Our army. An address by W.W. Atterbury ... Delivered before the members of the Union league of Philadelphia

Atterburyy William Wallace
Our army

OUR ARMY

DRESS

W. W. ATTERBURY

Vice-President, The Pennsylvania Railroad Company

Late Brigadier-General, U. S. A., and Director General of
Transportation, American Expeditionary Forces

Delivered Before the Members of the

UNION LEAGUE OF PHILADELPHIA

June 25, 1919

867968

OUR ARMY

AN ADDRESS BY

W. W. ATTERBURY

DELIVERED BEFORE THE

UNION LEAGUE OF PHILADELPHIA

JUNE 25, 1919.

To an American business man thrown into the
midst of it, either at home or abroad, what he has
gone through in the last two years must have
been a startling experience and dreadful evidence
of the inefficiency of our Government, and par-
ticularly its relation to preparedness and to war.

The average American is proud of his effi-
ciency, and the boast of the country is its ability
to organize, but there was nothing we had done
prior to our entry into the war for which we have
any reason to be proud. It was a shameful ex-
hibition of the lack of ordinary precautions to
safeguard the country, which, in counterpart, if
permitted in ordinary business would spell ruin.

Have we learned anything by the experience of
the last two years'? Are we going to "let it go
at that" and settle back, going about our ordinary
business lives with the same feeling of splendid
isolation and safety that we once enjoyed?

The situation of the world today is so involved

that only a real optimist sees anything but turmoil
for many years to come. Of all the great nations,
only America has come through financially, eco-
nomically and otherwise unimpaired; and to
America today the world looks for salvation.

The events of the last five years are now in
culmination — a great picture puzzle, its many
parts almost inextricably mixed, thrown on the
table to be again put together to form an har-
monious whole. Is such a thing possible ^ No!
A new picture must be made, and, in the making,
force must be used, pieces must be broken, and
no matter how great the sympathy or honesty of
purpose of those now engaged in its reconstruc-
tion, the new composite will be one for which
time alone can fill in the interstices.

BITTERNESS THE AFTERMATH OF WAR.

Whether we have a League of Nations or not;
no matter what the decision in regard to Piume,
Silesia, Danzig or the Basin of the Saare, the
aftermath is a train of bitterness, in comparison
with which the Alsace-Lorraine question pales
into insignificance. Whether we agree with Eng-
land to safeguard France against Germany, or
continue our traditional policy in relation to in-
ternational affairs, the same situation confronts
us. Nor will international recognition of the
Monroe Doctrine relieve us of our sacred duty to
its defense to the limit of our life and strength.

Continental, national and racial enmity and

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hatred have not been eliminated. On the con-
trary, they have been intensified, and we, who
prior to the war were at peace with the world,
are now drawn into the maelstrom of world
politics. It is a position that has been forced
upon us — we did not seek it — we earnestly tried to
avoid it.

AMERICA AND HER OPPORTUNITY.

Today we stand the one strong nation of the
world — a country united as it has never been
before — and united on the overwhelming senti-
ment that the peoples of the world have an equal
right to enjoy life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness, and that in their attainment we will
do our part.

It is a great privilege that presents itself, and
the nation has nobly arisen to the opportunity;
but that privilege carries with it an obligation—
and that obligation we must be prepared to meet.

The world's conflagration is for the moment
under control, but underneath are still the same
seething masses of fire liable to break into flame
at any moment. A change of wind may at any
time force the fire directly against us — and will
we be prepared to meet it? Are we to resume,
each his own business activity, and our eager
chase for the business of the world, with no
thought or care as against the fire that will in-
evitably break out ? Can we not as business men
devote some of our energy and our national genius

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of organization toward the development of an
efficient method of national defense ?

As never before, the war touches every person
and industry. National preparedness necessitates
the co-ordination of Army, Navy and Industry.
A limited co-ordination of Army and Navy now
exists; but no machinery has been provided to
reach the almost unlimited recources of material,
supply and personnel of Industry.

A NATIONAL POLICY OF DEFENSE REQUIRED.

In order to insure the realization of all the above,
in their correct proportion, and to prepare a suc-
cessful defense, it seems to me essential that what
might be called a National Defense Board be or-
ganized and a complete national policy decided
upon, which will then permit each to proceed
along its own lines.

The above to the business man would seem -so
axiomatic as to make it unnecessary to prove.

I am not competent to speak on the future of
the Navy; and you who so loyally carried on at
home are better able than I to speak on the
future organization of Industry as it relates to
national defense.

There are, however, certain factors in the de-
velopment of the Army, elemental in character,
nevertheless essential to its successful future.

It is on these elemental factors that I want to
speak tonight. What I have to say are the

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results of my observation following nearly two
years of close contact with the American Army—
for all of whom I have a great sympathy; for a
very large proportion a high regard; and for
many a deep affection — the suggestions of a busi-
ness man to business men — and most fittingly in
that keystone of national unity and safety — the
Union League of Philadelphia.

Our ultimate need will be the entire man-power
of the nation; our primary need an organization
sufficient to prevent an hostile landing, or to im-
mediately carry war into an enemy country-
such an organization being so elastic as will per-
mit the gradual and efficient mobilization of our
ultimate need.

In the past our Eegular Army has been, un-
fortunately, so subject to political influence that,
despite the earnest efforts of such able Secretaries
of War as Eoot and Stimson, practically all good,
remedial and constructive legislation has been
emasculated by that bane of national legislation —
the rider.

NECESSITY FOR A GENERAL STAFF.

The Departments and Corps have been so util-
ized as to strengthen one Department or advance
individuals at the expense of the efficiency of the
Army as a whole. The outbreak of the war
found us with Department and Corps organiza-
tions, each working out its own salvation, with

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but limited regard to the other. A General Staff
had been provided, but so limited as to personnel
and use as to have made it impossible to have met
the situation with proper plans of organization,
etc., to face what was the inevitable ; nor to co-or-
dinate the work of existing Corps and Depart-
ments, even if the preparation of such necessary
plans had been permitted by higher authority.

The great lesson that should be learned from
this war is the necessity of the General Staff. Its
authority should be absolute, and all Corps and
Departments should function under it.

We in Prance struggled along, each Depart-
ment striving to do its share — oftentimes unin-
tentionally working against each other — while
G. H. Q. gradually evolved a General Staff or-
ganization— a compromise between the French
and the English, adapted as far as possible to
our national characteristics and with as little
violation of regulations as possible.

A DIFFICULT PROCESS OF EVOLUTION.

Much of the criticism of Brigade and Division
Commanders is, I am satisfied, directly traceable
to the effect following the separation from .their
commands of many of the young and able officers
for General Staff work. The General Staff was
the essential, but the Divisions and Brigades,
particularly those that came over in the early
period of the war, had to suffer. This was neces-
sary and inevitable.

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It was not until the General Staff functioned
properly that the American Expeditionary Force
as a whole did its best work. About the time the
Armistice was signed the machine was working
smoothly. Notwithstanding this fact there were
changes in the organization under discussion,
particularly that of the General Staff, as a result
of the experience we had thus far obtained.

The various Corps and Departments have been
so increased and their scope so expanded as to
become, under existing conditions, almost impos-
sible of being properly administered. Under the
General Staff the number could be materially re-
duced and administration simplified.

WHOLE NATION MUST FUNCTION IN WAR.

Modern warfare is essentially applied science
and intimately associated in all of its various
phases with our industrial and commercial life.
To be effective, all the energy of the nation must
be so organized in time of peace as to function
properly in time of war. This is essentially a
function of the General Staff.

You at home were having your own difficulties,
which largely could have been avoided if there
had been available a General Staff of sufficient
size and thoroughly trained. It would not have
been necessary to resort to civilian organizations
such as the Aircraft Board, the Shipping Board,
the War Industries Board and many other im-
provised organizations, because a proper Gen-
eral Staff would have embraced such duties.

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West Point should continue to be a school in
which young men of special aptitude can be
trained for the career of professional soldier. The
course should be cut down to two years, the ad-
mission requirements increased, and the school
itself should be used as a school purely for ap-
plied military science, with the thought that the
graduates of the school be used for those phases
of General Staff work in which military science
is an essential, and for higher command as emer-
gency may present itself.

The number of post-graduate schools for spe-
cialized training should be largely increased, and
their courses strengthened, and along lines the
necessity for which our experience of the last
two years has developed.

Our colleges and training camps have shown us
what it is possible to do in a short time, by inten-
sive training, in the preparation of officers of the
lower ranks. Nor is any long or very technical
military education necessary for such officers for
the General Staff who, in an emergency, are
needed to direct the industrial, commercial and
transportation needs.

General Staff work is a real science, and the
officers assigned to it should be men trained with
that end in view.

NEW PLAN OF ARMY PROMOTION NEEDED.

Serious consideration should be given to the
question of promotion in the Army. Heretofore

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from the grade of Lieutenant to that of Colonel
it has been by seniority. Commissioned as a Sec-
ond Lieutenant, a man rose in his turn to be a
Colonel in his arm of the service if he lived long
enough, took care of his health and did nothing
that might by any possible chance get him in
trouble. He might be the most mediocre man or
the most brilliant; the least enterprising or one
with great initiative; but with continued good
health and an absence of disciplinary measures
against him he rose in his turn to be a Colonel.

Further promotion was by selection, but lim-
ited by Congressional action to a choice from
among Colonels of the line arriving at that grade.
Military socialism.

There has been no encouragement to officers to
stand out by excellence of their achievements, and
promotions have been carefully guarded from
being affected by individual effort. Punishment
but no reward.

PICK THE BEST— ELIMINATE THE UNFIT.

There should be a combined system of selec-
tion, seniority and elimination — selection for such
men as stand out above all others; seniority as
between equally good men; elimination of the
morally, intellectually and temperamentally un-
fit.

The question of rank was an ever-present and
unfailing cause of friction, and this seemed to
be true in all branches of the service.

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In the General Staff and for the higher com-
mand, rank should be ex officio. This would en-
able the best man to be used regardless of line
rank.

For the Regular Army I favor the volunteer,
and a short-term enlistment, with ample oppor-
tunity for trade and vocational education, and
at a good wage.

For the Reserve, or second line defense, I am
convinced that the existing militia system is in-
adequate. It is rather difficult for us, who are
citizens of Pennsylvania, to appreciate this. The
history of the Pennsylvania National Guard is
so creditable that it is hard to realize how in-
adequate the National Guard system has been as
a whole. Facts tell the real story.

INADEQUACY OF OLD MILITIA SYSTEM.

I quote from the published statement of an
ex-Secretary of War, and in reference to the ex-
perience we had in the Summer of 1916:

"The President's call issued on June 18 was
for units at war strength. Take the situation on
August 31st, when numbers were at their maxi-
mum and there had been nearly 21/2 months in
which to recruit. The war strength of the units
called for should have been 252,000 men. As a
matter of fact, we were able to raise only 138,500
men. We were 113,500 men short. This was in
spite of the most zealous efforts at recruiting;

it was on top of a year of unparalleled interest in

do)

military affairs, when hundreds of thousands of
citizens all over the United States were march-
ing in parades and shouting themselves hoarse
for Preparedness.

"Nor were these men whom we did raise, trained
Guardsmen. Over 60% of them were wholly
raw recruits who had come in since the call.
Nearly 50% of the enlisted Guardsmen, whose
names were originally on the rolls of the militia
units included in the call, disappeared altogether
after the call came. Over 23,000 of these were
found physically unfit. Over 7000 wholly failed
to answer the call; and over 16,000 (nearly
enough to constitute an infantry division) disap-
peared between the time of the call and the muster
in, nobody knows where.

"In the case of two States, such loose methods of
medical examination had been employed by the
State authorities that upon the call last Summer
more than half of their Guardsmen were re-
jected by the Federal examiners as physically
unfit for service. In the case of one company of
infantry these rejections amounted to 77%.

RECRUITS FALL SHORT OF REQUIREMENTS.

"Again, how did the men finally obtained,
measure up in the great essentials of discipline
and marksmanship? The results of the field in-
spection of about 123,000 of the force thus mobi-
lized give startling figures. Over 56,000 had never
had range instruction with the military rifle be-

fore the call ; only 19,000 had achieved a standard
of marksmanship which the Chief of Staff of
the United States Army calls ' barely tolerable;'
71,000 of these men had never attended a pre-
vious encampment or had any period of field
training whatever; only 37% were men who had
received before the call more than three months
of our imperfect indoor militia training.

"In other words, when the test of service came
to this force of the militia of the .several States
which Congress had planned to make our first line
of citizen defense, practically half of it melted
away into nothing at the call. When, after three
months' strenuous effort at recruiting, we had
gathered in all of the men we could lay our hands
on, we had a force which was 113,000 or 45%
short of the number called for and only 21%
of whom could shoot 'barely tolerably,' and 63%
of whom were virtually untrained."

VOLUNTEER PLAN FOR RESERVE OBSOLETE.

And history has merely repeated itself. The
volunteer sytem has regularly broken down.
During the Revolution, Massachusetts and Vir-
ginia were forced to resort to the Draft. The
War of 1812 was a conspicuous example of in-
efficiency. During the Crvil War both sides were
forced to the Draft, and, as for the Spanish War,
the full quota of volunteers called for by the
President never was obtained.

The volunteer system for our Reserve is obso-
lete. The experience of the last two years has

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demonstrated that in a great emergency modern
warfare is on such gigantic lines that any system
other than that of universal service means in-
justice to the individual. The one great national
act of the war was that of the Draft. The se-
quence should be that of universal military
service.

There is a steady trend on the part of nations
toward popular government on the one hand and
universal service on the other. The adoption of
universal service has occurred in free republics
like Switzerland, Prance, Argentina and Chile, in
commonwealths like Australia, and in free consti-
tutional monarchies like Norway and Sweden.

Again the conjunction of privilege and obliga-
tion.

SIX MONTHS MILITARY TRAINING FOR ALL.

Universal military service cannot be considered
at variance with our ideals. On the contrary,
it seems to me a most democratic distinction. Ap-
proximately 1,000,000 young men would annually
be subject to the workings of any laws governing
universal military service, of whom 50% at least
are immediately available and physically fit.
Roughly, this could be increased 75% by correc-
tive measures applied at an earlier age.

A boy in his nineteenth year has not yet become
an economic factor of great importance; nor has
he taken upon himself such ties as would ordi-
narily exclude him from military service. Six

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months in a training camp during their nine-
teenth year would throw into our Reserve each
year from 500,000 to 750,000 trained men, at an
age when impressions and knowledge are easily
made and retained.

If the training covers an unbroken period of
six months, it can take place in the open in almost
any part of our country. The effect upon the
race as a whole because of this experience, not
only from the point of discipline but also that of
health, would be most beneficial. If no other pur-
pose were served than the physical upbuilding of
our youth, it would well be worth the entire cost.

The figures of our Draft are startling — not so
bad as England, but sufficiently so to make us
welcome a system which will produce a more
rugged and virile race.

Discipline and training along military lines will
teach our young men self control, respect for law
and order, regard for constituted authority, con-
sideration for the rights of their fellowmen — all
essential to good citizenship — and, at the same
time, give them initiative and teach them sanita-
tion and hygiene.

THE DEMOCRACY OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE.

Social barriers will be broken down; class dis-
tinction disappear; each will learn the other's
viewpoint and respect the other's ideas; and the
relationship so established cannot fail in after
years to produce a more sympathetic attitude.

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No greater agency for instilling a truly demo-
cratic spirit into our youth could be established.

No one who has followed industrial conditions
for the last generation but must realize that our
present militia system has been a constant source
of irritation to our industrial population. The
mere fact that it was at hand has made it avail-
able for every petty riot, regardless of its char-
acter. Upon our citizen militia has been thrown
a duty which is essentially that of a paid police.
In every State it has been a serious source of dis-
content, and one of the most active causes of fric-
tion between our industrial population and society
in general.

MILITIA NOT SUITED TO POLICE WORK.

Instead of using the militia for ordinary police
duty, the other States in the Union can well fol-
low the lead of the State of Pennsylvania in its
magnificent State Constabulary.

In line with industrial reforms which are now
so generally under discussion throughout our
country, no one act could go farther toward re-
storing democratic relations between capital and
labor, between rich and poor, than the elimination
of the use of militia for police purposes.

Universal training and the Reserve— all under
Federal control — would restore labor to its proper
relation to patriotic duty.

However important a part universal service
may play in a scheme of national defense, it is

ds)

t-vt»n more important on moral, physical, political
and economic grounds.

It is logical, and essentially democratic.

The six-month period in the nineteenth year
should be followed by three weeks' service in the
field during the summer months for the two suc-
ceeding years. All of this should be under Fed-
eral control, but so exercised that the full advan-
tage should be taken of State and local pride and
enthusiasm.

AMERICANS SHOULD KNOW THEIR ARMY.

May I ask your consideration for the moment
also of another phase of the question : that is, the
relationship between the Army and the civilian.
My own case is, I think, fairly typical.

When I went abroad I had had no previous
military experience, and no close, personal touch
with the Army itself. I knew but few Regular
Army officers, and none sufficiently intimately to
call him by his first name. I knew there was an
Army — Yes! — but of its aims, ambition and life
I knew nothing.

I was eager to help, and they were anxious to
have me, but for months it seemed as if every
action taken and every move made was miscon-
strued— just as, often, in the dark hours, it
seemed to me that my help was not wanted. All
of this disappeared later as a result of associa-
tion and of a mutual knowledge and of common
aims.

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As I look back on it, and in the ultimate anal-
ysis, the fault was my own, in common with that
of practically all other citizens of our great coun-
try— and a national fault of taking no personal
interest whatever in our Government nor its agen-
cies— a national fault which must be corrected
if we are to get the full benefit of our free insti-
tutions.

CIVILIANS AND SOLDIERS OUGHT TO MIX.

The Army's faults are those that we, ourselves,
have permitted; its excellence a great tribute to
the unselfish and patriotic work of a few officers
who, in spite of national indifference — almost an-
tipathy— maintained an " esprit de corps" and
the high standard of organization which, after
all, was our salvation in the hour of our trial.

The point I wish to make is: that this was
accomplished in spite of, and not because of, any
help or sympathy given to them by the nation- at
large.

I have no doubt that for a time the associations
formed and friendships made will be maintained,
but unless some active agency is established this
will gradually die out, and the Army again be-
come the same unimportant factor in our every-
day life.

If we are to get their best effort — and, in turn,
in an emergency they be enabled to best utilize the
civilian population — a personal contact must be
maintained. They must know us and we must
know them.

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It will be of mutual benefit, and, as for myself,
it will be a great personal privilege. It is our
Army. Can we not make it a part of our life?

TWO GREAT ARMY LEADERS OVERSEAS.

To two of its chief officers with whom I was

-ociated overseas, may I pay a word of tribute?

To our Commander-in-Chief, General Pershing,
upon whose broad shoulders were thrown the re-
sponsibility and burden of our Army abroad — a
responsibility such as was borne by no other Com-
mander-in-Chief— a personal responsibility so
great that even with the lapse of time the wonder
still is with me that he could carry it all.

Notwithstanding the overwhelming burden,
never for a moment was he drawn from his one
purpose; and its rich fulfilment is a great per-
sonal achievement as well as a lasting glory for
our country.

And to General Harbord: who, having made a
gallant record in the field, later and equally suc-
cessfully served as Commanding General entirely
responsible for the procurement, distribution and
maintenance of supplies.

His loyalty to his Chief, his untiring devotion
to duty, his patience and broad sympathy were a
continual inspiration to all of us who had the
privilege of serving under him.

These two great men are largely responsible for
the splendid success of the American Expedition-
Force in Prance.

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WHAT AMERICA OWES TO GENERAL WOOD.

May I also correct a statement I have previ-
ously made — that there was nothing we had done
prior to our entry into the war of which we
might feel proud. There is one exception:

Thanks to the effort of one man, and despite
opposition and prejudice, the country had been
aroused; our men, young and old, had flocked to
the training camps ; our colleges had been turned
into military schools, and all so successfully that
later, when the actual need of officers arose, they
were available.

Whatever measure of preparedness we had
made prior to our entry into the war is attribut-
able to no other person, and to him belongs great
credit, and of him the nation may well be proud-
General Leonard Wood.

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PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY

UA Atterbury, William Wallace

23 Our army

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