Origins of the Triple Alliance : three lectures

ORIGINS OF THE TRIPLE
ALLIANCE

University of Virginia
Barbour-Pagc Foundation

ORIGINS OF THE TRIPLE
ALLIANCE

THREE LECTURES
BY

ARCHIBALD GARY COOLIDGE

PROFESSOR 01 HISTORY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY

NEW YORK

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
1919

£>

c

COPYRIGHT, 1917, BY
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

Published July, 1917

PREFACE

In January, 1916, I had the honor and
the pleasure of giving the Barbour-Page
lectures for that year at the University of
Virginia. The substance of those lec-
tures is reproduced in this little volume,
though there have been many changes in
the form besides the addition of foot-
notes. Any one who wishes to under-
stand even in a superficial way the causes
that have brought about the psesent
world conflict should familiarize himself
with the history of Europe since the
Franco-Prussian War, and should try to
grasp the interplay of political forces, the
aims of statesmen, and the aspirations of
peoples during that period. For the
greater part of the time the so-called
Triple Alliance was the strongest political
and military element in the international
situation. Its friends declared that it was
an element for peace; its enemies regarded

vi PREFACE

it as a conservative league to protect ill-
gotten gains. Although it dissolved when
brought to the touchstone of actual war,
its importance as an international factor
for many years makes it well worth our
study. In the following three chapters I
have tried to point out the causes, per-
sonal as well as international, that led
to its formation. I have not made any
startling discoveries, nor have I new the-
ories to put forth, but I believe I have
made use of the best accessible informa-
tion. Instead of St. Petersburg I ought
perhaps to have used the name Petrograd,
and I should have done so in speaking of
current affairs, but for those of the past
it still seems permissible to keep to the
older form. For the sake of brevity and
smoothness I have often used the word
Austria where Austria-Hungary or the
Dual Empire would have been more cor-
rect; but this, also, is, I think, condoned
by current usage.

June, 1917.

ORIGINS OF THE TRIPLE
ALLIANCE

THE ORIGINS OF THE
TRIPLE ALLIANCE

CHAPTER I

On May 10, 1871, the Peace of Frank-
fort was signed between the new French
republic and the still newer German em-
pire. This date may be regarded as
marking, in the conventional way that
dates do, the termination not only of
a great and dramatic war, but also of
a period of European history. With
the complete triumph of Germany over
France, accompanied by the overthrow
of what a few years before had seemed
the brilliantly successful government of
Napoleon III, with the proclamation at
Versailles of William of Prussia as Ger-
man emperor, with the entry of the
Italian troops into Rome, and the ex-

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

tinction of the age-long temporal sov-
ereignty of the Pope, Europe had within
a few months undergone such changes as
to constitute the end of an epoch and
the beginning of a new one. This new
epoch, which closes with the war of 1914,
may be described as that of the ascen-
dancy of Germany.

The Europe of 1871 was represented
and controlled, as it had been for cen-
turies, by certain great powers, jealous
indeed of one another and often in disa-
greement, but whose collective decision
once reached was in practice binding
upon the rest of the continent. The
composition of the group had varied
from time to time, and the relative
strength and influence of the different
members had been subject to continual
readjustment. They were six in number.
One of them, united Italy, had only just
come into existence and was hardly rec-
ognized by the rest as quite an equal.
Imperial Germany, on the other hand,

THE GREAT POWERS

was a political outgrowth of the kingdom
of Prussia, which had been a power for
more than a century, and now in its new
form, crowned with a halo of victories, it
had stepped from the last to the first
place among the great European states.
Three of the others, Russia, Austria, and
France, had been severely defeated in
war in the course of the last twenty years,
and of these none so disastrously as
France.

Ever since the days of Richelieu, for
well over two centuries, France had been,
with occasional eclipses, the first power
in the world. One coalition after an-
other had been necessary to check the
ambitions of Louis XIV. The last and
most formidable of all, though its armies,
led by Marlborough and Eugene, hum-
bled his pride and exhausted his resources,
did not succeed in preventing him from
seating his grandson on the throne of
Spain. Even the fatal reign of Louis XV,
with its loss of colonial empires in North

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

America and India, was marked by the
widest supremacy of the French language
and of French ideas. Politically, too,
France soon began to recover under his
successor and enjoyed a partial revenge
on England in the war of American inde-
pendence. Then followed the victories of
the Revolution, and the unexampled glo-
ries of the Napoleonic empire, when the
conquering soldiers of France entered the
gates of Berlin and Vienna, of Rome and
of Madrid and of Moscow. When at last
the tide turned and she was vanquished
by combined Europe, only a few years of
rest were necessary for her before she
again began to assert herself. A genera-
tion later, under Napoleon III, she was
victorious in the Crimea and in Italy,
and once more became the brilliant cen-
tre of Europe and the leading power in
international affairs.

Now all was changed. France had
been overwhelmingly defeated, this time
not by a coalition, but by a single foe, in

THE DEFEAT OF FRANCE

a war into which she had entered 'with a
light heart' and in which she had lost
every important battle. A large part of
her territory had been overrun, her capi-
tal had been entered by the victorious
enemy, she had had imposed upon her
the payment of an indemnity such as had
never been heard of in history. She was
deprived of her eastern provinces, Alsace
and part of Lorraine, with some 1,600,000
people, and she was left with a disad-
vantageous frontier unfortified against a
neighbor who had just given such fearful
evidence of his power. As a crowning
humiliation, she had to retake Paris itself
from the anarchistic government of the
Commune amid wild scenes of bloodshed,
and this under the very eyes of the Ger-
mans. In the midst of these disasters
she met with little compassion from the
outside world. Sympathy is the last
thing a vanquished nation may expect to
find, especially if it has excited envy in
the past. Instead, it is assured that it

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

has merited its fate by its faults, which
are pointed out to it with unsparing
frankness.

When we add to all this the fact that in
1871 the government of France was con-
fessedly only provisional, and the existing
republican form did not appear to satisfy
the wishes of the majority of the people,
though there was no telling just what
they did want, and finally when we re-
member that her birth rate had long been
declining and was lower than that of any
other country in Europe, we can see rea-
son enough for the widespread belief that
her sun had set and that henceforth she
must content herself with a secondary
place among nations. In any event, it
was hard to conceive that she could ever
again be the first state on the continent.

History records with admiration the
way in which the French people and their
rulers met and overcame the innumerable
difficulties that beset them, and in a sur-
prisingly short time brought order out of

THE RECOVERY OF FRANCE

chaos. Their most immediate and press-
ing task was the payment of the war in-
demnity, in order to obtain liberation of
French territory from the burden and
shame of foreign occupation. The huge
sums necessary for the purpose were
raised with a promptness that astonished
the world, and made the Germans regret
that they had not insisted on obtaining
more. Then followed the painful process
of recovery from the wounds inflicted by
the war, the arduous work of reconstruc-
tion, and especially the reconstitution of
the military strength of the country.
Not only did the building of a new chain
of fortresses on the exposed frontier cost
by itself many hundred million francs,
but the army had to be reorganized and
reenforced from top to bottom. Here,
too, the progress was soon such as to pro-
voke disquiet, not to say irritation, on the
part of the watchful neighbor to the east.
The question as to the final form of the
government of France remained open for

TEE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

some years, but in the meanwhile the
republicans, at first a minority in the na-
tion and a still smaller one among its
leading men, steadily gained ground.
The Conservatives, even after they had
brought about the fall of President Thiers,
were too divided among themselves to
profit by the majority they had in the
chambers, and in the end, against their
wills, they voted a republican constitu-
tion.

These circumstances imperatively de-
manded that the energies of France
should be devoted to internal affairs. In
consequence, the foreign policy of the
third republic was at first cautious, not
to say timorous, in the extreme, being
dominated by fear of Germany and by
the necessity of avoiding complications
of all kinds until the country should have
recovered its strength. This was no
time for France to take the initiative in
international questions, or, indeed, to do
much of anything, except keep on good

ITALY 9

terms with other powers, and, if she
could not make friends, at least avoid
giving offence.

Her Latin sister, the young kingdom
of Italy, was equally timid. Italian
unity had been achieved in large part
thanks to the assistance of stronger na-
tions, and thanks also to their quarrels
with one another. The coping stone of
the edifice, the acquisition of Rome as a
capital, had only been possible owing to
the withdrawal of the French army of
occupation after the first Prussian vic-
tories. This passing of the Eternal City
from the hands of the papacy, which had
ruled it for so many centuries, had created
a painful impression in the Catholic
world. It was, indeed, no secret that not
only in Austria and Germany, but also
among the Conservatives in France, there
were not a few who openly advocated the
restoration of the temporal authority of
the Pope, and were willing to use force to
bring this about. The fear of such inter-

io THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

vention was for many years a controlling
element in Italian foreign policy, and
combined with a sense of the weakness
and the backwardness of the new kingdom
to make its statesmen eminently cautious.
The Italians still professed their gratitude
for the aid France had given them on the
field of battle, but they were disposed to
claim that she had repaid herself by her
annexation of Nice and Savoy, an act
which they still resented. They had not
forgotten the French occupation of Rome,
and they feared the advent to power of
the clerical party in Paris. They were
also beginning to entertain ambitions of a
Mediterranean empire, ambitions which
could not fail to bring them some day
into disagreement if not actual collision
with their former benefactor. Austria
they regarded as a one-time hated op-
pressor, who still held Italians under her
rule, and was capable at any moment of
again menacing Italian unity and inde-
pendence.

ENGLAND n

Of the great European powers, Eng-
land was the one that had been least af-
fected by the recent convulsions on the
continent; indeed, her position in the
world had long been subject to fewer
variations than that of others. In the
course of the last four hundred years,
though often at war, she had met with but
one serious defeat, the war of American
independence. Even then, heavy as her
losses had been, they had brought little
direct gain to her rivals. England had
never dominated Europe, but she had al-
ways been a power of the first rank which
continental statesmen could not safely
leave out of account, though they some-
times affected to do so. She had reached
her highest point relatively in 1815, after
her triumph over Napoleon, whom she
had opposed so long, often single-handed.
In Nelson she had possessed perhaps the
greatest of all admirals, in Wellington she
had the one general who had been uni-
formly victorious over the French, and it

12 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

was her troops that had borne the brunt
of the fray in the crowning victory of
Waterloo. At that time she was not only
the first but in fact the only great mari-
time and colonial power; indeed, Britan-
nia ruled the waves more completely then
than ever before or since. In mechanical
invention, too, and in industrial progress,
she led mankind.

Since those days, however, her prestige
and political influence had somewhat
waned. It was not that Great Britain
had not made satisfactory progress. On
the contrary, in population, in industrial
development, in commerce, in wealth, she
had advanced without halt, and she had
added steadily to her vast colonial em-
pire. Nevertheless, her position in the
world, if imposing, was no longer com-
manding. Although she still held the
first place economically, other nations also
had modern industries and extensive sea-
going commerce. The British navy was
still the strongest in existence, but France

THE DECLINE OF BRITISH PRESTIGE 13

and the United States possessed powerful
fleets. British troops had won many vic-
tories over Orientals and savages, but
such successes have never made much
impression on foreign military opinion,
and in the Crimean war, the one struggle
where the English had had to face Euro-
pean opponents, though they fought with
their usual bravery, they did not display
equal competence, and in the later stages
they were completely cast into the shade
by the superior achievements of their
French allies. Not many people, even in
England, remember the name of the Eng-
lish general in command when Sebastopol
fell. On the continent there was a ten-
dency to depreciate the British army, and
to regard it as something good enough
against enemies of inferior civilization,
but not the equal of troops trained to
meet more scientific foes.

In the ten years preceding 1871, Eng-
land had several times been on the verge
of war with other great powers — with the

14 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

United States over the Trent affair and
over the question of the Confederate
cruisers, with Russia over the Polish in-
surrection of 1863, and with the German
states over the Schleswig-Holstein ques-
tion. In the Trent affair, the demand of
England had been acceded to, but in the
other cases she had suffered some hu-
miliation. She was still harassed by the
question of the Alabama claims, which,
as later arbitrated, ended in a triumph
for the United States; she had encouraged
the Polish revolt by joint diplomatic in-
tervention with France in its behalf, but
as she was unwilling to go to the point of
war, she had to submit to being severely
snubbed by Russia, while the Poles were
in the end left worse off than ever; and in
the question of Schleswig-Holstein, she
had likewise failed altogether to make
good her words by action. Of late, espe-
cially since the disappearance from the
scene of the bumptious figure of Lord
Palmerston, the foreign policy of England

ENGLISH FOREIGN POLICY 15

had been unaggressive and inclined to
mind its own business.

During the Franco-Prussian war Eng-
lish public opinion had been in the main
favorable to the Germans. This was not
due to any especial love for them, though
there was much respect for Prussia, but
Englishmen had sympathized with the
i achievement of German unity, and for
some years they had disliked and dis-
trusted their former ally, Emperor Napo-
leon III. The way, too, in which the war
had apparently been brought about had
prejudiced many against France, as had
Bismarck's timely revelations of French
desires for the acquisition of Belgium.
The first victories of the German armies
were, therefore, generally applauded. It
is true that, after the overthrow of
the Second Empire, the heroic efforts of
France to retrieve her desperate fortunes
and the severity of the terms of peace
imposed upon her produced a certain
reaction in her favor, but, as a whole,

i6 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

English feeling toward the new German
empire was one of cordiality and frank
admiration. There seemed to be no im-
portant matters about which the interests
of the two peoples were likely to conflict,

/ and the relations between the two courts
were intimate. Prince Albert of Saxe-
Coburg, the beloved husband of Queen
Victoria, had been a patriotic German,
and their daughter was now married to
Crown Prince Frederick, the heir to the
new imperial throne.

j The only power which England viewed
with suspicion and hostility was Russia;
indeed, there had been little improvement
in the relations between the two countries
since the Crimean war. The events con-
nected with the Polish insurrection, the
renewal of Russian activity in Asia, and
particularly the repudiation by Russia of
the article in the Treaty of Paris that
limited her freedom of action in the Black
Sea, had aroused British anger and deep-
ened British distrust of a state whose de-

ENGLAND AND RUSSIA 17

signs were deemed to be full of menace
to the interests of the British empire.

Russia under Tsar Alexander II had
profited by the bitter experiences of the
Crimean war to put her house in order.
Public opinion, from the emperor down,
had realized that the country was in
need of drastic changes, and that all re-
forms must be based on the fundamental
one of the abolition of serfdom. This,
perhaps the greatest legislative act in the
history of mankind, had been formally
proclaimed on March 3, 1861. It had
been carried out with the enthusiastic
support of all that was best in the nation
and had been followed up by the insti-
tution of provincial councils and by other
measures of far-reaching importance that
should help to create a new Russia. But,
as was inevitable in a work of such mag-
nitude, there had been numerous mis-
takes in matters of detail, and the first
enthusiasm of the public was succeeded
by disappointment. The government,

i8 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

too, alarmed at some of the results of its
own policy, had of late grown reactionary,
and had thereby aroused increasing dis-
content among the liberal elements of
society. In her absorption in the work
of internal regeneration and also in that
of reconstituting her military strength,
Russia had for fifteen years withdrawn
from active participation in international
questions. She had taken no share in the
events that led to the liberation of Italy
and to the unification of Germany. She
had, it is true, watched with lively satis-
faction the defeat and humiliation of
Austria, whose ungrateful hostility at the
time of the Crimean war she had not
forgiven. For a while she had seemed
to seek closer relations with France, but
the threat of French intervention during
the Polish insurrection, in contrast with
the ostentatious friendship of Prussia at
this juncture, had led to a reawakening of
Russian nationalism and thrown Alexan-
der II into the embrace of his kinsman

RUSSIA AND GERMANY ig

in Berlin. The Tsar had not only drunk
to the success of German arms at the
time of the Franco-Prussian war, he had
likewise made no secret of the intention
of Russia to intervene in case Austria
should ally herself to France. In return,
Russia, with the complicity of Bismarck,
had profited by the French disasters to
abrogate the Black Sea clause in the
Treaty of Paris in defiance of England
and Austria, who had protested angrily,
but in the end could only sanction* what
they were unable to prevent. In 1871
official relations between Berlin and St.
Petersburg were of the most cordial na-
ture, and personal ones were closer still.
To be sure, the former friendship of the
two chancellors, Gorchakov and Bis-
marck, had cooled down in the course of
time — neither of the two was sentimental
in such matters — but real ties of affection
bound together Tsar Alexander and his
uncle, Kaiser William.

* At the London Conference in 1871.

20 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

Austria-Hungary had within a few
years undergone profound changes, both
external and internal. When Francis Jo-
seph had come to the throne on December
2, 1848, his territories were in the throes
of revolutions that threatened the very
existence of his empire. Thanks, how-
ever, to able generals and ministers, and
still more thanks to the assistance of Rus-
sia, he had triumphed over Italians, Hun-
garians, and other insurgents, and had
been able to resume his absolute author-
ity. The German Confederation was re-
established, with Austria once more as its
leading member, and presently Russia, an
all too powerful friend, was defeated in
the Crimean war, while Austria took the
opportunity to "astonish the world by
her ingratitude." But this period of suc-
cess had been short-lived. In 1859, Aus-
tria had been expelled by the French from
Italy, save for the Trentino and the prov-
ince of Venetia, and had been forced to
tolerate the growth of a united Italian

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

state. Seven years later, by the battle of
Sadowa, she lost Venetia, and had also to
submit to being excluded from Germany,
to which her own German territories had
belonged by race and history ever since
they had come into existence. Her sys-
tem of centralized despotic rule had now
broken down, and disaffection was rife
throughout the empire.

It was high time for a change of policy.
The imperial government turned to the
strongest of the discontented elements,
the Hungarians, and offered to meet their
wishes. In the negotiations that ensued
the Hungarian leaders showed themselves
much the shrewder of the two parties.
The agreement reached, the so-called
Ausgleich, was highly favorable to them,
for they succeeded in obtaining not only
a liberal constitution for their kingdom,
but a complete ascendancy for the Mag-
yar race over all other elements in it, and
a reincorporation in it of the province of
Croatia, thus dividing and weakening the

22 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

South Slavs. Hungary, though the less
populous of the two halves of the mon-
archy, was granted equal rights with
Austria in every respect, except in the
language of the army, and she soon ob-
tained and has kept more than an equal
influence in the management of foreign
affairs. The least statesmanlike part of
the new constitution was the provision
that the Ausgleich should hold good only
for periods of ten years at a time, and
should then be renewed by fresh agree-
ment. It is in human nature that such
renewals can only be reached after sharp
bargaining, and that every ten years the
Dual Empire is threatened with a crisis.
Just before the outbreak of the Franco-
Prussian war, Austria had been in nego-
tiation with France for an alliance that
should bring her revenge against Prussia.
The plan had come to nothing, owing to
the opposition of the Hungarians, the
attitude of Russia, and the sudden com-
pleteness of the German victories. Aus-

GERMANY 23

tria quickly saw the error of her ways, and
was anxious for reconciliation with her
old rival and recently triumphant foe.

All that France had lost in the disas-
trous war of 1870, and more, Germany
had gained. The position of Napoleon III
at the height of his fortunes had never ap-
proached that attained by his victorious
adversary, William of Prussia, now Ger-
man emperor. The rank of the Germans
as one of the great peoples of Europe had
long been secure. Their achievements in
many fields ever since they had over-
thrown the Roman empire had assured
them a foremost place in the history of
the world, and though after the close of
their period of splendid accomplishments
in the middle ages they had lost their po-
litical eminence, they had given repeated
proof of their vitality and genius. Dur-
ing the last hundred years they had gained
fresh distinction in many fields of human
endeavor. German literature could show
names that rivalled any in the literature

24 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

of England or of France; German music
had surpassed the glory of the Italian;
German philosophy, with its cluster of
celebrities of the first rank, had not been
equalled since the days of ancient Greece;
German science had already come to be
regarded as second to none; German uni-
versities, as the models of learning and
advanced thought, were attracting stu-
dents from all over the civilized world.
Even German military prestige, some-
what tarnished with time, had received
fresh lustre from the exploits of Frederick
the Great. Since his day, however, it had
hardly gained, for Waterloo, where the
English had done most of the fighting, did
not more than efface the memories of
Jena, and the Germans as a whole had
the reputation of being not so much a
people of soldiers as of thinkers and poets.
In one respect Germany had been for
centuries a conspicuous failure. Her peo-
ple, though not devoid of national feeling
and pride, had long seemed unable to form

GERMANY 35

any real political union. Her magnificent
empire of the middle ages had disinte-
grated into a mass of disjointed frag-
ments, many of them ridiculously small,
and tempting to the cupidity of their
neighbors. The wars of the French Rev-
olution had, indeed, swept most of these
petty states into the melting-pot, and the
final rising against Napoleon had taken
on the character of a true national move-
ment, but the hopes of patriots had been
bitterly disappointed after the overthrow
of the oppressor. Left to themselves,
that is to say, to their governments, the
Germans had been able only to produce
a confederation helpless for any effective
purpose, and one whose two chief mem-
bers watched each other with constant
jealousy and seldom combined except to
put pressure on the others. The story
of the abortive] risings of 1848, and the
lamentable fiasco of the Parliament of
Frankfort appeared to set the seal on
German political incapacity.

26 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

Now all was changed. Prussia in six
years had fought three successful wars.
The first of these, it is true, had been
against so weak a foe that it could bring
but little glory, but in the second Austria
had been defeated in six weeks, and in the
third two great French armies had been
forced to surrender, others had been re-
peatedly defeated, Paris had had to yield
to a siege, and at Versailles, in the halls
that had witnessed the splendors of Louis
XIV, there had been proclaimed a new
German empire, which seemed to rec-
oncile the conflicting claims of the au-
tonomy of the smaller states and of the
necessary predominance of Prussia, the
principle of a strong monarchical author-
ity and a modern parliament based on
universal suffrage. The political achieve-
ment was as remarkable as the military.
No wonder that the world was filled with
astonishment and admiration. "Eu-
rope," it was said, "has lost a mistress
and got a master." * Not only was the

* Morley's Gladstone, ii, p. 357.

BISMARCK. 27

victorious German army without ques-
tion the most powerful in existence and
under the command of the first general in
Europe, but the destinies of the new em-
pire were directed by the great statesman
who had forged it 'with blood and iron/
Prince Otto von Bismarck.

In 1871, the German chancellor was
fifty-six years of age. Though somewhat
fatigued by his labors, he was at the
height of his extraordinary intellectual
powers. Since the days of the first Na-
poleon, no man in Europe had been so
feared and admired. Even his enemies—
and he had many of them — did not ven-
ture to question his genius. His domi-
nant personality, his gift of caustic ex-
pression, the apparent reckless frankness,
nay, the very brutality of his utterances,
fascinated and subjugated those with
whom he came into contact. Born for
strife, he passionately resented opposi-
tion, and was a good hater who seldom
forgot an injury. The difficulties he had
to overcome in winning over his master

28 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

to his opinions — for William of Hohen-
zollern, who took a serious view of his
rights and duties as a sovereign, was not
easy to convince — and the resistance that
he not infrequently met with at the hands
of the parties in the Reichstag, or of the
military authorities, or of hostile influ-
ences at court, at times so irritated Bis-
marck's nerves as to menace a breakdown
of his health and render intercourse with
him difficult. Ever and anon he would
threaten to resign; but, except at certain
critical moments, we may question the
seriousness of his intention. His master,
though sometimes angry enough with
him, recognized the immense services that
he had rendered, and had no thought of
letting him go.

Like other statesmen of the first rank,
Bismarck followed in the main a simple
policy, even if his contemporaries could
not be expected to realize this. He was
infinitely resourceful in detail, keeping
open various possibilities and ready to

BISMARCK 29

change on the instant, if need be, from
one course of action to another; he was
never off his guard, and was constantly
puzzling and bewildering his opponents;
but at bottom his aims and ambitions
were not complicated. Now that Ger-
man unity had been achieved in the form
he desired, with Prussian supremacy and
the exclusion of Austria, now that France
had been defeated and deprived of her
German territories, he regarded his crea-
tion as complete. Henceforth it was not
his object to add to the stately fabric he
had erected. He confined himself to
strengthening it and to putting it in a
position to weather future storms. He
strove to consolidate the new empire, to
make its inhabitants feel its advantages,
to win over the discontented elements, to
stimulate its economic development, to
keep up its military strength at the high-
est point of ' efficiency, but there is no
proof that he seriously harbored designs
of further extending its borders. Here

30 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

we have one of his remarkable character-
istics. In spite of successes sufficient to
turn the coolest head, his ambitions re-
mained what they had been, and in spite
of the aggressiveness of his manner and
the roughness, if need be, of his means,
he was essentially a moderate as well as
a conservative. The most famous proof
of this in his career was his single-handed
opposition to the desire of the king and
of the whole Prussian army to exact ter-
ritory from Austria after the victory of
Sadowa. By a desperate effort he had tri-
umphed, and his countrymen have since
been unanimous in recognizing the ex-
traordinary wisdom of his views on this
occasion. Toward France he did not dis-
play and could not be expected to display
the same moderation, but he had serious
doubts as to the advisability of taking the
French part of Lorraine. In this case he
yielded to the arguments of the military
authorities, perhaps thinking that as
France would be irreconcilable anyway,

BISMARCK 31

it was needless to try to conciliate her.
Even admitting that his imagination may
occasionally have played with the possi-
bility of fresh conquests,* the policy he
followed in his later years was one of
peace. As a statesman he belonged to
the school of Frederick the Great and of
Talleyrand, not to that of Napoleon. He
lacked, indeed, a certain kind of imagina-
tion, and this sometimes prevented his
understanding the forces opposed to him.
Thus in the famous Kulturkampf, which
was soon to break out, he long failed to
grasp the real strength of the modern

* Beust, Aus drci Fiertel-Jahrhunderten, ii, pp. 480, 48 1 . (At
Gastein, August, 1871): "We also spoke of the German prov-
inces of Austria, and Prince Bismarck strongly disclaimed any
desire of acquiring these provinces for the German Em-
pire. ... I do not question the sincerity of these objections,
but I cannot forget another circumstance in connection with
this subject. 'I would rather,' Bismarck told me, 'annex
Holland to Germany.' When I entered, some months later,
on my post as ambassador in London, the new Dutch am-
bassador, with whom I had formerly been acquainted, arrived
at the same time. He had hitherto been ambassador in
Berlin. The first thing he told me was that Bismarck had
reassured him as to the rumor that Germany wished to annex
Holland, by saying that he would greatly prefer the German
provinces of Austria."

32 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

Catholic church. When he did make the
discovery, he extricated himself with his
usual skill from a situation that had
grown too difficult. In spite of brave
words, he ended by going to Canossa, but
he did not do so until he had assured
himself of a very different reception
from Henry IV's, and of picking up a
good many advantages from the journey.
Though a conservative and an aristocrat,
he took the initiative in legislation to
ameliorate the condition of the laboring
classes, and set an example to Europe for
measures of state socialism; but he re-
garded the socialists themselves with the
most narrow-minded intolerance. Geo-
graphically, his outlook was limited, reach-
ing little beyond the European continent.
Even England he never completely under-
stood, and he looked on the Eastern Ques-
tion as one that did not touch Germany
directly and that, therefore, she should
keep out of. For lands farther away he
cared nothing at all. Great as he was, he

BISMARCK 33

was not in his visions ahead of his times;
indeed, if anything, he rather lagged be-
hind them. He had treated the Great
Germany idea of 1848 as a foolish Uto-
pia, and he never foresaw that the gen-
eration after his own would come to feel
that the German unity he had founded
was not complete when it left twenty
million Germans outside of its domain.
Nor did he realize that the industrial de-
velopment of the empire which he favored
and stimulated, breaking a few years later
with his liberal supporters and turning
from Free Trade to Protection, would
with its vast increase of German com-
merce and shipping lead to the building
up of a large navy. He believed such a
navy to be a useless and dangerous lux-
ury. In his old age he yielded to a public
opinion that had gone beyond him, and
entered upon a policy of the acquisition
of German colonies, but although in the
diplomatic controversies to which his ac-
tion gave rise he held his own with his

34 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

accustomed skill and aggressiveness, he
had no ambition for a colonial empire; he
only cared for trading-posts, and he
grudged expense even for them.

In 1871 the relations of Germany with
the other European powers were in the
main satisfactory. England Bismarck
did not like, and he resented British influ-
ence at the German court, as represented
particularly by the Crown Princess of
Prussia. In discussions with England his
tone was frequently sharp rather than
conciliatory, and he regarded her as being
too much interested in her commerce and
in her colonial affairs, and too unreliable
under democratic influences, to be a state
that could be counted upon. At the
same time he did not feel that her inter-
ests were antagonistic to those of Ger-
many, and would have deemed a serious
quarrel with her to be unnecessary and
foolish. With Russia Germany was on
intimate terms, even if the personal rela-
tions between the two chancellors were

BISMARCK 35

perhaps not quite so friendly as they once
had been. With Austria the first steps
to a reconciliation had already been
taken; with Italy there was no cause for
dispute. The one land whose enmity
must be accepted as a permanent fact and
appreciated accordingly was France.

With his usual sound judgment, Prince
Bismarck realized that France could not
be expected to forgive and forget the war
of 1870. Her loss in prestige and position
were in themselves hard enough for a
proud nation to bear, though time might
heal the ordinary wounds of the conflict,
including in this case the payment of a
huge war indemnity. But the loss of
Alsace-Lorraine was not a thing that a
people like the French could accept as
final, at least for a generation, and as
long as it was not accepted there would
always be Frenchmen who would wish to
seize the first favorable opportunity for a
guerre de revanche. This being so, Bis-
marck wasted no time in laments or illu-

36 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

sions, but faced the situation and shaped
his plans accordingly. He was willing,
when it suited his purposes, to assume a
polite, nay, even a benevolent, attitude
toward France, though often his tone was
much the reverse, but as she was always
a possible enemy, his policy was in the
first place to keep her weak and occupied
with home affairs, and in the second to
keep her isolated.

With these objects in view, he favored
for France a republic as the form of gov-
ernment that would suit him best. Court
circles in Berlin, like the rest of aristo-
cratic and conservative Europe, would
have preferred to see a Bourbon or an
Orleans prince restored to the French
throne, but such sentimentality did not
affect Bismarck. He believed that a
French republic would be weak and prob-
ably distracted, therefore not in a posi-
tion to desire a war, still less to carry one
on successfully, whereas a prince, whether
a Bourbon or an Orleans or a Bonaparte,

BISMARCK 37

would feel the need of strengthening his
position by gaining the prestige which
only a successful war could give him.
Undeterred, therefore, by court influ-
ences, the chancellor showed himself
friendly toward the French republicans,
and he even seems to have had a liking for
his old acquaintance, President Thiers.
When the German ambassador in Paris,
Count Harry von Arnim, attempted a
policy of his own not in accordance with
the prescribed one, he was recalled from
his post, tried on a charge of retaining
state papers in his own possession, and
his career was blasted.

But there was a still stronger reason
why Bismarck wished to see a republican
government in France. He was con-
vinced that a republic would find it much
more difficult than a monarchy to secure
alliances with the other great states of
the continent, all of which were monar-
chies. As against France alone, the Ger-
man empire bade fair to be able hence-

38 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

forth to hold its own. It was already the
stronger power of the two, and, owing to
the difference in birth rate, the disparity
between them would become steadily
greater. What he feared was an anti-
German coalition, and almost any com-
bination of this kind appeared to him
conceivable. To the world at large such
a danger might appear remote enough.
The German empire was not only so for-
midable that no other country would
lightly dream of attacking it, it was also
on better terms with the others than was
its weak, distracted neighbor. But this
was not enough for Bismarck. Some
years later, in answer to the charge, "You
have the nightmare of coalitions," he said,
"Yes, necessarily." * He remembered
that even the genius of Frederick the
Great would not have sufficed to save
Prussia in the Seven Years' war but for
the timely death of the most dangerous

* Conversation with Count P. Shuvalov. Gedanken und
Erinnerungen, ii, p. 224.

BISMARCK 39

of the king's enemies, the Empress Eliza-
beth. And a new alliance of these same
powers — Russia, Austria, and France —
that had so nearly brought Prussia to de-
struction in the eighteenth century, was
not unthinkable against Germany in the
nineteenth. Nor was this the only peril.
In 1870 Austria and Italy had both
been disposed to draw the sword against
Prussia. A little more diplomatic skill
and willingness to make concessions on
the part of Napoleon III, or a French
victory or two at the outset of the war,
might well have led to a triple alliance
with which even the armies of von Moltke
would have found it difficult to cope, ex-
cept, perhaps, with Russian assistance, an
assistance that would have had to be paid
for some day. It was true that since Ger-
many had triumphed, Austria and Italy
had hastened to express their friendliness
and to put far from them all thoughts
of hostility. Bismarck's old antagonist,
Count Beust, was now anxious to be his

40 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

friend. But the chancellor had a good
memory, and he looked further ahead than
the mere present, however glorious. The
friends of today had been the enemies of
yesterday, and might be the enemies
of tomorrow. No precautions could be
too great in such vital matters. At the
time these fears appeared without foun-
dation, but the events of recent years
have shown their extraordinary fore-
sight.

The policy of Bismarck, accordingly,
was to keep France isolated by every
means at his command, both direct and
indirect. Whether he happened to be on
bad terms with the government at Paris
and addressing it in a menacing tone, or
whether he seemed indifferent and openly
contemptuous, or whether he was just
then conciliatory and willing to do favors,
he never relaxed in his efforts to prevent
the republic from finding an ally in any
other great power. Circumstances aided
him, and as long as he remained at the

THE HOLY ALLIANCE 41

helm, France did not succeed in emerging
from her isolation.

The obvious way for Germany to avoid
all danger of a hostile coalition was to
become, herself, a member of some alli-
ance so strong that it would have noth-,
ing to fear from any number of foes. In j
the memory of men then living, there had
been a league which, after it had over-
thrown the Corsican conqueror of Europe,
had dominated the continent and had
maintained law and order often by the
mere terror of its name and the knowl-
edge of the immense forces at its disposal.
The union of Russia, Austria, and Prus-
sia, given a mystical consecration in 1815
by the so-called Holy Alliance, had lasted
for more than a generation. There had
been occasional friction between its mem-
bers, and even an interruption of good re-
lations in 1829, owing to divergences over
the Eastern Question, but the Revolution
of 1830 in Paris had brought the three con-
servative powers together once more, and

42 "CHE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

they lived in substantial harmony until
the outbreak of the Crimean war. Since
that event, to be sure, intercourse be-
tween Austria and Russia had been
devoid of cordiality, and Prussia and
Austria had actually fought against one
another in 1866, but first Russia and
then Austria had had her lesson and had
learned by it. In the defeat and humilia-
tion of Austria, Russia had her revenge for
Austrian ingratitude, which she was now
willing to forget. Austria, on her part,
after her own disasters and that of France,
was in a somewhat perilous position, in
view of the permanent ill will of Italy and
the close friendship between Berlin and
St. Petersburg. The counsel of wisdom
suggested that she should break with the
past, and, frankly accepting her present
situation, should forgive and forget what-
ever grievances she had entertained against
her two former partners. Instead, there-
fore, of showing resentment when the
new empire was proclaimed at Versailles,

LEAGUE OF THE THREE EMPERORS 43

Austria gave assurances of her entire sat-
isfaction and of her desire to be on the
best of terms with the Germany to which
she had ceased to belong.

This was what Bismarck wanted, and
he now reaped the reward for his modera-
tion in 1866. No other combination pos-
sessed such attractions for him as the
binding together of the old allies into a
new League of the Three Emperors. For,
as long as this league should last, FrericK
schemes of a revanche would be innocuous.
It would represent, too, not merely a vast
military force, but, as in the past, a
grouping of the conservatives of Europe.
And Bismarck, like his master, was thor-
oughly conservative. He had never at
heart renounced the principles which as a
Prussian Junker he had proudly defended
in his early days. Even if he had more
than once made use of revolutionary
forces when they suited his purposes and
had accepted universal suffrage as part of
the foundations of the new German em-

44 TEE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

pire, to the great realist these were but
means to his ends, and he used them
without scruple when convenient. None
the less, he remained a conservative.
He could maintain good relations with
republics, nay, he preferred one in France,
but his natural friends were the cham-
pions of the altar and the throne, the long-
established guardians of law and order,
the governments that ruled their people,
not those that were ruled by them.* It
seemed wise, too, in view of the recent
alarming growth of international social-
ism, for the conservative powers of Eu-
rope to forget their dissensions and once
more emphasize the solidarity of their
permanent interests.

On August n, 1871, at Ischl in Austria,
/ the German emperor paid a visit to Em-
peror Francis Joseph. A few days later
their chancellors, Prince Bismarck and
Count Beust, came together in confer-
ence and discussed the relations of the

* Gedanken und Erinnerungen, ii, p. 229.

ANDRASSY 45

two empires, and interchanged expres-
sions of mutual good will. But the feud
between the two men in the past had been
too bitter for them to have any real con-
fidence in one another. It was only when
Beust, the Saxon, had been succeeded as
foreign minister for the Dual Empire by ]
Andrassy, the Magyar, that intimate re-
lations became possible between the Ball-
platz and Wilhelmstrasse. In his earlier
years, Count Julius Andrassy had been
officially hanged in effigy as a rebel and
traitor. He was now the representative
of the triumph of Hungary as well as of
the new direction of Austrian policy. In
1870, when Hungarian prime minister, he
had strongly opposed Austrian participa-
tion in the war between Prussia and
France. He was also on good personal
terms with Bismarck. We have it on his
own authority that from the start he
aimed at obtaining for Austria admission '
as a third party into the intimacy that
existed between Russia and Germany,

46 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

and then at the gradual supplanting of
Russia in German good graces.*

But even before the fall of Beust, the
next step had been taken toward draw-
ing together the two empires. On Sep-
tember 7 Emperor Francis Joseph re-
turned at Salzburg the visit that had been
paid him at Ischl. Etiquette demanded
that the next visit should be paid by the
Austrian emperor in Germany, and policy
required that it should be in Berlin, the
capital now not only of William the
Prussian king, but of William the Ger-
man emperor. This public tribute to the
new empire of his Hohenzollern rival
must have cost not a little to the pride of
the heir of the Hapsburgs, whose house
had so long borne the imperial crown.
But whatever the sacrifice was, Francis
Joseph resolved to make it. Friendly re-
lations could be had on no other terms.
It was arranged, therefore, that he should
come to Berlin in state, accompanied by

* Wertheimer, Graf Julius Andrdssy, Hi, p. 226.

THE THREE EMPERORS AT BERLIN 47

his new foreign minister, who had already
had a meeting with Bismarck.

The news of the intended visit may well
have awakened some apprehension and
jealousy at St. Petersburg, as perhaps
foreshadowing a change in Prussian, now
German, policy. At any rate, it was not
for the interest of Russia to see herself
supplanted at Berlin in her position of
best friend. For this or for other rea-
sons, Tsar Alexander, when informed offi-
cially of what was to take place, asked:
"Why am I not wanted, too?"* Of
course, there could be but one answer,
and with all speed he was sent a cordial
invitation.

From the 5th to the I ith of September,
1872, the three emperors and their foreign
ministers met in the German capital amid
high festival, while Europe looked on
and wondered what might be the intent

* The Tsar was urged to take this step in a confidential letter
he received from his former German teacher, Schneider. It is
possible that Bismarck instigated the letter.

48 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

and the scope of their conversations.
These conversations resulted in a gen-
eral agreement, but the entente thus
concluded did not take the form of a
written alliance. The sovereigns and
their ministers, instead of formal confer-
ences, held a number of separate inter-
views, during which they exchanged ex-
pressions of good will and assurances of
mutual support. They also explained
their policies to one another and made
clear that there was nothing in the inten-
tions of any one of them to which the
others might fairly object. The attitude
of Austria was naturally more reserved
than that of Russia and of Germany, for
she was in the position of a former enemy
just admitted to the society of two old
friends.* Nevertheless, the Austrians had
no cause for complaint in the way they
were received, and they were, or fancied
they were, the objects of more popular
acclamation than the Russians.f

* Broglie, La Mission de M. de Gontaut-Biron, p. 45.
f Wertheimer, ii, p. 77.

GERMANY, RUSSIA, AND AUSTRIA 49

The old league of the three great con-
servative European states was thus re-
constituted, more powerful, more impos-
ing, than ever. Again it dominated the
continent. Not only was the combined
strength of its armies incomparably supe-
rior to any force that could be brought
against them, but as long as it lasted each
of its members could feel safe against at-
tack by land. But there was one very
important new feature to the league.
The relative position of the three allies
had changed profoundly since the days
they had first gone hand in hand with
each other. When, in 1815, Tsar Alex-
ander I had formed the Holy Alliance,
there was no doubt that he was its most
powerful sovereign and leading spirit,
even if in subsequent years he came under
the influence of the Austrian chancellor,
Prince Metternich. In the time of Nich-
olas I the primacy of Russia was clearer
still, so much so that after 1849 Austria
and Prussia were almost in a dependent
position. Prussia, indeed, had through-

So THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

out been the weakest of the three allies, a
docile follower of the other two; she had
never taken the lead in their joint policy.

In 1872 the situation in this respect was
different. It was evident to the whole
world that the mightiest of the three em-
pires was that of Germany and the first of
their statesmen was the German chan-
cellor. It was Germany that had brought
together the other two members of the
league, and it was in Berlin that the gen-
eral reconciliation had been effected.
Whatever else this renewal of former in-
timacies might mean, it meant without
question one more brilliant achievement
for the policy of Prince Bismarck.

The next few months served to
strengthen his position even more. In
May, 1873, together with his sovereign
and with von Moltke, he paid a visit to
St. Petersburg, where he found many old
acquaintances from his days as Prussian
minister there eleven years before. He
now came as the lion of the hour, enter-

BISMARCK AT ST. PETERSBURG 51

tained and run after by all the highest so-
ciety of the city. In return he had no
hesitation in recognizing the debt that he
and his country owed to Russia, and is
said to have declared before his depar-
ture: "Si j'admettais seulement la pensee
d'etre jamais hostile a TEmpereur et a
la Russie, je me considererais comme un
traitre." * His master went even further
and concluded a treaty of alliance with
Alexander II, which was countersigned
by the two field-marshals, von Moltke
and Bariatinski, but to which Bismarck
refused to append his signature, giv-
ing as his excuse that he objected to
"binding conventions in circumstances
where there was as yet no positive object
in view."f Almost immediately after the
departure of their German guests, Tsar
Alexander and Prince Gorchakov went by
invitation to visit the Vienna Exhibition
of 1873. Fresh expressions of good will

* Tatishchev, Alexander II, ii, p. 100.

t Moritz Buscb, Bismarck, some Secret Pages, ii, pp. 480, 481.

52 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

were exchanged, matters of common in-
terest were discussed in the most amicable
spirit, and an agreement was concluded
which may be regarded as a counterpart
of the one between Russia and Germany
at St. Petersburg.* Emperor William,
I also, in his turn came to Vienna, and an-
: other distinguished guest appeared in the
person of Victor Emmanuel, king of the
Italy so long bitterly hostile to Austria,
and so recently united at her expense.
His visit showed at least a desire to estab-
lish better relations between the two
states; and as he followed it up with one
to Berlin, where he met with a cordial
reception, the Italian kingdom seemed to
be following in the orbit of the three em-
pires. Great Britain, though unenthusi-
astic, was friendly; France could only
look on, lonely and helpless.

The diplomatic triumph of Bismarck
was thus complete, and he could have lit-
tle to fear from any foreign quarter. At

* Wcrtheimer, ii, p. 89.

THE KULTURKAMPF 53

home, on the other hand, matters were
not going to his taste, for he was in the
thick of a struggle with the Catholic
church, the so-called Kulturkampf, a con-
flict into which he had entered without
realizing the enormous latent power of his
adversary. The more deeply he became
involved, the worse became the difficulties
that it brought upon him, and the less
the prospect of a satisfactory issue. This
told upon his nerves. He was also much
irritated by the opposition he encoun-
tered in various other quarters, and he
especially resented the intrigues, real or
imaginary, spun against him by the
Empress Augusta and her friends. His
health, as well as his temper, was affected
by all this; so that he more than once
threatened to resign, and perhaps seri-
ously thought of doing so.

Meanwhile the rapid recovery of France
had first astonished and then angered and
alarmed the Germans. The French had
paid off their tremendous war indemnity

54 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

with unexpected facility; and now that
their territory was evacuated by the en-
emy, they were building up, in spite of
the storms of their internal politics, a new
army on a firmer basis and a larger scale
than ever before. This army was in-
tended primarily for purposes of defence
— French policy in those days was nothing
if not timid — and it was still no match
for that of Germany. Nevertheless, this
too rapid recuperation awakened displea-
sure and anxiety, especially among the
German military authorities, who were
inclined to argue that, however peaceful
the intentions of France might be for the
moment, yet, as she had not abandoned
the hope of getting back Alsace-Lorraine,
she would profit by the first favorable op-
portunity to undertake a war of revenge.
Granting that such was the case, would it
not be wise for Germany to provoke a
conflict now, before France had recov-
ered her full strength or had found an
ally, and then, after defeating her a second

THE WAR SCARE OF 1875 55

time, to impose upon her terms that
would render her harmless for the future ?
Such reasoning was not unnatural, and
there is little question that both at this
time and later several of the military
leaders, including von Moltke himself,
desired another war. On the other hand,
there is no ground for thinking that the
emperor had any intentions of the sort.
He wished to end his days in peace. Bis-
marck's position is not so clear. Several
times in his memoirs and elsewhere he
expressed his disapproval of 'preventive
wars/ On some other occasions his tone
was different.*

Early in 1875, Europe was startled by a
sudden war scare, an episode whose true
significance has not been entirely cleared
up to the present day. In February

_ * Denkvriirdigkeiten des Fursten Hohenlohe-Schillingsf first,
\\, p. 107 (February 18, 1874): "Bismarck: 'We want to keep
the peace; but if France goes on arming so that she is to be
ready in five years, and bent on war at the end of that time,
then we will declare war in three years.' This he had told
them quite plainly."

$6 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

Count von Radowitz, one of the trusted
servants of the chancellor, and newly
appointed minister to Greece, was des-:
patched on a special mission to St. Pe-
tersburg. According to Bismarck's un-
convincing later explanation, he was sent
to straighten out certain matters in the
machinery of the diplomatic relations
between the two capitals. It has been
charged, however, and there is reason for
believing, that the real object of the mis-
sion was to obtain for Germany, in return
for a promise of support in the Eastern
Question, a free hand from Russia in case
of war against France, but that this object
was not attained. At any rate, the
French foreign minister, the Due De-
cazes, was disturbed, and on March n
communicated his fears to Lord Lyons,
the British ambassador in Paris.* On the
following day the French Chamber voted
a bill which had been under consideration
for some time, to add a fourth battalion

* Lord Newton, Lord Lyons, ii, p. 68.

THE WAR SCARE OF 1873 S7

to each regiment. It was in vain that
France declared that her intentions were
purely defensive and that she was not
materially increasing her armament; pub-
lic opinion in Germany was inclined to
regard the measure as a menacing if not
hostile act. On the 8th of April the Ber- ,
lin Post, a newspaper supposed to be on /
good terms with the authorities, published /
a violent article entitled "War in Sight." \
Three days later the article was repro-
duced without contradiction by the North
German Gazette, which, as was well known,
was often inspired by the foreign office.
The French government now felt serious
alarm, an alarm which was heightened by
the report of the Due de Gontaut-Biron,
ambassador in Berlin, that in conversa-
tion with him at a banquet, von Radowitz
had discussed the ethics of 'preventive
wars' and had expressed the opinion that
Germany would be justified on grounds of
humanity as well as of policy in begin-
ning hostilities with France instead of

58 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

waiting until France had recovered
enough strength to attack with better
prospect of success. Bismarck later de-
clared that Radowitz carried his wine
badly and was in the habit of talking non-
sense after a banquet, but in view of the
strict discipline the chancellor kept among
his subordinates, it is unlikely that one of
them would venture so far on his own
authority, and there is no sign that Rad-
owitz was ever reproved for his loquacity
on this occasion. Nor were his remarks
the only ones to cause anxiety. Reports
came in from several quarters of menacing
language held by Bismarck, by Moltke,
and by German diplomats at foreign
courts. On May 5 Prince Hohenlohe,
ambassador at Paris, made a formal com-
munication to the Due Decazes that 'the
German government was not entirely
convinced of the inoffensive character
of the French armaments/ and that
'the German general staff considers war
against Germany as the ultimate object

THE WAR SCARE OF 1875 59

of those armaments, and so looks forward
to their consequences.'* The chancellor
was feeling just then particularly harassed
by various difficulties that beset him, and
on this account, or as a tactical move and
means of pressure, on May 4 he asked
permission of the emperor to retire from
office to take care of his shattered health.
The permission was not granted, and was
hardly meant to be.

Meanwhile the French had wasted no
time, but had appealed for support in
pressing terms at both London and St.
Petersburg. On April 15 General LeFlo,
their ambassador in St. Petersburg, had
communicated his fears and those of his
government to the Tsar, who had reas-
sured him and declared that during a /
visit he was about to make to Berlin he
would clear up everything. England, too^
promised to add her influence to that of
Russia to check any hostile designs on thej

*A. Dreux, Dernieres annees de I'ambassade en Allemagne
d: M. de Gontaut-Biron, pp. 108, 109.

60 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

part of Bismarck. On May 6 the London
Times startled the world by an article,
based on information secretly furnished
by the Due Decazes, which revealed to
the public the gravity of the crisis. The
; storm, however, soon blew over. On
May 10 Alexander II and Gorchakov ar-
rived in Berlin. When the Tsar took up
the matter, Emperor William declared
emphatically that he had no thought of
war with France. Bismarck, too, treated
the whole affair as a newspaper excite-
ment and a plot on the part of his ene-
mies to discredit him, but he had to sub-
mit to being lectured by Gorchakov, and
had also to listen to official exhortations
from the British ambassador. He was
not the man to relish such a lesson, and
. he was further exasperated by a diplo-
i matic circular of Gorchakov announcing
that "peace is now assured," a bit of
needless vanity which Bismarck never
forgave.
The whole incident of the 'war scare of

THE WAR SCARE OF 1875 6t

1875* remains mysterious. Most Ger-
man writers have accepted Bismarck's as-
surances on the subject. Many French-
men and some other foreigners have ac-
cused him of having planned mischief, but
of having been foiled by the intervention
of Russia and England.* We may well
believe that Emperor William was inno-
cent of warlike intentions at this time,
but the chancellor was capable of creating
a situation which would force his master's
hand. He may have been feeling the pulse
of France for his own purposes without
having made up his mind as to his fu-
ture course of action; he may merely have
intended to browbeat her; he may, per-
haps, as was feared in Paris, have thought
of sending an ultimatum demanding a
reduction of French armaments, a de-
mand which the French were determined

* Sir Charles Dilke, an unusually well informed and com-
petent observer, declared a dozen years later: "There can be
no doubt that in 1875, when Russia prevented a war
between Germany and France, and England took credit for
having done so, Germany could have crushed her rival."
Present Position of European Politics, p. 37.

62 TEE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

to refuse at all risks, and which they
would have regarded as tantamount to a
declaration of war. The truth will prob-
ably never be known with certainty.
What is certain is that at London and
St. Petersburg (though not at Vienna,
which maintained an attitude of reserve)
both the sovereigns* and their ministers,
after first treating French alarms as
groundless, became convinced that there
was serious reason for anxiety and acted
accordingly. Even some persons in Ger-
many entertained the same fear, among
them the Crown Prince.f

Matters soon settled down, and in out-
ward appearance the League of the Three
Emperors was unaffected by what had
passed. In reality, the effects were last-
ing, especially upon Prince Bismarck.
To begin with, it had been made clear to
him that in case of another Franco-Ger-

* After the incident was closed, Queen Victoria had some
correspondence with Emperor William on the subject.

t Mrs. Wemyss, Memoirs and Letters of Sir Robert Morier, ii,
p. 350.

GERMANY AND RUSSIA 63

man war Germany could not count again
on the moral support or even the inaction
of Russia. Friendly as Alexander II was
to Germany, it was, after all, plainly
against the interest of Russia that France
should once more be crushed and still
further weakened. The Tsar had now
shown that he understood this and wished
to maintain the existence of France as a
great power, however inconvenient such
an existence might be to Germany. Sec-
ondly, Bismarck was not the man to for-
get a bad turn and still less a humiliation.
From now on he bore a grudge against
his former friend, Prince Gorchakov.

As long as no serious conflict of interest
arose between the three imperial partners
in the League, some divergency of views
and the personal pique of their ministers
might not be of consequence.* But who

* Sir Robert Morier, after seeing Gorchakov at Wildbad in
June, wrote (Memoirs, ii, p. 362): "It is clear that in the
'happy family' of the three Kaisers, each of the 'mutual
friends' is endeavoring to convince the public that he has
an exclusive monopoly of the affections of No. 3."

64 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

could tell when such a conflict might
arise ? There was one domain where
jealousy between Russia and Austria
dated back to the early years of the
eighteenth century, where there was al-
ways at least latent antagonism between
them, and where every disturbance of the
status quo at once threatened to bring
their interests into sharp collision. Twice
before in the last fifty years the alliance
of the conservative powers had been dis-
rupted by the affairs of Turkey, and now
once more, in the summer of 1875, came
the news that a rising had occurred in the
Turkish province of Herzegovina, and
that Europe mus^ again face the incalcu-
lable difficulties and dangers inseparable

icu

OP

from a reopening of the Eastern Question.

CHAPTER II

The Eastern Question, that cause of
such perplexities to statesmen and of so
much bloodshed among peoples, may be
said to have begun with the beginning of
European history. The story of the hos-
tility between Europe and Asia, and of the
struggles for predominance in the lands of
the eastern Mediterranean, can be traced
back in the first pages of Herodotus to the
semi-mythical piratical expeditions that
culminated in the Trojan war,*and it can
be followed down through the ages to the
conflict between Austria and Serbia in
1914, which has involved in its gigantic
extension one-half the population of the
world.

In the course of the centuries the tide
of conquest has surged to and fro. Per-
sia invaded Europe but was beaten back;
Europe, as represented by Alexander of
6s

66 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

Macedon and later by Rome, overran and
subdued western Asia, which, with North
Africa, became part of Europe in history
and culture and remained so for many
generations. With the rise of Islam the
reaction set in. In the seventh century
the Arabs won back Syria and North
Africa to Asia, and subjugated Spain and
even a part of France. In the eleventh,
the Seljuk Turks broke the power of the
Byzantine empire and conquered Asia
Minor. In the fourteenth, the Ottoman
Turks crossed into Europe, and by the
middle of the sixteenth they had built up
a dominion reaching from the Persian
Gulf almost to the Strait of Gibraltar
and up into the borders of Austria.

Then the tide turned once more. The
Turks, after a last great offensive move-
ment, which brought their hosts in 1683
to the walls of Vienna, met with defeat
there at the hands of the Polish king,
John Sobieski. This disaster was quickly
followed by others, and by the time of the

THE DECLINE OF TURKEY 67

Peace of Passarowitz, in 1718, after an-
other calamitous war with Austria, the
Ottoman empire from being a terror to
its neighbors bade fair to become their
prey. Already, two centuries ago, peo-
ple were talking of its extinction in
Europe as a likely event of the near
future.

With the decline of the power of the
Turks, which has continued with little
interruption to the present day, and has
been marked by oft-repeated loss of terri-
tory, the Eastern Question entered into
a new phase. It has not been confined to
the relations between them and the vari-
ous claimants to their heritage. The re-
lations of those claimants to one another
have played an equal and often greater
part. By an extraordinary historical co-
incidence, the years in which the Turks
were first being defeated and shorn of
lands they were never to regain, witnessed
also the sudden appearance upon the
scene of European politics of a new state

68 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

destined henceforth to be a perpetual
menace to them. A few months before
the siege and deliverance of Vienna, Peter
the Great had ascended the throne of
Russia. When he came to manhood his
first important act was to wrest from the
Turks the port of Azov and obtain access
to the waters of the Black Sea. Ever
since then Russia, which under the iron
hand of Peter assumed at least the out-
ward semblance of a European state pro-
vided with a modern governmental ma-
chine and army and diplomatic service,
has taken a foremost part in the affairs of
the Near East. But she has not had the
field to Wrself. She has from the first
met not only foes but rivals, and her chief
rival has been Austria. Little as they
have liked it, Russia and Austria, in all
their calculations and plans in regard to
Turkey and later to the Christian states
of the Balkans, have had to take each
other into account for the last two hun-
dred years. Their ambitions and inter-

RUSSIA AND TURKEY 69

ests have continually come into conflict,
and the two powers have been often
enough on the verge of war with one an-
other. It is, in truth, a remarkable fact,
that, critical as the situation has been be-
tween them, jealous as they have shown
themselves of one another, they have
never actually come to blows until the
world conflict of 1914.*

The almost permanent hostility be-
tween Russia and Turkey, who are at war
with one another for the tenth time, has
been based on causes historical, religious,
social, and economic. The Turk has been
the successor of the Tartars, the former
masters of the Russians, who even at the
time of Peter the Great as Turkish vas-
sals held the whole territory north of the
Black Sea. The Turk has been the infi-
del, the Asiatic, under whose tyranny
millions of Christians, the Orthodox
brethren of the Russians and many of

*The nominal hostilities between them on two occasions
during the Napoleonic period can hardly be termed war.

70 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

them fellow Slavs, have groaned and suf-
fered for centuries. The Russians on
their part have regarded their country as
the successor and avenger of the Byzan-
tine empire, destined to erect the cross
once more on the cathedral of St. Sophia,
and to liberate Greek Orthodox Christen-
dom, and especially the oppressed Balkan
Slavs, from Paynim rule. As the popula-
tion of Russia has increased, it has ex-
panded southward into the prairie lands,
richer and more fertile than the northern
forests, but it has only been able to make
its way by driving back the Tartar and
the Turk. Even yet it has not reached
open water. In order to gain access to
western Europe, the great and growing
maritime commerce of the regions north
and east of the Black Sea must pass
through channels still in foreign hands.
Russia has grown to greatness largely at
the expense of the Turks, and it seems
impossible that she should have perma-
nently good relations with them as long

RUSSIA AND TURKEY 71

as the entrance to the Black Sea remains
under their control. Again and again the
Eastern Question has beefi the chief of
her interests. She has often not known
her own mind; she has made her fair
share of costly blunders; but, in the main,
her policy has been consistent, and has
been dictated, though at times uncon-
sciously, by natural laws as well as by the
sympathies of her people. Only occasion-
ally and for short intervals has she posed
as the friend and defender of the Turk.

The chief disadvantage with which
Russia has had to contend has been the
distances that her forces have had to
traverse before they could arrive at the
scene of action. They have had to oper-
ate from remote bases and to overcome
one line of defence after another. But
these drawbacks have diminished as her
frontiers and her settled territory have
been pushed farther to the south and her
means of communication have improved.
On the other hand, the fact that her

72 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

people have been of the same faith and
of the same race as the majority of the
Christians of European Turkey has given
to her conflicts with the Ottoman empire
a moral justification and a popular na-
tional character of the utmost value.
They have been crusades and wars of
liberation. In recent years, as fanati-
cism has declined, the religious sentiment
has been replaced by an almost equally
potent nationalistic one. The desire to
aid brother Slavs rather than brother
Orthodox has fired the Russian popular
mind, but the effects have been much the
same, and have strengthened, and, in-
deed, more than once forced, the hand
of the government of St. Petersburg.

Conversely, Russia, as the one inde-
pendent and mighty Orthodox power,
was long looked upon by most of the
Christian subjects of the Sultan as their
protector and future liberator. Their
hopes and their sympathies have turned
naturally to her, not to Catholic Austria,

THE CHRISTIAN SUBJECTS OF TURKEY 73

the zealous daughter of the hated Roman
church. Russia could count on these
Christians for such assistance as they
could give in furnishing her with informa-
tion, aiding her agents, and smoothing the
way for her armies. Even of late, when
the religious motive has receded into the
background, the Russians, though they
have lost most of their hold on the Ru-
manians and Greeks, have been in a much
better position to win over the Monte-
negrins, Serbians, and Bulgarians, their
fellow Slavs, than have the Germans and
Magyars of Austria-Hungary. It has
also, for the same reasons, been easier for
Russia than for Austria to stir up troubles
in the dominions of the Sultan or to find
causes for interfering in behalf of his op-
pressed subjects. The role of defender
of the oppressed has, indeed, never been
a peculiarly Austrian one.

The situation and policy of Austria
have been widely different. Until 1870
the government at Vienna was usually

74 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

more concerned with the affairs of Ger-
many and of Italy than with those of the
Ottoman empire. It has been consistent
in its determination that Russia should
not be allowed to dispose of affairs in the
East without consulting the interests of
Austria, but it has more than once
changed its mind as to whether those in-
terests could better be served by protect-
ing the Turks against Russian aggression
or by a division of Turkish spoils. In the
eighteenth century Austria usually leaned
to the latter policy. Since then, for the
last one hundred and twenty years, she
has been for the most part the friend of
the Ottoman empire, though not a senti-
mental one, and quite ready to profit at
its expense if that should seem the wisest
course. She has had the strategical ad-
vantage of being near to the scene of
action and of occupying a position which
threatened the exposed flank and long
line of communication of the Russian
armies when they had advanced far to
the southward.

THE CHRISTIAN SUBJECTS OF TURKEY 75

With the early years of the nineteenth
century a new element appears in the
Eastern Question. The Christian subject
nationalities, which for generations had
submitted passively to Turkish rule, be-
gan to reassert their rights to independent
existence and to strive to cast off the
yoke of the oppressor. With these move-
ments the Russian people ardently sym-
pathized from the first, and the govern-
ment of St. Petersburg also supported
them, though rather intermittently. Aus-
tria, on the other hand, cared nothing
for the wrongs or for the aspirations of
Greeks and Serbs and Rumanians, whom
she regarded as clients of Russia, nor did
she wish to see them achieve indepen-
dence at the expense of her former foe but
now convenient neighbor, the Ottoman
empire. She, therefore, bitterly opposed
the intervention of the powers that led to
the liberation of Greece. At the time of
the Crimean war, she not only ordered the
Russians out of the Rumanian principali-
ties, but after it was certain they were

76 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

defeated, practically joined the alliance
against them which forced them to the
Peace of Paris, and by a treaty with Eng-
land and France guaranteed the integrity
of the Ottoman empire.

That empire, thus set up again by the
powers, enjoyed a few years of progress
and reform, but soon the process of de-
composition set in more rapidly than
ever. Corruption and misgovernment
were everywhere rampant, and the money
wrung from an overtaxed people was
squandered in wanton fashion, until in
1875 the national debt was scaled down
by partial repudiation. Security of life
and property, or justice before the courts,
hardly existed for the Christian subjects
of the Sultan. It is no wonder that they
looked across the borders with envy to
their more fortunate brethren in the little
Balkan states which had succeeded in
emancipating themselves, wholly or in
part, from Turkish rule. It was also in
the nature of things that they found sym-

PAN SLAVISM 77

pathy not only among their free Balkan
kinsmen but also farther away, a sym-
pathy heightened by a nationalistic move-
ment that had been going on in the Rus-
sian empire itself.

The intense consciousness of national-
ity which has been so potent a factor in
the history of the world since about the be-
ginning of the nineteenth century, even if
at bottom much the same everywhere, has
taken on many shapes in different coun-
tries. In Russia one of its manifestations
has been a keen new interest in the fate
of the other Slav peoples and a desire for
union with them. As a purely senti-
mental idea, based on real or fancied
community of race, language, and cul-
ture, but without political objects, this
movement has been called Slavophilism.
Akin to this, but going a step further, and
with the avowed aim of bringing the
various Slav peoples into some sort of
common political system, has been the
better known movement termed Pan-

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

slavism. Not unnaturally this last doc-
trine was regarded by foreign countries
with Slavic subjects as a menace to their
integrity, especially as it found partisans
among all the Slav peoples. In 1867 their
ideals were set forth with much fervor in
a Panslavic Congress held in Moscow.
Panslavism had by this time obtained no
small hold on Russian public opinion,
and could count its orators and its poets
and its many local societies whose object
was not only to preach the cause but to
give assistance to brother Slavs suffering
under foreign oppression.

The imperial government at first looked
on the movement with little favor. Ever
since the days of Peter the Great the
Russian court and administration had
cared more for being regarded as full-
fledged exponents of general European
civilization than they had for any pecu-
liar virtues of the Slavic race. It was
difficult, too, to harmonize Panslavic
ideals with the severity which had been

PA NSLA VISM AND THE BALKAN PENINSULA 79

meted out to the Poles since the insurrec-
tion of 1863. Nevertheless, the Panslav-
ists had their friends at court and in the
official world of St. Petersburg, and were
supported by a widespread national feel-
ing.

The Balkan Peninsula presented an
obvious field for the activity of those
zealous for the cause of Slavic welfare.
Serbia and Montenegro had, indeed, won
their liberties, but there were still several
million Slavs groaning under the evils of
Turkish misrule. It is no wonder that
they found ardent sympathy in Russia,
and that Panslavist organizations there
not only sent them money for schools and
for many other needs, but also encouraged
their hopes of independence and aided
them to plot and prepare for it. The au-
thorities in St. Petersburg seem to have
kept aloof from these activities, though
they must have had some cognizance of
them; but the able and not too scru-
pulous ambassador in Constantinople,

8o THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

Count Ignatiev, an ardent Panslavist,
gave ground for English and Austrian
accusations that the Russian embassy
was a centre of conspiracy against the
integrity of the Ottoman empire. In
spite of this, Ignatiev had more influence
with the Sultan than had any of his col-
leagues.

The special object of Russian interest
was the Bulgarians. They had reawak-
ened to national consciousness later than
had the Greeks and the Serbs, but now
they were awake. Since the middle of
the century there had been an active Bul-
garian movement, not outwardly dis-
loyal, yet, in the nature of things, con-
cealing under its efforts for education and
progress hopes for political emancipation.
It had already achieved one notable suc-
cess in 1870, when, thanks in part to Rus-
sian influence, the Sultan had been per-
suaded to consent to the establishment of
a Bulgarian ecclesiastical exarchate, in-
dependent of the Greek patriarch of Con-

BULGARIA, BOSNIA, AND HERZEGOVINA 81

stantinople. The action of Russia on
this occasion showed that times had
changed, that the Greeks were no longer
her favorites as in the days of Catherine
II, but that in her sentiments toward the
Christian populations of the East the
nationalistic impulse had now taken the
place of the old religious one.

Bad as conditions were in Bulgaria,
they were still worse in the territories of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Here the un-
fortunate Christian peasantry had to suf-
fer not only from the usual exactions of
the Turkish official and tax-gatherer, but
also from the oppression of the upper
classes, a landowning aristocracy who,
though of Serbian origin, were Moham-
medan in faith, and treated their serfs
with brutal harshness. The mountain-
ous nature of the region, which made in-
surrection easy and its repression difficult,
the patent weakness of the Turkish gov-
ernment, and the spectacle of the success
of their brethren in Serbia in achieving in-

82 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

dependence contributed to make a rising
of the hard-pressed Christians in Bosnia
and Herzegovina an event that might
occur at any time.

But here the interests of Austria would
at once be vitally affected. Already, in
the wars of the eighteenth century, Aus-
trian armies had entered these regions.
Since 1815 Bosnia and Herzegovina had
been surrounded on three sides by Aus-
tro-Hungarian territory, and they formed
the obvious hinterland for the maritime
province of Dalmatia, which without
them had unsatisfactory connection with
the rest of the empire. The possibility of
their acquisition must have been often in
the minds of the statesmen in Vienna,
especially since the loss of Venice had
weakened the position of Austria in the
Adriatic and given her a dangerous rival
there in the new kingdom of Italy. The
military authorities frankly advocated the
annexation of the territory at the earliest
favorable opportunity, and there is reason

INSURRECTION IN HERZEGOVINA AND BOSNIA 83

for thinking that the emperor himself was
anxious to obtain compensation in this
way for the loss of Lombardy and Vene-
tia, and not to go down to history as one
of the few Hapsburgs under whose rule
the dominions of the house had grown
smaller, not larger. In 1875 he paid a
visit to Dalmatia with an ostentation and
in a manner that seemed to show interest
in the land beyond the borders of the
province.

When, therefore, in the course of that
autumn news began to reach Europe of
an insurrection in Herzegovina which soon
spread to Bosnia, and which the Turks
appeared unable to suppress, there was
little to surprise but much to alarm those
who cared for the preservation of Euro-
pean peace. However cordial the inter-
course might be between Austria and
Russia, however specific the political
agreements, however friendly the sover-
eigns, experience had shown again and
again that the raising of the Eastern

84 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

Question was fraught with danger to good
relations between the two empires. Twice
before in the nineteenth century it had
brought them into sharp opposition to
one another, and now at St. Petersburg
and at Vienna every one knew that the
League of the Three Emperors was too
feeble a bond to maintain Austro-Rus-
sian harmony if there should be a serious
clash of interests.

At first there was little difficulty in
maintaining the concert of the powers.
All of them were sincerely anxious that
the conflagration that had broken out in
the Balkans should not spread farther.
The nearest available consular officers
were sent to hunt out the insurgents and
persuade them to lay down their arms
and trust to the promises of the Sultan.
This they refused to do; they had lost
faith in such promises. As there was no
doubt that their grievances were real,
and as the sins of the Turkish administra-
tion were notorious, the three imperial

THE ANDRASSY NOTE 85

governments entered into communication
with one another and agreed upon a note
which took its name from Count An-
drassy, and which demanded from the
Porte, besides an armistice, a series of
reforms, including the equality of Chris-
tians and Mohammedans, the abolition of
the farming of taxes, an improvement of
agrarian conditions, and the appointment
of a mixed Christian and Mohammedan
commission to look after the carrying out
of these measures. England and France
adhered to this note, and on January 31,
1876, it was presented in Constantinople,
where after some parley it was accepted
in principle by the Turks. But the in-
surgents were not satisfied. They made
counter-propositions, demanding not only
greater concessions but guarantees; that
is to say, that the powers should see to it
that the Turkish promises were carried,
out. The Turks in their turn promptly
refused, and fierce desultory fighting con-
tinued, while thousands of refugees fled

86 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

into Dalmatia and Montenegro and agi-
tation increased among all the Balkan
Slavs. Aroused by this state of affairs,
the three imperial governments deter-
mined to make another effort. It was
agreed that their foreign ministers should
meet in Berlin and come to a further de-
cision on Eastern affairs. This time
Prince Gorchakov took the lead. He was
emphatic in his disbelief in Turkish prom-
ises and favored some vigorous step, but
met with unwillingness on the part of
Andrassy. A new note, however, was
drawn up, known as the Berlin Memo-
randum. The suggestions of the An-
drassy note were reiterated, and it was
declared that the carrying out of the
necessary reforms must be under the
safeguard of an international commis-
sion. Finally, in case the Turks should

remain obstinate, there was a distinct

.

hint at coercion.

Up to this point there had been at least
apparent agreement among the great

THE BERLIN MEMORANDUM 87

powers. But the League of the Three
Emperors had made a mistake in assum-
ing that all the other European states
would accede without discussion to what-
ever decisions were submitted to them.
France and Italy might not be in a posi-
tion to follow an independent course, but
Great Britain had just then as its prime
minister a man who held lofty ideas about
his country and had definite views as to
the course he meant to pursue.

Benjamin Disraeli, soon to be made
Earl of Beaconsfield, may be termed the
first of modern English Imperialists. To
him the British empire was no mere ab-
straction; it was a great world power with
interests everywhere and a right to be
consulted and listened to everywhere.
This right he meant to assert. The coro-
nation in 1876 of Queen Victoria as em-
press of India was not the bit of empty
theatrical display it appeared to many.
It was an assertion of the imperial posi-
tion of the sovereign of Great Britain,

88 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

and as such a declaration of policy. Dis-
raeli hardly entertained many illusions
about the Turks; but the Orient had long
appealed to his imagination, and he be-
lieved that England could and should
play a great part there. He had already
achieved one brilliant diplomatic success.
By his sudden secret purchase of the Khe-
dive's shares in the Suez Canal he had
strengthened the position of Britain in
the East at the expense of France, who
saw her control of the great waterway,
built by a Frenchman with French money,
slipping away from her, yet could only
look on with impotent chagrin. Toward
Prince Bismarck he seems to have felt at
this time a certain personal dislike, and,
it may be, jealousy, but the real foe, in
his eyes, the power that he ever watched
and distrusted, was Russia. His feelings
in this respect may, as has often been
asserted, have been influenced by his
Jewish origin, but they were in accor-
dance with English traditions of the pre-

GREAT BRITAIN DISSENTS 89

vious twenty years, and they were natural
in the breast of a statesman who had
visions of a splendid future for his own
country. At this very time the violently
anti-Russian ambassador of Britain at
Constantinople was sending home alarm-
ing reports of Muscovite intrigue.

When the League of the Three Emper-
ors had agreed upon the Andrassy note,
London had acceded, though without en-
thusiasm. Now when there came a sec-
ond document on Eastern affairs, con-
cocted without the participation of Great
Britain, and merely submitted by tele-
gram with a request for a prompt adhe-
sion, British dignity and the spirit that
guided British policy asserted themselves.
The reply sent was not prompt, and when
it did come it was a flat refusal. "Her
Majesty's government appreciate the ad-
vantage of concerted action by the pow-
ers in all that relates to the questions
arising out of the insurrection, but they
cannot consent to join in proposals which

QO THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

they do not conscientiously believe likely
to effect the pacification which all the
powers desire to see attained." *

This put an end to the unanimity of
the powers, and also to any impression
that the Memorandum might make on
the Turks, who now felt that they had,
as in 1854, friends on whom they could
rely for support, even without following
their advice. Meanwhile the situation in
the East had become grave, for the ex-
citement among the Christians of the
Ottoman empire had stimulated counter-
excitement among the Mohammedans.
On May 6, 1876, a mob in Salonica mur-
dered the French and German consuls
there. On May 29 the stupid and profli-
gate Sultan Abdul-Aziz was overthrown
by a revolution. Six days later he was
assassinated or committed suicide. He
was succeeded by his brother, Murad V,
who after a few months was deposed in
his turn on account of insanity and re-

* Parliamentary Papers, 1876, Ixxxiv, Turkey, no. 3, p. 171.

-.

SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO DECLARE WAR gi

placed by Abdul-Hamid II, then a very
young man. In May there were risings
in Bulgaria, and in time rumors from
there reached Europe of sporadic insur-
rections followed by fierce repression.
On July i and 2 Serbia and Montenegro,
carried away by their sympathies for
their insurgent kinsmen in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and by the hope of adding
these territories to their own, declared
war on Turkey.

As was inevitable, the news of what was
happening in the Balkans at once affected
Russia. The nation espoused with en-
thusiasm the cause of the brother Slavs.
Gifts of all kinds, and volunteers, includ-
ing army officers, came pouring into Ser-
bia. Public opinion began to clamor for
war, or at least intervention, and the
government itself could not, if it would,
remain indifferent to the pressure that
was being put on it.

It was not, indeed, to be expected that
Alexander II and his ministers could sit

92 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

with folded hands as mere spectators of
whatever events might occur in the Bal-
kan Peninsula. Sooner or later they must
take some decisive action. Every Rus-
sian tradition in the Eastern Question
made this imperative. But besides the
probable hostility of England, they had,
as so often before, to reckon with the
attitude of Austria, especially since the
immediate cause of the crisis had been
the troubles in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
the part of the Balkan Peninsula in which
she was most interested. It was well
known at St. Petersburg that Austria,
having abandoned the hope of playing a
role in German and Italian affairs, was
now looking more toward the ^Egean, and
was not inclined to remain a merely pas-
sive spectator. Also, it was at least sus-
pected that she could rely on the good
will and perhaps the actual support of
Germany. As early as 1867, the Austrian
minister at St. Petersburg had suggested
that if Russia were to regain Bessarabia,

RUSSIA AND AUSTRIA 93

Austria ought to have Bosnia and Herze-
govina. Gorchakov had combated the
idea, but not very strenuously.* We do
not know whether it was considered again
at Berlin in 1872. In the conversations
that took place there, Gorchakov and
Andrassy agreed not to meddle in the in-
ternal affairs of the Ottoman empire, but
not to aid it in suppressing insurrections
in its dominions, even if appealed to.
The first stipulation might be regarded as
a concession on the part of Russia, the
second on that of Austria, so long the
supporter of the status quo. In the fol-
lowing year, when Alexander II visited
Francis Joseph in Vienna, the question of
Bosnia and Herzegovina seems to have
been taken up again and an understand-
ing was reached but not put down in writ-
ing. A treaty of alliance, however, of a
general nature was concluded at the pal-

* Count Friedrich Revertera. The incident is narrated by
him in an article in the Deutsche Revue for May, 1904
(pp. I39-HO).

94 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

ace of Schonbrunn and signed by both
sovereigns, who pledged themselves to full
confidence in one another and to common
action for the maintenance of European
peace.* The time had now come when
it was urgent to pass from these vague
generalities to something more definite,

* Revertera declares that there was a signed agreement that
in case of a Russian-Turkish war Austria was to remain neu-
tral, and in case of a Russian victory was to obtain Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Russia was to have a free hand in settling
the affairs of the other Balkan territories, but must not retain
possession of Constantinople and must notify Austria in ad-
vance of the terms of peace. This statement cannot be recon-
ciled with the account given by Wertheimer (iii, 89), who had
consulted the copy of the compact in Andrassy's own hand-
writing. Revertera declares that he got his information from
one of the Russian diplomats present at the discussion; but,
writing about the event many years afterward, he may well
have confused previous discussions and oral agreements with
what was actually put into written form. According to Wert-
heimer (ii, 118), quoting from the unpublished correspon-
dence of the German ambassador, Prince Reuss, when An-
drassy visited St. Petersburg in 1874, Gorchakov declared to
him emphatically that an Austrian occupation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina would mean a casus belli. On the other hand,
the promptitude with which the understanding was reached
at Reichstadt would suggest that the terms had been discussed
earlier. It is curious that neither Goriainov nor Wertheimer
nor any other writer, so far as I know, has alluded to Re-
vertera's article.

REICHSTADT 95

especially as divergencies of policy were
beginning to manifest themselves.

It was under these circumstances that
the emperors of Russia and Austria, ac-
companied by their foreign ministers, once
more met, on July 8, 1876, at the Bohe-
mian castle of Reichstadt. The inter-
view lasted but a few hours and the scant
accounts of it that have been published
contain several discrepancies. Still, the
main outlines of what was stipulated are
clear. No official document was signed,
but an understanding was reached and
noted down, though some of its details
may not have been put in writing or
even formally expressed. Two hypoth-
eses were discussed: the victory of the
Turks and the victory of the Serbians and
Montenegrins. In the first event, Russia
and Austria were to preserve the two little
Christian states from suffering permanent
loss. This looked simple, but the second
contingency — and it seems to have been
regarded as the more probable of the two

96 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

—was much harder to provide for. A
defeat of the Turks might well mean the
end of the Ottoman empire in Europe.
In that case, what should be the policy of
Russia and Austria ?

The arrangement on this subject con-
cluded at Reichstadt showed astonishing
moderation or disinterestedness or weak-
ness— call it which we will — on the part
of Russia. It provided for a number of
slight additions of territory to Monte-
negro, Serbia, and Greece, and also for an
independent Bulgaria and Albania (Con-
stantinople was to be a free city), but
there was to be no large Balkan Slav
state, whether Serbian or Bulgarian, that
could be either a dangerous satellite of
Russia or a real obstacle to Austrian prog-
ress farther to the southward at some
future date. Austria was to have imme-
diate possession of Bosnia and Herze-
govina. All that Russia stipulated for
herself was the fragment of Bessarabia
that had been taken away from her at

REICHSTADT 97

the Peace of Paris in 1856,* and this,
though it gave her a foothold on the lower
Danube, was a matter of pride rather than
of real importance, and, secondly (but
perhaps not in writing), a rectification of
her frontier in Asia, a matter in which
Austria felt no interest. No wonder that
Emperor Francis Joseph and Count An-
drassy are said to have left Reichstadt
well satisfied.f

Events in the Balkans now ran their
course, but not in the way that had been
expected. The Ottoman state which had
shown itself incompetent to put down
the insurrection in Bosnia suddenly ral-
lied in the face of new perils. The feeble
risings in Bulgaria had been quenched in
the blood of some twelve thousand of the
inhabitants, men, women, and children.
It is true that the Montenegrins held
their own, but the Serbians, whose terri-

* But not the islands of the delta, which she had held from
1812 to 1856.
t A. Fournier, Wie teir zu Bosnien kamtn, p. 23.

98 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

tory was soon invaded, were defeated in
one encounter after another, in spite of
the streams of Russian volunteers that
came to their aid. On August 29, Prince
Milan appealed to the powers for media-
tion. At the news of these disasters the
excitement in Russia increased, and the
clamor for armed intervention in behalf
of the Balkan Slavs became ever louder.
The government could not but take heed
of this, and, while refusing to allow itself
to be hurried into precipitate action, it
urged the calling of a general European
conference, and even suggested to Eng-
land that she take the initiative.

The game of political and diplomatic
intrigue was at this moment particularly
intricate. The League of the Three Em-
perors still existed, and the relations be-
tween the members were in theory close
and cordial, but not one of the partners
had complete trust in the others. Cir-
cumstances beyond their control seemed
to be pushing them toward an estrange-

THE GAME OF INTRIGUE 99

ment, if not worse. Bismarck, Gorcha-
kov, and Andrassy were all diplomats of
more than ordinary skill, and each was
now trying to feel his way with the others.
Bismarck, the ablest of the three, was
also in much the strongest position, for,
besides representing the most powerful
empire, he had the fewest difficulties at
home to contend with, and he had no
immediate ambitions to serve or vital
interests at stake.

In August General Manteuffel was
sent with'a letter from Emperor William
assuring the Tsar of his undiminished
friendship and of his readiness to sup-
port him.* Manteuffel also seems, fol-
lowing in the steps of the Radowitz mis-
sion of the previous year, to have sug-
gested a new treaty of alliance between
Germany and Russia, presumably on the
same sort of terms, namely, freedom of ac-
tion against France in return for support

*The language was perhaps stronger than Bismarck ap-
proved.

JOG THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

in the Eastern Question. Again Emperor
| Alexander refused to entertain the sug-
1 gestion. Instead he asked that Ger-
] many should keep Austria in check.
Matters were not going well between St.
Petersburg and Vienna. Owing to the
Ottoman victories the Reichstadt agree-
ment soon ceased to fit the situation.
Austria no longer showed any zeal for the
betterment of the Turk; she at first re-
fused the conference of the powers when
suggested by England; and though she
later consented to it, she made it clear
that she would not consent to the political
autonomy of Bosnia, or to its annexation
to Serbia. Such an attitude could not
but provoke irritation.

It happened that Alexander II was at
that time at Livadia in the Crimea, as
were a number of the chief Russian gen-
erals, who were naturally occupied with
the political situation and with plans for
a possible campaign in the near future.
Suddenly General von Werder, the Ger-

BISMARCK'S REPLY

man military representative specially at-
tached to the Tsar, was asked to inquire
by telegraph whether Germany would
remain neutral in case of war between
Russia and Austria. The question was
most unwelcome to Bismarck, who tried
to evade a direct reply; but when it
was repeated with urgency, he at last
answered that Germany could indeed put
up with it that her friends should win
or lose battles against each other, "but
not that one of the two should be so
severely wounded and injured that her
position as an independent great power
taking its place in the councils of Europe
would be endangered."* This was plain
enough. As no one in Russia had any
fear that she might need German support
to maintain her position as an independ-
ent great power against Austria, the real
meaning of Bismarck's reply was that
Russia, despite the fact that she had been

* See Bismarck's account of the matter. Gedanken und
Erinnerungen, ii, p. 214.

102 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

prepared to fight Austria if necessary in
behalf of Germany six years earlier, now
could not count on German neutrality in
a Russo- Austrian war. A couple of weeks
later Bismarck once more sounded Gor-
chakov as to whether, in return for the
assistance of Germany in the East, Rus-
sia would guarantee to her the possession
of Alsace-Lorraine. Again the proposal
was declined.*

Baffled in its hope of obtaining a prom-
ise of German neutrality in case of a
breach with Austria, the government of
the Tsar, which was being reluctantly
driven toward a Turkish war by popular
feeling at home,'turned again to its pro-
fessed ally and friend in Vienna. Al-
ready, before von Werder had left Liva-
dia, and before Bismarck's reply had been
received, a special envoy had been sent
to Emperor Francis Joseph bearing a let-
ter from the Tsar, in which Alexander pro-
posed that in order to put pressure on the

* Wertheimer, iii, p. 249.

RUSSIA AND AUSTRIA 103

Turks the Austrians should occupy Bos- \
nia and Herzegovina, the Russians Bui- 1
garia, and that an allied fleet should be
sent to the Dardanelles.

In Vienna these overtures met with a \
cool reception. Neither Count Andrassy '
nor his master had the slightest desire to
go to war with Turkey. Partnership with
Russia was looked at askance by many
elements in the Dual Empire, and par-
ticularly by the Hungarians, who had
Turkish sympathies and who had not
forgotten that their revolution in 1849
had been put down by Russian armies.
Even the idea of annexing Bosnia and
Herzegovina was none too popular, ex-
cept in military circles. The Germans
and the Hungarians, the dominant na-
tionalities in the two parliaments, feared
the results of so large an addition to the
Slav elements in the population. An-
drassy, therefore, found himself in a deli-
cate situation. He does not appear to
have been eager for the annexation, and

104 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

he was anxious, if it should come, to have
it come peacefully, but he was deter-
mined not to let the territory go to any
other power or to permit any new obsta-
cles to be placed in the path if annexation
should prove to be desirable. Accord-
ingly, Emperor Francis Joseph, while re-
serving the rights and interests of Aus-
tria whatever might be the outcome of
the existing situation, refused to take any
joint steps with Russia toward actual
coercion of the Turks. A fresh inter-
change of imperial letters produced no
further agreement. In other words, Aus-
tria, though admitting that conditions
in the Balkan Peninsula were intolerable,
was none the less determined to leave the
risk and burden of intervention to her
ally, and yet to take her full pound of
flesh. Who could feel sure that even the
friendly neutrality which was all that she
offered was to be relied upon, and that
when once the armies of her ally had
made their way well to the southward,

THE VULGARIAN ATROCITIES 105

and she could threaten their long ex-
posed line of communications from her
dominant position on their flank, she
would not come forward with new de-
mands ?

Meanwhile, in England the reports of
the Bulgarian atrocities, elaborated in a
famous pamphlet by Mr. Gladstone, had
excited such public indignation as to
dampen for a time the pro-Turkish zeal
of Lord Beaconsfield's administration. In
Russia the war party was temporarily
mollified by an ultimatum on October 31,
summoning the Porte to grant within
forty-eight hours a two months' armistice
to Serbia. Even before receiving it the
Turks, yielding to English advice and still
more to the necessities of the situation,
had decided to make the concession.
None the less, Russia was steadily pre-
paring for war, and on November 2 the
Tsar, in an audience given to Lord Loftus,
the British ambassador, while earnestly'
disclaiming all desire of territorial ag-

106 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

grandizement and especially of the ac-
quisition of Constantinople, declared:
"He wished to maintain the European
concert, but if Europe remained passive,
he would be obliged to act alone." * On
the following day he sent a third personal
letter to Emperor Francis Joseph, and
fresh instructions to his own ambassador
at Vienna to negotiate for the friendly
neutrality of Austria even though she
had refused her cooperation.

But now Lord Beaconsfield sounded a
blast. At a Guildhall banquet on No-
vember 9 he proclaimed that "though
the policy of England is peace, there is no
country so well prepared for war as our
own," and he continued in a strain which
was generally interpreted as a menace to
Russia. Next day the Tsar replied f in
an address to the nobility at Moscow, in
which he declared that in spite of herself

* Parliamentary Papers, 1877, xc, p. 576.

t It is not certain whether he had already received news of

e Guildhall speech.

PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE 107

Russia might have to draw the sword;
and on the morrow he emphasized his re-
marks by an order for the mobilization
of six army corps.

The English government, however, had /
already issued an invitation to the powers |
for a conference at Constantinople.* The |
programme was based on the recognition
of the integrity of the Ottoman empire
and a disclaimer of all individual advan-
tages on the part of the powers, but the
object of the meeting was the elaboration
of a satisfactory plan of reform and au-
tonomy for the Balkan Christians. Lord
Derby suggested peace and the status quo
for Serbia and Montenegro, autonomy
for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and guar-
antees for an improved administration of
Bulgaria. Russia was in sympathy with
these proposals. Austria was not; but
as she could not make public the real
grounds for her objections to the auton-

* We may attribute this to the foreign secretary, Lord
Derby, rather than to the premier.

io8 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

omy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, she ob-
tained a definition that it was local ad-
ministrative reform, not political auton-
omy, that was meant ; and she instructed
her representatives to observe a passive
attitude.

The official opening of the conference at
Constantinople was preceded by prelimi-
nary sessions from which the Turks were
excluded : a proceeding naturally offensive
to them, but necessary, as they could not
well be permitted to take part in the dis-
cussion of what terms were to be imposed
fc upon them. For once English and Rus-
U sian diplomacy were in harmony. Lord
Salisbury, the chief British representative,
displayed a zeal for reform that was in
rather surprising contrast to the recent at-
titude of the government he represented.
He and Count Ignatiev worked hand in
hand, with the result that the powers
agreed upon a series of demands that
were to be presented to the Turks. Mere
promises of amelioration could no longer

THE CONSTANTINOPLE CONFERENCE 109

be accepted. Europe knew by this time
that "the whole history of the Ottoman
empire, since it was admitted into the
European concert under the engagements
of the Treaty of Paris, has proved that
the Porte is unable to guarantee the exe-
cution of reforms in the provinces by
Turkish officials, who accept them with
reluctance, and neglect them with im-
punity." * The powers now insisted not
only on local autonomy and improvement I
of administration, but also on the appoint- *.
ment of a foreign supervising commission /
to see that their decrees were carried out i

These unpalatable demands were pre-
sented to the Turks at the first 'full'
meeting of the conference (December 23).
But proceedings were soon interrupted by
the sound of the booming of cannon.
Whereupon Safet Pasha, Turkish foreign
minister, informed his astonished hearers
that they were listening to a salute fired

* Instructions of Lord Derby to Lord Salisbury, Parlia-
mentary Papers, 1877, xci, Turkey, no. 2, p. 7.

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

in honor of the constitution which His
Majesty, the Sultan, had just conferred
upon the peoples under his rule. It was,
indeed, deserving of a salute, for it was all
that it should be, modern and democratic,
granting not only representative govern-
ment but full and equal rights to every
race and creed in the transformed Otto-
man state. Compared with what it be-
stowed, the reforms insisted upon by the
powers looked insignificant enough; but
as its blessings were for all, it made no
mention of special autonomies, and, of
course, foreign control was inconceivable.
The only immediate effect of this the-
atrical stroke was to irritate the members
of the conference, who regarded the whole
thing as a farce and continued to press
their demands. On January 13, 1877,
they presented them, with some modifi-
cations, as an ultimatum. But the Turks
stuck to their ground, refusing to tolerate
foreign interference and claiming that the
Sultan had of his own free will conferred

AMBASSADORS LEAVE CONSTANTINOPLE in

on his subjects, Christian as well as Mo-
hammedan, far more than the powers had
asked for. Even the solemn departure of
all the ambassadors from Constantinople
failed to affect their attitude of flat de-
fiance. The Turks did not believe that
Europe could or would do anything.

In this belief they were right as re-
garded Europe as a whole, but one power
had gone too far to retreat. Genuine as
was his reluctance at being drawn into
war, Alexander II felt that his dignity
and that of his country made it impossi-
ble for him to submit tamely to further
rebuffs. He would have liked to act as
the mandatory of Europe, but though the
other powers had joined in diplomatic
notes and had even withdrawn their rep-
resentatives from Constantinople, they
would go no further. Russia had to act
alone, at her own risk and peril; and,
above all, before launching herself upon
the enterprise, she must take into ac-
count the attitude of Austria.

112 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

And that attitude by this time was
clear enough. The government at Vi-
enna not only was determined to take no
action itself, but also had no intention of
granting a free hand to its ally. Its posi-
tion was a disagreeably strong one. The
geographical situation of Austria on the
flank of the Russian armies made it un-
safe for them to venture into the Balkan
Peninsula unless assured of her neutrality,
and if the Tsar in his anger should turn
them first against her, not only would she
have the probable help of England, but
she could at the last resort count on the
protection of Germany. It was all very
well for Bismarck to declare, as he did in
his celebrated speech to the Reichstag of
December 5, 1876, that for Germany the
whole Eastern Question was not worth
the bones of one Pomeranian grenadier.
He might proclaim her equal friendship
for both her allies and her desire to main-
tain good relations between them. None
the less, he had made his choice and let it

THE RUSSO-AUSTRIAN AGREEMENT 113

be understood that in case of a conflict, if
the integrity of Austria were threatened,
Germany would take up arms in her be-
half.* It is true this did not prevent him
from continually repeating in public, and
still more in his interviews with the Rus-
sian ambassador, the assurances of his
warm friendship for Russia and his desire
to serve her. He also, in these inter-
views, gave his advice in favor of a war
with Turkey. f

The result of all this was that after /
some negotiation two Russo-Austrian I]
agreements were concluded. The first, 1
which was signed at Vienna on January
15, 1877, provided that, in case of war,
Austria would observe an attitude of
friendly neutrality and would give diplo-
matic support; but it was stipulated that
though Serbia and Montenegro might ren-
der military aid, their territories must not

* He expressed himself definitely in this sense at a parlia-
mentary dinner (December l), and in accordance with his
wishes, his words were widely quoted in the newspapers.

t Tatishchev, Alexander II (in Russian), ii, pp. 349-3 54.

>

ii4 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

be used by Russian troops as a base of
operations. This meant, to use a term
not then invented, that they were not to
be regarded as in the Russian 'sphere of
influence/ In a second agreement, not
signed till three months later, but re-
garded as an integral part of the first and
antedated accordingly, it was stipulated,
as at Reichstadt, that in case of a dis-
memberment of the Ottoman empire, Ser-
bia and Montenegro were, indeed, to ob-
tain some enlargement, but that Austria
should have Bosnia and Herzegovina,
while Russia was to get back the part of
Bessarabia she had been forced to cede
[in 1856.*

Once more Count Andrassy and his
master had cause to feel satisfied and
doubtless did so, even though Emperor
Francis Joseph in a telegram to the Tsar

* Russia was also to have Batum and the adjacent terri-
tory, but by Gorchakov's express wish this was not men-
tioned in the compact, which had to do with the European
and not the Asiatic territories of the Porte. Wertheimer, ii,
P- 393-

LAST EFFORTS TO AVERT WAR 115

expressed the fervent hope that these
agreements might never have to be car-
ried out and that their efforts to maintain
peace might yet succeed. Alexander II,
indeed, still hesitated.* The excited pub-
lic urged him to action; but he and his
ministers realized that Russia had not
yet recovered from the wounds of the
Crimean war. Her army was not thor-
oughly reorganized, her finances were in
bad condition, even the emancipation of
the serfs and the other great reforms of
the earlier years of his reign had been fol-
lowed after the first enthusiasm by dis-
appointment and discontent, and there
were already dangerous symptoms of
revolutionary agitation. All these facts
made the position of Alexander II and
his chancellor a difficult one.

The Tsar accordingly made a last effort
to bring about a peaceful solution. On
March 31 a document was drawn up in

* The beginning of the winter was the worst season for the
opening of military operations.

n6 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

London embodying a final appeal to the
Porte. The proposal for a foreign com-
mission was dropped, and was replaced
by a mere threat of further action in case
the reforms demanded were not carried
out. All the other powers adhered to
this protocol, though without much en-
thusiasm, perhaps even without the wish
that it should succeed. The situation
was further complicated by what the
Turks regarded as an unfair demand for
their demobilization before that of Rus-
sia. At any rate, the Sultan, supported
by the unanimous vote of the parliament
he had summoned under the new consti-
tution, had now determined to refuse all
concessions. On April 10, 1877, the Porte
answered the powers in a circular note in
which it refused to tolerate any foreign
interference in its internal affairs, and
three days later it notified Montenegro
that the existing armistice had come to
an end. On April 24 Russia declared
war.

OUTBREAK OF THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR 117

The position of Russia at the outbreak
of hostilities was not particularly favor-
able from either a political or a military
standpoint. By considerable sacrifices
she had secured for the time being the
neutrality of Austria, but that neutrality
was in no true sense friendly, and it was
provisional, dependent on the highly un-
certain course of events. From the Brit-
ish came the word "that the decision of
the Russian government is not one which
can have their concurrence or approval,"*
and Lord Derby gave formal warning
against the inclusion of Egypt or the Suez
Canal in the sphere of hostilities, or the
occupation of Constantinople, or any
change in the treaties of 1856. The atti-
tude of Germany was one of ostentatious
disinterestedness, that is to say, lack of
interest. France and Italy did not need
to be taken into serious consideration.

On paper, at least, the army Russia
could put into the field was much larger

* Parliamentary Papers, 1877, xci, Turkey, no. 18, p. 4.

n8 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

than that of her adversary, and, thanks
to the introduction of railways, it could
be conveyed to the front with far greater
ease than in any of her previous wars.
That front, however, was a contracted
one, owing to the agreement with Austria
which precluded the use of Serbian terri-
tory for military purposes. Russia, too,
had not since regaining her liberty of ac-
tion by the Treaty of London of 1871 had
time to rebuild a Black Sea fleet capable
of meeting the entire Turkish navy, which
could be concentrated against it. She
was, therefore, unable to bring troops and
supplies by water or to hamper the Turks
in this respect. The only way in which
she could reach the European territory of
her foe was through a Turkish vassal
state, the principality of Rumania.

Rumania had to make up her mind as
to what would be the wisest policy to
pursue under the circumstances. Russia
had repeatedly invaded the principality
in former wars, and had even occupied

RUMANIA ng

it for years at a time, and had now no
thought of allowing her sole passageway
to the Balkan Peninsula to be barred by
any desire of Rumania for neutrality. At-
tempts at resistance on her part would
be hopeless, even with Turkish aid, and
would bring her misfortune; mere pas-
sive acquiescence offered only negative
advantages; but actual collaboration with
Russia promised the much desired boon
of complete emancipation from Turkish
sovereignty. She therefore decided to f
conclude a treaty providing for the free /
passage of Russian troops, and when the /
Turks resented this as an act of hostility
and bombarded Rumanian forts across ^
the Danube, she declared war on her
own account. Difficulties about subordi-
nation, however, as well as the Russian
contempt for the untried Rumanian mili-
tia, and disinclination to share with them
the glory of the campaign, resulted in
their not taking part at first in military
operations.

120 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

In the spring of 1877 the military repu-
tation of the Turks did not stand high.
For the last two hundred years they had
been defeated by inferior numbers in al-
most every important battle they had
fought — not only by Europeans, but even,
not long before, by the unwarlike Egyp-
tians. The glories of their earlier tri-
umphs had thus become much dimmed.
It was known that they were brave and
could defend fortifications obstinately,
but their discipline was loose, their offi-
cers were ill trained, and the progressive
disorganization of the Ottoman empire in
the last twenty years did not promise well
for the efficiency of the troops. The Rus-
sians accordingly were confident of rapid
and easy success, and they made the mis-
take of undertaking their campaigns in
both Europe and Asia with insufficient
forces. Such ventures have often been
justified by the outcome and might well
have been in this case, but when such
risks are run a single check may lead to
grave disaster.

PLEVNA lax

The campaign began brilliantly. With
little difficulty the Russians succeeded in
crossing the Danube, they rapidly over-
ran much of northern Bulgaria, seized
some of the Balkan passes, and made a
daring raid beyond. But the Turks, who
in history have more than once surprised
the world both favorably and unfavor-
ably, rallied in an unexpected manner. A
small Russian force incautiously attacked
a much larger Turkish one under Osman
Pasha in an important strategic position
at Plevna and was shattered. When
more men had been hastily gathered
and the onslaught was renewed ten days
later, the result was a second and more
serious defeat. For a time the situation
was critical, as the Turks now took the
offensive and the Russian armies were in
danger of being thrown back shamefully
across the Danube. In Asia, too, they
presently met with a sharp check and had
to retreat to within their own frontiers.
In both fields weeks must elapse before

122 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

considerable reinforcements could be
brought up.

| Under these circumstances the Rus-
sians, putting their pride in their pockets,
appealed to Rumania for aid. This was
granted on terms highly honorable to the
Rumanians, and, assisted by the lack of
capacity shown by the Turkish generals,
saved the situation. The Russian and
Rumanian forces did, indeed, fail in a
third assault on Plevna, one of the great
battles of the nineteenth century; but
they kept their ground, and on the arrival
of fresh troops they turned the attack into
a siege. The Turks held out through the
autumn, till at last, on December 10, Os-
man Pasha, after a fierce belated attempt to
cut his way through, surrendered his army.
After this events followed each other
swiftly. The Russians, heedless of the
rigors of a winter campaign in the moun-
tains, gave their disorganized enemies no
respite, and forced their way across the
Balkans, routed the Turks in one en-

RUSSIAN VICTORIES 123

gagement after another, and pressed on
toward Constantinople. The tide had
also turned in Asia, where the Turks were
defeated in battle and the fortress of
Kars was taken by storm. Serbia now I
joined in the war, and Greece was stirring.

European diplomacy, which had been
waiting on the course of military events,
now awoke to feverish activity. Austria ]
and Great Britain, in particular, were I
resolved not to accept any solution dis-
advantageous to their interests. They
asserted that the status of the Eastern
Question was part of the public law of
Europe, as established by the Congress of
Paris in 1856, supplemented by the con-
ference in London in 1871, and that no
changes could be made in it without the
consent of all the signatories. They
wished, indeed, to be consulted by Russia
in advance, that is to say, to have a voice
in the negotiations.

As the foreign offices at Vienna and
London held much the same views, they

124 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

kept in close touch with one another.
London would have liked to take common
action, and proposed this as early as May
20, 1877. Andrassy, however, suspected
the British government of having in mind
the exigencies of home politics and of de-
siring his aid in order to obtain a diplo-
matic and parliamentary triumph for its
own selfish benefit.* He did not wish to
alienate too completely the Slavs in the
Balkan Peninsula, and to make them feel
that Russia was their only friend. More-
over, the relations of Austria with Russia
were not the same as those of England.
Great Britain and Russia were still at
peace with one another and maintained
correct official intercourse, but that was
about all. There was no pretense of cor-
diality between them, and one disagree-
able act more or less meant little. But
Austria was theoretically an ally of Russia
and did not wish to give unnecessary of-
fence. Besides, unknown to London,

* Wertheimer, iii, p. 28.

GREAT' BRITAIN AND AUSTRIA 125

Andrassy had in reserve his agreement of
January 15, which, if it were carried out,
as he meant that it should be, would safe-
guard Austrian interests. It was better
to wait and to watch the course of events,
while not neglecting precautions for the
future. He therefore declined all English j
suggestions of immediate alliance, and j
proposed instead a secret interchange of
declarations by which the two powers
bound themselves to uniform but separate
diplomatic, and, if need be in the future,
to joint military action.*

To this suggestion the English agreed.
For many reasons they were anxious to'
see the war brought to an end as soon as
possible. While deeply disliking and dis-
trusting Russia and determined to oppose
her advance, they did feel a certain sym-
pathy for the Christians under Turkish
rule and for their aspirations, whereas
Austria's foreign policy has seldom been
affected by such sentiments. The Eng-

* Wertheimer, iii, p. 39.

126 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

lish cabinet, moreover, was not united as
to what it should do, or just how far Rus-
sia should be allowed to go in weakening
the Ottoman empire. The prime min-
ister himself, Lord Beacon sfield, who
throughout favored vigorous action, was
nevertheless disturbed by the fear, felt
likewise in France, that Bismarck rejoiced
in the whole Eastern complication and
wished to profit by it in order to attack
the French at a moment when they could
obtain no outside help. On one point the
English government was clear; under no
circumstances would it permit the Rus-
sians to get into the Mediterranean; that
is to say, it would not consent to any
change in the clauses of the Treaty of
Paris which closed the Straits to Russian
ships of war. For the same reason, it was
opposed to the creation of a strong Slavic
state, especially to one on both sides of
the Balkans and with a seaport on the
^Egean, for it believed that this state
would be a vassal of Russia, its creator.

GREAT BRITAIN AND AUSTRIA 127

Here Austria was equally determined. I
There must not be a Great Serbia or ai
Great Bulgaria that included Macedonia.
Such a state, besides being a natural ally
of Russia, would be a bar to the exten-
sion of Austrian influence to the south-
ward, and might even serve as a centre
of encouragement to discontented Slavic
elements in the Dual Empire.

On the 8th of June, 1877, before her
armies had even passed the Danube, Rus-
sia had informed England as to the con-
ditions under which she would be willing
to concede peace to the Turks, provided
they asked for it before her troops had
crossed the Balkans. These conditions,
which in the main corresponded with
those in the agreement with Austria, were
not accepted by England as satisfactory,
but the matter rested for a time. The
disasters at Plevna made immediate dis-
cussion superfluous. But when at last
Osman Pasha surrendered and the Rus-
sians swarmed across the mountains, cap-

128 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

turing or driving before them without
respite whatever was left of the Turkish
armies, both Austria and England began
to make pressing inquiries as to Russian
intentions and to intimate that they
themselves ought to be consulted.

The demand was most unwelcome. It
often happens toward the close of a war
that interested third parties not only
proffer their good offices to bring hostili-
ties to an end, but even insist that they
have the right to be heard regarding*the
terms of peace. Such intervention may
be hailed by the defeated combatant, but
the victorious one fears and dislikes it
and rejects it if he can. In 1871 Bis-
marck had been worried over the danger
that some other nation might try to med-
dle in the peace negotiations between
Germany and France. In 1878 the Rus-
sians had special reasons for resenting any
attempt to rob them of the fruits of suc-
cess. They believed that they had done
alone what had been the duty of all Eu-

FEELING IN RUSSIA 129

rope, and yet they had been refused as-
sistance or even a mandate from the other
powers, though all had made the same
demands and had met with the same re-
buffs. The war had proved more diffi-
cult than the Russians had expected; they
had suffered heavy losses of men and
money; they had met with severe reverses
and some humiliations; and now that they
had finally triumphed, they were not dis-
posed to let those who should have helped,
but had only hampered them, dictate
what terms of peace they might impose
on the enemy. The Russian public knew
nothing of any secret agreement with
Austria, and the Russian army, after what
it had gone through and had achieved,
was as anxious to enter Constantinople in
triumph as the German one had been to
enter Paris in 1871. Tsar Alexander II,
in the correspondence which he still main-
tained with Emperor Francis Joseph,
while asserting that Russia would act ac-
cording to the spirit of the agreement of

130 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

January 15, declared that after all that
had happened it could not be carried out
to the letter. On January 26, 1878, the
Russians officially informed Vienna of the
demands which five days later they im-
posed on the Turks by the armistice of
Adrianople.

By this time the Turks were no longer
in a position to haggle over terms, but
Austria and England were, and had no
thought of allowing themselves to be
brushed aside. On February 3, Andrassy,
in a circular note, invited the powers to
an international conference at Vienna.
Russia, though agreeing to the idea, ob-
jected to Vienna as a meeting place, and
it was decided to hold, not a conference,
but a formal congress of the powers at
Berlin. The international situation was
alarming. On January 28 the English
ministry had asked Parliament for an
additional military grant of six million
pounds. Five days earlier the British fleet
had been ordered to pass the Darda-

CONDITIONS IN THE BALKANS 131

nelles. The order had been recalled, but
on February 7 it was repeated and was
carried out. The Russians answered by
declaring that if the English entered the
Bosphorus, they themselves would oc-
cupy Constantinople. The forces of the
two nations were now almost in sight of
one another, and any step forward on the
part of either would have led to immedi-
ate war. The Balkan Peninsula was in a
state of wild confusion. The Bulgarians
had begun to take sanguinary revenge on
their enemies for the outrages they had
suffered, and the Mohammedans retali-
ated when strong enough to do so. A
Greek army invaded Thessaly, only to be
withdrawn at the urgent remonstrance of
the powers, and the promise that the in-
terests of Greece should be looked after
at the general settlement. Meanwhile
the Russians, undeterred by the prepara-
tions against them and by the forthcom-
ing congress, continued their negotiations
with the representatives of the Sultan, till

132 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

I on March 3 they concluded the Peace of
! San Stefano.

By the terms of this treaty Russia was
to receive a war indemnity of 1,410,000,-
ooo roubles, an uncertain asset in view of
the state of Turkish finances; but 1,100,-
000,000 of it were to be commuted for the
district of the Dobrudja in eastern Bul-
i garia, and for a territory in Asia including
/ the fortress of Kars, the port of Batum,
' and the town of Bayazid. Rumania was
J to obtain her independence, but was to
.' cede Bessarabia to Russia and receive the
Dobrudja in exchange. Serbia and Mon-
tenegro were to have independence and
an accession .of territory. Bosnia and
Herzegovina were to get reform and au-
ftonomy. Most important of all was the
. creation of a large Bulgarian vassal prin-
! cipality, extending to the ^Egean and to
the frontiers of Albania. Until it was
organized it was to be occupied by Rus-
sian troops, for as long as two years if
necessary.

THE PEACE OF SAN STEFANO 133

The news of this treaty excited loud
clamors. Mohammedans in Bulgaria,
Greeks, Rumanians, and even Serbians
protested violently. These outcries Rus-
sia could disregard, but not the opposition
of England, who now refused to attend
the proposed congress unless the whole
San Stefano agreement should be sub-
mitted to it for discussion and modifica-
tion. On April I Lord Salisbury, who
had succeeded Lord Derby as foreign sec-
retary, sent a circular note to the pow-
ers, sharply criticising the treaty. Mili-
tary preparations were feverishly pushed.
Lord Beaconsfield startled Europe by the
despatch of Indian troops to Malta, as an
indication that in case of hostilities Brit-
ain could count on the resources not only
of the United Kingdom but of her whole
vast empire — a foretaste of what she was
to do on a much larger scale a generation
later. Andrassy, on his part, made no/
secret of his opposition to the terms of/
peace as they stood, and called on the

134 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

Austro-Hungarian delegations for an ex-
tra military credit of 60,000,000 gulden.
The government of Tsar Alexander II
now found itself in just the position it had
feared from the beginning, but had not
succeeded in avoiding. Its victorious
armies stretched as far as the gates of
Constantinople, but their flanks and rear
were at the mercy of an Austrian attack;
and whereas Russia could not count on an
ally, Austria would be joined by England,
and also by Rumania, who was intensely
exasperated at seeing the aid she had fur-
nished at a critical moment requited by a
demand for a cession of her territory.
Worst of all was the patent fact that Bis-
marck stood behind Austria. He had
encouraged the policy of Andrassy from
the start; indeed, he has been accused
of having suggested it; this is probably
an exaggeration, but it is easy to un-
derstand why he should have wished
to turn the energies and ambitions of
Austria to the eastward, and even have

THE PEACE OF SAN STEFANO 135

looked upon her, up to a certain point,
as the German advance guard in that
part of the world. None could say when
he would think the time had come for the
formidable intervention of Germany, an
intervention that might have results for
Russia far more disastrous than those of
the Crimean war.

England by herself was less to be
feared. She could hardly send aid suffi-
cient to enable the Turks to prolong their
resistance with success, and the Russians
believed that from Central Asia they
could make trouble for her in Afghanistan
and India.* But her demands were so
much like those of Austria that it was
probable that if either state took up
arms it would have the support of the
other. The conflict that had just ended
had proved unexpectedly costly in blood

* Skobelev, the most brilliant Russian general, and one with
Asiatic experience, had made a plan for the invasion of India
which he believed feasible. It was at this time that the
Russian mission was sent to Kabul which alarmed England
and led to the second Afghan war.

136 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

and treasure, Russia was exhausted, her
finances were in bad shape, and her victo-
rious army near Constantinople was melt-
ing away by disease, while before its eyes
the city, at first almost undefended, was
being provided with fortifications which
grew more formidable with every week
that passed. Rage as the Russian gov-
ernment and people might, the perils of
a general war were too great for them to
face, except at the last extremity. To
avoid disaster they must come to some
sort of terms with their rivals.

Bismarck, with his usual common sense,
had insisted that the Congress of Berlin
should not meet until all serious points in
dispute had been settled by preliminary
agreement. Gradually this was accom-
plished. Though England yielded more
than had been expected at St. Petersburg,
most of the concessions were made by
Russia, who by three secret compacts,
signed in London on May 30, gave up
her creation of a Great Bulgaria, but

THE CYPRUS CONVENTION 137

kept Bessarabia in Europe and Batum/
and Kars (but not Bayazid) in Asia.

But while the British government was
reducing the gains of Russia, it was also
providing itself with securities for the
future. By the Cyprus Convention,*
signed June 4, it guaranteed to the Turks
from Russian aggression the rest of their
possessions in Asia, in return for which
the Porte undertook "to introduce neces-
sary reforms, to be agreed upon later be-
tween the two powers, into the govern-
ment, and for the protection of the Chris-
tian and other subjects of the Porte in
these territories." And in order that
Great Britain might the more easily de-
fend and protect these territories (the
Turks knew nothing of the Anglo-Russian
arrangement signed five days before), she
was to receive the island of Cyprus to
occupy and administer. Having thus
sanctioned in her own case the principle of

* Also called the Convention of Constantinople. Parlia-
mentary Papers, 1878, Ixxxii, Turkey, no. 36, pp. 3, 4.

I38 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

appropriating Turkish lands for the good
of the Ottoman empire, she was in a posi-
tion to advocate it in the case of her
friends, and two days later, in one more
secret agreement, she promised to sup-

] port the views of Austria in regard to

i Bosnia and Herzegovina.

After the main difficulties had been sur-
mounted in advance, the representatives
of Europe could meet with the expecta-
tion of a happy result from their labors.
The celebrated Congress of Berlin was a
gathering of very distinguished and able
men, Beaconsfield, Gorchakov, Andrassy,
Salisbury, and various minor lights,
presided over with masterful vigor and
tact by Prince Bismarck, then at the full
height of his genius and his fame. He
had hoped that the proceedings would
last but a few days, and would consist in
the prompt ratification of the bargains
made between the great powers, and in
the submission to them by the smaller
ones, whose representatives were only al-

THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN 139

lowed to appear before the Congress, but
not to take part in it. Yet in spite of the
ruthless energy with which Bismarck
pushed matters through, the Congress
lasted for a month (June 13 to July 13),
and there were several disagreeable and
even critical moments before everything
was settled. The Bulgarian question, as
the most difficult, was taken up first, and
some time passed before every one was
agreed as to just what boundaries and
rights should be assigned to the three
parts into which the Great Bulgaria of /
San Stefano was to be divided : namely, a I
vassal Bulgarian principality, an autono- 1
mous province of Eastern Rumelia, and a»
Macedonia. This last was handed back
to the tender mercies of the Turks, with
no protection except promises of reforms
that were never to be carried out, and
that did not preserve it from another
thirty years of constantly increasing op-
pression and misery. On the other hand,
the Turks had a painful surprise when by

140 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

/previous arrangement their friend, Great
/ Britain, proposed that Bosnia and Herze-
govina should be handed over to their
other friend, Austria. When they at-
tempted to object they were browbeaten
by Bismarck and freely lectured on the
dangers of obstinacy. Russia, bound by
her agreements, was unable to do anything,
and the Turks, left unsupported, yielded
i in the end. It was voted that Austria
I should occupy and administer the two
; provinces, and should also occupy the dis-
trict of Novibazar. The Rumanians pro-
tested in vain at being obliged to cede
Bessarabia. They met with some sym-
pathy but no aid. Serbia and Monte-
negro were granted accessions of territory,
and Montenegro, thanks to Russian in-
sistence, was to have a seaport on the
Adriatic, though without the right of
policing its waters, which was put in Aus-
I trian hands. The Russians obtained Kars
f and Batum, but had to declare an inten-
/ tion of making Batum a free port. Their

THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN 141

war indemnity of 300,000,000 roubles was
left to them, but as it was stipulated that
this should have no precedence over other
Turkish debts, the prospect that it would
ever be paid was remote.

Shortly before the Congress came to ai
close, it was astonished, the Russian dele-/
gates most disagreeably so, by the an-y
nouncement of the Cyprus Convention/
Other territorial changes were suggested
in private discussion, but got no further.
Various minor matters were attended to,
including a vague promise of a rectifica-
tion of boundary for the Greeks and of
reforms for the Armenians, and a stipula-
tion that whatever was left of the decrees
of the Congress of Paris and of the Lon-
don Conference should be still regarded
as binding. The members of the high
assembly then departed to their homes,
among them Lord Beaconsfield, who on
his return proclaimed to an admiring
throng that he had brought back 'peace
with honor/

CHAPTER III

The Congress of Berlin in 1878 marks
one of the turning points in the history of
the Eastern Question. The changes in
the map made or consecrated there were
almost revolutionary in their extent. In
1856, at the Congress of Paris, the pow-
ers had attempted to rejuvenate and to
fortify the Ottoman empire. They had
freed it from the Russian menace, they
had guaranteed its integrity, they had
renounced the right of interference in its
internal affairs, and they had expressed
kindly approval of its projects of reform.
It was the spoilt child of Europe. In
1878 it fared differently. Friends, ene-
mies, former vassals, while squabbling
with each other, were one and all ready
to possess themselves of its territory.
Its wishes were the last thing that any
142

ATTITUDE OF THE TURKS 143

one thought of consulting, and its prom-
ises imposed upon nobody. No wonder
that the Turks felt every man's hand to
be against them, and that, far from carry-
ing out the mandates of the Congress in a
compliant and cheerful manner, they
adopted a policy of passive resistance,
which they pushed as far as they dared.
Nothing in the nature of reform was done
or even attempted for Macedonia or Ar-
menia; the Bosnian Mohammedans were
secretly instigated to resist Austrian oc-
cupation; the Albanians were played off
against the demands of Montenegro, un-
til a joint naval demonstration of the
powers and the threat of other measures
finally brought the Porte to terms and to
the keeping of its promises. In the mat-
ter of the extension of the Greek bound-
ary, Turkey, not unnaturally, showed no
inclination to grant anything. It was in
vain that the powers took up the matter
and decided she must yield Thessaly and
Epirus; she remained obstinate, till in the

144 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

end she wore down their insistence and
managed by a final agreement, in 1880, to
keep most of Epirus, to the wrath of the
Greeks.

But the Turks were not the only people
dissatisfied with the results of the Con-
gress. The anger of the Russians was
still hotter. They had fought what they
believed was the fight of Europe and of
humanity, they had shed their blood and
spent their treasure without stint, and in
the hour of victory their hand had been
stayed, the other nations had combined
against them, their fair compensation had
been cut down, while their jealous rivals,
Austria and England, had helped them-
selves to whatever Turkish lands were
to their liking. At Berlin Russia had
found herself without a friend. Even
Germany, the ally who owed so much
to her, had adopted an attitude of lofty
neutrality, which was only a mask for her
support of Austria.

Most of the smaller states were no

BULGARIA 145

better pleased. The Bulgarians had, in-
deed, not a little to be thankful for when
they compared their situation with what
it had been two years earlier, but they had
seen the brimming cup dashed from their
lips. The Great Bulgaria of San Stefano
had been partitioned, and much of it had
been handed back more or less completely
to the Turks. In consequence, the dis-
appointment of the Bulgarians was in-
tense. Far from resigning themselves to
their new lot, they never gave up the
hope of regaining what had once been
promised to them, and the chief historical
importance of the Bulgaria of San Ste-
fano has been that it created for a nation
an ideal they have pursued unswervingly
ever since.

Serbia was now independent and en-
larged, as was Montenegro, who had ob-
tained her long-coveted seaport, but both
these states bitterly resented the Austrian
occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
which were inhabited by their kinsmen,

146 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

and which they had desired for them-
selves. They also disliked the Austrian
occupation of Novibazar, which separated
them from one another. Greece was
much dissatisfied with the smallness of her
acquisitions, and she regarded the new
Bulgaria as a dangerous rival for territory
which she had long hoped might some
day be hers. Altogether, the outlook for
future harmony in the Balkans was not
promising.

Even the two powers that had fared
best could not, as later events have
proved, look back on their success with
complete satisfaction. Great Britain
may have obtained 'peace with honor/
though not every one thought so, but she
soon learned that she had been egregiously
mistaken in her estimate of the future re-
lations between the Russians and the Bul-
garians, and she had cause to regret that
she had opposed the creation of the Great
Bulgaria, which would thereafter have
given a different aspect to the history of

ENGLAND AND TURKEY 147

the Balkan Peninsula, and would have
saved Europe the perplexities and horrors
of the Macedonian question. By the Cy-
prus Convention, England assumed a
guarantee for the integrity of Asiatic
Turkey. This, luckily for herself, she has
never been called upon to make good, but
she also assumed an obligation to protect
the Armenians, an obligation that was to
weigh heavily on her in after-times, and
that she has found herself painfully un-
able to fulfil. With the Turks her rela-
tions soon underwent a radical change.
After the fall of the Beaconsfield ministry
in 1880 she ceased to be what she had
been for the previous half century, the
protector to whom they looked for aid in
every crisis. At the head of the new
Liberal government was Mr. Gladstone,
the champion of oppressed peoples, the
benefactor of Greece, the author of the
famous pamphlet on The Bulgarian Hor-
rors. Henceforth the voice of England
was no longer that of a friend. The

148 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

change was to prove lasting. From that
day to this, Great Britain and the Otto-
man empire have rarely been on cordial
terms.

Even Austria-Hungary was by no
means so content with her acquisitions as
might have been expected. Count An-
drassy had steered his course with skill
and had brought his vessel of state tri-
umphantly into port. He had checked
the ambitions of Russia, he had prevented
the creation of a powerful South Slav
kingdom, he had kept open the road to
Salonica, and he had secured for his sov-
ereign a territory that might be regarded
as a compensation for the loss of Lom-
bardy and Venetia. Under his guidance
Austria, excluded from Italy and Ger-
many, had found a new field for her expan-
sion, and she had entered into this heri-
tage not by war and conquest, but in re-
sponse to the official mandate of Europe,
which had commissioned her to take over
these lands from the Turks, who had

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 149

shown themselves incapable of retaining
them. And yet there were shadows to
this picture. In Austria, and still more
in Hungary, the two chief nationalities,
the Germans and the Magyars, were none
too well pleased at the strengthening of
the Slav element in the Dual Empire,
which sooner or later must result from the
bringing of over a million more Slavs
under the rule of Francis Joseph. At the
last moment Andrassy had decided to get
the right, not of 'annexation' of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, but only of 'occupation
and administration/ He was probably
influenced by the difficulty as to the dis-
position of the two provinces between the
two halves of the monarchy if they were
formally annexed, and also by his anxiety
to obtain the acquiescence of the Turks.
If he had asked for outright annexation
he might not have been able to obtain
the signatures of their plenipotentiaries
at Berlin, and without them his action
would bear an appearance of violence

150 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

which he was eager to avoid. Even as it
was he had to agree to a secret promise,
which we may feel sure he never intended
to keep, that the occupation should be
only temporary. Doubtless he thought
that he was getting the substance and
sacrificing only the shadow,* neverthe-
less his imperial master and the military
party at home seem to have been disap-
pointed, and his resignation a few months
later may have been connected with this.
He was never restored to favor, a thing
Bismarck declared to be incomprehen-
sible in a country possessing so few states-
men as Austria. The uncertainty as to
the ultimate status of Bosnia and Herze-
govina was destined to remain one of
the disturbing elements in the Balkans
for thirty years. When annexation was
at last formally decreed, it almost led
to a general conflict.

* In private he described the Austrian occupation of Bosnia
as annexation "very badly disguised." H. Drummond Wolff,
Rambling Recollections, ii, p. 194.

BOSNJA AND HERZEGOVINA 151

Andrassy had hoped and believed that
the territories he had won for his master
would submit peacefully to their new lot.
Instead, the Mohammedan population
rose in savage resistance, which was over-
come only by the employment of large
forces and after sharp righting. The
Christians accepted the change more
quietly, for it brought them great bene-
fits, but the largest element among them,
the Orthodox Serbs, never renounced their
nationalistic aspirations. On the con-
trary, as time went on, these aspirations
grew constantly stronger. They ren-
dered good relations between Austria and
Serbia almost impossible, till they cul-
minated, in 1914, in the tragedy of
Seraievo, the immediate cause of the
European war.

Germany, at the Congress of Berlin,
had, according to Bismarck's well known
phrase, played' the part of 'the honest
broker.' She had smoothed over the dif-
ferences between the other countries and

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

had approved of the division of the spoil
between them, while asking nothing for
herself. And yet, disinterested as Bis-
marck claimed to have been, and dexter-
ous as his management certainly was, he
had scant reason to look back on the
events of the last few months with satis-
faction. He had, it is true, helped to
launch Austria on a career of expansion
to the southeast in sharp rivalry with
Russia, thereby insuring that the two
would not combine against him, and
securing himself against any return on
the part of Austria to a policy of inter-
vention in German affairs. This was
well enough, but the League of the Three
Emperors, the one that of all others he
preferred, and the one that precluded
most completely any combination of
powers dangerous to Germany, was now,
if still nominally in existence, a mere
sham. What was more; he had failed
in his attempt to aid Vienna without
alienating St. Petersburg; and though he

POLICY OF BISMARCK 153

may have had confidence in the military
strength of Germany as compared with
that of her eastern neighbor, never in
his long career did Bismarck regard the
attitude of Russia as a matter of small
importance. As between Austria and
Russia he had deliberately chosen to
support the former,* but without swerv-
ing from this policy he had sought to
avoid arousing Russian susceptibilities,
except from delight in annoying and
humiliating Gorchakov or in occasional
outbursts of temper. Speaking publicly,
ten years later, he declared: "My con-
duct at the congress was such that I
thought, after it was over: Well, if I
had not got long ago the highest Russian
order set in precious stones, I ought to
get it now." f None the less, his effort
to retain Russian friendship had resulted
in failure. To the Russians his boasts of

* The reasons given by him in his memoirs may be accepted
as far as they go.
t Reden, xii, p. 463.

154 TEE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

what he had done for them appeared
a mockery. No small services that he
might have rendered them could obscure
the fact that, from their point of view,
Germany under his guidance had in the
hour of need deserted the friend to whom
she owed so much. And as the false
friend arouses more bitterness than the
open enemy, every one from the Tsar
down resented the so-called neutrality of
Germany as keenly as the open hostility
of England or Austria.

For popular opinion Prince Bismarck,
as a rule, cared little, especially for Rus-
sian opinion. He strove to win the good
will of the emperor, not that of the na-
tion, and he abominated the Panslavists,
who repaid him in kind, but now the Tsar
and his advisers were as angry as the most
ardent Panslavist. During the winter of
1878-79 the newspapers of St. Petersburg
and Moscow indulged in violent recrimi-
nations with those of Berlin, even men-
tioning with favor the idea of a Franco-

PEELING OF THE TSAR 155

Russian alliance. In the reorganization
and redistribution of the Russian armies
that followed the war with Turkey, the
troops stationed in Poland were strength-
ened to an extent that excited alarm in
Germany, where this action was regarded
as a sign of ill will. On their side the
Russian government, and especially the
emperor, were irritated by what they be-
lieved to be the unfriendly attitude of the
German representatives in the interna-
tional commission determining the bound-
aries of Bosnia.

The sincere admiration and affection
that the Tsar, a man of frank, impulsive
nature, had long felt for his aged uncle,
the Kaiser, and the many years of close
intimacy between the two, made his dis-
appointment and resentment the more
keen. Was this the gratitude to which
he was entitled ? Had not Emperor
William himself written in 1871 : "Prussia
will never forget that she owes it to you
that the war did not assume the most ex-

156 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

treme dimensions. May God bless you
for it." * At last, unable to restrain his
feelings longer, Alexander II poured out
his grievances to the German ambassador
at St. Petersburg and ended with a warn-
ing, and a week later wrote to his im-
perial uncle a letter f complaining in a
tone almost of menace of the conduct of
Germany, which he ascribed chiefly to
Bismarck's resentment against Gorcha-
kov.J There was more truth than tact

* Politische Correspondenz Kaiser WilhelnCs I, p. 302.

t He wrote at the same time a similar letter to Emperor
Francis Joseph, if we may trust Bismarck's statement to St.
Vallier. Chaudordy, La France en 1889, p. 261.

% "I understand perfectly that you are anxious to maintain
your good relations with Austria, but I do not understand
why it is to the interests of Germany to sacrifice those of
Russia. Is it worthy of a real statesman to put into the
scale a personal quarrel when it is a question of the interests
of two great states born to live on good terms with one
another and when one of them rendered the other, in 1870, a
service which according to your own words you said you
would never forget ? I should not have presumed to remind
you of this, but the situation is becoming too serious for me
to conceal from you the fears that are harassing me of con-
sequences that might be disastrous to our two countries. May
God preserve us from them and be your guide." H. Kohl,
Wegwciser durch Bismarck's Gedanken und Erinnerungen,
p. 170.

THE TSAR'S LETTER 157

in his remarks, and the letter greatly
incensed Emperor William. Bismarck
profited by the opportunity. He had
just heard of the forthcoming resignation
of Andrassy, which had rilled him with
alarm, as perhaps meaning the triumph
of clerical and anti- Prussian influences at
Vienna and a change in Austrian policy.
Although he had soon been reassured on
this point, he deeply regretted the re-
tirement of a statesman whose aims had
accorded so well with his own. On
August 13 he had expressed by telegraph
a desire to see Count Andrassy again at
any time and place that was convenient
to him. Andrassy replied on the I5th
(the day that the letter of the Tsar was
written), fixing Gastein as the meeting
place.

A close alliance between Germany and
Austria was an idea which Bismarck had
entertained before and even informally
suggested. This may seem strange in one
who had risen to greatness by his reso-

1 58 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

lute anti-Austrian policy, which had tri-
umphed in the war of 1866, and had led
to the aggrandizement of Prussia and to
the expulsion of Austria from the German
Confederation. Yet, much as he had dis-
liked the previous hollow friendship be-
tween Vienna and Berlin, which he be-
lieved to be entirely to the advantage of
the former, and convinced as he was that
Prussia could only fulfil her ambitions by
a successful war with Austria, none the
less, even before that war was finished, he
had begun to look forward to better rela-
tions in the future. The obstinacy with
which in the hour of victory he had
stood out against the eager wish of his
master and of the Prussian military
leaders for an acquisition of Austrian
territory, was due only in part to the
immediate dangers that he perceived in
case Prussia should show herself im-
moderate in her demands. It was also
due to his extraordinary foresight as to
the advantages of not alienating Austria

GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND RUSSIA 159

permanently, but of leaving the way
open to a subsequent reconciliation. In
the League of the Three Emperors, Bis-
marck had already reaped a first reward
for this policy, and he was now to reap
a further one when he believed the mo-
ment had come to guarantee Germany
against the consequences cf Russian re-
sentment.

The friendship between Russia and
Prussia was of old standing. For over a
century, since the alliance concluded be-
tween Catherine II and Frederick the
Great in 1764, the two countries, although
at times there had been coolness between
them, had never been at war with one
another, except, nominally, during the
Moscow campaign of Napoleon I. Their
soldiers had fought side by side at the bat-
tle of Leipsic and on other glorious fields,
they had entered Paris in triumph to-
gether, and Emperor William himself,
then a boy, had taken part in that trium-
phant entry. Since then the two coun-

160 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

tries had often befriended each other to
the advantage of both. The closely re-
lated courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg
had been on intimate terms, and the sov-
ereigns were bound together by sincere
mutual affection. But such sentimental
considerations did not weigh with Bis-
marck. Earlier in his career the friend-
ship of Russia had brought him great ben-
efits for which he had had to pay little in
return. He was not disposed now to pay
much and get little. If Russia had been
willing to give him a free hand against
France, his attitude might have been dif-
ferent, but as he later wrote in his mem-
oirs: "That for Russian policy there is
a limit beyond which the importance of
France in Europe must not be decreased
is explicable. That limit was reached, as
I believe, at the Peace of Frankfort — a
fact which in 1870 and 1871 was not so
completely realized at St. Petersburg as
five years later. I hardly think that dur-
ing our war the Russian cabinet clearly

GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND RUSSIA 161

foresaw that, when it was over, Russia
would have as neighbor so strong and
consolidated a Germany." * This was
true, and whatever may have been Bis-
marck's designs in 1875, the famous war
scare at least made clear that Russia was
not minded to permit him to attack
France.

Another consideration also weighed
with him. He says later in his memoirs :
" In point of material force I held a union
with Russia to have the advantage," f
and history has shown that this assump-
tion was correct. On the other hand,
Germany had great material force of her
own, so great that in an alliance between
her and Austria there could be little doubt
as to which would be the dominant part-
ner— as again later events have proved.
With Russia there was no such prospect.
To be sure, the time was past when St.
Petersburg could take with Berlin the

*£edanken und Erinnervngtn, ii, p. 231.
t Ibid., ii, p. 234.

i6z THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

superior tone used by Emperor Nicholas
I toward his brother-in-law, King Freder-
ick William IV. But even so, complete
docility to German suggestions could
hardly be expected on the banks of the
Neva. Russia was too mighty, too proud,
and too ambitious a state to remain long
content with the role of second fiddle.
She would wish to receive at least as
much as she gave, especially as she be-
lieved there was a good balance due her
already, and she would not be likely to
alienate for long her own liberty of ac-
tion. There was some ground for the
fear Bismarck expressed to Shuvalov,
"that if the German policy confined its
possibilities to the Russian alliance, and,
in accordance with the wishes of Russia,
refused all other states, Germany would
with regard to Russia be in an unequal
position, because the geographical situa-
tion and the autocratic constitution of
Russia make it easier for her to give up
the alliance than it would be for us." *

* Gedanktn und Erinnerungen, ii, p. 225.

RUSSIA OR AUSTRIA ? 163

This does not mean that under certain
circumstances, and if paid his price, Bis-
marck might not have gone back to the
policy of a close alliance with Russia,
even, to a certain extent, at Austrian ex-
pense, and such a policy is probably what
would have best pleased his sovereign.
But neither Russia nor Germany was
ready at the last analysis to grant the
other a perfectly free hand as against
France and Austria respectively. This
explains the failure of the offers of
Radowitz in 1875 and of Werder in the
following year, and, on the other hand,
the refusal of Bismarck to the Russian
proposal for an offensive and defensive
alliance, made to him in 1877 * and re-
newed and urged upon him a year later
by Shuvalov, just before the Congress
of Berlin.

To these considerations we may add the
deeper one of the common nationality and
history of the Germans in Germany and

* Tatishchev, Alexander II, ii, p. 487. See also Gedanhen
tind Erinnerungen, ii, p. 220.

1 64 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

of those in Austria. For a thousand years
they had been in the same empire, and
their present political severance from one
another dated back scarcely more than a
decade. Such factors weighed with Bis-
marck, and he mentions them among the
reasons for his decision, but we must not
exaggerate their importance. Though he
was a German to the core and the chief
maker of German unity, he had little of
the spirit of intense nationalism so char-
acteristic of the next generation; he had
never belonged to the 'Great Germany'
party, and without a qualm he had cut
off ten million Austrian Germans from
their immemorial connections, just as he
never worried over the fate of the Ger-
mans in the Russian Baltic provinces.
His positive genius was far removed from
the dreams of the modern Pangermanist.
He neither rhapsodized over the merits
of Kultur nor looked forward to an inev-
itable conflict between Slav and Teuton,
though he regarded Russian Panslavism

BISMARCK'S MOTIVES 165

as a menace. In short, he was a patriot,
but not a nationalist, clear-sighted and
practical rather than sentimental or im-
aginative. He had already shown by his
conduct throughout the whole Eastern
crisis that if the League of the Three
Emperors should break down, and he
were forced to choose between Austria and
Russia, it was Austria he would support.
Now, angered by the attitude of Russia
since the Congress of Berlin, and fearing
that in spite of assurances to the contrary
the retirement of Andrassy might lead to \
a change of policy at Vienna, he deter- »
mined while there was still time to bind
Germany and Austria together by an alli-
ance which should put an end to the dan-
gers that threatened them both. Hav-
ing, therefore, commented at length on
the letter of the Tsar, in such a manner
as to inflame rather than soothe the
anger of his sovereign, and having sub-
mitted a draft for a stiff reply, he started
for Gastein, eager to meet his Austrian

166 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

friend and to push matters to a con-
clusion.

Count Andrassy, on his part, if we may
trust to a memorandum that he wrote in
1888, had been aiming for just such a
result ever since he had become foreign
minister. It did not, therefore, take long
for the two statesmen to reach an under-
standing when they came together at
Gastein. They agreed that after each
had obtained the approval of his master,
Bismarck should proceed to Vienna to
enter into formal negotiations for an
Austro-German alliance. The idea was
immediately approved by Emperor
Francis Joseph, but the aged German
emperor was at first quite unfavorable
to it. Although offended at the tone of
his nephew, he still clung to the hered-
itary friendship between Berlin and St.
Petersburg, and he was just sending
General Manteuffel with a special mes-
sage to the Tsar. He also had not en-
tirely got over his old distrust of Austria.

ALEXANDROVO 167

He telegraphed, accordingly, to Gastein,
forbidding Bismarck's journey to Vienna,
and only gave his consent after the most
vigorous remonstrances on the part of
the chancellor, who declared that his
own position and further continuation
in office would be impossible if he were
to be disavowed in this manner. Em-
peror William yielded with reluctance,
and presently, in answer to an invitation
from Tsar Alexander, decided to meet him
and clear up the situation. Unwelcome
as such a step was to Bismarck at this
juncture, he was unable to do anything,
except submit to his master a long memo-
randum on the relations between Ger-
many, Russia, and Austria, in the past,
present, and future. The document, how-
ever, seems to have had little effect. On
September 3, at the Russian frontier town
of Alexandrovo, uncle and nephew greeted
each other once more. All the clouds be-
tween them soon vanished.* The Tsar

* For an account of the meeting, see Tatishchev, Alexander
II, ii, p. 550.

168 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

expressed his profound regret if anything
he had written had offended his uncle,
and declared that his feelings and pur-
poses had been misunderstood in Ger-
many. He brought forward his minister
of war, General Miliutin, the man sup-
posed to be the leader of the anti-German
faction, to aver that there was no truth
in the charge, and that the recent Rus-
sian military movements were not in
any sense hostile. The two monarchs
parted completely reconciled, and with
Emperor William satisfied that his chan-
cellor's suspicions of Russia were without
real foundation. He therefore rejected
flatly the idea of an Austro-German al-
liance directed against Russia, declaring
that such an act would now be dis-
honorable and treacherous on his part.

This brought matters to a crisis. Bis-
marck, from Gastein, where he was kept
by the state of his health, continued to
assail his master with arguments and
with threats of resignation. In answer

CROSS CURRENTS 169

the emperor talked of abdicating rather
than stooping to a dishonorable act.
Only after obstinate resistance did he
unwillingly consent to negotiations for
a defensive alliance, but it must not be
one that was specifically directed against
Russia.

On September 21 Prince Bismarck ar-
rived in Vienna. He was well received.
The discussions between him and Count
Andrassy and the drawing up of the
treaty lasted but three days. Andrassy
declined Bismarck's suggestion that the
pact should be made part of the constitu-
tion of both empires, thus bringing them
into a permanent relation with one an-
other that would recall in a measure the
Germanic federation dissolved by the war
of 1866. He also refused to sign any gen-
eral treaty of alliance, declaring that Aus-
tria had no quarrel with France and
wished to keep on good terms with her,
partly out of consideration for England.
As Germany was amply able to hold her

170 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

own against France without assistance,
just as Austria was against Italy, an al-
liance for such contingencies was not
necessary or desirable. The only real
menace was from Russia, or from a com-
bination of Russia and some other power,
and this was all that should be provided
against. On this point we may suspect
that Bismarck merely made a show of
following the instructions given him. If
he had cared at bottom, he would have
displayed more vigor and obstinacy than
he did in contesting Andrassy's argu-
ments. As it was, he soon yielded to
them, and in a memorandum to his em-
peror, on September 24, recommended
the ratification of the agreement that
had been reached.

This led to another acute crisis. Em-
peror William asserted repeatedly that
the proposed treaty would be an act of
ill faith on his part, after the assurances
he had just interchanged with the Tsar.
Again he talked of abdicating rather than

EMPEROR WILLIAM AND BISMARCK 171

consenting to such a thing. Why was
not the best and simplest solution to ad-
mit Russia herself to the pact, and thus
renew and strengthen the League of the
Three Emperors ? On the other hand,
Bismarck once more came forward with
the threat of his own resignation. He
called to his assistance the chief men of
the empire. He assured himself of the
approval of the king of Bavaria, and he
called on Prince Hohenlohe, the German
ambassador in Paris, to add his argu-
ments. Von Moltke brought the whole
weight of his military authority and in-
fluence to bear on the same side. The
crown prince also supported it with en-
thusiasm. The imperial ministers were
unanimous in its favor, and announced
their intention of resigning if the treaty
were not ratified. Thus the aged emperor
found himself alone. Most reluctantly he
yielded to the pressure put upon him.
The only concession that he was able to
obtain was that though for the present

172 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

the terms of the pact were to remain
secret, he might in case of need inform
the Tsar of its scope. To this Andrassy
consented, and on October 7, 1879, the
Austro-German alliance was signed" by
him and by Prince Reuss, the German
ambassador in Vienna.

The news of what had been done soon
transpired. In both Germany and Aus-
tria it was greeted with loud applause.
There were a few dissentients, especially
in Austria among the clericals and the
Slavs, but in the main both countries felt
that the alliance was a natural one,
founded on the interests of both, against
a common danger. To the former parti-
sans of Great Germany it seemed a par-
tial realization of their once cherished
dreams, bringing together all Germans, if
not into one confederation, at least into
close and, they hoped, permanent part-
nership. It threatened no one, for it was
purely defensive in character, but by its
existence and power it formed a dam

THE AUSTRO-GERMAN ALLIANCE 173

against the progress of Panslavism, while
it helped to keep France quiet by making
her feel her isolation.

In England, still under the Conserva-
tive and anti-Russian ministry of Lord
Beaconsfield, the news was well received.
Lord Salisbury, in a speech at Manchester
on October 17, hailed it as "good tidings
of great joy." In France, as was to be
expected, it aroused apprehension. The
French feared that Bismarck might now
attack them without fear of the restraint
which had been imposed upon him in
1875. He gave no indication, however,
of any such design. While he was nego-
tiating at Vienna, he had expressly sought
out the French ambassador there and
had spoken to him most reassuringly as
to German intentions. Indeed, his at-
titude during and after the Congress
of Berlin was more friendly than it had
been for years.

There remained Russia. Even with-
out knowing the exact contents of the

174 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

Aiistro-German treaty, the Russians real-
ized that the alliance was directed against
them and resented it accordingly. But
the Tsar took the matter quietly. On
November 4 Emperor William wrote a
letter to his "dear Nephew and Friend,"
enclosing the preamble to the treaty as
a memorandum and explaining with ob-
vious difficulty and confusion the reasons
for his action. He even went to the
length of declaring: "I like to say to
myself that you will judge the principles
embodied in this important act at their
true value, and that you will agree with
them as strengthening the League of
the Three Emperors, which since the year
1873 has rendered Europe such signal
services." Alexander II replied that he
was glad "that this political transaction
contains absolutely nothing contrary to
my wishes," and that "I like to see in
it the return to that perfect understand-
ing between the three emperors which, as
you remark with so much truth, has ren-

ATTITUDE OF RUSSIA 175

dered the greatest services to Europe."*
The words of the Tsar may have been
tinged with irony, but he continued on
good terms with his uncle until his own
death by assassination on March 13, 1881.
This event had little immediate influ-
ence on the international situation. The
new Tsar, Alexander III, was a man of
limited education and with no great range
of ideas, profoundly honest, slow, con-
servative, religious, not to say bigoted,
with a high sense of his duties and of his
position. He had come to the throne
under the most tragic circumstances, and,
after a short moment of hesitation, he
resolutely set his face against liberalism,
and reverted to the traditions of undi-
luted autocracy. With stern determina-
tion he stamped the revolutionary move-
ment almost out of existence and followed
a firm reactionary policy. In foreign af-
fairs he was nationalistic, with none of
the cosmopolitanism that had character-

* Kohl, Wegtoeiser, pp. 178-182.

/

176 TEE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

ized his predecessors for the last century
and a half. But little as he loved foreign
nations, he was a sincere lover of peace
and intent on preserving it, and by nature
he was adverse to adventure or to wanton
enterprise. He established friendly rela-
tions with his great-uncle at Berlin, and
he, and still more his quiet, moderate,
and cautious foreign minister, M. de
Giers, were soon on an amicable footing
with Bismarck. The tension with Aus-
tria also relaxed, as was shown by a secret
treaty signed in _i88i,* according to
which, in return for Austrian consent to
a union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia,
" si elle se faisait par la force des choses,"
Russia agreed that Austria might, when
she chose, convert her occupation of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina into actual annexa-
tion.
The difficulty Austria had experienced

* See the article on Kalnoky by Friedjung in the Bio-
graphisches Jahrbuch, March, 1909. See also Denkwurdig-
keiun des Fiirsten Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst, ii, p. 311.

AUSTRIA AND SERBIA 177

in pacifying these two provinces led her
to postpone for nearly a year longer her
occupation of Novibazar, which was
carried out, this time without resistance,
in September, 1879. She thus kept open
her passage to the southward and in-
serted herself between Serbia and Mon-
tenegro. She now possessed almost irre-
sistible means of pressure upon Serbia,
an inland state whose commerce with
western Europe must pass through her
territories, and whose capital, Belgrade,
could be reached across the river by
Austrian guns and could be threatened
with immediate attack.

Besides this, the Serbians had been
angered by the fact that Russia had
assigned to Bulgaria, at the Peace of
San Stefano, lands they regarded as
theirs and had also supported Bulgarian
claims at Berlin.* Serbia got these lands

* On Serbia at the Congress" of Berlin, see the article by
Dr. Vladan Georgevitch in the Revue fUiiiovre Diplomatique,
1891, pp. 483-SS2-

178 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

in the end * with the aid of Austria, who
had opposed her expansion in other direc-
tions and to whose dictation she had to
submit in railway and commercial affairs.
Continuing her pressure, Austria next
succeeded in winning over to her policy
Prince (later King) Milan, a man of intel-
ligence, but of untrustworthy character,
who felt far from secure on his throne. In
1 88 1 he brought back from Vienna the
draft of a treaty which he persuaded his
minister of foreign affairs to sign. It was
then put away in the archives, and very
few even of the prime ministers and min-
isters of foreign affairs of Serbia knew of
its existence for the next dozen years, by
which time it had come to be regarded
as inoperative.

By this treaty of June 28, i88i,f in or-
der to establish a "perfect friendship"
between the two states, Serbia bound her-

* The territory about Pirot. Bulgarian claims extended as
far as Nish.

t For an account of it, see the article by Stojan Protitch in
the Fortnightly Review for May, 1909.

AUSTRIA AND SERBIA 179

self not to tolerate any intrigues against
Austria-Hungary, who gave a reciprocal
assurance, promising also to support
the dynasty and to assist Serbia and
her interests with other European cab-
inets; Serbia in return undertook "not
to negotiate with or conclude political
treaties with any other states without
previous agreement with Austria-Hun-
gary." The two powers promised each
other mutual friendship and neutral-
ity in the event of war with a foreign
state. Even if this treaty did not mean
any great accession of strength to Aus-
tria, it helped to keep Serbia in the posi-
tion of her client in Balkan affairs.

But strong and satisfactory as the Aus-
tro-German alliance was, it was capa-
ble of being improved or at least supple-
mented by the accession of another
power, and that power, after earlier hesi-
tation and reluctance, was now eager to
be admitted into partnership.

The young kingdom of Italy had been

i8o THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

completed by the occupation of Rome in
September, 1870. Unlike Prussia, Italy
had not reached greatness by brilliant
victories of her own; her success had
been due not only to her efforts, but also
to the misfortunes of others, which she
had turned to good account. After the
achievement of her unity, she still feared
an Austrian attempt to reverse the ver-
dict of 1859 and of 1866, and that this
time she would not have a French or a
Prussian ally. She feared still more that
some power might take up the cause of
the Pope and demand the restoration of
his temporal authority, and she believed
that the greatest danger in this respect
threatened her from the side of France.

The relations between France and Italy
extend over a period of more than two
thousand five hundred years: that is to
say, to the beginning of the known his-
tory of each. Even before the founding
of Rome, Celtic tribes from Gaul had
penetrated into the heart of the peninsula

FRANCE AND ITALY 181

and settled there as conquerors. Rome
itself was captured by the Gauls in 390
B. c., and as late as the time of Caesar,
though Cisalpine Gaul had long been
under Roman rule, the frontier of Italy
proper was not the Alps but the Apen-
nines and the Rubicon. On the other
hand, during the centuries that Gaul
was part of the Roman possessions, it be-
came so thoroughly Latinized that, like
Spain, it retained its Latin character in
spite of a period of barbarian conquest
and domination. Only its eastern por-
tion was permanently Germanized; in the
rest of the land the intruders were soon
absorbed. Therefore in this present age|
of nationalistic consciousness Frenchmen I
and Italians regard themselves as bound V
together by ties of blood, of identical cul- j
tural origin, and of common civilization •
and ideals. Questionable as these ties
may be from a scientific point of view, the
belief in them and the sentimental value
attached to them are real. 'The sister-

i82" THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

hood of the Latin nations,' to use a favor-
ite term, represents the same sort of
vague nationalistic ideals as Panslavism,
Panteutonism, and other movements of
the kind.

This feeling of sisterhood has not kept
the Latin nations on especially good
terms with one another in the past.
Much as the French have owed not only
to Roman but to Renaissance Italian cul-
ture, they have none the less invaded
Italy again and again for frankly selfish
reasons. Their first appearance as bene-
factors, though still as plunderers, was
in the days of the French Revolution,
when they brought in temporarily a cer-
tain measure of political liberty, long
unknown south of the Alps. In the nine-
teenth century, liberals in France, as else-
where, sympathized with Italian aspira-
tions for freedom and political unity.
Napoleon III, himself an Italian almost
as much as a Frenchman, was moved by
sentimental considerations as well as by

FRANCE AND ITALY 183

calculation when he took up the Italian
cause and declared war on Austria in
1859. His two victories of Magenta and
Solferino soon led to the emancipation of
nearly the whole peninsula (if not quite
in the way he had intended), and though
he had his hesitations and misgivings, and
was not willing to abandon the Pope al-
together, he remained to the end of his
reign the sincere friend of Italy. By his
attitude in 1866 he helped her to obtain
Venice.

For all this the Italians were grateful to
him and to France. They had, however,
grievances which loomed large in their
eyes. The Peace of Villafranca, by which
Napoleon, in obedience to sound military
and political considerations, halted his
successful campaign and left Venice for
some years longer in the hands of Aus-
tria, was a sad disappointment to the
Italians, whose hopes had been inflamed
by the emperor's ill-advised proclamation
that he would free Italy "from the Alps

184 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

to the Adriatic." It is true that he still
gave them his support, and it would have
been impossible for them to achieve their
unity without his protection against Aus-
trian interference, a protection to which
they owed as much as to the genius of
Cavour or to the enterprise of Garibaldi.
But when their success went much fur-
ther than he had foreseen, he had exacted,
in compensation for his services and for
the sacrifices of France, the cession of
Nice and Savoy. Nice has in the past
been at times connected with Italy, at
times with France, and geographically be-
longs with either. The peasants in the
country about speak a dialect of Proven-
cal, but by 1860 the town of Nice had
become Italianized, and it was here that
Garibaldi was born. The duchy of Savoy
is situated on the French side of the
Alps and has never been Italian in lan-
guage, but it was the home of the dynasty
that had now been raised to the Italian
throne, and as such was dear to them.

FRANCE AND ITALY 185

The enforced cession of these two dis-
tricts, although not objected to by the
inhabitants themselves, has not been for-
given by the Italians to this day. When-
ever relations have been strained between
Italy and France, the eyes of those who
dream of Italia Irredenta — and every
Italian patriot has dreamed of it more or
less — have turned in the direction of Nice
and Savoy, and of the island of Corsica,
which once belonged to the republic of
Genoa and has been French only since
the middle of the eighteenth century.

Another cause of Italian discontent was
the continued occupation of Rome by
French troops, in deference to the wishes
of the clerical party in France. When the
garrison was withdrawn in 1867, Gari-
baldi's ill-advised expedition against the
city led to its prompt return, and to the
painful incident of the hero's defeat at
Mentana. In 1870 Italy, if given per-
mission to occupy Rome, was ready to
join with France against Prussia, her

i86 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

partner of four years earlier. But as
Napoleon refused his consent until too
late, the Italians, without running any
risks, profited by his disasters, and after
the withdrawal of the French garrison
seized the Eternal City.

Meanwhile in France there was much
division of opinion. Many were enthu-
siastic for the liberation of Italy and
proud of the part their country had taken
in it, but the powerful clerical party con-
demned the policy of the emperor alto-
gether and supported the territorial claims
of the Pope. There were Frenchmen, too,
who, though not clerical in their sympa-
thies, yet could not shut their eyes to the
fact that there were disadvantages in the
creation on the southeastern frontier of
France of a new great power and future
rival in the Mediterranean, whose ambi-
tions might some day conflict with hers.
Granted that the aspirations of the
Italians toward national unity were, like
those of the Germans, legitimate in them-

FRANCE AND ITALY 187

selves, was it, after all, the business of
France to further them from sentimental
reasons when their success must diminish
her own relative position among Euro-
pean states ?*

In the later part of the Franco-Ger-
man war, a number of Italian volunteers
served in the French army under Gari-
baldi, and though neither they nor their
leader achieved much success, the senti-
ment that inspired their action was ap-
preciated. But after the Peace of Frank-
fort the relations between France and
Italy became worse. The Italians had
grown weary of being reminded of a
debt which they regarded as being by
this time paid or cancelled, and indeed
many of them, including King Victor
Emmanuel, felt that they had owed
gratitude to Napoleon III rather than
to the people he had governed. They

* "Napoleon III said to me in Paris that he planned to
make a powerful nation out of Italy. I replied, 'Your Maj-
esty, that is a ward that may become stronger than his guard-
ian.' " Poschinger, Also sprach Bismarck, iii, p. 151.

i88 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

had little sympathy for the French repub-
lic, whose example might encourage the
republican party in Italy, though they
feared a Bourbon restoration, believing
that it would mean a French intervention
in behalf of the Pope. This fear was
strengthened by the outspoken advocacy
of the papal claims by many French
royalists, including the Pretender, the
Comte de Chambord himself, and also
by the fact that until October, 1874, the
French government unwisely kept a man-
of-war stationed at Civita Vecchia, the
port of Rome.

The Italians, therefore, began to look
for friends in other quarters. In 1873
King Victor Emmanuel visited Vienna
and Berlin, and there was talk of the
probable adhesion of Italy to the League
of the Three Emperors. But these first
advances led to nothing. The three em-
pires looked askance at Italy and felt no
particular need of her friendship. Her
alliance with Prussia in 1866, although it

ITALY AND GERMANY 189

had been profitable to both parties, had
led to singularly little good feeling be-
tween them. From first to last they had
mistrusted one another. The Prussians
had a poor opinion of Italian military
capacity, and the Italians, although,
thanks to the successes of their ally,
they obtained Venice, were humiliated
by the course of the war and chagrined
at the treaty of peace. Bismarck seems
to have entertained scant liking or re-
spect for them;* from Austria they could
hardly expect cordiality, and Russia was
indifferent.

In 1877, aroused by rumors of the
agreement of Reichstadt, the Italian gov-
ernment sent Francesco Crispi on a mis-
sion to sound the German chancellor as
to the possibility of an alliance between
Italy and Germany against France and
Austria. f But Bismarck, while express-

* In 1880 he remarked: "They are like carrion crows on
the battle-field, that let others provide their food." Busch,
Bismarck, ii, p. 233.

t See Crispi's account of the mission in his memoirs.

190 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

ing a willingness to make a defensive
treaty against France, frankly declared
that he was on excellent terms with Aus-
tria and would remain so. In answer to
Crispi's declaration that Italy could not
permit Austria to have Bosnia and Her-
zegovina without compensation for her-
self, he suggested, not a rectification of
her immediate frontier, which was what
Crispi was doubtless hinting at, but that
she should appropriate Turkish territory
in Albania. Nothing came of this sug-
gestion, and at the Congress of Berlin
Italy neither gained anything herself nor
dared oppose the gains of Austria. This
outcome produced disappointment and
discontent in the peninsula,* which was
not much allayed by the statement of the
ministry that "Italy had returned from
the congress with clean hands"; others
called it with empty hands. France, too,

*Crispi declared in a speech at Naples: "We were humiliated
at Berlin as the last people in Europe; we returned slapped
and despised." Chiala, Paging di storia contemporanea, ii,
p. 17.

TUNIS 191

came back from Berlin 'with clean hands/
but she had something in her pocket,*
and that something was an object Italy
coveted.

The Roman province of Africa has
more than once played its part in history.
From here the Punic city of Carthage
established her rule over the shores of
the western Mediterranean and sent her
ships in the Atlantic as far as Britain
and down the coasts of Africa. After her
fall there rose on the same site a new
Roman Carthage, long the second city in
the West. Then came the Vandal and
later the Arab conquest. Of Carthage
few traces remain, but some miles away
the city of Tunis had its periods of glory
as the capital of various Mohammedan
dynasties. In the sixteenth century it
was fought over by the Spaniard and the
Turk, and became the home of a piratical
state, nominally vassal to the Ottoman
empire. When the age of piracy came

* Words of Waddington on leaving the congress.

192 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

to an end, its fortunes declined, and by
the last quarter of the nineteenth cen-
tury the regency of Tunis seemed almost
in a state of dissolution. The rule of its
sovereign, the Bey, was tyrannical and
corrupt; the treasury was empty; and
the first fatal step in outside interference,
foreign control of finance, had already
been taken. But the natural resources
of the country were as great as they had
been in its brightest days, the soil was
as fertile, the climate as mild as ever.
All that it needed to bring back its former
prosperity was enlightened government
and foreign capital and enterprise.

No acquisition overseas could be more
alluring to the Italians than Tunis.
Lying at their very door, it would as-
sure them the possession of the southern
as well as the northern sides of the nar-
row passage between the western and
the eastern halves of the Mediterranean,
that Mediterranean in which they re-
garded themselves as the heirs of the

ITALY AND TUNIS 193

imperial traditions of Rome. The natural
conditions of the country were suitable
for Italian colonization, and its small
and backward population left plenty of
land for the immigrants whom Italy's high
birth rate enabled her to supply in any
number desired, and who already formed
much the largest foreign colony there.
No wonder, then, that as soon as the
kingdom of Italy was constituted,* and
even before,f Italians began to talk of the
necessity of bringing Carthage once more
under the rule of Rome.

But if Italy's desire for Tunis was nat-
ural and legitimate, that of France was
equally so. Half a century had now
elapsed since the French, by the capture
of Algiers, had set foot in North Africa.

* Mazzini wrote in 1871: "As Morocco turns toward the
Iberian Peninsula and Algeria toward France, Tunis, the key
to the central Mediterranean, linked in formation with Sar-
dinia and Sicily and distant but some twenty-five leagues
from Sicily, obviously turns toward Italy. . . . To-day the
French are making eyes at it and will soon possess it, if we
do not." Scriui, xvi, pp. 153, 154.

f For instance, in the writings of Gioberti.

IQ4 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

In the course of time, after years of ardu-
ous fighting and enormous expense, with
many hesitations and mistakes but with
stubborn persistence, they had built up
a colony that was just beginning to flour-
ish. The possession of Algeria not only
strengthened France in the Mediterra-
nean; it also furnished her with compen-
sation for what she had lost in Europe,
as well as for the colonies of which she
had been deprived in the previous cen-
tury. Although the French settlers in
Algeria were and always will be a minority
of the population, they can give it their
civilization and perhaps in time their lan-
guage, making it, if not an African
France, at least a fresh field for the ex-
pression of French character and genius,
one distant less than a day's sail from the
mother country, and capable of being
united to it by strong and permanent ties.
Algeria itself, however, is only the central
portion of a region known a century ago
as the Barbary states, the whole of which

FRANCE IN NORTH AFRICA 195

belongs naturally in the same hands, for
it has the same general features and is
inhabited by the same peoples. Geo-
graphically it has a well defined unity of
its own. Its political divisions have been
the result not of natural formation but of
historical accident.

As soon as the French began to feel at
home in Algeria they inevitably turned
their eyes toward their neighbors east
and west, the regency of Tunis and the
empire of Morocco, the two other portions
of this North African region.* Both were
in such condition that they bade fair
sooner or later to come under the control
of some European power. Napoleon III,
in his dreamy idealism, may have deemed
that France should content herself with
Algeria and should leave Tunis to Italy
and Morocco to Spain. Other and more
practical Frenchmen felt that if ever the

* Tripoli, though counted as one of the Barbary states, is
separated from Tunis by the desert, which here reaches the
coast.

196 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

time should come when these natural
prolongations of Algeria must fall into
foreign hands, those hands must be
French. From every point of view — po-
litical, commercial, military — for Algeria
to have as a direct neighbor the territory
of another great European power would
be disastrous, no matter how friendly
that power might be. This was partic-
ularly true as regarded Tunis, which on
the map goes as obviously with Algeria
as does Portugal with Spain, or Sicily
with Italy. In consequence, France
strove, on the whole with success, to
establish a preponderating influence in
Tunis, and she emphatically refused to
recognize the claims which the Sultan
of Turkey still put forth to suzerainty
there.

At the court of the Bey, as at many
other African and Asiatic posts, the chief
opponent to the French consul was
usually the British one. After 1860
the Italian consul appeared on the scene

TUNIS 197

as a new and active force. Here as else-
where the Franco-German war greatly
diminished French prestige and influence;
indeed, during its course an Italian ex-
pedition against Tunis was at one time
threatened.

When in 1878 the plan of the Congress
of Berlin was broached, it was at first
doubtful whether France would be repre-
sented. The contrast between her situa-
tion then and the one she had held at the
last European congress, that of Paris in
1856 after the Crimean war, was ex-
tremely painful to Frenchmen. To at-
tend, and at Berlin of all places, seemed a
humiliation, but not to attend was for
France to abdicate her right to be con-
sulted as a great power. She therefore
accepted the invitation, but on the con-
dition that there should be no discussion
of Egypt or of the French protectorate
of the Holy Places. To this the other
powers readily assented: a detail which
did not, it appears, prevent Bismarck

igS THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

from suggesting to England the occu-
pation of Egypt.*

Toward the end of the congress, when
M. Waddington, the French foreign min-
ister and first plenipotentiary, was in-
formed of the convention handing over
Cyprus to England, he was so angered
that he thought of leaving at once, thus
probably disrupting the congress. Lord
Salisbury sought him out and assured
him that Great Britain, recognizing that
the situation of France in the Mediter-
ranean and as the possessor of Algeria
gave her a right to shape the destinies of
Tunis, would make no opposition when
the time came for her to assert that right.
M. Waddington was also given to under-
stand, though just how has never been
revealed, that Germany would have no

* In his communication announcing the Cyprus Conven-
tion, Lord Salisbury wrote to M. Waddington, on July 6*
1878: "I am telling Your Excellency no secret when I say1
that we have been very earnestly pressed, by advisers of no
mean authority, to occupy Egypt — or at least to take the
borders of the Suez Canal." Lord Newton, Lord Lyons, ii,
p. 149.

TUNIS 199

objection to the acquisition of Tunis by
France.*

This attitude on the part of both Eng-
land and Germany was somewhat ex-
traordinary. In 1830 England was so
bitterly opposed to the French expedition
to Algiers that she almost went to war
to prevent it, and for many years after
she viewed the presence of the French in
North Africa with intense dislike. For
her now, without solicitation, to offer
Tunis to France was a startling reversal
of policy. We may surmise that it was
due chiefly to the fact that Tunis seemed
to be destined to fall soon into the hands
of some European power, and that Eng-
land, who just then happened to be on
quite cordial terms with France, and
since 1870 no longer feared her as of
old, was willing to grant her this com-
pensation for the strengthening of the
English position in the Mediterranean

* See G. Hanotaux, Histoire de la France conUmporaine, iv,
p. 388, n.

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

farther to the eastward. It is true that
England was likewise on excellent terms
with Italy, but if Italy should get pos-
session of Tunis, she would hold both
sides of the Mediterranean at its nar-
rowest part, and might some day control
or at least menace the security of a
passageway which was of more impor-
tance to Great Britain than the Suez
Canal itself. From the point of view
of British interests, it was better that
the two sides should not be in the hands
of the same power, even if that power
were Italy.

The attitude of Prince Bismarck was
determined by a different set of consid-
erations, which again we can only surmise,
as we lack direct evidence on the subject.
In 1873 Count Arnim, the German am-
bassador to Paris, said abruptly to the
Due Decazes: "I forbid you to take
Tunis." * There was no good reason

* DenktoiirdigkeiUn des Fursten Hokenloke-Schillingtfurst, ii,
p. 199.

. TUNIS 201

that we know of for the threat at that
time. Arnim may have gone beyond his
instructions, as he did more than once,
or his menace may have been part of the
policy of bullying which Bismarck then
followed in much of his dealings with
France. He cared little for the affairs of
the Mediterranean, and he had no senti-
mental predilections as between France
and Italy; but it was clear to him that if
either of the two obtained the supremacy
in Tunis, there would be an estrangement
between them, and that this would
accrue to the advantage of Germany.*
If Italy had been willing from the first
to court his favor and pay his price, he
might perhaps have been willing to sup-
port her claims. Indirect overtures were

* Sir Charles Dilke, one of the best informed students of
foreign politics in his day, and under-secretary for foreign
affairs in the Gladstone cabinet of 1880, later wrote: "It at
least seems plain that a great deal of offering of other
people's property took place, and that some of those offers
were suggested by Prince Bismarck. In one case, at least,
the same thing was offered to two parties, which is an in-
genious method of inducing complications which may lead to
war." Present Position of European Politics, pp. 27, z8.

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

made to her by Austria and Germany
at the Congress of Berlin, but were re-
jected by Count Corti, who believed
that they were only intended to embroil
his country with France, and who had
been enjoined by his government to
adopt an attitude of reserve.* It is
worthy of note that not long before,
when Crispi was seeking for a German
alliance, Bismarck had suggested to him
the taking of Turkish territories on the
Adriatic, but had made no mention of
Tunis. He may have believed that Italy,
even if assured of support, would not
summon up the resolution to follow his
advice at the cost of French enmity. He
may also have believed that, if he could
launch France into a career of colonial
expansion, he would not only turn her
thoughts from Alsace-Lorraine and a war
of revenge, but also weaken her by divert-
ing her resources from her tasks in Eu-

*J. Grabinski, M. Deprttis, pp. 255-257. See also the
appendix by Hans F. Helmolt in Arthur Singer's Geschichte
des Dreibundes, p. 253.

TUNIS 203

rope. Be that as it may, he let M. Wad-
el ington know that he would not stand in
France's way in Tunisian affairs, and in
the years that followed he maintained a
consistently favorable attitude.*

The temptation thus offered to France
was considerable, and possibly her states-
men were mistaken in not yielding to it
at once. But French public opinion was
hardly ready yet; the war of 1870 was
still too recent, the need of rest and re-
cuperation still too pressing. There was
suspicion of Italian designs and intrigues,
but there was little inclination to take any
adventurous step in order to anticipate
them. Besides, anything Bismarck ap-
proved of was feared as perhaps conceal-
ing a trap. The government at Paris,
therefore, decided against immediate ac-
tion, but Waddington, after his return,
took care to put on record, in a more
precise and perhaps exaggerated form,

* There are many indications of this in Hohenlohe, Busch,
and elsewhere. Bismarck was probably also pleased by the
reserve France displayed toward certain advances on the part
of Russia.

204 TEE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

his conversation with Lord Salisbury, and
then to submit the paper at London and
thereby obtain a formal acknowledgment
that in substance at least his statement
was correct.

In Italy the results of the Congress of
Berlin were received with dissatisfaction.
Russia, Austria, England, and the Balkan
states had all obtained something, and
there were rumors of a concession to
France, whereas Italy had come out
empty-handed — and she had got rather
into the habit of expecting to profit from
each international crisis. Public opinion
in the peninsula was discontented and
restless. There was a renewal of Irredent-
ist agitation, which put a strain upon the
relations between Italy and Austria and
led to a threatening concentration of
Austrian troops on the frontier. In
Tunis, just as the English consul, Mr.
Woods, for twenty years the tireless
opponent of French influence, was re-
tired, a new and active Italian one, Sr.

TUNIS 205

Maccio, appeared on the scene in a ship-
of-war and was installed with military
pomp. He immediately plunged into a
struggle with his equally active French
rival, M. Roustan, and for a couple of
years the duel between them continued,
the Bey hearkening sometimes to the one
and sometimes to the other,* while the
country fell into ever greater confusion.
In France and Italy the public followed
the course of these events with increas-
ing attention, and violent articles in the
press heightened the irritation on both
sides.

In all this the Italians were following a
dangerous policy. As the weaker nation
of the two, it was for their interest to
bide their time and maintain the status
quo, not to push matters to an issue. In-
stead, they angered and alarmed the
French by their noisy activity, until the

* Roustan, in obedience to orders from Paris, was trying
to persuade the Bey into signing a treaty that would make
him a protege of France. See C. de Freycinet, Souvenirs:
1878-1893, p. 168.

206 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

government in Paris, secure in its greater
strength and in its knowledge that Italy
would get no outside assistance, deter-
mined to settle the matter once and
for all. Taking as its pretext the viola-
tion of Algerian territory by an unruly
Tunisian tribe called the Kroumirs, it
despatched a punitive military expedi-
tion of 30,000 men. On April 24, 1881,
the French armies crossed the Tunisian
frontier, and without opposition pushed
on to the capital. On May 12, in the
palace of the Bardo,* the Bey was forced
to sign a treaty, which, while preserving
for him the semblance of sovereignty over
his subjects, deprived him of all real au-
thority, and turned Tunis into a French
protectorate.

In preparing and carrying out this ex-
pedition, the ministry of Jules Ferry, then
in power in Paris, had shown itself calm
and resolute. It had not, however, been
frank in its explanations to the chamber

* Or Kasr-el-Said.

TUNIS 307

of deputies, nor scrupulous as to truth
in its preliminary assurances to Italy. It
also made the mistake of withdrawing a
large part of the army of occupation too
soon, and thus giving an opportunity for
an insurrection, which broke out and ne-
cessitated the sending of fresh forces and
some little fighting before it was sup-
pressed. Nevertheless, in spite of their
mistakes, Jules Ferry and his colleagues
deserved well of their country. They
gained for France a territory which has
greatly strengthened her position in North
Africa, and is without question one of
the most valuable of all her possessions.
Its progress has been steady and satis-
factory; it has been admirably governed
from the first, and it presents perhaps
the most successful example of French
colonial administration. But it cost
France the enmity of Italy for twenty
years, and the entrance of Italy into an
alliance against her which lasted for a
generation.

208 TEE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

The expedition against Tunis and the
treaty of the Bardo aroused the Italians
to frantic protest. Turn where they
would, they could find no ally — except,
perhaps, the Turks, who wished to assert
the Sultan's suzerainty by despatching
ships to the scene of action, but were
stopped by the categorical declaration of
the French that a Turkish fleet would be
treated as an enemy. The great powers
remained deaf to Italian appeals. In
England public opinion was somewhat
excited, but the hands of the Liberal gov-
ernment were tied by the benevolent as-
surances of its Conservative predecessor.
Germany and Austria remained ostenta-
tiously indifferent; Russia was more in-
different still. There was no help for the
Italians. France was not to be stopped
except by actual force, and they were too
weak unaided to risk the arbitrament of
the sword.

Throughout the peninsula the resent-
ment was bitter. The Cairoli ministry,

RESENTMENT IN ITALY 209

which had been in power, fell after the
treaty of the Bardo, a victim to public
indignation. Italy regarded herself as in-
jured and humiliated, and she chafed at
her isolation and weakness. She believed
that France had cruelly wronged her, and
her ill-feeling was heightened by a riot,
accompanied by loss of life, between
Italians and Frenchmen at Marseilles.
She had relied in vain on assistance from
England. When she turned to Germany
and made fresh approaches for an alli-
ance, she was met with the frank answer
that the way to Berlin lay through
Vienna.

To Vienna the Italians went accord-
ingly. As a first step, King Humbert
himself made a visit there at the end of
October, 1881, despite the fact that Em-
peror Francis Joseph, on account of his
relations with the papacy, had never
been willing to return in Rome the visit
King Victor Emmanuel had paid him at
his capital in 1873. King Humbert was

210 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

received with friendly courtesy, but polit-
ical discussion was avoided. In Decem-
ber the Italian foreign office instructed
its ambassadors in Berlin and Vienna to
begin negotiations for a definite treaty.
At both places their overtures were re-
ceived with a calmness that was dis-
couraging. The truth was that though
the members of the Austro-German alli-
ance perceived the advantages of admit-
ting a new partner to their society, they
neither trusted nor greatly respected their
future friend, and they felt that they were
in a position to wait for advances and to
make their own terms. Prince Bismarck
«raciously admitted that he was " satis-
fied" with the attitude of Italy,* and in-
i timated that though he did not think the
f time had yet come for an alliance between
I her and Germany, he should be glad to
/ see her reach an agreement with Austria.
Cheered by this approval, the government
at Rome continued its negotiations with

* Chiala, iii, p. 282.

ITALY AND AUSTRIA

Vienna, which, however, progressed but
slowly, as the views of the two parties dif-
fered in various respects. Several notes
had to be interchanged, and Bismarck
presently joined in and shared the dis-
cussion.

Italy asked for two things: first, a
guarantee of the integrity of her territory,
which should put an end to all danger of
foreign intervention in behalf of the
papacy; and, second, support for her po-
sition and ambitions in the Mediterra-
nean. The first demand meant for Em-
peror Francis Joseph and for Catholic
Austria a sacrifice of sentiment. It was
a painful thing for them to consecrate the
possession of Rome by the upstart house
of Savoy. At last they consented to this,
chiefly because the provision for a terri-
torial guarantee, being mutual, bound the
Italian government to set its face in fu-
ture against the cry of Italia Irredenta.
Germany, on her part, cared nothing for
the territorial claims of the Pope, and

212 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

had naturally no objections to a provi-
sion that offered her one more security
for her possession of Alsace-Lorraine.

The second Italian demand was refused
by both Berlin and Vienna. Neither
had any interest in Italian ambitions in
the Mediterranean or inclination to put
themselves out to serve them. The
French occupation of Tunis did not dis-
turb them, and Austria at least was
hostile to any extension of Italian influ-
ence in the Adriatic. All that Italy could
get was a vague general promise that the
allies would support each other within the
limits of their own interests; and it was
provided, to reassure Austria, that the
principle of the status quo should be
maintained in the Balkans. The casus
fcederis for military support was only to
become operative when one of the allies
was attacked by two foreign powers.
The duration of the treaty was set at five
years, and it was to be kept secret.

During the course of the discussions

CONCLUSION OF THE ALLIANCE 213

Bismarck had decided to conclude an
identical treaty between Germany and
Italy, leaving out only the clause in re-
gard to the Balkans, which was of no in-
terest to him. On May 22, 1882, the two
documents which together constituted
the Triple Alliance were signed in Vienna, )
the one by Count Kalnoky, foreign min- ;
ister for the Dual Empire,, and by the
Italian ambassador, the other by the
German and Italian ambassadors. Sev-
eral months elapsed before the rumors
as to the existence of the agreement were
fully confirmed and it was officially ad-
mitted to the world.*

The formation of the Triple Alliance
was another triumph for Bismarck. He
paid almost nothing for it, as he refused
to interest himself in Italy's Mediterra-

* For«these negotiations, see Chiala, iii, and Fraknoi, "Zur
Entstehungsgeschichte des Dreibundsvertrags," in the
Deutsche Revue, December, 1915. For a sharp criticism of
the ambiguities in the text as at present known, see Fraknoi,
"Kritik des Dreibundsvertrags," Deutsche Revue, January,
1916.

214 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

nean affairs, and the guarantee he gave
of the integrity of her territory imposed
no burden upon Germany. What he ob-
tained was an important addition to the
forces of the Austro-German alliance in
case of a conflict with France and Russia.
To be sure, his opinion of the Italian army
was not high, but that it should menace
the French and not the Austrian frontier
in case of hostilities counted for a great
deal.* The Italians had also a navy that
was reckoned as the third in Europe, and
could be of service to Germany, whose
fleet was still inferior to that of France.
Austria, too, in return for a considerable
profit sacrificed but little, for she had
definitely abandoned the idea of regaining
her lost Italian territories, though she was
determined to retain those she still pos-

* "That is what Prince Bismarck meant when he once
remarked that it was sufficient for him that an Italian cor-
poral with the Italian flag and a drummer beside him should
array themselves against the West, i. e., France, and not
against the East, i. e., Austria." Billow, Imperial Germany,
p. 60. See also Poschinger, Also sprach Bismarck, iii, p. 151.

ADVANTAGES OP THE ALLIANCE 315

sessed. The Triple Alliance relieved her
from anxiety on that score and assured
her against the possibility, which she had
sometimes feared, of a league between
Russia and Italy.

For Italy the advantage of the compact
was more problematical, even though it
was she who had solicited it, and though
it was generally approved throughout the
peninsula. In its favor could be urged
that it put an end to the isolation that
had weighed upon her, and that it made
her feel she was being treated as a really
great power. It avenged her for the hu-
miliation that had been inflicted upon
her by France, and it assured her against
French attack in the future. It also
secured her against Austria, and here we
have one of the peculiarities of the situa-
tion. So deep-seated, in spite of what
was loudly said to the contrary, were the
causes of hostility between Austria and
Italy, that many Italians believed that
the only way for the two countries to

2i6 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

remain at peace with one another was
by becoming allies. Otherwise they must
be foes. Finally, the friendship of Ger-
many and Austria meant for Italy at least
their benevolent neutrality if she should
launch into colonial enterprises, and per-
haps their support, if France were to in-
terfere with her.

But critics of the alliance then, and still
more later, asserted that most of these
advantages were imaginary, since they
were an insurance against perils that did
not exist. Granting that France had
made use of her superior strength to seize
an object that had been coveted with
good reason by both countries, there was
no cause for believing that she meditated
further aggression.* The French repub-
lic was becoming increasingly radical and
anti-clerical, as was proved by its just
having passed a set of school laws that
had excited intense anger among good

* The Italian fears of French designs against Tripoli never
had any justification.

ITALY AND THE ALLIANCE 217

Catholics. To imagine that it or any
statesman serving it would undertake a
crusade to restore the temporal authority
of the Pope was preposterous. If Italy
was isolated, so were Great Britain and
Spain and many other powers, and they
found themselves none the worse for it.
If her policy was wise and she paid proper
attention to her army and navy, she was
strong enough not only to defend herself
against any likely attack but also to make
her aid well worth courting by other
powers. Instead, by joining the Triple
Alliance she had tied her hands in the
choice of her friendships, sacrificing that
of France for many years to come. It
was useless to declare that the Triple
Alliance was purely defensive, a league
of peace to which none could properly
object. No rhetoric could alter the fact
that while France had shed her blood for
the liberation of Italy, now Italy, in so
far as she was able, had guaranteed to
Germany the possession of Alsace-Lor-

218 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

raine. There was nothing for France to
do but to accept the situation,* but her
resentment was deep and lasting. This,
however, did not trouble the Italians.
They had found new friends and were
content with them. For better or for
worse, the Triple Alliance was destined
to last for a whole generation, during
which it was to be one of the dominant
forces in the European world.

* For an excellent and dignified article on the subject, see
G. Valbert, "Uu publiciste allemand et son plaidoyer en fa-
veur de la triple alliance," in the Revue des deux mondes, i
June, 1892, pp. 683-694.

INDEX

Abdul-Aziz, Sultan, 90.

Abdul-Hamid II, Sultan, 91.

Adrianople, armistice of, 130.

Adriatic, the, 184, 202, 212.

JEgean, the, 92, 126, 132.

Afghanistan, 135.

Alabama claims, the, 14.

Albania, 96, 132, 143, 190.

Albert, Prince, 16.

Alexander I, Tsar, 49.

Alexander II, Tsar, 17, 18, 19, 47, 50, S9/., 63, 91 /.,

93, 95» 99> ioo» 101, 102, 105 /., in, 115 /., 129 /.,

134, 154, 155, 156, 165, 167 /., 170, 172, 174 /.
Alexander III, Tsar, 175 /.
Alexander the Great, 65 /.
Alexandrovo, meeting of emperors at, 167 /.
Algeria, 193-196, 198.
Algiers, 193, 199.

Alsace-Lorraine, 5, 35, 54, 102, 202, 212, 217 /.
American independence, war of, 4.
Andrassy, Count Julius, 45 /., 85, 93, 97, 99, 103, 114,

124, 125, 130, 133, 134, 138, 148, 149 /., 151, 157,

165, 166, 169, 170, 172.
Andrassy note, the, 85, 89.
Anti-clericalism, in France, 2l6/.
Arabs, the, 66, 191.
Armenia, 143.
Armenians, the, 141, 147.

235

226 INDEX

Arnim, Count Harry von, 37, 200 /.

Asia Minor, 66.

Augusta, Empress, 53.

Ausgleich, the, 21 /.

Austria-Hungary, 3, 20-23, 35, 41, 42 /., 64, 66, 67,
153, 154, 1 80, 183, 189, 190, 202, 204, 208; the League
of the Three Emperors, 43-62; the Eastern Question,
68/., 73-76, 80, 82/., 85 /., 92-105, 111-115, "7>
123-130, 133-141, 144, 148-151, 176-179; the Aus-
tro-German alliance, 157-175; admission of Italy to
the alliance, 179, 209-216.

Azov, 68.

Balkan Peninsula, the, see Eastern Question.

Baltic provinces, the, 164.

Barbary states, the, 194 /.

Bardo, treaty of the, 206, 208, 209.

Bariatinski, 51.

Batum, 114, note, 132, 137, 140.

Bayazid, 132, 137.

Beaconsfield, Earl of, 87, 105, 106, 126, 133, 138, 141,

147, 173-

Belgium, 15.

Belgrade, 177.

Berlin, Congress of, 130, 136-154, 163, 165, 173, 197 /.,
202, 204.

Berlin, meeting of the three emperors at, 47 /.

Berlin Memorandum, the, 86, 89, 90.

Bessarabia, 92, 96/., 114, 132, 137, 140.

Beust, Count, 39/., 44/.; quoted, 31, note.

Bismarck, Prince Otto von, 15, 19, 63, 88, 99, 126, 128,
150, 156, 176, 190, 210, 213 ff.; commanding position
of, 27 /.; policy of, 28-43; tne League of the Three
Emperors, 43-62; prefers Austria to Russia* 101 /.,

INDEX 227

112 /., 134 /.; the Congress of Berlin, 136, 138-141,

151-154; frames an alliance with Austria, 157-1/3;

his estimate of the Italians, 189, 214; suggests to

England the occupation of Egypt, 197 /.; his Tunisian

policy, 200-203.
Black Sea clause of the Treaty of Paris, abrogation of,

16, 19.

Bonaparte, house of, 36.
Bosnia, 81, 82, 91, 92, 93, 94, note, 96, 97, 100, 103,

107, 108, 114, 132, 138, 140, 143, 145, 149, 150 /.,

155, 176, 190.
Bourbons, the, 36, 1 88.
Britain, 191.
Bulgaria, 8o/., 96, 97, 103, 105, 107, 121 /., 131, 132,

133. 139. I45» 176, 177-
Byzantine empire, the, 66, 70.

Caesar, 181.

Cairoli, 208.

Carthage, 191, 193.

Catherine II, empress of Russia, 81, 159.

Cavour, 184.

Central Asia, 135.

Chambord, Comte de, 188.

Christians, oppression of, by the Turks, 69 /., 75, 76,

97/:> I3L I39» 147-
Cisalpine Gaul, 181.
Civita Vecchia, 188.
Clericals, in Austria, 172; in France, 10, 185; in Italy,

1 86.

Commune, the, 5.
Constantinople, 79, 94, note, 96, 106, 117, 123, 129,

131, 134, 136.
Constantinople Conference, the, 107-111.

228 INDEX

Convention of Constantinople, see Cyprus Convention.

Corsica, 185.

Corti, Count, 202.

Crimea, the, 100.

Crimean war, the, 13, 1 6, 17, 18, 20,42,75, 115, 135, 197.

Crispi, Francesco, 189 /., 202.

Croatia, 21.

Cyprus, 137, 198.

Cyprus Convention, the, 137 /., 141, 147, 198.

Dalmatia, 82, 83, 86.

Decazes, Due, 56, 58, 60.

Derby, Lord, 107, 117, 133; quoted, 109.

Dilke, Sir Charles, quoted, 61, note, 201, note.

Disraeli, Benjamin, see Beaconsfield.

Dobrudja, the, 132.

Eastern Question, the, 32, 41, 56, 64, 65-154, 176-179,

190, 197, 202, 212, 213.

Eastern Rumelia, 139, 176.

Egypt, 117, 197, 198.

Egyptians, the, 120.

Elizabeth, empress of Russia, 38 /.

England, 11-17, 32, 34, 52, 56, 59, 60, 61, 62, 173, 198;
the Eastern Question, 76, 80, 85, 87-90, 98, 100,
105-111, 117, 123-131, 133-141, 144, 146 /.; Tunis,
196, 198, 199 /., 204, 208, 209.

Epirus, 143 /.

Eugene, Prince, 3.

Exarchate, Bulgarian, established, 80 /.

Ferry, Jules, 206, 207.
Fraknoi, cited, 213, note.

France, 3-9, 30 /., 35~4i» 43, 44> S*> S3 /•> 85, 128,
I73> 189, 190, 214, 215, 216 /., 218; the war scare of

INDEX 229

, 55-62, 161; the Eastern Question, 76, 87, 90,
117, 126; relations with Italy, 179-188; the acquisi-
tion of Tunis, 190-209, 212, 216.

Francis Joseph, emperor of Austria, 20, 44, 46, 93, 95,
97, 102, 104, 106, II4/., 129, 149, 156, note, 166,
209, 211.

Frankfort, Parliament of, 25.

Frankfort, Peace of, I, 160, 187.

Frederick, crown prince of Germany, 16, 62.

Frederick the Great, king of Prussia, 24, 38 /., 159.

Frederick William IV, king of Prussia, 162.

French Revolution, the, 4, 25, 182.

Garibaldi, 184, 185, 187.

Gastein, 157, 165-168.

Genoa, 185.

German Confederation, the, 20, 158, 169.

Germany, 2/., 23-27, 92, 99, 117, 128, 144, 1987.; Bis-
marck and his policy, 27-44; the League of the
Three Emperors, 44-52; the Kulturkampf, 53; alarm
at the rapid recovery of France, 53 /.; the war scare
of 1875, 55-62; loosening of the League of the Three
Emperors, 62 jf., 84; murder of the German consul
at Salonica, 90; prefers Austria to Russia, 100 jf.t
112 /., 134 /.; the Congress of Berlin, 136-142, 151-
154; estrangement of Russia, 154-161; the Austro-
German alliance, 161-175; relations with Italy,
1 88 ff.\ the question of Tunis, 200-203; th6 forma-
tion of the Triple Alliance, 209-218.

Giers, de, 176.

Gladstone, William Ewart, 105, 147, 201, note.

Gontaut-Biron, Due de, 57.

Gorchakov, Prince, 51, 60, 63, 86, 93, 94, note, 99, 114,
note, 138, 153, 156.

230 INDEX

Great Britain, see England.

Great Bulgaria, 127, 136, 139, 145, 146 /.

Great Germany, 33, 164, 172.

Great powers, the, 2-27.

Great Serbia, 127.

Greece, 24, 56, 81, 96, 123, 133, 141, 143 /., 146, 147;

invades Thessaly, 131.
Guildhall banquet, Lord Beaconsfield's address at, 106.

Herodotus, 65.

Herzegovina, 64, 81, 82, 83, 91, 92, 93, 94, note, 96,

103, 107, 108, 114, 132, 138, 140, 145, 149, ISO/.,

176, 190.

Hohenlohe, Prince, 58, 171.
Holland, 31, note.
Holy Alliance, the, 41, 49.
Holy Places, the, 197.
Humbert, king of Italy, 209 /.
Hungary, see Austria-Hungary.

Ignatiev, Count, 79 /., 108.

India, 4, 87, 135; Indian troops sent to Malta, 133.

Industrial development of Germany, 33.

Ischl, meeting at, 44, 46.

Italia Irredenta, 185, 204, 211.

Italy, 2, 9/., 35, 42, 52, 87, 92, 117, 148; relations with
France, 179-188; looks for friends elsewhere, 188-
191 ; the question of Tunis, 191-209; enters into alli-
ance with Austria and Germany, 209-218.

Jena, 24.

John Sobieski, king of Poland, 66.

Kabul, 135, note.

Kalnoky, Count, 176, note, 213.

INDEX 231

Kars, 123, 132, 137, 140.
Kroumirs, the, 206.
Kulturkampf, the, 3 1 /., 53 /.

Latin nations, the, 181 /.

League of the Three Emperors, the, 43-62, 63, 84, 87,

89, 98, 152, 159, 165, 171, 188.
Le Flo, General, 59.
Leipsic, battle of, 159.
Livadia, 100 ff.
Loftus, Lord, 105.
Lombardy, 83, 148.
London, Treaty of (1871), 118.
London Conference, the, 19, note, 123, 141.
London protocol, the (March 31, 1877), ii$/.
Lorraine, 30.

Louis II, king of Bavaria, 171.
Louis XIV, king of France, 3, 26.
Louis XV, king of France, 3 /.
Lyons, Lord, 56.

Maccio, Italian consul at Tunis, 204 /.

Macedonia, 127, 139, 143, 147.

Magenta, battle of, 183.

Malta, 133.

Manchester, Lord Salisbury's speech at, 173.

Manteuffel, General, 99, 166.

Marlborough, Duke of, 3.

Marseilles, riot at, 209.

Mazzini, quoted, 193, note.

Mediterranean, the, Italian ambitions for empire in,
10, 186, 192 /., 200, 211, 212, 213 /.; England opposes
Russia's access to, 126; policy of France in, 186, 194,
198; position of England in, 199 /.

232 INDEX

Mentana, 185.

Metternich, Prince, 49.

Milan, Prince, 98, 178.

Miliutin, General, 168.

Moltke, von, 39, 50, 51, 55, 58, 171.

Montenegro, 73, 79, 86, 91, 95, 96, 97, 107, 113 /., 116,

132, 140, 143, 145 /., 177.
Morier, Sir Robert, quoted, 63, note.
Morocco, 193, note, 195.
Moscow, Panslavic Congress at, 78; the Tsar's address

at (November 10, 1876), io6/.
Murad V, Sultan, 90 /.

Naples, speech of Crispi at, 190, note.
Napoleon I, II, 25, 27, 41, 159; the Napoleonic em-
pire, 4.

Napoleon III, I, 4, 15, 23, 39, 182 /., 186, 187, 195.
Nationality, development of the consciousness of, 77.
Nelson, 1 1.

,Nice, annexation of, 10, 184.
Nicholas I, Tsar, 49, 162.
Nish, 178, note.

North Africa, 66, 191-209, 212, 216.
North America, 3 /.
Novibazar, district of, 140, 146, 177.

Orleans, house of, 36.
Orthodox, the, 69, 70, 72.
Orthodox Serbs, the, 151.
Osman Pasha, 121, 122, 127.
Ottoman empire, the, see Turkey.
Ottoman Turks, the, 66.

Palmerston, Lord, 14.

Panslavism, 78 /., 154, 164 /., 173, 182.

INDEX 233

Panteutonism, 182.

Paris, Congress of (1856), 123, 141, 142, 197.

Paris, taken by the allies, 159; by the Germans (1871),
26, 129; by the national troops, from the Com-
mune, 5.

Paris, Treaty of (1856), 76, 97, 109, 126.

Passarowitz, Peace of, 67.

'Peace with honor,' 141, 146.

Persia, 65.

Peter the Great, 68, 69, 78.

Pirot, 178, note.

Plevna, battles at, 121, 122, 127.

Poland, 155; the Polish insurrection of 1863, 14, 16, 18,

79-

Portugal, 196.
Prussia, see Germany.

Radowitz, Count von, 56, 57, 58, 99, 163.

Reichstadt, interview at, 95 /., 189.

Reuss, Prince, 94, note, 172.

Revertera, Count Friedrich, cited, 93, note, 94, note.

Revolution of 1830, the, 41.

Richelieu, 3.

Roman Catholic church, the, 73 ; the temporal author-
ity of the Pope, 2, 180, 183, 186, 188, 211, 217; Fran-
cis Joseph and the papacy, 209; the Kulturkampf in
Germany, 31 /., 53 /.

Roman empire, the, overthrown by the Germans, 23;
modern Italy and the Roman imperial traditions in
the Mediterranean, 192 /.

Rome, taken by the Gauls, 181; subdues western Asia,
66; occupied by the French, 4, 185; acquired by Italy
as a capital, i, 9, 180, 186, 211.

Roustan, French consul at Tunis, 205.

234 INDEX

Royalists, French, 188.

Rubicon, the, 181.

Rumania, Ii8/., 132, 133, 134, 140.

Russia, 3, 17 /., 34/., 41, 42, 63, 64, 159, 160-163, 165,
169, 170 /., 189, 204, 208, 214; the League of the
Three Emperors, 43-62; the Eastern Question, 68-
154; resentment toward Germany, 154-157; the Bal-
tic provinces, 164; meeting of Alexander II and
William I at Alexandrovo, 166 /.; attitude toward
the Austro-German alliance, 173-176.

Sadowa, battle of, 21, 30.

Safet Pasha, 109 /.

St. Sophia, cathedral of, 70.

Salisbury, Lord, 108, 133, 138, 173, 198, 204.

Salonica, 148; murder of the French and German con-
suls at, 90.

Salzburg, 46.

San Stefano, Treaty of, 131 /., 139, 145, 177.

Sardinia, 193, note.

Savoy, annexation of, 10, 184.

Savoy, house of, 184, 211.

Schleswig-Holstein question, the, 14.

Schneider, German teacher of Alexander II, 47, note.

Schonbrunn, treaty of alliance signed at, 93 /.

Sebastopol, fall of, 13.

Seljuk Turks, the, 66.

Seraievo, 151.

Serbia, 73, 75, 79, 80, 81, 91, 95, 96, 97/., 100, 105, 107,
113 /., 118, 123, 132, 133, 140, 145 /., 151, 177 /.

Serfdom, abolition of, in Russia, 17, 115.

Seven Years' war, the, 38.

Shuvalov, 162, 163.

Sicily, 193, note, 196.

INDEX 235

Skobelev, General, 135, note.

Slavophilism, 77.

Solferino, battle of, 183.

South Slavs, 22, 148.

Spain, 3, 181, 191, 195, 196, 217.

Suez Canal, the, 88, 117, 198, note, 200.

Syria, 66.

Talleyrand, 31.

Tartars, the, 69.

Thessaly, 131, 143.

Thiers, President, 8, 37.

Trent affair, the, 14.

Trentino, the, 20.

Tripoli, 195, note, 216, note.

Tunis, 191-209, 212, 215.

Turkey, 64, 149, 155, 190, 191, 196, 202, 208; rise and
decline of, 66-75; tne Crimean war, 75 /.; increasing
corruption and misgovernment, 76; religious, racial,
and diplomatic causes of the war of 1877-78, 76-
116; the Russo-Turkish war, 116-138; the Cyprus
Convention, 137 /., 147; the Congress of Berlin, 138-
141; contrast between 1856 and 1878, 142 /.;
estrangement of England, 147 /.

United States, the, 13.

Valbert, G., cited, 218, note.

Vandal conquest of Africa, the, 191.

Venetia, 20, 21, 83, 148.

Venice, 82, 183, 189.

Versailles, proclamation of the German empire at,

I, 26.
Victor Emmanuel, king of Italy, 52, 187, 188, 209.

236 INDEX

Victoria, Queen, 16, 62, note, 87.
Vienna, defeat of the Turks at, 66, 68.
Vienna Exhibition of 1873, the, 51.
Villafranca, Peace of, 183.

Waddington, 191, note, 198, 202 /.

War indemnity, French, 5, 7, 35, 53 /.; Turkish, 132,

140 /.

War scare of 1875, the, 55-62, 161.
Waterloo, 12, 24.
Wellington, 1 1.

Werder, General von, ioo/., 102, 163.
William I, emperor of Germany, I, 18, 19, 23, 28, 44,

46, 50, 60, 61, 99, 155 /., 157, 159, 165, 166, 167, 168,

170, 171, 174, 176.
Woods, English consul at Tunis, 204.

2 A 0

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