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^OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

APRIL 23: MAY 10, 1918

Z^t 2Dtspatcl)es

OF

VICE-ADMIRAL SIR ROGER KEYES,

K.C.B., K.C.V.O.

And other Narratives of the Operations

EDITED BY

C. SANFORD TERRY, Litt.D.

BURNETl-FLETCHER PROFESSOR OF HISTORY
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW NEW YORK

TORONTO MELBOURNE CAPE TOWN BOMBAY

HUMPHREY MILFORD

1919

f^

•NOTE

The publication of Sir Eoger Keyes's Dispatches of
May 9 and June 15, 1918, at length affords an authentic
record, by its organizer and leader, of an achievement which
a French Admiral has characterized as ' the finest feat ot
arms in the naval history of all times and all countries '.
As a story of pure gallantry, it may be, the Dispatches do
not add to the information already accessible. But they
correct many glaring current inaccuracies, based on irre-
sponsible statements and incomplete knowledge.

Above all, they present us for the first time with an
authentic exposition of the purpose and tactics of the
operations, and permit us to view their incidents in
proper perspective. For the first time, too, we realize the
magnitude of the design, its colossal intricacy, its
patient weaving.

Narratives of both Raids were issued through the Press
Bureau on April 26 and May 15, 1918. Having regard to
their medium of publication, but on that' ground alone,
these articles, written by an exceedingly competent and
well-informed journalist, may be described as official.
There has also found its way into the public press an
unusual amount of first-hand information in the form of
interviews with actors in the events. Much of it is
unreliable, as statements hot upon the event generally
are. But there remains a residuum which is valuable and
worthy of recovery.

4 NOTE

These materials have been explored and sifted here,
by no means because they supplement the Dispatches on
any material point, but because they exhaust the sources
at present available for the record of deeds of which we
would not lose the minutest detail.

I am indebted to The Times for permission to repro-
duce the plans on pp. 40 and 100 ; to the Editor of
the Daily Mail for use of that on p. 8. The frontispiece
is copyright of the Graphic. It will be understood that
the photographs which illustrate the text of the Dispatches
are not part of the official document.

C. S. T.
King's College,

Old Aberdeen.

CONTENTS

PAOE

I. The Occasion and the Plan ... 9

II. St. George's Day Raid, April 23, 1918 . 25

(a) Captain Carpenters Narrative . . 36

(b) The Press Bureau Narrative . . .50

(c) 'TJie Storming of Zeehruyge Mole . . 67

(d) The German Admiralty's Account . . 79

III. The Ostend Raid, May 10, 1918 . . . 81

(a) The Press Bureau Narrative ... 91

(b) The German Admiralty's Account . . 104
[(c) TheEesult 107'

IV. Vice-Admiral Sir Roger Keyes's Dispatch,

May 9, 1918 Ill

V. Vice-Admiral Sir Roger Keyes's Dispatch,

June 15, 1918 178

VI. Vice-Admiral Sir Roger Keyes's Dispatch,

July 24, 1918 200

Index 217

ERRATA

Page 37, n. 3 : for Dover read the Swin

Page 39, ii. 2, 1. 6 : for clear the Mole read close the Mole

ILLUSTRATIONS

PAGE

General View of the Operations, April 23, 1918

Frontispiece
The Ostend-Bruges-Zeebrugge Canal System . 8

Block-ships joining Vice- Admiral's Flag off Good win

Sands ...... facing 16

The Mole at Zeebrugge : General View . ,, 32

Plan of the Zeebrugge Raid, Ajjril 28 . . .40
The Mersey Ferry-boats Iris and Daffodil facing 49

The Mole at Zeebrugge, showing the Viaduct] hettveen
Zeebrugge Viaduct after the Attack . J 64 and 65

The Mole Extension and Viaduct, Zeebrugge] between
H.M.S. Vindictive after the Raid, showing the j- 80 and 81

Brows )

The Canal Entrance, Zeebrugge . . facing 96
Plan of the Raid on Ostend, May 10, 1918 . . 100
Plan of Zeebrugge Harbour, showing Enemy

Defences and position of Block-ships, &c. . 110
Sea-plane View of the Zeebrugge Lock-gates, show-
ing positions of the sunken Cruisers facing 113
Sea-plane View of the Mole, showing the Viaduct

repaired ...... facing 128

The sunken Ships at Zeebrugge, September, 1918

facing 145
The sunken Ships in the Canal, Zeebrugge: a

second view ..... facing 160

H.M.S. Wanvick with H.M.S. Velox lashed along-
side, towed by H.M.S. WhirUvind, 4.30 a.m.,
May 10, 1918 facing 111

OSTEND AND ZEEBKUGGE

I

THE OCCASION AND THE PLAN

On October 13, 1914, the unstemmed advance of the
Germans forced the Belgian Government to evacuate
Ostend. The enemy, already established in Zeebrugge,
entered forthwith and remained in possession of the port
until October 17, 1918. ' From either the naval or the
military point of \iew,' The Times of October 17, 1914,
announced with ill-founded optimism, ' the German
occupation of Ostend is of no more account than the
German band which played in the square at Bruges on
Thursday night.' In fact, possession of the Ostend-
Bruges-Zeebrugge canal system gave the enemy control of
a stretch of coast outside his ' wet triangle ', the Bight
of Heligoland, which provided, in Bruges, an invaluable
and protected base for the submarine offensive on which he
relied to neutralize Great Britain's superiority in surface
craft. Both Zeebrugge and Ostend are connected with
Bruges by canal, and Bruges itself with Germany by rail.
Submarines could be dispatched in parts overland, be
put together at Bruges, and find their way into the
southern waters of the North Sea through the canals
connecting their inland d6p6t and the coast. At a bound
the U-boat bases were advanced 300 miles nearer to
the British lines of communication with the Continent.

The Zeebrugge-Bruges-Ostend system forms a triangle
with two sea entrances. The eastern side is the canal from

10 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

Zeebrugge to Bruges, and is eight miles long. The
southern side, the smaller canals from Bruges to Ostend,
is eleven miles long. The base, facing north-west, is
the twelve miles of strongly fortified coast between Ostend
and Zeebrugge.^

No time was lost by Germany in developing her acquisi-
tion. Artillery of heavy calibre was mounted on the
coast between Nieuport and the Dutch frontier. Between
Zeebrugge and Ostend alone at least 120 big guns
were concentrated, in addition to batteries of smalle)'
ordnance for dealing with inshore raids.- As Lord
Jellicoe remarked in August 1917, the Germans applied
to this length of sand-fringed coast the principle of
intensive fortification already adopted higher up the
North Sea and on the island of Heligoland, and studded
it with heavy pieces, in themselves infinitesimal targets
at a range of more than 20,000 yards, on which a
bombardment needed to be carried out." That ships
cannot engage land forts successfully is an axiom of
naval warfare ; the fortified Ostend-Bruges-Zeebrugge
system rested seemingly secure behind the disqualifica-
tion. While the ports sei'V'ed as lairs for destroyers and
submarines, the country behind them was soon planted
with aerodromes, whence with facility London and
other cities became targets for German aircraft. Britain's
insularity was doubly challenged.

Of the two ports Zeebrugge offered the greater utility
to the enemy. It was more distant from challenging

' Sir Roger Keyes's Dispatch of May 9, General Summary, para. 4.

2 Percival Hislam, Uoto we Ticisted the Dragonh Tail (.1918), p. 36.

' Between the Dutch frontier and the German right flank
fronting Nieuport 225 guns were in position, 136 of which were of
from G-inch to 15-inch calibre. The latter ranged up to 42,000
yards (21 miles). — Sir Rogei* Keyes's Dispatch of May 9, General
Summary, para. 4.

THE OCCASION AND THE PLAN 11

Patrols on the Thames estuary and at Dunkirk, more
difficult to approach, and, by reason of its protecting
Mole, more difficult to attack. Its canal permitted the
passage of destroyers and submarines of greater draught
from Bruges to the sea. The Germans therefore con-
centrated their chief care upon it, equipped it with
seaplane sheds, ammunition and store depots, floating
docks and armoured shelters for submarines, and made
it the principal outlet for their submarine, surface, and
aerial operations in the lower waters of the North Sea.
Ostend, on the other hand, lacking the protection of
a defensive Mole, lying within range of the 15-inch
batteries of the Royal Marine Artillery in Flanders,
and connected with Bruges by canals inadequate to carry
vessels of heavy draught, was subsidiary to its eastern
neighbour. Originally a destroyer and submarine base,
continuous bombardment caused the enemy to transfer
its plant, docks (except one), &c., to Bruges. Ostend
remained merely an emergency harbour for mosquito
craft in difficulties.

While the Germans employed their ports at Kiel and
in the Bight — Wilhelmshaven, Emden, Bremerhaven,
Brunsbiittel, and Heligoland itself — as the bases for their
Atlantic and distant operations, they proceeded to equip the
Flemish ports expeditiously for a more localized service.
Before the end of October 1914 Antwerp's shipbuilding
yards were appropriated and skilled German workmen
were introduced. Sections of small submarines dispatched
by rail were assembled there, the completed vessels
passing by canal to Bruges. By the end of November,
six weeks after the occupation of Ostend, Zeebrugge had
become an effective base of operations. In the same
period surface torpedo-craft or outpost-vessels, small and
of indiff'erent quality, were built at Antwerp and sent

12 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

through the canals to the coast. Two of them — A2
and A6 — were sunk at sea by British destroyers on
May 1, 1915. More powerful craft soon began to operate
from the Belgian ports. Vessels of 1,000 tons displace-
ment and 35 knots speed armed with three 4-1-inch
guns made their appearance,* and on the night of
October 26, 1916, ten German destroyers penetrated into
the Channel for the first time, sank the empty transport
Queen and the destroyer Nubian and disabled the
destroyer Flirt. In April 1918 Bruges provided a base
for at least thirty-five torpedo cratt and about thirty
submarines.'^

Standing, as they did, in dangerous proximity to our vital
communications, military and economic, it became a matter
of urgency either to recover the Belgian ports from the
enemy or to prevent his intensive fortification of them.
Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace Hood, who was sent
to Dover in October 1914 to organize a naval force
as a prolongation of the retreating left wing of the Allies
in Flanders, was not provided with the equipment for
an adequate offensive. His successor, Vice- Admiral Sir
Reginald Bacon, who succeeded him in command of the
Dover Patrol in April 1915, also was limited to exclu-
sively naval materials and to attempting by intermittent
bombardments results unattainable completely by their
means.

Theory and experience alike prescribed that, to achieve
success, naval and military power should co-operate on
such an enterprise as the reduction of the Belgian ports. ^

' Percival Hislam, How we Twisted the Dragon's Tail (1918), pp. 14, 23.

"^ Sir Roger Keyes's Dispatch of May 9, General Summary,
para. 5.

^ On this topic see Mr. Archibald Kurd's article, ' Zeebrugge and
Ostend — and Alter', in the Fortnightly Review for June 1918.

THE OCCASION AND THE PLAN 13

Admiral Togo's failure to block Port Arthur and place
the Kussian Fleet out of action in February-May 1904
provided a classic example of the axiom. But in and
after 1914 the military situation made a co-operative
expedition impossible. On the earliest stroke of war
the British Army, 'contemptible' in numbers but in-
domitable in efficiency and bearing, was called on to
participate in the defence of France's soil against the
invader. The interests of the whole Alliance, and not
merely France herself, demanded that the industrial
areas of France and Belgium and their populations
should be rescued from the enemy before the battle-
line settled down to equilibrium. At the same time
Britain was deeply pledged to protect Belgium and
her neutrality. To regain her - lost seaports was not
less an urgent duty because it was prescribed impera-
tively by our own maritime interests. But the military
forces the operation called for were needed elsewhere.
In 1915, in addition to the Western front, Egypt,
Gallipoli, and Mesopotamia made heavy calls upon the
British armies. In 1916 Germany's formidable but fruit-
less attacks upon Verdun pinned them to the Somme and
the Ancre. The Eussian Kevolution, which began in
March 1917 and preluded the collapse of our Eastern ally,
set free a vast number of German and Austrian troops,
and threatened to give the Central Powers at length
a decision on the Western front. If plans for a joint
operation against the Belgian ports were formed, they
were perforce abandoned. It behoved the Navy to act
alone.

The need for action was intensified by Germany's
inauguration of unrestricted submarine warfare on
February 1, 1917. Its heavy toll upon British, Allied, and
neutral shipping, from its inception until the eve of the

14

OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

Zeebrugge-Ostend operations in April 1918, is exhibited
in the following Table.'

Total.

Period.

Month.

Qtiarter.

1917

February

574,856

March

634,685

1,209,541

April

893,877

May

630,336

June

712,721

2,236,934

July

575,949

August

549,363

September

369,161

1,494,473

October

487,337

November

333,443

December

452,063

1,272,843

1918

January

354,715

February

388,542

March

399,473

1,142,730

Dissatisfaction with the Admiralty grew as the need
for more adventurous methods of combating the sub-
marines was suspected. In November 1916 Admiral
Sir John Jellicoe was summoned from the command of
the Grand Fleet to succeed Admiral Sir Henry Jackson
as First Sea Lord. The Naval War Staff was in-
vigorated by the influx of younger officers with war
experience, and towards the end of 1917 an inter- Allied
Naval Council was formed for the 'co-ordination of
effoi-t at sea as well as the development of all scientific
operations connected with the conduct of the war '. The

» See The Times, April 25 and May 23, 1918. The Table gives the
gross tonnage of losses in the mercantile marine by mine and
submarine.

THE OCCASION AND THE PLAN 15

adhesion of the United States to the Allied cause made
a considerable accession of force available for naval
operations and encouraged a more energetic prosecution
of offensive warfare.

In November 1916 a proposal, made by Rear-Admiral
Tyrwhitt, for the blocking of Zeebrugge was rejected by
the Board. But twelve months later the Plans Division,
of which Rear-Admiral Roger Keyes was the first Director,
had under consideration the blocking of both the Belgian
ports. In November 1917 a plan of attack was prepared
and reported to the First Sea Lord early in December.
The objections which had overruled the proposal in 1916
were, firstly, the risk involved to the personnel ; secondly,
the contention that it was foolish to block ports into
whose occupation we might ourselves hope to enter later.
To the former it could be answered that the sacrifice
involved in the operation was not greater than that
incurred normally by the land forces of the Crown. As
to the second, it was hardly doubtful that, whenever and
by whatever agency he was ejected from them, the enemy
would block and destroy the ports before evacuation. To
leave him undisturbed in their possession until he saw fit
to render them useless was a counsel of despair. These
arguments prevailed, and, after Lord Jellicoe left the
Admiralty (December 24), a conclusive decision was taken
to put the scheme of the Plans Division into execution.

Rear- Admiral Keyes, as Chief of Staff in the Eastern
Mediterranean Squadron in 1915, had been chiefly re-
sponsible for co-ordinating naval and military effort in
the Gallipoli undertaking. It was doubly fitting, there-
fore, that on January 1, 1918, he should succeed Vice-
Admiral Bacon in command (acting Vice- Admiral) of the
Dover Patrol, commissioned to execute his own daring
project. He proceeded at once to get together a staff

16 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

to work out its details, to prepare the material, train the
personnel, and fit out the ships the operation required.^

The difficult problem for solution was, how to
block Zeebrugge and Ostend, the doors of Germany's
Belgian submarine system, without the co-operation of
land forces, and with regard to the fact that each port
had been converted into an exceedingly powei'ful fortress.
It is a naval axiom that ships cannot successfully attack
land forts: the ship, visible itself, fights an invisible target,
and provides an unsteady platform for howitzers, to whose
plunging fire land forts are particularly vulnerable.
Nevertheless Admiral Keyes proposed simultaneously
to block two harbours defended by batteries of the
heaviest calibre. Other obstacles were hardly less for-
midable. Among them was the difficulty of access.
The Belgian coast is dangerous, beset by shoals, its
navigation treacherous. Yet it was imperative to handicap
the enemy's batteries by approaching them under cover
of darkness, deprived of lights, marks, and beacons.
The risks were great ; any deviation from the proper
course could not fail to lead to disaster. There was the
hazard of mines, submarines, surface attack, and the risk
of unfavourable weather conditions arising at a moment
when it was too late to withdraw.^ Moreover, as seven
hours' steaming at ten knots was required to bring the
forces from their rendezvous of concentration to Ostend
and Zeebrugge, sixty-three miles distant, at least four
hours of daylight had to be encountered, during which

^ Among the oflBcers killed on April 23 were many who shared
with Sir Roger Kcyes the secrets of the plan and the burden of its
preparation. See their names in his Dispatch of May 9, General
Summary, para. 30,

2 See an article by Mr. L. Cope Cornford, * A Great Feat of Arms ',
in the Rational Bevieic for June 1918, p, 502.

H

I r

4

o
o

o

J

THE OCCASION AND THE PLAN 17

enemy observation might detect and circumvent the
operations.^

In solving the problem, how to get the blocking
ships into effective position, Sir Koger Keyes estab-
lished a new precedent in naval tactics. Zeebrugge
and Ostend canals being comparatively narrow, there
was a good prospect of blocking them if the ships could
be taken in. At Zeebrugge, on April 23, the intention was
realized, one of the sunken ships touching both banks of
the canal channel, and the other so nearly achieving that
result as to make it difficult to dredge on the open side
without damaging the bank. At Ostend, on May 10,
the prospect was not realized only because Vindictive
was unable to fulfil completely the plans laid down
for her. 2

To sink a ship in the exact position marked out for her
is a difficult operation. Unless the vessel sinks on an
even keel, that end of her which drops first is carried
down stream while the other end projects from the
surface. Hence, instead of sinking athwart the channel,
the vessel inevitably will lie along it, her width and not
her length presenting an obstruction. The difficulty can
be overcome by anchoring stem and stern before opening
the main inlet valve. But at Zeebrugge and Ostend so
slow a process was impracticable. Nor, in view of the
strong current, could it promise to be effectual. The
alternative was to secure that the ship should sink on an
even keel by blowing out her bottom from end to end.
To the efficiency of the device to secure that result the

* Sir Roger Keyes's Dispatch of May 9, General Summaiy,
para. 15.

* The statement, that Vindictive s faikire was due to her draught
being too hirge for the channel, is not accurate. The true reason
is revealed in Sir Roger Keyes's Dispatch of June 15, para. 11.

2I7S B

18 OSTEND AND ZEEBKUGGE

success of the Zeebrugge adventure is in great measure
attributable.^

The scheme established another innovation in naval
warfare. It proposed to blind the enemy's heavy
batteries by the use of a thick fog-soreen, under cover of
■which the block-ships could approach their objectives.
The employment of a smoke-screen was not a novelty in
naval warfare. Von Hipper used it for the first time in
the Dogger Bank action on January 24, 1915. The
German High Sea Fleet used it in the later stages of the
Battle of Jutland on May 31, 1916, to escape from Sir John
Jellicoe's superior Battle Fleet. It was also in general
use as a protective device against the attacks of under-
water craft. But as cover for an offensive its employment
was a novelty devised by Wing-Commander Brock,
R.N.A.S., 'a high development of the scientific use
of smoke or fog — it is more fog than smoke— so as
to protect the operation from batteries which could
have flanked it ' ^ and sunk the block-ships while still
distant.

At both Zeebrugge and Ostend, and particularly the
former, the plan of assault involved the intricate com-
bination of various classes of naval units and called
for the concurrence of favourable physical conditions.
No less than seventy-five vessels were engaged in the raid
on Zeebrugge and over sixty in the simultaneous attack
on Ostend on April 23, the success of the operation

^ I follow here an exceedingly informing article, ' The Raids on
Zeebrugge and Ostend', by Staff- Paymaster Cyril Cox, RN.V.R., in
the Nineteenth Century and After for June 1918. His conclusions are
supported by a valuable array of historical examples. The block-
ships carried on their bottoms mines fired by a time-fuse.

" The quotation is from the speech of the First Lord to the House
of Commons on April 24 announcing the Raid and its success. See
Dispatch of May 9, para. 37.

THE OCCASION AND THE PLAN 19

depending absolutely upon their nicest attention to a pre-
arranged time-table — motor craft ahead to lay the fog-
screen ; vessels canying landing- and demolition-parties to
clear the Mole in advance of the block-ships ; a submarine
assault upon the viaduct to prevent reinforcement of the
German parties on the Mole ; destroyers in attendance
upon monitors and in-shore ships to ensure them against
attack from the sea ; the block-ships themselves, the centre
of this elaborate machinery ; motor craft to take off the
crews of the sunken vessels and to deal with enemy
destroyers in the harbour ; and off the Dutch coast, one
hundred miles to the northward, a portion of the
Harwich Force, under Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt, to hold
at bay any intruders from enemy bases in Heligoland
Bight ; monitors and their 15-inch guns to engage the
shore batteries ; and overhead the aeroplanes — an ex-
traordinarily complex mechanism whose efficiency de-
pended upon each unit's meticulous fulfilment of its
appointed part in the scheme.

While it was requisite that the operation should be
nicely timed to take advantage of high tide, and yet
avoid being caught by morning light, it was equally im-
perative, since the distance to be travelled on April 22-3
was about 100 miles each way,^ that the sea should
be calm for the small craft. Also an on-shore wind was
necessary to carry the covering fog-screen before the
advancing vessels. Absence of fog was essential ; a haze
would be beneficial. These desiderata postulated a con-
currence of favourable conditions. Even on April 23, at
the third attempt to execute the plan, they were not all
present ; high visibility and, at the eleventh hour,

* The point of assembling or concentration, as has been stated
already, was 63 miles from the Belgian ports. Froni Dover the
distance is as stated above.

b2

20 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

a change of wind threatened to jeopardize the scheme
and rob it of success. On the other hand^ better con-
ditions had not occurred since the preparations were
completed, nor did they recur within the period in which
the operations were practicable.^

The project was both desperate and unique. * Attacks
on territory by the fleet alone,' declares a high naval
authority,'^ * except by way of set bombardments for merely
punitive or destructive purposes, are not now, any more
than they were two hundred years ago, the properobjects for
a navy alone to carry out.' ' Whatever place in the pages
of history may eventually be accorded to the naval raids
on Zeebrugge and Ostend,' writes Staff-Paymaster Cyril
Cox, R.N.V.R.,' 'it is certain that no adequate parallel
to them can be found in the records of our own or any
other Navy.' Various incidents have been recalled, but
they accentuate characteristics that make the Raid of
St. George's Day unique rather than furnish precedents
for its ingenuity and daring.

In 1794 a combined expedition under Vice-Admiral
Sir John Jervis and General Sir Charles Grey attacked
Martinique, whose possession of the best harbour in the
eastern Caribbean Sea made its acquisition desirable. As
in the raid on Zeebrugge, the harbour was protected by
a sheltering sea-wall. Otherwise, apart from the dare-devil
courage which marked both operations, there is little in
common between them. H.M.S. Asia failed to breach
the sea-wall inside the harbour and open a way to a
party of bluejackets waiting outside in the bay to

' Sir Roger Keyes's Dispatch of May 9, General Summary,
para. IG, 18.

' Admiral P. H. Colomb, quoted in Forinighily Review, June 1918,
p. 832.

' Nineteenth Century and After, June 1918, p. 1198.

THE OCCASION AND THE PLAN 21

storm the citadel. Thereupon Captain Robert Faulknor,
of the sloo]) Zebra, laid his ship alongside the sea-wall,
scaled the parapet, and stormed the citadel.' Two years
later (1796) Captain Drury proposed to bottle up the
Dutch fleet inside the Zuider Zee and put an end to its
depredations upon British shipping. He planned to carry
the batteries commanding the channel by means of landing
parties, and, having opened it to the Fleet, to block the
Texel with sunken Dutch merchantmen, re-embarking
the landing parties when the Fleet had done its wox-k.'''
Save that the block-ships were to be provided from
enemy vessels within the channel the project is not
remote in conception from the Zeebrugge design. It was
rejected by Admiral Duncan, and the fact emphasizes the
boldness and confidence of the Admiralty in sanctioning
at Zeebrugge a vastly more formidable risk. Three years
later occurred the cutting out of Hermione. An act of
mutiny had placed the ship in Spanish hands two years
before, in October 1799, she was discovered in the
harbour of Puerto Cabello by Captain Edward Hamilton
of H.M.S. Surprise. He resolved to cut her out from
under the shore batteries. Sending six boats into the
harbour under cover of darkness, he boarded Hermione,
overpowered her crew, and in spite of a hot fire carried
her out of the harbour. There are details of similarity to
the Zeebrugge Raid, but as a deed of daring Captain
Hamilton's achievement cannot rank with it.^ Fitter to
be associated with it is the expedition to Ostend under
Captain Home Riggs Popham, R.N., in May 1798, which
achieved the destruction of the canal gates. The landing

' Nineteenth Century and After, June 1918, p. 1199.
2 Ibid., p. 1202.
» Ibid., p. 1198.

22 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

parties, however, unable to re-embark, were forced to
surrender.^

Recent history provides other episodes, among which
the effort of Naval Constructor R. P. Hobson to sink
the collier Merrimac in the fairway of the harbour of
Santiago de Cuba is most familiar. The attempt was
made on June 3, 1898. The Spanish Fleet under Admiral
Cervera lay within the harbour. Admiral Sampson and the
American Fleet waited outside. Under heavy fire Hobson
succeeded in taking Merrimac into the harbour and sank
her ; but the harbour was not blocked, and the American
Army eventually delivered the Spanish Fleet into Samp-
son's hands by capturing Santiago and forcing Cervera out
to sea.^ Equally indicative of the disadvantages under
which naval power lies in an unsupported challenge to
a defended enemy port is the familiar effort of Admiral
Togo to destroy the Russian Fleet in Port Arthur in
February-May 1904. Three attempts were made by the
Japanese to block a channel too wide to be closed by
a single ship. At the first attempt (February 23-4)
three of the five ships sent in were sunk by Russian fire
before they reached the harbour entrance ; the other two
sank themselves, but at some distance from the channel.
A month later (March 26-7) the Japanese sank four ships,
but ineffectually ; the Russian Fleet came out to assert its
continued liberty. Five weeks later (May 2-3) twelve
ships were requisitioned for blocking purposes and eight of
them were sunk ; but the harbour was not effectually sealed.
The circumstances demonstrate the destructive power of
well-placed land batteries trained upon blocking-ships in

^ See the Journal of the Unitedi Seivice Institute, Nov. 1918, for an
account of Popham's operations.

* Fortnightly Review, June 1918, p. 830 ; Nineteenth Century, June
1918, p. 1208.

THE OCCASION AND THE PLAN 23

a narrow channel. In sea-power the Japanese were
superior to the Russians. Yet their unsupported naval
measures failed to put the Russian Fleet out of action.^

The sinking of the collier Neiobrhlge in the Suninga
Channel of the Rufigi River in November 1914 was
a small affair, but it illustrates the difficulties to be
overcome in blocking a channel. The German cruiser
Konigsberg having been located there, it was resolved to
close the river against her egress. Escorted by a
small flotilla of ships' steamboats, Newhridge steamed to
the spot where it was decided to sink her, anchors were
dropped at head and stern, the main valve was opened,
and she began to settle. The crew stepped off into
a waiting steam-cutter, fired the explosive charge, and
withdrew.^

A review of these imperfect parallels heightens apprecia-
tion of the Zeebrugge adventure as a superb effort of
human courage. Had it failed the story of the nation
still would have been richer for a great tradition. In
fact, ovei'coming impediments of many kinds that
threatened failure, it won triumph for a project auda-
ciously conceived. Luck attended it, and deservedly.
A plan so laboriously prepared, whose details in the last
stages were shared by so many actors in it, might have
leaked out. The necessary factor of surprise might have
been sacrificed, and the enemy have been prepared to
effect the destruction of the expedition before it reached

^ Nineteenth Century, p. 1205 ; Fortnightly Review, p. 831.

' Nineteenth Centurrj, p. 1200. Staff-Paymaster Cox remarks, as
proving how diflScult is the operation, that the Turks on several
occasions tried to block the Shatt-al-Arab and Tigris to prevent our
naval advance in Mesopotamia. Not once were they successful.
The Germans were equally unsuccessful in their efforts to block tho
Cameroon River against our passage to Duala in the early stages of
the West African campaign.

24 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

its destination. A single scouting se<a-plane or patrol
boat would have deprived the adventure of the first
condition of success. Neither was encountered. More
serious still, a mine-field laid in an unexpected area
might have destroyed the vessels before their task was
accomplished. No foresight could prevent these con-
tingencies from happening. They were challenged in
a spirit of buoyant optimism, with a love of adventure for
adventure's sake, that priceless disposition of the race,
and with unswerving confidence in the mind that con-
ceived and the hands that guided the operation.

II

ST. GEORGE'S DAY RAID, APRIL 23, 1918

By the beginning of April the projected attack on
Zeebrugge and Ostend was planned to the last detail.
The special ships the service demanded had been
assembled and fitted at Chatham. Volunteer crews had
been selected and trained for the particular operations
in which they were to take part. To block the Zeebrugge
section of the Bruges Ship Canal was the chief object.
The concurrent closure of Ostend seemed necessary to
complete the sealing-up of the waterways radiating from
Bruges. Otherwise, lighter craft, denied an exit via
Zeebrugge, would pass more or less freely through the
smaller channels that debouch on the sea at Ostend.
A subordinate, but important, purpose was to inflict as
much damage as possible on the harbour works and
defences of the two ports. If successful, the operation
promised to set back the enemy's submarine bases tliree
hundred miles, which roughly is the distance from Zee-
brugge to Emden, to seal-up his torpedo craft at Bruges,
to free the Dover Patrol for service in the wider anti-
submarine campaign, and to relieve our military and
economic communications of an intolerable menace.^

The forces to which the operation was entrusted con-
sisted of monitors armed with heavy guns to tackle the

' Seo Sir Roger Koyes's Dispatch of May 9, General Summary,
para. 3, 6-9. Also an article, ' Zcebriigge ', by Mr. A. H. Pollen,
in Land and Water, May 2, 1918, and liis The Navy ui Battle (1918),
chap. 25.

26 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

shore batteries ; destroyers to provide a protecting cover
to the ships detailed for the attacking operations ; motor
boats and launches to lay the smoke-screens, rescue the
crews of the block-ships, and engage enemy destroyers
and other craft that might be found in the harbours ;
five obsolescent light cruisers for use as block-ships, filled
with cement and fitted with explosive charges and mines
attached to their bottoms ; a sixth light cruiser, H.M.S.
Vindictive, two Mersey ferry-boats, Daffodil and Iris II, and
two obsolescent submarines, all detailed to attack the Mole
at Zeebrugge and divert attention from the block-ships,
the sinking of which in their appointed places was the
main object to be achieved. The expedition, which
numbered over one hundred and forty vessels of all
kinds, was under the command of Vice-Admiral Roger
Keyes in H.M.S. destroyer Wancick.^ Commodore
Hubert Lynes directed the operations at Ostend. The
Harwich Force, under Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt, co-
operated off the coast of Holland in order to watch any
movement by the enemy from the direction of Heligoland
Bight. The Dover Wings of the Air Force and the
guns of the Royal Marine Ai'tillery in Flanders were
warned to bombard the shore batteries, in order to
obstruct their concentration on the block-ships. On
several nights prior to April 22 a bombardment had
been carried out. Consequently the enemy had no reason
to anticipate particular action on the night of the
operation.^

There being two points of attack, the operation resolved

' The numerous small craft detailed for the Ostend Raid were
based on Dunkirk. The block-ships Sirius and BriUiant and two
attendant destroyers alone made the passage from Dover with the
Zeebrugge force.

* Dispatch of May 9, General Siunmary, para. 20.

ST. GEORGE'S DAY RAID 27

itself into two distinct and simultaneous undertakings,
the expedition breaking up into unequal portions to
carry them out. In both cases the element of surprise
was essential to success. Concealment was to be secured
by smoke-screens laid by the small motor-craft steaming
ahead. A daring rush into the teeth of the shore
batteries, distracted by bombardment from sea and air,
was relied on to carry the concrete-laden cruisers to
their blocking positions within the canals.

At Ostend the operation was at once more simple
and more difficult. No protecting Mole covered the
approach to the canal entrance, as at Zeeljrugge. The
problem was simply to run in Sirius and Brilliant from
under the smoke-cover and place them between the
harbour piers before the enemy could sink them else-
where. The operation failed, partly through a change
of wind at the last moment, chiefly because the enemy
had previously shifted the Stroom Bank buoy marking the
channel to the harbour a mile to the eastward. The con-
crete-laden cruisers, picking up the false guide, and putting
their helms to starboard, consequently ran ashore.'

At Zeebrugge the operation was complicated by the
problem of the Mole on the west side of the harbour —
that is, on the starboard side of the block-ships as they
steamed towards the canal gates. The structure — used
by the Germans as a supply, air, and destroyer base — is
one and a half miles long by 100 yards wide. A battery
of three 5-9's, and six smaller guns on the extension,
guarded the entrance. Five hundred yards of viaduct
connect the Mole with the shore,- on which other
batteries were planted for its protection. At Zeebrugge,

> Sii- Roger Keyes's Dispatch of May 9, General Summary,
para. 26.
' The necessity to counteract the silting of the harbour explains

28 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

consequently, the block-ships were threatened both by
shore batteries, as at Ostend, and also by the Mole bat-
teries and machine-guns. It was especially necessary to
put the battery at the sea end of the Mole out of action
before the block-ships — Thetis, Intrepid, and Iphigenia —
entered the harbour.* The task was entrusted to landing
parties carried by the old cruiser Vindictive and the
two ferry-boats Iris and Daffodil. To cut off the Germans
on the Mole from reinforcement two submarines were
detailed to blow up the iron viaduct connecting it
with the shore. The submarine attack was entirely
successful. Vindictive imperfectly fulfilled her com-
mission. But without serious molestation from the
Mole's defences the block-ships were able to steam the last
mile of the course. Two of them — Intrepid and Iphigenia
— sank themselves in the fairwa)' of the canal and effec-
tually bottled it up. Motor-launches rescued their heroic
crews. The feri-y-boats Iris and Daffodil, being of large
carrying capacity, double hulled, and practically unsink-
able, were provided chiefly for the rescue of the landing
parties in the event of Vindictive being sunk.'^ A counter-
attack by the powerful Destroyer Flotilla inside the har-
bour was anticipated. In fact the greater part of it had
been withdrawn to Bruges. One destroyer emerged and
is believed to have been torpedoed by a C.M.B. Others
remained alongside the Mole and their crews took part
in its defence.^

As has been remarked already, so complex a scheme

why the Mole is broken by a viaduct which opens it to the sea for
500 yards.

* The attack on the Mole, conducted on such a scale as to
suggest that it was the main operation, was shrewdly planned to
conceal and also promote the real object of the expedition.

^ Jris II and Daffodil also carried landing parties.

^ Dispatch of May 9, General Summary, para. 10.

ST. GEORGE'S DAY RAID 29

demanded the concurrence of favourable conditions of
weather and atmosphere. Throughout April the crews
of the block-ships, lying in the West Swin anchorage,
debarred from communication with the shore, waited
eagerly for their arrival. Twice the whole Armada
concentrated at sea, and once, on April 11-12, got to thir-
teen miles from Zeebrugge, when weather conditions com-
pelled it to return.^ At length, on April 22, St. George's
Eve, satisfactory conditions invited a third venture.

The considerable Armada converged upon the scene
of action from four points." A covering force of light
cruisers and destroyers operated from Harwich towards
the Dutch coast. In the West Swin, the main channel
from the Nore to the north, the five block-ships, with
Vindictive, Daffodil, and Iris II, awaited the summons.
At Dunkirk the monitors (six), destroyers, M.L.s and
C.M.B.s — in all forty-seven vessels, including nine French
M.L.s and T.B.D.s — part of the force detailed for the
Ostend operations, were assembled. At Dover the rest
of the force was concentrated.

At 1.10 p.m. the Swin ships, and at 2.0 p.m. the
Dover contingent, proceeded to join Sir Roger Keyes off the
Goodwin Sands, and thence to a rendezvous 63 miles from
their objectives ; the speed was 10 knots, for the pace of the
block-ships was slow. At 4. 53 p.m. the force set out from

* Of the two occasions mentioned in the text, once the weather
compelled abandonment of the operation within an hour. See an
interesting article by Lieut.Commander E. Hilton Young, R.N.V.R.,
in the Cornhill Magazine for December 1918. The author was
a Lieutenant R.N.V.I>. on Vindictive on April 23. See the Dispatch
of May 9, General Summary, para. 18.

2 See Dispatch of May 9, para. 45 ff. Excluding the Harwich
covering force (23 ships) and the parent ships (3) the striking force
numbered 142 vessels (see Dispatch, para. 31). Of these, 75 were
engaged at Zeebrugge and 67 at Ostend.

30 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

the rendezvous for its destination. It was disposed in
three columns, Warwick, Phoebe, and North Star, detailed
to cover Vindictive from torpedo attacks while the storming
operations wei-e in progress, forming the starboard column.
Every craft was towing one or more C.M.B.s, and M.L.s
steamed between the columns.^ The Ostend force pro-
ceeded thither from Dunkirk under the orders of Com-
modore Lynes.

The greater part of the passage of the main force
having to be carried out in broad daylight, all the
scouting planes of the Patrol were employed to detect
the appearance of enemy craft. As the normal means of
communication might put him on guai*d, the movements
of the scattered forces were governed by a time-table,
which was observed with extraordinary punctuality.
Visual signals were reduced to the minimum of necessity ;
wireless signals (with one exception) were forbidden.
Special aids to navigation were laid down in advance to
guide the attacking force and the monitors to their
positions. On arrival at a certain position, the conditions
continuing to be favourable, a prearranged wireless message
was sent (8.45 p.m.) to the detached divisions in the north
and at Dunkirk signifying that the programme would be

* ' It was a brave and unusual array that swept to the north-east
as the light faded from the sky. Modern destroyers steamed on
the wings of the columns, one of which flew the flag of Vice-
Admiral Roger Keyes, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O., the old
Vindictive in the van of the centre column with the Iris and Daffodil
in tow, for all the world like veteran hound on the trail with her
two puppies on her flanks ; the five valiant block-ships followed,
each with specially detailed parties below stoking for all they were
worth, that their old ships' last voyage should be made at a seemly
speed. A cloud of motor-launches filled the waterways between
the columns, and the two obsolete submarines, with their escorting
picket-boat, proceeded in tow of destroyers.' — The Navy Eternal
(1918), by ' Bartimeus ', p. 294.

ST. GEORGE'S DAY RAID 31

adhered to. Fifteen miles or so from its objectives, the
main force stopped at 9.55 p.m. to enable the surplus crews
to be disembarked on to an attendant mine-sweeper, and
to slip the C.M.B.s. At 10.30 p.m. Sirius and Brilliant and
their escort of two destroyers proceeded towards Ostend.
The rest went on to Zeebrugge.

The striking units detailed for the attack on Zeebrugge *
were the three block-ships. Vindictive and her attendant
ferry-boats, submarines C 1 and C 3, a flotilla of twenty-
four M.L.s and eight C.M.B.s for laying smoke screens
and rescue work, and nine C.M.B.s to attack vessels
inside the Mole. Two monitors were stationed out to
sea for long-range bombardment, but, owing to poor
visibility and an unusual set of the tide, its opening was
delayed somewhat beyond the time prescribed in the
programme of operations.'^ At 11.20 p.m. the monitors
opened fire. At 11.40 p.m. the C.M.B.s, running in
close, set up the necessary ' fog ' and came under heavy
fire during the operation. Almost simultaneously the
wind died away, and, coming again from a southerly
direction, lessened the effectiveness of the smoke-screen.
At 11.56 p.m. Vindictive, with Daffodil and Iris II in her
rear, passed through the ' fog ' and found the end of the
Mole's giant structure 300 yards distant on the port bow.
At 12.1 a.m., one minute beyond her programme time,
she was alongside. Three minutes elapsed befox'e Daffodil
arrived and pushed Vindictive to the Mole to enable the
special anchors to hook the parapet. The heavy roll
caused by a three-knot tide, and the scend alongside the
Mole, prevented the ship from placing them and broke
up the foremost of them. Most of the landing brows
were broken by gun-fire. The two foremost, howevez*,
reached the wall, and two others eventually were got
^ Dispatch of May 9, para. 56 ff Ibid., para. 53.

32 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

into position. The storming and demolition parties
poured over them and began a valiant assault upon the
Mole's garrison and defences which is detailed elsewhere.*

Daffodil arrived at 12.4 a.m., and throughout the
operations was obliged to drive her stern against Vindictive's
starboard side to hold her to the Mole. Iris II followed
close and took station ahead of Vindictite. In her case
also the scend of the sea and roll of the ship made it
impossible to fasten the Mole anchors. Iris fell back
behind Vindictive, and prepared to land her parties across
the cruiser, but hardly had begun to do so when the
withdrawal signal was sounded.

The programme allowed twenty-five minutes for carry-
ing through the attack upon the battery of three 5-9-inch
guns at the seaward end of the Mole, and for isolating
the Mole from reinforcements by the destruction of the
Viaduct. The latter task was achieved completely, the
former imperfectly. Meanwhile, at 12.25 a.m., Thetis,
leading the other two block-ships, passed the end of the
Mole and made her way to the entrance of the Ship
Canal.'^ The plan of operations had been the object of
particularly close consideration. If Intrepid and Iphigenia
w^ere observed to be following her, Thetis was instructed
to ram the lock-gates, while the other two sank them-
selves near the entrance at the southern end of the Canal
piers, where, irrespective of the success or failure of
Thetis, they would be certain to set up silt.

Circumstances prevented Thetis from carrying out her
instructions. Under fire from the Mole extension's six guns,
but unmolested by the 5-9-in. battery, whose attention was
diverted from the block-ships by the naval landing party,
she made for what appeared to be an opening in the defen-
sive obstruction in the harbour, fouled the nets, and was
> Tn/ra, p. 67. ^ Dispatch of May 9, para. 92 if.

ST. GEORGE'S DAY RAID 38

300 yards from the eastern pier-head when both her
engines were brought up. She had a list to starboard
and was settling down, having been frequently holed on
her Mole side by gun-fire. Her starboard engine was
restarted, however ; her head was swung into the dredged
channel ; the charges were fired, and the ship quickly
sank. But she had cleared a patli for her consorts. Her
crew were taken off by M.L. 526.

Intrepid, directed by Thetis, passed her leader, and
unmolested by enemy gun-fire— which was concentrated
on Thetis and Vindictive — reached her assigned position
in the canal, where she was sunk. All of her crew,^
with one exception, were got away, mainly through the
heroism of M.L. 282, commanded by Lieutenant Percy T.
Dean. R.N.V.R. Iphifjcnia, last of the block-ships, twice
hit on the starboard, or Mole, side, made for the gap
which Intrepid had left between herself and the eastern
bank of the Canal. With complete success her com-
mander reached his position, fired the charges, and sank
the ship. Her crew were rescued, with few casualties,
by M.L. 282. Not the least detail of a hazardous adventure
is the heroism of M.L.s 282 and 526. M.L. 110, their
partner in the work of rescue, was sunk.

Besides their screening duties, the C.M.B.s were
emploj^ed in attacking enemy vessels within the Mole's
protection. Most of the German Flotilla had been with-
drawn to Bruges before the action, and only two craft
lay alongside the Mole, apparently without having steam
up.' C.M.B. 7 reported a torpedo hit upon one of them.
C.M.B. 32 A fired a torpedo at Captain Fryatt's old ship

' She had .a complemont of 87 instead of 54. Her surplus crew
liad not been taken off, cliiefly owing to their determination to
take part in the fight. See the Dispatch, para. 95,

' Dispatch of May 9, para. 10.

217S C

84 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

Brussels, and an explosion followed, C.M.B. 5 encoun-
tered a destroyer emerging from the harbour and
torpedoed her below her forward searchlight.* The
destroyer No7ih Star also discharged her torpedoes at
vessels alongside the Mole, but coming under very heavy
fire at point-blank range was disabled and eventually
sank.'' Two motor-launches also were lost. The material
casualties of the adventure were extraordinarily slight.

The attack on Zeebrugge was completely successful
in achieving the first and most important object of the
operations — the outlet of the Bruges Ship Canal to the
sea was effectually blocked. The second object — the
sealing of the entrance to Ostend harbour — was not
achieved, for reasons which reflect in no way upon the
plan or those responsible for its accomplishment.

Sirius and Brilliant were timed to reach the entrance to
Ostend harbour at midnight.^ At 11.20 p.m. the six
monitors began their bombardment." The smoke-screen
craft performed their task successfully until, at 11.50 p.m.,
the wind changed to from off-shore. Ten minutes later
the block-ships arrived at the Stroom Bank buoy, where
they were to find their direction for the harbour. Arrived
there, and meeting the adverse smoke, they were pre-
vented from taking bearings which would have shown
them that the buoy had been moved to a point 2,400 yards
east of its accustomed situation. Taking a line which,
had the buoy been in its original position, would have
led them into Ostend harbour, the two block-ships drove
ashore some 2,400 j'ards east of it.'' Brilliant, who was

' Dispatch of May 9, para. 120. On October 14, 1918, the Brussels
was again attacked as she hiy alongside the store shed on the Mole.
She was used as a torpedo training ship.

2 Ibid., para. 112. » Ibid., para. 25. " Ibid., para. 20.

^ Ibid , para. 26 ; Commodore Lynes's Report, para. G (a), 11 (d\

ST. GEORGE'S DAY RAID 35

leading, observing breakers where the Ostend piers
should have been seen, starboarded her helm, but too late
to avoid grounding. Sirhts put her helm hard over and
her engines astern. But the ship, badly damaged by
gun-fire and sinking, did not answer the helm, collided
with the port quarter of Brilliant, and grounded firmly.
Both were blown up where they stranded at 12.30 a.m.
Their crews were rescued by M.L.s 276 and 283. A small
party of Sirius's crew pulled thirteen miles out to sea
before they were picked up by Attentive.^ Meanwhile, at
1 a.m. the 'retirement' had been sounded. Until day-
light the destroyers continued to cruise and pick up
stragglers. No enemy craft were seen, and at 7.30 a.m.
the force returned to Dunkirk. All the crews of the
block-ships were saved. All the M.L.s returned intact,
with very slight casualties. The C.M.B.s were equally
fortunate, and their personnel casualties were only six
wounded. But the operation, partly owing to the change
of wind, chiefly to the success of the enemy's ruse de
guerre in changing the situation of the Stroom Bank
buoy, was a failure.^ Ostend harbour remained open
from the sea and for the passage of small craft through
the lesser waterways from Bruges. The operations of
May 10 were necessary and were already contemplated.

1 Dispatch of May 9, para. 25, 98 ft".
* Commodore Lynes, para. 11-13.

c2

36 OSTEND AND ZEEBEUOOE

(a) Captain Carpenter's Narrative.^

' Once it had been decided to make an attack on the
Mole,' we had to have a large number of men to carry
it out, and to obtain suitable ships. So the Grand
Fleet, the main naval depots, and the various Com-
mands,' were asked to lend a certain number of
the most suitable men they had. These men were
given to understand that they were going on a hazardous
enterprise,* so far as I know, and therefore one can say
that they volunteered for it, although they were not
actually told at the time what they were going to do."

1 The Times, April 26, 1918. Commander (now Captain) Alfred
Francis Blakeney Carpenter received the V.C. 'for most con-
spicuous gallantry' on April 23, 1918.

' The Zeebrugge Mole, along with the harbour and canal, was
built, at a cost of nearly 42,000,000 francs, between 1895 and 1907.
The Mole is constructed mainly of concrete blocks. The canal is
280 feet wide and 25 feet deep.

' For the contribution of the various Commands see the Dispatch
of May 9, para. 31.

* Lieutenant-Commander Hilton Young gives the wording of the
invitation : ' Volunteers are wanted for an undertaking of real
danger' {Cornhill Magazine for December 1918, p. 593).

^ ' They were all picked men — picked from volunteers. We tried
them out under intensive training until we got exactly the men
we wanted. That, naturallj'^, was a long and anxious job. At first
they thought it was for a hazardous operation in France, and they
were keen enough then ; but later, when we entrusted them
with the real secret, and thej- knew we were after Zeebrugge and
Ostend, there was no holding them ! ' — Statement by Captain
Carpenter in Keble Howard's The Glory of Zeehrugge (1918), p. 17.
An Admiralty official, quoted in the Baily Mail of April 26, states:
' When the preparations were completed the volunteers were sent
on board their ships, and for three weeks, while waiting for the
favourable moment, never a man was allowed ashore.' The Dis-

ST. GEORGE'S DAY RAID 87

However, before the operation actually took place, every
man had to be informed quite clearly what was expected
of him, because one fully realized that every officer might
be knocked out and the men would be entirely on their
own. Then the men undoubtedly had a chance of
saying that they did not want to go, perhaps for family
reasons ; but, so far as I know, there was not a single
case of a man asking to be left behind. To my know-
ledge, in fact, in one ship [the Intrepid), where orders had
been given that certain men were to be left behind, those
men in almost a mutinous spirit came up before their
captain and said they absolutely refused to leave the ship.
As it happened, in this particular case, owing to a slight
hitch, the extra crew of this ship were not taken off.*
The whole of the men went into Zeebrugge Canal in the
block-ship, and the whole of them were saved and
brought back.

* The nature of the operation was such that it required
the use of a very large number of small craft ; ^ and the
trip across tlie sea being rather over a hundred miles'
each way made it necessary that the weather should be
line. At the same time the wind had to be on-shore,
so that we could use our smoke-screens effectively. At
the same time, too, the operation had to be carried out
at high water, so as to allow the block-ships to get in.
Again, owing to the presence of a large number of

patch of May 9, para. 30, speaks of 'anxious days of waiting in
crowded ships in a secluded [West Swin] anchorage ' from April 4
onwards (para. 33).

^ The statement applies also to Iphigenia. See Dispatch of May 9,
para. 95, 96.

* See note 2 on p. 29, supra.

' I. e. from Dover to Zeebrugge. Dover was left at 1.10 p.m., the
point of concentration (63 miles) at 4.53 p.m. Steaming at ten
knots the full distance took nearly eleven hours to accomplish.

38 OSTEND AND ZEEBEUuGE

G«rman guns on the Belgian coast' it was necessary
to cany out the operation at night ; and it was fully
realized that if it were carried out in the latter part of
the night — that is to say, by the morning twilight —
there was practically no chance of any ship getting away
in the early morning, when they could be seen from the
shore.* It was, therefore, a rather complicated com-
bination of conditions that we required, and during the
period that we were waiting for a suitable day^ the
disappointments were very great. Before the operation
took place we had all gone over to within a few miles of
our objectives and had to turn back owing to impossible
weather conditions suddenly arising,* and it was with
very anxious hearts that we waited for suitable weather
conditions to occur, realizing that every day we waited
made a greater chance for the news of the impending
operation to leak out and get across to Germany, and for
preparations to be made ovei* there to defeat the operation
at the outset. The chances of the vicinities of Zeebrugge
and Ostend being heavily mined were considerable, and
the risk of this had to be taken.*

1 The Germans had at leai^t 120 guns ff heavy calibre in position
on the 12 miles of coast separating Ostend from Zeebrugge. See
note o on p. 10, supra.

- It was estimated that it ^Yould take Vi)i(lictive and her escort one
licur and twenty minutes to get out of range on their return
journey, and that half an hour before sunrise the visibility would
be good enough to enable the German batteries to spot them. Hence,
it was calculated that the ships must leave the Mole at latest one
hour and fifty minutes before sunrise. — Nineteentli Century, June
1918, p. 1204. Approximately, sunrise at Ostend and Zeebrugge
on April 23, 1918, was at 4.40 a.m. G.M.T. The latest moment for
departure, therefore, was 2 50 a.m. The programme fixed it for
].40 a.m. In fact Vindictive left at 1.10 a.m.

* From April 4. See note 5, p. 36, supra. * On April 11-12.

* Special arrangements were made for the salvage of crews and

ST. GEOEGE'S DAY RAID 39

* At last [April 22] the opportunity we had waited for
so long arose, and everybody started off in the highest
spirits and with no other thought than to make the very
greatest success of the operation that we could possibly
do. Fate was very kind to us on the whole,' and every-
thing went well, almost as per schedule. The various
phases of the operation depended on accurate timing of
the work of the various units.^ The smoke-screen ci*aft
and the fast motor-boats at given intervals rushed on
ahead at full speed, laid their smoke-screens, attacked
enemy vessels [in the harbour] with torpedoes, and
generally cleaied the way for the main force, in addition
to hiding the approach of the latter from i^e shore
batteries. Meanwhile a heavy bombardment was being
carried out by our monitors, and the sound of their
firing as we approached was one of the most heartening
things that I can remember. On arriving at a certain
point some considerable distance ' from shore the forces
parted, some going to Zeebrugge and some to Ostend,

landing parties in the event of vessels being mined. See Dispatch
of May 9, para. 17.

• The weather conditions broke down at the last moment and
contributed to defeat the Ostend attack. On the other hand, the
expedition encountered neither an unexpected mine field, nor
scouting vessels, nor scouting planes to give warning. Nor did
better conditions recur.

' One of the most noteworthy features of the operation, as Staff-
Paymaster Cox points out {Nineteenth Century, June 1918, p. 1204),
was the marvellous punctuality shown by the co-operating units:
bombardment by monitors and coast-batteries at 11.20 p.m. ; the
fog-raising motor-boats to begin operations at 1 1.40 p.m. ; Vindictive
and her escort to clear the Mole at 12 a.m. ; the submarine attack
to cut the Mole from shore reinforcements at 12.15 a.m. ; the
leading block-ship to p.iss the lighthouse at 12.25 a.m.; and lastly
the motor-craft to pick up tlio crews of the scuttled ships.

^ According to the Press Bureau Narrative the distance was
about 15 uiik'b.

^MUe

Plan of the Zeebnigge Raid, April 23.

Note. — The precise positions of the British ships are shown in
the ofticial plan on p. 110.

ST. GEOKGE'S DAY KAID 41

the idea being that the forces should arrive at the t-NVo
places simultaneously, so that communication from one
place to the other could not be used as a Avarning in
either case. Precisely at midnight the main force arrived
at Zeebrugge and two of the block-ships' arrived at
Ostend.

'At midnight we [Vindictive^] steamed through a very
thick smoke-screen. German star-shells were lighting
up the whole place almost like daylight, and one had
an extraordinary naked feeling when one saw how
exposed we were, although it was in the middle of the
night. On emerging from the smoke-screen the end of
the Mole, where the lighthouse is, was seen close ahead,
distant about 400 yards.' The ship was turned imme-
diately to go alongside and increased to full speed so
as to get there as fast as possible. We had decided not
to open fire from the ship until they opened fire on us,
so that we might remain unobserved to the last possible
moment. A battery of five or six guns on the Mole
began firing at us almost immediately from a range of
about 300 yards, and every gun on the Vindictive that
would bear fired at them as hard as it could.*

1 H.M.S. Sirius and Biilliant.

* H.M.S. Vindictive, light cruisei', launched 1897, completed 1898 ;
20 knots ; normal comjilement 430 ; ten 6-inch and also smaller
guns ; with the Mediterranean Fleet 1900-4 ; thereafter in Dock-
yard Reserve ; commissioned for service in the Nore Division of
Home Fleet ; served successively in Srd and 4tli Divisions of Home
Fleet and as tender to H.M.S. Albion and H.M.S. Vernon.

^ At 11.56 p.m. Vindictive saw the Mole about 300 yards distant
on the port bow. See the Dispatch, para. 60.

* The London Gazette of July 23, 1918, announcing Captain
Carpenter's distinction, states : * When Vindictive was within
a few yards of the Mole the enemy started and maintained
a heavy fire from batteries, machine-guns, and rifles on to the
bridge.' In the Cornhill article already quoted Lieut.-Commander
Uiltun Young writes : ' Wo were some GOO yards from tho Mole,

42 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

* In less than five minutes the ship was alongside the
Mole,' and efforts were made to grapple the Mole so as
to keep the ship in place.'' The Daffodil,^ which was
following close astern, came up, and in the most gallant
manner placed her bow against the Vindictive and pushed
the Vindictive sideways until she was close alongside the
Mole. There was a very heavy swell against the Mole.
The ships were rolling about, and this made the work of
securing to the Mole exceedingly difficult.^

'When the brows ^ were run out from the Vindictive
and had just begun to turn to starboard to run alongside it, when
the storm broke. A searchlight shone out from the end of the
Mole, swung to left and right, and settled on the ship. At once
the guns of tlie Mole battery opened'fii-e.' The battery had been
reckoned to be of 4-1-in. guns. Theypi'oved tobeo 9"s. Three of the
six guns on the extension were 4-1's. See the Dispatch, para. 56, 71.

^ Timed to arrive at 12 o'clock a.m. G.M.T., Vindictive actually
made alongside the Mole at 12.1 a.m. Captain Carpenter was
directed to fetch up 400 yards nearer the head of the Mole than the
position he actually took. Consequently the 6-9 battery at the end
of the Mole was not put out of action completely. The plan con-
templated the landing parties storming the Mole on the top of the
battery. See Dispatch, para. 71.

^ It is wrongly stated in Hoic ice Ttcisted the Dragotis Tail, p. 41,
that the special Mole anchors ' proved too short for the job '. See
the Dispatch, para. 62.

' Daffodil arrived at 12.4 a.m. See the Dispatch, para. 62.

* Captain Carpenter does not mention Iris, for whose action see
infra, p. 136. She first attempted to make fast to the Mole ahead
of Vindictive. The heavy swell prevented her, and after heroic
efforts she fell astei-n of Vindictive and began to land her parties
over the cruiser. See the Dispatch, para. 63.

^ To facilitate landing on the outer wall of the Mole, where
landings are not wont to be made. Vindictive carried a false top-deck
along her port side, that is, on the left side looking forward. From
this false deck eighteen brows, or landing gangways, wore operated,
over which the storming parties could pass on to the Mole.
Captain Carpenter describes a brow as ' a sort of light drawbridge
with a hinge in the middle' {The Glory of Zeebrugge, p. 20). Its con-
struction and appearance are easily realized from the illustration.

ST. GEORGE'S DAY RAID 43

the men at once climbed out along them. It was an
extremely perilous task, in view of the fact that the ends
of the brows at one moment were from 8 ft. to 10 ft.*
above the wall and the next moment were crashing
on the wall as the ship rolled. The way in which
the men got over those brows was almost superhuman.
I expected every moment to see them falling oif between
the Mole and the ship — at least a 30-ft. drop — and being
crushed by the ship against the wall. But not a man fell ;
their agility was wonderful. It was not a case of seamen
running barefoot along the deck of a rolling ship ; the
men were carrying heavy accoutrements, bombs, Lewis
guns, and other articles, and their path lay along a
narrow and extremely unsteady plank. They never
hesitated. They went along the brows and on to the
Mole with the utmost possible sjieed. Within a few
minutes three to four hundred had been landed,^ and
under cover of a barrage put down on the Mole by
Stokes guns and howitzer fire from the ship they fought
their way along.'

' Comparatively few of the German guns were able
to hit the hull of the ship, as it was behind the pro-
lection of the wall. Safety, in fact, depended on how
near you could get to the enemy guns instead of how
far away. While the hull was guarded, the upper works

* In fact their weight kept them always resting on the parapet.
They aawed backwards and forwards with the ship's motion.

* The Germnn Admiralty's account {infra, p. 79) mendaciously
states the number as forty, all of whom are said to have been
taken alive or dead !

^ An addendum to Captain Carpenter's narrative states that
Vindidive's howitzers were trained on the Gooben Fort (east of the
Canal mouth), the dock-gates inside the Canal mouth, and the shore
batteries near the landward end of the Mole. The forward howitzer
was put out of action and its crew suffered severely.

44 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

of the ship — the funnels, masts, ventUators, and bridge
— were showing above the wall, and on these a large
number of German guns appeared to be concentrated.
Many of our casualties were caused by splinters coming
down from the upper works.^ If it had not been for
the Daffodil ' continuing to push the ship in towards the
wall throughout the operation none of the men who
went on the Mole would ever have got back again.

* About twenty-five minutes after the Vindictive got
alongside, the block-ships were seen rounding the light-
house ' and heading for the canal entrance. It was then
realized on board the Iris, Daffodil, and Vindictive that
their work had been accomplished. A quarter of an hour
after the Vindictive took her position, and just before
the blockers arrived, a tremendous explosion was seen
at the shore end of the Mole.* We then knew that
our submarine had managed to get herself in between the
piles of the viaduct connecting the Mole with the shore
and had blown herself up." She carried several tons of

^ 'Those chaps in the fighting-tup -were attracting a lot of
attention, and the Huns were constantly trying to drop a shell
amongst them. They succeeded at last, I'm sorry to say, and laid
out every man-jack but one — Sergeant Finch. Ho was wounded
badly, but dragged himself out from under the bodies of his pals
and went on working his little gun until he couldn't work it any
longer.' — Captain Carpenter's statement in The Olory of Zeebrugge,
p. 23. Finch kept up his fire until the fighting-top was destroyed
by a direct hit. He received the V.C.

^ Daffodil managed to develop double her normal steam-pressure
for the purpose. Eventually she landed her storming party over
Vindictive.

' Vi7idictive got alongside the Mole at 12.1 a.m. G.M.T. The
leading block-ship passed the actual Mole end at 12.25.

* At 12.20 a.m. G.M.T. See accounts of Submarine C 3's per-
formance infra, p. 73, and the Dispatch, para. 23, 8CfF.

' ' I never saw such a column of flamo ! It seemed a mile high.'
(Captain Carpenter, in 27te Glory of Zeebrugge, p. 22.)

ST. GEORGE'S PAY RAID 45

high explosive, and the eftect of her action was effectually
to cut off the Mole from the land. Before the explosion
the crew of the submarine, which comprised some half-
dozen officers and men/ got away in a very small motor
skiff, which lost its propeller and had to be pulled with
paddles against a heavy tide and under machine-gun fire
from a range which could be reckoned only in feet.
Most of the crew^ were wounded, but the tiny boat
was picked up by a steam-pinnace.'^

* It is possible that the Germans, who saw the sub-
marine coming in under the play of their searchlights,
thought that lier object was to attack the vessels within
the Mole and that she thought it feasible to get through
the viaduct [into the hai'bour basin] to do this. Their
neglect to stop the submarine as she approached could
only be put down to the fact that they knew she could
not get through, owing to the large amount of inter-
lacing between the piles,' and that they really believed
they were catching her. A large number of Germans
were actually on the viaduct a few feet above the sub-
marine, and were firing at her with machine-guns.
I think it can safely be said that every one of those

' Lieutenant R. D. Sandford, R.N., in command, Lieutenant
J. Howell-Price, D.S.C., R.N.R., Stoker H. C. Bindall, P.O. Walter
Harner, Leading Seaman W. €4. Cleaver, Engine-room Artificer
A. G. Roxburgh.

* The steam-pinnace or picket-boat was commanded by Lieutenant
Sandford's brother, Lieut. -Commander F. H. Sandford. See Dis-
patch, para. 91.

' The open passage from outside to within the harbour had been
covered over with a sort of steel curtain, leaving a hole for the tide
to run through. The submarine made for the hole. — Statement by
Lieutenant-Commander Sandford in Hie Olory of Zeebriigge, p. 85. The
explosion, according to the Press Bureau account, made a gap of
more than 100 ft. in the structure. See another statement by Lieu-
tenant-Commander Sandford in/ra note, p. 75, and the Dispatch,
para. 88.

46 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

Germans went up with the viaduct. The cheer raised
by my men in the Vindictive when they saw the terrific
explosion was one of the finest things I ever heard.
Many of the men were severely wounded — some had
three and even four wounds — but they had no thought
except for the success of the operation.

' The block-ships came under very heavy fire im-
mediately they rounded the end of the Mole. Most
of the fire, it appears, was concentrated on the leading
ship, the Thetis} She ran ashore off the entrance to
the canal on the [western] edge of the chiainel,^ and
was sunk as approximately as possible across the channel
itself, thus forming an obstruction to the passage of the
German vessels. Before going down she gave a signal
to the other two block-ships, which were following
close behind, to inform them which side of her to pass
in order to get to the canal entrance. This co-operation
between the three block-ships, carried out under ex-
tremely heavy fire, was one of the finest things of the
operation. The second and third ships, the Intrepid
and TpJiigenia, both went straight through the canal
entrance until they actually reached a point some two
or three hundred yards inside the shore lines, and be-
hind some of the German batteries.' It really seems
very wonderful. How the crews of the two ships ever
got away is almost beyond imagination. A motor-launch *

' H.M.S. Thetis, Intrepid, and Iphigenia were sister ships of the A2)qIIo
class, launched about 1891, displacing about 3,600 tons each, and
latterly used as mine-layers.

' The explanation of her mishap is given by the Press Bureau
account infra, p. 58, and the Dispatch, para. 94.

' See the sea-plane photograph at p. 112. Iphigenia, last of the
block-ships, was sunk at 12.45 a.m. See Dispatch, para. 24.

* Lieutenant P. T. Dean, R.N.V.R. One M.L. followed each
block-ship. No. 110 was sunk rounding the Mole. No. 526

ST. GEORGE'S DAY RAID 47

seems to have picked up the majority of them in an
extraordinarily gallant way under extremely heavy fire
from very short i-ange. The launch got clear and put
the crews on board destroyers. A number of other men
escaped by their own boats. They had to pull several
miles out to sea, and were then picked up by vessels
outside.

'The situation rather more than an hour after the
Vindictive got alongside was this : The block-ships had
passed in, had come to the end of their run, and had
done their work. The viaduct was blown up and the
Mole had been stormed.^ Nothing but a useless sacrifice
of life could have followed if the three boarding vessels
had remained by the Mole any longer. The signal to with-
draw was therefore given, and the ships got away under
cover of their smoke-screens as quickly as they could.
I have already told you that owing to the ships being
so close to the German guns, that is to say, right along-
side the wall, they were comparatively immune from
hits. But it was realized that as soon as we left the
shelter of the wall we should come under exceedingly
heavy fire. I doubt whether there was anybody on
board who really thought we should get back. The signal
[for the re-embarkation of the landing parties] was given
by siren,* but the noise of the guns was so loud that it
had to be repeated many times. Twenty minutes passed
before it was definitely reported that there was nobody
left on the Mole who could possibly get on the with-

brought away the crew of Thetis. Lieutenant Dean, following
Iphigenia in No. 282, rescued 101 men from Iphigenia and Intrepid.

' For this operation see infra, p. 67, and the Dispatch, para. 67 ff.

* Daffodil's siren made the signal at 12.50 a.m. Vindictire^s search-
lights, which had been intended to give twenty minutes' warning,
had been destroyed, as well as her siren wliich was to have given
the executive signal. See the Dispatch, para. 104.

48 OSTEND AND ZKEBRUOGE

drawing ships. All three ships got away from the
wall.^ They went at full speed and were followed
all the way along their course by salvos from the
German guns. Shells seemed to fall all round the ships
without actually hitting them.'' The gunners apparently
had our speed but not our range, and with remarkable
regularity the salvos plopped into the sea behind us.
In a short time the ships were clear of imminent danger
owing to the large amount of smoke which they had left
behind them.'

' Should the Germans, who appear to suffer from an ex-
treme gift of imagination, ever suggest that the Vindictive
did not get alongside the Mole, their story could easily
be refuted by the fact that we brought awaj^ a piece of
Zeebrugge Mole, weighing about a quarter of a ton,
which fell on my ship.*

1 Approximately 1.10 a.m. G.M.T. Vindictive was clear at 1.15 a.m.
One hour and nine minutes was the precise duration of Vindiciive's
stay alongside the Mole. There is a careful account of the operation
in A Light Ship (1918) by 'Taffrail'.

2 The statement is true of Vindictive (see Lieut.-Commander
Hilton Young's article in the Cornhill Magazine for Dec. 1918), but
not of Iris. Sir Roger Keyes's DisiJatch of May 9 (para. 105) says :
' Shortly after leaving the Mole the ship came under a very hea^-y
fire from the Mole and shore batteries, being hit tea times
by small shell and twice by large ones. The first large shell
carried away the port side of the bridge.' ' At that short range
[400 or 500 yards] ', writes Lieut.-Commander Hilton Young, ' the
light fabric of the little ship was hulled through and through,
flames and smoke spurting from her far side as the shells struck.
I thought at the time that she had probably sunk.'

° Captain Carpenter omits to mention the g.allant conduct of
the small craft, which got between the three ships and the shore
batteries and made clouds of smoke.

* According to a statement in the Morning Post of April 20, 1918,
it is intended to use part of this relic for a memorial of the dead
who fell in the Raid.

*

\

■■' '1:

\

f

^^^^^^^Ei'*' ^m

'1

ST. GEORGE'S DAY RAID 49

* On the way across, before the operation, the Admiral
made the signal to the Vindictive, "St. George for
England!" and the reply was made to him, "May we
give the Dragon's tail a damned good twist". I think
we succeeded in doing it.'

50 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

{h) The Press Bureau Narrative.^

' April 24, 1918.

' Those who recall High Wood upon the Somme — and
they must be many — as it was after the battles of 1916,
may easily figure to themselves the decks of His Majesty's
Ship Vindictive as she lies to-daj', a stark, black profile
against the sea haze of the harbour [at Dover] amid the
stripped, trim shapes of the fighting ships which throng
these waters. That wilderness of debris, that litter of the
used and broken tools of war, that lavish ruin, and that
prodigal evidence of death and battle, are as obvious and
plentiful here as there. The ruined tank nosing at the
stout tree which stopped it has its parallel in the flame-
thrower hut at the port wing of Vindictive's bridge, its
iron sides freckled with rents from machine-gun bullets
and shell-splinters. The tall white cross which com-
memorates the martyrdom of the Londoners is sister to
the dingy, pierced White Ensign which floated over the
fight on the Zeebrugge Mole.

' Looking aft from the chaos of her wrecked bridge, one
sees, snug against their wharf, the heroic bourgeois shapes
of the two Liverpool ferry-boats (their captains' quarters
are still labelled '' Ladies Only") Iris and Daffodil, which
shared with Vindictive the honours and ardours of the
fight. The epic of their achievement shapes itself in the
light of that view across the scarred and littered decks,
in that environment of grey water and great still ships.

> Tlie complete text is in the Morning Posi, April 26, 1918, and
Tie Olory of Zielnigge, pp. 43 ft'.

ST. GEORGE'S DAY RAID 51

' Their objectives were the canal of Zeebrugge and the
entrance to the harbour of Ostend — theirs, and those of
five other veteran and obsolete cruisers and a mosquito
fleet of destroyers, motor-launches, and coastal motor-
boats. Three of the cruisers. Intrepid, Iphigenia, and
Thetis, each duly packed with concrete and with mines
attached to her bottom for the purj)ose of sinking her,
ilfem»2ac- fashion,' in the neck of the canal, were aimed at
Zeebrugge ; two others, similarly prepared, were directed
at Ostend. The function of Vindictive, with her ferry-
boats, was to attack the great half-moon Mole which guards
the Zeebrugge Canal, land blue-jackets and Marines
upon it, destroy what stores, guns, and Germans she
could find, and generally ci*eate a diversion while the
block-ships ran in and sank themselves in their appointed
place. Vice-Admiral Keyes, in the destroyer WarivicJc,
commanded the oj)eration.

* There had been two previous attempts at the attack,
capable of being pushed home if weather and other con-
ditions had served.- The night of the 22nd [of AprilJ
offered nearly all the required conditions, and at some
fifteen miles off Zeebrugge the ships took up their forma-
tion for the attack. Vindictive, which had been towing
Iris and Daffodil, cast them off to follow under their own
steam ; Intrepid, Iphigenia, and Thetis slowed down to
give the first three time to get alongside the Mole ; Sirius
and Brilliant shifted their course for Ostend ; and the
great swarm of destroyers and motor-craft sowed them-
selves abroad upon their multifarious particular duties.
The niglit was overcast, and there was a drift of haze ;

* The Merrhnuc, commanded by Nuval Constructor Hobson, w.i;
nk in Santiago Harbour, during the Spanish- American War, oi
ine 3, 1898. See siqmi, p. 22.

auiiiv 111 otiiibiii^u Ji<.iiu<juij \.v\.i.

June 3, 1898. See siqmi, p. 22
* See sujna, p. 29, note.

1)2

62 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

down the coast a great searchlight swung its beam to and
fro ; there was a small wind and a short sea.

' From Yindictive's bridge, as she headed in towards the
Mole, with her faithful ferry-boats at her heels, there was
scarcely a glimmer of light to be seen shoi-ewards.
Ahead of her, as she drove through the water, rolled the
smoke-screen, her cloak of invisibility, wrapped about her
by the small craft. This was a device of Wing-Commander
Brock,^ R.N.A.S., "without which", acknowledges the
Admiral in Command, "the operation could not have
been conducted ". The north-east wind moved the volume
of it shoreward ahead of the ships; be5^ond it, the distant
town and its defenders were unsuspicious ; and it was not
till Vindictive, with her blue-jackets and Marines standing
ready for the landing, was close upon the Mole that the
wind lulled and came away again from the south-west,
sweeping back the smoke-screen and laying her bare to
the eyes that looked seaward. -

* There was a moment immediately afterwards when it
seemed to those in the ships as if the dim coast and the

1 Wing-Commamk-r Frank Arthur Brock, R.A.F., b. 1884 ;
director of Messrs. C. T. Brock & Co., firework manufacturerH ;
Flight-Commander, R.A.F., 1916; O.B.E., January 1918 ; a man of
marked inventive genius. He invented tlie first powerful flarr s
used for the Channel barrage (see a statement by Sir Roger Keyos
in Tlie Times of December 13, 1918). See the Dispatch, para. 37, on
the ' fog ' preparations.

* Lieut.-Commandcr Hilton Young {CornhiU Magazine, December
1918, p. 601) describes the scene : * The sky was thick with a perfect
r.iia of star-shells ; but, clearly as they showed us to oiirselves, it
did not follow that they showed us to the Germans. As eacli star
fell into the smoke-screen that now covered the sea, unless it was
within a very few hundred yards of us it was eclipsed as a star
and became a large vague nebula. Although there was plenty of
light about, a few hundred yards from the ship ^Vindictive] every-
thing was blotted out in wreaths, eddies and whirls of glowing
vapour '

ST. GEORGE'S DAY EAID 63

hidden harbour exploded into light. A star-shell soared
aloft/ then a score of star-shells ; the wavering beams of
the searchlights swung round and settled to a glare ; the
wildfire of gun-flashes leapt against the sky ; strings of
luminous green beads ^ shot aloft, hung, and sank ; and the
darkness of the night was supplanted by the nightmare
daylight of battle-fires. Guns and machine-guns along
the Mole and batteries ashore woke to life, and it was in
a gale of shelling that Vindictive laid her nose against the
thirty-foot high concrete side of the Mole, let go an
anchor^ and signed to Daffodil to shove her stern in.
Iris went ahead and endeavoiu'ed to get alongside like-
wise.

* The fire, from the account of everybody concerned, was
intense. While the ships plunged and rolled beside the
Mole in an unexpected scend of sea, Vindictive with her
greater draught jarring against the foundation of the
Mole with every plunge, they were swept diagonally
by machine-gun fire from both ends of the Mole and
by heavy batteries ashore. Commander A. F. B.
Carpenter (now Captain) conned Vindictive from her open
bridge till her stern was laid in, when he took up his
position in the flame-thrower hut on the port side. It is
to this hut that reference has already been made ; it is
marvellous that any occupant of it should have survived
a minute, so I'iddled and shattered is it."* Officers of Iris,
which was in trouble ahead of Vindictive, describe Captain
Carpenter as " handling her like a picket-boat ".

^ It seems that Vindictive was about tweut}- minutes from the
Mole when the Germans sent up the warning star-shell. This
estimate is contii*med by Lieut.-Commander Hilton Young in the
Cornhill Magazine, December 1918, p. 602 n.

' Generally called 'flaming onions'. See infra, p. 64, note 4.

^ See tho Dispatch, para. C>2, fur Findicdie's difficulties here.

* S«o the picture at p. bO.

54 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

' Vin(7ictive was fitted along the port side Avitli a high
false deck, whence ran the eighteen brows,^ or gangways, by
which the storming and demolition parties were to land.^

' The men were gathered in readiness on the main and
lower decks, while Colonel Elliot,^ who was to lead the
Marines, waited on the false deck just abaft the bridge,
and Captain H. C. Halahan,' who commanded the blue-
jackets, was amidships. The gangways were lowered,
and scraped and rebounded upon the high parapet of the
Mole as Vindictive rolled ; and the word for the assault
had not yet been given when both leaders were killed,
Colonel Elliot by a shell, and Captain Halahan by the
machine-gun fire which swept the decks. The same shell
that killed Colonel Elliot also did fearful execution in the
forwai'd Stokes Mortar Battery.

'"The men were magnificent." Every officer bears
the same testimony. The mere landing on the Mole was
a perilous business ; it involved a passage across the
crashing, splintering gangways, a drop '^ over the parapet

' An officer of the landing party (quoted in TJie Times, April 25,
1918) states that only two proved serviceable for landing purposes,
the remainder having been shot away. Two others were got into
order. Sec the Dispatch, para. 62.

2 The primary object of the attack on the Mole was the capture
of the 5-9-in. battery at its sea end, a serious menace to the passage
of the block-ships. A secondary object was to damage the matei'ial
on the Mole in the time required for blocking the canal, and to
distract the enemy's atteiition in some degree from the main opera-
tion, i. e. the sinking of the block-ships. The Mole attack consisted
of (a) the landing of storming and demolition parties at the sea
end, and (b) the destruction of the ii'on viaduct connecting the
Mole with the shore.

' Lieutenant-Colonel Bertram Nowel Elliot, D.S.O.

* Captain Henry Crosby Halahan, D.S.O., R.N.

^ Of about four feet on to a ledge, about eight feet wide, with
an iron railing on the harbour-side, which runs along the inner wall
of the Mole. From the ledge to tlio surface of tlic Mole there is
a drop of fifteen feet. See the Dispatch, para. 72.

ST. GEORGE'S DAY RAID 55

into the field of fire of the German machine-guns, which
swept its length, and a further drop of some 15 ft. to the
surface of the Mole itself. Many were killed and more
were wounded as they crowded up to the gangways ; but
nothing hindered the orderly and speedy landing by every
gangway. Lieutenant H. T. C. Walker had his arm
carried away by a shell on the upper deck, and lay in the
darkness while the storming parties trod him under. He
was recognized and dragged aside by the Commander
[Carpenter]. He raised his remaining arm in greeting.
" Good luck to you," he called, as the rest of the stormers
hastened by ; " good luck ! "

'The lower deck was a shambles as the Commander
made the rounds of his ship ; yet those wounded and
dying raised themselves to cheer as he made his tour.
The crew of the howitzer which was mounted forward
had all been killed ; a second crew was destroyed like-
wise ; and even then a third crew was taking over the
gun.* In the stern cabin a firework expert who had never
been to sea before — one of Captain Brock's employees —
was steadily firing great illuminating rockets out of a
scuttle to show up the lighthouse on the end of the Mole
to the block-ships and their escort.'^

* Daffodil, after aiding to berth Vindictive, should have
proceeded to land her own men, but now Commander
Carpenter ordered her to remain as she was, with her
bows against Vindictive's quarter, pressing the latter ship
into the Mole.' Normally Daffodil's boilers develop eighty
pounds' pressure of steam per inch ; but now, for this

^ See the Dispatch, para. 6i.

* Thetis was much aided by this. See Dispatch, para. 91.

' Daffodil shouM have come alongside Vindictive to land her
parties. But having to shore Vindictive on to the Mole during the
whole operation, Daffodil's men had to disembark from her bows on
(o Vindicti-ce. See Dispatch, para. 62.

66 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

particular task, Artificer-Engineer Sutton/ in cliarge of
them, maintained a hundred and sixty pounds for the
■whole period that she was holding Vindictive to the Mole.*
Her casualties, owing to her position during the fight,
were small — one man killed and eight wounded, among
them her commander, Lieutenant H. Campbell,' who was
struck in the right e5^e by a shell splinter.

' Iris had troubles of her own. Her first attempts to
make fast to the Mole ahead of Vindictive iakiled, as her
grapnels were not large enough to span the parapet.''
Two officers, Lieutenant -Commander Bradford* and
Lieutenant Hawkings,* climbed ashore and sat astride the
parapet trying to make the grapnels fast till each was
killed and fell down between the ship and the wall.
Commander Valentine Gibbs ^ had both legs shot away,
and died next morning. Lieutenant Spencer, R.N.R.,
though wounded, took command, and refused to be
relieved.* Iris was obliged at last to change her

* Art.-Engiueer William Mark Sutton, R.N., received the D.S.C.
For this and other decorated officers' record of service see the
London Gaseite of July 23, 1918.

'^ Had not Daffodil been so emplo3'ed VindicHve could not have
been held in position at the Mole nor the landing parties have been
able to return to the ship.

' Lieutenant Harold George Campbell, R.N., received the D.S.O.

* This is not accurate. See note 2, p. 42, supra.

' Lt. -Commander G. N. Bradford, R.N. He was the first to set
foot on the Mole, writes Lieutenant-Commander Hilton Young
{Cornhill Marjazine, Dec. 1918, p. G04). He climbed up a davit and
jumped ashore. But see the Dispatch, para. 72.

* Lieutenant C. E. V. Hawkings, K.N.

' Commander Valentine Francis Gibbs, R.N.

■■ Lieutenant G. Spencer, D.S.C, R.N.R. ; died of wounds. The
statement in the text needs correction. Lieutenant Spencer, who
was acting as navigator, lay severely wounded on the remnants of
the bridge, conning the ship away from the Mole. Lieutenant
Oscar nondoison, ropruseutingthe Portsmouth Command, promptly

ST. GEOKGE'S DAY KAID 57

position, and fall in astern of Vindictive,^ and suffered
very heavily from the fire. A single big shell plunged
through the upper deck and burst below at a point where
fifty-six Marines were awaiting the order to go to the
gangways. Forty-nine were killed, and the remaining
seven wounded. Another shell in the ward-room, which
was serving as sick-bay, killed four ofl&cers and twenty-
six men. Her total casualties were eight officers and
sixty-nine men killed and three officers and a hundred
and two men wounded.

' The storming and demolition-parties upon the Mole
met with no resistance from the Germans, other than the
intense and unremitting fire. The geography of the
great Mole, with its railway line and its many buildings,
hangars, and store-sheds, was already well known, and
the demolition-parties moved to their appointed work in
perfect order. One after another the buildings burst into
flame or split and crumbled as the dynamite went off.'
A bombing party, working up towards the Mole extension
in search of the enemy, destroyed several machine-gun
emplacements, but not a single prisoner rewarded them.
It appears that on the approach of the ships and with the
opening of the fire, the enemy simply retired and con-
went up and took command. He lecoived the D.S.O. See the
Dispatch, para. 105.

* Lieutenant-Commander Hilton Young writes {CornhUl Magazine,
Dec. 1918, p. C04 : ' Now, tlie Iris was going to try to land her
parties over tlie Vindiclive. But beside the Vindictive the Iris danced
in the swell like a cork, and it was some time before we could get
a hawser on board from her, or secure it when we had got it. At
last it was done, and the men in the Iris, watching their oppor-
tunity, began to jump into the Vindiclire, But meanwhile time
had fled. We seemed to have been alongside a few minutes only ;
we had been there an hour, and it was almost time to go.' See
the Dispatch, para. 63.

' The statement is incorrect.

58 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

tented themselves with bringing machine-guns to the
shore end of the Mole. And while they worked and
destroyed, the covering party below the parapet could see
in the harbour, by the light of the German star-shells,
the shapes of the block-ships stealing in and out of
their own smoke and making for the mouth of the
canal.

' Thetis came first, steaming into a tornado of shell from
the great batteries ashore. All her crew, save a remnant
who remained to steam her in and sink her, had already
been taken off her by the ubiquitous raotoi*-launches, but
the remnant spared hands enough to keep her four guns
going. It was hers to show the road to Intrepid and
Iphigenia, who followed. She cleared the string of armed
barges which defends the channel from the tip of the
Mole, but had the ill-fortune to foul one of her propellers
upon the net-defence which flanks it on the shore side.
The propeller gathered in the net and rendered her
practically unmanageable ; the shore batteries found her
and pounded her unremittingly ; she bumped into a bank,
edged off, and found herself in the channel again, still
some hundreds of yards from the mouth of the canal, in
a practically sinking condition. As she lay she signalled
invaluable directions to the others,^ and here Commander
R. S. Sneyd, D.S.O., accordingly blew the charges and
sank her.^ A motor-launch^ under Lieutenant H.

* Before going down Thetis signalled to lier consorts to pass to
starboard of her by firing a green rocket. Engineer Lieutenant-
Commander Ronald Charles Boddie restarted her starboard engine,
thereby enabling the ship to be turned into the fairway before she
sank. He received the D.S.O. See The Navy Eternal, p. 300, and
Sir Roger Keycs's Dispatch, para. 94.

^ Commander Raljih S. Sneyd, D.S.O., R.N., specially promoted
to Captain for services in action. .

3 No. 626.

ST. GEORGE'S DAY RAID 59

Littleton, R.N.V.R.,^ raced alongside and took off her
crew. Her losses were five killed and five wounded.

' Intrepid, smoking like a volcano and with all her guns
blazing, followed ; her motor-launch had failed to get
alongside outside the harbour, and she had men enough
for anything.^ Straight into the canal she steered, her
smoke blowing back from her into Iphigenias eyes, so
that the latter, blinded and going a little wild, rammed
a dredger with a barge moored beside it, which lay at the
western arm of the canal. She got clear, though, and
entered the canal, pushing the barge before her. It was
then that a shell hit the steam connexions of her whistle,
and the escape of steam which followed drove off some of
the smoke and let her see what she was doing.

' Lieutenant Stuart Bonham-Carter,' commanding the
Intrepid, placed the nose of his ship neatly on the mud of
the western bank,* ordered his crew away, and blew up
his ship by the switches in the chart-room. Four dull
Inimps was all that could be heard, and immediately
afterwards there arrived on deck the engineer, who had
been in the engine-room during the explosion,^ and
reported that all was as it should be.

'Lieutenant E. W. Billyard ■ Leake,*"' commanding

* Lieutenant Hugh Alexander Littleton, R.N.V.R., received the
D.S.O.

'^ See note 1, i5. 33, supra.

' Lieutenant Stuart Sumner Bonham-Carter, R.N., received the
D.S.O.

* i. e. on his starboard (right) side looking forward.

^ As the ship was making stem way Lieut. Bonham-Carter had
to blow the charges before the steaming party could get out of the
engine-room. Sec the Dispatch, para. 95.

* Lieutenant Edward Whaley Billyard-Leako, R.N., received
the D.S.O. Lieut. Ivan B. Franks, R.N., who had superintended
the early preparations of all the block-ships, and liad commanded
Iphigcnia on the occasion of the two almndoncd altenii>ts, was laid

60 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

Iphigenia, beached her according to arraiigemeut on the
eastern side, blew her up,^ saw her drop nicely across the
canal, and left her with her engines still going to hold her
in position till she should have bedded well down on the
bottom. According to latest reports from air observation,
the two old ships, with their holds full of concrete, are
lying across the canal in a V position ; and it is probable
that the work they set out to do has been accomplished,
and that the canal is effectively blocked.*

'A motor-launch under Lieutenant P. T. Dean,
R.N.V.R.,^ had followed them in to bring away the
crews, and waited further up the canal towards the mouth
against the western bank. Lieutenant Bonham-Carter,
having sent away his boats, was reduced to a Carley float,
an apparatus like an exaggerated life-buoy with a floor of
grating.^ Upon contact with the water it ignited a calcium
flare, and he was adrift in the uncanny illumination with
a German machine-gun a few hundred yards a"s\"ay giving

low by appendicitis two days before tlie actual attack. See the
Dispatch, para. 40.

^ At 12.45 a.m. Sir Roger Keyes in the London Gazette of July 23
commends Lieut. Billyard-Leake ' for placing his ship by calculated
manceuvring exactly where he wanted to place her to block
the canal '.

^ See the picture at p. 144.

^ Commanding Motor-launch 282. Lieutenant Percy Thompson
Dean received the V.C. 'for most conspicuous gallantry' on the
occasion. Each block-ship was followed ))y a M.L., carrying a crew
of eight to ten volunteers, to bring away survivors.

* Lieutenant Bonham-Carter with two of his officers and four
petty officers remained behind, after the rest of the crew had been
sent away, to see that the ship was sunk properly. The seven
embarked in a Carley float, paddled down the canal and across
the harbour, and were picked up by Lieutenant Dean in Motor-
launch 282. Of all Intrepid's company only one man, Stoker
P. Officer 11. L. Palli^ser, was killed. See the Dispatch, para. 95.
There were 180 officers and men in the throe block-ships.

ST. GEORGE'S DAY RAID 61

him its undivided altontion. What saved him was
possibly the fact that the defunct Intrepid was still
emitting huge clouds of smoke which it had been worth
nobody's while to turn off.^ He managed to catch a rope
as the motor-launch started, and was towed for a while
till he was observed and taken on board. Another officer
jumped ashore and ran along the bank to the launch.
A bullet from the machine-gun stung him as he ran, and
when he arrived, charging down the bank out of the dark,
he was received by a member of the launch's crew, who
attacked him with a hammer.

* The whole harbour was alive with small craft. As
the motor-launch cleared the canal and came forth to the
incessant geysers thrown up by the shells, rescuers and
rescued had a view of yet another phase of the attack.
The shore end of the Mole consists of a jetty, and here an
old submarine,^ commanded by Lieutenant R. D. Sandford,
R.N.,Moaded with explosives, was run into the piles and
touched off, her crew getting away in a boat to where the
usual launch awaited them. Officers describe the explosion
as the greatest they ever witnessed — a huge roaring
spout of flame that tore the jetty in half and left a gap of
over 100 ft. The claim of another launch to have sunk
a torpedo-boat alongside the jetty is supported l)y many
observers, including officers of the Vindictive, who had
seen her mast and funnel across the Mole and noticed
them disappear.^

' A photogr.nph taken by a Cierman airman (Ulusfrated Lomlm
Neu-s, Feb. 22, 1919) at 11 a.m. on April 23, 1918, shows Intrepid still
emitting clouds of smoke at tliat hour.

^ Subm.arine C 3. See accounts of her exploit infra, p. 78.

' Lieutenant Richard Dougl.ns Sandford, R.N. Received the V.C.
'for most con.spicuous gallantry' on the occasion.

* Probably a dredger sunk l)y North Star. C.M.B. 7 torpedoed
a destroj'er alongside the Mole. A German destroyer was sunk in

62 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

* Where every moment had its deed and every deed
its hero, a recital of acts of valour becomes a mere
catalogue. " The men were magnificent," say the
officers ; the men's opinion of their leaders expresses
itself in the manner in which they followed them, in
their cheers, in their demeanour to-day while they tidy
up their battered ships, setting aside the inevitable
souvenirs, from the bullet-torn ensigns to great chunks
of Zeebrugge Mole dragged down and still hanging in
the fenders of Vindictive.

* The motor-launch from the canal cleared the end of
the Mole and there beheld, trim and ready, the shape
of the WarivicJc,^ with the great silk flag presented to the
Admiral by the officers of his old ship Centurion. They
stood up on the crow^ded decks of the little craft and
cheered it again and again. ^ While WarwicJc took them
on board, they saw Vindictive, towed loose from the
Mole by Daffodil, turn and make for home — a great
black shape, with funnels gapped and leaning out of
the true, flying a vast streamer of flame as her stokers
worked her up — her, the almost wreck — to a final display
of seventeen knots. Her forward funnel was a sieve ;
her decks were a dazzle of sparks : but she brought back
intact the horseshoe nailed to it, which Sir Roger Keyes
had presented to her Commander.

'Meantime the destroyers North Star, PJioehe, and
WarwicJc, which guarded Vindictive from action by
enemy destroyers while she lay beside the Mole, had

the cliannel close to Intrepid anil Iphigenia by a heavj' bomb from an
aircraft some flays later.

* Vice-Admiral Keyes directed the operations from this destroyer.

- Warwick picked up four M.L.s. The one mentioned in the text
was No. 282 (Lt. P. T. Dean). It had on board 101 people from
Intrepid and Iphigenia. Tt was dangerously oveiloaded. See the
Dispatch, para. 111.

ST. GEORGE'S DAY RAID 63

their share in the battle.' North Star (Lieutenant-Com-
mander K. C. Helyar, R.N.),- losing her way in the
smoke, emerged to the light of the star-shells, and was
sunk.^ The German conmmniqii 6,* which, states that only
a few members of the crew could be saved by them, is
in this detail of an unusual accuracy ; for the Phoehe
(Lieutenant-Commander H. E, Gore-Langton, R.N.^) came
up under a heavy fire in time to rescue nearly all.
Throughout the operation monitors and the siege guns
in Flanders, manned by the Royal Marine Artillery,
heavily bombarded the enemy's batteries.

The Attack on Ostend.^
* The wind that blew back the smoke-screen at Zee-
brugge served us even worse at Ostend, where that and
nothing else ' prevented the success of an operation ably

^ See the Dispatch, para. 111-13.

' Lieut. -Commander Kenneth Cai'y Helyar, R.N., received the
D.S.O.

' 'When we ran into the harbour,' says a member of her crew
(Baihj Mail, April 2.5), 'we ran out of darkness into light brighter
than daylight. They got searchlights all focussod on us and at
point-blank range thoy poured stuff into us and all over us from
guns big and little. Our port side was riddled from end to end,
our aft funnel went, our wireless room was put out of action, and
then they smashed our bow.' From Sir Roger Keyes's Dispatch,
para. 112, it appears that while Wanvick was engaged as in note 2,
p. 62, North Star lost her bearings and emerged from the smoke-
screen to the S. E. of the lighthouse on the Mole. She fired all her
torpedoes at vessels alongside the Mole, but was sunk by heavy fire
at point-blank range, presumably by the 8-in. battery east of the
Canal entrance.

■* Infra, p. 79.

'' Lieut. -Commander Hubert E. Gore-Langton, R.N., specially
promoted to Commander for services in the action.

* See Commodore Lynes's Report, infra, p. 172, and the Dispatch,
para. 98 ff.

^ This is not accurate. The displ.ncing of the Stroom Bank buoy
was the major cause of failure.

64 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

directed by Commodore Hubert Lynes, C.M.G,^ The
coastal motor-boats had lit the approaches and the ends
of the piers with calcium flares, and made a smoke cloud
which effectually hid the fact from the enemy. Sirius
and Brilliant^ were already past the Stroom Bank buoy '
when the wind changed, revealing the arrangements to
the enemy, who extinguished the flares with gunfire.*
' Sirius was already in a sinking condition,' when at

> Commanding tlie naval light forces at Dunkirk; received tlio
C.B. for services in the action.

' Sirius (Lieut.-Commander H. N. M. Hardy, P.N.) and Brilliant
(Commander A.. E. Godsal, R.X.) were sister ships, light cruisers of
the Apollo type, disphicing 3,600 tons each, launched in 1890 and
1891 respectively, with an armament of two G-inch and lesser guns.

' The Stroom Bank huoy marked the channel to the harbour
entrance. It had been moved some 2,400 yards east of its
customary position immediately before the attack. See the Dis-
patch, para. 20.

* Another account {The Tiwies, April 27, 1918) says that Sirixts and
Brilliant were about two miles from their objective when the
German searchlights picked them up. The ships at once came
under extremely heavy fire, which included a missile known as
'flaming onions', a small incendiary shell fastened together in
chains by wire which, on finding its target, winds round it and
creates a fire. Commodore Lynes's Report (para. 11 f.) confirms
this. From the Report it appears that the wind shifted about
11.50 p.m. and that the block-ships entered the smoke abreast the
buoy .ibout 12. The Dispatch, para. 26, gives 12.15 as the moment
of the change of wind. The block-ships sank at 12.30 a.m.

° The account quoted in the preceding note says that the com-
mander of Sirius, whose ship was sinking as the result of gunfire,
tried to warn the engine-room of his intention to blow the bottom
out of her. He was foiled in his purpose owing to the means of
communication having been destroyed. The rush of water into
the engine-room was the first indication to the staff there that the
demolition charge had been fired. After leaving Sirixis an officer
and a number of men were found to be missing. A C.II.B. com-
manded by Acting Sub-Lieutenant Peter Bootli Clarke, R.N.R,,
with Lieutenant-Commander Henry N. jM. Hardy (of Sirius), R.N.,
and Lieutenant Edward Lyon Bertlion, D.S.C.. returned and

ST. GEORGE'S DAY RAID 65

length the two ships, having failed to find the entrance,
grounded and were forced, therefore, to sink themselves
at a point about 400 yards east of the piers,' and their
crews were taken off by motor-launches under Lieutenant
K, R. Iloare, R.N.V.R.," and Lieutenant R. Bourke,
R.N.V.R.'

' The motor-launches here at Ostend were under the
command of Commander Hamilton Benn, R.N.V.R.,
D.S.O,, M. P.,* while those at Zeebrugge were commanded
by Captain R. Collins, R.N. (the Vice- Admiral's Flag
Captain).'' All the coastal motor-boats were commanded
by Lieutenant A. P. Welman, D.S.C., R.N.' The
torpedo-boat destroyer flotilla was commanded by Captain
Wilfred Tomkinson, R.N."

'The difficulty of the operation is to be gauged from
the fact that from Zeebrugge to Ostend the enemy
lotteries number not less than 120 heavy guns, which
can concentrate on retiring ships, during daylight, up

boarded the ship. The missing men were subsequently picked up
thirteen miles out to sea. Lieutenant Berthon received a bar to
the D.S.C. Sub-Lieutenant Clarke received the D.S.C. Lieutenant-
Commander Hardy was promoted to Commander, See The Navij
Eternal, p. 304, and Lotidon Gazette of July 23, 1918.

' This is not correct. The exact position was 2,400 yards east of
the eastern pier. See the Dispatch, p. 173.

2 M.L. 283. Lt.-Commander Keith Robin Hoarc,D.S.C.,R.N.V.R.,
received the D.S.O. ; he rescued nearly all (see note 5, p. 64) the
crew of Sirius and sixteen of the crew of BriUiant.

^ M.L. 276, Lieutenant Roland Bourke, R.N.V.R., received the
D.S.O. ; he rescued thirty-seven ofScers and men from Brillhmt.

* Commander Ion H. Benn, D.S.O., M.P., R.N.V.R., specially
promoted to Temporary Acting Captain ; was in Motor-launch 582
in one of the most insliore berths.

* Captain Ralph Collins, R.N., received the C.B.

* Lieutenant Arthur Eric Polo Welman, D.S.C, R.N., received
the D.S.O.

T Received the C.B.

2173 K

66 OSTEND AND ZEEBEUGGE

to a distance of about sixteen miles.' This imposes as
a condition of success that the operation must be carried
out at night, and not late in the night. It must take
place at high water, with the wind from the right quarter,
and with a calm sea for the small ciaft. The operation
cannot be rehearsed l^eforeliand, since the essf^nce of it
is secrecy, and though one might have to wait a long
time to realize all the essential conditions of wind and
weather, secrecy wears badly when large numbers of
men are brought together in readiness for the attack.'

1 This appears to be an under-btatement. See the Dispatch,
para. 4.

ST. GEORGE'S DAY RAID 07

(c) Hie Sfonning of Zcehrugge Mole}

As has been pointed out already, the attack on Zee-
brugge Mole was ancillary to the blocking of Bruges
Canal, the main operation, and indeed could not be justi-
fied apart from it. There was nothing on the Mole of
military importance to sanction the heavy expenditure
of human life its capture would entail. But the Mole's
defences had it in their power to impeach or to hamper
the passage of the block-ships ; it was therefore imperative
that they should be put out of action before the block-
ships arrived. Tlie scheme of attack projected two
almost simultaneous operations — an assault upon the
Mole's batteries, particularly the three 5-9's at its sea-
end, by landing parties from Vindictive and the Liverpool
feiTy-boats ; and the destruction of the iron viaduct in
order to close the Mole against reinforcements. The latter
operation was entirely successful. The former, while it
failed to destroy the seaward batteries, which opened fire
again as Vindictive and her escort withdrew, or to do as
much damage as had been intended, was effective in
causing a diversion during the critical period of the block-
ships' passage.

Zeebrugge Mole is a mile and a half long. The leading
block-ship, Thetis, was timed to pass the lighthouse
twenty-five minutes after Vindictive got alongside.^ The
interval was brief, and the operations on the Mole neces«
sarily were restricted to the critical positions which

* Sec pliiii at p. 110, and a detailed narrative of tho operation iii
tho Diypatcdf, para. G7 ft".

^ Dispatch of May 9, para. 71.

E 2

CS OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

menaced the block-ships* course towards the Canal piers.
The most formidable of them was a battery of three
5-9-inch guns^ at the sea-end of the Mole proper, and the
lighter guns on the Mole extension, three of which, after
the evacuation, were found to he of 4-1-incli calibre.^
The intention was to land storming parties on the toj) of
the 5-9 battery, and to silence it and the guns on the
extension before the block-ships arrived/ The operation
was entrusted to three companies of bluejackets, under
Lieutenant-Commander Arthur L. Harrison of Lion.* Cap-
tain Henry C. Halahan was in supreme command.

The second point selected for assault was a fortified
zone on the Mole about 150 yards landward of the 5-9
battery, lying to the right of the berth Tmclictire was
intended to take. Its tactical position was of great
importance, since it commanded the point at which
VindictiL-e was planned to berth, and its guns could bear
upon her landing j^arties as they droj^ped down upon the
Mole. Its capture was entrusted to the Fourth Royal
Marine Battalion, organized as four companies, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Bertram N. Elliot," and drawn from
the four divisional head-quarters and the Grand Fleet.
It was equipped with four Stokes guns, one 11 -inch
howitzer, five pom-poms, and Lewis guns. All the crews
had been specially trained, and the howitzer crews had
been put through a course at Shoeburyness.® Having
canied the fortified zone, the Marines were instructed to
proceed along the Mole towards the shore and cover the
operations at the sea-end against enemy troops advancing
across the Viaduct. The latter's coincident destruction
by submarine attack was intended to assist this result.'

* Dispatch of May 9, para. 5G, 73. ^ Ibid., para. 71, note.

» Ibid., para. 71. * Ibid., para. 68, 76.

0 Ibid., para. 67,68. ^ ibid., para. 77. '' Ibid., para. 78.

ST. GEORGE'S DAY RAID 69

The storming parties, having silenced the enemy's
guns, were to be followed by an independent ' demolition
force ', whose object was to do as much damage as
possible to the structures on the Mole during the transit
of the block-ships to the Canal. The party was composed
of a company of bluejackets, under Lieutenant Cecil C.
Dickinson of Resolution.^ Twenty-two rank-and-file of
the R.M.L.I. were attached for the transport of the
explosive equipment. ^

In view of the short time available for the operation,
and of the circumstances of darkness and confusion under
which it would be carried out, those engaged upon it had
I'eceived specialized training on a replica of the Mole,
described to the men, with intentional inaccuracy, as
' a position in France '. To ensure success it was impera-
tive that the topography made familiar to its assailants
on the model should be encountered on the Mole itself ;
in other words, that the storming parties should land at
the point where their assaults were to be delivered. Con-
sequently the plan was thrown out of gear by Vindlctire,
who, owing to the difficulty of recognizing objects on the
Mole, overran her assigned station and berthed about
400 yards nearer the shore than had been intended. It
resulted that the storming parties were committed to
their programme on a strange terrain, distant from the
objectives for which their rehearsals had prepared them.'

The outer concrete wall of the Mole, as Vindictive
Ijerthed beside it, rose from the sea to a height of thirty
feet. Along its inner side, four feet below the top, runs
a lodge or parapet eight feet wide, bounded by an iron
railing.* The surface of the Mole, over ninety feet wide,

» Recoiv.d the D.S.O.

^ Tho Dispatch, para. 69, 82. » lli-L, para. 70, 71.

* Tho parapet cau bo seen in the pii;turo at p. ^2.

70 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

lies fifteen feet below it. To facilitate landing on this
formidable structure Vindictive was provided with a false
deck on the port or landing side, and eighteen landing
brows or gangways to bridge the space between the false
deck and the parapet. Of this number only four remained
serviceable, partly owing to severe enemy gun-fire, partly
to the sawing of the brows on the parapet as the vessel
rocked in the svrell. The small Iris II was equipped
with scaling ladders. She and Daffodil had been
selected on account of their carrying capacity (1,500) and
shallow draft to act as Vindictive's auxiliaries.' Daffodil
carried two of the three parties of the demolition force, '^
which was not required on the Mole until the storming
parties had prepared for it. Iris II cari'ied the Chatham
Company of the storming Marines^ and D Company of
the Naval storming party.'' Both vessels landed their
complements over Yiudidicc, whose initial ori-or involved
their forces in the resulting confusion. Iris's diiliculties,
already narrated, also weakened both the storming and
demolition operations on the Mole. The rest of the
forces were carried by Vindictive, and suffered much from
enemy gun-fire Avhile waiting to land. 'Perfect order
prevailed,' an officer wriUs:'^ 'The men were lined up
on deck. They fell here, there, and almost everywhere.
But the instructions were that those unwounded should
remain in their positions, and not one moved.'

The first to land were tlie A and B Companies of
the Naval storming party, under Lieutenant-Commander
Bryan F. Adams'"' and Lieutenant G. B. T. Chamberlain'
rtspectiveh*. They proceeded a short distance along the

1 Dibi.alch of May 9, paia. oi. = jf,;^/., j^ai-a. C'J.

' Ihiih, para. 77. * IbuL, jiara. 78.
» Baibj Mail, April 25, 1918.

'' rromoted lo Comiiiauder. '' Killed uii board.

ST. GEORGE'S DAY RAID 71

parapet towards the sea-end of the Mole until they
reached a look-out or control station having a range-
finder behind and above it. Between it and the 5-9-inch
battery, the Naval storming party's objective, a machine-
gun was very active about 100 yards nearer. Lieutenant-
Commander Adams advanced his men to a point along
the parapet forty yards east of the look-out. Here his
party was protected from the machine-gun, but was
exposed to the fire of the two destroyers alongside the
Mole, which now began to be active. A sortie in the
direction of the machine-gun cost Lieutenant-Commander
Harrison his life. The situation, in fact, was beyond the
powers of a depleted force to cope with. A summons to
the Marines farther westward was answered. But before
their help could become effective the recall was sounded,
and the storming parties fell back on Vindictive. Their
ill-success was due to the cause already stated. But
though they failed to captu^ the 5-9 batter}^, it is probable
that their fire kept it out of action, for the block-ships
passed unscathed by it.'

The Marine storming party's intended objective was
the fortified zone which had defeated the Naval party's
endeavour to reach the Mole-end batterj'. But as Vindictive
l)erthed to landward of this zone, and as their strength
was reduced by Iris's inability to land her detachment,
the Marines turned at once to the secondary duty assigned
to them — the establishment of a strong point to prevent
enemy reinforcements pushing up to interfere with the
work in progress at the sea-end of the Mole. They were
in fact faced with a dilemma. To have attacked the
fortified zone first might haA'e given, tlie enemy an opening
to seize positions abreast Vindictive and exploit them
with disastrous consequences. On the other hand, unless
' Tho Dispatch, p.irn. 72-G. Soo plan, p. 110.

72 OSTEND AND ZEEBEUGGE

the fortified zone was reduced, the 5-9-inch battery at the
Mole-end could not be prevented from obstructing the
block-ships.

The first platoon to land passed along the parapet to
the right, taking a direction opposite to that followed by
the Naval storming party. Having silenced a body of
snipers firing at the landing parties from near No. 2 Shed,
the platoon reached a position some 200 yards west of
Vindictive. Two more platoons followed and, descending
to the surface of the Mole by means of rope ladders,
established a strong point at the westward (shoreward)
end of No. 3 Shed. Units now landed rapidly. Heavy
scaling ladders were got into position, and reinforcements
poured down upon the surface of the Mole to reinforce
the point established near No. 3 SheJ. Having secured
its secondary object, the Marine force was free to dis-
patch reinforcements to the Naval storming party which
had been brought to a standstill farther east. In con-
junction with it an attack was launched upon the fortified
zone. The Marines advanced as far as the look-out
station. But neither they nor the Naval storming party,
some forty or fifty yards east of them, were able to make
headway along the exposed parapet. The general recall
interrupted the attack. The attacking force fell back
in good order, the sections to the west suffering from
enemy fire as they climbed to the parapet by the scaling
ladders.^

Owing to the conditions under which the storming
parties Avorked, the demolition force's programme could
not be carried out. The storming bluejackets and
Marines were in such close proximity that the demolition
party, for Avhom they had been preparing, was unable to
destroy structures without endangering its own side. It
1 The Dispatch, para. 77-81.

ST. GEORGE'S DAY RAID 73

was oil sliuio for fifty-five minutes, but was only able to
place charges for the destruction of No. 3 Shed in case its
demolition might become practicable. An attempt to
place a charge alongside the destroyers was repulsed by
their fire ; but bombs were thrown on board.'

It is not surprising that the actors' accounts of
a croAvded and bewildering hour do little justice to its
incidents and are blemished by exaggerations. After
collating their statements with the Dispatch, it is neces-
sary to discard as misleading those published in the
public press on the morrow of the event.

While the storming and demolition parties were at
work under baffling conditions, Sir Roger Keyes's plans
were being executed with triumphant completeness at
the landward end of the Mole. The object here w^as to
prevent reinforcements passing on to the Mole across the
Viaduct while the storming parties seaward were in
action. The agents employed were a couple of old C class
submarines — C 1 and C 3 — built in 1906 and 1907 and
displacing 316 tons. It was calculated that the boats,
driven at a speed of six knots against the Viaduct con-
necting the Mole and the shore, would penetrate the light
bracing of the })iers up to their conning towers, a calcula-
tion exactlj' confirmed by the event. To enable the sub-
marines to be abandoned at a distance and continue their
course automatically, each was fitted with gyro-control,
which C3's commander, Lieutenant Richard D. Sandford,
disdained to use, preferring to remain on board and make
sure the accomplishment of his duty. Each submarine
carried two motor-skiifs and a light scaling ladder as
a means of escai)e to the Viaduct if other equipment
failed. A picket boat, commanded by Lieutenant-Com-
mander Francis H. Sandford, was in attendance to rescue
^ The Di~.i)atcli, i^ara. 82— t.

74 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

the crews if they abandoned the submarines in their
motor-skiffs.

The two submarines and picket-boat approached the
Mole in tow of destroyers. Owing to the parting of
the tow, however, C 1 vras delayed and did not reach the
vicinity of the Viaduct until its destruction had been
accomplished by C 3. The latter, at about a mile and
a half's distance, was lit up by star-shell and became the
object of a brief cannonade. At about half a mile's
distance searchlights were switched on to her and were
turned off again, possibly in hope that the submarine
would run into the Viaduct and become a prize. At
100 yards distance course was altered io ensure striking
the Viaduct end on. C3 struck exactly between two of
the lines of piers, raised her hull bodily about two feet
on to the horizontal girders, and penetrated up to the
conning tower. The crew lowered the motor-skiff, whose
damaged propeller compelled them to use oars. The
fuses on C3 were ignited, and the skiff set off, making
slow progress against the current, and under heavy fire.
She was holed several times and was kept afloat only by
means of a special pump. At 12.20 a.m., when the skiff
was 200 or 300 yards distant, C 3 exploded, and a portion of
the Viaduct was shattered to atoms. The picket-boat was
sighted, and picked up the skiff's crew. Eventually P/joc6e
took them on board.'

An officer of one of the C.M.B.s gives an account
of the event : "^

' The submarine [C 3] which got into position and blew
up the Mole went to it from the outer side. The Huns
seem to have thought that she liad lost her way in the
dark and that her real intention was to have gone inside

' Seo tho Dispatch of May 9, para. 86-91.

■•' Vail J Mail, April 25, lOlS.

ST. GEORGE'S DAY EAID 75

the Mole in order to torpedo something. Apparently they
said to themselves, " She has missed her way. Now we'll
entico her in and get her."

' So they sent up star-shells in such numbers that
it made the darkness just like daylight. In this way
they assisted her very greatly by showing her the way to
her goal. She could see them on the bridge' which led
from the Mole to the shore.- Apparently they thought
that they were going to trap our submarines^ and were
overjoyed at the prospect. But that was really the point
she was making for.

* They pushed the submarine under this bridge and
blew her up.^ As she was loaded with explosives you
can imagine what damage she did when all this cargo

1 /. c. the Viaduct,

- ' I must tell you a curious feature of this aflair. As ho [Saudford]
approached the Mole thoy got the searchliglits on to him and began
liring at him. Tliat was a nasty position, because she [C 3] was
stuffed full of explosives, and also had a big quantity of petrol on
board. But when they saw him still coming on, and dashing
straight at the Mole, they stopped firing and simply gaped, I
suppose they thought he was mad. Anyway, there they stood,
staring at Sandford in his submarine. Then, presently, came the
explosion, and bang wont the whole lot to glory!' — Statement by
Captain Carpenter in Keble Howard's Tlie Glory of Zecbnigge, p. 22.

" >Soe stipra, p. 74,

* Lieutenant Sandford, C 3's commander, states in a brief message
{Daily Mail, April 25) : 'There was no doubt about getting there,
I set the fuse myself and I think the thing was done all right.
Wo were lucky in being picked up by the picket-boat afterwards.
The firing from the shore was a bit severe at 200 yards, and only
the fact that the sea was a bit rough and we were up and down
a good deal saved us. The crew did their duty, every man. They
were all volunteers and picked men. We got in without difBculty
and were not found by the searchlights until we were getting
away,' The crew of six consisted of Lieutenant Sandford, R.N,,
Lieutenant J. llowell-Price, R.N,R., Coxswain W. Harnor, Engine-
room Artificer A. G. Roxburgh, Leading Seaman W. O. Cloavor,
and Stoker IL C, Bindall.

76 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

went off. It blew the bridge and all the Huns standing
on it right up into the air.

' By the blowing up of the bridge the Mole was isolated,
and it was upon this island of a place that the Vindictive
men landed and their fight with the Huns took place.
And it ^Yas a rare fight too. Every one of our fellows
who took part in it deserved a V.C

Stoker Bindall/ of Submarine C 3, gives the following
account : -

'Lieutenant Sandford commanded, with Lieutenant
Price as second in command, and with her engines
running smoothly the submarine glided into the shoal
waters of Zeebrugge at midnight, the whole crew of
six being on deck. The Mole, looming up black in
the darkness, and the Viaduct joining it to the shore
were clearly seen.

' It was a silent and nervy business. She was going
at full tilt^ when we hit the Viaduct. It was a good
jolt, but you can stand a lot when you hang on tight.
We ran right into the middle of the Viaduct and stuck
there as intended. I do not think anybody said a Avord
except " We're here all right".

* We lowered the skiff and stood by while the com-
mander touched off the fuse. Then we tumbled into
the skiff and pushed off. We had rather a bit of bad
luck. The propeller fouled the exhaust-pipe and left us
with only a couple of oars and two minutes to get away.

* The lights were now on us and the machine-guns
going from the shore. Before we had made 200 yards
the submarine went up. We had no doubt about that.

' Stoker Ist CI. Henry Ciillis Bimliill, i-cceivcd the Conspicuous
(jiallautry Medal.

2 Daily Mail, April 25, 1918.

3 At 91 knots. Her surface speed was 14 knots.

ST. GEORGE'S DAY RAID 77

There was a tremendous flash, bang, crash, and lots of
concrete from the Mole fell all round us into the water.
It was lucky we wore not struck. Coxswain Harner and
I took the oars first, till I was knocked out. Then
Cleaver^ grabbed the oar and carried on till the cox-
swain^ was hit. I was hit again, and Lieutenant Price,^
lifting me and Harner into the bows, took the oar, and
was afterwards relieved by Roxburgh * when Lieutenant
Sandford was hit. In the nick of time a picket-boat
found the skiff.^ We gave a shout of joy when we
saw her. She took us on board and transferred us to
another ship.' "

The demolition of the Viaduct at 12.20 a.m. and the
successful passage of the block-ships towards the Canal
accomplished the purpose for which the attack upon the
Mole had been organized. The programme time for
retirement had not yet been reached. But Vindictive was
only held to the Mole by Daffodil, and any accident to
the latter would place the storming and demolition j)arties
in grave jeopardy. Vindictive' s guns bearing on the Mole
had been put out of action, and she herself was the target
of the enemy's shore batteries. In these circumstances
Captain Carpenter anticipated the Vice-Admiral's instruc-

* Leading Seaman William Gladstone Cleaver, received the Con-
spicuous Gallantry Medal.

^ PettyOfficcr Walter Harner, received the Conspicuous Gallantry
Medal.

^ Lieutenant John Howell-Price, D.S.C., R.N.R., received the
D.S.O.

* Engine-room Artificer Allan Gordon Roxburgh, received the
Conspicuous Gallantry Medal.

'•" The picket-boat was commanded by Lieutenant-Commander
Francis H. Sandford, D.S.O., who undertook to save his brother .ind
crew. He was promoted to Commander.

* H.M.S. Phoebe, which, with Sir Roger Keyes in Warwick and
North Star, had been close inshore by the Mole during the operation.

78 OSTEND AND ZEEBEUGGE

tions and resolved to cast-off. At 12.50 a.m. DaJJodiVs
siren — Yindictke's having been destroyed — signalled the
Mole parties to return. At 1.5 a.m. it was reported that
officers and men had ceased coming on board. At 1. 10 a.m.
Daffodil began to tow Vindicfive's bow from the Mole.
At 1.15 a.m. she was clear and got off without damage
from the sea-end batteries, whose crews returned to their
guns upon the retirement of the landing parties and
inflicted heavy casualties upon Iris II as she left the
Mole. She did not reach Dover until 2.45 p.m.

Vindictive, in her heroic di.sarray, had arrived six hours
earlier.^ Sir Eoger Keyes already had marked her to
remedy the only serious failure in the operations of
St. George's Day. For long Ostend had been of little
value to the enemy, and of no value as a base. Under
stress of continual bombardment he had transferred plant
and docks— except one — to Bruges, and had organized
the latter as an exceedingly well-equipped base. The
failure of Sirius and Brill iant on April 23 left Bruges still
available for the purposes to which the enemy had
adapted it. To deny him these facilities, and to prevent
his numerous craft blocked at Bruges from escaping to
sea, the sealing of Ostend Harbour was essential. On
May 10 Sir Roger Keyes delivered a second stroke to
achieve it.

^ Seo the Dispatch, para. 103-5.

ST. GEORGE'S DAY RAID 79

{d) The German Admiralty's Account.

Issued by the 'Chief of the Admiralty Stuff of the
Navy' from Berlin on April 2i, the German version
of St. George's Day Raid is, as The Times of the following
day described it, 'a fine example in the camouflage of
disagreeable news ' :

* During the night of April 22-3 an enterprise of the
British naval forces against our Flanders bases, conceived
on a large scale and planned regardless of sacrifice, was
frustrated.

'After a violent bombardment from the sea, small
cruisers, escorted by numerous destroyers and motor-
boats, under cover of a thick veil of artificial fog, pushed
forward near Ostend and Zeebrugge to quite near the
coast, with the intention of destroying the locks and
harbour works there. According to the statements of
prisoners, a detachment of four Companies of the Royal
Marines was to occupy the Mole of Zeebrugge by a coup
de main, in order to destroy all the structures, guns,
and war material on it and the vessels lying in the
harbour. Only about forty of them got on the Mole.
These fell into our hands, some alive, some dead. On
the narrow high wall of the Mole both parties fought
with the utmost fierceness.

' Of the English naval forces which participated in the
attack the small cruisers Virginia [sic\, Intrepid, Sirius
and two others of similar construction, whose names
are unknqwn,* were sunk close off the coast. Moreover,
three torpedo-boat destroyers and a considerable number

» H.M.S. Thetis and Brilliant.

so OSTEND AND ZEEBEUGOE

of torpedo motor-l)oats were sunk by our artillery fire.*
Only a few men of the crews coukl be saved by us.'^

' Beyond damage caused to the Mole by a torpedo [sic]
hit, our harbour-works and coast batteries are quite
undamaged. Of our naval forces only one torpedo-boat
suffered damage of the lightest character.^ Our casualties
are small.'

^ British losses, other tlian the block-ships and submarine, were
one destroyer {Xorlh Star) sunk by gunfire off the Mole, and two
motor-launches (Nos. 110, 42i). No other vessels were rendered
unfit for furtlier sen'ico.

2 See the Press Bureau account supra, p. 63.

^ One of the two destroyers alongside the Mole was torpedoed
by C.M.B. 7. Another, escaping from the liarbour, was hit by
C.M.B. 5.

Ill

THE OSTEND EAID, MAY 10, 1918

On April 26 the Lords of the Admiralty issued an
Order to the Fleet : ' Their Lordships desire to ex-
press to all ranks and ratings concerned in the recent
gallant and successful enterprise on the Belgian coast
their high admiration of the perfect co-operation dis-
played and of tlie single-minded determination of all
to achieve their object. The disciplined dai'ing and
singular contempt of death places this exploit high in
the annals of the Koyal Navy and Eoyal Marines, and
will be a proud memory of the relatives of those who
fell.' ' Admiral Fournier, sometime Minister of the French
Marine, generously praised the attack on Zeebrugge as
' the finest feat of arms in the naval history of all times
and all countries'.^ 'The whole undertaking ', declared
tlie Dutch Xcw Courant of April 24, 'shows that the
British Navy in nowise lacks dare-devil pluck.'

In some quarters, e. g. the New Yorh Times of
April 24, the event was greeted as 'a welcome de-
parture inaugurating a more aggressive naval policy'.
Ill-informed criticism complained that the operation
ought to have been undertaken long ago, and that the
Admiralty in the past had been remiss in not attempting
it. The indictment indicates neglect to correlate the

' The casualties were : killed, 176; wounded, 412 ; missing, 49,
of whom 35 are believed to have been killed. Total = 637.
" The Times, May 13, 191S.

2173 F

82 OSTENB AND ZEEBRUGGE

naval and military situations.' The Allies had looked
forward to the campaign of 1917 to gain a decision on the
Western front which should yield them possession of the
Belgian coast. But the Russian collapse compelled the
plans of 1917 to be completely redrafted. The prospect
of an early recoveiy of the Flemish coast receded, and
the Navy, once more denied the co-operation of the Army,
addressed itself to render useless to the enemy ports from
which there was no immediate hope of his removal. The
changed military situation and not solely the substitution
of active for lethargic control at the Admiralty dictated
the attacks on Ostend and Zeebrugge.''

The results achieved by the operations on April 23
proved to be more considerable than had been at first
supposed. On May 9, the eve of their repetition, aerial
observation established that not only was the Bruges-
Zeebrugge Ship Canal blocked, but that even the lighter
craft in Bruges Docks were unable to find an exit through
the smaller waterways to Ostend Harbour. After April 23
at least twenty-three torpedo craft remained sealed up
at Bruges. Not less than twelve submarines were
imprisoned there also. At Zeebrugge no effective steps
had been taken to clear the obstructing block-ships from
the canal.' Even in normal conditions constant dredging
is needed to cope with the silt and preserve the artificial
harbour against the operations of Nature which have
built up the Flemish coast. But the three sunken
cruisers, displacing more than 10,000 tons of water, not
only impeded the process of dredging, but assisted the
unceasing assault of Nature on man's handiwork. Their

1 See an article by Lieut-Colonel Repington in the Morning Post,
April 27, 1918, and cf. Pollen, TJie Navy in Battle (1919), p. 367.

2 See Lord Jellicoe, The Grand Fleet, 1914-191G, p. 155.

^ See the Dispatch of May 9, General Summary, para. 12.

THE OSTEND RAID 83

removal by explosive force was forbitlilen out of regard
for the surrounding structure, and the unremitting vigil-
ance of aircraft impeached the enemy from attempting
to shift their position. Until Germany's evacuation of
the Belgian const in the following autumn, the three
vessels remained where their heroic crews left them. A
photograph, taken at low tide from the base of the wharf
on the west side of the canal, pu]>lished by the Admiralty
on September 19,' proves the fact conclusively and estab-
lishes the success of the operations on St. George's Day
so far as the sealing of Zeebrugge is concerned.

The craft shut up at Bruges presumably were able to
reach the sea by the alternative exit at Ostend. And
the port, owing to the failure of Sirhis and Brilliant on
April 23, was still used by incoming enemy toi-pedo craft
and submarines. The former, moreover, were reinforced
l)y destroyers from the Bight, brought down to the
Flanders coast to replace those in Bruges.^ Hence, when
he learnt, on April 23, that the attempt to block Ostend
had not succeeded, Sir Roger Keyes rej^resented to the
Admiralty the desirability of repeating the operation at
once. The quicker the delivery of the new attack, the
greater the element of surprise and consequent prob-
ability of success. Vindictive, the only vessel available
as a block-ship, was forthwith devoted to that service.
About four days still remained during which the coinci-
dence of high tide and darkness at Ostend permitted the
operation to be undertaken. Within that period Vindictive
was completed at Dover. Her after magazines and upper
bunkers on both sides were filled with 200 tons of wet

* It is reproduced at p. 144. The Germans are reported to have
endeavoured to dig the cliannel deeper, with a view to the obstruc-
tions becoming farther embedded.

' Dispatch of June 15, para. 6, 7.
i-2

84 OSTEND AND ZEERRUGGE

cement, the maximum weight she could carry in view
of the depth of water in the approaches to Ostend
Harbour. The oflficers of Sirius and Brilliant begged to
be employed. As Commander A. E. Godsal of Brilliant
had led the attempt on April 23. he and his officers were
chosen. Vindicfivc's old engine-room staff — Engineer
Lt.-Commander William A. Bury and four artificers —
pleaded their intimate knowledge of the cruiser's engines,
and also were accepted on her last commission. Lieutenant
Sir John Alleyne, who had been employed in refitting
her navigational arrangements, was selected to navigate
her. Her crew were volunteers from vessels of the
Dover Patrol.^

Vindictive was in all respects ready for sea by the
desired date. But a spell of bad weather set in. Strong
northerly gales raised roug-h seas, in which the small
motor craft could not operate. The attack consequently"
was postponed until the necessary conjunction of high
tide and darkness recurred, a period which opened on the
night of May 9-10. The delay made it possible to prepare
a second block-ship, the obsolescent Sappho, a light cruiser
of the Siriiis and Brillinnt class," v.-hose failure she was
intended to make good. She was forthwith equipped at
Chatham. The officers of Sirius received the command,
and volunteers from the Chatham Koyal Naval Barracks
provided her crew.^

The enforced postponement permitted Commodore
Lynes, to whom Sir Roger Kej^es again entrusted the
general command, to perfect the arrangements for
ensuring the block-ships' certain access to their goal.

^ Sir Roger Keycs's Dispatch of June 15, para. 2, 3.
2 Completed in 1893; displacement 3,400 tons.
' Dispatch of June 15, para. 4, 5; Commodore Lynes's Report,
para. 9-11.

THE OSTEND KAID 85

Small, but important, improvements were introduced
into the smoke gear, and so many alternatives were pro-
vided for guiding the block-ships to the harbour entrance
that the chance of failure was re'duced to the smallest
dimensions. The preliminary staff-work also included
precise orders for laying the smoke-screen, with plans
calculated for every direction of the wind.^ It was
necessary to assume that the enemy, instructed by his
experience on April 23, wd\ild be on the alert to make
counter-prpparations against an exactly similar attack.
While following the original scheme in its general out-
line, therefore, the smoke gear was improved, and the
small craft were reorganized in accordance with new
and alternative plans of attack. In particular, it was
determined that there should be no pieliminary bombard-
ment by the monitors and Flanders batteries or by the
Ail- Force.'^

The eneni}', on his side, had made special preparations
in anticipation of a renewed attack.^ A considerable
number of his destroyers had been called down from the
Bight to reinforce the crippled Flanders force.* The
deep-draught route from Ostend to seaward had been
mined, a precaution which almost succeeded in sinking
Sir Roger Keyes and his flagship.'' Gaps had been cut
in the piers as a precaution against a landing,'^ and the
buoys had been removed. On the othei* hand, as on
April 23, the enemy's measures against surprise did not
include the use of patrol craft in the offing, though nine of
his destroyers were out on May 9.'

^ Press Bureau Narrative, infrciy p. 93.

* Commodore Lynes, para. 5-7, 18.

' Sir Roger Keyes's Dispatch of July 24, para. 2, 3.

* Dispatch of June 15, para. 7.

* Ihid., para. 15. * Press Bureau Narrative, ui/'a, p. 92.
^ Commodore Lyiies, pura. 12, 17.

86 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

The night of May 9-10 opened a new conjunction of
darkness and high tide, and invited the postponed attack.
By good fortune "weather conditions on the 9th were
promising, after days of rain, cloud, and mist which pre-
vented more than the scantiest air reconnaissance. On
the afternoon of the 9th, therefore, Sappho proceeded to
Dover, whence, at 6 p.m., in company with Vindictive
and their escorts, she steamed to Dunkirk. The cruisers
anchored there after dark. • Meanwhile, towards sunset,
an air reconnaissance revealed the fact that the Stroom
Bank buoy marking the channel into Ostend Harbour
had been removed. It was arranged to replace it by
a special calcic-phosphide light-buoy,* a device which
promised a satisfactory departure-point for the block-
ships and smoke-laying craft. As the afternoon advanced
the weather conditions continued to be propitious. The
wind, N. by "W., blew from the right direction to carry '
the fog-screen ahead of the block-ships ; the sea was
smooth for the small craft, the sky clear, barometer
steady, and atmosphere good for air observation and
navigation.^

At midnight the block-ships and the small craft — M.L.s
and C.M.B.s — with the Commodore in H.M.S. Faulknor
— set out towards Ostend. Midway between Ostend and
Zeebrugge a division of destroyers — H.M.S. Warwicli
flying Sir Roger Keyes's flag. Whirlwind, Velox, and
Trident — cruised in order to prevent interference from
Zeebrugge by the enemy destroyer force I'ecently arrived
from the Bight.' Monitors took their stations out at sea
ready to open fire at a signal. Squadrons of the R.A.F.

' The buoy was laid by II. M.S. Faulknor, flying the Commodore's
broad pennant. Sco Press Bureau Narrative, infra, p. 92.
* Commodore Lynes, para. 11, 12, 18.
' Dispatch of June 16, para. 9.

THE OSTEND RAID 87

attached to the Dover Patrol were detailed to bomb the
port from the air, and the heavy batteries of the Eoyal
Marine Artillery in Flanders were ready to co-operate.

At the outset an ill-tinied accident threatened a further
postponement. Hardly had the block -ships left Dunkirk
Roads when Siq)pho's speed was reduced to about six knots
by the blowing out of a man-hole joint in the side of her
boiler. Her participation in the operation was out of the
question. The reduction in the blocking material was
serious. Commodore Lynes, however, decided to pro-
ceed with Vindictive alone, ^ and the event justified his
decision.

By 1.30 a.m. (May 10) preliminary dispositions were
completed, and the C.M.B.s and M.L.s steamed inshore
towards Ostend to carry out their several duties. No
patrol craft were encountered, and occasional star-shells
and * flaming onions ' alone indicated the enemy's alertness
against surprise. At 1.35 a.m. a searchlight peei-ed out
to sea, where the C.M.B.s were already running their
smoke-screens. At 1.43 a.m., seventeen minutes before
Vindictive was due at the harbour mouth, the Commodore
signalled ' open fire '. Simultaneously a storm of bombs
and shells from monitors, land batteries, and air-planes
burst upon the enemy, while a couple of C.M.B.s raced
forward and torpedoed the piers. Five minutes later
(1.50 a.m.) the sky suddenly became overcast. A thick
sea-fog settled down over the harbour's approaches, and
for a critical hour the ships engaged in the operation
kept in touch by sound alone. Tlie fog, happily, was
local. It neither reached the monitors to the westward
nor prevented the airmen from continuing their attacks
above it.^

' Conunodoro Lynes, para. 11, 15.
^ Commodore Lynes, pani. 17-21.

88 08TEND AND ZEEBKUGGE

Meanwhile, a heavy and continuous barrage-fire across
the entrance to Ostend Harbour showed that the enemy
aheady realized the nature of the attack. While the
monitors came as close inshore as was feasible to bring
their secondary armaments to bear, the offshore destroyer
force was directed to fire star-shell to light up the
entrance, and to i>ound the land batteries in order to divert
their attention from the approaching block-ship. Passing
at 1.39 a.m. the calcic-phosphide buoy laid hj the
Commodore,^ Vindictive had before her a critical twenty
minutes before the harbour mouth was reached. Only
half of it was traversed when tlie fog .settled down.
Punctually at 2 a.m.'^ the old ship arrived at the point
where she expected to make the entrance. Twenty
minutes elapsed before she found it. Visibility was
reduced to 200 or 300 yards, and nothing could be seen.'

Failing to sight the entrance, Vindictive altered course
to the westward and reduced speed. As the entrance
was still not visible, she went about to eastward and
returned along the shore. Once more the goal eluded
her. Again altering course to westsvard, the entrance at
length was sighted about one cable* distant on the port
beam. Immediately the ship came under very heavy
fire from the shore batteries. Commander Godsal and
his officers i^roceeded to the conning-tower. The signal
was passed to the engine-room ' jneparatory abandon

^ The time is deduced from the Press Bureau Narrative {uifia),
which states that Fmrfidtre made the light-huoy four minutes before
the signal was given to open fire.

2 Lieutenant Crutchley's Report (Dispatch of June 15, para. 10)
states that Vindictive proceeded for thirteen minutes after passing
the light-buoy before arriving at where she exjiected to find the
entrance. She must have reached that point at 1.52 a.m. therefore.

3 Commodore Lynes, para. 22-24.
* 200 yards.

THE 08TEND KAID 89

ship V aud her C.M.B. escort received the ' last resort '.
Immediately C.M.B. No. 23 (Lieutenant the Hon. Cecil
E. E. Spencer) ^ laid and lit a million candle-power * Dover
flare' to light uj) the entrance, while C.M.B. No. 25
(Lieutenant Eussell H. McBean) and C.M.B. No. 26
(Lieutenant Cuthbert F. B. Bowlby) torpedoed the piers
and attacked the macliine-guns upon them.^

The heavy fire to which Vindictive was subjected severed
the communication between the conning-tower and the
after control.* So soon as the entrance was passed
Commander Godsal went outside the conning-tower
to give the necessary directions for placing the ship in
her blocking position. He had just made the order ' hard-
a-starboard ' when a heavy shell killed him, severely
wounded Lieutenant Alleyne, and left Lieutenant
Crutchley to take command.'^

Commander Godsal's intention had been to ram the
western pier" and, taking advantage of a strong eastward
tide running through the piers, to swing the ship across
the channel under port helm. But when she actually
found the entrance, Vindictive was too close to the eastern
pier to use j)ort helm without incurring the risk of
grounding broadside on. Hence the Commander's order
' hard-a-starboard ' a few seconds before he was killed. In
the circumstances Lieutenant Crutchley promptly put the
port telegraph to ' full speed astern '. But the j^ort pro-
peller was of little value ; it had been severely damaged

' Lioutenaut Crutchley 's Report, infra, p. 182.

* Commander Lyncs, para. 29. The Press Bureau Narrative
wrongly attributes this deed to C.M.B. 22.

' Commodore Lynes, para. 24, 2i>.

* See the Press Bureau Narrative, p. *J7.

^ Commodore Lynes, para. 25 ; Lieutenant Crutchley 's Report,
inj'ra, p. 183.

* i.e. that on his right looliiug forward.

90 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

against the Mole. For that reason, and because the tide
was strong against her starboard side, Vindictive failed to
swing across the channel as desired. The charges were
fired, and she grounded at an angle of about 25 degrees
to the eastern pier, leaving a considerable channel between
her stern and the western pier.* She sank soon after
2.49 a.m.^

At 2.30 a.m., in accordance with the programme,
rockets were fired from the flagship recalling the small
craft.' Fifteen minutes later H.M.S. Wanvick and her
attendant destroyers proceeded slowly to the westward
parallel to the coast, and at 3.15 a.m. observed a signal
of distress from the direction of Ostend. It proceeded
from M. L. 254, conveying the greater number of Vindictive's
rescued crew. M.L. 276 brought in three more to Dunkirk.
Half an hour was exhausted in transferring the wounded
from M.L. 254 to the flagship. Dawn was breaking.
The tide had fallen so low that it was inexpedient to return
by the route inside the shoals, by which the approach
had been made, and necessary to use the deep-draught
route from Ostend seaward. At 4 a.m. H.M.S. Warwick
struck a mine which destroyed the after part of the ship.
She took a heavy list and appeared to be settling down.
The wounded were transferred to Velox, and Whirlwind
took the flagship in tow. Velox was lashed alongside to
steer. Progress was slow and for three hours the
destroyers were within range of the enemy's batteries.
Dover was reached at 4.30 p.m. on May lO.* The
retirement of the Dunkirk contingent was executed with-
out casualties or incident.'

' Sir Roger Keyes's Dispatcli of June 15, para. 11.

* See p. 105, i)i/ra.

^ Press Bureau Narrative, infra, p. 102.

* Dispatch of June 15, para. 12-15 ; Commodore Lyues, para. 28,
" Commodore Lynes, para. 31.

THE OSTEND RAID 91

(a) Tlie Press Bureau Narrative.^

'. BunJcirJc, May 11, 1918.

'The Sirius lies in the surf some 2,000 yards east of
the entrance to Ostend Harbour, which she failed so
gallantly to block [on April 23] ; and when, in the early
hours of yesterday morning [May 10], the Vindictive
groped her way through the smoke-screen and headed
for the entrance, it was as though the old fighting ship
awoke and looked on. A coastal motor-boat had visited
her and hung a flare in her slack and rusty rigging ; and
that eye of unsteady fire, paling in the blaze of the star-
shells, or reddening through the drift of the smoke,
watched the whole great enterprise, from the moment
when it hung in doubt to its ultimate triumphant success.

' The planning and execution of that success had been
entrusted by the Vice-Admiral, Sir Roger Keyes, to
Commodore Hubert Lynes, C.M.G.," who directed the
previous attempt to block the hax'bour with Sirius
and Brilliant. Upon that occasion a combination of
unforeseen and unforeseeable conditions had fought
against him ;' upon this, the main problem was to secure
the effect of a surprise att.ack upon an enemy who was
clearly, from his ascertained dispositions, expecting him.*

1 The Times, May 15, 1918, and The Glory of ZecWvgge, pp. 55 ff. For
tho official accounts see the Dispatch of June 15 and Comniodoro
Lynob's Report, vtfra,

' Commanding at Dunkirk. The Commodore directed the
operations on board H.M.S. Fuvlknor.

' His Report (para. 3) attributes his faihirc partly to tlie sudden
change of wind which blew the smoke-screens across the harbour
at tlie critical moment, chiefly to the displacement of the Stroom
Bank buoy.

* See siq»a, p. 85, on the stops taken by the enemy in anticipation
of a renewed attack.

92 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

Sirius and Brilliant had been baffled [on April 23]
by the displacement of the Stroom Bank buoy/ which
marks the channel to the harbour entrance. But
since then aerial reconnaissance ^ had established that the
Germans had removed the buoy altogether, and that
there were now no guiding marks of any kind. They
had also cut gaps in the piers as a precaution against
a landing ; and, further, when towards midnight on
Thursday [May 9j the ships moved from their anchorage,
it was known that some nine German destroyers were
out and at large upon the coast.^ The solution of
the problem is best indicated by the chronicle of the
event.

' It was a night that promised well for the entei'prise —
nearly windless, and what little breeze stirred came from
a point or so west of north ; a sky of lead-blue, faintly
star-dotted, and no moon ; a still sea for the small craft,
the motor-launches and the coastal motor-boats, whose
work is done close inshore. From the destroyer * which
served the Commodore for flagship the remainder of the
force was visible only as swift silhouettes of blackness,
destroyers bulking like cruisers in the darkness, motor-
launches like destroyers, and coastal motor-boats showing
themselves as racing hillocks of foam. From Dunkirk a
sudden and brief flurry of gunfire announced that German
aeroplanes were about — they were actually on their way
to visit Calais ; and over the invisible coast of Flanders
the summer-lightning of the restless artillery rose and
fell monotonously.''

^ See note 3 on p. 91, supra.

* Towaitls sunset on May 9. See Commodore Lynes, para. 12.
2 See the Dispatch of Juno 15, para. 7.

* H.M.S. Fuulknor.

^ The absence of enemy jjatrols in ilic uffiiig in communted on by
Commodore Lynes, para. 17.

THE OSTEND RAID 93

'"There's Vindictive I" The muffled seamen and
Marines standing by the torpedo tubes and the guns
turned at that name to gaze at the great black ship, seen
mistily through the streaming smoke from the destroyer's
funnels, plodding silently to her goal and her end.
Photographs have made familiar that high-sided profile
and the tall funnels with their Zeebrugge scars, always
with a background of the pier at Dover against which
she lay to bo fitted for her last task. Now there was
added to her the environment of the night, and the sea,
and the greatness and tragedy of her mission.

' She receded into the night astern as the destroyer
raced on to lay the light-buoy ^ that was to be her guide,
and those on board saw her no more. She passed thence
into the hands of the small craft, whose mission it was
to guide her, light hei-, and hide her in the clouds of the
smoke-screen.

' Tliere was no preliminary bombardment of the harbour
and the batteries as before the previous attempt ; that
was to be the first element in the surprise. A time-
table had been laid down for every stage of the operation ;
and the staff-work beforehand had even included precise
orders for the laying of the smoke barrage, with plans
calculated for every direction of wind.'^ The monitors,
anchored in their firing positions far to seaward, awaited
their signal ; the great siege batteries of the Royal
Marine Artillery in Flanders — among the largest guns
that have ever been placed on land-mountings — stood by
likewise to neutralize the big German artillery along the
coast ; and the airmen who were to collaborate with an
aerial bombardment of the town waited somewhere in

' See Commodoro Lyncs, para. 12.

' See si(2)ra, p. 85, on the preparations made for the operations
on May 10.

94 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

the darkness overhead. The destroyers * patrolled to sea-
ward of the small craft.

' The Vindictive, ahva5'S at that solemn gait of hers,
found the flagship's light-huoy/ and bore up for where
a coastal motor-boat, commanded by Lieutenant William
R. Slayter, R.N., was waiting by a calcium flare upon
the old position of the Stroom Bank buoy.' Four minutes
before she arrived there, and 15 minutes only before
she was due at the harbour mouth, the signal for the
guns to open was given.* Two motor-boats, under
Lieutenant Dayrell-Reed, R.N.R.,'' and Lieutenant Albert
L. Poland, R.N.,* dashed in towards the ends of the high
wooden piers and torpedoed them. There was a machine-
gun on the end of the western pier, and that vanished in
the roar and the leap of flame and debris which called
to the guns. Over the town a flame suddenly appeared
high in air and sank slowly earthwards — the signal that
the aeroplanes had seen and understood ; and almost
coincident with their fii'st bombs came the first shells
whooping up from the monitors at sea. The surprise
part of the attack was sprung.

'The surprise, despite the Germans' watchfulness, seems
to Ijave been complete. Up till the moment when the
torpedoes of the motor-boats exploded there had not been

1 Besides the Dunkirk destroyers, H.M.S. Warwick, Velox,
Whirhcind, Trident were cruising between Zeebrugge and Ostend in
order to prevent the newly arrived enemy destroyers {supra, p. 85)
from interfering with Commodore Lynes's force. See the Dispatch
of June 15, para. 9.

2 At 1.39 a.m.

^ The flare was hidden from the shore by the smoke-screen.

* At 1.43 a.m. G.M.T., Commodore Lynes, para. 19.

" C.M.B. No. 24. Lieutenant Archibald Dayrell-Reed, D.S.O.,
R.N.R. ; received a bar to the D.S.O.

« C.M.B. No. 30. Lieutenant Albert Lawrence Poland, R.N. ;
received the Distinguished Service Cross.

THE OSTEND RAID 95

a shot from the land — only occasional routine star-shells.
The motor-launches were doing their work magnificently.*
These pocket-warships, manned by officers and men of
the Eoyal Naval Volunteer Eeserve, are specialists at
smoke production ; they built to either hand of the
Vinclictive's course the likeness of a dense sea-mist driving
landward with the wind. The star-shells paled and were
lost as they sank into it ; the beams of the searchlights
seemed to break off short upon its front. It blinded the
observers of the great batteries when suddenly, upon
the warning of the explosions, the guns roared into
action.

* There was a while of tremendous uproar. The coast
about Ostend is ponderously equipped with batteries,
each with its name known and identified — Tirpitz,
Hindenburg, Deutschland, Cecilia, and the rest. They
register from six inches up to monsters of 15-inch naval
pieces in land-turrets, and the Royal Marine Artillery
fights a war-long duel with them. These now opened
fire '^ into tlie smoke and over it at the monitors ; the
Marines and the monitors replied ; and meanwhile the
aeroplanes were bombing methodically and the anti-
aircraft guns were searching the skies for them. Star-
shells spouted up and floated down, lighting the smoke
banks with spreading green fires ; and those strings of

^ They began their smoke-laying operations at 1.30 a.m. so
successfully that Vindictive was only hit by shrapnel on hei- way to
the harbour entrance. Sec Lieut. Crutehley's Report, infra, p. 182.

^ A writer in The Times of May 11, relying on 'authoritative
statements made to me this [May 10] afternoon and extracts from
the report of Commodore Hubert Lynes', states that the enemy
began firing 'about 1.45 a.m.' G.M.T. See Commodore Lynes,
para. 22. Vindidhe was due to arrive at the harbour enti-ance at

2 a.m. Enemy fire continued .ilmost without cessation until

3 a.m.

96 OSTEND AND ZEEBRFGGE

luminous green balls, which airmen call " flaming
onions "/ soared up to lose themselves in the clouds.
Through all this stridency and blaze of conflict the old
Vindictive, still unhurrying, \vas walking the lighted
waters toward the entrance.

' It was then that those on the destroyers became
aware that what had seemed to be merely smoke was
wet and cold, that the rigging was beginning to drip,
that there were no longer any stars — a sea-fog had
come on.^

' The destroyers had to turn on their lights and use
their sirens to keep in touch with each other ; the air
attack was suspended,' and Vindictive, with some distance
yet to go, found herself in gross darkness.

* There were motor-boats * to either side of her, escorting
her to the entrance, and these were supplied with what
are called "Dover flares" — enormous lights capable of
illuminating square miles of sea at once.' A " Very "
pistol was fired as a signal to light these, but the fog
and the smoke together were too dense for even the
flares. The Viyidictive then put her helm over and
started to cruise to find the entrance. Twice in her
wanderings she must have passed across it, and at her
third turn, upon reaching the position at which she had
first lost her way, there came a rift in the mist, and she
saw the entrance clear,- the piers to either side, and the

* See note 4 on p. 64, supra,

2 At 1.50 a.m. G.M.T. Sec Commodore Lynes, para. 20.
' In fact, the fog was sufficiently low lying to permit the air
attacks to continue. See Commodore Lynes, para. 21.

* C.M.B.s Nos. 23, 25, 26 escorted Vindictive to the entrance. See
Commodore Lynes, para. 29.

* They were of one million candle-power. See Commodore
Lynes, para. 29.

« At 2.20 a.m. G.M.T. See Lieut. Crutchley'.s Report.

;5

ID

THE OSTENI) RAID l.»7

oponing tloiKl jilieml.' The inevitable inotoi-boat daslied
up (No. 22,^ cominanded by Acting Lieutenant Guy L.
Cockburn, R.N.), raced on into the opening under a
heavy fire, and planted a flare on the water between the
piers, yinclictive steamed over it and on. She was in.

'The guns found her at once. She was hit every few
seconds after she entered, her scarred hull broken afresh
in a score of places, and her decks and upper works
swept. The machine-gun on the end of the western
pier had been put out of action by the motor-boat's
torpedo, but from other machine-guns at the inshore
ends of the pier, from a position on the front, and from
machine-guns apparently firing over the eastern pier,
there converged upon her a hail of lead. The after-
control was demolished by a shell which killed all its
occupants, including Sub-Lieutenant Angus H. Mac-
lachlan,* who was in command of it. Upper and lower
bridges and chart-room were swept by bullets, and
Commander Godsal, E.N.,^ ordered his officers* to go
with him to the conning-tower.

' They observed through the observation slit in the
steel wall of the conning-tower that the eastern pier was
breached some 200 5'ards from its seaward end, as

* Lieutenant C'rutchley says the entrance was observed about
one cable's distance on tlie port beam.

'^ Tiiis is incorrect. Tlio deed is attributed to C.M.B. No. 28.
Her commander, Lieut, the Hon. Cecil E. R. Spencer, R.N., was
awarded the D.S.C. See Commodore Lynes, para. 20.

^ He was in Brilliant as Sub-Lieutenant in the former Raid ;
specially promoted to Lieutenant for his services in that action ;
' mentioned ' in Sir Roger Reyes's Dispatch of July 24, p. 201.

* Commander Alfnd E. Godsal, D.S.O., R.N.; 'mentioned' in
the Dispatch of July 24 ; commanded BriUiant on April 23.

* Lieutenant Sir John Meyncll Alleyno, Bart., D.S.C. R.N., anrl
Lieutenant Victor Alexander Charles Crutchley, D.S.C, R.N. The
latter served in Brilliant on April 23.

JITS 0

98 OSTEND AXD ZEEP,KTTC40E

thou.iih at some time a ship hatl )>eoii in collision with
it. They saw the front of the town silhouetted again
and again in the light of the guns that blazed at them ;
the night was a patchwork of fire and darkness.
Immediately after passing the breach in the pier,
Commander Godsal left the conning-tower and went
out on deck, the better to watch the ship's movements.
He chose his position, and called in through the slit of
the conning-tower his order to starboard the helm. The
Vindictive responded ; she laid her battered nose to the
eastern pier, and prepared to swing her 320 feet of length
across the channel.^

* It was at that moment that a shell from the shore
batteries struck the conning-tower. Lieutenant Sir John
Alley ne [R.N.]- and Lieutenant V. A. C. Crutchley, R.N.,"
were still within ; Commander Godsal was close to the
tower outside. Lieutenant Alleyne was stunned by the
shock ' ; Lieutenant Crutchley shouted through the slit
to the Commander, and, receiving no answer, rang the
port engine full speed astern to help in swinging the ship.
By this time she was lying at an angle of about 40 deg.
to the pier,^ and seemed to be hard and fast, so that it
was impossible to bring her farther round. After
working the engines for some minutes to no effect,
Lieutenant Crutchley gave the order to clear the engine-
room and abandon ship, according to the programme
previously laid down. Engineer Lieutenant-Commander

^ On tliis iinporlant matter see the Dlspatcli of .Tune 15.
para. 10, 11.

- Roceived the D.S.O. See the Dispatch of June 15, para. 3.

° Received the V.C. 'for great bravery both in Vindidiie and
M.L. 2.u4'.

* lie was severely wounded in the sloniaeh.

•■' la fact she grounded at an angle of .about 25 deg. to the eastern
pier. See the Dispatch of June 15, para. 11.

THE OSTEND KAID 99

William A. Bury [K.N.]/ who was the last to leave the
engine-room, blew the main charges by the switch
installed aft ; Lieutenant Crutchley blew the auxiliary
charges in the forward 6-in. magazine from the conning-
tower. Those on board felt the old ship shrug as the
explosive tore the bottom plates and the bulkheads from
her ; she sank about six feet, and lay upon the bottom of
the channel. Her work was done.*

* It is to be presumed that Commander Godsal was
killed by the shell which struck the conning-tower.
Lieutenant Crutchley, searching the ship before he left
her, failed to find his body, or that of Sub-Lieutenant
JLaclachlan, in that wilderness of splintered wood and
shattered steel. In the previous attempt to block the
port, Commander Godsal had commanded Brilliant, and,
together with all the officers of that ship and of
Sirins, had volunteered at once for a further operation.
Engineer Lieutenant-Commander Bury, who was severely
wounded, had been in Vindictive in her attack on the
Zeebiugge Mole ; he had urged upon the Vice-Admiral
his claim to remain with her, with four Engine-room
Artificers, in view of his and their special knowledge of
her engines. The names of these four are as follows :
H. Cavanagh, H.M.S. Vindictive," wounded ; N. Carroll,'
Royal Naval Barracks, Chatham, wounded ; A. Thomas,°

' Engineer Lieutenant-Coinmaudt r William Aichib.ald Bury,
E.N.; promoted to Engineer Commander and received the D.S.O.
Ho had distinguished himself in Vindidire on April 23.

^ Accoi-dingto.i German account (/x/ra, p. 105), whose chronology
i^ reliable, Vindictive sank .ifter 2.40 a.m. G.M.T. It is doubtful
whether the auxiliary charges took effect. See Lieut. Crutchley's
Report, infra, p. IS.').

' Herbert Cavanagh, D.S.M. ; received a bar to the D.S.M.

* Norniaii Carroll, D.S.M. ; received a bar to the D.S.M
' Alan ThomaK, D.S.M., prisoner of war.

G 2

THE OSTEND KAID 101

II.M.S. J.ion, missing ; H. Harris/ H.M.S. lioiful Sovereign.
The coxswain was First-class Petty OHicer J. J. Eeed,-
Koyal Naval Barracks, Chatham, who had been with
Commander Godsal in the Brilliant, and whose urgent
re(j[uest to be allowed to remain with him had been'
granted. The remainder of the crew were selected from
a large number of volunteers from the ships of the Dover
Patrol.^

' Most of the casualties were incurred while the ship
was being abandoned. The men behaved with just that
cheery discipline and courage which distinguished them
in the Zeebrugge raid. Petty Officer Reed found Lieu-
tenant Alleyne in the conning-tower, still unconscious,
and carried him aft under a storm of fire from the
machine-guns. Lieutenant Alleyne was badly hit before
he could be got over the side, and fell into the water.
Here he managed to catch hold of a boat-fall, and a
motor-launch,^ under Lieutenant Bourke, R.N.V.R.,*
succeeded in rescuing him and two other wounded men.
The remainder of the cre-\v ■ were taken off by Motor-
launch 254, under Lieutenant Geoffrey 11. Drummond,
R.N.V.R.," under a fierce fire. When finally he reached

' Herbert Alfred Harris, D.b.M. ; received a bar to iho
D.S.M.

'^ P.O. Joseph Jame.^ Reed, D.S.M. ; received the Conspicuous
Gallantry Medal.

^ See the Dispatch of June 15, para. 3.

* No. 276. See Commodore Lynes, para. 28.

=* Lieutenant Roland Bourko, D.S.O., R.N.V.R. ; promoted to
Lieutenant-Commander and received the V.C.

* Motor-launch 254 took off Lieutenant Crutchley, Engineer
Lieutenant-Commander Bury, and thirty-seven men. In all,
therefore, forty-two survivors escaped from the ship.

■' Lieutenant Geoffrey Heneage Drummond, R.N.V.R. ; promoted
to Lieutenant-Commander and received the V.C. Sco Commodore
Lyncs, para, 27.

102 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

the Warwk'k,^ the launch was practically iii a sinking

condition ; her bows were shot to pieces. Lieutenant
Drummond was himself severely wounded ; his second
in command, Lieutenant Gordon Ross, R.N.V.K.,- and
one hand, were killed"; a number of others were
wounded. The launch was found to be too damaged to
tow, and day was breaking ; she and the Wanvick were
in easy range of the forts ; so, as soon as her crew and
the Vindictive'^- survivors were transferred, a demolition
charge Mas placed in her engine-room, and she was
sunk.

'Always according to programme, the recall rockets
for the small craft were fired from the flagship at
2.30 a.m. The great red rockets whizzed up to lose
themselves in the fog ; they cannot have been visible
half a mile away. But the work was done, and one by
one the launches ' and motor-boats commenced to appear
from the fog, stopped their engines alongside the
destroyers, and exchanged news with them. There were
wounded men to be transferred, and dead men to be
reported — their names called briefly across the water

' Molor-launch 25i sighted her at 3.15 a.m. G.M.T. Sco llie
Dispatch of June 1-5, para. 10, 13.

'Lieutenant Gordon F. Koss, R.N.V.E. ; 'mentioned' in the
Dispatch of July 24.

■* Lieutenant Crutchley then took command. See liis Report.

* Four motor-launclies volunteered for rescue work inside tlie
Harbour entrance : Nos. 128 (Lieutenant-Commander Rapli.iel
Saunders, E.N.V.R.), 254 (Lieutenant G. H. Drummond, R.N.V.R.),
276 (Lieutenant Roland Bourke, R.N.V.R.), and 283 ^Lieutenant-
Commander Keith Robin Hoare, R.N.V.R.). The first of these
commanders received the D.S.O., the second and third the V.C.,
and the fourth a bar to the D.S.O. Sub-Lieutenant James Petrie,
R.N.V.R., who volunteered for rescue woik in M. L. 27G, received
the D.S.C. Lieutenant Felix Francis lirayiiclJ, K.N.V.R., who
volunteered for rescue work in M. L. 1-8. received tlie D.^.C also.

THE OSTEND KAID 103

tVuiu tho little bwaying deck to the crowded rail above.
But no one had seen a single enemy craft ' ; the nine
German destroyers who were out and free to tight had
chosen the discreeter part.

' Vice-Admiral Sir Koger Keyes was present at
the operation in tho destroyer WartvicJc' Commander
Hamilton Benn, R.N.V.R, D.S.O., M.P./ was in command
of the motor-launches, and Lieutenant Francis C. Harrison,
D.S.O., K.N., of the coastal motor-boats. The central
smoke-screen was entrusted to Sub-Lieutenant Humphrey
V. Low, R.N., and Sub-Lieutenant Leslie R. Blake, R.N.R.
Casualties, as at present I'eported, stand at two officers
and six men killed ; two officers and ten men, all of
Vindictive, missing, believed killed ; and four officers and
eight men wounded.'*

* It is not claimed by tho officers who carried out the
operation that Ostend Harljour is completely blocked ;
but its purpose — to embarrass the enemy and make tho
harbour impracticable to any but ymall craft, and
dredging operations difficult — has been fully accom-
plished.'

* This is not accurate. Lieutenant Arthur E. P. Welman,
D.S.O., D.S.C., R.N., encountered an enemy torpedo-boat near the
entrance to Ostend. He engaged her successfully and received
a bar to the D.S.O. Lieutenant William H. Breniner, K.N.,
received the D.S.C. for tho same action. The authority already
quoted {'I'lte Times, May 13, 1913) states that no Germans were
seen on the pier. This may be so. But a very heavy fuo was
directed from tiie jjiers upon tho C.M.B.s that torpedoed them.
.See Sir Roger Keyes's Dispalch of July 24, pp. 206, 207.

- ]VarH-ick was mined at 4 a.m. See the Dispatch of June 15,
para. 12-15, for events &ubse(juent to tiioso detailed in tho text.

^Commander Ion Hamilton Benn, D.S.O., M. P., R.N.V.R. ;
received the C.B. and promotion to Tempor.ary Actijig Captain.

' The casualties were : Oflicer.s, 2 killed,. j wounded. 2 missing;
Mill, C. killed, 9 mishiug. 25 wound. d. Total - 49.

104 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

[b) The German Adniiralli/'s Account.^

As on the occasion of the former Raid, the German
Admiralty announced that of May 10 M'ith characteristic
effrontery.

'Berlin, May 10, 1918.

' At three o'clock in the morning of May 10 British
naval forces, after a violent bombardment, again made
a blockading attack on Ostend. Several enemy ships
which, under the protection of artificial fog, tried to
force their way into the harbour were driven off by the
excellently directed fire of our coastal batteries. An old
cruiser, entirely battered to jneces, lies aground before
the harbour outside the navigation channel. The entrance
into the harbour is quite free. Only dead were found
on board the stranded vessel. Two survivors had sprung
overboard and were captured. According to information
so far received, at least two enemy motor-boats were shot
away and one monitor badly damaged.' The blockading
attempt has, therefore, been completely fuiled. Once
again the enemy sacrificed human lives and vessels
in vain.'

A fuller account was transmitted through the wireless
stations of the German Government two days later ' :

' Berlin, May 12, 1918.
'The second attempt of the English to get at the
Flanders U-boat bases, which are getting more and more

1 The Times, May 11, I'JlS.

- Mutor-lauuch 254 was tlie only Bnlis>li loss.

■' n>e Times. Mav 13, 1»18.

THE OSTEND RAID 105

tioubletjonie to tlieiii every day, found the German Marine
Corps equally prepared as [on] the first attempt. It could
be foreseen that the English Admiralty would not be
satislied with one attempt. The reason why this time
only an attack against Ostend took place cannot at the
present moment be judged. It is true that simul-
taneously with the attack against Ostend a strong
artificial mist was developed by the English before
Zeebrugge, but apparently this was done only in order
to effect a diversion.

' In the morning of May 10 at 2.45 ' the enemy opened
fire from the sea and from the land against the German
batteries at Ostend. A few minutes later a strong
artificial mist was produced. When at two minutes after
three " two ' cruisers were sighted in the mist to the east
of Ostend, the German heavy battei-ies immediately
opened a well-directed target fire, an obstructive fire
having been directed previously against the area before
the entrance.

' One of the cruisers turned aside towards the west, the
other towards the north. The latter then could be seen
repeatedl}"- in the mist and was again bombarded every
time. At 3.43 a.m.* she loomed up again before the
entrance, and, taken under the heaviest fire on all sides,
sank outside the channel. In the meantime the German
batteries bombarded separate objects which could be
observed at sea. A monitor, which was lying still and
did not fire, and which clearly had been put out of action.

1 1.51 a.m. G.M.T. See note 4, p. 94, siqym.
■ 2.8 a.m. G.M.T.

' The Gt'iuians undoubtedly &aw Vindidixe twice as she sought
tho futiancc Iroia ta.'it to west.
* J.ia a.m. G.M.T.

106 OSTEND AND ZEEBKUGGE

was bpotted at 4. to a.m.,^ but was immediately afterwards
completely enveloped in a mist by the enemy. Accord-
ing to papers which have been found, the stranded cruiser
is the Vindictive.

' The German losses, as on the occasion of the first
operation, are again delightfully small.'

' 3.19 a.m. G.M.T. The 'monitor' must liavc boeii Warwick in
hor seriously damaged condition with Velcx hislied alongside. The
position is made clear in Sir Roger Keyos's Dispatch of June 15,
para. 15.

THE OSTEND RAID 107

(c) The licsult

A message to Sir Roger Keyes from the War Cabinet
on Maj' 1 1 applauded * the successful efforts you have
made to deal with the submarine menace at the source.
The blocking of Ostend last night puts the finishing touch
to the gallant achievement at Zeebrugge.' In fact the
leader of the operations on May 10 did not regard them
as final. Lieutenant Crutchley's Report to Sir Roger
Keyes stated that a * considerable channel ' was still open
between Vindictive s stern and the western pier.' A post-
script to the Pj ess Bureau's Narrative therefore disclaimed
the inference that Ostend Harbour was completely blocked,
and a third attack was instantly planned. Sappho's defects
were repaired at Cluitham, and, with feverish haste, the old
(1904) battleship Swiftsure was prepared as a second block-
ship. The operation was fixed for the first week in June.

Meanwhile, onMny 2o, The Times announced *on excel-
lent authority ' that the Germans had been successful in
shifting l'7/?(?jd/t'e'6' position inside Ostend Harbour" ; that
she had been swung round so tliat she laj- through her
whole length close against the eastern pier, leaving a pas-
sage of about thirty feet comparatively free for vessels to
go in or out ; that this left sufficient space for a destroyer
of large size, though it would be difficult to get her through.
The statements are substantially correct. But Bruges,
not Ostend, was aimed at. To prevent the enemy — Zee-
brugge being closed — from clearing his Bruges shipping
by the Ostend outlet was Sir Roger Keyes's single purpose.
And aerial observation established that it had been effec-

' Dispatch of June 15, para. 11.

* A picture of the sbiji us she hiy when tlic Cicniiaus (3vacu;ilcd
Obleiul on October 17 appeared in the Daily Mail of Oclolnr :,'C., IIUS.

108 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

tually achieved by the operations on April 23 and May 10.
The enemy had not contemplated the need to maintain the
Ostend channels and to substitute them for the main one
via Zeebiugge. The alternative route "was wholly inade-
quate and the silting up of the channel made it still less
practicable. At Zeebrugge also attempts to dredge a
passage between Iphigcnia and Intrejyid wero meeting with
no success.^ The projected third attack therefore was
countermanded, actually at the moment the block-ships
were leaving the basin.

Hence, the operations on May 10 effectually completed
those of St. George's Day, and mitigated a menace to the
sea communications of our Army and to the sea-borne
trade and food supplies of the United Kingdom which
had been continual and increasing for nearly four years."
The blocking of Ostend and Zeebrugge, and the success of
the anti-submarine barrage in the Straits of Dover, which
had been carried out vigorously during the past ten
months, amply supported Mr. Lloyd George's declaration
to an Edinburgh audience on May 24 : ' The submarine
is still a menace — it is no longer a peril — as a means of
inflicting injury, as a means of absorbing energies which
might be better devoted to other purposes, as a means of
restricting our power of transport. But as a danger which

' A visitor to Zeobruggo immediately after its evacui»tiou by the
Germans on October 19, 1918, writes to The Times of October 30:
' The block-sliips. Intrepid and Iphigeuia, lie well within the piers,
the latter across the passage, the other at a slight angle to the
piers. Thelis is outside, but well across. The German torpedo-
boats could only be mana-uvred past them with the greatest
difficulty after extensive dredging operations had been carried
out. . . . Round rphigenia's conning-tower a bomb-proof shelter of
reinforced concrete has been erected as a refuge for the men at
work on the dredger during our air-raids.'

- Sir Roger Keyes's Disi>ntch of May 9, General Summary,
I'ara. 5.

THE OSTEND KAID lol)

could cause tlie winning or losing of tlio war you can
rule out the submarine.'

Even had the operations not been crowned with success
they were of precious value. At a period of tense anxiety
over the situation on the Western Front in France
and Flanders they braced the moral tone of the nation,
which, seeing 'enshrined in the battered hull of the
Vindictive all that had made our island home great
and kept her free in a thousand years of history V drank
from the events a deep draught of encouragement. ' These
are thrilling deeds ', said Mr. Lloyd George, ' that give
new heart to a people, not merely for the hour, but,
when they come to be read by our children and our
children's children, for ages to come. They enrich our
history, they enrich the character of our people, they
fertilize the manhood of the land.' -

' Mr. J. L. Garvin, in tlio Ohacrver, Dec. 29, 1918.
- The Times, May 25, 1918.

IV

SIR ROGER REYES'S DISPATCH,

MAY 9, 1918 '

Fleet House, Lover,

*9t?i Mai/, 1918.
Sir,

Be plensed to submit for the information of the
Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty the following
Report on the Operations on the Belgian Coast on tho
night of the 22nd-23rd April, 1918.

I. — General Summauy.

2. To make the report clear, the different sections of
tlie oj^erations have been separated as much as possible.
Fuller details than appear in this despatch will be found
in the complete set of orders and reports forwarded here-
with.

(Note. — These orders and reports are not published
with this despatch.)

3. The main objects of the enterprise wez'e (1) to block
the Bruges ship-canal at its entrance into tfie harbour at
Zeebrugge ; (2) to block the entrance to Ostend harbour
from the sea ; and (3) to inflict as much dama.fre as
possible upon the ports of Zeebrugge and Ostend.

* Published in the London Ga:;et'e ' Supplcnu-nt ', No. 31189, of
February 19, 1918. Notes preceded by a nuiriL-ral are added by the
Editor.

*• Note. — Some amendments to this despatch of 9th May, 1918,
have been made by the Vicc-Admiral, Dover Patrol, in the light of
information received between that date and 22nd January, 1919.

112 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

4. Zoebnigge hail)our is coimoftod I*}' a Mhip-eanal
with the inland clocks at Bruges, which communicate
again by means of a system of smaller canals with
Ostend harbour. The whole forms a triangle with two
sea entrances. The eastern side, which is 8 miles long,
is the ship-canal from Zeebrugge to Bruges ; the southern
side, which is 11 miles long, consists of smaller canals
from Bruges to Ostend ; the base, facing north-west,
is the 12 miles of heavily fortified coast line between
Ostend and Zeebrugge. This fortified line is prolonged
8| miles to the westward, extending to the right flank
of the German Army, facing Nieuport, and 7 miles to
the eastward as far as the Dutch frontier. The defences
include a number of batteries mounting over 225 guns,
136 of which are from 6-in. to 15-in. calibre, the latter
ranging up to 42,000 yards.

5. This formidable system has been installed since
the German occupation in 1914, and Bruges has recently
provided a base for at least 35 enemy torpedo craft and
about 30 submarines. By reason of its position and
comparative security it has constituted a continual
and ever-increasing menace to the sea communications
of our Army and the seaborne trade and food supplies
of the United Kingdom.

6. When the operations of the 22nd-23rd April were
undertaken it was believed that, although the blocking
of the Zeebrugge entrance to the Bruges ship-canal was
the most important of all objects, it would be necesf=;ary
also to block the entrance to the Ostend harbour in order
to seal up the Bruges ship canal and docks ; for unless
this were done the lighter craft would still be able to
pass to and fro more or less freely through the smaller
canals.

7. The attack upon the Zeebrugge Mole, as well as

SEAi'LANK VIKW OF THK ZKKBRUOGK LOCK GATES,
SHOWING POSITIONS OF SUNKEN CKUISERS

SIR ROGER REYES'S FIRST DISPATCH 113

the bombardment of Zeebrugge by monitors and from
the air, were designed to distract the attention of the
enemy from the main operations. Without this diversion
the attempt of the blocking ships to pass round the end
of the Mole, to enter the harbour, and to reach the ship-
canal entrance at the inner end must almost certainly
have been discovered, with the result that the vessels
would have been sunk by the shore batteries long before
they reached their goal.

8. An important, though subordinate, object of the
attack upon the Zeebrugge Mole was to inflict as much
damage as was possible in the time upon the harbour
works and defences. In order to prevent enemy re-
inforcements being brought from shore while this work
was in progress arrangements were made for blowing
up the viaduct which connected the Mole with the
land.

9. Similarly the bombardment of the Ostend defences
by our shore batteries in Flanders, by the monitors and
also from the air, was designed to cover the attempt to
block the entrance to that harbour.

10. It was anticipated that, in addition to the fire from
the land batteries and harbour works, the attacking forces
would have to face a counter-attack from the powerful
destroyer flotilla which was known to be inside. One
destroyer emerged from Zeebrugge harbour, and is
reported to have been struck l)y a torpedo fired from
C.M.B. No. 5. Other torpedo craft, which apparently
ha<l not steam up, remained alongside tlie Mole, and
their crews assisted in its defence. The greater part of
the flotilla liad for some reason be^n previously with-
drawn to the Bruges docks.

11. As will be seen from the subsequent narrative,
our operations were completely successful in attaining

114 OSTEND AND ZEEBEUGGE

their first and most important object. The entrance to
the Bruges ship-canal was blocked. The second object —
the blocking of the entrance to Ostend harbour — was
not achieved, for reasons which will be explained sub-
sequently. The attack on the Zeebrugge Mole was
completely successful as a diversion to enable the block-
ing ships to enter the harbour, to proceed to their
allotted stations, and, witli the exception of the Thetis,
to be sunk in accordance with the plan. The blowing
up of the viaduct was cariied out without any hitch, and
produced the desired results. Owing, however, to various
reasons which will be more particularly dealt with later,
the less important objective, the destruction of the
defences on the Mole, was not so thorough as had been
hoped.

12. The main results achieved have, however, proved
greater than I expected when the fleet returned to port
on the morning of the 23rd April. Aerial observation
and photographs show clearly that even the lighter craft
in the Bi'uges ship-canal and docks have so far Ijeen
unable to find an exit through the smaller watei'ways to
Ostend harbour. At least 23 torpedo craft have remained
sealed up at Bruges ever since the operations on St. George's
Day, and so far as can be seen not less than 12 sub-
marines would likewise appear to be still imprisoned.
As yet no effective steps seem to have been taken to
clear the Zeebrugge entrance to the Bruges ship-canal,
where the silt is shown to be collecting ; and although
doubtless in time the enemy will succeed in opening
a way out, it seems likely that this important section
of his raiding and commerce-destroying forces must
inevitably be seriously hampered for a considerable
period. In addition to suffering this substantial injury,
the enemy has been obliged to bring down reinforce-

SIR ROGER KEYESS FIRST DISPATCH 115

merits from the Bight of Heligoland to Zeebrugge and
Ostend.

13. The preparations and training for the attack
extended over a long period,^ during the latter portion
of which {i.e. from the 22nd March) the Dover Patrol
was subjected to an exceptional strain owing to the
unprecedented transport of reinforcements to France.

14. Success would have been impossible without the
eager and generous co-operation of the Grand Fleet, the
neighbouring commands and dockyards, and the Harwich
Force.

15. The concentration of the attacking fleet had to
take place about 63 miles distant from Zeebrugge and
Ostend. As the length of time needed for reaching
these objectives after the forces had been assembled was
seven hours, it was inevitable that there should be a
period of not less than four liours of daylight during
which enemy observation by air and submarine might
discover our movements. In order to guard against
this, which would have meant the certain failure of the
expedition, it was necessary for the patrols and air forces
to show the utmost degree of vigilance and energy.
There is every reason for believing that, as a result of
their efforts, the enemy remained up to the last entirely
unaware of our intentions.

10. In order not only tliat the attack might have
a rea3onnl)le prospect of success, but that it might not
end in disaster, various conditions were essential :
(a) a certain state of the tide ; {?>) calm weather ; (c) a
more or less favourable direction of the wind ; and
{d) absence of fog, with, if jiossible, a moderate amount
of haze. The first of these conditions (the state of the
tide) fixed the dates between which it was practicable
' Marinrs from Foli. 25; hlnfjackots from >[arili 1.
H -J

116 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

to make the attempt. The others it was not possible
to reckon with in advance, owing to the uncertainty of
the weather, more especiallj^ at that time of year, and
also to the fact that all these conditions might be different
on the Flanders coast fi-om w^hat they were off the Good-
wins, or that they might change for the worse between
the starting of the expedition from the point of concen-
tration and its arrival at its destination seven hours later.

17. It was anticipated that minefields, which would
endanger the heavier draught vessels, might be en-
countered in the enemy's waters, but this risk had to
be faced, and special arrangements were made to save
the crews and storming-parties in the event of vessels
being sunk.

18. On tAvo occasions previous to the 22nd April the
concentration took place, but, owing to unfavourable
weather conditions setting in, had to be dispersed.^
This fact, although it caused disappointment among the
officers and men, and also contained a danger that the
enemy might become aware of our designs, had a con-
siderable practical value as a rehearsal of the preliminaiy
stages of the undertaking. On this point I may say here
that, although on this occasion the wind changed and
served us badly at a moment when we were finally
committed to the attack, better conditions had not —
since the preparations were completed — occurred before,
nor have they recurred up to this date.

19. The main force started from the point of concentra-

1 On the night of April 11-12 the whole striking force got to
thirteen miles from its objectives wlien the conditions compeiled
retirement. Ihe preliminary bombardment ot Ostendwas already
in progress, and was continued for the reason stated in the Vice-
Admiral's para. 20. See his Dispatch of July 24, infra, p. 212, for
commendations for service on that occasion.

SIR KOGEK KEYESfci FIRST DISPATCH 117

tioii at 4.5o o'clock on the afternoon of Monday, the
22ncl April.

20. The bombardment of Zeebrugge by monitors began
at 11.20 p.m., simultaneously with that of the Ostend
defences by monitors, and by our shore batteries in
Flanders. These bombardments had been carried out
on sevei'al nights prior to the 22nd April to give the
enemy no reason to anticipate further action on our part
on this particular occasion.

21. The vessels charged with making a smoke screen
began operations simultaneously off Zeebrugge and Ostend
at 11. -10 p.m.

22. According to time-table, the hour at which the
Vindictive (Captain Alfred F. B. Carpenter ^) should have
been laid alongside the Zeebrugge Mole was midnight.
She reached her station one minute after midnight,
closely followed by the Daffodil (Lieutenant Harold
Campbell-) and Iris II (Commander Valentine Gibbs"^).
A few minutes later the landing of the storming and
demolition parties began. By 1.10 a.m. the Vindictive
had taken off the survivors, who had meanwhile done
their work upon the Mole, and by 1.15 a.m. she and her
consorts were clear of the Mole.

23. At 12.15 a.m. Submarine C 3 (Lieutenant Richard D.
Sandford ^) had succeeded in ramming herself between
the iron piers of the viaduct, and was thereupon aban-
doned by her crew after they had lit the fuses. Five
minutes later the cargo of explosives blew up, completely
destroying communication between the Mole and the
shore.

21. The* Thetis (Commander Ralph S. Sneyd, RS-O.*),
the first of the blocking ships, passed the end of the

1 Received the V.C. ^ Kcceived the D.S.O.

^ Dkd of wouuds. ' Promoted to Captain, K.N.

118 OSTEND AND ZEEBKUUGE

Molf, according tuaiTangemeiit, twenty-five^ minutes after
midnight. Making her May to the entrance of the ship-
canal, slie carried away the obstructing nets, and being
then in a sinking condition from gunfire, with both her
propellers fouled, was sunk by her crew close to the
entrance of the canal. The Intrepid (Lieutenant Stuart S.
Bonham-Carter "), the second of the blocking ships,
following a few minutes later, was sunk in the ship-
canal itself; and the Iphigenia (Lieutenant Edward W.
Billyard-Leake), the last of the three blocking ships,
following close astern of the Intrepid, was sunk with thu
most complete success across the narrowest part of the
ship-canal at 12.45 a.m.

25. It was expected that the blocking ships Brillianl
(Commander Alfred E. Godsal") and Sirius (Lieutenant-
Commander Henry N. M. Hardy,^ D.S.O.) would have
found the entrance to Ostend harbour by midnight. For
the reason, however, which is explained in the next para-
graph, they missed their objective, ran ashore, and had
both to be sunk about 12.30 a.m.

26. The success of the Ostend enterprise was affected
to some extent by two adverse factors : (1) at 12.15 a.m.
the wind (N.N.E.), which so far had been favourable for
purposes of the smoke screen, shifted into an unfavour-
able quarter (S.S.W.), thereby exposing the attacking
forces to the fire of the enemy ; (2) the buoy which
marks the channel to Ostend harbour had been moved
very shortly before, unknown to us, to a position some
2,400 yards further east, so that when Brilliant and Sirius
found it and put their helms to starboard they ran ashore.

27. Tlie manner in which the survivors of the crews of
the five blocking ships and of Submarine C 3 were rescued

' By a bli}) tho Gazetk lias * fifteen'.

■■ RfCfived the D.S.O. " riniii'itcd tu C'uimuaiulcr, 1>.N,

am KOGEK KE YES'S FIKST DISPATCH ii'J

and brought away by volunteer crews in motor launches
and a picket boat was beyond praise. The various in-
cidents are described in subsequent paragraphs.

28. In the course of the attack on St. George's Day our
casualties to officers and men were as follows : — Killed,
176; wounded, -112; missing, 49 ; of the latter 35 are
believed to have been killed. Although these casualties
are light compared to those that the Army constantly
suffers in similar enterprises, we have to mourn the loss
of comrades selected from practically every unit of His
Majesty's sea forces. Our losses in ships were as follows :
— H.M.S. North Star and motor launches Nos. 424 and
110, sunk. No other vessel was rendered unfit for
further service.

29. I have already submitted to the Lords Com-
missioners of the Admiralty the list of naval officers
whom I considered deserving, of promotion, either im-
mediately or as soon as they have the prescribed service.
I propose to forward as soon as possible a sui:)plementary
despatch bringing to their Lordships' notice the names of
other officers and men who distinguished themselves, for
they are naturally numerous. They came from many
ships, and were scattered immediately the operations
were over, so that it is difficult to obtain the details
relating to them.'

30. I cannot close this brief summary without refer-
ence to those gallant souls who did not live to see the
success of their endeavours. It seems almost invidious
tu mention names when every officer and man who took
part was animated by one spirit, ardently welcoming the
opportunity of achieving a feat of aims against odds in

' IIoUour.s fur services in tlie oi)ei;ilions ou Api-il '2S aro
published in tlio ^iupplomciil t-i llio Luudou GmcHc. N". .SObOT, IVt
Jiilv -J-.i, VMS.

120 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

order that honour and merit might be added to that which
our Service has gained in the past. Amongst those who
lost their lives were many who shared with me the
secrets of the plan, and of those I cannot refrain from
recallmg Lieutenant-Colonel Elliot, Captain Halahan,
Commander Valentine Gibbs, Majors Cordner and Eagles,
Lieutenant-Commanders Harrison and Bradford, Lieu-
tenants Hawkings and Chamberlain, and Wing-Com-
mander Brock, who all worked for many weeks in the
training of the personnel and the preparation of material.
Their keen enthusiasm and absolute confidence that the
enterprise would be carried to a successful issue were in-
valuable to me. During the anxious days of waiting in
crowded ships in a secluded anchorage, and in spite of
two disai^pointments, the patience and faith that our
chance would come, which were displayed by all, owed
much to the line example of these officers.

NARRATIVE.

II. — Composition of Forces.

81. In order that all parts of the Naval Service might
share in the expedition, representative bodies of men
were drawn from the Grand Fleet, the three Home
Depots, the Royal Marine Artillery and Light Infantry.
The ships and torpedo craft were furnished by the
Dover Patrol, which was reinforced by vessels from
the Harwich Force and the French Navy. The Royal
Australian Navy and the Admiralty Experimental
Stations at Stratford and Dover were also represented.

The details thus contributed, which finally composed
the whole striking force, were as shown in the following
table : —

-,]

SIR KOGER KE YES'S FIRST DISPATCH 121

Besides those

belonging to

ships in

preceding

columns.

1^

L-? T-iOVOOOt~CCO
CO tH <o

1,698

»5

o

!>• a t- ci th -^ji cj o

(M 03

01

oo

';jvj3 ifji;t[ixnv

: 'H rH : : : : :

01

'SJddodAVseu ;pj[

: ^ i ; : : ; : ;

-

•sourautuqus

: :<?»::: : : :

o,

•sdiqg Sujuaoia ] :'"'"*:: : : :

lO

•0.^ 'sdjus ?U8JU(j

: : <N --I : : ; : :

CO 1

•s^vog qsjioij

: ;■.'"':: : : : >"•

•sawo

: iM 01 : : : : : :

CI

1

•«'TW

: o o 01 : ■ t : : : ci

CO rH l-H . . ... 5C

•sa-a\L

-* «S 1 - • • ■ • CO • ; : o

: 1-1 !-(;:;: .:.•>*

s.iapvaT; '■ *^' ■""*::•:;:: :

t>

•saasauQ^qSii

: t'. : T-i :;::;:: :

CO

•s.(o;iuopi[

: :: CO ::::::: :

CO

i

Grand Fleet (exclusive ol

Royal Marines)
Harwich Force —

Covering Squadron

For Operations .
Dover Patrol . . . .
Portsmouth .
The Nore
Plymouth

Royal Australian Navy .
French Navy .
Dover Experimental Base
Royal Marino Artillery .
Royal Marine Light Infantrj

3

122 OSTEND AND ZEEBKUGGE

III. — Training of Personnel, Preparation of
Material.

32. A force thus composed and its weapons obviously
needed collective training and special preparation to
adapt them to their purpose.

33. With these objects, the Blocking Ships and the
Storming Forces were assembled towards the end of
February and from the 4th April onwards in the West
Swin Anchorage, where training specially adapted to the
plan of operations was given, and where the organisation
of the expedition was carried on. The material as it
was prepared was used to make the training practical,
and was itself tested thereby. Moreover, valuable prac-
tice was afforded by endeavours to carry out the project
on two occasions on which the conditions of wind and
weather compelled its postponement, and much was
learnt from these temporary failures. The IlimlustaH, at
first at Chatham and later at the Swin, was the parent
ship and training depot, and it is due to Captain A. P.
Davidson, D.S.O., who also did good work in fitting out
the various ships, that the accommodation of the assem-
bling crews and their maintenance during the weeks of
preparation and postponement was so ably organised as
to reduce the discomforts inseparable from the situation
to a minimum. After the second attempt,^ when it
became apparent that there would be a long delay, the
Dominion joined the Uhidmtan, and the pressure on the
available accommodation was relieved by the transfer of
about 350 seamen and marines to her.

34. Two special craft, the Liverpool ferry-steamers
Iris (renamed Iris II) and Daffodil, were selected after
a long search at many ports by Captain Herbert C. J.

1 Oil April 11 1J.

SIR KOGER KEYES'S FIRST DISPATCH li>;i

Grant (Retired) unci a representative of the Director of
Dockyards, on account of their power, large carrying
capacity (1,500), and shallow draft, with a view in the
first place to their pushing the Vindictive alongside the
Mole (for which they were in the result most useful) ; to
the possibility, should the Vindictive be sunk, of their
bringing away all her crew and the landing parties ; and
to their ability to manoeuvre in shallow waters or clear
of minefields or torpedoes. They proved to be admirably
chosen, and rendered good service.

o5. The blocking ships and Vindictive were specially
prepared for their work in Chatham Dockyard, the
Iris II and Daffodil at Portsmouth. I received the most
zealous and able help from all officers and Departments
concerned, who did their utmost to expedite the work in
every way.

36. I was able to devote more personal attention and
time to working out the plan of operations and the pre-
paration of personnel and material than would otherwise
have been possible, because Rear-Admiral Cecil F.
Dumpier, Admiral Superintendent and second in com-
mand of the Dover Flotilla, Commodore the Hon.
Algernon Boyle, C.B., M.V.O.,i Chief of Staff, and
Captain Wilfred Tomkinson," commanding the Sixth
(Dover) Flotilla of Destroyers, practically relieved me of
all the routme work of the Dover base and patrol. I am
greatly indebted to Admiral Dampier for his loyal co-
operation in connection with the operations. In order
to bring together the number of destroyers requisite for
the operation, while maintaining the work of the patrol,
it was necessary to have the entire available force in run-
ning order. This called for high organisation on Captain
Tomkinson's part, and was made especi.illy difficult
' Kc'ciiwd Iho C.MAi. = H.ri-ivt.l llic (..ll.

124 OSTEND AND ZEEBKUGGE

because the period of preparation coincided with that in
which very heavy demands were suddenly made on the
escort flotilla by the pressing needs of the army in France.
The fact that the many additional services which the
Dover Patrol was called on to carry out, in addition to its
routine, were performed without deranging its working,
reflects the greatest credit on Commodore Boyle, whose
exceptional powera of organisation have been invaluable
to me.

37. Keference to Wing-Commander F. A. Brock's '
services during the operation will be made in connection
with the attack on the Mole, but I cannot leave this part
of the subject without recording my indebtedness to him
for the indispensable share he had in the operation.
When, as Vice- Admiral of the Dover Patrol, I first began
to prepare for this operation, it became apparent that
without an effective system of smoke-screening such an
attack could hardly hope to succeed. The system of
making smoke previously employed in the Dover Patrol
was unsuitable for a night operation, as its production
generated a fierce flame, and no other means of making
an effective smoke screen was available. Wing-Coni-
mander Brock and sixty ratings were lent to my command,
a factory was established in the dockyard, and he worked
with great energy to obtain materials, designing and
organising the means and the plans, and eventually
developing the resources with which we finally set out.
These were of great value even in the adverse circum-
stances which befell us, and I greatly deplore the loss of
a man so well qualified to carry experiments in this
matter further. When on the Mole he was very keen to
acquire knowledge of the range-finding apparatus which
might be of use to the country, and his efl"orts to do this
1 Killed.

SIR KOGER KEYES'S FIRST DISPATCH 125

were made without any regard to his personal safety, and
I fear cost this very brave and ingenious officer his life.^

38. The fitting out of the motor launches and coastal
motor boats with smoke apparatus, designed by Win^-
Commander Brock, was carried out at Dover, under short
notice and with untiring energy by ray Flag Captain
Ralph Collins,'^ ably assisted by Commander Hamilton
Benn,^ Engineer Lieutenant-Commander M. G. A.
Edwards, Lieutenant F. C. Archer, and Mr. G. D. Smart
of H.M. Dockyard, Dover.

39. Staff- Paymaster Walter C. Northcott, R.N.R., the
Naval Supply Officer at Dover, was at all times most
zealous and untiring in dealing with the vast quantities
of stores and munitions which had to be checked and
distributed, often at very short notice.

40. The first officer who became available for a com-
mand in the blockships was Lieutenant Ivan B. Franks
[Dolphin). Although suffering from the severe effects of
an accident on service, his confident enthusiasm fired all
who came into touch with him. He was put in charge
of the early preparations of all the blockships and com-
manded the Ix)higenia in the two abandoned attempts, but
to his gi'eat disappointment he was taken ill with appen-
dicitis two days before the actual attack, and had to be
sent to hospital to undergo an operation. I do not wish
the good work he did, and the good example he set, to go
unrecorded.

41. The flag officers of other commands who were in
a position to assist me did so most generously. The
Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet sent me a selected
body of officers and men truly representative of his com-
mand, for I understand that the whole of his command

' Seo infra, para. 72. 2 • Rp(.eived the C.B.

' Promoted to Temporary Acting Captain, R.N.V.R.

12C OSTEND AND 7EEBRUGGE

would have been equally glad to come. From the neigh-
bouring commands at Portsmouth and the Nore, the
Adjutant-General, Royal Marines, and the D^pot at
Chatham, I received support and assistance, not only in
ships and men, but in every possible way. The Rear-
Admiral Commanding the Harwich Force spared me
a flotilla leader and six destroj'ers, l)esides protecting the
northern flank of the area in which I was operating.

Brigadier-General McEwan and his staff" at Chatham
supervised the training of the officers and men from the
Grand Fleet as if for the Royal Naval Division, France.
Their assistance was invaluable, and I much appreciate
their whole-hearted co-operation.

42. I am much indebted to Brigadier-General Charles L.
Lambe, C.M.G., D.S.O., commanding the 7th Brigade of
the Royal Air Force, and Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick C.
Halahan, M.V.O., D.S.O., in command of the Air Forces
under my command, for the co-operation of the 61st
.and 65th Wings, under Lieutenant-Colonels P. F. M.
Fellowes, D.S.O.. and James T. Cull, D.S.O., respectively,
throughout the preparation and execution of the opera-
tions. The 65th Wing was lent for the purpose by the
Field -Marshal Commander-in-Chief, British Armies in
France. For several weeks the 61st Wing was engaged
in frequent reconnaissances, and took a large number
of photographs in diff"erent conditions of tide, from
which photographs, plans and models were constructed.
On the first occasion of attempting the operation, the
65th Wing was already committed to their attack when
I was compelled by shift of wind to withdraw the sea
attack. The air attack was delivered with the greatest
gallantry at a low altitude, and against a tremendous
anti-aircraft defence. To the intense disappointment
of the 65th Wing, mist and rain made it impossible to

SIR ROGER REYES'S FIRST DISPATCH 1L>7

co-operate by repeating the aerial bombardment on the
night of the 22nd-23rcl April, but the 61st Wing and
aircraft from the Guston aerodrome at Dover escorted
the main force across the North Sea.

IV.— Preparatiox and Depenck of Route.

43. The preparation of the routes from the starting
points of attack by the removal of olistructions, and the
placing of navigational marks and those for the long-
range bombardments, was carried out by Captain Henry P.
Douglas/ borne for surveying duties on my staff, and
Lieutenant-Commander Francis E. B. Haselfoot, his
assistant. The completely successful manner in which
this very important work was done, in circumstances of
interference from the enemy and the elements, does
great credit to these officers, both of whom I recommend
to the favourable notice of the Lords Commissioners.

44. To afford protection at a certain point in the
route, and to maintain the aids to navigation during
the approach and retirement of the expedition, a force
consisting of the flotilla-leader Scott and the destroyers
UUcswater, Teazer, and Storh, lent from the Harwich
Force, and the light cruiser Attentire, flying the broad
pendant of Commodore the Hon. Algernon I>. E. H.
Boyle,^ my Chief of Staff, was stationed there. The
duties of this force w^ere not interrupted by the enemy,
but it was insti-umental in controlling and directing the
movements of detached craft in both directions, and
relieved me of all anxiety on that score.

' Received tlie C.M.O.

128 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

V. — The Passage of the Forces.

45. At the moment of starting, the forces were disposed
thus : —

(a) In the Swin.

For the attack on the Zeebrugge Mole : Vindictive,
Iris II, and Daffodil.

To block the Bruges Canal: Thetis, Intrepid, and
Iphigenia.

To block the entrance to Ostend : Siriiis and Brilliant,
[h) At Dover.

T.B.D. WanoicTc (flag of Vice-Admiral).

Unit L, Phoche and North Star.

Unit M, Trident and Mansfield.

Unit F, Whirhvind and Myngs.

Unit R, Velox, Morris, Moorsom, and Melponiene.

Unit X, Tempest and Tetrarch.

To damage Zeebrugge viaduct : Submarines C 1 and
C3.

A special picket boat to rescue crews of C 1 and C 3.

Minesweeper Lingfield to take off surplus steaming
parties of blockships, which had 100 miles to steam.

Eighteen coastal motor boats, numbers 5, 7, 15, 16,
17, 21B, 22B, 23B, 24A, 25BD, 26B, 27A, 28A, 29A,
30B, 32A, 34A, 35A.

Thirty-three motor launches, numbers 79, 110, 121,
128, 223, 239, 241, 257, 258, 262, 272, 280, 282, 308,
314, 345, 397, 416, 420, 422, 424, 513, 525, 526, 533,
549, 552, 555, 557, 558, 560, 561, 562.

To bombard vicinity of Zeebrugge : Monitors Erebus
and Terror.

To attend on monitors, &c. : Termagant, Truculent,
and Manly.

SEA-PLANE VIEW OF THE MOLE, SIIOWINU THE VLVDUCT

REPAIRED

SIR ROGER REYES'S FIRST DISPATCH 120

Outer Patrol off Zeel>ruggo : Attentive, Scott, UUes-
ivater, Teaser, and Storl-.
(c) At Dunhirh

Monitors for liombarding Ostend : Marshal Soult,
Lord Clkc, Prince Eugene, General Craufiircl, M. 24 and
M. 26.

For operating off Ostend : Swift, Faullmor, Matcldess,
Mastiff, and Afridi.

The British destroyers Mentor, Liglitfoot, Zubian,
and French ior^QAo-hotiiH Lestin,Capitaine Mehl, Francis
Gamier, lloux, and Boxiclier, to accompany the monitors.

Eighteen British motor launches, numbers 11, IG,
17, 22, 23, 30, 60, 105, 254, 274, 276, 279, 283, 429,
512, 532, 551, 550, engaged in smoke-screening duty
inshore and rescue work, and six for attending on big
monitors.

Four French motor launches, num])ers 1, 2, 33, and
34, attending on M. 24 and M. 26.

Coastal motor boats (40 feet), numbers 2, 4, 10, and
12 ; (55 feet) 19 and 20.

46. Navigational aids having been estal)lished on the
route, the forces from the Swin and Dover were directed
to join my flag off the Goodwin Sands and proceed in
company to a rendezvous, and thereafter as requisite
to their respective stations ; those from Dunkirk were
given their orders by the Commodore.

47. An operation time-table was issued to govern the
movements of all the forces, wireless signals were pro-
hibited, visual signals of every sort were reduced to
a minimum, and manoeuvring prearranged as far as
foresight could provide. With few and slight delays
the programme for the passage was carried out as laid
down, the special aids to navigation being found of great
assistance.

SITS I

180 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

48. The Harwich Force, under Rear-Admiral Sir Regi-
nald Tj'rwhitt, K.C.B., D.S.O., ^vas posted to cover the
operation and prevent interference from the northward,
which relieved me of all concern on that score.

49. On leaving the Goodwins, the Main Force was
disposed in three columns. The centre column was led
by Yindictivef with Iris II and Daffodil in tow, followed
by the five blocking ships and the paddle mine-sweeper
Lingfield, escorting five motor launches for taking off
the surplus steaming parties of the blocking ships. The
starboard column was led by the Waricich, flying my
flag, followed by the Phoebe and North Star, wliich three
ships were to cover the Vindictive from torpedo attack
while the storming operations were in progress ; Trident
and Mansfield, towing sul^marines C 3 and C 1 ; and
Tetnpest, to escort the two Ostend blockships. The port
column was led by Whirlwind, followed by 3Iyngs and
Moorsom, which ships were to patrol to the northward
of Zeebrugge ; and the Tetrarch, also to escort the Ostend
blockships. Every craft was towing one or more coastal
motor boats, and between the columns were motor
launches.

50. The greater part of the passage had to be carried
out in broad daylight, with the consequent likelihood of
discovery by enemy aircraft or submarine. This risk
was largely countered hy the escort of all the scouting
aircraft under my command. On arrival at a certain
position (C), it being then apparent that the conditions
were favourable, and that there was every prospect of
carrying through the enterprise up to programme time,
a short prearranged wireless signal was made to the
detached forces that the programme would be adhered to.

51. On arrival at a position 1^ miles short of (G), at
whicli Commodore Boyle's force was stationed, the whole

SIR ROGER REYES'S FIRST DISPATCH 101

force stopped for fifteen minutes to enable the surplus
steaming parties of the blockships to be disembarked
and the coastal motor boats slipped. These and the
motor launches then proceeded in execution of previous
orders. On resuming the course the WartvicJc and
Whirlwind, followed by the destroyers, drew ahead on
either bow to clear the passage of enemy outpost vessels.

52. When the Vindictive arrived at a position where
it was necessary for her to alter course for the Mole, the
Waru'icJc. Fhoehe, and North Star swung to starboard and
cruised in the vicinity of the Mole until after the final
withdrawal of all the attacking forces. During this
movement and throughout the subsequent operations
WancicJc was manoeuvred to place smoke screens wherever
they seemed to be most required, and when the wind
shifted from north-east to south-west, her services in
this respect were particularly valuable.

VI. — BoMBABDING FOECES.

53. Zeehruggc. — The monitors Erchus (Captain Charles S.
Wills, C.M.G., D.S.O.) and Terror (Captain Charles W.
Bruton), with the destroyers Termagant, Truculent, and
Manly, were stationed at a position suitable for the long-
range bombardment of Zeebtugge in co-operation with
the attack. Owing to poor visibility and an extraordinary
set of the tide the opening of bombardment was delayed
slightly behind programme time ; otherwise the opera-
tions of this force were carried out according to plan.
During the operation enemy shell fell in the vicinity
of Erebus and Terwr, but neither was hit. On comple-
tion of the bombardment the vessels of this force took
up patrolling positions to cover the retirement from
Zeebrugge. Aerial photographs show the good effect of
this bombardment.

i2

132 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

54. Ostcnd. — Similarly, the monitors Marshal Soult
(Captain George R. B. Blount, D.S.O.), General Craufurd
(Commander Edward Altham), Prince Eugene (Captain
Ernest Wigram, D.S.O.), and Lord Clive (Commander
Reginald J. N. Watson, D.S.O.), and the small monitors
M. 21 (Commander Oliver M. F. Stokes), M. 24 (Acting
Commander Claude P. C. de Crespigny), and M. 26
(Lieutenant - Commander Arthur C. Fawssett) were
stationed by Commodore Hubert Lynes, C.M.G.,^ in
suitable positions to bombard specified batteries. These
craft were attended by the British destroyers Mentor,
Lighffoot, and Zubian, and the French Gapiiaine Mehl,
Francis Gamier, Boux, and Bouclier. The Commodore
reports that the bombardment was undoubtedly useful
in keeping down the fire of the shore batteries. These
returned the monitors' fire about five minutes after the
latter opened, the ships being hit by fragments of shell,
but no material damage being done.

55. Siege Guns. — Co-operation by R.M.A. siege guns
(Colonel Pryce Peacock, R.M.A.) on given enemy targets
was arranged by the Commodore Dunkirk, to which the
enemy replied without causing any casualties or any
damage of importance.

VII. — Attack on Zeebrugge Mole.

56. General. — The attack on the Mole was primarily
intended to distract the enemy's attention from the ships
engaged in blocking the Bruges Canal. Its immediate
objectives were, firstly, the capture of the 4-1 inch
battery at the sea end of the Mole*, which was a serious

' Received the C.B.

* Note. — After the evacuation of Zeebrugge by the enemy it was
found that these guns were of 5-9 inch calibre, and subsequent to
these operations the battery was moved from the end of the Mole
on to the parapet.

SIR ROGER KEYES'S FIRST DISPATCH 133

menace to the passage of the blockships, and, secondly,
the doing of as much damage to the material on the Mole
us time permitted ; for it \Yas not the intention to remain
on the Mole after the primary object of the expedition
had been accomplished.

The attack was to consist of two parts ; (a) the landing
of storming and demolition parties, and (h) the destruction
of the iron viaduct between the shore and the stone
Mole.

57. The units detailed for the attack were : —

(a) H.M. Ship Y indict ire, Acting Captain F. B. Car-
penter ^ (late Emperor of India) ; the special steamers
Iris II, Commander Valentine Gibbs^ {Tiger), and
Daffodil, Lieutenant Harold G. Campbell^ [Emiicror
of India) ; the latter detailed to push the Vindictive
alongside the Mole and keep her there as long as might
be requisite.

{b) Submarines C 3 and C 1, commanded by Lieu-
tenants Richard D. Sandford ^ and Aubrey C. Newbold
respectively, attended by a picket boat under Lieutenant-
Commander Francis H. Sandford, D.S.O.^

58. Besides the above, a flotilla of twenty-four motor
launches and eight coastal motor boats were told off- for
rescue work and to make smoke screens or lay smoke
floats, and nine more coastal motor boats to attack the
Mole and enemy vessels inside it, &c.

At 11.40 p.m. the coastal motor boats detailed to lay
the first smoke screen ran in to a very close range and
proceeded to lay smoke floats and by other methods
produce the necessary *fog'. These craft came under
heavy fire, and only their small size and great speed
saved them from destruction.

1 Received tlie V.C. « Killed.

^ Rcccivi'd tilt) D.S.O. ^ Promoted to CoinniaiuU r.

134 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

59. Vindictk-e.—Ai 11.30 p.m. the Blankenberghe light
buoy was abeam, and the enemy had presumably heard
or seen the approaching forces, as many star shells were
fired, lighting up the vicinity, but no enemy patrol craft
were sighted. At this time the wind, which had been
from the north-east, and therefore favourable to the
success of the smoke screens, died away, and at a later
period came from a southerly direction. Many of the
smoke floats laid just ofif the Mole extension were sunk
by enemy fire, and this in conjunction with the changes
in the wind lessened the effectiveness of the smoke screen.

60. At 11.56, the ship having just passed through
a smoke screen, the Mole extension was seen in the
semi-darkness about 300 yards off on the port bow.
Speed was increased to full, and course altered so that
allowing for cross tide the ship would make good a
closing course of 45 degrees to the Mole. The Vindictive
purposely withheld her fire to avoid being discovered,
but almost at the moment of her emerging from the
smoke the enemy opened fire. So i)romptly, under
the orders of Commander Edward 0. B. S. Osborne,^
was this replied to by the port 6-inch battery, the upper-
deck pom-poms, and the gun in the fore-top, that the
firing on both sides appeared to be almost simultaneous.
Captain Carpenter was conning the ship from the port
forward flame - thrower hut. Lieutenant - Commander
Robert R. Rosoman,'^ with directions as to the handling
of the ship should the captain be disabled, was in the
conning tower from which the ship was being steered.

61. At one minute after midnight on the 23rd April,

St. George's Day — the programme time being midnight —

the Vindictive was put alongside the Mole, taking gently

on the special fenders of the port bow, and the starboard

' Roceived the D.S.O. " Proinolcd tu ConmKuulcr.

SIR KOGER KEYES'S FIRST DISPATCH 135

juichor was let go. At this time the noise was terrific.
During the previous few minutes the ship had been hit
by a large number of shell and many casualties caused.
Lieutenant -Colonel Bertram N. Elliot, D.S.O., and
Major Alexander A. Cordner, the two senior officers of
the Royal Marine storming parties, and Captain Henry C.
Halahan, D.S.O., commanding the naval storming parties,
all ready to lead the men on to the Mole, had been killed ;
Commander Patrick H. Edwards, R.N.V.R., and many
other officers and men killed or wounded.

62. As there was some doubt as to the starboard
anchor having gone clear, the port anchor was dropped
close to the foot of the Mole, and the cable bowsed-to
with less than a shackle out. A three-knot tide was
running past the Mole ; and the scend alongside the
Mole created by the slight swell cavised much movement
on the ship. There was an interval of three or four
minutes before Daffodil could arrive and commence to
push Vindictive bodily alongside. During this interval
the ship could not be got close enough for the special
mole-anchors to hook, and it was a very trying period.
Many of the brows had been broken by shell fire, and
a heavy roll had broken up the foremost mole-anchor as
it was being placed. The two foremost brows, however,
reached the wall, and the naval storming parties, led
in the most gallant manner by Lieutenant-Commander
Bryan F. Adams ^ {Princess Itoyal) ran out along them
closely followed by the Royal Marines, gallantly led by
Captain and Adjutant A. R. Chater.^ Owing to the
rolling of the ship a most disconcerting motion was
imparted to the brows, the outer ends of which were
* sawing ' considerably on the Mole parapet. Officers and
men were carrying Lewis guns, bombs, ammunition, &c.,
' ri'jui'jtcd lu Cuininandor. - Ivocoivttl tlie D.y.O.

136 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

and were under heavy inacliine-gun fire at close range.
Add to this a drop of 30 feet between the ship and
the Mole and some idea of the conditions which had
to be faced may be realised. Yet the storming of the
Mole by these two brows, and later by two others which
were got into position, was carried out without the
smallest delay, and without any apparent consideration
of self-preservation. Some of the first men on the Mole
did splendid work with the object of hauling one of the
large mole-anchors across the parapet. Lieutenant-Com-
mander Rosoman assisted in this on board, encouraging
and directing the men with great coolness and abilitj'.

Daffodil arrived three minutes after Vindictirc, closely
followed by Iris II. Both suffered less in the approach,
Vindictive occupying practically all the enemy's attention.
As already stated, Daffodil's primary duty was to push
Vindictive bodily on to the Mole, to enable her to be
secured, after which Daffodil was to come alongside and
land her parties over that ship. In the end her men
had to disembark from her bows on to Vindictive, as it
was found essential to continue to push Vindictive on
to the Mole throughout the action. This duty was
magnificently carried out by her Commanding Officer,
Lieutenant Harold G. Campbell ^ [Emperor of India), who,
during the greater part of the time, was suffering from
a wound in the head which for the time deprived him
of the sight of one eye. Without the assistance of
Daffodil very few of the storming parties from Vindictive
could have been landed or re-embarked ; and the greatest
credit is due to Mr. Campbell for the skilful manner in
which he handled his ship.

63. The landing from Iris II was even more trying.
The scend alongside made her bump heavily, and

1 K. ceived tlio D.S.O.

SIK ROGER KEYES'S FIRST DISPATCH 137

rendered the use of the scaling ladders very difficult,
many being broken up. Lieutenant Claude E. V. Havvk-
ings (Erin) ascended the first ladder, secured the mole-
anchor, and M'as then shot and fell on to the Mole.
Lieutenant-Commander George N. Bradford {Orion) got
to the top of a derrick with a mole-anchor on it, leaped
on to the Mole, secured the anchor and was shot, falling
into the water between Iris II and the Mole. Gallant
attempts to recovei* his body were made, Petty Officer
M. D. Hallihan being killed while so employed. The
gallantry and devotion to duty of these two officers was
of the highest order. In the end, so impossible was it
to get the mole-anchors to hold, that the cable was
slipped, and Iris II went alongside Vindictiie to enable
' D ' Company and her Royal Marines to land across her,
but only a few men had got to the Vindictive when the
withdrawal signal was sounded.

64. On board the Vindictive the foremost 7-5-inch
Howitzer's Marine crew were all killed or wounded in
the very early part of the action. A naval crew from
a 6-inch gun took their place, and were almost entirely
wiped out. At this period the ship was being hit every
few seconds, chiefly in the upper works, from which the
splinters caused many casualties. It was difficult to
locate the guns which were doing the most damage, but
Lieutenant Charles N. B. Rigby, R.M.A., with his Royal
Marines in the foretop, kept up a continuous fire with
pom-poms and Lewis guns, changing rapidly from one
target to another. Two heavy shells made direct hits
on the foretop, killing Lieutenant Rigby and killing or
disabling all in the top, except Sergeant N. A. Finch, ^
who, though severely wounded, continued firing till the
top was wrecked by another heavy shell. Captain
> Received the V.C.

138 OSTEND AND ZEEBKUGGE

Carpenter repoi'ts that before going into the foretop Lieu-
tenant Rigby had displayed fine courage and ability, and
that the success of the storming of the Mole was largely
due to the good work of this officer and the men under
his orders.

65. Acting Captain Reginald Dallas Brooks, R.M.A.,^
was in command of the R.M.A. gun detachments in
Vindictive. He not only set his men generally a splendid
example of devotion to duty, but commanded the crew of
the 11-inch Howitzer in its exposed position in a very
fine manner.

66. Half an hour after the storming of 'the Mole had
been commenced, the Captain visited the decks below
and fomid Staff-Surgeon James McCutcheon^ and the
staff under him working with great energy and care.
A constant stream of casualties were being brought
down every hatch, yet there appeared to be no delay
in dealing with each case.

67. Tfie Mole. — The attack on the Mole was designed
to be carried out bj' a storming force to prepare the way
for, and afterwards to cover and protect, the operations
of a second force which was to cany out the actual
demolition, damage, «S:c. Both these forces comprised
Royal Naval ranks and ratings under the command of
Captain Henry C. Halahan, D.S.O.," and Royal Marines
under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Bertram N,
Elliot, D.S.0.3

68. The storming force was composed of Naval Com-
panies— A. (Lieutenant-Commander Bryan F. Adams,"*
Princess Roi/al), B. (Lieutenant Arthur G. B. T. Chamber-
lain,^ Neptune), and D. (Lieutenant-Commander G. N.
Bradford, Orion), all under the command of Lieutenant-

' Received tlic D.!S.O. - Promoted to Floet Surgeon.

^ Killed. ' riomotcd to Commander.

SIR ROGER KEYESS FIRST DISPATCH 109

Commander Arthur L. Harrison^ {L(O)i), and the 4th
Battalion, Royal Marines, organised as follows : —

' A ' (Chatham) Company : Major Charles E. C. Eagles,
D.S.O.i

* B ' (Portsmouth) Company : Captain Edward Barn-
ford, D.S.0.2

' C ' (Plymouth) Company : Major Bernard G. Weller,
D.S.C.3

Machine Gun Company: Captain Charles B. Cony-
beare.

On the death of Lieutenant-Colonel Elliot, D.S.O.,
and Major Alexander A. Cordner (Second in Command),
Major Weller assumed command of the battalion.
Captain A. R. Chater * was battalion adjutant.

This force was embarked mainly in Vindictive, but
partly in Iris II.

09. The demolition force was composed of C. Naval
Company, under the command of Lieutenant Cecil C.
Dickinson ■' (Eesolution), and was divided into three
parties. Nos. 1 and 3, under Sub-Lieutenant FelLx E.
Chevallier ^' (Iron DuJce), being conveyed in the Daffodil,
and No. 2, under Lieutenant Dickinson, in the Vindictive.

70. The objectives of the storming forces had been
communicated to the officei-s, and specific duties allotted
to the different units, who had been exercised on a replica
of the Mole, described to the men as * a position in
France '.

7L This specialised preparation was necessary, but it
handicapped the leaders of the storming parties, for,
owing to the difficulty in recognising objects on the
Mole, the Vindictive overran her station and was berthed

* Killed. = Received the V.C.

' Received thoC.B. •• Proinotod lo M.iji)r; D.S.O.

■■ Received the D.S.O. ' rruinuted lo LiouUiiaat.

140 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

some 400 yards further to the westward (or shore end
of the Mole) than was intended (see plan^). It was
realised beforehand that 1 'indictive might not exactly hit
off her position, but the fact that the landing was carried
out in an unexpected place, combined with the heavy
losses already sustained by Vindict'ue, seriously dis-
organised the attacking force. The intention was to
land the storming parties right on top of the 4*1 inch
guns (see footnote to para. 56) in position on the seaward
end of the Mole, the silencing of which was of the first
importance, as they menaced the approach of the block-
ships. The leading blockship was timed to pass the
lighthouse twenty-five minutes after Vindictlce came
alongside. This period of time proved insufficient to
organise and carry through an attack agamst the enemy
on the seaward end of the Mole, who were able to bring
heavy machine-gun fire to bear on the attacking forces.
As a result the blockships came under an unexpected
fire from the light guns on the Mole extension,* though
the 4-1 inch battery on the Mole head remained silent
(see paragraphs 73 and 94).

72. Lieutenant-Commander Adams, followed by the
survivors of ' A ' and ' B ' Companies, were the first to
land, no enemy being then seen on the Mole. These
two companies had suffered severely before landing,
especially ' B ', both of whose officers were casualties.
They found themselves on a pathway on the Mole
parapet about 8 feet wide, with a wall 4 feet high on
the seaward side, and an iron railing on the Mole side.
From this pathway there was a drop of 15 feet on to the
Mole proper. This raised portion of the Mole will in

» At p. 110.

* Note. — After the evacuation it was found that three of the guns
on the Mole extension were of A-l calibre.

SIR ROGER KEYER'S FIRST DISPATCH 141

future he referred to as the parapet. Followed by his
men, Mr. Adams went along the pampet to the left
(towards the lighthouse extension), where he found a
look-out station or control, with a range-finder behind
and above it. A bomb was put into this station, which
was found clear of men. Wing Commander Frank A.
Brock here joined the party, and went inside to investi-
gate. He was not seen again by Mr. Adams, but
from other accounts it is believed he was seen alive
later. ^

73. Near this look-out station an iron ladder led down
to the Mole, and three of Mr. Adams' party descended it
and prevented a few of the enemy from reaching the
harbour side of the Mole. Two destroyers alongside
the Mole showed no activity up to this time, nor did
Mr. Adams see the three-gun battery at the Mole end

^ A warrant-oificer (The Times, April 26) declares that Wing-
Commander Brock was ' knocked out ' while ' going single-handed
for a gun's crew ' on the Mole. ' I can imagine him ', says
a friend (The Times, April 25) 'being on the Mole at Zeebrugge,
and, if he lost his revolver, fighting on with Iiis fists." A member
of the Naval storming party gives the 'following account of his
end {Morning Post, Ajiril 27, 1918) : ' We were one of the earliest
crowds to go over, and Commander Brock wont ahead. It was
a fearful job getting over the brow, but the Commander dropped
down on to the Mole, a distance of fifteen feet. " Come on, you
boys,'' he shouted, and one by one we followed him. There were
Huns near us in a nest surrounded by barbed wire, but we stormed
that and reached one of the guns on the Mole. Commander Bi-ock,
single-handed, attacked the gun's crew, and we captured the gun
and put it out of action. Then we went further along the Mole,
and in the light of the star-shells I saw the officer fighting the crew
of another gun. The last time I saw him he was removing one of
the locks of the gun. He shouted to us to go on, and said that he
was coming too, but I never saw him again. A Marine told me
that just before we went back to the ship he saw Commander Brock
wounded and being held up against the side of the Mole by two
Marines, who refused to leave him.'

142 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

fire at any time whilst he wa«5 on the parapet, but
a machine gun about 100 yards to the westward of these
guns was firing on his party. It appeared at this time
that the enemy were firing at the Vindictive from the
shore end of the Mole, but no gun flashes were seen, as
everything was so well illuminated by enemy star shell
and the rockets fired by Vindictive. After capturing the
look-out station Mr. Adams advanced to the eastward
about 40 yards, where he left his party in position and
himself returned to collect more men.

74. Returning to the look-out station, Mr. Adams found
only some wounded, but later collected t\N'o Lewis gunners
and a small party under Petty Officer George E. Antel V O.N.
232634 (Lion). These he sent to the eastward and the
Petty Officer on board, as he had been wounded in the
hand and arm before landing, and although in great pain
had carried on most gallantly.

75. The situation now was that Mr. Adams' few men
and the two Lewis gunners were beyond the look-out
station, protected from the machine-gun fire from the
direction of the Mole head, but exposed to that from
the destroyers alongside the Mole, and the men were
being hit apparently by machine guns and pom-poms.
Lieutenant-Commander Harrison arrived at this time ;
this gallant officer was severely wounded in the head
on board Vindictive before coming alongside, but directly
he recovered consciousness he joined- his section on the
Mole ; on receiving Mr. Adams' report he directed him
to try and get more men. Major Weller, Commanding
the Royal Marines, on receiving Mr. Adams' report,
despatched Lieutenant G. Underbill '^ with reinforcements
to assist Mr. Harrison. Whilst this party was being
collected, Mr. Adams returned to the look-out station,

1 Received the D.S.M. - Received the D.S.C.

SIR ROGER KF.YES'S FIRST DISPATCH 14^

where he was informed that Mr. Harrison had led a rush
along the parapet and that he and several of his men had
been killed by machine-gun fire. Able Seaman M^Kenzie,^
one of B Company's machine gunners with Mr. Harrison,
did good execution with his gun, though wounded in
several places, and Able Seaman Eaves* was killed in
attempting to bring in Mr. Harrison's body.

76. About this time the recall was sounded, and
Mr. Adams therefore withdrew his men from the para-
pet and Mole, collected the wounded, and sent them
to the Vindictive. He himself went along the parapet
in search of Mr. Harrison, but not finding him, returned
to assist in the re-embarkation. As originally planned,
Mr. Harrison's bluejacket storming parties were to deal
with the battery on the Mole head and Mole extension
only, but for the reasons given in paragraph 71 they
started 400 yards further from their objectives than was
intended, with the intervening ground fully exposed to
machine-gun fire. Mr. Adams and his men, and later
Mr. Harrison, pressed their attack most gallantly, and,
though denied a full measure of success, it appears
probable their fire prevented the 4-1 inch battery at
the Mole head coming into action, as these guns did
not open fire at the blockships (see paragraph 94).

77. Marine Storming Party. — The Royal Marines of this
expedition were drawn from the four divisional head-
quarters and the Grand Fleet. The battalion was to
provide the officers and men of the storming force, the
crews of four Stokes guns, one 11-inch howitzer, five
pom-poms, and some Lewis guns of the Vindictive's arma-
ment, and a few men to work with the Naval demolition

> Received the V.C.

* Note. — Ablo Seaman Eaves, it appears, was not killed, but was
very severely wounded and taken prisoner.

144 OSTEND AND ZEEBEUGGE

party. It was carried to Zeebrugge in the Vindictive,
except A Company, two Vickers guns of the machine-
gun section, and two Stokes guns, which went in Iris II.
All had taken part in the special training and practices
already referred to, the howitzer crews having been put
through a course at Shoeburyness.

78. The first objective of the Eoyal Marine Battalion
was a fortified zone situated about 150 yards from the
seaward end of the Mole proper ; its capture was of
the first importance, as an enemy holding it could bring
a heavy fire to bear on tl|e parties landing from Vindictive.
This objective being gained, the Royal Marines were to
continue down the Mole^ and hold a position so as to
cover the operations of the demolition parties from an
attack by enemy troops advancing from the landward
end of the Mole. The destruction of the viaduct by Sub-
marine C 3 was intended to assist in this, by preventing
reinforcements reaching the Mole from the shore. Owing
to Vindictive coming alongside to landward of this zone,
the Royal Marines were faced with the double duty of
preventing an enemy attack from the shore end and
of themselves attacking the fortified zone. The casualties
already sustained and the fact that Iris II could not
remain alongside to land her company of Royal Marines
(see paragragh 63) left insufiicient men in the early stages of
the landing to carry out both operations. The situation was
a difficult one, for to attack the foi'tified zone first might
have enabled the enemy to advance up the Mole and seize
positions abreast Vindictive with the most serious con-
sequences to the whole landing force, whereas by not

1 The fortified zone lay to the west or right of the berth
Vindictive was intended to take. In fact it lay to the east of her
position owing to Vindldive's mischance, leaving its assault to the
Naval storming party. See plan on p. 110.

:::; u.-

-< - _

SIR ROGER REYES'S FIRST DISPATCH 145

attacking the fortified zone the guns at the Mole head
could not be prevented from firing at the blockships.
As will be seen in subsequent paragraphs, the Royal
Marines first secured the landward side, after which
an assault was organised against the fortified zone, but
the unavoidable delay prevented this attack from being
carried through beR>re the blockships had passed in and
the recall sounded. Major Weller's action was correct ;
lack of men prevented him reinforcing the l>luejacket
storming parties under Mr. Harrison and Mr. Adams,
who had in consequence to attempt an assault on a very
strong position with the depleted A and B Companies,
and without the assistance of D Company, which could
not be landed in time from Iris II (see paragraph 63).
How heroically they failed has been related in paragraphs
72 to 75.

79. No. 5 Platoon (Lieutenant T. F. V. Cooke ^) was the
first to land, and proceeded to the right (west) along the
parapet. They silenced a party of snipers who were
firing from near No. 2 Shed into the men landing. Cap-
tain and Adjt. A. R. Chater^ initiated this, which Major
Weller considers greatly assisted the disembarkation.
Captain Bamford^ now joined, and with Lieutenant Cooke
and this platoon reached a position some 200 yards from the
Vindictive ; their action greatly assisted the advance along
the Mole, they themselves being exposed to a galling fire.
Lieutenant Cooke, who set a fine example, was twice
wounded, and was rendered unconscious ; he was most
gallantly carried back to the Vindictice by Private John
D. L. Press,^ R.M.L.L, who was himself wounded.

80. No. 0 Platoon and the remnants of No. 10, under
Lieutenant C. D. R. Lamplough,^ were the next to land.

1 Recoived the D.S.O. - Received the V.C.

» Received the C.O.M. ^ Received the D.S.O.

146 OSTEND AND ZEEBKUCOE

Tlie5' descended from the parapet to the Mole (a drop
of 15 feet) by means of ropes, and proceeded to establish
a strong point at the shoreward end of No. 3 Shed, to
prevent possible attack from that direction. This unit
later attacked a destroyer alongside the Mole, inflicting
damage on the craft and crew.

81. Units were now rapidlj* landing, and No. 7 Platoon
(Lieutenant H. A. P. de Berrj') succeeded in j^lacing their
hea\y scaling ladders in position, and then formed up to
support Nos. 9 and 10 Platoons. The successful placing
of the scaling ladders was largely due to Sergeant-Major C. J.
Thatcher.^ Major Weller then received information that
the naval storming party needed reinforcements. He
therefore despatched No. 12 Platoon and the remnants
of No. 11, under Lieutenant G. Underhill,^ to their assist-
ance. These platoons advanced to the left (east) along
the parapet, and reached the look-out station, where
they were checked by machine-gun fire ; Mr. Adams
and his men were some 40 to 50 yards ahead of them,
and both parties could make no headway along the
exposed jiarapet. Meanwhile No. 5 Platoon, which had
been recalled from its advanced position, with Nos. 7
and 8 Platoons, all under Captain Bamford, were forming
up on the Mole for an assault on the fortified zone and
the 4-1 inch batteiy at the Mole head. This attack was
launched, but before it could be developed the general
recall was sounded. The units fell back in good order,
bringing their wounded with them. The passing of the
men from the Mole on to the j^arapet by means of
the scaling ladders was rendered hazardous by the
enemy opening fire at that portion of the Mole, several
ladders being destroyed ; the men were sent across in
small batches from the comparative shelter afforded
' Received tlie D.S.C.

STR ROGEK REYES'S FIRST DISPATCH 147

by No. '> Shed, such rushes taking place fis far as
possible in the intervals between the enemy's bursts of fire.

82. Tlie Demolition or C Company. — This company was
under the orders of Lieutenant Cecil C. Dickinson ^
{Besohition), and was divided into three parties, Nos. 1
and 3 consisting of Sub-Lieutenant Felix E. Chevallier"
[Iron Diil-e) and twenty-nine ratings in the Daffodil, and
No. 2 of Lieutenant Dickinson and twenty-one ratings
in the Vindicfire. Twenty-two rank and file, R.M.L.I.,
were attached for the transport of the explosive equipment.

83. Lieutenant Dickinson and No. 2 party landed
after the Naval Storming Parties and assembled on
the pathway of the par.apet, which })ecame somewhat
crowded before the scaling ladders could be got into
position to enable the men to descend on to the Mole.
No. 2 party then proceeded to No. 3 shed. The heavy
fire from the destroyers alongside the Mole prevented
.iny advance towards the shore, and the demolition of
this shed was therefore impracticable ; charges were,
however, placed and everything prepared in case an
opportunity for its destruction occurred. An attempt
was made to place a charge alongside the destroyers,
but was repulsed by their fire. Some bombs were there-
fore thrown on board. The enemy's shell fire at this
portion of the Mole became very heavy, and the recall
))eing sounded, the party re-embarked under the conditions
related in para. 81.

84. The demolition party was on the Mole about
55 minutes, and it was solely on account of the proxi-
mity of our own storming parties that no destruction
took place. This party, ably led by Lieutenant Dickinson?
behaved in a most cool and undisturbed manner both
during the approach (when they suffered severely) and

' deceived the D.S.O. 2 p,-oniotctl to Lioutonant.

k2

148 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

on the Mole. After returning on board the extra ex-
plosives, etc., were jettisoned, as they were then only
a danger to the ship. The preparation of the demolition
scheme and organization of the company for carrying it
out was very efficiently planned by Lieutenant-Commander
Francis H. Sandford, D.S.O.,' borne for special sei*vice on
my Staff.

85. Experimental Parti/. — The account of the attack on
the Mole would not be complete without reference to the
contribution in officers and men made by a detachment
from the Admiralty Experimental Station at Stratford,
and the work done by them. This detachment was
commanded by Lieutenant Graham S. Hewett, R.N.V.R.,
with Lieutenant A. L. Eastlake, R.E., second-in-command.
It contributed thirty-four men, all volunteers, for the
working of the fixed and portable flame-throwers, phos-
phorus grenades, etc., either on board Vindictive, Iris II,
and Daffodil, or with the various naval and marine parties
landed on the Mole. The fixed flame-throwers in Vindictive
were put out of action by enemy shell fire. The portable
ones accompanied the seaman and marine landing parties,
the personnel of the experimental party sharing the diffi-
culties and dangers of the assault. Lieutenant Hewett
specially mentions Air-Mechanics W. H. Gough and W. G.
Ryan for good service during the attack on the Mole.

86. Destruction of Viaduct. — The object of this part
of the attack on the Mole was to prevent reinforcements
from the land passing on to the Mole during the opera-
tions. It was proposed to do this by exploding one or
two old submarines in contact with the iron piers
and cross-ties of the viaduct. It was calculated that
a C class submarine at a speed of 6 knots would penetrate
the light bracing of the piers up to her conning tower.

1 Promoted to Commander.

SIR ROGER KEYESS IIRST DISPATCH U9

. 87. To enable the submarine to be abandoned and con-
tinue her course automatically, C 1 and C 3 were fitted
with gyro-control. A picket boat was provided for the
escape of the crew, and each submarine had two motor
skiffs, they also carried a light scaling ladder each, so
that in case all other means of rescue failed, they might
climb on to the viaduct and escape along it from the
effects of the explosion. Exploding charges, primers,
batteiy, and switch gear were devised and fitted. These
three craft were towed by T.B.D.s Trident and Mansfield to
certain positions, whence they proceeded under their own
power.

88. Submarine C 3 (Lieutenant Richard D. Sandford ')
proceeded on the courses laid down, and duly sighted the
viaduct right ahead, distance about a mile and a half.
Shortly after this, ))y the light of star shell, fire was
opened on C 3, apparently from 4-inch guns, but was
not long maintained. When the viaduct was about half
a mile oft', a flare on the far side silhouetted the Mole and
viaduct, which appeared about two points on the port
bow. Two searchlights were then switched on to C 3,
and off again, possibly in order that the submarine might
run into the viaduct and be caught. By this time the
viaduct was clearly visible. One hundred yards away,
course was altered to ensure striking the viaduct exactly
at right angles. C 3 struck exactly between two rows of
piers at a speed of nine and a half knots, riding up on to
the horizontal girders of the viaduct, and raising the hull
bodily about two feet ; she penetrated up to the conning
tower.

89. The crew, having mustered on deck before the
collision, lowered and manned the skift". The fuses were
then ignited and the submarine abandoned, the skifl^s

1 Received the V.C.

150 OSTEND AND ZEEBKUGGE

course being set to the westward ugaiust the current.
Her propeller having been damaged, oars had to be used.
Immediately the skiff left the submarine, the two search-
lights were switched on, and fire was opened with
machine guns, rifles, and pom-poms, the viaduct being
lined with riflemen firing under the wind screen, and the
houses on the inner end of the Mole opening on her with
pom-poms. The boat was holed many times, but was
kept afloat by special pumps which had been fitted.
Mr. Sandford (twice) and two of the crew were wounded
at this time. As only slow progress could be made
against the current, the charge exploded when the skiff
was but two or three hundred yards from the viaduct.
The explosion appeared to have great effect, much debris
falling into the water around. Both searchlights im-
mediately went out, and firing became spasmodic. The
picket boat was then sighted, and the skiff's crew taken
on board, the wounded being finally transfen-ed to the
T.B.D. Phcehe. Mr. Sandford describes the behaviour of
all his crew as splendid, and worthy of the high traditions
of the submarine service. He selects his next in com-
mand, Lieutenant John H. Price, D.S.C., R.N.K.,^ for
mention, and states that his assistance was invaluable,
and his conduct in a position of extreme danger exem-
plary. To this modest praise of the exi)loit I would add
that the officers and men, who eagerly undertook such
hazards, are deserving of their Lordships' highest recog-
nition. They were all well aware that if then* means of
rescue failed them, as through untoward circumstances
it nearly did, and they had been in the water at the
moment of the explosion, they must almost inevitably have
been stunned and drowned, or killed outright, by the
force of such an explosion. Yet they disdained to use
1 Kcceivcd I lie D.S.O.

SIR ROGEK KE YES'S FIRST DISPATCH 151

the gyro-steering which would have enabled them to
abandon the submarine at a safe distance, and preferred
to make sure, as far as was humanly possible, of the
accomplishment of their duty,

90. Submarine C 1 (Lieutenant Aubrey C. Newbold),
owing to delay caused by the parting of the tow, did not
arrive in the vicinity of the viaduct till the retirement
had commenced. He had previously seen a big flash, but
had not heard any sound, and was therefore in doubt as
to what the force in general had done, but realized that
his boat might be required for another occasion. He
therefore retired, though he and his crew immediately
volunteered for similar service. They were naturally
disappointed, but in my opinion Lieutenant Newbold was
perfectly right, and their Lordships will not lose sight of
the fact that they, equally with the olficers and men of
C 3, eagerly embarked on the enterprise in full realization
of what the consequences might well be.

91. The picket boat employed for rescuing the crew of
C 3 was commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Francis H.
Sandford, D.S.O., who had organised the method of
attack on the viaduct. The picket boat displayed bad
qualities when towed above a certain speed in the pre-
vailing conditions of wind and sea. She was steered
only with great difliculty, and was twice on her beam
ends, being saved from total capsize by the tow parting.
She then proceeded under her own steam, and en-
deavoured to reach the viaduct Ijefore the explosion.
Her speed was not as much as was expected ; still, she
arrived in time to pick up the motor-skifT very shortly
after the explosion, and transferred the officers and men
to the Plicehe. This boat subsequently returned to Dover
under her own steam, as her fore compartment being
holed and full of water made toNving inadvisable. From

152 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

first to last she had made a voyage of 170 miles to and
from the Belgian coast in unpleasant conditions, and
effected the rescue in the face of almost insurmountable
difficulties, due to enemy action, weather, and tide.
I have already recommended Lieutenant-Commander
Francis Sandford for promotion on this and previous
grounds.' His boat's crew were all volunteers, and I am
including them in my general list of recommeudutions to
their Lordships' notice.

VIII. — Blocking Operations.

92. The blocking of the Bruges Canal and the entrance
to Ostend Harbour was the principal part of the whole
objective, the damage to the Zeebrugge Mole being sub-
sidiary thereto. To the Intrepid, Iphigenia, and Thetis
was assigned the duty in the Bruges Canal ; Brilliant and
Sirius being detailed for Ostend.

93. Zeebrugge. — The orders to the blockships were to
proceed into the canal. If her two consorts were seen to
be following, the leading vessel [Thetis) was to ram the
lock gates ; the second and third [Intrepid and Ipihigcnia)
were to be run ashore near the entrance at the southern
end of the piers, this being the narrowest part of the
channel and the position best calculated to block the
channel by silt. This opinion as to the best position was
based on local knowledge, and the decision to attempt
the project in this way was come to after much con-
sideration, and bearing in mind the fact that if the lead-
ing vessel should fail to block the lock gates, and should
sink in the channel short of the gates, she would have
been no obstruction ; whereas two shij^s well athwart
the channel at the entrance would be certain to set up
silt and cause great inconvenience to the enemj'.

1 Promoted to Commander,

SIR ROGER KEYES'S FIRST DISPATCH 153

94. The proceedings of these ships were as follows: —
Thetis (Commander Ralph S. Sneyd, D.S.O.').— Sighted
the Zeebrugge Mole ahead, and signalled the fact to the
ships astern. She was greatly assisted by rockets fired
from Vindictive,' which showed up the Mole extension
and the lighthouse, and also by Captain Ralph Collins ' in
a motor launch, who hailed the Thetis and gave her the
bearing of the lighthouse. After rounding the latter the
barge-boom came into view, and Thetis was steered for
the barge furthest from the Mole, opening fire at the
lighthouse, and then at the barge, which is reported from
subsequent observation to have been sunk. The ship
was under a fairly heavy fire from the light guns on the
Mole extension, but her captain did not see any firing
from the 4-1-inch battery at the Mole head. As the ship
approached what appeared to be an opening between the
barges and the net obstruction extending to the south-
eastward from them she commenced to swing to port.
She was given full port helm, but ran into the nets be-
tween the two end buoys, and, continuing to forge ahead,
took the nets with her. The piers of the canal entrance
were in sight when both engines were reported to have
brought up. TJtdis had thus cleared the net ob-
struction away enough to enable the ships following to
pass to starboard of her, and she signalled to them to do
so. Being then about 300 yards from the eastern pier-
head, and having drifted slightly to port (shoreward), she
api^ears to have grounded. She had a list to starboard,
and was settling down, having been frequently holed along

' Promoted to Captain.

" They were fired, according to the Preas Bureau Narrative
{supra, p. 55), from the stern cabin of Vindictive by one of Com-
mander Brock's firework experts who had never been to sea
before. ' Received the C.B.

154 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

the starboard side by gunfire. She continued to be hit
from the Mole, from craft alongside it, and from guns on
shore east of the canal. One or two machine guns were
also firing at the ship, her 6-inch forecastle gun engaging
these guns until her own smoke made it impossible to see.
Communication with the engine-room having broken down,
a messenger was sent, and Engineer Lieutenant-Com-
mander Konald C. Boddie ^ {Hercules) succeeded in starting
the starboard engine, which moved the ship ahead ; and
being still aground aft, her head swung to starboard into
the dredged channel. As she appeared to be sinking,
the commander cleared the boiler rooms, sent the boat-
keepers to their boats, oi'dered the smoke to be turned
on and the ship to be abandoned. Owing to the death of
the petty officer in charge of them, the forward firing keys
were not in position ; smoke and shell fumes prevented
their being found, so that the charges were fired by the
after keys ; they detonated well, and the ship then
quickly sank. The ship's company manned the one
remaining cutter and pulled to M.L. 52(5 (Lieutenant
Hugh. A Littleton,^ R.N.V.R.), which was lying near.
Although crowded and holed in two or three places, the
cutter was got away w'ithout confusion, due to the
exertions of Lieutenant George A. Belben" {Feneloi)e],
Commander Sne3'd and Lieutenant Francis J. Lambert ■
[Sir Juhii Moore) Ijeing at this time disabled by gas.

95. iHtrepid (Lieutenant Stuart S. Bonham-Carter,'
Emperor of India). — This ship had been unable to get rid
of her spare watch of stokers, owing at first to the delay
in her motor launch getting alongside, and apparently to
the disinclination of the surplus crew to miss the coming
fight. She therefore proceeded to the canal with 87
officers and men on board instead of 54. On approaching
1 Kccuivml the b.'6.0. • Kuceivcd llio D.S.U.

SIK KOGEK KE YES'S FIRST DISPATCH 155

the Mole slie came under heavy shrapnel lire. She
rounded the lighthouse and, directed by Thetis, aground
on her port hand, steered for the canal, very few enemy
guns firing at her, as they were concentrated on the Mole
— doubtless at VlncUvtice — and on Thetis. On reaching
his position in the canal, Lieutenant Bonham-Carter went
full speed ahead Avith the starljoard engine and full speed
astern with the port helm hard a starboard. He then
waited for the crew to get into the boats, but finding the
ship was making stern way he had to blow the sinking
charges before the btdaming party could get out of the
engine-room. Engineer Sub-Lieutenant Edgar V. Meikle,
with his men, got into a cutter, of which he took charge,
jiroceedhig out past the Thetis till picked up by a motor
launch. Another cutter was picked up by the T.B.D.
Whirhiind, and the skifi' by M.L. 282. With the two
ollicers and four petty officers Lieutenant Bonham-Carter
launched a Carley raft and went down the canal until
picked up by motor launch 282. This motor launch
came right into the canal under the stern oi the Iphig en ia
— the next blocking ship — under a heavy fire. She w^as
commanded by Lieutenant Percy T. Dean,^ E.N.V.R.,
whobe conduct Lieutenant Bonham-Carter describes as
* simply magnificent '. I have had the pleasure of recom-
mending this officer to their Lordships for promotion,
and I consider his gallant conduct is well worthy of the
Victoria Cross. "With the exception of Stoker Petty
Officer Harold L. Palliser (O.N. 226201), who was killed
while in the motor launch by a machine gun, the whole
crew got away. Lieutenant Bonham-Carter reports the
exceptionally fine behaviour of the whole of his crew —
deck and engine»room alike — and specially mentions
Lieutenant Alan Cory-Wright" {EamllUes), Sub-Lieutenant
' luxeive<-l (lie V.C. " KcftivLd tho D.^.C.

156 OSTEND AND ZEEBKUGGE

Dudley A. Babb ' {Sarpedon), and Engineer Sub-Lieutenant
Meikle." In another letter I have recommended Lieu-
tenant Bonham-Carter and the two last-named officers
for promotion. I may say here that I regarded the
chances of escape from any of the blocking ships as very
slender, and this was well known to those who so readily
volunteered for this hazardous service, and to the volun-
teer crews of the motor launches who ran equal risks in
their work of rescue.

96. Iphigenia (Lieutenant Edward W. Billyard-Leake, '
Fearless). — This ship, like the preceding one, did not
discharge all her engine-room ratings, because some
managed to avoid it in order to take part in the fight,
and they therefore joined up with the rest of the crew.
The Iphigenia was the third and last of the Zeebrugge
blockers to imdertake her duty, and it is no disparage-
ment to the predecessors, who made her task the easier
by their example, to say that she was, as I believe,
completely successful. On approaching the Mole she
came under shrapnel fire, and was lighted up by two
searchlights on the western (or land) end of the Mole,
and by flares, these latter being rendered useless to the
enemy by the smoke-screen, and facilitating navigation
for the attacker. On rounding the lighthouse the Iphigenia
went full speed, a star shell shoA^ng up the Intrepid
headed for the canal and the Thetis aground. As she
approached Thetis that ship showed a green light on her
starboard side which enabled Lieutenant Billyard-Leake
to find the canal entrance. The ship was now hit
twice on the starboard side, one shell cutting the siren
steam-pipe and enveloping the fore part of the ship in steam.

* Promoted to Lieutenant.

- Promoted to Temporary Eiiyineer-Lieutenant.

» Received the D.S.O.

Sm ROGER REYES'S FIRST DISPATCPI 157

97. As Iphigenia approached the canal entrance it
became obscured by smoke, and her captain found that
she was heading for the western pier. Going full speed
astern he brought his ship in between a dredger and
a barge, severing them. He then went ahead with his
starboard engine and drove the barge into the canal.
When clear of the barge he went ahead with both
engines. Seeing that the Intrepid had grounded on the
western bank of the canal, with a gap between her and
the eastern bank, he steered to close the gap, and collided
with the port bow of Intrepid. He then rang the alarm-
gong to signify the imminent blowing of the sinking
charges, but finding that he was not completely blocking
the channel he telegraphed to the engine-room to go
astern, which was done. As soon as his ship was clear
lie sent Lieutenant Philip E. Vaux^ {Marvel), the First
Lieutenant, to the engine-room with an order to go
ahead, which was promptly ol)eyed. The entire entrance
was then covered in smoke. As soon as he considered
the ship had headway, he put the port engine astern, the
starboard ahead, and his helm hard-a-starboard, and
grounded on the eastern bank. He then abandoned ship
and fired his charges, which all exploded. The company
left the sliip in one cutter, as the other one was badly
damaged. While in the cutter the crew came under
more shrapnel and machine-gun fire, which caused some
casualties. When trying to pull clear of the ship, M.L.
282 (Lieutenant Percy T. Dean, R.N.V.R., whose conduct
in rescuing the officers and men from the Intrepid has
already been described) was sighted across the IpJiigenia's
bows, and the cutter pulled to her. The majority of the
crew got into the motor launch, which then went astern.
The cutter also pulled round the stern of the ship and
1 Received the D.S.C.

158 OSTENT) AND ZEEBRUGOE

the launch took the rest on board, except three, one of
whom was killed. The cutter was made fast to the stem
of the motor launch, which went out of the harbour stern
first at full speed. Lieutenant Billyard- Leake reports
that this motor launch was entirel)' responsible for saving
the survivors from the Iphigema. Heavy machine-gun
fire was concentrated on her while on passage out, at
which time Sub-Lieutenant Maurice C. H. Lloyd, ^ D.S.C.
{Dominion), was mortally, and Lieutenant James C. Keith
Wright,' R.N.V.R., of M.L. 416, dangerously wounded,
and two of the motor launch's crew of four killed. I trust
that the Lords Commissioners, who have so many claims
to judge, will consider that this recital of the part played
by the Ipliigenia well justifies my mention of Lieutenant
Billyard-Leake and of Mate (E) Sydney Greville West ^
{Benhow), who throughout the preparations and ojieration
worked his department in an admirable manner.

98. Brilliant and Siriiis. — I regret that the effort to
block Ostend did not succeed. The Brilliant (Commander
Alfred E. Godsal,' Centurion), with Sirins (Lieutenant-
Commander Henry N. M. Hardy,^ D.S.O., Patrol) in her
wake, was approaching the charted position of the Stroom
Bank Buoy, but did not sight it as expected. Deducing
from the positions of other navigation marks already
passed that the ships were to the northward of their
supposed position, they continued on their original course
for an extra two minutes, sighting the buoy to the north-
eastward. They steered to pass to the northward of the
buoy, at which time they first came under fire from tlie
enemy's batteries, and then shaped a course for the
deduced position of Ostend. No marks were vi?i))le
owing to smoke, which made it necessary for Sirins to

' Received bar to D.S.C. - Reeeivod tlie D.S.C.

' Received the D.S.O. ■* Promoted to Comm.indor, R.N.

SIR ROGER KF.YES'S FIRST DISPATCH 150

keep veiy close station on Brilliant. When the Ostend
Piers should have been seen by Brilliant, breakers were
obsei'ved on the starboard bow, and, though the helm
was starboarded, the ship grounded. Sirius, observing
this, immediately put her helm hard over and her
engines full speed astern, but the shij), being already
badly damaged by gunfire and sinking, did not answer
the helm, and collided with the port quarter of the
Brilliant. In the end, both ships being practically fast
ashore, Brilliant, with her port engine immovable, and
Sirias, in sinking condition, were blown up where
they stranded, as observation has since shown, about
2,400 yards east of the canal entrance. Lieutenant
A. C. Crutchley^ [Centurion), Sub-Lieutenant Angus
H. Maclachlan - [Temeraire], and Engineer Lieutenant
Wilfred Long ' [Biihlin], all serving in the Brilliant, were
reported by their captain as having set a fine example
to their men. Commander Godsal also mentions Petty
Officer Joseph J. Reed' (O.N. C230360), who behaved
with conspicuous coolness.

99. The rescue of the crews by motor launches, which
had been standing by under heavy fire of every calil)re,
was carried out in the gallant manner which distinguished
the work of the crews of the motor launches and coastal
motor boats throughout the action. Commander Ion
Hamilton Benn,^ R.N.V.R., attempted to go alongside
in motor launch No. 532, but owing to thick smoke she
was damaged by collision with the ship. Lieutenant
Roland Bourke,'^ R.N.V.R., in M.L. 276, repeatedly went
alongside Brilliant in the difficult circumstances of her

' Txeceived the D.S.C. " Promotofl to Lieutenant, TJ.X.

2 Received the D.S.M.

^ Promoted to Temporary Actin;; Capiain, K.N.V.R.

•■ Received the D.S.O.

160 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

starboard engines still going astern, while M.L. 283,
under the command of Lieutenant Keith R. Hoare/
D.S.C., R.N.V.R., embarked practically all the men from
the Sirius, and sixteen from the Brilliant's whaler, sunk
by gunfire.

100. After leaving the Sirius, Lieutenant-Commander
Hardy found that Engineer Lieutenant William R.
Maclaren ^ {Iron Duke) and some men were missing. He
therefore hailed C.M.B. 10 (Sub-Lieutenant Peter B.
Clarke,^ R.N.R.), and with Lieutenant Edward L.
Berthon,' D.S.C. {Viceroif), went alongside the ship under
a heavy and accurate fire from 4-1-inch and machine guns
to search for them, but found no sign of life in either
ship. The officer and men were subsequently picked up
by the Attentive in a boat, in which they had pulled
thirteen miles out to sea after the sinking of their ship.

101. Their Lordships will share with me and the
commanding officers of these ships the disappointment
due to the defeat of our plans, as we may believe, by the
legitimate ruse of the enemy in shifting the buoy. As
the Commodore at Dunkirk remarks in the despatch to
which their Lordships will refer for details on this point,
the location of buoj^s by aircraft is a high art, and can
only be done with accuracy in relation to closely sur-
rounding land or shoal features, but aerial photographs
have since established the fact that had the buoy been
in its original position the vessels would have made the
entrance accurately.

102. Both Commander Godsal and Mr. Hardy im-
mediately and repeatedly asked me for other ships, to be
allowed to try again. They report that all their officers
and Petty Officer Joseph Reed have volunteered to make

1 Keceivoil the D.S.O. ^ Received tlio D.S.C.

3 Received a bar to D.S.C.

SIR ROGER REYES'S FIRST DISPATCH 161

another attempt, sanguine that with the experience
gained it would succeed.

IX. — The Retirement.

103. The viaduct explosion having duly taken place,
and the blocking ships having leen seen proceeding
shorewards, the main object of storming the Mole had
been accomplished, and the only reason for prolonging
the operation till the programme time for retirement
was that of continuing the work of demolition. On the
other hand, the only guns in Vindictive bearing on the
Mole had been put out of action ; the upper works of
the ship and men in exposed positions were presenting
an easy target to the shore guns, while, in view of the
failure of the Mole anchors, the storming parties would
be unable to embark if the Daffodil should be disabled.
Captain Carpenter, regarding the Daffodil's escape up to
this time as being almost a miracle, therefore decided
to give the order for the retirement, and in this I consider
he acted with good judgment ; in fact, I had given
orders for the Warwick to close the Vindictive so that
I might inform Captain Carpenter that I had seen the
blockships proceeding in, ascertain the conditions on the
Mole, and decide on further action, when I saw that she
was hauling off.

104. The searchlights, by which twenty minutes*
warning was to be given, having been destroyed, as well
as the Vindictive' s siren, by which the executive signal
was to be made, the Daffodil made the latter signal at
fifty minutes past midnight, and the retirement com-
menced. About fifteen minutes later it was I'eported to
the Captain that officers and men had ceased coming on
board, a large number having already embarked by the
same means as they had originally used for storming

162 OSTEND AND ZEEBKUGGE

the Mole. To make tloubly sure, Captain Carpenter
waited till ten minutes past one, and after repeated
assurances from officers and his own observation that no
more were returning, he ordered Daffodil to tow VincUctive's
bow away from the Mole, the port cable was slipped, and
towing commenced. The hawser parted almost at once,
but the ship's head was clear enough to allow her to
proceed at full speed with helm hard-a-port under cover
of her own smoke screen. A large bumpkin made of her
own mainmast, rigged out over the Vindictive's port
quarter, and taking against the wall, protected the port
screw, which nevertheless hung up two or three times,
being probably fouled by the debris of the brows. The
Vindictive reached Dover soon after 8 a.m., on the 23rd.

105. Some of the proceedings of Iris II have been
reported in connection with the storming of the Mole,
and the rest may be told here. Shortly after leaving
the Mole she came under a very heavy fire from the
• Mole and shore batteries, being hit ten times by small
shell and twice by large ones. The first large shell came
through the port control position and carried away the
port side of the bridge, causing a very serious fire
amongst the ammunition and bombs under the bridge-
It mortally wounded Commander Valentine Gibbs and
Major Charles E. C. Eagles, D.S.O., E.M., and seriously
wounded Lieutenant George Spencer, D.S.C, K.N.R.
Lieutenant Oscar Henderson * (' P. 19 ') took a volunteer
fire party with a hose on to the upper deck to quench
the fire, but seeing the condition of the bridge he ran up
on to it and found Commander Gibbs, as he then thought,
dead, and Lieutenant Spencer seriously wounded, but
still conning the ship. He took command and steadied
the ship on her course, the coxswain, Petty Officer David
1 Received the D.S.O.

SIR ROGER KEYES'S FIRST DISPATCH 163

P. Smith/ sticking to his" post with great gallantry,
steering with one hand while holding an electric torch
to the compass with the other ; it is due to Lieutenan
Spencer that the ship was turned away from the land.
Iris II was again hit by three shells simultaneously, and
as the men were packed very closely on the main deck
the casualties were very heavy. When the ship was
steadied on her course the fire was put out, Able Seaman
F. E. M. Lake ' (Monarch) being the first man to attack it,
which he did with sand, afterwards helping Mr. Henderson
to throw bombs overboard, regardless of his own life.
A motor launch. No. 558, commanded by Lieutenant-
Commander Lionel S. Chappell, D.S.C., R.N.V.R., and
with Captain Ralph Collins ^ on board, gallantly came
into the heavy fire from the enemy's guns, and throwing
a smoke screen around 7m // enabled her to get clear,
the ship being very badly damaged ; she reached Dover
at 2.45 p.m., some five hours after the death of her
captain, who remained confident and cheerful until his
very heroic spirit passed.

106. Although the Lords Commissioners of the Ad-
miralty have most promptly recognised and rewarded
the services of Acting Captain Carpenter^ by promoting
him to the Post List, I should not like to end this part
of my despatch without putting on record the praise
which is due to him. An excellent staff officer, he
rendered me invaluable assistance in the drawing up
of the final operation orders, the preparations for which
involved strenuous work by many officers and a vast
amount of necessary detail. My account of the proceed-
ings of the Vindictive outlines his personal share in the

» Received the C.G.M. 8 Received the C.B.

s Received the V.C.
l2

164 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

attack, but as showing the force which his example had
on those under his command, I hear on all sides that
the Captain's calm composure when navigating mined
waters and bringing his ship alongside the Mole in
darkness, and his great bravery when the ship came
under heavj^ fire, did much to encourage similar behaviour
on the part of the crew, and thereby contributed greatly
to the success of the operation.

X. — OsTEND.

107. In arranging the sections of this despatch, I have
grouped proceedings of units taking part in the opera-
tions off Ostend in their appropriate places, but I submit
herewith the report by Commodore Hubert Lynes,^ C.M.G.,
Senior Naval Officer at Dunkirk, to whom I am indebted
for whole-hearted co-operation and loyal assistance at all
times. I share his regret as to the alteration by the enemy
of the position of the Stroom Bank Buoy not having been
discovered, but I feel that the consequence must be
accepted as one of the misfortunes of war.

108. The Lords Commissioners will notice that five
French torpedo craft co-operated at Ostend with our
big monitors, and four French motor launches with
our small monitors. I should like to be allowed to
express . my gratification at this co-operation, and my
thanks for the valuable assistance these vessels gave
are due to Vice-Admiral Pierre Alexis M. A. Eonarc'h,
K.C.B., C.M.G., Commandant Superieur de la Marine
dans la zone des Armees du Nord, Dunkerque, and to
Capitaine de Vaisseau Breart de Boisanger, D.S.O.

109. Commodore Lynes has recommended for special
recognition several officers and men, and the rest their

1 Received the C.B.

SIR ROGER REYES'S FIRST DISPATCH 165

Lordships will have an opportunity of considering in
the list which I am forwarding as soon as it can be
prepared.

XI. — ToKPEDO-BoAT Destroyer Force.

110. I desire to relate the proceedings of some of the
vessels of the 6th Destroyer Flotilla under the command
of Captain Wilfred Tomkinson,^ and the WarivicJc flying
my flag, which came under my own observation, or
are of special interest or merit.

111. The Trident and Mansfield after parting company
from their submarines, covered the western flotilla of
smoke-screening small craft. The WJiirhvind, Myngs, Velox,
Morris, Moorsom, and Melpomene covered the eastern smoke-
flotilla. The Warwick, Phoebe, and North Star cruised off
the Mole to protect the assaultii:!ig craft from torpedo
attack. These duties took the destroyers close in shore,
and they were frequently under a heavy fire from guns of
all calibres at short range. When the assaulting craft
were leaving the Mole, the Warwicli followed them for
a few minutes, and then returned to assist the with-
drawal of the small craft, picking up four motor launches,
including No. 282, commanded by Lieutenant P. T. Dean,
R.N.V.R. This launch had on board one hundred and
one people from Iphigenia and Intrepid, some of whom
had been killed in the launch, and others who were
wounded. As the motor launch was dangerously over-
loaded and full of wounded, I ordered them to be trans-
ferred to the Waricick, which took more than half an
hour to do. I was much struck with the gallant bearing
of Lieutenant Dean and the survivors of his crew. They
were all volunteers, and nearly all had been wounded and
several killed.

' Received the C.B.

166 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE^

112. "While the WancicJc was engaged as stated in the
preceding paragraph, the North Star, liaving lost lier bear-
ings in the smoke, emerged from the smoke screen to the
south-eastward of the lighthouse. Seeing some vessels
alongside the Mole, she fired all her torpedoes at them and
withdrew ; but coming under verj- heavy fire at point-blank
range she was immediately disabled, and soon in a sinking
condition. The Phcelc, commanded by Lieutenant-Com-
mander Hubert E. Gore-Langton,' was handled with
conspicuous gallantry while under this heavy fire. She
repeatedly circled round the North Star, making smoke
screens and attempting under their cover to tow her out
of action. She was twice successful in getting her in tow,
the hawser being shot away once and parted once. Phoahe
then went alongside North Star, and endeavoured to tow
in that way. North Star, however, was in a sinking
condition, and being continually hit. In these circum-
stances, Mr. Gore-Langton ordered the abandonment of
the North Star, standing by her, and taking off all of her
company who were left alive.

1 13. I regret that the North Starwas lost, but the conduct
of Lieutenant-Commander Kenneth C. Helyar" and his
company was all that could be desired, the North Star
not being abandoned until all possibility of salving her
was gone. The Lieutenant-Commander of Phoebe states
that Mr. Helyar by his coolness and calm devotion to
duty set a splendid example to all, though his ship was
totally disabled and constantly being hit. He would not
leave his bridge until ordered twice to abandon his shij)
when she was obviously sinking under him, and could
not be saved. He also did his utmost to assist the Phoebe
in every way to take him in tow.

114. Tempest and Tetrarch, of the Harwich Force, ac-
' Piomotcd to Commander, RN. ' Received tho D.S.O.

SIR ROGER REYES'S FIRST DISPATCH 167

companied the Ostend blockships from the Goodwins
until they reached the inshore smoke screen off Ostend,
after which they co-operated with the Dunkirk destroyers
Faiilhior, flying the broad pendant of Commodore Lynes,
Lighf/oof, Mastiff, Afrkli, Swiff, and Matdilcss, in sup-
porting the small craft inshore, within close range of
the enemy's heavy batteries.

115. I wish to recoid my entire satisfaction with the
good work done by the torpedo-boat destroyer force
throughout the operations. ,The part taken by the PJicebe
in protecting and endeavouring to tow out of action the
North Star, and in the final rescue of her people, is
a conspicuous example of the fine qualities of this branch
of the service, and is highly creditable to Mr. Gore-
Langton, his officers, and crew. I have already recom-
mended that officer for promotion, as I consider that his
personal and professional conduct on this occasion marks
him as likely to be valuable in the higher ranks of His
Majesty's service.

XII.— Smoke Screens, Motor Launches, and
Coastal Motor Boats.

116. The orders for smoke-screening the approach and
operations of the forces attacking Zeebrugge and Ostend,
and the reports from the numerous motor launches and
coastal motor boats employed on that duty, are necessarily
too detailed to be recapitulated in a despatch of this general
nature. Apart from the smoke apparatus supplied to the
larger craft for self-protection, the duty of making smoke
screens and laying smoke floats was imposed on a large
fleet of motor launches and coastal motor boats. With-
out the services of these little vessels for this duty, for
rescue work and for inshore work generally, an attack
of this nature could hardly have been considered.

168 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

117. SvwJcc S'Teens. — While the wind favoiired the
screens were efficacious. Captain Ralph Collins,' who
commanded the motor launches, reports that in some
units in which the smoke screens were maintained, and
in which most of the boats were under fire, there were
no boats hit ; whereas, in one instance, which came
under my own observation, the absence of a screen
led to preventabl}^ heavy punishment. As to the smoke
floats, the enemj' sunk many of them directly they were
laid, especially if, as happened in many cases, they emitted
flame. Those which remained were effective.

118. Motor Launches. — These craft were under the
command of Captain Ralph Collins at Zeebrugge, and
Commander Hamilton Benn at Ostend. As to the hand-
ling of these craft, great credit is due to the leaders of
sections for the way iii which they led their boats up
to the objectives. When the wind shifted, the com-
manding officers proceeded closer inshore to give as much
protection to the attacking ships as possible. One unit,
under Lieutenant Gordon S. Maxwell, R.N.V.R., went
close inshore, and by dropping three floats without baffles
succeeded in inducing the enemy to concentrate his fire
on these floats. Lieutenant-Commander Dawbarn Young,
R.N.V.R., was in command of M.L. 110. He had volun-
teered to precede the blockships and light the entrance
of the harbour and canal with calcium buoys. Whilst
approaching the entrance M.L. 110 was struck by three
shells, which killed and wounded half the crew and
wrecked the engines. Lieutenant-Commander Young,
hit in three places, was mortally wounded, but stuck
to his post and gave orders to abandon ship, until he
collapsed. This very gallant officer died before reaching
Dover. Ever the first to volunteer for any dangerous

1 Received the C.I3.

SIR ROGER KEYES'S FIRST DISPATCH 169

work, the Dover Patrol has sustained a great loss by his
death.

119. Of the meritorious work reported from the motor
launches, I have already selected the instances of Lieu-
tenant P. T. Dean,^ R.N.V.E., in No. 282, and Lieutenant
H. A. Littleton,- R.N.V.R., in No. 526, who brought off
the crews of the sunken blocking ships. There is no
doubt that these boats were handled in a magnificent
manner, and that the highest praise is due to their
officers and men. From Ostend reports of the motor
launch flotilla are of the same high character. Com-
mander Ion Hamilton Benn reports that M.L. 283 (Lieu-
tenant Keith R. Hoare,'^ R.N.V.R.) took on board the
entire crew of Sinus and some of BrilUanfs people, and
was seriously overloaded ; but was able to reach harbour
safeh'. He cannot speak too highly of the conduct of
Lieutenant Hoare and Lieutenant Roland Bourke,^
R.N.V.R. (M.L. 276), who both showed remarkable cool-
ness and good judgment throughout the operation. He
also mentions Lieutenants, R.N.V.R., Sidney D. Gowing
(M.L. 551), Ravvsthorne Procter (M.L. 556), and Malcolm S.
KirkwoodMM.L. 11).

120. Coastal Motor Boats. — I have been greatly im-
pressed with the administrative capacity of Lieutenant
Arthur E. P. Welman,^ D.S.C., R.N., the young officer
in charge of the coastal motor boats of the Dover Patrol.
In the Zeebrugge operation he had seventeen of these
vessels under his orders. Besides their screening duties,
several of them undertook attacks on enemy vessels and
against the Mole, the seaplane shed, &c., with success.
Lieutenant Welman always being in the most exposed
position. Sub-Lieutenant Cedric R. L. Outhwaite,'

1 Received the V.C. * Received the D.S.O

8 Received the D.S.C.

170 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

R.N.V.R., in C.M.B. 5, reports that he attacked an
enemy destroyer which was under way, and observed
his torpedo hit below her forward searchlight, the light
shortly afterwards going out. and her fire diminishing.
Sub-Lieutenant L. R. Blake,' R.N.R., in C.M.B. 7, reports
hitting a destroyer alongside the Mole with a torpedo
which struck below the fore bridge. No. 32 A fired
a torpedo at the steamship Brussels. An explosion
followed, but the result was hidden by smoke.

121. The zest of most of the young officers in the coastal
motor boats, like that of those in the motor launches,
compels one's admiration. I can select only one of many
instances which show the eagerness of the officers to take
part in a fight from which circumstances tried to exclude
them. Lieutenant Edward E. Hill in C.M.B. 35 A had the
misfortune to foul his propellers on the evening of the
22nd Ai)ril when already 18 miles on his outward voyage.
He got a tow from a drifter, and arrived at Dover at 8 p.m.
His boat was immediately hoisted and the propellers
cleared, but as there was other damage he was not
afloat again till 9.40 p.m. He then made his way to
the Belgian coast, and was off Zeebrugge — about 70 miles
— by 11.50 p.m., taking up his smoke-float patrol at once,
and continuing it for an hour, in the course of which he
came under rather heavy fire from a battei*y at Blanken-
berghe. The chapter of accidents amongst such small
craft is naturally a long one, but the resource developed
in overcoming them is more than compensation. The
daring way in which the crews of these boats approach
the shore, drawing the beams of the searchlights and the fire
of the guns, then escaping in their own smoke, is splendid.
Lieutenant Francis C. Harrison,^ who commanded the
Ostend section of C.M.B.s, mentions the names of Sub-
» Received tlie D.S.C. ^ Received a bar to D.S.O.

SIR ROGER KE YES'S FIRST DISPATCH 171

Lieutenant Peter B. Clarke/ R.N.R., Midshipman N. S.
Herbert, R.N.R., and Chief Motor Mechanic G. H.
Hebblethwaite (C.M.B. 10) for the dangerous work which
that boat undertook in searching for the engineer of the
Sir'ius, who was thought to be on board that ship after
she had been sunk, in the course of which the boat came
under very heavy fire ; and Sub-Lieutenant Frank A. W.
Ramsay (C.M.B. 19) for his coolness and quickness in
laying the inshore calcium buoys under heavy machine-
gun fire. Lieutenant Welman also mentions the names
of sevei'al officers and men in coastal motor boats ;
these will be forwarded for Admiralty consideration
shortly.

XIII. — Dover Traavler Patrol.

122. Captain William V. Howard, D.S.O., of the
Trawler Patrol, accompanied the expedition in the paddle
mine-sweeper Lingjicld, and did valuable work in keeping
touch with the force, giving assistance by towing, and
otherwise helping small craft in trouble while on the
passage to and from Zeebrugge, also in receiving the
surplus crews from blockships, and escorting motor
launches. This veteran officer has been on patrol woi'k
off the south-east coast of England during the whole of
the war. His energ)' and example are great incentives
to the officers and men of the Trawler Patrol which he
commands.

XIV. — Medical Arrangements.

123. In conclusion I desire to make a special reference
to the praiseworthy manner in which the medical officers
and their staff, and volunteer helpers, devoted their skill
and sympathy to those who were wounded in these opera-
tions. Fighting at such close quarters, the casualties

1 Received tlie D.S.C.

172 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

were bound to be numerous, and the wounds likely to be
severe. Staff Surgeon James McCutcheon/ M.B., was the
senior medical officer of the force. In an able report that
officer outlines the work of his staff, and the circumstances
in which it was done, and I trust that the Lords Com-
missioners will agree with me in thinking that no branch
of the naval service surpassed in zeal and ability the efforts
of the medical branch to prove itself worthy of its pro-
fession, and of the occasion. I have selected with
difficulty from a number of very deserving officers the
names of three* to be representative recipients of such
promotion as their Lordships may be able to award for
these operations to the medical branch of the Royal
Navy.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

ROGER KEYES,

Vice-Admiral.

Enclosure.

Proceedings at Ostend. Report from Commodore,

Dunkirk.

Office of Commodore, Dunkirk,
April 30, 1918.
Sir,—

I have the honour to forward the following report on
Operation Z.-O., carried out on the night of the 22nd-
23rd April.

1. A brief preliminary report was 'phoned to Vice-
Admiral, Dover Patrol, on the 23rd April, since which

^ Promoted to Fleet Surgeon, R.N.

» Surg. Frank P. Pocock, K.N. [D.S.O.] ; Surg. William L. Clcgg,
K.N. [D.S.C.]; and Surg. H. St. C. Colson (promoted to Staff
Surgeon).

SIR ROGER REYES'S FIRST DISPATCH 173

photograplis and air reconnaissances have established the
facts (as reported) that —

(a.) Sirhis and BriVidni are not inside Ostend Harbour,
but lie stranded about 2,400 yards to eastward of eastern
pier.

(6.) The Stroom Bank Buoy is not in its chained
position, but is a little to eastward of the prolongation
of eastern pier, approximately lat. 51 15 50 N., long.
2 53 20 E.

2. {&) accounts for (a) ; supposing, as is almost certain,
that the buoy was in this position on the night of 22nd-
23rd.

3. The location of tuoys by aircraft is, of course, a veiy
high art, and can only be done with any degree of
accuracy with relation to closely surrounded land (or
shoal) features.

Captain R. Graham, D.S.O., D.S.C, R.A.F., and
Captain L. H. Slater,' D.S.C, R.A.F., obtained the
present position of Stroom Bank Buoy by coming down
to 100 feet and fixing the buoy with reference, for direc-
tion, to the line of eastern pier.

4. The organisation detailed in my 0/53, of the 21st
April, was carried out for Ostend operation, which I con-
ducted with the assistance of Commander J. L. C. Clark,
D.S.O., R.N., from on board Faulhior, leader of the Off-
Shore Destroyer Force.

5. The operation was carried out according to pro-
gramme. There were no hitches, the times were kept
precisely, and I have complimented the senior officers of
units, and all, on the care with which they both studied
and carried out my necessarily rather voluminous oi'ders.

6. (a.) Tne wind, on starting out, was light north-
westerly, and continued thus until about 10 minutes
before Sirius and Brilliant arrived at Stroom Bank Buoy,

174 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

when it most unluckily shifted round to the south-west-
ward, causing all the smoke to go wrong at the critical
moment.

(b.) The M.L.s and C.M.B.s strove with resolution and
good judgment to compete with this reverse, but all
their efforts were overpowered by the enemy's smoke
screen blown to seaward, while they themselves became
subjected to a heavy, but happily ill-directed, gunfire.

7. The blockships made the Stroom Bank Buoy (which
was alight and marked the whole time), but after that
the adverse smoke prevented them seeing anything by
which they might have retrieved the error of the buo5''s
position.

8. (a.) Since the Captains of the blockships. Commander
A. E. Godsal, R.N., and Lieutenant-Commander H. N. M.
Hardy, D S.O., R.N., will have made their full reports to
you, I say little more, since, after what has been said, it is
needless to remark that the failure to find the entrance
was no fault of theirs ; on the contrary, the newly dis-
covered position of the buoy only too plainly shows that
their course, after rounding the buoy, ought to have
brought them right in.

(&.) I may add that on my return to harbour about six
hours later, the bitter disappointment of these two gallant
officers showed itself chiefly in begging for another block-
ship apiece to have another try.

9. The low clouds and drizzle put all aircraft parti-
cipation out of the question.

10. The monitor and siege gun bombardments were
undoubtedly useful as a blind, and to keep the fire of the
shore batteries down.

The shore batteries commenced to return the monitors'
fire about 5 minutes after the latter opened. A number
of shell fragments were picked up on board the monitors,

SIR ROGER REYES'S FIRST DISPATCH 175

but there were no hits. Pliotographs show a number of
hits around the German batteries, but none on the
guns.

11. (a.) This time the enemy took longer to be alarmed
than on the night of llth/12th.^ He seemed to take but
a desultory interest until the monitors opened fire, i.e.,
^ hour after the C.M.B.s arrived at the Stroom Bank
Buoy, and, as on the previous occasion, he cannot have
had a single patrol out.

(b.) Very feAV shells fell near us in the offshore
destroyers. Enemy's fire was evidently either directed
against the inshore boats, at the monitors, or barrage fire
into the smoke areas.

(c.) His star shell, as before, averaged about 7,000 yards
from the shore ; when we closed to that range they
dropped alongside of (one on) the division.

(d.) At intervals the enemy's star shell showed up to us
the M.L.s busily engaged with their smoke screens, and
at 11.50 also the blockships with their escort to the
E.N.E. steering for the Stroom Bank Buoy. It Wiis at
this moment that we noticed the shift of wind to south-
westward.

(e.) About 10 minutes later the blockships disappeared
abreast the buoy into the smoke, and we saw no more of
them, but picked up Tempest and Tetrarch.

if.) C.M.B.s 12 and 19 report a " M.L. blew up" about
00,15, E.S.E., 2 miles from Stroom Bank Buoy; this
apparently refers to the blockships being hit by shell.

(g.) About 00.25 bursts of firing became more frequent,
and more searchlights switched on than before, evidently
the result of the blockships' emergence from smoke and
stranding.

(/i.) After this there was little more than desultory
^ See p. 29, supra.

176 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

firing, probably at monitors, with the exception of two
3-minute bursts of barrage fire at 00.42-00.52,

The searchlights continued searching actively until
about 01.30 when their numbers reduced to three or four.

(i.) At 01.00 the 'retirement' red rocket signals and
siren ' K 's' were made by destroyers ; this produced a few
big shrapnel in our neighbourhood.

{ j.) A few C.M.B.s and M.L.s were seen coming away ofif
and on up to 2 a.m., when we withdrew to fix position
by R, R.M.C. Buoy, picking up No. 7 C.M.B., disabled, on
the way. [Tetrarch towed her home.)

{k.) Having fixed by Position R, we continued to cruise
between R and Stroom Bank Buoy until daylight, and the
shore became visible, when, nothing floating being in
sight, all forces were withdrawn ; B.C. Patrol being sent
out later, and picking up the last straggler, viz., C.M.B.
17, who had run out of petrol near 3 B.C. Buoy.

{I.) At 03.20, when near Stroom Bank Buoy, we saw
two searchlights, judged about 500 yards apart, concen-
trated on something burning in the water between them.

At 03.30 this fire culminated in an explosion, and
darkness ensued. The two searchlights switched out
a few minutes later.

(m.) No enemy craft were seen by anyone, except that
C.M.B. 12 feels sure that she was chased by a destroyer
with searchlights. But I cannot think a craft coming out
of Ostend could have been seen by no one else or escaped
us, for, apart from the star-shell illumination, the diffused
moonlight gave quite one mile visibility.

12. On return to harbour about 07.30, I found that : —

(a.) All the crews of the blockships had been saved, the
majority by M.L.s 276, 283, and brought to Dunkirk ; the
few others who had evacuated in a pulling boat were picked
up by the Gap Patrol.

f

a

SIR ROGER REYES'S FIRST DISPATCH 177

(6.) This salvage work of M.L.s 276 and 283 was carried
out under heavy, but fortunately not accurate, fire with
a courage and coolness that alone could have achieved its
wonderful result, for not a man was wounded, and the
heavily laden boats returned to harbour safely.

(c.) All the M.L.s had returned intact with very slight
casualties, and one damaged bow.

{(l) The C.M.B.s, too, both for Zeebrugge and Ostend,
had all returned safely, either to Dunkirk or Dover, with
the exception of two or three which were retrieved later.
Their personnel casualties were two dangerously wounded
and four wounded ; considering the work done, a mar-
vellous result, and one which reflects the greatest credit on
the C.M.B. officers.

13. Conclusions. — (a.) The luck of the wind changing,
combined with the shifting of the Strooni Bank Buoy,
accounts for the failure to block Ostend Harbour. There
is no discredit to anyone ; indeed, none could have carried
out their duties more admirably than did the Ostend forces
on this occasion.

(&.) I anticipate success in the new endeavour, the
undertaking of which has only been waiting favourable
weather conditions during the last few days.

(c.) The lion's share of the work was, of course, done by
the C.M.B.s, M.L.s, and blockships.

I have, &c.,

Hubert Lynes,
Commodore, BimkirJc.

Vice- Admiral Sir Roger Keyes, K.C.B.,
C.M.G., M.V.O., D.S.O., R.N.,
Dover.

V

VICE-ADMIRAL SIR ROGER KEYES'S
DISPATCH, JUNE 15, 1918'

Fleet House,
Dover,
June ]:",, WIS.
Sir,

Be pleased to lay before the Lords Com mission era
of the Admiralty the following report on the renewed
attempt made in the eai'Iy morning of the 10th May, 1918,
to block the entrance of the Ostend-Bruges Canal by
sinking the Vindictive therein.

2. When I learnt on the 23rd April that the attempt
to block Ostend had not succeeded, I represented to their
Lordships the desirability of repeating the operation at
once. The Vindictive, the only vessel available at the
moment, being placed at my disposal, every effort was
made to repair the damage she had suffered and fit
her out before the expiration of the period in which
the tide and darkness suited, ?', e. about four days.-
This was accomplished at Dover, thanks to the strenuous
efforts of Real-- Admiral C. F. Dampier, the Superintendent
of the Dockyard, and his small staff ; the services of
Engineer Commander Henry F, Bell, R.N., and Mr. A. J.
Luke being particularly valuable.

» Published in the Loti'hn Gazette 'Supplement', No. 31189, of
February 19, 1919.

2 The coincidence of high tide and darkness at Ostend terminated
on c. April 27. See Commodore Lynes's Keport infra, jjara. 9, 11.

SIR ROGER REYES'S SECOND DISPATCH 179

Two hundred tons of cement were put into the Vindictive's
fifter magazines and upper bunkers on both sides, which
was all her draught would permit her to carry, in view
of the depth of water in the approaches to Ostend
Harbour.

Major-General Sir William Hickey, K.C.B., Command-
ing Dover Garrison, most helpfully provided men for
filling bags with cement and putting them on board.

3. As already reported in my last dispatch,' Commander
Alfred E. Godsal, R.N., and Lieutenant-Commander
Heniy N. M. Hardy, D.S.O., R.N., of the BrUliant and
Sinus respectively, had begged to be allowed to make
another attempt, and had reported that all their officers
and Petty Officer Joseph J. Reed of the Brilliant had
volunteered for this service. As Commander Godsal
had led the previous attack, he was given command of the
Vimlicfive, and Lieutenant Victor A. C. Crutchley, R.N.,^
Sub-Lieutenant Angus H. Maclachlan, R.N., and Petty
Officer Joseph J. Reed,^ all of the Brilliant, accomi^anied
him. Engineer Commander William A. Bury, R.N.,*
however, claimed his right to remain in the Vindictive.
This very gallant officer, who greatly distinguished himself
on the 23rd April, represented that his knowledge of the
engines and boilers of his ship should be utilized. He
further begged that Engine-room Artificers Herbert
Cavanagh,^ Norman Carroll,' Alan Thomas,'' and Herbert
Alfred Harris, ' who also volunteered, might be allowed
to remain with him. I acceded to his request.

Lieutenant Sir John Alleyne, D.S.C., R.N.,* of H.M.S.
Lord Clive,'' who had been most useful in fitting up

^ Of May 9, supra, p. 111. 2 Received the V.C.

s Received the C.G.M. ■• Received the D.S.O.

* Received a h.nr to the D.S.M. ^ Prisoner of W.ir.

' Monitor.

h2

180 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

the navigational arrangements which were destro5^ecl on
the 23rd April, asked to be allowed to navigate the vessel
during the operation. I approved of this request, feeling
that this officer's experience and intimate knowledge of
the shoals and currents on the Belgian coast would be
of great value to the Commander of the Vindictive.

The crew were selected from a very large number of
volunteers from vessels of the Dover Patrol.

4. The Vii^dictive was in all respects ready by the
desired date, but the weather was unfavourable, and
the operation had to be postponed until the necessary
condition of tide and darkness recurred. This delay
made it possible to prepare a second ship, the old cruiser
Sappho,^ -which was taken from SouthamjDton to Chatham
and fitted out by Chatham Dockyard with the greatest
celerity and thoroughness.

5. Lieutenant-Commander Hardy took command of
her, and he was accompanied by all the officers of the
Sirius, Lieutenant Edward L. Berthon, D.S.C., E.N.,
Sub-Lieutenant Alfred V. Knight, R.N.E., and Engineer
Lieutenant William R. McLaren, R.N, Her crew were
selected from a very large number of volunteers in the
Royal Naval Barracks at Chatham.

6. Aerial ob.servation on the 9th May showed that
many torpedo and submarine craft were still shut up
in Bruges, and proved that the effectiveness of the
blocking of the Zeebrugge branch of the canal was main-
tained up to that date. Although the craft so shut up
in Bruges have been unable to use the small water-
ways to Ostend, the latter port was still being used by
enemy torpedo craft and sul^marines.

7. Other information, confirmed by aerial observation,

* Same Class as Sirhts and Brilliant ; completed 1893 ; displacing
3.400 tons.

SIR ROGER KEYES'S SECOND DISPATCH 181

also disclosed the fact that to counterbalance the forced
inactivity of the craft in Bruges, and probably to resist
any repetition of the April attack, a considerable number
of German destroyers had joined those units of the
Flanders force which were outside the canal on the night
of the 22nd -23rd of that month.

8. Commodore Hubert Lynes, C.M.G., at Dunkirk,
having so ably carried out the direction of the former
attempt as part of the Zeebrugge and Ostend scheme,
I entrusted the conduct of the operations on this occa-
sion to him, placing under his orders all the monitors,
destroyers, motor launches, and coastal motor boats
required, in addition to the blocking ships, Vindictive
and Sappho. On the evening of the 9th May, the weather
conditions being most promising,^ the Vindictive and
Sappho sailed in company" to join Commodore Lynes
at Dunkirk.

His report, which is attached,' furnishes the details of
the oi)eration.

9. In order to prevent interference from Zeebrugge
by the newly arrived enemy destroyer force mentioned
in paragraph 7, H.M.S. Warwich, flying my flag, and a
division of destroyers consisting of H.M. Ships Whirlwind,
Velox, and Trident, under Captain Wilfred Tomkinson, R.N.,
cruised midway between Ostend and Zeebrugge.

10. Meanwhile the operation proceeded in accordance
with the plan, except for the unfortunate breakdown of
the Sappho, due to a boiler accident, which reduced her
speed to such an extent that she was unable to reach
her destination in time to take part. This halved the
chances of success, and was a great misfortune.

' See the Press Bureau Narrative supra, p. 92, and Commodore
Lynes's Report infra, para. 13.

* From Dover. See Commodore Lynes's Report infra, para. II,
' Infra, p. 187.

182 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

With regard to the proceedmgs of Vindictive, I cannot
do better than quote from tlie report of Lieutenant Victor
Crutchley/ on whom the command devolved when Com-
mander Godsal was killed and Lieutenant Sir John
Allejuie seriously wounded : —

* On arrival at position " P ", course was altered for
the Stroom Bank Buoy.'^ The boat marking the buoy
was seen and left close on the port hand; the buoy was
not seen. Speed was reduced to twelve knots on pass-
ing the buoy.

' At this time the smoke screen was excellent. There
was a lane between the eastern and western sections,
and the only fire experienced was shrapnel, which I
considered was fired at a venture, and did no harm. We
ran on for thirteen minutes from the Stroom Bank
Buoy, and then, as the entrance was not sighted,
altered course to the westward parallel to the shore
and reduced to 60 revolutions (nine knots). As we
still failed to see the entrance we altered course 16
points to starboard, and returned along the shore to the
eastward. We again failed to find the entrance, and so
altered course 16 points to starboard. All this time,
owing to fog and smoke, the visibility was not more
than 1^ cables. This time the entrazice was sighted
about one cable on the port beam, and at the same
time the ship came under a very heavy fire from shore
batteries of all descriptions.

' On sighting the entrance, in accordance with pre-
vious orders, I passed the order " preparatory abandon
ship " to tlie engine-room. As soon as the entrance
was sighted the ship was handled from the conning
tower. Commander Godsal immediately turned up for
the entrance and ordered smoke to be lighted. At
about this time communication with the after control
failed. Just after the entrance was passed, Com-
mander Godsal went outside the conning tower and
gave the order " hard-a-starboard " from outside.

» Received the V.C.

2 See Coniuiedyre Lyiies's Report infiu, jara, ll'.

SIR ROGER KEYES'S SECOND DISPATCH 183

' Immediately after this a heavy shell burst either
on the conning tower or very close to it ; Lieutenant
Alleyne was knocked out, and Commander Godsal was
not seen again, and all the occupants of the conning
tower were badly shaken. I then ordered the port
telegraph to full speed astern, to try to swing the ship
across the channel. She grounded forward on the
eastern pier when at an angle of about three points
to the pier. As the ship stopped swinging, and at
the time I considered that no more could be done,
I ordered the ship to be abandoned.

'When the engine-room had been abandoned,
Engineer Lieutenant-Commander Bury blew the ship
up by firing the main charges and after auxiliary
charges, and I endeavoured to fire the forward auxiliary
charges. There was a considerable shock when the
first set of chaiges were fired. I am not jDositive
that the forward auxiliary charges fired, as I could
not distinguish the shock from other disturbances.

'When I got on board M.L. 254,^ I found that
the First Lieutenant" had been killed by a shell
bursting, also one deck-hand. The captain, Lieutenant
Geoffrey H. Drummond, E.N.V.R., and the coxswain,
had been wounded. We went out of the harbour stern
first, followed the whole way by machine-gun fire.
On finally going ahead the forecastle flooded, and the
boat was very much down by the bows. The pump
and buckets were got under way and all spare hands
placed right aft. Howevei', the water was gaining,
and "S.O.S." was made by Hashing lamp continually
to seaward. The courses steered from Ostend were
north for 15 minutes, and then west-by-north until
l)icked up by WanvicJc.

'I cannot speak too highly of the bravery of the
M.L.s coming alongside inside Ostend ; they were
under a continuous and heavy fire. M.L. 254 rescued
two officers and thirty-seven men.

'The question of recommendations is a very diffi-

* Licutonaut GeoU'royH. Drummond, K.N.V.K., rtceivedthe V.C.

* Lioutf uaul Ooidoii F. llubs, K.N.V.K.

184 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

cult one. Every man, without exception, behaved
splendidly.'

11. It had been Commander Godsal's intention to ram
the western pier with the object of swinging the ship
across the channel under port helm, a manoeuvre that
would have been greatly assisted by the tide, which was
setting strongly through the piers to the eastward. It
w^ould appear that when the Vindictive eventually found
the entrance she was too close to the eastern pier to use
port helm without risk of grounding broadside on. This
would account for Commander Godsal's order 'hard-a-
starboard ' a few seconds before he was killed. The
Vindictive was thus committed to starboard helm when
the command developed on Lieutenant Crutchley, who
very promptly put the port telegraph to full speed astern.
Unfortunately the port propeller, which was very severely
damaged against Zeebrugge Mole, was of little value.
Due to this, and also to the fact that the tide was setting
strongly against her starboard side, the ship's stern did
not swing across the channel as desired, with the result
that she grounded at an angle of about 25 degrees to the
eastern pier, leaving a considerable channel between her
stern and the western pier.

12. At 2.45 a.m., fifteen minutes after the programme
time for the withdrawal of the motor craft, the Warivich
and her consorts proceeded slowly to the westward parallel
to the coast.

13. At 3.15 a.m. a signal of distress was observed
from the direction of Ostend. I directed the division
to close, and found M.L. 254 (Lieutenant Geofifrey H.
Drummond,^ R.N.V.R.) badly damaged and in a sinking
condition, with two officers and thirty-seven men of
the Vindictive's crew on board. Lieutenant Drummond

1 Received the V.C.

SIR ROGER REYES'S SECOND DISPATCH 185

was very severely wounded, his second in command,
Lieutenant Gordon F. Ross, R.N.V.R., and other men
killed, and most of her small crew and many of tlie
Vindictive's, including her gallant Engineer Commander,*
were wounded. They were transferred to the WarwicTc,
and this took half an hour to do, on account of the
serious condition of some of the wounded.

14. Dawn was now breaking, and H.M.S. WarwicTc and her
consorts were within close range of the enemy's batteries.
M.L. 254 was too badly damaged fonvai'd to allow of her
being towed, and was rapidly settling down. I ordered
her to be destroyed, and, as soon as this had been carried
out, withdrew the division at 25 knots.

15. By this time the tide had fallen so low that it was
inexpedient to return by the route inside of the shoals
by which the approach had been made, and a course was
steered for a gap in the net defence by the deep-draught
route from Ostend to seaward.

It would seem that the enemy had mined this route in
anticipation of an attack. At 4.0 a.m. H.M.S. WartvkJc struck
a mine, which broke her back just before the Superstructure
of the after superimposed 4-inch gun, and destroyed the
after part of the ship. She took a heavy list and ai^peared
to be settling by the stern. H.M.S. Velox was ordered
alongside H.M.S. WarivicJc, and the wounded, of whom
there were a large number on board, were transferred
to the former. H.M.S. Whirlwind then took H.M.S.
WarwicJc in tow, and the latter being unable to steer,
H.M.S. Vclox was kept alongside while navigating the
channels through the shoals to the open sea.

I arrived at Dover in H.M.S. WarwicJc at 4.30 p.m.

16. I have again to refer to the fine work done by the
motor launches and coastal motor boats, as reported in para-

' Engineer Commander W. A. Bury.

186 OSTEND AND ZEEBEUGGE

graph 29 of the Commodore's letter. Their conduct in
the late operation confirms the opinion I expressed of
them in my dispatch on the previous operations.

17. The co-openition of the Air Force, under Brigadier-
General Charles L. Lambe, C.M.G., D.S.O., K.A.F., was
of great value during the operation. In spite of the fog
the 214th Squadron (Squadron-Commander Herbert G.
Brackley, D.S.O., D.S.C.) continued to attack in ac-
cordance with the programme until after the completion
of the operation.

18. I greatly regret the loss of so fine an officer as
Commander Godsal. His zeal to retrieve the failure of
the Brilliant on the 23rd April impelled him to disregard
all protection in order to secure success on this occasion.

19. As on the 22nd-23rd April, I am much indebted to
Vice-Admiral Pierre Alexis M. A. Eonarc'h, Commandant
Superieur de la Marine dans la zone des Armees du Nord,
Dunkerque, who placed at my disposal all the available
vessels under his command, and assisted me in every
possible way. The French torpedo craft and M.L.s per-
formed valuable service in connection with the monitor
bombardment.

20. I commend Commodore Hubert Lynes to their
Lordships' favourable consideration.

The officers and men mentioned by him are being
included in my list of recommendations, which will be
forwarded as soon as possible.^

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

KOGER KEYES,
Vice-Aclmiral, Dover Patrol
The Secretary of the Admiralty.

1 Soo in/,-a, p. 200.

SIK KOGER KEYES'S SECOND DISPATCH 187

Enclosure

Office of Commodore,
Dunkirk,

15th 3Iay, 1918.

SiK,

I have the honour to fonvard the following report
ou the operations for blocking Ostend Harbour, carried
out on the night of 9th-10th May, 1918.

2. It will be remembered that on the night of the 22ud-
23rd April, when the forces under your command so
successfully achieved the blocking of the Zeebrugge-
Bruges Canal, the Western Squadron, under my com-
mand, was unsuccessful in its attack, simultaneously
delivered and with the same object, on Ostend.

3. The failure on that occasion was due, firstly, to the
adverse shift of wind that blew all our smoke screens
across the harbour entrance at the critical moment,
and, secondly, to the displacement — whether by design
or chance on the enemy's part — of the Ostend Buoy,
whose normal position had formed a convenient departure
point for the blockships.

4. Our lack of success was the fortune of war, not
the fault of any one concerned ; indeed, no one could have
carried out their duties more admirably than did the
Ostend forces that night, and I am deeply grateful
that, in recognition of this fact, you were so considerate
as to place the organization and leadership of another
attack in my hands.

5. In the first operation the blockships had advanced
under cover of a smoke screen, guided by the lights and
signals made by the small craft (C.M.B.s and M.L.s)
Avorking close inshore. I decided to adopt in general
a similar plan for the new attack, but previous experience.

188 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

and the necessity for assuming that the enemy would
make counter-preparations against an exactly similar
attack, called for modification in detail.

6. In preparing for the new attack, particular attention
was paid to perfecting the navigational arrangements ;
numerous small, but important, improvements were in-
troduced into the smoke gear, and the alternatives for
guiding the blockships into the entrance were made
so numerous as to reduce chance of failure, in that
respect, to the smallest possible dimensions.

7. The quicker the delivery of the new attack, the
greater the element of surprise and, consequently, of
success. Eealizing this, special efforts were made both
at Dover and Dunkirk, so that within a few days of the
firat attack, Vindictive had been prepared for her new
role of blockship, all the small craft had been completed
with their smoke-lights and other fittings, and re-
organized according to the new jilan of attack, which
had been promulgated to all concerned.

The alternative plans of attack, 'V.O.' and 'V.S.', were
submitted to you in my operation orders 0/54 and 0/58
respectively.

8. For this rapid and satisfactory work of preparation
at Dover, I beg particularly to offer my grateful thanks
to Commodore the Hon. A. D. E. H. Boyle, C.B., M.V.O.,
Chief of the Staff, who left no stone unturned to have all
my numerous requests carried out ; for that at Dunkirk
I am chiefly indebted to the energy of Commander J. L. C.
Clark, D.S.O,, R.N., my Second-in-Command ; to Lieu-
tenant-Commander F. H. Sandford, D.S.O., RN., the
staff officer you were good enough to lend me, who
was mainly responsible for the smoke screen organiza-
tion ; and to Lieutenant H. F. Witherby, R.N.V.R., my
Staff Intelligence Officer, whose knowledge of the enemy's

SIR ROGER KEYES'S SECOND DISPATCH 189

coast and close association with the air reconnaissance
work of the 61st (Naval) Wing were invaluable.

9. The elements were, however, against us — for despite
all these preparations, strong northerly winds, with rough
seas, precluded all possibility of the enterprise up to a
period when the conjunction of darkness and tide, in its
turn, demanded postponement until the second week of
the present month.

10. This enforced period of inaction was occupied in
perfecting and testing the arrangements, and, above all,
in the preparation of a second blockship,' which, on your
representation, was ordered to be prepared and fitted out
by His Majesty's Dockyard, Chatham.

11. The conjunction of darkness and tide made the
night of 9th-10th May the first favourable night of
the new period. By good fortune the weather conditions
on the 9th gave every indication of promise, and accord-
ingly on the afternoon of the 9th the operations were put
in progress, firstly by the passage of Sappho to Dover, and
later by the passage of both blockships, with their support-
ing and escorting forces, from Dover to Dunkirk. It was
at first doubtful whether Sappho could be completed in
time, but Chatham Dockyard made great efforts, and
Sappho arrived at Dover with several hours in hand.

12. For days preceding the operation, rain, cloud, and
mist had prevented more than the scantiest air recon-
naissances, but towards sunset on the 9th, i. e. when
the blockships were already steaming eastwards, an air
reconnaissance announced that all the buoys off Ostend
had apparently been removed. At considerable risk of
having to land after dark, Squadron-Commander Ronald
Graham, D.S.O., D.S.C., himself at once went out, re-
turned safely, and confirmed the report.

1 H.M.S. Sappho. See note, p, 180, supra.

190 OSTEND AND ZEE BRUGGE

This new move on the enemy's part had to be countered ;
we accordingly arranged to lay a special (calcic-phosphide)
light-buoy of our own, which subsequently made a satis-
factory departure point for the blockship and smoke
screens.

13. The weather conditions as night advanced con-
tinued excellent, wind N. by W., sky clear, atmosphere
good, both for air work and navigation, sea smooth
enough for the small craft to operate, barometer steady,
and conditions likely to remain stable.

14. Vindictive and Sappho arrived in Dunkirk Roads
in good time, disembarked their surplus crews, and then
proceeded with their escorts at the appointed time in
the programme. Sappho, however, had scarcely left the
anchorage than a man-hole joint in the side of her
boiler blew out, reducing her speed to about six knots,
and therefore putting her participation that night out
of the question.

15. This very serious reduction of blocking material
required consideration whether or no it was advisaljle
to proceed with the operation.

I decided to continue with Vindictive and signalled
to Commander Godsal that I had every confidence he
would do his best without Sappho. I also informed
you by W/T of my decision.

16. This done, I proceeded on board Faulktior (Com-
mander Henry G. L. Oliphant, M.V.O., D.S.O.), leader
of the offshore supports, to overtake the other forces,
who, in accordance with orders, were already well on
their way to their various stations. Commander Clarke
and Lieutenant-Commander Sandford accompanied me in
Fanlhior to carry out staff work, and were of great
assistance to me in conducting the operations.

17. After the sudden removal of the buoys, and in the

SIR ROGEE KEYES'S SECOND DISPATCH 191

knowledge that nine enemy destroyers had been seen
in the offing late that evening, I had fully expected
enemy interference with our \^\an before reaching the
place off Ostend where we should lay our buoy and
spread the small craft. But no, nothing occurred. The
enemy star shells and ' flaming onions ' fired intermittently
from the coast during the approach were evidently only
part of his new searching routine. Once again his
preparations against surprise included no patrol craft
in the offing.

By 1.30 a.m. all preliminary dispositions had been
completed, and the (advanced) inshore forces, i. c. the
C.M.B. and M.L. divisions, sent in to carry out their
various duties.

18. One new feature of the present plan was that
there should be no jyrelhnmarji bombardments or air
raid ; we were to make no attacks until our sea forces
were discovered by the enemy.

19. At 1.35 a.m. there was still no firing from the
^hore, but a searchlight lit up, and commenced to search.

The C.M.B.s had arrived, and were running their smoke
screens. The noise of their engines, and those of the
M.L.s approaching on their heels, was. of course, carried
ashore by the breeze.

At 1.43 a.m. I gave the prearranged signal to
'open fire', Avhich was immediately responded to by
the monitors, siege guns, and the air squadrons. Bombs
and shells, whose bvn'sts could be seen over the top of
our smoke screen, were undoubtedly giving the enemy
a warm time, and constituting a protection to the small
craft inshore.

■ 20. Shortly before this I had noticed with some anxiety
the gathering of light-drifting ' clouds '. But good-sized
gaps, through which stars shone, could be seen at

192 OSTEND AND ZEEBEUGGE

1.45 a.m., when the sky became completely overcast,
and five minutes later we were enveloped in a thick
sea-fog which, for the next all-important hour, reduced
our means of keeping in touch with events to sound
alone.

21. I felt that we could hope for no more air or
monitor bombardments, and that thus deprived of their
valuable support, the small craft inshore would suffer
in proportion, but fortunately this was not the case.
The fog proves to have been merely a local patch, not
extending to the monitors to the westward, and was
also sufficiently low-lying to enable the airmen to con-
tinue their attacks between it and the true cloud system
at some 10,000 feet altitude.

To realize these conditions, and the darkness due to
absence of moon, and to know that the Eoyal Air Force
carried out its whole programme is, in itself, a very high
tribute to the efficiency of the air squadrons, who, under
the orders of Brigadier-General Charles L. Lambe, C.M.G.,
D.S.O., took part in the operations. All our aeroplanes
eventually returned to their aerodromes ; some landed
well to the westward, naturally under difficulties ; one
crashed so badly that the pilots were both severely
injured.

The monitors, too, did good and useful work — par-
ticularly Prince Eugene. Captain Ernest Wigram, D.S.O.,^
led his division well inside range limits, in order that
guns of the secondary armament might play a part as
well as the big guns. This they did with good effect,
and it is really rather wonderful that his division escaped
without injury, for his front rank position put him in-
side the enemy's long-ranged star shells, and brought his
division under a heavy fire from the shore batteries.
1 Received the C.M.G.

SIR ROGER REYES'S SECOND DISPATCH 190

The R.M.A. siege guns, under Colonel Pryee Peacock,
also maintained a valuable fire on the enemy's heavy
coast batteries thi'oughout the operation.

22. To return to Ostend. 2 a.m., i.e. Vindictive' s
programme time to arrive at the piers, was signalled
by a heavy cannonade of quick-firers and machine-gun
fire near the entrance. The enemy had now almost
certainly realized the nature of the attack, and since
the smoke screens and fog prevented him aiming at
definite objectives, except when the small craft ran close
alongside to fire torpedoes at, or engage, the pier-heads
with their machine-guns, he concentrated his effort in
a continuous barrage fire across the entrance from the
whole of the exceedingly formidable array of batteries
in the neighbourhood of Ostend.

23. For the next twenty minutes, the critical period
during which Vindictive must succeed or fail, the off-
shore destroyer forces were ordered to fire star shell
over the entrance, and shell at the enemy's batteries —
the former to light up the pier-heads for Vindictive, and
the latter to divert the enemy's attention further sea-
ward. This firing was useful ; the inshore forces were
encouraged by having audible proof of our support close
behind them, and the enemy diverted a small proportion
of his fire. Very few shells came near us, however,
either at this time or later ; there were no casualties either
to material or personnel among the offshoi'e forces. I
attribute this mainly to the fog and smoke screens.

24. Meanwhile, Vindictive, after passing our calcic-phos-
phide buoy,' had arrived *on time' at where she expected
to find the entrance. The fog, and apparently also some
of the smoke borne on an easterly draught of air (the

^ AccC'i'ding to the Press Bureau Narrative she passed it four
minutes before the signal * open fire * was madn, i.e. at 1.39 a.m.

»17S N

10-1 OSTEND AND ZEEBEUGGE

result of wind impinging on the tall houses on the sea-
front), had reduced the seashore visibility to two or
three hundred j^ards at the moat, and nothing could be
seen.

Vindictive accordingly reduced speed, turned about, and
searched to the westward. Still finding nothing, she
again turned about, steered slowly eastward, and gave
the 'last resort' signal to her C.M.B. escort. This
signal was obeyed by lighting a million candle-power
flare close inshore to the westward of the entrance. In
most circumstances, the illumination of the whole sea-
front by this intensely brilliant flare would probably
have brought very heavy casualties to the inshore craft
and Vindictive herself, through placing them under ac-
curate gunfire, but on this occasion the fog, hitherto
our enemy, now proved our friend, for while the flare
showed Vindictive the piers, the small craft still remained
ill-defined or invisible, except at closest range.

25. Vindictive now became clearly visible to the enemy's
batteries, who concentrated all efforts on her. But she had
only two hundred yards to go, and Commander Godsal im-
mediately turned up for the entrance.

Communication between the conning-tower and the
after control soon failed, and, the entrance being passed,
Commander Godsal went outside the conning-tower and
gave the necessary orders for placing the ship in her
blocking position.

At this moment a very heaN'j^ shell burst, either on
the conning-tower or close to it. This must have killed
Commander Godsal, for he was seen no more ; and later,
after the ship had been sunk in the channel, careful search
failed to reveal his body.

This very gallant officer must have known before
being killed that his efforts were crowned with success.

SIR ROGER KEYES'S SECOND DISPATCH 105

Lieutenant Sir John Alleyne * was knocked out, severely
wounded in the stomach, and all the occupants of the con-
ning tower were badly shaken by this shell. Lieutenant
Victor Crutchley* then took command, and endeavoured to
place the ship across the channel. The sinking charges
were fired by Engineer Lieutenant-Commander William
A. Bury* and preparations made to abandon ship.

26. All this time Vindictive was continuously fired at,
both by heavy and machine guns, and repeatedly hit ;
the after control had been completely demolished, killing
Sub-Lieutenant Angus Maclachlan and all with him, and
the whole upper deck was a mass of debris.

Notwithstanding this, perfect order was maintained,
and a careful search for wounded was made before em-
barking in the two M.L.s (Nos. 254 and 276), who had
run in through the fire zone to effect the rescue.

27. Motor Launch 254 (Lieutenant Geoffrey H. Drum-
mond, R.N.V.R.^), coming alongside Vindictive's inshore
side, embarked Lieutenant Crutchley, Engineer Lieu-
tenant-Commander Buiy, and thirty-seven men. With
his First Lieutenant (Lieutenant Gordon Ross, R.N.V.R.)
and Deckhand J. Thomas killed, his coxswain wounded,
and himself wounded in three places. Lieutenant Drum-
mond backed his now heavily laden motor launch out of
the harbour, still under a tremendous fire, cleared the
entrance, and made straight to seaward.

Arriving outside the fire zone. Lieutenant Drummond
found his launch gradually filling forward from her
injuries. Standing on at slow speed through the fog,
and contriving somehow or otlier to pass close to the
offshore destroyers without either getting in touch,
M.L. 254 was most fortunately picked up in a sinking
condition about forty minutes after leaving Ostend by

> Received the D.S.O. « Received the V.C.

n2

ion OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

your flagship WarwicJc.^ Rescuers and rescued were
quickly taken on board and M.L. 254 then sank.

28. M.L. 276 (Lieutenant Roland Bourke, R.N.V.R.''),
having followed Vindictive into Ostend (engaging both
piers with his machine-guns en route), went alongside
Vindictive after M.L. 254, with her first-rescued party,
had shoved off.

After much search and shouting, and still under a very
heavy fire. Lieutenant Bourke and Sub-Lieutenant Petrie ^
managed to find and embark the last three of Vindictive's
survivors (Lieutenant Alleyne and two ratings), all badly
wounded, in the water clinging to a capsized skiff.

This fine rescue effected, M.L. 276, hit in fifty-five
places and with three of her crew killed or wounded,
cleared the harbour, and was able to continue steering
to the westward until picked up and taken in tow by
Prince Eugene.*

29. The small inshore craft — C.M.B.s under Lieu-
tenant Arthur E. P. Welman, D.S.C., R.N.,'' and
Lieutenant Francis C. Harrison, D.S.O., R.N., and the
M.L.s under Commander Ion Hamilton Benn, D.S.O.,
R.N.V.R.,^ as before,' carried out all their duties
splendidly ; to them must be given the chief honour
of having guided Vindictive in.

Daring exploits of these small craft, all contributory
to the general success, are numerous ; they are recounted
by the senior officers of divisions in their detailed
reports, but I would specially mention the following :

C.M.B. No. 25 (Lieutenant Russell H. McBean, R.N.')
escorted Vindictive with smoke screen close up to the

1 See supra, p. 184. - Received the V.C.

s Received the D.S.C. * Monitor.

5 Received bar to the D.S.O. '' Received the C.B.

' i.e. as on April 22-23. « Received the D.S.C.

SIR ROGER KEYES'S SECOND DISPATCH 197

entrance, where she assisted her with guiding lights,
then torpedoed the piers, and finally engaged the
machine-guns there with his own machine-guns with
apparently good effect, during which Lieutenant McBean
was wounded and Acting Chief Motor Mechanic G. E.
Keel killed. Having seen Vindictive inside the piers, and
her work being completed, Sub-Lieutenant George R.
Shaw, R.N.R.^ (second in command), brought her safely
back to harbour, Motor Mechanic A. J. Davis* filling
Chief Motor Mechanic Keel's place, and keeping the
engines running most efficiently.

C.M.B. No. 24 (Lieutenant Archibald Dayrell-Reed,
D.S.O., R.N.R.") and C.M.B. No. 30 (Lieutenant Albert
L. Poland, R.N.') both carried out successful torpedo
attacks on the pier ends, afterwards laying and maintain-
ing good smoke screens close inshore, throughout the
remainder of the operation.

C.M.B. No. 26 (Lieutenant Cuthbert F. B. Bowlby, R.N.*)
escorted Vindictive close up to the entrance, then ran
ahead, and finding one of the piers, fired his torpedo
at it. The water being shallow, and range short, the
explosion shook the boat so severely as to damage her
engines and open her seams. She commenced to sink,
but by his presence of mind, and the cool perseverance
of Chief Motor Mechanic E. W. MfCracken,= Lieutenant
Bowlby got the leak stopped, engines going again, and
brought his boat out of the fire zone, where Commander
Bertram H. Ramsay, leader of one of the offshore
divisions, took her in tow.

C.M.B. No. 22 (Lieutenant William H. Bremner, R.N.,'
with Lieutenant Arthur E. P. Welman, D.S.O., D.S.C,"
Senior Officer of C.M.B. s, aboard), when carrying out her

' Roceiv<d the D.S.C. - Received tlio D.S.M.

^ IJeceived bar lu D.S O. * Received bar to D.S.C.

198 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

smoke-screening of the shore batteries, encountered, close
inshore, an enemy torpedo boat, Avho switched on her
searchlight and opened fire. C.M.B. No. 22 had no
better weapon than her Lewis guns, but with these
she attacked and peppered the torpedo boat to such good
effect as to drive her away from the harbour entrance,
and prevent her interfering with the blocking operation.

C.M.B. No. 23 (Lieutenant the Hon. Cecil E. R. Spencer ')
escorted Vindictive close inshore, and kept touch with her
until Vindictive gave the * last resort ' signal, on which
C.M.B. No. 23 laid, and lit, the million candle-power flare
by whose light Vindictive eventually found her way in.

30. To recount the foregoing exploits of the small
craft is in no way to detract from the praise due to
all, particularly to the senior officers of units, for the
care and precision with which they carried out my
necessarily rather elaborate orders.

31. The general retirement was well executed and
without further casualties or incident, the supporting
forces remaining out until dayliglit to pick up any dis-
abled small craft who miyht still be out. There were
none, however ; those who were unable to return by
their own power had already been towed home,

32. No interference by enemy craft was experienced
throughout the operation, but from subsequent reports
of some of the inshore craft it appears that several
German torpedo boats were lying close under the shore
batteries the whole time, and made no move to come out.

33. Our casualties were remarkably light — 2 officers
and 6 men killed, 5 officers and 25 men wounded,
2 officers and 9 men missing, believed killed. Our
only loss in material is M.L. 254. A number of the
small craft were considerably damaged by gunfire, but

' ll.'S. Ktxoivod bartu D.S.C.

SIR KOGEE KEYES'S SECOND DISPATCH 199

all these are, or will be shortly, ready for action again.
Tlie light casualty list must be attributed to the efficient
smoke screens, and probably also to the fog.

34. Of the Sappho, I can but record the bitter disap-
pointment of all aboard her at the accident that prevented
her following Vindictive. One and all, they begged to be
given another chance, and when the day comes for their
request to be granted, I am sure they will not be found
wanting.

I have, &c.,

Hubert Lynes,

Commodore.
To Vice-Admiral

Sir Roger Keyes, K.C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O.

VI

VICE-ADMIRAL SIK ROGER KEYES'S
DISPATCH,^ JULY 24, 1918

Fleet House, Dover.

Mth July, 1918.
Sib,

With reference to my despatch No. 2305/003 of 15th
June, 1918, I have the honour to bring to the notice of
the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty the names
of the following Officers and Men who performed dis-
tinguished service in the second blocking operation
against Ostend on the night of 9th lOth May, 1918*

2. — Aerial photographs taken prior to the operation
clearly showed that the enemy had made special pre-
parations in anticipation of a renewed attack.

3. — The operation was carried out in mined waters in
the face of a tremendous lire, and the greatest credit is
due to those who so readily volunteered for hazardous
service in the Vindictive and in motor launches detailed
for rescue work, and to the crews of the numerous craft
which covered and screened the approach of the Vindictive,
led her to her objective, and rescued the survivors of her
crew after she had been blown up between the piers of
Ostend harbour.

^ I'ublisliecl ill the L'ndun Ga'.cile 'Siip]>kiaeiil ', No. 30870, of
August 28, I'JIS.

SIK EOGEK KEYES'S THIRD DISPATCH 201

The following Officers, Petty Officers and Men per-
formed specially distinguished service in action on the
night of 9th/10th May, 1918 :—

Capt. Hubert Lynes, C.B., C.M.G., R.N. (Cdre., 2ncl CI.).

Couimodore Lyngs at Dunkirk having so ably carried out the
direction of the former attempt to block Ostend as part of the
Zecbrugge and Ostend scheme on the night of '22nd/23rd April,
I entrusted the conduct of the operation again to him. He
directed it in a most able manner, proceeding himself in
B..M.S. Fatdknor, and supporting the Vindictive from an inshore
position.

Cdr. Alfred E. Godsal, D.S.O., R.N.

This oflicer led the previous attempt to block Ostend in the
Brilliant, and on his return at once begged to be allowed to try
again. On being appointed to the Vindictive he worked with
the greatest energy to get her ready for further service at the
earliest possible moment. On the night of 9th/10th May,
having placed his vessel between the piera of Ostend harbour,
he left the shelter of the conning tower for the forecastle in
order to get a better view for manoeuvring her into the required
position. He was almost immediately killed, and the Service
lost in him a very gallant and valuable officer.

Lieut. Angus H. Maclachlan, R.N.

Lieutenant Maclachlan was in the Brilliant in the previous
attempt to block Ostend, and at once volunteered for the
second operation. This gallant young officer was in charge of
the Vindictive's after control on the night of the 9th/10th May,
and was killed at his post.

Lieut. Geoffrey H. Drummond, R.N.V.R.^

Volunteered- for rescue work in command of M.L. 254.
Following Vindictive to Ostend, when off the piers a shell burst
on board, killing Lieutenant Gordon Ross and Deckhand
J. Thomas, wounding the coxswain,'^ and also severely wounding
Lieutenant Drummond in three places. Notwithstanding his

1 Received the V.C.

- David George Keo>, infiu, \>. 20',).

202 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

■wounds he remained on the bridge, navigated his vessel, which
was already seriously damaged by shell fire, into Ostend
harbour, placed her alongside Vindictive, and took oflf two
officers and thirty-seven men — some of whom were killed and
many wounded while embarking. When informed that there
was no one alive left on board, he backed his vessel out clear of
the piers before sinking exhausted from his wounds. When
H.M.S. Wanvick fell in with M.L. 254 off Ostend half an hour
later the latter was in a sinking condition.^ It was due to
the indomitable courage of this very gallant officer that the
majority of the crew of the Vindictive were rescued.

Lieut. Roland Bourke, D.S.O., R.N.V.R.^

Volunteered for rescue work in command of M.L. 276, and
followed Vindictive into Ostend, engaging the enemy's machine
guns on both piers with Lewis guns. After M.L. 254 had
backed out, Lieutenant Bourke laid his vessel alongside Vin-
dictive to make further search. Finding no one he withdrew,
but hearing cries in the water he again entered the harbour,
and after a prolonged search eventually found Lieutenant Sir
John Alleyne and two ratings, all badly wounded, in the water,
clinging to an upended skiff, and rescued them. During all
this time the motor launch was under a very heavy fire at close
range, being hit in fifty-five places, once by a 6 in. shell— two
of her small crew being killed and others wounded. The vessel
was seiiously damaged and speed greatly reduced. Lieutenant
Bourke, however, managed to bring her out and carry on until
he fell in with a Monitor, which took him in tow. This
episode displayed daring and skill of a veiy high order, and
Lieutenant Bourke's bravery and perseverance undoubtedly
saved the lives of Lieutenant Alleyne and two of the Vin-
dictive's crew.

Lieut. Victor A. C. Crutchley, D.S.C., R N.^

This officer was in BriJliant in the unsuccessful attempt to
block Ostend on the night of 22nd/ 23rd April, and at once
volunteered for a further effort. He acted as 1st Lieut, of

' See the Dispatch of Juno 15. jiara. 13.
2 Received the V.C.

SIR ROGER KEYES'S THIRD DISPATCH 203

Vindictive, and worked with untiring energy fitting out that
ship for further service. On the night of 9th/10th May, after
his commanding officer had been killed and the second in
command severely -wounded, Lieut. Crutchley took command
of Vindictive and did his utmost by manoeuvring the engines to
place that ship in an effective position. He displayed great
bravery both in the Vindictive and in M.L. 254, which rescued
the crew after the charges had been blown and the former
vebsel sunk between the piers of Ostend harbour, and did not
himself leave the Vindictive until he had made a thorough
search with an electric torch for survivors under a very heavy
fire. Lieut. Crutchley took command of M.L. 254 when the
commanding ofiicer sank exhausted from his wounds, the
second in command ^ having been killed. The vessel was full
of wounded and very seriously damaged by shell fire, the fore
part being flooded. With indomitable energy and by dint of
baling Avith buckets and shifting weight aft, Lieut. Crutchley
and the unwounded kept her afloat, but the leaks could not be
kept under, and she was in a sinking condition, with her fore-
castle nearly awash, when picked up by H.M.S. Warwick. The
bearing of this very gallant officer and fine seaman throughout
these operations oft' the Belgian coast was altogether admirable
and an inspiring example to all thrown in contact with him.

Lieut. Sir John M. Alleyne, Bart., D.S.C., R.N.-

Volunteerod from a Monitor^ of the Dover Patrol for service
in the Vindictive. He rendered valuable service in refitting
navigational arrangements which were destroyed in Vindictive
on 23rd April, and on the actual night of the operation was
invaluable on account of his local knowledge. He showed
great coolness under a veiy heavy fire, and most skilfully
navigated the Vifidictive to the entrance to Ostend harbour.
He was severely wounded and rendered unconscious when his
Captain * was killed.

1 Lieutenant Gordon Ross.

- Received the D.S.O.

■' Lord Clive. S«o Dispatch of .Junt' 16, p;irn. .".

* Commaudor A. E. Gods>al.

204 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

Eng. Cdr. William A. Bury, R.N.'

This gallant otRcer greatly distinguished himself in Vindictive
on 23rd April, and as soon as he knew another operation was
contemplated, volunteered, begging to be allowed to remain in
charge of the engine room department of that vessel. He
worked most energetically to fit her out for further service,
and on the night of 9th/10th May he again rendered invaluable
service, setting a fine example to his men. He remained in
the engine room until the last possible moment, and when
everyone was clear he blew the bottom out of the ship by firing
the main and auxiliary after charges. He was very severely
wounded.

Cdr. (act. Capt.) Ion Hamilton Benn, D.S.O., M.P., R.N.V.R.2

This officer led the motor launches in M.L. 105 with con-
spicuous ability and success. This is the third occasion Capt.
Benn has led the inshore motor launch division off Ostend
under a very heavy fire. Capt. Bonn has set a very fine
example of bravery and devotion to duty to the officers and
men of the motor launches of the Dove?r Patrol, which he has
commanded for nearly three years, and has thus contributed
greatly to the success which has attended the gallant efforts of
these small craft in carrying out the dangerous duties assigned
to them during these operations oft" the Belgian coast.

Cdr. Reginald St. P. Parry, R.N.'

Commander Parry commanded a Destroyer, and handled his
vessel with skill and decision, performing a most valuable
service under difficult conditions.

Capt. Ernest Wigram, D.S.O., R.N.^

This officer was in command of H.M. Monitor Prince Eugene.
He led his division well inside the allotted range in order to
bring the secondary armament of the vessel into action. This
brought the ships under a heavy fire from the shore batteries,
and undoubtedly contributed considei-ably to the success of the
operations.

1 Keceived the D.S.O. * Keccivca IhoC.li.

3 Keceived (lie (J.M.G.

SIR ROGER KEYES'S THIRD DISPATCH 205

Lieut. Arthur E. P. Welmau, D.S.O., D.S.C., R.N.^

The part played by the Coastal Motor Boats during the
operation was all-important. Lieut. Welman organised and
led them in a coastal motor boat in a most spirited manner.
He^ encountered an enemy torpedo boat near the entrance to
Osteud, which switched on searchlights and opened fire. He
at once closed with her, and engaged her with Lewis guns to
such good effect that she withdrew and left the channel clear
for the approach of the blockships.

Lieut, (act. Lieut.-Cdr.) Keith R. Hoare, D.S.O., D.S.C., A.M.,
R.N.V.R.i
Volunteered for rescue work at Ostend in command of
M.L. 283. He was ordered to follow astern and assist two
other motor launches which were detailed for rescue work. He
remained at the Stroom Bank Buoy position until Vindictive
had passed and then followed her, patrolling east and west
within a quarter of a mile of the shore under heavy pom-pom
and machine-gun fire, searching for survivors until 3.20 a.m.,
when all hope of finding anyone had passed.

Cdr. William W. Watson, R.N.V.R.^

Was in command of M.L. 105, and was of the greatest assis-
tance to Capt. Benn in arranging and supervising the smoke
screen. This involved going from end to end of the line and
taking his vessel close inshore several times, when he came
under heavy barrage fire. He showed great courage and cool-
ness throughout the operation.

Lieut.-Cdr. Raphael Saunders, R.N.V.R.''

This officer volunteered for rescue work at Ostend in com-
mand of M.L. 128. In company with ]\LL. 283 he went in
after Vindictive to look for survivors. When near the shore he
came under heavy fire — his signalman was killed and Lieut.
Brayfield * and one of the crew wounded. This officer showed
great coolness, setting a fine example to his men throughout,

1 Received bar to D.S.O.

2 In C.M.B. 22. See Lieut. W. H. Bremner, infra, p. 206.
^ Received the D.S 0. * See infra, p. 208.

206 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

and was of the greatest assistance in organising the smoke
screen.

Lieut. Russell H. McBean, R.N.*

In command of a coastal motor boat [No. 25]. He escorted
Vindictive close up to the entrance at Ostend, covering her with
smoke screen and then assisting her with guiding lights. He
torpedoed the eastern and western piers, and finally engaged the
machine guns there with his own machine guns at point-blank
range with apparently good effect. He most skilfully handled
his vessel under a heavy fire until he was wounded.

Sub-Lieut. George R. Shaw, R.N.R.^

Second in command of a coastal motor boat [No. 25] which
escorted Vindictive with smoke screen close up to the entrance of
Ostend Harbour, assisting her with guiding lights. His vessel
then torpedoed the eastern and western piers, and finally engaged
the machine guns at point-blank range. During this engage-
ment the commanding ofiicer * was wounded and the chief motor
mechanic killed. Having seen Vindictive inside the piers, and
the work of his vessel completed, Sub-Lieut. Shaw brought her
safely back to harbour.

Lieut. ^Villiam H. Bremner, R.N.'

Was in command of a coastal motor boat [No. 22]. When
carrying out his smoke screening of the enemy shore batteries,
he encountered close inshore an enemy torpedo boat, which
switched on her searchlight and opened fire. Lieut. Bremner
had no better weapons than Lewis guns, but with these he
attacked and peppered the torpedo boat to such good effect as
to drive her away from the harbour entrance and prevent her
interfering with the blocking operation.

Lieut. The Hon. Cecil E. R. Spencer, D.S.C., R.N.^

This officer was in command of a coastal motor boat [No. 23]
and escorted Vindictive close inshore and kept touch with her
until she gave the " last resort " signal, on which he laid and lit

' Received the D.S.C. - Lieutenant Russell H. McBean.

3 Received bar to D.S.C.

SIR ROGER KEYES'S THIRD DISPATCH 207

the flare, which greatly assisted the operation, drawing heavy
fire previously directed at the Vindictive on to himself.

Lieut. Kuwsthorne Procter, R.N.V.K.*

This officer was in charge of a section of motor launches
screening Monitors during the bombardment of the Ostend
shore batteries. He exhibited conspicuous ability and initiative
under heavy fire, and materially contributed to the succebs of
the operation.

Lieut. Archibald Dayrell-Reed, D.S.O., R.N.R.«

"Was in command of a coastal motor boat [No. 24], and carried
out a successful attack on the pier ends, afterwards laying and
maintaining good smoke screens close inshore throughout the
remainder of the operation under a heavy fire.

Lieut.-Cdr. Jean L. Mieville, R.N.V.R.''

Was in command of M.L. 280 and leader of a smoke screen
unit. He led his unit with skill and judgment in a very
exposed position, and it was largely due to him that the screen
was so extremely successful in his section.

Sub-Lieut. James Petrie, R.N.V.R.'

This ofiicer volunteered for rescue work in M.L. 276. When
the coxswain was killed near the Ostend piers, he jumped to
the wheel and steered the launch into the harbour. When
fired on by machine guns from the piers, he manned the Lewis
gun and returned the fire on both pier-heads. Later, when
three wounded men * were discovered in the water, he personally
assisted them into the launch, being exposed all the time to
heavy fire.

Lieut. Cuthbert F. B. Bowlby, D.S.C., R.N.=

In command of a coastal motor boat [No. 26], and escorted
Vindictive close up to the entrance, then ran ahead, and finding
one of the piers, fired a torpedo at it. The water being shallow
and the range short, the explosion shook the boat so severely as

' Received the D.S.C. 2 Received bar to D.S.O.

2 Received the D.S.O.

^ Lieutenant Sir John Alleyno and two ratings of Vindictive.
'- Received bar to D.S.C.

208 OSTRND AND ZEEBRUGCtE

to damage her engines and open her seams. She commenced to
sink, but by his iiresence of mind he got the leak stopped,
engines going again, and brought his boat out of the fire zone,
where he was taken in tow by H.M.S. Broke.

Lieut. Albert L. Poland, R.N.^

In command of a coastal motor boat [No. 30], and carried out
a successful torpedo attack on the pier ends, afterwards laying
and maintaining good smoke screens close inshore throughout
the remainder of the operation under a heavy fire.

Lieut. Anthony C. Mackie, R.N.V.R.^

This officer was of great assistance in command of M.L. 279.
He pluckily carried on his smoke screen work under fire for
one and a half hours after breaking the starboard shaft, retiring
with the rest of the flotilla, when operations were completed,
under one engine.

Lieut.-Cdr. Arthur G. Watts, R.N.V.K.^

This officer was in command of M.L. 239 and leader of
a smoke screen unit. He led his unit with skill and judgment
in a very exposed position, and it was largely due to him that
the screen was so extremely successful in his section.

Lieut. Felix F. Bray field, R.N.V.R.^

This officer volunteered for rescue work as second in com-
mand of M.L. 128. M.L. 128, in company with M.L. 283, went
in after Vindictive to look for survivors. When near the shore
she came under heavy fire, the signalman was killed and Lieut.
Brayfield and one of ihe crew wounded. Lieut. Brayfield
showed great devotion to duty, remaining on the bridge and
carrying on with his duties until the operation was over,
though wounded in the leg.

Lieut. Allan L. Geddes, R.N.V.R.^

This officer was in command of M.L. 553 and leader of an
inshore smoke screen unit. He led his unit with skill and
judgment under fire, and it was largely due to him that the
smoke screen was so extremely successful in his section.

1 Received the D.S.C. - Received the D.S.O.

SIR ROGER KE YES'S THIRD DISPATCH 209

Lieut. Gordon F. Ross, R.N.V.R. (Killed in action.)

Volunteered for rescue -work in M.L. 2.54— killed in the
entrance to Ostend harbour.^

P.O. .Joseph James Reed, D.S.M."

This Petty Officer was in Brilliant in the previous attempt to
block Ostend. He immediately volunteered to accompany hia
officers in a second operation. On the night of 9th/10th May
he steered the Vindictive into Ostend harbour and, when the
charges were fired and the ship abandoned, he picked up Lieut.
Sir John Alleyne, who was lying unconscious in the conning
tower, carried him to the gangway, and lowered him over the
aide. This very gallant Petty Officer then assisted others to
escape, and on board M.L. 25i was of the greatest assistance in
keeping that vessel afloat until she was picked up.

Ldg. Dkhnd. David George Rces, R.N.R.'

For his conspicuous gallantry as coxswain of M.L. 254,
remaining at the wheel after being wounded. He assisted
Lieut.-Cdr. Drummond — also seriously wounded— to put the
motor-launch alongside Vindictive in Ostend harbour, and carried
on until he was relieved by one of the rescued crew.

The following Engine-room Artificers distinguished
themselves in the Vimlictive during the attack on Zee-
brugge Mole on 23rd April. Tliey immediately volun-
teered for further service in Vinclicfirc, and behaved with
conspicuous bravery in that ship on the night of 9th/10th
May:—

E.R..-\., 3rd CI., Herbert Oavanagh, D.S.M.^

Act. E.R.A., 4th CI., Herbert Alfred Harris, D.S.M.^

E.R.A., 4th CI., Norman Carroll, D.S.M.^'

E.R.A., 4th CI., Alan Thomas, D.SM. (Prisoner of war.)

The following volunteered for a very hazardous service
and distinguislied themselves in the Vindictire on the

' See Lieutenant 0. II. Drummond, s:ipra, p. 201.

2 Received the C.O.M. " R^ni-ived l-ar to D.S.M.

210 OSTENI) AND ZEEBRUGGE

night of 9th/10th May. Lieut. Crutchley reports:'"!
find it impossible to select any other names, as all
behaved equally well."

Sig. David Heale.^

Ldg. Sea. Albert Westly Ling.«

Ldg. Sea. Ernest Edward Robertson.'^

A.B. Henry Frederick George Wilson.^

A.B. Frank John Bore.-

A.B. John Chambers.^

A.B. Victor Vernon Snrridgo.^

E.R.A., 3rd CI., Francis Joseph Pickeroll.*

Sto. P.O. Samuel John Jordan.'^

Sto. P.O. James Percy Newington.-

Ldg. Sto. Bernard Whiiledge Lowe.- >

Ldg. Sto. Albert Edward Saunders.'^

Sto., 1st CI., John Edward Taylor.^

Sto., 1st CI., Frederick Gilroy.-

Sto., 2nd CI., George William Kenneth Elliott.''

Sto., 1st CI., William Carter.^

Sto., 1st CI., William Joslin.^'

Sto., 1st CI., John Henry Station.'

Sto., 2nd CI., Frederick Charles Russell.^

Sto., 2nd CI., Patrick O'Reilly.^

Sto. P.O. Charles ]\I<:Donald. (IMissing.)

Sto. P.O. George Herbert Fryer.-

P.O. Henry William Martin. (Missing.)

Sto. P.O. James Relf.==

Ldg. Sto. Henry William Kemp. (Missing.)

Ldg. Sto. Stanley Pearce.^

A.B. William John Morling. (Killed in action.)

Ldg. Sto. Thomas Everitt Chitty.'

A.B. Ernest Garbutt. (Missing.)

Ldg. Sto. John Willie Nicholas Akid.-

Sto., 1st CI., Roger Bailey.^

Sto., 1st CI., Samuel McCracken.'^

' Sae Dispatch of June 1.5, para. 10,
2 Received the D.S.M.

SIR ROGER REYES'S THIRD DISPATCH 211

Sto., 1st CI., Jamef? Norris.i

Sto., 1st CI., William Thomas Wood.^

Sig. George Harold Linegar, R.N.V.R, (Missing.)

Sto., 1st CI., Philippe Smithers. (Prisoner of war.)

Sto., 1st CI., George Cross.^

Sto., 1st CI., William John Johnson.'

Sto., 1st CI., Edward Largey.'

Sto., 1st CI., Charles James Fisher. (Missing.)

A.B. Frank Thomas Wilson. (Killed in action.)

Sto., 1st CI., Frank Neville."

Sto., If^t CI., Michael Henry.'

Sto., 1st CI., Harold Parr.'

In Destroi/er.'i.

Shipwt., 1st CI., George Frater.'
Mechn. John Pelham.'
P.O.. 1st CI., Charles Potter.'
P.O., 1st CI., Robert Charles Jeffreys.'
Yeo. Sigs. Thomas Pinches.'

In Mofor Lctinich'.'i.
Ch. Yeo. Sigs. Daniel Paul Foley, D.S.M.^

The following volunteered for dangerous rescue work.
It was largely due to the magnificent manner in which
the men of these vessels carried out their duties that so
many of the officers and men of the Vlndicfire were
rescued : —

Air Mech., 1st CI., Douglas Gordon Smith, R.N.A.S.^

Ch. Motor Mech. Archibald Murray IMacfarlane, R.N.Y.R.

(M.L. 25-i).'
Ch. Motor Mech. Kdgar Frank Chivers, R.N.V.R. {U.L. 276j.'
Ch. Motor Mech. Fred Clark Talbot, R.N.Y.R. (i\r.L. 283).'
Ch. Motor .Mech. Hugh IMo^^Iillan, K.N.Y.R. (M.L. 128).'
Ldg. Dkhnd. John ^^laclean, R.N.R. (M.L. 128).'
Dkhnd. Clivc Ingold Gillef t, R.N.R. (M.L. 128) (killed in action).

' Roceivod the D.-'^.M. * Roreived bar to D.S.M-

o2

212 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

Ldg. Dkhnd. Joseph Hamshaw, R.N.R. (M.L. 276) (killed in

action).
Dkhnd. Hugh Sutherland, R.N.R. (M.L. 276). ^
Dkhnd. Charles f:dward Surtees, R.N.R. (M.L. 254).^
Dkhnd. William George Clark, R.N.R. (M.L. 283).i
Dkhnd. William Hutchinson, R.N.R. (M.L. 276) (killed in

action).
Ch. Motor Mech. George Kerr, R.N.V.R. (M.L. 276).»
Ch. Motor Mech. George Jones, R.N.V.R. (M.L 254i.i
Dkhnd. John Owen Thomas, R.N.R. (M.L. 254) (killed in action).

The following displayed coiivage and coolness under
fire on the nights of lllh/12th April," 22nd/23rd April,
and 9th/10th May. These men carried out their duties
with great steadiness, and materially contributed to the
success of the operations : —

Ldg. Dkhnd. Walter George Farthing, R.N.R. (M.L. 105).i
Ldg. Dkhnd. George Turner, R.N.R. (M.L. 274).^
Ch. Motor Mech. Robert Rae, R.N.V.R. (M.L. 551 1.'
Ldg. Dkhnd. George McGee, R.N.R. (M.L. 307).»

In Coastal Motor Boats.

Ch. Motor Mech. Eric Willinm M'^Cracken, R.N.V.R.^
Ch. Motor Mech. Leslie Roy M^Ginley, R.N.V.R.^
Motor Mech. Arthur John Davis, R.N.V.R.^
Ch. Motor Mech. Ernest Seymour Mountain, R.N.V.R.^
Ch. Motor Mech. Leonard Ernest ]\I<=Queen, R.N.V.R.'

The following Officers. Petty Officers and men also
rendered valuable services in action and off the enemy
coast : —

Capt. Wilfred Tomkinson, C.B., R.N.
In command of the Destroyers.

Cdr. Frederick E. K. Strong, D.S.O., R.N.
In command of a Destroyer.

' Received tho D.S.JI. ■ See s^ipra, p. 29.

SIR ROGER REYES'S THIRD DISPATCH 213

Cdr. Victor L. A. Campbell, D.S.O., R.N.
In command of Warwick, flying flag.

Cdr. Patrick E. Parker, R.N.

Engaged Ostend batteries at close range with Prince Eugene.
Cdr. JamcB L. C. Clark, D.S.O., R.N. (Staff" of Commodore,

Dunkirk).

Cdr. Francis H. Saudford, D.S.O., R.N.

In Comutand of Off-Shore Destroyers.
Cdr. Henry G. L. Oliphant, M.V.O., D S.O., R.N. (Senior officer of
oft'-sliore force — flying broad pennant of Commodore Lynes).
Cdr. Bertram H. Ramsay, R.N.
Lieut.-Cdr. Astley D. C. Cooper-Key, D.S.O., K.N.
Lieut.-Cdr. Hubert S. Braddyll, R.N.
Lieut.-Cdr. William H. Sandford, R.N.
Lieut.-Cdr. Guy L. Warren, R.N.
Lieut. John R. Johnston, R.N.
Lieut. Christopher H. Ringrose, R.N.

1)1 Destroyers.
Lieut. Richard H. Caldwell, R.N.
Lieut. Frederick H. G. Trumble (killed in action).
Eng. Lieut.-Cdr. Robin Rampling, R.N.

Ill Monitors.
Lieut.-Cdr. William L. Jackson, R.N.

Li Motor Lunnches.
Lieut. Malcolm MacCallum, R.N.V.R. (M.L. 292).
Lieut. John Gordon, R.N.V.R. (M.L. 397).
Lieut. Arthur G. Bagot, D.S.C., A.M., R.N.V.R. (M.L. 283).
Sub-Lieut. Cyril W. Scott, R.N.V.R. (M.L. 562).
Mid. Harold L. Proctor, R.N.V.R. (M.L. 283).

The following rendered good service in attending
wounded and during the transportation of wounded
at sea : —

Act. Chap. Rev. Frauds M. Jackson, R.N.
Surg. Stanley S. Beare, R.N.

214 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE

Surg. Roger Buddie, M.B., R.N.
Surg. Bernard S. CoUings, R.N.
Payr. (act.) Herbert G. A. Woolley, R.N.

In Deatroi/ers.
Ord. Sea. Jameb William Burns, R.N.V.R.
Snr. Res. Attendant Hugh Hill.
Jnr. Res. Attendant Alexander Roscuc,

The above rendered good service in attending wounded
and during the transportation of wounded.

In Monitors.
A.B. Albert Edward Wood,

Lt Motor LauucJiea.
Dkhnd. Henry George Jarvest, R.N.R. (M.L. 276^
Ldg. Mech. William Henry Grice, R.N.A.S. (M.L. 288).
Ch. Motor Mech. William Patrick Yates, R.N.V.R. (M.L. 128).
Dkhnd. Norman William Vigar, R.N.R. (M.L. 254).
Dkhnd. George Henry Hancock, R.N.R. (M.L. 283).
Dkhnd. Angus Morrison, R.N.R. (M.L. 128).
Dkhnd. Percy Humphreys, R.N.R. (M.L. 276).
Ch. Motor Mech. Herbert George Underwood, R.N.V.R.

(M.L. 105).
Dkhnd. Robert Gardner, R.N.R. (M.L. 128j.
Air-Mech., 1st CI., Laurence Henry Sensicle, R.N.A.S. (M.L. 105).

In Coastal Motor Boats.

Ch. Motor Mech. Albert William Saunders, D.S.M., R.N.V.R.
Ch. Motor Mech. Edward Gordon Windley, D.S.M., R.N.V.R.

The co-operation of the Air Force under Brigadier-
General Charles L. Lambe, C.M.G., D.S.O., R.A.E., was
of great value during the operation. In spite of the fog,
the Squadron under the command of Squadron-Commander
Herbert G. Brackley, D.S.O., D.S.C., continued to attack
in accordance with programme until after the completion
of the operation.

SIR ROGER KEYE8S THIRD DISPATCH 215

In conclusion, I desire to place on record my indebted-
ness to Vice-Admiral Pierre Alexis Marie Antoine
Ronarc'h, K.C.B., C.M.G., Commandant Superieur de la
Marine dans la Zone des Armees du Nord, Dunkerque,
for the valuable assistance afforded by the French Navy
on the nights of 22nd/23rd April and 9th/10th May, and
also in several preparatory operations.

The Vice-Admiral placed at my disposal all the available
vessels under his command and assisted me in every
possible way, as did Capitaine de Vaisseau Broart de
Boisanger, D.S.O., Chef de Division des Flotilles de la
Mer du Nord.

The following Officers^ distinguished themselves in
action in the operations against Ostend : — •

Capitaine de Corvette Louis Vennin, T.B.D. Lestin.
Capitaine de Corvette Maurice Mottez, T.B.D. VEnse'Kjne Itoux.
Lieutenant de Vaisseau Alfred Richard, T.B.D. Bouclier.
Premier Maitre Patron Pilote Baylet, T.B. No. 320.
Premier Maitre Patron Pilote Mozach, T.B. No. 318.
Premier Maitre Patron Pilote Rabaste, T.B. No. 341.
Second Maitre Delporte, Vedette No. 34.^

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

ROGER KEYES,

Vice-Admiral,
Dover Patrol
The Secretary of the Admiralty.

^ In addition to the officers aheady mentioned in these pages the
following received honours for services on April 22-23 (London
Gazette, July 23, 1918) :— D.S.O. : Lieut. John C. Annesley, Chaplain
Charles J. E. Peshall. D.S.C. : Lieut. Leonard J. Lee, Lieut. John
W. Robinson, Lieut. George F. Bowen, Acting Lieut. Harold V.
Rogers, Gunner Thomas Gallctly, Acting Art. Engineer William
IL Edgar.

INDEX

' A ' craft, German, 12,
Adams, Lt. -Commander B. F.,

70, 71, 135, 188, 140 ff.
Afridi, H.M.S., 129, 167.
Air Force, Dover, 126, 186, 192.
Akid, John W. N., 210.
Alleyne, Lieut. Sir John M.,

84, 89, 97 n., 98, 101, 179, 183,

195, 202, 203, 207, 209.
Altham, Commander E., 132.
Anuesley, Lieut. J. C, 215.
Antwerp, 11.

Antell, Potty Officer G. E., 142.
Archer, Lieut. F. C, 125.
Asia, H.M.S., 20.
Attentive, H.M.S., 35, 127, 129,

160.
Australian Navy, 121.

Babb, Sub-Lieut. D. A., 156.
Bacon, Vice-Admiral Sir Regi-
nald, 12, 15.
Bagot, Lieut. A. G., 218.
Bailey, Roger, 210.
Bamford, Captain E., 139, 115,

146.
' Bartimeus ', quoted, 30 ii.
Baylet, Pilot, 215.
Bcare, Surgeon S. S., 213,
Beatty, Admiral Sir David,

125.
Belben, Lieut, G. A., 154.
Bell, Eng. Commander H. F. ,

178.
Benn, Commander I, H,, 65,

103, 125, 159, 168, 196, 204.
Berry, Lieut. II. A. P. de, 1 16.
Berthon, Lieut. E. L., 64 n,,

160, 180.
Billyard- Leake, Lieut. E. W., 59,

60 n.. 118, 156.

Bindall, Henry C, 45 n., 75 n,,

76.
Blake, Sub-Lieut. L. R., 103,

170.
Blount, Captain Q, R. B,, 132.
Boddie, Eng. Lieut.-Commander

R. C, 58 n., 154.
Boisanger, Captain B. do, 164,

215.
Bonham-Carter, Lieut. S. S., 59,

60, 118, 154.
Bore, Frederick G., 210.
Bouclier, French destrover, 129,

132.
Bourko, Lieut. R., 65, 101,102n.,

159, 169, 196, 202.
Bo-wcn, Lieut. G.F.Roland, 215.
Bowlby, Lieut. C. F. B., 89, 197,

207.
Boyle, Commodore the Hon.

A.D.E.H., 123, 127, 130, 188.
Brackley, Squad.-Commandor

H. G., 186, 21 1.
Braddyll, Lt. -Commander H.S.,

213.
Bradford, Lieut. - Commander

G. N,,56, 120, 137, 138.
Brayfield, Lieut. F. F., 102 n,,

205, 208.
Bremerhaven, 11,
Bremner, Lieut. W. H., 103 ji.,

197, 206.
Brilliant, H.M.S., 26 n., 27, 29,

31, 34, 35, 41, 51, 61 ff.. 78,

79 n., 83, 84, 91, 97 n., 101,

118, 128, 130, 158 ff., 172 ff.,

201, 202, 209.
Brock, Wing-Commander F. A.,

18, 52,55, 120, 124, 141, 153 n.
Brooks, Acting Captain R. D.,

138.

218

INDEX

Bruges, becomes Gerinaii naval
base, 9, 12, 78; plaus to close,
li5ff. ; destroyers withdrawn
from coast to, 33 ; Ship Canal
bloclced, 82 ; craft sealed up
at, ib. ; canal system, 112.

Brunsbiittel, 11.

Brussels, steamship, 34, 170.

Bruton, Captain C. W., 131.

Buddie, Surgeon R., 214.

Burns, James W., 214.

Bury, Eng. Commander W. A.,
84, 99, 101 u., 179, 183, 185,
195, 204.

CI, submarine, 26, 28, 30 n.,

31, 73, 74, 128, 130, 133, 149,

151.
C 3, submarine, 26, 28, 30 n., 31,

44, 61, 73 ff., 117, 118, 128,

130, 133, 144, 149 ff.
C.M.B.s, Ecport on, 169, 185,

196.
Caldwell, Lieut. R. H., 213.
Caxneroon River, 23 n.
Campbell, Lieut. H. G., 56, 117,

133, 136.
Campbell, Commander V. L. A.,

213.
Cajntaine Meld, French destroyer,

129, 132.
Carpenter, Captain A. F. B.,his

' Narrative ', 36 ff. ; 53, 55, 77,

117, 133, 134, 138, 161, 163.
Carroll, Norman, 99, 179, 209.
Carter, William, 210.
Cavanagh, Herbert, 99, 179,

209.
Centurmi, H.M.S., 62.
Cervera y Topete, Admiral Pas-

cual, 22.
Chamberlain, Lieut. G. B. T.,

70, 120, 138.
Chambers, John, 210.
Cliappell, Lt.-Commander L. S.,

163.
Chater, Captain A. R., 135, 139,

145.
Chatham, 25, 70, 84, 101, 123,

126, ISO, 189.

Chevallier, Sub-Lieufc. F. E.,

139, 147.
Chitty, Thomas E., 210.
Chivers, Edgar F., 211.
Clai-k, Commander J. L. C, 173,

188, 213.
Clark, William G., 212.
Clarke, Acting Sub-Lieut. P. B.,

64 n., 160, 171.
Cleaver, William G., 45 n., 75 ii.,

77.
Clegg, Surgeon W. L., 172 n.
Cockburn, Acting Lieut. G. L.,

97.
Colliugs, Surgeon B. 8., 214.
Collins, Captain R.,65, 125, 153,

163, 168.
Colomb, Admiral P. H., quoted,

20.
Colson, Surgeon H. St. C, 172 n.
Conybeare, Captain C. B., 139.
Cory-Wright, Lieut. A., 155.
Cooke, Lieut. T. F. V., 145.
Cooper-Key, Lt.-Commander A.

D. C, 213.
Cordner, Major A. A., 120, 139.
Cox, Staff-Paymaster Cyril,

quoted, 20, 39 n.
Crespigny, Acting Commander

C. P. C. do, 132.
Cross, George, 211.
Crutchley, Lieut. V. A. C.,88n.,
89, 97,98, 99, 101 n., 102 n.,

107, 159, 179, 182 S., 195, 202.
Cull, Lieut.-Colonel J. T., 126.

Dampier, Rear-Admiral C. i\,

123, 178.
Davidson, Captain A. P., 122.
Daffodil, H.M.S., 26, 28, 29, 30,

31, 32, 42, 44, 47 n., 50, 51, 53,

55, 56 n, 62. 70, 77, 78, 117,

122, 123, 128, 130, 133 ft'.,

161.
Davis, Arthur J., 212.
Dayrell-Reed, Lieut. A., 94, 197,

207.
Dean, Lieut. Percy T., 33, 46 n.,

60, 62 n., 155, 157, 165, 169.
Delporto, Second Maitrc, 215.
Destroyer Force, Report on, 165.

INDEX

219

Dickinson, Liout. C. C, 09, 139,
H7.

Dogger Bank, action off tlio, lb.

Dolphin, H.M.S., 125.

Dommivn, H.M.S., 122.

Douglas, Captain H. P., 127.

Dovoi-, 29, 37 n., 78, 83, 125, 128.

Dover Patrol, 12, 25, 81, 115, 120,
121.

Dover Trawler Patrol, lieport
on, 171.

Drummond, Limt. G. H., 101,
102, 183, 184, 195, 201, 209.

Drury, Captain, 21.

Duala, 23.n.

Duncan, Admiral Adam, Vis-
count Caniperdown, 21.

Dunkirk, 29, 30, 35, 92.

Eagles, Major C. E. C, 120, 139,
162.

Eastlake, Lieut. A. L., 148.

Eaves, Able Seaman, 143.

Edgar, Actg. Art. Engineer W.
H., 215.

Edwards, Engineer LI. -Com-
mander M. G. A., 125.

Edwards, Cuuimander P. H..
135.

Elliot, Lt.-Colouol B. N., 51, 68,
120, 135, 138, 139.

Elliott, George W. K., 210.

Emden, 11.

Ertbtis, H.M.S., 128, 131.

Earthing, Walter G., 212.
Faulknor',' UM-S., 80, 129, 107.

190.
Eaulknor, Captain Robert, 21.
Fawssett, Lt.-Commander A. C,

132.
Eellowos, Lt.-Colonel P. F. M.,

126.
Finch, Sergeant N. A., 44 n., 137.
Fisher, Cliarles J., 211.
Flaming Onions, 53, 64 n., 87.

96, 191.
Flares, Channel, 52 n., 90.
Flirf, H.M.S., 12.
Foley, Daniel P., 211.

Fournici-, Admiral, 81.

Francis Gamier, French destroyer,

129, 132.
Franks, Lieut. I. B., 59 n., 125.
Fratcr, George, 211.
French Navy, 121.

(jap Patrol, the, 176.
Galletly, Gunner T. W., 215.
Garbutt, Ernest, 210.
Gardner, Kobert, 214.
General Cranfurd, H.M.S. , 129,

132.
tieoige, Kt. Hon. D. Lloyd, 108.
Gibbs, Connnandir V. F., 56,

117, 120, 133, 102.
Gillett, Clivel., 211.
Gilroy, Frederick, 210.
Godsal, Commander A. E., 64,

84, 88, 89, 97, 98,99, 118, 158,

160, 179 ff., 180, 190,194,201,

203.
Goobcn Fort, 43 n.
Gordon, Lieut. J., 213.
Gore-Laugtou, Lt.-Commander

H. E., Ou, 100.
Gough, W. H., 148.
Gowing, Lieut. S. D., 109.
Graham, Captain R., 173, 189.
Grant, Captain II. C. J., 123.
Grey, General Sir Charles, 21.
Grice, William IL, 214.

Haig, Field - Marshal Sir

Douglas, 120.
llalahan, Capt. H.C., 54,08. 120,

135, 138.
llalahan, Lt.-Colonel F. C, 126.
Ilallihan, Petty Officer M. D.,

137.
Hamilton, Captain Edward, 21.
Hamshaw, Josepli, 212.
Hancock, George H., 214.
Hardy, Lt.-Ci>mmander II. N.

M., 04, 118, 158, 100, 179,

ISO.
ilarner. Petty Officer W., 45 n.,

75 n., 77.
Harris, Herbert A., 101, 179,

209.

220

INDEX

Harrison, Lt.-Commander A. L.,

68, 71, 120, 139. 142, US,

145.
Harrison, Lieut. F. C, 103, 170,

196.
Harwich Force, 19, 26, 115, 120,

121, 126, 128, 130.
Haselfoot, Lt. -Commander F.

E. B., 127.
Hawkings, Lieut. C. E. V., 56,

120, 137.
Heale, David, 210.
Hel.bletlnvaite, G. H,, 171.
Heligoland, 11, 115.
Helyar, Lt.-Commander K. C,

68, 166.
Henry, Michael, 211.
Henderson, Lieut. 0., 56 u., 162.
Herbert, Mid. N. S., 171.
Hermime, H.M.S., 21.
Hewett, Lieut. G. S., 148.
Hickey, Major-General Sir W.,

179.
Hill, Lieut. E. E., 170.
Hill, Hugh, 214.
Hindustan, H.M.S., 122.
Hipper, Rear-Admiral von, 18.
Hoare, Acting Lt.-Commander

K. R., 65, 102 n,, 160, 169,

205.
Hobson, Naval Constructor R.

P., 22, 51 n.
Hood, Rear-Admiral the Hon.

Horace, 12.
Howard, Captain W. V., 171.
Howell-Price, Lieut. J., 45 n.,

75 n., 76, 150.
Humplireys, Percy, 214.
Hutchinson, William, 212.

Intrepid, H.M.S., 28, 29, 31, 32,
33, 37, 46, 51, 59, 60 n., 61,
62 n., 79, 108, 118, 128, 154,
165.

Iphigenia, H.M.S., 28, 29, 31,32,
33, 37 n., 46, 51, 59, 62 n.,
108, 118, 125, 128, 156, 165.

Iris II, H.M.S., 26, 28, 29, 30 n..
31, 32, 44, 48 n., 50, 51, 53, 56,
57 n., 70, 71, 117, 122, 123,
128, 130, 133 ff., 162.

Jackson, Act. Chaplain F. M.,

218.
Jackson, Admiral Sir Henry,

14.
Jackson, Lt.-Commander W. L.,

213.
Jai-vest, Henry G., 214.
JeliVeys, Robert C, 211.
Jellicoe, Admiral Viscount, 10,

14, 18.
JeivJs, Vice-Admiral Sir John,

20.
Johnson, William J., 211.
Johnston, Lieut. J. E., 213.
Jones, George, 212.
Jordan, Samuel J., 210.
Joslin, William, 210.
Jutland, Battle of, 18.

Keel, G. E., 197.

Kemp, Henry W., 210.

Kerr, George, 212.

Keyes, Vice-Admiral Sir Roger,
Director of Plans Division,
15; incommand Dover Patrol,
ib. ; his plans, 16; in com-
mand of operations onApril
23, 26, 29, 30 n., 51, 77 ; his
signal, 49 ; flag presented to,
62 ; plans for May 10, 78, 83 ;
flagship mined, 85, 90 ; pre-
sent at operations on May 10,
86, 103 ; Admiralty approval
of, 107 ; Dispatch of May 9,
111 fl". ; Dispatch of June 15,
178 ff.; Dispatch of July 24,
200 ff.

Knight, Sub-Lieut. A., 180.

Konigsberg, H.I. G. M.S., 23.

Lake, Able Seaman F. E. M.,

163.
Lambe, Brigadier-General C. L.,

126, 186, 192, 214.
Lambert, Lieut. F. J., 154.
Lamplough, Lieut. C. D., 145.
Largey, Edward, 211.
Lee, Lieut. L. J., 215.
Lestin, French destroyer, 129.
Light/oot, H.M.S., 129, 132, 166.
l/jijc./^cM, minobweeper, 128, 130.

INDEX

221

Linegnr, George H., 211.
Ling, Albert W., 210.
Littleton, Lieut. H. A., 58, 154.
Lloyd, Sub-Lieut. M. C. H., 158.
Long, Eiig Lieut. W., 159.
Lord Clire, H.M.S., 129, 182.
Low, Sub-Lieut. 11. V., 108.
Lowe, Bernard W., 210.
Luke, Mr. A. J., 178.
Lynt'S, Commodore Hubert, 2t'i.
'30, 64, 84, 86, 87, 88, 91, 132,
164, 167, 181, 186, 201 ; Re-
ports, 172 ff. ; 187 ff.

M.L.s, Report on, 108, 180.
McBean, Lieut. R. H.. 89. 196.

206.
MaeC.allum, Lieut. M.. 213.
JPCracken, E. W., 197.
M<=Cracken, Samuel, 210.
MeCutcheon, Staff-Surgeon J.,

138, 172.
McDonald, Charles, 210.
McEwan, Brigadier - General,

126.
Macfarlane, Archibald M., 211.
McGee, George, 212.
M^Ginley, Leslie R., 212.
M°Kenzie, Able Seaman A. E.,

143.
Maekie, Lieut. A. C, 20S.
Maclean, John, 211.
Maclaclilan. Sub-Lieut. A. II..

97, 99, 159, 179, 195, 201.
McLaren, Eng. Lio\it. W. R..

100. 180.
M-^Miilan, Hugh. 211.
M<^Queen. Leonard E., 212.
Manly, H.M.S., 128, 181.
MansMcl H.M.S., 128, ISO, 149,

165.
Marshal Soidf, H.M.S., 129, 1,32.
JIartinique, 20.
Mastiff, H.M.S.. 129, 107.
MatcJdess, H.M.S., 129, 107.
Maxwell, Lieut. G. S., 168..
Medical Arrangements, Report

on, 171.
Meikle, Eng. Sub-Lieut. E. V..

155, 156.
Melponiene, H.M.S., 128. 165.

Mentor, H.M.S., 129, 132.

Merrinuic, collier, 22, 51.

MitSville, Lt. -Commander J. L.,
207.

Mole, the Zeebrugge, defences
of, 27 ; attack on. Biff., 54,
57, 132 ff. ; construction of,
86 n. ; submarine C S's attack,
44, 61, 67, 113; parapet of,
54 n.

Moorsom, H.M.S., 128, 130, 165.

Morling, William J., 210.

Mm-ris, H.M.S., 128, 165.

Morrison, Angus, 214.

Mottez, Captain M , 215.

Mountain, Ernest S., 212.

Mozach, Pilot, 215.

Mijngs, H.M.S., 128, 130, 165.

Seville, Frank, 211.

Newbold, Lieut. A. C, 188, 151.

Neivbridge, collier, 23.

Newington, .James P., 210.

Nore d6p6t, the, 121, 120.

Norris, James, 211.

Nwth Star. H.M.S., 30, 34, 62,

C3, 77 n., 80 n., 119, 128, 130,

131, 165, 106,
Northo.tt, Staff-Pavma>ter W,

C, 125.
Nubian, H.M.S , 12.

Olipliant, Commander H. O. L,,
190, 213

O'Reilly, Patrifk, 210.

Osborne, Commander E.G. B.S.,
134.

Ostend, evacuated, 9 ; German
fortification of, 10 ; German
u.se of, 11, 78 ; naval problem
presented by, 16 ; blockade
considered, ih. ; Sir Roger
Keyes's scheme, 17fT. ; his
toric parallels, 20 ft'. ; Pop
ham's expedition (1798), 21
pi-eparations for April 28
25 fl., 158 ff. ; forces engaged
ih. ; plan of attack, 27 ; Irus
trated attempts, 29, 116 ; pro
ceedings on Ai>ril 22, SO, 89
on April 23, 34 ; difficulties of

222

INDEX

operation, 37 ; Press Bureavi
narrative, 63 ; German ac-
count of operation, 79 ; opera-
tions on May 10, 81 ff., 178 ff.,
187 if. ; Press Bureau narra-
tive, 91 ff. ; German batteries
at, 95 ; German account of
May 10, 104 ; preparations for
a third attack, 107 ; Sir Roger
Reyes's Dispatches, 111 ff.,
178 ff.; failure on April 23,
118; casualties, 119 ; air forces
engaged, 126 ; bombarding
forces, 132; Commodore
Lynes's Reports, 172 ff., 187;
casualties, 198.
Outh-waite, Sub-Lieut. C. R. L.,
169.

Palliser, Sto. Petty Officer H. L.,

60, 155.
Parker, Commander P. E.. 213.
Parr, Harold, 211.
Parry, Captain R. St. P., 204.
Peacock, Colonel P., 132, 193.
Pearce, Stanley, 210.
Pelham, John, 211.
Peshall, Chaplain C. J. E., 215.
Petrie, Sub-Lieut. J., 102 n..

196, 207.
Phoebe, H.M.S., .80, 62, 77 n., 12.S,

130, 131, 151, 165, 166, 167.
Pickerell, Francis .T., 210.
Pinches, Thomas, 211.
Plymouth D.-put, the, 121,
Pocock, Surg. F. P., 172 n.
Poland, Lieut, A. L., 94, 197, 208.
Popham, Captain HomeRiggs,2 1 .
Port Arthur, 13, 22.
Press, John D. L., 145.
Portsmouth, 120, 121, 123, 126.
Potter, Charles, 211.
Prince Eugene, H.M.S., 129, 133,

192, 196, 204.
Princess Boyal, H.M.S., 135.
Procter, Lieut. Rawsthome, 1G9,

207.
Proctor, Mid. II. L., 213.
Puerto Cabf llo, 21.

Queen, transport, 12.

Rabaste, Pilot, 215.

Rae, Robert, 212.

Rampling,Eng.Lt.-Commander,

213.
Ramsav, Sub-Lieut. F. A. W.,

171."
Ramsay, Commander B. H.,

197,*213.
Reed, Petty Officer J. J., 101,

159, 160, 179, 209.
Rees, David George, 201 n., 209.
Relf, .Tames, 210.
Besolutim, H.M.S., 69.
Richard, Lieut. A., 215.
Rigby, Lieut. C. N. B., 137.
Ringrosc, Lieut. C. H., 213.
Robertson, Ernest E., 210.
Robinson, Lieut. J. W., 215.
Rogers, Actg. Lieut. H. V., 215.
Ronarc'h, Vice- Admiral P. A. M.

A., 164, 186, 215.
Roscoe, Alexander, 214.
Rosoman, Lt.-Commander R. R.,

134, 136.
Ross, Lieut. G. F , 102, 18.5, 195,

201, 203, 209.
7?0MX, French destroyer, 129,

132.
Roxburgh, Engine-room Arti-
ficer A. G., 45 n., 75 n., 77.
Boyal Sovereign, H.M.S., 101.
Rufigi River, 23.
Russell, Frederick C, 210.
Rj-an, W. G., 148.

Sampson, Admiral, 22.

Sandford, Lt.-Commander F.H.,
45 n., 7.3, 77 n., 133, 148, 151,
188, 213.

Sandford, Lieut. R. D, 45 n.,
61, 73 ff., 117, 1.3.3, 149 ff. '

Sandford, Lt.-Commander 'Wil-
liam H., 213.

Santiago, 22, 51 n.

Finpplio; H.M.S., 84, 86, 87, 107,
ISO ff.

Saunders, Albert E., 210.

Saunders, Albert W., 214.

Saunders, Lt.-Commander R..
102 n., 205.

Scntt, H.M.S., 127, 129.

INDEX

22:1

Scott, Sub-Lieut. C. W., 213,
Sensicle, Laurence H., 214.
Shatt-al-Arab, 23 n.
Shaw, Sub-Lieut. G. R., 197,

206.
Sirms, H.M.S., 26 n., 27, 29, 31,

34, 35, 41,51, 64ff., 78, 79, 83,

84, 91, 118, 128, 130, 158ff.,

171, 172 ff.
Slater, Captain L. H.. 173.
Slayter, Lieut. W. R., 94.
Smart, Mr. G. D., 125.
Smith, Douglas G., 211.
Smith, Petty Officer D. P., 163.
Smitliers, Philippe, 211.
Smoke tactics, 18, 52, 124, 168.
Sneyd, Commander Ealpli S.,

58, 117, 153, 154.
Spencer, Lieut, the' Hon. C. E.

R., 89, 97 n., 198, 206.
Spencer, Lieut. G., 56, 162.
Statton, John H., 210.
Stokes, Commander O. M. F.,

132.
Stork, H.M.S, 127, 129.
Stratford Exjierimental Station,

148.
Strong, Commander E. K., 212.
Stroom Bank buoy, 27, 34, 35,

63 n., 64, 86, 92, il8, 158. 164,

173, 175, 177, 189,205.
Submarine shipping losses, 14.
Surridge, Victor V,, 210.
Surprise, H.M.S., 21.
Surtees, Charles E,, 212.
Sutherland, Hugh, 212,
Sutton, Art. Engineer W. M.,

56.
Swift, H.M.S., 129, 167.
Sui/tsure, H.M.S., 107.

Talbot, FredC, 211,

Taylor, John E., 210.

Teazer, H M.S., 129.

Tempest, H.M.S., 128, 130, 166,

175.
Termagant, H.M.S., 128, 131.
Terror, H M.S , 128, 131.
Tetrarch,'H.M.S., 128, 130, 166,

175, 176.
Toxel, 21.

Thatcher, Sergeant-Major C. J.,

146.
T/ietis, H.M.S. , 28, 29, 31, 32, 33,

46, 51, 55 n., 58, 67, 79 n.,

117, 153, 155, 156.
Thomas, Alan, 99, 179, 209.
Thomas, John 0., 195, 201, 212.
Tiger, H.M.S., 133.
Tigris, 23 n.
Togo, Admiral Heiachiro, 13,

22.
Tomkinson, Captain W., 65,

123, 16.5, 181, 201.
Trictenf, H.M.S., 86, 94 n., 128,

130, 149, 165, 181.
Trmnlent, H.M.S., 128, 131.
Trumble, Lieut. F. H. G., 213.
Turner, George, 212.
Tvrwhitt, Rear-Admiral Sir
'Reginald, 14, 19, 26, 126, 130.

Underbill, Lieut. G., 142, 146.
Underwood, Herbert G., 214.
Ullesivater, H.M.S., 127, 129.

Vaux, Lieut. P. E., 157.

Velox, H.M.S., 86, 90, 94 n , 128,
16.5, 181, 185.

Vennin, Captain L., 215.

Vigar, Norman W., 214.

Vindictive, H.M.S., 26, 28, 29,
30n., 31, 32, 33, .38 n., 39 n.,
41 ff., 50 ff., 67 ff., 79, 83 ff.,
91 ff., 104, 105, 106, 107, 117.
123, 128, 130, 131, 133 ff. ; 153,
155, 161, 163, 178 h\, 188 ft'.,
200, 202, 204, 205, 206, 207,
208, 209.

Walker, Lieut. H. T. C, 55.
Warren, Lt.-Commnnder G. L,,

213.
Wanvick, H.M.S., 26, 30, 51, 62,

77 n., 86, 90. 94 n., 102, 103,

105 n., 128, 130, 131, 161, 165,

181 ff., 196.
Watson, Commander R. .T. N.,

132.
W.atson, Commander W. W.,

205,

224

INDEX

Watts, Lt.-Commandor A. 0.,

208.
Weller, Major B. G.. 139, 142,

U5, 146.
Welman, Lieut. A. E. P., 65,

108 n., 169, 196, 197, 205.
West, Mate S. Q., 158.
West Swin anchorage, 29, 122,

128.
WJdrlmnd, H.M.S., 86, 90, 94 n..

128, 180. 131, 155, 165, 181,

185.
Wigram. Captain E., 182, 192.

204.
Wilhelmshaven, 11,
Wills, Captain C. S.. 181.
Wilson, Frank T, 211.
Wilson, Henry F. G., 210.
Windlev. Edward G., 214.
Witherby, Lieut. H. F., 188.
Wood, Albert E.. 214.
Wood, William T., 211.
Woolley, Acting Paymaster H.

G. A., 214.
Wright, Lieut. J. C. K., 158.

Yates, William P , 214.

Young, Lt.-Commandcr D., 168.

Young, Lt.-Coramander E.
Hilton, 29 n., 86 n., 41 n ,
48 n., 52 n., 58 n., 56 n ., 57 n.

Zebra, H.M.S., 21.

Zetbrug^e, Germans enter, 9 ;
German fortification of, 10 ;
importance of, tb. ; base of
German operations, 11 ; naval
problem presented by, 16, 82,
112; blockade ordered, 16;
plans considered, ih. ; Sir
Roger Keyes's scheme, 17 ft". ;
historic parallels, 21 ff. ; pre-
parations for April 23, 25 ff. ;
forces engaged, ib. ; plan of
attack, 27 ; frustrated at-
tempts, 29, 116; proceedings
on April 22, 30, 39 ; on April
23, 31 ; Captain Carpenter's
Narrative, 36 ff. ; difficulties
of operation, 37 ; Press Bureau
Narrative, 50 ff. ; attack on
Mole, 67 ff., 182 ff. ; German
account of operations, 79 ;
Admiralty's approval of, 81 ;
result of operations on April
23, 82; Sir Roger Keyes's
Dispatches, 111 ff. ; casualties,
119 ; air forces engaged, 126 ;
bombarding forces, 181 ; at-
tack on viaduct, 78 ff., 148 ff. ;
blocking operations. 162 ff.

Z«5j«»i, H.M.S.. 129, 132.

Zuider Zee, 21.

Printed in England, at the Oxford University Press

5^1

THE LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

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