 
1869, an excellent commentary. 

3 F. Schiublin, Ueber den platonischen Dialog Kratylos, Basel 1891. 
The same subject had been treated very differently by C. Lenormant 
(Commentaire sur le Cratyle de Platon, 316 pp., Athénes 1861), in his 
voluminous edition and commentary. 


ORIGIN OF THE THEORY OF IDEAS: CRATYLUS 231 


etymologies given in the Cratylus with other etymologies 
occasionally indicated by Plato, and he demonstrates their 
similarity and good faith against Steinthal'* who be- 
lieved all the etymologies given in the Cratylus to be 
arbitrary. 

Competent writers disagree widslg as to the date of 
the Cratylus. Even C. Ritter, notwithstanding his 
stylistic observations, believed it possible for the 
Cratylus to have been written before the death of 
Socrates, as has been thought also by the poet Gray,’ 
by Socher, Stallbaum, and others. This opinion is 
opposed by those who believe the Cratylus to be later 
than the Phaedo and Phaedrus, as for example by Ast, 
and in recent times by Peipers and Bergk. The style 
would (see above, p. 168) place this dialogue clearly 
between the Gorgias and Phaedo, and the logical contents 
also point to the same result, the Cratylus being intro- 
ductory to the logical theories of the Phaedo, while pre- 
supposing the conclusion of ethical inquiries summed up 
in the Gorgias. Some other hints confirm the position 
here given to the Cratylus as the first logical work sub- 
sequent to the complete series of ethical dialogues. 
Diimmler ' observes that the allusion (433 A) to the early 
closing of the gates in Aegina presupposes a time of 
peace in which Athenians and more especially Plato's 
students could make excursions to the neighbouring town. 
But such a time of peaceable intercourse between Athens 
and Aegina was not possible, so Diimmler thinks, before 
the peace of Antalcidas, or 387 B.c. The Cratylus must 
then have been written later, after Plato’s return from his 


1 Steinthal, Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen and 
Rémern, Berlin 1862. 

1% Thomas Gray, Notes on Plato, in vol. iv. pp. 67-338 of the Works, 
edited by E. Gosse, London 1884 (first published 1814), p. 164, calls the 
Cratylus ‘ the least considerable’ of the works of Plato. 

196 Diimmler, Chronologische Beitrige zu einigen platonischen Dialogen 
aus den Reden des Isokrates, Basel 1890, p. 48 ; Christ, Platonische Studien, 
p. 8, made it probable that Plato had money transactions in Aegina. 


in Plato’s 
times 


The date 
of the 
Cratylus 
has been 
differently 
deter- 
mined. 
Mention 
of Aegina 
gives a 
useful in- 
dication. 


Hellenes 
and 
foreign 
nations 
spoken of 
as equal, 
as in later 
dialogues. 
This 
seems to 
imply 
that the 
Cratylus 
was 
written 
after 
Plato’s 
voyages, 
perhaps at 
the begin- 
ning of his 
teaching 
activity. 


232 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


first voyage to Sicily, and also after his captivity in 
Aegina,—if the story of this captivity is true. 

Another confirmation of this view is given by the 1m- 
partiality with which Plato treats foreign nations in the 
Cratylus as equal to the Greeks (383 A: dp@oTnTa ovo- 
patov Kat “EXdnow kai SapBdpois THY avTHY dTacW.... 
3890 A: Tov vopobérny tov te evOade Kal Tov év Tois 
BapBapos .. .. 425 HE: elot 6% pov apxaotepor 
BapBapo, see also 385 EH, 390 c, 409 £). This concep- 
tion remains unchanged in many later works, as the 
Symposium, Phaedo, Republic, Theaetetus, Politicus, 
Timaeus, while it is opposed to the narrow Greek and even 
Athenian patriotism, shown in the Protagoras, in which 
Athens is called the seat of wisdom (Prot. 337 D: mpv- 
Tavetov 7s codias) by the non-Athenian Hippias. In the 
Gorgias Athens is praised as the place in Hellas where the 
greatest freedom of speech is to be found (461 E :’A@nvate 
adikomevos, ov THs ‘EXXdbos mArEictn eotiv eEovcia Tov 
Aéevev), Without any mention of foreign countries, such as 
occurs repeatedly in the Cratylus, whenever the whole of 
Greece or the Greeks are named. This frequent mention 
of foreign nations in the Cratylus seems to belong to a 
time when the horizon of Plato’s experience had been 
considerably enlarged by his travels abroad, while the 
subject of the origin of Greek language, generalised into 
the inquiry about the origin of human speech and the 
relation of thought to it, would seem to have been 
specially debated in Plato’s school. The moral problems 
discussed in the preceding dialogues were inherited from 
Socrates, though their solution in the Gorgias is already 
Platonic: the problem of language as a source of know- 
ledge has been attributed to Antisthenes,!” and the 
peculiar proof that philosophic truth is independent of 


7 The very uncertain allusions of the Cratylus to this philosopher are 
treated by Diimmler, Akademika, pp. 148-161; K. Barlen, Antisthenes wnd 
Plato, Progr. Neuwied 1881; K. Urban, Ueber die Erwéhnungen der 
Philosophie des Antisthenes in den platonischen Schriften, Kénigsberg 1882. 


ORIGIN OF THE THEORY OF IDEAS: SYMPOSIUM 233 


language, contained in the Cratylus, is a worthy inaugu- 
ration of Plato’s own philosophical career, in which he 
was distinguished from all predecessors by his power over 
language as an external instrument for conveying thought. 
Plato, the great word-maker, could not better begin his 
new philosophy than by this inquiry into the relation 
between thought and speech. The counterpart of this, 
the inauguration of Plato’s logic, is to be found in the 
Symposium, where the philosopher was led to a new 
vision of truth as consisting in eternal and self-existent, 
independent ideas, those Platonic ‘ideas’ which have 
been accepted by so many readers as the quintessence 
of Platonism. 


II. The Symposium. 


(Relative affinity to the latest group, measured on the Laws 
as unity, = 0°14; see above, p. 169.) 


Nearly every other work of Plato admitted of discus- 
sion as to the author’s purpose and the chief contents. 
The Symposium, however, is distinguished by a clear 
announcement of its aim, and deals apparently only with 
one subject, love, teaching the first lesson of that new 
feeling discovered by Plato and in its first stage known 
even to-day as Platonic by some people who know nothing 
else of Plato. It would appear that in this lesson of love 
no room could be left for logic. But Plato, who is 
at once a great poet and a great logician, initiates us 
into the mystery of his first logical discovery through 
this triumphant poem of victorious love. It is love, 
he says, that leads to the highest knowledge of truth. 
But not the love of a single person, however pure, nor 
the love of a single city, be it the greatest on earth, 
nor the love of a single science. There is far above all 
these feelings a new and powerful love, difficult to under- 
stand even for Socrates, who has heretofore been repre- 
sented as the wisest of men. The explanation of this 
feeling, expressed by nobody before Plato, he puts 


Chief sub- 
ject of the 
Sympo- 
sium love, 
but a new 
kind of 
love, 
leading 

to know- 
ledge. 


For the 
first time 
Socrates 
is sup- 
planted by 
another 
teacher, 
but not a 
historical 
person. 


Diotima 
unknown 
to Thucy- 
dides : 
probably 
invented 
by Plato 
in order 
to give 
apparent 
historical 
authority 
to his own 
teaching. 


New 


theory 


234 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


poetically in the mouth of a woman. This woman, 
Diotima of Mantinea, is invented by Plato, though he 
gives her an historic appearance by the assertion that 
through her prayers she preserved the Athenians from the 
plague. If she had been, as Plato makes his readers 
believe, a well-known and inspired priestess, Thucydides 
could not have failed to mention her. But no Greek 
writer!** before Plato knows anything about a Diotima of 
Mantinea, and all later mentions of her are based on the 
Symposium. 

We may therefore assume that the new theory, here 
ascribed to Diotima, is Plato’s own invention. For the 
first time in all Plato’s dialogues, Socrates ceases to be 
the sole teacher of wisdom, and Plato unmistakably 
implies that his new wisdom may be above the under- 
standing even of his teacher (210 A: tadra pév ody ta 
épwtixa lows, © L@Kpates, Kav ov punOeins’ Ta b= TédEa Kai 
eTroTTiKU, MV EvEeKa Kal TadTa zoTLW, eav Tis OpOGS peTin, 
ovK 010 & olos T av eins... . Tepe ErvecOat, av 
olds te ns). He clearly hesitates to expose the treasure 
found in solitary meditation to the unprepared adherents 
of vulgar love. He apologises repeatedly for the admitted 
obscurity of his teaching (201 D: retpdcopar Sued Oeiy .. . 
otras av Svvwopar. 204 D: reipdocopar didaEar 
cadéotepov ép@ (also 206 Cc) . . . 206 B: pavtelas detrar 
6 ti mote reyes... 207 C: py Oavpale (also 208 B) 
210 A: ép@ wev ovv Kai wpoGvpmias ovdév aToneio . . 


? 


210 EB: weup® 5 por Tov vodv Tpocéyew ws oioy TE 
padiota). It is evident that the new-found knowledge is 
looked upon as far more important than anything which 
has been said in earlier dialogues. Like a precious gem, 
it is set in the poetical gold of the Sympositwm—the most 
consummate work of art which even Plato’s genius has 
produced. 

If we ask wherein consists the new logical knowledge 


''8 The unhistorical character of Diotima was made evident by Her- 
mann, De Socratis magistris et disciplina juvenili, Marburg 1837, p. 12 sqq. 


ORIGIN OF THE THEORY OF IDEAS: SYMPOSIUM 235 


immortalised by the Symposiwm, we see it condensed in a 
few pages of the highest eloquence, which may be read as 
a record of personal experience, and as the result of the 
long previous development of Greek art. Lévéque!” in 
France and Cohen” in Germany have noticed the near 
relation between the origin of Plato’s theory of ideas and 
this preceding growth of. Greek art. What Plato says 
about his discovery amounts to this: if somebody grows 
accustomed to generalisations and to the progress from 
particulars to general notions, then, at a certain moment 
of his life, he will become suddenly (210 E: 2£aidvns) 
aware of the existence of the general idea as something 
which does not depend upon particulars, but is the true 
origin of all particular qualities. This sudden vision, 
here pictured with the natural delight of a first discovery, 
is the aim of all intellectual development (211 A: toito 
éxeivo ov 61) Evexa kal of Eumpoobev Taytes Tovot ijcar), 
a marvellous beauty (210 E: 
KaNO?) 


Oavpactov tiv dvow 
leading to every kind of virtue and to the 
immortality of man (212 A: rexovte apetiv adnOh Kai 
Opewapevm iTrdpye Ozopirel yeveoOa, Kal eitrep TW AAW 
avOpararv, aBavatw Kal éxeive). 

What kind of existence the idea of the beautiful 
possesses is difficult to express in human language, 
according to Plato’s own confession. But this existence 
was clearly meant by Plato, when he wrote the Sym- 
posium, to be a solution of the problem of substance 
proposed in the Cratylus. In that dialogue he limited 
his indications as to the substance of things to a few 


"9 Carolus Lévéque, Quid Phidiae Plato debuerit, Parisiis 1852, p. 60: 
‘Quaecumque Plato de pulchritudine scripsit . . . haec in Phidiae deorum 
vultu expressa et ut ita dicam sculpta invenerit, ita tamen ut ad intelli- 
gendum penitus Phidiae ingenium ingenio Platonis opus fuerit. Ab illo qua 
via ad summae pulchritudinis ideam perveniatur didicit.’ 

*” Hermann Cohen, ‘ Die platonische Ideenlehre, psychologisch ent- 
wickelt,’ in vol. iv. pp. 403-464 of Zeitschrift fiir Vilkerpsychologie und 
Sprachwissenschaft, Berlin 1866, p. 413: ‘Platos That wie sein Geist 
wiichst hervor aus dem gemeinsamen Samen der hellenischen Weltarbeit.’ 


of ideas 
based on 
the pre- 
ceding 
growth of 
Greek art. 


Theideaas 
the cause 
of parti- 
culars. 


Existence 
of ideas 
difficult to 
explain. 

It is inde- 
pendent of 
opinions 
and ap- 
pearances. 


The idea 
is more 
perfect 
than a 
work of 
art. 


Intuition 
of ideas is 
acquired 
by exer- 
cise in 
generali- 
sations. 


236 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


determinations, such as permanence and objectivity. 
Now he has ‘suddenly’ perceived a beauty not only 
eternal (211A: del Ov Kal ovTe yiyvomevoy ovTE aTOANU- 
fevoyv, ovTe avéavouevoy ovte POivov) and objective, but 
also absolute, that is, independent of time and space, and 
of concrete appearances as well as individual opinions 
(ov TH mév Kadov, TH O aicypov, OVS TOTE péV, TOTE O& OU, 
ovdé mpos pév TO KaXOV, TPOs b& TO aiaxpor, OVO’ EVOA meV 
Kanov, ev0a 5& aicypov). It is natural that Plato, being 
himself an artist and living in an age when art had 
reached an ideal perfection, should formulate this first 
assertion of a self-existent absolute idea with reference 
to the idea of beauty. He saw the distance between all 
human models and such a creation of art as the Olympian 
Zeus of Phidias. He imagined that even the most 
perfect work of art is only a particular instance of the 
ideal beauty, which he did not claim to perceive with 
the mortal eye, but with the divine insight of an en- 
thusiastic soul. He recommends his readers to acquire 
this superior faculty of intellectual intuition by exercise 
in generalisation. He says clearly that the idea is not 
only immaterial (211 A: 0d8 ad davtacOyncetar avTo TO 
Kadov olov Tpocwmov TL ovdE YElpEs OVSE AAO OvOsY OY 
copa petéver) but not even intellectual (2114: ovd¢ tus 
Royos, ovdE TLs EriagTHpN, OVSE Tov dv ev ETE TLL, OloY ev 
Cow %) ev yh 7) ev ovpave % gv Tw AAXo), Nor Inherent in 
the soul as a notion, nor in anything else. Here we have 
an evident indication that Cohen’s?! doubts as to the 
separate existence of Platonic ideas, however justified 
with reference to other works, are inadmissible so far as 
concerns the Symposiwm, and the idea of Beauty, the 
first discovered by Plato and the only idea spoken of in 

21 H. Cohen, Platons Ideenlehre und die Mathematik, Marburg 1879, 
p- 9: ‘Diese Auffassung des xwpiouds ist einmal des Aristoteles eigenste 
verantwortliche That. Ob wir sie hitten, ob Jemand aus den Platonischen 
Dialogen sie herausgelesen haben wiirde, wenn Aristoteles sie nicht als die 


legitime gelehrt und—unerschrocken verhéhnt hiitte, das darf wenigstens 
bezweifelt werden.’ 


ORIGIN OF THE THEORY OF IDEAS: SYMPOSIUM 237 
the Symposium. This idea is certainly not immanent, 
but separated from concrete things. The relation of 
single beautiful things to the idea of beauty is expressed 
here by the word peré¢yew, not used in any earlier dia- 
logue to express the relation of a particular thing *” to 
a general notion. It means that all beautiful things owe 
their beauty to the idea of Beauty. This idea is not here 
called eZdos or id¢a, but is named ‘the beautiful’ (2118: 
To xadov). Itis self-existent, needs nothing else to enable 
it to exist eternally (211 8B: avdrto ca@’ avTo pel avTod 
povosides agi ov), and Plato has invented the term povo- 
evdgs, first used in the Symposiwm, to mark its simplicity. 
According to modern terminology Platonic Beauty is 
then a simple substance, the original cause of all in- 
dividual beauty, suffering no alteration through its 
action on the particular things, to which it imparts its 
own quality, though in a lesser degree. 

Plato admits this ideal Beauty to be an object of 
science and knowledge (211c: paOnpua), but he leaves 
it uncertain whether he pretends to know it as it really 
is, or only as it appears to him. When, however, he 


22 This term in Symp. 211 8 is paraphrased rather than translated by 
Jowett in the words: ‘Beauty absolute ... which .. . is imparted to 
the ever growing and perishing beauties of all other things.’ peréxew 
meaning the relation of things to ideas is used for the first time in the 
Symposium, while in earlier works it had the current meaning with which 
it is found in other authors, translated (Jowett) by ‘share in’ (Prot. 322 p, 
323 a, virtue and other arts), ‘take part in’ (conversation, Huthyd. 271 B, 
danger, 279 k), ‘are intermediate between’ (philosophy and politics, Huthyd. 
30648), ‘is proficient’ (in an art, Gorg. 448 c), ‘ partake’ (of good and evil, 
Gorg. 467 ©). The technical meaning of ueréxew as designating the relation 
of things to ideas is limited almost entirely to the Symposiwm and Phaedo 
(100 c, 101 c, ef. Rep. v. 476 p), while in the Parmenides (where the abstract 
noun “éGefs also occurs) it is mentioned and criticised. In other dialogues 
meréxew is used in the ordinary meaning (as for instance Rep. 432 B, 455 p, 
465 5, 520 B, &c.; Phaedr. 247 B, 249 £, 272»; Phil. 1lc, 54 8, 56c; Tim. 
27 c,53.c, 58x; Legg. 721, 755 a, 9638, &c.). The peculiar use of ueréxe 
in the Sophist (as 251 ©) to mark the relation between two general notions is 
quite different from the meaning of a participation of things in ideas. An 
alternative term for meréxew is metadauBdvery. Cf. Jowett and Campbell, 
Rep. vol. ii. p. 309. 


The 

idea of 
Beauty is 
the source 
of all 
beautiful 
things, 
exists 
eternally, 
being sub- 
ject to no 
changes in 
its sim- 
plicity. 
Ideas as 
objects of 
knowledge 
appa- 
rently 


identical 
with our 
subjective 
notions. 


Know- 
ledge 
remains 
right 
opinion 
based on 
grounds or 
sufficient 
reason, in 
the Sym- 
posium 
like in the 
Meno. 


Distine- 
tion 

between 
Wisdom 


and Philo- 


sophy 
common 
to 


238 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 
speaks of exercise, as enabling us to improve our sight 
of absolute Beauty (2118: 
Kadov apyntat Kabopay, axedov av TL ATTOLTO TOU TEdoUS), 
we must infer that he allowed the possibility of an 
immediate intuition of absolute Beauty as it is, without 
subjective error. He did not yet see the peculiar diffi- 
culties of such a position. 

Though Plato in the Symposiwm thus presents a new 
object of knowledge, he seems not to have progressed as 
to the definition of knowledge itself beyond the dis- 
tinction given in the Meno, according to which knowledge 
differs from right opinion by the reasons which we are’ 
bound to give when we know something. Here he recalls 
this distinction : 


é a \ 
OTav .. . émavimv éKxelvo TO 


Meno 984: dc€aradnOeis . . . 

> ~ fees o > 
ov moAAod aéiai eiow, ews ay Tis 
> ‘ , >’ , - > A 
avras Ojon airias Noywoug. everday 
b€ debaow, mp@rov pev emurtjpat 
ylyvovrat, eretra povusou. . . . kal 
dca tavra 81 TiyuimTepov emiotHpy 
6pOns dons 


> , ‘ , 
€otiv, kat drahépet 


Symposium 2024: 1ro dpda 
Sogafew avev Tov exe Aoyor Sovvat, 
ovte eniatacOai eotw: adoyov yap 
mpaypna Tas ay ein emiotnun; ove 
dpadia: TO yap Tov dvTos TUyxa- 

a a as , »” . , 

vov Tas ay etn Gpabia; got de dy 
~ c b] A ’ ‘ 

mov Towovtov n op Sofa, peraév 


Ppovnoews kai apabias. 


If right opinion without reasons is not knowledge, 
yet knowledge might still be for a modern logician 
something else than right opinion with reasons for it, 
but if Plato had changed his view of the nature of know- 
ledge expressed in the Meno, he could not conceal it here, 
because every unprejudiced reader infers that knowledge, 
not being right opinion without reasons, is right opinion 
based on reasons, as had been stated expressly in the 
Meno, and denied only much later in the Theaetetus. 

A fresh point is gained in the distinction between 
wisdom and philosophy, which is repeated later in the 
Phaedrus, and here founded on the etymology of the 
name ‘philosopher,’ as one who desires wisdom and 
therefore does not yet possess it. It is noteworthy that 
even in the etymologies of the Cratylus Plato did not 
allude to this new meaning of ‘philosophy,’ which is 


ORIGIN OF THE THEORY OF IDEAS: SYMPOSIUM 259 


first explained in the Symposiwm (203E: @e@v ovdeis Sympo- 
pirocodet obd’ ériOupst coos yevéoOar* eats yap* ovd’ ei stumand 
Tis adddos codes, ov didrocoget). This exaltation of a Phaedrus. 
wisdom above philosophy, which in the Euthydemus and 

Gorgias was still the highest science, corresponds to 

the new power of intuition of Beauty, which is placed 

above all other knowledge. Plato became conscious of 

the limitations of that purely ethical knowledge of which 

he was so proud in the Gorgias. He felt an artistic long- 

ing for a perfection beyond pure logical investigation and 
reasoned knowledge, even beyond knowledge based on 

full consciousness of all reasons. He was thus led to this 

almost unthinkable conception of absolute Beauty. 

Another consequence of the new idealism is the change Different 
of position as to personal immortality. It is not clearly view of 
denied, at least for the philosopher (2124), but the i 
religious faith as laid down in the Gorgias has been pares 
converted into a pantheistic view according to which 
immortality consists in the eternal reproduction of the 
same ideal form (208A: TovtTw T@® TpoT@ Tay TO OvnToV 
cwteTal, 00 TO TavTaTaTW TO avTOV dél eivaL WoTrEP TO 


Gorgias 
and Sym- 
posium. 


Ociov, GANA TO TO aTLOY Kal TadaLoOvpEvoY ETEPOV VEOV 
éyKatansirey olov avto Hv, cl. Legg. 721 c). 

This renovation of particulars is applied even to Peculiar 
knowledge (208 A: odd 52 adtome@tepoy eT1, OTL Kal at émre- View of in- 
oTHMAl py OTL al pev yiryvovTat, ai 6& awoONAVYTAL Hut, Kal tellectual 


Os ¢ > ee IOX \ \ 3 / > . exercise 
OvOeTOTE OL aUTOL éapEv OVE KATA TAS eTLTTH MAS, ANA 


ara Goats ial tae im 58% 5 , compared 
Kal pia ExdoTH TOV éTLoTHU@Y Tav’TOY Tacye). LHxercise with, tend 
keeps knowledge apparently the same, yet constantly yation of 


renewed, and creates new knowledge which seems to matter. 
be the same as that which we had before (2084: perérn 
Tdadw Kawnv éprowdca avtl THs amovaons cwler THY 
eTloTHLNV, WoTE THY avTHY Soxety eivac). This surprises 
Plato himself more than the exchange of elements in the 
body, and it seems to contradict the identity of knowledge 
admitted in the Gorgias. But the contradiction is only 
apparent, as the identity referred to the objective know- 


Literary 
merits of 


the Sym- 


posium. 


Date of 


the Sym- 


posvum 
385 B.c., 
almost 


240 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


ledge, and the successive substitutions are attributed to 
the individual. It was a consequence of the growing 
admiration of Plato for knowledge, that at this stage 
the subject disappeared as compared with the object, 
which became the only true reality. Thus was founded 
the system of idealism, known as the Platonic theory 
of ideas. In the Symposium it appears as a first attempt 
and is limited to the idea of Beauty. 

This logical importance of the Symposiwm has been 
little noticed up to the present time, being overshadowed 
by its literary perfection. Such poets as Racine ”’ and 
Shelley 7! have attempted to render it in modern lan- 
cuage, and many editors and commentators have spent 
their leisure on the text.2” 

There is an almost general agreement as to the date 
of the Symposium, the mention of the recent partition 
of Mantinea, which occurred 385 B.c., being admitted as 
a sufficient indication that the dialogue cannot have 
been written much later.2% This conclusion was suffi- 


»3 Le Banquet de Platon, trad. par J. Racine, M* de Rochechouart et 
Victor Cousin, Paris 1868; also in @wvres de J. Racine, ed. L. Aimé 
Martin, Paris 1844, vol. v. pp. 95-186. Racine’s translation extends only up 
to the speech of Eryximachus. 

204 Percy Bysshe Shelley, The Banquet of Plato, London 1887 (first ed. 
1840). Shelley held the Symposiun to be ‘ the most beautiful and perfect’ 
among the works of Plato. 

205 Besides modern editions of F. A. Wolf (Lipsiae 1782, also 1828), Ast 
(Landshut 1809), P. A. Reynders (Groningae 1825), L. J. Riickert (Lipsiae 
1829), A. Hommel (Lipsiae 1834), de Sinner (Paris 1834), Jahn (Bonn 
1864, re-edited by Usener, Bonn 1875), C. Badham (London 1866), G. F. 
Rettig (Halle 1875-76), it is worth noticing that the Symposiwm (ed. 
Salamanca 1553) was the first Greek publication of the famous Salamanca 
University Press. An extensive commentary on the Symposiwn was 
written already by the second French translator Loys Le Roy (Le Sympose 
de Platon, Paris 1559), who omitted the discourse of Alcibiades as too 
indecent for his French readers of the sixteenth century! The first trans- 
lation was Le Banquet de Platon, trad. par M. Heret, Paris 1556, a beauti- 
ful specimen of typography. 

206 However, Plato sometimes refers with a vewori to events over twenty 
years old, as for instance in the Gorg.503 c the death of Pericles is called recent 
(vewort), while from Gorg. 4738 it results, that the conversation between 
Gorgias and Socrates is assumed to have taken place 405 B.c. or twenty-four 


ORIGIN OF THE THEORY OF IDEAS: SYMPOSIUM 241 


ciently established in the last century by F. A. Wolf and 
has been successfully defended *” against some attempts 
at another interpretation.”* The mention of this event 
comes out so naturally that it cannot be regarded as a later 
interpolation added by the author or by his copyists. 
But it would still leave it open whether the Symposium 
was written in the same year or some years later, because 
for any contemporary reader an historical fact which 
occurred four or five years ago is still quite recent. Other 
considerations, however, make even the year 385 B.c. 
seem a late date for the Symposiwm, so that there is no 
probability in favour of a later time. The chief reason 
which makes it improbable that Plato could have written 
the Symposium much after 385 B.c. is the great number 
of works which, as our further inquiry will show, are 
later than the Sympostwm, and which also must be 
earlier than the change characterising the latest stage of 
Plato’s authorship. On the other hand, the number of 
works which precede the Symposium is very small for 
the space of fifteen years since the death of Socrates. 
Admitting the Huthydemus to have been written about 
390 B.c., as has been made very probable by Spengel, 
Teichmiuller, Sudhaus, and Diimmler, we have for the 
five following years only the Gorgias and the Cratylus, 
which is not much for a gifted author about the age 
of forty and at the height of his literary power. This 
years after the death of Pericles. But in referring to a time so far back 
Plato is careless of the exact dates. 

207 Besides Wolf in his edition of the Symposiwm (1782), also J. Spiller 
(De temporibus Convivii Platonici, Glivitti 1841), Ueberweg (Untersuch. 
p- 219), Teichmiiller (ii. p. 262), L. v. Sybel (Platons Symposion, Marburg 
1888), Kassai (Meletemata Platonica, p. 859, Budapest 1886), have shown 
that the Synvposiwm must haye been written about 385 B.c. 

208 A. Hommel, in his edition of this dialogue, tried to get rid of the 
anachronism by an emendation of the text. Diimmier believes that the 
reference to the partition of Mantinea might have been made also about 371, 
when the reunion of the separated parts of Mantinea was intended. Re- 
cently U. v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (Hermes, vol. xxxi. p. 102) suggested 


the dissolution of the Arcadic Union in 418 b.c. as the event alluded to by 
Aristophanes. . 


R 


unani- 
mously 
accepted 
on account 
of a well- 
known 
anachron- 
ism. 


Great 
number 
of works 
later than 
the Sym- 
posiwm. 
Small 
number 
of larger 
works pre- 
ceding it. 


The Sym- 
posiun as 
an acade- 


mical pro- 


gramme. 


Position 
inter- 
mediate 
between 
Cratylus 
and 
Phaedo. 


First 
introduc- 
tion of 
absolute 
Beauty or 
the idea 


of Beauty. 


242 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 
difficulty is avoided by those who place before the Sym- 
posium such dialogues as the Phaedo and Phaedrus,” 
not to speak of the dialectical works. But our subsequent 
exposition will prove beyond all doubt that these works 
must have been written after the Sympostwm. Besides, 
the Symposium, according to the very plausible reason- 
ing of Sybel and also of Teichmiuller, bears the character 
of having been written under the fresh impression of the 
successful beginning of Plato’s Academy, which was 
probably founded in 387 B.c. 

Various other indications confirm the intermediate 
position of the Sympostwm between the Cratylus and 
Phaedo, after the Gorgias and the other Socratic dialogues. 
In the Cratylus, Plato did not advance beyond a general 
distinction between substance and appearance, without any 
close determination of substance. In the Symposiwm this 
determination is given in regard to the substance of Beauty 
in a manner which makes it very probable that Plato is for 
the first time announcing his discovery of absolute being. In 
all earlier dialogues Socratic notions were ‘ present’ in the 
things, or immanent (Charm. 159 A: mdapects cwhpoovry, 
Lys. 217D : Xeveorns, 217E: wapovcia ayabod, Huthyd. 
301 A: «adXos, Gorg. 497 E, 498 D: ayabGv mapovaia) ; in 
the Symposium the higher doctrine of a participation of 
particulars in the idea is taught. The doctrine of pre- 
existence, which had been formulated in the Meno, is 


209 Tf C. Huit (Etudes sur le Banquet de Platon, Paris 1889) believes that 
all competent writers agree in placing the Phaedrus before the Symposium, 
except Ritter and Teichmiiller, he betrays his ignorance of many authors, as 
Suckow, Munk, Thompson, Campbell, Blass, Dittenberger, Schanz, Droste, 
Kugler, Gomperz, Lina, Tiemann, who all agree in placing the Phaedrus 
after the Symposium. It is true that against these fourteen authors, who 
up to the time of Huit’s strange assertion held the Symposiwm to be 
earlier than the Phaedrus, many others, as for instance, Schleiermacher, 
Stallbaum, Steinhart, Susemihl, Ueberweg, Liebhold, Teuffel, Peipers, 
Windelband, Christ, Zeller, were of the contrary opinion. But majorities 
cannot decide such questions, and since 1889 the proportion is reversed, so 
that the majority of new investigators take the later date of the Phaedrus 
for granted. 


ORIGIN OF THE THEORY OF IDEAS: SYMPOSIUM 243 


here only alluded to casually in the discourse of Aristo- 
phanes.?! 

The rule laid down in the Protagoras (347) to 
exclude flute girls and similar artists from philosophical 
banquets is repeated in the Symposium (1768), with the 
recommendation to find the best entertainment in con- 
versation (Prot. 3470: dua TO pH StvacOat adXAXoLS 
dv éavtT@v ovveivar.. . dia THs EavToV hovis Kal THY 
NOyov TOV éavTov Wo atraloevoias, Tiyulas Totovcr Tas 
avrntpioas: cl. Symp. 176 E: eionyodpar thy pév apte 
eiceNOodoay avrAnTpioa yaipew éGv . . . hyds O8 dia AOYwv 
adrnrors cuveivat). This appears, if we compare the 
passages, to be said in the Symposium as a matter of 
course, while it is explained at length in the Protagoras. 
Some other references to earlier dialogues are of the same 
kind : 

Gorg. 490: Socrates says :— Symp. 2218: ei €Oédou tis rev 
Tov oKUTOTOpoy tows péyloTta Set Lwxpdrovs dxovew oywr, daveiev 


¢ U ‘ bed ¢ Lf » ~ \ ~ * 
brodnpara kal mretota Urodedeuevoy dv yedoior TO mp@Tov . . . bvous 
mepuraretv, to which Kallikles yap .. . Neyer cai yadkéas Tivds 
answers: Avapeis . .. and det «al oxvtordpovs... kat det dia 
Ci , n > a dn \ 5K , , 
tavta éyets,—491 A: ov oKuTO- Trav airay Ta aiTda paivera éyety, 
TOpous heyw... @ote amepos Kat avonros avbpo- 
Crat. 3888D : dp’ odv mas xad- ros mas dy Tév oywr kaTaye- 
keds nOTHY TEx exoy, alsoO3BB9E Adceer. 
amas xaXkevs. Huthyd. 278d: 198 C: Kal yap pe Topyiov 6 Aoyos 


pn pov katayehate. Gorg.473 EB:  dvepivynoxey ... epoBovpny py jor 
Socrates complains of Polos, who reAeurav 6 ’Aydbav Topyiov kepa- 
isrepresented as dmretpos kaldvdnros:  Anv dewod eyew ev TH hoyo eri 
@\Xo at tovto cidos ekéyyou... Tov euoy Adyor méuas adrov pe 
karayekav. Gorg. 512D: Kara- iov rH adhwvia romoerer* Kat 
yéXaaros gor 6 oyos yiyverat €vevonoa Tote apa Karayédactos 
refers to 484D: (pitdcopo) kata- or. 

yéAaorot yiyvovra. 

Gorg. 456B: érewa, ovk aA réxvn TH pytropiKy. 





210 This seems to have been overlooked by Grote (vol. iii. p. 17) when he 
says that in the Symposiwm no such doctrine is found. It is important to 
notice this, because the entire absence of the pre-existence theory in the 
Symposiwm might lead to wrong chronological conclusions, at least as to the 
date of the Meno. ; 

R 2 


Refer- 
ences to 
some 
earlier 
dialogues. 


The vul- 
garity of 
examples 
usually 
quoted by 
Socrates 
defended. 


Hellenes 
and Bar- 
- barians. 


Relation to 
Tsocrates’ 
Busiris 
made pyro- 
bable by 
Teich- 
miiller ; 
this con- 
firms our 
conclu- 
sions. 


Relation 
to earlier 
dialogues 
generally 
admitted. 
But 
Phaedo 
and 
Phaedrus 
cannot be 
earlier 
than the 
Sym- 
posium. 


244 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


It seems as if the examples chosen in the Gorgias 
and Cratylus had provoked some critics, whom Plato 
answers in the Symposiwm, though the description given 
by Alcibiades corresponds also to the historical Socrates 
as represented by Xenophon. 

The mention of Hellenes and Barbarians (209 £) as 
equal to each other also places the Symposium above the 
Gorgias, and on a level with the Cratylus. 

Teichmiiller (I. p. 120) made it very probable that the 
Symposium must be later than Isocrates’ Busiris, in which 
we read (222c) that nobody except Polycrates had ever 
asserted that Alcibiades had been a disciple of Socrates. 
This céuld not be said by Isocrates if he knew Plato’s 
Symposium, in which the near relation and friendship 
between Alcibiades and Socrates is clearly represented. 
Teichmiuller infers that Plato in introducing Alcibiades 
answered Isocrates’ pretension to place Alcibiades above 
Socrates, and at the same time defended Alcibiades 
against the calumnious attacks of Lysias. The Busiris 
was written, according to Blass, some years after 391, and 
this would well agree with the admitted date of the 
Symposium, 385 B.c. 

We need no further evidence as to the priority of the 
Cratylus, Gorgias, and all Socratic dialogues, because 
these have generally been admitted to be earlier than the 
Symposium. The proof that some other dialogues, as the 
Phaedo and Phaedrus, which were also held by many 
critics to be earlier than the Symposium, are later, will be 
given when we come to deal with the date of each of 
them. For the present we may admit as certain, that 
the Symposium was written about 385 B.c., and after the 
Cratylus, Gorgias, Huthydemus, Meno, Protagoras, and 
all smaller dialogues. This result is not new; it is one 
of the few points of general agreement among writers on 
Plato. The comparison of logical contents has confirmed 
it, and also the style of the Symposium (see above, Dp. 169) 
is clearly intermediate between Gorgias and Phaedo. 


ORIGIN OF THE THEORY OF IDEAS: PHAEDO 245 


Ill. The Phaedo. 


(Relative affinity to the latest group, measured on the Laws 
as unity, = 0°21; see above, p. 170.) 


The Phaedo is less artistically simple than the Sym- 
posium; it contains many threads of argument united 
with such skill that there is room for various opinions 
as to the chief purpose of the author and the main 
subject of his work. The dialogue has been regarded 
as an historical account of the death of Socrates,?" 
as a treatise on the immortality of the soul,” as the 
poetical tragedy announced at the end of the Symposiwm,’ 
as a general psychology,” as an ideal picture of the true 
philosopher,”"* and even as a treatise on the underground 
rivers.” There is some truth in all these assumptions 
if not taken absolutely ; but for our present purpose the 
Phaedo deserves particular attention as containing the 
theoretical substantiation of Plato’s first logical theory. 
We have seen in earlier works many allusions to logical 
problems discussed by Plato with his pupils. In the 
Cratylus the subsidiary problem of the relation between 
thought and language led to the hypothesis of an existent 
substance of things, different not only from all appear- 
ances, but also from all possible expression in human 


*11 This exceedingly improbable opinion has been sustained in recent 
times by T. Bergk (Griechische Literaturgeschichte, 4*** Bd. Berlin 1887). 

12 This is the ordinary view, represented in our century especially by 
Steinhart. 

*13 The well-known passage, Symp. 223 p, has been interpreted as refer- 
ring to the Symposium as comedy, and to the Phaedo as tragedy. 

*4 Plutarch (Moral. 120 £) quotes the Phaedo by the title wep) puxiis, 
which appears also in the manuscripts. 

*15 Schleiermacher believed the Phaedo and Symposium to be the con- 
tinuation of the Politicus, and to constitute between them the definition of 
the philosopher which had been promised in Sophistes 217 4B and Politi- 
cus 2574. This is impossible, the Politicus being much later than both 
Symposium and Phaedo, 

16 This would result from a doubtful interpretation of Varro, de lingua 
latina, lib. VII. cap. iii. 88. 


The 
Phaedo 
has been 
inter- 
preted in 
different 
ways, but 
is chiefly 
important 
as the first 
attempt to 
sustain by 
logical 
argument 
the theory 
of ideas, 
which had 
been only 
poetically 
repre- 
sented in 
the Sym- 
posvwm. 


Beauty 
was the 
first idea, 
extended 
in the 
Phaedo to 
a system 
of ideas. 


Value of 
sense per- 
ceptions 
investi- 
gated. 
They are 
found to 
be mis- 
leading. 


Ideas per- 
ceived by 
the soul 
alone 
without 
help of 
the body. 
They are 
more eyi- 


246 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


language. In the Sympositwm one aspect of such a 
substance was displayed as an ecstatic vision insufficiently 
pictured by the witness who experienced it but found 
himself unable to give expression in words to this unique 
and marvellous revelation. The first substance thus 
discovered by Plato was Beauty, bearing some relation to 
the Good, or ethical Beauty (Symp. 205 E: o & éuds Aoxyos 
obtE nulozos pyow civat TOV EpwTa OTE Gov, zaV funy TUYYAIN 
yé Tov, ® étaipe, ayaOov dy. 212 A: Op@vTt @ opatoy TO 
Kado, TiKTELY OVK Eld@AA apETHs, ATE OK eid@AOU zhaT- 
TOMEVM, ANN AANOH, Ate TOU ANNOODS ehattopévw). ‘This 
Beauty, called already in the Sympostwm the Good, Truth, 
or reality, appeared in the first moment, suddenly raised 
above all human standards, as the only substance of the 
Universe. Soon, however, growing accustomed to the 
ideal existence of Beauty, he generalised this experience, 
extending it to other notions. This he does for his readers 
first in the Phaedo. He builds a system of ideas and 
gives an account of the way leading to his idealism ; so 
resuming the inquiry commenced in the Cratylus. 

After refuting all attempts to find truth in words, he 
discusses the value of knowledge gained by sense percep- 
tion, and held by ordinary ‘ common sense’ to be the most 
certain of all. Heat once distinguishes sight and hearing 
as the best of all senses (65 B), but finds that even these 
give us no correct notions, as has been already recognised 
even by the poets (65 B: of trountal iyiv ast Epvdrodcw), 
and, we might add, by such philosophical predecessors of 
Plato as Heraclitus and Parmenides. 

As in the Symposiwm the ecstatic vision of Beauty 
was independent of the senses and different from any 
material representation, so now in the Phaedo appear 
many other ideal substances, perceived by the soul alone, 
without help of the body (65 BC: % uy) . . . Otay pera 
TOU TMmaTos ETIYELPH TL OKOTEW, OAOV OTL TOTE saTraTaTaL 
um avtod). This is done through reasoning (65 c: év 76 
AoyifecPar) in moments when neither sight, nor hearing, 


ORIGIN OF THE THEORY OF IDEAS: PHAEDO 247 


nor bodily pain or pleasure affect us, and when we feel as if 
we had left the body in order to approach true being (65 c: 
NoyiGerat . . . KdANOTA, OTaY ... éHoa YalpEW TO' Tapa, 
Kat xaQ’ 6coy Svvatat pt) Ko\VwVvodca avT® pnd aTToMEvN 
épsyntat tod Svtos). Such substances as ideal Justice, or 
Beauty, Health, or Power, have an existence more evident 
to our reason than is the existence of particular things to 
our senses (65 D), though we can neither grasp them with 
our sight nor any other sense. We know them best by 
pure thinking (65 E: Os dv wadiota Huey Kai axpiBéotata 
TapacKevasyntar avTo ExacTov SvavonOjvar Tepi ov oKorEi, 
ovTOSs av eyyUTaTa lot TOU yvavat zxacTov), emancipated 
from the influence of sense perception (65 E: dsavola . . . 
MeTa TOU oyiopov . . . pate THY Opiy TrapaTLbeuevos ev TO 
Siavosio Oar punjte Tia AXAHV aicOnow). 

Human passions, illness, and physical necessities or 
desires put obstacles in our way to knowledge (66 B: 
pupias . . . aoxoNlas Tavéyer TO Opa), and lead to wars 
or other conflicts (65 c). Thence Plato infers that ideal 
knowledge will be attainable for us chiefly after death 
(66 £), and that in earthly life our only way to approach 
truth is to limit the activity of senses to what is indis- 
pensable (67 A: gv @ av COmev . . . eyyuTutw éoopeba Tod 
ElOgVal, Gav O TL MaALTTA mNdEV OMLA@pEV TO GOpaTr). Only 
the pure soul can reach pure truth (67 B: uy Kabape 
We can learn 
nothing from our senses, because our soul possesses 
eternal innate wisdom, and all our learning consists in 
remembering what we knew before this life (72 E: pa@nors 
ovK GAO TL 7) avauVNoLs TYYXdVE Odo . 


ka0apod éddrrecOar pn ov OeuiTov 7). 


. « avaykn Tov 
Huds ev mpotépm Tiwi xpovm peuaOnkévar & viv avauipvy- 
The reminiscence depends upon similarity or 
dissimilarity of absolute ideas with the concrete objects of 
earthly experience (74 A: cupBaiver thy avapynow éivat pev 
ad’ opoiwy, civar 62 Kat at avopoiwv). Still we notice in 
every case the difference between a perfect idea and the 
sensible experience which reminds us of this idea (74 A: 


oKoue0a). 


dent to 
reason 
than 
material 
things to 
the senses. 


Body puts 
obstacles 
in our way 
to know- 
ledge. 
Ideal 
knowledge 
expected 
after 
death. 

The pure 
soul 
reaches 
pure 
truth, and 
possessed 
it before 
entering 
the body. 


Difference 
between 
idea and 
particu- 
lars illus- 
trated by 
a mathe- 
matical 
example. 
Thereis no 
material 
equality in 
the world, 
though it 
is easy to 


- under- 


stand ideal 
equality. 


This truth 
was not 
gained by 
induction 
or experi- 
ment, but 
appears 
to be the 
result of 
pure 
thought. 


248 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


> lal / 7 5 to ” Bs: f la) 
AVAYKQLOV TOOE TT PpOOTTAoyely, EVVOELV ELTE TL ENAELTTEL TOUTO 
KATA THY OMOLOTHTE ElTE 42) eKEivoU OV ave“vycON). 

Here Plato introduces a classical example of this 


- radical difference between an idea and sensible particulars: 


an example which has lost nothing of its logical import- 
ance up to the present time, and which also shows a 
far-reaching apprehension of the sensible world. This 
example he finds not in the distance between a concrete 
work of art and the artist’s ideal, but in the perfection of 
a mathematical notion. He knows equality as the basis 
of all mathematical reasoning, and dares to assert that 
there is no such equality in the physical world. We 
know in our times, after many difficult measurements, 
that no one grain of sand is equal to another, nor a drop 
of water to another drop. But Plato had no microscopes 
and micrometers at his disposal, and it was a deep in- 
sight into the nature of physical phenomena that allowed 
him such an audacious generalisation against the evidence 
of his senses. He quotes as examples stones and pieces 
of wood, which only appear to be equal (74 B), but are 
not. He certainly knew physical objects which, accord- 
ing to all his means of observation, were really equal to 
each other, as for instance two stars of the same size and 
brilhancy, two wings of a small insect, or even two coins 
of the same mint. He could not ascertain the small 
existing differences between such objects by exact measure- 
ments and observations as we are enabled to do now; he 
had not arrived at his conviction of the impossibility of 
physical equality by Socratic induction. It was for him 
a knowledge a priori, quite as much as the knowledge of 
moral ideas. His reasoning was not built ‘upon attempts 
to establish differences between apparently equal objects. 
He knew beforehand that the idea of equality was too 
perfect to be realised in the physical world. And this a 
priort knowledge of Plato has been confirmed by the 


experience of all the generations which have come after 
him. 


ORIGIN OF THE THEORY OF IDEAS: PHAEDO 249 


Plato had never alluded in his earlier writings to that 
difference between idea and appearance. In the Cratylus 
he mentioned things corresponding to the notion formed 
of them, and even derived general notions from particular 
experiences. In the Symposiwm he reached the sight of 
absolute Beauty by progressive generalisations which 
might be described as a continuation of Socratic induction. 
It is only in the Phaedo that he undertakes to construct a 
knowledge entirely independent of concrete particulars, 
and shows us the first model of such absolute ideas in the 
mathematical notion of equality, not derived from ex- 
perience. 

We have already seen in the Meno the theory of tran- 
scendental knowledge exemplified through a psychological 
experiment. But in the Meno there is no mention of 
a difference between ideal and physical equality. The 
figures were assumed to be equal, and their equality known. 
Here in the Phaedo we meet the assertion that there are 
no two equal objects in this life’s experience, and that 
therefore all notion of equality is older than the present 
life. The apparent equality of two material objects 
approaches indefinitely the limit of absolute equality 
(75. A: opéyeras tmavra tadta eivat oiov To icov, Eye 6é 
évoeotepws), and offers us the only opportunity of recalling 
the notion of absolute equality (754A: ouoroyodper, p27) 
GdNoGev abTo évvevonkévat ... GAN’ 7) ex Tod ideiv 1) Grpacbae 
1) &ke Twos ad\Ans Tov aicAncewv). This reluctant concession 
leaves a certain importance to the activity of the despised 
senses. Without their perceptions we could not find an 
opportunity of remembering general ideas as the object 
of our transcendental knowledge. But once remembered, 
absolute equality is known to be radically different from 
any equality observed, and cannot therefore proceed from 
particular instances of approximative equality. This 
principle is extended to other ideas, not only of mathema- 
tical relation but also of justice, holiness,and everything 
that is predicated of particulars (75D: qepl ddvtwyv ols 


A process 
not ob- 
servable 
in earlier 
writings 
than the 
Phaedo. 


Even in 
the Meno 
ideal 
equality 
is not thus 
distin- 
guished. 
Still, 
sense per- 
ception 
remains a 
necessary 
condition 
for our 
training in 
the intui- 
tion of 
ideas. 

We are re- 
minded 

by con- 
crete ap- 
pearances 
of eternal 
ideas, 
which 
were 
known be- 


fore our 
birth. 


Ideas 
more real 
than 
material 
objects, 
and they 
explain 
them. 


Perma- 
nence of 
ideas a 
condition 
of un- 
change- 
able know- 
ledge. 


Privileges 
of philo- 
sophers 
who 
become 
equal to 
gods. 


250 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


‘A 


emiappayilouela TO 0 All these ideas must have 
been known before we began to see, to hear, and to receive 
other impressions of our senses (75 B: mpd tod dpa dp£a- 


Tol con \ 5 fal f 
cai nuds opav Kai axovew Kai TANNA aicbavecOar TUYXEiv FEL 


zo). 


mov ei\nbotas eto THuny avTOU TOV lcou O TL zaTLV) In Order to 
enable us to refer every sense perception to such eternal 
ideas ((5B: ta & Tov aicbjcewy toa éxsice avoioe, OTL 
mpoOupsttar ev TaVTA ToLadTa sivat olov éKsivo, ote Oe 
These ideas have an eternal existence, 
independent of the changes of sensible things. Beauty 
and similar ideas have the most real kind of existence, 
much more than any material appearances (77 A: ov« 


» f sy ¢) SS XN e fa! x / \ 
Ey@ eywrye OVOEY OUTW pol EvVapyzs OV ws TODTO, TO TaVTa TA 


avTod pavAoTEpa). 


ToLavT’ sival ws oloy TE wadLoTA, KANOV TE Kal ayaoY Kai 
TaANa TavtTa & ov vov 5) zreyes). Only through these ideas 
do we begin to understand the outward world (76D: 
OTL. TATA 1 TOLAUTN OVGLa, Kal éTl TAUTHY Ta &K THY 
aicOnoewy TavTa avadépomer). 

Everything that exists belongs to one of these two 
kinds (79 A: @duev dvo isn THY dvTwv): the visible material 
world, continuously changing, and the invisible ideal 
world, eternally the same, consisting of ideas and souls. 
No permanent and durable knowledge can refer to any 
but eternal objects, ideas without change. When the 
soul investigates ideas, certainty and knowledge are 
attained, and this we call activity of reason (79 D: sepi 
exeiva asl KATA TAVTA WTAVTWS EXEL, ATE TOLOUT@Y épaTTOMEVN: 
Such an 
activity implies happiness, and frees us from error and 
all human sufferings (81 4). 

And far more than even this, the victory over illusions 
of the senses leads a philosopher to become after death 
equal to the gods (820: eis Oedv yévos ut) hitocodjcavtt 
Kal TAaVTEAaS Kabap@ amrLovte ov Oguts adixvetc Oat aXN’ 1) TO 
pirouadei). A philosopher holds to be true only what he 
knows independently of the senses, through the pure 
activity of his soul, which gives an immediate, intuitive 


\ lal > lol \ / fe / 
Kal TOVTO avTHs TO TAOnwa Hpovnots KEKANTAL). 


ORIGIN OF THE THEORY OF IDEAS: PHAEDO 251 


knowledge of ideas (83.4: 4 didocogia . . . THY uyny 
Tapapv0eirar . . . Tapaxedsvomern TioTevew pndevi Addo 
GAN 4 abriy air, 6 Te dv vonon ait? Kal’ abtny adto Ka? 
QUTO TOV OvTwY). 

Here we read for the first time about a science of 
thought or logic (90 B: 4 wepl Tods Adyous Téxvy), Which 
is indispensable in order to preserve us from utter scep- 
ticism. He who trusts his own thoughts without an 
objective logic will often change his opinion, and this will 
lead him to a general distrust of human thought (90c: 
TeAEUT@VTES OlOVTAL . . . KATAVEVONKEVAL MOVOL OTL OUTE TOY 
mpayydrev ovdsvos ovdev trytés ods BéBatov ode THY AOywr). 
Such men believe themselves to have discovered that there 
is no truth, and that any and every opinion may be suc- 
cessfully defended by arguments among which none is 
decisive. This is an abnormal state of mind resulting 
from over-confidence, and similar to the misanthropy 
born of trusting men without knowing how to distinguish 
the good from the bad (89p). If, with this unlimited 
confidence, a man should be deceived by those on whom 
he relied, he will fall straight into the contrary extreme, 
and cease to put any trust in his fellows. To this wrong 
conclusion he is brought by his ignorance of psychology 
(S9E: dvev téyvns Ths wept tavOperea), and in like 
manner ignorance of logic may lead to a general distrust 
of human reason (90 CD: olkrpov av <in 70 maOos, et dvTos 
dn twos adrnOods Kai BzBaiov Aoyou Kal duvaTod KaTavoncat, 
eqeita . . 
ana. . 
. . . Tov 82 bvTMY Ths aXnOElas TE Kal erLaTHNS OTEPNOEIN). 
In this case they lose, by their own fault, the opportunity 
of knowing Truth and Being, and have no right to accuse 
human reason generally of imperfection. Plato himself 
is certain that human reason possesses the power of an 
infallible knowledge, and that we owe our errors, not to 
the weakness of our reason, but to the influence of the 
senses. 


\ / X fal / 
ba) EavTov Tis aiti@To wno=e THY EaUTOD aTEXViaY, 
‘ \ , > e fal 
. 27 TOUS NOyous ud’ zavToD THY aitiay aTw@CaLTY 


Necessity 
of logic 
insisted 
upon. 
Origin of 
scepticism 
in the 
want of 
logic. 
Scepti- 
cism com- 
pared with 
misan- 
thropy. 


Ignorance 
of logic 
similar to 
ignorance 
of psycho- 
logy. 
Logic 
unjustly 
accused. 
Power of 
human 
reason to 
attain 
truth by 
means of 
logic. 


Final 
causes 
esteemed 
above me- 
chanical 
causation. 


Ultimate 
aim of 
Being 
produces 
unity of 
knowledge 
and ex- 
istence. 


As 
thought 
reflects 
reality, 
we can in- 
vestigate ° 
reality 

in our 
thoughts. 


252 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


To find absolute Truth our thought must be pure 
thought, and we must take care not to trust other expla- 
nations of reality than those based upon an understanding 
of the ideal aim of everything (97: « obv tus BovdouTO 
THY aitiav svpsiy Tepl ExdoTov . . . TOTO Sev TEpl avToOd 
evpeiv, O7n BéNTLGTOV avT@ ézoTwW 7) sivat 4) GAO OTLODY 
maoxew  Toustv). This ideal cause is esteemed by Plato 
very much above all mechanical causation, which for him 
is no causation at all, but mere succession of events, or at 
most a necessary condition of real causation (99B: dAdo 
Mev TL goTL TO aitlov TO OvTL, GAO OF ékelvO aVEV Ov TO 
aitiov ovK av mot én aitiov). Plato rises here to the 
summit of his new idealistic metaphysics, despising all 
mechanical explanation of Being as quite unsatisfactory 
and criticising his great predecessor Anaxagoras (98 B-E) 
for not having understood the importance of final 
causes. ‘The only true cause appears to be that divine 
power which leads everything to the best, and according 
to the aims of the whole as well as of all parts 99: Th 
Tov ws olov Te PeATIOTA avTa TeOHvar SUvapl. . . Satmoviay 
ioxyvv). 

But the immediate knowledge of this ideal cause is 
beyond the scope of mankind, and Plato seeks an indirect 
way in order to find out the causes of things (99¢: éya 
pev ov THs ToLavTns aitias, bmn Tote ZyxEL, waOnTIs OTOVOdV 
Hor av yevoiwny* éreidyn 2 TavTns eotepynOnv Kat ovT’ 
autos evpelv oiTE Tap adrov pabeiy olds TE eyevOuNV, TOV 
SevTEpov TAodY etl THY THs aitias Entnow TeTpayyatev- 
pat). This second-best choice is based on the reflection 
that human thought is, as it were, an image of reality, 
and that exact knowledge of thought leads to a know- 
ledge of truth (99H: go0€e 6 mot yehvat eis Tovs Aoyous 
Katapvyovta ev éxeiyois cKoTEty Tov dvT@Y TiV aAjOsLar), 
just as we can observe the image of the sun reflected in a 
well, thus avoiding the injury to our eyes attendant upon 
looking at the sun itself. 

Once on this path Plato soon recognised that thought 


ORIGIN OF THE THEORY OF IDEAS: PHAEDO 253 


is more than a mere image of Being (1004: od zavu 
cvyXopa@ Tov év Tols NOyoLs GKOTTOvpLEVEY TA dvTA eV ELKOGL 
padXrov oKorreiv i) Tov év Tots zpyous), aS he had explained 
it in the Symposium. He now applied the hypothetical 
method proposed in the Meno, seeking for the safest 
hypothesis on which he could rely, admitting as true 
everything in agreement with, and rejecting as false 
anything contradictory to this iundamental proposition 
(100 A: droOéuevos ExdotoTe Noyov Oy av Kpivw Eppwyevéota- 
Toy Eval, & pev ay moe Soxn TovT@ cuudavelv, THON ws 
arnOn dvta, a 8 adv pH, ws ov« adnO7H). As such a funda- 
mental hypothesis he proposes to accept the independent 
existence of Beauty as set forth in the Sympostwm, and 
also of other ideas (LOO B: trroPguevos sivad Te KadOv avToO 
Kal’ avtTo Kai ayabov Kal péya kal Tada Travta). This he 
calls here, nothing new (100 8B: ovdév xawov), but already 
frequently spoken of. It would be, however, an error to 
infer that another written exposition of the theory of ideas 
preceded, besides the first initiation in the Symposium. 
If the Platonic Socrates asserts that he constantly repeats 
the same truth in other as well asin the present conversa- 
tion (100 B: del Kal dddoTE Kal év TH TaperynAvOoTL oye), 
this is a rhetorical artifice by which, on the one hand, 
Plato brings his new ideas into close relation with the 
old Socratic notions as subsisting still in the Huthydemus 
(301 A) and Cratylus (489 D), while on the other hand he 
refers to conversations with his pupils which may have 
been suggested by the argument of the Symposium. 
Among the literary works of Plato none can be thought 
of as referred to in this passage of the Phaedo, because 
none contains a more elementary and fundamental ex- 
planation of the theory of ideas, the Phaedrus and Republic 
being undoubtedly later, as will be seen from their psycho- 
logy, and as has been already made evident by their style. 
An earlier written exposition of this theory would have 
rendered superfluous the painstaking didactic tone of the 
Phaedo, and the difficulty of understanding expected by 


Thought 
is even 
more than 
an image 
of Being. 
Concep- 
tion of a 
highest 
principle 
or hypo- 
thesis, 
which is 
here the 
existence 
of ideas. 


Apparent 
allusion 
to earlier 
exposi- 
tions ex- 
plained. 
The only 
earlier ex- 
position in 
the Sym- 
posiume 


Relation 
between 
Phaedo 
and Sym- 
posvumr 
in the 
theory of 
ideas. 


Relation 
between 
idea and 
particu- 
lars simi- 
lar to that 
between a 
general 
notion and 
particu- 
lars. 


254 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


the Platonic Socrates, and admitted by his hearers 
(100A: BovrAopar 6¢ cor cadpgortepoy eitreiv & Aeyw* oipat 
yap oe viv ov pavOavew—od pa tov Aia, epn 0 KeBns, ov 
opodpa). This reminds us of the admitted obscurity of 
the speech of Diotima in the Symposiwm, and gives the 
impression of a first attempt at a written account of the 
new theory. 

The theory as it stands in the Phaedo is a generalisa- 
tion of the esthetic experience related in the Sympostwm. 
Particulars are what they seem to us to be, through their 
participation in the idea, and not only in the idea of 
Beauty but also in the ideas of all other general notions. 
The term wetéxyew used here (100 c: gaiverar yap por, i 
ti géotw aA KadOov, oOvdE dv’ BV AAO KadOY Eivat 7) SLOTL 
peTeyel éxeivou ToD KaNOD* Kat TavTa On OUTwWS eyo), AS IN 
the Symposium, is already felt to be not quite sufficient, 
and is supplemented by other terms, 7apovaoia and Kowwvia 
(100 D: ovK« GdXo Te TOLE? a’TO KAaXOV 1} 4 eKEivoU TOD KAaXOD 
eite mapovola Elite KoWwvia . . . ov Yap TL TODTO Sucxupi- 
Comat, GAN OTL TH KAX@ Ta KAA yiyvetat Kadad). The idea 
is present in the particulars, or is shared by them, this 
makes no difference for Plato : the only expression of his 
hypothesis which he believes to be perfectly certain is 
that beautiful things become beautiful through Beauty, or 
owe their particular beauty to the general idea. This 
relation between idea and particulars is formally similar 
to the relation between a Socratic notion and the 
particulars ; as expressed already in the Huthyphro (6£ : 
eldos, © TavTa TA Gola Cold goTW . . . pd idea Ta TE GvdoLa 
avoota Kal Ta bcta doa). But the Socratic notion was 
immanent (Huthyph. 5 D: tadbrov éorw 2v radon Tpdkée TO 
Gc.oy avTO avTO, Kal TO avoocLoy ad Tod psy oalov TavTos 
évavtiov, avTo S& avT@® Gpowoyv Kai zyov piav Twa ideay Trav 
6 ti wep ay pedAXy avoovov eivac), found in the concrete 
things as their point of similarity, while the Platonic 
idea is self-existent, independent of particulars, perceived 
by pure reason against all illusions of the senses. More- 


ORIGIN OF THE THEORY OF IDEAS: PHAEDO 255 


over, the terms ¢idos and idé¢a, which were freely used to 
designate general notions in earlier dialogues, up to the 
Gorgias and Cratylus, preserve generally the same mean- 
ing in the Symposiwm and Phaedo,”” while the transcen- 
dental ideas are chiefly designated by the neuter of the 
adjective, sometimes with such determinations as éxetvo 
(Symp. 210 £, Phaedo 103 c) or adto nab? aité (Symp. 
21138, Phaedo 100 B) and by the verb <ivai and its deriva- 
tives. The direct and constant use of cides or idéa_ to 
designate a transcendental idea belongs to a somewhat 
later stage of Plato’s logic. In the Symposiwm and Phaedo 
he still hesitates, and this hesitation produces great variety 
of terms for the peculiar relation between idea and 
particulars.”"* He says expressly that he does not insist 
upon any of these terms,”!® and that the only thing he is 
sure of is the priority of the idea, or that the given idea 


217 ¢id0s as wellas idéa means shape, form, or appearance in such passages 
as Symp. 1898, 1964, 204c, 2158; Phaedo 734, 104p, 108p, 1098. 
The meaning of a Socratic species or notion appears in Symp. 205BpD; 
Phaedo 91, 100 8, &e. Campbell has shown in §§ 24-32 of his essay on 
Plato’s use of language (Plato’s Republic, vol. ii. pp. 294-305) that both 
words have been used frequently by Plato in the same meaning as by 
earlier writers besides the new applications, chiefly illustrated from later 
dialogues. In the formula rd én’ efSer kaddy (Symp. 2108) we also miss 
the specific Platonic use of «lé0s. The possible identity of efdo0s and the 
absolute idea seems to be admitted in the formula: elvai ti €xaoroy tay 
eidév (1028). But here also the ef5y mean ethical notions of which 
substantial existence is predicated. Only Phaedo 104 8 idéa and 104 c etdn 
might be equivalent to the Platonic ‘ ideas.’ 

718 Besides meréxew, mapovola, kowwvia we read: pmetadauBdavew 102 8, 
mpocdéxeo0a: 102p, mpoorevar 102 Hu, 103d, SéxerOa 1025, 103 D, evetvar 
103 B, werdoxeois 101 c. 

219 Phaedo 100: ob yap ért TovTO SucxvpiCouae has been interpreted as 
a reference to an earlier different opinion by Diimmler (Akademika, p. 204), 
P. Natorp (Philosophische Monatshefte, vol. xxvi. p. 467), and Pfleiderer 
(p. 395). But this interpretation is based upon the assumption that Plato 
wrote about the theory of ideas before the Phaedo. If the Phaedo, as 
results from the present inquiry, is the first methodic exposition of Plato’s 
theory of ideas, then ‘ov yap é€r:’ does not signify ‘no longer,’ but ‘not 
further,’ ‘not moreover.’ The whole phrase would then mean: I am only 
sure that beautiful things are beautiful through Beauty, but I do not go so 
far as to affirm anything definitively about the exact manner in which this 
occurs. 


Use of 
terms. 
Variety of 
terms for 
the ideas. 
Priority of 
the idea. 


Logical 
rule as to 
the judg- 
ment on 
an hypo- 
thesis, and 
its conse- 
quences. 


Progyres- 
sive gene- 
ralisation 
up toa 
highest 
principle. 


Supposed 
polemical 
reference. 


Hypo- 
thetical 
method 
extended, 
and de- 
fended 
against 


unknown 


256 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


is the cause of the corresponding quality in each particular 
thing in which it is recognised. 

On this fundamental hypothesis, according to Plato, a 
consistent system of science can be built up (101 D: 
éyomevos exeivou Tov aahadrovs Tis virolgcews). He 
develops the hypothetical method given in the Meno, and 
recommends his disciples always to distinguish between 
an hypothesis and the consequences drawn from it. Ina 
skilful discussion, the agreement of all consequences 
with each other must precede any inquiry as to the 
truth of the hypothesis on which the consequences 
depend (10L D: « 62 Tis adths THs brobgcews ehoito, 
xalpew édns av Kal ovK aTroKpivato, Ems av Ta aT’ éxeivyns 
opunOevta aKéyato, i cot addjAOLS TUMbavel 7) Stadwrei). 
He advises rising from one hypothesis to another until 
irrefragable transcendental axioms are reached, which 
have no further need of demonstration (101 D: érevdy 
dé éxeivns avTns dor oe StOOvat XOYoV, WcavTws av d.60iNs, 
adAnv av vTocow Urobguevos, Hris THY avwOev BeXTloTH 
haivowto, fws émi Te ixavov éOos). He warns us against 
coupling illogically (101 E: dorep of ayTiAoyLKOL), IN One 
and the same discussion, arguments for or against the 
hypothesis itself with arguments for or against the 
derived consequences (101 C: dua ob« dv vpois Tepi TE 
Ths apyns Svareyousvos kat Tov 2& exeivns wpynuévov, eitrEp 
BovrowW TL THY OvTwY EvpEtr). 

This exhortation to a methodic investigation is aimed, 
as Diimmler thinks, against Antisthenes, and is emphati- 
cally assented to by Cebes and Simmias simultaneously 
(102 a), and by Echecrates who hears Phaedo’s report of 
the conversation. Phaedo adds that to all present, even 
to those who had the least understanding of philosophy, 
it seemed to be wonderfully clearly expressed (102 a: 
elrep ef tov pirocdpov . . . Oavpactds doxet ws evapyas 
7@ Ka) TpiKpoV vodv yovTL . . . TaaL Tots Tapodow eokev 
... Kal yap Hiv tois aodet, viv 62 axovovow). This 
insistent asseveration of the importance of the logical 


ORIGIN OF THE THEORY OF IDEAS: PHAEDO 297 


rule—to distinguish the consecutive steps of each argu- adver- 
ment, and to require internal consistency before criti- saries. 
cising the foundations of a course of reasoning, shows that 

Plato is introducing a new method (p20od0s, 79 B, 97 B), 

with full consciousness of its bearings. This new method 

is generalised from the inductive process by which, in the Progress 
Symposium, he reached his vision of absolute Beauty. As from hy- 
he then proceeded from particulars to the idea, he now pothesis 


wishes through hypothetical argumentation to reach ' age 
j : : ledge, 
absolute certainty, Every successive hypothesis must be sates 


‘better’ or logically more evident than the preceding, ocular 
until by such approximations the goal is attained—namely, yeasoning. 
certainty. 

Even then he will not indulge in the self-conceit of 
those who are delighted with their own circular reasonings 
(101 EB: of dvtiXoyiKot . . . ixavol bd codias ouod TavTa 
KUK@VTES O“ws avToL avTois apéoxev). The true philosopher First prin 
is obliged to examine again and again even the highest ciples re- 
generalisations or first principles (107 B: «ai tas brroBécers examined. 
Tas mpwras, kal a miotal tyuiv eiow, buws emioKerrtEea 
cadzotepov* . . . Ka’ dcoy duvatov padot’ avOpem~) in 
order to advance as far as human reason may. 

Plato acknowledges that his own highest hypothesis, Ptobable 
when he wrote the Phaedo, was the independent existence iflentity, 
of ideas as true substances, always the same, eternal, Pen 
divine, simple, and representing the highest reality of Rete 
Being. Were it not for the repeated assertion of the pai 
independence of the ideas, we might identify them with 
general notions. We have no clear indication either in 
the Phaedo or in the Symposiwm of any distinction 
between our subjective notions and the corresponding 
transcendental ideas. Everything confirms our supposi- 
tion that Plato, at the time of writing the Phaedo, as well 
as when he wrote the Symposiwm, believed it to be possible 
for the human soul to know ideas as they are, and in such 
absolute intuition the general notion would be identical 
with the idea, while the idea remains equally the same 

S 


represen- 
tation. 


Intuition 
of ideas 
dispenses 
with ex- 
perience. 


Law of 
contra- 
diction. 


Solution 
of the 
problem 
proposed 
in the 
Cratylus. 
Stability 
and inde- 
pendence 
of ideas, 


Lelation 
between 


ideas. 


258 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


both when manifest in us and outside of us (103 B: avro 
TO évavTlov EavT@ évayTiov ovK av TOTE YeVOLTO, OUVTE TO éV 
HutY oUTE TO FY TH HUGE). 

The logical consequence of this doctrine was the power 
of reason to acquire all truth accessible to mankind by 
pure intuition, by contemplative meditation without or 
almost without external experience. In other words, our 
reason is able to discover the nature of things by intense 
reflection on the nature of her own ideas, which ideas are 
common both to human reason and to every other possible 
reason of any superior being here called God. The logical 
side of this doctrine culminates in the law of contradic- 
tion, expressed here as one of the chief arguments 
demonstrating the existence of ideas (102 E: 7d cpiKpov 
ove e0¢dev Tote peya yiyvecOat ovoe sivat, avd’ Addo ovdEV 
TOV évayTiov ett Ov OEP HV Ga TovvayTioy yiyverOal TE Kal 
eivat). Hach idea is only what it is, and, therefore, per- 
fectly simple (wovoedés, 83 E). 

We see that Plato in the Phaedo gave his solution of 
the problem proposed in the Cratylus, and definitively 
decided against Heracliteanism. In the Cratylus he 
recognised the extreme difficulty of the problem and 
announced a further inquiry ; in the Phaedo he communi- 
cates the results of this inquiry, postulating not only the 
stability of notions, already acknowledged in the Cratylus, 
but their independence of human intelligence. He goes so 
far now as to deny every process of becoming in the world, 
or at least to decline any explanation of changes (97 B: ovéé 
ye &v 6 Te Sv yiyvetat @s éviotapat Ett TelOw ZpmavTor, ovd’ 
GidXo ovdev Evi Noy bu’ 6 Te ylyvEeTat t) ATOAAUTAL 7) ETTL, KATA 
TovTOY TOV TpoTOV THs we0ddov). Two unities added to each 
other cannot become two; it is not the addition which 
could produce a new idea. Addition is only the subjective 
side of the eternal relation subsisting independently of 
our reason between unity and the idea of two. Thesame 
explanation of all apparent changes through eternal rela- 
tions between immutable ideas is the result of the absolute 


ORIGIN OF THE THEORY OF IDEAS: PHAEDO 259 


reality attributed to ideas and opposed to the phenomenal 
appearance of all material things. 

The Phaedo brings Plato’s Idealism to its highest 
point and contains a conscious representation of all con- 
sequences deriving from the fundamental hypothesis 
sought for in the Cratylus, perceived in the Symposium, 
and demonstrated here, so far as it could be, for Plato’s 
followers. We shall meet this theory in later works, 
while there is no clear trace of it in works that were 
certainly written before the Phaedo. 

The importance of the Phaedo for the development 
of Plato’s logic is increased by the circumstance that the 
authenticity of this dialogue has passed unquestioned, 
even by such sceptical critics as Ast and Schaarschmidt. 
It has been advanced” that the Stoic Panaetius in the 
second century B.c. doubted the authenticity of the 
Phaedo, but Zeller has clearly shown the untrustworthi- 
ness and even the contradictoriness of the testimonies 
adduced in favour of that assumption—the first mention 
of these pretended doubts occurring some centuries after 
the death of Panaetius and betraying a complete igno- 
rance of Panaetius as well as of the reason of his imputed 
scepticism. The Phaedo has been so frequently quoted 
by Greek and Latin writers that we must admit that this 
work was generally regarded as undoubtedly authentic. 

The extreme idealism here professed has provoked 
severe criticisms, as for instance those of Crawford ”?! in 
the eighteenth and of Prantl*”’ in the present century. 
But even these criticisms show that, if Plato’s idealism 
was mistaken, such mistakes can be made only by a 


°° R. Hirzel, Untersuchungen zu Ciceros philosophischen Schriften, 
1877, vol. i. p. 232; Chiappelli, ‘ Panezio’ in Filosofia delle scuole italiane 
for 1882; also Teichmiiller, vol. i. p. 126. 

#1 C. Crawford, A Dissertation on the Phaedo of Plato, London 1773. 
The author evidently had a very superficial knowledge of Plato and pro- 
fessed a shallow materialism. 

* Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, p. 78, Leipzig 1855; 
also in his translation of the Phaedo, Berlin 1884. 


32 


The 
Phaedo 
contains 
the first 
repre- 
sentation 
of Ideal- 
ism. 


Unques- 
tionable 
authen- 
ticity 
increases 
its impor- 
tance. 


Plato’s 
idealism 
provoked 
strong op- 
position, 
but was of 


lasting 
import- 
ancein the 
history of 
human 
thought. 


New 
demon- 
stration 
of immor- 
tality. 
Proofs not 
entirely 
sufficient, 
but meant 
seriously, 
though 
consistent 
idealism 
would 
abolish 
individual 
immor- 

’ tality. 


260 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


philosopher of genius, and they are indispensable for the 
progress of philosophy, just as many failures of expe- 
ditions undertaken with the aim of discovering the 
sources of the Nile were indispensable for the progress 
of geography. Idealism is one obvious solution of the 
metaphysical problem, and it was necessary to follow out 
all the consequences of this solution in order to decide 
upon its value. In the Phaedo Plato is still struggling 
against some consequences of his idealism. His love of 
the religious traditions about the immortality of the 
soul, as set forth in the Meno and Gorgias, and indirectly 
confirmed in the Huthydemus and Cratylus, is really 
not quite consistent with the doctrine of idealism, and 
though we have no direct evidence whether he was aware 
of this inconsistency, we see that in the Symposiwm, to- 
gether with the first glimpse of eternal ideas, there 
appears almost a substitution of immortal influence for 
the immortality of the person taught in the Gorgias. 
Now in the Phaedo the avowed purpose of the Platonic 
Socrates is a demonstration of immortality, and he 
connects this demonstration with the exposition of the 
theory of ideas, which really might have impaired the 
religious belief in immortality. But if we examine 
the arguments in the Phaedo, we see that those from 
the beginning up to the objection of Cebes (87 A) prove 
only the persistence of the individual soul for some time 
after death, not for all time. The remaining arguments 
refer more to the idea of soul than to the individual soul, 
though they seem intended as a defence of personal 
immortality. Archer Hind *’ argued this question against 
Hegel and Teichmiuller, and made it very probable that 
Plato in writing the Phaedo still really believed in a 
prolongation of individual existence after death, without 
any suspicion of inconsistency. If we look at the final 
conversation of Socrates with Crito (115 D: éedar riw TO 


23 The Phaedo of Plaio, edited by R. D. Archer Hind, London 1883, 
pp. 18-26. 


ORIGIN OF THE THEORY OF IDEAS: PHAEDO 261 


Pappaxor, ovKere Vuivy TapapEev@, UAN' oiynoopar aTL@v .. . ) 
we must admit that Plato perfectly understood the con- 
sequences of personal immortality and believed them. 
The inconsistency between immortality and idealism 
arises only if by immortality is meant, according to our 
modern notions, absolute eternity of the soul, while an 
indeterminate continuation of the soul’s existence after 
death is not inconsistent with idealism. It is difficult 
to doubt that Plato meant his arguments as sufficient 
to establish individual immortality, because his conclusion 
does not admit of another interpretation (1074: wavtos 
MarXov dpa Wwuyn abdvatoy Kai avadeOpov Kai TH OvTL 
ZgovTalt Huoy ai Wuyai év “A.dov). It is also a natural 
psychological consequence of the profound dissatisfaction 
with the present conditions of life, manifested by Plato 
in the Phaedo, that he could not easily throw off his 
hopes of a better state, and of a deliverance from physical 
limitations. . 

The physical theory of the Phaedo, representing the 
insignificance of the world accessible to our knowledge as 
compared with a wider world even physically more perfect, 
confirms the place assigned to the Phaedo in the de- 
velopment of Plato’s thought. Here he appears no 
longer as an Athenian, nor as a Greek, but rises even 
above the standpoint of international equality between 


Physical 
theories 
of the 
Phaedo 
confirm 
its place 
after the 
Sym- 


Hellene and Barbarian attained in the Cratylus. In posium. 


the Phaedo there speaks a philosopher whose interests 
are not limited to the earth, but extend over the universe, 
though maintaining still the position of the earth at the 
centre, in conformity with the traditional religious beliefs 
which Plato afterwards discarded. 

The position of the Phaedo after the Symposiwm is 
evident from all the above comparisons, but additional 
evidence is not wanting as to the relation between these 
two dialogues, a relation generally admitted by writers 
on Plato since Schleiermacher. This relation allowed 
by Stallbaum, Hermann, Steinhart, Susemihl, and many 


Some 
direct con- 
firmations 
of this 
view are 
found by 
comparing 


both dia- 
logues, 
which are 
closely 
connected. 


The order 
of writing 
might in 
this case 
agree with 
order of 
events re- 
presented. 


262 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


others,4 has been in recent times very successfully 
defended by Teichmiuller against the older view of 
Tennemann, Ast, and Socher, who thought that the Phaedo 
must have been written soon after the death of Socrates. 
Besides the logical theories in the Phaedo, which are 
found to be a continuation of those in the Symposium, 
there are some other indications of the priority of the 
Symposium. ‘The mention at the end of the Symposiwm 
of a discussion about the identity of the tragic and comic 
poet has no visible aim at that place, but is very well 
explained if we take it as an apology for the prevalent 
comic character of the Symposium, and an announcement 
of a more serious encomium on Socrates to be delivered in 
the Phaedo. Also the words of Alcibiades, that nobody 
has yet praised Socrates as he deserves, if referred to 
Plato’s own time, are better justified if the Phaedo 
had not then been written. There is a further proba- 
bility that the picture of Socrates in the Symposium, 
if planned about the same time as that of the dying 
Socrates, should have been executed first, however im- 
probable may be the generalisation of similar reasonings 
as carried out by Munk. Also the view on immortality 
imphed in the Symposiwm presents an earlier stage 
than in the Phaedo. In the first moment of the con- 
templation of absolute Beauty, Plato could look upon 
immortal fame as an equivalent of immortal life. But 
so dear had been the belief in immortality to the 
author of the Gorgias that 1t became a natural task to 
base this personal immortality on the new logical theory 
emancipated from traditional authority. Philosophic 
reasoning in favour of immortality is a new departure, 
compared with the earlier representations of immortality 
as a traditional belief, a beautiful tale, true and worthy 


244 A. Bischoff, Platons Phaedo, Erlangen 1866, pp. 282-306; L. Noack, 
Philosophisch-geschichtliches Lexicon, Leipzig 1879; also Michelis, Ribbing, 
and others, while Peipers, Diimmler, Christ, and Pfleiderer still believe in 
the priority of the Phaedo. 


ORIGIN OF THE THEORY OF IDEAS: PHAEDO 263 


to be believed in, but not within the scope of positive 
knowledge. 

The recognition in the Symposiwm of immortal fame as 
desirable shows a regard for human opinion far greater 
than that professed in the Phaedo, which in this respect 
approaches nearer to the disposition of mind shown in the 
Phaedrus, Theaetetus, and Parmenides. On the other 
hand, while his esteem for public opinion was decreasing, 
Plato’s consciousness of his own power was undoubtedly 
growing, and here again we have an argument in favour 
of the later date of the Phaedo. In the Phaedo the philoso- 
pher is equal to the gods (82 Bc), while inthe Symposium 
the gods are very much above the philosopher. The 
proportion of apodictic affirmations, such as adnOgorarta, 
in the Phaedo is an additional proof of its later date. These 
form here 49 per cent. of all affirmations, while in no earlier 
dialogue do they exceed 35 percent., which ratio they surpass 
in all later dialogues, rising above 50 per cent. in the Laws. 
This places the Phaedo in a line with the later works, and 
is a very characteristic sign of the increasing certainty 
which Plato professed to have attained—a certainty which 
remained with him through life, together with his conscious- 
ness of the high and divine vocation of the philosopher. 

This growing confidence is specially evident if we 
compare two predictions about his own philosophical 
career putin the mouth of Socrates once in the Apology,” 
and again much later in the Phaedo™ : 


Apology 314: rowodros obv GdXos 
ov padiws tiv yernoerar .. « 

39 CD: mAelous €covrar bpas ot 
€éyxovtes, ods viv €yo kaTelxor, 
c - . > ’ , ‘ 
upets dé ovK yoOdveote: Kai yade- 
T@TEPOL EgovTal Go@ VEwTEPOL 
iow, Kal Upeis paddov dyavaktynoere, 





Phaedo 78 A: woh) pev 7 “EAas, 
. + woAAa 6€ Kal Ta TOY BapBapwv 
yen, ods mavras xpi Suepevvacba 
(nrovvras Tovovtov er@ddy,.. + (nretv 
8€ xp) kai avrovs per’ GAANA@ VY iows 
pS) * > . 2 ’ ” - 
yap av odde padiws evpoure pad- 
Lov Upa@v duvapevovs Tovro roveiv- 





25 This passage has been already understood as a prediction about 
Plato by Natorp (Philosophische Monatshefte, vol. xxvi. p. 453); Sybel 
(De Platonis prooemiis Academicis, Marburg 1889) and others. 

6 On Phaedo, 78 a, see Teichmiiller, i. 123. 


Disregard 
of human 
opinion. 
Increase 
of Plato’s 
certainty 
visible in 
the pro- 
portion of 
apodictic 
affirma- 
tions. 


Plato’s 
growing 
confidence 
illustrated 
by the 
allusions 
to his own 
activity 
contained 
in Apology 
and 
Phaedo. 


Allusions 
to Plato’s 
travels 
and 
teaching. 


Difference 
between 
Phaedo 
and Sym- 
posium in 
the treat- 
ment of 
poets. 


Also in 
style the 
Phaedo 
follows 
closely 
the Sym- 
posiun. 


264 ORIGIN: AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


According to the Apology there was no hope of finding 
a worthy successor to Socrates; in the Phaedo it is 
admitted as probable that such a successor, even if 
sought for all over the world, could not be easily found 
outside the circle of Socrates’ disciples, and this is said 
with a clear reference to Plato’s travels in search of 
truth. In the Apology Plato speaks of the indignation 
which will be produced by his writings; in the Phaedo 
he is already conscious of the charm exercised by his 
philosophy, and he calls himself a charmer. We shall 
see how Plato progressed even to a further point in the 
consciousness of his own power. 

Another indication of the priority of the Symposium 
is the different treatment of Beauty. While in the 
Symposium Beauty is the highest ideal, it is in the 
Phaedo only one among many ideas, as in the Phaedrus. 
In the Symposium Plato quotes poets and lawgivers as 
truly eminent men, deserving immortality of fame ; in the 
Phaedo (65 8) the poets are quoted with a certain irony, 
as if Plato meant that any truth observed by them must 
be clear even to a child. While in the Symposzum 
Aristophanes is represented as a friend of Socrates, and 
Plato thus forgives the gibes of the great comic poet 
against his master, he refers in the Phaedo (70: ov«ouy 
y’ av oilmat, eitrety TWWa VoV aKovcayTa, OVO Ei Kwpwd.oTroLOS 
ein, @s ado\scy@ Kal ov mepl mpoanKkevT@y Tovs AdyouS 
motovwar) to comic poets with a certain air of superiority 
and contempt; this reminds us of the Republic, and 
seems to be directed against comic poets of Plato’s own 
time who criticised, perhaps, the wild and playful tone of 
the Symposium. 

The position of the Phaedo after the Cratylus and 
Symyosium is fully confirmed by the considerable number 
of peculiarities of later style, which bring the Phaedo 
nearer to the Republic and to the latest group than any 
of the preceding dialogues (see above, p. 170). If we take 
into consideration that no other work of Plato is likely to 


ORIGIN OF THE THEORY OF IDEAS: PHAEDO 265 


have been composed between the Sympostwm and Phaedo, 
we must infer that the two dialogues were not separated 
by a great interval, since it is unlikely that Plato would 
remain long unproductive as an author at the period of 
his life in which his chief works betray such incomparable 
ease and mastery of form. 

The stylistically well-defined group consisting of the 
Cratylus, Symposium, and Phaedo, contains the first 
exposition of the theory of ideas, and shows us how Plato 
was led to this theory from different starting-points. In 
these three dialogues the ethical questions so much dis- 
cussed before become secondary, and the logical problem 
of knowledge, blended with the metaphysical inquiry 
about Being, begins to occupy the philosopher’s attention. 
He reaches a degree of certainty and a consciousness of 
his power forming a remarkable contrast with the incon- 
clusiveness and modesty of the Socratic dialogues up to 
the Meno. Also his literary skill, admirable already in 
the Euthydemus and Gorgias, arrives in the Symposiwm 
and Phaedo at a perfection not exceeded by himself in 
later writings, and equalled only in the Republic and 
Phaedrus. The polemical tone of the Huthydemus and 
Gorgias is disappearing, and the didactic character begins 
to prevail. The aim of life, which in the Gorgias was 
defined as justice founded on knowledge, becomes chiefly 
knowledge, with virtue as one of its consequences. The 
stage reached by Plato in the Cratylus, Symposiwm, and 
Phaedo is introductory to that of the Republic and 
Phaedrus, which represent the doctrine taught by Plato 
during the mature years of his life. Stylistic and 
logical comparison agree in connecting the Cratylus, Sym- 
posium, and Phaedo into one group of works succeeding 
each other in the first years of Plato’s activity in his 
Academy. The great number of works later than these 
reduces the limits of time for their composition to a few 
years. If the Symposiwm was written about 385 B.c., we 


Logical 
character 
of the 
Cratylus, 
Synypo- 
stum, and 
Phaedo 
contrasted 
with 
inconclu- 
siveness of 
Socratic 
dialogues. 


Preva- 
lence of 
didactic 
over 
polemical 
aims. 
Connec- 
tion of 
these 
three 
dialogues 
confirmed 
by their 
style. 
They were 
written in — 
the first 
years 


of the 
existence 
of the 
Academy. 


266 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


have no reason to put the Phaedo later than about 384, 
or between 384 and 3883 B.c., as will be seen from a com- 
parison between the Phaedo and later works, proving 
that after the Phaedo Plato must have written more than 
twice as much as he had written before. 


CHAPTER Vi 


MIDDLE PLATONISM 


WHEN Plato reached the development of his logical 
theories as these are known to us from the Phaedo, he was 
anxious to apply them to practical aims with the purpose 
of promoting the moral progress of his contemporaries. 
He was not satisfied with knowing the truth for himself, 
and he wanted to impart it to others. Two practical appli- 
cations of philosophy occupied his attention: politics and 
education. We have the results of his meditation on these 
subjects in two works, the Republic and the Phaedrus. 
The Republic no longer deals with the moral pro- 
blem in the fashion of the Meno or Gorgias. In these 
Socratic dialogues Plato asked and tried to answer moral 
questions referring to the conduct of the individual, in 
any given state, without expressly contemplating an 
altered condition of the state. He still professed 
Socratic ignorance as to politics, while he already had 


resolved the problem of individual conduct and indivi- 
dual relations between citizens, seeing therein the true 
physical knowledge, Plato no longer dared to decline 
the responsibilities it implied. He was deeply interested 
in the reasons of the general decay of Greek states in 
his time, and he understood that the Socratic precept 
to ‘mind one’s own business’ (ra égavtTod mpdrrew) 
would not work, if the political conditions of the state 
offered constant opportunities for the perversion of the 
individual. If the state was acknowledged to be a 
necessity, the citizen and especially the philosopher could 


Philo- 
sophical 
theories 
applied to 
practical 
aimsin the 
Republic 
and 
Phaedrus. 


Politics 
succeed 
to indi- 
vidual 
ethics. 


The state 
has an 
influence 
on the in- 
dividual’s 
conduct, 
and thus 
moral re- 
form must 
begin by 
the reform 


of the 
state, and 
by the 
reform of 
education. 


The 
excep- 
tional size 
of the 
Republic 
must be 
taken into 
account if 
we wish to 
reckon 
the time 
spent in 
writing 
this 
dialogue. 
According 
to some 
authors 
this was 
very con- 
siderable. 


268 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


not remain indifferent to the mode in which the state was 
to be ruled. Plato’s interest in this problem led him to 
write one of his greatest works, the Republic, in which 
educational and political topics are skilfully blended. 
Having recognised education as one of the chief instru- 
ments of political reform, he dedicated another dialogue, 
the Phaedrus, chiefly to educational questions. 


I. The Republic. 


Every reader of Plato is familiar with the fact that 
the Republic is very much larger than any other work of 
Plato except the Laws. This impression led even Grote 
to a curious exaggeration, when he said (vol. iv. p. 1) that 
each book of the Republic is as long as any one of the 
preceding dialogues. He was thinking chiefly of the 
small spurious dialogues held by him to be authentic. In 
reality four of the preceding dialogues, Gorgias, Cratylus, 
Symposium, and Phaedo, contain in all about the same 
amount of text as the Republic, and it is important to 
bear in mind this relation if we wish to arrive at 
correct conclusions on the much-debated question of the 
unity of the Republic. An incidental observation of 
Hermann (p.. 539), that B. V-VII appear to be 
written later than B. VIII-IX, and that B. X must 
have been added later still, has been more recently 
developed by Krohn, and after him by E. Pfleiderer, into 
a theory which breaks the continuity of the Republic, 
by supposing different parts of it to have been pro- 
duced at intervals during the greater part of Plato’s life. 
For anybody who wishes to understand the growth of 
Plato’s philosophy it becomes a very important pre- 
limmary question whether Krohn was right in_be- 
heving that Plato wrote much of the Republic before 
he had written any other dialogue. This view has been 
recently carried by Pfleiderer to the extreme of placing the 
first five books of the Republic even before the Apology, 


MIDDLE PLATONISM : REPUBLIC 269 


which heretofore had been almost unanimously held to be 
one of the earliest writings of Plato. 

If we consider that the Republic contains one-sixth 
of the texts bearing Plato's name, and that it is 
generally admitted that he was occupied with literary 
labours for at least fifty years, it becomes evident that 
even the continuous production of the Republic could not 
have been the work of a short tirne. In our own century 
a volume of this size and on such an all-important 
subject is rarely written in less than several years, and 
there are immense differences between our methods of 
writing and the mode of literary composition which 
probably prevailed in Plato’s time. Without referring to 
fountain pens and typewriting machines, the superiority 
of our ordinary writing materials over those that were 
available two thousand years ago has diminished many 
times the mechanical labour involved. The invention of 
printing and the custom of revising proofs affords an 
infinitely easier and quicker way of correcting and 
maturing our works than was practicable on old papyrus 
rolls, with an all too limited space for additions. But 
besides all these mechanical and material improvements, 
there are also deep psychological differences between an 
ancient Greek writer and ourselves. Any ordinary student 
of the present day has read ten or even a hundred times 
as much as Plato could have done at the same age; we 
are also generally far more practised in writing from our 
earliest years: even our elementary education includes 
besides gymnastics and music many literary studies. Keep- 
ing all this well in mind, we must ask the question: how 
many years must the composition of the Republic have 
required even if it were not interrupted by other labours ? 
We suppose that in the first ten years after the death of 
Socrates Plato wrote about half-a-dozen small dialogues, 
and only two larger works (Protagoras and Meno), not 
amounting together to more than about three-quarters of 
the extent of the Republic. This was the beginning, 


The 
Republic 
being one- 
sixth of all 
the works 
written in 
fifty years, 
it is pro- 
bable that 
it took 
some 
years to 
write. 


Difference 
in the 
mode of 
literary 
produc- 
tion. 

We have 
in the 
present 
time many 
advan- 
tages en- 
abling us 
to write at 
a greater 
speed. 


Illustra- 
tion from 
the above 
survey of 
the works 
preceding 
the 
Republic. 


In about 
six years 
five dia- 
logues 
had been 
written 
exceeding 
slightly 
the size 
of the 
Republic. 


B. II-X 
of the 
Republic 
and the 
Phaedrus 
are equal 
in size to 
the works 
written 
390-384 
B.C. 


It is pro- 
bable that 
the bulk 
of the 
Republic 
and the 
Phaedrus 
were 
written 
in the 
last six 


270 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


and it is reasonable to expect that the author’s speed in 
composition was increasing. In fact the next six years 
(8390-384 B.c.) produced five dialogues (Huthydemus, 
Gorgias, Cratylus, Symposium, Phaedo), which taken 
together slightly exceed the size of the Republic. Be- 
sides, there is ample reason to suppose that some work 
preparatory to the Republic had been already done at the 
time of writing the Sympostwm, and the tenour and 
language of the first book have an obvious affinity to 
those of the Gorgias. Taking this for granted, there is 
on the other side the Phacdrus, which could not have 
been written before the Phaedo, as will be seen, and 
which also is probably not much later than the last 
books of the Republic. The Phaedrus, together with 
B. II-X of the Republic, corresponds very nearly to 
the total amount of the works which we place between 
390 and 384 B.c. These works are so important and 
betray such a wonderful facility of composition, united 
with so complete a mastery of the language and of the 
subjects, that we have no reason to expect that Plato in the 
next period still further increased the speed of his writing, 
especially while his oral teaching must have occupied 
more and more of his time. Thus it becomes consistent 
with probability to suppose that the Phaedrus and 
fiepublic occupied him for another six years after 384, 
and this brings us to his fiftieth year, completed in 
old B.C. 

If we say that according to the above reasoning Plato 
worked on his Republic nearly up to the age of fifty, this 
remains only a probable inference. But where we have 
no direct evidence as to facts, we are justified in weighing 
probabilities and admitting provisionally the greatest 
probability, in order to obtain a distinct conception of im- 
portant events. For a knowledge of Plato’s philosophy 
it is sufficient to settle the consecutive order of his 
works, and it is not indispensable to name a date for 
each work or each part of a work. But dates are useful 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: REPUBLIC 2TH 


as an illustration of results arrived at by the detailed com- 
parison of each work with all the others, and it is only in 
order to convey to our readers a clear representation of 
what results from the above inquiry that we say: if Plato 
wrote the Republic as one continuous work, and after the 
Phaedo, as we shall attempt to prove, this work 
probably filled his time for about six years before he 
reached the age of fifty. 

We know he was forty when he formally founded his 
Academy. His Huthydemus and Gorgias had prepared 
the way for this, and the first years of the existence of the 
Academy brought out the Cratylus, Symposiwm, and 
Phaedo, enouncing the new theory of ideas. The 
Republic and Phaedrus were then written within the 
first ten years of the existence of the Academy. If this 
be so, one important point of discussion is at once dis- 
missed. It is natural that an author between forty and 
fifty, labouring at one production during about six years, 
while his thoughts were still maturing, should insensibly 
alter something in its original plan, adding new matter 
and even falling into some trifling contradictions. Cor- 
rections were not then so easy as they are to-day, and the 
standard of literary consistency was, even for Plato, not 
so high, as we can see from nearly all his works. He was 
above everything an educator, and he did not feel obliged 
to say all things at once. He had taught in the 
Symposium a progressive exposition of truth, and he 
conformed to these precepts in preparing the Republic. 
In B. I-IV we see no direct allusion to the theories 
explained in the Phaedo, and we might receive the im- 
pression that the author did not yet know the eternal 
ideas. At the beginning of B. V we have a clear 
indication that what follows is an expansion of the 
original plan, and at the beginning of B. VIII the 
thread of B. IV is resumed. B. I is called in 
B. II expressly an introduction (pooimiov 357 A), and 
B. X has distinctly the ‘form of a conclusion, somewhat 


years 
before 
Plato 
reached 
the age 
of fifty. 


An author 
between 
forty and 
fifty may 
change 
some 
things in 
the plan 
of a work 
continued 
for seve- 
ral years. 
Educa- 
tional aim 
explains 
why no 
mention 
of the 
theory 

of ideas 
occurs in 
the first 
books. 
Natural 
partitions 
of the 
Republic 
do not 
prevent 
its unity. 


Different 
moods in 
Plato’s 
works and 
different 
aims have 
a limited 
influence 
on the 
style. 


First book 
of the 
Republic 
closely 
related 

to the 
Gorgias in 
contents 
and style. 


Probable 
allusion 
to the 


272 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


loosely tacked on to what precedes. There is no possible 
discussion about the existence of these partitions, which 
are evident to every reader, and have been acknowledged 
generally. But on the other side frequent hints unite 
these parts into one whole (see Jowett and Campbell, 
Republic, vol. 1. pp. 11-20). For our purpose, we 
must consider each part separately, before drawing 
inferences as to the whole, and we recognise in the 
Republic five chief divisions: B. I, B. II-IV, B. V—VII, 
B, VIII-IX, and B. X. 


Book I 


Plato’s mind during many of the best years of life 
seems to have alternated between a resolute withdrawal 
from the world, indulging contemplation with a few 
disciples, and the endeavour to go forth and influence the 
world and bring the results of contemplation to bear on 
the social life of humanity. It is natural that his style 
should alter with the alteration of aim. Yet such 
alteration of style has limits, and it is hardly conceivable 
that in a single work produced without intermission he 
should approach the characteristic form in part of earlier 
and in part of later writings. 

The first book of the Republic, equal in size to the 
Apology, presents a strikingly close affinity to the Gorgias 
both in matter and form. The gentle treatment of 
Cephalus may be compared with the ironical respect for 
Gorgias, the puzzling of Polemarchus with the easy 
refutation of Polus, the sudden onslaught of Thrasy- 
machus with the brusque interposition of Callicles. And 
the presumption raised by these comparisons is confirmed 
by the stylistic evidence, which yields very few examples 
of later peculiarities. 

We see here Thrasymachus rising to defend a position 
which had to be abandoned by Polus in the Gorgias. 
Polus had admitted that injustice though advantageous 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: REPUBLIC I 273 


is uglier than justice (Gorg. 475 B: To dbdiuccioOar KaK.ov 
. . 70 08 aduxeiv aicywov), and this led to his defeat in 
the discussion with Socrates. Now Thrasymachus, as if 
he had been present then, dares to assert that perfect 
injustice is beautiful (Rep. 348 D BE), whereby he places 
himself above traditional opinion. Socrates recognises 
the greater consistency of this position (348 E: todro 7d 
OTEpEWTEPOY . . . EL YAP AVOLTENELY EV THY adLKlay éTiOzc0, 
kaklay mévToL 7) ALTYXpOV AUTO MmodrOyEls Elval, OoTEP 
Grou Teves, elyowsy av TL AsyELV KATA TA vomLfomeva) ; 
we might take this as an allusion to the earlier work, and 
as a sign that, however the first book might be earlier than 
the other books, we need not admit it to be earlier than 
the Gorgias. The standpoint of the author is far more 
advanced, since he acknowledges that his argumentation, 
though sufficient to overthrow a sophist’s impudence, is 
not satisfactory to himself, so long as he has not given a 
definition of justice, which accordingly becomes the_pro- 
fessed aim of the whole work. In the small dialogues no 
definition of any virtue is accepted as definitive, and in 
the larger ethical dialogues the question whether virtue 
is teachable overshadowed the logical inquiry as to the 
nature of virtue. It is only in the Republic that this 
problem is undertaken, and with a new purpose, to apply 
it to politics. 

There are some hints which show that the first book 
was not, as Hermann (p. 538) thought, originally meant 
as an independent whole, to which the following was 
added later. The mention of this life as preparing us for 
death (330 5: éyyutépw dv tov axed wadAXOV Te KaOopa aba 
... ddl A: beta errs ast mapect.) Shows us that Plato, 
even when he began to write his Republic, had passed 
beyond the stage of the small dialogues, and perhaps 
planned already in writing the first book the final myth 
concluding the tenth book. 

Also the threefold partition of the soul, which is the 
most important doctrine of the fourth book, is here as in 

y 


Gorgias 
in the 
first book 
of the 
Republic. 


More 
advanced 
stand- 
point. 
Polemic 
against 
the 
sophists 
secondary. 


First book 
not an in- 
dependent 
small 
dialogue. 
Close 
relation 
to the 
following 
books. 


274 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


Classifica- the Phaedo already prepared, when Socrates says that 
tion of the rulers of a state are paid in money, honour, or the 
rewards advantage of escaping a penalty for refusing to rule 
a (347 A: puoOov Trois wér\rovow eedyoew apyev, i) apyvprov 


here 
mentione 


fully ex 9 Te 7) Enulav, éav wx apyy). This is here a riddle for 
plained | Glaucon, and is fully explained only in the seventh book, 
in the where the obligation of the philosopher to rule a state 
seventh against his inclination is clearly expounded. This doctrine 


Hook is in advance of the Gorgias, where Plato said that in 
ood political influence the ruler must. be like th 
nae order to get political influence the ruler must be hke the 
Bo. people (Gorg. 513 B: 671s oe TovToIs OpordTatoy aTrepyd- 


to accept SETA, OUTOS GE TojoE, ws eLOUpEts sival, ToALTLKOY Kal 
political pytopexov). He then saw true politics only in individual . 
power educational influence (521 D: otwas . . . érreyetpety TH ws 


deniedin G\nOGs modiTix Teyvn Kal mpdtTEw Tad TodTiUd), and 


iia rejected Callicles’ exhortations to him to take an active 
enue part in the rule of the state. 

Now we see that already in the first book of the 

Republic Plato is conscious of the duty of obtaining 

political power in order to avoid the penalty of being 

ruled by his inferiors (847 c: ths Enulas peyiorn TO bard 

eee TovnpoTepou dpyecOa:). The three different kinds of men 

ae are also in the same passage opposed to each other (847 B: 


men as _ PlAdTipov TE Kal Piiapyupov—ot ayabot) very much as in the 
ailiC Phaedo (82 C: irocogpobytes—iroxypHuatot—giroTLMor). 
Phaedo. As in the Phaedo we see here the origin of the threefold 
partition of the soul. In the Phaedo Plato puts on one 

side the philosopher, and on the other side those who are 
[aaa Jno philosophers, almost identifymg the ambitious and 
of terms /the money-lover (Phaedo 68 c: the opposite of the 
philosopher is named ¢iuAoc@paros and subdivided: o avdras 
ee d¢ Tov ovTos TUyXavEL MY Kal hioypypwatos Kal didOOTYWLOS, 
ti ee TOL TA ETEpA TOUTwY 7) awoTepa). Here, likewise, we have 
Gorgias. not a direct trichotomy but a dichotomy with a subsequent 
Relation division of one of the two parts, without a definite name 
to the for the third part, for which in the Phaedo the term 
Phaedo — diddoaopos is used. This seems to show that B. I is 


places the 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: REPUBLIC I Ake 


earlier than the Phaedo, and we find a confirmation of it 
in the circumstance that for the lover of money the word 
ptrdpyupos is used, as in the Gorgias (515 E: Tepuxrga 
metroinkevat AOnvaiovs dirapyvpous), while in the Phaedo 
this word is replaced by ¢Aoypryatas, which also fre- 
quently recurs as a constant term in the later books of 
the Republic. The same relation between the Phaedo 
and the first book results from the comparison of the 
following passages : 


Rep. I. 353 b, after a long enu- 
meration of ¢pya (immov, 352 &, 
opbarporv, ete.) follows: 
taita To0de oxeWar: Wuxis e€ore TL 
épyov, 0 a\A@ Tv dvTwy ods ay Evi 
mpa&as, ... 
dipxew kat BovdeverOa Kal Ta ToL- 
avta tavta, €0@’ 6r@ aAdo fh Wry7 


‘ 
pera 


TO emtipeeiobar Kal 


Phaedo 105 c: without any pre- 
liminary explanation of what épyov 
means, or of what activities of the 
soul constitute life, comes the 
question : 
eyyernrar c@pari, Cav gotar; “Qu ay 
uxt, en. 


»” a \ a ¥ > 94 
EXEL; TS yap ovxt; 7 OS Gs. 


? c = x / 
Amoxpivov .. . @ ay TL 


> -~ A ~~ o 
OUKOUY GEL TOUTO OUT@S 


dixaiws av abra arodoiper, kai paipev 
” > , > > te 

iOua exeivns evar ;—ovdevi G\Aw.— 
TiS ad ro Cyv; ouxns pyooper epyov civac; paduora, 


It seems improbable that Plato should have explained 


his thought about_li ower of soul with 
such a series of inductions, if the result had been earlier 


stated to be evident, and on the other side, the short 
statement of the Phaedo is best justified by the more 
elementary exposition preceding it. It is not the length 
of an explanation which decides the question of priority, 
because a longer elucidation might be a supplement to a 
previous short statement of the question. But here we 
have on one side an elementary induction, and on the 
other -side the result of this induction quoted as evident 
truth. Under these circumstances the longer explanation 
may be reasonably held to be the earlier. 

The position of Book I between the Gorgias and 
Phaedo is further confirmed by the notion of the peculiar 
virtue of the soul, which appears here as a development of 
what in the Gorgias was named the peculiar order in a 
soul : 

T 2 


results 
also from 
the ditfer- 
ent ex- 
pression 
of the 
view that 
life is 
peculiar 
to soul. 


This, 
based on 
long in- 
ductions 
in the 
Republic, 
stated as 
evident 
in the 
Phaedo. 


Order in 
the soul, 
mentioned 
in the 


Gorgias, 
here de- 
veloped. 


Specific 
energies 
of the 
senses re- 
cognised, 
but with- 
out insis- 
tence. 


The 
second, 
third, and 
fourth 
books 

of the 
Republic 
represent 
the primi- 
tive state. 


276 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


Bp Pee 
Gorg. 506 B: ta&er reraypévov Rep. 353 B: ap’ obv more Wuxn 
c > mz A 
kal Kekoopnuevov eat 7 apeT) Ta avTns epya eb admepyacerat 
Ua , a 5 cot 
éxdgTou . . . KOMpos TIS dpa oTepopevn THS Oikelas apeTns, 
> , > ¢ + ec) Pie A A 257 ; , ) , 
eyyevopevos ev éxdot@ 6 ExdoTov 7) advvarov ; —’Advvarov—AvayKy 
cal iA - - rn 
oixetos dyabov mapéxer ekactov dpa Kaki Wux Kak@s apxew kal 
~ ll > cod > r , 
Tay évtav ... Kal Wuxn Kogpov emipedeio da, TH SE ayaby mavra 
a \ c = > if a ~ ke , é cal 
éxyovca tov €avTas Gpeivay THs Taira ed mpattev, Cf. 335 B: Tov 
> . r ’ col cod 
akoopnrov. Kuv@v apeTy, also T@v inrav. 


The notion of a peculiar power of the soul is intro- 
duced in connection with the observation that each kind 
of perception also depends upon a peculiar faculty, 
resulting in a special activity, which cannot be fulfilled by 
any other instrument than the corresponding organ of 
sense (352 BE: 00’ btm dy ddrAw idols 7) dbOarpols ; ov SHTa 

. akovoas a\Xo 7 @oly ; ovdapds. 353 BC: ap av ToTE 
Supata TO avTOY Epyov KahOS aTEpydoawTo wn EXoVTa THY 
avtov oikelay apetnv...). This is a clear statement of the 
theory known in our century as the law of specific energies 
of the senses. But Plato did not give any special im- 
portance to this observation, and it served him only as 
an analogy tending to establish his general view of human 
faculties. However, a variety of psychic faculties is not 
yet discovered in the first book, and the soul as in the 
Phaedo is spoken of as one indivisible whole. 


Booxs II-IV 


These three books, together equal in size to the 
Gorgias, form one whole, and represent the primitive 
state, including some considerations on poetry and 
primary education. The end of this part does not exactly 
coincide with the end of the fourth book, because p. 445 B 
begins a new argument, the explanation of a variety of 
states corresponding to the variety ,of souls, very 
soon interrupted at the beginning of the fifth book 
by the digression on the equality of the sexes. If 
we disregard this last page of the fourth book, connecting 
it with B. V and preparing for B. VIII-IX, we are justi- 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: REPUBLIC II-IV 277 


fied in treating B. II-IV as representing one important 
division of the Republic, independently of the question 
whether the following parts were added immediately 
afterwards or later. 

We see here chiefly one theory which belongs more to 
psychology than to logic, but which is indispensable for 
an adequate appreciation of Plato’s logical progress. This 
is the theory of the threefold_partition of the soul, intro- 
duced here for the first time and based on the logical law 
of contradiction. Plato discovered a truth of which he 
evidently was not yet aware in writing the Phaedo, 
namely that the soul has multiple opposed activities 
unified only through constant efforts (443 EB: &va yevopevev 
&K ToNA@D). e acknowledges the great difficulty of 
deciding whether the different activities do not belong to 
one and the same soul (436 AB: yadera d.0picacbar akiws 
Noyou ... ef OAN TH WuyH Kab’ ExacTov avTOV TpadTTOMED. . . 
i) Tplolw ovow ado dAAw). But he invents a safe method 
for the solution of his new problem. He puts it down 
as an unquestionable truth, that the same thing cannot 
act or be acted upon simultaneously in contrary ways 
(436 B: tavrOv Tavartia Tovey ) TadoXELY KaTAa TadTOV YE Kal 
mpos TavTov ovK eernoe dua, repeated 437 A, 439 B).° 

This sharp and general formulation of the law of contra- 
diction not only as a law of thought, as in the Phaedo, but 
for the first time as a law of being, as a metaphysical 
axiom, repeated several times with great insistence, is a 
very important step, not easily to be accounted for by those 
who believe the first part of the Republic to belong to 
about the same time as the Protagoras. Also the ter- 
minology used to express this truth betrays a stage much 
more advanced. Plato speaks here as a philosopher 
already accustomed to exact definition, not the youthful 
inquirer hesitating and declining the definitive solution of 
every proposed problem, as he appeared in the Protagoras 
and earlier dialogues. He is now familiar with the 
hypothetical method (437 A: jro@éwevor ws TovToU obtws 


Threefold 
partition 
of the 
soul based 
on law of 
contra- 
diction, 
which ap- 
pears here 
not onlyas 
a law of 
thought, 
but as a 
meta- 
physical 
principle. 


Plato 
admits 
that each 
hypo- 
thesis is 
taken for 
granted 


provision- 
ally, and 
may be 
revoked 
later. 


Thred 


278 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


Zyovtos eis TO mpdabev Tpoiwpsv, OMONOYHTaAVTES, av TOTE 
adXn dav tadta } TavTy, TavTa Hyiy Ta dd TovTOU 
EvuBalvovta ANedvupéeva Ecco Har) and proceeds according to 
the logical rule given in the Phaedo (100 A), arguing out 
the consequences of the most probable hypothesis. 

This leads him to the conclusion that as our sensual 


faculties desires are frequently in contradiction with our reason, 


of the 
soul, 
called also 
kinds or 
parts, 
‘do not ° 
“exactly 
corre- 
spond to 
will, feel- 
ing, and 
reason. 


Know- 
ledge and 
the will to 
act ac- 
cording to 
it belong 
to one 
faculty, 
while 
sensual 
feeling is 
separated 
from 
moral 
feeling. 


reason must be different from each other 





(439 cp). He thus establishes three powers or faculties 


of the soul for which he does not yet use the term dvvapus 
(B. V 4776: dycouev Suvdapers iva yévos TL TOV OYTO), 
calling them «én (402 c, 437 D, 439 B, 440 E), yévn (443 D), 
or wépn (442 c), with some hesitation as to their relation 
to the whole. Heseems to have looked upon the faculties 
as organs or instruments of the soul, according to the 
analogy of the senses, which are instruments of the body. 
The three Platonic faculties do not exactly correspond to 
will, feeling, and reason, which have been later generally 
used for the classification of psychical acts. Plato’s Noyiore- 
cov (439 D: TO @ NoyifeTa NoyLaTLKOY TPoTayopEvOYTEsS THS 
auyjs), though it is apparently the organ of reasoning, 
includes also the will-power, because it could otherwise 
not command (441 E: 7@ doyoTiK@ dpyeww mpoo- 
yxet)f Plato did not distinguish between pure objective 
thought and the decisions of will resulting from a 
certain intellectual knowledge. For him knowledge and 
the will to act according to this knowledge were one. 
Again, he did not link into one all kinds of feelings,,but 
separated sensual feelings, under the general appellation 
of desire, from the moral feeling. Thus two of his faculties 
(éarvMupia and Ovpos) correspond to one of later psychology, 
while he finds one faculty where later the will has been 
distinguished from the intellect. This union of will and 
intellect, as taught by Plato, is preserved in the current use 
of the word reason, even in the philosophical theories of 
Spinoza, and in the ‘ Praktische Vernunft’ of Kant. 
Plato assumes a gradation of faculties, placing first 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: REPUBLIC HU-IV 279 


reason, then the moral feeling (439 E: @ @upotpea— 
441 BE: TO Ovposiset tpoojxer wrnKow sivar Kal Evppayo 
TovtTov (TOU AoyioTsxov), also 441 A), and at the lowest 
stage the sensuous desire (439 D: 7d @ épd Te kal Trew Kal 
Siph Kai Tept Tas adXAas émiGupias emTonTar adoyoTOY TE 
kal émOuuntixov). He argues from the contradictions 
and conflicts of these three faculties to their independent 
existence. First, the sensuous desires are frequently 
opposed to reason and moral feeling, then the moral 
feeling itself is developed earlier than the reason (441 B: 
Ovpod pev evOds yevoweva peota éoTL, AoyLamod 8 Eviot meV 
Emouye Ooxodaw ovderote petTadamPBavewy, of OF TONAL oe 
mote). Here we notice that To Ovpoedés does not entirely 
correspond even to the notion of moral feeling, because it 
could not then be attributed to animals (441 8B: év Tots 
Onpios av Tes ioe 0 A€yets). 

It is a very curious circumstance that the term 
@vpozdés, very frequent in this part of the Republic, and 
also in B. VIII and IX, is entirely absent from 
B. V-VII and from B. X, recurring besides these parts 
of the Republic only once in Plato in the Timaeus, in 
connection with a recapitulation of the contents of the 
Republic. It seems that Plato had a passing fancy for this 
term and soon recognised it as insufficient, as he clearly 
avows later in B. VI (5044: tputta clin Woyhs duacty- 
odmevot... B: eppnOn ta Tore THs pev aKpiBelas, ws 
guoi épatveto, 2dduTrH . . . ). Here also he already con- 
fesses the imperfection of the method used (435D: & ¥’ 
ioQt . . . axpiBas pv TovTo 2k ToLlovTwY pEOddwy, oiaLs 
vov év Tois Oyo:s ypwmeOa, ob uA ToTe AaBa@pwev) and 
announces a ‘longer way’ (435D: adn yap paxpotépa 
Kal TAéi@y 0508 1) él ToT ayovea) leading with a greater 
certainty to truth. This longer way, however, 1s not 
fully shown in the Republic, and when later, in the sixth 
book, Glaucon insists on having it explained (506D: 
@otep Sikatocvvns Tépt Kal cwdpooiyns Kal Tav arwv 
SupAGes, oUTW Kat TEpi TOD ayaOod Sve\Oys), Socrates con- 


Opposi- 
tion of 
each 
faculty 
to the 
other. 


Difference 
in their 
growth. 


Limita- 
tion in 
the use of 
the term 
Ouuoedes. 


Imperfec- 
tion of 
method 
confessed 
and a 
longer 
way an- ; 
nounced, 
but not ° 
fully 
shown. 


The idea 
of the 
good 
could not 
be taught 
by 
Socrates. 


The men- 
tion of a 
longer way 
is an 
allusion 
to the 
theory 

of ideas. 
In the 
Sym- 
posium 
and the 
Phaedo, 
also, the 
theory 

of ideas 
was not 
constantly 
referred 
to. 


It is an 
artifice 
peculiar to 
Plato to 
introduce 
succes- 


280 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


fesses himself unable to do it (506 EB: av’7ré péy tl mor’ got 
Tayaov, tacmpmev TO voV EivaL* TAEOV Yap mot haivEeTat 7} KATA 
THY Tapodcay Opuny epixécOat Tod ye SoKODYTOS suol TA Vov), 
and returns to his beautiful allegories and metaphors. 
It was really beyond the reach not only of the historic 
Socrates, but even of the Platonic Socrates. When Plato 
set himself to expound the ‘longer way,’ he selected as 
his spokesmen Parmenides and the Eleatic Stranger, and 
made Socrates a hearer of their wisdom. 

The allusion to the longer way in B. IV is very 
valuable as a chronological sign, because it dismisses at 
once the supposition that this part of the Republic could 
have been written before the discovery of the theory of 
ideas. Plato looked upon his newly discovered treasure as 
a mystervum too deep to be constantly and familiarly 
referred to. In the Symposiwm the greatest part of the 
dialogue does not contain any allusion to the avdto to 
kadov, and then by a surprise the beautiful vision is pre- 
sented in the speech of Diotima, suddenly as it had 
appeared to Plato himself in his meditations. The same 
order and method were observed also in the Phaedo. In 
the beginning (up to p. 65 D) there is no mention of ideas, 
then the ideas are mentioned as notions (d¢catov avTo 
65D), these notions are slowly worked out into indepen- 
dence of the senses (740: ov tavTov dp’ éotiv TadTa TE Ta 
ioa Kai avTo TO iooy), and only after the final objections of 
Simmias and Cebes, after the criticism of Anaxagoras and 
other philosophers, appears the theory of ideas introduced 
ironically as something well known and implied in the 
preceding argument (100B: ovdéy Kawvov, GAN aep aet 
Kal GANoTE Kal ev TO TapedNAVvOoTL Oy obdsv TéTavpat 
rAéyov). This rhetorical artifice of Plato, which deceived 
some inquirers so far as to make them doubt the fact that 
the Phaedo is the first written exposition of the theory 
of ideas, 1s repeated on a larger scale in the Republic. 
Campbell (Rep. Il. p. 11) compares the late revelation 


sively new OL the ideas in B. V with the pervpeteca of a drama. 


MIDDLE PLATONISM : REPUBLIC II-IV 281 


Sybel”” explained this way of proceeding by educational points of 
motives. It is quite natural that Plato should reserve view of 
the application of the theory of ideas for special occasions, 8°" 
and he found no such occasion in the first sketch of his “?°” 

aye : : : tance. 
political views. It was sufficient for him to allude to the 
longer way. 

he threefold partition of the soul is net_introduced_ Analogy 

as a psychological problem, nor as subsidiary to some between 


logical investigation, but simply in_order to show the Sl 
og faa, a ee Lee 


parallelism between the three classes ina state OWers, denotes 
soldiers, and middle class) and the parts of an individual , jate, 
‘soul. This analogy between the individual and the state, stage of 
which can boast of such a long history after it had been thought 


invented by Plato, is not the idea of a young Socratic than the 


sequence of the theory of ideas. When he began to iniendes 
generalise widely and to seek in everything the ruling |. 
idea, he thought that he discovered an identity of 6 the 
principle between the state and the individual, and this goeratic 
led him from the individualistic ethics of the Gorgias to dialogues. 
the politics of the Republic. The transition is already 
indicated in the Symposium (210 c: tikrew Adyous To.od- 
tovs (nretv, olrwes Troujoovat BeNT lovs Tors véovs, iva avay- 
KacOn ad Vedoacbat TO ev Tols eit OEvpact Kal Tos VOMoLS 
Kadov Kal TovT’ idely OTe TaY avTO a’TO EvyyEves éorw), 
and this indication has been taken for an allusion to the 
Republic by those who cling to the belief of a Republic 
written very early, within the first ten years after the 
death of Socrates. 

Such a belief is founded on a gross misconception of Relation 
the relations between Plato and Aristophanes, and between 


illustrates the uselessness of interpreting Plato from ae aug 
Y1sto- 


phanes. 
227 T,, von Sybel, Platons Technik an Symposion und Euthydem 
nachgewiesen, Marburg 1889; of the same author on the same subject: 
Platons Symposion, ein Programm der Akadenvie, Marburg 1888; on some 
smaller articles of the same author, see a review by Natorp in Philosophische 
Monatshefte, vol. xxvi. p. 449. 





Argumen- 
tation of 
Schultess 
in favour 
of later 
date 

of the 
Republic 
never 
refuted. 
Partition 
of the soul 
common 
to the 
Republic 
with the 
Timaeus, 
while 
absent 
from the 
Phaedo. 
Subtle 
logical 
distinc- 
tions 
begin 
with the 
Phaedo 
and 
Republic. 
State- ° 
ments in 
a very 
condensed 
form 
requiring 
logical 


training 





282 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


uncertain allusions found in the works of others, instead 
of explaining him from his own writings. There is much 
to show that, though the method in the first books of the 
Republic is avowedly elementary, the threefold partition 
of the soul represents a later stage than the Phaedo. 
This has been best proved by Schultess 8 (p. 55), whose 
arguments have never been refuted. The theory of three 
parts of the soul, maintained by Plato in the Timaeus, is a 
later theory than the simplicity of the soul affirmed in the 
Phaedo, and could not be left out of consideration in the 
Phaedoif Plato professed it at that time. We have in the 
tenth book of the Republic a sample of the manner in 
which Plato deals with this subject afterwards. Though 
he speaks of the immortality of the soul generally, he 
adds there expressly that the true nature of the soul, its 
multiplicity or simplicity, will best be seen in the next 
life (6124: ror dv tis tdor aitis thy adnOh vow, ite 
moAvElons elite wovoevoys). A similar allusion to the parts 
of the soul would certainly be found in the Phaedo, if the 
Phaedo had been written after the first books of the 
Republic. 

The later date of this work is also seen in another 
peculiarity of Plato’s later writings, already visible in the 
Phaedo but further developed in the Republic and even 
later. Plato takes every possible opportunity to establish 
subtle logical distinctions in which we may discern the 
trace of his oral teaching in the Academy. He is de- 
lighted to bring such distinctions into a very concise form, 
which requires an explanation and is repeated afterwards. 
Any unprejudiced reader will recognise that a phrase 
like: ‘dca yy’ éori tovadra ofa sival tov, Ta wv ToL ATTA 
TOLOD TWOS éoTLWW, Ta O aUTA ExKaTTA GUTOD EKaoTOU MOVOY 
(438 B, repeated 438 D) requires some logical training to 
be understood at first reading. Such phrases would be 
vainly sought for even in the Cratylus or the Symposium, 
and they are far above the sophisms of the Huthydemus. 

“8 Fritz Schultess, Platonische Forschungen, Bonn 1875. 


MIDDLE. PLATONISM : REPUBLIC II-IV 283 


The Platonic Socrates delivers this logical riddle as if it 
were something quite natural, but Plato’s experience as 
a teacher showed him that it was too difficult for the 
ordinary reader, and Glaucon answers at once that he 
does not understand, in order to get the necessary ex- 
plenation from Socrates. Socrates explains by a number 
of examples that correlated terms remain correlated after 
the addition of a qualification to each of them. If a 
science is the science of a knowledge, then mathematical 
science will be the science of mathematical knowledge. 
Plato pushes his caution so far as to observe that the 
qualification of both terms need not consist in the same 
word, as for instance thé science of health is not healthy. 
After this lengthy explanation he repeats his logical 
theorem almost in the same words, and concludes with 
another example, until Glaucon is satisfied and acknow- 
ledges himself to have understood (438 E). This digression 
was not indispensable to the progress of the argument, 
and appears to have been introduced not to meet ob- 
jections really made by somebody, but only as a result 
of Plato’s increasing fondness for logic, and his experience 


about wrong inferences from dictwm simpliciter (amrOs | 


438 E) ad dictum secundum quid, a sophism exemplified 
already in the Huthydemus, but treated methodically for 
the first time in the Republic. 

A similar logical digression gives us the method of 
exclusion or of remainders, by which one part of a whole 
is investigated through elimination of the other parts 
(4284: @otep GrAwov TWoY TETTApwY, ei EV TL eCNnTOdMEV 
avi@v gv oTmodv ... ei Ta Tpla TpoTEpoy éeyvwpicaper, 
aiuT@® av TovTw zyvwpicto TO SyTovpevov). This is here 
introduced as leading to the definition of justice after 
separating from the general notion of virtue the three 
other virtues which together with justice constitute, 
according to Plato; the whole of virtue, namely temper- 
‘ance, courage, and wisdom. But if we look at the end 
of the discussion we see that the method of exclusion 


to be un- 
derstood, 
and ex- 
plained by 
examples, 
then 
repeated. 
This pro- 
duces di- 
gressions 
not indis- 
pensable 
to the 
progress of 
argument, 
and shows 
increased 
interest 

in logic. 


Method of 
exclusion 
intro- 
duced for 
the pur- 
pose of a 
definition 
of justice, 
then not 
used, be- 
cause at 
the end 
justice 
appears 


to be the 
general 
source of 
other 
virtues, 
not co- 
ordinated 
to the 
three 
other 
virtues. 


In earlier 
works wis- 
dom had 
the first 
place, now 
given to 
justice, as 
also in the 
first book 
of the 
Laws. 


284 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


has not been applied to the particular case for which it 
was introduced, because when justice appears at last, 
it is not discovered as the remaining part of virtue. 
After the elucidation of the three virtues corresponding 
to the three parts of the soul and to the three classes of 
citizens, Plato pretends to be still in the dark about 
justice (4820: dvcBatos yé Tis 6 ToTOs paiverar Kat 
eTicKLlos* goTL yoDY okoTELVOS Kal SuUGOLEpEvYNTOS) and 
takes this opportunity to vent one word and to use 
another in a new meaning for describing this special 
darkness. It is the same laborious play as later in the 
Parmenides : justice is found not as a virtue co-ordinated 
to the three others, but as the source of them (433 B: 
0 Tacw éxewos THY SUvapw TapécxXEV, WoTs eyyevecOal). 
Here also we find a point of view in advance of the 
Phaedo, in which wisdom was the chief virtue, and every 
other virtue to be exchanged for wisdom (Phaedo 698). 
The prevalence of wisdom is proper to the earlier thought 
of Plato, as we see in the Protagoras (352 D, cf. 357 c) and 
Euthydemus (282 A). In the Symposium likewise the first 
place is given to dpdvyncis (209A: ~uyh mpoonKe TeKetv 
gpovnow te Kal THY GAXnV apeTyHv), and it is a new de- 
parture in the Republic to recognise the peculiar position 
of justice as a link between all other virtues. This view, 
maintained also in the first book of the Laws (631¢c: 
éxe (bpovicews kal cwdpocvyvys) met avopelas KpabevTwv 
Tpirov iv ein SiKatocvyvyn . . . TaV Oziwv ayabdy), is the later 
view of Plato, while in his earlier works justice was only 
a part of virtue, co-ordinate with holiness or temperance 
(Prot. 329 c). In the Meno (79D: wy toivvy pnd od 
éve Entroupévyns apeThns Ons O TL eat olov Oud TOV TavTHS 
poplwv amroxpwopevos Snwooew avTHVv OTwOUY, 7) AXXO OTLODY 
TOUT T® avT® TpoTw rEywv) the identification of virtue 
with justice is even expressly denied, while already in the 
first book of the Republic justice appears to be the essence 
of virtue (853 E: apetny Wuyjs duxatocvvnyv—335 C : duKavo- 
avvn avOpwreta apeTy), a position which seems to have been 


MIDDLE PLATONISM : REPUBLIC II-IV 285 


again modified in favour of vods and ¢povnors in the 
Timaeus and the later books of the Laws. 

We may admit that the increasing importance of 
justice in the Platonic ethics is one of the practical results 
of the theory of ideas, which required at the summit of 
Being an ida ayaOod, prepared already in the Symposiwm 
(212 A) and in the Phaedo (99). Also in the second book 
of the Republic we meet the conception of good as a self- 
sufficient aim (8357B: towvde te ayabov, 6 debaliwe?’ av 
eye OV TOY aTroBawWwovT@Y epiEwEevol, GAN’ aVTO avTOD svEKa 
dotratouevot), Closely related to that of Aristotle in his 
Ethics. 

For the date of this part of the Republic as coming 
next after the Phaedo and the preceding dialogues, we find 
some other hints which it will be sufficient to mention 
briefly : 

1. Speech as an imitation of thought (882BC: 70 ye 
év Tols AOyous ipenua TL TOU év TH ruxH eoTl TaOnpaTos Kal 
botepov yeyovos eidwAov) seems to refer to the Cratylus 
(450 B : dvoua ulna TOD TpaypaTos). 

2. émvotnun is opposed to dofa (4444 : codiay Hv 
émistatovcay TavTn TH Mpaker émiotHuny ...duadiav... 
do€av) as in the Meno (86 A, cf. 97 c,98B). In the Meno 
the distinction is introduced as new, and in the Republic 
it is assumed to be generally known. That Plato again 
in the Republic also currently uses érvetHuy in a primitive 
meaning, equivalent to téyvy, signifies nothing, because a 
careful fixity of terminology was not yet acquired by 
Plato, as we see even later in B. V—VII. 

3. God is free from error and lying (382 D: counts 
wey apa Arevois év Os@ ovK Em. . . EH: madvtTn apa arpevoes 
TO Sapovwuv te Kal to Oziov). This agrees with the 
Cratylus (488 C: ole évavtia ay étiBeto abtos atte Oo Geis, 
av Sai tis i) Oeds;), only here the unity and simplicity 
of God is insisted upon, which ‘marks an advance beyond 
the traditional polytheism of earlier dialogues, which still 
survives in some expressions (881 c: advvatoy Oe 202rew 


Import- 
ance of 
justice 
results 
from the 
theory of 
ideas. 


Relation 
to the 
Phaedo. 


Speech 
and 
thought. 


Know- 
ledge and 
opinion 
well dis- 
tinguished 
though 
the terms 
changed. , 


Simplicity 
and unity 
of God, 
along with 
incidental 
mention 
of tra- 
ditional 
gods. 


Doctrine 
of one God 
peculiar to 
later Pla- 
tonism. 


Division 
of labour. 


Change of 
attitude 
towards 
the poets 
is defini- 
tive, and 
remains 
up to 
Plato’s 
latest age. 


No recon- 
ciliation 
possible, 
and thus 


286 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


avTov GNXoLOvY, GAN’, WS ZoLKe, KAANITTOS Kai ApLaTOS wy Eis 
To Ouvvatov ExacTOS avTo@V pméveL asi ATAWS ev TH avTOU 
popdy). But an occasional mention of more than one 
god, occurring in a criticism of traditional polytheism, 
is no evidence against Plato’s progress towards mono- 
theism, as we see from other passages in which 6 620s is 
used in a monotheistic sense (882 EB: 0 Osds amdodv Kat 
aXrnbes ty te Epyw Kal év Oyo, Kal ovTE abTos pEOictataL 
ouTE addovs eEatrata ; also 379 C: o Geds, éresd1) ayabds, ... 
tov ayabeav aitios, and elsewhere 379 A, 380D, etc. Cf. 
Phaedo 62c: @z0s). The doctrine of one God, a perfect 
Being, developed in the Republic, is adhered to in the 
Timaeus and Laws, while in earlier dialogues up to the 
Symposium a plurality of gods is either tacitly implied or 
expressly admitted. 

4. A curious contradiction to a statement of the 
Symposium is contained in the principle ‘one man one 
work’ (3945: eis geaoTos by wav ay eriTHSeupa Kaos éTLTN- 
Sevor, oA 8’ ov) When applied specially to the production 
and acting of comedy and tragedy (395 A: ovde Ta SoxobdvTa 
éyyvs addAnAwY iva OVO pinata SvvavTaL of avTol dua ed 
ptpetoOar, olov kop@diav Kal Tpayodiav wo.obytes), While in 
the Symposium Socrates is made to prove the identity of 
the comic and tragic poet (223D). This discrepancy is in 
close relation to the change of Plato’s attitude towards 
the poets. While in the Symposium the tragic poet and 
the comic poet are represented as friends of Socrates ; 
and Homer and Hesiod, as deserving immortal fame, are 
placed in one line with Lycurgus and Solon (209D 8), 
Plato now despises poetry as a mere pinovs and banishes 
Homer from his state. It is strange that some erudite 
eritics, who readily believe in an irreconcilable enmity 
between Plato and Isocrates, and take such a supposition 
for a firm basis of Platonic chronology, at the same time 
admit the possibility of Plato’s reconciliation with the 
poets, which would have taken place if the Symposiwm 
were written after the Republic or Phaedrus. It is much 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: REPUBLIC II—IV 287 


less probable that a philosopher like Plato should remain 
all his life hostile to a living man, than that he should 
become untrue to fundamental principles once recognised 
and repeatedly urged. We know from the last books of 
the Laws (941 8B, 967 ¢, cf. 890 A, 964, and many other 
passages) that Plato up to his latest age thought poets 
dangerous, and we have no reason whatever to believe 
that he changed his opinion after he had written the 
Republic. Thence it results that the Republic, at least 
from B, Il onwards, must be later than the Sym- 
postum. 

5. While in the Symposiwm the educational influence 
of Beauty began with the love of beautiful: bodies (210 a), 
in the Republic harmony and rhythm are acknowledged 
to be the chief factors in education (400 p-401 c) and are 
said to creep into the soul unobserved (401c). If we 
remember that the same view recurs in the Laws (665 B) 
and Timaeus (47D), it will be easy to recognise that also 
in this respect the Republic is later than the Symposium. 

6. The purification of the senses (411 D: Ssaxa0arpo- 
pévov TOV aicOjcewv) is a very concise term scarcely used 
before the Phaedo, where the necessity of such a purifica- 
tion is explained at length. 

7. The love of the Beauty of the soul (402 D) is here 
mentioned as entirely independent of corporeal Beauty, 
while in the Symposiwm (2108) such a love is a higher 
degree to which the pupil is led, after beginning with 
the love of physical Beauty. In the Symposium sensual 
love as a lower degree is almost excused, and here we 
find it absolutely condemned (403 B). 

8. Although the method of exposition is a popular 
one and not based on the theory of ideas, in some passages 
terms first explained in the Symposiwm and Phaedo are 
employed as if they were familiar. This occurs apparently 
against the author’s intention, but furnishes us with a 
valuable evidence against Krohn’s opinion that the theory 
of ideas was entirely ignored by the author of the first 


the Sym- 
posium 
must 
have been 
earlier. 


Educa- 
tional im- 
portance 
of har- 
mony and 
rhythm. 


Purifica- 
tion of 
senses. 


Love 

of the 
Beauty of 
the soul. 


Terms 
taken 
from the 
theory 

of ideas, 
occurring 
probably 
against 


the 
author’s 
intention, 
betray 
later date 
of com- 
position. 


Definition 
of 
courage 
compared 
with that 
of the 
Laches. 
Praise of 
justice 

in the 
Gorgias 
and 
Republic. 
Caution 
necessary 
with rhe- 
torical 
figures. 


Relation 
of the 
Republic 
to Aris- 
tophanes’ 
Eicclesia- 
zusae not 
justified. 


288 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


books of the Republic. This would leave no room for 
a distinction between avta ta Tis cwdpocvryns ei dy (402 0) 
and eixovas avta@v, nor for Kara On ev TA EldeL Omodo- 
yoorta ékelvots kai EuppovoovtTa, 700 aVTOD WET EX OVTA TUTOU, 
as aKaddoTov Ogaya TA Suvapéevo OeacOas (402D). This 
power of superhuman vision here invoked is certainly 
the same which we know from the Symposiwm and 
Phaedo. Nor are traces of the theory of ideas limited to 
these passages. We read also ti 7’ goTw avTo Ka avTo 
(358 B)—av70 Sixatoovyny (363 A)—adrTo & éxatepov TH avTod 
duvdapet év TH TOD EyovTos Wuyi (366 E). 

9. It need scarcely be added that the definition of 
courage (430 B: duvauus kai cwrnpia dia Tavtos SoEns ops 
TE Kal Vomiwov SEtvov Tépt Kai su), Which has been held by 
an eminent critic to be earlier than the Laches because of 
the promise to treat this subject again (430), shows a 
marked advance beyond the discussion on courage in the 
Laches. And the supposition that the Gorgias is later 
because Glaucon says that nobody has as yet praised 
justice as it deserves (358 D) is likewise based on a mis- 
conception. The Gorgias cannot be looked upon by 
Plato at this stage as an adequate encomium on justice, 
because it deals with the more special question whether 
to suffer wrongs is better than to do them, not to dwell 
on the absurdity of drawing matter-of-fact inferences 
from a rhetorical figure. Such assertions as that about 
the praise of love in the Sympostwm or the praise of 
justice in the Mepublic cannot be taken literally; any 
more than Isocrates’ saying in the Huagoras that nobody 
before him has written an encomium on a living man. 

The above considerations fully confirm the conclusions 
about the date of the first part of the Republic which 
resulted from our study of style. There cannot be the 
smallest doubt that the first part of the Republic, except 
the first book which is probably earlier, was written after 
the Symposium and Phaedo, and that therefore it is 
impossible to admit that Aristophanes in 391, when. he 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: REPUBLIC II-IV:' 289 


produced his Heclestazusae, meant Plato’s (LV. 424 a) 
short allusion to the community of wives, or his later 
exposition in B. V. If this comedy were a parody of 
Plato’s Republic, then Plato would not have represented 
Aristophanes a few years afterwards with all the sym- 
pathy and friendship which are evident in the Symposiwm. 
It is a strange inconsequence to believe that Plato on one 
side would feel a lifelong resentment for the insignificant 
attacks of Isocrates, and then to represent him as in- 
different to a ribald parody of his most cherished ideals. 
_ Between equality of women and the rule of women thete 
is a great difference. If Plato in the Timaeus (18 cD) 
and Aristotle in his Politics (1266 a 34) both clearly say 
that Plato was the first, and according to Aristotle the 
only writer, who advocated community of wives, then it 
is evident that neither Plato nor Aristotle recognised the 
similarity which some modern critics have seen between 
the absurd caricature of mad women in the Ecclesia- 
zusae and the plea for equality of sexes brought forward 
by Plato as the result of his meditations. The chief 
point for Plato was the unity of the state and the 
equality of the sexes. He was no advocate of abnormal 
sexual relations. The progress of mankind has not con- 
firmed Plato’s view, but his opinion cannot have been 
such an absurdity in the eyes of Aristophanes as it 
appeared to some modern readers. That the conception 
of a community of wives, on which Plato laid no special 
stress, was not a wholly novel conception, we see from a 
fragment of Euripides (quoted by Clem. Alex. Strom. vi. 
p. 751). 

The coincidences quoted between the Hcclesiazusae 
and the Republic refer chiefly to the fifth book, and are 
not very striking. The subject need not be further dis- 
cussed, as all consideration of it is precluded by the 
date .of the Republic, which is placed after 385 B.c. 
according to our comparisons of style as well as of 
logical theories. So long as it is supposed that the 

U 


Otherwise 
we should 
have 

to change 
also the 
date of 
the Sym- 
posium. 
Similarity 
between 
Republic 
and Hccle- 
siazusae 
not recog- 
nised by 
Aristotle 
or by 
Plato. 


Commu- 
nity of 
wives 
suggested 
before 
Plato. 


Coinci- 
dences 
between 
Aristo- 
phanes 
and Plato 
irrelevant. 


Exagee- 
rated im- 
portance 
has been 
given to 
them. 


External 
allusions 
less cer- 

tain than 
the result 
of a com. 
parative 

study of 

style and 
contents. 


Interrup- 
tion of the 
classifica- 
tion of 
constitu- 
tions by 
the ques- 
tion about 
position of 
women. 
This form 
of intro- 
ducing a 
new sub- 
ject might 
be inten- 
tional, or 
indicate 


290 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 

Ecclesiazusae were produced 391 B.c., there is no possi- 
bility whatever of admitting that they refer to Plato’s 
Republic. And if some eminent writers accepted this 
supposed relation, they acted like Schoene and Teich- 
muller in the question of style: giving an exaggerated 
importance to a single observation of doubtful value. It 
is an error of method to rely upon uncertain external 
allusions more than on the study of contents or style. 
If our information seems to involve contradictions, we 
must carefully weigh against each other the evidence 
in favour of both contradictory views. We have seen 
above a great number of sound arguments proving that 
the Republic is later than the Phaedo in style and 
contents. This gives us a consistent view of Plato’s 
evolution which cannot be overthrown ‘by the very 
uncertain supposition that a play in which Plato is not 
at all mentioned, written by one of Plato’s friends, could 
be intended as an attack on Plato’s greatest work. 


Booxs V-VII 


At the beginning of the fifth book Adeimantos inter- 
rupts Socrates’ classification of constitutions by a question 
about the position of women in the ideal Republic. The 
thread of the argument here interrupted is resumed 
only in B. VIII, and thus B. V-VII form a natural 
division of the whole and deserve to be considered apart. 
The view has been advanced that a more important 
division begins towards the end of B. V, p. 471¢, 
where the question of the rule of philosophers is raised, 
which fills the whole of B. VI-VII, offering many 
opportunities for logical reflections. But the transition 
from the particulars dealt with in the first part of B. V 
to problems of the highest philosophy is made quite 
plausible and natural, while the interruption at the 
beginning of B. V might be intentional and made in 
order to attract the reader’s special attention to the 


291 


new subjct{ by the rhetorical artifice of an apparently un- 
expected difficulty. The subjects dealt with in B. V-VII 
belong to the plan of the whole, and are not an afterthought, 
though this part of the Republic, if we trust stylistic 
comparisons, seems to have been completed somewhat 
later than the following books. Ifit is once recognised, 
as it must be on the authority of the same evidence, that 
there could not be any considerable distance of time 
between this part and the preceding fourth book, it 
becomes almost indifferent whether B. VI-VII were 
completed later or earlier than B. VIII-X. Admitting 
that they are probably written after B. [X and even after 
B. X, we do not agree for that reason with those who 
deny the unity of the Republic and the architectonic 
skill with which the parts of the whole structure are co- 
ordinated. 

The Platonic Republic would not be complete without 
the rule of philosophers, and it is irrelevant whether the 
explanation of this condition of the ideal state is better 
dealt with before or after the investigation of imperfect 
governments. As it stands, it crowns the picture of the 
ideal state and prepares the way for a representation of 
less perfect states. Even the discussion about the equality 
of sexes and the digression about international limitations 
of warfare (in B. V) are not out of place as an introduc- 
tion to the central part of the Republic. These essential 
pecuharities of the ideal state could be realised only 
under the rule of philosophers. Thus we are justified 
in leaving to this part of the Republic the place given to 
it by Plato, and in limiting our inquiry for the present 
to the relation between B. V-—VII and the preceding, 
with reference to what has been already proved of earlier 
writings. 

The theory of ideas no longer takes the form of an 
hypothesis, as in the Phaedo, but appears as a well- 
established truth, and the terms e/dos and id¢a begin to be 
used currently to denote ideas, along with the familiar 

ie] 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: REPUBLIC V—VII 


that 

B. V_VII 
have been 
inserted 
later at 
that 
point, 
though 
they he- 
longed to 
the plan 
of the 
whole. 


The rule * 
of philo- | 
sophers an 
essential - 
condition 
of the 
Platonic 
Republic. 


Theory of 
ideas 
appears 
to be 


familiar, 
and the 
terms 
eidos and 
idéa are 
freely 
used. 
Probable 
reference 
to the 
Phaedo 
and Sym- 
posvum 
compared 
with a 
similar 
allusion 
in the 
Phaedo to 
earlier ex- 
position. 


No fixity 
of ter- 
minology. 
Frequent 
use of 
meta- 
phors. 


292 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


terms avTo cal’ avto, Or avto, or 6 goTw. We have here 
an idea of beauty (479 A: id¢av twa avTod KadddXovs), of 
each Being (486 D: tod dvtos id¢av éxdotov), of justice 
(479 E: adro 70 dixacov), of injustice (476 A), of the good 
(505 A, 517 B, 534.0: tod ayabod idégav), and of all other 
general notions. These ideas remain always the same 
(479 E: agi Kata Ta’Ta WcavTos dvTa, repeated 484 B), and 
each of them is the unity of many particulars (507 B: 
avTo 6) Kadov Kal av’TO Gyabov Kat OUT TEpl TaVYT@Y, & TOTE 
@s TOMA éTiOEmEv, TAALY ad KaT’ Ldzav play ExadoTOU ws pas 
ovons TiOerTEs, 0 zoTW ExacToY Tpocayopevomev). This is 
here stated to have been already frequently repeated 
(507 A: ta 7 éy Tots Ewrpocbev pnOévta Kai ddroTE HON 
ToAnXakis eipnueva). Such a reference to the theory of 
ideas as familiar to Socrates can only allude to the Sym- 
posium and Phaedo, and is more explicit than the famous 
designation of the ideas in the Phaedo as ta todvOptrAnTa 
(100 B), which has appeared to some critics a reason for 
placing the Phaedo after the Phaedrus and Republic. In 
the Phaedo the mention ‘& Opvdrvduev ae’ (76 D) does not 
even necessarily refer to the theory of ideas, but only 
to the notions of the beautiful, the good, &c.: ‘if the 
beautiful, the good, and all similar attributes, about which 
we are always talking, have real existence,’ not: ‘if, as 
we are always repeating, the good, &c., have real existence.’ 
In the same way ‘ta moAv@pvdnta’ (100 B) may refer 
to moral ideas generally, and not to their transcendental 
existence as substances. But in Rep. V the theory of 
ideas is manifestly referred to. 

Moreover, no special stress is laid in the Republic on 
the separate and independent existence of ideas. The 
ideas are an object of thought (507 c: ras idgas vosiobai 
hapuev, opadcbat 6 ov). The relation of things to ideas is 
still described with the same terms (476 D: av’ro Kai Ta 
éxsivou wetéyovta) as in the Phaedo and Symposium, but 
how careless Plato was about the fixity of terms is evident 
if we consider that he speaks also of ‘seeing’ the idea of 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: REPUBLIC V—VII 293 


the beautiful (476 B: of 27 av’to 70 KadOv SuvuTol iévat TE 
Kal opav Ka@’ auto. . . omaviot av eiev). This is obviously 
a metaphor, which had been used also in the Symposiwm 
(210 E: xatoWetai te Oavpactov tiv divow Karov), and 
means that the intellectual intuition of ideas is quite as 
immediate and objective as the sight of visible things. 
This knowledge of ideas is even much clearer than the 
ordinary knowledge based on perception (511 c: cagéorepor 
TO UTO THS TOD StardéyecOar EriaTHUNS TOD dVTOS TE Kal VONTOD 
Gzwpovpevov . . ). Plato insists that the ideas are inde- 
pendent of the senses (532 A: ottw drav Tis TO Siadéyeo Oar 
emiyelph, avev Tacov TOV aidOnoewr Sia TOD NOYoU em avTO 
0 éotWw ExacToV Oppda, Kal fi) aTOCTH, Tply av avTO 0 zoTLY 
ayabov avth vonoe Ady, cf. 537 D), and it seems as if 
the senses no longer enjoyed even the merit of remember- 
ing ideas through the similarity of our perception to 
absolute notions. This marks a development in the 
direction of pure idealism beyond the Phaedo. The 
similarity between concrete things and the ideas, how- 
ever, continues to be maintained (476 C: 0 kxada per 
Tpaywata vouitwv, avTo d& KadXos pi) voulCwr TO 
Omorov T@ py Gmotov AX’ avTO iyhrat civar @ ZoLKeEV), aS 
the cause of errors, because every idea seems to be many, 
while it is really one (476.4: travtwv Tov eidav Trépt 0 adTos 
Aoyos, avTO pv Ev ExacTov civat, TH O62 TOV Tpakewr Kal 
cwpdTwy Kal adAn\wv KoWwvia TavTaxyod pavtaloueva 
TOANA haivecOat Exactov). The power or faculty of 
knowing the ideas as they are is here presented under 
different names, as yvoun (476 D), yvaous (478 ©, also 
508 E), émriustnun (478 A), vonows (532 B, 511 E), vods 
(511 D), Tod dtaréyeoOar ddvauis (511 B). 

This variety of vocabulary need not awaken suspicion 
as to the perfect unity of thought in the theory. It was 
Plato’s usual manner in that time, to use many names for 
his new ideas, and he blamed those who stick to names 
(4544: kar’ avtToO TO dvoma SiwKEew Tod REyOévTOS THY 
évavTiwowv) as eristics, unable to classify notions accord- 








Know- 
ledge of 
ideas 
clearer 
than ex- 
perience 


Similarity 
between 
things and 
ideas a 
cause of 
errors. 
Power of 
knowing 
ideas has 
different 
names. 


Variety of 
vocabu- 
lary a 
result of 
Plato’s 
position 
with 


regard to 
language. 


Sub- 
division 
of intel- 
lectual 
faculties. 
Intuition 
of ideas 
the 
highest 
faculty ; 

it depends 
on the 
idea of 
the Good. 


Idea of 
the Good 
identical 
with final 
cause 

of the 
Phaedo. 
Plato 
shows 
only the 
way lead- 
ing to it. 


In order 
to under- 


294 - ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


ing to natural species (454.4: 82a TO pr) Sivacbat Kat’ eid 
Svatpovperor TO Aeyduevoy éticxoTeiv) and therefore using 
the art of contradiction (4544: 7 dvvapis THs avtiAoyiKAs 
Téyvns) inferior to true logic. 

Apart from the diversity of names it is evident that 
Plato has progressed since his first attempt ata classifica- 
tion of psychical acts, and that the reason (NoysoteKov) of 
B. IV is now subdivided into several distinct faculties 
(Suvdpecs 477 c, cf. 443 B, 518 c) among which the highest 
is the science or vision of ideas, or of true Being (ro év 
mavteros 477 A, etXixpives, ibidem, ovoia 525 B, 534 A, &e.). 
This knowledge is infallible (4775: dvapaptytov), and is 
no longer as in the Phaedo based upon an ultimate hypo- 


’ thesis as the most probable truth, but upon a principle 


above every doubt (510 B: dpyjy avuTroberor, cf. 511 B: péype 
Tov avuTroOétou éri THY Tov TavTOs apyny, Cf. 533 C, 534 B). 
The knowledge of this principle is not an inference, but 
an intuition, and Plato constantly uses metaphorical 
expressions taken from the senses of sight and touch to 
denote the immediate character of his highest knowledge 
(iSetv 511 A, 533.0, GartecOar 511 B, WuyxAs dupa 533 D, 
opav 476 B, OzdoOat 518 ©, &e.). 

The principle itself, being the foundation of all this 
highest science, is the idea of the Good (} tod dyaOod idéza 
péyvotoy wana 505 A), identical with that Sapovia icyds 
mentioned in the Phaedo (99 c) and there held to be beyond 
the reach of mankind (Phaedo 99 CD: tavrtns zotepnOnv 
Kal oT avTos evpEiv ovTE Tap aAdov pabety olds TE eyevomnr). 
Now Plato has found it, but he feels unable to show it to 
his readers (533 A: ovKér’ oids 7 oe axodovbeiv) otherwise 
than by indicating the method of training, which leads to 
the evolution of the dialectical faculty. He says enough 
about his idea of Good to enable modern readers, who have 
gone through the prescribed training, and are familiar 
with abstraction, to distinguish what has been said meta- 
phorically from the abstract meaning of his thoughts. 

If we wish to understand Plato’s idea of the Good, we 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: REPUBLIC V—VII 295 


must bear in mind that mythical falsehoods have an edu- 
cational value (882 c), and that he was carried off by the 
novelty and the sublime beauty of his subject into some 
exaggerations, which he confesses clearly towards the end 
of the whole logical digression (5360: éreda@opny Ore 
erraitousv, Kal paddov évTewdpevos eitrov. héywv yap dua 
ZBreva pos girocodiavy, Kai idwv TpoTnaKiopEevny 
avatios, ayavakthnsas por S0xK Kal doTep Ovpwlsis Tots 
aitiows orrovdaioTepov eimeiv & eirov). In his indignation 
at the degraded condition of philosophy, Plato exalted her 
power and dignity. He does not add, in what particulars 
this exaggeration was contained, because the trifling 
correction introduced by this strange confession, namely 
the question of the most convenient age for dialectical 
studies, would not justify his apology. 

One property, at least, attributed to the idea of Good 
cannot be taken literally.2% Plato says the idea of Good 
exceeds even Being itself in power and dignity (5098: 
ovK ovolas bvTos TOU dyaBod, aX Ett eréKELVA THs OVTlas 
mpecBela Kal Suvaper vrepéyovtos) and is the first cause of 
all Being as well as of all knowledge and truth (50828: 
aitiav & érvotipns ovcay Kai adnOeias Ms yryvwoKopEVnS . . 
cf. 509 B). Having thus brought the expectation of his 
hearers to the highest point, he not only refuses any 
explanation of the dialectic power which perceives the 
idea of Good (533 A) but declines even to insist that his 
view of it is correct (533 A: odKér’ dEvov Toit Susyv- 
pifecbar, cf. Phaedo 114 Dp). Here he employs much 
rhetorical artifice with the aim of inducing his readers 
to attempt the long and tedious training which according 
to his indications leads to this vision of overwhelming 
Beauty, the idea of Good. But this idea of Good in 
the Republic, with all its briliancy and grandeur, cannot 
be anything else than the final cause depicted in more 


229 See Paul Shorey, ‘ The idea of Good in Plato’s Republic: a study in the 
Logic of Speculative Ethics,’ in vol. i. pp. 188-239 of the Studies im Classical 
Philology of the University of Chicago, Chicago 1895. 


stand it 
we must 
distin- 
guish 
mythical 
repre- 
sentation 
from 
reasoning. 


Exaggera- 
tion in- 
evitable 
and con- 
fessed. 


The idea 
of the 
Good 
above 
Being, as 
the cause 
of Being 


- and know- 


ledge. 


Nearer ex- 
planation 
declined. 


Some 
rhetorical] 
artifice 
used with 
an edu- 
cational 
aim. 


Ideas if 
placed 
above 
Being 
could not 
have a 
separate 
existence. 


Truth 
sought in 
thought 
rather 
than in 
reality. 


Condi- 
tions of 
philo- 
sophical 
training. 


Love of all 
knowledge 
not of 
sights or 
sounds. 


296 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


sober language in the Phaedo. ‘That it is raised above 
all hypotheses as an unconditioned principle means only 
that since the time when he wrote the Phaedo Plato had 
grown so much accustomed to his highest hypothesis that 
it has lost for him every hypothetical character. It had 
also become more substantial through intimate association 
with the practical aspirations which now absorbed him. 
At the same time, if he placed the idea of Good beyond 
Being, he made a very decisive step towards a return from 
the conception of the separate and independent existence 
of ideas. An idea as a necessary notion of every possible 
conscious mind is not a substance, and yet limits and 
shapes the existence of substances. We have no sufficient 
evidence for saying that Plato when he wrote the Re- 
public had fully realised this truth, but if he did so, he 
had no need to change anything in his revelations about 
the idea of Good and the other ideas. His doctrine 
that truth is rather to be found in thought than in actual 
hfe (473 A: gvow tye tpakw rNéEews Hrtov adrnOsias epar- 
tecOa, Kav 2 py Tm Soxet) 1s a sign that he went still 
farther away from his starting point referred to in the 
Phaedo, that thought is an image of Being. 

The conditions for an actual development of the 
faculty by which we see the idea of Good are depicted 
with glowing eloquence. Not everybody is able to follow 
the path, even if he has a leader (479 HE: rods avro To 
KanNov 1) Op@vTas, Nd AdXA@ er’ a’TO ayovTL SUVapéevouUsS 
Emecbar...d0Eaferv dyoouev). - A philosopher is born, 
and when born, he must also be made and have a strong 
will to develope his innate power (518 c). He has a 
golden nature (415 A), and loves wisdom and knowledge 
above everything (475 B: tov dirdcodov codias dycomev 
eruOuuntiy eivat, ov THs mev, THS & ov, a\AA Taons—cl. 
376 B: TO ye diropabés Kali dirocodoy tavtov, also Phaedo 
82.c girouabys is parallel to d:Nocodycas) ; he is insatiable 
of every kind of knowledge (475 c). Therein he is 
opposed to the sight-lover and others who care only for 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: REPUBLIC V—VII 297 


concrete things (476 B). A philosopher betrays already 
in his childhood the greatest love of justice (486 B: 
Wuyi cxorav diiocodoy Kal yr) evOvs véov dvtos emicKkeet, 
ei dpa dixala Te Ka) tuepos 7) SvoKowvwvnTos Kat aypia), an 
excellent memory, a great facility of learning, he is 
generous, kind, truthful, courageous, and temperate 
(487 A: gvoe pyywov, evuabys, peyadorpeTns, evyapis, 
giros te kal Evyyeris adgnbeias, Suxacocvyns, avopéelas, 
owppoovrvns). From his youth upwards he loves truth 
beyond everything (485 D: tov TO drtTe hirowabh waons 
annGeias det evOds ex véov 6 TL wardiota opéyecOar). He 
grows accustomed to consider the whole of the universe 
in his meditations (486 A: wuy} pweddovon Tod bdov cal 
mavTos ast étropeEscbat Gelov Kat avOpwrivov), which reach 
far beyond the lhmits of his own time and include the 
totality of Being (486 A: % trdpye diavola peyado- 
mpéTreva Kal Oewplia TavTos piv xXpdvov, Taons O= ovClas, 
otov Te oles TovT@ péya TL Soxeiy sivac Tov avOpwtivoy 
Btov ;) whereby human life appears insignificant, and 
death loses all its terrors (4868). Through all ephemeral 
appearances he perceives a substance free from changes 
(485 B: éxeivns THs ovalas THs ast ovons Kal wn TAAVOLMEVNS 
Uo yevécews Kal dbopas . . Kal Taons avThs) and 
neglects no manifestation of eternal Being, having an 
open eye for the smallest detail as well as for the whole. 
His faculty by which he sees the ideas (479 E: av’ta 
ExaoTa Kal aél KaTa TaVTA @oa’Tws dvTa) does not impair 
in any way the exercise of all virtues and the capacity for 
acquiring practical experience (484 D: éurreipia pndev 
éxsivwv EXAElTovTas und ev GrAXRW pundevl péepEL apETHs 
VoTEpovyTas). 

This image of the philosopher is made still more 
attractive by the contrast to the merely practical ordinary 
man (476 A) who esteems vulgar opinions (480 4), 
ignoring the certitude of science. He is dreaming, 
because he is unable to distinguish concrete things from 
the ideas, being deceived by their similarity (476 A, cf. 


Early de- 
velopment 
of moral 
qualities. 
Good 
memory, 
facility of 
learning. 
Philo- 
sophers 
possess all 
virtues. 
Contempt 
for the 
limita- 
tions of 
human 
life, which 
appears to 
be insigni- 
ficant, as 
compared 
with the 
total 
existence 
of the 
universe. 


Philo- 
sopher 
contrasted 
with the 
practical 
man who 
has only 


blind 
opinions. 


Idea of 
the Good 
the clear- 
est in all 
existence, 
compared 
with the 
sun as the 
brightest 
object of 
sight. 
Reason 
and truth 
produced 
by the 
philo- 
sopher. 


Highest 
level of 
knowledge 
attainable 
through 
highest 
training. 
Mathe- 
matical 
training 
required 
from the 


298 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


534 c). Plato calls such would-be practical persons 
blind (484 c: 4 oby Soxovel Te tuPrAGY Svahépew of TH dvTe 
TOU OVTOS EKdaTOU eo TEPHEvoL THS yvOoews ; Cf. 506 C), their 
opinions are sophisms (496 A), and if they hit the truth 
by accident they do it like a blind man following the 
right road (506 c). 

The power of the philosopher (511 B: 7 tod dua- 
AZyeo Oar Stvauts) 18 directed towards the idea of the Good 
which is the clearest idea in existence (518 6D: tod évTos 
TO davotatov . . . sivai hapev tayabov). Whatever else 
Plato says about the idea of Good, as cause of truth, 
reason, and Bemg (517 C: ayadod idéa ... adnevav Kai 
vobv Tapacyopern ... 509B: Kal TO sival Te Kal THY OVolav 
um’ éxelvou avtots mpoceivat), does not exclude the idea of 
Good from the system of ideas. Something is sacrificed 
to the defective comparison of the good with the sun, 
the light with truth (508 a—509 pb). Plato had himself 
admitted, in agreement with the common psychological 
experience, that truth and reason are a product of the 
philosopher’s own activity (490 B: ove évTws dudopabys, . . . 
yevynoas vodv Kal adAXnOELav, yvoly Te Kal adnOas 
Con), and if afterwards for the purpose of drawing a 
parallel between the material and intellectual world he 
attributes truth to a power independent of the individual 
mind, this must be counted among the exaggerations 
into which he was led by the greatness of the subject. 

In the whole Platonic doctrine of the ideal philosopher 
there is a permanent truth embodied: that the highest 
level of objective knowledge can be reached only by the 
highest subjective training of the best individuals. Looked 
at from this point of view, Plato’s indications as to this 
special training deserve the attention of the logician, and 
belong really to the logic of Plato. 

The way of initiation proceeds no longer, as in 
the Symposium, through esthetical contemplation, but 
is prepared, as in the Phaedo, by a course of mathe- 
matical propaedeutics. The power of mathematical 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: REPUBLIC V—VII 299 


studies in developing abstract thought is illustrated by 
two fresh examples, taken one from arithmetic and the 
other from geometry. The identity of units, which is 
fundamental in arithmetical inquiries, does not exist in 
our sensual experience, where each unit is different from 
every other. This identity can only be understood by the 
action of thought (526 A: dpiOuev ev ois TO 8v toov TE 
ExaoTov Tay Tavtl Kal ode TuLiKpoY Siapzpov, popLov Te ZyoV 
év £auT@ ovdev . . . StavonOHvat povov éyywpel, ddrws & 
ovdauas petayerpifecbar dvvatov). We owe it to the clear- 
ness of numbers that we distinguish things which to our 
senses appear confused (524 C: péeya puny Kai dus Kat 
OuiKpov s@pa . . . ovyKexumévoy TL. dia OF THY TOUTOU 
cadyveay péya av Kai cpiKpov 7) VONa LS HvayKaoln Loin, 
ov TUYyKEXUMEVA AXA SLwpLapéeva, ToLvayTion 7) ’KEiVN). 
This difference between numerical exactness and the 
inexactness of sense perception is the origin of rational 
inquiry about the nature of quantity (524 c: évredddv 
moley mp@tov éemrépyetar épéoOar Huiv, 71 ody ToT’ éoTl TO 
péya av Kal TO cutxpov). A similar difference exists be- 
tween the material models of geometrical figures and the 
ideal figures which they represent. Even Daidalos or 
another most skilful technical genius could never draw 
or form figures corresponding to our ideal notion of them 
(529 £), and it would be ridiculous to make geometrical 
inferences or to endeavour to learn the truth about geo- 
metrical properties of figures from such models, and not 
from the models of ideal figures that exist only in our 
thought, surpassing in exactness everything visible to the 
eye. On these examples Plato shows that mathematical 
studies lead from ever-changing perceptions to the true 
substance of Being (521 D: paOnua Woyijs odkKov aro Tod 
yeyvouéevov émt To ov), from the twilight of vulgar experi- 
ence to the daylight of philosophy (521 c: 2« vuxrepuvijs 
TLVOS NpEpas els anOwihy Tod dvTos ovcay éravoooV, HV 61) 
girocopiay adynOh} dyoowev eivac). But the philosopher 
will not content himself’with such a knowledge of mathe- 


philo- 
sopher. 
Mathema- 
tical units 
differ 
widely 
from the 
units of 
sense ex- 
perience. 


Difference 
between 
ideal geo- 
metrical 
figures 
and their 
material 
represen- 
tation. 


Study of 
mathe- 
matics 


for philo- 
sophical 
training 
indepen- 
dently of 
practical 


considera- 


tions. 


Solid 
geometry 
recom- 
mended. 


Astro- 
nomy not 
limited to 
observa- 
tion of 
the stars. 


Striking 
antici- 
pations 
of the 
modern 
progress 
of astro- 
nomy. 


300 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


matics as is useful for a practical man; his immediate 
alm is not any practical application, but theoretical 
knowledge (525 B). He will push his investigations far 
enough to understand the nature of quantity, without 
caring for practical advantages (525 c: &ws dav émt Oéav 
THs TOV apiouayv hicews abixwvtat TH VoHTEL AUTH, OVK WITS 
ovo Tpacews Yap, GAN Evexa avThs THs Wuyhs pactwvys TE 
MeTaoTpophs amo yevéocws ém’ adjlevay Te Kal OVTlay...). 
Such theoretical studies develope an organ of the soul 
more valuable than a thousand eyes, because it is the 
only eye which beholds truth (527 D E: év tovTo.s Tots 
pabipuacw sxactov dpyavov TL vpuxyns exxkabaipetar . 
KpgsitTov ov owOivar pupiov oupaTay* pove yap avT@ 
adnGeva opata). Plato complains that solid geometry 
was in his times very much behind plane geometry, and 
believes that it is in the power of the state to further 
such inquiries by honouring them as they deserve (528 B). 
He recommends also astronomy to the future philosopher, 
but adds that a philosophical astronomer will not expect 
very much from mere observation of the stars. He will 
use the sight of the stars just as a mathematician uses 
roughly drawn figures with aview to the discovery of general 
laws. 

Plato shows here a deep insight into the logical 
nature of theoretical knowledge. His very words can be 
applied even to-day to investigations about the possibility 
of which he could not have a definite idea. When he 
says that through all the apparent movements the astro- 
nomer should reach the true velocity and the true orbits 
and movements of heavenly bodies, and that this can be 
done only by thought, not by sight (529 b), the modern 
reader involuntarily remembers how Adams and Leverrier 
discovered Neptune without the use of a telescope, by 
following out purely theoretical considerations. When 
Plato further decides a priori that the movements of the 
stars must undergo periodical changes and cannot remain 
always the same (530 B: drorov iyjoetae Tov vouifovta 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: REPUBLIC V—VII 301 


yiyvecOai Te Tat’ta asl @oavTws Kai ovdauy ovd3v Tapad- 
AaTTEWV, TOA TE ZyovTA Kai Op@psva), this appears a still 
more striking example of true physical knowledge acquired 
by pure thought. 

But our illusion is destroyed when we read that the 
details of the movements of the stars are not worth 
careful search, precisely because they undergo changes. 
Here the whole distance between Plato’s logic and the 
modern logic becomes evident. For Plato science could 
only refer to knowledge, while we have learnt to deal 
scientifically with probabilities. Plato was_ perfectly 
right in holding that absolutely exact knowledge is 
impossible in astronomy and every other  investi- 
gation of nature. But he was wrong in supposing that 
therefore these subjects cannot be dealt with scienti- 
fically. The whole natural science of to-day, though few 
persons are always aware of it, is a science of approxi- 
mations and probabilities. We have learnt to estimate 
the possible amount of our errors, and to reduce them to 
units of such low degree that we can neglect them. We 
owe this power chiefly to the infinitesimal calculus, 
which marks the essential advance of science from Plato’s 
days to the present epoch of scientific progress. Plato 
had no instrument for such evaluations, and he therefore 
could not admit an exact knowledge of astronomy. He 
went so far as to say that looking up at the stars not only 
does not exalt the soul, but does not even teach us any- 
thing, because the soul rises upwards only through 
inquiries about invisible Being (529 B: od dvvayar ddXo TH 
vopicat dvw Towiv Wuynv Prérew wabnwa 7) éexeivo, 6 av 
Tepl TO OV TE KAL TO AOpaTor). 

The eyes must in no way be esteemed above reason, 
nor the ears, and Plato despises equally those who believe 
in learning music by hearing tones and distinguishing 
them as sharp and flat (531 4). The true theory of music 
has higher problems to resolve, and studies the harmony of 
numbers and its reason (5310: émicxoreiv tives Evypdwvor 


Contempt 
for actual 
observa- 
tion 
carried 
very far, 
because 
Plato was 
not aware 
of the pos- 
sibility of 
a scientific 
investiga- 
tion of 
probabili- 
ties. This 
became 
possible 
only 
through 
the infi- 
nitesimal 
calculus. 


Only 
rational 
inquiry 
belongs to 
science 
for Plato. 


Even 
music not 
studied on 


tones. 


Every 
particular 
science 
useful 
only as 
introduc- 
tory to 
dialectic. 


First prin- 
ciples 
must be 
best 
known, 
and this is 
the pr vi- 
lege of 
dialectic. 
The dia- 
lectician 
is able to 
give the 
ultimate 
reasons of 
his convie- 
tions, and 
refers all 
hypo- 
theses 

to their 
source, 
distrust- 
ing the 
testimony 
of the 
senses. 
General 
system of 


302 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


apiOwot Kai tives ov, Kai va ti sxatepor). Such higher 
music and higher astronomy, making use of the stars and 
of sound-harmonies only as matter for generalisations 
which show the unity of the whole, are recommended by 
Plato as useful in the preparatory training of a philo- 
sopher (531 D). But even such studies are only intro- 
ductory to dialectic. Mathematicians, astronomers, 
musicians are only dreaming about true Being; so long 
as they rely on hypotheses, without being able to give 
reasons for them, their studies do not deserve the name 
of true science (5330: dveypéttovor piv wept TO dv, Uap 
O& GdvvaTov avtais tOsiv). 

A true science cannot be based on unknown or un- 
knowable first principles (533: @ yap apy mév 0 un ote, 
TeNeuTH 62 Kal Ta peTaev gE ov pt) olde GOUpIémAEKTAaL, Tis 
UNXavy THY TOLAUTHY Omoroylay ToTe eTLaTHuny yevecPaL ;). 
Such apparent sciences rest on mutual agreement, while 
only Dialectic rises above all hypothetical beginnings 
(5330 D:  duarextixn we0odos ovn TavTH TopEeveTal, Tas 
iTobécets avatpodoa, én’ avTnv THY apynv, wa BeBatoontat) 
up to the absolute principle to which it gives the highest 
stability. The dialectician seeks the substance of each 
thing (534B: dvaNextixov Kanrels Tov oyou éxdoTOU Aap- 
Bavovta Ths ovactas) and conceives himself to know some- 
thing only in so far as he is able to give reasons for it 
(5384B: tov ma) eyovta, Kal’ boov av my ExN Oyo avT@ TE 
Kal ddAdw Oiddvat, KaTA TOTODTOY VodV TEpl TOUTOV ov dycELS 
gyew). Dialectic, then, or as we should now term it, 
metaphysic, is at the summit of all other sciences 
(5348). This summit is reached through the ability of 
asking questions and answering them (531 8, 534D), and 
through using the hypotheses with a full consciousness of 
their hypothetical character, until the highest principle is 
found, without any reliance on the testimony of the senses - 
(511 Bc). Plato had then already conceived a general 
system of human knowledge, including all sciences and 
uniting them into one whole (537 C: ta te yvonv waOjpara 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: REPUBLIC V—VII 303 
. TVVAKTEOY sis TVVOYpWW OiKELOTHTOS GAA@V TOV wabn- 
Only those who are 
able to perceive the unity of things are dialecticians 
(537 GC: 0 cuvoTTiKos StadEKTLKOS). 

This picture of the subjective training, which is in- 
dispensable if the highest objective knowledge is to be 
attained, betrays a point of view far more advanced than 
the Symposium, in which the subjective training was also 
recognised as indispensable, but started not from reason 
but from esthetical and ethical experience. Though in 
the Phaedo the importance of mathematics was already 
accepted, and one highest principle alluded to, we see 
here a greater certainty manifested as to this highest 
principle. We find the philosopher enraptured over his 
discovery ; it was Plato’s own discovery that all the 
details of existence can be brought into relation to one 
final cause of the universe. His great predecessor Par- 
menides had only recognised the unity of the whole, and 
declared the ‘many’ an illusion. Plato was the first to 
bridge over that abyss between the one and the many, 
and his metaphysical discovery is one that has never 
since been refuted. 

Plato’s conception of one final aim of the universe, 
of the connection between the highest idea and the 
most minute particulars even of sensible experience, 
remains unchanged after a long progress of particu- 
lar sciences and of philosophy. This conception he 
caught sight of in the Symposium, declared it beyond his 
understanding in the Phaedo, and affirmed confidently 
its existence in the Republic, though he still declined to 
explain it fully (506 D, 533 a), alleging as one reason that 
Socrates is unable to give that full explanation, and as 
another that Glaucon is not yet sufficiently prepared to 
understand it. But enough is said to enable the modern 
reader to see that Plato was in full possession of his 
highest principle when he wrote his Republic. He called 
it a model contained in the soul (484c: évapyés ev 77 


a r / 
MaTwY Kal THS TOD dvTOs PicEws). 


knowledge 
based on 
pure 
thought. 


Subjective 
training 
of the 
dialec- 
tician 
beginning 
with 
mathe- 
matics 
and lead- 
ing to the 
conception 
of the 
final 
cause of 
the 
universe. 


This con- 
ception 
is a dis- 
covery of 
Plato 
remain- 
ing in all 
later 
philo- 
sophy. 


Greatest 
exactness 


in the 
highest 
geneyrali- 
sation. 


Compari- 
son of 
the idea 
of the 
Good with 
the sun, 
and of 
the earth 
with a 
cave. 
Explana- 
tion why 
the philo- 
sopher is 
liable to 
err in 
practical 
life, 
though 
he has 

a higher 
knowledge 
of Being. 


304 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


uy Tapaderyya), and he required the greatest exactness 
in the highest generalisations of science (504D E: yeXotov 

. TOV peyioTay wn meyloTtas akvoby civat Kal Tas axpl- 
Betas). 

Two allegories used by Plato in the Republic to 
illustrate his thoughts are deservedly famous. The 
comparison between the sun and the idea of Good is 
deficient and contradictory, as truth, according to Plato’s 
own acknowledgment, comes not to us from without lke 
the light of day. But the other allegory in which this 
world is represented as similar to a cave (514-518) is one © 
of the most beautiful and consistent answers of a 
philosopher to practical people who deride philosophy as 
useless. Plato here explains why the philosopher, accus- 
tomed to the most difficult problems of Being, appears at 
first sight lable to error in practical hfe, and how he, 
better than the merely practical man, very soon acquires 
a certainty in action impossible for those who know only 
practical life and have never measured the depth of the 
world of thought. Nearly every image in the allegory of 
the cave has a deep meaning. We spend our life in 
chains, being limited in the possibility of our movements, 
and prevented by our situation from knowing the truth. 
Those who succeed in liberating themselves from the 
chains of earthly passion and human ignorance, and 
explore a world much wider than the cave in which the 
others are living, have laid on them, according to Plato, 
the duty of returning among their former companions 
in misfortune and of instructing them so as to set free 
as many as possible. They will not be believed at first, 
and people will laugh at their tales about the beauties of 
the upper world, and they will sometimes commit slight 
errors about objects seen in the cave, which are like 
shadows of the realities above. Their sight, after long 
dwelling in full daylight, requires some time to get accus- 
tomed to the darkness of the cave, in order to distinguish 
the shadows, which to the prisoners appear to be the 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: REPUBLIC V—VII 305 
highest realities. But once accustomed, the philosopher 
will judge more correctly than others, even about those 
shadows, because he knows the realities which produce 
them, and he has seen the sun of Truth, which does not 
shine in the cave. This beautiful allegory need not 
be repeated in all its details, as it may be assumed to be 
familiar to our readers. It has a very great logical 
importance, as it shows that for Plato at that time 
sensible experience was the shadow of the ideas. This 
is also the only hint which the Republic contains that the 
ideas might be independent of the human mind and indeed 
of any existing consciousness. In many passages, as we 
have seen, the ideas are spoken of as existing in the 
philosopher’s soul and even as a product of the activity 
of his thought. It seems that Plato no longer attached 
such importance to their separate existence, and that 
he had to a certain extent reconciled himself to the 
identity of ideas with general notions. 

The theory of ideas and of the dialectical faculty 
occupies the largest place in this part of the Republic, 
while the remaining .intellectual faculties are briefly 
disposed of. The second rank is taken by the mathe- 
matical knowledge termed here dsavora (534 A). The 
difference between this faculty and dialectical knowledge 
consists in the use of hypotheses (510 B), which re- 
main untouched by the mathematician. As such hypo- 
theses Plato quotes arithmetical properties of numbers 
and geometrical properties of figures, which are ad- 
mitted to be the ultimate foundations of mathematical 
science (510 c). 

Both dvdvora and zavetHyn are called in one passage 
vonois and opposed to the inferior faculty of opinion 
(Sofa 534 A), which is again subdivided into riotis 
referring to things and «ixacia to images (511 &). It 
seems that this division, mentioned here only and never 
again used by Plato, had a purely occasional character 
and served the purpose of an elaborate parallelism 

x 


Once ac- 
customed 
to. the 
darkness 
of the » 
cave, the 
philo- 
sopher 
begins to 
distin- 
guish 
even ap- 
pearances 
better 
than those 
who never 
saw the 
light of 
truth. 


Mathe- 
matical 
knowledge 
has the 
second 
rank as 
compared 
with dia- 
lectic. 


Sub- 
division 
of intel- 
lectual 
faculties 
irrelevant. 
It was in- 
troduced 


for the 
sake of 
analogy. 
Not main- 
tained 
consis- 
tently. 


Also sub- 
division 
of opinion 
into two 
different 
faculties 
has no 
import- 
ance. 


306 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


between the sense of sight and the intuition of the-soul. 
To correspond to the difference between things and 
images a division of ideas was wanted, and the mathe- 
matical figures best corresponded within the ideal world 
to the images of the physical world. So far the analogy 
was plausible, but the subdivision of the two chief 
faculties of opinion and science into four was not justified 
and is frequently contradicted by Plato in the same 
text, as he uses Ssdvoia, vonous, ériotnun and dvadexTLKy 
Svvayts indifferently one for another. Even in the sixth 
and seventh books the distinction is by no means con- 
sistently followed, and in some passages (500 B: 7 
yz Os GANVHSs Tpos Tots ovat THY Siayoray ExovTi—H11 A: 
fnroiyrés TE avta ékeiva idciy A ovx dv ddros idor Tis 7) TH 
dcavola— 529 D: TO dv Tayos .... & On ACY pev Kal Siavola 
AnwTa, des 8 ov) Suavota Means pure thought, and not the 
special faculty of mathematical knowledge which had 
been named Savoia (511 D: b:dvorav Kadety pot Soxets THY 
TOV yewpeTplKO” ... EELy). 

Equally irrelevant is the subdivision of opinion (é6£a) 
into an opinion about things (mots 511 E, 534 a), and 
an opinion about images (eacia 511 EB, 534 a). This 
division is of no importance and proves only Plato’s 
fondness for symmetrical dichotomies.“° He never again 
alludes to these distinctions, and the old bipartition of 
intellectual activity into opinion and knowledge remains 
here as in all other works of Plato fundamental. 
Opinion is intermediate between ignorance and know- 
ledge (477 B, cf. 478 D), and it refers to what in one 
respect 1s being and in another not-being, and appears as 
intermediate between substance and nothing (478 D: 
olov dua Ov TE Kal [2 OV). 

230 Tt has been attempted to find a relation between the four intellectual 
faculties of the Republic and the degrees of perfection in the Symposiwm 
(Carl Boetticher, ‘Eros und Erkenntniss bei Plato in ihrer gegenseitigen 
Foérderung und Ergiinzung,’ Jahresbericht des Luisenstdidtischen Gymna- 


siums zu Berlin, Ostern 1894), but the exposition is by no means con- 
vincing. 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: REPUBLIC V—VII 30 


For the first time Plato here investigates the object of 
opinion as differing both from the object of knowledge and 
from that of ignorance. While the ideas are the proper 
object of science, they are not accessible to opinion, and 
Plato defines with great logical acuteness what is sus- 
ceptible of opinion. It is anything that could be other- 
wise than it is (479 A). Wesee here clearly established the 
difference between accident and substance, opinion and 
science. This very important logical theory was prepared 
by the law of contradiction, stated in the Phaedo, where 
Plato observed that apparent contradictions are found in 
things but notin ideas (Phaedo 1038). But neither in the 
Phaedo nor in any earlier work had the difference between 
the object of science and that of opinion been recognised. 

It is interesting to observe that Plato employs this 
distinction between accident and substance to justify his 
conviction of the mental equality between the sexes, 
wherein he was so much in advance of his own times, and 
even of the reigning prejudice of our own century. It is 
one of the deepest thoughts in Plato’s Republic, that the 
sexual difference is accidental and exterior as compared 
with individual intellectual differences among men as 
well as women (454 B-455 a). And this thought is one 
of the most interesting practical applications of Plato’s 
logic. Plato thus proclaimed the truth that thought is 
independent even of such fundamental bodily conditions 
as the difference of sex. Many times later philosophers 
have been drawn by the strength of appearance to credit 
organs of our body with pure thought, and thus to 
destroy the soul’s independence and permanence. Plato 
had within his limited experience many inducements to 
admit the popular belief that some part of the body is 
active in thought. He resisted this temptation and was 
the first to understand clearly and to affirm confidently 
that thought is an activity of the invisible, incorporeal 
soul, which does not need material organs for its exercise. 
That the body’s only aim is to supply us with sensations 

x2 


Object of 
opinion : 
everything 
that could 
be other- 
wise than 
it is. 


Recogni- 
tion of the 
mental 
equality 
between 
the sexes. 


Thought 
indepen- 
dent of 
the body, 
even of 
the most 
essential 
bodily con- 
ditions. 


Plato the 
first to 
under- 
stand that 
thought 
is an 
activity of 
the soul. 


Not-Being 
object of 
ignorance, 
which is 
identical 
with 
wrong 


opinion. 


Relation 
to the 
Phaedo 
in the 
conception 
of the 
ultimate 
aim of 
life, above 
pleasure 
and even 
know- 


ledge. 


308 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


and to act on the outward world according to our own 
will, is a truth which remains even to-day incredible to 
some physiologists unjustly called psychologists. This 
truth was discovered by Plato and constantly reaffirmed 
by him, from the Phaedo onwards to his latest works. 

A consequence of the doctrine that the objects of 
opinion and science are not the same Jed Plato to his 
theory about Not-Being or Nothing as the object of igno- 
rance. Ignorance is a state of the soul, and consists in 
believing what is not (478B: dévvatov Kal 6.Eucau 70 
pr) Ov... C: My Ovte piyy ayvoray 2& avayxns aredomer, 
évte 62 yuoow). Therein ignorance is distingwshed from 
mere opinion and coincides with ‘wrong opinion’ (é0&a 
vrevoijs) called also dua@ia by Plato (Prot. 358 c: duabiav 76 
ToLovde NEyEeTE, TO Wevdh Exe SdEav cat &pedoOar wept TOV 
Tpaypatov Tov Todd a&iwy, cl. Huthyd. 286 D, and also 
Theaet. 170 B, Polit. 309 a, Crat. 429D: todrTo éotw TO 
wrevdh dye, TO wi) TA Ova déyelv). Opinion as inter- 
mediate between ignorance and knowledge had been 
already mentioned in the Meno and Symposium (202 4: 
To opta So€dfew . . . tot TL peTaEd copias Kai aywabias) 
but then with the predicate of ‘nght’ which is dropped 
here, with an intention of exact terminology not after- 
wards maintained. 

In the above exposition of the logical theories con- 
tained in B. V—VII we had already occasion to see 
that Plato has here advanced beyond the stage of the 
Phaedo. But perhaps a more evident proof of this position 
is found in an ethical hint about the highest aims of hfe. 
It was a current theory of earlier dialogues that true 
happiness is the aim of each individual, and the tale of 
rewards and punishments after death was in agreement 
with this conception of the aims of life. Even in the first 
books of the Republic this was tacitly admitted, and in 
the ninth book Plato attempts to prove that the philo- 
sopher is happier than anybody else. Intellectual pleasure 
or knowledge (dpovnors Phaedo 76 c, 79 D) was the highest 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: REPUBLIC. V_VII 5309 


ideal of Plato before the Republic. Now he declares that 
. ‘he aim cannot be pleasure, nor even knowledge (505 Bc), 
ecause there are bad pleasures, and because the 
nowledge, if defined, will turn out to be the knowledge 
the good. The aim of life is higher than this, and must 
clearly known by the leader of men (505E: 6 61 donee 

' daca uy Kal TovTov veka TavTa TpdtTe). The 
ception of an aim of life above every kind of pleasure 

happiness, even above knowledge and wisdom (509 4), 

ew, and arises here as a consequence of the new 
k vledge of ideas and their hierarchy leading to the one 
highest principle of Being. 

Some hints show us Plato’s educational experience at 
the time when he wrote this part of the Republic. He 
says that the young must be taught through play (537 A: 
maitovtas Tpépe), and warns us that no teacher should 
treat his pupils as slaves (536 E: ovdé& pabnua peta 
dovreias Tov zdevPepov ypr pavOdvev ... Wuyn PBiavov 
ovdev Yupovoy waOnua) because knowledge is never durable 

_ifimposed by violence. Plato is so confident as to the 
power of youth that he credits the young with the greatest 
labours and undertakings (536 D: veéwy mavtes of weyadou 
Kal oi TroAXol rover), but he has already experienced the 
logical abuses of youth, which he complains of later in 
the dialectical dialogues. Young men are not serious in 
reasoning, and delight in contradictions, playing with the 
argument like young dogs with our clothes (539 B). Here 
again, asin the Phuedo, Plato sees the origin of scepticism 


in the abuse of reasoning : 

Phaedo 90 B: emeay tis mro- Rep. 539 BC: Grav moddovs pev 

2B ’ eee) - ma > ‘ » 7 Caan a 5 
Tevon Ady@ Tiwi adnOei eivac . .. avToi edéywow, rd ToAAY Je 
a” xy 74 LA > - , > cal , ‘ ‘ > 
kamretta OAlyov Votepov aita Sd&n édeyxOGor, opddpa kai trax ep- 
Wevdiys etvar . . . Kat addis Erepos minrovow eis TO pydev nyeicOa 
kal €repos . + . TeAevT@vTes olovrar vrep mporepov. 


. ovder vytes odde BESator. 


It is characteristic that this abuse was explained in a 
general and somewhat lengthy way in the Phaedo, while 


Traces of 
teaching 
activity. 


Judgment 
about 
youth. 
Logical 
abuse 
leading to 
scepti- 
cism. 


Plato’s 
view of 
youth. 


Simi- 
larity of 
the soul 
to the 
ideas. 


Relation 
to the 
Sym- 
posiumr 
illustrated 
by com- 
parisons. 


Progress 
beyond 
earlier 
dialogues. 


Milder 


view 


310 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


here it is briefly mentioned as well known (539B : otuau ce 
ov Ned Oevar) and attributed specially to the young, which 
confirms the impression that Plato was grown older, as in 
his latest works he frequently speaks of the inconsequence 
of youth (cf. Phil. 15 DB). Some minor coincidences 
between this part of the Republic and the earlier 
dialogues may be briefly mentioned. The affinity of the 
soul to the ideas, affirmed in the Phaedo, is here shortly 


referred to (490B: avtod 6 goTw éxdoTov THs pPioEews 


drpacbar © mpoonke ruyns ébamtecOat Tod ToLovToU" 
mpoonxel 52 Evryyevel), with the difference that according to 
the new division of faculties only a part of the soul is 
distinguished by this affinity. The metaphor Aryeuv 
@boivos, used in this passage to describe the suffering of a 
soul in search of the Truth, would be scarcely natural in 
this abridged and familiar form if the theory of intellectual 
fecundity in the Sympostwm were not assumed as known 
(Symposium 209 A). A similar allusion to the Symposium 
appears in the assertion of the fewness of those who are 
able to seek the idea of Beauty, and to follow when they 
are led to it: 

Symp. 210A: det rov 6pbas 


Je) - - 
iovra emt TovTo TO mpaypa . 


Rep.476c:6 ka\a pev tpaypata 
, > 4 ‘ , , 
voui(ov, avto be KaddXXAos pyre 
vopilov prte, av tis nynrau emt 
THY yvaow avtov, Suvvapevos érre- 


. > - c A r € / 
eav Op6as Hyntal 6 HyovpeEvos 
~ tA 
. KaTavongat oTt TO KaAXOS 
TO ETL OT@OVV THOpaTl TH ET ETEPO 


+ Ao cr ~ 
Oat, dvap 7 Urap Ooxket wot Cyv; 
, > , , 
oopate adeAdoyv ect... 


It would be useless to enumerate all such hints, which 
become convincing to anybody who reads the dialogues 
in the order now proposed. Only a boundless indiffer- 
ence to the philosophical contents of Plato’s works could 
allow the supposition that Plato wrote the Republic about 
the same time as the Huthydemus, while in every respect 
we find here a thought more mature, and a positive 
philosophy which was only a desideratum when he disputed 
with the Sophists. He now no longer appears so anxious 
about the bad influence of bad teachers generally, because 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: REPUBLIC VIII-IX 311 
he has found in the fundamental differences of human 
nature a deeper reason for the natural evolution of states 
as well as individuals. A weak mind is not capable 
either of great virtues or of great crimes (491 E: acoder 
8 vow peyddov ovTe ayabay ote KaK@v aitiav ToTE 
ZoecOa). He denies that the Sophists could have the 
power of perverting their pupils (492 4). The eloquent 
picture of the influence of impersonal public opinion on a 
young man (49280) reveals an author who is himself 
very much above these dangers, and no longer in the first 
stage of his activity. All this agrees perfectly with our 
supposition that Plato was approaching the age of fifty 
when he wrote about the future reign of philosophers 
over the world. 


Booxs VIII-IX 


A strange contrast to the preceding digression is 
formed by the two next books, which resume the con- 
tinuation of the fourth book broken off at the beginning 
of B. V, and except the recapitulation at the outset 
contain no direct allusion to B. V-VII. The contents of 
B. VIII-IX are chiefly political, and give a peculiar 
application of the classification of human faculties to the 
classification of states and the demonstration of the 
happiness of the philosopher. The philosopher has a 
better experience of the pleasures of other men than they 
can have of the pleasures of knowledge, and he alone is 
competent to compare different feelings and to judge 
which of them gives the most satisfaction. Thence it 
results that he must be believed when he affirms that the 
pleasure of knowledge is the highest of all human plea- 
sures (580 D-583 A). This demonstration, repeated after- 
wards by Aristotle (Hthica Nic. X. vii.), is here stated 
with a certain insistence, and might appear superfluous 
after what has been said in the seventh book on pleasure 
as utterly indifferent to the true aims of life. 

While in the preceding books only contempt is ex- 


of the 
Sophists. 


Influence 
of public 
opinion 
on youth. 


Classifi- 
cation of 
states. 
Happi- 
ness of 
philo- 
sopher 
demon- 
strated 
by his ex- 
perience 
and his 
compe- 
tency. 


True 
opinions 
more 
appre- 
ciated 
but 
always 
opposed 
to know- 
ledge. 


Ideas 
more truly 
existent 
than 
bodies 


and can 
be better 
known. 


B. VIUI- 
IX a con- 
tinuation 
of B. 
(DEIN 


In the 
tenth 


312 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 
pressed for mere opinion as opposed to science, here true 
opinion and science are placed together almost as if they 
were synonyms (585 cc). This shows not a difference 
of views, but a difference of exposition. The opposition 
of opinion and science was already so familiar to Plato 
when he wrote the Republic that he did not always insist 
upon it in his most popular writings, and the eighth and 
ninth books are from the nature of the subject-matter very 
much more popular than the sixth and seventh. The 
author's own aim was always pure and certain science 
which he valued above mere opinion; but he recognised 
the value of right opinion above ignorance, as he had 
done already in the Meno. In the same passage in which 
he puts right opinion along with science as opposed to 
sensuous gratification, he makes a direct and unmistakable 
allusion to the theory of ideas, and even to the special 
account of it given in the Phaedo: 


Phaedo 80 B: r@ Oei@ ai dbava- 
TOP kh aks 
cf 


- = / 
Rep. 585 c: ro rov det dpolov 
. > A c , A > ’ 4 , , 4 > , 
Kal Get W@oaUT@S KaTa  eExOpevoy Kal ABavaTov kai adnbeias 
> » a“ > 
TavTa €xovTe €aUT@ OpoLoratoy elvat 


Wexn 


> ¢ ee, , 
elvat@s olov Te padtoTa.. 


\ > col \ > , 
kal @UTO TOLOUTOY OY Kal Ev TOLOUT@ 
yryvopevon, 
doxet; 


~ n > 
... 77 At wavra ra Towtr’ paddAov etvai cor 


Another allusion to earlier expositions is the assertion that 
what continually changes is less susceptible of knowledge 
and truth than the eternal (585 D: ta mept tHy Tod 
awpatos Gepareiay yevn TOY yevOv av TOV TEpl THY THS 
wruyiis Oepareiay HT TOV adNHOEias Te Kal OVaLaS pETeyél). 

Generally this part of the Republic is not only formally 
but also in its philosophical contents a continuation of the 
fourth book, and seems not to refer in any way, unless 
perhaps at the end of B. IX, to the high metaphysical 


speculations of the immediately preceding sixth and 
seventh books. 


Book X 


This last part of the Republic is introduced at first as 
a supplement to the judgment on the poets proffered in 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: REPUBLIC X Le 


the second and third books. Plato seems to defend him- 
self against some polemical attacks on his severe criticism 
of poetry, and he gives a deeper justification of his con- 
tempt by a general definition of art asan imitation. This 
part of the tenth book has its peculiar place in the history 
of ésthetics ; we are here concerned only with the logical 
theories alluded to in connection with other pursuits. 
We see here the theory of ideas treated as familiar to all 
readers (596 A: eidos mov te By Exactov cimOapev TiOz06ai 
méeol ExuoTAa TA TOAAA Ols TavTOV dvowa érripépomev). But in 
the formulation of this method we perceive a stage of the 
theory unknown from earlier works. Heretofore, only 
general mathematical, esthetical, and ethical notions were 
ideas. There is no trace whatever in preceding parts of 
the Republic (except in the allegory of the cave, which 
may have been written later), nor in the Phaedo and 
Symposium, of ideas of manufactured things, or of any 
and every group of things bearing one name. Then the 
ideas were contemplated, known or found as existent. 
Now they are posited (ri@ec@ar); this term has been 
appled earlier to names (as, for instance, Crat. 384 D), 
but never to ideas, though a distinction of species was 
posited in the Phaedo (79 A: Oduev dvo0 eidn Tov dyTHr). 
Here also we might at first suppose that <?d0s means only 
species, as in the similar passage of the Phaedo, but in 
what immediately follows the word idéa is used in its 
unmistakable technical meaning (596 B: pia idéa), and 
applied to a table or a chair. Thus it appears that ideas 
of manufactured articles are admitted. 

Also the popular objection to the unity of ideas is 
dealt with, namely, the supposition that the same process 
which leads to the positing of one idea could be repeated 
indefinitely, producing an infinity of ideas of the same 
thing. Plato says that God being the creator of ideas, 
either his will or some other necessity—of course a logical 
necessity—prevented the possibility of a plurality of 
identical ideas (597 c)! This logical necessity is further 


book 
esthetical 
consider- 
ations 
based on 
the fami- 
liar use 
of ideas. 


Ideas of 
manu- 
factured 
things 
appear for 
the first 
time, thus 
initiating 
a change 
in the 
primitive 
form 

of the 
theory. 


Infinity 

of identi- 
cal ideas 
denied on 
the same 
grounds 
as Aris- 
totle justi- 
fied the 


simplicity 
of per- 


ception. 


One idea 
of each 
thing. 


God as 
maker of 
ideas is a 
metaphor, 
meaning 
the logical 
necessity. 


New proof 
of immor- 
tality, 
begin- 
ning by a 
general 
statement 
of the 
conditions 
of inde- 
structi- 
bility. 

A class 

of inde- 
structible 
things is 
shown to 


314 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


explained exactly in the same way in which Aristotle 
afterwards justified the simplicity of perception (Aristot. 
De anima ii. 2, 425 b 15 sqq.). If there were two ideas 
of the same thing, then the true idea would be the 
common type of the two primitive ideas (597 c). This 
would impair the perfection of ideas, and to avoid it, God, 
who is not a chairmaker, but the maker of the idea of a 
chair, made one idea of the chair (597 D: o Ogos, ... 
ulav pvoee Zhvaev). 

Now if we consider the deeper meaning of this ex- 
planation, we recognise a certain advance beyond the 
Phaedo and perhaps even B. VI-VII. The God who 
makes the ideas is not the same God who is mentioned 
in earlier dialogues. God makes the ideas—this is a 
metaphorical expression which translated into abstract 
speech means: the ideas are a product of pure thought-— 
not necessarily of men, but of a thinking subject. This is 
a consequent development of the theory about the idea of 
Good which was the final cause of all other ideas. Now 
this idea of good is supplanted by God, not by some god 
nor by a god, but by ‘the God’ (o eos). The mono- 
theism appears well established and a matter of course. 

Also the immortality of the soul is reaffirmed, and a 
proof added to those of the Phaedo, which could hardly 
have been omitted in the Phaedo if Plato had then been 
in possession of it. In the Phaedo the problem was 
represented as very difficult and further research invited. 
Now it is an easy thing (608D: otézv yap yarerov) to 
prove that the soul is immortal. The proof is no longer 
based on the ideas, but on the substantiality of the soul. 
Each existing thing has its own virtue and its own evil, 
and can be destroyed only by its own weakness and evil 
(609 A). If there is anything in existence which suffers 
from its own evil, without danger of being destroyed, as 
metals are by rust, then this substance, if any, is inde- 
structible (6098). To this description the soul is 
found to correspond. This kind of proof is the converse 


Or 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: REPUBLIC X ae 


of all the proofs given in the Phaedo. There immortality 
was found as a property of the soul, through a definition 
of the idea of the soul. Here Plato begins by consti- 
tuting a class of indestructible substances, and then 
shows that the soul belongs to it. We shali see that this 
new logical expedient is used by Plato also later, and it is 
certainly superior to the method of the Phaedo. 

We have here an application of the principle that truth 
is to be found in thought, that our speculation is always 
concerned with our own ideas, and not with the things 
outside. Still, from our ideas we draw inferences about 
the things, and Plato, after representing immortality as a 
necessity of thought, goes a step further and concludes 
that the number of souls in the universe remains invari- 
able (611 A: évvoeis Oru del ay eiey ai abtat* ovTE yap av 
mov é\aTTovs yévowTo . . . ovTe av’ TAéiovs). This simple 
conclusion, which we shall find again in a later writing, 
was missed in the Phaedo, and leads to very important 
consequences. 

In the Phaedo the unity of the soul was one of its 
properties because the threefold partition was not yet 
proposed. Now, after the repeated exposition of a division 
of faculties, the parts of the soul can no longer be ignored 
(603 A), but Plato defends himself against a misinterpre- 
tation of his view. The soul is in its true substance not 
full of contradictory powers (6118). The eternal is 
simple in its own nature, and cannot be composed out of 
many elements (611 B: ov pdédiov aidcov civar civOeTOv TE 
é to\dov). The partition referred to the imperfect 
transitory earthly state, not to the soul’s eternal existence. 
We contemplated it under the modifications produced by 
union with the body, and failed to perceive its eternal 
nature. 

This is a manifest correction of the theory of three- 
fold partition as taught in B. IV and IX, and exempli- 
fies Plato’s manner of revising his earlier writings. He 
did not alter anything in what had been written, but he 


include 
the soul. 


Immor- 
tality as 
a neces- 
sity of 
thought. 
Conclu- 
sion 
about 
number 
of souls. 


Unity of 
soul de- 
spite its 
different 
parts. 
Simpli- 
city of 
eternal 
elements 
when set 
free from 
the bonds 
of the 
body. 


Example 
of revision 
of earlier 
writings 


without 
any altera- 
tion in 
the earlier 
text. 


Subject 

of immor- 
tality 
alterna- 
tively 
mentioned 
as new 
and as 
already 
dealt with. 


Clear 
allusion 
to the 
Phaedo 
in the 
tenth 
book of 
the 
Republic. 


Each 
dialogue 
of Plato 
stands 
apart, 


316 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


adds his correction. in the continuation of the same 
dialogue, just as he added his confession of a certain 
exaggeration in the picture of the philosopher at the end 
of the seventh book. This way of correcting and criti- 
cising his own views confirms our supposition as to the 
technical difficulties which stood in the way of many 
changes in the original drafts of Plato’s writings. Some 
other examples of such self-criticism will appear in later 
works, and it is exceedingly characteristic that this pro- 
ceeding begins already with the Republic. 

Plato’s habit of considering each work in turn as one 
independent whole is apparent from the fact that the 
subject of immortality is introduced in B. X as new and 
never heard of before (608D: ov« foO@ncat btu abdiatos 
Huav n rAruyn Kal ovdgroTEe aTrOhAUTAL; Kal ds EUBAEpas por 
kai Oavyaoas sire’ Ma Ai’, ove sywye* ot 83 Todt’ eyes 
Agyerv ;). Some readers of Plato saw in this passage a 
proof that the tenth book of the Republic had been 
written before the Phaedo, without noticing that a few 
pages later there occurs a perfectly clear allusion to the 
Phaedo, which cannot refer to any other work of Plato 
but the Phaedo only. He says (611 B) : 6te roivev dOavatov 
ox, Kal 0 apts Noyos Kal Of AXXO’ avayKacELaV ay. 

This means that in an earlier writing there had been 
given a number of arguments (Aoyor) of a logically neces- 
sary or apodictic character (advayxkdfovtes) proving the 
soul’s immortality. Now a plurality of such arguments 
is not given in any other work of Plato besides the 
Phaedo. The Phaedrus, which might be thought of 
here, contains only one argument, and other dialogues, 
such as the Meno, Gorgias, &c., do not contain arguments 
(Adyor) but tales (w0A0, cf. Phaedo 61 B: the poet invents 
pvOous, add’ ov Aoyous, cf. also Gorg. 523.4). That Xoyos is 
used in the tenth book in the meaning of a logical argu- 
ment can easily be seen from many passages (611 B: 6 
oyos ovK zacer—609 D: arAoyov—610A: Kata Aoyov, &C.). 
Thus we see that Plato, even alluding in a general way to 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: REPUBLIC X Ag 


his earlier writings, sometimes ignored their particular 
. contents in a new exposition. Each dialogue was meant 
to stand apart, as if it were written expressly for the new 
generation of students entering the Academy, or, in the 
case of the Republic, possibly for a wider circle. 

The illusory character of sense perception, as repre- 
sented in the Phaedo and in the earlier books of the 
Republic, is here maintained (602cC: tadvrov tov piv 
peyeOos eyylOev Te Kai Toppwbev Sia THs Orews ovK ioov 
¢aiv-ras), and is illustrated by a skilful enumeration of 
optical illusions produced by distance, colouring, and 
reflection of light. But the distrust of the senses is no 
longer so unlimited as in the Phaedo, and is subject to a 
distinct modification. We have a means of correcting 
their illusions, says Plato, and this consists in measuring, 
counting, and weighing (602D: 7d werpeiy Kal apOueiv 
kat iotavar Bonfevar yapigotatat . . . BoTE fur) apyely TO 
dawopmevov . . . AAA TO Royioauevov). This intuition of 
the mathematical power of correcting the illusions of 
sense seems to be a Pythagorean notion, and betrays also 
the fact that since the first understanding of the distance 
between appearance and ideas Plato had been working to 
bridge it over partially by physical research. His pro- 
gramme is constantly realised in our own days, and we 
witness many subtle corrections of primitive sense illu- 
sions by the power of number, measure, and weighing. 
This power of correcting the illusions of the senses is 
ascribed to the cognitive faculty, which is the best part 
of the soul (6034: 7d wétpw ye Kal oyiow@ THLoTEvOV 
BeXtLoTOv av ein THY Yrvys). 

The opposition between opinion and knowledge thus 
alone remains out of the whole fabric of the four sub- 
divisions of the cognitive faculty in B. VI-VII. And 
opinion is here more sharply distinguished from know- 
ledge than ever; it becomes quite another part of the 
soul, like feeling or desire (6034: To mapa ta pétpa 


/ r iol A X\ \ / > x yv > / 
do0€afov Ths Wuyns TO Kata Ta péeTpa OvK ay Ein TavTCD). 


though he 
sometimes 
refers to 
earlier ex- 
position. 


Illusory 
character 
of the 
sense per- 
ception, 
corrected 
by mea- 
suring, 
counting, 
and 
weighing. 
Physical 
research 
bridges 
over the 
distance 
between 
ideas and 
appear- 
ances. 
Reason 
corrects 
errors 

of the 
senses. 


Four sub- 
divisions 
of cog- 
nitive 
faculty 
not main- 
tained. 


Instability 
of termin- 
ology. 


Law of 
contra- 
diction 
as a 

law of 
thought. 


The user 
more 
compe- 
tent than 
the maker, 
as he has 
the know- 
ledge. 


Poets 
deprived 
of right 
opinion : 
Homer 
below Pro- 
tagoras. 


318 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


Hence opinion probably will not partake in immortality. 
The instability of Platonic terminology at the time when 
he wrote the Republic is seen from the circumstance that 
even here, where opinion is condemned so strongly, the 
same word, 60£a, is used for both opinion and knowledge, 
in the meaning of a judgment which might be wrong or 
right (6028, cf. Theaet. 190 4). 

Here for the first time occurs a formulation of the law 
of contradiction as a law of thought, while in the Phaedo 
and earlier books of the Republic it was a metaphysical 
law : 

Phaedo 102 E: Rep.436B: tatrovra-| Rep. 602 u: eapev 
ovdev TaY evavTio@y ett vavTia TroLetv 7) Tao Xe TO avT@ Gua rept TravuTa 
dv Srep fv Gua rowva- Kata ravrov ye kai pds évavria Sofdew advni- 
vriov yiyverOai te Kai Tavtov otk €OedAnoe Tov eiva. Cf. Theaet. 
elval. apa. | 190 a. 


This is also an indication of Plato’s advancing logical 
preoccupation. There are besides other hints of the re- 
lation of the tenth book of the Republic to earlier dialogues. 
Here, as in the Cratylus and Huthydemus, the competent 
judge about anything is he who makes a proper use of it 
(601 cC: é6ocep érictata: yphoOa) not the maker (601D: 
TOM avdayKn TOV Ypomevoy EKdTTw euTELPOTUTOY TE FiVat, 
Kal ayyedov ylyverOar TO ToInTH, ota ayaa 1) Kaka TrovEi ev 
™ xpela ® yphta). Here this principle is generalised, 
while in the Cratylus it was applied specifically to word- 
making. The opposition between user and maker is 
parallel to the contrast between knowledge and faith 
(601 EB: 6 pay eldms eayyédret wept xpnoTaV Kat Tovnpar 

. 0 68 TLOTEVWY TOLNGEL). 

The poets are now shown to have neither knowledge 
nor even right opinion (602 A: ore dpa sicetas ote OpOa 
Sokdoes 6 puuntys TEepl @v ay punta pos KadddOs 1 
movnpiav). Homer, who was named in the Symposiwm 
as holding the first place among those who deserved 
immortal fame, is now not only esteemed below Solon 
and Pythagoras, but even humiliated by comparison with 


S'YLE AND DATE OF THE REPUBLIC 319 
Protagoras and Prodikos (600 c) who succeeded better in 
life, says Plato, because they had more knowledge than 
the king of poets. We see here a pitiless condemnation 
of what had been the chief element in Plato’s own 
education. He knows well the temptations of the poet, 
and remains still poet enough to degrade poetry with 
poetical exaggeration. The future writer of the Laws 
appears here already with his boundless contempt even 
for the most refined pleasures, asking for deeds not words, 
choosing rather to deserve praise than to praise others 
(599 B), and proudly conscious of his own productive 
activity. 


The style and date of the Republic. 


We have found a natural progress of doctrine from 
the beginning to the end of the Republic, but no such 
fundamental differences between the first books and their 
continuation as to make it necessary to recur to such 
adventurous suppositions as Krohn and Pfleiderer made 
about the composition of this work, which is remarkable 
for its unity in spite of its unusual volume. A comparison 
of contents alone, however, is insufficient for a decisive 
solution of the question, and we must turn to our 
elwOvia pz00d0s of stylistic differentiation in order to 
find a trustworthy confirmation of the view resulting from 
the study of theoretical development. 

As to the single books of the Republic the point of 
main significance is the very early style of the first 
book. This has none of the important peculiarities 
common to all the following books, neither the scarcity of 
val, Tavu ye, Tavuy wev odv which characterises B. JI-X 
(these answers form in B. I over one-third of all answers, 
just as in Charm. Lach. Prot.)—nor té pv; nor 
adnbéoraza, nor 6pOas, nor doGorata, nor dpOorata rAéyers, 
nor 67A0v—all these being important peculiarities charac- 
terising all the following books, and missed in the first 
book certainly not by chance, as all the usual opportuni- 


\S 


Unity 

of the 
Republic 
resulting 
from 

the study 
of its 
contents. 


Style of 
the first 
book very 
early. 
Many 
important 
peculi- 
arities 
common 
to all 
later books 
are missed 


in the 
first book. 


Peculi- 
arities of 
later style 
oceurring 
in the 
first book 
are gener- 
ally found 
also in 
earlier 


dialogues. 


32() ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


ties for their use were given. Also some important 
peculiarities which were introduced into the style of 
Plato in earlier dialogues, and remained up to the latest 
works, are absent from B. I. Such is for instance the 
general prevalence of superlatives over positives in all 
affirmative answers, common to the Phaedo with nearly 
all later dialogues and all books of the Republic (325), the 
great frequency of questions by means of dpa (378) 
common to the Cratylus with all later dialogues and all 
other books of the Repwblic, new-invented adjectives in 
evdys (254), beginning with the Gorgias and frequent in 
all parts of the Republic except B. I, re singly (281) 
frequent in all other books and occurring already even in 
some Socratic dialogues, interrogations asking for better 
explanation (453), great frequency of prepositions 
(390, found already in the Laches and common to all 
other books of the Republic with the latest group), 
questions by means of zozos (353); many other less 
important peculiarities are absent from the first book, 
being common to all other parts of the Republic with the 
latest group and, in the case of the last enumerated, even 
with some Socratic dialogues. In the above enumeration 
no accidental peculiarity has been included, and of these 
a certain number can easily be found in the table of 
affinity (pp. 162-171), quoted as occurring in various parts 
of the Republic except in the first book. 

If now after this long enumeration of peculiarities 
vainly sought for in the first book we ask what kind of 
peculiarities of later style are found in it, we find chiefly 
accidental occurrences of peculiarities known already from 
the earliest dialogues, and only one unique peculiarity of 
some importance later than the Phaedo, namely a double 
occurrence of xa\@s or a similar adverb without verb in 
an affirmative answer. This is the only important 
peculiarity common to all other parts of the Republic, 
found in the first book and not in dialogues earlier than 
the Republic. Other important peculiarities of the first 


STYLE AND DATE OF THE REPUBLIC sea | 


book belong to an earlier time, as for instance totvyuy in 
conclusions (284) beginning with the Crito, frequency of 
apodictic answers equal to that in the Huthydemus (376), 
and dAn67 without A¥¢yers as in the Charnudes (385). 
This proves the very early date of the first book, which 
however may still be as late as the Gorgias. 

We cannot compare it with the Gorgias, because the 
latter dialogue is thrice as large, and we have no evidence 
as to the occurrence of the investigated peculiarities in a 
part of the Gorgias equal to the first book. That it is 
earlier than the Cratylus appears very probable if we 
consider the great difference of the equivalent of affinity, 
which is sufficiently considerable to include a reasonable 
allowance for the difference of size : 

Rep. a (204 pp.) : 28 (I) 6 (II) 8 (III) =49 (1). 
—> Crat. (42 pp.): 33 (I) 16 (II) 15 (IID) 1 (IV) =114 (1). 


As here the equivalent of affinity of the later work is 
over twice as large, and more than proportional to the 
size, while generally the equivalent of affinity increases 
less than proportionally to the size, we may fairly infer 
that the Cratylus is later. This inference is confirmed 
by the fact that certain peculiarities absent from the first 
book are sufficiently frequent in the Cratylus to be pre- 
sumed to exist in all its parts, and therefore also in any 
part equal in size to Rep. I. Such are ovcia in the 
meaning of substance (245), adjectives in wdys denoting 
causal relation (275), cara with accusative prevailing over 
all prepositions except 2v (389), interrogations asking for 
better explanation (453), new-invented adjectives in wéns 
(255), and great frequency of roivuy (308). Of these 
peculiarities, all frequent and important in the Cratylus, 
none is found in the Gorgias except one question asking 
for better explanation, and therefore they show the later 
date of the Cratylus, while they cannot be used for a 
determination of the relation between Gorgias and Rep. I. 
The Gorgias has only three important peculiarities (253, 
¥ 


Compati- 
son of 
the first 
book with 
the Craty- 
lus and 
with the 
Gorgias 
shows the 
probable 
position 
of the 
first book 
between 
these two 
dialogues. 


Close 
relation 
between 
second, 
third, 
fourth, 
eighth, 
and ninth 
books. 


FRIVEINY 
and B. 
VIII-IxX 
differ in 
the com- 


322 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


307, 377) absent from the first book of the Republic, which 
happen to be absent also from the Cratylus, and these 
have generally less importance than those found in the 
Cratylus and absent from the Gorgias and the first book 
of the Republic. 

Thus it may be-regarded as probable that the first book 
is earlier than the Cratylus, while nothing can be said 
from purely stylistic comparisons about its relation to 
the Gorgias, to which its contents show it to be subse- 
quent. ' 

As to the following books of the Republic, stylistic 
comparison proves that there is no such great distance 
between the first four books and the following as has been 
sometimes supposed by those who believed in a very early 
publication of the first four, five. or even six books.”! The 
style of B. II-IV is not very different from the style of 
B. VIIILIX, if equal samples are compared. ‘Take for 
instance B. II-B. III 412 4, slightly exceeding in size the 
total of B. VIII-IX. Both appear evidently later than 
the Phaedo, to which they are inferior in size: 

Phaedo (49 pp.) : 43 (I) 26 (II) 17 (III) 2 (IV) = 154 (1). 
—>Rep. b 12 (374 pp.) : 47 (I) 20 (II) 22 (III) 2 (IV) = 161. 
—>Rep. d (34 pp.): 47 (1) 22 (II) 27 (IID) 8 (IV) = 184. 


The advance beyond the Phaedo is considerable if we take 
into account the difference of size, and also the nature 
of those peculiarities which are common to B. II-Ix 
being absent from the Phaedo. These include nearly all the 


231 The separate publication of the first four books has been advocated 
by Hermann and later by Krohn, Chiappelli (‘Sopra aleuni capitoli della 
vita di Dione di Plutarco,’ Torino 1883, Rivista di jilologia, anno 12), 
Siebeck (Jahrbiicher fiir Philologie, Band 131, 1885, p. 229), and many 
others. Pfleiderer laid great stress on the division at 471 c. Teichmiiller, 
under the influence of the prejudice about the relation of B. V to 
Aristophanes’ Hcclesiazusae, supposed the first five books to be one whole 
published about 392 B.c. Finally Rudolf Kunert (‘Die doppelte 
Recension des Platonischen Staates,’ Wiussenschaftliche Beilage zwn 
Jahresbericht des Kéniglichen Gymnasiums zu Spandau, 1893) believes 
that B. II-VI form one indivisible whole, published before 390 B.c. 


STYLE ‘AND DATE OF THE REPUBLIC pie 


peculiarities enumerated above as characteristically absent 
from the first book. Among these the following have a 
special prominence: té pyv ; (202), Avuoedrs as a philo- 
sophical term (261), ovxodv ypx (338), adnbéorata, opbas 
(342), dArov (343), opAorata with or without Ayes (342, 
388), drespos (473), wePiorawar (488), all found in both 
parts of the Republic, but not in the Phaedo. On the other 
side B. VIII-IX contain not a single new important 
peculiarity absent from B. II-IV. The advance in style 
from the earlier to the later part is only due to a greater 
number of accidental peculiarities, and to an increase of 
the frequency of all kinds of peculiarities. Thus generally 
speaking B. VIII-IX belong to the same time as 
B. I-IV, showing a later style only to such an extent as 
might be expected in a continuous work of these dimen- 
sions. We have therefore no stylistic reason whatever 
to admit a great distance of time between the earlier and 
the later part, as has been also shown by the comparison 
of the contents. Naturally this does not imply that both 
parts must have been written in the same year, or in the 
same couple of years. 

Style is changing slowly, and even the small advance 
in style observed may correspond to two or three years, 
if we allow for the whole of the Republic an average term 
corresponding to its size, anything between 5-7 years. As 
to B. V-—VII, there is some stylistic evidence to place 
it after B. IX, at least its chief part designated in the table 
of affinity as cy (471 c—541). We find: 

Rep. d (B. VIII-IX = 34 pp.) : 47 (I) 22 (II) 27 (IIL)3 (IV) = 184. 
_sRep.c, (471 c-541 =44 pp.) : 50 (I) 21 (II) 38 (III) 7 (IV) =234 (1). 


The comparison seems at first sight, in view of the differ- 
ence of size, to be insufficient for chronological purposes. 
But if we add to B. VIII-IX a part of B. V to increase 
its size, then we obtain : 
Rep. c,d (50 pp.) : 62 (I) 23 (II) 36 (III) 3 = 228 (1). 
—Rep. c, (44 pp.) : 50’(I) 21 (II) 38 (III) 7 (IV) = 284 (I): 
ar) 


parative 
frequency 
of identi- 
eal péculi- 
arities. 


Both parts 
of the 
Republic 
belong to 
the same 
time. 


The inter- 
mediate 
part of 
the 
Republic 
appears 
to be 
later. 


Slight 
advance 
of style 

of B. 
VI-VII, 
over B. 
VITI-IX 
confirms 
the suppo- 
sition of 
their later 
date. 


Relation 
between 
beginning 
and end 
of B. V 
uncertain. 


Position 
of the 
tenth 
book 
remains 
uncertain, 
though 

it is 
probably 
the latest. 


324 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


a small difference of few units in favour of the smaller 
sample of text, very significant through the prevalence of 
important and very important peculiarities. Some pecu- 
liarities appear in B. V—VII, which are missed alike in 
B. II-IV and in B. VITI-IX as in all earlier dialogues. 
These include yap ody in short answers (3826), mH (332), 
mas used with dros (375), kata separated from the corre- 
sponding accusative by te (395), dvtws dv (236), dvw (195), 
akivntos (469), and other words of a more accidental 
character. This confirms our conclusions from the con- 
tents, and makes it probable that the bulk of B. V-VIT 
has been added later, at least after B. IX. 

From the observations it 1s, however, not easy to 
ascertain whether the beginning of the fifth book forms 
one indivisible whole with the picture of the philosopher 
from 471 c to the end of the seventh book. The first 
part of the fifth book, dealing with the equality of sexes, 
and with international relations between Hellenes and 
Barbarians, might still be earlier than the eighth book, 
while the larger portion filling the sixth and seventh books 
might have been added later. This point can only be 
decided by a more minute comparison of a greater number 
of peculiarities in samples of text absolutely equal. For 
our purpose it has no importance whatever, as this part 
of the fifth book contains no contribution to the know- 
ledge of Plato’s logic. 

It is equally difficult to decide whether the tenth book 
is later than all parts of the Republic, or only later than 
B. VITI-IX. It contains a considerable number of pecu- 
liarities of later style for its small size, but only three 
accidental peculiarities are new (438, 475, 478), while B. 
V-IX contain a greater number of peculiarities which are 
absent from B. X. But a definitive solution of these 
difficulties can only be expected from further stylistic 
research. Meanwhile it remains certain that B. X is 
later than B. LV, probable that it is later than B. IX, and 
possible that it is later than all other books of the 


STYLE AND DATE OF THE REPUBLIC 3290 


Republic. This possibility, a mere possibility so far as 
our stylistic comparison reaches, becomes a probability 
when the contents are carefully considered. 

All the parts of the Republic, except the first book, 
being later than the Phaedo, and differing not very much 
in style among each other, we may conclude that they 
were written continuously in the time next following the 
Phaedo, and as we have no reason to suppose that in 
that time Plato increased the speed of his writing, or 
the average amount of text produced yearly, it remains 
probable that the Republic occupied him for about six 
years, up to nearly his fiftieth year, as we supposed. 

This refutes all the suppositions about a possibly early 
date “? of the Republic, and shows that Plato wrote his 
ereat work after his return from the first Sicilian voyage, 
and after the foundation of the Academy. Chiappelli **! 
(p. 16) believes that Plato had already formed his political 
convictions when he came to Syracuse. If we accept the 
traditional account of his adventures, the reverse is far 
more probable: that the personal experience and observa- 
tion of the consequences resulting from the abuse of 
tyrannical power gave an opportunity to Plato for political 
reflections. This may have brought him from a position 
of individualistic ethics to a socialistic political theory 
such as is set forth in the Republic. 


282 Among all the artificial arguments in favour of an early date of the 
first books of the Republic, none has been invented with such remarkable 
imagination as Pfleiderer’s contention, which deserves, for the sake of 
curiosity, to be here quoted in his own words: ‘nach meiner Ansetzung 
in den neunziger Jahren des 4°" Jahrhunderts feiert Rep. A (=‘5}’ accord- 
ing to Pfleiderer’s strange designation, or B. I-V 471 c) zugleich das 
zweihundertjihrige Jubilium der Gesetzgebung des Solon von 594, welche 
ja als Leistung seines yon ihm so hoch geehrten Verwandten dem Plato 
Zeitlebens als spornender Vorgang vorgeschwebt’ (Sokrates und Plato, 
p. 248). Equally bold is Gymnasialdirector Carl Schmelzer (see above, 
p. 25, note 66) who declares that Plato did not mean seriously his political 
theories, and that for instance xowda Ta Toy PiAwy Means: ‘ es muss jeder 
Mann eine jede Frau achten und schitzen als sei sie die seinige.’ 


The 
Republic 
written 
after the 
Phaedo 
in the 
course of 
about six 
years. 


Voyage to 
Syracuse 
might 
have led 
Plato to 
reflect on 
political 
matters. 


The 
Phaedrus 
shows the 
conditions 
of a philo- 
sophical 
rhetoric. 


Plato’s 
natural 
eloquence 
made 
rhetoric 

* super- 
fluous 
for him. 


He saw 
the use- 
fulness 
of some 


326 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


Il. The Phaedrus. 


(Relative affinity to the latest group, measured on the Laws as 
unity, =0°31; see above, p. 176.) 


The Phaedrus, beyond any other work of Plato, has 
been misunderstood by interpreters who devoted more 
attention to indifferent details than to the philosophical 
contents of the dialogue. It has been ascribed to a young 
man of twenty-five, while it contains notions and theories 
which Plato could scarcely have advanced before he was 
fifty. Some critics, and among them Grote, saw in the 
Phaedrus an erotic dialogue, either supplementary or 
even preparatory to the Sympostwm—though the evident 
aim of the Phaedrus is to establish the conditions of a 
philosophical rhetoric, chiefly applicable to educational 
purposes. In the preceding dialogues we have seen 
Plato rising to the highest principles of knowledge with- 
out any attempt to reason about the best way of imparting 
them, except the few precepts given in the Republic. He 
tacitly assumed that any one possessing knowledge can 
impart it to others, if they are able to receive it. We 
may suppose that Plato attracted chiefly very gifted 
pupils, and to begin with he had such a great power 
of teaching that he felt no need of rhetorical artifice. 
His eloquence, which we admire even in such early 
dialogues as the Apology, was the natural outburst of his 
genius progressing spontaneously from the Apology to 
the Gorgias, from the Gorgias to Symposium, Phaedo, 
and the dialectical books of the Republic, apparently 
without effort or study (Phaedr. 2488). This explains 
why he contemptuously defined rhetoric in the Gorgias 
as a kind of flattery, and why he condemned tragic 
poetry in the Republic as an imitation. 

His first opportunity for noticing the usefulness of 
some rhetorical artifice must have arisen at a time when 
his pupils began to teach, and he first observed that some 
of them, with all the knowledge inherited from the Master, 


MIDDLE PLATONISM : PHAEDRUS BN 


were less capable of imparting it than others. Though 
we admit some educational activity of Plato before the 
foundation of the Academy in 387 B.c., the teaching by 
others under his direction could scarcely have begun 
earlier, and even probably began later, than the first years 
of the existence of his own school. When the number of 
his pupils increased, and some of them had remained 
with him a longer time, it is natural that the elder pupils 
should begin to teach; and their deficiencies in teaching 
may have led Plato to some reflections on rhetoric, which 
he embodied in the Phaedrus. This view is here not 
given as a reason for the late date of the Phaedrus, but 
only as an explanation of the origin of this dialogue, 
which becomes probable when once we know its late 
date, as resulting from the study of its style (see above, 
Duby by, 

For the purpose of a discussion on rhetoric, Plato had to 
select a speech as an example to illustrate his views. His 
choice of a speech of Lysias ** was natural, inasmuch 
as Lysias was thought one of the greatest rhetors of 


“33 Much erudition has been spent on the question whether the speech 
attributed by Plato to Lysias is authentic or only invented by Plato in 
imitation of other writings of this orator. We have no reason to disbelieve 
Plato if he clearly credits Lysias with this speech. To criticise his own 
invention and to accuse Lysias of the greatest moral degradation on the 
ground of a forged document, would certainly be below Plato’s dignity. That 
the speech is read by Phaedrus, and not repeated from memory, adds to the 
probability of its authenticity, which has been maintained also by Haenisch 
(De oratione quae sub nomine Lysiae in Platonis Phaedro legitur, Ratibor 
1825), Spengel, Franz, Westermann, Hélscher (quoted by Hermann, p. 675, 
note 554), L. Schmidt (Verhandlungen der 18° Philologenversammlung, 
Wien 1858), Ueberweg (Untersuchungen, p. 262), and by many others, while 
it has been opposed by Hermann and Jowett. A certainty in this question 
can only be arrived at by very minute stylistic comparison. So long as 
an evident proof of the spuriousness is not forthcoming, we must admit the 
authenticity. Plato has never quoted by name an author attributing to 
him words or opinions which were invented by himself. So far as the 
works alluded to by Plato are preserved, all his quotations from Homer, 
Parmenides, Protagoras, have been confirmed, and the natural assumption 
is, therefore, that he included in the Phaedrus an authentic speech of 
Lysias. The onus probandi is’entirely on the side of those who deny it. 


rhetorical 
rules when 
his pupils 
began to 
teach and 
mani- 
fested 
some (le- 
ficiencies 
in their 
teaching. 


Selection 
of aspeech 
of Lysias 
as an 


example 
of wrong 


rhetoric. 


Choice 
limited 
because it 
had to be 
a speech 
to the 
young. 


The 
second 
speech 
improves 
the form, 
the third 
speech the 
contents. 


Subject- 
matter 
secondary, 
and not 
limited to 


love. 


Widened 
horizon. 


328 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


those times (2284: Avaias év TOAN@ ypovw Kata cYOAnY 
ovveOnkev, SewoTatos Ov TOY viv ypadew). The subject of 
the speech to be selected was accidental and secondary. 
It could obviously not be a forensic speech, because 
Plato’s aim was an investigation of educational rhetoric, 
not of forensic oratory. He had to choose from speeches 
which were designed for the young, and it was not his 
fault that such speeches did not attain a very high moral 
standard. He could not select a model speech, even if 
one could be found outside the Socratic circle, because 
the artistic purpose required a sharp contrast between his 
rhetoric and the wrong rhetoric of contemporary orators. 
His choice of a discourse of Lysias, written in apology of 
illicit sexual relations, must be, therefore, recognised as 
perfectly fit and proper for the purpose. Before any 
theoretical discussion followed, a better example had to be 
opposed to the example taken from Liysias. This better 
example was at first to be better in the form, and then 
afterwards to be made better and more elevated in the 
contents. Plato chose to oppose to the first speech two 
speeches of his own: the first on the same subject, but 
better composed—the second directed against the contents 
of both the preceding speeches. Thus it resulted as a 
necessity of composition that the three speeches, intended 
to exemplify the theory, occupied a great part of the 
whole writing, being nearly equal in size to the remaining 
dialogue. 

The three speeches are avowedly examples of good 
and bad eloquence (262 b, cf. 264 E). The subject- 
matter is of secondary importance, and is by no means 
limited to love, since the myth in the second speech of 
Socrates deals even more with immortality, reminiscence, 
and human perfectibility than with the particular subject 
of love which formed the accidental starting point. We 
see here in every respect a very much widened horizon ; 
in the Phaedo the scene of the mythical digression was 
limited to the earth’s depths and heights, and even in 


e 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: PHAEDRUS 329 


Rep. X the Earth is still the centre of interest. Here 
we see Plato, in accordance with his recommendation in 
the Republic as to the study of astronomy, taking the 
universe up to the fixed stars as the scene for the periodical 
migrations of each soul. The allegory of the cave is re- 
peated on a much larger scale. The whole earth now takes 
the place of that subterraneous dwelling, and instead of 
the world outside the cave, where Truth can be seen as we 
see here earth and water, we have now the supramundane 
region beyond the most distant stars, a metaphorical 
expression which means beyond space and matter. Those 
who remember their vision of Truth, and act accordingly, 
are deemed to be mad (249 D: e&toTduevos Tav avOpwriver 
oTovoacudtov . . . voveteitar bTO TAY TOAKBY WS Tapa- 
kuev, cl Rep. 517 D: 
avOporea Tis Ody . . . paivetar cHddpa yedroivs), because 
vulgar people are unable to understand philosophy. 

While in the Phaedo even the murderer of his father 
could be pardoned after one year’s punishment (114 4), 
here, as in the Republic, the period of probation lasts a 
thousand years after each life on earth, and a free choice 
of a new fate is left to each soul: 


> > \ Z ial > \ \ 
eb amo Oeiwy Oswpidv eri Ta 


Phaedr. 249 AB: érav Tov mparov 
Biov Te\euvTHTwaL, Kpicews ETvXOV, 


Rep. X 615 a: SumnyeioOa Se 
ad\Ankas ... 


avapmynoKkopevas ooa 


A @ , ‘ ” > cr 
Te Kal ola maOouev Kai tOcLev ev TH 
bro yis mwopeta—eivar de thy Tro- 
petavy xtAvérn—ras 8 ad ex Tov 
> ~ > , a ‘ 
ovpavov evmabeias SupyeicOa kai 
Geas aunyavovs TO KadXos. . 
617 D: mpodyrny . . . AaBovra 
, 4A , / 
kAnpous te kal Bi@y mapade’ypara 
> ny \ > o 
. elmetv* wuxat ednuepor . 
bpets Saiwova aipnoec Oe. 


co ‘ c ‘ > \ c \ a 
kpietoa Oe ai pev els Ta UTO ys 
, > ~ , > / 

Stxarornpia eAOovcat Sikny exrivov- 
ow, ai 8 eis ToUpavod tiva TOrov 
c , f = , - Lg 

umd THs Oikns kovpiabetoa Sudyourw 
agiws ot ev advOpwmov cider €Biocav 
Biov. 


> , > A , ‘ A 
adtxvoupevat emit kAnpwolw Te Kal 


-~ ,¥ cal >. , 
Te Oe XtALogT@ auporepat 


~ -~ , “A 
aipeow Tov Oevtepov Biov aipodyrat 
a * f (ys 
ov av Oey ExaorTn. 


This denotes a deeper understanding of the responsi- 
bilities of life, and agrees with the doctrines of the latest 
works, such as the Timaeus and Laws. 

Even the philosopher, who, according to the Phaedo, 
reached the happiest state immediately after death, being 


Place 

of the 
mythical 
tale 
extended 
far beyond 
the limits 
of earth. 


Increase 
of the 
duration 
of punish- 
ments or 
rewards. 


Cycle 
of ten 


thousand 
years for 
ali souls 
except 
philo- 
sophers. 


Indol- 
gence 
towards 
persons 
treated 
severely 
before : 
Polos, 
Prota- 
goras, 
Pericles, 
Anaxa- 
goras, 
Isocrates. 
All of 
them 
being 
esteemed 
less than 
philo- 
sophers. 


Contempt 
of poets 


330 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


freed from the body (Phaedo 114: of diroco0dgia ixavds 
Kabnpamevot avev TE COmaTOV CHoLTO TapaTray Eis TOV eTELTA 
xpovov), is now obliged to return twice to life on earth in 
three thousand years before he can again reach perfection 
(Phaedr. 249 a). For other souls a cycle of ten incarnations 
during ten thousand years, unknown in the Republic, is 
now imagined at each fall into matter (249 a). This 
shows that Plato progressed In emancipating his thought 
from the narrow limits of time as known on earth. We 
see also other signs of the greater height from which 
earthly affairs are looked upon. Those against whom 
Plato wrote some of his earlier dialogues are here judged 
with the indulgence of one who is too sure of his superi- 
ority to deny small merits in others (247 A: $@ovos yao 
Zw Ueiov ywpov ioratar). Thus Polos, who had been 
treated so severely in the Gorgias, also Protagoras, and 
many others (267 AB), are recognised here as inventors of 
certain rhetorical artifices, not quite as important as they 
pretended, but useful and even necessary to those who 
know how to use them (269 B: ta mpo Ths TeyvNs avayKata 
pabynpata). This concession, though supplemented by the 
announcement that this preliminary knowledge should not 
be taken for the true art of rhetoric, is certainly a sign that 
the earlier hate is now changed into indulgent compassion. 
Pericles, too, who was treated with such severity in the 
Gorgias (516 A), is now represented as a model orator. 
Anaxagoras, who in the Phaedo was accused of having 
deceived Socrates by his unfulfilled promise of explaining 
everything through the power of reason, is now credited 
with the merit of teaching true eloquence to Pericles 
(270 A). In the same line comes also the very moderate 
recognition of Isocrates, only in so far as his character is 
said to be superior to that of Lysias and other orators 
(279 A), with the addition that even the greatest merit in 
this direction is infinitely inferior to true philosophy. 

In one respect Plato’s severity remained unchanged : 
the poets are here placed very low in the scale of human 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: PHAEDRUS 331 


fates, below the gymnasts, money-makers, and sooth- 
sayers (248 p). That poets are imitators, is here assumed 
without any further explanation (routixos 7) Tav epi 
pinoiv Tis adXos), as 1f the reader were supposed to be 
familiar with the tenth book of the Republic, no earlier 
general definition of poetry as imitation being known.” 


as imita- 
tors pre- 
supposes 
the 
Republic. 


Plato’s progress from admiration of poetry to contempt — 


of it began only after the Symposium, and was first justi- 
fied in the Republic; it is manifest in the Phaedrus and 
all later works. Also the low place assigned to the tyrant 
in the ninth book of the Republic remains here unchanged 
(248 kB). 

In some other respects we notice a development of 
earlier views. Love was in the Symposiwm the universal 
creative power in nature, and is here only one of four 
kinds of madness; Beauty was the highest idea, and is 
here only one among many ideas, of which justice occu- 
pies the first place (247 D: év 83 TH Tepiodm Kabopa pev 
abtiy Sikaoovyyv, Kabopa 52 cwdppoorrny, KaBopa bz émt- 
oTinv ...), asis natural after the long dialogue on justice 
(276 E: mayKadrnv, watd.av,.. . dikarocvvijs .. . wept pwvOo- 
Aoyodvra). Some important terms used in the Republic are 
here applied as quite familiar: thus dvvapcs in the meaning 
of a faculty (246 D: wrepod Stvapis), dvadexTiKN Meaning 
metaphysical science (never used before Plato, and by 


234 In Rep. I1 373 B wountai are named as co-ordinate to minal, and 
the latter term applies to interpreters of poetry. In the third book of the 
Republic only a part of poetical works is done ‘ by imitation’ (394 c: ris 
Tonoews . .. h wey did uyuhoews GAN eoTiy, h SE BV amaryyeAlas advToU TOU monTOd, 
i 8 ad 8 duorépwy), the term uiunois being never used as a general class to 
which poetry belongs. This is for the first time explained in the tenth 
book of the Republic and then applied, in the same manner as in the 
Phaedrus, in the Laws (668 a: povoixhy ye waiody paper cikaorikhy Te elvat 
kal wiuntixhv). To an evidently earlier stage corresponds the definition of 
poetry as creation in the Symposium (205 B: Tor ék Tov wy byTos eis Td 
by idvtt btwoty aitia macd éott molnois . . . amd 5é mdons THS ToLhcews EV 
Méptoy adopicbev Td mep) Thy povoikyy Kal Ta wéTpa TG Tov bAov dvduati mpooa- 
yopeverat), while in the much later subdivision of mo:nrixy in the Soph. 265 8, 
the primitive meaning of the word seems to be already forgotten, and poetry 
is not even named as one of the subdivisions. 


Love and 
Beauty 
have lost 
a part 

of their 
import- 
ance. 


Use of 
terms in 
troduced 
in the 
Republic. 


Proof of 
the soul’s 
immor- 
tality 
compared 
with the 
proofs 
given 

in the 
Republic 
and in the 
Phaedo. 


Phaedrus 
supple- 
ments the 
tenth book 
of the 
Republic. 


332 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


Plato first in Rep. VII, cf. Phaedr. 276 4); dvarextixos 
meaning, not as in the Cratylus, Huthydemus, and in 
Xenophon, one who knows how to ask and answer ques- 
tions, but the philosopher able to discover unity in the 
variety of particulars (266 B: duvvatov sis 8v Kal emt mTo\da 
mepuxod’ opav . . . Tpocayopevm . . . Svarextixov, cf. Rep. 
537 C: 6 cuvorrikos Stadextixos, cf. Crat. 3900: épwray Kat 
atokpivecOat ériotdpevoy . . . duadeKTLKOV) ; apy as first 
principle of Being (Phaedr. 245 pb). 

There are two special psychological theories of the 
Republic which recur in the Phaedrus, and offer some 
opportunity for an instructive comparison. The most 
important is the proof given of the soul’s immortality. 
Formally the proof differs here as in the Republic from 
the arguments of the Phaedo: a substance which must 
be necessarily immortal is first defined, and then the soul 
is shown to correspond to the notion thus determined. 
The proof given in the Phaedrus is supplementary to that 
of the tenth book of the Republic : there the question was 
asked, what can be the cause of destruction of something 
existing, and it had been answered by the supposition 
that only a thing’s own weakness and evil can destroy it. 
Here the corresponding positive question is asked, what 
is the cause of life and its external manifestation—move- 
ment, and it is answered, that the true cause must be 
a self-moving principle, all other things moved from 
without having no certainty of continued movement. 
There the only thing which is not destroyed by its own 
evil was the soul; here also each self-moving principle 
is found to be a soul. That the proof of immortality 
given in the Phaedrus is the later of the two, is evident 
from the fact that it is the only proof recurring in the 
Laws, and that no other new proof is given in any later 
dialogue. For the purpose of a further discussion of this 
definitive Platonic theorem, the two similar demonstra- 
tions in Phaedrus and Laws ought to be carefully com- 
pared with the last proof given in the Republic : 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: PHAEDRUS 


Rep. X (abbreviated). 
608 D : adavaros nav 
) Wuyi Kat ovdérore 
amroAXvrat (1). 
609 a B : To Evputov 
KaKOV 1 
movnpia €kagTov aroh- 


(} , A 
€kagTov Kal 
Avow (2), 7) ef pry TodTO 
amoXet, ovK av addo ye 
avro ert Siadbeipecev (3). 
ov yap Td ye ayabor hy 

¢ > ¥ > A 
mote Tt amodean, ovde 
av TO pnte KakoV pnre 
aya@or (4). 

609 B: é€ay dpa Tu 
eUpiokopev TOV dvTwY, 
e 7a \ , a 
® €oT’ pev Kakov, O 
L 
pox Onpov, 


TOUTO fLEVTOL OVX OLOY TE 


Tole avTo 
avTo vet amoAXvov. . . 
»” > , if -~ 
non elodpueOa Ste Tov 
, 7 ead 
mec:bukOTos ovTws Ode- 
Opos ovk Hv... . (5) 
609 D: puxnv... 
evovoa €v avtTH ad:Kia 
vec i, EvelaL. 6% 
ovdauas . . POeipe (6). 
@doyov tv pev dddov 
ay) > , 
movnpiay amro\Avvat TL, 
tv O€ avrod pn. 
610 c: 


delEer as Tav amobvn- 


> , 
ovdels more 


bd > U c 
OKOVT@Y aOLK@TEpaL ai 
\ X A / 
Woxai dia tov Odvarov 

ylyvovra (7). 

610 E: 6rore 5) py 
ixav7) 4 ye otkeia rrovnpia 
OlKelov KaKOV 


‘ Mi 
Kal TO 


droxretvat Kal amrodecat 
nr , 
Wouxnv, «xo TO ye 
em’ aAdov 6AEOp@ TeTAy- 
- A A + 
pevov Kakov Yuxny i Te 
GiAXo amoXNel. . . . OTFOTE 
pnd’ ud évds amddAvrar 
KUKOD, pte Olkelov pNTeE 
dndov 


a\Xortpiov, Ore 





Phaedr.245 c-246 a: 
Woy) maca 
(1), ro yap 


a@avarov 


a@avaros 
detkivnrov 
TO © ddXo 
tm’ dd Xov 


, ~ » 
KWoULeVvOV, TravAaV EXoV 


KLYOUV Kal 


, z » 
Kkunoews mavAay ێyet 


Cans (2): povoy &) ro 
auto Kwovv, are ovK 


| ~~ is / a7 
amro\etrrov €QUTO, OU TTOTE 


'Anyet Kevovpevov, adda 


@Xors 
KweiTal TOUTO my Kal 
apxn Kunoews (3). dpx7) 
d€ dyéynrov. €& apxis 
yap avaykn may 76 yey- 
vopevov yiyveo Oat, aviv 


dé pnd’ €& eves... . 


\ - or 
Kal TOLS ooa 


> A ‘ > , , ’ 
emetOn) Oe ayéevntov é€o- 
Tw, Kai ddtapOopov avrd 
avaykn eivat. 
‘ A - ’ + 
yap 81 amodopevns ov're 
avrn more &k Tov ovre 
G@Xo €& exeivyns yevn- 
my > > ~ co 
cerat, eimep €& apxis Set 
\ , , 
Ta mavra yiyverOa (4). 
ovta O) KuUncews per 
apx1] TO avTé avTO KivoOUY. 
TOUTO O€ OUT’ amoA\Ava bat 
ovre ylyverOar Suvaror. 
.... abavarov dé Tepa- 
opevov Tov vd’ €éavrov 
duis 
Noyor 


Kwoupevou (5), 


Ned 
ovgiavy Te Kal 


TovTov avTov Tis héywr 
(6). 
mav yap c@pha, @ pev 
cE wbev 


apuxov, @& S€ %doberv 


5 
ovK  aigayuvetrat 


‘ 
TO Kuveto Oar, 
ea € aie 
avT@ €& abrov, euypuxor, 
ec. , + , 
@s TaUTNs ovVaoNns PuTews 
- > 
Wuxns (7): « 8 eorw 
- oa oT 
TOUTO OUT@S EXOV, p21) 
2 > \ pa 
@\Xo Te eivat TO avTo 
€ \ ~ a , 
€avTO Kivovy } Wuxny, 
> ’ nn 
e€ avaykns ayévnrov 
, 


apxis | 





333 


Laws: 
894 E : G6ray €repov 
@Xo jpiy preraBarn, 


Kal touTo dAdo érepor 
del, TOV TOWUT@Y . . OK 
. €OTAL TOTE TL TPaTOV 
petaBaddov. ard’ érav 
avTo. = aro uray 
€repov ddd\owwon, Td 8” 
dpxn 
Ts 
Kunoews dmaons . . 


€repov ado 
Tis avTa@yv éora 
) THs avTHs avTHy Kwy- 
odons peTaorn. 

895 B: dpxnv apa 
Kino e@V Kal 
mpoTnv .. . dnoopev 
dvaykaiws evar T™peoBu- 
TaTNV... 


Tag @V 


ed ia fe - 
C: ¢yvavro rpocepod- 

eo > col 

Mev, OTav avTO avTO KLVH. 


896 a: @ 6 Wuxn 


Tovvopa, Tis  TovTou 
Aoyos ; €xouev idXov 


mAnv Tov viv d1 pyb€vra, 


A ’ 
THY Suvayévny avTny 


avurny KiveivKimnow; . . . 
ixavas OedeiyOar Wuyny 
TAUTOY Ov Kal THY TpaTHY 
yeveow kal Kivnow tev 
Te OvT@y Kal yeyovdtwv 
Kai ecopevayv ... Kun- 


gems admdons  airia 
dra ol. 
904 Cc: peraBadre 


bev toivuy av’ éca 


yet Ee sks aoe 
€TOVYA EOTL 
| MEeroxa eoTe Yuxis, ev 


ae 2 

EQUTOLS KEKTHLEVA THY 17S 
a > , 

preraBoAns airiav. 

959 A: weiBecOa & 
> ‘ Lal 4 \ 
EoTi T@® vowobern xpewv 

dice) (NEYOPRG ccd 2. em 

dA - ' ‘ 
avT@ TO Bi@ TO Tape- 

, c ~ o 
XOpevov Nuov €xagtov 
Tour’ etvar pndev add’ } 


THY Wuxny . 


7 hE Seron 


Parallel- 
ism 
between 
the proof 
in the 
Republic 
and the 
Phaedrus. 


Both 
proofs 
posterior 
to the 
Phaedo. 
They show 
a greater 
certainty, 
an ad- 
vance in 
the form 


334. ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


aay SEN ea Neen > \ > , \ ed ¢ Feb gecd 7 

dvdykn avo del Ov eivat, (Te Kal GOdvatov wWux7 | dvTa nud exacTov OvTws 

ei 8 det dv,aOavaroy(8). |av ein (8). wept pev | dOavarov, Wuyi éxovo- 
611 a: Tovro pev jody dBavacias adris | pa¢duevov, admiévat da- 
, ao > , fie ~ / 

Tolvuy, ovTas exéTw (9). | ikavs (9). | govra Noyov... 


The most striking parallelism is evident between the 
two first proofs. Both begin by a short statement of the 
theorem which has to be proved in what follows (1). Both 
then name a kind of things subject to destruction (2), 
contrasted with another indestructible kind (3). The 
indestructibility of this second kind is then proved by 
elimination of other possible suppositions (4). The 
next step in both arguments is the conclusion that 
a thing corresponding to the above definition is inde- 
structible (5), and the identification of such a thing with 
the soul (6). This identification is brought about in 
the Republic by a longer digression on the possible 
analogies between soul and body (609 B—D) which has 
been here omitted. In the Phaedrus the identification of 
the soul with the self-moving principle is briefly intro- 
duced as a conviction of which nobody needs to be 
ashamed. After this identification in both passages 
follows the special indication of the opposition between 
body and soul (7), the conclusion that the soul is immortal 
(8), in the Phaedrus supplemented by the additional 
determination that it has no beginning, and the whole 
argument concludes by an express statement that the 
proof is deemed sufficient (9). 

If Plato knew any one of these arguments when he 
wrote the Phaedo, he could not have omitted such proofs, 
which are far superior to anything which the dying 
Socrates had to offer to Simmias and Cebes. That those 
proofs were not yet deemed sufficient by Plato himself is 
seen from the exhortation at the end of the Phaedo to 
investigate the subject further (Phaedo 107 B : avayxafouat 
amiotiav étt eye Tap guavT@ Tepi TOV elpnugvwr, SAYS 
Simmias, and Socrates answers: kal tas vmoQeces Tas 
TPOTAS, Kal El TLOTAL Diy Elo, duws eTIoKEeTT Teal Capea Te- 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: PHAEDRUS 339 


pov) which is the opposite of the confident assertion in 
the Republic as well as in the Phaedrus, that the above 
proof is sufficient (Phaedr. 246 A: ixavds, cf. Phaedo 
101 E: gws emi te ixavov 2dXOos). ‘The logical method of 
beginning with the enunciation of the theorem which has 
to be proved, and then stating the axioms on which the 
proof rests, is also an advance beyond the method used in 
the Phaedo. Thus the arguments both of the Republic 
and Phaedrus are clearly later than those of the Phaedo. 
And almost equally probable is the priority of the Re- 
public as compared with the Phaedrus, the latter being 
distinguished by a greater conciseness, by the avoidance of 
induction based on analogy which is used in the Republic, 
by its deductive character based on necessities of thought, 
by the exact co-ordination of immortality or infinite 
future with an infinite past, and above all by its agree- 
ment with the only proof given in the Laws. This is 
a point of the greatest weight : Plato laid great stress on 
the immortality of the soul in the Laws, and out of all 
his arguments in favour of this doctrine he selected the 
proof given in the Phaedrus as adequate (‘cavor) and 
worthy to be repeated in his latest work. This confirms 
our view that the Phaedrus is nearer to the Laws than 
the Phaedo and Republic, which are the only other works 
of Plato containing logical argumentation about immor- 
tality. After the Phaedrus Plato thought it superfluous 
to look for new arguments, and whenever he spoke about 
immortality he took it as well established and certain, or 
he added only, as in the Ti%maeus, mythical representa- 
tions fit for popularising one of his favourite theories. 
The comparison with the Laws disposes also of every 
doubt about the author’s intention to apply his proof to 
the individual soul of every man.” Whatever Plato 


285 Some ancient interpreters thought that ~ux} maca means ‘the whole 
soul in the universe,’ and this artificial interpretation has been accepted also 
by Teichmiiller (I. 63), who contends that Plato did not admit individual 
immortality, against the evidence of the texts. But Walbe’s very special 


of expres- 
sion, 
carried 
further 
in the 
Phaedrus 
than in 
the 
Republic. 


Coinci- 
dence of 
Phaedrus 
with the 
Laws. 


In both 
cases the 
individual 


soul is 
meant, as 
results 
from a 
com- 
parison 
between 
Phaedo 
and the 
Laws. 


Doctrine 
of the 
parts of 
the soul in 
Phaedrus 
and 
Fiepublic. 


336 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


thought later about the relation of individual souls to the 
whole or to God, there is no possible doubt that he taught 
individual immortality as a rational theory from the 
Phaedo up to the Laws. There is no need to infer with 
Teichmiiller that those who read this teaching in Plato’s 
works make him an adherent of atomism or monado- 
logism. Individual souls can have a common origin 
and an universal direction, remaining all the same 
immortal, and always equal in number, as we read in 
the Republic as well as in the Timaeus. The Platonic 
doctrine was that the inward personality by no means 
needs the body for its existence: 


Phaedo115 cD: ot relOw Kpiteva, Legg. 959: ovdémrore oiko- 
os eyo ete odtos 6 S@xparns, 6 Pbopeiv xpy Siadhepovras, vopifovra 
yuvi Ovadeyopevos .. « G\N olerai Tov avTov TodTOY eivaL TOY TOV 
pe ekeivoy eivar, bv oYerac OALyov capK@v oyKovy Oanropevoy, aN’ 
VaoTepov vexpov, Kai epwTa On, Ts ekeivov . . . OvTiwd Tis padicO’ 

/ 3 A , ‘ , c cal cal uu m” 
pe Odntn .. . emevday riw TO ap-  yetrae ToOGy Burra, otyerOa 


> 4 ¢ os cal IAN’ ’ r ‘ > rx /, A 
Pakoy, OUKETL UpMLV TApapevo, a. TEPAlvovTa Kal EMT LLTAQVTa THY 
c a a 
olxnoopat amidy Os auToNvu potpav. 


This doctrine, common to the Phaedo with the twelfth 
book of the Laws, unchanged in the course of thirty years 
and more between these writings, results with equal 
stringency from the Phaedrus as from the Republic, since 
in both the soul is opposed to the body, and immortality 
predicated of the pure soul. 

We had to dwell at some length on these comparisons, 
because of their importance for the order of the dialogues, 
and also because they illustrate a logical progress of 
method. Plato’s increased power of exact argumentation 
did not prevent him from indulging in his favourite 
manner of mythical allegories, as we see in the shape 
which he gives in the Phaedrus to the other chief 
psychological doctrine of the Republic, namely the three- 


investigation on the use of mas in Plato (see note 135) proves that here 
Wux} mwaoa means ‘each soul’ or ‘all individual souls,’ and not, as 
Thompson translates, ‘the vital principle in general’ (Jowett: ‘the soul 
through all her being’). 


MIDDLE PLATONISM : PHAEDRUS 337 
fold partition of the soul. But even in this mythical 
shape a certain development of doctrine is noticeable. 

The @uyos was defined in the Republic as 16 6 Ovpotrat 
(580 pD), and we have there interpreted it as the moral 
feeling. This interpretation finds its confirmation in the 
Phaedrus. Plato must have felt the terms @uuos and 
Oupoeidés to be too narrow, and this explains why Odupoedes 
as a faculty of the soul has never been used by Plato after 
the Republic except in the recapitulation of the Tvmaeus 
(18 4). In the Phaedrus the moral feeling is represented 
under the image of a beautiful and good horse of noble 
breeding (2468), full of ambition, but also the lover of 
temperance and honour, following right opinion and 
amenable to reason (253 D). 

This 1s a wider determination than that given in the 
Republic, and also the classification of men according to 
their capacities is much enlarged. There we had only 
three kinds of men, divided according to the prevalence of 
one or another faculty. Here we find twelve kinds of 
souls, each of which has its own different ideal (247 A) 
allegorically represented by one of the Olympian gods. 
We need not attach any special importance to the number 
twelve, which is here accommodated to the mythological 
form. But it is certainly characteristic that Plato admits 
a great variety of souls not only in the myth of the 
dialogue, but also in the following conversation (271 B: 
Wouyjs yévn), and this reveals an enlarged view of human 
nature. Here, as in former writings, the philosopher is 
placed above all other kinds of men, as following the 
band or chorus of Zeus (248D: tiv wreiota idodcay els 
youny .. . dtrocodov, cf. 2528). He is here named a 
leader of men by his very nature (252 E: diddcodds TE Kai 
Hyspovixos tv dvow) whereby the result of the long 
explanation of the Republic about the leadership of 
philosophers is briefly assumed as certain. A still stronger 
sign of the increasing educational influence of Plato is 
that he once uses ‘we’ (250 B: #uets) without any nearer 

Z 


Wider 
determi- 
nation of 
the moral 
feeling. 


Classi- 
fication 

of men 
exceeds 
thenarrow 
limits 
drawn 

in the 
Republic. 


Philo- 
sopher 
assumed 
to be a 
leader of 
men. 


Authority 
of the 
philo- 
sopher 
above all 
other 
men. 


Ideal 
philo- 
sopher 
similar 
to God. 


Divine 
philo- 
sophy. 


Ideas con- 


templated 
by reason 
not the 


senses. 


338 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


determination, in the meaning ‘the philosophers.” The 
writer has already a sufficient public of readers among his 
pupils to feel certain that he will not be misunderstood. 
But he insists repeatedly on the scarcity of philosophical 
natures (250 A: oAuyae AsiTrovTaL, ais TO THS uVYHENS (Kavos 
mapeoti,. . . 250B: poys adta@v Kai ortyot ei Tas EiKovas 
tovtes Oe@vtat TO TOU eikacbévTos yévos). 

No authority is binding for the thinker but his own 
reason (270C: yp mpos Té ‘Immoxpater Tov oyov z€eTa- 
Covta oxorrety, ef cuppovet), and the philosopher proclaims 
his superiority not only above the poets, as in the 
Republic, but above the law-givers and orators; only 
when they are philosophers do any of these deserve our 
esteem (278cpD). This contempt for the eminence of 
fame and vulgar opinion (274C: adv@pwrivav dogacuatwv) 
shows a great distance from the Symposium. That the 
term dirdocodos is here introduced in opposition to cous 
(278 p) is a rhetorical artifice, ike the novelty of immor- 
tality in the Republic, while in another passage the 
dialectician is compared to a god, whom even Socrates 
would follow with delight (2668). Moreover, the 
ideal of the philosopher appears here, as later in the 
Laws, more and more supplanted by the ideal of a God, 
to whom the philosopher is similar. But in so far as any 
comparison of a philosopher with other men is made, the 
superiority of the philosopher accentuates itself more and 
more. Philosophy is divine (239B: Osta dirocopia) as in 
the Timaeus (474A: dirocodias petlov ayalov ovr’ HrOev 
ov HEev Tote TO Ovn~@ yever Swpnbev ex Ozeav, cf. Phil. 
16C: @sdv cis avOpwrovs docs), and leads her votaries to 
please gods not men (274 A). 

In the mythical part of the Phaedrus the ideas are 
still spoken of as contemplated by reason (247 C: 7 aypo- 
waros TE Kal AoYNpaTLOTOS Kal dvapns ovala dvTwS OUTa,.. . 
pove OeaTn v@), and appear to be objective (247 DE: Katopa 
_. . OLKALOTUUNY . . . ETLTTH UNV, OVX 7) YéEVETLS TPOTECTW .. . 
Gra tiv sv TO 6 éoTw Ov dvTwS ericTHunY ovcay), With 


MIDDLE PLATONISM : PHAEDRUS 339 


the express caution that they cannot be seen through our 
bodily eyes (250 D: dee Ppdvnors ody opadta). At all 
events the theory of an immanence of the ideas, as taught 
in the Symposiwm, and to a certain extent in the Phaedo, 
is supplanted by the view of a similarity or imitation of 
the ideas by the things which has been already indicated in 
the Phaedo and accepted in the Republic. The particular 
thing is an image of the idea (ouodwpa, 250 A, B) which 
it imitates (251 A: Geoedés tpoowroy Kaos Ed mELipn- 
MévOV 1) TWA GwWuaTos LOgav). 

We must translate this metaphorical speech into 
abstract thought in order to learn whether the writer of 
the Phaedrus continued in his belief of separate ideas. 
And the metaphors here used might well be applied to 
general notions. There are some hints pointing in this 
direction. Amidst all the imagery of the space above 
heaven appears a very dry explanation of the difference 
between man and animals. Man must understand general 
notions which are the result of the union by means of 
reasoning into one concept of what appears to the senses 
as a manifold variety (249 B: de? adv@pwrov Evévat TO Kat’ 
eidos Neyouevoy, 2x ToAA@Y lov alcOncEwr eis Ev NOYITU@™ 
Evvaipovpévwv). This is given as an explanation of the 
preceding metaphorical assertion that no soul is incarnated 
into the form of man without having enjoyed the super- 
celestial vision of true substance and science. If we 
follow this example set by Plato himself in the interpre- 
tation of his allegories, we soon get quit of the riddle of 
self-existing ideas. Plato does not require us to take his 
mythical allegories literally: he says clearly that he does 
not insist on everything said in the myth (265 B: icws 
pev adnOods twos éhartopuevor, Taxa 8 av Kal ANNOCE 
Tupadepomevol, KEepacavTes ov TavTaTracw imlGavov ddyor, 
pudixoy Twa buvov Tpocenatcapmev petpiws Te Kal evpypuos), 
and confesses to have mixed truth with fiction. Thus we 
are at liberty to interpret the allegories and to distinguish 
truth from fiction. That ‘beyond the limits of the stars 

z2 


Ideas as 
models of 
Being 
might 
well be 
identical 
with 
general 
notions. 
Faculty 
of per- 
ceiving 
unity of 
species 
in the 
variety 
of appear- 
ances a 
privilege 
of man. 


Metaphors 
about 
ideas 


could refer 
to general 
notions. 


Ideas of 
Plato and 
of Kant. 


Ideas 
formed by 
the study 
of par- 
ticulars. 


Subdi- 
vision of 
ideas into 
natural 


340 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


exist pure ideas without shape or colour, intangible and 
invisible, not fixed in sensible particulars, but free and 
independent,’ means only: that pure concepts of reason 
are never fully realised in the things to which they apply, 
as for instance, absolute equality is never found identical 
with physical equality. 

Our interpretation is apphable even to the ideas of the 
Phaedo, though there we had not such an express authori- 
sation of free interpretation as in the Phaedrus, where 
the whole mythical account is called a pleasant play 
(265 ©: haivetat Ta pév GAda TO OvTL TALOLA TETTatcGaL) In 
which the only serious thing is the double way from 
particular things to the general idea, and from the idea 
to all its particular kinds. Here (édéa and eidos are used 
in a meaning which is identical with the idea as conceived 
by Kant, a necessary concept of reason. The synthetic 
union of scattered particulars is clearly a condition of 
consistent definition for the purposes of teaching (265 D: 
eis play TE lozay GUVOPAVTA aye TA ToAAAXH SisoTTAappEva, 
iva ExacTov opitomevos SHAov Tron, wept ov av asi SiddoKEy 
202dy .. .). The test of self-consistency is already stated 
in the first Socratic speech as the indispensable condition 
of knowledge (237 ©: tods wodAovs AEANOEV STL OvK ioact 
THY ovolay éExdoTOV'’ @s ody EldoTes Ov SiOopfoAoyovVTAL é2v 
apyn THs oKeYEews, TpoEovTes b= . . . OUTE EaUTOIs OTE 
aAM)AOLs O“oroyodow). Substance is even used as a 
synonym of definition (245 E: ovcelay te Kai doyov, cf. 
270 H: THv ovoiay SelEev axpi8@s Ths Pvoews ToUTOV, Tpos 
0 Tovs AOYoUS Mpogoicst). 

The ideas appear as a result of the study of particulars, 
not found in the particulars, nor taken from the particulars, 
but discovered by reason in the act of defining each par- 
ticular (273 E: Kat’ eidn diaipstoOar Ta dvta Kai pid idea 
cal’ $y ExacTov Teprrau Pavey). When once a general idea 
is formed, it becomes the dialectician’s aim to subdivide 
it into kinds, not artificially, but nto natural kinds (265 BE: 


TO Tad Kal TA Eidn OtvacOat Témvey KaT ApOpa, 4) TepuKEY) 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: PHAEDRUS 341 


which are distinguished from accidental parts. This 
division and classification must proceed to the point of 
indivisibility (277 B: wav 6pifecPar, opicawevos Te Tadw 
Kat’ elon pzypt Tod atpjtou Téuvew). This method (pe@od0s, 
269 v, 270 c, D) shows the relation between each particular 
and the whole, neither soul nor body nor anything being 
perfectly known if studied apart from everything else 
(270 c: »~ruyis dvow aEiws NOyou Katuvojcat (advvaTov) ... 
ovde THpatos ... avev THs TOU OXov dioews). The first step 
of investigation is to ask whether a proposed object is 
simple or manifold, indivisible or divisible (270 D: mpa@tov 
bev, aTovv 1) TONUVELOES ZoTLY . . . Set diavoeio@at). 

The method of definition and division of notions differs 
from the divine intuition of ideas. And along with this 
transition from metaphysic to logic, the efficient cause, 
despised in the Phaedo, regains its rights. We are asked 
in the case of a simple element to investigate its active or 
passive capability in relation to other things (270 D: day 
wey aTodv H, oKoTrEly THY SUvapW adTod, Tiva Tpos TL Tépv- 
Kev els tO Spav éyov i) Tiva eis TO TaUeiv Ure Tov), while in 
dealing with a compound whole, we have to divide it into 
its kinds or elements, and then to look for the activity 
and passivity of each of them (270 D: gay 62 TAslw eid 
Zyn, Tadta apiOunodpevov, Orep 2h vos, TotT’ idstv eq’ 
EKATTOU, TO Th ToLely aVTO TehuKEY 7) TH TL TraOEiv br TOv;). 
The recognition of efficient causes corresponds to the 
higher esteem of Anaxagoras, and to the definition of the 
soul as a self-moving principle. This removes at once all 
possibility of believing the Phaedo to have been written 
later than the Phaedrus, as the importance of efficient 
causes is constantly recognised in all later works, for 
example in the Timaeus and the Laws. 

The Phaedrus is a work of the greatest inspiration; it 
contains in the most natural exposition the germs of much 
that was later worked out by Plato, and it betrays also a 
greater range of study than the Phaedo. Dialectic as a 
science of Being based’ on definition and division is the 


kinds 
brings 
them into 
mutual 
relations 
to each 
other. 


Transi- 
tion from 
meta- 
physics 
to logic. 


Division 
of things 
into their 
elements. 


Efficient 
causes 
recog- 
nised. 


Dialectic 
based on 


definition 
and divi- 
sion ap- 
plied to 
teaching, 
leads 

to the 
greatest 
human 
happiness. 


Natural 
conditions 
of 
eloquence 
contrasted 
with the 
art of 
rhetoric. 


Suitable 
disposi- 
tion of 
the parts 
of a dis- 
course. 


342 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


fulfilment of what had been postulated in the earlier work. 
Its chief application is clearly shown according to the 
ethical rules explained in the Republic: he who knows is 
bound in duty to teach. The teacher writes imperishable 
lines in his pupil’s immortal soul, imparting a living know- 
ledge, together with the ability to defend it against errors 
(276 A: Tod eiddTos Aoyos Cov Kal Eurbuyos. . . ypadhetat ev 77 
Tod pavOavovtos Wuyn, Svvatos wév apivar EavTO, eTLOTH LOY 
df Adyeww Te Ka ovyav Tpos ovs det). For this he requires 
dialectical art (2768: rH dvadexting Téyvn ypeuevos) and 
must make a proper selection of receptive souls (AaBwv 
ux tpooyxoveay). Then his activity will yield eternal 
fruits and procure the highest happiness attainable by 
man (277A: Adyous, of odyi akaprror adXa ExYOVTES oTeppA, 
60ev adror ev aArots HOEce duopevor TovT asl aBdvaTov 
Tapéyew ikavol, Tov eXovTa svdatpovEty ToLOdYTES Els OoOV 
avOpor@ Suyatov wadioTa). 

An art of rhetoric is recognised as useful, but the essen- 
tial conditions of a good speaker are: innate ability, exercise, 
and knowledge of the subject on which he intends to 
speak. If to these conditions we wish to add the 
euidance of art, then we are asked to look for much more 
than has been offered by rhetors and grammarians, who 
were able only to invent such elementary rules as are 
preparatory to the art, much as the rules for tuning a 
musical instrument are preparatory to a theory of harmony 
(268 8). True eloquence requires, besides a perfect know- 
ledge of the subject dealt with (262 c), also an excellent 
formal arrangement of the contents (236 A). Hach 
speech must consist of well-proportioned parts, and have 
a proper beginning as well as a suitable conclusion, with 
such a disposition of the contents that each part shall have 

*86 Strangely enough this knowledge (émotfun 269 p) has been mis- 
understood by many interpreters as if it meant knowledge of the rules of 
rhetoric. Even E. Holzner (‘ Platos Phaedrus und die Sophistenrede des 
Isokrates,’ Prager Studien, Heft IV. Prag 1894), who corrects the error of 
those who identified this émiorhu with the following téxvn, falls into an 


almost worse error in asserting the identity of ém:orjun in this passage with 
Ta mpd TIS TEXYNS avayKaia walhuara 269 B. This misconception is due to 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: PHAEDRUS 343 


its proper place, being the continuation of what precedes 
and preparing what follows (264 C: wéoa kat axpa, TpémovTa 
adAjroLs Kal TO CAM yeypapypéeva). A speech must not be 
like those verses which can be read in any order (264 D). 
There are rhetorical necessities which determine the 
placing of each part of a discourse (2648: 70 devT<por 
elpnuévov 2x Tevos avayKns SevTEpov TEFHvat). 

In order to arrive at this perfection, an art is required 
far above anything known heretofore by the name of 
rhetoric (266 D). This art will teach us to lead souls by 
means of speech (261 A : Wuyayvwyla dia Noyov) not only in 
tribunals and on the market place, but in every circum- 
stance of life, small or great (261 B: 7 adT) cpiKpor Te Kal 
peyddwv Trépl, Kal ovdev EvTLOTEpoY TO ye GoOOY TEpi TTrOUdaia 
} wept haddra yuyvopevov). The true speaker must begin 
an abuse of comparison with Isocrates’ oration against the Sophists, without 
taking into account his later works, and earlier opinions of others : 


Isocrates, in sophist.| Plato, Phaedr.269p:| Isocr. Antidosis (Or. 


(Or. xiii.) § 17 (294d): 
dey Toy pev pabnriy 
mpos TH Thy piow Exew | 


> / « Ul / 
ei mev cor bmdpxet pioet 
pnropiK@ elvan, Ever PHTwp 


| xv.) § 187: (Steph. p. 93). 
| de? Tovs wéAAovTas diol- 
cew 4) wep) Tovs Adyous 


olay xph, Ta mev cl5n TAT GY | EAACYMOS, TpOTAGBaY em- 7) wep! Tas mpdtes.. . 


Adywv pabety, wep) BE Tas oThuny TE Kad per€TnY. Tp@Tov mpos TOTO TEpu- 


xphoes avtav yuuvac- Cf. 237 c: cidévar Set Kevar Karkd@s .. . Emerta 

Ojvat. (About 390 B.c.) epi of dy 7 7 Bovah . . . TardevOjvar Kal AaBetv 
Cf. Plato Prot. 323 c: 259 EB: tmdpxew Set thy emiorhuny ris by 

ov pice GAAG Sidaxrdy Tois «d ye Kal Karas 7 mepl ExdoTov, Tplrov 

re Kal e& émmedclas mapa- pnOnocouevois thy Tov de evrpiBeis yeveo Bat 

yiyvecba. ‘Aé€yovtos Sidvoway eidviay Kal yupvacOjva 
Xenoph. Memor. II. | TaAnbes av ty epey mépt | About 353 B.c. 

vi. 39: dperas mdoas mérdn. 


pabhoe. Te Kal pedrérn | 

avgavouevas. IV. i. 3: al dpioras SoKotoa clva pices uddiora Taidcias Séovrat. 
See also Alkidamas’ rep) cogiorGy as quoted by Gercke (Hermes, vol. xxxii. 
pp. 362-364, Berlin 1897) who is, however, inclined to invert the chrono- 
logical relations. 


Here it is by no means certain that Plato had in view the much earlier 
work of Isocrates, as the three conditions of success were a commonplace 
and needed not to be invented by Plato or by Isocrates. Now it is very 
important to observe that Isocrates thought, in 390, that only the know- 
ledge of rhetoric is required, while thirty-seven years later he agrees with 
Plato in asking for a knowledge of the subject. That in the Phaedrus 
émiot/un means knowledge of the subject is evident from the other passages 
and from the opposition of this knowledge to Téxv7. 


Each part 
from the 
beginning 
to the 

end has 
its proper 
place. 


New con- 
ception of 
rhetoric. 


Classifica- 
tion of 
souls and 
of kinds 
of oratory. 


Plato did 
not write 
a hand- 
book of 
rhetoric, 
being 
therein 
very diffe- 
rent from 
Aristotle. 
Plato’s 
works 
retain 
always 
their 
dramatic 
character. 
They re- 
cord his 
own oral 
teaching. 
He was 
able to 
speak 
better than 
he wrote, 


344 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


by studying all kinds of souls and their classification 
(271D: avayKn eidévar uyn oa eidn zyev). Plato does not 
enumerate here these kinds, but those enumerated by 
Aristotle are probably due to a great extent to Plato’s teach- 
ing. The next step is to determine what can act on a 
soul, and what are the limits of the soul’s action (271a: 
OT@ TL ToLEiy 1) Tabety Ure Tov Twéduxev). After a careful 
classification of souls and.of kinds of oratory, a special 
inquiry is needed to show what kind of speech acts on 
each kind of soul, and why it has this power (271 B: 6dca- 
TaEdwEVOS TA AOYOY TE Ka WUXHS yevn Kal TA TOUT@OY TAOHwaTA 
dleiot Tas aitias, cieaaeon aes EKAOTOD EKATTH Kal OLOdTKO)Y, 
ola ovoa vd’ olwy AOyov Ou Hv aitiay #2 yaa: 1 bev 
mevOstat, 1) 6& aTreiOet). 

This clear programme of a future rhetoric has been 
so exactly followed up by Aristotle in his work on the 
same subject that probably Plato’s special teaching on 
that matter is preserved in his pupil’s exposition. Plato 
himself left no written system of rhetoric, because he did 
not write for the purpose of teaching, but for the artistic 
reminiscence of some new thoughts, or in order to refute 
the enemies of philosophy. All his works, even the Laws, 
preserve that character of art which is absent from the © 
works of Aristotle. Systematic teaching was probably 
given by Plato to his pupils, and transmitted by them to 
the following generations in the Academy. But he appears 
not to have thought it a convenient subject for written 
exposition. There is some dramatic character in his 
works even when they contain such dry enumerations as 
we find in the Sophist and Timaeus. Also in the present 
day, though writing is so much easier, some eloquent men 
write little. 

We may well believe Plato when he says that his 
eloquence was still greater than his literary skill (278 c: 
Adyov avTos duvaTos Ta yEeypapmeva hadra arodeiEat), as he 
expressly asks every great writer to be able to speak better 
than he wrote. This is certainly not a common faculty, 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: PHAEDRUS 345 


and many great writers would disagree with Plato. He 
judged evidently according to his own experience, and his 
power of oral eloquence has been unanimously praised by 
the tradition of bis times. This explains why Plato in a 
much longer life wrote much less than Aristotle. Aristotle, 
owing his initiation to Plato, may have been older when he 
began to write than Plato was, since Plato at the age of 
twenty-eight was emancipated from the influence of his 
teacher, while Aristotle remained under some influence of 
Plato up to the age of thirty-seven. If we assume that 
both began their literary activity about the same early age 
of twenty-eight, then Plato wrote during fifty-two years, 
and Aristotle only during thirty-four. But the extant 
works of Aristotle are considerably more than twice as 
long as all the works of Plato, though many works 
of Aristotle are lost, while we have all the works of 
Plato. This leads us to the conclusion that Aristotle 
wrote four or five times more copiously than Plato, and 
this implies a great difference of views about the use 
of writing. It is clear that many things written out 
by Aristotle were not held by Plato as fit for hterary 
representation. 

We must not judge about this from our present point 
of view, accustomed as we are to learn chiefly from books. 
In Plato’s times, and in his own opinion, oral teaching stood 
much higher than written handbooks, and this was a natural 
consequence of the difficulty of writing and reproducing 
written matter. It has been frequently argued from the 
celebrated passage on literary composition at the end of 
the Phaedrus that Plato despised writing altogether. 
This is certainly a very exaggerated inference. He calls 
writing a play, but at the same time insists on the 
superiority of this philosophical play over the vulgar 
diversions of other people (276 D: wayKadnv ratdidv, Tob 
éy Noyous Suvapmévou Trailer, Suxatocurys TE Kal GAwY OY 
Aéyers wept pvOoroyobvta). ‘To fable about justice, as had 
been done in the Republic, is one of the most beautiful 


and he 
wrote 
much less 
than 
Aristotle, 
though he 
lived 
longer. 


Difference 
of Plato’s 
and Aris- 
totle’s 
views on 
literary 
compo- 
sition. 


Plato 
did not 
despise 
writing. 


This 
was for 
him the 
noblest 
play. 


Reference 
to the 


Republic 
in a 
passage 

of the 
Phaedrus. 


The 
Phaedrus 
invites the 
reader to 
join the 
school. 
Invitation 
to learn 
philo- 
sophy ex- 
tended to 


Isocrates. 


346 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


amusements for a divine man. There is no reason to 
think that Plato would not have spoken so lghtly of 
writing after his great work. On the contrary, it is 
psychologically probable that he would not have spoken 
thus without the full consciousness of being a great 
writer (cf. Laws 968 ©, where the same thought recurs 
at the end of Plato’s largest work). It would not suit 
his artistic intention to despise writing if he had not 
already proved that he is a master in it, and that his 
contempt is not a consequence of impotence. And he 
has a very definite rhetorical and artistic purpose in this 
passage. 

After an encomium on his own written myth put in 
the mouth of Phaedrus (257c: tov doyov 62 cou Tarat 
Oavpacas Zyw), admitted even by Socrates with the poetical 
pretext of inspiration due to the Nymphs (263D: éc@ 
Aeyers Teyvixwtépas Nopdas . . . Avolov mpos doyous sivat), 
it is his purpose to raise the reader’s expectation to the 
highest pitch by announcing that this beautiful sample of 
written eloquence is nothing as compared with his oral 
teaching. The Phaedrus, like the Symposium, Euthy- 
demus, and some other works, is written not only for the 
pupils, but also for those who followed wrong paths out- 
side of the Academy, inviting them to joi the School. 
Invitations are extended even to those about whom no 
hope could be left. Lysias is told to learn dialectic, and 
what has been held for a eulogy on Isocrates is rather an 
ironic invitation to learn true philosophy. Anybody who 
reads Isocrates’ Panegyricus, written in 380 B.Cc., or 
about the same time when Plato was occupied with the 
Republic, will understand that Isocrates could not be 
flattered by such a form of recognition as that which we 
see in the Phaedrus. 

The recognition was meant sincerely, as also the 
merits attributed to Pericles (269 A), Prodikos, Polos, 
Hippias (267 B), Protagoras (267 c: Upwrayopsa.. . 
Tora Kal Kadd), even to Sophocles and Euripides (268 c) 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: PHAEDRUS 347 


who are named as the greatest poets, without any 
reference to the general low appreciation of poetry. In 
no other work of Plato is that same spirit of benevolence 
and conciliation shown, and this disposition of mind is 
best explained after a great success, like the production 
of the Republic. But certainly Isocrates pretended to 
more than to be preferred to Lysias (279 A), to hear that 
‘some philosophy’ is manifest in his character (279B: 
éveotl Tus hidocodpla 77 Tod «vdpos dvavoiq) and to be advised 
to take a more divine start (279 A: opun @eorgpa) than 
his present pursuits, if he cares to do better than to 
excel ‘in later age’ all orators (279A: ovdéy av yevorto 
Oavpactov tpoiovons THs HruKias, el... TAY 1) Traldwv 
Suevéyko. TOV TeTOTE ayayevwv Oywv). This prophecy 
is at once shown in its relative value, when we read in 
continuation that there is something far greater (ww) 
than to excel all orators, something requiring a divine 
power, and this is nothing else than Plato’s educational 
activity. 

Isocrates repeatedly pretends to be a representative 
of true philosophy (for instance Panegyric. §10) and he 
must have felt humiliated by Plato’s judgment of his 
relative merits. Thompson!” has shown at least one 
passage of the Phaedrus which clearly criticises a preten- 
sion of Isocrates as proffered in the Panegyricus : 


Tsoer. (Or. iv. p.42 cp) Panegyr. 
§ 8: ened & of Adyor rovavTny 
mn \ , ef a Ae wes 
exovor THY Piow oO otdv 7’ eiva 
Tept TOV av’Ta@v ToAayas eEnynoac- 
Oat, kai Ta peydda Tarewd Tomoa 
kai Tots puxpois reyeOos mrepibeivat, 

ie ‘ . Be ee 
kal Ta Te wadaa Kawas SueOeiv Kal 

‘ r 

TEPLT@V VeMaTl yeyeynuevav apxYaiws 
elmetv, ovKeTL GheuKTéov Tad’ €oTi, 
Tepl @v €Tepot mporepuv eipnkacy, 
> > chee: > ce , 
a)’ Gpewor exeivoy eirretv Tetparéov. 


Plato Phaedr. 267A: Turiav b¢ 
Topyiav te édcopev cvdew, ot mpd 
a > n \ Ade Sy: € 
Tav adnOav ta eikdta ecidov ows 
Tuyuintréa paAdov, Ta Te av optKpa 
peyadha kat Ta peyada opuikpa 
paiver Oa rovotaw dia popny Adyou 
evaytia 


, > , / > 
Kalva TE apxalws TA T 


cal / 
Kaw@s, ovvToutav te Adywr Kat 
, ~ 
ameipa pynkn mepl mavr@v avndpov ; 
”~ ‘ > , , , 
tadra O€ dxkovwy more jou Ipddukos 


eyedacev. 


Here we see that an artifice which Isocrates recom- 
mended as useful is attributed by Plato to Isocrates’ 


Spirit of 
benevo- 
lence and 
concilia- 
tion. 


Moderate 
recogni- 
tion of 
Tsocrates 
could 
not be 
accepted 
as satis- 
factory 
by him. 


Relation 
between 
the 
Phaedrus 
and 
Isocrates’ 
Panegyri- 
cus dis- 
covered by 
Thomp- 
son, 
though 
already 


alluded 
to by 
Cicero. 


Mention of 
Isocrates 
as at- 
tempting 
a new 
kind of 
speeches 
refers to 
the Pane- 
GYTICUS AS 
Teich- 
miiller 
demon- 
strated. 


This in- 
ference 
confirmed 
by an ob- 
servation 
of 
Diimmler, 
though he 
professes 
another 
opinion 
as to the 
Phaedrus. 


Pretended 
early date 
of the 

Phaedrus. 


348 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


teacher Gorgias, and condemned by the remark that he 
who would follow this advice would be obliged to esteem 
probability more highly than truth, and deserved the 
laughter of Prodikos. 

This relation of the Phaedrus to the Panegyricus, 
already implied by Cicero (Orator, xiii. 37), and again dis- 
covered by Thompson, gives a precious chronologic indica- 
tion, as the Panegyricus is known to have been published 
in 380 B.c. The date of the Phaedrus is thus indicated by 
an anachronism of Plato almost similar to that of the 
Symposium, because he puts in the mouth of Socrates the 
prediction that Isocrates would easily excel all orators if he 
continues to write such speeches as those on which he 
works now (279 A: Noyous, ois viv émuyetpet). This ‘now’ 
cannot refer to the lifetime of Socrates, as then Isocrates 
wrote forensic speeches not deserving even that restricted 
recognition which Plato expresses in the Phaedrus. And, 
as Teichmiiller (ignorimg Thompson) demonstrated in a 
most convincing way, no earlier work of Isocrates than 
the Panegyricus could educe from Plato any appro- 
bation. This is unexpectedly confirmed by Dimmler, 
though he continues to believe in an early date of the 
Phaedrus (Chronologische Beitrdge, p. 11). Diimmler 
sees in a later work of Isocrates (Antidosis, §62) a clear 
allusion to a conditional approbation of the Panegyricus, 
though he does not refer this mention to the Phaedrus, 
but to the Republic (426 cD). Itis more probable that 
Isocrates when he wrote the Panegyricus already knew 
Plato’s views on the relation between Hellenes and 
Barbarians (Rep. 470), though this cannot easily be made 
evident. 

The date of the Phaedrus is one of those problems in 
Platonic chronology on which a great wealth of ingenious 
supposition has been spent in vain. The strangest of all 
possible errors was the thought that the Phaedrus could 
have been written in the lifetime of Socrates. This is a 
result of purely philological combinations, without any 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: PHAEDRUS 349 


consideration of the philosophical contents, which betray 
a date at least as late as the Republic, and undoubtedly 
later than the Phaedo. What reasons Diogenes Laertius 
had for his observation that the subject of the Phaedrus 
has something juvenile in it, is unknown. Probably he 
held with many superficial readers the subject to be illicit 
love, not philosophical rhetoric. In our century Schleier- 
macher was the first to proclaim that the Phaedrus must 
be one of the earliest works of Plato on the ground of its 
philosophical poverty. He says that the philosophical 
contents in the Phaedrus are not yet mature for a dialec- 
tical exposition (vol. i. p. 67), for which were substituted 
strength of passion and questions of method. He seems 
to believe that investigations of method are particularly 
proper to the youth of a philosopher. According to such 
a standard Kant’s Kritik might have been written thirty 
years earlier than it was. 

Another argument is the poetical language of the 
Phaedrus, which reminds Schleiermacher of the tradi- 
tion about Plato’s verses which he was said to have burnt 
when he knew Socrates. This argument is fully refuted 
by the great number of stylistic coincidences with the 
Laws which are found in the Phaedrus. Schleiermacher 
sees also a sign of early date in the triumphant confid- 
ence of the dialogue. If Plato had such confidence at 
the age of twenty-five, how could he have lost it in the 
Protagoras and Meno? ‘This question is left unanswered 
by Schleiermacher. The contempt of writing, argues 
Schleiermacher, is unthinkable in a man who has written 
already very much. But Plato does not despise writing 
at all, and he states it expressly (258 D: cwavti dfXov te 
ovUK aiaxpov a’Td ye TO ypapew Noyous) —he despises only 
bad writing (éxeivo aicypov 75n, TO yn KAaABS NéEyeLV TE Kal 
ypabev) and the cult of mere literary erudition (275 D: 
TAgOv TL OlOpEvos Elvat AOYoUS YyEypampméevous TCD TOV ELdoTAa 
irouvncat wept Ov av 4 TA YyEeypaupeva) Which substitutes 
opinions for knowledge (275 B: wodvijKoo yap cou yevopevor 


Schleier- 
macher 
complains 
of the 
philo- 
sophical 
poverty 

of the 
Phaedrus. 


Poetical 
language. 


Trium- 
phant 
con- 
fidence. 


Contempt 
of mere 
erudition, 
not of 
literature. 


Mention of 
Isocrates 
is not a 
sign of un- 
reserved 
approba- 
tion, only 
a recogni- 
tion of his 
superior- 
ity to other 
orators. 


Solemnity 
of style. 


Mention of 
Sophocles 
and 
Euripides 
used by 
Ast as 
chrono- 
logical 
indication. 


350 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


dvev Sidaxyis modkvyvepoves sivac So€ovow . . . do€dcopar 
yeyovotes avti ocpov), and leads men to spend all their 
attention on the form, making it impossible for such 
mechanical writers to have a clear view of general ideas 
(248 B: moddy Eyovca Tovov atENEis THs Tod ovTOs Eas 
aTrEpYOVTAL). 

What Plato wanted, is that anybody who pretended, 
like Isocrates, to be named a philosopher, should be able 
to impart to his pupils something better than speeches 
corrected over and over during many years lke the 
Panegyricus of which that rhetor was so proud. The 
Platonic Socrates recommends Phaedrus to say that to 
Lysias (278 DE), but Phaedrus asks whether the same 
does not apply to Isocrates, and the answer is not in the 
negative: more talent (279 A: ra 7hs d¥cews) and a nobler 
character (700 yevvexwtépw) are not denied to the author of 
the Panegyricus, but he is left only the first place among 
orators, not allowed to rank among philosophers until he 
shall yield to a more divine inspiration. 

What Schleiermacher quotes besides as a sign of 
youthfulness, an exaggerated solemnity in some passages, 
has been demonstrated by Campbell to be a peculiarity of 
later style. The mention of Polemarchos, Lysias’ brother, 
as a pupil of Socrates appears to Schleiermacher most 
probable in the lifetime of Polemarchos, who was poisoned 
four years before Socrates (Lysias contra LHratosth. 
§§ 17,18). But Polemarchos is also introduced in a work 
written long after his death (Rep.). 

Ast saw in the Phaedrus Pythagorean influence, and 
a great similarity to the Tvmaeus (pp. 106-107), but this 
did not prevent him from following Schleiermacher in 
identifying the supposed date of the conversation with 
the date of the composition. He added to Schleier- 
macher’s arguments only one very curious reason: 
Sophocles and Euripides are spoken of as living, and 
therefore the Phaedrus must be written before 406 B.c. 
Ast did not notice that the same reasoning would lead 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: PHAEDRUS Sail 


him to place also the Timaeus and Critias before the death 
of Socrates. 

What has been said in favour of an early date of 
the Phaedrus by Krische *” and Volquardsen,”* who has 
dedicated a whole volume to the subject, is only a para- 
phrase of Schleiermacher with such insignificant additions 
as the acute observation of Krische that the death of 
Socrates is not alluded to in this work (this would rather 
speak for a late date) or the unfounded fancy of Vol- 
quardsen that the philosophical contents of the dialogue 
are purely Socratic. These authors have not thought it 
of any importance to explain why Plato in the Phaedrus 
despises poetry or how he could so early have arrived at 
the conviction of a periodic migration of souls, contra- 
dictory to the very cautious statements on future life in 
the Apology, Crito, and all purely Socratic dialogues. 

A more recent attempt to represent the Phaedrus as 
written some years before the death of Socrates has been 
made by Usener ?*? and accepted for a time by Wilamowitz- 
Moellendorff,“° but the latter has expressly revoked this 
opinion (Hermes, vol. xxxi. p. 102). 

The case of the Phaedrus in one respect resembles 
that of the Sophist. As Campbell’s investigations on the 
Sophist have waited thirty years to be at last acknow- 
ledged by a competent authority as an ‘immortal feat 
in Platonic chronology,’*! so Thompson’s equally im- 
mortal investigations on the Phaedrus—published in 1868, 


237 A. B. Krische, ‘ Ueber Platons Phaedrus,’ in Géttinger Studien for 
1847, pp. 930-1065, Goéttingen 1848. 

238 ©. R. Volquardsen, Platons Phaedrus, Erste Schrift Platons, Kiel 
1862, 321 pp. 

239 H. Usener, ‘Abfassungszeit des Platonischen Phaidros,’ in Rhewvi- 
sches Museum fiir Philologie, 35°" Band, p. 131, Frankfurt a. M. 1880. 

210 Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Philologische Untersuchungen, Band i. 
p. 213. 

41 Th. Gomperz, ‘Die Jowett-Campbellsche Ausgabe von Platos Re- 
public,’ in Zeitschrift fiir Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, Band cix. 
p. 163, says: ‘Lewis Campbell’s Name wird in der Platon-Forschung 
unverginglich dauern.’ , 


More 
recent 
defenders 
of the 
early date 
of the 
Phaedrus. 


Thomp- 
son’s 
edition 

of the 
Phaedrus 
still un- 
known in 
Germany. 


Both 
Thomp- 
son and 
Campbell 
stated 
their con- 
victions 
with great 
_ modesty, 
which 
produces 
the im- 
pression 
of incer- 
titude. 
Thomp- 
son 
confined 
the date 
of the 
Phaedrus 
within the 
narrow 
limits of 
380-378. 


This 
agrees 
with 

the above 
considera- 
tions. 


352 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


but written and read in the university of Cambridge 
as early as 1859—remain up to the present time a dead 
letter to continental philologers. Two reasons have 
acted in this case as well as in Campbell’s: first that on 
the Continent nobody expects important original investiga- 
tions to be buried in the Introduction and Appendices of 
the text edition of a single dialogue ; and second that 
Thompson, like Campbell, did not use the confident 
language which is necessary to make an impression on a 
reader accustomed to the confidence of Schleiermacher, 
Hermann, Zeller, Teichmiiller—and maintained even by 
such paradoxical authors as Schaarschmidt or Pfleiderer. 
What Teichmiiller developed into an important chapter 
of his work, without knowing Thompson, was given by 
the Master of Trinity College in footnotes, with a modesty 
which even on a reader accustomed to the incomparable 
modesty of English scholars leaves an impression of in- 
certitude. 

Thompson has made it evident to the attentive 
reader of the four dissertations accompanying his edition 
of the Phaedrus (Introduction and three Appendices) that 
this dialogue must be written after the Panegyricus of 
Tsocrates, that is after 380; and before the death of 
Lysias, that is before 378. This is such an exact deter- 
mination of date as is possible only for a very few Platonic 
dialogues. The same argument has been independently 
and with far greater assurance produced by Teichmiiller 
in 1881 (Literarische Fehden, vol. 1. pp. 57-82) and has 
never been refuted. This agrees perfectly with the place 
assigned by us to the Phaedrus in the development of 
Plato’s logic, and with the limits of the probable time 
necessary since the Symposiwm for the composition of the 
Phaedo, Republic, and Phaedrus. That the Phaedrus must 
be later than Phaedo and Symposium has been also recently 
recognised by Th. Gomperz and must be acknowledged by 
all who know the investigations on the style of Plato 
which have so completely confirmed Thompson’s view. 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: PHAEDRUS aoe 


Yet up to the present time, many eminent German 
scholars, as Zeller, Susemihl, W. Christ, P. Natorp and 
others, persist in the opinion that the Phaedrus is earlier 
than the Phaedo and Symposium, so that some supple- 
mentary observations on the evidence for the priority of 
these and other dialogues are perhaps not out of place. 

As to the Phaedo, the arguments of Schulthess 
are decisive, and Schedle,4? Liebhold,™*? Kassai,244 who 
advocated the priority of the Phaedrus, were unable to 
refute them, while Bury *° supplemented them in the 
best manner. The comparison of the arguments for im- 
mortality has shown equally that the Phaedrus must have 
been written after the Phaedo. The priority of the soul 
to the body appears in the Phaedo (804) as a new 
thought and is already familiar in the Phaedrus (246 B: 
maca » Wuxi) TavTos eripedeita TOD aryvyou) ; the theory 
of reminiscence, which is in the Phaedo mentioned with 
the caution ‘ei adnOns @otw’ (72), 1s in the Phaedrus 
assumed as certain (250 A); that ideas or notions are 
the substance of things is in the Phaedo a probability 
(76 D: e@ pev Zo ev & Opudrodper del, KaXOv Te Kai ayabov 
Kal Taca 1) TocavTn ovcia... 100 B: troOepevos civai te 
Karov avto Ka’ avto . . .), in the Phaedrus the common 
inheritance of all philosophers (2470: 9 .. . ovova dvtws 
odoa KuBepynth wovw Osat7) vo). More important points of 
comparison are afforded by some characteristic differences 
between Phaedo and Phaedrus, which show the Phaedrus 
in agreement with other later works. It has been ob- 
served by Ueberweg (Untersuchungen, p. 285) that an 
important doctrine is common to Phaedrus and Timaeus, 


“2 FB, Schedle, Die Reihenfolge der platonischen Dialoge Phaedros, 
Phaedon, Staat, Timaeus, Innspruck 1876. 

43 Liebhold, Ueber die Bedeutung des Dialogs Phidon fiir die Platoni- 
sche Erkenntnisstheorie und Ethik, Rudolfstadt 1876. 

24 G, Kassai, ‘ Meletemata Platonica,’ in Hgyetemes Philologias Kézliny, 
pp. 857-870, Budapest 1886. 

4> J. B. Bury, ‘Questions connected with Plato’s Phaidros,’ in Jowrnal 
of Philology, Nt xxix. for 1886. ° 

AA 


Relation 
of the 
Phaedrus 
to other 
dialogues. 


Relation 
to the 
Phaedo. 


Ueber- 
weg’s ob- 
servation 
which led 
him to 
suppose 
a later 


date 

of the 
Phaedo 
can be 
inter- 
preted 
otherwise. 


Coinci- 
dences 
between 
Phaedrus 
and 
Timacus 
as com- 
pared with 
Phaedo. 


Allusion 
in the 
Phaedrus 
to the 
Phaedo 
and Syi- 
postu 
with 
preference 
shown 
for the 
Phaedo. 


354 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


while not yet recognised in the Phaedo, namely the 
axiom that what is unconditioned is indestructible, while 
everything that has a beginning must have an end. 
Ueberweg was led by this observation to place the Phaedo 
after the Phaedrus and Timaeus, wherein he departed 
from his ordinary sagacity and caution, as the natural 
inference would have been that the Phaedo is earlier, 
the more so as Phaedrus and Timaeus agree in this respect 
with the Laws (see above, p. 333), a fact which seems not 
to have been noticed by Ueberweg. 

The view of the sense perceptions offers another coin- 
cidence between Phaedrus and Tumaeus against the 
Phaedo. In the Phaedo as well as in the Symposiwm true 
Beauty was inaccessible to the senses (Phaedo 65 D), while 
in the Phaedrus not only Beauty is accessible to the 
physical sight (250 D: kdddos . . . dedpo é\OovTEes KaTELhy)- 
dapev Sia THs evapyeotdtns aicOycews . . . ppovnous ovx 
jpatat . . . KaAOS povoy TavTnVY EoXE polpay, WaT’ 
éxpavéotatoy sivas Kal gpacuiwtatov), but the sense per- 
ceptions lead to the formation of general notions (249 B : 
To Kat’ Eidos Asyousvov, 2K ToAABY lov aidOncEwv sis By 
Loyioua@ Evvaipoupévov). This agrees with the view 
expressed in the Timaews metaphorically (44 B: apos vo 
Kata pvow idvtav coxa ExaotwoY TOY KUKNwY al TEepLpopat 
KaTevOuvouEvat, TO TE OdTEpOV Kal TO TaUTOY TpocayopEevoucaL 
kat’ opOov, udpova Tov ZxovTa abTas yuyvouEvov aToTENOvGLY). 

The relation of the Phaedrus to the Sympostwm can 
be easily shown by many comparisons, and it is now 
evident that the Phaedrus is later, though the majority 
of authors think otherwise. The mention that Phaedrus 
has been the cause of many speeches (242 4) in peculiar 
connection with a similar mention of Simmias (242 B) 
may with some probability refer to the Symposiwm, in 
which Phaedrus is represented (177 4) as the initiator of 
the series of speeches on love proposed by Eryximachos. 
This allusion is in so far probable as Simmias named in 
the same passage has in the Phaedo a principal share in 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: PHAEDRUS 355 


initiating the dialogue on immortality (Phaedo 61 c). 
And if Plato in the Phaedrus credits Simmias with a 
greater merit, this means that he preferred his Phaedo to 
the Symposium, and that he looked on both dialogues as 
his masterpieces, very superior to speeches of other orators 
(242 aB: Osios ei mepi Tods Noyous, ® Paidpe, Kal ateyvaos 
Oavpaowos’ oimat yap éym . . . wndéva TrElovs 7) Ce TEeTTOLN- 
Kévar ysyevijoOa Tor avTov NéyovTu i) aANOUS Evi ye TH 
TpoTw® Tpocavaycatovta. Lipplav OnBaiov eaipd Aoyou" 
Tov = dNwy Tautrohv KpaTéis). 

The mention of Lysias’ brother Polemarchos as con- 
verted to philosophy (Phaedr. 2578) might be a direct 
allusion to the Republic, in which Polemarchos is repre- 
sented as convinced by Socrates that nobody ought to do 
wrong to his enemies (Rep. 335). This would be an 
allusion similar to that which is contained in the mention 
of Simmias and Phaedrus, and would tend to show that 
Plato looked upon the persons of his dialogues as more 
real than their living models, who were dead when he 
wrote. He says at least that there is more truth in 
thought than in action (Rep. 478 4), and he takes many 
times such a liberty with Socrates that he puts in his 
master’s mouth allusions to his own written dialogues, or 
even to his experiences, without any consideration whether 
such allusions were suitable to the historical Socrates. 

Teichmiiller sees (ii. pp. 22, 272) in the erotic speech 
of Lysias allusions to the speech of Pausanias in the Sym- 
postum, and believes the speech to have been written as 
a criticism of the Sympostwm by Lysias, thus provoking 
Plato’s pitiless criticism in the Phaedrus. This ingenious 
supposition, if it could be proved, would sufficiently ex- 
plain why Plato selected just this speech of Lysias as a 
sample of bad rhetoric, and why he criticised it with more 
than usual insistence and irony (248.0: dvadas cipnoOov To 
év vatTais Trou TeOpaypévov Kal ovdgva 2devOepor 
Zpwta éwpaxdtwv). The parallel passages quoted by Teich- 
muller deserve our attention, but they seem not to be fully 

AA 2 


Oyo... 


Mention 

of Pole- 
marchos’ 
conversion 
might 
refer 

to the 
Republic. 


Teich- 
miiller’s 
supposi- 
tion about 
the speech 
of Lysias 
uncertain 
unless 
new eyvi- 
dence is 
forth- 
coming. 


View on 
poetry 
in both. 


Com- 
parisons 
with 
earlier 
dialogues 
super- 
fluous. 


Thomp- 
son’s 
deter- 


mination 


356 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


sufficient to prove his supposition (Symp. 183 E compared 
with Phaedr. 231 a, 184c with 233 a, 182pD with 2344, 
2188 with 231 Dp). These allusions are not quite evident, 
but they might be confirmed if some independent testi- 
mony about Lysias’ Eroticos should ever be found: 
therefore they deserve to be remembered. The relation 
between Phaedrus and Synypostwm appears also in the 
mention occurring in the Phaedrus that physical beauty 
provokes an admiration which can become a germ of per- 
fection (251 a): this seems to refer to the corresponding 
explanation in the Sympostwm (210 A). 

But the most decisive argument for the priority of the 
Symposiwm turns on the difference of views about poetry. 
In the Symposium poets are still esteemed, in the Phaedrus 
the poet takes one of the lowest places, and Homer is 
parodied (2528) by two verses in which the inconstancy of 
his gods is ridiculed. 

It would be easy to show in the Phaedrus also many 
points of comparison with the Cratylus, with which it has 
in common a certain etymological tendency, with the 
Gorgias, which Thompson showed to be earlier when the 
majority of German scholars were still of the contrary 
opinion, and with other dialogues. But the priority of 
the Gorgias has been lately recognised by some of its 
former opponents, especially by Zeller, and has been made 
evident also by Natorp, Siebeck, Dummler, after Socher, 
Stallbaum, Hermann, Steinhart, Susemihl, and Ueberweg, 
so that it may be admitted as sufficiently proved.” 

Thus Thompson’s determination of the date of the 
Phaedrus as written between 380 and 378, or about 379 B.c., 
is confirmed in every respect, and not the least important 
of all these confirmations is given by the stylistic investi- 


246 The recent attempt of Gercke (Platons Gorgias, erkldrt von Sauppe, 
herausgegeben von Gercke, Berlin 1897) to prove that the Phaedrus preceded 
the Gorgias is based on the assumption of uncertain allusions to writings 
of other authors, and without regard either for the philosophical contents 
or for the style of these two dialogues. See above, note 236. 


MIDDLE PLATONISM: PHAEDRUS oat 


gations. Already Campbell found in the Phaedrus a sur- 
prisingly large number of words common to the latest 
three dialogues, exceeding in relation to the size not only 
the number of such words to be found in the Phaedo 
and Symposium, but even those of the Republic, Sophist, 
Parmenides, and Philebus. This peculiarity of the voca- 
bulary of the Phaedrus has been since outweighed by 
other peculiarities observed, so that in our list the Phaedrus 
exceeds in stylistic affinity with the latest group only 
those works which are really earlier, as the Symposium, 
Phaedo, and equal samples from the Republic. The only 
part of the Republic which has a slightly greater number 
of important peculiarities of later style than the Phaedrus 
is the picture of the philosophers in B. VI-VII. But 
the difference is too insignificant for chronological con- 
clusions (116 peculiarities equivalent to 234 units of 
affinity on 44 pp. in Rep. VI-VII against 118 peculiari- 
ties equivalent to 220 units on 39 pp. in Phaedr.). The 
more so since only the greater frequency of peculiarities 
occurring is superior, and not their number. This might 
be a consequence of the much more varied contents of 
the Phaedrus. 

If we compare the peculiarities of later style found 
in this part of the Republic only and absent from the 
Phaedrus and all earlier dialogues with those found in 
the Phaedrus and absent from the Republic, we see that 
the Phaedrus notwithstanding its smaller size has more 
exclusive affinities with the latest group than the latest 
part of the Republic : 


Peculiarities of later style found in . 
Rep. 471 c-541 B (443 pp. Did.), Phaedrus (39 pp. Did.), and in 
and in no earlier dialogue nor in no earlier dialogue nor in the 
any other part of the Repwblic. Republic. 


Tavtn Tavras (323) once 
eipnrat (824) once 

TO &vpmay (363) once 

yévos as a logical term (24) 
ami@avos (476) once 


mavrws Kal TavtTn (327) once 
eppnOn (336) once 

ra mavta eidn (361) once 
pupi@ (329) once 

avarravia (470) once 


of the date 
of the 
Phaedrus 
confirmed 
by 
stylistic 
evidence. 


Only 

B. VI-VII 
of the 
Republic 
might be 
later, 
though 
this 
remains 
uncertain. 


Date 

of the 
Phaedrus 
about 

379 BCs 


The period © 


of Middle 
Platonism 
produced 
as much 
as one 
half 

of the 
amount 
of text 
written 
after- 
wards. 


358 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


Rep. (continued) — Phaedr. (continued)— 
ovoia =complexus omnium rerum adjectives in ros formed of sub- 
(238) once stantives (6) repeated 
axivntos (469) repeated re, adding a third phrase (2383) 
repeated 
dv@ (195) repeated 6potwpa (468) repeated 


great scarcity of answers denoting 
subjective assent (318), import- 
ant 

Interrogations by ri prevailing 
over those by més (452), im- 
portant 


Thus it is probable, though not yet certain, that the 
Phaedrus is later than the Republic, taken as a whole, 
and it is quite certain that the last three books of the 
Republic preceded the Phaedrus. This results both from 
stylistic comparisons and from the comparison of con- 
tents. At all events the date of the Phaedrus as written 
about 379 B.c. (880-378) is now quite as well confirmed 
as the date of the Symposiwm about 385 B.c. 


Middle Platonism 


We have seen that in the time between 384 and 378 
B.c. Plato dedicated his leisure only to the Republic and 
Phaedrus, all other works being either earlier, as has 
been already shown with respect to those preceding the 
Republic, or later, as will be seen in the continuation of 
our inquiry. This short epoch of middle Platonism 
lasting up to Plato’s fiftieth year produced, therefore, an 
amount of text equal to one half (233 pp. ed. Did.) of all 
the works written in the remaining thirty years of the 
philosopher’s life (476 pp. ed. Did.). Thence it results 
that Plato’s literary activity was on the decrease after 
the Phaedrus, and that he followed the maxims expressed 
at the end of this dialogue, according to which writing is 
by no means the most important of the aims of a philo- 
sopher, in contradiction to his rival Isocrates, to whom 


MIDDLE PLATONISM 359 


nothing appeared more important than his written 
speeches, in which he pretended to teach also a philo- 
sophy, condemned by Plato. 

The doctrine of the ideas, invented in the first period 
after the foundation of the Academy, is maintained 
during the time of middle Platonism, but the same stress 
is no longer laid on the independent existence of the ideas, 
and the relation between particular things and the ideas, 
first designated by the term petéyewv, becomes a mere 
similarity (udunpa, pyetoar, opolmpa, opovodv), Which 
allows us also to form ideas by the observation of simi- 
larities in sensible objects. In several passages the ideas 
and knowledge appear as created by the philosopher, 
though the earlier conception of a vision of self-existing 
ideas is not yet wholly abandoned, and reappears in the 
myth of the Phaedrus accompanied by its logical inter- 
pretation, according to which the ideas become identified 
with general notions. 

It is fully in accordance with this later stage of the 
doctrine, that ideas are no longer limited as in the 
Symposium and Phaedo to ethical and mathematical 
objects, but are equally supposed to exist for manufac- 
tured things. Thus a transformation of the primitive 
theory of ideas is already prepared though not yet carried 
out. While the ideal of the first Platonic stage was a 
state of subjective perfection and separation from the 
vulgar surroundings of common life, a passive contempla- 
tion of ideas, we see in middle Platonism an increasing 
confidence in the necessity of applying philosophy to life, 
and also of investigating particulars. The search for 
definitions was a Socratic inheritance, but the fondness 
for classifications appears not earlier than in the Republic, 
though it is prepared by the Phaedo. 

This direction taken by Plato had a great influence on 
the development of his logic. So long as only definitions 
are sought for, the supramundane independence of ideas 
can easily be maintained. But once on the way of 


Doctrine 
of ideas 
during 
Middle 
Platonism 
developes 
into 

the view 
of a mere 
similarity 
between 
things 
and ideas. 


Ideas not 
limited to 
ethical or 
mathe- 
matical 
notions. 


Applea- 
tion of 
philo- 
sophy 

to life. 


Logical 
classifi- 
cations 
lead to a 


recogni- 
tion of the 
subjective 
element 
in ideas. 


Ideas in- 
depende nt 
of par- 
ticulars 
but not 
outside 
individual 
conscious- 
ness. 


Logical 
independ- 
ence of 
ideas the 
founda- 
tion of 
science. 


Plato’s 
objective 
idealism 
lasted 

a short 


time. 


360 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


systematic classification it 1s impossible not to observe 
the subjective character of subdivisions, and this leads to 
the conclusion that the existence of ideas is only possible 
in a soul: not necessarily the soul of the thinker, but a 
soul of an individual being. The objectivity of ideas 
resulting from. an agreement between souls is different 
from the objectivity based on the feeling produced by 
passive contemplation. The first impression of a philo- 
sopher who notices the distance between an idea and the 
particulars is to exaggerate the objectivity and independ- 
ence of the idea, and to assert emphatically its independ- 
ence and incommensurability with the particulars, which 
seems to imply its existence outside individual conscious- 
ness. The belief in its independence of particulars is 
lasting, because it is true, and has been proved by Plato 
in the Phaedo and in all following works, remaining the 
cardinal truth of all later philosophy, ignored only by 
thinkers who were not sufficiently versed in the history of 
logic, like Comte and Mill. 

But the existence of ideas otherwise than in some 
individual consciousness is an illusion, similar to that 
more familiar illusion which makes colours and sounds 
appear objective, though they have no existence outside 
of us. The illusion of objective idealism is, however, one 
of those illusions which are necessary steps in philo- 
sophical progress. It is only a metaphoric expression of 
the truth that ideas are logically independent of the 
individual, and this logical independence (avayxn) must 
be recognised as a foundation of objective knowledge and 
science. 

Thus Plato at the beginning of his logic and during 
the middle period of his literary activity was idealist: he 
believed in the objective existence of the ideas outside 
particulars and outside the individual soul. This belief 
found its clearest expression, at the beginning, in the 
Symposium and in the Phaedo, combined with a vague 
uncertainty as to the relation between things and ideas. 


MIDDLE PLATONISM 361 


During middle Platonism, so far as we can guess from 
the hints given in the Republic and Phaedrus, the same 
conviction was maintained with a clearer definition of the 
relation between things and ideas as consisting in their 
similarity. But less emphatic stress was laid on the 
independence, and if due allowance is made for meta- 
phorical language, the whole mythical part of the 
Phaedrus may well agree with a conception of ideas in 
the meaning they had for Kant. 

We need not fear to deprive Kant of his originality if 
we come to the conclusion that Plato towards his later 
age understood the ideas in very much the same way as 
Kant. The truth is one, and once found cannot be 
changed. There is no impossibility or even improba- 
bility in supposing that a thinker like Plato, having no 
other aim in his life than thought, arrived at a correct 
notion of ideas after a long educational career. It would 
be astonishing to find the contrary. And Kant cannot lose 
any substantial merit in consequence of this discovery, as 
the notion of ideas forms only one of the points of Kant’s 
philosophy, while in many other points he progressed, 
as might naturally be expected, beyond Plato and other 
philosophers. 

There is one very striking analogy between Kant and 
Plato. Kant undertook a critical reform of his earlier 
‘convictions after having reached the age of fifty, and the 
same was the case with Plato. It is not surprising that 
philosophers arrive late at the full maturity of their 
thoughts. Every more perfect being requires a longer 
development, and men’s childhood lasts longer than the 
childhood of inferior animals. A philosopher in Plato’s 
opinion must excel other men almost to the same extent 
as any man is superior to other animals. This is not an 
extraordinary pretension, if we bear in mind that for 
Plato the activity of a philosopher is by no means limited 
to abstract thought, but extends to all departments of 
human life; so that he would certainly have included in 


Already 
less 
certain 

in the 
Republic 
and 
Phaedrus. 


Coinci- 
dence 
between 
the later 
stage of 
Plato’s 
thought 
and Kant 
not acci- 
dental. 


Analogy 
between 
Kant and 
Plato. 


362 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


this class some of our contemporaries, not asking them to 
write philosophical dissertations in order to legitimate 
their pride in belonging to the ruling class of mankind, 
formed of more perfect beings than the average citizens 
even in an ideal state. 


CHAPTER VII 


REFORM OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


WE have seen in the above exposition of middle Platon- 
ism a theory of knowledge according to which the ideas 
were perceived by intuition, and constituted eternal 
models of everything in the phenomenal world. The 
chief point was the independence of ideas, not involving, 
however, their separate existence. That no phenomenal 
appearance can fully correspond to a pure idea is a great 
discovery of Plato, made by the consideration of mathe- 
matical as well as moral notions. Whether such ideas 
have any existence out of the human mind, or generally 
outside an individual consciousness, was a question 
not discussed, and perhaps not clearly formulated by 
Plato: when he speaks of the beauty of ideas outside 
the physical universe, he does it in such metaphorical 
language, that we cannot draw certain inferences from 
his images. The true meaning of all these visions is the 
conviction that ideas are independent of material things, 
and that the existence and changes of physical objects 
must be ruled by immaterial and invisible ideas, often 
spoken of as objects of thought. 

The relation between things and ideas—whether 
defined as a presence or immanence of ideas in the things, 
or as a similarity between things and ideas, or as an 
imitation of ideas by particulars—was the first question 
that occurred when once the existence of the ideas had 
been established. While a personal training was deemed 
necessary in order to. attain the vision of ideas, their 


Ideas 
perceived 
by in- 
tuition 
and inde- 
pendent 
of appear- 
ances. 


Substan- 
tial ex- 
istence of 
ideas not 
certain. 


Existence 
of ideas 


evident 
for the 
initiated. 


Once their 
existence 
recognised 
their 
order and 
hierarchy 
deserve 
the at- 
tention 

of the 
philo- 
sopher. 


Classifi- 
catory 
tendency 
appears 
at a later 
stage. 


The dia- 
lectical 
dialogues 
carry out 
the pro- 
gramme 


364 ORIGIN AND:_ GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


existence needed no other proof than the personal ex- 
perience of the initiated. This initiation by means of 
mathematical, astronomical, or musical studies, and 
subsequent discussion of political or educational problems, 
proved a sufficient aim for many years of teaching. But 
at last a new problem became inevitable. Suppose we 
have arrived at the intuitive knowledge of many ideas, 
and are aware of the difference between an idea and a 
particular object of sensible experience, the next question 
to ask is about the order of ideas and their mutual rela- 
tions. ‘These can be well explained only through a 
distinction of similarities, leading to an universal classifi- 
cation of notions. Already in the Republic it was asked 
how many kinds of reasoning are possible (5382D: tis o 
TpoTros THs Tov dtaréyeobar Svvapews, Kal KaTa Tota by Eidn 
dugoTnKe), but the question was left unanswered. In the 
Phaedrus (266 8B) the complete classification of ideas 
from the most general kinds down to the indivisible 
logical units was proclaimed as the chief aim of the 
dialectician. 

This classificatory tendency is absent from earlier 
works, where specific problems were discussed, without 
any allusion to a contemplation of all time and all exist- 
ence, which we find first in the Republic (486 a). But 
even in the Republic the classifications and divisions are 
limited to a few subjects, and no attempt is made to bring 
all the possible objects of knowledge under a certain 
number of heads. Nor is this fully carried out even in 
the Phaedrus, where the importance of such a logical 
method is so warmly insisted upon, and the power of 
building up general notions and dividing them is pro- 
claimed divine. 

An attempt to realise this programme is made in the 
series of dialectical dialogues, among which the Theaetetus 
and Parmenides are the earliest, as we have seen from 
stylistic comparisons, which are confirmed by the exami- 
nation of their logical contents. They share with the 


REFORM OF PLATO'S LOGIC 365 


later works of this group another important peculiarity, 
the historical method of comparing impartially and 
judging according to their merits the theories of other 
philosophers. The primitive theory of ideas is no longer 
the object of such ecstatic admiration as in the Sympo- 
swum and Phaedrus. It is subjected to a critical exami- 
nation in the Parmenides and almost ignored in the 
Theaetetus, so much so that many readers have believed 
this to be an early dialogue. This impression vanishes at 
once upon a close consideration of some philosophical 
terms familiarly used both in Theaetetus and Parmenides 
which had been elaborated during the period of middle 
Platonism. To these belong the notions of dialectic 
(Theaet. 161 ©, Parm. 135 c), of substance (otcla, Theaet. 
186 Dp, Parm. 1385 A), power or faculty (dvvapyis, Theaet. 
158 8, 159 a, 185 c, Parm. 133 5, 135 c), the one (Theaet. 
152 pv, Parm. 137 c, &c.), Not-Being (Theaet. 185 co, 
Parm. 142 A), and the opposition of activity and passivity 
(Theaet. 157 a, 174 B, Parm. 138 B). 

Both Theaetetus and Parmenides have further in 
common two important distinctions, which could not 
have been ignored in the Republic, nor in the Phaedrus, 
if the author had already become familiar with them. 
One of these is the well-defined notion of movement, 
including qualitative alteration as well as change of 
position in space. This meaning of «ivyous, accepted by 
Aristotle, and many later philosophers, is a result of the 
increasing importance of this notion for Plato, and would 
necessarily have been alluded to in the Republic and 
Phaedrus in those passages in which «iynous is used in 
its primitive signification of movement through space. It 
is a far-reaching generalisation to identify movement with 
qualitative alteration, because both are a manifestation 
of change. The comparison of corresponding passages 
shows that this unity was not yet noticed in the period of 
middle Platonism : 


of the 
Phaedrus. 


Theory 

of ideas 
ignored in 
Theaetetus 
criticised 
in Par- 
menides. 
In both 
occur 
terms 
elaborated 
during the 
preceding 
period. 


Both 
Theaetetus 
and Par- 
menides 
contain 

a new 
notion of 
move- 
ment, 
including 
change of 
position 
as well as 
of quality. 


The dis- 
tinction 
of two 
kinds of 
move- 
ment, first 
introduced 
in the 
Theae- 
tetus, 
stated 

to bea 
personal 
discovery 
of the 
Platonic 
Socrates. 


366 


Rep. 454 © D: ékeivo 
3 ~ > 
TO elOos THs AANoL@GDEwS 
Te Kal Opmolmoews [LOVOY 
T™pos 
> A ~ A > i“ 
avTa Telvoy Ta emuTnoev- 


epvAdtropev TO 


para. 
530 Cc: 
mapéxerae 7) Gopad.. .« 
583 BE: Td ye Od ev 
Wux yeyvopevov Kat TO 


TAEL@ €l0n 


Aumnpov Kivnois Tus 

apporepw eater. 
Phaedr. 245 vd: 

KuUNnoews GpxXt) . . . ovr 


dmohAvobar ovrTe yiy- 
ver Oar Suvarov, 7) mavra 
Te ovpavoy macay Te 
yeveotv = TUpTETOVTAY 
oTnvat Kal pymote avis 
KunOévra 


a a 
exe Oev 


yevnoerat. 


cA ov fe , , 
d&uov erepov eidos avar Kunoeas ; 





Theaet. 156 A: kev7- | 


cews Sto etdn, Svvapuw 
dé TO prev mroveity exor, 
To 6€ macxew (quoted 
as a view to be criti- 
cised), 
181 ©: mérepoy ev tT 
Ey 2 A , a 
eloos autns eyovow 7} 
ef > \ , 
@orep e“or chatverat 
dvo ; pay) pevrou provoy 
> \ , > \ 
epot Soxeitw, a\Aa oup- 
perexe kal ov, . . . apa 
kuveto Oat Kadels Oray Te 
xX@pav ek xX@pas pera- 
, a ‘ > -“ > a 
Badd\n 7) Kal ev TO AUTO 
c c L 
4 4 
otpepyrar ; — éywye —- 
er Wy s > ~ 
. Orav Oc 7H pev Ev TO 
> n , Oe x 
avT@, ynpdokn Oe, 7) 
pedav ek AevKov 7) 7KAN- 
pov ek padakov ylyrnrat, 
# Twa adAnv addXolo- 
> Lol > > 
ov addAot@rat, apa ovK 


... d00 84 


Neyo rovT@ €ldn Kunoews, a\doi@ow, Ti dé hopay. 


« a | 
153 A: TO pev eiva kal TO yiyver Oar kivnows 


G sy Se Ve We) rr 6 « s 
TAPEXEL, TO OE fA7) ELVAL KAL ATTOAAVO UAL novxia. 


| 


ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


Parm. 138 B: xwov- 
/ Xx id Ba 
fevov ye 7) epotro 7 
adXovotro ay + abrau yap 
povat Kunoets—vai. 
162 D: ovK apa To 
ev py dv orpeperba dv 
Svvaito ev exeiv@ ev @ 


\ »” > ‘ A 
by) €EOTCEY . +‘ ovde Bynv 
> a 
Q\XNowotral wou TO év 


c ~ + Loa ” 
€aUTOU, OUTE TO OY OUTE 
\ \ + > \ Pe) 
TO py Ov. e« O€ pat 
> a , > see 
a\XouodTat unre ev TaUT@ 
; f 
oTpépeTat punte era- 
Baive, ap’ av mn ere 
KLVOLTO ; TAS yap; 
Legg. 894 &: érayv 
é _ 
avTO aUTO KivjoaV ETepov 
> icf 
adXot@on, TO 8 erepov 
»y n~ > Ud 
ado... wOY apxn Tis 
- yy ol , 
avT@v eorar THS KLWN- 
f° 
mews amaons adAn mAHVY 
¢ fol a c 
) THS avTns avTHY Kl- 
, , 
unoaons petaBorAn ; 





We see that in the Repwhlic the distinctions introduced 


in the Theaetetus are not yet known. 


The use in the 


Republic of «évnots in its metaphorical meaning as move- 
ment of the soul is transitional to the later generalisation, 


but does not yet imply it. 


In the Phaedrus kivnots 


means movement through space, and this is very charac- 
teristic if we remember that in the later dialogues the 
distinction of two kinds of movement is represented as 


quite essential. 


This distinction is first made in the 


Theaetetus, and recurs as familiar in the Parmenides and 
Laws (where it is assumed as a matter of course that the 
first movement produced is a qualitative change) as well 
as later in the works of Aristotle. 
two kinds of movement is introduced in the Theaetetus as 
a new theory, after another division had been incidentally 


The distinction of 


REFORM OF PLATO’S LOGIC 367 


referred to. It is stated expressly to be a personal dis- 
covery of the Platonic Socrates, which he is anxious to 
see accepted and to share with others the risk of an error 
(cuppétexe kai ov). After its acceptance, it is repeated 
as logically necessary (181 D: dvayxaiov). The starting 
point of this theory was the recognition of movement as 
a principle of Being, justified in the Phaedrus, mentioned 
as known in the Theaetetus, and finally reconciled with 
the stability of Being in the Sophist. This discovery is 
related to the increasing interest for physical science, 
' which is manifest through Plato’s later works, while it 
is absent from his earlier writings. It need hardly be 
observed that here we have not to do with such an 
ephemeral distinction as between wiotis and eixacéa in 
the Republic, but with one of the greatest generalisations 
of philosophy, continually discussed by later thinkers 
up to Trendelenburg and Lotze. It is one of Plato’s 
wonderful anticipations of ideas which have been better 
explained only in modern times. The identification of 
physical movement with qualitative change is a truth 
which could scarcely be fully realised before Kant, and 
yet it is taken for granted in the Theaetetus, Parmemdes, 
and Laws of Plato. 

Had the Theaetetus and Parmenides, being the two 
most critical works of Plato, no other new theory than 
the inclusion of qualitative change and physical move- 
ment under one primary kind, with the subtle sub- 
division of physical movement into a movement through 
space, and revolution on the same spot—this would alone 
be a strong reason for placing them after Republic and 
Phaedrus. But we find in these two dialogues another 
theory of cardinal importance, yet introduced quite as 
incidentally as the theory of movement. In the time 
of middle Platonism the favourite examples of ideal 
existence were moral or mathematical notions, the former 
being specially fit for allegorical representation as objects 
of enthusiastic vision. When the first enthusiasm was 


It is one 
of the 
great 
generali- 
sations 
of philo- 
sophy. 


Implies 
subjec- 
tivity of 
space. 


List of 
categories 
first 
attempted 
by Plato 
in the 
Theae- 
tetus. 


Enumera- 
tion of 
highest 
kinds 
indepen- 
dent of 
esthetical 
considera- 
tions. 


A very 
important 
step in 
philo- 
sophy. 
Its im- 
portance 
under- 
stood by 
Plato. 


368 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 

over, it became very natural to attempt a general 
enumeration of highest kinds, independently of the 
esthetical feelings of awe and admiration which first led 
to the perception of such ideas. This problem of 
categories has remained ever since a permanent depart- 
ment of philosophy and has been cultivated from Aristotle 
onwards by all logicians. But the first table of cate- 
gories in the history of logic is found in Plato’s Theaetetus, 
repeated and enlarged in his Parmenides and Sophist. 
It ig not wrapped in such emphatic language as the 
sovereignty of philosophers or the precept that to suffer 
wrongs is better than to inflict them. It is the historian’s 
duty to show the incomparable importance of this first 
step in a new direction. There is reason to believe that 
Plato was conscious of this importance, though he did 
not insist on it, because he felt the incompleteness of his 
table of categories (ra xowd). The enumeration in the 
Theaetetus 1s introduced at a culminating point of the 
dialogue, and followed by ‘an unwonted outburst of 
admiration’ (Campbell, Theaet. p. 160) of the pupil who 
discovered it ; also by the significant observation that a 
long discussion has been avoided by this happy intuition, 
a result of good natural capacity (144) and a training in 
mathematics, music, and astronomy (145 A) according to the 
precepts laid down in the Republic. A careful comparison 
of similar passages in later dialogues and of Aristotle’s 
account of the same problem shows very clearly that the 
first attempt at such an enumeration is that occurrig im 
the Theaetetus, not, as has been sometimes supposed, 
that in the Parmenides. The list is increased by some 
notions in the Parmenides and Sophist : 


Theat. 185c: 7 6e 
57 Sua rivos Svvauis TO 
KOLVYOV 


> 


rT é€ml wact 
, cr 
kal TO emt TovTo.s Ondot 


e > 
ol, @ TO éoTiv emovo-|... 
, ‘ A > BLA 
pacers KALTO OUKEGOTLY). . 
‘ > r 
kai & vuvdr npeT@pev |... 





Parm. 


okoTmel ... 


186 A: xpn 

ei moAXa 

> \ a > , 

€oTl . . . Kal avd et py 

€oTt moAAd ... kal 

77 id , 

el €CoTL OMOLOTNHS 
‘ > 

. Kal TEpt AVOMOLOV 
; 

KLYNO EWS Kal OTA- 





Soph. 254D: pey- 
Lota Tav yevav ... TO 
Te OV alTO Kal OTaOLS 
Kai Kivnoes. 

‘és > A ‘ 

E: TO Te TAVTOY Kal 
Oarepor. 


REFORM OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


> rs 

Tepl av’T@v ;—ovciay 
eyets Kal TO fL7) ELVat 

3 
kal OpotdTnTa kal 
avomoloTnta, Kat TO 

4 4 
TAUTOY TE Kal TO ETE- 
» ‘ a ‘ A 

pov, ére dé Ev kal Tov 
@ ov rept 


avTav. 


ap.Opov 
Onrov be 


ua 
Kal GpTLov Te Kal TEp- 


o 
OTL 


A > aA A 3 
‘TT OV epwras Kat TaANa 
ao 7 ov = 
6oa Tovrots emetat, dua 
TWOS mwoTé TOY TOU 

: es 
copatos TH ux) aic- 
> 
Oavopueba ;—trépev axo- 
éoTw a 


Novbeis, kai 


col > ~ 
€p@T® avra Tadra. 


(oe@s, Kal Tepi yeve- 
4 “~ \ 
wews kat POopas, kal 
Tept aUTOU TOU E(vat Kal 
TOU pH Elvat Kal Evi 
, Ny ue? x a 
Oy@, mept Grov ay aet 
¢ a“ c ” A < 
vr00n ws ovTos Kal ws 
ovK OvTos Kal 6TLovY 
r ‘ p 
@AXo mabos tacxovTos, 
col al Ul 
det okomety Ta EvpBa- 
vovTa Tpos avTo Kal mpos 
a a - / 
€v EKagTOV TOY adAwv. 
1298: ra eldn, oiov 
6molorntra Te kal avo- 
fovotnra Kai TAGs 





Kal KLYn OLY. 


‘ A a A , 
Kat TO €V Kal OTaAGLY 





369 


Aristoteles Categor. 
1 b25: oveia, rocor, 
TOLOV, TPOS TL, TOU, TOTE, 
ketoOar, exe, Trovetv, 
Tao XEl. 

Metaphys. 1029 b 
24: mowov, moor, Tote, 
mov, kiwnots. See also 
below, p. 480, on 
the categories in the 
Timaeus, produced by 
the movements of the 


soul. 


The first place is given in all enumerations to sub- 
stance and Not-Being. The same and the other, and 
similarity and dissimilarity, are also common to the three 
enumerations. One and the many form a third pair in 
the Theaetetus and Parmendes, but are dropped in the 
Sophist. A fourth pair is movement and immobility, 
omitted in the Theaetetus, but appearing both in Parme- 
mides and Sophist. The differences are not necessarily 
due to a change of views, but to the incompleteness of 
enumeration, also frequent in Aristotle, who often men- 
tions only six Categories even in passages where it would 
seem that the enumeration might be complete. 

These highest kinds, which denote what is common 
to many particulars, are different from the ideas admired 
in the Republic. There is no place among these common 
notions for Truth or Beauty, nor for the idea of Good, 
though these are mentioned as also perceivable by the 
soul alone (186.4). These are not entirely supplanted by 
the new ideas, but they no longer attract the philo- 
sopher’s chief attention. The intuitive vision of trans- 
cendental ideas is exchanged for a discursive investigation 
of a given universe. This may be explained by the 
natural evolution of Plato’s activity in his Academy. 

BB 


Ditfer- 
ences in 
the three 
lists. 


Among 
categories 
Truth, 
Beauty, 
the Good 
omitted. 


Variety of 
actual ex- 
perience 
had to be 
submitted 
to classi- 
fication. 


Extension 
of the 
field of 
thought 
beyond 
the limits 
of moral 
ideas. 


Reform 

of Plato’s 
logic 
carried 
out in the 
Theae- 
tetus and 
Parme- 
nides. 


370 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


The training recognised to be necessary in order to 
develope intuition had to be directed, and the variety of 
material appearances, at first despised as irrelevant, had 
to be considered and classified. The astronomical and 
mathematical studies recommended in the Republic 
tended to promote not only dialectical ability, but also 
some recognition of sensible experience, and of the reality 
underlying physical phenomena. If in earlier times the 
power of the soul over the body was chiefly seen in moral 
determinations, it now appeared that the body, though 
subordinate to the soul, is a useful instrument for the 
purpose of increasing even ideal knowledge by forming 
new ideas. The moral ideas, being few in number, 
afforded no sufficient scope for the dialectical tendency to 
distinguish and classify. The field of logical exercise was 
first extended to a classification of states and men; but 
even this did not satisfy that philosophical curiosity 
which is accustomed to consider all substance and all 
time, neglecting nothing, however small or insignificant 
it may appear to the vulgar mind. 

Among such pursuits, which seem to have occupied 
the greatest part of Plato’s time after the Phaedrus, the 
general problem of knowledge was reinvestigated, and 
this led to an important reform of earlier logical con- 
ceptions. Of this reform we have a record in two works 
which more than any preceding them may be termed 
critical, though at first sight they appear almost as in- 
conclusive as the Socratic dialogues. These works, the 
Theaetetus and Parmenides, are of decisive importance 
for an appreciation of Plato’s philosophy, and deserve our 
attention not only for their main subjects, but also for 
seemingly casual allusions to doctrines of the greatest 
gravity. 


REFORM OF PLATO’S LOGIC: THEAETETUS 371 


I. The Theaetetus. 


(Relative affinity to the latest group, measured on the Laws as 
unity, = 0°32; see above, p. 177.) 


The aim of this dialogue is a definition of knowledge, 
which, however, is not given, in spite of several unsuc- 
cessful attempts made by Theaetetus. Among the defi- 
nitions which are recognised to be insufficient is one 
which had been provisionally received in some previous 
dialogues: namely, that knowledge is true opinion 
founded on sufficient reasons. This had been proposed 
in the Meno (98 A) and tacitly admitted in Symposium 
(see above, p. 238) and Phaedo, whereas it is refuted in 
the Theaetetus (210 a): 


Phaedo 96 B: rodAdkis ewavrov Theaet. 210 a: ovre apa aic6n- 
dvw Kat petéBaddov oxom@v ... ois, ote Sd€a adnOys ovre per’ aAn- 
ex prnpns cal Sd&ns AaBovons 7d Oois SdEns Adyos mpooytyvopevos 
npepetv Kata tadtra yiyverOar emiotnyn ay etn. 
emLoTnNy. 


In the Cratylus (426 a), Symposium (202 A), and Phaedo 
(76 B) Xeyos had the meaning of a sufficient reason, while 
here it is more exactly analysed, and each of its three 
meanings is shown to be incapable of changing opinion into 
knowledge. What Plato’s real conviction about know- 
ledge was, is known from the Republic, and also from later 
works: for him the difference between opinion and know- 
ledge ultimately consisted in the difference of their 
objects. In this respect there is no change from the 
Phaedo to the Theaetetus: the activity of reason is an 
activity of the soul, not wanting the help of the senses 


and of the body: 
Phaedo 6580: 7 uxn ris adnOeias Theaet. 186D: év pev dpa Trois 
drrerat . . . €v TO RoyierOar. . . maOnuaoww ork eu emotnun, ev Se 


Aoyiterar Sé yé rou rére KddduoTa, TO repli ékeivov cVAAOyLO MUG: ovotas 
a er aN + eat > Chard | \ ‘ > 6 ‘ > v6. , c 
éray Ott padiota ait Ka’ attny yap kai GdnOeias evravda pév, ws 
yiyyyrat €doa xaipew TO copa. éouxe, Suvaroyv awaobat. 

& 


BB 2 


Defini- 
tion of 
knowledge 
sought 

in the 
Theae- 
tetus not 
given. 


Difference 
between 
opinion 
and 
knowledge 
consists in 
the objects 
to which 
they refer. 


Know- 
ledge is 
acquired 
by the 


soul’s own 
activity. 


Unity of 
conscious- 
ness 
indicated 
in the 
Republic 
is here 
more 
clearly 
expressed. 


Senses 
instru- 
ments of 
the soul. 


372 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 

The same term is repeatedly used in both dialogues 
(adt? Kal’ aitny Phaedo 65 c, 79D, 834, Theaet. 1864, 
187 A) to denote the soul’s independence of the body. 
Also the distinction between attaining knowledge and 
possessing it is already prepared in the Phaedo. 


Phaedo 75D: TO yap «idéva 
rovr’ €otiv, A\aBovra Tov éemucTHnuNny 


a \ ‘ > 4 
éxely Kal pt) aTroA@Aekevat. 


Theaet. 197 c: épa 67) Kai éme- 


, 7 
otnunv ef Suvatov oUT@ KEKTNLEVOY 


pn e€xelv. 


But it is only here that the unity of consciousness is 
insisted upon, as resulting from the variety of perceptions. 
It had been already observed in the Republic that each 
sense is used only to convey one kind of impression. 
This observation is here generalised and affirmed as 


certain : 


Rep. 352 £: éc6' ér@ av addko 
Wors 7) OpOadrpots ;—ov djra—ri be ; 


> ¥, Ji Xx > , > lal 
dxovoas a\X@ 7) @oly ;—ovdapos: 


Theaet. 185 A: a Ov €répas 
Svvdpews aicOaver, advvatov eivat 
80 GAAns Tadr aicbéabat, oiov a dv 


> a , a a , > = > lj x >» ’ 
—ovkoov Suxaiws adv radta rovtwv axons, dv dews, 7) a OV Oews, Ou 


daipey épya eivar; mavu ye. axons ; 
ATT C: Neyo GWiv Kal axony 


rav duvdpewy eivat, ci dpa pavOavers 6 BotvAowa éyev TO eidos. 


There is a certain progress in the formulation of this 
principle from the Republic to the Theaetetus. In the 
earlier work the term évvayuts as appliable to the senses 
was first introduced ; here itis used without hesitation, and 
the observation that it is possible to see only by means of 
the eyes is supplemented by the general rule: it is 1m- 
possible to perceive through one faculty the proper object 
of another sense faculty, as can be verified through the 
familiar example of sight and hearing. 

The application of this law of specific energy of the 
senses, given in the T'heaetetus, goes far beyond what we 
found in the Republic and Phaedo. Already in those 
earlier works the senses were defined as instruments used 
by the soul, and this is here maintained : 


REFORM OF PLATO’S 


Phaedo 79 ©: 4 Wuxn, Grav 
TO o@pate mpooxpyrac 
okoretiy Tt 7) Oud Tov épay 7 dia Tov 


> ‘ 
els TO 
dkovew 7) dv addAns Twos aicbnoews 
yap Sua 


, \ > > t - 
couartos, TO bv’ aiaOnoewy oKomeiv 


—ToUTO €oTlt TO TOU 


Ti—ToTe . . . TAavara.. 
Frome é 
Rep. 508 B: oppa 
evdcaTatov TOY mepl Tas aicOnoets 
opyavev. 


mr to- 


LOGIC: THEAETETUS 373 


T heaet. 


> 
amr oKptots 


184 c: 


ToTepa 


oKoTet yap, 
> 4 2 
6pOorepa, @ 
Teac = > > ’ Xx 
Op@pev, Tovto eivar ofOadpovs, 7} 
iene si : i 

dv ob ép@pev, kat @ dkovoper, ra, 
a > @ 29 , 2 ” 
7 SV od akovopev ;—Ov Sv Exacta 
aicOavoueba, enorye Soxet, paddov 7 
fe \ s > ? 
ois-—Aewov yap mov, et modAai 
Ties ev npiv, @omep ev Sovpetors 
o > U > , > \ 
immo, aicOnoes éyxd@nvra, adda 
‘ -> , ‘ > , ww A 
py eis play twa ideav, etre Wuxnv 


mw oe col cal , - 
eire O Te Oet Kadeiy, mavTa TavTa 
, i 8 \ is Le 2 , > , Wd > , 
Evrreiver, 7 Oia ToUTwY oiov bpyaywy aigbavopeba boa aigOnrd. 


But we find here a new conclusion, not thought of before. 
If all senses are but instruments, they must be the in- 
struments used by one and the same thing, be 1t named 
soul or otherwise. In earlier works Plato used the term 
soul as free from every ambiguity. Here we see already 
a trace of doubts about the existence of the soul, against 
which he guards himself by the caution that it does not 
matter whether we call by the name soul or otherwise 
that substance which is the necessary recipient of all 
particular impressions. A further proof of the existence 
of this substance and its peculiar activity is given by 
the argument that impressions of different senses are 
comparable among themselves, and no single sense could 
bring about these comparisons. If we think about two 
different perceptions of two different senses, this could 
not be done by means of one of the senses concerned 
(185 A: e@ te mept audotépwv Siavosi, ov av dua ye TOU 
Etépov dpyadvov, vs’ ad did Tov éTépou Trept dupotépwv alc Oavor’ 
Plato proceeds to give well-chosen examples of 
thoughts, which are possible with reference to different per- 
ceptions. He observes in the first place that all perceptions 
have in common existence (185 A), then that they differ 
from each other, and are identical each with itself (185 a), 
then that each of them is one, and both are two (185 B), 
and finally that there may be similarity or dissimilarity 
between them (186B: «ite dvopolw cite ouolw adAndow). 


av). 


Concep- 
tion of 

the soul 
developed. 


Its power 
of com- 
paring 
impres- 
sions of 
different 
senses. 


Attributes 
of dif- 
ferent per- 
ceptions 
form the 
list of 
categories. 


No special 
faculty 
for per- 
ceiving 
categories. 


They are 
recognised 
by the 
soul alone; 
though 
this is a 
truth not 
easy to 
prove. 


Illusions 
of the 
senses 
difficult 
to dis- 
cover. 


Colour 
and heat 
explained 
as result- 
ing from 
motion. 


Traces of 
physical 


374 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


This enumeration of general notions which can be applied 
to a variety of concrete objects is not accidental, because 
it is repeated by Theaetetus nearly in the same order, and 
forms really the most ancient table of categories. Plato 
asks by what faculty the soul can perceive those general 
notions. 7 
The answer that such general notions can be known 
only immediately by the soul’s own activity (185 DE: avdty 
&v abrhsn uy Ta Kowa wor palvetat TEepl TavT@V éTLoKOT EL) 
is received asa truth which can be at once understood 
only by the better class of intellects, and would require 
a long proof, had not this been made superfluous by the 
natural capacity of Theaetetus (185 £). These general 
notions, here distinguished as the proper object of 
knowledge, are placed in close relation to the particulars 
observed by means of the senses, and this denotes a 
change in Plato’s attitude towards physical phenomena. 
He no longer despises them as in the Phaedo and 
Republic: he recognises the difficulty of discovering the 
illusions of the senses (179 C: qrepi d& TO Tapov ExdoT@ 
ma0os, && av ai aicOjoes Kal ai KaTa TavTas bo£at yiyvovTat, 
xaneT@TEpov éEdelv ws ovK adnOeis). He has made a very 
special study of these appearances and has arrived at sur- 
prising intuitions of physical truth. Thus for instance 
he states clearly that colour does not belong to objects out- 
side us nor even to our eyes (153 pD). That light is a result 
of movement and affects different persons in a different 
way, and that it is a pure quality out of space, appears 
to be a truth attainable only by the methods of modern 
physics, and yet any reader can find it in the Theaetetus 
(153 B: pndé tw’ ad’td yopay arotdéyns). Another of the 
creat discoveries of our own time is here anticipated, 
the explanation of heat as a mode of motion (153 a: to 
Oeppov te Kal wip, 0 62 Kal TAG yEevva Kal éeiTpoOTrEvEL, 
avTo yevvatar &x dopas Kal tpirews* TodTo Sz Kivyots). 
This is certainly said with another meaning than it might 
have for the modern reader. But it betrays the fact that 


REFORM OF PLATO'S LOGIC: THEAETETUS 379 


Plato had already begun those physical reflections which 
led him later to the theories expounded in the Timaeus. 

It seems that a thorough-going materialism had made 
its appearance within the Academy or outside it and 
decided him to a full refutation. For the Theaetetus, no 
doubt, is meant above everything as a refutation of 
materialism and sensualism. The materialists are men- 
tioned as very uneducated men, not initiated into the 
mysteries of a refined philosophy (155 £). With these 
are contrasted the subtler sensualists (156 a: xcouworepor, 
Ov wéArw cor TA wvoTHpia eye) Who explain everything 
by movement and make everything relative, destroying 
thus all fixed notions, which are indispensable in laying 
the groundwork for a system of science. Plato seems to 
admit so much of their theory of the relativity of sensa- 
tions as agrees with his own views. He argues that 
the reality of dreams for the dreamer is equal to the 
reality of waking for men awake (158 cD), and he leaves 
the difficulty for the time unsolved. The same might be 
said of illness (158 D) and madness (157 5), but only in so 
far as sensations are concerned, which have always a 
subjective character (1544: 7 
coi paivetar ExactTov ypOua, ToLodTOy Kal KuVi Kal OT@WOdD 
So@—pa Ac’ ov« éywye). This proves that true knowledge 
cannot be sought in sensations. 

Though the true nature of knowledge is not stated in 
clear words as the result of the inquiry, we can easily 
gather from certain allusions that knowledge was no 
longer conceived to be a mere intuition of pre-existing 
ideas, but a product of the mind’s activity. Knowledge 
is to be found in that state of the soul, in which it con- 
siders being, or in its judgments (187 A: éruotHun . . 
2xElv@ THO OvOmaTl, O TL ToT Eyer ) Wuyn, Stay ait) Kal 
avTny Tpayyatevntar wept Ta dvta). Here knowledge is 
brought under the head of d0€a, not in the meaning of 
opinion, but of judgment (187 a: 
Sofafev). This position is not contradicted in the 


av dvicxupicaio ay ws, otov 


> 
- &V 


TOUTO KaNELTAL . . 


investi- 
gations. 


Refuta- 
tion of 
material- 
ism. 


Con- 
trasted 
with a 
subtler 
sensual- 
ism which 
had 
produced 
some 
physical 
theories 
accepted 
by Plato. 
Relativity 
of sensa- 
tions 
under 
different 
condi- 
tions. 


Plato’s 
view of 
knowledge 
as a kind 
of judg- 
ment. 


Thought 
as moving 
between 
affirma- 
tion and 
negation, 
according 
to the 
law of 
contra- 
diction. 


Opposi- 
tion of 
contra- 
dictory 
ideas. 


Judgment 
is a new 
unity 
differing 
from its 
elements. 


Know- 
ledge of 
a whole 


376 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


following discussion and may be accepted as Plato’s 
true conviction. He explains thought as a conversa- 
tion of the soul with itself (189 E: ro 62 dvavostaBar Gp’ 
OmEep &yw@ Kadels:—TL Kad@v ale OV AUTH TpOS aUTHY 7 
yoy ie TEpl OV AV OKOTH .. « 4 EAUTHNV EPWTHTA 
Kal atoKpiwoTévn, Kal hacKovoa Kati ov dacKovaa), lead- 
ing to a choice between affirmation and negation, wherein 
judgment consists (190 A: oray 62 opicaca, .. . TO avTo HON 
7 Kal wn Svat aby, So€av TavtTnv THEuev adths). This duality 
of affirmation and negation begins to attract Plato’s atten- 
tion more than ever before. The beautiful and the good 
are not merely associated as in Republic and Phaedrus, 
but paired with their opposites (186 A): so also the four 
pairs of categories in the same passage, and other notions 
(186 B: oxAnpotnta Kal wadraxdtnta, 180 D: éordvar.. . 
xweio@ai, &c.). Thus he quotes as one of the objects of 
judgment the essence of the opposition of beings among 
each other (186 B: tv odotay Ths évavTioTyTOs av’Th  Wuy7 
Kplwew repatar), and he insists on the impossibility of 
identity between opposite notions (190 B: dvayipvyoKkou 
él TwToT simEes TpOS GEAVTOY OTL TavTOS paAov .. - TO 
Etepov ETEpOV zo7TL). 

The nature of judgment is further analysed and 
found to be essentially different from the notions of 
which it consists. While according to the earlier 
theory the sight or intuition of ideas was knowledge, it 
appears now from the example of letters and syllables 
that the judgment is not the sum of its compo- 
nents, but a new unity (203 E: yphv yap icws tH 
ovdraBnv TiWecbar wy Ta oToLyEia, add’ 2E exeivov ew Te 
yeyovos sidos, idzav wlav avTo avTod Eyov, ETepov THY oTOL- 
yelwv, cf. 204 a). This conception is repeated with 
insistence several times (203 E, 204 a, 205 c, 205 D) in 
order to refute the supposition that the elements can be 
less knowable than the whole. He who pretends to know 
a whole without being able to account for its parts is 
declared not to speak seriously (206 B: gay tus 7 ovA- 


REFORM OF PLATO’S LOGIC: THEAETETUS 377 


AaBny pev yowoortor, dyvwaTov O& TEebvKévat aToLvyésiov, EKOVTA 
 akovta Tailew nynoouel’ avrov, cf. Crat. 426 a). This 
postulate, to base the knowledge of everything upon the 
knowledge of its ultimate elements, agrees with what has 
been said in the Phaedrus on the same subject (270 D), 
and corresponds to a stage in which the chief interest 
attaches to those notions which are built upon the obser- 
vation of actual appearances. The question of analysing 
everything into its elements or kinds was superfluous in 
dealing with absolute ideas which were supposed to be 
simple in their perfection. 

It corresponds also to the new classificatory tendency 
that Adyos is distinguished into its three kinds: speech 
(206 D), enumeration of parts (207 A), and definition (2088). 
The three degrees are declared insufficient to guarantee 
knowledge, but it may be taken for granted that each of 
them is held indispensable for knowledge. Nobody knows 
who cannot explain in words the object of his knowledge, 
enumerate its parts, and give a definition of each of its 
elements. This last poimt is stated here with greater 
fulness than anywhere before. Definition should consist 
in the indication of the specific difference which distin- 
euishes a given object from all others (208 c: to yew Te 
onpstov cimely w TOV atravTay Siadéper TO epwTnOdv, .. « 
cf. 175 c). Weare warned to avoid circular definitions, 
which pretend to explain a notion by its synonym (147 B, 
210 A), and the enumeration of examples is also declared 
to be an insufficient substitute for a definition. When 
Theaetetus began by an enumeration of different kinds of 
science instead of giving a definition of science, Socrates 
detained him and appeared to imply at this stage of the 
dialogue that knowledge is based on definitions (146 E: 
To 8 érepwrnGev ov TovTo Hv, Tay } erLaTHpN, Ode OTFOTAL 
Twés * ov yap apiOphcar adtas BovdrSsusvor jpouela, adda 
yvavac ériornuny avto 6 Ti ToT zar7iv, cl. Huthyph. 5D, 
6£; Meno 72 4). Some models of definitions are given, 
as for instance ‘ clay is moistened earth’ (147 c), or ‘the 


presup- 
poses the 
knowledge 
of its 
elements, 
while 
absolute 
ideas are 
simple 

in their 
perfection. 


Three 
kinds of 
Adyos 
indis- 
pensable 
for know- 
ledge. 


Defini- 
tion by 
indica- 
tion of a 
specific 
difference, 
equivalent 
to know- 
ledge 

at the 
beginning 
of the 
dialogue. 


Defini- 
tions 
common 
to know- 
ledge and 
opinion. 


Consis- 
tency 
condition 
of know- 
ledge. 


Heraclitus 
refuted 
while the 
investi- 
gation of 
Parme- 
nides 

is ad- 
journed. 


Dramatic 
opposi- 
tion of 
two views 
on Being. 


378 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


sun is the brightest of the heavenly bodies which revolve 
about the earth’ (208 p). Though at the end of the dia- 
logue the definition is supposed not to be a peculiarity of 
knowledge alone, there is no doubt that it has been 
admitted as an essential condition of knowledge, common 
to knowledge and true opinion (209 D: qepi tv Suabopornta 
dpa Kal % op0y do&a dy ein éxadotou wépu). It 1s very 
surprising that among the possible meanings of Doyos 
enumerated, precisely that meaning which this word 
appears to have in connection with knowledge for Plato 
(=airia) is omitted, except in one passage in the familiar 
phrase dvivai rz Kal d¢EacOat NOyor (202 C) in which Aoyos 
is identical with sufficient reason, as in similar passages 
of the Cratylus (426 A), Phaedo (76 B, 95 A), and Republic 
(531 £). Consistency is here, as already in earlier works, 
expressly stated to be a necessary condition of knowledge 
(154 E: BovrAnoopeta OzacacOa aita Tpos avTd, Ti ToT’ 
gotiv & Siavoovpeba, TOTEpoV Huiv ANAndOLS Evpdwvei 7) odd 
ommaTioov.—200 D: 7i dv avTo padLoTa EltrovTEs HKLoT av 
hiv adtois évavtiwGeiuev ;), and the fixity of notions is 
represented as a condition of consistency (183 A) against 
the Heraclitean theory of eternal change of everything. 

This theory had been declared in the Cratylus to be 
too difficult for refutation, and only here it is refuted, 
while the criticism of the opposite view of Parmenides is 
left for a future occasion under a similar pretext to that 
which in the Cratylus accounted for the postponement of 
the criticism of the Heraclitean doctrine, namely that the 
philosophy of Parmenides is too deep for a superficial 
digression, while it would lead away from the chief pur- 
pose of the present conversation, the definition of knowledge 
(184 4). Wesee here the same dramatic opposition of 
two conflicting views as to the whole of universal existence, 
which was represented later with such pathetic solemnity 
in the Sophist. Only here the conflicting views are not 
materialism and idealism as in the Sophist, but Hera- 
cliteanism and Eleaticism (180 D £). 


REFORM OF PLATO'S LOGIC: THEAETETUS 379 


This comprehensive survey of the great conflicts in 
human thought could have been reached by Plato only 
after a full elaboration of his own philosophy. Thus 
speaks the head of a school, who has pupils from all parts 
of the Hellenic world, and observes in them the natural 
tendencies towards different aims. 

What has been said in the Republic ine the necessary 
training of a philosopher is here repeatedly mentioned 
with reference to Theaetetus, who has been prepared 
for the present inquiry by mathematical, musical, and 
astronomical studies (145 A, c), and also, according 
to the recommendation given in the Republic, by 
investigation into stereometry (148 B). His mind cor- 
responds in every point to what has been required from a 
philosopher in the Republic: he learns everything as easily 
as oil spreads silently over a smooth surface (1448), and 
besides this intellectual development he is courageous and 
gentle (1444). This picture of the natural gifts of a 
future philosopher agrees perfectly with that given in the 
Republic, as also Plato’s confidence in youth expressed 
through the person of Theodorus (146 B: 76 yap dvte 7 
veoTns eis wav ériooow zyxe). Thusin one important point 
the psychological rule of earlier logic is maintained: the 
highest level of knowledge can be reached only by excep- 
tional natures, which have the privilege of being born rulers 
and teachers of men. For the ideal of the philosopher rises 
above the rest of mankind, and finds its own model in the 
ideal of divinity, to which the philosopher approaches as 
near as possible (1764: 610 Kai Teipacbar ypn evOevde 
éxeioe hevyew 6 TL TayLaTA. Gvyy OF dpolwors Oe@ KaTa TO 
duvatov* opoiwors de Sixavoy Kai baLvov peta dporiicews 
yevéo@a). The philosopher is represented as indifferent 
to the political affairs of his country (173 D), and no stress 
is laid on his duty to go down into the struggles of vulgar 
life, and to apply his higher knowledge to the necessities 
of his countrymen. 

The philosopher is here conceived in that stage of 


Historical 
stand- 
point 
reached. 


Training 
of the 
Philo- 
sopher 
illus- 
trated 

by the 
Theae- 
tetws, so 
as to con- 
firm the 
precepts 
laid down 
in the 
Republic. 


Aa 
Philo- 


sopher 
near the 
divinity, 
far from 
the actual 
political 
life, dedi- 
cated to 
abstract 
specu- 
lation. 


Enlarge- 
ment of 
Plato’s 
mental 
horizon. 
Human 
measures 
of time 
and space 
insigni- 
ficant. 


Antici- 
pation of 
modern 


views. 


Antiquity 
of Man. 
Myriads 
of genera- 
tions 
meant 
more 
seriously 
than 
twenty- 
five 
ancestors. 


Reason 
slowly 


380 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


abstract speculation which was lmited in the Republic 
to a few years of his life. His mind expatiates over 
the whole heaven, and all manifold objects forming 
different wholes, without caring any longer for what is 
near at hand (173 E£: 7 didvoia tabTa wavta jynoapevn 
OuiKpa Kal ws ovdsey aTYLdcacu TavTayh dhépeTaL KaTa 
Ilivéapov, ta te yas UrevepOe Kai Ta érimeda yewpeTpodoa, 
ovpavod Te UTEp aoTpoVvomotca, Kal Tacav TavTn vow 
Suepevvouevyn TOV OvTwY ExaoTOU Grov, Eis TOV eyyS ovOEY 
avuTnv cuyxabieica). Accustomed to look upon the whole 
earth, he despises the greatest landowner as insignificant 
(174 8), and he equally thinks little of human measures of 
time, because he knows that even this poor earth (1764: 
Tovée Tov ToTrov) has already a past of innumerable millions 
of years (175A: wdtrev Kai tpoyovwy pmupiddes ExdoT@ 
yeyovaciy avapiOunto, év ais Trovavor Kal Trwyol Kal 
Bacwrfs Kai dodo. BapBapot te Kat “ENAnves TodrAKis 
pupion yeyovaciww otwodv). We see here an horizon of 
thought extending beyond even that of the Phaedrus. 
With his wonderful intuition, Plato credits the earth with 
an age which modern geology for the first time made 
probable, and leaves far behind him those primitive 
chronologies which counted only thousands of years since 
the appearance of the first man. It is strange that acute 
critics, who took quite seriously the number of twenty-five 
ancestors quoted here as an example of cuxpodoyia, and 
counted with the greatest care the ancestors of various con- 
temporaries of Plato in order to ascertain whom he might 
have meant, did not perceive that ‘innumerable myriads 
of generations’ evidently was not a rhetorical exaggera- 
tion, but a quite serious view of Plato about the antiquity 
of mankind, in agreement with the cycle of ten thousand 
years alluded to in the Republic and the myth of the 
Phaedrus, but entirely absent from the Phaedo and all 
earher dialogues. 

The theoretical tendency is increasing here, and the dif- 
ferences between men still more clearly recognised than in 


REFORM OF PLATO'S LOGIC: THEAETETUS 381 


the Republic. Few reach a full development of reason : 
true knowledge can be acquired only by long endeavours 
under the best guidance, while man and beast alike have 
sense perceptions from their birth upwards (186 c). The 
impartial pursuit of truth is here contrasted with eristic 
discussion, and this exhortation is curiously enough put 
into the mouth of Protagoras, against whom Plato fought 
earlier not quite impartially in the dialogue bearing his 
name. Here Protagoras recommends justice in every 
discussion, and explains for us some of Plato’s own 
contradictions, avowing frankly that in polemical writings 
every one seeks the appearance of being right, while 
convicting his opponent of as many errors as_ possible 
(167 E: dosxsiv 8 got ev 7 ToLOvTH, OTav TLs wn yopls meV 
@s ayovtouevos Tas SiatpiBas mrowvjrar, ywpis 52 Siadeyo- 
mevos, Kal ev pev TO Taitn te Kal ohddrdyn Kal’ Goov ay 
Suvntat, ev b& TO SiareyecGat orrovdatyn). If we lead a 
discussion with the object of arriving at the truth and 
deal fairly with our opponent, then he accuses only him- 
self and hates his errors, whereby he is led to philosophy, 
with a complete change of his former nature (168 4). 

That such a purely Platonic precept should be given 
as an exhortation of Protagoras to the Platonic Socrates, 
appears to be an expiation of earlier polemics and an 
announcement of that purely objective historical stand- 
point which we see in the dialectical dialogues. Also 
Rhetoric as an art of persuasion is here mentioned with 
irony but without the bitterness of the Gorgias, and more 
in the indulgent mood of the Phaedrus. Plato recognises 
the power of Rhetoric to persuade without knowledge, 
and sees herein an argument for the great distance 
separating right opinion from knowledge (201 A: od édd- 
TKOVTES, GNAG Ookaley ToLobyTEs & Av BovAwYTaL). 

This importance attached to a distinction between 
right opinion and knowledge might be better appreciated 
if we could guess with some certainty against whom the 
polemic is directed. Knowledge is emphatically affirmed 


developed 
and in few 
persons. 


Increas- 
ing 
serious- 
ness of 
philo- 
sophical 
purpose. 


Prota- 
goras in- 
troduced 
as exhort- 
ing to 
impartial 
dialectical 
discus- 
sion. 


An 
implied 
confession 
of earlier 
partiality. 
Recog- 
nition of 
rhetoric, 
as giving 
beliefs 
without 
know- 
ledge. 


Rhetoric 
still dis- 
tinguished 
from phi- 
losophy. 


Changes 
in the 
logical 
point of 
view 

not made 
explicitly. 
Earlier 
state- 
ments not 
revoked. 
But cate- 
gories 
take the 
place of 
ideas. 


382 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


to be one of the highest aims in life (148¢: ériotypn... 
T@V axpotatwy), Worthy to be explained (148D: spo- 
OupnOnte mavti TpoTwe TOV TE AANwY TéepL Kal éTLaTHUNS 
AaBEiv Aoyov Ti TroTe TUyXavet Ov), and giving authority to 
those who possess it (170 A: % ye rois weyiotots Kivdvvots 
.. . WoTEp Tpos Oeovs EyEW .. . TWTHPAS THOV TpoTboKOYTAS, 
ovK ddAwW Tw Siahégpovtas 7 THO eldévar. Cf. 171 c, 183 BC). 

Although the ultimate distinction between knowledge 
and right opinion is not given, it results at least that 
there is an essential difference between them, and this 
consists in the systematic unity of knowledge founded 
on one highest principle, as has been postulated in Phaedo 
and Republic. It is exceedingly significant that no use 
of the theory of ideas as known from those dialogues has 
been made in the whole inquiry, and that the transition 
from self-existing ideas to categories of reason is made 
without a formal revocation of earlier views. But it 
must be recognised that these views are not entirely 
contradictory, and that ideas of moral notions might 
continue to exist along with the categories of percep- 
tions. Only in some special cases the conflict becomes 
evident, as for instance if we compare some passages of 
the Phaedo and Theaetetus referring to a problem which 
was one of the starting points of the theory of ideas and 
which again returns here as requiring a new explanation : 


Phaedo 100 E: ov6€ ov ap’ av 
2 , ” , ’ x4 
arrod€exouo, €l Tis TLva Gain €eTEpoV 
CF - cal , > \ 
éTepou TH Kean peifw etvat, Kal 
Tov €hdTT@ TO avT@ TOUT@ eaTTo, 
101 A: ada Siapapripoo adv Gre 
4 x 
av pev ovdev GAO eéyers 7) OTL TO 
a = o (dee? > why 
peiCov may erepov érepov ovdevi GAA@ 
mye > x , , , 
peiov eat i) weyéGer . . « py Tis 
’ , A - 
cot evavtios hoyos anavTnTn, €av TH 
a a <A \ 
Kearny peiCova tia is €tvat Kat 
cal ‘ ~ > - ‘ 
eAdTT@, TP@TOV pevy TH avT@ TO 
ms A > 4 . 
petCov petCov eivar Kat TO €XaTTOV 
” ” a a a 
éatrov, émerra TH KechaAn opikpa 
ovon Tov peiCw pei etvar. 


Theaet. 1540: optxpov dae 
mapdadetypa, kal mavta eloe a 
BovAopat. dotpayddouvs yap mov 
e&, dv pev rértapas avrois mpoo- 
evéykns, meiovs apev elvar Tov 
TeTTaGpwY Kal Hutodiovs, eav Oe 
dadexa, ehatTovs Kal Huicers. 

1554: 
pacparaev nu; &v rp@tov... 
pndérrote peigov pnde 
éXatrov yeverOar pyre oyK@ prre 
aptOne, ews ixov ein ato EavT@ .. . 
Sevrepov S€é ye, © pte mpootiborro 
pnre acaipotro, TovTo pyte avéa- 


ot Papo 4 \ A \ 
ajtTa@ WOT €OTL TAVTA TA 


undev av 


REFORM OF PLATO’S LOGIC: THEAETETUS 383 


B:... Ta deka tev oxr@ dvoiv 
‘ be © Le , iY a 
melo etvat, kat dia Tavtny THY airiav 
UrepBadrew, poBoio dv Aéyerv, dda 
ay wander... Evi évds mpoote- 
, - 
Oévros thy mpdabecw airiay eiva 
a , , x Z 
tod dvo yeverba 7 SiacxiocOevros 
\ , > > $9 a 4 
Thv oxlaw ovk evAaBoto dv éyew ; 
C: Kat péeya dy Bowns ort v 
: Kai péya Gv Bons ott . . . ovK 
: 5) ee a , 
éxets GAAnv tiva airiay tod dvo 
yever Oar add’ 7) thy THs Suddos pera- 
oxeow ... Tas d€ syxioes TavTas 
. vas \ \ Bod A 
kai mpoobéeoes Kal Tas adAas Tas 
, , aes a , 
TowavTas Kouelas eons ay xatpet, 
> , cal ~ 
Tapels amoxpivacGar Tots éavtov 
copwrepois. 


, 
veo Gai rrore pnre POivey, det dé tcov 
- 
eivat. 
. A , a A , > 

B. kal TplTov, O fn TpOTEpoY Hy, 
nm A A A > y+ ~ 
aha vorepov Todto eivar avev Tod 

, 6 ’ > , 
yeveo Oa ytyver Oar advvarov 


. TavTa 6uodoynuata Tpia pa- 


\ 
Kat 


XeTae avta abrois ev TH Nwetépa 
Wuxn, Stray ra repli tov dotpa- 
yahav héyoperv. 

C: kat GAAa 67 pupia emi pv- 
plots ovrws exe. . . doxeis yoov 
ovK Gmreipos TOY ToLOvTwY e€ivat ;— 
trephuas ws Oavudtw ti ror’ éoti 
TavTa kal eviote @s aAnOds Brérwv 
eis avTa oKOTOOWLA. 


We see here ™’ that in the earlier dialogue the diffi- 
culty is stated and left ironically to wiser men for solu- 
tion. In the Theaetetus the statement of the difficulty 
is no longer particular as in the Phaedo, but is expressly 
generalised, and shown to be applicable to innumerable 
instances, out of which one had been selected as ex- 
ample. 

Then also the form of the statement is much sharper 
in the later work, where the problem is reduced to three 
axioms (ddcputa), two of which are in contradiction with 
the third. The axioms are here said to be in the soul, 
whereby it becomes clear that we are no longer dealing 
with transcendental ideas, as in the Phaedo, but with sub- 
jective notions. While in the Phaedo only the fixity of 
notions is insisted upon, here we see activity as a condi- 
tion of change, which corresponds to the increasing 
interest in physical science, and to the constant applica- 


*7 H. Jackson (‘ Plato’s later theory of ideas: iv.’ Journ. of Philol. vol. 
xili. pp. 267-268) infers from this passage of the Theaetetus that ‘ the inter- 
vention of the idea is wholly unnecessary for a change of relations,’ while 
in the Phaedo this intervention was held to be necessary. But really in 
the Phaedo there was no question of change, and only fixity of relations 
was sought. The notion of change and movement belongs to a later stage, 
prepared in the Republic, beginning with the Phaedrus, and growing in 
the Theaetetus and Parmenides. 


7 


The 
problem 
now con- 
sidered 
with more 
apprecia- 
tion of its 
logical 
nature 
and its 
relation 
to other 
instances. 


Form 

of the 
statement 
sharper. 


Import- 
ance of 
the soul 
increased. 


Specula- 
tions as 
to the 
possi- 
bility 

of error 
do not 
lead to 
definitive 
conclu- 
sions. 


No 
solution 
possible 
until 
knowledge 
is defined. 


Theae- 
tetus not 
a Socratic 
dialogue. 
The in- 
conclusive 
ending 
marks 

a new 
departure. 


384 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


tion of the opposition between zoey and mdoxew, 
common to the Theaetetus with the Phaedrus. 

In connection with this we find in the Theaetetus 
a general investigation into the possible conditions of 
error, which does not lead to a definitive conclusion, but 
contains very subtle distinctions and deserves our closest 
attention. It appears first that errors are only possible 
when one perception is taken for another (193 Bc D) under 
the influence of an imperfection of sense activity (194 B: 
mept ov iopev Te Kat aicbavoueba, éy adtois TovToLs oTpédeTat 
Kal éritteTae 7) Sd€a wevd)s Kal adnOns yryvopévn) combined 


-with thought (195 cD: nipnKas 8) Wevdh do€av, oT ovTE ev 


tats aicOnoeclv éoTe Tpos adXrnAaS OUT’ év Tais diavoiats, 
aXN év TH avvarpe aicOynoews mpos Sedvorav). But then an 
instance is adduced of errors possible without the partici- 
pation of the senses (196 A 8B), and the difficulty is left 
unsettled. It results that without a definition of know- 
ledge no definition of error can be given (290 D) and know- 
ledge remains undefined, though Socrates remembers that 
in the whole discussion it had been dealt with as already 
known (196 E: wupiaKis yap eipnkapev TO yiyvooKopev Kal 
ov yryv@oKomev, Kal éTLioTameOa Kai ovK éTicTapEOa, Os TL 
cuvievtes GXAHAWY ev @ ETL ETLETHUNY ayvoodpsv) because 
dialectical discussion would be impossible without a notion 
of knowledge (196 E: tiva tpomov SuadéEev tovTwY arreyo- 
eevos ;—ovdzva WV YE Os Eli). 

These fundamental problems were not yet appreciated 
in their whole importance in the earlier works, and their 
appearance in the T'heaetetus brings us back in one 
respect to the Socratic stage, namely in so far as no 
definitive conclusion is apparently reached... But the 
above significant logical contents involve subtle distinc- 
tions which would be looked for in vain in the Socratic 
dialogues. The similarity consists only in the circum- 
stance that here as well as there a new development of 
thought was beginning. This new development beginning 
here—with the substitution of categories for ideas, of 


REFORM OF PLATO’S LOGIC: THEAETETUS 385 


the individual soul for the supercelestial space, of analysis 
and synthesis for poetical vision, of activity and passivity 
for immutable identity, of critical cautiousness for poe- 
tical eloquence—is a momentous step in the history of 
human thought and would have required another thinker 
than the author of the Republic and Phaedrus, were he 
not of such an immense intellectual power and had he not 
lived so long as to initiate a new philosophical movement 
after the age of fifty. 

Thus considered, the question of the date of the 
Theaetetus acquires an exceptional importance, and no 
consideration of evidence will be wasted, if it helps to 
decide the question, whether we are right in placing this 
dialogue after the Republic and Phaedrus. Up to the 
present time some of the most competent scholars agree 
with Zeller in believing that the Theaetetus must have 
been written within the first ten years after the death of 
Socrates, or about the same time as the Huthydemus. We 
have seen that this position is contradicted by the style 
as well as by the logical theories of our dialogue. 
view of the paramount importance of the question and of 
the great authority of those who are supporting an early 
date for the Theaetetus we are obliged to consider in 
detail the arguments in support of this opinion, which has 
been unanimously sustained by the chief writers on Plato 
from Tennemann, Schleiermacher, Ast, Socher, Stallbaum, 
Hermann, Steinhart, Susemihl up to the last editions 
of Zeller’s Philosophie der Griechen (1889) and of 
Ueberweg’s Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie 
(1894) besides many special dissertations.“* The most 
eminent supporter of an early date of the Theaetetus is 


248 Among these are conspicuous Natorp’s Forschungen zur Geschichte 
des Erkenntnissproblems im Alterthwm (Berlin 1884) and his paper on the 
Phaedrus (Philologus, 48° Band, pp. 428-449, 583-628, Gottingen 1889), 
wherein he looks upon the Theaetetus as preparatory to the theory of ideas. 
In favour of the opposite view we have, besides all those who have written on 
the style of Plato, also some authors who admitted a late date for the Theae- 
tetus for other reasons, as for instance Munk (see note 89), Berkuski (Platons 


CC 


But in- 


Conse- 
quent im- 
portance 
of the 
date of 
compo- 
sition, 
which by 
Zeller and 
others is 
assumed 
to be very 
early. 


Zeller, in 
common 
with many 


previous 
critics, 
still up- 
holds an 
early date. 


Allusion 
to an 
encamp- 
ment near 
Corinth. 


Assump- 
tion of the 
identity 
of the 
date of 
composi- 
tion with 
the sup- 
posed 
date of 
the intro- 
ductory 
dialogue 


386 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


Zeller, and he has not yet been thoroughly refuted. 
Though polemic enters to no extent into the plan of the 
present investigation, it seems to be in this special case 
our duty to consider Zeller’s arguments, and to prove 
that they are insufficient to establish his claim. 

1. The first chronological indication is seen by Zeller 
in the allusion to an encampment near Corinth (Theaet. 
142 a). He refers it to the war which is known in 
history as the Corinthian war and lasted about seven 
years 394-387. Even if we admit this reference as 
possible—instead of accepting the very convincing argu- 
ments of Ueberweg, Teichmiiller, Bergk, and Rohde, 
according to which the allusion refers to a battle of 
368 B.c. mentioned by Xenophon (Hellen. vu, 1, 15) and 
other historians— Zeller’s inference as to the identity of the 
date of composition and the presumed date of the con- 
versation is not cogent. The more striking the campaign 
the more probable becomes a later allusion to it. All that 
is really proved is that the date of composition is subse- 
quent to 392; there is no reason to identify both dates, as 
has frequently been done in the case of the Phaedo and 
Phaedrus. The association of ideas between Corinthian war 
and ‘ encampment near Corinth’ is more immediate for us | 
than for the first readers of Plato. But we see in the 
dialogue the mention of an encampment not of a battle. 
A soldier might have been wounded in some insignificant 
attack on his encampment, without having taken part in 
an historical battle. If we take the mere fact of an en- 


Thedtetos wnd dessen Stellung in der Reihe seiner Dialoge, Inaugural-disser- 
tation, Jena 1873), H. Schmidt (Hxegetischer Commentar zu Platos Thedtet, 
Leipzig 1880), H. Jackson, E. Rohde, W. Christ (‘ Platonische Studien,’ in 
vol. xvil. of Abhandlungen der philosophisch-philologischen Classe der 
kinighich bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften), Teichmiiller, 
Siebeck, Archer Hind (Introduction to the Timaeus, p. 21), M. Jezienicki 
(Ueber die Abfassungszeit der platonischen Dialoge Theaitet und Sophistes, 
Lemberg 1887). Zeller did not consider all the above authors and their 
arguments when he declared repeatedly the discussion as definitively settled 
(Archiv fiir Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. iv. p. 189, vol. v. p. 289, 
vol. viii. p. 124, and on many other occasions). 


REFORM OF PLATO’S LOGIC: THEAETETUS 387 


campment in which dysentery is reigning, we have no 
reason whatever to refer it to 392 rather than to 368 
unless some independent testimony is forthcoming about 
an epidemic of dysentery occurring at one of these dates 
alone. In both cases a fight near Corinth took place. It 
has been argued that Theaetetus, who was a boy according 
to the dialogue at the time of Socrates’ death, could not 
already be famous seven years later. Here, as in the 
Phaedrus, we have a prophecy put in the mouth of 
Socrates realised at the time of writing. If in the 
Phaedrus the prophecy refers to the Panegyricus written 
26 years later, the prophecy about Theaetetus might 
well have been realised in a length of time almost equal. 
Zeller believes that the mention must refer to a recent fact. 
The notion of recent facts is often abused. Anybody 
might speak to-day of the Russo-Turkish war as recent 
if compared with the conquest of Constantinople by the 
Turks. There is no reason to believe that for Plato 
current events ceased to be recent sooner than for us, at 
a time when he spoke of twenty-five generations as a 
ridiculously small period. 

2. If historians are right in saying that Iphicrates in 
this very Corinthian war introduced the peculiar force of 
light-armed infantry known as 7eAtactai, the allusion to 
them on the part of Socrates (165 D) certainly involves 
an anachronism. But if the use of peltasts began at that 
time, there is no reason to think that it ceased twenty 
years later. It would be more reasonable to argue from 
a similar mention of peltasts in the Protagoras (350 A) 
that the Protagoras cannot have been written earlier than 
393; and any one who compares the Protagoras with the 
Theaetetus will find such differences of style, of method, 
of literary perfection, and of philosophical theory, that it 
is impossible to ascribe both to the same period. But 
the truth is that, whatever may have been the device of 
Iphicrates, the word weNraorys occurs in several earlier 
writers, Euripides, Thucydides, Lysias, Xenophon, and 


Comet 


Compari- 
son 

with the 
Phaedrus 
prophecy. 


Notion of 
a recent 
fact. 


Mention 
of the 
Peltasts 
common 
to the 
Theae- 
tetus wit 
Prota- 
goras and 
Laws. 


Twenty- 
five 
ancestors. 


Genealogy 
less 
interest- 
ing for 
Plato 
than for 
some 
modern 
historians 
of philo- 
sophy. 


388 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


is common to the Laws with Theaetetus and Protagoras, 
so that it has no chronological value whatever in Plato. 
To infer anything from it means almost as much as to 
refer any work in which a mention of potatoes occurs to 
the next time after the first introduction of this vegetable 
in Europe in 1584 4.p. It seems astonishing that Zeller 
should have followed Teichmiiller in such inferences 
from an accidental mention of an object familiar to Greek 
readers before Plato began to write. 

3. A third indication of the date of the Theaetetus is 
seen by Zeller in the allusion (175 a) to those who are 
proud of twenty-five ancestors, and of their descent from 
Heracles son of Amphitryon. This allusion has also been 
treated as a mark of date by Bergk and Rohde, but each 
assumes a different descendant of Heracles. And even if 
we take Plato to be referring to a contemporary, who 
is to decide whether among the twenty-five ancestors 
Amphitryon’s father Alcaeus or his grandfather Perseus 
are to be counted or not? In any case Heracles need 
not be the twenty-fifth. The discussion whether Agesi- 
polis (Zeller), Euagoras (Rohde), Dionysius of Syracuse 
(Teichmiiller), Agesilaos (Bergk) or anybody else is meant 
by Plato is a curious example of the abuse of erudition 
leading to misunderstanding of the text on which the 
erudition is spent. Plato speaks of twenty-five genera- 
tions as he does of ten thousand plethra of land, probably 
without any intentional allusion to any one in particular. 
The pride of counting Heracles among one’s ancestors, 
and even a catalogue of twenty-five or more of them, 
cannot have been uncommon in Plato’s time, if after so 
many centuries four historians are able to quote four 
different descendants of Heracles with twenty-five or more 
ancestors a-piece (175 A: ceuvuvouévwy Kal avadepovTar 18 
a plural that might be taken literally). But it is by no 
means certain that Plato was as skilled in genealogy as 
his modern interpreters. He regards the whole question 
as contemptible, a monstrously small way of reckoning 


REFORM OF PLATO'S LOGIC: THEAETETUS 389 


(cpuxpodroyia). Those acute critics who perceive in each 
round number quoted a statistical datum incur the danger 
of being accused of a opsxporoyia more blameworthy than 
that complained of by Plato. 

4. A fourth argument of Zeller is more serious than 
the preceding. He says that the critical character of the 
Theaetetus does not agree with the positive constructive 
exposition of the Republic. Zeller means that such 
elementary inquiry into the foundations of knowledge 
was most probable in a time when Plato began the build- 
ing of his philosophy. We quite agree with Zeller, but 
if we add that Plato in his exceptionally long and active 
life had time to build more than one philosophy, we are 
at liberty to place the Theaetetus at the opening of Plato’s 
second voyage for the discovery of truth, after the Republic. 
In two passages we notice allusions which may with some 
probability be referred to Republic (177 B: rapadevypatav 
év T® dvTL EoTwTHY, TOD pev Oelov EevdaLpoverTaToU, TOD dé 
abgov aOdwrdtov, oly opdvTes OTL oUTwS FxEL, ITO nALOL0- 
TTOs TE Kal éoydtns avoias NavOavovet ...175 C: cKEeYfrw 
aiths Sicavoovvns TE xa adixias . . . Bacidrsias Tépt Kab 
avOpwrivns Gros evdaymovias Kal aOdTHTOS . . . Tolw TE 
TWe oTOV kal tiva TpoTrov avOpwrrou pio TpoonKeEl TO meV 
kTycacbat avtoiv, To S82 amodpuyeiv), and to the Phaedrus 
(175 E: dppoviay Nyov AaB6rT0s bpOGs bwrjoas Oe@v Te Kal 
avOporrev evdaipovev Biov)—while Zeller could not find 
in the whole Republic an equally probable allusion to the 
Theaetetus. If we compare the critical tendency of the 
Theaectetus with the critical and elementary character of 
the works belonging to the Socratic stage, we shall easily 
notice the difference between those youthful personal 
criticisms and the fundamental criticisms of the Theae- 
tetus similar to those of the Parmenides and Sophist. 

5. Zeller finds an argument for the early date of the 
Theaetetus in his belief that the Politicus is earlier than 
Symposium and Phaedo. But he has not furnished any 
proof of this assumption, which contradicts everything we 


The 

incon- 
clusive 
form 
indicates 
new de- 
parture, 
or second 
beginning. 


Allusions 
to 
Republic 
and 
Phaedrus. 


Zeller’s 
view of 
early 
date of 


Politicus 
clearly 
wrong. 
Relation 
to 
Euclides 
and 

Anti- 
sthenes 
uncertain. 


Zeller’s 
view that 
a late 
date 

for the 
Theae- 
tetus 
leaves no 
room for 
the dia- 
logues 
which 
follow it. 


Which are 
these ? 


Relation 
of size 
between 
dialogues 
earlier 
and later 
than the 
Theae- 
tetus. 


390 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


know about the development of Plato’s style and his 
logical doctrines. 

6. The relations between Plato, Antisthenes, and 
Euclides, which Zeller also invokes in favour of an early 
date of the Theaetetus, are too little known for any chrono- 
logical inferences, and they could never prove anything 
about the date of composition, because Antisthenes is not 
named in the dialogue, and EHuclides appears at the 
beginning without any mention which would allow infer- 
ences about his relations to Plato. 

7. Geller enumerates the dialogues which in his opinion 
followed. the Theaetetus, and finds it improbable that they 
could have been written in the last twenty years of Plato’s 
life. But he includes the Repwblic in this enumeration, 
on the ground that he holds the Republic to be later 
than the Philebus, and the Philebus than Parmenides and 
Theaetetus. We quite agree that the Parmenides and 
Philebus follow the Theaetetus, but we see no sufficient 
reason for placing the Republic after the Philebus. Zeller 
relies on some parallel passages which are too general to 
prove anything, and even rather confirm the priority of 
the Republic.** Such parallels are rarely decisive, and 
have only then a certain value, if many concomitant 
variations point in the same direction. The seven 
dialogues which, according to our exposition, precede 
the Theaetetus (Huthydemus, Gorgias, Cratylus, Sym- 
postum, Phaedo, Republic, Phaedrus) are in their total 
size (453 pp. ed. Did.) almost equal to the seven dialogues 
which we suppose to be later than the Theaetetus (Parme- 
nides, Sophist, Politicus, Philebus, Timaeus, Critias, 
Laws, 457 pp. ed. Did.). If we are right in supposing 
that the seven earlier dialogues were written in the years 
390-379, there is no difficulty whatever in admitting that 
the seven later works fall within the last twenty years of 


249 This question has been recently dealt with by Jackson (‘ Plato’s later 
theory of ideas VII. The supposed priority of the Philebus to the Republic,’ 
in the Jowrnal of Philology for 1897, N. 49, pp. 65-82). 


REFORM OF PLATO’S LOGIC: THEAETETUS 391 


Plato’s life (867-847), or even within the time after his 
third voyage to Sicily (861 B.c.). If this were proved, 
then the mention of the superiority of oral teaching at 
the end of the Phaedrus would mean nothing less than 
an interruption of about twelve years in Plato’s literary 
labours. But of course such a conclusion requires more 
serious arguments than those on which Zeller founded 
his conviction about a very early date of the dialectical 
works. Here it is only put forth as a possibility which 
may be made probable by further investigations. 

At all events, the above reasoning shows that Zeller’s 
arguments prove only that the Theaetetus is later than 
392 B.c., without any determination of the distance be- 
tween this terminus a quo and the date of composition. 
All the allusions found out by Zeller with such acuteness 
and erudition, even if we admit the interpretation he 
gives them, would remain quite as natural twenty-five 
years after the Corinthian war as immediately afterwards. 
In such things we have not the right to look at Plato 
from the point of view of a newspaper editor, who wishes 
to give to his readers the most recent information. Plato 
was free to choose from his large stores of experience at 
any time any example proper for an illustration of his 
views, without considering whether it occurred long ago 
or yesterday. Nosuch immediate allusion as the Ssovxrcpos 
of the Symposium has been found as yet in the T'heaetetus. 
On the contrary we have several reasons to believe that 
the Theaetetus is a late dialogue, written by Plato after 
fifty and possibly after sixty. These reasons have been 
collected since Munk and Ueberweg by many investi- 
gators and can easily be supplemented by considerations 
of style and logical comparisons. 

We find in the Theaetetus clear allusions to Plato’s 
school. The person of the younger Socrates, introduced 
here, is also known from the Metaphysics of Aristotle 
(1036 b 25), where he is quoted in the manner in which 
Aristotle quotes oral reminiscences. ‘This led Ueberweg to 


Probable 
interrup- 
tion in 
Plato’s 
literary 
activity. 


Zeller’s 
argumen- 
tation 
not con- 
vincing. 


Prevailing 
reasons 
for a 

late date 
of the 
Theae- 
tetus. 


Allusions 
to Plato’s 
school. 


The 
younger 
Socrates 
and 
Aristotle. 


Allusions 
to travels. 


Theo- 
dorus of 
Cyrene. 


Teich- 
miiller’s 
argument 
from the 
dramatic 
form. 


How far 


defensible. 


392 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


the conclusion that this younger Socrates belonged to the 
Academy at the same time with Aristotle, or after 367 B.c. 
If we consider that he does not take an active part in the 
conversation, it becomes probable that Plato introduced 
him as a witness out of some personal sympathy at the 
time when he already had known him for some time past. 
This argument is not decisive, because the younger 
Socrates may have belonged to the Academy a long time 
before Aristotle and still have continued in it afterwards. 
The Academy was not similar to our universities as to 
the limits of time fixed for the studies, and Plato’s pupils 
probably remained in touch with him for life. 

But a more important observation has been made 
by Ueberweg as to the picture drawn of the philo- 
sopher, that it can best be explained if we refer it to 
Plato’s experience in Syracuse, where he may have found 
many parasites ready for all kinds of slavish services to 
please the tyrant. It may also be argued that the insist- 
ence with which Theodorus of Cyrene is asked to take an 
active part in the discussion is most natural after Plato’s 
visit to Cyrene. 

Such allusions to external events are always open to 
doubts, and are here quoted without attaching to them 
any special importance. There is another chronological 
indication of a more serious character, noticed already by 
Schleiermacher and brought forward afresh with strong 
conviction by Teichmiiller. This is the statement at the 
beginning of the dialogue that it has been written down 
in the dramatic form to avoid frequent repetitions of such 
formulas as Kal éy@ env, Kai éyw civov, cuvedhn, OVX wpwordoryst 
(143 c). Teichmuller infers from this passage that Plato 
began only with the Theaetetus to write his dialogues in a 
dramatic form. But the dramatic form is the primitive 
form for a dialogue, and needs no apology. The narrated 
form of a philosophical dialogue is a much more com- 
plicated mode, and was perhaps introduced into Greek 
literature by Plato. After trying its different variations, 


REFORM OF PLATO’S LOGIC: THEAETETUS 393 


he returns to the dramatic form and apologises for the 
change. In point of fact the narrated form has been tried 
by Plato only in a few of his works, and almost in every 
case with some difference, as the following classification 
of the form of Plato’s dialogues shows : 


1. A continuous speech, including questions andanswers. This 
is the character of the Apology, in which some passages refer to con- 
versations held by the speaker (20 a), and others introduce an 
imagined conversation with the accuser (24D E, 278 ¢, &c.). 

2. Dramatic dialogues in which Socrates acts as leader of a con- 
versation. This is the most numerous class, including Huthyphro, 
Crito, Laches, Io, Meno, Gorgias, Cratylus, Philebus—and among 
the doubtful dialogues Alcibiades I. II., Hipparchus, Theages, 
Hippias maior and minor. A slight variation appears when the 
dramatic conversation includes long speeches of Socrates or others : 
Menexenus, Phaedrus. 

3. In a narration in which Socrates gives an account of some 
earlier conversation, the chief part is a narrated dialogue. This is 
the form of the Republic, and besides only of Lysis and Charmides 
(among the spurious dialogues: Hrastae). In this form the re- 
petition of the formulas complained of at the beginning of the 
Theaetetus is most conspicuous. 

4, After a dramatic introduction, in which Socrates appears as 
one of the persons of the dialogue, he begins to narrate an earlier 
conversation, and this narration follows up to the end. This form 
is found only in the Protagoras. 

5. Different from the above is a narration interrupted by 
dramatic portions in which other persons speak with Socrates about 
his narration, and such a conversation forms the conclusion of the 
whole. This occurs only in the Huthydemus. 

6. After a dramatic introduction another person than Socrates 
narrates a dialogue in which Socrates played the chief part. This 
is limited to the Symposium. 

7. The above form is improved by dramatic interruptions in 
which some opinions are expressed by the hearer about the narrated 
dialogue. This occurs only in the Phaedo. 

8. After a dramatic introduction follows a reading of a dramatic 
dialogue, excused by a censure of the narrated dialogues generally. 
This is the case of the Theaetetws alone. 

9. After a short narration designed to explain the circumstances 
of a conversation, follows the dialectical conversation without the 
interruptions complained of in the Theaetetus. This distinguishes 
the Parmenides from all other narrated dialogues, and makes it 
possible that this work was written after the Theaetetus, though in 


Twelve 

different 
modes of 
dialogue 
in Plato. 


Pure 
narration 
least 
common 
of all, and 
occurs 

in three 
works. 


394 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


its general form it is a narrated dialogue, and even a narration of 
a narration, the dialogue being represented as first narrated by 
Pythodoros, then from him learned by Antiphon, and from 
Antiphon’s narration repeated by the actual narrator. But formulas 
peculiar to the narrated form occur only on pp. 126 a-187 c, 
here being also often omitted, while they are altogether missed 
on pp. 1387-166. Those occurring in the introduction are different 
from those condemned in the Theaetetws and from the use of other 
works : edn cava, eirety being chiefly used. 

10. Dramatic conversations in which Socrates proposes a 
subject, which is then dealt with by another philosopher: Sophist, 
Politicus. 

11. After a short dramatic conversation in which Socrates 
proposes a subject, follows a much longer speech by another person. 
This long speech may be interrupted by some words of recognition 
from Socrates (T7imaeus) or not at all interrupted (Critias). 

12. Dramatic dialogue in which Socrates no longer appears 
even as hearer: Laws. 


It results from the above distinctions ° that what 
Teichmuller calls the narrated dialogue includes seven 
kinds (No. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6,7, 9), which represent different 
attempts towards a more perfect form. Only the Lysis, 
Charmides, and Republic take the form of a continuous 
narration. ‘The nearest mode to this is a narration with 
dramatic introduction, asin the Protagoras. From the 
Protagoras the Huthydemus differs by dramatic interrup- 
tions and conclusion, the Symposiwm by the absence of 
Socrates in the Introduction, the Phaedo in addition to 
this by its dramatic interruptions. At last, in the second 
part of the Parmenides narration is abandoned altogether 
without any explanation, and the whole dialectical dis- 
cussion follows dramatically. 

Teichmiuller’s inference, if limited to the supposition 
that Plato did not return after the Theaetetus to the form 
criticised in this dialogue, appears very probable, and 

250 An attempt at such a classification has already been made by Stein 
(Sieben Biicher zur Geschichte des Platonismus, Gottingen 1864), who 
divided all the works of Plato into five classes, in a somewhat ditferent 
manner from the above. It is noteworthy that all the spurious dialogues 


have the form 2 or 3, while the ten other kinds of dialogues used by Plato 
have not been imitated. 


REFORM OF PLATO’S LOGIC: THEAETETUS 395 


furnishes us with valuable chronological information, 
giving additional strength to other reasons, according to 
which the Theaetetus is later than the Phaedo and 
Republic. It is not contradicted by any well-established 
fact, that Plato in his later age used the dramatic form 
exclusively. Allthe dialogues known to be the latest are 
dramatic, and the narrated form of the Republic compared 
with the dramatic form of the Timaeus, its professed con- 
tinuation, confirms again the supposition that Plato re- 
linquished the narrated form in order to adopt the 
dramatic. But it does not follow that he should never 
have used the dramatic form before he started with narra- 
tions, nor even in intervals between narrated dialogues. 
The small dialogues, as to which there is great probability 
that they were written early, are dramatic, and it is most 
natural for anybody who writes philosophical dialogues to 
begin with this form. Esthetical reasons, and the desire 
to give a greater poetical plasticity or historical probability 
to an imagined conversation, led later to the more difficult 
form of narration, which, after different variations, had 
to be finally abandoned in the Theaetetus and Parmenides. 
The inconvenience of narration could nowhere be felt 
more clearly than in the composition of the Republic, and 
thus one of the most probable inferences from the explana- 
tion given in the Theaetetus is the priority of the Republic. 
This is further confirmed by a parallel passage in the Re- 
public, where the dramatic form is condemned, after a long 
explanation of the difference between narration and dramatic 
representation (Rep. 392 D-396 c) onthe ground that the dra- 
matic form is less immediate and sincere than the narrative 
(396 0: 6 pwév pot Soxel pétpsos avnp, éresdav adpikntar év 
TH Sunynos emi AE Twa 1) meade avdpos ayabod, 2er- 
NOEL WS AUTOS MY éxeivos aTrayyéhNEW Kal OvK ala yuveta Oat 
éml TH TOLAUTH pwinos . . . BH: Sinynoes yproetac ola tsis 
ddXéyov mpoTEpoy SinOowev . . . Kal eoTAaL avTOU 7 AéELs 
peTéyouca psy adudhotépwv, piynoews TE Kal THs adds 
Sunyijcews, cpuxpov O€ TL mepos ev TOAAD NOYH THS wiurjoEws). 


It is true, 
however, 
that all 
the latest 
dialogues 
are dra- 
matic in 
form. 


Theae- 
tetus after 
Republic. 


Possible 
motive 
for the 
preface to 
Theae- 
tetus. 


Notions 
familiar 
in Theae- 
tetus, but 
carefully 
explained 
in the 
Republic. 


Relation 
of both 


dialogues. 


396 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


This recommendation of narrations is given in a narrated 
dialogue, and we know that Plato wrote afterwards dramatic 
dialogues, as, for instance, his Laws, Timaeus, Critias. 
If now we meet in the Theaetetus an apology for avoiding 
the form of a narrative when it might be expected, it 
appears very natural that this apology is later than the 
condemnation of the dramatic form enunciated in the 
Republic. This conclusion is the more justifiable, as Plato 
warns us that his condemnation of the dramatic form is 
not limited to tragedy and comedy (3894p). The above is 
only an indication, but seems to be more significant than the 
inferences drawn from the genealogy of various descendants 
from Heracles. The formulas objected to in the Theaetetus 
can occur only in a dialogue narrated by Socrates, and 
therefore the whole objection, if taken literally, refers 
solely to Lysis, Charmides, Protagoras, Huthydemus, and 
Republic. Besides the formulas expressly named other 
answers are used, and it would be an interesting investiga- 
tion to find out in which of these five dialogues the 
expressions rejected in the T'heaetetus are most frequent. 
There can be scarcely any doubt that the greatest number 
of them is to be found in the Republic. 

The priority of the Republic to the Theaetetus is 
confirmed also by other allusions and comparisons already 
mentioned which may be here briefly recapitulated : 


1. déivaus is first explained in Rep. 477 c as a new notion. 
It is used currently as familiar in the Theactetus: 158 8, 185, &ce. 

2. The eternal models of the happiest and unhappiest life 
(176 &) as well as the mention that the philosopher investigates the 
nature of justice (175 c) are best explained if the reader is supposed 
to be familiar with the Republic. 

3. The short and matter-of-fact enumeration of mathematics, 
music, astronomy, geometry, and stereometry (145. c, 1488), as 
preparatory to philosophical problems, seems also to be a remin- 
iscence of the Republic. 

4, The poets are placed on the same footing with Protagoras in 
their error of denying permanent substance (1528). This is best 
explainable after the Republic, as in the Symposiwm and even in 
the Phaedo (95 A) Homer was praised without irony. 


REFORM OF PLATO’S LOGIC: THEAETETUS 397 


5. The notion of movement as distinguished into change of 
quality and change of place, common to the Theaetetus with 
Parmenides and Laws, could not easily be ignored in Republic and 
Phaedrus if already familiar to Plato. 

6. The idea of innumerable periods of ten thousand generations 
(Theaet. 175 a, cf. Legg. 676 Bc, 677 D: pupideis ppia érn) implies 
an advance beyond the Republic and Phaedrus, where large 
periods of generations first appeared, and were specially justified. 
The long duration of life on the earth is here assumed as known to 
every educated man, and this was first explained in the Republic. 

7. The logical standpoint goes very much beyond the theory of 
ideas as known from the Republic and Phaedrus. This results 
from our whole exposition. 


Some of the above points apply equally to the priority 
of the Phaedrus, and there is besides one special point of 
comparison which places the Phaedrus before the Theae- 
tetus, namely the calm recognition of rhetoric (201 4), 
which seems to imply what has been said on this subject 
in the Phaedrus. But the strongest reason why the 
Theaetetus must be looked upon as later than the 
Phaedrus lies in the affinities of both dialogues to 
different groups of other dialogues. The Theaetetus is in 
style and contents nearest to the Sophist and Politicus, 
which are proved to be very late. The Phaedrus shows 
in style and contents the greatest affinity with the 
Republic, which is proved to be earlier than the Sophist. 
The poetical imagination displayed in the Phaedrus and 
Republic is radically different from the dialectical imagin- 
ation of the Theaetetus and Sophist. The retirement of 
the philosopher from the world, which we see in the 
Theaetetus, remains throughout all later dialogues, and 
also the complaint that life on earth is too imperfect for 
the realisation of a philosopher’s dreams. This complaint, 
quite opposed to the optimism of the Republic and 
Phaedrus, betrays an interval not only of time but also of 
bitter experience between the poetical and the dialectical 
group. 

We know in Plato’s life, after the foundation of the 
Academy, only one great disenchantment which could 


Priority of 
Phaedrus 
to Theae- 
tetus. 


Affinity of 
Phaedrus 
to the 
Republic, 
and of 
Theae- 
tetus 

to the 
Sophist. 


The 
Theae- 
tetus 


probably 
subse- 
quent to 
the second 
voyage to 
Sicily. 


This 
agrees 
with other 
argu- 
ments. 


Probable 
interval 
between 
Phaedrus 
and 
Theae- 
tetus. 


This 
would 
explain 
peculiar 
style of 
the 
Theae- 
tetus. 


398 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


justify that change of attitude on the part of the great 
thinker. This was his second voyage to Sicily in 367 B.c. 
which he undertook in the hope of realising his ideal 
schemes, and which ended unsuccessfully. It appears 
most probable that the new departure, beginning with 
the Theaetetws, coincides with his return from this 
voyage. This cannot be proved, but may be suggested as 
a plausible hypothesis, well adapted to explain many 
things otherwise unexplained. Those who believe that 
the battle near Corinth, mentioned at the beginning of 
the dialogue, must have been quite recent when Plato 
wrote the Theaetetus are then at liberty to accept Ueber- 
weg’s supposition that a battle in 368 B.c. is meant here, 
and they can seek additional evidence in inscriptions and 
literary monuments in order to prove that dysentery was 
reigning then in the encampment. The lovers of genea- 
logies will have a greater choice to select from, and may 
find in some contemporary encomium, as Diimmler expects, 
a clear statement about twenty-five ancestors descending 
from Heracles, thus removing the improbable supposition 
that Plato himself counted somebody’s ancestors. 

These are trifling advantages, compared with other con- 
siderations. If, as we suppose, the Phaedrus was written 
about 3879 B.c., and the Theaetetus after 367, then the 
passage at the end of the Phaedrus, in which oral 
teaching is extolled over writing, would obtain a new and 
original interpretation: it was a farewell to literary 
activity for about twelve years. And also one strange 
peculiarity of the style of the Theaetetus is psychologi- 
cally explained. The Theaetetus, having according to our 
calculations a slightly later style than the Phaedrus, is 
distinguished by the entire absence of very important or 
very frequent stylistic peculiarities. This is natural if 
that dialogue is written after a long interruption of 
literary activity. Plato was then to a certain extent free 
from acquired habits, and he did not at once fall into new 
idioms which might become very familiar in later works. 


REFORM OF PLATO’S LOGIC: THEAETETUS 399 


He used freely the richness of his old vocabulary and 
style, recurring less than usual to new formations and 
new idioms. Out of 500 peculiarities observed only four 
accidental words or locutions (11: pewrros, 208: évtredbev 
non, 399 : wept dn with genitive, 467: yuuracia) are new, 
being missed in earlier works. All other peculiarities of 
later style occurring in the Theaetetus (58 accidental, 
41 repeated, 31 important) have been also found in 
dialogues which we have placed earlier. While the 
number of accidental, repeated, and important peculiari- 
ties is much greater than in the Phaedrus (130 against 
112) there is not one very important peculiarity in the 
Theaetetus though seven are found in the Phaedrus. 
But none of these seven is missed in the Theaetetus, only 
their frequency is smaller, so that they are counted only 
as important or repeated in the Theaetetus, while they 
are more important in the Phaedrus (23, 231, 376, 377, 
390, 412, 451). 

The difference between both dialogues is just what 
might be expected if we place the Phaedrus at the end of 
a period of extraordinarily intense literary activity, and 
the Theaetetus at the beginning of another period, after a 
long interruption. Nor is the time of twenty years from 
367-347 B.c. too short for the composition of the Theae- 
tetus and the seven dialogues which are left, as their total 
size is inferior to the total size of the nine dialogues 
preceding the Theaetetus (Protagoras—Phaedrus) written 
according to our view between 393-379 B.c. or in about 
fourteen years. Whether a writer like Plato writes more 
at forty than after sixty is a question that cannot be 
decided on general grounds, and we make a due allow- 
ance for the diminution of activity in old age, down to an 
average of only four lines (ed. Didot) every day if the last 
eight dialogues (Theaetetus—Laws) were written in about 
nineteen years. 

What is here proposed as a plausible hypothesis is 
susceptible of proof by further investigation of style. At 


Absence 
of very 
important 
pecu- 
liarities. 


Amount 
of text 
written 
after the 
Theae- 
tetus 
inferior to 
the pre- 
ceding 
nine dia- 
logues. 


The 
interval 


between 
Phaedrus 
and 
Theae- 
tetus 
might be 
confirmed 
by further 
research. 


The 
Theae- 
tetus is 
certainly 
later 

than the 
Republic, 
Phaedrus, 
and Sym- 
posium. 


Authen- 
ticity 
doubted 
but with- 
out cause. 


400 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


present the stylistic difference between Phaedrus and 
Theaetetus is only just sufficient to confirm the later date 
of the second. But if we remember that thirty years 
ago the style of the Theaetetus so far as it could then be 
ascertained appeared as early as that of the Protagoras, 
and that Campbell resisted the temptation to trust that 
appearance and judged the Theaetetus to be later than 
the Phaedrus, which has been fully confirmed by later 
research—then we are entitled to hope that also our 
present supposition, that the Theaetetus is about twelve 
years later than the Phaedrus, may be confirmed by 
further research. It may also be contradicted, but one 
thing results as certain from the whole above investiga- 
tion: the Theaetetus is certainly later than the Republic, 
Phaedrus, Phaedo, and Symposium.”! This relation will 
be still better confirmed if we study the next dialogue, 
the Parmenides, which in many respects shows a greater 
affinity with the Theaetetus than its acknowledged con- 
tinuation, the Sophist. 


Il. The Parmenides. 


(Relative affinity with the latest group, measured on the Laws as 
unity, = 0°34; see above, p. 177.) 


Among the greater works of Plato none has raised so 
many suspicions as to its authenticity as the Parmenides, 
since Socher (1820) had the courage to confess that he 
felt unable to share the traditional admiration for the 
antinomies forming its second part. Many doubts ex- 
pressed by Ueberweg and Schaarschmidt have been 
removed by the subsequent studies on Plato’s style. This 
dialogue presents such numerous Platonic peculiarities, 
despite its abstract contents, as never occur in spurious 


251 The relation between Theaet. and Symp. can also be judged from 
a comparison of what in both dialogues is said about intellectual pregnancy, 
which is first introduced in the Symposiwm (206 8), and here supplemented 
by the notion of intellectual midwifery (Theaet. 148 z-149 B). 


REFORM OF PLATO'S LOGIC: PARMENIDES 401 


works. Whatever may be thought of the philosophical 
value of antinomies, we find them here presented with 
great skill, and the conclusions are not more puzzling 
than those found in a similar treatment of philosophical 
problems by modern thinkers. The great originality of 
form and contents can raise suspicion only in critics who 
are unaware of Plato’s originality in other works. The 
Parmenides is not like other dialogues, but the Phaedrus 
and the Timaeus also differ widely from the Phaedo and 
Symposium. 

It has been thought that Plato could not have 
invented such objections to his own theory as those 
with which he credits Parmenides in this dialogue. Thus 
Teichmiiller and Siebeck.*” have been led to the supposi- 
tion that Plato wrote the Parmenides against Aristotle, 
and that the second part is intended to refute the objec- 
tions raised in the first part against the theory of ideas. 
Even if we admit that the Aristoteles of the dialogue is 
introduced here with reference to the philosopher Aristotle, 
there are serious difficulties in the way of crediting him 
with the objections expressed by Parmenides. Aristotle 
came to the Academy in 367 B.c. at the age of seventeen, 
and in view of the extent of the six dialogues which are 
later the Parmenides cannot have been written long after 
this. We have seen in the Theaetetus how Plato pro- 
ceeds when he seriously wishes to refute an objection, 
and according to this standard we cannot accept the 
second part of the Parmenides as a refutation of objec- 
tions raised in the first part. It leads, like the Theaetetus, 
beyond the primitive theory of ideas to a system of 
categories, among which unity and variety are discussed 
by a peculiar method, and shown to supplement each 
other. 

Every exclusive hypothesis leading to contradictions, 
it follows that neither the one alone nor the many 

252 «Plato als Kritiker aristotelischer Ansichten,’ in Zeitschrift fiir 


Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, vol. 107, pp. 1-28, Leipzig 1895. 
' DD 


Grounds 
urged by 
Ueberweg 
and 
Schaar- 
schmidt 
removed 
by sub- 
sequent 
research. 


The 
Parme- 
aides not 
written 
against 
Aris- 
totle. 


One and 
many. 


The terms 
are used 
with 
absolute 
generality. 


Plato 
himself 
discovered 
the ob- 
jections : 
whether 
to his 
own 
theory, 
or that 
of some 
follower. 


The 
Tpitos 
&vOpwros 
argument. 


402 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


explain existence altogether, and that therefore we have 
to seek everywhere the one and the many, as is done 
in the subsequent dialectical dialogues. It has been 
asked whether the one means the Platonic idea, or God, 
or anything else. This question is out of place here. 
The whole discussion is kept in the most general terms, 
and may apply to many particular cases. We notice the 
same tendency as in the Theaetetus to substitute abstract 
notions for the primitive conception of the ideas, and we 
need not deprive Plato of the merit of having discovered 
his objections for himself, the more so as these objections 
do not necessarily refer to his own earlier views, but to 
certain special determinations of these views, which may 
be ascribed to his pupils. 

In no earlier dialogue had the different conceptions 
of the relation between ideas and the particulars been 
stated with such clearness. It remains uncertain whether 
these different conceptions are Plato’s own, because his 
theory of ideas so far as it was expressed in earlier 
dialogues admitted different interpretations. It might be 
supposed that these interpretations had been attempted 
by some of his pupils and that he wrote the Parmenides 
with the purpose of showing the difficulty of such very 
concrete and special interpretations. The chief point 
which had been always insisted upon with sufficient 
clearness, the essential difference between idea and par- 
ticulars, remains untouched by all objections, and for the 
first time we find it clearly stated that an idea may vary 
according to the conception of the conceiving mind. 

The chief objection, known as the ‘third man,’ 
consists in the representation of an infinite number of 
identical ideas (132 A: avrTo TO wéya Kal Tada TA pEyaXa, 
giv @oavTws TH Wux7y el Tava ions... ev TL ad TOV peya 
daveital, © Tad’Ta TavTa avayKn peydra daivecBar. 
Gdro dpa sidos weyéOovs avahavnoeta, Tap’ avTd Te TO 
péyeOos yeryovos Kal Ta weTeyovTa avTOD * Kal él TovTOLS ad 
raow érepoy, @ Tada TavTa wEeydda zoTaL* Kal ovKére bx ev 


REFORM OF PLATO'S LOGIC: PARMENIDES 403 


ExaoTov cor Tov cidav otal, AAN arrEeipa TO TAHOOS). 
This objection is by no means peculiar to the Parmenides. 
It had occurred in the Theaetetus (200 B: 4 wadw ad por 
gpeite OTL Ta emioTnuoV Kal avEeTLCTHMOCUVaY sicily av 
eTLoTHpar ... Kab oUTw oi) avayxacOncecbe eis TavToV 
TEPLTpEYELY wUPLaKLS OvdsV TAOVY TroLodyTEs) applied to 
knowledge, and in the Republic (597 Bc) to the idea of 
a chair. There Plato indicated the logical necessity of 
stopping in this infinite progress. A certain analogy to 
this is found also in the Timaeus (31 A) where the question 
is raised, whether besides our world there is not an 
infinity of worlds containing it, and this is denied. 

This argument has been attributed to Polyxenos whom 
Plato met in Syracuse, and is here for the first time answered 
by the supposition that each idea might be a thought and 
exist only in our soul (1382 B: yu Tdv 2id@v ExacToOV 7 TOU- 
Tov vonua, Kal ovdapuod abt@ mpoonjKn syyiyverOas EXO 4) 
év wuyxais). This explanation is not contradicted by what 
follows. Parmenides says that if each idea is thought of 
as unity (1382 c: eidos Zorat ToUTO TO voovpeEvor sv sival, asl 
dv TO avTO ért maowv) the primitive theory of pwéeEs could 
not be maintained (182¢C: ef radXa hys Tav eid@y peTeyely ... 
ov« yet NOyov). Then Socrates proposes, not as a differ- 
ent solution, but only as an additional explanation, a view 
of the ideas as models of natural kinds, to which the 
particulars are similar (132 D: ta pév eidn tTadta woTeEp 
Tapadelypata éotdvat ev TH HvTEL, TA OE AAA TOUTOLS eoLKEVAL 
Kal sival opowbpata* Kat 7 péOcEis attn Tots aAXOLs yiy- 
veolar ToV ELd@V OVK AAXH TLS 7) sixacOAvaL adrots). This 
view is consistent with the psychological character of 
ideas as notions, and the further objections refer to e/én 
avta Ka? avtra (133 A), not to general notions. 

The one and the many, to which the antinomies of the 
second part refer, are also notions, not ideas existing outside 
thehuman mind. This is perfectly consistent with what has 
been said in the Theaetetus about the activity of the soul. 
It is one of the aspects of later Platonism : the soul as the 


DIDEZ 


Not 
peculiar 
to the 
Parme- 
nides. 


Ideas as 
notions. 


Ideas as 
models. 


All 
centres 
in the 
soul. 


Extension 
of know- 
ledge to 
imperfect 
things. 


Relativity 
and fixity. 


Dialec- 
tical 
exercise 


after a 


404 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


source of movement acquires an increasing importance 
and considers its own notions as objects of knowledge. In 
the Parmemdes the link is given which makes it possible 
to use the terminology of ideas for general kinds or 
notions. One of the objections of Parmenides against the 
universal application of transcendental ideas is at once 
admitted by Socrates and gives the explanation of the 
subsequent discussion. The idea in its former shape had 
to be perfect, and at that earlier stage Plato cared only 
for the knowledge of what could attain perfection. Now 
his desire of knowledge extends to everything existing, 
and there are things imperfect by their very nature (130 c: 
OpiE cal mndros Kal pvTros 7) GAO 6 TL aTimoTaTOY TE Kal 
gavAdtatov) of which we conceive notions, but not trans- 
cendental ideas, under the penalty of falling into an abyss 
of absurdity (130 D: defcas wn tote eis Tw’ ABv00v Prvapiav 
guTrecov Staplape). 

Rising from particulars to more general kinds, 
human notions are susceptible of improvement up to 
the ideal standard of the divinity. Thus perfect ideas 
appear to be out of the reach of human reason (135 a: 
TOM) avayKn avTa sivac TH avOpwrTrivn hice AyvwoTa). 
If anybody denies their existence, it is difficult to prove 
his error: it requires an exceptional intelligence to show 
that each thing has its own substance (1354 B: avépos 
mavu psy evvods Tod Suvyncomevov pabeiv ws eoTL yévos 
TL ExdoTou Kat ovaia adtn Kal’ abtHv, ett 68 Oavpactotépouv 
Tov eupnoovTos Kal adXov Suynoomevou Sidd~ar TaiTa TavTa 
ixavos Suevxpwnodpevov). What Parmenides says, that 
without fixed ideas neither dialectic nor philosophy is 
possible, refers to the general kinds of Being as they have 
been presented in the Theaetetus, and does not necessarily 
imply their separate existence. He then recommends 
dialectical exercise as the best way of advancing know- 
ledge, and proceeds to give a sample of such an exercise, 
which is here called a laborious pastime (137 B: mpay- 
patewdn Traidiayv maifev), convenient only in a lmited 


REFORM OF PLATO’S LOGIC: PARMENIDES © 405 


circle of friends and pupils (137 A: adroit éoper), not 
before a larger public (186 D: damper yap Ta to.adta 
TONY évavTioy eye .... Ayvoodat yap ot TOAXOL OTL avEV 
TavtTns ths Sia Tavt@v Sikddouv re Kal mradvNs advvaToV 
éyTvyOVTA TO GANOEL vodv Zyeuv). 

The method is supplementary to the method which had 
been proposed in the Phaedo. There it was the philoso- 
pher’s aim to explain each hypothesis by another up to the 
highest hypothesis which might be confidently accepted. 
Here Parmenides wants us to follow out the consequences 
of each hypothesis affirmed or denied, and its relation to the 
whole of our knowledge (136 B: évi Aoy@, mepl drov ay ael 
vT007n ws dvTOs Kal ws ovK dyTOS Kal OTLODY aXXo TAOOS Trac Xo- 
Tos, Oe oxotrety TA EvuBaivovta Tpods avTO Kal Tpds év EKaoTOV 
TOV GANwv, 6 TL Av poy, Kal pds TAEiw Kal Tpos EVp- 
TavTa @oavTws * Kal TAX ad Tpos avUTa TE Kal Tpos aAO 
6 Tt av mpoaiph asi, edv te ws dv broOh 6 wteTieco, 
édv Te ws pr) Ov, ei pméeddELS TEAZWS YUMVAaTAamEVOS KUpIwS 
SioecOar TO adnOes). This method implies the recog- 
nition of a mutual relation and interdependence of 
all things that exist, and we need not expect in the 
following large sample of antinomies about the one and 
the many a full realisation of the proposed problem. 

The idea of relation occupied Plato’s mind with increas- 
ing fascination, as is shown not only in the antinomies of 
the Parmenides, but also in the surprising conception 
according to which our notions are in the first instance 
related only among themselves, and could be out of relation 
with more perfect notions or ideas of the Divinity. The 
example chosen to illustrate this relativity is the relation 
between a slave and his master. This relation is a relation 
of two men, says Parmenides, and not of the ideas of 
slavery and mastership (133 5). Although this view is 
here introduced as an objection to transcendental ideas 
generally, it agrees very well with the tendency of the 
dialectical dialogues which follow, in which we shall find 
frequently a complaint about the relativity of human 


new 
model. 


Disjune- 
tive in- 
ference. 


Mutual 
relation 
of all 
existing 
things. 


Remote- 
ness of 
the per- 
fect idea. 


Platonic 
and 
Kantian 
anti- 
nomies. 


Know- 
ledge 
more 
clearly 
conceived. 


Univer- 
sality of 
the philo- 
sopher 
and his 
high 
training. 


406 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


knowledge. The distinction between a subjective notion 
and its objective counterpart is nowhere so clearly stated 
as here; this is not the only feature in which the 
Parmenides approaches Kant’s Kritvk. Also the dis- 
covery that abstract notions, if applied without restriction, 
lead to antinomies of reason, is common to Plato and 
Kant, although they have treated the subject differently. 
These antinomies are the further consequence of the 
dualistic tendency already visible in the T'heaetetus and 
increasing in the Laws, where even the unity of soul 
throughout the universe is denied, since evil cannot be 
ascribed to God. 

On the other side we find here a partial answer to the 
question ‘ what is knowledge ?’ which was raised in the 
Theaetetus and left unanswered. Knowledge is a system 
of notions from the highest down to the lowest, brought 
into manifold mutual relations. Only uneducated people 
look upon logical exercise as idle talk (135 D). Such 
exercise leads us from the visible world to the ideas which 
are an object of reason (135 E: HryadaOnv, ote ovK clas év Tots 
Opwpévors ovOE TEpl TAaUTA TiV TAGVHY éTLTKOTElY, AAA Trépl 
éxelva & pddioTa Tis av NOY AaPor Kar edn dy ayjoavto 
sivat). The true philosopher neglects nothing, however 
insignificant it may appear, if it has a bearing upon his 
general theories, and is not influenced by the unscientific 
opinions of the many (130 E: véos yap ei ét1, Kal ovTw 
cov aytetAntTas pirocodia, as ere avTiApEetar Kat’ surp 
ddEav, Ore ovdev avTav aTyacers * vOV O& ETL pds avOpaTaV 
aTroBnérrets So€as Sia THY HAtKiav). This attitude is pre- 
served also in the Sophist and Politicus, in which the 
dialectical pastime is continued. 

We have seen in the preceding works the theory 
that the highest standard of knowledge is attainable 
only through the highest intellectual training. The 
training proposed in the Republic was in mathematical, 
astronomical, and musical studies as preparatory to 
Dialectic. Dialectic was there only the knowledge of 


REFORM OF PLATO'S LOGIC: PARMENIDES 407 


the highest idea of Good. In the Phaedrus it was 
defined as the art of analysis and synthesis of concepts, 
and this programme was probably followed out in many 
particulars in the oral teaching of Plato. The result 
was an essential change of the former views about ideas. 
The occupation with particulars of nature brought the 
concept of movement into prominence; and movement 
was in some way brought into the fixed and unalterable 
world of the ideas as we know them from the Phaedo and 
Symposium. This movement consisted first in the 
universal mutual relations among ideas, and then in the 
progress of each idea, according to the individual perfec- 
tion of the thinker. Plato’s love of ideal perfection is not 
on the decrease, and the ideas of the perfect Being or God 
remain as perfect as they were seen in the space above 
heaven of the Phaedrus. But they are not out of all 
relation to a living consciousness, and each of those 
unities has infinite approximations in the minds of the 
whole hierarchy of beings, and in the variety of appear- 
ances. No doubt the philosopher is able to bring his 
ideas to divine perfection, but only through dialectical 
exercise. In agreement with the importance acquired 
by general concepts, we find in the Parmenides some 
new notions. Besides dvvawis (1383 B, 135 ©), Kivnots 
(138 B), dAXoiwows, dopa (138 c, 162 DE), wy dv (142 A) 
and other categories used already before, we meet here 
for the first time To cvpBeBnKes as a logical term (128 c), 
otépecOar (157 Cc, 1598), ro eEaidyns (156 D), which are 
clear as general notions but scarcely fit for representa- 
tion as transcendental ideas. 

If our interpretation of the logical meaning of the 
Parmenides is right, it becomes exceptionally important 
to determine the place of this work among Plato’s dia- 
logues, as 1t begins together with the Theaetetus a new 
philosophy of Plato. 

That the Parmenides is not an early dialogue, results 
from many hints. What is here repeatedly said of 


Beginning 
of move- 
ment 
among 
ideas : 
increased 
interest 
in be- 
coming. 
Evolution 
of ideas 
according 
to the 
perfection 
of the 
thinker. 


New terms 
and 
notions. 


Parme- 
nides not 


early: as 
appears 
from the 
way 

in which 
youth is 
regarded. 


Socrates 
repre- 
sented 

as very 
young 
and sub- 
ordinated 
to another 
master. 


Plato’s 
conscious- 
ness of 
his own 
superi- 
ority. 


The con- 
ception 

of ideas as 
patterns 
has been 
antici- 
pated ; 


408 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


youth (130 £, 135 p, 137 B), that young men are inconse- 
quent, that one must learn while young, and that youth 
is pleasing and compliant, is only explainable if the author 
was comparatively speaking an old man when writing. 
If we consider that the limits of youth were wider with 
the Greeks than with us, that youth must be already at 
some distance to be thus treated, and that we find in the 
Laws and in the other works of Plato’s old age similar 
remarks on youth, we are justified in admitting that 
Plato must have passed middle life when he wrote the 
Parmenides. 

Another general argument in favour of a late date is 
the characterisation of Socrates as a young man, receiv- 
ing instruction from Parmenides. There is nothing dis- 
paraging for Socrates in this position, as Schaarschmidt 
thought. He is here clearly admired by Parmenides and 
Zeno, and his philosophical aptitude is extolled. In all 
preceding dialogues we have seen Socrates as the ideal 
teacher, only in the Sympostwm subordinated to the ideal 
Diotima, but even there supposed to be the true author of 
all that he attributes to her. If now we meet for the 
first time a Socrates who is truly subordinated to another 
Master, and if we know that in all remaining works of 
Plato, except the Philebus, Socrates is only a hearer, it 
becomes very natural to suppose that the Parmenides was 
written at a time when the living picture of Plato’s 
Master was fading away in a distant past, under the 
influence of a consciousness of his own superiority. That 
Socrates appears here as a young man, is a consequence 
of the plan of the dialogue, in which a theory formerly 
attributed to Socrates had to be corrected and abandoned. 

It has been thought that the view of paradeigmatic 
ideas or eternal models (182D: rapadetypata év 1H hice, 
cf. Theaet. 176 £) appears here for the first time, but this 
cannot be maintained in view of the fact that we had 
already in the tenth book of the Republic paradeigmatic 
ideas, and that such are also implied in the allegory of the 


REFORM OF PLATO'S LOGIC: PARMENIDES 409 


Cave. 


The only view which is really expressed for the 


first time is the identification of the ideas with notions 


in the soul. 


This view, which we shall see recurring 


in later works, cannot belong to an early time in Plato’s 
life, at least in connection with a criticism of self-existing 


ideas. 


The meeting of Parmenides with Socrates, whether 
historic or not, is mentioned besides this dialogue also in 


the Theaetetus and Sophist. 


If we compare ®* both men- 


tions, it is obvious that the Sophist refers to our dialogue, 
while in the Theaetetus the mention is more general : 


Theaet. 183: rots adXovs, ot 
ev €otos héyouot TO Tay . . . Arrov 
> , a ” , 
aigxvvopat 7 eva ovta Tappevidny 

. cupmporenga yap 6) TO avdpi 
mavu veos tavy mpeoBuTy, Kai pot 
> U , bod / 
edavn Bdabos te exe mavtdract 
yevvaiov. 184A: oBodpa ody py 
oUre Ta Aeyopeva Evyid@pev, Ti re 


Soph. 217 ©: mérepov etwbas 
a > > ‘ ~ cal / 
HOwov adres emt cavTov paxp@ eyo 
Ld x 7 9 U fe 
OteEvevar . . . 7) Ot epwrnoewy, oidv 
mote kai Tlappevidn ypopév@ kal 
dteErovte Aoyous maykdAous mape- 
, U 
yevdunv eyo véos wy, exeivov pada 
; AG 
6) Tore dvTos mpeaBuUTOV ;—Te@ pev 
aditres Te Kal evnviws mpoodiadreyo- 


‘ - A , , cn 9 \ A a 
Stavoovpevos etre TOAD mA€ov Aet- —pev@ PAov oVTw, TO mpds GAXor. 


mapa... 


We see that Plato in the Theaetetus mentions in 
general terms his admiration for Parmenides, and an 
interview which might be historical without necessarily 
implying a special reference to the dialogue, while in the 
Sophist an allusion is made to the short generally affirma- 
tive answers which characterise both the Parmenides and 
Sophist, not the Theaetetus. These three dialogues con- 
tain very frequent mentions of Parmenides, who is besides 
quoted only in the Symposiwm (178 B, 195 c) on an in- 
significant matter and without great esteem. In the 
Theaetetus the examination of the philosophy of Parme- 
nides is declined and adjourned ; in the Parmenides the 


258 This comparison has been specially insisted upon by P. Natorp in 
his review of O. Apelt’s Beitrége zur Geschichte der Philosophie, Leipzig 
1891, in the Philosophische Monatshefte, vol. xxx. pp. 63-70, but in con- 
nection with a very early date of the Theaetetus. Natorp’s own argumenta- 
tion gains in strength if the Theaetetus immediately preceded the Par- 
menides. 


ideas as 

notions 

appear for 

the first 
ime. 


Other 
allusions 
to the 
meeting of 
Socrates 
with 
Parme- 
nides. 


Elea- 
ticism for 
the first 
time 
seriously 
con- 
fronted. 


Possible 
occasions 
for this. 


Categories 
more 
differen- 
tiated. 


Remote- 
ness of 
the 
imaginary 
dialogue. 


Stylistic 
relation 
to the 


410 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


philosopher is introduced as criticising earlier Platonism 
and explaining the consequences of his own hypothesis in 
a manner which might lead the hearer to some doubts; 
in the Sophist he is criticised by the anonymous guest 
from Elea, introduced as a friend of Parmenides and 
Zeno. If these three dialogues, in which the influence 
of the EHleatic philosophy is first noticed, are written 
after a sojourn of Plato in Sicily, then it might appear 
probable that on this voyage he came into closer rela- 
tions with the Hleatics, just as in the period of middle 
Platonism the influence of Pythagoras’ school is notice- 
able. So long as we have no more detailed testimonies 
about these voyages, we must limit our inferences to the 
observation that Plato at a later stage of his life con- 
ceived a special interest in the Hleatic philosophy, either 
in consequence of personal acquaintance with the repre- 
sentatives of this school abroad, or perhaps under the 
influence of his own pupils in the Academy, some of 
whom might have arrived from Italy. 

An important argument for the priority of the Theae- 
tetus to the Parmenides is the different manner in 
which the categories and the subdivision of xivnovs into 
adXolwors and dopa appear, being in the earlier dialogue 
distinctly meant as something new, while in the later 
both theories are supposed to be known. 

Both the Theaetetus and Parmendes are distinguished 
from other dialogues by the introductory information 
calculated to make on the reader the impression of things 
of a remote time: in the Theaetetus this is done by the 
fiction of a written account repeatedly corrected ; in the 
Parmenides the source appears more distant, as the dia- 
logue has been first narrated by Pythodorus to Antiphon, 
and by Antiphon to Kephalos, who narrates it to the 
reader. 

Some reason for placing the T'heaetetus before the 
Parmenides is given by stylistic comparisons. The 
total stylistic affinity of the Parmendes with the latest | 


REFORM OF PLATO’S LOGIC: PARMENIDES 411 


group (equivalent to 243 accidental peculiarities) exceeds 
only slightly that of the Theaetetus (equivalent to 233 
accidental peculiarities), and this alone would not yet 
justify a conclusion, were there not a great difference of 
size between the two dialogues, the Theaetetus being one 
of the largest (53 pp. ed. Did.), and the Parmenides one of 
the shorter (31 pp. ed. Did.) dialogues.. Under these cir- 
cumstances the priority of the T'heaetetus appears to be 
very probable, so much more as the Parmenides has a 
much greater number of peculiarities of later style which 
are absent from the Theaetetus, than vice versa, as can be 
seen from the following comparison : 


Peculiarities of later style not occurring in works earlier than the 
Republic and found: 
in Theaet., not in Parm., acci- in Parm., not in Theaet., acci- 
dental: 218, 337, 348, 395, 404, dental: 486, 487, 488, 189, 216, 
336, 190, 335, 341, 324, 11, 208, 224, 331, 485, 470, 492, 483, 490, 
399; repeated: 192, 227; im- 478, 323, 476, 25, 28, 225, 322, 
portant: 247, 12, 452. 458, 459, 461, 462, 464, 466; re- 
peated : 481, 477, 489, 332, 480, 
475, 24, 468, 26, 460, 463, 465; 
important: 479, 318, 27; very 
important: 14, 15. 


This relation of style between Parmenides and Theae- 
tetus was less evident as long as smaller numbers of 
peculiarities were compared. Thus, according to Camp- 
bell’s table, the Parmenides appeared to have less affinity 
with the latest group than nearly all Socratic dialogues, 
and C. Ritter was led even to doubt the authenticity, 
because he found fewer peculiarities of later style than 
he expected in a work which betrayed by some very 
characteristic marks its late origin. Now we have just 
enough stylistic evidence to confirm the place assigned 
to the Parmenides between Theaetetus and Sophist, 
and further stylistic investigations may very possibly 
increase such evidence in this case, as they have done in 
the case of the Theaetetus. Both Parmenides and Theae- 
tetus are stylistically more difficult to class than most 


Theae- 
tetus 
shows 
that the 
longer 
dialogue 
is earlier. 


Proba- 
bility 

of an 
interval 
after 
Republic 
and 
Phaedrus. 


Supposed 
allusion 
to Aris- 
totle 
difficult 
to verify. 
The 
younger 
Socrates. 


The 
Phaedrus 
affords a 
point of 
transition 
towards 
the new 
dialectic. 


412 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


other works of Plato. The supposition that both followed 
after a longer or shorter interval of literary inactivity 
accounts best for this circumstance. An author who 
returns to literary labours after an interval does not reach 
at once a certain fixity of expression and is less likely to 
introduce many new peculiarities of a permanent character. 
Thus, however original may be his style in such works, 
they will contain fewer peculiarities recurring later than 
the following dialogues, and this produces a diminution 
of the stylistic affinity with the latest group. The close 
relation between Theaetetus and Parmenides as critical 
dialogues has been illustrated by Campbell through a 
number of analogies (‘On the place of the Parmenides,’ 
pp. 6-7, see note 145) which are the more striking as the 
subject of both dialogues is not identical. 

There is no definitive indication which could help to 
fix the date of the Parmenides with exactness, except the 
supposed allusion to the philosopher Aristotle contained 
in the mention as a person of the dialogue of another 
Aristotle, one of the thirty tyrants. This allusion is 
plausible, and has been brought into relation with 
Aristotle’s criticism of the Platonic ideas. It acquires 
some additional plausibility if compared with the intro- 
duction of the younger Socrates in the Theaetetus. But 
these conjectures require some independent testimonies 
before they can be accepted as certain. If we accepted 
them, then the Parmenides would have been written after 
367 B.c., and shortly after the T’heaetetus. Without reject- 
ing this hypothesis, it remains still possible that both 
dialogues were composed earlier, but not before the 
Phaedrus, and not in the next time after the Republic, as 
the elaboration of the new point of view required a certain 
length of time. The nearest approach to this new point 
of view was the recommendation of analysis and synthesis 
given in the Phaedrus. 


REFORM OF PLATO’S LOGIC 413 


Plato’s critical philosophy. 


To resume the results of the above inquiry on the 
Theaetetus and Parmenides, we see in these two works the 
trace of a new logical departure, which does not quite 
amount to a brusque negation of earlier views, but changes 
the aims of science. While Plato in the works of his 
middle lifetime had a conception of truth eternally fixed, 
which can be perceived by a well-trained mind exactly as 
it 1s, he became later aware of the subjectivity of knowledge, 
of its existence in an ascending scale of souls up to divine 
perfection. The ideal was thus further removed from the 
present life, while losing nothing in its perfection. The 
alm of science is now not the immediate contemplation of 
truth eternally pre-existent, but the perfecting of our own 
ideas so as to form a system built on the mutual corre- 
lation of all particulars. The particulars of sensible ex- 
perience are no longer rejected as useless or perturbing, 
but they have to be brought into relation with the general 
stock of knowledge. In the physical world movement is 
acknowledged as the chief factor, and the origin of move- 
ment attributed to the soul. The causes of error are in- 
vestigated with greater accuracy and found chiefly in the 
imperfection of our perceptions. The notions are paired 
with their opposites, and the preference for dichotomy is 
manifest, but is not suffered to stiffen into a conventional 
rule. 

Plato remains in this period faithful to his custom of 
fixing in a literary form only certain aspects of his thoughts, 
obliging us to supplement by inferences what he omits to 
mention. Neither the Theaetetuws nor the Parmenides are 
systematic accounts of any part of the doctrine which 
probably was imparted to Plato’s pupils according to the 
precepts of the Phaedrus. The centre of gravity of the 
Platonic system has been changed without recapitulating 
all the details it carried with it, and the dialogues written 


Beginning 
of a re- 
form in 
dialectic. 


Remote- 
ness of 
the ideal. 
Syn- 
thetic en- 
deavour. 
Ideas 
correlated 
with one 
another 
and with 
particular 
things. 
The soul 
as source 
of move- 
ment 
acknow- 
ledged 

as chief 
factor. 
Preference 
for dicho- 
tomy. 


The 
change 
is not 


explicit. 
Plato’s 
dialogues 
are still 
works 

of art. 


Their 
protreptic 
and edu- 
cational 
character. 


The ideal 
recedes, 
and 
becomeg 
more 
divine, 
but is ap- 
proached 
continu- 
ally. 


414 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


after the change continue to be works of art rather than 
expositions of doctrine. They are only ideal samples of 
conversations held in the Academy, and the artistic pur- 
pose of harmonious proportion is quite as evident in these 
conversations on abstract subjects as in the more poetical 
Symposium. In these works, as in the preceding, from 
the Symposium onwards, we have didactic conversations 
between pupil and master, not as in earlier works like the 
Gorgias, discussions between men of opposed convictions. 

The pupil is led by an ascending way so that at each 
turning point he believes himself to reach the summit, 
when a new horizon is opened, leading higher, and at the 
end the infinite ideal of knowledge remains still high 
above the highest summits hitherto described. This 
protreptic character is maintained in the critical dialogues 
no less than in the constructive works. In the Re- 
public the idea of the Good remained beyond the reach 
of Adeimantos and Glaucon; in the Phaedrus the ideal 
rhetoric appeared as a powerful ideal beyond the under- 
standing and ability of the greatest orators of the time ; 
in the Theaetetus knowledge appeared at a height much 
above all human opinions, even those which guess the 
truth correctly. In the Parmenides the objects of know- 
ledge are shown not to correspond to poetic metaphors, 
and to be attainable only by a difficult exercise of 
reason. In all these cases the rismg soul of a lover 
of philosophy is the chief object of literary exposition. 
The contents of philosophy are mentioned occasion- 
ally and never exhaustively. The distance between the 
philosopher and vulgar humanity is increasing while the 
philosopher’s constant aim is to approach his ideal of the 
divinity. | 

The occasional glimpses of theory show us a great 
wealth of intellectual life, and a consciousness of some 
cardinal conditions of truth. The chief results arrived at 
by Plato at this stage appear to be: the subjectivity of 
sensations, the unity of consciousness in the act of judg- 


REFORM OF PLATO’S LOGIC ANS 


ment, the plurality and mutual relation of the highest 
kinds of Being, the universal analogy between great and 
small things which must be considered all with equal care 
in order to increase our knowledge. The method pro- 
posed leads to a general system of science, some aspects of 
which are developed in the three following dialectical 
dialogues. 


416 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


CHAPTER VIII 


NEW THEORY OF SCIENCE 


Asthe | We have seen Plato begin his literary career with small 
Socratie critical dialogues, culminating in Protagoras, Meno, and 
stage was Hyuthydemus, and progressing from this first critical stage 


anaes to the positive exposition of some of his moral, political, 
ie "Ve and educational theories in the Gorgias and later works up 
ees. -borthe Phaedrus. In like manner the second critical stage, 


tion, so Manifest in the Theaetetus and Parmenides, was followed 
the second by some dialogues full of positive metaphysical and logical 
critical theories, skilfully treated with regard to questions of 
Buage purely formal importance. This indirect manner of expo- 


as Bs sition is prominent in the three dialectical dialogues which 
: : a 

ey follow the Parmenides, namely the Sophist, Politicus, 
heel and Philebus. Here, as in the preceding works, we do 


and meta. not find a systematic exposition of doctrine, but occasional 

physical glimpses which betray studies very remote from those of 

teaching. yiddle Platonism, and show usa part of that ‘longer way ’ 
alluded to in the Republic as leading to the knowledge of 
truth. 


I. The Sophist. 


The aim is In this dialogue the definition of the Sophist is only a 
formally, pretext for the exposition of Plato’s views on scientific 
to define method, on the origin of error, and on the nature of true 
the Being. These views are presented in a form which 


a. leaves no doubt as to the author’s own convictions and 
adie his judgments about other philosophers. The historical 


Plato's method of comparing existing theories and contradictions 
views on is here maintained, as in the Theaetetus and Parmenides, 


NEW THEORY OF SCIENCE: THE SOPHIST 417 


but with greater maturity of treatment. In this respect, 
as well as in the manner of the didactic proceeding 
accompanied with frequent quotations of results obtained 
before, and with recapitulations after each progress of the 
argument, the Sophist approaches more nearly to the 
writings of Aristotle than any earlier dialogue of Plato. 
The dialogical form is still preserved, but the answers 
for the most part only confirm opinions expressed in the 
question, so that they could easily be omitted. 

While in the Parmenides it was still assumed as 
natural and necessary that a dialectical exposition must 
be given in the form of a conversation (1378: tis ody pol 
amoxpwetrat; %) 0 vewtatos ;), we see in the Sophist for 
the first time a clear admission that philosophical teach- 
ing may be given in the form of a continuous lecture 
(217 C: morepov ciwOas Hdi0v avTos él cavTOd paKpe@ oyw 
SieEvévar Aeywv TovTO, 0 av évdeiEacOai Tw BovdrnOijs, 7 Sv’ 
gpwricewv, oidv mote Kai Llapwevidy xpwyévm . . . Tapeye- 
vounv). If we take into account that this form of con- 
tinuous lecture prevails in the Timaeus and Critias and 
some parts of the Laws, which are acknowledged to 
be late works, it becomes evident that the Sophist is 
in this respect intermediate between Parmenides and 
Timaeus. This inference is strengthened by the obser- 
vation that in an admittedly early work, the Prota- 
goras, lecturing is condemned and dialogical discussion 
required (Prot. 334D: éym tuyydvw éridjopwv tis ov 
avOpwrros, Kat éav Tis wor pakpa déyn, eriAavOavomar Tepi 
ov dv 70 Oyos . . . avvTEuve joo Tas aToKpices Kal Bpa- 
xuTépas Tole, eb WEANW CoOL ErecOat). 

Thus we see how Plato advanced from the form of 
philosophical conversations to that form of a_philo- 
sophical lecture or dissertation which has been adopted 
by his pupil Aristotle and by the majority of later philo- 
sophers. This fact is not without logical importance. 
In conversation at least two persons are wanted to 
elaborate the truth. This implies a stage of personal 

EE 


scientific 
method. 
Use of 
historical 
compari- 
sons. 
Approach 
to the 
manner 
of Aris- 
totle. 


Con- 
tinuous 
exposition 
admitted 
as pos- 
sible. 


Not as 
in Prota- 
goras. 


Logical 
signifi- 
cance 
of the 
change. 


Form of 
dialogue 
gradually 
relin- 
quished. 


Conscious- 
ness of 
method. 


418 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


uncertainty or at least the absence of a recognised 
authority. The thinker who has arrived at the highest 
degree of certainty needs only receptive hearers to whom 
he may communicate his knowledge, and looks upon 
discussion as useless and tiresome. The earliest works 
of Plato were discussions; even later, despite the in- 
creasing authority of Socrates, the persons represented as 
partners in his conversation still enjoyed the freedom of 
expressing other views. In the Theaetetus Socrates is 
represented as desiring to discuss freely philosophical 
difficulties with Theodoros rather than with a young 
man who dares not go against his authority. It is only 
in the Parmenides that discussion (oAvmpaypovetv) 18 
declared useless. This is a logical mode of regarding the 
matter and amounts to this: whoever is in possession of 
truth can impart it to others without expecting an 
advance of knowledge from the conflict of opinions. Or, 
truth is the result of the activity of one soul, not of 
the co-operation of many. In all the six latest dialogues 
Plato remained faithful to this principle, which he adopted 
definitively in the Parmenides. There is no discussion in 
the Sophist and Politicus, nor in the Philebus and the 
Laws. Inthe Timaeus and Critias even the dialogical 
form is extinct. Plato appears to have abandoned con- 
versational equality between investigating friends, he 
prefers now a didactic authority of one Master of wisdom. 

The consciousness of method is also increasing. The 
art of reasoning, postulated already in the Phaedo (90 B: 
 TEpt Tos NOyous Teyvy), 1S Now a reality and bears the 
name of a logical method (Soph. 227A: tév royov 
uéOod0s), which remained in the highest esteem among all 
later philosophers. Many translators of Plato refrained 
from the identification of ué0d0s with the modern term 
method, as if they were afraid to credit an ancient Greek 
philosopher with a consciousness of regulated proceed- 
ing which seems to be a privilege of recent science. 
Thus, for instance, Schleiermacher renders péOod0s by 


NEW THEORY OF SCIENCE: THE SOPHIST 419 


‘das erklirende Verfahren,’ Deuschle by ‘der Gang 
der Untersuchung, Miiller by ‘der Fortgang unserer 
Eroérterung.’ This is really a wrong cautiousness, and 
Jowett and Campbell were perfectly right in translating 
p20060s here by ‘method.’ In earlier dialogues, as Phaedo 
(79 B, 97 B) and Republic (435 D, 510 B c, 531 o, 533 BC, 
596 A), this word had not yet a fixed meaning and was 
equivalent to ‘ argument,’ ‘study,’ or ‘way of reasoning.’ 
In the Phaedrus pé0o0é0s (269 D, 270 D) is used in the 
same primitive meaning of ‘ way of reasoning.’ In the 
Theaetetus (183 c) it means ‘hypothesis’ or ‘theory.’ But 
in the Sophist there appears for the first time a ‘ logical 
method,’ essentially different in form and contents from 
the dvaXextv«? wz0o0d0s of the Republic (533 c), which meant 
no more than the study of dialectic, or vision of the idea 
of Good. Here the ‘logical method’ means what up to 
the present time is known as the method of classification, 
or scientific method generally. 

This method neglects nothing however insignificant it 
may appear to be, and seeks truth quite independently of 
all practical applications or advantages (227 A: 79 Tov 
oyov pebd8m orroyyrotiKhs 7) hapwaxotoctas ovdeyv ArTov 
ovdé TL ULGANOV TUYyyavEL pENOV, EL TO WEY TMIKpa, TO OF wEyara 
nuas mers Kabaipov). Its aim is pure knowledge, which 
depends upon the distinction of natural affinities and 
similitudes between different things, without any prejudice 
in favour of one subject or another (2278). Of this dis- 
interested impartiality of pure science Plato gives curious 
examples which show his tendency to free himself from 
every authority or reigning opinion. The art of human 
war, he says, belongs to the general kind of hunting, no 
less surely than the art of vermin-destroying, despite the 
greater vanity of man-killers (227 B, cf. Theaet. 174 p). 

The philosopher finds out the true similarities and 
differences which allow an exact definition of each kind 
of beings as belonging to a more general class (235¢c: 
TdvTws OUTE OUTOS OUTE GAO ryévos OvVdEV pu} TOTE exduryov 


Hie 2, 


Meaning 
of “e8odos 
more 
definite. 


Disin- 
terested- 
ness of 
science. 


Similarity 
and dif- 
ference 
impar- 
tially 


- surveyed, 
without 
trusting 
appear- 
ances or 
following 
arbitrary 
lines. 


Definition 
of primary 
notions 
too much 
neglected. 


Scientific 
truth 

the philo- 
sopher’s 
single 
aim. 
Generali- 
sation and 
division 
proceed- 
ing from 
the simple 
to the 
complex. 


4920 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


érevéntat THY TOV OUTW SuVaméevwv pETLevaL KAO’ EKaoTa TE 
Kal él mavta péGodov). The greatest care must be taken 
about apparent similarities (231 A: tov 68 aogarh dei 
TaVTWY padLoTA TEpl TAS OpmoloTHTas aél TroletcOaL THY 
durakny * odkucOnpotatov yap To yévos). The temptation 
to mix all things and to make the great appear as small 
and the like as unlike is the sign of a man who is only 
beginning to approach the problem of being, and delights 
in contradictions (259 D: ro 6& TadTov ETEpov amodaivety 
aun yé wy Kal TO OatTEpoy TavTOV Kal TO Méya TMLKPOY Kal TO 
6oLov avomoLOV, Kal YalpELy OUTW TavavTia asl TpopEepoyTa 
év Tots NOyots, OUTE TLS EAEYXOS OUTOS aGANOWds ApTL TE TOV 
OvT@V TWOs éparrTomevou SHAOs vEeoyevns wv). Many notions 
as to which apparently there is no disagreement among 
disputants are insufficiently defined, and ought to be in- 
vestigated again, however clear and simple they appear at 
first sight (242 c: ra Soxodyta viv évapyas Eyew éemricKé- 
Wacbat Tp@Tov, un TH TETapaywevoL Mev BEV TEPL TavTa, 
padiws 8’ GdAHroLs Oporoyamev ws evKpwas Zyovtes). The 
true logician follows his opponents on their own ground 
and refutes them according to their own principles 
(259 CD: yaderrov dua Kal Kadov . . . Tols NEyouevots old 
T sivat Ka’ Exactov édéyxovT’ émaxoNovbetv, Otay Te TLS 
Etepov bv Tn TAaUTOY Eivat hy Kal OTay TavTOv OV ETEpor, éxEivy 
kat Kat’ éxstvo 6 dyno TovT@y tretovOévas ToTepov). He 
seeks the truth first for himself and then for those who 
are able to partake of such investigations (264 E: édet- 
Eowsv wadiota wev nly avtois, fmetta O& Kal TOls éyyuTaT@ 


“yéver THS ToravTns wEeOddou TeduKocty). 


This aim is reached by the subdivision of notions into 
indivisible ultimate kinds (229 D: xat todto oxerréov, et 
atowov dn éoti Trav, h Twa éyov Siatpeow aklay érwvuplas), 
and by a training which consists in a consecutive selection 
of examples, beginning with those which present less 
difficulty and rising progressively to the most difficult 
problems (218 c: dca 8 ad tov peyadov Set Siatroveio bar 
KAOS, TEPL TOV TOLOVTWY S£doKTAL TaoL Kal TaNAL TO TPO- 


NEW THEORY OF SCIENCE: THE SOPHIST 421 


TEpov éy opuKpols Kal paoow avTa déeiv werXeTav, ply év avTots 
Tots peyiotos). This notion of logical exercise is here 
new, and did not occur in any earlier work of Plato. 
When Parmenides recommended dialectical exercise, he 
took as subject of this ‘play’ at once the highest notions 
of the one and the many; also the illustration of the 
nature of justice in the Republic through the idea of the 
state was not a vulgar example. Now we see that any 
insignificant object is admitted to be a convenient model 
for logical exercise (218 D: Bovre SHta epi Tivos THY 
gavrwv petiovtes Treipab@puev Trapddevrypa avTo O¢o0ar Tod 
pelCovos). Here we are at a considerable distance from 
the time when observation of stars appeared to be a use- 
less and even pernicious occupation if not immediately 
connected with a knowledge of the general laws of astro- 
nomy. Now not only stars, but all animals and plants 
come within the range of observation and investigation. 
When Plato in the Republic described the philosopher as 
desiring intensely every kind of knowledge, he had not 
yet drawn all the consequences from this universal desire, 
and he despised many kinds of knowledge which in the 
Sophist are gravely included in the system of science. 
Newly discovered kinds are named by means of new 
words, with the observation that we ought not to pay too 
much attention to the existing names, which are often 
understood in different ways by different men (218 c: de 
agl TavTos Tréplt TO Tpaywa avTO uadXov dia AGywv 7) TOUVVOMA 
Hovey avvo“odoyncacbar ywpls Noyov). 

Dialectic is no longer, as in the Republic, the knowledge 
of the Good, but the science of division of notions, as in 
the Phaedrus. This important coincidence between the 
Phaedrus and the Sophist (253 0D: émiothyns .. . lows 
THS mEeyloTns ... TOV edevOzpwr . . . TO KaTAa yévn SiatpEta Bat 
kal pte TavTov dv eldos EtEpov ryyjnoacOa pate ETEpov ov 
TavTov ... THs SiarexTiKns dycowev emvotnuns eivar) 1s 
difficult to account for by those who place the Phaedrus 
before the Republic. In earlier dialogues dialectic was 


Dialec- 
tical 
exercise 
to be first 
used on 
obvious 
examples. 
No object 
of know- 
ledge 

to be 
despised. 


The 
logician 
is not 

to be 
misled by 
common 
language. 
Division 
of con- 
cepts a 
link be- 
tween the 
Phaedrus 
and the 
Sophist. 


But the 
process is 
here more 
elabor- 
ately 
described. 


Commu- 
nion of 
ideas not 
transcen- 
dental. 


Propae- 
deutic 
through 
playful 
defini- 
tions. 


422 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


merely the art of asking and answering questions (Crat. 
390 c), as it was for Xenophon. Now the dialectician 
follows each idea through its manifold appearances, and 
distinguishes within each notion many differences, uniting 
again one notion with many others into one higher kind 
(253 D: pilav iddav dia TordaD, EVOS ExdoTOU KELEVOU YopLs, 
TavTn SiateTauevny tkavas StatcOdveTat, Kal ToANAS ETEPAS 
GAXjrov wo pits EEwbev Tepieyouévas, Kal plav ad bv drov 
Tov ev évi Evynupevnv, Kal Todas ywpls TavTn Siwpic- 
pevas...). The ideas here mentioned can evidently only 
be notions of the human mind, never the self-existent 
ideas of a space above heaven. 

The aim of dialectical operations is precisely to learn 
the relation between ideas (253 E: todto & gotw, 7 TE 
Kowwovev Exacta SUvaTtat Kal OTN pH, SvaKpive KaTa ‘yévos 
érrictacOar). Many definitions of notions are given, and 
we are asked to determine the specific difference which 
distinguishes each notion from others of the same kind 
(232 a). Here again, as in the Theaetetus, Plato insists 
upon the difference between an enumeration of examples 
and the definition of the class to which these objects 
belong (240 A: 70 dua TavTwr TovTwD, & TOANA eiT@V HElwoas 
évl mpocevrety ovomati, POzyEduevos eidwov emt TaoLwv ws Ev 
dv). We have here the teacher who warns his pupils 
repeatedly against familiar logical errors. His own defi- 
nitions are not always serious, as, for instance, when he 
calls the sophist a paid hunter after wealth and youth 
(223 B), a merchant in the goods of the soul (224 ¢, cf. 
Prot. 313 c), a retailer of the same sort of wares (224 D), 
a manufacturer of the learned wares he sells (224 5), a 
money-maker of the eristic kind (226 a), a purger of souls 
who clears away notions obstructive to knowledge (231 £), 
a magician and imitator of true being (235 A), and a dis- 
sembler who in private and in short speeches compels 
the person who is conversing with him to contradict 
himself (268 c). This is intended to show the various 
relations of notions apparently very distant from each 


NEW THEORY OF SCIENCE: THE SOPHIST 


423 


other, and can only be taken as a sample of dialectical 


exercise. 


There are definitions of other notions to which a 
serious importance seems to have been attached, and 
one of these generalises a view already enunciated in the 


Symposium : 


Symp. 205 B: moinais éoriv te 
TONY * 1) Yap ToL ek TOU ju) OVTOS Eis 
TO dy idvre 6T@ody airia Tacd eoTe 
moinats, @oTE Kal ai Ud wacats Tais 
Téxvais epyaciat momoets cial Kal 
oi rovrwy Snpuovpyot mavres moural. 


Soph. 265 B: moiwmriny wacay 
” a , Gd x ~/ 
epapev eivac Svvapuy, y Tis Gv atria 
ylyyntat Tots pn mporepov ovow 
votepoy yiyver Oat. 

219 B: . . . mav Omep dv pr mpo- 
Tepov TLs Ov VaTEpor eis OvTiaY ayn, 


Tov pev dyovra Trovety, TO Oe aydpevor 
mroveia Gai ov bape. 

This definition of creation as the power of bringing 
into Being anything not existing before presents in both 
dialogues a characteristic difference resulting from the 
increasing importance attributed to the personal agent. 
In the Symposiwm Plato spoke of an impersonal cause 
of new existence and named it for the purpose of his 
argument ‘poetry,’ thus extending the notion of poetry 
to all kinds of making. In the Sophist the formulation 
is sharper, and the opposition between the agent and the 
object of activity is introduced, with the use of the 
favourite term dvvayis, familiar since the Republic. 

More important is the definition of true Being as any- 
thing that has the power of activity or passivity, to act or 
to undergo an influence from anything else, be it even 
only once (247 D: Aéyw 62) TO Kal OmoLavody KEKTNMEVOY 
Svvapww eit’ eis TO Troveiv Erepov oTLody TrehuKos elt’ eis TO 
maGeiy Kal ouiKpotatoy UTd TOD davAoTaTOV, Ka EL LOVOY 
eicdrak£, Wav TodTO dvTws sivas * TIDEmar yap Spov opitew Ta 
OvTa, Ws ZoTLW OK AAO TL TAHY SvVauts). This is here 
proposed after the complaint that none among the earlier 
philosophers has given a definition of Being, and that 
many would be unable to do it (247 p). Thus we must 
accept it as Plato’s own view at the time of writing 
the Sophist. This definition does not correspond to the 


Others 
more 
serious. 

‘ Making ” 
includes 
more than 
poetry. 


Definition 
of Being 
in reply 
to the 
Mate- 
rialists: as 
capability 
of acting 
or being 
acted on. 
Dynamic 
notion of 
existence, 


Not, like 
the old 


ideas, un- 


alterably 
fixed 


Know- 
ledge an 
activity. 


Ideas are 
no longer 
true 
Being. 


The Soul 
is now 
seen to 
be the 
truest 
Being. 


424 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


primitive ideas, which according to the Symposium re- 
main unaffected by the changes occurring in the world. 
If we compare it with the definition of the soul as the 
first cause of movement, it becomes very probable that 
Plato attributed true Being to souls more than to anything 
else, and this is confirmed by the following argumentation 
in which the author states clearly that the soul acts in 
acquiring knowledge, while the substance of things under- 
goes the influence of the soul’s activity (248D: thy yuyny 
yiyvecke, THY © ovolay yiyvwoKkesOar... .E: THY ovolaDy 
57). . yeryveckopuevny 70 Ths yvooews, Ka’ Oaov yiyvOoKETal, 
Kata TooovTov KiweicCat dia TO TacyELv, 0 8H Pawev ovK av 
yeveoOat Trepl TO HpEwodr). 

If this view is maintained, the objects of knowledge 
are here not unchanging and unaffected ideas, but our 
own notions, which undergo some changes under the 
influence of our intellectual activity. This agrees well 
with the view put forth in the Parmenides, and we may 
accept it as Plato’s conviction with the restrictions which 
are made by himself in connection with this passage. He 
says that true Being must have movement, life, soul, and 
reason (248 E: @s adnfas kivnow Kai Conv Kal >woyny Kai 
ppovnow % padiws teOnoopeOa TO TavTed@s SvTL pr) 
mapsivar, unde Chv avTo wndz hpovely, dAAG oEpvov Kal ayLov, 
vouv ovK é&xov, akivntoy soTds eivac;). Students of the 
Sophist who read this dialogue with the prejudice that 
true Being can never mean anything for Plato besides the 
ideas, have drawn the curious inference from this passage 
that Plato credits here the ideas with life and a soul— 
why not with a body also? Such ideas, if still named 
ideas, could evidently be nothing else than individual 
beings, very similar to human persons. 

Any unprejudiced reader who remembers what is said 
in the Phaedrus about the soul as origin of movement, 
and in the Laws about the stars as bodies of individual 
gods (967 A-E), must infer from this passage that here 
true Being means no longer ideas but souls, including 


NEW THEORY OF SCIENCE: THE SOPHIST 425 


human souls. This view is well prepared by the theory 
of unity of consciousness in the Theaetetus and by the 
contradictions shown in the Parmenides as resulting from 
self-existing ideas. Only the circumstance that the 
dialectical dialogues, being more difficult, were less read, 
could lead to the reigning conception of Platonism as a 
mere theory of ideas. We have seen that the ideas ap- 
peared first in the Symposium and were maintained 
only in three other dialogues (Phaedo, Republic, Phaedrus), 
undergoing a change from immanence to transcendence, 
and becoming at last ideal models of things, which apart 
from their copies retain their own existence. After the 
Parmenides we have no reason to identify true Being 
with ideas in this sense. We shall see in later works of 
Plato that he more and more dedicated himself to the 
investigation of notions of his own soul and of the par- 
ticulars of experience. He says unmistakably that reason 
and life are possible only in a soul (249 A: vobyv pév eyeuv, 
Conv dF un, POwev ;—Kal TOs ;—adra TadTa pev aupoTEepa 
evovT AUT@ AeYouEV, OV HY ev ruyn ye Hyoomev avTO EyEew 
avTad;—xal Tir’ av Etepov Exor TpOTOY ;—adXa OHTA vodv pev 
Kal Conv Kal :oynv, axivntov pévTo. TO Tapatav, euuyov 
év, éoTavat ;—TavTa Zwovye adoya tadT sivar gaivetas. 
—kal 70 Kivovpevov Oy Kal Kivnow cvyywpnTéov ws ovTa). 
We see here movement recognised as true Being. In 
the Phaedrus and Laws the cause of movement is the soul. 
Here equally in the whole passage the soul is identified 
with true Being. The only difficulty of interpretation 
might be seen in the ambiguity of the term ‘soul,’ as it is 
not always the individual soul. But we have seen that in 
the Phaedrus the individual soul was meant, as results 
from the avowed purpose of the exposition there given. 
Equally in the Laws the priority of soul has a practical 
application to the individual life of each citizen, and unity 
of soul in the universe is even denied. Thus we must 
admit as Plato’s view a plurality of souls, and this agrees 
with the myth of the Timaeus. In the Timaeus these 


Thus the 
theory of 
ideas has 
been 
modified ; 
first pass- 
ing from 
imma- 
nence to 
transcen- 
dence, 
then be- 
coming 
models of 
things. 
Now they 
are 
notions 
inherent 
in a soul. 


Plurality 
of souls 
acting and 
being 
acted 
upon. 


A certain 
fixity or 
stability 
still 
required 
in the 
objects 
of know- 
ledge. 


Existence 
implies 
unity and 
totality. 


The com- 
munion 
of kinds. 


426 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


souls are said to be created by one universal creator. But 
this is a mythical allegory which means only the sub- 
stantial similarity of all souls. Whatever Plato’s opinion 
about the relation of the individual human soul to the 
Divinity could have been, so much is clear from the above 
comparisons, that he credited the individual soul with 
true existence, the power of acting and being acted upon. 
The movement of the objects of knowledge is limited by 
Plato in so far as without the fixity of notions knowledge 
appeared impossible (249 c: 76 Kata tavTa Kal wcatTws 
Kal Trepl TO avTO SoKei cou ywpis oTaTEws yevéo0aL ToT av ;— 
ovdapas *—rti 0’; dvev TovT@Y vodv KaBopas ovTa 7) yEvouEvOV 
av Kal oTrovoov ;—hxiota). The object of philosophy is the 
divine substance of Being, which is not attainable to 
vulgar minds (254 A: o giAdcodos, TH Tod Ovtos ae dua 
Noyropav mpockeipevos idea, Sia TO NaTPOY ad THs ywpas 
ovdapas evTreTHs OPEHVaL * TA Yap THs TOV TOAN@V uXis 
Ompata KapTEpEly Tpos TO Ostov adopavTa advvaTa). 

But this does not mean that we have to imagine 
this substance as the idea of Good in the Republic. 
The notion of Being extends to all individual things 
(237 D: Kat todTo nuiv tov dhavepov, ws Kal TO TL TOUTO 
pha em’ Ovte Aeyomev ExdoToTE* povoy yap avTO Eye, 
MOTEP YULVOY Kal aTNPHU@pmEvoY ATO TOV dYTMOY aTaVTMD, 
advvatov) which constitute unities of thought (257 D: 
avaykn Tov TL Asyovta ev ye TL Aeyevv), each of them an 
existing whole (245 D: ote ovciay ote yéverw ws odoay 
50 mpocayopevew TO ev 1) TO Gov ev Tols odoL jun) TLEVTA). 

The theory of the mutual relation (covwvta) of notions 
among each other is proposed after the refutation of two 
contradictory suppositions. That all notions cannot be 
predicated of each other (252 D: wavta addjdows eomev 
Svvapuy Eyew erixowwvias; ... TOUTO yé Tov Tals wEyioTaLs 
avayKais advvatov) is seen from the impossibility of join- 
ing in one judgment contradictory ideas, as, for instance, 
immobility and movement. On the other hand, if each 
idea stands apart from all others (251 E: pndevi pndev 


NEW THEORY OF SCIENCE: THE SOPHIST 427 


pndeuiav Stivamw zxew xowwvias zis pndev), all reasoning 
becomes impossible. It remains only to admit that some 
notions agree and others not; a special investigation is 
needed to find which is the case in each instance (253 A). 
This is illustrated by the example of letters, which form 
syllables and words only in certain combinations, deter- 
mined by the science of grammar. Similarly the combi- 
nations of ideas are the object of dialectic. But Plato 
warns us against the illusions of thought which can be 
produced by the charm of skilful eloquence (234 c). 

The recognition of the power of a perverse rhetoric goes 
so far that it implies a certain opposition between pure 
thought and acquired experience, conceding to the latter 
the power of correcting the illusions of thought. Such a 
view is far removed from the triumphant idealism of the 
Republic and Phaedrus, and cannot be interpreted other- 
wise than by an increasing esteem of outward experience, 
which is common to the Sophist and the Laws: 


Soph. 234 D: rods moddods Tay 
ToTe akovdyvTwy Gap’ ovk avdykn, 
Xpovov Te exehOorvtos avrots ikavov 

o 2 « ’ ~ > 
Kal mpotovons nALKias, Tots TE ovat 
mpoorimrovras eyyvOev kai Sua 7abn- 
patev avayxafowevous evapyas épd- 
cel y+ , 

mrecOar Tav ovT@y, peTaBadXecv 
Tas Tore yevouevas Od€as, Bote 

A \ f A / 
opikpa pev atverOa ra peydda, 

A X A cv ‘ , 4 
xaderd dé ta padia, kai ravra mdvTy 
> 4 A > cal , 
davarerpap@at ta ev Trois o- 
yots havrdgpatra tno tev ev 
Tais mpageotv epywy mapayevo- 
pevon. 


Legg. 169 D: rowdvrov Tov vopo- 
mp@Tov pev ypaat 
Tovs vdpous mpos THY akpiBevay Kara 


Oérov BovAnua - 


Sdvapuy ixavas + &retra mpotdvros TOU 
Xpévov kai tev Sokdvrav epyo 
meip@pevoy .. . maymodAa avayKy 
mapadeinec Oa Tovadra, a Set Twa 
Evverropevov emavopOovuv . . . 

888 A: véos «it - 


Xpovos tomoe mod\d\a Sy 


mpotoy O€ ae 6 
vuv 
SoEadlers petaBaddvra emi Tav- 
avtia TiderOat * mepipewvov ovy eis 
Tore KpiTHs mept TOY peylaT@v ylyve- 
cba. 


It was a natural consequence of the extension of 
detailed investigations that Plato began to think more 
highly of experience than he did at the time when he was 


still inebriated with his discovery of absolute ideas. 


For 


the same reason it is impossible to explain the above 
passage without the admission that the writer is an aged 


man. 


He knows that truth is reached through bitter 


Only 
certain 
combina- 
tions 
possible. 


Increasing 
recogni- 
tion of 
the value 
of ex- 
perience. 


The 
highest 
kinds, or 
categories. 


Being and 
Not- 
Being. 


Not-Being 
always 
relative. 


Not-Being 
is dif- 
ference. 
Prepara- 
tion in 
previous 
dialogues 
for this 
concep- 


428 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


experience, and that experience can prevent the pain to 
which youth without a guide is often exposed (234 E: 
nusis oe olde TdvTes TEeipacouzOa Kal viv TEipmueba ws 
éyyvTata dvev TOV TAaOnpaTwY TpoTayEty). 

This concession to practical experience, which led to 
the substitution of a second best state for the ideal 
Republic, did not change the fundamental postulate of 
earlier Platonic logic, namely the fixity of ideas, without 
which knowledge and reason would become impossible 
(249 C: mpos ye ToDTOY TaVvTi NOyw waxETéor, Os Ay éTLTTH UNV 
n ppovnow 7 vodv abavitwy toxupitntar TEepi Twos omnodvr). 
The ideas exist in the soul and are quite as invisible and 
intangible as the soul in which they abide (247 4B). There 
are certain highest kinds (254 D: péyota Tov yevor), 
which Plato enumerates as Being, rest, motion, identity, 
and difference (6v, otaavs, Kivnots, TavTov, Gatepov, 254 D BE). 

The idea of difference explains the notion of Not-Being 
which presented such difficulties to Plato’s predecessors 
(237 c-238 D). Being is absolute or relative (255 c: otuai 
ce ovyxwpely TOV OVTwY Ta “EV a’TA KAO’ avTa, Ta bz TpOs 
a\Anra asi Neyec Par), While Not-Being is always relative. 
It is impossible to affirm that something contradictory to 
Being exists (257 B, 258 E). But Not-Being means only 
different Being, and denotes the relation of notions which 
do not agree with each other (256 p). Of each thing an 
infinity of negations can be predicated, because we can 
compare with each Being all different Beings which are 
not what the chosen Being is (256 E: qwepl txaotov dpa 
TOV ElO@V TOAD pv 2oTL TO OV, aTrELpoy S62 TANOEL TO pr) GV 
... 257A: Kal TO Ov... dca Tép 2o7t Ta GAA, KaTA 
TOTaUTA OUK EoTLY * exEiva yap ovK Ov ev wey avTO éoTL, 
atrépavra b& Tov apiOuov TadAa OvK Zot ad). This logical 
solution of the riddle which caused so much difficulty to 
Parmenides has been prepared already by the mention of 
a perception of opposites in the Theaetetus (186 B), and 
by the antinomies of the Parmenides. Such antinomies 
would have no meaning after a definition of Not-Being as 


NEW THEORY OF SCIENCE: THE SUOPHIST 429 


different Being, and after the transition from a meta- 
physical idea of Not-Being to the logical conception of 
Other-Being. 

The term Not-Being had been used already in the 
Republic (478 c), where, as in the Parmenides, it was 
declared impossible to be a subject of thought or opinion. 
Such a declaration coming after the inquiry of the Sophist 
would be unaccountable, and has never been accounted 
for by those who believe the Republic to be later than 
the Sophist. For the explanation of Not-Being in the 
Sophist is not a passing fancy like the creation of an 
object of ignorance in the Republic. It is an important 
step in the history of Philosophy, and brings Not-Being 
from the region of metaphysical speculation into the dry 
light of formal logic. It is a consequence of the recog- 
nition of Relation as a chief factor of knowledge, without 
which error in pure thought is inconceivable (237 a: 
TETOAMNKEV O AOYOS OUTOS UToHECOaL TO un) OV Eivar’ WrEeddos 
yap ovK av adrws eylryvETo or). 

If the ideas were always perceived as they are, the 
participation of concrete things in them would allow of a 
determination free from error. But as the relations of 
ideas between each other are not evident to our intuition, 
we commit errors by supposing relations which are not. 
The question of error was left unsettled in the Cratylus 
(429 p), and in the Theaetetus (187 D, cf. 200 p). It is 
only here that Plato explains error as a judgment about 
Not-Being, while in all earlier works the possibility of 
thinking or judging Not-Being was denied in agreement 
with Plato’s philosophical predecessors. Not-Being is 
recognised as a notion in one line with Being (260 B: 7é 
pav 6) wn Ov Huly Ev TL TOV Addov yévos dv avehavn, KaTA 
TavTa Ta ovta SieoTrapuévov), from which it differs by its 
relativity. 

While the elements of earlier Platonic logic were single 
ideas, the importance of judgment is here asserted as a 
first element of knowledge. . Judgment is analysed into 


tion of 
Other- 
Being. 


These 
imperfect 
views 
could not 
be later 
than the 
Sophist. 


First clear 
concep- 
tion of 
Relation 
as a con- 
dition of 
thought. 
Conse- 
quent 
possibility 
of errors. 


Judgment 
a first 
element 


of know- 
ledge. 


Subject 
and pre- 
dicate. 


The terms 
here first 
accurately 
defined. 


The 
Cratylus 
compared. 


430 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 

its essential parts, and for the first time Plato establishes 
the distinction between the subject and predicate of a pro- 
position (2618). He divides the signs used in language 
into dvoyata and pata and states expressly that pjya 
means the sign of an action (262 A: 70 éi tats mpakeow 
dv OnAWpA PHua TOU Eyouev). Thisis a new term, because 
in earlier dialogues phya, even if used along with dvopa, 
meant a phrase or expression. Thus, for instance, in the 
Protagoras (3415, 343 8B) the term pjya is used for sayings 
of Simonides and Pittacos. In the same meaning of a 
saying or phrase pia is often used (Prot. 342 z, Crat. 
399 B, 421 B, HE, Rep. 336 A, 463 B, 498 B, 562 c, Phaedr. 
269 B, Theaet. 190 c, Legg. 660 a, 669 c, 839 B, 840 c), 
also in such expressions as pjuwa Kal royov (Rep. 473 B), 
ovopata Kai pnuata (Apol. 17 B, Crat. 425 a, Symp. 198 B, 
221 un, Rep. 601 A, Theaet. 168 B, 184 oc, 206 D), phjywa Kai 
ddyua (Rep. 464 a, Soph. 265 c, Legg. 797 c). In other 
cases phwa means a single word (Rep. 462 c, Theaet. 165 a, 
183 B, Soph. 237 p, Tim. 49 E, Legg. 627 D, 656 c, 669 £, 
783 c, 800 p, 906 c) or textual expression (Huthyd. 305 a, 
Gorg. 450 £, 489 B, Phaed. 102 B, Rep. 340 D, Phaedr. 
998 D, 271 c, Theaet. 166 p, 190 c, Soph. 257 B). It as 
quite another thing in the above passage of the Sophist 
in which dvowa and pjywa have each an unmistakable 
technical meaning, as subject and predicate, clearly intro- 
duced for the first time. The term pjya is used in this 
meaning of predicate also in some later instances (Polit. 
303 o, Legg. 838 B). If we compare Cratylus and Sophist 
on the connection between évoya, phua, and doyos, it might 
at first sight appear that the later dialogue repeats only a 
definition given in the earlier : 


Crat. 425 4: ék trav dvoparer 
kal pnudtev péya in Te Kat Kadov 
kal 6Aov ovaoTnoopev . . 
Aoyov TH dvopacrixh 7) pyTopiKy 7 
ris eoTiy n TEXYN. 

431 B: ef éort py OpOGs Siaveperv 
. etn dy kal pnpara 


\ 
» TOV 


Ta dvopata .. 


Soph. 262 a: €€ dvopatray povev 
guvex@s eyouevay ovK eat Tore 
a 
Adyos, ov’ av pnudrav yxapis 

dvopatrav ex Oevrar. 
C : ovdepiay yap ovre ovTas ovr’ 
exeivos mpakw ovs’ ampakiay ovdé 
ey) ” ar \ oo” Tl 
ovalav dvTos ovdE pu) dvTos SnAot Ta 


NEW THEORY OF SCIENCE: THE SOPHIST 431 


TavTov TovTo Trovety. ei O€ pyuatakal  wrnbévra, piv ay Tis Tois dvopace 

évopata eat ovTw TiWéval, dvaykn Ta pypata Kepdon: Tore 8 ppooe 

kat Adyous* Adyot yap mov... TE Kai Adyos eyevero evOds 7 TPaTNH 

toutay Evvbecis eat. cupmdokn, oxed0v Tav Adyar 6 
Tp@Tos kal cptKporaros. 


Many translators understood pia in the above passage 
of the Cratylus as‘ verb’ or ‘ predicate,’ but if we compare 
other passages of the same dialogue it becomes evident that 
here also pjwa means ‘ phrase.’ Plato deals with a suc- 
cession of increasing units, beginning with a single letter, 
progressing to a syllable, a word, a phrase, and a speech. 
The parallelism of dvowacrixn and dvoya, pntopixn and 
pyua confirms this, and Aeyos means here not a sentence 
but a speech, or language generally; also in the second 
passage the progress from a wrong distribution of words 
to a wrong distribution of phrases is a plausible induction, 
while it would be unjustifiable to apply to the Cratylus a 
definition given only in the Sophist, and received first by 
the pupil as requiring nearer explanation (262A: tadz’ 
ovK Euabov, C: Tas ap’ Moe eyes ;). Even if we had not 
many other reasons to admit the priority of the Cratylus 
to the Sophist, this comparison would show that the 
distinction of subject and predicate, made in the Sophist, 
must be later than the opposition of words and phrases, 
which in the Cratylus is already familiar at a time when 
the need of a theory of predication was not yet felt. 

A judgment, says Plato here, refers to things present, 
past, or future, and connects a predicate with a subject 
(262D: Sndot yap 76n Tov TéTE TEpl TV GVvT@Y 1) YyirYyVvoMEVOY 
7) yEeyoveTov 7) wEANOYTMY, Kal OvK Ovouater povOV, GANG TL Kal 
TEpaivel, cuuTACKWY TA PHuaTa Tois dvouac.). This con- 
nection is not, as some logicians even now suppose, 
limited to an identity of subject and predicate, but presents 
a great variety of aspects (251 A: Adyouev dvOpwroy by Tov 
TON atta erovowalovtes, Ta TE YPOmata émipépoyTes avTO 
Kal Ta oxnmata Kal peyé0n Kal Kaxlas Kal apeTas, év ols Tact 
kal éTépous uplots ov ovoyv dvOpwrrov avTov sivar hapév, GArA 


7 


Predica- 
tion does 
not imply 
identity : 
variety of 
predi- 
cates. 


Negation 
not con- 


tradiction. 


Refuta- 
tion an 
instru- 
ment of 
moral 
training. 


Import- 
ance of 
the new 
theory. 


432 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


Kal aya0ov cal étepa arepa). This is misunderstood by 
those who are unable to grasp the relation between the 
one and the many, and believe that each judgment implies 
an identity (2518: d0ev. . . Tots Te véous Kal TOY yEepovTwY 
Tots oyabeor Ooivny TapecKevdxapev’ evbvs yap avTira- 
BécOat Twayti Tpoxeipov ws advvaToy Ta TE TOAAG EV Kal TO 
&y moAda sivat, Kai 6% Tov yaipovaw ovK« e@vTes ayabov 
Aéyetv avOpwrov, adAA TO pev ayaov dyabov, Tov dé 
dvOpwrov avOpwrov). What is here explained about the 
nature of the sentence applies also to the unspoken judg- 
ment (263 E: dsdvota Kai NOyos TavTOv’ ANY O meV eVTOS 
Tis Wuyhs Tpos avTHy Siadoyos avev Povis yuyvopmevos TOUT’ 
avTO Hhuly émwvouacin, Siavola ... TO O& yY am’ éxelvns 
peta Sua Tod otopatos iov meta POdyyou KéKANTAL AdyoS). 
The negative judgment is not contradictory to its positive 
counterpart, and the negation means only a difference, 
leaving open an infinity of possibilities (257B: ov« ap’, 
évayTiov bTav awopacis AeyNTAL TnualvEeWw, TVYYwpNToOMUEOa, 
TOTOUTOY Of movov, STL THY AAAwWY TL wNVUEL TO pH Kal TO 
ov mpoTileweva TOV eTrLoVTwWY dvouUdT@V, Maddov O& TOV 
MpayuaT@v wept ATT av KéenTat Ta eTihOeyyopweva VoTEpov 
Ths atopacews ovdwata). Wrong judgments are refuted 
by showing the contradictions they imply (2808). Such 
refutations are extolled as being not only of logical but 
also of moral importance (230 D: Tov z\eyyov NeKTEov ws 
dipa peyicTn Kal Kuplwratn TOV Kabapoewy éoTL, Kal TOV 
GvéehsyKTOV av vomloTéov, .. . Ta péeylota axdaprtor drTa, 
dmral0evTov TE Kal aloypov yeyoveval). 

Plato presents his theory of negation and of predica- 
tion as a truth which alone can account for the existence 
of error, and could only be denied under the penalty of 
being involved in constant contradictions (241 £). Ignor- 
ance, named here an ugliness of the soul (228 4), is always 
involuntary (228 C: Wuynv ye lower axovoav Tacav Tay 
ayvoovcav), being worst if he who is ignorant is under 
the illusion that he knows (2290: dyvoias ... méya Kal 


NEW THEORY OF SCIENCE: THE SOPHIST 433 


Xaretov abwpiopévov eidos . . - TO wy KaTELdoTa TL Soxeiv 
elddvat . . . TOUT@ LOVwW THs ayvolas auabia Tovvoma). 

The most impressive passage of the Sophist (242 c- 
251 A) represents the metaphysical and logical conflict 
between materialism and idealism, wherein Plato chooses 
a middle solution, thus confirming his criticism in the 
Parmenides of the primitive theory of ideas. The im- 
proved materialism here represented has, with some 
plausibility, been attributed by Siebeck ?* to Aristotle ; 
the idealism here represented bears some relation to 
Plato’s own views as expressed in Phaedo, Republic, and 
Phaedrus. The third or middle view proposed is the true 
existence of souls, not of animated ideas as some critics 
thought. Here, exactly as in the tenth book of the Re- 
public and the Phaedrus, Plato, at the end of an argument 
on another notion, suddenly introduces the soul as corre- 
sponding best to the general notion first explained. There 
it was the notion of a self-moving principle—here it is 
the notion of true Being (248 E: 76 ravtedds dv) which, 
besides movement, as postulated in the Phaedrus, must 
have reason, and if reason, necessarily life (249 a: vodv 
pav eyetv, Conv Sé uj, POwev ; Kal tos;). But reason and 
life are found only in a soul (249 A: radra pév audotepa 
evovT’ avT@ (TH TavTEAOs dyTL) NEyousr, Ov may ev ruyh ye 
pyoomev avTo eye avta ;—xal tiv’ dv Erepov Zyou tpdTrov). 

It results that the soul or souls correspond best to the 
idea of true existence, though Plato at the end does not 
insist on this conclusion, because his aim was only to show 
that both materialists and idealists have a too narrow con- 
ception of Being (246 A): earlier philosophers have taken 
it lightly, and spoke of quality and quantity of Being 
without a definition of their starting point (242 c: 
evxdrws pot doxet Ilappevidns juiv SiereyOar Kal ras batts 
T@TOTE Tl Kpiolv Wpunoe TOD Ta dvTA SiopicacbaL Toca 


254 H. Siebeck, ‘Platon als Kritiker aristotelischer Ansichten : III. Der 
Sophista,’ in Zeitschrift fiir Philosophie wnd philosophische Kritik, Band 
108, pp. 1-18, Leipzig 1896. 

FF 


Conflict 
between 
material- 
ism and 
idealism. 


Plato’s 
mediating 
view. 


Dynamic 
aspect of 
Being 
identifies 
Being 
with Soul. 


Narrow- 
ness of 
earlier 
concep- 
tions. 


Being 
becomes 
the chief 
object of 
research, 
not the 
Idea of 
Good. 


434 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


Te Kal Tota éoriv). They invent fables as if they were 
speaking to children (242c¢: pd0ov twa Exactos haivetat 
pot Sunysic0ar Tatclv ws ovcty juiv) Instead of analysing 
the chief concept of philosophy, the idea of Being. This 
substitution of Being as the ultimate aim of Dialectic 
instead of the earlier hegemony of the Good is one of the 
signs of the change which occurred in Plato’s thoughts, 
from absolute ideas to the ideas of the human mind. 
At the same time the bold review of philosophical doc- 
trines betrays a Master in metaphysics who could be 
nobody else than Plato alone, so that all doubts as to the 
authenticity of the Sophist must be dismissed. 

Those who up to quite recent times ascribed the 
Sophist to another writer *° had not considered the close 


25 Ernst Appel (‘ Zur Echtheitsfrage des Dialogs Sophistes,’ in vol. v. 
pp. 55-60 of the Archiv fiir Geschichte der Philosophie) and Huit (in 
vol. xviii. pp. 48-69, 169-188 of the Annales de philosophie chrétienne, 
Paris 1888) have added nothing to Schaarschmidt’s arguments, which have 
been abundantly refuted by R. Pilger (Ueber die Athetese des platonischen 
Sophistes, Berlin 1871) and many others. Huit adds only a very strange 
objection (p. 175): he believes that the historical character of the Sophist 
is unplatonic, and that Plato never reviews his predecessors. This needs 
no refutation for anybody who knows the Theaetetus, the Phaedrus, or the 
Phaedo. Fouillée (La Philosophie de Platon, Paris 1888) was right in 
saying (p. xii. Préface) that to deny the authenticity of the Sophist and 
Politicus ‘il faut étre myope intellectuellement.’ The logical importance 
of the Sophist has been recognised among other authors by: Bertini (Nwova 
interpretazione delle idee Platoniche, Torino 1876, p. 23 sqq.), Achelis 
(‘ Kritische Darstellung der platonischen Ideenlehre,’ pp. 90-103 in vol. 79 
of the Zeitschrift fiir Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, Halle 1881), 
Benn (The Greek philosophers, London 1882), Peipers (Ontologia Platonica, 
Lipsiae 1883, pp. 319-346), Lukas (Die Methode der Hintheilung bei Platon, 
Halle 1888), Apelt (Beitrdge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, 
Leipzig 1891, pp. 67-99, also pp. 529-540 of vol. 145 of Newe Jahrbiicher 
fiir Philologie und Pddagogik). Very peculiar are the views of Wolff (Die 
Platonische Dialektik, Halle 1875), who thinks that Plato ignored ‘den 
Unterschied zwischen Gattung und Art,’ and Uphues (Das Wesen des 
Denkens bei Plato, Landsberg 1881), who credits Plato with such opinions 
as: ‘das Denken ist eine Verbindung der die Vorstellungen verbindenden 
Worter zu Sitzen,’ and resumes his opinion on Plato’s logic thus: ‘das 
Verstiindniss des Satzes wird uns nicht durch ihn selbst sondern durch ein 
Anderes gegeben; als Quelle unserer HErkenntniss der Wahrheit kann 
nicht der Satz sondern muss eben dies Andere gelten. Dieses Andere ist die 


NEW THEORY OF SCIENCE: THE SOPHIST 435 


stylistic relations between the Sophist and the Laws. 
The strangest of all objections to the authenticity of the 
Sophist rests on a very low estimate of Plato’s sincerity. 
It has been said that Plato would not have criticised 
his own theories as the author of the Sophist criticises 
the Platonic ideas. Such critics seem to measure Plato’s 
ambition according to the standard of a vulgar school- 
master. The dialogical form of Plato’s works left him 
a great liberty for introducing new theories, attributing 
them to new speakers. In the Laws many political 
theories of the Republic are abandoned, and thus also the 
Parmenides and Sophist take leave of the theory of ideas 
as expounded in the Phaedo or Phaedrus. 

The Sophist appears to be in every respect a continua- 
tion of the Parmenides and a fulfilment of a part of the 
programme there proposed. There are at least two 
passages in which the Parmenides is alluded to in the 
later dialogue : at the beginning (217 c), where the form 
of the dialectical discussion of the Parmenides is men- 
tioned in an unmistakable manner, and at a further stage, 
where an equally clear allusion is made to the contents of 
the antinomies (2440: 7é tavrny THY UTdOEcw UTobEUEv 
(ro &v eivat), mpdos TO viv EpwTnOZv, Kal Tpos Addo Oz OTLOdY, 
ov TavTwv pactov atroxpivacOat: cf. 245 EB: Kai dda pupla 
amepavrous amopias Exactov eidnpos pavettat TH TO Ov EiTE 
dSvo Twe elite 8v wovov sivas Aéyovts”*). What Zeller 
says in order to invert the relation and to place the Parme- 
nides after the Sophist is by no means convincing. After 
the determination of negation in the Sophist a great part 
of the antinomies of the Parmenides would be superfluous, 
as can be seen from what is said in the Parmenides about 
Not-Being (Parm. 142 A: 7& pu) ovte 088 Gvopa obbE Novos 
christliche Trinititslehre.’ This touching simplicity is equalled only by 
Pfleiderer, who sees in the Sophist ‘die Ehrenrettung des richtigverstan- 
denen Nichtseins’ (p. 347). 

*6 This passage, in which True Being appears neither as only one, nor 


as Two opposite, seems also to imply a plurality of Beings, or souls, as the 
ultimate solution of the metaphysical problem. 


Rae 


Stylistic 
relations. 


Criticism 
of the 
cruder 
theory of 
ideas. 


The 
Sophist 
subse- 
quent 
to the 
Parme- 
nides. 


Zeller’s 
parallels 
uncon- 
vincing. 


436 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


ovdé Tis émioTHun ovde aicOnaois ovde Soka: cf. 164 B). 
Zeller quotes several parallel passages of both dialogues 
which either prove nothing about the chronological order 
or even confirm the priority of the Parmenides : 


Parm. 128 5-129 c: the parti- 
culars are said to participate in 
ideas and even in opposite ideas, 
and Socrates adds: ef 6 eorw ev 

> 4 “a \ > , ‘ > 
avro TovTO ToAAd arrobel Eel, Kal av 


Soph. 251 a-c: the multiplicity 
of predicates referring to one sub- 
ject is denied only by persons 
Und tTevias THs wept ppovnow KTH- 
ews TA TOLAUTU TeDaUpAaKOGL . « « 

253 D: the dialectician distin- 
guishes ideas and their rela- 
tions. 


ra mo\Aa 61 €v, TovTo 7On Oavpd- 
coma. ... el pev aura Ta yern Te Kal 
elon €v avTots amodpaivor TavayTia. 
In the above two passages the Hleatic stranger takes 
for granted what Socrates in the Parmenides represents 
as a great and unsettled difficulty. If any chronological 
inference is allowed from such general coincidences, the 
later date of the Sophist is the most probable conclusion. 


Other passages compared by Zeller are quite as incon- 


clusive : 


Parm. 183 Cc: otwar ay kai oe 
‘ wy iA > U ? 
kal dAXov, dotis avTny tia Kad 
2 zi 
avTiy ExdoTou ovciav TiWerae etvat, 
-~ a , 
6podoynoa av mpatoy pev pndeplav 
~ > ces a x 
avT@v eivat ev piv. mas yap av 
> 1 bd ig \ + ww a 
avti Kad’ avrny ett em; ... Ooat 
r - > , o 
trav ieav mpos addAndas cioly at 
\ 5 , 
elo, avTal mpos avTas THY ovoLay 


»” ae > \ \ > 
€xovow, a ov mpos Ta Tap 
Huty Opowmpara. 

Parm. 1483 A: ovoias ape 
perexer TO Ev, Ovo €oTW ... Kai 


51a ratra Oy) TO Ev Ov wOAAG eharn. 
> A \ a a iA > U 

. a’ro TO €v, O Sn paper ovotas 
~ , 

peréxeww, eav avTo TH Ovavoia povoy 

’ CON ‘ a s 2 

kad’ avto AaBwpev Gvev TovTov ov 

‘ dR a , 

cpapev perexe, apa ye Ev povoy da- 
, Xx ‘ \ \ 3 A a 

vyoeTat 7) Kat TOANG TO AUTO TOUTO; 

@ Xo Tt 


‘ > > ’ > A 
erepov pev avaykn THY OvoLaY aUTOU 


oo > yy é 
—E€V, Oluar Eymye ... B:? 


op o \ raat a A Seas, 
eivat, €repov O€ avTO ; ElmEp pL OVTLA 
(ie: > she a Pye , 
TO €v, GAN* ws EV OVTLas pEeTETXEV 
ead ‘\ c > / id A 
. el Erepov pev 7 ovoia, Erepov Oe 


Soph. 255 D : oipai oe cvyxepeiv 
TOV bvT@V Ta pev arta Kal’ adra, 
ra Se mpos adAnda dei héyer Oa. . 
to 8’ érepov det mpos erepoy ... 
etrep Odtrepov apcboiy pereixe ToL 
eldoiv Bomwep TO bv, HY av Tore TL 
kal TOY €éTépwy ETepov ov mpos 
Erepov: viv O€ atexvas huly 6 Ti mEp 
dy €repov 7), cup BEBnkev e& avaykns 
érépou TovTo 6 mép eoTLy eivat. 

Soph. 244 B: ev wov dare povov 
eivat ;—apéev yap—dv kadeiré TH; 
—vai—morepov Orep Ev, ert TO AUTO 
mpooxpopevor Svoiv dvopacw, 7 
mos ;—the answer to this ques- 
tion is stated to be difficult, with 
a very probable reference to the 
Parmenides, in which precisely 
the same question led to contra- 
dictory conclusions. The theory 
of communion of kinds as set 
forth in the Sophist may be 
regarded as an attempt to solve 


NEW THEORY OF SCIENCE: THE SOPHIST A37 


TO €v, oUTe TH Ev TO Ev THs ovoias the riddles of the Parmenides, 
érepov ore TH ovoia eivae 7 ovcia and to progress beyond the rigid 
Tov €vos G\Xo, G\Aa TO Erep@ Te kai _— Eleatic unity of Being. 

a@\Aw Erepa adAnhov. 

The above comparisons speak rather against Zeller’s 
conclusions, though the chronological value of these 
passages is much less evident than the above quoted 
references to the Parmenides in the Sophist (217 oc, 
244 c). The general contents of both dialogues are 
best explained by the priority of the Parmenides. The 
Parmenides prepares the ground for the theories of the 
Sophist, and is as we have seen intermediate between 
Theaetetus and Sophist in its list of categories‘ as well as 
in its antinomies. This is confirmed also by numerous 
stylistic observations. The vocabulary of the Sophist, 
despite the difference of contents, shows such a surpris- 
ing number of coincidences with Timaeus, Critias, and 
Laws, as no earlier dialogue except the Phaedrus. We 
have already seen what reasons account for the excep- 
tional style of the Phaedrus, and there are many stylistic 
peculiarities in which the Sophist is much nearer to the 
Laws than the Phaedrus and Parmenides. To these 
belongs first of all the avoidance of hiatus, which cannot 
be accidental, and is common to the Sophist with the five 
latest works. Other important peculiarities absent from the 
Parmenides, Theaetetus, Phaedrus and all earlier dialogues 
appear for the first time in the Sophist and remain in the 
style of all the latest works of Plato: the prevalence of 
Kabarrep Over dotrep, the very great frequency of rtoivur, 
mas, Ev¥u7ras, and the scarcity of wévtor. Besides these 
important peculiarities, others of less importance appear 
for the first time in the Sophist and are common to this 
dialogue with the latest works of Plato : ta dvo, raya icws, 
Touyapodv, wav ovv, wav ov, Inversion of Aéyes, Evvdrras are 
found repeatedly in our dialogue, and the number of 
accidental peculiarities of later style is much greater than 
in the Parmenides; thus the stylistic affinity of the 


The list 
of cate- 
gories 
in the 
Sophist 
more 
mature. 
Vocabu- 
lary. 


Hiatus 
avoided. 


Other 
pecu- 
liarities 
of later 
style. 


Zeller is 
singular 
in pla- 
cing the 
Soplist 
before the 
Republic. 
Important 
confirma- 
tion of 
the later 
date by 
Hirzel 
and 
Bruns. 

R. Hirzel 
on Dia- 
logue in 
Litera- 


ture. 


438 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


Sophist with the group of the Laws amounts to 468 
units of affinity against only 243 of the Parmenides. 

This is quite sufficient to render the later date of 
the Sophist as probable as anything can be in Platonic 
chronology, and it has been recognised since Campbell by 
all investigators of Plato’s style, as well as by many other 
critics, as for instance Jowett, Tocco, Teichmiiller, on 
independent internal grounds. Against all this evidence 
Zeller continues to place the Sophist before the Republic 
and the Sympostwm. This is chiefly due to the circum- 
stance that he is evidently unaware of the existence of so 
many investigations on the style of Plato, and that he has 
not given a special attention to Plato’s logical theories. 
On the other side the late date of the Sophist has been 
recently confirmed in a most decisive manner by two 
different lines of inquiry, which enabled two authors, 
who knew nothing of Campbell, to find out that in two 
different ways the Sophist and Polsticus belong to the 
same group as the T%maeus and Critias. ‘These con- 
firmations acquire an increased importance through the 
fact that they touch upon our problem from a standpoint 
not yet applied specially to Plato. R. Hirzel?” dedicated 
two volumes to a general investigation of the form of 
literary dialogue from Plato to the present time. This 
he did with remarkable acuteness, at least so far as Plato 
is concerned, and he made it still more evident than 
Ueberweg and Campbell had done that the form of the 
dialogue in the Sophist and the dialectical dialogues cor- 
responds necessarily to a later stage of literary activity 
than that evinced in the Republic and Phaedrus. In 
view of the special attention paid by Hirzel to the dia- 
logical form in the literature of all ages and nations, we 
are bound to accept his testimony as a valuable confirma- 
tion of the results obtained by comparison of style and 
logical theories. Hirzel observes that the change in the 


27 R. Hirzel, Der Dialog, ein literarhistorischer Versuch, 2 vols. 
Leipzig 1895. 


NEW THEORY OF SCIENCE: THE SOPHIST 439 


form of the dialogue consists in many peculiarities, by 
which the dialectical dialogues are distinguished from 
earlier more poetical works. The characterisation of 
persons and of the place of conversation is less elaborate, 
and the leader of the conversation becomes the impersonal 
representative of abstract reason, not only without 
personal character but even without name in the Sophist, 
Politicus, and Laws. There is nothing in these dialogues 
to remind us that they are represented as held in Attica 
or even Greece: they could be imagined anywhere in the 
universe. Throughout these works we move in a spiritual 
atmosphere apart from the material world (vol. 1. p. 252: 
Farb und gestaltlos legt die Welt um uns, Platons 
Dichtergeist entziindet kein sinnliches Leben mehr in ihr, 
wir befinden uns in einer Geisteratmosphire, die erhaben 
ist tiber Zeit und Raum). The connection of several 
dialogues into one larger whole is also indicated by Hirzel 
as a peculiarity of Plato’s latest manner, and he agrees 
with Christ in the supposition that the term trilogy and 
tetralogy had been used for Platonic dialogues before it 
came into use for dramatic poetry. The progress from 
single dialogues to trilogies or tetralogies appears to Hirzel 
a psychological evolution similar to that which is notice- 
able in epic and dramatic poetry. Plato saw after the 
Republic the difficulty of representing very complex sys- 
tematic expositions in a single dialogue, and he was also 
led to simplify introductory matters by the connection of 
dialogues in series. 

These observations of Hirzel, made in a work of more 
general aims and not limited to Plato, deserve the most 
serious attention of all who still have any doubts as to 
the authenticity and late date of the Sophist and Politicus. 
They were unexpectedly confirmed in a most satisfactory 
manner by another author, who also referred to Plato 
only in connection with an investigation into another 
general aspect of literary composition. Ivo Bruns wrote 


Less 
marked 
charac- 
terisation. 


Scene 
indefinite. 


Dialogues 
connected ° 
in series. 

‘ Trilogy’ 
and 

‘ tetra- 
logy.’ 


Ivo 
Bruns, on 
Literary 
Portrai- 
ture, also 
observes 
the de- 
cline of 
charac- 


terisation. 


Plato had 
retired 
from life 
to the 
School. 


Less of 
realism, 
more of 
system ; 
hence 
connected 
series. 


This con- 
nection 
begins 
with the 
Sophist. 


Neither 
Republic 
nor 


440 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


a very interesting volume ™* on the literary portraits in 
Greek literature, from Thucydides down to Demosthenes. 
This work deals also at some length with Plato as a 
great artist in skilful personal characterisation. Bruns 
found this art no longer present in the Platonic trilogies, 
namely in the Sophist, Politicus, Timaeus, and Critvas. 
While in the Republic, Phaedrus, Theaetetus, and in 
earlier dialogues a careful characterisation of each 
speaker is given, and the philosophical conversation comes 
as if by accident, Bruns observes that in the Sophist and 
later dialogues the speakers are not characterised indivi- 
dually, except that they are spoken of as competent and 
well prepared for philosophical conversation. This, says 
Bruns, is a sign that Plato, when he wrote the dialectical 
works, had retired from life to the School (p. 272: der 
Unterschied scheint gering, ist aber in Wirklichkeit ein 
tiefgreifender : er bedeutet den Schrift des platonischen 
Dialogs von dem Leben in die Schule; er bedeutet das 
Aufgeben des kiinstlerischen Princips, mit dem der 
friihere platonische Dialog untrennbar verbunden ist). 
This is called by Bruns a new style, essentially different 
from the ‘realistic’ style of the Republic and earlier 
works, in which each conversation was accidental and 
ended naturally after a single problem had been ex- 
hausted. In the trilogies the subject of the conversation 
is not accidental, but well planned, and this produces the 
systematic connection of several works into larger wholes. 
The Sophist and Timaeus are only apparent continuations 
of earlier dialogues: really each of them begins a new 
trilogy, and their connection with a dialogue of the old 
style is only employed to avoid an introductory exposition 
of the circumstances in which the dialogue was started. 
Neither in writing the Theactetus had the Sophist been 
planned, nor in writing the Republic had Plato already 
formed the plan of the Timaeus; but with the Sophist 


*88 Tvo Bruns, Das literarische Portrit der Griechen im fiinften und 
vierten Jahrhundert vor Christi Geburt, Berlin 1896. 


NEW THEORY OF SCIENCE: THE SOPHIST 44] 


and Timaeus begins the plan of two trilogies. The 
difference between the trilogies and the dialogues of the 
old style which are supposed to be introductory to the 
trilogies consists, as Bruns very judiciously observes, in 
the great authority given to the new leaders of philo- 
sophical conversation. The stranger of Elea, who leads 
the dialogue in the Sophist and Politicus, is expressly 
recommended at the beginning of the dialogue as a 
remarkable philosopher (Soph. 216 A: Eévov dryopev . . 2& 
"Edéas, éraipov 62 Tav audi Ilappevidny nal Zynvova, wara d3 
avépa pirocodov ... 
Osios pny... 217 B: diaxnkodvar yé dnow ixavds Kal ovK 
adpynpoveiv). Similar is also what is said in the Timaeus 
and Critias about the special authority and preparation of 
the speakers. We see in all these dialogues perfect 
teachers, accustomed to repeat their lessons, and well 
prepared for what they are to say, and hearers equally 
prepared to receive the instruction. What Bruns says 
about the psychological motives of this change in Plato’s 
later style comcides with the similar observations of 
Ueberweg, Campbell, and also of Hirzel, though Bruns 
seems not to be aware of this coincidence, or, at least, 
does not quote his predecessors. 

His testimony, coming thus quite independently, in- 
creases our confidence as to the absolute certainty of our 
conclusions about the date of the Sophist. This dialogue 
belongs evidently to Plato’s old age, and is much later 
than the Republic and Phaedrus; it may even have been 
written after the third voyage to Sicily. In style and 
contents there is a progress beyond the Theaetetus 
which prevents us from seeing in the Sophist an immediate 
continuation of the former. The external relation between 
Theaetetus and Sophist is no sign of a continuity of com- 
position, just as, in despite of a similar connection, the 
Timaeus is much later than the Republic. 


C: doxet Oeds piv ... ovdapHs Eivat, 


Theae- 
tetus 
contem- 
plated 
other 
dialogues 
to follow. 
The leader 
of the 
conver- 
sation is 
invested 
with far 
more 
authority. 


Bruns’ 
testimony 
evidently 
inde- 
pendent. 
The 
Sophist 
belongs 
already 
to Plato’s 
*old age. 


Continua- 
tion of the 
Sophist. 


The 
scientific 
method 
still in 
use. 


Logical 
method, 
especially 
classi- 
fication 
regarded 
as a pre- 
paratory 
exercise. 


Defence of 
lengthy 
arguments 
against 
objectors, 
who 
remain 
unknown. 


442 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


Il. The Polsticus. 


The Politicus is a genuine continuation of the Sophist 
much more than the Sophist can be esteemed as a con- 


_ tinuation of the Theaetetus. Here we have a close and 


mutual connection: in the Sophist (217 a) the Politicus is 
announced, and in the Politicus the Sophist is caDGEey 
quoted (257 a, 266 D, 284 8, 286 B). 

This close literary connection of the two companion 
dialogues corresponds to the near relation of their con- 
tents and method. The scientific method is here equally 
praised as leading to truth against every prejudice, and 
neglecting nothing, however insignificant it may appear 
(266D: 7H ToLdde we00d@ THY AOywV OUTE TE“VOTEPOV WaAXOV 
emehnoev 1) pj, TOV TE TMIKpOTEpoy OVdsY HTiWaKke TPO TOD 
peiGovos, asi d& Kal’ avTny Tepalves tTaXnOécTtaTov). This 
method consists here, as in the Sophist, in the classifica- 
tion of particulars according to their natural kinds (286 D : 
0 AOYyos TrapayyéANEL TOAD padicTa Kal TpaTov THY wéOodov 
avTny Tysav TOD Kat edn OvvaTor eivar dvaspetv). The aim 
of logical exercise is to become better prepared for more diffi- 
cult problems, and the impatient pupils are warned that the 
way may be long or short according to the subject (286 E : 
hoyov, av TE TampnKys NEXOEls TOV akovTaVTA ELPETLKMTEPOV 
aTrepyalnt at, TOUTOV oTrovoatELy Kal TO pnKEL Ndev GYAVAKTEL, 
av T av Bpaxvtepos, wcavTws). It seems that the form of the 
Sophist had been criticised as too lengthy, and as winding 
around the subject with which it deals. Plato answers here 
that such critics ought to have shown how the same 
results could have been reached by a shorter way, and 
whether the shorter way would have been equally useful 


‘for the purpose of developing dialectical power (287 A). 


This is clearly apolemic reference, and if in a contemporary 
writing we could discover some censure of the Sophist of 
Plato, the relation between this writing and the Polzticus 
would be established beyond every doubt. Unluckily, no 


NEW THEORY OF SCIENCE: THE POLITICUS 443 


such writing seems to be known—at least, Teichmiiller 
and Dummler, who believe themselves to have found so 
many other ‘ literary feuds,’ have made no use of this in- 
teresting passage. 

The ideal of logical training occupies Plato’s mind 
with increasing fascination, and he insists on its im- 
portance at every step. He quotes manifold instances of 
the way in which higher aims are furthered by elementary 
exercise. One who learns reading, and is asked of what 
letters a word consists, does not aim only at answering 
that particular question, but at becoming more proficient 
in grammar (285 c). Thus also the investigation of the 
nature of the statesman is only a lesson in dialectic 
(285 p, cf. Soph. 227 B). For the aim of life is to become 
better and wiser by means of science and justice (293 D). 
True and well-founded opinions on these things are divine, 
and to be seen only in divine souls (309 C: tH Tv Kardv 
Kal Sixal@y trépt Kai aya0@v Kat TOV TOUTOLS évavTiwy d’TwS 
ovoav arnOn Sdofay peta BeBaiwoews, oTrotav ev r>uyats 
éyylyvntat, Ociav pnt ev Satpovio yiryverOar yéver). Their 
greatest happiness is knowledge (272 B), and Plato invents 
here a new word never used before him to signify the trea- 
sury of human knowledge (272 C: cuvayupuos Ppovicews) 
as an ideal totality of individual endeavours, eternally in- 
creasing and transmitted from generation to generation. 
Such a conception he could not have had when he wrote 
the Socratic dialogues, and it is really difficult to under- 
stand how so many distinguished Platonists could believe 
in an early date of the Politicus. The use of dvvamis 
alone in this passage is a sufficient sign that the Politicus 
is written after the Repwblic, and many other signs are 
here available for the determination of this relation between 
the two dialogues. Here even the notion of desire is 
subtilised to such a height that it is applied to logical 
training (272 D: ras émvOuplas mepi Te eLoTNU@Y Kal THS 
T@Y NOywv xpetas). The chief instrument of this 
training is the same here as at an earlier stage, the power 


Illustra- 
tion from 
learning 
to read. 


Know- 
ledge of 
truth and 
justice 

is the 
ultimate 
aim. 
Compre- 
hensive- 
ness of 
knowledge 
as now 
conceived. 
Maturity 
of this 
concep- 
tion a 
mark of 
lateness. 


Simi- 
larity and 
difference 
again. 


Scientific 
construc- 
tion. 


Reality 
only 
attained 
by reason. 


True con- 
ceptions 
indepen- 
dent of 
sense 
and of 
language. 


Platonic 
absolu- 
tism, 


444 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


to ask and answer questions (286 A: 6é¢ pedeTav Noyor 
éxdoTou Suvatov eivat dovvar Kat de€acOa, cf. Phaedo 76 B, 
Crat. 426 A, &c.). 

The notion of similarity and difference retains the im- 
portance which it acquired in the Parmenides. The true 
dialectician is asked first to find out all the differences in 
a group of things, and then to discern all common pecu- 
liarities which unite them into various logical units (285 B). 
Each science is built up by a skilful selection of appropriate 
elements, and the right union of similar particulars into 
one, while useless observations and notions are rejected 
(308 C: maca ériotipn Tavtayod Ta ev woxOnpa eis Sivapuy 
aTroBddnel, Ta & éruTHdeva Kal ypnata EXaPev, 2x TovTeV be 
Kal ouolwy Kal avopolwy dvtwy, Tata eis 8v avta Evydyovca, 
pay tia Sivamw Kati ideav Snmovpye, cf. Crat. 488 4). 
For this an exact definition of each notion is required, 
based on reasoning not on sense perception (277 c: 
ypadhs 68 Kal cupmagns yxelpoupylas héEer Kal Noyw@ Ondodv 
mav Coov wadrov mpétret Tots Suvamévors Erecbar). No 
figure or drawing can correspond to the true substance of 
things, which is conceived only by pure reason (286 A: 
Tots 6 av psyioTtows ovolt Kal TluLwWTaTOLs OvK zoTLW EldwAOV 
ovdev pos Tovs avOpwrtrous eipyacuevon evapyas, ob SevyOéevtos 
THY ToD TuVOavopévou rpuxnV 6 BovreyEevos aToTANpHcaL, 
Tpos TOV alcOnceHv TWA TpocappoTTMD, ikavas TANPOCEL). 
This relation of truth to reason is here insisted upon 
(286 A: Ta yap dodpata, KaAdoTA byTAa Kal peyLoTA, NoYO 
fovoy, a\drAw OF ovdevl cadds Setxvutat, cf. Phaedo 65 D). 
The ideas must be understood independently of the use of 
language and without attaching any exceptional import- 
ance to words (261 E: Kav duadvAaEns To un ocrovddleww 
emi Tois ovdpact, TAOVTLMTEPOS ELS TO Yhpas avahavyncEl 
dpovncews, cf. Crat. 439 A). 

The greatest differences of opinion, which divide men 
into opposite camps, refer to moral convictions, and the 
philosopher appears here possessed with that Platonic 
absolutism which in a later age produced the Christian 


NEW THEORY OF SCIENCE: THE POLITICUS 445 


Inquisition. Such an intolerance is a distinct peculiarity 
of Plato’s later years, and distinguishes the Laws from 
the Republic, forming at the same time a link between 
the Politicus and the Laws. That ethical questions divide 
men more than purely theoretical discussion was assumed 
already in the Socratic dialogues, but here it is asserted 


with much greater strength : 


Euthyphro 7 c: epi trivos Se 
57 SvevexOévres Kal emt triva xpiow 
ov Suvdapevor adixéaOar exOpoi ye 
div ddAndous eiwev Kai dpyCoijeOa ; 

. oxomer ei trade eati Td Te 
Sikavov Kat TO Gdixov Kal Kadov kal 
aioxpov Kal ayaOor Kai Kakév. 


Crito 49D: oida.. 


tit TavTa Kat Soxet Kai do€e - 


a > / 
. OTL OALyots 
ols 
- a 4 ‘ e U , 
obv oUt Sédoxrat Kal ois pn, TovTOLS 
ovk €aTt Kowwn Bovdn, a\Aa avdyKn 
, > 4 - cos 
Toutous a\Anh@v karadpoveiv, dépav- 


Polit. 308 B: 7 Baoruen.. . 
Tovs py Ovvapevous Kovwveiv HOous 
> / ‘ , a EA 
avépelov kai a@dpovos dca Tre dAda 
€oTl TelvovTa mpos apeTHyv, GAN’ eis 
> , Qe, ‘ > / © \ 
aedrnra kai UBpw Kai adiciav bd 
kaxyjs Bia hicews drwbovpévous, 
Oavdrois Tre éxBdddeuc Kal uyais 
Kai Tails peyiotas Kodd(ovea ari- 
pias. Cf. Legg. 909 a: where 
those who disagree with the law- 
giver on religious matters are 
condemned to death. 


ras Ta GAAnAwy BovAevpara. 


Thus we see that Plato admitted the impossibility of 
proof in moral questions, otherwise he had no reason to 
propose the penalty of death for moral dissenters, and 
specially for atheism. He recognised here a power of 
individual nature, resisting the charm even of the highest 
philosophical rhetoric, which produces conviction only in 
purely theoretical matters of science, not in practical 
tendencies of life. 

The unity of universal science, already affirmed in the 
Sophist (257), is here taken for granted, and a division 
of the whole is attempted into theoretical and practical, 
or pure and applied science (258 E: tavrn rolwuy cuurdcas 
emioTHuas Siaipel, THY meV TPAaKTLKNY TpoceiTa@Vv, THY b& 
LOvov yYoOoTiKHY—#oTw ToL TADO’ ws mids ErLoTHuNs THs bdns 
elon Ovo). Pure science is again divided into critical and 
_epitactic, of which the former teaches what is, and the 
latter what ought to be (260 B: kpioe 52 Kat émutdte 
SuahépeTov GAAHrOW TOUTW TH yévEe; TULTAENS Ths yvwoTLKHs 
TO piv emlTAKTLKOV épos, TO Sz KpiTixov...). To the 


’ 


the source 
of later 
Christian 
Inquisi- 
tion. 


Division 
of uni- 
versal 
science 
into pure 
and 
applied, 
critical 
and 
epitactic. 


Even 
casual 
observa- 
tions here 
take a 
scientific 
form. 


Produc- 
tions 
classified. 


Rules of 
classifica- 
tion. 
Dicho- 
tomy 
preferred, 
but 
natural 
units 
always 

to be pre- 
served. 


446 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


epitactic sciences belong not only ethics and politics but 
also all practical pursuits which require helpers to execute 
the leader’s instructions, as, for instance, the art of archi- 
tecture. The further subdivisions are only playful, and 
cannot be taken seriously as a permanent contribution to 
the classification of sciences.”® Also other samples of 
classification given at some length in the Politicus, as, 
for instance, the classification of living beings (262-267), 
have no permanent value, and offer only an opportunity 
for the application of logical rules. For instance, Plato 
criticises the division of men into Hellenes and Barbarians 
(262 D), and compares it with a division of all numbers 
into ten thousand and other numbers than ten thousand. 
For the purpose of showing his independence of every 
prejudice he finds a similarity between swine and men, so 
much that both kinds of animals are distinguished only 
by the number of their feet, man being a gregarious tame 
hornless animal walking on earth by the power of two 
divided feet, while the swine use twice that number, thus 
appearing to have even an advantage over men (266 C). 
Such a fanciful definition is meant as a protest against 
the undeserved exaltation of vulgar mankind over other 
animals. Also the subdivision of productions and pos- 
sessions (279D) is mainly an example by which the rules 
of classification are illustrated. These rules were then 
first expressed by Plato, and appeared to his mind as very 
important logical laws. The subdivisions ought to be 
nearly equal to each other, and form natural units, not 
artificial parts (262A B: mw opixpov popioy By trpos peyada 
Kal TOA apaipapev, unde eldouvs ywpis’ GAA TO Epos dpa 
eldos éyét@ . . . Ova péown O2 dogadéoTepon Lévat TEuVOVTAS). 
Ideas, as here conceived, are to be found by classification 
of notions, or are ideal notions in the same meaning as 


259 The various classifications of the Politicus have been specially repre- 
sented by Lukas (Methode der Eintheilung), and also recently by C. Ritter 
(Platos Politicus: Bettrdége zu semer Erklérung, Programm des Gymna- 
siums zu Ellwangen 1896). 


NEW THEORY OF SCIENCE: THE POLITICUS 447 


the ideas were for Leibniz or Kant. Any attentive reader 
of the dialectical dialogues will at once observe that in 
this and similar passages eidos and ida are identical in 
meaning, and that they cannot mean transcendental 
beings, but natural kinds or ideas in the same sense as 
the term is used in modern philosophy, that is, perfect and 
universal notions of the human or any higher mind. A 
notion as first formed might be imperfect and subjective. 
As soon as by dialectical thought it attains perfection and 
objectivity, it deserves the name of an idea. Objectivity 
is not separate existence outside any mind, but uniform 
existence in all possible souls. 

The separate existence of ideas outside any mind is 
a poetical absurdity which could subsist only for a very 
limited time in the imagination of a thinker like Plato, 
and which has never been expressly affirmed in clear 
words by him—because the poetical metaphors of the 
Phaedrus, Republic, Phaedo and Symposium cannot be 
taken as literal expressions of abstract truth. They only 
supply an indication that Plato, when he first discovered 
the objectivity of notions, hesitated how to explain this 
objectivity and felt some inclination to a worship of ideas 
in anideal world, whence they could influence our im- 
perfect minds. This conception may have been developed 
by his pupils to such extremes that he undertook to 
demonstrate its absurdity in the Parmenides. Since that 
time he continues to use the terms ¢eidos and idéa, but no 
longer suggests the separate existence of abstractions, 
as this would contradict the increasing importance 
attached to the priority of soul in the universe. 

The ideas can only exist in a soul, as has been clearly 
said in the Sophist: they are notions, but not every notion 
is an idea. The idea is a notion of a perfect soul, free 
from error, and we must carefully distinguish among 
our own notions the ideas from other imperfect notions. 
This is the only consistent interpretation of later Platonic 
logic, and might be confirmed by a long enumeration of 


tivity at 
first mis- 
under- 
stood. 


The ex- 
aggeration 
of Plato’s 
followers 
may have 
unde- 
ceived 
him. 


The idea 
is a notion 
of a per- 
fect soul. 


C. Ritter’s 
examina- 
tion of 
passages 
in the 
Politicus 
shows that 
none of 
them 
imply the 
current 

‘ doctrine 
of ideas.’ 


This 
throws 
the 
burden of 
proof on 
those who 
maintain 
the older 


view. 


Logical 
division 
compared 
to the 
breaking 
up of a 


448 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


the passages in the six latest dialogues where eidos, idéa, 
yévos, “Epos, MOpLoV, Tuna, puats, Ovvauts Occur. Such a 
full enumeration, however, with a sufficient interpreta- 
tion of each passage, exceeds the limits of the present 
work. But C. Ritter in his very interesting programme 
on the Politicus ** enumerates the corresponding pas- 
sages of this dialogue and arrives at the conclusion that 
not one of these passages confirms the ‘herkémmliche, 
durch Aristoteles eingefuhrte Auffassung der platonischen 
Idee.’ This is also Campbell’s opinion in his Intro- 
ductions to the Sophist and Politicus. Here it will be 
sufficient to re-assert as the result of a careful reading of 
the six last works of Plato the conviction that the philo- 
sopher at this stage of his thought no longer admitted 
the conception of ideas as existing outside every soul. If 
anybody sustains the opposite view, he must always 
recur to the very improbable hypothesis that the second 
part of the Parmenides is a refutation of the objections 
raised in the first part, and to the serious blunder of 
interpreting wavteA@s dv in the Sophist (249 A) as ideas, 
possessing each of them soul, life, movement, and reason. 
Even this absurdity is insufficient to prove the separate 
existence of ideas in later Platonism: we challenge our 
readers and critics to point out in works written after 
the Parmenides a single passage supporting the assump- 
tion that ideas exist outside every soul, or contradicting 
our view that ideas are perfect notions of a perfect Being, 
natural kinds of particular things in agreement with the 
thoughts and aims of their Creator. 

All the rules given for the finding of ideas by classifi- 
cation become useless if we understand ‘ideas’ to mean 
anything else than this. One of these rules compares the 
division of an idea with the cutting into parts of a sacrificial 
animal, and recommends dichotomy as the best way of 
division, leaving open the recourse to a partition in three 
or more parts only when for some reason dichotomy is 
impossible (287 C: xara wédn Tolvuy avtas oiov iepstoy 


NEW THEORY OF SCIENCE: THE POLITICUS 449 


Svaipameba, zrretdn Siya addvvatovmev. Sei yap eis Tov eyyv- 
Tata 6 Tt mddoTa Téuvev aptOuov azi). In these divisions 
the parts should be always natural kinds (263 A: yévos 


da Kal pépos etpicxerv .. . 262 E: paddov Kar’ eidn Kal 


dixa . 285A: Kat’ eidn cvvetOicOar cKxoreiv Svatpov- 
pévouvs .. . 285B: Svahopas omocaumep év eideou xeivtas 
... . 262B: 70 pépos dpa eidos 2yétw, &c.). Constantly 


etoos and id¢a are used in the same meaning as yévos, 
coinciding with the conception of parts of a class of 
objects. This process of classification enables us to find 
the principles or elements of Being, unknown to those 
who cannot recognise the essential identity of things 
apparently different, but really belonging to the same 
class (278 c D). 

In order to attain a greater dialectical power, it is 
necessary to recur to exercise on familiar examples and 
to observe the analogies between such examples and the 
highest metaphysical problems (277D: yaderov wn trapa- 
Selywace xpwpmevovy ixavas éevdeixvucOar Te Tov peCover. 
KWOUVEvEL Yap NuoV ExacTos oloy dvap Eidws ATavTa TaVT’ 
av Tddw ooTep Urap ayvoev), Sometimes we believe 
ourselves to have seen things distinctly in dreams, while 
we are unable to describe them after we are awake. 
Thus untrained people often are unable to distinguish 
notions which on other occasions they had distinguished. 
We are best led to the knowledge of truth by the skilful 
selection of convenient examples which bring us gradually 
nearer to the aim of our inquiry. Plato applies this rule 
immediately by giving an example of the use of example 
(277D: mapadeiypatos Kal TO Tapaderywa avtTo S2dénKev 
. . . 2788). Children when they learn reading recognise 
a letter more easily in short than in long and difficult 
syllables. They will learn with the greatest facility if 
they are first shown short and easy syllables, as examples 
of the use of letters which recur in long and difficult 
syllables. Then they will without effort develope their 
faculty of recognising the same letter wherever they see 

GG 


sacrificial 
victim. 


Natural 
kinds in- 
differently 
spoken of 
as yevn 

or €t67. 
Deeper 
and fuller 
concep- 
tion of 
know- 
ledge. 


Use of the 
argument 
from 
example. 


Example 
of 
example. 


Com- 
plexity of 
nature 
and of 
Life 
compared 
with the 
variety 
of words 
and 
phrases. 


The 
weaver 
compared 
with the 
politician. 
Example 
of the 


physician. 


Oppor- 
tunism 
as in the 
Laws. 
Tllus- 
tration 
from an 


450 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


it, be it in a short or long syllable, as they will notice 
that each letter remains identical in all the combinations 
it enters into with other letters, so that it is sufficient to 
know well the small number of existing letters in order 
to be able to read the most difficult words and phrases 
in their innumerable combinations (277 E-278c). Though 
Plato had already in his earlier works made use of 
examples and recommended them (Phaedr. 262: wards 
Tos Reyouev, OK ZyovTEs iKava Trapadsiyywata, cf. Soph. 
218 D: wept twos TOV havrwy pETiovTes TELpabapEV Tapa- 
Sevywa avto Géc0a Tod petCovos), he had never given such 
direct attention to the theory of analogyas he has done here. 

The use of an example has the purpose of inducing a 
pupil to recognise an idea in a less familiar application, 
by comparing it with a familar instance of the same idea 
(278 ©: TodTO .. ikav@s ovverndapev, OTL Tapadelypatos 
y’ gotl TOTE yévEeots, OTOTAaY Oy TavTOV ev ETépw SLEoTTac- 
bev o€alopevov opOas Kai ovvayOev rept EKaTEpoy ws 
cuvadw piav adrnOn So€av amored\y). It is very 
characteristic that this practice 1s here represented as 
leading in the first place to true opinion, not to absolute 
knowledge, which cannot rest on mere analogy. The 
use of examples in the Politicus is very frequent: thus 
for instance the long explanation of the art of weaving is 
an example which is given only for the purpose of ex- 
plaining the political art (287 B). The politician is 
also compared to a physician who prescribes drugs 
according to the state of the patient and changes them 
when he finds it convenient. Thus also the true poli- 
tician will change the laws if new experience requires it 
(295 c-296 a. Cf. Legg. 769 D). 

The political opportunism here proposed agrees well 
with the Laws, and is very different from the absolutism 
of the Republic, and for this reason alone it would be 
impossible to admit that the Republic could have been 
written between the Politicus and Laws, as Zeller sup- 
poses. A very remarkable example is given to illustrate 


NEW THEORY OF SCIENCE: THE POLITICUS 451 


the incompetence of the majority in political affairs. 
Supposing that the rules of medicine and navigation were 
entrusted not to physicians and seamen, but to a majority 
of citizens, the consequences of this arrangement. would 
certainly be disastrous for all. Not less disastrous are 
the consequences of the political power of a blind majority 
(298-299, 300 E: @poroynpévov tiv Keirar pndev rHOos 
Ld Hvtwvoov Suvatov sivas AaBeiy Téxvyv). 

In the Poltticus even more than in the Sophist, the idea 
of method acquires a prevailing power over the mind of 
Plato. At every step reflections on thought arise, thus 
giving to everything a logical aspect, and showing a 
tendency to an impartial consideration of all the condi- 
tions of each branch of knowledge. For instance we find 
here a digression on the difference between absolute 
and relative measure (283 E: duttas.. ovolas Kal Kpices 
Too peyddou Kal TOO oplKpod Oetéoy . . . THY pmaev Tpos 
adAAnra...THV Oo avd pos TO wéTpLov). We judge about quan- 
tities by comparing them either with each other or with 
an absolute standard of what ought to be, in thought or 
action (283 £). The absolute standard named 70 pértpiov 
is the principle of every art and also of politics and 
morality (284 a). This absolute standard (284 E: pos 
TO pétplov Kal TO TpéTOV Kal TOV KaLpoY Kal TO gov Kal TavO” 
Oméca gis TO pécov atwxicOn tav zoxatwr) is equally 
distant from two extremes and is here indicated as an 
important new discovery (284 D: dejoe Tod viv AexOévTOS 
Tpos THY Tepl avTO TaKpiBes amodeaEw .. . HyNTéov opolws 
Tas téyvas Tdoas eivat Kai weifov Te aya Kai eaTTov 
petpsicbar pa mpos GAAMAA povoy GAAA Kal Tpos THY TOD 
fetplov yéveowv). Only those who are not accustomed to 
dialectical distinction are unable to see the difference 
between absolute and relative measure (285 A). This 
theory, later applied by Aristotle in his Ethics, is here re- 
peated several times with great insistence, and is evidently 
felt to be expressed for the first time (285 c: SudAaTTwpev 
S povor, OTe S00 yévn eevontar THs petpntixns). It corre- 


ag 2 


imagined 
rule 

of the 
majority 
in medi- 
cine and 
naviga- 
tion. 


Increasing 
preva- 
lence of 
the idea of 
method. 
Measure, 
absolute 
and rela- 
tive: 7d 


Mer ploy. 


To be 
compared 
with Aris- 
totle’s 


MeaoTNS. 


Causes 
and con- 
ditions. 


altia and 


tvvairia, 


Final and 
efficient 
causes. 


452 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 

sponds very well to the new conception of ideas and could 
not easily apply to the primitive transcendental ideas, 
which were out of relation with particular extremes. 


Another logical distinction, which had been already 
prepared in the Phaedo, is here developed as it were 
casually in the progress of the inquiry : 


Phaedo 99 A: airta Ta Tovadra 
(the physical conditions) kadeiv 
Aiav Gromov + et dé Tis éyou OTe 
avev Tov Ta ToLavra exe, Kal 
> ~ ‘ ~ ‘ oe a» wy 
doTa Kal vevpa Kat doa adda exo, 

> a ey) er - \ , Jt 
ovk dv olos T’ AV Trotety Ta Oo€avTa 
pot, GAnOn av deéyou @s pevroe bua 
TavTa TOW a TOW Kal TavTa YO 
mpatTr@v, GAN’ ov tH Tov BedTicToU 

ee \ \ XY He , x 
aipeoet, ToAA Kai pakpa padupia ay 
ein TOU Adyov. B: TO yap pr duedé- 

cr ? > ef ei , , 
oOa oiov Tr etvae Ore GAXO pev Ti 
> ‘ 4 Lod aa AY 
€oTL TO alrioy T@ OvTL, GAO Oé 
Ses a = \ ” > By 
exelvo Gvev OU TO AlTLOV OUK ay 


Polit. 281 c: the production of 
the weaver’s tools is designated 
ouvvairia of the art of weaving. 
This term has been used only 
once before, according to Ast, in 
Gorg. 519 B: ovk airiwy bvrev Tov 
kak@v ad’ icas cuvatiov. This 
use of the word is similar to that 
in Aeschylos and Isocrates. A 
more technical use of the same 
term is found Polit. 281 p: dvo 
Téxvas ovoas rept Tavra Ta Spapeva, 

THY pev THS yeverews oUcay 
Evvairov, thy & avryy airiay . 


) ” mw A , , o wy” / 
ToT eln alttov: 00n por daivovraa doa... Opyava Tapackevdfovcww 
- c ‘ e > , ‘ ’ A ‘ 
Wnrtaporvres of mohAot Borep ev ravtas pev Evvairious, Tas de 
, > / > y , > A A aA > ’ 
okorel, GAAoTpi@ GvopaTe mpoTXp®- av’TO TO mpaypa amepyaCopevas 
eo) > A f 
pevol, @S aiTloy avTO mpoga- aitias... 


yopevey. ef. 287 B: Evvaitioy Kai rov 
airlov. 

287 D: doa yap opikpor 7) péya 
Tu Onpuovpyovou Kara modu Opyavoy, Oeréov admdaas TavTas ws ovcas 
cuvaitious. avevyapTovTa@Y ovK ay Tore yévoito Tous OvVSE TroduTiKN, 
rovtov 8’ ad Baaidikns épyov téxyns ovdev trou Oncopmer. 

Cf. Tim. 46 bD: do0€a¢erar td tév mreloT@v ov Evvairia add’ airia 
civac Tov tavrev (namely material causes as compared with final 
causes). In the same meaning 76D: ro... d€ppa, Tots wey Evvairious 
rovtows Onpuoupynbev, tH Se aitwwrary Svavoia Tay reita eoopevwv evexa 


elpyacpevov. 

We see that the distinction between final and efficient 
cause, which remained the same from the Phaedo to the 
Timaeus, acquired its proper terminology only in the 
Politicus. What in the Phaedo is called ‘ éxetvo avev ob 
TO altiov ovK av ToT en altuov’ becomes in the Politicus 
Evvaituov and is again designated by this term in the 


Timaeus. The special application of the term in the 


NEW THEORY OF SCIENCE: THE POLITICUS 493 


Politicus changes nothing in its general meaning, and 
the word évvairioy is a peculiarity of later style, limited 
to Politicus, Timaeus, Laws in its technical use, while it 
is used only once in an earlier dialogue in the earlier 
meaning, taken from tragic poetry. It will be difficult for 
the believers in the Megaric period to explain why Plato 
should use in the Phaedo a lengthy circumlocution if he 
had already introduced a short and convenient term 
with the same meaning. For us it is quite clear that 
Evvaitiov as a metaphysical term was not yet in Platonic 
use when he wrote the Phaedo, as can be seen by the 
comparison of the above passages. Another interesting 
reference to earlier theories is here found in the familiar 
mention of the soul as the first principle of movement, 
which could scarcely be understood in the form in which 
it occurs here, if the demonstration of the Phaedrus were 
not presupposed (269 E: avto 62 éavTo otpépery ae oyeddov 
ovdevi Suvatoy TANV TO TOV KlvoULevaY ad TdaVvTwD 
nryounévw). In connection with the cyclic revolutions of 
the heaven Plato speaks here again of immense periods 
of time, which he never had mentioned nor imagined 
before the Republic. The universe is supposed to be 
subject to periodical revolutions which last millions of 
years * (270 A: advatadw mopeverBat Todas TEpLOdwY 
pupidoas). 

If we look at the logical character of the Politicus 
and at the biting humour displayed in this dialogue as 
in few other works of Plato, it appears incredible that 
critics were found who doubted the authenticity of this 
dialogue. What Socher (1820) and Suckow (1855) said 
in favour of such doubts has been repeatedly refuted by 
Grote, Campbell and Jowett. But Schaarschmidt’s plea 
for the spuriousness of the Politicus seems not yet to 

200 The meaning of zepiodos is not quite certain; Campbell translates 
‘days,’ but in view of the similar passages of Theaetetus and Phaedrus 
and of the astronomical studies which appear to have occupied Plato in his 


later years, it is quite as probable that he meant years, each year being the 
smallest period in which the heaven returns to the same relative position. 


» ‘ 


Fresh 
proof 
of the 
priority 
of the 
Phaedo. 


Demon- 
stration 
of the 
Phaedrus 
also pre- 
supposed. 
Ilimit- 
able 
periods 

of time. 


Biting 
humour 
of the 
Politicus. 


Objections 
of Schaar- 
schmidt 


to the 
authen- 
ticity 

of this 
dialogue 
easily 
refuted. 


454 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


have been specially considered, though nearly all com- 
petent authorities recognise the authenticity of. this 
dialogue as established beyond every doubt. It may not 
be superfluous to consider these arguments, as Schaar- 
schmidt, living still, has not found it necessary to revoke 
them in the course of thirty years, and as he has followers 
among quite recent historians of philosophy.” Schaar- 
schmidt thinks that such tedious divisions of notions as 
are found in the Politicus are unworthy of Plato. If we 
remember that divisions of notions have been recom- 
mended in the Phaedrus, and very much used in the 
Republic, there is no reason whatever to doubt that Plato 
at a later period of his literary activity gave a special 
attention to this logical exercise. What Schaarschmidt 
says about the use of example and analogy as contrary to 
Plato’s custom is equally contradicted by the Phaedrus 
(262c D), where examples are as strongly recommended 
as in the Politicus. The myth of the Politicus, like the 
myth of the Phaedrus, is used to help the progress of 
the philosophical argument, and Schaarschmidt has no 
right on this account to doubt the authenticity of the 
Politicus if he admits, as he does, the authenticity of the 
Phaedrus. The difference between the myth in the 
Politicus (271 D-2748) and a short mention of the same 
legend in the Laws (713 cp#8) has further excited 
Schaarschmidt’s suspicion. But Plato never attempted 
a painful identity of myths, and anybody can see how 
freely his imagination worked in the different versions of 
the eschatological myths. 

Schaarschmidt contradicts himself, because he holds 

61 W. Windelband, Geschichte der alten Philosophie, 2° Aufl. Miinchen 
1894, p. 114, says: ‘es ist nicht wahrscheinlich, dass der Philosoph neben 
der Republik denselben Gegenstand in einem andern Werke behandelt 
heben sollte, zumal da das letztere in wichtigen Punkten erheblich andere 
Lehren aufstellt.” In France Huit (‘ Etudes sur le politique attribué a 
Platon,’ in Séances et travaux de l Académie des sciences morales et poli- 
tiques, vol. 128, p. 569; vol. 129, p. 169, Paris 1887) popularised Schaar- 


schmidt’s views. On the relation between Rep. and Polit. see Nusser’s 
article, in Philologus for 1894, vol. liii. pp. 13-37. 


NEW THEORY OF SCIENCE: THE POLITICUS 455 


every difference between two dialogues to be a reason for 
suspicion, while on the other hand every similarity also 
appears to him as an indication of the work of an imitator. 
Thus he wonders why in the Poltticus an ideal ruler is 
placed above the laws. He forgets that here, as in the 
Laws, the ideal is already admitted to be almost impossible 
to realise, and the idea of a second best state based on fixed 
laws, here introduced (297 8), is later developed in the 
Laws. Onthe other side, the view of a state without fixed 
laws is already prepared in the Republic (425D: ov« a&ov 
avepace Kadois kayabots éruratrew), as also the comparison 
of politics and medicine (Rep. 426 A, cf. Polit. 298 a—300 D). 
The usefulness of laws is fully recognised in the Politicus 
in the case when a perfect ruler cannot be found. 
Ordinary governments do best to keep the law (801 4). 
The same doctrine occurs in the Laws, only there it is 
recognised as impossible that an ideal ruler should be 
born on this imperfect earth, so that the laws acquire an 
increased importance, though the notion of an ideal state 
is not altogether abandoned, except for transient practical 
reasons (Legg. 739D: 1) pév tovavTn ods (as proposed in 
the Republic), eire mov Ooi 7 matdes Oca avtiv otxodor 
Mrslous sos, ovTw Sialavtes evdpawomevor KaTo.xovar, Cf. 
746.48). In the Politicus as in the Laws (874: vouous 
avOpwros avayKaiov tiOecOar Kal Shv Kata vopous, 7) wndéev 
Siadépew TOY TavtTn aypiwrdtwv Onpiwv) the fixed rules 
become necessary only in consequence of human ignorance 
and imperfection. This conviction led Plato equally in 
the Politicus as in the Laws (684Bc) to recommend 
coercion in order to maintain the fixed legislation. 

In political theories it becomes especially evident that 
the Politicus is intermediate between Republic and Laws, 
so that there is no reason to raise any suspicion from 
that standpoint against the authenticity of our dialogue. 
Schaarschmidt wonders why the ideal ruler in the Polt- 
ticus is not a philosopher as in the Republic, and thinks 
that this ideal ruler has no other aim than to satisfy the 


Relation 
to the 
Laws. 


Supposed 
silence 

of Aris- 
totle. 


Denied by 
Ueberweg, 


and 
shown to 
be unten- 
able by 
Bonitz. 


456 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


personal needs and aspirations of the governed. This by 
no means agrees with what we really read in the Politicus. 
Politics is here counted among the theoretical sciences 
(259 D) opposed to the practical arts, and the politician’s 
aim is to produce divine and true opinions about justice in 
his subjects (809 co, cf.293p). It is very natural that only 
opinions are to be expectéd in the blind majority of men. 
Knowledge is also in the Republic a privilege of the rulers. 

Schaarschmidt’s inferences from the silence of Aris- 
totle about the differences between the Poleticus and 
Laws are sufficiently refuted if we consider the acci- 
dental nature of all allusions to Platonic dialogues in 
the works of Aristotle. There was no necessity for 
him expressly to quote the Politicus, and we must not 
apply our standard of literary erudition to Aristotle. 
His works have come to us in a state which does not 
guarantee that we possess all the quotations he might 
have made from Plato’s works. And the quotations 
preserved could in most cases be omitted without any 
prejudice to the argument of the passages where they 
occur. ‘The Politicus is not, as its title might suggest, a 
political treatise, and therefore there was no opportunity 
to quote it in Aristotle's Politics, where the Republic 
and Laws are dealt with. Here we find more logical 
than political theories, and the definition of the states- 
man or politician is only a pretext for many digressions 
on the method of scientific investigation generally, as can 
be seen from the above exposition. Ueberweg has suffi- 
ciently proved that the Sophist and Politicus were known 
to Aristotle, and although he afterwards believed that 
some pupil of Plato might have written these dialogues, 
the references he collected show clearly that Aristotle 
knew them. It is difficult to admit that Aristotle would 
have named a pupil of Plato an ‘earlier writer.’ This, as 
the name is not specified, refers to Plato with greater 
probability than to anybody else. Bonitz quotes thirteen 
references to the Politicus of Plato in the works of 


NEW THEORY OF SCIENCE: THE POLITICUS 457 


Aristotle (Index Aristotelicus, p. 598). The feeblest of 
all Schaarschmidt’s arguments against the authenticity of 
the Politicus is based on a misconception of Plato’s style. 
He did not know stylistic peculiarities as they are known 
now, and was therefore entirely unaware of the fact that 
the Politicus is as near in style to the Laws as the 
Timaeus, and this despite the great difference of contents. 

After Schaarschmidt no really new argument against 
the authenticity of the Politicus has been advanced, for 
what Huit says on the subject demonstrates only the 
strange ignorance of this author. He is, for instance, 
astonished that the title is not a proper name, as if he had 
never heard of the Banquet, Republic, Laws, which he 
still holds to be authentic. He complains of the absence 
of well-characterised persons, which is common to the 
Politicus with all later works. He objects to the person 
of the younger Socrates as unplatonic, and he does not 
notice that the individual characterisation of all persons 
in later dialogues is equally deficient. He wonders why 
the Politicus has been so little quoted by later authors, 
and asserts that only Proclus, Plotinus, Plutarch, Theo- 
doretus, and Simplicius quoted it, while Fischer in his 
edition (1774) without attempting completeness of enu- 
meration gives a list of a dozen classical authors who had 
read this dialogue. Such tests are generally of little 
value, because most of these quotations are accidental. 
But it is quite unjustifiable to ask for better authorities 
than Proclus and Plotinus when corroborating Aristotle 
as to the authenticity of a Platonic dialogue. Huit also 
professes indignation over the fact that in the Politicus 
the Sophist is quoted, and he seems to be unaware that 
in the Timaeus and Laws the Republic is clearly referred 
to, and in the Critias the Timaeus. 

The only argument of Huit which might claim some 
importance is based on a misinterpretation of texts. He 
thinks that Plato in this dialogue does not distinguish d0&a 
from ériotiun. If this were true, we should have reason 


Huit’s 
arguments 
still 
feebler. 


Import- 
ance of the 
Philebus. 


Schaar- 
schmidt’s 
doubts 
refuted 
by Huit. 


458 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


to consider it seriously, because the above distinction is 
fundamental in Platonic philosophy. But really, as has 
been shown above, Plato speaks of d0£ac as mere opinions, 
not as knowledge, as it cannot be expected from all 
common citizens that they should rise to the level of 
knowledge, and the ideal ruler must be satisfied if he is 
able to produce in their minds true opinions. 

All these arguments of Schaarschmidt and Huit prove 
nothing, and the authenticity of the Politicus is established 
beyond reasonable doubt by the similarity of its style to 
the latest works of Plato. Until somebody can show in 
a work written by another author two hundred and forty 
stylistic peculiarities recurring in the Laws, we must 
accept the Polvticus as authentic. It is a work of rare 
literary and logical excellence, and could not easily be 
written by anybody else than the author of the Phaedrus. 

As to the date of the Poltticus, it is certain that this 
dialogue must have been written after the Sophist. This, 
taken together with the order of the preceding works, 
gives to the Politicus a place among the productions of 
Plato’s old age, in so far as only the Timaeus, Critias, and 
Laws are distinctly later. It remains difficult to decide 
whether the Philebus followed or preceded the Politicus. 
Hirzel *” has already clearly demonstrated that the Poli- 
ticus is very nearly related to the Laws. 


Ill. The Philebus. 


This dialogue is one of the most important writings 
not only of Plato but of ancient philosophy in general. 
Yet it has not escaped unjustifiable suspicions as to its 
authenticity. Schaarschmidt’s attempts in this respect 
have been already refuted by Tocco, and even his faithful 
follower Huit feels obliged to dissent in this point from 
his master. It is delightful to read this refutation of 
Schaarschmidt by Huit (vol. u. pp. 171-181), because 


*? Hirzel, ‘ Zu Platons Politicus,’ in vol. vii. p. 127 of Hermes for 1874. 


NEW THEORY OF SCIENCE: THE PHILEBUS 459 


nearly every word of it applies equally to the Sophist and 
Politicus, while Huit is very careful to produce all argu- 
ments of Schaarschmidt as his own when he triumphantly 
asserts the spuriousness of the Parmenides, Sophist, 
and Politicus. We have limited our previous discussion 
on authenticity to the Politicus, because the authenticity 
of the Politicus implies necessarily the authenticity of the 
Sophist and also of the Parmenides. Here it may not be 
superfluous to say something about a more recent attempt, 
undertaken by F. Horn,” to strike the Philebus out of the 
list of Plato’s writings. It is significant that Horn does not 
deny Aristotle’s testimony in favour of the Platonic origin of 
the Philebus. Hence he is obliged to recur to the strange 
supposition that Aristotle could be mistaken in such a 
question as the authenticity of a Platonic dialogue, whereby 
the whole of Ueberweg’s investigation on the authenticity 
of Platonic dialogues is brought into question. Not on 
this point only Horn seems to be unaware of the method 
which alone can lead to valid conclusions in such matters. 
He reasons continually thus: some arguments of the 
Philebus do not agree with enunciations on the same 


68 A curious proof of the incomparable ingenuousness of that French 
author, whom, by a regrettable mistake, the Académie des sciences morales 
crowned, is given by the fact that in his whole argument on the spuriousness 
of the Parmenides, Sophist, and Politicus (pp. 269-311, vol. ii. of La vie 
et Veuvre de Platon) he quotes Schaarschmidt only once, and this in a 
note (p. 309) in which he disagrees with him as to the pretended stoic 
origin of the Sophist. This cautious silence about an author from whom 
nearly all arguments of the text are taken, and who, in the chapter on the 
Philebus, is often quoted with a humorous contempt, is an interesting 
sample of apparent erudition paired with real ignorance of the subject, dis- 
played for the competent reader at every step, despite all the numerous 
quotations. Thus Campbell is also quoted in irrelevant matters, and 
appears to the candid reader either as an authority for the spuriousness of 
the Sophist (vol. ii. pp. 282, 286), or even further from the truth, as a mere 
critic, populariser or supporter of the views of Dittenberger! (p. 341). 

64 BF. Horn, Platonstudien, Wien 1893; see against this: Dr. Apelt, 
‘Die neueste Athetese des Philebos,’ in Archiv fiir Geschichte der Philo- 
sophie, vol. ix. pp. 1-23, Berlin 1895, and again the reply of Horn: ‘ Zur 
Philebosfrage’ in Archiv fiir Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. ix. pp. 
271-297, Berlin 1896. 


Objections 
of Horn, 
in spite 

of Aris- 
totle’s 
testimony. 
Plato’s 
later views 
notalways 
consistent 
with 
earlier 
state- 
ments. 


Philebus, 
perhaps 
twenty 
years 
later than 
Republic. 


A master- 
piece of 
Plato’s 
old age. 


Progress 
of 
thought. 


460 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


subject in the Republic, therefore the Philebus cannot 
have been written by Plato. 

We have seen in the above exposition of Plato’s 
logical theories that even such a thinker as Plato could 
not be in every particular free from errors, which he 
corrected later. In the course of his long activity he 
changed his opinion on several important points, which 
become specially manifest to anybody who cares to 
compare the Republic with the Laws. Also the Philebus 
is according to stylistic observations very distant from 
the Repuwblic—probably about twenty years later. This 
sufficiently accounts for some divergencies. Horn’s 
general view of the Philebus is extremely subjective. For 
him this interesting dialogue is ‘ei mit vollig unzuliang- 
lichen Mitteln unternommener und hochst schiilerhaft 
gerathener Versuch einer Vermittlung zwischen den 
ethischen Hauptrichtungen der Zeit.’ Other scholars, 
as, for instance, G. Schneider, who devoted very special 
attention to the Philebus,™ are of an entirely different 
Opinion and see in the Philebus a masterpiece of Plato’s 
old age. 

The differences between the Philebus and Republic 
are all of such a character that they are perfectly well 
explained by the length of time and the progress of 
thought from the earlier to the later dialogue. Such 
differences ought never to be esteemed as an argument 
against the authenticity of any work of Plato, because 


65 G. Schneider, Die Platonische Metaphysik, auf Grund der in Phile- 
bus gegebenen Principien im ihren wesentlichsten Ziigen dargestellt, Leipzig 
1884 ; also: ‘ Die Ideenlehre in Platos Philebus’ in Philosophische Monats- 
hefte, vol. x. p. 193, 1874: ‘Das Princip des Masses in der Platonischen 
Philosophie,’ Verhandlungen der 33 Philologenversammlung, Gera 1878 ; 
Das materiale Princip der Platonischen Metaphysik, Gera 1872. 

26 The relation of the Philebus to the Republic has been specially 
investigated by F. Schmitt (Die Verschiedenheit der Ideenlehre m Platos 
Republik und Philebus, Giessen 1891) and Siebeck (‘ Platon als Kritiker 
aristotelischer Ansichten: II. Der Philebus,’ in Zeitschrift fiir Philosophie 
und philosophische Kritik, vol. 107, pp. 161-176, Leipzig 1896). They both 
agree as to the later date of Philebus; see also note 249. 


NEW THEORY OF SCIENCE: THE PHILEBUS 461 


in this way we might find suspicious almost every- 
thing Plato has written. The method which Horn uses 
consists in exaggerating every difference up to the point 
at which it appears to be an irreconcilable contradiction ; 
on the other hand, if one dialogue agrees in some parti- 
cular with another, he takes it as a sign that the author 
imitated Plato; finally if some opinion measured by the 
standard of our own time appears wrong, he finds herein 
an opportunity for representing it as unworthy of Plato. 
Such reasonings are built on three wrong suppositions : 
1, that Plato never erred ; 2, that he never recognised his 
errors nor changed his opinion ; 3, that he never repeated 
what he said in another work. Any reader of Plato can 
easily see in hundreds of instances that all these three 
suppositions are inadmissible, and, we may add, any 
philosopher will recognise them to be psychologically 
impossible. But they are the constant basis of nearly 
everything that has been said against the authenticity of 
the dialectical dialogues. 

The only argument of Horn which at all deserves our 
attention is advanced without evidence and rests on no 
quotation from the Philebus. Horn finds in the Philebus 
‘Geringschiitzung der Dialektik’ (Zur Philebosfrage, p. 
292). The high esteem of dialectic is such a permanent 
Platonic peculiarity that any work in which dialectic is 
despised must excite serious doubts against its Platonic 
origin. But nothing of that sort occurs in the Philebus. 
It is strange and unjustifiable that Horn was not more 
explicit on that point, and that he did not quote the 
passages from which he has drawn his inference. It is 
evident that he misunderstands Plato and takes for irony 
what is either solemnity of tone or Platonic humour. 
It does not follow that Plato despised dialectic, when he 
required that the philosopher should also have other know- 
ledge. This is not even a difference between Philebus and 
Republic, because there also dialectic was only the crown 
of all sciences, and did not render them superfluous. 


Horn’s 
view is 
based on 
mistaken 
presump- 
tions. 


He 
strangely 
speaks 

of a 
disparage- 
ment of 
dialectic 
in the 
Philebus. 


Union of 
practical 
with 
specula- 
tive know- 
ledge. 


But 
reason 
must be 
supreme. 


462 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


There is a progress in the dialectical dialogues as com- 
pared with the Republic only in the increasing appreciation 
of concrete facts and details, which less attracted his 
attention in the period of self-existing ideas. 

Here we meet the same enthusiasm for the power of 
reason as in the Sophist and Politicws. He who has elected 
the life of a thinker 1s more divine than other men and re- 
mains, hike a god, free from exuberant pleasures, as well 
as from the sorrow which usually follows such pleasures 
(83 AB: TO TOV TOD ppovetv EXopév@ Blov cic ws TovTOV TOV 
TpoTov ovodzev atroKwduEL Chv . . . Tov ToD wn yalpewy pnde 
Aurreta Oat . . . Kat lows ovdsv AToTOY & TdavyT@VY TaV BlwY 
gol OevoTaTos . . . oUKOUY EiKOS YE OUTE yalpELW TOUS Devs 
ovte TO évavtiov). The satisfaction given by knowledge is 
the purest pleasure in human life, free from the pain which 
mostly accompanies physiological pleasures (52 AB: paén- 
pater wAnpwlsiow éeav VoTepoy atoBoral Sia THS ANOns 
yiyvortar . . . xwpis NUTS . ~~ AION yiyveTac ExdoToTE). 
These pleasures of science are the privilege of a very small 
circle of men (52B: tas Tav waOnwatwy joovas . . . pyTEov 

. . ovdaLas TOV TOAKOY avOpwTTaAY adda THY ohodpa 
oriywv). Kvery manifestation of intellectual life is better 
than sensual gratification for all those who are able to 
partake of it (11 B: To dpovety cai TO vosiv Kai TO wEenvqoPar 
Kal Ta ToUT@y av Evyyevh, doEav te opOnv Kai adnOsis doy- 
LoOmOUs, THS YE NOovHAsS apev@ Kal AOw yiyverOar Etutracw, 
doaTep avTa@y Suvata petadaBetr). 

All sages are agreed that reason reigns on earth and 
in heaven (28¢C: wavtes Evxpdwvotow oi codoi, éavtovs 
OVTMS GEuUVUVOVTES, WS VovS eoTi PBactELS iuiy ovpavod 
Te Kal ynst Kat laws ed Réeyovor). This rule of reason 
becomes manifest by the finality appearing in the magni- 
ficence of the universe (28 D: ta &iyravta nal tode TO 
KaXovpevoy GrAov ... vouv Kal dpovnoiv twa Oavpacthny 
cuvtattovaeay dtaxuBEepvav .. . hava. Kal Ths bews TOD 
Kogpov Kal HAlov Kab cedAnvns Kal actépwv Kal Tdons THs 
mepipopas d&ov). The ultimate goal of this finality is a 


NEW THEORY OF SCIENCE: THE PHILEBUS 463 


self-sufficing aim, the Good (54¢: To pny ob svexa TO 
&vexd Tov yuyvopevoy asi yiyvout’ av, év TH Tot ayabod poipa 
éxeivo goTe . .. Cf. 600). This is the union of beauty, 
measure, and truth (654). We see here a development of 
what had been said in the Republic on the idea of Good. 
There it was one and the highest idea, here the union of 
three ideas, one of which, the ideal measure (Evpperpia = 
petptorns 64 £), has been introduced only in the Politicus 
(uétptov Polit. 2838, Phileb. 66 A corresponds to petpuotns 
which in that sense occurs besides Philebus 64 8, 65 B only 
in the Laws 701 8, 7368, while in Rep. 560 D it has another 
meaning). 

Truth is the aim of each inquiry, and it must be 
found in agreement among investigators (14 8), not in 
their ambition to be each of them right against all others. 
This ambition is peculiar to youth, and is here described 
with incomparable humour and a certain benevolence 
which denotes an experienced teacher, accustomed to see 
many useless discussions among his pupils (15D: zo7m 7d 
TowovTOY TOV NOywv avToV aBdvaTov Ti Kal ayypwv TaBos ev 
nuiv’ o O& TP@Tov avToU yevodpEvos EKdOTOTE TOV VéwV, HabEls 
as Twa copias eipnxws Onoaupov, bd’ jSovijs évOoverd TE Kai 
TdvTa KWel NOyor dowEvos .. . Eis aTroplav avTOY peév TPATOV 
Kal padiota KataBaddrwv, SevTEpoy 8 asl Tov eéyomevov . . .). 
True wisdom consists in defining ideas and their relations, 
until we obtain a continuous system of notions from the 
highest ‘one’ down to the ‘many’ through measured 
degrees, subdividing each idea into the smallest number in 
order to give the detailed specification of each subdivision 
of the one (16D: deiv ody tas TovTwy obtw SiaKxexoopn- 
pevov az ulav ideav TEept Tavtos éxactoTe Ozpéevous CnTEiv" 
eUpnoeLy yap évodaar’ éay ody wseTaduBapev, pwsTa pia 
dvo, «i mas eict, sKoTetv, ef SE wy, TpEels 7) Twa GAXov 
apiOuov, Kal t@v ev éxelvwy ExacToy Tdd\W wcavTos, 
MéxpiT@ep av TO Kat apxas Ev wy 6te sv Kal Todd 
Kai dmeipa éote povoy ion Tis, aAdAa Kal oTdca). This 
system of ideas is to be found in nature, as everything 


The final 
aim of 
Reason is 
the union 
of beauty, 
measure, 
truth, 
wherein 
dwells the 
Good. 


Humorous 
descrip- 
tion of 
juvenile 
logic. 


A more 
complex 
ideal of 
definition. 


Natural 
kinds 
must be 
numbered 
and co- 
ordinated. 


Inter- 
mediate 
kinds: 
‘middle 
terms.’ 


Prepara- 
tion for 
the theory 
of syllo- 
gism. 


Difficulty 
of the 
true 
method. 


464 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


has been arranged by reason, and our ideas are copies of 
the world’s finality, existing in the maker’s mind. 

There is no longer any trace of an existence of ideas 
apart from souls and from particular things. Hach idea is 
the result of the impression which the natural unity of a 
eroup of particulars produces in an observing soul. The 
faculty of thinking ideas is here a divine gift (16c: Oeav 
eis avOpwtrovs docs) and human imperfection consists in 
errors as to the number of the subdivisions which connect 
the one with the infinite many (16D: tiv 62 Tod arreipou 
idgav Tpos TO TAHOos wn Tpoodhéperv, Tpiv av Tis TOV apLOwov 
avtTov Tavta KaTion Tov meTAaEV TOU aTrEipoU TE Kal TOU éVvOS). 
Only gods herein attain perfection (16 E : of wév ody Geol 
oUTws nuiy Tapédocay oKoTEty Kai wavOavely Kal diddaKELW 
aAdndovs), while even the wisest among men are liable to 
pass too rapidly or too slowly from the one to the infinity 
of particulars, through the ignorance of convenient middle 
terms (17 A: of 5 viv TOV avOpaeTrav codoi ev pév, OTTwS av 
TUYwOL, TA TONGA OaTTOV Kai BpadvTEepoy ToLodaL Tod SéorTOS, 
peta Oe TO év atretpa evOUs' Ta OF wéaa avTovs eKpevyet, 
ois Svakeywplotal TO Te SuadEKTLKOS TAALY Kal TO épLOTLKMS 
Huds Toveicbat Tpos AAAoUS TOs AGyous). 

We see here for the first time the term péoov used in its 
technical meaning as later accepted by Aristotle in his 
theory of syllogism. If we take into consideration that it 
would be entirely against Plato’s view of literary compo- 
sition to enumerate all possible figures of syllogism in a 
dialogue, as is done in Aristotle’s treatise, it becomes quite 
possible and even probable that Aristotle’s theory of syl- 
logism was more than prepared by Plato. This point 
must remain unsettled so long as we have no independent 
testimonies of contemporaries. At all events, we see in 
the Philebus the same striving as in the preceding dia- 
logues towards an universal system of sciences, and we 
are warned that the classification of ideas, being the most 
beautiful method and leading to all discoveries which have 
ever been made, is exceedingly difficult and full of per- 


NEW THEORY OF SCIENCE: THE PHILEBUS 465 


plexities (168). Therefore a complete realisation of the 
proposed method, and the consequent reduction of all ideas 
to their highest aim, appears here as a tale heard in a 
sort of dream (20B: Adyar moTé Twwv Taddat aKovoas dvap 
}) Kal éypnyop@s viv evvo® TEpi Te HOovns Kali dpovijcews 
@s ovdéTEpov avtoiv zoTl Tayabov, GAN adro Te TpiTov. This 
is perhaps a reference to Rep. 505 8B). 

Careful distinction between truth and _ probability 
is recommended, and those arts and sciences in which 
certainty appears unattainable are deemed inferior (564: 
TOA pEMITyUEVOV EXELV TO Hn Tadés, TuLKpoV O& TO BEBSacov— 
is said of music, medicine, agriculture, strategy, naviga- 
tion, &c.). The highest perfection here as in the Republic 
is attributed to dialectic and mathematics (57.E: rip 
Tov dvadéyeoOas Sivaww . . . S8A: TEpl TO Ov Kal TO dvTWS 
Kal TO KaTa TaUTOV aél TEepuKOS TaVTOS ZywryE Oluat HryeioOaL 
Evutavtas, boous vod Kal opiKpov TpoonpTnTaL, paKpo 
anneoratny iva yvaow—this after the recognition of 
mathematical sciences). The priority of dialectic or 
metaphysics as compared with all other sciences is so 
insisted upon, that it is difficult to guess.on what possible 
misinterpretation of texts Horn built his contention that 
dialectic is despised in the Philebus. Plato repeats clearly 
that only dialectical objects or eternal ideas lead us to 
absolute certainty (59: ypn ... 10de Ssapyaptipacbar 
TO AOYO, ws 7) TEPL exeiva 20M Huiv TO Te BEBavov Kai TO 
Kabapov Kat TO adynOés Kal 0 8 Aéyomev eiduxpuves, Tept Ta 
ae KaTa TA av’Ta MoaUTWS auiKTOTATA zyoVTA, 1) éxelvwv 6 
Te wadmuora eos Evyyevés). It is very important to observe 
that eternal ideas (del kara ta aird) are not now separate, 
self-existing, or independent existences (avtd xa’ avrté) 
as they were in earlier dialogues. They are simply eternal, 
or always the same, because the true thoughts of a perfect 
being are not liable to change, and ideas are nothing else 
than ideal notions. 

Natural science is represented as deficient in exactness, 
because it does not refer to eternal ideas, but to changing 

HH 


Dialectic 
is exalted, 
not 
despised. 


Ideas 
aid.a 

but not 
Xwpiord, 


Imper- 
fection 


attributed 
to physical 
science. 


This view 
confirmed 
in the 
Timaeus. 


Science 
pure and 
applied. 


Qualita- 
tive and 
quantita- 
tive. 


Genus 
and 
species. 


466 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


appearances (59 A) which are in time, not in eternity, and 
can never become an object of absolute knowledge (59 B: 
Toutwy ody TL cadés dv dhaipev Th axpiBeotaTyn adnOsia yiryve- 
oa, dv pyre toxye wndiv mwHToTE Kata TATA UnP BEev pajre 
eis TO vov Tapov EyEL; . . . Odd Apa vods OvE TLS emia THN 
ep) avta gore TO AANOcTaTOV Zxyovea). This view agrees 
perfectly well with what has been said on that subject in 
the Republic, and also with the theoretical views of the 
dialogue which deals chiefly with natural science, the 
Timaeus. It was Plato’s permanent conviction that 


the immense variety of the physical world did not admit 


of perfect knowledge. The distinction between theo- 
retical and practical or pure and applied science is also 
here maintained (57 A—£), and illustrated by the example 
of mathematical units, which are absolutely equal to each 
other, while for technical purposes units really unequal 
are counted as equivalent (56 DE: of pév yap mov povddas 
avicovs KatapiOpodvtar TOV Tept aptOpuor, oloy oTpaToTEda 
dvo kal Bods dv0 Kai S00 Ta cputkpoTata 1) Kal Ta TaYTOV 
péyioTta * of © ovK ay Tote avTols GuvaKoNOVONcELAY, EL 141) 
povada movabos ExdoTns TOV vpiwv pnodewiav GAnV addns 
duahgpovedy tis Onos). This idea of unity in variety 
haunts Plato’s mind here as in all the dialectical dia- 
logues. He goes so far as to say that one who is not able 
to distinguish the quality and quantity of each kind and 
its opposite deserves no consideration whatever (19 B: 
elon . . . eT goTuy Ele uy, Kal OTTOGa éoT Kal OTTOIa . . . fl) 
SuvamEvoL KATA TraVTOS sVOs Ka Opmolov Kal TavTOU Kal TOD 
évavtiov (OnA@aal) . . . oVdEis Els ovdsv OvdEVOS AV MOV 
ovdérrote yévorto détos). 

The difference of genus and species is illustrated 
through many examples, and the species shown to be 
different and sometimes opposed within one genus (12 E: 
yéver pév oT. Tay Ev, TA OF pépy Tois mépEcLY aVTOD Ta meV 
evayTLOTATA AAANAILS, TA Oé StahopoTnTa ZyovTa puplav Tov 
tuyxaver). All the difficulties implied in the relation be- 
tween the idea and particulars are repeated as it seems 


NEW THEORY OF SCIENCE: THE PHILEBUS 467 


with a clear reference to a similar exposition of these 
difficulties in the Parmenides (15 A: érav 8é Tis va 
avOpwroy eruyeipy TiWecGar . . . TEpl ToUTwWY TaV évddwr 
Kat T@V ToOLOUT@VY 7) WoAA) apdicByTnOLs yiryverar .. . 
Tpa@tov pev el twas Set Tovav’Tas zivar povddas UToXaL- 
Bavew adnOds ovoas* cita THs ad TavTas, play éxdorny 
ovoapy del THY aUTHY Kal pnTE Yyéverw pte OEOpov Tpodd:- 
xouevnv, buws sivat BeBavotata wiav tavtnv). Here is a 
very clear indication that a separate existence of ideas is 
deemed impossible (15 B: peta 82 rodT’ év Tots yuyvopméevors 
av Kai ametpows site Suecmacwévny Kal Toda yeyovuiay 
Geréov, ci@’ OAnv adTHy aiTis ywpis, 0 5) TavTOV aduvVAaTo- 
Tatov haivoir av, TavTov Kal tv awa ev évl Te Kal TroAXots 
ylyvecGar). As in the Sophist, the theory of ideas is 
introduced objectively, and not directly supported by the 
leader of the conversation, at least nothing is decided 
about the difficulties referred to. Throughout the dia- 
logue the terms used for ideas have no other meaning 
than ideal notions, as is the case everywhere after the 
Parmenides. The nature of thought requires the union of 
notions into higher units, and this constitutes an eternal 
necessity of the human mind (15 p). The absolute unity 
of knowledge is not prevented by many differences and 
even partial oppositions between sciences (13 E: wodAaé 
te ai Evvarracar émiotipar Sofovow eivar Kal avopovot tives 
avT@v adAjdats* et 5é Kai evavTiar TH YyiyvovTal TWes, dpa 
akwos av einv Tod SiareyecOar viv, ei hoBnOels TodTo avTo 
unodeulay avomovov hainy émiotnunv éervotiun yiyverOa ;). 
On the other side, we need not attempt a reconciliation 
of all contradictions (13 A: tovT@ TO NOY pi) TioTEVE, TO 
TavTa Ta gvayTwwotata Sy ToLovyTt). 

Sense perception is explained as a motion common to 
.body and soul, whereby the theory presented in the 
Theaetetus is repeated and accepted (34 A: to & gv & 
mabe. Thy Wuyny Kal TO CHa Kon YyoyvopEvoyv KoWw?} Kal 
kweic8ar, tavtny 8 ad thy Kivnow dvoualwv aicOnow ovk 
amo TpoTou POéyyou’ dv). But the soul can become indif- 


HH 2 


Abstract 
and 
concrete 
unity. 


Ideally 
but not 
really 
separable. 


The unity 
of know- 
ledge 
embraces 
sciences 
diverse 
and even 
opposed. 


The 
theory of 
sensation 
is further 
developed. 


Sensation, 
memory, 
remi- 
niscence. 


Compari- 
son and 
judgment. 


Thought 
“indepen- 

dent of 

language. 


The 
human 
soul 
similar 
to the 
Divine. 


Judg- 
ments 
are in- 
scribed 
on the 
soul. 


468 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


ferent to the action of the body, and then receives no 
sensations (383 E: étav () wWuyy) amabns ylyyntas Tov 
CELTLOV TOV TOU GwuaTos, avatcOnciav érovduacov). In 
that state the soul retains the faculty of repeating by its 
own power the qualitative changes it had undergone on 
former occasions through the action of the body’s move- 
ments, and thus reminiscence needs not the co-operation 
of the body (384 B: étav & peta Tod copartos Eracyé Tol’ 7 
aux, TadT’ avev TOD TwmaTos av’TH ev EaVTH 6 TL wadLoTa 
avadapSavn, TOTE avapipvnoxecOal Tov éyousv). Sensa- 
tion and memory are the faculties on which opinions rest 
(88 B: &« pynuns Te Kal aicOncews S0éa piv Kat TO dtado- 
Ealew eyyxepeiy ylyve@’ éExadotore) ; our judgments exist in 
our thought before we give them an expression in words 
(38 8, cf. Soph. 264 a). Plato insists on the faculty of 
thought as independent of words and of sense percep- 
tions. _We are able to represent to ourselves all past 
perceptions at our will, and such images do not require 
the co-operation of the organs of sense (89 B). The origin 
of error is here, as in the Theaetetus, attributed to indis- 
tinct sensations (88 C: moAXakis iddvte Twi ToppwelEv pi) 
Tavu capas Ta Ka0opwpmeva EvpBaivety Botr\AcOar Kpivewy 
gains av Tad0’ arep Opa). 

The possibility of knowledge is founded on the funda- 
mental similarity between each individual soul and the 
world’s soul from which all individual souls are derived, 
and in which all our notions exist in far greater perfection 
(80 A: 76 wap’ Hiv cdma ap’ ov Woynv dycomev EXE ;— 
SHrov ote dycopev.—robev AaPor, elrep fu) TO YE TOU TraVTOS 
copa zuapvyov ov étvyyave Ta’Tad ye Fxov TOUT@ Kal ETL 
mTavTn KadXdLova ;—OfArov ws ovdaucbev addOMev). Our soul 
is compared to a book, in which memory and sense-per- 
ception inscribe opinions and judgments (39 A: 7 synyn 
tais aicOnoeor Evprrintovea eis TavTOV, KaKeiva & TEpl TATA 
got Ta TAOHuATA, haivovTai wor ayedov olov ypadew Huav 
éy Tais uyats Tote NOyous). It may be taken for granted 
that these opinions remain for Plato essentially different 


NEW THEORY OF SCIENCE: THE PHILEBUS 469 


from dialectical knowledge. The ideal of knowledge is 
in no way lowered, as can be seen from the above quota- 
tions on dialectic, but it is more and more looked upon as 
divine and opposed to mere human opinions. Our souls 
are copies of the world’s soul, our notions repeat God’s 
ideas, our knowledge finds out the Creator’s final aim. 
Thus ideas remain eternal, though they have lost their 
supramundane existence, and are to be sought and found 
only in souls. 

There is no substantial difference of doctrine between 
the Philebus and Politicus, and both belong most probably 
to the same time. Only in some points the Philebus 
appears to refer more or less clearly to the Politicus : 

1. The division of sciences into theoretical and 
practical (57 AE) appears here more familiar than in the 
Politicus (258 EB). 

2. The world’s soul has been introduced in the 
Politicus (270 A), and is mentioned in the Philebus (30 A) 
as a matter of course. 

3. The absolute measure (7d wétpsov) is explained as 
a new notion in the Politicus (2848), while it is here 
applied (66 A). 

These tests are, however, not decisive, and only 
further stylistic research can lead us to settle the ques- 
tion of priority between these two dialogues, a question 
which appears not to have a great importance for the 
understanding of Plato’s philosophy so long as both are 
admitted to be later than the Sophist. The difficulty 
implied in the union of many different predicates with 
one subject, which has been specially investigated in the 
Sophist, is here mentioned (14D) in a manner which 
seems to point to the discussions of the Sophist. The 
relation of the Philebus to the Parmenides need not be 
insisted on here, as it is recognised even by Zeller, as well 
as by many other investigators, including those who have 
denied the authenticity of the Philebus, as for instance 
Schaarschmidt. Also the question of the relation be- 


Human 
knowledge 
may 
approxi- 
mate 

to the 
Divine 
ideas. 


The 
Politicus 
and 
Philebus 
represent 
the same 
stage of 
Plato’s 
thought. 


Priority 
between 
Philebus 
and 
Politicus 
not yet 
deter- 
mined 
with 
certainty. 


Relation 
to the 
Parme- 
nides and 
to the 
Republic. 


Zeller 
thought 
that the 
Republic 
quoted the 
Philebus, 
but the 
Philebus 
makes no 
reference 
to the 
ppdvnots 
TOU aryalov 
so 
pointedly 
mentioned 
in Rep. 
505 c. 


The 
Philebus 
probably 
the latest 
of the 
dialectical 
dialogues. 


Charac- 
teristics 
of the 
dialectical 
dialogues. 
Classi- 
fication. 
The 

ideas not 
self- 
existent. 


470 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


tween the Republic and Philebus need hardly be discussed, 
although Zeller persists in arguing that the Republic is 
later. This view has been refuted recently by Siebeck, 
and Zeller has never accounted for the fact that the 
chief reference in the Republic to the question whether 
pleasure or reason is the good mentions a difficulty which 
is not found at all in the Philebus, namely, that the 
defenders of reason are obliged to confess at last that 
the sought-for dpovnots is Ppdvynois Tod ayabod (Rep. 505 B), 
a position which is declared to be ridiculous (yeAowws). 
This looks like a criticism of some philosophical opponent 
who is difficult to identify, and not like a quotation from 
the Philebus. We have seen above that the Philebus 
shows in every respect a later stage of thought than the 
Republic, and stylistic comparisons have made it so 
evident, that no reasonable doubts remain for those who 
know Plato’s style. Stylistically the Philebus is nearest 
to the Politicus, the collected evidence being insufficient 
to decide with certainty which of the two is later. If 
we take into consideration the close connection of the 
Politicus with the Sophist, and the few points on which 
the contents of the Politicus allow a comparison with 
the Philebus, it becomes very probable that this dialogue 
is the latest in the dialectical group, to which it naturally 
belongs. 


New dialectic. 


If now we resume the logical theories of the three 
dialogues following the Parmenides, we observe that their 
chief peculiarity is the great importance given to division 
and classification. These logical operations apply here 
to notions of the human mind, which are similar to the 
divine ideas. Ideas are no longer self-existing, but exist 
in the divine mind, and from thence pass to our souls 
through the observation of concrete particulars. The 
material world is built up according to God’s ideas, and 
we have to find them out by comparisons and distinctions 


NEW DIALECTIC ATL 


of particulars. This credits the external world with an 
existence which is other than the existence of ideas and 
of souls. Plato first recognised this double meaning of 
existence, whereby he advanced far beyond his prede- 
cessors. The new dialectic is distinguished from middle 
Platonism and the earlier theory of ideas by the greater 
importance attached to particulars. No.explanation of 
the universe is accepted as sufficient, unless it accounts 
for the smallest and most insignificant detail as well as 
for the greatest ideas. The unity of all existence is no 
longer an abstract unity, but a summit built up on 
the widest basis of the universal experience of mankind, 
to which each investigator has power to contribute ac- 
cording to his own aptitudes. The attempt made first 
in the Theaetetus to enumerate the highest categories is 
maintained and carried further throughout the dialectical 
dialogues. A worship of method, unknown in earlier 
Platonism, is here predominant over all particular subjects 
of inquiry. The influence of a long and_ successful 
educational activity is visible at every step of the argu- 
ment, and the final aim of an universal knowledge of all 
reality is sought through constant logical training and 
reflections on the method of inquiry. 


Reality 
of the 
external 
world, 
ordered 
according 
to God’s 
ideas. 
Import- 
ance of 
particu- 
lars. 
Know- 
ledge 
based on 
universal 
experi- 
ence. 
Enume- 
ration of 
categories. 
Import- 
ance of 
method. 


The latest 
group: 
Timaeus, 
Critias, 
Laws. 


Coinci- 

dences of 
style and 
contents. 


472 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


CHAPTER IX 


LATEST DEVELOPMENTS OF PLATO’S THOUGHT 


WHILE our view of the way leading Plato from the 
Protagoras to the Philebus appeared as the result of 
difficult chronological investigations, and needs still many 
confirmations before it is generally accepted, there is an 
almost universal agreement as to the final stage of 
Plato’s philosophy. All critics have unanimously re- 
cognised the Timaeus, Critias, and Laws as the latest 
works of Plato, and there is in this respect scarcely any 
difference between the representatives of the most diver- 
ging views on Plato’s chronology. The reasons of this 
unanimity are found in the peculiar contents of these 
works, their relation to other earlier writings of Plato, 
and also in direct testimonies of Aristotle and other 
witnesses as to the very late date of the Laws, to which 
the Timaeus and the Critias fragment are nearest in 
style and doctrine. Campbell has found in Timaeus and 
Critias eighty-one words which besides these dialogues 
are found only in the Laws and form so many peculi- 
arities of latest style, absent even from the dialectical 
dialogues. There are also some important points of 
theory in which the Timaeus coincides with the Laws 
only. Thus for instance the representation of the stars 
as bodies belonging to perfect divine souls (Tim. 41D, 
Legg.8998), and the enumeration of more than two 
kinds of motion (Tim. 438, Legg.894D) are important 
views not found anywhere else in Plato. It is, perhaps, 
not quite accidental that both in the Timaeus (20 A) and 
in the Laws (6388) Locris, not mentioned elsewhere 


LATEST WORKS: TIMAEUS 473 


by Plato, is highly praised, and it may well have a 
personal explanation in connection with the third voyage 
to Sicily, or with the tyrannis of Dionysius in Locri 
(356 B.c.) ; also Tyrrhenia is mentioned only in the three 
latest dialogues (Tum. 258, Critias 1140, Legg. 738 ¢). 
The number of stylistic peculiarities common to Timaeus 
and Laws, and peculiar to this group, is very much more 
considerable than is shown in our reduced list of 500 
marks of style, because with a few exceptions such pecu- 
liarities as are common only to a very few dialogues have 
been excluded. Still it is easy to see that some peculi- 
arities of the Laws are found nowhere else than in the 
Timaeus or Critias. Such are wpérov av ein (312), Kal” 
imvov (432), PopuyBadns (278), otatpwdns (268), and some 
peculiar uses of te (230, 233, 235). It would be easy to 
increase this list of peculiarities of the latest style of Plato 
to any extent, but in view of the universal agreement as to 
the very late date of Timaeus, Critias, and Laws, it is not 
necessary to insist any more on this subject. The Critias 
being a fragment anda close continuation of the Timaeus, 
we have really only two works to consider in this group: 
Timaeus and Laws. 


I. The Timaeus. 


There are very few logical elements in the Timaeus. 
Here true and probable opinion takes a larger place than 
in the dialectical dialogues, but the decisive and irredu- 
cible difference between such beliefs and perfect know- 
ledge is emphatically maintained (51D: vods kai d0fa 
arnOyns . . . S00 NeKTéov, SioTs ywpls yeyovaToy avo“olws TE 
ZyeTov). Knowledge is imparted by teaching, opinion by 
rhetoric, knowledge is unchangeable, opinion easily over- 
thrown, knowledge is a divine privilege of a few philo- 
sophers, opinion a common faculty of all men (51 E: To pév 
yap avtav bia Sidays, TO 8 bd TreOods tuty eyyiryveTar Kai 
TO Mev Gel WET AANOOds AOyou, TO OF GAOYOV" Kal TO EV AKivnTOV 
mevOot, TO Of meTaTrELOTOV Kal TOU mév TaVTAa avdpa pETexyELV 


Natural 
science a 
work of 
human 
opinion, 
imper- 
fectly 
approxi- 
mating to 
Divine 
know- 
ledge. 


Priority 
of soul. 


474 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


patéov, vou bé Gzovs, avOpwrrev 52 yévos Bpaxd 71). The ideas 
which exist in reason eternally are the object of knowledge 
(27 E: 70 Op dei, yeveow Oe ovK eyov . . . VONTEL META AOYOU 
TEpLANTTOV, Gel KaTa TavTa Ov), and reason occurs only in 
souls (80B: vobv . . . ywpis Wuyis adivarov Tapayevéc Oar 
7). This close relation between soul and knowledge is 
here insisted upon as in the Sophist, and makes it evident 
that Plato no longer dreamed of separate ideas. He says 
repeatedly that knowledge and reason cannot exist out ofa 
soul (37 C: vods érioTHun te... 2 © TOV OYTwY eyyiyvec Gor, 
dv Toté Tis avTe AO TAY Yuyny Eitn, TaV padAdov 1 
Tadnés épet . . . 46D: Ta yap dvTwY @ VoObY move KTaGOaL 
MpoonKel, NexTEoy Wuy7v). 

If the ideas could exist independently, then they would 
form also an objective system of knowledge, and Plato 
need not have credited the soul with such an importance 
in relation to the progress of science. For him the ob- 
jectivity of knowledge has its only basis in the common 
origin and similar power of all existing souls. Every 
soul is anterior to the body, and rules over it (84c: 
reverse Kal aperi} Tpotépav Kal TpecButépav ~uyiy c@paTos 
@s deormoTw Kai ap£ovoay apEouevov Evveotnoatro ... ). 
There is an apparent contradiction in the explanation of 
the relation between soul and space. Once the soul is said 
to be in the body (308: Wuyny év copate Evyitotas TO TAY 
€vverextaivero) and then to contain the body and to extend 
through space or to include it (36DE: érei cata voty TO 
Evvictavts Taca 7 Ths Wuyhs Evotacis eyeyévnTo, weTAa TODTO 
Tay TO TMMaATOELOES EVTOS AUTHS eTEKTAivETO Kal wéToY pecn 
Evvayayov tpoonppottev). The latter view refers clearly 
to the world’s soul, which animates the universe just as 
each individual soul animates our individual bodies (308 c: 
Tov Koopov Caov zuapuyov evvouv Te TH GAnOela Sia THY TOd 
Geod yevéoOac mpovorav). But it must be remembered that 
the whole creation of the world-soul and of individual 
souls is here given as a myth (30 B: Kata Noyor Tov EiKoTa 
de? Adgyecv), and admits of various interpretation. 


LATEST WORKS: TIMAEUS AT5 


The great philosophical thought here illustrated is the 
perfect unity of the universe, which is represented as the 
result of an ordering and over-mastering power of a God 
over a primitive indefinite andchaotic matter. Therecannot 
be a multiplicity of worlds, argues Plato, because the true 
world is only that which contains everything according 
to God’s conception of a perfect whole (31.4: wérepov oby 
6p0as Eva ovpavov TpocelpyjKaper, 7) ToNOVS Kal arreipous 
Aéyew Hv opOoTepov ; Eva, eltrep KaTa TO Tapddevypa Se- 
Snucoupynuévos Zora). If several worlds were imagined, 
one idea of a universe containing them all would still be 
needed, and thus the whole forms one unique universe 
(831B: wa obv 10de Kata THY pOvWTLW GpoLoY 7 TO TaVTENEL 
bow, Sua tadta ovte Sv0 ovr’ ameipous éerroincey 6 TrOL@Y 
KOT MOUS, GAN’ els Bde wovoryern|s oUpavos yeyovws zoTL TE Kal ET’ 
gota, cf. 928). Out of the earlier world of ideas existing by 
themselves and influencing all appearances, there is only 
one left now, and so transformed that it is scarcely recog- 
nisable. It is the ideaof the Good transformed into the 
good Demiurge, whom we ought not to call really a 
Creator, because he orders the world only out of a pre- 
existing chaos, without calling into existence anything 
that was not before. This Demiurge is outside the world, 
and different from the world’s soul. He imparts to the 
world its shape and present nature, abiding thereafter in 
his own eternal peace (42 E: 0 pév 87 arravta tadta Siatakas 
Ewevev 2v TO EavTOD Kata TpoTov HOE). 

This conception of a God, who dwells at a height 
above the world ordered by him, is common to the Timaeus 
with the Politicus (272: rod mavtos 0 uév KuBEpvnTns, 
olov mndadiwv olaxos adéuevos, cis THY abTod TEepLwmny 
améoTn, Tov O& 51) KOcpov Taw avéoTpEdEev Eiapperyn TE KAL 
Evudvtos émiOupia), where also the contrast between blind 
necessity and divine rule has been first recognised. God’s 
self-contemplation of the Politicws has been here deve- 
loped into an invariable peace. The difference between 
Politicus and Timaeus consists in a more complete sepa- 


Unity 
of the . 
world. 


The 
Demiurge 
and the 
Good. 


Time and 
Eternity. 


God is 
unenvious 
and rules 
through 
free con- 
viction. 


The 
whole dis- 
course is 
mythical, 
‘ similar to 
truth’: 


476 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


ration of time and eternity. While in the Politicus 
divine rule and the power of necessity alternated in 
time, and thus formed consecutive periods, we have here 
an eternal permanent influence of divine rule opposed 
to the working of necessity in time. The Demiurge 
of the Timaeus (cf. Rep. 530A: 10d odpavod Snuwovpyds, 
also 597BC) is good and free from envy, desiring to 
make everything as like himself as possible Q9E: 
ayabos hv, aya0@ 62 ovdels Trepi ovdevds ovdérroTEe syylyvEeTat 
pOovos * tovtov & éxrds Ov TavTa 6 TL wddoTa yevécOaL 
éBovrAnOn mapatdrjowa égavto). He is the best of all 
causes (29A: dpictos Tov aitiwy), and it is difficult for 
us to find him out, more difficult still to explain him 
to others if they are unable to find him by their own 
reason (28C: tov pév ody TomTiy Kal matépa Tovde TOD 
TavTos evupsiy Te Epyov Kal evpovTa eis mavtTas advvaTov 
Aéyewv). His influence is compared to the free convic- 
tion of one soul by another, not to the necessary action 
of one body on another (484: vod 8: dvayxns apyovtos 
TO TelOery avTny ToY Yylyvonevwy Ta TAEiota él TO 
BérrioTov dyew, TavTn KaTa TadTa Te Sv avdyKns HTT@pEevNs 
uo TELAovs Eudpovos odTw Kat’ apyas EvvictaTo TOdE TO 
may... 060: Omnrep } THS avayKns Exodoa TELTOEiod 
te dvows wreixe). He is supposed to have found already 
in existence matter with its necessary forces and move- 
ments (380A: may dcov jv opatov TaparaBav ovy ovyiav 
dyov adXa KWovpevov TANUMEA@S Kal aTaKTws, sis TaEW 
avTo Hyayev 2 Ths atakias, Nynodmevos éKEivo TOUTOU TaVTWS 
aetvov), but this is not necessarily to be understood as 
occurring in time, otherwise it would contradict one of the 
most important axioms of latest Platonism, the priority 
of soul. 

For a correct interpretation of the story of creation 
as told in the Timaeus we must constantly keep in 
mind that it is a mythical and allegorical exposition, 
which from the outset does not pretend to be true, 
but only similar to truth. Plato having reached his 


LATEST WORKS: TIMAEUS 47 
view of an eternal existence out of time, can scarcely 
have believed in a beginning of the world in time. If he 
represents the divine reason as introducing order in the 
chaotic world of matter, he does not mean that this chaotic 
disorder had a temporal priority. He only wishes to 
impress upon the reader’s mind the truth that wherever 
order and reason are found, they ought to be ascribed to 
divine influence, the origin of all order and thought 
(30AB: Opes bz ob’ Hv oT’ Eat. TO Apiot@ Spav ado TAY 
TO KaAMOTOV * NoyLodwevos . . . vooY ev ev puyH, Wyn 
d& gv c@pati Evriotas TO Tay Evverextaiveto, OTws 6 TL 
KaAXoTOV sin KaTA pUowW apioToV TE Epyov aTEetpyacpuévos). 
Taking this for granted, we shall easily recognise that 
the ideas were nothing else for Plato when he wrote the 
Timaeus than God’s thoughts. We see that he re- 
repeatedly represents the ideas as included in thought 
(284: vonoes peta Noyou TEeptAnTTov . . . 2DA: Adyw Kal 
They are always the same (284: 
det kata tavTd, cl. 29a, 384, &c.) and unchangeable, 
because they have no beginning nor end, nor existence in 
time (384: TO asl KaTa TadTAa Zyov aKLWHTwS OUTE TPE BUTE- 
pov oUTE vewTEpoy TpoaHKeL yiyverOar Sia ypovov ovd: yevé- 
oOat tote ovde yeyovévar viv ovd’ sicadOis zrecOar), nor 
participation of any kind in particulars, being inaccessible 
to the senses, but evident to reason (524: 10 cata tava 
eidos Exov, wyévvntov Kal avedeOpor, ovTE Eis éavTO cicdexXs- 
mevov GANa AANObev oUTE AUTO Eis GAAO Toe lov, aopaToy Sz 


OVnoEL TEpLANnT TOD). 
pov” p 


kat addws avaicOntov, TodTo O 81) vdnots eiinyev erricKo- 
meiv). The eternal nature of ideas is expressed by various 
terms: they are aiéia (29 A, 37D) or have a dvaus ai@vios 
(37 D) whereby their separate existence in time is recog- 
nised to be impossible. Their function is to be eternal 
models of thought, first existent in God’s mind, then 
reproduced in the investigating souls of men. The term 
Tapadevya 1s now constantly applied to ideas (28, 370, 
39 E, 48H, &c.) ; they are the models according to which 
the Demiurge has brought order in the world, and we are 


et 


the action 
is not to 
be under- 
stood as 
happening 
in time. 


Pate 


The ideas 
of the 
Timaeus 
are God’s 
thoughts, 
and are 
out of 
Time. 


They are 
models or 
patterns 
of our 
best 
thoughts 


and of 
natural 
kinds. 


Animated 
Beings. 


‘Condi- 
‘tional im- 
mortality. 


‘The 
mortal 
soul of the 
Timaeus. 


Antici- 
pated in 
Polit. 
309 c. 


478 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


able to recognise these models by our own soul’s activity. 
This applies more especially to the natural types which 
form the limits and definition of each kind of animals. 
The conception of an animal or animated body becomes 
more prominent here than ever before. Not only the 
whole world is an animal, but also each star is the body 
of a divine animal or a god, distinguished from all other 
animals by its subtle matter (fire), by the perfection of its 
spherical shape, and by the great regularity of its move- 
ments (40 A: Tod pév ody Oelov THY TAEloTHY idéaVv ex TuUpoOS 
ameipyatero .. . velwas Tmepl TdyTa KUKAw TOV ovpavoV 

. kunosis 52 S00 Tpoon ev ExdoT@, THY MEV ev TAUTO 
KATA TAUTA TEpl TOV aVTOV as TA aVTA EAUTO SLavooupEra, 
tiv 88 eis To mpocbev bro THs TavTOD Kai Omolov TEpipopas 
KPATOULEVQ). 

It is exceedingly important for the understanding of 
latest Platonism that even these perfect gods with 
perfect souls are no longer conceived as absolutely im- 
mortal by their own nature; they owe their permanence 
to the Demiurge’s personal will (414: the Demiurge 
speaks : Ozol Oedv, ay zym Snutoupyos Tatnp Te epywv, & ov’ 
zuod yevoueva aduta ewovd ye wn e0zdovtos). We see here a 
theory which to some extent was already implied in 
the Phaedrus: only the simple substance is indestructible, 
all compounds being reducible to their elements, and 
subsisting only through the divine influence. The last 
consequence of this view had not been drawn in the 
Phaedrus: there the human soul, with its three parts, 
existed indefinitely ; here a mortal part of the soul is 
distinguished from its immortal part. To this mortal 
part belongs nearly everything that constitutes personal 
character: pleasure and pain, courage and fear, anger and 
hope, perception and love (690: aAXo Te eidos ypuyis 
mpocwKodomovy TO Oyntov, dewa Kal avayxaia ev EavT@ 
Tabipata zxov). A vague distinction of a divine and a 
human or animal part of the soul was occasionally 
touched upon in the Politicus (809 C: 10 devyevés dv THs 


LATEST WORKS: TIMAEUS 479 


auyjs abitav wépos Oeiw Evvappocapévn Secu@, peta 82 TO 
Ociov TO Cwoyevés avTav avOis dvOpwrrivors), but only here we 
find a nearer explanation of this difference which exceeds 
in importance all previous partitions of the soul. 

The mortal part corresponds to the two earlier inferior 
divisions, with the difference that aic@nots combined with 
Zpws takes the place of év@upia, and that @uuds holds a 
lower rank than formerly (424: mpatov pév aicOnow 
avaykatoy ein play Taow ek Biaiwy Tabnpdtwv EvpduTov 
ylyverOat, SevTepoy bz HOovHR Kal AVTTN wELvypeVOY EpwTa, TpoS 
dé TovTows PoBov Kat Oupoyv boa TE Eropeva alTois Kal OTOCA 
évavtiws tépuxe SuectnKoTa). The lower part of the soul 
occupies the lowest part of the body, and is common to 
men with other animals and plants (77B: peréye.. . 
ToUTO . . . TOU TpiTourpuyxns Eidous, 0 peTaEd hpevdv oudarod 
Te lopdaOat Aoyos, @ SoEns pév Noyiopov Te Kal vow péTEaTL 
TO pnodev, aicOnoews bé HOdeias Kal aNyewhs pweTa ervOvpLav). 

It is very remarkable that the successive incarnations 
of the immortal part of the soul are maintained, with the 
supposition that in each incarnation the lower activities 
grow with the body. Thus it is admitted that not only 
the same soul is repeatedly incarnated on earth in the 
shape of men or women, but also the possibility of a 
descent into the form of lower animals is left (4280). 
Under these circumstances nothing remains for the im- 
mortal part of the soul except the abstract conception of 
a principle (apyy 42), as already formed in the Phaedrus 
with special reference to motion. A place in the body is 
assigned to this immortal soul in the head (69 £) in order 
to keep it apart from lower tendencies. Knowledge is the 
only activity of this immortal principle, which is the 
divine element in man (90D: 76 0 év jyiv Bei Evyryeveis 
elol Kiwyoels ai ToD TavTos Stavoncels Kal mepidopai). The 
ultimate aim is here as in the Phaedo and Theaetetus to 
become as like God as possible, only here feelings and 
even virtues appear to be excluded from the divine 
perfection, for which only pure knowledge is left. This 


Re-incar- 
nation. 


The 
immortal 
principle 
of thought 
located 

in the 
head. 


Know- 
ledge the 
supreme 
aim. 


Categories 
of Reason. 


Judgment 
and 
sentence. 
Control 

of bodily 
conditions 
necessary 
to 
thought. 


Ante- 
natal 
vision of 


480 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


is the result of the dialectical construction of universal 
science. As knowledge was the starting point of Socratic 
Platonism, it becomes the final aim of Plato’s life. The 
same idea of intellectual exercise which had such im- 
portance from the Parmenides onwards is also here the 
predominant factor in reaching the aims of knowledge, 
being identified with a kind of movement which corre- 
sponds to the best part of the soul (89 E, cf. 90B). These 
movements produce the various categories of reason, 
which are here more fully enumerated than in the Sophist, 
being very closely similar to the Aristotelian list of cate- 
gories : 


- c , 
Tim. 87 AB: (n fuxn). . . A€yet 
, , - a > 
Kwoupern Sua maons EavTns, OT@ T 
at ces z aq aA 
dy Te Tavrov 7 Kal Grou av ETEpoOY, 
A a , , ,ooqg ‘ 
mpos 6 TL Te padtoTa Kal Ory Kal 
er i ee, s ¢ A \ 
Smas kat 67OTe EvpPaiver kata Ta 
icf a 
yryvopeva Te mpos ExagTov EKaoTa 
> 4 \ 
eivat kal maoxety kal mpos Ta 
wy > 
Kata TavTa €xoVTa ae. 


Arist. Categoriae 1 b 25: rav 
Kata pnoepiay cupmAokyy Aeyopevov 
éxagTov #ToL ovoiay onpaiver 7 
TOCOY 7) TOLOY 7) TpOS TL 7) TOU H TroTE 
#) keto Oar 7) €xew 7) Tovety 7) MaoXELY : 
ef. Topic. 103b 20, and above, 
pp. 368-369, on the categories in 
Theaet. 


For Plato these are the highest kinds of ideas, while 
Aristotle looks upon the categories as chief kinds of 
words. But the conception of categories, as later under- 
stood in the history of philosophy, we owe to Plato. 
He explains in the Timaeus our faculty of judging all 
existence through the recognised identity of substance 
in all souls. The familiar distinction between judg- 
ment as an act of the soul and the sentence as an 
expression of judgment recurs here also (37B: Aoryos 
.. . TO Kwoupéve bf’ abrod pepopevos avev POoyyou Kal 
Axfs) and judgment includes opinion as well as know- 
ledge (870: 80€a0 Kal miotes .. . vows eTLoTHMN Té). 
The reason acts by distinctions, and requires for the full 
development of its activity a certain limitation of the 
stream of bodily changes (44 8). 

Each soul is supposed to have seen once the nature 
of the whole universe and the moral laws which thus are 
an innate possession of each individual (41 E: dvetre 


LATEST WORKS: TIMAEUS 481 


Wuyxas tcapiOmous tois dotpois, Eevee & Exdotny pos 
ExaoTov, Kal zuBuBdoas ws és Oynwa Ty TOU TavTos dvaw 
ZeiEe, vomous Te TOVS Eiwappmévous eivev avtais). It is highly 
characteristic of Platonic logic that such knowledge does 
not refer to the physical occurrences in the world, as to 
which. Plato has only to offer uncertain opinions and 
probabilities which do not even pretend to be consistent 
or to attain any exactness (29 C: gay ovv toda TOAAOV 
elmovtwv TrEepi Oe@v Kal THs ToD TaVTOS yevécews, pi) SuVaTOL 
yiyveue0a travtTn TavTws avTovs éavTols owodoyoupéevous 
AOyous Kat aTynKpLPwmuévovs atrododvat, wn Oavyaons). Full 
knowledge as to these things must be left to God, while 
men must be satisfied with probable myths and ought not 
to search further (29 D). Physical investigation is held to 
be only a convenient pastime in moments when we are 
tired of metaphysical inquiry (59 c). The same uncer- 
tainty refers to empirical psychology as well as to general 
physics (72D: ra pev ody repi uxis, boov Ovnrov ze 
Kal doov Ostov, Kat Orn, Kal pe’ wv, Kai Ov & Ywpis OKicOn, 
TO pv adnG2s, ws eipnrat, Oeod Evudycavtos TéT’ adv ovTw 
povws ducyupiloiueba),. 

The sensible world consists of appearances which are 
becoming and changing without true permanent existence 
(28 A: 60&n pet’ aicOnoews adoyou dofacrov, yuyvomevor Kai 
aTroANUpevoy, dvtTws O& ovdeTroTe Gv). The physical universe, 
like everything that is material, had a beginning (28 B: 
OKETTEOV . . . TOTEPOV HV él, YEevécEwWS ApYIVY FXwY oVSEWiar, 
7 yeyovev, am’ dpyns Twos apEduevos. yéyovev* opatos yap 
amos Té toTl Kal Chua eywv, Tata 62 Ta ToLAadTA aicOnTd, 
aicO@noews, yiyvomeva 
adds later that the 
together with time, 
have an end (88 B: 
va aa yevynbévtes 


ta © atoOnra, do&n mepidnmta per’ 
Kal yevvnta épdvn). But if Plato 
world did not begin in time but 
leaving it open whether both will 
xpdvos & ovv per’ ovpavod yéeyovev, 
dpa Kat AvOHoWw, av Tote NUoIS TLS av’Ta@Y YiyvnTal), he 
authorises us to interpret the beginning of the world not 
as a temporal beginning, but a relation of dependence of 
El 


Truth and 
Good. 


Physical 
occur- 
rences 
into 
which 
human 
beings 
must not 
inquire 
too 
curiously 
are 
matters of 
opinion. 


Every 
thing 
that is 
material 
had a be- 
ginning ; 
but only 
in the 
sense 
that it is 
dependent 
on Divine 
Power. 
The 
material 


world is 
made in 
the like- 
ness of 

an eternal 
pattern. 


General 
physical 
notions : 
Time, 
Space, 
Matter, 
Causality. 


Concep- 
tion of 
Space. 


482 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


the material world on a divine power. Physical appear- 
ances are represented as an imitation or an image of 
the eternal ideas (29 B: mwaca avayxn tovde Tov Kdcpov 
elxova Twos elvat, CL. 49 A: piunua trapadeiypatos, yéveouy 
Zyov Kal opator). 

The ideas seem to be chiefly limited to natural kinds, 
and do not include some of the most general physical 
notions which are investigated in the Timaeus with 
special care, namely time, space, matter, and causality. 
The analysis of these notions is not without logical 
importance and therefore deserves our attention. Time 
is a moving image of the eternal nature of ideas, and is 
placed into close relation with the movements of stars 
(87 D: eixkm 8 éiwost KwHTov TWa alovos TroLhoal, Kal 
Siakoopwav aua ovpavoy Trovet pévovTos al@vos év évl Kat’ 
apiOuov lodcav aiwwoy eixova, TodTov dy 57 xpovoyv @vomd- 
xapev). ‘This acts in obedience to a very primitive con- 
sideration: days, months, and years are made by the 
celestial movements, and as they are parts of Time, Plato 
infers that Time itself is a product of those movements 
(837 E: Huepas Kal vietas Kab phvas Kal émavtovs, ovK 
dvTas Tply ovpavoy yevécOal, TOTe Gua exeivw EviLoTapevo 
THY Yyéverw avTay pnyavata.* tadTa 2 TdvTa pépn ypdvov, 
kal 70 T Hv TOT eoTAL Ypovou yeyovora ion). Thus Plato 
did not reach the abstract conception of time, and knew 
only concrete durations measured by physical movements. 

More elaborate is the conception of space, which Plato 
introduces as co-ordinated to ideas and their images at a 
later stage of the inquiry, expressly avowing that he had 
omitted it at the beginning (49 4: tpitov 62 Tore wey ov 
duetNomeOa, vopicaytes ta dvo z€eav ixavos). He finds 
this notion very difficult to explain, and unlike Time, 
Space is admitted to exist before matter, being necessary 
for the reception of matter into being (494: wdons sivas 
yevéoews UTrodoy)y avTny otov tiOnvnv). The imagined 
identity of all matter is here the starting point (498), 
based on the observation that water becomes ice as well as 


LATEST WORKS: TIMAEUS 483 


steam, or air, which is supposed to be susceptible of a 
change into fire (49 c), thus forming a circle of transfor- 
mations. From the fact of transformations the unreality 
of appearances is inferred, and the reality underlying them 
is found in the notion of space, free from any determining 
quality (49 5). Plato’s fondness for proportions and 
analogies finds here also an opportunity for display. Space 
has the same relation to matter as matter to form (50 4). 
Thus, if various forms were given to one and the same 
matter, for instance gold, each particular object could 
best be named gold, and not according to its special chan- 
ging form. Ina similar manner space remains always the 
same, however different qualities of matter might fill it. 
Here we see Plato advancing to a more abstract notion 
than he had of time, and he feels the difficulty of explain- 
ing it. He calls it by different names, beginning with 
dvvauis (49 A, 50 B) and dvovs (50 B), and ending with yopa 
(524). Itis ta ravta dexouevn copata vars (50 B), maons 
yevérews UTrodoyn oboy TLOnvy (49 A), TO év @ ylyverac (50 C). 
Space has no shape, but appears differently according to 
the phenomena occurring in it (50c: déyerai te del Ta 
TavTa, Kal wophrv ovdemiay TrOTE OVSEVL TOV ELTLOVTMY Opolay 
elAndev ovdauy ovdauas). It is not an idea, nor imitates 
any idea (50 B: duopdov dv éxeivav atracav TaV ide@v, boas 
pédrot SeyecOai Tobey . . . mavTwy éxTOos Elddy eivar xXpE@v 
TO Ta Tata éxdekopevov gv avT@ yevn). Its relation to the 
ideas is recognised to be most difficult to explain (51a: 
avopatoy <idos TL Kal auopdoy, Tavdeyés, weTadapBavov dé 
aTopoTatad 1n TOU vonTOD Kal SucaAwTOTATOV AUTO AéyoVTES 
ov Wevooueba). Space is conceived not by the senses, nor by 
purereason, but by a kind of fictitious inference which has 
however a necessary character (52AB: yévos dv TO Ths 
yopas ael, bOopav ov tpocdexopuevov, pay dé Tapexyov 
doa 2yer yéveow Taow, avto S2 pet avaoOnoias amrtov 
Loyicwe Til vow, pwoyis TieTOv, mpos 0 by Kal dvELpoTro- 
Aodpev Brérovtes Kal dapev avayKaioy sivai mov To dv dap 


Space 
void of 
qualities. 


Notion of 


‘Space 


more 
abstract 
than of 
Time. 


dy Tie TOT Kal KaTeYov Ywpav Tiva). Space has been thus Matter. 


hab oP 


Quality 


an appear- 


ance 
resulting 
from 
invisible 
motions. 
The 
infinitely 
little. 
Flux of 
particles 
in every 
organism. 


Layoi- 
sier’s 
analysis 
of water 
antici- 
pated. 


Causality : 


final and 
efficient 
causes. 


484 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


represented as an indispensable condition of matter, though 
essentially differing from matter. The difference consists 
in the entire absence of quality in space, while matter is 
held to be always qualified. 

To illustrate the relation of space to matter, Plato uses 
many metaphors taken from the impregnation of one 
matter by another. Thus various perfumes can be com- 
municated to an oil which has no smell by itself, various 
shapes to a shapeless clay (50H). The chief kinds of 
matter, as earth, water, air, and fire, can be changed into 
one another (49 8B), and existed in space before the 
Demiurge set to work (52D). The different qualities of 
matter are only appearances resulting from a variety of 
movements (52D). There are amid all the mythical 
fictions of the Timaeus some wonderful glimpses of deep 
insight which betray Plato’s genius. Thus he speaks 
about invisible matter and its infinitely small elements 
(56.6: dua cpixpoTynta ovdév opmpevoy vd’ Hud), about the 
stream of matter passing through our body (43 A: éip- 
puTov c@pua Kal avépputov), about the spermatozoa, which 
he seems to have divined many centuries before their 
actual discovery (910: péypirep av Exatépwv 1) eriOupla 
Kal 0 2pws Evvdiayayovtes . . . Ws els Apoupay THY pHTpaV 
aopata UT opuikpoTntos Kal adiaTAacTa boa KaTaoTrEl- 
pavtes Kal Tadw Ovaxpivaytss peydda évTos éxOpévovtas 
Kal peta TOTO «sis das ayayovtes Cowv amToTehécwor 
yéveowv). By a strange divination he calmly teaches us, in 
agreement with our modern discoveries, that each particle 
of water consists of three atoms, two of one gas and one 
of another (56 D), thus anticipating the results of Lavoisier’s 
experiments. But he declares the analysis of colours to 
transcend human ability, and to be a divine privilege (68 D). 
On the contrary, stereometry is here advanced (53 c—55 C) 
beyond the stage complained of in the Republic. 

One of the distinctions made by Plato already in the 
Phaedo is here developed and fully explained. The dif- 
ference between final and efficient causality has a consi- 


LATEST WORKS: TIMAEUS 485 


derable place in Platonism ; while at an earlier stage only 
the final cause had been recognised as a true cause and 
opposed to the current notion of causality as employed by 
Anaxagoras, Plato later admitted efficient causes, and this 
change had a close relation to the increasing importance 
of the notion of movement in his system. (See above, 
p. 452.) 

The terminology established in the Politicus is here 
maintained. The final cause is named aitiov, and acts 
everywhere, nothing being possible without an aim (28 a: 
may O& av TOYyLyvouEevon UT aitiou Tivos 2& avayKns yiyverCau 
TavTl yap advvatov xwpis aitiov yévecw oyeiv). Vulgar 
people call aiziov what is only Evvaitiov, namely, material 
causes, used by God only as means for the realisation of 
the best which is his aim (46c). The reason of the 
superiority of final causes over mechanical causation lies 
in the absence of reason and design from physical causa- 
tion, if considered alone and apart from aims which can 
be conceived only by a soul (46D: tév yap dvt@v & vodv 
pove Kktac0ar TpoonKel, NexTéov ruynv). The philosopher, 
as lover of reason and knowledge, thinks more highly of 
aims of the mind than of necessities of matter (462). 
The final cause is here identified with a first source of 
movement and contrasted with the physical cause which 
is a movement caused from without. It is also called 
divine or free, as opposed to what is necessary (68 E: 610 
8 xpi) Sv’ aitias eldn di0pifecOar, TO ev avayxatov,-To bé 
Ociov). The mechanical cause, here as in the Politicus 
called £vvairiov and identified with the necessary condi- 
tion without which, as stated in the Phaedo, the aim 
could not be reached, is blind Necessity (avayxn, 48 A), 
opposed to Reason. Reason acts on Necessity, leading it 
to the best aim, and Necessity yields to Reason (484: 
vod O& avayKns apyovtTos TO TrElOEy a’THY TOY YyLyvopevov Ta 
mrsiota eri to BédtioTOV ayew, Ta’TH KaTA TadTa Te OV 
avayKns HTT@péevns vTro TEOovs Zudpovos oUTw Kat’ apyas 
Evviorato T00e TO Tay). 


Con- 
current 
causes. 
Mechani- 
cal causes 
are 


tvvairia. 


Reason 
and 
Necessity. 


Being and 
Becoming. 


Place 
of the 
Timaeus. 


Stylistic 
affinity to 
the Laws. 


Implied 
references 
to previous 
dialogues. 
1. Effi- 
cient 
causes. 

2. The 
visible 
world 
proceed- 
ing apart 
from God. 


486 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


This general view of Being and Becoming, as given 
in the Timaeus, is not essentially different from the theories 
contained in the dialectical dialogues, and some theories 
of the Timaeus are already prepared for in the Phaedrus 
and Theaetetus. ‘This leaves very few points for confirm- 
ing by detailed comparison the place generally assigned 
to the Timaeus towards the end of Plato’s literary 
activity. We are justified in accepting in this case 
the agreement among all investigators (with insignificant 
exceptions, as, for instance, Munk and Schone), be- 
cause the theories here observed agree exceedingly well 
with the Politicus and Philebus, two very late dialogues, 
and because the style of the Timaeus is nearer to the 
style of the Laws than the style of any other dialogue. 
This is here affirmed as the result of the personal 1m- 
pression produced by the perusal of many thousands of 
stylistic observations; it would take too much space to 
enumerate here all the peculiarities of style common to 
the Laws with the Tvmaeus only, and we refer the reader 
to Ast’s Lexicon and to the authors quoted in Chapter IIL. 
In all these works he will find sufficient evidence for the 
great stylistic affinity of the Timaeus with the Laws, 
an affinity far exceeding the numbers of our own table of 
affinity, based only on 500 peculiarities. Besides the style 
there are still the following arguments in favour of placing 
the Timaeus after the dialectical dialogues : 

1. The relation to the Politicus in the theory of final 
and efficient causes, as explained above. 

2. The relation to the Politicus in the theory of God’s 
retirement from the world. 

3. The transition from the form of a dialogue to a 
continuous exposition, recurring in this form only in 
certain parts of the Laws. Longer speeches in earlier 
dialogues were either of no didactic character (Apology, 
Protagoras, Menexenus) or interrupted by many questions 
and answers (Gorgias, Symposium). Such a_ purely 
didactic exposition in a longer speech without interrup- 


LATEST WORKS: TIMAEUS 487 


tion is a peculiarity of the Timaeus, Critias, and Laws, 
found nowhere earlier. 

4. The view that the same elements are common to 
man with the universe is found in both the Philebus and 
the Timaeus, but presents in the Tvmaeus amore advanced 
stage. In the Philebus this view is introduced as new 
and as a daring feat (29 A: cuyKiwdvvevmper Kal meTexopmev 
Tov oyou, btav avnp Sewos ph Tadta pi) obTws ANN aTadKTws 
éyewv—this refers to the preceding axiom that reason has 
ordered everything, and also to the following hypothesis : 

(OTL OMLKpOY TOUTwY ExacTOV Trap’ Hiv everTL Kal hadrov Kal 
ovdapy ovdapds eidixpives Ov Kai THY SUvVamLy ovK akiav Ths 
gvcews zyov). An attempt is made to prove it by induc- 
tion (29 B: év évl 62 NaBov Twepl Tavtwy voee TavTov. oboy 
Tp Mev EoTL TOU Tap Hiv, ZoTL © ev TO TavTl. . « » TULKpOV 
pév Te TO Tap’ Hiv Kal acOevées Kai Padrov, TO & év TO TavTl 
mANnOE Te Oavpacroy Kal Karr Kal Tacn SvVapEL TH Trepl 
To trip ovon). All this is supposed to be known in the 
Timaeus, and needs no further demonstration. 

5. The world’s soul as the origin of individual souls is 
also first introduced in the Philebus (30 A), and appears 
there as something new, while the same view is the basis 
of the mythus in the Timaeus. The relation in this 
respect of Timaeus and Philebus is similar to the rela- 
tion between Phaedrus and Republic in the question of 
the threefold partition of the soul: the mythical exposi- 
tion uses truths previously reached by reasoning. This 
is not necessarily a general rule, as at an earlier stage the 
intuition of ideas was first mythically given in the Sym- 
posium, then reasoned out in the Phaedo. But as Plato 
later had an increasing liking for myths, it is natural that 
he should represent also mythically truths which had been 
earlier set forth as based on reasoning. 

6. Philosophy is represented as gift of Gods in Phile- 
bus and Timaeus. Though this is a commonplace of 
Platonism, there is in the form in which the mention is 


3. Con- 
tinuous 
exposi- 
tion. 

4. The 
elements 
in Man 
and 
Nature. 


5. Human 
souls 
derived 
from the 
world’s 
soul, as 
hinted in 
Philebus. 


6. Philo- 
sophy 

a cift 
from God. 


7. Doc- 
trine 

of sense- 
percep- 
tion. 

8. God 
free from 
pleasure 


and pain. 


Relation 
to the 
Republic. 


Timaeus 


488 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


made in the Timaeus something that may well be inter- 
preted as a reminiscence of the Philebus : 

Phil.16 co: Oedv pev eis avOpo- Tim. 47 AB: .. . éemoptoducba 
mous Sodas, as ye karapaiverae cirocodias yevos, ob peifoy ayabdy 
enol, moder ex Oey eppihyn Sud twos ovr’ HAOev ovire HEet ToTE TH OvNTO@ 
IIpopnbews dua pavorar@ rwi mupit. yévet dwpnberv ex Gear. 

7. The explanation of sense-perception in the Philebus 
(33 D) as a movement communicated to the soul through 
the body is more elementary than the corresponding 
mention in the Tvmaeus (48 c). 

8. The state of God as free from pleasure or pain is 
announced in the Philebus to be the subject of a future 
inquiry (33 B: tTodto ete Kal eicadOis emicxeoucba, zav 
mpos Noyov Te 7H), and the Timaeus more than any other 
work seems to correspond to that announcement. 

In the above statement we have made no use of the 
peculiar relation of the Timaeus to the Republic. The 
reference to the Republic at the beginning of the Timaeus 
is unmistakable, but the relation of the two dialogues is 
not quite the same as the relation of the Sophist to the 
Theaetetus. In the Sophist we have a direct continuation 
of the Theaetetus, and the persons of the dialogue are the 
same, with the single addition of the Eleatic guest. In the 
Timaeus the scene is different from that of the Republic, 
and Plato recurs to the fiction that the substance of the 
Republic dialogue has been narrated on the previous day 
to the persons first appearing in the Timaeus. This 
fiction is deemed insufficient and improbable by the author 
himself, and he puts in the mouth of Socrates a recapitu- 
lation of the preceding dialogue. In that recapitulation 
not the whole of the Republic is included, and no mention 
is made of the four last books. Far-reaching inferences 
have been made from this omission, about the structure 
of the Republic as well as about the date of the Timaeus. 

The most obvious conclusion would be to allow a longer 


separated distance of time between Republic and Timaeus than 


by a long 


between Theaetetus and Sophist. This conclusion is con- 


LATEST WORKS: TIMAEUS 489 


firmed by our whole inquiry and best explains the great 
change of style and of the literary manner. Other conclu- 
sions, at first sight plausible, are refuted by the considera- 
tion of style. The recapitulation of the Timaeus seems 
to refer only to the first five books of the Republic, and 
thus we might be tempted to suppose that it was written 
before the following five books. But in view of the great 
unity of composition of the Republic and of the great 
homogeneity of its style, it is impossible to separate the 
fifth book from the following by any other work. On the 
other hand, the close relation of the Timaeus to the Laws 
makes it very probable that some twenty years have come 
between that apparent sequel of the Republic and the 
work which it presupposes. Under these circumstances it 
is very natural that Plato should omit some details from his 
recapitulation, and should limit it to the most general 
results, which happen to be concentrated in the first five 
books. There is also another psychological reason why 
he should not now insist on the rule of the philosophers, 
which is the chief subject of the sixth and seventh books of 
the Republic. We must assume that the Timaeus at all 
events is written after the third voyage to Sicily (361 B.c.), 
and after Plato’s great and definitive failure to obtain 
political ascendency. His explanation of that failure is 
given in the Politicus, where he says that the ideal state 
is too perfect for mankind, and that the philosopher who 
could bring it into existence ought to be a god. Now in 
the Timaeus he plans a practical representation of the 
conflict between a perfect state and its neighbours. This 
conflict has not been represented by Plato, because he left 
the Critias unfinished. But we have every reason to 
assume that he did not intend to identify in everything the 
historical state of primitive Attica with the ideal state of 
the Republic. The outline given at the beginning of the 
Critias confirms that assumption. Thus it is natural that 
fixed laws had to play a greater part in the old state of 
Athens than in the Republic. Still the identification of 


interval 
from the 
Republic. 


Rule of 
philo- 
sophers, 
why 
omitted 
in the 
Timaeus. 


The 
Critias 
un- 
finished : 
why ? 


490 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


the political ruler with the philosopher is here also alluded 
to (19 E: dirocédwv avipay Kal TodTiKOY) In a similar 
manner to that which appears in the Politicus. Philo- 
sophy remains the greatest gift of gods to men (47 B), 
and ignorance an illness of the soul (86 B). Also the 
low estimate of poets is maintained (19 D), with a similar 
ironical compliment to that in the Republic. Generally, 
whoever considers impartially the relation of these two 
dialogues must recognise not only that the Tvmaeus pre- 
supposes the whole of the Republic, but that it appears to 
be very much later. 

Thus the place of the Tvmaeus as nearest to the 
Laws is confirmed by every consideration, and no valid 
objection can be raised against this conclusion. It 
remains, however, desirable that the great number of 
stylistic peculiarities of this latest group should be col- 
lected and classified in order to confirm the common 
verdict of all competent authorities. 


II. The Critias. 


There is little to say in the present connection about 
this small fragment of a dialogue left unfinished by Plato 
for some reason unknown. If we consider the great 
interest manifested in its introduction for the intended 
subject of this work, and the circumstance that it is the 
only fragmentary work of Plato, the most natural suppo- 
sition is that only death could have prevented him from 
carrying out such a cherished plan as that of the Timaeus 
trilogy. This supposition is also confirmed by the very 
late style of the Critias, but a definitive proof could be 
given only through stylometric comparison of the Critias 
with the latest parts of the Laws. In view of the small 
size of the Critias (11 pp. ed. Did.) a very great number 
of stylistic observations is required, and they ought to 
refer not only to the vocabulary but also to the construc- 
tion of phrases, inversion of words, phonetic effects, and 


LATEST WORKS: CRITIAS 49] 


all details which constitute the less accidental peculiarities 
of style. Only then will it be possible to decide with 
absolute certainty, on a basis of some thousand peculi- 
arities resuming some hundred thousand observations, 
whether the Critias is contemporaneous with the latest 
parts of the Laws or not. Such a special investigation 
exceeds the limits of the present inquiry: the more so 
as the whole question has no philosophical importance, 
and claims only a purely literary interest. The Critias 
contains no contribution to Plato’s logic besides the 
incidental mention of the familiar view that knowledge 
has a divine origin (106B: avdrov (@eov) TeXe@TaToOv Kal 
adpiotov pappakwv ericthunyv evxoucOa Sidovar), and the 
curious appreciation of the cosmogony of the Timaeus 
as acceptable only on account of human ignorance 
about the gods and everything there expounded (107 AB: 
wept Oe@v .. . eyovTd Te Tpds avOp@Tous Soxeivy ixavas 
Aéyew pdov 1) mepl OvnTav mpos jas. 1) yap amretpia Kal 
apddpa ayvoia TOY akovovTwyv Tepl @V av ovUTws Exwot 
ToAM)Y EvTroplay TapzyecOov TH péddovTe Neyer TL Trepl 
avT@v). 


III. The Laws. 


The question has been seriously discussed whether 
the theory of ideas is alluded to or maintained in the 
Laws. The question put in this indefinite manner is 
entirely out of place. Anybody who reads the Laws 
must notice the entire absence of the earlier theory of 
ideas as known from Phaedo and Republic. This has 
been recognised by all students of Plato, and Ribbing,”*” 
who made a special study of the theory of ideas, went so 
far as to deny the authenticity of the Laws chiefly 
because he did not find there any trace of the Platonic 
ideas. Equally Ueberweg (Untersuchungen, p. 100) recog- 
nised that in the Laws the theory of ideas is nowhere 


*67 §. Ribbing, Genetische Darstellung der Platonischen Ideenlehre, 
Leipzig 1863-64, vol. ii. pp. 150-190. 


Divine 
nature 
of know- 
ledge. 


The 
Timaeus 
gave only 
a probable 
account of 
Divine 
things. 


Supposed 
absence 
of the 
ideal 


theory. 


Generali- 
sation. 


The Laws 
not 
written 

for philo- 
sophers. 


But Plato 
never 


492 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


mentioned. The same has been the impression of 
English scholars. Grote (vol. iv. p. 275) and Jowett 
(vol. 11. p. 18; vol. v. p. ccxxxvi) agree that the theory of 
ideas is left out in the Laws. The same conclusion is 
reached by C. Ritter, in his recent commentary to the 
Laws, and Zeller also finds only one passage which could 
be interpreted as an allusion to the theory of ideas (Philo- 
sophie der Griechen, II. 1. p. 953). This passage (965 c: 
mpos wlav idzay 2K TOV TOAAOY Kal avomolwy SvvaTov Eivat 
Aréevv) is really as insufficient as evidence in favour of 
the old theory of ideas as similar passages from the earliest 
Socratic dialogues (Huthyph. 6D: wid idfa Ta te avoowa 
avoota sivat). AlsoSusemihl, who maintained against Zeller 
that Plato remained faithful to his theory of ideas up to 
his latest age, acknowledged (Genetische Entwickelung, 
vol. 11. p. 577) that the idea of the good can be only 
guessed at in the passage concluding the dialogue. 

It is very strange that in the whole discussion about 
the traces of the theory of ideas in the Laws nobody cared 
to distinguish between the earlier self-existing ideas and 
the ideas as known from the dialectical dialogues, where 
they appear as existing only in souls. Such ideas, 
equivalent to perfect notions, cannot have been abandoned 
by Plato, though he had no opportunity to mention them 
in the Laws, because the whole dialogue, like the 
Timaeus, rests on right and probable opinion, not on 
dialectical knowledge. Plato was not obliged to write 
always for philosophers alone, and he seems to have 
dedicated his latest years to a popular exposition of his 
political doctrines adapted to the actual level of mankind, 
very much below his own ideal standard. If somebody, 
like Grote, believes that Plato could become untrue to 
philosophy, he betrays only his own incapacity to judge 
a philosopher. Plato remained a philosopher up to his 
latest age, and the very last pages of the Laws prove it to 


268 C. Ritter, Platos Gesetze, Kommentar zum griechischen Text, Leipzig 
1896, p. 355. 


LATEST WORKS: LAWS 493 


any unprejudiced reader. The distinction between know- 
ledge and opinion is one of those logical distinctions 
which, once reached, cannot be afterwards neglected by a 
true philosopher, and if Plato could be reasonably 
suspected of such a desertion, no hope is left for any one 
of a permanence of knowledge. Plato remains in all ages 
the ideal type of a philosopher, and philosophy which is 
not knowledge is nothing. Thus it is from the outset a 
psychological impossibility to accept Grote’s interpreta- 
tion of Plato’s silence about ideas in the Laws, according 
to which Plato contracted ‘a comparative mistrust of any 
practical good to come from philosophy,’ ‘ eliminating or 
reducing to a minimum that ascendency of the: philo- 
sophical mind which he had once held to be omnipotent 
and indispensable.’ 

Such extravagant conclusions are the result of a 
widespread error about Plato’s philosophy, consisting in 
identifying the so-called ‘theory of ideas’ with Platonic 
philosophy and with his philosophical knowledge. We 
have seen above that no such identification results from 
a chronological survey of the development of Plato’s 
logic. Even in the Republic the transcendental ideas do 
not include all the philosophy of Plato, and some of his 
logical doctrines have little to do with the world of ideas. 
The last appearance of such a world is in the Phaedrus. 
Already in the Theaetetus the categories occupy the place 
of ideas, which in the Parmenides also are supplanted 
by logical exercise in the analysis of notions. In the 
Sophist Plato speaks of his own earlier doctrine of ideas 
as belonging to the history of thought, and after the 
Sophist he never uses the terms «idos and (ééa in the 
meaning which they had in Phaedo, Republic, and 
Phaedrus. It becomes for him a cardinal truth of 
philosophy that ideas and reason exist only in souls, so 
that they cannot any longer be looked upon as inde- 
pendent substances, though they are always called True 
Being. Ideas are perfect notions and refer more espe- 


aban- 

doned 
philo- 
sophy. 


Nor did he 
mistrust 
philo- 
sophy, 

as Grote 
imagined. 


Plato’s 
philo- 
sophy 
has been 
too much 
identified 
with the 
so-called 
‘ theory 
of ideas.’ 


The Soul 
is the 
centre 

of Plato’s 
later 
theory of 
know- 
ledge. 


494 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


cially to the natural kinds of animals in the largest 
meaning of this word (including plants) in all dialectical 
dialogues and also in the Tvmaeus. In this meaning 
alone we can expect to find them in the Laws, and in the 
only passage in which Plato mentions an idea in this 
dialogue (965 c), this is the only interpretation acceptable. 
A very strange prejudice is needed if we are to find every- 
where the old supramundane ideas, where Plato speaks of 
an idea in a meaning which exactly corresponds to the 
use of this word in modern philosophy. It can only be 
recommended to all those who still have any doubts on 
this subject to read with the greatest attention what 
Campbell (Rep. II. pp. 294-321) wrote about the use of 
metaphysical terms by Plato. They will then see at once 
that no conclusion can be drawn from the use or absence 
of terms like eidos or 6a which Plato borrowed from 
earlier writers and used himself in many different mean- 
ings, ‘very seldom with a pronounced metaphysical 
intention’ (p. 294). Plato’s philosophy is not a mere 
theory of knowledge, and his theory of knowledge is not 
limited to the conception of ideas. The soul is not an 
idea, and acts a more important part in later Platonism 
than all ideas of Middle Platonism. It is the soul, and 
not the ideas, which is the central point of Plato’s later 
theory of knowledge. Here it is expressly acknowledged 
that dialectical questions exceed the scope of the dialogue 
and the understanding of the hearers (892E: vody o 
perrov goth Aoyos opodpotepos Kai ayeddov lows aBaTos ws 
TH ope@v poun * un 6) cKoTodwiay thuyyov TE bpiv guTroinon 
Tapapepomevos TE Kal épwT@v aijOels dvTas atroKpicewy) and 
even a simple classification of psychical movement is 
followed immediately by the confession of both Kleinias 
and Megillus that they are unable to follow (644D: 
boys pév mos ebéropat, eye piv TO pETA TATA WS ETrOME- 
vou—kal év wot nv TavTO TOdTO maOos zu). Still, despite 
these limitations, we see here the theory of the soul made 
the object of a longer explanation, given in a more 


LATEST WORKS: LAWS 495 


popular tone than in the Phaedrus and Timaeus, where 
the same doctrines were already set forth, and resuming 
the conclusions reached in both these dialogues. 

The old distinction made in the Phaedrus between 
the self-moving principle and all other moving and 
moved objects of the universe is here again stated with 
ereat rhetorical strength and with all the absolute 
certainty that Plato attached to metaphysical truths. 
Once entered upon this argument the reader must notice 
at once that he is outside the realm of probable opinions 
and plausible myths in the calm region of absolute know- 
ledge which never changes. Material things move in 
space (893 C: év ywpa Twi Ta Te EoTHTAa EoTNKE KAL TA 
Kivovpeva KweiTat...D: Ta dé ye KWotvpeva ev TOA. . 
boa hopa Kivetrar wetaBawvovta eis zrepoy del TOTO) and 
produce infinite appearances of growth and decay (893 E: 
ouyKcpwoueva pev av€avetar, Staxpivopeva 82 Olver TOTE, 
dtav 7 KabecotynKvia Exdotov zis Siayévn, wr) pwEevovons b& 
avThs & awpotepa atodAvtat). The material world is 
here pictured, in agreement with the Timaeus, as con- 
stantly becoming something else, never remaining the 
same (894 A: yiyverar 6 TavTwY yéveots, Hvik’ av TL TdOos 
73; Odov @s oTOTay apx7 aBodca avEnv eis Thy Sevtépav 
EXOn petadBacww Kal aro tavrns eis THY TANoioY, Kal wéxpL 
Tplav éModca aicOnow oxy Tots aicbavopevots. petaBanr- 
Nov méev odv oUTw Kal wETAKLWOUpEVOY YlyvEeTaL Tar). 

After an eloquent page on the movements forming 
the material universe (893 B-894 4) the Athenian guest 
reminds us in a very short phrase that True Being 
remains always the same (894 A: gortu 62 évTws dv oroTay 
pevn). This phrase is scarcely supposed to be under- 
stood by Kleinias and Megillus, but has an unmistakable 
meaning for those readers who remember the Timaeus. 
It means the world of eternal notions forming the 
system of human and divine knowledge. These notions 
are here as little as in any dialectical dialogue meant to 
exist as separate substances. They can only exist in 


Resump- 
tion of 
the self- 
moving 
principle 
of the 
Phaedrus. 


The 
material 
world 
subject to 
continual 
change. 


True 
Being 
remains 
always the 
same. 


Priority 
of soul. 


Self- 
causing 
movement 
the 
strongest. 


This is 
shown 
more 
fully than 
in the 
Phaedrus 
to be a 
logical 
necessity. 


496 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


souls, and a sample of such eternal knowledge is given in 
the following explanation of the priority of soul over 
matter, an important theorem of latest Platonism. The 
starting point of this argument is an analysis of various 
kinds of motion, as in the Phaedrus. Among all pos- 
sible movements, those caused from without must be 
distinguished from those which are their own cause, the 
latter being by far the strongest and most active move- 
ments (894 B: goTw Tolyuy 7 pev ErEepa Suvapevn Kuvelv 
Kivno.s, sautnv d& advvaTodoa az pla Tis, ) O62 EauTHY T 
ast Kat étepa Suvapévn KaTa TE ovYKploEs EV TE SlaKpicEeoWW 
avEats Te Kal TO evavTiw Kai yevéceor Kal POopais adrAH pia 
Tis av TOV Tacav KWhcsov.... D: TW’ av TpoKpivaimer 
opOotata Tacav zppwmeveotatTny Te Elval Kal TpaKTLKnY 
Stahepovtws ;—uupio avayKn tov pavat SvabEepew THY avTHV 
auTny Suvapgevny KWwetlv, Tas dé AANas Tacas VoTépas). 

The conception of a principle or beginning of movement 
is here more fully illustrated than in the Phaedrus, as a 
logical necessity (894 E: étav dpa avTo avTo Kwhcav Erzpov 
addowwon, TO OS ETEpov Addo, Kal oVT@ 87) yidLa eri puplots 
ylypntas Ta KWNOZVTA, MOV APY} Tus avT@V ~oTaL THs Kw7- 
cews ATUGNS ANAN TANY 7) THS avTHS aUTHV KLWNTdoNS pwETA- 
Bory;). To make it clearer to hearers who are not used 
to such metaphysical investigations, the Athenian guest 
supposes that before all physical movements began there 
may have been a time of immobility, and asks what kind 
of movement must have been the first movement in the 
universe. He answers that it could only be the move- 
ment of a self-moving principle, and calls it a logical 
necessity (895 A B: e otain Tws Ta TdvTAa omod yevouEva 
Le GvayKn TpeTHY Kiynow yEevécOaL.. THY AUTHY KWotCaD* 
apXnVY dpa KLYnoewY Tach Kal TpaTHY ev TE ETTHOL 
yevomevny Kal ev KivoUpevoLs OVTAaY TIV ATHY KWoDGaY dHcoMEV 
avayKkaiws sivat mpecButatny Kat Kpatiotny petaBoryy 
macov). After such a decisive explanation of the nature 
of movement Plato proceeds exactly as in the Phaedrus 
to identify the soul with the self-moving principle. But 


LATEST WORKS: LAWS 497 


he introduces here a middle term which has not been 
mentioned in the Phaedrus, though already used in con- 
nection with the theory of the soul in the Phaedo and 
fiepublic. In these earlier dialogues life had been stated 
to be the characteristic distinction of the notion of soul. 
In the Phaedrus the soul was identified with a self- 
moving principle. In the Laws, where the argument 
on the soul’s priority and immortality is more minute and 
popular than either in the Phaedrus or in the Phaedo, 
Plato combines both trains of argument and uses the 
notion of life as a link between ‘self-moving principle’ 
and ‘soul’ (895cC: Gv avto mpocepodmev, Otay avTo avTo 
xu). What moves itself, lives, and what lives is animated, 
or has a soul (895 ©: orotay Wuyny ev Ticw opdysv ovK 
aro 7) TavTOv TOUTH Cy OporoynTZor). 

It results from the above that the soul is identical 
with a self-moving principle, beg indeed only a name 
for what is thus defined (8964: 6 6) ux) Tovvopa, Tis 
TovToU NOyos; Fxomev AANov TAHY TOV voY dn PnOgvTA, THY 
Suvapévnv avutnyv avutnyv Kively Kivnow.w;... 68 & 
EoTL TOUTO OUTws ZyoV, Apa eT TOFODpEV pr) iKavas dSedeiy Oat 
Wuxny Tavtov ov Kai THY THOTHY yévEecLV Kal KNOW... , 
emevon ye avehavn petaBorHs TE Kai KWITEwWs ATrdons aiTia 
admacw; ... (kavoeTtata O2deiKTas Woyn TOY TavTwY 
mpecButatn, paveioa ye apxn KLvnaews). The proof is 
held sufficient, both by teacher and pupil, and we see in 
this passage that Plato had lost nothing of his proud 
philosophical certainty so far as metaphysical truth was 
concerned, even after all political disillusions, and in his 
latest age, when he wrote the tenth book of his Laws for 
vulgar readers and citizens. 

Without going so far as the Neoplatonists in their 
suspicions and guesses about a secret doctrine, we are led 
by a consideration of the whole of Plato’s literary legacy 
to believe that he did not care to leave in writing his 
answer to all the most difficult problems of philosophy. 


Even ‘the Laws, the largest of his works, representing 
KK 


Life the 
middle 
term 
between 
self- 
moving 
principle 
and Soul. 


Traces of 
unabated 
confidence 
in meta- 
physical 
truth. 


Pro- 
treptic 
character 
of earlier 
writings 
continued 
in the 


Laws. 


The 
philo- 
sopher 

is still 
the only 
legislator. 


498 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


a conversation which must have lasted a whole very long 
summer day—the Laws, which in our editions forms a 
volume of over four hundred pages of close printing— 
maintain the protreptic character of earlier writings, and 
appear to have been written as a voluminous programme 
of the Academy, in order to attract future lawgivers to 
Plato’s oral lessons. Such at least is the impression 
produced by the concluding pages of this long dialogue. 
Here the fiction of the dialogue seems to disappear, and 
Plato exalts his school in such an unmistakable manner 
that no doubt can be left who the Athenian philosopher 
is: no one in all the world could speak in this way save 
the first Master of the Academy. He says that he can 
supply from among his pupils men qualified as. leaders for 
any state, and that he has in these things unusual ex- 
perience and knowledge (9688: EvAAjrTwp TOUTOU ye vuiy 
Kal eyo yuyvoiunyv av Tpoliuws, Tpos 8 gmol Kai ETepous 
lows evpnow Sia THY TEpl Ta ToOLAdT eEwreiplay TE Kal 
oKEeyly yeyovuidy wot Kal pada ouxvny). 

It has been clearly expressed in the preceding pas- 
sage that such leaders of men can be only dialecticians 
or philosophers who are able to unite into one whole all 
knowledge, to apply it harmoniously to the aims of life, and 
to show the reason of everything that is reasonable (967 8). 
Whoever is not able to comply with these conditions, 
however he may have reached a high level of virtue, 
ought to obey, not to command, and this refers to any 
given state, not only to the ideal state of the Republic 
(968 4: 0 53 un Tad oids 7” dv pos Tats Snuociats apetats 
KexThoOat oyedov apyeov mév OdK av TOTE yévoLTO iKavos OANS 
movEsws, UTnpeTns 8 av aAdois dpyovow. Cf. 969 B: éav 
ye wav ovTOS Huiv o Ostos yevntar EVANOYOS, TapadoTéov TOv- 
TO THY TOAW, aupisBATHals 7 OK zZo7’ OSEMia OVSEVL TOY 
viv Tapa Tav0’ ws eros eimety vopoleTav, bvTws S& EoTaL 
oyedov Uap aToTETEhETpEvOY, OD TuLKP® TpoabEV dvElpaTos 
Hs TO Oyo ehnWapsla, Kehardis vod Te Kowwvias eixova 
twa Twos Evupitaytes, av dpa nuiv of te avdpes axpiBas 


LATEST WORKS: LAWS 499 


exAeyOGo1, Taidev0aal Te TpoonKkovTws, TaLdevOévTES TE ev 
aKpoTONEL THS YOpas KaToLKnoaYTEes PUAaAKES ATOTEAEC OCW, 
olous isis ovx sidouev ev TH Tpdcbev Biw mpos apeThy 
cwTnpias yEvomEevous). 


But, as in the Republic, Plato declines to explain 


the highest knowledge in the present dialogue, and he 
repeats at the end of his life the same conviction which 
he expressed about thirty years earlier in the Phaedrus, 
when he had just completed some of his most brilliant 
works. It would be a vain task to set down in writing 
the highest knowledge, because this can be only im- 
planted in living souls, and would lose all its power 
if fixed in a literary work (968 DE: pods tovTos 62 
xpovous os Te Kai éy ols det mapadrapBdavew Exacta, 
MaTaLOY TAUT ev ypadpmace éyEW* OVOE yap aUTOls Tots 
pavOdvovor dna yiryvowt’ av, 6 Te Tpos Katpov pavOdveTat, 
mplv evTOs THS Wuy hs ExdoTw TOU waOypatos era TH NY 
yeyovevat). Thus the highest summit of political training 
and knowledge is not to be foretold, as Plato explains, 
playing upon words in his usual fashion and inventing 
a new term for the purpose (968 E: ott 67 Twavta Ta Tepi 
Tatra amoppnta pev rExOevtTa ovK av dpOds RzyorTO, 
ampoppnta be dia TO pndév tmpoppnOévta Sndody Tav 
Neyouevwv). The careful consideration of this passage, 
one of the last pages written by Plato, must be emphatic- 
ally recommended to all those who believe that the judg- 
ment on writing and literature expressed in the Phaedrus 1s 
a mark of youthfulness, and could not well fit the author 
of the Republic after he had composed this literary 
masterpiece. It is exceedingly important for a right 
understanding of Plato’s writings to keep constantly in 
mind the protreptic character of all his works. 

In this light it becomes also evident why, though we 
do not find in the Laws many traces of logical theories 
expressed earlier, these theories are by no means aban- 
doned, only omitted as out of place in a very popular 
work. The theory of the soul, which finds in the Laws 


K K 2 


Plato’s 
last 
written 
page 
again 
exalts 

oral above 
written 
teaching. 


Repetition 
of earlier 
state- 
ments. 


Theory of 
the Soul. 


Plurality 
of souls : 
perfect 
and im- 


perfect. 


500 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


an exceptionally large place, is the best measure of 
Plato’s latest metaphysical convictions and shows that 
they have not been essentially altered since the Sophist. 
Plato complains that nobody before him has sufficiently 
investigated the nature of the soul, or recognised its 
priority (892 A: ~uyny jyvonkévar Kivduvedovor pv ddLyou 
Evuravtes, oiov Te Ov TUyXavEL Kai SvvamW Hv zyEL, TOV 
Te GdAwy avThis Tepe Kal 61 Kai yEevécsws, wS ev TpwTOLS 
goTl cwpatov zutpocbey Tavt@v yEevomevn Kal wetaBorHs 
TE AUT@Y Kal METAKOTUNnTEWS ATTUTNHS ApKEl TavTOs “adXov, 
cf. 967D: Wey éote mpecBUTaTov atavtwv boa ors 
peteirndev aavatov Te apyEe TE ON TwUaTwV TaVTwY). 
The soul, with all its manifestations, as will, reason, 
opinion, memory, is not only earlier than the material 
world with the three dimensions of space and the forces 
acting in it (896 CD: tporros dé Kai On Kai Bovrnoes Kal 
Aoyiopol Kai Soar adyOsis eriédeval TE Kal var TpPOTEpA 
piKoUS TwUaTwWY Kal TAdTOUs Kai BdOovs Kai pwopyns Ely 
yeyovota av, elmep Kal Wuyi) cepartos), but also the true 
cause of all material and moral existence (896 D: déyo- 
Aoyetv avayKaioy tov Te ayabav aitiay sivar Wuyi Kai 
TOV KAKOV Kal KaNOV Kal alaxypOV OiKdiwy TE Kal Adikwy Kal 
TayTwy TOV évayTiov, Elm@Eep TOY TaVTwY ye aUTHY OnoopEy 
aitiav). 

This refers primarily, as in the T’vmaeus, to the world’s 
soul, with the difference that the plurality of souls 
is here more insisted upon. Already in the Timaeus a 
plurality of perfect souls was affirmed on account of the 
perfection visible in the stars; here another reason is 
brought forward for a plurality of souls, which reminds 
us of the discussion in the Parmenides about the differ- 
ence between human and divine notions. Plato refrains 
from ascribing imperfection to perfect souls, and as he 
cannot accept every detail of Being as perfect, he wants 
at least two souls to explain the universe, and generally 
speaking, a plurality of souls (896 E: Wuyrv 51) Svotkodcapy 
Kal évoiKovcay év amace TOls TuVTH KiWoUméevoLs . . . Kal TOV 


LATEST WORKS: LAWS 501 


ovpavoy avayKn dvorxety pavar .. . wiay i) TrElovs;—m7 NELovS* 
eyo UTep oha@v atoxpwobtpat. Svotv wey yé Tov eXaTTOY 
wnodev TUOGpmev, THs TE EvepyéeTiOos Kal THS TavayTia duvapEevns 
eEepyateo Oar). This passage has been generally interpreted 
as implying a dualism contradictory to Plato’s earlier 
doctrines. But there is no need for such an interpreta- 
tion, if we can take it literally and find it in general 
agreement with the Timaeus. Plato does not say that 
there are two world souls, two opposed principles like 
those in the Persian religion. He says only that if per- 
fection is opposed to imperfection, imperfection cannot be 
ascribed to a perfect soul, and to account for it at least 
one imperfect soul is needed besides the perfect soul 
which is the source of perfection. This minimal number 
of two souls is only introduced for the sake of argument, 
the conclusion being stated clearly at the outset: a 
plurality of souls. This agrees with the plurality of un- 
equal souls as represented in the Tvmaeus, and only the 
argument of imperfection as proof of plurality is new. 
That Plato by no means abandoned his views on the 
fundamental unity of the universe as set forth in the 
Timaeus can be clearly seen from many passages in the 
Laws, and specially from his increasing reverence for 
divine Providence which is evident at every step of the 
arcument. For the sake of the popular character of 
his exposition he generally speaks of a plurality of Gods, 
according to the use of language and the prevailing 
religious conviction of his hearers. But occasionally the 
almighty Demiurge reappears under the name of @0s or 
of vods. That the term dnwoupyes is no longer applied to 
the highest Divinity may be explained by the increasing 
awe of Plato for the highest soul, which he dares not now 
compare, as in the Timaeus, with other agencies. But 
he maintains the conception of such a soul (898C: apictn 


One God 
supreme. 


uy), reigning over a whole hierarchy of Gods down to | 


each man’s individual soul, and even below. It is no 
longer a God abiding after creation in his eternal peace, 


New con- 
ception 
ot Provi- 
dence. 


502 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


but the true image of Providence which remained in all 
later religions, beg a conception far transcending the 
natural limits of Greek mythology. 

Above the blind necessity of Homer, Plato’s genius 
raised a new idea of the almighty leader of the whole 
universe, who orders every detail in it according to the 
alms of the whole (903 B: t® Tod mwavros émipedoupév@ 
Tpos THY cwTnplay Kal apeTHnv Tov bdov TavT zoTl CUVTE- 
TAYMEVA, WY Kal TO mépos els OUVamLY ExacTOY TO TPOGHKOY 
TdoxyEel Kal Toit’ TovTo 6 sicily apyovTes mpooTeta- 
yeévot EXaoTOLS 27 TO OpLKpOTaTOY asi TAaOns Kal Tpdk&ews, 
gis Leplopov Tov zoyaTov TédOS aTrELpyacpévoL . . .). 
While the individual souls wander from one life to 
another, it remains the task of God to fix for each soul 
its proper place. of activity according to its merits or 
sins (903 D: éret 68 det wuyn cuvTeTaypevn ToOmaTe 
TOTE pev AAW TOTE OF GANM, pETABAArEL TavTOias péETA- 
Boras Sv éavtny if) bv) ETepav wuyny,” oddzv Addo Epyov 
TO TETTEVTH NElreTar TANY pETATLOevalL TO MeV ApELVoV YyiTyVO- 
pevov 700s eis BeXtiw TOTOV, yEipov O& Eis TOV YElpova, KATA 
TO TpéTrov avT@Y ExacToV, Wa THs TpoanKkovans polpas Nay- 
Yan). 

In heaven and on earth the movements of the soul 
are the first causes of all physical movements, the soul 
being governed either by divine reason or folly (896 E: 
airyer psy On wy? TavTa Ta Kat’ ovpavoy Kal YY Kal 
Oanrattrav tais avTis Kuwnoecow... 897A: maoats doar... Tas 
KLUNTELS THMAT@Y AyovoL TaVTA...B: ots uy} ypwuevn voov 
bev TpocdaBovca ais} Oeiov opOas Oéovea, opOa Kai evdaipova 
Tadaywyel Tavta, avota 68 Evyyevoyevn TavTa av TavavTia 
TovTos atepyatetat). The most perfect souls are Gods 
whose bodies we see in the shape of stars. Those perfect 
movements can be produced only by perfect souls (899 B: 
dotpev Tépt TdvT@Y . . . épodpev . . . ws errELdn uy ev 
Hh abuxyal wavrwv tovtwv aitia éhavnoarv, ayabai 62 Tacav 


*69 Here appears for the first time the conception of a direct action of 
one soul on another, which anticipates modern theories of telepathy. 


LATEST WORKS: LAWS 503 


apetnv, Scovs avras sivas dyoomer, cite 2v copacw evodoa, 
fda ovta, Koopover TayTa ovpavor éite OTN Te Kal Oras, Cf. 
966 E, 967 D). God being the true measure of all things 
(716 C: 6 Oe0s jpiv ravtTev XpnuaTov péTpov av eln wadLoTAa), 
it is the common aim of all souls to become as similar to 
Him as possible (716 c: tov ody TA ToLovT~ TpocPiryH 
yevnoopevov sis Stvayw 6 Te pddiota Kal avtoy ToLodToV 
dvayKatov yiyvecbat). 

While Plato thus raises the conception of Divinity 
above all earlier standards, he does not deprive the 
individual human soul of its powers and responsibilities. 
After the Gods, there is nothing in the universe so divine 
as human souls, which are the nearest to divinity (726 E: 
TAVTOV KTHUATWY pwEeTAa Oeovs rvyn OeLoTAaTOV, oiKELoTATOV 
dv, cf. 728 B, 731 0: apuyy mace Tywwrartor, cf. 966 EZ). And 
the soul has power also to err, and is the cause of its 
own faults (727 B: Tov dwaptnudtwv aitioy . . . Kat TOV 
TArsioToV Kakav Kal weyiotwv). Different kinds of life de- 
pend upon the variety of souls and their faculties (803 a B: 
Ta Tov Biov cynpata SvactHcacbar KaTa TpOTTOUs TOUS TOY 
Wuyav dvTws avToav Ta TpoT Ela KaTABAEC OAL, Toa wNXaVT, 
Kal tice Tote TpoTraLs Evvortes TOV Biov apiota Sia TOV TOD 
toutou Ths Cws StakopicOnoopeba, ToUTO oKoTEiv OpOds). 

The philosopher is looking upon human life from 
a very exalted point of view, and with almost infinite 
horizons before his mind, as if he dwelt already in a better 
place than this earth. He occasionally goes so far as to 
question whether human life is altogether to be taken 
seriously, comparing it with a stage performance in which 
each of us may be looked upon as.a puppet of the Gods, 
perhaps a plaything only pulled by various cords and 
strings in different ways (644D : dadpa piv ExacTov tev 
nync@ucla Tov Sow Ociov, cite ms Talyvioy ékElywy ETE WS 
omovon Til EvveotnKos’ ov yap 61) TOUTO YE YyuyV@oKOpED, 
TOOE O& lopev, OTL TadTA Ta AON ev Hiv olov Vvetpa 7H 
pnpwOoi tives evotoat orl Te Huds Kal AXdjdats avOENKovoWw 
évavTiat ovoat én’ évavtias mpaéets, ov 52 Swwpicpévyn apET 


God the 
true? 
measure 
of all 
things, 
not Man. 


Life not 
to be 
taken too 
seriously. 


Serious- 
ness of 
noble 
pastime. 


The best 
security 
lies in 
following 
the good 
and wise. 
The worst 
punish- 
ment is 


504 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


kat Kxakia xetrat, cf. 803c). From the philosopher’s 
standpoint human cares and struggles have not all the 
importance attached to them by those concerned; still he 
recommends that they should be met with due earnest- 
ness as long as we are here, and that we should play 
our part as we are expected to do (803 B: gots 61) tolvuy Ta 
ToV avipoTev Tpdywata pEeyadns pev oTrevdns ovK déLa, 
avayKatov ye wiv oTrovdabew* toUTO b ovK EvTUYEes* e7reLON OF 
evTav0a éopev, si THs Sia TPOTHKOVTOS TLVOS AUTO TPATTOLMED, 
lows dv nuiv cvmpeTpov av ein). 

He complains that most men ignore the relative 
importance of human things, and take seriously what 
does not deserve their attention, while they play with 
things which ought to be taken very seriously (803c: 
gnut xphvar TO pv omovdaioy orovdabew, TO OF pn) 
oTrovoatoy fn . . . TOVT@ On Oeiv TO TpOTM EvvETOmEVOY Kal 
maivovta 6 TL KadXicTas TaLdids TavT avdpa Kal yuvaixa 
oUTw SiaBiavat, Tovvavtiov 7) vov SvavonOevtas). Human 
nature if left to itself easily degenerates (713 C: avOpwreia 
vats ovdemia ixavy Ta avOpworiwa diotkodca avToKpaTwp 
TavTa mi) ovy UBpews Te Kal adixlas wectodcOar). But there 
are always found in the crowd a few divine men, whose 
character is independent of all outward influences: these 
are worth seeking over sea and land, and their experience 
and knowledge are valuable in any state (951 B: etait yap év 
Tots Todnois avOpwro. ast Oelot Ties, ov TodAOl, TavTos 8 
aEvoe EvyylyvecOat, pvopevos ovdev padAov ev evyoMoumEevats 
TONECLW 7) Kal pn, WY KaT’ ixyvOsS al YPN TOV év Tals EvVO- 
povupévats TONECW OiKodVTA, éE.ovTa KaTa PadXaTTaY Kal Yhv, 
Cntety os av advapGaptos 7, cl. Phaedo78 A). 'The best men 
ought to be followed always (728 c), and the worst punish- 
ment is to become similar to the worst men (728 B: tiv 
yap Neyouevny Sixny THs Kakoupylas THY pEyloTHY OvOElS . . « 
NoylCerar, zoTe 8 1) pweylotyn TO Opmotovcbat Tols ovoL KaKois 
avépacw .. . TpoamepuKota 52 Tots ToLovTOLs avayKn TroLEty 
Kal Tdoyew & Tep’KaciY AAA ovSs of ToLodTOL TroLEtY Kal 


Aéeyeuv, cf. Theaet. 177 A). 


LATEST WORKS: LAWS 505 


Against the vulgar worship of wealth, Plato protests 
with his wonted vehemence, saying that all the gold on 
earth, added to all the treasures hidden underground, can 
never equal the value of virtue (728A: was yap 6 7 ért 
ys Kal UO yhs ypuaos apeThs ovx avtagkios). The greatest 
danger to the soul’s growth and the source of all its errors 
is the wrong popular belief that each man is nearest to 
himself, and the wicked love of self (731 E: mavtov 62 
peylotov Kxak@v avOpwrrois toils modXols EwhuTov ev Tais 
uxyais zoTiv, ob Tas EavTS cvyyvopny Zxov atopuyiy ovde- 
flav pnyavata TOTO & Zot 0 Agyoucw ws hiros avTO Tas 
avOpwros dio 7’ go7l Kal dpOas Exeu TO Oeiv Eivat TOLOVTOV" 
To O& aAnOeia ye TwavTwy dpapTnuatwv dia Tv oodpa 
Eavtod didiay aitiov éxaot@ ylyvetar Exacrote). Hach man 
should love just actions wherever he meets them (7324 : 
oUTE EavTOY OTE TA EaUTOU xpi) TOY YE méyav avdpa zoopevoY 
otépyelv, GdAa Ta SlKaLa, gay Te Tap AUTO zav Te Tap Gr 
PaAXNoV mpatTomeva Tuyyarvy). It is thoroughly character- 
istic of a time when Plato no longer admitted the ideas as 
substances, that he speaks on that occasion of just actions, 
and not of absolute justice or of the idea of the just. 
The ruling notions of later Platonism are the soul and 
activity or movement. The world is represented as a 
struggle of souls, each of them striving to advance by the 
love of those who are better and farther ahead on the way 
to perfection (732B: mdvra dvOpwrov xpyn pevyew 70 opodpa 
dirsiv aitév, tov 8 éavtod Bertio Sioxew Sei, pndeniar 
aicyvyny éml TO TowovT® Tpdcbev ToLovuevov). The close 
relation of each person to the highest divinity and power 
of the leading Providence is illustrated by the assertion 
that even chance is directed by the divine will, and is to 
be trusted when human reason fails (690 c: Ozopiry 62 ye 
kal evTvyh Twa AsyovTes . . . Els KAHpov Twa Tpodyousy 
kal NayovTa wey apyew, SvoKAnpodvTa 82 amuovta apxyecVat 
70 SixawTatov cival paper). . 

It is evident that in this realm of souls directed by 
divine Providence, and, acting on matter as well as on 


to grow 
like the 
bad. <— 
Contempt 
of the 
worship 
of wealth 
and of 
self-love. 


Good 
men and 
righteous 
actions 
here 
replace 
justice 
and the 
idea of 
Good. 


Divine 
Provi- 
dence to 
be relied 
on where 
reason 
fails, as 
in leaving 
final 
election 
to the lot. 


No room 
for 


separate 
ideas. 


Unity of 


conscious- 


ness: 
subdivi- 
sion of 
faculties. 


Pleasure 
and pain, 
replacing 
desire. 


The 
higher 
emotions 
replace 
the 
Oupoedes. 
Fear and 


506 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


each other, there is no room for self-existing substantial 
ideas. Ideas continue to be called true Being (8944: 
ovtws ov), but their only Being, here as in all the dialecti- 
cal dialogues, is truly in a soul of some kind, so that the 
substantial existence of an infinity of souls, affirmed in 
the Laws as well as in the Timaeus, throws a new light 
on the correctness of our interpretation of that famous 
passage of the Sophist (249A) which gave rise to the 
strange conception of animated ideas. The truth is that 
for Plato in his later works zavteAds év corresponded 
rather to the soul than to the ideas contained in the 
soul. 

The unity of consciousness, known from the Theae- 
tetus, is here reasserted (6440: fa piv jyov ExacTov 
avTov TLOHpuev) and the subdivision of the faculties of the 
soul is carried farther than in the Republic and Phaedrus. 
The lowest stage is pleasure and pain, two opposite 
advisers both deprived of reason (6440: dvo 02 KexTnmevov 
év avT@ EvuPovdw évavtio Te Kal adhpove, & TpocaryopEvo- 
fev HOovnY Kal AUTnV). These two movements of the soul 
(896 E) are the earliest in the development of man and 
begin in childhood (653 A: Aéy@ Tolvuv Tov Taldwv TraLdicnv 
eivat Tp@THY alaOnow HoovnY Kai ATHY, Kal 2v ois apETH 


Wuxi Kal KaKia Tapaylyvetat TpOToVv, TadT’ eivar); they 


correspond to the worst part of the soul as represented in 
the Republic and Phaedrus, except that Plato substitutes 
here as in the Timaeus the ,two opposite notions of 
pleasure and pain for the earlier éri@upntixoy of the 
Republic, which had been still alluded to in the Timaeus 
as combined with the sensations of pleasure and pain 
(Tim. T7 B: aicO@noews Hdelas Kal adyewis peta er iOupiov). 

Also the faculty of the nobler feelings, designated 
earlier by the term @upoedes, is now subdivided and 
reduced to the opposites of fear and confidence, both 
being defined as expectancy or opinions about the future 
(644D: d0€as weddovT@v, oly Kowov pev dvoua érTis, LOLoVv 
52 hoBos wey 7 Tpo AUarHS earls, Oappos 5: 7 Tpo TOD éva- 


LATEST WORKS: LAWS 507 


vtiov). This is also called @uyéds, and like desire is equally 
deprived of reason (863B: Oupos, Svceps Kal Svc payor 
KThwa zuTepuKos, adoyiotm Bia To\Ad avatpére), and 
different from pleasure (863B: *Sovjy ye od tadtov TO 
Ovup@ mpocayopevouev, 2& évavtias 82 alte dauiv popns 
duvactevovoay TELOot meta aTatns Bralov TpaTrTEl, 6 TL TEP 
av avTis 7» BovrAnows 20zAjon). Once called a state or 
part of the soul (863 B: & pév ev woyn tis dvcews elite 
Te wa0os site 71 wépos By 6 Ovyds), this faculty is gene- 
rally included among the soul’s movements, which are 
enumerated without any systematic order in the important 
passage in which the priority of the soul’s movement is 
reasserted (897 A: wuyijs Kivijceow dvoyata gots Bovre- 
cba, cxorreic bat, erripedeioba, PovrgsvecOar, doEdLev opbds, 
évrevopevws, Yalpovoay, uToupevynv, Oappovoay, poBovpevnr, 
Mioovoay, oTEpyoucay). 

All these movements ought to be directed by the highest 
faculty of reason, which alone is able to decide about their 
value (644 D: éari 6& waou TovTOLs Noytopds, 6 Ti ToT avTaV 
dpewov % xetpov). It is one of the strangest errors of a 
purely philological interpretation of Plato, that some 
authors believed themselves to find evidence in the Laws 
for affirming such a radical change in Plato’s convictions 
as would have been implied by the identification of true 
opinion and knowledge. Even Hermann, despite his great 
knowledge of Plato, says in a note (p. 709, note 737), 
as if it were an indifferent observation, that the Laws 
imply an entire absence of the earlier conception of 
knowledge, which now appears to be identified with true 
opinion. If this were true, then the Laws could not be 
authentic. For a philosopher who once recognised the 
existence of knowledge above all opinions cannot return 
to the vulgar faith of the multitude. From the stand- 
point of philological or literary interpretation it might 
seem a very irrelevant question, but for the historian of 
logic it is the most important point in Platonism and the 
greatest merit of Plato that he distinguished invariable 


confi- 
dence. 


Various 
movye- 
ments of 
the Soul, 
to be 
directed 
by Reason. 


Know- 
ledge 

is still 
differen- 
tiated 
from right 
opinion. 


vovs and 


ppovnets. 


508 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


knowledge from changing opinion and found permanence 
of ideas in the waves of appearances. Hermann was 
misled by Plato’s complaint about the scarcity of reason 
in human life (875 D: vots... ov got ovdapmod ovdauas, 
aXN 7 KaTa Bpayv). But if in practical life and for practice 
a great scarcity might be equivalent to entire non-existence, 
there is an infinite difference between the two for the 
logician. Reason is scarce, but scarce as it is, it is recog- 
nised by Plato as the only trustworthy leader in our life, 
the golden thread which unites‘us with God (644 E: pa 
yap dynow o royos deiy Twv EXEewv Evverrouevov dei Kal 
Hnoay aroreiTomsvoy exelvyns avOédxew Tols aNAoLS VEvpoLS 
ExaoTov, TaVTHY 8 Eeival THY TOV NoyLapod aywynv ypvahy 
Kal (spay). 

It may have misled Hermann and some other readers 
that Plato often uses in the Laws the term ¢povnous in 
a sense which is equivalent to vovs. But this use is by 
no means limited to the Laws, and is to be found 
already in the Phaedo (79 D). In the Symposium 
gdpovnors (202 A) was opposed to duaOia, and in the 
Republic it is sometimes equivalent to Science or Know- 
ledge (496 A). If Plato sometimes enumerates ¢povnots 
or émiotiun together with dofa (645 E: aicOyjoes Kai 
pviypas Kal dd€as cal dpovycers), this does not mean that 
he abandoned the distinction between opinion and know- 
ledge, but only that both are opposed to indefinite feelings 
(645 D: Hdovas Kai AUTras Kal Oupovs Kal ZowTas). Once 
Sé£a is named between érotiun and Aoyos (689 B: bray 
obv emiotHpars i) Sofas 7) NOYH evavTLATaL, Tois Uae 
apxiKois, 7 Wuy}, ToUTO dvovay tpocayopevw). But even 
this proves only that opinion is held to be different from 
knowledge. It is the ruling faculty for the great 
majority; because Plato here as in his earlier writings 
does not expect to find knowledge and science in every 
citizen. He said already in the Meno that for the prac- 
tical life right opinion is sufficient; in the Politicus he 
sees the aim of the rulers in implanting right opinions in 


LATEST WORKS: LAWS 509 


the souls of the people, and this remains his aim in the 
Laws. He does not even pretend that all the laws pro- 
posed have the character of permanent knowledge. The 
laws are a matter of opinion generally and should be 
tested by experience (769 D: mpétov ypdyar tovs vopuous 
mpos Tv axpiSeav Kata Stvamw ikavds* emevta TpoidvTos 
Tod xpovov Kai Tov SoEdvTwY Epym TEtpepevoy Gp’ ole 
Tia OUTwWS adpova yeyovevar vouobernv, wat’ ayvosiv, brt 
TaATONAA avaykn TapareitecOa Tovadra, & Sel Twa 
Evverrouevov eravopOodv). It is impossible to foresee every- 
thing in legislation (875 D: 10 devTepov aipetdov, TaEw Te 
kai vopov, & 6 TO wsv WS emi TO TOAD Opa Kal BXérreL, TO 
& éri wav advvare?) and time alters opinions (888 B: 
mpoiwy dé c& 0 Ypovos ToLncEl TONGA Ov vov bo€dLes peTa- 
Badovta éri tavavtia TiBec Oat). 

That in the Laws, as in the Timaeus, plausible 
opinions are chiefly expressed, is caused by the subjects 
dealt with in these works, and does not change anything 
in the immense distance between opinion and knowledge 
in Plato’s mind. He states this difference on every op- 
portunity in the most emphatic way. Nothing is exalted 
above knowledge and reason, nor can they be subordinated 
to any political considerations, because science and reason, 
whenever they are found, overrule every law and tra- 
dition (875 ©: tadta ei tote tis avOporav dice ixavos, 
Geia pmolpa yevvnbels, TapadaBeiy Suvatos «in, vowov 
ovdey dv dzo1To TOV apEdvTwY EavTOU* eTLOTHUNS Yap oUTE 
vomos ovTe Takis ovdeula KpeitT@y, ovde Fzmis eoTl vobv 
ovdevos UTHKOOY OVE SodAOY GANA TraVTWY apyovTa éival, 
eavirep adnOuvos zrevOzpos Te dvTws 7) KaTa pvow). Truth 
leads Gods and men (730 C: aA7@ea ravtTwy wiv ayabav 
cots Hyeitar, mavtwy dé avOpwos). In such things as 
practical regulations of political life complete truth is a 
divine privilege (641 D: 70 pev adybés Sducyupifec Oar 
TavTa ovTws #yew, ToMa@Y audicBynTovvTwY, Oeod), and 
always very difficult to attain for men (804 B: @avpata 
OVTES TO TOAV, TuLKpa Oz aArAnOelas ATTA peTéxovTes), equally 


Law de- 
pends on 
opinions 
and ex- 
perience. 


But Law 
itself is 
overruled 
by Reason. 


This, 
however, 
is a height 
which few 
men can 
attain. 


Opinion 
and know- 
ledge are 
repeatedly 
con- 
trasted. 


510 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


difficult to impart to others (968 D: @ 8 pavOavew, obte 
eupEty padioy ovTE EUpNKOTOS GAXOU uaOnTHY yevéoOa). But 
difficulty is not impossibility, and Plato most certainly 
claimed to possess full knowledge on such matters as the 
priority of the soul before matter in the universe. He re- 
peatedly contrasted also in the Laws truth and knowledge 
with right opinion and experience (632 .C: o @éls tovs 
vomous atract dUAaKas éTLaTHCEL, TOUS ev SLA PpovncEas, 
tous 6& Ov adrnOods Sd&ns tovtas, bTws TavTa TadTa 
Evydncas 0 vods érropeva cwhpoovyy Kal dixatocvyvyn atopyvn, 
ANAa pI) TWOVTM uuNd= HiroTyuia.—b668 A: ov« el To SoKEzT 
HOU 7 Tis YalpEL T@, TO ye Loov icoy ovdE TO GUupeTpoY Ay Ely 
oUppeTpov OXwS, GAAA TO ANNO EL TaVTMOV paNOTA, HKLoTA 
d2 oT@ODY GAX@—720 CD: 0 dovAOs TpocTaEas avTa TA 56 E- 
avta & zumetplas, ws axpiB@s eidas, KalatTrEep TUpavvos 
...0 Of 2devOcpos ... éwucKoTmEel... wavOdver... 
OvdadcKEl). 

Opinion is based on sensible experience, reason like the 
soul in which it is contained remains unattainable to the 
senses, and can be grasped only by our invisible thought 
(897 D BE: p romowpela THY atroKpiow, ws vodY ToTe 
Ovntots dppacty orouevol TE Kal YvM@ocomEVOL iKav@s— 
898 D BE: TO yévos nuiy TodTO dvatcOnTov Tacats Tats TOD 
cwpatos aicOnceou mepimeducéevar, vontov 6 Eivat vO Love). 
Opinions are held by children, knowledge or right opinion 
founded on reason can be reached only late in life, and by 
few happy men (653 A: @povnotv bé xa adnOets d0Eas 
BeBalovs, evtvyts btw Kal Tpos TO Yhpas TapeyEevEeTo, 
cf. Theaet. 186c). The truth carries all advantages with 
it (667 C: tHv opOoTnTa Kal THY @pédevav Kal TO Ed Kal TO 
Kados THV adynOeav civat THY atTroTEXOvVcay), and wisdom is 
the highest good (631 C: 6 mp@tov Tay Gsiwy iyenovotv 
éotly ayabav, 7) ppovnots). The power of reasoning acts 
without either constraint or violence (645 A: Noysopod 
KaXov iv OvTos, Tpaov Sz Kal ov Bratov—690 C: Tov dpov- 
obvta nysioOai Te Kal apyew .. . Kata pvow THY TOD vouov 
EXOVT@V ApynV adr’ ov Blavov TepuKviar). 


LATEST WORKS: LAWS alah 


Even here, where as little opportunity as anywhere is 
given for logical theories, Plato insists upon the unity of 
science, and shows how each particular detail is connected 
with the most general views on the whole (857 cp, ef. 
Phaedr. 270c). He illustrates it by the familiar example 
of the difference between an ordinary medical practitioner 
and a true physician, the first being like a slave, and 
the second a philosopher, inquiring into the nature of 
all bodies (720D) in order to heal a particular illness. 
Equally the lawgiver is asked to write not only for a 
present purpose, but to prepare a general view of law 
(858 C: avvowis THY vouwwy), and to know wherein consists 
the unity of virtue (965 D: dvayKxactéov . .. dvdraKas 
axpiBas iSsiv mpOtov, 6 ti Tote Sia TavTwY THY TETTApwY 
TavTov Tuyyavel, 6 61) hapev ev Te avdpeia Kat cwppootvy Kai 
Sixatocvvn Kat év hpovnce Ev Ov apetny evi Sixaiws adv 
dvomaTe mpocaryopeved Gan). 

As to the order of sciences, mathematics and astro- 
nomy are here also recommended as introductory to 
dialectic, which is alluded to only in a general way, as 
the hearers are supposed not to be trained for dialectical 
conversations. Once the term ta xad\Nota pablypata 
(818 D) is applied to dialectical science. Also the well- 
known dialectical term kar’ «ién (nteivy (630 E) is used 
once, and the rulers of the state are asked to be able 
to proceed from the indefinite many to the one which 
constitutes dialectical inquiry according to the earlier 
dialogues (965 B: é\dyouev Tov Tpas Exacta aKpov Snuroupyov 
Te Kal dUAaKA jun wOovoy Sety mpos Ta TrOMAG Arérew SuvaToV 
elvat, pos de TO ev émelyecOar yvavat TE Kal YyvovTa pos 
éxelvo ouvtatacbar wavta Evvopavta). The dialectical 
method is even clearly recommended as the best way to 
truth. It consists in perceiving unity in the variety of 
appearances. This unity is the unity of notions, which 
here as in the dialectical dialogues are called ideas. The 
Athenian philosopher rebukes his Doric friends for their 
indifference, and this imagined indifference is the best 


Particu- 
lars are 
still 
dependent 
on the 
Universal. 
The true 
lawgiver 
has 
grasped 
the Unity 
of Virtue. 


Distant 
allusion 
to dia- 
lectic, to 
which 
mathe- 
matics 
and astro- 
nomy are 
propae- 
deutic as 
in the 
Republic. 


Unity of 
notions 

in variety 
of appear- 
ances. 


Plato still 
Maintains 
the rule 
of reason 
and the 
priority 
of soul. 


512 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


explanation why Plato did not expound at length in the 
Laws his dialectical theories: 965 c: dp’ obv axptBeo- 
tépa oxeyris Oa 7 ay TEepl OTOVOY OTwOvY YyiyvoLTO, 7) TO 
mpos play oéav &k TOY TONA@Y Kal aAvopwolwy SuvvaTov 
civat Brerew ;—lows—ovK iows, GX byTws, @ SaLpovis, 
TavTNs ovK tots cadectépa weodos avOpwrwv ovosvi (cf. 
638 E: dpOjnv wéPodov Synrodv). Still it is evident that 
the same dialectical knowledge is here required from the 
rulers of the state as in the Republic. They should per- 
ceive the unity of beauty and of the good, and be able to 
prove it by reasoning (966 A: zrepl Kkadod Te Kal ayabod.. . 
tous dvvakas niv yuwortéoy . . . Omws Ev TE Kal OTN... 
B: Ti 8’, évvosty wev, THY bz EvdevE TO NOY advvaTeiv evOsi- 
xvuc0at;—Kal Ts; avdpatrodov yap Tiva ov Devers EEwv). 
Thus on every subject the rulers are supposed to have 
true knowledge, and to be able to explain it, to apply it 
in practice, and to judge about the results (966 B: zepi 
TAYTwWV TOV TTOVOALWY Hiv O AUTOS NOYoS, OTL Osi TOUS dVTWS 
fUAakas écopévous TOV vo“wV OVTwS ELOeVaL TH TEpl THY 
adnfevay ablTtov, Kal NOyw TE iKavoUs EpuNvEvEy sivas Kal Tots 
Epyous Evvaxodovbeiv, epivovtas Td TE KAAS YuYVomEVa Kal TA 
un) Kata dvow). These conditions show very clearly that 
the true rulers can be only philosophers or dialecticians, 
though Plato representing a conversation with untrained 
simple hearers did not lay a special stress upon the terms. 
At the end of the Laws he resumes the two chief points 
of his doctrine, the priority of the soul and the rule of 
reason in the universe (967 D). It is the aim of the 
philosopher to apply the whole of his general knowledge 
also to moral problems and to explain the reasons of 
everything reasonable (967 E: ovv@eacduevos ypnontat 
mpos Ta TaV nOwY ETLTNOEUMATA Kal VOMLMLA TUVAPMLOTTOVTMS, 
doa Te NOyor Zyxel, TOUT@Y SuVAaTOS 7 SodvaL Tov Aoyor). He 
who possesses knowledge is also bound to transmit it to 
others according to his best ability (730 E: éca ayaa tus 
KéxTyTaL SuvaTa [42 LOvOY avTov exe GNA Kal AALS pETA- 
SuSdvar* Kai TOV Mev peTAdOOVTA ws AKpoTaToY ypi) TYuar). 


LATEST WORKS: LAWS 513 


In all parts of the Laws, and on every occasion, Plato 
exalts the power of reason in the universe and in human 
life ; in these respects the Laws agrees perfectly with the 
Timaeus. Reason is the leading power for gods and men 
(631 D: ra pev avOpwrmwwa eis Ta Ozia, Ta Sz Osia els Tov 
nyeuova vodv Evutravta Bree), binds all virtues into one 
(632 ©: mavta tadra Evydynoas o voids, cf. 963 A), rules over 
everything (875 D), has produced everything (890 D: vod 
yé 2o7e yevvnuaTa Kata AOyov opOov), helps the soul in its 
movements (897 B: Wuyi . . vodv . . tpocdaBodca aisl 
Oeiov op0as Ogovea), and has ordered the universe (966 B: 
voods TO Tay Staxexoounkws). For readers who everywhere 
in Plato see the theory of ideas, this reason so often spoken 
of might mean an impersonal reason ; but if we consider 
the exceeding importance of God and souls in the latest 
phase of Platonism, no possible doubt is left that vods is 
the reason which can exist only in a thinking soul. Ina 
similar way ignorance is represented as the source of evil 
(688 c). The worst ignorance leads to the prevalence of 
the lower activities of the soul (689 B), and its worst form 
is ignorance which feigns to be wisdom (863 Cc: dyvovav 
héyov av Tis TOV GuapTnaTwY aitlav ovK ay evdorTO .. . 
SumAodv, Otav apalaivyn tis wn povov ayvoia Evvexdpevos, 
ara Kal d0&n codias, ws cidas TavTeX@s Tepi A pwndayas 
oide). To this belongs all the wrong learning which is 
dreaded by Plato as worse indeed than pure ignorance 
(819 A: hoBovuar... Tovs Hupévous... wabnudtwv, Kaos 
S ayupévous * ovdamovd yap Sewov ovdé spodpov azreipia Tav 
TAVTWY OVE UEYLOTOV KAKOV, AAN’ 7 TOUT ELpla Kal TOND- 
wabia peta KaKhs ayoyns yiyvEeTat Torv ToVTwY wEilwv Cnpia). 

Plato maintains his right here, as in the Poltticus, 
to judge for himself about the length of his explanations 
on any simple subject (642 A: cxomd 67, wn SoEav tpiv 
mapdoxyouat Tepl opiKpov TOA devel... TO SE 1) KaTA 
dow avtov di0pOwaors od« av Sdvatto avev povatKis opo- 
TnT0s Tote cadés ovd’ ikavoy 2y Tols AOyors aodaPetv). 
If everything is truly known and explained, the length of 

LL 


God and 
the Soul. 


The worst 
ignorance 
is still 
conceit 

of know- 
ledge. 


Prolixity 
defended, 
as in the 
Politicus. 


Relation 
of 
Definition 
to name 
and 
thing. 


All 
physical 
qualities 
are to be 
explained 
dyna- 
mically. 


514 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


the explanation is easily recognised as corresponding to 
the importance of the subject (645 C: évapyeotépov 8 avtod 
yevouévou ... Kal TO TEepl THS ev Tois olvots StaTpiBHs, 6 
d0Eacbein pév ay civar havrouv Tépt wAKOS TOAD AOYwr TEpLT- 
Tov sipnuevoyv, haven b= Tay av lows TOU pHKOUS Y avTaV 
ouk amraéuop). 

The distinction between thing, name, and definition, 
brought forward as a logical instrument with the purpose 
of identifying the soul with the self-moving movement, 1s 
already known from earlier dialogues, but it leads here to 
a far-reaching generalisation. All possible questions 
appear to be reduced to only two kinds: either asking 
the name of a subject of which the definition is given, or 
asking the definition of a given name (895D: dp’ ovK ay 
20édos Tept ExacTov Telia voeiv’ Sv wey THY ovolav, sv dé THs 
ovaias Tov Noyor, &v Sz TO dvoua" Kal 6) Kal EpwTHoELs elvar 
mTéepi TO Ov array dv0.—Tas Sv0 ;—TOTe Mev Huov ExacTOY 
TOUVOMA TPOTELVOMEVOY AUTO TOV NOYOV aTraLTEiV, TOTS O& TOV 
Aoyou avTov TpoTEwomEevoy Epwrav av Tovvoua). Those who 
know only names without being able to give definitions 
have no true knowledge of anything. Thus knowledge is 
here, as in the dialectical dialogues, based on definitions 
(964 a: cf. Soph. 218 c). 

Among the allusions to scientific investigations one 
of the most remarkable is the reduction of all material 
appearances, including colours, temperatures, pressure, 
taste, to physical movements, which consist only of 
agglomeration and dispersion of atoms (here not ex- 
pressly mentioned), analysis and synthesis of matter 
(897 A: Kuwyoes cwouaTwY adyovot Tata «eis av—now Kat 
P0icw Kai Sivaxpiow Kai ociyKpiow Kal TovTOLs ETOMEVaS 
Oeppotntas, Wes, Bapvtntas, KougoTntas, oKAnpov Kat 
Mahakov, NEvKOV Kal péAav, avoTnpoY Kal ydAvKv). This 
audacious anticipation of modern views is one of Plato’s 
many happy guesses, which produce on the impartial 
reader the strange impression of an unaccountable a priori 
knowledge of nature. 


LATEST WORKS: LAWS 515 


The breadth of view about the whole of Being is 
shown also in repeated references to the great periods of 
time which have elapsed since the beginning of life on 
earth. Millions of states have existed, grown, and decayed, 
with many changes in their constitutions (676 BC: pupias 
emi puplars nuiv yeyovace Todes év TOUTS TO ypdve, KaTa 
Tov autov 6& Tod TAnOovs NOyov ovK erAaTTOUS 2 bOappéevar, 
meToNTEvpevat © av) Tacas TONTELAS TOANAKLS EKaTTAYXOd). 
Nothing is new, and everything must be sought and found 
again after it had been lost and forgotten (677 D: pupsdxes 
pupta etn SuehdvOavev Tovs TOTE, xia 8 af’ ob . . . KaTa- 
gavn yzyove). It is even doubted whether human life 
had any beginning, and this confirms our interpretation 
of the myth told in the Timaeus. The Athenian philo- 
sopher is speaking to people unaccustomed to the con- 
ception of an infinite past, and still he says clearly that 
the long periods referred to are only a symbol of the actual 
eternity of mankind (781E: &... yp) mavt’ avdpa 
Evvvosiv, @s ) TAY avOpeTwY yévEecls 7) TO TAapdTay apyny 
ovdeulay eihnyev odd’ EEeu mote ye TekevTHV, 782A: adr’ fy 
TE Gél Kal EoTAL TaYTWS 7) UAKOS TL THS apyHs ad’ ob yéyover 
aunyavoy ay xpovov Gcov yeyovos ay gin). 

It forms a curious contrast to this enlarged horizon 
that in the Laws, asin the Timaeus and Critias, Athens 
is praised as it had never been since the death of Socrates 
(642 ©: dco.’ AOnvaiwr ciciv ayaboi Svadepovtws eiat TOLovTOL, 
Soxel adnOgotata NéyecOar). This reconciliation with the 
natal city may be explained by the success of the Academy 
of which we see some trace in the constant allusions to 
the great importance of education (642 A, 6444, 653 ac, 
803 p, 965.4). But the old enmity against the poets 
remains unabated; they are submitted to a severe cen- 
sure (816 E-817 c), and often ill-treated (890 4, 964 ¢c, 
967 c). Thus we see Plato remaining faithful to many of 
his most important doctrines up to his latest age. His 
love of knowledge and science is not lessened by the cir- 
cumstance that he devoted his latest years to a popular 


Tt 


Concep- 
tion 

of vast 
periods 
of time. 


Eternity 
of Man. 


Athens is 
praised 

as never 
before, but 
the old 
quarrel 
between 
poetry 
and philo- 
sophy - 
continues. 


The 
highest 
reality is 
found in a 
hierarchy 
of Souls. 


Anticipa- 
tion of 
modern 
religious 
belief. 


516 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


exposition of practicable political schemes. What he had 
discovered in earlier years,—the fixity of knowledge as 
opposed to the inconstancy of opinions,—remained for him 
a permanent truth. Only the ideas which were at first 
credited with a substantial existence out of the mind have 
been later enclosed in souls, and the hierarchy of souls 
became the highest reality, the last explanation of the 
problem of existence. These souls are free to fall or to 
rise according to their own will, and they have the power 
of becoming the source of evil. But a divine Providence 
leads those who trust their inspirations out of all troubles 
to a higher and better life, of which our life on earth is 
only a small and insignificant part. This latest form of 
Platonism comes remarkably near the views of later 
religions, and it is Plato’s peculiar merit to have progressed 
so far by his perfected method of dialectical investigation. 


d17 


CHAPTER X 


PLATO'S LOGIC 


WE have been obliged to include many psychological and 
metaphysical theories in our account of the origin and 
growth of Plato’s logic, in order to illustrate the stages of 
his development and to confirm by every possible hint the 
conclusions about the chronology of his works built upon 
the study of his style. It is now our purpose to give a 
general view of Plato’s logic and its development, with- 
out special reference to texts or to chronological difficulties 
which have been sufficiently dealt with in the preceding 
chapters. Here we may also supplement our direct 
information on the subject by probable inferences as to 
some aspects of logical theory and practice which did not 
find a full expression in Plato’s literary production. For 
this most certainly is one of the results of the above 
inquiry. Plato did not care to write all he knew, nor 
were his works intended to be handbooks of any science. 
All of them, not excepting the Laws, had the character 
of academic programmes, dealing with some question in 
order to attract the reader’s attention to more difficult 
problems, and referring for the solution of these to oral 
teaching. Much as has been said about the last page of 
the Phaedrus, and of the neglect of writing it seems to 
imply, this interesting passage has not been sufficiently 
compared with the concluding pages of the Laws, in 
which we find about thirty years later much the 
same opinion. Nor is it difficult to point out many other 
passages in which oral teaching is recommended as the 
true teaching, as a serious occupation, contrasted with 


General 
view of 
Plato’s 
logic. 


Plato 
did not 
write 
down all 
he knew. 


He prefers 
oral 
teaching 
not only 
in the 
Phaedrus, 


but at 
the end 
of the 
Laws. 


Law- 
giving the 
noblest 
form of 


literature : 


but life is 
nobler 
still. 


His 
writings 
do not 
fully ex- 
press his 
philo- 
sophy, 
which, 
however, 
may still 
be traced 
in them. 


Socratic 
period of 
inductive 
definition. 


518 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


literature as a pastime, a noble pastime, though it can 
never be so serious as the seed implanted in living souls 
by living intercourse with a living teacher. 

This ‘game’ of writing was never despised by Plato, as 
some interpreters of the Phaedrus have wrongly inferred. 
In the Symposiwm (209 Dk), in the Phaedrus (278 c), and 
in the Laws (858) Plato insists on the literary character 
of the work of the lawgiver, which he esteems as the 
noblest model of literary production. But literature has 
its limits, and is not comparable to life ; life, not litera- 
ture, is Plato’s aim; the soul and its ideas, not words nor 
speeches, claim his highest attention. He wrote for those 
who could not hear him, and play with him at the 
laborious game described in the Parmenides ; also for his 
pupils who had lived through some of the problems 
fixed by him in writing; but to the end he regarded 
his works as artistic reminiscences of a small part of his 
thoughts, and of some of the conversations held in the 
Academy. We have therefore no reason to suppose that 
any part of his philosophy has been fully expressed in 
his works, though we may look at these as sufficient 
evidence of his thought, enabling us to acquire a fair and 
probable conception of his theories. 

In earlier days Logic seems not to have had much 
interest for him. His small dialogues and the Protagoras 
contain attempts at definition, and proceed generally by 
induction in a manner which, so far as our knowledge 
goes, does not differ from the mode of Socrates. Moral 
questions are chiefly discussed, without any special 
attention to logical difficulties, except perhaps the mention 
of a science of science in the Charmides, in which dialogue 
also the term ovAXoyoduevos 1s applied to a formal syllo- 
gism of the form Cesare. This need not appear very 
startling even at an early stage of Plato’s literary career. 
Inferences are older than Logic, and even the term for 
the process of inference is older than Plato. The absence 
of logical preoccupations is also manifest in the Prota- 


SOCRATIC PERIOD 519 


goras, notwithstanding all the praise there bestowed 
upon knowledge and the incidental observation about 
the invalidity of the conversion of universal affirmative 
judgments. This is a sign rather of logical practice than 
of logical theory. Anybody who thinks consciously must 
notice that an universal affirmative judgment cannot 
undergo total conversion, or that it can be converted only 
into a particular affirmation. This is not yet a beginning 
of logic, just as the distinction of transparent and opaque 
bodies is not a beginning of optics. 

The first start in Plato’s logic is made in the Meno, 
and it is a very remarkable beginning, because besides the 
lesson in generalisation at the opening, this dialogue contains 
a foreshadowing of Plato’s latest thought : the foundation 
of our a priort knowledge on the supposition of a previous 
existence of each soul, and the highest axiom of the unity 
of the universe indicated as the source of the similarity of 
souls. Here also true opinion is repeatedly distinguished 
from knowledge as a different power, parallel to the 
distinction of substance and appearance. These are the 
great lines on which Plato progressed all his life, and 
their expression in the Meno is a strong confirmation of 
that psychological theory according to which youthful 
genius foresees the chief results of its later labours. 
This psychological theory is here in so far confirmed, as 
Plato is supposed to have written the Meno at the age of 
thirty-three, certainly a very early age for a Greek writer. 
Those who in the name of the same theory attributed the 
Phaedrus to a youth of twenty-five seem to have been 
unaware of the great logical superiority of the Phaedrus 
over the Meno, which is evidently written after the death 
of Socrates, and probably after 395 B.c. (as 1s shown by 
the mention of Ismenias). 

However important are the logical theories of the 
Meno, the method here followed still remains Socratic. It 
is by induction and experience that Plato attempts to 
prove the pre-existence of the soul, not hy that logical 


Anticipa- 
tion of 
Platonic 
theory 

in the 


Meno. 


Early 
genius 
forecasts 
its latest 
results. 


Hypo- 
thetical 
reasoning 
a new 


thing. 


Huthy- 
demus : 
exposure 
of current 


Sophisms. 


In the 
Gorgias, 
Socratic 
ignorance 
is changed 
to ethical 
certainty. 


Cratylus: 
first 
logical 
dialogue. 
Relation 
of lan- 
guage to 
thought. 


Plato had 
already 
caught 


520 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


necessity which is so much employed in the Republic and 
later works. Also hypothetical reasoning, or the follow- 
ing out of the consequences of each hypothesis before its 
truth is decided, is here evidently introduced for the first 
time and is admittedly taken from mathematical experi- 
ence, while at a later time it is constantly used as a very 
familiar method. 

The practical and inductive character of the Meno is 
common to this dialogue with the Huthydemus ; in which 
examples of Sophisms are quoted and refuted, without 
any attempt at a general discussion on the origin of 
error. The Gorgias insists on the permanence and con- 
sistency of true knowledge without attempting to go 
deeper into the question of its nature: still the ethical 
results of this dialogue are affirmed as knowledge with 
a certainty very much opposed to the earlier Socratic 
ignorance. It was natural that at this point of his philo- 
sophical development Plato should begin to consider with 
greater attention the question of method. He had arrived 
at the truth in individual ethics, and he saw that truth 
assailed by the vulgar eloquence of his opponents. In the 
Gorgias, despite his apparent condemnation of eloquence, 
he challenged eloquence and rhetoric in a somewhat 
rhetorical manner. 

But he was already on the way to a new armoury 
for the conquest of truth, and we see in the Cratylus 
the first logical dialogue—the question debated being 
the relation of thought to language,—certainly a logical 
question. It is decided against the current identifica- 
tion of speech with thought, and this is a great victory 
of Plato not only over his contemporary adversaries, but 
over a natural and almost invincible tendency of the 
human mind to credit words with more importance than 
they deserve. The question raised in the Cratylus,—what 
is the true substance of things, as distinguished from their 
changing appearances?—is not definitively answered, 
but certain allusions make it probable that Plato had 


ORIGIN OF THE THEORY OF IDEAS 521 


already conceived the supremacy of ideas over the human 
mind and over the world of appearances. The transition 
from Socratic notions to Platonic ideas may have been 
effected in Plato’s mind long before he represented it in 
his writings. It would therefore be useless to seek in 
his works a first mention or first exposition of the theory 
of ideas. Eternal unchangeable ideas independent of the 
human mind have arisen suddenly as a beautiful vision, 
and this vision he represented with masterly skill in the 
Symposium, where it is prepared by a scale of succeeding 
views of Love and Beauty. A more detailed account of 
the ideas is given in the Phaedo, a dialogue in which 
logical questions take almost an equal place with meta- 
physical investigation. 

If we take the description of ideas literally, they 
appear to have been for Plato true substances, existing 
outside every consciousness. But this conception being 
very difficult to realise, it may be that Plato did not 
intend to convey it by his highly metaphorical language, 
and that he only endeavoured to illustrate the fixity 
and objectivity of ideas as contrasted with the in- 
stability and subjectivity of appearances. Objectivity 
does not require substantial existence: anything that by 
its logical nature must be universally admitted is an 
objective truth. The difference between this objectivity 
and the objectivity of substances may not yet have been 
fully realised by Plato, and in many passages of the 
Symposium and Phaedo, as well as of the Republic and 
Phaedrus, the ideas appear to exist outside the world 
and outside souls, forming a separate and more perfect 
universe of true Being, the model and the cause of the 
apparent universe of matter. 

This period of Middle Platonism, during which the 
Republic and Phaedrus were written, and to which also 
the two immediately preceding dialogues might be re- 
ferred, shows in many details an increasing interest in 
logical studies. Hypothetical proceeding is supplemented 


glimpses 
of the 
supre- 
macy 

of ideas. 
Sym- 
posvuUm : 
Idea of 
beauty 
self- 
existent, 
and an 
object of 
blessed 
contem- 
plation. 


Phaedo: 
the ideas 
true sub- 
stances, 
outside 
conscious- 
ness : 
objectivity 
not yet 
dis- 
tinguished 
from 
transcen- 
dental 
Being. 


Middle 
Plato- 
nism : Re- 
public and 
Phaedrus. 


Increasing 
interest in 
logical 
theory. 
Classifi- 
cation of 
notions. 
Know- 
ledge and 
* opinion. 
Con- 
sistency 
the test 
of truth. 


New con- 
ception of 
dvvauus, 

a point of 
transition 
towards 
the new 
Criticism 
of Ideas. 
The High- 
est Kinds, 
or Cate- 
gories. 

No idea 
apart from 
a soul. 
Fresh in- 
terest in 
the mate- 
rial world. 
Becoming 
depends 
on move- 
ment, and 
the prime 


522 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 

by the careful classification of notions, and the aim of 
science is stated to be the reduction of all truths to one 
highest principle. The difference between knowledge and 
opinion is explained by the difference of their objects : 
knowledge refers only to eternal ideas; opinion to 
changing appearances. The test of truth is consistency, 
and the universal relation of all parts of knowledge 
affords a mutual confirmation for each of them, all de- 
pending upon one central idea of the Good, or the final 
cause of the universe. Ideas, being inaccessible to the 
senses, are still very much clearer and more distinct to 
thought than material things to the senses. A truth 
only then deserves our full confidence, if it be above 
every sense illusion, and based on the intuition of pure 
ideas, which alone are the object of knowledge. Among 
the notions which acquire an increased importance in 
the period of the Republic the term dvvayss is the most 
important, as it leads to the later conception of self- 
moving souls. In the Phaedrus this latter conception 
appears for the first time, and may be looked upon as the 
starting point of the logical reform initiated in the 
Theaetetus and Parmenides. 

In these essentially critical dialogues logical cate- 
gories as the highest kinds of notions are introduced and 
enumerated for the first time, while the ideas of the 
Good and of the Beautiful which played such a great 
part in Middle Platonism are less prominent. More- 
over, the existence of ideas outside conscious souls is 
completely abandoned, and the importance of soul as a 
first principle of movement is greater than in the period of 
Middle Platonism. Appearances remain illusory, but 
a certain reality of the material world is recognised in so 
far as all happening and all Becoming is reduced to move- 
ment, movement being either change of position in space 
or change of quality ina soul. This view of a real world 
acted upon by souls remains throughout the later 
Platonism. The old conception of substantial ideas is 


REFORM OF PLATO’S LOGIC 923 


criticised in the Parmenides in a manner that may suggest 
a doubt whether it had ever been maintained by Plato in 
the crude form admitted by his interpreters. 

With the Sophist our philosopher begins a dialectical 
period during which the classification of notions is his 
chief aim. The notion of being or substance now occupies 
the first place, and is made the subject of very special 
investigations. It is found that it applies to the soul 
generally or to souls in a higher degree than to anything 
else. Knowledge ceases to be a pure intuition, and 
becomes the product of thought as a co-ordinating agency. 
This activity of thought has produced the existing order 
in the material universe, and our individual thought is a 
reproduction of the more perfect divine thoughts. The 
continuity of human science is based on our historical 
knowledge of the efforts of our predecessors. Classifi- 
cation and co-ordination, analysis and synthesis, are the 
two powerful instruments of inquiry. Soul and move- 
ment are the ultimate explanation of everything that 
happens. 

These views, brought forward in the three dialectical 
dialogues (Sophist, Politicus, Philebus), are also maintained 
in the latest group of Timaeus, Critias, and Laws. The 
system of latest Platonism is no longer a system of ideas, 
but asystem of souls, of different and increasing perfection, 
from the lowest soul of a plant to the souls of stars which 
are termed gods. Above all rises the ruling soul of the 
universe, the world’s maker and ordainer, a divine Provi- 
dence, which places each soul in the right place, and 
allots it its proper task in a series of successive lives 
extending over millions of years, probably without 
‘beginning and without end. Knowledge is acquired by 
each soul through its own exertions, increased by constant 
exercise and imparted by teaching. Ideas exist only in 
souls—they are eternal and unchangeable because their 
first model is created by God in his own thought. Thus 
ideas are the patterns of reality, and their existence in 


mover is 
the Soul. 


The 
Sophist, 
Politicus, 
Philebus. 
Activity of 
thought. 


Analysis 
and syn- 
thesis. 


The latest 
group: 
Timaeus, 
Critias, 
Laws. 

Not now 

a system 
of ideas, 
but a 
system of 
souls act- 
ing on the 
universe 
surround- 
ing them. 
Suprem- 
acy of 
divine 
Provi- 
dence, yet 


free action 
of indi- 
vidual 
souls. 


Classifica- 
tion, gene- 
ralisation, 
and diyi- 
sion. 
Dicho- 
tomy to be 
preferred, 
but nature 
always 
followed. 
Natural 
types. 


The essen- 
tial differ- 
ence of 
each kind. 
True elo- 
quence 
the privi- 
lege of 
the 
thinker. 
Aristotle’s 
debt to 
Plato. 


Logical 
fallacies 
in Plato. 


524 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


souls is named true Being. But they are not now 
suddenly perceived in ecstatic visions, as in the period of 
Middle Platonism. They must be created and elaborated 
by each soul in its own turn, and sought for by the logical 
exercises of classification, generalisation, and division. 

The logical rules given by Plato refer chiefly to these 
elementary operations. Each notion should be subdivided 
into as few parts as possible, and dichotomy according to 
the law of contradiction is always preferred. Sometimes 
a greater number of subdivisions is allowed, but we are 
asked to show what essential differences distinguish each 
part from all others. This is more specially applied to 
the kinds of animals, or living beings, which extend from 
the vegetable kingdom to the Gods. We are warned 
against the error of selecting superficial marks for the 
distinction of kinds. Each kind of beings has by its 
nature and by God’s design one really essential peculiarity 
which should be found and manifested. The exact defi- 
nition of notions is the chief condition of a consistent 
system of knowledge, and must be independent of the pre- 
judice produced by the use of language. Thought precedes 
language, and speech is but an instrument of thought ; 
true eloquence being the privilege of the thinker. In 
this respect Plato’s logic appears to be more independent 
of the traditional forms of language than the logic of 
Aristotle, while his range of investigation, if less minute, 
was scarcely less universal. 

Plato, unlike Aristotle, did not attempt to leave in his 
writings a full account of his teaching, and thus it is 
probable that his teaching included more logical rules 
than those enunciated in his works. We find in them a 
frequent use of syllogisms, and though this does not 
imply that he had brought the theory of syllogism to 
that precise form which it has taken in the works 
of Aristotle, there is a distinct progress in the form of 
reasoning from the Socratic dialogues up to the latest age 
of Plato. It would be a very interesting subject for a 


PLATO'S PHILOSOPHY a2) 


special investigation to collect and compare the logical 
fallacies which are found very often in the earliest 
writings, while they are rare in the latest group. Such 
a special inquiry could not be included in the present 
work, as our chief aim was a representation of Plato’s 
logic and theory of knowledge in their relation to some 
psychological and metaphysical doctrines. We have seen 
that Plato altered his primitive idealism into a more com- 
prehensive philosophy, recognising the soul and a definite 
number of souls as the chief active powers of existence. 
This conclusion of latest Platonism is Plato’s greatest 
discovery, far more important in philosophy than his dis- 
covery of the fixity of ideas. It has been strangely 
overlooked by many readers of Plato, and first of all by 
Aristotle, whose authority gained a lasting ascendency on 
the opinion of Plato’s other interpreters. We have seen 
that the philosopher’s genius anticipated many discoveries 
of modern science, as for instance the identification of 
heat and light with movement, the existence of invisible 
organisms in the seminal fluid of animals, the periodic 
changes in the movements of stars, the reduction of all 
material changes to aggregation and dispersion (or, as it 
has been termed recently, to integration and differentiation), 
the distinction between atoms and molecules, the composi- 
tion of each molecule of water out of two atoms of one gas 
and one atom of another, &c. The same wonderful power 
of intuitive knowledge he displayed also in reference to 
purely philosophical questions. He is the first idealist, 
and has given rise to a long succession of idealistic philo- 
sophers from his own time to that of Hegel. But in his 
later stage of thought he anticipated that new course of 
philosophy which led Descartes two thousand years later to 
seek the origin of all knowledge in individual consciousness, 
and Kant to seek in the categories a priori forms of all 
appearances. How far Plato advanced on this road can 
easily be seen from the above survey of his theories. We 
do not pretend to say that Descartes or Kant added nothing 


Plato’s: 
early 
idealism 
grew 
afterwards 
into a 
compre- 
hensive 
philo- 
sophy- 


Aristotle: 
misread 
Plato. 
Plato’s 
anticipa- 
tions of 
modern 
science. 


Relation 
of Plato’s 
views to 
the specu- 
lations of 
Descartes, 
Kant, and 
Leibniz. 


Plato’s 
power of 
thought 
and of ex- 
pression. 
His ex- 
clusive de- 
votion to 
philoso- 
phy under 
the most 
favourable 
condi- 
tions. 


526 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


to Plato’s views. But there are in Plato’s latest works 
clear anticipations of the most important theories of 
Descartes and Kant, and also of Leibniz’s view of Divine 
Providence. 

This need not appear surprising to serious seekers 
after Truth. Truth about Being, so far as it is attainable 
to man, must be essentially the same now as in Plato’s 
times. Thinkers of his power are so exceedingly rare in 
the history of mankind that nobody among his successors 
can claim to be his peer. Power of thought and power 
of expressing thought were united in this great thinker 
and great writer to an extent which never has been again 
attained. Other great philosophers, such as Descartes 
and Leibniz, while they enjoyed the same personal inde- 
pendence as Plato, did not devote their lives so exclusively 
to philosophy. Those who spent their lives in study and 
teaching, as Kant or Hegel did, were deprived at the 
beginning of that material independence which is the 
indispensable condition for the full display of philo- 
sophical power. Thus even the greatest of our philoso- 
phers labour, as compared with Plato, under the constraint 
of a certain inevitable one-sidedness and personal limita- 
tion, from which Plato was free. He had all the highest 
conditions for making the most of his passage through 
earthly life. Of noble ancestry, he inherited a bodily 
strength and power enabling him to sustain the efforts 
necessary in order to acquire all the knowledge of his 
times and to increase it; he was not compelled in any 
way to struggle for material existence, being a wealthy 
citizen in the wealthiest city of his times; he was 
born after a generation which included some of the 
greatest poets of mankind, and had himself an exceptional - 
poetical talent, which he reserved entirely for the purposes 
of his philosophical teaching. He did not live in isola- 
tion, like Descartes or Spinoza, nor in a whirl of worldly 
interests, like Leibniz, nor in humiliating dependence 
upon an absolute government, like Kant or Hegel. His 


PLATO’S PHILOSOPHY Doe 


freedom of speech and teaching was actually secured by the 
crime committed against Socrates, because the Athenians 
were not likely to repeat it after the reaction produced by 
the writings of Socrates’ pupils, and because religious 
intolerance was on the decline. Amidst all these favour- 
able conditions imagine a divine soul of the greatest 
power; disposing of all means in the fulfilment of a 
providential mission: that of showing for the first time 
the fixity of ideas and the infinite dignity of the human 
soul. What limits can be set to the intellectual progress 
of such a philosopher? He stands far above his great 
teacher, far above his great pupil, alone in his incompar- 
able greatness, and his works are only a splendid re- 
membrance of his living activity, the result of the least 
serious of his endeavours. What amount of his influence 
was transmitted to his pupils from generation to gene- 
ration we can only guess: but for us Plato’s dialogues 
are unique as a literary and philosophical monument, and 
deserve the greatest attention of all who long for meta- 
physical Truth, who remain unsatisfied with the world of 
appearances and with the passing aims of material life. 


Unique 
philo- 
sophical 
excellence 
of Plato. 





IND 


ARSENCE of words as a chronological 
indication: 90, 119, 121, 199 

ABSOLUTE equality : 248; government: 
526; measure: 469 ; standard: 451 

AcapEmy, Plato’s school, preserved 
his MSS.: 4-5; its beginning : 242, 
271; invitations to join it: 346; 
allusions to it: 211, 212, 379, 392, 
414, 471, 498; its success, 515 

ACCIDENT opposed to substance: 507 

’ ACCIDENTAL peculiarities of style neg- 
lected: 143-4; defined: 146 

AccUSATIVE prevailing : 130 

ACHELIS on ideas: 27; on Soph.: 434 

Activity produces qualities: 200 ; 
directed on itself: 204; investigated: 
841; condition of change: 383; See 
Sout, AGENT 

Apam, supposed to be a logician: 2 

Apam, J., on Euthyph.: 198; on Crito: 
202 

Apams discovered Neptune: 300 

ADJECTIVES, newly invented: 78, 112-7, 
320, 821, 358; frequency of: 70-1 

ADVERBS, frequency of: 70 

ANGINA, captivity of Plato in: 232 

JBscHYLUS compared with Plato: 112 

AFFINITY, stylistic: 75, 83, 144, 145, 
152, 153; relative: 183, 187; table 
of ; 162-182 

AFFIRMATION, forms of: 103, 121-4, 
126-9, 136-8; particular or general: 
208; form of judgment: 376 

AFFIRMATIVE general judgments incon- 
vertible: 205 

AGENT opposed to object of activity: 
423 

AGESILAOS, supposed allusion to: 388 

AGESIPOLIS, supposed allusion to: 
388 

AGNELLI on ideas: 15 

AGRICULTURE: 465 

Arm of Life: 448, 503-4; of science: 
413, 522; of the universe: 303 

AmeE Marti: 240 ; 


ALBERTI on dialect: 25; on Charm. : 


203; on Crat.: 230 


ALBINUS on ideas : 
Plato: 51 

AucrsrabEs, his relation to Plato, 244 

Aucrp1aDEs I., a spurious dialogue: 75, 
92, 113, 114, 197-8 

AucrsrAbEs II., a spurious dialogue : 75, 
113, 114, 194, 197 

ALDINE edition of Plato: 141 

ALEXANDRINE tradition of Plato’s 
text: 6 

ALKIDAMAS : 343 

ALLEGORY, use of: 336, 339 

ALuusions to earlier works by Plato: 
60, 87, 153-9, 202, 225, 271, 316, 
355. For special allusions see under 
the name of each dialogue the pas- 
sages dealing with its relation to 
other dialogues 

AMATORES, a spur ous dialogue: 75, 194 

AmorT on Plato’s logic: 13 

Amount of text fit for stylistic com- 
parison : 143, 184, 185, 188, 357, 411 

AMPHITRYON as ancestor: 388 

ANACHRONISMS in Plato’s works: 210, 
263, 348, 387 

ANACOLUTHIAE: 74, 76, 109 

ANALOGY, use of: 201, 335, 449-50 

ANALYsIs of matter: 514; logical : 523 

ANASTROPHE : 131-2 

ANAXAGORAS criticised: 252, 280; re- 
cognised: 330, 341 

ANDREATTA, on Alcib. : 197 

ANGER belongs to the mortal part of 
the soul: 478 

AnmAts defined: 478; classified: 494; 
credited with some human faculties: 
279; differ from men: 359 

ANIMATED IDEAS ascribed to Plato: 
424, 433 

Answer, form of answer used by Plato: 
104, 121-3, 126-9, 137-8, 358 

ANTALCIDAS, peace of : 231 

ANTICIPATIONS of modern science: 276, 
300, 367, 484, 514, 525 

AntTinomiEs, of predication: 382; of 
metaphysics : 401, 406; resolved : 
428, 435 


15; introd. to 


MM 


530 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


ANTIPHANES: 3 

ANTIPHON : 61, 410 

Antiquity of mankind: 880, 897, 4538, 
515 

ANTISTHENES, allusions to: 57, 61, 
232, 256, 390 

Aparny of the soul: 468 

APELT on Theaet.: 409 ; on Soph. : 
434; on Phil.: 459 

ApopricTic certainty: 212 3 affirmations : 
126-9, 263, 321 

Apoposts omitted : 76 

Apouoey, Plato’s dialogue: style: 159, 
162; form : 398, 486; date: 201; re- 
lation to Crito: 202; to Gorg.: 214; 
to Phaedo: 263; to Rep.: 268 

APPEARANCES, depend on ideas: 249, 
363, 521; produced by movements: 
495, 514; not the object of science: 
466 

AppEL on Soph.: 484 

ARCHITECTURE : 446 

ARCHER Hinp: 260, 386 

ARISTIPPUS: 57, 61 

ARISTOPHANES: 3, 51, 57, 61, 112, 264, 
981, 289-90 

ARISTOTLE, supposed references to :57, 
61, 401, 412, 483; compared with 
Plato: 4-5, 19, 107, 110, 112, 344, 
524, 527: his logic: 1, 8, 16, 28, 464; 
his testimony on authenticity: 456, 
459, 472; on Plato’s teaching: 27, 
195, 525; on Crat.: 221; on ideas: 
236, 448; on equality of sexes: 289; 
his views on ethics: 285; on happi- 
ness, 311; on rhetoric: 844; on 
perception : 314; on motion: 365-6; 
on categories: 868; on absolute 
standard: 451 

ARNIM: 128, 129, 186-8, 142-3 

ARNOLD: 24 

ARRANGEMENT of words: 70 

Art, Greek, its influence on the theory 
of ideas: 235-6 

ARTIFICIAL classes of stylistic peculiari- 
ties: 144 

ARTIFICIAL classification condemned : 
446 

ASCENDING scale of souls: 413 

Ast, Lex. Pl.: 18, 68, 73, 88, 486; on 
Plato’s works: 388, 45, 46, 49, 197, 
198, 202, 203, 204, 210, 215, 231, 240, 
262, 885 

Asrronomy: 800 

ATHEISM punished by death: 445 

ATHENIAN patriotism ; 232, 261, 515 

ATTRACTION, use of, in Plato’s works 
decreasing ; 134 

AUFFARTH, on ideas: 27 

AUTHENTICITY wrongly denied: 197-8, 
455, 461 

AUTHORITY, competent: 202, 205; not 
binding, 419 

AVERAGE use of words: 69 


Axioms, reached by hypothetical 





reasoning : 256; existing in the soul: 
383 
AYRMANN ;: 12 


BAcHMANN: 23 

Bapuam: 240 

BaRuEn : 232 

Baron: 133-4 

BartTuneEk: 207 

Beauty, first idea: 237, 246; is good 
and true: 246; its educational inflv- 
ence: 287, 356 

BECKER: 24 

BrckmMann: 19 

BEGINNERS in logic: 420 

BEHNCKE : 25 

BEING, totality of: 297; predicated of 
each unity : 426; chief object of the 
new dialectic: 434 

BEKKER: 18, 47 

Brier inferior to knowledge: 209, 213 

BENFEY: 230 

BENN : 28, 434 

Berek: 60, 200, 211, 231, 245, 886 

BERKUSKI: 885 

BERNARDI: 10 

BERTINI: 26, 484 

BERTRAM: 135 

BrEssaRiIon: 9, 13 

Burst soun: 501 

BiacH; 19 

BIBLi0oGRAPHY of Plato: 73 

Birt: 5 

BIscHorr: 262 

Buakey: 25 

Buass: 88, 101, 105, 121, 242, 244 

BuInDNESS of practicians: 298 

Bossa: 9 

BoBEeRTAG: 24 

Bopr: 19 

Bopy as instrument: 370 

BorckH: 210 

BorrricHEer: 306 

BoIssoNaDE: 221 

Bonirz: 69, 205, 210, 280, 456 

Bovurn.Let: 11 

Branvis: 19, 26, 50, 200 

BRAUN: 77 

Bravut: 24 

BreEem1: 202 

BRINCKMANN : 17 

British Museum: 8, 11, 35 

BrockHaus: 11, 24 

BrRUCKER: 15 

BRUEGGEMANN: 24 

BruNET: 11 

Bruns: 197, 489-41 

Bune: 14 

BuRATELLI: 10 

Bury: 3538 


CALANNA: 10 

CALKER: 28 

CALLICLES compared with Thrasyma- 
chus: 272 


INDEX 


CaLLisTus: 8 

CaLvary: 73 

CaMPBELL, unknown in Germany: 21, 
107, 109, 120, 124, 186; in France: 
242, 459 ; first recognised in Poland: 
85; then in Austria: 351; his 
introduction to the Soph. : 83, 84-99, 
104, 112, 121, 141-3, 161, 186, 190, 
852, 357, 400, 411, 419, 438, 441, 448, 
453; his commentary to the Theaet. : 
868; his essay on the Rep.: 135-6, 
182, 237, 280, 494; on Phaedo: 4; 
on Plato’s dialogues: 135; on Parm.: 
138-40, 412; on C. Ritter: 84 

CarPENTARIUS (Charpentier) against 
Plato: 10 

CasPaRI: 25 

CaTaLocuEs of libraries and book- 
sellers: 73 

CaTEGorins: 868-9, 874, 882, 428, 471, 
480, 522 

CAUSALITY, 252, 294, 341, 452, 484-6, 
514 

Cave, allegory of the: 304, 409 

Cazac: 19 

CrpHaus compared with Gorgias: 272 

Crertarnty of stylometric inferences: 
189, 193; of metaphysics: 209, 497, 
520; of ethics : 221; attained through 
reasoning : 250, 257 

CxsarB, form of syllogism: 203 

Crsca, on Plato’s logic: 28 

CHAIGNET : 56, 62 

CHaAMPIER (Champerius): 9 

CHANCE directed by Providence: 505 

CHANGES in the world first unex- 
plainable: 258; later acknowledged: 
383 

Cuances of construction: 76 

Caos pre-existing: 475 

CHARACTERISATION of persons in 
Plato’s dialogues: 440-1, 457 

Cuarmipzs, Plato’s dialogue: style: 
164; form: 393; authenticity: 2038; 
date: 203-4; logic : 203, 518; rela- 
tion to Lach. : 204; Prot.: 206; Meno: 
204, 208; Gorg.: 208; Phil.: 196 

CHEMISTRY compared with stylometry : 
192 

CHIAPPELLI: 25; on Phaedo: 259; on 
Rep.: 322, 325 

CHILDREN have opinions: 510 

Cuoric metre in Plato: 87 

Curist: 60, 134, 200, 231, 242, 262, 353, 
386, 439 

CHRISTIAN protection of Plato’s works; 
5-6 

CuRronoLocy of Plato’s works: neg- 
lected: 17-19, 27-8, 32, 62; impor- 
tant : 80-4, 56, 63; determined : 
188-93, 518-528. See MrtuHop and 
the name of each dialogue 

CicrERo: 43-4, 348 : 

CIRCULAR DEFINITIONS : 877 

CLARKE: 5 





531 


CLASSIFICATION of rare words: 98; 
of stylistic peculiarities: 75,144,151; 
of faculties: 294; of men: 274, 337; 
of notions : 226, 359, 364, 870, 377, 
419, 470, 522-3 

CLEEF : 133-4 

CLEMENS Alexandrinus: 289 

CuriropHo, a dialogue of dubious au- 
thenticity: 75, 194 

CoHEN, on ideas : 26, 235, 236 ; followed 
by Auffarth: 27 

CoLour, a subjective impression: 374; 
unexplainable: 484; produced by 
movement : 514; adjectives design- 
ing it: 116 

ComBes Dounovus: 14 

CoMBINATION of ideas: 427 

Comic authors ;: 264 

CommuniIon of kinds: 436 

Community of wives: 289 

Comparison a function of the soul: 
873 

CoMPLETE enumeration of passages 
indispensable in stylistic investiga- 
tions: 140 

ComTE against Plato: 360 

ConceEpts of reason: 840; see Notions 
and InEas 

ConcruiaTory tone: 347 

CoNCRETE facts: 462 

CONFIDENCE, as a chronological indica- 
tion: 349; as belonging to the mor- 
tal soul: 506 

CoNFLICTING metaphysical views : 378 

CONSCIOUSNESS: 213, 217; see Unity 

ConsISTENCY a test of truth; 213, 227, 
229, 340, 378, 520, 522 

CoNSTANTINOPOLITAN MSS.: 11 

CoNSTRUCTIVE dialogues: 134, 389 

CoNTEMPLATION of all existence: 364 

Contempr of writing: 346, 349, 499, 
518 

ConTENTS of Plato’s works as chrono- 
logical indication: 79-80, 87. See 
also the name of each dialogue 

Continuity of science: 443 

CONTRADICTION explained: 271, 381; a 
mark of error: 227, 432; when irre- 
concilable : 467 

ConVERSION of judgments : 205, 519 

CoopER: 17 

Co-ORDINATION of phrases: 77 

Coray on Gorg.: 215 

CORINTHIAN war: 46, 386, 398 

CoRRECTIONS of earlier exposition: 
271, 279, 295. See ExaGGERATIONS 

CoRRELATED terms: 283 

CosmoGony uncertain: 491 

CountTINnG of words: 65 

Courace defined: 288; belongs to 
mortal soul: 478 

CouURDAVEAUX: 24 

Cousin: 240 

CratyLus, Plato’s dialogue : style: 168; 

form: 393; authenticity: 230; date: 


MM 2 


532 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


189, 281; logic: 221-9, 520; relation 


to Prot.: 232; to Meno: 222; to 
Euthyd.: 226; to Gorg.: 215, 221, 
227-9, 231-2; to Symp.: 233, 235, 


238, 242-3; to Phaedo : 231, 249, 253, 
258, 264; to Rep.: 285, 318, 321; 
to Phaedr. : 224, 231, 356; to Theaet. : 
224, 871, 878; to Parm.: 229; to 
Soph. : 429-30 ; to Xenoph. Mem. : 226 

Cratytus, Plato’s teacher: 221 

CRAWFORD on Phaedo: 259 

CREATION defined: 423; of words: 67, 
88-92, 98, 112-5, 227; of souls: 426, 
474, 476 

Crispi against Plato: 11 

Crittis, Plato’s dialogue: style: 88, 
156, 182, 472; form: 394, 487; date: 
490; relation to Soph. and Polit.: 
438; to Tim.: 85, 491 

CRITICAL sciences: 445 

CrIiTIcAL stage in Plato’s development : 
416 

Criticism later than dogmatism: 37, 
389 

Crito, Plato’s dialogue: style: 159, 
163; form: 398; authenticity: 202; 
date: 202; logic: 201-2; relation to 
Apol. : 202; to Meno: 202; to Gorg.: 
202, 214; to Polit.: 445; to Phil. : 196 

Cron? 215 

CupwortH : 15 

CuMmULATIVE evidence of stylistic inves- 
tigations: 73-4 

Curtositiss of Platonic literature: 
heresies in Plato: 11; logical blunders 
in Plato: 13; inventive authors: 
24-5; feeling of style: 80; vote of 
majorities: 242; Solon’s jubilee: 
825; counting of ancestors: 888; 
thinking in sentences: 4343 trinita- 
rian doctrine applied to logic: 435; 
incomparable ingenuousness: 459 

Cyc Lz of incarnations: 330, 380 


Darpatos: 299 

Dammann: 14 

DANZEL: 23 

Danses: 13 

Date of the composition of a dialogue 
not to be identified with the supposed 
date of its occurrence: 43, 200, 262, 
849, 351, 8386-8, 391, 410 

DautH: 12 

Days as parts of time? 482 


DEATH prepared by life: 273; not | an) 


evil: 297; as penalty for mora 

dissenters :_ 445 pee ee A 
FINITION by means of general 
notions: 195; determination of 
substance : 207; union of particulars : 
840; elimination: 283; specific 
difference : 877 ; definition and name: 
514; definition and reasoning: 444; 
examples of definition: 216, 377, 422 

DEGENERATION; 504 








DeEMIuRGE not Creator: 475-6 

DemocriTos: 2, 4; relation to Plato: 57 

DEMOSTHENES: compared with Plato: 
77, 107, 440 

DESCARTES ; 525-6 

DeEscriP ion differs from knowledge: 80 

DEsIRE opposed to moral feeling: 278 

DETERMINATIVES, position of: 70 

DrEUSCHLE: 419 

Drzopry: 11 

Dr1auectic as the science of being: 341, 
422; compared with other sciences: 
802; the most exact: 461, 465, 511 

DIALECTICAL DIALOGUES: 383, 42, 54,58, 
62, 85, 111, 186, 425 

DIALECTICAL requirements: 208 

DiaLEcTician judge of Imnowledge: 
210; knows reasons: 219; asks and 
answers: 225; is superior to other 
Men; 226; similar to God: 338 

Dicnoromy recommended; 306, 413, 
448, 524 

Dictum simpliciter : 283 

Drinactic character of later works: 88, 

86, 265, 414, 417-8 

Dino7’s edition of Plato: 11, 35,180,141 

Dreck: 26 

DirFERENCE explains Not-Being: 428 

Dimensions of space: 500 

DroGENnES Laertius: 43, 45, 47, 49, 538, 
349 

Dionysius : 888 ; as Tyrant of Loceri: 473 

Diotima invented by Plato: 234 

DiscuRSIvE investigation substituting 
intuition: 369 

Discussion recommended: 206; aban- 
doned: 418 

DISENCHANTMENT in Plato’s life: 397 

DISINTERESTEDNESS of science: 419 

DissEn: 18 

DIssERTATIONS on Plato’s style wanted 
72; little known: 73 

Dirren: 17 

DITrTENBERGER: 72, 108, 107, 109, 112, 
120, 121, 125, 126, 128, 129, 136, 142, 
143, 242, 459 

DirrricH: 230 

DivinE origin explains nothing: 228 

Divine souls: 443; independent of 
surroundings: 504 

DrivinE standard: 404 

Division of concepts: 214, 226, 341; 
examples of: 446; division of labour: 
286 

Documrac: 87 

DorEHN : 25 

Docmatism the earlier stage of Plato 
and Kant: 37 

Donato Bernardino: 8 

DRaMATIC action: 55; 
344; poets: 3-4 

DREAMS: 875 

DREYKORN : 230 

Droste: 111, 142, 242 

Dua number, use of: 101-2 


form: 80, 103, 


INDEX 


Duatity of existence: 250, 406 

Dimer: 61, 200, 207, 210, 212, 215, 
231, 232, 241, 255, 262, 348, 356, 398, 
443 

Duration not distinguished from time : 
482, 

Durpik: 17 

Dyer on Crito: 202 

DysENTERY near Corinth as a chrono- 
logical indication: 387, 898 


Harta as the centre of the world: 261, 
329 

EasTERN influence on Plato: 14, 18 

EBBEN: 17 

EBERHARD: 14 

Enptirors of Plato: 48 

EDucATIONAL rules: 309 

EFFICIENT cause: 252, 341, 452, 485 

Eacorsm condemned: 505 

EIcHHOFF: 17 

ELEArTIc influence on Plato: 410 

ELEMENTS explain the whole: 377; 
common to individuals and universe: 
487 

ELOoQuENCE, conditions of: 842; in- 
fluence of: 427; eloquence of Plato: 
826, 344 

EMPEDOCLES: 61 

EMPIRicaL psychology uncertain: 481 

ENGEL: 14 

ENGELHARDT: 74 

ENGELMANN: 73 

ENGLISH investigations little known: 
84, 99, 135, 352 

ENUMERATION contrasted with defini- 
tion: 377 

Epicurus: 5 

Eprnomis, a spurious dialogue: 75, 194 

Eprractic sciences: 445 

Epitome insufficient 
investigation: 17, 29 

EquaL amounts of text comparable : 185 

EqQuaLity of sexes: 289, 507, 324 

EQuivaLent of affinity: 145, 154-60, 
162, 183, 184 

Eristic opposed to dialectic: 293, 381 

Error, origin of: 203, 211, 226, 227, 
384, 413, 429, 432, 468, 503 

ERuDITI0n, dangers of: 349, 513 

EsotvEerRisM: 405 

EsTHETIC prejudice: 48-50 

ETERNITY and time: 476 , 

EruicaL dialogues: 196, 205, 220 

Evacoras: 388 

Euciw’s MS.: 5 

BEucuives of Megara: 43-5, 390 

Evurrpwses: 8, 61, 112, 289, 346, 350 

Evusepsius: 6 

EutuyDEemus refuted : 221-2 

Evuruypemus, Plato’s dialogue: style: 
155, 166; form: 393; authenticity: 
210; date: 211-2; logic: 210-11; 
relation to Gorg.: 213; to Crat.: 
226; to Symp.: 211, 239; to Phaedo: 


in historical 


533 


253; to Rep.: 810, 318; to Isocrates : 
211-2 

Evuruypuro, Plato’s dialogue: style: 
159, 163, 200; form: 393; authen- 
ticity: 198; date: 200; logic: 199- 


200; relation to Gorg.: 213; to 
Phaedo: 254; to Polit.: 445; to 
Laws: 492 


Evin, source of : 406, 501 

Evouution of Plato’s logic: 23, 30-4, 
216-8, 265, 858-61, 413-4, 470-1, 515- 
6, 518-24 

Exact sciences: 65 

Exactness of the highest generalisa- 
tions: 304 

ExaGGERATIONS of Plato: 217; con- 
fessed : 295, 298 

EXxaMPLe, use of: 243, 421, 449-50 

Exerciss, logical. See TRAINING 

EXIsTENCE predicated of all percep- 
tions: 373; its double meaning: 471 

Expectancy: 506 

EXPERIENCE, its influence: 427-8, 510 

EXPLANATION, a better, asked for: 137 


Faper: 25 

Fasricius: 8, 12 

Facuutiss of the soul: 276, 278-9, 315, 
506 

FAarHsE: 26 

Farrx contrasted with knowledge: 213. 
See OPINION 

FALLACIES: 211, 525 

FALsEHooD as educational agent: 295 

Fear belongs to mortal soul: 478, 506 

FERRARA council: 8 

Ficrnus: 15 

Ficures of syllogism: 9 

FInaL cause: 252, 295, 452, 462, 476, 
484-5 

FINDEISEN: 215 

Fire: 483 

Fist movement: 833-5, 366, 496 

First principles tested: 257 

FiscHer, J. F'.: 457 

FiscHer, K.: 23 

Frxity of notions: 878, 426 

FLUTE girl: 243 

FoREIGN nations: 232, 244 

FoREIGN words: 68 

ForGOTTEN discoveries: 515 

Form of Plato’s writings : 87, 334, 393-4, 
438, 486 

FourLuEe: 18, 25, 62, 484 

FRANCK: 23 

FRANZ: 327 

FREDERKING: 72, 107, 121, 126 

FrreEDoM of Gop: 475-6; of souls: 
829, 516; of speech: 232, 527 

Frequency of words: 68, 97, 108, 151 

Fucus: 19 

FULLEBORN: 16 

FUNKE: 25 

Future life dominated by philosophy: 
228. See also IumorraLity 


534 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC 


GARDTHAUSEN: 5 

Gass: 9 

GASSENDI: 11, 12 

GeEmistos: 8 

GENEALOGY indifferent to Plato: 888 

GENETIC method: 52 

GENITIVES: 71, 180, 131 

GENNADIOS: 8 

GENOVESI: 2, 13 

GENUS and species: 466 

GEOLOGY, modern, confirming Plato’s 
views: 380 

GEOMETRY : 208, 228-9, 299, 444 

Guore of Trebizond: 9 

GEORGI: 11, 200, 202, 208, 205 

GERCKE: 848, 356 

GILTBAUER: 204 

GOCLENIUS: 15 

Gop, model of philosophers: 201, 479; 
creator of ideas: 818; knows truth: 
481, 509; ignores pleasure and pain: 
488; ordered the chaos: 475; his 
retirement from the world: 475, 486; 
his aims: 469 

GOETHE on style: 79; his style: 153 

GOMPERZ: 72, 120, 126, 207, 242, 351-2 

Goo, idea of; 294-5, 298, 369, 414, 434, 
475; a self-sufficient aim: 285; 
wherein consisting: 463; compared 
with the sun: 298 

Gores, his relation to Plato: 61; 
compared with Cephalus: 272; 
teacher of Isocrates: 348 

Gores, Plato’s dialogue: style: 155, 
167; form: 393, 486; date: 189; 
relation to Apol,: 214; Crito: 202, 
214; Charm.: 203; Prot.: 195, 
207, 218-5; Meno: 218-5; Huthyd.: 
213; Crat.: 215, 221, 227-9, 231-2; 
Symp.: 239, 248; Phaedo: 262, 274, 
275; Rep.: 267, 270, 272-8, 275, 281, 
288, 821; Phaedr.: 356; convenient 
pee of stylistic comparison : 
19 

GossE: 231 

GRAESSE: 11 

GRAMMATICAL peculiarities : 88 

GRASER : 25 

GRay: 281 

GROTE : 5, 29, 56, 826, 458, 492 

GRUNWALD: 134 

GUGGENHEIM : 17, 210 

GUNTHER: 25 


HAENIScH : 827 
HaANnpdWRITING compared with style: 
66 


APPINESS : 808 ; of philosophers: 811 
HARLEY DE Sancy: 11 


Harmony as educational factor: 2873; 
of numbers: 801 

Harris : 25 

Haypuck : 280 

HayMANN : 24 

HEARING a higher sense: 246 








Heat a mode of motion: 874 
HEATH : 230 

HEGEL : 18, 260, 525 
HEIDEMANN: 19 


HEicn; 24 
HEINZE: 59 
Heirz: 5 


HELLENES compared with Barbarians : 
261, 446 

Hetwie: 15 

H®RACLES: 388 

HERACLITUS : 61, 221, 246, 258, 378 

HERBART: 16, 17, 25 

Heresies of Plato: 11 

H®RET: 240 

HERMANN: 18-21, 88, 40-2, 47-9, 197-8, 
208, 207, 234, 261, 278, 322, 327, 352, 
356, 385, 507 

HERMOcRATES, intended dialogue : 85 

HERMODORUS : 43, 49 

Heropotus : 112 

Hestop : 112 

HEUvUSDE : 16-17 

HeEyDER: 18, 26 

Hiatus: 71, 88, 101, 487 

HIpPaRCcH, spurious dialogue: 75, 194 

Hippras: 61, 346 

Hippras, dialogue of dubious authenti- 
city: 75, 194 

HIRZEL : 22-8, 197, 207, 216, 259, 438, 
441, 458 

Hisine: 10 

HistToricaL method, applied to Plato: 
29-31, 50; in Plato’s writings: 365, 
381, 416, 434 

Horrer: 72, 107, 125, 126 

HOoELSCHER: 327 

HoEuzER: 17 

HorrMann: 24 

Hoxtumann: 14 

HOouLzneER : 342 

Homer: 112, 318, 327, 856, 896 

Homme: 240, 241 

Hope: 478 

Horizon of Plato widening: 261, 828, 
380, 880, 414 

Horn: 207, 215, 459, 465 

Hurr: 62, 230, 242, 434, 454, 457-9 

Human nothingness: 86, 297, 503 

Hyporumsis, use of: 253, 256-7, 302, 
805 

HYyPoTHETICAL reasoning: 208, 277, 
520 


Icr, 482 

IDEALISM: 240, 252, 259, 267, 860, 483, 
447 

IbEAs as substances: 16, 25, 296, 860, 
8638 ; criticised ; 401, 448, 505, 521-3 ; 
identical with their representation : 
257, 3853; not incompatible with 
categories: 882; as perfect notions : 
15, 25, 48, 859, 404, 407, 422, 492; 
objects of thought: 247, 305, 338, 
403, 406, 474, 522; objective: 360, 


INDEX 


521; permanent : 508; eternal : 465, 
482; progressing: 407; found by 
definition : 340; inthe union of par- 
ticulars: 464; created by the soul: 
524; innate: 209; existing in the 
soul: 258, 447, 464, 469, 516; in 
divine mind : 470, 477 ; common to 
men and gods: 258; how known: 
235, 250, 253, 359, 521; not indefi- 
nitely multiplied ; 313,402; models: 
299, 403, 477; theory of ideas: 225, 
271, 280-1, 291, 467; terminology of 
ideas: 212; their origin: 217 

IDENTIFICATION by external tests: 66 

IpENTITY predicated of different percep- 
tions: 373 

IGNORANCE distinguished from opinion : 
308; ugliness of the soul: 4323; ill- 
ness: 490; source of evil: 513 

Tum : 17 

Inuuusrons of thought: 427 

IMMANENCE of ideas: 242, 254 

ImmeE: 100 

ImuiscH: 5 

Immortat part of the soul: 479 

Imworrariry of fame: 239, 262-3 

Immorranity of the soul: doubtful: 
201; a tale of priests: 209; valuable 
only with knowledge: 210; produced 
by knowledge: 235; proved: 260-2, 
314, 316, 332; a divine privilege : 
478 

ImpERFEcT things have no ideas: 404 ; 
their existence explained: 501 

IMPERFECTION of method acknow- 
ledged : 279 

IMPERSONAL expressions : 128 

Importance of stylistic peculiarities ; 
148, 146-151 

ImpuTED knowledge: 81 

INCONCLUSIVENESS common to the 
Socratic and to the critical stage : 
384 

InconsIstTEncy of language: 229 

INCONVERTIBILITY : 205 

INDEFINITE progress of generalisation : 
403 

InDESTRUCTIBILITY of the uncondi- 
tioned : 354 

INDEXING missed: 58, 68 

INDIRECT investigation : 252 

INDIVIDUAL and state : 267 

INDIVIDUAL soul: 335, 426, 468, 502 

InpDivipua ity of style: 66 

INDIVISIBLE kinds: 420 

Inpuctrion: 195, 201, 209 

INFALLIBILITY : 1, 206, 209, 213, 216 

INFINITESIMAL calculus: 65, 301 

INFLUENCE of bad teachers: 310 

INITIATION to dialectic: 298, 364 

Inquisition based on Plato’s prin- 
ciples: 445 

INTELLECTUAL pleasure: 462; fecun- 
dity : 310 , 

INTERNATIONAL relations; 324, 348 


539 


INTERROGATIONS: 81, 100, 137, 209, 
320-1 

INTOLERANCE : 206, 444-5 

INTRODUCTIONS to text editions : 73, 83, 
99 

INTUITION: 251, 258, 293, 363, 522; 
requires training: 236, 368 

INVENTION of words: 67, 112,115 

INVERSION of words: 71, 87 

INVISIBLE Being: 301, 484 

Io, Plato’s dialogue: 75, 194 

Ionic dative; 88 

IpHicraTes: 207, 387 

Trony : 209, 215 

IsMEnrIAS: 210 

IsocratEs, relation to Plato: 4, 57, 61, 
107, 211, 215, 244, 288-9, 330, 341, 
343, 346-8, 350, 387 


JACKSON : 23, 56, 883, 886 

JAHN; 240 

JAMBLICHUS: 15 

JANET; 18 

JECHT: 105 

JEZIENICKI: 886 

JEZIERSEI: 198 

JOWETT ; 56, 89, 185, 225, 229, 237, 827 
336, 419, 438, 453, 492 

JUDGMENT, choice between affirmation 
and negation: 376; first element of 
knowledge: 429-31; act of pure 
thought: 468; relation to sentence : 
480 

JUSTICE: 284-5, 331 

JUVENILE logic: 309, 408, 463 


Kant on formal logic: 1; on Plato’s 
ideas: 26,30; compared with Plato : 
19; in his views on knowledge: 33 ; 
on movement ; 367; on ideas: 223, 
340, 361, 447; on antinomies;: 406; 
on practical reason: 278; on cate- 
gories: 525; in his evolution from 
dogmatism to criticism ; 37,191, 349 ; 
his life: 526 

Kassar: 241, 358 

KAYSSLER : 77 

KeCKERMANN: 10-11 

KerpHatos: 410 

Kresex: 19 

Kinps of Being: 415; of reasoning: 
364; of souls: 887, 844 

KLEINPAUL : 17 

KNowineG subject a substance: 223 

KNOWLEDGE, progress of : 1-2, 80-3 

KNOWLEDGE defined: 238, 371, 466; 
its fixity : 312, 473, 495, 516; its in- 
fallibility : 209, 251, 294; its objects: 
201, 203, 204, 222, 252, 265, 293, 360, 
426; its highest principle: 382; its 
divine origin: 491; its conditions : 
377; its possession not implied by its 
acquisition : 372; produced by the 
soul: 375, 479; based on intuition; 
294 ; on judgment: 3875, 480; 


536 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


definitions : 378, 514; increased by 
training : 370,406,523 ; not found in 
words: 227; hindered by the body: 
247; as aim of life: 265, 309; its re- 
lation to tradition : 509; to opinion: 
32, 205, 213, 223, 285, 317, 371, 469, 
473, 493, 507, 509, 519, 522 

Kock: 19 

KONSTANTINIDOS : 5 

KopretscH: 78 

KOPHINIOTES: 197 

Kramm : 25 

KRISCHE : 351 

Kroun : 56, 60, 268, 287, 319 

KRoscHEL : 207 

KUEHN: 24 

KuGLER: 117, 142, 242 

KUNERT : 322 


Lazporious play : 284 

LacuHeEs, Plato’s dialogue: style: 165; 
form: 393; authenticity : 204-5 ; 
date: 204; relation to Charm.: 204; 
to Prot.: 206; to Meno: 204, 208 ; 
to Gorg.: 203; to Rep. : 288 

LANGE : 77 

Latest group of Plato’s dialogues: 75, 
90, 98, 101, 187-40, 157, 178, 188, 190, 
472 

Lavoisier: 484 

Law OF CONTRADICTION: 258, 277, 307, 
318 

Law OF GRAVITATION: 1 

Law OF STYLISTIC AFFINITY: 152 

Laws matter of opinion: 509 

LEARNING a reminiscence: 247 

LEFEVRE ; 24 

LEFRANC : 25 

Lrces: Plato’s dialogue: style: 88, 
157, 182; form: 394, 487; date: 
472-3 ; relation to Euthyph. : 492; 
to Prot. : 71, 91; to Phaedo: 336, 
341; to Rep.: 87, 499; to Phaedr.: 
332-5, 346, 425, 495, 499,511,517; to 
Theaet. : 91, 366; te Parm.: 91, 366; 
to Soph.: 427, 506; to Polit. : 454-5, 
508, 513; to Tim.: 495, 500, 501, 506, 
509, 518, 515; as standard of com- 
parison: 67, 152 

LeuRsS: 240 

LrrBniz : 191, 447, 526 

LericuH Aston: 24 

LENORMANT: 230 

Le Roy: 240 

LESSING on style: 79 

LEV£QUE: 26, 235 

LEVERRIER: 300 

Lexicon Platonicum needed: 69, 78 

LICHTENSTADT: 18 

LIrBHOLD: 242, 853 

Lire peculiar to soul: 275, 425, 497 

Licut produced by motion: 374 

Liwitine determinations: 211 

Lina: 129, 141, 242 

LINGENBERG: 100 


Lineutstics, Plato’s view on: 65 
Livrerary character of Plato’s works: 
213, 220, 240, 265, 269, 316, 413, 518 
LITERARY composition, how  con- 

sidered by Plato: 344, 518 
LITERARY inactivity : 391, 398, 412 
Locau connection indicated by adjec- 

tives: 117 
Locris praised : 473 
Lopes : 216 
Loatc of Plato: 17, 28-32, 251, 517 
Loetcat distinctions: 282; necessity : 

316, 367, 467, 496; operations: 95; 


progress: 301; standard: 201 ; 
terms: 214 

LONGER Way: 279-80 

Lorze: 25-7 


Love akind of madness: 331; activity 
of the mortal soul: 478 

Lowrey: 15 

Luckow : 230 

Lukas: 18, 434, 446 

LycEeum: 5 

Lystas: 4, 57,212, 244, 326, 330 

Lysis: a dialogue of dubious authen- 
ticity : 75, 194 





MavnEss affects sensations: 375 

MAGurIrE : 25 

Majority incompetent: 451 

MANUFACTURED things, ideas of: 225, 
313, 359 

Martinius : 19, 81, 101 

MarTertaL world: 250, 470, 495, 522 

MATERIALISM : 875, 433 

MATHEMATICAL notions: 2, 95, 466; 
studies introductory to dialectic: 
465, 511 

Matter: 476, 482-4 

Mazont: 10 

Measure of text: 130, 141, 192 

Measure: absolute and relative: 451, 
503 

MECHANICAL cause: 485, See EFFICIENT 

MEDICINE: 465 

Meearic school, influenced by Plato: 
44; of no influence on Plato: 35, 
42-45, 49, 453 

Memory: 468, 500 

MENEXENUS, Plato’s dialogue: 75, 194, 
486 





MENo, Plato’s dialogue: style: 158, 
166; form: 893; date: 207, 210; 
logic: 207-210, 519; relation to 
Crito : 202; to Charm.: 204, 208; to 
Lach. : 208; to Prot.: 195, 208, 210; 
to Euthyd.: 210-11; to Gorg.: 213-5; 
to Crat.: 222; to Symp.: 238, 243; to 
Phaedo: 249, 253, 256, 871; to Rep.: 
267, 284-5, 312; to Phaedr. : 519 

MetTaAPHoRS used by Plato: 100, 132, 
135, 298, 339, 354, 363, 521 

METAPHYSICAL convictions ; 32, 88, 220, 
484, 500 

| Mrrempsycnosis: 479 


INDEX 


Metuop of Platonic investigation: 1, 
7, 48, 54; deficient: 80, 141-4, 290, 
349, 459-61; improved: 82, 84, 112, 
122, 126-7, 145-93, 282, 315, 336 

MeruHop, recommended by Plato: 217, 
956-7, 364, 418, 451, 471, 512; ex- 
plained: 208, 335-6, 341, 405, 415, 
442, 456 

MertHopo.oey proper to later age : 349 

Meyer’s encyclopedia: 11 

MEYER, P.: 230 

Micuaup: 11 

MiIcHELIs: 19, 20, 50, 78, 200, 262 

MiciX ski: 69 

Mippie group of dialogues: 
125, 137, 189 

Mrppie Platonism: 358, 521 

MIDDLE TERM: 464 

MiIGNE: 8 

MIL: 2, 360 

Minos, a spurious dialogue: 75, 194 

MisanTuHRopy explained : 251 

Mistrioves : 50, 200 

MITCHELL: 68 

MonoTHEIsSM : 285-6, 314 

MoRAINVILLIER: 11 

Moral FEELING: 337; innate: 480; 
irreconcilable differences of: 202, 
444-5 

Mora VALUE of judgments : 201 

MorGENSTERN : 16, 51 

Moruor ;: 10 

Mortau sout: 478-9 

MosHerm: 15 

Morton, a principle of Being and Be- 
coming : 367, 413, 496, 522; manifes- 
tation of life: 332; includes qualita- 
tive change: 865; of the soul: 366, 

’ 502, 507; common to body and soul: 
467 ; kinds of : 65, 366, 472, 496 

MULLER: 50, 419 

Mu.tipeuiciry of worlds : 475 

Munk: 21, 52, 203, 242, 885, 391, 486 

MuvrixL1o : 79 

Music: 301, 465 

Mussmann : 26 

Muruat relation of things: 
notions: 426 

MyruicaL exposition: 295, 340; uses 
truth previously explained : 487 


93, 122, 


405; of 


NaMEs irrelevant: 293 

NARRATED dialogues: 80, 103, 392-6 

Nast: 14 

NaTorP: 207, 215, 255, 263, 281, 353, 
356, 285, 409 

NATURAL KINDS: 
449, 482, 494 

NATURAL SCIENCE: 1, 65, 465, 514 

NAVIGATION : 465 

Necessity blind: 475, 485 

NEGATION explained: 428, 429, 482 

NEOPLATONISTS on secret doctrine: 
497 ; 

NIA0CLES : 215 


144, 340, 408, 442, 





537 


Noack: 262 

Not-BEING : object of ignorance: 308 , 
a category : 369; explained: 428 35 

Notions, objects of knowledg,: 404, 
424; understood by rerson: 339; 
identified with ideas: +09, 447; in 
the world soul: 468 

NouRIsson : 25 

Novetty of doctri.1e, indicated by 
admission of ob: -urity : 234, 253 

NumBERS make tusings clear : 299 

NussER : 454 


OxBscuRITY a amitted : 234, 254 

OBSERVATICN of stars: 301; of other 
objects: 421 

OcHMANN ; 203 

OLDENBE 2G: 21, 210 

OLLIViEsI |: 24 

ONE AN’ MANY: 4038, 511 

Opin’ x subdivided: 306; its object: 
304-7; based on memory and sen- 
sation : 468,510. See KNowLEDGE 

(PPORTUNISM in politics: 450 

OpportTuNItTiEgs for the occurrence of 
words: 68, 122; not proportional to 
size : 184 

OpposITEs paired : 876, 413 

ORAL TEACHING: 27, 270, 345, 391, 398, 
499, 517 

Orators of Plato’s age: 4 

Oran of language ; 228 

ORIGINALITY of Plato’s style: 88, 412 


Paces of different editions of Plato’s 
works differ: 130, 141 

Parn follows pleasure : 462; belongs to 
mortal soul: 478; is deprived of 
reason : 506 

PANAETIUS : 259 

Papyrus fragment of the Phaedo: 4; 
MSS. of Plato: 5 

PARADEIGMATIC ideas: 199, 408 

PARALLEL passages compared: 222, 238, 
243, 263, 275, 309, 310, 312, 318, 329, 
333-4, 336, 343, 547, 366, 368-9, 371, 
372, 373, 3882-8, 409, 423, 427, 436-7, 
445, 452, 480 

ParaLocisms of Plato: 208, 211, 525 

ParcHMEentT MSS.: 6 

PaRrkER: 13 

PARMENIDES: 246, 303, 327; meeting 
with Socrates : 409 

PARMENIDES, Plato’s dialogue : 
UOT 411; form : 898-4; authen- 
ticity: 27, 115, 400; date: 408; 
logic : 402-7; relation to Crat.: 229; 
Phaedo: 263, 405; Rep.: 366, 406, 
412,429; Phaedr.: 407, 412; Theaet.: 
866, 868, 402, 409-11, 418, 493; to 
Soph. : 368, 409-10, 417, 424, 428-9, 
435-7, 493; to Phil.: 467, 469; to 
Legg.: 91, 366 


style : 


PAaRTICIPLES : 102, 128 


538 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF :PATO'S LOGIC 


PaRTIcULARS in relation to ideas: 254, 
839, 466 
Pats of speech : 70 


Passnea® : B41 


PATER: 20 

Patmos: 5 ~ , 

PATRIOTISM: & , 

Parrizi: 9, 35, re 

PAUSANIAS: 855 

PerPers: Ontol.: Ny edhe dget rage! 

aot 242, 262,434; 2 pose 
ELTASTS : 207, 387 : 

PERCEPTION : 478. See 

PERFECT RULER above la\® * 

PERFECT SOULS: 478 

PERICLES: 240, 830, 346 

PeERtopIc migration of souls . 

Perriops in Plato’s style: 74-’ _ 

PERIPHRASTIC use of particip!® * 
128 a 

PERMANENCE of knowledge: 495 

PERSONAL AGENT : 423 s 

PERSONS in Plato’s dialogues: 55, « 
855, 439 

PERVERTING influence of sophists: 311 

PFLEDERER: 60, 207, 224, 255, 262, 268, 
819, 822, 852, 485 

PuaeEpdo, Plato’s dialogue: style: 155, 
170; form: 393; authenticity: 259 ; 
purpose: 245; date: 189, 265-6; 
MSS.:4; logic: 246-58; relation to 
Apol.: 263; to Euthyph.: 254; to 
Meno: 249, 253, 256, 371; to Euthyd.: 
258; to Gorg. : 262, 274-5; to Crat.: 
231, 249, 253, 258, 264; to Symp.: 242, 
245, 249, 258-4, 257, 261-4, 871; to 
Rep. : 253, 264, 274-5, 278, 280, 282, 
287, 290, 294, 296, 303, 808-10, 312-3, 
316, 822, 825; to Phaedr.: 61, 253, 
263, 329, 334, 340-1, 352-8; to 
Theaet.: 161, 263, 371-3, 382-3, 395; 
to Parm.: 268, 405 ; to Soph. : 419; to 
Polit.: 452; to Tim.: 841, 452; to 
Legg. : 836, 341 

PHAEDRUS, caused many speeches: 354 

PHaxEDRUS, Plato’s dialogue: style : 80, 
90, 154; form: 893; date: 35, 326, 
348, 352, 356; relation to Meno: 519; 
to Gorg.: 356; to Crat.: 224, 231, 
356; to Symp.: 242, 331, 352, 354-6; 
to Phaedo: 161, 253, 263, 329, 334, 
340-1, 352-3; to Rep.: 331, 333-5, 
345, 847, 357, 897, 421; to Theaet. : 
867, 880, 897, 400, 493; to Parm.: 
407, 412; to Soph.: 419, 421, 429, 438, 
441; to Polit.: 453-4; to Tim.: 329, 
341, 350, 353, 478, 479; to Legg.: 
332-5, 346, 425, 495, 499, 511, 517 . 

Purptas : 235-6 

PuHILEBuS, Plato’s dialogue: style: 90, 
159, 181; form: 393; authenticity: 
27,458; date: 469-70; logic: 462-8; 
relation to : Socratic dialogues: 196 ; 
to Rep. : 390, 460, 466, 470, 484; to 
Theaet.: 467; to Parm.: 467, 469; 


100, 


6, 


to Soph.: 262, 467, 469; to Polit.: 
462, 469; to Tim. : 466, 486-8 
PHILOSOPHER, intended dialogue : 85 
PHILOSOPHERS, preceding Plato: 3; of 
Plato’s time: 4; interpretation of: 
29, 30 
PHILOSOPHERS, according to Plato: 
213; their scarcity: 310, 338; they 
are accused of madness: 329; leader 
of men: 337, 862, 489, 498; how 
developed : 296, 298; characterised : 
238, 880; similar to God: 250, 263, 
838, 879; above law-giver and other 
men: 861, 489, 503; compared with 
practical people : 297, 805; obliged to 
teach : 342 
PHILOSOPHICAL REFORM undertaken 
by Kant and Plato: 361 
Puitosopuy defined: 210; defended: 
211; personified: 213; divine: 338, 
487; its highest principle: 503; its 
degradation : 295 
PHONETIC peculiarities of style: 71 
PHRASES, construction of: 71, 77, 111 
PuysiIcau science: 95, 261, 317, 367, 
374, 481 
PuysiciaN compared with a philoso- 
‘ her: 511 
AR: 112 
EXNY 008 : 430 _ 
Piaro #8 ® philosopher: 524-7; first 
‘n: 8, 82-4; his works: 3-6; 


i le: 65, 68-71, 74-159; his 
Shots 5 (See AcapEMY and ORAL 
iter See the name of each 
Einiiaglas pad nearly all entries of 
5 
the Index ._, 
PLATONIC LOVE’ 233 


‘ 1 3ATES, to be distin- 
Puawonie” Sous s historical Socrates : 
guished from th 554 260, 262, 273 
88, 48, 66, 205, =) “") “eens 
398-4, 408 
PuaTonists: 8-15 _. ce f 
PLEASURE is not an = life : 809 ; 
condemned: 319; pea cee 
462; belongs to me z 
506 
PLeEssinG: 14 
Pueruon : 8, 15 
PuLotinus: 11, 15, 24, 457 90 
PuuRatity of souls : 425, 5 
PLUTARCH: 245, 457 
Poerticat language used by - 
87, 849 
Poetry tragic and comic: 7, 
creation : 831, 423; as imitat 
313, 331 = 
Ports despised: 264, 319, 33) a 
350-1, 490, 515; incompetent’ < 
396 
Poaer: 198 eee 
PoLEMARCHUS compared with Pa to 
272; his death: 350; converte 5 
philosophy : 355 
PoLEMICAL ALLUSIONS: 58, 210, 


Mato: 67, 


262; as 
pa: 286, 


112, 


INDEX 


244, 289, 343, 347-8, 852, 355-6, 388~ 
90, 401, 403, 412, 470 

Poxicarpus: 8 

Po.iTIcaL AcTIvITy as an obligation: 
274 

PoLiITICAL THEORIES, origin of: 281, 
325; form a pure science : 456 

Pouirictan compared to a weaver and 
to a physician: 450 

Pouiricus, Plato's dialogue: style: 89, 
90, 97, 158, 180, 457; form: 394; 
authenticity: 27, 115, 453-8; date: 
458, 469; logic: 442-53; relation to 
Euthyph. and Crito: 445; to Symp. : 
245, 889; to Phaedo: 245, 389, 452; 
to Rep. : 443, 450, 453-5 ; to Phaedr. : 
453-4; to Soph.: 442 

PoxiinGana philosophia : 18 

Poxos: 880, 346 

Potycratss : 61, 207, 210, 244 

PoLyxenos: 403 

Pouzer: 210 

Ponp : 24 

Porpuynrius : 15 

Positive exposition following a critical 
stage : 416 

Praise of others rejected: 819 

PRanT : 17, 31, 259 

Precociry of genius: 519 

PREDICATE, its position : 70 

PREDICATION: 211, 430-1; its diffi- 
culties : 469 ; not limited to identity : 
432 

Prepictions about Plato by himself: 
263-4 


Presvupice, esthetical : 48-50; against 
dialectical dialogues : 32 

PRELUDES: 87 

Premisses : 208, 214 

PREPOSITIONS : 129-138, 820 

PReEssuRE : 514 

Previous existence of the soul: 242, 
519 

Priority of the soul: 853, 425 

PropaBiuities in Platonic chronology : 
141, 270 

Propanimity beyond the scope of 
Plato's logic: 801, 465 

PROBLEMATIC affirmations: 126 

Prozsiems for future investigations: 
70, 71, 88, 151, 161, 190, 191, 194, 324, 
858, 387, 400, 458, 469, 490-1 

Procius: 6, 11, 15, 24, 221, 229, 457 

Propikos: 61, 319, 327, 346, 348 

PROGRESSIVE exposition: 271, 420 

PROMETHEUS: 3 

Promise of further exposition: 224 

Proor impossible in moral questions: 
445 

PROPHECIES: 263-4, 387 

PROTAGORAS: 2, 61, 206, 221, 319, 827, 
330, 346, 381 

Proracoras, Plato's dialogue: style: 
165; form: #893, 486; date: 207; 
logic: 205-6, 518; relation to small 


: 


539 


dialogues: 195; to Charm. Lach.: 
206; to Meno: 195, 208, 210; to 
Euthyd.: 195, 211; to Gorg.: 195, 
207, 213-5; to Crat.: 232; to Symp.: 
248; to Rep.: 277; to Legg.: 71, 91 

Prorreptic character of Plato's dia- 
logues: 414, 498 

PRoverss: 71, 100, 135 

PrRovENCE: 501-2; directs chance: 
505; rules the universe: 523 

PsycHo.ocism : 83 

PsycHoLocy preserves from misan- 

py: 251 

PuBLic OPINION: 215, 811 

Pure and applied science : 445, 466 

PurtricaTIon of the senses: 287 

PYTHAGORAS: 818, 850, 410 

Pyruoporus: 410 


QUALIFICATION of terms: 283 

QUALIFYING words: 71 

QUALITATIVE change defined as a 
movement: 365, 468 

QUALITY nota cause: 200; acategory: 
433, 466, 483 

QuaNTITY, its nature: 299, 873, 433, 466 

Questions: 81, 444. See InTERRO- 
GATIONS 

Quorations made by Plato: 71, 327 


Rasvus: 28 

Racine: 240 

Ramus (Ramée): 8, 10 

RAPHAEL: 79 

Rapin: 12 

Rare words: 68, 69, 93. See Worps, 
Use or 

Reauis de Vienna: 18 

Reawistic style: 440 

Rea.ity of thought: 217 

REASON scarce: 508; free: 610; 
divine: 477 ; influenced by the body : 
480; exists in the soul: 425, 474, 
493; its subdivisions: 294; its 
power : 251, 278, 338, 462, 507, 518 

RECAPITULATIONS: 87 

RECENT events: 241, 887, 891 

REFERENCES to earlier dialogues. See 
ALLUSIONS 

Reroro of logic: 870, 885 

REFUTATION on granted principles: 420 

REMMANN: 2, 13 

RE-INCARNATION : 889, 479 

RELATION of ideas; 258, 882, 402, 422 ; 
of parts of knowledge: 429, 522 

RELATIVE affinity ; 183, 187, 191 

Rewativity of sensations: 875; of 
notions: 405; of knowledge: 406 

RE .IG10vus protection of Plato’s works: 5 

REMINISCENCE : 247, 353, 468 

RENOUVIER: 23 

RENOVATION of knowledge: 289 

REPEATED peculiarities of style: 147 

RepuBLic, Plato’s dialogue: style: 
154-7, 168-76, 184-6, 319-24; form: 


540 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF *P4To's LOGIC 


893; date: 324; unity: 268-9, 271; 
parts: 271-2, 276, 290, 311-2; logic: 
2738-4, 277-84, 291-308, 312-318; 
relation to preceding dialogues: 160, 
168, 270, 284; to following dialogues: 
160, 178; to Apol.: 268; to Lach. : 
288; to Prot.: 277; to Meno: 267, 
284, 285, 312; to Euthyd.: 310, 318; 
to Gorg.: 267, 270, 272-3, 275, 
281, 288, 821; to Symp.: 280, 281, 
284, 286, 287, 803, 306, 808, 313; to 
Phaedo: 258, 264, 274-5, 278, 280, 
282, 287, 290, 294, 296, 303, 308-10, 
312-8, 316, 822, 325; to Phaedr.: 
831, 833-5, 345, 347, 357, 397, 421; to 
Theaet.: 161, 366, 372-3, 382, 389, 
395-7; to Parm.: 366, 406, 412, 429; 
to Soph.: 419, 421, 429, 438, 441; to 
Polit.: 448, 450, 453-5; to Phil.: 
460, 466, 470, 484; to Tim.: 488-90; 
to Legg.: 499 

RESPONSIBILITY : 329, 503 

Rettie: 240 

Revision of earlier writings by Plato: 
185, 189-90, 315. See CoRRECTIONS 

REYNDERS: 240 

RHETORIC useful: 326, 342-3, 381, 397, 
427, 445, 473; its two kinds: 213 

RHETORICAL ARTIFICE in Plato: 258, 
280, 295, 330, 338, 520 

RuHETORICAL figures: 72; interroga- 
tions: 137; influence on Plato: 88 

RHETORICAL NECESSITIES: 343 

Ruytus: 71, 87, 287 

RiBsine: 20, 50, 200, 207, 262, 491 

RIcHTER: 25 

RIDDELL: 99 

RIGHT OPINION compared with know- 
ledge: 312, 381, 508, 510 

RIsING SOUL: 414 

Ritter, C.: Untersuch.: 88, 103, 108, 
121, 128-9, 136, 142-8, 207, 211, 231, 
242, 411; on Polit.: 446, 448; on 
Laws: 492 

Ritter, H.: 19, 26, 40, 47, 200, 203 

RocHECHOUART: 240 

RoEPER: 101, 121, 125 

RouDE: 60, 386, 388 

ROSENKRANTZ: 20 

RosENSTOCK: 230 

RuckertT: 240 

Rv tes of classification: 446, 448 


Satint AUGUSTINE: 6 

Satnt Mato, Bishop of: 11 

Satamancoa University Press: 240 

SALES: 24 

SATIRICAL character of 
dialogues: 87 

SAUERESsIG: 19 

Scepticism: 204; compared with 
misanthropy: 251; explained: 359 

SCHAARSCHMIDT: 27, 56, 62, 100, 198, 
202-4, 210, 223, 230, 852, 400, 408, 
434, 453, 454-9, 469 


dialectical 


ScHAUBLIN: 230 

ScHANZ: edition of Plato: 18, 47; on 
Plato’s style: 72, 120, 121, 125-6, 
128-9, 136, 140, 242 

SCHEDLE: 353 

SCHIERENBERG: 200 

SCHLEIERMACHER: 21, 33, 36-7, 45, 49, 
197, 200, 203, 207, 210, 242, 349, 352, 
385, 392, 418 

SCHMELZER: 25, 325 

Scumipt, A.: 26 

Scumipt, H.: 22, 230, 886 

Scumipt, L.: 327 

Scumitt, F.: 17, 460 

SCHNEIDER: 27, 457 

SCHNIPPEL: 25 

ScHOENE: 79, 142, 207, 290, 480 

ScHULTE : 25 

ScHULTESS: 282, 353 

SCHULTGEN : 264 

ScHULTZE: 8 

SCHULZE: 15 

ScHWEGLER: 50 

ScreNcE, impartiality of: 419; division 
into practical and theoretical: 203, 
214, 469 

SECRET DOCTRINE : 497 

SELF-CRITICISMS, Plato’s : 316, 435, 460 

SELF-MOVING principle: 332 

SENSATIONS: 246, 307, 354, 370, 413, 
467, 488; a shadow of ideas: 805; 
cause of illusions : 317, 374; of error: 
299, 466; affected by illness: 375; 
common to men and animals: 381 

SENSES are instruments: 873 

SENSIBLE world: 481 

SENSUALISM: 375 

SENSUALITY: 287 

SENTENCE follows judgment: 432, 480 

SEPARATE existence of ideas: 224, 236, 
292, 296, 839, 404, 447, 467, 474, 477, 
506, 521 

SERRANUS: 18, 85 

SEXES, equality of: 276, 307 

SHAKESPEARE : 65 

SHELLEY: 240 

SHOREY: 27, 295 

SIEBECK: 23, 60, 126, 128, 207, 211, 
322, 356, 386, 401, 433, 460, 470 

Sieur: 246, 296 

SrruaRity of things and ideas: 293, 
361; of perceptions: 373; of ele- 
ments : 419, 444 ; deceiving : 297, 420 

Simmias compared with Phaedrus: 354 

SrmonmeEs: 430 

Suvpuicrtry of the soul: 282, 315 

SIMPLIcIUS: 457 

SINNER: 240 

81zE of Plato’s dialogues: 143, 162-85, 
194, 270, 358, 399 

SMALL DIALOGUES of Plato: 184, 194, 
196, 395 

SocHER : 27, 39, 196, 200, 208, 210, 231,. 
262, 356, 385, 400, 453 

SOCIAL LIFE ; 272 


INDEX 541 
Socrates, the younger: 55, 891 Dittenberger: 105; despised by 
Socrates: 837, 195-61, 244, 527; see Plato: 227 
also PLATONIC SOCRATES Stream : 483 
Socratic dialogues: 38, 40, 59, 194, | STEGER: 26 
205, 209, 215 STEN: 22, 394 


SoLemniry of style: 101, 350 

Soon : 818, 825 

Sopuisms: 210-1, 520 

Sopuist defined: 422 

Sopuist, Plato’s dialogue: style : 89-90, 
97, 157-8, 178, 437; form: 894, 417, 
438, 442; authenticity: 27, 115, 434; 
date: 441; logic: 417-84; relation 
to Prot.: 417; to Crat.: 429-30; 
to Symp. : 428; to Phaedo: 419; to 
Rep.: 419, 421, 429, 488, 441; to 
Phaedr. : 419, 421, 425, 488, 441, 493 ; 
to Theaet.: 368, 417, 419, 428-9, 
488; to Pharm.: 868, 409-10, 417, 
424, 428-9, 435-7, 493; to Polit.: 
442; to Phil.: 462, 467, 469; to 
Tim.: 417, 488; to Crit.: 438; to 
Legg.: 427, 506 

SopHocies: 8, 112, 846, 350 

Sout, a substance: 814, 523; a self- 
moving principle: 332, 413, 425, 453, 
495; truly existing: 873, 424, 433, 
506 ; invisible : 307 ; similar to ideas: 
250, 810; not an idea: 494; contains 
ideas: 860, 428; conceives aims: 
485; rules the body: 870; receives 
impressions: 343, 873, 467; exists 
before the body: 216, 474, 496; ac- 
quires knowledge : 246, 298, 344, 374, 
424; without help of the body: 871; 
number of souls : 815, 836 ; their 
nature: 197, 336, 468, 480, 500, 505; 
parts: 277, 337; power: 276, 445, 
522; probation: 329 ; wisdom: 247 ; 
See: KNOWING SUBJECT, FacuLTIES, 
IMMORTALITY. 

Space: 474, 482-8, 495 

SPEcIES: 208, 294, 313 

Speciric difference: 422; energy of 
the senses: 276, 372 

SPEECHES, examples of: 328 

SPEED of writing: 269, 399 

SPENGEL: 57, 212, 241, 327 

SPERMATOZOA: 484 

SPIELMANN: 203 

SPILLER: 241 

Spinoza: 278, 526 

SPIRITUAL atmosphere: 439 

Spurious dialogues : 36, 56, 75, 145, 194 

STACKEL: 19 

STaLLBAauM: 25, 39-41, 46-7, 196, 198, 
200, 203, 205, 207, 210, 211, 231, 242, 
261, 356, 385 

STanLeEy: 11, 12 

Stars: 800, 421, 478, 482; bodies of 
Gods: 472, 502 

STATESMEN judged: 214 

Statistics of style requires great 
numbers: 142; weighing of the 
evidence: 93; attributed wrongly to 


STEINHART : 50, 196, 200, 203, 207, 211, 
242, 245, 261, 356, 885 

STEINTHAL: 231 

STEPHANUS: 18, 141 

STEREOMETRY: 800, 484 

Stock: 201 

Srorc origin of the Sophist, supposed: 
459 

STOLLEN: 18 

STRATEGY: 465 

Sty e of Plato : 63-183; See also the 
name of each dialogue 

STYLOMETRY, compared with palaeo- 
graphy: 193; theory of: 140-190 

Suppivisions of notions: subjective : 
860 

SusJecT and predicate: 71, 430 

SUBJECTIVE element in historic inves- 
tigations: 31 

SUBJECTIVE PERFECTION : 359 

SuBsEcTiIvity of notions: 257; of 
knowledge: 413; of sensations : 375, 
414; of ideas: 402 

SuBORDINATION of phrases: 77 

SUBSTANCE defined: 315; permanent: 
222; object of knowledge: 224, 444; 
unchangeable : 297, 478; difficult to 
know : 404, 520; not to find in words: 
221 

SUBSTANTIVES, use of : 71, 102 

Suckow : 20, 50, 203, 242, 453 

SUDDEN intuition of ideas: 235-6 

SupwHaus: 212, 215, 241 

SUGGESTIVFRAGEN: 81 

Sumas: 43 

SuLLA: 4 

Sun compared with idea of Good: 304 

oa sage use of : 78, 127, 129, 137, 

0 

SUPRAMUNDANE ideas: 829, 494 

SUSEMIHL : 20, 22, 52-3, 59-60, 200, 
2038, 207, 212, 225, 242, 261, 353, 356, 
885, 492 

SWINE compared with men: 446 

SYBEL: 241, 263, 281 

SYLLoGIsM: 9, 118, 208, 464, 524 

SyMBOLIcAL nature of words: 226 

SymMMETRY as a peculiarity of style: 76 

Symposium, Plato’s dialogue: style: 
154, 159, 169; form: 393,486; date: 
189, 240-1, 244; logic: 234-240; re- 
lation to Prot.: 243; to Meno: 238, 
243 ; to Euthyd.: 211, 239; to Gorg.: 
239, 243; to Crat.: 233, 235; 2388, 
242-3; to Phaedo: 242, 245, 249, 
253-4, 257, 261-4, 371; to Rep. :280-1, 
284, 286-7, 303, 306, 308, 313; to 
Phaedr.: 242, 831, 852, 354-6 ; to 
Theaet. : 161,371,400; to Soph. : 423 ; 
to Polit. : 245, 389 


542 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


Synonyms: 103, 377 

Syntax of Plato: 136 

SYNTHESIS: 514, 523 

SyRBius: 14 

System of ideas: 246; of notions: 463; 
of souls: 523 

SysTEMATIC prejudice: 29 

SZCZERBOWICZ: 23 


TaBLE of affinity: 162-183; of adjec- 
tives in e1d4%s and dns: 118-4 ; of 
rare words : 92, 98 

TasTE: 514 

TaTHAM: 205 

TAYLOR: 24 

TCHORZEWSKI: 51 

TEACHER, ideal: 205, 211, 842 

TEACHING of Plato: 211, 216, 258, 309, 
327; See ORAL TEACHING, ACADEMY 

TrICHMULLER: 57,60, 102, 142, 200, 207, 
212, 215, 241, 242, 244, 259,260, 262, 
322, 335, 348, 352, 855, 886, 388, 392, 
401, 438, 443 

TELEPATHY, anticipated by Plato : 502 

TEMPERATURE: 514 

TENNEMANN: 13-6, 26, 29, 31, 35, 42-3, 
45, 58, 207, 211, 262, 885 

TERMINOLOGY : 67, 77, 87, 89; logical : 
229, 277, 806, 308, 318; of ideas: 
224, 237, 255, 288, 292-8, 318,859; of 
substance: 225; of later Platonism, 
365 

TETRALOGIES: 42, 85, 153, 489-41 

TEUBNER: 180, 141 

TEUFFEL: 73, 242 

THEAETETUS, Plato’s dialogue: style: 
89, 91, 155, 157,177, 399, 411 ; form: 
398; date: 885, 391; relation to 
Prot. : 387; Crat.: 224, 371; Symp.: 
161, 871, 400; to Phaedo: 161, 263, 
371-3, 382-8, 395; to Rep.: 161, 366, 
372-3, 382, 389, 395-7; to Phaedr.: 
367, 380, 397, 400, 493; to Parm.: 
366, 368, 402, 409-11, 418, 493; to 
Soph. : 368, 417, 419, 428-9, 488; to 
Phil.: 467; to Legg.: 366, 391; to 
preceding and following dialogues: 
390-1 

THEAGES: 75, 194 

THEODORETUS: 6, 457 

THEODORUS of Cyrene: 392 

THEOGNIS : 112 

THEORETICAL and practical science : 
445, 466 

THEUPOLIS: 10 

THoMAsIuS: 18, 15 

THOMPSON : 212, 242, 336, 356 

THOUGHT as aconversation: 376, 520; 
image of reality: 252 ; independent 
of words: 468; of the body, 307 

THRASYMACHUS compared with Calli- 
cles: 272 

THUCYDIDES: 107, 112, 199, 200, 225, 
934, 440 

TIEDEMANN: 14 


TIEMANN : 128, 186, 242 

TimaxEvs, Plato’s dialogue : style: 156, 
181, 472,486 ; form : 394,487; date: 
490; logic: 473-486; relation to 
Phaedo: 341,452; to Rep. : 488-90; 
to Phaedr. : 329, 341, 350, 353, 478, 
479; to Soph.: 417, 438; to Polit.: 
452, 475, 478, 486, 489; to Phil. : 
466, 486-8 ; to Legg.: 495, 500-1, 506, 
509, 513, 515 

Time, its influence on opinions: 429, 
509; measure of; 829,330, 380, 482,515 

TISSANDIER: 23 

Tocco: 57, 60, 438, 458 

TRADITION overruled by knowledge : 
215 

TRAINING : 294-5, 298, 303, 363, 879; 
philosophical : 396, 471; logical : 207, 
989, 870, 404, 406, 414, 421, 442-3, 
449, 480, 524 

TRENDELENBURG : 26 

TRIEVENBERG : 12 

TRILoGIES : 439-41 

Troost : 203 

TROPES: 72 

TROXLER: 23 

True Berne defined : 423; always the 
same: 495, 506 

TruTH eternal ; 205, 213; exists in 
thought : 296; is produced by the 
soul: 418, 463; leads Gods and 
men: 509 

TYRANNY despised: 215, 331 

TYRRHENIA: 473 


UEBERWEG: Untersuch.: 20, 54-7, 82, 
198, 201, 207, 242, 358, 356, 386, 391, 
398, 400, 438, 441, 456, 459, 491; 
Grundr. : 73, 385 

UNCONDITIONED principle: 296 

Units, mathematical: 299 

Unity of knowledge : 302, 445, 467, 511; 
of the soul: 315; of consciousness: 
372-3, 414, 425, 506 ; of the universe: 
209, 341, 471, 475, 501 

Universaity of philosophers: 261; 
of science: 370, 420-1 

UNIVERSE: 297; unique: 475; ex- 
plained: 471 

UpuuEs: 484 

URBAN: 212, 232 

UsEFULNESS of knowledge: 204 

UsENER: 4, 5, 240, 351 

UseER and maker: 318 


VAHLEN: 73 

Varro: 245 

VERA: 18 

VERBS, use of: 70,102 
VIERI: 11 

VIRTUE: 196, 211, 216 
VOLQUARDSEN: 351 
Voss: 12 


INDEX 543 


WappincTon: 18, 199 

WacGner, J.: 17, we 

WAGNER, J.J.: 

WaGner. See ais de Vienna 

WaLseE: 125, 335 

Watcu: 13 

Wanrrare, limitations of: 291 

Warer, molecules of: 484 

We, meaning philosophers: 337 

WEBER : 27 

WEGNER: 12 

WEISSE : 79 

WELLs: 198 

WELPER: 24 

WESTERMANN : 327 

WeyGoLpT : 24, 60, 200, 211 

Wuote known through the investiga- 
tion of its parts; 341, 376 

Wreck: 24 

WrenBarG: 25 

Wi.amow1tz-MoELLENDoRFY : 5, 241, 
351 

WILL POWER included in reason: 278, 
500 

WINDELBAND: 200, 242, 454 

Wispom above philosophy: 239; sub- 
stituted by justice: 284; highest 
good: 510 

Wo tr: 36, 240, 241 

Wotrr : 21, 191 

Women, position of: 290 

Woousey: 215 

WorpMakeERr guided by the dialectician : 
226; subject to errors: 228 

Worps are instruments: 226, 2383; 
their right use: 211, 227; invented: 
112, 421; donot correspond to ideas : 
444; are of no importance: 520 

Worps used by Plato: their fre- 

quency: 69; their number: 69; 
use of 


ayaboedis: 114 
ayévnros: 79 
erapat A as 
aytos: 
~ pants 95 
aykiorpeutinds : 
aypduparos: 97 
aywviorixy: 96 
aerdhs: 118, 116 
aepoedys: 114 
abedrns : 96 
abgos: 96 
Gidia: 477 
aiuaciwdns : 114 
alviypwaTw@dns: 1138 
alc@nois : 479 
aitla : 878, 452, 485 
aidyvios : 477 
akivntos: 189, 324, 358 
akparis : 96 
adndeig : 120 
aAnbéorara : 123—4,126, 129, 137, 319, 
323 


&Andq: 119, 128, 821 
aAndas: 110, 120 
aAiTnpi@dns: 114, 117 
GAAd: 104, 123, 137 
aAAolwais : 407, 410 
&uetpos : 95 
auvyThptos : 96 
aupraBnrnrixds : 177 
aupoiy: 102 
ava: 132 
avayKatoy: 123 
avaryKka.sT ara : 137 
avdynn : 126 
avakvKAnots : 96 
dvaxvKAovpar : 96 
avaravaa : 139, 357 
avdoratos: 96 
avaroA7: 96 
avdparodaHdns : 113, 116 
aveiArkis : 95 
avetAitTw : 95 
&vicos : 139 
avicdrns : 139 
dvouodrns : 139 
avouow : 139 
ay rdécos : 96 
amas: 125, 126 
areipla : 138 
&retpos: 139, 323 
pee. any 139 
pnudw: 97 
drexe: 139 
amibeiv : 95 
amidavos : 139, 857 
amAavis: 97 
&meros : 96 
arouepiCw : 96 
amorxicw : 96 
ampemijs : 139 
dpa : 128, 320 
&pirra: 137 
apx7f : 332, 479 
&oxioros: 96 
avromaéAns : 97 
avrdés: 106, 255 
apepunvetw : 96 
&peais: 96 
apvaAaktos: 96 
aédns : 114, 116 


BéBnka: 139 
Biacrikds: 96 
BopBopaéins : 113 
Bpéxos: 96 


yap: 107, 123, 324 

rye: 104, 118 

YET OVE : 96 

yéveots : 94 

yevos: 94, 125, 357, 448-9 
yeaons : 113, 116 
yAowdns : 113 
yuapevTixds : 97 
yveépiots : 96 

yyoédns : 114 


544 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


ypapea. : 139 
yupvucta: 138, 399 


yuuvar Tis : 96 


decuds: 94 
deomd(w: 139 
deomoreta: 139 
Seomdtis: 97 
dexer ba ; 255 
64: 118 
Shaov : 123-4, 319, 323 
Snutovpyds: 501 
Snuddns : 113, 116 
didyvwots : 96 
diddeors : 95 
diabpatw : 96 
diakovw : 139 
SiakpBoroyodpat : 96 
Sid piois : 95 
diadayxdvw: 96 
SiadexTiky : 331 
diadextikds : 332 
SiaroyiCouar: 95 
diaduTikds: 96 
StaperdeTa@ : 138 
SiapepiCw : 95 
diavdnots: 96 
didvora: 305 
diamepaw : 96 
Statrop@ : 97 
diabopdrns : 139 
diaxwpiCw: 95 
Sindeiv : 96 
SiBvpauBadns : 115 
dixadtara : 137 
diopiouds : 96 
Soret : 122, 138 
SéEa : 818, 457, 508 
Sogoropia: 95 
SpvoToula: 96 
SpvoT omy : 96 
dvvauts: 331, 896, 407, 425, 443, 448, 
483 
Sd: 101, 102, 324, 358, 437 
dvcedijs; 114 


éykatpos : 96 

éywrye: 122 

eidos : 125, 199, 225, 240, 255, 447-9 
eixacia: 305 

elxaoTiKkt : 96 
423) 


. Vv. 
eimes ; 124, 157 
elroy : 122 
elmaéy : 137 
efpnras : 124, 187 
elpntat: 123, 137, 357 
elpwvikds : 96 
eis Sivauw : 124 
exaoTos : 126 
€xdoo1s : 96 
exeivo: 255 
exxplvw : 96 
éxkpitos : 96 
EXeyov : 122 








Euorye : 122, 138 
euol yoov Boxe? : 
éumopevouar: 96 
cutropevTiKds : 96 
évaptOuos : 95 
eveivat: 255 
évrevdev 757 : 106, 399 
evurypoOnpevTiis : 95 
évuypoOnpucds : 95 
evudpos: 97 
eEaipyns : 235, 407 
eg av aryKns : 123 
eicovuar: 139 
€oukey: 138 
émavetut: 139 
emevxomual : 97 
émbupia: 479 
éerikAny : 95 
emiveuw : 96 
emiokeva(ouat: 96 
émiomevdw : 96 
émiorhun : 342, 457, 508 
epyov: 275 
€ppiiOn : 123, 357 
Epws : 479 

ie lees 139 

> 118 

cheibie: 113 

e¥KoAos : 189 
evxurdos : 96 
evaAaBis: 96 

evmetis : 139 
evmpetis : 97 
evedys : 113, 116 
evavuuos : 96 
E€womep : 95, 104 


122, 128 


(nuiddns : 118, 117 
(ga : 126 


#5: 105, 106, 118 
NAtoeto7s : 114 

}) was : 123 
TNpeuatos : 96 
naovxaios: 96 
7nTo01: 119 


@eoerd7js: 113, 116 
Enpiwdns : 118, 116 
Ovntoedis : 113 

OopuB ons : 114, 117 
Opnvadns: 114, 117 
Ovmoerd7js: 114, 116, 279 
Ouuds : 479, 507 
Oupavaeiv : 96 


id€a: 224, 225, 255, 447-9 
iuavrdins : 114 

tva: 111 

Yoov: 138 

ivomadés : 96 

Yorttov : 138 

iraporns : 96 

ivayas : 96 

ixvevw : 139 


INDEX 545 


kabamep : 103, 104, 437 muxtds : 189 
Kadamepel : 122 ulcOwars : 96 
Kkabaprinds : 96 bovapxia : 96 
kal udAa: 124, 187 Movoeidijs : 118, 115, 237 
kal why : 104, 107 bdvws : 188 
kal mas : 123, 187 Béptoy : 448 
kalro: 118, 119 modes : 816 
kal rolyuy : 118 pmvdddns : 114 
KdAAora, : 137 bupidKis wipia: 397 
KdAAuoros : 124 pupi : 123 
Kada@s ; 137, 320 u@y: 119 
kara: 180-33, 821, 824 M@y ov : 119, 437 
Kard ye Thy eudy: 123 Bay oby : 119, 437 
kara Sbvauy : 124 
KaTabpatw : 96 val : 137, 144, 319 
kataxdounots : 96 veuvpwdns : 114 
katamatw : 95 vénats : 305 
Knpoedhs: 114 vouobernua : 96 
Knonvedns : 114 vorwdns : 113, 116 
xlynots : 407, 410 vovOerntikds : 96 
kowd : 868 vous : 508 
kowwwvla: 254 viv %dn : 106 
KoAA@ons : 118 vay: 102 
Kompédns : 114 
kpnris : 96 talvw : 97 : 
Kpox@dns : 114 Eévios : 96 
Kpudaios : 96 Edumas : 106, 125, 857, 437 
KUKAnats : 96 Evyatrioy : 452, 485 
Kiptos : 97 tuydmas : 125, 437 
Aéyeis : 128, 187, 487 oyKddns : 118 
Aéyots : 187 % rr: : 110 
AeovTadns : 114 olorpains: 114, 116 
Anpa@ins : 114 bAos : 126, 824 
ABoedhs: 114 buorm : 140 
ALOa@5ns : 114 buolwua: 139, 858 
Aurp@dns: 114 bums: 119 
Adyos : 816, 871, 877-8, 431, 508 by: 109, 110 

bvoua: 430-1 
mdxpp : 128 évouaariKh : 431 
meBetis : 94, 403 évrws : 120 
meOnuepivds : 96 bytws bv: 109-10, $24 
peOloraua: 139, 323 banrep : 97 
metpaxiwdns : 114 émws : 110 
neumrds : 79, 399 ép0drara: 123, 124, 126, 129, 137, 319, 
bev Te: 107 523 
mévrot: 118, 119, 437 6p0ds : 129, 137, 319, 323 
meplCw : 94 dpun: 140 
mepis: 96 opviBeurijs : 96 
Mepiords : 138 épyiBevTixds: 96 
bépos: 448 bcoomep : 139 
uécov: 464 ov yap ér1 : 255 
MeTaAauBavery : 255 ovdauy : 124 
meTaoxeots : 255 ovde jv: 104 
mera TovTO: 106 ovKouy : 123, 323 
meréxen : 237, 254 ovata: 109, 110, 225, 321, 358 
mérpnots : 96 ov tolyvy: 119 
petpntés : 96 obtws dn: 106 
MET ptov : 469 opew@dns: 114 
beéTpov : 140 6xAG@Sns : 114 
méxpurep : 95, 104 
bndapuy : 124 maiyviov : 96 
pndamov: 139 ; madapimdns : 114, 126 
MnvuThs : 96 maupeyedns : 138 
Bh Tolvuy: 118 mapmay : 97, 123 


NWN 


546 ORIGIN AND GROWTH 


mavra edn : 125, 357 
maytamaciw: 124, 126 
mavTeA@s : 189, 448 

mavrTn : 123, 857 

may Toda ws : 138 

TAT OS : 123, 357 

mavu ve: 124, 137, 144, 319 
mayy pev ovv: 124, 137, 144, 319 
mammos: 139 

mapdadery ia : 477 

mapadragss : 96 

mapapopos : 97 

mapacopsrns : 97 

mapahpoovyn : 96 

Trapappwy : 96 

mapeori: 212 

mapovoia: 254 

Tapwyvutoy : 96 

mas : 106, 125, 324, 437 
macxew : 384 
TeATACTIS : 387 
mepas : 140 
meparoeidys : 114 
mepl ; 130-32 
mep) 8%: 399 
meprexw: 140 
meptAeimo : 97 
meTpw@odns : 114 
m7: 123, B24 
més : 95 
mnrAwodns : 113 
mioris: 805 
TAaTTas : 96 


mAaTos: 95 
mAeypna : 97 


mAeKTiKOS : 96 
mvevuaTwons : 113 
modnyev: 96 
Tovey : 384 

motos : 124, 320 
moAtds : 94 
moAveloys : 113, 115 
moAvOpvantos : 292 
ToAUTparywovery : 418 
Tparywarerbdys : 114 
mpemoy : 122, 128 
TpEeT ONS : 114 
mpoBoan: 97 
Mpoowodoryouua : 96 
mpoodexer Ba : 255 
TpoonKwy : 128 
mpoctevar: 255 
MpooKowave : 96 
mpooplyvups : 96 
TpooTUX |S : 96 
Tp@Tov pev ToLvuy : 118 
mupoe.dis : 114 
mupwons : 114 

m@s: 122, 123, 137 





pan: 96 
prua: 430 
pnTopiKy: 431 
puwdyns: 114 





OF PLATO’S LOGIC 


wapKoeidns : 114 
capKadns : 114 
capeotara: 137 
oKeracua: 96 
okwoedyns: 113 
cKotodwia: 96 
okorwons: 113, 117 
ouikpodAoyia: 380, 389 
omnAawdns: 114 
orariacTiKds : 96 
oragiwrela: 96 

or eyao ja: 97 

or EAA OfaL : 95 
orepeoetdis: 114 
orépomat: 139, 407 
ovykarackevd (a : 96 
cuykepadatovuar: 95 
ovykpacis: 95 
ovykpivecOar: 139 
ovyKpiois: 95 
asvAAayxavw : 96 
cupBeBnkds: 407 
cUpperpos: 139 
oUppikis: 94 
TUUTIAD®: 96 

ovum odnyoupat : 96 
suupuhs: 97 
cuvayupuds: 449 
cuvamepydcerbar: 96 
ovvd.taTov@: 96 
avvSpomos: 96 
atvdvo: 138 
cuvepéemouo: 97 
obyvouos : 97 
avvodos: 97 
Tuvoporoyia.: 96 
curr ema : 97 
abytpopos : 96 
cuvupaiyw: 96 
chaipoedns: 114 
op@v: 102 

oxeddy: 124 

oxiCw: 94 

gama: 95 
cwuaroedjs: 113, 115 


taiv: 102 

Ta voy: 124 

Taxa tows: 104, 437 
re: 107-9, 320, 358 
TEpaToons : 113 

TEXVO: 102 

TéexvN: 342 

ThKTOs: 96 

Ti: 187 

al phy : 104, 137, 319, 323 
TidetOou: 313 

Tuna: 448 

rot: 117, 118 
Tovyapovv: 107, 437 
Tovyaptot: 107 

tolyuy: 118-20, 321, 437 
ToAunpss: 96 

Town: 97 

TéT HOdn : 106 


TovvayTiov: 125 
Tovrw: 102 
Tparyoeid7s: 113 
TpimAovs: 9T 
Tporn: IT 

BAn: 94 
bméAaBes: 124 
ttrepoxn: 96 
tmvedns: 114 
bpn: 96 


papuakorocia: 96 
piAdpyupos : 275 
piroxpnuatos: 275 
Lo baphin ok 114 
dopa: 407, 410 
ppdvnois: 508 
bois: 448, 483 
puaddns: 118 
puwrvnbervta: 96 


xarendrns: 9T 
xdpw: 124 
xepoatos : 97 
XoAwSns: 114, 117 
Xpewy: 122 
Xpucoedys: 118 
X@pa: 488 


INDEX 547 


ws 5h ror: 119 
as Suvardy: 122 
Somep: 1038, 104, 437 


Wortp has no beginning: 477, 481 

Wor.p’s sou: 468-9, 474, 487, 523 

Worsutp of wealth: 505 

Wower: 16 

WRITING a noble play: 845; under- 
rated: 517 

Woutrr: 434 

Wurzporrr: 17 


XENOPHON : 48, 57, 61, 107, 112, 204 
207, 244, 343 


Yourn’s advantages: 879 
YxEm: 198 


ZABARELLA: 10 

ZELLER: 7, 15, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 88, 58- 
9, 72, 78, 105, 120, 128, 141, 190, 200- 
1, 203, 205, 207, 212, 217, 242, 259, 
352-8, 356, 385-91, 435, 438, 450, 469, 
470, 492 

ZENO: 408 

Zumpr: 5 

ZURICH edition of Plato; 47 


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CONTENTS. 
PA 

BADMINTON LIBRARY (THE)- - 1a | MENTAL, MORAL, AND POLITICAL 
BIOGRAPHY, | PERSONAL’ ME- =|; MEOSOFEY ~~: at 

MOIRS - - - - > Q | MISCELLANEOUS AND ei Se hee 
CHILDREN’S BOOKS - - - | WORE sy tt4) 5% 38 
CLASSICAL LITERATURE, TRANS. | POETRY AND THE DRAMA 23 

LATIONS - - - 22 | POLITICAL Shee AND a: 
COOKERY, DOMESTIC MANAGE- | NOMICS -_ - : 20 
MENT 2 4 : - z 36" | POPULAR SCIENCE - - - - 30 
EVOLUTION, ANTHROPOLOGY - 21 | RELIGION, THE SCIENCE OF 21 
FICTION, HUMOUR-. - + + a5 |STDVER LIBRARY (PHE)" > 33 
FINE ARTS (THE) AND MUSIC - 36|SPORT AND PASTIME -_ .- 12 
FUR, FEATHER AND FIN SERIES 15 | STONYHURST PHILOSOPHICAL = 

HISTORY, POLITICS, POLE Y, TRAVEL AND ADVENTURE, THE 
POLITICAL MEMOIRS - - = 3 COLONIES ~ v 5 . Be Ste 

LANGUAGE, HISTORY AND WAMPUM LIBRARY (THE) OF 
SCIENCE OF - - - - 20 AMERICAN LITERATURE - - 40 
LOGIC, RHETORIC, PSYCHOLOGY - wee WORKS OF REFERENCE- - 31 

INDEX OF AUTHORS, AND EDITORS. 

Page Page ¢ | Page 
Abbott Sa 19,22 Barnett(S.A.andH.) 20} | Campbell (Rev. Lewin | Dante - 9) 23 
——(T. K.) = 17,18 | Baynes (T. S.) - 38 21, 22 Dauglish (M. G.) B 9 
— (E. A.) 17 Beaconsfield (Earl of) 25| Carlyle (T.) - + 9 | Davidson ey M. GC; ) 22 
Acland (A. H. D.) 3 | Beardsley (A.) - - g | Casserly (G.) - - | —— (W. 20 
Acton (Eliza) - 36 Beauiort(Duks of) 12, 24135 14| Chapman (S. J.) - 20 | Davies (J. =) ) - - 22 
#Eschylus - - 22 | Becker (W. A.) 22| Chesney (SirG.)  - 3 | Dennison (C. G.) 4 
Airy (Osmund) 3 | Beesly (A. H.) - - g| Chisholm(G.C) - 31 | Dent (C. T.) - = 14 
Albemarle (Earl off - 13 Bell(Mrs. Hugh) - 23 | Cholmondeley-Pennell | —— (P. O.) : 2 
Allen (Grant) - 30 | Belmore (Earl of) - 3 (H.) - - . 13 | De Salis (Mrs.) - 36 
Allgood (G.) - - 3| Benn (R. D.) - 36 | Christie (R. C.) - 38 | Devas (C.S.) - - 19, 20 
Alston (L.) - . 3 | Bent (J. Theodore)’ - - 11 | Churchill (Winston S.) Dewey (D. R.)- : 20 
Angwin (M. C.) - 36 | Besant (Sir Walter)- 3 3, 4,25 | Dickinson (W. H.) - 38 
Anstey (F.)_- - 25 | Bickerdyke (J.) - 14, 15 | Cicero - - 22|Dougall(L.) - = 25 
Anstruther Thomson Blackburne (J. H.) - 15 | Clarke (Rev. R. F.) - 19 | Dowden (E.) - 40 
) - - =) 5 | Bland (Mrs. Hubert) 24 | Clodd (Edward) - 21,30 Doyle (Sir A. Conan) 25 
Aristophanes - Boase (Rev. C. W.) - 5 | Clutterbuck (W. J.)- 12 | Du Bois (W. E. B.)- 5 
Aristotle - =a Boedder (Rev. B.) - 19 | Cockerell (C. RR.) - 11 | Dunbar (Aldis) . 25 
Arnold (Sir Edwin) - - 11,23 | Bonnell (H. H.) . 38 | Colenso (R. J.) - 36 | —— (Mary F.) - = 25 
—(Dr.T.) - 3) Booth(A.J.) -  - 38|Collie(J.N.) - - 12 | Elgood (G. S.) - 37 
Ashby (H.) - - 36 | Bowen (W. E.) - g| Colville (Mrs. A.) - g | Elkind tf - 5 
Ashley (W. J.)- - 3,20) Brassey (Lady) - 11! Conington (John) - 23) Ellis (J. H.) - 15 
Atkinson (J. J.) - 21 |—— (Lord) - - 14, 20| Converse (F.) - - 25;——(R.L.) - : iy 
Avebury ( ord) - 21 | Bright (Rev. J. F.) - 3 | Conybeare (Rev. W. J.) | Erasmus - - = 9 
Bacon - - 9,17} Broadfoot ( ajor W.) 13| | & Howson (Dean) 33 | Escreet (J. M.) = 10 
Bagehot (W.) - 9, 20, 38| Brooks (H.J.)- = - 17 | Coolidge (W. A. B.) 11 | Evans (Sir John) - 38 
Bagwell (R.) - - 3| Brough (J-) - - 17 | Corbett (faiass S.) - 4 | Falkiner (C. L.) - 4 
Bailey (H. C.) - - 25 | Brown (A. F.) - - 32 | Coutts (W.)  - - 22 | Farrar (F. W.) - - 26 
Bain (Alexander) - 9,17|Bruce(R.I.) - - 3 | Cox (Harding) - 13| Fite(W.)- —- = 17 
Baker (Sir S. W.) - 11, 12| Buckle (H. T,) - - 3 | Crake (Rev. A. D.) - 32 | Fitzwygram (Sir * 33 
Baldwin (C. S:) - 25|Bull(T.) -  - - 36) Creighton (Bishop) - -4,5,9|Ford(H.)-  - 15 
Balfour (A. J.) - 13, 21| Burgoyne (F. J.) - 4, 38| Cross (A. L.) ; Fountain (P.) - - II 
Ball Cory - -  141| Burke (U.R.) - 3| Crozier(J.B.)-  - 9,17| Fowler (Edith H.) - 26 
Banks (M. M.)- - 24) eat ly (Sir E. ) 36 | Cutts (Rev. E.L.) - 5 | Francis (M. E.) - 26 
Baring- -Gould (Rev. | Burns(C.L.) - = 36|Dale(L.)-" = = 4 | Freeman (Edward A, visa 
Ss.) - - 21, 38 Burrows (Montagu) 5 | Dallinger (F.W.) - 5 | Fremantle(T.F.) - 15 


INDEX OF AUTHORS AND EDITORS—continued. 


Page | 

Frost G.) - - - 
Froude (James A.) 

4,9, 11, 26 

Furneaux (W.) - 30 





Gardiner(SamuelR.) 4, 5 
Gathorne-Hardy (Hon. 
AB: ) = —Piayy 16 | 
Gerard (J.) - - 21 
Gibson (C. H.)- - 17 
Gilkes (A. H.) - - 38 
Gleig (Rev. G. R.) - pa) 
Gore-Booth(E.) - 23 
Graham (A,.) - - 5 
—(P.A.) - - 15 
—(G.F.) - - 20 
Granby (Marquess of) 15 
Grant (Sir A.) - - 17 
Graves (R. P.) - - 9 
(A. F.) - - 23 
Green (T. Hill) - 17, 18 
Greene (E. B.)- - 5 
Greville (C.C. F.) - 5 
Grose (T. H.) - - 18 
Gross (C.) - - 5 
Grove (Lady) - - II 
—— (Mrs. Lilly) 13 
Gurnhill(J.) - = - 17 
Gwilt (].) - - 31 
Haggard (H. Rider), 
11, 26, 27, 38 
Halliwell -Phillipps (J. a 10 


Hamilton (Col. H. B.) 5 
Hamlin (A. D. F.) - 
Harding (S. B.) - 5 
Hardwick (A. A.) - 
Harmsworth (Sir A. 


eye - - 13, 14 
Hart (A. B.) - 5 
Harte (Bret) - - 27 
Harting (J. E.) - - 15 
Hartwig (G.) - - 30 
Harvey- Brooks (E.C.) 38 
Hassall (A.) - - 8 
Hatch (ly. C:)) = - 5 
Havell (E. B.) - II 
Haweis (H. R.) - 9, 36 
Hawtrey (Mrs. H.C.) 5 
Head (Mrs.)_ - - 36 
Heathcote (J. M.) - Ig 
—— (C. G.) - = re 
Helmholtz (Hermann 

von) - - - 30 
Henderson (Lieut- 

Col GareR)= 10 
—— (W.J.) - - oF 
Henry (W.)_ - - 14 
Henty (G. A.) - - 32 
Hibbert (W.) - - 17 
Higgins (Mrs. N.) - 9 
Hiley (R. W.) - - 9 
Hill (S.C.) - - 5 
Hillier (G. Lacy) - 13 
Hime (H. W.L.) - 38 


Hodgson (Shadworth) 18, 38 


Hoenig (F.) - - 38 
Hoffmann (J) - - 30 
Hogan (J. F.) - - 9 
Holmes (R. R.) - 10 
Homer - - 22 
Hope (Anthony) - 27 
Horace - - 22 
Houston (D. F. ) 5 
Howard (Lady Mabel) 27 
Howitt (W.)  - II 
Hudson (W.H.)_~ - 30 
Hughes-Games (S.) - 23 
Huish (M. B.) - - 36 
Hullah (J.) 5 - 37 
Hume (David) - - 18 
—— (M.A. S.) - 3 
Hunt (Rev. W.) - 5 
Hunter (Sir W.)_- 6 


Hutchinson (Horace G.) 
13, 16, 38 





38 | Ingelow (Jean) - 


Ingram (T. D.) - 
James (W.) - 








Moran (T. F.) - 
Morgan (C. Lloyd) 


Page 


23 | 


| 


6} 


- 18, 21 | 








Page | Page 
Morris (W.) - 10,22, 23,| Stanley (Bishop) - 31 
24, 27, 28, 37, 40} Stebbing (W.) - - 28 
Mulhall (M. G.) - 20| Steel(A.G.)_ - - 13 
Myers (F.W.H) - 19, 40, Stephen (Leslie) 12 
Nansen (F.)_ - - 12 Stephens (H. Morse) 8 
Nesbit (E.) - - 24 Stevens(R.W.)_ - 40 
Nettleship (R. L.) - 17 | Stevenson (R. L.) 25, 28, 33 
Newlandsmith (E.) - 37 Storr (F.) - - - 17 
Newman (Cardinal) - 28 | Stuart-Wortley (A. J. )14,15 
Nichols (F. M.) - ol | Stubbs (J. W.) - 8 
Norris (W. E) - - 28 | — (W.) 8 
Oakesmith (J.) - - 22, Stutfield ‘a. E. M. ) 12 
Ogilvie (R.) - - 22) Suffolk & Berkshire 
Osbourne (L.) - - 28 (Earlot) - - 14 
Packard (W.) - - 33 | Sullivan (Sir EE.) - 14 
Paget (Sir J.) - - 10 | Sully (James) - - 19 
Park (W.) = = 16 Sutherland (A. and G.) 8 
Parker (B.) - - 40 (Alex.) = - - 19, 40 
Payne- SaaWEY (Sir | Sverdrup (Otto) - 12 
R.) - 14, 16 Swinburne (A. J.) - 1g 
Payne (W. M.) - 38 | Symes (J. E.) - - 20 
Pears (E.) - - 7| Tallentyre (S.G.) - 10 
Pearse (H.H.S.) - 6 Taylor (Col. Meadows) 8 
Peek (Hedley) - - 14 | Theophrastus - - 23 
Penrose (H.H.)  - 33 Thomas (J. W.) - 19 
Phillipps-Wolley (C.) 12,28 | Thomas-Stanford (C.) 16 
Pierce (A. H.) - = 19 Thompson (N. G.) - i6 
Pollock (W. H.) - 13 Thomson (J.Anstruther) 
Poole (W. H. and SBE 36 9, 15 
Powell (E.) - 8| Thomson (H.C.) - 8 
Praeger (S. Rosamond) 33 | Thornhill (W. J.) - 23 
Pritchett (R. T.)  - 14| Thuillier(H.F.)  - 40 
Proctor (R.A.) 16, 30, 35 | Todd (A.) - - : 8 
Raine (Rev. James) - 5| Toynbee (A.) - - 20 
Rankin (R.) - - 8,25| Trevelyan (Sir G. 0.) 
Ransome (Cyril) - 3,8] 7, 8,9, 10 
Rhoades (J.) - - 23|/——(G.M.) - - 8 
| Rice (S. P.) = - 12! —— (R.C.)_ - - 25 
Rich (A.) - - - 23, 31 | Trollope (Anthony) - 2 
Richmond (Ennis) - 19 | Turner (H. G.) - 8, 40 
Rickaby (Rev. John) 19| Tyndall(j.)  - - 9,12 
—— (Rev. Joseph) - 19/| Tyrrell {R. Y.) - - 22, 23 
Ridley (Lady) - - 28 | Unwin (R.) - - 
Riley (J. W.) - - 24 | Upton(F.K.and Bertha) a 
Robbins (L.) - - 33 | Van Dyke (J.C.)_ - 37 
Roberts (E. P.) = 33 | Vanderpoel (E. N.) - 37 
Roget (Peter M.) - 20, 31 | Vaughan (Capt. A.O.) 29, 33 


Jameson (Mrs. Anna) 37 | 
Jefferies (Richard) - 38 
Jekyll(Gertrude) - 36, 39 : 
Jerome (Jerome K.) - 27 
Johnson (J. & J. H.) 39 
Jones (H. Bence) - 31 
Jordan (W. L.) - 39 
Nabe (P.W.) - 6,27, 39 
ustinian - - - 18 
Kant (I.) - - 18 
| Kaye (Sir J. W.). - 6 
Keller (A. G.) - 21 
Kelly (E.)- - - 18 
Kendall (H. C.) - 2 
Kielmansegge (F.) - 10 
| Killick (Rev. A. H.) - 18 
Kitchin (Dr. G. W.) 5 
Knight (E. F.) - - II, 12 
KOstlin (J.) - - 10 
Ladd (G.T.) - - 18 
Lang (Andrew) 6 ,13, 14, 16, 
21, 22, 24, 27, 32, 39 
Lapsley (G. T.) - 5 
Lecky (W. E. H.) 6, 18, 24 
Lees (J. A.) - - 
Leslie (T. E. Cliffe) - oa 
Lieven (Princess) - 6 
Lindley (J.) - - 31 
List (F.) - - - 20 
Lodge (H. C.) - - 5 
Loftie (Rev. W. J.) - 5 
Longman (C. J.)  - 12, 16 

(HAW ee - 16 
——(G.H.) - - 33,15 

(Mrs. C.J.) - 36 
Lowell (A. L.) - - 6 
Lucian - = 22 
Lutoslawski (W,) - 18 
Lyall (Edna) - - 27,32 
Lynch (G.) - - 6 
—— (H. F. B.)- - 12 
Lytton (Eazl of) 2 
Macaulay (Lord) 7, 10,24 
Macdonald (Dr. G.) - 24 
—— (L.S.) - = 32 
Macfarren (Sir G. A.) 37 
Mackail (J. W.) - 10, 23 
Mackenzie (C.G.) - 16 
Mackinnon (J.) - a 
Macleod (H. D.) - 20 
Macpherson (Rev.1. 

Dees eae 
Madden (D. H.) - 16 
Magnusson (E.) - 28 
Maher (Rev. M.)_ - 19 
Mallet (B.) - - v4 
Malleson (Col. G. B.) 
Marbot (Baron de) - 10 

| Marchment (A. W.) 27 
Marshman (J.C.) - 9 
Mason (A. E. W.) - 27 
Maskelyne(J.N.) - 16 
Matthay (Tobias) - 37 
Matthews (B.) - 23, 39 
Maunderz (S.) - - 31 
Max Muller (?.) 

10, 18, 20, 21, 22, 27, 39 
May (Sir T. Erskine) 7 
Meade (L. T.) - - 33 
Melville(G.J. Whyte) 27 
Merivale (Dean) - v4 
Metcalfe (E. E.) - 

Mill (John Stuart) - 18, 20 

| Millais (J. G.) - - 16, 30. 
Milner (G.) - = 40 | 
Monck(W.H.S.) - 19 
ar (F.C.) - 7 
Moore (T - 31 
—— (Rev. pdward) - 17 





Romanes (G. J.) 10, 19,21,2 








Verney (F. P.and M.M.) 10 








—(Mrs.G.J.) - ro} Virgil - - - 23 
Ronalds (A.) - - 16 Wagner (R.) - - 25 
Roosevelt (T.) - - 5! Wakeman (H.O.) - 8 
| Ross (Martin) - - 28 | Walford (L. B.) - 2c 
Rossetti (Maria Fran- | Walpole (Sir Specees) 8 
cesca) - - 40 | Walrond (Col. H.) - 1 
; Rotheram (M. re ave 36 | Walsingham (Lord) - 14 
; Rowe (L.S.) - - 8 | Ward (W.) - - 9, 40 
(RP Pye - 14 (Mrs. W.) - 29 
Russell (Lady) - - to | Watson (A. E. T.) 12, 13, 14 
— (R.) - - - 19, 49 | Weathers (J.) - - 40 
Sandars (T. C.) 18 | Webb (Mr. and Mrs. 
Sanders(E.K.) -  9| Sidney) - - 20 
Be - - 19 
Scott (F. J.)  - - 37| Weber (A.) _ - - 19 
Seebohm (F.) - - 8,10) Weir (Capt. R.) - 14 
Selous (F. C.) - - aa Wellington (Duchess of) Ei 
| Senior (W.) - 13 | Weyman (Stanley) - 29 
Sewell (Elizabeth M. ) 2B | Whately(Archbishop) 17,19 
Shadwell (A.) - - 40 | Whishaw (F.) - = 29 
—(L.J.) - - 40 | Whitelaw (R.) - - 23 
Shakespeare - - 10,25 | Wilkins (G.) - - 23 
Shaw (L. H. de V.) - 15 | ——(W. ae - - 10 
' Shearman (M.) - 12, 13| Willard (A. R t.) - 37 
Sheehan (P. A.) - 25, 28 | Willich (C. M.) - 31 
Sherston (J.) - - 40| Willoughby (W.) - 8 
Sinclair (A.) - 14| Willson (B.) - - 8 
Smith (R. Bosworth) 8| Wood (Rev. J. G.) - 31 
—(T.C) - 5 | Wood-Martin WwW G.) 22 
— (W.P. Haskett) 12| Wotton(H.) - - 37 
Somerville (E.) - 16, 28| Wyatt (A. J.) - - 24 
| Sophocles - - 23| Wyld({M. A.) - -~< 2g 
Soulsby (Lucy H.) - 40| Wylie (J. H.) - - 8 
Southey (R.) - - 40| Yardley (J. W.) - 8 
| Spedding (J.) - - 9,17| Yeats (S. Levett) - 29 
| Spender (A. E.) - 12 Zeller (E.) ae A 19 


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