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Full text of "Overall U.S. counternarcotics policy toward Colombia : hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress, second session, September 11, 1996"

OVERALL U.S. COUNTERNARCOTICS POUCY 
TOWARD COLOMBIA 



Y 4. IN 8/16: C 83 

Overall U.S. Counternarcotics Folic. . . ^G 

BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 



SEPTEMBER 11, 1996 



Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations 



'/1»«, 




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3 m? 



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
3e_261 CC WASHINGTON : 1996 



For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office 
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402 
ISBN 0-16-053904-8 



OVERALL U.S. COUNTERNARCOTICS POUCY 
TOWARD COLOMBIA 

|V4. IN8/16;C 83 

Dverslig.S. Cou.ternjrcotics Polio. . . s^Q 

BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 



SEPTEMBER 11, 1996 



Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations 




* y c i '■"■'■ h-f 



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
36-261 CC WASHINGTON : 1996 

For sale by the U.S. Govemment Printing Office 
Superintendent of Documents. Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402 
ISBN 0-16-053904-8 



COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman 



WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

JAN MEYERS, Kansas 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

JAY KIM, California 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

DAVID FUNDERBURK, North Carolina 

STEVEN J. CHABOT, Ohio 

MARSHALL "MARK" SANFORD, South 

Carolina 
MATT SALMON, Arizona 
AMO HOUGHTON, New York 
TOM CAMPBELL, California 
JON FOX, Pennsylvania 

Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff 

Michael H. Van DUSEN, Democratic Chief of Staff 

John P. Mackey, Investigative Counsel 

Pakkek H. Brent, Staff Associate 



LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana 

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut 

TOM LANTOS, California 

ROBERT G. TORRICELLl, New Jersey 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, Cahfomia 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

HARRY JOHNSTON, Florida 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California 
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 
ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia 
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida 
ALBERT RUSSELL WYNN, Maryland 
JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 
VICTOR O. FRAZER, Virgin Islands (Ind.) 
CHARLIE ROSE, North Carolina 
PAT DANNER, Missouri 
EARL HILLIARD, Alabama 



(II) 



CONTENTS 



WITNESSES 

Page 

The Honorable Robert Gelbard, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Department of State 3 

Mr. Eric Newsom, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political- 
Military Affairs, Department of State 6 

Mr. Peter Romero, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Inter- 
American Affairs, Department of State 11 

Colonel Leonardo Gallego, Counter-Narcotics Director, Colombian National 
Police, Bogota, Colombia 21 

Colonel Oscar Enrique Gonzalez, Commander of the Search Operation of 

Cali, Military Forces of Colombia, National Army, Cali, Colombia 23 

APPENDIX 

Prepared statements: 

The Honorable Robert Gelbard 31 

Colonel Leonardo Gallego 42 

Colonel Oscar Enrique Gonzalez 44 

Statement for the record prepared by Professor Marc Chernick, submitted 
by Congressman Lee Hamilton 46 

Photographs taken by the committee staff submitted by Chairman Ben- 
jamin Gilman 50 

Article entitled "DEA: Sharp Increase in Colombian Heroin", Reuters, 
September 3, 1996, submitted by Chairman Benjamin Gilman 57 

State Department cables dated December 20, 1995, and July 25, 1996, 

submitted by Chairman Benjamin Gilman 58 

Colombian National Police report submitted by Colonel Gonzalez 62 

Letter dated September 4, 1996, from Ambassador Morris Busby to 
Chairman Benjamin Gilman 105 

Letter dated August 2, 1996, from Barbara Larkin, Assistant Secretary, 
Legislative Affairs, Department of State, to Chairman Benjamin Gil- 
man 107 

Letter dated September 14, 1996, from Barbara Larkin, Assistant Sec- 
retary, Legislative Affairs, Department of State, to Chairman Benjamin 
Gilman 109 

National Defense Council Foundation report submitted by Chairman Ben- 
jamin Gilman 114 

Letter dated September 10, 1996, from General Wesley Clark, U.S. Army, 
to Chairman Benjamin Gilman 117 

Letter dated September 12, 1996, from H. Diehl McKalip, Acting Direc- 
tor, Defense Security Assistance Agency, to Chairman Benjamin Gil- 
man 118 

Drug Enforcement Agency report submitted by Chairman Benjamin Gil- 
man 121 

Memorandum dated September 6, 1996, from Victor Abeyta, Director, 
Narcotics Affairs Section, U.S. Embassy, Bogota, Colombia, to John 
Mackey, Investigative Counsel, House International Relations Commit- 
tee 130 

House International Relations Committee majority staff recommendation 
on the Blackhawk helicopter sale submitted by Chairman Benjamin 
Gilman 133 

Responses to additional questions submitted by the Department of State . 135 

(III) 



OVERALL U.S. COUNTERNARCOTICS POLICY 
TOWARD COLUMBLV 



WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1996 

House of Representatives, 
Committee on International Relations, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:06 a.m. in room 
2172, Raybum House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman 
(chairman of the committee) presiding.Chairman Oilman. The 
hearing will come to order. 

Today's hearing originated with a request from the Administra- 
tion for congressional approval to sell up to 12 Blackhawk utility 
helicopters to the Colombian Army, and we are pleased we have 
some of the Colombian Army people here with us today. However, 
this hearing is about much more than 12 Blackhawk helicopters. 
It is also about the effectiveness of the Administration's overall 
narcotics policy with regard to Colombia. 

Colombia is a source of nearly 80 percent of the world's cocaine, 
and according to some startling new DEA data, more than 60 per- 
cent of the heroin reaching our Nation, most of which ends up in 
the Northeast, now comes from Colombia. Colombia, as we shall 
shortly hear from the second panel of witnesses, is in the midst of 
a deadly war with narcotraffickers and their guerrilla allies. Gren- 
eral McCaffrey, our Nation's drug czar, said that the war on drugs 
metaphor is, "inadequate for the complexity of the issue". Tell that 
to the more than 3,000 men of the Colombian National Police, plus 
those of the military who have now died fighting the narco-guerril- 
las. Tell that to the police on the streets of our inner cities, who 
see the destruction and violence that is caused by illicit drugs each 
and every night. 

The Administration has at least acknowledged what many of us 
have known for a long time about the alliance of convenience be- 
tween the guerrillas and drug traffickers in Colombia. In a letter 
to me on a Blackhawk sale now before us, the Assistant Secretary 
of State for Legislative Affairs said, and I quote, "Colombian forces 
are combatting well-armed drug traffickers as well as guerrillas 
whose interests in territory often coincide." 

Our former ambassador to Colombia, Morris Busby, said it best 
in his letter on today's hearing as to these guerrillas, and I quote, 
"They long ago abandoned any true ideology or political intent. 
They are nothing more than bandits and semiprivate armies." 

Our committee staff were in Colombia this past weekend and 
were told that some elements of guerrillas are, in fact, the "third 
cartel", after Medellin and Cali. They saw the evidence firsthand, 

(1) 



body bags of brave Colombian Army personnel on countemarcotics 
missions who were killed in attacks by narco-guerrillas, as the pho- 
tographs in this room make clear. 

Colombia is in a drug war whose outcome will also affect Ameri- 
ca's vital interest, yet the Administration has somehow been acting 
as though the struggle is just a side show. Clearly General 
McCaffrey's statement about dropping the war on drugs metaphor 
is a reflection on current Administration policy. 

Last year well equipped and heavily armed narco-guerrillas shot 
down five U.S. HUEY helicopters used by the Colombia National 
Police as well as aircraft used for eradication of coca and opium 
production in Colombia. It took me and my colleague from Indiana, 
Mr. Burton, 6 months to get those five choppers replaced. Only re- 
cently did we learn that a DC-3 transport used to ferry fuel, 
troops, and eradication supplies to Colombia antinarcotics units in 
the field has been disabled for more than a year. Since March 1st 
when we decertified Colombia, the Administration has continued to 
delay over whether to provide vital equipment and spare parts to 
Colombia under our foreign military sales program. In the interim 
the drug war rages on. 

We are asking how long it is going to take the Administration 
to resolve the FMS issue. The damaged Colombian aircraft must be 
repaired. We must supply needed spare parts. We know the enemy 
in Colombia. We know the serious threats that narcotraffickers and 
guerrillas pose to America's vital interests. 

So let us get on with providing Colombia the tools and equipment 
to do the job before these drugs reach our streets and further infect 
our communities and schools. 

Today we will be examining the Administration's policies toward 
a war on drugs in Colombia that, despite the naivete or ignorance 
of some, is being waged by dedicated and courageous men and 
women. They have been fighting for the benefit of their nation as 
well as for future generations of Americans here at home. 

Chairman Oilman. Before hearing our witnesses, I ask our dis- 
tinguished ranking member, the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. 
Hamilton, if he has any opening comments. 

Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Chairman, I don't have an opening state- 
ment. I do want to ask unanimous consent to submit additional 
material for the record. Just for your information, these will be 
statements of academics and scholars that are pertinent to the is- 
sues of the hearing. 

Chairman Oilman. Without objection, the statements will be in- 
cluded in our hearing. 

[The information appears in the appendix.] 

Chairman Oilman. Mr. Burton. 

Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As the chairman said, we had some difficulty getting the heli- 
copters down there. I will say, however, that Ambassador Oelbard 
did end up working with us in helping get that problem solved, and 
I thank him for that. But a lot more needs to be done. 

Oil Kapen, my chief of staff on foreign policy, just got back fi-om 
Colombia, and as you can see, they were unloading bodies of people 
who were fighting the drug war down there. Twenty-five or thirty 
were killed while they were in Colombia just a couple of weeks ago. 



Over 100 have been killed in the last month. These people are 
fighting the drug war not only for themselves, but for the United 
States of America. They are fighting for our kids, and they are 
fighting to stop the crime problems we have in this country. Sev- 
enty percent of all crimes are drug-related in America. 

These people who are dying in those coca fields in Colombia, 
fighting drug cartels and tne Communist guerrillas who are pro- 
tecting the drug cartels, are fighting for us and our kids. We need 
to do whatever is necessary to assist them, and selling them these 
11 Blackhawk helicopters seems the right thing to do at this time. 
And if the Administration or if anybody has any reasons why we 
should not be assisting them or not selling them these helicopters 
or whatever weaponry they need to fight the narcotraffickers and 
guerrillas, then I would like to know about it today. 

Again, I want to thank Ambassador Gelbard for his help. More 
needs to be done. We need your assistance, and I am going to listen 
to your testimony with great interest today. Thank you. 

Chairman GiLMAN. Thank you, Mr. Burton. 

Chairman Oilman. Mr. Hastings. 

Mr. Hastings. Mr. Chairman, I have no opening statement. 

Chairman Oilman. Thank you. 

Mr. Campbell. 

Mr. Campbell. No opening statement except to thank you for 
holding the hearing, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Oilman. Thank you, Mr. Campbell. 

Our first panel consists of the Honorable Robert Oelbard, Assist- 
ant Secretary of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs, Department of State; Mr. Eric Newsom, Prin- 
cipal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Af- 
fairs of the Department of State; Mr. Peter Romero, Principal Dep- 
uty Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs at the 
Department of State. 

Ambassador Robert Oelbard has been Assistant Secretary of 
State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 
since November 1993. From 1991 to 1993, he was the Principal 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and 
in 1988 he was named ambassador to Bolivia where he was respon- 
sible for all aspects of U.S. relations in the second largest U.S. em- 
bassy in Latin America. Ambassador Oelbard has been the recipi- 
ent of many awards including the Presidential Meritorious Award. 

Secretary Oelbard, you may submit a full statement for the 
record, or read the full statement, or summarize it, whichever you 
see fit. 

Ambassador Oelbard. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. GELBARD, ASSISTANT SEC- 
RETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. Oelbard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to submit 
my full statement for the record. 

Chairman Oilman. Without objection. 

Mr. Oelbard. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, I am 
pleased to have the opportunity today to discuss with you U.S. 



countemarcotics policy toward Colombia. Our relationship with Co- 
lombia and questions about the best way to deal with the enormous 
threat Colombia drug mafias pose to this country present us with 
a difficult and complex challenge. After years of cooperation, Presi- 
dent Clinton denied certification to Colombia on March 1st because 
the efforts of Colombia's police, military, prosecutors, and other 
honest government officials were being undermined by corruption 
at the highest levels of the Colombian Government and Congress. 

The toughest question we faced then was the one many of you 
have asked: How do we deny credibility to a President and some 
members of his administration we believe to be corrupt without 
turning our backs on honest Colombians and thereby handing some 
of the leading criminals a victory by default? 

Our approach is to maintain support for key countemarcotics 
programs and institutions in Colombia by pressing the government 
to take specific policy and legislative actions to enhance the capa- 
bilities of law enforcement and judicial sectors. We have proposed 
not only to continue, but to augment the U.S. assistance to the Co- 
lombian police, military, and justice sector which are confronting 
the drug threat and the corruption it has engendered. 

There can be no doubt in Colombia about our commitment to 
stamping out drug production, trafficking, and consumption. The 
traffickers intend to make Colombia a drug-safe haven, and they 
have demonstrated their power to do so by successfully corrupting 
a President. We then must redouble our efforts and support for 
those Colombians struggling to deny these criminals the freedom 
and resources to make their goal a reality. We have told the Colom- 
bian Government what we expect to accomplish, and we will evalu- 
ate its cooperation on the basis of concrete results. 

The Colombian Government must enact tough asset forfeiture 
and sentencing laws, strengthen Colombia's inadequate 1995 
money laundering statute, conduct effective coca and poppy eradi- 
cation, investigate and prosecute corrupt public officials, negotiate 
a bilateral maritime interdiction agreement, and reconsider Colom- 
bia's policy of not extraditing its nationals. 

President Samper has promised specific action on many of these 
issues since even before he took office. We have noted Samper's 
promises and intend to hold him to these promises. We have evalu- 
ated his government's cooperation, however, on the basis of con- 
crete achievements. We continue to support the Colombian Na- 
tional Police and judicial efforts to investigate, prosecute, convict 
traffickers to long prison terms, to dismantle trafficker organiza- 
tions, and to ensure the forfeiture of their front companies and ill- 
gotten proceeds. 

We likewise support the Colombian National Police's aerial eradi- 
cation program and the air, maritime, and riverine interdiction op- 
erations conducted by the police and military. 

At our urging the military has increased its support for the police 
countemarcotics operations, another key objective of our support. 
Operation Conquest, a joint operation in the coca-growing regions 
of southeastern Colombia, combines police aerial coca eradication 
with army and police ground-based interdiction operations 
targeting cocaine processing laboratories. The army also is restrict- 



ing the importation of cement and gasoline, key elements used in 
refining cocaine base into coca-growing areas. 

Neither the Colombian National Police nor the armed forces is 
equipped to take on all aspects of this threat without the benefit 
of U.S. assistance. Even given the improved cooperation we have 
seen among the services in terms of eradication and interdiction 
operations, they lack the basic capability to move personnel safely 
into an area to conduct operations or simply to establish some form 
of government control. 

Colombian National Police pilots consequently take enormous 
risks in conducting eradication operations in areas dominated by 
heavily armed guerrillas and traffickers because army troops are 
unable to get to those areas to secure them. Shortages of helicopter 
support with greater range, lift capacity and survivability than 
that afforded by the UH-IH, "HUEY," helicopter for both the Co- 
lombian National Police and the military has begun to limit the 
scope and effectiveness of eradication and interdiction operations. 

We have provided the police with additional UH-IH helicopters 
and are in the process of trying to identify ways consistent with the 
certification legislation to provide key Colombian police and mili- 
tary units with much-needed resources. 

Our 1997 budget request, if approved by Congress at the full re- 
quest level, will include an increase in funding for the police. The 
Colombian Army, meanwhile, has decided to take the matter into 
its own hands. We consistently have pressed the Colombian Army 
and Air Force to provide greater support to police counternarcotics 
operations. The Colombian Government finally has budgeted over 
$100 million for the purchase of utility helicopters and is prepared 
to move forward with a purchase before year end. 

We support this sale for a number of reasons, and these reasons 
are obvious. It is a straight cash sale, and as such it does not con- 
flict with the President's decision to decertify Colombia. The Colom- 
bian Army would use the helicopters for logistical support to a vari- 
ety of missions, including counternarcotics and counterinsurgency 
operations, and Colombia National Police Commander General 
Serrano has made clear he supports this purchase. Finally, if the 
Colombian Grovemment cannot buy U.S. -made helicopters, they will 
simply shop elsewhere. 

The threat to the United States from Colombian drug trafficking 
organizations remains enormous. Colombian drug traffickers 
produce some 80 percent of the cocaine on U.S. streets, and a re- 
ported 60 percent of heroin seized in the United States is now 
traced to South America, and that means Colombia. 

Many of Colombia's top traffickers are now in jail. The last Cali 
kingpin on Colombia's most wanted list, Helmer "Pacho" Herrera, 
turned himself in to Colombian authorities September 1st. That is 
the good news. Unfortunately, however, he surrendered knowing 
that he, like his jailed colleagues, will be able to continue to run 
his empire from prison. He also will have the advantage of weak 
laws designed to ensure he serves a negligible prison term while 
retaining millions of dollars' worth of assets and drug proceeds. 

I understand that some in President Samper's administration be- 
lieve that Colombia's decertification was only tied to U.S. election- 
year politics and that come January 1997, it will be business as 



usual for his government. This may account for his apparent bHnd 
determination to block extradition and key legislative changes, 
even in the face of what Vice President Humberto de la Calle de- 
scribed as Colombia's deepening crisis of leadership, when he called 
last week for Samper to step down, and yesterday when he himself 
resigned. 

President Samper's assessment of U.S. resolve, however, could 
not be more wrong. The President's decision to deny Colombia cer- 
tification and our decision to revoke President Samper's visa reflect 
this shared conviction. 

Despite our difficulties with President Samper, Colombian co- 
operation remains the key to our ability to eliminate most of the 
cocaine and much of the heroin that threaten our youth. The thou- 
sands of brave Colombian police, military, judges and officials who 
already have sacrificed their lives in the confrontation with the Co- 
lombian drug trade have been our allies in a common struggle, and 
in spite of corruption in critical segments of their government, they 
remain our principal hope for destroying the drug mafias. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Oilman. Thank you. Secretary Gelbard. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gelbard appears in the appen- 
dix.] 

Chairman Oilman. Did Ms. Meyers have any comments she 
wants to make? 

Mr. Secretary, the Blackhawks are support, not attack, heli- 
copters; isn't that correct? 

Mr. Gelbard. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Oilman. Can they be armed with anything more than 
we have already permitted the Colombian National Police to have 
added to the HUEVs we have provided them over the years? 

Mr. Oelbard. I think the standard armament has been machine 
guns, though I am not an expert on this. Traditionally helicopters 
have been armed with those machine guns. 

Mr. Newsom. Mr. Chairman, in the letter of offer and accept- 
ance, there is a provision for 22 M-60 machine guns, which would 
be door-mounted on either side of the helicopter. 

Chairman Oilman. On the HUEY. So that is part of the sale? 

Mr. Newsom. That is part of the sale. 

Chairman Oilman. Thank you. 

Am I correct that both the army — Colombian Army and the Na- 
tional Police of Colombia cooperated in the capture or the forced 
surrender of all of the seven Cali cartel kingpins; is that correct? 

Mr. Oelbard. The police were deeply involved in this, and some 
elements of the army were involved, to my knowledge, in some of 
the captures. 

Chairman Oilman. Wouldn't this sale of improved support 
Blackhawks with greater capacity, foster even greater cooperation 
and greater success by increasing the range, lift, and mobility 
needed by both the army and the police in the drug war? 

Mr. Oelbard. We believe this would enhance the army's ability 
to support counternarcotics operations as well as the other kind of 
operations in which they are engaged, and this is why we support 
this sale. 



Chairman Oilman. How long will it take for the sale to be com- 
pleted now? 

Mr. Newsom. Mr. Chairman, DSAA advises us that it would take 
approximately 1 year to complete delivery from signature of the 
LOA. 

Chairman Oilman. What takes so long? 

Would you please identify yourself and come up to the stand? 
Just please identify yourself for the record, sir. 

Colonel Oalante. I am Colonel Oalante from the Defense Secu- 
rity Assistance Agency. 

Chairman Oilman. Colonel, what would take so long? Why a 
year to complete this kind of delivery? 

Colonel Oalante. Because they have to be manufactured, sir. 
The army is still receiving new UH-60's as well, and part of the 
arrangements we would have to take care of to facilitate this sale 
would be to get Colombia into the queue. And the army is actually 
prepared to let them in ahead of them for these helicopters, but 
there is a demand on the helicopters now. 

Chairman Oilman. There are Blackhawks available now? 

Colonel Oalante. No, sir. They are being produced on a month- 
by-month basis. 

Chairman Oilman. Where are they being produced? 

Colonel Oalante. I am not sure where they are being produced. 
I imagine there is a good part of them being produced in Connecti- 
cut, but I am not certain of the location. 

Chairman Oilman. Will there be a special delivery as the produc- 
tion goes along? Do we have to wait for the full line to be com- 
pleted? 

Mr. Oelbard. Mr. Chairman, my understanding is that the first 
deliveries would occur this year. 

Chairman Oilman. This year? 

Mr. Oelbard. Yes, sir. 

Chairman Oilman. How soon would that be? 

Mr. Oelbard. When I met with Sikorsky, they told me if ap- 
proval is given shortly, that they could begin delivering — if I re- 
member correctly — sometime in late October. 

Colonel Oalante. That sounds right. 

Mr. Burton. Would the Chairman yield? 

Chairman Oilman. I would be pleased to yield to Mr. Burton. 

Mr. Burton. I don't understand this. If new Blackhawks are re- 
quired, and the drug war is as important to the United States of 
America as we all know that it is, why couldn't we use some 
Blackhawks that are already in our arsenal to send to Colombia in 
lieu of the new ones until they arrive? I mean, don't we have any 
Blackhawks available? If we don't have any Blackhawks that are 
already produced in our arsenal, why not? Colonel. 

Colonel Oalante. Sir, I am afraid I can't speak for the army. I 
wear a purple suit working for DSAA, but the decision to do that 
would have to be made by the Chief of Staff of the army, and it 
hasn't been posed to him. 

Mr. Burton. I am posing it right now. If we are talking about 
the need for 11 Blackhawks to assist in the war against drugs 
against the drug cartel and the Communists down there who are 
supporting them, then why in the world can't we take the 



8 

Blackhawks that are currently in existence in the army and send 
them down there and replace them as the new ones come on line? 
Why should we wait 6 months to a year? This war is going on right 
now. 

Colonel Galante. Sir, I will take that direction and work on it. 

Chairman Oilman. Colonel, if you would submit your response in 
writing for the record, we will make it part of the record. 

Colonel Galante. Yes, sir. 

Chairman Oilman. Thank you. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The Colombian Army (COLAR) may purchase up to seven UH-60L helicopters. In 
anticipation of such a sale, the U.S. Army has approved the diversion of four UH- 
60 helicopters from army production in order to meet the COLAR request for early 
delivery of six of these aircraft in January 1997. The prime contractor, Sikorsky Air- 
craft, has committed to provide two aircraft in January 1997 from on-hand assets 
to complete the Colombian requirement. 

Chairman Oilman. Mr. Secretary, are you familiar with the role 
of the two DC-3's of the Colombian National Police in support of 
their operations; in other words, fuel for helicopters, troop and her- 
bicide movement to the forward positions in order to carry out their 
goals, eradication, laboratory destruction? Why did it take such a 
long time from September 5th, 1996, when Mr. Burton's and my 
staff were visiting, to see these DC-3's, which make up one-half of 
the Colombian National Police vital DC-3 fleet that had been down 
for nearly a year due to damages, to get a work order going to fix 
it, and finally that order arrived on the day that staff arrived? 
Some estimates are that hundreds of missions had been lost during 
the 1 year. Why such a lengthy delay? Was there some cause for 
that kind of lengthy delay in getting parts and being able to repair 
this equipment? 

Mr. Oelbard. Well, first, the Colombian National Police has 
many other fixed-wing transport aircraft which they have been 
using to support eradication and interdiction efforts. Many of them 
have been supplied through our budget; others have been supplied 
through the U.S. military. We don't believe after an estimate that 
their efforts have been interrupted in any substantial way. 

Second, we were only advised of the state of the DC-3 in late 
July, and once we were advised of this, we moved to begin repair 
of that aircraft. We sent in our two of the transport aircraft CASA- 
212 and another aircraft and have been working since then to get 
that wing repaired. 

Chairman Oilman. I have a memo in fi^ont of me that says that 
in your internal memo it needs to be said that the DC-3 are the 
backbone, and the DANTI conducts an average of 50 flights per 
month with each aircraft, indicating the extensiveness of the 
amount of utilization of that kind of equipment. 

All I am asking about, is this delay something that we may be 
encountering again as kind of a delay? 

Mr. Oelbard. I don't think so, as we know about these things. 
As I said, we only learned about it in July. But in June we received 
for the first time CASA-212 transport aircraft. In June we sent a 
CASA-212 to Colombia, and that has been picking up some of that 
responsibility, but there are other aircraft that we have provided 
which are picking up other parts of it. 



Chairman Oilman. You are saying you didn't learn about it until 
recently, but I notice an internal memo that on August 7th, 1995, 
the DC-3 suffered a serious accident as it attempted to fly in rein- 
forcements into a clandestine airstrip. That is all you said in 1995. 

Mr. Gelbard. My understanding was that, looking back, when I 
learned about this and my staff learned about it, we asked why we 
hadn't heard about it before. My understanding was that the Co- 
lombians attempted to fix it locally and got to the point where it 
could be flown minimally. When they came to us, and when we 
heard about it, we immediately went out for a contract to get it re- 
paired. 

Chairman Oilman. I just hope that communications could be im- 
proved. 

Mr. Hamilton. 

Mr. Hamilton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I support this sale, but I do have some questions about it. It is 
a very puzzling situation, isn't it, and quite unusual, as I under- 
stand, the way we are proceeding here. 

Before I get to that, though, I just want to say that I didn't know 
anything about these machine guns. I had been told all along that 
there would be no lethal equipment involved in this sale. My staff 
had been briefed to that effect, and now this morning all of a sud- 
den you treat it as if it is a casual matter and traditionally done 
that these helicopters will be armed. 

Why were we not told of that early on, and why are we told only 
today or maybe yesterday that the machine guns were going to be 
included, and why would you withhold that information from us for 
so long? 

Mr. Newsom. Mr. Hamilton, there was certainly no desire to hold 
that information back from the committee. It is my understanding 
from Colonel Oalante at DSAA that the Colombian request for the 
helicopters as it was developed did 

Mr. Hamilton. Would you hold that mike up a little closer? I 
can't hear very well. 

Mr. Newsom. The Colombian request for the helicopters did in- 
clude, as I mentioned, 22 M-60 machine guns for mounting on ei- 
ther side of the helicopter from the doors, and this would be for the 
protection of the helicopter as it came in. 

Mr. Hamilton. I am not really disputing that. My question re- 
lates to the previous representation that no lethal equipment would 
be involved in this transfer, and then this morning you come in 
and tell us there will be. Why? 

Mr. Newsom. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am giving you my best ex- 
planation is that the Colombian Grovernment requested the arma- 
ments for protection of the helicopters, and that is now included as 
part of the letter of offer and acceptance. 

Mr. Hamilton. When did they make their request? Mr. Newsom, 
in July the ambassador told us several times there would be no le- 
thal weapons involved here. That was in July. 

Mr. Newsom. Mr. Hamilton, I have just been handed a letter 
dated August 2nd. This is from Assistant Secretary Barbara Larkin 
of the Department of State. It is addressed to Chairman Oilman, 
and on the second page of the letter it says like the 



10 

Mr. Hamilton. I see the sentence. That is dated August the 2nd. 
In July, just a week before, we had been assured there would be 
no lethal equipment. 

Well, you probably don't know that history, and I am not oppos- 
ing the use of machine guns. I just don't like the fact that you tell 
us one thing one day and next day tell us something else on a pret- 
ty important aspect of the sale. 

Mr. Newsom. I apologize that there wasn't followup. 

Mr. Hamilton. Now, we are supplying this equipment for 
countemarcotics programs; is that correct? 

Mr. Gelbard. These would be multipurpose equipment. 

Mr. Hamilton. You say our approach is designed to maintain 
support for the essential countemarcotics programs and institu- 
tions in Colombia; countemarcotics on one hand, counterinsurgency 
on the other. We are providing these helicopters for what pu7T)ose? 

Mr. Gelbard. As we have indicated in the letter to the Chair- 
man, we feel that these helicopters will be used for a variety of 
missions, which is why we are here today and requested the ap- 
proval of the Congress. The mission will include, as I said in my 
statement, countemarcotics missions, but it will also include 
counterinsurgency missions. 

Mr. Hamilton. Have we supplied military equipment for 
counterinsurgency purposes prior to this? 

Mr. Gelbard. I believe we have provided it on a straight cash 
basis. We have not provided it in recent years through F^F pro- 
grams because all our FMF assistance has been done for 
countemarcotics only. 

Mr. Hamilton. Wtiat drives this sale from your standpoint? Is it 
the countemarcotics or the counterinsurgency? 

Mr. Gelbard. My view is that, first, the Colombian military is 
now supporting the police in the countemarcotics mission more 
than ever before. And it is very clear, particularly fi-om what we 
have seen in recent weeks during Operation Conquest, that that 
support from the Colombian military is greatly needed. 

Second, it is clear, too, that the threat from the guerrillas is 
greater than before, and particularly because this is a cash sale, we 
feel that the missions that the Colombian Army wishes to use this 
for, including counterinsurgency, countemarcotics and humani- 
tarian purposes, is fully warranted. 

Mr. Hamilton. So ii the Colombian Army makes the decision to 
use these helicopters primarily or principally for counterinsur- 
gency, that is OK? 

Mr. Gelbard. The army, as we have indicated, does not intend 
to use them solely for countemarcotics purposes, and we have not 
sought assurances that they would use it solely for countemarcot- 
ics. They have told us that among the missions, and a major part, 
the missions would be countemarcotics. 

Mr. Hamilton. So if they use the helicopters primarily for 
counterinsurgency, that woula be OK? 

Mr. Gelbard. We would like to see them use it in substantial 
part, and even primarily if I had my preference, for countemarcot- 
ics, but 

Mr. Hamilton. Is that going to be in the contract with Colombia, 
that they principally use these for countemarcotics? 



11 

Mr. Gelbard. I do not believe so. 

Mr. Hamilton. So the army then will have the discretion how to 
use these helicopters. They could use them 100 percent for 
counterinsurgency if they wanted to under the terms of sale? 

Mr. Gelbard. Theoretically they could, but a major part of their 
mission has been counternarcotics. 

Mr. Hamilton. I understand that, but I just want to understand 
what the terms of the sale are. As I understand it, discretion as 
to how the helicopters are used will lie with the Colombian Armv. 

Mr. Gelbard. That is because it is a cash sale that they would 
be paying for as opposed to something that originates with U.S. as- 
sistance. 

Mr. Hamilton. Ordinarily we deal with governments and not 
with the Defense Department on something like that. This is curi- 
ous. The President of Colombia seems to be an irrelevant factor 
here; is that correct? 

Mr. Gelbard. I wouldn't call him irrelevant, I would call him a 
negative factor. 

Mr. Hamilton. A negative factor. Have we been in touch with 
him at all? 

Mr. Gelbard. We have been dealing, as we do, with the Minister 
of Defense as well as with the army and other forces. 

Mr. Hamilton. And we have not engaged him at all in this proc- 
ess of the sale of the helicopters? 

Mr. Gelbard. It is possible that our ambassador has discussed 
this with him, but we have been discussing it through our embassy, 
and for my part, too, have discussed it with the Minister of De- 
fense. 

Mr. Hamilton. One of the things we support in Latin America 
is the civilian control of the military, isn't it? 

Mr. Gelbard. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Hamilton. Yet this sale, you are not really dealing with the 
civilian head of government at all, or at least only marginally. You 
are dealing with the military, and you are giving the military dis- 
cretion to use the helicopters however they want to. 

Mr. Gelbard. We are dealing with the civilian Minister of De- 
fense. He is the person, for example 

Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Romero, can you respond to that? 

Mr. Romero. Mr. Hamilton, I think you need to look at and 
members of the committee need to look at the situation in its en- 
tirety, and I do believe that the military, the army, would not have 
been given the allocation of $107 million by the government if the 
government did not approve of this particular sale. The ambas- 
sador has spoken to the President about the sale. We have been en- 
gaging almost on a constant basis for several months now between 
the embassy, State Department people, and the Defense Minister, 
among others, about this sale. 

Mr. Hamilton. We don't support the President at all, do we? We 
would like to see him out; is that correct? 

Mr. Romero. That is a very difficult question to answer. Con- 
gressman. We are trying to do the best that we can so that the he- 
roes in this saga, those Colombians who are dying in the trenches 
in the war against drugs, can have the minimal amount of tools 
necessary to do an effective job. 



12 

Mr. Hamilton. Nobody quarrels with that. We all applaud that. 
The question was do we support or oppose the President complet- 
ing his term of office? 

Mr. Burton. May I interrupt just a minute? With all due respect 
to the ranking member, there are others of us who would like to 
ask questions in the second go-round. He could ask questions later 
on. If he would conclude, we would appreciate it. 

Mr. Romero. Should I respond, Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman Oilman. Yes, please respond. 

Mr. Romero. We have supported the strengthening of democratic 
institutions in Colombia for several years now. It is well known 
that this particular President has ties and has accepted money 
from the cartel. We have decertified Colombia as a result of all of 
this. It is widely known in Colombia, it is no secret, that we sup- 
port the democratic institutions in Colombia. 

Mr. Hamilton. That is — Mr. Chairman, that does not answer my 
question. Do we support or oppose his completing his term of office? 

Mr. Romero. I think we support the attempts by several mem- 
bers of the judiciary, among others, to get to the bottom of his in- 
volvement, his previous involvement with cartel members and his 
having accepted the money, and those efforts appear to have been 
blocked by the Colombian Congress. 

Chairman Oilman. The gentleman's time has expired. 

Just one question for the record. Has the U.S. Oovemment pro- 
vided many guns in the past that were approved by the 103d Con- 
gress for use on the HUEVs? 

Mr. Oelbard. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Oilman. I submit this photograph for the record show- 
ing the use of these miniguns. This photograph was taken Septem- 
ber 5th, 1996. Thank you. 

Mr. Burton. 

Mr. Burton. It is inconceivable to me, Mr. Chairman, that we 
could send helicopters that were not adequately armed into a war 
zone where the drug cartel controls large segments of the land 
mass. I have been to the Upper Huallagg Valley in Peru where the 
Maoists' Shining Path was controlling the area for a long time, and 
our helicopter was forced down. We had 250-millimeter machine 
guns on both sides of that machine down there. I just can't imagine 
sending helicopters down there that are not adequately armed. 

As I said in my opening remarks 

Mr. Hamilton. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. Burton. Sure, I will yield. 

Mr. Hamilton. I really wasn't objecting to using the machine 
guns, I was objecting to the fact that they told us they were not 
sending lethal equipment down there, then they were. That was 
my objection. I agree with the gentleman that they probably ought 
to be on the helicopters. 

Mr. Burton. I appreciate the gentleman's comments. The tone of 
his remarks at least led me to believe that they had some concerns 
about this. 

My concern is that we are in a war against drugs. Eighty percent 
of the cocaine that is processed comes into this country from Co- 
lombia. Sixty percent of the heroin that comes in is processed in 



13 

Colombia. They killed over 100 people last month who were fight- 
ing the war against drugs down there. 

I think we ought to give them everything we possibly can to con- 
duct this war against the drug cartel and their guerrilla suppliers 
in Colombia for maybe other reasons. And if it involves some mili- 
tary reprisals against the guerrillas, then so be it, because they are 
killing the people who are fighting for our kids who are suffering 
on the streets of the United States of America. 

I have a couple of questions I would like to ask. 

Mr. Grelbard, you appeared before my subcommittee along with 
some others, I think, four, five, six times. It was never brought to 
my attention that those DC-3's were not both operational. That 
concerns me because we were under the impression that those 
planes were operational, and they were needed not only for the war 
against drugs, but also for transporting troops, transporting herbi- 
cides and petrol, gasoline. There are other fixed-wing aircraft down 
there that don't fly because they can't carry the large quantities of 
people and materials that those planes did. So why is it that we 
weren't informed, and why weren't they fixed more quickly? 

Mr. Gelbard. As I said. Congressman, we learned about this in 
late July and moved to contract for repair of that aircraft imme- 
diately. We do have at least nine total counternarcotics-oriented 
transport aircraft in Colombia right now, two DC-3's and seven C- 
130's, and in addition, as I mentioned earlier, in June we supplied 
an additional CASA-212 aircraft when we received that from other 
parts of the government. It was our view that, when I learned 
about this, that we needed to move on this and repair the aircraft 
as quickly as possible, and we are in the process of doing that. But 
in addition, there are other aircraft which have been fulfilling these 
missions, as I said, including one other DC-3 and several other C- 
130's. 

Mr. Burton. We were under the impression, and perhaps we 
were wrong, that those were essential parts of the fight against 
drugs down there, and I hope they are fully operational quickly. 

I would like to run through these points, and we will submit 
these to you. These are fi-om the majority members of the commit- 
tee. I hope the minority will concur. 

First: the assurances we need. The Minister of Defense, including 
the commander of the armed forces and the commander of the 
army, will in all instances where it is both practical and appro- 
priate, fully commit to use these Blackhawk utility helicopters in 
full support of the Colombian National Police, which has had the 
long, traditional and very outstanding role in the battle against il- 
licit drugs that is now spreading throughout the region. 

Second: that the U.S. Government will commit, at the same time, 
to deliver as soon as possible without delay to the Colombian Na- 
tional Pohce an equal number, 11, of UH-IH HUEVs in addition 
to the Blackhawks, which will be converted to HUEVs to improve 
lift range and high-altitude performance. 

We must also enhance this outstanding professional police agen- 
cy, which has an exemplary human rights record incidentally, and 
the ability to prosecute an even more effective war on the drugs 
against often better equipped narco-guerrillas and drug traffickers. 



14 

Finally, the State Department shall report annually to the appro- 
priate committees of the House and the Senate and provide brief- 
ings upon request for the utilization and performance of the Colom- 
bian Army in operations where Blackhawlc helicopters are deployed 
during the preceding year, and the report shall include analyses of 
three areas: one, performance and conduct of the Colombian Amiy 
and its respect for human rights, vigilance of human rights viola- 
tions, and discipline with recommendations to improve human 
rights protections if appropriate; second, maintenance records and 
pilot information and performance data on the use of Blackhawk 
utility helicopters, including any recommendations to improve effi- 
ciency in one or both of these areas, in particular with respect to 
all countemarcotics missions that the Colombian Army acts and 
supports; finally, data on the direct support provided to Colombian 
National Police, with these UH-60 helos, for example the number 
of missions, the number of CNP personnel transported, and the 
amount of CNF supplies moved forward. 

I hope you will take a look at this, and if you concur, I hope we 
can move this forward along with the 11 helos given to them as 
quickly as possible so the National Police will be able to double 
their effort down there. 

Mr. Gelbard. Thank you very much, Congressman. We will look 
at that with great interest. 

Let me just say on the issue of additional helicopters, we antici- 
pate we will be forwarding for congressional approval a 506(a)(2) 
drawdown package this fiscal year, and we have recommended the 
inclusion of additional helicopters for the Colombian National Po- 
lice. 

Mr. Burton. Mr. Gelbard, I hope you will do more than just look 
at that. You and I have had long discussions, and you have been 
helpful. I think that should be made public. We have a lot of heli- 
copters, and there should be no problem in giving the Colombian 
National Police 11 helicopters to go along with the 11 Blackhawks 
they are buying so they can really conduct an effective war against 
these guerrillas and the narcotraffickers. 

Mr. Gelbard. Just to finish what I was going to say, I anticipate 
no problem in providing at least that number. 

Mr. Burton. Thank you. 

Mr. Gelbard. Thank you, Mr. Burton. 

Chairman GllJviAN. Thank you, Mr. Burton. 

Mr. Hastings. 

Mr. Hastings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I admit to a substantial amount of confusion. I 
appreciate so very much your having this hearing, but what I am 
hearing suggests to me that there is a great deal of oversimplifica- 
tion of an extraordinarily complex problem. 

One of the areas of concern that I won't be able to raise today 
only because of time interests are the legitimate interests of Colom- 
bian citizens who pursue trade with the United States and, more 
specifically, being very parochial, with Florida. There are interests 
where there is no specific indication that they have been directly 
involved in any drug activities. If I use, for example, the greater 
portion of the flower industry where we have millions of dollars of 
concerns, has not had this direct involvement. So it is very disturb- 



15 

ing for us to express, as rightly we should, our moral outrage and 
then to not be mindful of the economic impact legitimate trade has 
as well. 

Another thing that adds to the confusion is, I don't know who the 
army and the military report to if they don't report to the demo- 
cratically elected President of a country. If we are selling arms, 
which I support because the Administration and Congresspersons 
think it is going to help eliminate drug trafficking, somehow or an- 
other we are fooling ourselves if we think that the democratically 
elected President, whether decertified or without a visa or anything 
else, does not have any say with regard to the army. 

I understand that the United States was partially responsible for 
ensuring that the police in Colombia are responsible for dealing 
with drug trafficking rather than the military. 

Since it is the police constitutionally in Colombia and not the 
military who are tasked with this responsibility, how does provid- 
ing the military with helicopters help the police fight the drug 
trade? And how do we know, as a segue to Mr. Hamilton's ques- 
tion, that the military will not use this equipment to fight insur- 
gent opposition groups within Colombia? 

Can either of you respond to me? 

Mr. Romero. Congressman Hastings, the sad truth is that it is 
very difficult to distinguish between guerillas who support narco- 
traffickers in specific operations and those who don't. 

I just came back from being ambassador in Quito, Ecuador, and 
in the course of my 3 years there, we had three American citizens 
who were kidnapped by FARC guerillas. In the course of debriefing 
them, they paint a dire picture. They were kidnapped from Ecua- 
dor by FARC guerillas, brought into Colombia, and in the course 
of one of them being held for a year and a half, another for a year, 
they never saw any Colombian civilian authorities, civilian police, 
or military during that time. 

When they were kept on the march, which was almost with regu- 
larity, the people in these areas viewed the guerillas as the local 
authority and they provided a function for narcos, and the function 
which they provide is to ensure that the Colombian Government, 
with all its arms, does not have the reach into these areas. 

It is difficult to say which front of the FARC collaborate with the 
narcos, but if they are security corps that prevent the government 
from being able to move in effectively in securing areas, then es- 
sentially it is difficult to distinguish between an operation that 
would be counterinsurgency and countemarcotics in some in- 
stances. 

Mr. Hastings. The general thought in most instances is that 
they are an opposition group. But what I hear vou saying is that 
in some instances they may be involved in the drug trade as well. 

I heard FARC was actually a third cartel. Do you agree with that 
limited analysis? 

Mr. Romero. There is some information that suggests that some 
of the FARC fronts are engaged in cultivation and other activities 
involved with refining and transporting cocaine. But basically the 
function that they provide is as a security corps for narcos in the 
remote areas where there are remote airstrips, clandestine air- 
strips, hectares of coca being grown, and of course laboratories. 



16 

Mr. Hastings. In sum, then, we can provide counterinsurgency 
assistance to Colombians but we can't ensure that we are not sup- 
porting abusive counterinsurgency tactics? 

Mr. Romero. There are two issues that you raise. One is human 
rights and adherence to basic human rights standards. The other 
is operations to counter narco-guerillas. 

With respect to the human rights side of that question, I think 
all of us in this room would agree that performance of the army 
particularly has been very disappointing with respect to adherence 
to human rights standards. There continue to be instances of 
extrajudicial killing, disappearances, torture from very credible 
sources. 

The staff that went down over the weekend met with a lot of the 
Colombian NGO types down there. There is cause for concern, and 
there is no doubt about it. But there are some positive signs, and 
that is that the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights is set- 
ting up an office. We continue to follow very closely the human 
rights situation performance of the army. 

Mr. Hastings. Mr. Chairman, that is my final question. I would 
make a request that either this panel or the next panel that has 
the area of expertise, I would appreciate just the information that 
can be provided to me as a Congressperson regarding the increase 
in the production and distribution of heroin. 

Naturally, Florida being impacted as well as the Nation, I have 
an interest in that, and I would like accurate information before I 
go shooting off my mouth like a lot of my colleagues do. 

Mr. Gelbard. I would be happy to arrange a briefing. I would 
like to point out, though, an additional point to what Ambassador 
Romero said. 

We believe that the insurgent groups are also responsible in sig- 
nificant part for reaching across the border of Colombia into Ven- 
ezuela to spread the cultivation of opium poppies. We have been 
working very closely with the Venezuelan Government on spraying 
and eradicating those opium poppies, but it is very clear they see 
it — whether it is in Venezuela, Ecuador, or Peru — they see it as a 
transnational problem. 

But we will be happy to arrange a briefing for you, sir. 

Chairman GiLMAN. Thank you. 

Let me add to the record a report from Reuters dated September 
3: "DEA: Sharp Increase in Colombian Heroin", showing an in- 
crease in Colombian heroin. I will ask our staff to provide a copy 
to Mr. Hastings. It shows that Colombian heroin has become a 
major threat. 

Sixty percent of all heroin seized in the United States last year 
originated in South America, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Adminis- 
tration said on Tuesday. This is no accident. It is assured market- 
ing decision, et cetera. I will ask the staff to make a copy of that 
and will submit a copy of it for the record, without objection. 

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.] 

Chairman Giijvian. Mr. Campbell. 

Mr. Campbell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

On March 1 of this year, the Administration decertified Colombia 
under the Andean Trade Preference Act, but, to the best of my 
knowledge, no trade sanctions have followed. That is to say, decer- 



17 

tification authorizes the President to remove those trade benefits 
but he has not done so. 

I wish to know the truth, so let me ask any of the witnesses if 
this is true and, if it is true, why has the President failed to apply 
any trade sanctions as he is now authorized to do regarding Colom- 
bia? 

Mr. Gelbard. First, the decision by the President to decertify Co- 
lombia is under the certification provisions, not the Andean Trade 
Preference Act. That is separate. In fact, under the decertification 
decision there is a combination of mandatory sanctions and op- 
tional sanctions. 

The mandatory sanctions that have taken place have included 
that the U.S. Government votes against Colombia in multilateral 
development institutions. We have voted against them in the Inter- 
American Development Bank and I believe in the World Bank too. 
It has also included cutting Colombia from access to Export-Import 
Bank, OPIC, and certain kinds of U.S. assistance. 

The optional sanctions have been and continue to be examined 
very closely within the Administration. As our ambassador has 
made very clear to all senior members of the Colombian Govern- 
ment and as he has said publicly on many occasions, we continue 
to examine our options on these issues. We want to be able to hold 
out some opportunities if we can get enhanced performance. 

There are combinations of pluses and minuses, and, as Congress- 
man Hastings said earlier, we don't want to hurt American busi- 
ness. The idea is to be able to produce positive results. There are 
many groups in Colombia, including in the private sector particu- 
larly, who have been very supportive of those and very good exam- 
ples of those honest Colombians who are trying to produce serious 
results in the fight against drugs. 

For example, the Colombian Flower Growers Association is a 
prominent beneficiary of the Andean Trade Preference Act. They 
have been prominent in pushing the Samper Grovernment to try to 
do more. We have seen other parts of the private sector in Colom- 
bia who are also trying to do more. 

Mr. Campbell. Let me interrupt just a moment, because you 
have focused on flowers. I understand my colleague and good friend 
from Florida's point of view as to the Americans engaged in the 
business of importing, but there are also Americans engaged in the 
business of growing. What was granted in 1991 was duty-free 
treatment for Colombian flowers. 

All the trade sanction would be to treat Colombian flower im- 
ports the way we treat flower imports from any other countries, 
namely, subject to a series of duties as low as 3.7 and as high as 
7.6. Am I correct? 

Mr. Romero. Mr. Congressman, you are correct. But the essen- 
tial ingredient, the essential reason for having passed the Andean 
Trade Preference Act in 1991 remains valid today, and that is as 
an alternative to coca production, heroin production, as an incen- 
tive. 

Mr. Campbell. Let me ask directly that question. Can you tell 
me today that you have any evidence of the substitution away from 
coca and into production of flowers? 



18 

Mr. Romero. I can tell you that in Ecuador it has worked exceed- 
ingly well. 

Mr. Campbkll. We are speaking of Colombia. Do you have as you 
sit here today any evidence of substitution away from coca and into 
flowers in Colombia? 

Mr. Romero. I would have to go back and give you that; I am 
sorry. 

Mr. Campbell. Do you, Mr. Secretary, have any evidence of sub- 
stitution away from coca and into flowers in Colombia? 

Mr. Gelbard. In terms of direct substitution, no. However, the 
point is also to try to help develop strong macro economies to try 
to prevent people in moving into a variety of drugs. 

Mr. Campbell. I care very much about my colleague; I care 
about the economy in Florida; I also care about the economy of 
California. But putting parochialism to one side, we ought to con- 
sider whether there has been substitution and not simply a 
theoretic possibility, and I would love to know that that is being 
considered as opposed to, this segment has been OK and hence we 
are going to continue a preference. 

Mr. Gelbard. We continue to keep open our options. The Presi- 
dent has made it very clear that we are continuing to leave open 
the possibility for other kinds of sanctions if Colombian 
countemarcotics performance does not improve. 

Mr. Campbell. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman GiLMAN. Mr. Menendez. 

Mr. Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good afternoon, gentlemen, and, Ambassador Romero, I would 
like to welcome you from your last tenure in Ecuador. You did a 
tremendous job for our country. Let me ask you a series of ques- 
tions that I am concerned about. 

Ambassador Romero, does Colombia have a democratic constitu- 
tion? 

Mr. Romero. Yes, it does. It has a constitution that was ratified 
in 1991. 

Mr. Menendez. In that constitution, who is the commander in 
chief of the armed forces? 

Mr. Romero. The President. 

Mr. Menendez. In that constitution, who does the civilian De- 
fense Minister respond to? 

Mr. Romero. The President. 

Mr. Menendez. In that constitution, who does the attorney gen- 
eral respond to? 

Mr. Romero. The attorney general is independent. 

Mr. Menendez. Now, having said that — and I assume that we 
seek to promote democratic constitutions and democratic govern- 
ments — let me preface my question with the statement that I make 
no excuses for the allegations and whatever evidence exists against 
President Samper. 

What I am seriously concerned about is what road we are headed 
on here as it relates to both our narcotics efforts and to undermin- 
ing the possibility of the democratic institutions within Colombia. 

The fact of the matter is that — and maybe you can tell the com- 
mittee — there is a series of constitutional changes being considered 



19 

that would reverse certain provisions of the 1991 constitution that 
increased civiHan control over the military. Is that true? 

Mr. Romero. That is correct, Congressman Menendez. A bill was 
introduced into the Colombian Senate on September 3, if I am not 
mistaken, and it would provide, as you and I would term it, "fuero" 
for the military. In other words, there is an exemption from the 
same kind of law and regulation that others would have to work 
under, particularly the police. 

Mr. Menendez. What is the path of that legislation? 

Mr. Romero. I am told that 40 members of the Colombian Con- 
gress have introduced it, cosponsor it, and support it currently. 
That is not a majority. 

Mr. Menendez, What is our assessment of its possibihties of pas- 
sage? 

Mr. Romero. It is premature. It does have a potential for passing 
and would set back human rights efforts, we believe, greatly, be- 
cause it would take a commitment that was given to us by Presi- 
dent Samper to put the military under civilian judicial review and 
would basically take the military's ability to remain impugned from 
prosecution even five steps further. 

Mr. Menendez. Under the constitution, what is the process of 
impeachment of the President? Is it not a vote of the Congress? 

Mr. Romero. I think both Houses, if I am not mistaken. 

Mr. Menendez. Didn't the Colombian Congress basically, as I 
understand it, have a hearing on the allegations against President 
Samper and clear him of them? 

Mr. Romero. That is correct. 

Mr. Menendez. So my concern here is that we have a democratic 
constitution, and we have a process. We may not like it and we 
may abhor what President Samper is alleged to have done, and ef- 
forts in drug interdiction may concern us, but by the same token, 
how is it that we follow a process that seems to, through the decer- 
tification process and the things that have happened since then in 
terms of our efforts, travel a road that still seeks to promote de- 
mocracy in Colombia, not undermine its democratic constitution, 
and at the same time and not interfere with its democratic process, 
while simultaneously trying to engage the very forces that are ulti- 
mately responsive under that constitution to the President of the 
country? 

Mr. Romero. You have encapsulized the dilemma under which 
we are working, but we do feel strongly that democratic institu- 
tions need to be supported, defended, and strengthened. It is obvi- 
ous that their effectiveness has been hampered oy the influence of 
narcos in Colombia; no doubt about it. 

Mr. Menendez. Ambassador Gelbard, it sounds to me like we are 
in a sticky wicket in this process. 

Mr. Gelbard. I don't see it that way. 

First of all, we obviously and very clearly do believe in civilian 
control of the military and strong democratic institutions. There is 
a civilian Defense Minister in Colombia, a man who has a long and 
distinguished reputation as a jurist and juridical expert. We have 
worked very closely with him since he came into office. He was in 
Washington just a few weeks ago, and we discussed this. He 
strongly supports the sale. I believe that the members of this com- 



X. - 



::i«d. I tib^ 

M- Saltan's 
^ Yon 



3le. 



:t raised. lii£S 



'nis is A ditt^' '. 



21 

genetab, that m order to get tne generals to ^e HM'tliiig, lS»ey 
not do it lisroa^ the DeKiise Minister, tiiey bave to call tbe gen- 
erals ^rediy to get tiiem to the ■wHi ii g 

That, to me, is a Tery signififant w n'tAiwm m tUs praeesoL tfve 
are potting all our eggs in a basket wUh die Defense liiniiitiffr «bo 
Htm 13 respODsve to the Prendent and l3ie generals are not nec- 
essarily responsve nc r pas«iii ly to Um, it cases lae a lot of eao- 

Chairman Gilmak. I want to tiiank the paneiiats I s:r- ^- - ^ :: 
ask that tbe State DepartaMnt provide far tfae record - 
cable that was dated other Joljr 25, 1995, or 1 906 - nc . 
tain of that— tJiat informed the State Department of tiir 
one of the two DC-S's in tiie CNP inventory, if be eoukz - 
original catAe — a copy of tiiat — part of tbe record, and '. 
panelists for being widti os. 

[The infiMimation referred to appeals ir. :!- e a- : r : 

Chairman G^lmaml We now torn to ^^ - :: : 
bian witnesses, Colond Jdoe Leor ^ : 
coontesnarcotics director, Colonfaian !^•^ 
Cfliondria; and CUonel Oscar Eariqne C- 
Unit of CaK National Arvf, CaH, Col - 
nesses would take tbeir seats, we wdarr - : 

I want to tbank our Colooribian office v :fig S^ 

lance to testify, and we wekc— e \^'r~^z - ~ ^ i*^::-^ : ir san- 
mittee. 

Colcmel GaDego, yon laas i -" — 

rixe. 

Colon^ Gallego. I would 

Chairman G^lman. ¥^dio- 

Coknd Gallego. Thank -y. . 

Qiairman (^LMAML Flesj^ ;. ttI 

STATEMENT OF COLOTl ::^ LEONAJKDO GaLLZGO. 
COL-NTERNAECOnCS LI?^:::.-. CC«jnHAN NATIONAL 
POUCE. BOGOTA. COLOMBLA 

Coicnei GallZGG. ^Ir C'l — i* i- : : : - r_ - ' - : ----- ' 

rectcr : - : - t -.r - i - I - - - - 

Thank yon for mvilmg' ~ -. '. . r - ^ - -ii- 

gTes5 an overview of tti i - - - r ' r - -2- 

cooperaiic:: . a^ai ""?::■-"": t r i " i v : . ; 



22 

licit crops, 25,000 of them of coca crop and 15,000 of them of opium 
poppy. 

Third, the flow of illegal drugs through San Andres Island, once 
a major transshipment point, has been completely shut down. 

Fourth, the importation of precursor chemicals has been regu- 
lated to impede their use in the drug trade. 

Fifth, since January of this year, more than 2,000 narcotics traf- 
fickers have been apprehended. 

And sixth, we have seized more than 27 tons of pure cocaine and 
coca base and more than 600 coca processing labs have been de- 
stroyed. 

But we are not here to talk about our past successes. We are 
here to discuss the future and how we can best stop the flow of il- 
licit narcotics for once and for all. 

Today narcotics traffickers and guerillas have joined forces in an 
attempt to impede the renewed efforts by the Colombian Govern- 
ment to stop the flow of illicit drugs. This new phenomenon is what 
we call narco-guerrilla. 

Colombia's largest guerilla army has become a force in the nar- 
cotics trade. The FARC, as they call themselves, have become an- 
other cartel. Unfortunately, they have turned to trafficking in nar- 
cotics and have joined forces with the wealthiest criminal organiza- 
tion in the world. This is the adversary we face. The narco-gueril- 
las are ominous in resources and extremely violent in methods. 
With increased funding due to a variety of methods, these residual 
elements of the Communist insurgency are now better armed and 
equipped than they ever have been and are now actively involved 
in the illicit narcotics trade. 

The operations and aspects of our missions are ominous. Colom- 
bia is a vast country divided into sections by the towering Andes. 
The battleground is on Colombia's eastern plain, that ranges from 
prairie-like grasslands in the north to the swampy jungles of the 
Amazon Basin in the south. This area is roughly the size of the 
State of Texas. It is a vast expanse with few serviceable roads, 
crisscrossed by rivers and dotted with marshes and swamps. A crit- 
ical factor to success in any operation in this climate is the mobility 
of our forces to confront the narco-guerillas. Let me give you an ex- 
ample. 

The mission of the Anti-Narcotics Police is to eradicate illicit 
crops principally through aerial fumigation. In the jungle, some of 
these coca fields are protected by armed guerilla forces who at- 
tempt to shoot down any aircraft that come too close, and for fumi- 
gation efforts to be effective, we must come very close. They also 
attack any ground troops that attempt to penetrate the area. Effec- 
tive eradication cannot be carried out without the support of the 
armed forces that protect us while we carry out the crop eradi- 
cation program. For this reason, it is Colombian policy to carry out 
these operations with the integrated support of the Colombian 
armed forces. Colonel Gonzalez from the army will report on the 
activities of the armed forces in this fighting. 

Chairman GiLMAN. Thank you. Colonel, for your testimony. 

Colonel Gonzalez, you may submit your full statement or sum- 
marize, whichever you see fit. 



23 

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL OSCAR ENRIQUE GON- 
ZALEZ, COMMANDER, SPECIALIZED SEARCH UNIT OF CALI, 
MILITARY FORCES OF COLOMBIA NATIONAL ARMY, CALI, 
COLOMBIA 

Colonel Gonzalez. The full statement is shown. 

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. My name is Lieutenant Colonel 
Oscar Enrique Gonzalez, and I am the commander of the special- 
ized unit created to seek out and capture members of the Cali car- 
tel. Unfortunately, the man who wanted to be here today. General 
Carlos Alberto Ospina, commander of the Second Colombian Mobile 
Brigade based in San Jose del Guaviare, is on the battlefield and 
wasn't able to attend. Last week 24 of his men were killed in a 
major narco-guerilla offensive, and he asked me to come in his 
place. 

As Colonel Gallego has stated, the current situation in Colombia 
is of a considerable armed conflict throughout the regions of El 
Guaviare, Vaupes, Caqueta, and Putumayo, originated by the 
narco-guerilla in response to the recent government actions to com- 
bat illicit drug operations. 

While not our traditional role, the Colombian Armed Forces have 
been drawn into the war against narcotics trafficking given the 
special characteristics of the narco-guerillas. Our role is to protect 
the police units while they do their job. 

WTien our fight against guerilla activities first began to merge 
with anti-narcotics interdiction efforts, close cooperation was re- 
quired between the armed forces and the Colombian National Po- 
lice. 

Everyone does their part. The Colombian Air Force does its best 
to identify aircraft involved in narcotics trafficking, to monitor 
their progress, to follow them, and finally to intercept them. The 
Colombian Police does its best to protect the fumigation aircraft on 
their fumigation runs and to suppress attacks against them. Naval 
units patrol the vast expanses of the great rivers that cross the re- 
gion, and Colombian Army regulars manually eradicate crops 
whenever they come across them and provide tactical support. The 
frontal fight, whenever joined, is the job of the armed forces. 

In this vast region of no roads, air transportation is vital both 
for troop movement and support, and this is precisely where we are 
most handicapped by the lack of equipment. Rapid deployment and 
support are the key to success in this region. For this, we need hel- 
icopters. We need Blackhawk helicopters or helicopters with simi- 
lar capabilities. They would have to be able to deploy troops, to 
fight the narco-guerilla forces that are protecting the coca and 
opium poppy fields, and to provide tactical support when the going 
gets tough. 

That is why we need fast, capable, and reliable helicopters suit- 
able for our purposes, helicopters that we know how to operate and 
to maintain. These helicopters are also versatile. They are able to 
carry people long distances. They must be able to help us overcome 
the difficulties of the terrain in which the battles of the drug war 
are now being fought. These helicopters would not be used as at- 
tack helicopters but for support and transport operations. 

The second use of these helicopters would be in the eradication 
program, to support efforts in high-altitude areas that cannot be 



24 

reached by other planes or aircraft. This is an integral part of the 
eradication program as originally conceived. 

Another use of these helicopters would be to evacuate the in- 
jured, civilian and military, and to provide for humanitarian sup- 
port to those that flee from the zones of conflict. 

Before closing, I want to express on behalf of the Colombian Air 
Forces our sincere appreciation of the support the United States 
and the international community has shown for our efforts to elimi- 
nate the scourge of illicit drugs. 

Thank you for the invitation to testify before this committee. We 
stand ready to answer any questions that you may have. Thank 
you. 

Mr. Burton [presiding]. We understand that Greneral Ospina 
was going to be here but something unavoidably detained him. 
Could you explain that? 

Colonel Gonzalez [through translator, Carlos Acevedo]. Colonel 
Ospina was unable to come due to the fact that a situation arose 
last week in which 24 of his men were killed. He had to remain 
with his troops and assume direct control of the situation. 

Mr. Burton. And those troops were on countemarcotics mis- 
sions? 

Mr. Romero. Yes. Those troops were being used in the Operation 
Conquest and Support operations and in manual eradication pro- 
grams. 

Mr. Burton. Can you tell us. Colonel, which guerilla faction at- 
tacked those troops? 

Colonel Gonzalez. The guerilla faction that attacked the Second 
Colombian Mobile Brigade are those that call themselves the Co- 
lombian Armed Revolutionary Forces, the FARC, those that are 
now becoming known as the third drug cartel. 

Mr. Burton. And these are pro-Marxist forces; is that correct? 

Colonel Gonzalez. Years ago, perhaps in their origins, these had 
ideological basis for their fight, but since a couple of years ago, 
they no longer have any ideological basis and have turned them- 
selves into common criminals and have now turned to this activity. 

Mr. Burton. Originally, though, when they were formed, they 
were a revolutionary group who wanted to take over the govern- 
ment and put a Communist organization in charge? 

Colonel Gonzalez. In all the documents that they have produced, 
their intention was manifest in that it was to overthrow the gov- 
ernment and install a Communist regime. 

Mr. Burton. Thank you. I wanted to make sure that was clear 
because there has been lack of clarity in that area. 

There were human rights groups who were concerned about the 
hearing today, and they had raised concerns about human rights 
violations from the military and the Government of Colombia. We 
have assurances, I believe, from the army and the police, that these 
helicopters will not be used in any way to violate human rights, 
and that you are willing to give us reports on a regular basis on 
alleged human rights violations and how you deal with them? 

Colonel GoNZAi^z. Every part of the Colombian Armed Forces 
works to protect human rights, and in every single unit of all of 
the Colombian Armed Forces there are offices that specifically were 
formed and are dedicated to the protection of human rights. 



25 

Mr. Burton. Before I yield, I have a couple more questions and 
will yield to my colleague in 1 second. 

How many Colombian National Police have been killed in the 
struggle against the narco-traffickers? 

Colonel Gallego. In the last 10 years in the fight against illicit 
narcotics production, approximately 3,000 officers and agents of the 
police have died in the fight against illicit narcotics. Of these, dur- 
ing the past 2^2 years that I have been at the head of the Colombia 
Anti-Narcotics Police, the narco-guerilla has taken five aircraft, of 
which three have been helicopters and two aircraft used in fumiga- 
tion and 37 Anti-Narcotics Police have been assassinated, among 
them officers, pilots, regulars, and command. 

Mr. Burton. Let me just say that I and many of my colleagues 
in the Congress who are following the drug war in Colombia and 
Latin America have heard of Colonel Gallego and also General 
Serrano. They are heroes in our eyes, and we appreciate the hard 
work and the dedication that you have shown. 

I would like to ask you a very hard question. There has been 
some question in the past about the cooperation between the na- 
tional police and the armed forces in Colombia. Can you tell us 
what kind of level of cooperation you anticipate once we send the 
Blackhawk helicopters down to the military and hopefully the addi- 
tional HUEVs down to the police? 

Colonel Gallego. Thank you for your concepts on General 
Serrano and myself. I must admit that our relationship with the 
military forces are the best that they could be. 

I come directly from the zone of operations in Guaviare, 
Putumayo, and Caqueta, where the Anti-Narcotics Division of the 
Colombian National Police is carrying out the fight against illicit 
narcotics with the complete cooperation and assistance of the 
Communar Forces, and what we hope is that when the army has 
its own means of transportation in these zones, that the support, 
tactical and otherwise, that the army is providing us in our efforts 
will increase and therefore the results for Colombia and for the 
United States and, indeed, for the international community in the 
fight against the illicit narcotics trade will increase. 

Mr. Burton. That is very good news. I am glad to know that the 
cooperation level is increasing and that there is going to be unified 
effort to fight the narco-traffickers. 

With that, let me yield to my colleague from the great State of 
New Jersey, Representative Menendez. 

Mr. Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

To both of the colonels, thank you for coming so far to testify, 
and let me commend your countrymen who have given their lives 
in this fight. 

Colonel Gallego, I am reading from your statement where you 
say, 'Today narcotics traffickers and guerilla forces have joined 
forces in an attempt to impede the renewed efforts by the Colom- 
bian Government to stop the fiow of illicit drugs. This new phe- 
nomenon is what we call narco-guerilla." Later you say, the FARC, 
as they call themselves, has become the third cartel. Then at the 
end you give an example of why there is a need for these heli- 
copters, which is describing your fumigation efforts, saying that the 
coca fields are protected by armed guerilla forces who attempt to 



26 

shoot down any aircraft that come close and also attack ground 
troops that attempt to penetrate the area. That is your testimony 
before the committee. 

In view of that, is it not a fair statement to say that in order to 
fight the narcotic efforts you must fight the insurgency? 

Colonel Gallego. Yes, sir. I understand what you are saying, 
but in Colombia, where there has been a very close relationship be- 
tween the guerilla forces and the narcotics traffickers, it is only ob- 
vious that in those operations that are carried out against the nar- 
cotics traffickers in the jungles of the eastern plains of Colombia 
and in the higher elevations of the mountains where the opium 
poppy is cultivated, all of this, the Colombian Police and the Co- 
lombian Armed Forces, in carrying this mission out, cannot distin- 
guish between those which are armed narcotics traffickers and 
those which are armed guerillas. They must carry the fight out in 
a frontal assault to stop the illicit narcotics trade. 

Mr. Menendez. And based upon that answer. Colonel Gonzalez, 
isn't it difficult to make the statement that you have made that 
these helicopters will not be used as attack helicopters? Isn't it 
very difficult for you, based upon what we just heard from Colonel 
Gallego, to differentiate? 

Colonel Gonzalez. During the long experience that we have had 
fighting the guerilla forces in Colombia, we have never had offen- 
sive helicopters, and the Blackhawk helicopters that we might pur- 
chase are not configured to be attack helicopters. These helicopters 
will be configured for the transportation of troops and personnel. 

Mr. Menendez. If, in fact, these helicopters are to assist you 
then, and they do not have any offensive capability, how are you 
going to ward off the concerns that Colonel Gallego says you find 
all the time in the battlefield against the narco-traffickers? 

Colonel Gonzalez. Just like we have been doing it up to now. 
With the few means that we have, we transport the army troops. 
We actually take the zone that is attempting to be fumigated, we 
secure the zone with our troops, and we provide protection and se- 
curity so that the police can then come in and perform their eradi- 
cation. 

Mr. Menendez. So the question that Mr. Hamilton raised before 
about these being armed with machine guns, is that not the case, 
then? 

Colonel Gonzalez. The machine guns that are going to be on the 
helicopters are to support the troops as they are deployed from the 
helicopters when they land. They are not attack helicopters, nor 
will they have the offensive capabilities that you have on those hel- 
icopters here in the United States. 

Mr. Menendez. Thank you for your answers. They help clarify 
some issues. 

Chairman GllJVlAN [presiding]. Thank you. 

I regret that I had to attend another hearing for a few minutes 
and interrupt my review of your testimony. 

Colonel Gonzalez, when I left you mentioned General Ospina. Let 
me state that I understand why he is not here today. Staff saw 
firsthand those young men in nis unit over there in those body 
bags, and I want to extend to you both and to all of the armed 
forces and police of Colombia who have given their lives in our mu- 



27 

tual struggle our sincere appreciation for what you are doing, and 
please convey our sympathy and condolences to the families of 
those brave young men. 

General Gallego, head of the Colombian Army, has described the 
FARC guerillas as the third cartel after that of the Medellin and 
Cali. Wasn't the FARC attack last week on the army's second mo- 
bile brigade out on counternarcotics operations clear evidence of 
those kinds of links? 

Colonel Gk)NZALEZ. The recent attack by the FARC on the Colom- 
bian Second Mobile Brigade is a clear demonstration of the fact 
that the FARC has indeed become the third narcotics cartel. 

When the decision was taken by the government to step up the 
eradication efforts in El Caqueta, Guaviare, and the Putumayo re- 
gion in Colombia, the guerilla forces in the region mobilized not 
only themselves but instigated peasant conglomerations. Once this 
situation is brought under control, these operations will continue. 

Chairman GiLMAN. I address this to both of our panelists. What 
role do the guerillas play in the day-to-day operations of cultiva- 
tion, production, and distribution of narcotics, including laboratory 
and airstrip protection? Can you tell us first what the guerilla in- 
volvement is in those day-to-day operations of the narcotics busi- 
ness? 

Colonel Gallego. The role of various guerilla fronts is not only 
notorious but it is also a very close relationship with narcotics traf- 
ficking and it is in every single phase of the narcotics activities. 

According to what we have learned in the fields and in the jun- 
gles and in the mountains, we have found guerilla units providing 
armed security to the narcotics traffickers in their different activi- 
ties. We have also found them protecting and providing security for 
larger complexes for the processing and manipulation of the coca. 
They have also provided support and cover for the loading and dis- 
patching of shipments of cocaine in clandestine airstrips. They 
apply pressure to large sectors of our rural population so that they 
are, in turn, pressed into service and begin cultivating coca plants, 
and of course they charge the narcotics traffickers a very high sum 
for these services that they provide. 

Furthermore, the army itself in their zones of operation has had 
similar experiences. I refer to Colonel Gonzalez so that he might 
answer on behalf of the army. 

Colonel Gonzalez. Let me give you a simple example to answer 
your question. This is a copy of a document that we were able to 
capture from the FARC. It belongs to what they call the 15th 
Front, denominated Jose Nasciomora, where they have some sort 
of bookkeeping that shows the income they derive from this sort of 
activity. 

On the 8th of May 1995, there is an entry showing that 7 million 
pesos were received for coca, and there is a day-by-day account of 
what they receive for security operations for coca, for their different 
activities related to the narcotics traffickers. 

Chairman Oilman. What document is Colonel Gonzalez reading 
from? Can you identify it? 

Colonel Gonzalez. This is a document that was captured by the 
12th Brigade in an attempt to capture some of the members of the 



28 

15th Front of the FARC. This organization carries out its oper- 
ations in El Caqueta, where part of the current zone of conflict 

Chairman GllJviAN. Is there a title to the document, to the entire 
document? 

Colonel GoNZAlJ^z. As he stated before, this is a photocopy of a 
document that was captured by the 12th Brigade and was turned 
over in due course to the Prosecutor General's Office. 

Chairman Gil^AN. Would it be possible to make that document 
a part of our record? 

Colonel Gonzalez. Yes, sir. 

Chairman GllJViAN. Thank you very much. The document will be 
included in the record at this point. The document is entitled "Na- 
tional Army Colombia" and has both the Spanish and English lan- 
guage with regard to the explanation. We will make this part of the 
record, without objection. 

[The document appears in the appendix. 1 

Chairman Gilman. To both panelists: Is it true that the guerillas 
are better armed than our military police units? And, if so, what 
would this proposed sale do to change that kind of imbalance? 

Colonel Gallego. In the police operations, in the areas that are 
being used for the production and processing of illicit narcotics, the 
countemarcotics division has been attacked on numerous occasions 
by different units — guerilla units. These units have been using very 
powerful weapons both in their capacity ground-to-air and ground- 
to-ground. 

For example, on the 6th and 7th of August, 1995, approximately 
400 to 500 members of the FARC attacked an antinarcotics base 
in Guaviare that was protected by some of the regulars. That at- 
tack was carried out with arms as powerful as rockets, mortars, 
machine guns, rifles, and different types of grenades. And those 
same guerillas made it known that the attack was due to the re- 
cent policies enacted by the government. 

On other occasions, aircraft, airplanes and helicopters of the Co- 
lombian National Police and the Narcotics Division had been at- 
tacked while they are on their fumigation runs. They have been at- 
tacked by the narco-guerrillas using M-16 and .50-caliber machine 
guns. For this reason, many times our own agents and officers have 
made it known that it seems that the narco-guerrillas are better 
equipped and have better arms than we do. 

Chairman Oilman. Have you made any requests for better arms 
from our own country? 

Colonel Gallego. In the documents showing the items that are 
needed and the documents that are presented to the international 
community, we have certainly included requests for better arms, 
ammunitions and explosives so we can better carry out our mission 
in the zones of narcotics operations. 

Chairman Oilman. Would miniguns be helpful to you? 

Colonel Gallego. We are counting on the help of the United 
States, who has been our ally in this fight, and hope that we could 
be supplied with minigun machine guns so we can better carry out 
and better fight the fight against the narco-guerrillas. 

Chairman Oilman. How many miniguns or machine guns have 
you requested from our government? 



29 

Colonel Gallego. We haven't specified a number in the past, but 
in the short term we believe that at least 30 are needed to continue 
the fight. 

Chairman Oilman. And how many have we provided? 

Colonel Gallego. At this point in time we have only five units 
installed on five different helicopters. 

Chairman GiLMAN. And have we wired up, set up, these 
miniguns so they would be usefiil, the ones that we have supplied? 

Colonel Gallego. No, sir. We have done our best to adapt as 
best as we can those units and to mount them as best as we could 
on the helicopters we have, basically because having the guns, we 
did not have the wiring that was necessary to correctly install 
them. We make do with what we had. For that reason we reiterate 
our request and at this time would also ask for the appropriate 
wiring so that they can be installed correctly. 

Chairman GiLMAN. At this point I am going to ask if there are 
any of our State Department people still here to give us a report 
to explain why we pulled the plug on the miniguns that we did pro- 
vide and failed to wire up. We welcome having a written report on 
that for the record. 

Does your brigade. Mobile Brigade Number 2, have any air mo- 
bihty? 

Colonel Gonzalez. The community of the Second Mobile Brigade 
is completely dedicated at the present to the antinarcotics Oper- 
ation Conquest. There are approximately 3,000 soldiers, and we 
currently have to borrow the police's helicopters whenever we can 
get them. This common Mobile Brigade does not have any air 
transportation equipment of its own. 

Chairman Oilman. How much more effective would your troop 
operations be when you receive a Blackhawk with regard to police 
movement, eradication, Medivac operations, over a HUEY heli- 
copter? How much more effective would Blackhawks be? 

Colonel Gonzalez. The advantages of the Blackhawk over the 
HUETs are numerous, and on one hand they have a greater capac- 
ity for transporting troops. They have a greater range. They have 
a service ceiling that would allow them to approach the opium 
poppy cultivation feeds, something that the HUEVs cannot do. And 
since they are much faster helicopters, they imbue the operations 
that they are used on with greater security for the personnel that 
carries them out. 

Chairman Oilman. As we near the end of our testimony, are 
there any further requests that either one of you would like to 
make of our government to help you in your work in antinarcotics 
trafficking? 

Colonel Gallego. Yes, sir. Thank you for the opportunity to 
make this additional request. 

Please, the Colombian Narcotics Division needs in the short term 
at least 20 helicopters more of which we would be greatly pleased 
if we could receive the 11 that have been discussed here as soon 
as possible. 

We also desperately need the minigun machine guns, including 
the wiring that would be needed to mount them appropriately; the 
applying of armor to the helicopters so that they can withstand at- 
tacks; assistance in the reparation of the DC-3 that is desperately 



36-261 96-2 



30 

needed but out of service because we have been unable to repair 
it. 

And in the medium term we would greatly appreciate two more 
DC-3's so that we can continue and expand the operation and mis- 
sions that they are used on. 

Again, I wish to express my sincere gratitude to the United 
States for its assistance and support in the war that Colombia is 
waging against drugs that affect not only the interest of Colombia, 
but the interest of the United States as well. 

Chairman Oilman. Again, we want to thank both Colonel 
Gallego and Colonel Gonzalez for your willingness to come to the 
States and take the time to appear before us and bring us up to 
date. We want to thank you, too, for the sacrifices you have made 
and for the successes in our common goal of fighting narcotraffi ek- 
ing. 

You made the case very poignantly for the sale of the 
Blackhawks, and the RUBY'S and for the other additional equip- 
ment. We are asking our State Department officials to move expe- 
ditiously with regard to these requests. We are asking that 36(b) 
on this sale be sent up to the Congress promptly. 

At this point we are asking if you have no further requests or 
inquiries, I would like to include several items in the record: A let- 
ter from the former U.S. ambassador to Colombia Morris Busby; a 
letter from the State Department which we quoted earlier; an ex- 
cellent report of the National Defense Council Foundation, which 
has been extremely helpful in getting the facts for this hearing on 
the deadly struggle in Colombia against drugs; and a letter from 
Wesley Clark, General, of the U.S. Army, Commander in Chief of 
SOUTHCOM, in support of the sale that was received today. 

And for the record I would like to request that the interpreter 
at this point provide his name, position, and affiliation. 

Mr. AcEVEDO. [Interpreter.] My name is Carlos Acevedo. I am 
the Commercial Secretary here in the Commercial Office of the Co- 
lombian embassy. 

Chairman Oilman. And to our military officers, we wish you 
Oodspeed and a safe journey, and may you continue our successes 
in our mutual battle. Thank for appearing, and this committee 
stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:16 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 



31 
APPENDIX 



STATEMENT 

TO THE 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

BY 

Robert S. GeLbard 

Assistant Secretary of State for 

International Narcotics and. Law Enforcement Affairs 

September 11, 1996 



Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members 
of the Committee. I am pleased to have the opportunity today 
to discuss with you U.S. Counternarcotics policy toward 
Colombia. I understand that the Committee has some specific 
questions about the levels and types of counterdrug 
assistance we should be providing to elements of the 
Colombian Government in light of the President's March 1 
decision to deny Colombia certification. Before I address 
the issue of specific types of support, however, I'd like to 
explain our strategy and the results we hope to achieve. 

Our relationship with Colombia, and questions about the 
best way to deal with the enormous threat Colombian drug 
mafias pose to this country, present us with an incredibly 
difficult and complex challenge. After years of cooperation. 
President Clinton denied certification to Colombia on March 1 
because the efforts of Colombia's police, military, 
prosecutors and honest government officials were being 
undermined by corruption at the highest levels of the 
Colombian Government and Congress. The toughest question we 
faced then, was the one many of you have asked: how do we 



32 



deny credibility to a president and some members of his 
administration we believe to be corrupt without turning our 
backs on honest Colombians and thereby handing some of the 
world's leading criminals a victory by default? 

Our approach is designed to maintain support for 
essential counternarcotics programs and institutions in 
Colombia, while pressing the Government to take specific 
policy and legislative actions that would enhance the 
capabilities of the law enforcement and judicial sectors. We 
have proposed not only to continue, but to augment U.S. 
assistance to Colombian National Police, the military and 
elements of the justice sector which are actively confronting 
the drug threat and the corruption it has engendered. There 
can be no room for doubt about the U.S. Government's 
commitment to stamping out drug production, trafficking, and 
consumption. The traffickers are intent on making Colombia a 
drug safehaven and they have demonstrated their power to do 
so by successfully corrupting a president. The only 
appropriate response is the redoubling of our efforts and our 
support of those in Colombia struggling to deny these 
criminals the freedom and resources to make their goal a 
reality. 

We have outlined for the Colombian Government a set of 
specific realistic objectives and actions we expect it to 
pursue, and upon which we will evaluate its cooperation. 



33 



These include the enactment of tough asset forfeiture and 
sentencing laws; the strengthening of Colombia's inadequate 
1995 money laundering statute; effective eradication of coca 
and opium poppy fields; reconsideration of Colombia's policy 
of not extraditing its nationals; support for investigations 
and prosecutions targetting corrupt public officials; and the 
signing of a bilateral maritime interdiction agreement. 

President Ernesto Samper has promised specific action on 
the legislative front since before he took office. Last 
month he presented the Colombian Congress with a legislative 
package which, if approved, should bring Colombia in line 
with international standards on many of these issues. We 
have noted Samper' s promises and intend to hold him to those 
promises. We continue to engage those members of his 
Administration who are prepared to cooperate with us. We 
will evaluate his government's cooperation, however, on the 
basis of concrete achievements. 

We also are seeking continued law enforcement and 
judicial action against traffickers; their prosecution, 
conviction, and sentencing to prison terras commensurate with 
their crimes; the dismantling of their organizations; and the 
forfeiture of their front companies and ill-gotten proceeds. 



34 



We continue to work closely with the Colombian National 
Police, units of the military, and the Prosecutor General's 
Office in pursuit of these goals. We likewise support the 
Colombian Police's aerial eradication program, and the air, 
maritime and riverine interdiction operations conducted by 
the police and military. At our urging, the military has 
increased its support for police counternarcotics operations, 
another key objective of our support. 

The military and police have been cooperating closely in 
the coca-growing regions of southeastern Colombia in 
"Operation Conquest." This combined operation includes 
aerial eradication of coca fields by the police, while army 
and police units conduct ground-based interdiction operations 
targetting cocaine processing laboratories. The army also is 
restricting the importation of cement and gasoline — key 
elements used in refining cocaine base — into coca growing 



The cooperation from the working level on these fronts 
remains good. Law enforcement organizations and the judicial 
sector can only be fully successful, however, if they are 
given the tools to carry out the job and they have the clear 
backing of their government. We are pressing the Colombian 
government to provide that support. More importantly, our 



35 



continued support of the police, soldiers, prosecutors and 
judges on the front lines of this effort is sustaining_the 
segments of Colombian society which ultimately must be able 
to confront and defeat the threat posed by rampant 
corruption. Corruption threatens not only Colombian 
democratic tradition and institutions; it diminishes our 
ability to stem the flow of drugs and crime into the United 
States from Colombia. 

Colombian drug trafficking organizations, and the 
products they distribute in the U.S., continue to pose a 
tremendous threat to the United States. An estimated 80 
percent of the cocaine available in the U.S. still is 
produced in Colombia, and the Drug Enforcement Administration 
reports that more than 60 percent of heroin being seized in 
the U.S. can now be traced to South America — that means 
Colombia . 

Many of Colombia's top traffickers are in jail. The 
last Cali kingpin on Colombia's most-wanted list — Helmer 
"Pacho" Herrera — turned himself in to Colombian authorities 
September 1. Unfortunately, however, he surrendered knowing 
that he, like his jailed colleagues, will be able to run his 
empire from prison. By surrendering now, he will have the 
advantage of weak laws — laws in part drafted at the 



36 



direction of the traffickers themselves -- designed to ensure 
that top kingpins serve negligible prison terms and are. able 
to retain millions of dollars' worth of assets and 
criminally-derived proceeds. 

Meanwhile, a younger, hungry group of traffickers 
apparently is launching an effort to take control of the 
massive Colombian production, trafficking and distribution 
networks established by the jailed and now-deceased Medellin 
and Cali kingpins. Internal struggles have begun among 
second and third-tier traffickers. They are killing off 
competitors in an effort to consolidate power bases from 
which to threaten the old guard. This is a recipe for the 
type of violence which prevailed in Colombia in the late 
1980' s and early 1990' s. Drug mafia warfare spilled onto 
America's streets as competing Colombian syndicates fought to 
establish control over parts of the U.S. market. 

Add to this volatile mix Colombia's far-flung, 
entrenched guerrilla movements, elements of which have become 
increasingly involved in organized crime, including drug 
trafficking. While some segments of the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army 
(ELN) continue to pursue a political agenda, sectors of these 
organizations are directly engaged in coca cultivation and 



37 



processing, and in extorting money for the "protection" of 
fields, laboratories and markets. They are benefitting^ 
substantially from the cocaine trade. The profits generated 
by this and other criminal enterprises pay for impressive 
arsenals and supplies. 

The interest of the guerrillas in the cocaine trade as a 
source of revenue is well illustrated by the recent effort to 
instigate massive peasant protests in the southeastern, 
coca-growing region of Colombia. The Colombian National 
Police and army have been facing tens of thousands of coca 
growers — men, women, and children — protesting the 
U.S .-supported aerial eradication program. The protests are 
led by guerrillas-turned-narco-security corps who believe 
that they can gain public sympathy, and ultimately stop 
eradication, if they can force authorities into a violent 
confrontation with the peasants. Their tactics — in many 
cases they forced peasants to participate actively in the 
marches by holding family members hostage — leave little 
doubt that their primary motivation is profit, rather than 
the hearts and minds of the local campesinos. To its credit, 
the Government of Colombia has stood firm in its resolve to 
continue eradicating illicit crops. 

Neither the Colombian National Police nor the armed 
forces is equipped to take on all aspects of this threat 
without the benefit of U.S. assistance. Even given the 



38 



improved cooperation we have seen among the services in terms 
of eradication and interdiction operations, they lack the 
basic capability to move personnel safely into an area to 
conduct operations or simply to establish some form of 
government control. Colombian National Police pilots 
consequently take enormous risks in conducting eradication 
operations in areas dominated by heavily-armed guerrillas and 
traffickers because army troops are unable to get to those 
areas to secure them. The police, likewise, are short of 
helicopters for air support, search and rescue and medevac 
operations . 

The shortage of helicopter support with greater range, 
lift capacity and survivability than that afforded by the 
UH-IH "Huey, " for both the Colombian National Police and the 
military has begun to limit the scope and effectiveness of 
eradication and interdiction operations. We are working to 
identify ways consistent with the certification legislation 
by which we can provide key Colombian Police and military 
units with much-needed resources. The Department of State 
sent six additional UH-lHs to Colombia to support the police 
eradication and interdiction programs in early June. Our 
1997 budget plan, if approved by Congress at the full request 
level, will include an increase in funding for the police. 

The Colombian Army, meanwhile, has decided to take the 
matter of air mobility into its own hands. We consistently 



39 



have pressed the Colombian Army and Air Force to provide 
greater support to Police counternarcotics operations. The 
Colombian Government finally has budgeted over 100 million 
dollars for the purchase of high-performance, utility 
helicopters which will enable them to provide such support. 
To deny them the ability to purchase U.S. helicopters — we 
are aware that the Army strongly prefers a U . S . -manufactured 
helicopter -- would limit our own credibility as we argue for 
greater army involvement in the counterdrug effort. 

The Colombians have told us they are prepared to move 
forward with a purchase before year end. We support this 
sale for a number of obvious reasons. It is a straight cash 
sale — there is no U.S. financing of any kind involved — 
and as such, it does not conflict with the President's 
decision to deny certification to Colombia. The Colombian 
Army needs utility helicopters to provide logistical support 
for a variety of missions, including counterinsurgency and 
counternarcotics operations; they are not seeking attack 
helicopters. The Colombian National Police has made clear 
that the success of many of their missions hinges on support 
from the army, and General Serrano, Commander of the Police, 
supports this purchase. Finally, if the Colombian Government 
cannot buy U.S. -made helicopters, it will simply shop 
elsewhere. 



40 



Despite our difficulties with President Samper, we must 
continue to work with Colombia to curtail the drug flow. 
Colombian cooperation remains the key to our ability to 
eliminate most of the cocaine and much of the heroin that 
threaten our youth. We also must bear in mind that thousands 
of Colombian police, military, judges and officials already 
have sacrificed their lives in the effort to bring down the 
Colombian drug trade. These forces have been our allies in a 
common struggle and, in spite of corruption in critical 
segments of their government, they remain our principal hope 
for destroying the drug mafias. 

I understand that some in President Samper's 
Administration believe that Colombia's decertification was 
tied to U.S. election-year politics and that, come January 
1997, it will be business as usual for his government. This 
may account for his apparent blind determination to block 
extradition and key legislative changes, even in the face of 
what Vice President Humbert© de la Calle described as 
Colombia's deepening crisis of leadership when he called last 
week for Samper to step down. President Seimper' s assessment 
of U.S. resolve, however, could not be more wrong. 

I think that we all agree that destroying the drug trade 
is one of our foremost national priorities. Our unanimous 
decisions to deny Colombia certification, and to revoke 
President Samper's tourist visa reflect this shared 
conviction. Similarly, our commitment to support the drug 



41 



traffickers' most steadfast opponents in Colombia, while 
demanding real cooperation in the drug fight from the 
government, is undiminished. Sending any other signal to 
Colombia would be tantamount to granting Colombia' s drug 
traffickers and their corrupt supporters their ultimate 
victory. 



42 



Statement of Colonel Leonardo Gallego, 

Director, Antinarcotics Division, Colombian National Police 

before the House Committee on International Relations. 

September 11, 1996 



Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee. , 

My name is Colonel Leonardo Gallego, I am the Director of the Antinarcotics Division of the 
Colombian National Police, the principal organization on the front line in the war against drugs. 

Thank you for inviting me to be here today to give the US Congress an overview of the war that 
Colombia is waging - with US cooperation - against the flow of illegal narcotics. 

During the past two years, as head of the Colombian Antinarcotics Police, my job has been to fight 
international narcotics trafficking, and in that fight, we have had a great deal of success. 

1995 was an excellent year, and our success has continued in 1996. Without going into detail, let me 
highlight the following: 

- First of all, of the seven main leaders of the Cali cartel, 6 are now behind bars and the seventh was 
killed while being captured; 

- Second, the eradication programs carried our with the support and help of the US have met with 
notable success. Since January first of this year, we have fiimigated over 40,000 acres of illicit 
crops; 25,000 acres of coca crop and 15,000 acres of opium poppy; 

- Third, the flow of illegal drugs through San Andres Island, once a major trans-shipment point, has 
been completely shut down; 

- Fourth, the importation of precursor chemicals has been regulated to impede their use in the drug 
trade; 

- Fifth, since January of this year, more than 2,000 narcotics traffickers have been aprehended; and 

- Sixth, were have seized more than 27 tons of pure cocaine and coca base, and, more than 600 
cocaine processing laboratories have been siezed and destroyed. 

But we are not here to talk about our past successes. We are here to discuss the future, and how can 
we best stop the flow of illicit narcotics for once and for all. 

Today, narcotics traffickers and guerrilla forces have joined forces in an attempt to impede the 
renewed efforts by the Colombian Government to stop the flow of illicit drugs. This new 
phenomenon is what we call narco-guerrilla. 

Colombia's largest guerrilla army, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia has become a 
powerful force in the narcotics trade. The FARC, as they call themselves, have become the third 
cartel. 



43 



UnforUmately, they have turned to trafficking in narcotics, and have joined forces with the wealthiest 
criminal organization in the world. This is the adversary we face - the narcoguerrillas, are ominous 
in resources and extremely violent in methods. With increased funding due to a variety of methods, 
these residual elements of communist insurgency are now better armed and equipped than they ever 
have been and are now actively involved in the illicit narcotics trade. 

The operational aspects of our mission are ominous. Colombia is a vast country, divided into 
sections by the towering Andes. The battle ground is on Colombia's Eastern plain, that ranges from 
prairy-like grasslands in the North to the swampy jungles of the Amazon basin in the South. This 
area is roughly the size of the State of Texas. It is a vast expanse with few serviceable roads, cris- 
crossed by rivers and dotted with marshes and swamps. A critical factor to success in any operation 
in this climate is the mobility of our forces to confront the narcoguerrilla. 

Let me give you an example. 

The mission of the Antinarcotics Police is to eradicate illicit crops principally through aerial 
fimiigation. In the jungle, some of these coca fields are protected by armed guerrilla forces who 
attempt to shoot down any aircraft that come too close, and for fimiigation efforts to be effective, 
we must come very close. They also attack any ground troops that attempt to penetrate the area. 
Effective eradication cannot be carried out without the support of the armed forces, that protect us 
while we carry out the crop eradication program. 

For this reason, it is currently Colombian Policy to carry out these operations with the integrated 
support of the Colombian Armed Forces. 

Colonel Gonzalez will report on the activities of the Armed Forces. 



44 



Statement of Lieutenant Colonel Oscar Enrique Gonzalez, 

Commander, Specialized Search Unit of Cali, 

before the House Committee on International Relations. 

September 11, 1996 



Good afternoon. My name is Lieutenant Colonel Oscar Enrique Gonzalez, and I am the Commander 
of the Specialized Unit created to seek out and capture members of the Cali Cartel. Unfortunately, 
the man who wanted to be here today. General Carlos Alberto Ospina, commander of the Second 
Colombian Mobile Brigade based in San Jose del Guaviare is on the battlefield, and was unable to 
attend. Last week, 24 of his men were killed in a major narcoguerrilla offensive, and he asked me 
to come in his place. 

As Colonel Gallego has stated, the current situation in Colombia is of a considerable armed conflict 
throughout the regions of El Guaviare, Vaupes, Caqueta and Putumayo, originated by the 
narcoguerrilla in response to the recent government actions to combat illicit crop cultivation. 

While not our traditional role, the Colombian Armed Forces have been drawn into the war against 
narcotics trafficking given the special characteristics of the narcoguerrillas. Our role here is to 
protect the Police Units while they do their job. 

When our fight against guerrilla activities first began to merge with anti-narcotics interdiction 
efforts, close cooperation was required between the Armed Forces and the Colombian National 
Police. 

Everyone does their part. The Colombian Air Force does its best to identify aircraft involved in 
narcotics trafficking, to monitor their progress, to follow them and fmally to intercept them. The 
Colombian Police does its best to protect the fiunigation aircraft on their fumigation runs, and to 
supress attacks against them. Naval units patrol the vast expanses of the great rivers that cross the 
region and Colombian Army regulars manually erradicate crops wherever they come across them, 
and provide tactical support. The frontal fight, whenever joined, is the job of all of the Armed 
Forces. 

La this vast region of no roads, air transportation is vital both for troop movement and support, and 
this is precisely where we are most handicapped by the lack of equipment. Rapid deployment and 
support are the key to succes in this region. For this, we need helicopters. Black Hawk helicopters, 
or helicopters with similar capabilities. They would have to be able to deploy troops, to fight the 
narcoguerrilla forces that are protecting the coca and opium poppy fields, and to provide tactical 
support when the going gets tough. 

This is what we need. Fast, capable, and reliable helicopters, suited for our purposes. Helicopters 
that we know how to operate and to maintain. 



45 



These helicopters are also versatile. They are able to carry people long distances. They must be able 
to help us overcome the difficulties of the terrain in which the battles of the Drug War are now being 
fought. 

These helicopters would not be used as attack helicopters, but for support and transport operations. 



The secondary use of the helicopters would be in the eradication program, to support efforts in high 
altitude areas that cannot be reached by other planes and aircraft. This is an integral part of the of 
the eradication program,as originaly conceived. 

Another use of these helicopters would be to evacuate the injured, civilian and military, and to 
provide humanitarian support to those that flee from the zones of conflict. 

Before closing, I want to express, on behalf of the Colombian Armed Forces, our sincere 
appreciation of the support the United States and the international community has shown for our 
efforts to eliminate the scourge of illicit drugs. 

I thank you for the invitation to testify before this committee. Colonel Gallego and I stand ready to 
answer any questions that you may have. Thank you. 



46 



STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD 
prepared for the Houie Committee on IntematioDal Reiatioiu 

Prof. Marc W. Chcrnick, 
Director of the Andean and Amazonian Studies Program at Georgetown University 

THE SALE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO COLOMBIA TO 
SUPPORT THE WAR ON DRUGS 

I welcome this opportunity to share my views with the House Commirtec on International Relations. For 
many years, I have been a close observer of Colombian politics, specifically studying the escalation of 
gucrnlla violence, the nse of the multinational drug exporting syndicates and U.S. anti-narcotics policy in 
the Andean region. I lived for over six years in Colombia and taught in the pohtical science departments 
at two of the leading umversibes in Bogota. During this time, I conducted research supported fu-st by a 
Fulbright Scholarship and later by an individual research grant &om the Harry Frank Guggenheim 
Foundation. In the United States, I have taught and directed the Latin American Studies Programs at 
Columbia Umversity and Johns Hopkins Umversity. Currently, I teach at Georgetown Umversity where 1 
have founded a program specifically geared towards the study of pohtical, envuonmental and social 
conflict in the Andean and Amazonian regions. Because of my background and interests, much of our 
work is related to the social and pohtical conflict at the national and local levels m the Republic of 
Colombia. 

I view with great concern the proposal to sell Blackhawk helicopters to Colombia. The move represents a 
step backwards in U.S. anti-drug efforts in the region. After initially engaging the Colombian military m 
the nation's drug war in the late 1980s, the Uruted States eventually began to reduce its support of the 
rrulitary and to emphasize the role of other other instituitonal actors, such as the police and judiciary. By 
1995, U.S. rmlitary aid to Colombia was largely eliminated reflectmg concerns about human rights, 
military corruption and the Colombian military's priority in fighting a counter-insurgency war against the 
oldest insurgency movement in the hemisphere. Sclhng Blackhawks now threatens to re-mihtarize the 
drug war as well as to draw the U.S. into an unwanted counter-insurgency war. 

Prior to 1989. the U.S. had only a minor military presence in Colombia. After 1989, when drug 
traffickers assassinated the leading Colombian presidential candidate, Luis Carlos Galan. an early and 
outspoken adversary of the rismg narco-corruption and narco-tenonsm, the United States moved rapidly 
to jump-start Colombia's drug war and to bolster the Colombian military The day after the assassination, 
President Bush announced a S65 million dollar gift of stockpiled Defense Department supplies and 
weapons to Colombia- Just a month earlier, the US Export-Import Bank had authorized a $200 million 
line of credit to the Colombian military Congress approved this loan as part of its broader offensive 
against drug trafficking Three weeks after the a-ssassination of Galan, on September 5, 1989, President 
Bush on national television called for an additional $261 miUion for the drug war to be divided among 
Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. (Approximately $232 million in military, law enforcement and economic 
and was actually spent in FY1990 ) At Cartagena. Colombia, on February 1 5, 1990 President Bush 



47 



called for an ncrcase in that figure to $430 million in anti-narcotics aid. The sums were revealing By 
1989, the Andean region had surpassed Central America as the leading recipient of military aid m the 
hemisphere. As the anti-Communist wars died down or were settled through international mediation and 
peace agreements, the Andean region emerged as the major hcmisphenc battlefield in the post-cold war 
world. The Southern Command, based in Panama , was transformed into a frontline outpost in post-cold 
war security environment. AIL military aid to the Andean region now had to be authorized within the 
fi-amcwork of U.S. anti-aarcotics policy. 

At the time, many observers —including myself — expressed concern over the new military programs 
Andean militaries, particularly in Colombia and Peru, were engaged in major counter-insurgency 
operations. From the beginning, it was evident that the Colombian and Peruvian Armed Forces welcomed 
the new military aid However, at the same tune, they showed little desire to pursue the U.S. version of a 
"drug wai" consistmg of crop eradication and poUcc activity against criminal leaders and syndicates, or to 
use the drug war vernacular, "drug lords and cartels." Moreover, Andean militanes understood 
immediately the contradictions of counter-insurgency and anti-narcotics policy. Eradicating coca plants 
(a traditional Andean and Amazoman crop) and destroying the livelihood of small peasant farmers would 
only encourage cooperation between the farmers and guerrillas who were prepared to provide security 
and protection. In Peru, the counter-narcotics offensive aided the consolidation of support for Sendero 
Luminoso and the MRTA, particularly m the Upper Huailaga River valley. In Colombia, the eradication 
programs drove the farmers into the arms of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia FARC, the 
oldest guerrilla insurgency in the Western Hemisphere with strong ties to mauy of the regions that 
produce coca and opium poppies. 

Moreover, additional concerns that the new military programs in the Andes placed the United States on 
the side of militaries with some of the worst human rights records m the world, were expressed by 
members of Congress, the Executive branch and independent analysts In 1989 and 1990, Peru led the 
world in "'disappearances.'" Smce 1990 in Colombia, about ten persons a day (or over 3000 a year) have 
died as a result of "political violence", including assassinations and disappearances by the Armed Forces, 
the para-military squads (many with ties to the Armed Forces) or the guerrillas. 

Second, there was growing concern that the United States . was backing into a counter-insurgency war 
when the stated mandate , as articulated by Congress, was to fight drug-trafficldng In 1992 and 1993, 
the GAO audited drug war expenditures in Colombia and expressly raised their concern that counter- 
neircotics funds were being used illegally for counter-insurgency operations. 

Some have tried to obfuscate this issue by collapsmg the two issues into one, saying that the guerrillas 
work with the drug traffickers and therefore arc effectively "narco-guemllas" However this is a gross 
distortion of the situation in Colombia The guerrillas do not constitute another "Cartel " Their role in the 
drug trade is in extorting a percentage of the commercial transaction of coca and coca paste, just as they 
do with many other commercial products in the areas in which they operate , be it cattle, {jctrolcum or 
coffee. The evidence does not warrant the entrance of the United States into a counter-insurgency war in 
order to fight a counter-narcotics war. Keep the issues separate. 

Nevertheless, the debate that was generated around the Andean drug wars had some effect Partially as a 
result of the GAO reports, the lobbying of NGOs, concerned citizens and human rights groups m 



48 



Colombia and the United States, U.S. drug policy apparently shifted In 1992, the DEA and State 
Department began to de-emphasize crop eradication and concentrated more efforts on attacking the 
Cartels directly. This was often referred to as the "kingpin strategy." The philosophy was that attacking 
cocaine production at its primary level — the coca grower — was counter-productive and involved 
alienating hundreds of thousands of fanners with few other economic options. .Moreover, there was no 
evidence that the strategy worked. The flow of cocaine to the United States has remained steady; indeed 
prices have steadily fallen, representing an oversupply. At best, after major crackdowns, there have been 
some fluctuations in the price. These however, have been in all cases shortlived. 

The new "kingpin strategy" attempted to avoid some of these hazards. It emphasized the police over the 
military, and involved tracking down major criminal figures who were strategically placed between coca 
growers and middlemen or one side, and transporters, wholesalers, retailers and consumer s on the other 
The kingpins were the bottleneck through which the other extensive ilbcit activities had to flow through 

This approach led to the massive, and succcssfiil campaign against the Medellin Cartel. However, this 
too, did not lead to an interruption in drug supplies to the United States. The Cali Cartel quickly 
emerged to fill the vacuum, and other smaller Cartels readjusted their businesses. Clearly, the drug war 
strategics needed to be re-conceived. However, as anti-narcotics strategy evolved, there was one 
welcome development TTie United States reduced and by 1995 eliminated most aid to the Colombian 
military. The eflfect has been to prevent the U.S. from being dragged into Colombia's counter-insurgency 



What concerns me now is that the proposal to sell Blackhawk helicopters to Colombia will open the door 
to a renewed U.S. involvement with the Colombian military and its counter-insurgency campaign 
Moreover, the sale represents a return to a dangerous policy of going after the small coca farmers in 
Colombia's Amazonian region. The limited results of the "kingpin strategy" should not lead the US or 
Colombia to return to the failed strategy of repressing coca growers. Already, we have seen the 
consequences of this Ul-advised resurrection of policy: In August and September, 200,000 farmers in the 
major coca growing regions of Caqucta, Putumayo and Guaviare staged major protests and strikes 
This is not the work of a feckless guerrilla movement. These are ordinary farmers (knowingly engaged in 
the cultivation of an illicit crop for commercial export) who are acting rationally to what they view as a 
destruction of their means of make a living. Few other crops grow in the fragile eco-systcm which is the 
.Amazonian Basin. Moreover, these are areas with little or no pubUc infrastructure Settlements have 
been made along rivers, and coca and coca paste has been transported from private airstrips. These 
fanners do have a relationship with the guerrillas, who often represent the only source of authority in 
these remote areas with little or no state presence. The guerrillas, for their part, are more than willmg to 
exploit the farmers' predicament. 

The sale of the Blackhawk helicopters to the Colombian military is designed to fight the guerrillas to clear 
the way for the destriKtion of coca crops. This is flawed policy. 

Equally grave, it opens the door to re- militarizing the drug war and again placing the United States on the 
side of a military whose human rights record remains among the worst in the world and which contmue to 
dra>v outrage from the international community. And once again, it potentially opens the door to 
escalated U.S. involvement in one of the most protracted insurgent conflict in the world. 



49 



A final note. U.S. relations with Colombia, traditionally a strong and close ally, arc at their lowest level 
since the days of Teddy Roosevelt and Colombia's loss of the province of Panaitia. The U.S. 
decertification of Colombia, its questioning of Colombia's democratic institutions, its withdrawal of 
support and denying a visa to the Colombia President, Ernesto Samper, have created a profound political 
crisis in Colombia. President Samper was seriously weakened as a result of US policies and the parallel 
political crisis within the country. However, he was not removed from office or persuaded to resign. The 
result is that Samper is left with two more years in ofQce, yet he has been reduced to a figurehead with 
very little authority. The result is a vacuum of power at the highest levels of the State. Given this 
situation, many political sectors and actors arc taking advantage of the president's weakened condition. 
First and foremost are the Colombian military and their allies. When President Samper sent negotiators to 
speak with the protesting coca farmers, the military reftiscd to cooperate or cease activities. At the level 
of state institutions and the rule of law, dozens of senators have introduced legislation that would reform 
the 1991 Constitution and weaken civilian control over the military. These are disturbing trends and 
represent a reversal of a decade of reformism in civil-military relations in Colombia. Since the mid- 
1980s, a succession of Colombian presidents had slowly, but surely begun to exercise civilian control 
over the Armed Forces in an attempt to limit the worst abuses of official power. Reforms involved 
dismantling para-military groups, naming a civilian National Security Advisor and eventually appointing 
a civilian as Minister of Defense. The effects of these reforms are now threatened. This may be the most 
disturbing element of the Colombian political crisis. 

As the United States rc-assesses its policies towards Colombia, it should not make the mistake of 
appearing to side with the military in the internal power struggles inside Colombia. Further, it should not 
rc-open the closed door of using the military in the drug war. If there is one lesson that has been learned 
in the Andean drug wars of the last decade , it is the following: 'T)eploying the military in the drug war 
can only lead to a corrupt military and to major abuses against the civilian population." In the tinderbox 
which is Colombian politics today, selling the Black Hawk hehcopters sends the wrong signal and 
potentially paves the way for a return to the worst excesses of the initial stages of the drugs wars. 

Thank you. 

Washington. DC, October 10, 1996. 



50 




51 




52 




1 . Committee staff examine destroyed Turbo Thrush eradication plane f!ov.n by the 
Colombian National Police for coca and opium poppy reduction in San Jose del Gua\ iare in 
southeast Colombia. 



53 




2. Removing dead Colombian Army personnel from our excess Hueys, just one day after 
battle when 19 members of the 2nd Mobile Brigade were killed by FARC guerillas while on 
countemarcotics missions near San Jose del Guaviare in southeast Colombia. 



54 




3. Removing dead Colombian Army personnel from our excess Hueys, just one day after 
battle when 19 members of the 2nd Mobile Brigade were killed by FARC guerillas while on 
counternarcotics missions near San Jose del Guaviare in southeast Colombia. 



55 




4. Removing dead Colombian Army personnel from excess our Hueys, just one day after 
battle when 19 members of the 2nd Mobile Brigade were killed by FARC guerillas while on 
countemarcotics missions near San Jose del Guaviare in southeast Colombia. 



56 




5. Committee staff visit grounded (over one year) DC-3 of Colombian National Police used 
to move troops, fuel, and herbicide to the forward positions to battle the narco-guerillas. El 
Dorado Airport, Bogota. 



57 

REUTERS 



Tuesday September 3 2:13 PM EDT 

DEA: Sharp Increase in Colombian Heroin 

WASHINGTON (Reuter) - Colombian heroin has become a major threat with 62 percent of all heroin 
seized in the United States last year originating in South America, the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration said Tuesday. 

"Independent Colombian traffickers have moved into heroin and this is no accident. It's a shrewd 
marketing decision made to capitalize on the increased profits that can be derived from heroin 
trafficking," DEA chief TTiomas Constantine said. 

Right now they are positioning themselves to be central players in the Western Hemisphere heroin 
market by the year 2000. They control cocaine and they are looking to control heroin," he said in a 
statement. 

In 1 989, nearly all of the heroin seized in the United States came from Southeast or Southwest Asia, the 
agency said. But by 1993, heroin from South America, mainly Colombia, accoimted for 15 percent of all 
domestic seizures, which increased to 32 percent in 1994 and kept surging in 1995. 

The DEA said the availability of high-purity South American heroin had led to more overdoses and 
deaths in the northeast United States. It also said heroin consumption nationwide had been rising. 

Heroin has become more affordable and more glamorous. We are seeing more people snorting heroin 
or using heroin coupled with crack or other forms of cocaine," Constantine said. "Today we are seeing 
1 1 th and 1 2th graders turning to heroin." 

DEA investigators have found a sharp rise in the number of Colombian couriers who have been arrested 
between 1 99 1 and 1 995 for attempting to smuggle heroin into the United States. 

Constantine said the agency planned to spend more than $ 1 1 million over the next two years for 
domestic heroin enforcement and additional amounts intemationally to fight heroin trafficking. 



58 



BOGOTA x63^-i 



Page 1 of 2 



UNCLAS BOGOTA 163 54 

CLANOl: 

ACTION: NAS 

INFO: AMB MILG OPM DEA POLII DAO P/E DCM 
Lasers : 

INFO : TAT 



DISSEMINATION: NAS3 
CHARGE : PROG 









> 



APPROVED: NAS: VABEYTA 

DRAFTED: NAS: CRODRIGUEZ "^>'' ;*^ 

CLEARED: MIL: FCORTES NAS : JCROW -i I] 

VZCZCBOI202 

RR RUVAFMC RUEAHQA RUEHC RHLBAAA RUEKJCS 

DE RUEHBO #6354 3542321 

ZNR UUUUU ZZH 

R 202321Z DEC 95 

FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 

TO RUVAFMC/AFSAC WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB//GBK/GBKS// 

RUEAHQA/SAF WASHINGTON DC//IAL// 

INFO RUEHC / SECSTATE wa.qHnr/ /TNT./ PM/awa /AND/ / 53 73 

RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//SCJ5-SA/SCJ4// 

RUEKJCS /SECDEF WASHDC//DSAA-OPS-MA// 

BT 

UNCLAS BOGOTA 0163 54 

SUBJECT: LETTER OF REQUEST FOR CNP DC -3 REPAIR 

REP: CNP/DIPON-DIRAN LETTER 18 DEC 95 

1. REFERENCE LETTER IS A SOLE SOURCE REQUEST FOR THE 
REPAIR OF THE CNP DC-3 SERIAL NUMBER 211. AN 
UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF THE LETTER FOLLOWS: 

"MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE 
NATIONAL POLICE 
DIRECTORATE GENERAL 

SANTAFE DE BOGOTA D.C. 

DIPON-DIRAN 18 DECEMBER 1995 

SUBJECT: REQUEST 

TO: MR. VICTOR ABEYTA 
DIRECTOR 

NARCOTICS AFFAIRS SECTION 
US EMBASSY BOGOTA 

AIRCRAFT DC-3 TP, SERIAL NUMBER 211, IS GROUNDED, 
HAVING SUFFERED MAJOR DAMAGE WHILE PERFORMING A 
COUNTERNARCOTICS MISSION IN GUAVIARE DEPARTMENT, 

CLAS BOGOTA 163 54 Page 1 of 2 



59 



BOGOTA ^6i- . 

Page 2 of 2 



REPAIRS ARE NEEDED URGENTLY. WE REQUEST THE REPAIR 
WORK FOR THIS ACFT BE DONE USING THE FMS SYSTEM WITH 
SOLE SOURCE TO BASLER TURBO CONVERSION INC. OSHKOSH 
WISCONSIN. THIS COMPANY PERFORMED THE ORIGINAL 
MODIFICATION OF THE ACFT AND HAS THE NECESSARY .x, 
INFRASTRUCTURE TO RESTORE THE AIRPLANE. ^=. 

THE FOLLOWING REPAIRS ARE NECESSARY: ''' 

1 . REPLACEMENT OF LEFT WING WITH ONE HAVING THE SAME 
CONFIGURATION AS THE ORIGINAL MODIFICATION. 

2. REPLACEMENT OF LEFT MAIN LANDING GEAR. 

3. LEFT CENTER WING REPAIR. 

4 . REPAIR OR REPLACE OF ALL COMPONENTS DAMAGED DURING 
THE ACCIDENT, INCLUDING THOSE THAT WERE NOT POSSIBLE 
TO IDENTIFY DURING THE VISUAL INSPECTION. 

A BASLER FLIGHT CREW WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR FERRYING 
THE ACFT TO BASLER' S REPAIR FACILITIES IN OSHKOSH 
WISCONSIN. 

THE CNP WILL TURN IN THE ACFT IN FLYABLE CONDITION AND 
MEETING SAFETY OF FLIGHT REQUIREMENTS. 

REQUEST EXPEDITIOUS HANDLING OF THIS REPAIR SINCE THE 
AVAILABILITY OF THIS ACFT IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO 
FULFILLMENT OF COUNTERNARCOTICS MISSIONS. 

SINCERELY, 

SIGNED 

GENERAL ROSSO JOSE SERRANO CADENA 

GENERAL DIRECTOR NATIONAL POLICE" 

2 . NAS AND USMILGP CONCUR WITH THE SOLE SOURCE 
REQUEST FOR BASLER TURBO CONVERSION INC. THIS WILL 
MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF THE PROGRAM SINCE IDENTICAL 
STANDARD ITEMS USED IN THE BASIC CONVERSION WILL BE 
USED FOR THE REPAIR. 

3. REQUEST FORMAL PRICE AND AVAILABILITY (P&A) IN THE 
FORM OF A LETTER OF OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE (LOA) BE 
PROVIDED AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME. THE ESTIMATED 
CASE VALUE SHOULD NOT EXCEED $500K, INCLUDING A SPARE 
PARTS LINE. 

4. TERMS: CASH, INL FUNDS, COUNTERNARCOTICS STATEMENT 
APPLIES 

5. NAS POC IS MR. JOHN CROW, 571-315-0811 EXT. 2588. 
MILGP POC IS MAJ FRANK CORTES, COMM. 571-221-6870. 
FRECHETTE 

BT 

#6354 

NNNN 



BOGOTA 16354 Page 2 of 2 



60 



UNL'IiAS BOGOTA , 1 5 6 

Page 1 of 2 



UNCLAS BOGOTA 07156 

CLANOl . 

ACTION: NAS 

INFO: DAO AMB P/E DCM DEA POLII 0PM 
Lasers : 

INFO: TAT 

SISSEMTNA'J'XON: NASi 
CHANGE : PROG 

APPROVED: NAS:VABEYTA 
DRAFTED: NAS:VABEYTA 
CLEARSC : NONE 

V2CZCBOI255 

OO RITEHC RUDGSTJ 

DE RUliHBO #715b 2071800 

ZNR UUUUU ZZH 

251800Z JUL 96 

m AMLMBASSY BOGOTA 

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMroiATE 056 9 

INFO RUDGSTD/DOSAIRWING PATRICK AFB FI. 

BT 

ONCLAS BOGOTA 7156 

STATE FOR INL 

E.O. 12S'58: N/A 

TAGS : SNAR , CO 

SUBJECT: REPAIRS TO COLOMBIAN NATIONAJ. POLICE TURBO DC-3 

REF: RYAN/ABEYTA TELECONS 

1. ONE OF THE TWO BASLER TURBO DC-3'S IN THE CNP INVENTORY WAS 
HEAVILY DAMAGED IN AUGUST 1995 WHEN IT EFFECTED A HARD LANLUNG ON 
A CLANDESTINE AIRSTRIP CLOSE TO MIRAFLORES , GUAVIARE. THE PLANE 
WAS ON A RESCUE MISSION OF ANT I -NARCOTICS POLICE STRANDED AND UNDER 
HEAVY ATTACK AT MIRAFLORES. THE AIRCRAFT'S LEFT LANDING GEAR AND 
WING WERE SEVERELY DAMAGED. THE WINGS CONTAIN FUEL CELLS INSTALLED 
BY BASLER, THE COMPANY THAT CONVERTS THIS TYl'E OF AIRCRAFT. 

2. CNP MAINTENANCE CREWS WERE. ABLE TO PERFORM EMERGENCY REPAIRS ON 
SITE. PERMUTING THE AIRCRAFT SAFE DEPARTURE AND LANDING AT EL 
DORADO IN BOGOTA. THE DC-3 MAINTENANCE CREM BEGAN TEMPORARY 
REPAIRS ALMOST IMMEulATELY. WE HOPED TO HAVE THE AIRCAFT AIRWORTHY 
BEFORE THE END OF 1995 SO IT COULD BE SENT TO BASLER AT OSKOSH. 
WISCONSIN FOR FINAL REPAIR. HOWEVER, SECURING A WING PROVED A 
MAJOR PROBLEM. TO MAKE THE AIRCRAFT AIRWORTHY, THE CNP FINALLY 
SECTTRlD a WING FROM THE COLOMBIAN AIR FORCE. HOWEVER, THE WING 
DOES NOT CONTAIN THE FUEL CELLS WHICH ARE CUSTOM DESIGNED BY 
BASLF.K. 

3. NAS/CNP OPENED AN FMS CASE WITH FMFP FUNDS FOR THE REPAIR OF 
THE AIRCRAFT. REGRETTABLY, HOWEVER, THE CASE WAS CAUGHT ttp tm 



61 



UNCLAS BOGOTA 0,156 

Paga 2 of 2 

DECERTIFICATION. AT THIS STAGE WE WOULD LIKE TO PROCEED IN THE 
FINAL REPAIRS. WHICH ONLY BASLER CAN ACCOMPLISH, IN ONE OF THREE 
WAYS: (1) SECUPE RELEASE OF THE FMS CASE, (2) ALLOW US TO OPEN A 
NEW CASH FMS CASE FROM PROGRAM FUNDS, OR (3! PERMIT A TASK ORDER 
THROUGH DYNCORP USING OUR ESTABLISHED CONTRACTING MECHANISM AS SET 
UP BY JOHN STEVER. 

4. TllE CMP HAS A CRUSHING AND PARAMOUN T NEED TO PUT THIS AIRCRAFT 

BACV INTO THE PROaRArnf^^WSffi^WSTOEJT THE NEED IS 

PARTICULARLY ACUTE AT THIS TIME AS WE EXPAND THE ERADICATION 

PROGRAM TC SOUTHEASTERN COLOMBIA. THE REPAIRS SHOULD BE SOLE 

SOURCE SINCE THE AIRCRAFT WAS MODIFIED BY THE BASLER CORP TO MEET 

SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS. TOTAL COST, AS ESTIMATED BY BASLER, IS 

APPROXIMATELY USD 175 THOUSAND. 

GARZA 

BT 

#7156 

NNITO 



36-261 96-3 



62 



\ 



'l^ 



r r 



i^fMAIfMy 




onot 2i»' 



r 



\j\JUi 




hf 




63 

CONTENIDO 
COLOMBIA 

DATOS YCIFRAS - 2 

CAPITULO 1 

GRUPOS NARCO-TERRORISTAS (CARTEL DE L^S FARC) 5 

CAPITULO 2 

FINANZAS DE LA GUERRILLA 16 

CAPITULO 3 

PROGRAAM AGRARIO DE LAS FARC 51 

CAPITULO 4 

INFRACCIONESAL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL HUAMNITARIO 59 

COMETIDAS POR LOS GRUPOS NARCO-TERRORISTAS 

CAPITULO 5 

RESULTADOS OPERACIONALES EN APLICACION DEL PLAN 80 

ANTI-NARCOTICOS CONDOR 

CONTENT 
COLOMBIA 

DATA AND NUMBER 2 



iXc 



CHAPTER 1 

ARCO-TERRORIST GROUPS (THE FARC CARTEL) 5 



CHAPTER 2 

GUERRILLA FINANCIAL INFORMATION 16 

^CHAPTER 3 

THE FARC AGRARIAN PROGRAM ._ __.. 51 

CHAPTER 4 

OFFENCES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW{IHL) 59 

COMMITTED BY THE NARCO-TERRORIST GROUPS 

CHAPTER 5 

OPERATION RESULTS IN THE APLICATION OF THE 80 

ANTI-NARCOTICS CONDOR PLAN 



64 



CAPiTULO 1 



GRUPOS NARCO-TERRORISTAS 
(CARTEL DE LAS FARC) 



CHAPTER 1 



NARCO-TERRORIST GROUPS 
(THE FARC CARTEL) 



65 



COI.OMIilA 



INFORMACION NARCOTRAFICO 

1. NARCO-TERRORISMO 
(CARTEL DE LAS FARC) 



INFORMATION ABOUT DRUG 
TRAFFIC 

1. NARCO-TERRORISM GROUPS 
(THE FARC CARTEL) 



Aunque se liacia evideiite desde tiem- 
po atras que los vincuios entre la sub- 
version y el iiarcotrafico eran un he- 
cho, es en 1982, cuando se produce el primer 
documento escrito por las FARC (Fuerzas Ar- 
madas Revolucionarias Comunistas) que mencio- 
na el tema Este documento corresponde a la Sep- 
tima Conferencia Nacional Guerrillera. en ella se 
da como concepto frente al problema del 
narcotrafico que las ciiadiillas (organizaciones 
guerrilleras de 1 00 miembros aproximadamente), 
deberian "mantener un equilibrio entre la produc- 
cion de coca y cultivos de economia fawiliar" y 
realizar un especial trabajo de masas con los cul- 
tivadores de hoja de coca con el proposito de 
ganarios para la revolucion 

El equilibrio de produccion, no obedecia a 
la preocupacion de las FARC por el costo de la 
canasta familiar de los campesinos cultivadores 
de hoja de coca, quienes dada la confianza en la 
comercializacion del producto, sus buenos pre- 
cios, etc habian dejado casi totalmente los culti- 
vos tradicionales dandose el caso que en muchos 
sectores de los territories nacionales la yuca, el 
platano y ademas productos de consumo regio- 
nal que anteriormente se cultivaban en todas las 
flncas, se traian ahora por avion desde el interior 
del pais. 

Esta situacion representaba un problema a 
la organizacion guerrillera especialmente cuan- 
do concentraba un gran numero de hombres 

Son muchos los casos en los que se presen- 
taron combates entre el Ejercito y grupos arma- 
dos, principalmente de las FARC, dedicados a 



Although the obvious link between 
subversive groups and drug traffic was 
factually evident from a long time ago, 
the first document produced by the FARC (stan- 
ding for Communist Revolutionary Armed 
Forces) which mentions this subject openlv came 
into the light in 1982 This document was 
elaborated during the Seventh National Guerrilla 
Conference and it contains the guiding principles 
assumed by the ciiaJiillas (guerrilla squads 
conformed by approximately one hundred 
combatants) in front of the drug traffic issue, the 
ciiaJiil/as are ordered to "preserve the balance 
between the production of cocaine and the t'c«- 
iiomia fami/iai {famWy consumption) crops" and 
carry out a special indoctrination work among 
cocaine-leaf raisers to have them on the side of 
the revolution 

Such a concern about the balance in the 
products cultivated was not originated in the 
FARC's interest to protect the peasants' economy. 
The starting end of the string was the trend among 
the countrymen to nearly abandon the production 
of traditional crops to produce cocaine leaf 
because of their great confidence in the easy 
marketing of the product, the good prices they 
used to get, and some other advantages which 
made that some food items -yucca, p/dtano, etc- 
and other consumption goods which once used 
to be produced locally -in the regions which were 
known as los lenitorio.s iKicioiui/e.s {WievaWy, the 
national territories, i.e.. the farthest territories 
from the see of the Central Government) were to 
be brought by airplane from the central regions 
of the country 



66 






defender laboratorios de narcotiaficantcs tslos 
les pagaban el impuesto acordado. mientras que 
los pequcnos cullivadorcs y comerciantes esta- 
ban obligados a cancelar cl llamado gramaje, can- 
tidad de dinero que deben aportar por cada gra- 
nio de coca c|ue se produzca Los cabecillas de 
las cuadrillas de las FARC no se contentaron con 
ios dineros que recibian por este concepto y de- 
ciden entrar en el negocio de la dioga y es asi 
como Jacobo Arenas (lider ideologico de esa or- 
ganizacion, ya fallecido), ordena robar a los 
narcotraficantes, en uno de los casos una cuadri- 
lla de las FARC roba mas de 200 kilos de coca a 
Carlos Leder (caso que Leder menciono en una 
entrevista televisada por un noticiero nacional) 

En los mapas Nos 1 - 2 - 3 y 4 podemos 
apreciar la coincidencia existente entre las zonas 
con cultivos ilicitos y la ubicacion de los grupos 
narco-subversivos 

El diario "El Mercurio". de Santiago de 
Chile, en su edicion del domingo 25 de febrero 
de 1996, publica un articulo del senor Miguel 
Posada -director del Centro de Analisis 
Sociopoliticos-; que se refiere a la alianza exis- 
tente entre el narcotrafico y los grupos terroris- 
tas. 



Such a trend posed a big problem for the 
ucriilla organization because a great number of 
men were concentrated in the coca leaf 
production labor 

A significant number of combats between 
the army troops and illegally armed groups, mainly 
the FARC squads, has involved guerrilla units 
whose main task is to protect and defend 
laboratories belonging to diverse kinds of drug 
tratfickers who pay a jireviously fixed tax to the 
guerrillas Petty raisers and traffickers have to 
pay the so-called f^ciimiic - a given amount of 
money paid per each gram of cocaine produced- 
I'he FARC squad heads were not fully satisfied 
by the money they obtained this way, so they made 
up their mind to take on the drug business by 
themselves and Jacobo Arenas (ideological leader 
of the organization) sent orders to steal the 
merchandise from the traffickers Thus, in only 
one case reported, a FARC squad took over two 
hundred kilograms coke from Carlos Leder 
Leder himself spoke about the incident in a 
television interview for a news program 

On maps 1-2-3 and 4 we can appreciate 
the existence with in the zones the culture of illicit 
drugs and the different locations of narco-guerri- 
lla groups 

The daily newspaper "El Mercurio" from 
Santiago Chile, in their edition of 25 february 
1996, published an article fiom Mr Miguel Po- 
sada, Director for Center for Analysis on Social - 
Politics, in which he referenced the alliance 
between the narco-traffickers and the terrorist 
groups 



67 



CAPITULO 2 



FINANZAS DE LA GUERRILLA 



CHAPTER 2 



GUERRILLA FINANCIAL 
INFORMATION 



68 



2. FINANZAS DE LA GUERRILLA 



COI.OMblA n 



2. GUERRILLA FINANCIAL 
INFORMATION 



Eslos documentos, alguiios escritos a 
maquina, otros en coniputador y 
otros tantos manuscritos son prue- 
bas de irrefutable valor que muestran como las 
FARC se ban convertido en un CARTEL 

Se observa alii que se dedicaron no solo 
como en los primeros tiempos a cobrar el gramaje 
y el impuesto por seguridad a laboratorios, sino 
que poseen sus propias zonas de cullivos de hoja 
de coca, sus cocinas de procesamientos, sus la- 
boratorios de purificacion, sus pistas y la 
comercializacion en el exterior 

Hn septiembre de 1995 en el balance de la 
reunion plenaria del estado mayor del bloque sur. 
reunion a la que asistieron los cabecillas de las 
cuadrillas 2, 3. 13. 14. 15. 49 y 61, las cuales 
delinquen en Caqueta. Huila y Putamayo, emiten 
ordenes a sus secuaces, las que incluyen "se co- 
brara por kilo de base $ 25 000 y de cristal $ 
3 5 000 ( hace 1 anos se viene cobrando $ 5 000 
menos y la devaluacion sigue creciendo)" ( Anexo 
No 1 ) En cumplimiento de esto transmiten a las 
cuadrillas sus "planes financieros" que no son otra 
cosa que las instrucciones por escrito a un grupo 
de bandidos para que reunan dineros con destino 
a la organizacion delictiva mediante la coordina- 
cion con los mafiosos, los duenos de laborato- 
rios, comisionistas (recolectores de pasta de coca 
que trabajan por comision a los duerios de los 
laboratorios), cultivadores de coca, ganaderos, 
comerciantes y toda aquella persona o entidad 
que realice actividades economicas en la region 
Hsta coordinacion establece la cantidad de dine- 
ro que deben aportar por periodo de tiempo o 
cantidad de produccion, el incumplimiento del 
acuerdo a que se llegue da como respuesta de 
las FARC, la pena de muerte 



The documents seized along with this 
material, some of which were 
typewritten, some others computer- 
printed, and even some others handwritten, 
constitute valuable and irrefutable evidence to 
demonstrate that the FARC have really turned 
into a real CARFEL 

These documents let us see the transition 
made from charging the }(iaimiic fee and a safety 
tax on account of the protection given to the 
laboratories in the early period to the owning of 
areas devoted to producing coca leaves, 
processing co(7/;(/s (small laboratories), landing- 
strips, and a net to market the drug abroad 

In September, 1995. in the balance made 
after the plenary meeting of the Southern Block 
Stafl"( Annexed I ). the commanders of the second, 
third, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, forty-ninth, 
and sixty-seventh squads that perform their cri- 
minal acts throughout the territories of the 
Departments of Caqueta, Huila, and Putumayo 
sent orders to their comrades in order to "charge 
$25,000 00 per kilogram cocaine paste and 
$35,000 00 per kilogram cocaine crystal (Starting 
ten years ago, amounts $5,000 oo lower have 
been charged, and the devaluation process goes 
on)" fo make their plans operational, the Staff 
Commanders sent to their squads what they 
considered to be their "financial plans" -a set of 
written instructions for the guerrilla combatants 
to help gather money to support their 
revolutionary cause- by coor-dinating their 
actions with drug mafia members, laboratory 
owners, commission agents (cocaine paste 
collectors who work on a commission basis for 
the laboratory owners), coca leaf raisers, cattle 
raisers, business people and any other person 



69 



■IN -1 (' 



Tomando como ejempio un plan financiero se ve 

El 28 de enero de 1996 la cuadrilla 1 5 Jose 
Ignacio Mora del bloque sur emite un Plan Fi- 
nanciero (Anexo No 2) en el que ordena a 6 de 
sus bandidos, desplazarse por las veredas San An- 
tonio, la Maquina, Union Peneya (Caqueta) co- 
brando $ 25 000 por kilo de base y $ 35 000 por 
kilo de crista!, por pista $ 3 '000 000 y a los pro- 
ductores de coca que pasen de mas de 4 hecta- 
reas se cobrara $ 200 000, es decir ademas del 
"gramaje" una cantidad de dinero adicional que 
debe ser entregada por el uso de las pistas y por 
cada hectarea que sobrepase de las cuatro que ya 
tienen su "impuesto" establecido Informacion 
encontrada en los planes financieros de marzo 
(Anexos 3 y 4) y julio de 1995 (Anexo 5) para 
probar la permanenle actividad desarrollada por 
las FARC en este campo 

Se ha comprobado que el colono que no 
siembra coca es obligado a ello o desplazado del 
area para ubicar en su tierra un militante de la 
organizacion que la siembre, de esta forma ade- 
lantan el llamado "Proyecto Agrario de las FARC" 
(Ver capitulo 3), que se traza como objetivo es- 
pecial Ademas llevan unas planillas de control 
de entradas generales (Anexos 6 y 7), donde 
relacionan la fecha, el numero de cuenta, la per- 
sona que paga el "impuesto", la cual se llama DO- 
NANTE, como DETALLE menciona el "con- 
cepto" el que es generalmente dc coca aunque se 
observa tanibien el llamado de colaboracion que 
no es de otra cosa que el "impuesto" a comer- 
ciantes, tenderos y demas habitantes que no se 
dedican al narcotrafico, asi como el de "Mue- 
lles" el que cobran a los duenos de canoas, lan- 
chas, etc para permitirles circular por los rios 

Una sola comision de estas que cumple el 
"plan financiero" recogio en 4 meses US $ 
1*750.000 dolares como lo muestra la relacion 
de entrada generales del Caguan (Anexo 8) 
En un ano recibirian L'S $ 5'250.000 dolares Esta 



who performs an economic activity in the region. 
The coordination process is useful to fix the 
amount of money to be contributed per time 
period or production yield and to make clear that 
non-fulfillment of the agreement will lead to death 
penalty as the only answer obtainable form the 
FARC 

As an example of a financial plan prepared by a 
guerrilla unit, let us present the following infor- 
mation 

On January 28th, 1996, the Fifteenth Squad 
named after Jose Ignacio Mora and belonging to 
the Southern Block issued a Financial Plan 
(Annexed 2) by means of which six bandits are 
ordered to call on villages {lereJas) San Anto- 
nio, La Maquina, and Union Peneya (in the 
Department of Caqueta) to "charge $25,000 oo 
per kilogram cocaine paste and $35,000 oo per 
kilogram cocaine crystal, $3 '000,000 oo per 
landing-strip, and $200,000 oo to coca leaf raisers 
who have over four hectares In other words, a 
fee difterent from the ^^lamaje shall be paid on 
account of the use of landing-strips and each 
additional hectare over a four-hectare field which 
has already been taxed (See annexed financial 
plans for March (Annexed 3 and 4) and July 
(Annexed 5) to confirm the on-going activities 
carried out by the FARC on a permanent basis 
concerning the issues discussed in this document) 

Additional information has been obtained to 
evidence that those peasant settlers who do not 
raise coca leaves are either obliged to do so or 
expelled from the region to be replaced for by a 
guerrilla helper who will grow the coca crop, thus 
giving way to the so-called "FARC's Agrarian 
Project" (See chapter 3) which constitutes a 
special objective for the organization The gue- 
rrilla units also keep a series of overall income 
control rolls (Annexed 6 and 7) where data such 
as the date, account number, tax payer name -or 
DONOR as they like to say- are recorded The 



70 



coumni.i 



cifra sirve para realizar un calciilo de lo que reci- 
biiia la organizacioii en el transcurso de un ano 

Tomando conio referencia estos ingresos y 
leniendo en cuenta que la niaiirilla 15 contaha 
con dos coniisioncs flnancicras la coinision del 
"Caguan" y la del "15". Multiplicamos poi dos 
la cantidad de dinero que recibe por ano cada 
comision para tener una apreciacion de cuanto 
reciben aproximadamente pot cuadrilla y nos da- 
ria una cifra de I'SS I0"500.000 dolares este di- 
nero corresponde solaniente a! recibido por con- 
cepto de coca sin contar con los secuestros. 
boleteos, extorsiones y los llamados impuestos 
etc El bloque recibiria US$73'500.000 dolares 
y las FARC en total US$ 514'500.000 aproxi- 
madamente (Grafica No I) 

bstas cifras son bastante aproximadas a la 
realidad si se analiza que existen frentes del car- 
tel de las FARC que reciben mucho mas dinero 
como lo son los ubicados en el departamento del 
Guaviare, Vicliada. Guainia y Vaupes 

Un infbrme del "pleiio del estado mayor 

del hloqiie sur"(Anexo 9) realizado en el Ca- 
queta traza coino objelivo obtener mediante re- 
tenciones de caracter economico (secuestros) 
ocho mil doscientos millones de pesos. I'SS 
8*200.000 aproximadamente Ademas mencio- 
na que las cuadrillas 14 y 15 en solo dos activi- 
dades fmancieras obtuvicron US$ 2*016.500, los 
que entregaron a los cabecillas de las FARC y en 
octubre de 1995 tenian US$ r442.000 por en- 
tregar como parte de la cuota de los 4 millones 
de dolares que por fase (periodo de tiempo de 6 
meses) el llamado estado mayor de las FARC les 
habia impuesto 

F.n la agenda manuscrita ( Anexo 1 0) del ca- 
becilla de la cuadrilla 15 (alias Arturo Medina), 
menciona que esta posee entre otios elementos 
de infraestructura 



SIATEMENF iiilbimalion con-tained therein 
usually corresponds to cocaine and, in some other 
cases, lo collaboration, i.e., the tax imposed on 
the traders, stall-kccpcrs, and any other inhabitant 
whose current activity does not have anything lo 
do with drug tiaHic Another piece of information 
-quays- recoids the fees charged on canoe and 
launch proprietors who operate along the rivers 

Only one of the commissions in charge of 
developing the ' rmancial plan" gathered US 
$ I "750,000 00 in a lour month lapse as appearing 
in the Caguan Overall income Roll (Annexed 
8) fhe projection for a whole year indicates that 
this commission would obtain as much as US 
$5"250.000 oo Ihese figures arejust an indicator 
of the amounts of money picked up by the gue- 
rrilla organization during a year 

Based on the figures computed for the 
Fifteenth Squad, which had two financial 
commissions -the Caguan commission and the 
I5tli commission-, that is, multiplying for two 
the amount of money received by each 
commission, we obtain a rough figure of US 
SIO'SOO.OOO 00 per squad which is the money 
picked on account of cocaine production alone 
fhis does not include the money received as 
payments for kidnappings, holctco (compulsory 
contributions demanded by means of written no- 
tes or hok'tas), extortion operations, and luxes, 
etc Allogelhei, the block income sums up to 
US $73^500,000 00 and the FARC reaches a great 
total US S5I'C500,000 00 approximately 
(Graphic No 1 ) 

Ihese figuies are rather rough because ihe 
lARC cartel has many dilferent fronts whose 
incomes differ notoriously Some of them gather 
even more money than the ones analyzed here, 
take for instance the guerrilla units operating in 
the Departments of Guaviare, Vichada, Guainia, 
and Vaupes 

in a report entitled "Plenary to the 
Southern Block SlafT' (Annexed 9) sent from 






71 



03 Pistas 

16 Cocinas (pequenos laboiatorios) 

01 Laboratorio y pista en cl Peru 
(Cocara){ll) 

varias fincas, casas, motosierras y 
guadanadoras, motores fuera de borda y 
deslizadores, computadoras, impiesoras, 
fotocopiadoras etc 

Con este material se ha montado toda eni- 
presa dedicada a las actividades de narcotrafico 
en el Caqueta 

En varias agendas y cuadernos de comuni- 
caciones se encontraron frecuencias de radio que 
Servian para establecer comunicacion entre miem- 
bros de las FARC y el cartel de Cali, asi conio 
telefonos y codigos de beepers para establecer 
coordinaciones de todo tipo (Anexo 12) Se ve- 
rificaron las frecuencias y flieron utilizadas por 
cabecillas de las FARC tales conio alias IVAN 
MARQUEZ, alias USLiRRlAGA e individuos 
desconocidos conio interlocutores desde diferen- 
tes sectores del Valle del Cauca 

En el mes de enero de 19% se intercepto 
una comunicacion entre un abogado del cartel de 
Cali y un desconocido en la que manifestaba que 
el frente 30 de las FARC y los cabecillas del car- 
tel, se unirian para desarroliar actos terroristas 
contra el gobierno (Anexo 13) 

Cn el mes de febrero se realizaron opcra- 
ciones militares en el sur del Huila contra el fren- 
te 13 de las FARC "Cacique La Gaitana" que 
opera en esta region (Anexo 14 - Mapa No 6) y 
alii tambien se encontraron planes financieros, 
como los de la cuadrilla 1 5, que dan fe de la acti- 
vidad que estan desarrollando frente a los culti- 
vos de amopola y el procesamiento del opio 
(Anexo 15 -16), incluyendose la base de coca y 
la amapola en sus claves de comunicaciones 
(Anexo 1 7) En el misnio mes se decomisaron mas 
de 40 toneladas de marihuana de propiedad del 



the Department of Caqueta. the target sum 
proposed to be collected on account of retentions 
with economic purpose (kidnappings) sums up 
to eight thousand and two hundred million pesos 
- US $8'200,000.oo approximately- I'he report 
includes some other information explaining that 
the Fourteenth and Fitleenth Squads obtained US 
$2'01 6,000 oo in two llnancial operations, this 
money was submitted to the FARC Central 
Command By October, 1995. US $1442,000 oo 
more were ready to be sent as a part of the four 
million dollars quota imposed by the FARC Staff 
on these squads to be sent at the end of each 
phase (a six-month lapse) 

In a notebook containing handwritten notes 
(Annexed 10) found to the Commander of the 
Fifteenth Squad (Nicknamed Arturo Mejia), a 
complete description is made of the infrastructure 
elements available in the squad 
03 Landing-strips 
16 ( ocinas (Small laboratories) 
01 Laboratory and landing-strip in Peru 
(Cocara) (Annexed 1 1 ) 
Several farms, houses, power chain saws, 
mowing machines, outboard motors, small 
speedboats, computers, printers, 
photocopying machines, etc 

This material has been used to create a huge 
drug traftlc enterprise based in the Department 
of Caqueta 

Many other notebooks and desk-diaries 
were found to contain radio frequencies used by 
the FARC Cartel members to get in touch with 
the Cali Cartel members Likewise, a long list of 
telephone numbers and beeper codes were written 
there to coordinate different types of actions 
(Annexed 12) Once the liequencies were tested 
and confirmed, there was evidence that they were 
used by FARC Commanders such as IVAN 
MARQUEZ (nickname). USURRIAGA (nick- 
name), and other unknown individuals who spoke 
from different areas in the Valle del Cauca 
Department 



72 



frente 30 de las lARC comprimida y envasada 
en recipicntes metalicos en los que se simulaba 
exportacion de pina para ser enviada a Alemania 

Se ha detectado que el bloque sur ha im- 
pueslo el cultivo de la amapola en 1 8 municipios 
del Muila. destruyendo 18 800 heclareas de bos- 
qiic alto andino tl Fjeicito en el mcs de mai/o 
ha destruido 88 5 hectareas sembradas de 63 5 000 
matas de amapola 

Para las actividades de proteccion de labo- 
ratorios las FARC vienen empleando campos nii- 
nados, tVancotiradores, una excelente red de co- 
municaciones, asi como hostigamientos y 
emboscadas a la fuerza publica y ataque a 
aeronaves, lo que les ha permitido derribar avio- 
nes y helicopteros, todo esto da merito para cali- 
ficar a las FARC como el cartel del narcotrafico 
mas grande, poderoso e importante del pais (Ver 
fotografias anexas) 

Los demas grupos guerrilleros tambien tie- 
nen participacion en estas actividades (|ue les arro- 
jan importantes sumas de dinero como se calcula 
en el cuadro No 2 

Con parte de estos dineros fmancian orga- 
nizaciones encargadas de divulgar sus plantea- 
mientos y realizar un trabajo de manejo de ima- 
gen a nivel internacional como es el caso de 
Mexico y Ginebra 



lOI.OMIilA 19 

In January. 1^)96, a communication was 
intercepted The message sent by an attorney 
repiesenting some people who are members of 
the Cali Cartel to an unknown listener said that 
the I ARC Ihirticlh Front and the heads of the 
Cali Cartel were planning a joint efVort to commit 
terrorist acts against government facilities and 
oHkials (Annexed I 3) 

During the month of lebruary, a number of 
military operations were launched against the 
[•ARC Ihirteenth front -named after ( cicica la 
(jailaiia (a XVIth Century Indian chieO- 
( Annexed 14 -Map No 6) in the southern region 
of the Department ofHuila In the course of these 
actions, several financial plans similar to the ones 
seized from the Fifteenth Squad were found, this 
is a clear proof of the activities that the guerrilla 
organizations are carrying out concerning poppy 
crops and opium processing (Annexed 15-16), 
likewise, a system of communication code keys 
referring to cocaine paste and poppy was seized 
(Annexed 1 7), as well as over 40 tons marihuana 
belonging to the thirtieth FARC Front It is 
worthy remarking that the marihuana seized was 
compressed and packed in metallic containers in 
an eftbrt to disguise the drug load as a pineapple 
shipment to be exported to Germany 

As a result of the operations in the area, it 
has been discovered a measure imposed by the 
FARC Southern Block which obliges peasants to 
cultivate poppy fields in eighteen different 
municipalities in the Department of Huila, this 
has brought along the destruction of 18,800 
hectares of High Andean Forest (18) During 
the month of March, the army destroyed 88 5 
cultivated hectares where 635,000 poppy plants 
were sown 

I he FARC organization uses many diflerent 
mechanisms to protect their laboratories and 
cultivated fields I hey have mined huge land 
strips, they have sharp-shooters corps, they have 
established an excellent communication network. 



73 






they perform surprise attacks on the army, they 
lay ambushes Ibr the armed forces, and lately 
they have even begun attacking aircraft which has 
produced the shooting down of a number of 
ail planes and helicopters Altogether, the 
mformation presented heiein gives us enough 
evidence to declare that the FARC are indeed the 
biggest, most powerful, and most important drug 
Cartel in our country (See annexed photographs). 

The other guerrilla gioups also participate 
in these activities which provides them with large 
sums of moneys as shown in figure nuinber 2 

Which the money obtained these 
organizations finance false organizations in the 
exterior, like Mexico and Switzerland, to obtain 
support for their cause. 



Con parte de estos diueros financian organizaciones 

encargadas de divulgar sus planteamientos 

y realizar un trabajo de manejo de imagen a nivel internacional 

como es el caso de Mexico y Ginebra. 



Which the money obtained these organizations finance 

false organizations in the exterior, like Mexico and Switzerland, 

to obtain support for their cause. 



74 



M ANCI HI I, A 111 



in» III I. lu.nijHi- ;;iiii 



I ' ••""•• ■!' I l-.l-"!" ILiv." .1. I Ml„.| I,,.,. .„„. I,,.; .., ., ,.. ,.„ ,., 

i"i--'^' ' ' ..-.■. I,, .-Ml., ,1,-. : .1,. I., „,,.,>., ,-„„i.,,„, ,., ,,,.„,„ vi..,„,,.,' , ..„;, 

ill- rli'iin I'liiiipHiKii'iiln |Mii Ml-, ii,ii,|.„|i-. 

1.11'». II.Ml..-;. t I,;,, la ll.mi'ia. ,\im-'. ''m,"!!',, "' 

Iir.''"' i.. a 1.1 I ,IHai ,lr Villa (:ai..,ii. I,al 



_ ^^^ ^^^^^ ^^ iliali 

'■•■ '■ ' ■' "■ ■■ ■'■"' ■' ■■'••■i-l.ii.- .1 ■ ..m,..„„a- ,,„l,al,. Pa, a 

•aimailas a las I, ■■» i si ml ,■■; l.iia ami,. ,1 a.i i..iiai |mii,m,„„;<. 

li. Ca.la iiimaiiilu iip.'ialivM , ■ ,a ai .1. |,a, lamralii ill- ml r I i I'.a,, I a cli- n.ml.al.-. 

■' :;::::::' ■ ■-• •■■■■'■ — ■ '•• 



I II lall,, l.aj,, la .In,,. ,..„ .1. ,\, , r |, „ ,, , 

'•'""■" >• !■' inwiiii, I a, man,,- „■ ,,.a,l|,. ,la„a,l„ 



^^^^^^. ^^, ,,..„,,,. „ """ '■'■'"■"'■'■' !■• 

I."iili,a 1,-,,., „. I,,.. ,„,.a.,.,.. ,1.. r 



„!., ,-l lll,„|„,. ■ ' 



|,ii, ,, n,.,s„i ai:ili,lail |,ara rl 



$ 25 000 pesos will be charged for each kilo and S ^5 000 pesos poi cristal We've been charging ; 
5 000 pesos less over the last ten years, but because of inflation the cost is going up 



Anexo l\'o. I 



75 



I .1 . 



niKir/.A;; nrMiAriA;; 



RfilK'r liil in. I:sl<i'i nil. mi c nn 
npcRsorlii, Radio ilp 7 mnfios y . 

1" Consolldai laK rl'iz-T^ '•'^ Snii 

2" Colirnnil.i 2'. .01)0 i'"' '■•II" dp 
pot plsla 1. (100. 000 V .1 I..-: I 
l.is 1 ptrtras, sp cnlii.i ;!oil . 



I1I1.1 pl.itn 1 1.1 rip 



■111.11 1.1!5 pai.l 'IIIP tlMS .ii~ 

ilurlonflr alqunon iii.ililc 



8" Las comiinlcni-l.iiio': ili'l.pn fm 
y hoinitoR pst.ihlp- i ilo!: y I 
•>srrllo PM pl cii.iclpriin iIp i- 

9" Ciimplll PSI I lcl.ini>'r.lp I n.l.in 
FAIir-Ff y l.i.s ilp 111,'in .lir.pns 
SuppllnroR, Nil ilnimil n 

prnnrtas til rllnpm pri -i*^. 



FIRMAN [HDrK: ATTIIRO (IMIINA I FSAK lAUAMI M.O nil.r:il VINAVIPKS 

January 28 IWO 

KHVOL,Llt■|ONAR^ ARMLD I ORC IS Ol (. OLUMBIA I'l Ol'l L.S ARMY - FARC - LP 

15 I RON! JOSL lUNACIOMORA SOLilll lU.OfK 

Financial plan for six units under the command ot'Jainie. Nelsy and Roberluiio Ihey go with side arms, they 
need two meter radios and HF radio, for a three months penod 

lo Consolidate control of the towns of San Antonio, la Mai|uina. I a I 'nion Peneya 

2o Charge $ 25 000 pesos for base kilo and $ 35 000 pesos for crista), \ VOOO 000 pesos for landing strips 

use and the cocaine grower that pass 4 hectares, $ 200 000 pesos for each additional hectare 
.lo A written control of incomes and expenditures will be kept and detailed information must be kept 
4o Consolidate such work with the commissions agents, malia, landing sttis and cocaine producers 

Anexo l\o. 2 



76 



M.'irr-.o ;^'» rie |',i'i5 

FUCilZAS AiUIAlJ/v.'J |{EVOIAI'JlOi]/M!J/\r. nD CCH -iii. ' /■. ):.H;H':riO OijL rUi;BLU FAIIC-EP 
FtlEiTl'L IT' J0:J.K 1(JI:/,C[(J IK'.iA •! I. 'In '■■, .",11.;. 

Plan financioro pnra 6 iinid.-uleR al mr'ti'irj ,]n Vu-j.fr, y Leonar'Io, Rntos - 
nalpn con doctacirtn Oe arma-, o'ln i >nn, i.i.-M.rri.-'.J. l-ir, ir.t i.co, radio d<? comu 
nicaciones, radios de ? nitres y p; '-r.npu'.'rl .• !r>r. r'r.i ;■> '^l '>(; de Junio. 

15 Area do oper:;c.i6n:M.llan, Sanant on in,|,.-i i..-^ pri (i.'<,iiii lYi.i P'-no- a.Continua r 
el trabajo flnanciero rn d1cl\;'r. :rc:<r.. 

2^ Connolldar psto tr.-ib-''Jo do jor. n.';r ior-.T-.o-nir i'>n ir,l nr., y lo de las - 
Pir.tas, cohrando 27> "ill por i-iJo ?'o i-an'- y •'' mil roi- l;ilo de cr'stal 
Hacicndo entcndcv que ar^c U' aHor. von' nor. c-'ivrui'io ■ nil nenos.pero 
que la devaluaci(5n niKuo crrciondo, 

3? A J OR prod'ic' oron dp coca quo pane de 'n.^ir, de 'i ect.afear,,r.ob!'nrle 200- 
mil y a los panadoros que par.c d<> UXi rnc^r, cobrnr colaboracifin de - 
I'XJO por cabeza y OGolorar ot'aa rufnln.'-. cir rjnanciaci6n de personas 
pudientes de la rer,i6n, 

h^ Se llebara una pl< nilia de control de ml r'ad.-ip ,oneralcn, donde cons 
te: Fecha,Donante, IJetalles, Plaza, Hecaudpdor y pstar informando to- 
dos los lunes sobre lo que so aya recaudodo en ese mercado, 

55 Hacer campana de reclutamiento, Pero aplicando las nonnas de recluta 
miento, sacandoles la hoja de vida y precentarla al mando superior y 
este deterrainara. 

6? Haier trabajo de masar, y aol nc i 'mi-'t- pi-ol-l o'iv-t, -ihp ■^ptoii (ientro de 
sus facultades y dejaiKJo consl.acia de lr>r, pnjblcmnr. Rolucionados. 

7- Las coinunicac loM' s doben fmv.ionar ponn-'in'-'nLnrnnntr' y aplrcando las - 
Nonnas establenidas an la carl.ill;', lodn inenr.",)" dpb(> r.er sifrado y 
por escrito y regidtracJo en ''1 cuadr'rnn rip nontrol rip mensajes. 

09 Cumplir estritamente las llor-niar dlr-r. i pHprTi/ir. -ip las Fa.RC-EP Y de - 
la inisma manera apl'car el IIupvo modn dp Uo'^rar, p.r.I cono las do rnas 
disposiciones de los orcanismos suporioipr. como: 'In dnrnir en casas- 
ni en escuelas, no tomar vevidas alcoliolinas, no ;uardar nrendas mi- 
litares en casas de c'vilos, el mando nr pi I'^aponr.'iblo de la educa- 
ci6n y del iuncionrriipnto dp la polul; poi Tl ira. 

99 Este plan es balido asLa cuando '-n nii'io "."nnid^r" cambiarlo o reaju 
starlo. 

Otras Orientacionps seran dadar, v^T-bal'icni ", 



FlRf'IA CMDTS AJ^TUltOMffiDIfJA CKSAi? ,j,>.;/- II 1,1,0 

Anexo No. 3 



77 



MaT-zo ?'i do 10''">, 

Fu:',RZ/iS Ann/. I)/-..; HKVcLucioiiAiiiAr, !>•: coum:'.- ..i,; /.-iiX' "ci, ni,-.ni,u fa"c-kf 23 

BLOUUE SU}{ COMAHUO CunjUIO'O CAJIJLO 'l'OU!!i:Z 

Flan financicro, Fi'.ra 15 uii.ldadcs almntiflc fl»= .'vaco y ,'" camai-adas m5s del 
3 y I't. Eston quGdan con dotaci'^n de rn'oria, p'luipnc, 1 oristica. radios - 
dp comvinlcaci6n y radio dc ? mtrony autori z^-lor, prun ']un se presupuesten 
di.icuerdo a Ion rublos nutorizados ani.a rl ',() dp junin. 

I'? Continuor el trab.ijo financlprn on tod.- 1,- i^rc:^ drl Caruafiw ,Concoli- 
dando dicho trahajo, con Ids diipfior dp lor, 1 ,d)'if'l.fn-io,'-.,lon comicio - 
nictac, control dp pjr.tan y cobr-^rlor. r. lor. r-nt I i h.-^doT-o.^ do coca que 
tengan mftn dc h ptaroas on produce i'^n. 

2? Hay que cobr-'r -''5 mil por kilo d" hnr.n,_:'< t,,,- i [,r^^• i: ; 1 -^ d-- cri.-l.al ,pcr 
picta 3 inillonps y por pct.'ri.a dp cop.i "in 'nil ;,• Mpc-t- r.oncipncin qw 
asc 10 arloG vpiiinior! cohrando 3 mil I'lpno'-,, p'-ro hip 1p dpvaluacifin 
continua creclcndo, 

3° Hay que cuodrrr en lo.i comprc i -■iiLo-. niui i-id r.- y ,}\}ni;nr. 'lo ],in bamba.'- 
de casolina p.nra nue aportpn, peri.od.i r,-inirni " .•■! inolii iniont.o. 

/(" El mando .llob.'irfl una nlanilla dp pnt-f-d.",-, r'onor'' ' '■.'^, dondc CF.tlpulf?: 
FechaG,Donanto,Detallo,-., Flaza,y re caudador y do ^:< micmn manora In- 
formara todos los luncs del total dc pntrad.nn "n cada merc5o, 

5- En la pirji^a pormaneceran C, uii.idador., p.-i-a contr-alrr buelor:,morccncla' 
que lleguon o salgan y Londrrn a cu di .'-.no.'^ ic, i 'n rri'ian y un minado pa- 
ra accionarlo en cl momento que lJ('r;Mpn .•ivioiiT. o plicopteros encmi- 
gos, aterrisar o adafiar la pi.'jta, Entas ^ vmidadci dobsn spr relava- 
cada I'j dias con el misnio personal que interra J a coiiici^n. 

65 La comlci6n financiora aprobpcliara lor, dian o n-.ntor. qup l^r- quede - 
libre para hacpr tribajo de iia.na.n y rnlurionnr- proiilrniat: comunitarlo.'-. 
que esten dentro de cusfacultades y tener conr.t-itu. ia de cada problema 
que se soluclones. 

7- Esplorar otras fucntoG do f in.inci.ici6n,c(>nl .octor; p-'r.a couEonuir armar 
miinici6n,pcploxivos y alpotror; elprncntor; Inf. i .-.t i co.'; y informar al 
mando quidn determinara o oricntar'i oup ba<-pr, 

09 La comJcii?n no orrara psfuorzo.-., prn^.-i ''nlpcl-or lo,-. mornnin non que ten 
Ca el cjorcito dn la recifin y do l.n -nirma m.->nora rio Ion f.rupor, para- 
militares, para osto hay que crear rod-r ''p inJoiTiaci6n con personas 
de suma confianza, 

9° La comici6n financiera, ahasi^ocpra pi t."L'nr, om^ipntio todo asta un- 
citio cercano donde los del taller puoda rpco.pilo r.in dificultad. 

I0?E1 mando bolara por la pducacii^n y comipot-I a;riJcnl:o do lo,--, combatientes 
y el funcionrmiento de la cpIuIi iiolJl. ica, 

lI5Las comunlcaclones dpbon funcionar dircu'-rdo ■• i'^r. r->ro(;ramas estable- 
cidos y aplicando I's norman pr.tablcci dar. i^n la cart 11 la, todo mpnsaje 
debe ser sifrado y reristrado en el cuadorno dp control de mensaje.";. 

I2?Aplicacl(5n de todoc- lar, iloi-mas IHncipl in- r i-ic do Ins n-ARC-iCP y de la 
mieran manora el Mupvo modo dp Opprar, ar.t cono lor, dcnas dicposlclon 
nes de los orr;anJ smor. Rup'-^rioros.Mo dornii- pn '■'•.-. 'S, no tomar vevidas 
alcoholicas, ni .^^uardar prendas o dinrro en car-.a do civilps, 

'J 



" / / J) 

/JlTUUO^MEDin.i p'/WIAu'liEIMI'i; 



FI1U1A CliirrS: / /jaUl((/ MEDJIJ.i FAVIAIJ'iiEIMI'i;/ J/,lMi, VILLAilir^./U, 
Anexo 4 



/ 



78 



24 

Julio 30 de 1995 

FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOLUCIONARI AS DE COLOMBIA EJERCITO DEL PUEBLO 

FARC-EP 

FRENTE XV JOSE IGNACIO MORA DEL BLOQUE SUR 

Plan financiero para 6 unidades al manrlo de Mauricio, Robertulio y 
4 unidades nicis . Estoe salen con toda la dotacl6n de 
guerra, equipos , radio de comunicacion y presupuestados para el 
tiempo que est6n en dicha misi6n. 

15 Consol idaci6n de las plazas de San Antonio, La Maquina, la Uni6n 
Peneya. 

2^ Consolidar dicho trabajo: Con los mafiosos, Comisionistas, 
Pistas, Ganaderos y productores de coca. 

33 Cobrando 25.000 por kilo de base, 35.000 por kilo de cristal, 
por pistas 3.000.000 y a los productores de hoja de coca que 
pase de mSs de 4 ectareas se cobrara por la que sobre pase 
de las 4 de 200.00. 

4Q Se 1 levara una planilla de control de entradas generales y otra 
planilla de sal idas, donde estipula en detalle, todo lo que entra 
y sale con su especif icacion . 

55 Informar todos los lunes de las entradas en cada mercado 
estipulando concepto de que. 

63 Hacer trabajo de reclutamiento, pero aplicando las Normas 

establecidas, sacando las hojas de vida y hacerlas conocer al 
organismo superior, este determinara sobre el caso. 

79 Hacer trabajo de masas, solucionar a! gunos que esten dentro de 
sus facultades, dejando constancia de cada caso solucionado. 

83 Las comunicaciones deben funcionar diacuerdo a los programas y 
horarios establecidos, todo mensaje debe cer cifrado y escrito. 

93 Cumplir estr ictamente las Normas di sci pi inarias de las FARC-EP 
y de la misma manera lae de m&s disposiciories dadas por los 
organismos superiores. 

Otras orientaciones ser&n dadas verbalmente. 



FIRMA CMDT: ARTURO MEDINA 

Anexo No. 5 



79 



FOKRZAS ARMADAS REVOLUC I ONARI AS DE COLOMBIA EJERCITO DEL PUEBLO 

FARC-EP 



FRENTE XV JOSE IGNACIO MORA 
PLANILLA DB CONTROL DE BNTRADAS GENERALES 



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Anexo No. 6 



80 



FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOLUC I ONARI AS DE COLOMBIA EJERCItO DEL POEBLO 

FARC-BP 



FRENTE XV JOSE IGNACIO MORA 
PLANILLA DR CONTROL DB ENTRADAS GBNBRALBS 



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July 23/95 
August 7/95 
August 20/95 

Anexo No. 8 



$230,000 dollars 
$100 400 dollars 
$700,000 dollars 



$950,000 dollars 
$700 000 dollars 



82 






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83 



PLENO DEL ESTADO MAYOR DEL BLOyUE SUR 

Infnrme dn finKincp rio*:pntadf» pot If**; r-rimniuJanf r": lo-Tqiifn Oomez y 
Rol ando Romero { comindontc y r nempl nzant n rerpnct i vnmente ) a 1 
Cuarto Pleno de Tomandantes dnl Ploque Smt d"l pi an pel ftlro 
mllltar . para dos aftos , olaborndo y aprohTjo pr^r nl Fstado 
Mayor de 1 BI oqu" el 23 de julto do IPPI , dR acuerdo con 1 as 
directrices emanadas de La Octava Conferencfa. 

Estdn prppontes todos los comandorit or del Tst-idcj naynf del O!oquf» 

Sur : Joaquin G6moz . Rolando Romoro , Ar 1 nro Hofllna , Fab I An 

Ramlre7. , Ar ley leal . Mar t in Corona llocl*^r Rami rez y Podro 

Martinez . MSs ctmtro Invltados : Rohledo Tercero , Euclldes 49 , 
Arturo Rojas (Tlmanco) y Oscar (palsa). 

En este plono cabe destacar In prosencia del fnmnrndn Mnntiel . la 
que B-Tludamos y ogtamos seguros dard , mucha m.-^s re^rteza y 
realismo al enfoque y elaboracl6n del plan pnM t ico-ml 1 1 tar del 
Bloque Sur, para la conquista de la Nueva Colombia. 

En el plan de dos aAos el Bloque Sur se f i jo las sigulentes 
metas: 

1 - Aumentar en 763 unldades {9'i unidarin«^ por Fi fnte ) ; ronsequl r 

2 78 armas largas (34 f us lies por Frente) ; rreni 80 eel ulas de 
rartldo Clandostlno y 96 mllicfas ; la toma de 26 objetlvos 
mllltares fijos y 9 m*^vlle3 ; hacerle inlollqencia a 10 Ba*^es 
Mllltarea y a 7 puo«itns de Polirla ; conKfniir 71 corre. lores y 
mallzar 18 retenclones do car.^ctor e^onbrnlro , para la 
conseruclGn de 8.200.000.000 mlllones de peso?^ {ocho mil 
dosclentos mlllones de pesos) para las dos fases , de a dos aflos 
cada una 

2- Palanceado el plan de dos aflos se aumonin solamonte on 125 
unldadea Hay que anotar que on Ins i^reas do los Frentes 
Segundo, Tercero y Trece , los I ngresos son escasos ( habrA que 
analizar causae). 

Se recnperaron 113 fusiles . 9 amotral ladoras y tres 
lanzagranadas H-79 (dos de ellos de seis tiros) 

Se const ruyeron 89 c^lulas de Parti do Clandestlno , con 4 45 

mllltantes , donde el Frente 15 time 52 c^lulns con 230 

ml 1 1 tantos. Han sldo creadas 85 tnlllclas con un total de 768 
mlllclanos . 

Fueron tq/nados seis objetlvos militarrs t i Jos : Sal ado Blanco , 
Bol^n y Gabr lol L6poz , por los F rentes Sognndo y Trece . en el 
Hulla ; la Baso MlUtar del Lihano , en "1 rutumayo ; Mll'in y 
Cartagena del ChalrA , en el CaqnetA . Ties omboscndas : una en 
Purac^ (Cauca) por los F rentes Segundo y Trece ; y dos en el rlo 
Putumayo , por los Frentes 32 , 48 y 4T . Tamblen fno dorrlbado 
por el Frente 48 , un helIc6pf-ero do la Pollcfa Ant I natc^t Ico 
Hay que eubrayar , que a pesar de la creacl 6n do 1 as t res 
Compaflias de Combat e , para un total de nuove ol acclonar 
mllltar de los Frentes del Bloque , en el ultimo somestro , con 
cxcepcl6n de los Frentes Sequndo y Trece , fue bastante pobre : 
en el Putumayo s61o hubo la emboscada a las Plraflas y en el 
Caquet^ , la toma' de Hlldn. 



En cuanto a la accl6n de mas^s el Frente 48 1 Mpr6 un 
Importante paro clvlco on el Putumayo , do resonanr-la naclonal ; 
lo que unido a la llberaclOn por el Frente 32 do los llderes 
campesinoB presos, constltuye una gran accl6n pel itlco-mi 1 Itar . 



3-Se hlcleron 10 retenes econ6mlcos, los que aportaron 529 
mlllones (Incluyendo 415 mil d61ares). 



Six Military objectives were taken 

Front 48 arTange(d a nationally important stride in Putumayo which together with the liberation of 
jailed farmer leaders consolidates a great political and military action 

Anexo J^o. 9 



84 



••t 14 Y 15 FrenlPB rnnllz.iron ilti-. ar 1 1 v 1 .Indr--. 


f lll.iiirlorn<; que 


.i J lion S?'016.'->00.000(doK mil dlnz y sel? mlllo 


^^"■. qiilnlentos mil 


pesos). Cod PFto cnnc-clamoa la prlmera faso <lf 


los 4 mflloiie"! de 


d(M.-itPn( SlftOO mlllones) e hlclmos un anticlpo de 


$4 16,500,000 para 


la segunda fasc. 





Lob desertorea Be lian llevado del Bloqiie Siir S 149 ' 340 . 000 . 



.10 



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Tlpnp 633 arir 
y S lanzagran 
Trece y 6 de 



largas, 9 amptral 1 a<ln 
IS M-79 . Armas petdlds 
ros FrenteB . 



; I 1 pn comando 
(31 fusil del 



5- Ha dlctado 6 cursos de psppcl al I d.ides . t^i riifprmprla , 
filmacl6n . propaganda , comtinl car i tin , fnPT7a" p^^ppclales y 
filosofia. Este ultimo fue para miembros de Eslado Mayor (2,3 y 4). 

6- De los Fstados Mayores se encupntran proKoR '. F.lmer 13 y Dlpqo 
32 . Han desprtado Jaime Tercpro (comandanle Frpntp ) , .1os<^ Segundo, 
Javier Trpce (Mufleco) ; Oldpn 3? , nanlpl 49 y rn«;ael ( Frenle 
nuevo. IMuertoe por el enemlgo: Andres Segiindo , Josolo 49 y Ren6 32. 

7-La romunfcaclbn entre lo" Frpntes y la Central del nioqup ha 
mpjorado en un 99% . Rln embargo , a nivpl I nl r>r f rpiiles aim se 
prnseniraii fallas , romo el caso eiilip Ppdro y ntiendla . ruando 
Ppdro pstaba al frente de las compaOIas fin coml).Ttp p Iba para la 
emboscada dp NarlRo : dlez dias sin comunlraclon . Se hace 
necesarlo que los comandantes de Frentes se ejercitpii mAs en la 
t^cnlca del clfrado , ya que algnnos tn.iavla no la manejan como 
debe ser : caso Pedro . Es oportuno tambi^n locoidar a Ins Jpfps dp 
Frente que para camblar de radlsta , se neceslta la autorlzacl6n 
superior . 

8- El Bloqiic tlene una emlsora con todo lo imcPFiatlo para su 
f unclonamlento ; cinco f otocopladoras , siete compiit adores ; sols 
Impresoras , una de ellas a color ; vplntp televisorcs ; dlez y 
selB cdmaras fotogrAflcas y quince fllmadoras Fntrp chapolas, 
hojas volanteB . romunlcados y casolPT . Iia rpprotlucldo 110.950 
Gjemplares , los qtjp han sldo dlstrlbuldos en tofia el Area del 
Bloque Sur «, fundamentalmente en las cabeceras munlclpales . 



9- El Bloque tlene tres tal teres : talabar 
armerla ; los que necpsltan ser separados , re( 
a funclonar en base a planes. 

es. Y se hace 



ptia , snstteila y 
rganlzados y puestos 



10- Se tlenen 20 corredores. Y 
mantenlmlento y darles f unclonal Idad, para evltar fracases como los 
dos acontecldos en el Putum.Tyo, cuando caycron dos cargas de 
explosives y munlrlonea, con destlno a los Frentes Segundo y Trcce, 
en el Hulla; dondp se perdleron en el primer vlnjp 40 g de TNT. 
120 granadas de mano, 16.000 tiros cal. 2,23 y 16.000 ca 1.7, 62 Yen 
el segundq vlajc: 80 de TNT y 14.000 H ros 7,62x39; tambl^n se 
perdl6 un mortero de los Frentes Segundo y Tercero.en la via 
Campoalegte - La Plata. 

ll-Es necesarlo elevar aun mAs la dlsrlplina <le los combatlentes y 
erradicar la rutlna para evltar que el enpmlgo iios golpee 
sobretodo a las comlslones financleras , como ha venldo haclendo en 
los ultlmofl meses: junto 26, cae Sorangela 49, Gllberto y Albelro 
32, de la Comlsl6n Financiers .capturan ahl mlsmo, herldo, a Diego 

The 14th and 1 5th fronts made two financial ventures that earned $2'0 16 500 dollars Withtliis we'll cover the 
first phase of the 4 million dollars and advance them $ 4 16'5000 000 for second phase 

Actually the block has to turn in $ I 442 million (including the 535 million given by Pedro, to comrade Raul) 
included as a part of the total of 4 million dollars 



The south block has 829 giiemlla soldiers, 64 killed in action, 9 killed in accidents, 139 have deseted, 43 
executed, 1 1 on leave, 16 captured, including 4 militias or supporters, 3 are out for medical treatment. 



85 



32; Julio i, can Lpnnardo , Argeml lo y Somunl 15, ticrido Alheiro , 
y muerto con los comaradas, f>l civil acompnnant o : Orlando Unices; 
agoEto 12, capturado pnr el EJ6rcl to, on un rotnn , Norbey , Edgar 
19 y Carolina 32. Agosto 31. cacn JorpIo -19 y Aiif!r6s ; herldo 
Alfonso. Todos Integrantes de la Comisl6n Financlera . 

Tambl^n pors I stpn en algunos F rentes los ajnsficl amlentos 
Inconnultos con la (nstancla suporlor , como f*s el caso dnl Frrnto 
1 5, que ajust!cl6 al ex-sargento del Ei<^rclto e Inf ormante, Luis 
Arenas, hermano de la doctora Olga Arenas. 

12-Fl DIoque tiene las slgtiiente Inf raest ructurn : 10 canons, ocho 
voladoras, clnco vehiculos, 16 motos, 20 mul as, 315 cabnzas de 
ganado, 15 flncas y 6 casas; un torno. un mandril y una fresadora. 

13 MomoP observndo clorta noijl i gonri a por altpmof; comandant of: dol 
Estndo Mayor del Hloque, que 1 I ogan n los PJenos y no prcscntnn 
planllla de gastos, lo que impide presentar un Informe exacto de 
gastos . 

14-Todos los Frentes estSn presupuostaclns hnsla nl 3! de rllrfnmbre 
del presonte aOo , con excepcI6n de los Frenles Regmido y 
Tercero(que solo ban reclbldo 25 mlllones); In rnlnmna Teofllo 
Fnrero, la Fuerza Dlsponlble del Bloque y la unidad del camarada 
Manuel . 

15-Pedro 40 le entreg6 a Joaquin r.omez, on In ipnnion pnsada, 
Sie'OOO.OOO para caja menor . De ^s(e dinrro pngn Rotnndo remnsn, 
compr6 log I st 1 en y todns los 1 mpl emrnt os noro«;ar i (^s pnr n o 1 cirso 
de Fuerzas Especlales. Tambl^n saco l ntlos los riihros pnrn 
f Inanclar le a la Tei^f 1 lo n I semes Lie pasadn. ToLnl 
gastos:S42 ' 214 .500, quednndo un saldo de 33*785.500. De aqul se ban 
gastado para la FDB $1*785.000. Ouedan S2'000.000. 

Del 3 al 27 de eeptlembre de 1995 , Joo' d " Const i t nyeni n " In Iia 
entregado a Joaquin G6mez S 545'Ono.OOO De nqni se sacnron 
S33'000.000: 16 millones para pagarle al "Gotdo" In munlcl6n; y 16 
mlllones a Aliplo, mds un mi 1 16n para qastos de In Unidnd. Ouednndo 
un saldo de $512000.000 . De estos se encaletaron $470,000,000 y 
$42000.000 se encuentran en los equipos. 

16-Re8erva de municiones y exploslvos que posee el Bloque: 

Calibre 7.62x51= 31.757 cartucbos 
" - 2.23 = 23.579 cartucbos. 
- " 9m. m. 2nO - " 
Cord6n detonante - 7.000 metroB. 
CApsulas detonantes 1.420. 
Dlnamita = t6 @. 

17-La relacl6n con los Regionnles dpi Tuiumnyo y pI CnquetA es 
buena. Con el del Hnlla no bay nlngun tipo de ronlacto En el 
Regional del Putumayo se estdn presentando fisiiras al interior del 
Partldo , motlvadas por las amblciones personales y la corrupci6n 
de algunos mllltantes , entre los que hay , romo Jairo Casanova , 
conservadores con ropaje de comunlstas Aqul bay que ipconocer 
autocr 1 1 Icamente el error que hemes comntldo romn TARCnl Ir 
creando Partldo clandestine y ent regAndoselo al Parlldo legal , 
vlolando una directrlz de la Octnva Confrrencla . P6I0 abora ba 
comenzado el FrentQ 32 a trabajar de acuerdo a lo orlentado : tiene 
3 c61ulas*clandestlnas . 

IB-l.as carteras no ban funclonado como debiera ser, debido a 
problemas de comunicacl6n. 

19-En algunos Frentes del Bloque aun no ba sldo siiperada la 
costumbre de envlar a otros Frentes , los guerrllleros que a el los 
no les slrven. Caso concreto lo sucedldo con el Frente nuevo 
(Tlmanco) , donde la gran mayor la de los trasladados ten Ian 



31 



Anexo No. 9 



86 



ptohlpmas de salud. 

Cnmnrail.TS : 

Con-, Idor.liPO-; .(lir^ r, |.o^.it 'I- 1<TS iln I I ■ i i-lic i ir: r .1.-.- r ••.I'l.i-. nil IlilGfilri) 32 

I r.Tlj.Tjn, taiito Itwll vidiial como roJccMvt) . h.iy .|iif x"<nnor.rT el gian 
nsfiiotro loallinil.i rnr I ii'lon p.ii.i -.nc.it .i.lol.iiiln 1 n55 pl.iiios 
IrazadoE pot La Octave Conforeiicla y dcmSs organlsmos soperlotes. 

Iliy quo ms.Tll.ir 1 .t t i >i o i ii I .l.id ctmuri I - I .t r,.,n i o i m rn 1 .t I>lrf-.tl6n 
dr-l Fstn.1.1 Ilayni do 1 lUn'ni- y I .t -olido- {dno|.,.|M.i d>- -ui-: m.ilKlos . 
F<i iin dPhor prppat .ii nns m.'i<; y mo |or I'.iin .ipn|lii ' on rolvnucla 
iPvolticlonnrl.T lo qun dri plan r--,l i .il r^r, 1 1 o .ioi,.-,,t|. cnr rpspoiido nl 
Dloque Sut, para la conqiiista (In la Niifv.i Coloml.i.i. 

Viva i-l I'aT I Ido (-..inMlii ■■.! .i I 
viva Pl MatxlKmo l.fillni-.inol 
Vlvan las FARC, EJercito dnl pnohla! 



Anextf No. 9 



87 



Mtilerio; 



yi I I 









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Mil I I I 



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T^.a'c^b'rh > \/pj-'^ 







El-IuIL 







io- 



Other infrastructure elements 

1 . Wood saw and grass trimmer 

2. Water pumps 2 

3. Landing strip in the Orteguaza 



4. Landing strip in Buenos Aires 

5 Landing strip in the Union Peneya 

6 There's a house in Guadua Branch 

Juaco chief of finance 



Anexo 10 



88 



i fTg a/n r/^//7Cro^C 



e/lctcfio: 






M ! I I f ! I ■ ! i -| ! ' i i I I i I I I I I M K-T 



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TTTI I I I i: 

Have to talk with the Paujil's mayor to know about the project of Nemera mine. Juaco's reports 

a General incomes $ 664 000 

b Use 30 cans of gasoline and send 4 cans of A C PM. 

c There are 1 6 kitchens 

AnexoNo. 10 



89 



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F. There's a landing strip in Napoles, Suncillo's Landing strip is being fixed 

G. Qiamizo said he's ready to crystallize about 30 kilos and sell than overseas 

H. Juaco says that hen merchandise is cheap is cheap is good to invest because you buy it in 700 and sell it m 900 at the kitchen 

I. Juaco says, fiarte Burro is working a kilo of ours and hasn't paid 

J. Oiucho Pecas, plantation is under our control and is being administer by Juaco's Brother 

L. In Santo Domingo there's an abandoned farm. 

Anexn Nn. 10 



90 



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Juacos reports that when he can, he'll send 3 kilos of Cocaine to be sold, he got paid 5 million for 900 
grams, saved 

AnexoNo. 10 



91 








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C- Juaco turned in a report on the finance commission, where $ 664 000 dollars was obtained. $ 55 308 



dollars from different jobs and the rest from kitchen and landing strips 

$ 1 19.276 dollars were obtained by the finance commission from the 15th front Details are found i 
the receipt 

AnexoNo. 10 



92 




B Finance accounted for 97 600 from 20 july to 30 October $ 97'600 000 from volunUry contribution 
and cocaine tax Of this 9'144 000 more was spent 



Anexo No. 10 



93 




MM 



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V- In Peru there's a landing strip and laboratories at Cocara it is located close to where we did last time 
work. 

*- There's a request from the mafia men to pay the tax in dollars. 
Anexo No. 11 



36-261 96-4 



94 









-:;j-7^ 



S^iiizL^. "ZZ^lllLli^ ^^cP^Wife 



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Call cartel 

Frequencies 6 560 Principal 
6 875 Ahemate 

Anexo No. 12 



Beeper 923334666 code 5230 code name Diebre 

026661866 code 1462 CarBcol 



95 



INPORME DE INTELIGENCIA TECNICA SECCION. C.E.C 



41 



NQ INTEC : EJCQ001F 
INTERLOCUTORES: DESCONOCIDOS 



FRECUENCIA : 672.750.0 FMn 



FECHA DE INTERCEPCION 
FECHA DE TRANSCRIPCION 
OPERADOR COLECCION 



13-ENE-gG 
1.3-ENE-96 
2090 



HORA 
HORA 
OPER. 



: 21:20 

: 23:00 

TRANSCRIPTOR 



9839 



ANALISIS TECNICO: SISTEMA CELULAR. 

ANTENA OMNIDIRECCIONAL AH-7000 PARA V/UHF A UNA ALTURA DE 15 MTS 



RESUMKN DEL TEXTO: DIALOGO TELEFONICO INALAMBRICO CELULAR DONDE 
UNICAMENTE SE ESCUCHA AL SJNNl: QUIEN HACE EL COMENTARIO SOBRE LA 
UNION DE LOS PRESUNTOS NARCOTRAFICANTES CHEPE, PACHO, RASGURO, 
CHUPBTA Y CUCHILLA CON EL CABECILLA DEL 30 FRENTE DE LAS FARC PARA 
HACER LA GUERRA POR EL INCUMPLIMIENTO A LOS ACUERDOS POSIBLEMENTE 
POR EL GOBIERNO, Y POR EL ATROPELLO QUE RECIBEN SUS MUJERES CUANDO 
VAN A VISITA CONYUGAL A LA CARCEL. 



TRANSCRIPCION 



SJNNl aiEPE, Be va de guerra con PACHO, con CHUPETA, con 
RASGUHO, con CUCHILLA y con el comandante del frente 
treinta de lae FARC hermano, con el mi§dlco que opera ahl 
en eee sector del kllometro 30 ... 



SJNN2 
SJNNl 
SJNN2 
SJNNl 
SJNN2 
SJNNl 



No al man 



Va a eer una mlerda 



Va a eer una mlerda el no le cumplen a eeta genfce hermano 



SJNN2 
SJNNl 



SJNN2 



Que lee han hecho dies mil cagadae, ... ouanto no ee ha 
eabldo me entendee, que les atropellan lae mujeree cuando 
van a entrar, a vlelta con ... bueno ... mijo vea; y que 
dice GUILLERMITO . . . 



Anexo No. 13 



96 



En el mes de febrero de 1 996 

se realizcron operociones 

en el sur de! deportornento del Huiio, 

contra e! frente 1 3 de ios "FARC, 

Cacique La Gaitona" 





^■''*y(y1*'*«Wtf^TV; , 



DEPARTAMEKTO DEL HUii 



ZZl Cultivos de amapola 
18 Munfcipms 
18.800 Hectareas 



42 



97 



FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOrDCIONARIAS DE (.■OLOMUIA 
FAllC-EP . 

Frente "Casique la Gaytaiia" B.S C G S 13. 

Orden operativa N? 

Fecha de salida _v^HJ5_^^Hora 



Inteqrantes. lc{d(X- 


Sc 




N')&,-(-C'C''?> 




Mision Tj-s-.'^Vv-iol'-A.-l 


,-u- 


C-. v_' I + 1 'O O . ." A 


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Qbservaciones . 
Cumpiir extrictairenLc- las nomas diriplinai'iaa 
ue lea FARC-Er. 

■ !<?/(; J^o ■ o\.o 'a . 

Fecha de regraso Hora 



Cuinplaio. 
Firma ccmandanteCs) . 



Quien resive la mision_ 



Anexo No. 14 



98 



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W me^e^Q^ ^ ^cKo ■■<.■ .-. ■ _■ 

as <:l^ulc'"^ ■ F. ivj . t..V,^ =. 'KV, "3 O 



AnexoNo. 15 



99 



ORDEN OPERATIVA 



Integrantes: Elmer, Darwin, Ferney y 7 unidades mas 
MISION 



Desplozorse hasta el area del Verge!, a la Palma y aledenas de Suaza 

realizar un trabajo de firmas con los amopoleros en la region de la palma y 
veredas aledenas al municipio de Suaza. 



Realizar un trabajo politico y de organizacion de masas de acuerdo al plan de 
la compania; actuar militarmente donde se presenten las condiciones. 
La comision llevara sus respectivos rublos. 



AREA: 
MEDIOS: 
DOTACIONES: 
TIEMPO DE DURACION: 



Veredas aledenas al municipio de Suaza. 
Dos radios y sus respectivos dotociones. 
Fusiles, carabinas, armas cortas, granadas. 
Un mes. 



OBSERVACIONES 

Aplicar la disciplina de la organizacion. 

Mantener las mejores y'mas excelentes relaciones con las masas. 

Se mantendra el contacto con el mando por medio del radio de dos metros 

pore lo cual se empleara un codigo. 

Firman comandantes de los frentes 



Anexo 16 



100 



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102 





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105 



^ ^^^^^ 1 INTERNATIONAL 
1 z_^ ^^ m, CONSULTING 
= = 1 = i ^ SERVICES 



Ambassador Morris D. Bustry 



September 4, 1996 



The Honorable Benjamin Oilman 

Chairman, Committee on International Relations, 

House of Representatives 

2170 Rayburn Building 

Washington, D.C. 20515 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

I regret that I will be unable to participate in the Hearing you will hold regarding the 
sale of Blackhawk helicopters to the Republic of Colombia, but am pleased to 
provide you my comments on the sale, as you requested. 

As you are aware, I served as the U.S. Ambassador to Colombia from 1991 - 1994. 
I am currently in the private sector, but follow events in Colombia and the narcotics 
issue closely and serve on the steering Committee of the Global Organized Crime 
Task Force convened by the Center for Strategic International Studies. I chair the 
Narcotics Working Group of the CSIS Task Force. 

During my tenure in Colombia I worked constantly to arrange a sale of Blackhawks 
to the Colombian military. During that time we enjoyed very close relations with 
President Gaviria'and his team, which is not the case today. The distrust we 
currently have of the political leadership in Colombia should not, in my opinion, 
detract from the wisdom of this sale. I believed then, and believe now, that the 
Colombian military and counter-narcotics police are for the most part courageous 
and dedicated people, deserving of our support. This is particularly true of General 
Serrano and Admiral Delgado, the present leaders of these forces. 

There is no doubt that the Colombian military will use these utility helicopters in their 
fight against the FARC and the ELN. The "insurgent" movement in Colombia is not 
the sort of group we Americans think of when we speak of national guerrilla groups. 
Their main source of income derives from narcotics related activity and kidnapping. 
They long ago abandoned any true ideology or political intent and are nothing more 
than bandits and semi-private armies. They are "narco-guerrillas" in every sense of 
the word. The FARC and ELN control large parts of the Colombian territory and are 
a major part of the narcotics problem in that country. 

The traffickers could not operate with the impunity they enjoy without an active 
partnership with the FARC and the ELN. On many occasions during the years I 
served in Colombia the counter-narcotics police, mounting operations against labs 
and cultivations, encountered stiff resistance from heavily armed guerrilla groups. 



4628 4th Road North. Arlington. Virginia 22203 • Tel: (703) 524-9682 • Fax: (703) S24-2236 



106 



September 4, 1996 



often with significant loss of life. There was also evidence that the traffickers 
contracted with the guernllas to carry out assassinations and attacks on military or 
police units which menaced their activities The narcotics problem in Colombia will 
never be solved unless the problem of the guerrillas is .solved as well. Providing this 
equipment to the Colombian military and National Police will help prevent illicit drugs 
from reaching our streets. 

I support the sale of the Blackhawks to Colombia and applaud the decision of the 
administration not to insist on assurances that the helicopters will be used for purely 
counter-narcotics purposes. 



Sincerely 




107 




I nited States Department of State 
Ifaslun^lon. D.C. 20520 

AUG 2 1996 



Dear Mr. Chairman: 

We would like to provide our perspective on the proposed 
sale of Blackhawk helicopters to the Colombian Army. 
Ambassador Frechette has asked us to let you know that he fully 
shares these views. 

The Army wants the Blackhawks for a variety of missions, 
including counterinsurgency, its own counternarcotics 
operations, support to police units engaged in eradication and 
interdiction, search and rescue, movement of supplies, medical 
evacuation, and humanitarian assistance. The Army does not 
intend to use them solely for counternarcotics purposes, and we 
have not sought such assurances. Strict use conditions likely 
would compel the Army to buy elsewhere. The Army strongly 
prefers Blackhawks, but will buy Russian, French or Canadian 
helicopters if necessary. 

While both the Army and the Colombian National Police (CNP) 
want Blackhawks, only the Army has been able to come up with 
funding to purchase them. It has $107 million available but is 
obligated to spend or lose that money by the end of 1996. The 
USG is unable to donate Blackhawks to the police as none have 
been declared excess to U.S. miltary needs, but in early June 
we provided the CNP with six additional UH-IH helicopters. 
CNP Commanding General Serrano supports this Blackhawk sale to 
the Army. 

We hope to build on the success of "Operation Conquest," a 
combined operation in Guaviare Department which has shown that 
Army-police cooperation has the potential to significantly 
disrupt coca growing and narco-traf f icking . However, that 
operation has also demonstrated the Army's most critical 
weakness, insufficient air mobility. 

Colombian forces are conijbatting well -arm ed drug traffickers 
as well " S's"'^ ^??! n aTT^wHo s e i n t e r e s^Ts a n?^Te FF- nEo r y'^ SYYe n 

cSTnci'a e". "PG V ffr(i(3'"SnT6 r c^rfieVrf^Vn d""c be a~"^'a(fr c ati o ft "t o have 

a'riy df'HSnce of success, the Army must support the CNP by 
securing areas taken over by traffickers and terrorists alike. 



The Honorable 

Benjamin Gilman, Chairman, 

Committee on International Relations, 
House of Representatives. 



108 



- 2 - 



Ambassador Frechette wants you to know that he has personal 
experience of the threat that the Army and CNP are confronting 
daily. In early 1995, the CNP helicopter in which he was 
riding en route to examine coca eradication efforts was hit by 
groundfire. This is a war-like military challenge, one the CNP 
cannot cope with alone. 

Blackhawks are utility helicopters, not attack helicopters. 
They are needed to put more manpower in the field, where the 
Army and the CNP often encounter heavily armed narcotics 
traffickers. Like the CNP's utility helicopters, the Army 
would probably equip the Blackhawks with door-mounted machine 
guns to defend against groundfire. Such armament is appropriate 
and necessary to carry out their mission. The twin-engine 
Blackhawk has a heavy lift capability that makes it ideal for 
use in high altitude operations and search and rescue in 
support of the CNP, which has lost five UH-IH helicopters and 
two T-65 Turbo-Thrush eradication spray planes to ground fire. 

There is no contradiction between our cut-off of most 
non-counternarcotics assistance to Colombia and this proposed 
cash sale. Decertification was meant to encourage greater 
counternarcotics efforts by the political leadership, not to 
deny assistance to the police and the military, which have been 
cooperating with us. As part of our certification process, we 
are pressing for greater military support for CNP anti-drug 
efforts, and these Blackhawks would allow the Army the means to 
provide that support. Recognizing that the Colombian Army has 
uses for the Blackhawks other than counternarcotics and the 
need to be vigilant about protecting human rights, allowing the 
sale is, on balance, in the U.S. national interest. 

We hope that this information is helpful to you in your 
consideration of the proposed sale. Please do not hesitate to 
contact us if we can be of further assistance. 

Sincerely, 

Barbara Larkin 
Assistant Secretary 
Legislative Affairs 



109 




United States Department of State 
Washington, D.C. 20520 

SEP I 4 L3j 



Dear Mr. Chairman: 



I wish to inform you that the President proposes to 
exercise his authority for FY 1996 under section 506(a)(2) of 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA), to 
direct a drawdown of up to $75^00^^00 of articles and 
services (including aircraf t"'Sn?^ssociated spares and 
training) from the inventory and resources of the Department 
of Defense, and military education and training from the 
Department of Defense, for the purposes and under the 
authorities of chapter 8 a£ part I of the FAA. 

The President's proposal would provide much-needed 
counternarcotics assistance for Colombi a, Venezuela, Peru, 
and the countries of the Eastern Tl^fflBtean. Additional 
information is contained in the enclosed Memorandum of 
Justification. 

I also want to bring to your attention that this package 
is one of two international counternarcotics proposals, one 
for FY 1996, the other for FY 1997, which the President is 
sending to Congress for simultaneous notification. Taken 
together, they will make an important contribution to our 
efforts to stop the flow of drugs to the United States. 

Finally, I wish to notify you, pursuant to section 
484(a)(2) of the FAA, that the Secretary has decided that the 
application of section 484(a)(1) of the FAA with respect to 
aircraft to be transferred to the Governments of Colombia, 
Peru, Venezuela, and Barbados would be contrary to the 
national interest of the United States. 

Please do not hesitate to contact us if you have any 
questions on this or any other matter. 

Sincerely, 



J^e^U-i.^?— «^i^P(^ 



Barbara Larkin 
Assistant Secretary 
Legislative Affairs 

Enclosure: 

Memorandum of Justification. 

The Honorable 

Benjamin Oilman, Chairman, 

Committee on International Relations, 
House of Representatives. 



no 



HEHORAMOUM OF J-STiriCATION 

?05 USE OF SECTION 505(a^.:^ SrECIAL AUTHORITY 

TO DRAW DOWN ARTICLES, SERVICES. AND MILITARY 

EDOCATIOS AND TRAINING 

The President's national Srug control strategy includes as 
a central element the need to increase the capability of 
foreign ccvernaents to interdict drugs en route through their 
crur.tries, and thus reduce -he flow cf drugs ir.to the United 
States. We propose to utilize section 5C6(a)(2) of the Fcreigr. 
Assistance Act of 1961, as asiended (FAA) , to direct a drawdown 
of up to 5-5 million for FY 1996 froa Departrrent of Defense 
inventory and resources to provide articles, services, and 
"raining to te provided for anti-narcotics purposes to the 
Governments of Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, and the rrenicer states 
of the Regional Security Syster:; (RSS>. which are: .-..itigua & 
Barhuda; Sarbados; Dcainica; ^senada; St. Sitts & Nevis; St. 
Lucia; and St. Vincent a the Grenadines. 

The special authority of section 505, =) (2,' is reserved to 
the President. Section 506(a)(2)(B) provides that an aggregate 
value cf not r>cre thar. SI"? ~iIlion in any fiscal year of 
articles , services ar.i ---.zzty ecucation and training rsav be 
provided under sectitr. 5 : i , = . :2) (A) . Section 505(a)(2)(3) 
provides further that not acre than $75 rillion .tay be provided 
fro3 the drawdown fror the inventory and resources of the 
Depart:3ent of Defense; not sore than $75 -illion -;ay be 
provided for international narcotics control assistance 
(pursuant to chapter 3 of part Z rf the F.-_A) ; and not -ore than 
$15 zrillion -aay be provided for POW/MIA activities to Yietnas. 
Laos, and Cartbcdia. To direct a section 506(a)(2) drawdown. 
the President 2tist detertaine that to do so is "in the national 
i.nterest cr tne ^nz^tec states . ' "^e wou*n autnortze -ne 
drawdown during fiscal year 199 5, with the result that it would 
count against this year's ceilings, though it is anticipated 
that delivery would be cocpleted thereafter. 

virtually all of the cocaine sold in this country is 
processed in or transits through Coloabia. On March 1, 1996, 
the President -ad= the difficult but necessary decision not to 
certify Z:'-:-i-. ; --ier the provisions of section 490 cf the 
FAA, for i --...-: i: t.-.e highest levels to cooperate 
sufficient.y -.:- : - e '.'~i~.^t States in ste~~i-7 the flow of 
drugs throuc.-. Z.'z.- .:: t'ls country. 

Despite this decision, those ele:3ents of the ::^:--ar.t tf 
Colonbia (GOC) that are cooperating with us cor.ti-_e -: -eed 
and deserve our support. These include -'? T: :-;:;- stitnal 
Police (C»iP) and those elements of the C:.:-r.:- -r-^i ::rces 
" :- directi :-:;:rt the counternarcotics efftrt. Tr.ese 

;3 are c.-.z-z exactly the types of programs we want to 

_..-.ue wit.'- z:.- -ZZ, and which are i'-pcrta.Tt to the security 

interests of the United States. 



Ill 



The 340.5 million drawdown requested fcr Colorriia would 
support Colorubia's law enforcerent, interdiction, and coca 
and opium poppy eradication programs. Specifically, we will 
provide to the CNP twelve utility helicopters; flight crew 
and ground police field gear, and rations; two C-26 
surveillance/transport aircraft, comcaunications equipment, 
training, and a.-rrnunition for use by the Police to defend 
themselves against heavily-armed narcotraf f ickers . 

For the Colombian military, we would provide three ar^ed 
Boston Whaler boats; six river patrol boats; one Utility 

Lancing Craft; twenty 'JH-IH helicopter hulks for salvage 
parrs; three C-26 surveillance^/ transport aircraft, spare 
parts for aircraft supporting "tfounternarcotics operations, 
communications equipment, land navigation and troop field 
gear; utility vehicles, and training. without this 
assistance for the Colombian counternarcotics forces, not 
only will important programs in progress grind to a halt, but 
our multi-million dollar counternarcotics infrastructure 
investment will suffer due to deterioration of equipment, 
training skills, and good will on the part of those elements 
of the CNP who put their lives on the line daily. 

In y.arch 1955, tr.e President lit not ister-ine that it 
was i.n the vital national interests of the United States to 
continue Colombia's eligibility for all forms of bilateral 
assistance or its eligibility to receive support for 
multilateral development assistance. However, Colombia is 
still eligible for, and receiving, anti-narcotics assistance 
under chapter 8 of part I of the FAA, and remains eligible to 
receive assistance under the previsions of section 
505(a)(2). Moreover, it would be consistent with our 
national program to take necessary steps to stem the flow cf 
illegal drugs into this country. 

Traffickers are making more and more use cf Venezuelan 
national territory to move drugs out cf Colombia — and to 
move precursor chemicals in. The Governiaent of Venezuela has 
asked us for help in increasing the capability of its armed 
forces to meet this increased threat to Venezuelan 
sovereignty -- and particularly for help in patrolling its 
immense river syste.m and the porous Colombian border. We 
propose to furnish the Venezuelan Arced Forces and National 
guard with two 65-foot Coastal patrol boats, six river tatrrl 
boats, one Utility Landing Craft, com-.unications gear, 
training, and spares where available. We will also provide 
Venezuela with two C-26 surveillance/transport aircraft. The 
total arnount of counternarcotics assistance for Venezuela is 
S12.25 million. 



112 



USG support is also needed to help the countries of the 
Eastern Caribbean confront the shift in trafficking patterns 
resulting from the increased pressure and effectiveness of 
our evolving counterdrug efforts in Mexico. The Caribbean 
states face the enormous financial and organizational powers 
of the transnational drug cartels, based mostly in Colombia, 
which respect no boundaries. The security (military and 
police) forces of seven independent Eastern Caribbean 
countries -- Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, 
St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent & the 
Grenadines -- have joined to form the Regional Security 
System (RSS) , with counternarcotics as one of its primary 
missions . 

We would provide the countries comprising the RSS with 
two 65-foot ocean patrol boats, training, and secure 
communications equipment for all member states of the RSS 
and police communications equipment within and between RSS 
nations for counterdrug operations. We also would provide 
to Barbados two C-26 fixed-wing aircraft for 
patrol/observation over water, as well as flight crew 
equipment. The total for the Eastern Caribbean countries is 
estimated to be $8.5 million. 

We also need to support the counternarcotics efforts of 
the Government of Peru. In the past 18 months, the 
Government of Peru and the Peruvian Air Force have been 
active and aggressive partners of the U.S. in the 
counternarcotics battle. Peru's highly successful air 
interdiction program has caused traffickers to use surface 
routes to move cocaine base. We wish to build on that 
success by increasing Peru's ability to control key inland 
waterways and to better detect illegal drug movement. We 
will provide four C-26 surveillance/transport aircraft, as 
well as secure communications equipment. We will also 
furnish three river patrol craft to allow Peruvian security 
forces to begin to intercept the cocaine base which has 
moved to the rivers in response to air interdiction 
success. We are seeking a drawdown of up to $13.75 
mi llion . 

Packing, crating, and transport costs are included in 
all country totals. In order to assure optimal reception of 
new equipment, delivery and integration teams will be 
included where appropriate. 

We will pass aircraft title to the Governments of 
Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, and Barbados. Section 484(a)(1) 
of Llie FAA provides that aircraft "made available to a 
foreign country primarily Cor na rcot ics- related jjurposes . . 
. shall tao provided only on a lease or loan basin." Section 



113 



- 4 - 



484(a)(2) provides that subsection (1) shall not apply to 
the extent that retention of title would be "contrary to the 
national interest of the United States," and if appropriate 
congressional committees are notified. 

It would be contrary to our national interests to retain 
title in any of these cases. The Peruvian, Colombian, and 
Venezuelan Air Forces have proven themselves reliable 
partners during ongoing combined interdiction operations 
with the U.S. The Colombian National Police have been a 
reliable counterdrug ally, and responsible custodian of 
U. S. -supplied equipment for years. The member states of the 
RSS have a consistent record of using equipment effectively 
and of excellent cooperation i.p counterdrug efforts with the 
U.S. 

Use of section 506(a)(2) for anti-narcotics purposes 
requires 15-day prior notification to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, the House International Relations 
Committee, and the Senate and House Appropriations 
Committees. Under Section 652A of the FAA, the President 
must notify the Speaker of the House and the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee. Section 515 of the FY 1994 Foreign 
Operations Appropriations Act also requires a 15-day 
notification in accordance with "the regular notification 
procedures" of the appropriations committees. Notification 
regarding transfer of aircraft title is combined with the 
notifications required under section 506(a)(2). 



114 




National Defense 
Council Foundation 

l220Kln(>Slrccl"Sulle«l ■ Alexandria, VA 22JI4 • (703) 836-3443 FAX (703) 8J6-540J 




"DE OPPRESSO LIBER" 

The drug \tar in Cutomhia is ml going well because the ( i.S. gnvernment has largely ahancJtintd the 
Colombian National Police and Cnlnmbian Army in their efforls, to stem an explovve riie in narco-lrulficking hy 
the Fe\olutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) anil the National Liberalion Army (EI.S) guerrilla 
movements This is the cure finding reached hy a team of lim-mtensity conflict experts ivho conducted three 
exlemne fact-finding trips to Colombia from April through July 1996. This independent and mm-partnan effort 
Kas led by Mr. Davis Elkins. Major F. Andy Messing. .Jr (USARSpeciat Forces. Ret.), and .'^lujor G Andre^i 
Macklin (U.SMC. Ret.) and sponsored by the National Defense Council foundation. It is a finding shared by 
journalist Robert Noviik vho joined the group in its July trip 

COLOMBI A SITUATION REPORT 

• Colombiii IS Uie world s leading producer and dislnbutor of cocaine and a major supplier of heroin and 
marijuana President Emesio Saniper h:is been linked lo Uie Call tanel by accepting drug nionej' for his 
presidential camp;iign The US government has undertaken an aggressive (campaign to force tus lesignaiion 
including ilie decertification of Colombia in March I'jy.i for failing to ftilly cix)peralc on coiinlemareoiics 

• Colombia is home lo a "Ill-year old insurgenCT' led by the Rc\ olutionaiy Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
and the National Liberation Army (ELK), These insurgencies have recently filled the vacuum left by the 
weakened Medellin ;ind Call cartels, seizing control of the cocaine trade in llie easteni tlufd of Colombia. 
Thev directly fund and coerce farmers lo cultivate coca leaf for refinement into cocaine and arm ihein to resist 
by force government-sponsored eradication efforts In Miraflores. for instance, where the population has 
doubled in two years due lo the drug trade, police are fired upon daily 

• Despite the corniption problems in the Saniper adniiiustralion. tlie Colombian National Police and Army are 
aggressively striving to severe the FARC and ELN huk to the drug business. Since 1991. over 3,000 
Colombian National Policemen have been killed. In recent yeiirs. its highly trained and e.viremcly dedicated 
anii-tcrrorism forces (COPES) have been experiencing a 20 percent casualty rate in its battle against tiie 
narco-gucrrillas and drug cartels 

• While the drug trade provides the guerrillas »itli a well-heeled base for funding its violent civil war, the 
Colombian govenmienl s efforts are significanll> constrained by the fact that; 

- The National Police must rely on a small fleet of 22. ancient UH-IH "huey" helicopters for mobility and 
transport in a country the size of Texas, Oklahoma, and Arkansas combined Each day, the police must 
travel an average of 75-100 miles from their bases lo areas of operations These hucys are evtrcmely 
vulnerable lo ground fire (si.\ were shot down last year) and lack the multi-barreled macliine-guns (uum- 
guns) to defend themselves dunng hot-zone inserts and Medevac rescues 

- The Army's Second Mobile Brigade has only one Ml-17 Russian troop transport helicopter, leased from 
the Nicaiaguan government, and three Uli-iiO Blackhawks to support its operations. 

- The riverine forces are woefully short of boats and effective training 

US POLICY IN CHAO S 

• Despite evidence lo ilie contrary gathered b\ tlus fiict-finding group-and tlie views held by DEA agents in 
Bogota and personnel in liis own embassy military group -US Anibas-sadoi Frechette denies that there is a 
significant connection between the FARC and ELN and narcotics iraffickiug. 

• Despite the reality thai Colombia is essential lo an>' effort lo combat the flow of illicit drugs into the United 
States ilie U S govenuneni has cut foreign military sales, "sat-on previously approved assisumee to provide 
helicopters and miniguns lo the Colombian National Police, and reduced the number of military' advisors to 
support the dedicated front-line warriors who daily nsk tlieir lives to eradicate coca and to djsnipl the narco- 
guerrilla nevus U S military and law enforcement advisors are confronted with ;ui uphill battle in trying to 
restore U S credibility with the Colombian National Police and Aiiny 

• US. law enforcement assistance has been scaled back despite the fact that bolstenng tlie nation s fragile 
crimin:d justice system is key to any long-term effort to redress the long-standing problem of politie^il 
corniption in Colombia 

CONCLUSION 
The ill-considered cessation in US support for the Colombian National Pohce and Army lias significantly eroded 
their efforts lo combat Uie narco-guerrtllas and to disrupt the supply of drugs at the source This self-defeating 
policy should be replaced with a combined carrol-and-stiek approach ihal seeks lo make clear America's contcnipl 
for the drtig-rclaied corruption at the liighesi levels of ilie Colombian political establishment while indicating our 
willingness to back the brave and dedicated anti-drug warriors who fight on the front-lines of the drug war 



115 



Squeezing Blood from a Stone: 
The Elusive Nature of an Effective US Antidrug Policy 

Mark C. DeMier, NDCF Research Assistant 

A year ago, William Bennett, former drug policy director during the Bush administration, 
stated that "cocaine treatment is only 4% effective in reducing heavy (drug) use and only 2% more 
effective in reducing heavy use than no treatment at all." At the same time, current estimates 
suggest that only 10-15% of all cocaine in distribution is interdicted before reaching our cities' 
streets. 

The death and destruction wrought by the scourge of illicit drugs is undeniable, and no 
current antidrug policies seem to have had much impact. Meanwhile, drug use by 12 to 17 year 
olds has increased 80%, with a corresponding increase in juvenile crime, since President Clinton 
took office in 1992. Drug policy strategist Robert B. Charles, Staff Director and Chief Counsel to 
the Subcommittee on National Security, implies that President Clinton's drug policy priorities are 
woefully misguided. He writes, "Drug treatment for a limited number of older, chronic addicts has 
been favored over accountable, juvenile drug prevention; and the Administration has made a public 
shift away from transit zone interdiction, favoring source country programs, but has not shifted the 
resources necessary to sustain their stated priority on source country programs." [emphasis added] 



To What End? 



$5.00 




•Demand Reduction 

-Domestic Law 
Enforcement 
■Drug Interdiction 

■International Programs 



Source: ONDCPINDCF (1982-84=100. Bureau of iMhor Slalistirs) 

Compared to a total drug budget of about $1.5 billion in 1981, President Clinton requested 
$15.1 billion to fund drug-control efforts in FY 1996, a 9.3% increase from FY 1995. 

Cleariy, our efforts have been heavily weighted on domestic spending. Why do we seem 
to insist on waiting for the horrible problems associated with drug abuse to come to us, where we 
are forced to spend billions of dollars on treatment and crime control, instead of cutting the supply 
of drugs off at the source? 

America is losing the War on Drugs, and our casualties are defenseless. Preliminary 
statistical testing shows that the predictability of supply-side reduction programs is about twice as 
significant in reducing overall illicitdrug use than demand-side programs: 

*Corellation Results with Percentage of Illicit Drug Use 1981-1995 

{limt^el Figures Acljii.sleJ for hifltition: 1982-84=100) 



International 
Programs 

(SlTPl.'i-SlD!-;] 



Drug Interdiction 
Activities 

(Sitpia-Sidh; 



Domestic Law 
Enforcement 

(Df.m.\nd-Sidi,) 



Demand 
Reduction 

(Demwd-Sidh) 



Pearson's R 



.34 



.45 



-.23 



-.15 



116 



(* Note: I lie "I'earson's r" roeffitieiil is a measure of how predirlive one item is oJaiiDther hosed on hivariale 

(orellalioniil lesiin^. I'liese figures are prelimimir\. as there are onl\ 15 rorresponding years of data regarding illicit 

drug use and quantification of budget dollars allocated to the antidrug effort. ) 

If we streamline our domestic drug-control spending, we can afford to redirect our funds 
toward source-country supply reduction efforts for a more balanced antidrug program. There is 
plenty of opportunity to do so. 

The Colombian National Police (CNP) are true heroes in the fight against illicit drugs. 
They face up to 100 casualties per month sacrificing fiesh and blood battling the narco-guerrillas. 
Their valiant efforts have caused the price of raw coca leaf to double within the past year. 
However, the Administration decertified Colombia on March 1st. This at a time when a small 
amount of aid (military excess 1960s era UH-IH "Huey" helicopters, for instance) would allow 
the CNP to cut in half the flow of dangerous narcotics before we are forced to deal with their 
consequences at home. 

Crackdowns in Mexico's National Institute to Combat Drugs, their equivalent to the US 
Drug Enforcement Administration, are forcing some smugglers to re-route their supplies through 
the Caribbean. As reported in The New York Times, however, nine Caribbean nations have 
agreed to open their waters to US pursuit of narco-traffickers. 

The task of interdicting these criminals is increasingly difficult as traffickers take more risks 
and find new ways to defeat our technology. For instance, some elements of the Peruvian Navy 
are using official Naval vessels, consigned to carry commercial cargo, to transport cocaine. These 
Naval ships rarely even have to stop for customs inspections. 

President Clinton shifted the Drug War from its prior placement on the White House list of 
national security priorities from number 3 to number 29 — on a list of 29. He cut the ONDCP staff 
from 146 to 25 overnight. During his re-nomination speech for the presidency, the President 
requested Congress to approve 100% of his requested budget for the fight against drugs. This is 
worthy of praise, but it is only a half-step, for his budget is lopsided and misguided in its focus on 
ineffectual domestic efforts. In fact, the Administration's shift to emphasis on treatment of 
chronic, hard-core addicts has allowed the number of casual and juvenile users to greatly increase 
by failing to provide them with an antidrug message. It is plainly in our national interest to keep 
this poison from even reaching our borders. 



Illicit Drug Use 1975-1995 



w 80.00% 




Source: Monitoring the Future Study (University of Michigan) 

Hence our task should be clear. Stop drugs at the source before we have to spend another 
$15 billion on domestic interdiction, law enforcement, and treatment programs. Let us take 
advantage of the new opportunities to operate in source countries — via aid and advisement, and a 
new authority in territorial waters. 




117 



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

UNireO STATES SOUTHERN COUUANO 

OFFICE OF rue COMUAMOER JN CHIEF 

APOAA 34003 

September 10, 1996 




Office of the Comnunder in Chief 



The Honorable Beajantin A. Oilman 
Chaimuo, Coimninec on International Relations 
U.S. House of Representatives 
Washington DC 205 1 5-6128 

Dear Mr. Chairman, 

In response to your question on the U.S. Southern Command position on the 
possible cash sale of UH-60 helicopters to the Colombian Army, we wholeheanedly 
support the sale of these helicopters. This position was reinforced during my visit to 
Colombia on September 2, 1996, at which time I had the opporamity to meet with 
Ambassador Frechette, his country team, the Minister of Defense, Chief of the Colombian 
National Police, and the Service Chiefs. 



Respectfiilly, 




Wesley K. Clary 
General, US 
Commander in Chief 



118 




DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY 

WASHINGTON. DC 20301-2800 



1 I SEP ISbS 

In reply refer to: 
I-04248/96ct 



Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman 

Chairman, Committee on International Relations 

House of Representatives 

Washington, D.C. 20515-6128 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 3 6(b) (1) 
of the Arms Export Control Act, we are forwarding herewith 
Transmittal No. 96-71, concerning the Department of the Army's 
proposed Letter (s) of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) to Colombia 
for defense articles and services estimated to cost $169 
million. Soon after this letter is delivered to your office, 
we plan to notify the news media. 

Sincerely, 



<pcii<-^4^>>^ c ^^^^-^^ 



H. Diehl McKalip 
Acting Director 



Attachments 



119 



Transmittal No. 96-71 

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer 

Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) 

of the Arms Export Control Act 

(i) Prospective Purchaser : Colombia 

(ii) Total Estimated Value : 

Major Defense Equipment* $ 149 million 

Other $ 20 million 

TOTAL $ 169 million 

(iii) Description of Articles or Services Offered : 

Twelve UH-60L utility helicopters, four spare T700 GE 
engines, 24 M60D door mounted machine guns, 920,000 
rounds of 7 . 62MM (M80) ammunition, special test and 
ground support equipment, special tools and diagnostic 
equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and 
technical documentation, personnel training and training 
equipment and U.S. Government and contractor technical 
and support services; follow-on support to include 
repair and overhaul of major helicopter components and 
assemblies, long term supply support, update of 
publications and technical documentation and other 
related elements of logistics to ensure long term 
supportability of the program. 

(iv) Military Department : Army (UTN) 

(v) Sales Commission. Fee, etc.. Paid. Offered, or Agreed to 
be Paid : None 

(vi) Sensitivity of Technolocry Contained in the Defense 
Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold : 
None 

(vii) Date Report Delivered to Congress : J ^ SEP ]99S 



as defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act. 



120 



POLICY JUSTIFICATION 

Colombia - UH-60L Utility Helicopters 

The Government of Colombia has requested the purchase of 12 UH-60L 
utility helicopters, four spare T700 GE engines, 24 M60D door 
mounted machine guns, 920,000 rounds of 7.62MM(M80) ammunition, 
special test and ground support equipment, special tools and 
diagnostic equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and 
technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment 
and U.S. Government and contractor technical and support services; 
follow-on support to include repair and overhaul of major 
helicopter components and assemblies, long term supply support, 
update of publications and technical documentation and other 
related elements of logistics to ensure long term supportability of 
the program. The estimated cost is $169 million. 

This sale will contribute to the foreign policy and national 
security of the United States by helping Colombia improve its 
capability to fight the war on drugs. These 12 helicopters will be 
in addition to 14 already delivered. 

The sale of this equipment and support will not affect the basic 
military balance in the region. 

The prime contractor will be United Technology, Sikorsky Aircraft, 
Stratford, Connecticut. There are no offset agreements proposed to 
be entered into in connection with this potential sale. 

Implementation of this sale will not require the assignment of any 
additional U.S. Government personnel or contractor representatives 
in-country. 

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a 
result of this sale. 



121 



VS- Departrocnl of Justice 

Drug Enforcement Adminisiraiton 



l^4A- Intelligence Bulletin 
The 1995 Heroin Signature Program 



August 1996 
0EA-g6042 



Introduction 

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
primarily relies on intelligence generated by 
investigative activity to assess the heroin trafficking 
situation in the United States. DEA also uses other 
indicators to monitor domestic heroin trafficking 
trends, including the Heroin Signature Program 
(HSP) and the Domestic t*/lonitor Program (DMP). 
These two programs supplement the information 
developed through investigations of drug trafficking 
organizations and analyses of drug production and 
seizure data in the formulation of a comprehensive 
assessment of heroin trafficking trends. It must be 
stressed that no single indicator should be used to 
draw definitive conclusions. 

The origins of heroin seized in the United States 
and the proportion from each source area are 
tracked annually through the HSP. Because the 
HSP results are based on seizure data, fluctuations 
from year to year in the proportion from each 
source area may reflect shifting drug law 
enforcement priorities and significant seizures, as 
well as changing trafficking pattems. In addition, 
large seizures of heroin from one source area may 
boost that source area's representation in the KSP; 
therefore, the HSP results are not representative of 
the actual amount of heroin available In the 
United States from each source area. '• 

1995 HSP Results " 



According to the 1 995 HSP results. South 
America was the predominant source area 
for heroin seized In the United States for 
the first time, accounting for 62 percent of 
the total net weight of heroin analyzed in 
the HSP. Southeast Asian heroin 
accounted for 1 7 percent of the total net 
weight of heroin analyzed. Southwest Asian 
heroin accounted for 16 percent, and 
fulexican heroin accounted for 5 percent. 



HSP Sample Selection Process 

Bach year, through the HSP, DEA performs an in- 
depth chemical analysis of from 600 to 900 
samples taken from heroin seizures and 
purchases made in the United States. The 
samples selected for signature analysis include all 
DEA seizures af U.S. points of entry and other 
seizures/purchases selected at random from 
DEA, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and U.S. 
Customs Service investigations. As a result of 
signature analysis. DEA chemists are able to 
associate the heroin sample with a heroin 
manufactunng process unique to a particular 
geographic source area. The proportion of heroin 
associated with each geographic area is 
measured In terms of the net weight of heroin 
seized from each geographic source area. During 
1995, more than 860 samples from heroin 
seizures underwent signature analysis at DEA's 
Special Tasting and Research Laboratory. 



Geographic Source Area' Distribution 

Based on Net Weight of Heroin Seized 

(Percents) 






Mm 


mo 


!♦») 


ifn 


im 


IfW 


HW 


sua 


m 


s 


m 


a 


a 


57 


17 


SWE) 1 


37 


9 


s 


» 




16 


mxO 


t 


7 


3 


10 


a 


s 


S 


u ■ 










15^ 


3! 


s 



' Sou/QB ar«M Biv SouVwut Asia (SEA). ScxjthwMt Asia (SWA), Umcs (MEX), and South Arwra (5/ 
■ Tna Figur* rvpnsans anhr a poftion or Vt» 1 993 vnoum fbr S* hsroin bacausa Its signafajre «QS no( 
devvtoped until July 19S3. 



122 



The 1995 HSP results are unusual in terms of the 
size of heroin seizures from Southeast and 
Southwest Asia. For the first time in several years 
there was not a significant, multikilogram seizure of 
heroin from Southeast Asia. The largest seizure of 
Southeast Asian heroin in 1995 was approximately 
13 Kilograms, much smaller than seizures from 
previous years, and the average of all Southeast 
Asian heroin seizures was slightly less than l 
kilogram per seizure. Southwest Asian heroin 
seizures, on the other hand, averaged more than 
2.5 kilograms each, primarily as a result of the 
seizure of 68 kilograms in Lubbock, Texas, In 
December 1995, and the small number of seizures 
of heroin from this source area overall. South 
American and Mexican heroin seizures continue to 
average less than 1 kilogram — roughly 800 and 300 
grams per seizure respectively. 

South American Heroin 



In California. In 1992, there were no bulk seizures of 
Southeast Asian heroin domestically and the 
proportion of Southeast Asian heroin seized dropped 
to 58 percent. In 1 993, the increase in the propoaion 
of Southeast Asian heroin to 68 percent was 
atlributable to a 1 70-kilogram seizure in New Orleans. 
In 1994, while several bulk seizures of Southeast 
Asian heroin were made abroad, there were no 
domestic seizures over 100 kilograms. As a result, 
the proportion of Southeast /.sian heroin decreased to 
57 percent during that year. In 1995, several factors 
caused the representation of Southeast Asian heroin 
to decline significantly. These Included the large 
number of seizures of South American heroin, the 
large single seizure of Southwest Asian heroin, and 
the fact that the largest domestic seizure of Southeast 
Asian heroin analyzed in ttie HSP in 1995 weighed 
only 1 3 kilograms. 

Southwest Asian Heroin 



The high proportion of South American heroin 
seized In 1 995 reflects both the smuggling tactics of 
Colombian traffickers and the high success rate of 
airport interdiction programs In New York City and 
Miami. Ttiese programs target drug couhers 
attempting lo pass through the most significant U.S. 
entry points used by Colombian trafficking 
organizations. Colombian traffickers send 
hundreds of heroin couriers aboard commercial 
airlines into New York City's JFK International 
Airport and Miami's International Airport. (Reporting 
Indicates that a substantial proportion of the South 
American heroin seized at Miami's International 
Airport is destined for distribution in the 
northeastern United States.) Although each courier 
carries an average of sightly less than 1 kilogram, 
the amount of heroin seized is significant because 
of the number of couriers sent to the United States. 
In tact, the number of samples of South American 
heroin seized at U.S. airports was nearly half of all 
of the samples analyzed in the HSP in 1995. 
causing the representation of South Amencan 
heroin in the HSP to double from the previous year. 

Southeast Asian Heroin 

The proportion of heroin seized in the United States 
from Southeast Asia is consistently at its highest 
during years in which multihundred-kilogram (bulk) 
seizures of heroin from that source area were made 
domestically. In 1991. for example, when Southeast 
Asian heroin represented 88 percent of the heroin 
seized in the United States, a 486-kilogram 
shipment of Southeast Asian heroin was confiscated 



The single seizure of approximately 70 kilograms of 
Southwest Asian heroin in December 1995 caused 
the representation of Southwest Asian heroin in the 
HSP to rise lo 16 percent. Excluding this seizure, the 
representation was approximately 6 percent, 
unchanged from the previous year While Southwest 
Asian heroin continues to be smuggled into the United 
States, its distribution appears to be limited to ethnic 
communities in a handful of cities, including Chicago, 
Detroit, Los Angeles, and New York City. Most 
Southwest Asian heroin traffickers sell heroin on the 
European market, which is easily accessible to them, 
rather than In the United States. Southwest Asian 
heroin, which is generally lower in purity than 
Southeast Asian and South American heroin, would 
be particularly difficult to market in the northeastern 
United States, where retail punty is at or near record- 
high levels. 

Mexican Heroin 

Mexico is the predominant source area for heroin 
available throughout much of the western half of the 
United States. Mexico's extended land border with 
the United States affords Mexican heroin traffickers 
an advantage over other trafficking organizations. 
These traffickers minimize the risk of losing significant 
amounts to U.S. drug law enforcement authorities by 
stockpiling multikilogram quantrties of heroin in 
Mexico and then smuggling smaller amounts across 
the border as transactions in the United States are 
arranged. HSP data confirm this — the average weight 
of Mexican heroin seizures analyzed In the HSP was 
approximately 300 grams, less than half the average 
weight of seizures from any other source area. 



123 



Purity 

The purity of heroin exhibits sampled In ihe HSP is 
consistent with other indicators of domestic heroin 
purity. South American heroin purity is the highest 
among all source areas, with an average purity of 
over 60 percent. This reflects the aggressive 
marketing tactics employed by Colombian heroin 
traffickers in an effort to gain a share of the 
lucrative heroin market in northeastem U.S. cities. 
In these areas. South American heroin must 
compete with high-purity Southeast Asian heroin, 
which averaged close to 70 percent in the HSP. 
Southwest Asian and Mexican heroin samples 
consistently lag behind in purity, averaging 59 
percent and 43 percent respectively in the HSP. 



Conclusion 

The predominance of heroin from South America in 
the HSP is not a surprising development, given the 
fact that every heroin seizure at a domestic airport 
is included in the program, and that this is the 
primary method used to smuggle South American 
heroin into the United States. The 1995 HSP 
results show clearly that South American heroin is 
transported in relatively small amounts by a large 
number of couriers and that airport interdiction 
teams are very effective in interdicting these 
couriers. Perhaps, most importantly, the HSP 
indicates that traffickers are continuing to Increase 
the amount of South American heroin being 
smuggled into the northeastern United States via 
this method of conveyance. 



Average Purity of 199S HSP Samples 
(Percents) 




Origin ot Heroin Samples 



This repofi <viis prepared by ihe [Samestic Unit of the 
Intelligence Division. Cammenu and requests for 
copies are welcome and may be directed to the 
intelligence Production Unit, Intelligence Division, 
D&A Headquonen. at (202) 307-B726. 




124 



PARTNERSHIP FOR A DRUG-FREE AMERICA 



Heroin Fact Sheet 

♦ What is it? 

A powerfully addictive "downer" derived from the opium poppy. 

•f How is it used? 

Method of use depends on user preference, form of drug, and the 
purity. Powdered heroin can be snorted or dissolved in water and 
injected; "black tar" heroin is often heated and the vapors are smoked 
(called "chasing the dragon"). The purity of powder heroin has 
increased dramatically, from an average of 4% in 1980 to 40% in 1995. 
Higher purity heroin is frequently snorted. 

■f What are the effects? 

The heroin "high" lasts 4-6 hours and is experienced as intense 
pleasure. Users describe a sense of well-being, "floating on cloud 
nine," relaxation, and euphoria. 

♦ What else happens? 

Tolerance develops rapidly and physical dependence ("addiction") can 
occur after only three weeks of daily use. Once addicted, heroin users 
need higher doses to achieve a high; lower doses merely ward off the 
dramatic flulike withdrawal symptoms. 

•♦• Anything else? 

Heroin is both physically and psychologically addictive. Physical 
withdrawal begins with a grueling "acute withdrawal" which peaks after 
36-72 hours and then subsides over the next few days. This "acute 
withdrawal" is followed by months of "protracted withdrawal." Fighting 
the psychological addiction is a lifetime battle. 

■♦■ How big of a problem is "heroin"? 

There are no national usage studies that accurately measure the extent 
of heroin use; Experts estimate that there are between 500,000 and 1 
million heroin addicts. Data from police, ethnographers, and treatment 
providers suggests a recent dramatic increase in heroin use. Much of 
this increase stems from use by young people who are snorting or 
smoking heroin. 

June 1996 

405 Lexington Avenue • New York, NY 10174 • (212) 922.1560 • FaX: (2iz) 922.1570 



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128 



Heroin Deaths 

1991-1994 

DAWN Medical Examiner Data 





1991 


1992 


1993 


1994 


% change 
91-94 


Los Angeles, CA 


317 


457 


534 


472 


+49% 


Atlanta, GA 


17 


15 


35 


35 


+ 105% 


Baltimore, MD 


176 


180 


301 


339 


+93% 


Buffalo, NY 


4 


11 


5 


- 


- 


Chicago, IL 


172 


192 


334 


294 


+71% 


Cleveland, OH 


13 


22 


37 


44 


+238% 


Dallas, TX 


15 


23 


60 


46 


+207% 


Denver, CO 


13 


13 


17 


22 


+69% 


Detroit, Ml 


82 


101 


112 


109 


+33% 


Indianapolis, IN 


5 


2 


7 


- 


-- 


Kansas City, KS/MO 


8 


-- 


3 


7 


-- 


Miami, FL 


16 


25 


28 


32 


+100% 


Minneapolis, MN 


13 


8 


9 


7 


• -46% 


New Orleans, LA 


3 


8 


20 


25 


+733% 


New York, NY 


583 


681 


796 


531 


-9% 


Newark, NJ 


68 


81 


105 


199 


+1 93% 


Norfolk, VA 


9 


18 


23 


14 


+55% 


Philadelphia, PA 


240 


298 


412 


402 


+68% 


Phoenix, AZ 


41 


73 


66 


89 


+ 117% 



129 





.1991 


1992 


1993 


1994 


% change 
91-94 


St. Louis. MO 


48 


42 


36 


42 


-1 3% 


San Antonio, TX 


34 


23 


30 


30 


-12% 


San Diego, CA 


108 


161 


136 


149 


+38% 


San Francisco, CA 


82 


152 


171 


167 


+104% 


Seattle, WA 


47 


66 


99 


103 


+119% 


Washington, DC 


127 


89 


109 


82 


-35% 



130 



SEPTEMBER 6, 1996 



MEMORANDUM 



TO: JOHN MACKEY, U.S. CONGRESSIONAL STAFF 

I 
FROM: NAS - VICTOR A. ABEYTA, /-DIRECTOR 

SUBJECT: PENDING REPAIRS TO COLOMBIAN NATIONAL POLICE TURBO 
DC-3 



THE FOLLOWING CRONOLOGY ON THE TWO TURBO DC-3'S IN THE 
COLOMBIAN NATIONAL POLICE'S (CNP) ANT I -NARCOTICS UNIT (DANTI) 
INVENTORY IS PROVIDED AT THE REQUEST OF JOHN MACKEY. THE INTENDED 
PURPOSE FOR THE REQUEST IS TO IDENTIFY THE DOWN TIME OF THE 
AIRCRAFT AS THE RESULT OF ACCIDENTS SUFFERED BY THE AIRCRAFT WHILE 
ON COUNTERNARCOTICS MISSIONS CONDUCTED BY THE DANTI. IT IS 
IMPORTANT TO STRESS THAT THE TURBO DC-3'S ARE THE CORE OF THE 
DANTI 'S LOGISTICS FLEET AND ARE USED HEAVILY FOR THE MOVEMENT OF 
TROOPS, HERBICIDE, MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT TO THE VARIOUS FORWARD 
OPERATING LOCATIONS (FOL'S) WHERE THE DANTI IS CONDUCTING ILLICIT 
CROP ERADICTION EFFORTS AND INTERDICTION OPERATIONS. 

THE FIRST DC-3 WAS MADE AVAILABLE TO THE DANTI IN 1991. THE 
SECOND DC-3 WAS ADDED IN 1993. THE COST OF EACH AIRCRAFT AT THE 
TIME OF ACQUISITION WAS $3,500,000.00 EACH. THE AIRCRAFT ARE TURBO 
CONVERSION MODELS PROVIDEDED BY THE BASLER CORPORATION, OSKOSH, 
WISCONSIN. 

IN THE SPRING OF 1994, THE COLOMBIAN NATIONAL DRUG DIRECTORATE 
APPROVED THE USE OF THE HERBICIDE GLYPHOSATE FOR USE AGAINST COCA 
BEIGN GROWN IN COLOMBIA. THE DANTI BEGAN TO TOOL UP FOR AERIAL 
ERADICATION IN MID 1994, AND BY THE FALL OF 1994 THE AERIAL PROGRAM 
WAS IN FULL SWING. THE TURBO DC-3'S PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN 
SUPPORTING THAT ENDEAVOR AS THE DANTI PREPARED THE FOL'S FOR 
OPERATION. THE AIRCRAFT MOVED FUEL, HERBICIDE AND MEN AND 
EQUIPMENT INTO THESE AREAS, LOGGING ON AN AVERAGE MORE THAN 50 
FLIGHTS PER MONTH AND SEVERAL HUNDRED HOURS IN THE PROCESS. 
MAINTENANCE FOR THE AIRCRAFT WAS PROVIDED BY BASLER TRAINED 
MECHANICS, WHO IN TURN HAVE TRAINED COLOMBIAN MECHANICS. IN OTHER 
WORDS, THE BASLER PEOPLE BROUGHT DOWN AND IMPLEMENTED THE CONCEPT 
OF "TRAIN THE TRAINER." CURRENTLY, THE NAS MAINTAINS ONE BASLER 
TECHNICIAN AS THE HEAD DC-3 TECHNICIAN. ALL ROUTINE MAINTENANCE ON 



131 



THE AIRCRAFT IS PERFORMED BY THE CNP TEAM. 

IN 1995, THE DANTI GREATLY INCREASED ITS AERIAL ERADICATION 
ACTIVITIES, TO INCLUDE SIMULTANEOUSLY OPERATING AN FOL AGAINST 
OPIUM POPPY IN THE CENTRAL MOUNTAINS AND AN FOL AGAINST COCA OUT OF 
SAN JOSE DEL GUAVIARE . IN ORDER TO SUPPORT TWO FOL'S, THE DANTI 
PRESSED ITS TWO MAIN LOGISTICS WORKHORSES EVEN HARDER. WHEN THE 
DC-3'S WERE DOWN FOR MAINTENANCE, THE DANTI PRESSED SOME OF ITS 
SMALLER AND LESS EFFICIENT AIRCRAFT INTO SERVICE. HOWEVER, THE 
LOSS BY NOT HAVING THE LIFT AND CAPACITY WAS NOTICIBLE TO THE 
PROGRAM BUT THERE WAS NO OTHER CHOICE IF THE WORK WAS TO GET DONE. 

ON AUGUST 7, 1995, PNC-211 (TURBO DC-3) SUFFERED A SERIOUS 
ACCIDENT AS IT ATTEMPTED TO FLY IN REINFORCEMENTS INTO A 
CLANDESTINE AIRSTRIP NEAR MIRAFLORES, GUAVIARE. THE POLICE BASE AT 
MIRAFLORES HAD BEEN ATTACKED BY FARC GUERRILLAS AND THE DANTI WAS 
ATTEMPTING TO PROVIDE ITS CONTINGENT WITH RELIEF. THE RESULTING 
DAMAGE WAS SO EXTENSIVE THAT AT FIRST IT WAS BELIEVED THE AIRCRAFT 
COULD NOT BE BROUGHT OUT ECONOMICALLY. NEVERTHELESS, THE DANTI 
FLEW IN THE MAINTENANCE TEAM, WHO ONCE ON THE GROUND DETERMINED THE 
PLANE WAS SALVAGABLE. UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE LEAD CONTRACT 
MECHANIC, THE TEAM PROCEEDED TO CONDUCT REPAIRS ON SITE, MANAGING 
TO BRING THE PLANE OUT WITHIN THREE DAYS. 

THE INITIAL ASSESSMENT WAS THAT EXTENSIVE REPAIRS WOULD HAVE 
TO BE MADE IN COLOMBIA, INCLUDIGN REPAIRS TO THE LANDING GEAR AND 
REPLACING THE RIGHT WING BEFORE THE PLANE COULD BE MOVED TO 
WISCONSIN FOR MAJOR STRUCTURAL REPAIRS AND REPLACEMENT OF SEVERELY 
DAMAGED COMPONENTS NOT AVAI LABEL IN COLOMBIA. THE MAINTENANCE TEAM 
WORKED ON THESE REPAIRS TILL LATE NOVEMBER. MEANWHILE, THE NAS 
BEGAN THE PROCESS OF OPENING AN FMS CASE FROM WHICH TO REPAIR THE 
AIRCRAFT. REGRETTABLY, THE CASE WAS CAUGHT UP BETWEEN DSAA, THE 
MILGP IN COLOMBIA AND THE DECERTIFICATION PROCESS AND IT WAS NOT 
SIGNED BEFORE MARCH 1, 1996. ALL CASES SIGNED AFTER THAT DATE 
CANNOT BE IMPLEMENTED, CONTRARY TO OUR BELIEF THAT BECAUSE THE CASE 
WAS COUNTERNARCOTICS ORIENTED IT WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY 
DECERTIFICATION. WE LEARNED SUBSEQUENTLY THAT THAT IS NOT THE CASE 
AND THAT WE COULD NOT IMPLEMENT THE CASE. 

THE NEXT STEP WE FOLLOWED WAS TO TRY FOR APPROVAL OF A SOLE 
SOURCE CONTRACT TO EFFECT THE REPAIRS. THAT PROCESS HAS BEEN IN 
THE WORKS FOR OVER TWO MONTHS. AND ONLY TODAY DID WE RECEIVE THE 
TASK ORDER WHICH WILL RESULT IN THE REPAIR. 

IT NEEDS TO BE SAID THAT THE DC3 ' S ARE THE BACKBONE OF THE 
DANTI AND THAT THE DANTI CONDUCTS AN AVERAGE OF 5 FLIGHTS PER 
MONTH WITH EACH AIRCRAFT. THAT SAID, WE CAN CALCULATE THAT THE 
LOSS OF FLIGHT TIME FOR THE DANTI FROM THIS ARICRAFT SINCE AUGUST 
7, 1995 TO THE PRESENT TRANSLATES INTO A LOSS OF APPROXIMATELY 6 00 
FLIGHTS FOR THE YEAR. EVEN BY DOUBLING THE REQUIREMENTS ON THE 
REMAINING DC-3, IT HAS BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO MAKE UP THE LOST TIME. 
NOT HAVING THE DC-3 ON THE FLIGHT LINE MEANS THE DANTI HAVE HAD TO 
TAKE A CORRESPONDING REDUCTION IN THE ACTIVITIES THEY OTHERWISE 
WOULD HAVE CARRIED OUT IN A GIVEN MONTH. RECENTLY, THE REMAINING 



132 



DC- 3 TOOK SEVEN ROUNDS FROM GROUND FIRE WHILE ON A REFUELING 
MISSION TO MIRAFLORES. FORTUNATELY THE MAINTENANCE TEAM WAS ABLE 
TO REPAIR THE AIRCRAFT IN A FEW HOURS, PUTTING IT BACK INTO SERVICE 
THE NEXT DAY. 

ATTACHMENTS: UNCLASSIFIED CABLE TO INL ON THE DAMAGE AND PROPOSED 
REPAIRS 



133 



Majority Staff Recommendation on the Proposed Direct Sale of Blackhawk Support (utility) 
UH-60 Helicopters to the Colombian Army 



We strongly recommend approval for the direct sale of the requested number (12) of 
these Blackhawk suppon helicopters to the Colombian Army as they desire by the end of 
November, 1996. A serious and deadly narcotics based war rages full scale in Colombia 
today, where the government is often out armed, immobile and ill equipped to wage this 
struggle, which is also in our vital national interest. 

In doing so, we also acknowledge there is a need for several assurances in writing 
from the State Department in order to help advance this our vital national interest in the 
counter-narcotics struggle in the world's most important drug source nation (80% world's 
cocaine, now also 60% of the heroin in U.S.) consistent with our concerns for himian rights. 

Assurances needed: 

First, the Minister of Defense, including the Commander of the Armed Forces, and 
Conmiander of the Army, will in all instances were it is both practicable and appropriate, 
fully commit to use these Blackhawk utility helicopters in full support of the Colombian 
National Police, which has had the long, traditional, and very outstanding lead role in the 
battle against illicit drugs, now spreading to vast areas and regions beyond even its reach. 

Second, the U.S. government will commit at the same time to deliver as soon as 
possible and without any delay to the Colombian National Police (CNP) at least an equal 
number (12) of UH-IH (Hueys), which will be converted to Huey lis (improved lift, range, 
and high altimde performance). We must also enhance this outstanding professional and well 
trained police agency's (with an exemplary human rights record) ability to also prosecute a 
even more effective war on drugs, against often better equipped narco-guerrillas, or better 
financed drug traffickers. 

Finally, the State Department shall report annually to the appropriate Committees of 
the House and the Senate (and provide briefings upon requests) on the utilization and 
performance of the Colombian Army in operations where the Blackhawk helicopters are 
deployed during the preceding year. The report shall include analysis of three specific areas: 

A. Performance and conduct of the Colombian Army in its respect for human rights, 
vigilance of human rights violations, and discipline; with recommendations to improve 
human rights protection, if appropriate. 

B. Maintenance record and pilot performance data on the use of these Blackhawk 
utility helicopters, including any recommendations to improve efficiency in one or both of 
these areas, in particular with respect to all coimtemarcotics missions that the Colombian 
Army acts to support. 



134 



C. Data on the direct support provided to the Colombian National Police by the UH- 
60 Helos, for example; number of missions, number of CNP personnel transported, amount 
of CNP supplies moved forward. 



135 



Additional Question for the Record 

Submitted to Robert S. Gelbard by Chairman Oilman 

House Committee on International Relations 

September 11, 1996 



Ql . Please provide an estimated completion date for final 
installation of all the remaining miniguns not yet in use by 
the Colombian National Police (CNP) under the proposal as 
part of Congressional approval of the Blackhawk utility 
helicopter sale, which involves the CNP's use of its own 
funds to complete this minigun installation on its UHIH helos? 

A. According to Embassy Bogota, the CNP has contacted a 

Colombian arms expert to install the remaining miniguns. As 

of November 22, the Colombian CNP expert was doing a parts 

inventory. He will then do a time-line plan and present it 

to CNP Commander General Serrano for approval by November 29. 

The Embassy informed us on November 22 that it has a pending 
request with SOUTHCOM for a subject matter expert exchange 
(SMEE) on minigun installation. 



136 



Additional Question for the Record 

Submitted to Robert S. Gelbard by Chairman Gilman 

House Committee on International Relations 

September 11, 1996 



Q2 . Please identify for the record the individuals who 
served as the Assistant Secretary of State for the then INM 
Bureau, as well as U.S. Ambassador to Colombia at both the 
time the original decision was made to provide the CNP the 
miniguns, as well as on the dates the miniguns were in fact 
eventually delivered to the CNP in Bogota? If any of these 
individuals remain in the State Department today, please 
identify their positions. 



A. In May 1991, when Embassy Bogota initiated and the 
Department approved an FMS for the CNP to purchase miniguns, 
Ambassador Melvyn Levitsky was Assistant Secretary for INM 
and Morris Busby was U.S. Ambassador to Colombia. The same 
principals were in those positions during the two shipments 
of miniguns, in October 1992 and in May 1993. Ambassador 
Levitsky is currently U.S. Ambassador to Brazil and 
Ambassador Busby is retired. 



137 



Additional Question for the Record 

Submitted to Robert S. Gelbard by Chairman Oilman 

House Committee on International Relations 

September 11, 1996 



Q3 . Please identify for the record the individuals who 
served as Assistant Secretary of State for INM as well as 
Ambassador to Colombia at the time the decision was made not 
to go forward with installation of the miniguns previously 
provided to the CNP? If any of these individuals remain in 
the State Department today, please identify their positions. 

A. In June 1994, when the Department asked that the 

deployment of a minigun systems firing training site survey 

team for the CNP be postponed, thus effectively ending the 

installation of the miniguns. Ambassador Robert S. Gelbard 

was Assistant Secretary of State for INL and Ambassador 

Morris Busby was still U.S. Ambassador to Colombia. Busby 

left post in July 1994 and retired. Ambassador Gelbard 

continues in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for INL. 



138 



Question for the Record 

Submitted to Robert S. Gelbard by Chairman Gilman 

House Committee on International Relations 

September 11, 1996 



Ql . What date was Congress notified about the miniguns we 
have previously provided for the use of Colombian National 
Police (CNP)? 



A. In May 1991, an FMS case initiated by Embassy Bogota and 
approved in Washington was implemented for the Colombia 
National Police to purchase miniguns for their helicopters, 
paid for out of FY-89 and FY-90 FMS and MAP funds. Congress 
was not notified about the miniguns because, pursuant to 
Section 36 (b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) , the sale 
was well below the $7 million threshold required for a 
congressional notification. 



139 



Question for the Record 

submitted to Robert S. Gelbard by Chairman Oilman 

House Committee on International Relations 

September 11, 1996 

Q2. What were the results of the notification of Congress on 
these miniguns for the CNP? 

A. Congress was not notified because the miniguns did not 
meet the dollar threshold required for notification. 



140 



Question for the Record 

Submitted to Robert S. Gelbard by Chairman Gilman 

House Committee on International Relations 

September 11, 1996 

Q3. When were the miniguns shipped to the CNP? 

A. There were two shipments- -one in October, 1992, and the 
other in May, 1993 . 



141 



Question for the Record 

Submitted to Robert S. Gelbard by Chairman Oilman 

House Committee on International Relations 

September 11, 1996 



Q4 . What was the date the 4 or 5 miniguns the CNP are now 
using were in fact installed? 



A. Embassy officials in Bogota at the time report that the 
miniguns were installed by the CNP between January and 
September, 1995, utilizing Colombian national funds. 



142 



Question for the Record 

Submitted to Robert S. Gelbard by Chairman Oilman 

House Committee on International Relations 

September 11, 1996 



Q5 . Who made the decision to end the installation of the 
miniguns by the CNP, and why? Please provide any cables or 
memos reflecting the rationale behind the decision, and any 
notice to the Embassy in Bogota on the decision itself. 



A. After consulting with our Embassy in Bogota, the 
Department of State informed the Embassy in June of 1994 of 
its decision to defer training for and installation of 
miniguns on helicopters for the Colombian National Police. 
At the time, this decision was made in response to reports of 
alleged human rights abuses by the Colombian security forces 
from human rights groups. Some of the concerns about 
Colombia's human rights record came from U.S. Congressional 
sources. In general, the Department decided to defer 
training for and installation of the miniguns pending review 
of Colombia's human rights record and consideration of 
mechanisms to ensure the proper use of U.S. counternarcotics 
assistance . 

In subsequent queries, the U.S. Embassy among others 
provided background on the reliable human rights record of 
the narcotics unit of the CNP, as well as additional detail 
on the CNP's interest in quick installation of the miniguns. 
However, in the intervening period the Department of State 
did not revise its original guidance to the Embassy. 
Relevant Department and U.S. Embassy telegrams will be 



143 



made available separately to the Committee following standard 
procedures . 

In late 1995, the CNP, on its own, using an independent 
contractor, installed miniguns on five helicopters. Since 
they were installed, there is every indication that the drug 
unit of the CNP has used these guns properly and only in a 
defensive mode. In October 1996, after the September HIRC 
hearing, the U.S. Embassy in Bogota reported that the 
Colombian National Police has decided to pay for costs 
associated with training and installation of the remaining 
miniguns. 



144 

Question for the Record 

Submitted to Robert S. Gelbard by Chairman Oilman 

House Committee on International Relations 

September 11, 1996 

Q6 Was congress also notified of this decision to terminate 
installation of the miniguns as provided? If not, why. 

A. Congress was not formally notified of the decision to 
terminate the training for and installation of the miniguns. 
There is no statutory requirement to notify Congress of 
decisions to suspend FMS cases. 



145 



Question for the Record 

Submitted to Robert S. Gelbard by Chairman Oilman 

House Committee on International Relations 

September 11, 1996 



Q7 . Did anyone ask the CNP to return the previously provided 
miniguns once the decision was made to not permit them to 
install this equipment? Did anyone ask the CNP to remove the 
miniguns they had already installed? Are those miniguns now 
being used by the CNP? 



A. Because the miniguns were purchased, they are the 
property of the Government of Colombia. The U.S. has no 
legal basis to request that they be returned and the U.S. 
Government made no such request. No official request was 
made to remove the miniguns and we are not aware of any 
informal discussion about removing them. According to the 
Government of Colombia, five miniguns have been and nine will 
soon be installed in CNP helicopters. The CNP told our 
Embassy that the remaining six miniguns purchased by them had 
recently been transferred to the Colombian Air Force. 



146 



Question for the Record 

Submitted to Robert S. Gelbard by Chairman Oilman 

House Committee on International Relations 

September 11, 1996 



Q8 . What is needed for all the miniguns we originally- 
provided to be installed now? 



A. Complete installation of the miniguns requires mounts, 
wiring harnesses and motors. The 20 miniguns shipped to 
Colombia arrived without motors and electrical wiring 
necessary for installation. According to information 
provided to the U.S. Embassy, the CNP plans to pay for this 
expense itself by contracting a Colombian civilian arms 
expert who has worked on similar installations for the 
Colombian Air Force to install the nine remaining miniguns 
for the CNP. 



147 



Question for the Record 

Submitted to Robert S. Gelbard by Chairman Oilman 

House Committee on International Relations 

September 11, 1996 



Q9. Does the State Department have plans to aggressively 
pursue both the motors and wiring necessary to install the 
remaining miniguns in the CNP inventory? If not, why? If 
so, please outline the plan. 



A. As stated in question 8, the CNP plans itself to fully 
fund installation of the remaining miniguns on helicopters in 
the CNP inventory. The State Department/INL has decided to 
offset this cost (approximately $60,000) by paying for other 
CNP expenditures associated with drug control. 



148 



Question for the Record 

Submitted to Robert S. Gelbard by Chairman Gilman 

House Committee on International Relations 

September 11, 1996 



QIO. What is the tentative date all the miniguns will be 
fully installed? 



A. The CNP will begin actual installation of the miniguns 
within the next couple of months and will complete the job as 
soon as possible. 



149 



Question for the Record 

Submitted to Robert S. Gelbard 

House Committee on International Relations 

September 11, 1996 



Ql . Please supply for the official hearing record hard copy 
of unclassified cable dated 12/19/95 from Embassy Bogota 
Subject "Letter of Request for CNP DC-3 Repair"? 



A. Attached, for the official hearing record, is a copy of 
Bogota 16354, dated 12/19/95, subject: "Letter of Request for 
CNP DC-3 Repair. " 



150 



UNCLASSIFIED PTQ0827 

PAGE 01 BOGOTA 16354 202322Z 

ACTION INL-01 



R202321ZDEC95 



UNCLAS BOGOTA 016354 



SUBJECT: LETTER OF REQUEST FOR CNP DC-3 REPAIR 

E.G. 12958: N/A 

REF: CNP/DIPON-DIRAN LETTER 18 DEC 95 

1. REFERENCE LEHER IS A SOLE SOURCE REQUEST FOR THE 
REPAIR OF THE CNP DC-3 SERIAL NUMBER 211. AN 
UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF THE LEHER FOLLOWS: 

"MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE 
NATIONAL POLICE 
DIRECTORATE GENERAL 
TO: MR. VICTOR ABEYTA 

DIRECTOR 

NARCOTICS AFFAIRS SECTION 

US EMBASSY BOGOTA 

AIRCRAFT DC-3 TP, SERIAL NUMBER 21 US GROUNDED. 
HAVING SUFFERED MAJOR DAMAGE WHILE PERFORMING A 
COUNTERNARCOTICS MISSION IN GUAVIARE DEPARTMENT, 
REPAIRS ARE NEEDED URGENTLY. WE REQUEST THE REPAIR 
WORK FOR THIS ACFT BE DONE USING THE FMS SYSTEM WITH 
SOLE SOURCE TO BASLER TURBO CONVERSION INC. OSHKOSH 
WISCONSIN. THIS COMPANY PERFORMED THE ORIGINAL 
MODIFICATION OF THE ACFT AND HAS THE NECESSARY 
INFRASTRUCTURE TO RESTORE THE AIRPLANE. 



151 



THE FOLLOWING REPAIRS ARE NECESSARY: 

1 . REPLACEMENT OF LEFT WING WITH ONE HAVING THE SAME 
CONFIGURATION AS THE ORIGINAL MODIFICATION. 

2. REPLACEMENT OF LEFT MAIN LANDING GEAR. 

3. LER CENTER WING REPAIR. 

4. REPAIR OR REPLACE OF ALL COMPONENTS DAMAGED DURING 
THE ACCIDENT, INCLUDING THOSE THAT WERE NOT POSSIBLE 

TO IDENTIFY DURING THE VISUAL INSPECTION. 

A BASLER FLIGHT CREW WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR FERRYING 
THE ACFTTO BASLERIS REPAIR FACILITIES IN OSHKOSH 
WISCONSIN. 

THE CNP WILL TURN IN THE ACFT IN FLYABLE CONDITION AND 
MEETING SAFETY O^ FLIGHT REQUIREMENTS. 

REQUEST EXPEDITIOUS HANDLING OF THIS REPAIR SINCE THE 
AVAILABILiW OF THIS ACFT IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO 
FULFILLMENT OF COUNTERNARCOTiCS MISSIONS. 

SINCERELY, 

SIGNED 

GENERAL ROSSO jOSE SERRANO CADENA 

GENERAL DIRECTOR NATIONAL POLICE" 

2. NAS AND USMILGP CONCUR WITH THE SOLE SOURCE 
REQUEST FOR BASLER TURBO CONVERSION INC. THIS Vv/ILL 
MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF THE PROGRAM SINCE IDENTICAL 
STANDARD ITEMS USED IN THE BASIC CONVERSION WILL BE 
USED FOR THE REPAIR. 

3. REQUEST FORMAL PRICE AND AVAILABILITY (P&A) IN THE 
FORM OF A LEHER OF OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE (LOA) BE 
PROVIDED AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME. THE ESTIMATED 
CASE VALUE SHOULD NOT EXCEED $500K, INCLUDING A SPARE 
PARTS LINE. 

4. TERMS; CASH, INL FUNDS. COUNTERNARCOTICS STATEMENT 
APPLIES 

5. NAS POC IS MR, JOHN CROW, 571-315-081 1 EXT. 2588. 
MILGP POC IS MAJ FRANK CORTES. COMM. 571-221-6870. 
FRECHEHE 



152 



Question for the Record 

Submitted to Robert S. Gelbard 

House Committee on International Relations 

September 11, 1996 



Q2 . Please also provide for the record a copy of the 
referenced letter from General Serrano dated 12/18/95 to NAS 
Director in Bogota, asking for urgent repair of DC-3 serial 
number 211? 



A. Attached for the record is a copy of the referenced 
letter from General Serrano dated 12/18/95. 



153 

MiNISTERfO DE DEFENSA NACiONAL 




POUCIA NACIONAb 
OIREGCION GENERAL 



Santiif« de Bocotd, D. C. 



w 


y 


DIPON- DIRAN 


ASUNTO: 




Solicitud 


AL : 




Seftor Doctor 



VICTOR ABEYTA 

DIRECTOR OFICINA DE PROGkAMAClON NAS 
Embajada dc EE.UU 



Dcbido a los damxs sufiidos por la iteroitavd DC -3 TP, dc matrfcula PNO 
211^ en dcsarroUo dc. misiones Antinarcoticos en la Region del Guaviare y rcquiriendosti con 
urgtticia suhcitn sc ge^tionc U reparaci<5n del avidn a traycs del Mistenta FMS con fucntc dnica 
(Sole source) con la Companfa Basic r Turbo Convnrsidn Inc dc Oshko.ih Wisconsin la ctial 
efedtuo la moditicacinn y poMe lu int'raestructura necesaria para habilitai lu acronave. 



o<'ors.irM>. 



I^as siguientes son la.« r(>.paracio(K'$ que previa csUidio tecnicu se hacen 

1. Cambio del piano izquierduicon la misma conl'iguracion. 

2. Reemplazo tren de atcrrivaj^ izquicrdo. 

3. Reparacion "CE^fTER WING" del Ala izquicrda. 

4. Reparacion o reempla/o; de todos aquellos componentcs 
eitructurales donde se f^rescntan discrepanciasi durante la 
in5pecci6n 

De igual manera se requicrc (ripul4cinn por parte de la Compatifu Bnslor 
pnra el trasUdo dc la a«ronavc hasta k ciudad dc Oshko^h Wisconsin. 



154 



BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY 



3 9999 05983 795 3 



La Polkfa Nncional cntregari U aetonave en laa mcjores coiKljcionM do 
kcguridad para cl vucio dc trtHlado. 



Reconiiendo sc ugilice 6»le procfcK) y* que Ja disponibilidad de dita 
acrisnHve os de vital importancia para el cumpJimienlo dc misioncs AntinarcdUcon. 



Atentanicnte, 





I ROSSO JOSE ^ERRA^O CADENA 

r/3ejior«l Policfa Nlcional ' 



• CAMBIAMOS PARA SERVIR A \a CiENTE 



155 



Question for the Record 

Submitted to Robert S. Gelbard 

House Committee on International Relations 

September 11, 1996 



Q3 . Please ascertain the current status of any mini-guns we 
have previously provided the Government of El Salvador. Who 
now has title to this equipment? Can it be provided to the 
Colombian National Police, and if so, will INL make a effort 
to transfer this equipment? If not, please explain why not? 



A. The USG provided 48 M134 miniguns to El Salvador from 
1985 to 1991 (24 in 1985, 4 in 1986, 8 in 1988, and 12 in 
1991) . These miniguns are integral parts of the M-21 weapon 
sub-system mounted on Salvadoran UH-IM helicopters. Removing 
the M-134 miniguns would render the weapon sub-system 
ineffective and prevent the UH-lM's from completing their 
primary mission. The helicopters and weapons system were 
transfered to the Government of El Salvador as an integrated 
weapon system. 

Because the Government of El Salvador has the title to 
these miniguns, the USG cannot request them back or transfer 
them to Colombia. Should the GOES be interested in selling 
them to the Government of Colombia, the sale would have to be 
approved by the State Department. Nevertheless, the sale 
would have to be for the entire system -- helicopter and gun 
--as the minigun is an integral part of the helicopter. 

o 



36-261 (160) 



ISBN 0-16-053904-8 



9 780 




60"539046 



90000