The Panama canal

THE

PANAMA
CANAL

DUNCAN &.M^KJNLAY

University of California • Berkeley

DUNCAN E. McKINLAY

Who as a Member of Congress

Visited the Canal with the

Interstate Committee of

the House

THE BIG FOUR OF THE PANAMA CAN AL—P resident William Mc-
Kinley, President William H. Taft, President Theodore Roosevelt and
Colonel G. W. Goethals.

THE

PANAMA CANAL

DUNCAN E. McKINLAY

1912
W H i T A K E R & RAY- W i r, <;r N Co .

SAN FRANCISCO

COPYRIGHT BY
WHITAKER & RAY-WIGGIN CO.

1912

DEDICATED
TO

PRESIDENT WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT
BY THE AUTHOR.

THE PANAMA CANAL

Of all subjects now occupying the attention of the world
at large, and of importance not only to the State of Cali-
fornia, but to all the territory west of the Rocky mountains
and the islands and coasts of the Pacific Ocean, over which
the American flag floats in sovereignity, none is paramount
to the construction of the Panama Canal. The completion
of the canal, while a world event, will, of course, be of
peculiar significance and importance to that portion of the
globe which borders on the Pacific Ocean. Countries,
islands, coasts and States that for centuries have been
isolated and far distant by water routes from the centers
of population of Europe and Eastern United States, will
be brought thousands of miles nearer to, and consequently,
into more intimate social, industrial and business relations
with the more highly organized governments of Europe and
America.

In effect, the opening of the canal in 1915 to the com-
merce and trade of the world will be the realization of the
dream of Columbus, who sailed across the Atlantic in 1492
to discover a shorter water route between Europe and Asia,
and the fulfillment of the prophecy of Baron von Humboldt,
who, between the years of 1799 and 1805, explored and sur-
veyed a great portion of Central and South America. Hum-
boldt, as a result of his explorations, predicted that within
a reasonable period of time the two largest oceans of the
world, the Atlantic and the Pacific, would be united by an

THE PANAMA CANAL

artificial water-way. This water-way, in his opinion, as ex-
pressed in a letter to his friend, the German poet Goethe,
would be constructed by the little republic at the north, the
United States, even then beginning to take an important
place among the powers of the world.

In 1867, the energy and foresight of Seward acquired
Alaska as an addition to American territory; and though
Seward was laughed at and reviled as a foolish dreamer
because of his purchase of a so-called iceberg and a fog-
bank, nevertheless, that able statesman and diplomat point-
ed out to the people of the United States that some day the
Pacific Ocean must become the world's greatest sea of
commerce and trade, and that in that day Alaska would be-
come one of the most valuable possessions of the Ameri-
can nation.

Those dreams and prophecies today are reaching their
culmination and fulfillment in the opening of the Panama
Canal, which will be celebrated in San Francisco, — yes, not
only in San Francisco, but throughout all California and the
sister States of the western coast — by the greatest interna-
tional exposition ever conducted in the history of civiliza-
tion. It will be a jubilee celebration in which all the
States and principalities, nations and empires of the world
will join in proud and thankful participation.

The History of the Canal

The idea of constructing an artificial water-way between
the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Panama is as old as the
discovery of America. Christopher Columbus, in early life,
became converted to the idea that the world was round,
and his studies led him to believe that by sailing in a direct
course and sailing far enough, he could circumnavigate the

RUINS OF SANTA DOMINIE CHURCH, PANAMA.

THE PANAMA CANAL

globe and come back to the point from which he started,
provided he could keep on that straight course. This be-
lief naturally led him to the conclusion that by sailing
westward from Spain, across the Atlantic, he could reach
the coasts and the islands of Asia, which about that time
were coming into great prominence as a desired market
for the exchange of the wares of the producers and the
manufacturers of Europe.

The only mistake made by Columbus was that he esti-
mated the circumference of the world at about 8.000 miles,
instead of over 24,000. Following his theory, Columbus
embarked on his first and greatest voyage, and was suc-
cessful, as we know, in discovering one of the islands of the
West Indies. Columbus made four voyages in all to the
newly discovered land, but it is doubtful as to whether
or not he ever reached the mainland of America. One of
his historians claims that on his last voyage he landed upon
the coast of Honduras in Central America, and on the land
now known as Venezuela, farther toward the south. This
fact is of little importance to us at this time. We do know,
however, that Columbus died in ignorance of the fact that
he had discovered a great continent instead of some of the
islands of the East Indies.

Immediately following the death of Columbus, his enter-
prising lieutenants, men like Vespucci, Ojeda, Balboa, and
others of equal prominence, pushed their explorations
farther westward, and Balboa, the boldest of the Spanish
conquistadores, fitted out an expedition in Hispaniola,
which island was then the base of operations of Spanish
exploration and conquest, and sailed across the narrow sea
to the coast of that portion of Central America we now
call Panama.

Balboa established a rendezvous and base of supplies

THE PANAMA CANAL

and operations on the coast, and thence continued his
journey inland, and on the 23rd of September, 1513, sur-
mounted the heights of Darien, and from that eminence be-
held the expansive stretches of watery waste known today
as the Pacific Ocean. Balboa, continuing his explorations
along the coasts of Panama, soon discovered that the land
was not an island, but a continent, and becoming acquaint-
ed with the Indians who inhabited the country, he learned
that there were two large bodies connected by a smaller
body.

Balboa understood this statement to mean two large
bodies of water connected by a smaller body of water, and
therefore, naturally came to the conclusion that the Indians
meant that the Pacific and the Atlantic Oceans were con-
nected at some point or other along the isthmus by a natural
water-way. What the Indians really meant was that there
were two large bodies of land, to the north and south, and
that these large bodies were connected by a long, narrow
strip of land, part of which he was then exploring.

The Spaniards, naturally eager to extend their explora-
tions into the great western ocean, began to search for the
connecting water-way, and this quest was continued by
them for nearly half a century; but they finally realized
that the two great oceans of the world were separated by
the impassable barrier of a continuous chain of mountain-
ous land. The conquerer of Mexico, Cortez, after finishing
the subjugation of the Indians of that part of the Spanish
possessions, in 1526, was commanded by the King of Spain
to proceed to the Isthmus and to assist in the search for
the secret water-way.

Cortez answered the command of the King by saying
that if he could not find the natural water-way he would
proceed to make one. The brave old soldier, all his life

THE PANAMA CANAL

trained in the habit of surmounting great difficulties, de-
clared that if there were obstacles and mountains, there
were also men with brains and hands, and that if he could
not find the water-way as commanded by the King, he
would carry out the order by constructing a canal to con-
nect the two oceans. And so, the idea of Columbus being
to find a short water-route between Europe and the East
Indies and coasts of Asia, by the completion of the Panama
Canal, the United States is carrying out the original pur-
pose of efforts of the discoverer of America and the orders
of the King of Spain to Cortez, to make an artificial water-
way which will shorten the lines of trade and commerce
around the globe.

Between those early days and the present time every
great maritime nation of the world has been interested in
isthmian canal construction — Spain, Portugal, Holland, Ger-
many, France, Great Britain and Italy have all, at one time
or another in the intervening years, considered the ad-
visability and feasibility of constructing a canal somewhere
across the narrow territory between the Atlantic and Pa-
cific.

Nine Different Routes Proposed

In all, nine routes have been surveyed or considered by
some nation or some company. The first route to the north
is known as the Tehuantepec route, which extends across
Mexico from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean, a
distance of nearly 200 miles, and over which route an Eng-
lish syndicate, headed by the Pearsons, is now operating
a splendid railroad system. Captain Eads, one of the most
prominent of American engineers of his time, advocated
the building of a ship railway over this route, a railway

THE PANAMA CANAL

so constructed that cars could be let down into the water
under the bottoms of ships, drawing them out of the water
and across the land to the ocean on the other side.

Of course, this project might have been feasible with the
smaller sized merchant ships of forty years ago, but it
would hardly be so for transporting the gigantic freighters
and passenger vessels that now traverse the seas.

The second route, towards the south, was called the
Honduras Bay route, a route across the Republic of Hon-
duras from Honduras Bay on the east to the Pacific.

The third route came to be known as the Nicaraguan
route. For a long time this was the most popular of all
the routes with the American Congress and the American
people. The Nicaraguan route contemplated the utilization
of the San Juan River on the east, between the Atlantic
Coast and the Nicaraguan lakes, the Nicaraguan lakes as
far as they extended westward, and thence through a canal
across the dividing land from the upper lake to Nicaragua
to the Pacific Ocean at Brita. The Nicaraguan route would
be 377 miles shorter between San Francisco and New York
than is the Panama route, along which the United States
is now constructing a canal.

A fourth route was surveyed between the Chirique La-
goon on the eastern side to the Pacific Ocean.

The Isthmian Routes

Three routes across the Isthmus of Panama have been
surveyed and considered — two besides the one which the
United States is now utilizing; and farther south two pos-
sible canal routes have been surveyed across the territory
of Colombia. The two southern routes would use the At-
ranto River as a part of their course, and from that river

THE PANAMA CANAL

across to the separating lands an excavation would be re-
quired.

Of these nine routes only three have been seriously
contemplated by the engineers of the various governments
and companies who have examined them. The three are
the Tehuantepec, the Nicaraguan, and the Panama Canal
route.

In the year 1800 all South American territory, with the
exception of Brazil and a few colonies, was under the
sovereignty of Spain, but about the year 1811 a series of
revolutions broke out in various parts of Central and South
America, having for their object the establishment of in-
dependent republics, and by 1823 all Central and South
American countries had achieved independence. The prov-
ince of Panama secured her independence in the year 1823,
maintained that independence for a short time and then
merged with the Republic of New Granda.

Panama remained a part of New Granda for several
years, and then became a part of the New Granadan and
Colombian confederacy, and continued to be a part of that
confederacy through various vicissitudes of fortune and
misfortune arising out of revolutions and war until Novem-
ber 3, 1903, when she seceded from the Colombian confeder-
acy, hoisted her old flag, and resumed her ancient nation-
ality.

In 1825, the South and Central American Republics, de-
siring to bring themselves into closer relations and sym-
pathy so that trade and commerce and industry might be
better developed, conceived the idea of holding a convention
in the City of Panama, in the year 1826. The United States
Government was invited to participate and take a prominent
part in that convention, and in order to induce the President
of the United States to send his representatives, the sub-

8 THE PANAMA CANAL

ject of canal construction across the Isthmus was to be one
of the most prominent subjects considered.

Henry Clay, the Secretary of State of the United States
at that time, was at first very eager to participate in the
Pan-American convention, but was prevented by objections
of the President from sending representatives to Panama.
However, he sent a note of felicitation and encouragement
and promised the support of the United States in any mu-
tual project that would be to the advantage of all the coun-
tries, and particularly pledged that support to any feasible
project of canal construction. This was the first official
interest taken by the United States in the construction of
an Isthmian Canal.

Like nearly all conventions, the one that was held in
Panama in 1826 met and resoluted a great deal and in-
dulged in much oratory, but adjourned without accomplish-
ing very much of practical value. However, a congress
composed of representatives of several of the South and
Central American States authorized the construction of
an Isthmian Canal, and actually went so far as to enter
into negotiations with a prominent engineer for the purpose
of having one constructed, at some point to be decided upon
later; but owing to revolutions and disorders soon after
developing, plans for the project were for the time aban-
doned.

In 1837 the Congress of the United States authorized
canal surveys to be made and a commission was appointed'
for the purpose of surveying and exploring the Central
American country so that data might be secured that would
give the American Congress information as to the practica-
bility of the different routes that might be utilized. From
that time on, until today, the subject of Panama Canal con-

THE PANAMA CANAL

struction has been almost constantly before the American
Congress.

Of course, action in that body was more or less sporadic.
The subject would be taken up from time to time when
some pressing need for quicker and cheaper transporta-
tion to the Pacific Coast made itself apparent.

In 1846 the United States entered into war with Mexico,
which engaged the energies of the nation for the time
being and canal legislation was forgotten. After the war
with Mexico came the discovery of gold in California, and
the rush of the argonauts to the Golden State made it
necessary that quicker and cheaper routes be established
than those around Cape Horn by water, or the long trail
over the plains and mountains to the Pacific Slope. A com-
pany was organized in New York which established a line
of transportation by means of steamers from New York
to Greytown, thence through the San Juan River to the
lakes of Nicaragua, and thence by the stage lines to the
Pacific Coast, where again vessels were taken for San
Francisco Bay and for the coasts of Oregon and Puget
Sound.

The Panama Railroad

About the same time a railway company was formed in
the United States which secured a concession from the Re-
public of Colombia for the purpose of constructing the rail-
way system across the Isthmus, which is now known as the
Panama Railroad. This railroad was completed in 1856,
and this addition to the means of transportation to the
Pacific Coast again indefinitely postponed the necessity
for canal construction.

In 1861 the United States drifted into the Civil War,

10 THE PANAMA CANAL

and once more the subject of canal construction was for-
gotten. After the close of the Civil War the transconti-
nental railroads, headed by the Union and Central Pacific
Companies, pushed their lines westward until they reached
the Pacific Coast, and as soon as the first railroad had
crossed the continent active opposition to canal constru-
tion began to show itself in the American Congress.

The transcontinental railroads, fearing opposition in
transportation, from that day until the Spooner bill was
passed, June 28, 1902, maintained an active lobby at
Washington, and whenever canal legislation was suggested,
having for its object the construction of an Isthmian Canal
at any point, this railroad opposition manifested itself in
every form, and no doubt canal construction by the United
States was postponed for many years by that agency.

However, in 1889, Congress authorized the incorpora-
tion of a company known as the Maritime Canal Company
of the United States, and under that authority Hiram Hitch-
cock, of New York, as president, together with Warner
Miller and several other capitalists, proceeded to raise about
six million dollars, which was actually used in obtaining
franchises and concessions from Costa Rica and Nicaragua
for a canal route through these countries. Some money
was also spent in doing necessary preliminary work.

The Maritime Canal Company was a favorite in the
United States for a great many years, principally because
it was championed by Senator J. T. Morgan, of Alabama.
Senator Morgan made this the dearest project of his later
life, and no doubt his last years of public service were em-
bittered by his failure to secure Government co-operation
for the building of the canal through Nicaraguan territory.

THE PANAMA CANAL 11

The French Company

In the meantime Count Ferdinand de Lesseps, the bril-
liant and successful French engineer, having completed the
Suez Canal, turned his attention to the Isthmian country.
After a thorough investigation of all the possible routes,
through a series of negotiations, he succeeded in securing
a franchise from the Republic of Colombia, giving him
authority to organize a French company and the right to
construct a canal between the little city of Aspinwall (now
known as Colon) on the eastern side, and the City of Pan-
ama on the Western side.

So great was the popularity of de Lesseps that he had
no difficulty in forming a strong company in France. The
stocks offered to the French public were subscribed for
rapidly. The French are a frugal people, and even the
poorest of the French peasants and working men have
always a little hoard of savings. The French people had
such confidence in de Lesseps' ability to complete success-
fully his great American enterprise that the first issue of
his stocks were taken almost at par.

De Lesseps' Plan

De Lesseps' plan contemplated the building of a sea-
level canal, 42 miles in length, from shore to shore, 100
feet wide and 28 feet deep. His authority from the Co-
lombian Government amounted to merely a right to ex-
cavate the canal, the Colombian Government retaining juris-
diction over the soil and the people. The estimate of the
cost of the type of canal proposed was fixed by the French
company at $120,000,000. The work of construction was
inaugurated on February 1, 1881, with ceremony by the

12 THE PANAMA CANAL

officers of the French company, and was participated in
by officials of France, Panama and Colombia. But within
a very short time, owing to the magnitude of the scale of
operations, coupled with wasteful business methods, the
first fund of $120,000,000 was expended.

The company put out a second issue of stock which they
offered to the people of France as the first issue had been
offered. This second issue was taken up as the first had
been, but with some suspicion on the part of the buyers.
The second issue sold at a considerable discount; still they
found purchasers, and again the coffers of the company
were supplied with cash.

But the wastefulness and extravagance of the company
continuing, the proceeds from the second issue of stock
were soon exhausted and a third issue was offered. The
sale of the third issue was made with a great deal of diffi-
culty, and premiums were given to prominent men of in-
fluence or authority, or any line of business, providing they
would use that influence in the marketing of the company's
shares. So flagrant did these irregularities become that
they culminated in criminal prosecutions.

The sum total of the capital stock subscribed to by the
buyers of the French Panama Company's shares was $393,-
505,100. This great volume of stock sold to the purchasers
produced for the company only $201,546,740, the difference
of $191,958,360 being lost in discounts and premiums paid
in marketing the stock.

Wastefulness of the French Company

This appalling exhibition of criminal wastefulness and
unlawful business methods caused the utter collapse of con-
fidence in the success of the enterprise, not only of the in-

THE PANAMA CANAL 13

vesting public of France, but of the world as well, and has-
tened the time when such methods must reach their logical
conclusion in bankruptcy. The old timers on the Isthmus
will tell the inquirer that of the enormous sum of money
raised by the French Canal Company, one-third was wasted,
one-third grafted and one third probably used in actual
work.

It seemed as if anyone who had any sort of influence
might sell that influence to the Panama company for some
kind of a consideration. On the Isthmus today they will
show you a storehouse containing about half a ship's cargo
of snow shovels which a manufacturing company in France
succeeded in selling to the French Panama Company, no
doubt in return for the influence they might be able to give
in assisting in the sale of the French Panama Company's
stocks. Of course, one can easily see the ridiculous side
of the purchase of half a cargo of snow shovels to be used
in the tropics.

Practical bankruptcy came in the year 1889, and from
that time on the French Canal Company simply held its
franchise and concessions from the Republic of Colombia
for speculative purposes only. Then the officers of the
French company, seeing that the United States Congress
was beginning to take a lively interest in canal construction,
and was showing signs of a disposition to pass legislation
that would commit the United States as a Nation to the
building of a canal, began to look toward the United States
as a prospective customer for their uncompleted canal pro-
ject at Panama. In the meantime the Nicaraguan company
had gone upon the rocks of bankruptcy, and they, too, were
offering their concessions and franchises to the American
Government. And so with these two propositions before

14 THE PANAMA CANAL

Congress, time drifted on to the opening of the war be-
tween our country and Spain.

When the Spanish war was declared, it was reported in
the United States that a Spanish fleet was cruising in
Asiatic waters. Of course, it was not known how strong
that fleet might be. There was no way of knowing whether
or not it would be able to cross the Pacific and take San
Francisco or some of the other cities or ports of the western
coast of the United States. So the Secretary of the Navy
ordered the crack battleship of the navy, the "Oregon," to
maintain her station in San Francisco Bay with steam up,
prepared to go into action at any moment.

Significance of the "Oregon's" Course

Everyone who lived around the Bay of San Francisco
in those days remembers what relief the news in the papers
brought on a bright May morning that Admiral Dewey, in
response to an order from Secretary J. D. Long had pro-
ceeded to Manila and destroyed the Spanish fleet. This
meant there was no longer any danger of the bombardment
of San Francisco.

There was no longer any necessity for holding the "Ore-
gon" in Pacific waters, and so quickly followed the order
from the Secretary of the Navy that she should at once
take her departure to the coasts of Cuba and join the Ameri-
can squadron operating there. The citizens of San Fran-
cisco swarmed the hilltops to see the departure of their fa-
vorite battleship. She sailed majestically out through the
Golden Gate and turned her prow southward. The patriotic
hearts of the men and women of California followed her
course as they read each morning in the newspapers the
description of her successful voyage down the western

THE PANAMA CANAL 15

coasts of Mexico and Central America, on past Panama
and along the coasts of South America, through the Straits
of Magellan, then to the northward to her station on the
coast of Cuba. But they noted that this voyage consumed
sixty-five days of time.

Then the President, the American Congress, and the
American people awoke to the fact that if the safety of the
cities of the seaboards of the Atlantic and the Pacific de-
pended upon naval protection, and that if such a long
voyage would have to be taken by ships stationed upon the,
opposite coast, it might mean the destruction of incalculable
wealth.

The entire Nation began to realize that if the "Oregon"
could have sailed from San Francisco to Panama and pass-
ed through the isthmus by means of a canal such as we
are now constructing, she could have made the voyage from
San Francisco to the coasts of Cuba, consuming three days
at Colon or Panama to take on stores and ammunition, and
still could have been at her station on the coasts of Cuba in
sixteen days' time. The people of the country began to
realize that the difference between sixteen and sixty-five
days might mean the safety of the Nation, and especially so
if we were at war with a maritime power such as Great
Britain, Germany and Japan.

This startling demonstration of the absolute necessity
for a Panama Canal from the standpoint of American
national safety, at once swept aside all opposition at Wash-
ington to canal construction. Immediately a universal
wave of sentiment in favor of a national American Isthmian
Canal swept over the land and found its expression in in-
structions by every constituency in the Union to Congress-
men and to Senators to do all in their power to assist in
bringing canal legislation to a successful termination.

16 THE PANAMA CANAL

The Canal Commission

Immediately thereafter President William McKinle}
was authorized by Congress to send a commission to Pan
ama and Nicaragua to examine those two routes and tc
receive offers from the different companies as to th<
amounts the different projects could be purchased for.

The result of the investigations of the commission wa<
that the Panamanian Company offered their uncompletec
canal, their franchises, their plans and specifications, tin
Panama Railroad, which was worth about $12,000,000, anc
a line of steamships from Colon to New York, consisting
of five medium-sized steel vessels of modern construction
for the sum of $110,000,000. The Nicaraguan Compan>
offered their concessions from Costa Rica and Nicaragua
in addition to all their other property, for $6,000,000. The}
simply desired to be reimbursed for the amounts spent ir
securing their concessions and making their preliminary
surveys.

After careful consideration the commission recommend-
ed the purchase of the Nicaraguan proposition. It was al
this critical state of the negotiations that President Mc-
Kinley was removed by the bloody hand of the assassin, and
as a result Vice-President Roosevelt took his place as the
head of the American Government. President Roosevelt de-
cided on the Nicaraguan proposition ; but before the matter
was closed the French Panama Company came fully to the
realization that if the United States purchased the conces-
sions of the Maritime Canal Company and began the con-
struction of a canal through the Nicaraguan territory, with-
out any question that project would be completed in a
reasonably short space of time, as it would have the power
of the entire American Government behind it.

BONEYARD OF THE OLD FRENCH MACHINERY.

THE PANAMA CANAL 17

They also realized that if the Nicaragua Canal was con-
structed it would probably make their holdings in Panama
of far less value ; and as they were practically bankrupt then,
they begged an opportunity to submit a lower price for
their property. This opportunity was granted, and the
result was that the French company offered their franchises
?nd holdings, including the railroad and the steamship line,
for the sum of $40,000,000.

This amount was so much lower than the amount orig-
inally demanded that it caused a reconsideration by the
President and Congress, which terminated in the decision
of the President and Congress to purchase the rights and
the property of the French Company.

The next step was to ascertain whether or not the
French company could convey a valid title to the United
States, and Attorney-General Knox was instructed to go to
France and consult with the proper French authorities and
determine if such a legal conveyance could be made. As a
result of his investigations, General Knox on October 30,
1902, decided that the French company could convey an
absolute title to the American Government.

A great nation such as the United States could not con-
template becoming the tenant of any other country under
the sun, much less a feeble republic of Central America.
The dignity of the United States required absolute sover-
eignty over any territory through which the American
Nation might decide to construct an isthmian canal. Abso-
lute sovereignty over an isthmian canal, however, on the
part of the United States had been waived by the terms of
the Clayton-Bulwer treaty entered into with Great Britain
a half century before. The terms of this treaty provided
that in case either nation should construct an isthmian
canal, such canal should not be fortified nor controlled by

18 THE PANAMA CANAL

cither power; and that should any other nation construct
an isthmian canal, the United States and Great Britain
should join in preserving its neutrality.

Before the United States could exercise absolute sov-
ereignty over any strip of territory across the isthmus, the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty would have to be abrogated, and to
accomplish this Secretary of State Hay entered into nego-
tiations with Great Britain. He found the representatives
of that country very willing to meet every reasonable de-
mand. After a short series of negotiations he succeeded
in having passed and ratified by both countries the Hay-
Pauncefort treaty. Under the terms of this treaty Great
Britain waived all claims to sovereignty and control over an
Isthmian Canal, and substantially agreed to the jurisdiction
and control of the United States over any canal that might
be constructed by that country.

Acquirement of the Canal Zone

When this obstacle was removed the next step was to
secure a canal zone, and the United States entered into
negotiations with the Government of Colombia with
that end in view. The result of the negotiations
was that an agreement was reached by which the Re-
public of Colombia agreed to convey to the United States a
strip of land thirty miles wide and extending a marine
league into the waters on either side of the isthmus. The
terms of the treaty were that the United States, in consider-
ation of the zone proposed to be transferred, should pay to
the Republic of Colombia ten million dollars in cash on the
ratification of the treaty by the separate governments, and
commencing nine years from the date of ratification, the
sum of one hundred thousand dollars a year for all time.

THE PANAMA CANAL 19

This tentative treaty found great favor in Washington, D.
C., and was immediately ratified by the American Senate,
and then sent back to Bogata for ratification by the Colom-
bian authorities. But much to the astonishment and chagrin
of the people of the United States, and to the extreme dis-
appointment of the people and the authorities of Panama,
this so-called Hay-Herran treaty was refused ratification by
the Colombian Senate.

The refusal of this ratification ultimately led to the seces-
sion of Panama from its allegiance to the Republic of Co-
lombia and the acquirement of independence.

While on the Canal Zone in 1907 on an official visit I
came into close contact with the officials of Panama, par-
ticularly President Amador, the first President of the Pana-
ma Republic, and General Arrias, who held the combined
offices of Secretary of State and War for the new republic.

At a dinner given by the American Minister, being plac-
ed beside General Arrias, I took occasion to inquire of him
the reasons why the Hay-Herran treaty was refused rati-
fication by the Senate of Colombia, after it had been tenta-
tively agreed to by the Colombian authorities.

General Arrias' explanation was to the effect that there
were four reasons why the Hay-Herran treaty was refused
ratification on its return to the Colombian Senate. The
first was that the German influence was strong in Colombia,
and the German merchants and diplomats were very much
opposed to the extension of American influence down the
west coast of South America, particularly in the Colombian
Republic. The German merchants, seeing the collapse of
the French Canal Company near at hand, hoped that a
German company might purchase the wreck of the French
enterprise and carry the canal to completion, realizing that

20 THE PANAMA CANAL

this course would mean much in the way of German ag-
grandizement.

The second influence, according to General Arrias, was
that of the old transcontinental railroad management of the
United States. Popular demand for an isthmian canal hav-
ing swept away all obstruction at Washington, D. C, the
scene of operations was shifted to Bogata, and railroad in-
fluence and railroad money were probably used to induce
some of the Senators to refuse to vote for the ratification
of the treaty.

The third influence was that of patriotism. Some of the
Colombian Senators were opposed to a transfer of any
portion of Colombian soil to a foreign power, more espe-
cially as the Colombian constitution contained a clause
making it treason for any Colombian subject to become a
party to the alienation of any part of Colombian territory to
another country.

The fourth and the most potent influence was the fact
that the French Panama Canal Company had failed in every
respect to keep the terms of their contract with the Colom-
bian Government. Not only had they failed to complete
the canal at the time specified in their franchise, but having
obtained an extension of that time, had failed to observe
the terms by which the extension had been secured.

Therefore the Colombian Government might very prop-
erly proceed to a forfeiture, which could be obtained through
due process of law in something less than ten months' time.

Many of the Colombian Senators took the position that
it would be lawful and more expedient to declare a for-
feiture upon the French company, and take over the canal
under the terms of such forfeiture as provided by the fran-
chise. The Republic of Colombia would then be in a posi-
tion to sell the same to the American Government for forty

THE PANAMA CANAL 21

million dollars, and since then they would secure ten million
dollars for a zone and a perpetual rental of a large sum an-
nually, the financial condition of the country would be very
much improved. As the finances of the Republic of Colom-
bia were at that time in a desperately depleted condition,
this prospect of their rehabilitation must have had powerful
effect with many of the Senators.

These four reasons operating, no doubt caused the
Colombian Senate to refuse ratification to the Hay-Herran
treaty.

But in Panama the people and the authorities were de-
termined not to submit to the action of the Colombian
Senate The Panamanians were aware of the fact that the
President of the United States had been authorized by Con-
gress to make a choice between either the French Panama
or the Nicaraguan route, and that under that authority he
would at once proceed to close a contract with the Maritime
Canal Company of Nicaragua if he could not secure a canal
zone. They also realized that if once the American Gov-
ernment began the work of excavating a canal through
Nicaraguan and Costa Rican territory, in all human prob-
ability, the French Panama Company's project would be
abandoned.

Thus the cities of Colon and Panama, and the territory
surrounding, would be relegated to obscurity so far as
world's trade was concerned, for many years. This the
Panamanians were determined to prevent if possible, so
they took every step necessary to inaugurate and success-
fully carry out a revolution in case of the refusal of the
Colombian Government to ratify the Hay-Herran treaty.
They sent Dr. Varilla as their representative to New York
and instructed him to remain in close touch with the cable,
and should he receive a cablegram that Panama had thrown

22 THE PANAMA CANAL

off her allegiance to Colombia and had resumed her old-
time independence, he should proceed at once to Washing-
ton, D. C, notify President Roosevelt of the fact, demand
recognition of the new Republic of Panama as an inde-
pendent power, and enter at once into negotiations with the
United States for the recognition of that independence and
the transfer of a canal zone.

The New Republic of Panama

This program was carried out later on. The Pan-
amanians had very little trouble in overawing the few Co-
lombian officers within their territory. They knew that the
Colombian Government had no navy, from the fact that a
year before the Colombian navy had been sent to the City
of Panama to coerce the authorities there who were disput-
ing with the Colombian Government over some items of
revenue which were an issue; and meeting force with force
the authorities of the City of Panama had succeeded, with
the assistance of a small tug-boat and one piece of cannon,
in sweeping the seas of the entire Colombian naval power,
and as evidence of their success the two masts of the Colom-
bian navy were sticking up out of the mud-banks of Panama
Bay.

Nor were the inhabitants of Panama or Colon much con-
cerned as to a possible attack from a Colombian army. That
would entail a long march of hundreds of miles through
morass and jungle, and could not be successfully accom-
plished in less than a year's time. And so the Panamanians
v/ere free to act in their purposes of securing independence
without danger of very much interference from the home
government.

The result of the revolution was very gratifying to the

THE PANAMA CANAL 23

Panamanians. As soon as they learned that the treaty had
been refused ratification, they immediately wired to Dr.
Varilla at New York. He apparently was at his post wait-
ing the news, for it was whispered in Washington that he
took the night train from New York, reached Washington
in the morning, and arrived at the White House early in the
forenoon. And from all indications President Roosevelt
must have been waiting just inside the door to receive him,
for it is said that the President was on hand to grasp Dr.
Varilla by the hand and welcome him to the White House,
and that when he came out two hours later, Panama was
virtually recognized as an independent government. Within
a few days a treaty was negotiated between Panama and
the United States.

Terms of the Treaty

This treaty, called the Hay- Varilla treaty, was ratified in
December, 1903. Its terms provided that the sum of ten
millions of dollars, be paid by^the United States to the
Government of Panama, and the further sum of two hun-
dred and fifty thousand dollars a year for all time, com-
mencing nine years after the ratification of the treaty by
both countries. The Republic of the United States was to
have absolute title and sovereignty to a strip of land ten
miles wide, five miles on either side of the center of the
canal prism, extending from Colon to Panama, and three
miles out into the water on either side, but without including
either of the cities of Colon or Panama within its area.

This treaty further provided that the United States
should guarantee the independence of the Panamanian Re-
public, the terms being most explicit that the United States
should protect the Panamanian Government from insur-
rection within and invasion from without. This little joker

24 THE PANAMA CANAL

in the treaty between the United States and Panama makes
that little republic the strongest of all the republics on the
American continent next to our own. In fact, the Republic
of Panama is as strong as the United States, and will be so
as long as the American flag floats in sovereignty over a
foot of American soil.

The treaty also provided that the United States should
have the privilege of sanitizing the cities of Panama and
Colon, and that the cost of the same should be a charge
against the Government of Panama.

When all obstacles to the acquirement of the zone were
removed under the Hay-Varilla treaty, the next step on the
part of the American Republic was to begin the most im-
portant work of sanitization.

Sanitization of the Canal Zone

The sanitization of the Canal Zone and the cities of
Colon and Panama is one of the most interesting features
of the history of the Panama Canal. The want of proper
sanitation was, no doubt, very largely the cause of the
French failure.

The French authorities, either not understanding the
significance of maintaining the health of the great mass of
employees engaged in their work, or being criminally negli-
gent of the lives and the health of their employees, failed to
take the necessary measures for the protection of life and
health. Their laborers were allowed to live in a haphazard
way. The negroes were permitted to furnish their own food
and to sleep where they pleased.

The consequence was that the ignorant and the improvi-
dent ate food that was not properly prepared, and slept very
often in tents or on the ground, subject to the night dews
and miasmatic vapors of the tropics. Diseases of the most

THE EFFECT OF A BLAST ALONG THE CULEBRA CUT.
Upper Picture — Before; Lower — After a Blast.

THE PANAMA CANAL 25

virulent nature broke out in every camp, and yellow fever
became especially active in carrying off its victims.

So with this dreadful experience as an example and a
warning, the American authorities realized that the first
work of importance was that of subduing the unhealthful
conditions of the Canal Zone so that labor might be en-
gaged in with reasonable safety by the tens of thousands of
employees who would be placed upon the line of operations
of the canal when work was actively commenced.

Fortunately, surgeons of the American army had gained
a great deal of experience during the Cuban campaign, and
cne army surgeon had achieved particular prominence in his
handling of tropical diseases. Dr. W. C. Gorgas, who had
campaigned in Cuba and assisted General Leonard Wood in
the cleaning up and sanitization of Santiago and Havana,
was peculiarly fitted for the important work of establishing
healthful conditions on the Zone.

Dr. Gorgas had also had the advantage of being a col-
laborator as well as a fellow officer of Dr. Reed in
Cuba. Dr. Reed was one of the first army surgeons to be-
come familiar with the theory that the yellow fever and the
malarial fevers of the tropics were carried and distributed
through the agency of mosquitoes. In fact, Dr. Reed him-
self became a victim to his desire for scientific knowledge,
he having allowed himself to be bitten by a niosquito that
had first filled itself with the virus of a yellow fever patient,
and died as the result of the experiment.

War on the Mosquito

Dr. Gorgas carried on the work of the investigation and
development of the mosquito theory after the death of Dr.
Reed, and became a recognized world-wide authority on the

26 THE PANAMA CANAL

science of tropical diseases and sanitation, when he was
chosen as the officer to whom the sanitization of the Zone
should be entrusted. He was given ample funds by the
American Government and furnished with a force of men
numbering more than 2000, his theory being that by the
destruction of the breeding places of mosquitos he could
finally eliminate the mosquitoes themselves.

In carrying out his plan the vegetation on either side
of the canal for half a mile was cut down and burned, the
dead trees destroyed, the low marshy places drained where
possible; and where it was impossible to successfully drain
the ground and water pools they were covered with a
petroleum mixture. In fact, petroleum was found to be so
effective that it came to be the favorite means of destroying
the mosquitoes, and one approaching Colon today, if the
wind is in the right quarter, may catch the odor of that
ingredient one hundred miles at sea.

It was found after investigation by Dr. Gorgas that the
mosquito, called the stegomya, was peculiarly partial to the
yellow fever victim, and that after biting a yellow fever
patient and becoming inoculated with the poison, the
stegomya became very active in its distribution to other
subjects. A mosquito called the anophyles, by some pe-
culiar freak of nature, had a like attraction for the victims
of malarial diseases.

And so, between the two kinds of mosquitoes there
seemed to be a rivalry as to which could do the most dam-
age. But fortunately neither one of these pestiferous in-
sects could fly over a quarter of a mile, and so the theory
of Dr. Gorgas was that by destroying their breeding places
and eliminating them from the Canal Zone, he might pre-
serve the health of the workers.

Colon was overhauled by repaving the streets after first

THE PANAMA CANAL 27

saturating the ground with petroleum, bringing in fresh
water and constructing sewers. In fact, all the measures
that were necessary to establish healthful conditions were
used.

The same course of treatment was given the City of
Panama, much to the disgust of many of the Panamanian
residents, who had been using water from wells and cisterns
that had been dug two centuries before, when Panama was
founded.

A splendid system of hospitals was built up by rehabilita-
tion of the hospital system left by the French company and
the addition of others. Thousands of cabins were built for
the common laborers, the so-called "silver men," and better
cottages for white men who might take their families with
them to the Zone while engaged in labor there. Dormitories
for single white men were built at every construction point.
Restaurants were established at which a meal of four
courses was furnished the superior class of white employees
at 35 cents. Provision was made for the issuance of cooked
rations at a price of 10 cents per ration to the "silver men,"
who are nearly all negroes, it being the policy of the com-
mission to protect the life and health of every employee of
the Zone, so that the health of the individual would become
a guarantee of the safety of the whole body of working men.

The Present Low Death Rate

Time and experience have conclusively shown Colonel
Gorgas' theories to have been correct, and the gratifying
result is that because of the wonderful precautions taken
and the very effective work done in scientific sanitization
since the commencement of operations under Colonel Gargas
tropical diseases have almost been eliminated on the Zone.
As a matter of fact, there has not been a case of yellow

28 THE PANAMA CANAL

fever on the Canal Zone since June, 1906, and the malarial
fevers have been reduced to a minimum. The Canal Zone
has now a lower death rate than most American cities, and
has almost become a health resort. In the opinion of some
of the most eminent authorities, the most effective work
entering into the entire construction of the canal is the
work of sanitization so successfully accomplished by Colonel
Gorgas and his able assistants.

While the work of sanitization was under way, the Presi-
dent of the United States was taking counsel with a board
of engineers as to the type of canal that should be con-
structed. As usual in all such matters, the authorities were
about equally divided, half of the engineers being strongly
in favor of a sea-level canal, and the other half advocating
what was called a lock canal.

The Two Types of Canal

The difference between the two types of canal is this : A
sea-level canal contemplated an excavation from shore to
shore at the level of the sea ; a lock canal contemplated the
construction of a great dam across the valley of the Chagres
and the course of the Chagres river, which dam would have
the effect of holding the waters of the Chagres river. The
accumulation of those waters in time would form a lake,
the surface of which lake, of course, would be considerably
above the level of the sea on either side. The dam would
necessarily have to be surmounted through the agency of
locks.

After much controversy and bickering, and a great deal
of muck-raking by the newspapers and magazines of the
United States and Europe, the plan of a lock canal was
finally adopted. This plan contemplated the impoundment
of the waters of the Chagres river by a dam constructed at

AT WORK IN THE CULEBRA CUT.

THE PANAMA CANAL 29

Gatun, a little village about three and one-half miles inland
from the shore of Limon bay. This dam when finished
would be 7700 feet in length, half a mile in width at the
base, and 135 feet in height. It was designed that this
dam should hold the waters of the lake at a height of 85
feet above sea-level, but it was constructed 50 feet higher
so that all danger might be obviated in case of excessive
floods.

The plan of the canal contemplated that this dam should
be surmounted by three locks constructed in pairs, so that
in case one series of locks became impaired the other could
be used, or ships might pass up one side and down the other
at the same time. Each of the locks was to be 1000 feet
long, 110 feet wide, and have a lifting capacity of 2&y2
feet. Therefore, when completed, this series of locks con-
structed of concrete would be more than 3000 feet in length
and about 250 feet in width, without doubt the largest con-
crete formation ever constructed.

The engineers of the Panama Commission give four
reasons for the adoption of the lock system instead of the
sea-level type. In the first place, it would take twice as
long to construct a sea-level canal as it would a lock canal.
Secondly, it would cost twice as much money, and as
the lock canal system is costing nearly four hundred mil-
lions of dollars, the difference in cost would be a great
obstacle to the construction to the other type of canal. The
third reason was that in case a sea-level canal was con-
structed it would be necessary to place locks somewhere
along its course because of the fact of the variation of tides
between the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans.

The tide rises and falls at Colon, on the Atlantic side,
about 3T/2 feet, at the time of extreme high tide ; while on
the Pacific side the tides rise and fall 27^ feet, and this

30 THE PANAMA CANAL

great variation would cause a current to rush through the
course of the canal so great that locks would be required
for its control.

But the fourth was the most potent reason of all why
the lock system was adopted. On the Isthmus of Panama
the rainfall amounts to 130 to 150 inches annually. Some-
times the precipitation will amount to 10 or 12 inches in
twenty-four hours. The Chagres river is the only agency
for the drainage of a vast area of water-shed in the
Caribbean sea. Therefore, at times the Chagres river might
be a small, inconsequential stream that a boy could wade
across, and yet before twenty-four hours had elapsed, be-
cause of a heavy rainfall, it might have swelled into a rag-
ing torrent that would wreck the strongest battleship of
the American navy. The large volume of water discharged
by the Chagres river could not be turned into the canal
proper, as the currents and the rush of flood waters would
soon impair the banks of the canal.

The Lock System Adopted

Therefore it would be necessary, under the sea-level type
oi canal, to construct a series of embankments and dams
that would be far more expensive to build and keep in re-
pair than would be one great dam over the course of the
Chagres river. Besides, the safety of the lock system
would be much greater than that of the sea-level type.
These were the reasons which finally controlled the de-
termination of the engineers to construct a lock system of
canal.

After the type of canal was decided upon, the next step
was the assemblage of the force of laborers and the me-
chanical appliances necessary for the physical operations.

THE PANAMA CANAL 31

In order to carry out this scheme, a commission was origin-
ally appointed, composed half of civilians and half of mili-
tary officers. The first engineers were selected as being the
most eminent of their profession, and taken from civil em-
ployment.

But great difficulties were encountered in perfecting the
proper kind of an organization to successfully complete this
stupendous project. The engineers taken from private life
and entrusted with the work, after a little experience on
the Isthmus, would be offered greater inducements to aban-
don their Governmental employment and take some other
position, generally far more lucrative, in the United States.
And so, either through accident or design, the Canal Com-
mission lost the services of such men as Wallace, Stevens,
Shonts, Grunsky, and other noted engineers, and again it
seemed as if canal operations would be badly crippled for
want of the right kind of men to direct the work.

Army Engineers Installed

This tendency of the civil engineers to leave their em-
ployment caused much concern to the President and Con-
gress,' and finally President Roosevelt, with his character-
istic acumen, decided that he would place the work of canal
construction under the army engineers entirely. So, at his
suggestion, Congress reframed the law of the Canal Com-
mission, and President Roosevelt remarked that under the
new law he would put army engineers on the job, and that
they would either stay there until it was done or get out
of the army.

Experience has proved that President Roosevelt's judg-
ment was correct, for the work has gone on since the re-
organization of the commission with the regularity of a

32 THE PANAMA CANAL

machine. There has hardly been a stop or a break at any
point along the line of operations. Colonel G. W. Goethals,
one of the most successful of the army engineers, was
placed at the head of the Canal Commission and given full
charge, and his work has been so successful that he has
demonstrated his ability to command and to control the
operations placed in his charge to the satisfaction of the
great powers that gave him his commission.

His first step upon being placed in control was to pro-
vide the means of feeding and caring for an army of from
25,000 to 40,000 men. A bake shop was built at Crystobal,
out of which 30,000 loaves of bread are turned twice a day
if necessary, and a batch of pies and cakes in proportion.
Storage warehouses have been built for the storage of meats
and vegetables and various other supplies that are brought
from the north by shiploads. Ice plants have been con-
structed so that ice may be distributed up and down the
line of operations. Every morning at 3 o'clock a supply
train leaves Colon, and furnishes every camp along the line
of the canal with fresh supplies for the day's consumption.

Thus, under army supervision the employees of the
Canal Zone are as well supplied with rations and materials
as they would be on an army reservation.

Following these necessary preparations for handling the
big force of men, came the assemblage of the machinery
and the mechanical implements necessary to perform the
work. Without going into exhaustive details, it is only
necessary to say that the very best materials, implements
and machinery that money could supply, brought from all
parts of the world, were sent to Panama.

Old French Machinery
One of the most interesting things the traveler upon the

Upper Picture — Gatun Lower Locks
Lower Picture — Huge Traveling Crane Used in Construction Work.

THE PANAMA CANAL 33

Isthmus will see is the mass of discarded French machinery
piled all along the line of operations. No doubt the French
used the best machinery that could be obtained at that
time, but that was thirty years ago, and the progress of the
world, particularly in the use of labor-saving machinery, is
nowhere more thoroughly demonstrated than on the Isth-
mus of Panama by a comparison of the old French ma-
chinery with that assembled by the American engineers.
There are piles of French locomotives that today are abso-
lutely worthless, not because the machinery itself is de-
fective, but because of their feeble power. At the town of
Empire there are forty-five French engines piled in one
heap that cannot be used by the Canal Commission. In fact,
they are of such little power that they would hardly be
used by a street contractor on a city job in the United
States.

In direct contrast to these are the splendid engines sent
to the Isthmus by the commission — 200 locomotives, not
of the largest, but about of the medium size one sees
on the American railways ; 2000 splendidly constructed
steel dump cars for the hauling of rock and debris ; 300 air-
compressed drills for boring into the rocks in blasting op-
erations ; 125 steam shovels of 75, 90 and 125 tons capacity ;
apparatus and machinery for the moving of railroad tracks,
so effective that a railroad track can be slung 10 or 12
feet to one side or the other, laid down and spiked almost
as fast as a man can walk ; great steel plows that are pulled
across strings of gravel cars, plowing the gravel or debris
off the cars on one side so rapidly that a long train of 25
or 30 cars can be unloaded in a few minutes. The station-
ary machinery is of the best quality that genius and money
can construct, and so effective have been these means of
labor saving that the work has been accelerated from time

34 THE PANAMA CANAL

to time until it is now a realized fact that the canal will be
actually constructed a year and a half ahead of time.

When the Canal Commission first began their work
after the completion and the adoption of their plans, it was
estimated that 110,000,000 cubic yards of debris must be
excavated from the canal prism. This debris must be taken
and deposited at some place so remote that it could never
wash back into the canal by the rains and floods. The
debris taken from the cuts on the high lands could not be
used in the structure of the Gatun dam, as it would be too
liable to percolation.

The Gatun Dam

The Gatun dam is being constructed by hydraulic pro-
cess through the instrumentality of suction pumps, which
suck up the slime and the debris from the course of the
Chagres river and the swamps and morass through which
the canal is being constructed. This debris and this water
are sucked up and allowed to run along the center of the
dam, the water running off and the solid matter congeal-
ing there, and by this hydraulic process that great structure
will be formed.

The traveler upon the Isthmus today, if standing upon
an eminence overlooking the cut through Culebra hill,
would imagine himself on a height overlooking an indus-
trial city like Pittsburg. There are scenes of such immense
activity on every side that he forgets he is in a remote part
of the world far from his home, and that he is actually
standing upon an eminence in the tropics.

The development of labor-saving machinery has been so
marked since the construction of the canal was actually
commenced that each month's work has marked an in-

THE PANAMA CANAL 35

crease in the amount of debris excavated from the canal
prism. When the Government began operations in 1906,
the engineers had before them the task of excavating 110,-
000,000 cubic yards. Their first month's operations were
very successful, and they reported at the end of the month
an excavation of about 250,000 cubic yards. They esti-
mated that if they could keep up this amount of work
through each month they could finish the canal at a certain
time; but the carping yellow newspapers and magazines
of the United States and Europe were extremely skeptical
of the ability of the Canal Commission to continue to turn
out 250,000 cubic yards per month. The critics foretold
that when the rainy season came more debris would be
carried into the canal prism by floods than could be taken
out by machinery in the dry season. At times this criticism
grew very irksome and disagreeable to the commissioners.
However, they kept their temper, and continued improving
their machinery, and month by month the output grew
greatly. It grew to such an enormous extent that the esti-
mated time has been shortened to the extent that I have
formerly indicated.

The Work of Excavation

To give a comparison by the use of figures of the re-
markable progress made, I will say that about six months
ago I took up the report of the Canal Commission and I
found that in the previous month the amount of debris
excavated for that one month exceeded 4,000,000 of cubic
yards, this tremendous output being a complete answer to
the criticisms of the opponents of canal construction.

In order to give a mental picture of the type of canal,
let us take an imaginary trip through the canal proper. It

36 THE PANAMA CANAL

will be forty-two miles from shore to shore. In addition
to this there will be an excavation out in Limon bay on
the eastern side, and in Panama bay on the western side, of
about four miles on either side, in order to reach deep
water.

Supposing that we are sailing down through Limon
bay, which is a small bay at the bottom of the Caribbean
sea, on one of our American battleships. We first enter
the canal which leads from the bay up into the shore to-
ward Gatum dam, and this section of the canal will be
500 feet wide and 40 feet deep at low water level. This
channel penetrates through the mud banks and land about
four miles, when it encounters Gatun dam. Gatun dam
must be surmounted through the agency of locks, whicli
have been previously described.

Operation of the Locks

Our vessel then sails into the first, or the lower, of the
locks. The steel doors are closed and locked, and water
from the chamber above is let down by means of pipes and
valves which discharge underneath the vessel. This water
flowing into the lower chamber, raises our vessel 28^ feet
to the level of the second lock. Our ship sails into the sec-
ond lock, the doors are closed behind and locked, the water
let down from above, and again our vessel is raised 28^
feet. And so the process is repeated the third time, until
our ship sails out upon the lake which is formed by the im-
pounding of the waters of Gatun dam.

This lake, when filled to its capacity, will be thirty-
three miles long between extreme points, and eight miles
wide at the widest part. The course of a vessel from
this lake will be twenty-three miles to a place called Bas

THE PANAMA CANAL 37

Obispo. This is the point at which the canal begins to
run through the hill called Culebra, and therefore the cut
is called the Culebra cut, and is nine miles long. The canal
through this portion of its course will be 250 feet wide at
the bottom, and the sides of the canal will slope so gradual-
ly that at the highest point of Culebra hill, which is 325
feet above sea level, the width will be about one-half mile.

Our vessel passes through this nine-mile course to
Pedro Miguel. At Pedro Miguel there will be a pair of
locks 1000 feet long, 110 feet wide, and with a drop or lift-
ing area of 35 feet, instead of 28 feet. Through this lock
our vessel will be lowered to a small lake formed by the
damming of two small streams in the vicinity of the City
of Panama. This lake will be a couple of miles across, and
on the farther point, called Miraflores, two pairs of locks
will lower our vessel to the level of the Pacific Ocean.
From the Miraflores locks a channel will be constructed
out into Panama bay — 500 feet wide and 40 feet deep at
low tide, the same as on the Caribbean side.

The engineering features of the Panama Canal are not
intricate, and not in any sense difficult from an engineering
standpoint, save for the great magnitude. It is the size of
the enterprise that has appalled, and discouraged the canal's
construction, and not the technical difficulties of the work
required.

The Future of the Canal

When the Panama Canal is completed the commerce
and trade of the world will be revolutionized. San Fran-
cisco will be brought nearly 9000 miles closer to New York
than it is today and European ports nearly 6000 miles
closer. It is estimated by statisticians skilled in transporta-

38 THE PANAMA CANAL

tion and in carrier service, that the cost of transporting the
great mass of bulky products from the Pacific Coast to
Eastern seabords of the United States and to European
points will be reduced nearly two-thirds. In other words,
freights that now cost approximately $1.00 per 100 pounds
over the transcontinental railroads from Pacific Coast ports
to Eastern markets, may be carried through the canal for
about 33 1/3 cents.

It is estimated that this saving of freight on timber
alone, which is still standing in California, would pay the
cost of the canal, great as it is, three times over. We can
hardly estimate the effect that this shortening of water
rates will have on all the countries fronting the Pacific
Ocean.

It would seem as if the Western hemisphere was at
last coming into its own in dignity and progress, in its re-
lation to all the world. Certainly the tides of people of
enterprise and of business have been steadily pressing west-
ward since long before Bishop Berkeley declared that
"Westward the star of empire takes its way," and that
Western wave is rushing onward today more strongly and
steadily than ever before in the world's history. Men of
even middle age today probably will live to see the fulfill-
ment of the dreams and prophecies of the olden time in the
opening up of our coasts and land to ship commerce with
every country on the globe.

.In ancient days it was the fact that seas divided nations,
because of the difficulty of ocean travel. In those days the
only safe routes were those over the land, but in this
modern time of gigantic ocean vessels, capable of carrying
thousands of passengers and hundreds of thousands of tons
of freight, water travel and transportation is the cheapest
and most agreeable of all forms. And therefore, today it

O
O

-
O

z
<

QC
L_

Z »

O

I

THE PANAMA CANAL 39

is a fact that seas unite the countries of the world instead
of dividing them.

The completion of the Panama Canal will be only the
completion of one link of the chain of three great improve-
ments that are in contemplation by the statesmen of
America.

On the eastern side of the continent all the States bor-
dering on, or tributary to, the Mississippi river are en-
gaged in the propaganda for the deepening of that river
to a depth of 14 feet from New Orleans to St. Louis, and
12 feet from St. Louis to St. Paul, as well as the improve-
ment of the tributaries thereof, so that ocean-going vessels
may penetrate to the very heart of the American continent
and discharge their cargoes there.

The up-to-date and progressive city of Chicago, the
mighty metropolis of the center of the continent, is alive
to the possibilities of the near future, and has made pro-
vision for the issuance and sale of bonds to the amount of
$24,000,000, the proceeds of which are to be used in the
deepening and widening of the Chicago drainage canal and
the Illinois river, so that ocean-going vessels may not only
penetrate as far as St. Louis, but may also proceed to Chi-
cago, and place that great city in direct water communica-
tion with any part of the world.

The improvement of the Mississippi and its tributaries,
then, is one of the links of the chain. The Panama Canal
is the central link. The third link must be and will be,
if the projects of the most eminent and patriotic American
statesmen are carried out, the re-establishment of the
American merchant marine, so that American ships may
be used as the agency for the distribution of the products
of our great industrial country to all the lands fronting the
Pacific Ocean, as well as to all other parts of the earth.

40 THE PANAMA CANAL

I believe that it has been a well recognized policy of all
the Presidents and statesmen of our country for the last
twenty years to urge the accomplishment of these improve-
ments. They come slowly, of course, but all large projects
take time in their development, and those of us who today
are so fortunate as to live in California, or anywhere upon
the Pacific Coast, may easily look forward to the time, not
far distant, when California will be at least the second State
ot the American Republic in wealth, and industrial and
commercial power, and San Francisco the second city in
importance under the American flag.