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Other Books by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar
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Evolution of Provincial Finance in
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Mr. Gandhi & theJLmancipation of
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Forthcoming. Works :

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in Ancient India.

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What the Hindus Have Done to Us.

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PAKISTAN

THE PARTITION OF INDIA

BY
Dr. B. R. AMBEDKAR

THACKER & Co., LTD.

FIRST PUBLISHED DECEMBER 1940

SECOND EDITION FEBRUARY 1945

THIRD EDITION 1946

Price Rs. 015/12

Published by C. Murphy, for
Thacker <& Co., Ltd., Rampart Row, Bombay,

and printed by R. Bourdon,
at Western Printers <£ Publishers' Press,
15 <& 23. Hamam Street, Fort, Bombay.

INSCRIBED TO THE MEMORY

RAMU

As a token of my appreciation of
her goodness of heart, her nobility
of mind and her purity of character
and also for the cool fortitude and
readiness to suffer along with me
which she showed in those friendless
days of want and worries which fell
to our lot.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
PROLOGUE «. * ...
INTRODUCTION

PAGES
ix — xi

xiii — xiv
xv — xxvi

PART I— MUSLIM CASE FOR PAKISTAN

CHAPTER I— What does the League Demand ? ... 3—10

CHAPTER II— A Nation Calling for a Home ... ... 11—21

CHAPTER III— Escape from Degradation ... ... 23—32

PART II— HINDU CASE AGAINST PAKISTAN

CHAPTER IV— Break-up of Unity... ... ... 35—49

CHAPTER V— Weakening of the Defences... ... 51—87

CHAPTER VI— Pakistan and Communal Peace ... 89-113

PART III— WHAT IF NOT PAKISTAN ?

CHAPTER VII— Hindu Alternative to Pakistan ... 117—185

CHAPTER VIII— Muslim Alternative to Pakistan ... 187—195

CHAPTER IX— Lessons from Abroad ... ... 197—212

PART IV— PAKISTAN AND THE MALAISE

CHAPTER X— Social Stagnation ... ... ... 215—238

CHAPTER XI— Communal Aggression ... ... 239—261

CHAPTER XII— National Frustration ... ... 263—339

PART V

CHAPTER XIII— Must There be Pakistan? '... .. 343—365

CHAPTER XIV— The Problems of Pakistan ... ... 367—382

CHAPTER XV— Who Can Decide? ... ... 383—402

EPILOGUE ... ... ... ... ... 403-414

APPENDICES ... ... ... ... 415—478

INDEX ... ... ... ... ... 479—481*

MAPS

TO THE SECOND EDITION

The problem of Pakistan has given a headache to everyone,
more so to me than to anybody else. I cannot help recalling
with regret how much of my time it has consumed when so
much of my other literary work of greater importance to me
than this is held up for want of it. I therefore hope that this
second edition will also be the last. I trust that before it is
exhausted either the question will be settled or withdrawn.

There are four respects in which this second edition differs
from the first.

The first edition contained many misprints which formed
the subject of complaints from many readers as well as reviewers.
In preparing this edition, I have taken as much care as is possible
to leave no room for complaint on this score. The first edition
consisted only of three parts. Part V is an addition. It contains
my own views on the various issues involved in the problem of
Pakistan. It has been added because of the criticism levelled
against the first edition that while I wrote about Pakistan I did
not state what views I held on the subject. The present edition
differs from the first in another respect. The maps contained
in the first edition are retained but the number of appendices
have been enlarged. In the first edition there were only eleven
appendices. The present edition has twenty-five. To this edition
I have also added an index which did not find a place in the first
edition.

The book appears to have supplied a real want. I have seen
how the thoughts, ideas and arguments contained in it have
been pillaged by authors, politicians and editors of newspapers to
support their sides. I am sorry they did not observe the decency
of acknowledging the source even when they lifted not merely

* In the first edition there unfortunately occurred through oversight in proof
correction a discrepancy between the population figures in the different districts of
Bengal and the map showing the lay-out of Pakistan as applied to Bengal which
had resulted in two districts which should have been included in the Pakistan area
being excluded from it. In this edition, this error has been rectified and the map
and the figures have been brought into conformity.

Pakistan

the argument but also the language of the book. But that is a
matter I do not mind. I am glad that the book has been of service
to Indians who are faced with this knotty problejn of Pakistan.
The fact that Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah in their recent talks
cited the book as an authority on the subject which might be
consulted with advantage bespeaks the worth of the book.

The book by its name might appear to deal only with the
X. Y. Z. of Pakistan. It does more than that. It is an analytical
presentation of Indian history and Indian politics in their com-
munal aspects. As such, it is intended to explain the A. B. C. of
Pakistan also. The book is more than a mere treatise on Paki-
stan. The material relating to Indian history and Indian politics
contained in this book is so large and so varied that it might well
be called Indian Political What is What.

The book has displeased both Hindus as well as Muslims
though the reasons for the dislike of the Hindus are different
from the reasons for the dislike of the Muslims. I am not sorry
for this reception given to my book. That it is disowned by the
Hindus and unowned by the Muslims is to me the best evidence
that it has the vices of neither and that from the point of view of
independence of thought and fearless presentation of facts the
book is not a party production.

Some people are sore because what I have said has hurt
them. I have not, I confess, allowed myself to be influenced by
fears of wounding either individuals or classes, or shocking
opinions however respectable they may be. I have often felt
regret in pursuing this course, but remorse never. Those whom
I may have offended must forgive me, in consideration of the
honesty and disinterestedness of my aim. I do not claim to
have written dispassionately though I trust I have written with-
out prejudice. It would be hardly possible — I was going to say
decent — for an Indian to be calm when he talks of his country
and thinks of the times. In dealing with the question of
Pakistan my object has been to draw a perfectly accurate, and,
at the same time, a suggestive picture of the situation as I see
it. Whatever points of strength and weakness I have discovered
on either side I have brought them boldly forward. I have taken
pains to throw light on the mischievous effects that are likely
to proceed from an obstinate and impracticable course of action.

Preface to the Second Edition

The witness of history regarding the conflict between the
forces of the authority of the State and of anti-State nationalism
within, has been uncertain, if not equivocal. As Prof. Fried-
mann* observes : —

"There is not a single modern State which has not, at one time
or another, forced a recalcitrant national group to live tinder its
authority. Scots, Bretons, Catalans, Germans, Poles, Czechs, Finns,
all have, at some time or another, been compelled to accept the
authority of a more powerful State whether they liked it or not.
Often, as in Great Britain or France, force eventually led to co-
operation and a co-ordination of State authority and national
cohesion. But in many cases, such as those of Germany, Poland,
Italy and a host of Central European and Balkan countries, the
forces of Nationalism did not rest until they had thrown off the
shackles of State Power and formed a State of their own. ..."

In the last edition, I depicted the experience of countries in which
the State engaged itself in senseless suppression of nationalism and
weathered away in the attempt. In this edition I have added by
way of contrast the experience of other countries to show that
given the will to live together it is not impossible for diverse com-
munities and even for diverse nations to live in the bosom of one
State. It might be said that in tendering advice to both sides I
have used terms more passionate than they need have been. If I
have done so it is because I felt that the manner of the physician
who tries to surprise the vital principle in each paralyzed organ
in order to goad it to action was best suited to stir up the average
Indian who is complacent if not somnolent, who is unsuspecting
if not ill-informed, to realize what is happening. I hope my
effort will have the desired effect.

I cannot close this preface without thanking Prof. Manohar
B. Chitnis of the Khalsa College, Bombay, and Mr. K. V. Chitre
for their untiring labours to remove all printer's and clerical
errors that had crept into the first edition and to see that this
edition is free from all such blemishes. I am also very grateful to
Prof. Chitnis for the preparation of the Index which has un-
doubtedly enhanced the utility of the book.

1st January 1945, B. R. AMBEDKAR.

22, Prithviraj Road,

New Delhi,

• Th€ Crisis of the National State (1943), p. 4.

PROLOGUE

•

It can rightly be said that the long introduction with which
this treatise opens leaves no excuse for a prologue. But there
is an epilogue which is affixed to the treatise. Having done
that, I thought of prefixing a prologue, firstly , because an epilogue
needs to be balanced by a prologue, and secondly, because the
prologue gives me room to state in a few words the origin of
this treatise to those who may be curious to know it and to
impress upon the readers the importance of the issues raised in it.
For the satisfaction of the curious it may be stated that there
exists, at any rate in the Bombay Presidency, a political organiza-
tion called the Independent Labour Party (abbreviated into I.L.P. )
for the last three years. It is not an ancient, hoary organization
which can claim to have grown grey in politics. The I.L.P.
is not in its dotage and is not overtaken by senility, for which
second childhood is given as a more agreeable name. Compared
with other political organizations, the I.L.P. is a young and
fairly active body, not subservient to any clique or interest.
Immediately after the passing of the Lahore Resolution on
Pakistan by the Muslim League, the Executive Council of the
I.L.P. met to consider what attitude it should adopt towards
this project of Pakistan. The Executive Council could see that
there was underlying Pakistan an idea to which no objection
could be taken. Indeed, the Council was attracted to the scheme
of Pakistan inasmuch as it meant the creation of ethnic states
as a solution of the communal problem. The Council, however,
did not feel competent to pronounce at that stage a decided
opinion on the issue of Pakistan. The Council, therefore,
resolved to appoint a committee to study the question and make
a report on it. The committee consisted of myself as the Chairman,
and Principal M. V. Donde, B.A., Mr. S. C. Joshi, M.A., LL.B.,
Advocate (O.S.), M.L.C., Mr. R. R. Bhole, B.Sc., LL.B., M.L.A.,
Mr. D. G. Jadhav, B.A., LL.B., M.L.A., and Mr. A. V. Chitre,
B.A., M.L.A., all belonging to the I.L.P., as members of the com-
mittee. Mr. D. V. Pradhan, member, Bombay Municipal Corpo-
ration, acted as Secretary to the committee, The committee asked
me to prepare a report on Pakistan which I did. The same was

Pakistan

submitted to the Executive Council of the I. L. P., which resolved
that the report should be published. The treatise now published
is that report.

The book is intended to assist the student of Pakistan to come
to his own conclusion. With that object in view, I have not only
assembled in this volume all the necessary and relevant data but
have also added 14 appendices and 3 maps, which, in my judg-
ment, form an important accompaniment to the book.

It is not enough for the reader to go over the material collected
in the following pages. He must also reflect over it. Let him
take to heart the warning which Carlyle gave to Englishmen of his
generation. He said :

"The Genius of England no longer soars Sunward, world-
defiant, like an Eagle through the storms, 'mewing her mighty

youth,' : the Genius of England — much like a greedy

Ostrich intent on provender and a whole skin ; with its

Ostrich-head stuck into whatever sheltering Fallacy there

may be, and so awaits the issue. The issue has been slow ; but
it now seems to have been inevitable. No Ostrich, intent on
gross terrene provender and sticking its head into Fallacies, but
will be awakened one day — in a terrible a posteriori manner if
not otherwise ! Awake before it comes to that. Gods and men
bid us awake ! The Voices of our Fathers, with thousandfold
stern monition to one and all, bid us awake."

This warning, I am convinced, applies to Indians in their
present circumstances as it once did to Englishmen, and Indians,
if they pay no heed to it, will do so at their peril.

Now, a word for those who have helped me in the prepara-
tion of this report. Mr. M. G. Tipnis, D.C.E., (Kalabhuwan,
Baroda), and Mr. Chhaganlal S. Mody have rendered me great
assistance, the former in preparing the maps and the latter in
typing the manuscript. I wish to express my gratitude to both
for their work which they have done purely as a labour of love.
Thanks are also due in a special measure to my friends Mr.
B. R. Kadrekar and Mr. K. V. Chitre for their labours in under-
taking the most uninteresting and dull task of correcting the
proofs and supervising the printing.

28th December, 1940,

cRajagrah,' B. R. AMBEDKAR.

Dadar, Bombay, 14.

XIV

INTRODUCTION

The Muslim League's Resolution on Pakistan has called
forth different reactions. There are some who look upon it as
a case of political measles to which a people in the infancy of
their conscious unity and power are very liable. Others have
taken it as a permanent frame of the Muslim mind and not
merely a passing phase and have in consequence been greatly
perturbed.

The question is undoubtedly controversial. The issue is
vital and there is no argument which has not been used in the
controversy by one side to silence the other. Some argue that
this demand for partitioning India into two political entities under
separate national states staggers their imagination ; others are
so choked with a sense of righteous indignation at this wanton
attempt to break the unity of a country, which, it is claimed,
has stood as one for centuries, that their rage prevents them from
giving expression to their thoughts. Others think that it need
not be taken seriously. They treat it as a trifle and try to destroy
it by shooting into it similes and metaphors. uYou don't cut
your head to cure your headache," "you don't cut a baby into
two because two women are engaged in fighting out a claim as
to who its mother is," are some of the analogies which are used
to prove the absurdity of Pakistan. In a controversy carried on
the plane of pure sentiment, there is nothing surprising if a dis-
passionate student finds more stupefaction and less understand-
ing, more heat and less light, more ridicule and less seriousness.

My position in this behalf is definite, if not singular. I do not
think the demand for Pakistan is the result of mere political dis-
temper, which will pass away with the efflux of time. As I read
the situation, it seems to me that it is a characteristic in the biolo-
gical sense of the term, which the Muslim body politic has
developed in the same manner as an organism develops a
characteristic. Whether it will survive or not, in the process of
natural selection, must depend upon the forces that may become
operative in the struggle for existence between Hindus and
Musalmans. I am not staggered by Pakistan ; I am not indig-
nant about it; nor do I believe that it can be smashed by shooting

Pakistan

into it similes and metaphors. Those who believe in shoot-
ing it by similes should rememljpr that nonsense does not cease
to be nonsense because it is put in rhyme, and that a metaphor
is no argument though it be sometimes the gunpowder to drive
one home and imbed it in memory. I believe that it would be
neither wise nor possible to reject summarily a scheme if it has
behind it the sentiment, if not the passionate support, of 90 p.c.
Muslims of India. I have no doubt that the only proper attitude
to Pakistan is to study it in all its aspects, to understand its
implications and to form an intelligent judgment about it.

With all this, a reader is sure to ask: Is this book on
Pakistan seasonable in the sense that one must read it, as one
must eat the fruits of the season to keep oneself in health ? If
it is seasonable, is it readable ? These are natural queries and
an author, whose object is to attract readers, may well make use
of the introduction to meet them.

As to the seasonableness of the book there can be no doubt.
The way of looking at India by Indians themselves must be
admitted to have undergone a complete change during the last
20 years. Referring to India Prof. Arnold Toynbee wrote in
1915 :—

"British statesmanship in the nineteenth century regarded
India as a ' Sleeping Beauty,' whom Britain had a prescriptive right
to woo when she awoke ; so it hedged with thorns the garden
where she lay, to safeguard her from marauders prowling in the
desert without. Now the princess is awake, and is claiming
the right to dispose of her own hand, while the marauders have
transformed themselves into respectable gentlemen diligently
occupied in turning the desert into a garden too, but grievously
impeded by the British thorn-hedge. When they politely request
us to remove it, we shall do well to consent, for they will not
make the demand till they feel themselves strong enough to
enforce it, and in the tussle that will follow if we refuse, the
sympathies of the Indian princess will not be on our side. Now
that she is awake, she wishes to walk abroad among her neigh-
bours ; she feels herself capable of rebuffing without our coun-
tenance any blandishments or threats they may offer her, and
she is becoming as weary as they of the thorn-hedge that confines
her to her garden.

" If we treat her with tact, India will never wish to secede
from the spiritual brotherhood of the British Empire, but it is

xvi

Introduction

inevitable that she should lead a more and more independent
life of her own, and follow the example of Anglo-Saxon Com-
monwealths by establishing direct relations with her neighbours.

»
• • • •

Although the writer is an Englishman, the view expressed
by him in 1915 was the view commonly held by all Indians
irrespective of caste or creed. Now that India the " Sleeping
Beauty " of Prof. Toynbee is awake, what is the view of the
Indians about her? On this question, there can be no manner
of doubt that those who have observed this Sleeping Beauty
behave in recent years, feel she is a strange being quite different
from the angelic princess that she was supposed to be. She is a
mad maiden having a dual personality, half human, half animal,
always in convulsions because of her two natures in perpetual
conflict. If there is any doubt about her dual personality, it has
now been dispelled by the Resolution of the Muslim League
demanding the cutting up of India into two, Pakistan and
Hindustan, so that these conflicts and convulsions due to a dual
personality having been bound in one may cease forever, and so
freed from each other, may dwell in separate homes congenial
to their respective cultures, Hindu and Muslim.

It is beyond question that Pakistan is a scheme which will
have to be taken into account. The Muslims will insist upon
the scheme being considered. The British will insist upon some
kind of settlement being reached between the Hindus and the
Muslims before they consent to any devolution of political power.
There is no use blaming the British for insisting upon such a
settlement as a condition precedent to the transfer of power. The
British cannot consent to settle power upon an aggressive Hindu
majority and make it its heir, leaving it to deal with the mino-
rities at its sweet pleasure. That would not be ending imperial-
ism. It would be creating another imperialism. The Hindus,
therefore, cannot avoid coming to grips with Pakistan, much as
they would like to do.

If the scheme of Pakistan has to be considered, and there
is no escape from it, then there are certain points which must be
borne in mind.

The first point to note is tha£ the Hindus and Muslims must
decide the question themselves. They cannot invoke the aid of

xvii

Pakistan

anyone else. Certainly, they cannot expect the British to decide
it for them. From the point of view of the Empire, it matters
very little to the British whether India remains one undivided
whole, or is partitioned into two parts, Pakistan and Hindu-
stan, or into twenty linguistic fragments as planned by the
Congress, so long as all of them are content to live within the
Empire. The British need not interfere for the simple reason
that they are not affected by such territorial divisions.

Further, if the Hindus are hoping that the British will use
force to put down Pakistan, that is impossible. In the first place,
coercion is no remedy. The futility of force and resistance was
pointed out by Burke long ago in his speeches relating to the
coercion of the American colonies. His memorable words may
be quoted not only for the benefit of the Hindu Maha Sabha but
also for the benefit of all. This is what he said :

" The use of force alone is temporary. It may endure a
moment but it does not remove the necessity of subduing again :
a nation is not governed which is perpetually to be conquered.
The next objection to force is its uncertainty. Terror is not
always the effect of force, and an armament is not a victory.
If you do not succeed you are without resource ; for conciliation
failing, force remains ; but force failing, no further hope of recon-
ciliation is left. Power and Authority are sometimes bought by
kindness, but they can never be begged as alms by an impoverished
and defeated violence. A further objection to force is that you im-
pair the object by your very endeavours to preserve it. The
thing you fought for (to wit the loyalty of the people) is not
the thing you recover, but depreciated, sunk, wasted and consumed
in the contest."

Coercion, as an alternative to Pakistan, is therefore unthinkable.

Again, the Muslims cannot be deprived of the benefit of the
principle of self-determination. The Hindu Nationalists who
rely on self-determination and ask how Britain can refuse India
what the conscience of the world has conceded to the smallest
of the European nations, cannot in the same breath ask the
British to deny it to other minorities. The Hindu Nationalist
who hopes that Britain will coerce the Muslims into abandoning
Pakistan, forgets that the right of nationalism to freedom from
an aggressive foreign imperialism and the right of a minority to
freedom from an aggressive majority's nationalism are not two

xviii

Introduction

different things ; nor does the former stand on a more sacred
footing than the latter. They ,are merely two aspects of the
struggle for freedom and as snch equal in their moral import.
Nationalists, fighfing for freedom from aggressive imperialism,
cannot well *ask the help of the British imperialists to thwart
the right of a minority to freedom from the nationalism of an
aggressive majority. The matter must, therefore, be decided
upon by the Muslims and the Hindus alone. The British can-
not decide the issue for them. This is the first important point
to note.

The essence of Pakistanis the opposition to the establishment
of one Central Government having supremacy over the whole of
India. Pakistan contemplates two Central Governments, one for
Pakistan and the other for Hindustan. This gives rise to the
second important point which Indians must take note of. That
point is that the issue of Pakistan shall have to be decided upon
before the plans for a new constitution are drawn and its founda-
tions are laid. If there is to be one Central Government for
India, the design of the constitutional structure would be differ-
ent from what it would be if there is to be one Central Govern-
ment for Hindustan and another for Pakistan. That being so,
it will be most unwise to postpone the decision. Either the
scheme should be abandoned and another substituted by mutual
agreement or it should be decided upon. It will be the greatest
folly to suppose that if Pakistan is buried for the moment, it will
never raise its head again. I am sure, burying Pakistan is not
the same thing as burying the ghost of Pakistan. So long as
the hostility to one Central Government for India, which is the
ideology underlying Pakistan, persists, the ghost of Pakistan will
be there, casting its ominous shadow upon the political future
of India. Neither will it be prudent to make some kind of a
make-shift arrangement for the time being, leaving the perma-
nent solution to some future day. To do so would be something
like curing the symptoms without removing the disease. But,
as often happens in such cases, the disease is driven in, thereby
making certain its recurrence, perhaps in a more virulent form.

I feel certain that whether India should have one Central
Government is not a matter which can be taken as settled ; it is

xix

Pakistan

a matter in issue and although it may not be a live issue now,
some day it will be.

The Muslims have openly declared that «they do not want
to have any Central Government in India and they have given
their reasons in the most unambiguous terms. They have suc-
ceeded in bringing into being five provinces which are predomi-
nantly Muslim in population. In these provinces, they see the
possibility of the Muslims forming a government and they are
anxious to see that the independence of the Muslim Governments
in these provinces is preserved. Actuated by these considera-
tions, the Central Government is an eye-sore to the Muslims of
India. As they visualize the scene, they see their Muslim Pro-
vinces made subject to a Central Government predominantly
Hindu and endowed with powers of supervision over, and even
of interference in, the administration of these Muslim Provinces.
The Muslims feel that to accept one Central Government for the
whole of India is to consent to place the Muslim Provincial
Governments under a Hindu Central Government and to see
the gain secured by the creation of Muslim Provinces lost by
subjecting them to a Hindu Government at the Centre. The
Muslim way of escape from this tyranny of a Hindu Centre is
to have no Central Government in India at all.*

Are the Musalmans alone opposed to the existence of a
Central Government ? What about the Hindus ? There seems
to be a silent premise underlying all political discussions that are
going on among the Hindus that there will always be in India
a Central Government as a permanent part of her political con-
stitution. How far such a premise can be taken for granted is
more than I can say. I may, however, point out that there are
two factors which are dormant for the present but which some
day may become dominant and turn the Hindus away from the
idea of a Central Government.

The first is the cultural antipathy between the Hindu Pro-
vinces. The Hindu Provinces are by no means a happy family.
It cannot be pretended that the Sikhs have any tenderness for
the Bengalees or the Rajputs or the Madrasis. The Bengalee

* This point of view was put forth by Sir Muhammad Iqbal at the Third Round
Table Conference.

Introduction

loves only himself. The Madrasi is bound by his own world.
As to the Mahratta, who does not recall that the Mahrattas, who
set out to destroy the Muslim Empire in India, became a menace
to the rest of. the Hindus whom they harassed and kept under
their yoke for nearly a century ? The Hindu Provinces have
no common traditions and no interests to bind them. On the
other hand, the differences of language, race, and the conflicts
of the past have been the most powerful forces tending to divide
them. It is true that the Hindus are getting together and the
spirit moving them to become one united nation is working on
them. But it must not be forgotten that they have not yet be-
come a nation. They are in the process of becoming a nation
and before the process is completed, there may be a setback
which may destroy the work of a whole century.

In the second place, there is the financial factor. It is not
sufficiently known what it costs the people of India to maintain
the Central Government and the proportionate burden each
Province has to bear.

The total revenue of British India comes to Rs. 194,64,17,926
per annum. Of this sum, the amount raised by the Provin-
cial Governments from provincial sources, comes annually to
Rs. 73,57,50,125 and that raised by the Central Government from
central sources of revenue comes to Rs. 121,06,67,801. This will
show what the Central Government costs the people of India.
When one considers that the Central Government is concerned
only with maintaining peace and does not discharge any func-
tions which have relation to the progress of the people, it should
cause no surprise if people begin to ask whether it is necessary
that they should pay annually such an enormous price to pur-
chase peace. In this connection, it must be borne in mind that
the people in the provinces are literally starving and there is no
source left to the provinces to increase their revenue.

This burden of maintaining the Central Government, which
the people of India have to bear, is most unevenly distributed
over the different provinces. The sources of central revenues
are (1) Customs, (2) Excise, (3) Salt, (4) Currency, (5) Posts
and Telegraphs, (6) Income Tax and (7) Railways. It is not pos-
sible from the accounts published by the Government of India to

Pakistan

work out the distribution of the three sources of central revenue,
namely Currency, Posts and Telegraphs and Railways. Only the
revenue raised from other sources can be wcyked out province
by province. The result is shown in the following table : —

Provinces.

Revenue raised by Provin-
cial Government from
provincial sources.

Revenue raised by Central
Government from central
sources.

Rs.

I Madras

16,13,44,520

9,53,26,745

2 Bombay

12,44,59,553

22,53,44,247

3 Bengal

12,76,60,S92

23,79,01,583

4 U.P.

12,79,99,851

4,05,53,030

5 Bihar

5,23,83,030

1,54,37,742

6 C. P. & Berar

4,27,41,280

31,42,682

7 Assam

2,58,48,474

1,87,55,967

8 Orissa

1,81,99,823

5,67,346

9 Punjab

11,35,86,355

1,18,01,385

10 N.-W. F. P.

1,80,83,548

9,28,294

1 1 Sind

3,70,29,354

5,66,46,915

It will be seen from this table that the burden of maintain-
ing the Central Government is not only heavy but falls unequally
upon the different provinces. The Bombay Provincial Govern-
ment raises Rs. 12,44,59,553 ; as against this, the Central Govern-
ment raises Rs. 22,53,44,247 from Bombay. The Bengal Govern-
ment raises Rs. 12,76,60,892 ; as against this, the Central Govern-
ment raises Rs. 23,79,01,583 from Bengal. The Sind Govern-
ment raises Rs. 3,70,29,354 ; as against this, the Central Govern-
ment raises Rs. 5,66,46,915 from Sind. The Assam Government
raises nearly Rs. 2\ crores ; but the Central Government raises
nearly Rs. 2 crores from Assam. While such is the burden of
the Central Government on these provinces, the rest of the pro-
vinces contribute next to nothing to the Central Government.
The Punjab raises Rs. 11 crores for itself but contributes only
Rs. 1 crore to the Central Government. In the N.-W. F. P. the
provincial revenue is Rs. 1,80,83,548 ; its total contribution to
the Central Government however is only Rs. 9,28,294. U.P.

uii

Introduction

raises Rs. 13 crores but contributes only Rs. 4 crores to the Centre.
Bihar collects Rs. 5 crores for itself; she gives only 1J crores
to the Centre. C. P. and Berar levy a total of 4 crores and pay
to the Centre .31 lakhs.

This financial factor has so far passed without notice. But
time may come when even to the Hindus, who are the strongest
supporters of a Central Government in India, the financial
considerations may make a greater appeal than what purely
patriotic considerations do now. So, it is possible that some day
the Muslims, for communal considerations, and the Hindus, for
financial considerations, may join hands to abolish the Central
Government.

If this were to happen, it is better if it happens before the
foundation of a new constitution is laid down. If it happens
after the foundation of the new constitution envisaging one
Central Government were laid down, it would be the greatest
disaster. Out of the general wreck, not only India as an entity
will vanish, but it will not be possible to save even the Hindu
unity. As I have pointed out, there is not much cement even
among the Hindu Provinces, and once that little cement which
exists is lost, there will be nothing with which to build up even
the unity of the Hindu Provinces. It is because of this that Indians
must decide, before preparing the plans and laying the founda-
tions, for whom the constitutional structure is to be raised and
whether it is temporary or permanent. After the structure is
built as one whole, on one single foundation, with girders run-
ning through from one end to the other; if, thereafter, a part is to
be severed from the rest, the knocking out of the rivets will shake
the whole building and produce cracks in other parts of the
structure which are intended to remain as one whole. The
danger of cracks is greater, if the cement which binds them is, as
in the case of India, of a poor quality. If the new constitution
is designed for India as one whole and a structure is raised on
that basis, and thereafter the question of separation of Pakistan
from Hindustan is raised and the Hindus have to yield, the altera-
tions that may become necessary to give effect to this severance
may bring about the collapse of the whole structure. The desire
of the Muslim Provinces may easily infect the Hindu Provinces

xxiii

Pakistan

and the spirit of disruption generated by the Muslim Provinces
may cause all round disintegration.

•

History is not wanting in instances of constitutions threaten-
ed with disruption. There is the instance of the Southern States
of the American Union. Natal has always been anxious to get
out from the Union of South Africa and Western Australia
recently applied, though unsuccessfully, to secede from the Aus-
tralian Commonwealth.

In these cases actual disruption has not taken place and
where it did, it was soon healed. Indians, however, cannot hope
to be so fortunate. Theirs may be the fate of Czechoslovakia.
In the first place, it would be futile to entertain the hope that if
a disruption of the Indian constitution took place by the Muslim
Provinces separating from the Hindu Provinces, it would be pos-
sible to win back the seceding provinces as was done in the
U.S.A. after the Civil War. Secondly, if the new Indian con-
stitution is a Dominion Constitution, even the British may find
themselves powerless to save the constitution from such a disrup-
tion, if it takes place after its foundations are laid. It seems to
be, therefore, imperative that the issue of Pakistan should be
decided upon before the new constitution is devised.

If there can be no doubt that Pakistan is a scheme which
Indians will have to resolve upon at the next revision of the con-
stitution and if there is no escape from deciding upon it, then it
would be a fatal mistake for the people to approach it without
a proper understanding of the question. The ignorance of some
of the Indian delegates to the Round Table Conference of consti-
tutioi&l law, I remember, led Mr. Garvin of the Observer to
remark that it would have been much better if the Simon Com-
mission, instead of writing a report on India, had made a report
on constitutional problems of India and how they were met by
the constitutions of the different countries of the world. Such a
report I know was prepared for the use of the delegates who
framed the constitution of South Africa. This is an attempt to
make good that deficiency and as such I believe it will be wel-
comed as a seasonable piece.

XXIV

Introduction

So much for the question whether the book is seasonable.
As to the second question, whether the book is readable no
writer can forget, the words of Augustine Birrell when he
said :—

" Cooks, warriors, and authors must be judged by the effects
they produce ; toothsome dishes, glorious victories, pleasant
books, these are our demands. We have nothing to do with
ingredients, tactics, or methods. We have no desire to be admit-
ted into the kitchen, the council, or the study. The cook may
use her saucepans how she pleases, the warrior place his men as
he likes, the author handle his material or weave his plot as best
he can; when the dish is served we only ask, Is it good?; when
the battle has been fought, Who won?; when the book comes
out, Does it read ?

"Authors ought not to be above being reminded that it is
their first duty to write agreeably. Some very disagreeable men
have succeeded in doing so, and there is, therefore, no need for
any one to despair. Every author, be he grave or gay, should try
to make his book as ingratiating as possible. Reading is not a
duty, and has consequently no business to be made disagreeable.
Nobody is under any obligation to read any other man's book."

I am fully aware of this. But I am not worried about
it. That may well apply to other books but not to a book on
Pakistan. Every Indian must read a book on Pakistan, if not
this, then some other, if he wants to help his country to steer
a clear path.

If any book does not read well, i.e., its taste be not good,
the reader will find two things in it which, I am sure, are good.

The first thing he will find is that the ingredients are good.
There is in the book material which will be helpful and to gain
access to which he will have to labour a great deal. Indeed, the
reader will find that the book coritains an epitome of India's
political and social history during the last twenty years, which
it is necessary for every Indian to know.

The second thing he will find is that there is no partisan-
ship. The aim is to expound the scheme of Pakistan in all its
aspects and not to advocate it. The aim is to explain and not
to convert. It would, however, be a pretence to say that I have
no views on Pakistan. Views I have. Some of them are express-
ed, others may have to be gathered. Two things, however, may

XXV

Pakistan

well be said about my views. In the first place, wherever they
are expressed, they have been reasoned out. Secondly, whatever
the views, they have certainly not the fixity gf a popular preju*
dice. They are really thoughts and not views. In, other words,
I have an open mind, though not an empty mind. A person
with an open mind is always the subject of congratulations.
While this may be so, it must, at the same time, be realized that
an open mind may also be an empty mind and that such an open
mind, if it is a happy condition, is also a very dangerous
condition for a man to be in. A disaster may easily overtake a
man with an empty mind. Such a person is like a ship
without ballast and without a rudder. It can have no direction.
It may float but may also suffer a shipwreck against a rock for
want of direction. While aiming to help the reader by placing
before him all the material, relevant and important, the reader
will find that I have not sought to impose my views on him.
I have placed before him both sides of the question and have
left him to form his own opinion.

The reader may complain that I have been provocative in
stating the relevant facts. I am conscious that such a charge
may be levelled against me. I apologize freely and gladly for
the same. My excuse is that I have no intention to hurt. I had
only one purpose, that is, to force the attention of the indifferent
and casual reader to the issue that is dealt with in the book.
I ask the reader to put aside any irritation that he may feel with
me and concentrate his thoughts on this tremendous issue :
Which is to be, Pakistan or no Pakistan?

XXVI

PART I
MUSLIM CASE FOR PAKISTAN

The Muslim Case for Pakistan is sought to be justified on

the following grounds : —

(i) What the Muslims are asking for is the creation of
administrative areas which are ethnically more
homogeneous.

(ii) The Muslims want these homogeneous administra-
tive areas which are predominantly Muslim to
be constituted into separate States,

(a) because the Muslims by themselves consti-

tute a separate nation and desire to have
a national home, and

(b) because experience shows that the Hindus

want to use their majority to treat the
Muslims as though they were second-
class citizens in an alien State.

This part is devoted to the exposition of these grounds.

CHAPTER I

WHAT DOES THE LEAGUE DEMAND?

On the 26th of March 1940, Hindu India was startled to
ittention as it had never been before. On that day, the Mnslim
League at its Lahore Session passed the following Resolution : —

" 1. While approving and endorsing the action taken by the Council
and the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League
as indicated in their resolutions dated the 27th of August, 17th
and 18th of September and 22nd of October 1939 and 3rd of
February 1940 on the constitutional issue, this Session of the
All-India Muslim League emphatically reiterates that the
Scheme of Federation embodied in the Government of India
Act, 1935, is totally unsuited to, and unworkable in the peculiar
conditions of this country and is altogether unacceptable to
Muslim India.

U2. It further records its emphatic view that while the declaration
dated the 18th of October 1939 made by the Viceroy on behalf
of His Majesty's Government is reassuring in as far as it
declares that the policy and plan on which the Government
of India Act, 1935, is based will be reconsidered in consultation
with the various parties, interests and communities in India,
Muslim India will not be satisfied unless the whole constitu-
tional plan is reconsidered de novo and that no revised plan
would be acceptable to the Muslims, unless it is framed with
their approval and consent.

"3. Resolved that it is the considered view of this Session of the
All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be
workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless
it is designated on the following basic principle, viz. that
geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions
which should be so constituted with such territorial readjust-
ments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims
are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and
Eastern Zones of India should be grouped to constitute " Inde-
pendent States " in which the Constituent Units shall be auto-
nomous and sovereign;

Pakistan

"4. That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be
specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in these
units and in the regions for the protection of their religious,
cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights,
and interests in consultation with them ; and in other parts of
India where the Musalmans are in a minority, adequate,
effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provid-
ed in the constitution for them and other minorities for the
protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, admi-
nistrative and other rights, and interests in consultation with
them.

11 5. This Session further authorizes the Working Committee to
frame a scheme of Constitution in accordance with these basic
principles, providing for the assumption finally by the respec-
tive regions of all powers such as defence, external affairs,
communication, customs, and such other matters as may be
necessat}'."

What does this Resolution contemplate? A reference to
para 3 of the Resolution will show that the Resolution contem-
plates that the areas in which Muslims predominate shall be
incorporated into independent States. In concrete terms, it
means that the Punjab, the North-Western Frontier Province,
Baluchistan and Sind in the North-West and Bengal in the East
instead of remaining as the provinces of British India shall
be incorporated as independent States outside of British India.
This is the sum and substance of the Resolution of the Muslim
League.

Does the Resolution contemplate that these Muslim pro-
vinces, after being incorporated into States, will remain each an
independent sovereign State or will they be joined together into
one constitution as members of a single State, federal or unitary ?
On this point, the Resolution is rather ambiguous, if not self-
contradictory. It speaks of grouping the zones into " Indepen-
dent States in which the Constituent Units shall be autonomous
and sovereign." The use of the terms " Constituent Units"
indicates that what is contemplated is a Federation. If that is
so, then, the use of the word " sovereign" as an attribute of the
Units is out of place. Federation of Units and sovereignty of
Units are contradictions. It may be that \vhat is contemplated

What does the League Demand?

is a confederation. It is, however, not very material for the
moment whether these Independent States are to form into a
federation or a confederation. What is important is the basic
demand, namely, that these areas are to be separated from India
and formed into independent States.

The Resolution is so worded as to give the idea that the
scheme adumbrated in it is a new one. But, there can be no
doubt that the Resolution merely resuscitates a scheme which
was put forth by Sir Mahomed Iqbal in his Presidential address
to the Muslim League at its Annual Session held at Lucknow in
December 1930. The scheme was not then adopted by the
League. It was, however, taken up by one Mr. Rehmat Ali
who gave it the name, Pakistan, by which it is known. Mr.
Rehmat Ali, M.A., LL.B., founded the Pakistan Movement in
1933. He divided India into two, namely, Pakistan and Hindu-
stan. His Pakistan included the Punjab, N. -W.F. Province,
Kashmir, Sincl and Baluchistan. The rest to him was Hindu-
stan. His idea was to have an "independent and separate
Pakistan " composed of five Muslim provinces in the North
as an independent State. The proposal was circulated to the
members of the Round Table Conference but never officially
put forth. It seems an attempt was made privately to obtain
the assent of the British Government, who, however, declined to
consider it because they thought that this was a " revival of the
old Muslim Empire/'*

The League has only enlarged the original scheme of Paki-
stan. It has sought to create one more Muslim State in the East
to include the Muslims in Bengal and Assam. Barring this, it
expresses in its essence and general outline the scheme put forth
by Sir Mahomed Iqbal and propagated by Mr. Rehmat Ali.
There is no name given to this new Muslim State in the East.
This has made no difference in the theory and the issues involv-
ed in the ideology of Mr. Rehmat Ali. The only difficulty one
feels is that the League, while enlarging the facets, has not
christened the two Muslims States with short and sweet names
as it might have been expected to do. That it did not do and we
are left to carry on the discussion with two long jaw-breaking

• Halide Edib— Inside India, p. 355.

Pakistan

names of Muslim State in the West and Muslim State in the
East. I propose to solve this difficulty by reserving the name
Pakistan to express the ideology underlyipg the two-nation
theory and its consequent effect, namely, partition^ and by desig-
nating the two Muslim States in the North-West and North-
East as Western Pakistan and Eastern Pakistan.

The scheme not only called Hindu India to attention but
it shocked Hindu India. Now it is natural to ask, what is there
that is new or shocking in this scheme?

Is the idea of linking up of the provinces in the North-West
a shocking idea? If so, let it be remembered that the linking
of these provinces is an age-old project put forth by successive
Viceroys, Administrators and Generals. Of the Pakistan pro-
vinces in the North-West, the Punjab and N.-W.F.P. constituted
a single province ever since the Punjab was conquered by the
British in 1849. The two continued to be a single province till
1901. It was in 1901 that Lord Curzon broke up their unity and
created the present two provinces. As to the linking up of the
Punjab with Sind, there can be no doubt that had the conquest
of Sind followed and not preceded the conquest of the Punjab,
Sind would have been incorporated into the Punjab, for the two
are not only contiguous but are connected by a single river which
is the most uatural tie between them. Although Sind was joined
to Bombay, which in the absence of the Punjab was the only
base from which it could be governed, the idea of disconnecting
Sind from Bombay and joining it to the Punjab was not given
up and projects in that behalf were put forth from time to time.
It was first put forth during the Governor-Generalship of Lord
Dalhousie; but for financial reasons, was not sanctioned by the
Court of Directors. After the Mutiny, the question was reconsi-
dered but owing to the backward state of communications along
the Indus, Lord Canning refused to give his consent. In 1876,
Lord Northbrook was of the opinion that Sind should be joined
to the Punjab. In 1877, Lord Lytton, who succeeded North-
brook, sought to create a trans-Indus province, consisting of the
six frontier districts of the Punjab and of the trans-Indus districts

What does the League Demand?

of Sind. This would have included the six Frontier districts of
the Punjab, namely, Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu (except
the Cis-Indus tracts), Dera Ismail Khan (with the same excep-
tion), Dera Gh#zi Khan, and trans-Indus Sind (with the exception
of Karachi). Lytton also proposed that Bombay should receive
the whole or part of the Central Provinces, in order to compen-
sate it for the loss of trans-Indus Sind. These proposals were
not acceptable to the Secretary of State. During the Viceroyalty
of Lord Lansdowne (1888-94), the same project was revived in
its original form, namely, the transfer of Sind to the Punjab, but
owing to the formation of the Baluchistan Agency, Sind had
ceased to be a Frontier district and the idea which was military
in its motive, lost its force and Sind remained without being
incorporated in the Punjab. Had the British not acquired
Baluchistan and had Lord Curzon not thought of carving out
the N.-W.F.P. out of the Punjab, we would have witnessed long
ago the creation of Pakistan as an administrative unit.

With regard to the claim for the creation of a national
Muslim vState in Bengal, again, there is nothing new in it. It will
be recalled by mail}- that in 1905, the province of Bengal and
Assam was divided by the then Viceroy, Lord Curzon into two
provinces: (1) Eastern Bengal and Assam with Dacca as its
capital and (2) Western Bengal with Calcutta as its capital. The
newly-created province of Eastern Bengal and Assam included
Assam and the following districts of the old province of Bengal
and Assam: (1) Dacca, (2) Mymensingh, (3) Fariclpur, (4)
Backergunge, (5) Tippera, (6) Noakhali, (7) Chittagong, (8)
Chittagong Hill Tracts, (9) Rajashahi, (10) Dinajpur, (11) Jal-
paiguri, (12) Rangpur, (13) Bogra, (14) Palma and (15) Malda.
Western Bengal included the remaining districts of the old Pro-
vince of Bengal and Assam with the addition of the district of
Sambalpur which was transferred from C.P. to Western Bengal.

This division of one province into two, which is known in
Indian history as the Partition of Bengal, was an attempt to
create a Muslim State in Eastern Bengal, inasmuch as the new
province of Eastern Bengal and Assam was, barring parts of
Assam, a predominantly Muslim area. But, the partition was
abrogated in 1911 by the British who yielded to the Hindus,

Pakistan

who were opposed to it and did not care for the wishes of the
Muslims, as they were too weak to make themselves felt. , If the
partition of Bengal had not been annulled, tjie Muslim State in
Eastern Bengal, instead of being a new project, wpuld now have
been 39 years old.*

Ill

Is the idea of separation of Pakistan from Hindustan shock-
ing? If so, let me recall a few facts which are relevant to the
issue and which form the basic principles of the Congress policy.
It will be remembered that as soon as Mr. Gandhi captured the
Congress, he did two things to popularize it. The first thing he
did was to introduce Civil Disobedience.

Before Mr. Gandhi's entry into the politics of India, the
parties contending for power were the Congress, the Liberals
and the Terrorists of Bengal. The Congress and the Liberals
were really one party and there was no distinction between
them such as divides them today. We can, therefore,
safely say that there were only two parties in India, the Liberals
and the Terrorists. In both, the conditions for admission were
extreme^ difficult. In the Liberal Party, the condition for admis-
sion was not merely education but a high degree of learning.
Without first establishing a reputation for study, one could never
hope to obtain admission to the Liberal Party. It effectively
excluded the uneducated from rising to political power.
The Terrorists had prescribed the hardest test conceivable. Only
those who were prepared to give their lives for the cause, not
in the sense of dedicating them but in the sense of d}nng for
it, could become members of their organization. No knave could,
therefore, get an entry into the Terrorists' organization. Civil
disobedience does not require learning. It does not call for the
shedding of life. It is an easy middle way for that large majority
who have no learning and who do not wish to undergo the
extreme penalty and at the same time obtain the notoriety of

• Government of India Gj^ette Notification No. 2832, dated 1st September 1905.
The two provinces became separate administrative units from 16th October 1905.

What does the League Demand?

being patriots. It is this middle path which made the Congress
more popular than the Liberal Party or the Terrorist Party.

The second thing Mr. Gandhi did was to introduce the
principle of Linguistic Provinces. In the constitution that was
framed by the Congress under the inspiration and guidance of
Mr. Gandhi, India was to be divided into the following Provinces
with the language and head-quarters as given below : —

Province.

Ajmere-Merwara

Andhra

Assam

Bihar

Bengal

Bombay (City)

Delhi

Gujarat

Karnalak

Kerala

Mahakosal

Maharashtra

Nagptir

N.-W. F. P.

Punjab

Si ncl

Tamil Nadu

United Provinces

Utkal

Vidarbha (Berar)

Language.

Hindustani

Telegu

Assamese

Hindustani

Bengali

Marathi-Gujarati

Hindustani

Gnjarati

Kannada

Malayalam

Hindustani

Marathi

Pushtu

Punjabi

Sindhi

Tamil

Hindustani

Oriya

Marathi

Head quarters.

A j mere.

Madras.

Gauhati.

Patna.

Calcutta.

Bombay.

Delhi.

Ahmedabad.

Dharwar.

Calicut.

Jubbulpore.

Poona.

Nagpur.

Peshawar.

Lahore.

Karachi.

Madras.

Tviicknow.

Cuttack.

Akola.

In this distribution no attention was paid to considerations
of area, population or revenue. The thought that every admi-
nistrative unit must be capable of supporting and supplying a
minimum standard of civilized life, for which it must have
sufficient area, sufficient population and sufficient revenue, had
no place in this scheme of distribution of areas for provincial
purposes. The determining factor was language. No thought
was given to the possibility that it might introduce a disruptive
force in the already loose structure of the Indian social life. The
scheme was no doubt put forth with the sole object of winning
the people to the Congress by appealing to their local patriotism.
The idea of linguistic provinces has come to stay and the demand
for giving effect to it has become so insistent and irresistible that

Pakistan

the Congress, when it came into power, was forced to put it into
effect. Orissa has already been separated from Bihar.* Andhra
is demanding separation from Madras. Karijatak is asking for
separation from Maharashtra, f The only linguistic province
that is not demanding separation from Maharashtra is Gujarat.
Or rather, Gujarat has given up for the moment the idea of
separation. That is probably because Gujarat has realized that
union with Maharashtra is, politically as well as commercially,
a better investment.

Be that as it may, the fact remains that separation on lingu-
istic basis is now an accepted principle with the Congress. It is
no use saying that the separation of Karnatak and Audhra is
based on a linguistic difference and that the claim to separation
of Pakistan is based on a cultural difference. This is a distinc-
tion without difference. Linguistic difference is simply another
name for cultural difference.

If there is nothing shocking in the separation of Karuatak
and Andhra, what is there to shock in the demand for the sepa-
ration of Pakistan ? If it is disruptive in its effect, it is no more
disruptive than the separation of Hindu provinces such as Kar-
natak from Maharashtra or Andhra from Madras. Pakistan is
merely another manifestation of a cultural unit demanding free-
dom for the growth of its o\vu distinctive culture.

• This was done under the Government of India Act, 1935.

t Karnatak also wants some districts from the Madras Presidency.

CHAPTER II

A NATION CALLING FOR A HOME

That there are factors, administrative, linguistic or cultural,
which are the predisposing causes behind these demands for
separation, is a fact which is admitted and understood by all.
Nobody minds these demands and many are prepared to concede
them. But, the Hindus say that the Muslims are going beyond
the idea of separation and questions, such as what has led them
to take this course, wh}r are they asking for partition, for the
annulment of the common tie by a legal divorce between
Pakistan and Hindustan, are being raised.

The answer is to be found in the declaration made by the
Muslim League in its Resolution that the Muslims of India arc
a separate nation. It is this declaration by the Muslim League,
which is both resented and ridiculed by the Hindus.

The Hindu resentment is quite natural. Whether India is
a nation or not, has been the subject matter of controversy
between the Anglo-Indians and the Hindu politicians ever since
the Indian National Congress was founded. The Anglo-Indians
were never tired of proclaiming that India was not a nation, that
'Indians' was only another name for the people of India. In the
words of one Anglo-Indian uto know India was to forget that
there is such a thing as India." The Hindu politicians and
patriots have been, on the other hand, equally persistent in their
assertion that India is a nation. That the Anglo-Indians were
right in their repudiation cannot be gainsaid. Even Dr. Tagore,
the national poet of Bengal, agrees with them. But, the Hindus
have never yielded on the point even to Dr. Tagore.

This was because of two reasons. Firstly, the Hindu felt
ashamed to admit that India was not a nation. In a world
where nationality and nationalism were deemed to be special

Pakistan

virtues in a people, it was quite natural for the Hindus to feel,
to use the language of Mr. H. G. Wells, that it would be as
improper for India to be without a national it}' as it would be
for a man to be without his clothes in a crowded assembly.
Secondly, he had realized that nationality had a most intimate
connection with the claim for self-government. He knew that
by the end of the 19th century, it had become an accepted
principle that a people, who constituted a nation, were entitled
on that account to self-government and that any patriot, who
asked for self-government for his people, had to prove that they
were a nation. The Hindu for these reasons never stopped to
examine whether India was or was not a nation in fact. He
never cared to reason whether nationality was merely a question
of calling a people a nation or was a question of the people being
a nation. He knew one thing, namely, that if he was to succeed
in his demand for self-government for India, he must maintain,
even if he could not prove it, that India was a nation.

In this assertion, he was never contradicted by any Indian.
The thesis was so agreeable that even serious Indian students of
history came forward to write propagandist literature in support
of it, no doubt out of patriotic motives. The Hindu social reform-
ers, who knew that this was a dangerous delusion, could not
openly contradict this thesis. For, anyone who questioned it
was at once called a tool of the British bureaucracy and enemy
of the county. The Hindu politician was able to propagate his
view for a long time. His opponent, the Anglo-Indian, had
ceased to reply to him. His propaganda had almost succeeded.
When it was about to succeed conies this declaration of the
Muslim League — this rift in the lute. Just because it does not
come from the Anglo-Indian, it is a deadlier blow. It destroys
the work which the Hindu politician has done for years. If the
Muslims in India are a separate nation, then, of course, India is
not a nation. This assertion cuts the whole ground from under
the feet of the Hindu politicians. It is natural that they should
feel annoyed at it and call it a stab in the back.

But, stab or no stab, the point is, can the Musalmans be said
to constitute a nation? Everything else is beside the point.
This raises the question : What is a nation ? Tomes have been

4 Nation Calling for a Home

written on the subject. Those who are curious may go through
them and study the different basic conceptions as well as the
different aspects of it. It is, however, enough to know the core
of the subject .and that can be set down in a few words. Nation-
ality is a social feeling. It is a feeling of a corporate sentiment
of oneness which makes those who are charged with it feel that
they are kith and kin. This national feeling is a double edged
feeling. It is at once a feeling of fellowship for one's own kith
and kin and an anti-fellowship feeling for those who are not
one's own kith and kin. It is a feeling of " consciousness of
kind" which on the one hand binds together those who have
it, so strongly that it over-rides all differences arising out of eco-
nomic conflicts or social gradations and, on the other, severs
them from those who are not of their kind. It is a longing not
to belong to any other group. This is the essence of what is
called a nationality and national feeling.

Now apply this test to the Muslim claim. Is it or is it not a
fact that the Muslims of India are an exclusive group? Is it
or is it not a fact that they have a consciousness of kind? Is it
or is it not a fact that every Muslim is possessed by a longing to
belong to his own group and not to any non-Muslim group?

If the answer to these questions is in the affirmative, then
the controversy must end and the Muslim claim that they are a
nation must be accepted without cavil.

What the Hindus must show is that notwithstanding some
differences, there are enough affinities between Hindus and
Musalmans to constitute them into one nation, or, to use plain
language, which make Muslims and Hindus long to belong
together.

Hindus, who disagree with the Muslim view that the Mus-
lims are a separate nation by themselves, rely upon certain fea-
tures of Indian social life wllich seem to form the bonds of
integration between Muslim society and Hindu society.

In the first place, it is said that there is no difference of race
between the Hindus and the Muslims. That the Punjabi Musal-
nian and the Punjabi Hindu, the U. P. Musalman and the U. P.
Hindu, the Bihar Musalman and the Bihar Hindu, the Bengal

Pakistan

Musalman and the Bengal Hindu, the Madras Musalman and
the Madras Hindu, and the Bombay Musalman and the Bombay
Hindu are racially of one stock. Indeed there is more racial
affinity between the Madras Musalman and the Madras Brahmin
than there is between the Madras Brahmin and the Punjab
Brahmin. In the second place, reliance is placed upon linguistic
unity between Hindus and Muslims. It is said that the Musal-
mans have no common language of their own which can mark
them off as a linguistic group separate from the Hindus. On
the contrary, there is a complete linguistic unity between the
two. In the Punjab, both Hindus and Muslims speak Punjabi.
In Sind, both speak Sindhi. In Bengal, both speak Bengali. In
Gujarat, both speak Gujarati. In Maharashtra, both speak
Marathi. So in every province. It is only in towns that the
Musalmans speak Urdu and the Hindus the language of the
province. But outside, in the inofussil, there is complete lingu-
istic unity between Hindus and Musalmans. Thirdly, it is
pointed out that India is the land which the Hindus and
Musalmans have now inhabited together for centuries. It is
not exclusively the land of the Hindus, nor is it exclusively the
land of the Mahomedans.

Reliance is placed not only upon racial unity but also upon
certain common features in the social and cultural life of the two
communities. It is pointed out that the social life of many
Muslim groups is honeycombed with Hindu customs. For
instance, the Avans of the Punjab, though they are nearly all
Muslims, retain Hindu names and keep their genealogies in the
Brahmanic fashion. Hindu surnames are found among
Muslims. For instance, the surname Chaudhari is a Hindu sur-
name but is common among the Musalmans of U. P. and North-
ern India. In the matter of marriage, certain groups of Muslims
are Muslims in name only. They either follow the Hindu form
of the ceremony alone, or perform the ceremony first by the
Hindu rites and then call the Kazi and have it performed in the
Muslim form. In some sections of Muslims, the law applied is
the Hindu Law in the matter of marriage, guardianship and in-
heritance. Before the Shariat Act was passed, this was true even
in the Punjab and the N.-W. F. P. In the social sphere, the caste

A Nation Calling for a Home

system is alleged to be as much a part of Muslim society as it is
of Hindu society. In the religious sphere, it is pointed out that
many Muslim ptrg had Hindu disciples; and similarly some
Hindu yogis \ixvt had Muslim chelas. Reliance is placed on
instances of friendship between saints of the rival creeds. At
Girot, in the Punjab, the tombs of two ascetics, Jamali Sultan
and Diyal Bhawan, who lived in close amity during the early
part of the nineteenth century, stand close to one another, and
are reverenced by Hindus and Musalmans alike. Bawa Fathu,
a Muslim saint, who lived about 1700 A.D. and whose tomb is
at Ranital in the Kangra District, received the title of prophet
by the blessing of a Hindu saint, Sodhi Guru Gulab Singh. On
the other hand, Baba Shahana, a Hindu saint whose cult is
observed in the Jang District, is said to have been the chela of a
Muslim pir who changed the original name (Mihra), of his
Hindu follower, into Mir Shah.

All this, no doubt, is true. That a large majority of the
Muslims belong to the same race as the Hindus is beyond ques-
tion. That all Mahomedans do not speak a common tongue,
that many speak the same language as the Hindus cannot be
denied. That there are certain social customs which are com-
mon to both cannot be gainsaid. That certain religious rites
and practices are common to both is also a matter of fact. But
the question is: can all this support the conclusion that the
Hindus and the Mahomedans on account of them constitute
one nation or these things have fostered in them a feeling that
they long to belong to each other?

There are many flaws in the Hindu argument. In the first
place, what are pointed out as common features are not the
result of a conscious attempt to adopt and adapt to each other's
ways and manners to bring about social fusion. On the other
hand, this uniformity is the result of certain purely mechanical
causes. They are partly due to incomplete conversions. In a
land like India, where the majority of the Muslim population
has been recruited from caste and out-caste Hindus, the Muslimi-
zation of the convert was neither complete nor effectual, either
from fear of revolt or because of the method of persuasion or
insufficiency of preaching due to insufficiency of priests.

Pakistan

There is, therefore, little wonder if great sections of the Muslim
community here and there reveal their Hindu origin in their
religious and social life. Partly it is to be explained as the effect
of common environment to which both Hindus, and Muslims
have been subjected for centuries. A common environment is
bound to produce common reactions, and reacting constantly in
the same way to the same environment is bound to produce a
common type. Partly are these common features to be explain-
ed as the remnants of a period of religious amalgamation between
the Hindus and the Muslims inaugurated by the Emperor
Akbar, the result of a dead past which has no present and no
future.

As to the argument based on unity of race, unity of language
and inhabiting a common country, the matter stands on a differ-
ent footing. If these considerations were decisive in making or
unmaking a nation, the Hindus would be right in saying that
by reason of race, community of language and habitat the
Hindus and Musalmans form one nation. As a matter of his-
torical experience, neither race, nor language, nor country has
sufficed to mould a people into a nation. The argument is so
well put by Renan that it is impossible to improve upon his
language. Long ago in his famous essay on Nationality, Renan
observed : —

"that race must not be confounded with nation- The truth
is that there is no pure race; and that making politics depend
upon ethnographical analysis, is allowing it to be borne upon a
chimera .... Racial facts, important as they are in the begin-
ning, have a constant tendency to lose their importance. Human
history is essentially different from zoology. Race is not every-
thing, as it is in the sense of rodents and felines."

Speaking about language, Renan points out that : —

"Language invites re-union; it does not force it. The Unit-
ed States and England, Spanish America and Spain, speak the
same languages and do not form single nations. On the con-
trary, Switzerland which owes her stability to the fact that she
was founded by the assent of her several parts counts three or
four languages. In man there is something superior to language,
— will. The will of Switzerland to be united, in spite of the
variety of her languages, is a much more important fact than a
similarity of language, often obtained by persecution."

A Nation Calling for a Home

As to common country, Renan argued that : —

"It is no more the land than the race that makes a nation.
The land provides a substratum^ the field of battle and work ;
man provides the soul ; man is everything in the formation of
that sacred thing which is called a people. Nothing of material
nature suffices for it."

Having shown that race, language, and country do not suffice
to create a nation, Renan raises in a pointed manner the ques-
tion, what more, then, is necessary to constitute a nation? His
answer may be given in his own words : —

" A nation is a living soul, a spiritual principle. Two things,
which in truth are but one, constitute this soul, this spiritual princi-
ple. One is in the past, the other in the present. One is the com-
mon possession of a rich heritage of memories; the other is the
actual consent, the desire to live together, the will to preserve
worthily the undivided inheritance which has been handed down.
Man does not improvise. The nation, like the individual, is the
outcome of a long past of efforts, and sacrifices, and devotion.
Ancestor-worship is therefore, all the more legitimate ; for our
ancestors have made us what we are. A heroic past, great men,
glory, — I mean glory of the genuine kind, — these form the social
capital, upon which a national idea may be founded. To have
common glories in the past, a common will in the present; to have
done great things together, to will to do the like again, — such are
the essential conditions for the making of a people. We love in
proportion to the sacrifices we have consented to make, to the
sufferings we have endured. We love the house that we have built,
and will hand down to our descendant. The Spartan hymn, 'We
are what you were ; we shall be what you are/ is in its simplicity
the national anthem of every land.

" In the past an inheritance of glory and regrets to be shared, in
the future a like ideal to be realised ; to have suffered, and rejoiced,
and hoped together ; all these things are worth more than custom
houses in common, and frontiers in accordance with strategical
ideas ; all these can be understood in spite of diversities of race and
language. I said just now, 'to have suffered together' for indeed,
suffering in common is a greater bond of union than joy. As
regards national memories, mournings are worth more than
triumphs ; for they impose duties, they demand common effort."

Are there any common historical antecedents which the
Hindus arid Muslims can be said to share together as matters of
pride or as matters of sorrow? That is the crux of the question.
That is the question Which the Hindus must answer, if they wish

i 17

Pakistan

to maintain that Hindus and Musalmans together form a nation.
So far as this aspect of their relationship is concerned, they have
been just two armed battalions warring against each other.
There was no common cycle of participation for a common
achievement. Their past is a past of mutual destruction — a past
of mutual animosities, both in the political as well as in the
religious fields. As Bhai Parmanand points out in his pamphlet
called "The Hindu National Movement " :— " In history the
Hindus revere the memory of Prithvi Raj, Partap, Shivaji and
Be-ragi Bir who fought for the honour and freedom of this land
(against the Muslims), while the Mahomedans look upon the
invaders of India, like Muhammad bin Qasim and rulers like
Aurangzeb as their national heroes." In the religious field, the
Hindus draw their inspiration from the Ramayan, the Maha-
bharat, and the Geeta. The Musalmans, on the other hand,
derive their inspiration from the Quran and the Hadis. Thus,
the things that divide are far more vital than the things which
unite. In depending upon certain common features of Hindu
and Mahomedan social life, in relying upon common language,
common race and common country, the Hindu is mistaking
what is accidental and superficial for what is essential and funda-
mental. The political and religious antagonisms divide the
Hindus and the Musalmans far more deeply than the so-called
common things are able to bind them together. The prospects
might perhaps be different if the past of the two communities
can be forgotten by both. Renan points out the importance of
forgetfulness as a factor in building up a nation : —

" Forgetful ness, and I shall even say historical error, form an
essential factor in the creation of a nation ; and thus it is that the
progress of historical studies may often be dangerous to the nation-
ality. Historical research, in fact, brings back to light the deeds
of violence that have taken place at the commencement of all politi-
cal formations, even of those the consequences of which have been
most beneficial. Unity is ever achieved by brutality. The union of
Northern and Southern France was the result of an extermination,
and of a reign of terror that lasted for nearly a hundred years. The
king of France who was, if I may say so, the ideal type of a secular
crystalliser, the king of France who made the most perfect national
unity in existence, lost his prestige when seen at too close a distance.

A Nation Calling for a Home

The nation that he had formed cursed him ; and today the know-
ledge of what he was worth, and what he did, belongs only to the

cultured.

•

"& is by contrast that these great laws of the history of Western
Europe become apparent. In the undertaking which the king of
France, in part by his justice, achieved so admirably, many countries
came to disaster. Under the crown of St. Stephen, Magyars and
Slavs have remained as distinct as they were eight hundred years
ago. Far from combining the different elements in its dominions,
the house of Hapsburg has held them apart and often opposed to
one another. In Bohemia, the Czech element and the German
element are superimposed like oil and water in a glass. The
Turkish policy of separation of nationalities according to religion
has had much graver results. It has brought about the ruin of the
East. Take a town like Smyrna or Salonica ; you will find there
five or six communities each with its own memories, and possessing
among them scarcely anything in common. But the essence of the
nation is, that all its individual members should have things in
common; and also, that all of them should hold many things in
oblivion. No French citizen knows whether he is a Burgundian,
an Alan, or a Visigoth; every French citizen ought to have forgot-
ten St. Bartholomew, and the massacres of the South in the
thirteenth century. There are not ten families in France able to
furnish proof of a French origin; and yet, even if such a proof
were given it would be essentially defective, in consequence of a
thousand unknown crosses, capable of deranging all genealogical
systems."

The pity of it is that the two communities can never forget
or obliterate their past. Their past is imbedded in their religion,
and for each to give up its past is to give up its religion. To
hope for this is to hope in vain.

In the absence of common historical antecedents, the Hindu
view that Hindus and Musalmans form one nation falls to the
ground. To maintain it is to keep up a hallucination. There
is no such longing between the Hindus and the Musalmans to
belong together as there is among the Musalmans of India.

It is no use saying that this claim of the Musalmans being
a nation is an after-thought of their leaders. As an accusation,
it is true. The Muslims were hitherto quite content to call them-
selves a community. It is only recently that they have begun to
style themselves a nation. But an accusation, attacking the mo-
tives of a person, does not amount to a refutation of his thesis.

Pakistan

To say that because the Muslims once called themselves a com-
munity, they are, therefore, now debarred from calling themselves
a nation is to misunderstand the mysterious working of the
psychology of national feeling. Such an argument presupposes
that wherever there exist a people, who possess the elements that
go to the making up of a nation, there must be manifested that
sentiment of nationality which is their natural consequence and
that if they fail to manifest it for 'some time, then that failure
is to be used as evidence showing the unreality of the claim of
being a nation, if made afterwards. There is no historical sup-
port for such a contention. As Prof. Toynbee points out : —

"it is impossible to argue a priori from the presence of one or
even several of these factors to the existence of a nationality; they
may have been there for ages and kindled no response and it is
impossible to argue from one case to another ; precisely the same
group of factors may produce nationality here, and there have no
effect."

This is probably due to the fact, as pointed out by Prof.
Barker, that it is possible for nations to exist and even for cen-
turies, in unreflective silence, although there exists that spiritual
essence of a national life of which many of its members are not
aware. Some such thing has no doubt happened in the case of
the Musalmans. They were not aware of the fact that there
existed for them the spiritual essence of a national life. This
explains why their claim to separate nationality was made by
them so late. But, it does not mean that the spiritual essence of
a national life had no existence at all.

It is no use contending that there are cases where a sense of
nationality exists but there is no desire for a separate national
existence. Cases of the French in Canada and of the English in
South Africa, may be cited as cases in point. It must be admitted
that there do exist cases, where people are aware of their nation-
ality, but this awareness does not produce in them that passion
which is called nationalism. In other words, there may be
nations conscious of themselves without being charged with
nationalism. On the basis of this reasoning, it may be argued
that the Musalmans may hold that they are a nation but they
need not on that account demand a separate national existence ;
why can they not be content with the position which the French

A Nation Calling for a Home

occupy in Canada and the English occupy in South Africa?
Such a position is quite a sound position. It must, however, be
remembered that such a position can only be taken by way of
pleading with the Muslims not to insist on partition. It is no
argument agrfinst their claim for partition, if they insist upon it.

Lest pleading should be mistaken for refutation, it is neces-
sary to draw attention to two things. First, there is a difference
between nationality and nationalism. They are two different
psychological states of the human mind. Nationality means
41 consciousness of kind, awareness of the existence of that tie of
kinship/' Nationalism means " the desire for a separate national
existence for those who are bound by this tie of kinship."
Secondly, it is true that there cannot be nationalism without the
feeling of nationality being in existence. But, it is important to
bear in mind that the converse is not always true. The feeling
of nationality ma3r be present and yet the feeling of nationalism
may be quite absent. That is to say, nationality does not in all
cases produce nationalism. For nationality to flame into nation-
alism two conditions must exist. First, there must arise the
4 * will to live as a nation." Nationalism is the dynamic expres-
sion of that desire. Secondly, there must be a territory which
nationalism could occupy and make it a state, as well as a cultural
home of the nation. Without such a territory, nationalism, to
use Lord Acton's phrase, would be a usoul as it were wandering
in search of a body in which to begin life over again and dies
out finding none." The Muslims have developed a u will to
live as a nation." For them nature has found a territory which
they can occupy and make it a state as well as a cultural home
for the new-born Muslim nation. Given these favourable condi-
tions, there should be no wonder, if the Muslims say that they
are not content to occupy the position which the French choose
to occupy in Canada or the English choose to occupy in South
Africa, and that they shall have a national home which they can
call their own.

CHAPTER III

•

ESCAPE FROM DEGRADATION

" What justification have the Musalmans of India for demand-
ing the partition of India and the establishment of separate
Muslim States? Why this insurrection? What grievances
have they?" — ask the Hindus in a spirit of righteous indigna-
tion.

Anyone, who knows history, will not fail to realize that it
has now been a well established principle that nationalism is a
sufficient justification for the creation of a national state. As the
great historian Lord Acton points out : —

"In the old European system, the rights of nationalities were
neither recognized by governments nor asserted by the people.
The interest of the reigning families, not those of the nations, regu-
lated the frontiers, and the administration was conducted generally
without any reference to popular desires. Where all liberties were
suppressed, the claims of national independence were necessarily
ignored, and a princess, in the words of Feuelon, carried a
monarchy in her wedding portion."

Nationalities were at first listless. When they became conscious —

"They first rose against their conquerors in defence of their
legitimate rulers. They refused to be governed by usurpers. Next
came a time when they revolted because of the wrongs inflicted
upon them by their rulers. The insurrections were provoked by
pafticular grievances justified by definite complaints. Then came
the French Revolution which effected a complete change. It taught
the people to regard their wishes and wants as the supreme criter-
ion of their right to do what they liked to do with themselves.
It proclaimed the idea of the sovereignty of the people uncontrolled
by the past and uncontrolled by the existing state. This text
taught by the French Revolution became an accepted dogma of
all liberal thinkers. Mill gave it his support. ' One hardly
knows/ says Mill, 'what any division of the human race should
be free to do, if not to determine with which of the various
collective bodies of human beings they choose to associate them-
selves.' "

Pakistan

He even went so far as to hold that —

11 It is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that
the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with
those of nationalities." 9

Thus history shows that the theory of nationality is imbed-
ded in the democratic theory of the sovereignty of the will of a
people. This means that the demand by a nationality for a
national state does not require to be supported by any list of
grievances. The will of the people is enough to justify it.

But, if grievances must be cited in support of their claim,
the Muslims say that they have them in plenty. They may be
summed up iii one sentence, that constitutional safeguards have
failed to save them from the tyranny of the Hindu majority.

At the Round Table Conference, the Muslims presented their
list of safeguards, which were formulated in the well-known
fourteen points. The Hindu representatives at the Round Table
Conference would not consent to them. There was an impasse.
The British Government intervened and gave what is known as
u the Communal decision/' By that decision, the Muslims got
all their fourteen points. There was much bitterness amongst
the Hindus against the Communal Award. But, the Congress
did not take part in the hostility that was displayed by -the
Hindus generally towards it, although it did retain the right to
describe it as anti-national and to get it changed with the consent
of the Muslims. So careful was the Congress not to wound the
feelings of the Muslims that when the Resolution was moved in
the Central Assembly condemning the Cornniuual Award, the
Congress, though it did not bless it, remained neutral, neither
opposing nor supporting it. The Mahomedans were well justi-
fied in looking upon this Congress attitude as a friendly gesture.

The victory of the Congress at the polls in the provinces,
wlift-e the Hindus are in a majority, did not disturb the tran-
quillity of the Musalmans. They felt they had nothing to fear
from the Congress and the prospects were that the Congress and
the Muslim League would work the constitution in partnership.
But, two years and three months of the Congress Government
in the Hindu Provinces have completely disillusioned them and

Escape from Degradation

have made them the bitterest enemies of the Congress. The
Deliverance Day celebration held on the 22nd December 1939
shows the depth .of their resentment. What is worse, their
bitterness is not confined to the Congress. The Musalmans,
who at the Round Table Conference joined in the demand for
Swaraj, are today the most ruthless opponents of Swaraj.

What has the Congress done to annoy the Muslims so much?
The Muslim League has asserted that under the Congress regime
the Muslims were actually tyrannized and oppressed. Two
committees appointed by the League are said to have investigat-
ed and reported on the matter. But apart from these matters
which require to be examined by an impartial tribunal, there are
undoubtedly two things which have produced the clash : (1)
the refusal by the Congress to recognize the Muslim League as
the only representative body of the Muslims, (2) the refusal by
the Congress to form Coalition Ministries in the Congress Pro-
vinces.

On the first question, both the Congress and the League are
adamant. The Congress is prepared to accept the Muslim
League as one of the many Muslim political organizations, such
as the Ahrars, the National Muslims and the Jauiiat-ul-Ulema.
But it will not accept the Muslim League as the only representa-
tive body of the Muslims. The Muslim League, on the other
hand, is not prepared to enter into any talk unless the Congress
accepts it as the only representative body of the Musalmans of
India. The Hindus stigmatize the claim of the League as an
extravagant one and try to ridicule it. The Muslims nia3' say that
if the Hindus would only stop to inquire how treaties between
nations are made, they would realize the stupidity of their view.
It may be argued that when a nation proceeds to make a treaty
with another nation, it recognizes the Government of the latter
as fully representing it. In no country does the Govern-
ment of the day represent the whole body of people. Every-
where it represents only a majority. But nations do not
refuse to settle their disputes because the Governments, which
represent them, do not represent the whole people. It is
enough if each Government represents a majority of its citizens.
This analogy, the Muslims may contend, must apply to the

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Congress-League quarrel on this issue. The League may not
represent the whole body of the Muslims but if it represent^ a
majority of them, the Congress should hav§ no compunction to
deal with it for the purpose of effecting a settlement of the
Hindu-Muslim question. Of course, it is open to the Govern-
ment of a country not to recognize the Government of another
country where there is more than one body claiming to be the
Government. Similarly, the Congress may not recognize the
League. It must, however, recognize either the National Mus-
lims or the Ahrars or the Jamiat-ul-Ulema and fix the terms of
settlement between the two communities. Of course, it must
act with the full knowledge as to which is more likely to be
repudiated by the Muslims — an agreement with the League or
an agreement with the other Muslim parties. The Congress
must deal with one or the other. To deal with neither is not
only stupid but mischievous. This attitude of the Congress only
serves to annoy the Muslims and to exasperate them. The Mus-
lims rightly interpret this attitude of the Congress as an attempt
to create divisions among them with a view to cause confusion
in their ranks and weaken their front.

On the second issue, the Muslim demand has been that in
the cabinets there shall be included Muslim Ministers who have
the confidence of the Muslim members in the Legislature.
They expected that this demand of theirs would be met by the
Congress if it came in power. But, they were sorely disappoint-
ed. With regard to this demand, the Congress took a legalistic
attitude. The Congress agreed to include Muslims in their cabi-
nets, provided they resigned from their parties, joined the Con-
gress and signed the Congress pledge. This was resented by
the Muslims on three grounds.

In the first place, they regarded it as a breach of faith. The
Muslims say that this demand of theirs is in accordance with the
spirit of the Constitution. At the Round Table Conference, it
was agreed that the cabinets shall include representatives of
the minority communities. The minorities insisted that a pro-
vision to that effect should be made a part of the statute. The
Hindus, on the other hand, desired that the matter should be left
to be regulated by convention. A via media was found. It was

Escape from Degradation

agreed that the provision should find a place in the Instrument
of Instructions to the Governors of the provinces and an obliga-
tion should be imposed upon them to see that effect was given
to the convention in the formation of the cabinets. The Musal-
mans did not ^insist upon making this provision a part of the
statute because they depended upon the good faith of the
Hindus. This agreement was broken by a party which had
given the Muslims to understand that towards them its attitude
would be not only correct but considerate.

In the second place, the Muslims felt that the Congress view
was a perversion of the real scope of the convention. They rely
upon the text of the clause* in the Instrument of Instructions
and argue that the words " member of a minority community "
in it can have only one meaning, namely, a person having the
confidence of the community. The position taken by the Con-
gress is in direct contradiction with the meaning of this clause
and is indeed a covert attempt to break all other parties in the
country and to make the Congress the only political party in the
country. The demand for signing the Congress pledge can have
no other intention. This attempt to establish a totalitarian state
may be welcome to the Hindus, but it meant the political death
of the Muslims as a free people.

This resentment of the Muslims was considerably aggravat-
ed when they found the Governors, on whom the obligation was
imposed to see that effect was given to the convention, declin-
ing to act. Some Governors declined, because they were helpless
by reason of the fact that the Congress was the only majority
party which could produce a stable government, that a Congress
Government was the only government possible and that there was
no alternative to it except suspending the constitution. Other
Governors declined, because they became active supporters

* " In making appointments to his Council of Ministers, our Governor shall use his
best endeavours to select his Ministers in the following manner, that is to say, to
appoint in consultation with the person who in his judgment is most likely to com-
mand a stable majority in the Legislature, those persons (including so far as practicable,
members of important minority communities) who will best be in a position collect-
ively to command the confidence of the Legislature. In so acting, he shall bear
constantly in mind the need for fostering a sense of joint responsibility among his
Ministers."

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of the Congress Government and showed their partisanship by
praising the Congress or by wearing Khadi which is the official
party dress of the Congress. Whatever be the reasons, the Mus-
lims discovered that an important safeguard had failed to save
them.

The Congress reply to these accusations by the Muslims is
twofold. In the first place, they say that coalition cabinets are
inconsistent with collective responsibility of the cabinets. This,
the Musalmans refuse to accept as an honest plea. The English
people were the first and the only people, who made it a princi-
ple of their system of government. But, even there it has been
abandoned since. The English Parliament debated* the issue
and came to the conclusion that it was not so sacrosanct as it
was once held and that a departure from it need not necessarily
affect the efficiency or smooth working of the governmental
machine. Secondly, as a matter of fact, there was no collective
responsibility in the Congress Government. It was a govern-
ment by departments. Each Minister was independent of the
other and the Prime Minister was just a Minister. For the Con-
gress to talk about collective responsibility was really impertinent.
The plea was even dishonest, because it is a fact that in the
provinces where the Congress was in a minorit}-, they did form
Coalition Ministries without asking the Ministers from other
parties to sign the Congress pledge. The Muslims are entitled
to ask cif coalition is bad, how can it be good in one place and
bad in another?'

The second reply of the Congress is that even if they take
Muslim Ministers in their cabinet who have not the confidence
of the majority of the Muslims, they have not failed to protect
their interests. Indeed, the}- have done everything to advance
the interests of the Muslims. This no doubt rests on the view
Pope held of government when he said —

"For forms of government let fools contest ;
What is best administered is best."

In making this reply, the Congress High Command seem to

* See the announcement of 22nd January 1932 by the British Prime Minister on the
decision of the cabinet to agree to differ on the Tariff Question and the debate on
it in Parliament.

Escape from Degradation

have misunderstood what the main contention of the Muslims
and the minorities has been. Their quarrel is not on the issue
whether the Congress has or has not done any good to the
Muslims and the minorities. Their quarrel is on an issue which
is totally different, Are the Hindus to be a ruling race and the
Muslims and other minorities to be subject races under Swaraj ?
That is the issue involved in the demand for coalition ministries.
On that, the Muslims and other minorities have taken a definite
stand. They are not prepared to accept the position of subject
races.

That the ruling community has done good to the ruled is
quite beside the point and is no answer to the contention of
the minority communities that they refuse to be treated as a
subject people. The British have done many good things in
India for the Indians. They have improved their roads, con-
structed canals on more scientific principles, effected their trans-
port by rail, carried their letters by penny post, flashed
their messages by lightning, improved their currency, regulated
their weights and measures, corrected their notions of geography,
astronomy and medicine, and stopped their internal quarrels and
effected some advancement in their material conditions. Be-
cause of these acts of good government, did anybody ask the
Indian people to remain grateful to the British and give up their
agitation for self-government? Or because of these acts of
social uplift, did the Indians give up their protest against being
treated as a subject race by the British? The Indians did noth-
ing of the kind. They refused to be satisfied with these good
deeds and continued to agitate for their right to rule themselves.
This is as it should be. For, as was said by Currau, the Irish
patriot, no man can be grateful at the cost of his self-respect, no
woman can be grateful at the cost of her chastity and no nation
can be grateful at the cost of its honour. To do otherwise is to
show that one's philosophy of life is just what Carlyle called
' pig philosophy. ' The Congress High Command does not seem
to realize that the Muslims and other minorities care more for
the recognition of their self-respect at the hand of the Congress
than for mere good deeds on the part of the Congress. Men,
who are conscious of their being, are not pigs who care only for

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fattening food. They have their pride which they will not yield
even for gold. In short "life is more than the meat. "

•

It is no nse saying that the Congress is not a Hindu body.
A body which is Hindu in its composition is bound to reflect
the Hindu mind and support Hindu aspirations. The only
difference between the Congress and the Hindu Maha Sabha is
that the latter is crude in its utterances and brutal in its actions
while the Congress is politic and polite. Apart from this differ-
ence of fact, there is no other difference between the Congress
and the Hindu Maha Sabha.

Similarly, it is no use saying that the Congress does not recog-
nize the distinction between the ruler and the ruled. If this is so,
the Congress must prove its bona fides by showing its readiness
to recognize the other communities as free and equal partners.
What is the test of such recognition? It seems to me that
there can be only one — namely, agreeing to share power with
the effective representatives of the minority communities. Is the
Congress prepared for it? Everyone knows the answer. The
Congress is not prepared to share power with a member of a
community who does not owe allegiance to the Congress.
Allegiance to the Congress is a condition precedent to sharing
power. It seems to be a rule with the Congress that if allegiance
to the Congress is not forthcoming from a community, that
community must be excluded from political power.

Exclusion from political power is the essence of the distinc-
tion between a ruling race and a subject race ; and inasmuch as
the Congress maintained this principle, it must be said that this
distinction was enforced by the Congress while it was in the
saddle. The Musalmans may well complain that they have
already suffered enough and that this reduction to the position
of a subject race is like the proverbial last straw. Their decline
and fall in India began ever since the British occupation of the
country. Every change, executive, administrative, or legal, intro-
duced by the British, has inflicted a series of blows upon the
Muslim community. The Muslim rulers of India had allowed
the Hindus to retain their law in civil matters. But, they
abrogated the Hindu criminal law and made the Muslim

Escape from Degradation

criminal law the law of the state, applicable to all Hindus as
well as Muslims. The first thing the British did was to displace
gradually the Muslim criminal law by another of their making,
until the process was finally completed by the enactment of
Macaulay's Penal Code. This was the first blow to the prestige
and position of the Muslim community in India. This was
followed by the abridgment of the field of application of the
Shariat or the Muslim Civil Law. Its application was restricted
to matters concerning personal relations, such as marriage and
inheritance, and then only to the extent permitted by the British.
Side by side came the abolition, in 1837, of Persian as the official
language of the Court and of general administration and the
substitution of English and the vernaculars in place of Persian.
Then catne the abolition of the Qazis, who, during the Muslim
rule, administered the Shariat. In their places, were appointed
law officers and judges, who might be of any religion but who
got the right of interpreting Muslim law and whose decisions
became binding on Muslims. These were severe blows to the
Muslims. As a result, the Muslims found their prestige gone,
their laws replaced, their language shelved and their education
shorn of its monetary value. Along with these came mpre pal-
pable blows in the shape of annexation of Sind and Oudh and
the Mutiny. The last, particularly, affected the higher classes of
Muslims, who suffered enormously by the extensive confiscation
of property inflicted upon them by the British, as a punishment
for their suspected complicity in the Mutiny. By the end of the
Mutiny, the Musalmans, high and low, were brought down by
these series of events to the lowest depths of broken pride, black
despair and general penury. Without prestige, without education
and without resources, the Muslims were left to face the Hindus.
The British, pledged to neutrality, were indifferent to the result
of the struggle between the two communities. The result was that
the Musalmans were completely worsened in the struggle. The
British conquest of India brought about a complete political
revolution in the relative position of the two communities. For
six hundred years, the Musalmans had been the masters of the
Hindus. The British occupation brought them down to the
level of the Hindus. From masters to fellow subjects was

Pakistan

degradation enough, but a change from the status of fellow
subjects to that of subjects of the Hindus is really humiliation.
Is | it< unnatural, ask the Muslims, if they seek an escape from so
intolerable a position by the creation of separate Rational States,
in which the Muslims can find a peaceful home and in which
the conflicts between a ruling race and a subject race can find
no place to plague their lives?

PARTH

HINDU CASE AGAINST PAKISTAN

There seem to be three reasons present to the mind of the
Hindus who are opposing this scheme of Pakistan. They object
to the scheme : —

1. Because it involves the breaking-up of the unity of India.

2. Because it weakens the defence of India.

3. Because it fails to solve the communal problem.

Is there any substance in these objections ? This Part is con-
cerned with an examination of the validity of these objections.

CHAPTER IV

BREAK-UP OF UNITY

Before the Hindus complain of the destruction of the unity of
India, let them make certain that the unity they are harping upon
does exist. What unity is there between Pakistan and Hindustan?

Those Hindus, who maintain the affirmative, rely chiefly upon
the fact that the areas which the Muslims want to be separated
from India have always been a part of India. Historically this is,
no doubt, true. This area was a part of India when Chandragupta
was the ruler ; it continued to be a part of India when Hsuan
Tsang, the Chinese pilgrim, visited India in the 7th century
A. D. In his diary, Hsuan Tsang has recorded that India was
divided into five divisions or to use his language, there were 'five
Indies '*:(!) Northern India, (2) Western India, (3) Central India,
(4) Eastern India and (5) Southern India and that these five divi-
sions contained 80 kingdoms. According to Hsuan Tsang,
Northern India comprised the Punjab proper, including Kash-
mir and the adjoining hill states with the whole of Eastern
Afghanistan beyond the Indus, and the present Cis-Satlej States
to the west of the Sarasvati river. Thus, in Northern India
there were included the districts of Kabul, Jallalabad, Peshawar,
Ghazni and Bannu, which were all subject to the ruler of Kapisa,
who was a Hindu Kshatriya and whose capital was most prob-
ably at Charikar, 27 miles from Kabul. In the Punjab proper,
the hilly districts of Taxila, Singhapura, Urasa Punch and
Rajaori, were subject to the Raja of Kashmir ; while the whole
of the plains, including Multan and Shorkot, were dependent

* Cunningham's Ancient Geography of India (Ed. Majumdar), pp. • 13-14.
The writers of tke Puranas divided India into nine divisions.

Pakistan

on the ruler of Taki or Sangala, near Lahore. Such was the extent
of the northern boundary of India at the time when Hsuan
Tsang came on his pilgrimage. But as Prof. Toynbee points
out —

"We must be on our guard against Historical sentiment',
that is, against arguments taken from conditions which once
existed or were supposed to exist, but which are no longer real
at the present moment. They are most easily illustrated by ex-
treme examples. Italian newspapers have described the annexa-
tion of Tripoli as recovering the soil of the Fatherland because
it was once a province of the Roman Empire ; and the entire
region of Macedonia is claimed by Greek Chauvinists on the one
hand, because it contains the site of Pella, the cradle of Alexander
the Great in the fourth century B. C. and by Bulgarians on the
other, because Ochrida, in the opposite corner, was the capital
of the Bulgarian Tzardom in the tenth century A. D., though
the drift of time has buried the tradition of the latter almost as
deep as the achievements of the 'Emathian Conqueror* on which
the modern Greek nationalists insist so strongly."

The same logic applies here. Here also arguments are taken
from conditions which once existed but which are no longer real
and which omit to take into consideration later facts which
history has to record during practically one thousand years —
after the return of Hsuan Tsang.

It is true that when Hsuan Tsang came, not only the
Punjab but what is now Afghanistan was part of India and
further, the people of the Punjab and Afghanistan were either
Vedic or Buddhist by religion. But what has happened since
Hsuan Tsang left India?

The most important thing that has happened is the invasion
of India by the Muslim hordes from the north-west. The first
Muslim invasion of India was by the Arabs who were led by
Mahommad bin Qasim. It took place in 711 A. D. and resulted
in the conquest of Sind. This first Muslim invasion did not
result in a permanent occupation of the country because the Cali-
phate of Baghdad, by whose order and command the invasion had
taken place, was obliged by the middle of the 9th century A. D.
to withdraw* its direct control from this distant province of

• Sind was reoccupied by Mahommed Ghori.
36

Break-Up of Unity

Sind. Soon after this withdrawal, there began a series of terrible
invasions by Muhammad of Ghazniin 1001 A.D. Muhammad died
in 1030 A. D., but within the short span of 30 years, he invaded
India 17 timers. He was followed by Mahommed Ghori who
began his career as an invader in 1173. He was killed in 1206.
For thirty years had Muhammad of Ghazni ravaged India and for
thirty years Mahommed Ghori harried the same country in the
same way. Then followed the incursions of the Moghul hordes
of Chenghiz Khan. They first came in 1221. They then only
wintered on the border of India but did not enter it. Twenty
years after, they marched on Lahore and sacked it. Of their
inroads, the most terrible was under Taimur in 1398. Then
comes on the scene a new invader in the person of Babar who
invaded India in 1526. The invasions of India did not stop with
that of Babar. There occurred two more invasions. In 1738
Nadirshah's invading host swept over the Punjab like a flooded
river "furious as the ocean". He was followed by Ahmadshah
Abdalli who invaded India in 1761, smashed the forces of the
Mahrattas at Panipat and crushed for ever the attempt of the
Hindus to gain the ground which they had lost to their Muslim
invaders.

These Muslim invasions were not undertaken merely out of
lust for loot or conquest. There was another object behind them.
The expedition against Sind by Mahommad bin Qasim was of a
punitive character and was undertaken to punish Raja Dahir
of Sind who had refused to make restitution for the seizure of an
Arab ship at Debul, one of the sea-port towns of Sind. But,
there is no doubt that striking a blow at the idolatry and polythe-
ism of Hindus and establishing Islam in India was also one of
the aims of this expedition. In one of his despatches to Hajjaj,
Mahommad bin Qasim is quoted to have said : —

"The nephew of Raja Dahir, his warriors and principal officers
have been dispatched, and the infidels converted to Islam or
destroyed. Instead of idol-temples, mosques and other places of
worship have been created, the Kutbah is read, the call to
prayers is raised, so that devotions are performed at stated hours.
The Takbir and praise to the Almighty God are offered every
morning and evening."*

Indian Islam by Dr. Titus, p. 10.

Pakistan

After receiving the above despatch, which had been forward-
ed with the head of the Raja, Hajjaj sent the following reply to
his general : —

" Except that you give protection to all, great and small alike,
make no difference between enemy and friend. God says, 'Give
no quarter to infidels but cut their throats.' Then know that
this is the command of the great God. You shall not be too
ready lo grant protection, because it will prolong your work.
After this give no quarter to any enemy except those who are
of rank."*

Muhammad of Ghazni also looked upon his numerous inva-
sions of India as the waging of a holy war. Al} Utbi, the
historian of Muhammad, describing his raids writes: —

"He demolished idol temples and established Islam. He cap-
tured cities, killed the polluted wretches, destroying

the idolaters, and gratifying Muslims. 'He then returned home
and promulgated accounts of the victories obtained for Islam

and vowed that every year he would undertake a holy

war aginst Hind.'"1

Mahommed Ghori was actuated by the same holy zeal in
his invasions of India. Hasan Nizami, the historian, describes
his work in the following terms : —

"He purged by his sword the land of Hind from the filth of
infidelity and vice, and freed the whole of that country from the
thonuof God-plurality and the impurity of idol-worship, and by
his royal vigour and intrepidity left not one temple standing."!

Taimur has in his Memoir explained what led him to invade
India. He says : —

"My object in the invasions of Hindustan is to lead a campaign
against the infidels, to convert them to the true faith according
to the command of Muhammad (on whom and his familj' be
the blessing and peace of God), to purify the land from the
defilement of misbelief and polytheism, and overthrow the temples
and idols, whereby we shall be Ghazis and Mujahids, companions
and soldiers of the faith before God."^

These invasions of India by Muslims were as much invasions
of India as they were wars among the Muslims themselves.

* Quoted by Dr. Titus— Ibid., p. 10.

tlbid., p, 11.

\ Ibid., p. 11.

11 Quoted by Lane Poole in Medieval India, p. 155.

Break-Up of Unity

This fact has remained hidden because the invaders are all lump-
ed together as Muslims without distinction. But as a matter of
fact, they were Tartars, Afghans and Mongols. Muhammad of
Ghazni was a Tartar, Mahommed of Ghori was an Afghan, Taimur
was a Mongol, Babar was a Tartar, while Nadirshah and Ahmad-
shah Abdalli were Afghans. In invading India, the Afghan was
out to destroy the Tartar and the Mongol was out to destroy
the Tartar as well as the Afghan. They were not a loving
family cemented by the feeling of Islamic brotherhood. They
were deadly rivals of one another and their wars were often
wars of mutual extermination. What is, however, important to
bear in mind is that with all their internecine conflicts they were
all united by one common objective and that was to destroy the
Hindu faith.

The methods adopted by the Muslim invaders of India are
not less significant for the subsequent history of India than the
object of their invasions.

Mahommad bin Qasim's first act of religious zeal was
forcibly to circumcise the Brahmins of the captured city of
Debul ; but on discovering that they objected to this sort of con-
version, he proceeded to put all above the age of 17 to death, and
to order all others, with women and children, to be led into
slavery. The temple of the Hindus was looted, and the rich
booty was divided equally among the soldiers, after one-fifth,
the legal portion for the government, had been set aside.

Muhammad of Ghazni from the first adopted those plans that
would strike terror into the hearts of the Hindus. After the
defeat of Raja Jaipal in A. D. 1001, Muhammad ordered that Jaipal
"be paraded about in the streets so that his sons and chieftains
might see him in that condition of shame, bonds and disgrace ;
and that fear of Islam might fly abroad through the country
of the infidels."

"The slaughtering of 'infidels' seemed to be one thing that
gave Muhammad particular pleasure. In one attack on Chand Rai,
in A. D. 1019, many infidels were slain or taken prisoners, and
the Muslims paid no regard to booty until they had satiated them-
selves with the slaughter of the infidels and worshippers of the
sun and fire. The historian naively adds that the elephants of

Pakistan

the Hindu armies came to Muhammad of their own accord, leaving
idols, preferring the service of the religion of Islam."*

Not infrequently, the slaughter of the Hindus gave a great
setback to the indigenous culture of the Hindus, as in the con-
quest of 'Bihar by Muhammad Bakhtyar Khilji. When he took
Nuddea (Bihar) the Tabaquat-i-Nasiri informs us that

"great plunder fell into the hands of the victors. Most of
the inhabitants were Brahmins with shaven heads. They were

put to death. Large numbers of books were found but

none could explain their contents as all the men had been killed,
the whole fort and city being a place of study."!

Summing up the evidence on the point, Dr. Titus concludes :

"Of the destruction of temples and the desecration of idols
we have an abundance of evidence. Mahommad bin Qasim
carried out his plan of destruction systematically in Sind, we
have seen, but he made an exception of the famous temple at
Multau for purposes of revenue, as this temple was a place of
resort for pilgrims, who made large gifts to the idol. Neverthe-
less, while he thus satisfied his avarice by letting the temple stand,
he gave vent to his malignity by having a piece of cow's flesh
tied around the neck of the idol.

" Minhaj-as-Siraj further tells how Mahommad became widely
known for having destroyed as many as a thousand temples, and
of his great feat in destroying the temple of Somnath and carrying
off its idol, which he asserts was broken into four parts. One
part he deposited in the Jami Masjid of Ghazni, one he placed at the
entrance of the royal palace, the third he sent to Mecca, and the
fourth to Medina. "I

It is said by Lane Poole that Muhammad of Ghazni "who had
vowed that every year should see him wage a holy war against
the infidels of Hindustan'' could not rest from his idol-break-
ing campaign so long as the temple of Somnath remained in-
violate. It was for this specific purpose that he, at the very close
of his career, undertook his arduous march across the desert
from Multan to Anhalwara on the coast, fighting as he went,
until he saw at last the famous temple.

* Dr. Titus— Ibid., p. 22.
1 1 bid., p. 22.
t Ibid., pp. 22-23.

Break-Up of Unity

"There a hundred thousand pilgrims were wout to assemble,
a thousand Brahmins served the temple and guarded its treasures,
and hundreds of dancers and singers played before its gates.
Within stood the famous linga, a rude pillar stone adorned with
gems and lighted by jewelled candelebra which were reflected in
rich hangings, embroidered with precious stones like stars, that
decked the shrine ...... Its ramparts were swarmed with incre-

dulous Brahmins, mocking the vain arrogance of foreign infidels
whom the God of Somnath would assuredly consume. The
foreigners, nothing daunted, scaled the walls ; the God remained
dumb to the urgent appeals of his servants ; fifty thousand
Hindus suffered for their faith and the sacred shrine was sacked
to the joy of the true believers. The great stone was cast down
and its fragments were carried off to grace the conqueror's palace.
The temple gates were set up at Ghazni and a million pounds
worth of treasure rewarded the iconoclast/' *

The work done by Muhammad of Ghazni became a pious
tradition and was faithfully followed by those who came after
him. In the words of Dr. Titus t

11 Mahommed Ghori, one of the enthusiastic successors of
Muhammad of Ghazni, in his conquest of Ajmir destroyed pillars and
foundations of the idol-temples, and built in their stead mosques
and colleges, and the precepts of Islam and the customs of the
law were divulged and established. At Delhi, the city and its
vicinity were freed from idols and idol worship, and in the
sanctuaries of the images of the gods mosques were raised by the
worshippers of the one God.

"Qutb-ud-Din Aybak also is said to have destroyed nearly
a thousand temples, and then raised mosques on their founda-
tions. The same author states that he built the Jami Masjid,
Delhi, and adorned it with the stones and gold obtained from
the temples which had been demolished by elephants, aud cover-
ed it with inscriptions (from the Quran) containing the divine
commands. We have further evidence of this harrowing process
having been systematically employed from the inscription extant
over the eastern gateway of this same mosque at Delhi, which
relates that the materials of 27 idol temples were used in its
construction.

" Ala-ud-Din, in his zeal to build a second Minar to the Jami
Masjid, to rival the one built by Qutb-ud-Din, is said by Amir
Khusru not only to have dug stones out of the hills, but to have
demolished temples of the infidels to furnish a supply. In his

• Medieval India, p. 26.
t Ibid., pp. 23-24.

Pakistan

conquests of South India the destruction of temples was carried
out by Ala-ud-Din as it had been in the north by his predecessors.

"The Sultan Firoz Shah, in his Futuhat, graphically relates
how he treated Hindus who had dared to build new temples.
1 When they did this in the city (Delhi) and the environs, in
opposition to the law of the Prophet, which declares that such
are not to be tolerated, under Divine guidance I destroyed these
edifices, I killed these leaders of infidelity and punished others
with stripes, until this abuse was entirely abolished and where
infidels and idolaters worshipped idols, Musalmans now by God's
mercy perform their devotions to the true God."

Even in the reign of Shah Jahan, we read of the destruction
of the temples that the Hindus had started to rebuild, and the
account of this direct attack on the piety of the Hindus is thus
solemnly recorded in the Badshah-namah :

"It had been brought to the notice of His Majesty, says the
historian, that during the late reign (of Akbar) many idol-temples
had been begun but remained unfinished at Benares, the great
stronghold of infidelity. The infidels were now desirous of
completing them. His Majesty, the defender of the faith, gave
orders that at Benares and throughout all his dominions in every
place all temples that had been begun should be cast down. It
was reported from the Province of Allahabad that 76 temples had
been destroyed in the district of Benares." *

It was left to Aurang/eb to make a final attempt to over-
throw idolatry. The author of ' Ma ' athir i-Alawgiri dilates
upon his efforts to put down Hindu teaching, and his destruc-
tion of temples in the following terms : —

" In April, A. D. 1669, Aurangzib learned that in the provinces
of Thatta, Multau and Benares, but especially in the latter, foolish
Brahmins were in the habit of expounding frivolous books in
their schools, and that learners, Muslims as well as Hindus, went
there from long distances The 'Director of the Faith' con-
sequently issued orders to all the governors of provinces to destroy
with a willii : hand the schools and temples of the infidels ; and
they were t ijoined to .put an entire stop to the teaching and

practising of idolatrous worship Later it was reported to

his religious Majesty that the Government officeis had destroyed
the temple of Bishuath at Benares." \

• Dr. Titus— Ibid., p. 24.
t Ibid., p. 22.

Break-Up of Unity

As Dr. Titus observes* —

"Such invaders as Muhammad and Timur seem to have been
more concerned with iconoclasm, the collection of booty, the en-
slaving of captives, and the sending of infidels to hell with the
* proselytizing sword* than they were with the conversion of
them even by force. But when rulers were permanently esta-
blished the winning of converts became a matter of supreme
urgency. It was a part of the state policy to establish Islam as
the religion of the whole land.

"Qutb-ud-Din, whose reputation for destroying temples was
almost as great as that of Muhammad, in the latter part of the twelfth
century and early years of the thirteenth, must have frequently
resorted to force as an incentive to conversion. One instance may
be noted: when he approached Koil (Aligarh) in A. D. 1194,
' those of the garrison who were wise and acute were converted
to Islam, but the others were slain with the sword '.

"Further examples of extreme measures employed to effect
a change of faith are all too numerous. One pathetic case is
mentioned in the time of the reign of Firoz Shah (A, D. 1351-
1388). An old Brahmin of Delhi had been accused of worship-
ping idols in his house, and of even leading Muslim women to
become infidels. He was sent for and his case placed before
the judges, doctors, elders and lawyers. Their reply was that
the provisions of the law were clear. The Brahmin must either
become a Muslim or be burned. The true faith was declared
to him and the right course pointed out, but he refused to
accept it. Consequently he was burned by the order of the
Sultan, and the commentator adds, 'Behold the Sultan's strict
adherence to law and rectitude, how he would not deviate in
the least from its decrees.' "

Muhammad not only destroyed temples but made it a policy
to make slaves of the Hindus lie conquered. In the words of
Dr. Titus—

"Not only was slaughter of the infidels and the destruction
of their temples resorted to in earlier period of Islam's contact
with India, but as we have seen, many of the vanquished were
led into slavery. The dividing up of booty was one of the special
attractions, to the leaders as well as to the common soldiers in
these expeditions. Muhammad seems to have made the slaughter
of infidels, the destruction of their temples, the capturing of
slaves, and the plundering of the wealth of the people, particularly
of the temples and the priests, the main object of his raids. On
the 'occasion of his first raid he is said to have taken much booty ;

1 Dr. Titus—Ibid., pp. 31-32.

Pakistan

and half a million Hindus, 'beautiful men and women', were
reduced to slavery and taken back to Ghazni."*

When Muhammad later took Kanauj, in A. D. 1017, he took
so much booty and so many prisoners that (the fingers of those
who counted them would have tired'. Describing how com-
mon Indian slaves had become in Ghazni and Central Asia after
the campaign of A. D. 1019, the historian of the times says t •

"The number of prisoners may be conceived from the fact
that each was sold for from two to ten dirhams. These were
afterwards taken to Ghazui, and merchants came from far distant

cities to purchase them; and the fair and the dark, the

rich and the poor were commingled in one common slavery.

"In the year A.D. 1202, when Qutb-ud-Din captured Kalin-
jar, after the temples had been converted into mosques, and the
very name of idolatry was annihilated, fifty thousand men came
under the collar of slavery and the plain became black as pitch
with Hindus."

Slavery was the fate of those Hindus who were captured in
the holy war. But, when there was no war the systematic abase-
ment of the Hindus played no unimportant part in the methods
adopted by the Muslim invaders. In the days of Ala-ud-Din,
at the beginning of the fourteenth century, the Hindus had in
certain parts given the Sultan much trouble. So, he determined
to impose such taxes on them that they would be prevented from
rising in rebellion.

"The Hindu was to be left unable to keep a horse to ride
on, to carry arms, to wear fine clothes, or to enjoy any of the
luxuries of life." I

Speaking of the levy of Jizyah Dr. Titus says^I :

"The payment of the Jizyah by the Hindus continued
throughout the dominions of the sultans, emperors, and kings in
various parts of India with more or less regularity, though often,
the law was in force in theory only ; since it depended entirely
on the abi 'ty*oi the sovereign to enforce his demands. But,
finally, it \ as abolished throughout the Moghul Empire in the
ninth year of the enlightened Akbar's reign (A.D. 1665), after

• Ibid., p. 24.

t Quoted by Dr. Titus— Ibid., p. 26.

Jlbid., p. 29.

1 Ibid., p. 30.

Break-Up of Unity

it had been accepted as a fundamental part of Muslim govern-
ment policy in India for a period of more than eight centuries."

Lane Poole says that

"the Hindu was taxed to the extent of half the produce of
his land, and had to pay duties on all his buffaloes, goats, and
other milch-cattle. The taxes were to be levied equally on rich
and poor, at so much per acre, so much per animal. Any
collectors or officers taking bribes were summarily dismissed and
heavily punished with sticks, pincers, the rack, imprisonment and
chains. The new rules were strictly carried out, so that one
revenue officer would string together 20 Hindu notables and en-
force payment by blows. No gold or silver, not even the betel-
nut, so cheering and stimulative to pleasure, was to be seen in
a Hindu house, and the wives of the impoverished native officials
were reduced to taking service in Muslim families. Revenue
officers came to be regarded as more deadly than the plague ;
and to be a government clerk was disgrace worse than death, in
so much that no Hindu would marry his daughter to such a
man."*

These edicts, says the historian of the period,

"were so strictly carried out that the chauktdars and khuts
and muqaddims were not able to ride on horseback, to find

weapon, to wear fine clothes, or to indulge in betel No

Hindu could hold up his head ...*... Blows, confinement in the
stocks, imprisonment and chains were all employed to enforce
payment."

All this was not the result of mere caprice or moral perver-
sion. On the other hand, what was done was in accordance
with the ruling ideas of the leaders of Islam in the broadest
aspects. These ideas were well expressed by the Kazi in reply
to a question put by Sultan Ala-ud-Din wanting to know the
legal position of the Hindus under Muslim law. The Kazi
said : —

"They are called payers of tribute, and when the revenue
officer demands silver from them they should without question,
and with all humility and respect, tender gold. If the officer
throws dirt in their mouths, they must without reluctance open

their mouths wide to receive it The due subordination of the

Dhimmi is exhibited in this humble payment, and by this throw-
ing of dirt into their mouths. The glorification of Islam is a

* Medieval India, p. 104.

Pakistan

duty, and contempt for religion is vain. God holds them in
contempt, for he says, 'Keep them in subjection.' To keep the
Hindus in abasement is especially a religious duty, because they
are the most inveterate enemies of the Prophet, and because the
Prophet has commanded us to slay them, plunder them, and
make them captive, saying, * Convert them to Islam or kill them,
and make them slaves, and spoil their wealth and property*. No
doctor but the great doctor (Hauifah), to whose school we be-
long, has assented to the imposition of jizya on Hindus ; doctors
of other schools allow no other alternative but ' Death or Islam'."*

Such is the story of this period of 762 years which elapsed
between the advent of Muhammad of Ghazni and the return of
Ahmadshah Abdalli.

How far is it open to the Hindus to say that Northern India
is part of Aryavarta ? How far is it open to the Hindus to say
because once it belonged to them, therefore, it must remain for
ever an integral part of India? Those who oppose separation
and hold to the 'historic sentiment' arising out of an ancient
fact that Northern India including Afghanistan was once part of
India and that the people of that area were either Buddhist or
Hindus, must be asked whether the events of these 762 years
of incessant Muslim invasions, the object with which they were
launched and the methods adopted by these invaders to give
effect to their object are to be treated as though they were matters
of no account ?

Apart from otltter consequences which have flowed from
them these invasions have, in my opinion, so profoundly altered
the culture and character of the northern areas, which it is now
proposed to be included in a Pakistan, that there is not only no
unity between that area and the rest of India but that there is
as a matter of fact a real antipathy between the two.

The first consequence of these invasions was the breaking
up of the unity i,f JjjTorthern India with the rest of India. After
his conquest of Northern India, Muhammad of Ghazni detached
it from India and ruled it from Ghazni. When Mahommed
Ghori came in the field as a conqueror, he again attached it to
India and ruled it from Lahore and then from Delhi. Hakim,

• Quoted by Dr. Titus—Ibid., p. 29.
46

Break-Up of Unity

the brother of Akbar, detached Kabul and Kandahar from North-
ern India. Akbar again attached it to Northern India. They
were again detached by Nadirshah in 1738 and the whole of
Northern India would have been severed from India had it not
been for the check provided by the rise of the Sikhs. Northern
India, therefore, has been like a wagon in a train, which can
be coupled or uncoupled according to the circumstances of the
moment. If analogy is wanted, the case of Alsace-Lorraine
could be cited. Alsace-Lorraine was originally part of Germany,
like the rest of Switzerland and the Low Countries. It continued
to be so till 1680, when it was taken by France and incorporated
into French territory. It belonged to France till 1871, when it
was detached by Germany and made part of her territory. In
1918, it was again detached from Germany and made part of
France. In 1940, it was detached from France and made part
of Germany.

The methods adopted by the invaders have left behind them
their aftermath. One aftermath is the bitterness between the
Hindus and the Muslims which they have caused. This bitter-
ness, between the two, is so deep-seated that a century of political
life lias neither succeeded in assuaging it, nor in making people
forget it. As the invasions were accompanied with destruction
of temples and forced conversions, with spoliation of property,
,with slaughter, enslavement and abasement of men, women and
children, what wonder if the memory of these invasions has ever
remained green, as a source of pride to the Muslims and as a
source of shame to the Hindus? But these things apart, this
north-west corner of India has been a theatre in which a stern
drama has been played. Muslim hordes, in wave after wave,
have surged down into this area and from thence scattered
themselves in spray over the rest of India. These reached
the rest of India in thin currents. In time, they also receded
from their farthest limits ; while they lasted, they left a deep
deposit of Islamic culture over the original Aryan culture in this
north-west corner of India which has given it a totally different
colour, both in religious and political outlook. The Muslim
invaders, no doubt, came to India singing a hymn of hate against
the Hindus. But, they did not merely sing their hymn of hate

Pakistan

and go back burning a few temples on the way. That would
have been a blessing. They were not content with so negative
a result. They did a positive act, namely, to plant the seed of
Islam. The growth of this plant is remarkable. It is not a
summer sapling. It is as great and as strong as an oak. Its
growth is the thickest in Northern India. The successive inva-
sions have deposited their ' silt ' more there than anywhere else,
and have served as watering exercises of devoted gardeners.
Its growth is so thick in Northern India that the remnants of
Hindu and Buddhist culture are just shrubs. Even the Sikh
axe could not fell this oak. Sikhs, no doubt, became the political
masters of Northern India, but they did not gain back Northern
India to that spiritual and cultural unity by which it was bound
to the rest of India before Hsuan Tsang. The Sikhs coupled
it back to India. Still, it remains like Alsace-Lorraine politically
detachable and spiritually alien so far as the rest of India is
concerned. It is only an unimaginative person who could fail
to take notice of these facts or insist in the face of them that
Pakistan means breaking up into two what is one whole.

What is the unity the Hindu sees between Pakistan and
Hindustan ? If it is geographical unity, then that is no unity.
Geographical unity is unity intended by nature. In building up
a nationality on geographical unity, it must be remembered that
it is a case where Nature proposes and Man disposes. If it is
unity in external things, such as ways and habits of life, that is
no unity. Such unity is the result of exposure to a common
environment. If it is administrative unity, that again is no unity.
The instance of Burma is in point. Arakan and Tenasserim
were annexed in 1826 by the treaty of Yendabu. Pegu and
Martaban were annexed in 1852. Upper Burma was annexed
in 1886. The administrative unity between India and Burma
was forged in 1826. For over 110 years that administrative unity
continued to exu . * In 1937, the knot that tied the two together
was cut asunder and ^nobody shed a tear over it. The unity
between India and Burma was not less fundamental. If unity
is to be of an abiding character, it must be founded on a sense
of kinship, in the feeling of being kindred. In short, it must
be spiritual. Judged in the light of these considerations, the

Break-Up of Unity

unity between Pakistan and Hindustan is a myth. Indeed, there
is more spiritual unity between Hindustan and Burma than there
is between Pakistan and Hindustan. And if the Hindus did not
object to the severance of Burma from India, it is difficult to
understand how the Hindus can object to the severance of an
area like Pakistan, which, to repeat, is politically detachable
from, socially hostile and spiritually alien to, the rest of India,

CHAPTER V

WEAKENING OF THE DEFENCES

How will the creation of Pakistan affect the question of the
Defence of Hindustan? The question is not a very urgent one.
For, there is no reason to suppose that Pakistan will be at war
with Hindustan immediately it is brought into being. Neverthe-
less, as the question is sure to be raised, it is better to deal with
it.

The question may be considered under three heads: (1)
Question of Frontiers, (2) Question of Resources and (3) Ques-
tion of Armed Forces.

QUESTION OF FRONTIERS

It is sure to be urged by the Hindus that Pakistan leaves
Hindustan without a scientific frontier. The obvious reply, of
course, is that the Musalmans cannot be asked to give up their
right to Pakistan, because it adversely affects the Hindus in the
matter of their boundaries. But banter apart, there are really
two considerations, which, if taken into account, will show that
the apprehensions of the Hindus in this matter are quite uncalled
for.

In the first place, can any country hope to have a frontier
which may be called scientific? As Mr. Daviesj the author of
North-West Frontier, observes: — ^

"It would be impossible to demarcate on the North-West of
our Indian Empire a frontier which would satisfy ethnological,
political and military requirements. To seek for a zone which
traverses easily definable geographical features; which does not

Pakistan

violate ethnic considerations by cutting through the territories
of closely related tribes; and which at the same time serves as a
political boundary, is Utopian."

As a matter of history, there has been no one scientific
boundary for India and different persons have advocated different
boundaries for India. The question of boundaries has given
rise to two policies, the " Forward" Policy and the "Back to
the Indus" Policy. The " Forward" Policy had a greater and a
lesser intent, to use the language of Sir George Macmunn. In
its greater intent, it meant active control in the affairs of Afghani-
stan as an Etat Tampion to India and the extension of Indian
influence upto the Oxus. In its lesser intent, it was confined to
the absorption of the tribal hills between the administered terri-
tory (i.e. the Province of N.-W. F.) and Afghanistan as defined
by the Durand Line and the exercise of British control right up
to that line. The greater intent of the Forward Policy, as a
basis for a safe boundary for India, has long been abandoned.
Consequently, there remain three possible boundary lines to
choose from: (1) the Indus River, (2) the present administra-
tive boundary of the N.-W. F. P. and (3) the Durand Line. Paki-
stan will no doubt bring the boundary of Hindustan Back to the
Indus, indeed behind the Indus, to the Sutlej. But this "Back
to the Indus " policy was not without its advocates. The greatest
exponent of the Indus boundary was Lord Lawrence, who was
strongly opposed to any forward move beyond the trans-Indus
foot hills. He advocated meeting any invader in the valley of
the Indus. In his opinion, it would be an act of folly and weak-
ness to give battle at any great distance from the Indus base ;
and the longer the distance an invading army has to march
through Afghanistan and the tribal country, the more harassed
it would be. Others, no doubt, have pointed out that a river is a
weak line of defence. But the principal reason for not retiring
to the Indus boundary seems to lie elsewhere. Mr. Davies gives
the real reason wh mTie says that the —

'"Back to Indus' cry becomes absurd when it is examined
from the point of view of the inhabitants of the modern North-
West Frontier Province. Not only would withdrawal mean loss
of prestige, but it would also be a gross betrayal of those peoples
to whom we have extended our beneficent rule."

Weakening of the Defences

In fact, it is no use insisting that any particular boundary is the
safest, for the simple reason that geographical conditions are not
decisive in the world to-day and modern technique has robbed
natural m frontiers of much of their former importance, even
where they are mighty mountains, the broadest streams, widest
seas or far stretching deserts.

In the second place, it is always possible for nations with
no natural boundaries to make good this defect. Countries are
not wanting which have no natural boundaries. Yet, all have
made good the deficiencies of nature, by creating artificial forti-
fications as barriers, which can be far more impregnable than
natural barriers. There is no reason to suppose that the Hindus
will not be able to accomplish what other countries similarly
situated have done. Given the resources, Hindus need have no
fear for want of a naturally safe frontier.

QUESTION OF RESOURCES

•

More important than the question of a scientific frontier, is
the question of resources. If resources are ample for the neces-
sary equipment, then it is always possible to overcome the
difficulties created by an unscientific or a weak frontier. We
must, therefore, consider the comparative resources of Pakistan
and Hindustan. The following figures are intended to convey
an idea of their comparative resources : —

Resources of Pakistan.

Provinces. Area. Population, Revenues.*

Rs.

N.-W.F.P. ... 13,518 2,425,003 1,90,11,842

Punjab ... 91,919 23,551,210 12,53,87,730

Sind ... 46,378 3,887,070 9,56,76,269

Baluchistan ... 54,228 420,648

Bengal ... 82,955 50,000,000 36,55,62,485

Total ... 288,998 80,283,931 60,56,38,326

Pakistan
Resources of Hindustan.

Provinces.

Ajmer-Meiwara

Assam

Bihar

Bombay

C. P. & Berar

Coorg

Delhi

Madras

Orissa

U. P.

Area.

Population.

Revenues.*

Rs.

2,711

560,292

21,00,000

55,014

8,622,251

4,46,04,441

69,348

32,371,434

6,78,21,588

77,271

18,000,000

34,98,03,800

99,957

15,507,723

4,58,83,962

1,593

163,327

11,00,000

573

636,246

70,00,000

142,277

46,000,000

25,66,71,265

32,695

8,043,681

87,67,269

206,248

48,408,763

16,85,52,881

Total

607,657 178,513,919

96,24,05,206

These are gross figures. They are subject to certain addi-
tions and deductions. Revenues derived by the Central Govern-
ment from Railways, Currency and Post and Telegraphs are not
included in these 'figures, as it is not possible to ascertain how
much is raised from each Province. When it is done, certain
additions will have to be made to the figures under revenue.
There can be no doubt that the share from these heads of reve-
nue that will come to Hindustan, will be much larger than the
share that will go to Pakistan. Just as additions will have to be
made to these figures, so also deductions will have to be made
from them. Most of these deductions will, of course, fall to
the lot of Pakistan. As will be shown later, some portion of the
Punjab will have to be excluded from the scheme of Western
Pakistan. Similarly, some portion of Bengal will have to be
excluded from the proposed Eastern Pakistan, although a district
from Assam will h vejto be added to it. According to me, fifteen
districts will have to be excluded from Bengal and thirteen
districts shall have to be excluded from the Punjab. Sufficient

• Revenues include revenue raised both by Provincial Governments in the Pro-
vinces from provincial sources and by the Central Government from Central revenues.

Weakening of the Defences

data are not available to enable any one to give an exact idea of
what would be the reduction in the area, population and revenue,
that would result from the exclusion of these districts. One may,
however, hazard the guess that so far as the Punjab and Bengal
are concerned, their revenues would be halved. What is lost by
Pakistan by this exclusion, will of course be gained by Hindustan.
To put it in concrete terms, while the revenues of Western and
Eastern Pakistan will be 60 crores minus 24 crores, i.e. 36 crores,
the revenues of Hindustan wrill be about 96 crores fltus 24 crores,
i.e. 120 crores.

The study of these figures, in the light of the observations
I have made, will show that the resources of Hindustan are far
greater than the resources of Pakistan, whether one considers
the question in terms of area, population or revenue. There
need, therefore, be no apprehension on the score of resources.
For, the creation of Pakistan will not leave Hindustan in a
weakened condition.

Ill
QUESTION OF ARMED FORCES

The defence of a country does not depend so much upon its
scientific frontier as it does upon its resources. But more than
resources does it depend upon the fighting forces available to it.

What are the fighting forces available to Pakistan and to
Hindustan?

The Simon Commission pointed out, as a special feature of
the Indian Defence Problem, that there were special areas which
alone offered recruits to the Indian Army and that there were
other areas which offered none or if at all, very few. The facts
revealed in the following table, taken from the Report of the
Commission, undoubtedly will come as a most disagreeable sur-
prise to many Indians, who think and care about the defence of
India.

Pakistan

Areas of Recruitment. Number of Recruits drawn.

1 N.-W. Frontier Province ... 5,600

2 Kashmir ... 6,500

3 Punjab ... 86,000

4 Baluchistan ... 300

5 Nepal ... 19,000

6 United Provinces ... 16,500

7 Rajputana ... 7,000

8 Central India ... 200

9 Bombay ... 7,000

10 Central Provinces ... 100

11 Bihar & Orissa ... 300

12 Bengal ... Nil

13 Assam ... Nil

14 Burma ... 3,000

15 Hyderabad ... 700

16 Mysore ... 100

17 Madras ... 4,000

18 Miscellaneous ... 1,900

Total ... 158,200

The Simon Commission found that this state of affairs was
natural to India, and in support of it, cited the following figures

of recruitment from the different Provinces of India during the
Great War especially because "it cannot be suggested that any
discouragement was offered to recruitment in any area" :—

Combatant Non-combatant

Province. Recruits Recruits Total.

Enlisted. Enlisted.

Madras ... 51,223 41,117 92,340

Bombay ... 41,272 30,211 71,483

Bengal ... 7,117 51,935 59,052

United Provinces ... 163,578 117,565 281,143

Punjab ... 349,688 97,288 446,976

North- West Frontier ... 32,181 13,050 45,231

Baluchistan ... 1,761 327 2,088

Burma ... 14,094 4,579 18,673

Bihar & Orissa ... 8,576 32,976 41,552

Central Provinces I... 5,376 9,631 15,007

Assam ... 942 14,182 15,124

Ajmer-Merwara ... 7,341 1,632 8,973

Nepal ... 58,904 ... 58,904

Total ... 742,053 414/493 1,156,546
56

Weakening of the Defences

These data reveal in a striking manner that the fighting
forces available for the defence of India mostly come from areas
which are to be included in Pakistan. From this it may be
argued, that without Pakistan, Hindustan cannot defend itself.

The facts brought out by the Simon Commission are, of
course, beyond question. But they cannot be made the basis of
a conclusion, such as is suggested by the Simon Commission,
namely, that only Pakistan can produce soldiers and that Hindu-
stan cannot. That such a conclusion is quite untenable will be
seen from the following considerations.

In the first place, what is regarded by the Simon Commission
as something peculiar to India is not quite so peculiar. What
appears to be peculiar is not due to any inherent defect in the
people. The peculiarity arises because of the policy of recruit-
ment followed by the British Government for years past. The
official explanation of this predominance in the Indian Army
of the men of the North-West is that they belong to the Martial
Classes. But Mr. Chaudhari* has demonstrated, by unimpeach-
able data, that this explanation is far from being true. He has
shown that the predominance in the Army of the men of the
North-West took place as early as the Mutiny of 1857, some 20
years before the theory of Martial and Non-martial Classes was
projected in an indistinct form for the first time in 1879 by the
Special Army Committeef appointed in that year, and that theif
predominance had nothing to do with their alleged fighting
qualities but was due to the fact, that they helped the British to
suppress the Mutiny in which the Bengal Army was so complete-
ly involved. To quote Mr. Chaudhari : —

uThe pre-Mutiny army of Bengal was essentially a Brahmin
and Kshatriya army of the Ganges basin. All the three Presi-
dency Armies of those days, as we have stated in the first part of
this article, were in a sense quite representative of the military

* See his series of articles on " The Martial Races of India " published in the
Modern Review for July 1930, September 1930, January 1931 and February 1931.

f The Questionnaire circulated by the Committee included the following question :
" If an efficient and available reserve of the Indian Army be considered necessary for
the safety of the Empire, should it not be recruited and maintained from those parts
of the country which give us best soldiers, rather than amongst the weakest and least
warlike races of India? "

Pakistan

potentialities of the areas to which they belonged, though none
of them could, strictly speaking, be correctly described as national
armies of the provinces concerned, as there was no attempt to
draw upon any but the traditional martial elements of the popu-
lation. But they all got their recruits mainly from their natural
areas of recruitment, viz., the Madras Army from the Tamil and
Telugu countries, the Bombay Army from Western India, and
the Bengal Army from Bihar and U. P. and to a very limited
extent from Bengal. There was no official restriction on the
enrolment of men of any particular tribe or caste or region, pro-
vided they were otherwise eligible. Leaving aside for the mo-
ment the practice of the Bombay and the Madras Armies, the
only exception to this general rule in the Bengal Army was that
which applied to the Punjabis and Sikhs, who, inspite of their
magnificent military traditions, were not given a fair representa-
tion in the Army of Northern India. Their recruitment, on the
contrary, was placed under severe restrictions by an order of the
Government, which laid down that 'the number of Punjabis in
a regiment is never to exceed 200, nor are more than 100 of them
to be Sikhs'. It was only the revolt of the Hindustani regiments
of the Bengal Army that gave an opportunity to the Punjabis
to rehabilitate themselves in the eyes of the British authorities.
Till then, they remained suspect and under a ban, and the Bengal
Army on the eve of the Mutiny was mainly recruited from Oudh,
North and South Bihar, especially the latter, principally Shahabad
and Bhojpur, the Doab of the Ganges and Jumna and Rohil-
khund. The soldiers recruited from these areas were mostly high-
caste men, Brahmins of all denominations, Kshatriyas, Rajputs and
Ahirs. The average proportion in which these classes were en-
rolled in a regiment was: (l) Brahmin 7/24, (2) Rajputs 1/4,
(3) Inferior Hindus 1/6, (4) Musalmans 1/6, (5) Punjabis 1/8.

" To this army, the area which now-a-days furnishes the great-
est number of soldiers — the Punjab, Nepal, N.-W. F. Province,
the hill tracts of Kumaon and Garhwal, Rajputana, — furnished
very few recruits or none at all. There was practical exclusion
in it of all the famous fighting castes of India, — Sikhs, Gurkhas,
Punjabi Musalmans, Dogras, Jats, Pathans, Garhwalis, Rajpuiana
, Rajputs, Kumaonis, Gujaras, all the tribes and sects, in fact,
which are looked upon today as a tower of strength of the Indian
Army. A single year and a single rebellion was, however, to
change all thi . |The Mutiny, which broke out in 1857, blew up
the old Benga Army and brought into existence a Punjabized
and barbarized army, resembling the Indian Army of today in
broad lines and general proportions of its composition.

" The gaps created by the revolt of the Hindustani regiments
(of the Bengal Army) were at once filled up by Sikhs and other
Punjabis, and hillmen eager for revenge and for the loot of the

Weakening of the Defences

cities of Hindustan. They had all been conquered and subju-
gated by the British with the help of the Hindustani soldiers,
and in their ignorance, they regarded the Hindustanis, rather
the handful of British, as their real enemies. This enmity was
magnificently exploited by the British authorities in suppressing
the Mutiny. When the news of the enlistment of Gurkhas reach-
ed Lord Dalhousie in England he expressed great satisfaction and
wrote to a friend: 'Against the Oude Sepoys they may confi-
dently be expected to fight like devils'. And after the Mutiny,
General Mansfield, the Chief of the Staff of the Indian Army,
wrote about the Sikhs: 'It was not because they loved us, but
because they hated Hindustan and hated the Bengal Army t!.at
the Sikhs had flocked to our standard instead of seeking the
opportunity to strike again for their freedom. They wanted to
revenge themselves and to gain riches by the plunder of Hindu-
stani cities. They were not attracted by mere daily pay, it was
rather the prospect of wholesale plunder and stamping on the
heads of their enemies. In short, we turned to profit the esprit
de corps of the old Khalsa Army of Ranjit Singh, in the manner
which for a time would most effectually bind the Sikhs to us as
long as the active service against their old enemies ma}' last'.

" The relations thus established were in fact to last much
longer. The services rendered by the Sikhs and Gurkhas during
the Mutiny were not forgotten and henceforward the Punjab and
Nepal had the place of honour in the Indian Army."

That Mr. Chaudhari is right when he says that it was the
Mutiny of 1857 which was the real cause of the preponderance
in the Indian Anuy of the men of the North- West is beyond the
possibility of doubt. Equally incontrovertible is the view of
Mr. Chaudhari that this preponderance of the men of the North-
West is not due to their native superiority in fighting qualities,
as the same is amply borne out by the figures which he has col-
lected, showing the changes in the composition of the Indian
Infantry before and after the Mutiny.

Pakistan

CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE INDIAN INFANTRY
Percentage of men from different Parts

Year.

North-Wcst India.

North-East
India
U.P.. Bihar.

South
India.

Burma.

Punjab, N.-W. F.,
Kashmir.

Nepal, Garhwal,
Kumaon.

1856

Less than 10

Negligible.

Not less
than 90

Nil

1858

»»

1883
1893

48
53

17
24

35
23

1905

1919

14.8

25.5

1.7

1930

58.5

11.0

5.5

These figures show that in 1856, one year before the Mutiny,
the men from the North- West were a negligible factor in the
Indian Army. But in 1858, one year after the Mutiny, they had
acquired a dominant position which has never received a set-
back.

It will thus be seen that the distinction between Martial and
Non-martial Classes, which was put forth for the first time in
1879, as a matter of principle, which was later on insisted upon
as a matter of serious consideration by Lord Roberts* and which
was subsequently recognised by Lord Kitchener as a principle
governing recruitment to the Indian Army, had nothing to do

* In his Forty-One 'ecfs he wrote: "Each cold season, I made long tours in
order to acquaint myself /ith the needs and capabilities of the men of the Madras
Army. I tried hard to discover in them those fighting qualities which had distin-
guished their forefathers during the wars of the last and the beginning of the present
century . . . And I was forced to the conclusion that the ancient military spirit had
died in them, as it had died in the ordinary Hindustani of Bengal and the Mahratta
of Bombay, and that they could no longer with safety be pitted against warlike races,
or employed outside the limit of Southern India."

Weakening of the Defences

with the origin of this preponderance of the men of the North-
West in the Indian Army. No donbt, the accident that the
people from North-West India had the good Inck of being
declared by the Government as belonging to the Martial Class,
while most of the classes coming from the rest of India had the
ill-luck of being declared Non-martial Classes had important
consequences. Being regularly employed in the Army, the
people of North-West India came to look upon service in the
Army as an occupation with a security and a career which was
denied to meu from the rest of India. The large number of
recruits drawn from North-West India, therefore, indicates
nothing more than this — namely, owing to the policy of the
British Government, service in the Army has become their occupa-
tion and if people in other parts of India do not readily come forth
to enlist in the Army, the reason is that Government did not
employ them in the Army. People follow their ancestral occupa-
tions whether they like it or not. When a people do not take to a
new occupation it does not necessarily mean that they are not
fit for it. It only means that it is not their ancestral occupation.

This division between Martial and Non-martial Classes is,
of course, a purely arbitrary and artificial distinction. It is as
foolish as the Hindu theory of caste, making birth instead of
worth, the basis for recognition. At one time, the Government
insisted that the distinction they had adopted was a real distinc-
tion and that in terms of fighting qualities, it meant so much
fighting value. In fact, this was their justification for recruiting
more men from the North-West of India. That this distinction
has nothing to do with any difference in fighting qualities has
now been admitted. Sir Phillip Chetwode,* late Commander-
in-Chief of India, broadcasting from London on the constitution
of the Indian Army, took pains to explain that the recruitment
of a larger proportion of it from the Punjab, did not mean that
the people of the Peninsula were without martial qualities. Sir
Phillip Chetwode explained that the reason why men of the
North were largely recruited for the Indian Army was chiefly
climatic, as the men from the South cannot stand the extremes
of heat and cold of North India. No race can be permanently

* Indian Social Reformer. January 27th, 1940.

Pakistan

without martial spirit. Martial spirit is not a matter of native
instinct. It is a matter of training and anybody can be trained
to it.

But apart from this, there is enough fighting material in
Hindustan, besides what might be produced by special training.
There are the Sikhs, about whose fighting qualities nothing need
be said. There are the Rajputs who are even now included in
the category of Martial Classes. In addition to these, there are
the Mabrattas who proved their calibre as a fighting race during
the last European War. Even the people of the Madras Presi-
dency can be depended upon for military purposes. ^ Speaking
of the Madrasis as soldiers, General Sir Frederick P. Haines, at
one time Commander-in-Chief in India, observed : —

" It has been customary to declare that the Madras Army is
composed of men physically inferior to those of the Bengal Army,
and if stature alone be taken into consideration, this is true. It is
also said that by the force of circumstances the martial feeling and
the characteristics necessary to the real soldier are no longer to be
found in its ranks. I feel bound to reject the above assertions and
others which ascribe comparative inefficiency to Madras troops.
It is true that in recent years they have seen but little service ; for,
with the exception of the sappers, they have been specially excluded
from all participation in work in the field. I cannot admit for one
moment that anything has occurred to disclose the fact that the
Madras Sepoy is inferior as a fighting man. The facts of history
warrant us in assuming the contrary. In drill training and discip-
line, the Madras Sepoy is inferior to none ; while in point of
health, as exhibited by returns, he compares favourably with his
neighbours. This has been manifested by the sappers and their
followers in the,Khyber ; and the sappers are of the same race as
the sepoys."

Hindustan need, therefore, have no apprehension regard-
ing the supply of au adequate fighting force from among its
own people. The separation of Pakistan cannot weaken her in
that respect. , #

The Simon Commission drew attention to three features of
the Indian Army, which struck them as being special arid peculiar
to India. It pointed out that the duty of the Army in India
was two-fold; firstly, to prevent the independent tribes on the
Indian side of the Afghan frontier from raiding the peaceful

Weakening of the Defences

inhabitants of the plains below. Secondly, to protect India
against invasion by countries lying behind and beyond this belt
of unorganized territories. The Commission took note of the
fact that from 1850 to 1922, there were 72 expeditions against the
independent tribes, an average of one a year, and also of the fact
"that in the countries behind and beyond this belt of unorganized
territory, lies the direction from which, throughout the ages, the
danger to India's territorial integrity has come. This quarter is
occupied by " States which according to the Commission are not
members of the League of Nations" and is, therefore, a greater
danger to India now than before. The Commission insisted on
emphasizing that these two facts constituted a peculiar feature
of the problem of military defence in India and so far as the
urgency and extent of the problem is concerned, they are " with-
out parallel elsewhere in the Empire, and constituted a difficulty
in developing self-government which never arose in any com-
parable degree in the case of the self-governing Dominions."

As a second unique feature of the Indian Army, the Com-
mission observed : —

" The Army in India is not only provided and organized to
ensure against external dangers of a wholly exceptional charac-
ter: it is also distributed and habitually used throughout India
for the purpose of maintaining or restoring internal peace. In

all countries the military is not normally employed in this

way, and certainly is not organized for this purpose. But the
case of India is entirely different. Troops are employed many
times a year to prevent internal disorder and, if necessary, to quell
it. Police forces, admirably organized as they are, cannot be expect-
ed in all cases to cope with the sudden and violent outburst of a
mob driven frantic by religious frenzy. It is, therefore, well
understood in India both by the police and by the military — and,
what is even more to the point, by the public at large- — that the
soldiers may have to be sent for... This use of the Army for the
purpose of maintaining or restoring internal order was increasing
rather than diminishing, and that on these occasions the practi-
cally universal request was for British troops. The proportion
of the British to Indian troops allotted to this dut}7 has in fact
risen in the last quarter of a century. The reason, of course, is
that the British soldier is a neutral, and is under no suspicion of
favouring Hindus against Mahomedans or Mahomedans against

Hindus Inasmuch as the vast majority of the disturbances

which call for the intervention of the military have a communal

Pakistan

or religious complexion, it is natural and inevitable that the inter-
vention which is most likely to be authoritative should be that
which has no bias, real or suspected, to either side- It is a
striking fact in this connection that, while in regular units of the
Army in India as a whole British soldiers are in a minority of
about 1 to 2i, in the troops allotted for internal security the pre-x
ponderance is reversed, and for this purpose a majority of British'
troops is employed — in the troops ear-marked for internal security
the proportion is about eight British to seven Indian soldiers."

Commenting upon this feature of the Indian Army the Com-
mission said : —

"When, therefore, one contemplates a future for India in
which, in place of the existing Army organization, the country is
defended and pacified by exclusively Indian units, just as Canada
relies on Canadian troops and Ireland 011 Irish troops, it is essen-
tial to realize and bear in mind the dimensions and character
of the Indian problem of internal order and the part which the
British soldier at present plays (to the general satisfaction of the
country-side) in supporting peaceful government."

The third unique feature of the Indian Army, which was
pointed out by the Simon Commission, is the preponderance in
it of the men from the North-West. The origin of this prepon-
derance and the reasons underlying the official explanation given
therefor have already been examined.

But, there is one more special feature of the Indian Army
to which the Commission made no reference at all. The Com-
mission either ignored it or was not aware of it. It is such an
important feature that it overshadows all the three features to
which the Commission refers, in its importance and in its social
and political consequences.

It is a feature which, if widely known, will set many people
to think furiously. It is sure to raise questions which may prove
insoluble and which^may easily block the path of India's politi-
cal progress — qu stfons of far greater importance and complexity
than those relating to Indianization of the Army.

This neglected feature relates to the communal composition
of the Indian Army. Mr. Chaudhari has collected the relevant
data in his articles, already referred to, which throws a flood of
light on this aspect of the Indian Army. The following table

Weakening of the Defences

shows the proportion of soldiers serving in the Indian Infantry,
according to the area and the community from which they are
drawn : —

CHANGES IN THE COMMUNAL COMPOSITION OF
THE INDIAN ARMY

Area and Communities.

I The Punjab, N.-W. F. P.
and Kashmir

1 Sikhs

2 Punjabi Musalmans • •

3 Pathans

II Nepal, Kumaon, Garhwal

1 Gurkhas
III Upper India

1 U.P. Rajputs

2 Hindustani Musalmans

3 Brahmins

TV South India

1 Mahrattas

2 Madrasi Musalmans

3 Tamils

V. Burma

1 Bur mans

Percentage ; Percentage ( Percentage Percentage
in 1914. in 1918. I in 1919. in 1930.

p.p.

46*5

58*5

19' 2

17'4

15'4

13'58

IS • •

1T3

12'4

22*6

6*2

5*42

4'54

6'35

hwal

18*9

14'9

22'0

13*1

16*6

12*2

16*4

. .

227

25*5

ll'O

. .

6*4

6*8

2'55

mans

4*1

3'42

4'45

Nil.

1*86

2'5

Nil.

11*9

5*5

4'9

3X5

5*33

ns • •

3'5

271

2' 13

Nil.

1 2 '5

2'U

1'67

Nil.

Nil. Negligible 17

3'0

This table brings out in an unmistakable manner the pro-
found changes which have been going on in the communal
composition of the Indian Army particularly after 1919. They
are (1) a phenomenal rise in the strength of the Punjabi Musal-
man and the Pathan, (2) a substantial reduction in the position
of Sikhs from first to third, (3) the degradation of the Rajputs
to the fourth place, and (4) the shutting out of the U. P.
Brahmins, the Madrasi Musalmans, and the Tamilians, both
Brahmins and Non-Brahmins.

Pakistan

A further analysis of the figures for 1930, which discloses
the communal composition of the Indian Infantry and Indian
Cavalry, has been madefy Mr. Chaudhari in the following
table.*

COMMUNAL COMPOvSlTTON OF THE INDIAN ARMY IN 1930

Class.

Percentage in
Infantry.

Percentage
Areas. in

Excluding Including Cavalry.
Gurkhas. Gurkhas.

1 Punjabi Musalman

Punjab

| 27

22-6

14-28

2 Gurkhas

Nepal

16-4

3 Sikhs

Punjab

16-24

13*58

23-81

4 Dogras

North Punjab and

11-4

9-54

9-53

Kashmir

5 Jats

Rajputana, U. P.,

9-5

7-94

19-06

Punjab

6 Pathans

N.-W. F. Province

7-57

6-35

4-76

7 Mahrattas

Konkan

6'34

5-33

8 Garhwahs

Garhwal

4-53

3-63

9 U. P. Rajputs

U. P.

3-04

2-54

10 Kajputana Rajputs

Kajputana

2-8

235

1 1 Kumaonis

Kuniaon

2-44

2-05

12 Gujars

N. 1C. Rajputana

•52

1-28

13 Punjabi Hindus

Punjab

1-28

14 Alurs

Do.

•22

1-024

15 Musalmans, Rajput*;

Neighbourhood of

•22

1-024

7-14

Ranghars.

Delhi

16 Kaimkhanis

Kajputana

4-76

17 Kachins

Burma

"•22

1-024

18 Chins

Do.

•22

1'024

19 Karens

Do.

•22

1-024

20 Dekhani Musalmans

Deccan

4-76

21 Hindustani Musalmans

IT. P.

2-38

* This table shows the percentage of men of each eligible class in the Indian
Infantry (82 active and 18 training battalions), the Indian Cavalry (21 regiments),
and the 20 battalions of the Gurkha Infantry. This table does not include the
Indian personnel of (a) the 19 batteries of Indian Mountain Artillery, and (b) 3
regiments ol Sappers and Miners, (c) the Indian Signal Corps, and (d) the Corps
of Indian Pioneers, all of which are composed of different proportions of the Punjabi
Musalmans, Sikhs, Pathans, Hindustani Hindus and Musalmans, Madrasis of all
classes and Hazra Afghans, either in class units or class companies. Fxcept that
some units in these arms of the service are composed of the Madrasis and Hazras,
now enrolled in other units ol the Indian Army, the class composition of these units
does not materially alter the proportion of the classes as given in the table. This
table does not also include the Indian personnel attached to the British Infantry and
Artillery u&iti.

Weakening of the Defences

Reducing these figures in terms of communities, we get the
following percentage as it stood in 1930 : —

Percentage in Infantry.

Communities.

1 Hindus and Sikhs

2 Gurkhas

3 Muhammadans

Including
Gurkhas.

Excluding
Gurkhas.

Percentage in
Cavalry.

60'55 , 50-554 j 61'92

16-4 i

3579 29-974 I 30'08

4 Burmans . j 3'66 , 3'072 j

These figures show the communal composition of the Indian
Army. The Musalmans according to Mr. Chaudhari formed
36% of the Indian Infantry and 30% of the Indian Cavalry.

These figures relate to the year 1930. We must now find
out what changes have taken place since then in this proportion.

It is one of the most intriguing things in the Military history
of India that no information is available on this point after 1930.
It is impossible to know what the proportion of the Muslims in
the Indian Army at present is. There is no Government publi-
cation from which such information can be gathered. In the
past, there was no dearth of publications giving this information.
It is very surprising that they should have now disappeared, or
if they do appear, that they should cease to contain this informa-
tion. Not only is there no Government publication containing
information on this point, but Government has refused to give
any information on the point when asked by members of the
Central Legislative Assembly. The following questions and
answers taken from the proceedings of the Central Legislative
Assembly show how Government has been strenuously combat-
ing every attempt to obtain information on the point : —

There was an interpellation on 15th September 1938, when
the following questions were asked and replies as stated below
were given : —

Arrangements for the Defence of India.11'

• Legislative Assembly Debates, 1938 Vol. VI, page 2462.

Pakistan

Q. 1360 : Mr. Badri Dull Pamie (on behalf of Mr. Ama-
rendra Nath Chattopadhya).

(a] x x x x

(It) x x x x

(d) How many Indians have been recruited during
1937 and 193X as' soldiers and officers during 1937-38 for
the Infantry and Cavalry respectively ? Amongst the
soldiers and officers recruited, how many are Punjabi Sikhs,
Pathaus, Garhwalis, Mahrattas, Madrasis, Biharis, Bengalis
and Hindustanis of the United Provinces and Gurkhas?

(e) If none but the Punjabi Sikhs, Pathans and Garh-
v/alis have been recruited, is it in contemplation of the
Honourable Member to recruit from all the Provinces for
the defence of India and give them proper military
training?

(/) Will the Defence Secretary be pleased to state if
Provincial Governments will be asked to raise Provincial
Regiments, trained and fully mechanised, for the defence
of India? If not, what is his plan of raising an efficient
army for the defence of India?

Mr. C. M. (r. Ogilvie :—

(a) The Honourable Member will appreciate that it is
not in the public interest to disclose the details of such
arrangements.

(b) 5 cadets and 33 Indian apprentices were recruited
for the Indian Air Force during 1937-38.

(r) During 1937-38, 5 Indians have already been
recruited to commissioned ranks in the Royal Indian Navy,
4 will be taken by competitive examination in October
1938, and 3 more by special examination of " Dufferin "
cadets only. During the same period, 314 Indians were
recruited to different non-commissioned categories in the
Royal Indian Navy.

Weakening of the Defences

(d) During the year ending the 31st March 1938, 54
Indians were commissioned as Indian Commissioned
Officers. They are now attached to British units for train-
ing, and it is not yet possible to say what proportion will
be posted to infantry, and cavalry respectively. During
the same period, 961 Indian soldiers were recruited for
cavalry, and 7,970 for infantry. Their details by classes
are not available at Army Headquarters and to call for
them from the recruiting officers all over India would not
justify the expenditure of time and labour involved.

(e) No.

(/) The reply to the first portion is in the negative.
The reply to the second portion is that India already
possesses an efficient army and so far as finances permit,
every effort is made to keep it up-to-date in all respects.

Mr. S. Satyamurti: With reference to the answers to
clauses (d) and (r) of the question taken together, may
I know whether the attention of Government has been drawn
to statements made by many public men that the bulk of
the army is from the Punjab and from one community?
Have Government considered those facts and will Govern-
ment also consider the desirability of making the army truly
national by extending recruitment to all provinces and com-
munities, so as to avoid the clanger present in all countries
of a military dictatorship seizing political power?

Mr. C. M. (r. Ogilvic: I am not sure how that arises^from
this question, but I am prepared to say that provincial
boundaries do not enter into Government's calculations at all.
The best soldiers are chosen to provide the best army for
India and not for any province, and in this matter national
considerations must come above provincial considerations.
Where the bulk of best military material is found, there we
will go to get it, and not elsewhere.

Mr. S. Satyamurti: May I know whether the bulk of the
army is from the Punjab and whether the Government have
forgotten the experience of the brave exploits of men from

Pakistan

my province not very long ago in the Indian Army^ and may
I know if Madrasis are practically kept out and many other
provinces are kept out of the army altogether ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : Madras is not practically kept out
of the army. Government gladly acknowledge the gallant
services of the Madrasis in the army and they are now recrtiit-
ed to those Units where experience has proved them to be
best. There are some 4,500 serving chiefly in the Sappers
and Miners and Artillery.

Mr. S. Satyamurti: Out of a total of 120,000?
Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie: About that.

Mr. S. Satyamurti : May I take it, that, that is a proper
proportion, considering the population of Madras, the reve-
nue that ^Madras pays to the Central exchequer, and the
necessity of having a national army recruited from all the
provinces?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : The only necessity we recognise is
to obtain the best possible army.

Mr. S. Satyamurti: May I know by what tests Govern-
ment have come to the conclusion that provinces other than
the Punjab cannot supply the best elements in the Indian
Army?

Mr. Ogilvie : By experience.

Dr. Sir Ziauddin Ahmed : May I ask if it is not a fact that
all branches of Accounts Department are monopolised by the
Madrasis and will Government immediately reduce the num-
ber in proportion to their numerical strength in India?

Mr. Ogilvie: I do not see how that arises from this
question either, but the Government are again not prepared
to sacrifice efficiency for any provincial cause.

Indian Regiment consisting of Indians belonging to Different
Castes*

* Legislative Assembly Debates, 1938, Vol. VI, page 2478.
70

Weakening of the Defences

Q. 1078 : M r. M. Anantasayanam Ayyangar (on behalf
of Mr. Manu Subedar) :

(a) Will the Defence Secretary state whether any
experiment has ever been made under British rule of having
an Indian regiment consisting of Indians recruited from
different provinces and belonging to the different castes
and sections, such as Sikhs, Mahrattas, Rajputs, Brahmins
and Muslims?

(b) If the reply to part (a] be in the negative, can
a statement of Government's policy in this regard be made
giving reasons why it has not been considered proper to
take such action ?

(d) Are Government aware that in the University
Corps and in the Bombay Scout Movement, and in the
Police Forces of the country, there is no separation by caste
or creed?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie:
(a) No.

(6) Government regard it as a fundamental principle
of organization that Military Sub-Units, such as companies
and squadrons, must be homogeneous.

(d) Yes.

Mr. S. Satyamurti : May I know the meaning which
Government attach to the word " homogeneous " ? Does it
mean from the same province or the same community?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie: It means that they must belong to
the same class of persons.

Pakistan

Mr. S. Satvamurti: May I ask for some elucidation of this
point? Do they make distinction between one class and
another?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie: Certainly.

Mr. S. Satyamurti: On what basis ? Is it religious class
or racial class or provincial class?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie: Neither. It is largely racial class.

Mr. S. Satyamurti: Which races are preferred and which
are not preferred?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie: I refer the Honourable Member
to the Army List.

Recruitment to the Indian Army.*

Q. 1162 : Mr. Brojendra Naniyan Chaudhary: Will the
Defence Secretary please state : —

(a) Whether the attention of Government has been
drawn to the address of the Punjab's Premier, the Hon'ble
Sir Sikander Hyat Khan to his brother soldiers, in these
words: " No patriotic Punjabi would wish to impair
Punjab's position of supremacy in the Army," as reported
by the Associated Press of India in the Hindustan Times
of the 5th September 1938 ; and

(l>) Whether it is the policy of Government to main-
tain the supremacy of Punjabis in the army by continuing
to recruit the major portion from the Punjab; or to attempt
recruitment of the Army from all the provinces without
racial or provincial considerations ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie :
(a) Yes.

(£) I refer the Honourable Member to replies I gave
to the supplementary questions arising from starred ques-
tion No. 1060 asked by Mr. Amarendra Nath Chatto-
padhyaya on 15th September 1938.

• Legislative Assembly Debates, 1938, Vol. VI, page 2754.
72

Weakening of the Defences

Mr. 5. Satyamurti: With reference to the answer to part
(a) of the question, my Honourable friend referred to pre-
vious answers. As far as I remember, the3^ were not given
after this statement was brought before this House. May I
know if the Government of India have examined this state-
ment of the Punjab Premier, uNo patriotic Punjabi would
wish to impair Punjab's position of supremacy in the Army " ?
May I know whether Government have considered the danger-
ous implications of this statement and will they take steps to
prevent a responsible Minister going about and claiming pro-
vincial or communal supremacy in the Indian Army, which
ought to remain Indian first and Indian last?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : I can only answer in exactly the
same words as I answered to a precisely similar question of
the Hon'ble Member on the 15th September last. The policy
of Government with regard to the recruitment has been
repeatedly stated and is perfectly clear.

Mr. S. Satyamurti : That policy is to get the best material
and I ain specifically asking my Honourable friend I hope
he realises the implications of that statement of the Punjab
Premier. I want to know whether the Government have
examined the dangerous implications of any provincial Pre-
mier claiming provincial supremacy in the Indian Army and
whether they propose to take any steps to correct this danger-
ous misapprehension ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie: Government consider that there are
no dangerous implications whatever but rather the reverse.

Mr. Satyamurti: Do Government accept the supremacy
of any province or any community as desirable consideration,
even if it is a fact, to be uttered by responsible public men
*nd do not the Government consider that this will give rise
to communal and provincial quarrels and jealousies inside the
army and possibly a military dictatorship in this country?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie: Government consider that none of
these forebodings have any justification at all

Pakistan

Mr. M. S. Aney : Do the Government subscribe to the
policy implied in the statement of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie: Government's policy has been
repeatedly stated and made clear.

' Mr. M. S. Aney : Is it the policy that the Punjab should
have its supremacy in the Army ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : The policy is that the best material
should be recruited for the Army,

Mr. M. S. Aney : I again repeat the question. Is it the
policy of Government that Punjab should have supremacy in
the Army?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie: I have repeatedly answered that
question. The policy is that the Army should get the best
material from all provinces and Government are quite satis-
fied that it has the best material at present.

Mr. M. S. Aney; Is it not, therefore, necessary that
Government should make a statement modifying the policy
suggested by Sir Sikander Hyat Khan ?

Afr. C. M. G. Ogilvie: Government have no intention
whatever of changing their policy in particular.

Another interpellation took place on 23rd November 1938
when the question stated below was asked : —

Recruitment to the Indian Army from the Central Provinces
& Berar*

£). 1402 : Mr. Govind V. Deshmukh : Will the Defence
Secretary please state : —

(a) The centres in the Central Provinces and Berar
for recruiting men for the Indian Army ;

(£) The classes from which such men are recruited ;

(c) The proportion of the men from the C. P. &
Berar in the Army to the total strength of the Army, as
well as to the population of these provinces ; and

* Legislative Assembly Debates, 1938, Vol. VII. page 3313.
74

Weakening of the Defences

(d) The present policy of recruitment, and if it is
going to be revised ; if not, why not ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie :

(a) There are no recruiting centres in the C. P. or
Berar. Men residing in the C. P. are in the area of the
Recruiting Officer, Delhi, and those of Berar in the area of
the Recruiting Officer, Poona.

(5) Mahrattas of Berar are recruited as a separate
class. Other Hindus and Mussalmaus who are recruited
from the C. P. and Berar are classified as " Hindus" or
" Musalmans", and are not entered under any class deno-
mination.

(<:) The proportion to the total strength of the Army
is .03 per cent, aud the proportion to the total male popu-
lation of these provinces is .0004 per cent.

(d) There is at present no intention of revising the
present policy, the reasons for which were stated in my
reply to a supplementary question arising out of Mr.
Satyarnurti's starred question No. 1060, on the 15th Sep-
tember 1938, and in answer to part (a) of starred question
No. 1086 asked by Mian Ghulam Kadir Muhammad
Shahban on the same date, and in the reply of His Excel-
lency the Cominander-in-Chief to the debates in the Council
of State on the Honourable Mr. Sushil Kumar Roy
Chaudhary's Resolution regarding military training for
Indians on the 21st February 1938 and on the Honourable
Mr. P. N. Sapru's Resolution on the recruitment of all
classes to the Indian Army in April 1935.

This was followed by an interpellation on 6th February 1939,
when the below mentioned question was asked: —

Recruitment to the Indian Army*

Q. 129: Mr. S. Satyanmrti; Will the Defence Secre-
tary be pleased to state :

* Legislative Assembly Debates, 1939, Vol. I, page 253.

Pakistan

(a) Whether Government have since tfie last answer
on this question reconsidered the question of recruiting to
the Indian Army from all provinces and from all castes
and communities;

(b] Whether they have come to any conclusion ;

(r) Whether Government will categorically state the
reasons as to why other provinces and communities are not
allowed to serve in the army ; and

(d) What are the tests by which they have come to
the conclusion that other provinces and other communities
than those from whom recruitment is made to the Indian
Army to-da3* cannot conie up to the standard of efficiency
required of the Indian Aru^ ?

Mr. C\ J7. (>. Oft /vie:
(a) No.
(/>) Does not arise.

(r) and (//) The reasons have been categorically
stated in my replies to starred questions Nos.-1060 and 1086
of 15th September 1938, No. 1162 of 20th September 1938
and No. 1402 of 23rd November 1938 and also in the replies
- of His Excellency the Coinniander-in-Chief in the Council
of State to the debates on the Honourable Mr. P. N.
Sapru's Resolution regarding recruitment of all classes to
the Indian Army and the Honourable Mr. Sushil Kumar
Roy Chaudhary's Resolution regarding Military training
for Indians, on the 13th March 1935 and 21st February
1938 respectively.

This conspiracy of silence on the part of the Government of
India, was quite recently broken by the Secretary of State for
India, who came forward to give the fullest information on this
most vital and most exciting subject, in answer to a question in
the House of Commons. From his answer given on 8th July

Weakening of the Defences

1943 we know the existing communal and provincial composition
of the Indian Army to be as follows : —

I. PROVINCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE INDIAN ARMY

Province.

Percentage, i Province. • Percentage.

1. Punjab 50 7. Bengal Presidency

2. U. P. 15 8. C. P. & Herar i

3. Madras Presidency 10 9. Assam [

4. Bombay Presidency 10 10. Bihar

5. N.-W. F. Province 5 11. Oriisa I

6. Ajmere & Merwara H 12. Nepal

If. COMMUNAL COMPOSITION OF THK INDIAN ARMY

1. Muslims J>>\ p.c.

1. Hindus & Gurkhas 5o p.r.

3. Sikhs 10 p.c.

1. Christians & The Rest 6 p.c.

The information given by the Secretary of State is indeed
very welcome. But, this is the war-time composition of the Indian
Army. The peace-time composition must be very different. It
rested on the well-known distinction between the Martial and
Non-Martial Races. That distinction was abolished during: the
War. There is, however, no certainty that it will not be revived
now that peace has returned. What we want to know is the
peace-time communal composition of the Indian Army. That
still remains an unknown fact and a subject of speculation.

Some say that the normal pre-war proportion of Muslims
was between 60 and 70 p.c. Others say that it is somewhere in
the neighbourhood of 50 p.c. In the absence of exact informa-
tion, one could well adopt the latter figure as disclosing the true
situation especially, when on inquiry, it happens to be confirmed
by those who are in a position to form some idea on the matter.
Even if the proportion be 50% it is high enough to cause alarm
to the Hindus. If this is true, it is ^Jffiiyjfesgglation of

Pakistan

well established principles of British Army policy in India,
adopted after the Mutiny.

After the Mutiny, the British Government ordered two
investigations into the organization of the Indian Army. The
first investigation was carried out by the Peel Commission which
was appointed in 1859. The second investigation was under-
taken by a body, called the Special Army Committee, appointed
in 1879 to which reference has already been made.

The principal question considered by the Peel Commission
was to find out the weaknesses in the Bengal Army, which led to
the Mutiny of 1857, The Peel Commission was 'told by witness
after witness that the principal weakness in the Bengal Army
which mutinied was that

"In the ranks of the regular Army men stood mixed up as
chance might befall. There was no separating by class and clan

into companies In the lines, Hindu and Mahomedan,

vSikh and Poorbeah were mixed up, so that each and all lost to
some extent their racial preiudice r\nd became inspired with one
common sentiment."*

It was, therefore, proposed by Sir John Lawrence that in
organizing the Indian Army care should betaken "to preserve
that distinctiveness which is so valuable, and, while itlasts, makes
the Mahomedan of one country despise, fear or dislike the
Mahomedan of another; Corps should in future be provincial,
and adhere to the geographical limits within which differences
and rivalries are strongly marked. Let all races, Hindu or
Mahomedan of one province be enlisted in one regiment and no
others, and having created distinctive regiments, let us keep

them so, against the hour of need By the system thus

indicated two great evils are avoided : firstly, that community
of feeling throughout the native army and that mischievous
political activity and intrigue which results from association with
other races and travel in other Indian provinces. " t

• MacMunn and Lovctt — The Armies of India, pp. 84-85, quoted by
Chaudhari.

t As quoted by Chaudhari.

Weakening of the Defences

This proposal was supported by many military men before
the Peel Commission and was recommended by it as a principle
of Indian Army Policy. This principle was known as the principle
of Class Composition.

The Special Army Committee of 1879 was concerned with
quite a different problem. What the problem was, becomes
manifest from the questionnaire issued by the Committee. The
questionnaire included the following question : —

11 If the efficient and available reserve of the Indian Army is
considered necessary for the safety of the Empire, should it not
be recruited and maintained from those parts of the country
which give us best soldiers, rather than among the* weakest and
least warlike races of India, due regard, of course, being had to
the necessity of not giving too great strength or prominence to
any particular race or religious group and with due regard to the
safety of the Empire ? "

The principal part of the question is obviously the necessity
or otherwise of " not giving too great strength or prominence to
any particular race or religious group M. On this question official
opinion expressed before the Committee was unanimous.

Lt.-General H. J. Warres, Commander-in-Chief of the Bom-
bay Army, stated : —

" I consider it is not possible to recruit the reserve of the
Indian Army altogether from those parts of India which are said
to produce best soldiers, without giving undue strength and promi-
nence to the races and religions of these countries."

The Commander-in-Chief, Sir Frederick P. Haines, said : —

41 Distinct in race, language and interests from the more
numerous Army of Bengal, it is, in my opinion, eminently politic
and wise to maintain these armies (the Madias and Bombay
Armies) as a counterpoise to it, and I would in no way ^diminish
their stienglh in older that a reserve composed ot what is called
'the most efficient fighting men whom it is possible to procure'
maybe established. It by this it is meant to replace Sepoys oi
Madras and Bombay by a reserve of men passed through the
ranks of the Bengal Army and composed oi the same classes ot
which it is formed, I Twonld say. that 'anything more unwise or
more impolitic could hardly be conceived-1'

Pakistan

The Lt.-Governor of the Punjab also shared this view. He too
declared that he was " opposed to having one recruiting field for
the whole armies " in India. " It will be necessary," he added,
"for political reasons, to prevent preponderance of one nation-
ality/'

The Special Committee accepted this view and recommend-
ed that the composition of the Indian Army should be so
regulated that there should be no predominance of any one
community or nationality in the Army.

These two principles have been the governing principles of
Indian Army policy. Having regard to the principle laid down
by the Special Army Committee of 1879, the changes that have
taken place in the communal composition of the Indian Army
amount to a complete revolution. How this revolution was
allowed to take place is beyond comprehension. It is a revolu-
tion which has taken place in the teeth of a well-established
principle. The principle was really suggested by the fear of the
growing predominance of the men of the North- West in the
Indian Army and was invoked with the special object of curbing
that tendency. The principle was not only enunciated as a rule
of guidance but was taken to be rigorously applied. Lord
Roberts, who was opposed to this principle because it set a limit
upon the recruitment of his pet men of the North-West, had to
bow to this principle during his regime as the Cominander-in-
Chief of India. So well was the principle respected that when
in 19^3, Lord Kitchener entered upon the project of converting
fifteen regiments of Madrasis into Punjab regiments, lie imme-
diately set up a counterpoise to the Sikhs and the Punjabi
Musalnians by raising the proportion of the Gurkhas and the
Pathans. As Sir George Arthur, his biographer, says : —

" The Government, mindful of the lesson taught by the
Mutiny, was alive to the danger of allowing any one element in
the Indian Army to preponderate unduly. An increase in the
Punjabee infantry had as its necessary sequel a further recruitment
of the valuable Gurkha material and the enlistment of more
trans-border Pathans in the Frontier Militia."

That a principle, so unanimously upheld and so rigorously
applied upto the period of the Great War, should have been

Weakening of the Defences

thrown to the wind after the Great War, without ceremony and
without compunction and in a clandestine manner, is really
beyond comprehension. What is the reason which has led the
British to allow so great a preponderance of the Muslims in the
Indian Army ? Two explanations are possible. One is that the
Musalmans really proved, in the Great War, that they were better
soldiers than the Hindus. The second explanation is that the
British have broken the rule and have given the Musalmans such
a dominating position in the Army because they wanted to
counteract the forces of the Hindu agitation for wresting politi-
cal power from the hands of the British.

Whatever be the explanation, two glaring facts stand out
from the above survey. One is that the Indian Army today is
predominantly Muslim in its composition. The other is that the
Musalmans who predominate are the Musalmans from the
Punjab and the N.-W. F. P. Such a composition of the Indian
Army means that the Musalmans of the Punjab and the N.-W.
F. P. are made the sole defenders of India from foreign invasion.
So patent has this fact become that the Musalmans of the Punjab
and the N.-W. F. P. are quite conscious of this proud position
which has been assigned to them by the British, for reasons best
known to them. For, one often hears them say that they are
the * gate-keepers ' of India. The Hindus must consider the prob-
lem of the defence of India in the light of this crucial fact.

How far can the Hindus depend upon these 'gate-keepers' to
hold the gate and protect the liberty and freedom of India ?
The answer to this question must depend upon who comes to
force the gate open. It is obvious that there are only two foreign
countries which are likely to force this gate from the North-
West side of India, Russia or Afghanistan, the borders of both
of which touch the border of India. Which of them will invade
India and when, no one can say definitely. If the invasion came
from Russia, it may be hoped that these gate-keepers of India
will be staunch and loyal enqiigh to hold the gate and stop the
invader. But suppose the Afghans singly or in combination
with other Muslim States march on India, will these gate-keepers
stop the invaders or will they open the gates and let them in ?
This is a question which no Hindu can afford to ignore. This

o 81

Pakistan

is a question on which every Hindu must feel assured, because
it is the most crucial question.

It is possible to say that Afghanistan will never think of
invading India. But a theory is best tested by examining its
capacity to meet the worst case. The loyalty and dependability
of this Army of the Punjabi and N.-W.F.P. Muslims can only be
tested by considering how it will behave in the event of an
invasion by the Afghans. Will they respond to the call of the
land of their birth or will they be swayed by the call of their re-
ligion, is the question which must be faced if ultimate security is to
be obtained. It is not safe to seek to escape from these annoying;
and discomforting questions by believing that we need not worry
about a foreign invasion so long as India is under the protection of
the British. Such a complacent attitude is unforgivable to say the
least. In the first place, tbe last war has shown that a situation
may arise when Great Britain may not be able to protect India,
although, that is the time when India needs her protection most.
vSecondly, the efficiency of an institution must be tested under
natural conditions and not under artificial conditions. The
behaviour of the Indian soldier under British control is artificial.
His behaviour when he is under Indian control is his natural
behaviour. British control does not allow much play to the
natural instincts and natural sympathies of the men in the Army.
That is whj' the men in the Army behave so well. But that is an
artificial and not a natural condition. That the Indian Army
behaves well under British control is no guarantee of its good
behaviour under Indian control. A Hindu must be satisfied that
it will behave as well when British control is withdrawn.

The question how this army of the Punjabi and the
N.-W.F.P. Muslims will behave if Afghanistan invades India, is
a very pertinent and crucial question and must be faced, however
unpleasant it may be.

Some may say — why assume . that the large proportion of
Muslims in the Army is a settled fact and that it cannot be un-
settled? Those who can unsettle it are welcome to make what
efforts they can. But, so far as one can see, it is not going to be
unsettled. On the contrary, I should not be surprised if it was

Weakening of the Defences

entered in the constitution, when revised, as a safeguard for the
Muslim Minority. The Musalmans are sure to make this demand
and as against the Hindus, the Muslims somehow always succeed.
We must, therefore, proceed on the assumption that the compo-
sition of the Indian Army will remain what it is at present.
The basis remaining the same, the question to be pursued
remains what it was : Can the Hindus depend upon such an
Army to defend the country against the invasion of Afghanistan?
Only the so-called Indian Nationalists will say 4yesJ to it. The
boldest among the realists must stop to think before he can give
an answer to the question. The realist must take note of the
fact that the Musalmans look upon the Hindus as Kaffirs, who
deserve more to be exterminated than protected. The realist
must take note of the fact that while the Musalman accepts the
European as his superior, he looks upon the Hindu as his inferior.
It is doubtful how far a regiment of Musalmans will accept the
authority of their Hindu officers if they be placed under them.
The realist must take note that of all the Musalmans, the Musal-
man of the North -West is the most disaffected Musalman in his
relation with the Hindus. The realist must take note that the
Punjabi Musalman is fully susceptible to the propaganda in
favour of Pan-Islamism. Taking note of all these considerations,
there can be very little doubt that he would be a bold Hindu
who would say that in any invasion by Muslim countries, the
Muslims in the Indian Army would be loyal and that there is
no danger of their going over to the invader. Even Theodore
Morrison*, writing in 1899, was of the opinion that —

"The views held by the Mahomeclans (certainly the most
aggressive aud truculent of the peoples of India) are alone suffi-
cient to prevent the establishment of an independent Indian
Government. Were the Afghan to descend from the north upon
an autonomous India, the Mahomedans, instead of uniting with
the Sikhs and the Hindus to repel him, would be drawn by all the
ties of kinship and religion to join his flag."

And when it is recalled that in 1919 the Indian Musalmans
who were carrying on the Khilafat movement actually went to
the length of inviting the Amir of Afghanistan to invade India,

' Imperial Rult in India, page 5.

Pakistan

the view expressed by Sir Theodore Morrison acquires added
strength and ceases to be a matter of mere speculation.

How this Army composed of the Muslims of the Punjab
and N.-W. F. P. will behave in the case of an invasion by Afghani-
stan is not the on\y question which the Hindus are called upon
to consider, There is another and equally important question
on which the Hindus must ponder. That question is : Will
the Indian Government be free to use this Army, whatever its
loyalties, against the invading Afghans? In this connection,
attention must be drawn to the stand taken by the Muslim
League. It is to the effect that the Indian Army shall not be
used against Muslim powers. There is nothing new in this.
This principle was enunciated by the Khilafat Committee long
before the League. Apart from this, the question remains
how far the Indian Muslims will, in future, make it their
article of faith. That the League has not succeeded in this
behalf against the British Government does not mean that it
will not succeed against an Indian Government. The chances
are that it will, because, however unpatriotic the principle may
be from the standpoint of the Hindus, it is most agreeable to
the Muslim sentiment and the League may find a sanction for
it in the general support of the Muslim community in India.
If the Muslim League succeeds in enforcing this limitation upon
India's right to use her fighting forces, what is going to be the
position of the Hindus? This is another question which the
Hindus have to consider.

If India remains politically one whole and the two-nation
mentality created by Pakistan continues to be fostered, the
Hindus will find themselves between the devil and the deep sea,
so far as the defence of India is concerned. Having an Army,
they will not be free to use it because the League objects. Using
it, it will not be possible to depend upon it because its Io3^alty is
doubtful. This is a position which is as pathetic as it is precari-
ous. If the Army continues to be dominated by the Muslims of
the Punjab and the N.-W. P.P., the Hindus will have to pay it
but will not be able to use it and even if they were free to use it
against a Muslim invader, they will find it hazardous to depend
upon it. If the League view prevails and India does not remain

Weakening of the Defences

free to use her Army against Muslim countries, then, even if the
Muslims lose their predominance in the Army, India on account
of these military limitations, will have to remain on terms of
subordinate co-operation with the Muslim countries on her
border, as do the Indian States under British paramountcy.

The Hindus have a difficult choice to make : to have a safe
Army or a safe border. In this difficulty, what is the wisest
course for the Hindus to pursue? Is it in their interest to insist
that the Muslim India should remain part of India so that they
may have a safe border, or is it in their interest to welcome its
separation from India so that they may have a safe Army ? The
Musalmans of this area are hostile to the Hindus. As to this,
there can be no doubt. Which is then better for the Hindus :
Should these Musalmaus be ivithout and against or should tkcy
be within and against f If the question is asked to any prudent
man, there will be only one answer, uainely, that if the Musal-
mans .are to be against the Hindus, it is better that they should
be without and against, rather than within and against. Indeed,
it is a consummation devoutly to be wished that the Muslims should
be without. That is the only way of getting rid of the Muslim
preponderance in the Indian Army.

How can it be brought about? Here again, there is only
one way to bring it about and that is to support the scheme of
Pakistan, Once Pakistan is created, Hindustan, having ample
resources in men and money, can have an Army which it can call
its own and there will be nobody to dictate as to how it should
be used and against whom it should be used. The defence of
Hindustan, far from being weakened by the creation of Pakistan,
will be infinitely improved by it.

The Hindus do not seem to realize at what disadvantage
they are placed from the point of view ol their defence, by their
exclusion from the Army. Much less do they know that, strange
as it may appear, they are in fact purchasing this disadvantage
at a very heavy price.

Pakistan

The Pakistan area wliicli is the main recruiting ground of
the present Indian Army, contributes very little to the Central
Exchequer as will be seen from the following figures :—

Contribution to the Central Exchequer

Rs.

Punjab 1,18,01,385

North-West Frontier ... ... 9,28,294

Sind ... ... ... ... 5, 86,46,915

Baluchistan ... .... ... Nil

Total ... 7,13,76,594

As agaiiist this the provinces of Hindustan contribute as
follows : —

Rs.

Madras ... ... ... ... 9,53,26,745

Bombay 22,53,44,247

Bengal* 12,00,00,000

U. P. -1,05,53,000

Bihar 1,54,37,742

C. P. & Berar 31,42,6cS2

Assam ... ... ... ... 1,87,55,967

Orissa 5,67,346

Total ... 51,91,27,729

The Pakistan Provinces, it will be seen, contribute very little.
The main contribution comes from the Provinces of Hindustan.
In fact, it is the money contributed by the Provinces of Hindustan
which enables the Government of India to carry out its activities
in the Pakistan Provinces. The Pakistan Provinces are a drain
on the Provinces of Hindustan. Not only do they contribute
very little to the Central Government but they receive a great
deal from the Central Government. The revenue of the Central

* Only i revenue is shown because nearly J population is Hindu.
86

Weakening of the Defences

Government amounts to Rs. 121 crores. Of this, about Rs. 52
crores are annually spent on the Army. In what area is this
amount spent? Who pays the bulk of this amount of
Rs. 52 crores ? The bulk of this amount of Rs. 52 crores
which is spent on the Army is spent over the Muslim Army
drawn from the Pakistan area. Now the bulk of this amount of
Rs. 52 crores is contributed by the OHindu Provinces and is spent
on an Army which for the most pirt consists of non-Hindus!!
How many Hindus are aware of this tragedy? How many
know at whose cost this tragedy is being enacted ? Today the
Hindus are not responsible for it because they cannot prevent it.
The question is whether they will allow this tragedy to continue.
If they mean to stop it, the surest way of putting an end to it
is to allow the scheme of Pakistan to take effect. To oppose it,
is to buy a sure weapon of their own destruction. A safe Army
is better than a safe border.

CHAPTER VI

PAKISTAN AND COMMUNAL PEACE

Does Pakistan solve the Communal Question is a natural
question which every Hindu is sure to ask. A correct answer
to this question calls for a close analysis of what is involved in it.
One must have a clear idea as to what is exactl}' meant, when
the Hindus and the Muslims speak of the Communal Question.
Without it, it will not be possible to say whether Pakistan does
or does not solve the Communal Question.

It is not generally known that the Communal Question like
the "Forward Policy" for the Frontier has a "greater" and a
"lesser intent/' and that in its lesser intent it means one thing,
and in its greater intent it means quite a different thing.

To begin with the Communal Question in its "lesser intent."
In its lesser intent , the Communal Question relates to the re-
presentation of the Hindus and the Muslims in the Legislatures.
Used in this sense, the question involves the settlement of two
distinct problems : —

(1) The number of seats to be allotted to the Hindus
and the Muslims in the different legislatures, and

(2) The nature of the electorates through which these
seats are to be filled in.

The Muslims at the Round Table Conference claimed: —

(1) That their representatives in all the Provincial as
well as in the Central Legislatures should be elected by
separate electorates ;

Pakistan

(2) That they should be allowed to retain the weight-
v age in representation given to Muslim minorities in those
Provinces in which they were a minority in the population,
and that in addition, they should be given in those Provinces
where they were a majority such as the Punjab, Sind, North-
West Frontier Province and Bengal, a guaranteed statutory
majority of seats.

The Hindus from the beginning objected to both these
Muslim demands. They insisted on joint electorates for Hindus
and Muslims in all elections to all the Legislatures, Central and
Provincial, and on population ratio of representation, for both
minorities, Hindus and Muslims, wherever they may be, and
raised the strongest objections to a majority of seats being
guaranteed to any community by statute.

The Communal Award of His Majesty's Government settled
this dispute by the simple, rough and ready method of giving
the Muslims all that they wanted, without caring for the Hindu
opposition. The Award allowed the Muslims to retain weight-
age and separate electorates, and in addition, gave them the
statutory majority of seats in those provinces where they were a
majority in the population.

What is it in the Award that can be said to constitute a
problem? Is there any force in the objections of the Hindus
to the Communal Award of His Majesty's Government? This
question must be considered carefully to find out whether there
is substance in the objections of the Hindus to the Award.

Firstly, as to their objection to the weightage to Muslim
minorities in the matter of representation. Whatever may be
the correct measure of allotting representation to minorities, the
Hindus cannot very well object to the weightage given to
Muslim minorities, because similar weightage has been given to
the Hindus in those Provinces in which they are a minority and
where there is sufficient margin for weightage to be allowed.
The treatment of the Hindu minorities in Sind and the North-
West Frontier Province is a case in point.

Secondly, as to their objection to a statutory majority. That
again does not appear to be well founded. A system of

Pakistan and Communal Peace

guaranteed representation may be wrong and vicious and quite
unjustifiable on theoretical and philosophical grounds. But
considered in the light of circumstances, such as those obtaining
in India, the system of statutory majority appears to be inevitable.
Once it is granted that the representation to be given to a mino-
rity must not reduce the majority to minority, that very provi-
sion creates, as a mere counterpart, a system of statutory majority
to the majority community. For, fixing the seats of the minority
involves the fixation of the seats of the majority. There is,
therefore, no escape from the system of statutory majority, once
it is conceded that the minority is not entitled to representation
which would convert a majority into a minority. There is,
therefore, no great force in the objections of the Hindus to a
statutory majority of the Muslims in the Punjab, the N.-W.F.
Province, Sind and Bengal. For, even in the Provinces where
the Hindus are in a majority and the Muslims are in minority,
the Hindus have got a statutory majority over the Muslims.
At any rate, there is a parity of position and to that extent there
can be said to be no ground for complaint.

This does not mean that because the objections set forth by
the Hindus have no substance, there are no real grounds for
opposing the Communal Award. There does exist a substantial
ground of objection to the Communal Award, although, it does
not appear to have been made the basis of attack by the Hindus.

This objection may be formulated in order to bring out its
point in the following manner. The Muslim minorities in the
Hindu Provinces insisted on separate electorates. The Com-
munal Award gives them the right to determine that issue.
This is really what it comes to when one remembers the usual
position taken, viz., that the Muslim minorities could, not be
deprived of their separate electorates without their consent, and
the majority community of the Hindus has been made to abide
by their determination. The Hindu minorities in Muslim Pro-
vinces insisted that there should be joint electorates. Instead
of conceding their claim, the Communal Award forced upon
them the system of separate electorates to which they objected.
If in the Hindu Provinces, the Muslim minorities are allowed

Pakistan

the right of self-determination in the matter of electorates, the
question arises : Why are not the Hindu minorities in the
Muslim Provinces given the right of self-determination in the
matter of their electorates ? What is the answer to this ques-
tion ? And, if there is no answer, there is undoubtedly a deep-
seated inequity in the Communal Award of His Majesty's
Government, which calls for redress.

It is no answer that the Hindus also have a statutory majo-
rity based on separate electorates * in those Provinces where the
Musalmans are in a minority. A little scrutiny will show that
there is no parity of position in these two cases. The separate
electorates for the Hindu majorities in the Hindu Provinces are
not a matter of their choice. It is a consequence resulting from
the determination of the Muslim minorities who claimed to have
separate electorates for themselves. A minority in one set of
circumstances may think that separate electorates would be a
better method of self-protection and may have no fear of creating
against itself and by its own action a statutory majority based on
separate electorates for the opposing community. Another
minority or, for the matter of that, the same minority in a differ-
ent set of circumstances would not like to create by its own
action and against itself a statutory majority based upon separate
electorates and may, therefore, prefer joint electorates to separate
electorates as a better method of self-protection. Obviously the
guiding principle, which would influence a minority, would be :
Is the majority likely to use its majority in a communal manner
and purely for communal purposes? If it felt certain tliat the
majority community is likely to use its communal majority for
communal ends, it may well choose joint electorates, because it
would be the only method by which it would hope to take away
the communal cement of the statutory majority by influencing
the elections of the representatives of the majority community in
the Legislatures. On the other hand, a majority community may
not have the necessary communal cement, which alone would

* It ib perhaps not quite correct to speak of a Hindu Electorate. The Electorate is a
General Electorate consisting of all those who are not included in any separate electorate.
But as the majority in the General Electorate consists of Hindus, it is called
a Hindu Electorate.

Pakistan and Communal Peace

enable it to use its communal majority for communal ends, in
which case a minority, having no fear from the resulting statu-
tory majority and separate electorates for the majority community,
may well choose separate electorates for itself. To put it con-
cretely, the Muslim minorities in choosing separate electorates
are not afraid of the separate electorates and the statutory
majority of the Hindus, because they feel sure that by reason of
their deep-seated differences of caste and race the Hindus will
never be able to use their majorities against the Muslims. On
the other hand, the Hindu minorities in the Muslim Provinces
have no doubt that, by reason of their social solidarity, the
Muslims will use their statutory majority to set into operation
a u Resolute Muslim Government'', after the plan proposed by
Lord Salisbury for Ireland as a substitute for Home Rule ; with
this difference, that Salisbury's Resolute Government was to last
for twenty years only, while the Muslim Resolute Government
was to last as long as the Communal Award stood. The situa-
tions, therefore, are not alike. The statutory majority of the
Hindus based on separate electorates is the result of the choice
made by the Muslim minority. The statutory majority of the
Muslims based on separate electorates is something which is not
the result of the choice of the Hindu minority. In one case, the
Government of the Muslim minority by a Hindu communal
majorit}' is the result of the consent of the Muslim minority.
In the other case, the Government of the Hindu minority by the
Muslim majority is not the result of the consent of the Hindu
minority, but is imposed upon it by the might of the British
Government.

To sum up this discussion of the Communal Award, it may
be said that, as a solution of the Communal Question in its
tk lesser intent," there is no inequity in the Award on the
ground that it gives weightage to the Muslim minorities in the
Hindu Provinces. For, it gives weightage also to Hindu
minorities in Muslim Provinces. Similarly, it may be said that
there is no inequity in the Award, on the ground that it gives a
statutory majority to the Muslims in Muslim Provinces in which
they are a majority. If there is any, the statutory limitation put
upon the Muslim number of seats, also gives to the Hindus in

Pakistan

Hindu Provinces a statutory majority. But the same cannot
be said of the Award in the matter of the electorates. The
Communal Award is iniquitous inasmuch as it accords
unequal treatment to the Hindu and Muslim minorities in
the matter of electorates. It grants the Muslim minorities
in the Hindu Provinces the right of self-determination in the
matter of electorates, but it does not grant the same right to the
Hindu minorities in the Muslim Provinces. In the Hindu Pro-
vinces, the Muslim minority is allowed to choose the kind of
electorates it wants and the Hindu majority is not permitted to
have any say in the matter. But in the Muslim Provinces, it is
the Muslim majority which is allowed to choose the kind of
electorates it prefers aud the Hindu minority is not permitted to
have any say in the matter. Thus, the Muslims in the Muslim
Provinces having been given both statutory majority and separate
electorates, the Communal Award must be said to impose upon the
Hindu minorities Muslim rule, which they can neither alter nor
influence.

This is what constitutes the fundamental wrong in the Com-
munal Award. That this is a grave wrong must be admitted.
For, it offends against certain political principles, which have
now become axiomatic. First is, not to trust any one with
unlimited political power. As has been well said,

" If in any state there is a body of men xvho possess unlimited
political power, those over whom they rule can never be free.
For, the one assured result of historical investigation is the lesson
that uncontrolled power is invariably poisonous to those who
possess it. They are always tempted to impose their canon of
good upon others, and in the end, they assume that the good of
the community depends upon the continuance of their power.
Liberty always demands a limitation of political authority "

The second principle is that, as a King has no Divine Right
to rule, so also a majority has no Divine Right to rule. Majority
Rule is tolerated only because it is for a limited period and
subject to the right to have it changed, and secondly because
it is a rule of a political majority, i. e., majority which has sub-
mitted itself to the suffrage of a minority and not a communal
majority. If such is the limited scope of authority permissible
to a political majority over a political minority, how can a

Pakistan and Communal Peace

minority of one community be placed under the perpetual sub-
jection of a majority of another community ? To allow a
majority of one community to rule a minority of another
community without requiring the majority to submit itself to the
suffrage of the minority, especially when the minority demands
it, is to euact a perversion of democratic principles and to show
a callous disregard for the safety and security of the Hindu
minorities.

To turn to the Communal Question in its u greater intent."
What is it, that the Hindus say is a problem ? In its greater
intent the Communal Question relates to the deliberate creation
of Muslim Provinces. At the time of the Lucknow Pact, the
Muslims only raised the Communal Question in its lesser intent.
At the Round Table Conference, the Muslims put forth, for the
first time, the plan covered by the Communal Question in its
greater intent. Before the Act of 1935, there were a majority of
Provinces in which the Hindus were in a majority and the
Muslims in a minority. There were only three Provinces in which
the Muslims were in a majority and the Hindus in a minority.
They were the Punjab, Bengal and the North-West Frontier
Province. Of these, the Muslim majority in the North-West
Frontier Province was not effective, because there was no respon-
sible government in that province, the Montagu-Chelnisford
Scheme of Political Reforms not being extended to it. vSo, for
all practical purposes, there were only two provinces — the
Punjab and Bengal — wherein the Muslims were in majority
and the Hindus in minority. The Muslims desired that the
number of Muslim Provinces should be increased. With this
object in view, they demanded that Sincl should be separated
from the Bombay Presidency and created into a new self-govern-
ing Province, and that the North-West Frontier Province, which
was already a separate Province, should be raised to the status of
a self-governing Province. Apart from other considerations,
from a purely financial point of view, it was not possible to con-
cede this demand. Neither Sind nor the N.-W.F.P. were finan-
cially self-supporting. But in order to satisfy the Muslim demand,

Pakistan

the British Government went to the length of accepting the respon-
sibility of giving an annual subvention to Sind* and N.-W.F.P. t
from the Central Revenues, so as to bring about a budgetary equili-
brium in their finances and make them financially self-supporting.

These four Provinces with Muslims in majority and Hindus
in minority, now functioning as autonomous and self-governing
Provinces, were certainly not created for administrative conveni-
ence, nor for purposes of architectural symmetry — the Hindu
Provinces poised against the Muslim Provinces. It is also true
that the scheme of Muslim Provinces was not a matter of
satisfying Muslim pride which demanded Hindu minorities under
Muslim majorities to compensate the humiliation of having Mus-
lim minorities under Hindu majorities. What was then, the motive
underlying this scheme of Muslim Provinces? The Hindus
say that the motive for 'the Muslim insistence, both on
statutory majority and separate electorates, was to enable the
Muslims in the Muslim Provinces to mobilize and make effec-
tive Muslim power in its exclusive form and to the fullest extent
possible. Asked what could be the purpose of having the Mus-
lim political power mobilized in this fashion, the Hindus
answer that it was done to place in the hands of the Muslims of
the Muslim Provinces an effective weapon to tyrannize their
Hindu minorities, in case the Muslim minorities in the Hindu
Provinces were tyrannized by their Hindu majorities. The
scheme thus became a system of protection, in which blast was
to be met by counter-blast, terror by terror and tyranny by tyranny.
The plan is, undoubtedly, a dreadful one, involving the mainten-
ance of justice and peace by retaliation, and providing an
opportunity for the punishment of an innocent minority, Hindus
in Muslim Provinces and Muslims in Hindu Provinces, for the
sins of their co-religionists in other Provinces. It is a scheme of
communal peace through a system of communal hostages.

That the Muslims were aware from the very start, that the
system of communal Provinces was capable of being worked in

* Sind gets an annual subvention of Rs. 1,05,00,000.

1 N.-W. F. P. gets an annual subvention of Rs, 1,00,00.000.

Pakistan and Communal Peace

this manner, is clear from the speech made by Maulana Abul
Kalam Azad as President of the Muslim League Session held in
Calcutta in 1927. In that speech the Maulana declared :—

"That by the Lucknow Pact they had sold away their inter
ests. The Delhi proposals of March last opened the door for
the first time to the recognition of the real rights of Mussalmans
in India. The separate electorates granted by the Pact of 1916
only ensured Muslim representation, bnt what was vital for the
existence of the community was the recognition of its numerical
strength. Delhi opened the way to the creation of such a state
of affairs as would guarantee to them in the future of India a
proper share. Their existing small majority in Bengal and the
Punjab was only a census figure, but the Delhi proposals gave
them for the first time five provinces of which no less than three
(Sind, the Frontier Province and Baluchistan) contained a real
overwhelming Muslim majority. If the Muslims did not recog-
nise this great step they were not fit to live. There would now
be nine Hindu provinces against five Muslim provinces, and
whatever treatment Hindus accorded in the nine provinces,
Muslims would accord the same treatment to Hindus in the five
provinces. Was not this a great gain? Was not a new weapon
gained for the assertion of Muslim rights? "

That those in charge of these Muslim provinces know the
advantage of the scheme, and do not hesitate to put it to the
use for which it was intended, is clear from the speeches made
not long ago by Mr. Fazl-ul-Huq, as Prime Minister of Bengal.

That this scheme of Communal Provinces, which constitutes
the Communal Question in its larger intent, can be used as an
engine of communal tyranny, there can be no doubt. The system
of hostages, which is the essence of the scheme of communal
provinces, supported by separate electorates, is indeed insupport-
able on any ground. If this is the underlying motive of the
demand for the creation of more Muslim provinces, the system
resulting from it is undoubtedly a vicious system.

This analysis leaves no doubt that the communal statutory
majority based on separate communal electorates and the com-
munal provinces, especially constituted to enable the statutory
majority to tyrannize the minority, are the two evils which com-
pose what is called, 'the Communal Problem'.

7 97

Pakistan

For the existence of this problem the Hindus hold the
Muslims responsible and the Muslims hold the Hindus respon-
sible. The Hindus accuse the Muslims of contumacy. The
Muslims accuse Hindus of meanness. Both, however, forget
that the communal problem exists not because the Muslims
are extravagant and insolent in their demands and the Hindus
are mean and grudging In their concessions. It exists and will
exist wherever a hostile majority is brought face to face against
a hostile minority. Controversies relating to separate vs. joint
electorates, controversies relating to population ratio vs. weight-
age are all inherent in a situation where a minority is pitted
against a majority. The best solution of the communal problem
is not to have two communities facing each other, one a
majority and the other a minority, welded in the steel-frame
of a single government.

How far does Pakistan approximate to the solution of the
Communal Question?

The answer to this question is quite obvious. If the scheme
of Pakistan is to follow the present boundaries of the Provinces
in the North-West and in Bengal, certainly it does not eradicate
the evils which lie at the heart of the Communal Question. It
retains the very elements which give rise to it, namely, the pitting
of a minority against a majority. The rule of the Hindu mino-
rities by the Muslim majorities and the rule of the Muslim mino-
rities by the Hindu majorities are the crying evils of the present
situation. This very evil will reproduce itself in Pakistan, if the
provinces marked out for it are incorporated into it as they are,
i.e., with boundaries drawn as at present. Besides this, the evil
which gives rise to the Communal Question in its larger intent,
will not only remain as it is but will assume a new malignity.
Under the existing system, the power centered in the Communal
Provinces to do mischief to their hostages is limited by the power
which the Central Government has over the Provincial Govern-
ments. At present, the hostages are at least within the pale of a
Central Government which is Hindu in its composition and
which h^s power to interfere for their protection. But, when
Pakistans become Muslim States with full sovereignty over

Pakistan and Communal Peace

internal and external affairs, it would be free from the control of
the Central Government. The Hindu minorities will have no
recourse to an outside authority with overriding powers, to inter-
fere on their behalf and curb this power of mischief, as under
the scheme, no such overriding authority is permitted to exist.
So, the position of the Hindus in Pakistan may easily become
similar to the position of the Armenians under the Turks or of
the Jews in Tsarist Russia or in Nazi Germany. Such a scheme
would be intolerable and the Hindus may well say that they
cannot agree to Pakistan and leave their co-religionist as a help-
less prey to the fanaticism of a Muslim National State.

Ill

This, of course, is a very frank statement of the consequences
which will flow from giving effect to the scheme of Pakistan.
But care must be taken to locate the source of these consequences.
Do they flow from the scheme of Pakistan itself or do they flow
from particular boundaries that may be fixed for it If the evils
flow from the scheme itself, i.e., if they are inherent in it, it is
unnecessary for any Hindu to waste his time in considering it.
He will be justified in summarily dismissing it. On the other
hand, if the evils are the result of the boundaries, the question
of Pakistan reduces itself to a mere question of changing the
boundaries.

A study of the question amply supports the view that the
evils of Pakistan are not inherent in it. If any evil results follow
from it they will have to be attributed to its boundaries. This
becomes clear if one studies the distribution of population.
The reason why these evils will be reproduced within Western
and Eastern Pakistan is because, with the present
boundaries, they do not become single ethnic states. They
remain mixed states, composed of a Muslim majority and a
Hindu minority as before. The evils are the evils which are
inseparable from a mixed state. If Pakistan is made a single
unified ethnic state, the evils will automatically vanish. There
will be no question of separate electorates within Pakistan,
because in such a homogeneous Pakistan, there will be no
majorities to rule and no minorities to be protected. Similarly,

Pakistan

there will be no majority of one community to hold, in its posses-
sion, a minority of an opposing community.

The question, therefore, is one of demarcation of bound-
aries and reduces itself to this : Is it possible for the boundaries
of Pakistan to be so fixed, that instead of producing a mixed
state composed of majorities and minorities, with all the evils
attendant upon it, Pakistan will be an ethnic state composed of
one homogeneous community, namely Muslims? The answer
is that in a large part of the area affected by the project of the
League, a homogeneous state can be created by shifting merely
the boundaries, and in the rest, homogeneity can be produced by
shifting only the population.

In this connection, I invite the reader to study carefully the
figures given in the Appendices V, X, XI showing the distribu-
tion of the population in the areas affected, and also the maps
showing how new boundaries can create homogeneous Muslim
States. Taking the Punjab, two things will be noted : —

(i) There are certain districts in which the Musalmans pre-
dominate. There are certain districts in which the Hindus
predominate. There are very few in which the two are, more
or less, evenly distributed ; and

(ii) The districts in which the Muslims predominate and
the districts in which the Hindus predominate are not inter-
spersed. The two sets of districts form -two separate areas.

For the formation of the Eastern Pakistan, one has to take
into consideration the distribution of population in both the
Provinces of Bengal and Assam. A scrutiny of the population
figures shows : —

(i) In Bengal, there are some districts in which the Muslims
predominate. In others, the Hindus predominate.

(ii) In Assam also, there are some districts in which the
Muslims predominate. In others, the Hindus predominate.

(iii) Districts in which the Muslims predominate and those
in which the Hindus predominate are not interspersed.
They form separate areas.

(iv) The districts of Bengal and Assam in which the Muslims
predominate are contiguous,

100

Pakistan and Communal Peace

Given these facts, it is perfectly possible to create homoge-
neous Muslim States out of the Punjab, Bengal and Assam by
drawing their boundaries in such a way that the areas which are
predominantly Hindu shall be excluded. That this is possible
is shown by the maps given in the appendix.

In the North-West Frontier Province and Sind, the situation
is rather hard. How the matter stands in the N.-W. F. P. and
Sind may be seen by an examination of the figures given in the
appendices VI to IX. As may be seen from the appendices,
there are no districts in which the Hindus in the N.-W. F. P. and
Sind are concentrated. They are scattered and are to be found
in almost every district of the two provinces in small, insignificant
numbers. These appendices show quite unmistakably that the
Hindus in Sind and the N.-W. F. P. are mostly congregated in
urban areas of the districts. In Sind, the Hindus outnumber the
Muslims in most of the towns, while the Muslims outnumber
the Hindus in villages. In the N.-W. F. P., the Muslims out-
number the Hindus in towns as well as in villages.

The case of the N.-W. F. P. and Sind, therefore, differs
totally from the case of the Punjab and Bengal. In the Punjab
and Bengal, owing to the natural segregation of the Hindus and
Muslims in different areas, it is possible to create a homogeneous
State by merely altering their boundaries, involving the shifting
of the population in a very small degree. But in the N.-W. F. P.
and Sind, owing to the scattered state of the Hindu population,
alteration of boundaries cannot suffice for creating a homogene-
ous State. There is only one remedy and that is to shift the
population.

Some scoff at the idea of the shifting and exchange of popu-
lation. But those who scoff can hardly be aware of the compli-
cations, which a minority problem gives rise to and the failures
attendant upon almost all the efforts made to protect them.
The constitutions of the post-war states, as well as of the older
states in Europe which had a minority problem, proceeded on the
assumption that constitutional safeguards for minorities should
suffice for their protection and so the constitutions of most of
the new states with majorities and minorities were studded with

101

Pakistan

long lists of fundamental rights and safeguards to see that they
were not violated by the majorities. What was the experience?
Experience showed that safeguards did not save the minorities.
Experience showed that even a ruthless war on the minorities did
not solve the problem. The states then agreed that the best way
to solve it was for each to exchange its alien minorities within
its border, for its own which was without its border, with a view
to bring about homogeneous States. This is what happened in
Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria. Those, who scoff at the idea of
transfer of population, will do well to study the history of the
minority problem, as it arose between Turkey, Greece and Bul-
garia. If they do, they will find that these countries found that the
only effective way of solving the minorities problem lay in ex-
change of population. The task undertaken by the three countries
was by no means a minor operation. It involved the transfer of
some 20 million people from one habitat to another. But un-
daunted, the three shouldered the task and carried it to a
successful end because they felt that the considerations of com-
munal peace must outweigh every other consideration.

That the transfer of minorities is the only lasting remedy
for communal peace is beyond doubt. If that is so, there is no
reason why the Hindus and the Muslims should keep on trading
in safeguards which have proved so unsafe. If small countries,
with limited resources like Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria, were
capable of such an undertaking, there is no reason to suppose
that what they did cannot be accomplished by Indians. After
all, the population involved is inconsiderable and because some
obstacles require to be removed, it would be the height of folly to
give up so sure a way to communal peace.

There is one point of criticism to which no reference has
been made so far. As it is likely to be urged, I propose to deal
with it here. It is sure to be asked, how will Pakistan affect
the position of the Muslims that will be left in Hindustan? The
question is natural because the scheme of Pakistan does seem to
concern itself with the Muslim majorities who do not need pro-
tection and abandons the Muslim minorities who do. But the
point is: who can raise it? Surely not the Hindus. Only the

102

Pakistan and Communal Peace

Muslims of Pakistan or the Muslims of Hindustan can raise it.
The question was put to Mr. Rehmat Ali, the protagonist of
Pakistan and this is the answer given by him : —

"How will it affect the position of the forty five million
Muslims in Hindustan proper ?

"The truth is that in this struggle their thought has been
more than a wrench to me. They are the flesh of our flesh and
the soul of our soul. We can never forget them; nor they, us.
Their present position and future security is, and shall ever be, a
matter of great importance to us. As things are at present,
Pakistan will not adversely affect their position in Hindustan.
On the basis ..of population (one Muslim to four Hindus), they
will still be entitled to the same representation in legislative as
well as administrative fields which they possess now. As to the
future, the only effective guarantee we can offer is that of recipro-
city, and, therefore, we solemnly undertake to give all those safe-
guards to non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan which will be con-
ceded to our Muslim minority in Hindustan.

" But what sustains us most is the fact that they know we are
proclaiming Pakistan in the highest interest of the 'Millet'. It
is as much theirs as it is ours. While for us it is a national
citadel, for them it will ever be a moral anchor. So long as the
anchor holds, everything is or can be made safe. But once it
gives way, all will be lost."

The answer given by the Muslims of Hindustan is equally
clear. They say, "We are not weakened by the separation of
Muslims into Pakistan and Hindustan. We are better protected
by the existence of separate Islamic States on the Eastern and
Western borders of Hindustan than we are by their submersion
in Hindustan." Who can say that they are wrong? Has it not
been shown that Germany as an outside state was better able to
protect the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia than the Sude-
tens were able to do themselves ? *

Be that as it may, the question does not concern the Hindus.
The question that concerns the Hindus is: How far does the

* The leaders of the Muslim League seem to have studied deeply Hitler's bul-
lying tactics against Czechoslovakia in the interest of the Sudeten Germans and also
learned the lessons which those tactics teach. See their threatening speeches in the
Karachi Session of the League held in 1937.

103

Pakistan

creation of Pakistan remove the communal question from Hindu-
$tan ? That is a very legitimate question and must be considered?
It must be admitted that by the creation of Pakistan, Hindustan
is not freed of the communal question. While Pakistan can be
made a homogeneous state by redrawing its boundaries, Hindu-
stan must remain a composite state. The Musalmans are scatter-
ed all over Hindustan — though they are mostly congregated in
towns — and no ingenuity in the matter of redrawing of boun-
daries can make it homogeneous. The only way to make
Hindustan homogeneous is to arrange for exchange of popula-
tion. Until that is done, it must be admitted that even with the
creation of Pakistan, the problem of majority vs. minority will
remain in Hindustan as before and will continue to produce
disharmony in the body politic of Hindustan.

Admitting that Pakistan is not capable of providing a com-
plete solution of the Communal Problem within Hindustan,
does it follow that the Hindus on that account should reject
Pakistan ? Before the Hindus draw any such hasty conclusion,
they should consider the following effects of Pakistan.

First, consider the effect of Pakistan on the magnitude of
the Communal Problem. That can be best gauged by reference
to the Muslim population as it will be grouped within Pakistan
and Hindustan.

Muslim Population in Pakistan.

1. Punjab .. .. 13,332,460

2. N.-W. F. P. .. .. 2,227,303

3. Sind .. .. 2,830,800

4. Baluchistan .. .. 405,309

5. Eastern Bengal Muslim

State:—

(i) Eastern Bengal .. 27,497,624

(ii) Sylhet.. .. 1,603,805

Total .. 47,897,301

Muslim Population in Hindustan.

1. Total Muslim Population 66,442,766

in British India (Exclu-
ding Burma and Aden).

2. Muslim Population grouped 47,897,301

in Pakistan and Eastern
Bengal State.

3. Balance of Muslims in Bri- 18,545,465

tish Hindustan.

104

Pakistan and Communal Peace

What do these figures indicate ? What they indicate is
that the Muslims who will be left in British Hindustan will be
only 18,545,465 and the rest 47,897,301, forming a vast majority
of the total Muslim population, will be out of it and will be the
subjects of Pakistan States. This distribution of the Muslim
population, in terms of the communal problem, means that while
without Pakistan the communal problem in India involves 6\
crores of Muslims, with the creation of Pakistan it will involve
only 2 crores of Muslims. Is this to be no consideration for
Hindus who want communal peace? To me, it seems that if
Pakistan does not solve the communal problem within Hindustan,
it substantially reduces its proportion and makes it of minor
significance and much easier of peaceful solution.

In the second place, let the Hindus consider the effect of
Pakistan on the communal representation in the Central Legis-
lature. The following table gives the distribution of seats in the
Central Legislature, as prescribed under the Government of
India Act, 1935 and as it would be, if Pakistan came into being.

Distribution of seats.

Name of the

f\V- .^-V****-

I. — As at present.

II.— After Pakistan.

Chamber.

Non-

Total
seats.'

Muslim
(Hindu)
Territorial

Muslim
Territorial
Seats.

Total
seats.

Muslim
(Hindu)
Territorial

Muslim
Territorial
Seats.

seats.

Council of State.

150

126

Federal Assem-

250

105

211

105

bly.

To bring out clearly the quantitative change in the commu-
nal distribution of seats, which must follow the establishment of

105

Pakistan

Pakistan, the above figures are reduced to percentages in the table
that follows : —

Name of the
Chamber.

Distribution of seats.

I. — As at present.

II.— After Pakistan.

Percentage of
Muslim seats
to total seats.

Percentage of
Muslim seats
to Hindu seats.

Percentage of
Muslim seats
to total seats.

Percentage of
Muslim seats
to Hindu seats.

Council of State • .
Federal Assembly..

33
33

66
80

33*
40

From this table one can see what vast changes must follow
the establishment of Pakistan. Under the Government of India
Act, the ratio of Muslim seats to the total is 33% in both the Cham-
bers, but to the Hindu seats, the ratio is 66% in the Council of
State and 80% in the Assembly — almost a position of equality
with the Hindus. After Pakistan, the ratio of Muslim seats to the
total seats falls from 33 J% to 25% in the Council and to
21% in the Assembly, while the ratio to Hindu seats falls from
66% to 33$% in the Council and from 80% to 40% in
the Assembly. The figures assume that the weightage given to
the Muslims will remain the same, even after Hindustan is
separated from Pakistan. If the present weightage to Muslims
is cancelled or reduced, there would be further improvement in
the representation of the Hindus. But assuming that no change
in weightage is made, is this a small gain to the Hindus in the
matter of representation at the Centre? To me, it appears that
it is a great improvement in the position of the Hindus at the
Centre, which would never come to them, if they oppose Pakistan.

These are the material advantages of Pakistan. There is
another which is psychological. The Muslims, in Southern and
Central India, draw their inspiration from the Muslims of the
North and the East. If after Pakistan there is communal peace
in the North and the Bast, as there should be, there being no

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Pakistan and Communal Peace

majorities and minorities therein, the Hindus may reasonably
expect communal peace in Hindustan. This severance of the
bond between the Muslims of the North and the East and the
Muslims of Hindustan is another gain to the Hindus of Hindu-
stan.

Taking into consideration these effects of Pakistan, it can-
not be disputed that if Pakistan does not wholly solve the com-
munal problem within Hindustan, it frees the Hindus from the
turbulence of the Muslims as predominant partners. It is for
the Hindus to say whether they will reject such a proposal,
simply because it does not offer a complete solution. Some gain
is better than much harm.

One last question and this discussion of Pakistan in relation
to communal peace may be brought to a close. Will the Hindus
and the Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal agree to redraw the
boundaries of their provinces to make the scheme of Pakistan
as flawless as it can be made?

As for the Muslims, they ought to have no objection to
redrawing the boundaries. If they do object, it must be said that
they do not understand the nature of their own demand. This
is quite possible, since the talk that is going on among Muslim
protagonists of Pakistan, is of a very loose character. Some speak
of Pakistan as a Muslim National State, others speak of it as a
Muslim National Home. Neither care to know whether there
is any difference between a National State and a National Home.
But there can be no doubt that there is a vital difference between
the two. What that difference is was discussed at great length
at the time of constituting in Palestine a Jewish National Home.
It seems that a clear conception of what this difference is, is
necessary, if the likely Muslim opposition to the redrawing of the
boundaries is to be overcome.

According to a leading authority : —

"A National Home connotes a territory in which a people,
without receiving the rights of political sovereignty, has

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Pakistan

nevertheless a recognised legal position and receives the opportu-
nity of developing its moral, social and intellectual ideals."

The British Government itself, in its statement on Palestine
policy issued in 1922, defined its conception of the National Home
in the following terms : —

"When it is asked what is meant by the development of the
Jewish national home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is
not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants
of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the
existing Jewish Community, with the assistance of Jews in other
parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which
the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion
and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this com-
munity should have the best prospect of free development and
provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its
capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine
as of right and not on sufferance. This is the reason why it is
necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in
Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should
be formally recognized to rest upon ancient historic connection."

From this, it will be clear that there is an essential difference
between a National Home and a National State. The difference
consists in this : in the case of a National Home, the people
who constitute it do not receive the right of political sovereignty
over the territory and the right of imposing their nationality on
others also living in that territory, All that they get, is a recog-
nized legal position guaranteeing them the right to live as citizens
and freedom to maintain their culture. In the case of a National
State, people constituting it, receive the rights of political
sovereignty with the right of imposing their nationality upon
the rest.

This difference is very important and it is in the light of this
that one must examine their demand for Pakistan. What do
the Muslim want Pakistan for? If they want Pakistan to
create a National Home for Muslims, there is no necessity for
Pakistan. In the Pakistan Provinces, they already have their
National Home with the legal right to live and advance their
culture. If they want Pakistan to be a National Muslim State,
they are claiming the right of political sovereignty over the
territory included in it. This they are entitled to do. But the

108

Pakistan and Communal Peace

question is : Should they be allowed to retain, within the
boundaries of these Muslim States, Non-Muslim minorities as
their subjects, with a right to impose upon them the nationality
of these Muslim States? No doubt, such a right is accepted to be
an accompaniment of political sovereignty. But it is equally
true that in all mixed States, this right has become a source of
mischief in modern times. To ignore the possibilities of such
mischief in the creation of Pakistan will be to omit to read the
bloody pages of recent history on which have been recorded the
atrocities, murders, plunders and arsons committed by the Turks,
Greeks, Bulgars and the Czechs against their minorities. It is
possible to take away from a state this right of imposing its nation-
ality upon its subjects, because it is incidental to political
sovereignty. But it is possible not to provide any opportunity
for the exercise of such a right. This can be done by allowing
the Muslims to have such National Muslim States as are strictly
homogeneous, strictly ethnic states. Under no circumstances
can they be allowed to carve out mixed states composed of Mus-
lims opposed to Hindus, with the former superior in number to
the latter.

This is probably not contemplated by the Muslims who are
the authors of Pakistan. It was certainly not contemplated by
Sir M. Iqbal, the originator of the scheme. In his Presidential
address to the Muslim League in 1930, he expressed his willing-
ness to agree to "the exclusion of Ambala Division and perhaps
of some other districts where non-Muslims predominate " on the
ground that such exclusion u will make it less extensive and more
Muslim in population". On the other hand, it may be that
those who are putting forth the Scheme of Pakistan, do contem-
plate that it will include the Punjab and Bengal with their present
boundaries. To them it must become clear, that to insist upon the
present boundaries is sure to antagonize even those Hindus who
have an open mind on the question. The Hindus can never be
expected to consent to the inclusion of the Hindus in a Muslim
State deliberately created for the preservation and propagation
of Muslim faith and Muslim culture. The Hindus will no doubt
oppose. Muslims must not suppose that it will take long to find
them out. Muslims, if they insist upon the retention of the

10?

Pakistan

present boundaries, will open themselves to the accusation that
behind their demand for Pakistan there is something more sinister
than a mere desire to create a National Home or a National
State. They will be accused of a design to perfect the scheme
of Hindu hostages in Muslim hands by increasing the balance of
Muslim majorities against Hindu minorities in the Muslim areas.

So much, for considerations which ought to weigh with the
Muslims in the matter of changing the provincial boundaries to
make Pakistan.

Now, as to the considerations which ought to weigh with the
Hindus of the Punjab and Bengal. The Hindus are the more
difficult of the two parties to the question. In this connection it is
enough to consider the reaction of the high caste Hindus only.
For, it is they who guide the Hindu masses and form Hindu
opinion. Unfortunately, the high caste Hindus are bad as leaders.
They have a trait of character which often leads the Hindus to
disaster. This trait is formed by their acquisitive instinct and aver-
sion to share with others the good things of life. They have a
monopoly of education and wealth, and with wealth and educa-
tion they have captured the State. To keep this monopoly to them-
selves has been the ambition and goal of their life. Charged
with this selfish idea of class domination, they take every move
to exclude the lower classes of Hindus from wealth, education
and power, the surest and the most effective being the prepara-
tion of scriptures, inculcating upon the minds of the lower classes
of Hindus the teaching that their duty in life is only to serve the
higher classes. In keeping this monopoly in their own hands
and excluding the lower classes from any share in it, the high
caste Hindus have succeeded for a long time and beyond measure.
It is only recently that the lower class Hindus rose in revolt against
this monopoly by starting the Non-Brahmin Parties in the Madras
and the Bombay Presidencies and the C.P. Still the high caste
Hindus have successfully maintained their privileged position.
This attitude of keeping education, wealth and power as a close
preserve for themselves and refusing to share it, which the high
caste Hindus have developed in their relation with the lower
classes of Hindus, is sought to be extended by them to the

110 J

Pakistan and Communal Peace

Muslims. They want to exclude the Muslims from place and
power, as they have done to the lower class Hindus. This trait of
the high caste Hindus is the key to the understanding of their
politics.

Two illustrations reveal this trait of theirs. The Hindus
in 1929 opposed the separation of Sind from the Bombay Presi-
dency before the Simon Commission, strenuously and vehemently.
But in 1915, the Hindus of Sind put forth the opposite plea and
wanted Sind to be separated from Bombay. The reason in both
the cases was the same. In 1915, there was no representative
Government in Sind, which, if there was one would have undoubt-
edly been a Muslim Government. The Hindus advocated separa-
tion because in the absence of a Muslim Government, they could
obtain jobs in Government in a greater and greater degree. In
1929, they objected to the separation of Sind because they knew
that a separate Sind would be under a Muslim Government, and
a Muslim Government was sure to disturb their monopoly and
displace them to make room for Muslim candidates. The
opposition of the Bengali Hindus to the Partition of Bengal is
another illustration of this trait of the high caste Hindus. The
Bengali Hindu had the whole of Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, Assam
and even U. P. for his pasture. He had captured the civil
service in all these Provinces. The partition of Bengal meant a
diminution in the area of this pasture. It meant that the Bengali
Hindu was to be ousted from Eastern Bengal to make room for
the Bengali Musalman who had so far no place in the civil service
of Bengal. The opposition to the partition of Bengal on the
part of the Bengali Hindus, was due principally to their desire
not to allow the Bengal Musalmans to take their place in
Eastern Bengal. Little did the Bengali Hindus dream that by
opposing partition and at the same time demanding Swaraj they
were preparing the way for making the Musalmans the rulers of
both Eastern as well as Western Bengal.

These thoughts occur to one's mind because one fears that
the high caste Hindus, blinded by their hereditary trait, might
oppose Pakistan for no other reason except that it limits the field
for their self-seeking careers. Among the many reasons that
might come in the way of Pakistan, one need not be surprised,

111

Pakistan

if one of them happens to be the selfishness of the high caste
Hindus.

There are two alternatives for the Hindus of the Punjab and
Bengal and they may be asked to face them fairly and squarely.
The Muslims in the Punjab number 13,332,460 and the Hindus,
with Sikhs and the rest, number 11,392,732. The difference is
only 1,939,728. This iheans that the Muslim majority in the
Punjab is only a majority of 8 p.c. Given these facts, which is
better : To retain the unity of the Punjab and allow the Muslim
majority of 54 p.c. to rule the Hindu minority of 46 p.c. or to
redraw the boundaries, to allow the Muslims and the Hindus
to be under separate national states, and thus rescue the whole
body of Hindus from the terrors of the Muslim rule?

The Muslims in Bengal number 27,497,624 and the Hindus
number 21,570,407. The difference is only of 5,927,217. This
means that the Muslim majority in Bengal is only a majority of
12 p.c. Given these facts, which is better : To oppose the crea-
tion of a National Muslim State out of Eastern Bengal and
Sylhet by refusing to redraw the boundaries and allow the
Muslim majority of only 12 p.c. to rule the Hindu minority of
44 p.c. ; or to consent to redraw the boundaries, to have Muslims
and Hindus placed under separate National States, and thus
rescue the 44 p.c. of the Hindus from the horrors of the Muslim
rule,?

Let the Hindus of Bengal and the Punjab consider which
alternative they should prefer. It seems to me that the moment
has come when the high caste Hindus of Bengal and the Punjab
should be told that if they propose to resist Pakistan, because it
cuts off a field for gainful employment, they are committing the
greatest blunder. The time for successfully maintaining in their
own hands a monopoly of place and power is gone. They may
cheat the lower orders of the Hindus in the name of nationalism,
but they cannot cheat the Muslim majorities in the Muslim
Provinces and keep their monopoly of place and power. The
resolution of the Hindus — if their cry against Pakistan can be
regarded as such — to live under a Muslim majority and oppose
self-determination may be a very courageous thing. But it will

Pakistan and Communal Peace

not be a very wise thing if the Hindus believe that they will be
able to maintain their place and power by fooling the Musal-
mans. As Lincoln said, it is not possible to fool all people for
all times. If the Hindus choose to live under a Muslim majority
the chances are that they may lose all. On the other hand, if
the Hindus of Bengal and the Punjab agree to separate, true,
they will not get more, but they will certainly not lose all.

113

PART III

WHAT IF NOT PAKISTAN?

Having stated the Muslim case for Pakistan and the
Hindu case against it, it is necessary to turn to the alterna-
tives to Pakistan, if there be any. In forming ones judg-
ment on Pakistan, one must take into account the alternatives
to it. Either there is no alternative to Pakistan : or
there is an alternative to Pakistan, but it is worse than
Pakistan. Thirdly, one must also take into consideration
what would be the consequences, if neither Pakistan nor
its alternative is found acceptable to the parties concerned.
The relevant data, having a bearing on these points, are
presented in this part under the following heads : —

1 Hindu alternative to Pakistan.

2 Muslim alternative to Pakistan.

3 Lessons from abroad.

CHAPTER VII

IHINDU ALTERNATIVE TO PAKISTAN

Thinking of the Hindu alternative to Pakistan, the scheme
that at once conies to one's mind is the one put forth by the late
Lala Hardjral in 1925. It was published in the form of a state-
ment which appeared in the Pratap of Lahore. In this state-
ment, which he called his political testament, Lala Hardyal
said : —

"I declare that the future of the Hindu race, of Hindustan and
of the Punjab, rests on these four pillars : (l) Hindu Sangathan,
(2) Hindu Raj, (3) Shuddhi of Moslems, and (4) Conquest and
Shuddhi of Afghanistan and the Frontiers. So long as the Hindu
nation does not accomplish these four things, the safety of our
children and great-grand-children will be ever in danger, and the
safety of the Hindu race will be impossible. The Hindu race
has but one history, and its institutions are homogeneous. But
the Musalmans and Christians are far removed from the confines
of Hinduism, for their religions are alien and they love Persian,
Arab and European institutions. Thus, just as one removes
foreign matter from the eye, Shuddhi must be made of these two
religions. Afghanistan and the hilly regions of the frontier were
formerly part of India, but are at present under the domination
of Islam .... Just as there is Hindu religion in Nepal, so there
must be Hindu institutions in Afghanistan and the frontier ter-
ritory ; otherwise it is useless to win Swarai. For, mountain tribes
are always warlike and hungry. If they become our enemies,
the age of Nadirshah and Zamanshah will begin anew. At
present English officers are protecting the frontiers ; but it cannot

always be If Hindus want to protect themselves, they must

conquer Afghanistan and the frontiers and convert all the
mountain tribes."

• See Times of India dated 25-7-1925, 'Through Indian Eyes".

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Pakistan

I do not know how many Hindus would come forward to
give their support to this scheme of Lai a Hardy al as an alterna-
tive to Pakistan.

In the first place, Hindu religion is not a proselytising
religion. Maulana Mahomed AH was quite right when, in the
course of his address as President of the Congress, he said : —

"Now, this has been my complaint for a long time against
Hinduism, and on one occasion, lecturing at Allahabad in 1907.
I had pointed out the contrast between Musalmans and Hindus,
by saying that the worst that can be said of a Muslim was that he
had a tasteless mess which he called a dish fit for kings, and
wanted all to share it with him, thrusting it down the throats of
such as did not relish it and would rather not have it, while
his Hindu brother, who prided himself on his cookery, retired into
the privacy of his kitchen and greedily devoured all that he had
cooked, without permitting even the shadow of his brother to
fall on his food, or sparing even a crumb for him. This was
said not altogether in levity; and in fact, I once asked Mahatma
Gandhi to justify this feature of his faith to me."

What answer the Mahatma gave to his question, Mr. Maho-
med All did not disclose. The fact is that however much the
Hindus may wish, Hindu religion cannot become a missionary
religion like Islam or Christianity. It is not that the Hindu
religion was never a missionary religion. On the contrary, it
was once a missionary religion — indeed could not but have been
a missionary religion, otherwise it is difficult to explain how it
could have spread over an area so vast as the Indian continent.*
But once a missionary religion, Hinduism perforce ceased to
be a missionary religion after the time when the Hindu society
developed its system of castes. For, caste is incompatible with
conversion. To be able to convert a stranger to its religion, it
is not enough for a community to offer its creed. It must be
in a position to admit the convert to its social life and to absorb
and assimilate him among its kindred. It is not possible for the
Hindu society to satisfy this prerequisite of effective conversion.
There is nothing to prevent a Hindu, with a missionary zeal, to

* On the question whether the Hindu Religion was a missionary Religion and if
it was why it ceased to be so, see my essay on Caste and Conversion in the Annual
Number of the Telugu Samachar for 1926.

118

Hindu Alternative to Pakistan

proceed to convert an alien to the Hindu faith. But before he
converts the alien, he is bound to be confronted with the ques-
tion : What is to be the caste of the convert? According to
the Hindus, for a person to belong to a caste he must be born
in it. A convert is not born in a caste, therefore he belongs to
no caste. This is also an important question. More than politi-
cal or religious, man is a social animal. He may not have, need
not have, religion; he may not have, need not have, politics.
He must have society ; he cannot do without society. For a
Hindu to be without caste is to be without society. Where there
is no society for the convert, how can there be any conversion ?
So long as Hindu society is fragmented in autonomous and
autogenic castes, Hindu religion cannot be a missionary religion.
The conversion of the Afghans and the frontier tribes to Hindu-
ism is, therefore, an idle dream.

In the second place, Lala Hardyal's scheme must call for
financial resources the immensity of which it is hardly possible
to compute. Who can furnish the funds necessary for the con-
version of the Afghans and the Frontier Tribesmen to Hinduism?
The Hindus, having ceased to convert others to their faith for a
long time, have also lost the zeal for conversion. Want of zeal
is bound to affect the question of finances. Further, Hindu
society being moulded in the cast of the Chaturvarna, wealth has,
from very ancient times, been most unevenly distributed. It is
only the Baniya who is the heir to wealth and property among
the Hindus. There are, of course, the landlords who are the
creation of foreign invaders or native rebels, but they are not as
numerous as the Baniya. The Baniya is money-made and his
pursuits are solely for private gain. He knows no other use of
money except to hold it and to transmit it to his descendants.
Spread of religion or acquisition and promotion of culture do
not interest him. Even decent living has no place in his budget.
This has been his tradition for ages. If money is excepted, he
is not much above the brute in the conception and manner of
life. Only one new service, on the expenditure side, has found
a place in his budget. That service is politics. This happen-
ed since the entry of Mr. Gandhi as a political leader. That new
service is the support of Gandhian politics. Here again, the

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Pakistan

reason is not love of politics. The reason is to make private
gain out of public affairs. What hope is there that such men
will spend money on such a bootless cause as the spread of
Hindu religion among the Afghans and Frontier Tribes ?

Thirdly, there is the question of facilities for conversion that
may be available in Afghanistan. Lala Hardyal evidently
thought that it is possible to say in Afghanistan, with the same
impunity as in Turkey, that the Koran is wrong or out of date.
Only one year before the publication of his political testament
by Lala Hardyal i.e. in 1924, one Niamatulla — a follower of
Mirza Ghulam Ahamed of Quadiyan — who claimed to be the
messiah and Mahdi and a prophet of a sort — was stoned to
death* at Kabul by the order of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal
of Afghanistan. The crime of this man was, as reported by a
Khilafat paper, that he was professing and preaching ideas and
beliefs, inconsistent with Islam and Shariat. This man, says the
same paper was stoned to death according to the agreeing judg-
ments of the first Sharai (canon) Court, the Central Appellate
Court and the Ulema and Divines of the final Appellate Com-
mittee of the Ministry of Justice. In the light of these difficulties,
the scheme must be said to be wild in its conception and is sure
to prove ruinous in its execution. It is adventurous in character
and is too fantastic to appeal to any reasonable man except
perhaps some fanatical Arya Sainajists of the Punjab.

The stand taken by the Hindu Mahasabha has been defined
by Mr. V. D. Savarkar, the President of the Sabha, in his presi-
dential addresses at the annual sessions of the Sabha. As defined
by him, the Hindu Maha Sabha is against Pakistan and proposes
to resist it by all means. What these means are we do not know.
If they are force, coercion and resistance, they are only negative
alternatives and Mr. Savarkar and the Hindu Maha Sabha alone
can say how far these means will succeed.

*Scc Report in Times of India 27-11-24, "Through Indian Eyes".
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Hindu Alternative to Pakistan

It would, however, not be fair to Mr. Savarkar to say that
he has only a negative attitude towards the claim put forth by
the Muslims of India. He has put forth his positive proposals
in reply to them.

To understand his positive proposals, one must grasp some
of his basic conceptions. Mr. Savarkar lays great stress on a
proper understanding of the terms, Hinduism, Hindutva and
Hindudom. He says :— *

11 In expounding the ideology of the Hindu movement, it is
absolutely necessary to have a correct grasp of the meaning
attached to these three terms. From the word "Hindu" has
been coined the word " Hinduism " in English. It means the
schools or system of Religion the Hindus follow. The second
word " Hindutva " is far more comprehensive and refers not only
to the religious aspects of the Hindu people as the word " Hindu-
ism" does but comprehend even their cultural, linguistic, social
and political aspects as well. It is more or less akin to " Hindu
Polity" and its nearly exact translation would be " Hinduness".
The third word "Hindudom" means the Hindu people spoken
of collectively. It is a collective name for the Hindu World, just
as Islam denotes the Moslem World."

Mr. Savarkar takes it as a gross misrepresentation to say that
the Hindu Maha Sabha is a religious body. In refutation of this
misrepresentation, Mr. Savarkar says: — \

"it has come to my notice that a very large section of the
English educated Hindus hold back from joining the Hindu Maha

Sabha under the erroneous idea that it is an exclusively

Religious organization— something like a Christian Mission. Noth-
ing could be far from truth. The Hindu Maha Sabha is not a
Hindu Mission. It leaves Religions questions regarding theism,
monotheism, Pantheism or even atheism to be discussed and
determined by the different Hindu schools of religious persua-
sions. It is not a Hindu Dharrna Maha Sabha, — but a Hindu-
National Maha Sabha. Consequently by its very constitution it
is debarred to associate itself exclusively as a partisan with any
particular religious school or sect even within the Hindu fold.
As a national Hindu body it will of course propagate and defend
the National Hindu Church comprising each and all religions of
Hindusthani origin against any non-Hindu attack or encroach-
ment. But the sphere of its activity is far more comprehensive

* Speech at the Calcutta Session of the Hindu Maha Sabha held in
December 1939, p. 14.
t Ibid., p. 25.

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Pakistan

than that of an exclusively religious body. The Hindu Maha
Sabha identifies itself with the National life of Hindudoin
in all its entirety, in all its social, economical, cultural and above
all political aspects and is pledged to protect and promote all
that contributes to the freedom, strength aiid glory of the Hindu
Nation ; and as an indispensable means to that end to attain
Purna Swarajya, absolute political Independence of Hindu sthan
by all legitimate and proper means."

Mr. Savarkar does not admit that the Hindu Maha Sabha
is started to counteract the Muslim League and that as soon as
the problems arising out of the Communal Award are solved to
the satisfaction of both Hindus and Musalmans, the Hindu Maha
Sabha will vanish. Mr. Savarkar insists that the Hindu Maha
Sabha must continue to function even after India becomes politi-
cally free. He says : — *

" . . . . Many a superficial critic seems to fancy that the Maha
Sabha was only contrived to serve as a make-weight, as a re-
action checkmating the Moslem Ivcague or the anti-Hindu policy
of the present leaders of the Congress and will be out of court
or cease automatically to function as soon as it is shorne of this
spurious excuse to exist. But if the aims and object of the Maha
Sabha mean anything it is clear that it was not the outcome of
any frothy effusion, any fussy agitation to remove a grievance
here or oppose a seasonal party there. The fact is that every
organism whether, individual or social which is living and
deserves to survive throws out offensive and defensive organs as
soon as it is brought to face adversely changing environments.
The Hindu Nation too as soon as it recovered and freed itself
from the suffocating grip of the pseudo-Nationalistic ideology of
the Congress biand developed a new organ to battle in the
struggle for existence under the changed conditions of modern
age. This was the Hindu Maha Sabha. It grew up of a funda-
mental necessity of the National life and not of any ephemeral
incident. The constructive side of its aims and objects make it
amply clear that its mission is as abiding as the life of the Nation
itself. But that apart, even the day to day necessity of adapting
its policy to the ever changing political currents makes it incum-
bent on Hindudoin to have an exclusively Hindu organization
independent of any moral or intellectual servility or subservience
to any non-Hindu or jointly representative institution, to guard
Hindu interests and save them from being jeopardised. It is
not so only under the present political subjection of Hindustan
but it will be all the more necessary to have some such exclusively

• Ibid., pp. 24-27.
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Hindu Alternative to Pakistan

Hindu organization, some such Hindu Maha Sabha in substance
whether it is identical with this present organization or otherwise
to serve as a watchtower at the gates of Hindudom for at least
a couple of centuries to come, even after Hindustan is partially
or wholly free and a National Parliament controls its political
destiny. v

"Because, unless something altogether cataclysmic in nature
upsets the whole political order of things in the world which
practical politics cannot envisage today, all that can be reason-
ably expected in immediate future is that we Hindus may prevail
over England and compel her to recognise India as a self-govern-
ing unit with the status contemplated in the Westminster
Statute. Now a National Parliament in such a self-governing
India can only reflect the electorate as it is, the Hindus and the
Moslems as we find them, their relations a bit bettered, perhaps
a bit worsened. No realist can be blind to the probability that
the extra-territorial designs and the secret urge goading on the
Moslem to transform India into a Moslem state may at any
time confront the Hindustani state even under self-government
either with a Civil War or treacherous overtures to alien invaders
by the Moslems. Then again there is every likelihood that there
will ever continue at least for a century to come a danger of
fanatical riots, the scramble for services, legislative seats, weight-
ages ont of proportion to their population on the part of the
Moslem minority and consequently a constant danger threatening
internal peace. To checkmate this probability which if we are
wise we must always keep in view even after Hindustan attains
the status of a self-governing country, a powerful and exclusive
organization of Hindudom like the Hindu Maha Sabha will
always prove a sure and devoted source of strength, a reserve
force for the Hindus to fall back upon to voice their grievances
more effectively than the joint Parliament can do, to scent danger
ahead, to warn the Hindus in time against it and to fight out if
need be any treacherous design to which the joint state itself
may unwittingly fall a victim.

"The History of Canada, of Palestine, of the movement of the
Young Turks will show you that in every state where two or
more such conflicting elements as the Hindus and Moslems in
Irfdia happen to exist as constituents, the wiser of them has to
keep its exclusive organization intact, strong and watchful to
defeat any attempt at betrayal or capture of the National State
by the opposite party; especially so if that party has extra-terri-
torial affinities, religious or cultural, with alien bordering states."

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Pakistan

Having stated what is Hindustan, and what is Hindu Maha
Sabha, Mr. Savarkar next proceeds to define his conception of
Swaraj. According to Mr. Savarkar : — *

"Swaraj to the Hindus must mean only that in which their
"Swatva", their "Hindutva" can assert itself without being
overlorded by any non-Hindu people, whether they be Indian
Territorials or extia-Territorials — some Englishmen are and may
continue to be territorially born Indians. Can, therefore, the
overlordship of these Anglo-Indians be a "Swarajya" to the
Hindus? Aurangzeb or Tipu were hereditary Indians, nay,
were the sons of converted Hindu mothers. Did that mean that
the rule of Aurangzeb or Tipu was a "Swarajya" to the Hindus?
No! Although they were territorially Indians they proved to be
the worst enemies of Hindudom and therefore, a Shivaji, a
Gobindsingh, a Pralap or the Peshwas had to fight against the
Moslem domination and establish real Hindu Swarajya."

As part of his Swaraj Mr. Savarkar insists upon two things.

Firstly, the retention of the name Hindustan as the proper
name for India. t

"The name " Hindustan" must continue to be the appellation
of our county. Such other names as India, Hind etc. being
derived from the same original word Sindhu maj7 be used but
only to signify the same sense the land of the Hindus, a country
which is the abode of the Hindu Nation. Aryavarta, Bharat-
Bhumi and such other names are of course the ancient and the
most cherished epithets of our Mother Land and will continue
to appeal to the cultured elite. In this insistence that the Mother
Land of the Hindus must be called but "Hindustan," no
encroachment or humiliation is implied in connection with any
of our non-Hindu countrymen. Our Par see and Christian
countrymen are already too akin to us culturally and are too
patriotic and the Anglo-Indians too sensible to refuse to fall in
line with us Hindus on so legitimate a ground. So far as our
Moslem countrymen are concerned it is useless to conceal the fact
that some of them are already inclined to look upon this molehill
also as an insuperable mountain in their way to Hindu-Moslem
unity. But they should remember that the Moslems do not
dwell only in India nor are the Indian Moslems the only heroic
remnants of the Faithful in Islam. China has crores of Moslems,
Greece, Palestine and even Hungary and Poland have thousands

• Ibid., p. 18.
t Ibid., pp. 19-20.

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Hindu Alternative to Pakistan

of Moslems amongst their nationals. But being there a minority,
only a community, their existence in these countries has never
been advanced as a ground to change the ancient names of these
countries which indicate the abodes of those races whose over-
whelming majority owns the land. The country of the Poles
continues to be Poland and of the Grecians as Greece. The
Moslems there did not or dared not to distort them but are quite
content to distinguish themselves as Polish Moslems or Grecian
Musi ems or Chinese Moslems when occasion arises, so also our
MoTslem countrymen may distinguish themselves nationally or
territorially whenever they want, as " Hindusthanee Moslems"
without compromising in the least their separateness as Reli-
gious or Cultural entity. Nay, the Moslems have been calling
themselves as " Hiiulnsthanis" ever since their advent in India,
of their own accord.

"But if inspite of it all some irascible Moslem sections
amongst oiir countrymen object even to this name of our Country,
that is no reason why we should play cowards to our own
conscience. We Hindus must not betray or break up the continu-
ity of our Nation from the Sindlms in Rigvedic days to the
Hindus of our own generation which is implied in " Hindustan,"
the accepted appellation of our Mother Land. Just as the land
of the Germans is Germany, of the English England, of the
l\irks Turkistau, ol the Afghans Afghanistan — even so we
must have it indelibly impressed on the map of the earth for all
times to come a "Hindustan " — the land of the "Hindus."

The second is the retention of Sanskrit as sacred language,
Hindi as national language and Nagari as the script of Hindu-
dom.*

'The Sanskrit shall be our lf^WW", (Deva Bhasba)§ our
sacred language and the "Sanskrit Nishtha"! Hindi, the Hindi
which is derived from Sanskrit and draws its nourishment from
the latter, is our "fl^TT^r," (Rashtra Bhasha)! our current
national language —be sides being the richest and the most cultur-
ed of the ancient languages of the world, to us Hindus the
Sanskrit is the holiest tongue of tongues. Our scriptures, history,
philosophy and culture have their roots so deeply imbedded in the

*. Ibid., pp. 21, 22, 23.

$. Language of Gods.

f. Basically Sanskrit.

J. National Language.

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Pakistan

Sanskrit literature that it forms veritably the brain of our
Race. Mother of the majority of our mother tongues, she has
suckled the rest of them at her breast. All Hindu languages
current today whether derived from Sanskrit or grafted on to
it can only grow and flourish on the sap of life they imbibe from
Sanskrit. The Sanskrit language therefore must ever be an
indispensable constituent of the classical course for Hindu youths.

"in adopting the Hindi as the National tongue of Hindudom
no humiliation or any invidious distinction is implied as regards
other provincial tongues. We are all as attached to our provin-
cial tongues as to Hindi and they will all grow and flourish in
their respective spheres. In fact some of them are today more
progressive and richer in literature. But nevertheless, taken all
in all the Hindi can serve the purpose of a National Pan-Hindu
Language best. It must also be remembered that the Hindi is
not made a National Language to order. The fact is that long
before either the English or even the Moslems stepped in India
the Hindi in its general form bad already come to occupy the
position of a National tongue throughout Hindustan. The
Hindu pilgrim, the tradesman, the tonrist, the soldier, the Pandit
travelled up and down from Bengal to Sind and Kashmere to
Rameshwar by making himself understood from locality to
locality through Hindi. Just as the Sanskrit was the National
language of the Hindu intellectual world even so Hindi has
been for at least a thousand years in the past the National Indian
Tongue of the Hindu community

"By Hindi we of course mean the pure "Sanskrit Nistha"
Hindi, as we find it for example in the "Satyartha Prakash"
written by Maharsi Dayananda Saraswati. How simple and
untainted with a single unnecessary foreign word is that Hindi
and how expressive withal ! It may be mentioned in passing that
Swami Dayanandaji was about the first Hindu leader who gave
conscious and definite expression to the view that Hindi should
be the Pan-Hindu National language of India. " This Sanskrit
Nistha" Hindi has nothing to do with that hybrid, the so-called
Hindu sthani which is being hatched up by the Wardha scheme.
It is nothing short of a linguistic monstrosity and must be ruth-
lessly suppressed. Not only that but it is our bounden duty to
oust out as ruthlessly all unnecessary alien words whether Arabian
or English, from every Hindu tongue — whether provincial or
dialectical

"..../'.Our Sanskrit alphabetical order is phonetically about
the most perfect which the world has yet devised and almost all
our current Indian scripts already follow it. The Nagari Script
too follows this order. Like the Hindi language the Nagari
Script too has already been current for centuries all over India

126

Hindu Alternative to Pakistan

amongst the Hindu literary circles for some two thousand years
at any rate in the past and was even popularly nick-named as

the ' Shastri lyipi" the script of our Hindu Scriptures It

is a matter of common knowledge that if Bengali or Gujarathi
is printed in Nagari it is more or less understood by readers in
several other provinces- To have only one common language
throughout Hindustan at a stroke is impracticable and unwise.
But to have the Nagari script as the only common script through-
out Hindudom is much more feasible. Nevertheless, it should
be borne in mind that the different Hindu scripts current in our
different provinces have a future of their own and may flourish
side by side with the Nagari. All that is immediately indis-
pensable in the common interest of Hindudom as a whole is that
the Nagari Script must be made a compulsory subject along
with the Hindi language in every school iti the case of Hindu
students-"

What is to be the position of the Non-Hindu minorities
under the Swaraj as contemplated by Mr. Savarkar? On this
question, this is what Mr. Savarkar has to say : — *

"When once the Hindu Maha Sabha not only accepts but
maintains the principles of "one man one vote "and the public
services to go by merit alone added to the fundamental rights
and obligations to be shared by all citizens alike irrespective of

any distinction of Race or Religion any further mention

of minority rights is on the principle not only unnecessary but self-
contradictory. Because it again introduces a consciousness of
majorit}' and minority on Communal basis. Biit as practical
politics requires it and as the Hindu Sanghatanists want to
relieve our non-Hindu country-men of even a ghost of suspicion,
we are prepared to emphasise that the legitimate rights of
minorities with regard to their Religion, Culture, and Language
will be expressly guaranteed: on one condition only that the
equal rights of the majority also must not in any case be
encroached upon or abrogated- Every minority may have separate
schools to train up their children in their own tongue, their own
religious or cultural institutions and can receive Government
help also for these, — but always in proportion to the taxes they
pay into the common exchequer. The same principle must of
course hold good in case of the majority too.

"Over and above this, in case the constitution is not based on
joint electorates and on the unalloyed National principle of one
man one vote, but is based on the communal basis then those
minorities who wish to have separate electorate or reserve seats

•Ibid., P. 4.

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Pakistan

will be allowed to have them, — but always in proportion to their
population and provided that it does not deprive the majority
also of an equal right in proportion to its population too."

That being the position assigned to the minorities, Mr.
Savarkar concludes* that under his scheme of Swaraj : —

" The Moslem minority in India will have the right to

be treated as equal citizens, enjoying equal protection and civic
rights in proportion to their population. The Hindu majority
will not encroach on the legitimate rights of any non-Hindu
minority. But in no case can the Hindu majority resign its right
which as a majority it is entitled to exercise under any democratic
and legitimate constitution- The Moslem minority in particular
has not obliged the Hindus by remaining in minority and there-
fore, they must remain satisfied with the status they occupy and
with the legitimate share of civic and political rights that is
their proportionate due- It would be simply preposterous to
endow the Moslem minority with the right of exercising a
practical veto on the legitimate rights and privileges of the
majority and call it a "Swarajya". The Hindus do not want a
change of masters, are not going to struggle and fight and die
only to replace an Edward by an Aurangazeb simply because the
latter happens to be born within Indian borders, but they want
henceforth to be masters themselves in their own house, in their
own Land."

' And it is because he wants his Swaraj to bear the stamp of
being a Hindu Raj that Mr. Savarkar wants that India should
have the appellation of Hindustan.

This structure has been reared by Mr. Savarkar on two pro-
positions which he regards as fundamental.

The first is that the Hindu are a nation by themselves. He
enunciates this proposition with great elaboration and vehe-
mence. Saysf Mr. Savarkar : —

"In my Presidential speech at Nagpur I had, for the first time
in the history of our recent politics pointed out in bold relief that
the whole Congress ideology was vitiated ad initio by its unwitted
assumption that the territorial unity, a common habitat, was the
only factor that constituted and ought to and must constitute

*Ibid.. p. 16.

t Ibid., pp. 14-17.

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Hindu Alternative to Pakistan

a Nation. This conception of a Territorial Nationality has since
then received a rude shock in Europe itself from which it was
imported wholesale to India and the present War has justified
my assertion by exploding the myth altogether. All Nations
carved out to order on the Territorial design without any other
common bond to mould each of them into a national being
have gone to rack and ruin, tumbled down like a house of cards.
Poland and Czechoslovakia will ever serve as a stern warning
against any such efforts to frame heterogeneous peoples into such
hotch-potch Nation, based only on the shifting sands of the con-
ception of Territorial Nationality, not cemented by any cultural,
racial or historical affinities and consequently having no com-
mon will to incorporate themselves into a Nation. These treaty-
Nations broke up at the first opportunity they got: The German
part of them went over to Germany, the Russian to Russia,
Czechs to Czechs, and Poles to Poles. The cultural, linguistic,
historical and such other organic affinities proved stronger than
the Territorial one. Only those Nations have persisted in main-
taining their National unity and identity during the last three
to four centuries in Europe which had developed racial,
linguistic cultural and such other organic affinities in addition
to their Territorial unity or even at times in spite of it and con-
sequently willed to be homogeneous National units — such as
England, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, etc.

"Judged by any and all of these tests which go several ly and
collectively to form such a homogeneous and organic Nation,
in India we Hindus are marked ont as an abiding Nation by
ourselves. Not only do we own a common Fatherland, a Terri-
torial unity, but what is scarcely found an}'where else in the
world, we have a common Holy Land which is identified with
our common Fatherland. This Bharat Bhunii, this Hindustan,
India is both our ta^TI, and S"**?. Our patriotism therefore
is doubly sure. Then, we have common affinities, cultural,
religious, historical, linguistic, and racial which through the
process of countless centuries of association and assimilation
moulded us into a homogeneous and organic nation and above
all induced a will to lead a corporate and common national life.
The Hindus are no treaty Nation — but an organic National
Being.

"One more pertinent point must be met as it often misleads
our Congressite Hindu brethren in particular. The homogeneity
that wields a people into a National Being does not only imply
the total absence of all internal differences, religious, racial or
linguistic, of sects and sections amongst themselves. It only
means that they differ more from other people as a national unit
than they differ amongst themselves. Even the most Unitarian
nations of today — say the British or the French — cannot be free

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Pakistan

from any religious, linguistic, cultural, racial or other differences,
sects or sections or even some antipathies existing amongst them-
selves. National homogeneity connotes oneness of a people ,in
relation to the contrast they present to any other people as a
whole.

"We Hindus, in spite of thousand and one differences within
our fold, are bound by such religious, cultural, historical, racial,
linguistic and other affinities in common as to stand out as a
definitely homogeneous people as soon as we are placed in con-
trast with any other non-Hindu people — say the English or
Japanese or even the Indian Moslems. That is the reason why
today we the Hindus from Cashmere to Madras and Sindh to
Assam will have to be a Nation by ourselves" —

The second proposition on which Mr. Savarkar has built up
his scheme relates to the definition of the term Hindu. Accord-
ing to Mr. Savarkar a Hindu is a person : —

" ... who regards and owns this Bbarat Bhumi, this land from
the Indus to the Seas, as his Fatherland as well as his Holy
Land ; — i.e., the land of the origin of his religion, the cradle of
his faith.

The followers therefore of Vaidicism, Sanatanism, Jainism,
Buddhism, Lingaitism, Sikhism, the Arya Samaj, the Brahmo-
samaj, the Devasamaj, the Prathana Samaj and such other
religions of Indian origin are Hindus and constitute Hindudom,
i.e., Hindu people as a whole.

Consequently the so-called aboriginal or hill-tribes also are
Hindus: because India is their Fatherland as well as their Holy
Land, whatever form of religion or worship they follow. The
definition rendered in Sanskrit stands thus: —

n fain : s«**iw* s «r % ft ROTE*: n

This definition, therefore^, should be recognized by the Govern-
ment and made the test of Hindutva' in enumerating the popu-
lation of Hindus in the Government census to come. "

This definition of the term Hindu has been framed with
great care and caution. It is designed to serve two purposes
which Mr. Savarkar has in view. First, to exclude from it
Muslims, Christians, Parsis and Jews by prescribing the recogni-
tion of India as a Holy Land as a qualification for being a Hindu.
Secondly, to include Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs, etc. , by not insisting
upon belief in the sanctity of the Vedas as an element in the
qualifications.

130

Hindu Alternative to Pakistan

Such is the scheme of Mr. Savarkar and the Hindu Maha
Sabha. As must have been noticed, the scheme has some disturb-
ing features.

One is the categorical assertion that the Hindus are a nation
by themselves. This, of course, means that the Muslims are a
separate nation by themselves. That this is his view, Mr. Savar-
kar does not leave to be inferred. He insists upon it in no
uncertain terms and with the most absolute emphasis he is
capable of. Speaking at the Hindu Maha Sabha Session held
at Ahmedabad in 1937, Mr. Savarkar said : —

"Several infantile politicians commit the serious mistake in
supposing that India is already welded into a harmonious nation,
or that it could be welded thus for the mere wish to do so.
These our well-meaning but unthinking friends take their dreams
for realities. That is why they are impatient of communal
tangles and attribute them to communal organizations. But the
solid fact is that the so-called communal questions are but a
legacy handed down to us by centuries of a cultural, religious
and national antagonism between the Hindus and the Muslims.
When the time is ripe you can solve them ; but you cannot suppress
them by merely refusing recognition of them. It is safer to diag-
nose and treat deep-seated disease than to ignore it. Let us
bravely face unpleasant facts as they are. India cannot be assum-
ed today to be a Unitarian and homogeneous nation, but on the
contrary these are two nations in the main, the Hindus and the
Muslims in India."

Strange as it may appear, Mr. Savarkar and Mr. Jinnah
instead of being opposed to each other on the one nation versus
two nations issue are in complete agreement about it. Both
agree, not only agree but insist that there are two nations in
India — one the Muslim nation and the other the Hindu nation.
They differ only as regards the terms and conditions on which
the two nations should live. Mr. Jinnah says India should be cut
up into two, Pakistan and Hindustan, the Muslim nation to
occupy Pakistan and the Hindu nation to occupy Hindustan.
Mr. Savarkar on the other hand insists that, although there are
two nations in India, India shall not be divided into two parts,
one for Muslims and the other for the Hindus ; that the two
nations shall dwell in one country and shall live under the
mantle of one single constitution ; that the constitution shall be

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Pakistan

such that the Hindu nation will be enabled to occupy a predomi-
nant position that is due to it and the Muslim nation made to
live in the position of subordinate co-operation with the Hindu
nation. In the struggle for political power between the two
nations the rule of the game, which Mr. Savarkar prescribes, is
to be one man one vote, be the man Hindu or Muslim. In his
scheme a Muslim is to have no advantage which a Hindu does
not have. Minority is to be no justification for privilege and
majority is to be no ground for penalty. The State will guarantee
the Muslims any defined measure of political power in the form
of Muslim religion and Muslim culture. But the State will not
guarantee secured seats in the Legislature or in the Administra-
tion and, if such guarantee is insisted upon by the Muslims,*
such guaranteed quota is not to exceed their proportion to the
general population. Thus by confiscating its weightages, Mr.
Savarkar would even strip the Muslim nation of all the political
privileges it has secured so far.

This alternative of Mr. Savarkar to Pakistan has about it
a frankness, boldness and definiteness which distinguishes it from
the irritating vagueness and indefiniteness which characterizes
the Congress declarations about minority rights. Mr. Savarkar's
scheme has at least the merit of telling the Muslims, thus far,
and no further. The Muslims know where they are with regard
to the Hindu Maha Sabha. On the other hand, with the Con-
gress the Musalmans find themselves nowhere because the
Congress has been treating the Muslims and the minority ques-
tion as a game in diplomacy, if not in duplicity.

At the same time, it must be said that Mr. Savarkar's attitude
is illogical, if not queer. Mr. Savarkar admits that the Muslims
are a separate nation. He concedes that they have a right to
cultural autonomy. He allows them to have a national flag.
Yet he opposes the demand of the Muslim nation for a separate
national home. If he claims a national home for the Hindu
nation, how can he refuse the claim of the Muslim nation for a
national home?

• It should be noted that Mr. Savarkar is not opposed to separate electorates for
the Muslims. It is not clear whether he is in favour of separate electorates for
Muslims even where they are in a majority.

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Hindu Alternative to Pakistan

It would not have been a matter of much concern if incon-
sistency was the only fault of Mr. Savarkar. But Mr. Savarkar
in advocating his scheme is really creating a most dangerous
situation for the safety and security of India. History records
two ways as being open to a major nation to deal with a minor
nation when they are citizens of the same country and are sub-
ject to the same constitution. One way is to destroy the nation-
ality of the minor nation and to assimilate and absorb it into the
major nation, so as to make one nation out of two. This is done
by denying to the minor nation any right to language, religion or
culture and by seeking to enforce upon it the language, religion
and culture of the major nation. The other way is to divide
the country and to allow the minor nation a separate, autonomous
and sovereign existence, independent of the major nation. Both
these ways were tried in Austria and Turkey, the second after
the failure of the first.

Mr. Savarkar adopts neither of these two ways. He does not
propose to suppress the Muslim nation. On the contrary he is
nursing and feeding it by allowing it to retain its religion,
language and culture, elements which go to sustain the soul of
a nation. At the same time he does not consent to divide the
country so as to allow the two nations to become separate, auto-
nomous states, each sovereign in its own territory. He wants the
Hindus and the Muslims to live as two separate nations in one
country, each maintaining its own religion, language and culture.
One can understand and even appreciate the wisdom of the
theory of suppression of the minor nation by the major nation
because the ultimate aim is to bring into being one nation. But
one cannot follow what advantage a theory has which says that
there must ever be two nations but that there shall be no divorce
between them. One can justify this attitude only if the two
nations were to live as partners in friendly intercourse with
mutual respect and accord. But that is not to be, because Mr.
Savarkar will not allow the Muslim nation to be co-equal in
authority with the Hindu nation. He wants the Hindu nation
to be the dominant nation and the Muslim nation to be the
servient nation. Why Mr. Savarkar, after sowing this seed of
enmity between the Hindu nation and the Muslim nation should

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Pakistan

want that they should live under one constitution and occupy
one country, is difficult to explain.

One cannot give Mr. Savarkar credit for having found a
new formula. What is difficult to understand is that he should
believe that his formula is the right formula. Mr. Savarkar has
taken old Austria and old Turkey as his model and pattern for
his scheme of Swaraj. He sees that in Austria and Turkey there
lived one major nation juxta posed to other minor nations bound
by one constitution with the major nation dominating the minor
nations and argues that if this was possible in Austria and
Turkey, why should it not be possible for the Hindus to do the
same in India.

That Mr. Savarkar should have taken old Austria and old
Turkey as his model to build upon is really very strange. Mr.
Savarkar does not seem to be aware of the fact that old Austria
and old Turkey are no more. Much less does he seem to know
the forces which have blown up old Austria and old Turkey to
bits. If Mr. Savarkar instead of studying the past — of which he
is very fond — were to devote more attention to the present, he
would have learnt that old Austria and old Turkey came to
ruination for insisting upon maintaining the very scheme of
things which Mr. Savarkar has been advising his "Hindudom"
to adopt, namely, to establish a Swaraj in which there will be
two nations under the mantle of one single constitution in which
the major nation will be allowed to hold the minor nation in
subordination to itself.

The history of the disruption of Austria, Czechoslovakia,
and Turkey is of the utmost importance to India and the mem-
bers of the Hindu Maha Sabha will do well to peruse the same.
I need say nothing here about it because I have drawn attention
to lessons from their fateful history in another chapter.
Suffice it to say that the scheme of Swaraj formulated by Mr.
Savarkar will give the Hindus an empire over the Muslims and
thereby satisfy their vanity and their pride in being an imperial
race. But it can never ensure a stable and peaceful future for the
Hindus, for the simple reason that the Muslims will never yield
willing obedience to so dreadful an alternative.

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Hindu Alternative to Pakistan

III

Mr. Savarkar is quite unconcerned about the Muslim re-
action to his scheme. He formulates his scheme and throws it in
the face of the Muslims with the covering letter c take it or leave
it'. He is not perturbed by the Muslim refusal to join in the
struggle for Swaraj. He is quite conscious of the strength of
the Hindus and the Hindu Maha Sabha and proposes to carry
on the struggle in the confident hope that, alone and unaided,
the Hindus will be able to wrest Swaraj from the British. Mr.
Savarkar is quite prepared to say to the Musalmans : —

" If you come, with you, if you don't, without you ; and if
you oppose, in spite of you — the Hindus will continue to fight
for their national freedom as best as they can."

Not so Mr. Gandhi. At the very commencement of his
career as a political leader of India when Mr. Gandhi startled
the people of India by his promise to win Swaraj within six
months, Mr. Gandhi said that he could perform the miracle only
if certain conditions were fulfilled. One of these conditions
was the achievement of Hindu-Muslim unity. Mr. Gandhi is
never tired of saying that there is no Swaraj without Hindu-
Muslim unity. Mr. Gandhi did not merely make this slogan
the currency of Indian politics but he has strenuously worked
to bring it about. Mr. Gandhi, it may be said, began his career
as a political leader of India with the manifesto dated 2nd
March 1919 declaring his intention to launch Satyagraha against
the Rowlatt Act and asking those who desired to join him to sign
the satyagraha pledge. That campaign of Satyagraha was a
short-lived campaign and was suspended by Mr. Gandhi on 18th
April 1919. As a part of his programme Mr. Gandhi had fixed*
the 6th March 1919 to be observed all over India as a day of
protest against the Rowlatt Act. Mass meetings were to beheld
on that day and Mr. Gandhi had prescribed that the masses
attending the meetings should take a vow in the following
terms : —

" With God as witness, we Hindus, and Mahomedans declare
that we shall behave towards one another as children of the same
parents, that we shall have no differences, that the sorrows of

* See his Manifesto dated 23rd March 1919.

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Pakistan

each shall be the sorrows of the other and that each shall help
the other in removing them. We shall respect each other's
religion and religious feelings and shall not stand in the way of
our respective religious practices. We shall always refrain from
violence to each other in the name of religion."

There was nothing in the campaign of Satyagraha against
the Rowlatt Act which could have led to any clash between the
Hindus and the Muslims. Yet Mr. Gandhi asked his followers to
take the vow. This shows how insistent he was from the very
beginning upon Hindu-Muslim unity.

The Mahomedans started the Khilafat movement in 1919.
The objective of the movement was two-fold ; to preserve the
Khilafat and to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire.
Both these objectives were unsupportable. The Khilafat could
not be saved simply because the Turks, in whose interest this
agitation was carried on, did not want the Sultan. They wanted
a republic and it was quite unjustifiable to compel the Turks to
keep Turkey a monarchy when they wanted to convert it into
a republic. It was not open to insist upon the integrity of the
Turkish Empire because it meant the perpetual subjection of the
different nationalities to the Turkish rule and particularly of the
Arabs, especially when it was agreed on all hands that the
doctrine of self-determination should be made the basis of the
peace settlement.

The movement was started by the Mahomedans. It was
taken up by Mr. Gandhi with a tenacity and faith which must
have surprised many Mahomedans themselves. There were
many people who doubted the ethical basis of the Khilafat move-
ment and tried to dissuade Mr. Gandhi from taking any part
in a movement the ethical basis of which was so questionable.
But Mr. Gandhi had so completely persuaded himself of the
justice of the Khilafat agitation that he refused to yield to their
advice. Time and again he argued that the cause was just and
it was his duty to join it. The position taken up by him may
be summed up in his own words.*

11 (l) In my opinion, the Turkish claim is not only not
immoral and unjust, but it is highly equitable, if only because
Turkey wants to retain what is her own. And the Mahomedan

• Young India. 2nd June 1920.
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Hindu Alternative to Pakistan

manifesto has definitely declared that whatever guarantees may
be necessary to be taken for the protection of the non-Muslim
and non-Turkish races, should be taken so as to give the Christians
theirs and the Arabs their self-government under the Turkish
suzerainty ;

(2) I do not believe the Turk to be weak, incapable or cruel.
He is certainly disorganised and probably without good general-
ship. The argument of weakness, incapacity and cruelty one
often hears quoted in connection with those from whom power
is sought to be taken away. About the alleged massacres a
proper commission has been asked for, but never granted. And
in any case security can be taken against oppression ;

(3) I have already stated that, if I were not interested in
the Indian Mahotnedans, I would not interest myself in the
welfare of the Turks any more than I am in that of the Austrians
or the Poles. But I am bound as an Indian to share the sufferings
and trials of fellow-Indians. If I deem the Mahomedan to be
my brother, it is my duty to help him in his hour of peril to
the best of iny ability, if his cause commends itself to me as just ;

(4) The fourth refers to the extent Hindus should join hands
with the Mahomedans. It is, therefore, a matter of feeling and
opinion. It is expedient to suffer for my Mahomedan brother to
the utmost in a just cause and I should, therefore,- travel with
him along the whole road so long as the means employed by him
are as honourable as his end. I cannot regulate the Mahomedan
feeling. I must accept his statement that the Khilafat is with
him a religious question in the sense that it binds him to reach
the goal even at the cost of his own life."

Mr. Gandhi not only agreed with the Muslims in the Khila-
fat cause but acted as their guide and their -friend. The part
played by Mr. Gandhi in the Khilafat agitation and the connec-
tion between the Khilafat agitation and the Non-co-operation
Movement has become obscure by the reason of the fact that
most people believed that it was the Congress which initiated
the Non-co-operation Movement and it was done as a means
for winning Swaraj. That such a view should prevail is quite
understandable because most people content themselves with
noting the connection between the Non-co-operation Movement
and the special session of the Congress held at Calcutta on 7th
and 8th September 1920. But anyone, who cares to go behind
September 1920 and examines the situation as it then stood, will
find that this view is not true. The truth is that the non-co-

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Pakistan

operation lias its origin in the Khilafat agitation and not in the
Congress movement for Swaraj : that it was started by the
Khilafatists to help Turkey and adopted by the Congress only to
help the Khilafatists : that Swaraj was not its primary object,
but its primary object was Khilafat and that Swaraj was added
as a secondary object to induce the Hindus to join it will be
evident from the following facts.

The Khilafat movement may be said to have begun on
27th October 1919 when the day was observed as the Khilafat
Day all over India. On 23rd November 1919 the first
Khilafat Conference met at Delhi. It was at this session that
the Muslims considered the feasibility of non-co-operation as a
means of compelling the British Government to redress the
Khilafat wrong. On 10th March 1920 the Khilafat Conference
met at Calcutta and decided upon non-co-operation as the best
weapon to further the object of their agitation.

On 9th June 1920 the Khilafat Conference met at
Allahabad and unanimously reaffirmed their resolve to resort to
non-co-operation and appointed an Executive Committee to en-
force and lay down a detailed programme. On 22nd June 1920
the Muslims sent a message to the Viceroy stating that they would
start non-co-operation if the Turkish grievances were not redress-
ed before 1st August 1920. On 30th June 1920 the
Khilafat Committee meeting held at Allahabad resolved to
start non-co-operation, after a month's notice to the Viceroy.
Notice was given on 1st July 1920 and the non-co-operation
commenced on 1st August 1920. This short resum6 shows that
the non-co-operation was started by the Khilafat Committee and
all that the Congress special session at Calcutta did was to adopt
what the Khilafat Conference had already done and that too
not in the interest of Swaraj but in the interest of helping the
Musalmans in furthering the cause of Khilafat. This is clear
from the perusal of the Congress Resolution* passed at the
special session held at Calcutta.

• " In view of the fact that on the Khilafat question both the Indian and Imperial
Governments have signally failed in their duty towards the Muslims of India and the
Prime Minister has deliberately broken his pledged word given to them, and that
it is the duty of every non-Muslim Indian in every legitimate manner to assist his
Muslim brother in his attempt to remove the religious calamity that has overtaken him ;

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Hindu Alternative to Pakistan

Although the Non-co-operation Movement was launched by
the Khilafat Committee and merely adopted by the Congress
primarily to help the Khilafat cause, the person who suggested
it to the Khilafat Committee and who identified himself with
the Committee and took the responsibility of giving effect to
it and who brought about its adoption by the Congress was Mr.
Gandhi.

At the first Khilafat Conference held at Delhi on 23rd
November 1919 Mr. Gandhi was present. Not only was Mr.
Gandhi present but also it was he who advised the Muslims to
adopt non-co-operation as a method for forcing the British to
yield to their demands regarding the Khilafat. The joining of
Mr. Gandhi in the Khilafat movement is full of significance.
The Muslims were anxious to secure the support of the Hindus
in the cause of Khilafat. At the Conference held on 23rd
November 1919 the Muslims had invited the Hindus. Again
^on 3rd June 1920 a joint meeting of the Hindus and the
Khilafatist Muslims was held at Allahabad. This meeting was

" And in view of the fact that, in the matter of the events of the April of 1919,
both the said Governments have grossly neglected or failed to protect the innocent
people of the Punjab and punish officers guilty of unsoldierly and barbarous behaviour
towards them, and have exonerated Sir Michael O'Dwyer who proved himself directly
responsible for most of the official crimes and callous to the sufferings of the people
placed under his administration, and that the debate in the House of Lords betrayed
a woeful lack of sympathy with the people of India, and systematic terrorism and
frightfulness adopted in the Punjab, and that the latest Viceregal pronouncement is
proof of entire absence of repentance in the matters of the Khilafat and the Punjab.

" This Congress is of opinion that there can be no contentment in India without
redress of the two aforementioned wrongs, and that the only effectual means to vindi-
cate national honour and to prevent a repetition of similar wrongs in future is the
establishment of Swarajya.

" This Congress is further of opinion that there is no course left open for the
people of India but to approve of and adopt the policy of progressive non-violent
non-co-operation inaugurated by Mahatma Gandhi, until the said wrongs are righted
and Swarajya is established."

Mrs. Annie Besant says : " It will be remembered that Mr. Gandhi, in March
1920, had forbidden the mixing up of non-co-operation in defence of the Khilaiat
with other questions ; but it was found that the Khilafat was not sufficiently attractive
to Hindus", so at the meeting of the All-India Congress Committee held at Benares
on May 30 and 31, the Punjab atrocities and the deficiencies of the Reforms Act were
added to the list of provocative causes.— The Future of Indian Politics, p. 250.

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Pakistan

attended among others by Sapru, Motilal Nehru and Annie
Besant. But the Hindus were hesitant in joining the Muslims.
Mr. Gandhi was the only Hindu who joined the Muslims. Not
only did he show courage to join them, but also he kept step
with them, nay, led them. On 9th June 1920 when the
Khilafat Conference met at Allahabad and formed an Executive
Committee to prepare a detailed programme of non-co-operation
and give effect to it, Mr. Gandhi was the only Hindu on that
Executive Committee. On 22nd June 1920 the Muslims sent
a message to the Viceroy that they would start non-co-operation
if the Turkish grievances were not redressed before 1st August
1920. On the same day Mr. Gandhi also sent a letter to the
Viceroy explaining the justice of the Khilafat cause, the reasons
why he has taken up the cause and the necessity of satisfying
the hands of the Khilafatists. For instance the notice given to
the Viceroy on 1st July 1920 that non-co-operation will be
started on 1st August was given by Mr. Gandhi and not by
the Khilafatists. Again when non-co-operation was started by
the Khilafatist on 31st August 1920 Mr. Gandhi was the first
to give a concrete shape to it by returning his medal. After
inaugurating the Non-co-operation Movement as an active mem-
ber of the Khilafat Committee Mr. Gandhi next directed his
energy to the cause of persuading the Congress to adopt non-
co-operation and strengthen the Khilafat movement. With
that object in view Mr. Gandhi toured the country between
1st August and 1st September 1920 in the company of the
Ali Brothers who were the founders of the Khilafat movement
impressing upon the people the necessity of non-co-operation.
People could notice the disharmony in the tune of Mr. Gandhi
and the Ali Brothers. As the Modern Review pointed out "Read-
ing between the lines of their speeches, it is not difficult to see that
with one of them the sad plight of the Khilafat in distant Turkey
is the central fact, while with the other attainment of Swaraj
here in India is the object in view." This dichotomy* of interest

* Mr. Gandhi repudiated the suggestion of the Modern Review and regarded it as
11 crudest cut". Dealing with the criticism of the Modern Review in his Article in
Ydung India for 20th October 1921 Mr. Gandhi said " I claim that with us both the
Khilafat is the central fact, with Maulana Mahomed Ali because it is his religion,
with me because, in laying down my life for the Khilafat, I ensure safety of the
cow, that is my religion, from the Musalman knife."

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Hindu Alternative to Pakistan

did not augur well for the success of the ultimate purpose.
Nonetheless Mr. Gandhi succeeded in carrying the Congress
with him in support of the Khilaf at cause. *

For a long time the Hindus had been engaged in wooing
the Muslims to their side. The Congress was very anxious to
bridge the gulf between itself and the Muslim League. The
wjays and means adopted in 1916 for bringing about this con-
summation and which resulted in the Lucknow Pact signed
between the Congress and the Muslim League have been graphi-
cally told by Swami Shradhanand in his impressions of the
Congress Session held in that year at Lucknow. Says the
Swami f : —

"On sitting on the dais (Lucknow Congress platform) the
first thing that I noticed was that the number of Moslem dele-
gates was proportionately fourfold of what it was at Lahore in
1893. The majority of Moslem delegates had donned gold, silver
and silk embroidered chogas (flowing robes) over their ordinary
coarse suits of wearing apparel. It was rumoured that these
1 chogas ' had been put by Hindu moneyed men for Congress
Tamasha. Of some 433 Moslem delegates only some 30 had
come from outside, the rest belonging to Lucknow City. And of
these majority was admitted free to delegate seats, board and
lodging. Sir Syed Ahmad's anti-Congress League had tried in a
public meeting to dissuade Moslems from joining the Congress
as delegates. As a countermove the Congress people lighted
the whole Congress camp some four nights before the session began
and advertised that that night would be free. The result was that
all the " Chandul Khatias " of Lucknow were emptied and a
huge audience of some thirty thousand Hindus and Moslems
was addressed from half a dozen platforms. It was then that
the Moslem delegates were elected or selected. All this was
admitted by the Lucknow Congress organisers to me in private.

" A show was being made of the Moslem delegates. Moslem
delegate gets up to second a resolution in Urdu. He begins:
Hozarat, I am a Mahomedan delegate. vSome Hindu delegate
gets up and calls for three cheers for Mahomedan delegates and
the response is so enthusiastic as to be beyond description."

• The Resolution of non-co-operation was carried by 1886 votes against 884. The
late Mr. Tairsee once told me that a large majority of the delegates were no others
than the taxi drivers of Calcutta who were paid to vote for the non-co-operation
resolution

t Liberator. 22nd April 1926.

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Pakistan

In taking np the cause of Khilafat Mr. Gandhi achieved a
double purpose. He carried the Congress plan of winning over
the Muslims to its culmination. Secondly he made the Congress
a power in the country, which it would not have been, if the
Muslims had not joined it. The cause of the Khilafat appealed
to the Musalmans far more than political safeguards, with the
result that the Musalmans who were outside it trooped into the
Congress. The Hindus welcomed them. For, they saw in this
a common front against the British, which was their main aim.
The credit for this must of course go to Mr. Gandhi. For
there can be no doubt that this was an" act of great daring.

When the Musalmans in 1919 approached the Hindus for
participation in the Non-co-operation Movement which the
Muslims desired to start for helping Turkey and the Khilafat,
the Hindus were found to be divided in three camps. One was
a camp of those who were opposed to non-co-operation in prin-
ciple. A second camp consisted of those Hindus who were
prepared to join the Muslims in their campaign of non-co-opera-
tion provided the Musalmans agreed to give up Cow Slaughter.
A third group consisted of the Hindus who feared that the
Mahomedans might extend their non-co-operation to inviting
the Afghans to invade India, in which case the movement instead
of resulting in Swaraj might result in the subjection of India to
Muslim Raj.

Mr. Gandhi did not care for those Hindus who were oppos-
ed to joining the Muslims in the Non-co-operation Movement.
But with regard to the others he told them that their attitude
was unfortunate. To those Hindus who wanted to give their
support on the condition that the Muslims give up cow killing,
Mr. Gandhi said * : —

"I submit that the Hindus may not open the Goraksha (cow
protection) question here. The test of friendship is assistance in
adversity, and that too, unconditional assistance. Cooperation
that needs consideration is a commercial contract and not friend-
ship. Conditional co-operation is like adulterated cement which
does not bind. It is the duty of the Hindus, if they see the
justice of the Mahomedan cause, to render co-operation. If the
Mahomedans feel themselves bound in honour to spare the

* Young India, 10th December 1919.
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Hindu Alternative to Pakistan

Hindus' feelings and to stop cow killing, they may do so, no
matter whether the Hindus co-operate with them or not.
Though therefore, I yield to no Hindu in my worship of the cow,
I do not want to make the stopping of cow killing a condition
precedent to co-operation. Unconditional co-operation means the
protection of the cow."

To those Hindus who feared to join the Non-co-operation
Movement for the reasons that Muslims may invite the Afghans
to invade India, Mr. Gandhi said* : —

" It is easy enough to understand and justify the Hindu
caution. It is difficult to resist the Mahomedan position. In
my opinion, the best way to prevent India from becoming the
battle ground between the forces of Islam and those of the English
is for Hindus to make non-co-operation a complete and im-
mediate success, and I have little doubt that, if the Mahomedans
remain true to their declared intention and are able to exercise
self-restraint and make sacrifices, the Hindus will 'play the
game* and join them in the campaign of non-co-operation.
I feel equally certain that Hindus will not assist Mahomedans in
promoting or bringing about an armed conflict between the
British Government and their allies, and Afghanistan. British
forces are too well organised to admit of any successful invasion
of the Indian frontier. The only way, therefore, the Mahomedans
can carry on an effective struggle on behalf of the honour of
Islam is to take up non-co-operation in real earnest. It will not
only be completely effective if it is adopted by the people on an
extensive scale, but it will also provide full scope for individual
conscience. If I cannot bear an injustice done by an individual
or a corporation, and I am directly or indirectly instrumental in
upholding that individual or corporation, I n ust answer for it
before my Maker ; but I have done all that is humanly possible
for me to do consistently with the moral code that refuses to
injure even the wrong-doers, if I cease to support the injustice in
the manner described above. In applying, therefore, such a great
force, there should be no haste, there should be no temper shown.
Non-co-operation must be and remain absolutely a voluntary
effort. The whole thing, then, depends upon Mahomedans
themselves. If they will but help themselves, Hindu help will
come and the Government, great and mighty though it is, will
have to bend before this irresistible force. No Government can
possibly withstand the bloodless opposition of a whole nation."

Unfortunately, the hope of Mr. Gandhi that ' no Government
can possibly withstand the bloodless opposition of a whole

* Young India, 9th June 1920.

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Pakistan

nation ' did not come true. Within a year of the starting of the
Non-co-operation Movement, Mr. Gandhi had to admit that the
Musalmans had grown impatient and that : —

"In their impatient anger, the Musalmans ask for more
energetic and more prompt action by the Congress and Khilafat
organisations. To the Musalmans, Swaraj means, as it must
mean, India's ability to deal effectively with the Khilafat question.
The Musalmans, therefore, decline to wait if the attainment of
Swaraj means indefinite delay or a programme that may require
the Musalmans of India to become impotent witnesses of the
extinction of Turkey in European waters.

4< It is impossible not to sympathise with this attitude. I would
gladly recommend immediate action if I could think of any
effective course. I would gladly ask for postponement of Swaraj
activity if thereby we could advance the interest of the Khilafat.
I could gladly take up measures outside non-co-operation, if I
could think of any, in order to assuage the pain caused to the
millions of the Musalmans.

"But, in my humble opinion, attainment of Swaraj is the
quickest method of righting the Khilafat wrong. Hence it is,
that for me the solution of the Khilafat question is attainment
of Swaraj and vice versa. The only way to help the afflicted
Turks is for India to generate sufficient power to be able to assert
herself. If she cannot develop that power in time, there is no
way out for India and she must resign herself to the inevitable.
What can a paralytic do to stretch forth a helping hand to a
neighbour but to try to cure himself of his paralysis? Mere
ignorant, thoughtless and angry outburst of violence may give
vent to pent-up rage but can bring no relief to Turkey."

The Musalmans were not in a mood to listen to the advice
of Mr. Gandhi. They refused to worship the principle of non-
violence. They were not prepared to wait for Swaraj. They
were in a hurry to find the most expeditious means of helping
Turkey and saving the Khilafat. And the Muslims in their
impatience did exactly what the Hindus feared they would do,
namely, invite the Afghans to invade India. How far the Khila-
fatists had proceeded in their negotiations with the Amir of
Afghanistan it is not possible to know. But that such a project
was entertained by them is beyond question. It needs no saying
that the project of an invasion of India was the most dangerous
project and every sane Indian would dissociate himself from so
mad a project. What part Mr. Gandhi played in this project it

144

Hindu Alternative to Pakistan
*

is not possible to discover. Certainly he did not dissociate him-
self from it. On the contrary his misguided zeal for Swaraj and
his obsession on Hindn-Moslem unity as the only means of
achieving it, led him to support the project Not only did he
advise* the Amir not to enter into any treaty with the British
Government but declared —

" I would, in a sense, certainly assist the Amir of Afghanistan
if he waged war against the British Government. That is to
say, I would openly tell my countrymen that it would be a crime
to help a government which had lost the confidence of the nation
to remain in power".

Can any sane man go so far, for the sake of Hindu-Moslem
unity? But Mr. Gandhi was so attached to Hindu-Moslem
unity that he did not stop to enquire what he was really doing
in this mad endeavour. So anxious was Mr. Gandhi in laying
the foundation of Hindu-Moslem unity well and truly, that he
did not forget to advise his followers regarding the national
crisis. In an Article in Young India of 8th September 1920
Mr. Gandhi said : —

"During the Madras tour, at Bezwada I had occasion to
remark upon the national crisis and suggested that it would be
better to have cries about ideals than men. I asked the audience
ro replace Mahatma Gandhi-ki-jai and Mahomed AH Shoukat
Ali-ki-jai by Hindu-Musalman-ki-jai. Brother Shoukat AH, who
followed, positivelj' laid down the law. In spite of the Hindu-
Muslim unity, he had observed that, if Hindus shouted Bande
Mataram, the Muslims rang out with Allaho Akbar and vice
versa. This, he rightly said jarred on the ear and still showed
that the people did not act with one mind. There should be
therefore only three cries recognised. Allaho Akbar to be joyous-
ly sung out by Hindus and Muslims, showing that God alone
was great and no other. The second should be Bande Mataram
(Hail Motherland) or Bharat Mata-ki-jai (Victory to
Mother Hind). The third should be Hindu-Musalman-ki-jai
without which there was no victory for India, and no true
demonstration of the greatness of God. I do wish that the
newspapers and public men would take up the Maulana's sug-
gestion and lead the people only to use the three cries. They are
full of meaning. The first is a prayer and confession of our
littleness and therefore a sign of humility. It is a cry in which
all Hindus and Muslims should join in reverence and prayfulness.
Hindus may not fight shy of Arabic words, when their meaning

• Young India dated 4th May 1921.
*° 145

Pakistan

is not only totally inoffensive but even ennobling. God is no
respector of any particular tongue. Bande Mataram, apart from
its wonderful associations, expresses the one national wish — the
rise of India to her full height. And I should prefer Bande
Mataram to Bharat Mata-ki-jai, as it would be a graceful recog-
nition of the intellectual and emotional superiority of Bengal.
Since India can be nothing without the union of the Hindu and
the Muslim heart, Hindu-Musalman-ki-jai is a cry which we may
never forget.

11 There should be no discordance in these cries. Immediately
some one has taken up any of the three cries, the rest should
take it up and not attempt to yell out their favourite. Those,
who do not wish to join, may refrain, but they should consider
it a breach of etiquette to interpolate their own when a cry has
already been raised. It would be better too, always to follow out
the three cries in the order given above."

These are not the only things Mr. Gandhi has done to build
up Hindu-Moslem unity. He has never called the Muslims to
account even when they have been guilty of gross crimes against
Hindus.

It is a notorious fact that many prominent Hindus who had
offended the religious susceptibilities of the Muslims either by
their writings or by their part in the Shudhi movement have
been murdered by some fanatic Musalmans. First to suffer was
Swami Shradhanand, who was shot by Abdul Rashid on
23 December 1926 when he was lying in his sick bed. This
was followed by the murder of Lala Nanakchand, a prominent
Arya Samajist of Delhi. Rajpal, the author of the Rangila
Rasool, was stabbed by Ilamdin on 6th April 1929 while he
was sitting in his shop. Nathuramal Sharma was murdered by
Abdul Qayum in September 1934. It was an act of great daring.
For Sharma was stabbed to death in the Court of the Judicial
Commissioner of Sind where he was seated awaiting the hearing
of his appeal against his conviction under Section 195, I. P. C.
for the publication of a pamphlet on the history of Islam.
Khanna, the Secretary of the Hindu Sabha, was severely assault-
ed in 1938 by the Mahomedans after the Session of the Hindu
Maha Sabha held in Ahmedabad and very narrowly escaped
death.

This is, of course, a very short list and could be easily
expanded. But whether the number of prominent Hindus

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Hindu Alternative to Pakistan

killed by fanatic Muslims is large or small matters little. What
matters is the attitude of those who count towards these murder-
ers. The murderers paid the penalty of law where law is
enforced. The leading Moslems, however, never condemned
these criminals. On the contrary, they were hailed as religious
martyrs and agitation was carried on for clemency being shown
to them. As an illustration of this attitude, one may refer to Mr.
Barkat Alii, a barrister of Lahore, who argued the appeal of
Abdul Qayum. He went to the length of saying that Qayum was
not guilty of murder of Nathuramal because his act was justifi-
able by the law of the Koran. This attitude of the Moslems is
quite understandable. What is not understandable is the attitude
of Mr. Gandhi.

Mr. Gandhi has been very punctilious in the matter of con-
demning any and every act of violence and has forced the Con-
gress, much against its will to condemn it. But Mr. Gandhi
has never protested against such murders. Not only have the
Musalmans not condemned* these outrages but even Mr, Gandhi
has never called upon the leading Muslims to condemn them.
He has kept silent over them. Such an attitude can be explained
only on the ground that Mr. Gandhi was anxious to preserve
Hindu-Moslem unity and did not mind the murders of a few
Hindus, if it could be achieved by sacrificing their lives.

This attitude to excuse the Muslims any wrong, lest it should
injure the cause of unity, is well illustrated by what Mr. Gandhi
had to say in the matter of the Mopla riots.

The blood-curdling atrocities committed by the Moplas in,
Malabar against the Hindus were indescribable. All over South-
ern India, a wave of horrified feeling had spread among the
Hindus of every shade of opinion, which was intensified
when certain Khilafat leaders were so misguided as to pass
resolutions of u congratulations to the Moplas on the brave fight

* It is reported that for earning merit for the soul of Abdul Rashid, the murderer
of Swami Shradhanand, in the next world the students and professors of the famous
theological college at Deoband finished five complete recitations of the Koran and
had planned to finish daily a lakh and a quarter recitations of Koranic verses. Their
prayer was "God Almighty may give the marhoom (i.e. Rashid) a place in the 'a'
ala-e-illeeyeen (the summit of the seventh heaven)" — Times of India, 30-11-27
Through Indian Eyes columns.

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Pakistan

they were conducting for the sake of religion". Any person
could have said that this was too heavy a price for Hindu-Moslem
unity. But Mr. Gandhi was so much obsessed by the necessity
of establishing Hindu-Moslem unity that he was prepared to
make light of the doings of the Moplas and the Khilafatists who
were congratulating them. He spoke of the Moplas as the
" brave God-fearing Moplas who were fighting for what they
consider as religion and in a manner which they consider as
religious". Speaking of the Muslim silence over the Mopla
atrocities Mr. Gandhi told the Hindus : —

"The Hindus must have the courage and the faith to feel
that they can protect their religion in spite of such fanatical
eruptions. A verbal disapproval by the Mussalmans of Mopla
madness is no test of Mussalman friendship. The Mussalmans
must naturally feel the shame and humiliation of the Mopla
conduct about forcible conversions and looting, and they must
work away so silently and effectively that such a thing might
become impossible even on the part of the most fanatical among
them. My belief is that the Hindus as a body have received the
Mopla madness with equanimity and that the cultured Mussal-
mans are sincerely sorry of the Mopla's perversion of the teaching
of the Prophet."

The Resolution* passed by the Working Committee of the
Congress on the Mopla atrocities shows how careful the Congress
was not to hurt the feelings of the Musalmans.

"The Working Committee places on record its sense of deep
regret over the deeds of violence done by Moplas in certain areas
of Malabar, these deeds being evidence of the fact that there are
still people in India who have not understood the message of the
Congress and the Central Khilafat Committee, and calls upon
every Congress and Khilafat worker to spread the said message
- of non-violence even under the gravest provocation throughout
the length and breadth of India.

"Whilst, however, condemning violence on the part of the
Moplas, the Working Committee desires it to be known that the
evidence in its possession shows that provocation beyond endur-
ance was given to the Moplas and that the reports published by

*Thc resolution says that there were only three cases of forcible conversion ! !
In reply to a question in the Central Legislature (Debates 16th January 1922)
Sir William Vincent replied " The Madras Government reportthat the number of
forcible conversions probably runs to thousands but that for obvious reasons it
will never be possible to obtain anything like anaccurate estimate ".

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Hindu Alternative to Pakistan

and on behalf of the Government have given a one-sided and
highly exaggerated account of the wrongs done by the Moplas and
an understatement of the needless destruction of life resorted to
by the Government in the name of peace and order.

"The Working Committee regrets to find that there have
been instances of so-called forcible conversion by some fanatics
among the Moplas, but warns the public against believing in the
Government and inspired versions. The Report before the Com-
mittee says :

The families, which have been reported to have been forcibly
converted into Mahomedanism, lived in the neighbourhood of
Manjeri. It is clear that conversions were forced upon Hindus
by a fanatic gang which was always opposed to the Khilafat and
Non-co-operation Movement and there were only three cases so
far as our information goes/ "

The following instances of Muslim intransigence, over which
Mr. Gandhi kept mum are recorded by Swami Shradhanand in
his weekly journal called the Liberator. Writing in the issue
of 30th September 1926 the Swamiji says: —

" As regards the removal of untouchability it has been autho-
ritatively ruled several times that it is the duty of Hindus to
expiate for their past sins and non-Hindus should have nothing
to do with it. But the Mahomedan and the Christian Congress-
men have openly revolted against the dictum of Gandhi at
Vaikom and other places. Even such an unbiased leader as Mr.
Yakub Hassan, presiding over a meeting called to present an
address to me at Madras, openly enjoined upon Musalmans the
duty of converting all the untouchables in India to Islam."

But Mr. Gandhi said nothing by way of remonstrance either
to the Muslims or to the Christians.

In his issue of July 1926 the Swami writes : —

"There was another prominent fact to which I drew the atten-
tion of Mahatma Gandhi. Both of us went together one night
to the Khilafat Conference at Nagpur. The Ayats (verses) of
the Quoran recited by the Maulanas on that occasion, contained
frequent references to Jihad and against, killing of the Kaffirs.
But when I drew his attention to this phase of the Khilafat
movement, Mahatmaji smiled and said, 'They are alluding to
the British Bureaucracy.' In reply I said that it was all subver-
sive of the idea of non-violence and when the reversion of feeling
came the Mahomedan Maulanas would not refrain from using
these verses against the Hindus."

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The Swami's third instance relates to the Mopla riots.
Writing in the Liberator of 26th August 1926 the Swami says : —

"The first warning was sounded when the question of con-
demning the Moplas for their atrocities on Hindus came up in
the Subjects Committee. The original resolution condemned the
Moplas wholesale for the killing of Hindus and burning of Hindu
homes and the forcible conversion to Islam. The Hindu members
themselves proposed amendments till it was reduced to condemn-
ing only certain individuals who had been guilty of the above
crimes. But some of the Moslem leaders could not bear this
even. Maulana Fakir and other Maulanas, of course, opposed the
resolution and there was no wonder. But I was surprised, an
out-and-out Nationalist like Maulana Hasrat Mohanr opposed
the resolution on the ground that the Mopla country no longer
remained Dar-ul-Aman but became Dar-ul-Harab and as they
suspected the Hindus of collusion with the British enemies of the
Moplas. Therefore, the Moplas were right in presenting the
Quoran or sword to the Hindus. And if the Hindus became
Mussalmans to save themselves from death, it was a voluntary
change of faith and not forcible conversion — Well, even the
harmless resolution condemning some of the Moplas was not
unanimously passed but had to be accepted by a majority of
votes only. There were other indications also, showing that the
Mussalmans considered the Congress to be existing on their suffer-
ance and if there was the least attempt to ignore their idiosyn-
crasies the superficial unity would be scrapped asunder."

The last one refers to the burning of the foreign cloth started
by Mr. Gandhi. Writing in the Liberator of 13th August 1926
the Swamiji says : —

"While people came to the conclusion, that the burning of
foreign cloth was a religious duty of Indians and Messrs. Das,
Nehru and other topmost leaders made bon-fire of cloth worth
thousands, the Khilafat Musalmans got permission from Mahat-
inaji to send all foreign cloth for the use of the Turkish brethren.
This again was a great shock to me. While Mahatmaji stood
adamant and did not have the least regard for Hindu feelings
when a question of principle was involved, for the Moslem derelic-
tion of duty, there was always a soft corner in his heart."

In the history of his efforts to bring about Hindu-Moslem
unity mention must be made of two incidents. One is the Fast,
which Mr. Gandhi underwent in the year 1924. It was a fast of
21 days. Before undertaking the fast Mr. Gandhi explained the
reasons for it in a statement from which the following extracts
are taken : —

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Hindu Alternative to Pakistan

"The fact that Hindus and Musalmans, who were only two
years ago apparently working together as friends, are now fight-
ing like cats and dogs in some places, shows conclusively that
the non-cooperation they offered was not non-violent. I saw the
symptoms in Bombay, Chauri Chaura and in a host of minor
cases- I did penance then. It had its effects protanto. But this
Hindu-Muslim tension was unthinkable* It became unbearable
on hearing of the Kohat tragedy. On the eve of my departure
from Sabarmati for Delhi, Sarojini Devi wrote to me that speeches
and homilies on peace would not do. I must find out an effective
remedy. She was right in saddling the responsibility on me.
Had I not been instrumental in bringing into being the vast
energy of the people ? I must find the remedy if the energy
proved self-destructive.

* * *

" I was violently shaken by Amethi, Sambhal and Gulbarga. I
had read the reports about Amethi and Sambhal prepared by
Hindu and Musalman friends. I had learnt the joint finding
of Hindu and Musalman friends who went to Gulbarga. I was
writing in deep pain and yet I had no remedy. The news of
Kohat set the smouldering mass aflame. Something had got to
be done. I passed two nights in restlessness and pain. On Wed-
nesday I knew the remedy. I must do penance.

"it is a warning to the Hindus and Musalmans who have
professed to love me. If they have loved me truly and if I have
been deserving of their love, they will do penance with me for
the grave sin of denying God in their hearts.

"The penance of Hindus and Mussalmans is not fasting but
retracing their steps. It is true penance for a Mussalman to
harbour no ill-will for his Hindu brother and an equally true
penance for a Hindu to harbour none for his Mussalman brother.

" I did not consult friends — not even Hakim Saheb who was
closeted with me for a long time on Wednesday — not Maulana
Mahomed AH under whose roof I am enjoying the privilege of
hospitality.

"But was it right for me to go through the fast under a
Mussalman roof? (Gandhi wa$ at the time the guest of Mr.
Mahomed AH at Delhi). Yes, it was. The fast is not born out
of ill-will against a single soul. My being under a Mussalman
roof ensures it against any such interpretation. It is in the fitness
of things that this fast should be taken up and completed in a
Mussalman house.

"And who is Mahomed AH? Only two days before the fast
we had a discussion about a private matter in which I told him

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what was mine was his and what was his was mine. Let me
gratefully tell the public that I have never received warmer or
better treatment than under Mahomed Ali's roof. Every want
of mine is anticipated. The dominant thought of every one of
his household is to make me and mine happy and comfortable.
Doctors Aiisari and Abdur Rehman have constituted themselves
my medical advisers. They examine me daily. I have had
many a happy occasion in my life. This is no less happy than
the previous ones. Bread is not everything. I am experiencing
here the richest love. It is more than bread for me.

" It has been whispered that by going so much with Mussal-
man friends, I make myself unfit to know the Hindu mind.
\ The Hindu mind is myself. Surely I do not live amidst Hindus
to know the Hindu miud when every fibre of my being is Hindu.
My Hinduism must be a very poor thing if it cannot flourish
under influnces the most adverse. I know instinctively what is
necessary for Hinduism. But I must labour to discover the Mussal-
man mind. The closer I come to the best of Mussahnans, the
jnster I am likely to be in my estimate of the Mussalmans and
their doings. I am striving to become the best cement between
the two communities. My longing is to be able to cement the
two with my blood, if necessary. But, before I can do so, I must
prove to the Mussalmans that I love them as well as I love the
Hindus. My religion teaches me to love all equally. May God
help me to do so! My fast among other things is meant to
qualify me for achieving that equal and selfless love."

The fast produced Unity Conferences. But the Unity Con-
ferences produced nothing except pious resolutions which were
broken as soon as they were announced.

This short historical sketch of the part Mr. Gandhi played
in bringing about Hindu-Moslem unity may be concluded by
a reference to the attitude of Mr. Gandhi in the negotiations
about the Communal Settlement. He offered the Muslims a
blank cheque. The blank cheque only served to exasperate the
Muslims as they interpreted it as an act of evasion. He opposed
the separate electorates at the Round Table Conference. When
they were given to the Muslims by the Communal Award, Mr.
Gandhi and the Congress did not approve of them. But when
it came to voting upon it, they took the strange attitude of neither
approving it nor opposing it.

Such is the history of Mr. Gandhi's efforts to bring about
Hindu-Moslem unity, What fruits did these efforts bear? To

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Hindu Alternative to Pakistan

be able to answer this question it is necessary to examine tlie
relationship between the two communities during 1920-40, the
years during which Mr. Gandhi laboured so hard to bring about
Hindu-Moslem unity. The relationship is well described in the
Annual Reports on the affairs of India submitted year by year
to Parliament by the Government of India under the old Govern-
ment of India Act. It is on these reports * that I have drawn
for the facts recorded below.

Beginning with the year 1920 there occurred in that year in
Malabar what is known as the Mopla Rebellion. It was the
result of the agitation carried out by two Muslim organizations,
the Khuddam-i-Kaba (servants of the Mecca Shrine) and the
Central Khilafat Committee. Agitators actually preached the
doctrine that India under the British Government was Dar-ul-
Harab and that the Muslims must fight against it and if they
could not, they must carry out the alternative principle of Hijrat.
The Moplas were suddenly carried off their feet by this agitation.
The outbreak was essentially a rebellion against the British
Government. The aim was to establish the kingdom of Islam
by overthrowing the British Government. Knives, swords and
spears were secretly manufactured, bands of desperadoes collected
for an attack on British authority. On 20th August a severe
encounter took place between the Moplas and the British forces
at Pirunangdi. Roads were blocked, telegraph lines cut, and the
railway destroyed in a number of places. As soon as the
administration had been paralysed, the Moplas declared that
Swaraj had been established. A certain Ali Musaliar was pro-
claimed Raja, Khilafat flags were flown, and Ernad and Wal-
luranad were declared Khilafat Kingdoms. As a rebellion
against the British Government it was quite understandable.
But what baffled most was the treatment accorded by the Moplas
to the Hindus of Malabar. The Hindus were visited by a dire
fate at the hands of the Moplas. Massacres, forcible conversions,
desecration of temples, foul outrages upon women, such as ripping
open pregnant women, pillage, arson and destruction — in short,
all the accompaniments of brutal and unrestrained barbarism,
were perpetrated freely by the Moplas upon the Hindus until

• The series is wknown as " India in 1920 " & so on.

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such time as troops could be hurried to the task of restoring order
through a difficult and extensive tract of the country. This was
not a Hindu-Moslem riot. This was just a Bartholomew. The
number of Hindus who were killed, wounded or converted, is
not known. But the number must have been enormous.

In the year 1921-22 communal jealousies did not subside.
The Muharram Celebrations had been attended by serious riots
both in Bengal and in the Punjab. In the latter province in
particular, communal feeling at Multan reached very serious
heights, and although the casualty list was comparatively small,
a great deal of damage to property was done.

Though the year 1922-23 was a peaceful year the relations
between the two communities were strained throughout 1923-24.
But in no locality did this tension produce such tragic conse-
quences as in the city of Kohat. The immediate cause of the
trouble was the publication and circulation of a pamphlet con-
taining a virulently anti-Islamic poem. Terrible riots broke out
on the 9th and 10th of September 1924, the total casualties being
about 155 killed and wounded. House property to the estimated
value of Rs. 9 lakhs was destroyed, and a large quantity of goods
were looted. As a result of this reign of terror the whole Hindu
population evacuated the city of Kohat. After protracted nego-
tiations an agreement of reconciliation was concluded between
the two communities, Government giving an assurance that,
subject to certain reservations, the prosecution pending against
persons concerned in rioting should be dropped. With the
object of enabling the sufferers to restart their businesses and
rebuild their houses, Government sanctioned advances, free of
interest in certain instances, amounting to Rs. 5 lakhs. But even
after the settlement had been reached and evacuees had returned
to Kohat there was no peace and throughout 1924-25 the tension
between the Hindu and Musalman masses in various parts of the
country increased to a lamentable extent. In the summer months,
there was a distressing number of riots. In July, severe fighting
broke out between Hindus and Musalmans in Delhi, which was
accompanied by serious casualties. In the same month, there was
a bad outbreak at Nagpur. August was even worse. There were
riots at Lahore, at Lucknow, at Moradabad, at Bhagalpur and
Nagpur in British India ; while a severe affray took place at

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Hindu Alternative to Pakistan

Gulbarga in the Nizam's Dominions. September-October saw
severe fighting at Lucknow, Sh ah a j ah an pur, Kankinarah and at
Allahabad. The most terrible outbreak of the year being the
one that took place at Kohat which was accompanied by murder,
arson and loot.

In 1925-26 the antagonism between the Hindus and the
Muslims became widespread. Very significant features of the
Hindu-Muslim rioting, which took place during this year were
its wide distribution and its occurrence, in some cases, in small
villages. Calcutta, the United Provinces, the Central Provinces
and the Bombay Presidency were all scenes of riots, some of
which led to regrettable losses of life. Certain minor and local
Hindu festivals which occurred at the end of August, gave rise
to communal trouble in Calcutta, in Berar, in Gujarat in the
Bombay Presidency, and in the United Provinces. In some of
these places there were actual clashes between the two commu-
nities, but elsewhere, notably at Kankinarah — one of the most
thickly populated jute mill centres of Calcutta — serious rioting
was prevented by the activity of the police. In Gujarat, Hindu-
Muslim feeling was running high in these days and was marked
by at least one case of temple desecration. The important
Hindu festival of Ramlila, at the end of September, gave rise to
acute anxiety in many places, and at Aligarh, an important place
in the United Provinces, its celebration was marked by one of
the worst riots of the year. The riot assumed such dangerous
proportions that the police were compelled to fire in order to
restore order, and five persons were killed, either by the police
or by rioters. At Lucknow, the same festival gave rise at one
time to a threatening situation, but the local authorities prevented
actual rioting. October saw another serious riot at Sholapur in
the Bombay Presidency. There, the local Hindus were taking a
car with Hindu idols through the city, and when they came near
a mosque, a dispute arose between them and certain Muslims,
which developed into a-riot.

A deplorable rioting started in Calcutta in the beginning of
April as an affray outside a mosque between Muslims and some
Arya Samajists and continued to spread until 5th April, though
there was only one occasion on which the police or military

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were faced by a crowd which showed determined resistance,
namely, on the evening of the 5th April, when fire had to be
opened. There was also a great deal of incendiarism and in the
first three days of this incendiarism, the Fire Brigade had to deal
with 110 fires. An unprecedented feature of the riots was the
attacks on temples by Muslims and on mosques by Hindus which
naturally led to intense bitterness. There were 44 deaths and
584 persons were injured. There was a certain amount of loot-
ing and business was suspended, with great economic loss to
Calcutta. Shops began to reopen soon after the 5th, but the
period of tension was prolonged by the approach of a Hindu
festival on the 13th of April, and of the Id on the 14th. The
Sikhs were to have taken out a procession on the 13th, but
Government were unable to give them the necessary license.
The apprehensions with regard to the 13th and 14th of April,
fortunately, did not materialise and outward peace prevailed
until the 22nd April when it was abruptly broken as a result of
a petty quarrel in a street, which restarted the rioting. Fighting
between the mobs of the two communities, generally on a small
scale, accompanied by isolated assaults and murders continued
for six days. During this period there were no attacks on the
temples or mosques and there was little arson or looting. But
there were more numerous occasions, on which the hostile mobs
did not immediately disperse on the appearance of the police
and on 12 occasions it was necessary to open fire. The total
number of casualties during this second phase of the rioting was
66 deaths and 391 injured. The dislocation of business was
much more serious during the first riots and the closing of
Marwari business houses was not without an effect on European
business firms. Panic caused many of the markets to be wholly
or partially closed and for two days the meat supply was practi-
cally stopped. So great was the panic that the removal of
refuse in the disturbed area was stopped. Arrangements were,
however, made to protect supplies, and the difficulty with the
Municipal scavengers was overcome, as soon as the Municipality
had applied to the police for protection. There was slight
extension of the area of rioting, but po disturbances occurred in
the mill area around Calcutta. Systematic raiding of the por-
tions of the disturbed area, the arrest of hooligans, the seizure

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Hindu Alternative to Pakistan

of weapons and the re-inforcement of the police by the posting
of British soldiers to act as special police officers had the
desired effect, and the last three days of April, in spite of the
continuance of isolated assaults and murders, witnessed a steady
improvement in the situation. Isolated murders were largely
attributable to hooligans of both communities and their persist-
ence during the first as well as the second outbreak induced a
general belief that these hooligans were hired assassins. Another
equally persistent feature of the riots, namely, the distribution of
inflammatory printed leaflets by both sides, together with the
employment of hired roughs, strengthened the belief that money
had been spent to keep the riots going.

The year 1926-27 was one continuous period of communal
riots. Since April 1926, every month witnessed affrays more or
less serious between partizans of the two communities and only
two months passed without actual rioting in the legal sense of
the word. The examination of the circumstances of these
numerous riots and affrays shows that they originated either in
utterly petty and trivial disputes between individuals, as, for
example, between a Hindu shopkeeper and a Mahomedan
customer, or else, the immediate cause of trouble was the cele-
bration of some religious festival or the playing of music "by
Hindu processionists in the neighbourhood of Mahomedan
places of worship. One or two of the riots, indeed, were due to
nothing more than strained nerves and general excitement. Of
these, the most striking example occurred in Delhi on 24th June,
when the bolting of a pony in a crowded street gave the impres-
sion that a riot had started, upon which both sides immediately
attacked each other with brickbats and staves.

Including the two outbursts of rioting in Calcutta during
April and May 1926, 40 riots took place during the twelve
months ending with April 1st 1927, resulting in the death of
197 and in injuries, more or less severe, to 1,598 persons.
These disorders were wide-spread, but Bengal, the Punjab, and
the United Provinces were the parts of India most seriously
affected. Bengal suffered most from rioting, but on many occa-
sions during the year, tension between Hindus and Maho-
medans was high in the Bombay Presidency and also in Sind.

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Calcutta remained uneasy throughout the whole of the sum-
mer. On 1st June a petty dispute developed into a riot
in which forty persons were hurt. After this, there was
a lull in overt violence until July 15th on which day fell an
important Hindu religious festival. During its celebration the
passage of a procession, with bands playing in the neighbourhood
of certain mosques, resulted in a conflict, in which 14 persons were
killed and 116 injured. The next day saw the beginning of the
important Mahomedan festival of Muharram. Rioting broke
out on that day and, after a lull, was renewed on the 19th, 20th,
21st and 22nd. Isolated assaults and cases of stabbing occurred
on the 23rd, 24th and 25th. The total ascertained casualties
during this period of rioting were 28 deaths and 226 injured.
There were further riots in Calcutta on the 15th September and
16th October and on the latter day there was also rioting in the
adjoining city of Howrah, during which one or two persons
were killed and over 30 injured. The April and May riots had
been greatly aggravated by incendiarism, but, happily, this
feature was almost entirely absent from the later disorders and
during the July riots, for example, the Fire Brigade was called
upon to deal with only four incendiary fires.

Coming to the year 1927-28 the following facts stare us in
the face. Between the beginning of April and the end of Sep-
tember 1927, no fewer than 25 riots were reported. Of these 10
occurred in the United Provinces, six in the Bombay Presidency,
2 each in the Punjab, the Central Provinces, Bengal, and Bihar
and Orissa, and one in Delhi. The majority of these riots
occurred during the celebration of a religious festival by one or
other of the two communities, whilst some arose out of the
playing of music by Hindus in the neighbourhood of mosques
or out of the slaughter of cows by the Muslims. The total
casualties resulting from the above disorders were approximately
103 persons killed and 1,084 wounded.

By far the most serious riot reported during the year was
that which took place in Lahore between the 4th and 7th of
May 1927. Tension between the two communities had been
acute for some time before the outbreak, and the trouble when
it came was precipitated by a chance collision between a Maho*

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Hindu Alternative to Pakistan

medan and two Sikhs. The disorder spread with lightning
speed and the heavy casualty list — 27 killed 272 injured —
was Ikrgely swollen by unorganised attacks on individuals.
Police and troops were rushed to the scene of rioting quickly
and it was impossible for clashes on a big scale to take place
between hostile groups. Casual assassinations and assaults were
however, reported, for two or three days longer before the streets
and lanes of Lahore became safe for the solitary passerby.

After the Lahore riot in May, there was a lull for two months
in inter-communal rioting, if we except a minor incident, which
happened about the middle of June in Bihar and Orissa; but
July witnessed no fewer than eight riots of which the most
serious occurred in Multan in the Punjab, on the occasion of the
annual Muharram celebrations. Thirteen killed and twenty-
four wounded was the toll taken by this riot. But August was
to see worse rioting still. In that month, nine riots occurred,
two of them resulting in heavy loss of life. In a riot in Bettiah,
a town in Bihar and Orissa, arising out of a dispute over a
religious procession, eleven persons were killed and over a
hundred injured, whilst the passage of a procession in front of
a mosque in Bareilly in the United Provinces was the occasion of
rioting in which fourteen persons were killed and 165 were
injured. Fortunately, this proved to be the turning point in
inter-communal trouble during the year, and September wit-
nessed only 4 riots. One of these, however, the riot in Nagpur
in the Central Provinces on September 4th, was second only to
the Lahore riot in seriousness and in the damage which it
caused. The spark, which started the fire, was the trouble an
connection with a Muslim procession, but the materials for the
combustion had been collected for some time. Nineteen
persons were killed and 123 injured were admitted to hospitals
as a result of this riot, during the course of which many members
of the Muslim community abandoned their homes in Nagpur.

A feature of Hindu-Muslim relations during the year
which was hardly less serious than the riots was the number of
murderous outrages committed by members of one community
against persons belonging to the other. Some of the most

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serious of these outrages were perpetrated in connection with the
agitation relating to Rangila Rasul and Risala Vartman^ two
publications containing most scurrilous attack on the Prophet
Muhammed and as a result of them, a number of innocent
persons lost their lives, sometimes in circumstances of great
barbarity. In Lahore a series of outrages against individuals led
to a state of great excitement and insecurity during the summer
of 1927.

The excitement over the Rangila Rasul* case had by now
travelled far from its original centre and by July had begun to
produce unpleasant repercussions on and across the North- West
Frontier. The first signs of trouble in this region became
apparent early in June, and by the latter part of July the excite-
ment had reached its height. On the British side of the border,
firm and tactful handling of the situation by the local authorities
averted, what would have been a serious breach of the peace.
Economic boycott of Hindus was freely advocated in the British
Frontier Districts, especially in Peshawar, but this movement met
with little success, and although the Hindus were maltreated in
one or two villages, the arrest of the culprits, together with appro-
priate action under the Criminal Law, quickly restored order.
Across the border however, the indignation, aroused by these
attacks on the Prophet, gave rise to more serious consequences. The
Frontier tribesmen are acutely sensitive to the appeal of religion
and when a well-known Mullah started to preach against the
Hindus among the Afridis and Shinwaris in the neighbourhood
of the Khyber Pass, his words fell on fruitful ground. He called
upon the Afridis and Shinwaris to expel all the Hindus living in
their midst unless they declared in writing that they dissociated
themselves from the doings of their co-religionists down country.
The first to expel their Hindu neighbours were two clans of the
Khyber Afridis, namely the Kuikhel and Zakkakhel, on the
22nd of July. From these, the excitement spread among their
Shinwari neighbours, who gave their Hindu neighbours notice
to quit a few days later. However, after the departure of
some of the Hindus, the Shinwaris agreed to allow the remainder

* Rangila Rasul was written in reply to Sitaka Chinala — a pamphlet written by a
Muslim alleging that Sita, wife of Rama, the hero of Ramayana, was a prostitute.

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Hindu Alternative to Pakistan

to stay on. Some of the Hindus on leaving the Khyber were
roughly handled. In two cases, stones were thrown, though
happily without any damage resulting. In a third case, a
Hindu was wounded and a large amount of property carried
off, but this was recovered by Afridi Khassadars in full, and the
culprits were fined for the offence. Thereafter, arrangements
were made for the picketing of the road for the passage of any
Hindus evacuating tribal territory. Under pressure from the
Political Agent an Afridi jirga decided towards the end of July
to suspend the Hindu boycott pending a decision in the Risala
Vartman case. In the following week, however, several Hindu
families, who had been living at Landi Kotal at the head of
the Khyber Pass moved to Peshawar refusing to accept the
assurances of the tribal chiefs but leaving one person from each
family behind to watch over their interests. All told, between
four hundred and four hundred and fifty Hindus, men, women
and children, had come into Peshawar by the middle of August,
when the trouble was definitely on the wane. Some of the
Hindus were definitely expelled, some were induced to leave
their homes by threats, some left from fear, some no doubt from
sympathy with their neighbours. This expulsion and voluntary
exodus from tribal territory were without parallel. Hindus
had lived there for more generations than most of them could
record as valued and respected, and, indeed, as essential members
of the tribal system, for whose protection the tribesmen had
been jealous, and whose blood feuds they commonly made their
own. In all, about 450 Hindus left the Khyber during the
excitement ; of these, about 330 had returned to their homes in
tribal territory by the close of the year 1927. Most of the
remainder had decided to settle, at any rate for the present,
aniid the more secure conditions of British India.

The year 1928-29 was comparatively more peaceful than the
year 1927-28. His Excellency Lord Irwin, by his speeches to
the Central Legislature and outside, had given a strong impetus
to the attempts to find some basis for agreement between the
two communities, on those questions of political importance,
which were responsible for the strained relations between them.
Fortunately the issues arising out of the inquiry by the Simon
Commission which was appointed in 1929, absorbed a large part of

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the energy and attention of the different communities, with the
result that less importance came to be attached to local causes of
conflict, and more importance to the broad question of constitu-
tional policy. Moreover, the legislation passed during the autumn
session of the Indian Legislature in 1927 penalising the instiga-
tion of inter-communal hostility by the press, had some effect in
improving the inter-communal position. But the year was not
altogether free from communal disturbances. The number of
riots during the twelve months ending with March 31st, 1929,
was 22. Though the number of riots was comparative^ small,
the casualties, — swelled heavily b}- the Bombay riots, — were very
serious, no fewer than 204 persons having been killed and nearly
a thousand injured. Of these, the fortnight's rioting in Bombay
accounts for 149 killed and 739 injured. Seven of these 22 riots,
or roughly one-third of them, occurred on the day of the cele-
bration of the annual Muslim festival of Bakr-i-Id at the end of
May. The celebration of this festival is always a dsfcgerous time
in Hindu-Muslim relations. The Muslims regard it as a day
of animal sacrifice, and as the animal chosen is almost always
a cow the slightest tension between the two communities is apt
to produce an explosion. Of the Bakr-i-Id riots only two were
serious and both of them took place in the Punjab. The first
took place in a village in the Ambrila District in which ten people
were killed and nine injured. The other riot which took place
in Softa village in the Gurgaon District in the Southern Punjab,
attained considerable notoriety because of its sensational features.
The village of Softa is about 27 miles south of Delhi
and is inhabited by Muslims. This village is surrounded
by villages occupied by Hindu cultivators \vho> on hearing that
the Muslims of Softa intended to sacrifice a cow on the 'Id Day ',
objected to the sacrifice of the particular cow selected on the
ground that it had been accustomed to graze in fields belonging
to the Hindu cultivators. The dispute over the matter assumed
a threatening aspect and the Superintendent of Police of the
district accordingly went with a small force of police, about 25
men in all, to try to keep peace. He took charge of the disputed
cow and locked it up, but his presence did not deter the Hindu
cultivators of a few neighbouring villages from collecting about
a thousand people armed with pitchforks, spears and staves, and

162

Hindu Alternative to Pakistan

going to Softa. The Superintendent of Police and an Indian
Revenue official, who were present in the village, assured the
crowd that the cow, in connection with which the dispute had
arisen would not be sacrificed, but this did not satisfy the mob
which threatened to burn the whole village if any cow was
sacrificed, and also demanded that the cow should be handed
over to them. The Superintendent of Police refused to agree to
this demand, whereupon the crowd became violent and began to
throw stones at the police and to try to get round the latter into
the village. The Superintendent of Police warned the crowd to
disperse, but to no effect. He, therefore, fired one shot from
his revolver as a further warniug. Notwithstanding the crowd
still continued to advance and the Superintendent had to order
his party of police to fire. Only one volley was fired at first,
but as this did not cause the retreat of the mob, two more volleys
had to be fired before the crowd slowly dispersed, driving off
some cattle belonging to the village.

While the police were engaged in this affair a few Hindu
cultivators got into Softa at another place and tried to set fire
to the village. These were, however, driven away by the police
after they had inflicted injuries on three or four men. In all
14 persons were killed and 33 were injured. The Punjab
Government deputed a judicial officer to enquire into this affair.
His report, which was published on 6th July, justified the
action of the police in firing on the mob and recorded the
opinion that there was no reason to suppose that the firing was
excessive or was continued after the mob had desisted from its
unlawful aggression. Had the police not opened fire, the report
proceeds, their own lives would have been in immediate danger,
as also the lives of the people of Softa. Lastly, in the opinion
of the officer writing the report, had Softa village been sacked,
there would certainly have broken up, within 24 hours, a terrible
communal conflagration in the \\hole of the surrounding
country-side.

The riots of Kharagpur, *an important railway centre not
far from Calcutta, also resulted in serious loss of life. Two riots
took place at Kharagpur, the first on the occasion of the Muhar-
ram celebration at the end of June and the second on the 1st

163

Pakistan

September 1928, when the killing of a cow served as a cause.
In the first riot 15 were killed and 21 injured, while in the second
riot, the casualties were 9 killed and 35 wounded. But none of
these riots is to be compared with those that raged in Bombay
from the beginning to the middle of February, when, as we have
seen, 149 persons were killed and well over 700 injured.

During the year 1929-30 communal riots, which had been
so conspicuous and deplorable a feature of public life during the
preceding years, were very much less frequent. Only 12 were
of sufficient importance to be reported to Government of India,
and of these only the disturbances in the City of Bombay were
really serious. Starting on the 23rd of April they continued
sporadically until the middle of May, and were responsible for
35 deaths and about 200 other casualties. An event which caused
considerable tension in April was the murder at Lahore of
Rajpal, whose pamphlet Rangila Rasul, containing a scurril-
ous attack on the Prophet of Islam, was responsible for much
of the communal trouble in previous years, and also for a variety
of legal and political complications. Fortunately, both com-
munities showed commendable restraint at the time of the
murder, and again on the occasion of the execution and funeral
of the convicted man; and although feelings ran high no serious
trouble occurred.

The year 1930-31 saw the eruption of the Civil Disobedience
Movement. It gave rise to riots and disturbances all over the
country. They were mostly of a political character and the
parties involved in them were the police and the Congress
volunteers. But, as it always happens in India, the political
disturbances took a communal twist. This was due to the fact
that the Muslims refused to submit to the coercive methods
used by Congress volunteers to compel them to join in Civil
Disobedience. The result was that although the year began
with political riots it ended in numerous and quite serious com-
munal riots. The worst of these communal riots took place in
and around Sukkur in Sind between the 4th and llth of August
and affected over a hundred villages. The outbreak in the
Kishoreganj sub-division of Mymensingh District (Bengal) on
the 12th/15th of July was also on a large scale. In addition,

164

Hindu Alternative to Pakistan

there were communal disturbances on the 3rd of August in
Ballia (United Provinces) ; on the 6th of September in Nagpur,
and on the 6th/7th September is Bombay; and a Hindu-
Christian riot broke out near Tiruchendur (Madras) on the
31st of October. On the 12th of February, in Amritsar, an
attempt was made to murder a Hindu cloth merchant who had
defied the picketers, and a similar outrage which was perpetrat-
ed the day before in Benares had very serious consequences. On
this occasion, the victim was a Muslim trader, and the attack
proved fatal ; as a result, since Hindu-Muslim relations through-
out most of Northern India were by this time very strained, a
serious communal riot broke out and continued for five days,
causing great destruction of property and numerous casualties.
Among the other communal clashes during this period were the
riots at Nilphamari (Bengal) on the 25th of January and at
Rawalpindi on the 31st. Throughout Northern India com-
munal relations had markedly deteriorated during the first two
months of 1931, and already, in February, there had been serious
communal rioting in Benares. This state of affairs was due
chiefly to the increasing exasperation created among Muslims
by the paralysis of trade and the general atmosphere of unrest
and confusion that resulted from Congress activities. The
increased importance which the Congress seemed to be acquiring
as a result of the negotiations with the Government aroused in
the Muslims serious apprehensions and had the effect of
worsening the tension between the two communities. During
March, this tension, in the United Provinces at any rate, became
greatly increased. Between the 14th and 16th there was serious
rioting in the Mirzapur District, and on the 17th, trouble broke
out in Agra and continued till the 20th. There was also a com-
munal riot in Dhanbad (Bengal) on the 28th, and in Amritsar
District on the 30th ; and in many other parts of the country,
the relations between members of the two communities had
become extremely strained.

In Assam, the communal riot which occurred at Digboi
in Lakhimpur District, resulted in the deaths of one
Hindu and three Muslims. In Bengal, a communal riot took
place in the Asansol division during the Muharram festival.
In Bihar and Orissa there was a certain amount of communal

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Pakistan

tension during the year, particularly in Saran. Altogether there
were 16 cases of communal rioting and unlawful assembly.
During the Bakr-i-Id festival a clash occurred in the Bhabua
sub-division of Shahabad. Some 300 Hindus collected in the
mistaken belief that a cow had been sacrificed. The local officers
had succeeded in pacifying them when a mob of about 200
Muhammadans armed with lathis, spears and swords, attacked
the Hindus, one of whom subsequently died. The prompt action
of the police and the appointment of a conciliation committee
prevented the spread of the trouble. The Muharram festival
was marked by two small riots in Moughyr, the Hindus being
the aggressors on one occasion and the Muslims on the other.
In the Madras Presidency there were also several riots of
a communal nature during the year and the relations between
the communities were in places distinctly strained. The most
serious disturbance of the year occurred at Vellore on the 8th of
June, as a result of the passage of a Muslim procession
with Tazias near a Hindu temple ; so violent was the conflict
between members of the two communities that the police were
compelled to open fire in order to restore order ; and sporadic
fighting continued in the town during the next two or three
days. In Salem town, owing to Hindu-Muslim tension a dispute
arose on the 13th of July, as to who had been the victor at a
largely attended Hindu-Muslim wrestling match at Shevapet.
Another riot occurred in October at Kitchipalaiyam near Salem
town ; the trouble arose from a few Muslims disturbing
a street game played by some young Hindus. Hindu-Muslim
dis turbances also arose in Polikal village, Kurnool District, on the
15th of March, owing to a dispute about the route of a Hindu
procession, but the rioters were easily dispersed by a small force
of police. In the Punjab there were 907 cases of rioting during
the year as compared with 813 in 1929. Many of them were of
a communal character, and the tension between the two princi-
pal communities remained acute iu many parts of the Province.
In the United Provinces, although communal tension during
1930 was not nearly so acute as during the first 3 mouths of 1931,
and was for a while overshadowed by the excitement engendered
by the Civil Disobedience Movement, indications of it were fairly
numerous, and the causes of disagreement remained as potent

166

Hindu Alternative to Pakistan

as ever. In Dehra Dun and Bulandshahr there were communal
riots of the usual type, and a very serious riot occurred in Ballia
city as a result of a dispute concerning the route taken by a
Hindu procession, which necessitated firing by the police. Riots
also occurred in Muttra, Azamgarh, Mainpuri and several
other places.

Passing on to the events of the year 1931-32, the progress of
constitutional discussions at the R.T.C. had a definite reaction in
that it bred a certain nervousness among the Muslim and other
minority communities as to their position under a constitution
functioning on the majority principle. The first session of the
Round Table Conference afforded the first " close-up" of the
constitutional future. Until then the ideal of Dominion Status
had progressed little beyond a vague and general conception, but
the declaration of the Princes at the opening of the Conference
had brought responsibility at the Centre, in the form of a federal
government, within definite view. The Muslims, therefore, felt
that it was high time for them to take stock of their position.
This uneasiness was intensified by the Invin-Gandhi settlement,
which accorded what appeared to be a privileged position to the
Congress, and Congress elation and pose of victory over the
Government did not tend to ease Muslim misgivings. Within
three weeks of the upact" occurred the savage communal riots
at Cawnpore, which significantly enough began with the
attempts of Congress adherents to force Mahomedan shopkeepers
to observe a hartal in memory of Bhagat Singh who was
executed on 23rd March. On the 24th March began the plunder
of Hindu shops. On the 25th there was a blaze. Shops and
temples were set fire to and burnt to cinders. Disorder, arson,
loot, murder, spread like wild fire. Five hundred families
abandoned their houses and took shelter in villages. Dr. Ram-
chandra was one of the worst sufferers. All members of his
family, including his wife and aged parents, were killed and
their bodies thrown into gutters. In the same slaughter Mr.
Ganesh Shanker Vidyarthi lost his life. The Cawnpore Riots
Inquiry Committee in its report states that the riot was of
unprecedented violence and peculiar atrocity, which spread with
unexpected rapidity through the whole city and even beyond it.
Murders, arson and looting were wide-spread for three days,

167

Pakistan

before the rioting was definitely brought under control. After-
wards it subsided gradually. The loss of life and property was
great. The number of verified deaths was 300, but the death
roll is known to have been larger and was probably between
four and five hundred. A large number of temples and
mosques were desecrated or burnt or destroyed and a very large
number of houses were burnt and pillaged.

This communal riot, which need never have occurred but for
the provocative conduct of the adherents of the Congress, was the
worst which India has experienced for many 3^ears. The trouble,
moreover, spread from the city to the neighbouring villages,
where there were sporadic communal disturbances for several
days afterwards.

The year 1932-33 was relatively free from communal agita-
tions and disturbances. This welcome improvement was
doubtless in some measure due to the suppression of lawlessness
generally and the removal of uncertainty in regard to the position
of the Muslims under the new constitution.

But in 1933-34 throughout the country communal tension
had been increasing and disorders which occurred not only on
the occasion of such festivals as Holi, Id and Muharram, but
also many resulting from ordinary incidents of every-day life
indicated, that there had been a deterioration in communal
relations since the year began. Communal riots during Holi
occurred at Benares and Cawnpore in the United Provinces, at
Lahore in the Punjab, and at Peshawar. Bakr-i-Id was marked
by serious rioting at Ajodhya, in the United Provinces over cow
sacrifice, also at Bhagalpore in Bihar and Orissa and at Canna-
nore in Madras. A serious riot in the Ghazipur District of the
United Provinces also resulted in several deaths. During April
and May there were Hindu-Muslim riots at several places in
Bihar and Orissa, in Bengal, in Sind and Delhi, some of them
provoked by very trifling incidents, as for instance, the uninten-
tional spitting by a Muslim shopkeeper of Delhi upon a Hindu
passer-by. The increase in communal disputes in British India
was also reflected in some of the States where similar incidents
occurred.

168

Hindu Alternative to Pakistan

The position with regard to communal unrest during the
months from June to October was indicative of the normal,
deep-seated antagonism between the two major communities.
June and July months, in which no Hindu or Muhammadan
festival of importance took place, were comparatively free from
riots, though the situation in certain areas of Bihar necessitated
the quartering of additional police. A long-drawn-out dispute
started in Agra. The Muslims of this city objected to the noise
of religious ceremonies in certain Hindu private houses which
they said disturbed worshippers at prayers in a neighbouring
mosque. Before the dispute was settled, riots occurred on the
20th July and again on the 2nd September, in the course of which
4 persons were killed and over 80 injured. In Madras a riot, on
the 3rd September resulting in one death and injuries to 13
persons, was occasioned by a book published by Hindus contain-
ing alleged reflections on the Prophet. During the same month
minoi riots occurred in several places in the Punjab and the
United Provinces.

In 1934-35 serious trouble arose in Lahore on the 29th June
as a result of a dispute between Muslims and Sikhs about a
mosque situated within the precincts of a Sikh temple known
as the Shahidganj Gurudwara. Trouble had been brewing for
some time. Ill-feeling became intensified when the Sikhs
started to demolish the niosque despite Muslim protests. The
building had been in possession of the Sikhs for 170 years and
has been the subject of prolonged litigation, which has confirmed
the Sikh right of possession.

On the night of the 29th June a crowd of 3 or 4 thousand
Muslims assembled in front of the Gurudwara. A struggle
between this crowd and the Sikhs inside the Gurudwara was
only averted by the prompt action of the local authorities. They
subsequently obtained an undertaking from the Sikhs to refrain
from further demolition. But during the following week, while
strenuous efforts were being made to persuade the leaders to
reach an amicable settlement, the Sikhs under pressure of
extremist influence again set about demolishing the mosque.
This placed the authorities in a most difficult position.
The Sikhs were acting within their legal rights. Moreover the

169

Pakistan

only effective method of stopping demolition would have been
to resort to firing. As the building was full of Sikhs and was
within the precincts of a Sikh place of worship, this would not
only have caused much bloodshed but, for religious reasons,
would have had serious reactions on the Sikh population
throughout the Province. On the other hand, inaction by
Government was bound to cause great indignation among the
Muslims, for religious reasons : and it was expected that this
would show itself in sporadic attacks on the Sikhs and perhaps
on the forces of Government.

It was hoped that discussions between leaders of the two
communities would effect some rapprochement, but mischief-
makers inflamed the minds of their co-religionists. Despite the
arrest of the chief offenders, the excitement increased. The
Government's gesture in offering to restore to the Muslims
another mosque which they had purchased years ago proved
unavailing. The situation took a further turn for the worse
on the 19th July aud during the following two days the situation
was acutely dangerous. The Central Police station was practi-
cally besieged by huge crowds, which assumed a most menacing
attitude. Repeated attempts to disperse them without the use
of firearms failed aucl the troops had to fire twice on the 20th
July and eight times on the 21st. In all 23 rounds were fired
and 12 persons killed. Casualties, mostly of a minor nature,
were numerous amongst the military and police.

As a result of the firing, the crowds dispersed and did not
re-assemble. Extra police were brought in from other Provinces
and the military garrisons were strengthened. Administrative
control was re-established rapidly, but the religious leaders
continued to fan the embers of the agitation. Civil litigation
was renewed and certain Muslim organisations framed some
extravagant demands.

The situation in Lahore continued to cause anxiety up to
the close of the year. On the 6th November, a Sikh was mortally
wounded by a Muslim. Three days later a huge Sikh-Hindu
procession was taken out. The organisers appeared anxious to
avoid conflict but nonetheless one serious clash occurred. This
was followed by further rioting on the next day. But for the

470

Hindu Alternative to Pakistan

good work of the police and the troops, in breaking up the
fights quickly, the casualties might have been very large.

On the 19th March 1935 a serious incident occurred in
Karachi after the execution of Abdul Quayum, the Muslim who
had murdered Nathuramal, a Hindu, already referred to as the
writer of a scurrilous pamphlet about the Prophet. Abdul
Quayum's body was taken by the District Magistrate, accom-
panied by a police party, to be handed over to the deceased's
family for burial outside the city. A huge crowd, estimated
to be about 25,000 strong, collected at the place of burial.
Though the relatives of Abdul Quayum wished to complete the
burial at the cemetery, the most violent members of the mob
determined to take the body in procession through the city.
The local authorities decided to prevent the mob entering, since
this would have led to communal rioting. All attempts of the
police to stop the procession failed, so a platoon of the Royal
Sussex Regiment was brought in to keep peace. It was forced
to open fire at short range to stop the advance of the frenzied
mob and to preveut itself from being overwhelmed. Forty-
seven rounds were fired by which 47 people were killed and 134
injured. The arrival of reinforcements prevented further
attempts to advance. The wounded were taken to the Civil
Hospital and the body of Abdul Quayum was then interred
without further trouble.

On the 25th August 1935 there was a communal riot at
Secunderabad.

In the year 1936 there were four communal riots. On the
14th April there occurred a most terrible riot at Firozabad in
the Agra District. A Muslim procession was proceeding
along the main bazar and it is alleged that bricks were thrown
from the roofs of Hindu houses. This enraged the Muslims
in the procession who set fire to the house of a Hindu, Dr.
Jivaram, and the adjacent temple of Radha Krishna. The in-
mates of Dr. Jivaram's house in addition to 11 Hindus including
3 children were burnt to death. A second Hindu-Muslim riot
broke out in Poona in the Bombay Presidency on 24th April
1936. On the 27th April there occurred a Hindu-Muslim riot
in Jamalpur in the Monghyr District. The fourth Hindu-

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Pakistan

Muslim riot of the year took place in Bombay on the 15th
October 1936.

The year 1937 was full of communal disturbances. On the
27th March 1937 there was a Hindu-Muslim riot at Panipat
over the Holi procession and 14 persons were killed. On the
1st May 1937 there occurred a communal riot in Madras in which
50 persons were injured. The month of May was full of com-
munal riots which took place mostly in the C. P. and the Punjab.
One that took place in Shikarpur in Sind caused great panic.
On 18th June there was a Sikh-Muslim riot in Amritsar. It
assumed such proportions that British troops had to be called
out to maintain order.

The year 1938 was marked by two communal riots — one in
Allahabad on 26th March and another in Bombay in April.

There were 6 Hindu-Muslim riots in 1939. On the 21st
January there was a riot at Asansol in which one was killed and
18 injured. It was followed by a riot in Cawnpore on the llth
February in which 42 were killed, 200 injured and 800 arrested.
On the 4th March there was a riot at Benares followed by a riot
at Cassipore near Calcutta on the 5th of March. On 19th June
there was again a riot at Cawnpore over the Rathajatra
procession.

A serious riot occurred on 20th November 1939 in Sukkur
in Sind. The riot was the culmination of the agitation by the
Muslims to take possession, even by force, of a building called
Manzilgah which was in the possession of Government as
Government property and to the transfer of which the Hindus
had raised objections. Mr. E. Weston — now a judge of the
Bombay High Court — who was appointed to investigate into the
disturbances gives* the following figures of the murdered and
the wounded : —

* Report of the Court of Inquiry appointed under Section 3 of the Sind Public
Inquiries Act to inquire into the riots which occurred at Sukkur in 1939, p. 65.
The total of 142 Hindus under ' murdered ' seems to be a mistake. It ought to
be 72.

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Hindu Alternative to Pakistan

Taluka.

Murders
committed.

Persons
injured.

Persons subse-
quently died from
injuries.

Hindus.

Mdns.

Hindus.

Mdns.

Hindus.

Mdns.

Sukkur Town

...

Sukkur Taluka

Shikarpur Taluka

••

Garhi Yasin Taluka

...

Rohri Taluka

Pano Akil Taluka

...

Ghorki Taluka . . 1 . . ! 1

...

Mirpur Mathelo Taluka . . . . . . 1

...

Ubauro Taluka

...

! 142 14 i 58 12 | 9

i i 1

Of the many gruesome incidents recorded by him the follow-
ing may be quoted : —

"The most terrible of all the disturbances occurred on the
night of the 20th at Gosarji village which is eigfct miles from
Sukkur and sixteen from Shikarpur. According to an early
statement sent by the District Magistrate to Government, admit-
tedly incomplete, 27 Hindus were murdered there that night.
According to the witnesses examined the number was 37.

"Paniaurnal a contractor of Gosarji states that at the time
of satyagraha the leading Hindus of Gosarji came in deputation
to the leading zemindar of the locality Khan Sahib Amirbux
who was then at Sukkur. He reassured them and said he was
responsible for their safety. On the 20th Khan Sahib Amirbux
was at Gosarji, and that morning Mukhi Mahrumal was murder-
ed there. The Hindus went to Khan Sahib Amirbux for
protection and were again reassured, but that night wholesale
murder and looting took place. Of the 37 murdered, seven were
women. Pamanmal states that the following morning he went
to the Sub-Inspector of Bagerji, which is one mile from Gosarji,
but he was abused and driven from the thana. He then went to
Shikarpur and complained to the panchayet, but did not com-

. 173

Pakistan

plain to any officer there. I may mention that the Sub-Inspector
of Bagerji was afterwards prosecuted under section 211, Indian
Penal Code, and has been convicted for failure to make arrests
in connection with murders at Gosarji.

"As Khan Sahib Amirbux, the zemindar, who was said to
have given assurance of protection to the Hindus of Bagerji, was
reported to be attending the Court, he was called and examined
as a Court witness. He states that he lives half a mile from
Gosarji village. The Sub-Inspector of Bagerji came to Gosarji on
the 20th after the murder of Mehrumal, and he acted as a
mashir. He says that the Hindus did not ask for help and there
was no apprehension of trouble. On the night of the 20th he
was not well, and he heard nothing of the murders. He admits
that he had heard of the Mair/ilgah evacuation. Later in his
evidence he admits that he told the villagers of Gosarji to be on
the alert as there was trouble in Sukkur, and he says he had
called the panchaj^et on the evening of the 19th. He went to
Gosarji at sunrise on the 21st after the murders. He admits that
he is regarded as the protector of Gosarji."

Mr. Weston adds* : —

" I find it impossible to believe the evidence of this witness.
I have no doubt that he was fully aware that there was trouble
in Gosarji on the night of 20th and preferred to remain in his
house."

Who can deny that this record of rioting presents a picture
which is grim in its results and sombre in its tone? But being
chronological in order, the record might fail to give an idea of
the havoc these riots have caused in any given Province and the
paralysis it has brought about in its social and economic life.
To give an idea of the paralysis caused by the recurrence of riots
in a Province I have recast the record of riots for the Province of
Bombay. When recast the general picture appears as follows :

.Leaving aside the Presidenc3j> and confining oneself to the
City of Bombay, there can be no doubt that the record of the
city is the blackest. The first Hindu-Muslim riot took place in
1893. This was followed b}' a long period of communal peace
which lasted upto 1929. But the years that have followed have
an appalling story to tell. From February 1929 to April 1938 — a
period of nine years — there were no less than 10 communal riots.
In 1929 there were two communal riots. In the first, 149 were

• Ibid., pp. 66-67.

174

Hindu Alternative to Pakistan

killed and 739 were injured and it lasted for 36 days. In the
second riot 35 were killed, 109 were injured and it continued
for 22 days. In 1930 there were two riots. Details as to loss of
life and its duration are not available. In 1932 there ware again
two riots. The first was a small one. In the second 217 were killed,
2,713 were injured and it went on for 49 days. In 1933 there
was one riot, details about which are not available. In 1936
there was one riot in which 94 were killed, 632 were injured and
it continued to rage for 65 days. In the riot of 1937, 11 were
killed, 85 were injured and it occupied 21 days. The riot of
1938 lasted for 2\ hours only but within that time 12 were
killed and a little over 100 were injured. Taking the total
period of 9 years and 2 months from February 1929 to April
1938 the Hindus and Muslims of the City of Bombay alone were
engaged in a sanguinary warfare for 210 days during which
period 550 were killed and 4,500 were wounded. This does not
of course take into consideration the loss of property which took
place through arson and loot.

Such is the record of Hindu-Muslim relationship from 1920
to 1940. Placed side by side with the frantic efforts made by
Mr. Gandhi to bring about Hindu-Muslim unity, the record
makes most painful and heart-rending reading. It would not
be much exaggeration to say that it is a record of twenty years
of civil war between the Hindus and the Muslims in India,
interrupted by brief intervals of armed peace.

In this civil war men were, of course, the principal victims.
But women did not altogether escape molestation. It is perhaps
not sufficiently known how much women have suffered in
communal hostilities. • Data relating to the whole of India are
not available. But some data relating to Bengal exist.

On the 6th September 1932 questions were asked in the old
Bengal Legislative Council regarding the abduction of women
in the Province of Bengal. In reply, the Government of the
day stated that between 1922 to 1927, the total number of women
abducted was 568. Of these, 101 were unmarried and 467 were
married. Asked to state the community to which the abducted

175

Pakistan

women belonged, it was disclosed that out of 101 unmarried
women 64 were Hindus, 29 Muslims, 4 Christians and 4 non-
descript: and that out of 467 married women 331 were Hindus,
122 Muslims, 2 Christians and 12 non-descript. These figures
relate to cases which were reported or if reported were not
detected. Usually, about 10 p.c. of the cases are reported or
detected and 90 p.c. go undetected. Applying this proportion
to the facts disclosed by the Bengal Government, it may be said
that about 35,000 women were abducted in Bengal during the
short period of five years between 1922-27.

The attitude towards women-folk is a good index of the
friendly or unfriendly attitude between the two communities.
As such, the case which happened on 27th June 1936 in the
village of Govindpur in Bengal makes very instructive reading.
The following account of it is taken from the opening speech*
of the Crown counsel when the trial of 40 Mahomedan accused
began on the 10th August 1936. According to the prosecu-
tion : —

"There lived in Govindpur a Hindu by name Radha Vallabh.
He had a sou Harendra. There lived also in Govindpur a
Muslim woman whose occupation was to sell milk. The local
Musalmans of the village suspected that Harendra had illicit
relationship with this Muslim milk woman. They resented that
a Muslim woman should be in the keeping of a Hindu and they
decided to wreak their vengeance on the family of Radha
Vallabh for this insult. A meeting of the Musalmans of Govind-
pur was convened and Harendra was summoned to attend this
meeting. Soon after Harendra went to the meeting, cries of
Harendra were heard. It was found that Harendra was assault-
ed and was lying senseless in the field where the meeting was
held. The Musalmans of Govindpur were not satisfied with this
assault. They informed Radha Vallabh that unless he, his wife
and his children embraced Islam the Mitsalmans did not feel
satisfied for the wrong his son had done to them. Radha Vallabh
was planning to send away to another place his wife and children.
The Musalmans came to know of this plan. Next day when
Ktisuni, the wife of Radha Vallabh, was sweeping the courtyard
of her house, some Mahomedans came, held down Radha
Vallabh and some spirited away Kusum. After having taken
her to some distance two Mahomedans by name Laker and

•This is an English version of the report which appeared in the Savadhan,
a Marathi weekly of Nagpur, in its issue of 25th August 1936.

Hindu Alternative to Pakistan

Mahazar raped her and removed her ornaments. After some
time, she came to her senses and ran towards her home. Her
assailants again pursued her. She succeeded in reaching her
home and locking herself in. Her Muslim assailants broke
open the door, caught hold ^of her and again carried
her away on the road. It was suggested by her assailants
that she should be again raped on the street. But with the help
of another woman by name Rajani, Kusum escaped and took
shelter in the house of Rajani. While she was in the house of
Rajaiii the Musalmans of Govindpur paraded her husband Radha
Vallabh in the streets in complete disgrace. Next day the
Musalmans kept watch on the roads to and from Govindpur to
the Police station to prevent Radha Vallabh and Kusum from
giving information of the outrage to the Police."

These acts of barbarism against women, committed without
remorse, without shame and without condemnation by their
fellow brethren show the depth of the antagonism which divided
the two communities. The tempers on each side were the
tempers of two warring nations. There was carnage, pillage,
sacrilege and outrage of every species, perpetrated by Hindus,
against Musalmans and by Musalmans against Hindus — more
perhaps by Musalmans against Hindus than by Hindus against
Musalmans. Cases of arson have occurred in which Musalmans
have set fire to the houses of Hindus, in which whole families
of Hindus, men, women and children were roasted alive and
consumed in the fire, to the great satisfaction of the Muslim
spectators. What is astonishing is that these cold and deliberate
acts of rank cruelty were not regarded as atrocities to be con-
demned but were treated as legitimate acts of warfare for which
no apology was necessary. Enraged by these hostilities, the
editor of the Hindustan — a Congress paper — writing in 1926
used the following language to express the painful truth of the
utter failure of Mr. Gandhi's efforts to bring about Hindu-
Muslim unity. In words of utter despair the editor said*: —

"There is an immense distance between the India of to-day
and India a nation, between an uncouth reality which expresses
itself in murder and arson and that fond fiction which is in the
imagination of patriotic if self-deceiving men. To talk about
Hindu-Muslim unity from a thousand platforms or to give it
blazoning headlines is to perpetrate an illusion whose cloudy
structure dissolves itself at the exchange of brick-bats and the

* Quoted in " Through Indian Eyes" columns of the Times of India dated 16-8-26.
M 177

Pakistan

desecration of tombs and temples. To sing a few pious hymns

of peace and goodwill a la Naidu will not benefit the

country. The President of the Congress has been improvising on
the theme of Hindu-Muslim unity, so dear to her heart, with
brilliant variations, which does credit to her genius but leaves the
problem untouched. The millions in India can only respond
when the unity song is not only on the tongues of the leaders
but in the hearts of the millions of their countrymen."

Nothing I could say can so well show the futility of any
hope of Hindu-Muslim unity. Hindu-Muslim unity up to now
was at least in sight although it was like a mirage. Today it is
out of sight and also out of mind. Even Mr. Gandhi has given
up what, he perhaps now realizes, is an impossible task.

But there are others who notwithstanding the history of the
past twenty years, believe in the possibility of Hindu-Muslim
unity. This belief of theirs seems to rest on two grounds.
Firstly, they believe in the efficacy of a Central Government to
mould diverse set of people into one nation. Secondly, they feel
that the satisfaction of Muslim demands will be a sure means of
achieving Hindu-Muslim unity.

It is true that Government is a unifying force and that there
are many instances where diverse people have become unified
into one homogeneous people by reason of their being subjected
to a single Government. But the Hindus, who are depending
upon Government as a unifying force seem to forget that there
are obvious limits to Government acting as a unifying force.
The limits to Government working as a unifying force are set
by the possibilities of fusion among the people. In a country
where race, language and religion do not stand in the way of
fusion, Government is most effective as a unifying force. On the
other hand, in a country where race, language and religion put
an effective bar against fusion, Government can have no effect
as a unifying force. If the diverse people in France, England,
Italy and Germany became unified nations by reason of a com-
mon Government, it was because neither race, language nor
religion obstructed the unifying process of Government. On the
other hand, if the people in Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia
and Turkey failed to be unified, although under a common
Government, it was because race, language and religion were

178

Hindu Alternative to Pakistan

strong enough to counter and nullify the unifying power of
Government. No one can deny that race, language and religion
have been too dominant in India to permit the people of India
to be welded into a nation by the unifying force of a common
Government, It is an illusion to say that the Central Govern-
ment in India has moulded the Indian people into a nation.
What the Central Government has done, is to tie them together
by one law and to house them together in one place, as the
owner of unruly animals does, by tying them with one rope
and keeping them in one stable. All that the Central Govern-
ment has done is to produce a kind of peace among Indians. It
has not made them one nation.

It cannot be said that time has been too short for unification
to take place. If one hundred and fifty years of life under a
Central Government does not suffice, eternity will not suffice.
For this failure the genius of the Indians alone is responsible.
There is among Indians no passion for unity, no desire for fusion.
There is no desire to have a common dress. There is no desire to
have a common language. There is no will to give up what is
local and particular for something which is common and national.
A Gujarati takes pride in being a Gujarati, a Maharashtrian in
being a Maharashtrian, a Punjabi in being a Punjabi, a Madrasi in
being a Madrasi and a Bengali in being a Bengali. Such is the
mentality of Hindus, who accuse the Musalman of want of
national feeling when he says UI am a Musalman first and
Indian afterwards." Can any one suggest that there exists any-
where in India even among the Hindus an instinct or a passion
that would put any semblance of emotion behind their declara-
tion "Civis Indianus sum", or the smallest consciousness of a
moral and social unity, which desires to give expression by
sacrificing whatever is particular and local in favour of what is
common and unifying ? There is no such consciousness and
no such desire. Without such consciousness and without such
desire, to depend upon Government to bring about unification is
to deceive oneself.

Regarding the second, it was no doubt the opinion of the
Simon Commission : —

" That the communal riots were a manifestation of the
anxieties and ambitions aroused in both the communities by the

179

Pakistan

prospect of India's political future. So long as authority was
firmly established in British hands and self-government was not
thought of, Hindu-Muslim rivalry was confined within a narrow-
er field. This was not merely because the presence of a neutral
bureaucracy discouraged strife. A further reason was that there
was little for members of one community to fear from the predo-
minance of the other. The comparative absence of communal
strife in the Indian States today may be similarly explained.
Many, who are well acquainted with conditions in British India
a generation ago, would testify that at that epoch so much good
feeling had been engendered between the two sides that communal
tension as a threat to civil peace was at a minimum. But the
coming of the Reforms and the anticipation of what may follow
them have given new point to Hindu-Muslim competition. The
one community naturally lays claim to the rights of a majority
and relies upon its qualifications of better education and greater
wealth; the other is all the more determined on those accounts
to secure effective protection for its members, and does not forget
that it represents the previous conquerors of the country. It
wishes to be assured of adequate representation and of a full
share of official posts. "

Assuming that to be a true diagnosis, assuming that Muslim
demands are reasonable, assuming that the Hindus were prepar-
ed to grant them — and these are all very big assumptions — it is
a question whether a true union between Hindus and Muslims
can take place through political unity, resulting from the satis-
faction of Muslim political demands. Some people seem to
think that it is enough if there is a political unity between
Hindus and Muslims. I think this is the greatest delusion.
Those who take this view seem to be thinking only of how to
bring the Muslims to join the Hindus in their demands on the
British for Dominion Status or Independence as the mood of
the moment be. This, to say the least, is a very shortsighted
view. How to make the Muslims join the Hindus in the latter's
demands on the British is comparatively a very small question.
In what spirit will they work the constitution ? Will they work
it only as aliens bound by an unwanted tie or will they work
it as true kindreds, is the more important question. For work-
ing it as true kindreds, what is wanted is not merely political
unity but a true union of heart and soul, in other words, social
unity. Political unity is worth nothing, if it is not the expres-
sion of real union. It is as precarious as the unity between
persons, who without being friends become allies of each other.

180

Hindii Alternative to Pakistan

How very precarious it always is, is best illustrated by what has
happened between Germany and Russia. Personally, I do not
think that a permanent union can be made to depend upon the
satisfaction of mere material interests. Pacts may produce unity.
But that unity can never ripen into union. A pact as a basis
for a union is worse than useless. As its very nature indicates,
a pact is separative in character. A pact cannot produce the
desire to accommodate, it cannot instil the spirit of sacrifice,
nor can it bind the parties to the main objective. Instead of
accommodating each other, parties to a pact strive to get, as
much as possible, out of each other. Instead of sacrificing for
the common cause, parties to the pact are constantly occupied
in seeing that the sacrifice made by one is not used for the good
of the other. Instead of fighting for the main objective, parties
to the pact are for ever engaged in seeing that in the struggle
for reaching the goal the balance of power between the parties
is not disturbed. Renan spoke the most profound truth when
he said : —

" Community of interests is assuredly a powerful bond between
men. But nevertheless can interests suffice to make a nation? I
do not believe it. Community of interests makes commercial
treaties. There is a sentimental side to nationality ; it is at once
body and soul ; a Zollverein is not a fatherland."

Equally striking is the view of James Bryce, another well-
known student of history. According to Bryce,

"The permanence of an institution depends not merely on the
material interests that support it, but on its conformity to the deep-
rooted sentiment of the men for whom it has been made. When
it draws to itself and provides a fitting expression for that senti-
ment, the sentiment becomes thereby not only more vocal but
actually stronger, and in its turn imparts a fuller vitality to the
institution."

These observations of Bryce were made in connection with
the foundation of the German Empire by Bismarck who, accord-
ing to Bryce, succeeded in creating a durable empire because
it was based on a sentiment and that this sentiment was
fostered —

" . . . . most of all by what we call the instinct or passion for
nationality, the desire of a people already conscious of a moral
and social unity, to see such unity expressed and realized under

181

Pakistan

a single government, which shall give it a place and name
among civilized states."

What is it that produces this moral and social unity which
gives permanence and what is it that drives people to see such
unity expressed and realized under a single government, which
shall give it a place and a name among civilized states?

No one is more competent to answer this question than
James Bryce. It was just such a question he had to consider
in discussing the vitality of the Holy Roman Empire as contrast-
ed with the Roman Empire. If any Empire can be said to
have succeeded in bringing about political unity among its
diverse subjects it was the Roman Empire. Paraphrasing for
the sake of brevity the language of Bryce : — The gradual exten-
sion of Roman citizenship through the founding of colonies, first
throughout Italy and then in the provinces, the working of
the equalized and equalizing Roman Law, the even pressure of
the government on all subjects, the movements of population,
caused by commerce and the slave traffic, were steadily assimilat-
ing the various peoples. Emperors, who were for the most
part natives of the provinces, cared little to cherish Italy or even
after the days of the Antonines, to conciliate Rome. It was their
policy to keep open for every subject a career by whose freedom
they had themselves risen to greatness. Annihilating distinctions
of legal status among freemen, it completed the work, which
trade and literature and toleration to all beliefs but one were
already performing. No quarrel of race or religions disturbed
that calm, for all national distinctions were becoming merged
in the idea of a common Empire.

This unity produced by the Roman Empire was only a
political unity. How long did this political unity last? In
the words of Bryce : —

"Scarcely had these slowly working influences brought about
this unity, when other influences began to threaten it. New
foes assailed the frontiers ; while the loosening of the structure
within was shewn by the long struggles for power which follow-
ed the death or deposition of each successive emperor. In the
period of anarchy after the fall of Valerian, generals were raised
by their armies in every part of the Empire, and ruled great
provinces as nionarchs apart, owning no allegiance to the posses-
sor of the capital. The breaking-up of the western half of the

182

Hindu Alternative to Pakistan

Empire into separate kingdoms might have been anticipated by
two hundred years, had the barbarian tribes on the borders been
bolder, or had there not arisen in Diocletian a prince active and
skilful enough to bind up the fragments before they had lost
all cohesion, meeting altered conditions by new remedies. The
policy he adopted of dividing and localizing authority recognized
the fact that the weakened heart could no longer make its
pulsations felt to the body's extremities. He parcelled out the
supreme power among four monarchs, ruling as joint emperors
in four capitals, and then sought to give it a factitious strength
by surrounding it with an oriental pomp which his earlier prede-
cessors would have scorned The prerogative of Rome

was menaced by the rivalry of Nicomedia, and the nearer great-
ness of Milan."

It is, therefore, evident that political unity was not enough
to give permanence and stability to the Roman Empire and as
Bryce points out that " the breaking-up of the western half (of
the Roman Empire) into separate kingdoms might have been
anticipated by two hundred years, had the barbarian tribes on
the border been bolder, or had there not arisen in Diocletian a
prince, active and skilful enough to bind np the fragments
before they had lost all cohesion, meeting altered conditions by
new remedies." But the fact is that the Roman Empire which
was tottering and breaking into bits and whose political unity
was not enough to bind it together did last for several hundred
years as one cohesive unit after it became the Holy Roman
Empire. As Prof. Marvin points out* : —

"The unity of the Romati Pyinpire was mainly political and
military. It lasted for between four and five hundred years.
The unity which supervened in the Catholic Church was religious
and moral and endured for a thousand years."

The question is what made the Holy Roman Empire more
stable than the Roman Empire could ever hope to be ? Accord-
ing to Bryce it was a common religion in the shape of Christian-
ity and a common religious organization in the shape of the
Christian Church which supplied the cement to the Holy
Roman Empire and which was wanting in the Roman Empire.
It was this cement which gave to the people of the Empire a
moral and social unity and made them see such unity express-
ed and realized under a single government.

• The Unity of Western Civilization (4th Ed.), p. 27.

183

Pakistan

Speaking of the unifying effect of Christianity as a common
religion Bryce says : —

" It is on religion that the inmost and deepest life of a
nation rests. Because Divinity was divided, humanity had been
divided, likewise ; the doctrine of the unity of God now
enforced the unity of man, who had been created in His image.
The first lesson of Christianity was love, a love that was to join
in one body those whom suspicion and prejudice and pride of
race had hitherto kept apart. There was thus formed by the
new religion a community of the faithful, a Holy Empire,
designed to gather all men into its bosom, and standing opposed
to the manifold polytheisms of the older world, exactly as the
universal sway of the Caesars was contrasted with the innumer-
able kingdoms and city republics that had gone before it " ~!:

If what Bryce has said regarding the instability of the Roman
Empire and the comparatively greater stability of its successor,
the Holy Roman Empire, has any lesson for India and if the
reasoning of Bryce that the Roman Empire was unstable
because it had nothing more than political unity to rely on, and
tl\at the Holy Roman Empire was more stable, because it rested
on the secure foundation of moral and social unity, produced by
the possession of a common faith, is valid reasoning and embodies
human experience, then it is obvious that there can be no
possibility of a union between Hindus and Muslims. The
cementing force of a common religion is wanting. From a
spiritual point of view, Hindus and Musalmans are not merely
two classes or two sects such as Protestants and Catholics or
Shaivas and Vaishnavas. They are two distinct species. In this
view, neither the Hindu nor the Muslim can be expected to
recognize that humanity is an essential quality present in them
both, and that they are not many but one and that the differences

* The Christian Church did not play a passive part in the process of unification
of the Holy Roman Empire. It took a very active part in bringing it about. " See-
ing one institution after another falling to pieces around her, seeing how countries
and cities were being severed from each other by the eruption of strange tribes and
the increasing difficulty of communication the Christian Church," says Bryce, " strove
to save religious fellowship by strengthening the ecclesiastical organization, by drawing
tighter every bond of outward union. Necessities of faith were still more powerful.
Truth, it was said, is one, and as it must bind into one body all who hold it, so it
is only by continuing in that body that they can preserve it. There is one Flock
and one Shepherd."

184

Hindu Alternative to Pakistan

between them are no more than accidents. For them Divinity
is divided and with the division of Divinity their humanity is
divided and with the division of hninanity they must remain
divided. There is nothing to bring them in one bosom.

Without social union, political unity is difficult to be
achieved. If achieved, it would be as precarious as a summer
sapling, liable to be uprooted by the gust of a hostile wind. With
mere political unity, India may be a State. But to be a State
is not to be a nation and a State, which is not a nation, has small
prospects of survival in the struggle for existence. This is
especially true where nationalism — the most dynamic force of
modern times — is seeking everywhere to free itself by the des-
truction and disruption of all mixed states. The danger to
a mixed and composite state therefore, lies not so much in exter-
nal aggression as in the internal resurgence of nationalities which
are fragmented, entrapped, suppressed and held against their
will. Those who oppose Pakistan should not only bear this
danger in mind but should also realize that this attempt on the
part of suppressed nationalities to disrupt a mixed state and to
found a separate home for themselves, instead of being con-
demned, finds ethical justification from the principle of self-
determination.

185

CHAPTER VIII

MUSLIM ALTERNATIVE TO PAKISTAN

The Hindus say they have an alternative to Pakistan. Have
the Muslims also an alternative to Pakistan? The Hindus say
yes, the Muslims say no. The Hindus believe that the Muslim
proposal for Pakistan is only a bargaining manoeuvre put forth
with the object of making additions to the communal gains
already secured under the Communal Award. The Muslims
repudiate the suggestion. They say there is no equivalent to
Pakistan and, therefore, they will have Pakistan and nothing but
Pakistan. It does seem that the Musalmans are devoted to
Pakistan and are determined to have nothing else and that the
Hindus in hoping for an alternative are merely indulging in
wishful thinking. But assuming that the Hindus are shrewd
enough in divining what the Muslim game is, will the Hindus
be ready to welcome the Muslim alternative to Pakistan ? The
answer to the question must, of course, depend upon what the
Muslim alternative is.

What is the Muslim alternative to Pakistan? No one
knows. The Muslims, if they have any, have not disclosed it
and perhaps will not disclose it till the day when the rival parties
meet to revise and settle the terms on which the Hindus and the
Muslims are to associate with each other in the future. To be
forewarned is to be forearmed. It is, therefore, necessary for the
Hindus to have some idea of the possible Muslim alternative to
enable them to meet the shock of it ; for the alternative cannot
be better than the Communal Award and is sure to be many
degrees worse.

In the absence of the exact alternative proposal one can only
make a guess. Now one man's guess is as good as that of
another, and the party concerned has to choose on which of

187

Pakistan

these lie will rely. Among the likely guesses, my guess is that
the Muslims will put forth as their alternative some such propo-
sal as the following : —

" That the future constitution of India shall provide :

(i) That the Muslims shall have 50% representation in the
Legislature, Central as well as Provincial, through separate elec-
torates.

(ii) That 50% of the Executive in the Centre as well as in
the Provinces shall consist of Muslims.

(Hi) That in the Civil Service 50% of the posts shall be
assigned to the Muslims.

(iv) That in the Fighting Forces the Muslim proportion
shall be one half, both in the ranks and in the higher grades.

(v) That Muslims shall have 50% representation in all
public bodies, such as councils and commissions, created for
public purposes.

(vi) That Muslims shall have 50% representation in all
international organizations in which India will participate.

(vii) That if the Prime Minister be a Hindu, the Deputy
Prime Minister shall be a Muslim.

(viii) That if the Comroander-in-Chief be a Hindu, the
Deputy Commander-in-Chief shall be a Muslim.

(ix) That no changes in the Provincial boundaries shall
be made except with the consent of 66% of the Muslim members
of the Legislature-

(x) That no action or treaty against a Muslim country
shall be valid unless the consent of 66% of the Muslim members
of the Legislature is obtained.

(xi) That no law affecting the culture or religion or
religious usage of Muslims shall be made except with the con-
sent of 66% of the Muslim members of the Legislature.

(xii) That the national language for India shall be Urdu.

(xiii) That no law prohibiting or restricting the slaughter
of cows or the propagation of and conversion to Islam shall be
valid unless it is passed with the consent of 66% of the Muslim
members of the Legislature.

(xiv) That no change in the constitution shall be valid unless
the majority required for effecting such changes also includes a
66% majority of the Muslim members of the Legislature."

This guess of mine is not the result of imagination let loose.
It is not the result of a desire to frighten the Hindus into an
unwilling and hasty acceptance of Pakistan. If I may say so,

188

Muslim Alternative to Pakistan

it is really an intelligent anticipation based upon available data
coming from Muslim quarters.

An indication of what the Muslim alternative is likely to be,
is obtainable from the nature of the Constitutional Reforms
which are contemplated for the Dominions of His Exalted
Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad.

The Hyderabad scheme of Reforms is a novel scheme. It
rejects the scheme of communal representation obtaining in
British India. In its place is substituted what is called Func-
tional Representation,*.^, representation by classes and by profes-
sions. The composition of the Legislature which is to consist
of 70 members is to be as follows: —

Elected

Agriculture
Patidats 8

Tenants
Women
Graduates
University
Jagirdars
Maashdars
Legal
Medical
Western

Oriental 1 )

Teaching

Commerce

Industries

Banking

Indigenous 1

Cooperative and

Joint Stock ... 1
Organized Labour
Harijan

District Municipalities
City Municipality
Rural Boards

Total

1
1
1
1
1

Nominated

Illakas
vSarf-i-Khas

Paigahs

Peshkari

Salar Jung

Samasthans

Officials * ...

Rural Arts and Crafts
Backward Classes
Minor Unrepresented Classes.
Others ...

18
1
1
3
6

Total ... 37

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Pakistan

Whether the scheme of functional representation will pro-
mote better harmony between the various classes and sections
than communal representation does is more than doubtful. In
addition to perpetuating existing social and religious divisions,
it may quite easily intensify class struggle by emphasizing class
consciousness. The scheme appears innocuous but its real
character will come out when every class will demand representa-
tion in proportion to its numbers. Be that as it may, functional
representation is not the most significant feature of the Hydera-
bad scheme of Reforms. The most significant feature of the
scheme is the proposed division of seats between Hindus and
Musalmans in the new Hyderabad Legislature. Under the scheme
as approved by H. E. H. the Nizam, communal representation
is not altogether banished. It is retained along with functional
representation. It is to operate through joint electorates. But
there is to be equal representation for "the two majority com-
munities" on every* elective body including the legislature and
no candidate can succeed unless he secures 40 per cent, of the
votes polled by members of his community. This principle of
equal representation to Hindus and Muslims irrespective of their
numbersf is not only to apply to every elective body but it is to
apply to both elected as well as nominated members of the body.

In justification of this theory of equal representation it is
stated that :—

"The importance of the Muslim community in the state,
by virtue of its historical position and its status in the body
politic, is so obvious that it cannot be reduced to the status of a
minority in the Assembly."

Quite recently there have appeared in the press} the propo-
sals formulated by one Mr. Mir Akbar Ali Khan calling himself

* Besides the Central Legislature there are to be constituted under the scheme of
Reforms other popular bodies such as Panchayats, Rural Boards, Municipalities and
Town Committees.

fThe distribution of population of Hyderabad State (excluding Berar) is accord-
ing to the census of 1931 as follows : —

Hindus Untouchables Muslims Christians Others Total

96,99,615 24,73,230 15,34,666 1,51,382 5,77,255 1,44,36,148

J See Bombay Sentinel, June 22nd, 1940. Mr. Mir Akbar Ali Khan says that he
discussed his proposals with Mr. Srinivas lyengar, ex-President of the Congress, and the
proposals published by him are really proposals as approved by Mr. lyengar.

190

Muslim Alternative to Pakistan

the leader of the Nationalist Party as a means of settling the
Hindu-Muslim problem in British India. They are as follows : —

(1) The future constitution of India must rest upon the
broad foundation of adequate military defence of the country
and upon making the people reasonably military minded. The
Hindus must have the same military mindednes as the Muslims.

(2) The present moment offers a supreme opportunity for
the two communities to ask for the defence of India being
made over to them. The Indian Army must consist of an equal
number of Hindus and Muslims and no regiment should be on
a communal, as distinguished from regional basis.

(3) The Governments in the Provinces and at the Centre
should be wholly National Governments composed of men who
are reasonably military minded. Hindu and Muslim Ministers
should be equal in number in the Central as well as all Provincial
cabinets ; other important minorities might wherever necessary
be given special representation. This scheme will function most
satisfactorily with joint electorates, but in the present temper of
the country separate electorates might be continued. The Hindu
Ministers must be elected by the Hindu members of the legisla-
ture and the Muslim Ministers by the Muslim members.

(4) The Cabinet is to be removable only on an express vote
of no-confidence, against the Cabinet as a whole, passed by a
majority of 2/3rds of the whole house which majority must be of
Hindus and Muslims taken separately.

(5) The religion, language, script and personal law of each
community should be safeguarded by a paramount constitutional
check enabling the majority of members, representing that com-
munity in the legislature to place a veto on any legislative or
other measure affecting it. A similar veto must be provided
against any measure designed or calculated to affect adversely the
economic well-being of any community.

(6) An adequate communal representation in the services
must be agreed to as a practical measure of justice in administra-
tion and in the distribution patronage.

If the proposals put forth by a Muslim leader of the Nation-
alist Party in Hyderabad State is an indication of the direction
in which the mind of the Muslims in British India is running,
then, the guess I have made as to what is likely to be the alter-
native to Pakistan derives additional support.

191

Pakistan
II

It is true that in the month of April 1940 a Conference of
Muslims was held in Delhi under the grandiloquent name of
"The Azad Muslim Conference." The Muslims who met in
the Azad . Conference were those who were opposed to the
Muslim League as well as to the Nationalist Muslims. They
were opposed to the Muslim League firstly, because of their
hostility to Pakistan and secondly because they did not want to
depend upon the British Government for the protection of their
rights.* They were also opposed to the Natonalist Musalmans
(i. e. Congressites out and out) because they were accused of
indifference to the cultural and religious rights of the Muslims. t

With all this the Azad Muslim Conference was hailed by the
Hindus as a Conference of friends. But the resolutions passed
by the Conference leave very little to choose between it and the
League. Among the resolutions passed by the Azad Muslim
Conference the following three bear directly upon the issue in
question.

The first of these runs as follows : —

"This conference, representative of Indian Muslims who
desire to secure the fullest freedom of the country, consisting of
delegates and representatives of every province, after having given
its fullest and most careful consideration to all the vital questions
affecting the interest of the Muslim community and the country
as a whole declares the following: —

*' India will have geographical and political boundaries of an
individual whole and as such is the common homeland of all the
citizens irrespective of race or religion who are joint owners of
its resources- All nooks and corners of the country are hearths
and homes of Muslims who cherish the historic eminence of their
religion and culture which are dearer to them than their lives.

* Mufti Kifayat Ullah, a prominent member of the conference, in the course of his
speech is reported to have said: ** They had to demonstrate that they were not behind
any other community in the fight for freedom. He wished to declare in clear terms
that they did not rely on the British Government for the protection of their rights. They
would themselves chalk out the safeguards necessary for the protection of their religious
rights and would fight out any party, however powerful, that would refuse to accept
those safeguards, as they would fight the Government for freedom " (Prolonged cheers).
Hindustan Times, April 30, 1940.

t See the speeches of Maulana Hafizul Rehman and Dr. K. M. Ashraf in the same
issue of the Hindustan Times.

192

Muslim Alternative to Pakistan

From the national point of view every Muslim is an Indian.
The common rights of all residents of the country and their re-
sponsibilities, in every walk of life and in every sphere of human
activity are the same. The Indian Muslim by virtue of these rights and
responsibilities, is unquestionably an Indian national and in every
part of the country is entitled to equal privileges with that of
every Indian national in every sphere of governmental, economic
and other national activities and in public services. For that
very reason Muslims own equal responsibilities with other Indians
for striving and making sacrifices to achieve the country's inde-
pendence. This is a self-evident proposition, the truth of which
no right thinking Muslim will question. This Conference
declares unequivocally and with all emphasis at its command
that the goal of Indian Muslims is complete independence along
with protection of their religion and communal rights, and that
they are anxious to attain this goal as early as possible. Inspired
by this aim they have in the past made great sacrifices and are
ever ready to make greater sacrifices.

"The Conference unreservedly aiid strongly repudiates the
baseless charge levelled against Indian Muslims by the agents of
British Imperialism and others that they are an obstacle in the
path of Indian freedom and emphatically declares that the
Muslims are fully alive to their responsibilities and consider it
inconsistent with their traditions and derogatory to their honour
to lag behind others in the struggle for independence."

By this Resolution they repudiated the scheme of Pakistan.
Their second Resolution was in the following terms : —

"This is the considered view of this Conference that only that
constitution for the future Government of India would be accept-
able to the people of India which is framed by the Indians them-
selves elected by means of adult franchise. The constitution
should fully safeguard all the legitimate interests of the Muslims
in accordance with the recommendations of the Muslim members
of the Constituent Assembly. The representatives of other com-
munities or of an outside power would have no right to interfere
in the determination of these safeguards."

By this Resolution the Conference asserted that the safe-
guards for the Muslims must be determined by the Muslims
alone.

Their third Resolution was as under : —

"Whereas in the future constitution of India it would be
essential, in order to ensure stability of government and preser-
vation of security, that every citizen and community should feel
satisfied, this Conference considers it necessary that a scheme of

if 193

Pakistan

safeguards as regards vital matters mentioned below should be
prepared to the satisfaction of the Muslims.

" This Conference appoints a board consisting of 27 persons.
This board, after the fullest investigation, consultation and consi-
deration, shall make its recommendations for submission to the
next session of this Conference, so that the Conference may utilise
the recommendations as a means of securing a permanent national
settlement of the communal question. This recommendation
should be submitted within two months. The matters referred
to the board are the following: —

"l. The protection of Muslim culture, personal law and
religious rights.

" 2. Political rights of Muslims and their protection.

"3. The formation of future constitution of India to be non-
unitary and federal, with absolutely essential and unavoidable
powers for the Federal Government.

"4. The provision of safeguards for the economic, social and
cultural rights of Muslims and for their share in public services.

" The board will be empowered to fill up any vacancy in a
suitable manner. The board will have the right to co-opt other
members. It will be empowered also to consult other Muslim
bodies and if it considers necessary, any responsible organisation
in the country. The 27 members of the board will be nominated
by the president.

"The quorum for the meeting will be nine.

"Since the safeguards of the communal rights of different
communities will be determined in the constituent assembly
referred to in the resolution which this Conference has passed,
this Conference considers it necessary to declare that Muslim
members of this constituent assembly will be elected by Muslims
themselves."

We must await the report* of this board to know what
safeguards the Azad Muslim Conference will devise for the
safety and protection of Muslims. But there appears no reason
to hope that they will not be in favour of what I have guessed
to be the likely alternative for Pakistan. It cannot be over-
looked that the Azad Muslim Conference was a body of Muslims
who were not only opposed to the Muslim League but were
equally opposed to the Nationalist Muslims. There is, therefore,
no ground to trust that they will be more merciful to the Hindus
than the League has been or will be.

* This report has not appeared even now,

Muslim Alternative to Pakistan

Supposing my guess turns out to be correct, it would be
interesting to know what the Hindus will have to say in reply.
Should they prefer such an alternative to Pakistan ? Or should
they rather prefer Pakistan to such an alternative ? Those are
questions which I must leave the Hindus and their leaders to
answer. All I would like to say in this connection is that the
Hindus before determining their attitude towards this question
should note certain important considerations. In particular they
should note that there is a difference between Macht Politic* and
Gravamin Politic • f; that there is a difference between Communitas
Communitatum and a nation of nations; that there is a differ-
ence between safeguards to allay apprehensions of the weak and
contrivances to satisfy the ambition for power of the strong : that
there is a difference between providing safeguards and handing
over the country. Further, they should also note that what
may with safety be conceded to Gravamin Politic may not be
conceded to Macht Politic. What may be conceded with safety
to a community may not be conceded to a nation and what may
be conceded with safety to the weak to be used by it as a weapon
of defence may not be conceded to the strong who may use it
as a weapon of attack.

These are important considerations and, if the Hindus over-
look them, they will do so at their peril. For the Muslim
alternative is really a frightful and dangerous alternative.

* Macht Politic means Power Politics.

1 Gravamin Politic means in which the mam strategy is to gain power by
manufacturing grievances.

195

CHAPTER IX

LESSONS FROM ABROAD

Hindus who will not yield to the demand of the Muslims for
the division of India into Pakistan and Hindustan and would
insist upon maintaining the geographical unity of India without
counting the cost, will do well to study the fate that has befallen
other countries which, like India, harboured many nations and
sought to harmonise them.

It is not necessary to review the history of all such countries.
It is enough to recount here the story of two, Turkey and
Czechoslovakia.

To begin with Turkey. The emergence of the Turks in
history was due to the fact that they were driven away by the
Mongols from their home in Central Asia, somewhere between
1230-40 A. D., which led them to settle in north-west Anatolia.
Their career as the builders of the Turkish Empire began in
1326 with the conquest of Brusa. In 1360-61, they conquered
Thrace from the Aegean to the Black Sea; in 1361-62, the
Byzantine Government of Constantinople accepted their supre-
macy. In 1369 Bulgaria followed suit. In 1371-72 Macedonia
was conquered. In 1373 Constantinople definitely accepted
Ottoman sovereignty. In 1389 Servia was conquered, in 1430
Salonica, in 1453 Constantinople, in 1461 Trebizond, in 1465
Quraman, and in 1475 Kaffa and Tana were annexed.
After a short lull, they conquered Mosul in 1514,
Syria, Egypt, the Hiaz and the Yainan in 1516-17 and Belgrade
in 1521. This was followed in 1526 by victory over the
Hungarians at Mohacz. In 1554 took place the first conquest
of Baghdad and in 1639 the second conquest of Baghdad. Twice
they laid siege to Vienna, first in 1529 and again in 1683 with a
view to extend their conquest beyond. But on both occasions
they were repulsed with the result that their expansion in
Europe was completely checked forever. Still the countries

197

Pakistan

they conquered between 1326 and 1683 formed a vast empire.
A few of these territories the Turks had lost to their enemies
thereafter, but taking the extent of the Turkish Empire as it
stood in 1789 on the eve of the French Revolution, it comprised
(1) the Balkans, south of the Danube, (2) Asia Minor, the
Levant and the neighbouring islands (i.e., Cyprus), (3) Syria
and Palestine, (4) Egypt, and (5) North Africa from Egypt to
Morocco.

The tale of the disruption of the Turkish Empire is easily
told. The first to break away de facto, if not de jure, was Egypt
in 1769. The next were the Christians in the Balkans. Bes-
sarabia was taken by Russia in 1812 after a war with Turkey.
In 1812 Serbia rebelled with the aid of Russia and the Turks
were obliged to place Serbia under a separate government. In
1829 similar concessions were granted to two other Danubian
provinces, Moldavia and Wallachia. As a result of the Greek
war of independence which lasted between 1822-29, Greece was
completely freed from the Turkish rule and the Grefek independ-
ence was recognised by the Powers iu 1832. Between 1875-77
there was turmoil amongst the Balkans. There was a revolt in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bulgarians resorted to atrocities
against the Turks, to which the Turks replied with atrocities in
eqiftil measure. As a result, Serbia and Montenegro declared war
on Turkey and so did Russia. By the Treaty of Berlin, Bulgaria
was given self-government under Turkey and Eastern Rumania
wasvto be ruled by Turkey under a Christian Governor. Russia
gained Kars and Batoum. Dobrudja was given to Rumania.
Bosnia and Herzegovina were assigned to Austria for adminis-
tration and England occupied Cyprus. In 1881 Greece gained
Thessaly and France occupied Tunis. In 1885 Bulgaria and
Eastern Rumania were united into one state.

The story of the growth and decline of the Turkish Empire
upto 1906 has been very graphically described by Mr. Lane
Poole in the following words* : —

"In its old extent, when the Porte ruled not merely the
narrow territory now called Turkey in Europe, but Greece,
Bulgaria and Eastern Rumania, Rumania, Serbia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, with the Crimea and a portion of Southern Russia,

• Turkey, pp. 363-64.
198

Lessons from Abroad

Egypt, Syria, Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers and numerous islands in the
Mediterranean, not counting the vast but mainly desert tract of
Arabia, the total population (at the present time) would be over
fifty millions, or nearly twice that of Europe without Russia.
One by one her provinces have been taken away. Algiers and
Tunis have been incorporated with France, and thus 175,000
square miles and five millions of inhabitants have transferred
their allegiance. Egypt is practically independent, and this means
a loss of 500,000 miles and over six millions of inhabitants.
Asiatic Turkey alone has suffered comparatively little diminution.
This forms the bulk of her present dominions, and comprises
about 680,000 square miles, and over sixteen millions of popula-
tion. In Europe her losses have been almost as severe as in
Africa where Tripoli alone remains to her. Serbia and Bosnia
are administered by Austria and thereby nearly 40,000 miles and
three and a half millions of peoples have become Austrian sub-
jects. Wallachia and Moldavia are united in the independent
kingdom of Rumania, diminishing the extent of Turkey by
46,000 miles and over five millions of inhabitants. Bulgaria is
a dependent state over which the Porte has no real control and
Eastern Rumania has lately de facto become part of Bulgaria and
the two contain nearly 40,000 square miles, and three millions
of inhabitants. The kingdom of Greece with its 25,000 miles
and two million population has long been separated from its
parent. In Europe where the Turkish territory once extended
to 230,000 miles, with a population of nearly 20 millions, it
now reaches only the total of 66 thousand miles and a population
of four and a half millions, it has lost nearly three-fourths of its
laud, and about the same proportion of its people."

Such was the condition of Turkey in 1907. What has be-
fallen her since then is unfortunately the worst part of her story.
In 1908 taking advantage of the revolution brought about by
the Young Turks, Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Bulgaria declared her independence. In 1911 Italy took posses-
sion of Tripoli and in 1912 France occupied Morocco. Encour-
aged by the successful attack of Italy in 1912, Bulgaria, Greece,
Serbia and Montenegro formed themselves into a Balkan League
and declared war on Turkey. In this war, known as the first
Balkan War, Turkey was completely defeated. By the Treaty of
London (1913) the Turkish territory in Europe was reduced to
a narrow strip round Constantinople. But the treaty could not
take effect because the victors could not agree on the distribution
of the spoils of victory. In 1913 Bulgaria declared war on the
rest of the Balkan League and Rumania declared war on Bui-

199

Pakistan

garia in the hope of extending her territory. Turkey also did
the same. By the Treaty of Bukharest (1913), which ended the
second Balkan War, Turkey recovered Adrianople and got
Thrace from Bulgaria. Serbia obtained Northern Macedonia
and Greece obtained Southern Macedonia (including Salonika),
while Montenegro enlarged her territory at the expense of
Turkey. By 1914 when the Great European War came on, the
Balkans had won their independence from Turkey and the area
in Europe that remained under the Turkish Empire was indeed
arery small area round about Constantinople and her possessions
in Asia. So far as the African continent is concerned, the
Sultan's power over Egypt and the rest of North Africa was only
nominal; for the European Powers had established real control
therein. In the Great War of 1914 the overthrow of Turkey
was complete. All the provinces from the Mediterranean to
the Persian Gulf were overrun, and the great cities of Baghdad,
Jerusalem, Damascus and Alleppo were captured. In Europe
the allied troops occupied Constantinople. The Treaty of
Sevres, which brought the war with Turkey to a close, sought
to deprive her of all her outlying provinces and even of the
fertile plains of Asia Minor. Greek claim for territory was
generously allowed at the expense of Turkey in Macedonia,
Thrace and Asia Minor and Italy was to receive Adalia and a
large tract in the south. Turkey was to be deprived of all her
Arab provinces in Asia, Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Hedjaz and Nejd.
There was left to Turkey only the capital, Constantinople, and
separated from this city, by a " neutral zone of the straits," part
of the barren plateau of Anatolia. The treaty though accepted
by the Sultan was fiercely attacked by the Nationalist Party
under Keinal Pasha. When the Greeks advanced to occupy
their new territory, they were attacked and decisively beaten.
At the end of the war with Greece, which went on from 1920 to
1922, the Turks had reoccupied Smyrna. As the allies were not
prepared to send armies to help the Greeks, they were forced to
come to terms with the Nationalist Turks. At the conference
at Mudiania the Greeks agreed to revise the terms of the Treaty
of Sevres, which was done by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923
which granted the demands of Turkey except in Western
.Thrace. The rest of the Treaty of Sevres was accepted by the

200

Lessons from Abroad

Turks which meant the loss of her Arab provinces in Asia.
Before the War of 1914, Turkey had lost all her provinces in
Europe. After the War, she lost her provinces in Asia. As a
result of the dismemberment of the old Turkish Empire, what
now remains of it is the small state called the Republic of Turkey
with an area which is a minute fraction of the old Empire.*

Take the case of Czechoslovakia. It is the creation of the
Treaty of Trianon which followed the European War of 1914.
None of the peace treaties was more drastic in its terms than the
Treaty of Trianon. Says Prof. Macartney, uBy it Hungary
was not so much mutilated as dismembered. Even if we exclude
Croatia, Slavonia, which had stood only in a federal relationship
to the other lands of the Holy Crown — although one of eight
hundred years' standing — Hungary proper was reduced to less
than one-third (32.6 per cent.) of her prewar area, and a little
over two-fifths (41.6 per cent.) of her population. Territories
and peoples formerly Hungarian were distributed among no
less than seven states." Of these states, there was one which did
not exist before. It was a new creation. That was the state of
Czechoslovakia.

The area of the Republic of Czechoslovakia was 54,244
square miles and the population was about 13,613,172. It includ-
ed the territories formerly known as Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia
and Ruthenia. It was a composite state which included in its
bosom three principal nationalities, (i) Czechs occupying Bohe-
mia and Moravia, (ii) Slovaks, occupying Slovakia and (iii)
Ruthenians in occupation of Ruthenia.

Czechoslovakia proved to be a very short-lived state. It
lived exactly for two decades. On the 15th March 1939 it
perished or rather was destroyed as an independent state. It
became a protectorate of Germany. The circumstances attend-
ing its expiry were of a very bewildering nature. Her death was
brought about by the very Powers which had given it birth. By
signing the Munich Pact on 30th September 1938 — of which the
protectorate was an inevitable consequence, Great Britain,

* The area of Turkey is 294,492 square miles exclusive of 3,708 square miles of
lakes and swamps. The area of Turkey in Europe is only 9,257 square miles.

201

Pakistan

France and Italy assisted Germany, their former enemy of the
Great War, to conquer Czechoslovakia, their former ally. All
the work of the Czechs of the past century to gain freedom was
wiped off. They were once more to be the slaves of their former
German overlords.

Ill
What are the reasons for the disruption of Turkey?

Lord Eversley in his Turkish Empire* has attempted to give
reasons for the decay of Turkey, some internal, some external.
Among the internal causes there were two. First the degeneracy
of the Ottoman dynasty. The supreme power fell into the hands
either of the Vaziers of the Sultans or more often in the hands
of women of the harem of the Sultan. The harem was always
in antagonism to the official administration of the Porte, which
ostensibly carried on the administration of the state under the
direction of the Sultan. The officials of every degree from the
highest to the lowest were interested in the sale of all offices,
civil and military, to the highest bidders. For securing their
object, they found it expedient to bribe the inmates of the harem
and thereby wiu the assent of the Sultans. The harem thus
became the centre from which corruption spread throughout the
Turkish Empire and which was one of the main causes of its
decay. The second main cause of the decadence of the Turkish
Empire was the deterioration of its armies due to two causes.
During the last 300 years the army had lost the elan and the
daring by which the Ottomans won their many victories in the
early period of their career. The loss of this elan and daring
by the Turkish army was due to the composition of the army,
recruitment to which was restricted to Turks and Arabs, and
also to the diminution of opportunities of plunder and the hope
of acquiring lands for distribution among the soldiers as an
incentive to victory and valour in the latter period when the
Empire was on the defensive and when it was no longer a
question of making fresh conquests, but of retaining what had
already been won.

Among the external causes of the disruption of Turkey, the
chief one is said to be the rapacity of the European nations. But

* See abridgment by Sheikh Abdur Rashid.
202

Lessons from Abroad

this view omits to take note of the true cause. The true and the
principal cause of the disruption of Turkey was the growth of
the spirit of nationalism among its subject peoples. The Greek
revolt, the revolts of the Serbs, Bulgarians and other Balkans
against the Turkish authority were no doubt represented as a
conflict between Christianity and Islam. That is one way of
looking at it, but only a superficial way. These revolts were
simply the manifestations of the spirit of nationalism by which
they were generated. These revolts no doubt had for their im-
mediate causes Turkish misrule, Christian antipathy £o Islam
and the machinations of European nations. But this does not
explain the real force which motivated them. The real motive
force was the spirit of nationalism and their revolts were only
a manifestation of this inner urge brought on by it. That it was
nationalism which had brought about the disruption of Turkey
is proved by the revolt of the Arabs in the last war and their
will to be independent. Here there was no conflict between
Islam and Christianity, nor was the relationship between the two
that of the oppressor and the oppressed. Yet, the Arab
claimed to be freed from the Turkish Empire. Why? Because
he was moved by Arab nationalism and preferred to be an Arab
nationalist to being a Turkish subject.

What is the cause of the destruction of Czechoslovakia?

The general impression is that it was the result of German
aggression. To some extent that is true. But it is not the
whole truth. If Germany was the only enemy of Czechoslo-
vakia, all that she would have lost was the fringe of her borderland
which was inhabited by the Sudeten Germans. German aggres-
sion need have cost her nothing more. Really speaking the
destruction of Czechoslovakia was brought about by an enemy
within her own borders. That enemy was the intransigent
nationalism of the Slovaks who were out to break up the unity
of the state and secure the independence of Slovakia.

The union of the Slovaks with the Czechs, as units of a
single state, was based upon certain assumptions. First, the two
were believed to be so closely akin as to be one people, and that
the Slovaks were only a branch of Czechoslovaks. Second, the
two spoke a single 'Czechoslovak' language. Third, there was
no separate Slovak national consciousness. Nobody examined

203

Pakistan

these assumptions at the time, because the Slovaks themselves
desired this union, expressing their wish in 1918 by formal
declaration of their representatives at the Peace Conference.
This was a superficial and hasty view of the matter. As Prof.
Macartney* points out

" . . . . ' the central political fact which emerges from the consi-
deration of this history (of the relations between the Czechs and
Slovaks) for the purposes of the present age is the final crystal-
lization of a Slovak national consciousness ' The genuine

and uncompromising believers in a single indivisible Czechoslo-
vak language and people were certainly never so large, at least
in Slovakia, as they were made to appear. Today they have
dwindled to a mere handful, under the influence of actual
experience of the considerable differences which exist between
the Czechs and the Slovaks. At present Slovak is in practice
recognized by the Czechs themselves as the official language of
Slovakia. The political and national resistance has been no less
tenacious, and to-day the name of 'Czechoslovakia' is practically
confined to official documents and to literature issued for the benefit
of foreigners. During many weeks in the country I only remem-
ber hearing one person use the term for herself ; this was a Imlf-
Germau, half-Hungarian girl, who used it in a purely political
sense, meaning that she thought irridentism futile. No Czech
and no Slovak feels or calls himself, when speaking naturally,
anything btit a Czech or a Slovak as the case may be."

This national consciousness of the Slovaks, which was always
alive, began to burst forth on seeing that the Sudeten Germans
had made certain demands on Czechoslovakia for autonomy.
The Germans sought to achieve their objective by the applica-
tion of gangster morality to international politics, saying uGive
us what we ask or we shall burst up your shop." The Slovaks
followed suit by making their demands for autonomy but with
a different face. They did not resort to gangster methods but
modulated their demands to autonomy only. They had .eschew-
ed all idea of independence, and, in the proclamation issued on
October 8 by Dr. Tiso, the leading man in the autonomist
movement in Slovakia, it was said uWe shall proceed in the
spirit of our motto, for God and the Nation, in a Christian and
national spirit." Believing in their bona jides and desiring to
give no room to the Gravamin Politic of which the Slovaks were
making full use to disturb the friendly relations between the

• C. A. Macartney— Hungary and, Her Successors (Oxford), 1937, p. 136.
204

Lessons from Abroad

Czechs and the Slovaks, the National Assembly in Prague passed
an Act in November 1938 — immediately after the Munich Pact
— called the "Constitutional Act on the Autonomy of Slovakia."
Its provisions were of a far-reaching character. There was to be
a separate parliament for Slovakia and this parliament was to
decide the constitution of Slovakia within the framework of
the legal system of the Czechoslovak Republic. An alteration
in the territory of Slovakia was to be with the consent of the
two-third majority in the Slovak parliament. The consent of
the Slovak parliament was made necessary for international
treaties which exclusively concerned Slovakia. Officials of the
central state administration in Slovakia were to be primarily
Slovaks. Proportional representation of Slovakia was guaranteed
in all central institutions, councils, commissions and other orga-
nizations. Similarly, Slovakia was to be proportionally repre-
sented on all international organizations in which the Czechoslo-
vak Republic was called upon to participate. Slovak soldiers, in
peace time, were to be stationed iri Slovakia as far as possible.
As far as legislative authority was concerned all subjects which
were strictly of common concern were assigned to the parliament
of Czechoslovakia. By way of guaranteeing these rights to the
Slovaks, the Constitution Act provided that the decision of the
National Assembly to make constitutional changes shall be valid
only if the majority constitutionally required for such changes
includes also a proportionate majority of the members of the
National Assembly elected in Slovakia. Similarly, the election of
the President of the Republic required the consent not merely of
the constitutionally determined majority of the members of the
parliament, but also of a proportionate majority of the Slovak
members. Further to emphasize that the central government
must enjoy the confidence of the Slovaks it was provided by the
constitution that one-third of the Slovak members of parlia-
ment may propose a motion of c No Confidence \

These constitutional changes introduced, much against the
will of the Czechs, a hyphen between the Czechs and the Slovaks
which did not exist before. But it was clone in the hope that,
once the relatively minor quarrels between the two were got out
of the way, the very nationalism of the Slovaks was more likely
to bring them closer to the Czechs than otherwise. With the

205

Pakistan

constitutional changes guaranteeing an independent status to
Slovakia and the fact that the status so guaranteed could not be
changed without the consent of the Slovaks themselves, there was
no question of the Slovaks ever losing their national identity
through submergence by the Czechs. The autonomy introduced
by the hyphen separated the cultural waters and saved the Slovaks
from losing their colour.

The first Slovak parliament elected under the new constitu-
tion was opened on January 18, 1939, and Dr. Martin Sokol, the
President of the parliament, declared "The period of the Slovak's
struggle for freedom is ended. Now begins the period of national
rebirth". Other speeches made on the occasion indicated that
now that Slovakia had its autonomy the Slovaks would never
feel animosity towards the Czechs again and that both would
loyally abide by the Czecho-Slovak State.

Not even a month elapsed since the inauguration of the
Slovak parliament before the Slovak politicians began their
battle against the hyphen and for complete separation. They
made excited speeches in which they attacked the Czechs, talked
about Czech oppression and demanded a completely indepen-
dent Slovakia. By the beginning of March, the various forms of
separatism in Slovakia were seriously threatening the integrity
of the Czecho-Slovak State. On March 9 it was learnt that
Tiso, the Slovak Premier, had decided to proclaim the independ-
ence of Slovakia. On the 10th in anticipation of such an act
troops were moved in Slovakia and Tiso, the Prime Minister,
was dismissed along with other Slovak ministers by the President
of the Republic, Dr. Hacha. On the next day Tiso, supposed to
be under police supervision, telephoned to Berlin and asked for
help. On Monday Tiso and Hitler met and had an hour and a
half's talk in Berlin. Immediately after the talk with Hitler, Tiso
got on the phone to Prague and passed on the German orders.

They were : —

(i) All Czech troops to be withdrawn from Slovakia ;

(ii) Slovakia to be an independent state under German
protection ;

(iii) The Slovak parliament to be summoned by Presi-
dent Hacha to hear the proclamation of independence.

Lessons from Abroad

There was nothing that President Hacha and the Prague
Government could do except say * yes,' for they knew very well
that dozens of divisions of German troops were massed round
the defenceless frontiers of Czechoslovakia ready to march in at
any moment if the demands made by Germany in the interest of
and at the instance of Slovakia were refused. Thus ended the
new state of Czechoslovakia.

What is the lesson to be drawn from the story of these two
countries ?

There is some difference as to how the matters should be put.
Mr. Sydney Brooks would say that the cause of these wars of
disruption is nationalism, which according to him is the enemy
of the universal peace. Mr. Norman Angell, on the other hand,
would say it is not nationalism but the threat to nationalism
which is the cause. To Mr. Robertson nationalism is an irra-
tional instinct, if not a positive hallucination, and the sooner
humanity got rid of it the better for all.

In whatever way the matter is put and howsoever ardently
one may wish for the elimination of nationalism, the lesson to
be drawn is quite clear: that nationalism is a fact which can
neither be eluded nor denied. Whether one calls it an irrational
instinct or positive hallucination, the fact remains that it is a
potent force which has a dynamic power to disrupt empires.
Whether nationalism is the cause or the threat to nationalism is
the cause, is a difference of emphasis only. The real thing is to
recognize, as does Mr. Toynbee, that " nationalism is strong
enough to produce war in spite of us. It has terribly proved
itself to be no outworn creed, but a vital force to be reckoned
with." As was pointed out by him, "the right reading of
nationality has become an affair of life and death." It was not
only so for Europe. It was so for Turkey. It was so for Czecho-
slovakia. And what was a question of life and dedth to them
could not but be one of life and death to India. Prof. Toynbee
pleaded ,as was done before him by Guizot, for the recognition
of nationality as the necessary foundation of European peace.
Could India ignore to recognize this plea? If she does, she
will be acting at her peril. That nationalism is a disruptive

20?

Pakistan

force is not the only lesson to be learnt from the history of these
two countries. Their experience embodies much else of equal
if not of greater significance. What that is, will be evident if
certain facts are recalled to memory.

The Turks were by no means as illiberal as they are painted.
They allowed their minorities a large measure of autonomy.
The Turks had gone far towards solving the problem of how
people of different communities with different social heritages are
to live together in harmony when they are geographically inter-
mingled. The Ottoman Empire had accorded, as a matter of
course, to the non-Muslim and non-Turkish communities with-
in its frontiers a degree of territorial as well as cultural autonomy
which had never been dreamt of in the political philosophy of
the West. Ought not the Christian subjects to have been satis-
fied with this? Say what one may, the nationalism of Christian
minorities was not satisfied with this local autonomy. It fought
for complete freedom and in that fight Turkey was slit open.

The Turks were bound to the Arabs by the tie of religion.
The religious tie of Islam is the strongest known to humanity.
No social confederacy cau claim to rival the Islamic brotherhood
in point of solidarity. Add to this the fact that while the Turk
treated his Christian subjects as his inferior, he acknowledged
the Arab as his equal. All non-Muslims were excluded from
the Ottoman army. But the Arab soldiers and officers served
side by side with Turks and Kurds. The Arab officer class,
educated in Turkish schools, served in military and civil capa-
cities on the same terms as the Turks. There was no derogating
distinction between the Turk and the Arab, and there was
nothing to prevent the Arab from rising to the highest rank in
the Ottoman services. Not otily politically but even socially the
Arab was treated as his equal by the Turk and Arabs married
Turkish wives and Turks married Arab wives. Ought not the
Arabs to have been satisfied with this Islamic brotherhood of
Arabs and Turks based on fraternity, liberty and equality ? Say
what one may, the Arabs were not satisfied. Arab nationalism
broke the bonds of Islam and fought against his fellow Muslim,
the Turk, for its independence. It won, but Turkey was com-
pletely dismantled.

Lessons from Abroad

As to Czechoslovakia, she began with the recognition that
both the Czechs and the Slovaks were one people. Within a
few years, the Slovaks claimed to be a separate nation. They
would not even admit that they were a branch of the same stock
as the Czechs. Their nationalism compelled the Czechs to
recognize the fact that they were a distinct people. The Czechs
sought to pacify the nationalism of the Slovaks by drawing a
hyphen as a mark indicating distinctness. In place of Czecho-
slovakia they agreed to have Czecho-Slovakia. But even with
the hyphen the Slovak nationalism remained discontented. The
act of autonomy was both a hyphen separating them from the
Czechs as well as a link joining them with the Czechs. The
hyphen as making separation was welcome to the Slovaks but
as making a link with the Czechs was very irksome to them.
The Slovaks accepted the autonomy with its hyphen with great
relief and promised to be content and loyal to the state. But
evidently this was only a matter of strategy. They did not accept
it as an ultimate end. They accepted it because they thought
that they could use it as a vantage ground for destroying the
hyphen which was their main aim and convert autonomy into
independence. The nationalism of the Slovaks was not content
with a hyphen. It wanted a bar in place of the hyphen. Im-
mediately the hyphen was introduced, they began their battle to
replace the hyphen between the Czechs and the Slovaks by a
bar. They did not care what means they should employ. Their
nationalism was so wrong-headed and so intense that when they
failed they did not hesitate to call the aid of the Germans.

Thus a deeper study of the disruption of Turkey and Czecho-
slovakia shows that neither local autonomy nor the bond of
religion is sufficient to withstand the force of nationalism, once
it is set on the go.

This is a lesson which the Hindus will do well to grasp.
They should ask themselves: if the Greek, Balkan and Arab
nationalism has blown up the Turkish State and if Slovak
nationalism has caused the dismantling of Czechoslovakia, what
is there to prevent Muslim nationalism from disrupting the
Indian State? If experience of other countries teaches that this
is the inevitable consequence of pent-up nationalism, why not
profit by their experience and avoid the catastrophe by agreeing

u 209

Pakistan

to divide India into Pakistan and Hindustan? Let the Hindus
take the warning that if they refuse to divide India into two
before they launch on their career as a free people, they will be
sailing in those shoal waters in which Turkey, Chechoslovakia
and many others have foundered. If they wish to avoid ship-
wreck in mid-ocean, they must lighten the draught by throwing
overboard all superfluous cargo. They will ease the course of
their voyage considerably if they — to use the language of Prof.
Toynbee — reconcile themselves to making jetsam of less cherish-
ed and more combustible cargo.

Will the Hindus really lose if they agree to divide India into
two, Pakistan and Hindustan?

With regard to Czechoslovakia it is instructive to note the
real feelings of its government on the loss of their territory
caused by the Munich Pact. They were well expressed by the
Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia iu his message to the people
of Czechoslovakia. In it he said*: —

" Citizens and soldiers .... I am living through the hardest
hour of my life ; I am carrying out the most painful task, yi
comparison with which death would be easy. But precisely
because I have fought and because I know under what condi-
tions a war is won, I must tell you frankly . . . that the forces
opposed to us at this moment compel us to recognize their
superior strength and to act accordingly ....

"In Munich four European Great Powers met and decided
to demand of us the acceptance of new frontiers, according to
which the German areas of our State would be taken away. We
had the choice between desperate and hopeless defence, which
would have meant the sacrifice not only of the adult generation
but also of women and children, and the acceptance of conditions
which in their rnthlessness, and because they were imposed by
pressure without war, have no parallel in history. We desired
to make a contribution to peace; we would gladly have made
it. But not by any means in the way it has been forced upon us.

" But we were abandoned, and were alone .... Deeply moved,
all your leaders considered, together with the army and the
President of the Republic, all the possibilities which remained.

* Alexander Henderson — Eyewitness in Czechoslovakia ( Harrap, 1939), pp. 229-30.
210

Lessons from Abroad

They recognized that in choosing between narrower frontiers and
the death of the nation it was their sacred duty to save the life of
our people, so that we may not emerge weakened from these
terrible times, and so that we may remain certain that our nation
will gather itself together again, as it has done so often in the
past. Let us all see that our State re-establishes itself soundly
within its new frontiers, and that its population is assured of
a new life of peace and fruitful labour. With your help we
shall succeed. We rely upon you, and you have confidence
in us."

It is evident that the Czechs refused to be led by the force of
historic sentiment. They were ready to have narrower frontiers
and a smaller Czechoslovakia to the ultimate destruction of their
people.

With regard to Turkey the prevalent view was the one that
was expressed in 1853 by the Czar Nicholas I, during a conver-
sation with British Ambassador in St. Petersburg in which he
said " We have on our hand a sick man — a very sick man ....
He may suddenly die upon our hands." From that day the
imminent decease of Turkey, the sick man of Europe, was
awaited by all his neighbours. The shedding of the territories
was considered as the convulsions of a dying man who is alleg-
ed to have breathed his last by affixing his signature to the
Treaty of Sevres.

Is this really a correct view to take of Turkey in the process
of dissolution ? It is instructive to note the comments of Arnold
Toynbee on this view. Referring to the Czar's description of
Turkey as the sick man who may suddenly die, he says*: —

11 In this second and more sensational part of his diagnosis
Czar Nicholas went astray because he did not understand the
nature of the symptoms. If a person totally ignorant of natural
history stumbled upon a snake in course of shedding its skin,
he would pronounce dogmatically that the creature could not
possibly recover. He could point out that when a man (or
other mammal) has the misfortune to lose his skin, he is never
known to survive. Yet while it is perfectly true that the leopard
cannot change his spots nor the Ethiopian his skin, a wider
study would have informed our amateur naturalist that a snake
can do both and does both habitually. Doubtless, even for the
snake, the process is awkward and uncomfortable. He becomes
temporarily torpid, and in this condition he is dangerously at the
mercy of his enemies. Yet, if he escapes the kites and crows

* Arnold Toynbee — Turkey, p. 141.

211

Pakistan

until his metamorphosis is complete, he not only recovers his
health but renews his youth with the replacement of his mortal
coils. This is the recent experience of the Turk, and Moulting
snake' is better simile than sick man for a _ description of
his distemper."

In this view, the loss of her possessions by Tnrkey is the
removal of an anomalous excrescence and the gain of a new
skin. Turkey is certainly homogeneous and has no fear of any
disruption from within.

The Muslim areas are an anomalous excrescence on Hindu-
stan and Hindustan is an anomalous excrescence on them.
Tied together they will make India the sick man of Asia.
Welded together they will make India a heterogeneous unit. If
Pakistan has the demerit of cutting away parts of India, it has
also the merit of introducing harmony in place of conflict.

Severed into two, each becomes a more homogeneous unit.
The homogeneity of the two areas is obvious enough. Each has
a cultural unity. Each has a religious unity. Pakistan has a
linguistic unity. If there is no such unity in Hindustan, it is
possible to have it without any controversy as to whether the
common language should be Hindustani, Hindi or Urdu.
Separated, each can become a strong and well-knit state.
India needs a strong Central Government. But it cannot
have it so long as Pakistan remains a part of India.
Compare the structure of the Federal Government as embodied
in the Government of India Act, 1935, and it will be found, that
the Central Government as constituted under it is an effete
ramshackle thing with very little life in it.* As has already
been pointed out, this weakening of the Central Government is
brought about by the desire to placate the Muslim Provinces who
wish to be independent of the authority of the Central Govern-
ment on the ground that the Central Government is bound to be
predominantly Hindu in character and composition. When
Pakistan comes into being these considerations can have no force.
Hindustan can then have a strong Central Government and a
homogeneous population, which are necessary elements for the
stability of the state and neither of -which will be secured unless
there is severance of Pakistan from Hindustan.

* For further light on this topic, see my tract on Federation vs. Freedom.
212

PART IV

PAKISTAN AND THE MALAISE

The Hindu- Muslim problem has two aspects to it.
In its first aspect, the problem that presents itself is the
problem of two separate communities facing each other
and seeking adjustment of their respective rights and
privileges. In its other aspect, the problem is the problem
of the reflex influences which this separation and conflict
produces upon each of them. In the course of the foregoing
discussion we have looked at the project of Pakistan in
relation to the first of the aspects of the Hindu-Muslim
problem. We have not examined the project of Pakistan
in relation to the second aspect of that problem. Yet, such
an examination is necessary because that aspect of the
Hindu-Muslim problem is not unimportant. It is a very
superficial if not an incomplete view to stop with the problem
of the adjustment of their claims. It cannot be overlooked
that their lot is casl together : as such they have to participate
in a course of common activity whether they like it or not.
And if in this common activity they face each other as two
combatants do, then their actions and reactions are worth
study, for they affect both and produce a state of affairs
from which, if it is a deceased state, the question of escape
must be faced. A study of the situation shows that the
actions and reactions have produced a malaise which exhibits
itself in three ways: (1) Social Stagnation, (2) Communal
Aggression, and (3) National Frustration of Political
Destiny. This malaise is a grave one. Will Pakistan
be a remedy for the malaise ? or, will it aggravate the
malaise? The following chapters are devoted to the
sideration of these questions.

213

CHAPTER X

SOCIAL STAGNATION

The social evils which characterize the Hindu Society, have
been well known. The publication of Mother India by Miss
Mayo gave these evils the widest publicity. But while Mother
India served the purpose of exposing the evils and calling
their authors at the bar of the world to answer for their sins, it
created the unfortunate impression throughout the world that
while the Hindus were grovelling in the mud of these social
evils and were conservative, the Muslims in India were free from
them, and as compared to the Hindus, were a progressive people.
That, such an impression should prevail, is surprising to those
who know the Muslim Society in India at close quarters.

One may well ask if there is any social evil which is found
among the Hindus and is not found among the Muslims?

Take child-marriage. The Secretary of the Anti-Child-
marriage Committee, constituted by the All-India Women's
Conference, published a bulletin which gives the extent of the
evil of child-marriage in the different communities in the
country. The figures which were taken from the Census
Report of 1931 are as follows : —

TABLE
Married Females aged 0-15 per 1000 Females of that age.

Hindus. Muslims. Jains. Sikhs. Christians.

1881 208 153 189 170 33

1891 193 141 172 143 37

1901 • 186 131 164 101 38

1911 184 123 130 88 39

1921 170 111 117 72 32

1931 199 186 125 80 43

Can the position among the Musalmans so far as child-
marriage goes, be considered better than the position among the
Hindus?

215

Pakistan

Take the position of women. It is insisted by Muslims that
the legal rights given to Muslim women, ensure them a greater
measure of independence than that allowed to other Eastern
women, for example, Hindu women, and are in excess of the
rights given to women in some Western countries. Reliance is
placed on some of the provisions of the Muslim Law.

Firstly, it is said the Muslim Law does not fix any age for
marriage, and recognizes the right of a girl to marry any time.
Further, except where the marriage is celebrated by the father
or the grandfather, a Muslim girl, if given in marriage in child-
hood, has the power to repudiate her marriage on attaining
puberty.

Secondly, it is held out that marriage among the Musal-
mans is a contract. Being a contract, the husband has a right
to divorce his wife and the Muslim Law has provided ample
safeguards for the wife which, if availed of, would place the
Muslim wife on the same footing as the husbaud in the matter
of divorce. For, it is claimed that the wife under the Muslim
Law can, at the time of the marriage, or even thereafter in some
cases, enter into a contract by which she may under certain
circumstances obtain a divorce.

Thirdly, the Mahomedan Law requires that a wife can
claim from her husband, by way of consideration for the sur-
render of her person, a sum of money or other property —
known as her "dower". The dower may be fixed even after
marriage and if no amount is fixed, the wife is entitled to proper
dower. The amount of dower is usually split into two parts,
one is called "prompt" which is payable on demand, and the
other "deferred" which is payable on dissolution of marriage
by death or divorce. Her claim for dower will be treated as a
debt against the husband's estate. She has complete dominion
over her dower which is intended to give her economic inde-
pendence. She can remit it or she can appropriate the income
of it as she pleases,

Granting all these provisions of law in her favour, the
Muslim woman is the most helpless person in the world. To
quote an Egyption Muslim leader : —

" Islam has set its seal of inferiority upon her, and given the
sanction of religion to social customs which have deprived her

Social Stagnation

of the full opportunity for self-expression and development of
personality."

No Muslim girl has the courage to repudiate ier marriage,
although it may be open to her on the ground that she was a
child and that it was brought about by persons other than her
parents. No Muslim wife will think it proper to have a clause
entered into her marriage contract reserving her the right to
divorce. In that event, her fate is "once married, always married."
She cannot escape the marriage tie, however irksome it may be.
While she cannot repudiate the marriage, the husband can
always do it without having to show any cause. Utter the word
" Tallak" and observe continence for three weeks and the woman
is cast away. The only restraint on his caprice is the obligation
to pay dower. If the dower has already been remitted, his right
to divorce is a matter of his sweet will.

This latitude in the matter of divorce destroys that sense of
security which is so fundamental for a full, free and happy life
for a woman. This insecurity of life, to which a Muslim woman
is exposed, is greatly augmented by the right of polygamy and
concubinage, which the Muslim Law gives to the husband.

Mahomedan Law allows a Muslim to marry four wives at
a time. It is not unoften said that this is an improvement over
the Hindu Law which places no restriction on the number of
wives a Hindu can have at any given time. But it is forgotten
that in addition to the four legal wives, the Muslim Law permits
a Mahomedan to cohabit with his female slaves. In the case of
female slaves nothing is said as to the number. They are allow-
ed to him without any restriction whatever and without any
obligation to marry them.

No words can adequately express the great and many evils
of polygamy and concubinage and especially as a source of misery
to a Muslim woman, It is true that because polygamy and con-
cubinage are sanctioned, one must not suppose they are indulged
in by the generality of Muslims ; still the fact remains that they
are privileges which are easy for a Muslim to abuse to the
misery and unhappiness of his wife. Mr. John J. Pool, no enemy
of Islam, observes* : —

* Studies in Mahomedamsm, pp. 34-35.

217

Pakistan

"This latitude in the matter of divorce is very greatly taken
advantage of by «ome Mohamedaus. Stobart, commenting on
this subject in his book, Islam, and its Founder > says : * Some
Mohamedan s make a habit of continually changing their wives.
We read of young men who have had twenty and thirty wives, a
new one every three months ; and thus it comes about that
women are liable to be indefinitely transferred from one man
to another, obliged to accept a husband and a home whenever
they can find one, or in case of destitution, to which divorce
may have driven them, to resort to other more degrading means
of living/ Thus while keeping the strict letter of the law, and
possessing only one or certainly not more than four wives,
unscrupulous characters may yet by divorce obtain in a lifetime
as many wives as they please.

"in another way also a Mohamedan may really have more
than four wives, and yet keep within the law. This is by means
of living with concubines, which the Koran expressly permits.
In that sura which allows four wives, the words are added, 'of
the slaves which ye shall have acquired.' Then in the 70th
sura, it is revealed that it is no sin to live with slaves. The very
words are: 'The slaves which their right hands possess, as to
them they shall be blameless.' At the present day, as in days
past, in multitudes of Mohamedan homes, slaves are found;
as Muir says, in his Life of Mahomet ' so long as this unlimited
permission of living with their female slaves continues, it cannot
be expected that there will be any hearty attempt to put a stop to
slavery in Mohamedan countries.' Thus the Koran, in this
matter of slavery, is the enemy of the mankind. And women, as
usual, are the greater sufferers."

Take the caste system. Islam speaks of brotherhood. Every-
body infers that Islam must be free from slavery and caste.
Regarding slavery nothing needs to be said. It stands abolished
now by law. But while it existed much of its support was deriv-
ed from Islam and Islamic countries.* While the prescriptions
by the Prophet regarding the just and humane treatment of
slaves contained in the Koran are praiseworthy, there is nothing
whatever in Islam that lends support to the abolition of this curse.
As Sir W. Muir has well said \ : —

" . . . rather, while lightening, he rivetted the fetter ....
There is no obligation on a Muslim to release his slaves — "

But if slavery has gone, caste among Musalmans has remain-
ed. As an illustration one may take the conditions prevalent

•Ibid., Chapter XXXIX.

t The Koran, its Composition and Teaching, p. 58.

218

Social Stagnation

among the Bengal Muslims. The Superintendent of the Census
for 1901 for the Province of Bengal records the following interest-
ing facts regarding the Muslims of Bengal : —

"The conventional division of the Mahomedans into four
tribes — Sheikh, Saiad, Moghul and Pathan — has very little appli-
cation to this Province (Bengal). The Mahomedans themselves
^ recognize two main social divisions, (i) Ashraf or Sharaf and

(2) Ajlaf . Ashraf means ' noble ' and includes all undoubted
descendants of foreigners and converts from high caste Hindus.
All other Mahomedaus including the occupational groups and all
converts of lower ranks, are known by the contemptuous terms,
4 Ajlaf ', * wretches ' or ' mean people ' : they are also called
KaminShrrr Itar, 'base' or Rasil, a corruption of Rizal, 'worth-
less'. In some places a third class, called Arzal or 'lowest of
atl, ' is added. With them no other Mahomedan would associate,
and they are forbidden to enter the mosque or to use the public
burial ground.

"Within these groups there are castes with social precedence
of exactly the same nature as one finds among the Hindus.

I. Ashraf &t better class Mahomedans.

(1) Saiads.

(2) Sheikhs.

(3) Pathan s.

(4) Moghul.

(5) Mallik.

(6) Mirza.

II. Ajlaf or lower class Mahomedans.

(1) Cultivating Sheikhs, and others who were originally

Hindus but who do not belong to any functional
group, and have not gained admittance to the Ashraf
Community, e.g. Pirali and Thakrai.

(2) Darzi, Jolaha, Fakir, alid Rangrez.

(3) Barhi, Bhathiara, Chik, Churihar, Dai, Dhawa, Dhunia,

Gaddi, Kalal, Kasai, Kula Kunjara, Laheri, Mahifarosh,
Mallah, Naliya, Nikari. < *

(4) Abdal, Bako, Bediya, Bhat, Chamba, Dafali, Dhobi, Hajjam,

Mucho, Nagarchi, Nat, Pauwaria, Madaria, Tuntia.

III. Arzal or degraded class.

Bhanar, Halalkhor, Hijra, Kasbi, Lalbegi, Maugta,
Mehtar."

The Census Superintendent mentions atfbther feature of the
Muslim social system, namely, the prevalence of the u panchayet
system." He states : —

219

Pakistan

"The authority of the panchayat extends to social as well
as trade matters and . . . marriage with people of other com-
munities is one of the offences of which the governing body takes
cognizance. The result is that these groups are •ften as strictly
endogamous as Hindu castes. The prohibition on inter-marriage
extends to higher as well as to lower castes, and a Dhunia, for
example, may marry no one but a Dhuma. If this rule is
transgressed, the offender is at once hauled up before the panchag*
yat and ejected ignominiously from his community; A member
of one such group cannot ordinarily gain admission to another,
and he retains the designation of the community in which he
was born even if he abandons its distinctive occupation and takes
to other means of livelihood . . . thousands of Jolahas are
butchers, yet they are still known as Jolahas."

Similar facts from other Provinces of India could b^e gather-
ed from their respective Census Reports and those who are
curious may refer to them. But the facts for Bengal are enough
to show that the Mahornedans observe not only caste but also
untouchability.

There can thus be no manner of doubt that the Muslim
Society in India is afflicted by the same social evils as afflict the
Hindu Society. Indeed, the Muslims have all the social evils of
the Hindus and something more. That something more is the
compulsory system of purdah for Muslim women.

As a consequence of fat purdah system a segregation of the
Muslim women is brought about. The ladies are not expected
to visit the outer rooms, verandahs or gardens, their quarters are
in the back-yard. All of them, young and old, are confined in
the same room. No male servant can work in their presence.
A woman is allowed to see only her sons, brothers, father, uncles
and husband, or any other near relation who may be admitted
to a position of trust. She cannot go even to the mosque to
pray and must wear burka (veil) whenever she has to go out.
These burka women walking in the streets is one of the most
hideous sights one can witness in India. Such seclusion cannot
but have its deteriorating effects upon the physical constitution
of Muslim women. They are usually victims to anaemia, tuber-
culosis and pyorrhoea. Their bodies are deformed, with their
backs bent, bones protruded, hands and feet crooked. Ribs,
joints and nearly all their bones ache. Heart palpitation is very
often present in them. The result of this pelvic deformity is

220

Social Stagnation

untimely death at the time of delivery. Purdah deprives Muslim
women of mental and moral nourishment. Being deprived of
healthy social life, the process of moral degeneration must and
does set in. Being completely secluded from the outer world,
they engage their minds in petty family quarrels with the result
that they become narrow and restricted in their outlook.

They lag behind their sisters from other communities, can-
not take part in any outdoor activity and are weighed down
by a slavish mentality and an inferiority complex. They have
no desire for knowledge, because they are taught not to be
interested in anything outside the four walls of the house.
Purdah women in particular become helpless, timid, and unfit
for any fight in life. Considering the large number of purdah
women among Muslims in India, one can easily understand the
vastness and seriousness of the problem oiptirdah*

The physical and intellectual effects of purdah are nothing as
compared with its effects on morals. The origin vlpurdah lies of
course in the deep-rooted suspicion of sexual appetites in both sexes
and the purpose is to check them by segregating the sexes. But
far from achieving the purpose, purdah lias adversely affected the
morals of Muslim men. Owing to purdah a Muslim has no
contact with any woman outside those who belong to his own
household. Even with them his contact extends only to occa-
sional conversation. For a male there is no company of and
no commingling with the females except those who are children
or aged. This isolation of the males from females is sure to
produce bad effects on the morals of men. It requires no psycho-
analyst to say that a social system which cuts off all contact
between the two sexes produces an unhealthy tendency towards
sexual excesses and unnatural and other morbid habits and ways.

The evil consequences of purdah are not confined to the
Muslim conimunit}' only. It is responsible for the social segre-
gation of Hindus from Muslims which is the bane of public life
in India. This argument may appear far fetched and one is
inclined to attribute this segregation to the unsociability of the
Hindus rather than to purdah among the Muslims. But the

* For the position of Muslim women, sec Our Cause, edited by Shyam Kumar
Nehru.

221

Pakistan

Hindus are right when they say that it is not possible to establish
social contact between Hindus and Muslims because such con-
tact can only mean contact between women from_one side and
men from the other.*

Not fart, purdah and the evils consequent thereon are not to
be found among certain sections of the Hindus in certain parts
of the country. But the point of distinction is that among the
Muslims, purdah has a religious sanctity which it has not with
the Hindus. Purdah has deeper roots among the Muslims than
it has among the Hindus and can only be removed by facing
the inevitable conflict between religious injunctions and social
needs. The problem of purdah is a real problem with the
Muslims — apart from its origin — which it is not with the
Hindus. Of any attempt by the Muslims to do away with it,
there is no evidence.

There is thus a stagnation not only in the social life but also
in the political life of the Muslim community of India. The
Muslims have no interest in politics as such. Their predominant
interest is religion. This can be easily seen by the terms and
conditions that a Muslim constituency makes for its support to a
candidate fighting for a seat. The Muslim constituency does
not care to examine the programme of the candidate. All that
the constituency wants from the candidate is that he should
agree to replace the old lamps of the masjid by supplying new
ones at his cost, to provide a new carpet for the masjid because
the old one'is torn, or to repair the masjid because it has become
dilapidated. In some places a Muslim constituency is quite
satisfied if the candidate agrees to give a sumptuous feast and
in other places if he agrees to buy votes for so much a piece.
With the Muslims, election is a mere matter of money and is
very seldom a matter of social programme of general improve-
ment. Muslim politics takes no note of purely secular categories
of life, namely, the differences between rich and poor, capital
and labour, landlord and tenant, priest and layman, reason and

* It is interesting to note the argument which the Europeans who are accused by
Indians for not admitting them to their clubs use to defend themselves. They say,
44 We bring our women to the clubs. If you agree to bring your women to the
club, you can be admitted. We can't expose our women to your company if you
deny us the company of your women. Be ready to go fifty-fifty, then ask for entry
in our clubs/1

222

Social Stagnation

superstition. Muslim politics is essentially clerical and recog-
nizes only one difference, namely, that existing between Hindus
and Muslims. None of the secular categories of life have any
place in the politics of the Muslim community and if they do
find a place — and they must because they are irrepressible —
they are subordinated to one and the only governing principle
of the Muslim political universe, namely, religion.

The existence of these evils among the Muslims is distressing
enough. But far more distressing is the fact that there is no
organized movement of social reform among the Musalmans
of India on a scale sufficient to bring about their eradication.
The Hindus have their social evils. But there is this relieving
feature about them — namely, that some of them are conscious
of their existence and a few of them are actively agitating for
their removal. The Muslims, on the other hand, do not realize
that they are evils and consequently do not agitate for their
removal. Indeed, they oppose any change in their existing
practices. It is noteworthy that the Muslims opposed the Child-
Marriage Bill brought in the Central Assembly in 1930, whereby
the age for marriage of a girl was raised to 14 and of a boy to
18 on the ground that it was opposed to the Muslim canon law.
Not only did they oppose the bill at every stage but that when
it became law they started a campaign of Civil Disobedience
against that Act. Fortunately the Civil Disobedience campaign
of the Muslims against the Act did not swell and was submerg-
ed in the Congress Civil Disobedience campaign which
synchronized with it. But the campaign only proves how
strongly the Muslims are opposed to social reform.

The question may be asked why are the Muslims opposed
to social reform ?

The usual answer given is that the Muslims all over the
world are an unprogressive people. This view no doubt accords
with the facts of history. After the first spurts of their activity
— the scale of which was undoubtedly stupendous leading to the
foundations of vast empires — the Muslims suddenly fell into
a strange condition of torpor, from which they never seem to

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Pakistan

have become awake. The cause assigned for this torpor by
those, who have made a study of their condition, is said to be
the fundamental assumption made by all Muslims that Islam is
a world religion, suitable for all peoples, for all times and for
all conditions. It has been contended that : —

"The Musalman, remaining faithful to his religion, has not
progressed ; he has remained stationary in a world of swiftly
moving modern forces. It is, indeed, one of the salient features
of Islam that it immobilizes in their native barbarism, the races
whom it enslaves. It is fixed in a crystallization, inert and im-
penetrable. It is unchangeable ; and political, social or economic
changes have no repercussion upon it.

11 Having been taught that outside Islam there can be no
safety ; outside its law no truth and outside its spiritual message
there is no happiness, the Muslim has become incapable of con-
ceiving any other condition than his own, any other mode of
thought than the Islamic thought. He firmly believes that he
has arrived at an unequalled pitch of perfection ; that he is the
sole possessor of true faith, of the true doctrine, the true wisdom ;
that he alone is iu possession of the truth — no relative truth
subject to revision, but absolute truth.

" The religious law of the Muslims has had the effect of
imparting to the very diverse individuals of whom the world is
composed, a unit}' of thought, of feeling, of ideas, of judgment."

It is urged that this uniformity is deadening and is not
merely imparted to the Muslims, but is imposed upon them by
a spirit of intolerance which is unknown anywhere outside the
Muslim world for its severity and its violence and which is
directed towards the suppression of all rational thinking which
is in conflict with the teachings of Islam. As Renan observes*: —

" Islam is a close union of the spiritual and the temporal;
it is the reign of a dogma, it is the heaviest chain that humanity

has ever borne Islam has its beauties as a religion; — But

to the human reason Islamism has only been injurious. The
minds that it has shut from the light were, no doubt, already
closed in their own internal limits ; but it has persecuted free
thought, I shall not say more violently than other religions, but
more effectually. It has made of the countries that it has con-
quered a closed field to the rational culture of the mind. What
is, in fact essentially distinctive of the Musalmau is his hatred
of science, his persuasion that research is useless, frivolous, almost
impious — the natural sciences, because they are attempts at

* Nationality and other Essays.
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Social Stagnation

rivalry with God; the historical sciences, because they apply to
times anterior to Islam, they may revive ancient heresies . . . ."
Renan concludes by saying : —

"Islam, in treating science as an enemy, is only consistent,
but it is a dangerous thing to be consistent. To its own misfor-
tune Islam has been successful. By slaying science it has slain
itself ; and is condemned in the world to a complete inferiority."

This answer though obvious, cannot be the true answer.
If it were the true answer, how are we to account for the stir
and ferment that is going on in all Muslim countries outside
India, where the spirit of inquiry, the spirit of change and the
desire to reform are noticeable in every walk of life. Indeed,
the social reforms which have taken place in Turkey have been
of the most revolutionary character. If Islam has not come in
the way of the Muslims of these countries, why should it come
in the way of the Muslims of India ? There must be some
special reason for the social and political stagnation of the
Muslim community in India.

What can that special reason be? It seems to me that the
reason for the absence of the spirit of change in the Indian
Musalman is to be sought in the peculiar position he occupies
in India. He is placed in a social environment which is predo-
minantly Hindu. That Hindu environment is always silently
but surely encroaching upon him. He feels that it is de-musal-
manazing him. As a protection against this gradual weaning
away he is led to insist on preserving everything that is Islamic
without caring to examine whether it is helpful or harmful to
his society. Secondly, the Muslims in India are placed in a
political environment which is also predominantly Hindu. He
feels that he will be suppressed and that political suppression
will make the Muslims a depressed class. It is this consciousness
that he has to save himself from being submerged by the Hindus
socially and politically, which to my mind is the primary cause
why the Indian Muslims as compared with their fellows outside
are backward in the matter of social reform. Their energies are
directed to maintaining a constant struggle against the Hindus
for seats and posts in which there is no time, no thought and
no room for questions relating to social reform. And if there
is any, it is all overweighed and suppressed by the desire, generat-
ed by pressure of communal tension, to close the ranks and offer

i6 225

Pakistan

a united front to the menace of the Hindus and Hinduism by
maintaining their socio-religious unity at any cost.

The same is the explanation of the political stagnation in
the Muslim community of India. Muslim politicians do not
recognize secular categories of life as the basis of their politics
because to them it means the weakening of the community in
its fight against the Hindus. The poor Muslims will not join
the poor Hindus to get justice from the rich. Muslim tenants
will not join Hindu tenants to prevent the tyranny
of the landlord. Muslim labourers will not join Hindu
labourers in the fight of labour against capital. Why ? The
answer is simple. The poor Muslim sees that if he joins in the
fight of the poor against the rich, he may be fighting against a
rich Muslim. The Muslim tenant feels that if he joins in the
campaign against the landlord, he may have to fight against a
Muslim landlord. A Muslim labourer feels that if he joins in
the onslaught of labour against capital, he will be injuring a
Muslim mill-owner. He is conscious that any injury to a
rich Muslim, to a Muslim landlord or to a Muslim mill-owner,
is a disservice to the Muslim community, for it is thereby
weakened in its struggle against the Hindu community.

How Muslim politics has become perverted is shown by the
attitude of the Muslim leaders to the political reforms in the
Indian States. The Muslims and their leaders carried on a great
agitation for the introduction of representative government in
the Hindu State of Kashmir. The same Muslims and their
leaders are deadly opposed to the introduction of representative
governments in other Muslim States. The reason for this strange
attitude is quite simple. In all matters, the determining question
with the Muslims is how it will affect the Muslims vis-a-vis
the Hindus. If representative government can help the Muslims,
they will demand it, and fight for it. In the State of Kashmir
the ruler is a Hindu, but the majority of the subjects are
Muslims. The Muslims fought for representative government
in Kashmir, because representative government in Kashmir
meant the transfer of power from a Hindu king to the Muslim
masses. In other Muslim States, the ruler is a Muslim but the
majority of his subjects are Hindus. In such States representa-
tive government means the transfer of power from a Muslim

226

Social Stagnation

ruler to the Hindu masses, and that is why the Muslims support
the introduction of representative government in one case and
oppose it in the other. The dominating consideration with the
Muslims is not democracy. The dominating consideration is
how democracy with majority rule will affect the Muslims in
their struggle against the Hindus. Will it strengthen them or
will it weaken them? If democracy weakens them, they will
not have democracy. They will prefer the rotten state to con-
tinue in the Muslim States rather than weaken the Muslim
ruler in his hold upon his Hindu subjects.

The political and social stagnation in the Muslim com-
munity can be explained by one and only one reason. The
Muslims think that the Hindus and Muslims must perpetually
struggle; the Hindus to establish their dominance over the
Muslims and the Muslims to establish their historical position
as the ruling community — that in this struggle the strong will
win, and to ensure strength they must suppress or put in cold
storage everything which causes dissension in their ranks.

If the Muslims in other countries have undertaken the task
of reforming their society and the Muslims of India have
refused to do so, it is because the former are free from com-
munal and political clashes with rival communities, while the
latter are not.

Ill

It is not that this blind spirit of conservatism which does not
recognize the need of repair to the social structure has taken
hold of the Muslims only. It has taken hold of the Hindus
also. The Hindus at one time did recognize that without
social efficiency fio permanent progress in other fields of
activity was possible, that, owing to the mischief wrought by
evil customs Hindu Society was not in a state of efficiency and
that ceaseless efforts must be made to eradicate these evils. It was
due to the recognition of this fact that the birth of the National
Congress was accompanied by the foundation of the Social Con-
ference. While the Congress was concerned with defining the
weak points in the political organisation of the country, the Social
Conference was engaged in removing the weak points in the

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social organisation of the Hindu Society. For some time, the
Congress and the Conference worked as two wings of one com-
mon body and held their annual sessions in the same pandal.
But soon the two wings developed into two parties, a Political
Reform Party and a Social Reform Party, between whom raged
fierce controversy. The Political Reform Party supported the
National Congress and the Social Reform Party supported the
Social Conference. The two bodies became two hostile camps.
The point at issue was whether social reform should precede
political reform. For a decade the forces were evenly balanced
and the battle was fought without victory to either side. It was,
however, evident that the fortunes of the Social Conference were
ebbing fast. The gentlemen who presided over the sessions of
the Social Conference lamented that the majority of the educated
Hindus were for political advancement and indifferent to social
reform and that while the number of those who attended the
Congress was very large and the number who did not attend
but who sympathized with it even larger, the number of those
who attended the Social Conference was very much smaller.
This indifference, this thinning of its ranks was soon followed
by active hostility from the politicians, like the late Mr. Tilak.
In course of time, the party in favour of political reform won
and the Social Conference vanished and was forgotten.* With
it also vanished from the Hindu Society the urge for social
reform. Under the leadership of Mr. Gandhi, the Hindu
Society, if it did not become a political mad-house, certainly
became mad after politics. Non-co-operation, Civil Disobedi-
ence, and the cry for Swaraj took the place which social reform
once had in the minds of the Hindus. In the din and dust of
political agitation, the Hindus do not even know that there are
any evils to be remedied. Those who are conscious of it, do not
believe that social reform is as important as political reform, and
when forced to admit its importance argue that there can be no
social reform unless political power is first achieved. They are
so eager to possess political power that they are impatient even
of propaganda in favour of social reform, as it means so much
time and energy deducted from political propaganda. A corres-
pondent of Mr. Gandhi put the point of view of the Nationalists

* For a more detailed statement, see my tract on Annihilation of Caste.
228

Social Stagnation

very appropriately, if bluntly, when lie wrote* to Mr. Gandhi,
saying : —

" Don't you think that it is impossible to achieve any great
reform without winning political power ? The present econo-
mic structure has got to be tackled ? No reconstruction is pos-
sible without political reconstruction and I am afraid all this
talk of polished and unpolished rice, balanced diet and so on
and so forth is mere moonshine."

The Social Reform Party, led by Ranade, died leaving the
field to the Congress. There has grown np among the Hindus
another party which is also a rival to the Congress. It is the
Hindu Maha Sabha. One would expect from its name that it
was a body for bringing about the reform of Hindu Society.
But it is not. Its rivalry with the Congress has nothing to do
with the issue of social reform vs. political reform. Its quarrel
with the Congress has its origin in the pro-Muslim policy of the
Congress. It is organized for the protection of Hindu rights
against Muslim encroachment. Its plan is to organize the
Hindus for offering a united front to the Muslims. As a
body organized to protect Hindu rights it is all the time engaged
in keeping an eye on political movements, on seats and posts. It
cannot spare any thought for social reform. As a body keen on
bringing about a united front of all Hindus, it cannot afford
to create dissensions among its elements which would be the
case if it undertook to bring about social reforms. For the sake
of the consolidation of the Hindu rank and file, the Hindu Maha
Sabha is ready to suffer all social evils to remain as they are.
For the sake of consolidation of the Hindus, it is prepared to
welcome the Federation as devised by the Act of 1935 in spite
of its many iniquities and defects. For the same purpose, the
Hindu Maha Sabha favours t'he retention of the Indian States,
with their administration as it is. ( Hands off the Hindu States '
has been the battle-cry of its President. This attitude is stranger
than that of the Muslims. Representative government in Hindu
States cannot do harm to the Hindus. Why then should the
President of the Hindu Maha Sabha oppose it ? Probably
because it helps the Muslims, whom he cannot tolerate.

*Hari;an — llth January 1936.

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Pakistan
IV

To what length this concern for the conservation of their
forces can lead the Hindus and the Musalmans cannot be better
illustrate^ than by the debates on the Dissolution of Muslim
Marriage Act VIII of 1939 in the Central Assembly. Before
1939, the law was that apostasy of a male or a female married
under the Muslim law ipso facto dissolved the marriage with the
result that if a married Muslim woman changed her religion,
she was free to marry a person professing her new religion. This
was the rule of law enforced by the courts, throughout India at
any rate, for the last 60 years.*

This law was annulled by Act VIII of 1939, section 4 of
which reads as follows : —

"The renunciation of Islam by a married Muslim woman or
her conversion to a faith other than Islam shall not by itself
operate to dissolve her marriage :

Provided that after such renunciation or conversion the
woman shall be entitled to obtain a decree for the dissolution of
marriage on any of the grounds mentioned in section 2 :

Provided further that the provisions of this section shall not
apply to a woman converted to Islam from some other faith who
re-embraces her former faith."

According to this Act, the marriage of a married Muslim
woman is not dissolved by reason of her conversion to another
religion. All that she gets is a right of divorce. It is very
intriguing to find that section 2 does not refer to conversion or
apostasy as a ground for divorce. The effect of the law is that
a married Muslim woman has no liberty of conscience and is
tied for ever to her husband whose religious faith may be quite
abhorrent to her.

The grounds urged in support of this change are well worth
attention. The mover of the Bill, Quazi Kazmi, M.L. A., adopted
a very ingenious line of argument in support of the change.
In his speech t on the motion to refer the Bill he said : —

"Apostasy was considered by Islam, as by any other religion,
as a great crime, almost amounting to a crime against the State.

* The earliest reported decision was that given by the High Court of the North-
West Province in 1870 in the case of Zabaroast Khan vs. His wife.

t Legislative Assembly Debates. 1938. Vol. V, pp. 1098-101.
230

Social Stagnation

It is not novel for the religion of Islam to have that provision.
If we look up the older Acts of any nation, we will find that
similar provision also exists in other Codes as well. For the
male a severer punishment was awarded, that of death, and for
females, only the punishment of imprisonment was awarded.
This main provision was that because it was a sin, it was a
crime, it was to be punished, and the woman was to be deprived
of her status as wife. It was not only this status that she lost,
but she lost all her status in society; she was deprived of her
property and civil rights as well. But we find that as early as
1850 an Act was passed here, called the Caste Disabilities
Removal Act of 1850, Act XXI of 1850

"....by this Act, the forfeiture of civil rights that could
be imposed on a woman on her apostasy has been taken away.
She can no longer be subjected to any forfeiture of property
or her right of inheritance or anything of the kind. The only
question is that the Legislature has come to her help, it has given
her a certain amount of liberty of thought, some kind of liberty
of religion to adopt any faith she likes, and has removed the
forfeiture clause from which she could suffer, and which was a
restraint upon her changing the faith. The question is how far
we are entitled after that to continue placing the restriction on
her status as a wife. Her status as a wife is of some importance
in society. She belongs to some family, she has got children,
she has got other connections too. If she has got a liberal mind,
she may not like to continue the same old religion. If she
changes her religion, why should we, according to our modern
ideas, inflict upon her a further penalty that she will cease to
be the wife of her husband. I submit, in these days when we
are advocating freedom of thought and freedom of religion,
when we are advocating inter-marriages between different com-
munities, it would be inconsistent for us to support a provision
that a mere change of faith or change of religion would entail
forfeiture of her rights as the wife of her husband. So, from
a modern point of view, I have got no hesitation in saying that
we cannot, in any way, support the contrary proposition that
apostasy must be allowed to finish her relationship with her
husband. But that is only one part of the argument.

" Section 32 of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936,
is to the effect that a married woman may sue for divorce on the
grounds 'that the defendant has ceased to be a Parsi....1

"There are two things apparent from this. The first is, that
it is a ground for dissolution, not from any religious idea or reli-
gious sentiment, because, if two years have passed after the con-
version and if plaintiff does not object, then either the male or
female has no right to sue for dissolution of marriage. The second
thing is, that it is the plaintiff who has got the complaint that the

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other party has changed the religion, who has got the right of
getting the marriage dissolved ......... In addition to this Act,

as regards other communities we can have an idea of the effect
of conversion on marriage tie from the Native Converts' Marriage
Dissolution Act, Act XXI of 1886 ........ It applies to all the

communities of India, and this legislation recognises the fact
that mere conversion of an Indian to Christianity would not
dissolve the marriage but he will have the right of going to a
law court and saying that the other party, who is not converted,
must perform the marital duties in respect of him ........ then

they are given a year's time and the judge directs that they shall
have an interview with each other ill the presence of certain
other persons to induce them to resume their conjugal relation-
ship, and if they do not agree, then on the ground of desertion
the marriage is dissolved. The marriage is dissolved no doubt,
but not on the ground of change of faith .......... So, every

community in India has got this accepted principle that conver-
sion to another religion cannot amount to a dissolution of
marriage."

Syed Gulam Bikh Nairang, another Muslim member of the
Assembly and a protagonist of the Bill, was brutally frank. In
support of the principle of the Bill he said*: —

" For a very long time the courts in British India have held
without reservation aud qualification that under all circumstances
apostasy automatically and immediately puts an end to the
married state without any judicial proceedings, any decree of
court, or any other ceremony. That has been the position which
was taken up by the Courts. Now, there are three distinct views
of Hanafi jurists on the point. One view which is attributed to
the Bokhara jurists was adopted and even that not in its
entirety but in what I may call a mutilated and maimed condition.
What that Bokhara view is has been already stated by Mr. Kazmi
and some other speakers. The Bokhara jurists say that marriage
is dissolved by apostasy. In fact, I should be more accurate in
saying — I have got authority for that — that it is, according to
the Bokhara view, not dissolved but suspended. The marriage
is suspended but the wife is then kept in custody or confinement
till she repents and embraces Islam again, and then she is
induced to marry the husband, whose marriage was only sus-
pended and not put an end to or cancelled. The second view
is that on apostasy a married Muslim woman ceases to be the wife of
her husband but becomes his bond woman. One view, which
is a sort of corollary to this view, is that she is not necessarily
the bond woman of her ex-husband but she becomes the bond
woman of the entire Muslim community and anybody can employ
her as a bond woman. The third view, that of the Ulema of

Assembly Debates, 1938, Vol. V. pp. 1953-55.
232

Social Stagnation

Samarkand and Balkh, is that the marriage tie is not affected by
such apostasy and that the woman still continues to be the wife
of the husband. These are the three views. A portion of the
first view, the Bokhara view, was taken hold of by the Courts
and rulings after rulings were based on that portion.

"This House is well aware that it is not only in this solitary
instance that judicial error is sought to be corrected by legislation,
but in many other cases, too, there have been judicial errors or
conflicts of judicial opinion or uncertainties and vagueness of
law. Errors of judicial view are being constantly corrected by
legislation. In this particular matter there has been an error
after error and a tragedy of errors. To show me those rulings
is begging the question. Surely, it should be realized that it is
no answer to my Bill that because the High Courts have decided
against me, I have no business to come to this House and ask it
to legislate this way or that way."

Having regard to the profundity of the change, the argu-
ments urged in support of it were indeed very insubstantial.
Mr. Kazmi failed to realize that if there was a difference between
the divorce law relating to Parsis, Christians and Muslims, once
it is established that the conversion is genuine, the Muslim law
was in advance of the Parsi and the Christian law and instead
of making the Muslim law retrograde, the proper thing ought
to have been to make the Parsi and the Christian law progress.
Mr. Nairang did not stop to inquire that, if there were different
schools of thought among the Muslim jurists, whether it was not
more in consonance with justice to adopt the more enlightened
view which recognized the freedom of the Muslim woman and
not to replace it by the barbaric one which made her a bonds-
woman.

Be that as it may, the legal arguments had nothing to do
with the real motive underlying the change. The real motive
was to put a stop to the illicit conversion of women to alien faiths,
followed by immediate and hurried marriages with some one
professing the faith she happened to have joined, with a view to
locking her in the new community and preventing her from going
back to the community to which she originally belonged. The
conversion of Muslim women to Hinduism and of Hindu
women to Islam looked at from a social and political point of view
cannot but be fraught with tremendous consequences. It means
a disturbance in the numerical balance between the two com-
munities. As the disturbance was being brought about by the

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Pakistan

abduction of women, it could not be overlooked. For woman
is at once the seed-bed of and the hot-house for nationalism in
a degree that man can never be.* These conversions of women
and their subsequent marriages were therefore regarded, and
rightly, as a series of depredations practised by Hindus against
Muslims and by Muslims against Hindus with a view to bringing
about a change in their relative numerical strength. This
abominable practice,. of woman-lifting had become as common
as cattle-lifting and, with its obvious danger to communal balance,
efforts had to be made to stop it. That this was the real reason
behind this legislation can be seen from the two provisions to
section 4 of the Act. In proviso 1 the Hindus concede to the
Musalmans that if they convert a woman who was originally a
Muslim she will remain bound to her former Muslim husband
notwithstanding her conversion. By proviso 2 the Muslims
concede to the Hindus that if they convert a Hindu married
woman and she is married to a Musalman, her marriage will be
deemed to be dissolved if she renounces Islam and she will be
free to return to her Hindu fold. Thus what underlies the
change in law is the desire to keep the numerical balance and it
is for this purpose that the rights of women were sacrificed.

There are two other features of this malaise which have not
been sufficiently noted.

One such feature is the jealousy with which one of them
looks upon any reform by the other in its social system. If
the effect of such reform is to give it increase of strength for
resistance, it at once creates hostility.

Swami Shradanand relates a very curious incident which
well illustrates this attitude. Writing in the Liberator \ his recol-
lections, he refers to this incident. He says : —

"Mr. Ranade was there .... to guide the Social Con-
ference to which the title of 'National9 was for the first and
last time given. It was from the beginning a Hindu Conference
in all walks of life. The only Mahomedan delegate who joined
the National Social Conference was a Mufti Saheb of Barreily.
Well! The conference began when the resolution in favour of

* The part played by woman in sustaining nationalism has not been sufficiently
noticed. See the observations of Renan on this point in his Essay on Nationality.

t 26th April 1926.
234

Social Stagnation

remarriage of child-widows was moved by a Hindu delegate and
by me. Sanatanist Pandits opposed it. Then the Mufti asked
permission to speak. The late Baijnath told Mufti Saheb that
as the resolution concerned the Hindus only, he need not speak.
At this the Mufti flared up.

"There was no loophole left for the President and Mufti
Saheb was allowed to have his say. Mufti Saheb's argument was
that as Hindu Shastras did not allow remarriage, it was a sin to
press for it. Again, when the resolution about the reconversion
of those who had become Christians and Musalmans came up,
Mufti Saheb urged that when a man abandoned the Hindu
religion he ought not to be allowed to come back."

Another illustration would be the attitude of the Muslims
towards the problem of the Untouchables. The Muslims have
always been looking at the Depressed Classes with a sense of
longing and much of the jealousy between Hindus and Muslims
arises out of the fear of the latter that the former might become
stronger by assimilating the Depressed Classes. In 1909 the
Muslims took the bold step of suggesting that the Depressed
Classes should not be enrolled in the census as Hindus. In
1923 Mr. Mahomed Ali in his address as the President of the
Congress went much beyond the position taken by the Muslims
in 1909. He said :—

"The quarrels about ALAMS and PIPAL trees and musical
processions are truly childish ; but there is one question which
can easily furnish a ground for complaint of unfriendly action if
communal activities are not amicably adjusted. It is the question
of the conversion of the Suppressed Classes, if Hindu society
does not speedily absorb them. The Christian missionary is
already busy and no one quarrels with him. But the moment
some Muslim Missionary Society is organized for the same pur-
pose there is every likelihood of an outcry in the Hindu press.
It has been suggested to me by an influential and wealthy gentle-
man who is able to organize a Missionary Society on a large
scale for the conversion of the Suppressed Classes, that it should
be possible to reach a settlement with leading Hindu gentlemen
and divide the country into separate areas where Hindu and
Muslim missionaries could respectively work, each community
preparing for each year, or longer unit of time if necessary, an
estimate of the numbers it is prepared to absorb or convert. These
estimates would, of course, be based on the number of workers
and funds each had to spare, and tested by the actual figures of
the previous period. In this way each community would be
free to do the work of absorption and conversion, or rather, of
reform without chances of collision with one another. I cannot

235

Pakistan

say in what light my Hindu brethren will take it and I place
this suggestion tentatively in all frankness and sincerity before
them. All that I say for myself is that I have seen the condition
of the 'Kali Praja' in the Baroda State and of the Gonds in
the Central Provinces and I frankly confess it is a reproach to
us all. If the Hindus will not absorb them into their own
society, others will and must, and then the orthodox Hindu too
will cease to treat them as untouchables. Conversion seems to
transmute them by a strong alchemy. But does this not place a
premium upon conversion ?"

The other feature is the " preparations " which the Muslims
and Hindus are making against each other without abatement.
It is like a race in armaments between two hostile nations. If
the Hindus have the Benares University, the Musalmans must
have the Aligarh University. If the Hindus start Shudhi move-
ment, the Muslims must launch the Tablig movement. If the
Hindus start Sangathan, the Muslims must meet it by Tanjim.
If the Hindus have the R. S.S. S.,* the Muslims must reply by
organizing the Khaksars.t This race in social armament and
equipment is run with the determination and apprehension
characteristic of nations which are on the war path. The
Muslims fear that the Hindus are subjugating them. The
Hindus feel that the Muslims are engaged in reconquering them.
Both appear to be preparing for war and each is watching the
" preparations" of the other.

Such a state of things cannot but be ominous. It is a vicious
circle. If the Hindus make themselves stronger, the Musalmans
feel menaced. The Muslims endeavour to increase their forces
to meet the menace and the Hindus then do the same to equalize
the position. As the preparations proceed, so does the suspicion,
the secrecy, and the plotting. The possibilities of peaceful
adjustment are poisoned at the source and precisely because
everyone is fearing and preparing for it that "war" between
the two tends to become inevitable. But in the situation in
which they find themselves, for the Hindus and the Muslims
not to attend to anything, except to prepare themselves to meet
the challenge of each other, is quite natural. It is a struggle for

• Short for the Rashtriya Swayam Sevaka Sangh which is a Hindu volunteer
corps.

t Khaksar is a Muslim volunteer corps.
236

Social Stagflation

existence and the issue, that counts, is survival and not the
quality or the plane of survival.

Two things must be said to have emerged from this dis-
cussion. One is that the Hindus and the Muslims regard each
other as a menace. The second is that to meet this menace,
both have suspended the cause of removing the social evils with
which they are infested. Is this a desirable state of things?
If it is not how then can it be ended ?

No one can say that to have the problems of social reform
put aside is a desirable state of things. Wherever there are social
evils, the health of the body politic requires that they shall be
removed before they become the symbols of suffering and in-
justice. For it is the social and economic evils which every-
where are the parent of revolution or decay. Whether social
reform should precede political reform or political reform should
precede social reform may be a matter of controversy. But
there can be no two opinions on the question that the sole object
of political power is the use to which it can be put in the cause
of social and economic reform. The whole struggle for political
power would be a barren and bootless effort if it was not justi-
fied by the feeling that, because of the want of political power,
urgent and crying social evils are eating into the vitals of society
and are destroying it. But suppose the Hindus and the Muslims
somehow come into possession of political power, what hope is
there that they will use it for purposes of social reform? There
is hardly any hope in that behalf. So long as the Hindus and
the Muslims regard each other as a menace, their attention will
be engrossed in preparations for meeting the menace. The
exigencies of a common front by Musalmans against Hindus
and by Hindus against Musalmans generate — and is bound to
generate — a conspiracy of silence over social evils. Neither the
Muslims nor the Hindus will attend to them even though the
evils may be running sores and requiring immediate attention,
for the simple reason that they regard every measure of social
reform as bound to create dissension and division and thereby
weaken the ranks when they ought to be closed to meet the
menace of the other community. It is obvious that so long as
one community looks upon the other as a menace there will be

237

Pakistan

no social progress and the spirit of conservatism will continue
to dominate the thoughts and actions of both.

How long will this menace last? It is sure to last as long
as the Hindus and Muslims are required to live as members of
one country under the mantle of a single constitution. For, it
is the fear of the single constitution with the possibility of the
shifting of the balance — for nothing can keep the balance at the
point originally fixed by the constitution — which makes the
Hindus a menace to the Muslims and the Muslims a menace to
the Hindus. If this is so, Pakistan is the obvious remedy. It
certainly removes the chief condition which makes for the
menace. Pakistan liberates both the Hindus and the Muslims
from the fear of enslavement of and encroachment against each
other. It removes, by providing a separate constitution for each,
Pakistan and Hindustan, the very basis which leads to this per-
petual struggle for keeping a balance of power in the day-to-
day life and frees them to take in hand those vital matters of
urgent social importance which they are now forced to put
aside in cold storage, and improve the lives of their people,
which after all is the main object of this fight for Swaraj.

Without some such arrangement, the Hindus and the
Muslims will act and react as though they were two nations, one
fearing to be conquered by the other. Preparations for aggression
will always have precedence over social reform, so that the
social stagnation which has set in must continue. This is quite
natural and no one need be surprised at it. For, as Bernard
Shaw pointed out : —

"A conquered nation is like a man with cancer; he can
think of nothing else .... A healthy nation is as unconscious
of its nationality as a healthy man of his bones. But if you break
a nation's nationality, it will think of nothing else but getting
it set again. It will listen to no reformer, to no philosopher, to
no preacher until the demand of the nationalist is granted. It
will attend to no business, however vital, except the business of
unification and liberation."

Unless there is unification of the Muslims who wish to
separate from the Hindus and unless there is liberation of each
from the fear of domination by the other, there can be no doubt
that this malaise of social stagnation will not be set right.

238

CHAPTER XI
COMMUNAL AGGRESSION

Even a superficial observer cannot fail to notice that a spirit
of aggression underlies the Hindu attitude towards the Muslim
and the Muslim attitude towards the Hindu. The Hindu's
spirit of aggression is a new phase which he has just begun to
cultivate. The Muslim's spirit of aggression is his native en-
dowment and is ancient as compared with that of the Hindu.
It is not that the Hindu, if given time, will not pick up and
overtake the Muslim. But as matters stand to-day, the Muslim
in this exhibition of the spirit of aggression leaves the Hindu
far behind.

Enough has been said about the social aggression of the
Muslims in the chapter dealing with communal riots. It is
necessary to speak briefly of the political aggression of the
Muslims. For this political aggression has created a malaise
which cannot be overlooked.

Three things are noticeable about this political aggression
of the Muslims.

First is the ever-growing catalogue of the Muslim's political
demands. Their origin goes back to the year 1892.

In 1885 the Indian National Congress was founded. It
began with a demand for good government as distinguished
from self-government. In response to this demand the British
Government felt the necessity of altering the nature of the Legis-
lative Councils, Provincial and Central, established under the
Act of 1861. In that nascent stage of Congress agitation, the
British Government did not feel called upon to make them fully
popular. It thought it enough to give them a popular colouring.
Accordingly the British Parliament passed in 1892 what is called
the Indian Councils Act. This Act is memorable for two things.
It was in this Act of 1892 that the British Government for the
first time accepted the semblance of the principle of popular

239

Pakistan

representation as the basis for the constitution of the Legislatures
in India. It was not a principle of election. It was a principle
of nomination, only it was qualified by the requirement that
before nomination a person must be selected by important public
bodies such as municipalities, district boards, universities and
the associations of merchants, etc. Secondly, it was in the legis-
latures that were constituted under this Act that the principle of
separate representation for Musalmans was for the first time
introduced in the political constitution of India.

The introduction of this principle is shrouded in mystery.
It is a mystery because it was introduced so silently and so steal-
thily. The principle of separate representation does not find a
place in the Act. The Act says nothing about it. It was in the
directions — but not in the Act — issued to those charged with the
duty of framing regulations as to the classes and interests to
whom representation was to be given that the Muslims were
named as a class to be provided for.

It is a mystery as to who was responsible for its introduc-
tion. This scheme of separate representation was not the result
of any demand put forth by any organized Muslim association.
In whom did it then originate? It is suggested* that it originat-
ed with the Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, who, as far back as the
year 1888, when dealing with the question of representation in
the Legislative Councils, emphasized the necessity that in India
representation will have to be, not in the way representation is
secured in England, but representation by interests. Curiosity
leads to a further question, namely, what could have led Lord
Dufferin to propose such a plan? It is suggestedf that the idea
was to wean J away the Musalmans from the Congress which
had already been started three years before. Be that as it may,
it is certain that it is by this Act that separate representation
for Muslims became, for the first time, a feature of the Indian
Constitution. It should, however, be noted that neither the Act

• See the speech of Sir Mahomad Shafi in the Minorities Sub- Committee of the
first R.T.C. (Indian Edition), p. 57.

t See the speech of Raja Narendranath, Ibid., p. 65.

t The Musalmans had already been told by Sir Sayad Ahmad not to join the
Congress in the two speeches, one delivered at Lucknow on 28th December 1887,
and the other at Meerut on 16th March 1888. Mr. Mahomed Ali in his presidential
address speaks of them as historic speeches.

240

Communal Aggression

nor the Regulations conferred any right of selection upon the
Muslim community, nor did the Act give the Muslim community
a right to claim a fixed number of seats. All that it did was to
give the Muslims the right to separate representation.

Though, to start with, the suggestion of separate representa-

tion came from the British, the Muslims did not fail to appre-

ciate the social value of separate political rights with the result

that when in 1909 the Muslims came to know that the next step

in the reform of the Legislative Councils was contemplated, they

waited of their own accord in deputation* upon the Viceroy,

Lord Minto, and placed before him the following demands: —

( i ) Communal representation in accordance with their

numerical strength, social position and local influ-

ence, on district and municipal boards.

( ii ) An assurance of Muhanimadan representation on

the governing bodies of Universities.

(iii) Communal representation on provincial councils, elec-
tion being by special electoral colleges composed of
Muhammadan landlords, lawyers, merchants, and re-
presentatives of other important interests, University
graduates of a certain standing and members of dis-
tpct and municipal boards.

(iv) The number of Muhammadan representatives in the

Imperial Legislative Council should not depend on

their numerical strength, and Muhammadans should

never be in an ineffective minority. They should be

elected as far as possible (as opposed to being nominat-

ed), election being by special Muhammadan colleges

composed of landowners, lawyers, merchants, members

of provincial councils, Fellows of Universities, etc.

These demands were granted and given effect to in the Act

of 1909. Under this Act the Muhammadans were given (1)

the right to elect their representatives, (2) the right to elect their

representatives by separate electorates, (3) the right to vote in the

general electorates as well, and (4) the right to weightage in

representation. The following table shows the proportion of

representation secured to the Muslims in the Legislatures by the

Act of 1909 and the Regulations made thereunder : —

* Mr. Mahomad Ali in his speech as the President of the Congress said that this
deputation was a "command performance".

Pakistan

«o

•til* .

-DON

rt 0

i irt

•siaqinsjM OIDIJJO-XH rf

6*0 "5 j

'6061 }o JPV

siaq

o o

§ §

a G

*«

g
jo

242

Communal Aggression

The provisions were applied to all Provinces except the
Punjab and the C. fi. It was not applied to the Punjab because
such special protection was considered unnecessary for the
Musalmans of the Punjab and it was not applied to the C. P.
because it had no Legislative Council at the time.*

In October 1916, 19 members of the Imperial Legislative
Council presented the Viceroy (Lord Chelmsford) a memoran-
dum demanding a reform of the Constitution. Immediately the
Muslims came forward with a number of demands on behalf of
the Muslim community. These were : —

(i) The extension of the principle of separate representation
to the Punjab and the C. P.

(ii) Fixing the numerical strength of the Muslim represen-
tatives in the Provincial and Imperial Legislative Councils.

(iii) Safeguards against legislation affecting Muslims, their
religion and religious usages.

The negotiations following upon these demands resulted in
agreement between the Hindus and the Muslims which is known
as the Lucknow Pact. It may be said to contain two clauses.
One related to legislation, under which it was agreed that: —

" No Bill, nor any clause thereof, nor a resolution introduced
by a non-official affecting one or other community (which ques-
tion is to be determined by the members of that community in
the Legislative Council concerned) shall be proceeded with, if
three-fourths of the members of that community in the particular
Council, Imperial and Provincial, oppose the Bill or any clause
thereof or the resolution."

The other clause related to the proportion of Muslim repre-
sentation. With regard to the Imperial Legislative Council the
Pact provided : —

" That one-third of the Indian elected members should be
Muhammadans, elected by separate electorates in the several
Provinces, in the proportion, as nearly as might be, in which
they were represented on the provincial legislative councils by
separate Muhammadan electorates."

• The C. P. Legislative Council was established in 1914.

243

Pakistan

In the matter of Muslim representation in the Provincial
Legislative Councils it was agreed that the proportion of Muslim
representation should be as follows*: —

Percentage of elected
Indian Members to
the Provincial Legis-
lature

Punjab .. .. 50

United Provinces • • » • 30

Bengal .. .. 40

Bihar and Orissa . . - - 25

Central Provinces • • • • 15

Madras •• -. 15

Bombay .. .. 33

While allowing this proportion of seats to the Muslims, the
right to second vote in the general electorates which they had
under the arrangement of 1909 was taken away.

The Lucknow Pact was adversely criticized by the Montagu-
Chelmsford Report. But being an agreement between the
parties Government did not like to reject it and to substitute in
its place its own decision. Both clauses of the agreement were
accepted by Government and embodied in the Government of
India Act of 1919. The clause relating to legislation was given
effect to but in a different form. Instead of leaving it to the
members of the Legislature to oppose it, it was providedf that
legislation affecting the religion or religious rites and usages of
any class of British subjects in India shall not be introduced at
any meeting of either Chamber of the Indian Legislature with-
out the previous sanction of the Governor-General.

The clause relating to representation was accepted by the
Government, though in the opinion of the Government the
Punjab and Bengal Muslims were not fairly treated.

The effect of these concessions can be seen by reference to
the composition of the Legislatures constituted under the Govern-
ment of India Act, 1919, which was as follows : —

• For some reason the Pact did not settle the proportion of Muslim representation
in Assam.

t Government of India Act, 1919, section 67 (2) (b).

244

Communal Aggression
Composition of the Legislatures

Elected Members.

Nominated
Members.

•*j a

Non-

"cS

<M ,11

CflS

Total

Muslims

Mushms

Officials

1 2

Legislative Assembly

145

104

145

Council of State ...

Madras Provincial Council

118

132

Bombay Provincial Council

111

114

Bengal Provincial Council

125

114

75 16

140

U. P. Provincial Council ...

118

110

71 17

123

Punjab Provincial Council

39 15

.94

Bihar Provincial Council ...

58 15

103

C. P. Provincial Council ...

48 10

Assam Provincial Council

27 7

The extent of representation secured by the Muslims by the
L/ucknow Pact can be seen from the following table*: —

Percentage

Percentage of

Lucknow

of Muslims

oi Muslim

ot elected

Muslim

Pact

to total

Members

Muslim

Members

Percentage

population

to total

Members

to total

of the

No. of

to total

Members

electoral

Members.

No. of

in seats filled

Legislative Body.

area (1921
Census).

elected
Indian

by election
from Indian

Members.

general

(communal)

constituencies.

Punjab ...

55-2

48-5

United Provinces ...

14-3

32-5

Bengal ...

54-6

40-5

Bihar and Orissa ...

10-9

18-5

Central Provinces

4-4

9-5

145

Madras ...

6-7

10-5

16-5

Bombay ...

19*8

25-5

33-3

Assam

32-2

355

37-5

No provi-

sion.

Legislative Assembly

24-0

333

•Statutory Commission, 1929, Report, Vol. I, p. 189.

t Column 3 includes Indians elected by special constituencies, e.g. Commerce,
whose communal proportions may of course vary slightly from time to time. Similarly
column 2, including also officials and nominated non-officials, will show slightly
different results at different periods.

245

Pakistan

This table does not show quite clearly the weightage obtained
by the Muslims under the Lucknow Pact. It was worked out
by the Government of India in their despatch* on the Report
of Franchise Committee of which Lord Southborough was the
Chairman. The following table is taken from that despatch
which shows that the Muslims got a weightage under the Luck-
now Pact far in excess of what Government gave them in 1909.

....

Muslim per-
centage of
Population.

Percentage of
Muslim seats
Proposed.

Percentage
(2) of (1).

Bengal »

52-6

Bihar and Orissa

10-5

238

Bombay

20-4

33-3

163

Central Provinces

4-3

349

Madras

6*5

231

Punjab ... ... ...

54*8

United Provinces

14-0

214

In 1927 the British Government announced the appointment
of the Simon Commission to examine the working of the Indian
Constitution and to suggest further reforms. Immediately the
Muslims came forward with further political demands. These
demands were put forth from various Muslim platforms such as
the Muslim League, All-India Muslim Conference, All-Parties
Muslim Conference, Jamiat-ul-Ulema and the Khilafat Confer-
ence. The demands were substantially the same. It would
suffice to state those that were formulated by Mr. Jinnahf on
behalf of the Muslim League.

* Fifth despatch on Indian Constitutional Reforms (Franchises), dated 23rd April
1919, para 21.

tThc demands are known as Mr. Jinnah's 14 points. As a matter of fact they
are 15 in number and were formulated at a meeting of Muslim leaders of all shades
of opinion held at Delhi in March 1927 and were known as the Delhi Proposals.
For Mr. Jinnah's explanation of the origin of his 14 points, see All-India Register, 1929,
Vol. I. p. 367.

246

Communal Aggression

They were in the following terms : —

1. The form of the future Constitution should be federal
with residuary powers vested in the provinces.

2. A* uniform measure of autonomy should be granted to
all provinces.

3. All legislatures in the country and other elected bodies
should be reconstituted on the definite principle of adequate and
effective representation of minorities in every province without
reducing the majority of any province to a minority or even
equality.

4. In the Central Legislature Muslim representation should
not be less than one-third.

5. The representation of communal groups should continue
to be by means of separate electorates as at present, provided that
it should be open to any community at any time to abandon its
separate electorate in favour of joint electorates.

6. Any territorial redistribution that might at any time be
necessary should not in any way affect the Muslim majority in
the Punjab, Bengal and North- West Province.

7. Full religious liberty, that is, liberty of belief, worship,
observances, propaganda, association and education should be
guaranteed to all communities.

8. No bill or resolution, or any part thereof, should be
passed in any legislature or any other elected body if three-fourths
of the members of any community in that particular body oppose
such bill or resolution or part thereof on the ground that it
would be injurious to the interests of that community or, in the
alternative, such other method as may be devised or as may be
found feasible and practicable to deal with such cases.

9. Sind should be separated from the B mibay Presidency.

10. Reforms should be introduced in the North-West
Frontier Province and Baluchistan on the same footing as in other
provinces.

11. Provision should be made in the Constitution giving
the Muslims an adequate share along with other Indians in all
the Services of the State and in self-governing bodies, having
due regard to the requirements of efficiency.

12. The constitution should embody adequate safeguards
for the protection of Muslim religion, culture and personal law,
and the promotion of Muslim education, language, religion,
personal laws, Muslim charitable institutions, and for their due
share in grants-in-aid given by the State and by self-governing
bodies.

247

Pakistan

13. No Cabinet, either Central or Provincial, should be
formed without there being a proportion of Muslim Ministers
of at least one-third.

14. No change to be made in the Constitution by the Central
Legislature except with the concurrence of the States constituting
the Indian Federation.

15. That in the present circumstances the representation of
Musalmans in the different legislatures of the country and of the
other elected bodies through separate electorates is inevitable,
and, further, Government being pledged not to deprive the
Musalmans of this right, it cannot be taken away without their
consent, and so long as the Musalmaris are not satisfied that their
rights and interests are safeguarded in the manner specified above
(or herein) they would in no way consent to the establishment
of joint electorates with or without conditions.

Note. — The question of excess representation of Musalmans
over and above their population in the provinces where they are
in minority to be considered hereafter.

This is a consolidated statement of Muslim demands. In it
there are some which are old, and some which are new. The
old ones are included because the aim is to retain the advantages
accruing therefrom. The new ones are added in order to remove
the weaknesses in the Muslim position. The new ones are five
in number: (1) Representation in proportion to population to
Muslim majorities in the Punjab and Bengal, (2) One-third
representation to Muslims in the cabinets both Central and Pro-
vincial, (3) Adequate representation of Muslims in the Services,
(4) Separation of Sind from the Bombay Presidency and the
raising of N.-W.F.P. and Baluchistan to the status of self-govern-
ing provinces, and (5) Vesting of residuary powers in the pro-
vinces instead of in the Central Government.

These new demands are self-explanatory except perhaps 1,
4 and 5. The object of demands 1 and 4 was to place, in four
provinces, the Muslim community in a statutory majority where
it had only communal majority, as a force counteracting the six
provinces in which the Hindu community happened to be in a
majority. This was insisted upon as a guarantee of good treat-
ment by both the communities of its minorities. The object of
demand No. 5 was to guarantee Muslim rule in Sind, N.-W.F.P.,
the Punjab and Bengal. But a Muslim majority rule in these
Muslim Provinces, it was feared, woulc^ not be effective if they

248

Communal Aggression

remafoed under the control of the Central Government which
could not but be in the hand of the Hindus. To free the Muslim
Provinces from the control of the Hindu Government at the
Centre was the object for which demand No. 5 was put forth.

These demands were opposed by the Hindus. There may
not be much in this. But what is significant is that they were
also rejected by the Simon Commission. The Simon Commis-
sion, which was by no means unfriendly to the Muslims, gave
some very cogent reasons for rejecting the Muslim demands. It
said* : —

"This claim goes to the length of seeking to preserve the
full security for representation now provided for Muslims in
these six provinces and at the same time to enlarge in Bengal and
the Punjab the present proportion of seats secured to the com-
munity by separate electorates to figures proportionate to their
ratio of population. This would give Muhammadans a fixed and
unalterable majority of the general constituency seats in both
provinces. We cannot go so far. The continuance of the present
scale of weightage in the six provinces could not — in the absence
of a new general agreement between the communities — equitably
be combined with so great a departure from the existing allocation
in Bengal and the Punjab.

" It would be unfair that Muhammadans should retain the
very considerable weightage they enjoy in the six provinces, and
that there should at the same time be imposed, in face of Hindu and
Sikh opposition, a definite Muslim majority in the Punjab and
Bengal unalterable by any appeal to the electorate "

Notwithstanding the opposition of the Hindus and the Sikhs
and the rejection by the Simon Commission, the British Govern-
ment when called upon to act as an arbiter granted the Muslims
all their demands old and new.
%

By a Notification t in the Gazette of India dated 25th January
1932 the Government of India, in exercise of the powers conferred
by sub-section (2) of section 52 A of the Government of India Act,
1916, declared that the N.-W. F. Province shall be treated as a

•Report, Vol. IT, p. 71.

t Notification No. F. 173/31- R in the Gazette of India Extraordinary, dated 25th
January 1932.

249

Pakistan

Governor's Province.* By an Order in Council, issued under the
provisions contained in sub-section (1) of section 289 of the Govern-
ment of India Act of 1935, Sind was separated from Bombay as
from 1st April 1936 and declared to be a Governor's Province to
. be known as the province of Sind. By the Resolution issued by the
Secretary of State for India a'nd published on 7th July 1934 the
Muslim share in the public services was fixed at 25 per cent, of
all appointments Imperial and Provincial. With regard to resi-
duary powers, it is true that the Muslim demand that they should
be vested in the Provinces was not accepted. But in another sense
the Muslim demand in this respect may be deemed to have been
granted. The essence of the Muslim demand was that the
residuary powers should not be vested in the Centre, which, put
in different language, meant that they should not be in the
hands of the Hindus. This is precisely what is done by section
104 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which vests the
residuary powers in the Governor-General to be exercised in
his discretion. The demand for 33 £ per cent, representation
in the Cabinets, Central and Provincial, was not given effect to
by a legal provision in the Act. The right of Muslims to repre-
sentation in the Cabinets was however accepted by the British
Government and provision for giving effect to it was made in
the Instruments of Instructions issued to the Governors and
Governor- General. As to the remaining demand which related
to a statutory majority in the Punjab and Bengal, the demand
was given effect to by the Communal Award. True, a statutory
majority in the whole House has iiot been given to the Muslims
and could not be given having regard to the necessity for pro-
viding representation to other interests. But a statutory majority
as against Hindus has been given to the Muslims of the Punjab
and Bengal without touching the weigh tages obtained by the
Muslim minorities under the Lucknow Pact.

* The Simon Commission had rejected the claim saying: "We entirely share the
view of the Bray Committee that provision ought now to be made for the constitu-
tional advance of the N.-W.F.P But we also agree that the situation of the

Province and its intimate relation with the problem of Indian defence are such that
special arrangements are required. It is not possible, therefore, to apply to it auto-
matically proposals which may be suited for provincial areas in other parts of India."
They justified it by saying : " The inherent right of a man to smoke a cigarette
must necessarily be curtailed if he lives in a powder magazine." — Report. Vol. II,
paras 120-121.

250

Communal Aggression

These political grants to the Muslim community by the
British Government lacked security and it was feared by the
Muslims that pressure might be brought upon them or upon
His Majesty's Government by the Hindus to alter the terms of
the grants to the prejudice of the Muslims. This fear was due
to two reasons. One was the success of Mr. Gandhi in getting
that part of the Award which related to the Depressed Classes
revised by means of the pressure of a fast unto death.* Some
people encouraged by this success actually agitated for revision
of that part of the Award which related to the Muslims and some
Muslims were even found to be in favour of entering into such
negotiations.! This alarmed the Muslim community. The
other reason for the fear of a revision of the terms of the grants
arose out of certain amendments in the clauses in the Govern-
ment of India Bill which were made in the House of Commons
permitting such revision under certain conditions. To remove
these fears and to give complete security to the Muslims against
hasty and hurried revision of the grants, His Majesty's Govern-
ment authorized the Government of India to issue the following
communique J : —

"It has come to the notice of His Majesty's Government that
the impression is prevalent that what is now Clause 304 of the
Government of India Bill, (numbered 285 in the Bill as first
introduced and 299 in the Bill as amended by the Commons in
Committee) has been amended during the passage of the Bill
through the Commons in such a way as to give His Majesty's
Government unfettered power to alter at any time they may
think fit the constitutional provisions based upon what is com-
monly known as Government's Communal Award.

"His Majesty's Government think it desirable to give the

following brief explanation both of what they consider is the

practical effect of Clause 304 in relation to any change in the

Communal Award and of their own policy in relation to any
such change.

"Under this Clause there is conferred on the Governments
and Legislatures in India, after the expiry of ten years, the right
of initiating a proposal to modify the provisions and regulating

• This resulted in the Poona Pact which was signed on 24th September 1932.
t For the efforts to get the Muslim part of the Award revised, see All- India
Rtgisttr, 1932, Vol. II, pp. 281-315.

J The communique is dated Simla July 2, 1935.

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Pakistan

various matters relating to the constitution of the Legislature,
including such questions as were covered by the Communal
Award.

"The Clause also imposes on the Secretary of State the duty
of laying before Parliament from the Governor-General or the
Governor as the case may be his opinion as to the proposed
amendment and in particular as to the effect which it would
have on the interests of any minority and of informing Parlia-
ment of any action which he proposed to take.

" Any change in the constitutional provisions resulting from
this procedure can be effected by an Order in Council, but this is
subject to the proviso that the draft of the proposed Order
has been affirmatively approved by both Houses of Parliament
by a resolution. The condition is secured by Clause 305 of the
Bill.

" Before the expiry of ten years there is no similar constitu-
tional initiative residing in the Governments and the Legislatures of
India. Power is, however, conferred by the Clause to make such a
change by an Order in Council (always with the approval of both
Houses of Parliament) even before the end of ten years, but
within the first ten years (and indeed subsequently, if the initiative
has not come from the Legislatures of India) it is iiicumbeut upon
the Secretary of State to consult the Governments and the
Legislatures of India who will be affected (unless the change is of a
minor character) before any Order in Council is laid before Parlia-
ment for its approval.

"The necessity for the powers referred to in the preceding
paragraph is due to such reasons as the following : —

"(a) It is impossible to foresee when the necessity may
arise for amending minor details connected with the franchise
and the constitution of legislatures, and for such amendment
it will be olearly disadvantageous to have no method avail-
able short of a fresh amending Act of Parliament, nor is it
practicable statntorily to separate such details from the more
important matter such as the terms of the Communal Award;

"(b) It might also become desirable, in the event of a
unanimous agreement between the communities in India, to
make a modification in the provisions based on the Communal
Award ; and for such an agreed change it would also be
disadvantageous to have no other method available than an
amending Act of Parliament.

" Within the range of the Communal Award His Majesty's
Government would not propose, in the exercise of any power
conferred by this Clause, to recommend to Parliament any change
unless such changes had been agreed to between the communities
concerned.

252

Communal Aggression

" In conclusion, His Majesty's Government would again em-
phasise the fact that none of the powers in Clause 304 can, in
view of the provisions in Clause 305, be exercised unless both
Houses of Parliament agreed by an affirmative resolution."

After taking into account what the Muslims demanded at
the R.T.C. and what was conceded to them, any one could have
thought that the limit of Muslim demands was reached and that
the 1932 settlement was a final settlement. But, it appears that
even with this the Musalmans are not satisfied. A further list
of new demands for safeguarding the Muslim position seems to
be ready. In the controversy that went on between Mr. Jinnah
and the Congress in the year 1938, Mr. Jinnah was asked to dis-
close his demands which he refused to do. But these demands
have come to the surface in the correspondence that passed
between Pandit Nehru and Mr. Jinnah in the course of the con-
troversy and they have been tabulated by Pandit Nehru in one
of his letters to Mr. Jimiah. His tabulation gives the following
items as being matters of disputes and requiring settlement*: —

(1) The fourteen points formulated by the Muslim
League in 1929.

(2) The Congress should withdraw all opposition to the
Communal Award and should not describe it as a negation
of nationalism.

(3) The share of the Muslims in the state services should
be definitely fixed in the constitution by statutory enactment.

(4) Muslim personal law and culture should be
guaranteed by statute.

(5) The Congress should take in hand the agitation in
connection with the Sahidganj Mosque and should use its
moral pressure to enable the Muslims to gain possession of
the Mosque.

(6) The Muslims' right to call Azan and perform their
religious ceremonies should not be fettered in any way.

(7) Muslims should have freedom to perform cow-
slaughter.

• Indian Annual Register. 1938, Vol. I, p. 369.

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Pakistan

(8) Muslim majorities in the Provinces, where such
majorities exist at present, must not be affected by any terri-
torial re-distribution or adjustments.

(9) The ' Bande Mataram ' song should be given up.

(10) Muslims want Urdu to be the national language of
India and they desire to have statutory guarantees that the
use of Urdu shall not be curtailed or damaged.

(11) Muslim representation in the local bodies should be
governed by the principles underlying the Communal Award,
that is, separate electorates and population strength.

(12) The tricolour flag should be changed or alternately
the flag of the Muslim League should be given equal
importance.

(13) Recognition of the Muslim League as the one
authoritative and representative organization of Indian
Muslims.

(14) Coalition Ministries should be formed.

With this new list, there is no knowing where the Muslims
are going to stop in their demands. Within one year, that is,
between 1938 and 1939, one more demand and that too of a
substantial character, namely 50 per cent, share in everything,
has been added to it. In this catalogue of new demands there
are some which on the face of them are extravagant and impos-
sible, if not irresponsible. As an instance, one may refer to the
demand for fifty-fifty and the demand for the recognition of
Urdu as the national language of India. In 1929, the Muslims
insisted that in allotting seats in Legislatures, a majority shall
not be reduced to a minority or equality.* This principle, enun-
ciated by themselves, it is now demanded, shall be abandoned
and a majority shall be reduced to equality. The Muslims in
1929 admitted that the other minorities required protection and
that they must have it in the same manner as the Muslims.
The only distinction made between the Muslims and other
minorities was as to the extent of the protection. The Muslims
claimed a higher degree of protection than was conceded to the
other minorities on the ground of their political importance.

9 See point No. 3 in Mr. Jinnah's:14 points.
254

Communal Aggression

The necessity and adequacy of protection for the other minorities
the Muslims never denied. But with this new demand of 50
per cent, the Muslims are not only seeking to reduce the Hindu
majority to a minority but they are also cutting into the political
rights of the other minorities. The Muslims are now speaking
the language of Hitler and claiming a place in the sun as Hitler
has been doing for Germany. For their demand for 50 per cent,
is nothing but a counterpart of the German claims for Deutsch-
land Uber Alles and Lebensraum for themselves, irrespective of
what happens to other minorities.

Their claim for the recognition of Urdu as the national
language of India is equally extravagant. Urdu is not only not
spoken all over India but is not even the language of all the
Musalmaus of India. Of the 68 millions of Muslims* only 28
millions speak Urdu. The proposal of making Urdu the national
language means that the language of 28 millions of Muslims is
to be imposed particularly upon 40 millions of Musalmans or
generally upon 322 millions of Indians.

It will thus be seen that every time a proposal for the reform
of the constitution comes forth, the Muslims are there, ready
with some new political demand or demands. The only check
upon such indefinite expansion of Muslim demands is the power
of the British Government, which must be the final arbiter in
any dispute between the Hindus and the Muslims. Who can
confidently say that the decision of the British will not be in
favour of the Muslims if the dispute relating to these new
demands was referred to them for arbitration ? The more the
Muslims demand the more accommodating the British seem to
become. At any rate, past experience shows that the British have
been inclined to give the Muslims more than what the Muslims
had themselves asked. Two such instances can be cited.

One of these relates to the Lucknow Pact. The question
was whether the British Government should accept the Pact.
The authors of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report were disin-
clined to accept it for reasons which were very weighty. Speak-

* These figures relate to the Census of 1921.

255

Pakistan

ing of tlie weightages granted to the Muslims by the Lucknow
Pact, the "authors of the Joint Report observed* : —

"Now a privileged position of this kind is open to the
objection, that if any other community hereafter makes good a
claim to separate representation, it can be satisfied only by deduct-
ing the non-Muslim seats, or by a rateable deduction from both
Muslim and non-Muslim ; and Hindu and Muslim opinion are
not likely to agree which process should be adopted. While,
therefore, for reasons that we explain subsequently we assent to
the maintenance of separate representation for Muhammadans,
we are bound to reserve our approval of the particular proposals
set before us, until we have ascertained what the effect upon other
interests will be, and have made fair provision for them."

Notwithstanding this grave flaw in the Lucknow Pact, the
Government of India, in its despatch referred to above, recom-
mended that the terms of the Pact should be improved in so far
as it related to the Muslims of Bengal. Its reasons make a
strange reading. It argued that : —

"The Muhammad an representation which they [the authors
of the Pact] propose for Bengal is manifestly insufficient. + It is
questionable whether the claims of the Muhammadan population
of Eastern Bengal were adequately pressed when the Congress-
League compact was in the making. They are conspicuously a
backward and impoverished community. The repartition of the
presidency in 1912 came as a severe disappointment to them, and
we should be very loath to fail in seeing that their interests are
now generously secured. In order to give the Bengal Muslims
a representation proportionate to their numbers, and no more,
we should allot them 44 instead of 34 seats [due to them under
the Pact]."

This enthusiasm for the Bengal Muslims shown by the
Government of India was not shared by the British Government.
It felt that as the number of seats given to the Bengal Muslims
was the result of an agreement, any interference to improve the
bargain when there was no dispute about the genuineness of
the agreement, could not but create the impression that the
British Government was in some special sense and for some
special reason the friend of the Muslims. In suggesting this

* M -ntagu-Chclmsford Report, 1918, para 163.

t The Government of India felt that injustice was done to the Punjab as well.
But as there was no such special reason as there was in the case of Bengal, namely,
the unsettling of the partition, they did not propose any augmentation in its representa-
tion as settled by the Pact.

256

Communal Aggression

augmentation in the seats, the Government of India forgot to
take note of the reason why the Muslims of the Punjab and
Bengal were not given by the Pact seats in proportion to their
population. The Lucknow Pact was based upon the principle,
now thrown to the winds, that a community as such was not
entitled to political protection. A community was entitled to
protection when it was in a minority. That was the principle
underlying the Lucknow Pact. The Muslim community in the
Punjab and Bengal was not in a minority and, therefore, was not;
entitled to the same protection which it got in other Provinces
where it was in a minority. Notwithstanding their being in a
majority, the Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal felt the neces-
sity of separate electorates. According to the principle under-
lying the Pact they could qualify themselves for this only by
becoming a minority which they did by agreeing to a minority
of seats. This is the reason why the Muslims of Bengal and the
Punjab did not get the majority of seats they were entitled to on
the population basis.*

The proposal of the Government of India to give to the
Bengal Muslims more than what they had asked for did not go
through. But the fact that they wanted to do so remains as
evidence of their inclinations.

The second occasion when the British Government as an
arbiter gave the Muslims more than they asked for was when
the Communal Decision was given in 1932. Sir Muhammad
Shafi made two different proposals in the Minorities Sub-Com-
mittee of the R. T. C. In his speech on 6th January 1931, Sir

* There is no doubt that this was well understood by the Muslims who were
parties to the Pact. This is what Mr. Jinnah said as a witness appearing before the
Joint Select Committee appointed by Parliament on the Government of India Bill,
1919, in reply to question No. 3808 : " The position of Bengal was this : In Bengal
the Muslims are in a majority, and the argument was advanced that any section or
any community which is in the majority cannot claim a separate electorate : separate
electorate is to protect the minority. But the counter-argument was perfectly true that
numerically we are in a majority but as voters we are in the minority in Bengal, because
of poverty and backwardness and so qn. It was said : Very well, then fix 40 per
cent., because if you are really put to test you will not get 40 per cent, because you
will not be qualified as voters. Then we had the advantage in other Provinces."

IT 257

Pakistan

Muhammad Shafi put forth the following proposal as a basis
for communal settlement* : —

"We are prepared to accept joint electorates on the conditions
named by me : Firstly, that the rights at present enjoyed by
the Musalmans in the minority Provinces should be continued
to them ; that in the Punjab and in Bengal they should have two
joint electorates and representation on a population basis; that
there should be the principle of reservation of seats coupled with
Maulana Mahomed All's condition/'!

In his speech on 14th January 1931 before the same Com-
mittee he made a different offer. He saidj : —

"To-day I am authorized to make this offer: that in the
Punjab the Musalmans should have through communal elector-
ates 49 per cent, of the entire number of seats in the whole
House, and should have liberty to contest the special constituencies
which it is proposed to create in that Province : so far as Bengal
is concerned that Musalmans should have through communal
electorates 46 per cent, representation in the whole House, and
should have the liberty to contest the special constituencies which
it is proposed to create in that Province ; in so far as the minority
Provinces are concerned, the Musalmans should continue to
enjoy the weightage which they have at present through separate
electorates, similar weigbtage to be given to our Hindu brethren
in Sind, and to our Hindu and Sikh brethren in the North- West
•Frontier Province. If at any time hereafter two-thirds of the
representatives of any community in any Provincial Legislative
Council or in the Central Legislative Council desire to give up
communal electorates and to accept joint electorates then there-
after the system of joiut electorates should come into being."

The difference between the two proposals is clear. "Joint
electorates, if accompanied by statutory majority. If statutory
majority was refused, then a minority of seats with separate
electorates." The British Government took statutory majority
from the first demand and separate electorates from the second
demand and gave the Muslims both when they had not asked
for both.

* Report of the Minorities Sub-Committee of the first R. T. C. (Indian Edition),
p. 96.

t Mr. Mahomed Ali's formula was for Joint Electorates and Reserved Seats with
this proviso that no candidate shall be declared elected unless he had secured at
least 40 per cent, of the votes of his own community and at least 5 or 10 per cent.
of the votes of the other community.

t Ibid., p. 123.

258

Communal Aggression

The second thing that is noticeable among the Muslims is
the spirit*of exploiting the weaknesses of the Hindus. If the
Hindus object to anything, the Muslim policy seems to be to
insist upon it and give it up only when the Hindus show them-
selves ready to offer a price for it by giving the Muslims some
other concessions. As an illustration of this, one can refer to the
question of separate and joint electorates. The Hindus have
been to my mind utterly foolish in fighting over joint electorates
especially in Provinces in which the Muslims are in a minority.
Joint electorates can never suffice for a basis for nationalism.
Nationalism is not a matter of political nexus or cash nexus, for
the simple reason that union cannot be the result of calculation
of mere externals. Where two communities live a life which
is exclusive and self-inclosed for five years, they will not be one,
because, they are made to come together on one day in five
years for the purposes of voting in an election. Joint electorates
may produce the enslavement of the minor community by the
major community : but by themselves they cannot produce
nationalism. Be that as it inayr because the Hindus have been
insisting upon joint electorates the Muslims have been insisting
upon separate electorates. That this insistence is a matter of
bargain only can be seen from Mr. Jinnah's 14 points* and the
resolution! passed in the Calcutta session of the All-India
Muslim League held on 30th December 1927. Therein it was
stipulated that only when the Hindus agreed to the separation
of Sind and to the raising of the N.-W. F. P. to the status of a
self-governing Province the Musalmans would consent to give
up separate electorates. J The Musalmans evidently did not
regard separate electorates as vital. They regarded them as a
good quid pro quo for obtaining their other claims.

Another illustration of this spirit of exploitation is furnished
by the Muslim insistence upon cow-slaughter and the stoppage
of music before mosques. Islamic law does not insist upon the
slaughter of the cow for sacrificial purposes and no Musalman,

*See point No. 15 in Mr. Jinnah's points.

fFor the resolution and the speech of Mr. Barkat Ali thereon, see the Indian
Quarterly Register, 1927, Vol. II, pp. 447-48.

I The unfortunate thing for the Hindus is that they did not get joint electorates
although the Musalmans got the concessions.

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Pakistan

when lie goes to Haj, sacrifices the cow in Mecca or Medina.
But in India they will not be content with the sacrifice of any
other animal. Music may be played before a mosque in all
Muslim countries without any objection. Even in Afghanistan,
which is not a secularized country, no objection is taken to
music before a mosque. But in India the Musalmans must
insist upon its stoppage for no other reason except that the
Hindus claim a right to it.

The third thing that is noticeable is the adoption by the
Muslims of the gangster's method in politics. The riots are a
sufficient indication that gangsterism has become a settled part
of their strategy in politics. They seem to be consciously and
deliberately imitating the Sudeten Germans in the means em-
ployed by them against the Czechs.* So long as the Muslims
were the aggressors, the Hindus were passive, and in the conflict
they suffered more than the Muslims did. But this is no longer
true. The Hindus have learned to retaliate and no longer feel
any compunction in knifing a Musalman. This spirit of reta-
liation bids fair to produce the ugly spectacle of gangsterism
against gangsterism.

How to meet this problem must exercise the minds of all
concerned. There are the sinrple-niinded Hindu Maha Sabha
patriots who believe that the Hindus have only to make up their
minds to wipe the Musalmans and they will be brought to their
senses. On the other hand, there are the Congress Hindu
Nationalists whose policy is to tolerate and appease the Musal-
mans by political and other concessions, because they believe that
they cannot reach their cherished goal of independence unless
the Musalmans back their demand. The Hindu Maha Sabha
plan is no way to unity. On the contrary, it is a sure block to
progress. The slogan of the Hindu Maha Sabha President —
Hindustan for Hindus — is not merely arrogant bitt is arrant
nonsense. The question, however, is : is the Congress way the
right way ? It seems to me that the Congress has failed to
realize two things. The first thing which the Congress has
failed to realize is that there is a difference between appeasement

* In the Karachi session of the All-India Muslim League both Mr. Jinnah and
Sir Abdullah Haroon compared the Muslims of India to the "Sudeten" of the
Muslim world and capable of doing what the Sudeten Germans did to Czechoslovakia.

260

Communal Aggression

and settlement, and that the difference is an essential one. Ap-
peasement means buying off the aggressor by conniving at his
acts of murder, rape, arson and loot against innocent persons
who happen for the moment to be the victims of his
displeasure. On the other hand, settlement means laying down
the bounds which neither party to it can transgress. Appease-
ment sets no limits to the demands and aspirations of the
aggressor. Settlement does. The second thing the Congress
has failed to realize is that the policy of concession has increased
Muslim aggressiveness, and what is worse, Muslims interpret
these concessions as a sign of defeatism on the part of the Hindus
and the absence of the will to resist. This policy of appease-
ment will involve the Hindus in the same fearful situation in
which the Allies found themselves as a result of the policy of
appeasement which they adopted towards Hitler. This is an-
other malaise, no less acute than the malaise of social stagnation.
Appeasement will surely aggravate it. The only remedy for it
is a settlement. If Pakistan is a settlement, it is a proposition
worth consideration. As a settlement it will do away with this
constant need of appeasement and ought to be welcomed by
all those who prefer the peace and tranquillity of a settlement to
the insecurity due to the growing political appetite shown by
the Muslims in their dealings with the Hindus.

261

CHAPTER XII

NATIONAL FRUSTRATION

Suppose an Indian was asked, what is the highest destiny
you wish for your country, what would be his answer ? The
question is important, and the answer cannot but be instructive.

There can be no doubt that other things being equal, a
hundred per cent Indian, proud of his country, would say, " An
integral and independent India is my ideal of India's destiny."
It will be equally true to say that unless this destiny was accept-
ed by both Hindus as well as Muslims, the ideal can only
convey a pious wish, and can never take a concrete form. Is it
only a pious wish of some or is it a goal to be pursued by all ?

So far as profession of political aims goes, all parties seem to
be in agreement inasmuch as all of them have declared that the
goal of India's political evolution is Independence. The Congress
was the first to announce that its aim was to achieve political
independence for India. In its Madras session, held in Decem-
ber 1927, the creed of the Congress was defined in a special
resolution to the effect that the goal of the Indian people * was
complete national independence. The Hindu Maha Sabha until
1932 was content to have Responsible Government as the goal of
India's political evolution. It made no change in its political
creed till 1937 when in its session held at Ahmedabad it declar-
ed that the Hindu Maha Sabha believed in " Poorna Swaraj ", i.e.,
absolute political independence for India. The Muslim League
declared its political creed in 1912 to be the establishment of

• The creed of the Congress was not changed at Madras. It was changed at the
Lahore session of the Congress by a resolution passed on 31st December 1929. In
the Madras session only a resolution in favour of independence was passed. In the
Calcutta session of the Congress held in December 1928 both Mr. Gandhi and the
President of the Congress declared themselves willing to accept Dominion Status if
it was offered by the British Government by midnight of 31st December 1929.

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Pakistan

Responsible Government in India. In 1937 it made a similar
advance by changing its creed from Responsible Government
to Independence and thereby brought itself in line with the
Congress and the Hindu Maha Sabha.

This independence defined by the three political bodies
means freedom from British Imperialism. But an agreement on
freedom from the yoke of British Imperialism is not enough.
There must be an agreement upon maintaining an independent
India. For this, there must be an agreement that India shall not
only be free and independent of the British but that her freedom
and independence shall be maintained as against any other
foreign power. Indeed, the obligation to maintain her freedom
is more important than merely winning freedom from the
British. But on this more important obligation there does not
seem to be the same unanimity. At any rate, the attitude of the
Muslims on this point has not been very assuring. It is obvious
from the numerous utterances of Muslim leaders that they do
not accept the obligation to maintain India's freedom. I give
below two such utterances.

In a meeting held in Lahore in 1925 Dr. Kitchlew said* : —

" The Congress was lifeless till the Khilafat Committee put
life in it. When the Khilafat Committee joined it, it did in one
year what the Hindu Congress had not done in 40 years. The
Congress also did the work of uplifting the seven crores of un-
touchables. This was purely a work for the Hindus, and yet
the money of the Congress was spent on it. Mine and my
Mn salman brethren's money was spent on it like water. But the
brave Musalnians did not mind. Then why should the Hindus
quarrel with us when we Musalmans take up the Tanzim work
and spend on it money that belongs neither to the Hindus nor
to the Congress ?

" If we remove British rule from this country and establish
Swaraj, and if the Afghans or other Muslims invade India, then
we Muslims will oppose them and sacrifice all our sons in order
to save the country from the invasion. But one thing I shall
declare plainly. Listen, my dear Hindu brothers, listen very
attentively ! If you put obstacles in the path of our Tanzim
movement, and do not give us our rights, we shall make com-
mon cause with Afghanistan or some other Musalman power
and establish our rule in this country."

* " Through Indian Eyes." Times of India dated 14-3-25.
264

National Frustration

Maulana Azad Sobhani in his speech* made on the 27th
January 1939 at Sylhet expressed sentiments which are worthy
of attention. In reply to the question of a Maulana, Maulana
Azad Sobhani said : —

" If there is any eminent leader in India who is in favour
of driving out the English from this country, then I am that
leader. In spite of this I want that there should be no fight
with the English on behalf of the Muslim League. Our
big fight is with the 22 crores of our Hindu enemies, who con-
stitute the majority. Only 4i crores of Englishmen have practi-
cally swallowed the whole world by becoming powerful. And
if these 22 crores of Hindus who are equally advanced in learning,
intelligence and wealth as in numbers, if they become powerful,
then these Hindus will swallow Muslim India and gradually
even Egypt, Turkey, Kabul, Mecca, Medina and other Muslim
principalities, like Yajuj-Majuj (it is so mentioned in the Koran
that before the destruction of the world, they will appear on the
earth and will devour whatever they will find).

"The English are gradually becoming weak .... they will
go away from India in the near future. So if we do not fight
the greatest enemies of Islam, the Hindiis, from now on and
make them weak, then they will not only establish Ramrajya in
India but also gradually spread all over the world. It depends
on the 9 crores of Indian Muslims either to strengthen or to
weaken them (the Hindus). So it is the essential duty of every
devout Muslim to fight on by joining the Muslim League so
that the Hindiis may not be established here and a Muslim rule
may be established in India as soon as the English depart.

"Though the English are the enemies of the Muslims, yet
for the present our fight is not with the English. At first we
have to come to some understanding with the Hindus through
the Muslim League. Then we shall be easily able to drive out
the English and establish Muslim rule in India.

"Be careful! Don't fall into the trap of Congress Maulvis;
because the Muslim world is never safe in the hands of 22 crores
of Hindu enemies."

According to the summary of the speech given by the cor-
respondent of the Anand Bazar Patrika Maulana Azad Sobhani
then narrated various imaginary incidents of oppressions on
Muslims in Congress provinces.

"He said that when the Congress accepted ministry after
the introduction of Provincial Autonomy, he felt that Muslim

* The Bengali version of the speech appeared in the Anand Bazar Patrika.
The English version of it given here is a translation made for me by the Editor of
the Hindustan Standard.

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Pakistan

interests were not safe in the hands of the Hindu-dominated
Congress; but the Hindu leaders felt indifferently and so he left
the Congress and joined the League. What he had feared has
been put in reality by the Congress ministers. This forestalling
of the future is called politics. He was, therefore, a great
politician. He was again thinking that before India became
independent some sort of understanding had to be arrived at
with the Hindus either by force or in a friendly way. Other-
wise, the Hindus, who had been the slaves of the Muslims for
700 years, would enslave the Muslims."

The Hindus are aware of what is passing in the mind of the
Muslims and dread the possibility of Muslims using independ-
ence to enslave them. As a result Hindus are lukewarm towards
making independence as the goal of India's political evolution.
These are not the fears of those who are not qualified to judge.
On the contrary, the Hindus who have expressed their appre-
hensions as to the wisdom of heading for independence are those
who are eminently qualified by their contact with Muslim leaders
to express an opinion.

Mrs. Annie Besant.says* : —

11 Another serious question arises with regard to the Muham-
madans of India, If the relation between Muslims and Hindus
were as it was in the Lucknow days, this question would not
be so urgent, though it would even then have almost certainly
arisen, sooner or later, in an Independent India. But since the
Khilafat agitation, things have changed and it has been one of
the many injuries inflicted on India by the encouragement of
the Khilafat crusade, that the inner Muslim feeling of hatred
against 'unbelievers* has sprung up, naked and unashamed,
as in years gone by. We have seen revived, as guide in practical
politics, the old Muslim religion of the sword, we have seen the
dragging out of centuries of forgetful ness, the old exclusiveness,
claiming the Jazirut-Arab, the island of Arabia, as a holy land
which may not be trodden by the polluting foot of a non-Muslim,
we have heard Muslim leaders declare that if the Afghans invad-
ed India, they would join their fellow believers, and would slay
the Hindus who defended their motherland against the foe:
we have been forced to see that the primary allegiance of Musal-
mans is to Islamic countries, not to our motherland ; we have
learned that their dearest hope is to establish the 'Kingdom of
God1, not God as Father of the world, loving all his creatures,
but as a God seen through Musalman spectacles resembling in
his command through one of the prophets, as to the treatment
of unbeliever— the Mosaic JEHO VA of the early Hebrews, when

• The Future of Indian Politics, pp. 301-305.
266

National Frustration

they were fighting as did the early Muslims, for freedom to
follow the religion given to them by their prophet. The world
has gone beyond such so-called theocracies, in which God's com-
mands are given through a man. The claim now put forward
by Musalman leaders that they must obey the laws of their
particular prophet above the laws of the State in which they
live, is subversive of civic order and the stability of the State ;
it makes them bad citizens for their centre of allegiance is outside
the nation and they cannot, while they hold the views proclaim-
ed by Maulanas Mahomed Ali and Shaukat All, to name the most
prominent of these Muslim leaders, be trusted by their fellow
citizens. If India were independent the Muslim part of the
population — for the ignorant masses would follow those who
appealed to them in the name of their prophet — would become
an immediate peril to India's freedom- Allying themselves with
Afghanistan, Baluchistan, Persia, Iraq, Arabia, Turkey and Egypt
and with such of the tribes of Central Asia who are Musalmans,
they would rise to place India under the Rule of Islam — those
in ' British India ' being helped by the Muslims in Indian States

— and would establish Musalman rule. We had thought that
Indian Musalmans were loyal to their motherland, and indeed,
we still hope that some of the educated class might strive to
prevent such a Musalman rising; but they are too few for
effective resistance and would be murdered as apostates. Malabar
has taught us what Islamic rule still means, and we do not want
to see another specimen of the 'Khilafat Raj' in India. How
much sympathy with tne Moplas is felt by Muslims outside
Malabar has been proved by the defence raised for them by their
fellow believers, and by Mr. Gandhi himself, who stated that
they had acted as they believed that religion taught them to act.
I fear that that is true ; but there is no place in a civilised land
for people who believe that their religion teaches them to murder,
rob, rape, burn, or drive away out of the country those who refuse
to apostatise from their ancestral faiths, except in its schools,
under surveillance, or in its gaols. The Thugs believed that
their particular form of God commanded them to strangle people

— especially travellers with money. Such 'Laws of God' can-
not be allowed to override the laws of a civilised country, and
people living in the twentieth century must either educate people
who hold these Middle Age views, or else exile them. Their
place is in countries sharing their opinions, where they can still
use such arguments against any who differ from them — as indeed,
Persia and with the Parsis long ago, and the Bahaists in our
own time. In fact, Muslim sects are not safe in a country ruled
by orthodox Muslims. British rule in India has protected the
freedom of all sects: Shiahs, Sun nis, Sufis, Bahaists live in safety
under her sceptre, although it cannot protect any of them from
social ostracism, where it is in a minority. Musalmans are

267

Pakistan

more free under British rule, than in countries where there are
Muslim rulers. In thinking of an Independent India, the menace
of Muhammadan fule has to be considered."

Similar fear was expressed by Lala Lajpatrai in a letter* to
Mr. C. R. Das :—

"There is one point more which has been troubling me very
much of late and one which I want you to think carefully and
that is the question of Hindu-Mohamedan unity. I have devot-
ed most of my time during the last six months to the study of
Muslim history and Muslim Law and I am inclined to think, it
is neither possible nor practicable. Assuming and admitting the
sincerity of the Mohamedan leaders in the Non-co-operation
movement, I think their religion provides an effective bar to
anything of the kind. You remember the conversation, I report-
ed to you in Calcutta, which I had with Hakim Ajmalkhan and
Dr- Kitchlew. There is no finer Mohamedan in Hindustan than
Hakimsaheb but can any other Muslim leader override the
Quran? I can only hope that my reading of Islamic Law is
incorrect, and nothing would relieve me more than to be con-
vinced that it is so. But if it is right then it comes to this that
although we can unite against the British we cannot do so to
rule Hindustan on British lines, we cannot do so to rule
Hindustan on democratic lines. What is then the remedy? I
am not afraid of seven crores in Hindustan but I think the seven
crores of Hindustan plus the armed hosts of Afghanistan, Central
Asia, Arabia, Mesopotamia and Turkey will be irresistible. I do
honestly and sincerely believe in the necessity or desirability of
Hindu-Muslim unity. I am also fully prepared to trust the
Muslim leaders, but what about the injunctions of the Quran and
Hadis? The leaders cannot override them. Are we then
doomed? I hope not. I hope your learned mind and wise
head will find some way out of this difficulty."

In 1924 the editor of a Bengalee paper had an interview with
the poet Dr. Rabindra Nath Tagore. The report of this inter-
view states! : —

" . . . . another very important factor which, according to
the poet, was making it almost impossible for the Hindu-Moha-
medan unity to become an accomplished fact was that the
Mohamedans could not confine their patriotism to any one
country .... The poet said that he had very frankly asked many
Mohamedans whether, in the event of any Mohamedau power
invading India, they would stand side by side with their Hindu
neighbours to defend their common land. He could not be

• Quoted in Life of Savarkar by Indra Prakash.

t Quoted in "Through Indian Eyes" in the Times of India dated 18-4-24.

268

National Frustration

satisfied with the reply he got from them. He said that he could
definitely state that even such men as Mr. Mahomed Ali had
declared that under no circumstances was it permissible for any
Mohamedan, whatever his country might be, to stand against
any other Mohamedan."

If independence is impossible, then the destiny acceptable to
a hundred per cent. Indian as the next best would be for India
to have the status of a Dominion within the British Empire.
Who would be content with such a destiny ? I feel certain that
left to themselves the Musalmans will not be content with
Dominion Status while the Hindus most certainly will. Such
a statement is sure to jar on the ears of Indians and Englishmen.
The Congress being loud and vociferous in its insistence of inde-
pendence, the impression prevails that the Hindus are for inde-
pendence and the Muslims are for Dominion Status. Those who
were present at the R.T. C., could not have failed to realize how
strong a hold this impression had taken of the English mind
and how the claims and interests of the Hindus suffered an injury
because of the twin cries raised by the Congress, namely, inde-
pendence and repudiation of debts. Listening to these cries,
Englishmen felt that the Hindus were the enemies of the British
and the Muslims, who did not ask either for independence or
repudiation, were their friends. This impression, however true
it may be in the light of the avowed plans of the Congress, is a
false impression created by false propaganda. For, there can be
no doubt that the Hindus are at heart for Dominion Status and
that the Muslims are at heart for Independence. If proof is
wanted there is an abundance of it.

The question of independence was first raised in 1921. In
that year the Indian National Congress, the All-India Khilafat
Conference and the All-India Muslim League held their annual
sessions in the city of Ahmedabad. Each had a resolution in
favour of Independence moved in its session. It is interesting
to note the fate which the resolution met at the hands of the
Congress, the Khilafat Conference and the Muslim League.

The President of the Congress was Hakim Ajmal Khan who
acted for Mr. C. R. Das, who though duly elected could not

269

Pakistan

preside owing to his arrest by Government before the session
commenced. In the session of the Congress, Maulana Hasrat
Mohani moved a resolution pressing for a change in the creed
of the Congress. Tke following is the summary of the pro-
ceedings* relating to the resolution : —

"Maulana Hasrat Mohani in proposing his resolution on
complete independence made a long and impassioned speech in
Urdu. He said, although they had been promised Swaraj last
year, the redress of the Khilafat and the Punjab wrongs within
a year, they had so far achieved nothing of the sort. Therefore
it was no use sticking to the programme. If remaining within
the British Empire or the British Commonwealth they could not
have freedom, he felt that, if necessary, they should not hesitate
to go out of it. In the words of Lok. Tilak 'liberty was their
birth-right,' and any Government which denied this elementary
right of freedom of speech and freedom of action did not deserve
allegiance from the people. Home Rule on Dominion lines or
Colonial Self-Government could not be a substitute to them for
their inborn liberty. A Government which could clap into jail
such distinguished leaders of the people as Mr. Chitta Ranjan
Das, Pandit Motilal Nehru, L,ala Lajpat Rai and others, had
forfeited all claim to respect from the people. And since the
end of the year did not bring them Swaraj nothing should pre-
vent them from taking the only course left open to them now,
that of winning their freedom free from all foreign control. The
resolution reads as follows : —

'"The object of the Indian National Congress is the attain-
ment of Swaraj or complete independence free from all foreign
control by the people of India by all legitimate and peaceful
means.'"

After several delegates had spoken in favour of it, Mr.
Gandhi came forward to oppose the resolution. In opposing
the resolution, Mr. Gandhi said : —

"Friends, I have said only a few words in Hindi in connec-
tion with the proposition of Mr. Hasrat Mohani. All I want
to say to you in English is that the levity with which that pro-
position has been taken by some of you has grieved me. It has
grieved me because it shows lack of responsibility. As respon-
sible men and women we should go back to the days of Nagpur
and Calcutta and we should remember what we did only an
hour ago. An hour ago we passed a resolution which actually
contemplates a final settlement of the Khilafat and the Punjab
wrongs and transference of the power from the hands of the

* Sec The Indian Annual Register, 1922, Appendix, pp. 64-66.
270 *

National Frustration

bureaucracy into the hands of the people by certain definite
means. Are you going to rub the whole of that position from
your mind by raising a false issue and by throwing a bombshell
in the midst of the Indian atmosphere? I hope that those of
you who have voted for the previous resolution, will think fifty
times before taking up this resolution and voting for it. We shall
be charged by the thinking portion of the world that we do not
know really where we are. I^et us understand, top, our limita-
tions. Let Hindus and Musalmans have absolute, indissoluble
unity. Who is here who can say today with confidence: 'Yes
Hindu-Muslim unity has become an indissoluble factor of Indian
Nationalism ? ' Who is here who can tell me that the Parsis
and the Sikhs and the Christians and the Jews and the untouch-
ables about whom you heard this afternoon — who will tell me
that those very people will not rise against any such idea ?
Think therefore fifty times before you take a step which will
redound not to your credit, not to your advantage, but which
may cause you irreparable injury. Let us first of all gather up
our strength ; let us first of all sound our own depths. Let us
not go into waters whose depths we do not know, and this
proposition of Mr. Hasrat Mohani lands you into depths un-
fathomable. I ask you in all confidence to reject that proposi-
tion, if you believe in the proposition that you passed only an
hour ago. The proposition now before you rubs off the whole
of the effect of the proposition that you passed only a moment
ago. Are creeds such simple things like clothes which a man
can change at will ? For creeds people die, and for creeds people
live from age to age. Are you going to change the creed which
with all deliberation and after great debate in Nagpur, you
accepted? There was no limitation of one year when you ac-
cepted that creed. It is an extensive creed; it takes in all, the
weakest and the strongest, and you will deny yourselves the
privilege of clothing the weakest amongst yourselves with protec-
tion if you accept this limited creed of Maulana Hasrat Mohani,
which does not admit the weakest of your brethren. I, there-
fore, ask you in all confidence to reject his proposition."
The resolution when put to vote was declared to be lost.
The session of the All-India Khilafat Conference was presid-
ed over also by Hakim Ajmal Khan. A resolution in favour
of independence was also moved in the subjects committee of
this Conference. What happened to the resolution is clear from
the following summary of its proceedings. The report of the
proceedings says* : —

" Before the Conference adjourned at eleven in the night till
the next day the President, Hakim Ajmalkhan, announced that
• The Indian Annual Register, 1922, Appendix, pp. 133-34.

^7l

Pakistan

the Subjects Committee of the Conference had, on the motion
of Mr. Azad Sobhani, supported by Mr. Hasrat Mohani, by a
majority resolved to ask ail Mohamedans and other communities
to endeavour to destroy British imperial is in and secure complete
independence.

" This resolution stated that whereas through the persistent
policy and attitude of the British Government it cannot be expect-
ed that British Imperialism would permit the Jazirat-ul-Arab
and the Islamic world to be completely free from the influence
and control of non-Muslims, which means that the Khilafat
cannot be secured to the extent that the Shariat demands its
safety, therefore, in order to secure permanent safety of the
Khilafat and the prosperity of India, it is necessary to endeavour
to destroy British Imperialism. This Conference holds the view
that the only way to make this effort is, for the Muslims, con-
jointly with other inhabitants of India, to make India completely
free, and that this Conference is of opinion that Muslim opinion
about Swaraj is the same, that is, complete independence, and it
expects that other inhabitants of India would also hold the same
point of view.

" On the Conference resuming its sitting on the second day,
December 27th, 1921, a split was found to have taken place in
the camp over this resolution about independence. When Mr.
Hasrat Mohani was going to move his resolution declaring as
their goal, independence and the destruction of British Imperial-
ism, objection was taken to its consideration by a member of
the Khilafat Subjects Committee on the ground that according
to their constitution no motion which contemplated a change
in their creed could be taken as adopted, unless it was voted for
in the Subjects Committee by a majority of two-third.

"The President, Hakim Ajmalkhan, upheld this objection
and ruled the independence motion out of order.

" Mr. Hasrat Mohani strongly protested and pointed out that
the President had disallowed a similar objection by the same
member in the Subjects Committee, while he had allowed it in
the open Conference. He said that the President had man-
oeuvred to rule his motion out of order in order to stand in
their way of declaring from that Conference that their Swaraj
meant complete independence,"

The President of the All-India Muslim League was Mau-
lana Hasrat Mohani. The report of the proceedings of the
League bearing on the resolution saj^s* : —

"The Muslim League met at 9 p. m. on 31st December
1921. After it had passed some non-contentious resolutions the

• Ibid., Appendix, p. 78,

272

National Frustration

President Hasrat Mobani made an announcement amidst applause
tbat he proposed that the decision of the Subjects Committee
rejecting his resolution regarding the attainment of independence
and destruction of British Imperialism would be ^held as final
and representing the opinion of the majority in the League, but
that in view of the great importance of the subject he would
allow a discussion on that resolution without taking any vote.

"Mr. Azad Sobhani, who had moved the resolution in the
Subjects Committee, also moved it in the League. He said he
believed in Hindu-Muslim unity as absolutely essential, in non-
violent non-co-operation as the only way to fight their battle and
Mr. Gandhi was fully deserving the dictatorship which had
been invested on him by the Congress but that he also believed
that British Imperialism was the greatest danger to India and
the Muslim world and must be destroyed by placing before them
an ideal of independence.

"Mr. Azad Sobhani was followed by several speakers who
supported him in the same vein.

"The Hon'ble Mr. Raza Ali announced that the reason for
the ruling of the President was that the League did not want to
take a step which the Congress had not taken. He warned them
against saying big things without understanding them and
reminded the audience that India was at present not ready for
maintaining liberty even if it was attained.

"He asked, who would, for instance, be their Commander-in
Chief if the British left tomorrow. (A voice, ' Enver Pasha ' .)

"The speaker emphatically declared that he would not tolerate
any foreigner. He wanted an Indian Commander-in-Cbief."

The question of Independence was again raised at the
Congress session held in March 1923 'at Coconada but with no
success.

In 1924 Mr. Gandhi presiding over the Congress session
held in Belgaum said : —

"in my opinion, if the British Government mean what they
say and honestly help us to equality, it would be a greater
triumph than a complete severance of the British connection. I
would, therefore, strive for Swaraj within the Empire but would
not hesitate to sever all connection if it became a necessity
through Britain's own fault. I would thus throw the burden
of separation on the British people."

In 1925 Mr. C. R. Das again took up the theme. In his
address to the Bengal Provincial Conference held in May of
that year he, with the deliberate object of giving a deadly blow
to* the idea of independence, took particular pains to show the

19 273

Pakistan

inferiority of the idea of Independence as compared with that
of Dominion Status : —

"... Independence, to my mind, is a narrower ideal
than that of Swaraj. It implies, it is true, the negation of
dependence; but by itself it gives us no positive ideal. I do not
for a moment suggest that independence is not consistent with
Swaraj. But what is necessary is not mere independence but
the establishment of Swaraj. India may be independent tomor-
row in the sense that the British people may leave us to our
destiny but that will not necessarily give us what I understand
by Swaraj. As I pointed out in my Presidential address at Gaya,
India presents an interesting but a complicated problem of con-
solidating the many apparently conflicting elements which go
to make up the Indian people. This work of consolidation is
a long process, may even be a weary process; but without this
no Swaraj is possible. . . .

"Independence, in the second place, does not give you that
idea of order which is the essence of Swaraj. The work of
consolidation which I have mentioned means the establishment
of that order. But let it be clearly understood that what is sought
to be established must be consistent with the genius, the tem-
perament and the traditions of the Indian people. To my mind,
Swaraj implies, firstly, that we must have the freedom of work-
ing out the consolidation of the diverse elements of the Indian
people ; secondly, we must proceed with this work on National
lines, not going back two thousand years ago, but going forward
in the light and in the spirit of our national genius and tem-
perament. . . .

"Thirdly, in the work before us, we must not be obstructed
by any foreign power. What then we have to fix upon iu the
matter of ideal is what I call Swaraj and not mere independence
which may be the negation of Swaraj. When we are asked as
to what is our national ideal of freedom, the only answer which
is possible to give is Swaraj. I do not like either Home Rule or
Self-Government. Possibly they come within what I have des-
cribed as Swaraj. But my culture somehow or other is anta-
gonistic to the word ' rule* — be it Home Rule or Foreign Rule."
*****

"Then comes the question as to whether this ideal is to be
realised within the Empire or outside? The answer which the
Congress has always given is ' within the Empire if the Empire
will recognise our right* and 'outside the Empire, if it does not.'
We must have opportunity to live our life, — opportunity for
self-realization, self-development, and self-fulfilment. The ques-
tion is of living our life. If the Empire furnishes sufficient
scope for the growth and development of our national life the

274

National Frustration

Empire idea is to be preferred. If, on the contrary, the Empire
like the Car of Jagannath crushes our life In the sweep of its
imperialistic march, there will be justification for the idea of the
establishment of Swaraj outside the Empire.

"Indeed, the Empire idea gives us a vivid sense of many
advantages. Dominion Status is in no sense servitude. It is
essentially an alliance by consent of those who form part of the
Empire for material advantages in the real spirit of co-operation.
Free alliance necessarily carries with it the right of separation.
Before the War it was generally believed that it is only as a great
confederation that the Empire or its component parts can live.
It is realised that under modern conditions no nation can live in
isolation aud the Dominion Status, while it affords complete
protection to each constituent composing the great Commonwealth
of Nations called the British Empire, secures to each the right to
realise itself, develop itself and fulfil itself and therefore it
expresses and implies all the elements of Swaraj which I have
mentioned.

"To me the idea is specially attractive because of its deep
spiritual significance. I believe in world peace, in the ultimate
federation of the world ; and I think that the great Common-
wealth of Nations called the Britsh Empire — a federation of
diverse races, each with its distinct life, distinct civilization, its
distinct mental outlook — if properly led with statesmen at the
helm is bound to make lasting contribution to the great problem
that awaits the statesmen, the problem of knitting the world into
the greatest federation the mind can conceive — the federation of
the human race. But if only properly led with statesmen at the
helm ; — for the development of the idea involves apparent sacri-
fice on the part of the constituent nations and it certainly involves
the giving up for good the Empire idea with its ugly attribute of
domination. I think it is for the good of India, for the good of
the world that India should strive for freedom within the Com-
monwealth and so serve the cause of humanity."

Mr. Das not only insisted that Dominion Status was better
than Independence but went further and got the Conference to
pass the following resolution on the goal of India's political
evolution : —

" 1. This Conference declares that the National ideal of
Swaraj involves the right of the Indian Nation to live its own
life, to have the opportunity of self-realization, self-development
and self-fulfilment and the liberty to work for the consolidation
of the diverse elements which go to make up the Indian Nation
unimpeded and unobstructed by any outside domination.

"2. That if the British Empire recognises such right and does
not obstruct the realisation of Swaraj and is prepared to give

275

Pakistan

such opportunity and undertakes to make the necessary sacrifices
to make such rights effective, this Conference calls upon the
Indian Nation to realise its Swaraj within the British Common-
wealth."

It may be noted that Mr. Gandhi was present throughout
the session. But there was no word of dissent coming from him.
On the contrary, he approved of the stand taken by Mr. Das.

• With these facts, who can doubt that the Hindus are for
Dominion Status and the Muslims are for Independence? But
if there be any doubt still remaining, the repercussions in Muslim
quarters over the Nehru Committee's Report in 1928 must dis-
solve it completely. The Nehru Committee appointed by the
Congress to frame a constitution for India accepted Dominion
Status as the basis for India's constitution and rejected inde-
pendence. It is instructive to note the attitude adopted by the
Congress and the Muslim political organizations in the country
towards the Nehru Report.

The Congress in its session held at Calcutta in 1928 passed
a resolution moved by Mr. Gandhi which was in the following
terms : —

"This Congress, having considered the constitution recommend-
ed by the All-Parties Committee Report, welcomes it as a great
contribution towards the solution of India's political and com-
munal problems, and congra till ate s the Committee on the virtual
unanimity of its recommendations and, whilst adhering to the
resolution relating to complete independence passed at the Madras
Congress approves of the constitution drawn up by the Committee
as a great step in political advance, especially as it represents
the largest measure of agreement attained among the important
parties in the country.

"Subject to the exigencies of the political situation this
Congress will adopt the constitution in its entirety if it is accepted
by the British Parliament on or before December 31, 1929, but
in the event of its non-acceptance by that date or its earlier rejec-
tion, Congress will organise a non-violent non-co-operation by
advising the country to refuse taxation or in such other manner
as may be decided upon. Consistently with the above, nothing
in this resolution shall interfere with the canning on, in the
name of the Congress, of the propaganda for complete independ-
ence."

This shows that Hindu opinion is not in favour of Inde-
pendence but in favour of Dominion Status. Some will take

276

National Frustration

exception to this statement. It may be asked what about the
Congress resolution of 1927 ? It is true that the Congress in
its Madras session held in 1927 did pass the following resolution
moved by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru :—

" This Congress declares the goal of the Indian people to be
complete National Independence."

But there is enough evidence to support the contention that
this resolution did not and does not speak the real mind of the
Hindus in the Congress.

The resolution came as a surprise. There was no indication
of it in the speech of Dr. Ansari * who presided over the 1927
session. The Chairmauf of the Reception Committee only
referred to it in passing, not as an urgent but a contingent line
of action.

There was no forethought about the resolution. It was the
result of a coup and the coup was successful because of three
factors.

In the first place, there was then a section in the Congress
which was opposed to the domination of Pandit Motilal Nehru
and Mr. Gandhi, particularly the former. This group was led
by Mr. Srinivas lyengar who was the political rival of Pandit
Motilal. They were searching for a plan which would destroy
the power and prestige of Pandit Motilal and Mr. Gandhi.
They knew that the only way to win people to their side was to
take a more extreme position and to show that their rivals were
really moderates, and as moderation was deemed by Congressmen
to be a sin, they felt that this plan was sure to succeed. They

* This is all that Dr. Ansari said about the subject in his speech :

"Whatever be the final form of the constitution, one thing may be said with
some degree of certainty, that it will have to be on federal lines providing for a
United States of India with existing Indian States as autonomous units of the Federa-
tion taking their proper share in the defence of the country, in the regulation of
the nation's foreign affairs and other joint and common interests." — The Indian
Quarterly Register, 1927, Vol. II, p. 372.

t Mr. Muthuranga Mudahar said :

" We ought to make it known that if Parliament continues in its present insolent
mood, we must definitely start on an intensive propaganda for the severance of India
from the Empire. Whenever the time may come for the effective assertion of Indian
nationalism, Indian aspiration will then be towards free nationhood, untrammelled even
by the nominal suzerainty of the King of England. It behoves English statesmanship
to take careful note of this fact. Let them not drive us to despair." — Ibid., p. 356.

277

Pakistan

made the goal of India the battle-ground, and knowing that
Pandit Motilal and Gandhi were for Dominion Status, put forth
the goal of Independence. In the second place, there was a
section in the Congress which was led by Mr. Vithalbhai Patel.
This section was in touch with the Irish Sinn Fein party and
was canvassing its help in the cause of India. The Irish Sinn
Fein party was not willing to render any help unless the Indians
declared that their goal was Independence. This section was
anxious to change the goal from Dominion Status to Independ-
ence in order to secure Irish help. To these two factors was
added a third, namely, the speech made by Lord Birkenhead,
the then Secretary of State for India, on the occasion of the
appointment of the Simon Commission when he taunted the
Indians on their incapacity to produce a constitution. The
speech was regarded as a great insult by Indian politicians. It
is the combination of these three factors which was responsible
for the passing of this resolution. Indeed, the resolution was
passed more from the motive* of giving a fitting reply to Lord
Birkenhead than from the motive of defining the political goal
of the country and if Mr. Gandhi and Pandit Motilal Nehru
kept quiet it was largely because the storm created by the intem-
perate language of Lord Birkenhead against Indians was so
great that they thought it wise to bow to it rather than engage
upon the task of sweeping it off which they would have other-
wise easily done.

That this resolution did not speak the real mind of the
Hindus in the Congress is beyond doubt. Otherwise, it is not
possible to explain how the Nehru Committee could have flouted
the Madras resolution of 1927 by adopting Dominion Status as
the basis of the constitutional structure framed by it. Nor is it
possible to explain how the Congress adopted Dominion Status
in 1928 if it had really accepted! independence in 1927 as the
resolution says. The clause in the resolution that the Congress

* Mr. Sambamurti in seconding the resolution said :

"The resolution is the only reply to the arrogant challenge thrown by Lord
Birkenhead."— The Indian Quarterly Register, 1927, Vol. II. p. 381.

t Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in moving the resolution said :

"It declares that the Congress stands today for complete Independence. None-
theless it leaves the doors of the Congress open to such persons as may perhaps be
satisfied with a lesser goal."— Ibid., p. 381.

478

National Frustration

would accept Dominion Status if given before 31st December
1929, if not, it would change its faith from Dominion Status to
Independence was only a face-saving device and did not con-
note a real change of mind. For time can never be of the
essence in a matter of such deep concern as the political destiny
of the country.

That notwithstanding the resolution of 1927, the Congress
continued to believe in Dominion Status and did not believe in
Independence, is amply borne out by the pronouncements made
from time to time by Mr. Gandhi who is the oracle of the Con-
gress. Anyone, who studies Mr. Gandhi's pronouncements on
this subject from 1929 onwards, cannot help feeling that Mr.
Gandhi has not been happy about the resolution on Independence
and that he has ever since felt necessary to wheel the Congress
back to Dominion Status. He began with the gentle process of
interpreting it away. The goal was first reduced from Inde-
pendence to substance of Independence. From substance of
Independence it was reduced to equal partnership and from equal
partnership it was brought back to its original position. The
wheel completed the turn when Mr. Gandhi in 1937 gave the
following letter to Mr. Pollock for the information of the English
people : —

"Your question is whether I retain the same opinion as I
did at the Round Table Conference in 1931. I said then, and
repeat now, that, so far as I am concerned, if Dominion Status
were offered to India in terms of the Statute of Westminster,
i.e., the right to secede at will, I would unhesitatingly accept.1'*

Turning to the pronouncements of Muslim political organi-
zations on the Nehru Report it is interesting to note the reasons
given by them for its rejection. These reasons are wholly unex-
pected. No doubt some Muslim organizations such as the Muslim
League rejected the Report because it recommended the abolition
of separate electorates. But that was certainly not the reason why
it was condemned by the Khilafat Conference or the Jamiat-ul-
Ulema — the two Muslim organizations which went with the

• Times of India 1-2-37. In view of this, the declaration made by the National
Convention — consisting of the members elected to the new Provincial Legislatures
under the new constitution — on the 20th March 1937 held at Delhi in favour of
independence has no significance. But from his having launched the Quit India move-
ment it may be said that Mr. Gandhi now believes in Independence.

279

Pakistan

Congress through the same fiery ordeal of non-co-operation and
civil disobedience and whose utterances expressed far more truly
the real opinion of Muslim masses on the issues relating to the
political affairs of the country than did the utterances of any
other Muslim organization.

Maulana Mahomed AH set out his reasons for the rejection
of the Nehru Report in his Presidential address to the All-India
Khilafat Conference held in Calcutta in 1928. He said* :—

" [I] was a member of the Indian National Congress, its
Working Committee, the All-India Muslim League and [I]
have come to the Khilafat Conference to express (my views) on
the important political issues of the time, which should have the
serious attention of the whole Muslim community.

*****

"In the All-Parties Convention he had said that India
should have complete independence and there was no communal-
ism in it. Yet he was being heckled at every moment and
stopped during his speech at every step.

*****

"The Nehru Report had as its preamble admitted the bond-
age of servitude .... Freedom and Dominion Status were
widely divergent things ....

*****

11 1 ask, when you boast of your nationalism and condemn com-
munalism, show me a country in the world like your India — your
nationalist India.

*****

44 You make compromises in your constitution every day with
false doctrines, immoral conceptions and wrong ideas but you make
no compromise with our communalists — with separate electorates
and reserved seats. Twenty-five per cent, is our portion of
population and yet you will not give us 33 per cent, in the
Assembly. You are a Jew, a Bania. But to the English you
give the status of your dominion."

The Conference passed a short resolution in the following
pithy terms : —

" This Conference declares once more that complete inde-
pendence is our goal."

* The Indian Quarterly Rtpsttr, 1928, Vol. II, pp. 402-403.
280

National Frustration

Maulana Hasrat Mohani, as President of the Jamiat-ul-
Ulema Conference held in Allahabad in 1931, gave the same
reasons for condemning the Nehru Report in words more
measured but not less scathing. Said* the Maulana : —

" My political creed with regard to India is now well known
to everybody. I cannot accept anything short of complete inde-
pendence, and, that too, on the model of the United States of
America or the Soviet Russia which is essentially (l) democratic,
(2) federal and (3) centrifugal, and in which the rights of
Muslim minorities are safeguarded.

11 For some time the Jamiat-ul-Ulema of Delhi held fast to
the creed of complete independence and it was mostly for this
reason that it repudiated the Nehru Report which devised a
unitary constitution instead of a federal one. Besides, when,
after the Lahore session, the Congress, at the instance of Mahatma
Gandhi, declared the burial of the Nehru Report on the banks
of the Ravi and the resolution of complete independence was
unanimously agreed upon, the Delhi Jamiat ventured to co-
operate with the Congress and its programme of civil disobedience
simply because it was the duty of every Indian, Hindu or Muslim,
to take part in the struggle for independence.

" But unfortunately Gandhiji very soon went back upon his
words and (l) while yet in jail he told the British journalist Mr.
Slocombe that by complete independence he meant only the
substance of independence, (2) besides, when he was released on
expressing his inclination for compromise he devised the illusory
term of ' Puma Swaraj ' in place of complete independence and
openly declared that in 'Puma Swaraj1 there was no place for
severance of the British connection, (3) by making a secret pact
with Lord Irwin he definitely adopted the ideal of Dominion
Status under the British Crown.

" After this change of front by Gandhiji the Delhi Jamiat
ought to have desisted from blindly supporting the Mahatma
and like the Nehru Report it should have completely rejected
this formula of the Congress Working Committee by which the
Nehru Report was sought to be revived at Bombay.

" But we do not know what unintelligible reasons induced
the Delhi Jamiat-ul-Ulema to adopt ' Puma Swaraj ' as their
ideal, in spite of the knowledge that it does not mean complete
independence but something even worse than complete independ-
ence. And the only explanation for adopting this creed is said
to be that, although Gandhiji has accepted Dominion Status,
he still insists that Britain should concede the right of secession
from the British Empire to the Indians.

• Ibid., 1931, Vol. II, pp. 238-39.

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Pakistan

" Although it is quite clear that insistence on this right has
no better worth than the previous declaration of complete inde-
pendence, in other words, just as Gandhiji insisted on complete
independence with the sole object of forcing the British Govern-
ment to accede to the demand of Dominion Status, which was
the sole ultimate aim of the Mahattna, in the same way the
leaders of the Congress insisted upon the right of secession with
the object of extorting the largest measure of political rights from
the British people who might not go beyond a certain limit in
displeasing them. Otherwise Gandhiji and his followers know
it full well that even if this right of secession is given to Indians,
it would perhaps be never put into practice.

"If someone considers this contention of mine to be based
on suspicion and contends that the Congress will certainly
declare for secession from the Empire whenever there is need
of it, I will ask him to let me know what will be the form of
Indian Government after the British connection is withdrawn.
It is clear that no one can conceive of a despotic form and a
democratic form, whether it be unitary or federal but centripetal,
will be nothing more than Hindu Raj which the Musalmans can
in no circumstances accept. Now remains only one form, viz.
after complete withdrawal of the British connection India with
its autonomous Provinces and States forms into united centri-
fugal democratic government on the model of the United States
Republic or Soviet Russia. But this can never be acceptable to
the Mahasabhaite Congress or a lover of Britain like Mahatma
Gandhi.

" Thus the Jatniat-ul-Ulema of Delhi after washing its hands
of complete independence has stultified itself, but thank God the
Ulemas of Cawnpore, L/ucknow, Badaun, etc., still hold fast to
their pledge and will remain so, God willing. Some weak-kneed
persons urge against this highest ideal that, when it is not possible
for the present to attain it, there is no use talking about it. We
say to them that it is not at all useless but rather absolutely
necessary, for if the highest ideal is not always kept before view,
it is liable to be forgotten.

"We must, therefore, oppose Dominion Status in all circum-
stances as this is not the half-way house or part of our ultimate
aim, but its very negation and rival. If Gandhiji reaches England
and the Round Table Conference is successfully concluded, giving
India Dominion Status of any kind, with or without safeguards,
the conception of complete independence will completely vanish
or at any rate will not be thought of for a very long time to
come."

The All-India Khilafat Conference and the Jamiat-ul-
Ulema were surely extremist bodies avowedly anti-British. But

282

National Frustration

the All-Parties Muslim Conference was not at all a body of
extremists or anti-British Musalmans. Yet the U. P. Branch of
it in its session held at Cawnpore on 4th November 1928 passed
the following resolution : —

" In the opinion of the All-Parties U- P. Muslim Conference,
Musalmans of India stand for the goal of complete independ-
ence, which shall necessarily take the form of a federal
republic."

In the opinion of the mover, Islam always taught freedom,
and for the matter of that the Muslims of India would fail in
their religious duty, if they were against complete independence.
Indian Muslims were poor, yet they were, the speaker was sure,
devoted to Islam more than any other people on earth.

In this Conference an incident* of some interest occurred
in the Subjects Committee when Maulana Azad Sobhani pro-
posed that the Conference should declare itself in favour of
complete independence.

Khan Bahadur Masoodul Hassan and some other persons,
objected to such declaration, which, in their opinion, would go
against the best interests of Musalmans. Upon this, a number of
women from their puraah gallery sent a written statement to
the President saying that if men had not the courage to stand
for complete independence, women would come out of purdah,
and take their place in the struggle for independence.

-JII

Notwithstanding this difference in their ultimate destiny,
an attempt is made to force the Hindus and Muslims to live in
one country, as one people, bound by the political ties of a single
constitution. Assuming that this is done and that the Muslims
are somehow manoeuvred into it, what guarantee is there that
the constitution will not break down ?

The successful working of a Parliamentary Government
assumes the existence of certain conditions. It is only when
these conditions exist that Parliamentary Government can take
roots. One such condition was pointed out by the late Lord

• See The Indian Quarterly Register, 1928, Vol. II, pp. 425.

283

Pakistan

Balfour when in 1925 lie had an occasion to discuss the political
future of the Arab peoples in conversation xwith his niece
Blanche Dugdale.

In the course of this conversation he said* : —

/ "It is partly the fault of the British nation — and of the
Americans ; we can't exonerate them from blame either — that
this idea of 'representative government' has got into the heads
of nations who haven't the smallest notion of what its basis must
be. It's difficult to explain, and the Anglo-Saxon races are bad
at exposition. Moreover we know it so well ourselves that it
does not strike us as necessary to explain it. I doubt if you
would find it written in any book on the British Constitution
that the whole essence of British Parliamentary Government lies
in the intention to make the thing work. We take that for
granted. We have spent hundreds of years in elaborating a
system that rests on that alone. It is so deep in us that we have
lost sight of it. But it is not so obvious to others. These peoples
— Indians, Egyptians, and so on — study our learning. They
read our history, our philosophy, and politics. They learn about
our parliamentary methods of obstruction, but nobody explains
to them that when it comes to the point, all our parliamentary
parties are determined that the machinery shan't stop. ' The
king's government must go on' as the Duke of Wellington said.
But their idea is that the function of opposition is to stop the
machine. Nothing easier, of course, but hopeless."

Asked why the opposition in England does not go to the
length of stopping the machine, he said : —

"Our whole political machinery presupposes a people...
fundamentally at one."

Laski has well summarized these observations of Balfour
on the condition necessary for the successful working of Parlia-
mentary Government when he saysf :

"The strength of Parliamentary Government is exactly
measured by the unity of political parties upon its fundamental
objects."

Having stated the condition necessary for the successful
working of the machinery of representative government it will
be well to examine whether these conditions are present in India.

How far can we say that there is an intention in the Hindus
and the Muslims to make representative government work?

• Dugdale's Balfour (Hutchinson), Vol. II, pp. 363-64.
t ParliAmtnt&y Government in England, p. 37.

284

National Frustration

To prove the futility and unworkability of representative and
responsible government, it is enough even if one of the two
parties shows an intention to stop the machinery of government.
If such an intention is enough, then it does not matter much
whether it is found in the Hindus or in the Muslims. The
Muslims being more outspoken than the Hindus, one gets to
know their mind more than one gets to know the mind of the
Hindus. How the Muslim mind will work and by what factors
it is likely to be swayed will be clear if the fundamental tenets
of Islam which dominate Muslim politics and the views ex-
pressed by prominent Muslims bearing on Muslim attitude
towards an Indian Government are taken into consideration.
Certain of such religious tenets of Islam and the views of some
of the Muslim leaders are given below to enable all those who
are capable of looking at things dispassionately, to judge for
themselves whether the condition postulated by Balfour can be
said to exist in India.

Among the tenets one that calls for notice is the tenet of
Islam which says that in a country which is not under Muslim
rule wherever there is a conflict between Muslim law and the
law of the land, the former must prevail over the latter and a
Muslim will be justified in obeying the Muslim law and defy-
ing the law of the land.

What the duty of the Musalmans is in such cases was well
pointed out by Maulana Mahomed Ali in the course of his
statement made in 1921 before the Committing Magistrate of
Karachi in answer to the charges for which he was prosecuted
by the Government. The prosecution arose out of absolution
passed at the session of the All-India Khilafat Conference held
in Karachi on 8th July 1921 at which Mr. Mahomed Ali presid-
ed and introduced the resolution in question.

The resolution was as follows : —

" This meeting clearly proclaims that it is in every way
religiously unlawful for a Musalman at the present moment to
continue in the British Army, or to enter the Army, or to induce
others to join the Army. And it is the duty of all Musalmans
in general and of the Ulemas in particular to see that these
religious commandments are brought home to every Musalman
in the Army/*

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Pakistan

Along with Maulana Mahomed AH six other persons* were
prosecuted under Section 120-B read with Sec. 131 I. P. C. and
under Sec. 505 or 505 read with Sec. 114 and Sec. 505 read
with Sec. 117 I. P. C. Maulana Mahomed Ali in justification of his
plea of not guilty, saidt : —

"After all what is the meaning of this precious prosecution.
By whose convictions are we to be guided, we the Musalmans
and the Hindus of India? Speaking as a Musalman, if I am
supposed to err from the right path, the only way to convince
me of my error is to refer me to the Holy Koran or to the
authentic traditions of the last Prophet — on whom be peace and
God's benediction — or the religious pronouncements of recog-
nized Muslim divines, past and present, which purport to be
based on these two original sources of Islamic authority demands
from me in the present circumstances, the precise action for
which a Government, that does not like to be called satanic, is
prosecuting me to-day.

"If that which I neglect, becomes by my neglect a deadly
sin, and is yet a crime when I do not neglect it, how am I to
consider myself safe in this country?

"I must either be a sinner or a criminal Islam

recognizes one sovereignty alone, the sovereignty of God, which
is supreme and unconditional, indivisible and inalienable

"The only allegiance a Musalman, whether civilian or
soldier, whether living under a Muslim or under a non-Muslim
administration, is commanded by the Koran to acknowledge is
his allegiance to God, to his Prophet and to those in authority
from among the Musalmans chief among the last mentioned
being of course that Prophet's successor or commander of the

faithful This doctrine of unity

is not a mathematical formula elaborated by abstruse thinkers
but a work-a-day belief of every Musalman learned or unlettered

Musalmans have before this also and elsewhere too,

lived in peaceful subjection to non-Muslim administrations. But
the unalterable rule is and has always been that as Musalmans
they can obey only such laws and orders issued by their secular
rulers as do not involve disobedience to the commandments of
God who in the expressive language of the Holy Koran is 'the
all-ruling ruler.' These very clear and rigidly definite limits of
obedience are not laid down with regard to the authority of non-

* Strange enough one of them was the Shankaracharya of Sharda Peeth.
t The Trial of Ali Brothers, by R. V. Thadani, pp. 69-71.

286

National Frustration

Muslim administration only. On the contrary they are of
universal application and can neither be enlarged nor reduced
in any case."

This must make anyone wishing for a stable government
very apprehensive. But this is nothing to the Muslim tenets
which prescribe when a country is a motherland to the Muslim
and when it is not.

According to Muslim Canon Law the world is divided into
two camps, Dar-ul-Islam (abode of Islam) and Dar-ul-Harb
(abode of war). A country is Dar-ul-Islam when it is ruled
by Muslims. A country is Dar-ul-Harb when Muslims only
reside in it but are not rulers of it. That being the Canon Law
of the Muslims, India cannot be the common motherland of the
Hindus and the Musalmans. It can be the land of the Musal-
mans — but it cannot be the land of the c Hindus and the Musal-
mans living as equals.' Further, it can be the land of the
Musalmans only when it is governed by the Muslims. The
moment the land becomes subject to the authority of a non-
Muslim power, it ceases to be the land of the Muslims. Instead
of being Dar-ul-Islam it becomes Dar-ul-Harb.

It must not be supposed that this view is only of academic
interest. For it is capable of becoming an active force capable
of influencing the conduct of the Muslims. It did greatly in-
fluence the conduct of the Muslims when the British occupied
India. The British occupation raised no qualms in the minds
of the Hindus. But so far as the Muslims were concerned, it
at once raised the question whether India was any longer a
suitable place of residence for Muslims. A discussion was start-
ed in the Muslim community, which Dr. Titus says lasted for
• half a century, as to whether India was Dar-ul-Harb or Dar-ul-
Islam. Some of the more zealous elements, under the leadership
of Sayyed Ahmad, actually did declare a holy war, preached the
necessity of emigration (Hijrat) to lands under Muslim rule,
and carried their agitation all over India.

It took all the ingenuity of Sir Sayyed Ahmad, the founder
of the Aligarh movement, to persuade the Indian Musalmans
not to regard India under the British as Dar-ul-Harb merely
because it was not under Muslim rule. He urged upon the
Muslims to regard it as Dar-ul-Islam, because the Muslims were

287

Pakistan

perfectly free to exercise all the essential rites and ceremonies
of their religion. The movement for Hijrat for the time being
died down. But the doctrine that India was Dar-ul-Harb had
not been given up. It was again preached by Muslim patriots
during 1920-21, when the Khilafat agitation was going on. The
agitation was not without response from the Muslim masses and
there was a goodly number of Muslims who not only showed
themselves ready to act in accordance with the Muslim Canon
Law but actually abandoned their homes in India and crossed
over to Afghanistan.

It might also be mentioned that Hijrat is not the only way
of escape to Muslims who find themselves in a Dar-ul-Harb.
There is another injunction of Muslim Canon Law called Jihad
(crusade) by which it becomes uincumbent on a Muslim ruler to
extend the rule of Islam until the whole world shall have been
brought under its sway. The world, being divided into two
camps, Dar-ul-Islam (abode of Islam), Dar-ul-Harb (abode of
war), all countries come under one category or the other. Tech-
nically, it is the duty of the Muslim ruler, who is capable of
doing so, to transform Dar-ul-Harb into Dar-ul-Islam. n And
just as there are instances of the Muslims in India resorting to
Hijrat^ there are instances showing that they have not hesitated
to proclaim Jihad. The curious may examine the history of the
Mutiny of 1857 and if he does, he will find that, in part, at any
rate, it was really a Jihad proclaimed by the Muslims against the
British, and that the Mutiny so far as the Muslims were concern-
ed was a recrudescence of revolt which had been fostered by
Sayyed Ahmad who preached to the Musalmans for several
decades that owing to the occupation of India by the British the
country had become a Dar-ul-Harb. The Mutiny was an attempt
by the Muslims to re-convert India into a Dar-ul-Islam. A more
recent instance was the invasion of India by Afghanistan in 1919.
It was engineered by the Musalmans of India who led by the
Khilafatists' antipathy to the British Government sought the
assistance of Afghanistan to emancipate India.* Whether the
invasion would have resulted in the emancipation of India or

• This interesting and awful episode has been examined in some details, giving
the part played therein by Mr. Gandhi, in a series of articles in the issues of the
Maratha, for the year by Mr. Karandikar.

288

National Frustration

whether it would have resulted in its subjugation, it is not pos-
sible to say because the invasion failed to take effect. Apart
from this, the fact remains that India;*" if not exclusively under
Muslim rule, is a Dar-ul-Harb and the Musalmans according to
'the tenets of Islam are justified in proclaiming a Jihad.

Not only can they proclaim Jihad but they can call the aid
of a foreign Muslim power to make Jihad a success, or if the
foreign Muslim power intends to proclaim a Jihad, help that
power in making its endeavour a success. This was clearly
explained by Mr. Mahomed Ali in his address to the Jury in the
Sessions Court. Mr. Mahomed Ali said : —

"But since the Government is apparently uninformed about
the manner in which our Faith colours and is meant to colour
all our actions, including those which, for the sake of conveni-
ence, are generally characterised as mundane, one thing must
be made clear, and it is this: Islam does not permit the believer
to pronounce an adverse judgment against another believer with-
out more convincing proof; and we could not, of course, fight
against our Muslim brothers without making sure that "they were
guilty of wanton aggression, and did not take up arms' in defence
of their faith." (This was in relation to the war that%was going
on between the British and the Afghans in 1919.) "Now our
position is this. Without better proof of the Amir's malice or
madness we certainly do not want Indian soldiers, including the
Musalmans, and particularly with our own encouragement and
assistance, to attack Afghanistan and effectively occupy it first,
and then be a prey to more perplexity and perturbation after-
wards-

"But if on the contrary His Majesty the Amir has no quarrel
with India and her people and if his motive must be attributed,
as the Secretary of State has publicly said, to the unrest which
exists throughout the Mahometan world, an unrest with which
he openly professed to be in cordial sympathy, that is to say, if
impelled by the same religious motive that has forced Muslims
to contemplate Hijrat, the alternative of the weak, which is all that
is within our restricted means, His Majesty has been forced to
contemplate Jihad, the alternative of those comparatively stronger
which he may have found within his means; if he has taken up
the challenge of those who believed in force and yet more force,
and he intends to try conclusions with those who require Musal-
mans to wage war against the Khilafat and those engaged in
Jihad ; who are in wrongful occupation of the Jazirut-ul-Arab
and the holy places ; who aim at the weakening of Islam ; dis-
criminate against it; and deny to us full freedom to advocate its
cause ; then the clear law of Islam requires that in the first place,

19 289

Pakistan

in no case whatever should a Musalman render anyone any
assistance against him; and in the next place if the Jihad
approaches my region-every Musalman in that region must join
the Mujahldin and assist them to the best of his or her power.

"Such is the clear and undisputed law of Islam; and we
had explained this to the Committee investigating our case when
it had put to us a question about the religious duty of a Muslim
subject of a non-Muslim power when Jihad had been declared
against it, long before there was any notion of trouble on the
Frontiers, and when the late Amir was still alive."

A third tenet which calls for notice as being relevant to the
issue is that Islam does not recognize territorial affinities. Its
affinities are social and religions and therefore extra-territorial.
Here again Maulana Mahomed Ali will be the best witness.
When he was committed to the Sessions Court in Karachi Mr.
Mahomed Ali addressing the Jury said : —

11 One thing has to be made clear as we have since discovered
that the doctrine to which we shall now advert is not so generally
known in non-Muslim and particularly in official circles as it
ought to be. A Musalman's faith does not consist merely in
believing in a set of doctrines and living up to that belief him-
self ; he must also exert himself to the fullest extent of his power,
of course without resort to any compulsion, to the end that others
also conform to the prescribed belief and practices. This is
spoken of in the Holy Koran as Amribilmaroof and Nahi
anilmunkar ; and certain distinct chapters of the Holy Prophet's
traditions relate to this essential doctrine of Islam. A Musalman
cannot say : ' I am not my brother's keeper/ for in a sense he
is and his own salvation cannot be assured to him unless he
exhorts others also to do good and dehorts them against doing
evil. If therefore any Musalman is being compelled to wage
war against the Mujahid of Islam, he must not only be a con-
scientious objector himself, but must, if he values his own salva-
tion, persuade his brothers also at whatever risk to himself to
take similar objection. Then and not until then, can he hope
for salvation. This is our belief as well as the belief of every
other Musalman and in our humble way we seek to live up to
it; and if we are denied freedom to inculcate this doctrine, we
must conclude that the land, where this freedom does not exist,
is not safe for Islam."

This is the basis of Pan-Islamism. It is this which leads
every Musalman in India to say that he is a Muslim first and
Indian afterwards. It is this sentiment which explains why the
Indian Muslim has taken so small a part in the advancement of

290

National Frustration

India but has spent himself to exhaustion41 by taking up the
cause of Muslim countries and why Muslim countries occupy
the first place and India occupies a second place in his thoughts.

His Highness the Aga Khan justifies it by sayingf : —

" This is a right and legitimate Pan-Islamism to which every
sincere and believing Mahomedan belongs — that is, the theory of
the spiritual brotherhood and unity of the children of the Pro-
phet. It is a deep, perennial element in that Perso-Arabian
culture, that great family of civilization to which we gave the
name Islamic in the first chapter. It connotes charity and good-
will towards fellow-believers everywhere from China to Morocco,
from the Volga to Singapore. It means an abiding interest in
the literature of Islam, in her beautiful arts, in her lovely archi-
tecture, in her entrancing poetry. It also means a true reforma-
tion— a return to the early and pure simplicity of the faith, to its
preaching by persuasion and argument, to the manifestation of
a spiritual power in individual lives, to beneficent activity of
mankind. This natural and worthy spiritual movement makes
not only the Master and His teaching but also His children of
all climes an object of affection to the Turk or the Afghan, to the
Indian or the Egyptian. A famine or a desolating fire in the
Muslim quarters of Kashgar or Sarajevo would immediately
draw the sympathy and material assistance of the Mahomedan of
Delhi or Cairo. The real spiritual and cultural unity of Islam
must ever grow, for to the follower of the Prophet it is the
foundation of the life of the soul."

If this spiritual Pan-Islamism seeks to issue forth in political
Pan-Islamism, it cannot be said to be unnatural. It is perhaps
that feeling which was in the mind of the Aga Khan when he
saidj : —

" It is for the Indian patriot to recognise that Persia, Afghani-
stan and possibly Arabia must sooner or later come within the
orbit of some Continental Power — such as Germany, or what
may grow out of the break-up of Russia — or must throw in their
lot with that of the Indian Empire, with which they have so
much more genuine affinity. The world forces that move small
States into closer contact with powerful neighbours, though so
far most visible in Europe, will inevitably make themselves felt

• Between 1912 when the first Balkan war began and 1922 when Turkey made
peace with the European Powers, the Indian Muslims did not bother about Indian
politics in the least. They were completely absorbed in the fate of Turkey and
Arabia.

f India in Transition, p. 157.

tlbid., p. 169.

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Pakistan

in Asia. Unless she is willing to accept the prospect of having
powerful and possibly inimical neighbours to watch, and the
heavy military burdens thereby entailed, India cannot afford to
neglect to draw her Mahomedan neighbour States to herself by
the ties of mutual interest and goodwill.

"In a word, the path of beneficent and growing union must
be based on a federal India, with every member exercising her
individual rights, her historic peculiarities and natural interests,
yet protected by a common defensive system and customs union
from external danger and economic exploitation by stronger forces.
Such a federal India would promptly bring Ceylon to the bosom
of her natural mother, and the further developments we have
indicated would follow. We can build a great South Asiatic
Federation by now laying the foundations wide and deep on
justice, on liberty, and on recognition for every race, every religion,
and every historical entity.

" A sincere policy of assisting both Persia and Afghanistan
in the onward march which modern conditions demand, will
raise two natural ramparts for India in the north-west that
neither German nor Slav, Turk nor Mongol, can ever hope to
destroy. They will be drawn of their own accord towards the
Power which provides the object lesson of a healthy form of
federalism in ludia, with real autonomy for each province, with
the internal freedom of principalities assured, with a revived and
liberalised kingdom of Hyderabad, including the Berars, under
the Nizam. They would see in India freedom and order, auto-
nomy and yet Imperial union, and wou^d appreciate for them-
selves the advantages of a confederation assuring the continuance
of internal self-government buttressed by goodwill, the immense
and unlimited strength of that great Empire on which the sun
never sets. The British position in Mesopotamia and Arabia
also, whatevei its nominal form may be, would be infinitely
strengthened by the policy I have advocated."

This South Asiatic Federation was more for the good of the
Muslim countries such as Arabia, Mesopotamia and Afghanistan
than for the good of India.* This shows how very naturally the
thoughts of Indian Musalmans are occupied by considerations
of Muslim countries other than those of India.

* What a terrible thing it would have been if this South Asiatic Federation had
come into being ? Hindus would have been reduced to the position of a distressed
minority. The Indian Annual Register says: "Supporters of British Imperialism
in the Muslim community of India have also been active trying by the organization
of an Anglo-Muslim alliance to stabilize the rule of Britain in Southern Asia, from
Arabia to the Malaya Archipelago, wherein the Muslims will be junior partners in the
firm at present, hoping to rise in time to the senior partnership. It was to some such

292

National Frustration

Government is based on obedience to authority. But those,
who are eager to establish self-government of Hindus and
Muslims, do not seem to have stopped to inquire on what such
obedience depends and how far such obedience would be forth-
coming in the usual course and in moments of crisis. This is
a very important question. For, if obedience fails, self-govern-
ment means working together and not working under. That
may be so in an ideal sense. But in the practical and work-a-
day world, if the elements brought under one representative
government are disproportionate in numbers, the minor section
will have to work under the major section and whether it works
under the major section or not will depend upon how far it
is disposed to obey the authority of the government carried on
by the major section. So important is this factor in the success
of self-government that Balfour may be said to have spoken only
part of the truth when he made its success dependent upon
parties being fundamentally at one. He failed to note that
willingness to obey the authority of government is a factor
equally necessary for the success of any scheme of self-govern-
ment.

The importance of this second condition, the existence pf
which is necessary for a successful working of parliamentary
government, has been discussed by* James Bryce. While dealing
with the basis of political cohesion, Bryce points out that while
force may have done much to build up States, force is only one
among many factors and not the most important. In creating,
moulding, expanding and knitting together political communities
what is more important than force is obedience. This willing-
ness to obey and comply with the sanctions of a government
depends upon certain psychological attributes of the individual
citizens and groups. According to Bryce the attitude which

feeling and anticipation that we must trace the scheme adumbrated by His Highness
the Aga Khan in his book India in Transition published during the war yeari. The
scheme had planned for the setting up of a South Western Asiatic Federation of which
India might be a constituent unit. After the war when Mr. Winston Churchill was
Secretary of State for the Colonies in the British Cabinet, he found in the archives
of the Middle Eastern Department a scheme ready-made of a Middle Eastern Empire "
— 1938, Vol. II, Section on " India in Home Polity,1' p. 48.

* Studies in History and Jurisprudence, Vol. II, Essay I.

293

Pakistan

produces obedience are indolence, deference, sympathy, fear and
reason. All are not of the same value. Indeed they are relative
in their importance as causes producing a disposition to obey.
As formulated by Bryce, in the sum total of obedience the per-
centage due to fear and to reason respectively is much less than
that due to indolence and less also than that due to deference or
sympathy. According to this view deference and sympathy are,
therefore, the two most powerful factors which predispose a
people to obey the authority of its government.

Willingness to render obedience to the authority of the
government is as essential for the stability of government as
the unity of political parties on the fundamentals of the state.
It is impossible for any sane person to question the importance
of obedience in the maintenance of the state. To believe in
civil disobedience is to believe in anarchy.

How far will Muslims obey the authority of a government
manned and controlled by the Hindus ? The answer to this
question need not call for much inquiry. To the Muslims a
Hindu is a Kaffir.* A Kaffir is not worthy of respect. He is
low-born and without status. That is why a country which is
ruled by a Kaffir is Dar-ul-Harb to a Musalman. Given this,
no further evidence seems to be necessary to prove that the
Muslims will not obey a Hindu government. The basic feel-
ings of deference and sympathy, which predispose persons to
obey the authority of government, do not simply exist. But if
proof is wanted, there is no dearth of it. It is so abundant that
the problem is what to tender and what to omit

In the midst of the Khilafat agitation when the Hindus
were doing so much to help the Musalmans, the Muslims did
not forget that as compared with them the Hindus were a low
and an inferior race. A Musalman wrote t in the Khilafat
paper called Insaf\ —

"What is the meaning of Swatni and Mahatma ? Can
Muslims use in speech or writing these words about non-Mus-
lims ? He says that Swami means ' Master ', and * Mahatma'

* The Hindus have no right to feel hurt at being called Kaffirs. They call the
Muslims Mlechas — persons not fit to associate with.

t See "Through Indian Eyes," Times of India, dated 11-3-24.
294

National Frustration

means 'possessed of the highest spiritual powers' and is equi-
valent to 'Ruh-i-aazam', and the supreme spirit-"

He asked the Muslim divines to decide by an authoritative
fatwa whether it was lawful for Muslims to call non-Muslims
by such deferential and reverential titles.

A remarkable incident was reported* in connection with
the celebration of Mr. Gandhi's release from gaol in 1924 at the
Tibbia College of Yunani medicine run by Hakim Ajmal Khan
at Delhi. According to the report, a Hindu student compared
Mr. Gandhi to Hazarat Isa (Jesus) and at this sacrilege to the
Musalman sentiment all the Musalman students flared up and
threatened the Hindu student with violence, and, it is alleged,
even the Musalman professors joined with their co-religionists
in this demonstration of their outraged feelings.

In 1923 Mr. Mahomed Ali presided over the session of
the Indian National Congress. In this address he spoke of Mr.
Gandhi in the following terms : —

<l Many have compared the Mahatma's teachings, and latterlv
his personal sufferings, to those of Jesus (on whom be peace)

• When Jesus contemplated the world at the outset of

his ministry he was called upon to make his choice of the

weapons of reform The idea of being all-powerful by

suffering and resignation, and of triumphing over force by purity
of heart, is as old as the days of Abel and Cain, the first progeny
of man

"Be that as it may, it was just as peculiar to Mahatma Gandhi
also; but it was reserved for a Christian Government to treat as
felon the most Christ-like man of our time (Shame, Shame) and
to penalize as a disturber of the public peace the one man engaged
in public affairs who comes nearest to the Prince of Peace. The
political conditions of India just before the advent of the Mahat-
ma resembled those of Judea on the eve of the advent of Jesus,
and the prescription that he offered to those in search of a
remedy for the ills of India was the same that Jesus had dispens-
ed before in Judea. Self-purification through suffering; a moral
preparation for the responsibilities of government; self-discipline
as the condition precedent of Swaraj —this was Mahatma's creed
and conviction ; and those of us, who have been privileged to
have lived in the glorious year that culminated in the Congress
session at Ahmedabad, have seen what a remarkable and rapid

• See " Through Indian Eyes," Times of India, dated 21-3-24.

295

Pakistan

change he wrought in the thoughts, feelings and actions of such
large masses of mankind."

A year after, Mr. Mahomed AH speaking at Aligarh and
Ajmere said : —

"However pure Mr. Gandhi's character may be, he must
appear to me from the point of view of religion inferior to any
Musalman, even though he be without character."

The statement created a great stir. Many did not believe
that Mr. Mahomed Ali, who testified to so much veneration
for Mr. Gandhi, was capable of entertaining such ungenerous
and contemptuous sentiments about him. When Mr. Mahomed
Ali was speaking at a meeting held at Aminabad Park in
Lucknow, he was asked whether the sentiments attributed to
him were true. Mr. Mahomed Ali without any hesitation or
compunction replied* : —

"Yes, according to my religion and creed, I do hold an
adulterous and a fallen Musalman to be better than Mr. Gandhi."

It was suggested! at the time that Mr. Mahomed Ali had
to recant because the whole of the orthodox Muslim community
had taken offence for his having shown such deference to Mr.
Gandhi, who was a Kaffir, as to put him on the same pedestal
as Jesus. Such praise of a Kaffir, they felt, was forbidden by the
Muslim Canon Law.

In a manifesto! on Hindu-Muslim relations issued in 1928
Khwaja Hasan Nizami declared: —

"Musahnans are separate from Hindus; they cannot unite
with the Hindus. After bloody wars the Musalmans conquered
India, and the English took India from them. The Musalmans
are one united nation and they alone will be masters of India.
They will never give up their individuality. They have ruled
India for hundreds of years, and hence they have a prescriptive
right over the country. The Hindus are a piinor community
in the world. They are never free from internecine quarrels;
they believe in Gandhi and worship the cow; they are pollut-
ed by taking other people's water. The Hindus do not care for
self-government ; they have no time to spare for it : let them go
on with their internal squabbles. What capacity have they for

* " Through Indian Eyes," Times of India, dated 21-3-24.
t Ibid.', dated 26-4-24.
J Ibid., dated 14-3-28.

296

National Frustration

mHng over men? The Musalmans did rule, and the Musal-
mans will rule."

Far from rendering obedience to Hindus, the Muslims seem
to be ready to try conclusions with the Hindus again. In 1926
there arose a controversy as to who really won the third battle
of Panipat, fought in 1761. It was contended for the Muslims
that it was a great victory for them because Ahmad Sha Abdali
had 1 lakh of soldiers while the Mahrattas had 4 to 6 lakhs.
The Hindus replied that it was a victory to them — a victory to
the vanquished — because it stemmed the tide of Muslim inva-
sions. The Muslims were not prepared to admit defeat at the
hands of the Hindus and claimed that they will always prove
superior to the Hindus. To prove the eternal superiority of
Muslims over Hindus it was proposed by one Maulana Akbar
Shah Khan of Najibabad in all seriousness, that the Hindus and
Muslims should fight, under test conditions, fourth battle on
the same fateful plain of Panipat. The Maulana accordingly
issued* a challenge to Pandit Madau Mohan Malaviya in the
following terms : —

11 If you, Malaviyaji, are making efforts to falsify the result
at Panipat, I shall show you an easy and an excellent way (of
testing it). Use your well-known influence and induce the
British Government to permit the fourth battle of Panipat to be
fought out without hindrance from the authorities. I am ready
to provide ... a comparative test of the valour and fighting
spirit of the Hindus and the Musalmaus. . . . As there are seven
crores of Musalmans in India, I shall arrive on a fixed date on
the plain of Panipat with 700 Musalmans representing the seven
crores of Muslims in India and as there are 22 crores of Hindus
I allow you to come with 2,200 Hindus. The proper thing is
not to use cannon, machine guns or bombs : only swords and
javelins and spears, bows and arrows and daggers should be
used. If you cannot accept the post of generalissimo of the
Hindu host, you may give it to any descendant of Sadashivraof
or Vishwasraot so that their scions may have an opportunity to
avenge the defeat of their ancestors in 1761. But any way do
come as a spectator ; for on seeing the result of this battle you will
have to change your views, and I hope there will be then an end
of the present discord and fighting in the country In conclu-
sion I beg to add that among the 700 men that I shall bring

• Quoted in " Through Indian Eyes," Times of India, dated 20-6-26.
fThey were the Military Commanders on the side of the Hindus in the third
battle of Panipat.

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Pakistan

there will be no Pathans or Afghans as you are mortally afraid
of them. So I shall bring with me only Indian Musalmans of
good family who are staunch adherents of Shariat"

Such are the religious beliefs, social attitudes and ultimate
destinies of the Hindus and Muslims and their communal and
political manifestations. These religious beliefs, social attitudes
and views regarding ultimate destinies constitute the motive
force which determines the lines of their action, whether they
will be co-operative or conflicting. Past experience shows that
they are too irreconcilable and too incompatible to permit
Hindus and Muslims ever forming one single nation or even
two harmonious parts of one whole. These differences have the
sure effect not only of keeping them asunder but also of keeping
them at war. The differences are permanent and the Hindu-
Muslim problem bids fair to be eternal. To attempt to solve
it on the 'footing that Hindus and Muslims are one or if they
are not one now they will be one hereafter is bound to be a
barren occupation — as barren as it proved to be in the case of
Czechoslovakia. On the contrary, time has come when certain
facts must be admitted as beyond dispute, however unpleasant
such admission may be.

In the first place, it should be admitted that every possible
attempt to bring about union between Hindus and Muslims has
been made and that all of them have failed.

The history of these attempts may be said to begin with
the year 1909. The demands of the Muslim deputation, if they
were granted by the British, were assented to by the Hindus,
prominent amongst whom was Mr. Gokhale. He has been
blamed by many Hindus for giving his consent to the principle
of separate electorates. His critics forget that withholding con-
sent would not have been a part of wisdom. For, as has been
well said by Mr. Mahomed Ali: —

u . . . . paradoxical as it may seem, the creation of separate
electorates was hastening the advent of Hindu-Muslim unity.
For the first time a real franchise, however restricted, was being
offered to Indians, and if Hindus and Musalmans remained just
as divided as they had hitherto been since the commencement

298

National Frustration

of the British rule, and often hostile to one another, mixed elec-
torates would have provided the best battle-ground for inter-
communal strifes, and would have still further widened the gulf
separating the two communities. Each candidate for election
would have appealed to his own community for votes and would
have based his claims for preference on the intensity of his ill-will
towards the rival community, however disguised this may have
been under some such formula as 'the defence of his com-
munity's interests'. Bad as this would have been, the results
of an election in which the two communities were not equally
matched would have been even worse, for the community that
failed to get its representative elected would have inevitably borne
a yet deeper grudge against its successful rival. Divided as the
two communities were, there was no change for any political
principles coming into prominence during the elections. The
creation of separate electorates did a great deal to stop this inter-
communal warfare, though I am far from oblivious of the fact
that when inter-communal jealousies are acute the men that are
more likely to be returned even from communal electorates are
just those who are noted for the ill-will towards the rival com-
munity."

But the concession in favour of separate electorates made by
the Hindus in 1909 did not result in Hindu-Muslim unity.
Then came the Lucknow Pact in 1916. Under it the Hindus
gave satisfaction to the Muslims on every count. Yet, it did
not produce any accord between the two. Six years later,
another attempt was made to bring about Hindu-Muslim unity.
The All-India Muslim League at its annual session held at
Lucknow in March 1923 passed a resolution* urging the estab-
lishment of a national pact to ensure unity and harmony
among the various communities and sects in India and appoint-
ed a committee to collaborate with committees to be appointed
by other organizations. The Indian National Congress in its
special session held in September 1923 at Delhi under the
presidentship of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad passed a resolu-
tion reciprocating the sentiments expressed by the League. The
Congress resolved to appoint two committees (1) to revise the
constitution and (2) to prepare a draft of a national pact. The
report! of the committee on the Indian National Pact was signed
by Dr. Ansari and Lala Lajpat Rai and was presented at the

* For the full text of the resolution of the League, see Indian Annual Register,
1923. Vol. I., pp. 395-96 .

t For the terms of the Bengal Pact, see Ibid., p. 127.

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Pakistan

session of the Congress held at Coconada in 1923. Side by side
with the making of the terms of the Indian National Pact there
was forged the Bengal Pact* by the Bengal Provincial Congress
Committee with the Bengal Muslims under the inspiration of
Mr. C. R. Das. Both the Indian National Pact and the Bengal
Pact came up for discussion! in the Subjects Committee of the
Congress. The Bengal Pact was rejected by 678 votes against
458. With regard to the Indian National Pact, the Congress
resolved J that the Committee do call for further opinions on
the draft of the Pact prepared by them and submit their report
by 31st March 1924 to the A. I. C. C. for its consideration. The
Committee, however, did not proceed any further in the matter.
This was because the feeling among the Hindus against the
Bengal Pact was so strong that according to Lala L/ajpat Rai§ it
was not considered opportune to proceed with the Committee's
labours. Moreover, Mr. Gandhi was then released from jail and
it was thought that he would take up the question. Dr. Ansari,
therefore, contented himself with handing over to the A. I. C. C.
the material he had collected.

Mr. Gandhi took up the threads as soon as he came out of
the gaol. In November 1924 informal discussions were held in
Bombay. As a result of these discussions, an All-Parties Con-
ference was constituted and a committee was appointed to deal
with the question of bringing about unity. The Conference
was truly an All-Parties Conference inasmuch as the representa-
tives were drawn from the Congress, the Hindu Maha Sabha,
the Justice Party, Liberal Federation, Indian Christians, Muslim
League, etc. On the 23rd January 1925, a meeting of the com-
mittee^j appointed by the All-Parties Conference was held in Delhi
at the Western Hotel. Mr. Gandhi presided. On the 24th
January the committee appointed a representative sub-committee

• For the report and the draft terms of the Pact, see the Indian Annual Register,
1923, Vol. II, supplement, pp. 104-108.

t For the debate on these two Pacts, see Ibid., pp. 121-127.
t For the resolution, see Ibid., p. 122.

§ See his statement on the All-Parties Conference held in 1925 in the Indian
Quarterly Register. 1925, Vol. I, p. 70.

IF For the proceedings of the committee, see the Indian Quarterly Register, 1925,
Vol. I, pp. 66-77.

300

National Frustration

consisting of 40 members (a) to frame such recommendations
as wonld enable all parties to join the Congress, (b) to frame a
scheme for the representation of all communities, races and sub-
divisions on the legislative and other elective bodies under
Swaraj and recommended the best method of securing a just and
proper representation of the communities in the services without
detriment to efficiency, and (c) to frame a scheme of Swaraj
that will meet the present needs of the country. The committee
was instructed to report on or before the 15th February. In the
interest of expediting the work some members formed them-
selves into a smaller committee for drawing up a scheme of
Swaraj leaving the work of framing the scheme of communal
representation to the main committee.

The Swaraj sub-committee under the chairmanship of Mrs.
Besant succeeded in framing its report on the constitution and
submitted the same to the general committee of the All-Parties
Conference. But the sub-committee appointed to frame a
scheme of communal representation met at Delhi on the 1st
March and adjourned sine die without coming to any conclusion.
This was due to the fact that Lai a Lajpat Rai and other repre-
sentatives of the Hindus would not attend the meeting of the
sub-committee. Mr. Gandhi and Pandit Motilal Nehru issued
the following statement*: —

"Lala Lajpat Rai had asked for a postponement by reason
of the inability of Messrs. Jayakar, Sriuivas lyengar and Jai Ram
Das to attend. We were unable to postpone the meeting on our
own responsibility. We, therefore, informed Lala Lajpat Rai
that the question of postponement be placed before the meeting.
This was consequently done but apart from the absence of Lala
Lajpat Rai and of the gentlemen named by him the attendance
was otherwise also too meagre for coming to any decision. In
our opinion there was moreover no material for coming to any
definite conclusions nor is there likelihood of any being reached
in the near future "

There is no doubt that this statement truly summed up the
state of mind of the parties concerned. The late Lala Lajpat
Rai, the spokesman of the Hindus on the committee, had already
said in an article in the Leader of Allahabad that there was no
immediate hurry for a fresh pact and that he declined to accept

• For the proceedings of the committee, see the Indian Quarterly Rtgistcr, 1925
Vol. I, p. 77.

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Pakistan

the view that a Hindu majority in some provinces and a Muslim
majority in others was the only way to Hindu-Muslim unity.

The question of Hindu-Muslim unity was again taken up
in 1927. This attempt was made just prior to the Simon Com-
mission inquiry, in the hope that it would be successful as
the attempt made prior to the Montagu-Chelmsford Enquiry in
1916 and which had fructified in the Lucknow Pact. As a preli-
minary, a conference of leading Muslims was held in Delhi on
the 20th March 1927 at which certain proposals* for safeguard-
ing the interest of the Muslims were considered. These propo-
sals, which were known as the Delhi proposals, were considered
by the Congress at its session held in Madras in December 1927.
At the same time, the Congress passed a resolution! authorizing
its Working Committee to confer with similar committees to be
appointed by other organizations to draft a Swaraj constitution
for India. The Liberal Federation and the Muslim League
passed similar resolutions appointing their representatives to join
in the deliberations. Other organizations were also invited by
4he Congress Working Committee to send their spokesmen.
The All-Parties Conference, J as the committee came to be
called, met on 12th February 1928 and appointed a sub-commit-
tee to frame a constitution. The committee prepared a report
with a draft of the constitution — which is known as the Nehru
Report. The report was placed before the All-Parties Conven-
tion which met under the presidentship of Dr. Ansari on 22nd
December 1928 at Calcutta just prior to the Congress session.
On the 1st January 1929 the Convention adjourned sine die
without coming to any agreement, on any question, not even on
the communal question.

This is rather surprising because the points of difference
between the Muslim proposals and the proposals made in the
Nehru Committee report were not substantial. This is quite

• These proposals will be found in the Indian Quarterly Register, 1927, Vol. I,
p. 33. These proposals subsequently became the basis of Mr. Jinnah's 14 points.

t For the resolution of the Congress on these proposals, see Ibid., 1927, Vol. II,
pp. 397-98. .

t For the origin, history and composition of the All-Parties Convention and for
the text of the report, Ibid., 1928, Vol. I, pp. 1-142.

302

National Frustration

obvious from the speech* of Mr. Jinnah in the "All-Parties Con-
vention in support of his amendments. Mr. Jinnah wanted four
amendments to be made in the report of the Nehru Committee.
Speaking on his first amendment relating to the Muslim demand
for 33$ per cent, representation in the Central Legislature, Mr.
Jinnah said : —

"The Nehru Report has stated that according to the scheme
which they propose the Muslims are likely to get one-third in
the Central Legislature and perhaps more, and it is argued that
the Punjab and Bengal will get much more than their population
proportion. What we feel is this. If one-third is going to be
obtained by Muslims, then the method which you have adopted
is not quite fair to the provinces where the Muslims are in a
minority because the Punjab and Bengal will obtain more than
their population basis in the Central Legislature. You are going
to give to the rich more and keeping the poor according to popu-
lation. It may be sound reasoning but it is not wisdom. . . .

" Therefore, if the Muslims are, as the Nehru Report sug-
gest, to get one-third, or more, they cannot give the Punjab or
Bengal more, but let six or seven extra seats be distributed among
provinces which are already in a very small minority, such as,
Madras and Bombay, because, remember, if Siud is separated,
the Bombay Province will be reduced to something like 8 per
cent. There are other provinces where we have small minorities.
This is the reason why we say, fix one-third and let it be distri-
buted among Muslims according to our own adjustment."

His second amendment related to the reservation of seats on
population basis in the Punjab and in Bengal, i.e. the claim to
a statutory majority. On this Mr. Jinnah said : —

"You remember that originally proposals emanated from
certain Muslim leaders in March 1927 known as the 'Delhi
Proposals.1 They were dealt with by the A. I. C. C. in Bombay
and at the Madras Congress and the Muslim League in Calcutta
last year substantially endorsed at least this part of the proposal.
I am not going into the detailed arguments. It really reduces
itself into one proposition, that the voting strength of Maho-
medans in the Punjab and Bengal, although they are in a
majority, is not in proportion to tbeir population. That was one
of the reasons. The Nehru Report has now found a substitute
and they say that if adult franchise is established then there is
no need for reservation, but in the event of its not being esta-
blished we want to have no doubt that in that case there should
be reservation for Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal, according

* See the Indian Quarterly Register, 1928, Vol. I, pp. 123-24.

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Pakistan

to their population, but they shall not be entitled to additional
seats."

His third amendment was in regard to residuary powers
which the Nehrn Committee had vested in the Central Govern-
ment. In moving his amendment that they should be lodged
in the Provincial Governments Mr. Jinnah pleaded: —

"Gentlemen, this is purely a constitutional question and has
nothing to do with the communal aspect. We strongly hold — I
know Hindus will say Muslims are carried away by communal
consideration — we strongly hold the view that, if you examine
this question carefully, we submit that the residuary powers
should rest with the provinces."

His fourth amendment was concerned with the separation
of Sind. The Nehru Committee had agreed to the separation
of Sind but had subjected it to one proviso, namely, that the
separation should come "only on the establishment of the
system of government outlined in the report." Mr. Jinnah in
moving for the deletion of the proviso said : —

" We feel this difficulty Suppose the Government

choose, within the next six months, or a year or two years, to
separate Siud before the establishment of a government under
this constitution, are the Mahomedans to say, 'we do not want

it* So long as this clause stands its meaning is that

Mahomedans should oppose its separation until simultaneously
a government is established under this constitution. We say
delete these words and I am supporting niy argument by the fact
that you do not make such a remark about the N.-W. F. Province.

The Committee says it cannot accept it as the resolution

records an agreement arrived at by parties who signed at Luck-
now. With the utmost deference to the members of the Com-
mittee I venture to say that that is not valid ground ........

Are we bound, in this Convention, bound because a particular
resolution was passed by an agreement between certain persons?"

These amendments show that the gulf between the Hindus
and Muslims was not in any way a wide one. Yet there was
no desire to bridge the same. It was left to the British Govern-
ment to do what the Hindus and the Muslims failed to do and
it did it by the Communal Award.

The Poona Pact between the Hindus and the Depressed
Classes gave another spurt to the efforts to bring about unity.*

9 For an account of these efforts, see the Indian Quarterly Register 1932, Vol. II.
p. 2% et seq.

304

National Frustration

During the months of November and December 1932 Muslims
and Hindus did their best to come to some agreement. Muslims
met in their All-Parties Conferences, Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs
met in Unity Conferences. Proposals and counter-proposals were
made but nothing came out of these negotiations to replace the
Award by a Pact and they were in the end abandoned after the
Committee had held 23 sittings.

Just as attempts were made to bring about unity on political
questions, attempts were also made to bring about unity on social
and religious questions such as : —

(1) Cow slaughter, (2) music before Mosques and (3) con-
versions over which differences existed. The first attempt in this
direction was made in 1923 when the Indian National Pact was
proposed. It failed. Mr. Gandhi was then in gaol. Mr. Gandhi
was released from gaol on the 5th February 1924. Stunned by
the destruction of his work for Hindu-Muslim unity, Mr. Gandhi
decided to go on a twenty-one days' fast, holding himself morally
responsible for the murderous riots that had taken place between
Hindus and Muslims. Advantage was taken of the fast to gather
leading Indians of all communities at a Unity Conference,* which
was attended also by the Metropolitan of Calcutta. The Confer-
ence held prolonged sittings from September 26th to October
2nd, 1924. The members of the Conference pledged themselves
to use their utmost endeavours to enforce the principles of free-
dom of conscience and religion and condemn any deviation from
them even under provocation. A Central National Panchayet
was appointed with Mr. Gandhi as the chairman. The Confer-
ence laid down certain fundamental rights relating to liberty of
holding and expressing religious beliefs and following religious
practices, sacredness of places of worship, cow slaughter, and
music before mosques, with a statement of the limitations they
must be subject to. This Unity Conference did not produce peace
between the two communities. It only produced a lull in the
rioting which had become the order of the day. Between 1925
and 1926, rioting was renewed with an intensity and malignity
unknown before. Shocked by this rioting, Lord Irwin, the
then Viceroy of India, in his address to the Central Legislature

* Pattabhi Sitarammaya— • H istory of the Congress, p. 532.
*o 305

Pakistan

on 29th August 1927 made an appeal to the two communities to
stop the rioting and establish amity. Lord Irwin's exhortation
to establish amity was followed by another Unity Conference
which was known as the Simla Unity Conference.* This Unity
Conference met on the 30th August 1927 and issued an appeal
beseeching both the communities to support the leaders in their
efforts to arrive at a satisfactory settlement. The Conference
appointed a Unity Committee which sat in Simla from 16th
to 22nd September under the chairmanship of Mr. Jinnah.
No conclusions were reached on any of the principal points
involved in the cow and music questions and others pending
before the Committee were not even touched. Some members
felt that the Committee might break up. The Hindu mem-
bers pressed that the Committee should meet again on some
future convenient date. The Muslim members of the Committee
were first divided in their opinion, but at last agreed to break up
the Committee and the President was requested to summon a
meeting if he received a requisition within six weeks from eleven
specified members. Such a requisition never came and the Com-
mittee never met again.

The Simla Conference having failed, Mr. Srinivas lyengar,
the then President of the Congress, called a special conference of
Hindus and Muslims \vhich sat in Calcutta on the 27th and 28th
October 1927. It came to be known as the Calcutta Unity Con-
ference.f The Conference passed certain resolutions on the three
burning questions. But the resolution had no support behind
them as neither the Hindu Maha Sabha nor the Muslim League
was represented at the Conference.

At one time it was possible to say that Hindu-Muslim unity
was an ideal which not only must be realized but could be realized
and leaders were blamed for not making sufficient efforts for its
realization. Such was the view expressed in 1911 even by
Maulana Mahomed Ali who had not then made any particular
efforts to achieve Hindu-Muslim unity. Writing in the Com-
rade of 14th January 1911 Mr. Mahomed Ali said J : —

* For the proceedings of this Conference, see the Indian Quarterly Register, Vol.
II, pp. 39-50.

t For the proceedings of the Conference, see Ibid., pp. 50-58.

t Quoted in his presidential address at Coconada session of the Congress, 1923.

306

National Frustration

" We have no faith in the cry that India is united. If India
was united where was the need of dragging the venerable Presi-
dent of this year's Congress from a distant home? The bare
imagination of a feast will not dull the edge of hunger. We
have less faith still in the sanctimoniousness that transmutes in
its subtle alchemy a rapacious monopoly into fervent patriotism
.... the person we love best, fear the most, and trust the least
is the impatient idealist. Goethe said of Byron that he was a
prodigious poet, but that when he reflected he was a child. Well,
we think no better and no worse of the man who combines great
ideals and a greater impatience. So many efforts, well meaning
as well as ill-begotten, have failed in bringing unity to this dis-
tracted land, that we cannot spare even cheap and scentless
flowers of sentiment for the grave of another ill-judged endeavour.
We shall not make the mistake of gumming together pieces of
broken glass, and then cry over the unsuccessful result, or blame
the refractory material. In other words, we shall endeavour to
face the situation boldly, and respect facts, howsoever ugly and
ill-favoured. It is poor statesmanship to slur over inconvenient
realities, and not the least important success iii achieving unity
is the honest and frank recognition of the deep-seated prejudices
that hinder it and the yawning differences that divide."

Looking back on the history of these 30 years, one can well
ask whether Hindu-Muslim unity has been realized? Whether
efforts have not been made for its realization? And whether
any efforts remain to be made? The history of the last 30
years shows that Hindu-Muslim unity has not been realized.
On the contrary, there now exists the greatest disunity between
them: that efforts — sincere and persistent — have been made to
achieve it and that nothing now remains to be done to achieve
it except surrender by one party to the other. If anyone, who
is not in the habit of cultivating optimism where there is no
justification for it, said that the pursuit of Hindu-Muslim unity
is like a mirage and that the idea must now be given up, no
one can have the courage to call him a pessimist or an impatient
idealist. It is for the Hindus to say whether they will engage
themselves in this vain pursuit in spite of the tragic end of all
their past endeavours or give up the pursuit of unity and try for
a settlement on another basis.

In the second place, it must be admitted that the Muslim
point of view has undergone a complete revolution. How com-
plete the revolution is can be seen by reference to the past pro-

307

Pakistan

nouncements of some of those who insist on the two-nation
theory and believe that Pakistan is the only solution of the Hindu-
Muslim problem. Among these Mr. Jinnah, of course, must
be accepted as the foremost. The revolution in his views on
the Hindu-Muslim question is striking, if not staggering. To
realize the nature, character and vastness of this revolution it is
necessary to know his pronouncements in the past relating to
the subject so that they may be compared with those he is
making now.

A study of his past pronouncements may well begin with the
year 1906 when the leaders of the Muslim community waited
upon Lord Minto and demanded separate electorates for the
Muslim community. It is to be noted that Mr. Jinnah was
not a member of the deputation. Whether he was not invited
to join the deputation or whether he was invited to join and
declined is not known. But the fact remains that he did not
lend his support to the Muslim claim to separate representation
when it was put forth in 1906.

In 1918 Mr, Jinnah resigned his membership of the Imperial
Legislative Council as a protest against the Rowlatt Bill.* In
tendering his resignation Mr. Jinnah said : —

"I feel that under the prevailing conditions, I can be of
no use to my people in the Council, nor consistently with one's
self-respect is co-operation possible with a Government that shows
such utter disregard for the opinion of the representatives of the
people at the Council Chamber and the feelings and the sentiments
of the people outside."

In 1919 Mr. Jiunah gave evidence before the Joint Select
Committee appointed by Parliament on the Government of
India Reform Bill, theii on the anvil. The following views were
expressed by him iu answer to questions put by members of the
Committee on the Hindu-Muslim question.

EXAMINED BY MAJOR ORMSBY-GORE.

Q. 3806. — You appear on behalf of the Moslem league —
that is, on behalf of the only widely extended Mohammedan
organisation in India ? — Yes.

* The Bill notwithstanding the protest of the Indian members of the Council was
passed into law and became Act XI of 1919 as " The Anarchical and Revolutionary
Crimes Act."

308

National Frustration

Q. 3807. — I was very much struck by the fact that neither
in your answers to the questions nor in your opening speech this
morning did you make any reference to the special interest of
the Mohammedans in India: is that because you did not wish
to say anything ? — No, but because I take it the Southborough
Committee have accepted that, and I left it to the members of
the Committee to put any questions they wanted to. I took a
very prominent part in the settlement of Lucknow. I was repre-
senting the Mussalmans on that occasion.

Q. 3809. — On behalf of the All-India Moslem L,eague, you
ask this Committee to reject the proposal of the Government of
India? — I am authorised to say that — to ask you to reject
the proposal of the Government of India with regard to Bengal
[i.e. .to give the Bengal Muslims more representation than was
given them by the Lucknow Pact].

Q. 3810. — You said you spoke from the point of view of
India. You speak really as an Indian Nationalist ? — I do.

Q. 3811. — Holding that view, do you contemplate the early
disappearance of separate communal representation of the
Mohammedan community ? — I think so.

Q. 3812. — That is to say, at the earliest possible moment
you wish to do away in political life with any distinction between
Mohammedans and Hindus ? — Yes. Nothing will please me
more than when that day comes.

Q. 3813. — You do not think it is true to say that the
Mohammedans of India have many special political interests not
merely in India but outside India, which they are always parti-
cularly anxious to press as a distinct Mohammedan community ?
— There are two things. In India the Mohammedans have very
few things really which you can call matters of special interest
for them — I mean secular things.

Q. 3814. — I am only referring to them, of course? — And
therefore that is why I really hope and expect that the day is
not very far distant when these separate electorates will disappear.

Q. 3815. — It is true, at the same time, that the Mohamme-
dans in India take a special interest in the foreign policy of the
Government of India? — They do: a very, — No, because what
you propose to do is to frame very keen interest and the large
majority of them hold very strong sentiments and very strong
views.

Q. 3816. — Is that one of the reasons why you, speaking on
behalf of the Mohammedan community, are so anxious to get
the Government of " India more responsible to an electorate ?
—No.

Q. 3817. — Do you think it is possible, consistently with
remaining in the British Empire, for India to have one foreign

309

Pakistan

policy and for His Majesty, as advised by his Ministers in
London, to have another ? — Let me make it clear. It is not a
question of foreign policy at all. What the Moslems of India
feel is that it is a very difficult position for them. Spiritually,
the Sultan or the Khalif is their head.

Q. 3818.— Of one community ?— Of the Sunni sect, but
that is the largest ; it is in an overwhelming majority all over
India. The Khalif is the only rightful custodian of the Holy
Places according to our view, and nobody else has a right.
What the Moslems feel very keenly is this, that the Holy Places
should not be severed from the Ottoman Empire — that they
should remain with the Ottoman Empire under the Sultan.

Q. 3819. — I do not want to get away from the Reform
Bill on to foreign policy. — I say it has nothing to do with foreign
policy. Your point is whether in India the Moslems will adopt
a certain attitude with regard to foreign policy in matters con-
cerning Moslems all over the world.

Q. 3820.— My point is, are they seeking for some control
over the Central Government in order to impress their views on
foreign policy on the Government of India ? — No.

EXAMINED BY MR. BENNETT

Q. 3853. — Would it not be an advantage in

the case of an occurrence of that kind [i.e. a f communal riot]
if the maintenance of law and order were left with the execu-
tive side of the Government ? — I do not think so, if you ask
me, but I do not want to go into unpleasant matters, as you say.

Q. 3854. — It is with no desire to bring up old troubles that
I ask the question ; I would like to forget them ? — If you ask
me, very often these riots are based on some misunderstanding,
and it is because the police have taken one side or the other,
and that has enraged one side or the other. I know very well
that in the Indian States you hardly ever hear of any Hindu-
Mohammedan riots, and I do not mind telling the Committee,
without mentioning the name, that I happened to ask one of the
ruling Princes, "How do you account for this?" and he told
me, "As soon as there is some trouble we have invariably traced
it to the police, through the police taking one side or the other,
and the only remedy we have found is that as soon as we come
to know we move that police officer from that place, and there
is an end of it."

Q. 3855. — That is a useful piece of information, but the
fact remains that these riots have been inter-racial, Hindu on
the one side and Mohammedan on the other. Would it be an
advantage at a time like that the Minister, the representative of

310

National Frustration

one community or the other, should be in charge of the main-
tenance of law and order? — Certainly.

Q. 3856. — It would?— If I thought otherwise I should be
casting a reflection on myself. If I was the Minister, I would
make bold to say that nothing would weigh with me except
justice, and what is right.

Q. 3857. — I can understand that you would do more than
justice to the other side ; but even then, there is what might be
called the subjective side. It is not only that there is impartiality,
but there is the view which may be entertained by the public,
who may harbour some feeling of suspicion? — With regard to
one section or the other, you mean they would feel that an
injustice was done to them, or that justice would not be done?

Q. 3858. — Yes : that is quite apart from the objective part
of it? — My answer is this: That these difficulties are fast dis-
appearing. Even recently, in the whole district of Thana,
Bombay, every officer was an Indian officer from top to bottom,
and I do not think there was a single Mohammedan — they were
all Hindus — and I never heard any complaint. Recently that
has been so. I quite agree with you that ten years ago there
was that feeling what you are now suggesting to me, but it is
fast disappearing.

EXAMINED BY LORD ISLINGTON

Q. 3892. — You said just now about the

communal representation, I thiuk in answer to Major Ormsby-
Gore, that you hope in a very few years you would be able to
extinguish communal representation, which was at present pro-
posed to be established and is established in order that Mahomme-
dans may have their representation with Hindus. You said you
desired to see that. How soon do you think that happy state
of affairs is likely to be realized? — I can only give you certain
facts : I cannot say anything more than that : I can give you
this, which will give you some idea: that in 1913, at the All-
India Moslem League sessions at Agra, we put this matter to
the test whether separate electorates should be insisted upon or
not by the Mussalmans, and we got a division, and that division
is based upon Provinces ; only a certain number of votes represent
each Province, and the division came to 40 in favour of doing
away with the separate electorate, and 80 odd — I do not remem-
ber the exact number — were for keeping the separate electorate.
That was in 1913. Since then I have had many opportunities
of discussing this matter with various Mussalman leaders; and
they are changing their angle of vision with regard to this
matter. I cannot give you the period, but I think it cannot last
very long. Perhaps the next inquiry may hear something
about it

311

Pakistan

Q. 3893. — You think at the next inquiry the Mahommedans
will ask to be absorbed into the whole?— Yes, I think the next
inquiry will probably hear something about it.

Although Mr. Jinnah appeared as a witness on behalf of
the Muslim League, he did not allow his membership of the
League to come in the way of his loyalty to other political orga-
nizations in the country. Besides being a member of the Mus-
lim League, Mr. Jinnah was a member of the Home Rule
League and also of the Congress. As he said in his evidence
before the Joint Parliamentary Committee, he was a member
of all three bodies although he openly disagreed with the Con-
gress, with the Muslim League and that there were some views
which the Home Rule League held which he did not share.
That he was an independent but a nationalist is shown by his
relationship with the Khilafatist Musalmans. In 1920 the
Musalmans organized the Khilafat Conference. It became so
powerful an organization that the Muslim League went under
and lived in a state of suspended animation till 1924. During
these years no Muslim leader could speak to the Muslim masses
from a Muslim platform unless he was a member of the Khilafat
Conference. That was the only platform for Muslims to meet
Muslims. Even then Mr. Jinnah refused to join the Khilafat
Conference. This was no doubt due to the fact that then he
was only a statutory Musalinan with none of the religious fire
of the orthodox which he now says is burning within him. But
the real reason why he did not join the Khilafat was because he
was opposed to the Indian Musalmans engaging themselves in
extra-territorial affairs relating to Muslims outside India.

After the Congress accepted non-co-operation, civil disobe-
dience and boycott of Councils, Mr. Jinnah left the Congress.
He became its critic but never accused it of being a Hindu body.
He protested when such a statement was attributed to him by his
opponents. There is a letter by Mr. Jinnah to the Editor of the
Times of India written about the time which puts in a strange
contrast the present opinion of Mr. Jinnah about the Congress
and his opinion in the past. The letter* reads as follows : —

"To the Editor of ''The Times of India"

* Published in the T\m*t of India of 3-10-25.
312

National Frustration

Sir, — I wish again to correct the statement which is attribut-
ed to me and to which you have given currency more than once
and now again repeated by your correspondent * Banker' in
the second column of your issue of the 1st October that I de-
nounced the Congress as 'a Hindu Institution. ' I publicly
corrected this misleading report of my speech in your columns
soon after it appeared ; but it did not find a place in the columns
of your paper and so may I now request you to publish this
and oblige/'

After the Khilafat storm had blown over and the Muslims
had shown a desire to return to the internal politics of India,
the Muslim League was resuscitated. The session of the League
held in Bombay on 30th December 1924 under the presidentship
of Mr. Raza Ali was a lively one. Both Mr. Jinnah and Mr.
Mahomed Ali took part in it.*

In this session of the League, a resolution was moved which
affirmed the desirability of representatives of the various Muslim
associations of India representing different shades of political
thought meeting in a conference at an early date at Delhi or
at some other central place with a view to develop "a united
and sound practical activity" to supply the needs of the Muslim
community. Mr. Jinnah in explaining the resolution said| : —

"The object was to organize the Muslim community, not
with a view to quarrel with the Hindu community, but with a
view to unite and cooperate with it for their motherland. He
was sure once they had organized themselves they would join
hands with the Hindu Mahasabha and declare to the world that
Hindus and Mahomedans are brothers."

The League also passed another resolution in the same ses-
sion for appointing a committee of 33 prominent Musalmans
to formulate the political demands of the Muslim community.
The resolution was moved by Mr. Jinnah. In moving the reso-
lution, Mr. JinnahJ : —

• Mr. Mahomed Ali in his presidential address to the Congress at Coconada
humorously said : " Mr. Jinnah would soon come back to us (cheers). I may mention
that an infidel becomes a Kaffir and a Kaffir becomes an infidel ; likewise, when
Mr. Jinnah was in the Congress I was not with him in those days, and when I was
in the Congress and in the Muslim League he was away from me. I hope some day
we would reconcile (Laughter)."

t From the report in the Times of India, 1st January 1925.

JThe Indian Quarterly Register. 1924, Vol. II, p. 481.

313

Pakistan

"Repudiated the charge that he was standing on the plat-
form of the League as a communalist. He assured them that he
was, as ever, a nationalist. Personally he had no hesitation. He
wanted the best and the . fittest men to represent them in the
Legislatures oi the land (Hear, Hear and Applause). But un-
fortunately his Muslim compatriots were not prepared to go as
far as he. He could not be blind to the situation- The fact
was that there was a large number of Muslims who wanted
representation separately in Legislatures and in the country's
Services. They were talking of communal unity, but where was
unity? It had to be achieved by arriving at some suitable
settlement. He knew, he said amidst deafening cheers, that his
fellow-religionists were ready and prepared to fight for Swaraj,
but wanted some safeguards. Whatever his view, and they
knew that as a practical politician he had to take stock of the
situation, the real block to unity was not the communities them-
selves, but a few mischief makers on both sides."

And he did not thus hesitate to arraign mischief makers
in the sternest possible language that could only emanate from
an earnest nationalist. In his capacity as the President of the
session of the League held in Lahore on 24th May 1924 he
said*: —

"if we wish to be free people, let us unite, but if we wish
to continue slaves of Bureaucracy, let us fight among ourselves
and gratify petty vanity over petty matters, Englishmen being
our arbiters."

In the two All-Parties Conferences, one held in 1925 and the
other in 1928, Mr. Jinnah was prepared to settle the Hindu-
Muslim question on the basis of joint electorates. In 1927 he
openly saidj from the League platform : —

" I am not wedded to separate electorates, although I must
say that the overwhelming majority of the Mu sal mans firmly
and honestly believe that it is the only method by which they
can be sure."

In 1928, Mr. Jinnah joined the Congress in the boycott of
the Simon Commission. He did so even though the Hindus
and Muslims had failed to come to a settlement and he did so
at the cost of splitting the League into two.

Even when the ship of the Round Table Conference was
about to break on the communal rock, Mr. Jinnah resented being

• See the Indian Quarterly Review, 1924, Vol. I, p. 658.
t The Indian Quarterly Register, 1927, Vol. I, p. 37.

314

National Frustration

named as a communalist who was responsible for the result and
said that he preferred an agreed solution of the communal prob-
lem to the arbitration of the British Government. Addressing*
the U. P. Muslim Conference held at Allahabad on 8th August
1931 Mr. Jinnah said : —

" The first thing that I wish to tell you is that it is now
absolutely essential and vital that Muslims should stand united.
For Heaven's sake close all your ranks and files and stop this
internecine war. I urged this most vehemently and I pleaded to
the best of my ability before Dr. Ansari, Mr. T. A. K. Sherwanl,
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Dr. Syed Mahmud. I hope that
before I leave the shores of India I shall hear the good news that
whatever may be our differences, whatever may be our convic-
tions between ourselves, this is not the moment to quarrel between
ourselves.

" Another thing I want to tell you is this. There is a certain
section of the press, there is a certain section of the Hindus, who
constantly misrepresent me in various ways. I was only reading
the speech of Mr. Gandhi this morning and Mr. Gandhi said
that he loves Hindus and Muslims alike. I again say standing
here on this platform that although I may not put forward that
claim but I do put forward this honestly and sincerely that I
want fair play between the two communities.''

Continuing further Mr. Jinnah said : " As to the most im-
portant question, which to my mind is the question of Hindu-
Muslim settlement — all I can say to you is that I honestly believe
that the Hindus should concede to the Muslims a majority in
the Punjab and Bengal and if that is conceded, I think a settle-
ment can be arrived at in a very short time.

" The next question that arises is one of separate vs. joint
electorates. As most of you know, if a majority is conceded in
the Punjab and Bengal, I would personally prefer a settlement
on the basis of joint electorate. (Applause.) But I also know
that there is a large body of Muslims — and I believe a majority of
Muslims — who are holding on to separate electorate. My posi-
tion is that I would rather have a settlement even on the footing
of separate electorate, hoping and trusting that when we work
our new constitution and when both Hindus and Muslims get rid
of distrust, suspicion and fears and when they get their freedom,
we would rise to the occasion and probably separate electorate
will go sooner than most of us think.

" Therefore I am for a settlement and peace among the
Muslims first; I am for a settlement and peace between the
Hindus and Mahommedans. This is not a time for argument,

• Tkt Indian Annual Register, 1931, Vol. II, pp. 230-231.

315

Pakistan

not a time for propaganda work and not a time for embittering
feelings between the two communities, because the enemy is at
the door of both of us and I say without hesitation that if the
Hindu-Muslim question is not settled, I have no doubt that the
British will have to arbitrate and that he who arbitrates will keep
to himself the substance of power and authority. Therefore, I
hope they will not vilify me. After all, Mr. Gandhi himself
says that he is willing to give the Muslims whatever they want,
and my only sin is that I say to the Hindus give to the Muslims
only 14 points, which is much less than the * blank cheque*
which Mr. Gandhi is willing to give. I do not want a blank
cheque, why not concede the 14 points ? When Pandit Jawaharlal
Nehru says: 'Give us a blank cheque' when Mr. Patel says:
'Give us a blank cheque and we will sign it with a Swadeshi
pen on a Swadeshi paper' they are not communalists and
I am a communalist ! I say to Hindus not to misrepresent
everybody. I hope and trust that we shall be yet in a position
to settle the question which will bring peace and happiness to
the millions in our country.

"One thing more I want to tell you and I have done.
During the time of the Round Table Conference, — it is now an
open book and anybody who cares to read it can learn for him-
self— I observed the one and the only principle and it was that
when I left the shores of Bombay I said to the people that I
would hold the interests of India sacred, and believe me — if you
care to read the proceedings of the Conference, I am not bragging
because I have done my duty — that I have loyally and faithfully
fulfilled my promise to the fullest extent and I venture to say
that if the Congress or Mr. Gandhi can get anything more than
I fought for, I would congratulate them.

" Concluding Mr. Jinnah said that they must come to a settle-
ment, they must become friends eventually and he, therefore,
appealed to the Muslims to show moderation, wisdom and conci-
liation, if possible, in the deliberation that might take place and the
resolution that might be passed at the Conference."

As an additional illustration of the transformation in
Muslim ideology, I propose to record the opinions once held by
Mr. Barkat Ali who is now a follower of Mr. Jinnah and a
staunch supporter of Pakistan.

When the Muslim League split into two over the question of
co-operation with the Simon Commission, one section led by
Sir Mahommad Shafi favouring co-operation and another section
led by Mr. Jinnah supporting the Congress plan of boycott, Mr.
Barkat Ali belonged to the Jinnah section of the League. The
two wings of the League held their annual sessions in 1928 at

316

National Frustration

two different places. The Shafi wing met in Lahore and the
Jinnah wing met in Calcutta. Mr. Barkat AH, who was the
Secretary of the Punjab Muslim League, attended the Calcutta
session of the Jinnah wing of the League and moved the resolu-
tion relating to the communal settlement. The basis of the
settlement was joint electorates. In moving the resolution Mr.
Barkat Ali said* : —

"For the first time in the history of the League there was
a change in its angle of vision. We are offering by this change
a sincere hand of fellowship to those of our Hindu countrymen
who have objected to the principle of separate electorates."

In 1928 there was formed a Nationalist Muslim Party under
the leadership of Dr. Ansari.f The Nationalist Muslim Party
was a step in advance of the Jinnah wing of the Muslim League
and was prepared to accept the Nehru Report, as it was, without
any amendments — not even those which Mr. Jinnah was insist-
ing upon. Mr. Barkat Ali, who in 1927 was with the Jinnah
wing of the League, left the same as not being nationalistic
enough and joined the Nationalist Muslim Party of Dr. Ansari.
How great a nationalist Mr. Barkat Ali then was can be seen
by his trenchant and vehement attack on Sir Muhammad Iqbal
for his having put forth in his presidential address to the annual
session of the All-India Muslim League held at Allahabad in
1930 a scheme^ for the division of India which is now taken up
by Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Barkat Ali and which goes by the name
of Pakistan. In 1931 there was held in Lahore the Punjab
Nationalist Muslim Conference and Mr. Barkat Ali was the
Chairman of the Reception Committee. The views he then
expressed on Pakistan are worth recalling.§ Reiterating and
reaffirming the conviction and the political faith of his party,
Malik Barkat Ali, Chairman of the Reception Committee of the
Conference, said : —

"We believe, first and foremost in the full freedom and

honour of India. India, the country of our birth and the place

with which all our most valued and dearly cherished associations

are knit, must claim its first place in our affection and in our

• The Indian Quarterly Register, 1927, Vol. II, p. 448.

t The Indian Quarterly Register, 1929, Vol. II, p. 350.

j For his speech see The Indian Annual Register, 1930, Vol. II, pp. 334-345.

5 Indian Annual Register, 1931. Vol. II, pp. 234-235.

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Pakistan

Hesires. We refuse to be parties to that sinister type of propa-
ganda which would try to appeal to ignorant sentiment by
professing to be Muslim first and Indian afterwards. To us a
slogan of this kind is not only bare, meaningless cant, but down-
right mischievous. We cannot conceive of Islam in its best and
last interests as in any way inimical to or in conflict with the
best and permanent interests of India. India and Islam in India
are identical, and whatever is to the detriment of India must,
from the nature of it, be detrimental to Islam whether economi-
cally, politically, socially or even morally. Those politicians,
therefore, are a class of false prophets and at bottom the foes of
Islam, who talk of any inherent conflict between Islam and the
welfare of India. Further, howsoever much our sympathy with
our Muslim brethren outside India, i.e. the Turks and the Egyp-
tians or the Arabs, — and it is a sentiment which is at once noble
and healthy, — we can never allow that sympathy to work to the
detriment of the essential interests of India. Our sympathy, in
fact, with those countries can only be valuable to them, if India
as the source, nursery and fountain of that sympathy, is really
great. And if ever the time comes, God forbid, when any Muslim
Power from across the Frontier chooses to enslave India and
snatch away the liberties of its people, no amount of pan-Islamic
feeling, whatever it may mean, can stand in the way of Muslim
India fighting shoulder to shoulder with non-Muslim India in
defence of its liberties.

" I/et there be, therefore, no misgivings of any kind in that
respect in any non-Muslim quarters. I am conscious that a
certain class of narrow-minded Hindu politicians is constantly
harping on the bogey of an Islamic danger to India from beyond
the N.-W. Frontier passes but I desire to repeat that such state-
ments and such fears are fundamentally wrong and unfounded.
Muslim India shall as much defend India's liberties as non-
Muslim India, even if the invader happens to be a follower of
Islam.

" Next, we not only believe in a free India but we also believe
in a united India—- not the India of the Muslim, not the India
of the Hindu or of the Sikh, not the India of this community
or of that community but the India of all. And as this is our
abiding faith, we refuse to be parties to any division of the
India of the future into a Hindu or a Muslim India. However
much the conception of a Hindu and a Muslim India may appeal
and send into frenzied ecstasies abnormally orthodox mentalities
of their party, we offer our full throated opposition to it, not
only because it is singularly unpractical and utterly obnoxious
but because it not only sounds the death-knell of all that is
noble and lasting in modern political activity in India, but is
also contrary to and opposed to India's chief historical tradition.

3 IS

National Frustration

"India was one in the days of Asoka and Chandragupta and
India remained one even when the sceptre and rod of Imperial
sway passed from Hindu into Moghul or Muslim hands. And
India shall remain one when we shall have attained the object
of our desires and reached those uplands of freedom, Where all
the light illuminating us shall not be reflected glory but shall
be light proceeding direct as it were from our very faces.

"The conception of a divided India, which Sir Muhammad
Iqbal put forward recently in the course of his presidential utter-
ance from the platform of the League at a time when that body
bad virtually become extinct and ceased to represent free Islam —
I am glad to be able to say that Sir Muhammad Iqbal has since
recanted it — must not therefore delude anybody into thinking
that it is Islam's conception of the India to be. Even if Dr. Sir
Muhammad Iqbal had not recanted it as something which could
not be put forward by any sane person, I should have emphati-
cally and unhesitatingly repudiated it as something foreign to
the genius and the spirit of the rising generation of Islam, and
I really deem it a proud duty to affirm today that not only must
there be no division of India into commtmal provinces but that
both Islam and Hinduism must run coterminously with the
boundaries of India and must not be cribbed, cabined and con-
fined within any shorter bounds. To the same category as Dr.
Iqbal's conception of a Muslim India and a Hindu India, belongs
the sinister proposals of some Sikh coinmunalists to partition
and divide the Punjab.

"With a creed so expansive, namely a free and united India
with its people all enjoying in equal measure and without any
kinds of distinctions and disabilities the protection of laws made
by the chosen representatives of the people on the widest possible
basis of a true democracy, namely, adult franchise, and through
the medium of joint electorates — and an administration charged
with the duty of an impartial execution of the laws, fully account-
able for its actions, not to a distant or remote Parliament of
foreigners but to the chosen representatives of the land, — you
would not expect me to enter into the details and lay before you,
all the colours of my picture. And I should have really liked
to conclude my general observations on the aims and objects of
the Nationalist Muslim Party here, were it not that the much
discussed question of joint or separate electorates, has today assum-
ed proportions where no public man can possibly ignore it.

44 Whatever may have been the value or utility of separate
electorates at a time when an artificially manipulated high-pro-
pertied franchise had the effect of converting a majority of the
people in the population of a province into a minority in the
electoral roll, and when communal passions and feelings ran
particularly high, universal distrust poisoning the whole atmo-
sphere like a general and all-pervading miasma, — we feel that in

319

Pakistan ,

the circumstances of today and in the India of the future, separate
electorates should have no place whatever."

Suet were the views which Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Barkat AH
held on nationalism, on separate electorates and on Pakistan.
How diametrically opposed are the views now held by them on
these very problems ?

So far I have laboured to point out two things, the utter
failure of the attempts made to bring about Hindu-Muslim
unity and the emergence of a new ideology in the minds of the
Muslim leaders. There is also a third thing which I must dis-
cuss in the present context for reasons arising both from its
relevance as well as from its bearing on the point under consi-
deration, namely whether this Muslim ideology has behind it a
justification which political philosophers can accept.

Many Hindus seem to hold that Pakistan has no justifica-
tion. If we confine ourselves to the theory of Pakistan there
can be no doubt that this is a greatly mistaken view. The
philosophical justification for Pakistan rests upon the distinction
between a community and a nation. In the first place, it is
recognized comparatively recently. Political philosophers for
a long time were concerned, mainly, with the controversy sum-
med up in the two questions, how far should the right of a
mere majority to rule the minority be accepted as a rational basis
for government and how far the legitimacy of a government
be said to depend upon the consent of the governed. Even
those who insisted, that the legitimacy of a government depend-
ed upon the consent of the governed, remained content with a
victory for their proposition and did not care to probe further
into the matter. They did not feel the necessity for making
any distinctions within the category of the " governed." They
evidently thought that it was a matter of no moment whether
those who were included in the category of the governed formed
a community or a nation. Force of circumstances has, however,
compelled political philosophers to accept this distinction. In
the second place, it is not a mere distinction without a difference.
It is a distinction which is substantial and the difference is con-
sequentially fundamental. That this distinction between a
community and a nation is fundamental, is clear from the

320

National Frustration

difference in the political rights which political philosophers are
prepared to permit to a community and those they are prepared
to allow to a nation, against the Government established by
law. To a community they are prepared to allow only the
right of insurrection. But to a nation they are willing to con-
cede the right of disruption. The distinction between the two
is as obvious as it is fundamental. A right of insurrection is
restricted only to insisting on a change in the mode and manner
of go vernment The right of disruption is greater than the right
of insurrection and extends to the secession of a group of the
members of a State with a secession of the portion of the State's
territory in its occupation. One wonders what must be the
basis of this difference. Writers on political philosophy, who
have discussed this subject, have given their reasons for the
justification of a community's right to insurrection* and of a
nation's right to demand disruption.! The difference comes to

* Sidgwick justifies it in these words : " the evils of insurrection may

reasonably be thought to be outweighed by the evils of submission, when the question
at issue is of vital importance .... an insurrection may sometimes induce redress
of grievances, even when the insurgents are clearly weaker in physical force ; since
it may bring home to the majority the intensity of the sense of injury aroused by their
actions. For similar reasons, again a conflict in prospect may be anticipated by a
compromise ; in 'short, the fear of provoking disorder may be a salutary check on
the persons constitutionally invested with supreme power under a democratic as under
other forms of government .... I conceive, then that a moral right of insurrection
must be held to exist in the most popularly governed community." — Elements of
Politics (1929), pp. 646-47.

i This is what Sidgwick has to say on the right to disruption: "....some of
those who hold that a government to be legitimate, must rest on the consent of the
governed, appear not to shrink from drawing this inference : they appear to qualify
the right of the majority of members of a state to rule by allowing the claim of a
minority that suffers from the exercise of this right to secede and form a new state,
when it is in a mijority in a continuous portion of its old state's territory....
and I conceive that there are cases in which the true interests of the whole may be
promoted by disruption. For instance, where two portions of a state's territory arc
separated by a long interval of sea, or other physical obstacles, from any very active
intercommunication, and when, from differences of race or religion, past history, or
present social conditions, their respective inhabitants have divergent needs and demands
in respect of legislation and other governmental interference, it may easily be inex-
pedient that they should have a common government for internal affairs; while if,
at the same time, their external relations, apart from their union, would be very
different, it is quite possible that each part no ay lose more through the risk of
implication in the other's quarrels, than it is likely to gain from the aid of its
military force. Under such conditions as these, it is not to be desired that any

11 321

Pakistan

this : a community has a right to safeguards, a nation has a right
to demand separation. The difference is at once clear and
crucial. But they have not given any reasons why the right of
one is limited to insurrection and why that of the other extends
to disruption. They have not even raised such a question. Nor
are the reasons apparent on the face of them. But it is both
interesting and instructive to know why this difference is made.
To my mind the reason for this difference pertains to questions
of ultimate destiny. A state either consists of a series of com-
munities or it consists of a series of nations. In a state, which
is composed of a series of communities, one community may be
arrayed against another community and the two may be oppos-
ed to each other. But in the matter of their ultimate destiny
they feel they are one. But in a state, which is composed of a
series of nations, when one nation rises against the other, the
conflict is one as to differences of ultimate destiny. This is the
distinction between communities and nations and it is this dis-
tinction which explains the difference in their political rights.
There is nothing new or original in this explanation. It is
merely another way of stating why the community has one kind
of right and the nation another of quite a different kind. A
community has a right of insurrection because it is satisfied with
it. All that it wants is a change in the mode and form of
government. Its quarrel is not over any difference of ultimate
destiny. A nation has to be accorded the right of disruption
because it will not be satisfied with mere change in the form of
government. Its quarrel is over the question of ultimate
destiny. If it .will not be satisfied unless the unnatural bond
that binds them is dissolved, then prudence and even ethics
demands that the bond shall be dissolved and they shall be freed
each to pursue its own destiny.

While it is necessary to admit that the efforts at Hindu-
Muslim unity have failed and that the Muslim ideology has

sentiment of historical patriotism, or any pride in the national ownership of an
extensive territory, should permanently prevent a peaceful dissolution of the incoherent
whole into its natural parts."— Elements of Politics (1929), pp. 648-49.

322

National Frustration

undergone a complete revolution, it is equally necessary to
know the precise causes which have produced these effects. The
Hindus say that the British policy of divide and rule is the real
cause of this failure and of this ideological revolution. There
is nothing surprising in this. The Hindus having cultivated the
Irish mentality to have no other politics except that of being
always against the Government, are ready to blame the Govern-
ment for everything including bad weather. But time has come
to discard the facile explanation so dear to the Hindus. For it
fails to take into account two very important circumstances.
In the first place, it overlooks the fact that the policy of divide
and rule, allowing that the British do resort to it, cannot succeed
unless there are elements which make division possible, and
further, if the policy succeeds for such a long time, it means
that the elements which divide are more or less permanent and
irreconcilable and are not transitory or superficial. Secondly,
it forgets that Mr. Jinnah, who represents this ideological trans-
formation, can never be suspected of being a tool in the hands
of the British even by the worst of his enemies. He may be too
self-opinionated, an egotist without the mask and has perhaps
a degree of arrogance which is not compensated by any extra-
ordinary intellect or equipment. It may be on that account he
is unable to reconcile himself to a second place and work with
others in that capacity for a public cause. He may not be over-
flowing with ideas although he is not, as his critics make him
out to be, an ernpty-headed dandy living upon the ideas of
others. It may be that his fame is built up more upon art and
less on substance. At the same time, it is doubtful if there is a
politician in India to whom the adjective incorruptible can be
more fittingly applied. Anyone who knows what his relations
with the British Government have been, will admit that he has
always been their critic, if indeed, he has not been their adver-
sary. No one can buy him. For it must be said to his credit
that he has never been a soldier of fortune. The customary
Hindu explanation fails to account for the ideological transfor-
mation of Mr. Jinnah.

What is then the real explanation of these tragic phenomena,
this failure of the efforts for unity r this transformation in the
Muslim ideology ?

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Pakistan

The real explanation of this failure of Hindu-Muslim unity
lies in the failure to realize that what stands between the Hindus
and Muslims is not a mere matter of difference, and that this
antagonism is not to be attributed to material causes. It is spiri-
tual in its character. It is formed by causes which take their
origin in historical, religious, cultural and social antipathy, of
which political antipathy is only a reflection. These form one
deep river of discontent which, being regularly fed by these
sources, keeps on mounting to a head and overflowing its ordi-
nary channels. Any current of water flowing from another
source however pure, when it joins it, instead of altering the
colour or diluting its strength becomes lost in the main stream.
The silt of this antagonism which this current has deposited,
has become permanent and deep. So long as this silt keeps on
accumulating and so long as this antagonism lasts, it is unna-
tural to expect this antipathy between Hindus and Muslims to
give place to unity.

Like the Christians and Muslims in the Turkish Empire, the
Hindus and Muslims of India have met as enemies on many
fields, and the result of the struggle has often brought them into
the relation of conquerors and conquered. Whichever party has
triumphed, a great gulf has remained fixed between the two and
their enforced political union either undar the Moghuls or the
British instead of passing over, as in so many other cases, into
organic unity, has only accentuated their mutual antipathy.
Neither religion nor social code can bridge this gulf. The two
faiths are mutually exclusive and whatever harmonies may be
forged in the interest of good social behaviour, at their core
and centre they are irreconcilable. There seems to be an inher-
ent antagonism between the two which centuries have not been
able to dissolve. Notwithstanding the efforts made to bring the
creeds together by reformers like Akbar and Kabir, the ethical
realities behind each have still remained, to use a mathematical
phrase, which nothing can alter or make integers capable of
having a common denominator. A Hindu can go from Hindu-
ism to Christianity without causing any commotion or shock.
But he cannot pass from Hinduism to Islam without causing a
communal riot, certainly not without causing qualms. That

324

National Frustration

shows the depth of the antagonism which divides the Hindus
from the Musalmans.

If Islam and Hinduism keep Muslims and Hindus apart in
the matter of their faith, they also prevent their social assimila-
tion. That Hinduism prohibits intermarriage between Hindus
and Muslims is quite well known. This narrow-mindedness
is not the vice of Hinduism only. Islam is equally narrow in
its social code. It also prohibits intermarriage between Muslims
and Hindus. With these social laws there can be no social
assimilation and consequently no socialization of ways, modes
and outlooks, no blunting of the edges and no modulation of
age-old angularities.

There are other defects in Hinduism and in Islam which
are responsible for keeping the sore between Hindus and
Muslims open and running. Hinduism is said to divide people
and in contrast Islam is said to bind people together. This is
only a half truth. For Islam divides as inexorably as it binds.
Islam is a close corporation and the distinction that it makes
between Muslims and non-Muslims is a very real, very positive
and very alienating distinction. The brotherhood of Islam is
not the universal brotherhood of man. It is brotherhood of
Muslims for Muslims only. There is a fraternity but its benefit
is confined to those within that corporation. For those who
are outside the corporation, there is nothing but contempt and
enmity. The second defect of Islam is that it is a system of
social self-government and is incompatible with local self-govern-
ment, because the allegiance of a Muslim does not rest on his
domicile in the country which is his but on the faith to which
he belongs. To the Muslim ibi bene ibi patria is unthinkable.
Wherever there is the rule of Islam, there is his own country.
In other words, Islam can never allow a true Muslim to adopt
India as his motherland and regard a Hindu as his kith and
kin. That is probably the reason why Maulana Mahomed AH,
a great Indian but a true Muslim, preferred to be buried in
Jerusalem rather than in India.

The real explanation of the ideological transformation of
the Muslim leaders is not to be attributed to any dishonest drift

325

Pakistan

in their opinion. It appears to be the dawn of a new vision
pointing to a new destiny symbolized by a new name, Pakistan.-
The Muslims appear to have started a new worship of a new
destiny for the first time. This is really not so. The worship
is new because the sun of their new destiny which was so far
hidden in the clouds has only now made its appearance in full
glow. The magnetism of this new destiny cannot but draw the
Muslims towards it. The pull is so great that even men like
Mr. Jinnah have been violently shaken and have not been able
to resist its force. This destiny spreads itself out in a concrete
form over the map of India. No one, who just looks at the
map, can miss it. It lies there as though it is deliberately plan-
ned by Providence as a separate National State for Muslims.
Not only is this new destiny capable of being easily worked out
and put in concrete shape but it is also catching because it
opens up the possibilities of realizing the Muslim idea of linking
up all the Muslim kindred in one Islamic State and thus avert
the danger of Muslims in different countries adopting the
nationality of the country to which they belong and thereby
bring about the disintegration of the Islamic brotherhood.*
With the separation of Pakistan from Hindustan, Iran, Iraq,
Arabia, Turkey and Egypt are forming a federation of Muslim
countries constituting one Islamic State extending from Con-
stantinople down to Lahore. A Musalman must be really very
stupid if he is not attracted by the glamour of this new destiny
and completely transformed in his view of the place of Muslims
in the Indian cosmos.

So obvious is the destiny that it is somewhat surprising that
the Muslims should have taken so long to own it up. There is
evidence that some of them knew this to be the ultimate destiny
of the Muslims as early as 1923. In support of this, reference
may be made to the evidence of Khan Saheb Sardar M. Gul Khan
who appeared as a witness before the North-West Frontier
Committee appointed in that year by the Government of India
under the chairmanship of Sir Dennis Bray, to report upon the
administrative relationship between the Settled Districts of the

* Sir Muhammad Iqbal strongly condemned nationalism in Musalmans of any
non-Muslim country including Indian Musalmans in tfhe sense of an attachment to the
mother country.

326

National Frustration

N.-W.F. Province and the Tribal Area and upon the amalga-
mation of the Settled Districts with the Punjab. The import-
ance of his evidence was not realized by any member of the
Committee except Mr. N. M. Samarth who was the one mem-
ber who drew pointed attention to it in his Minority Report.
The following extracts from his report illuminate a dark corner
in the history of the evolution of this new destiny.* Says
Mr. Samarth : —

"There was not before the Committee another witness who
could claim to speak with the authority of personal knowledge
and experience of not only the North-West Frontier Province and
Independent Territory but Baluchistan, Persia and Afghanistan,
which this witness could justly lay claim to. It is noteworthy
that he appeared before the Committee as a witness in his capa-
city as 'President, Islamic Anjuman, Dera Ismail Khan.' This
witness (Khan Saheb Sardar Muhammad Gul Khan) was asked
by me: 'Now suppose the Civil Government of the Frontier
Province is so modelled as to be on the same basis as in Sind,
then this Province will be part and parcel of the Punjab as Sind
is of the Bombay Presidency, What have you to sa}' to it?*
He gave me, in the course of his reply, the following straight
answer: 'As far as Islam is concerned and the Mahometan
idea of the League of Nations goes, I am against iU' On this
answer, I asked him some further questions to which he gave me
frank, outspoken replies without mincing matters. I extract the
pertinent portions below : —

'Q. — The idea at the back of your Anjuman is the Pan-
Islamic idea which is that Islam is a League of Nations and as
such amalgamating this Province with the Punjab will be detri-
mental, will be prejudicial, to that idea. That is the dominant idea
at the back of those who think with you ? Is it so ?

'A. — It is so, but I have to add something. Their idea is
that the Hindu-Muslim unity will never become a fact, it will
never become a fait accompli, and they think that this Province
should remain separate and a link between Islam and Britannic
Commonwealth. In fact, when I am asked what my opinion
is — I, as a member of the Anjuman, am expressing this opinion
— we would very much rather see the separation of the Hindus
and Muhammadans, 23 crores of Hindus to the south and 8
crores of Muslims to the north. Give the whole portion from
Raskumarit to Agra to Hindus and from Agra to Peshawar to

* Report of the North-West Frontier Inquiry Committee, 1924, pp. 122^23.
t This is as in the original. It is probably a misprint for Kanya Kumari.

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Pakistan

Muhammadans, I mean transmigration fronr one place to the
other. This is an idea of exchange. It is not an idea of anni-
hilation. Bolshevism at present does away with the possession
of private property. It nationalizes the whole thing and this is
an idea which of course appertains to only exchange. This is
of course impracticable. But if it were practicable, we would rather
want this than the other.

4Q. — That is the dominant idea which compels you not to
have amalgamation with the Punjab ?

'A. — Exactly.

* * # *

*Q. — When you referred to the Islamic League of Nations,
I believe you had the religious side of it more prominently in your
mind than the political side ?

'A. — Of course, political. An juman is a political thing. Initially,
of course, anything Muhamniadan is religious, but of course
Anjuman is a political association.

'Q. — I am not referring to your Anjuman but I am referring
to the Musalmans. I want to know what the Musalmans think
of this Islamic League of Nations, what have they most prominently
iu mind, is it the religious side or the political side?

'A. — Islam, as you know, is both religious and political.
'Q. — Therefore politics and religion are intermingled?

'A. — Yes, certainly.'

* * * *

Mr. Samartli used this evidence for the limited purpose of
showing that to perpetuate a separate Pathan Province by refus-
ing to amalgamate the N.-W.F.P. with the Punjab was danger-
ous in vew of the Pathan's affiliations with Afghanistan and
with other Muslim countries outside India. But this evidence
also shows that the idea underlying the scheme of Pakistan had
taken birth sometime before 1923.

In 1924 Mr. Mahomed Ali speaking on the resolution on
the extension of the Montagu-Chelinsford Reforms to the
N.-W. F. Province, which was moved in the session of the
Muslim League held in Bombay in that year is said to have sug-
gested* that the Mahomedans of the Frontier Province should

* For reference see Lala Lajpatrai's Presidential address to the Hindu Maha
Sabha session held at Calcutta on llth April 1925 in the Indian Quarterly Register,
1925, Vol. I, p. 379.

328

National Frustration

have the right of self-determination to choose between an affi-
liation with India or with Kabul. He also quoted a certain
Englishman who had said that if a straight line be drawn from
Constantinople to Delhi, it will disclose a Mahomedan corridor
right up to Shaharanpur. It is possible that Mr. Mahomed
Ali knew the whole scheme of Pakistan which came out in the
evidence of the witness referred to by Mr. Saniarth and in an
unguarded moment gave out what the witness had failed to
disclose, namely, the ultimate linking of Pakistan to Afghani-
stan.

Nothing seems to have been said or done by the Muslims
about this scheme between 1924 and 1930. The Muslims appear
to have buried it and conducted negotiations with the Hindus
for safeguards, as distinguished from partition, on the basis of
the traditional one-nation theory. But in 1930 when the Round
Table Conference was going on, certain Muslims had formed
themselves into a committee with headquarters in London for
the purpose of getting the R. T. C. to entertain the project of
Pakistan. Leaflets and circulars were issued by the committee
and sent round to members of the R. T. C. in support of Paki-
stan. Even then nobody took any interest in it, and the Muslim
members of the R. T. C. did not countenance it in any way.*

It is possible that the Muslims in the beginning, thought
that this destiny was just a dream incapable of realization. It
is possible that later on when they felt that it could be a reality
they did not raise any issue about it because they were not
sufficiently well organized to compel the British as well as the
Hindus to agree to it. It is difficult to explain why the Muslims
did not press for Pakistan at the R. T. C. Perhaps they knew
that the scheme would offendf the British and as they had to

* If opposition to one common central government be taken as a principal feature
of the scheme of Pakistan, then the only member of the R.T. C. who may be said
to have supported it without mentioning it by name was Sir Muhammad Iqbal who
expressed the view at the third session of the R. T. C. that there should be no central
government for India, that the provinces should be autonomous and independent
dominions in direct relationship to the Secretary of State in London.

f It is said that it was privately discussed with the British authorities who were
not in favour of it. It is possible that the Muslims did not insist on it for fear of
incurring their displeasure.

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Pakistan

depend upon the British for a decision on the 14 points of dispute
between them and the Hindus, the Musalmans, perfect states-
men as they are and knowing full well that politics, as Bismarck
said, was always the game of the possible, preferred to wait and
not to show their teeth till they had got a decision from the
British in their favour on the 14 points of dispute.

There is another explanation for this delay in putting forth
the scheme of Pakistan. It is far more possible that the Muslim
leaders did not until very recently know the philosophical justi-
fication for Pakistan. After all, Pakistan is no small move on
the Indian political chess-board. It is the biggest move ever
taken, for it involves the disruption of the state. Any Maho-
medan, if he had ventured to come forward to advocate it, was
sure to have been asked what moral and philosophical justifica-
tion he had in support of so violent a project. The reason why
they had not so far discovered what the philosophical justifica-
tion for Pakistan is, is equally understandable. The Muslim
leaders were, therefore, speaking of the Musalmans of India as
a community or a minority. They never spoke of the Muslims
as a nation. The distinction between a community and a
nation is rather thin, and even if it is otherwise, it is not so
striking in all cases. Every state is more or less a composite
state and there is, in most of them, a great diversity of popula-
tions, with varyinglanguages, religious codes and social traditions,
forming a congeries of loosely associated groups. No state is
ever a single society, an inclusive and permeating body of thought
and action. Such being the case, a group ina3r mistakenly call
itself a community even when it has in it the elements of being
a nation. Secondly, as has been pointed out earlier, a people
may not be possessed of a national consciousness although there
may be present all the elements which go to make a nation.

Again from the point of view of minority rights and safe-
guards this difference is unimportant. Whether the minority
is a community or a nation, it is a minority and the safeguards
for the protection of a minor nation cannot be very different
from the safeguards necessary for the protection of a minor
community. The protection asked for is against the tyranny of
the majority, and once the possibility of such a tyranny of the

330

National Frustration

majority over a minority is established, it matters very little
whether the minority driven to ask for safeguards is a commu-
nity or is a nation. Not that there is no distinction between a
community and a nation. The difference indeed is very great.
It may be summed up by saying that a community, however
different from and however opposed to other communities,
major or minor, is one with the rest in the matter of the ulti-
mate destiny of all. A nation, on the other hand, is not only
different from other components of the state but it believes in
and cherishes a different destiny totally antagonistic to the
destiny entertained by other component elements in the state.
The difference appears to me so profound that speaking for
myself I would not hesitate to adopt it as a test to distinguish
a community from a nation. A people who, notwithstanding
their differences accept a common destiny for themselves as well
as for their opponents, are a community. A people who are not
only different from the rest but who refuse to accept for them-
selves the same destiny which others do, are a nation. It is this
acceptance or non-acceptance of a common destiny which alone
can explain why the Untouchables, the Christians and the Parsis
are in relation to the Hindus only communities and why the
Muslims are a nation. Thus, from the point of view of harmony
in the body politic the difference is of the most vital character
as the difference is one of ultimate destiny. The dynamic
character of this difference is undeniable. If it persists, it can-
not but have the effect of rending the State in fragments. But
so far as safeguards are concerned, there cannot be any differ-
ence between a nation aud a community. A community is
entitled to claim the same rights and safeguards as a nation can.

The delay in discovering the philosophical justification for
Pakistan is due to the fact that the Muslim leaders had become
habituated to speaking of Muslims as a community and as a
minority. The use of this terminolog}' took them in a false
direction and brought them to a dead end. As they acknow-
ledged themselves to be a minority community, they felt that
there was nothing else open to them except to ask for safeguards
which they did and with which they concerned themselves for
practic&lly half a century. If it had struck them that they need
not stop with acknowledging themselves to be a minority, but

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Pakistan

that they could proceed further to distinguish a minority which
is a community from a minority which is a nation, they might
have been led on to the way to discover this philosophical justi-
fication for Pakistan. In that case, Pakistan would, in all proba-
bility, have come much earlier than it has done.

Be that as it may, the fact remains that the Muslims have
undergone a complete transformation and that the transforma-
tion is brought about not by any criminal inducement but by the
discovery of what is their true and ultimate destiny. To some,
this suddenness of the transformation may give a shock. But
those who have studied the course of Hindu-Muslim politics for
the last twenty years, cannot but admit feeling that this trans-
formation, this parting of the two, was on the way. For the
course of Hindu-Muslim politics has been marked by a tragic
and ominous parallelism. The Hindus and Muslims have
trodden parallel paths. No doubt, they went in the same
direction. But they never travelled the same road. In 1885, the
Hindus started the Congress to vindicate the political rights of
Indians as against the British. The Muslims refused to be lured
by the Hindus into joining the Congress. Between 1885 and 1906
the Muslims kept out of this stream of Hindu politics. In 1906
they felt the necessity for the Muslim community taking part
in political activity. Even then they dug their own separate
channel for the flow of Muslim political life. The flow was to
be controlled by a separate political organization called the
Muslim League. Ever since the formation of the Muslim League
the waters of Muslim politics have flown in this separate chan-
nel. Except on rare occasions, the Congress aud the League
have lived apart and have worked apart. Their aims and
objects have not always been the same. They have even
avoided holding their annual sessions at one and the same
place, lest the shadow of one should fall upon the other. It is
not that the League and the Congress have not met. The two
have met but only for negotiations, a few times with success and
most times without success. They met in 1916 at Lucknow and
their efforts were crowned with success. In 1925 they met but
without success. In 1928 a section of the Muslims were prepared
to meet the Congress. Another section refused to meet. It rather
preferred to depend upon the British. The point is, they have

332 \

National Frustration

met but have never merged. Only during the Khilafat agitation
did the waters of the two channels leave their appointed course
and flow as one stream in one channel. It was believed that
nothing would separate the waters which God was pleased to
join. But that hope was belied. It was found that there was
something in the composition of the two waters which would
compel their separation. Within a few years of their conflu-
ence and as soon as the substance of the Khilafat cause vanished
— the water from the one stream reacted violently to the pre-
sence of the other, as one does to a foreign substance entering
one's body. Each began to show a tendency to throw out and
to separate from the other. The result was that when the
waters did separate, they did with such impatient velocity and
determined violence — if one can use such language in speaking
of water — against each other that thereafter they have been
flowing in channels far deeper and far more distant from each
other than those existing before. Indeed, the velocity and
violence with which the two waters have burst out from the pool
in which they had temporarily gathered have altered the direc-
tion in which the3T were flowing. At one time their direction
was parallel. Now they are opposite. One is flowing towards
the east as before. The other has started to flow in the opposite
direction, towards the west. Apart from any possible objection
to the particular figure of speech, I am sure, it cannot be said
that this is a wrong reading of the history of Hindu-Muslim
politics. If one bears this parallelism in mind, he will know that
there is nothing sudden about the transformation. For if the
transformation is a revolution, the parallelism in Hindu-Muslim
politics marks the evolution of that revolution. That Muslim
politics should have run a parallel course and should never have
merged in the Hindu current of politics is a strange fact of
modern Indian history. In so segregating themselves the
Muslims were influenced by some mysterious feeling, the source
of which they could not define and guided by a hidden hand
which they could not see but which was all the same directing
them to keep apart from Hindus. This mysterious feeling and
this hidden hand was no other than their pre-appointed destiny,

333

Pakistan

symbolized by Pakistan, which, unknown to them, was working
within them. Thus viewed, there is nothing new or nothing
sudden in the idea of Pakistan. The only thing that has hap-
pened is that, what was indistinct appears now in full glow,
and what was nameless has taken a name.

Summing up the whole discussion, it appears that an integral
India is incompatible with an independent India or even with
India as a dominion. On the footing that India is to be one
integral whole there is a frustration of all her hopes of freedom
writ large on her future. There is frustration, if the national
destiny is conceived in terms of independence, because the
Hindus will not follow that path. They have reason not to
follow it. They fear that that way lies the establishment of the
domination of the Muslims over the Hindus. The Hindus see
that the Muslim move for independence is not innocent. It is
to be used only to bring the Hindus out of the protecting shield
of the British Empire in the open and then by alliance with the
neighbouring Muslim countries and by their aid subjugate them.
For the Muslims independence is not the end. It is only a means
to establish Muslim Raj. There is frustration if the national
destiny is conceived of in terms of Dominion Status because the
Muslims will not agree to abide by it. They fear that under
Dominion Status, the Hindus will establish Hindu Raj over
them by taking benefit of the principle of one man one vote
and one vote one value, and that however much the benefit of
the principle is curtailed by weightage to Muslims, the result
cannot fail to be a government of the Hindus, by the Hindus
and therefore for the Hindus. Complete frustration of her
destiny therefore seems to be the fate of India if it is insisted that
India shall remain as one integral whole.

It is a question to be considered whether integral India is
an ideal worth fighting for. In the first place, even if India
remained as one integral whole it will never be an organic whole.
India may in name continue to be known as one country, but
in reality it will be two separate countries — Pakistan and
Hindustan — joined together by a forced and artificial union.

334

National Frustration

This will be specially so under the stress of the two-nation
theory. As it is, the idea of unity has had little hold on the
Indian world of fact and reality, little charm for the common
Indian, Hindu or Muslim, whose vision is bounded by the valley
in which he lives. But it did appeal to the imaginative and
unsophisticated minds on both sides. The two-nation theory
will not leave room even for the growth of that sentimental
desire for unity. The spread of that virus of dualism in the
body politic must some day create a mentality which is sure to
call for a life and death struggle for the dissolution of this forced
union. If by reason of some superior force the dissolution does
not take place, one thing is sure to happen to India — namely,
that this continued union will go on sapping her vitality, loosen-
ing its cohesion, weakening its hold on the love and faith of her
people and preventing the use, if not retarding the growth, of its
moral and material resources. India will be an anaemic and
sickly state, ineffective, a living corpse, dead though not buried.

The second disadvantage of this forced union will be the
necessity for finding a basis for Hindu-Muslim settlement.
How difficult it is to reach a settlement no one needs to be told.
Short of dividing India into Pakistan and Hindustan what more
can be offered — without injury to the other interests in the
country, — than what has already been conceded with a view to
bring about a settlement, it is difficult to conceive. But whatever
the difficulties, it cannot be gainsaid that if this forced union
continues, there can be no political advance for India unless it
is accompanied by communal settlement. Indeed, a communal
settlement — rather an international settlement for now and
hereafter the Hindus and the Muslims must be treated as two
nations — will remain under this scheme of forced union a con-
dition precedent for every inch of political progress.

There will be a third disadvantage of this forced political
union. It cannot eliminate the presence of a third party. In the
first place the constitution, if one comes in existence, will be a
federation of mutually suspicious and unfriendly states. They
will of their own accord want the presence of a third party to
appeal to in cases of dispute. For their suspicious and unfriend-
ly relationship towards each other will come in the way of the

335

Pakistan

two nations ever reaching satisfaction by the method of negotia-
tion. India will not have in future ev$n that unity of opposition
to the British which used to gladden the hearts of so many in
the past. For the two nations will be more opposed to each
other than before, ever to become united against the British.
In the second place, the basis of the constitution will be the
settlement between the Hindus and the Muslims, and for the
successful working of such a constitution the presence of a third
party, and be it noted, with sufficient armed force, will be
necessary to see that the settlement is not broken.

All this, of course, means the frustration of the political
destiny, which both Hindus and Muslims profess to cherish and
the early consummation of which they so devoutly wish. What
else, however, can be expected if two warring nations are locked
in the bosom of one country and one constitution?

Compare with this dark vista, the vista that opens out if
India is divided into Pakistan and Hindustan. The partition
opens the way to a fulfilment of the destiny each may fix for
itself. Muslims will be free to choose for their Pakistan inde-
pendence or dominion status, whatever they think good for
themselves. Hindus will be free to choose for their Hindustan
independence or dominion status, whatever they may think wise
for their condition. The Muslims will be freed from the night-
mare of Hindu Raj and Hindus will save themselves from the
hazard of a Muslim Raj. Thus the path of political progress
becomes smooth for both. The fear of the object being frus-
trated gives place to the hope of fulfilment. Communal settle-
ment must remain a necessary condition precedent, if India, as
one integral whole, desires to make any political advance. But
Pakistan and Hindustan are free from the rigorous trammels of
such a condition precedent and even if a communal settlement
with minorities remained to be a condition precedent it will not
be difficult to fulfil. The path of each is cleared of this obstacle.
There is another advantage of Pakistan which must be mention-
ed. It is generally admitted that there does exist a kind of
antagonism between Hindus and Muslims which if not dissolved
will prove ruinous to the peace and progress of India. But, it is
not realized that the mischief is caused not so much by the

336

National Frustration

existence of mutual antagonism as by the existence of a common
theatre for its display. It is the common theatre which calls this
antagonism into action. It cannot but be so. When the two are
called to participate in acts of common concern what else can
happen except a display of that antagonism which is inherent
in them. Now the scheme of Pakistan has this advantage,
namely, that it leaves no theatre for the play of that social anta-
gonism which is the cause of disaffection among the Hindus and
the Muslims. There is no fear of Hindustan and Pakistan
suffering from that disturbance of peace and tranquillity which
has torn and shattered India for so many years. Last, but by no
means least, is the elimination of the necessity of a third party
to maintain peace. Freed from the trammels which one imposes
upon the other by reason of this forced union, Pakistan and
Hindustan can each grow into a strong stable State with no fear
of disruption from within. As two separate entities, they can
reach their respective destinies which as parts of one whole they
never can.

Those who want an integral India must note what Mr.
Mahomed AH as President of the Congress in 1923 said. Speak-
ing about the unity among Indians, Mr. Mahomed Ali said : —

" Unless some new force other than the misleading unity of
opposition unites this vast continent of India, it will remain a
geographical misnomer."

Is there any new force which remains to be harnessed ? All
other forces having failed, the Congress, after it became the
Government of the day, saw a new force in the plan of mass
contact. It was intended to produce political unity between
Hindus and Muslim masses by ignoring or circumventing the
leaders of the Muslims. In its essence, it was the plan of the
British Conservative Party to buy Labour with "Tory gold."
The plan was as mischievous as it was futile. The Congress
forgot that there are things so precious that no owner, who
knows their value, will part with and any attempt to cheat him
to part with them is sure to cause resentment and bitterness.
Political power is the most precious thing in the life of a com-
munity especially if its position is constantly being challenged
and the community is required to maintain it by meeting the

22 337

Pakistan

challenge. Political power is the only means by which it can
sustain its position. To attempt to make it part with it by false
propaganda, by misrepresentation or by the lure of office or of
gold is equivalent to disarming the community, to silencing its
guns and to making it ineffective and servile. It may be a way
of producing unity. But the way is despicable for it means
suppressing the opposition by a false and unfair method. It
cannot produce any unity. It can only create exasperation,
bitterness and hostility.* This is precisely what the mass
contact plan of the Congress did. For there can be no doubt
that this mad plan of mass contact has had a great deal to do
with the emergence of Pakistan.

It might be said that it was unfortunate that mass contact
was conceived and employed as a political lever and that it might
have been used as a force for social unity with greater success.
But could it have succeeded in breaking the social wall which
divides the Hindus and the Muslims ? It cannot but be matter
of the deepest regret to every Indian that there is no social tie
to draw them together. There is no inter-dining and no inter-
marriage between the two. Can they be introduced? Their
festivals are different. Can the Hindus be induced to adopt
them or join in them? Their religious notions are uot only
divergent but repugnant to each other so that on a religious
platform, the entry of the one means the exit of the other. Their
cultures are different; their literatures and their histories are

* So sober a person as Sir Abdur Rahim, in his presidential address to the session
of the Muslim League held in Aligarh on 30th December 1925, gave expression to
this bitterness caused by Hindu tactics wherein he "deplored the attacks on the
Muslim community in the form of Shuddhi, Sangathan and Hindu Maha Sabha move-
ments and activities led by politicians like Lala Lajpat Rai and Swami Shradhanand "
and said "Some of the Hindu leaders had spoken publicly of driving out Muslims
from Indians Spaniards expelled Moors from Spain. Musalmans would be too big
a mouthful for their Hindu friends to swallow. Thanks to the artificial conditions
under which they lived they had to admit that Hindus were in a position of great
advantage and even the English had learned to dread their venomous propaganda.
Hindus were equally adept in the art of belittling in every way possible the best
Musalmans in public positions excepting only those who had subscribed to the
Hindu political creed. They had in fact by their provocative and aggressive conduct
made it clearer than ever to Muslims that the latter could not entrust their fate to
Hindus and must adopt every possible measure of self-defence." — All-India Register,
1925, Vol. II, p. 356.

338

National Frustration

different. They are not only different, but so distasteful to each "
other, that they are sure to cause aversion and nausea. Can any-
one make them drink from the same fount of these perennial
sources of life? No common meeting ground exists. None
can be cultivated. There is not even sufficient physical contact,
let alone their sharing a common cultural and emotional life.
They do not live together. Hindus and Muslims live in separate
worlds of their own. Hindus live in villages and Muslims in
towns in those provinces where the Hindus are in a majority.
Muslims live in villages and Hindus in towns in those provinces
where the Muslims are in a majority. Wherever they live, they
live apart. Every town, every village has its Hindu quarters
and Muslim quarters, which are quite separate from each other.
There is no common continuous cycle of participation. They
meet to trade or they meet to murder. They do not meet to
befriend one auother. When there is no call to trade or when
there is no call to murder, they cease to meet. When there is
peace, the Hindu quarters and the Muslim quarters appear like
two alien settlements. The moment war is declared, the settle-
ments become armed camps. The periods of peace and the
periods of war are brief. But the interval is one of continuous
tension. What can mass contact do against such barriers? It
cannot even get over on the other side of the barrier, much less
can it produce organic unity.

339

PART V

Different people have thought differently of what has
been said in the foregoing pages on the question of Pakistan.
One set of people have alleged that I have only stated the
two sides of the issue and the problems arising out of it
but 'have not expressed my personal views on either of them.
This is not correct. Anyone who has read the preceding
parts will have to admit that I have expressed my views in
quite positive terms, if not on all, certainly on many
questions. In particular I may refer to two of the most
important ones in the controversy, namely, Are the Muslims
a Nation, and Have they a case for Pakistan. There are
others whose line of criticism is of a different sort. They
do not complain that I have failed to express my personal
views. What they complain is that in coming to my
conclusions I have relied on propositions as though they were
absolute in their application and have admitted no exception.
I am told, "Have you not stated your conclusions in too
general terms f Is not a general proposition subject to
conditions and limitations? Have you not disposed of
certain complicated problems in a brief and cavalier fashion?
Have you shown how Pakistan can be brought into existence
in a just and peaceful manner?'9 Even this criticism is
not altogether correct. It is not right to say that I have
omitted to deal with these points. ^It may be that my
treatment of them is brief, and scattered. However, I am
prepared to admit that there is much force in this criticism
and I am in duty bound to make good the default. This
part is therefore intended and is devoted to the consideration
of the following subjects : —

j. What are the limiting considerations which affect the
Muslim case for Pakistan?

2. What are the problems of Pakistan? and what is
their solution ?

3. Who has the authority to decide the issue of
Pakistan?

CHAPTER XIII

MUST THERE BE PAKISTAN?

With all that has gone before, the sceptic, the nationalist, the
conservative and the old-world Indian will not fail to ask u Must
there be Pakistan ?". No one can make light of such an atti-
tude. For the problem of Pakistan is indeed very grave and it
must be admitted that the question is not only a relevant and
fair one to be put to the Muslims and to their protagonists but
it is also important. Its importance lies in the fact that the
limitations on the case for Pakistan are so considerable in their
force that they can never be easily brushed asitle. A mere state-
ment of these limitations should be enough to make one feel
the force they have. It is writ large on the very face of them.
That being so, the burden of proof on the Muslims for establish-
ing an imperative need in favour of Pakistan is very heavy.
Indeed the issue of Pakistan or to put it plainly of partitioning
India, is of such a grave character that the Muslims will not only
have to discharge this burden of proof but they will have to
adduce evidence of such a character as to satisfy the conscience
of an international tribunal before they can win their case. L,et
us see how the case for Pakistan stands in the light of these
limitations.

Must there be Pakistan because a good part of the Muslim
population of India happens to be concentrated in certain defin-
ed areas which can be easily severed from the rest of India?
Muslim population is admittedly concentrated in certain well
defined areas and it may be that these areas are severable. But
what of that? In considering this question one must never
lose sight of the fundamental fact that nature has made India

343

Pakistan

one single geographical unit. Indians are of course quarrelling
and no one can prophesy when they will stop quarrelling. But
granting the fact, what does it establish ? Only that Indians
are a quarrelsome people. It does not destroy the fact that India
is a single geographical unit. Her unity is as ancient as Nature.
Within this geographic unit and covering the whole of it there
has been a cultural unity from time immemorial. This cultural
unity has defied political and racial divisions. And at any rate
for the last hundred and fifty years all institutions — cultural,
political, economic, legal and administrative — have been working
on a single, uniform spring of action. In any discussion of
Pakistan the fact cannot be lost sight of, namely, that the start-
ing point, if not the governing factor, is the fundamental unity
of India. For it is necessary to grasp the fact that there are
really two cases of partition which must be clearly distinguished.
There is a case in which the starting point is a pre-existing state
of separation so that partition is only a dissolution of parts
which were once separate and which were subsequently joined
together. This "case is quite different from another in which
the starting point at all times is a state of unity. Consequently
partition in such a case is the severance of a territory which has
been one single whole into separate parts. Where the starting
point is not unity of territory, i.e., where there was disunity
before there was unity, partition — which is only a return to the
original — may not give a mental shock. But in India the start-
ing point is unity. Why destroy its unity now, simply because
some Muslims are dissatisfied ? Why tear it when the unit is
one single whole from historical times ?

Ill

Must there be Pakistan because there is communal antagon-
ism between the Hindus and the Muslims? That the communal
antagonism exists nobody can deny. The question however is,
is the antagonism such that there is no will to live together in
one country and under one constitution ? Surely that will to live
together was not absent till 1937. During the formulation of
the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, both Hindus
and Musalmans accepted the view that they must live together

Must There be Pakistan?

under 'one constitution and in one country and participated in
the discussions that preceded the passing of the Act. And
what was the state of communal feeling in India between — say
1920 and 1935? As has been recorded in the preceding pages,
the history of India from 1920 upto 1935 has been one long tale
of communal conflict in which the loss of life and loss of pro-
perty had reached a most shameful limit. Never was the com-
munal situation so acute as it was between this period of 15
years preceding the passing of the Government of India Act,
1935, and yet this long tale of antagonism did not prevent the
Hindus aud the Musalmans from agreeing to live in a single
country and under a single constitution. Why make so much
of communal antagonism now?

Is India the only country where there is communal anta-
gonism ? What about Canada ? Consider what Mr. Alexander
Brady * has to say on the relations between the English and the
French in Canada : —

"Of the four original provinces, three, Nova Scotia, New
Brunswick and Ontario had populations substantially of the
same Anglo-Saxon stock and traditions. Originally a by-product
of the American Revolution, these colonies were established by
the 50,000 United Empire Loyalists who trekked north from
persecution and cut their settlements out of the wilderness. Pre-
vious to the American Revolution, Nova Scotia had received a
goodly number of Scotch and American settlers, and in all the
colonies after the Revolution the Loyalist settlements were rein-
forced by immigrants from Great Britain and Ireland."
* * * *

"Very different was the province of Quebec. French
Canada in 1867 was a cultural unit by itself, divorced from the
British communities, by the barriers of race, language and religion.
Its life ran in a different mould. Stirred by a Catholic faith
mediaeval in its intensity, it viewed with scant sympathy the
mingled Puritanism and other-world line ss of a Protestantism
largely Calvinistic. The religious faiths of the two peoples were
indeed poles apart. In social, if not always in religious, outlook,
English Protestantism tended towards democracy, realism and
modernism: the Catholicism of the French leaned to paternal-
ism, idealism and a reverence for the past."

* * * •

"What French Canada was in 1867 it re mains -substantially
today. It still cherishes beliefs, customs, and institutions which

* Canada — Chapter I.

345

Pakistan

have little hold on the English provinces. It has distinctive
thought and enthusiasm, and its own important values. Its
attitude, for example, on marriage and divorce is in conflict with
the dominant view, not merely of the rest of Canada, but of the
remainder of Anglo-Saxon North America."

* * # *

" The infrequency of intercourse between the two peoples is
illustrated in Canada's largest city, Montreal. About 63 per
cent, of the population is French and 24 per cent. British. Here,
if anywhere, is ample scope for association, but in fact they
remain apart and distinct except where business and politics
force them together. They have their own residential sections;
their own shopping centres, and if either is more notable for
racial reserve, it is the English."

* * * *

"The English-speaking residents of Montreal, as a whole,
have made no effort to know their French-speaking fellow
citizens, to learn their language, to understand their traditions
and their aspirations, to observe with a keen eye and a sympathe-
tic mind their qualities and their defects. The separation of the
two peoples is encouraged by the barrier of language. There
is a wealth of significance in the fact revealed by the census of
1921 ; viz., that about 50 per cent, of the Canadians of French
origin were unable to speak English and 95 per cent, of those of
British origin were unable to speak French. Even in Montreal,
70 per cent, of the British could not speak French and 34 per
cent, of the French could not speak English. The absence of a
common language maintains a chasm between the two nation-
alities and prevents fusion.

"The significance of Confederation is that it provided an
instrument of government which enabled the French, while
retaining their distinct national life, to become happy partners
with the British and attain a Canadian super-nationality, em-
bracing a loyalty extending beyond their own group to that of
the Dominion as a whole."

* * * *

" While the federal system successfully opened the path for
a wider nationality in Canada, the co-operation which it spon-
sored has at times been subjected to severe strain by the violent
clash of opinion between the French and the British. The
super-nationality has indeed often been reduced to a shadow."

What about South Africa ? Let those who do not know
the relationship between the Boers and the British ponder over
what Mr. E. H. Brooks* has to say : —

• The Political Future of South Africa, 1927.
346

Must There be Pakistan?

"How far is South African nationalism common to both the
white races of South Africa? There is, of course, a very real
and intense Afrikander nationalism; but it is, generally speaking,
a sentiment confined to one of the white races, and characterised,
significantly enough, by a love of the Afrikans language, the
tongue of the early settlers from Holland, as modified slightly by
Huguenot and German influence, and greatly by the passage of
time. Afrikander nationalism has a tendency to be exclusive,
and has little place for the man who, while in every way a
devoted son of South Africa, is wholly or mainly English-
speaking."

* * * *

" Is there a South African nation today?

"There are certain factors in South African life which
militate against an affirmative answer."

* * * *

"Among English-speaking South Africans there are found
many tendencies inclined to hinder the cause of national unity.
With all the great virtues of the race they have its one cardinal
defect — a lack of imagination, a difficulty in putting one's self
in the other man's place. Nowhere does this come out more
clearly than in the language question. Until recently compara-
tively few English-speaking South Africans have studied Afri-
kans except as a business proposition or (as in the Civil Service)
more or less under compulsion ; and fewer still have used it
conversationally. Many have treated it with open contempt —
a contempt in inverse proportion to their knowledge of it — and
the majority with mere tolerance, exasperated or amused accord-
ing to temperament."

Another witness on the same point may be heard. He is
Mr. Manfred Nathan.* This is what he has to say on the rela-
tions between the Boers and the British in South Africa : —

"They are also, in the main, both of them Protestant peoples
— although this is not of too great importance nowadays, when
differences of religion do not count for much. They engage freely
in commercial transactions with each other."

* * * *

" Nevertheless it cannot with truth be said that hitherto there
has been absolutely free social intercourse between these two great
sections of the white population. It has been suggested that this
is partly due to the fact that in the large urban centres the popu-
lation is predominantly English, and that the townsfolk know
little of the people in the country and their ways of life. But

* The South African Commonwealth, p. 365.

347

Pakistan

even in the country towns, though there is, as a rule, much
greater friendliness, and much hospitality shown by Boers to
visitors, there is not much social intercourse between the two
sections apart from necessary business or professional relation-
ship, and such social functions, charitable or public, as require
co-operation."

Obviously India is not the only place where there is com-
munal antagonism. If communal antagonism does not come in
the way of the French in Canada living in political unity with
the English, if it does not come in the way of the English in
South Africa living in political unity with the Dutch, if it does
not come in the way of the French and the Italians in Switzer-
land living in political unity with the Germans why then should
it be impossible for the Hindus and the Muslims to agree to live
together under one constitution in India?

Must there be Pakistan because the Muslims have lost faith
in the Congress majority ? As reasons for the loss of faith Muslims
cite some instances of tyranny and oppression practised by the
Hindus and connived at by the Congress Ministries during the
two years and three months the Congress was in office. Unfor-
tunately Mr. Jinnah did not persist in his demand for a Royal
Commission to inquire into these grievances. If he had done
it we could have known what truth there was in these com-
plaints. A perusal of these instances, as given in the reports* of
the Muslim League Committees, leaves upon the reader the im-
pression that although there may be some truth in the allega-
tions there is a great deal which is pure exaggeration. The
Congress Ministries concerned have issued statements repudiat-
ing the charges. It may be that the Congress during the two
years and three months that it was in office did not show
statesmanship, did not inspire confidence in the minorities, nay
tried to suppress them. But can it be a reason for partitioning

* On this point, see Report of the Inquiry Committee appointed by the All-India
Muslim League to inquire into Muslim grievances in Congress Provinces popularly
known as Pirpur Report. Also Report of the Bihar Provincial Muslim League to
inquire into some grievances of Muslims in Bihar and the Press Note issued by the
Information Officer, Government of Bihar, replying to some of the allegations • con-
tained in these reports published in Amrita Bazar Patrika of 13-3-39.

348

Must There be Pakistan?

India ? Is it not possible to hope that the voters who supported
the Congress last time will grow wiser and not support the
Congress? Or may it not be that if the Congress returns to
office it will profit by the mistakes it has made, revise its
mischievous policy and thereby allay the fear created by its past
conduct ?

Must there be Pakistan because the Musalmans are a
nation? It is a pity that Mr. Jinnah should have become a
votary and champion of Muslim Nationalism at a time when
the whole world is decrying against the evils of nationalism and
is seeking refuge in some kind of international organization.
Mr. Jinnah is so obsessed with his new-found faith in Muslim
Nationalism that he is not prepared to see that there is a dis-
tinction between a society, parts of which are disintegrated, and
a society parts of which have become only loose, which no sane
man can ignore. When a society is disintegrating — and the two-
nation theory is a positive disintegration of society and country
— it is evidence of the fact that there do not exist what Carlyle
calls u organic filaments " — i.e., the vital forces which work to bind
together the parts that are cut asunder. In such cases disintegra-
tion can only be regretted. It cannot be prevented. Where, how-
ever, such organic filaments do exist, it is a crime to overlook them
and deliberately force the disintegration of society and country
as the Muslims seem to be doing. If the Musalmans want
to be a different nation it is not because they have been
but because they want to be. There is much in the Musal-
mans which, if they wish, can roll them into a nation. But
isn't there enough that is common to both Hindus and Musal-
mans, which if developed, is capable of moulding them into one
people? Nobody can deny that there are many modes, man-
ners, rites and customs which are common to both. Nobody
can deny that there are rites, customs and usages based on reli-
gion which do divide Hindus and Musalmans. The question
is, which of these should be emphasized. If the emphasis is
laid on things that are common, there need be no two nations
in India. If the emphasis is laid on points of difference, it will

349

Pakistan

no doubt give rise to two nations. The view that seems to guide
Mr. Jinnah is that Indians are only a people and that they can
never be a nation. This follows the line of British writers who
make it a point of speaking of Indians as the people of India and
avoid speaking of the Indian nation. Granted Indians are not a
nation, that they are only a people. What of that? History
records that before the rise of nations as great corporate person-
alities, there were only peoples. There is nothing to be asham-
ed if Indians are no more than a people. Nor is there any cause
for despair that the people of India — if they wish — will not
become one nation. For, as Disraeli said, a nation is a work of
art and a work of time. If the Hindus and Musalmans agree
to emphasize the things that bind them and forget those that
separate them there is no reason why in course of time they
should not grow into a nation. It may be that their nationalism
may not be quite so integrated as that of the French or the
Germans. But they can easily produce a common state of mind
on common questions which is the sum total which the spirit
of nationalism helps to produce and for which it is so much
prized. Is it right for the Muslim League to emphasize only
differences and ignore altogether the forces that bind ? Let it
not be forgotten that if two nations come into being it will not
be because it is predestined. It will be the result of deliberate
design.

The Musalmans of India as I have said are not as yet a nation
in the de jure or de facto sense of the term and all that can be said
is that they have in them the elements necessary to make them a
nation. But granting that the Musalmans of India are a nation,
is India the only country where there are going to be two
nations? What about Canada? Everybody Igiows that there
are in Canada two nations, the English and the French. Are
there not two nations in South Africa, the English and the
Dutch? What about Switzerland? Who does not know that
there are three nations living in Switzerland, the Germans, the
French and the Italians? Have the French in Canada demand-
ed partition because they are a separate nation ? Do the English
claim partition of South Africa because they are a distinct
nation from the Boers? Has anybody ever heard that the
Germans, the French and the Italians have ever agitated for the

350

Must There be Pakistan?

fragmentation of Switzerland because they are all different
nations? Have the Germans, the French and the Italians ever felt
that they wonld lose their distinctive cultures if they lived as
citizens of one country and under one constitution ? On
the contrary, all these distinct nations have been content
to live together in one country under one constitution with-
out fear of losing their nationality and their distinctive cultures.
Neither have the French in Canada ceased to be French
by living with the English, nor have the English ceased
to be English by living with the Boers in South Africa. The
Germans, the French and the Italians have remained distinct
nations notwithstanding their common allegiance to a common
country and a common constitution. The case of Switzerland
is worthy of note. It is surrounded by countries, the nationalities
of which have a close religious and racial affinity with the
nationalities of Switzerland. Notwithstanding these affinities
the nationalities in Switzerland have been Swiss first and Ger-
mans, Italians and French afterwards.

Given the experience of the French in Canada, the English
in South Africa and the French and the Italians in Switzerland,
the questions that arise are, why should it be otherwise in India ?
Assuming that the Hindus and the Muslims split into two
nations, why cannot they live in one country and under one
constitution? Why should the emergence of the two-nation
theory make partition necessary? Why should the Musalmans
be afraid of losing their nationality and national culture by
living with the Hindus ? If the Muslims insist on separation,
the cynic may well conclude that there is so much that is com-
mon between the Hindus and the Musalmans that the Muslim
leaders are afraid that unless there is partition whatever little
distinctive Islamic culture is left with the Musalmans will even-
tually vanish by continued social contact with the Hindus with
the result that in the end instead of two nations there will grow
up in India one nation. If the Muslim nationalism is so thin
then the motive for partition is artifi9ial and the case for Pakistan
loses its very basis.

351

Pakistan
VI

Must there be Pakistan because otherwise Swaraj will be a
Hindu Raj ? The Musalmans are so easily carried away by this
cry that it is necessary to expose the fallacies underlying it.

In the first place, is the Muslim objection to Hindu Raj a
conscientious objection or is it a political objection? If it is a
conscientions objection all one can say is that it is a very strange
sort of conscience. There are really millions of Musalmans in
India who are living under unbridled and uncontrolled Hindu
Raj of Hindu Princes and no objection to it has been raised by
the Muslims or the Muslim League. The Muslims had once a
conscientious objection to the British Raj. Today not only have
they no objection to it but they are the greatest supporters of it.
That there should be no objection to British Raj or to undiluted
Hindu Raj of a Hindu Prince but that there should be objection
to Swaraj for British India on the ground that it is Hindu Raj
as though it was not subjected to checks and balances is an atti-
tude the logic of which it is difficult to follow.

The political objections to Hindu Raj rests on various
grounds. The first ground is that Hindu society is not a demo-
cratic society. True, it is not. It may not be right to ask
whether the Muslims have taken any part in the various move-
ments for reforming Hindu society as distinguished from pro-
selytising. But it is right to ask if the Musalmans are the only
sufferers from the evils that admittedly result from the undemo-
cratic character of Hindu society. Are not the millions of Shudras
and non-Brahmins or millions of the Untouchables, suffering
the worst consequences of the undemocratic character of Hindu
society? Who benefits from education, from public service
and from political reforms except the Hindu governing class —
composed of the higher castes of the Hindus — which form not
even 10 per cent, of the total Hindu population? Has not the
governing class of the Hindus, which controls Hindu politics,
shown more regard for safeguarding the rights and interests of
the Musalmans than they have for safeguarding the rights
and interests of the Shudras and the Untouchables? Is not Mr.
Gandhi, who is determined £o oppose any political concession to
the Untouchables, ready to sign a blank cheque in favour of the

352

Must There be Pakistan?

Muslims? Indeed, the Hindu governing class seems to be far
more ready to share power with the Muslims than it is to share
power with the Shudras and the Untouchables. Surely, the
Muslims have the least ground to complain of the undemocratic
character of Hindu society.

Another ground on which the Muslim objection to Hindu
Raj rests is that the Hindus are a majority community and the
Musalmans are a minority community. True. But is India the
only country where such a situation exists? Let us compare the
conditions in India with the conditions in Canada, South Africa
and Switzerland. First, take the distribution of population.*
In Canada out of a total population of 10,376,786 only 2,927,990
are French. | In South Africa the Dutch number 1,120,770 and
the English are only 783,071.+ In Switzerland out of the total
population of 4,066,400 the Germans are 2,924,313, the French
831,097 and the Italians 242,034.

This shows that the smaller nationalities have no fear of
being placed under the Raj of a major community. Such a
notion seems to be quite foreign to them. Why is this so? Is
it because there is no possibility of the major nationality estab-
lishing its supremacy in those centres of power and authority,
namely the Legislature and in the Executive? Quite the con-
trary. Unfortunately no figures are available to show the actual
extent of representation which the different major and minor
nationalities have in Switzerland, Canada and South Africa.
That is because there is no communal reservation of seats such
as is found in India. Each community is left to win in a
general contest what number of seats it can. But it is quite easy
to work out the probable number of seats which each nationality
can obtain on the basis of the ratio of its population to the total
seats in the Legislature. Proceeding on this basis what do we
find? In Switzerland the total representatives in the Lower
House is 187. Out of them the German population has a pos-
sibility of winning 138, French 42 and Italians only 7 seats. In
South Africa out of the total of 153, there is a possibility of the

• Canada Year Book, 1936.

t South Africa Year Book, 1941.

I Statesman's Year Book, 1941.

29 353

Pakistan

English gaining 62, and the Dutch 94 seats. In Canada the
total is 245. Of these the French* have only 65. On this basis
it is qnite clear that in all these countries there is a possibi-
lity of the major nationality establishing its supremacy over the
minor nationalities. Indeed, one may go so far as to say that
speaking de jure and as a mere matter of form in Canada the
French are living under the British Raj, the English in South
Africa under the Dutch Raj, and the Italians and French in
Switzerland under the German Raj. But what is the position
de facto"* Have Frenchmen in Canada raised a cry that they
will not live under British Raj? Have Englishmen in South
Africa raised a cry that they will not live under Dutch Raj ?
Have the French and Italians in Switzerland any objection to
living under the German Raj? Why should then the Muslims
raise this cry of Hindu Raj?

Is it proposed that the Hindu Raj should be the rule of a
naked communal majority? Are not the Musalmans granted
safeguards against the possible tyranny of the Hindu majority ?
Are not the safeguards given to the Musalmans of India wider and
better than the safeguards which have been given to the French
in Canada, to the English in South Africa and to the French and
the Italians in Switzerland ? To take only one item from the list of
safeguards. Haven't the Musalmans got an enormous degree of
weightage in representation in the Legislature? Is weightage
known in Canada, South Africa or Switzerland? And what is
the effect of this weightage to Muslims? Is it not to reduce
the Hindu majority in the Legislature? What is the degree of
reduction? Confining ourselves to British India and taking
account only of the representation granted to the territorial
constituencies, Hindu and Muslim, in the Lower House in the
Central Legislature under the Government of India Act, 1935,
it is clear that out of a total of 187, the Hindus have 105 seats
and the Muslims have 82 seats. Given these figures one is
fdrced to ask where is the fear of the Hindu Raj ?

If Hindu Raj does become a fact, it will, no doubt, be the
greatest calamity for this country. No matter what the Hindus
say, Hinduism is a menace to liberty, equality and fraternity. On

*That is for the Province of Quebec.
354

Must There be Pakistan?

that account it is incompatible with democracy. Hindu Raj must
be prevented at any cost, But is Pakistan the true remedy against
it? What makes communal Raj possible is a marked dispropor-
tion in the relative strength of the various communities living in a
country. As pointed out above, this disproportion is not more
marked in India than it is in Canada, South Africa and Switzer-
land. Nonetheless there is no British Raj in Canada, no Dutch Raj
in South Africa, and no German Raj in Switzerland. How have
the French, the English and the Italians succeeded in preventing
the Raj of the majority community being established in their
country? Surely not by partition: What is their method? Their
method is to put a ban on communal parties in politics. No
community in Canada, South Africa or Switzerland ever thinks
of starting a separate communal party. What is important to
note is that it is the minority nations which have taken the lead
in opposing the formation of a communal party. For they
know that if they form a communal political party the major
community will also form a communal party and the majority
community will thereby find it easy to establish its communal
Raj. It is a vicious method of self-protection. It is because the
minority nations are fully aware how they will be hoisted on their
own petard that they have opposed the formation of communal
political parties.

Have the Muslims thought of this method of avoiding
Hindu Raj. Have they considered how easy it is to avoid it?
Have they considered how futile and harmful the present
policy of the League is? The Muslims are howling against the
Hindu Maha Sabha and its slogan of Hindudom and Hindu Raj.
But who is responsible for this? Hindu Maha Sabha and Hindu
Raj are the inescapable nemesis which the Musalmans have
brought upon themselves by having a Muslim League. It is action
and counter-action. One gives rise to the other. Not partition,
but the abolition of the Muslim League and the formation of a
mixed party of Hindus and Muslims is the only effective way
of burying the ghost of Hindu Raj. It is, of course, not possible
for Muslims and other minority parties to join the Congress or
the Hindu Maha Sabha so long as the disagreement on the ques-
tion of constitutional safeguards continues. But this question
will be settled, is bound to be settled and there is every hope

355

Pakistan

that the settlement will result in securing tolhe Muslims and
other minorities the safeguards they need. Once this consum-
mation, which we so devoutly wish, takes place nothing can
stand in the way of a party re-alignment, of the Congress and
the Maha Sabha breaking up and of Hindus and Musalmans
forming mixed political parties based on an agreed programme
of social and economic regeneration, and thereby avoid the
danger of both Hindu Raj or Muslim Raj becoming a fact.
Nor should the formation of a mixed party of Hindus and
Muslims be difficult in India. There are many lower orders in
the Hindu society whose economic, political and social needs are
the same as those of the majority of the Muslims and they would
be far more ready to make a common cause with the Muslims
for achieving common ends than they would with the high
caste of Hindus who have denied and deprived them of ordi-
nary human rights for centuries. To pursue such a course
cannot be called an adventure. The path along that line is a
well trodden path. Is it not a fact that under the Montagu-
Chelmsford Reforms in most Provinces, if not in all, the Muslims,
the Non-Brahmins and the Depressed Classes united together
and worked the reforms as members of one team from 1920 to
1937? Herein lay the most fruitful method of achieving com-
munal harmony among Hindus and Muslims and of destroying
the danger of a Hindu Raj. Mr. Jinnah could have easily
pursued this line. Nor was it difficult for Mr. Jinnah to succeed
in it. Indeed Mr. Jinnah is the one person who had all the
chances of success on his side if he had tried to form such a
united non-communal party. He has the ability to organize.
He had the reputation of a nationalist.- Even many Hindus
who were opposed to the Congress would have flocked to him
if he had only sent out a call for a united party of like-minded
Hindus and Muslims. What did Mr. Jinnah do? In 1937 Mr.
Jinnah made his entry into Muslim politics and strangely
enough he regenerated the Muslim League which was dying
and decaying and of which only a few years ago he would have
been glad to witness the funeral. However regrettable the
starting of such a communal political party may have been,
there was in it one relieving feature. That was the leadership
of Mr. Jinnah. Everybody felt that with the leadership of

356

Must There be Pakistan?

Mr. Jinnah the League could never become a merely communal
party. The resolutions passed by the League during the first
two years of its new career indicated that it would develop into
a mixed political party of Hindus and Muslims. At the annual
session of the Muslim League held at Lucknow in October 1937
altogether 15 resolutions were passed. The following two are
of special interest in this connection.

Resolution* No. 7 :

"This meeting of the All India Muslim League deprecates
and protests against the formation of Ministries in certain Pro-
vinces by the Congress parties in flagrant violation of the letter
and the spirit of the Government of India Act, 1935, and Instru-
ment of Instructions and condemns the Governors for their
failure to enforce the special powers entrusted to them for the
safeguards of the interest of the Musalmans and other im-
portant minorities."

Resolution* No. 8 :

"Resolved that the object of the All India Muslim League
shall be the establishment in India of Full Independence in the
form of federation of free democratic states in which the rights
and interests of the Musalmans and other minorities are ade"
quately and effectively safeguarded in the constitution."

Equal number of resolutions were passed at the next
annual session of the League held at Patna in December 1938.
Resolution* No. 10 is noteworthy. It reads as follows : —

"The All India Muslim League reiterates its view that the
scheme of Federation embodied in the Government of India Act,
1935, is not acceptable, but in view of the further developments
that have taken place or may take place from time to time it
hereby authorises the President of the All India Muslim League
to adopt such course as may be necessary with a view to explore
the possibility of a suitable alternative which will safeguard the
interests of the Musalmans and other minorities in India."

By these resolutions Mr. Jinnah showed that he was for a com-
mon front between the Muslims and other non-Muslim minor-
ities. Unfortunately the catholicity and statesmanship that
underlies these resolutions did not last long. In 1939 Mr.
Jinnah took a somersault and outlined the dangerous and dis-
astrous policy of isolation of the Musalmans by passing that
notorious resolution in favour of Pakistan. What is the reason

* Italics not in the original.

357

Pakistan

for this isolation? Nothing but the change of view that the
Musalmans were a nation and not a community I I One need
not quarrel over the question whether the Muslims are a nation
or a community. But one finds it extremely difficult to under-
stand how the mere fact that the Muslims are a nation makes
political isolation a safe and sound policy? Unfortunately Mus-
lims do not realize what disservice Mr. Jinnah has done to them
by this policy. But let Muslims consider what Mr. Jinnah has
achieved by making the Muslim League the only organization
for the Musalmans. It may be that it lias helped him to avoid
the possibility of having to play the second fiddle. For inside
the Muslim camp he can always be sure of the first place for
himself. But how does the League hope to save by this plan
of isolation the Muslims from Hindu Raj? Will Pakistan
obviate the establishment of Hindu Raj in Provinces in
which the Musalmans are in a minority? Obviously it
cannot. This is what would happen in the Muslim-
minority Provinces if Pakistan came. Take an all-India view.
Can Pakistan prevent the establishment of Hindu Raj at the
centre over Muslim minorities that will remain in Hindustan?
It is plain that it cannot. What good is Pakistan then? Only
to prevent Hindu Raj in Provinces in which the Muslims are
in a majority and in which there could never be Hindu Raj I I
To put it differently Pakistan is unnecessary to Muslims where
they are in a majority because there, there is no fear of Hindu Raj.
It is worse than useless to Muslims where they are in a minority,
because Pakistan or no Pakistan they will have to face a Hindu
Raj. Can politics be more futile than the politics of the Muslim
League? The Muslim League started to help minority Muslims
and has ended by espousing the cause of majority Muslims. What
a perversion in the original aim of the Muslim League! What a
fall from the sublime to the ridiculous ! Partition as a remedy
against Hindu Raj is worse than useless.

These are some of the weaknesses in the Muslim case for
Pakistan which have occurred to me. There might be others

358

Must There be Pakistan?

which have not struck me. But the list as it is, is quite a formid-
able one. How do the Muslims propose to meet them? That
is a question for the Muslims and not for me. My duty as a
student of the subject extends to setting forth these weaknesses.
That I have done. I have nothing more to answer for.

There are, however, two other questions of such importance
that this discussion cannot be closed with any sense of complete-
ness without reference to them. The purpose of these questions
is to clear the ground between myself and my critics. Of these
questions, one I am entitled to ask the critics, the other the
critics are entitled to ask me.

Beginning with the first question, what I feel like asking
the critics is, what good do they expect from a statement of these
weaknesses? Do they expect the Musalmans to give up Pakistan
if they are defeated in a controversy over the virtues of Pakistan?
That of course depends upon what method is adopted to resolve
this controversy. The Hindus and the Musalmans may follow
the procedure which Christian missionaries had set up in early
times in order to secure converts from amongst the Hindus.
According to this procedure a day was appointed for a disputa-
tion, which was open to public, between a Christian missionary
and a Brahmin, the former representing the Christian religion
and the latter holding himself out as the protagonist of the Hindu
religion with the condition that whoever failed to meet the case
against his religion was bound to accept the religion of the other.
If such a method of resolving the dispute between the Hindus
and the Muslims over the issue of Pakistan was agreed upon
there may be some use in setting out this string of weaknesses.
But let it not be forgotten that there is another method of dispos-
ing of a controversy which may be called Johnsonian after the
manner which Dr. Johnson employed in dealing with arguments
of Bishop Berkeley. It is recorded by Boswell that when he told
Dr. Johnson that the doctrine of Bishop Berkeley that matter was
non-existent and that everything in the universe was merely ideal,
was only an ingenious sophistry but that it was impossible to
refute it, Dr. Johnson with great alacrity answered, striking his
foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded
from it saying, " I refute it thus." It may be that the Musalmans

359

Pakistan

will agree, as most rational people do, to have their case for Paki-
stan decided by the tests of reason and argument. But I should not
be surprised if the Muslims decided to adopt the method of Dr.
Johnson and say "Damn your arguments 1 We want Pakistan."
In that event the critic must realize that any reliance placed upon
the limitations for destroying the case for Pakistan will be of
no avail. It is therefore no use being jubilant over the logic of
these objections to Pakistan.

Let me now turn to the other question which I said the
critic is entitled to put to me. What is my position regarding
the issue of Pakistan in the light of the objections, which I have
set out? I have no doubts as to my position. I hold firmly that,
subject to certain conditions, detailed in the chapters that follow,
if the Musalmans are bent on having Pakistan then it must be con-
ceded to them. I know my critics will at once accuse me of incon-
sistency and will demand reasons for so extraordinary a conclu-
sion— extraordinary because of the view expressed by me
in the earlier part of this chapter that the Muslim case for
Pakistan has nothing in it which can be said to carry the
compelling force which the decree of an inexorable fate
may be said to have. I withdraw nothing from what I have
said as to the weaknesses in the Muslim case for Pakistan. Yet
I hold that if the Muslims must have Pakistan there is no escape
from conceding it to them. As to the reasons which have led
me to that conclusion I shall not hesitate to say that the strength
or weakness of the logic of Pakistan is not one of them. In my
judgment there are two governing factors which must determine
the issue. First is the defence of India and second is the senti-
ment of the Muslims. I will state why I regard them as decisive
and how in my opinion they tell in favour of Pakistan.

To begin with the first. One cannot ignore that what is
important is not the winning of independence but the having of
the sure means of maintaining it. The ultimate guarantee of the
independence of a country is a safe army — an army on which you
can rely to fight for the country at all times and in any eventuality.
The army in India must necessarily be a mixed army composed of
Hindus and Muslims. If India is invaded by a foreign power, can
the Muslims in the army be trusted to defend India? Suppose
invaders are their co-religionists. Will the Muslims side with the

360

Must There be Pakistan ?

invaders or will they stand against them and save India? This is
a very crucial question. Obviously, the answer to this question
must depend upon to what extent the Muslims in the army
have caught the infection of the two-nation theory, which is the
foundation of Pakistan. If they are infected, then the army in
India cannot be safe. Instead of being the guardian of the inde-
pendence of India, it will continue to be a menace and a potential
danger. to its independence. I confess I feel aghast when I hear
some Britishers argue that it is for the defence of India that they
must reject Pakistan. Some Hindus also sing the same tune.
I feel certain that either they are unaware as to what the determin-
ing factor in the independence of India is or that they are talking
of the defence of India not as an independent country responsible
for its own defence but as a British possession to be defended by
them against an intruder. This is a hopelessly wrong angle of
vision. The question is not whether the British will be able to
defend India better if there was no partition of India. The ques-
tion is whether Indian swill be able to defend a free India. To that,
I repeat, the only answer is that Indians will be able to defend a
free India on one and one condition alone — namely, if the army
in India remains non-political, unaffected by the poison of
Pakistan. I want to warn Indians against the most stupid habit
that has grown up in this country of discussing the question of
Swaraj without reference to the question of the army. Nothing
can be more fatal than the failure to realize that a political army
is the greatest danger to the liberty of India. It is worse than
having no army.

Equally important is the fact that the army is the ultimate
sanction which sustains Government in the exercise of its author-
ity inside the country, when it is challenged by a rebellious or
recalcitrant element. Suppose the Government of the day enun-
ciates a policy which is vehemently opposed by a section of the
Muslims. Suppose the Government of the day is required to use
its army to enforce its policy. Can the Government of the day
depend upon the Muslims in the army to obey its orders and
shoot down the Muslim rebels? This again depends upon to
what extent the Muslims in the army have caught the infection
of the two-nation theory. If they have caught it, India cannot
have a safe and secure Government.

361

Pakistan

Turning to the second governing factor the Hindus do
not seem to attach any value to sentiment as a force in politics.
The Hindus seem to rely upon two grounds to win against
the Muslims. The first is that even if the Hindus and the
Muslims are two nations, they can live under one state. The
other is that the Muslim case for Pakistan is founded on strong
^entiment rather than upon clear argument. I don't know how
long the Hindus are going to fool themselves with such argu-
ments. It is true that the first argument is not without prece-
dent. At the same time it does not call for much intelligence
to see that its value is extremely limited. Two nations and one
state is a pretty plea. It has the same attraction which a ser-
mon has and may result in the conversion of Muslim leaders.
But instead of being uttered as a sermon- if it is intended
to issue it as an ordinance for the Muslims to obey it will be a mad
project to which no sane man will agree. It will, I am sure, de-
feat the very purpose of Swaraj. The second argument is equally
silly. That the Muslim case for Pakistan is founded on senti-
ment is far from being a matter of weakness; it is really its
strong point. It does not need deep understanding of politics
to know that the workability of a constitution is not a matter
of theory. It is a matter of sentiment. A constitution like
clothes must suit as well as please. If a constitution does not
please, then, however perfect it may be, it will not work. To
have a constitution which runs counter to the strong sentiments
of a determined section is to court disaster if not to invite
rebellion.

It is not realized by the Hindus that, assuming there is a safe
army, rule by armed forces is not the normal method of govern-
ing a people. Force, it cannot be denied, is the medicine of the body
politic and must be administered when the body politic becomes
sick. But just because force is the medicine of the body politic
it cannot be allowed to become its daily bread. A body politic
must work as a matter of course by springs of action which are
natural. This can happen only when the different elements
constituting the body politic have the will to work together and
to obey the laws and orders passed by a duly constituted autho-
rity. Suppose the new constitution for a United India contained
in it all the provisions necessary to safeguard the interests of the

362

Must There be Pakistan ?

Muslims. But suppose the Muslims said " Thank you for your
safeguards, we don't want to be ruled by you" ; and suppose they
boycott the Legislatures, refuse to obey laws, oppose the payment
of taxes; what is to happen? Are the Hindus prepared to
extract obedience from Muslims by the use of Hindu bayonets?
Is Swaraj to be an opportunity to serve the people or is it to be
an opportunity for Hindus to conquer the Musalmans and for
the Musalmans to conquer the Hindus? Swaraj must be a
Government of the people by the people and for the people.
This is the raison cC&tre of Swaraj and the only justification
for Swaraj. If Swaraj is to usher in an era in which the Hindus
and the Muslims will be engaged in scheming against each
other, the one planning to conquer its rival, why should we have
Swaraj and why should the democratic nations allow such a
Swaraj to come into existence? It will be a snare, a delusion and
a perversion.

The non-Muslims do not seem to be aware that they are
presented with a situation in which they are forced to choose
between various alternatives. Let me state them. In the first
place they have to choose between Freedom of India and the
Unity of India. If the non-Muslims will insist on the Unity
of India they put the quick realization of India's freedom into
jeopardy. The second choice relates to the surest method of
defending India, whether they can depend upon Muslims in
a free and united India to develop and sustain along with the
non-Muslims the necessary will to defend the common liberties
of both : or whether it is better to partition India and thereby
ensure the safety of Muslim India by leaving its defence to the
Muslims and of non-Muslim India by leaving its defence to
non-Muslims.

As to the first, I prefer Freedom of India to the Unity of
India. The Sinn Feinners who were the staunchest of nation-
alists to be found anywhere in the world and who like the
Indians were presented with similar alternatives chose the free-
dom of Ireland to the unity of Ireland. The non-Muslims who
are opposed to partition may well profit by the advice tendered
by the Rev. Michael O' Flanagan, at one time V ice-President of

363

Pakistan

the Feitms to the Irish Nationalists on the issue of the partition
of Ireland.* Said the Rev. Father:—

" If we reject Home Rule rather than agree to the exclusion
of the Unionist parts of Ulster, what case have we to put before
the world? We can point out that Ireland is an island with
a definite geographical boundary. That argument might be all
right if we were appealing to a number of Island nationalities
that had themselves definite geographical boundaries. Appeal-
ing, as we are, to continental nations with shifting boundaries,
that argument will have no force whatever. National and geogra-
phical boundaries scarcely ever coincide. Geography would
make one nation of Spain and Portugal ; history has made two
of them. Geography did its best to make one nation of Norway
and Sweden; history has succeeded in making two of them.
Geography has scarcely anything to say to the number of nations
upon the North American continent ; history has done the
whole thing. If a man were to try to construct a political map
of Europe out of its physical map, he would find himself grop-
ing in the dark. Geography has worked hard to make one
nation out of Ireland; history has worked against it. The island
of Ireland and the national unit of Ireland simply do not coin-
cide. In the last analysis the test of nationality is the wish of
the people."

These words have emanated from a profound sense of realism
which we in India so lamentably lack.

On the second issne I prefer the partitioning of India into
Muslim India and non-Muslim India as the surest and safest
method of providing for the defence of both. It is certainly the
safer of the two alternatives. I know it will be contended that
my fears about the loyalty of the Muslims in the army to a
Free and United India arising from the infection of the two-
nation theory is only an imaginary fear. That is no doubt true.
That does not militate against the soundness of the choice I have
made. I may be wrong. But I certainly can say without any
fear of contradiction that, to use the words of Burke, it is better
to be ridiculed for too great a credulity than to be ruined by
too confident a sense of security. I don't want to leave things
to chance. To leave so important an issue, as the defence of
India, to chance is to be guilty of the grossest crime.

Nobody will consent to the Muslim demand for Pakistan
unless he is forced to do so. At the same time, it would be a

* Quoted by Sir James O'Connor — History of Ireland, Vol. II, p. 257.
364

Must There be Pakistan?

folly not to face what is inevitable and face it with courage and
common sense. Equally would it be a folly to lose the part
one can retain in the vain attempt of preserving the whole.

These are the reasons why I hold that if the Musalmans
will not yield on the issue of Pakistan then Pakistan must come.
So far as I am concerned the only important question is : Are
the Musalmans determined to have Pakistan ? Or is Pakistan
a mere cry? Is it only a passing mood? Or does it represent
their permanent aspiration ? On this there may be difference of
opinion. Once it becomes certain that the Muslims want
Pakistan there can be no doubt that the wise course would be to
concede the principle of it.

365

CHAPTER XIV
THE PROBLEMS OF PAKISTAN

Among the many problems to which the partition of India
into Pakistan and Hindustan must give rise will be the follow-
ing three problems : —

(1) The problem of the allocation of the financial assets
and liabilities of the present Government of India,

(2) the problem of the delimitation of the areas, and

(3) the problem of the transfer of population from Pakistan
to Hindustan and vice versa.

Of these problems the first is consequential, in the sense,
that it would be worth while to consider it only when the parti-
tion of India has been agreed to by the parties concerned. The
two other problems stand on a different footing. They are
conditions precedent to Pakistan in the sense that there are many
people who will not make up their mind on Pakistan unless
they are satisfied that some reasonable and just solution of them
is possible. I will, therefore, confine myself to the consideration
only of the last two problems of Pakistan.

On the question of the boundaries of Pakistan we have had
so far no clear and authoritative statement from the Muslim
League. In fact it is one of the complaints made by the Hindus
that while Mr. Jinnah has been carrying on a whirlwind cam-
paign in favour of Pakistan, which has resulted in fouling the
political atmosphere in the country, Mr. Jinnah has not thought
fit to inform his critics of the details regarding the
boundaries of his proposed Pakistan. Mr. Jinnah's argument

367

Pakistan

has all along been that any discussion regarding the boundaries
of Pakistan is premature and that the boundaries of Pakistan
will be a matter for discussion when the principle of Pakistan
has been admitted. It may be a good rhetorical answer, but it
certainly does not help those who wish to apply their mind with-
out taking sides to offer whatever help they can to bring about
a peaceful solution of this problem. , Mr. Jimiah seems to be
under the impression that if a person is committed to the princi-
ple of Pakistan he will be bound to accept Mr. Jinnah's plan of
Pakistan. There cannot be a greater mistake than this. A
person may accept the principle of Pakistan, which only means
the partition of India. But it is difficult to understand how
the acceptance of this principle can commit him to Mr. Jinnah's
plan of Pakistan. Indeed if no plan of Pakistan is satisfactory
to him he will be quite free to oppose any form of Pakistan
although he may be in favour of the principle of Pakistan.
The plan of Pakistan and the principle of Pakistan are therefore
two quite distinct propositions. There is nothing wrong in this
view. By way of illustration it may be said that the principle of
self-determination is like au explosive substance. One may
agree in principle to its use when the necessity and urgency of
the occasion is proved. But no one can consent to the use of the
dynamite without first knowing the area that is intended to be
blown up. If the dynamite is going to blow up the whole struc-
ture or if it is not possible to localize its application to a particular
part he may well refuse to apply the dynamite and prefer to use
some other means of solving the problem. Specifications of
boundary lines seem therefore to be an essential preliminary for
working out in concrete shape the principle of Pakistan. Equally
essential it is for a bona fide protagonist of Pakistan not to hide
from the public the necessary particulars of the scheme of Pakistan.
Such contumacy and obstinacy as shown by Mr. Jinnah in refusing
to declare the boundaries of his Pakistan is unforgivable in a
statesman. Nevertheless those who are interested in solving the
question of Pakistan need not wait to resolve the problems of
Pakistan until Mr. Jinnah condescends to give full details. Only
one has to carry on the argument on the basis of certain assump-
tions. In this discussion I will assume that what the Muslim
League desires is that the boundaries of the Western Pakistan

368

The Problems of Pakistan

should be the present boundaries of the Provinces of the North-
West Frontier, the Punjab, Sind and Baluchistan, and that the
boundaries of Eastern Pakistan should be the boundaries of the
Present Province of Bengal with a few districts of Assam thrown
in.

Ill

The question for consideration therefore is: Is this a just
claim? The claim is said to be founded on the principle of self-
determination. To be able to assess the justice of this claim it
is necessary to have a clear understanding of the scope and
limitations of the principle of self-determination. Unfortunately,
there seems to be a complete lack of such an understanding. It
is therefore necessary to begin with the question : What is the
de facto and de jure connotation of this principle of self-deter-
mination? The term self-determination has become current
since the last few years. But it describes something which is
much older. The idea underlying self-determination has deve-
loped along two different lines. During the 19th century self-
determination meant the right to establish a form of government
in accordance with the wishes of the people. Secondly, self-
determination has meant the right to obtain national independ-
ence from an alien race irrespective of the form of government.
The agitation for Pakistan has reference to self-determination
in its second aspect.

Confining the discussion to this aspect of Pakistan it seems
to me essential that the following points regarding the issue of
self-determination should be borne in mind.

In the first place, self-determination must be by the people.
This point is too simple even to need mention. But it has become
necessary to emphasize it. Both the Muslim League and the
Hindu Maha Sabha seem to be playing fast and loose with the
idea of self-determination. An area is claimed by the Muslim
League for inclusion in Pakistan because the people of the area
are Muslims. An area is also claimed for being included in
Pakistan because the ruler of the area is a Muslim though the
majority of the people of that area are non-Muslims. The
Muslim League is claiming the benefit of self-determination in
India. At the same time the League is opposed to self-determina-

* 369

Pakistan

tion being applied to Palestine. The League claims Kashmir
as a Muslim State because the majority of people are Muslims
and also Hyderabad because the ruler is Muslim. In like man-
ner the Hindu Maha Sabha claims an area to be included in
Hindustan because the people of the area are non-Muslims. It
also comes forward to claim an area to be a part of Hindustan
because the ruler is a Hindu though the majority of the people
are Muslims. Such strange and conflicting claims are entirely
due to the fact that either the parties to Pakistan, namely, the
Hindus and the Muslims do not understand what self-determina-
tion means or are busy in perverting the principle of self-deter-
mination to enable them to justify themselves in carrying out the
organized territorial loot in which they now seein to be engaged.
India will be thrown into a state of utter confusion whenever the
question of reorganization of its territories comes up for consi-
deration if people have no exact notions as to what self-deter-
mination involves and have not the honesty to stand by the
principle and take the consequences whatever they be. It is,
therefore, well to emphasize what might be regarded as too
simple to require mention, namely, that self-determination is a
determination by the people and by nobody else.

The second point to note is the degree of imperative
character with which the principle of self-determination can be
said to be invested. As has been said by Mr. O'Connor*: —

"The doctrine of self-determinatiou is not a universal princi-
ple at all. The most that can be said about it is that generally
speaking, it is a sound working rule, founded upon justice,
making for harmony and peace and for the development of
people in their own fashion, which, again generally speaking,
is the best fashion. But it must yield to circumstances, of which
size and geographical situation are some of the most important.
Whether the rule should prevail against the circumstances or the
circumstances against the rule can be determined only by the
application of one's common sense or sense of justice, or, as a
Benthamite would prefer to put it, by reference to the greatest
good of the greatest number — all these three, if properly under-
stood, are really different methods of expressing the same thing.
In solving a particular case very great difficulties may arise.
There are facts one way and facts another way. Facts of one
kind may make a special appeal to some minds, little or none

* History of Ireland, Vol. II.
370

The Problems of Pakistan

to others. The problem may be of the kind that is called im-
ponderable, that is to say, no definite conclusion that will be
accepted by the generality of the mankind may be possible.
There are cases in which it is no more possible to say that a
nation is right in its claim to interfere with the self-determina-
tion of another nation than that it is to say that it is wrong.
It is a matter of opinion, upon which honest and impartial
minds may differ."

There are two reasons why this must be so. Firstly, nation-
ality is not such a sacrosanct and absolute principle as to give it
the character of a categorical imperative, over-riding every other
consideration. Secondly, separation is not quite so essential for
the maintenance and preservation of a distinct nationality.

There is a third point to be borne in mind in connection
with the issue of self-determination. Self-determination for a
nationality may take the form of cultural independence or may
take the form of territorial independence. Which form it can
take must depend upon the territorial layout of the population.
If a nationality lives in easily severable and contiguous areas,
other things being equal, a case can be made out for territorial
independence. But where owing to an inextricable intermingl-
ing the nationalities are so mixed up that the areas they occupy
are not easily severable, then all that they can be entitled to is
cultural independence. Territorial separation in a case like
this is an impossibility. They are doomed to live together. The
only other alternative they have is to migrate.

Having defined the scope and limitations of the idea of self-
determination we can now proceed to deal with the question
of boundaries of Pakistan. How does the claim of the Muslim
League for the present boundary to remain the boundaries of
Pakistan stand in the light of these considerations? The answer
to this question seems to me quite clear. The geographical lay-
out seems to decide the issue. No special pleading of any kind
is required. In the case of the North- West Frontier Province,
Baluchistan and Sind, the Hindus and the Muslims are inter-
mixed. In these Provinces a case for territorial separation for
the Hindus seems to be impossible. They must remain content
with cultural independence and such political safeguards as may

371

Pakistan

be devised for their safety. The case of the Punjab and Bengal
stands on a different footing. A glance at the map shows that
the layont of the population of the Hindus and the Muslims in
these two Provinces is totally different from what one finds in
the other three Provinces. The non-Muslims in the Punjab
and Bengal are not found living in small islands in the midst of
and surrounded by a vast Muslim population spread over the
entire surface as is the case with the North-West Frontier Pro-
vince, Baluchistan and Sind. In Bengal and the Punjab the
Hindus occupy two different areas contiguous and severable.
In the^e circumstances, there is no reason for conceding what
the Muslim League seems to demand, namely, that the present
boundaries of the Punjab and Bengal shall continue to be the
boundaries of Western Pakistan and Eastern Pakistan.

Two conclusions necessarily follow from the foregoing dis-
cussion. One is that the non-Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal
have a case for exclusion from Pakistan by territorial severance
of the areas they occupy. The other is that the non-Muslims
of North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan and Sind have no
case for exclusion and are only entitled to cultural independence
and political safeguards. To put the same thing in a different
way it may be said that the Muslim League claim for demand-
ing that the boundaries of Sind, North- West Frontier and
Baluchistan shall remain as they are cannot be opposed. But
that in the case of the Punjab and Bengal such a claim is unten-
able and that the noil-Muslims of these Provinces, if they desire,
can claim that the territory they occupy should be excluded by a
redrawing of the boundaries of these two Provinces.

One should have thought that such a claim by the non-
Muslim minorities of the Punjab and Bengal for the redrawing
of the boundaries would be regarded by the Muslim League as a
just and reasonable claim. The possibility of the redrawing of
boundaries was admitted in the Lahore Resolution of the Muslim
League passed in March 1940. The Resolution* said: —

"The establishment of completely independent States form-
ed by demarcating geographically contiguous units into regions

•Italics are'mine.
372

The Problems of Pakistan

which shall be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments
as may be necessary^ that the areas in which the Musalmans
are numerically in a majority, as in the north-western and
eastern zones of India, shall be grouped together to constitute
independent States as Muslim free national homelands in which
the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign."

That this continued to be the position of the Muslim League is
clear from the resolution passed by the Muslim League on the
Cripps Proposals as anyone who cares to read it will know. But
there are indications that Mr. Jinnah has changed his view. At
a public meeting held on 16th November 1942 in Jullunder Mr.
Jinnah is reported to have expressed himself in the following
terms : —

" The latest trick — I call it nothing but a trick — to puzzle and
to mislead the ignorant masses purposely, and those playing the
game understand it, is, why should the right of self-determination
be confined to Muslims only and why not extend it to other
communities? Having said that all have the right of self-
determination, they say the Punjab must be divided into so many
bits; likewise the North- West Frontier Province and Sind.
Thus there will be hundreds of Pakistans.

SUB-NATIONAL, GROUPS

"Who is the author of this new formula that every com-
munity has the right of self-determination all over India?
Either it is colossal ignorance or mischief and trick. Let me give
them a reply, that the Musalmans claim the right of self-deter-
mination because they are a national group on a given territory
which is their homeland and in the /ones where they are in a
majority. Have you known anywhere in history that national
groups scattered all over have been given a State? Where are
you going to get a State for them? In that case you have got
14 per cent. Muslims in the United Provinces. Why not have a
State for them? Muslims in the United Provinces are not a
national group; they are scattered. Therefore in constitutional
language they are characterized as a sub-national group who
cannot expect anything more than what is due from any civi-
lized Government to a minority. I hope I have made the posi-
tion clear. The Muslims are not a sub-national group; it is
their birthright to claim and exercise the right of self-determina-
tion."

Mr. Jinnah has completely missed the point. The point
raised by his critics was not with regard to the non-Muslim

• Eastern Times (Lahore) of 17th November 1942.

373

Pakistan

minorities in general. It had reference to the non-Muslim
minorities in the Punjab and Bengal. Does Mr. Jinnah propose
to dispose of the case of non-Muslim minorities who occupy a
compact and an easily severable territory by his theory of a
sub-nation? If that is so, then one is bound to say that a
proposition cruder than his it would be difficult to find in any
political literature. The concept of a sub-nation is unheard of.
It is not only an ingenious concept but it is also a preposterous
concept. What does the theory of a sub-nation connote? If I
understand its implications correctly, it means a sub-nation must
not be severed from the nation to which it belongs even when
severance is possible: it means that the relations between
a nation and a sub-nation are no higher than the relations
which subsist between a man and his chattels, or between property
and its incidents. Chattels go with the owner, incidents go with
property, so a sub-nation goes with a nation. Such is the chain
of reasoning in Mr. Jinnah's argument. But does Mr. Jinnah
seriously wish to argue that the Hindus of the Punjab and
Bengal are only chattels so that they must always go wherever
the Muslims of the Punjab and the Muslims of Bengal choose to
drive them? Such an argument will be too absurd to be enter-
tained by any reasonable man. It is also the most illogical
argument and certainly it should not be difficult for so mature a
lawyer as Mr. Jinnah, to see the illogicality of it. If a numeri-
cally smaller nation is only a sub-nation in relation to a
numerically larger nation and has no right to territorial separa-
tion, why can it not be said that taking India as a whole the
Hindus are a nation and the Muslims a sub-nation and as a
sub-nation they have no right to self-determination or territorial
separation ?

Already there exists a certain amount of suspicion with
regard to the bona fides of Pakistan. Rightly or wrongly, most
people suspect that Pakistan is pregnant with mischief. They think
that it has two motives, one immediate, the other ultimate. The
immediate motive, it is said, is to join with the neighbouring Mus-
lim countries and form a Muslim Federation. The ultimate motive
is for the Muslim Federation to .invade Hindustan and conquer
or rather reconquer the Hindus and re-establish Muslim Empire
in India. Others think that Pakistan is the culmination of the

374

The Problems of Pakistan

scheme of hostages which lay behind the demand, put forth by
Mr. Jinnah in his fourteen points, for the creation of separate
Muslim Provinces. Nobody can fathom the mind of the
Muslims and reach the real motives that lie behind their demand
for Pakistan. The Hindu opponents of Pakistan if they sus-
pect that the real motives of the Muslims are different from the
apparent ones, may take note of them and plan accordingly.
They cannot oppose Pakistan because the motives behind it are
bad. But they are entitled to ask Mr. Jinnah, Why does he
want to have a communal problem within Pakistan ? However
vicious may be the motives behind Pakistan it should possess at
least one virtue. The ideal of Pakistan should be not to have
a communal problem inside it. This is the least of virtues one
can expect from Pakistan. If Pakistan is to be plagued by a
communal problem in the same way as India has been, why
have Pakistan at all? It can be welcomed only if it provides an
escape from the communal problem. The way to avoid it is to
arrange the boundaries in such a way that it will be an ethnic
State without a minority and a majority pitched against each
other. Fortunately it can be made into an ethnic State if only
Mr. Jinnah will allow it. Unfortunately Mr. Jinnah objects to
it. Therein lies the chief cause for suspicion and Mr. Jinnah,
instead of removing it, is deepening it by such absurd, illogical
and artificial distinctions as nations and sub-nations.

Rather than resort to such absurd and illogical propositions
and defend what is indefensible and oppose what is just, would
it not be better for Mr. Jinnah to do what Sir Edward Carson did
in the matter of the delimitation of the boundaries of Ulster?
As all those who know the vicissitudes through which the Irish
Home Rule question passed know that it was at the Craigavon
meeting held on 23rd September 1911 that Sir Edward Carson
formulated his policy that in Ulster there will be a government of
Imperial Parliament or a Government of Ulster but never a Home
Rule Government. As the Imperial Parliament was proposing to
withdraw its government, this policy meant the establishment
of a provisional government for Ulster. This policy was em-
bodied in a resolution passed at a joint meeting of delegates
representing the Ulster Unionist Council, the County Grand
Orange Lodges and Unionist Clubs held in Belfast on 25th

375

Pakistan

September 1911. The Provisional Government of Ulster iwas
to come into, force on the day of the passing of the Home Rule
Bill. An important feature of this policy was to invest the
Provisional Government with a jurisdiction over all "these
districts which they (Ulsterites^ could control"

The phrase "those districts which they could control" was
no doubt meant to include the whole of the administrative
division of Ulster. Now this administrative division of Ulster
included nine counties. Of these three were overwhelmingly
Catholic. This meant the compulsory retention of the three
Catholic counties under Ulster against their wishes. But what
did Sir Edward Carson do in the end? It did not take long for
Sir Edward Carson to discover that Ulster with three over-
whelmingly Catholic districts would be a liability, and with all
the courage of a true leader he came out with a declaration that
he proposed to cut down his losses and make Ulster safe. In
his speech in the House of Commons on the 18th of May 1920
he announced that he was content with six counties only. The
speech that he made on that occasion giving his reasons why he
was content only with six counties is worth quoting. This is
what he said*: —

"The truth is that we came to the conclusion after many
anxious hours and anxious days of going into the whole matter,
almost parish by parish and townland by townland, that
we would have no chance of successfully starting a Parliament
in Belfast which would be responsible for the government of
Donegal, Caven and Monaghan. It would be perfectly idle for
us to come here and pretend that we should be in a position to
do so. We should like to have the very largest areas possible,
naturally. That is a system of land grabbing that prevails in all
countries for widening the jurisdiction of the various govern-
ments that are set up ; but there is no use in our undertaking a
government which we know would be a failure if we were
saddled with these three counties-"

These are wise, sagacious and most courageous words. The
situation in which they were uttered has a close parallel with
the situation that is likely to be created in the Punjab and
Bengal by the application of the principle of Pakistan. The
Muslim League and Mr. Jinnah if they want a peaceful Pakistan

• Hansard (House of Commons), 1920, Vol. 129, p. 1315. Italics arc mine.
376

The Problems of Pakistan

should not forget to take note of them. It is no use
asking the non-Muslim minorities in the Punjab and Bengal
to be satisfied with safeguards. If the Musalmans are not pre-
pared to be content with safeguards against the tyranny of
Hindu majority why should the Hindu minorities be asked to
be satisfied with the safeguards against the tyranny of the
Muslim majority? If the Musalmans can say to the Hindus
"Damn your safeguards, we don't want to be ruled by you" — an
argument which Carson used against Redmond — the same
argument can be returned by the Hindus of the Punjab and
Bengal against the Muslim offer to be content with safeguards,

The point is that this attitude is not calculated to lead to a
peaceful solution of the problem of Pakistan. Sabre-rattling
or show of force will not do. In the first place, this is
a game which two can play. In the second place, arms
may be an element of strength. But to have arms is not enough.
As .Rousseau said : " The strongest is never strong enough to be
always master, unless he transforms his might into right, and
obedience into duty." Only ethics can convert might into right
and obedience into duty. The League must see that its claim
for Pakistan is founded on ethics.

So much for the problem of boundaries. I will now turn
to the problem of the minorities which must remain within
Pakistan even after boundaries are redrawn. There are two
methods of protecting their interests.

First is to provide safeguards in the constitution for
the protection of the political and cultural rights of the minorities.
To Indians this is a familiar matter and it is unnecessary to
enlarge upon it.

Second is to provide for their transfer from Pakistan
to Hindustan. Many people prefer this solution and would be
ready and willing to consent to Pakistan if it can be shown that
an exchange of population is possible. But they regard this as
a staggering and a baffling problem. This no doubt is the sign
of a panic-stricken mind. If the matter is considered in a cool
and calm temper it will be found that the problem is neither
staggering nor baffling.

377

Pakistan

To begin with consider the dimensions of the problem. On
what scale is this transfer going to be ? In determining the scale
oneisbound to take into account three considerations. In the first
place, if the boundaries of the Punjab and Bengal are redrawn
there will be no question of transfer of population so far as
these two Provinces are concerned. In the second place, the
Musalmans residing in Hindustan do not propose to migrate to
Pakistan nor does the League want their transfer. In the third
place, the Hindus in the North- West Frontier Province, Sind
and Baluchistan do not want to migrate. If these assumptions
are correct, the problem of transfer of population is far from being
a staggering problem. Indeed it is so small that there is no
need to regard it as a problem at all.

Assuming it does become a problem, will it be a baffling
problem? Experience shows that it is not a problem which it is
impossible to solve. To devise a solution for such a problem it
might be well to begin by asking what are the possible difficulties
that are likely to arise in the way of a person migrating from one
area to another on account of political changes. The following are
obvious enough: (1) The machinery for effecting and facili-
tating the transfer of population. (2) Prohibition by Govern-
ment against migration. (3) Levy by Government of heavy
taxation on the transfer of goods by the migrating family. (4)
The impossibility for a migrating family to carry with it to its
new home its immovable property. (5) The difficulty of
obviating a resort to unfair practices with a view to depress
unduly the value of the property of the migrating family. (6)
The fear of having to make good the loss by not being able to
realize the full value of the property by sale in the market. (7)
The difficulty of realizing pensionary and other charges due to
the migrating family from the country of departure. (8) The
difficulty of fixing the currency in which payment is to be
made. If these difficulties are removed the way to the transfer
of population becomes clear.

The first three difficulties can be easily removed by the
two States of Pakistan and Hindustan agreeing to a treaty em-
bodying an article in some such terms as follows : —

"The Governments of Pakistan and Hindustan agree to
appoint a Commission consisting of equal number of representa-

378

The Problems of Pakistan

thres and presided over by a person who is approved by both and
who is not a national of either.

"The expense of the Commission and of its Committees
both on account of its maintenance and its operation shall be
borne by the two Governments in equal proportion.

"The Government of Pakistan and the Government of
Hindustan hereby agree to grant to all their nationals within
their territories who belong to ethnic minorities the right to
express their desire to emigrate.

"The Governments of the States above mentioned undertake
to facilitate in every way the exercise of this right and to interpose
no obstacles, directly or indirectly, to freedom of emigration. All
laws and regulations whatsoever which conflict with freedom of
emigration shall be considered as null and void."

The fourth and the fifth difficulties which relate to transfer
of property can be effectually met by including in the treaty
articles the following terms : —

"Those who, in pursuance of these articles, determine to
take advantage of the right to migrate shall have the right to
carry with them or to have transported their movable property
of any kind without any duty being imposed upon them on this
account.

"So far as immovable property is concerned it shall be
liquidated by the Commission in accordance with the following
provisions: —

(1) The Commission shall appoint a Committee of Experts
to estimate the value of the immovable property of
the emigrant. The emigrant interested shall have a
representative chosen by him on the Committee.

(2) The Commission shall take necessary measures with a
view to the sale of immovable property of the emigrant/'

As for the rest of the difficulties relating to reimbursement
for loss, for payment of pensionary and charges for specifying
the currency in which payments are to be made the following
articles in the treaty should be sufficient to meet them : —

" (l) The difference in the estimated value and the sale price
of the immovable property of the emigrant shall be
paid in to the Commission by the Government of the
country of departure as soon as the former has notified
it of the resulting deficiency. One-fourth of this pay-
ment may be made in the money of the country of
departure and three-fourths in gold or short term gold
bonds.

379

Pakistan

" (2)* The Commission shall advance to the emigrants the
value of their immovable property determined as above.

" (3) All civil or military pensions acquired by an emigrant
at the date of the signature of the present treaty shall
be capitalized at the charge of the debtor Government,
which must pay the amount to the Commission for the
account of its owners.

" (4) The funds necessary to facilitate emigration shall be
advanced by the States interested in the Commission."

Are not these provisions sufficient to overcome the difficulties
regarding transfer of population? There are of course other
difficulties. But even those are not insuperable. They involve
questions of policy. The first question is : is the transfer of
population to be compulsory or is it to be voluntary? The
second is : is this right to State-aided transfer to be open to all
or is it to be restricted to any particular class of persons? The
third is : how long is Government going to remain liable to be
bound by these provisions, particularly the provision for making
good the loss on the sale of immovable property ? Should the
provisions be made subject to a time limit or should the liability
be continued indefinitely ?

With regard to the first point, both are possible and there
are instances of both having been put into effect. The transfer
of population between Greece and Bulgaria was on a voluntary
basis while that between Greece and Turkey was on a compulsory
basis. Compulsory transfer strikes one as being prima facie wrong.
It would not be fair to compel a man to change his ancestral habitat
if he does not wish to, unless the peace and tranquillity of the
State is likely to be put in jeopardy by his continuing to live
where he is or such transfer becomes necessary in his own
interest. What is required is that those who want to transfer
should be able to do so without impediment and without loss.
I am therefore of opinion that transfer should not be forced but
should be left open for those who declare their intention to
transfer.

As to the second point, it is obvious that only members of a
minority can be allowed to take advantage of the scheme of
State-aided transfer. But even this restriction may not be suffi-
cient to exclude all those who ought not to get the benefit of

380

The Problems of Pakistan

this scheme. It must be confined to certain well defined minor-
ities who on account of ethnic or religious differences are sure
to be subjected to discrimination or victimization.

The third point is important and is likely to give rise to
serious difference of opinion. On a fair view of the matter it
can be said that it is quite unreasonable to compel a Government
to keep open for an indefinite period the option to migrate at
Government cost. There is nothing unfair in telling a person
that if he wants to take advantage of the provisions of the
scheme of State-aided migration contained in the foregoing
articles, he must exercise his option to migrate within a stated
period and that if he decides to migrate after the period has elapsed
he will be free to migrate but it will have to be at his own cost
and without the aid of the State. There is no inequity in thus
limiting the right to State-aid. State-aid becomes a necessary
part of the scheme because the migration is a resultant conse-
quence of political changes over which individual citizens have
no control. But migration may not be the result of political
change. It may be for other causes, and when it is for other
causes, aid to the emigrant cannot be an obligation on the State.
The only way to determine whether migration is for political
reasons or for private reasons is to relate it to a definite point
of time. When it takes place within a defined period from the
happening of a political change it may be presumed to be
political. When it occurs after the period it may be presumed
to be for private reasons. There is nothing unjust in this. The
same rule of presumption governs the cases of civil servants who,
when a political change takes place, are allowed to retire on
proportionate pensions if they retire within a given period but
not if they retire after it has lapsed.

If the policy in these matters is as I suggest it should be,
it may be given effect to by the inclusion of the following
articles in the treaty : —

"The right to voluntary emigration may be exercised under
this treaty by any person belonging to an ethnic minority who
is over 18 years of age.

"A declaration made before the Commission shall be .suffi-
cient evidence of intention to exercise the right.

381-

Pakistan

"The choice of the husband shall cany with it that of the
wife, the option of parents or guardians that of their children
or wards aged less than 18 years.

"The right to the benefit provided by this treaty shall
lapse if the option to migrate is not exercised within a period of
5 years from the date of signing the treaty.

"The duties of the Commission shall be terminated within
six months after the expiration of the period of five years from
the date when the Commission starts to function."

What about the cost? The question of cost will be im-
portant only if the transfer is to be compulsory. A scheme of
voluntary transfer cannot place a very heavy financial burden
on the State. Men love property more than liberty. Many will
prefer to endure tyranny at the hands of their political masters
than change the habitat in which they are rooted. As Adam
Smith said, of all the things man is the most difficult cargo to
transport. Cost therefore need not frighten anybody.

What about its workability ? The scheme is not new. It
has been tried and found workable. It was put into effect after
the last European War, to bring about a transfer* of population
between Greece and Bulgaria and Turkey and Greece. Nobody
can deny that it has worked, has been tried and found workable.
The scheme I have outlined is a copy of the same scheme. It had
the effect of bringing about a transfer* of population between
Greece and Bulgaria and Turkey and Greece. Nobody can deny
that it was worked with signal success. What succeeded else-
where may well be expected to succeed in India.

The issue of Pakistan is far from simple. But it is not
so difficult as it is made out to be provided the principle and the
ethics of it are agreed upon. If it is difficult it is only because it is
heart-rending and nobody wishes to think of its problems and
their solutions as the very idea of it is so painful. But once senti-
ment is banished and it is decided that there shall be Pakistan,
the problems arising out of it are neither staggering nor baffling.

•Those who want more information on the question of transfer of population
may consult with great advantage The Exchange of Minorities. Bulgaria, Greece
and Turkey by Stephen P. Ladas (Mac), 1932, where the scheme for the transfer of
population between Greece and Bulgaria and Greece and Turkey has been fully set
out.

382

CHAPTER XV

WHO CAN DECIDE?

There are two sides to the question of Pakistan, the Hindu
side and the Muslim side. This cannot be avoided. Unfortunately
however the attitude of both is far from rational. Both are deeply
embedded in sentiment. The layers of this sentiment are so
thick that reason at present finds it extremely difficult to pene*
trate. Whether these opposing sentiments will wither away
or they will thicken, time and circumstances alone can tell.
How long Indians will have to wait for the melting of the snow
no one can prophesy. But one thing is certain that until this
snow melts freedom will have to be put in cold storage. I am
sure there must be many millions of thinking Indians who are
dead opposed to this indefinite postponement of Indian freedom
till an ideal and a permanent solution of Pakistan is found. I
am one of them. I am one of those who hold that if Pakistan
is a problem and not a pose there is no escape and a solution
must be found for it. I am one of those who believe that what
is inevitable must be faced. There is no use burying one's head
in the sand and refusing to take notice of what is happening
round about because the sound of it hurts one's sentiments. I
am also one of those who believe that one must, if one can,
be ready with a solution long before the hour of decision arrives.
It is wise to build a bridge if one knows that one will be
forced to cross the river.

The principal problem of Pakistan is : who can decide
whether there shall or shall not be Pakistan? I have thought
over the subject for the last three years, and I have come to
some conclusions as to the proper answer to this question.
These conclusions I would like to share with others interested
in the solution of the problem so that they may be further
explored. To give clarity to my conclusions, I have thought
that it would serve the purpose better if I were to put them in

393

Pakistan

the form of an Act of Parliament. The following is the draft
of the Act which embodies my conclusions : —

Government of India ( Preliminary Provisions ) Act

Be it enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, by
and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and
Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assem-
bled, and by the authority of the same as follows: —

7. — (i) // within six months from the date appointed in
this behalf a majority of the Muslim members
of the Legislatures of the Provinces of the North-
% West Frontier, the Punjab, Sind and Bengal

pass a resolution that the predominantly Mus-
lim areas be separated from British India, His
Majesty shall cause a poll to be taken on that
question of the Muslim and the non-Muslim
electors of these Provinces and of Baluchistan
in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

(2) The question shall be submitted to the electors
in these Provinces in the following form : —

(i) Are you in favour of separation from

British India /
(ii) Are you against separation ?

(3) The poll of Muslim and non-Muslim electors
shall be taken separately.

II. — (i) If on a result of the poll, a majority of Muslim
electors are found to be in favour of separation
and a majority of non-Muslim electors against
separation, His Majesty shall by proclamation
appoint a Boundary Commission for the
purpose of preparing a list of such districts
and areas in these Provinces in which a
majority of inhabitants are Muslims. Such
districts and areas shall be called Scheduled
Districts.

(2) The Scheduled Districts shall be collectively
designated as Pakistan and the rest of British
India as Hindustan. The Scheduled Districts

394

Who Can Decide?

lying in the North-west shall be called the State
of Western Pakistan and those lying in the North-
east shall be called Eastern Pakistan.

III. — (i) After the findings of the Boundary Commission
have become final either by agreement or the
award of an Arbitrator, His Majesty shall cause
another poll to be taken of the electors of the
Scheduled Districts.

(2) The following shall be the form of the questions
submitted to the electors : —

( i ) Are you in favour of separation forthwith ?
(ii) A re you against separation forthwith ?

IV. — (j) // the majority is in favour of separation forthwith
it shall be lawful for His Majesty to make arrange-
ments for the framing of two separate constitutions,
one for Pakistan and the other for Hindustan.

(2) The New States of Pakistan and Hindustan shall
commence to function as separate States on the
day appointed by His Majesty by proclamation
issued in that behalf.

(3) If the majority are against separation forthwith
it shall be lawful for His Majesty to make
arrangements for the framing of a single constitu-
tion for British India as a whole.

V. — No motion for the separation of Pakistan if the poll
under the last preceding section has been against
separation forthwith and no motion for incorporation
of Pakistan into Hindustan if the poll under the
last preceding section has been in favour of separation
forthwith shall be entertained until ten years have
elapsed from the date appointed by His Majesty
for putting into effect the new constitution for
British India or the two separate constitutions for
Pakistan and Hindustan.

VI. — (i) In the event of two separate constitutions com-
ing into existence under Section Four it shall
be lawful for His Majesty to establish as soon

385

Pakistan

as may be after the appointed day , a Council of
India with a view to the eventual establishment
of a constitution for the whole of British India,
and to bringing about harmonious action between
the Legislatures and Governments of Pakistan and
Hindustan, and to the promotion of mutual
intercourse and uniformity in relation to matters
affecting the whole of British India, and to
providing for the administration of services which
the two parliaments mutually agree should be
administered uniformly throughout the whole of
British India, or which by virtue of this Act are
to be so administered.

(2) Subject as hereinafter provided, the Council of
India shall consist of a President nominated in
accordance with instructions from His Majesty
and forty other persons, of whom twenty shall be
members representing Pakistan and twenty shall
be members representing Hindustan.

(3) The members of the Council of India shall be
elected in each case by the members of the
Lower Houses of the Parliament of Pakistan
or Hindustan.

(4) The election of members of the Council of India
shall be the first business of the Legislatures oj
Pakistan and Hindustan.

(5) A member of the Council shall, on ceasing to be
a member of that House of the Legislature of
Pakistan or Hindustan by which he was elected
a member of the Council, cease to be a member of
the Council: Provided that, on the dissolution
of the Legislature of Pakistan or Hindustan, the
persons who are members of the Council shall
continue to hold office as members of the Council
until a new election has taken place and shall
then retire unless re-elected.

(6) The President of the Council shall preside at
each meeting of the Council at which he is

386

Who Can Decide?

present and shall be entitled to vote in case of an
equality of votes, but not otherwise.

(7) The first meeting of the Council shall be held at
such time and place as may be appointed by the
President.

(8) The Council may act notwithstanding a deficiency
in their number, and the quorum of the Council
shall be fifteen.

(9) Subject as aforesaid^ the Council may regulate
their own procedure, including the delegation of
powers to committees.

(id) The constitution of the Council of India may from
time to time be varied by identical Acts passed by
the Legislature of Pakistan and the Legislature of
Hindustan , and the Acts may provide for all or
any of the members of the Council of India being
elected by parliamentary electors, and determine
the constituencies by which the several elective
members are to be returned and the number of the
members to be returned by the several constituencies
and the method of election.

VII. — (i) The Legislatures of Pakistan and Hindustan
may, by identical Acts, delegate to the Council
of India any of the powers of the Legislatures
and Governments of Pakistan and Hindustan,
and such Acts may determine the manner in
which the powers so delegated are to be exercis-
able by the Council.

(2) The powers of making laws with respect to
railways and waterways shall, as from the day
appointed for the operation of the new constitution,
become the powers of the Council of India and
not of Pakistan or Hindustan: Provided that
nothing in this sub-section shall prevent the
Legislature of Pakistan or Hindustan making
laws authorising the construction, extension, or
improvement of railways and waterways where

387

Pakistan

the works to be constructed are situate wholly in
Pakistan or Hindustan as the case may be.

* (3) The Council may consider any questions which

may appear in any way to bear on the welfare
of both Pakistan and Hindustan, and may, by
resolution, make suggestions in relation thereto as
they may think proper, but suggestions so made
shall have no legislative effect.

(4) It shall be lawful for the Council of India to
make recommendations to the Legislatures of
Pakistan and Hindustan as to the advisability
of passing identical Acts delegating to the
Council of India the administration of any
all-India subjects,* with a view to avoiding the
necessity of administering them separately in

"— Pakistan or Hindustan.

(5) It shall be lawful for either Legislature at any
time by Act to deprive the delegation to the
Council of India of any powers which are in
pursuance of such identical Acts as aforesaid
for the time being delegated to the Council and
thereupon the powers in question shall cease to
be exercisable by the Council of India and shall
become exercisable in parts of British India
within their respective jurisdictions by the
Legislatures and Governments of Pakistan and
Hindustan and the Council shall take such steps
as may be necessary to carry out the transfer,
including adjustments of any funds in their hands
or at their disposal.

VIII. — (i) // at the end of ten years after coming into
operation of a constitution for British India as
prescribed by Section IV — (j) a petition is
presented to His Majesty by a majority of the
Muslim members representing the Scheduled
Districts in the Provincial and Central Legis-
latures demanding a poll to be taken with
regard to the separation of Pakistan froty

38*

Who Can Decide?

Hindustan, His Majesty shall cause a poll to be
taken.

(2) The following shall be the form of the questions
submitted to the electors : —

(t ) Are you in favour of separation of Pakistan
from Hindustan?

(ii) Are you against the separation of Pakistan
from Hindustan?

IX. — If the result of the poll is in favour of separa-
tion it shall be lawful for His Majesty to
declare by an Order-in-Council that from a day
appointed in that behalf Pakistan shall cease
to be a part of British India, and dissolve the
Council of India.

X. — (i) Where two constitutions have come into existence
under circumstances mentioned in Section IV
it shall be lawful for His Majesty Jo declare by an
Order-in-Council that Pakistan shall cease to be a
separate State and shall form part of Hindustan.

Provided that no such order shall be made until
ten years have elapsed from the commencement of
the separate constitution for Pakistan.

Provided also that no suck declaration shall be
made unless the Popular Legislatures of Pakistan
and Hindustan have passed Constituent Acts as
are provided for in Section X — (2).

(2) The popular Legislatures of Pakistan and
Hindustan may, by identical Acts agreed to by
an absolute majority of members at the third
reading (hereinafter referred to as Constituent
Acts), establish, in lieu of the Council of India,
a Legislature for United India, and may
determine the number of members thereof and
the manner in which the members are to be
appointed or elected and the constituencies for
which the several elective members are to be
returned, and the number of members to be

389

Pakistan

returned by the several constituencies, and the

method of appointment or election, and the

relations of the two Houses if provided for to
one another.

XL— (i) On the date of the union of Pakistan and
Hindustan the Council of India shall cease to
exist and there shall be transferred to the Legis-
lature and Government of India all powers then
exercisable by the Council of India.

(2) There shall also be transferred to the Legislature
and Government of British India all the powers
and duties of the Legislatures and Governments of
Pakistan and Hindustan, including all powers as
to taxation, and those Legislatures and Govern-
ments shall cease to exist.

XII. — (x) A poll under this Act shall be taken by ballot
in the same manner so far as possible as a poll
of electors for the election of a member to serve
in a 'Legislature, and His Majesty may make
rules adopting the election laws for the purpose
of the taking of the poll.

(2) An elector shall not vote more than once at the
poll, although registered in more than one
place.

(3) Elector means every adult male and female
residing in the Provinces of North-West Fron-
tier, the Punjab, Sind, and Bengal and in
Baluchistan.

XIIL — This Act may be called the Indian Constitution
(Preliminary Provisions] Act,

I do not think that any detailed explanation is necessary for
the reader to follow and grasp the conclusions I have endeavour-
ed to embody in this skeleton Act. Perhaps it might be
advantageous if I bring out some of the salient features of the
proposals to which the projected statute of Parliament is intend-
ed to give effect by comparing them with the Cripps proposals.

390

Who Can Decide?

In my opinion it is no use for Indians to ask and the British
Parliament to agree to proceed forthwith to pass an Act confer-
ring Dominion Status or Independence without first disposing
of the issue of Pakistan. The Pakistan issue must be treated as
a preliminary issue and must be disposed of one way or the
other. This is why I have called the proposed Act "The
Government of India (Preliminary Provisions) Act." The issue
of Pakistan being one of self-determination must be decided by
the wishes of the people. It is for this that I propose to take a
poll of the Muslims and non-Muslims in the predominantly
Muslim Provinces. If the majority of the Muslims are in favour
of separation and a majority of non-Muslims are against separa-
tion, steps must be taken to delimit the areas wherever it is pos-
sible by redrawing provincial boundaries on ethnic and cultural
lines by separating the Muslim majority districts from the
districts in which the majority consists of non-Muslims. A
Boundary Commission is necessary for this purpose. So a
Boundary Commission is provided for in the Act. It would be
better if the Boundary Commission could be international in its
composition.

The scheme of separate referenda of Muslims and non-
Muslims is based on two principles which I regard as funda-
mental. The first is that a minority can demand safeguards
for its protection against the tyranny of the majority. It can
demand them as a condition precedent. But a minority has no
right to put a veto on the right of the majority to decide on
questions of ultimate destiny. This is the reason why I have
confined the referendum on the establishment of Pakistan to
Muslims only. The second is that a communal majority cannot
claim a communal minority to submit itself to its dictates. Only
a political majority may be permitted to rule a political minority.
This principle has been modified in India where a communal
minority is placed under a communal majority subject to certain
safeguards. But this is as regards the ordinary question of social,
economic and political importance. It has never been conceded
and can never be conceded that a communal majority has a
right to dictate to a communal minority on an issue which is of a
constitutional character. That is the reason why I have provided

391

Pakistan

a separate referendum of non-Muslims only, to decide whether
they prefer to go in Pakistan or come into Hindustan.

After the Boundary Commission has done its work of de-
Hmitingthe areas, various possibilities can arise.-The Musalmans
may stop with the delimitation of the boundaries of Pakistan.
They may be satisfied that after all the principle of Pakistan has
been accepted — which is what delimitation means. Assuming
that the Musalmans are not satisfied with mere delimitation but
want to move in the direction of establishing Pakistan there are
two courses open to them. They may want to establish Paki-
stan forthwith or they may agree to live under a common
Central Government for a period of say ten years and put the
Hindus on their trial. Hindus will have an opportunity to
show that the minorities can trust them. The Muslims will
learn from experience how far their fears of Hindu Raj are
justified. There is another possibility also. The Musalmans of
Pakistan having decided to separate forthwith may after a
period become so disgusted with Pakistan that they might desire
to come back and be incorporated in Hindustan and be one
people subject to one single constitution.

These are some of the possibilities I see. These possibilities
should in my judgment be kept open for time and circumstances
to have their effect. It seems to me to be wrong to say to the
Musalmans if you want to remain as part of India then you
can never go out or if you want to go then you can never come
back. I have in my scheme kept the door open and have pro-
vided for both the possibilities in the Act (1) for union after a
separation of ten years, (2) for separation for ten years and union
thereafter. I personally prefer the second alternative although I
have no strong views either way. It would be much better that the
Musalmans should have the experience of Pakistan. A union
after an experience of Pakistan is bound to be stable and lasting.
In case Pakistan comes into existence forthwith, it seems to me
necessary that the separation should not altogether be a sever-
ance, sharp and complete. It is necessary to maintain live
contact between Pakistan and Hindustan so as to prevent any

392

Who Can Decide?

estrangement growing up and preventing the chances of re-
union. A Council of India is accordingly provided for in the
Act. It cannot be mistaken for a federation. It is not even a
confederation. Its purpose is to do nothing more than to serve
as a coupling to link Pakistan to Hindustan until they are
united under a single constitution.

Such is my scheme. It is based on a community-wise
plebiscite. The scheme is flexible. It takes account of the fact
that the Hindu sentiment is against it. It also recognizes the
fact that the Muslim demand for Pakistan may only be a passing
mood. The scheme is not a divorce. It is only a judicial
separation. It gives to the Hindus a term. They can use it to
show that they can be trusted with authority to rule justly. It
gives the Musalmans a term to try out Pakistan.

It might be desirable to compare my proposals with those
of Sir Stafford Cripps. The proposals were given out as a serial
story in parts. The draft Declaration issued on 29th March 1943
contained only the following: —

41 His Majesty's Government therefore make the following
terms :-=-

(a) Immediately upon cessation of hostilities steps shall be
taken to set up in India in manner described hereafter an
elected body charged with the task of framing a new con-
stitution for India.

(b) Provision shall be made, as set out below, for participation
of Indian States in the constitution-making body.

(i) The right of any province of British India that is not
prepared to accept the new constitution to retain its
present constitutional position, provision being made
for its subsequent accession if it so decides.

With such non-acceding provinces should they so desire, His
Majesty's Government will be prepared to agree upon a new
constitution giving them the same full status as the Indian
Union and arrived at by a procedure analogous to that here
laid down."

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Pakistan

Particulars of accession and secession were given in his
broadcast. They were in the following terms : —

"That constitution-making body will have as its object the
framing of a single constitution for the whole of India — that
is, of British India, together with such of the Indian States as
may decide to join in.

41 But we realize this very simple fact. If you want to per-
suade a number of people who are inclined to be antagonistic to
enter the same room, it is unwise to tell them that once they go
in there is no way out, they are to be forever locked in together.

" It is much wiser to tell them they can go in and if they
find they can't come to a common decision, then there is nothing
to prevent those who wish, from leaving again by another door.
They are much more likely all to go in if they have knowledge
that they can by their free will go out again if they cannot agree.

"Well, that is what we say to the provinces of India. Come
together to frame a common constitution — if you find after all
your discussion and all the give and take of a constitution-
making assembly that you cannot overcome your differences and
that some provinces are still not satisfied with the constitution,
then such provinces can go out and remain out if they wish and
just the same degree of self-government and freedom will be
available for them as for the Union itself, that is to say complete
self-government. "

To complete the picture further details were added at the
Press Conference. Explaining the plan for accession or secession
of provinces Sir Stafford Cripps said : —

"If at the end of the Constituent Assembly proceedings,
any province or provinces did not wish to accept the new con-
stitution and join the Union, it was free to keep out — provided
the Provincial Assembly of that province, by a substantial vote
say not less than 60 per cent., decided against accession. If it
was less than 60 per cent., the minority could claim a plebiscite
of the whole province for ascertaining the will of the people.
In the case of the plebiscite, a bare majority would be enough.
Sir Stafford explained that for completing accession there would
have to be a positive vote from the Provincial Assembly con-
cerned. The non-acceding province could, if they wanted, com-
bine into a separate union through a separate Constituent
Assembly, but in order to make such a Union practicable they
should be geographically contiguous.11

The main difference between my plan and that of Sir
Stafford Cripps is quite obvious. For deciding the issue of
accession or secession which is only another way pf saying, will

394

Who Can Decide?

there be or will there not be Pakistan, Sir Stafford Cripps took
the Province as a deciding unit. I have taken community as the
deciding unit. I have no doubt that Sir Stafford adopted a
wrong basis. The Province can be a proper unit if the points
of dispute were inter-provincial. For instance, if the points of
dispute related to questions such as distribution of taxation, of
water, etc., one could understand the Province as a whole or a
particular majority in that Province having the right to decide.
But the dispute regarding Pakistan is an inter-communal problem
which has involved two communities in the same Province.
Further the issue in the dispute is not on what terms the two com-
munities will agree to associate in a common political life. The
dispute goes deeper and raises the question whether the com-
munities are prepared at all to associate in a common political
life. It is a communal difference in its essence and can only be
decided by a community-wise plebiscite.

I do not claim any originality for the solution I have propos-
ed. The ideas which underlie it are drawn from three sources,
from the Irish Unity Conference at which Horace Plunket
presided, from the Home Rule Amending Bill of Mr. Asquith
and from the Government of Ireland Act of 1920. It will be
seen that my solution of the Pakistan problem is the result of
pooled wisdom. Will it be accepted? There are four ways of
resolving the conflict which is raging round the question of
Pakistan. First is that the British Government should act
as the deciding authority. Second is that the Hindus and
the Muslims should agree. Third is to submit the issue to an
International Board of Arbitration and the fourth is to fight
it out by a Civil War.

Although India today is a political mad-house there are I
hope enough sane people in the country who would not allow
matters to reach the stage of Civil War. There is no prospect
of an agreement between political leaders in the near future.
The A.I.C.C. of the Indian National Congress at a meeting in
Allahabad held in April 1942 on the motion of Mr. Jagat

395

Pakistan

Narayan Lai resolved* not to entertain the proposal for Pakistan.
Two other ways are left to have the problem solved. One is by
the people concerned ; the other is by international arbitration.
This is the way I have suggested. I prefer the former. For various
reasons this seems to me the only right course. The leaders
having failed to resolve the dispute it is time it was taken to the
people for decision. Indeed, it is inconceivable • how an issue
like that of partition of territory and transference of peoples'
allegiance from one government to another can be decided by
political leaders. Such things are no doubt done by conquerors
to whom victory in war is sufficient authority to do what they
like with the Conquered people. But we are not working under
such a lawless condition. In normal times when constitutional
procedure is not in abeyance the views of political leaders can-
not have the effect which theyfo/.r of dictators have. That would
be contrary to the rule of democracy. The highest value that
can be put upon the views of leaders is to regard them as worthy
to be placed on the agenda. They canuot replace or obviate the
necessity of having the matter decided by the people. This is
the position which was taken by Sir Stafford Cripps. The stand
taken by the Muslim League was, let there be Pakistan because
the Muslim League has decided to have it. That position has
been negatived by the Cripps proposals and quite rightly. The
Muslim League is recognized by the Cripps proposals only to
the extent of having a right to propose that Pakistan as a propo-
sition be considered. It has not been given the right to decide.
Again it does not seem to have been realized that the decision
of an All-India body like the Congress which does not carry
with it the active consent of the majority of the people, immedi-
ately affected by the issue of Pakistan, cannot carry the matter
to solution. What good can it do if Mr. Gandhi or Mr. Raja-
gopalachariar agreeing or the All-India Congress Committee
resolving to concede Pakistan, if it was opposed by the Hindus

* The text of the resolution is as follows : —

"The A.I.C.C. is of opinion that any proposal to disintegrate India by giving
liberty to any component State or territorial unit to secede from the Indian Union
or Federation will be highly detrimental to the best interests of the people of the
States and Provinces and the country as a whole and the Congress, therefore, cannot
agree to any such proposal/1

396

Who Can Decide?

of the Punjab, or Bengal. Really speaking it is not the business
of the people of Bombay or Madras to say, 'let there be Paki-
stan \ It must be left to be decided by the people who are
living in those areas and who will have to bear the consequences
of so violent, so revolutionary and so fundamental a change in
Ae political and. economic system with which their lives and
fortunes have been closely bound up for so many years. A refer-
endum by people in the Pakistan Provinces seems to me the
safest and the most constitutional method of solving the problem
of Pakistan.

But I fear that solving the question of Pakistan by a refer-
endum of the people howsoever attractive may not find much
favour with those who count. Even the Muslim League may
not be very enthusiastic about it. This is not because the pro-
posal is unsound. Quite the contrary. The fact is that there is
another solution which has its own attractions. It calls upon
the British Government to establish Pakistan by the exercise of
its sovereign authority. The reason why this solution may be
preferred to that which rests on the consent of the people is that
it is simple and involves no such elaborate procedure as that of
a referendum to the people and has none of the uncertainties
involved in a referendum. But there is another ground why it
is preferred, namely, that there is a precedent for it. The prece-
dent is the Irish precedent and the argument is that if the
British Government by virtue of its sovereign authority divided
Ireland and created Ulster why cannot the British Government
divide India and create Pakistan ?

The British Parliament is the most sovereign legislative body
in the world. De L'home, a French writer on English Consti-
tution, observed that there is nothing the British Parliament
cannot do except make man a woman and woman a man. And
although the sovereignty of the British Parliament over the
affairs of the Dominions is limited by the Statute of Westminster
it is still unlimited so faras India is concerned. TL A is nothing
in law to prevent the British Parliament from proceeding to
divide India as it did in the case of Ireland. It can do it, but
will it do it? The question is not one of power but of will.

Those who urge the British Government to follow the

397

Pakistan

precedent in Ireland should ask what led the British Government
to partition Ireland. Was it the conscience of the British
Government which led them to sanction the course they took
or was it forced upon them by circumstances to which they had
to yield? A student of the history of Irish Home Rule will
have to admit that the partition of Ireland was not sanctioned
by conscience but by the force of circumstances. It is not often
clearly realized that no party to the Irish dispute wanted partition
of Ireland. Not even Carson, the Leader of Ulster. Carson was
opposed to Home Rule but he was not in favour of partition.
His primary position was to oppose Home Rule and maintain the
integrity of Ireland. It was only as a second line of defence
against the imposition of Home Rule that he insisted on parti-
tion. This will be quite clear from his speeches both inside and
outside the House of Commons. Asquith's Government on the
other side was equally opposed to partition. This may be seen
from the proceedings in the House of Commons over the Irish
Home Rule Bill of 1912. Twice amendments were moved for
the exclusion of Ulster from the provisions of the Bill, once in
the Committee stage by Mr. Agar- Roberts and again on the third
reading by Carson himself. Both the times the Government
opposed and the amendments were lost.

Permanent partition of Ireland was effected in 1920 by Mr.
Lloyd George in his Government of Ireland Act. Many people
think that this was the first time that partition of Ireland was
thought of and that it was due to the dictation of the Conserva-
tive— Unionists in the Coalition Government of which Mr. Lloyd
George was the nominal head. It may be true that Mr. Lloyd
George succumbed to the influence of the predominant party
in his coalition. But it is not true that partition was thought
of in 1920 for the first time. Nor is it true that the Liberal Party
had not undergone a change and shown its readiness to favour
partition as a possible solution. As a matter of fact partition as
a solution came in 1914 six years before Mr. Lloyd George's Act
when the Asquith Government, a purely Liberal Govern-
ment, was in office. The real cause which led to the parti-
tion of Ireland can be understood only by examining the factors
which made the Liberal Government of Mr. Asquith change its
mind.* I feel certain that the factor which brought about this change

398

Who Can Decide?

in the viewpoint of the Liberal Government was the Military
crisis which took place in March 1914 and which is generally
referred to as the "Curragh Incident". A few facts will be
sufficient to explain what the " Curragh Incident" was and how
decisive it was in bringing about a change in the policy of the
Asquith Government.

To begin at a convenient point the Irish Home Rule Bill had
gone through all its stages by the end of 1913. Mr. Asquith
who had been challenged that he was proceeding without a man-
date from the electorate had however given an undertaking that
the Act would not be given effect to until another general election
had been held. In the ordinary course there would have been a
general election in 1915 if the War had not supervened. But
the Ulstermen were not prepared to take their chance in a
general election and started taking active steps to oppose Home
Rule. They were not always very scrupulous in choosing their
means and their methods and under the seductive pose that they
were fighting against the Government which was preventing
them from remaining loyal subjects of the King they resorted to
means which nobody would hesitate to call shameless and nefari-
ous. There was one Maginot Line on which the Ulstermen
always depended for defeating Home Rule. That was the
House of Lords. But by the Parliament Act of 1911 the House
of Lords had become a Wailing Wall neither strong nor high.
It had ceased to be a line of defence to rely upon. Knowing
that the Bill might pass notwithstanding its rejection by the House
of Lords, feeling that in the next election Asquith might
win, the Ulstermen had become desperate and were searching
for another line of defence. They found it in the Army. The
plan was twofold. It included the project of getting the House
of Lords to hold up the Annual Army Act so as to ensure that
there would be no Army in existence to be used against Ulster.
The second project was to spread their propaganda — That
Home Rule will be Home Rule — in the Array with a view to
preparing the Army to disobey the Government in case Govern-
ment decided to use the Army for forcing Home Rule on
Ireland. The first became unnecessary as they succeeded easily
in bringing about the second. This became clear in March 1914
when there occurred the Curragh Incident. The Government

399

Pakistan

had reasons to suspect that certain Army depots in Ireland were
likely to be raided by the Unionist Volunteers. On March 20th,
orders were sent to Sir Arthur Paget, Commander-in-Chief of the
Forces in Ireland, to take steps to safeguard these depots. His
reply was a telegram to the effect that officers were not prepared
to obey and were resigning their commissions and it was feared
that men would refuse to move. General Sir Hubert Gough
had refused to serve against the Ulster Unionists and his example
had been followed by others. The Government realized that
the Army had become political,* nay, partisan. It took fright
and decided in favour of partition acting on the wellk-nown
maxim that wisdom is the better part of valour. What made
Asquith change his position was not conscience but the fright
of the Army rebelling. The fright was so great that no one there-
after felt bold enough to challenge the Army and enforce Home
* Rule without partition.

Can His Majesty's Government be depended upon to repeat
in India what it did in Ireland? I am unable to answer the
question. But two things I will say. The first thing is that
His Majesty's Government knows full well what have been the
consequences of this partition of Ireland. The Irish Free State
has become the most irreconcilable enemy of Great Britain. The
enmity knows no limits. The wound caused by partition will
never be healed so long as partition remains a settled fact. The
Partition of Ireland cannot but be said to be morally inde-
fensible inasmuch as it was the result not of the consent of the
people but of superior force. It was as bad as the murder of
Duncan by Macbeth. The blood stains left on His Majesty's
Government are as deep as those on Lady Macbeth and of which
Lady Macbeth said that " All the perfumes of Arabia" had
failed to remove the stink. That His Majesty's Government
does not like to be responsible for the execution of another deed

• On this point see Life of Field- Marshal Sir Henry Wilson by Major General
Sir C. E. Callweil, Vol. I, Chapter IX; also Parliamentary Debates (House of Lords),
1914, Vol. 15, pp. 998-1017, on Ulster and the Army. This shows that the Army
had been won over by the Ulsterites long before the Curragh Incident. It is possible
that Mr. Asquith decided in 1913 to bring in an Amending Bill to exclude Ulster from
Home Rule for six years because he had become aware that the Army had gone over
to Ulster and that it could npt be used for enforcing Home Rule.

400

Who Can Decide?

of partition is quite clear from its policy with the Jew-Arab
problem in Palestine. It appointed the Peel Commission to
investigate. The Commission recommended partition of Pales-
tine. The Government accepted it in principle as the most hope-
ful line of solving the deadlock. Suddenly the Government
realized the gravity of forcing such a solution on the Arabs and
appointed another Royal Commission called the Woodhead
Commission which condemned partition and opened an easy
way to a Government which was anxious to extricate itself from
a terrible position. The partition of Ireland is not a precedent
worthy to "be followed. It is an ugly incident which requires to
be avoided. It is a warning and not an example. I doubt very
much if His Majesty's Government will partition India on its
owu authority at the behest of the Muslim League.

And why should His Majesty's Government oblige the
Muslim League? In the case of Ulster there was the tie of blood
which made a powerful section of the British politicians take the
side of Ulster. It was this tie of blood which made Lord Curzon
say " You are compelling Ulster to divorce her present husband,
to whom she is not unfaithful and you are compelling her to
marry someone else who she cordially dislikes, with whom she
does not want to live." There is no such kinship between His
Majesty's Government and the Muslim League and it would
be a vain hope for the League to expect His Majesty's Govern-
ment to take her side.

The other thing I would like to say is that it would not be
in the interests of the Muslim League to achieve its object by
invoking the authority of His Majesty's Government to bring
about the partition of India. In my judgment more important
than getting Pakistan is the procedure to be adopted in bringing
about Pakistan if the object is that after partition Pakistan and
Hindustan should continue as two friendly States with goodwill
and no malice towards each other.

What is the procedure which is best suited for the realiza-
tion of this end? % Everyone will agree that the procedure must
be such that it must not involve victory to one community and

•Sec Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 1938-39, Vol. 341, pp. 1987-2107; also
Lords) 1936-37, Vol. 106, pp. 599-674.

«e 401

Pakistan

humiliation to the other. The method must be of peace with
honour to both sides. I do not know if there is another solution
better calculated to achieve this end than the decision by a refer-
endum of the people. I have made my suggestion as to which
is the best course. Others also will come forth with theirs. I
cannot say that mine is the best. But whatever the suggestion be
unless good sense as well as a sense of responsibility is brought
to bear upon the solution of this question it will remain a fester-
ing sore.

402

EPILOGUE

Here I propose to stop. For I feel that I have said all that
I can say about the subject. To use legal language I have
drawn the pleadings. This I may claim to have done at sufficient
length. In doing so, I have adopted that prolix style so dear
to the Victorian lawyers, under which the two sides plied one
another with plea and replication, rejoinder and rebutter, sur-
rejoinder and surrebutter and so on. I have done this deliber-
ately with the object that a full statement of the case for and
against Pakistan may be made. The foregoing pages contain
the pleadings. The facts contained therein are true to the best
of my knowledge and belief. I have also given my findings.
It is now for Hindus and Muslims to give theirs.

To help them in their task it might be well to set out the
issues. On the pleadings the following issues seem to be necessary
issues :

(1) Is Hindu-Muslim unity necessary for India's political
advancement? If necessary, is it still possible of realization not-
withstanding the new ideology of the Hindus and the Muslims
being two different nations ?

(2) If Hindu-Muslim unity is possible, should it be reached
by appeasement or by settlement ?

(3) If it is to be achieved by appeasement, what are the
new concessions that can be offered to the Muslims to obtain
their willing co-operation, without prejudice to other interests?

(4) If it is to be achieved by a settlement, what are the
terms of that settlement? If there are only two alternatives,
(i) Division of India into Pakistan and Hindustan, or (ii) Fifty-
fifty share in Legislature, Executive and the Services, which
alternative is preferable ?

(5) Whether India, if she remained one Integral whole,
can rely upon both Hindus and Musalmans to defend her inde-
pendence, assuming it is won from the British?

(6) Having regard to the prevailing antagonism between
Hindus and Musalmans and having regard to the new -ideology
demarcating them as two distinct nations and postulating an

403

Pakistan

opposition in their ultimate destinies* whether a single consti-
tution for these two nations can be built in the hope that
they will show an intention to work it and not to stop it?

(7) On the assumption that the two-nation theory has come
to stay, will not India as one single unit become an incoherent
body without organic unity, incapable of developing into a strong
united nation bound by a common faith in a common destiny
and therefore likely to remain a feeble and sickly country, easy
to be kept in perpetual subjection either of the British or of
any other foreign power ?

(8) If India cannot be one united country, is it not better
that Indians should help India in the peaceful dissolution of
this incoherent whole into its natural parts, namely, Pakistan and
Hindustan ?

(9) Whether it is not better to provide for the growth of
two independent and separate nations, a Muslim nation inhabit-
ing Pakistan and a Hindu nation inhabiting Hindustan, than
pursue the vain attempt to keep India as one undivided country
in the false hope that Hindus and Muslims will some day be
one and occupy it as the members of one nation and sons of one
motherland ?

Nothing can come in the way of an Indian getting to grips
with these issues and reaching his own conclusions with the help
of the material contained in the foregoing pages except three
things: (1) A false sentiment of historical patriotism, (2) a false
conception of the exclnsive ownership of territory and (3) absence
of willingness to think for oneself. Of these ^obstacles, the last is
the most difficult to get over. Unfortunately thought in India
is rare and free thought is rarer still. This is particularly
true of Hindus. That is why a large part of the argument of this
book has been addressed to them. The reasons for this are obvi-
ous. The Hindus are in a majority. Being in a majority, their
viewpoint must count. There is not much possibility of peaceful
solution if no attempt is made to meet their objections rational or
sentimental. But there are special reasons which have led me to
address so large a part of the argument to them and which may
not be quite so obvious to others. I feel that those Hindus who are
guiding the destinies of their fellows have lost what Carlyle calls
the Seeing Eye " and are walking in the glamour of certain vain
illusions, the consequences of which must, I fear, be terrible for
the Hindus. The Hindus are in the grip of the Congress and
the Congress is in the grip of Mr. Gandhi. It cannot be said

404

Epilogue

that Mr. Gandhi has given the Congress the right lead. Mr.
Gandhi first sought to avoid facing the issue by taking refuge
in two things. He started by saying that to partition India is a
moral wrong and a sin to which he will never be a party. This
is a strange argument. India is not the only country faced with
the issue of partition or shifting of frontiers based on natural and
historical factors to those based on national factors. Poland has
been partitioned three times and no one can be sure that there
will be no more partition of Poland. There are very few
countries in Europe which have not undergone partition during
the last 150 years. This shows that the partition of a country is
neither moral nor immoral. It is unmoral. It is a social, poli-
tical or military question. Sin has no place in it.

As a second refuge Mr. Gandhi started by protesting that
the Muslim League did not represent the Muslims and that Paki-
stan was only a fancy of Mr. Jinnah. It is difficult to understand
how Mr. Gandhi could be so blind as not to see how Mr. Jinnah's
influence over the Muslim masses has been growing day by day
and how he has engaged himself in mobilizing all his forces for
battle. Never before was Mr. Jinnah a man for the masses. He
distrusted them.* To exclude them from political power he was
always for a high franchise. Mr. Jinnah was never known to be a
very devout, pious or a professing Muslim. Besides kissing the
Holy Koran as and when he was sworn in as an M.L.A., he does
not appear to have bothered much about its contents or its special
tenets. It is doubtful if he frequented any mosque either out of
curiosity or religious fervour. Mr. Jinnah was never found in the
midst of Muslim mass congregations, religious or political. Today
one finds a complete change in Mr. Jinnah. He has become a
man of the masses. He is no longer above them. He is among
them. Now they have raised him above themselves and call
him their Qaid-e-Azam. He has not only become a believer in
Islam, but is prepared to die for Islam. Today, he knows more
of Islam than mere Kalama. Today, he goes to the mosque
to hear Khutba and takes delight in joining the Id congrega-
tional prayers. Dongri and Null Bazaar once knew Mr. Jinnah
by name. Today they know him by his presence. No Muslim

* Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in his autobiography says that Mr. Jinnah wanted
the Congress to restrict its membership to matriculates.

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Pakistan

meeting in Bombay begins or ends without Allah-ho-Akbar and
Long Live Qaid-e-Azam. In this Mr. Jinnah has merely followed
King Henry IV of France — the unhappy father-in-law of the
English King Charles I. Henry IV was a Huguenot by faith. But
he did not hesitate to attend mass in a Catholic Church in Paris.
He believed that to change his Huguenot faith and go to mass
was an easy price to pay for the powerful support of Paris. As
Paris became worth a mass to Henry IV, so have Dongri and
Null Bazaar become worth a mass to Mr. Jinnah and for similar
reason. It is strategy; it is mobilization. But even if it is
viewed as the sinking of Mr. Jinnah from reason to superstition,
he is sinking with his ideology which by his very sinking is
spreading into all the different strata of Muslim society and is
becoming part and parcel of its mental make-up. This is as clear
as anything could be. The only basis for Mr. Gandhi's extraordi-
nary view is the existence of what are called Nationalist Musal-
mans. It is difficult to see any real difference between the com-
munal Muslims who form the Muslim League and the Nationalist
Muslims. It is extremely doubtful whether the Nationalist
Musalmans have any real community of sentiment, aim and policy
with the Congress which marks them off from the Muslim League.
Indeed many Congressmen are alleged to hold the view
that there is no difference between the two and that the Nation-
alist Muslims inside the Congress are only an outpost of the
communal Muslims. This view does not seeni to be quite devoid
of truth when one recalls that the late Dr. Ansari, the leader
of the Nationalist Musalmans, refused to oppose the Communal
Award although it gave the Muslims separate electorates in teeth
of the resolution passed by the Congress and the Nationalist
Musalmans. Nay, so great has been the increase in the
influence of the League among the Musalmans that many Musal-
mans who were opposed to the League have been compelled to
seek for a place in the League or make peace with it. Anyone
who takes account of the turns and twists of the late Sir Sikandar
Hyat Khan and Mr. Fazlul Huq, the late Premier of Bengal,
must admit the truth of this fact. Both Sir Sikandar and Mr.
Fazlul "Huq were opposed to the formation of branches of the
Muslim League in their Provinces when Mr. Jinnah tried to revive
it in 1937. Notwithstanding their opposition, when the branches

406

Epilogue

of the League were formed in the Punjab and in Bengal
within one year both were compelled to join them. It is a case
of those coming to scoff remaining to pray. No more cogent
proof seems to be necessary to prove the victory of the League.

Notwithstanding this Mr. Gandhi instead of negotiat-
ing with Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League with a
view to a settlement, took a different turn. He got the
Congress to pass the famous Quit India Resolution on
the 8th August 1942, This Quit India Resolution was
primarily a challenge to the British Government. But it
was also an attempt to do away with the intervention of
the British Government in the discussion of the Minority ques-
tion and thereby securing for the Congress a free hand to settle
it on its own terms and according to its own lights. It was in
effect, if not in intention, an attempt to win independence by by-
passing the Muslims and the other minorities. The Quit India
Campaign turned out to be a complete failure. It was a mad
venture and took the most diabolical form. It was a scorch-
earth campaign in which the victims of looting, arson and mur-
der were Indians and the perpetrators were Congressmen.
Beaten, he started a fast for twenty-one days in March 1943 while
he was in gaol with the object of getting out of it. He failed.
Thereafter he fell ill. As he was reported to be sinking the British
Government released him for fear that he might die on their
hand and bring them ignominy. On coming out of gaol, he
found that he and the Congress had not only missed the bus
but had also lost the road. To retrieve the position and win for
the Congress the respect of the British Government as a premier
party in the country which it had lost by reason of the failure of
the campaign that followed up the Quit India Resolution, and
the violence which accompanied it, he started negotiating with the
Viceroy. Thwarted in that attempt, Mr. Gandhi turned to Mr.
Jinnah. On the 17th July 1944 Mr. Gandhi wrote to Mr. Jinnah
expressing his desire to meet him and discuss with him the com-
munal question. Mr. Jinnah agreed to receive Mr. Gandhi in
his house in Bombay. They met on the 9th September 1944. It
was good that at long last wisdom dawned on Mr. Gandhi and
he agreed to see the light which was staring him in the face and
which he had so far refused to see.

407

Pakistan

The basis of their talks was the offer made by Mr. Rajagopala-
chariar to Mr. Jinnah in April 1944 which, according to the
somewhat incredible* story told by Mr. Rajagopalachariar, was
discussed by him with Mr. Gandhi in March 1943 when he (Mr.
Gandhi) was fasting in gaol and to which Mr. Gandhi had given
his full approval. The following is the text of Mr. Rajagopala-
chariar's formula popularly spoken of as the C. R. Formula : —

(1) Subject to the terms set out below as regards the
constitution for Free India, the Muslim League
endorses the Indian demand for Independence and
will co-operate with the Congress in the formation
of a provisional interim government for the transi-
tional period.

(2) After the termination of the war, a commission shall
be appointed for demarcating contiguous districts
in the north-west and east of India, wherein the
Muslim population is in absolute majority. In the
areas thus demarcated, a plebiscite of all the inhabit-
ants held on the basis of adult suffrage or other
practicable franchise shall ultimately decide the issue
of separation from Hindustan. If the majority
decide in favour of forming a sovereign State separate
from Hindustan, such decision shall be given effect
to, without prejudice to the right of districts on the
border to choose to join either State.

(3) It will be open to all parties to advocate their points
of view before the plebiscite is held.

(4) In the event of separation, mutual agreements shall
be entered into for safeguarding defence, and com-
merce and communications and for other essential
purposes.

(5) Any transfer of population shall only be on an
absolutely voluntary basis.

(6) These terms shall be binding only in case of transfer
fry Britain of full power and responsibility for the
governance of India.

* The formula was discussed with Mr. Gandhi in March 1943 but was not com-
municated to Mr. Jinnah till April 1944.

408

Epilogue

The talks which began on the 9th September were carried
on over a period of 18 days till 27th September when it was
announced that the talks had failed. The failure of the talks
produced different reactions in the minds of different people.
Some were glad, others were sorry. But as both had been, just
previous to the talks, worsted by their opponents in their struggle
for supremacy, Gandhi by the British and Jinnah by the Unionist
Party in the Punjab, and had lost a good deal of their credit the
majority of people expected that they would put forth some con-
structive effort to bring about a solution. The failure may have
been due to the defects of personalities. But it must
however be said that failure was inevitable having regard
to certain fundamental faults in the C. R. Formula. There
are many faults in the C. R. Formula. In the first place, it tied
up the communal question with the political question in an
indissoluble knot. No political settlement, no communal settle-
ment, is the strategy on which the formula proceeds.
The formula did not offer a solution. It invited Mr. Jinnah
to enter into a deal. It was a bargain — "If you help
us in getting independence, we shall be glad to consider
your proposal for Pakistan." I don't know from where Mr.
Rajagopalachariar got the idea that this was the best means of
getting independence. It is possible that he borrowed it from
the old Hindu kings of India who built up alliances for protect-
ing their independence against foreign enemies by giving their
daughters to neighbouring princes. Mr. Rajagopalachariar forgot
that such alliances brought neither a good husband nor a per-
manent ally. To make communal settlement depend upon help
rendered in winning freedom is a very unwise way of proceed-
ing in a matter of this kind. It is a way of one party drawing
another party into its net by offering communal privileges as a
bait. The C. R. Formula made communal settlement an article
for sale.

The second fault in the C. R. Formula relates to the
machinery for giving effect to any agreement that may be arrived
at. The agency suggested in the C. R. Formula is the Provisional
Government. In suggesting this Mr. Rajagopalachariar obviously
overlooked two difficulties. The first thing he overlooked is
that once the Provisional Government was established, the pro-

409

Pakistan

mises of the contracting parties, to use legal phraseology, did not
remain concurrent promises. The case became one of an executed
promise against an executory promise. By consenting to the
establishment of a Provisional Government, the League would
have executed its promise to help the Congress to win independ-
ence. But the promise of the Congress to bring about Pakistan
would remain executory. Mr. Jinnah who insists, and quite
rightly, that the promises should be concurrent could never be
expected to agree to place himself in such a position. The second
difficulty which Mr. Rajagopalachariar has overlooked is what
would happen if the Provisional Government failed to give effect
to the Congress part of the agreement. Who is to enforce it ? The
Provisional Government is to be a sovereign government, not
subject to any superior authority. If it was unwilling to give
effect to the agreement, the only sanction open to the Muslims
would be rebellion. To make the Provisional Government the
agency for forging a new Constitution, for bringing about Paki-
stan, nobody will accept. It is a snare and not a solution. The
only way of bringing about constitutional changes will be through
an Act of Parliament embodying provisions agreed upon by the
important elements in the national life of British India. There is
no other way.

There is a third fault in the C. R. Formula. It relates to
the provision for a treaty between Pakistan and Hindustan to
safeguard what are called matters of common interests such as
Defence, Foreign Affairs, Customs, etc. Here again Mr. Raja-
gopalachariar does not seem to be aware of obvious difficulties.
How are matters of common interest to be safeguarded? I see
only two ways. One is to have a Central Government vested
with Executive and Legislative authority in respect of these
matters. This means Pakistan and Hindustan will not be
sovereign States. Will Mr. Jinnah agree to this? Obviously he
does not. The other way is to make Pakistan and Hindustan
sovereign States and to bind them by a treaty relating to matters
of common interests. But what is there to ensure that the terms
of the treaty will be observed ? As a sovereign State Pakistan can
always repudiate it even if it was a Dominion. Mr. Rajagopala-
chariar obviously drew his inspiration in drafting this clause
from the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1922. But he forgot the fact that

410

Epilogue

the treaty lasted so long as Ireland was not a Dominion and
that as soon as it became a Dominion it repudiated the treaty
and the British Parliament stood silent and grinned, for it knew
that it could do nothing.

One does not mind very much that the talks failed. What
one feels sorry for is that the talks failed without giving us a
clear idea of some of the questions about which Mr. Jinnah has
been observing discreet silence in his public utterances, though he
has been quite outspoken about them in his private talks. These
questions are — (1) Is Pakistan to be conceded because of the
Resolution of the Muslim League? (2) Are the Muslims, as
distinguished from the Muslim League, to have no say in the
matter? (3) What will be the boundaries of Pakistan? ^hether
the boundaries will be the present administrative boundaries of
the Punjab and Bengal or whether the boundaries of Pakistan
will be ethnological boundaries? (4) What do the words "subject
to such territorial adjustments as may be necessary" which occur
in the Lahore Resolution mean? What were the territorial
adjustments the League had in mind? (5) What does the word
"finally" which occurs in the last part of the Lahore Resolution
mean? Did the League contemplate a transition period in which
Pakistan will not be an independent and sovereign State? (6) If
Mr. Jinnah's proposal is that the boundaries of Eastern and
Western Pakistan are to be the present administrative boundaries,
will he allow the Scheduled Castes, or, if I may say so, the non-
Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal to determine by a plebiscite
whether they wish to be included in Mr. Jinnah's Pakistan and
whether Mr. Jinnah would be prepared to abide by the results
of the plebiscite of the non-Muslim elements in the Punjab and
Bengal? (7) Does Mr. Jinnah want a corridor running through
U. P. and Bihar to connect up Eastern Pakistan to Western
Pakistan? It would have been a great gain if straight questions
had been put to Mr. Jinnah and unequivocal answers obtained.
But instead of coming to grips with Mr. Jinnah on these ques-
tions, Mr. Gandhi spent his whole time proving that the C. R.
Formula is substantially the same as the League's Lahore
Resolution — which was ingenious if not nonsensical and thereby
lost the best opportunity he had of having these questions
clarified.

411

Pakistan

After these talks Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah have retired to
their pavilions as players in a cricket match do after their game
is over, as though there is nothing further to be done. There is
no indication whether they will meet again and if so when.
What next? is not a question which seems to worry them. Yet
it is difficult to see how India can make any political advance
without a solutiofl of the question of Pakistan. The ques-
tion of Pakistan is not an academic question which one may
refuse to discuss. It does not belong to that class of questions
about which people can agree to differ. It is a question for which
solution will have to be found. How? It must be by agree-
ment or by arbitration. If it is to be by agreement, it must be
the result of negotiations — of give and take and not of sur-
render by one side to the other. That is not agreement. It is
dictation. Good sense may in the end prevail and parties
may come to an agreement. But agreement may turn
out to be a very dilatory way. It may take long before
good sense prevails. How long one cannot say. The political
freedom of India is a most urgent necessity. It cannot be post-
poned and yet without a solution of the communal problem it
cannot be hastened. To make it dependent on agreement
is to postpone its solution indefinitely. Another expedi-
tious method must be found. It seems to me that arbitration
by an International Board is the best way out. The
disputed points in the minorities problem including that of
Pakistan should be remitted to such a Board. The Board should
be constituted of persons drawn from countries outside the
British Empire. Each statutory minority in India — Muslims,
Scheduled Castes, Sikhs, Indian Christians — should be asked
to select its nominee to this Board of Arbitration, These mino-
rities as also the Hindus should appear before the Board in
support of their demands and should agree to abide by the deci-
sion given by the Board. The British should give the following
undertakings : —

(1) That they will have nothing to do with the communal
settlement. It will be left to agreement or to a Board
of Arbitration.

412

Epilogue

(2) They will implement the decision of the Board of
Arbitration on the communal question by embodying
it in the Government of India Act.

(3) That the award of the International Board of Arbitra-
tion would be regarded by them as a sufficient dis-
charge of their obligations to the minorities in India
and would agree to give India Dominion Status.

The procedure has many advantages. It eliminates the fear
of British interference in the communal settlement which has
been offered by the Congress as an excuse for its not being able
to settle the communal problem. It is alleged that, as there is
always the possibility of the minorities getting from the British
something more than what the Congress thinks it proper to give,
the minorities do not wish to come to terms with the Congress.
The proposal has a second advantage. It removes the objection
of the Congress that by making the constitution subject to the
consent of the minorities, the British Government has placed a
veto in the hands of the minorities over the constitutional
progress of India. It is complained that the minorities can
unreasonably withhold their consent or they can be prevailed
upon by the British Government to withhold their consent as
the minorities are suspected by the Congress to be mere tools
in the hands of the British Government. International arbitra-
tion removes completely every ground of complaint on this
account. There should be no objection on the part of the mino-
rities. If their demands are fair and just no minority need have
any fear from a Board of International Arbitration. There is
nothing unfair in the requirement of a submission to arbitration.
It follows the well known rule of law, namely, that no man
should be allowed to be a judge in his own case. There is no
reason to make any exception in the case of a minority. Like
an individual it cannot claim to sit in judgment over its own case.
What about the British Government? I cannot see any reason
why the British Government should object to any part of this
scheme. The Communal Award has brought great odium on the
British. It has been a thankless task and the British should be
glad to be relieved of it. On the question of the discharge of their
responsibilities for making adequate provision for the safety and
security of certain communities in respect of which they have

413

Pakistan

regarded themselves as trustees before they relinquish their
sovereignty what more can such communities ask than the im-
plantation in the constitution of safeguards in terms of the award
of an International Board of Arbitration? There is only one
contingency which may appear to create some difficulty for the
British Government in the matter of enforcing the award of
the Board of Arbitration. Such a contingency can arise if any
one of the parties to the dispute is not prepared to submit its
case to arbitration. In that case the question will be : will the Bri-
tish Government be justified in enforcing the award against such
a party? I see no difficulty in saying that the British Government
can with perfect justice proceed to enforce the award against
such a party. After all what is the status of a party which refuses
to submit its case to arbitration? The answer is that such a
party is an aggressor. How is an aggressor dealt with? By sub-
jecting him to sanctions. Implementing the award of the Board
of Arbitration in a constitution against a party which refuses to
go to arbitration is simply another name for the process of
applying sanctions against an aggressor. The British Govern-
ment need not feel embarrassed in following this process if the
contingency should arise. For it is a well recognized process of
dealing with such cases and has the imprimatur of the League
of Nations which evolved this formula when Mussolini refused
to submit to arbitration his dispute with Abyssinia. What I have
proposed may not be the answer to the question : What next ? I
don't know what else can be. All I know is that there will be
no freedom for India without an answer. It must be decisive,
it must be prompt and it must be satisfactory to the parties con-
cerned.

414

LIST OF APPENDICES

Pages
I — Population of India by Communities ... 417

II — Communal distribution of population by Minor-
ities in the Provinces of British India ... 418

III — Communal distribution of population by Minor-
ities in the States ... ... ... ... 419

IV — Communal distribution of population in the

Punjab by Districts ... ... ... 420

V — Communal distribution of population in Bengal

by Districts ... ... ... ... 421

VI — Communal distribution of population in Assam

by Districts ... ... ... ... 422

VII — Proportion of Muslim population in N.-W.F.

Province by Districts ... ... ... 423

VIII — Proportion of Muslim population in N.-W.F.

Province by Towns ... ... ... 424

IX — Proportion of Muslim population in Sind by

Districts ... ... ... ... ... 425

X — Proportion of Muslim population in Sind by

Towns ... ... ... ... ... 426

XI — Languages spoken by the Muslims of India ... 427

XII — Address by Muslims to Lord Minto, 1906, and

Reply thereto ... ... ... ... 428

XIII — Allocation of Seats under the Government of
India Act, 1935, for the Lower House in each
Provincial Legislature ... ... ... 444

XIV — Allocation of Seats under the Government of
India Act, 1935, for the Upper House in each
Provincial Legislature ... ... ... 445

415

Pakistan

Pages

XV — Allocation of Seats under the Government of
India Act, 1935, for the Lower House of the
Federal Legislature for British India by Province
and by Community ... ... ... 446

XVI — Allocation of Seats under the Government of
India Act, 1935, for the Upper Chamber of the
Federal Legislature for British India by Province
and by Community ... ... ... 447

XVII — Allocation of Seats under the Government of
India Act, 1935, for Indian States in the Upper
and Lower Houses of the Federal Legislature ... 448

XVIII — Communal Award ... ... ... ... 453

XIX — Supplementary Communal Award ... ... 461

XX— The Poona Pact ... ... ... ... 462

XXI — Comparative Statement of Minority Representa-
tion under the Government of India Act, 1935, in
the Provincial Legislature ... ... ... 464

XXII — Comparative Statement of Minority Representa-
tion under the Government of India Act, 1935, in
the Central Legislature ... ... ... 465

XXIII — Government of India Resolution of 1934 on Com-
munal Representation of Minorities in the
Services ... ... ... ... ... 466

XXIV — Government of India Resolution of 1943 on Re-
presentation of the Scheduled Castes in the Ser-
vices ... ... . ... ... ... 472

XXV— The Cripps Proposals ... ... ... 476

Index ... ... ... ... ... 479

MAPS

1. Hindu and Muslim areas in the Punjab.

2. Hindu and Muslim areas in Bengal and Assam.

3. British India as divided into Pakistan and Hindustan.

416

Appendices

APPENDIX I

POPULATION OF INDIA BY COMMUNITIES

Communities

British
India

Indian
States and
Agencies

Total

1. Hindus

150,890,146

[
55,227,180

206,117,326

2. Muslims

79,398,503

12,659,593

92,058,096

3. Scheduled Castes*

39,920,807

8,892,373

48,813,180

4. Tribal

16,713,256

8,728,233

25,441,489

5. Sikhs '

4,165,097

1,526,350

5,691,447

6, Christians :

(i) Indian Christians ...

1,655,982

1,413,808

3,069,790

(ii) Anglo-Indians

113,936

26,486

140,422

(in) Others

75,751

7,708

83,459

7. Jains

578,372

870,914

1,449,286

8. Buddhists ...

167,413

64,590

232,003

9. Parsees

101,968

12,922

114,890

10. Jews
11. Others

Total

19,327
371,403

3,153
38,474

22,480
409,877

294,171,961

89,471,784

383,643,745

* This is a statutory designation given to the untouchables by the Government of India
Act, 1935.

NOTE. — The figures for the Scheduled Castes both for British India and Indian
States do not give the correct totals. The figures for Ajmer-Merwara in British
India and for Gwalior State arc not included in the totals. The Census Reports
for 1940 fail to give these figures.

27 417

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A ppendices
APPENDIX VII

N.-W. F. PROVINCK
Proportion of Muslim Population by Districts

Districts

Total
Population

Total
Muslim
Population

P. C. of
Muslim
Population
to Total

Total
Non-
Muslim
Population

P. C. of
Non-
Muslim
to Total

Hazara

796,230

756,004

94-9

40,226

5-1

Mardan

506,539

483,575

96-5

22,964

4-5

Peshawar

851,833

769,589

90'4

82,244

9'6

Kohat

289,404

266,224

92-0

23,180

8-0

Bannu

295,930

257,648

87-1

38,282

12-9

D.I. Khan

298,131

255,757

85-8

42,374

14-2

423

Pakistan

APPENDIX VIII

N.-W. F. PROVINCE

Proportion of Muslim to Non-Muslim Population in Towns
C = Cantonment. M = Municipality. N.A. = Notified Area.

Towns by Districts

Total
Population

Total
Muslim
Population

Percent-
age of
Muslims
to Total

Total
Non-
Muslim
Population

Percent-
age of
Non-
Muslims
to Total

Hazara

Abbottabad ...

13,866

3,331

10,535

7-6

Abbottabad ...

13,558

8,861

66-1

4,697

33-9

Haripur

9,322

5,174

55'5

4,148

44-5

Baffa

N.A.

7,988

7,166

89-7

822

10-3

Nawanshehr

N.A.

6,414

5,075

79- i

1,339

20-9

Kot Najibullah

5,315

4,228

79-5

2,087

20-5

Mansehra

10,217

8,141

79-7

1,076

20-3

Mardan

39,200

28,994

73-9

10,206

26*1

Mardan

3,294

1,307

39-7

1,987

60'3

Peshawar

10.

Peshawar

1,30,967

1 ,04, 650

79-9

26,317

20-1

11.

Peshawar

42,453

18,322

43-2

24,131

56-8

12.

Nowshera

N.A.

17,491

16,976

515

13.

Nowshera

26,531

11,256

42-4

15,275

57-6

14.

Risalpur

9,009

3,506

38-9

5,503

61-1

15.

Cherat

337

270

80-1

19'9

16.

Charsada

16,945

15,747

92-9

1,198

7-1

17.

Utamanzai

10,129

9,768

96-4

361

3-6

18.

Tangi

...

12,906

12,456

96-5

450

3-5

19.

Parang

13,496

13,494

99-9

Kohat

20.

Kohat

34.316

27,868

81-2

6,448

18-8

21.

Kohat

10,661

4,243

39-8

6,418

60-2

Bannu

22.

Bannu

33,210

8,507

25'6

24,703

74-4

23.

Bannu

5,294

2,189

41-4

3,105

58-6

24.

Lakki

N.A.

10,141

5,883

4,258

Dera Ismail Khan

25.

D.I. Khan

49,238

25,443

51-7

23,795

48-3

26.

D.I. Khan

2,068

981

1 47-4

1,087

52-6

27.

Kulachi

N.A.

8,840

6,610

i 74-8

! 2,230

25-2

28.

Tauk

N.A.

9,089

5,531

60-8

i 3,558

39-2

424

Appendices

APPENDIX IX

SIND
DISTRIBUTION OF MUSLIM POPULATION BY DISTRICTS

Districts

Total
Population

Total
Muslim
Population

P. C. of
Muslims
to Total

Total
Non-
Muslima

P. C. ot
Non-
Muslims
to Total

- 3

1. Dadu ...

389,380

329,991

84-7

59,389

15-3

2. Hyderabad

758,748

507,620

66-9

251,128

33' 1

3. Karachi...

713,900

457,035

64-0

256,865

36-0

4. Larkana

511,208

418,543

81-9

92,665

18-1

5. Nawabshah

584,178

436,414

74-7

147,764

25'3

6. Sukkur ...

692,556

491,634

71'0

200,922

29-0

7. Thar Parkar

581,004

292,025

50-3

288,979

49-7

8. Upper Sind Fron-
tier ...

Total* ...

304,034

275,063

90-5

28,971

9-5

""1
4,553,008 ! 3,208,325

70-7

1,326,683

29-3.

This is exclusive of the population of Khairpur State.

Pakistan

APPENDIX X

SIND

Proportion of Muslim to Non-Muslim Population in Towns
-= Municipality ; Cl. C.^Civil Cantonment; Mily. C.^- Military Cantonment

Total

P. C.

Total

P.C.of Non-

Towns by Districts

Total
Population

Muslim
Popul ation

of Muslims
to Total

Non-Muslim
Population

Muslims to
Total

Dadu

1. Dadu ... M.

10,996

5,279

5,717

52-0

2. Kotri ... M.

9,979

5,137

51-5

4,842

48*5

3. Manjhand ... M.

3,025

1,053

34-8

1,972

65-2

4. Sehwan ... M.

4,364

2,218

50-8

2,146

49-2

Hyderabad

5. Hala ... M.

7,960

5,042

63'3

2,918

36-7

6. Hyderabad ... M.

1,27,521

31,983

25-1

95,538

74-9

7. Hyderabad ... Cl. C.

5,255

2,667

50-7

2,588

49-3

8. Hyderabad ..Mily. C.

1,917

1,419

498

9. Matiari ... M.

5,910

4,339

73-4

1,571

26'6

10. Nasarpur ... M.

3,810

2,331

61 2

1,479

38-8

11. Tando Allahyar M.

8,406

1,690

20-1

6,716

79-9

12. Tando Maho-

med Khan ... M.

8,718

2,902

33-3

5,816

66-7

Karachi

13. Karachi ... M.

3,58,492

1,52,365

425

2,06,127

57-5

14. Karachi ... Cl. C.

5,854

895

! 15'3

4,959

84-7

15. DaighRoad ... Cl. C.

2,881

1,172

40-7

1,709

59-3

16. Manora ... Cl. C.

2,533

932

36-8

1,601

63-2

17. Karachi ..Mily. C.

15,895

7,063

; 44*4

8,832

5-56

18. Tatta ... M.

8,262

4,198

j 50-8

4,064

49*2

Larkana

19. Kambar ... M,

11,681

6,297

53-1

5,384

46-9

20. Larkana ... M.

20,390

7,834

38-4

12,556

61-6

21. Ratedero ... M.

9,925

^ 2,393

24-1

7,532

75-9

Nawabshah

22. Nawabshah ... M.

17,509

4,420

25-3

13,089

74.7

23. Shahabadpur ... M.

11,786

1,898

16-1

9,888

839

24. Tando Adam ... M.

17,233

2,994

17-4

14,239

82-6

Sukhur

25. GhariYasin ... M.

8,397

2,895

34'5

5,502

65*5

26. Ghotki ... M.

5,236

1,533

29-3

3,703

70-7

27. Rohri ... M.

14,721

4,132

28*7

10,589

71'9

28. Shikarpur ... M.

67,746

21,775

32-1

45,971

67-9

29. Sukkur ... M.

66,466

18,152

27-3

48,314

72-7

Thar Parkar

30. Mirpurkhai ... M.

19,591

5,086

25*9

14,505

74-1

31. Umarkot ... M.

4,275

986

22*9

3,209

77-1

Upper Sind Frontier

32. Jacobabad ... M.

21,588

9,774

45'3

11,814

54-7

426

Appendices
APPENDIX XI

LANGUAGES USED IN INDIA BY MUSLIMS IN ORDER OF IMPORTANCE
(According to Census of 1921)

Urdu (Western Hindi) ... ... 20,791,000

Bengali ... ... ... 23,995,000

Punjabi ... ... ••• 7,700,000

Sindhi ... ... ... 2,912,000

Kashmiri (and allied languages) ... 1,500,000

Pushtu ... ... ... 1,460,000

Gujarati ... ... ... 1,400,000

Tamil ... ••• ... 1,250,000

Malay alam ... ••• ... 1,107,000

Telugu ... ... ... 750,000

Oriya ... ... ... 400,000

Baluchi ... ... ... 224,000

Brahui ... ... ... 122,000

Arabic ... ... ... 42,000

Persian ... ... ... 22,000

Other languages... ... ... 5,060,000

Total ...68,735,000

Pakistan
APPENDIX XII

Address1" presented to H. E. Lord Minto, Viceroy and Governor-
General of India

A Deputation of the Muslim Community of India on
1st October 1906 at Simla

ADDRESS

u May it please your Excellency, — Availing ourselves of the
permission accorded to us, we, the undersigned nobles, jagirdars,
taluqdars, lawyers, zemindars, merchants and others representing
a large body of the Mahomedan subjects of His Majesty the
King-Emperor in different parts of India, beg most respectfully
to approach your Excellency with the following address for your
favourable consideration.

* This document has a great importance and significance in the
history of India. It marks the beginning of the British Government's
policy of giving favourable treatment to the Muslims in the administra-
tion of India which, it is alleged, was intended to wean them away from
the Congress and to create a breach and disunity between the Hindus
and the Musalmans. It has also acquired a certain amount of notoriety
in the minds of the Indians in view of the statement made by late
Maulana Mohammad Ali in his address as President of the Congress,
stating that "it was a command performance", meaning thereby that the
address was arranged by the British Government. On this account there
has been a great deal of curiosity on the part of many Indians to know
the text of the address and the reply given by Lord Minto, I had made
a long search to obtain the same. I had even approached elderly Muslim
politicians prominent in those days for a copy but none of them had it
or knew where it was available. Newspapers of that day do not appear
to have carried the text of the address and the reply. I was however
lucky to get a copy of it from my friend Sir Raza Ali, M.L.A.
(Central), who happened to have kept a cutting of the Indian Daily
Telegraph — a paper then published from Lucknow but had long ago
become defunct, in which the full text of the address as 'well as of the
reply was printed. I am grateful to Sir Raza Ali for a loan of the cutting.
As the document marks a historic event in the political history of British
administration in India, it might be of some interest to reproduce details
about the function which the Simla correspondent of the Indian Daily
Telegraph had published in its issue of October 3rd, 1906. Says the
correspondent : —

428

Appendices

We fully realise and appreciate the incalculable benefits
conferred by British rule on the teeming millions belonging to
diverse races and professing diverse religions who form the popu-
lation of the vast continent of India, and have every reason to
be grateful for the peace, security, personal freedom and liberty
of worship that we now enjoy. Further, from the wise and
enlightened character of the Government, we have every reason-
able ground for anticipating that these benefits will be progres-
sive, and that India will in the future occupy an increasingly
important position in the comity of nations.

"The representatives of the Mahomedan community who were to present
the address to His Excellency the Viceroy this morning at Viceregal Lodge
collected in the Ballroom at 11 A.M. They numbered thirty-five and were
seated in a horse-shoe facing His Excellency's chair. Precisely at 11 A.M.
Lord Minto, preceded by his staff, entered the room, all standing to receive
him. His Excellency was taken round and personally introduced to each
member by the Aga Khan. The Khalita from Patiala then asked permission
for the presentation of the address and the Aga Khan then advanced and
facing His Excellency read the petition given below, all the representatives
standing.1'

Those who formed the deputation were: — His Highness Aga Sir Sultan Mahomed
Shah Aga Khan, G.C.I.E., (Bombay), Shahzadah Bakhtiar Shah, O.I.E., Head of the
Mysore family, Calcutta; Hon'blc Malik Omar Hayat Khan, C.I.E., Lieutenant 17th
Prince of Wales' Tiwana Lancers, Tiwana, Shahpur (Punjab) ; Hon'ble Khan Bahadur
Mian Mohomed Shah Din, Bar.-at-Law, Lahore ; Hon'blc Maulvi Sharfuddin, Bar.-at-
Law, Patna ; Khan Bahadur Sycd Navvab Ali Chowdhury, Mymensingh (Eastern
Bengal); Nawab Bahadur Sycd Amir Husan Khan, C.I.E., Calcutta; Naseer Hussain
Khan Khayal, Calcutta; Khan Bahadur Mirza Shujaat Ali Beg; Persian Consul-
General, Murbhidabad, Calcutta (Bengal) ; Syed Ali Imam, Bar.-at-Law, Patna
(Behar) ; Nawab Sarfraz Husain Khan, Patna (Behar) ; Khan Bahadur
Ahmad Mohiuddin Khan, Stipendiary of the Carnatic family (Madras);
Maulvi Rafiuddin Ahmed, Bar.-at-Law (Bombay) ; Ebrahimbhoy Adamji Peerbhoy,
General Merchant (Bombay) ; Mr. Abdur Rahim, Bar.-at-Law, Calcutta ; Syed Allah-
dad Shah, Special Magistrate and Vice-President, Zamindars' Association, Khairpore
(Sindh) ; Maulana H. M. Malak, Head of Mehdi Bazh Bohras, Nagpur (Central
Provinces) ; Mushir-ud-Doula Mumtazal-ul-Mulk Khan Bahadur Khalifa Syed Moha-
med Hussain, Member of the State Council of Patiala (Punjab) ; Khan Bahadur Col.
Abdul Majid Khan, Foreign Minister, Patiala (Punjab) ; Khan Bahadur Khwaja Kusuf
Shah, Hony. Magistrate, Amritsar (Punjab) ; Mian Mahomed Shafi, Bar.-at-Law, Lahore
(Punjab) ; Shaikh Ghulam Sadik, Amritsar (Punjab) ; Hakim Mohamed Ajmul Khan,
Delhi (Punjab) ; Munshi Ihtisham Ah, Zamindar and Rais, Kakori (Oudh) ; Syed
Nabi Uriah, Bar.-at-Law, Rais Kara, Dist. Allahabad ; Maulvi Syed Karamat Husain,
Bar.-at-Law, Allahabad ; Sycd Abdulraoof, Bar.-at-Law, Allahabad ; Munshi Abdur
Salam Khan, retired Sub-Judge, Rampur ; Khan Bahadur Mohamad Muzammil Ullah
Khan, Zamindar, Secretary, Zamindars' Association, United Provinces, and Joint

429

Pakistan

One of the most important characteristics of British policy
in India is the increasing deference that has so far as possible
been paid from the first to the views and wishes of the people
of the country in matters affecting their interests, with due
regard always to the diversity of race and religion which forms
such an important feature of all Indian progress.

Claims of the Community

Beginning with the confidential and unobtrusive method of
consulting influential members of important communities in
different parts of the country, this principle was gradually ex-
tended by the recognition of the right of recognised political or

Secretary, M. A. O. College Trustees, Aligarh ; Haji Mohamed Ismail Khan, Zamindar,
Aligarh ; Sahabzadas Aftab Ahmad Khan, Bar.-at-Law, Aligarh ; Maulvi Mushtaq
Hussain, Rais, Amroha, United Provinces ; Maulvi Habibul Rahaman Khan, Zamindar,
Bhikhanpur, United Provinces; Nawab Syed Sirdar AH Khan, son of the late Nawab
Sirdar Diler-Ul-mulk Bahadur, C.I.E., Hyderabad (Deccan) ; Maulvi Syed Mahdee
Ally Khan (Muhsin-ul-Mulk), Hony. Secretary, M. A. O. College, Aligarh, Etawah,
United Provinces.

The following gentlemen intended to have attended the presentation of the address
to the Viceroy, but were prevented by illness or other causes: — Hon'ble Nawab Khwaja
Salimulla, Nawab of Dacca, Hon'ble Nawab Haji Mohamed Fateh Ali Khan, Qazel-
bash, Lahore; Hon'ble Syed Zamul-Edros, Surat, Khan Bahadur Kasim Mir Ghayas-
uddin Peerzadah of Broach ; Khan Bahadur Raja Jahandad ot Hazara and Shaik
Shahid Hussain of Lucknow.

The correspondent of tfie Telegraph adds : —

Lady Minto, the Ladies Elliot and the Hon. Mrs. Hewett were present at the
function.

At the presentation of the address today most of the deputies wore ordinary
European dress with a fez as distinguishing head-dress, but the Patiala representatives,
Lieut. Hon. Malik Omar Hayat Khan, Khan Bahadur Ali Choudhary, Khan Bahadur
Ahmad Mohiuddin Khan and a few others, were in Indian dress, while a few others
wore uniforms with gold lace. His Excellency the Viceroy was in morning dress with
the Order of the Star of India on his frock coat.

GARDEN PARTY AT VICEREGAL LODGE

This afternoon a garden party was held in the Viceregal Lodge grounds when
the Mahomedan representatives were received by the Viceroy, who spoke with each
deputy individually.

The Hon. Mr. Baker, Financial Secretary, has invited the following Bengal
gentlemen of the Mahomedan deputation to lunch tomorrow : —

Nawab Amir Hosein, Mirza Shujat Ah, Nawab Nasar Hossem, Hon. Shurfuddin
and Ali Imam.

430

Appendices

commercial organisations to communicate to the authorities their
criticisms and views on measures of public importance, and finally
by the nomination and election of direct representatives of the
people in Municipalities, District Boards, and above all in the
Legislative Chambers of the country. This last element is, we
understand, about to be dealt with by the Committee appointed
by your Excellency with the view of giving it further extension,
and it is with reference mainly to our claim to a fair share in
such extended representation and some other matters of import-
ance affecting the interests of our community, that we have
ventured to approach your Excellency on the present occasion.

Past Traditions

The Mahomedans of India number, according to the census
taken in the year 1901, over sixty-two millions or between one-
fifth and one-fourth of the total population of His Majesty's
Indian dominions, and if a reduction be made for the uncivilised
portions of the community enumerated under the heads of ani-
mist and other minor religions, as well as for those classes who
are ordinarily classified as Hindus but properly speaking are not
Hindus at all, the proportion of Mahomedans to the Hindu
majority becomes much larger. We therefore desire to submit
that under any system of representation extended or limited a
community in itself more numerous than the entire population
of any first class European power except Russia may justly lay
claim to adequate recognition as an important factor in the State.

We venture, indeed, with your Excellency's permission to
go a step further, and urge that the position accorded to the
Mahomedan community in any kind of representation, direct or
indirect, and in all other ways affecting their status and influence
should be commensurate, not merely with their numerical
strength, but also with their political importance and the value
of the contribution which they make to the defence of the empire,
and we also hope that your Excellency will in this connection be
pleased to give due consideration to the position which they
occupied in India a little more than hundred years ago and of
which the traditions have naturally not faded from their minds.

431

Pakistan

The Mahomedans of India have always placed implicit reli-
ance on the sense of justice and love of fair dealing that have
characterised their rulers, and have in consequence abstained
from pressing their claims by methods that might prove at all
embarrassing, but earnestly as we desire that the Mahomedans of
India should not in the future depart from that excellent and
time-honoured tradition, recent events have stirred up feelings,
especially among the younger generation of Mahomedans, which
might, in certain circumstances and under certain contingencies
easily pass beyond the control of temperate counsel and sober
guidance.

We therefore pray that the representations we herewith
venture to submit, after a careful consideration of the views and
wishes of a large number of our co-religionists in all parts of
India, may be favoured with your Excellenc3^s earnest attention.

European representative institutions

We hope your Excellency will pardon our stating at the
outset that representative institutions of the European type are
new to the Indian people ; many of the most thoughtful mem-
bers of our community in fact consider that the greatest care,
forethought and caution will b^ necessary if they are to be suc-
cessfully adapted to the social, religious and political conditions
obtaining in India, and that in the absence of such care and
caution their adoption is likely, among other evils, to place our
national interests at the mercy of an unsympathetic majority.
Since, however, our rulers liave, in pursuance of the immemorial
instincts and traditions, found it expedient to give these institu-
tions an increasingly important place in the Government of the
country, we Mahomedans, cannot any longer in justice to our
own national interests hold aloof from participating in the con-
ditions to which their policy has given rise. While, therefore,
we are bound to acknowledge with gratitude that such represen-
tation as the Mahomedans of India have hitherto enjoyed has
been due to a sense of justice and fairness on the part of your
Excellency and your illustrious predecessor in office and the
heads of Local Governments by whom the Mahomedan members
of Legislative Chambers have almost without exception been

432

Appendices

nominated, we cannot help observing that the representation thus
accorded to us has necessarily been inadequate to our require-
ments, and has not always carried with it the approval of those
whom the nominees were selected to represent. This state of
things was probably uuder existing circumstances unavoidable,
for while on the one hand the number of nominations reserved
to the Viceroy and Local Governments has necessarily been
strictly limited, the selection on the other hand of really-repre-
sentative men, has, in the absence of any reliable method of
ascertaining the direction of popular choice, been far from easy.

The Results of Election

As for the results of election, it is most unlikely that the
name of any Mahomedan candidate will ever be submitted for
the approval of Government by the electoral bodies as now con-
stituted unless he is in sympathy with the majority in all matters
of importance. Nor can we in fairness find fault with the desire
of our non-Muslim fellow-subjects to take full advantage of their
strength and vote only for members of their own community,
or for persons who, if not Hindus, are expected to vote with the
Hindu majority on whose goodwill they would have to depend
for their future re-election. It is true that we have many and
important interests in common with our Hindu fellow-country-
men and it will always be a matter of the utmost satisfaction to
us to see these interests safeguarded by the presence in our
Legislative Chambers of able supporters of these interests, irres-
pective of their nationality,

A DISTINCT COMMUNITY

Still, it cannot be denied that we Mahomedans are a distinct
community with additional interests of our own which are not
shared by other communities, and these have hitherto suffered
from the fact that they have not been adequately represented.
Even in the provinces in which the Mahomedans constitute a
distinct majority of the population," they have too often been
treated as though they were inappreciably small political factors
that might without unfairness be neglected. This has been the
case, to some extent, in the Punjab, but in a more marked degree
in Sind and in Eastern Bengal.

28 * 433

Pakistan

Before formulating our views with regard to the election of
tepresentatives, we beg to observe that the political importance
of a community to a considerable extent gains strength or suffers
detriment according to the position that the members of that
community occupy in the service of the State. If, as is unfor-
tunately the case with the Mahomedans, they are not adequately
represented in this manner, they lose in the prestige and influence
which-are justly their due.

Employment in Government Service

We therefore pray that Government will be graciously pleas-
ed to provide that both in the gazetted and the subordinate and
ministerial services of all Indian provinces a due proportion of
Mahomedans shall always find place. Orders of like import
have at times been issued by Local Governments in some pro-
vinces, but have not, unfortunately, in all cases been strictly
observed on the ground that qualified Mahomedans were not
forthcoming. This allegation, however well founded it may
have been at one time, is, we submit, no longer tenable now, and
wherever the will to employ them is not wanting the supply of
qualified Mahomedans, we 'are happy to be able to assure your
Excellency, is equal to the demand.

The Competitive Element

Since, however, the number of qualified Mahomedans has
increased, a tendency is unfortunately perceptible to reject them
on the ground of relatively superior qualifications having to be
given precedence. This introduces something like the competi-
tive element in its worst form, and we may be permitted to draw
your Excellency's attention to the political significance of the
monopoly of all official influence by one class. We may also
point out in this connection that the efforts of Mahoinedan educa-
tionists have from the very outset of the educational movement
among them been strenuously directed towards the development
of character, and this we venture to think is of greater import-
ance than mere mental alertness in the making of good public
servants.

Mahomedans on the Bench

We venture to submit that the generality of Mahomedans
in all parts of India feel aggrieved that Mahomedan Judges are

434

- Appendices

not more frequently appointed to the High Courts and Chief
Courts of Judicature. Since the creation of these Courts, only
three Mahomedan lawyers have held these honourable appoint-
ments, all of whom have fully justified their elevation to the
Bench. At the present moment there is not a single Mahomedan
Judge sitting on the Bench of any of these Courts, while there
are three Hindu Judges in the Calcutta High Court, where the
proportion of Mahomedans in the population is very large, and
two in the Chief Court of the Punjab, where the Mahomedans
form the majority of the population. It is not, therefore, an
extravagant request on our part that a Mahomedan should be
given a seat on the Bench of each of the High Courts and Chief
Courts. Qualified Mahomedan lawyers eligible for these appoint-
ments can always be found, if not in one province then in
another. We beg permission further to submit that the presence
on the Bench of these Courts of a Judge learned in the Maho-
medan Law will be a source of considerable strength to the
administration of justice.

Municipal Representation

As Municipal and District Boards have to deal with im-
portant local interests affecting to a great extent the health,
comfort, educational needs and even the religious concerns of
the inhabitants, we shall, we hope, be pardoned if we solicit for
a moment your Excellency's attention to the position of Maho-
medans thereon before passing1 to higher concerns. These insti-
tutions form, as it were, the initial rungs in the ladder of self-
government, and it is here that the principle of representation is
brought home intimately to the intelligence of the people, yet
the position of Mahomedans on these Boards is not at present
regulated by any guiding principle capable of general applica-
tion, and practice varies in different localities. The Aligarh
Municipality, for example, is divided into six wards and each
ward returns one Hindu and one Mahomedan Commissioner,
and the same principle we understand is adopted in a number
of Municipalities in the Punjab and elsewhere, but in a good
many places the Mahomedan tax-payers are not adequately
represented. We would, therefore, respectfully suggest that the
local authority should in every case be required to declare the

435

Pakistan

number of Hindus and Mahomedans entitled to seats on Munici-
pal and District Boards, such proportion to be determined in
accordance with the numerical strength, social status, local influ-
ence and special requirements of either community. Once their
relative proportion is authoritatively determined, we would sug-
gest that either community should be allowed severally to return
their own representatives as is the practice in many towns in the
Punjab.

Fellows of Universities

We would also suggest that the Senates and Syndicates of
Indian Universities might be similarly dealt with, that is to say,
there should, so far as possible, be an authoritative declaration of
the proportion in which Mahomedans are entitled to be represent-
ed in either body,

Nomination to Provincial Councils

We now proceed to the consideration of the question of our
representation in the Legislative Chambers of the country.
Beginning with the Provincial Councils, \ve would most respect-
fully suggest that as in the "case of Municipalities and District
Boards the proportion of Mahomedan representatives entitled to
seats should be determined and declared with clue regard to the
important considerations which we have ventured to point out
in paragraph 5 of this address, and that the important Maho-
medan landowners, lawyers, merchants and representatives of
other important interests, the Mahomedan members of District
Boards and Municipalities and the Mahomedan graduates of
universities of a certain standing, say five years, should be formed
into Electoral Colleges and be authorised, in accordance with
such rules of procedure as your Excellency's Government may be
pleased to prescribe in that behalf, to return the number of mem-
bers that may be declared to be eligible.

The Viceroy's Council

With regard to the Imperial Legislative Council whereon
the due representation of Mahomedan interests is a matter of
vital importance, we crave leave to suggest (1) that in the cadre
of the Council the proportion of Mahomedan representatives

436

Appendices

should not be determined ou the basis of the numerical strength
of the community, and that in any case the Mahomedan repre-
sentatives should never be an ineffective minority ; (2) that as
far as possible, appointment by election should be given prefer-
ence over nomination; (3) that for the purposes of choosing
Mahomedau members, Mahomedan landowners, lawyers, mer-
chants and representatives of other important interests of a status
to be subsequently determined by your Excellency's Government,
Mahomedan members of the Provincial Councils and Mahome-
dan fellows of universities should be invested with electoral
powers to be exercised in accordance with such procedure as may
be prescribed by your Excellency's Government in that behalf.

The Executive Council

An impression has lately been gaining ground that one or
more Indian Members may be appointed on the Executive Coun-
cil of the Viceroy. In the event of such appointment being
made we beg that the claims of Mahomedans in that connection
may not be overlooked; More than one Mahomedan, we ven-
ture to say, will be found in the country fit to serve with distinc-
tion in that august chamber.

A Mahomedan University

We beg to approach your Excellency on a subject which
must closely affect our national welfare. We arc convinced that
our aspirations as a community and our future progress are
largely dependent on the foundation of a Mahomedan University
which will be the centre of our religious and intellectual life.
We therefore most respectfully pray that your Excellency will
take steps to help us in an undertaking in which our community
is so deeply interested.

In conclusion, we beg to assure your Excellency that in assist-
ing the Mahomedan subjects of His Majesty at this stage in the
development of Indian affairs in the directions indicated in the
present address, your Excellency will be strengthening the basis
of their unswerving loyalty to the Throne and laying the founda-
tion of their political advancement and national prosperity, and
your 'Excellency's name will be remembered with gratitude by
their posterity for generations to come, and we feel confident

437

Pakistan

that your Excellency will be gracious enough to give due consi-
deration to our prayers. We have the honour to subscribe our-
selves, Your Excellency's most obedient and humble servants.

LORD MINTO'S REPLY

Appreciation of Mahomedan aspirations

After the address, His Excellency rose and delivered a most
sympathetic reply, which was frequently punctuated with cheers
and cries of "Hear, hear" from the members of the deputation,
particularly when his Excellency declared that he was entirely
in accord with the views of the deputation that any electoral
system must take cognizance of the various religious beliefs of
this great Empire and that the British Government would always
in the future as in the past safeguard the political rights of the
different communities entrusted to their charge. The Viceroy
concluded by thanking the deputation for affording him the
unique opportunity of meeting so many representative men.

The Viceroy said : —

Your Highness and Gentlemen, Allow me before I attempt
to reply to the many considerations your address embodies, to
welcome you heartily to Simla. Your presence here to-day is
very full of meaning. To the document which you have
presented me are attached the signatures of nobles, of Ministers
of various States, of great landowners, of lawyers, of merchants
and of many others of His Majesty's subjects. I welcome the
representative character of your deputation as expressing the
views and aspirations of the enlightened Muslim community of
India. I feel that all you have said emanates from a representa-
tive body basing its opinions on a matured consideration of the
existing political conditions of India, totally apart from the small
personal or political sympathies and antipathies of scattered
localities, and I am grateful to you for the opportunity you are
affording me of expressing my appreciation of the just aims of
the followers of Islam and their determination to share in the
political history of our Empire.

As your Viceroy, I am proud of the recognition you express
of the benefits conferred by British rule on the diverse races of

438

Appendices

many creeds who go to form the population of this huge con-
tinent. You yourselves, the descendants of a conquering and
ruling race, have told me to-day of your gratitude for the person-
al freedom, the liberty of worship, the general peace and the
hopeful future which British administration has secured for
India.

Help in the Past ^

It is interesting to look back on early British efforts to assist
the Mahomedan population to qualify themselves for the public
service. In 1782 Warren Hastings founded the Calcutta Madras-
sah with the intention of enabling its students to compete on
more equal terms with the Hindus for employment under
Government. In 1811 my ancestor, Lord Minto, advocated im-
provements in the Madrassah and the establishment of Maho-
medan Colleges at other places throughout India. In later years
the efforts of the Mahomedan Association led to the Government
resolution of 1885 dealing with the educational position of the
Mahomedan community and their employment in the public
service, whilst Mahomedan educational effort has culminated
in the College of Aligarh that great institution which the noble
and broad-minded devotion of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan has dedi-
cated to his co-religionists.

The Aligarh College

It was in July 1877 that Lord Lytton laid the foundation-
stone of Aligarh, when Sir Syed Ahmed Khan addressed these
memorable words to the Viceroy: "The personal honour which
you have done me assures me of a great fact and fills me with
feelings of a much higher nature than mere personal gratitude.
I am assured that you, who upon this occasion represent the
British rule, have sympathies with our labours and this assurance
is very valuable and a source of great happiness. At my time
of life it is a comfort to me to feel that the undertaking which
has been for many years, and is now the sole object of my life
has roused on the one hand the energies of my own country-
men, and on the other has won the sympathy of our British
fellow-subjects and the support of our rulers, so that when the
few years I may still be spared are over, and when I shall be no

439

Pakistan

longer amongst yon, the College will still prosper and succeed
in educating my countrymen to have the same affection for
their country, the same feelings of loyalty for the British rule,
the same appreciation of its blessings, the same sincerity of friend-
ship with our British fellow-subjects as have been the ruling feel-
ings of niy life."

Sir Syed's Influence

Aligarh has won its laurels. Its students have gone forth
to fight the battle of life strong in the tenets of their own reli-
gion, strong in the precepts of loyalty and patriotism, and now
when there is much that is critical in the political future of
India the inspiration of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and the teachings
of Aligarh shine forth brilliantly in the pride of Mahomedan
history, in the loyalty, coinmonsense and sound reasoning so
eloquently expressed in your address. But, gentlemen, you go
on to tell me that sincere as you* belief is in the justice and fair
dealings of your rulers, you cannot but be aware that " recent
events " have stirred up feelings amongst the younger genera-
tion of Mahomedans which might upass beyond the control of
temperate counsel and sober guidance."

Policy in Eastern Bengal

Now I have no intention of entering into any discussion
upon the affairs of Eastern Bengal and Assam, yet I hope that
without offence to anyone I may thank the Mahomedan com-
munity of the new Province for the moderation and self-restraint
they have shown under conditions which were new to them,
and as to which there has been inevitably much misunderstand-
ing, and that I may at the same time sympathise with all that is
sincere in Bengalee sentiments. But above all, what I would
ask you to believe is that the course the Viceroy and the Govern-
ment of India have pursued in connection with the affairs of
the new Province, the future of which is now I hope assured,
has been dictated solely by a regard for what has appeared best
for its present and future populations as a whole, irrespective of
race or creed, and that the Mahomedan community of Eastern
Bengal and Assam can rely as firmly as ever on British justice

440

Appendices

and fairplay for the appreciation of its loyalty and the safeguard-
ing of its interests.

The unrest in India

You have addressed me, gentlemen, at a time when the
political atmosphere is full of change. We all feel it would be
foolish to attempt to deny its existence, hopes and ambitions new
to India are making themselves felt. We cannot ignore them

— we should be wrong to wish to do so — but to what is all
this unrest due? Not to the discontent of misgoverned millions

— I defy anyone honestly to assert that — not to say uprising of
a disaffected people.

Fruits of Western Education

It is due to that educational growth in which only a very
small portion of the population has as yet shared, of which
British rule first sowed the seed and the fruits of which British
rule is now doing its best to foster and to direct. There may be
many tares in the harvest we are now reaping. The Western
grain which we have sown may not be entirely suitable to the
requirements of the people of India but the educational harvest
will increase as years go on, and the healthiness of the nourish-
ment it gives will depend on the careful administration and dis-
tribution of its products. You need not ask my pardon, gentle-
men, for telling me that " Representative institutions of the
European type are entirely new to the people of India" or that
their introduction here requires the most earnest thought and
care. I should be very far from welcoming all the political
machinery of the Western world amongst the hereditary instincts
and traditions of Eastern races. Western breadth of thought,
the teachings of Western civilisation, the freedom of British
individuality can do much for the people of India, but I recog-
nise with you that they must not carry with them an impractic-
able insistence of the acceptance of political methods.

Political Future of Mahomedans

And now, gentlemen, I come to your own position in respect
to the political future ; the position of the Mahomedan community
for whom you speak. You will, I feel sure, recognise that it is

441

Pakistan

impossible fpr me to follow you through any detailed considera-
tion of the conditions and the share that the community has a
right to claim in the administration of public affairs. I can at
present only deal with generalities. The points which you have
raised are before the Committee, which, as you know, I have
lately appointed to consider the question of presentation
(? representation), and I will take care that your address is
submitted to them, but at the same time I hope I may be able
to reply to the general tenor of your remarks without in any
way forestalling the Committee's report.

The Question of Representation

The pith of your address, as I understand it, is a claim that
in any system of representation whether it affects a Municipality,
a District Board or a Legislative Council, in which it is proposed
to introduce or increase an electoral organisation, the Maho-
medan community should be represented as a community. You
point out that in many cases electoral bodies, as now constituted,
cannot be expected to return a Mahomed an candidate, and that
if by chance they did so it could only be at the sacrifice of such
a candidate's view to those of a majority opposed to his own
community whom he would in no way represent, and you
justly claim that your numerical strength both in respect
to the political importance of your community and the service
it has rendered to the Empire entitle you to consideration. I am
entirely in accord with you ; please do not misunderstand me.
I make no attempt to indicate by what means the representation
of communities can be obtained, but I am as firmly convinced
as I believe you to be that any electoral representation in India
would be doomed to mischievous failure which aimed at grant-
ing a personal enfranchisement regardless of the beliefs and
traditions of the communities composing the population of this
continent. The great mass of the people of India have no
knowledge of representative institutions. I agree with you,
gentlemen, that the initial rungs in the ladder of self-government
are to be found in the Municipal and District Boards and that
it is in that direction that we must look for the gradual political
education of the people.

442

Appendices

An Assurance

In the meantime I can only say to you that the Mahomedan
community may rest assured that their political rights and inter-
ests as a community will be safeguarded in any administrative
reorganization with which I am concerned and that you and
the people of India may rely upon the British Raj to respect, as
it has been its pride to do, the religious beliefs and the national
traditions of the myriads composing the population of His
Majesty's Indian Empire.

Your Highness and Gentlemen, I sincerely thank you for
the unique opportunity your deputation has given me of meeting
so many distinguished and representative Mahomedans. I
deeply appreciate the energy and interest in public affairs which
have brought you here from great distances, and I only regret
that your visit to Simla is necessarily so short.

443

Pakistan

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446

Appendices

APPENDIX XVI

ALLOCATION OF SEATS UNDER THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT, 1935,

FOR THE UPPER CHAMBER OF THE FEDERAL LEGISLATURE FOR

BRITISH INDIA

Province or Community.

Total
Seats.

General
Seats.

Seats for
Scheduled
Castes

Sikh
Seats

Maho-
med ail '
Seats.

Women's
Seats.

Madras

Bombay

4 '

Bengal

United Province!

The Punjab

Bihar

Central Provinces and Berar

••

Assam

••

North-West Frontier Province

• •

Orlssa

•-

Bind

••

British Baluchistan

••

Delhi

-•

Ajmer-Merwara

Coorg
Anglo-Indians

]
1

••

• •

Europeans

Indian Christians

Total . .

160

447

Pakistan

APPENDIX XVII

ALLOCATION OF SEATS UNDER THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT, 1935,

FOR THE LOWER AND UPPER HOUSE OF THE FEDERAL LEGISLATURE

FOR INDIAN STATES

States and
Groups of States.

Number
of seats
in the
Council
of State.

States and
Groups of States.

Number
i of Seats
in the
Federal
Assembly.

Population

DIVISION I

DIVISION I 1

Hyderabad

14,486,142

DIVISION II

Mysore

6,557,802

DIVISION III

Kashmir

& 4

8,646,248

DIVISldN IV

DIVISION IV

Gwallor

Gwalior

8,528,070

DIVISION V

Baroda

2,443,007

DIVISION VI

DIVISION VI j

Kalat

842,101

DIVISION VII

Sikkim

109,808

DIVISION VIII

1 Kampur

1. Bampur

465,225

2. Benares

891,272

DIVISION IX

1. Travail core

1. Travancore

6,096,978

2. Cochin

1,206,016

8. Pudukkottai .. )
Banganapalle ' . . >
Sandur . . . . . . )

8. Pudukkottai .. )
Banganapalle . . X
Sandur . . . . )

400,694
89,218
13,688

DIVISION X

1. Udaipur

1,566,910

2. Jaipur

2,681,775

S. Jodhpur

3. Jodhpur

2,126,982

4. Bikaner

936,218

5. Alwar

6. Alwar

749,761

6. Kotah

685,804

7. Bharatpur

1 I

486,964

*. Tonk

8. Tonk

817,860

448

Appendices
APPENDIX XVII — ( Contd. )

States and
Groups of States.

Number
of -oats
in
Council
of State

Number
States and <* "ft*
Groups of States. Federal
Assembly

Population.

3 4

DIVISION X— (Continued)

9.
10.

Dholpur
Karauli

1
1

Dholpur ..'. . I .
Karauli .. .. >|

254,986
140,625

11.
12.

Bundi
Sirohi

J
1

10.

Bundi ... ... ) ,
Sirohi ... ... j| A

216,722
216,528

13.
14.

Duugarpur
Banswara

1
1

Jl.

iMmgarpur ... ... | 1
Banswara ... ... [

227,544
260,670

15.

Partabgarh »
Jhalawar }

•

12.

Partabgarh ... .. ) t
Jhalawar ... .. J l

76,639
107,890

16.

Jaisalmer |
Kishongarh |

13.

S±£i- - }! *

76.256

85,744

DIVISION XI

Indore

Indore 2

1,825,089

lihopal

Bhopal l

729,955

Rewu

Rewa ., 2

1,587,445

Datia .. |
Orchh a . (

•

Datia ) j .
Orchha f ; l

158,834
314,661

Dhar
Duwas (Senior) i
Dewas (Junior) ... j

Dhar ) !
DOWUH (Senior) l
Dewaa f Junior) )

243,430
83,321
70,513

Jaora ... ... i
Ratlam ... ... J

J aora ) !
Ratlam { ! l

100,166
107,821

Panna ... .. )
Sarnthar ... ... v.
Ajaigarh ... \

Panna )
Samthar V l
Ajalgarl» )

212,180
83,307
85,895

Bijawar ... . j
Charkhari .. I
Chhatarpur ... j

Bijawar ) i
Charkhari V ! l
Chhatarpur )

115,862
120,361
161,267

11.

Baoni ... ^
Nagod 1
Maihar f
Baraundha ... ... J

Baoni . . v i
Nagod ! i ,
Maihar 1 '< A
Baraundha ) ;

19,132
74,689
68,991
16,071

12.

Barwani ... ... )
AliRaJpur J-
Shahpura ... ... )

10.

Barwani ) >
Ali Raj pur [ l
Shahpura J

141,110
101,963
54,283

13.

Jhabua .. ... i
Sailaua [
Sitamau ... ... i

11.

Jhabua . )
Sailana V 1
Sitamau )

145,622
86,228
28,422

14.

Rajgarh »
Narsingarh ... . >
Kbilchipur ... ... j i

12.

Rajgarh l
Naraingarh ... . r 1
Khilchipur . )

184,891
113,873
45,583

449

Pakistan
APPENDIX XVII — ( Contd. )

Niinilior '

Number

States and of seats States and
(ii«ii|iH of State** roimcil (iroups of States

of seats
in the Population.
Federal

of Stuto.

Assembly.

1 2 a

4 5

DIVISION Ml DIVISION XII

Cut eh

1 1 ditch

1 1 , 514,307

Id iii

1 i!. I.inr

i 1 262,660

Nauann^'ar 1 3 Na\\ana^ar

1 409,192

l'.lm\ niiiMii ; I 4. llhavna^rar

1 i 500 274

Jiinav'ii

.11. ' J ft .lunar>dh

i 1 545,152

Hajpipla 1 ! j 0 Kajpiphi

1 , 206,114

I'al.'mptir i I'alanpm

j 264,179

Dhinni

ailhin i , 7 I Hiran^Hilliia

\ i 88,961

Corutal

I <}(ii.lal

> J 205,846

I'orhandai i , H. rorbamlai

I , 115,673

Morvl

1 Moivi

j 113,023

lta(lhaTi]nir } '•>• lladhanpur

70,580

Wanka

n'T 1 : Wankanei

f 1 44.259

I'alitai

a 1 1'alitana

j , 624,150

ramli.'iy } 10. Caiulmx

' 87,701

Dhanimpiii 1 Dharanipui
I'.alasinor > I'.alaainor

1 | 112,031
) ' i 52,527

I'.aria

\ 'II Hariri

}' 159,429

Chlmta
Saul
l,ni] a \\

1'deiuu f , ' Chhola rdepnr
1 Sant
ula I.unawada

, : 144,640
1 \ 83,531
95,162

Itanflda

} 12. Itai^da

48,839

Saehln

' , Sai Inn

22,107

Jnwhar

[ .la \\har

57,261

Danta

' Danta

20,196

J- 1

Dhrol
LunlMll

\ Dhrol
[ } Limhdi

i ' 27,639
40,088

Wadli\\

an i Wadhw an

42,602

Hajkut

1 , Kajkot

' 75,540

DIVISION XIII DIVISION XIII !

Kolhapur U 1. Kolhapur

1 957,137

Sangll

1 , 2. Suogli

, 258,442

Savantvadi j ' Savant vadi

230,589

Janjira
Mndl.ol
Bhor

) 3. Janjira
Y ' Mudliol ... .;'

) 110,379
Yl 1 62,832
j i 141,540

Jamkhandi . \ 4. Jamkhandi .
Mirnj (Senior) [ , Miraj (Senior)
Miraj (Junior) , 1 Miraj i Junior)
Kurundwad (Senior) . , Kurundwad (Senior) ..
Kurundwad (Junior) ' Kurundwad (Junior)...

\ ! ' 114,270
; 93,938
1 ! 40,684
; j 44,204
/ 1 75,540

450

A ppendices
APPENDIX XVII — (Contd.)

States and
Groups of States.

Number I , Number
! of?«ats ! State* and °|f"e«*B
i (J,n,II I Groups of StatOB Jj^J,
1 of Slutr. i i Assembly.

Po]>ulation

2 - .'i i

DIVISION XIII- -(Continued)

i DIVISION XIII --(rontinued) '

5. Aknlkot .. v
Phaltau ... 1
.lath
Anudli . . J
HaiiuiurK . . /

ft Akalkot .. . v '
! Pliult.au
1 ! .Inth . ^ 1
AlllKlll

j Kiiindurg . . '

ua.eori

58,701
Ol.Ofttt
70,507
;U"> 4f>4

DIVISION xiv

1 I'atiala

DIVISION XIV

U 1 1 attain . ... ..i ^

1, (125,0120

2 Bhawulpur ...

« IS. Kliiiwdlpiir . ...| 1

UM4,«lli

S. Khairpur

1 | 3 KliMiipm . . 1

227. J 83

4. Kapurthahi

1 4 K'ipiirthala . .. 1

310,757

6. liiiti ...

1 ft. Jiiul . ..1

324,070

0 Nahha

1 1 (i Nahhu ...i 1

287,574

7 Ttthri-darhwul ...i 1

340, ft" 3

7 Mandi ... ... )
lilluHpur ... ... >
Siiki't .. .. j

' 8 Mandi... )
1 llilaspur
Stikft .. )

207,4ttf»
J 00, 994
58,40^.

8. TehrKJarlitttil ... }
Siriuiir
Cliamba .. ... \

I). Siriiiur . ... ) i
1 Cli:unl>n .. 1

148,508
1 40,870

tt. Kuriclkol ... . i
Mulerkntlu ... .. '
Loliani . .. )

10. J*','iii<llvi>l ... i ,
1 Malrrkotlu . . .. V 1
Lohuru . I i

104,304
83,072
23,338

DIVISION XV

DIVISION \N \

J I'oorli Ilehur...

1 I. Cooch Delinr... .. ... 1

500.880

2. Tripura ... ... |
Manipur ... ... j

• 2 Tripura ... . . ... 1
3 Manipur ... ... ... 1

382,450
445,006

DIVISION XVI

1 Mayurbhanj ..
SOUP pur

1 1 Mayurbhanj... .. ... 1
li. Sonupur ... ... ...; 1

; 889,603
237,020

2. Pataa
Kalahandi ...

, 3. Patna ... ... ...'
f 4. Kalahandi |

566,924
513,716

!J. Keonjhar
Dhenkanal ...
Nayagarh
Talcher
Nilgiri

5 Keonjhur
fi. Uangpur
r J ,7. Hantar
8. Surguja

' 460,609
356,674
524,721
i 501,939

451

Pakistan
APPENDIX XVII — (Contd.)

Nui

nbet

Number

States and of
Groups of States. Coi

"Jat8 States and
°cil Groups of States.

of seats
in the
Federal

Population.

of 8

tate.

Assembly.

1 i

2 3

DIVISION XVI— (Continued)

4. Qangpur

0. Dhenkanal

284,326

Bamra

Nayagarh

142,406

Seraikola

1 Beraikela

148,525

Baud i

Baud

135,248

Bouai ... . j

1 Talcher

60,702

I Bonai

80,186

6. Bastar )
Surguja ... . . (

, Nilgiri

Bamra

68,604
161,047

Kuigarh ... .. ('

Nandgaon ... ... J

0. Khalrgarh
.Tashpur
K anker
Korea

10. Baigarh
Khairagarh ...
1 Jasbpur
Ranker

277,569
157,400
103,608
186,101

Sarangarh ... . '

: Sarangarh
1 Korea

128,067
00.886

Nandgaon

182,380

DIVISION XVJ1 j

DIVISION XVII

States not mentioned in any ol the
preceding Divisions, but deiK.ri >.
od In paragraph 12 of thta Part
of this Schedule.

'2 States not mentioned in any of the
preceding Divisions but describ-
; ed in paragraph lii of this Part
of this Schedule.

8,047,120

Total Population of the States in this Table

78,006,844

452

A ppendtces
APPENDIX XVIII

COMMUNAL AWARD BY HIS MAJESTY'S
GOVERNMENT— 1932

In the statement made by the Prime Minister on 1st Decem-
ber last on behalf of His Majesty's Government at the close of
the second session of the Ronnd Table Conference, which was
immediately afterwards endorsed by both Houses of Parlia-
ment, it was made plain that if the commnnities in India were
unable to reach a settlement acceptable to all parties on the
communal questions which the Conference had failed to solve
His Majesty's Government were determined that India's con-
stitution^l advance should not on that account be frustrated,
and that they would remove this obstacle by devising and apply-
ing themselves a provisional scheme.

, 2. On the 19th March last His Majesty's Government,
having been informed that the continued failure of the commu-
nities to reach agreement was blocking the progress of the plans
for the framing of a new Constitution, stated that they were
engaged upon a careful re-examination of the difficult and con-
troversial questions which arise. They are now satisfied that
without a decision of at least some aspects of the problems con-
nected with the position of minorities under the new Constitu-
tion, no further progress can be made with the framing of the
Constitution.

3. His Majesty's Government have accordingly decided that
they will include provisions to give effect to the scheme set out
below in the proposals relating to the Indian Constitution to be
laid in due course before Parliament. The scope of this scheme
is purposely confined to the arrangements to be made for the
representation of the British Indian communities in the Provin-
cial Legislatures, consideration of representation in the Legisla-
ture at the Centre being deferred for the reason given in para-
graph 20 below. The decision to limit the scope of the scheme
implies no failure to realise that the framing of the Constitution

* Parliamentary Paper (Command 4147) of 1932. Officially it is spoken of as
Communal Decision.

453

Pakistan

will necessitate the decision of a number of the problems of great
importance to minorities, but has been taken in the hope that
once a pronouncement has been made upon the basic questions
of method and proportions of representation the comnrunities
themselves may find it possible to arrive at a modus vivendi on
other communal problems, which have not as yet received the
examination they require.

4. His Majesty's Government wish it to be most clearly
understood that they themselves can be no parties to any nego-
tiations which may be initiated with a view to the revision of
their decision, and will not be prepared to give consideration to
any representation aimed at securing the modification of it
which is not supported by all the parties affected. But they are
most desirous to close 110 door to an agreed settlement should
such happily be forthcoming. If, therefore, before a new
Government of India Act has passed into law, they are satisfied
that the communities who are concerned are mutually agreed
upon a practicable alternative scheme, either in respect of any
one or more of the Governors1 Provinces or in respect of the
whole of the British India, they will be prepared to recommend
to Parliament that that alternative should be submitted for the
provisions now outlined.

5. Seats in the Legislative Councils in the Governors' Pro-
vinces, or in the Lower House if there is an Upper Chamber,
will be allocated as shown in the annexed table.*

6. Election to the seats allotted to Muhanimadan, European
and Sikh constituencies will be by voters voting in separate com-
munal electorates covering between them the whole area of the
Province (apart from any portions which may in special cases
be excluded from the electoral area as " backward ").

Provision will be made in the Constitution itself to empower
a revision of this electoral arrangement (and the other similar
arrangements mentioned below) after 10 years with the assent
of the communities affected, for the ascertainment of which
suitable means will be devised.

7. All qualified electors, who are not voters either in a
Muhammadau, Sikh, Indian Christian (see paragraph 10 below),

•Sec page 370.
454

A ppcndiccs

Anglo-Indian (see paragraph 11 below) or European constitu-
ency, will be entitled to vote in a general constituency.

8. Seven seats will be reserved for Mahrattas in certain
selected plural member general constituencies in Bombay.

9. Members of the u depressed classes" qualified to vote
will vote in a general constituency. In view of the fact that for
a considerable period these classes would be unlikely, by this
means alone, to secure any adequate representation in the Legis-
lature, a number of special seats will be assigned to them as
shown in the table. These seats will be filled by election from
special constituencies in which only members of the " depressed
classes " electorally qualified will be entitled to vote. Any person
voting in such a special constituency will, as stated above, be also
entitled to vote in a general constituency. It is intended that
these constituencies should be formed in selected areas where the
Depressed Classes are most numerous, and that, except in Madras,
they should not cover the whole area of the Province.

In Bengal it seems possible that in some general constitu-
encies a majority of the voters will belong to the Depressed
Classes. Accordingly, pending further investigation, no number
has been fixed for the members to be returned from the special
Depressed Class constituencies in that Province. It is intended
to secure that the Depressed Classes should obtain not less than
10 seats in the Bengal Legislature.

The precise definition in each Province of those who (if
electorally qualified) will be entitled to vote in the special Depress-
ed Class constituencies has not yet been finally determined. It
will be based as a rule on the general principles advocated in the
Franchise Committee's Report. Modification may, however, be
found necessary in some Provinces in Northern India where the
application of the general criteria of untouchability might result
in a definition unsuitable in some respects to the special condi-
tions of the Province.

His Majesty's Government do not consider that these special
Depressed Class constituencies will be required for more than
a limited time. They intend that the Constitution shall provide
that they shall come to an end after 20 years ifvthey have not

455

Pakistan

previously been abolished under the general powers of electoral
revision referred to in paragraph 6.

10. Election to the seats allotted to Indian Christians will
be by voters voting in separate communal electorates. It seems
almost certain that practical difficulties will, except possibly in
Madras, prevent the formation of Indian Christian constituencies
covering the whole area of the Province, and that accordingly
special Indian Christian constituencies will have to be formed
only in one or two selected areas in the Province. Indian Christ-
ian voters in these areas will not vote in a general constituency.
Indian Christian voters outside these areas will vote in a general
constituency. Special arrangements may be needed in Bihar
and Orissa, where a considerable proportion of the Indian Christ-
ian community belongs to the aboriginal tribes.

11. Election to the seats allotted to Anglo-Indians will be by
voters voting in separate communal electorates. It is at present
intended, subject to investigation of any practical difficulties that
may arise, that the Anglo-Indian constituencies shall cover the
whole area of each Province, a postal ballot being employed;
but no final decision has yet been reached.

12. The method of filling the seats assigned for representa-
tives from backward areas is still under investigation, and the
number of seats so assigned should be regarded as provisional
pending a final decision as to the constitutional arrangements to
be made in relation to such areas.

13. His Majesty's Government attach great importance to
securing that the new Legislatures should contain at least a small
number of women members. They feel that at the outset this
object could not be achieved without creating a certain number
of seats specially allotted to women. The3' also feel that it is
essential that women members should not be drawn dispropor-
tionately from one community. They have been unable to find
any system which would avoid this risk, and would be consistent
with the rest of the scheme for representation which they have
found it necessary to adopt, except that of limiting the electorate
for each special women's seat to voters from one community.*
The special women's seats have accordingly been specifically

• Subject to one exception, see nfcte (e) to Table, Appendix XVI
456

Appendices

divided, as shown in the table, between the various communities.
The precise electoral machinery to be employed in these special
constituencies is still under consideration.

14. The seats allotted to u Labour " will be filled from non-
communal constituencies. The electoral arrangements have still
to be determined, but it is likely that in most Provinces the
Labour constituencies will be partly trade union and partly
special constituencies as recommended by the Franchise Com-
mittee.

15. The special seats allotted to Commerce and Industry,
Mining and Planting will be filled by election through Chambers
of Commerce and various Associations. The details of the
electoral arrangements for these seats must await further
investigation.

16. The special scats allotted to Land-holders will be filled
by election by special Land-holders' constituencies.

17. The method to be employed for election to the Univer-
sity seats is still under consideration.

18. His Majesty's Government have found it impossible in
determining these questions of representation in the Provincial
Legislatures to avoid entering into considerable detail. There
remains, nevertheless, the determination of the constituencies.
They intend that this task should be undertaken in India as
early as possible.

It is possible that in some instances delimitation of consti-
tuencies might be materially improved by slight variations from
the numbers of seats now given. His Majesty's Government
reserve the right to make such slight variations, for such purpose,
provided that they would not materially affect the essential
balance between communities. No such variations will, how-
ever, be made in the case of Bengal and Punjab.

19. The question of the composition of Second Chambers
in the Provinces has so far received comparatively little attrition
in the constitutional discussions and requires further considera-
tion before a decision is reached as to which Provinces shall
have a Second Chamber or a scheme is drawn up for their
composition.

457

Pakistan

His Majesty's Government consider that the composition of
the Upper House in 'a Province should be such as not to disturb
in any essential the balance between the communities resulting
fram the composition of the Lower House.

20. His Majesty's Government do not propose at present
to enter into the question of the size and composition of the
Legislature at the Centre, since this involves among other ques-
tions that of representation of the Indian States which still needs
further discussion. They will, of course, when considering the
composition, pay -full regard to the claims of all communities for
adequate representation therein.

21. His Majesty's Government have already accepted the
principle that Sind should be constituted a separate Province, if
satisfactory means of financing it can be found. As the financial
problems involved still have to be reviewed in connection with
other problems of federal finance, His Majesty's Government
have thought preferable to include, at this stage, figures for a
Legislature for the existing Province of Bombay, in addition to
the schemes for separate Legislatures for Bombay Presidency
proper and Sind.

22. The figures given for Bihar and Orissa relate to the
existing Province. The question of constituting a separate
Province of Orissa is still under investigation.

23. The inclusion in the table of figures relating to a
Legislature for the Central Provinces including Bcrar does not
imply that any decision has yet been reached regarding the
future constitutional position of Berar.

London,

4th August, 1932.

458

Appendices

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459

Pakistan

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460

Appendices
APPENDIX XIX

•^

SUPPLEMENTARY COMMUNAL AWARD*

"Then there was the question of the representation of com-
munities in the Centre, particularly of the Muslim community,
There, I think, I can say definitely — I think I have said it in-
directly very often before — that the Government consider that
the Muslim community should have a representation 33£ pei
cent, in the Federal Centre. As far as Indian India is concerned
that must be a matter for arrangement between the communities
affected and the princes, but, so far as the British Government
has any part in the question we will, at any time, give our good
offices to making it as easy as possible for the arrangement
between those parties with regard to the future allocation oJ
seats."

*The Communal Award of His Majesty's Government (Appendix XVIII) did noi
give any decision regarding the Muslim claim fc-r 33^ per cent, representation ir
the Central Government. The decision of His Majesty's Government on this clairr
was announced by the Secretary oi State for India on 24th December 1932 in the
course of his statement to the Third Round Table Conference.

461

Pakistan

APPENDIX XX
POONA PACT*

(1) There shall be seats reserved for the Depressed Classes
out of the general electorate seats in the Provincial Legislatures
as follows : —

Madras 30: Bombay with Sincl 15; Punjab 8; Bihar and
Orissa 18; Central Provinces 20; Assam 7; Bengal 30; United
Provinces 20 ; Total 148.

These figures are based on the total strength of the Provin-
cial Councils, announced in the Prime Minister's decision.

(2) Election to these seats shall be by joint electorates
subject, however, to the following procedure :

All the members of the Depressed Classes registered in the
general electoral roll in a constituency will form an electoral
college, which will elect a panel of four candidates belonging
to the Depressed Classes for each of such reserved seats, by the
method of the single vote ; the four persons getting the highest
number of votes in such primary election, shall be candidates
for election by the general electorate. *

(3) Representation of the Depressed Classes in the Central
Legislature shall likewise b^on the principle of joint electorates
and reserved seats by the method of primary election in the
manner provided for in Clause two above, for their representa-
tion in the Provincial Legislatures.

(4) In the Central Legislature, eighteen per cent, of the seats
allotted to the general electorate for British India in the said
Legislature shall be reserved for the Depressed Classes.

(5) The system of primary election to a panel of candidates
for election to the Central and Provincial Legislatures, as herein-
before mentioned, shall come to an end after the first ten years,
unless terminated sooner by mutual agreement under the provi-
sion of Clause six below,

(6) The system of representation of the Depressed Classes
by reserved seats in the Provincial and Central Legislatures as

* Signed on 25th September 1932.
452

Appendices

provided for in Clauses 1 and 4 shall continue until determined
by mutual agreement between the communities concerned in the
settlement.

(7) Franchise for the Central and Provincial Legislatures for
the Depressed Classes shall be as indicated in the Lothian Com-
mittee Report.

(8) There shall be no disabilities attaching to anyone on
the ground of his being a member of the Depressed Classes in
regard to any elections to local bodies or appointment to the
Public Services. Kvery endeavour shall be made to secure fail-
representation of the Depressed Classes in these respects, subject
to such educational qualifications as may be laid down for
appointment to the Public ServicCvS.

(9) In every province, out of the educational grant an ade-
quate sum shall be earmarked for providing educational facilities
to the members of the Depressed Classes.

463

Pakistan

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464

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465

Pakistan

APPENDIX XXIII

COMMUNAL REPRESENTATION IN SERVICES
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA RESOLUTION*

Establishments

the 4th July 1934

SECTION I— GENERAL

No. F. 14/17-B./33. — In accordance with undertakings
given in the Legislative Assembly the Government of India
have carefully reviewed the results of the policy followed since
1925 of reserving a certain percentage of direct appointments to
Government service for the redress of communal inequalities.
It has been represented that though this policy was adopted
mainly with the object of securing increased representation for
Muslims in the public services, it has failed to secure for them
their due share of appointments and it has been contended that
this position cannot be remedied unless a fixed percentage of
vacancies is reserved for Muslims. In particular, attention has
been drawn to the small number of Muslims in the Railway
services, even on those railways which run through areas in
which Muslims form a high percentage of the total population.

The review of the position has shown that these complaints
are justified, and the Government of India are satisfied by the
enquiries they have made that the instructions regarding recruit-
ment must be revised with a view to improving the position of
Muslims in the services.

2. In considering this general question the Government of
India have also to take into account the claims of Anglo-Indians
and Domiciled Europeans and of the depressed classes. Anglo-
Indians have always held a large percentage of appointments in
certain branches of the public service and it has been recognised
that, in view of the degree to which the community has been
dependent on this employment, steps must be taken to prevent in
the new conditions anything in the nature of a rapid displacement
of Anglo-Indians from their existing positions, which might occa-
sion a violent dislocation of the economic structure of the com-

* Gazette of India. Part I. July 7, 1934.
466

Appendices

munity. The instructions which follow in regard to the employ-
ment of Anglo-Indians and Domiciled Europeans in certain
departments are designed to give effect to this policy.

3. In regard to the depressed classes it is common ground
that all reasonable steps should be taken to secure for them a
fair degree of representation in the public services. The inten-
tion of caste Hindus in this respect was formally stated in the
Poona Agreement of 1932 and His Majesty's Government in
accepting that agreement took due note of this point. In the
present state of general education in these classes the Government
of India consider that no useful purpose will be served by reserv-
ing for them a definite percentage of vacancies out of the num-
ber available for Hindus as a whole, but the3^ hope to ensure
that duly qualified candidates from the depressed classes are not
deprived of fair opportunities of appointment merely because
they cannot succeed in open competition.

4. The Government of India have also considered care-
fully the position of minority communities other than those
mentioned above and are satisfied that the new rules will con-
tinue to provide for them, as at present, a reasonable degree of
representation in the services.

SECTION II— vSCOPE OF RULES

5. The Government of India propose to prescribe annual
returns in order to enable them to watch the observance of the
rules laid down below.

6. The general rules which the Government of India have
with the approval of the Secretary of State adopted with the
purpose of securing these objects are explained below. They
relate only to direct recruitment and not to recruitment by pro-
motion which will continue to be made as at present solely on
merit. They apply to the Indian Civil Service, the Central
Services, Class I and Class II, and the Subordinate Services tinder
the administrative control of the Government of India with the
exception of a few services and posts for which high technical
or special qualifications arc required, but do not apply to recruit-
ment for these Services in the province of Burma. In regard to
the Railways, they apply to all posts other than those of inferior

467

Pakistan

servants or labourers on the four State-managed Railways, and
the administrations of the Company -managed Railways will be
asked to adopt similar rules for the services on these Railways.

SECTION III— RULES FOR SERVICES RECRUITED
ON AN ALL-INDIA BASIS

7. (1) For the Indian Civil Service and the Central and
Subordinate Services to which recruitment is made on an All-
India basis, the following rules will be observed : —

(i) 25 per cent, of all vacancies to be filled by direct recruit-
ment of Indians, will be reserved for Muslims and 8 1/3 per cent,
for other minority communities.

(ii) When recruitment is made by open competition, if
Muslims or the other minority communities obtain less than these
percentages, these percentages will be secured to them by means
of nomination ; if, however, Muslims obtain more than their
reserved percentage in open competition, no reduction will be
made in the percentage reserved for other minorities, while if
the other minorities obtain more than their reserved percentage
in open competition, no reduction will be made in the percentage
reserved for Muslims.

(iii) If members of the othei minoiity communities obtain
less than their reserved percentage in open competition and if
duly qualified candidates are not available for nomination, the
residue of the S 1 3 per cent, will be available foi Muslims.

(iv) The percentage of 8 1 3 reserved for the other minorities
will not be distributed among them in any fixed proportion.

(v) In alj cases a minimum standard of qualification will be
imposed and the reservations are subject to this condition.

(vi) In order to secure fair representation for the depressed
classes duly qualified members of these classes may be nominat-
ed to a public service, even though recruitment to that service is
being made by competition. Members of these classes, if appoint-
ed by nomination, will not count against the percentages reserved
in accordance with clause (i) above.

(2) For the reasons given in paragraph 2 of this Resolution,
the Government of India have paid special attention to the ques-
tion of Anglo-Indians and Domiciled Kuropeans iu the gazetted
posts on the Railways for which recruitment is made on an All-
India basis. Iu order to maintain approximately their present
representation in these posts the Anglo-Indian and Domiciled

468

A ppendtces

European community will require to obtain about 9 per cent, of
the total vacancies available to members of Indian communities.
The Government of India have satisfied themselves that at present
the community is obtaining by promotions to these gazetted posts
and by direct recruitment to them more than 9 per cent, of these
vacancies. In these circumstances, it has been decided that no
special reservation is at present required. If and when the com-
munity is shown to be receiving less than 9 per cent, of the
vacancies, it will be considered what adjustments in regard to
direct recruitment may be reqtiired to safeguard their legitimate
interests.

SECTION IV— RULKS FOR vSRRVICES RKCRUITKD
LOCALLY

(3) In the case of all services to which recruitment is made
by local areas and not on an All-India basis, e.g., subordinate
posts in the Railways, Posts and Telegraphs Department, Customs
Service, Income-tax Department, etc., the general rules prescrib-
ed above will apply subject to the following modifications : —

(1) The total reservation for India as a whole of 25 per
cent, for Muslims and of 8 1,3 percent, for other minorities will
be obtained by fixing a percentage for each Railway or local area
or circle having regard to the population ratio of Muslims and
other minority communities in the area and the rules for recruit-
ment adopted by the local Government of the area concerned;

(2) In the case of the Railways and Posts and Telegraphs
Department and Customs Service in which the Anglo-Indian and
Domiciled European community is at present principally employ-
ed special provisions described in the next paragraph are required
in order to give effect to the policy stated in paragraph 2 above.

9. (1) (a) The Anglo-Indian and Domiciled European
community at present holds 8*8 per cent, of the subordinate posts
on the Railways. To safeguard their position 8 per cent, of all
vacancies to be filled by direct recruitment will be reserved for
members of this community. This total percentage will be
obtained by fixing a separate percentage (i) for each Railway
having regard to the number of members of this community at
present employed, (ii) for each branch or department of the
Railway service, so as to ensure that Anglo-Indians continue to
be employed in those branches in which they are at present

469

Pakistan

principally employed, e.g., the Mechanical Engineering, Civil
Engineering and Traffic Departments. No posts in the higher
grades of the subordinate posts will be reserved, and promotion
to these grades will be made, as at present, solely on merit.

(b) The reservation of 25 per cent, for Muslims and 8 per
cent, for Anglo-Indians makes it necessary to increase the reser-
vation of 33 1 per cent., hitherto adopted for all minority com-
munities, in order to safeguard the interests of minorities other
than Muslims and Anglo-Indians. It has been decided, there-
fore, to reserve for them 6 per cent, of vacancies filled by direct
recruitment, which is approximately the percentage of posts held
by members of these communities at present. This total reserva-
tion will be obtained in the manner prescribed in paragraph 8
(1) of this Resolution and will not be further sub-divided among
the minority communities.

(2) In the Posts and Telegraphs Department the same prin-
ciples will be followed as in the case of the Railways for safe-
guarding the interests of the Anglo-Indian and Domiciled
European community which at present holds about 2'2per cent,
of all subordinate posts. It has been ascertained that if a reserva-
tion is made for this community of 5 per cent, of the vacancies
in the branches, departments or categories which members of
this community may reasonably be expected to enter, it will
result in securing for them a percentage equal to slightly less
than the percentage of subordinate posts which they at present
hold. In the departments or branches in which a special reserva-
tion is made for Anglo-Indians the reservation of vacancies for
other minorities will be fixed so as to be equal approximately to
the percentage of subordinate posts at present held by them.
The total reservation for Anglo-Indians and other minority
communities, other than Muslims, will in any case be not less
than 8& per cent.

(3) Anglo-Indians are at present largely employed in sub-
ordinate posts in the Appraising Department and in the Superior
Preventive Service at the major ports. For the former depart-
ment special technical qualifications are required, and in accord-
ance with the general principles indicated in paragraph 6 of this
Resolution it will be excluded from the operation of these rules.

470

Appendices

In the Preventive Service special qualifications are required, and
the present system of recruitment whereby posts are reserved for
Anglo-Indians will be maintained.

ORDER. — Ordered that this Resolution be communicated
to all Local Governments and Administrations and the several
Departments of the Government of India, for information ( and
guidance) and that it be also published in the Gazette of India.

M. G. HALLET,
Secretary to the Government of India.

471

Pakistan
APPENDIX XXIV

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA RESOLUTION OF 1943 ON

COMMUNAL REPRESENTATION OF SCHEDULED

CASTES IN THE SERVICES

HOME DEPARTMENT

RESOLUTION
New Delhi, the lllh August 1943

No. 23/5/42 - Ests( S ). — In pursuance of the undertaking
given in the Central Legislative Assembly in 1942, the Govern-
ment of India have carefully reviewed the policy which they
have followed since 1934 in regard to the representation of
Depressed Classes, since described in the Government of India
Act, 1935 as 'Scheduled Castes', in services under their adminis-
trative control. In their Resolution No. F. 14/17-B/33, dated the
4th July 1934, the Government of India stated that in the then
state of general education among these classes they did not con-
sider that any useful purpose would be served by reserving for
them a definite percentage of vacancies. In order, however, to
secure fair representation for Scheduled Castes they directed that
duly qualified members of these classes might be nominated to a
public service even though recruitment to that service was being
made by competition. Various measures have been taken since
then to secure increased representation of the Scheduled Castes
ill the public services. The results obtained so far have, however,
not been substantial. While the Government of India recognize
that this is mainly due to the difficulty of getting suitably quali-
fied candidates, they now consider that the reservation of a
definite percentage of vacancies might provide the necessary
stimulus to candidates of these castes to obtain better qualifica-
tions and thus make themselves eligible for various Government
posts and services. It is believed that the grant of age conces-
sions and the reduction of prescribed fees might also help to
secure qualified candidates from among members of the Schedul-
ed Castes. The Government of India have accordingly decided
to prescribe the rules mentioned in paragraph 4 below.

472

Appendices

2. On the basis of the proportion which the population of
the Scheduled Castes bears to the population of the other com-
munities entitled to a share in the present unreserved vacancies,
the Scheduled Castes would be entitled to 12.75 per cent, out of
the total number of such vacancies. It is, however, not likely
that sufficient number of candidates from the Scheduled Castes
would be forthcoming to fill the full number of vacancies to
which they are entitled on a population basis. The Government
of India have, therefore, come to the conclusion that for the
present it will be sufficient- to reserve a somewhat smaller per-
centage, viz., 8 1/3. They propose to consider the question of
raising this percentage as soon as a sufficient number of qualified
candidates from these classes are found to be available.

3. The rules mentioned below will apply only to direct
recruitment and not to recruitment by promotion which will
continue to be made as at present without reference to communal
considerations. They will apply to Central Services (Class I and
Class II) and the Subordinate Services under the administrative
control of the Government of India with the exception of a few
services and posts for which highly technical or special qualifi-
cations are required and which have been excluded from the
purview of the communal representation orders contained in
their Resolution No. F. 14/1 7-13/33, dated the <Hh July 1934. In
regard to the Railways, the rules will apply to all posts other than
those of inferior servants and labourers. The administrations
of the Company-managed Railways will be asked to adopt similar
rules for the services on those Railways.

4. The following rules will therefore be observed in future
in order to secure better representation of the Scheduled Castes
in public services : —

0) 8 1/3 per cent, of all vacancies to be filled by direct
recruitment of Indians in the Central and Subordinate vServices
to which recruitment is made on an all-India basis will be reserv-
ed for Scheduled Castes candidates.

(2) In the case of services to which recruitment is made
by local areas or circles and not on an all-India basis, e.g., sub-
ordinate posts in the Railways, Posts and Telegraphs Department,
the Customs Services, the Income-Tax Department, etc., the total

473

Pakistan

reservation for India as a whole of 8 1/3 per cent, of vacancies for
Scheduled Castes candidates will be obtained by fixing a percent-
age for each local area or circle having regard to the population
of vScheduled Castes in the area or circle concerned and the rules
for recruitment adopted by the Provincial Government of the
area or circle concerned.

(3) When recruitment is made by open competition and
Scheduled Castes candidates obtain fewer vacancies than are
reserved for them, the difference will, if possible, be made up by
the nomination of duly qualified candidates of those castes.

(4) If Scheduled Castes candidates obtain less than the
number of vacancies reserved for them in open competition and
duly qualified candidates of these castes are not available, or not
available in sufficient numbers, for nomination, the remaining
vacancies reserved for such candidates will be treated as unreserv-
ed ; but a corresponding number of vacancies will be reserved
for them in that year under clause (1) or clause (2) above.

(5) If duly qualified candidates of the Scheduled Castes are
again not available to fill the vacancies carried forward from the
previous year under clause (4), the vacancies not filled by them
will be treated as unreserved.

(6) In all cases, a minimum standard of qualification will
be prescribed and the reservation will be subject to this condition.

(7) The maximum age limit prescribed for appointment to
a service or post will be increased by three years in the case of
candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes.

(8) The fees prescribed for admission to any examination
or selection will be reduced to one-fourth in the case of candi-
dates belonging to the Scheduled Castes.

(9) The orders contained in the foregoing rules will also
apply to temporary vacancies lasting three months or longer,
including vacancies in permanent posts filled temporarily by
persons not permanently employed in Government service.

(10) For the purposes of these rules a person shall be held
to be a member of the Scheduled Castes if he belongs
to a caste which under the Government of India (Scheduled

474

Appendices

Castes) Order, 1936, has been declared to be a Scheduled Caste
for the area in which he and his family ordinarily reside.

Order. — Ordered that a copy of this Resolution be commu-
nicated to all Chief Commissioners, the several Departments of
the Government of India, the Director, Intelligence Bureau, and
the Federal Public Service Commission for information and
guidance ; to the Political Department, the Crown Finance
Department, the Secretary to the Governor-General (Public), the
Secretary to the Governor-General (Reforms), the Secretary to
the Governor-General ( Personal ), the Legislative Assembly
Department, the Federal Court, the Military Secretary to His
Excellency the Viceroy, and all Provincial Governments for infor-
mation, and also that the Resolution be published in the Gazette
of India.

E. CONRAN-SMITH, Secy.

475

Pakistan

APPENDIX XXV

CRIPPS PROPOvSALS

Published on March 29, 1941

DRAFT DECLARATION FOR DISCUSSION
WITH INDIAN LEADERS

His Majesty's Government having considered the anxieties
expressed in this country and in India as to the fulfilment of
promises made in regard to the future of India have decided to
lay down in precise and clear terms the steps which they propose
shall be taken for the earliest possible realisation of self-govern-
ment in India. The object is the creation of a new Indian Union
which shall constitute a Dominion associated with the United
Kingdom and other Dominions by a common allegiance to the
Crown but equal to them in every respect, in no way subordinate
in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs.

His Majesty's Government, therefore, make the following
Declaration:

(a) Immediately upon cessation of hostilities steps shall be
taken to set up in India In manner described hereafter
an elected body charged with the task of framing a new
Constitution for India.

(b) Provision shall be made, as set out below, for partici-
pation of Indian States in the Constitution-making body.

(i) The right of any Province of British India that
is not prepared to accept the new Constitution to
retain its present constitutional position, provision
being made for its subsequent accession if it so
decides.

With such non-acceding Provinces, should they so
desire, His Majesty's Government will be prepar-
ed to agree upon a new Constitution giving them
the same full status as the Indian Union and

476

Appendices

arrived at by a procedure analogous to that here
laid down.

(ii) The signing of a Treaty which shall be negotiated
between His Majesty's Government and the
Constitution-making body. This Treaty will
cover all necessary matters arising out of the
complete transfer of responsibility from British
to Indian hands ; it will make provision, in
accordance with undertakings given by His
Majesty's Government, for the protection of racial
and religious minorities ; but will not impose any
restriction on the power of the Indian Union to
decide in future its relationship to other Member
States of the British Commonwealth.

Whether or not an Indian State elects to adhere to
the Constitution it will be necessary to negotiate a
revision of its Treaty arrangements so far as this
may be required in the new situation.

(d) The Constitution-making body shall be composed
as follows unless the leaders of Indian opinion in the
principal communities agree upon some other form
before the end of hostilities : —

Immediately upon the result being known of Provincial
Klectioiis which will be necessary at the end of hostili-
ties, the entire membership of the Lower Houses of
Provincial Legislatures shall as a single electoral college
proceed to the election of the Constitution-making body
by the system of provincial representation. This new
body shall be in number about 1/1 Oth of the number of
the electoral college.

Indian States shall be invited to appoint representatives
in the same proportion to their total population as in
the case of representatives of Brit:sh India as a whole
and with the same powers as British Indian members.

(e) During the critical period which now faces India and
until the New Constitution can be framed His Majesty's
Government must inevitably bear the responsibility for
and retain the control and direction of the defence of

477

Pakistan

India as part of their world war effort, but the task
of organising to the full the military, moral and material
resources of India must be the responsibility of the
Government of India with the co-operation of the
people of India. His Majesty's Government desire and
invite the immediate and effective participation of the
leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people
in the counsels of their country, of the Commonwealth
and of the United Nations. Thus they will be enabled to
give their active and constructive help in the discharge
of a task which is vital and essential for the future
freedom of India.

478

INDEX

Barkat AH, Mr. — Transformation of 'his
ideology 316-320.

Boundaries — The Punjab, Sind, Bengal
6-7; Pakistan 100-101; Rev.
Michael O'Flanagan on geogra-
phical and physical boundaries 364.
See also Ireland.

Canada — Communal antagonism 345-
346.

Congress — Communal award 24 — Re-
presentative character of Muslim
League 25 — Inclusion of Muslim
ministers in cabinet 28 — Coalition
ministry 29 — Good government
vs. self-government 29-30; Failure
to solve the communal question
260-261; Political aim 263-264;
History of development of politi-
cal aim 269-279 ; Mass contact to
produce political union 337-339 ;
Resolution on Pakistan 396 ;
International Board of Arbitration
413-414.

Communal Award — In its 'lesser'
intent and 'greater' intent 89-99;
Statutory majority in the Punjab
and Bengal 250 ; Supplementary
communal award 461 ; Text 453-
458 ; see also Congress, Hindus.

Cripps, Sir Stafford — His proposals 476-
478 ; Accession and secession of
provinces 393-394 ; Difference be-
tween his proposals and the au-
thor's scheme 393-395.

Czechoslovakia — History of 201-202;
Causes of Destruction 203-207 ,
Lesson from 207-211.

Defence — Scientific frontiers 51-52;
Resources of Pakistan and Hin-
dustan 53-55; Simon Commis-
sion's table on composition of the
army 56 ; Recruitment in the last
world war (table) 56 ; Martial and
non-martial classes 57-62 ;

Changes in composition of Indian
infantry 60; Simon Commission
on two-fold duty of Indian army
63-64 ; Changes in communal
composition of Indian army (table)
65-66; Peel Commission on weak-
ness of Bengal army 78; Special

Army Committee's recommenda-
tions 79 ; Questions and replies in
Central Legislative Assembly in
1938 on communal composition
of army 68-76 ; Loyalty of Muslim
army in free India 81-84, 360.

Depressed Classes — Muslim attitude
towards 235; Poona Pact 251;
Text of Poona Pact 464-465 ; Re-
presentation in services 474-477.

Gandhi, M. K. — Civil Disobedience
8-9 ; Linguistic provinces 9-10 ;
Efforts for Hindu-Muslim unity
135-152; Attitude towards Paki-
stan scheme 404-405 ; Quit India
campaign 407; Talks, with Mr.
Jinnah 407-409.

Government of India — Act of 1935 :
Allocation of seats for legislatures
444-452 — Comparative statement
of minority representation 466-
467 — Resolution of 1934-1943 on
communal 'representation in ser-
vices 468-477.

Hindu Maha Sabha — Not religious but
political body 121-122; Indiffer-
ence to social reform 229 ; Cham-
pioning of Hindu States 229;
Political aim 263-264 ; Interpre-
tation of self-determination 369.

Hindu-Muslim Unity — Khilafat and
non-co-operation movements 136-
146 ; Efficacy of Time and Gov-
ernment as a unifying force 178-
179; Political and social 180-181;
History of attempts to bring
about 298-307, 323-326. See also
Gandhi, Roman Empire.

Hindus — Nationalism and Pakistan
(Introduction); Objection to Com-
munal Award 89-94,96: Position
in legislatures after Pakistan
(table*) 105-106; of the Pun-
jab, Bengal and Sind, their atti-
tude to the redrawing of provin-
cial boundaries 110-113 ; Alterna-
tives to Pakistan 117-120, 120-
134; A nation 129-130; Points for
consideration regarding Muslim
alternative to Pakistan 195 ;
Social reform 227-228, 230-238;

479

INDEX — ( Continued)

Apprehension of Muslim domina-
tion in independent India 264-
269; Attitude to Muslim senti-
ment re : Pakistan 362-363.

International Board of Arbitration —

412. See also Congress.

Ireland — Geographical and historical
boundaries 364 ; Sir Edward Car-
son on delimitation ol boundaries
of Ulster 375-376 ; Genesis of par-
tition 397-401 ; No precedent for
Pakistan 401.

Islam — Social reform 215-223; Rcnan
on 224-225; Apostasy 230-233,
Impossibility oi representative
government in India 280-290;
Pan-lslamism 200-202. 326-329.
See rilso Muslims.

Jinnah, Mr. M. A. — Fourteen points
246-248; Amendments proposed
to Nehru Repoit 303-304 : Muslim
question 308-316, 323; Obsession
with now-touml laith of national-
ism 340-350 , Formation ol nun-
communal party S56 ; Leadership
oi League 356-358, Silence on
proposed boundaries oi Pakistan
367-360; Theory oi sub-iiation.il
groups 373-375; Transformation
into man of masses 405 ; Points le :
Pakistan on which he observes
silence 41 1.

Khilafat Movement — See Hindu-Mu«-
Irrn Unity.

Lu'cknow Pact — 243- J4
255-257.

Weightage

Muslim League — Lahore Resolution
Text 3; Opposition to use oi
Indian army against Muslim
powers 84-85; Why it wanted
communal provinces 96-07 ; Will-
ingness in 1030 to exclude predo-
minantly non- Muslim areas trom
Pakistan 100 , Political aim 260-
261; Pirpur Committee's Report
on' grievances in Congress piovm-
ces.,348; Policy' tinder Mr. Jinnalfs
leadership 355-357 ; Attitude to
non-Muslim minorities 377:
Growth of influence in the Punjab
and Bengal 406-407. Sec also
Congress. Self-determination

480

Muslims — Grievances against Hindus
24-27; Decline and fall under
British rule 30-32 ; Invasion of
India 37-48 ; Demand at R. T. C.
for separate electorate and weight-
age 89-90; Creation of Muslim
majority provinces 95 ; Redraw-
ing of provincial boundaries 107-
110; In other countries 124-125;
Child marriage 215 ; Position of
women 216 ; Caste system 218-
220 ; Purdah system and its evils
220-222 ; Social and political stag-
nation, causes and effects 222-
238; Political aggression 239-
255 ; Exploitation of Hindu weak-
ness 250-260 ; Refusal to maintain
India's freedom 264-265 ; Attitude
to Nehru Report 279-282, 303-
304 ; Transformation of ideology
326-334 ; National frustration 334-
336 ; Fulfilment of their destiny
and Pakistan 336-337; Loss of
faith in Congress majority 348-
349 ; Objections to Hindu raj
352-354; How to avoid Hindu ra?
in undivided India 335-356; Ad-
dress to Lord Minto (1006) and
reply thereto 428-443. Sec also
Hindus, Islam, Jinnah, Muslim
League, Savarkar.

Nation — Feeling of nationality 13 ;
Common features between Hindu
and Muslim society 14-15; Race,
language, common country, com-
mon historical antecedents 16-18 ;
Forgethilncss 18-10; Latent exis-
tence oi nationality 20; Nation-
ality and nationalism 21 , Euro-
pean nationalities 23-24 ; National
state and national home 107-109 ;
Lessons Irom multi-national
states • see Canada, Czechoslo-
vakia, South Africa. Switzerland,

Turkey ; and community, a

distinction 320-322; The people
350; sec also Muslims, Jinnah.

Nehru Report — Congress attitude to
276 302; Muslim attitude to 279-
282, 303-304.

Non-Co-operation — Movement of 1920.
its genesis 137-141 ; Hindu fears
and Mr. Gandhi's advice 142-143.

Pakistan — Hindu nationalism (Intro-
duction) ; Central government
(Introduction) : Lahore Resolu-
tion text 3-4 ; Sir Mahomed Iqbal

INDEX— ( Continued)

on 5 ; movement and Rehmat

Ali 5 ; Its resources 53-55; Contri-
bution to Central Exchequer (table)
86; Solution of communal ques-
tion 98, 104-105; Muslim popu-
lation 104; Psychological advan-
tage 106-107; Other alternatives
189-194; Philosophical justifica-
tion 320-322 ; vs. a forced political
union 334-336 ; Limitation on case
for 343-346; Muslim minority in
Hindustan 358 ; Author's position
360; Lesson from Ireland to
opponents of 363-364 ; Communal
problem within 375 ; Solution of
the problem ; a scheme and its
explanation 384-393; Solution of
the problem : by the people 397 ;
By the British* Government after
the Irish precedent 397-401; Is-
sues emerging from the discussion
of 403-404 ; Arbitration by Inter-
national body 412. See also
Boundaries, Savarkar, Self-deter-
mination.

Population — Distribution of, and a
homogeneous Muslim State 100-
101, 417-427; Maps No. 1, 2, 3 ;
Transfer and exchange of : Be-
tween Turkey and Greece 101-
102; between Hindustan and
Pakistan 103 ; Difficulties in way
of transfers 378; Scheme to re-
move difficulties 378-380 ; Transfer

compulsory or voluntary 380-381
Period for, and cost of optional
migration 381.

Rajagopalachariar, E. — His formula and
its defects 408-411.

Riots — Hindu-Muslim riots during
1920-1940 152-177; diagnosis by
Simon Commission 179-180.

Roman Empire — Political and religious
unity 182-184.

Savarkar, V. D. — His alternative to
Pakistan 120-130; His theory of
two nations 31 ; Criticism of hts
alternative 131-134.

Self-determination — Meaning 369;
Hindu Maha Sabha's interpretation
of 369 ; Muslim League's interpre
tation of 369 ; By the people 369-
370 ; Its imperative character
370 ; Mr. O'Connor on 370 ; Cul-
tural and territorial independence
371 ; Application to boundaries of
Pakistan 371-372.

South Africa — Lessons from 346-348.

Switzerland — Lessons from 350-351,
353.

Turkey — History of 197-201; Reasons
for disruption of 202-203 ; Lessons
from its history 207-211.

W.P.P. 128

481

\SLSLU \

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