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Fb',1 ?'^9tf.y7 




(Class of 1814) 
President of Harvard College 


being giT«n to worin in tli* lalelloetaal 
•nd Moral Sdeaoes** 












With a Biographical Note 


a WHITEHAXL gardens 

■'}^: %8?6>*/ 


iixiUi^^ ^^^''^^ 

BUTLBR & Tanner. 

THB Sblwood Printing works» 

Fromb, and London. 

' n' • 

Thk preeoQt translation owes its origin to a desire on the part of the trans- 
lator of bringing to the wider notice of his fellow-coiintrymen a work which 
has proved beneficial and stimulating to himself. Written daring short 
intervals of leisure while studying with Professor Anton Marty of Prague 
University, it has had the advantage of his careful and constant super- 
vision; Without his aid it would scarcely have seen the light. The trans- 
lator has especially to thank Professor S. A. Alexander, of Owens College, 
Manchester, for his valuable help in the general revision and the translation 
of several difficult passages. It is now, alas, too late to do more than record 
the translator's debt to the late Professor Adamson, of Glasgow University, 
whose revision and correction of this essay was cme of the last services ren- 
dered to the cause of truth by a life-long disciple. 

West Dfdwich, 1902. 


Tms lecture, which I now bring before the notice of a 
larger public, was delivered by me before the Vienna 
Law Society on January 23, 1889. It then bore the 
title : "Of the Natural Sanction for Law and Morality." 
This title I have changed in order to bring its general 
purport more clearly into prominence ; otherwise I have 
made scarcely any further alteration. Numerous notes 
have been added, and an already published essay: 
" MiMosich on Subjectless if^ropositions " appended. In 
what way it bears upon inquiries apparently so remote 
will be evident in the sequel. 

The occasion of the lecture was an invitation extended 
to me by Baron von Hye, President of the Society. It 
was his wish that what had been said here a few years 
ago by Ihering, as jurist, in his address, Uber die 
Entstehmg des Rechtsgefuhls, might in the same 
Society be illustrated by me from the philosophic point 
of view. It would be a mistake to assume from the 
incidental nature of the circumstances to which it owed 
its first appearance that the Essay was only a fugitive, 
occasional study. It embraces the fruits of many years' 
reflection. The discussions it contains form the ripest 
product of all that I have hitherto published. 

a • 



These thoughts fonn a fragment of a Descriptive 
Psychology, which, as I now venture to hope, I may 
be enabled in the near future to publish in its complete 
form. In its wide divergence from all that has hitherto 
been put forward, and especially by reason of its being 
an essential stage in the further development of some 
of the views advocated in my Psychology from the 
Empirical Standpoint it will be sufficiently evident 
that during the period of my long Uterary retirement 
I have not been idle. 

. Specialists in philosophy wiU find also in this lecture 
what will be at once recognized as new. As regards 
the general reader, the rapidity with which I pass from 
one question to another might at first completely conceal 
many a sunken reef which required to be circumnavigated, 
many a precipice which had to be avoided. Surely I, 
if any one, have reason, owing to the conciseness of 
statement employed, to remember the saying of Leibnitz 
and pay little attention to refutation and much to 'de- 
monstration. A glance at the notes — ^which, were they 
to do full justice to the subject, would need to be mul- 
tiplied an hundredfold — ^will give him a further idea of 
those bye-paths which have misled so many, and pre- 
vented their finding an issue to the labyrinth. Meantime 
I would be well content — ^nay, I would regard it as the 
crown to all my efforts — should all that has been said 
appear so self-evident to him that he does not deem 
himself bound to thank me once in return. 

No one has determined the principles of ethics as, on 

the basis of new analyses, I have found it necessary to 

• • • 


determine them, no one, especially among those who 
hold that in the foundation of those principles the 
feelings must find a place, have so radically and com- 
pletely broken with the subjective view of ethics. I 
except only Herbart. But he lost himself in the sphere 
of aesthetic feeling, until at last we find him so far from 
the track that he, who in the theoretical philosophy 
is the irreconcilable enemy of contradiction, nevertheless 
in practical philosophy (i.e. ethics) tolerates it when 
his principles — ^the highest universally valid ideas — ^rush 
into conflict with one another. Still his teaching 
remains in a certain aspect truly related with mine, 
while, on other sides, other celebrated attempts to 
discover a basis for ethics find in it points of contact. 

In the notes, individual points are more sharply 
defined, a very detailed examination of which would 
have been too prolix in the lecture. Many an objection 
already urged has been met, many an expected rejoinder 
anticipated. I also hope that some will be interested 
in the several historical contributions, especially in the 
inquiries concerning Descartes, where I trace back the 
doctrine of evidence to its causes and point out two 
further thoughts, one of which has been misunderstood, 
the other scarcely noticed, neither treated with the 
consideration they deserve. I refer to his fundamental 
classification of mental states and to his doctrine of the 
relation of love to joy, and of hate to sadness. 

With several highly honoured investigators of the 

present — ^assuredly not least honoured by myself — 

I have entered into a polemical debate, and indeed most 




vigorously with those whose previous attack has 
compelled me to a defence. T hope that they do not 
regard it as a violation of their claims, when I seek, to 
the utmost of my power, to help the truth, which we in 
common serve, to her rights, and I assure them in turn, 
that as I m3rself speak frankly, so also none the less do 
I welcome with all my heart every sincere word of my 






1. Value of History and Philosophy for Jurispradeiice ; the new pro- 

posals for the reform of legal studies in Austria 1 

2. Our theme ; Relation to Ihering's lecture before the Vienna Law 

Society 2 

3. Twofold meaning of the expression "' natural right '- . .2 

4. Points of agreement with Ihering ; rejection of the "" jus naturae " 

and " jus gentium -' ; pre-ethical political statutes ... 3 

5. Opposition to Ihering; There exists a universaUy valid naturally 

recognizable moral law.< Relative independence of the question 4 

6. The notion -'natural sanction" 4 

7. Manifold misconception of the same l^ philosophers. ... 6 

8. Habitually developed feeling of compulsion as such is no sancticm . 6 

9. Motives of hope and fear as such not yet sanction . . 6 

10. The thought of the arbitrary command of a higher power is not the 

natural sanction 7 

1 1. The ethical sanction is a oozomand similar to the logical rule . . 8 

12. The aesthetic point of view ; as little in ethics as in logic the right 

one .- 9 

13. Kant's Categorical Imperative an impracticable fiction 10 

14. Necessity for preliminary psychological inquiri^ .10 

15. No wUling without a final end 10 

16. The problem : which end is right ? the chief problem of ethics . 11 

17. The right end is the best among attainable ends ; obscureneas 

of this definition 11 

18. Of the origin of the conception of the good ; it has not its origin in 

the sphere of the so-called external impression . .12 

19. The common characteristic of everything psychical . . .12 

20. The three fundamental classes of psychical phenomena ; idea 

(VorsteUung), judgment, feeling (Gemiitsbewegung) . . 13 




21. The contrasts, belief and denial, love and hate . . . .15 

22. Of these opposed modes of relation one is always right, one wrong . 15 

23. The conception of the good 15 

24. Distinction of the good in the narrgw sense from what is good for 

the sake of some other good . . . . . . .16 

25. Love is not always a proof that an object is worthy to be loved . 16 

26. ^* Blind ''- and " self-evident " judgment . . . . .17 

27. Analogous distincti6n in the sphere of pleasure and displea- 

sure ; criterion of the good ....... 18 

28. Plurality of the good ; problems associated therewith . . .21 

29. Whether by - the better '* is to be understood that which deserves 

to be loved with more intensity 21 

30. Bight determination of the conception . • . . .22 

31. When and how do we recognize that anything is in itself prefer- 

able 7 The case of the opposite, of absence, of the addition of 
like to Hke 23 

32. Oases where the problem is insoluble 25 

33. Whether the Hedonists in this respect would have the advantage . 26 

34. Why these failures prove less disadvantageous than might 

be feared 27 

35. The sphere of the highest practical good 28 

36. The harmonious development 28 

37. The natural sanction respecting the limits of right . .29 

38. The natural sanction for positive ethical laws . . ^ .29 

39. The power of the natural sanction 30 

40. True and false relativity respecting ethical rules . ... 30 
41.' Derivation of well known special enactments . . . .32 

42. Why other philosophers, by other ways, arrive at the same goal . 32 

43. Whence arise the universally extended ethical truths ? Unclear- 

ness oonoeming processes in one's own consciousness . . 33 

44. Trace of the influence of the moments severally mentioned . . 35 

45. Lower currents exercising an influence 37 

46. Necessity of guarding against overlooking the distinction between 

ethical and pseudo-ethical development . ... 39 

47. Value of such developments in the pre-ethioal time ; establishment 

of the social order ; formation of dispositions ; outlines of laws 
at the disposal of legislative ethical authority ; security against 
doctrinaire tendencies 39 

48. Beneficent influences which still operate continually from this side 41 

49. A further word on the reform of politico-legal studies . • .42 




13. In defence of my ohAnusterization of Herbart's ethical criterion . 44 

14. Of Kant's Oategorioal Imperative 44 

16. The Nicomachean Ethics and Ihering's '' fondamental idea " in 

his work ; Der Zwedc im BecM 46 

17. Of the cases of smaller chances in the effort after higher ends . 46 

18. Of the dependence of the conceptions upon concrete perceptions . 46 

19. The term "intentional"- 47 

21. The fundamental classification of mental states in Descartes 47 

22. Windelband's error in respect of the fundamental classification of 

mental states ; short defence of various attacks upon my Psy- 
chology from the Empirical Standpoint ; Land, on a supposed 
improvement on formal logic ; Steinthal's criticism of my 
doctrine of judgment 50 

23. In criticism of Sigwart*s theories of the existential and 

n^ative judgments ........ 55 

24. Descartes on the relation of " love " to " joy '* and of ** hate " to 

"sadness" : . 69 

25. Of the notions of truth and existence 69 

26. Of the unity of the notion of the good 71 

27. Of " evidence."- Descartes " Clara et distincta perceptio." Sig- 

wart's doctiine of " evidence " and his " postulates " . .71 

28. Of ethical subjectivism. Aristotle's oversight in respect of the 

source of our knowledge of the good. Parallels between his 
error in respect of the feelings (Gemiitsthatigkeit), and Des- 
cartes' doctrine of the " Clara et distincta perceptio " as a pre- 
condition of the logically justified judgment ; modem views 
which approach to this doctrine ...... 78 

29. Of the expressions " gut gefallen " and " schlecht gefaUen " . 84 

31. Topical case of a constant geometrical relation of mental values . 85 

32. Cases in which something at the same time both pleases and 

displeases 85 

33. Establishment of universal laws of valuation on the basis of a 

single experience 86 

34. Certain moments in the theory of ethical knowledge are of more 

importance for the theodicy than for ethics itself . . .87 

35. Explanation of the manner in which anything in certain cases is 

recognized as preferable ....... 87 

36. The two cases, unique in their kind, in which pref erability becomes 

clear for us from a certain character in the act of preference . 87 
39. Gauss on the measurement of intensities 89 

• « • 




40. Against exaggerated expeotations from the so-called psycho- 
physical law ......... 89 

40. Defence against the objection of a too great ethical rigour . . 90 

41. Love of neighbour in harmony with greater care of one's own good 91 
43. Why the narrowness of human foresight should not do injury to 

moral courage 92 

44 In criticism of Ihering's view of the notion of right and of his 

criticism of older views ....... 93 

45. Of the provisional ethical sanction of objectionable laws . . 96 

60. Self-contradiction of Epicurus 97 

64-65. Proof for the law of addition of like to like ; testimony for it in 

the teaching of the Stoa, of the theistic Hedonists, and in the 

demand for immortality ; Helmholtz 98 

67. The great theologians are opponents of the arbitrary character of 

the divine law of morals ....... 99 

68. John Stuart Mill on the doctrine of the distinction between 

'* blind "• and " self-evident judgments " . . . .99 
(The numbers missing in the index contain only literary references.) 

(Appendix to pages 14 and 55); 

L Short sketch of the essential features treated in Mikiosich's article • 105 

n. Critical remarks 110 

Biographical Note .... ... 119 




1. The invitation to lecture extended to me by the 
Law Society was the more binding as it gave expression 
in strong terms to a conviction which, imfortimately, 
seems on the point of falling into abeyance. Proposals 
for a reform of legal studies have been heard (and they 
are even said to have proceeded from university circles) 
which can only mean that the roots of jurisprudence 
deeply implanted as they are in the spheres of ethics 
and national history may be severed, without the organ- 
ism itself suffering any vital injury. 

As regards history, this coimsel is to me, I confess, 
utterly inexplicable ; in respect of philosophy, I can 
excuse it only on the groimd that the men who at present 
occupy the chairs in the legal faculty have taken a deep 
and gloomy impression of the mistakes of a period which 
has lately passed away. A personal reproach may 
therefore well be spared them. Yet indeed such sug- 
gestions were every bit as wise as would be the case if a 
medical faculty were to propose to erase from their plan 
of obligatory studies zoology, physics and chemistry. 

If Leibnitz in his Vita a se ipso lineata^ speaking of 
himself, says : " I foimd that my earlier studies in 
history and philosophy lightened materially my study 
of law," and if, as in his Specimen diffUyuUatis in jure, 
deploring the prejudices of contemporary jurists, he 
exclaims : " Oh ! that those who busy themselves with 

1 B 



the study of law would throw aside their contempt of 
philosophy and see that without philosophy most of the 
questions of their jus form a labjnrinth without issue ! " 
what indeed would he say were he to rise again to-day, 
to these retrograde reform movements ? 

2. The worthy President of the Society, who has 
retained such a lively and wide sense of the real scientific 
needs of his profession, expressed to me his own special 
wishes respecting the theme to be chosen. The question 
as to the existence of a natural right was, he said, a 
subject which enjoyed an exceptional interest with the 
members of the Law Society ; and he himself was 
anxious to learn what attitude I would adopt with regard 
to the views there expressed by Ihering some years ago/ 

I consented gladly, and have therefore designated as 
the subject of my lecture the natural sanction for law 
V and morality, wishing thereby, at the same time, to 

indicate in what sense alone I believe in a natural right. 

3. For a two-fold meaning may be associated with 
the term " natural " : — 

(1) It may mean as much as " given by nature," 
" innate," in contradistinction to what has been acquired 
during historical development either by deduction or 
by experience. 

(2) It may mean, in contradistinction to what is 
determined by the arbitrary will of a dictator, the rules 
which, in and for themselves and in virtue of their nature 
are recognized as right and binding. 

Ihering rejects natural right in either of these mean- 
ings.' I, for my part, agree as thoroughly with him 
regarding the one meaning as I differ from him regarding 

the other. 


* ar 


4. I agree completely with Iher in g when , following 
the example of John Locke, he denies all innate moral 

Further, like him, I believe neither in the grotesque 
ji^ naturae^ i.e. quod natura ipsa omnia animalia docuit, 
nor in a jus gentium, in a right which, as the Roman 
jurists defined it, is recognized as a natural law of reason 
by the universal agreement of all nations. 

It is not necessary to have gone deeply into zoology 
and physiology in order to see that we can no longer use 

the anim al world r^ ^ rn'tPTinn for tTift afttting np gi 

ethical standar ds, even if one is not disposed to go so 
far as Rokitansky in pronoimcing protoplasma, with 
its aggressive character, an unrighteous and evil principle. 

As to a common nnde ( )i right for all natiQu a, such a 

belief was a d elusion ^ which might hold good in the 
antique world; in modem times when the ethno- 
graphical horizon has been extended, and the customs 
of barbarous races drawn upon for comparison, these 
laws can no longer be recognized as a product of nature, 

b ut only as a product of culture com mon tiO thft mnrpi 

a dvanced nation s. 

As regards all this, therefore, I am in agreement with 
Ihering ; I am also substantially in agreement with him 
when he asserts that there have been times without any 
trace of ethical knowledge and ethical feeling ; at any 
rate without anything of the kind that was commonly 

Indeed I acknowledge unhesitatingly that this state 
of things continued even when larger communities under 
state government had been constituted. When Ihering, 
in support of this view, points to Greek mythology with 
its gods and goddesses destitute of moral thought and 
feeling, and maintains that, by the lives of the gods, the 




life of mankmd in the period in which these myths took 
shape may be interpreted,^ he does but use a method of 
proof which Aristotle has already employed in a similar 
manner in his Politics.* This also must therefore be 
^^conceded him, and we shall, on this groimd, no lonj 
deny that the earliest political laws su p ported by pena l 
^^ ^^^i"^' sanc tion were e sta blished without the help of any feeling 
: "^jU^n 1^ oi r ight f oimded upon moral insight. There are, t herefore, 
^ no natural moral laws and legal precepts in the sense that 

t hey are given by nature herself, that they are mn&te ; in 
this respi5t7IKeriigV^n5^Kive our entire approval. 

5. We have now to meet the second and far more 
important question : Do there exist truths concerning 
morality, taught by nature herself, and is there moral 
< truth, independent of all ecclesiastical, political, in fact 
every kind of social authority ? Is t here a natu caL 
moral law whic h, in its nature^ is unive rsally and incon- 
te stably valid tor men of ever y place a n d time, vali d 
indeed for every kind of thinlang and se ntient bein g ; 
;' and dg eTthe knovBTe dgg^ofjt^ wittiTn the realm ofjour 
mental faculties ? Here we are at the point where I join 
issue'~with Jhering. To t his questi on, which Ihering 
answers in the negative, I return a decided afl&rmative. 
WhichToFus is here iirffie*right oiS present mqiu^Tnto 
the natural sanction for law and morality will, I hope, 
make clear. 

At any rate, the decision as to the former question, 
whatever Ihering * himself may think to the contrary, 
does not in any way prejudge the latter. Innate preju- 
dices do exist ; these are natural in the former sense, 
but they lack natural sanction ; whether true or false, 
they possess no immediate validity. On the other hand, 
there are many propositions recognized after a natural 



i are incontestably certain and have 

ity for all thinking beings, which, however, 

.e, the Pjrthagorean theorem are anything 

Ise the blissful first discoverer had never 

)catomb to the god. 

has been said I have made it sufficiently 

/, when I speak of natural sanction^ I under- 

notion of sanction. Yet it will be well to 

ament in order to exclude another inadequate 

tion " signifies " making fast." Now a law 
ixed in a double sense : 

c may be fixed in the sense of becoming law, 

n a proposed law receives validity by ratifica- 

ol the part of the highest legislative authority. 

In the sense of being rendered more effectual 

by ttaching to it positive punishments, perhaps also 


It is in this latter sense that sanction was spoken 
of by writers of antiquity, as when Cicero® says of 
the leges Porciae : " Neque quicquam praeter sanctionem 
attulerunt novi " ; and Ulpian : ^ " Interdum in sanc- 
tionibus adijicitur, ut qui ibi aliquid commisit, capite 
puniatur." It is in the former sense that the expression 
is more usual in modem times ; a law is said to be 
" sanctioned " when it secures validity by receiving 
confirmation at the hands of the highest authority. 

Manifestly sanction in the second sense presuppose^ 
sanction in the first, which sanction is the more essential, 
since, without it, the law would not truly be law at all. 
Such a natural sanction therefore is of the last necessity 
if anjrthing whatever is to bear by nature the stamp 
of law or morality. 




7. If we now compare with such a view what has 
been said by philosophers concerning the natural 
sanction for morality, it will be easily seen how 
often they have overlooked its essential character. 

8. Many think that they have discovered a natural 
sancti on in respect of a certain line of conduct when 
they have shown that a certain feeling of compulsion so 
to act is developed within the individual . Since every 
one, for example, renders services to others in order to 
receive similar services in return, there at last arises a 
habit of performing such services even in cases where 
there has been no thought of recompense.^ This it is 
which is thought to constitute the sanction for love of 
our neighbour. 

But this view is entirely erroneous. Such a feeling 
of compulsion is certainly a force driving to action, but 
itis assuredly not a sanction conferring valid ity. Be- 
sides, the inclination to vice develops according to the 
same law of habit, and exercises, as an impulse, the most 
unbounded sway. The miser's passion which leads 
him, in his desire of amassii^ riches, to submit to the 
heaviest sacrifices and to commit the most extreme 
cruelties, certainly constitutes no sanction for his 

9. Again, motives of hope er fear that a certain 
manner of behaviour, as, for example, regard for the 
general good, will render us agreeable or disagreeable 
to other and more powerful beings, these it has often 
been .sought to regard as a sanction for such conduct.' 
But it is manifest that the most cringing cowardice, the 
most servile flattery might then boast a natural sanction. 
As a matter of fact virtue shines out most brightly where 


neither threats nor entreaties are able to divert her from 
the right path. 

10. Some speak of an education in which man, as 
belonging to an order of living beings accustomed to 
live in society, receives from those by whom he is sur- 
rounded. An injunction is repeatedly laid upon him, 
the command : " You ought." It lies in the nature 
of things that certain actions are very frequently and 
generally required of him. There is thus formed an 
association between his mode of action and the thought : 
" You ought." And so it may happen that he may 
come to regard, as the source of this command, the , 
society in which he lives, or even something vaguely 
conceived to be higher than an individual, that is to say, 
something regarded in a way as superhuman. The 
" ought " associated by him with such a being would 
then constitute the sanction of conscience." 

In this case the natural sanction would then consist 
in the naturally developed belief in the command of a 
more powerful will. 

But it is manifest that such a belief in the command 
of a more powerful being contains, as yet, nothing which 
deserves the name of a sanction. Such a conviction 
is shared by one who knows himself to be at the mercy 
of a tyrant or of a robber horde. Whether he obey, or 
bid defiance, the command itself contains nothing able 
to give to the required act a sanction similar to that of 
the conscience. Even if he obey he does so through 
fear, not because he regards the command as one based 
on right. 

^tejthoyght, therefore, that an act is commanded 
by^gome one does not constitute a natural sanction. 
In the case of every command issued by an external will 



the question arises: Is such a command authorized 
or is it not ? Neither is there any reference here to a 
command enforced by a still higher power enjoining 
obedience to the former. For then the question would 
again reappear, and we should proceed from one com- 
mand to another enjoining obedience to the former, 
and from that to a third enjoining in like manner obe- 
dience to the second, and so on ad infin. 

Just a s in the case o f the feeling of com pulsion^ and m 
that of the fear or hope^of recom pense, so also the 
thought of the com mand of an external will cannot 
poss ibly b e ttTe^anc^^ for law and m orality. 

11. But there are also commands in an essentially 
different sense ; commands in the sense in which we 
speak of the commands of logic respecting our judg- 
ments and conclusions. We are not here concerned 
with the wUl of logic, since a will logic manifestly has 
not, nor with the wUl of the logician, to which we have in 
no way sworn allegiance. The laws of logic are naturally 
vaUd rules of jud^, that is to say, we are obliged to 
conform to them, since conformity to these rules ensures 
certainty in our judgments, whereas judgments diverging 
from these rules are liable to error. What we therefore 
mean is a natural superiority which thought-processes 
in conformity with law have over such as are contrary 
to law. So also in ethics, we are not concerned with 
the command of an external will but rather with a 
natural preference similar to that in logic^ and the law 
founded on that preference. This has been emphasized 
not only by Kant but also by the majority of great 
thinkers before him. Nevertheless there are still many 
— ^unfortunately even among the adherents of the em- 
pirical school to which I myself belong— by whom this 



fact has neither been rightly understood nor appre- 

12. tn what then lies this special superiority which 
gives to morality its natural sanction ? Some regarded 
it as, in a sense, external, they believed its superiority 
to consist in beauty of appearance. The Greeks called 
noble and virtuous conduct to Ka\6v^ the beautiful, 
and the perfect man of honour /caXoKoryado^ ; though 
none of the philosophers of antiquity set up this 
aesthetic view as a criterion. On the other hand, David 
Hume", among modem thinkers, has spoken of a moral 
sense of the beautiful which acts as arbiter between the 
moral and the immoral, while still more recently the 
German philosopher, Herbart," has subordinated ethics 
to aesthetics. 

Now I do not deny that the aspect of virtue is more 
agreeable than that of moral perversity. But I cannot 
concede that in this consists the only and essential 
superiority of ethical conduct. It is rather an inner 
superiority which distinguishes the moral from the 
immoral will, in the same way that it is an inner supe- 
riority which distinguishes true and self evident judg- 
ments and conclusions from prejudices and fallacies. 
Here also it cannot be denied that a prejudice, a fallacy 
has in it something unbeautiful, often indeed something 
ridiculously narrow-minded, which makes the person 
BO scantily favoured by Minerva appear in a most 
disadvantageous attitude ; yet who, on this account, 
would class the rules of logic among those of aesthetics, 
or make logic a branch of aesthetics ? '^ No, the real 
logical superiority is no mere aesthetic appearance but 
a certain inward rightness which then carries with it 
a certain superiority of appearance. It will, therefore, 





be also a certain in ward lightness which constitutes 
the essential super iorit y of qtip. pflrf.ifinlRr act nf w^ll 
over another of an opposite character ; i n which co nsists 
the superiority of the moral over the immora l. 

T he belief in this superiority is an ethical motive ; 
t he knowledge of it is the right ethical motiv e, the 
sa nction which gives to ethical law permanence and 
. validit: 

13. But are we capable of attaining to such know- 
ledge ? Here lies the difl&culty which philosophers have 
for a long time sought in vain to solve. Even to Kant 
it seemed as though none had found the right end of 
the thread by means of which to unravel the skein. 
This the Categorical Imperative was to do. It resembled 
however, rather the sword i drawn by Alexander to cut 
the Gordian knot. With such a palpable fiction the 
matter is not to be set right.'* 

14. In order to gain an insight into the true origin 
of ethical knowledge it will be necessary to take some 
accoimt of the results of later researches in the sphere 
of descriptive psychology. The limited time at my 
disposal makes it necessary for me to set forth my views 
very briefly, and I have reason to fear that by its con- 
ciseness the completeness of the statement may suffer. 
Yet it is just here that I ask your special attention, in 
order that what is most essential to a right imderstanding 
of the problem be not overlooked. 

15. The subject of the moral and immoral is termed 
the will. What we will is, in many cases, a means to 
an end. In that case we will this end also, and even 
in a higher degree than the means. The end itself may 
often be the means to a further end ; in a far reaching 



plan there may often appear a whole series of ends, the '' 
one being always connected in subordination to the 
other as a means. There must be present, however, ' 
one end, which is desired above aU others and for its own ^ 
sake ; without this essential and final end all incentive 
would be lacking, and this would involve the absurdity 
of aiming without a goal at which to aim. 

16. The means we employ in order to gain an end 
may be manifold, may be right or wrong. They are 
right when they are really adapted to the attainment v<^ 
of the end. 

The ends, also, even the most essential and final ends, 
may be manifold. It is a mistake which appeared 
especially in the eighteenth century, nowadays the 
tendency is more and more to abandon it, that every 
one seeks the same end, namely, his own highest pos- 
sible pleasure.^* Whoever can believe that the martyr 
facing with full consciousness the most terrible 
tortures for the sake of his conviction — and there were 
some who had no hope of recompense hereafter — ^was * 
thus inspired by a desire after the greatest possible 
pleasure, such a man must have either a very defective 
sense of the facts of the case, or, indeed, have lost all 
measure of the intensities of pleasure and pain. 

This, therefore, is certain : even final ends are mani- 
iold. between them hovers the choice, which, since the 
final end is for everything the determining principle, 
is of the most importance. What ought I to strive after? 
WkifilL-end is the right pne^^ which .wrong ? This, as 
Aristotle long ago declared, is the essential, the cardinal 
question in ethics.'® 

17. Which end is right, for which should our choice 

declare itself ? 




Where the end is fixed and it is merely a question as 
to the choice of means, we reply : Choose means which 
will certainly attain the end. Where it is a question 
as to the choice of ends we would say : Choose an end 
y which reason regards as really attainable. This answer 
is, however, insuflicient, many a thing attainable is 
rather to be shunned than sought after ; choose the 
best among attainable ends, this alone is the adequate 
answer. "^^ 

But the answer is obscure ; what do we mean by 
" the best *' ? what can be called " good " at all ? and 
how can we attain to the knowledge that one thing is 
good and better than another ? 

18. In order to answer this question satisfactorily, 
( we must, above all, inquire into the origin of the concep- 
tion of the good, which lies, like the origin of all our 
conceptions, in certain concrete impressions. ^« 

We possess impressions with physical content. These 
exhibit to us sensuous qualities localized in space. Out 
of this sphere arise the conceptions of colour, sound, 
space and many others. The conception of the good, 
however, has not here its origin. It is easily recog- 
nizable that thejDonception of the good like that of the 
true, which, as having afl&nity, is rightly placed side by 
. side with it, derives its origin from concrete impressions 

19. The conmion feature of everjrthing psychical 
consists in what has been called by a very unfortunate 
and ambiguous term, consciousness; i.e. in a subject- 
attitude ; in what has been termed an intentional relation 
to something which, though perhaps not real, is none 

^ the less an inner object of perception ; '^ No hearing 
without the heard, no believing without the believed, 



no hoping without the hoped for, no striving without the 
striven for, no joy without the enjoyed, and so with 
other mental phenomena. -^ 

20. The sensuous qualities which are given in our 
impressions with physical content exhibit manifold 
differences. So also do the intentional relations given 
in our impressions with psychical content. And, as in 
the former case, the number of the senses is determined 
by reference to those distinctions between sensuous 
qualities which are most fundamental (called by 
Helmholtz distinctions of modality), so in the latter 
case the number of fundamental classes of mental . 
phenomena is fixed by reference to the most fundamental 
distinctions of intentional relation.** 

In this way we distinguish three fundamental classes. 
Descartes in his Meditations *' was the first to exhibit 
these rightly and completely ; but suflicient attention 
has not been paid to his observations, and they were 
soon quite forgotten, until in recent times, and inde- 
pendently of him, these were again discovered. Now- 
adays they may lay claim to sufficient verification.** 

The first fundamental class is that of ideas (Vorstel- 
lungen) in the widest sense of the term (Descartes' 
ideae). This class embraces concrete impressions, those 
for example which are given to us through the senses, 
as well as every abstract conception. 

The second fundamental class is jud^ent (Descartes' 
judicia). Previous to Descartes these were thought of 
as forming, along with ideas, one fundamental class, 
and since Descartes' time philosophy has fallen once 
more into this error. This view regarded judgment 
as consisting essentially in a combination or relation 
of ideas to one another. This was a gross misconception 



of its true nat\ire. We may combine or relate ideas as 
we please, as in speaking of a golden mountain, the 
father of a himdred children, a friend of science ; but 
as long as nothing further takes place there can be no 
judgment. Equally true is it that an idea always forms 

' the basis of a judgment, as also of a desire ; but it is not 
true that, in a judgment, there are always several ideas 
related to one another as subject and predicate. This 
is certainly the case when 1 6ay : " God is just," though 
not when I say : " There is a God." 
^ What, therefore, distinguishes those cases where I have 
not only an idea but also a judgment ? There is here 
added to the act of presentation a second intentional 
relation to the object given in presentation, a relation 

neither of recognition or rejection. Whoever' says : 
" God," gives expression to the idea of God ; whoever 
says : " There is a God," gives expression to a belief in 

I must not linger here, and can only assure you that 
this, if anything! admite to-day of no denial. From 
the philological standpoint Miklosich confirms the results 
of psychological analysis.- 

The third fundamental class consists of the emotions 
in the widest sense of the term, from the simple forms 
of inclination or disinclination in respect of the mere 
idea, to joy and sadness arising from conviction and to 
the most complicated phenomena as to the choice of 
ends and means. Aristotle long since included these 
under the term ope^t,^. Descartes says this class 
embraces the voluntates sive affectus. As in the second 
fundamental class the intentional relation was one of 
recognition or rejection, so in the third class it is one of 
love or hate, (or, as it might be equally well expressed,) 

a form of pleasing or displeasing. Loving, pleasing, 



hating, displeasing, these are given in the simplest forms 
of inclination or disinclination, in victorious joy as well 
as in despairing sorrow, in hope and fear, and in every 
form of volimtary activity. " Plait-il ? " asks the 
Frenchman ; " es hat Gott gef alien," one reads in 
(German) announcements of a death ; while the " Placet," 
written when confinning an act, is the expression of the 
determining fiat of will.** 

21. In comparing these three classes of phenomena • 
it is found that the two last mentioned show an analogy 
which, in the first, is absent. There exists, that is, an 
opposition of intentional relation ; in the case of judg- \^^ 
ment, recognition or rejection, in the case of the emotions, 
love or hate, pleasure or displeasure. The idea shows 
nothing of a similar nature. I can, it is true, conceive 

of opposites, as for example white and black, but whether 
I believe in this black or deny it, I can only represent 
it to myself in one way ; the representation does not 
alter with the opposite act of judgment ; nor again, 
in the case of the feelings, when I change my attitude 
towards it according as it pleases or displeases me. 

22. From this fact follows an important conclusion. 
Concerning acts of the first class none can be called 
either right or wrong. In the case of the second class / 
on the other hand, one of the two opposed modes of ^ '*" 
relation, affirmation and rejection, is right the other 
wrong, as logic has long affirmed. The same naturally 
holds good of the third class. Of the two opposed modes 

of relation, love and hate, pleasure and displeasure, in 
each case one is right the other wrong. 

23. We have now reached the place where the notions 



of good and bad, along with the notions of the true and 
the false which we have been seeking, have their source. 
We call anything true when the recognition related to it 
is right/* We call something good when the love relating 
to it is right. That which can be loved with a right 
love, that which is worthy of love, is good in the widest 
sense of the term. 

24. Since everything which pleases does so, either for 
its own sake, or for the sake of something else which is 
thereby produced, conserved or rendered probable, we 
must distinguish between a primary and a secondary 
good, i.e. what is good in itself, and what is good on 
accoimt of something else, as is specially the case in the 

^ sphere of the useful. 

What is good in itself is the good in the narrower 
sense. It alone can stand side by side with the true. 
For everything which is true is true in itself, even when 
only mediately known. When we speak of good later 
we shall therefore mean, whenever the contrary is not 
"^ expressly asserted, that which is good in itself. 

In this way we have, I hope, made clear the notion 
of good.*^ 

25. There follows now the still more important 
question : IJow are we to know that anything is good ? 
Ought we to say that whatever is loved and is capable 
of being loved is worthy of love and is good ? This is 
manifestly untrue, and it is almost inconceivable that 
some have fallen into this error. One loves what another 
hates, and, in accordance with a well known psycho- 
logical law already previously referred to it often happens 
that what at first was desired merely as a means to 
something else, comes at last from habit toi4)e desired 
for its own sake. In such a way the miser is irrationally 



led to heap up riches and even to sacrifice himself for 
their sake. The actual presence of love, therefore, by 
no means testifies unconditionally to the worthiness of 
the object to be loved, just as affirmation is no uncon- 
ditional proof of what is true. 

It might even be said that the first statement is even 
more evident than the second, since it can hardly happen 
that he who affirms anything at the same time holds 
it to be false, whereas it frequently happens that a 
person, even while loving something, confesses himself 
that it is unworthy of his love : 

" Video meliora proboque, 
Deteriora sequor." 

How then are we to know that anything is good ? 

26. The matter appears enigmatical, but the enigma 
finds a very easy solution. 

As a prdiminary step to answering the question, let Mt( 
us turn our glance from the good to the true. 

Not everything which we affirm is on this account 
true. Our judgments are frequently quite blind. Many 
a prejudice which we drank in, as it were, with our 
mother's milk presents to us the appearance of an irre- 
futable principle. To other equally blind judgments 
all men have, by nature, a kind of instinctive impulsion, 
as, for example, in trusting blindly to the so-called 
external impression, or to a recent remembrance. What 
is so recognized may often be true, but it may equally 
well be false since the affirming judgment contains . 
nothing which gives to it the character of rightness. 

Such, however, is the case in certain other judgments, 

which in contradistinction to these blind judgments 

may be termed " obvioijg," " self-evident " judgments; 




as, for example, the Principle of Contradiction, and 
^ every so-called inner perception which informs me that 
I am now experiencing sensations of sound or colour, 
or think and will this or that. 

In what, then, does the distinction between these 
lower and higher forms of judgment essentially consist ? 
Is it a distinction in the degree of belief, or is it something 
else ? It is not a distinction in the degree of belief ; the 
instinctive blind assumptions arising from habit are 
often not in the slightest degree weakened by doubts, 
and we are unable to get rid of some even when we have 
already seen their logical falsity. But such assumptions 
are the results of blind impulse, they have nothmg of the 
clearness peculiar to the higher forms of judgment. 
Were the question to be raised : " What is then your 
V reason for believing that ? " no rational answer would 
be forthcoming. It is quite true that if the same inquiry 
were to be made respecting the immediately evident 
judgment here also no reason could be given, but in 
face of the clearness of the judgment the inquiry would 
appear utterly beside the point, in fact ridiculous. 
Every one experiences for himself the difference between 
these two classes of judgment, and in the reference to 
^ this experience, consists, as in the case of every concep- 
tion, the^ final explanation. 

27. All this is, in its essentials, universally known^ 
and is contested only by a "few, and then not without 
great inconsistency. Far fewer have notice^ an analo- 
gous distinction between the higher and lower forms 
of the feelings of pleasmre and displeasure. 

Om: pleasure or displeasure is often quite like blind 
judgment, only an instinctive or habitual impulse. This 
is so in the case of the miser's pleasure in piling up, in 



those powerful feelings of pleasure and pain connected 
in men and animals alike with the appearance of certain 
sensuous qualities, moreover, as is especially noticeable 
in tastes, different species and even different individuals, 
are affected in a quite contrary manner. 

Many philosophers, and among them very considerable 
thinkers, have regarded only that mode of pleasure 
which is peculiar to the lower phenomena of the class, 
and have entirely overlooked the fact that there exists 
a pleasure and a displeasure of a higher kind. David 
Hume, for example, betrays almost in every word that 
he has absolutely no idea of the existence of this higher 
class.** |( How general this oversight has been may be 
judged from the fact that language has no conmion 
name for it.*^ Yet the fact is imdeniable and we propose 
now to elucidate it by a few examples.. 

We have already said that we are endowed by nature 
with a pleasure for some tastes and an antipathy for ^ 
others, both of which are purely instinctive. We also 
naturally take pleasure in clear insight, displeasure in . 
error or ignorance. " All men," says Aristotle in the 
beautiful introductory words of his Metaphysics,^ 
" natually desire knowledge." This desire is an example 
which will serve our purpose. It is a pleasure of that 
higher form which is analogous to self-evidence in the ^ 
sphere of judgment. In our species it is universal. 
Were there another species which, while having different 
preferences from us in respect of sensible qualities, were 
opposed to us in loving error for its own sake and hating 
insight, then assuredly we should not in the latter as in 
the former case say : that it was a matter of taste, " de 
gustibus non est disputandum " ; rather we should here 
answer decisively that such love and hatred were funda- 
mentally absurd, that such a species hated what was 



undeniably good, and loved what was undeniably bad 
in itself. Now why, where the feeling of compulsion 
is equally strong, do we answer differently in the one 
case than in the other ? The answer is simple. In the 
former case the feeling of compulsion was an instinctive 
impulse ; in the latter the natural feeling of pleasure is 
a higher love, having the character of rightness.^^ We 
therefore notice when we ourselves have such a feeling, 
that its object is not merely loved and lovable, its oppo- 
site hated and unlovable, but also that the oneis^ worthy 
of love, the other worthy of hatred, and therefore that 
one is good, the other bad. 

Another example. As we prefer insight to error, so 
also, generally speaking, we prefer joy (unless indeed 
it be joy in what is bad) to sadness. Were there beings 
among whom the reverse held good, we should regard 
such conduct as perverse, and rightly so. Here too it 
is because our love and our hatred are qualified as 

A third example is found in feeling itself so far as it is 
right and has the character of rightness. As was the 
case with the rightness and evidence of the judgment, 
so also the rightness and higher character of the feelings 
are also reckoned as good, while love of the bad is itself 

In order that, in the sphere of ideas, we may not leave 
the corresponding experiences unmentioned : here in 
the same way every idea is found to be something 
good in itself, and that with every enlargement in the 
realm of our ideas, quite apart from what of good or 
bad may result therefrom, the good within us is in- 

Here then, and from such experiences of love qualified 
as right, arises within us the knowledge that anything 



is truly and unmistakably good in the full extent to 
which we are capable of such knowledge.^* 

This last clause is added advisedly ; for we must not, 
of course, conceal from ourselves the fact that we have 
no guarantee that everything which is good will arouse 
within us a love with the character of rightness. Wher- 
ever this is not the case our criterion fails, and the good 
then, so far as our knowledge and practical account of 
it are concerned, is as much as non-existent,^' 

28* It is, however, not one but many things which we 
thus recognize as good. And so the questions remain : 
In that which is good, and especially in what, as good, 
is attainable, which is the better ? and further, which 
is the highest practical good ? so that it may become 
the standard for our actions. 

29. We must first inquire : When is anjrthing better 
than anjrthing else and recognized by us as better ? and 
what is meant by " the better " at all ? 

The answer now lies ready to hand though not in such 
a way as to render it unnecessary to exclude a very 
possible error. If by " good " is meant that which is 
worthy of being loved for its own sake, then by " better " 
appears to be meant that which is worthy of being loved 
with a greater love. But is this really so ? What is 
meant by " with greater love " ? Is it spatial magni- 
tude ? Hardly ; no one would propose to measure 
pleasure or displeasure in feet and inches. " The inten- 
sity of the pleasure," some will perhaps say, " is what 
is meant in speaking of love as great." According to 
this " better " would mean that which pleases with a 
moi;e intense pleasure. But such a definition closely 
exaihined would involve the greatest absurdities. Ac- 
cording to this view, each single case in which joy is 




felt in anything would seem only to admit of a certain 
measure of joy, whereas one would naturally think that 
it could not possibly be reprehensible to rejoice in what 
is really good to the fullest extent possible. Or, as we 
say, " with all one's heart." Descartes has already 
observed that the act of loving (when directed towards 
what is good at all) can never be too intense/^ And he 
is manifestly right. Were it otherwise what cautiousness 
should we not be called upon to exercise considering 
the limits of our mental strength ! Every time one 
wished to rejoice over something good, an anxious 
survey would be necessary respecting other existing 
goods in order that the measure of proportion to our 
total strength might in no way be exceeded. And if 
one believes in a God, understanding thereby the Infinite 
Good, the Ideal of all ideals, then, since a man, even 
with his whole soul and strength can only love God with 
an act of love of finite intensity he will therefore be 
compelled to love every other good with an infinitely 
small degree of intensity, and, since this is impossible, 
must cease as a matter of fact to love it at all. 
All this is manifestly absurd. 

. 30. And yet it must be said that the better is that 
which is rightly loved with a greater love, which is 
rightly more pleasing, though in quite another sense. 
The " more " refers not to the relation of intensity 
between the two acts, but rather to a peculiar species 
of phenomena belonging to the general class of pleasure 
and displeasure, i.e., to the phenomena of choice. 
Thereby are meant relating acts which in their peculiar 
nature are known to every one in experience. In the 
province of ideas there is nothing analogous. In the 
province of judgment there are, it is true, alongside the 



simple, subjectless propositions, predicative judgments ;/ 
which are acts of a relative character, but this resem- J 
blance is very imperfect. The case here which has most 
similarity is that of a decision respecting a dialectically 
propounded question : "Is this true or false ? " in 
which a sort of preference is given to one above the other. 
But even here it is always something true which is, so to 
speak, preferred to something false, never something 
more true over something less true. Whatever is true 
is true in a like degree, but whatever is good is not good •- 
in equal degree, and by " better " nothing else is meant 
than what, when compared with another good, is pre- 
ferable, i.e^ something which for its own sake, is preferred /'' 
"With a right preference. For the rest a somewhat wider '\ 
usage of language allows us also to speak of a good as 
" better " over against a bad or purely indifferent, or 
even to call something bad over against something still 
worse " the better." We then say not of course that 
it is good, but stiQ better than the other. 
This shortly in explanation of the notion of the better. 

31. Next the question : How do we k n ow that any- 
thinf r j^ r p^lly ttlfi Ijffttrf^^ ? Assuming the existence of 
shnple knowledge of thmgs as good and bad, we appear, 
so analogy suggeste, to derive this insight from certain 
^iirefenjng which have the character o{ rightBew, - 
For, like the simple exercise of pleasure, so also the act 
of pref ening is sometimes of a lower or impulsive, and 
sometimes of a higher kind, and like the evident ^jg_^ 
judgment, is qualified as right. y^he cases in point av^'Ui^iJi.A 
are, however, of such a nature mat many might say, ^i>^* 

and perhaps with a better right, that it is analytical , 
judgments which furnish us here with the means of 

progress, and that instead of our learning the preferability 





from the actual preferences, the preferences have the 
qualification of rightness because they already presume 
the recognition of the standard of preferabilitj^f^^s^ 

^ Chiefly belonging to this class are obviously (1) the 
case where we prefer something good, and recognized 
as good, to something bad, and recognized as bad. Also 
(2) the case where we prefer the existence of something 
recognized as good to its non-existence, or the non- 
existence of something recognized as bad to its existence. 
This case embraces in itself a series of important 
cases, as the case where, we. prefer a good, to _ the 
same good with an admixture of the. bad; and, on 
the other hand, where we prefer something bad, with an 
admixture of good, to the same bad purely for its own 
sake. Further, the cases in which we prefer the whole 
of a good to its part, and again, the part of something 
bad to its whole. Aristotle has already called attention 
to the fact that in the case of the good the sum is always 
better than the separate parts which together make 
up its sum. Such a case of summation presents itself 
wherever a state has a certain permanence. The same 
amount of joy which endures an hour is better than if 

^ it only lasted for a moment. Whoever denies this, like 

Epicurus when he would console us on account of the 

mortality of the soul, may easily be led into stiU more 

striking absurdities. For then an hour's torture would 

be no worse than that of a moment. And, by combining 

both these propositions, we should have to assume that 

an entire life full of joy with a single moment of pain 

is in no way preferable to an entire life full of pain with 

a single moment of joy. This is a result at which not 

only every sound mind in general would demur, but also 

one respecting which Epicurus in particular, expressly 

asserts the contrary. 

' 24 


Closely related to this is the case (3) where one good 
i s preferr ed to another, which, while Arming, no part 
of J^fi -first, is yet similar in .every respect to one of its 
:parts . It is not merely by adding a good to the same 
good but also by adding it to a good which is in every 
respect similar that we get a better for total. The case 
is analogous when to a similar bad another bad is thought 
of as added. When therefore, for example, a fine picture 
is seen, the first time as a whole, the second timd only 
partially though exactly in the same way, we must then 
say that the first view, considered in itself, is better : 
Or, when one imagines something that is good and a 
second time not only imagines it even as perfectly as 
before, but also loves it, this latter sum of psychical acts 
is then somethmg better. 

Cases of difEerence in degree belong also to this third 
class, and are especially worthy of mention. If one 
good, e.g. one joy is in every respect quite equal to 
another, only more intense, then the preference which 
is given to the more intense is qualified as right, the 
more intense is the better. Conversely, the bad which 
is more intense, e.g. a more intense pain, is worse. That 
is to say : the degree of intensity corresponds with the 
distance from the zero point, and the distance of the 
greater degree of intensity from zero is compounded 
of its distance from the weaker degree of intensity plus 
the distance of this from zero. We have, therefore, 
really to do with a kind of addition, a view which has 
been disputed. 

32. Many a one will, perhaps, think to himself that 

the three cases which I have set forth are so self-evident 

and insignificant that it is a matter for surprise that I 

have lingered over them at all. Self-evident they are 



of course, and this must be so, since we have here to 
do with what has to serve as a fondamentum. The 
case would be worse if they were insignificant ; for, I 
confess it frankly, I have scarcely another further case 
to add : in all, or, at any rate, most of the cases not 
here included a criterion fails UBCom^letejt^/^ 

An exampl e. AUjnaight is, we have said, something 
good in itself, and all noble love is likewise something 
good in itself. We recognize both these things clearly. 
But who shall say whether this act of insight or that 
act of love is in itself, the better ? There have, of 
course, not been wanting those who have given a verdict 
on this point ; some have even asserted that it is certain 
every act of noble love for its own sake is a good so high 
that, taken by itself, it is better than all scientific insight 
taken together. In my judgment this view is not only 
doubtful but altogether absurd. For a single act of 
noble love worthy as it is, is yet a certain finite good. 
But every act of insight is also a finite good and if I keep 
adding this finite quantity to itself ad libitum^ its sum 
is bound some time to exceed every given finite measure 
of good. On the other hand, Plato and Aristotle were 
inclined to regard the act of knowing considered in 
itself as higher than ethically virtuous acts, this also 
quite unjustly, and I only mention it since the opposition 
of opinions here is a confirmatory proof of the absence 
of any criterion. As often happens in the sphere of 
the psychical^ so also here, real measurements are 
impossible. Now where the inner preference is not to 
be detected there holds good here what was said in a 
similar case of simple goodness — as far as our knowledge 
and practical concern go it is as good as non-existent. 

33. There are some who, in opposition to the clear 



teaching of experience, assert that only pleasure is good 
for its own sake, and pleasure is the good. Assuming 
this view to be right, would it have the advantage, as 
many have believed, and as Bentham in particular 
maintained in its f a vourf'^hat we should at once attain ^ * 
to a determination of the relative value of goods, seeing 
that now we should have only homogeneous goods and 
these admit of being measured side by side ? Every 
more intense pleasure would then be a greater good 
than one less intense, and a good having double the 
intensity would be equal to two of half the intensity. 
In this way everything would become clear. 

A moment's reflection only is needed to shatter an 
illusion bom of such hope. Are we really able to find 
out that one pleasure is twice as great as another ? 
Ga^hin.^ who to™ «.n>et4 about Measuxe- 
ments,* has denied this. A more intense pleasure is 
never really made up of twelve less intense pleasures 
distinguishable as equal parts within it, as a foot is 
made up of twelve inches. So the matter presents itself 
even in simpler cases. But how f ooHsh would any one 
appear were he to assert that the pleasure he had in 
smoking a good cigar increased 127, or, let us say, 1077 
times in intensity yielded a measure of the pleasure ex- 
perienced by him in listening to a symphony, of Beeth- 
oven or contemplating one of Raphael's madonnas V^^ 
I think I have said enough, and do not need to allude 
to the further difficulty involved in comparing the in- 
tensity of pleasure with that of pain. 

34. Only therefore to this very limited, exteffit are y 
we able to derive from experience a knowledge of what 
is better in itself. 

I can well understand how any one, reflecting upon 



this for tiie first time, will be led to fear that the great 
gaps whichremain must, in practice, prove in the highest 
degree embarrassing. Yet as we proceed and make a 
vigorous use of what we do possess, we shall find that 
the most sensible deficiencies may fortunately turn 
out harmless in practice. 

35. For, from the cases we adduced of preference 
qualified as right, the important proposition follows 
that t]jft proyi nca of the highest practical good eipbraces 
e verything which is subject to our rational operation 
in so far as a good c an be r ealized in such niatter. Not 
merely the self but also the family, the town, the state, 
the whole present world of life, even distant future times, 
may here be taken into account. All this follows from 
the jgripcqilQ.Qf the summation of the good. To promot e 
as far^as possible the good throughout this great whole , 
Sb^at js man i festly the right end in life , towardswhich 
every act is to be ordered ; that is the one, the highest 
command upon which all the rest depend.*^ Self- 
devotion and, on occasion, self-sacrifice are, therefore, 
duties ; an equal good wherever it be, and therefore 
in the person of another also, is, in proportion to its value, 
and, therefore, everywhere equally to be loved, and 
jealousy and malignant envy are excluded. 

36. And now, since all lesser goods are to be made 
subservient to the good of this widest sphere, light may 
also be shed from utilitarian considerations upon those 
dark regions where before we found a standard of choice 
wanting. If, for example, it was true that acts of 
insight and acts of noble love are not to be measured 
as to their inner worth in terms of one another, it is now 
clear that at any rate neither of these two sides may be 
entirely neglected at the expense of the other. If one 



person had perfect knowledge without noble love, and 
another perfect noble love without knowledge, neither 
would be able to use his gifts in the service of the still 
greater collective good. A certain, haxmonioua. .dfiYfiL 
qpment and exercise of all our. noblest poWQis.. Jfiems, 
tfeerefoie^TlrQia, this. point jof view* 9rt,iiny. rate, 
what we must strive after/^^ 

37. And now after seeing how many duties of love 
towards the highest practical good come to light, we 
proceed to the origin of duties of law. That association 
which renders possible a division of labour is the indis- 
pensable condition of the advancement of the highest 
good as we have learnt to understand it. Man therefore 
is moraUy destined to live in society, and it is easily 
demonstrable that limits must exist in order that one 
member of society may not be more of a hindrance than 
a help to another,^^and that these limits (though much 
in this respect is settled by considerations of natural 
common-sense) require to be more exactly marked by 
positive laws, and need the further security and support 
of public authority. 

And while in this way our natural insight demands 
and sanctions positive law in general, it may, in parti- 
cvdar, raise demands on the fulfilment of which depends 
the measure of the blessing which the state of law is to 
bring with it. 

In this way does truth, bearing the supreme crown, 
give, or refuse, to the products of positive legislation 
its sanction, and it is from this crown that they derive 
theirto..bindmgforce.V For » the old »ge oJ iphe^u. 
says in one of his pregnant Sibyl-like utterances: 
" All human laws are fed from the one divine law."*^ 

38. Besides the laws referring to the limits of right, 



in every society there are other positive enactment s 
as to the wayio-wiucli an individualia to act inside his 
own sphere of right, how he is to make use of his liberty 
and U, propel. Mli^^lfe» approves indu^y. 
generosity, and economy each in its place, while disap- 
proving idleness, greed, prodigality and much else. In 
the^sjatntea. no aunh laws aifiiin he. fmind, but they 
stftjid wntten. withia iha .hfiartfl .at ihe. people. Nor 
are reward and punishment lacking as regards this kind 
of positive law. These consist in the advantages and 
disadvantages of good and bad reputation. There 
exists here, as it were, a positive code of moialiiy, the 
complement of the positive code of law7 This positive 
code of morality also may contain both right and wrong 
enactments. To be truly binding they. Jiefid.tQ be iii 
accord^ with the. jailfia..whichi as we.hiive already seQn, 
are^ capable of recogpition by the leaaon^.as a duty of 
love towards the highest practical good. 

And so we have really found the natural sanction 
of moraUty which we soi^ht. 

39. I do not linger here to show how this sanction 
operates. Every one would rather say to himself : "I 
am acting rightly," than " I am acting foolishly." And 
to^noone capQ'ble of lecognizing what is better is thi^ 
fact entirely indifierent in choosu^ig. In the case of 
some it is nearly so, whereas for others it is of the very 
first importance. Innate dispositions are themselves 
diverse and much advance may be made by education 
and one's own ethical conduct. Enough, truth speaks^ 
and whoever is of the truth hears her voice. 

40. Throughout the multiplicity of derived laws 
graven by nature herself upon the tables of the law, 
utilitarian considerations, as we have seen, form the 



standard. As now, in different situations, we resort / 
to different means, so also with regard to these different 
situations different special precepts must hold good. 
They may be quite conflicting in their tenour without 
of course being really contradictory, since they are 
intended for different circumstances. In this sense, 
then, a rfi]j)^tiyjf.y JT^ ftth|(»g^i.q rightly asserted. 

Ihering has drawn attention to this,*® but he is not 
as he seems to think, one of the first. On the contrary 
the doctrine was known of old and is insisted upon by 
Plato in his Republic/^ Aristotle in his Ethics^ and 
with special emphasis in his Politics has aflirmed 
it.^** The scholastic philosophers also held fast to the 
doctrincj and in modem times men even of such energetic 
ethical and political convictions as Bentham^^ have not 
denied it. If the fanatics of the French Revolution 
failed to recognize it, still the clear-headed among their 
fellow-citizens, even in that time, did not fall into such 
a delusion. Laplace, for example, in his Essai phUo- 
sofhique sur les probabUites occasionally bears witness 
to the true teaching and raises his voice in warning.^* 

Thus it happens that the distinguished investigator 
who has disclosed to us the spirit of Roman law and to 
whom, as the author of Der Zweck im Rechtj we also are 
bound in many respects to tender our thanks, has yet 
here, as we see, done nothing else than render the doc- 
trine unclear by confounding it with an essentially 
different and false doctrine of relativity. According 
to this doctrine, no proposition in ethics, not even the 
proposition that the best in the widest sphere ought 
to be the determining standard of action, would have 
unexceptional validity. In primitive times and even 
later, throughout long centuries, such a procedure 
would, he expressly says, have been as immoral as, in 



later times, the opposite conduct. We must, he thinks, 
on looking back into the times of cannibalism sympathize 
rather with the cannibals, and not with those who 
perhaps, in advance of their time, preached even then 
the universal love of neighbour." These are errors 
which have been crushingly refuted not merely by 
philosophical reflection upon the fundamental prin- 
ciples of ethics, but also by the successes of Christian 

41. Thus the road leading to the goal which we set 
before us has been traversed. For a time it led us 
through strange and rarely trodden districts, finally, 
however, the results at which we have arrived smile 
upon us like old acquaintances. In declaring love 
of neighbour and self-sacrifice, both for our country 
and for mankind to be duties, we are only echoing what 
is proclaimed all around us. We should also find by 
goi^ further into particulars that lying, treachery, 
murder, debauchery and much besides that is held to 
be morally base are, measured by the standard of the 
principles we have set up, condenmed, one as unjust, 
another as immoral. 

All this would seem, in a measure, familiar to us as 
the shores of his native land to the sea-farer when, 
after a voyage happily consummated, he sees them rise 
suddenly into view, and the smoke curling from the 
old familiar chimney. 

42. And certainly we are at liberty to rejoice over 
this. The absolute clearness with which all this follows 
is a good omen for the success of our undertaking, since 
i t is the m ethod by which we arrived at our result, which 
is obvwusry^t& most essential feature in it. Without 
it what advantage can our inquiry be said to have over 



that of others ? Even Kant, for example, whose doc- 
trines concerning the principles of ethics were quite 
different, arrived, in the further course of his statement, 
pretty much to the popular view. But what we miss 
in him is strict logical coherence. Beneke has shown 
that the Categorical Imperative as Kant used it, may 
be so employed as to prove, in the same case, contra- 
dictory statements and so everything and nothing. '* 
If, none the less, Kant is able to arrive so often at right 
conclusions, this must be attributed to the fact that 
from the outset he had harboured such opinions. Even 
Hegel, had he not known in other ways that the sky 
was blue, would certainly never have succeeded by 
means of his dialectic in deducing this d priori. Did 
he not equally succeed in demonstrating that there 
were seven planets, a number accepted in his day, 
but which in our tune science has long left behind ? 

The causes of this phenomenon, therefore, are easily 

43. But there is another point which appears enig- 
matical. How does it happen that the prevailing public 
opinion respecting law and morality is itself, in so many 
respects, obviously right ? If a thinker like Kant was 
unable to discover the sources from which ethical know- 
ledge flows, how can we believe that the common folk 
succeeded in drawing therefrom ? And if this were 
not the case, how were they able, while ignorant of the 
premises, still to reach the conclusions ? Here the 
phenomenon cannot possibly be explained from the 
fact that the right view was long before established. 

This difficulty also resolves itself in a very simple 
manner when we reflect that much in our store of know- 
ledge exists, and contributes towards the attainment 

33 D 


of new knowledge, without the knowledge of the process 
itself being clearly present to consciousness. 

It must not be supposed that in sajing this I am an 
adherent of the wonderful philosophy of the unconscious. 
I am speaking here only of undeniable and well known 
truths. Thus it has often been observed that for thou- 
sands of years men have drawn right conclusions without 
bringing the procedure and the principles which form 
the condition of the formal validity of the hiference 
into clear consciousness by means of reflection. Indeed 
when Plato first took the step of reflecting upon it, he 
was led to set up an entirely false theory which assumed 
that every inference was a process of reminiscence.^^ 
What was perceived and experienced on earth recalled 
to the memory knowledge acquired in a pre-mundane 
existence. Nowadays this error has disappeared. Still, 
false theories concerning the fundamental principles of 
syllogism iare continually emerging, as, for example, 
when Albert Lange,^^ finds them in space-perceptions 
and in synthetic propositions d priori^ or Alexander 
Bain''' in the experience that the moods Barbara, Celarent, 
etc., have up to the present time been found to be valid 
in every case : mere crude errors which overlook the 
immediate intuitions forming the conditions of right 
conclusions, but which do not prevent Plato, Lange, 
and Bain from arguing in general exactly like other 
people. In spite of their false conception of the true 
fundamental principles, these stiU continue to operate 
in their reasoning. 

' But why do I go so far for examples ? Let the expe- 
riment be made with the first ^^ plain man " who has 
just drawn a right conclusion, and demand of him that 
h^ give you the premises of his conclusion. This he 
will usually be unable to do and may perhaps make 



entirely false statements about it. On requiring tKe 
same man to define a notion with which he is familiar, 
he will make the most glaring mistakes and so show 
once again that he is not able rightly to describe his own 

44. Meantime, however dark the road to ethical know- 
ledge might appear, both to the '^ plain man " and to 
the philosopher, we must still expect, since the process 
is a complicated one and many combined principles 
operate therein, that thetraces of the operation of each 
separat.e_principle will be evident, in history, and this 
fact, even more than agreement in respect of the final 
results, is a confirmation of the rightthepry. 

This also, if only the time permitted, in what fulness 
would I not be able to lay before you ! Who is there, 
for example, who would not, as we have done, regard 
joy as something evidently good in itself, if only it were 
not joy in what is bad. Nor has there been any lack 
of writers on ethics who have asserted that pleasure 
and the good were strictly identical conceptions.'* 
Opposed to these were others who bore witness to the 
inner worth of insight and such wiU be supported by all 
unprejudiced mini Many phno«,phe« Uve wiLed 
to exalt knowledge above all else as the highest good.« 
They recognized, however, at the same time, a certain 
inner worth in each act of virtue, while others have 
carried this view so far as to recognize only in virtuous 
action the highest good.^ 

On the one hand, therefore, we have had sufficient 
confirmatory tests in support of our view. 

Next with regard to the priuQiples pi choice, how often 
do we not see the principle of summa tion applied as, for 
example, when it is said that the measure of the happi- 



ness of life as a whole and not that of the passing moment 
is to be considered/' And, again, passing beyond the 
limits of the self, when, for example, Aristotle says, that 
the happiness of a nation seems to be a higher end than 
that of an individual happiness,^* and that in the same 
way in a work of art, or in an organism and similarly 
in the case of the family, the part always exists for the 
sake of the whole ; everything is here subordinate to 
the "common" {"eh ro koivov^*).^^ Even in the 
case of the whole creation he makes the same principle 
hold good. " In what," he asks,^* " regarding all created 
things consists the good, and the best, which is its final 
aim " ? Is it immanent or transcendent ? And he 
answers : " Both," setting forth as the transcendent 
aim the divine first cause, likeness to which everything 
strives after, while the immanent aim is the world-order 
as a whole. The like testimony to the principle of sum- 
mation might be taken from the lips of the Stoics.^^ It 
reappears in every attempt to construct a theodicy from 
Plato down to Leibnitz and even later.^ 

In the precepts of our popular religion, again, the 
operation of this principle is also distinctly visible. When 
it ordains us to love our neighbour as ourselves, what 
else is taught but that, in the right choice, equality 
(be it our own or that of others) shall fall with equal 
weight into the balance, from which follows the subor- 
dination of the single individual to the good of the 
collective whole ; just as the ethical ideal of Christianity 
— the Saviour — offers himself as a sacrifice for the sal- 
vation of the world. 

And when it is said : " Love God above all else " 

(and Aristotle also says that God is much rather to be 

called the best than the world as a whole),^^ here also 

there is a special application of the law of summation. 



For how else do we think of God than as the sum of all 
that is good raised to an infinite degree ? 

And so the two propositions : that we should love 
our neighbour as ourselves, and love God above all else, 
are manifestly so closely related that we are no longer 
surprised to find added the words that the one law is 
like unto the other. The law that we are to love our 
neighbour, it should be carefully noted, is not subor- 
dinated to that of love of God, and derived from it, it is, 
according to the jOhristian view, not right because God 
has required it, rather he requires it because it is by 
nature right ; ^ and this rightness is made manifest 
in the same way, and with the same clearness by means, 
so to speak, of the same ray of natural knowledge. 

Sufficient testimony has perhaps been offered to the 
shaping operation of those factors which have been 
separately set forth by us, and so we have, on the one 
hand, a strengthening of our theory while, on the other 
hand, we have in essentials the explanation of that 
paradoxical anticipation of philosophical results. 

45. We are not to suppose, however, that all has now 
been said. Not every opinion regarding law and mora- 
lity holding good in society to-day, and which has also 
the sanction of ethics, flows from these pure and noble 
sources which, even when hid, have none the less dis- 
charged their waters in rich abundance. Many such 
views have arisen in a way quite unjustifiable from a 
logical point of view, and an inquiry into the history 
of their origin shows that they take their rise in lower 
impulses, in egoistic desires through a transformation 
due, not to higher influences, but simply to the instinctive 
force of habit. It is really true, as so many utilitarians 
have pointed out, that egoism prompts men to make 



themselves agreeable to others and that such conduct 
continually practised, develops finally into a habit 
which is blind to the original ends. The chief reason 
for this is the limits of our mind, the so-called " nar- 
rowness of consciousness," which does not allow of our 
always keeping clearly before us the more remote and 
final ends side by side with what is immediately in 
question. In such a way many a one may be frequently 
led, by the blind force of habit, to have regard also for 
the well-being of others with a certain self-f orgetfulness* 
Further, it is true, as some have particularly insist^, 
that in history it must often have happened that a 
powerful person has selfishly reduced to subjection a 
weaker individual, and transformed him by force of 
habit more and more into ^ wUling slave. And then 
in this slave-soul an avrb^ e^a comes in the end to 
operate with a blind, but none the less powerful force, 
an impelUng " you ought,'^ as though it were a revelation 
of nature regardmg good and bad. On every violation 
of a command he feels himself, like a well4rained dog, 
uneasy and inwardly tormented. When such a tyrant 
had, L this way, reduced many to subjection his prudent 
egoism would cause him to give commands helpful to 
the maintenance of his horde. These orders would in 
the same slavish manner become habitual, and as it 
were, natural to his subjects. And so regard for the 
whole of this community would gradually become for 
each subject something into which he felt himself driven 
in the manner above described. At the same time, 
we may e0psily recognize how, owing to the constant 
care exercised towards his subjects, habits must be 
formed in the t3rrant himself favourable to a regard 
for the welfare of the community. It may even happen 
at last that, just as in the case of the miser, who sacrifices 



himself for the sake of his gold, the tyrant may he ready 
to die for the maintenance of his people. Throughout 
the whole process thus described ethical principles do 
not exercise the slightest influence. The compulsion 
which in this way arises, and the opinions which as a 
result approve or disapprove of a certain procedure 
have nothing whatever to do with the natural sanction 
and are devoid of all ethical worth. It may, however, 
be easily understood — especially if one considers how 
one tribe enters into relations with another and consi- 
derations of friendliness begin here too to prove advan- 
tageous, — ^how this kind of training may lead, indeed 
one may venture to say miist, sooner or later, lead to 
opinions in agreement with* the principles springing 
from a true appreciation of the good. 

46. Thus also the blind, purely habitual expectation 
of similar events under similar circumstances which 
animals, and also we ourselves, practise in countless 
instances, often coincide with the results which a com- 
plete induction according to the principles of the calcula- 
tion of probability would, in the same case, have brought 
about. The very similarity of result has led people 
even with a psychological education,?^ to regard the 
two processes as exactly identical, although they stand 
wide as the poles asunder, the one completing itself by 
means of a purely blind instinct, while the other is illu- 
mined by mathematical evidence. We ourselves should, 
therefore, be well on our guard against supposing in 
such pseudo-ethical developments the concealed influ- 
ence of the true ethical sanction. 

47. Great, however, as is the contrast, still even these 
lower processes have their worth. Nature — ^and this 



has been often insisted on^° — frequently does well in 
leaving much which concerns our welfare to instinctive 
impulses like hunger and thirst rather than leave every- 
thing to our reason. This, also, is confirmed in our case. 
In those very early times in which, as I conceded to 
Ihering, (why you will, perhaps, now be better able to 
see,) nearly every trace of ethical thought and feeling 
was absent, much nevertheless was done which was a 
preparation for true virtue. Public laws, however much 
in the first instance established under the influence of 
lower motives, were yet preliminary conditions for the 
free unfolding of our noblest capacities. 

Nor is it a matter of no consequence that, under the 
influence of this training, certain passions became mode- 
rated and certain dispositions implanted which made it 
easier to follow the true moral law in the same direction. 
/ Catiline's courage was assuredly not the true virtue of 
. courage if Aristotle is right when he says that they only 
• have such who go to danger and to death " rod KaXoi 
''€P€Ka,^^ "for the sake of the morally beautiful."'' 
f Augustine might have made use of this instance when 
I he said : " virtutes ethnicorum splendida vitia." But 
who will deny that if such a man as Catiline had been 
converted, the dispositions he had acquired earlier 
would have made it easier for hipa to venture to ex- 
tremes in the service of the good too ? In this way, 
the ground was made receptive for the admission of 
truly ethical impulses and therein lay a powerful encou- 
ragement to the propagation of truth on the part of 
those who were foremost in the discovery of ethical 
knowledge, and first to hear the voice of a natural sanc- 
tion. It is in this sense that Aristotle observed that it is 
not every one who can study ethics. He who is to hear 
about law and morality, must be already wdl conducted 



by dint of habit. In the case of others, he thinks, it is 
but a waste of pains.^* 

Indeed, stiU more may be said in praise of the services 
rendered to the recognition of natural law and morality 
by these pre-ethical, though not pre-historical, times. 
The legal ordinances and customs formed in this time, 
owing to the reasons previously assigned, approached 
so closely to what ethics demands, that this peculiar 
kind of mimicry blinded many to the absence of a more 
thorough going afl^ity. What, in the one case, a blind 
impulse and in the other, knowledge of the good exalts 
into a law, is often completely the same in substance. 
The legislative moral authority found therefore in these- 
already codified laws and customs the rough drafts, as 
it were, of laws, which with a few changes, it could 
sanction without more ado. These were the more 
valuable because, as seems required from a utilitarian 
point of view, they were adapted to the special circum- 
stances of the people. A comparison of the one consti- 
tution with the other made this noticeable, and early 
helped to lead to the important knowledge of the real 
relativity of natural right and of natural morality. Who 
knows whether otherwise, it would have been possible, 
even for an Aristotle, to succeed to the degree in which 
he did in steering clear of all cut and dried doctrinaire 
theories ? 

So much, therefore, concerning the pre-ethical times, 
in order that these may not be denied the acknowledg- 
ment which they deserve. 

48. Nevertheless it was then night ; though a night 
which heralded the coming day, and the dawn of that 
day witnessed assuredly the most glorious sunrise which, 
in the history of the world is yet to rise into full splen- 



i,^\, dour. I say, is to rise, not has risen, for we still see the 
light struggling with the powers of darkness. True 
^ , ethical motives, in private as in public life, are still far 
from being everywhere the determining standard. 
These forces^— to use the language of the poet* — ^prove 
themselves stiU too little developed to hold together 
the structure of the world ; and so nature, — and we 
have need to be thankful that it is so — ^keeps the machine 
going by hunger and love, and, we must also add, by all 
those other dark strivings which, as we have seen, may 
be developed from self-seeking desires. 

49. Of these, and their psychological laws the jurist 
must, therefore, if he would truly understand his time, 
and influence it beneficially, take cognizance, as well 
as of the doctrines of natural right and natural morality 
which our inquiry has shown to be not the first but— 
in so far as hope in the realization of a complete ideal 
may be cherished at all— will be the last in the history 
of the development of law and morality. 

Thus the near relationships of jurisprudence and 
politics of which Leibnitz spoke, become evident in 
their full range. 

Plato has said : "It will never be well with the state 
until the true philosopher is king, or kings philosophize 
rightly.'' In our constitutional times we should express 
ourselves better by saying that there will never be a 
change for the better regarding the many evils in our 
national life until the authorities, instead of abolishing 
the limited philosophical culture required for law stu- 
dents by the existing regulations, shall rather strive 
hard to secure that for their noble profession they shall 
really receive an adequate philosophical culture. 

* SohiUer. 


1 (p. 2). Cf. "ber tJdie Entstehung des Rechtsgefiihls." 
Lecture by Dr. Rudolf von Ihering, delivered before the Vienna 
Law Society, March 12, 1884 {AUgem, Juristenzeitung, 7 Jahrg., 
No. 11 seq., Vienna, March 16-April 13, 1884). Cf. further, v. 
Ihering, Der Zweck im Recht, vol. ii. Leipzig, 1877-83. 

2 (p. 2). For the first point, cf. AUgem, JuristenzeUung, 
7 Jahrg. p. 122 seq., Zweck im Rechty vol. ii. p. 109 seq. For the 
second point AUgem, Juristenzeitung, 7 Jahrg. p. 171, Zweck im 
Rechty pp. 118-123. It is here denied that there is any absolutely 
valid ethical rule (pp. 118, 122 seq.) ; further every " psycho- 
logical " treatment of ethics, according to which ethics is repre- 
sented " as twin sister of logic " is contested. 

3 (p. 4). AUgem, Juristenzettung, 7 Jahrg., p. 147 ; cf. Zweck 
im Bechly vol. ii. p. 124 seq. ' 

4 (p. 4). Aristotle, PdUicSy i. 2, p. 1252 b. 24. 

6 (p. 4). Cf. e.g. AUgem, Juristenzeitung, 7 Jahrg. p. 146. 

6 (p. 5). Rep, 2. 31. 

7 (p. 5). Dig. 1. 8, 9. 

8 (p. 6). Amongst the numerous adherents of this view 
and one of its best advocates is J. S. Mill in his Utilitarianismy 
chap. iii. 

9 (p. 6). Here also, along with many others, J. S. Mill may 
be cited. The motives of hope and fear are, according to him, 
the external ; the motives first described, the feelings developed 
by habit, the internal sanction. UtUitarianiamj chap. iii. 




10 (p. 7). Gf. espec. here a discussion in James Mill's 
Fragment on Mackinioshy printed by J. S. Mill in the second 
edition of his Analysis of the phenomena of the human mind^ 
vol. ii. p. 309 seq. ; and Grote's powerful essay published by 
A. Bain under the title, '^ Fragments on Ethical Stijects, by the 
late George Grote, F.R.S.," being a selection from his posthumous 
papers, London, 1876 ; Espec. Essay 1, On the Origin and 
Nature of Ethical Sentiment, 

11 {p. 9). D. Hume, An Enquiry concerning the Principles 
of Morals, London, 1761. 

12 {p, 9). Herbart, Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philo- 
sophic, 81 seq. Collected Works, vol. i. p. 124 seq. 

13 (p. 9). This comparison with logic should be my best 
defence against the charge of placing Herbart's doctrine in a false 
Ught. Were the logical criterion to consist in judgments of taste 
experienced on the appearance of thought-processes in accordance 
with or opposition to rule, it would then, in comparison with 
what it actually is (the internal self-evidence of a process in 
accordance with rule) have to be called external. Similarly 
Herbart's criterion of ethics is rightly characterized as external, 
however loudly Herbartians may insist that in the judgment 
of taste which arises spontaneously on the contemplation of 
certain relations of will, an inner superiority regarding these 
relations is recognizable. 

14 (p. 10). In his Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Bitten, 
Kant enunciates his Categorical Imperative in the foUowing^ 
forms : " Act only in accordance with that maxim which you 
can at the same time will should become a universal law," and 
" Act as if the maxim of your action were by your will to be raised 
to a universal law." 

In the Critique of' Practical Reason it runs " Act so that the 
maxim of your will could on each occasion be valid as a universal 
legislative principle," i.e. as Kant himself explains, in such a way 
tiiat the maxim, when raised to a universal law, does not lead 
to contradictions and consequent self-abrogation. The conscious* 
ness of this fundamental law was, for Kant, a fact of pure reason, 



thereby proclaiming itself to be legislative (sic volo sic jubeo). 
Beneke has already observed (Orundlinien der Sittenlehrey vol. ii. 
p. xviii., 1841 ; cf. his Orundlegung zm Phynk der Bitten, a 
counterpart to Kant's Orundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 
1822) that it is nothing more than a '^ psychologische Dichtung," 
and to-day no one able to judge is any longer in doubt concerning 
it. It deserves to be noted that even philosophers like Mansel, 
who have the highest reverence for Kant, admit that the Cate- 
gorical Imperative is a fiction and absolutely untenable. 

The Categorical Imperative has at the same time another and 
not less serious defect, i.e. that even when admitted, it leads to 
no ethical conclusions. Kant fails, as Mill LUtilitarianismy chap, 
i.) rightly says " in an almost grotesque fashion " to deduce what 
he seeks. His favourite example of a deduction, by which he 
illustrates his manner of procedure not only in his Orundlegung 
zur Metaphysik der Bitten but also in the Critique of Practical 
Reason is as follows : May a person, he asks, retain for himself 
a possession which has been entrusted to him without a receipt 
or other acknowledgment ? He answers. No. For he thinks, 
were the opposite maxim to be raised to a law, nobody, under 
such circumstances, would entrust anything to anybody. The 
law would then be without possibiUty of application, therefore 
impracticable and so self-abrogated. 

It may easily be seen that Kant's argumentation is false, 
indeed absurd. If, in consequence of the law, certain actions 
ceased to be practised, the law exercises an influence ; it there- 
fore still exists and has in no way annulled itself. How ridiculous 
would it appear if the following question were treated after an 
analogous fashion : '' May I yield to a person who desires to 
bribe me ? " Yes, since, were I to think of the opposite maxim 
as raised to a universal law, then nobody would seek any longer 
to bribe another ; therefore the law would be without appUcation, 
therefore, impracticable, and so self-abrogated, 

15 (p. 11). Cf. J. S. Mill, System of Deductive and Inductive 
Logic^ vol. iv. chap, iv, section vi. (towards the end) ; vol. vl. 
ohap. ii. section iv. and elsewhere, e.g. in his Vtililarianism, 
Essays on Rdigion, and in his article on ConUe and Positivism^ 
part ii. 



16 (p. 11). Gf. with what has been said in the lecture the 
first chapter of the Nicomachian Ethics, and it will be seen that 
Ihering's "fondamental thought" in his work Der Zw^h im 
Rechty vol. i. p. vi., viz. : " that no legal formula exists which 
does not owe its origin to an end," is as old as ethics itself. ' 

17 (p. 12). Cases may arise where the consequence of certain 
efforts remains in doubt, and two courses are open : one present- 
ing the prospect of a greater good but with less probability, 
the other a lesser good but with a greater probability. In 
choosing here, account must be taken of the degree of proba- 
bility. If A is three times better than B, but B has ten times 
as many chances of being attained as A, then practical wisdom 
will prefer course B. Supposing that, under like circumstances, 
such a procedure always takes place, then (in accordance 
with the law of great numbers) the better would, generally 
speaking, be realized, a sufficient number of cases being assumed, 
and so such a manner of choosing would still obviously corre- 
spond to the principle laid down in the text, i.e. ^^ Choose the 
best that is attainable." The full significance of this remark 
will be made still more evident in the course of the inquiry. 

18 (p. 12). This truth was familiar to Aristotle (cf. e.g. 
De Anima^ iii. 8). The Middle Ages maintained it, 
but expressed it unfortunately in the proposition : nihH eat 
in inteUuctu, quod non prim fuerit in sensu. The notions " will- 
ing," " concluding " are not gained from sensuous perception ; 
the term " sensuous " would in that case have to be taken so 
generally that all distinction between ^' sensuous " and '^ super- 
sensuous" disappears. These notions have their origin in 
certain concrete impressions with psychical content (Anschan- 
ungen psychischen Inhalts). From the same source arise the 
notions "end," "cause" (we observe, for example, a causal 
relation existing' between our belief in the premises and in the 
conclusion), " impossibility " and " necessity" (we gain these 
from judgments which accept or reject not merely assertori- 
cally, but, as it is usually expressed, apodictically,) and many 
other notions which some modem philosophers, failing in detecting 
the true origin of them, have sought to regard as categories given 



d priori. I may mention, by the way, that I am well aware 
Sigwart and others influenced by him have recently questioned 
the peculiar nature of apodictic as opposed to assertorical judg- 
ments. But this is a psychological error which it is not the place 
to discuss here. Gf . note 27, p. 83 sub. 

19 (p. 12). This doctrine in germ is also found in Aristotle ; 
cf. espec. Metaph, : ^ 15, p. 1021 a. 29. This term " intentional," 
like many other terms for important notions, comes from the 

20 (p. 13). The question of the grounds of this division is 
discussed in more detail in my Paychologie vom empirischen 
Standpunkte (1874, Bk. ii. chap. vi. ; cf. also chap. i. section 5). 
The statements there made regarding this division I still consider 
to be substantially correct in spite of many modifications respect- 
ing points of detail. 

21 (p. 13). Meditat. iii. " Nimc autem ordo videtur exigere, 
ut prius omnes meas cogitationes (all psychical acts) in certa 
genera distribuam . . . Quaedam ex his tanquam rerum ima- 
gines sunt, quibus soHs proprie convenit ideae nomen, ut cum 
hominem, vel chimaeram, vel coelum, vel angelum, vel Deum 
cogito; aUae vero aUas quasdam praeterea formas habent, ut cum 
volo cum timeo, cum affirmo, cum nego, semper quidem aUquam 
rem ut subjectum meae cogitationis apprehendo, sed aliquid 
etiam amplius quam istius rei similitudinem cogitatione com- 
plector ; et ex his aliae vduntates sive affectua aliae autem judicia 

Strangely enough this clear passage has not prevented Windel- 
band (Strassb. phUos, Abhandl. p. 171) from ascribing to Des- 
cartes the view that the judgment is an act of volition. What 
led him astray is a discussion in the fourth Meditation on the 
influence of the will in the formation of judgment. Even scho- 
lastics like Suarez had ascribed too much to this influence, and 
Descartes goes so far in exaggeration of this dependence that he 
considers every judgment (even the self-evident judgments) as 
the work of the will. But to " produce the judgment " and 
*' to be the judgment " are yet manifestly not one and the same. 



And, therefore, although Descartes, in the passage cited, allows 
his view as to the influence of the will to appear, and probably 
it is only on this account that he assigns to the judgment the 
third place in the fundamental classification of psychical pheno- 
mena^ yet none the less he says without contradiction : aliae 
voluntates — aliae judicia appellantur. 

More illusive are a couple of passages in his later writings, 
i.e. in his Principia PhUosophiae (i. 32), published three years 
after the Meditations, and in a work also written three years later : 
Notae in Programma quoddam, sub finem Anni 1647 in Belgio 
editum, cum hoc Titulo : Explicatio mentis humanae sive animae 
rationalis, ubi explicatur quid sit, et quid esse possit." Particu- 
larly might the passage in the Principles lead to the opinion 
that Descartes must have changed his view, and it is astonishing 
that Windelband has not appealed to this passage rathe^ than 
to that in the Meditations. We read here : — Ordines modi cogi- 
tandi quos in nobis experimur, ad duos generates referri possont ; 
quorum unus est, perceptio sive operatio inteUectus ; alius vero 
volitio sive operatio voluntatis. Nam sentire, imaginari, et pure 
intellegere, sunt tantum diversi modi percipiendi ; ut et cupere^ 
aversari, affkmare, negare, dubitare, sunt diversi rnodi volendL 

At first sight this passage appears to be so clearly in contradic- 
tion to the one in the third Meditation that, as we have said, it 
is scarcely possible to avoid the supposition that Descartes had 
meantime rejected his thesis as to the three fundamental classes 
of psychical phenomena, so shunning Scylla only to plunge into 
Charybdis ; avoiding the old mistake of confusing the judgment 
with the idea (Vorstellung), he would now seem to confound it 
with the will. But a more attentive examination of all the 
circumstances will suffice to exonerate Descartes from such a 
charge, and this on the following grounds : (1) There is not the 
slightest sign that Descartes was ever conscious of having become 
untrue to the view expressed in the Meditations. (2) Further, 
in the year 1647 (three years after the publication of the Medita- 
tions and shortly before writing the Notae to his Programma) 
the Meditations appeared in a translation revised by Descartes 
himself, where, remarkably enough, not the slightest alteration 
is to be found in the decisive passage in the third Meditation. 



'^ Entre mes pens^es," it reads, "' quelques unes sont commes 
lea images des choses, et c'est a celles-14 seales que convient 
proprementlejiomd'id^e . . . D'autres, outre celaont quelques 
autres formes ; . . . et de ce gemre de pensees les unes sont appa- 
ll volorU4s ou affections, et les autres jugements.^^ (3) In the 
Brindples itself lie says directly after (i. No. 42) that all 
our errors depend upon our will (a voluntate pendere) ; but so 
far is he from regarding the '' error " as an act of volition, that he 
says there is no one who errs voluntarily (nemo est qui velit falli). 
Still clearer is it that he does not regard the judgment like the 
desires and dislikes as inner activities of the will itself, but only 
as a product of the will, since he at once adds; sed longe aliud 
est velle faUi quam velle assentiri iis, in quibus contingit errorem 
reperiri," etc. He does not say of the will that it desires, affirms, 
assents, but that it wills ^e assent ; so also, not that it is true 
but that it desire s the truth (veritatis assequendae cupidities . . . 
efficit, ut . . . judicium ferant). 

As to Descartes' real view, therefore, there can be no doubt ; 
his doctrine has not in this respect suiSered the slightest change. 
It only remains, therefore, to come to an understanding of his 
obviously variable modes of expression, and this is, I believe, 
solved incontrovertibly in the following manner. Descartes, 
while regarding will and judgment as two classes differing funda- 
mentally, none the less finds that in contradistinction to the 
first fundamental class — that of ideas — ^these have something 
in common. In the third Meditation he designates (cf . the above 
passage) as the common element the fact that although essen- 
tially based upon an idea, in both alike there is contained a 
further special form. In the fourth Meditation a further common 
character appears, i.e. that the will decides concerning them ; 
not only can it determine and suspend its own acts, but also those 
of the judgment. It is this common character which he was 
bound to regard as especially, indeed all important, in the first 
part of the Principles, xxix.-xlii. Accordingly, he classes 
them, in opposition to the ideas (which he calls operationes intel- 
lectus) under the term operationes voluntatis. In the Notae 
to the Frogramma he calls them distinctly in the same sense, 
I'determinationes voluntatis." " Ego enim, cum viderem, praeter 

49 B 


perceptionem, quae praerequiritur ut judicemus, opus esse affir- 
matione vel negatione ad fonnam judicii constituendam,no&i8gte6 
saepe esse liberum ut cohibeamus (usensionem^ etiamsi rem perci- 
piamus, ipsum actum judicandi, qui non nisi in assensu, hoc est 
in affinnatione vel negatione consistit, non retuli ad perceptionem 
intelleotus sed ad determinationem voluntatis." He does not 
even hesitate in the Princijjies to term both these two classes 
of modi cogUandiy ^^ modi volendi " the context seeming sufficiently 
to indicate that he means only to express thereby the fact that 
they fall within the domain of the will. 

In further support of this explanation we may compare the 
scholastic, terminology into which Descartes as a young man 
was initiated. It was customary to denote under the term actus 
voluntatis not merely the movement of the will itself but also the 
act performed in obedience to the will. In accordance with 
this custom, the actus vduntatis fell into two classes ; the actus 
dicitus voluntatis and the actus imperatus voluntatis. In a similar 
manner Descartes groups the class which, according to him, was 
only possible as an actus imperatus of the will along with his 
actus dicitus. There is here, therefore, no question of a common 
fundamental character of the intentional relation. 

Clear as all this is to those who carefully attach due weight 
to the various moments, it would yet appear that Spinoza (pro- 
bably misled rather by the passage in the Principles than 
by that cited by Windelband), anticipates Windelband in this 
misunderstanding of the Cartesian doctrine. In his Ethics^ ii. 
prop. 49, he actually, and in the most real sense, regards the 
affirm^atio and negatio as " vditiones mentis,^^ and by a further 
confusion, comes finally to obliterate the distinction between 
the two classes ideae and vduniaies, ^' Voluntas et intdlectus 
unum et idem sunt " his thesis now reads, so overthrowing not 
only the three-fold classification of Descartes, but also the old 
Aristotelian dual classification. Spinoza has here, as usual, done 
nothing else than corrupt the teaching of his great master. 

22 {p. 13). I do not mean to say that the classification Is 
universally recognized to-day. It would not even be possible 
to regard as certain the Principle of Contradiction if in order 



to do so we were to await universal assent. In the present 
instance it is not difficult to understand that old, deeply-rooted 
prejudices cannot all at once be banished. But that even under 
such circumstances it has not been possible to urge a single 
important objection affords the best confirmation of our doctrine. 

Some, as for instance, Windelband — while giving up the attempt 
at including judgment and idea (Vorstellung) in one fundamental 
class, on the other hand believe it possible to subsume judgment 
under feeling, thus falling back into the error which Hume 
committed earlier in his inquiry into the nature of belief. Accord- 
ing to these writers, to affirm implies an act of approval, an 
appreciation on the part of the feelings, while denial ia an act 
of disapproval, a feeling of repugnance. 

Despite a certain axislogy the confusion is hard to understand. 
There are people who recognize both the goodness of God and 
the wickedness of the devil, the being of Ormuzd and the being of 
Ahriman, with an equal degree of conviction, and yet, while 
prizing the nature of the one above all else, they feel themselves 
absolutely repelled by that of the other. Since we love know- 
ledge and hate error it is, of course, proper that those judgments 
we hold to be right (and this is true of all those judgments which 
we ourselves make) are for this very reason dear to us, i.e. we 
estimate them in some way or other through feeling. Btit who 
on this account would be misled into regarding the judgments 
themselves which are loved as acts of loving ? The confusion 
would be almost as gross as if we should fail to distinguish wife 
and child, money and possessions, from the activity which is 
directed towards these, inasmuch they are the objects of affection. 
Gf. also what has been said (note 21) with regard to Windelband, 
where, misunderstanding Descartes, he ascribes to him the same 
teaching ; further, note 26 (on the unity of the idea of the good) 
as well as what is urged by Sigwart in the note (in part much to 
the point) on Windelband (Logic, vol. i. chap. ii. p. 166 seq.). To 
those who, despite all that has been said, still wish further argu- 
ments for the distinction between the second and third funda- 
mental classes, I may, perhaps, be allowed to refer them, by 
anticipation, to my Descriptive Psychology , which I have 
alluded to in the preface as an almost completed worki and which 



will appear if not as a continuation, yet still as a further develop- 
ment of my Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint. 
As against Windelband, I here add the following observations : 

1. It is false and a serious oversight, as he himself will be 
convinced on reading again in my Psychology^ vol. i. p. 262, 
when he (p. 172) makes me assert, and that too as a quotation 
from my own work, that " love and hate " is not an appropriate 
term for the third fundamental class. 

2. It is false, and a quite unjustifiable supposition when (p. 178) 
he ascribes to me the opinion that the classification of judgments 
according to quality is the only essential classification belonging 
to the act of judgment itself. I believe exactly the contrary. 
I regard, for example (of course in opposition to Windelband), 
the distinction between assertorical and apodictic judgments 
(cf. here note 27, p. 83), as also the distinction between self- 
evident and blind judgments as belonging and highly essential, 
to the act of judgment itself. Other differences, again, especially 
the distinction between simple and compound acts of judgment, 
I might mention. For it is not every compound judgment that 
can be resolved into quite simple elements, and something 
similar takes place also in the case of certain notions, a fact 
known to Aristotle. What is red ? — Red colour. What is 
colour ? — The quality of colour. The difference, it is seen, 
contains in both cases the notion of the genus. The separating 
of the one logical element from the other is only possible from 
the one side. A similar one-sided capacity to separate appears 
also in certain compound judgments. J. S. Mill is, therefore, 
quite wrong when he {Deductive and Inductive Logic, vol. i. chap. iv. 
section 3), regards as ridiculous the old classification of judgments 
into simple and compound, and thinks that the procedure in 
such a case is exactly as if one should wish to divide horses 
into single horses and teams of horses ; otherwise the same 
argument would hold good against the classification of concep- 
tions into simple and compound. 

3. It is false, though an error which finds almost universal 
acceptance, and one from which I myself at the time of writing 
the first volume of my Psychology was not yet free, that the 
so-called degree of conviction consists in a degree of intensity 



of the judgment which can be brought into analogy with the 
intensity of pleasure and pain. Had Windelband charged 
me with this error I would have acknowledged the complete 
justice of the charge. Instead of this he finds fault with me 
because I recognize intensity with regard to the judgment, only 
in a sense analogous, and not identical to that in the case of feeling, 
and because I assert the impossibility 'of comparing in respect 
of magnitude, the supposed intensity of the belief and the real 
intensity of feeling. Here we have one of the results of his 
improved theory of judgment ! 

If the degree of conviction of my belief that 2+1=3 were 
one of intensity how powerful would this be ! And if the said 
belief were to be identified, as by Windelband (p. 186), with 
feeling, not merely regarded as analogous to feeling, how de- 
structive to our nervous system would the violence of such a 
shock to the feelings prove ! Every physician would be com- 
pelled to warn the public against the study of mathematics 
as calculated to destroy health. (Cf. with regard to this so- 
called degree of conviction the view of Henry Newman in his 
interesting work : An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent — 
a work scarcely noticed in Germany.) 

4. When Windelband (p. 183) wonders how I can regard the 
word " is " in such propositions as " God is," " A man is " 
(ein Mensch ist), " A lack is " (ein Mangel ist), " A possibility 
is," "A truth is," (i.e. There is a truth), etc., as having the same 
meaning and finds it extraordinary (184, note 1) in the author 
of Von der mannigfacJien Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristotdes 
that he should fail to recognize the manifold significance of '' to 
be," I can only reply that he who in this view does not perceive 
the simple consequence of my theory of the judgment can hardly 
have understood this doctrine. With regard to Aristotle it 
never occurs to him, while dividing the " ov " in the sense of 
reality into various categories, and into an " ov ivepyeia 
and ov Svpdfi€i'\ to do the same with the "ecrriv" 
transforming what is the expression of an idea into that 
of a judgment and the '' ov m akriBh " as he calls it. 
This could only be done by those who, like Herbart]Jand many 
others after him, did not know how to hold apart the notion 



of being in the sense of absolute position and being in the sense 
of reality (cf. the following note). 

5. I have just said that there exist simple and compound 
judgments, and that many a compound judgment is not, without 
a residue, resolvable into simple judgments. Special attention 
must be paid to this in seeking to convert judgments otherwise 
expressed into the existential form. It is self-evident that only 
simple judgm^its, i.e. such as are, strictly speaking, without 
parts, are so. convertible. I may therefore be excused for not 
thinking it necessary to emphasize this expressly in my Psycho- 
logy, If this restriction hold good universally it is, of courser, 
valid also of the categorical form. In the propositions categorical 
in form, which the formal logicians have denoted by the signs 
A.E.I. and 0. they wish to express strictly simple judgments. 
These are therefore one and all convertible into the existential 
form (cf. my Psychologyy vol. i. p. 283). The same, however, 
will not hold good when propositions categorical in form contain 
in consequence of an ambiguity of expression (cf. p. 120, note 
to Appendix) a plurality of judgments. In such a case the exis- 
tential form may certainly be the expression of a simple judgment 
equivalent to the compound one, but cannot be the expression 
of the judgment itself. 

This is a point which Windelband ought to have considered 
in examining (p. 184) the proposition : ^' The rose is a flower " 
with respect to its convertibility into an existential proposition. 
He is quite right in protesting against its conversion into the 
proposition : " There is no rose which is not a flower," but he 
is not equally right in ascribing this conversion to me. Neither 
in the passage cited by him nor elsewhere have I made such a 
conversion, and I consider it just as false as that attempted by 
Windelband and all such as may be attempted by anybody else. 
The judgment here expressed in the proposition is made up of 
two judgments of which one is the recognition of the subject 
(whether it be that thereby is meant " rose " in the ordinary 
sense, or "what is called rose," ''what is understood by rose"), 
and this, as we have just said, is not always the case where a 
proposition is given of the form : All A is B. 

Unfortunately Land also has overlooked this, the only one 



among my critics who has succeeded in comprehending, in their 
necessary connection with the principle, what Windelband has 
termed the ^' mjnsterious " hints which I have thrown out towards 
the reform of elementary logic, and in deducing them correctly 
from it. (Cf. Land, '^ On a supposed improvement in Formal 
Logic " in the papers of the Kgl. Niederldndischen Akademie der 
Wissenachaften, 1876.) 

I conclude with a curiosity recently furnished by Steinthal 
in his Zeitschrift fUr V^kerpsychologie (chap, xviii. p. 175). I 
there read with astonishment : '' Brentano's confusion in com- 
pletely severing judgments from idea and thoughts (!) and 
grouping the judgments as acts of recognition or rejection, with 
love and hate (!!) is instantly removed if such (?) a judgment, 
as an aesthetic judgment is termed '^ Beurteilen " (!). Probably 
Steinthal has never once glanced into my Psychology^ and has 
only read Windelband^s statement concerning it ; this, however, 
so hastily that I hope he will not be ungrateful at my sending 
hia lines to Windelband for correction. 

23 {p. 14). Miklosich, SubjecUose SdizSy second edition, 
Vienna, 1883. 

In order to make the reader familiar with the contents of this 
valuable little book a notice written at the time for the Vienna 
Evening Post may prove useful. Through an oversight it was 
printed as a feuilleton in the Vienna newspaper. As no one 
certainly would look for it there, I will include it here by way 
of an appendix. Meantime, Sigwart's monograph. The Imper- 
sonalia has appeared, in which he opposes Miklosich. Marty 
has submitted this, as well as (shortly before) the corresponding 
section in Sigwart^s Logic to a telling criticism in the ViertdjahrS' 
sckrift fiir mssenschaftliche PhUosophie^ with regard to which 
criticism Sigwart, though without any reasonable ground, has 
shown himself highly indignant. "II se fache," the French 
say, " done il a tort." That Sigwart's theory in its essential 
points has not succeeded, even Steinthal really allows, though 
in his Zeitschrift (chap, xviii. p. 172 seq.) he bums thick clouds 
of incense to the writer of the monograph, and even in his preface 
to the fourth edition of his Origin of Language applauds a form 



of conduct which every true friend of that deserving man 
(Sigwart) must regret. After the high praise awarded to him 
at the outset, one feels somewhat disappointed finally by the 
criticism. Steinthal rejects (pp. 177-180) Sigwart's theory on 
its grammatical side. There would only remain therefore as 
really successful Sigwart's psychological theory. But the psy- 
chological portion is not that concerning which Steinthal's 
estimate is authoritative ; for in that case, one would be bound 
to take seriously the following remark : " In the proposition : 
" Da biickt sich's hinunter mit liebendem Blick " (a line from 
Schiller's Diver), it is obvious that everybody must think 
of the king's daughter, but it is not she which stands before *me 
but a subjectless " sich hinunter-biicken," and now I have all 
the more fellow-feeling for her. According to my (Steinthal's) 
psychology, I should say the idea of the king's daughter " fluc- 
tuates" (schwingt) but does not enter into consciousness." 
This calls for something more than the old sapng : Sapienti sat. 

The psychological theory of Sigwart shows itself in all its 
weakness when he seeks to give an account of the notion of 
" existence,''^ It has been already recognized by Aristotle, that 
this notion is gained by reflection upon the affirmative judgment. 
But Sigwart, like most modem logicians, neglects to make use 
of this hint. Instead of saying that to the existent belongs 
everything of which the affirmative judgment is true, he becomes 
repeatedly, and once more in the second edition of his logic 
(pp. 88-95) involved in diffuse discussions upon the notion of 
being and upon existential propositions, which cannot in any 
way conduce to clearness, seeing that they move in false directions. 

*' To be," according to Siewart, expresses a relation (pp. 88, 95) ; 
if it be asked : What kind of a relation ? the answer would, at 
first sight (92), appear to be, a relation to me as thinking. But 
no ; the existential proposition asserts just this : '^ that 
the existing also exists, apart from its relation to me and to 
another thinking being." It cannot, therefore, be '^ a relation 
to me as thinking." But what other relation can be meant ? 
Not until p. 94 is this brought out more clearly. The relation 



ought to mean (of course he adds "zimichst " , provisionally) 
the agreement (" identity " ib.) of the thing represented with 
a possible impression (" einem Wahmehmbaren " ib. " something 
which may be perceived by me," ib. p. 90). 

Now it will be immediately recognized that this notion of 
existence is too narrow ; for it might very well be asserted that 
much exists which it is not possible to perceive, e.g. a past and 
a future, an empty space, and any sort of deficiency, a possibility 
or impossibility, etc., etc. It is therefore not surprising that 
Sigwart himself seeks to widen the notion. But he does this 
in a manner which I find it difficult to understand. At first 
sight he appears to say in order that something may exist it is 
not necessary that it can be perceived by me ; it is enough if 
it can be perceived by anybody. Or what else can be meant 
when Sigwart, after what has just been said, that existence was 
the agreement of the thing represented with a possible impression, 
thus continues : '' That which exists stands not merely in this 
rdation to me but to all other existing beings ? " It cannot 
surely mean that Sigwart is inclined to ascribe to every existing 
being the capacity to receive every impression. It may be he 
only wishes to say that everything which exists stands to every 
other existing being in the relation of existence, and then it 
might be concluded from what immediately follows that this 
rather meaningless definition is intended to express that existence 
is the capacity to act or to be acted upon. (*' What exists . . . 
stands in causal relations to the rest of the world " ; similar also 
is p. 91, note : the existent is something which ^^ can exercise 
effects upon me and others.") Finally, however, there is some 
ground for thinking Sigwart ^otdd say : what exists is that 
which can be perceived or can be inferred as perceivable, for 
he adds : *' hence (on accoimt of this causal relation) from 
what is perceivable also an existence which is merely inferred 
may be asserted." 

That all this is equally to be rejected it is not difficult to re- 

For (1) To " infer " the existence of something does not mean 
so much as "to infer that it is capable of being perceived." 
If, for example, the existence of atoms and of empty spaces 




could be assured by inference, we should still be very far from 
proving their perceptibility either to ourselves or to some other 
being. If any one were to conclude the existence of God while 
giving up the attempt '* togive vividness" to the thought by anthro- 
pomorphic means, he would not on this account believe that 
Ood must be perceptible to one of his creatures or even that he 
is the object of his own perception. 

2. From this pc^t of view it would be absurd for any one to 
say : I am convinced that there is much the existence of which 
can neither be perceived at any time or even inferred by any- 
body." For that would mean : '^ I am convinced that much 
can be perceived or can be inferred to be capable of perception 
which yet can never be perceived or inferred." Who does not 
recognize here how far Sigwart has strayed from the true notion 
of existence ! 

3. Should Sigwart wish ux this passage to widen the notion 
of existence to such a degree as to think that existence is that 
which can either be perceived or hxferred from some perceivable 
object, or again, stands in some sort of causal relation to what 
is perceivable, it might be replied — ^if indeed such a monstrous 
notion of existence still require refutation — that even this notion 
is still too narrow. If, for example, I aay : It may be that aji 
empty space exists but this can never with certainty be known 
by any one, I thereby confess that existence may perhaps belong 
to empty space ; but I deny most definitely that it is perceptible, 
or that it is to be inferred from that which is perceptible. In 
regard to relations of cause and effect on the other hand, it is of 
course impossible that empty space (which is certainly no thing) 
can stand in such a relation to anything perceivable. We should 
thus once again, arrive at an absurd meaning in interpretation 
of an assertion in no way absurd. 

How wrongly Sigwart has analysed the notion of existence 
is also proved very simply by means of the following proposition : 
A real centaur does not exist ; a centaur in idea^ however, cer- 
tainly exists, and that as often as I imagine it. Whoever does 
not clearly reoognixe here the distinction of the £y m aXf^di^ 
i.e. in the sense of existing, from ip in the sense of real (wesen- 
haft) will I fear hardly be brought to recognize it by the fullest 



illustrations which might be famished by further examples. 
We may, however, also consider briefly the following point : 
According to Sigwart, the knowledge of the existence of anything 
consists in the knowledge of the agreement of something repre- 
sented in idea with, let us say, x, since I do not clearly understand 
with what. What now is necessary in order to recognize the 
agreement of something with something else ? Manifestly, 
the knowledge of eyer3rthing which is required in order that this 
agreement should really exist. But this requires (1) that the 
one element exist, (2) that the other element exist, and (3) that 
between them there exist the relation of identity since what does 
not exist can be neither like something nor different from it. 
But the knowledge of the first element constitutes already in 
itself a knowledge of existence. Hence the knowledge of the 
two remaming elements is no longer necessary to the recognition 
of any existence, and Sigwart's theory leads to a contradiction. 
(Cf . with what has been said here, Sigwart's polemic against my 
Psychology, book ii. chap. vii. in his work ; The Impersonalia, 
p. 50 seq., and Logic, vol. i. second edition, p. 89 seq. note, as 
well as Marty's polemic against Sigwart in the articles : " Tiber 
Subjectlose Satze " in the Viertdjahrsschrift fiir toisaenschaftliche 
Philosophie, viii. i. seq.* 


As Sigwart has failed to grasp the nature of judgment in general 
he is not, of course, able to understand that of the negative judg- 
ment in particular. He has gone so far in error as to deny to 
it an equal right as species along with the positive judgment ; 

^ I had already written my Critique of Sigwart's notion of existence when 
I became aware of a note in his Logic, second ed. p. 390, a passage which, 
while it has not made it necessary to alter anything which I had written, 
has led me to insert it for the purpose of comparison. " Das Seiende iiber- 
haupt," Sigwart writes, " kann nicht als wahrer Gattungsbegriff zu dem 
einzebien Seienden betrachtet werden ; es ist, begrifflich betrachtet, nur 
ein gemeinschaftlicher Name. Denn, da ' Sein ' fiir uns ein Relations- 
pradikat ist, kann es kein gemeinschaftUches Merkmal sein> es miisste denn 
gezeigt werden, dass dieses Pradikat in einer dem Begriffe alles Seienden 
gemeinsamen Bestimmung wurzle." I fear that the reader will, just as 
httle as myself, attain by this explanation to clearness concerning Sigwart's 
notion of existence. He will perhaps the better understand why all my 
efforts regarding it have proved futile. 



no negative judgment is, he thinks, a direct judgment, its object 
is rather always another actual judgment or the attempt to fonn 
such a judgment. 

In this assertion Sigwart is opposed to some important psy- 
chological views which I have made good in my lecture. It 
would therefore seem fitting to resist his attack. For this 
purpose I shall show : (1) that Sigwart's doctrine is badly founded ; 
(2) that it leads to an irremediable confusion, as in that case 
Sigwart's afitenative judgment is a negative judgment, while 
his negative judgment if indeed a judgment at all, and not rather 
the absence of one, is a positive judgment, and that moreover 
his positive judgment really involves a negative one, along with 
other similar confusions. (3) Finally I think it will be possible 
— thanks to Sigwart's detailed explanations — ^to show the genesis 
of his error. 

1. The first inquiry in the case of an assertion so novel and 
so widely diverging from the general view, will be as to its foun- 
dation. With regard to this, he insists above all (p. 150) that 
the negative judgment would have no meaning if the thought 
of the positive attribution of a predicate had not preceded. 
But what can this mean ? Either there is here a clear p^itio 
principii, or it cannot mean anything more than that a connection 
of ideas must have preceded. Now granting this for a moment 
(although I have in my Psychology shown its falsity) this would 
by no means prove his proposition, since Sigwart himself recog- 
nizes (p. 89 note, and elsewhere) that such a " subjective con- 
nexion of ideas " would still not be a judgment ; that there 
needs rather to be added to it a certain feeling of constraint. 

An argument follows later (p. 151) the logical connexion of 
which I imderstand just as little. It is rightly observed that 
in and for itself we have the right to deny of anything an infinite 
number of predicates, and it is with equal right added that in 
spite of this, we do not really pass all these negative judgments. 
And now what conclusion is drawn from these premisses? 
Perhaps this, that the fact that a certain negative judgment 
is warranted is not sufficient in itself to explain the entrance 
of the judgment. This we may without hesitation admit. But 
Sigwart concludes quite otherwise ; he permits himself to assert, 



it follows from this that the further condition which is here 
lacking is that the corresponding positive affirmation has not 
yet been attempted. This is indeed a bold leap, and one which 
my logic at least is not able to follow. And why, if one were 
to inquire further, are not all the positive judgments here con- 
cerned really attempted ? The most probable answer, judging 
by the examples given by Sigwart (this stone reads, writes, 
sings, composes ; justice is blue, green, heptagonal, rotating), 
is, that this has not been done because the negative judgment 
has already been made with evident certainty ; for this would 
best explain why there is no '' danger of any one attributing 
these predicates to the stone or to justice." If, however, any one 
prefer to answer that '^ the narrowness of consciousness " makes 
it impossible to attempt at the same time an infinite number 
of positive judgments, I am content with this expedient also, 
only it must then be asked if this appeal ought not to have been 
made directly and earlier, since Sigwart himself calls the possible 
negative judgments an " immeasurahle quantity." 

It is also a curious error (Marty has already called attention 
to it), when Sigwart asserts that in contradistinction to what 
holds good of the negative judgment " every subject admits only 
of a limited number of predicates being affirmed." But why ? 
Can we not, for example, say a whole hour is greater than half 
an hour, greater than a third, greater than a fourth and so on 
ad infin. ? . . . If then, notwithstanding, I do not really make 
all these judgments, there are evidently good reasons for this ; 
above all that the '^ narrowness of consciousness" forbids it. 
But then this might also be applied most successfully in regard 
to negative judgments. 

Somewhat later we meet a third argument which, as I have 
already by anticipation refuted it in my Psychology (book ii. chap. 
7, section v.), will be treated quite shortly here. If the negative 
judgment were a direct one, co-ordinated with the affirmative 
judgment as species then, thinks Sigwart (p. 155 seq.), whoever 
in an affirmative categorical proposition regards the affirmation 
of the subject as involved must, to be consistent, regard the 
denial of tiie subject as involved in the negative proposition, 
which is not the case. The latter observation is correct, the 



fonner assertioti, however, quite untenable, as it involves in 
itself a contradiction. For exactly because the existence of 
each part in a whole is involved in the existence of the whole, 
the whole no longer exists if bat one of its parts is missing. 

It only remains now to consider a point of language by which 
Sigwart believes himself able to support his view. A testimony 
for it is, he thinks, to be found in the fact that the symbol lor 
the negative judgment is formed in every case by means of a 
combination with the symbol of affirmation, the word " not '* 
being added to the copida. In order to judge what is here 
actually the fact, we will glance for a moment at the sphere of 
feeling. Sigwart agrees, I think, with me and everybody else 
that pleasing and displeasing, rejoicing and sorrowing, loving 
and hating, etc., are co-ordinate with each other. Yet a complete 
series of expressions denoting a disinclination of feeling are 
found in dependence upon the expression for the corresponding 
inclination. For example, inclination, disinclination ; pleasure, 
displeasure; ease, disease; Wille, Widerwille; froh, unfroh; 
happy, unhappy ; beautiful, imbeautiful ; pleasant, un- 
pleasant ; — even " ungut " is used. The explanation of this 
is, I believe, not difficult for the psychologist, notwithstanding 
the equally primordial character of these opposite modes of 
feeling. Ought then the explanation of the phenomenon lying 
before us in the expression of the negative judgment, closely 
related as it is to the before mentioned phenomenon, to be really 
so very difficult, even assuming the primordial character' ? 

As a matter of fact the case must be very bad when thinkers 
like Sigwart in making statements so important in principle, 
and at the same time so unusual, have to resort to arguments 
so weak. 

2. The grounds on which Sigwart's doctrine concerning the 
negative judgment rest have, therefore, each and all proved 
untenable. This must be so ; for how could the truth of any 
doctrine be shown which would plunge everything into the 
greatest confusion ? 

Sigwart finds himself compelled to distinguish between the 
positive and the affirmative judgment, and the affirmative 
judgment— one hears and wonders at the new terminology — 



is according to him, closely examined, a negative judgment. 
On page 150 he says literally : " The primordial judgment can 
certainly not be termed the affirmative judgment, but is better 
described as the positive judgment, for only in opposition to 
the negative judgment, and in so far as it rejects the possibility 
of a negation, is the simple statement A is B an affirmation," 
and so on. Inasmuch as it '^rejects." What else can that 
mean than ^^ so far as it denies " ? As a matter of fact only 
these negations can, according to this new and extraordinary 
use of language, be called affirmations ! Tet this would really 
mean, and particularly when it is said that the proposition A is 
B is often such a negation (cf. the expressions just quoted), that 
the use of language would be reduced to a confusion quite unne- 
cessary and altogether unendurable. 

Not only is the affirmation — as set forth — ^according to Sigwart 
really a negation but also, paradoxical as it may seem, the nega- 
tion, on close consideration, proves to be a positive judgment. 
It is true, Sigwart protests against those who, like Hobbes, would 
regard all negatives as affirmative judgments with negati^^e 
predicates. But, following Sigwart, if this is not so, then these 
must be affirmative judgments with affirmative predicates, 
since he teaches that the subject is in every cfiise a judgment, 
the predicate being the notion of invalidity*. On p. 160 he says 
in the note the negation does away with a supposition, denies 
the validity, and this expression, considered in itself, might be 
taken to mean that Sigwart assumes here a special function of 
denial (absprechen) the contrary of that of affirmation (zu- 
sprechen). But no ; a negative copula (cf. p. 153) according 
to him there is not. 

Now what in the world is one to understand by " denial "- 
(absprechen) ? Does it mean the simple suppression (Aufho- 
renlassen) of the positive judgment upon the given subject matter, 
that is, according to Sigwart, the falUng away of the feeling of 
compulsion previously given in a connexion between ideas ? 
This is impossible, since the removal of this would bring about 
a condition in which the connexion of ideas remains, without 
being either affirmed or denied. How often does something 
of which we were previously certain become uncertain without 



our on this account denying it. What then is this denying i 
May we perhaps say that according to Sigwart it is a feeling 
oneself compelled (sich-genotigt-fuhlen) to annul, whereas affirm- 
ing is a feeling oneself compelled to posit? We should then 
have to say that all the while we are passing a negative judgment, 
we are in reality always seeking to pass a positive judgment, 
but that we experience a hindrance in so doing. The same 
consciousness, however, is felt by one who is clearly aware of 
the entire absence of a positive ground. For how can any one 
succeed in believing anything which he at the same time holds 
to be entirely ungrounded ? Of no one, especially if Sigwart's 
definition of the judgment be applied as the standard, is this 
comceivable ; that is to say, every one in such a case will expe- 
rience failure in such an attempt. Accordingly there is, as yet, 
no negative judgment. If then the rejection does not signify 
a negative copula it must manifestly be regarded as an instance 
of the affirmation of the predicate " false," or (to use Sigwart's 
term) as its '^ identification " with the judgment which in this 
case should be the subject. This ^' false " also cannot simply 
mean '* untrue," for I can assert *' untrue " of thousands of 
things with regard to which the predicate '' false," which appears 
in certain judgments, would not be in place. If only judgments 
are true, then of everything which is not a judgment the predicate 
'" untrue " must be affirmed, thojigh certainly not on that ac- 
count the predicate " false." " False " must therefore be 
regarded as a positive predicate ; and so from Sigwart's point 
of view absolutely false in principle, certain as it is that the 
merely not being convinced (nicht-iiberzeugt-sein) is no denial, 
it is equally certain that we have actually no choice ; we should 
be compelled to regard every negative judgment as a positive 
judgment with a positive predicate. So we arrive at a second 
and greater pai!adox. 

But here a third factor enters which completes the confusion. 
If we examine Sigwart's view as to the nature of judgment in 
general, it may be shown in the clearest manner possible that 
the simple positive judgment itself involves in turn, a negative 
judgment. That is to say, following Sigwart, every judgment 
involves besides a certain combination of ideas, a consciousness 



of the necessity of our ^' identification " (unseies Einssetzens) 
and the impossibility of its contradictory (cf. espec. p. 102), 
the consciousness, moreover, of such a necessity and impossibility 
valid for all thinking beings (cf . pp. 102 and 107), which, by the 
way, is of course quite as false as Sigwart's whole view of the 
nature of judgment in general. All judgments without exception 
are, on account of this peculiarity, called by Sigwart apodictic ; 
nor will he admit the validity of any distinction between the 
assertorical and apodictic forms of judgment (cf. p. 229 seq.). 
I now ask : Have we not here a negative judgment distinctly 
involved ? Otherwise what meaning can be given to the state- 
ment when we hear Sigwart speak of a '' consciousness of the 
impossibility of the contradictory." Further I have already 
shown in my Psychology how all universal judgments are nega- 
tive, since to be conscious of universality means nothing else 
than to be convinced that there exists no exception ; if this 
negative be not added, the most extenuve list of positive asser- 
tions will never constitute a belief in universality. When 
therefore, a consciousness that every one must so think is here 
spoken of, there is in this fact a further proof of what I have 
asserted, namely that according to Sigwart's doctrine of judg- 
ment the simplest positive acts of judgment must involve a 
negative act of judgment. And yet we are called upon at the 
same time to believe that the negative judgment, as set forth 
(p. 169 seq.), arose relatively late, and that therefore on this, as 
well as on other grounds, it is unworthy of being placed side by 
side, with the positive judgment as a species equally primordial ! 
Sigwart would surely not have expected this of us had he been 
conscious of all that I have here set forth in detail, and which is 
the more clearly seen to be involved in his exposition, often so 
difficult to comprehend the more carefully it is submitted to 
reflection. Of course expressions may be found where Sigwart, 
respecting this or that point of detail, asserts the contrary of 
what is here deduced ; for what else can be expected where 
everything is left in such ambiguity, and where the attempt 
to make things clear exhibits the most manifold contradictions ? 
3. Finally, we have still to show the genesis of the error in 
which this able logician has involved himself in a relatively 

65 F 


simple question after having once mistaken the natnre of the 
judgment. The proton pseudos is to be sought in a delusion 
which has come down to us from the older logic that to the essence 
of the judgment there belongs the relation of two ideas with one 
another. Aristotle has described this relation as combination 
and separation {crwdeai^ /cal hiaCpeaL^i) although he was 
well aware of the imperfect propriety of the expressions, adding 
at the same time that in a certain sense both relations might 
be described as a combination (crvvdeai^^ cf. de Anima, iii. 
6). Scholastic and modem logic held fast to the expres- 
sions " combination " and " separation " ; in grammar, however, 
both these relations were termed " combination," and the symbol 
for this combination the " copula." Sigwart now takes seriously 
the expressions " combination " and " separation," and so a 
negative copula seems to him a contradiction (cf. p. 153), the 
positive judgment, on the other hand, appears to be a pre- 
supposition of the negative judgment, since, before a combination 
has been set up, it cannot be separated. And so it appears to 
him that a negative judgment without a preceding positive 
judgment is quite meaningless (cf. p. 150 and above). Conse- 
quently we find this celebrated inquirer in a position which 
compels him to put forth the most strenuous efforts all to no 
purpose — the negative judgment remains inexplicable. 

In a note (p. 159) he gives us, as a result of such attempts, a 
remarkable description of the process by which we arrive at the 
negative judgment— a result in which he believes himself finally 
able to rest satisfied. In this account the false steps which he 
successively makes become, each in turn, evident to the attentive 
observer. Long before the point is reached where he believes 
himself to have come upon the negative judgment, he has as a 
matter of fact already anticipated it. 

He sets out with the correct observation that the first judg- 
ments which we make are all positive in character. These 
judgments are evident and made with full confidence. " Now, 
however," he continues, "our thought goes out beyond the 
given ; by the aid of recollections and associations, judgments 
arise which are at first also formed in the belief that they express 
reality " (which means, according to other expressions of Sigwart, 



that the ideas are combined with the consciousness of objective 
validity ; for this (xiv. p. 98) belongs to the essence of the 
judgment) " as, for example, when we expect to find something 
with which we are acquainted in its usual place or pre-suppose 
respecting a flower that it smells. Now, however, a part of what 
is thus supposed contradicts our immediate knowledge." (We 
leave Sigwart to show here how we are able to recognize anything 
as " contradictory " when we are not as yet in possession of 
negative judgments and negative notions. The difficulty 
becomes still more sharply apparent as he proceeds : ) *' when 
we do nM find what we expected, we become conscious of the 
difference between what exists merely in idea and what is real." 
(What does " not find " mean here ? I had not found it pre- 
viously ; obviously I now find that what was erroneously sup- 
posed to be associated with another object is without it, and this 
I can only do by recognizing the one and denying the other, 
i.e. recognize it as nx)t being with it. Further what is meant 
here by " difference " ? To recognize difference means to recog- 
nize that of two things the one is not the other. What is meant 
by existing " merely in idea " ? Manifestly, " what exists in 
idea which is not at the same time also real." It would seem, 
however, that Sigwart is stiU unaware that in what he is describing 
the negative fuSon of the judgment is already more than one: 
involved. He continues :) " That of which we are immediately 
certain is another than that " (i.e. it is not the same, it is indeed 
absolutely incompatible with that) " which we have judged in 
anticipation, and now" (i.e. after and since we have already 
passed all these negative judgments) ''appears the negation which 
annuls the supposition and denies of it validity. And here a 
new attitude is involved in so far as the subjective combination is 
separated from the consciousness of certainty. The subjective 
combination is compared with one bearing the stamp of certainty, 
its distinction therefrom recognized, and out of this arises the 
notion of invalidity." This last would almost seem to be a 
carelessness of expression, for if invalid were to mean as much 
as " false " and not " uncertain " it could not be derived from 
the distinction between a combination with and a combination 
without certainty, but only from the opposition existing between 



a combination which is denied and one which is affirmed. As 
a matter of fact, the opposite affirmative judgment is not 
at all necessary to it. The opposition, the incompatibility 
of the qualities in a real, is already evident on the ground of 
the combination of ideas representing the opposite qualities 
which, as I repeat once more, cannot, according to Sigwart 
himself (p. 89 note ; and p. 98 seq.), be called an attempt at 
positive judgment. Although this may now and again happen 
in the case of contradictory ideas, it certainly does not happen 
always. If, for example, the question is put to me : Does there 
exist a regular chiliagon with 1001 sides ? then — assuming that 
I am not perfectly clear in my own mind, as will be the case with 
most men, that there does exist a regular chiliagon, I certainly 
do not attempt to form a judgment (i.e. according to Sigwart, 
conj&dently assume) that there exists a regular chiliagon having 
1001 sides before forming the negative judgment that no such 
figure exists on the ground of the opposition between the 

Sigwart himself, as his language frequently betrays (cf. e.g. 
pp. 152 and 150) recognizes at bottom, as he is bound to recog- 
nize, in spite of his attack upon the negative copula, that nega- 
tion and denial are just as much a special function of the judg- 
ment as affirmation and recognition. If this be granted, then 
the range of their application is by no means so limited as he 
erroneously asserts. It is false that in every case where a 
denial takes place the predicate denied is the notion '' valid." 
Even of a judgment we may deny now its validity, now its 
certainty, now its H priori character. And just in the same way 
the subject of the judgment can change most frequently. Of 
a judgment we may deny certainty, and validity ; of a request, 
modesty ; and so in every case, universally expressed, we may 
deny B of A. Sigwart himself, of course, does this just like 
any one eke. Indeed he sometimes speaks unintentionally 
&r more correctly than his theory would admit, and witnesses, 
as it were, instinctively to the truth ; as, e.g. p. 151, where he 
declares not — as he elsewhere teaches — that the subject of a 
negative proposition is always a judgment, and its predicate 
the term " valid," but '^ that of every subject ... a counUess 



number of predicaies may be denied" This is certainly true and 
just on this account the old doctrine holds that affirmation and 
denial are equally primordial species. 

24 {p. 16). The discovery that every act of love is a " pleas- 
ing," every act of hate a " displeasing," was very near to Des- 
cartes when he wrote his valuable little work on The Affections. 
In the second book, Des Passions^ ii. art. 139, he says : " Lorsque 
les choses qu'elles (Famour et la haine) nous portent a aimer 
sont veritablement bonnes, et celles qu'elles nous portent a hair, 
sont veritablement mauvaises, Tamour est incomparablement 
meilleure que la haine ; elle ne saurait etre trop grande et elle 
ne manque jamais de produire la joie " ; and this agrees with 
what he says a little later : '' La haine, au contraire ne saurait 
§tre si petite qu'elle ne nuise, et elle n'est jamais sans tristesse." 

In ordinary life, however, the expressions " joy " and " sad- 
ness," " pleasure " and " pain " are only used when the pleasure 
and displeasure have attained a certain degree of Uveliness. A 
sharp boundary in this unscientific division there is not ; we 
may, however, be allowed to make use of it as it stands. It is 
enough that the expressions, " pleasure " and " displeasure " 
are not narrowed down by any such limit. 

25 (p. 16). The expressions " true " and " false " are em- 
ployed in a manifold sense ; in one sense we employ them in 
speaking of true and false judgments ; again (somewhat modify- 
ing the meaning), of objects, as when we say, " a true friend," 
" false money." I need scarcely observe that where I use the 
expressions " true " and " false " in this lecture, I associate 
therewith not the first and proper meaning, but rather a meta- 
phorical one having reference to objects. True, is, therefore, 
what is ; false, what is not. Just as Aristotle spoke of '' ov cb? 
oKviOi^ " so we might also say, " oKr^dh «9 oi/." 

Of truth in its proper sense it has often been said that it is 
the agreement of the judgment with the object (adequatio rei 
et intellectus, as the scholastics said). This expression, true in 
a certain sense, is yet in the highest degree open to misunder- 
standing, and has led to serious errors. The agreement is re- 
garded as a kind of identity between something contained in 
the judgment, or in the idea lying at the root of the judgment 



and eomething situated without the mind. But this cannot be 
the meaning here ; '' to agree " means here rather as much 
as " to be appropriate," " to be in harmony with," " suit," 
"correspond." It is as though in the sphere of feeling one 
should say, the rightness of love and hate consists in the agree- 
ment of the feelings with the object. Properly understood this 
also would be unquestionably right ; whoever loves and hates 
rightiiy, has his feehngs adequately related to the object, i.e. 
the relation is appropriate, suitable, corresponds suitably, 
whereas it would be manifestly absurd were one to beheve that 
in a rightly directed love or hate there was found to be an iden- 
tity between these feelings or the ideas lying at their root on the 
one hand, and something lying outside the feelings on the other, 
an identity which is absent where the attitude of the feelings 
is unrightly directed. Among other circumstances this mis- 
understanding has also conduced towards bringing the doctrine 
of judgment into that sad confusion from which to-day psy- 
chology and logic seek with such painful efforts to set themselves 

The conceptions of existence and non-existence are the cor- 
relates of the conceptions of the truth of the (simple) affirmative 
and negative judgments. Just as to judgment belongs what is 
judged, to the affirmative judgment what is judged of affirma- 
tively, to the negative judgment, what is judged of negatively, 
so to the rightness of the affirmative judgment belongs the exist- 
ence of what is judged of affirmatively, to the rightness of the 
negative judgment the non-existence of what is judged of nega- 
tively ; and whether I say an affirmative judgment is true, or, 
its object is existent ; whether I say a negative judgment is 
true, or its object is non-existent ; in both cases I am sajring 
one and the same thing. In the same way, it is essentiaUy one 
and the same logical principle whether I say, in each case either 
the (simple) affirmative or negative judgment is true, or, each 
is either existent or non-existent. 

Thus, for example, the assertion of the truth of the judgment, 
" a man is learned," is the correlate of the assertion of the 
existence of the object, " a learned man " ; and the assertion 
of the truth of the judgment, " no stone is ahve," is the correlate 



of the assertion of the non-existence of its object, " a living stone." 
The correlative assertions are here, as everywhere, inseparable. 
The case is exactly the same as in the assertions A > B and that 
B < A ; that A is the cause of B, and that B is produced by A. 

.26 (p. 16). The notion of the good, in and for itself, is 
accordingly a unity in the strict sense, and not, as Aristotle 
teaches (in consequence of a confusion which we shall have to 
speak of later) a unity in a merely analogous sense. German 
philosophers also have failed to grasp the unity of the concep- 
tion. This is the case with Kant, and, quite recently, with 
Windelband. There is a defect in our ordinary way of speaking 
which may prove very misleading to Germans inasmuch as for 
the opposite of the term " good " there is no common expression 
current, but this is designated now as " schlinam," now as " libel," 
now as " bose," now as " arg," now as " abscheulich," now as 
" schlecht," etc. It might very well, as in similar cases, come 
to be thought that not only the common name is wanting, but 
also the common notion. And if the notion is wanting on the 
one side of the antithesis, it would also be wanting on the other, 
and so the expression " good " would seem an equivocal term. 

Of all the expressions quoted, it seems to me (and philologists 
also, whose advice I have asked, are of the same opinion), that 
the expression " schlecht," hke the Latin " malum," is most 
applicable as the opposite of the good in its full universality, 
and in this way I shall allow myself to use this expression in 
what follows. 

The fact that I adhere to the view of a certain common char- 
acter regarding the intentional relation of love and hate does 
not debar my recognizing along with this view, special forms 
for particular cases. If, therefore, " bad " is a truly universal 
simple class conception, there may yet be distinguished special 
classes within its domain of which one may be suitably termed 
" bose," another ** iibel," etc. 

27 (p. 18). The distinction between "self-evident" and 
" blind " judgments is something too striking to have altogether 
escaped notice. Even the sceptical Hume is very far from 
denying the distinction. Self-evidence, accordii^ to him {Enq. 



concerning Hum, UndersL iv.) may be ascribed, on the one hand, 
to a,^alyiic judgments (to which class belong also the axioms of 
mathematics and the mathematical demonstrations), and, on 
the other hand, to certain impressions, but not to the so-called 
truths of experience. Reason does not lead us here, but rather 
habit, after a manner entirely irrational ; belief, in this case is 
instinctive and mechanical {ib, v.). 

But to observe a fact does not mean to set forth its nature 
clearly and distinctly. As the nature of the judgment has, 
until recent times, been almost universally misunderstood, bow 
could it be possible rightly to understand its self -evidence ? It 
is just here that even Descartes' discernment fails him. How 
very closely the phenomenon occupied him a passage in the 
Meditations bears witness : '^ Cum hie dico me ita doctum esse 
a natura (he is speaking of the so-called external impressions) 
inteUigo tantum spontanea quodam impetu me ferri ad hoc 
credendum non lumine aliquo naturali mihi ostendi esse verom, 
quae duo multum discrepant. Nam quaecunque lumine natu- 
rali mihi ostenduntur (ut quod ex eo quo dubitem sequatur me 
esse et simiUa) nullo modo dubia esse possunt quia nulla alia 
facultas esse potest, cui aeque fidam ac lumini isti, quaeque ilia 
non vera esse possit docere ; sed quantum ad impetus naturales 
jam saepe olim judicavi me ab illis in deteriorem partem fuisse 
impulsum cum de bono ehgendo ageretur, nee video cur iisdem 
in uUa alia re magis fidam."— (Medit. iii.). 

That Descartes did not mark the fact of self-evidence> that he 
did not observe the distinction between intuition and blind 
judgment certainly cannot be affirmed from the above. But, 
while separating the judgment as a class from the idea, he still 
leaves behind in the class of ideas the character of self -evidence 
which distinguishes the judgments of intuition. It consists, 
according to him, in a special mark of the perception, that is, 
of the idea lying at the root of the judgment. Descartes even 
goes so far as actually to call this act of perception a " cogno- 
scere," a " knowing." A " knowing," that is, and still not an 
act of judgment ! These are rudimentary organs which after 
the progress made, owing to Descartes, in the doctrine of judg- 
ment, remind us of a stage of life in Psychology which has been 



suimoanted ; but with this distinction, in opposition to similat 
phenomena in the history of the development of the species, 
that these organs, in no way adapted, become ip. the highest 
degree troublesome, and render all Descartes' further efforts 
for the theory of knowledge ineSectiye. He remains, to use 
Leibnitz' phrase, " in the antechamber of truth " (cf. here note 
28, towards the end). Only in this way does Descartes' clara 
et distincta perceptio — concerning which term itself it is so diffi- 
cult to gain a clear and distinct idea — in its curious dual nature 
become perfectly intelligible. The only means of overcoming 
this confusion is to seek that which distinguishes insight in oppo- 
sition to other judgments as an inner quality belonging to the 
act of insight itself. 

It is true that some who have sought here have yet failed to 
find. We saw (cf. note 23) how Sigwart conceives the nature 
of the judgment. To this, he teaches, there belongs a relation 
of ideas to one another, and along with this a feeling of obliga^ 
tion respecting this connexion. (Cf. sections 14 and 31, espec. 4 
and 5.) Such a feeling therefore, always exists even in the case 
of the blindest prejudice. It is then abnormal, but is held (as 
Sigwart expressly explains) to be normal and" of universal 
validity. And what now in contrast to this case, is given in the 
case of insight ? Sigwart replies that its evidence consists in 
the same feeling (cf. e.g. section 3) which now, however, is not 
merely held to be normal and universally valid, but is really 
normal and universally valid. 

It seems to me that the weakness of this theory is at once 
apparent ; and it is on many grounds to be rejected. 

1. The peculiar nature of insight, the clearness and evidence ' 
of certain judgments from which their truth is inseparable 
has little or nothing to do with any feeling of compulsion. It. 
may well happen that at a given moment I cannot refrain from' 
so judging, yet none the less the essence of its clearness does 
not consist in the feeling of compulsion, and no consciousness 
of an obligation so to judge could, as such, afford security as 
to its truth. He who disbelieves in every form of indeterminism 
in respect of judging, regards all judgments under the circum- 
stances in which they were passed as necessary, but he does not 



—and with indisputable right — ^regard all of them as on that 
account true. 

2. Sigwart, in seeking the consciousness of insight in a feeling 
of necessity so to think, asserts that the consciousness of one's 
being compelled is, at the same time, a consciousness of a neces- 
sity for all thinking beings whenever the same grounds are 
present. If he means, however, that the one conviction is 
doubtless connected with the other, this is an error. Why, 
when a person feels bound to pass a judgment upon certain 
data, should the same compulsion hold good in respect of every 
other thinking being to whom the same data are also given ? 
It is obvious that only an appeal to the law of causality which, 
under like conditions demands like results, cocdd be the ground 
of the logical connexion. Its application, however, to the 
present case would be entirely erroneous, since this would involve 
the ignoring of the special psychical dispositions, which, although 
they do not directly enter into consciousness at all, must yet 
be regarded, along with the conscious data, as pre-determining 
conditions, and these are very different in the case of different 
persons. Hegel and his school, misled by paralogisms, have 
denied the principle of contradiction ; Trendelenburg, who op- 
posed Hegel, has at least restricted its validity (cf. his Ahhani- 
lungen fiber Herbarts Metaphysik). The universal impossibility 
of inwardly denying the principle which Aristotle asserted 
cannot therefore, to-day, be any longer defended ; Aristotle 
himself, however, for whom the principle was self-evident, 
assuredly found its denial impossible. 

Whatever is evident to any one is of course certain not only 
for him, but also for every one else who, in the same way, sees 
its evidence. The judgment, moreover, which is seen to be 
evident by any one has also universal validity, i.e. the contra- 
dictory of what is seen to be evident by one person, cannot be 
seen to be evident by another person, and every one who believes 
in its contradictory is in error. Further, since what is here said 
belongs to the essence of truth, whoever has evidence of the 
truth of anything may pierceive that he is justified in regarding 
it as true for all. But he would be guilty of a flagrant con- 
fusion of ideas who should regard such a consciousness that a 



truth is true for all, as equivalent to a consciousKesB of a uniyersal 
necessity of thinking. 

3. Sigwart involves himself in a multitude of contradictions. 
He asserts and must assert-if he is not to yield to the sceptick 
and rdinquish his entife logical S3rstem — that evident judgments 
are not merely different from non-evident judgments, but that 
they are also distinmiishable in consciousness. The one class 
mJt tk»»f<»e .ppT^ no™.! »d of ™u™™l validity, tt. 
other class as not so. But if evident and non-evident judgments 
ahke carry with them the consciousness of universal validity, 
then the two classes would at first sight exactly agree in the 
manner in which they present themselves, and only as it were, 
afterwards (or at the same time, though as a mere concomitant), 
and by reflection upon some sort of criterion which is applied 
to them as a standard could the distinction be discovered. And 
passages are actually to be found in Sigwart where he speaks 
of a consciousness of agreement with the universal rules which 
accompany the fully evident judgment. (Of. e.g. Logicy 2nd ed., 
39, p. 311.) But apart from the fact that this contradicts ex- 
perience — for long before the discovery of the syllogism, con- 
clusions were reached syllogistically and with complete evidence 
— ^it is also to be -rejected inasmuch as, seeing that the rule 
itself must be assured, it would lead either to an infinite regress, 
or to a circulus vUiosus, 

4. Another contradiction with which I have to charge Sig- 
wart (though in my opinion it might have been avoided even 
after his erroneous view as to the nature of the judgment and 
as to the nature of self-evidence), we meet with in his doctrine 
of self-consciousness. The knowledge that I am contains ovdy 
self-evidence, and this exists independent of any consciousness 
of an obUgation so to think and of a necessity which is common 
to all alike. (At least I am not able otherwise to understand 
the passage. Logic, 2nd ed., p. 310 : " The certainty that I am 
and think is the absolutely last and fundamental one — the con- 
dition of all thinking and certainty at all ; here, only inunediate 
evidence can be given ; one cannot even say that this thought 
is necessary, since it is previous to all necessity, and just as 
immediate and evident is the conscious certainty that I think 




iMs or tiiat ; it is inextricably interwoven with my seU-con- 
scioosness ; the one is given with the other/') After Sigwart's 
doctrine abeady examined, this would appear to be a contradictio 
in adjecto and, as such, quite indefensible. 

5. Further contradictions appear in Sigwart's very peculiar 
and doubtful doctrine concerning the postulates, which he op- 
poses to the axioms. The latter are to be regarded as certain 
on the ground of their real intellectual necessity ; the former, 
not on the ground of purely intellectual motives, but on psycho- 
logical motives of another kind, on the ground of practical needs. 
(Logic, 2nd ed. p. 412 seq.) The law of causahty : e.g. is, accord- 
ing to him, not an axiom, but a mere postulate ; we regard it as 
certain, since we find that without affirming it we should not 
be able to investigate nature. Sigwart, by this mode of accepting 
the law of causahty, that is, affirming, out of mere good-will, 
that in nature under like conditions, the same results would 
constantly be forthcoming, manifestly takes it for granted 
without being conscious of its intellectual necessity. But, if all 
'^ taking-as-true " (Fiirwahrhalten) is an act of judgment, this 
is quite incompatible with his views as to the nature of the 
judgment. Sigwart has here, as far as I can see, but one way 
of escape, i.e. to confess that he does not believe in what, as a 
postulate, he accepts as certain (as e.g. the law of causality) ; 
then, however, he will be hardly serious in hoping for it. 

6. This point becomes still more doubtful on reflection upon 
what (2) has been previously discussed. The consciousness of 
a universal necessity of thought does not, according to Sigwart, 
belong to the postulates, but rather to the axioms. (Cf. 6.) 
But Sigwart could only with any plausibility exhibit the con- 
sciousness of this universal necessity of thinking as operating 
in the consciousness of one's personal necessity of thinking by 
making use of the universal law of causatioi^. But this causal 
law is itself merely a postulate ; it is destitute of self-evidence. 
It is therefore obvious that the universal thought-necessity in 
the case of the axioms is also a postulate, and consequently they 
lose what, according to Sigwart, is their most essential distinc- 
tion from the postulates. It may perhaps be in accordance 
with this that Sigwart calls the belief in the trustworthiness of 



" self-evidence " a postulate. But how the statement so inter- 
preted, can be brought into hannony with the remaining parts 
of his doctrine I am at a loss to conceive. 

7. Sigwart denies (31) the distinction between assertorical 
and apodictic judgments, since in every judgment the sense of 
necessity in respect of its function is essential. Consequently 
this assertion likewise hangs together with his erroneous funda- 
mental view of the judgment ; he would appear to identify the 
feeling which he sometimes calls the feeling of evidence with the 
apodictic character of a judgment. But it would be quite un- 
justifiable to overlook the modal peculiarity of certain judgments, 
as for example, the law of contradiction in distinction from other 
forms of judgment like that of the consciousness that I am. 
In the first instance, we have to do with what is "necessarily true 
or false," in the second instance only with what is " true or false 
as a matter of fact," though both are in the same sense evident 
and do not differ in respect of their certainty. Only in the case 
of judgments like the former, not, however, from such as the 
latter do we draw the notions of impossibiUty and necessity. 

That Sigwart, in opposing the view which regards the apo- 
dictic judgment as a special class, also occasionally bears witness 
against himself is clear from what has been already said (4). 
The knowledge that I am, he calls, in opposition to the know- 
ledge of an axiom, the knowledge of a simple actual truth (p. 312). 
Here he speaks more soundly than his general statements would 
really allow. 

Sigwart's theory of self-evidence is, therefore, essentially false. 
As in the case of Descartes, so here it cannot be said that Sigwart 
was not conscious of the phenomenon ; indeed, we must rather 
say in his praise, that with the greatest zeal he has sought to 
analyze it, but as is the case with many in psychological analysis, 
it would seem that in the eagerness of analyzing he did not stop 
at the right point, and has sought to resolve into one another 
phenomena very distinct in nature. 

It is obvious that an error respecting the nature of evidence 
is fraught with the gravest consequence for the logician. It might 
well be said that we have here touched upon the deep-seated 
organic disease in Sigwart's logic, if this may not rather be said 



to consist in a misunderstanding of the nature of the judgment 
in general. Again and again its evil results become manifest, 
as for example, in Sigwart's inabUity to understand the most 
essential causes of our errors, Cf. Logic, vol. i. 2nd ed. p. 103, 
note, where, with strange partiality he assigns the chief blame 
to the defective development of our language. 

For the rest, many another celebrated logician in recent times 
can claim no superiority over Sigwart here. As a further 
example we need only observe how the doctrine of evidence 
fares at the hands of the admirable J. S. Mill. Cf. note 69, p. 99. 

Owing to the great unclearness as to the nature of evidence, 
almost universal, it becomes conceivable why, as often happens, 
we meet with the expression " more or less self-evident." Even 
Descartes and Pascal use such expressions, although it is clearly 
quite unsuitable. Whatever is self-evident is certain, and cer- 
tainty in the real sense knows no distinctions of degree. Even 
quite recently we find the opinion expressed in the Viertdjahrs- 
schrift fiir wissenschafitiche Philosophie (and the writer is mani- 
festly quite serious), that there exist sdf-evident suppositUms 
which, in spite of their self-evidence, may quite well be false. 
It is unnecessary to add that I hold this to be opposed to reason. 
I may here, however, express regret that lectures delivered by 
me at a time when I still regarded degrees of conviction as inten- 
sities of judgment, seem to have given an occasion for such 

28 (p. 19). Cf. Hume's Essay, already cited : An Enquiry 
concerning the Principles of Morals. Other philosophers, who 
have placed the foundation of ethics in the feelings, as e.g. 
Beneke and Uberweg (who follows him) have seen further than 
Hume here. (Cf . the presentation of Beneke's ethics in his Orund- 
riss der Oeschichte der Philosophie, iii.) Herbart comes still nearer 
to the truth when he speaks of self-evident judgments of taste 
(these, however, are really not judgments at all, but feelings, 
and as such are not self-evident, but can only be said to have 
something analogous to self-evident judgments) and when he 
further opposes to the merely pleasurable the beautiful, ascrib- 
ing to the latter as distinct from the former, universal validity 



aud und^able worth. Unfortunately, there is alwajrs some- 
thing false mixed up with his view, and Herbart loses at once 
and for ever the right path, so that his ethics in its course di- 
verges much further from the truth than the doctrine of Hume. 

Those thinkers who have completely overlooked the distinc- 
tion between pleasure with the character of rightness and 
pleasure which is not so qualified, are in danger of falling into 
opposite errors. The one class view the matter as though all 
pleasure had the character of rightness, the other class as though 
no pleasure were so qualified. By the one class the notion of 
the good as that which rightly pleases, is entirely given up ; 
" worthy of desire " (begehrenswert) in distinction from " desir- 
able "'(begehrbar), is an unmeaning expression. For the other 
class, ^' worthy of desire " (begehrenswert) remains as a separate 
notion, so that there is no tautology in their saying nothing is 
in itself desirable except in so far as it is in itself worthy of 
desire, is good in itself. Manifestly they must, to be consistent, 
assert this, and this they have really taught. The extreme 
hedonists all belong to this class ; but, along ¥dth them, many 
others ; in the Middle Ages, for example, the teaching is found 
in Thomas Aquinas, whose greatness receives fresh appreciation 
from Ihering (cf. Summ. theol. l.a. qu. 80, qu. 82, art. 2 ad. 1, 

But even then such a view cannot be maintained in the light 
of the facts without exposing the nature of good and bad to a 
falsification which involves a form of subjectivism similar to 
that formerly committed by Protagoras respecting the notions 
of truth and falsehood. Just as, according to this subjectivist 
in the sphere of the judgment, man is the measure of all things, 
and often what is true for one, may at the same time be false 
for another — so the advocates of the view that only the good 
can be loved, only the bad hated, are really compelled to assimie 
that, in this sphere, each is himself the measure of all things ; 
for the good, in that it is good ; for the bad, that it is bad ; 
so that often something is, in itself and at the same time, both 
good and bad : good in itself, in the case of all who love it for 
its own sake ; bad in itself, in the case of all who hate it for 
its own sake. This is absurd, and the subjectivistic falsification 





of the notion of the good is to be rejected equally with the sab- 
jectivistio falsification of the notions of truth and existence by 
Protagoras, but with this difference : that the subjectivistic 
error in the sphere of what is rightly pleasing and cUspleasing 
takes root more easily and infects most ethical sjrstems even 
to-day. Some, as recently, Sigwart (Vorfragen der Ethik, p. 6), 
confess it openly ; others fall into this error without themselves 
becoming clearly conscious of the subjectivistic character of 

their view.* 


* Those especially who teach that generally speaking the knowledge, 
pleasure, and perfection of each individual is, for him, good, their opposites 
bad, and that all else is in itself indifferent, will perhaps protest against 
my classing them among the subjectivists. It might even seem on a super- 
ficial survey, that they have set up a doctrine of fiie good equally valid for 
all. But on a more careful examination we find that this teaching does not 
even in a single instance, hold one and the same object to be good uni- 
versally. For example, my own knowledge is, accor(Mng to this view, for 
me worthy of love ; for every one else indifferent in itself, while the know- 
ledge of another individual is in itself for me indifferent. It is curious to 
observe theistic thinkers, as often happens, setting up a subjectivistic view 
respecting ihe good, valid of all mortal loving and willing, while, at the 
same time assuming that God, without respect of person, estimates every 
perfection by a kind of objective standard. This exception with regard to 
the loving and willing of God and the notion of Him as eternal Judge is then 
meant to render harmless in respect of its practical consequences, the egoism 
which such a principle implies. 

Of the celebrated controversy between Bossuet and Fenelon it may be 
laid that the great bishop of Meaux advocated a kind of subjectivism. 
Fenelon's theses, though he advocated a system of morality neither ignoble 
nor unchristian, were finally condemned by the Church of Rome, though it 
did not go so far as to reject his teaching as hereticaL Otherwise one would 
really be compelled to condemn also those fine glowii^ lines attributed by 
many to St. llieresa, that in a very imperfect Latin translation have found 
their way into many Catholic prayer-books which is much more than their 
escaping the ecclesiastical censor. I give them translated directly from 
the Spanish : — 

Nicht Hoffnimg auf des Himmels sel'ge Freuden 
Hat Dir, mein Gott, zum Dienste mich verbxmden, 
Nicht Furcht, die ich vor ew'gem Graus empfunden. 
Hat mich bewegt der Siinder Pfad zu meiden. 

Du Herr bewegst mich, mich bewegt Dein Leiden, 
Dein Anblick in den letzten, bangen Stunden, 
Der Geisseln Wuth, Dein Haupt von Dom umwimden, 
Dein schweres Kreuz und — ach ! — Dein bittres Scheiden. 

Herr, Du bewegest mich mU solchem Triebe, 
Das ich Dick lieUe, wOr' kein Himmd off en, 
Dich fUrchtete, wenn avch kein Ahgrund schrechU ; 



Whoever, as I have said, has once accepted the view that 
nothing can please except in so far as it is really good, nothing dis- ^' 
please, except in so far as it is really bad, is on a way which, if 
consistently followed, most lead him to subjectivism. This is 
evident as soon as it is admitted (and at first sight, it is true, 
it may be denied) that opposite tastes, here desire, theie dislike, 
may be associated with the same sense phenomenon. One 
might, in defence, argue that here, in spite of the similarity of 
the eitemal stimulus the corresponding subjective idea may 
have an essentially different content. But such a view refutes 
itself in those cases where we ourselves repeatedly experience 
the same phenomenon, and, in consequence of a further develop- 
ment in age or by reason of a changed habit (cf. text 25, p. 16) 
thereby experience a different feeling, dislike for desire, or defdre 
for dislike. There remains, then, no doubt that as a fact the 
feelings may take an opposed attitude towards the same phe- 
nomenon ; and again, in the case where ideas instinctively 
repel us, while at the same time arousing within us a pleasure 

NicJUe kannet Du geben, uxu mir Liebe wechte; 
Denn wii/rd^ ich avch nichi, wie ich hoffe, hoffen, 
Ich wiirde detmoch lieben, wie ich liebe" 

The teaching of Thomas Aquinas has often been so represented as though 
it were pure subjectiyisin. It is true that much of hia teaching sounds 
quite subjectivistic (cf. e.g. Summ. theoL la. q. 80, art. 1, espedally the 
objections and replies as well as the passages in which he declares that the 
happiness of each is the highest and final end, asserting even of the saints 
in heaven that each rightly desires more his own blessedness than the bles- 
sedness of all others). Along with these, however, are to be found state- 
ments in which he soars above this subjectivistic view as, for example, 
when he declares (as Plato and Aristotle before hut and Descartes and 
Leibnitz after) that everything which exists is good as such, not good 
merely as a means but also — ^a point which pure subjectivists (as recently 
Sigwart, Vorfr. d, Ethik, p. 6) expressly deny — good in itself, and again, when 
he affirms that in case any one — ^an impossible case — ^had at any time to 
choose betwe^i his own eternal ruin and an injury to the Divine love, the 
right course would be to prefer his own eternal unhappiness. 

There the moral feelii^ of western Christendom touches the feeling of 
the heathen Hindu, as is shown in a somewhat strange story of a maiden 
who renounces her own everlasting blessedness for tiie salvation of the rest 
of the world ; as also that of a positivist thinker like Mill when he declares 
sooner than bow in prayer before a being not truly good, -*to hell he will go." 
I knew a Catholic priest who, on account of this utterance of Mill's, voted 
for him at the parliamentary election. 

81 G 


of a higher kind (cf. note 32, p. 92), what has been said is also 
clearly evident. ^ 

Finally, we should expect from one who thinks that every 
act of simple pleasure is right, and that one act never contra- 
dicts another, a similar doctrine in respect of the act of choosing. 
But the reverse is here so obvious that the advocates of this 
view have in striking contrast , always asserted in the most 
definite manner that different individuals have preferences 
opposite in character, and that one is right, the other wrong. 

Glancing back from the disciples of Aristotle in the Middle 
Ages to the master himself, we find his teaching appears to be a 
different one. Aristotle recognizes a right and a wrong kind 
of desire (6p€^v<; 6p0^ xal ovk opOtj) and that what is desired 
(6p€Kr6v) is not always the good. (De Anima, iii. 10.) In 
the same way he affirms in respect of pleasure (1780V17) in the 
Nicomachian Ethics that not every pleasure is good ; there is 
a pleasure in the bad, which is itself bad {Nic. Eth. x. 2). In 
his Metaphysics he distinguishes between a lower and a higher 
kind of desire {iindvfila and fiovXtfai^:) ; whatever is desired 
by the higher kind for its own sake is truly good (Metaiph. A 
7, p. 1072 a. 28). A certain approadh to the right view seems 
already to have been reached here. It is of special interest 
(a point I have only discovered later) that Aristotle has suggested 
an analogy between ethical subjectivism and the logical sub- 
jectivism of Protagoras, and equally repudiates both {Metaph. 
K 6, p. 1062 b. 16, and 1063 a. 5). On the other hand it would 
appear from the lines immediately foUowing as though Aris- 
totle had fallen into the very obvious temptation of believing 
that we can know the good as good, independent of the excita- 
tion of the emotions. (Metaph, 29 ; cf . De Anima, iii. 9 and 

In close connection with this appears to be the passage (Nic. 
Eih. i. 4) where he denies that there is any uniform notion of 
the good (understanding, of course, the good in itself, cf . respect- 
ing this, note 26, p. 77), thinking rather that only by way of 
analogy does there exist a unity in the case of the good of rational 
thinking and seeing, joy, etc., and when, in another passage 
{Metaph, E 4, p. 1027 b. 25), he says that the true and the false 



are not in the things, where the good and the bad are, i.e. the 
former predicates (e.g. true God, false friend) are ascribed to 
the things only in respect of certain mental acts, the true and 
false judgments, while the latter, on the other hand, are not in 
a similar way ascribed to them merely in respect of a certain 
class of mental activities : — all of which, incorrect as it is, is 
still connected as a necessary result with the aforesaid error. 
He is more in agreement with the tnie doctrine of the origin of 
our notion and knowledge of the good, when (Nic. E^ics, x, 2) 
he adduces as an argument against the assumption that joy 
does not belong to the good, the fact that all desire it, and 
adds : " For if only irrational beings desired it, the opposition 
to this argument would still contain a certain justification ; 
but if every rational being also does so, how can anjrthing be 
said against it ? " Yet even this utterance is reconcilable with 
his erroneous view. 

Considered in this aspect, the moralist of sentiment (Gefiihls- 
morahst), Hume, has here the advantage of him, for Hume 
rightly urges, how is any one to recognize that anything is to 
be loved without experiencing the love ? 

I have said that the temptation into which Aristotle has 
fallen appears quite conceivable. It arises from the fact that, 
along with the experience of an emotion qualified as right there 
is given at the same time the knowledge that the object itself 
is good. Thus it may easily happen that the relation is then 
perverted and the love is thought to follow as a consequence 
of the knowledge, and recognized as right by reason of its agree- 
ment with this its rule. / 

It is not without interest to compare the error here made 
by Aristotle in respect of emotion qualified as right with that 
which we have seen was committed by Descartes in respect of 
the similarly qualified judgment (cf. note 27, p.^3^. The cases 
are essentially analogous ; in both cases the distinguishing 
mark is sought in the special character of the idea which forms 
the basis of the act rather than in the act itself quahfied as 
right. In fact it seems to me evident from various passages in 
his treatise Des Passions, that Descartes himself has treated 
the matter in a way quite similar to that of Aristotle, and in a 


^ * 



manner essentially analogous to Us doctrine of the self-evident 

At the present time many approach very near to Descartes' 
error in respect of the marks of self-evidence (if we are not rather 
to say that the error is really implicitly contained in their state- 
ments) when they regard the matter as though in the case of 
every self-evident judgment a criterion were referred to. In 
this case it must have been previously given somewhere, either 
as recognized — and this would lead to infinity — or (and this is 
the only alternative), it is given in the idea. It may be said 
that here also the temptation to such a misconception lies ready 
to hand and this may well have exercised a misleading 
influence upon Descartes. Aristotle's error is less general, 
though only because the phenomenon of the emotion qualified 
as right has, generally speaking, come less frequently under 
consideration than that of the similarly qualified judgment. 

If the nature of the former has been misunderstood, the 
latter has often been so overlooked as not even to admit of its 
essential nature being misinterpreted. 

29 (p. 19). When I affirmed that the language of common 
life offers no suitable terms for activities of feeUng qualified as 
right, I did not mean thereby to deny that certain expressions 
are, in themselves, well suited, indeed they would seem to have 
been created for this purpose, particularly, for example, the 
expressions ^* to be well jdeasing,^^ and ^^ to be HI pleasing " (gut 
gefallen and schlecht gefallen), as distinct from tiie simple '^ to 
be pleasing " and " to be mis-pleasing." Though, however, it 
might seem advisable to limit these terms in this way and ao 
to make them serve as scientific terms, scarcely any trace of 
such a limitation is to be found in ordinary language. One 
does not, of course, care to say : ^' the good pleases him ill," 
^' the bad pleases him well," though one still says that to one 
this tastes good, to another that, and so on, i.e. the expression 
^^to be weU pleasing " is applied unhesitatingly even in the case 
where pleasure is given in the lowest instinctive form. Indeed 
the term-" impression " (Wahrnehmung) has degenerated in an 
almost similar way. Only really appropriate in respect of know- 




ledge, it came to be applied in the case of the so-called external 
impression (aussere Wahmehmung), i.e. in cases of a belief, blind, 
and in its essential relations, erroneous, and consequently would 
require, in order, as a terminus technicus to have scientific ap- 
plication, an important reform of the usual terminology and 
one which would essentially narrow the range of the term. 

20 (p. 19). Metaph.y A 1, p. 980 a. 22. 

31 (p. 20) i.e., ** Als richtig characterisiert." This phrase, 
which occurs frequently, I have translated sometimes as above, 
sometimes by "qualified as right." By this phrase and its 
equivalents is meant that the act (sc. of loving, hating, or pre- 
ferring,) is at once perceived by us to be' a right one, bears 
the mark or character of rightness. 

32 (p, 20). In order to exclude a misunderstanding and 
the doubts necessarily connected therewith, I add the following 
remark to what has been suggested shortly in the text. In 
order that an act of feeling may be called purely good in itself 
it is requisite : (1) that it be right ; (2) that it be an act of pleasing 
and not an act of displeasing. If either condition be absent, 
it is already, in a certain respect, bad in itself ; pleasure at the 
misfortunes of others (Schadenfreude) is bad on the first ground ; 
pain at the sight of injustice, on the second ground* If both 
conditions are lacking, the act is still worse, in accordance with 
the principle of summation of which we shall speak later in the 
lecture. According to this same principle, where a feeling is 
good, its increase increases also the goodness of the act, while, 
similarly, where an act is purely bad, or at least participates 
in any respect in the bad, with the intensity of the feeling 
increases the badness of the act. When the act is a mixed one; 
good and bad manifestly increase, or diminish, in simple pro- 
portion to one another. The " plus " belonging to the one or the 
other side, must therefore, with the increase in intensity of the act 
become ever greater, with its decrease ever smaller. And so 
the surplus of good in the act may, under certain circumstances 
in spite of its impurity, be described as a very great good, while 
conversely, the surplus of the bad may, despite the admixture 
of the good, be described as something very bad (cf. note 36). 

33 (p. 20). It may happen that, at the same time, one and 

86 . 


the same thing is both pleasing and displeasing. First, some- 
thing in itself displeasing may yet be pleasing as a means to 
something else, and vice versa ; then a case may arise where 
something instinctively repels us, while at the same time it is 
loved by us with a higher love. We may thus have an instinc- 
tive repugnance to a sensation, which is yet at the same time 
(and every idea, qua idea, is good), a welcome enrichment of 
our world of ideas. Aristotle has said : *' It happens that de- 
sires enter into conflict with each other. This happens when 
the reason {\6709) and the lower desires (iiridv/Mia) are in 
opposition {De Anima iii. 10). And again : " Now the lower 
desires (iTrtOvfiia) gain a victory over the higher, now the 
higher over the lower, and as '' (according to the ancient astro- 
nomy) " one celestial sphere the other, so one desire draws ofiE 
the other with it when the individual has lost the firm rule over 
himself " {De Anima ii.). 

34 {p. 21). Just as love and hate may be directed towards 
single individuals, so also they may be directed to whole classes. 
This Aristotle has already observed. We are, he thinks, " not 
only angry with the individual thief who has robbed us, and 
with the individual sycophant who deceives our confiding nature, 

• but we hate thieves and sycophants in general " (Rfiet. ii. 4). 
Acts of loving and hating, where in this way there is an under- 

, lying general conception, also possess frequently the character 

'I of rightness. And so quite naturally along with the experience 
of this given act of love or hate, the goodness or badness of the 
entire class becomes manifest at one stroke, and apart from 
every induction from special cases. In this way, for example, 

/ we attain to the general knov^ledge that insight as such is good. 
It is easy to understand how near the temptation lies, in the 
tase of such knowledge of a general truth without any induction 

■ from single cases otherwise demanded in truths of experience, 
entirely to overlook the preparatory experience of a feeling 
having the character of rightness, and to regard the universal 
judgment as an immediate synthetic (t priori form of knowledge. 
Berbart's very remarkable doctrine of a sudden elevation to 
general ethical principles seems to me to point to the fact that 



he had observed something of this peculiar process without 
at the same time becoming quite clear about it. 

35 (p. 21). It is easy to see how important this proposition 
may become for a theodicy. As regards ethics it might be 
feared that its security becomes thereby seriously endangered, 
perhaps, indeed, completely destroyed. To see how unfounded 
such a fear is, cf. note 43. p. 99. 

36 (p. 22). It seems to me evident even from analysis of the 
notion of choice (1) that everything which is good is to be pre- 
ferred, i.e. that in an act of choice it shall faU as a reasonable 
moment into the balance ; (2) that everything bad forms a 
reasonable anti-moment, and therefore also that (3) in such cases 
— ^partly by direct means, partly by an addition in which the 
good and the bad are to be taken into account as quantities 
with opposite signs — ^the preponderance in which right choice 
is to be grounded may become evident, i.e. the preferability or 
superiority of the one as opposed to the other. According to 
this view, it does not, closely examined, require the special 
experience of an act of preference having the character of right- 
ness, but only the experience of simple similarly qualified acts 
of pleasing and displeasing, in order to attain in the above- 
mentioned cases to the knowledge of the bett^r. And therefore 
I have said that we derived our knowledge of preferability, not 
from the fact that our experience has the character of rightness, 
but that the said preferences possess the character of rightness 1. 
because the knowledge of preferabiUty has here been made the 
determining standard. I do not, however, mean to say that 
the same distinguishing character which was previously insisted 
upon in the case of certain simple acts of pleasing is not also 
here really present. 

37 (p. 24). In order that the procedure here might have 
been rendered quite exact and really exhaustive, two other very ^ CVi. 
important cases would still need to have been mentioned in the 
lecture. The one case is that of pleasure in the bad, the other 

that of displeasure in the bad. If we enquire : Is pleasure in 
the bad good ? the answer has already been given in a measure 
quite rightly by Aristotle : No. " No one," he says in the 



Nicamachian Ethics (z. 2, p. 1174 a. 1), "'would wish to fed joy 
in what is shameful even if it were made certain to him that no 
harm would result therefrom." The hedonists, to which class 
belonged such noble men as Fechner (cl his work on The Highest 
Good) contradicted this view. Their teaching is to be rejected ; 
in practice as Hume has observed, they fortunately proved 
much better than in theory. There is still, however, a grain of 
truth in their view. The pleasure in the bad is, qua pleasure, 
good, and only at the same time bad as a wrong activity of 
feeling, and though, by reason of this perversion, it may be 
^escribed as a preponderance of the bad, it cannot be regarded 
as something purely bad. While, therefore, abhorring it as 
bad, we are really making an act of choice in which freedom 
from what in the object is bad is preferred to the possession of 
what is good. And when we recognize the aversion as right, 
this is possible only because the preference has the character 
of rightness. 

The case is similar when we inquire if a similarly qualified 
displeasure in the bad is good, as e.g. where a noble heart feels 
pain on seeing the innocent oppressed, or where some one, look- 
ing back upon his past life, feels remorse at the consciousness 
of a bad action. Here the case is in every respect the reverse 
of the one preceding. Such a feeUng arouses a state in which 
pleasure preponderates, but this pleasure is not pure ; it cannot 
be called a pure good like the joy which would have arisen were 
the opposite of that over which we now mourn a fact, hence 
Descartes' advice (cf. 24, p. 76) — to turn the attention and 
feeUng in an equal degree rather to the good — would really not 
lose its significance. We recognize all this clearly, and have 
therefore, once more a preference with the character of rightness 
as the source of our knowledge of what is worthy of preference. 

In order not to introduce too many complications, I omitted 
in my lecture when discussing preferences to mention these cases. 
And this seemed to me the more admissible, because it would 
practically lead to the same result, if (Uke Aristotle in the case 
of disgraceful pleasure) one were to treat hate qualified as right 
on the one hand and love qualified as right on the other, as 
phenomena of simple disinchnation aud inclination. 



It may be easily seen that from these special cases of a possible 
deteimination of a quantitative relation between good and bad 
pleasure and displeasure, on the one hand, and of rightness and 
unrightness on the other hand (cf. for these also Note 31, p. 91) 
there is no hope of filling in the great gaps referred to in the 
lecture in a way valid for all cases. 

38 (p. 26). Cf. my Psych, from the Empirical Standpoint^ 
book ii. chap. iv. 

39 (p. 26). E. Dumont. Traitis de UgisUuion civile et 
pSnale, extraits des manuscrits de J. Bentham ; espec. in the 
section bearing the title : '' Principes des 16gislation," chap. iii. 
section 1 towards the end ; chap. vi. section 2 towards the end ; 
and chaps, viii. and ix. 

40 {p. 27). S. Rudolph Wagner. Der Kampf urn die 
Seele, vom Standpunkt der Wissenschaft. (Sendschreiben an Herm 
Leibarzt Dr. Beneke in Oldenburg.) Gottingen, 1857, p. 94 
note. "Oauss said, the author (of a certain psychological work) 
spoke of a want of exact measurements in the case of psychical 
phenomena, but it would be good if we only had clumsy ones, 
one could then make a beginning ; but we have none. There 
is here wanting the conditio sine qud rum of all mathematical 
treatment, i.e. whether and how far the changing of an intensive 
into an extensive quantity is possible. Yet this is the first and 
indispensable condition ; then there were also others. On this 
occasion Oauss spoke also about the usual incorrect definition 
of quantity as an ' ens ' which is capable of being increased or 
diminished ; one ought rather to say, an ' ens ' that admits of 
being divided into equal parts. . . ." 

41 (p, 27). Pechner's psycho-physical law, eveii were it as- 
sured, whereas it awakens continually increasing doubt and 
opposition, could only be used as a means of measuring the in- 
tensity of the content of certain concrete perceptions, not, 
however, for measuring the strength of the emotions like joy 
and sorrow. Attempts have been made at determining the 
measure of feelings by means of the involuntary movements 
and other externally visible changes accompanying them. To 



me, this seems very much as if one were to seek to reckon the 
exact date of the day of the month by means of the weather. 
The direct inner consciousness, however imperfect its testi- 
mony may be, nevertheless offers here far more. At least one 
draws from the spring itself, whereas in the other case one has 
to do with water Rendered impure by a variety of influences. 

42 (p. 27). Sigwart, in his Vorfragen der Ethik (p. 42), 
emphasizes the fact that no more must be required from the 
himian will than what it is able to perform. This utterance, 
which coming from the lips of so decided an indeterminist 
(cf. Logic^ ii. p. 592) may especially excite surprise, hangs to- 
gether with his subjective view of the good, from which view, 
in my opinion, there is offered no logical, normal path to the 
peace of all who possess a good will. (Cf . e.g. the way in which 
Sigwart, p. 15, passes over from egoism to regard for the general 

But similar expressions are also heard from others. And it 
might really appear doubtful whether the sublime command 
which bids us to subordinate all our actions to the highest 
practical good is really the right ethical principle. For, putting 
aside cases of want of reflection, which do not, of course, enter 
here into consideration, the demand for such complete self- 
devotion still seems too stringent, since there is no one, however 
carefully he may conduct himself, who, looking sincerely into 
his heart, will not frequently be compelled to say with Horace : — 

" Nunc in Aristippi furtim praecepta relabor, 
Et mihi res, non me rebus subjungere conor." 

And yet the doubt is unfounded, and a comparison may serve 
to make this clear. It is certain that no one can entirely avoid 
error ; still, avoidable or unavoidable, every error remains a 
judgment, which is what it should not be, and is opposed to 
the indispensable demands of logic. What applies to logic in 
respect of weakness of thought applies to ethics on the ground 
of weakness of will. Ethics cannot cease to demand from a man 
that he should love the acknowledged good and prefer that which 
is recognized to be better, not putting anything else before 
the highest practical good. Even were it proved (which is not 



the case), that in a definite class of cases all men without excep- 
tion in respect of these were never able to remain true to the 
highest practical good, this would still not afford the sUghtest 
justification for setting aside the fundamental ethical demand. 
Even then it would still remain an evident and unchangeable 
truth, the sole and only right rule, here as everywhere, to give 
the preference to the better over what is less good. 

J. S. Mill fears that this, would lead to endless self-reproaches 
and that these constant reproaches would embitter the life of 
each individual. This, however, is so Uttle impUed by the rule 
that it is easily demonstrable that such a result is excluded. 
Goethe well understood this, — 

" Nichts taugt Ungeduld " 

i.e. impatience in respect of one's own imperfections, he sayB 
in one of his by no means lax sayings, — 

" Nooh weniger Reue," 

— giving way to the stings of conscience, when fresh joyous 
resolve is alone available, — 

" Jene vermehrt die Schuld, 
Diese schaflFt neue."* 

In an album I once found in the hand of the pious Abbot 
Haneberg, afterwards Blishop of Spires, the following Unes, 
written to the same effect : — 

''Sonne dich mit Lust an Gottes Huld, 
Hab' mit alien — auch mit dir, GeduldL" t 

43 (p. 28). It is necessary to be on one's guard jgtgainst 
drawing from the prii^cjple pf lQyg..j3i,jaur neighbour the con- 
clusion that each has to care for every other individual in the 
same degree as for himself, which, far from conducing towards 
the universal good, would rather essentially prejudice it. This 

* " Impatience naught avails 
Nor more availeth rue. 
One addeth to the fault. 
The other maketh new." — Tr. 
t " Bathe thyself with delight in the sunshine of heavenly grace. 
Let patience toward all men abound — e'en with thyself find a place." — Tr. 



is Been by reflectmg on the circumstanoe that to ourselves we 
stand in a position different from that in whidi we stand to 
everybody else, while again in respect of these others we are in 
a position to help, or to injure, one more, the other less. If 
there are human beings in Mars the inhabitants of the earth can 
and ought to wish them good also, not however to strive after 
their good in the same manner as for hhnself and his feUow-men. 
It is in this connexion that the injunction to take thought 
in the first instance for oneself, a precept to be found in 
every sjrstem of morality, is justifiable : " yv&0i o-avrov," 
" Sweep before your own doorstep," etc. The demand to seek 
first of all the welfare of wife and child, home and fatherland, 
is also universal. The command : '' Take no thought for the 
morrow," in the sense in which it really offers wise counsel, also 
flows as a result from the same source. That my future happi- 
ness ought not to be so dear to me as my present happiness is 
not here impUed. 

So regarded, the communistic doctrines which illogical im- 
petuosity would seek to derive from the lofty principle of uni- 
versal brotherhood are shown to be unjustifiable. 

44 (p, 29). The fact that we are often unable to measure 
the more remote results of our actions offers a more serious 

But even this thought will not discourage us if we love the 
universal good. It may be said of all results which are un- 
recognizable in an exactly equal degree, that one has just as 
many chances in its favour as the others. According to the 
law of great numbers a compensation will on the whole result, 
and so whatever calculable good we create will stand as a plus 
on the one side and, just as though it stood alone, will justify our 

From the same point of view, as I have already suggested in 
the lecture (p. 22), the doubt is removed which in a similar 
manner might arise through uncertainty as to whether every- 
thing that is good draws from us a love having the qualification 
of rightness, and whether, therefore, we are able to recognize 
it as good and to take due account of it. 



46 (p. 29). That in the case of the limits of right (Itechts- 
gtenzen) we have essentially to do with spheres which lie at 
the disposal of the individual will has been frequently empha- 
sized both by philosophers (cf. in this respect e.g. Herbart's 
Idea of Right) and by able jurists. Ihering in his Geist des 
ri^mischen Rechts, iil. 1 (p. 3^ note), demonstrates this with 
numerous citations. Amdt e.g. in his Handbuch der Pandekten 
defines law as " supremacy of the will regarding an object " ; / 
for Sintenis it is, '' the will of one person raised to the universal 
will." Windscheid defines it as " a certain volition (Willens- 
inhalt) of which the legal code in a concrete case affirms that 
it may be made valid as against every other will.*' Puchta, 
who has perhaps expressed the thought in the most manifold 
ways, says in his digest of Roman law, section 22, " as the 
subjects of such a unU thought of potentially men are called 
persons, . . . personality is therefore the subjective possibility 
of the legalized will, of a legal power.*' In the same work (section 
118, note b) he observes in regard to a want of personality : 
** The principle of modem law is inability to dispose of property " ; 
many other of his expressions convey the same meaning. 

As however these legal authorities have concentrated their 
attention exclusively upon legal duties, and do not touch upon 
the problem as to the way in which the individual will has to 
rule in its legal sphere, Ihering has interpreted them as 
meaning that they considered the true and highest good, 
and the most intrinsic and final end, towards which the legal 
code strives, to be the exercise of the will as will, the joy of the 
individual in his volitional activity ; " the final end of all law 
is, for them, willing" (pp. 320, 326); "the end of law (according 
to them) consists once for all in the power of the wiU, in its 
supremacy " (p. 326). One can well understand how he comes 
to condemn a theory so interpreted (p. 327), and even that he 
succeeds in making it appear ridiculous. " According to this 
view," he says, (p. 320) "all private right is nothing less than an 
arena in which the will moves and exercises itself ; the will is 
the organ by which the individual enjoys his right, the profit 
obtained from legal right consists in feeling the joy and glory 
of power, in the satisfaction of having realized an act of will, 



e.g. of having effected a mortgage, transferred a title, and so 
proved oneself to be a legal personality. What a poor thing 
would the will be if the bare and low regions of law were the 
proper " sphere of its activity ! " 

Certainly the heaviest charges of absurdity and ridiculous- 
ness would be well deserved if those scholars who regard the 
immediate aim of law as consisting in a limitation of the 
spheres at the disposal of the will had intended in so doing to 
disavow all regard for the final ethical end, i.e. the advancement 
of the highest practical good. There is, however, absolutely 
nothing to justify this insinuation, and therefore one could 
perhaps with more right smile at the zeal of an attack which is 
really levelled merely against windmills. Moreover, what 
Ihering proposes to set in its place is certainly a bad substitute. 
For, in regarding the sphere ascribed by the legal authority to 
the individual simply as a sphere consigned to their egoism (a 
view which, as the author of Der Zweck im Recht, he perhaps no 
longer holds), he is thus led to his definition :. '' Law (Recht) is 
legal security for enjoyment," whereas he would have been more 
correct in saying : '* Law is legal security for the undisturbed 
disposal of individual power in the advancement of the highest 
ood." Is then injustice something which exhausts bad con- 
duct ? By no means ; legal duties have limits ; duty in general 
governs all our actions, and this our popular religion expressly 
emphasizes, as, for instance, when it asserts that for every idle 
word the individual must render an account. 

Besides this first objection, which rests upon a simple mis- 
understanding of the intention, Ihering has also raised several 
others which are essentially due to imperfections in the use of 
language. If the legal code essentially consists in setting certain 
limits to the activity of the individual will in order that one 
person may not disturb the other in striving after the good, it 
follows that he who has, or had, or will have no will has also no 
legal sphere. I say, " has, or had, or will have," for obviously 
regard must be^paid to the past and to the future. A dead 
man often exercises an influence extending into the far distant 
future, so that Comte well says : the Uving are more and more 
dominated by the dead. In like manner, the situation will 




entail that, in respect of many problems, we leave the decision 
to the future, i.e. renounce the sovereignty in favour of a future 
will. This consideration resolves many a paradox urged by 
Ihering (pp. 320-325) ; not however, all. In the case of one 
who from birth has been an incurable imbecile, it is obvious 
that no power of will whatever can be found, to which regard 
for the highest practical good might allow a sphere ; there re- 
mains therefore to him, according to our view, really no legal 
sphere, and yet on every hand we hear of a right which he pos- 
sesses in his own Ufe ; even under some circumstances, we refer 
to him as the owner of a great estate, or ascribe to him the right 
of a crown or kingly rule. On examining the relations closely, 
we find that we are never concerned here with a true legal sphere 
respecting a subject incapable of being held responsible, but 
rather with the legal spheres of other individuals, as, for example, 
that of a father who, in providing for his imbecile child, gives 
instructions in his will concerning his property, the dominion of 
whose will is safeguarded after his death by the law of the land ; 
or (as, for example, the case where the imbecile's life is held to 
be sacred), quite apart from the injury done to the simple duty 
of affection which this would involve, there is also in question 
the State's legal sphere, which permits no one else to commit a 
fatal attack, and accordingly often imposes a punishment, even 
in the case of an attempt at suicide. 

A third objection of Ihering's, i.e. that by a limitation of rights 
as affecting spheres of will, even the most senseless dispositions of 
will must be allowed legal validity (p. 326), this offers, after 
what has been said, hardly any further difficulty. Certainly 
many a foolish disposition of will must be allowed. Were the 
State not to admit this, then it alone would possess a definitive 
right of disposal ; all private right would be at an end. So 
long as not merely subjects, but also governments, are liable 
to commit acts of foolishness, such an extension of the power 
of the State cannot be recommended. For the rest, just as 
secondary ethical rules in general suffer exceptions, and in par- 
ticular expropriations in the case of private owners are fre- 
quently necessary, so also it is clear and to be admitted with- 
out contradiction, that senseless dispositions or dispositions 



which have evidently lost all meaning and reference to the 
highest practical good can be annulled by the State. Regard 
for the highest practical good is here, as is the case of every 
other so-called collision of duties, decisive. 

46 (p. 29). That a law, which in and for itself is bad and 
contrary to nature, however condemnable from an ethical point 
of view, and its modification urgently necessary, may yet in 
many cases receive a provisional sanction from the reason, this 
has long been recognized and made clear, as e.g. by Bentham 
in his Trait^s de Legislation civ. et pdn. In antiquity Socrates, 
who deemed himself worthy to be feasted in the Prytaneum, 
died for the sake of this conviction. The positive legal code, 
despite all its defects, creates a condition of things which is better 
than anarchy, and since each act of insubordination to the law 

. threatens to injure its force in general, so in those circumstances 
brought about by the law itself, it may be that provisionally 
and for the individual a mode of action even from the rational 
standpoint is right, which, apart from this, would be in no way 
justifiable. All this results without doubt from the relativity 
of the secondary ethical rules, which will be treated later. 

It may be added that errors respecting the laws of positive 
morality (a point shortly to be discussed in the lecture) in a 
similar way demand, under certain circumstances, to be taken 
into account. 

It dare not, on the other hand, be overlooked that there are 
here limits, and that the saying : " We ought to obey God rather 
than man," may not, in its free and sublime range, be allowed 
to suffer injury. 

47 {p. 29). Heraclitus of Ephesus (b.c. 500), the oldest of 
the Greek philosophers, of whose philosophy we possess rather 
extensive fragments. 

48 (p. 31). Ihering, Der Zweck im Recht, vol. ii. p. 119, and 
other passages. 

49 (p. 31). Politics, vol. i. chap. 6. 

60 (p. 31). Nic. Ethics, v. 14, p. 1137 b. 13. PolUics, iii. 
and iv. 



61 (p. 31). Cf. Discours pr61iininaire to the TraiUs de 
Legislation, also the section '^ De rinfluence des temps et des 
lieux en matiere de legislation " of that work. 

62 {p. 31). PhUos, Versuch Uber die WahrscheirUichkeiten 
von La/flace, translated from the sixth edition of the original text 
by N. Schwaiger, Leipzig, 1886, p. 93 seq. (Application of 
the calculation of probabilities to moral science.) 

63 (p. 32). Cf. AUg. Juristenzeitung, vii. p. 171 ; Ztveck 
im Rechty vol. ii. p. 118 ; 122 seq. 

64 (p. 33). Orundlegung zur Physik der Sitten. Cf. above 
note 14, p. 49. 

66 (p. 34). Cf. e.g. the Meno dialogue. 

66 {p, 34). Friedr. Alb. Lange, Logische Studien, ein Beitrag 
zur Neubegrilndung der fonntden Logik und der Erkenntnislehre. 
Iserlohn, 1877. 

67 (p. 34). Alex. Bain, Logic, pt. 1. Deduction. London, 
1870, p. 169 seq. 

•^ 68 (p. 36). e.g. Bentham, also, in antiquity, Epicurus. 

— 69 (p. 36). e.g. Plato and Aristotle, and following them 
Thomas Aquinas. Jrv^Vv^^. 

60 (p. 36). The Stoics, and in the Middle Ages, the followers 
of Scotus. 

61 (p. 36). This even Epicurus did not deny (little in har- 
mony as it is with his utterance quoted p. 64). 

62 (p. 36). Nic, Ethics, I. i. 

63 (p. 36). Metaphi A 10. 

64 (p3 36). Metaph. A 10. 

97 H 


65 (p. 36). They made the relation to the greater whole 
serve as an argument in favour of the view that the practical 
life (of the politician) stands higher than that of the theorist. 

66 (p, 36). This testimony to the principle of summation 
likewise reappears as often as in a theory based upon egoistic 
and utilitarian grounds, the notion of God is employed in the 
construction of ethics (e.g. Locke ; Fechner in his work on the 
highest good ; cf . also for Leibnitz, Trendelenburg, Histor. 
Bettr&ge, vol. ii. p. 245). God, so runs their argument, loves each 
of His creatures, and therefore their totality more than the 
single individual ; He therefore/approves and rewards the sacri- 
fice of the individual to the whole, while disapproving and punish- 
ing self-seeking injury. 

In the desire after mmiortality also, the influence of the prin- 
ciple of summation is manifest. Thus Hehnholtz, (uber die 
Entstehung dee Planetevsy stems, lecture delivered at Heidelberg 
and Cologne, 1871), in seeking to offer a hopeful prospect to those 
who cherish this desire, says : " The individual (if that which 
we achieve can ennoble the lives of those who succeed us) may 
face fearlessly the thought that the thread of his own conscious- 
ness will one day be broken. But to the thought of a final 
annihilation of the race of living mortals, and with them, the 
fruits of the striving of all past generations, even men of minds 
so imfettered and great as Lessing and David Strauss could 
scarcely reconcile themselves." When it is scientifically shown 
that the earth will one day be incapable of supporting living 
beings, then, he thinks, the need of immortality will irresistibly 
return, and we shall feel bound to cast about for something which 
will afford us the possibility of assmning it. 

67 (p. 34). MetapL A 10. 

68 (p. 37). This is the standing doctrine of the great theo- 
logians, as e.g. Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theohgica, Only 
certain nominalists, like Robert Holcot, teach the complete arbi- 
trariness of the divine commands. Cf . my essay on the Oeschichie 
der kirchlichen Wissenschaften im Mittelalter, in Mohler'a Church 



History (published by Gams, 1867) vol. ii. 626 seq., respecting 
which, however, the reader is asked not to overlook the revision 
of the printer's errors in the " errata," p. 103 seq., at the end 
of that work. 

69 {p. 39). At a time when psychology was far less advanced 
and inquiries into the province of the calculation of probability 
had not brought sufficient clearness into the process of rational 
induction, it was possible even for a Hume to fall a victim to this 
gross confusion. Cf. his Enq: concern. Hum. UtidersL, chaps, v. 
and vi. More striking is it that James Mill and Herbert Spencer 
have still not advanced in the slightest degree beyond Hume ; 
(Cf. Anal, of the Phen. of the Hum. Mind, vol. ii. chap. ix. and 
note 108), and that even the acute thinker, J. S. Mill, although 
Laplace's Essai PhUosophique sur lea Probabilit^s lay at his dis- 
posal, never arrived at a clear distinction of the essential difference 
between these two forms of procedure. This hangs together 
with his failure to appreciate the purely analytic character of 
mathematics and the import of the deductive procedure in 
general. Indeed he has absolutely denied that the syllogism 
leads to new knowledge. Whoever bases the whole of mathe- 
matics upon induction cannot possibly justify mathematically 
the inductive procedure. It would be for him a circulus vitiosus. 
It is here beyond question that Jevon's Logic takes a truer view. 

Even in the case of Mill, it sometimes appears as if an inkling 
of the immense difference had begun to dawn upon him, as 
when, in a note to his Analysis of iJie Phenomena of the Human 
Mind (vol. i., chap. xi. p. 407), in criticizing his father's theory, 
he says : ^' If belief is only an inseparable association, belief is 
a matter of habit and accident and not of reason. Assuredly an 
association, however close, between two ideas is not a sufficient 
ground (the italics are his own) of belief ; it is not evidence that 
the corresponding facts are united in eicternal nature. The 
theory seems to annihilate all distinction between the belief 
of the wise, which is regulated by evidence and conforms to the 
real successions and co-existences of the facts of the universe, 
and the belief of fools which is vnechanically produced by any 
accidental association that suggests the idea of a succession or 



co-existence to the mind ; a belief aptly characterized by the 
popular expression, believing a thing because they have taken 
it into their heads." This is all excellent. But it is robbed of 
its most essential worth, when, in a later note (vol. i. p. 438. 
note 110) we hear J. S. Mill say : " It must be conceded to him 
(the author of the Analysis) that an association sufficiently 
strong to exclude all ideas that would exclude itself, produces a 
kind of mechanical belief, and that the processes by which the 
belief is corrected, or reduced to rational bounds, aU consist in 
the growth of a counter-association tending to raise the idea of a 
disappointment of the first expectation, and as the one or the 
other prevails in the particular case, the belief or expectation 
exists or does not exist exactly as if the belief were the same thing 
with the association," and so on. 

There is much here that calls for criticism. When ideas are 
mentioned which mutually exclude one another it may well be 
asked what kind of ideas these are ? According to another 
utterance of Mill's (vol. i. p. 98 seq. note 30 and elsewhere), he 
knows " no case of absolute incompatibility of thought except 
between the thought of the presence of something and that of 
its absence." But are even these incompatible ? Mill himself 
teaches elsewhere the very opposite when he thinks that along 
with the idea of existence there is always given at the same time 
the idea of non-existence (p. 126, note 39 ; " we are only con- 
scious," he says, " of the presence of an object by comparison 
with its absence "). Apart, however, from all this, how strange 
is it that Mill here overlooks the fact that he abandons entirely 
the distinctive character of self-evidence, and retains only that 
blind and mechanical formation of judgment, which he rightly 
treats with contempt. The sceptic Hume stands in this respect 
far higher, since he at least sees that such an empirical (empi- 
ristisch) view of the process of induction does not satisfy the 
requirements of our reason. Sigwart's criticism of Mill's theory 
of Induction {LogiCy vol. ii. p. 371) contains here much that is 
true, though in appealing to his postulates he has certainly not 
substituted anything truly satisfactory in the place of what is 
defective in Mill. 




.70 (p. 40). Cf. Hume, Empiiry concerning Human Under- 
standing^ vol. ii. towards the end. 

71 (p. 40). Nic, Ethics, iii. 10. Cf. the subtle discussions 
in the subsequent chapter on the five kinds of false courage. 

72 (p. 41). Nic. Ethics, i. 2. 





" SuBJEOTLBSS propositions " so the celebrated philologer 
has entitled a little work which, on its first appearance, bore the 
title, The Verba Impersonalia in the Slav Languages, 

The change of name may well be connected with considerable 
additions in the second edition. The new designation would, 
however, even in the earlier form, have been the more suitable 
title. For, far from treating the special nature of merely one 
family of languages, the author sets up a theory of wide-reaching 
significance, which, while contradicting the prevailing view, 
only deserves all the more on this account general attention. 
Not only philology, but also psychology and metaphysics have 
an interest in the problem. Moreover, the new doctrine pro- 
mised to bring profit not only to the inquirer in these lofty spheres 
but also to the schoolboy at present tortured by the school- 
master with impossible and incomprehensible theories (cf. 
p. 23 seq.). 

Such an influence, however, the treatise has not exercised. 
The earlier views still hold unbroken sway even to-day, and 
although the appearance of the monograph in a new edition 
bears testimony to a certain interest in wider circles, this is 
manifestly not due to the circumstance that the work was believed 
to have thrown light upon old doubts and errors. Darwin's 
epoch-making work, quite apart from the truth of its hypothesis, 
had, even for its opponents, an indisputable worth ; the wealth 
of important observations and ingenious combinations every one 
had to acknowledge with admiration. So also in the case of 
Miklosich, who has compressed into a few pages a rich store of 



learning and interspersed the most subtle observations. Many 
who have withheld their assent to his principal thesis may still 
feel indebted to him for many points of detail. ^ 

Here, however, we wish chiefly to consider the main problem 
and, very briefly, to make ourselves clear respecting that with 
which it really deals. 

It is an old assertion of logic that the judgment consists essen- 
tially in a binding or separating, in a relation of ideas to one 
another. This view, almost unanimously maintained for two 
thousand years, has exercised an influence upon other disciplines. 
And so we find grammarians from very early times teaching that 
no more simple form of expression in the case of the judgment 
exists, or can exist, than the categorical, which combines a subject 
with a predicate. 

That the carrying out of this doctrine brings with it difficulties 
could not, of course, be permanently concealed. Propositions 
like : it rains, it lightens, appear as though they had no wish 
to conform to this view. Tet none the less the majority of 
inquirers were so firmly convinced, that in such cases they felt 
compelled, not so much to doubt the universal validity of their 
theory as rather to search for the subjects, which in their view 
were only apparently missing. Many really believed themselves 
to be in possession of the same. Now, however, in marked 
contrast to the unity which had hitherto prevailed, they branched 
off in the most varied directions. And if we examine somewhat 
closely and ia detail the various attempts at an explanation, 
we shall easily be able to understand, why none of these were 
able to give permanent satisfaction, or even for a time to bring 
about unanimity. 

Science explains by reason of its comprehending a multiplicity 
as a unity. Here also, of course, every effort has been made 
to accomplish this, but every attempt has proved futile. When 
we say : it rains, many have supposed that the unnamed subject 
denoted by the indefinite " it " is ^' Zeus " : Zeus rains. But 
when we say : ^' es rauscht," is is obvious that Zeus cannot be 
the subject. Others again have thought that the subject is 
here " das Bauschen " ; consequently the meaning of the propo- 
sition would be : " das Bauschen rauscht." The previous 



example they also completed in the same manner : '' Raining, 
(or the rain) rains." 

When, however, we now say : " es fehlt an Geld," the meaning 
must therefore be : " das Fehlen an Greld fehlt an Geld." But 
this is absurd. It was therefore explained that the subject here 
is '^ Geld," and the meaning of the proposition is : '' Greld fehlt 
an Geld." Closely examined, this would seem to strike a blow 
at the wished-for unity of explanation. If, however, by closing 
one eye, the failure here may be partially ignored, even this is 
useless when we stumble upon propositions like : " es giebt 
einen Gott," respecting which we arrive at no satisfactory mean- 
ing either in the proposition : *' das einen Gott geben giebt einen 
Gott ; das Geben giebt einen Gott," or in the proposition, " Gott 
giebt einen Gott." 

It was therefore necessary to look for an explanation of an 
entirely different character. But where was such an explanation 
to be found ? And even if ingenuity were here able to hit upon 
some expedient, what availed such leaping from case to case, 
which could only be called the caricature of a truly scientific 
explanation ? Not a single designation of the subject which 
has been so far suggested, can be termed suitable, unless indeed 
it be a sajdng of Schleiermacher's. For if this philosopher 
(cf. p. 16) has really asserted that the subject in such cases is 
chaos, this utterance must be regarded, not so much as an attempt 
at explanation as rather a satire upon the hjrpotheses hitherto 
set up by philologists. 

Many inquirers are therefore of opinion that the real subjects 
of such propositions as : it rains, it lightens, have, up to the 
present time, not been discovered, and that even at the present 
time it is the business of science to find them. But, would it not 
be strange if the tracing of a subject, which is thought of by 
everyone, and which, though unexpressed, forms the basis of 
the judgment, should yet offer such extraordinary difficulties ? 

Steinthal seeks to explain this by saying that by the gramma- 
tical subject something is suggested, which is yet unthinkable. 
But many will reply with Miklosich (p. 23) : " We would not, 
I think, be going too far in asserting that grammar is not con- 
cerned with the unthinkable." 



The totality of the phenomena and the absolutely grotesqae 
failure of every attempt to determine the nature of the subject, 
however often and however ingeniously this has been attempted, 
are the chief grounds on which Miklosich bases his assertion 
that, generally speaking, the supposed subject in the case of 
such propositions is a delusion, that the proposition is no com- 
bination of subject and predicate, that, as Miklosich expresses 
it, the proposition is subjectless. 

Further reflections go to confirm this view, and among these 
one consideration as to the nature of the judgment requires to 
be emphasized on account of its special importance. Miklosich 
combats those who, like Steinthal, deny that there is any recipro- 
cal relation between grammar and logic, at the same time repel- 
ling the attacks which, on the ground of such a reciprocal relation, 
might be made against his doctrine by psychologists and logicians. 
Indeed he arrives at the result that, in consequence of the special 
peculiarity of certain judgments, subjectless propositions must 
from the very first be expected in language. According to his 
view it is wrong to suppose that every judgment is a relation 
existing between ideas. It often happens that in a proposition 
only one fact is affirmed or denied. In such cases a mode of 
expression is also necessary, and it is obvious that this cannot 
well consist in a combination of subject and predicate. Miklosich 
shows how philosophers have been repeatedly led to this know- 
ledge, though, as a rule, they have not appreciated sufficiently 
the significance of their discovery. Not sufficiently clear them- 
selves as to the new truth to which they gave expression, and, 
at the same time, clinging with strange indecision to certain resi- 
dues of the older view, it came about that what at first they 
effirmed they at last essentially deny. Thus Trendelenburg 
chose to find expressed in the proposition, '* it lightens," in the 
last resort, no real judgment, but only the rudiments of a judg- 
ment which precedes the notion of lightning and settles down into 
it, thereby forming the basis for the complete judgment, "'lightning 
is conducted by iron." Herbart finally declared such jud^gments 
as "' es rauscht," to be no judgments in the ordinary sense, not, 
he thought, what in logic is, strictly speaking, termed a judg- 
ment. The passage in which our author censures the incon- 



sistency of these philosopliers, and shows that the soarce of 
their confusion lies in their misunderstanding of the nature 
of judgment and in their erroneous definition of it (p. 21 seq.), 
is excellent. 

From all this MlMosich draws the conclusion that his subject- 
less propositions are completely assured. And not only does 
he consider their existence beyond doubt, he further shows that 
their appearance is by no means so rare as might be supposed 
from the controversy into which it has been necessary to enter 
concerning them. Their great variety had led him, in the 
second part of his treatise (pp. 33-72) to set forth their chief 
classes, and there we find subjectless propositions with the 
Active Verb, the Reflexive Verb, the Passive Verb and the verb 
^' to be," each of these four classe» being illustrated by means 
of numerous examples from the most various languages. This 
is especially the case with the first class, where he makes an 
eightfold division with the object of grouping the propositions 
according to the difference in their content. He mentions as 
universally true (p. 6) that the finite verb of the subjectless 
propositions always stands in the third person singular, and, 
where the form admits a difference of gender, in the neuter. 

In other directions also he traces the matter further. He 
shows how these propositions did not arise later than those which 
predicate something of a subject, but appear from the very 
outset among the various forms of propositions (p. 13 seq., p. 19), 
and how, in the course of time, they have disappeared from 
several languages (p. 26). He proves that the languages in which 
they are preserved enjoy an advantage, inasmuch as their appli- 
cation lends to the language a special liveliness (26), and he 
shows how in other respects also it is not slwajs possible tp 
substitute for the subjectless proposition the categorical form, 
with which it is supposed to be identical. " Ich friere " is, for 
instance, not fully identical with ^' mich friert." Instead of, 
was frierst du draussen ? Eomme doch herein ! we cannot 
say : was friert dich's draussen ? etc. " Mich friert " cannot 
be applied if I expose myself voluntarily to the cold (p. 37). 



This, shortly, is the substance of his book, regarding which 
I venture to make a few critical observaHons. 

I have sufficiently expressed in this sununary, my approval 
of the treatise in general, especially in respect of the main argu- 
ment. The proofs appear to me to be of so cogent a nature, 
that even the unwilling will scarcely be able to escape from the 
truth. Qiiite independent of these arguments, however, I had 
mjrself, long ago, arrived at the same view, by way of a purely 
psychological analysis, and gave, in the most decisive manner, 
public expression to it, when in 1874 I published my Psychology. 

Great, however, as were the pains I then took to set the 
teaching in a clear light and to show every former view untenable, 
my success so far has been slight. Apart from isolated indi- 
viduals, I have been just as little able to convince the philo- 
sopher, as Miklosich, in his first edition, was able to convince 
pldlologists. Where a prejudice has, during centuries, become 
ever more and more finnly rooted, where a doctrine has pene- 
trated even to the primary school, when a theory has come to 
be regarded as fundamental upon which much else rests, and 
so, as it were, by its weight rendered the foundation immovable, 
in such a case, it is not to be expected that the error will im- 
mediately disappear as soon as its refutation is established ; 
on the contrary, it is to be feared that distrust of the new view 
will be so great, as not even to admit of a closer examination 
being made regarding the grounds on which it rests. And yet 
when two investigators completely independent of each other 
agree in their testimony, when by quite different paths they 
arrive at the same goal, it may be hoped that this concurrence 
will not be regarded as a mere coincidence, but that a more 
careful attention will be bestowed upon the arguments on 
either side. I hope that this will be so in the case of the new 
edition of Miklosich, in which I am glad to see regard paid to 
my own work. 



The agreement with regard to the main points makes sub- 
ordinate points, in respect of which we differ, of less moment. 
I shall, notwithstanding, briefly touch on these. 

Miklosich has termed those simple propositions, in which 
there is contained no combination of subject and predicate, 
and in the recognition of which I am in agreement with him, 
*^ subjectless propositions." I am not able entirely to approve 
his i^e of the term and the grounds which he has given for its 

Subject and predicate are correlative conceptions and stand 
or fall together. A proposition which is truly without a subject 
must with equal right be regarded as without a predicate. It 
does not therefore seem to me quite fitting that Miklosich 
should always term such propositions subjectless, and it is quite 
incorrect when he calls them mere predicative propositions. 
(Cf. pp. 3, 25, 26, and elsewhere.) This might suggest the view 
that he Ukewise beUeves a second conception (the subject) is 
understood though not expressed, had he not in the most 
decided manner denied this (p. 3 seq. and elsewhere) ; or that 
he regarded such propositions as stunted forms of categorical 
propositions, and the latter form as the original, had he not 
expressly refuted this also (p. 13 seq.). His view rather seems 
to be, that the natural development from the simple to the 
categorical form in thinking and speaking is generally accom- 
plished in such a way that the notion which stands alone in 
the former proposition is combined 'with a second as subject. 
" The subjectless propositions," he says, p. 26, " are propositions 
which consist only of a predicate, of what, in the natural process 
of thought-formation must, in a great number of propositions, 
be regarded as the prius, for which a subject may, but not 
necessarily must be sought." 

But this also can hardly be right, and the expression " sub- 
ject " scarcely seems to favour this view. That which forms the 
basis is, of course, certainly that which in the construction of 
the judgment stands first. The temporal succession of the 
words also agrees ill with such a view, since, in the categorical 
proposition, we usually begin with the subject. In opposition 
to such a view it may also be contended that the emphasis 



usually falls upon the predicate (and Trendelenburg lias made 
use of this to indicate that the predicate is the main conception, 
and even with exaggeration goes on to say : " We think in 
predicates," cf. p. 19). If the predicative conception is what is 
newly added, it will, accordingly, be the object of greater in- 
terest. On the other hand, we would be compelled to expect 
exactly the opposite if the notion of the subject contained the 
newly added moment. 

It may just as truly be said, " a bird is black," as, " some- 
thing black is a bird " ; '' Socrates is a man," as, '^ a man is 
Socrates " ; but Aristotle has already observed that only the 
former predication is natural, the latter form is opposed to the 
natural order. And this is really so far true, that we naturally 
make that term the subject to which we first pay regard in form- 
ing a judgment, or to which the hearer must first attend in order 
to understand the proposition, or to gain knowledge as to its 
truth or falsity. We can be assured of the existence of a black 
bird by seeking it among birds or among black objects, more 
easily, however, among the former. In the same way we may 
be more easily assured that an individual belongs to a particular 
species or genus by analysing its nature than by running over 
the entire range of the corresponding general notion. The 
cases of exceptions clearly confirm the rule and the grounds on 
which it rests, as, for instance, when I say : '' There is some- 
thing black ; this something black is a bird," in which case it 
is just because I have first recognized the colour that I accord- 
ingly make it the subject in the categorical proposition so formed. 

Of the two categorical Sorites, the Aristotelian and the 60- 
clenian, the former in every succeeding link makes that term 
the subject which is common to it and to the one preceding, 
the latter form makes it the predicate. It is just on this account 
that the former appears the more natural, and as such is gene- 
rally regarded as the regular, the latter as the reversed form. 
In like manner where, to a proposition not consisting of a com- 
bination of ideas, we add a categorical proposition having one 
term in common with the former, we usually apply this not as 
a predicate but as a subject, and we should therefore prefer to 
say that a predicate has been sought for a subject rather than 



that a subject has been sought for a predicate. For example : 
es rauscht ; das Bauschen kommt von einem Bache (there is 
a sound of running water ; the sound comes from the brook). 
Es donnert ; der Donner verkiindet ein nahendes Gewitter (it 
thunders ; the thunder heralds an approaching storm). Es 
riecht nach Rosen ; dieser Bosengeruch kommt aus dem Nach- 
bargarten (there is a smell of roses ; the rose-scent comes from 
a neighbour's garden). Es wird gelacht ; das Gelachter gilt 
dem Hanswurste (there is laughter ; the laughter is due to the 
clown). Es fehlt an Geld ; dieser Geldmangel ist die Ursache 
der Stockung der Geschafte (there is a lack of money ; this 
dearth of money is the cause of the depression in trade). Es 
giebt einen Gott ; dieser Gott ist der Schopfer des Himmels 
und der Erde (there is a God ; this God is the maker of heaven 
and earth), etc., etc. 

Only in one sense, therefore, does the term " subjectless pro- 
position " appear to me justifiable, and even perhaps deserving 
of reconmiendation, in so far as regard is paid to the fact, that 
the notion which is contained thereby is the only, and there- 
fore, of course, the main conception ; a preference which in the 
categorical proposition belongs, as we have seen, to the predi- 
cate. Similariy also in respect of categorical in relation to 
hypothetical propositions we would much rather say that they 
are propositions without an antecedent, than propositions with- 
out a consequent proposition ; not as though we meant that 
where there is no antecedent there may still be a consequent 
proposition, but that in the hypothetical construction the con- 
sequent is the main proposition. In this way then I might 
perhaps agree with the author respecting the term " subjectless 

Another point, however, in which I am unable fully to agree 
with him is the question as to what extent subjectless propo- 
sitions are applicable. Miklosich rightly emphasizes the fact 
that the limits are on no account to be drawn too tightly. But 
he thinks such limits at any rate exist, and this is just what is 
shown most clearly in his attempt to classify and divide the varied 
nature of the matter capable of being expressed by subjectless 
sentences. But this appears to me incorrect. The applica- 

113 I 


bility of the sabjectlesB form may, strictly speaking, be rather 
regarded as unlimited, since — ^as I believe I have already shown 
in my Psychology — every judgment, whether expressed in cate- 
gorical, hypothetical or disjunctive form admits, without the 
sUghtest alteration in the sense, of being expressed in the form 
of a subjectless proposition or, as I expressed it, of an existential 
proposition. Thus the proposition, " A man is ill," is sjrnony- 
mous with '' There is a sick man " ; and the proposition, '^ All 
men are mortal," with the proposition, ^' There is no immortal 
man," and the like.^ 

In yet another direction Miklosich appears to me to have 
limited too narrowly the applicability of his subjectless pro- 
positions. We have heard that such propositions constitute 
'^ an excellence in a language," " respecting which all languages 
are very far from being able to boast " (p. 26). This, however, 
appears scarcely credible if it be true, as in another passage he 
has so convincingly shown, that there are and always have been 
judgments which do not consist in any combination of two 
ideas with each other, and which therefore it is impossible to 
express by means of a connexion of a subject with a predicate 
(p. 16). From this must follow, not merely, as Miklosich 
affirms^ the necessary existence of subjectless propositions 
generally, but further (which he denies) the existence of suoh 
propositions in all languages. 

' Supplementary note. What is here said of the general applicability 
of the existential form holds good only with the one manifest limitation, in 
respect of judgments which are really completely simple. In expressing 
such judgment logic has always made use of the categorical form; in 
common life they are often applied as the expression of a plurality of 
judgm«its based upon each o&er. This is clearly the case in the proposi- 
tion, *' this is a man." In the demonstrative ** this " the belief in existence 
is already included ; a second judgment then ascribes to him the predicate 
" man.'* Similar cases are frequent elsewhere. In my opinion it was the 
original purpose of the categorical form to serve as a means of expressing 
such double judgm«its (Doppelurteile), which recognize something while 
afi&rming or denying something else of it. I also believe that the existential 
and impersonal forms have, by a change in fanotion, proceeded from this 
form. This does not alter its essential nature : a lung is not a swim- 
bladder (Fisch-blase) even though it has developed therefrom, and the 
word ** kraft *' is none the less a merely synoategorematic word (Of. Mill, 
Logic, i . 2, { 2), even though its origin may be traced to a substantive. 



That the author has here fallen into error seems to me partiy 
explicable from the fact that in order to proceed with the utmost 
caution and lay claim to no unwarrantable example, he has not 
ventured to regard certain propositions as subjectless, which, 
in truth, really are so. We saw that Miklosich expressed the 
view that the finite verb of subjectless propositions always 
stands in the third person of the singular, and, when the form 
admits a difference of gender, in the neuter. This was cer- 
tainly too narrow a limit, a limit which he himself transgresses, 
though this appears in a much later passage. In the second 
part of his treatise he says : " In ' es ist ein Gott,' the notion 
^ Gott ' is affirmed absolutely without a subject, and this is 
also the case in the proposition ' es sind GdUer ' " ; and he adds : 
The " ist " of the existential proposition takes the plaoe of the 
so-called copula '^ is^," which in many, though by no means in 
all, languages, is indispensable to the expression of the judg- 
ment, and has the same significance as the termination of person 
in the finite verb as is clearly shown in the proposition " es ist 
Sommer, es ist Nacht " alongside the propositions, " es sommert, 
es nachtet." " Ist " is accordingly not a predicate (p. 34 ; 
cf. also p. 21 above). As a matter of fact, if the proposition, 
" es giebt einen Gott," is to be considered subjectless, " so also 
must the proposition, " es ist ein Gott," and therefore also, 
" es sind (Jotter " ; and thus the rule previously laid down has 
proved to be too narrow. That the existential propositions and 
other analogous forms, which may be found, are all to be reckoned 
as subjectless propositions may serve to confirm what we have 
sought to show above, i.e. that no language exists, or can exist, 
which entirely dispenses with these simplest forms of propo- 
sitions. Only certain special kinds of subjectless propositions 
therefore, am I able, with Miklosich, to recognize as the peculiar 
advantage of certain languages. 

These are the criticisms which I have thought it necessary 
to make. It will be seen that, if found to be justified, they do 
not in the slightest degree prejudice either the correctness or 
the value of the author's main argument, but rather lend to it 
a still wider significance. And so I conclude by expressing once 
again the wish that this suggestive little work, which, on its 



first appearance did not meet with, sufficient general recog- 
nition, may in its second edition — ^where individual points have 
been corrected, much extended, and particularly the critical 
objections of scholars like Benfey, Steinthal and others, refuted 
with a laconic brevity, yet rare dialectical power — ^find that 
interest which the importance of the inquiry and its excellent 
treatment deserve. 




(x^M^L dj^ yvUr^ 

Fhanz Brentano, son of Christian Brentano, and nephew of 
Clemens Brentano and Bettina von Arnim, was bom on January 
16, 1838, at Marienberg, near Boppard on the Rhine. He early 
embraced the study of philosophy and theology, both at Berlin, 
under Trendelenburg, and also at Munich. In 1864 he was 
ordained priest, and two years later became privat docerU in 
the University of Wiirzburg. In 1873 he was appointed pro- 
fessor there^ but in the same year resigned his office in conse* 
quence of his changed attitude towards the Church, and as an 
opponent of the Vatican Council. Somewhat later, in response 
to this change in his convictions, he separated himself definitely 
from the Church. 

In 1874 Brentano received a call to the University of Vienna, 
and continued there teaching Philosophy until 1895, first as 
ordinary professor, and afterwards, having meantime renounced 
his professorship, as privat decent. The reasons which led him 
to retire from this post also, are set forth Inf his work. My Last 
Wishes for Aitstria (Stuttgart, 1895). After withdrawing from 
his post as teacher he took up his residence at Florence. 

Brentano regards Aristotle as his real teacher in philosophy, 
and his two earliest publications. Von der mannigfachen Bedeu- 
tung des Seienden nach Aristotdea (Freiburg, i. Br. 1862), and 
Die Psychologie des Aristoteles insbesondere seine Lehre vom vov^ 
iroiTfTiKo^ (Mainz, 1867), are a testimony to his comprehensive 
study and thorough knowledge of Aristotelian philosophy. 
Especially is he in agreement with the Stagirite regarding the 
high position he would assign to the application of the empirical 
method as the only one which, in regard alike to scientific 
and philosophical problems, is able by cautious and gradual 



advance, to attain to knowledge. These first principles of 
method, especially in their relation to psychological research, 
he has set forth and practised in his first systematic work, 
Psychologie vom Emptriscken Standpunkte (vol. i., Leipzig, 1874). 
It was also his regard for this method of inquiry which early 
imbued him with a special interest for the works of the most 
eminent English philosophers of modem times, not only John 
Locke and David Hume, but also Bentham, the two Mills, 
Jevons and others. A study of these writers led Brentano to 
enter at length in his Wiirzburg lectures into a critical and 
explanatory treatment of English psychology and logic, charac- 
terizing it as a source of instruction and inspiration at a time 
when other distinguished advocates of German philosophy 
looked askance at this attitude towards English thought, be- 
lieving that by its contact with English writers the peculiar 
character of German thought might sufEer. It will be observed 
that only the first volume of the Psychology from the Empirical 
Stand/point has hitherto appeared, and it seems hardly likely 
that the work in its present form will be continued, for further 
reflection convinced Brentano that descriptive^ psychology, or 
Psychognosy, as of most importance in the examination and 
presentation of psychological problems, must be separated from 
genetic psychology,^ a study necessarily half physiological in 
character ; and that the former problem as the naturally earUer 
and least difficult study should first be as far as possible com- 

Such psychognostical inquirieSy although not yet in principle 
separated from genetic inquiry, occupy by far the greater part 
of the first volume of the Psychology from the Empirical Stand- 
point. Among the subjects there treated are : 1, the funda- 
mental revision of the classification of psychical phenomena, 
and their division into the three main classes : idead^ judgments, 
and phenomena of love and hate ; 2, and in particular, a new 
and more appropriate characterization of the judgment. 

The insafficiency of the old doctrine according to which judg- 

< i.e. the closest possible description and analysis of psychical events and 
their contents, on the basis of inner obse rvation.* 

^ i.e. the more difficult inquiry into the laws underlying the origin of 



ment conaistB esaentiaUy in a connexion of ideas, had already 
been shown by Home, and more recently was strongly emphasized 
by Mill, though neither was able to arrive at perfect clearness 
respecting its real nature. Notwithstanding this, the affinity 
of Brentano's doctrine of the judgment with that of Mill, led 
to a scientific correspondence, and later to arrangements for a 
personal interview, when, at the last moment, the plan was 
frustrated by the death of the great English investigator. 

The new description of the judgment and its essential quali- 
ties form the basis for a reform of logic even in its most ele- 
mentary stages, a reform which, in its essential features, is 
suggested in the above-mentioned work, and also touched upon 
in the Essay here translated ; but this truer description of the 
phenomenon of judgment also throws light upon the description 
and classification of the modes of speech from the point of view 
of their fur^ion or meaning, — a classification based upon true 
and most essential distinctions. In comparison with phonetics 
this branch is still little developed. What is here said, was seen 
by eminent philologists like Fr. von Miklosich, the pioneer in 
the sphere of Slav comparative philology. In the appendix will 
be found an article bearing upon this view. ^ 

While engaged in a profound study of the descriptive pecu- 
liarities connected with the third fundamental class of psychical 
states above referred to — a study analogous to that previously 
undertaken by him with regard to the judgment — Brentano was 
led to the discovery of the jyrjn/iiflpjt of ethical knowledg e which 
form the subject, of this lecture. The author, in his lectures 
delivered before students of all faculties, but especially to stu- 
dents in the faculty of law, during each winter session throughout 
many years, presented a complete and fully developed system of 
ethical teaching based upon these principles.^ Unfortunately, 

I Since this essay was written the statements as to the principles here 
developed have been modified only in respect of two points which, if not 
practically important, are still theoretically so, and these, with the 
author's permission, may be here shortly referred to : — 

1. In the lecture (p. 16) it is said that anything may be either aflfirmed 
or denied, and that if the affirmation is right its denial must be considered 
wrong, and vice versa. It is also stated that this is true analogously in 
respect of love and hate. 



this lecture still remains unpublished. The same holds good of 
many of his inquiries into '' descriptiye psychology," or psycho- 
gnosie, e.g. inquiries into the natute of sense perceptions accord- 
ing to their qualitative and spatial nature, the nature of the 
continuum, the time phenomenon, etc., the results of which are 
hitherto familiar only to those who have either attended his 
lectures, or have been present during private conversations. 

As to the other branches of philosophy, the work of 
Brentano already published forms but a portion — often but 
the smaller portion — of investigations, which, in the manner 
above described, have become known to a larger or smaller 
circle of disciples. This explains the striking fact that, in pro- 
portion to the extent of what has been published, an unusually 
large number of investigators and scholars appear in a greater 
or lesser degree to have been influenced by Brentano. (Uberweg- 
Heinze, in the eighth edition of the Orundrisa der Oeschichte 
der PhUosophiCj reckons, as belonging to his school, six names 
of men at present occupying important positions as teachers 
of philosophy.) 

One section of Brentano's doctrine of sense-perception forms 

\ This Brentano no longer asserts, but rather observeB that whereas the 
* whole must be denied, if but a part is untrue, a sum of good and bad, on the 
other hand, may be of such a nature as nevertheless as a whole to be worthy 
of love. It may be also so constituted that good and bad remaia in 

2. In the lecture (p. 24), and in the corresponding note 37 (p. 87), it is 
said that our preference qualified as right in the case where, for instance, 
to one good another is added, is drawn, not from our knowledge of the 
preferability of the sum as opposed to the parts, but that analytic judg- 
ments here yield the means of our advance in knowledge, and that the 
corresponding preferences are therefore qualified as right, since the 
knowledge (given analytically) is here the criterion. Here it is overlooked 
that without the experience of acts of preferring we neither have nor could 
have the conception, and therefore also our notion of preferability. And 
so it is also true that it is by no means evident from analysis that one good 
plus another is preferable to each of these goods taken singly. Here also 
a complete analogy to the sphere of the true is wanting. 

One truth added to another does not yield something more true. On the 
other hand, one good plus another good 3delds a better. But that this is so 
can only be understood by means of a special experience belonging pecu- 
liarly to this sphere, i.e. by means of the experience of acts of preferring 
which are qualified as right. 




the substance of a lecture, Zur Lehre von der Empfindungj de- 
livered at the Third International Psycholc^cal Congress held 
in Munich (1896), and published in the report of its proceedings 
(1897). A fragment of the above system of ethical inquiry, 
Ober das Sddechte als Gegenatand dicJUerischer Darstdlung 
(Leipzig, 1892), treats of the worth and preferability of the 
ideas employed by the artist. 

With regard to psycho-genetic problems, apart from the ques- 
tion as to the meaning and validity of Fechner's psycho-physical 
law, a question discussed in the first volume of his Psychology 
and elsewhere, and that of the spirituality and immortality of 
the soul, which formed repeatedly the substance of lectures at 
Vienna University, Brentano has especially occupied himself 
with the laws of the association of ideas. One result of this 
study is his lectui^e. Das Genie, published in 1892, which seeks 
to explain the artistic productions of men of genius— often 
regarded as something quite unique and Inexplicable — as a 
development of psychical events which universally control our 
imaginative Hfe. 

Of Brentano^s researches in metaphysics and in the theory of 
knowledge it must also be said that hitherto they remain still 
unpublished, though they are famiUar to a greater or smaller 
circle of disciples. In this latter sphere are to be mentioned 
particularly his inquiries respecting the mature of our insight 
into the law of causality, the logical justification of induction, 
the a priori nature of mathematics, and the nature of analytic 
judgments. In ontological questions also psychognosie has 
proved fruitful to the investigator in leading him to an under- 
standing and to an analysis based upon experience, of the most 
important metaphysical notions, as, for instance, causality, sub- 
stance, necessity, impossibihty, etc., notions which some, 
despairing of the task rightly insisted upon by Hume, of showing 
their origin to be based upon perception and experience, have 
sought to explain straight away as a priori categories. 

For the rest, Brentano, in regard to metaphysics, is a decided 
theist. He is an adherent of the theory of evolution, while 
denying that accidental variations and natural selection in the 
struggle for existence render explicable the phenomena of 



evolution and the teleological character of the organism, basing 
his objections, among other things, upon the fact that this attempt 
at a solution not only leaves unexplained the first beginnings of 
an organism, but also takes too Uttle account of the fact that 
with the increasing perfection and complication of the organism 
it becomes more and more improbable that an accidental varia- 
tion will lead to an improvement upon that which already exists. 
And yet if there is to be progress, the organisms which, in the 
struggle for existence, survive must not only be more perfect 
than those which perish, but also more perfect than the organ- 
isms through which they themselves are descended. 

Brentano's views on the historical development of philo- 
sophical inquiry and the causes determining that development; 
the present state of philosophy and its views regarding the 
future, he has set forth in various publications : Die Geschickte der 
PhUosophie im MittelaUer (Mohler's Kirchengeschichte^ vol. li. 
1868) ; Ober die Griinde der Entmutigung auf philosaphischem 
Gebiete (Vienna, 1874), delivered as an inaugural address on 
entering upon his work at Vienna University ; Was fur ein 
PhUosoph manchmal Epoche rnackt (Vienna, 1876) ; tJher die 
Zukunft der PhUosophie (Vienna, 1893); and Die vier Phasen 
der PhUosophie und ihr augenUicMicher Stand (Stuttgart, 1896). 

In the last work a concise survey is made of the entire course 
of the History of Philosophy, and it is there shown how in the 
three periods, rightly regarded as distinct (Greek Philosophy, 
the Philosophy of the Middle Ages, and Modern Philosophy), 
there is each time an analogous change, a rising or blossoming 
period, and three periods of decadence, of which those which 
succeed are always the psychologically necessary result of the 
preceding. That in so doing Brentano has characterized the 
latest phase of German philosophy, the so-called idealistic direc- 
tion from Kant to Hegel as the third or mystic period of de- 
cadence (howbeit with all due recognition of the talents of these 
writers) has naturally aroused violent opposition, though it has 
not found any real refutation. 

It has been already said that Brentano's earliest efforts were 
directed to historical inquiries and especially to a presentation 
of the Aristolelian psychology and to important sections of his 



Metaphysics. The results of these researches, diverging as they 
did in many respects from the traditional view, did not fail to 
awaken the attention of other investigators. Their attitude, 
however (with a few exceptions like Trendelenburg, and in part 
also Grote), was, on the whole, hostile and polemic. This was 
especially so in the case of E. Zeller, in the later edition of his 
Greek Philosophy, and in view of the reputation which this work 
enjoys, Brentano thought it necessary to offer, as against Zeller's 
attacks, at least with regard to one point, an apology for his own 
view, a point where the threads of metaphysics and psychology 
become most intimately related, and where at the same time, 
the contrast between the opposing views of these two writers in 
the psychological and metaphysical spheres alike culminate. 
And so there appeared in the Report of the Proceedings of the 
Imperial Academy of Sciences in Vienna (1882) Brentano's 
article : " Uber den Creatianismus des Aristoteles, in regard 
to which E. Zeller in the same year, in the Report of the Pro- 
ceedings of the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences in Berlin 
(vol. 49), published a detailed reply under the title : " Uber 
die Lehre des Aristoteles von der Ewigkeit des Geistes." The 
charge which is there made by Zeller against Brentano of inter- 
preting Aristotle without sufficient confirmation and with over- 
confidence, Brentano has sufficiently repelled in his Ojfener 
Brief an Herm Prof, Dr. E, Zeller (Leipzig, 1883), and the 
proofs which are here offered of the way in which Zeller, on his 
part, bases his own attempts at explanation and his charges 
against Brentano show distinctly that, if here one of the two 
opponents is really open to the charge of over-confidence, it is 
at any rate not Brentano. 

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, JHoufe, C. A.^8., 

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.'■ / ■ . • . ' ^- ■ ■ ' •■ , 

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ICC^LEm, 7* 
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Parker, Nella, 39. 
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Popowski, Joseph, 10. 
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Rait, R. S., 10, 44, 45. 
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Roosevelt, Theodore, 11. 

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Ryley, Rev. J. Buchanan, ii, 32. 

Sangermano, Father, 16. 

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Sichel, Editn, 12. 

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Skrine, J. Huntley, 32, 45. 

Slaughter, Frances, 34. 
Smim, Edward, 12. 
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Stoneclink (T. F. Dale), 6, 17, 34. 
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Tarver, J. C, 29. 
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Thomson, J. J., F.R.S., 29. 
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Tottel, R., 23. 

Townsend, Meredith, 12. 

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Trench, Herbert, 38. 

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Udall, Rbv. John, 24. 
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Vallery-Radot, R., 13. 
Vibart, Colonel Henry M., 13, 19. 
Villiers, George, 22. 

Waddbll, Surg.-Maj. J. A., 16. 

Walker, Charles, 17. 

Warren, Kate M., 28, 30. 

Watson, Thomas, 23. 

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Webbe, E., 22. 
W^be, WUliam, 23. 
Wesslau, O. E., 7. 
White, W. Hale, 42. 
White, Percy, 41. 
White, Stewart £.,41. 
Whiteway, R. S., 13. 
Wicksteed, Rev. P. H., 13, 43. 
Wigram, Percy, 7. 
Wilkinson, Spenser, 13, 18, 19. 
Wilson, A. J., 17- 
Wilson, J. M., M.A., 32. 
Wilson, Robert, 46. 
Wilson, Sarah, 32. 
Winslow, Anna Green, 13. 
Wood, Walter, 13. 

Young, Ernest, 16. 

Zimmermann, Dr. A., 50. 




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